

A TALE OF TWO VILLAGES:
A GRAMSCIAN ANALYSIS OF THE HAMULA AND THE RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE ISRAELI STATE AND PALESTINIAN ARAB CITIZENS OF
ISRAEL

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ABSTRACT

A TALE OF TWO VILLAGES: A GRAMSCIAN ANALYSIS OF THE HAMULA AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ISRAELI STATE AND PALESTINIAN ARAB CITIZENS OF ISRAEL

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Drawing on empirical data from the two Palestinian Arab villages of Abu Ghosh and Umm al Fahem, this dissertation assesses the nature of relationship between the Israeli state and its Palestinian Arab citizens from a Gramscian perspective. In this respect, a particular emphasis is given to the analysis of impact of local socio-economic and political structures on the relationship between the villagers and Israeli state and dominant classes especially following a hegemonic crisis during post-al Aqsa Intifada. Based on Gramscian methodology and empirical data, it is concluded that hamula structures could act as an agent of hegemony in internalization and reproduction of of consent based Israeli hegemony. Conditions, dynamics and consequences of this agent-structure relationship is also assessed in detail.

Key words: Gramsci, hamula, Al Aqsa Intifada, Abu Ghosh, Umm al Fahem

ÖZ

İKİ KÖYÜN HİKAYESİ: HAMULA VE İSRAİL DEVLETİYLE FİLİSTİNLİ ARAP İSRAİL VATANDAŞLARI ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİLERİN GRAMŞİYAN ANALİZİ

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Bu çalışmada İsrail devleti ve Filistinli Arap vatandaşlar arasındaki ilişkilerin doğası Gramşiyen bir perspektifle İsrail’de bulunan Abu Ghosh ve Umm al Fahem adlı iki Filistin Arap köyü özelinde incelenmiştir. Bu incelemeye konu olan iki köydeki sosyo-ekonomik ve politik yerel yapılanmanın köy yaşayanlarıyla İsrail devleti ve baskın grupları arasındaki ilişkiyi özellikle toplum-içi bir kriz dönemi olan el Aksa İntifada’sı sonrasında nasıl etkilediği mercek altına alınmıştır. Hamula adı verilen aşiret yapılarının rızaya dayalı İsrail hegemonyasının Filistinli Arap köy halkı tarafından içselleştirilmesi ve yeniden üretilmesi süreçlerinde bir aracı rolü üstlenebileceği değerlendirilmiş ve bu araçsallığın koşulları, dinamikleri ve sonuçları Gramşiyen bir yöntemle irdelenmiştir.

Anahtar sözcükler: Gramsci, hamula, El Aksa Intifadası, Abu Ghosh, Umm al Fahem

To my parents, my love and beloveds,
who have been and will be in my words and
my worlds throughout my life

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Consequential visit of Ariel Sharon to *Al-Aqsa Mosque* on September 28, 2000, increased communal tension and generated reactive movements among the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. They considered the visit as a provocative act of dominant Israeli Jewish political community against the Palestinian Arabs. Within this context, Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel expressed their reactions against the Israeli dominant political community by using different methods and instruments all over the country. Some of these methods included violent means of resistance and resembled the communal uprising of the Palestinians in 1987 against the Israeli state and the institutions of Israeli dominant political community. The violent events that took place following the Ariel Sharon's provocative visit to one of the most sacred places of the Muslim Palestinian Arabs were called as *October 2000 Events or Al-Aqsa Intifada*. It was the first time that the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel participated in the movement of resistance against the practices of Israeli state with such intensity.

On October 1, 2000, *Umm al-Fahem*, a Palestinian Arab town with over 50.000 inhabitants and located on the "Little Triangle" in central Israel (continues along west of the *Green Line* separating the *West Bank* from Israel), was one of the first Palestinian Arab towns, where violent demonstrations erupted. On that day, the youth of *Umm al Fahem* gathered in the main junction at the entrance of the town and blocked the *Highway No.65* that connects Tel Aviv and Jerusalem to the northern districts of Israel. The rebellious youth yelled at the police with slogans. They burnt an *Egged* (an Israeli public transportation company) bus and threw stones and Molotov cocktails at riot police. Israeli security forces counteracted them with tear gas canisters

and then live gunfire¹. Snipers of the Israeli security forces were instructed by their commanders to open-fire below the knees of demonstrators with slingshots². In the midst of the clashes, ambulances carried away the wounded Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. However, their efforts were not enough to save the lives of Ahmed Ibrahim Siyyam Jabarin and Muhammad Ahmed Jabarin. The clashes also left more than 75 Palestinian Arabs injured in *Umm al Fahem*.

The resentment of the demonstrators and their feelings with regard to the existing system was reflected in the words of a young Palestinian Arab protestor, who delivered his message to the reporter Sa'id Badran:

An eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth. The policemen should beware of us. It was a child's game at first when we amused ourselves throwing stones. But once the police started using live fire, once they killed three of our youths, the rules of the game changed. They have gone one step further down the road and so shall we. The police should beware of us. We've learned this from the children of Intifada. We have nothing to lose. Palestine is our country and our land, and the Jews are temporary guests here. We've tried to live peacefully with them, but they have foiled these attempts, they've stolen our lands, they humiliate us over and over again. When a Jew fights with his wife at home, he starts calling "death to Arabs," as if our blood were free for all. It is time for us to cry "enough!" We are not a minority; we are part of a great Arab nation. The Jews' behavior has determined their fate. Their end is near now; this land will not belong to two peoples. The Jews are no longer welcome here.³

For some commentators, the reason behind the events that took place in *Umm al Fahem* was the active mobilization of the masses by the *Islamic Movement*, which had a significant impact on the inhabitants of the town. For them, *Umm al Fahem* was one of the major Arab localities within the Green line, where "the lava of 'Islamic volcano' that burst out adjacent to the Temple Mount"⁴ had caused reactivation of the flames of

¹ Nomi Morris, "Israel's Arab community getting into fray", *Knight Ridder Tribune Washington Bureau (DC)*, 02.10.2000

² "Adalah's Summary Report on the Commission of Inquiry" on the events in Jatt and Umm al-Fahem, 26.02. 2001, at <http://www.adalah.org/eng/commission.php>

³ Daniel Dor, **Intifada Hits the Lines, How the Israeli Press Misreported the Outbreak of The Second Palestinian Uprising**, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2004, p.98

⁴ Ibid., p. 19

resentment against the Israeli state authorities and institutions. For others, the uprising symbolized a resistance basing more on the nationalist sentiments and thus meant elimination of the *Green Line* between the Palestinians of Israel and the *West Bank*. Thus for them, masked youth, who blocked the *Wadi Ara* road at the entrance of the village represented “a gentle warning that the place is off-limits to Israelis”⁵.

Umm al Fahem was not the only town where the Palestinian Arab demonstrations and violent events took place. Yet, it was the town where the most severe violence took place and where the first fatalities were spotted. Besides, historically *Umm al Fahem* had a reputation to be the symbol of out-of-system stance and local mobilization against the institutions of Israeli dominant political community.

On October 1, 2000, the same day of clashes in *Umm al Fahem*, in another village of Palestinian Arabs silence dominated the streets. *Abu Ghosh* is a Palestinian Arab village located 12 kilometers west of Jerusalem and which is on the *Highway No. 1* that connects Jerusalem to Tel Aviv. There did not take place any violent demonstration, stone-throwing, killings or fatalities, tire-burning. Snipers did not shoot the inhabitants; riot police did not use tear gas canisters or bulletproofs to silence the crowds. Israeli security forces did not confront the youth of the village. They rather visited the village in their routine controls to get information about preparations of annual classical music festival and discuss the probable security measures about the event.

When the events took place in *Umm al Fahem* and other Palestinian Arab localities, Salim Jaber, the council head of *Abu Ghosh* gathered the village’s youth and warned them not to stage any demonstration and not to involve any violent activity. Salim Jaber, also strongly advised the imam of the mosque not to deliver any politically significant and judgmental messages in his Friday sermons. *Issa Jaber*, principal of the high school of *Abu Ghosh* joined him in suggesting the youth to refrain any act of protest against the Israeli institutions as well as neighboring Jewish people and

⁵ Graham Usher, “Uprising wipes off Green Line”, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/503/re6.htm>

traveling cars on the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway⁶. For him, any violent act would harm the good relations of *Abu Ghosh* with its Jewish neighbors as well as with the Israeli political and social institutions. He thought that there were other ways of expressing the disapproval of the state's policies and practices rather than using violent means and extra-institutional methods⁷.

Concisely, during *Al-Aqsa Intifada* inhabitants of *Abu Ghosh* did not express their reaction against the practices and policies of Israeli state by throwing stones. Despite strategic location of *Abu Ghosh* like *Umm al Fahem*, the youth of *Abu Ghosh* did not block the main highway between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv contrary to what their fellow Palestinian Arabs did in *Umm al Fahem*. They rather tried to prove that their town represented coexistence with their Jewish neighbors and obedience to the social and political structures of the existing system. In other words, *Abu Ghosh* "remained on the outskirts of uprising"⁸ and did not react against the dominant socio-economic and political structures of Israel as in the case of *Umm al Fahem* and many other Palestinian Arab localities. It was even accentuated as a model by the neighboring Jews and Israeli authorities for their Palestinian Arab counterparts in expression of demands by utilizing the mechanisms of existing Israeli social and political structures. In fact, during the tense days of *Al-Aqsa Intifada* a headline in the local paper of *Telz Stone*, a *Haredi* –orthodox Jewish community- populated neighboring settlement, uttered "Arabs of Galilee: Learn from the example of *Abu Ghosh*"⁹.

As seen above, in the course of *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, different groups among the Israel's Palestinian citizens reflected their reactions differently against the Israeli state. While some groups used extra-institutional means and violence to express their political and

⁶ Interview with Issa Jaber, Abu Ghosh, 16.08. 2004

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Leora Eren Frucht, "The Village Overlooking the Violence", *Jerusalem Post Magazine Edition*, 24.11.2000, p. 14

⁹ *Ibid.*

socio-economic dissatisfaction of the existing structures and practices of the state; others tried to find ways to communicate their appeals through the institutional processes within the existing Israeli political and legal structure. *Umm al Fahem* and *Abu Ghosh* were two important representative cases for the out-of-system (extra-institutional) and in-system institutional reactions against the policies and practices of the Israeli political community towards the Palestinian Arab populations in this period and thereafter.

Why did *Umm al Fahem* and *Abu Ghosh* interpret the *Al-Aqsa Intifada* differently and expressed their reactions in completely dissimilar ways? Why did inhabitants of one Palestinian Arab village use out-of-system tools and especially violence to express their reactions against the Israeli state's policies within the context of *Al-Aqsa Intifada* while the other village remained either silent or reacted by utilizing in-system mechanisms? Why did youth of *Umm al Fahem* block the main road to the north of Israel and burn tires while the youth of *Abu Ghosh* either continued their daily schooling routines or joined the peaceful and in-system activities against the state's policing practices with regard to Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel?

1.1. The Puzzle and Statement of Problem

Umm al Fahem and *Abu Ghosh* cases offer exceptional opportunity to look at the interplay between the hegemonic processes and structures exerted by the majority and socio-economic and political structures of minority in Israel. As we will elaborate further in this thesis, in our view political and socio-economic trajectories between the Israeli state and Palestinian Arab citizens of these localities can be best conceptualized as hegemonic process, which would mean a process of domination through both coercion and consent in Gramscian terms. Both *Umm al Fahem* and *Abu Ghosh* share some critical characteristics. Populations of both localities are predominantly Muslim. Most of the inhabitants in both localities consider themselves as Palestinian Arabs, Palestinians or Arabs. Thus, *Palestinianness* and *Arabness* are components of their identities. Prior to *Al-Aqsa Intifada* both localities had important economic ties with

Israel's Jewish community. Considerable amount of lands of both municipalities were confiscated by the Israeli state for different reasons in the history. In both localities, *hamulas* (clans) used to be important actors in the socio-economic and political organization of the community.

However, in *Umm al Fahem*, dominant clan structure was seriously challenged by the immigration and urbanization while in *Abu Ghosh* it remained intact throughout history. Change and continuity in respective *hamula* structures had their consequences on the interaction between the hegemonic processes of the existing dominant socio-economic and political structures of Israel and the inhabitants of these localities. In *Umm al Fahem*, for instance, decline of *hamula*'s leading role in socio-economic and political organization after the flows of internally displaced people from the Israeli-confiscated neighbor villages led to emergence of new actors to provide socio-economic shelter for the inhabitants of the town. Lacking *hamula* ties and protection, new immigrants of *Umm al Fahem*, found their socio-economic and political refuge under the leadership of socio-economic organizations and ideological movements that transcended the *hamula* attachments. These organizations and movements, lacking historically built pragmatic relationship between the Israeli dominant structures and the *hamulas* opted for a new form of socio-economic organization and political positioning.

Gradually *Umm al Fahem* witnessed crisis of hegemony and its consolidation at the same time among different segments of its inhabitants. While inhabitants living under the socio-economic and political guidance of the *Islamic Movement* (especially the *Northern Wing*), opted for creation of new socio-economic and political structures at local level alternative to the Israeli dominant structures, others continued their pragmatic relationship with the existing system and allowed the operation of hegemonic processes of the existing structure. Within this framework, *hamulas* in *Umm al Fahem* sided with these movements as long as they do not threaten their survival within the existing system. In fact, especially *Islamic Movement* suggested a socio-economic and political platform that transcended the *hamula* ties and created a

common ground for the inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem* for expressing their demands and dissatisfactions arising from the existing dominant structures. As the *Islamic Movement's* moderate wing did not totally isolate itself from the Israeli dominant socio-economic and political structures interplay between the inhabitants and the hegemonic processes continued. However, this interaction took place along with the interplay between *the Islamic movement* or the *hamulas* on the one hand and the dominant socio-economic and political institutions of majority in Israel on the other.

In *Abu Ghosh*, on the other hand, *hamula* structure remained intact. Having different political and demographical trajectory compared to *Umm al Fahem*, *hamula* continued to play central role in socio-economic and political organization of inhabitants of the town. However, the nature of *hamula's* central role and its structure transformed. As Ghanem would argue, in *Abu Ghosh*, kinship ties and boundaries, which were embodied in *hamula*, was restructured and became considerably integrated in the contemporary system under the impact of modernization¹⁰. Thus, it did not simply serve as “closely-knit network of cognatic and affinal relations”¹¹, which provided social and economic forms of cooperation, protection and security to its members basing on traditional values and kinship ties. Its role and its structure were re-organized in line with its changing relationship with the Israeli hegemonic processes and structures. This evolution however, did not remain limited with the pragmatic requirements and constraints. Changing dynamics of interplay between the hegemonic structures and the tribal pragmatism repositioned *hamula* in the processes of socio-economic orientation and re-orientation of its members according to new traits.

Why did ethno-religiously similar localities react so differently against the Israeli dominant structures in the course of an ethno-religiously significant and loaded confrontation or crisis? Did aforementioned different structuring of two villages play a

¹⁰ Asad Ghanem, **The Palestinian –Arab Minority in Israel, 1948-2000**, State University of New York Press, Albany, 2001, p.150

¹¹ Ibid.

role in their differentiated reactions against the Israeli hegemonic structure in the course of *Al-Aqsa Intifada*? Was that this different positioning and trajectory of *hamula* structures that caused dissimilar organization and selection of tools in responding the practices and policies of Israeli state during the crisis? If so, what role did *hamula* play in *Abu Ghosh*, and what was the significance of the lack of effective *hamula* structure in *Umm al Fahem* in connection to the orientation and mobilization (or immobilization) of the inhabitants against the dominant structures during and after the Al-Aqsa Intifada?

Basing on such a puzzle, this thesis asks both case-specific and general questions. How does dominance of the majority over the minority function or dysfunction in multi-ethnic societies? Can traditional structures of socio-economic and political organization such as *hamula* facilitate internalization and reproduction of the dominant socio-economic and political structures by their members despite their ethno-religious differences with the majority? Can Gramscian approach serve as an ingenious methodology for a refined assessment of the relations between the state and its citizens? In our view, sophisticated responses to these questions can provide methodological and empirical input of great magnitude to the in-depth analysis of the state-minority relations in the region as well as in the world.

1.2. Literature Review

There is a considerable amount of studies about the situation of Arab minority and different aspects of the relationship between the Arabs and Jews in Israeli society. This literature is composed of a rich collection of studies on the issues of Jewish-Arab coexistence¹²; integration, segregation¹³ of Arab minorities and inter-group relations¹⁴

¹² Helena Syna Desivilya, "Jewish-Arab coexistence in Israel: The role of joint professional teams", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.35, No.4, 1998, pp.429-452

¹³ Eyal Kafkafi, "Segregation or integration of the Israeli Arabs: Two concepts in *Mapai*", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1998, pp. 347-367.

¹⁴ Ahmed H. Sa'di , "Jewish-Arab inter-group relations. The case of Israel", *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2002, pp.119-132

in Israel; the attitudes and position of Palestinian Arab citizens towards the nature of state¹⁵ and democracy in Israel; the power and limits of consociationalism¹⁶; the crisis of Arab minority in ethnic state¹⁷ and ethnic democracy¹⁸; issues of ethnonationalism¹⁹; place of Israeli Arabs in political, economic²⁰ and social structures of Israeli society, identity issues²¹ and identity politics of Palestinian Arab citizens, citizenship²², gender²³ and education issues²⁴ of Palestinian Arab citizens.

There has also been considerable number of efforts towards understanding and explaining the nature of relationship between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority. While the mainstream approaches more focused on the assumptions of the

¹⁵ Asad Ghanem, "The Palestinian minority in Israel :The "challenge" of the Jewish state and its implications", *Third World Quarterly* (Abingdon), Vol.21, No.1, 2000, pp.87-104 and Eric Rozenman, "Israeli Arabs and the future of the Jewish state", *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 6, No.3, 1999, pp. 15-24

¹⁶ Alan Dowty, "Consociationalism and Ethnic Democracy: Israeli Arabs in Comparative Perspective", David Levi-Faur, Gabriel Sheffer, and David Vogel (eds.), **Israel: the dynamics of continuity and change**, Frank Cass, London, 1999, pp.169-182

¹⁷ Nadim Rouhana, "The crisis of minorities in ethnic states: The case of Palestinian citizens in Israel", *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, August, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1998, pp.321-346 and Nadim Rouhana, "Israel and its Arab citizens: Predicaments in the relationship between ethnic states and ethnonational minorities", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1998, pp.277-296.

¹⁸ Dowty, (1999) op.cit.

¹⁹ Vered Kraus, "The Power and limits of ethnonationalism. Palestinians and Eastern Jews in Israel", *British Journal of Sociology*, September, Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 525-552

²⁰ Meir Yaish, "Class structure in a deeply divided society:Class and ethnic inequality in Israel, 1974 - 1991", *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol.52, No. 3, 2001, pp. 409-439

²¹ Raphael Israeli, "The Arabs in Israel. Identity, criminality and the peace process", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.10, No. 1, 1998, pp. 39-59

²² Rouhana, (1998), "Israel and its Arab citizens..." ,op.cit. note 17.

²³ Ibtisam Ibrahim, "The Status of Arab women in Israel" *Critique*, No. 12, 1998, pp.107-120, and Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, "Law, Politics, and violence against women. A case study of Palestinians in Israel", *Law and Policy*, 1999, Vol.21, No. 2, pp. 161-189

²⁴ Abu Khawla Baker, "Social and Educational Welfare Policy in the Arab Sector in Israel" *Israel Affairs*, Autumn/Winter 2003, Vol. 9, No. 1/2, pp. 68-97 and Dan Soen, "A Binational Society: The Jewish-Arab Cleavage and Tolerance Education in the State of Israel" *Israel Affairs*, Autumn/Winter 2003, Vol. 9 No. 1/2, pp.97-110

modernization theory and the study of collective identity of Palestinians in Israel; critical approaches analyzed the position of Palestinians in Israel in terms of power relationships between the majority and minority and focused on the structure of inequalities between the two national groups with the historical roots and dynamics²⁵. Political development school which analyzed the situation of Arab minority according to the differences in modernization levels of it and the Jewish majority²⁶ can be considered as a part of these mainstream approaches. Within this context social development and democratization theories presupposed a "process of natural development and normalization, for the Arab minority, which includes processes of construction and consolidation that are turning them into a society with the characteristics of a normal society"²⁷.

Critical voices and political evaluation of collective identities within the mainstream approaches brought about a new breath to the studies on the Arab minority and its main concerns as an integral component of Israeli society. Internal colonialism model of critical social scientists and revisionist historians such as Zureik and Nakhleh for instance viewed the Jewish settlement as colonial power, which used to control and govern the boundaries of the state extending to all the territories and populations through a non-Western, ethnic democracy²⁸. Lustick's *system of controls* attempted to describe framework of structural conditions, institutional arrangements and policy implementation processes which are thought to play important role in shaping the attitudes, beliefs and perceptions of the Arab minority, which would be ruled over

²⁵ Zeev Rosenhek, "New Developments in the sociology of Palestinian citizens of Israel: an analytical review", *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Vol. 21, No:3, 1998, pp.558-579

²⁶ Jacob M. Landau, **The Arab Minority in Israel 1967-1991. Political Aspects**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992

²⁷ Ghanem, op.cit. p.98

²⁸ For Zureik's and Nakleh's arguments see Khalil Nakleh and Elia Zureik eds. **The Sociology of the Palestinians**, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1980; also see Elia Zureik, **Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism**, Routledge, London, 1979.

through segmentation, dependence, and cooptation²⁹. Some other models of Shamir³⁰ and Migdal³¹ tried to explain the relative quiescence of the Arab minority within the context of the voluntaristic non-integration approach tracing the obedience and passive and non-integrative pattern of Arabs political behavior back to the centuries of foreign rule³².

All these studies tried to examine and understand the main tenets and the nature of the relationship between the dominant and the subordinated sectors of the Israeli society from different perspectives. Despite their conceptual and terminological differences most of these studies have elements that can be translated into the theories of hegemony in Gramscian terms. Especially, Seliktar's emphasis on the necessity of intra-communal and perceptual 'consensus' within the context of the system of controls and the formation of the collective identity system of the Arab minority³³ can be interpreted as a contribution to the literature of hegemonic relationship in its further stages.

Notwithstanding its mainstream premises, Landau's dependency/modernization model consisted of remarks, which points to a sort of consolidation of hegemonic relationship through internalization of the hegemonic patterns initiated by the hegemonic leadership due to its "more developed" and/or "more democratized" position³⁴. Ghanem's criticism of the processes of development put in the social development and other mainstream

²⁹ Ian Lustick, **Arabs in the Jewish State: A Study in Control of a National Minority**, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1980

³⁰ Michal Shamir, "The Political Context of Tolerance: A Cross-National Perspective from Israel and the United States", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 77, No. 4, December 1983, 911-928

³¹ Joel S. Migdal, "State and Society in a Society without a State" in Gabriel Ben-Dor (ed.) **The Palestinians and the Middle East Conflict**, Turtledove, Ramat Gan, Israel, 1978

³² Ofira Seliktar, "The Arabs in Israel: Some Observations on the Psychology of the System of Controls" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 28, No.2, 1984

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Landau, op.cit.

lines of thought in his model of 'predicament developmental approach' on the other hand points out crisis situation in hegemonic relationship. Emphasizing the potential problems and predicaments at the daily and strategic levels due to the limited choices available to the members of this community in their relations to the state, seemed to contribute the theories of radicalization, alienation and Palestinization in its attempts towards problematizing the relationship between the hegemon and the hegemonized.

Within the relevant literature on the relationship between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in Israel, the studies on the dichotomic processes of radicalization versus politicization³⁵; integration versus alienation³⁶; and Israelization versus Palestinization³⁷; and the process of democratization seem to be more contributive and constructive for the purposes of conducting an analysis on hegemonic relationship in Gramscian terms. In this respect, it is possible, for instance, to see landmarks of hegemonic relationship within the Smootha's ethnic democracy thesis. His arguments on the internalization of Israeli democratic values by Arab minority and advancement of Arabs' status in Israeli political arena correspond with the premises of hegemony thesis, which assert the internalization of the hegemonic structure as a pre-condition for a smooth functioning hegemonic relationship between the hegemon and the hegemonized. Rekhess' counter argument on the other hand, highlights the continuing crisis of hegemony by stressing the process radicalization of the Arab minority since 1960s. His argument is mainly based on the "continued strengthening of the Palestinian component in the Arab Minority's national identity, a trend which contributed to growing alienation between Arabs and Jews"³⁸ thus; it made the functioning of hegemonic patterns less probable.

³⁵ Hillel Frisch, "The Arab Vote: The Radicalization or Politicization" in D.J. Elazer and S. Sandler (eds.) **Israel at Polls 1996**, Frank Cass, London, 1998

³⁶ Elie Rekhess, 'The Arab Minority and the 1992 Election: Integration or Alienation' in E. Karsh and G. Mahler (eds.) **Israel at Crossroads**, British Academic Press, London, 1994

³⁷ Sammy Smootha, **Arabs and Jews in Israel**, Vol.2, Westview Press, Boulder and London 1992

³⁸ Rekhess, (1994), op.cit.

For others such as Ghanem, it is the Israeli state and Jewish majority that forced Palestinian Arab minority into the process of *Palestinization*. In this respect, one may argue that Israeli state is also responsible for the crisis of hegemony for it excluded and discriminated against the Arab minority at both ideological, declarative and the structural levels instead of seeking for a probable consent for the maintenance of its hegemonic position. Through cognitive disregard of the existence of the Arab minority at declarative/ discursive level (by preference of Jewish symbols over the others) and with implementing different methods towards exclusion of this minority (such as excluding them from the political decision-making centers, exempting them from compulsory military service, not employing them in senior positions, and establishing special institutions to deal with Arabs)³⁹. Israeli state weakened the basis of consent from the Arab minority's side for a hegemonic relationship notwithstanding consent of most segments of Palestinian Arab community to accommodate or adopt the dominance of Israeliness⁴⁰.

Referring to another dimension of the majority minority relations in Israel, Rouhana discusses the relationship within the dichotomy between Jewish ethnocracy and binational democracy⁴¹. In his human theory perspective, he argues that as long as an ethnic state like Israel falls short of fulfilling basic human needs for equality and political participation, power sharing and identity for the excluded minority, it would only be possible to maintain ethnic policies by employing various forms of control or by force rather than by the consent of inferior minority⁴². In Gramscian terms, it can well be translated as follows: As long as the *passive revolutionary* acts of the political leadership (the acts that aim to pacify oppositional forces through short-term

³⁹ As'ad Ghanem, "State and minority in Israel: the case of ethnic state and the predicament of its minority" *Ethnic & Racial Studies*, May 1998, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp.428-449

⁴⁰ Interview with Asad Ghanem, Tamra village, 10.08.2006

⁴¹ Nadim Rouhana, "The Test of Equal Citizenship: Israel between Jewish Ethnocracy & Binational Democracy", *Harvard International Review*, Vol.20, No.2 1998, pp.74-78

⁴² Rouhana, "Israel and its Arab Citizens..." (1998), op.cit.

compromises and transforming them into agents of dominant group) fail to obtain consent of the subordinated actors, the crisis of hegemony or general crisis of the State will persist.

In brief, among these studies while the findings from the analyses on the processes of *politicization*, *integration*, and *Israelization* seem to support main arguments of hegemony thesis within this context; the arguments on the contrasting processes of *radicalization*, *Palestinization*, and *alienations* on the other hand endorse the situations that can be interpreted as hints marking the (continuous) crisis of hegemonic relationship within the Gramscian terminology. Nevertheless, both among the mainstream and critical scholarly efforts towards the conceptualization of the nature of the majority-minority relationship in Gramscian terms *hegemony* does not seem popular in the terminology of Middle Eastern Studies in evaluating the situation of minorities in the Middle Eastern countries. Thus, Gramscian approaches and their applicability to the relationship between the Jewish state and the Palestinian minority seemed to be neglected by scholars of Middle Eastern studies. Refraining from using Gramscian terminology in understanding and explaining the relationship most of the scholars in the field, prefer to use *hegemony* and the related concepts within the framework of either pure domination or of control through the use of material force. In this respect, although most of these studies refer to the unequal nature of the relationship, they do not provide an in-depth analysis of an important aspect: its hegemonic nature.

Scholars, who wrote on hegemony in Gramscian terms, on the other hand focus more on Jewish issues in state-civil society relations rather than evaluating the majority-minority relationship. One of the rare studies that tries to implement the Gramscian understanding of hegemony to the Israeli case is Baruch Kimmerling's work that situates the ideological and intellectual dominance of the existing order, based on Zionist hegemony to the centre of relationship among the social groups within the Israeli society. For Kimmerling, this hegemonic order is above and outside of the public debate due to its unchallengeable nature since "there are not even terms and

concepts with which to characterize and question it”⁴³. Kimmerling’s understanding of hegemony keeps Arab citizens outside of the boundaries of Zionist hegemony due to their incapability of communication with the other members of the collectivity in the absence of a common consciousness shared with those within the hegemonic bubble⁴⁴. In this respect, his arguments are more related to the hegemonic structure within the Jewish majority as the already hegemonized sectors of the society.

Uri Ben Eliezer, in his analysis of one of the Israel’s core myths (pioneering), focuses on a totally different dimension of relationship between the Israeli state and society while trying to apply the Gramscian concept of hegemony to the socio-economic and political processes and structures within Israel. His analysis is based on orthodox adoption of basic premises of hegemonic understanding concerning the essence of a state, the nature of society and binary relations between the two to the Israeli case⁴⁵. However, this adoption excluded Palestinian Arabs from the hegemonic context as well. Eliezer Ben Rafael, on the other hand, gave an account of hegemonic economic, societal and political structures and processes in Israel. He mentioned two aspects of dominant culture, which were *melting perspective* and the *self-acclaimed guidance mission of the dominant stock*⁴⁶. However, once more, Palestinian Arabs were absent in his analysis of the Israeli hegemonic structure. His focus was rather on the groups of Jewish immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East.

A more recent study of Rouhana and Sultany on the other hand, has analyzed a new consensus in Israeli Jewish society with regard to the Arab minority, which the authors

⁴³ Baruch Kimmerling, “Religion, Nationalism and Democracy in Israel”, *Constellations: An International Journal of Critical & Democratic Theory*, Vol. 6 No. 4, 1999.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Uri Ben Eliezer, “State Versus Civil Society? A Non-Binary Model of Domination Through the Example of Israel”, *Journal of Historical Sociology*, Vol. 11 No. 3, 1998.

⁴⁶ Eliezer Ben-Rafael, **The Emergence of Ethnicity: Cultural Groups and Social Conflict in Israel** Greenwood Press, Westport, CT 1982 and Interview with Eliezer Ben Rafael, Tel Aviv University, 09.08.2006.

call "the New Zionist Hegemony" rather than providing an in-depth analysis of consensual relationship between the Israeli state and the Arab minority⁴⁷. Thus, as Smooha, Kimmerling and Ben Eliezer, comprehensive analysis of Rouhana and Sultany about the manifestation of "the New Zionist Hegemony" in the four areas of legislation, government policies, public opinion, and public discourse mainly focuses on the hegemonic processes and discourse within the Jewish majority and excluding the Palestinian Arabs from these processes.

Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled also use Gramscian conceptualization of hegemony in a limited way to explain the relationship between the *Labor Settlement Movement* and the Yishuv and the Zionist movement's state-building venture" especially between 1927 and 1937.⁴⁸ They referred to *hegemony* while explaining the leadership of the Labor Settlement Movement which was followed by the Jewish parties and social strata due to "its promise to assimilate them into its own ranks and to create a more equitable social order" in the course of establishment of "a socialist Jewish nation-state"⁴⁹. However, they did not broaden the scales of hegemonic structure to include Palestinian Arab citizens. In fact, they argued that dilemma of integrating Palestinian Arabs to the Jewish majority in civil and political sense while maintaining the Jewish character of the Israeli state structurally prevented Israelization⁵⁰ and thus operation of hegemonic structures and processes in Palestinian Arab segments of Israeli society especially in late 1990s and after the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Thus as many others, they did not provide a detailed account of the relationship between the Palestinian Arabs and Jewish dominated hegemonic processes and structures.

⁴⁷Nadim Rouhana and Nimer Sultany, "Redrawing the Boundaries of Citizenship: Israel's New Hegemony", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Fall 2003 Vol. 33 No.1, pp.5-23

⁴⁸ Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, **Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.66

⁴⁹ Ibid, p.67

⁵⁰ Ibid, p.129

Literature on clan (*hamula*) structures of Palestinian Arabs on the other hand, has been influenced for a long time by the convergence approaches, which considered *hamulas* as close and static structures, which could only be mobilized in socio-economic and political arena by appeals of their pragmatism and survival of their closely-knit social network based on traditional values. Groundbreaking anthropological work of Abner Cohen on the Arab border villages in Israel, provided an in-depth analysis of *hamula* structures, mechanisms and dynamics of continuity and change in *hamula* organization and the relationship between *hamula* cleavages and national political structures. In his analysis, Cohen foresaw possibility of a complete transformation of *hamula* structure in Palestinian Arab villages and “decline or disappearance of *patriliney* as an articulating principle of political organization”⁵¹ as early as 1960s. Nevertheless, he did not provide insight on possible implications of such a transformation for the *hamula*, its members, and the dominant system in general. In fact, in his analysis, integration of *hamula* to the system as an institution of hegemonic order was not considered as a prospect. This was because his emphasis on *hamula* pragmatism as determining factor on the political and economic relations of the Palestinian Arab citizens with the national structures and processes. In his analysis of the relationship between the *hamulas* and the national political institutions, Cohen observed a penetration of Israeli dominant national organizations in to the villages while there was not a counter-penetration of the villagers to the national system⁵². However, since Cohen considered institutional or ideological penetration of the dominant Jewish structures and ideas as a sequel of manipulation of *hamula* pragmatism or its ineffectiveness by the well-organized, large-scale Jewish associations⁵³, he did not think about probable relationship between the *hamula* structures and internalization of these ‘penetrations’ by the members of these *hamulas*.

⁵¹ Abner Cohen, Arab Border-Villages in Israel, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1965, p.178

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid., p.177

Like Cohen, Asad Ghanem considered *hamula pragmatism* as one of the major determining factor in the relationship between the members of *hamula* and the system. He argued that the roles of *hamula* were rooted in pragmatic requirements and constraints rather than ideological and cultural commitments⁵⁴. Basing on this assumption, Ghanem too underestimated the possibility of *hamula*'s repositioning in the interplay between the pragmatic requirements and hegemonic processes. Although he put emphasis on the evolutionary and dynamic nature of the kinship structure, Ghanem did not provide an in-depth account of the reasons behind the dissimilar trajectories of this evolution in different localities. Furthermore, in spite of his emphasis on diverse rather than uniform effects of modernization on kinship structure, Ghanem did not elaborate probable implications of these different evolutionary trajectories of *hamula* structures for the relationship between the Palestinian Arab members of these *hamulas* and the hegemonic processes and structures.

As it may be observed, although most of these studies have significant hints to conduct a Gramscian analysis of majority-minority relations in Israeli case none of them chose this path. In fact, Palestinian Arabs are excluded from the hegemonic structuring of the Israeli society by the scholars who based their analysis on the Gramscian analysis. Their basis for exclusion was the cultural and ethno-religious difference of the Arabs and the discriminative and exclusionary practices of state against them.

1.3. Aim of Dissertation

Aforementioned invaluable works and detailed analyses provide a broad and comprehensive evaluation of the problematic relationship between the Israeli institutions and the Jewish majority and the Palestinian Arab minority in general. Moreover, they offer different scholarly gateways to understand operational patterns of general social, political, economic and cultural structures and dynamics in majority-state-minority relationship in Israel. Nevertheless, they do not fully explain the reasons

⁵⁴ Ghanem, (2001), op.cit. p.150

of differentiation in the interactions of different minority groups with the majority and the state especially in the moments of crises.

I think the majority-minority relationship between the Jewish state and the Arabs in Israel reveals important characteristics of ‘hegemony’ as well as ‘domination’ from the point of Gramscian perspective. The accommodation of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel’s political, socio-economic and legal structures was not maintained simply by the absolute coercion of the Jewish state. It is also not possible to explain obedience of Palestinian Arabs to the dominant value-systems and institutional structure of Israel by communal or tribal pragmatism of the Palestinian Arab communities. There exists a certain level of consent given by the Palestinian Arab minority to the Israeli (though not necessarily Jewish) political, economic and legal structures in organizing their daily lives. In fact, in many cases the reaction of the Arab minority is to the *Jewishness* of the Israeli state structures rather than their very existence.

Therefore, in this thesis it is argued that Gramscian approach can provide an additional vital ground for the analysis of issues of consent and coercion within the context of majority-minority relationship in Israeli case. In fact, any analysis which neglects the component of consent may face with the risk of reducing the relationship into a relationship of domination, which is maintained through control or coercion and thus can not reflect the complex nature of relationship completely. Nevertheless, as it will be elaborated in this dissertation, hegemony does not operate in all segments of Palestinian Arab community at the same level and in the same way. While hegemonic values and processes are internalized and reproduced by some Palestinian Arab communities in their daily routines and their relationships with the dominant Israeli political community, some Palestinian Arabs seek alternative forms and structures other than the Israeli dominant political and socio-economic structures. These different preferences are closely related to the differentiated intra-communal structures of the Palestinian Arabs as well as their different positioning towards the hegemonic processes. They are also connected to the success of the agents of hegemony in internalization of the hegemonic processes by the members of Palestinian Arab

community. These agents vary according to level of their affect on the individual-level internalization of the hegemony. Although, modern structures and institutions such as schools, media, and civil society organizations play an important role in internalization of hegemony by the Palestinian Arabs, traditional structures such as *hamulas* are also critical in the internalization of the hegemonic processes by the Palestinian Arab population in greater numbers and in a more systematic way.

In this respect, another neglected area in the literature of relations between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority is the position of the traditional *hamula* (clan) structures within the framework hegemonic relationship. Most of the studies about the *hamula* in Israel put emphasis on the *hamula pragmatism*. Both anthropological works and political scientists analyzed the *hamula* as pre-modern structure whose main objective is survival in a hostile environment. Thus, they interpreted the interactions between the institutions of the Jewish majority and the *hamulas* within the narrow framework of pragmatism. This also explains negligence of these studies of the possible catalyzing role of *hamula* in the hegemonic processes in Gramscian terms. They did not put enough emphasis on the transformation of *hamula* structures in time in line with the negotiation of the dominant values of Israeli political culture and internalization of the daily practices of dominance without developing any opposing mechanisms or counter-hegemonies.

In fact, explaining the relationship between the Jewish socio-economic, political and cultural institutions and the *hamula* simply by the mutual pragmatic terms of control and survival, neglects the important cognitive processes of transformations in both sides throughout their interactions within a hegemonic framework. Defining the relationship by referring reciprocal pragmatism (of *hamula* and state or any other institution of the dominant) and survival strategies of the minority against the exclusionary practices of majority's dominant structures and institutions brings about an inadequate and limited interpretation of interaction between members of *hamula* and dominant structure.

In effect, such approaches cannot cohesively explain the case such as *Abu Ghosh*, where Hebrew literacy is widespread, recruitment to the Israeli army is guaranteed, differential voting for the Jewish dominated political parties is common, members actively participate in the preparations of the Jewish religious rituals and festivals, a model bi-national football team play its games to the eyes of its Jewish and Palestinian Arab fans, and the resident established strong ties with the Jewish communities by simply labeling these moves as pragmatic tactics of *hamula* for guaranteeing its survival. In fact, at the same time as some *hamulas* in Israel interact with the Jewish majority they may also negotiate the dominant features of the structure of interaction. At the end, *hamula* emerges as a catalyzing mechanism for its members for internalization of a consensual domination and thus expressing their reaction or demands through the mechanisms of existing structure.

This dissertation does not assert that members of clans are not involved in violent confrontations with the state. In fact, two protestors who were killed during the demonstrations in *Umm al Fahem* were members of one of the *hamulas* in this town. Besides, they can even be driving force in continuation of the crisis of hegemony and their isolation from the hegemonic processes and structures. In this respect, this thesis also highlights both traversing and clashing areas of the clan affiliations and the hegemonic process while trying to explain reactions of the Palestinian Arab communities against the Israeli state during and after the *Al-Aqsa Intifada*. There have been numerous scholarly works on different aspects of relationship between the Palestinian/ Arab minority and Israeli state and Jewish majority. Almost none of these works however, sophisticatedly focused on the complex interaction between the modern hegemonic processes and the primordial agents and structures in explaining the differences among the different levels of internalization and banal reproduction of institutionalized domination of the majority by the members of the minority. Therefore, in addition to detailed Gramscian assessment of relations of the Palestinian Arab citizens with the Israeli structures and superstructures, this thesis also aims to fill the abovementioned gap in the literature.

1.4. Methodology

Analysis of political trajectories of the villages from a historical perspective required an archival research. Within this context, archival documents and historical accounts about the Palestinian Arab villages in general and about *Abu Ghosh* and *Umm al Fahem* in particular were searched in the libraries of University of Washington in the U.S. and Haifa, Hebrew and Tel Aviv Universities of Israel as well as archives of research centers such as Truman Center of Hebrew University, and Moshe Dayan and Jaffa Centers of Tel Aviv University. Due to limited access to the state archives, data about the historical context were based on the studies of researchers, historians and other scholars who worked on the history of Palestinian Arab villages. In this respect, these archival data was examined and processed by referring to comments and elaborations of both traditional and revisionist Israeli and Palestinian historians. In addition, interviews with the local elite of these two villages also provided invaluable information about the historical developments and transformations in the villages. Historical data collected in the interviews with Palestinian Arab NGO directors who specialized on these localities and the problems of Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel, also contributed the historical contextualization of the relationship between the inhabitants of these localities and the hegemonic processes. Especially interviews conducted with the directors of *Ittijah*, *Association of Internally Displaced People* and *Association Forty* (unrecognized villages) provided significant data for understanding the transformation of the *hamula* structure in *Umm al Fahem* following the immigration of internally displaced people who provided a basis of support for the ideological movements and challenged the *hamula* structure of *Umm al Fahem*. These interviews also provided some hints in comprehending the feelings of insecurity and isolation of people who were inhabited in the *unrecognized villages* around *Umm al Fahem*.

Theoretical part is based on the analysis and discussion of considerable amount of scholarly works on Gramscian theoretical perspective and methodology in English and Turkish. Apart from the works of Antonio Gramsci, numerous studies (books, articles,

and websites) were searched in the libraries of Turkish, Israeli, American and German universities and research centers. In addition, numerous articles and PhD. theses on Gramscian methodology and its implementations were downloaded from the electronic data bases such as EBSCO, CIAO, Emerald and ProQuest were assessed as well as other resources (such as websites on Gramsci and his works) on the internet. With regard to the literature on tribal and clan structure, a two-staged methodology was followed. In the first step, anthropological, social and political works on tribe was collected and examined. In this analysis, general structural characteristics and the relations of tribes with the processes of modernization were assessed respectively. In the second step, the attention was directed to literature on the tribe and clan structures and their relations with the socio-economic and political systems and structures in the Middle East throughout history. Thus, both particularities and commonalities of tribe structures in the Middle East and in Israel were taken into consideration while analyzing their relationship with the hegemonic processes and structures.

In the analysis of the situation, reactions, and positioning of the villages during the Al-Aqsa Intifada broad range of sources were utilized. Within this framework, the analysis of the two Palestinian Arab towns also benefited from oral history of the elite of *Abu Ghosh* and *Umm al Fahem*. Interviews with Issa Jaber (school principal in *Abu Ghosh*) and Ibrahim Jabreen (advocate in *Umm al Fahem*) assisted in clarifying the debated historical events that took place in these two towns. More significantly, these interviews provided a full account of *Al-Aqsa Intifada* in the two towns from the eyewitnesses. In addition to these interviews in the analysis of the events during Al-Aqsa Intifada, news archives of *Palestinian Times*, *Al Ahram Weekly*, *Al Quds*, and Israeli newspapers of *Haaretz*, *Jerusalem Post*, *Yedioth Aharonot*, *Maariv* were used in examining the reactions of the two towns to the practices and policies of the Israeli dominant structures in this period. Other than the news articles, reports of the state (*Or Commission Report*) on the events as well as the reports and archives of Palestinian Arab human right organizations (i.e. *Adalah*, *Arab Human Rights Association*,

Mossawa) were examined for an in-depth analysis of the forms of reaction among the Palestinian Arabs in these two localities during the Al-Aqsa Intifada.

Furthermore, area visits, which were conducted in the respective summers of 2004 and 2006 to *Abu Ghosh* and *Umm al Fahem*, provided opportunities to observe the changes and continuities in the mood of these towns in the post-*al-Aqsa Intifada* period. In the course of these area visits, on the spot conversations with the Jewish visitors or by-passers in *Abu Ghosh* and Umm al-Fahem provided some hints about the image of these villages in the eyes of some members of majority. A more systematic analysis of statements, discourses and practices of Jewish political parties, Jewish civil society organizations and the state about these localities in particular and about the Palestinian Arab citizens in general assisted in contextualizing these localities within the hegemonic discourse and processes. Conversations with the Jewish NGO directors or representatives working on co-existence of the Jews and Palestinian Arabs like *Sikkuy* and Palestinian Arab human right activists in the groups like *BTselem* assisted in the analysis of both bi-communal contributions and challenges against the operations of hegemonic processes between the majority and minority in Israel.

Conversations with the Palestinian Arab members of Israeli parliament like Mohamed Barakeh, Talab el Sana during the *Question and Answer* sections of the public conferences assisted in clarifying the position of the Palestinian Arab legislators in the hegemonic structure and their views on the differentiated responses of the Palestinian Arab citizens to the hegemonic structures and processes. Finally, expert views and open-ended interviews with the scholars specialized on these localities in particular and majority-minority relations in general contributed significantly to both theoretical framing and empirical analysis of the case studies. In this context, interviews conducted with scholars Majd al Haj, Amal Jamal, Asad Ghanem, Yousef Jabreen, Nimer Sultany, Oren Yiftachel, Elie Rekhess, Zeev Rosenhek, Joel Migdal, Raphael Israeli, Uri Davis, Sammy Smooha, Dan Rabinowitz, Yitzhak Reiter, Hilel Frisch, and Ofra Bengio, authenticated the arguments of the thesis in elaborating cases through comprehensive evaluation of hegemonic context in which they evolved.

1.5. Organization of Thesis

Thesis will be composed of six parts. Following the introduction chapter, second chapter of dissertation set the historical, political economic and socio-cultural context, in which comparative analysis of experiences of two towns will be evaluated. In this part, roots and development of hegemonic system between the Jewish majority and Palestinian minority in Israel will be analyzed from a historical perspective. Changes and continuities in the nature of relations; factors that affected these changes and continuities; reasons for differentiation of the relationship among the different segments of the majority and minority populations; policies of Israeli state and their impact on the bi-communal relations will be analyzed by addressing developments in political, economic and socio-cultural spheres. Responses of the Palestinian Arab citizens to the policies of Israeli dominant structures will also be analyzed by referring to the acts of parliamentary and counter-hegemonic movements of the Palestinian Arab citizens as well as by acknowledging the *hamula* structures in this period.

Al-Aqsa Intifada or *October 2000 Events* had a momentous impact on the majority-minority relations in Israel. Both Jews and Palestinian Arabs were forced to reconsider the integrity and efficacy of existing dominant socio-economic and political structures in responding the demands of the citizens of Israel. Therefore, after putting the relationship in a historical context, *post-Al Aqsa Intifada* period will be assessed in detail by referring to its significance for the relationship between the Jewish and Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel in the third chapter. In this respect, chronology of events, their legal, socio-economic and political dimensions and their implications for different segments of the Palestinian Arab citizens will be discussed through detailed analysis of two groundbreaking reports about *Al-Aqsa Intifada* and by referring to parliamentary and counter-hegemonic movements of the Palestinian Arab citizens. The *hamula* structures will also be contextualized within this period by analyzing positioning of *hamula* structures towards the developments of the era .

In the fourth chapter, theoretical framework of the thesis will be put forward. First part of the chapter will provide an in-depth analysis of Gramscian conceptualization of hegemony through elaborating its roots, development, and main premises. In this part Gramscian concepts such as hegemony, hegemonic processes and structures, counter-hegemony, crisis of hegemony, passive revolution, Risorgimento, consent and coercion, war of maneuver and war of position, civil and political societies, ethico-political leadership, ruling elite, historical bloc and integral state will be defined and exemplified by referring to Gramscian works as well as to Israeli case. In this respect, hegemony will simply be defined as dominance by both coercion and consent, while the hegemonic processes will mean the ruling elite's courses of action through which dominance is produced and reproduced through seeking consent of the subordinate groups. The conceptual choice of "ruling elite" rather than a state or government in referring the leading segments of the dominant classes is an intentional choice to indicate the role and involvement of economic and political actors (such as business associations, trade unions, political parties) other than the government in composition of the *historic bloc*. As it will be elaborated in detail in the fourth part historical bloc refers to a dialectical unity of structure and superstructure and social relations of production, which include the concord of intellectuals and masses, alliance of social forces as well as unity of political and civil society⁵⁵. It is a unity of structure and superstructure, which is generally reproduced following the transition from war of maneuver (frontal attack to the dominant system) to the war of position (struggle for reinforcing the hegemonic positions)⁵⁶. This transition is also embodied in the Risorgimento (or Transformism), which is one of the historical forms of "revolution-restoration" or "passive revolution" that avoids any intervention of masses to state affairs as well as "any organic reform that would replace crude dictatorial dominance

⁵⁵ David Forgacs, (ed.) **The Antonio Gramsci Reader, Selected Writings 1916-1935**, New York University Press, New York, p.192 and p. 424

⁵⁶ Joseph A. Buttigieg, (ed.), **Antonio Gramsci Prison Notebooks, Vol.3**, Columbia University Press, New York, p.109

with a hegemony”⁵⁷. In fact, hegemony requires unity of political society with the civil society under the ethico-political leadership of the integral state, an entity that assures the vigorous and enduring involvement of society into the actions and decision-making practices of its political bodies⁵⁸. Agents of hegemony, such as army, law, economic organizations, education, land planning, language and literature, media, symbols and hamula facilitate internalization and reproduction of hegemony by the subaltern and subordinate groups. In this respect, a broad analysis of operation of hegemonic processes, mechanisms and the agents of hegemony will follow the conceptualization part. Overall, detailed assessment of abovementioned concepts in the fourth chapter will elucidate the Gramscian conceptualization the relationship between the Palestinian Arab citizens and the Israeli structures in elaborating the historical background and the empirical case studies of *Abu Ghosh* and *Umm al Fahem*.

In the fifth chapter, attempts and countervailing movements, which led to emergence of the processes of hegemony building and *crisis of hegemony* will be analyzed in the cases of *Abu Ghosh* and *Umm al Fahem* respectively. First part of the chapter will examine *Abu Ghosh* where hegemonic processes and structures did not cause emergence of counter-hegemonic movements. They operated more effectively compared to *Umm al Fahem*. Does *hamula* structure of *Abu Ghosh* have an impact on this effectiveness? To answer this question this part will begin with discussing main tenets of interaction between *hamula* of *Abu Ghosh* and Israeli state and dominant socio-economic and political institutions (i.e. *Histadrut*, *Supreme Court*, Zionist political parties), evolution of that interaction throughout history and the role of *hamula* in that interaction. Historical background of relations between the *hamula* and Jewish population from *Yishuv* era to *Al-Aqsa Intifada* is an important issue to be considered in this analysis. Such an analysis is important to understand the nature and direction of political trajectories, which had impact on the decisions of *hamula* in its relations with

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* p. 257

⁵⁸ Christine Buci-Glucksmann, ***Gramsci and the State***, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1980, p. 62

the dominant structures and processes. Appraisal of political trajectory of *hamula* and inhabitants of the village is necessary in the search of probable signs of operation of hegemonic processes among the *hamula* members. Analysis of the nature of the relationship between the *hamula* and hegemonic processes and structures will be done by referring to detailed analysis of operation of agents of hegemony in the village. Finally the assessment of impact of *hamula*'s decisions on adopting the hegemonic structures and processes is vital in order to understand whether *hamula* play a role in internalization and reproduction of hegemonic structures and processes by the inhabitants of *Abu Ghosh* . In this analysis specific concentration will be given to the responses of inhabitants of *Abu Ghosh* to the *Al-Aqsa Intifada* and their relationship with the hegemonic structures in *post-Al-Aqsa Intifada* period.

In the second part of the fifth chapter, interplay of the hegemonic processes and the socio-economic and political structure of *Umm al Fahem* will be analyzed by referring two parallel processes of hegemony and counter-hegemony. In *Umm al Fahem* while some segments of the town are not fully isolated from the hegemonic processes and structures, some other segments build a counter-hegemony against the existing system at local level. Why did hegemonic processes not operate in some segments of *Umm al Fahem*? Why did some of *Umm al Fahem*'s inhabitants not hesitate to get involved in counter-hegemonic and violent resistance against the hegemonic structures? In order to clarify these points, this part of dissertation will refer to an important component of the puzzle. In this context, historical background of relations between Israeli dominant structures and Palestinian Arab inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem* will be examined. This examination will be important to clarify main political trajectories of the town from a historical perspective. In this analysis, impact of transformation of the clan-dominated politics and socio-economic structure with the continuous flows of immigration from the villages whose lands were confiscated by the Israeli state from early 1950s onwards will be another factor to be elaborated in this chapter. Pressures on the *Umm al Fahem*'s pre-immigration *hamula* structures by the immigrant villagers, who were stripped from their traditional village ties and *hamula* protection, will be evaluated in

relation with their impact on the transformation of the *hamula* dominated socio-economic and political processes in the town. In the following part, operation of the agents of hegemony/counter-hegemony will be analyzed in *Umm al Fahem* in a detailed way. Given “the lack of state legitimacy and efficacy as well as general feeling of discontent and despair”⁵⁹ among the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem*, factors that led emergence of alternative hegemonies or counter-hegemonies under the roof of the *Islamic Movement* will be discussed by referring to their relevance with the *hamula*-dominated structures and processes. A specific emphasis will be put on the changes and continuities in positioning of *hamula* structures and counter-hegemonic movements in relation to the hegemonic structures and processes.

The final chapter will briefly discuss the significance of the link between the tribal pragmatism and hegemonic processes for mobilization of tribes (*hamulas*) for catalyzing the internalization and reproduction of the dominant structures and processes by the members of that clan. Basing on the conclusions driven from the analysis of empirical cases the implications of this relationship will be assessed. Prospects for the further studies about the relations between the dominant and subordinate groups in the Middle East and possibility of utilizing Gramscian conceptualization and methodology in these studies will also be scrutinized by referring the conclusions that were reached in this dissertation.

⁵⁹ Rita Abrahamsen , “The Victory of Popular Forces or Passive Revolution? A Neo-Gramscian Perspective on Democratisation”, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 1 , 1997, p.134

CHAPTER 2

FROM DICTATORSHIP TO HEGEMONY: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

2.1. Introduction

Several scholars followed various patterns of periodization while historicizing the intra-societal and inter-societal relations in Israel/Palestine by focusing different aspects of these relations. From Gramscian perspective, it is possible to analyze history of relationship between the Israeli dominant classes and Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel in four periods. Pre-state period until 1948 witnessed the dichotomies and dilemmas of Jewish leadership about the mode and structure of co-existence with the Palestinian Arab populations in Palestine. These dichotomies were reflected in the divisiveness of Jewish dominant elite about the most effective policies of generating the most proficient and sophisticated structure for such co-existence while assuring realization of the Zionist goals.

Establishment of the Israeli state in 1948 created a new agenda, which breezed but not diminished the heat of debates over nature of intra-country interaction with the Palestinian Arab population in Israel. Main concern of the dominant ruling elite became how to control the activities of Palestinian Arab residents of the country who became minority after the significant population flow following the clashes. Thus, establishment and enforcement of military rule over the Palestinian Arab population until 1966 was materialization of a dictatorial system of control, which mainly aimed to prevent any counter-hegemonic organization and upheaval against the Israeli state-in-building. The system of control, which was based on the exclusionary practices and controlled segmentation of the Jewish majority and Palestinian Arab minority within “Israeli” socio-economic and political structure of stratification. Notwithstanding severe oppositions within the Israeli Jewish historic bloc against the functionality and efficacy of such system for establishment and maintenance of robust and confidential relationship between the dominant structures and the Palestinian Arab community, this

domineering system survived until 1966 with the initiatives of *Mapai*-led practical ruling elite of Israel and collaboration of some pragmatic Palestinian Arab traditional leadership. In this period, *hamula* operated as an agent of system of control. The Israeli ruling elite manipulated pragmatism of *hamula* leadership in order to prevail over the traditional Palestinian Arab communities. *Hamula* leadership, on the other hand, pursued strategies of survival and provided basic socio-economic securities for their members while at the same time collaborating with the Israeli dominant elite in preventing emergence of counter-hegemonic mobilization and movements among the Palestinian Arab community against the Israeli system.

Although military rule dissolved in 1966, legacy of system of control continued to overshadow the relationship of Israeli dominant elite with the Palestinian Arab community in the coming decades. Dissolution of military government over the Palestinian Arab community in 1966 and post-1967 War exposition of Palestinian Arab citizens to the Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied *West Bank* and *Gaza Strip* opened a new epoch in the historical evolution of relations. Dilemmas of Israeli Jewish historic-bloc about the nature and future of the relationship between the Israeli state and the Palestinians of the *West Bank* and *Gaza Strip* added to increased concerns of the ruling elite about the new dynamics of social mobilization within the Palestinian Arab community such as ideological and demographic trends. In this respect, period between 1967 and 1977 witnessed the mixture of coercive and passive revolutionary acts of Israeli ruling elite in order to minimize the impact of new dynamics on emergence and development of counter-hegemonic consciousness and institutionalization among the Palestinian Arab community. In this period, *hamula* faced with the challenges of outward and inward economic transformation of the Palestinian Arab villages. As the proletarianization and urbanization of rural Palestinian Arab population gained impetus, some *hamulas*' central role in socio-economic organization of the villages was undermined. Emergence and rise of influence of national level Palestinian Arab communist, nationalist and religious movements at political sphere further contested essential role of *hamula* within Palestinian Arab community. As it will be shown in the

empirical part, this resulted in dissolution of some *hamula* ties and replacement of these ties with individual, corporate or national affiliations. Some *hamulas* however, survived these challenges and consolidated their central position in the socio-economic and political organization of urbanizing rural communities.

In the era between 1977 and 1992 concerns of the Israeli ruling elite with regard to the nature of relationship that should be established with the Palestinian Arab community and new generation of Palestinian Arab movements continued. However, crisis of Jewish historic bloc and polarization within the Jewish political elite provided increased political influence as well as broader terrain of maneuver and mobilization for the Palestinian Arab citizens within the dominant structures and processes of Israeli system. In this respect, notwithstanding the existence of exclusionary practices, the period between 1977 and 1992 was marked with increased passive revolutionary acts of the Israeli dominant elite towards the Palestinian Arab citizens, attempts of some sectors of Israeli ruling elite towards establishing hegemonic relationship with the Palestinian Arab community. These developments were corresponded with the processes of increased political influence of Palestinian Arab community within Israeli national political sphere, increase of political and economic mobility within the dominant socio-economic structures and processes, amplification of intra-communal national and civic consciousness, emergence of counter-hegemonic movements based on nationalist or religious ideologies. End of this period was determined by the uprising of 1987, which marked a crisis in the relationship between the Israeli dominant structures and the Palestinian Arab community.

The crisis continued until the early 1990s and mostly resolved in 1992 with the change of government and its leading policies in Israel as well as with the increased efforts and expectations towards the peace in the region. In this period, although new dynamics and actors of socio-economic and political mobilization challenged its centrality in organization and mobilization of the traditional Palestinian Arab community, *hamula* continued to be an important actor in coordinating the relationship between the Israeli dominant structures and the evolving Palestinian Arab traditional society.

Concurrently, while some of the *hamula* structures were not able to adjust themselves to the modern processes and dynamics of social organization and dissolved; others adopted these changes and reformed their organizational role by beginning to refer the demands and expectations of their members while communicating and negotiating the escalating hegemonic commands and demands of the Israeli dominant system.

With the changes in international and regional sphere, Israeli dominant structures entered into an age of reformation and restructuring in line with necessities of adjustment to new international economic order. As the neo-liberal socio-economic structuring began to influence all segments of Israeli society, the Israeli ruling elite gradually abandoned coercive methods of domination. In fact, main concern of the Israeli dominant classes until 1990s was to prevent a counter-hegemonic mobilization of Palestinian Arab citizens rather than establishing and consolidating hegemony over them. Following the economic transformation and changes in the class structure from 1990s onwards, Israeli ruling elite began to implement policies towards the Palestinian Arab citizens that are more inclusive in order to attract Palestinian Arab consent to the policies of dominant elite. Following the crisis of hegemony-in-building in September 2000, these efforts gained more impetus.

In this respect, the period between the 1992 and 2000 witnessed a process hegemony-in-building in Israel. Within this period, *al-Aqsa intifada* marked a turning point in the hegemony-in-building process. It indicated a crisis of hegemony-in-building. This crisis was not resolved completely until the second half of the 2000s; however, it resulted in increased efforts of the dominant ruling elite in Israel towards selectively integrating the various segments of Palestinian Arab community into the hegemonic structures and processes as well as into the “Israeli historic bloc”, especially from 2003 onwards.

2.2. Pre-State Relationship Between the Jewish Yishuv and the Palestinian Arabs

Until the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Jewish leadership was divided on putting effort on establishing a basis for a future hegemonic structure between the Jews and the Palestinian Arabs. The separation derived from different priorities of the different segments of the Jewish leadership that were shaped by their affiliations with the conflicting ideologies socialism and right wing Zionism. Main concern of the socialist leadership was the establishment of a class-based unity that would prioritize common class interests of Jewish and Palestinian Arab workers. This concern was mainly reflected by the *Po'alei Tzion* and *Hapo'el Hatza'ir* brands of Labor Zionism in the 1920s⁶⁰. These groups and other groups within the Jewish community in Palestine (*Yishuv*) like *Brit Shalom*, *Po'alei Tzion Smol*, *Hashomer Hatza'ir*, and the *League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement* prioritized establishment of a functioning cooperation with the Palestinian Arabs over the fundamentals of official Zionist premises and objectives. However, they were far from assuming leadership within the *Yishuv* and their views did not have an impact neither on the official Jewish leadership nor on the Palestinian Arabs who considered these views inapplicable⁶¹. Palestinian Arabs' rejection of prototype of a bi-national state offered by the abovementioned Jewish groups that deviated from official Zionism strengthened the position of the dominant segments of the *Yishuv* with regard to prospective policies on the Palestinian Arabs.

Besides, priority of the dominant segment of the Jewish leadership headed by Ben Gurion was not to establish either an integrative state that would represent the common class interests of the Jews and the Palestinian Arabs or a bi-national state, which would balance and endorse diverse national interests of these two groups on an equal basis. In this respect, David Ben Gurion expressed the need for establishing a balance between

⁶⁰ Reinhard Wiemer, 'Zionism and the Arabs after the Establishment of the State of Israel', Alexander Schölch (ed.) **Palestinians over the Green Line**, Ithaca Press, London, 1983, p.28

⁶¹ Ibid. p.33

the Jews and Arabs, which would avoid either of these nations of ruling each other⁶². However, he did not clarify the nature of the balance. In fact, this statement, which was adopted by some other leaders of the dominant Jewish leadership in early 1930s, appeared to be a strategic discursive move in order to appease international society and the neighboring Arab states. In reality, dominant Jewish leadership presented a tactical discourse of equity and parity of the Jews and Palestinian Arabs in the institutions of a future state as a passive revolutionary act between 1929 and 1935 in order to obtain Palestinian Arab compliance with “the Zionist maximalist program”⁶³. This detectable difference between the discourse/image and practices of Ben Gurion as “the representative of the consensus” and “the driving force behind the expulsion of the Palestinians”⁶⁴, was reflecting the differentiated images and practices of the Israeli state towards the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel as well.

Apart from that differentiation between the policies and discourse of the dominant elite of Yishuv, there existed a dichotomy of isolationism versus integrationist realization of Zionism occupied an important place within the Zionist establishment among the Jewish political elite⁶⁵ from the very early days of the Israeli state and even before it. While the former approach supported by Ben Gurion and his followers, was mainly based on the idea of gradual segregation of Jewish society from the Arab population to form an Arab-free territory and purely Jewish state; the latter stood for development of the country as a whole for the benefits of all its inhabitants⁶⁶. This second ‘constructivist-revolutionary’⁶⁷ line of thought, which was represented by Chaim

⁶² Asad Ghanem, “The Binational Idea in Palestine and Israel: Historical Roots and Contemporary Debate”, *Holy Land Studies*, Vol.1, No.1, 2002, p.67

⁶³ Wiemer, (1983), op.cit., p.33

⁶⁴ Avi Shlaim, “The Debate about 1948”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, No. 27, 1995, p.289

⁶⁵ Kafkafi, (1998) op.cit.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

Arlosoroff and Pinhas Lavon, was mainly built on the ideal of convincing Arabs to integrate into processes of state-formation and to participate into the political and socio-economic systems that would be established within the state of Israel. From this point of view, the Arab consent was necessary for the development of Zionist enterprise. In line with this second approach, it has been argued that traditional Jewish isolationism at its extremes, found its most suitable milieu in the ghetto and cannot be fully sustained either in free democratic Diaspora countries or in sovereign Israel.⁶⁸ In this respect, since Israel had already an identity shared by Jew and Arab; Arabs' consent and their absorption by Israeli and Jewish socio-economic and political institutions was a *sin a qua non* for the full sovereignty in Israel.⁶⁹ In fact, despite his hard-liner stance, Ben Gurion also felt the necessity of referring the second option time to time, when the issue of integration or co-existence of Arab minority within Israel became a serious concern both prior and after the establishment of the State of Israel within the Jewish institutions. It was this necessity that had an impact on above-mentioned differentiation between practices and discourse of the state. Nevertheless, this dichotomy between isolationist and integrationist realization of Zionism in Israel prevailed among the dominant Jewish political elite and came to front especially during the crises of control over the Arab minority and debates regarding the future Palestinian state.

The idea of coexistence with the Arabs as minority within a Jewish state was not then a new issue for the founders of Israeli state. Besides, as Yossi Katz argued, establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 as a Jewish state was not the first time that the Zionist establishment was called upon to deliberate the issue of minority rights of non-Jews⁷⁰. The issue of the status and rights of the Arab minority in the future Jewish State was

⁶⁸ Ben Halpern "The Arabs of Israel: A Test of Jewishness", *Judaism: A Quarterly Journal of Jewish Life and Thought*, 1977, pp.413-417

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Yossi Katz, "Status and Rights of the Arab Minority in the Nascent Jewish State", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.33, No. 3, 1997, pp.535-569

one of primary issues for the prominent figures in the *Jewish Agency* from 1937 onwards (within the context of the recommendation of British Royal Commission in that year). Apart from other pragmatic reasons, for Ben Gurion it was necessary to prevent the Arab population, which was perceived as organic part of Arab-Israeli problem, from adopting a hostile attitude towards the Jewish state in order to provide both internal stability and necessary conditions for establishment of homeland with partition of boundaries and external possibilities for expansion.⁷¹

At these initial stages, the limits and content of minority rights was another concern of Jewish future ruling elite in late 1930s and early 1940s in the *Jewish Agency*. This concern led *Jewish Agency* to focus on the international precedents in the sphere of minority rights within the context of the *League of Nation* system of protection of minority rights. Following the debates on the future status and rights of Arab minority, it became unfolded that Jewish Agency was willing to grant equal rights to the Arabs of the Jewish state the status and rights granted and practiced in Iraq in 1932 following the independence.⁷² These rights would be similar to the minorities treaties of *the League of Nation* minority protection system. For the purposes of this study, their significance can be noted as their demand for full political rights for minorities; an electoral system that would guarantee fair representation for all and use of minority language in local political arena and for the minority educational purposes in addition to overall use Hebrew as official language.⁷³ It was important that the minorities would be given these rights to be equally represented in political arena as well as other fields of social life in the future Israel. In rhetoric, it was the case. However, in practice it was not. Notwithstanding willingness of future founders of Israeli state to award equal rights and to improve the situation of Arab minority in the future Israeli state; it was not possible for Zionists to introduce full equality for all inhabitants due to incompatibility

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.543

⁷² *Ibid.*, p.561

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p.558

of this principle with the goals of Zionism of establishing a state which would be Jewish in its nature. In this respect, in 1938 Jewish Agency set forth the main principles with regard to status and rights of the Arab minority, which would prevail after the establishment of the state of Israel “as equal -but not full- rights”.⁷⁴

2.3. 1948-1967: Era of Dictatorship

2.3.1. Political Sphere

As debates of 1930s indicated, on the contrary to what Landau and Rekhess argued, Jewish elite were not totally unprepared for dealing with the Arab minority issues⁷⁵. They already had intentions towards exercising leadership in a future Israeli State before winning the governmental power. In this respect, as *Sandler* maintained, in the early stages of relationship the Jewish community seemed to be ready to hold the governmental power before it hold it. In fact, it functioned 'as a state even prior to receiving formal sovereignty' over the other side, “which had undergone an identity crisis prior to having succeeded in developing a socially integrated community”⁷⁶.

After holding the governmental power from 1948 onwards, apart from the intentions and control-seeking acts of the Jewish political elite; hegemony could not be immediately installed following the establishment of the Israeli state due to reasons deriving from the Palestinian Arab community as well. First set of these reasons was related to the lack of interest and political [un]consciousness, which kept Arabs out of the newly emerging political system. Non-participation of Arabs in the foundational efforts of Israeli state and its political system later on appeared as one of the causes of

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p.562

⁷⁵ Jacob M. Landau, **The Arab Minority in Israel, 1967-1991 Political Aspects**, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, and Elie Rekhess, **The Arab Minority in Israel: Between Communism and Arab Nationalism, 1965-1991**, Tel-Aviv, 1993 quoted by Shmuel Sandler, “Israeli Arabs and the Jewish state: The Activation of a Community Syuspebnded Animation”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.31, No.4, 1995, p. 937

⁷⁶ Sandler, *ibid* , p. 937

their subordinate position within the political system of Israel. However, it was not the sole reason. Ethiopian and Russian Jews were integrated to the system later than Arab minority, however their integration was less problematic (though they were in a subordinate position against the *Askhenazim* as well). They did not take place among the founding actors of Israeli society while then the future political structure was designed and put into practice by the political actors of the newly emerging political structure. Palestinian Arabs initially ignored this new embryonic 'Israeli' political structure. When they decided to integrate into it, they realized that the Jewish symbols were penetrated to all dimensions of this political system, which could not have been so if the Arab citizens of Israel had participated in the initial steps of formation and designing of the Israeli political structure just after 1948. While this absence partly took place because of divisiveness and weakness of Palestinian political elite, it was also supported and maintained by some segments of the dominant Jewish political elite through exclusionary practices towards Palestinian Arab communal leadership such as enclavization and marginalization⁷⁷ of them in the state-formation process.

As the founders of the state dominant Jewish elite exploited absence of Palestinian Arab elite as equal partners in the Israeli state-formation process. In 1948, Ashkenazi domination was institutionalized by the establishment of the Israeli state. Until 1970s, Israeli ruling elite was mainly composed of Ashkenazi Jews⁷⁸. Thus, the period between 1948 and 1966 witnessed 'dictatorship' of Israeli ruling class over the Palestinian Arabs in Gramscian terms. In this era, the Israeli state established a system of control, which was based on coercive means. The enactment of British Mandatory Emergency Regulations by the Israeli *Knesset* in 1949 was an important indicator of intentions of the new ruling elite. Exclusion of the Palestinian Arab citizenry from the historical bloc of the new Israeli national-popular collective was reflected in the discourse of historicizing the state formation of Israel. The founding myths that Israel

⁷⁷ Amal Jamal, "The Arab Leadership in Israel: Ascendance and Fragmentation", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 35, No.2, 2006, p.7

⁷⁸ Yaish, (2001), op.cit., p.414

created in the course of the nation building and state-formation were mainly based on the ignorance of the sufferings of the Palestinian Arab population during the *al-Nakba* (disaster) of 1948. Thus, they maintained an “impenetrable ideological shield” surrounding the birth of the state and nation of Israel⁷⁹. In fact, as Adriana Kemp stated, “the disparity between the Palestinians’ formal inclusion as citizens and the exclusionary practices of the state, was perhaps starkest in the period between 1948-1966”⁸⁰.

On January 1949, Palestinian Arab population participated in the elections for the Constituent Assembly of Israel⁸¹. Paradoxically, their representatives engaged in a legislative process, which decided on the instruments of the system of control and coercive dominance that would govern the Palestinian Arab community in the next two decades. As the military rule was established, institutionalized exclusion continued to consolidate coercive nature of Israeli dictatorship at the expense of hegemonic alternative that could be based on efforts towards internalization of Israeliness by the subordinate groups. In fact, priority of the ruling classes was to consolidate the ties among the different groups in the *Jewish* historical bloc rather than seeking integration of the Palestinian Arabs into a broader *Israeli* historical bloc. Regarding the Palestinian Arab population, main concern of the Israeli dominant elite was to prevent any systematic counter-hegemonic institutionalization or movement against the newly emerging Israeli historic bloc. Negligence of the Jewish dominant elite in accepting Palestinian Arab entity as one of the founding elements of the Israeli state-in-building was reflected in the early legal arrangements with regard to the symbols of the Israeli state. Consequently, the *Flag and Emblem Law* of 1949, *The State Stamp Law* of 1949, *the Days of Rest Ordinance* Law of 1948, *the Martyrs and Heroes Remembrance Day*

⁷⁹ Avi Shlaim, (1995), *op.cit.* p.288

⁸⁰ Adriana Kemp, ‘ “Dangerous Populations”, State Territoriality and the Constitution of National Minorities’, Joel S. Migdal (ed.), ***Boundaries and Belonging***, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.77

⁸¹ Rebecca Kook, ‘Dilemmas of Ethnic Minorities in Democracies: The Effect of Peace on the Palestinians in Israel’, *Politics and Society*, 1995, Vol. 23, No. 3, p.310

Law of 1959 systematically detached Palestinian Arab community from the image of the Israeli state.

Apart from detaching the Palestinian Arab community from the image of the state, Jewish dominant elite utilized legal mechanisms for gradual detachment of the Palestinian Arab population from their lands in order to consolidate political and economic control over both the land and the people. In this respect, the Israeli legal structure was designed to support the system of dominance and control while creating a legal basis for exclusionary and discriminative practices towards the Palestinian Arabs. Within this context, *The Law of Return* of 1950, *The Entrance to Israel Law* of 1952, *The Law of Citizenship* of 1952, *The Land Acquisition Law* of 1953, *The Law for the Concentration of the Land* of 1961, *The National Planning and Building Law* of 1965 served creation and maintenance of jurisdictional and legal basis for the exclusion of the Palestinian Arabs from the Israeli popular-national collective. Israeli state also restructured intra-communal legal institutions of Palestinian Arab community in order to consolidate control over the Palestinian Arab population as well as to prevent any institutionalization towards self-governance, which could cause a counter-hegemonic mobilization. Sophisticated control system served erosion of self-governing and self-empowering potential of the Palestinian Arab community at institutional level and thus it was mainly designed to disallow any possibility of counter-hegemonic institutionalization against the dominant elite within the Israeli system.

The mechanisms of control, however, did not operate solely through procedural coercion. In some cases, they used tangible coercive instruments thoughtlessly and uncontrollably. In 1956, under tense atmosphere Suez Crisis, uncontrolled coercive acts of the military units of the dominant control institution over the Palestinian Arab community resulted in a shocking incident. The *Kafr Kassem massacre* was one of the most striking examples of how the military apparatuses of the Israeli “dictatorship” operated coercively without seeking legitimacy from the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. Israeli dominant elite’s response to the massacre however, was significant for indicating the severe concerns of the ruling elite about the possible transformation of

the discontent of the Palestinian Arab community into an organized or disorganized counter-hegemonic resistance. Thus, immediate state-ordered inquiry following the killings and appointment of commission to investigate the circumstances of the events, the responsibility of the Border Patrolmen and the compensations to be paid to the families of the victims⁸² were important steps towards decreasing tension among the Palestinian Arab community. Furthermore, Ben Gurion's severe criticism of the killings and his rigorous statements on punishment of the responsible Israeli army units aimed to reinforce the efforts of Israeli authorities towards convincing the Palestinian Arab community about localized nature of event, which did not reflect the broader policy of the Israeli dominant governing bodies towards the Palestinian Arab citizens⁸³.

Another indicator of such efforts was a sizeable "ceremony of reconciliation" which took place on 20 November 1957 with the participation of the representatives from all levels of Israeli dominant structure such as cabinet ministers, military-government envoy, *Histadrut's* bureaucrats, parliamentarians from the ruling *Mapai* Party and notables from the neighboring villages⁸⁴. Notwithstanding their symbolic significance, these activities did not undermine the general framework and patterns of exclusion and isolation which dominated the relations between the some segments of Israeli Jewish dominant elite and the Palestinian Arab community. Resentment of the incidents, however, did not lead to any hesitance among the Jewish dominant elite while continuing to activate the laws for expropriation and de-territorizing the Palestinian Arab communities.

In this period, land planning and property policies were formulated in order to de-territorialize and to diminish economic self-sufficiency of the Palestinian Arab

⁸² "When B-G told the cabinet about the Kfar Kassem massacre, Excerpts from the State Archive"s, *Ha'aretz*, 28.03.2001

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Shira Robinson, 'Local struggle, national struggle: Palestinian responses to the Kafr Qasim massacre and its aftermath, 1956-66', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 35, No.3, 2003, pp.393–416.

population while consolidating their isolation as well as their dependency to the Israeli dominant structures. *National Planning and Building Law* of 1965, for example, served alienation of the Palestinian Arabs from the system by not recognizing some of the Palestinian Arab villages within the borders of Israel and denying basic services like transportation, water, electricity, sewage, communications⁸⁵. Some 60,000 Arab Bedouin citizens of Israel, who lived in the *Naqab* and throughout the country, became illegal as a result of the enactment of *the National Planning and Building Law (1965)* when their lands were declared as non-residential zones and partially appropriated by the state⁸⁶.

In the same year (1965) an amendment to the Absentees' Property Law, transferred the management of the *Waqf* properties of the Palestinian Arab Muslim population to Israeli government-appointed committees, which had full capacity of administering these properties without requiring any consultation with the Palestinian Arab Muslim community.⁸⁷ Implementing land and property policies legalized under this amendment, Israeli ruling elite gradually diminished possibilities of self-empowerment and self-governance, which could be anchored in the rights over the *Waqf* lands and properties. Apart from that, land-planning policies, which were based on confiscations of large segments of the Palestinian Arab land, resulted in a process of proletarianization of the Palestinian Arab rural population. Furthermore, in this period, city planning, housing and urbanization processes were led by the Israeli authorities in line with the goal of de-Arabization of the spaces as well as their names. Former Arab urban areas were Judaized through repopulation of these areas by the Jews and by changing the names of these localities. Ein Hod (previously Ayn Hawd), Bet Shean (Beisan), Ashkelon (Al-Majdal) and many other former Arab localities were connected

⁸⁵ David McDowall, **The Palestinians The Road to Nationhood**, Minority Rights Publications, London, 1994, p.47

⁸⁶ http://www.monabaker.com/pMachine/more.php?id=A210_0_1_0_M

⁸⁷ Ilan Saban, "Minority Rights in Deeply Divided Societies: A Framework for Analysis and the Case of the Arab Palestinian Minority in Israel", *International Law and Politics*, Vol. 36, No.4, 2004, p.958

to the “Jewish settlement system” in a “process of transforming the pre-state colonial urban system of Palestine into the urban system of the emerging nation-state”⁸⁸. These processes of urbanization took place along with the controlled processes of proletarianization of the Palestinian Arab community.

2.3.2. Economic Sphere

This period was characterized by economic nationalism and highly commanded economic structuring in Israeli economy. Central actor in the economic sphere was the newly built Israeli state and its institutions such as the *General Organization of Workers in Israel (Histadrut)*. Within this context, main concern of Jewish dominant economic elite was to maintain control over the dynamics and processes of the Israeli economy such as employment, trade, growth, investments while incorporating new Jewish immigrants into the new economic structure through the state-led labor market and thus facilitating their social integration as well as gaining their consent to the legitimacy of existing regime⁸⁹. In this era, Israeli ruling economic elite’s relationship with the Palestinian Arab citizens generally took place in the area of employment and through the dominant structures and processes of labor market. In fact, Palestinian Arab community was an important segment of new Israeli society, which could provide unprotected and unskilled cheap labor for the newly emerging labor intensive industries such as agriculture and construction. While incorporating the Palestinian Arab to the dominant structures and processes of Israeli economic system, Israeli ruling elite mainly utilized the military governance as regulatory mechanism in controlling the process of Palestinian Arab proletarianization and entry of Palestinian Arab citizens into Israeli labor market⁹⁰.

⁸⁸ Arnon Golan, ‘Jewish Settlement of Former Arab Towns and Their Incorporation into the Israeli Urban System (1948-50)’ *Israel Affairs*, Vol.9, No.1-2, pp. 149 – 164.

⁸⁹ Zeev Rosenhek, “The Political Dynamics of a Segmented Labor Market”, *Acta Sociologica*, Vol.46, No.3, 2003, p.235

⁹⁰ *Ibid.* p.236

Israeli ruling elite tried to establish necessary mechanisms to control the process of proletarianization of the Palestinian Arab population under the military governance as well. In pre-state period, *Keren Keymeth LeIsrael* (or Jewish National Fund), the leading institution of the Jewish bourgeoisie in designing and implementing the policies of land acquisition⁹¹, had played an important role in Judaization of the labor force in the acquired land through using means as Hebrew labor regulation. This regulation had prevented Arab labor to work in the *Keren Keymeth* – owned lands as well as other Jewish owned lands and enterprises⁹². Thus, the wave of ethnic segregation of labor also took part parallel to the socialist movements, which tried to promote solidarity of Palestinian Arab and Jewish labor. In fact, as Rosenhek stated, political supervision and control of the labor market had been a fundamental constituent of the Zionist state and nation-building⁹³. This political regulatory mission was undertaken by the *Histadrut* after the establishment of the Israeli state.

One of the key mechanisms of control and regulation in the labor market was the *Histadrut's labor exchanges*, which interlinked the Palestinian Arab workers with the Israeli labor market. These mechanisms ensured prevention of the uncontrolled entry of the Palestinian Arab workers into the Israeli labor market following the process of their *proletarianization* until the demand for wage labor surpassed the Jewish supply⁹⁴. Another significant role *Histadrut's labor exchanges* was the establishment and maintenance of political collaboration of the Palestinian Arab workers with the ruling elite. For Israeli authorities, dependency of the Palestinian Arab labor to the *Histadrut* would also facilitate political recruitment of Palestinian Arab support for the ruling elite as well as prevention of Palestinian Arab political mobilization by the potential

⁹¹ Uri Davis and Walter Lehn, "And the Fund Still Lives: The Role of the Jewish National Fund in the Determination of Israel's Land Policies", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1978, p. 3

⁹² Sabri Jiryis, "The Land Question in Israel", *MERIP Reports*, No. 47, 1976, p.5

⁹³ Rosenhek, (2003), *op.cit.*, p.234

⁹⁴ Joel Beinin, "Political Economy and Public Culture in a State of Constant Conflict: 50 Years of Jewish Statehood", *Jewish Social Studies*, Vol.4, No. 3, 1998, p.103.

counter-hegemonic movements. Thus, *Histadrut Executive* of May 1953, which initiated partial integration of Palestinian Arab wage labor into the *Histadrut* structure, aimed to consolidate their dependency to the dominant economic structures and institutions.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, as a general characteristic of the era this integration took place in an exclusionary mode. In fact, Palestinian Arab labor was excluded from the *Histadrut's* overall structure of social and economic securities that mainly served to protect rights of Jewish wage labor.

With the economic boom and full employment from late 1950s to 1965, controlled proletarianization of the Palestinian Arab citizens under labor exchanges gained impetus with the parallel deterritorialization of the Palestinian Arab population through the land planning and confiscation policies of the ruling elite. With the *Employment Service Act* of 1959, ruling elite established an *Employment Service*, which would regulate relations of the Palestinian Arab workers with the Israeli labor market. This institution, however, did not improve unprotected status and socio-economic security of the Palestinian Arab wage labor. In fact, the economic crisis of 1965-1967, which hit especially unskilled-labor-intensive construction and agriculture sectors in Israel, revealed insecure status of the Palestinian Arab wage labor with the increased unemployment levels among them. As the organization of the Israeli labor market had been designed along the ethno-national lines⁹⁶, main concern of the Israeli ruling elite continued to secure protection of the Jewish immigrant labor and maintaining control over the Palestinian Arab population in order to prevent its mobilization by counter-hegemonic movements.

2.3.3. Socio-cultural Sphere

Following the establishment of Israeli state, Israeli dominant educational elite adopted pedagogic policies of the *British Mandatory Administration* regarding Palestinian Arab

⁹⁵ Wiemer, *op.cit.*, (1983), p.39

⁹⁶ Rosenhek, (2003) *op.cit.*, p.238

education in order to prevent utilization of Palestinian Arab educational tools and mechanisms for generating counter-hegemonic consciousness against the Israeli state building and consolidation processes. In this respect, as in the case of British mandatory practices, although Palestinian Arab schools were managed by the Palestinian Arab principals and teachers, institutional structure, staffing, curricula, textbooks, and budget of Palestinian Arab education was designed, controlled and monitored by the Israeli ruling elite. Under the military rule, Palestinian Arab education suffered from Israeli policies of control, which resulted in acute problems such as, insufficient educational budget, constrained and controlled programs of study, professional recruitment monitored by the security checks, inadequate and outdated textbooks, disallowance of supplementary pedagogic sources and materials⁹⁷. This reflected the quantitative and qualitative inequality as well as disparities of investment on education between the dominant and subordinate educational systems⁹⁸. These policies took place in line with the objectives of Israeli ruling elite of creating a dependent and strictly controlled educational system, which would serve curtailing self-empowerment and self-governance capacity of Palestinian Arab population. Through effective containment of Palestinian Arab history, culture, identity and contemporary political issues in the content of education, Israeli ruling elite intended to pacify a pedagogic counter-hegemonic consciousness building and activism among the Palestinian Arab youth.

Thus, in this period, military government utilized the education system as a tool for political purposes especially in positioning the Palestinian Arab citizens within Israeli society⁹⁹. *The Law of State Education* of 1953 maintained dominant values of the

⁹⁷ Ismael Abu Saad and Duane Champagne, "A Historical Context of Palestinian Arab Education", *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 49, No.8, 2006, pp. 1035-1055

⁹⁸ Daphna Golan Agnon, 'Separate but not Equal: Discrimination against Palestinian Arab Students in Israel', *Education, Social Development and Empowerment among Indigenous Peoples and Minorities: International Perspectives*, Negev Center for Regional Development, Beer-Sheva, 2005, pp. 300-

⁹⁹ Ismael Abu Saad, "Palestinian Education in Israel: The Legacy of the Military Government", *Holy Land Studies*, Vol.5, No.1, 2006, pp.21-56

Jewish culture as one of the priorities of Israeli education as well as promoting loyalty to the state and the Jewish people¹⁰⁰. According to *Saad*, the Israeli educational structure developed within the framework of an Israeli system of control, which was based on segmentation, dependence and co-option of the Palestinian Arab citizens¹⁰¹. In this respect, educational structure was designed to pursue two parallel sets of pedagogical policy with regard to the education of the Palestinian Arab community. Primary set of policies concentrated on the maintenance and consolidation of control mechanisms over the Palestinian Arab education, which was inherited from the British colonial rule. Second group of policies aimed to prevent development of Palestinian identity and consciousness among the Palestinian Arab population.

By the means of military government, Israeli dominant elite promoted erosion of the Palestinian Arab self-governing potential and rights in many other areas in this period. Apart from the exerting control over the Palestinian Arab media and precluding possibility of an autonomous Palestinian Arab higher education institution in Israel, the dominant elite implemented various policies in order to prevent development of widespread intra-communal consciousness and counter-hegemonic potential for self-governance among the Palestinian Arab citizens. In this respect, it adopted a course of action, which included elimination of pre-state self-governing institutions such as *Waqf*, disallowance of activities of the Palestinian Arab private bodies such as private schools through certain restrictions; disapproval of establishment of self-governing bodies such as religious councils. In addition, it tried to reduce self-governing capacity of the existing Palestinian Arab public institutions such as *Sharia* courts and public schools by intensification of control over them through controlled staffing and planning policies as well as by increasing their economic dependence to the dominant economic structure¹⁰². Consequently, all these policies served the primary goal of the Israeli

¹⁰⁰ Ismael Abu Saad, "State-Controlled Education and Identity Formation Among the Palestinian Arab Minority", *American Behaviouralist Scientist*, Vol.49, No.8, 2006, p.1088

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p.1087

¹⁰² Saban, (2004), *op.cit.*, p.959

dominant elite with regard to the Palestinian Arab citizens of restraining counter-hegemonic potential among the community.

2.3.4. Palestinian Arab Response

2.3.4.1. Palestinian Arab Parliamentary Movements

As the main concern of the powerless and disorientated Palestinian Arab groups was to survive in the first decades of the post-1948 period, they tried to find the ways of “practical accommodation”¹⁰³ with the newly emerged Jewish socio-political and economic entity. Thus, in this period, *collaboration* with the dominant structures became an important phenomenon among the Palestinian Arab citizens in their interactions with the existing regime.¹⁰⁴ As Sadi argued, especially under the military governance, the Israeli state incorporated the Palestinian Arab citizens between 1948 and 1970 through a system of collaboration¹⁰⁵. In fact, the military governance provided necessary conditions and circumstances, which was conducive for such collaboration at different levels. Notwithstanding attempts of different segments of Israeli historic bloc towards easing restrictions of the Israeli dictatorship over the Palestinian Arab population, until late 1960s collaboration was the overriding mode of interaction of the subordinate population with the dominant ruling elite.

This mode of interaction was also dominant in the political sphere. Idea of *Mapai*-affiliated Palestinian Arab lists was mainly based on the accommodation of Palestinian Arab traditional political leaders in the election lists of the dominant *Mapai* party in return to their collaboration in obtaining Palestinian Arab votes for the *Mapai*. These lists and the idea of collaboration, which was inherent in them survived until the

¹⁰³ Eliezer Ben Rafael, *The Emergence of Ethnicity, Cultural Groups and Social Conflict in Israel*, 1982, Westport Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1982, p.208

¹⁰⁴ Ahmad Sa’di, ‘The Incorporation of the Palestinian Minority by the Israeli State, 1948-1970: On the Nature, Transformation, and Constraints of Collaboration’, *Social Text*, Vol. 21, No 2, 2003, pp. 75-94

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

elections of 1981. Within this period, *Agriculture and Development*, *Arab List for Bedouins and Villagers*, *Cooperation and Brotherhood*, *Democratic List for Israeli Arabs*, *Democratic List for Nazareth*, *Progress and Development*, *Progress and Labor* and *United Arab List* were the affiliated lists to the *Mapai*. Although list-system was abandoned in 1981, tendency of accommodating Palestinian Arab political leaders by the Zionist parties continued in order to attract the votes of Palestinian Arab community. In fact, in this era Palestinian Arab lists functioned very affectively for satisfying the pragmatic interests of traditional leadership while providing the Israeli ruling elite guaranteed electorate without needing to involve or campaign within the isolated Palestinian Arab community. Correspondingly, it provided the necessary socio-economic and political means for the traditional Palestinian Arab leadership in order to consolidate their central role in organization and administration of traditional Palestinian Arab community through strengthening their distributive capacities.

Apart from collaboration, Palestinian Arab citizens gained access to the political sphere of dominant Israeli system by the activities of *Mapam* and Israeli Communist Party. Rejecting any contradiction between the progressive Zionism and progressive Arab nationalism, Mapam's effort concentrated on acceptance of Zionism by the Palestinian Arab community as guiding ideology in the state of Israel¹⁰⁶. It showed deep interest in prevailing over the national resentment in Israel facilitated inter-communal activities such as Arab youth camps of 1954 for spreading the Zionist ideology among the Palestinian community. Furthermore, Mapam was the first Zionist political party which accepted the Palestinian Arab citizens as members as early as 1954 while affiliating Palestinian Arab lists to the party from 1951 onwards¹⁰⁷.

Another important political mechanism for the Palestinian Arab citizens for expressing their political and socio-economic demands from the Israeli dominant structures and processes was the Israeli Communist Party. It was the only non-Zionist platform,

¹⁰⁶ Wiemer, (1983) op.cit. p.40

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., pp.40-41

which was composed of Jewish, and Palestinian Arab political leaders and activists. Despite its anti-Zionist stance however, the Communist party did not appear as a counter-hegemonic movement in Israel from the very beginning. As the *Communist Party* leadership concerned more on the status of the party as a legitimate political institution that would operate within the Israeli legal structure and serve a comparative moderation. It did not present a counter-hegemonic project that would be detached from the dominant system. In fact, leadership of the Israeli communist party opted for an institutional and constitutional reform within the existing system to embrace both Jewish and Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel rather than revolutionary or evolutionary change through a counter-hegemonic mobilization of the masses.

2.3.4.2. Palestinian Arab Counter-hegemonic Movements

Al-Ard movement was the first and only organized movement that put emphasis on the *Palestinianness* of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel as a basis for counter-hegemonic expression in this period. From 1959 to 1965, *al-Ard* movement emerged as the main counter-hegemonic organization of the Palestinian Arab citizens. Al Ard movement was established in 1959 as a Pan-Arab political platform. Mansur Kardosh, Habib Qa'uqji, and Sabri Jirys were among its leaders. Between the 1959 and 1961, Al-Ard expressed its discontent with by rejecting the possibility of its reform from within the Israeli system and it boycotted the *Knesset* elections. It tried to establish alternative structures for the development of Pan-Arab consciousness and political self-empowerment among the Palestinian Arab community against the Israeli dominant structures through public information and propaganda campaigns, publication of newspapers, establishing an alternative economic infrastructure for communal self-sufficiency, international propaganda campaigns¹⁰⁸. With its activities, the movement exerted a challenge to the dominant structures and processes of Israeli system as well as

¹⁰⁸ Ron Harris, "A Case Study in the Banning of Political Parties: The Pan Arab Movement of El-Ard and the Israeli Supreme Court", 2004, bepress Legal Series, Working Paper 349, pp.10-12 <http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/349>

traditional structures of Palestinian Arab community¹⁰⁹. Considered as a serious threat and suppressed by the government in the 1960s through the means of shutting down the newspapers of *Al Ard*, rejecting its demands for establishment of its companies, undermining its demands for establishing associations. In 1965, *Al Ard* decided to wage its struggle through the parliamentary means within the Israeli political system. However, its demand to run in the national elections under the name of ‘Socialist List’ was rejected by the Israeli authorities. Although it waned from the political sphere shortly after its disqualification for the elections, *Al Ard* exemplified possibility of an organized counter-hegemonic reaction against the attempts of Israeli ruling elite towards peripheral integration of the Palestinian Arab citizenry into Israeli national collective.

Being aware of the discontent of the Palestinian Arab citizenry on their peripherization in the Israeli national-collective, Israeli ruling classes tried to prevent transformation of such discontentment into a counter-hegemonic institutionalization among the Palestinian Arabs. The statement of the *Israeli Supreme Court* dated 1964 revealed concerns of the Israeli ruling classes on this issue very clearly as they declined the appeal of the *Al-Ard*, a Palestinian Arab activist group, for obtaining official status as an association:

It is a very important rule that only extremely weighty considerations may prohibit the registration of an Association. The freedom to organize is one of the mainstays of the democratic regime and one of the basic rights of the citizen. Heaven forbid that we should revoke this right and proscribe an Association simply because one or another of its aims is to aspire toward a change in the legal situation existing in the State. The present situation might be in need of reform from this or another point of view and a movement wishing to organize public opinion in the State in order to bring about reform of the situation may do this within the framework of an Association registered by law, but no free regime can give its hand and conscience to a movement which undermines the regime itself.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Michal Shamir and John L. Sullivan, “Jews and Arabs in Israel: Everybody Hates Somebody, Sometime”, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.29, No.2, 1985, p.297

In fact, in Gramscian terms all these coercive practices of the Israeli state revealed its weaknesses in the sense that for Gramsci it was only the weak states that generally depend on the “threat or use of force implied in their domination”¹¹¹. Strong states, on the other hand, lead the different segments of the societies mainly through practices of hegemonic processes¹¹². In this respect, as mentioned above, the main tenets of hegemonic nature of relationship were far from being in function at this initial stage. Hegemony necessitated integration of hegemonized into the system of the hegemon with the consent of the hegemonized. Since the Palestinian Arab community was separated from the Jewish majority or isolated within the society, there would be no basis for hegemonic relationship between the dominant and the subordinate.

Another requirement for a functioning hegemonic relationship was the conscious consent of Arab minority for such integration to the political system dominated by the political actors of the Jewish majority. Being under the military governance of Israel, it was not possible to expect a conscious and internalized consent from the Palestinian Arab community, for the hegemonic position of Ashkenazi-dominated Jewish ruling elite within the Israeli political arena. In fact, they were under the coercive domination of the Israeli establishment which was represented by the Military government acting under the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 and their political, social, religious and municipal institutions were under the supervision of Israeli authorities. Thus, in general, it was the "coercion" and pragmatic concerns for survival that determined the nature of relationship rather than the consent. As a result, none of these two conditions existed in the first decades of the political relationship between the major Jewish political parties and Palestinian Arab community in Israeli political arena.

On the Palestinian Arab side, in the first period, the political sphere of the Palestinian Arab community can be characterized as isolationism, dependence on the Jewish lists

¹¹¹ Walter L. Adamson, **Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Gramsci's Political and Cultural Theory**, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1980, p.171

¹¹² Ibid.

for political representation in Israeli political arena, *hamula's* domination of intra-communal political sphere. These characteristics were rooted in several factors such as trauma of turning into a minority; absence of experienced political leadership; unfamiliarity with the language and the with the new rules of the political game which would be shaped by the Jewish political elite; restrictive nature of the Military administration and finally unwillingness of Jewish political organizations in welcoming them to their ranks¹¹³.

Lacking of a considerable degree of political organization was closely linked to the widely spaced number of the political representative bodies. This isolation had two implications for the relationship in terms of hegemony from the Arab minority's side. First, it prevented interaction between the two sides and thus turned it less viable for the 'future hegemon' to hegemonize the Palestinian Arab community on the basis of imposing the moral, intellectual and political leadership of the Jewish political elite. Secondly, due to lack of functioning interactive communication, Arab minority had to face the coercive phase of hegemony through its direct relation with the military government. Because the indirect relationship of the Arab minority with the Israeli political arena was subject to the filtering process of the military government, it would not be possible for the Arab minority to adopt the norms and values of Israeli political culture, which was shaped under the leadership of Jewish political elite. There were some unsuccessful counter-hegemonic attempts of creating alternative political sphere by Palestinian Arab movements such as *al-Ard* instead of seeking full representation in Israeli political arena. Nevertheless, they were not very successful.

At the end of this era, practical integration of the Palestinian Arab citizens in the dominant structures and processes began to take place gradually under the control of the Israeli authorities until the last years of the military governance over the Palestinian Arabs. In this respect, transformation into the passive revolutionary phase from the dictatorship occurred in stages through several mechanisms in social, economic, and

¹¹³ Landau, (1993), op.cit.

political spheres. In this respect, early 1960s witnessed signs of gradual transformation of the dictatorship period. Proposals for the abolishment of the military governance over the Palestinian Arab community were an important sign of passive revolutionary transformation in the attitudes of the Israeli dominant political elite. In economic terms, the year 1965 witnessed another sign of transformation from dictatorship to the passive revolutionary phase. In this year, the *Histadrut* allowed the Palestinian Arab citizens to obtain full membership to the most dominant economic institution of Israel and changed its name from “*the General Federation of Jewish Workers in Israel*” to “*the General Federation of Laborers in the Land of Israel*”¹¹⁴. Such passive revolutionary acts would increasingly change the nature of relationship between the Palestinian Arab community and Israeli dominant structures and processes in the following periods.

2.3.5. Hamula Structure in This Period

In the early years of Israeli state, Israeli passive revolution was maintained over the Palestinian Arab population through utilization of state-sponsored pragmatic, traditional Arab leaders as well as by means of intra-communal *hamula* and religious networks in Palestinian Arab community. As the Palestinian Arab intellectual leadership diminished as a consequence of 1948 war, leadership vacuum was filled by the traditional chiefdoms of the *hamulas* especially during the military rule. Israeli ruling elite also promoted *hamula*-based local organization and governance of Palestinian Arab communities. In fact, restructuring of Palestinian Arab local governance around the institutional framework of local councils and *mukhtars* in the villages gained impetus between 1948 and 1968 with the establishment of 42 local councils and 18 self governing villages¹¹⁵. In other words, three quarters of the Palestinian Arab population was incorporated into the Israeli local government scheme under the supervision of Israeli ruling elite. In this period, *hamula* structure served as an

¹¹⁴ Beinun, (1998), op.cit., p.104.

¹¹⁵ Daniel J. Elazar, ‘Local Government in Israeli Society’, Michael Curtis and Mordechai S. Chertoff (eds.) , *Israel: Social Structure and Change*, Transaction Books, New Jersey, New Brunswick, 1973, p.24

agent of Israeli “dictatorship” over the Palestinian Arab citizens. Pragmatic interests of the *hamulas* surpassed the ethno-national, religious and individual aspirations of the Palestinian Arab citizens in post-1948 era.

In fact, even the extension of the military rule from the 1962 to 1966 was provided by the leaders of *hamulas* who voted for the continuation of the military rule in 1962. In 1962, various groups in *Knesset* presented a proposal to lift the military rule over the Palestinian Arab citizens. In the course of the voting on this decision the Arab MKs Jabr Moade and Diyab Ovid voted in favor of the military rule when the proposal was rejected by 56 to 57 votes¹¹⁶.” As a result, military administration continued until 1966 as thanks to the support of two Arab members of *Knesset* to the decision of *Mapai* towards prolongation military rule over the Palestinian Arab population¹¹⁷.

As the dominant Israeli political elite perceived *hamulas* as an important agent of maintaining political influence among the traditional Palestinian Arab community, they politically manipulated the *hamula* structure by granting certain favors and benefits. *Hamulas* were also perceived as agents of integration of Palestinian Arab community to the Israeli system by the *Mapai* leadership. *Mapai* followed a dual policy of coopting the *hamula* leaderships to the Israeli political system while manipulating inter-*hamula* or intra-*hamula* conflicts in order to achieve certain political goals in the Israeli power struggle in political sphere.

For Lustick, passive revolutionary acts of the Israeli state in this period were the “side payments”, which were given to the Palestinian Arab elites, opinion leaders or *hamula* chiefs in order to co-opt them into the system¹¹⁸. In Lustick’s conceptualization, such cooptation did not require internalization of the Israeli dominant values as long as they

¹¹⁶ Issa Jaber, *Arabs in Israel and Their Political Participation* (in Turkish) master thesis, 1984 Ankara University, Faculty of Political Sciences, p.122

¹¹⁷ Harris, (2004), op.cit.

¹¹⁸ Ian Lustick, **Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority**, University of Texas Press , Austin 1980, p.77

provided functional support for the actual surveillance and control of the Palestinian Arab population. These passive revolutionary side payments proved to be successful in containing any possibility of emergence of a systematic counter-hegemonic movement among the Palestinian Arab community. In fact, mutually beneficial interaction between the political and socio-economic objectives of Israeli ruling elite the *hamula* pragmatism of *hamula* leadership prevented recruitment of Palestinian Arab rural population by the counter-hegemonic movements such as *Al-Ard*. In this respect, the counter-hegemonic activists perceived *hamulas* as primary obstacles in front of development and spread of intra-communal counter-hegemonic consciousness among the Palestinian Arab population.

However, in mid-1960s nationalist counter-hegemonic movements began to flourish among the Palestinian Arab community and *hamula*'s dominant role as an organizer institution of the Palestinian Arab traditional society was challenged by the young and nationalistic leadership within Palestinian Arab community.

2.4. 1967-1977 Transition from Dictatorship to Israeli Passive Revolution

The era between 1967 and 1977 was marked with important developments such as abolishment of military rule and exposition to Palestinians in the *West Bank* and *Gaza Strip* following the occupation of these territories by Israel. Abolishment of military rule meant broadening of area of maneuver for the Palestinian Arab citizens in economic, political and socio-cultural processes in Israel.

With the occupation of the *West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS)* Palestinian Arab community was exposed to the Palestinians in these territories whom they were isolated from 1948. As the Palestinian Arab community became more involved in the affairs of Palestinian diasporas and the situation in the *WBGS*, some of its political activity focused on the solidarity with demands of these populations. Thus, there was an increased support for the movements in the Palestinian territories as well as struggle for civic and national rights.

Furthermore, regional developments in this era also affected the nature of relationship between the Palestinian Arabs and the Israeli structures. Non-responsive stance of the Palestinian Arabs to the Arab calls for collaboration and insurrection against Israeli authorities during the *Yom Kippur War* of 1973, for example, indicated lack of belief to the susceptibility of the existing Israeli dominant structures, if not their loyalty to the Israeli state. Therefore, they did not fit the image of natural collaborators of “their people” in a case of war between them and “their country”. In this respect, the peace efforts of President *Anwar Sadat* of Egypt with Israel, which were materialized in late 1970s with the peace initiative of 1977 and the *Camp David Accords* of 1978, decreased the regional Arab pressures on the Palestinian Arabs with regard to dilemmatic abundance between “their people” and “their country”.

2.4.1. Political Sphere

This transition period from the dictatorship reflected the indecisiveness of Israeli ruling elite on preferences between the coercive and passive revolutionary policies. It also revealed initial signs of a crisis in Jewish historical bloc marked by increased disagreements between the statist elite under the leadership of *Mapai* and the more ethno-nationalist Jewish elite under *Herut* (and later *Likud*) on the future policies of the state following the occupation of the *West Bank and Gaza Strip*. In fact, the Jewish consensus, which remained unquestioned until the *Yom Kippur War* of 1973, began to decline in line with the rise of Sephardi political elite within the Israeli dominant power structures¹¹⁹ and their increased criticism of the policies implemented by the Ashkenazi-dominated ruling elite during and after the war. There was also an increasing disagreement between the “moderate” and “hawkish” segments of ruling elite on the policy choices with regard to the Palestinian Arab community in this period.

¹¹⁹ Don Peretz and Gideon Doron, **The Government and Politics of Israel**, Westview Press, Oxford, 1997, pp.54-5

As indicated in the historical part, initially, main concern of the Israeli ruling elite in this era continued to be pacification of counter-hegemonic mobilization and institutionalization of Palestinian Arab community in order to prevent emergence of organized counter-hegemonic upheavals among them. As a mechanism and agent of direct coercive control over the Palestinian community such as military government did not exist any longer, Israeli ruling elite turned to passive revolutionary acts in addition to less coercive methods of maintaining dominance. Thus, tasks of the military government in controlling and supervising affairs of the Palestinian Arab citizens were transferred to the specialists in the Arab departments of the dominant Israeli political and socio-economic structures. However, as this era also witnessed the beginning of polarization of Jewish political elite and crisis of Jewish *historic bloc* in Israel, Palestinian Arab political elite began to become more capable of utilizing internal crisis of Jewish historic in order to achieve its political and socio-economic goals. In this respect, main institutions of Israeli dominant establishment contributed in implementing both passive revolutionary and coercive policies towards the Palestinian Arab community throughout the 1970s.

In this era one of the most significant passive revolutionary act was The Pan Proposal of 1970, which elaborated possibilities of reintroduction of agricultural industry and mechanization in agriculture in the regions where Palestinian Arab citizens habituated¹²⁰. It aimed to obtain consent of the Palestinian Arab community for the existing structure through controlled development of the Palestinian Arab localities. Parallel to agricultural industry, Israeli ruling elite increased the allocation of land for industrial zones to improve industrial infrastructure in these regions¹²¹. These passive revolutionary acts took place parallel to increase of unskilled Palestinian Arab labor within the as a result of interrelated processes of dislocation and *proletarianization* as

¹²⁰ Fred M. Gottheil, 'On the Economic Development of the Arab Region in Israel', , Michael Curtis and Mordechai S. Chertoff (eds.) , **Israel: Social Structure and Change**, Transaction Books, New Jersey, New Brunswick, 1973, p.24

¹²¹ Michael Sofer, Izak Schnell and Israel Drori, "Industrial Zones and Arab Industrialization in Israel", *Human Organization*, Vol.55, No.4, 1996, p.467

the land expropriations continued and skilled labor was employed mainly in the industrial plants in the more developed Jewish towns¹²². These acts resulted in emergence and development of a peripheral industry in the Palestinian Arab localities.

Another considerable passive revolutionary act was the organization of a meeting about the problems of the Palestinian Arab citizens by the Labor Party on June 19, 1976 Labor Party. Until that year, dominant political parties within the Jewish historic bloc had not initiated a meeting, which solely focused on the problems and demands of Palestinian Arab community. Other passive revolutionary acts included decisions on creating several jobs for Arabs in the ministries in 1971, acceptance of Palestinian Arabs as Labor party members in 1973 and formation of new committees to deal with the demands of the Palestinian Arab community in 1976 following the Land Day protests¹²³.

Continuation of coercive nature of the dominant structures can be best exemplified with the dominant elite's land policies. Although these policies were proclaimed to be erected on the consent of the inhabitants of the Palestinian Arab populated localities, their implementation was anchored in institutionalized pressure and coercion. In fact, in the case of removal of the Bedouin Arab population in Negev in 1970s and 1980s:

When [Moshe] Dayan, [then Minister of Agriculture] first openly broached the plan to transfer the Bedouin of the Negev, everyone was assured that any implementation of transfer would be strictly voluntary. The increasing tendency to apply pressure that may be noted since then shows that the stress is beginning to be laid on coercion, in one way or another.¹²⁴

¹²² Ibid. pp.465-7

¹²³ Wiemer, (1983), op.cit., p.52

¹²⁴ Yitzhak Oded, "Bedouin Lands Threatened by Takeover", *New Outlook*, Vol.7, No.9, November-December 1964, p.51, Quoted in Nur Masalha, **A Land Without People**, Faber and Faber, London, 1997, p. 139

In this respect, it was assumed that the evacuation and resettlement of the inhabitants of the Palestinian Arab villages would take place within Israeli legal framework by obtaining consent of Palestinian Arab community. However, as the decisions of the dominant elite were not able to gain consent of the Palestinian Arab population, Israeli authorities opted for coercive means. Within this context, the *Green Patrol*, a special unit of the Nature Reserve Authority of the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture, which was established in 1976, turned into coercive apparatus of the Israeli state in the implementation of the evacuation policies¹²⁵. Use of coercive measures by the Green Patrol, such as confiscations, forced evacuations, spraying and destruction of the crops occurred in the reports of Israeli and international press until 2000s¹²⁶. Coercive acts of the Green Patrol were further institutionalized within the Israeli legal framework with a decree of 1979 issued by Ariel Sharon, then the Minister of Agriculture¹²⁷.

On February 29, 1976, decree of Ministry of Finance on the expropriation of lands around the Sakhnin, a village in Galilee region was another example of coercive policies of land planning which would have more severe consequences for the future of relationship between the Israeli ruling elite and the Palestinian Arab community. The decree caused rigorous opposition from the Palestinian Arab residents of the region. This robust wave of opposition activated Palestinian Arab parliamentary and extra-parliamentary organizations to take some measures against the land policies of the ruling elite. Land day protests of March 30, 1976, which took place against the confiscation of the lands of the Palestinian Arab citizens, resulted in clashes between the Israeli police and the Palestinian Arab citizens. As the coercive measures of the ruling elite caused killing of six Palestinian Arab citizens and injury of many others, *The Land Day* (*Yom al-Ard*) protest of March 30, 1976 became an important point of

¹²⁵ David K. Shipler, "Israelis Drive Bedouins of Negev into Closed Zones", *The New York Times*, December 26, 1981, Late City Final Edition, Section 1, p.2

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ Masalha, (1997), *op.cit.*, p. 139

reference for the Palestinian Arab intelligentsia and masses in their further organized reactions against the Israeli ruling classes.

Debates on *the Koenig Report* of 1976 were significant to indicate the indecisiveness of the ruling elite on the nature of policies that should be implemented in regulating the relationship of the dominant structures with the Palestinian Arab community in this period. *The Koenig Report* was a confidential report about the policy guidelines and strategies about the Palestinian citizens of Israel, which was written on April 1976. *Yisrael Koenig*, the author of the report was then the *Northern District Commissioner of the Ministry of the Interior* and a member of the ruling party Alignment. He was known for his unsympathetic and coercive stance and tactics with regard to Palestinian Arab population¹²⁸. Referring to the increased Palestinian nationalism and activism in post-1967 period among the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel as a consequence of their increased interaction with the Palestinians in the *West Bank* and Gaza, the Koenig report presented suggestions to the government in order to contain Palestinian Arab demographic threat by encouraging their emigration. Among these policies there existed promoting study-abroad programs for young Arab students from which they will not be allowed to return Israel, minimizing the quantity of Palestinian Arab employment in Jewish ventures, intensifying control over the political activism of the Palestinian Arab citizens as well as amplifying surveillance activities with regard to the Palestinian Arabs¹²⁹.

The report provided insight both about intensions of decision-making circles of the dominant Israeli authorities with regard to the Palestinian Arab citizens as well as the divisions among the Israeli leadership about the nature and the methods of the domination over the Palestinian Arab population in the 1970s. As revealed by the debates on the report, although one segment of Israeli dominant elite favored the use of coercive means in order to maintain control over the Palestinian Arab community,

¹²⁸ “The Koenig Report: Demographic Racism in Israel”, *MERIP Reports*, No. 51, 1976, pp. 11-14

¹²⁹ Masalha,(1997), *op.cit.*, p. 151

other segment of ruling elite proposed perpetuation of control through implementation of economic passive revolutionary acts.

Leading personality of the passive revolutionary bloc in the ruling elite was *Shmuel Toledano*, the adviser on Arab Affairs to the Prime Minister. *Toledano* suggested a more moderate plan for continuation of control over the Palestinian Arab population. He prioritized consolidation of economic dependence of Palestinian Arab community to Israeli dominant economic structures and processes as a means of exerting dominance over them. *Toledano* suggested establishment of a hegemonic system, which would gradually incorporate the Palestinian Arab citizens to the decision-making mechanisms of economic and political spheres. *Hisrtadrut's* Arab Department also supported the *Toledano's* suggestions on increasing dependency of the Palestinian Arab community on the dominant Israeli economic structures while systematically preventing their effective access from the decision-making mechanisms.

Coercive and activist segment of the dominant elite, which was represented by *Israel Koenig*, emphasized the use of coercive mechanisms to achieve permanent control over the Palestinian Arab population. Transfer was an option in the agenda of coercive bloc of the ruling elite in order to provide effective control over the potentially threatening Palestinian Arab community. Koenig suggested intensification of systematic efforts towards de-territorialization of the Palestinian Arab community, pacification and deformation of the Palestinian Arab political activism, preventing their intellectual and pedagogical development, incapacitating counter-hegemonic Palestinian Arab consciousness based on denominators of Palestinian identity, encouraging their immigration outside Israel and debilitating socio-economic security of the Palestinian Arab citizens within the existing Israeli system¹³⁰.

¹³⁰ Ahmet Sa'adi, "The Koenig report and Israeli policy towards the Palestinian minority, 1965-1976: old wine in new bottles", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Summer 2003 and Khalil Nakhleh, **Palestinian Dilemma, Nationalist Consciousness and University Education in Israel**, AAUG Monograph Series, The Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Detroit, Michigan, 1979, p.111

These oppressive policy lines of the coercive bloc within the ruling elite encouraged extremist circles in the Jewish political society like Rabbi *Kahane* and his followers as well. *Kahane* suggested imposition of the values through forcing the Palestinian Arab citizens to choose either submission to them or leaving the country.¹³¹ Although these ideas were not immediately accepted and implemented by the ruling elite, they first pervaded, then gradually dominated the mainstream policy making mechanisms especially following the *Likud*'s election victory in 1977. In fact, dissolution of the consent among the different constituents of Jewish historic bloc that officially dated back *Mapai- Mizrahi* agreement of June 19, 1947 resulted in increasing dependence of Israeli ruling elite to small extreme political organizations.

As the polarization between the Labor-led Ashkenazi and *Likud*-led *Mizrahi* began to deepen both segments of the Jewish historic bloc amplified their efforts towards finding new allies within the Israeli political sphere. Given that the ranks of alliances became apparent, either *Labor* or *Herut* (then *Likud*) did not have many options to increase their political constitutions other than appealing different segments of the Palestinian Arab community for their political support. Thus, conflict of interests, which appeared in the hegemonic bloc of Israeli ruling group with the rise of Sephardic Jews in political arena in 1970s, resulted in possibility of emergence of new cliental relationships with a newly emerging segment of Jewish political elite. This new elite was organized under the leadership of *Herut* and *Liberal Party* and based its power on another peripheral group, Oriental Jews, in Israeli society. Notwithstanding its pragmatic interest in recruitment of some Palestinian Arab voters, this new political elite, would not be willing to grant concessions to the Palestinian citizens of Israel for securing their long-term political interests as much as their predecessors .

¹³¹ Halpern, (1977), *op.cit.* p. 413

2.4.2. Economic Sphere

In this era, relations of the Palestinian Arab citizens with Israeli economic structure were determined by the dynamics of Israeli economy which were shaped by economic boom of post -1967 War and economic recession following the 1973 Yom Kippur War. While economic growth following the 1967 War transformed the unprotected status of the Palestinian Arab wage labor and resulted in its upward class mobility; post-1973 War economic regulations and welfare policies of Israeli ruling elite with regard to compensation of the impact of recession in Israeli society once more revealed exclusionary nature of peripheral and controlled integration of Palestinian Arab citizens to the Israeli economic system. In fact, notwithstanding improvements in their living standards and upward mobility they were still excluded from the social security system as well as development and infrastructural programs such as *Project Renewal*, which was initiated by Menachem Begin in 1977 to renovate the disadvantaged and neglected neighborhoods of Israeli cities¹³². Thus, contrary to efforts of ruling elite in order to protect the Jewish segment of society from the negative impact of the post-1973 War economic crisis that was exacerbated by the international oil shock of the 1974, no effective measures were taken by the Israeli leadership to provide such protection to their Palestinian Arab citizens.

In addition, although they were incorporated to the structure of *Histadrut* from 1957 onwards, their exclusion from the general structure of the *Histadrut* continued throughout the 1970s. As the exclusionary logic was reflected in the embodiment of Arab Department and Arab Affairs Department in 1970s, the Palestinian Arab workers could not internalize the economic leadership position of the *Histadrut* in these years. They rather perceived membership to the *Histadrut* as an access to the Israeli labor

¹³² Osama Fouad Khalifa, "Arab Political Mobilization and Israeli Responses", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Winter- 2001.

market. In this respect, membership was a pragmatic choice for some segments of Palestinian Arab wage labor as a part of their strategy for survival¹³³.

Prior to 1967, military rule had served protection of Jewish labor from any organized challenge from cheaper Palestinian Arab labor and provided better job opportunities for the Jewish immigrants. Consequently, it had functioned as an apparatus of the dominant structures in segmentation of the class structure. In this respect, even the working class was segmented in itself in Israel. The upper strata was occupied by the Ashkenazi Jews, middle strata was composed of Sephardic and oriental Jewish labor while the Palestinian Arab labor was placed into the bottom level of the class structure especially during the military governance.

Expansion of Israeli economy following the 1967 War created new opportunities for the Palestinian Arab citizens. Growing demand of labor in especially construction sector, which had been mainly employed by the Palestinian Arab citizens, facilitated their situation further. In addition, expansion of state-sponsored defense industry¹³⁴ and allocation of the Jewish labor in military industry due to security concerns resulted in additional employment opportunities for the Palestinian Arab workers due to the labor shortage in other industries.

These changes had a significant impact on the mobility of the Palestinian Arab citizens in the ethno-nationally hierarchical structure of Israeli labor market. After abolishment of the military government and following the Six Days War of 1967, Israeli class structure was further modified by addition of the Palestinian labor from the *West Bank* and *Gaza Strip* in from 1970s onwards. The Palestinian labor from the *West Bank* and *Gaza Strip* complemented the Palestinian Arab labor in Israel rather than competed with it. Thus, flow of the Palestinian unskilled labor from the *West Bank* and *Gaza Strip* in 1970s resulted in intra-class upward mobility for the Palestinian Arab citizens

¹³³ Sharif Kanaana, "Survival Strategies of Arabs in Israel", *MERIP Reports*, No. 41, 1975, p.5

¹³⁴ Linda Sharaby, "Israel's Economic Growth: Success Without Security" *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol.6, No.3, 2002

of Israel. This upward mobility and more institutionalized *proletarianization* process was accompanied by an increased interclass mobility of the Palestinian Arab citizens from the working class to petty bourgeoisie¹³⁵. Significance of such mobility for the Palestinian Arab community was the transformation of their insecure and unprotected status in the Israeli labor market. Although weak position of the Palestinian Arab community in the ethno-national hierarchy of Israeli labor market improved significantly, its peripheral and controlled integration to the dominant economic processes and structures continued in this era.

One of the most important components of such peripheral and controlled integration of Palestinian Arab citizens to the dominant economic structures was the policies of social and economic security, which were pursued by the Israeli dominant elite within the framework of Israeli welfare structuring. As the overlap between the class and ethnic hierarchies became more perceptible in this period of construction of Israeli welfare system, discriminatory economic practices and socio-economic stratification became integral components of both Zionist logic of Israeli ruling elite and inner logic of the Israeli welfare state¹³⁶. In this respect, Israeli state warranted different scales of social and economic security benefits to the dominant group and the subordinate group.

In 1970, a socio-economic security program about the child allowances which was initiated by the Israeli state in 1950s, introduced conditionality of fulfillment of military service in Israeli army in order to access these social security benefits. Considering the impossibility of serving in the Israeli army for the Palestinian Arab population, Israeli ruling elite utilized a “universally legal” method of exclusion¹³⁷ that resulted in further *peripharization* of Palestinian Arab population within the Israeli welfare system. Later in 1970s, this program was extended to the ultra-orthodox Jewish

¹³⁵ Yaish, (2001), op.cit., p.431

¹³⁶ Zeev Rosenhek, “The Exclusionary Logic of the Welfare State”, *International Sociology*, Vol. 14, No.2, 1999, p.196

¹³⁷ Ibid. p.196

families whose members were officially exempted from the military service. By 1977, while the proportion of Jewish families who had access to these special benefits reached 92 per cent, only 8 per cent of the eligible Palestinian Arab families received these benefits¹³⁸.

Furthermore, as the Israeli ruling elite determined the wage policy by taking these benefits into account, Palestinian Arab citizens became victims of double *peripherization* in newly emerging Israeli welfare system. In 1974, following the economic decline after the *Yom Kippur War*¹³⁹, the Israeli economic elite designed and implemented disparate compensation programs for the low-income families of the veterans who served in the Israeli army and for the Palestinian Arab citizens who did not fulfilled such military service¹⁴⁰. As *Rosenhek* argued, these social and economic security schemes of 1970s targeted reducing the scale of Palestinian Arab access to the Israeli welfare system. As the welfare state was a “crucial stratificatory mechanism in advanced capitalism”, stratification of Palestinian Arab citizens in Israeli social security structures allowed smooth functioning of Israeli welfare system for the dominant group throughout the 1970s and 1980s until its dissolution in early 1990s¹⁴¹.

Although the class structure overlapped with ethnic stratification scheme and *proletarianization* processes of the 1970s, such overlap did not lead to development and activation counter-hegemonic consciousness based on class and ethnic awareness and solidarity among the Palestinian Arab citizens. One of the important reasons for absence of such consciousness and activism was the incorporated status of the *Rakah* (New Communist List) within the dominant Israeli socio-economic and political structures and processes notwithstanding its non-Zionist discourse. In fact,

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.207

¹³⁹ Edi Karni, “The Israeli Economy, 1973-1976: A Survey of Recent Developments and a Review of an Old Problem”, *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1979, p. 63

¹⁴⁰ *Rosenhek*, (1999) *op.cit.* , p.208

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.* p.211

notwithstanding its in-system position based on the class interests, it did not manage to establish a cooperation on the basis of class consciousness and solidarity with the subordinate Sephardi and Oriental Jewish proletariat, who, by 1976 continued to occupy lower levels of socio-economic hierarchy in Israeli dominant structures¹⁴². In fact, while the Oriental Jews gradually rose to power positions in the Israeli dominant economic structures, they became perpetrators of policies towards exerting of control over the activities of Palestinian Arab proletariat under the framework of *Histadrut* (the main trade union of Israel) as well as in the local Workers Councils and labor exchanges.

2.4.3. Socio-cultural Sphere

Lack of agreement and commitment among the Palestinian Arab and the Jewish segments of Israeli society on the common values, which would verify *Israeliness* became sharper during the late 1970s especially following the *Knesset* elections of 1977. Increased efforts of the dominant policy making circles towards “repressive uniformity”¹⁴³ in this period annulled the passive revolutionary moves of the precedent Labor governments as well as of some segments of oriental and Sephardic opposition, which took place during the 1960s and early 1970s.

The clash between the passive revolutionary and coercive understanding was also reflected in the policy-making processes on pedagogical development of the Palestinian Arab community in harmony with the Israeli dominant processes. Some set of policies of Israeli ruling elite on Palestinian Arab education after the 1973 October War, reflected their passive revolutionary concerns with regard to redefinition of socio-cultural relationship between the Palestinian Arab community and Israeli dominant structures. The new guidelines of Israeli education system, which was approved in

¹⁴² Yael Yishai, ‘Israel’s Right Wing Jewish Proletariat’ , Moshe Lissak, (ed.), **Stratification in Israeli Society, Ethnic, National and Class Cleavages** Open University Press, Tel-Aviv, 1989

p.237

¹⁴³ Halpern, (1977), op.cit., p. 417

1972 by the Israeli Ministry of Education, put emphasis on the peace culture, loyalty to state, common interests of all citizens, unique characteristics of Palestinian Arab citizens, social and economic integration¹⁴⁴. This passive revolutionary measure signified serious apprehension of some segments of ruling elite of the necessity of redefining the nature of socio-cultural relationship between the Palestinian Arab citizens and the Israeli state. In this respect, main concerns of the ruling elite were creating non-coercive pedagogical mechanisms in order to prevent a possible counter-hegemonic mobilization based on nationalist consciousness.

The *Koenig Report* of the 1976 on the other hand outlined possible ways of exerting coercive control over the socio-cultural development of the Palestinian Arab community. Tightening the requirements for Palestinian Arab students to the institutions of higher education to limit their numbers; directing them to technical schools rather than universities to prevent development nationalistic consciousness among them; sending them foreign countries for educational purposes and preventing their return nor employment ; and enforcing strong procedures against provocative students¹⁴⁵ were most significant examples of such measures. As exemplified in the case of education, the clash of hegemonic and dictatorial understandings were reflected in the policy making and implementation processes of Israeli dominant pedagogical institutions throughout the 1970s.

Another impact of the passive revolutionary stance of the Israeli ruling elite was observed in the socio-cultural organization and institutionalization of the Palestinian Arab community. As a consequence of increased civic activism in this era, Palestinian Arab NGOs appeared to become alternative platforms to express demands and dissatisfactions of different segments of the community in a more institutionalized and systematic way. Establishment of *Acre Arab Women's Organization* in 1975, *Association for Support and Defense of Bedouin Rights* in Israel in 1976, signified

¹⁴⁴ Nakhleh, (1979), op.cit., p.18

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p.111

increased opportunities for civic mobility on specific concerns within the Israeli socio-cultural sphere.

2.4.4. Palestinian Arab Response

The period between 1967 and 1977 witnessed revitalization of Palestinian Arab political activism within the Israeli political system. This era also was marked with attempts of certain Palestinian Arab groups towards generating counter-hegemonic mobilization among the Palestinian Arab citizens through accentuating the national aspirations especially after their encounter with the residents of the occupied territories and the rest of the Arab world. Rise of the PLO in the late 1960s and increased Palestinian activism at regional and international levels also contributed the soul-searching of the Palestinian Arab community in Israel in this period. Within this context, notwithstanding emergence of some significant counter-hegemonic movements, in-system political reorganization in post-Yom Kippur War of 1973 indicated the increasing utilization of *Palestinianness* discourse as an in-system means for mobilization of the Palestinian Arab citizens within the Israeli dominant structure rather than a counter-hegemonic revolutionary tool in a *war of maneuver*.

2.4.4.1. Palestinian Arab Parliamentary Movements

With abolishment of military government and consequent lifting of restrictions on freedom of expression, freedom of association, and political institutionalization of Palestinian Arab community, this period witnessed revitalization of parliamentary activism among the Palestinian Arab community. Introduction of new in-system political movements in addition to the political lists affiliated by the *Mapai* party was an important sign of this revitalization. Most important of these political organizations were *Rakah*, (later formed *Hadash*). Challenging the *Mapai*-dependent political positioning of *Mapai* affiliated Palestinian Arab lists such as *the Progress and Development*, *the Cooperation and Brotherhood*, *Arab List for Bedouin and Villagers*, and *the United Arab List*, with its critical stance against inequalities in Israeli system, *Rakah-Hadash* became a very influential political actor in the Israeli political sphere.

Hadash also exploited the polarization among the Jewish political elite, which deepened prior to elections of 1977.

Rakah's constituency and political influence augmented with its increased Palestinian Arab electorate in this period. It maintained its two seats within the *Knessets* in the elections of 1969 and 1973 respectively. In 1977 elections, *Rakah* was the dominant faction in the *Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash)*, which became an important political platform for Palestinian Arab elite in the Israeli legislative system with its six Members of *Knesset* following the Israeli national elections of 1977¹⁴⁶. It gained significant success among the other Palestinian Arab parliamentary organizations in 1977 elections. Another success of *Hadash* was its incorporation of *Black Panthers*, a Sephardic Jews non-parliamentary faction that criticized the injustices of Ashkenazi –dominated Israeli system against the Oriental and Sephardic Jews. Initially, such a coalition and election alliance between the *Hadash* and *Black Panthers* of Oriental and Sephardic Jews in the 1977 *Knesset* elections signified an important cooperation between the two peripherized segments of Israeli political elite against the hegemonic bloc. However, *Hadash* did not manage to mobilize greater segment of Oriental Jews through the discourse of solidarity of the subaltern groups. In fact, even the *Black Panthers* established their own political group within the *Knesset* by separating from *Hadash* following the elections. Nevertheless, its inclusion of a non-parliamentary groups such as *Black Panthers* of the Israeli Oriental Jews by the *Hadash* was important for indicating efforts of Palestinian Arab political elite to extend its in-system influence through collaboration with the Jewish groups, who opposed the nature of the Israeli political structure under the dominance of Ashkenazi Jews.

Another sign of Palestinian Arab political revival was observed in the composition and nature of the Palestinian Arab leadership. Traditional leadership was challenged and replaced by a more educated, vigorous, and nationalist Palestinian Arab political leadership. In this respect, this period witnessed increased politicization with the

¹⁴⁶ Knesset Webpage http://www.knesset.gov.il/faction/eng/FactionPage_eng.asp?PG=12

emergence of new Palestinian political elite. Establishment of National Committee of Heads of Arab Councils in 1974, the National Committee for the Defense of Arab Lands in 1975, the National Committee of Arab Students, the National Committee of Arab High School Students signified a political resurrection of the Palestinian Arab institutionalized activism within the Israeli political sphere. These were the institutions through which mobilization of the Palestinian Arab citizens were organized within the limits of the existing political and socio-economic system rather than offering an alternative counter-hegemonic one.

In this respect, the activities of the *National Committee of Chairmen of Arab Local Authorities*, and the operations of the *Committee for the Defense of the Arab Land (Lujnat at-Diffa'a an al-Arradi Al-Arabia)* focused more on dealing with problems of the Palestinian Arab citizens¹⁴⁷ within the limits of the Israeli legal and political structures, albeit their counter-hegemonic discursive connotations. In fact, in 1970s the *National Committee of Chairmen of Arab Local Authorities*, created a bridge between the Israeli dominant system and the Palestinian Arab localities notwithstanding their unfavorable stance against the system. In addition, it provided necessary interconnecting mechanisms between the national and local levels of Palestinian Arab leadership in Israeli political structure. In this respect, it played an important role in converting the radical local leaders into more moderate in-system national representatives in the *Knesset*. The election of *Hasheem Mahameed*, former head of the *Umm al Fahem* local council, as a *Knesset* member representing the *Hadash* was a good example for such a transformation.

After its foundation as a representative body of the Palestinian Arab localities in 1974, the National Committee of Chairmen of Arab Local Authorities also initiated some acts with counter-hegemonic connotations. For example, it enunciated the demands of some segments of the Palestinian community of redefining the character of the Israeli state as

¹⁴⁷ Asad Ghanem, "State and minority in Israel: The case of ethnic state and predicament of its minority", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 21, No.3, 1998, pp.428-448

bi-national¹⁴⁸. The Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who sharply emphasized the Jewish character of the state with its Arab minority, did not welcome these efforts towards the redefinition of the state. Although he strongly stressed absence of a contradiction between the fundamental goals of “the Jewish national survival” and “the full right and ability of the Arab and Druze minority to live a full and complete life as Israeli citizens”¹⁴⁹; he refrained from any reference to possibility of bi-national prospect for the Israeli state.

Land Day protests were a significant case for an analysis of the positions of the Palestinian Arab parliamentary and extra-parliamentary organizations towards the Israeli dominant structures and processes in this period. Following the announcement of ministerial decree with regard to land expropriations around Palestinian Arab village Sakhnin most of the organizations put efforts towards activating Palestinian Arab masses against the coercive practices of Israeli ruling elite. *The Committee for the Defence of the Land in Israel* called for a general strike in protest against land policies of the Israeli ruling elite on March 30, 1976. The Union of the Arab Students’ Committees issued a leaflet, which severely denounced the land policies of the government in Israel as well as in the *WBGS*¹⁵⁰. Notwithstanding some counter-hegemonic connotations in their discourse, they were not completely involved in a counter-hegemonic struggle against Israeli ruling elite. However, some of the students, who issued an additional leaflet with a more counter-hegemonic tone, stated their support participated in counter-hegemonic activities which would serve a “Palestinian national struggle against Israeli occupation and Judaization”¹⁵¹. The *Rakah* criticized

¹⁴⁸ Nissan Mordechai, **Toward a New Israel, The Jewish State and Arab Question**, AMS Press, New York, 1992, p.196

¹⁴⁹ ‘Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Rabin- 3 June 1974’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel Historical Documents, Volumes 1-2: 1947-1974, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/31+Statement+to+the+Knesset+by+Prime+Minister+Rabi.htm>

¹⁵⁰ Alexander Flores, ‘Political Influences Across the Green Line’, Alexander Schölch ed. **Palestinians over the Green Line**, Ithaca Press, London, 1983, p.191

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

the land appropriations by separating the agendas of the Palestinians in the *WBGS* and the Palestinian Arabs in Israel. Its criticism was within the limits of political appropriateness determined by the Israeli dominant structures. Meanwhile, extra-parliamentary *Abna al Balad* emphasized the necessity of solidarity with the Palestinians of the *WBGS* in a national struggle against the Israeli dominant structures. Differentiation of the responses of these organizations to the *Land Day* protests and its consequences would also provide insight about their positioning within, towards or against the Israeli dominant structures and processes.

2.4.4.2. Palestinian Arab Counter-hegemonic Movements

Revitalization of political activism among the Palestinian Arab community led to emergence of new counter-hegemonic movements in the Israeli political sphere. Two of the most important Palestinian Arab counter-hegemonic movements were *Abna al Balad* and *the Islamic Movement* in this era. Apart from these institutionalized forms of counter-hegemonic activism, there appeared instantaneous counter-hegemonic activities among the Palestinian Arab community against the policies of the Israeli dominant elite towards the Palestinian Arabs in Israel as well as the Palestinians in the *West Bank* and *Gaza Strip*.

There were two streams of counter-hegemonic organization among the Palestinian Arab community. The *Sons of the Village* (*Abna al Balad*) represented secular, nationalist, anti-*hamula* and rejectionist stream, while the *Islamic Movement* represented a counter-hegemonic stream based on the religious and rejectionist stance against the dominant structures. Both of these streams however, joined in their denunciation of the existing Israeli dominant structures and processes.

Sons of the Village was established in 1969 as a local organization, which concentrated its activity on the community problems of Palestinian Arab villages in Israel. It was established as grassroots movement and followed a radical Palestinian nationalist ideology enriched with a firm socialist stance. It presented an alternative ethico-moral leadership to the Palestinian Arabs in 1970s whose ideology was based on

Palestinianness against the dominant ideology of *Israeliness*. Its ideological and moral commitment was based on objectives of developing class-consciousness and political mobilization among Palestinian Arab masses to struggle against the dominant “Zionist” system. In this respect, it rejected “any normalizing of relations with the Jewish state in Palestine through a firm boycott of the Zionist electoral process”¹⁵². It perceived the efforts towards reforming the Israeli dominant structures and processes from within as a useless challenge and argued that they would only provide legitimacy and acceptance to the dominant structures by the Palestinian Arab voter.¹⁵³ Accordingly rather than legitimizing the existing dominant structures and processes it opted for a counter-hegemonic struggle which would target preserving the Palestinian Arab collective national identity, human rights and equality within the imposed dominant structure, and providing self sufficiency among the Palestinian Arab masses. It, thus, appeared and operated as a counter-hegemonic movement throughout 1970s and 1980s with its rejectionist stance against the legitimate existence of the Israeli state.

Organized mainly at Palestinian Arab districts at local level, *Abna al Balad* tried to exploit the apparatuses of the Israeli dominant structures¹⁵⁴ in order to provide the basis of a counter-hegemonic mobilization within the existing system. In this respect, they maneuvered within the Israeli legal structure on municipal organization in order to establish a counter-hegemonic front in their *war of position*. Thus, they engaged in municipal elections and acquired influential position in councils of some of the Palestinian Arab localities. Consequently, after the success of *Abna al-Balad* in Umm al-Fahem in municipal elections of 1973, a number of Palestinian Arab villages followed the organizational and ideological model of the *Abna al Balad* in mobilization

¹⁵² *Abna al Balad* web page, <http://www.abnaa-elbalad.org/harakeh.htm>

¹⁵³ <http://www.abnaa-elbalad.org/harakeh.htm>

¹⁵⁴ Interview with Mohammed Kiwan by Pamela Ann Smith , ‘Sons of the Village’ Assert Palestinian Identity in Israel, *MERIP Reports*, No.68, 1978, p.15

of Palestinian Arab villagers against the dominant Israeli structures based on local unity and national identity¹⁵⁵.

Thus, *Abna al Balad* appeared as one of the influential representatives of a counter-hegemonic stance based on assertion of the *Palestinianness* against the *Israeliness*. In this respect, *Abna al Balad*, also stressed linkages between the struggle of the Palestinian Arab masses in Israel and Palestinians in the *West Bank* and *Gaza Strip* as well as with the international struggle against imperialism and “subjugation of working classes and poor”¹⁵⁶. Accordingly, it advocated the right of return for all Palestinian refugees while at the same time referring to internationalism in its struggle against the old and new internal and external colonialism

Abna al Balad’s counter-hegemonic stance was reflected in its activities within its *war of maneuver* against the dominant structure. Thus, it materialized this struggle through activities towards creation of alternative socio-economic structures to the dominant structure, programs of capacity and institution building towards developing self-sufficiency, empowerment as well as independence from Israeli social and economic security schemes, educational campaigns for increasing and spreading national awareness among the Palestinian Arab masses¹⁵⁷.

Despite the remarkable influence of the *Abna al Balad* movement on the rural population of Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel, it did not result in emergence of a homogenous counter-hegemonic rural bloc basing on ethno-national consciousness. Responses of the rural Palestinian Arab communities to the Israeli dominant structures varied in accordance with their different historical experiences with the Israeli

¹⁵⁵ ‘Views from Abroad’, reviewed interview of Pamela Smith on “Sons of the Village” in MERIP, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.8, No 1, 1978, p.,167

¹⁵⁶ <http://www.abnaa-elbalad.org/harakeh.htm>

¹⁵⁷ <http://www.abnaa-elbalad.org/harakeh.htm>

establishment as well as their intra-communal positioning as rich, middle or landless within the segmented Palestinian Arab peasantry¹⁵⁸.

Another axis of counter-hegemonic resistance was the *Islamic Movement* in the 1970s. Following the imprisonment of many leaders of the movement with the charges of their involvement in subversive activities against the state, they sought alternative strategies in order to spread their message. Some of the leaders of the movement argued the ineffectiveness of extra-parliamentary channels in changing the predicament of Muslim Palestinian Arab population and developed in-system strategies for a peaceful transformation through adopting the Israeli legal framework and dominant Israeli structures and processes.

The other group of leaders of *Islamic Movement* rejected the legitimacy of the Israeli state and its structures. Basing on the ideas of “self-help” and “parallel governance”¹⁵⁹, they tried to develop an alternative hegemonic structure to the existing one. Consequently, they concentrated their efforts on gaining the control of local governments through utilization of the in-system means. Despite the fact that they rejected the legitimacy of the elections and Israeli political system, they accepted this limited participation in the system as a tool to achieve the ultimate goal of parallel governance in Israel. In fact, they totally disregarded the possibility of participation in the legislative elections at national level, in the sense that it would indicate their acceptance of the legitimacy of the Israeli dominant structures and processes. These efforts gained impetus in the early 1980s and evolved to transform northern wing of the *Islamic Movement* into a counter-hegemonic front against the Israeli dominant structures and processes.

¹⁵⁸ Kanaana,(1975, *op.cit.* , pp. 3-18

¹⁵⁹ Raphael Israeli, **Palestinians Between Israel and Jordan**, Praeger, New York, 1991, p.34

2.4.5. Hamula Structure in This Period

The 1970s witnessed both outward and inward economic transformation of the villages. In addition to gradual proletarianization of village population, steady increase in local economic welfare and development caused important changes in the village economic life as well as living standards. This transformation affected *hamula* structure in two ways. In some Palestinian Arab villages, it challenged dominance of *hamula* leadership and ignited gradual dissolution of *hamula*'s determining role on the socio-economic organization and security of the villagers in their relations with the Israeli dominant structures and processes. In some other villages, it assisted consolidation of *hamula*'s role in maintenance and development of socio-economic status of its members as the distributor of increased wealth and welfare. In fact, some *hamulas* became noticeably prosperous in the early 1980s¹⁶⁰ as a result of expanding their businesses with the initial waves of neo-liberal restructuring of the Israeli economic system and emerged as important local distributors of socio-economic security and welfare, which was expanded as a consequence of developed cooperation with the dominant structures of Israeli economic and political systems.

In terms of social organization, 1970s witnessed serious challenges against the role of *hamula*'s in determining the individual's social status within the Israeli society. As the processes of modernization began to pervade many spheres of Palestinian Arab communal and individual livelihood, significance of *hamula* ties in determining social status of an individual became less important in some segments of Palestinian Arab community¹⁶¹. Mar'i stated the impact of modern processes on the role of *hamula* as follows:

Feudalism and Hamoula position were the outstanding indications of socio-economic status in Arab society until a few years ago when, in general, the distinguished

¹⁶⁰ Aziz Haidar, On the Margins: The Arab Population in the Israeli Economy, Hurst and Company, London, 1995, p.20

¹⁶¹ Sami Khalil Mar'i, 'Arab Education in Israel', Ernest Krausz (ed.), Education in a Comparative Context, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick and Oxford, 1989, pp.103-4

Hamoulas were also feudalistic clans and the large landowners. However, these are no longer the exclusive or even principal tokens of socio-economic status in an ascriptive society. Higher education and the acquisition of a trade have taken the place of feudalistic affiliation and family position, and the two variables of education and occupation are outstanding status tokens in a modern achievement-oriented society.¹⁶²

Another challenge against the centrality of *hamula* in economic organization of traditional Palestinian Arab community appeared as a result of increasing significance of nuclear family as an important unit in economic decision-making in Israeli economic system. In fact, as the number of households and their *hamula*-free heads increased significantly in 1970s¹⁶³, *hamula*'s dominance in socio-economic organization was decayed in some localities of the Palestinian Arab community.

In this respect, as the socio-cultural and economic transformation of the Palestinian Arab community gained impetus in 1970s, some *hamula* structures began to dissolve and the processes of modernization undermined their role in socio-economic organization and security. However, contrary to general understanding of the modernization theorists, some *hamula* structures survived challenges of modernization by either resisting them or trying to adjust themselves to the processes of modernization such as *proletarianization* and urbanization. As *Ghanem* emphasized, the change that was observed by some scholars with regard to the decline of socio-economic and political significance of *hamula* was 'illusionary'¹⁶⁴, since the empirical data on which these studies relied, was based on analysis of selected *hamula* structures. In fact, as mentioned, some *hamulas* became family companies which distributed jobs to *hamula* members and continued their central role in economic and social life of their members experiencing such processes of 'intra-*hamula* proletarianization' while some *hamulas* became an integral part of the Israeli dominant political structure.

¹⁶² Khalil Mar'i, *op.cit.* pp.110

¹⁶³ Ian Lustick, 'Israel's Arab Minority in the Begin Era', Robert O. Freedman, (ed.) **Israel in the Begin Era**, Praeger Publishers, New York, p.128

¹⁶⁴ Ghanem, (2001), *op.cit.* p.150

In political sphere, until the 1980s, patterns of political behavior of Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel were determined by efficacy of kinship group or sectarian boundaries rather than political consciousness at communal level. As *Nakhleh* argued, *hamula* structure was subject to the intra-village conflicts as well as the political pressures of the Israeli dominant authorities¹⁶⁵. Traditional ties and *hamula* connections were source of both consensus and conflict among the Palestinian Arab community following the establishment of the Israeli state. In some villages, *hamula* created a basis for intra-village cooperation as well as socio-economic, cultural and political security for its members in an era of growing interactions with the new politico-cultural and socio-economic system of control. In such villages, *hamula* leadership functioned as the linkage between the new dominant structures and process and the Palestinian Arab members of those *hamulas*. In this respect, contrary to the thesis of *Nakhleh* with regard to total inability of Palestinian Arab villagers in benefiting from the new processes of control, *hamula* leaderships in those villages tried to utilize possible socio-economic and political opportunities within the new system. In this villages, *hamula* became the organizer of village's pragmatic co-existential relationship with the dominant majority in the new system. *Abu Ghosh* was a good example of such villages.

Some other villages on the other hand, suffered from intra-village conflicts, which derived either from inter-*hamula* clashes or demands of different social groupings within the village. Within the changing socio-economic and political dynamics of relationship between the Israeli dominant structures and the Palestinian Arab localities, these intra-village, inter-village and inter-factional conflicts resulted in rising powerlessness of Arab villagers "to adapt and benefit from new process of political control"¹⁶⁶. Furthermore, such conflicts rather put those villages in the target of the Israeli and Palestinian Arab political elite, who did not hesitate to exploit inter-village and intra-village rivalries in their political power struggles. In fact, although most of

¹⁶⁵ Khalil Nakhleh, "The Direction of Local-Level Conflict in Two Arab Villages in Israel", *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1975, pp. 497-516

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.* p. 497

the modern Palestinian Arab movements claimed to challenge the traditional patterns of organization in Palestinian Arab community, some political movements had to accept the centrality of *hamulas* in the traditional Palestinian Arab livelihood. In this respect, notwithstanding their criticism against the recruitment tactics of Zionist parties in receiving *hamulas*' political support they began to implement similar strategies in order to gain political backing of the *hamulas* in the political game¹⁶⁷.

2.5. 1977-1992: From Crisis of Jewish Historic Bloc to the Genesis of Hegemony-in-Building

The *Mahapach* (upset) of 1977 represented the degeneration of Israeli 'statist' moral and intellectual leadership under the *Mapai*¹⁶⁸ and integration of the *Mizrahi/Oriental* Jewish political elite to the power centers in the Jewish *historic bloc*. Increased representation within the core of the dominant structures and processes led crystallization and reveal of the clashes between the two centers of Jewish intellectual and moral leaderships (Ashkenazi and Mizrahi) within the Jewish *historic bloc*. Thus, following the *Mahapach* a new era began in the relationship between the Palestinian Arab community and newly configured Israeli ruling elite. Consequently, mixture of coercive and passive revolutionary acts of Israeli ruling elite in line with the fluctuations in the crisis of Jewish *historic bloc* marked this period that continued until 1992. Coercive measures were more operated in the initial years of *Likud*-led coalition between 1977 and 1984 as well as within the context of the *Intifada* in 1987. Period of governance under national unity government between 1984 and 1987 on the other hand witnessed an Israeli passive revolution, which was reflected in the relations between the Israeli ruling elite and the Palestinian Arab citizens notwithstanding existence of coercive policies notwithstanding continuance of coercive policies especially in the course of political crises. Diverse evaluation of political and economic instabilities,

¹⁶⁷ Maha El-Taji, 'Arab Local Government between Nationalism and Traditionalism', paper presented in Association of Israel Studies Conference, Open University, Raanana, 2007

¹⁶⁸ Shmuel Sandler, "Israeli Arabs and the Jewish state: The Activation of a Community Suspended Animation", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.31, No.4, 1995, p. 944

their possible remedies and their connectedness with the Palestinian Arab minority among the Jewish *historic bloc* influenced the patterns of public policies initiated by different segments of Jewish political elite within the bloc.

2.5.1. Political Sphere

For the Israeli dominant elite, 1977 elections signified a fracture in the Jewish *historic bloc*. This fracture was deepened in 1984 elections with the further polarization of the Jewish political elite. Significance of this fissure for the Palestinian Arab population was the gradual rise of passive revolutionary acts of Israeli elite in order to maintain its dominance over the Palestinian Arab citizens. In this respect, although early years of the *Likud* government witnessed implementation of exclusionary and coercive policies to control the Palestinian Arab community, this policy line was replaced gradually by a more passive revolutionary mode of interaction with the Palestinian Arab citizenry.

From 1977 to 1981, Israeli political sphere witnessed dominance of coercive approaches of the *Likud*-led ruling elite in the relations with the Palestinian Arab community. Plans and policies of the ruling elite such as establishing observation post settlements over the Arab villages in 1979, destruction of unauthorized buildings in the Palestinian Arab villages in 1979 and 1980¹⁶⁹, establishment of new police stations in the Palestinian Arab villages of the Galilee region¹⁷⁰, were significant example of its stance in this period. Begin government also threatened to punish the Palestinian Arab intellectuals who supported the *June Document* of 1980 that severely protested the government policies following the assassination attempts against the mayors of important *WBGs* towns¹⁷¹. As a part of these exclusionary measures, Begin government used the 1945 Defense Emergency Regulations on December 1, 1980 to

¹⁶⁹ Ian Lustick, 'Israel's Arab Minority in the Begin Era', Robert O. Freedman, (ed.) *Israel in the Begin Era*, : Praeger Publishers, New York, pp. 132-134

¹⁷⁰ Alexander Flores, 'Political Influences Across the Green Line', Alexander Schölch ed. **Palestinians over the Green Line**, Ithaca Press, London, 1983, p. 195

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

ban the holding of the Congress of Arab Masses, a forum that aimed at establishing an all-Arab citizens' representative body¹⁷². This banning was followed by the decision of Israeli government towards outlawing the *National Coordinating Committee*, an umbrella organization representing nine Palestinian Arab political groups on April 12, 1981. In this respect, as one observer stated Begin period at the beginning of this era was marked by "gradual institution of policies with the unmistakable character of naked military occupation throughout the Arab-populated territories of the state of Israel"¹⁷³

Not all segments of the Israeli political elite however, welcomed these policies. In fact, possibilities of integration of the Palestinian Arabs to the dominant political structures started to be mentioned in early 1980s as a deliberate decision of the leading ruling classes. Main goal of such efforts would be preventing emergence of a counter-hegemonic mobilization and organization of Palestinian Arab citizens against the dominant structures rather than spreading hegemonic acculturation based on *Israeliness* among them. In fact, this goal was clearly stated by Shmuel Toledano, adviser to Prime Minister on Arab affairs between 1966 and 1977. He revealed the concerns of the Israeli ruling elite with regard to accommodation of Palestinian Arab citizens in Israeli political sphere in line with such acculturation. For him some segments of ruling elite concluded that integration of Palestinian Arab political elite to the existing Zionist parties would be preferable in order to prevent emergence of a unified Arab party.¹⁷⁴ Since the possible bloc Palestinian Arab vote to a Palestinian Arab party would result in an emergence of a power bloc in the *Knesset* that could have an impact on the parliamentary processes, Israeli ruling classes concerned about possibility of emergence of an organized leadership for a future counter-hegemonic bloc. These

¹⁷² Nur Masalha, *op.cit.*, p. 154

¹⁷³ Flores, *op.cit.*, p. 196

¹⁷⁴ David K. Shipler, *Arab and Jew*, Penguin Books, New York, 2002, p.398

concerns seemed to be unfounded considering the diversification of the Palestinian Arab citizens in their political views.

As the crisis of Jewish *historic bloc* deepened, Palestinian Arab political support became more decisive in determining the leadership of the dominant ruling elite. Prior to *Knesset* elections of 1984, Palestinian Arab members were put in the places on the electoral lists of the Zionist parties, where they could have chance to be elected such as *Abdel Wahab Darawshe* of the *Labor* and *Zeidan Attashe* of *Shinui*. *Yahad* voiced the demands of Palestinian Arab community very widely in his agenda during the election campaign as well as after the elections. It put significant emphasis on the rights of Palestinian Arabs as citizens of Israel and maintained its willingness to work for the equality of their rights and obligations with the other citizens of Israel¹⁷⁵.

Following the elections, *Yahad's* leader *Ezer Weizman* became seriously involved in passive revolutionary movement towards the Palestinian Arab citizens. His removal of the Advisory Office to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs to upgrade the Palestinian Arab issues to Cabinet level responsibility, his replacement of hawkish adviser Benjamin *Gur Aryeh* with a more moderate and integrationist adviser *Yosef Ginat* were important steps towards gaining trust and consent of the Palestinian Arab community. Announcement of return of certain amount of expropriated land, which was called *Area 9*, to its previous Palestinian Arab possessors were other important passive revolutionary acts initiated by *Yahad* faction in the Israeli ruling elite¹⁷⁶.

The other segment of the Jewish historic bloc however, did not welcome these passive revolutionary acts. Notwithstanding its initial disapproval of passive revolutionary acts of the *Labor*, the *Likud*-led segment of ruling elite did not discard the passive revolutionary line of the *Labor*-led ruling elite when they undertook the Prime Ministry and the decision-making institutions on the Palestinian Arab affairs according to the

¹⁷⁵ Ian Lustick, *The Political Road to Binationalism: Arabs in Jewish Politics*, Ilan Peleg and Ofira Selektar (eds.), **The Emergence of a Binational Israel**, Westview Press, Boulder, 1989, p. 108

¹⁷⁶ Ian Lustick, op.cit. pp.108-10

governmental rotation of national unity government in 1986. In this respect, continuance of Ezer Weizman's policies with regard to abolishment of *the Office of the Advisor to the PM on Arab Affairs*, returning the expropriated lands of the Palestinian Arab community to their previous owners, preventing house demolitions in the Palestinian Arab villages, meeting with the members of Palestinian Arab councils and allowing return of the Palestinian Arab residents of *Iqrit* and *Biram* to their villages¹⁷⁷ indicated *Likud*'s involvement in Israeli passive revolution notwithstanding its initial reluctance. Nevertheless, the *Likud* also displayed its dissatisfaction with such a line by its ignorance of financial demands of the Palestinian Arab local councils¹⁷⁸.

Another coercive measure against the non-Jewish political elite was taken in the Israeli parliament to put additional emphasis on the Jewish character of the state. In 1985, an amendment to the *Knesset Basic Law* prevented any candidates' list, to participate in the *Knesset* elections, whose "objects or actions, expressly or by implication, include negation of the existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people; negation of the democratic character of the State; or incitement to racism"¹⁷⁹. This amendment aimed to eliminate political formations, which would deny the dominance of an ethno-religious segment of Israeli society in the nature of the state and its apparatuses. In other words, it preconditioned the access to the Israeli political power centers with acceptance of the dominant structures without exerting challenge against their ethnocratic nature. Palestinian Arab representatives in the *Knesset* proposed changes in the amendment. MK Tawfiq Tubi from *Hadash* proposed replacement of the term "State of Israel as the state of Jewish people" with the "state of Israel", which would then not avoid any emphasis on the ethnic character of the state. MK Mattityahu

¹⁷⁷ Ian Lustick, *The Political Road to Binationalism: Arabs in Jewish Politics*, Ilan Peleg and Ofira Selektar (eds.), *The Emergence of a Binational Israel*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1989, p.112

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.112-3

¹⁷⁹ Basic Law: Knesset (Amendment No 9), Amendment to Section 7A, Passed by the Knesset on the 13th Av, 5745 (31st July, 1985) and published in Sefer Ha-Chukkim No. 1155 of the 20th Av, 5745 (7th August, 1985), p. 196; the Bill and an Explanatory Note were published in Hatz'a'ot Chok No. 1728 of 5745, p. 193. at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic2_eng.htm

Peled from the *Progressive List for Peace* recommended a change in the amendment to include Arab citizens of Israel in the definition of the Israeli state by proposing replacement of the term “State of Israel as the state of Jewish people” with “state of the Jewish people and its Arab citizens”.¹⁸⁰ Notwithstanding its intra-bloc crisis, Jewish historic bloc indicated its reluctance against any challenge to the Jewish image of the state. In this respect, it did not acknowledge any of these suggestions and passed the amendment with an emphasis on ethnic associations of the Israeli state.

Intifada period witnessed rise of coercive approaches among the Israeli ruling elite in line with the increase of activism among some Palestinian Arab citizens against the Israeli dominant structures. For example, one-day strike of December 1987, which was organized by the Palestinian Arab community in Israel to indicate solidarity with the Palestinians in the *West Bank* and *Gaza Strip* caused severe reaction among the ranks of dominant Israeli Jewish establishment. *Likud* MK Haim Kaufman proposed reinforcement of the military rule in the regions with dense Palestinian Arab population such as *Galilee* and *the Little Triangle*. An alternative suggestion was made by *Yuval Neeman*, the Minister of Science and Energy in government. In 1988, he raised the possibility of transferring the Palestinian Arab citizens out of Israel, who indicated their solidarity with the *intifada*.¹⁸¹ Coercive acts and propositions of the Israeli ruling elite in this era caused strengthening of the Palestinianness among the Palestinian Arab citizens as a reference point in their political mobilization¹⁸².

In 1988, *Supreme Court*’s decision on the *Progressive List for Peace*’s participation in the elections indicated dilemma of Israeli dominant legal authorities between the hegemonic concerns and the exclusionary image of the Israeli state. In fact, Supreme Court represented a more passive revolutionary stance among the dominant Israeli

¹⁸⁰ Nadim Rouhana, “The Political Transformation of the Palestinians in Israel: From Acquiescence to Challenge”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 18, No.3, 1989, p.51

¹⁸¹ Nur Masalha, *op.cit.*, p. 154

¹⁸² Gad Barzilai and Ilan Peleg, “Israel and Future Borders: Assessment of a Dynamic Process”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 31, No. 1, p. 64.

institutions with regard to Palestinian citizens in 1980s as well. During Intifada an important passive revolutionary act of the Israeli moderate ruling elite was its call for peace agreement based on the principles of ‘peace for land’ understanding in 1987. Appointment of first Palestinian Arab diplomat of Israel in 1987 was another significant symbolic passive revolutionary act in this period. In fact, under the international and domestic scrutiny about its policies in the *WBGS*, ruling elite wanted to deliver a message to international society and Palestinian Arab community about the opportunities of “loyal Israeli Arabs” for upward mobility within the dominant structures¹⁸³. Appointment of Mohammed Massarwa during the term of Shimon Peres as one of the eight general consuls to the United States, where the Jewish Diaspora heavily habituated was also indicative of degree of passive revolutionary stance of Alignment towards the Palestinian Arab community as well as degree of polarization within the Jewish historic bloc.

Furthermore, Israeli historical bloc tried to obstruct pervasion of the extremist views and plans of the Jewish segments of the society with regard to the Palestinian Arab citizens to challenge the ideational balance of dominant views among the Israeli governing bodies. In other words, although the extremist views and politicians were utilized as control mechanisms over the Palestinian Arab citizens by some segments of Jewish ruling elite they were not allowed to become dominant views in Israeli political and public spheres. In this respect, for example some segments of the mainstream ruling elite tried to bloc pervasion of the radical stance and views of Rabbi Meir Kahane in the dominant understanding and structures¹⁸⁴.

¹⁸³ Ronald Smothers, ‘Arab Envoy for Israelis Bridges Conflict in U.S.’, *New York Times*, September 4, 1988, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE6D8113AF937A3575AC0A96E948260>

¹⁸⁴ Raphael Cohen-Almagor, ‘The Delicate Framework of Israeli Democracy during 1980s’, Efraim Karsh (ed.), ***Israeli Politics and Society Since 1948: Problems of Collective Identity***, Frank Cass, London, 2002, pp.127-8

2.5.2. Economic Sphere

This era can be divided into two sub-periods in terms of economic developments. The period between 1977 and 1985 was marked by the failure of *Likud*-led efforts towards liberalization of economy. These efforts resulted in economic slowdown and noticeably high inflation. The economic crisis was overcome following the 1984 elections by the unity government-sponsored economic policies and stabilization program.

Israeli economy was hit by an economic crisis, which also had consequences for the relationship between the already segregated Palestinian Arab labor and the Israeli economic structure and institutions. Israel experienced high rates of inflation, which rose up to 450% annually in 1985 in addition to intensified unemployment rate that elevated from 3% in 1981 up to 11% in 1992¹⁸⁵. Austerity measures that were implemented as a part of government's *Emergency Stabilization Plan* and radical economic decisions taken by the *Bank of Israel* in the following year, which proposed renewal of austerity measures as well as freeze of wages and prices¹⁸⁶ influenced mostly the Palestinian Arab citizens who did not have access to the trade union social security protection. Persistence of discerning legal restrictions implemented by the Israeli ruling elite on Palestinian Arab community's access to the Israeli system of socio-economic benefits and compensations exacerbated their economic conditions further and caused deepening of distrust to the Israeli institutional framework. Most of the social benefits and compensation measures were preconditioned to fulfillment of military service or being a residence of localities categorized as 'development zones'¹⁸⁷. As most Palestinian Arab citizens were not eligible for complementation of

¹⁸⁵ Lea Achdut, "Income Inequality, Income Composition and Macroeconomic Trends: Israel, 1979-93", *Economica*, No.63, 1996, p.10

¹⁸⁶ Emma Murphy, "Structural Inhibitions to Economic Liberalization in Israel", *Middle East Journal*, Vol.48, No.1, 1994, pp.71-2

¹⁸⁷ Benjamin W. Wolkinson, "Recruitment and selection of workers in Israel: the question of disparate impact", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.17, No.2, 1994, p.261

these legal prerequisites, they could not have access to Israeli social security system in the course of economic depression.

Exacerbated economic situation between 1979 and 1984, whose detrimental impact continued even in the stabilization period between 1985 and 1993¹⁸⁸, added to the pressures over the Palestinian Arab citizens in their interactions with Israeli dominant economic structure and institutions. Grave decline in income and severe increase in unemployment rates damaged economic sufficiency of majority of the Palestinian Arab citizens in this era.¹⁸⁹ As the unemployment escalated in late 1980s with the massive immigration from the former Soviet Union and subsequent expansion in the size of labor force¹⁹⁰, Palestinian Arab citizens felt the consequences of increased income inequality in addition to aggravated redundancy.

As the political crises mounted, chances of potential Palestinian Arab employees waned by the non-institutionalized forms of pervasion of negative and violence-associated images of the Palestinian Arab citizens into worker recruitment and selection processes within the Israeli labor market¹⁹¹. Inability of the Israeli legal system to prevent latent manipulations of selection and recruitment criteria for discouraging application of Palestinian Arab citizens by some Jewish employers, hindered employment prospects of some segments of Palestinian Arab community especially during the political crises. Accordingly, joined with the political crises (such as invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and *Intifada* of 1987), deteriorated economic conditions exacerbated the crisis between the Palestinian Arab citizens and the Israeli dominant structures.

¹⁸⁸ Lea Achdut, Income Inequality, Income Composition and Macroeconomic Trends: Israel, 1979-93, *Economica*, No.63,1996, p.1

¹⁸⁹ Aziz Haidar, **On the Margins, The Arab Population in the Israeli Economy**, Hurst and Company, London, 1995, p.22

¹⁹⁰ Lea Achdut, Income Inequality, Income Composition and Macroeconomic Trends: Israel, 1979-93, *Economica*, No.63,1996, p.1

¹⁹¹ Benjamin W. Wolkinson, "Recruitment and selection of workers in Israel: the question of disparate impact", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.17, No.2, 1994, pp.260-279

Exclusion of the Palestinian Arab citizens from the *Project Renewal* of PM Menachem Begin in 1980s which was initiated to “renovate and rehabilitate” of Israeli *development towns*, disallowed access of the Palestinian Arab localities to the funds that were allocated for improvement of infrastructure, habitual planning, facilities for educational, cultural and sport activities¹⁹². Although ruling elite’s policies towards industrialization in the Jews-habituated development towns created new employment opportunities for the Palestinian Arab labor, absence of significant industrial investments in the Palestinian Arab localities resulted in consolidation of economic dependence of Palestinian Arabs to the dominant economic structure¹⁹³.

In parallel, there were also passive revolutionary attempts to prevent complete alienation of the Palestinian Arab citizens from the system. In fact, this period also witnessed *Histadrut*’s passive revolutionary acts embodied in an industrial development program in the Palestinian Arab sector through establishment of joint ventures¹⁹⁴. Complementary to this development, number of industrial plants increased in the Palestinian Arab localities and created jobs for the Palestinian Arab labor at the periphery of the Israeli economic sphere. This process was supported by the Israeli ruling elite in the sense that it would serve controlled and selective integration of the peripheral Palestinian Arab industry to the main Israeli industrial structure and processes. As any possible disintegration from such structure and establishment of a Palestinian Arab counter-industrialization would necessitate higher level economic and infrastructural capacity¹⁹⁵, such control would enable Israeli ruling elite to prevent a

¹⁹² Don Peretz and Gideon Doron, **The Government and Politics of Israel**, (3rd ed.) , Westview Press, Oxford, 1997, p.55

¹⁹³ Oren Yiftachel and H. Law Yone, “Regional Policy and minority attitudes in Israel”, *Environment and Planning*, Vol. 27, p.1287

¹⁹⁴ Ian Lustick, The Political Road to Binationalism: Arabs in Jewish Politics, Ilan Peleg and Ofira Selektar (eds.), The Emergence of a Binational Israel, Westview Press, Boulder, 1989, pp.108-10

¹⁹⁵

counter-hegemonic economic structuring which could be supported by a parallel self-sufficient industrialization along with the dominant industrial structure.

Overall, economic policies of the Israeli ruling elite in this period witnessed the mixture of passive revolutionary and coercive acts in order to maintain selective integration of the Palestinian Arab community into the Israeli main economic structures and processes.

2.5.3. Socio-cultural Sphere

There were important changes in the approaches of the ruling elite towards the Palestinian Arab community at the levels of symbols in socio-cultural sphere. In fact, issuance of the first Israeli post stamps in honor of Palestinian Arab Muslim citizens of Israel on '*Id al-Fitr*' by the Ministry of Communication under *Shinui* leader *Amnon Rubinstein* was a significant passive revolutionary act¹⁹⁶.

In addition, *Yahad* initiated several improvements in the Palestinian Arab sector, which had significant symbolic value. Approval of the *Umm al Fahem*'s municipality application, halting the demolition orders about the Palestinian Arab illegal housing facilities, constant meetings with the representatives of the Palestinian Arab local councils, establishment of bi-communal committees for generating funding for the development projects in Palestinian Arab sector, and closing down of ideological apparatuses (i.e. *Al-Anba*) of traditional government policies¹⁹⁷. Such passive revolutionary acts of the Israeli authorities continued during the early 1990s. Israeli Ministry of Interior, for instance, upgraded the status of Taibe from village to municipality following the nationalistic activities and resistance of the youth of the village against the Israeli authorities in support for *intifada* in the *West Bank* and *Gaza Strip*.

¹⁹⁶ Ian Lustick, *The Political Road to Binationalism: Arabs in Jewish Politics*, Ilan Peleg and Ofira Selektar (eds.), *The Emergence of a Binational Israel*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1989, p. 108

¹⁹⁷ ibid., pp.108-10

Other segment of Jewish *historic bloc* pursued a more coercive policy, which included increasing the university tuition fees for the Palestinian Arab community¹⁹⁸. As a part of coercive measures, in late 1980s and early 1990s, Arabic newspapers and publications such as *al-Raya* of *Sons of the Homeland* and *Sawt al-Haq Wa-al-Hurriyah* of the *Islamic movement* were banned or closed because of security reasons.¹⁹⁹ As a passive revolutionary act on the other hand, the Israeli authorities did not cease publication and distribution *Al-Ittihad*, which was affiliated with *Hadash* in the Palestinian Arab localities in Israel even when it published news and opinions in a counter-hegemonic tone from the *WBGs* during the *intifada*.

[In *al-Ittihad*] The terminology of the articles-"heroism," "martyrdom," "massacres of occupation," soldiers of occupation," and so on-was virtually indistinguishable from that used in the occupied territories; analysts and reporters made no effort to conceal either their pride in their fellow Palestinians in the territories or their rage over the behavior of the Israeli military. The paper emphasized news showing solidarity with the Palestinians, international criticism of Israel, and signs of restlessness in various sectors of Israeli society. Editorials frequently invoked the inevitability of Palestinian victory, compared Israeli forces to the French in Algeria, and condemned Israeli acts. After the Palestinian declaration of independence, the paper began using the terms "occupied State of Palestine," "President of the State of Palestine," and "the flag of the State of Palestine" almost consistently.²⁰⁰

In this era, Israeli Hebrew mainstream media also played an important role in consolidating both coercive and passive revolutionary aspects of the structures and processes of domination over the Palestinian Arab community. Media functioned as an apparatus of Zionist hegemony with regard to the relationship between the authorities and the Palestinian Arab citizens. The representation and reporting of the *intifada* in the Israeli newspapers was an important example, which provided insight on operation of dominant structures and processes within the major discursive apparatuses at both

¹⁹⁸ *ibid.*, pp.112-3

¹⁹⁹ Nur Masalha, *op.cit.*, p. 154

²⁰⁰ Nadim Rouhana, "The Intifada and the Palestinians of Israel: Resurrecting the Green Line", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1990, p.62

technical and ideological levels²⁰¹. During Intifada, Israeli media operated within a dominant discursive framework in order to promote a 'law and order frame'²⁰² and placed Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel in its coding scheme accordingly. In the messages delivered through media basing on the news sources of the Israeli dominant structures and ruling elite, Palestinian Arab community was advised to be loyal to the state and express their dissatisfaction or protest by remaining within Israeli legal structure²⁰³. In fact, journalistic embeddedness to the dominant Israeli ideological content²⁰⁴ was not specific and limited to the case of *Intifada*. Mainstream media remained as an admonitory apparatus of Israeli dominant structures and processes in the coming years as well.

2.5.4. Palestinian Arab Response

In this period, responses of Palestinian Arab community was mainly affected by the rise of its *Palestinianness*, amplification in its parliamentary and counter-hegemonic activism and impact of increased popularity of the *PLO* as a counter-hegemonic alternative among the counter-hegemonic movements of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. Growing solidarity with the Palestinians from the *WBGS* became an important factor in the mobilization of the Palestinian Arab community in the 1980s. As the *PLO* also wanted to benefit from such development, from 1977 onwards mentioned the necessity of cooperating with the Palestinian Arab community in Israel to mobilize them against the dominant structures in Israel. However, concentration of the *PLO* on the predicament of the Palestinians in the *WBGS* and its consequent reluctance in undertaking moral and intellectual leadership for a counter-hegemonic upheaval in the

²⁰¹ Ilan Asya, "The Israeli Newspapers' Coverage of the Israeli Arabs During the Intifada", *Israel Affairs*, Vol.9, No.1-2, Winter 2003, pp.188-9

²⁰² Gadi Wolfsfeld, **Media and Political Conflict**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p.155

²⁰³ Asya, (2003), op.cit., p.209

²⁰⁴ Tamar Liebes, **Reporting the Arab Israeli Conflict, How Hegemony Works**, Routledge, London and New York, 1997, p.11

Palestinian Arab sector in Israel diminished its significance as a counter-hegemonic option for the counter-hegemonic segments of the Palestinian Arab community.

Land policies of the Israeli state continued to cause instantaneous counter-hegemonic rages against the ruling elite in late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. Within this context, Palestinian Arab community reacted by the means of demonstrations, roadblocks, clashes with policy implementers and coercive forces of the state against the coercive policies of the *Likud* government.

2.5.4.1. Palestinian Arab Parliamentary Movements

For the Palestinian Arab community, the 1977 elections led to unification of *Rakah* with the other in-system Palestinian Arab nationalist opposition forces under the roof of *Hadash* (the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality). Notwithstanding its nationalist rhetoric and *non-Zionist* character, main concern of *Hadash* was to reform the Israeli system from within through rigorous criticism of its distributive inequalities²⁰⁵.

Establishment of political parties within the Israeli political system and shifting of the political support to the in-system *Communist Party (Rakah)* and its successor *Hadash* in 1980s was an example of this pragmatic choice in political sphere. This development also marked implementation of Israeli passive revolutionary preferences. By means of opening the necessary channels for the Palestinian Arabs to express their demands within the Israeli political system, Israeli authorities tried to keep Palestinian Arab citizens within the dominant framework rather than allowing them to opt for extra-parliamentary means and counter-hegemonic institutionalization.

Two new political parties joined Israeli parliamentary politics in the 1980s. *The Progressive List for Peace (PLP or Ramal)* emerged as a reaction of incorporated status of the *Hadash* within the Israeli political system in 1984. *The Democratic Arab Party* on the other hand appeared as a result of pragmatic choice of its leader in 1988.

²⁰⁵ Jamal, "The Arab Leadership in Israel:...",(2006), op.cit., p.10 .

Adoption of nationalist discourse by both of these parties was an indicator of utilization of the discourse of *Palestinianness* within the in-system politicization of the Palestinian Arabs.

Establishment of *Progressive List for Peace* in 1984 and its success in the *Knesset* elections of the same year indicated significant rise of political institutionalization and mobilization of popularized rhetoric of Palestinian nationalism within the Israeli political system. The PLP stressed the contradiction between association of the state with the Jewish segments of society and its discourse on democratic and egalitarian character of the Israeli dominant structures and processes²⁰⁶. Following the success of *PLP*, most of the Palestinian Arab political parties ranging from the communist *Hadash* to moderate Democratic Arab Party of *Abd-al Wahab Darawsha* retained and articulated discourse of Palestinian nationalism at different levels²⁰⁷.

Notwithstanding its counter-hegemonic discourse with regard to the return of the Palestinian refugees, negotiations with *PLO*, the boundaries of Israeli borders and support for *intifada*; *PLP* became an in-system political organization with configuration of its party members and electoral lists as well as with its restrained official statements and energetic involvement in the Israeli parliamentary processes²⁰⁸. In fact, in 1984, 49 per cent of its candidacy list was Jewish. Its official statements about the regional peace, secularity, and constitutional reform, advancement of democracy and rights of the Palestinian Arabs, equality in civic spheres²⁰⁹ referred mainly to in-system demands rather than proclaiming counter-hegemonic challenges.

²⁰⁶ Amal Jamal, 'Abstention as Participation: The Labyrinth of Arab Politics in Israel', **Asher Arian and Michal Shamir (eds.) The Elections in Israel 2001**, The Israel Democracy Institute, Jerusalem, 2002, p.78

²⁰⁷ Jamal, "The Arab Leadership in Israel:...",(2006), op.cit., p.10

²⁰⁸ Landau, op.cit. pp.118-19

²⁰⁹ ibid.

Rakah/Hadash also drew a line between the demands of the Palestinians of the Diaspora, and of *WBGS* and the concerns of the Palestinian community in Israel notwithstanding its support of two-state solution in Palestine. Following the military operations of Israel in Lebanon in 1978 it rejected to organize general strike contrary to the demands of militant segments of the Palestinian Arab political sphere, it also followed a similar line of policy during the *Land Day* commemorative activities in 1980²¹⁰. Consequently, “Sixth of June Charter” of Rakah-led political activist groups outlined a list of *in-system* demands of the Palestinian Arab leadership in 1980. Although there was a mention of protest against the suppressive policies of the Israeli ruling elite in the *WBGS*, main focus of the document was the discontent and demands of the Palestinian Arab community. In this document, after underlining the rights of the Palestinian Arab people deriving from their Israeli citizenship Rakah-led opposition mainly presented a set of demands on the central issues such as impartial land planning, promotion of economic development, ending discriminative policies at local and national level²¹¹. This approach continued to dominate activities of *Hadash* during the *Intifada* as well.

In this period, notwithstanding the rise of Palestinian nationalism, cooptation of the Palestinian Arab political and societal leadership continued until the late 1980s following the military governance. In 1988, around 40 per cent of the Palestinian Arab vote went to the Zionist parties²¹². Although this amount was lower than the previous elections, it indicated continuous impact of the ruling elite’s practices of co-opting or incorporation among the Palestinian Arab community. This figure indicated success of passive revolutionary practices of the some segments of ruling elite in gaining the

²¹⁰ Alexander Flores, ‘Political Influences Across the Green Line’, Alexander Schölch ed. **Palestinians over the Green Line**, Ithaca Press, London, 1983, p.194

²¹¹ Ian Lustick, ‘Israel’s Arab Minority in the Begin Era’, Robert O. Freedman, (ed.) **Israel in the Begin Era**, Praeger Publishers, New York, pp.139-40

²¹² Yaish, (2001), op.cit., p.413

consent of the Palestinian Arab citizens for their leadership albeit the increased political activism mobilized by the discourse of *Palestinianness*.

However, the period also witnessed several counter-hegemonic movements which marked the failures of the passive revolutionary acts in convincing all segments of Palestinian Arab community to remain within the legal and political domain determined by Israeli dominant structures and processes. In this respect, contrary to elaboration of *Nadim Rouhana* as a period of Palestinian Arab consensus on the status of the Palestinian Arab community, problems and issues of the Palestinians and the nature of tactics or political tools in achieving their political objectives did not prevail among the all segments of Palestinian Arab citizenry²¹³.

2.5.4.2. Palestinian Arab Counter-hegemonic Movements

Research conducted in late 1980s revealed discernible level of conservatism among both Jewish and Palestinian Arab segments of the society, which appeared as an important obstacle facing inter-communal communication²¹⁴. High degrees of militarism, ethno-centrism, religio-centrism, which are components of the conservatism²¹⁵, prevented participation of the Palestinian Arab citizens in the processes towards internalization of the *Israeliness*.

Abna al Balad continued its activities throughout the 1980s. It concentrated its efforts on mobilization of The Palestinian Arab community to struggle against the Israeli dominant structures in solidarity with the Palestinians in the *WBGS*. In line with this position, it demanded general strikes, called for boycotting the *Knesset* elections and tried to mobilize Palestinian Arab community in Israel for establishment of a

²¹³ Nadim Rouhana, "The Political Transformation of the Palestinians in Israel: From Acquiescence to Challenge", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 18, No.3, 1989, pp.46-8

²¹⁴ Yaacov J. Katz, "Conservatism of Israeli Arabs and Jews", *The Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol.128, No. 5, p. 696

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 695

Palestinian state as an alternative hegemonic project to the existing Israeli project in this era.

In this period, Progressive National Movement became an important counter-hegemonic organization in the Palestinian Arab community in 1980s, which aimed to mobilize Palestinian Arab students and intellectuals in its struggle against the Israeli dominant structures and processes. It also harshly criticized the in-system Palestinian Arab actors such as *Rakah* because of their role in the reproduction of the suppressive structures and processes by participating in them. Thus, it did not hesitate to compete with the *Rakah* for the *intellectual and moral leadership* of the Palestinian Arab community. It gained successes among the intellectual segments of the Palestinian Arab community. In the following years however, the PNM decided to incorporate into Israeli national legislative structure and processes, which it severely criticized in the previous years. Emergence of Progressive List for Peace (PLP) in 1984 signified transformation of a counter-hegemonic movement into a parliamentary organization within the Israeli dominant political structure and processes.

Another counter-hegemonic endeavor was *National Coordination Committee (NCC)*, which was banned by the Israeli ruling elite in 1981. NCC was an umbrella organization for the counter-hegemonic front, which was composed of various extra-parliamentary organizations including *Abna el Balad* and *Progressive National Movement*. Differentiated significantly from the *Rakah's "Sixth of June Charter"*, NCC's "*Umm al Fahem Charter*" represented counter-hegemonic stance of its initiators. In this Charter, NCC presented a clear counter-hegemonic position, which accepted PLO as its moral and intellectual leadership and claimed a right of self-determination for all of the Palestinian Arab community in Israel along with the Palestinians in the *WBGs*²¹⁶. Rejection of the Israeli political sphere at national level as

²¹⁶ Ian Lustick, 'Israel's Arab Minority in the Begin Era', Robert O. Freedman, (ed.) *Israel in the Begin Era*, New York: Praeger Publishers, p.143

platform for political struggle for the Palestinian Arab community also was an indicator of its counter-hegemonic position.

As the Islamic sentiments began to be organized under socio-political movements, Islamic organization of society emerged as a basis for a counter-hegemonic alternative against the Israeli dominant structures and processes from late 1970s onwards. Influenced by the regional and international developments in the late 1970s and early 1980s like Islamic revolution in Iran, Islam evolved to become a marker of political identity for the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel.

Al Harakat al Islamiya (Islamic Movement) was established in 1979 by Abu Mukh as a quasi-military clandestine organization under the name of *Usrat al-Jihad* (Family of Jihad). It had connections with the Muslim Brotherhood organizations in Syria and Egypt. Its main objective was to wage a struggle against the Israeli state through extra-parliamentary tools including violence. In this respect, it maintained a counter-hegemonic stance both in terms of its objectives and in terms of its methods. Its membership was composed of lower middle class Palestinian Arabs some of whom attended religious schools in the *West Bank*. In fact, its spiritual leader *Abdullah Nimr Darwish* was also a graduate of Islamic Institute in Nablus. Initially, Israeli authorities responded this local-based counter-hegemonic structuring by means of enacting of passive revolutionary measures. Within this framework, for instance, Israeli Ministry of Education allowed a teaching of Islamic studies in the Palestinian Arab high schools in Acre and other Arab populated localities in the Little Triangle.²¹⁷ From 1979 to 1981 however, *Usrat al-Jihad* (Family of Jihad) continued its immoderate position by the acts of violence against both Jewish establishment and Palestinian Arab secular

²¹⁷ Nissan Mordechai, Toward a New Israel, The Jewish State and Arab Question, AMS Press, New York 1992, p.196

leadership. They stroke the economic targets in Israel and they attacked the symbols of secular life among the Palestinian Arab community like cinemas²¹⁸.

In fact, notwithstanding their limited membership and impact on the community, it signified militarization of the Islamic fundamentalism among some segments of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel. Perceiving *Usrat al-Jihad* as a threat to the very existence of Israeli state, Israeli security forces captured its activists and dismantled its organizational infrastructure.²¹⁹ Its leader Sheik Darwish and his followers were imprisoned in 1981. After his release on the condition that he would not involve in illegal political activities against the Israeli state and people Darwish concentrated his efforts to create a counter-hegemonic movement in 1980s through utilization of non-violent counter-hegemonic agents such as “education, culture and social reform to give every Moslem here back his identity”²²⁰. Thus, the movement was organized at local level and it refused to participate in Israeli national politics in order to indicate its rejection legitimacy of the Israeli state in the eyes of Palestinian Arab Islamic localities. Concentrating its efforts on local counter-hegemonic political mobilization of Palestinian Arabs in Israel it focused on taking over local governance and increased the number of mayorships from one (*Kafr Bara*) to five (*Umm al Fahem, Kafr Bara, Kafr Qasim, Jaljulya, Rahat*) between 1984 and 1989. Consequently, Islam emerged as an alternative ground for political counter-hegemonic mobilization of the Palestinian Arabs.

Mélange of Islamic awareness with the increased Palestinian national consciousness caused a significant change in the some segments of Palestinian Arab community’s patterns of behaviour regarding their relations with the Israeli dominant structures and

²¹⁸ Alisa Rubin Peled,, “Towards Autonomy? The Islamist Movement's Quest For Control of Islamic Institutions in Israel”, *The Middle East Journal*, 22 June 2001

²¹⁹ Landau, (1993), op.cit., p. 38

²²⁰ Thomas Friedman, “An Islamic Revival is Quickly Gaining Ground in an Unlikely Place: Israel”, *New York Times*, 30.04.1987, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DE2DA153FF933A05757C0A961948260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=print>

processes. Such a change in the patterns of relationship was reflected in various ways ranging from symbolic acts like non-raising of the Israeli flag during the official fests, non-participation of Israeli national holidays to active involvement in the counter-hegemonic moves such as non-participation of parliamentary elections and anti-regime demonstrations. In addition, until mid-1990s *Islamic Movement* distanced itself from the national level politics since it rejected the legitimacy of the *Knesset* in representation of Palestinian Arab and Islamic demands. Its main concerns were the spread of Islamic values and Islamic lifestyles²²¹ among the Palestinian Arab community. In this respect, it represented a counter-hegemonic stance. They challenged the dominant structures not only at political level but also cultural and ideological level. In this respect, they opted for a *war of maneuver* rather than a *war of position* within the system. Following its split into northern and southern wings in 1996 due to an intra-movement conflict that took place about participation of movement in the national level politics, southern wing increased its interaction with the Israeli dominant political and socio-economic structures and process at national level while the north wing maintained its counter-hegemonic stance.

2.5.4.3. Intifada: A Critical episode in Palestinian Arab political activity

On 21 December 1987, some leaders of the Palestinian Arab community declared a general strike to indicate their support to the *intifada*. Apart from the strikes and demonstrations, Palestinian Arab citizens also utilized violent means in order express their dissatisfaction with the policies of the government in confronting the uprisings in the *West Bank* and *Gaza Strip*. As mentioned by *Elie Rekhess*, in 1988, reaction of some Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel against the dominant structures took place in form of “out-of-system actions” such as rioting, burning tires, blocking roads, stoning, waving Palestinian flags, damaging property and agricultural produce, and setting fire

²²¹ Kook, (1995), op.cit., p.322

to forests²²². In fact, 1988 witnessed significant increase of involvement of the Palestinian Arab citizens in criminal cases, which indicated a momentous counter-hegemonic challenge to the dominant Israeli legal structures. The 208 violent incidents that were carried out by the Palestinian Arab citizens such as bombings, stabbings and use of explosive packages and hand grenades in 1988, contrast to 69 in 1987, indicated the amplified disrespect of the Palestinian Arab citizens to the Israeli legal system by which they consented to be abode until the *Intifada*.²²³ Some Palestinian Arabs got involved in acts of violence, confrontations with Israeli authorities, violation of Israeli laws, organization of self-help activities and acts of hostilities against the Israeli system²²⁴.

Following a more counter-hegemonic line of resistance, some segments of the Palestinian Arab community expressed their willingness to fulfill their responsibility in the resistance of the Palestinian people as well as in accomplishing their rights²²⁵. While fulfilling such a responsibility however, some Palestinian Arab citizens shared counter-hegemonic stance of the Palestinians in the *WBGS* rather than utilizing the Israeli civic mechanisms to express their dissatisfaction about the policies of ruling elite against the Palestinians in both sides of the Green Line. Thus, the cases like murders of Arab workers from *Gaza Strip* in Rishon Letzion on 20 May 1990 and riots in the Temple Mount on 8 October 1990 caused immediate expression of counter-hegemonic responses by the Palestinian Arab community through and violent means of

²²² Elie Rekhess, 'The Arabs in Israel and the Intifada', Robert O. Freedman (ed.), **The Intifada: Its Impact on Israel, The Arab World and the Superpowers**, Miami, University Press of Florida, 1991, pp.343-69.

²²³ Asya, (2003), op.cit., p.189

²²⁴ Israeli, (1991), op.cit., p.27

²²⁵ Nissan Mordechai, **Toward a New Israel, The Jewish State and Arab Question**, AMS Press, New York, 1992, p.198

protest such as riots, tire burning, stone throwing and roadblocks.²²⁶ All these incidents exemplified instantaneous counter-hegemonic movements.

In addition, a counter-hegemonic sentimental mood dominated some segments of Palestinian Arab community in Israel during the *intifada*. As Rouhana argued this mood was reflected in the social, political, and cultural discourses of the Palestinian Arab people in Israel as well:

Meanwhile, the cultural, social, and political discourse of the Arabs of Israel was beginning to be dominated by the sentiments of the uprising. In contrast to mainstream Jewish society, which was trying to cope with the uprising by denying it in various ways, the Arabs talked about it, followed its news, embraced its literature, sang its songs, recited its poetry, and learned its folklore. The people did this spontaneously and organizations followed suit, a trend exemplified in a conference on the folklore of the uprising held in Nazareth in the summer of 1989²²⁷

Most of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel reproduced the counter-hegemonic discourse banally in their daily basis discursive interactions. However, counter-hegemonic acts and movements of some segments of Palestinian Arab community never grew to become durable, systematic and cohesive enough to create an alternative hegemonic project for the Palestinian Arab masses in Israel. Thus, they simply represented a nebulous wave of expressive reactions rather than a premeditated counter-hegemonic upheaval. In this respect, *Intifada* was a moment of a crisis between the Israeli dominant elite and the Palestinian Arab population. However, it did not result in an efficient and institutionalized counter-hegemonic mobilization and movement against the Israeli dominant system. In fact, it crystallized the preferences of some Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel based on a civic rather than extra-parliamentary stance in dealing with the particular problems with the dominant structure and processes in Israel.

²²⁶ Asya, (2003), *op.cit.*, p.196

²²⁷ Nadim Rouhana, "The Intifada and the Palestinians of Israel: Resurrecting the Green Line", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1990, p. 63

In addition, Palestinian Arab political leadership mainly did not challenge the existing dominant civic structure and urged their members to act within the boundaries of Israeli legal framework while expressing their demands and discontent. For Rouhana it was a reflection of a consensus among the Palestinian Arab political elite about the in-system political methods of expressing the discontent of the masses²²⁸. This in-system civic consensus among the leadership was reflected in the demonstrations of both the Land Day of 1988 and the Land Day of 1989. In these demonstrations, although discourses of the Palestinian Arab leadership included some counter-hegemonic flavor, their methods and practices of expressing their discontent from the Israeli dominant structures and processes took place in line with the requirements of the existing dominant system. Thus, both of the land days passed without significant counter-hegemonic incident.

In fact, some Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel did not actively involve in *Intifada*, albeit the mounted impact of the Palestinian nationalism within the Green line throughout the 1980s. Notwithstanding their deepening isolation from the Israeli society due to the policies of the state during the crisis²²⁹, they did not express their dissatisfaction about the existing hegemonic system through use of violent and extra-institutional means by initiating their own *intifada* either. For Shaffir and Peled, it was a pragmatic choice in the sense that “they had lot to lose” by causing structural trouble for the dominant system and challenging the existing order single-handedly. In fact, Israeli dominant structures supported the development of such pragmatist choice through pursuing passive revolutionary policies and thus by creating necessary conditions for the Palestinian Arab citizens to express their reactions within the existing system.

²²⁸ Nadim Rouhana, “The Political Transformation of the Palestinians in Israel: From Acquiescence Challenge”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1989, pp. 46-8.

²²⁹ Aziz Haidar, **On the Margins: The Arab Population in the Israeli Economy**, Hurst and Company, London, 1995, p.21

In addition to such pragmatism, absence of systematic mass involvement of the Palestinian Arabs to the *Intifada* of 1987 also indicated either their disbelief to the possible success of a counter-hegemonic movement or continuing disorganization and fragmentation notwithstanding the amplified signals of *Palestinization*. Alternatively, higher participation of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel to the national elections of the 1988 compared to elections of 1984 signified their in-system politicization in Israel. This was an indicator of in-system politicization of the Palestinian Arabs in Israeli political structure. In fact, group consciousness, which was galvanized through revitalization of commonalities of the *Palestinianness*, became a mobilizing ground for the Palestinian Arab citizens for an in-system civic struggle against the system by utilizing its own tools.

Overall, *Intifada* once more revealed two paradoxical lines of the Palestinian Arab community and its leadership²³⁰ in expressing their demands to the Israeli ruling elite. One of those lines was based on a counter-hegemonic political activism, which called for replacement of the existing Israeli dominant structures by a Palestinian system and Palestinian intellectual and moral leadership that would embrace entire Palestinian people in the region. The other line rooted in the idea of transforming the dominant structures through utilization of in-system mechanisms by strengthening Palestinian Arab position within the Israeli dominant structures and processes.

2.5.5. Hamula Structure in This Period

As the intensification of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activism was accompanied by a significant expansion in the civil societal institutionalization following the Association Law of 1980, *hamula* structure faced new challenges against its centrality in socio-economic and political organization of Palestinian Arab community. In fact, 1980s witnessed significant rise of professional, pedagogical, medical, social, economic, and cultural organizations to congregate different segments

²³⁰ Alexander Bligh, "The Intifada and the new political Role of Israeli Arab Leadership", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.35, No.1, 1999, pp.134-64

of Palestinian Arab community around their specific demands from the Israeli dominant structure²³¹. Thus, they presented an alternative and modern channel of catalysis for the interactions between the Israeli dominant structures/processes and the Palestinian Arab citizens.

In economic arena, economic crisis revitalized the role of the *hamula* as a bedrock of socio-economic security. As the local jobs became more secure in the absence of access to the Israeli national social security services, “intra-*hamula* proletarianization”, which began in late 1970s gained impetus during the 1980s. In fact, as some *hamulas*, which instrumentalized the kinship ties in economic restructuring of the *hamula* as an economic player in Israeli dominant structures, transformed into distributors of public and private jobs and thus continued to occupy a significant place in economic and social organization of traditional Palestinian Arab livelihood. In this respect, they remained as socio-economic formations and networks, which could be characterized as “semi-corporate groups”²³².

In political arena, notwithstanding amplified political party and organization pluralism²³³, *hamula*’s impact in local elections remained intact. In fact, in the local elections of 1978, local council candidates sponsored or supported *hamulas* received majority of the seats in many Palestinian Arab villages.²³⁴ In the early 1980s, as the local councils became main actors in the Palestinian Arab political sphere in Israel with the intensification of municipal institutionalization in the localities, the *hamula* continued to be main platform of mobilization of Palestinian Arab villagers with the

²³¹ Nadim Rouhana, “The Political Transformation of the Palestinians in Israel: From Acquiescence Challenge”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1989, p.52

²³² Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, **The Transformation of Israeli Society**, Westview Press, Boulder, 1985, pp.341-2

²³³ Robert Blecher, "Citizens without Sovereignty: Transfer and Ethnic Cleansing in Israel.", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 47, No.4 , 2005, p.737

²³⁴ Ian Lustick, ‘Israel’s Arab Minority in the Begin Era’, Robert O. Freedman, (ed.) **Israel in the Begin Era**, Praeger Publishers, New York, p.128-9

absence of any institutionalized form of mobilization. As the 1980s witnessed rise of challenges exerted by the modern forms of socio-economic structuring both from nationalist and religious organizations with counter-hegemonic positions or discourses such as *Abna al Balad* and *Islamic movement*, some *hamulas* underwent processes of transformation.

Transformational impact of these challenges varied in different *hamulas*. In 1980s, Palestinian Arab *hamulas* experienced two parallel transformational processes in Israel. In some Palestinian Arab localities the *hamula* structure began to dissolve due to the pressures exerted by the processes of modernization, urbanization, proletarianization and institutionalization. Within this context, new organizations based on modern rather than traditional attachments emerged to compete to fill the leadership vacuum that emerged following the dissolution of *hamula*'s political and socio-economic guidance over the community. Ties to the nationalist or socialist forms of associations became new forms of intra-communal corporate relationship. Traditionalism on the other hand was restructured and redefined within the framework of religiosity. Thus, it was reframed in line with religious ties rather than kinship under the guidance of the *Islamic Movement*, which was a "modernized form of political activity"²³⁵ that operated through references to the traditional set of values within the dominant political structure. In this respect, in some cases religious affiliations suppressed the kinship affiliations among some segments of Palestinians Arab community and moved the political basis of Palestinian Arab activism and organization away from *hamula*. As a result, some *hamulas* lost their significance in the socio-economic organization of the traditional Palestinian Arab livelihood.

Some other *hamulas* adopted the changes and survived the challenges by maintaining their centrality in socio-economic and political livelihood of Palestinian Arab community. Thus, they *hamulas* introduced new strategies in order to maintain their

²³⁵ Mark Tessler; Audra K. Grant, "Israel's Arab Citizens: The Continuing Struggle", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 555, 1998, p.107.

dominance over the Palestinian Arab communities in terms of their intra-communal affairs as well as their relationship with the Israeli dominant structures. They continued to be important co-opted actors within the Israeli system notwithstanding the challenges exerted by the new forms of socio-economic and political formations among the Palestinian Arab citizens. Meanwhile, persistence of inter-*hamula* competitions remained as an important denominator in intra-communal power struggle. The *hamulas* continued to canvass in order to guarantee a co-opted position within the Israeli system in order to materialize the interests of the *hamula*. An example of such competition took place in 1981 between a Druze and a Bedouin *hamula* over a seat in Israeli Parliament. Following controversial death of a Bedouin sheikh Hamad Abu Rabia due to his alleged disagreement with a Druze sheikh Jaber Muadi over acquiring MK position in the *Knesset*, an inter-*hamula* struggle took place in order to assume this position²³⁶.

2.6. 1992-2000: Hegemony-in-Building

Following the “first bourgeoisie revolution of Israel”²³⁷ and with the adaptation of the Israeli economic structure to the neo-liberal world economy, the 1990s signified a change in the economic, political and social structures and institutions of Israel with the impact of economic and political liberalization and the Oslo Peace Process. This structural change had a significant impact on the traditional patterns of relationship between the ruling elite and the other segments of the Israeli society and particularly the Palestinian Arabs. Many Palestinian Arab citizens felt pressure of reevaluating and reorganizing their attitudes towards the Israeli state and dominant structures in line with the domestic and international developments. The Peace Process, which was institutionalized by Oslo Peace Accords of 1993, and following agreements also led to

²³⁶ *The New York Times*, ‘Druze Sheik Takes Seat In the Israeli Parliament’, January 21, 1981, at <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C03E1DD153BF932A15752C0A967948260&n=Top/News/World/Countries%20and%20Territories/Israel>

²³⁷ Uri Ram, “The State of the Nation: Contemporary Challenges to Zionism in Israel”, *Constellations*, Vol.6, No.3, pp.325–338

rise of expectations among the Palestinian Arab citizenry about the improvement of their status and legitimization of their efforts towards equal citizenship²³⁸.

As discussed in the previous parts, until 1990s, main concern of the Israeli ruling elite was to prevent a counter-hegemonic mobilization of Palestinian Arab citizens rather than establishing and consolidating hegemony over them. In the course of economic transformation and changes in the socio-economic structure from early 1990s onwards, Israeli ruling elite began to implement policies towards the Palestinian Arab citizens that were more inclusive in order to attract Palestinian Arab consent to their ethico-moral leadership. Although implemented and internalized by some segments of the Israeli ruling elite under Yitzhak Rabin leadership and interrupted in the consecutive governments of Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak, these policies made a transformational impact on the nature of relationship between the most segments of the Palestinian Arab community and the Israeli dominant structures and processes in different spheres. In fact, notwithstanding severe opposition of some segments of the Israeli ruling elite and intervals in late 1990s, these efforts gained more impetus especially following the crisis of hegemony-in-building in September 2000.

2.6.1. Political Sphere

In political arena, the cadres of neo-liberal, pro-peace wing of the *Labor* Party and the liberal *Meretz* party chauffeured the change in the attitudes within some segments of the Israeli Jewish historical bloc. This change was reflected in most of the policies implemented by the Israeli ruling elite especially until 1996 under Yitzhak Rabin's leadership. Notwithstanding the interlude by Netanyahu's and Barak's consecutive governments of 1996 and 1999, changes in the controlled and selective passive revolutionary policies played an important role in empowerment and emancipation of Palestinian Arab political elite and electorate within Israeli political sphere. In 2000,

²³⁸ Majid Al-Haj, 'Whither the Green Line? Trends in the Orientation of the Palestinians in Israel and the Territories', Raphael Cohen-Almagor (ed.), **Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads**, Routledge Publishers, Abingdon, 2005, p. 195

even one of the most the critical voices of the Arab world, Edward Said noted existence of “*some*” “Israeli Jewish groups and individuals who have begun to organize around the notion of a full secular democracy for all Israeli citizens.”²³⁹

Changes in the policies and general approach of the Israeli ruling elite under Rabin’s leadership did not entirely aim to eliminate advantageous position of the Jewish majority in socio-economic and political structures or to abolish ethnic character and image of the Israeli state. Their objective was to obtain and institutionalize the consent of the Palestinian Arab citizenry to the Israeli dominant structures and processes through building confidence by realization of intra-systemic openings. They tried to take initial steps of structural modifications in the status-quo in the nature of relationship between the Israeli state and the Palestinian Arab citizenry by materialization of a more integrative and inclusive re-institutionalization. In this respect, as the *integral state* in Gramscian terms is defined as an entity, which pledges the active and permanent participation of society into the activities and decision-making processes of its political institutions²⁴⁰, the Rabin period witnessed increased signs for repositioning of the Israeli state in this trail with regard to its relations with the Palestinian Arab community. Although the Palestinian Arabs were not integrated to the image of the state, they became an important power center in determining the composition and leadership of the political framework in practice through their decisive position within the existing political institutional structure. Their continued exclusion from the image of the Israeli state due to persisting dominance of Jewish symbols in its definition did not necessarily mean their complete omission from the political framework and nation-power system of Israel.

Thus, the period between 1992 and 1996 under Rabin’s leadership was marked by an explicit departure from the policies of sustaining exclusionary status-quo and implementing controlled passive revolutionary processes towards the Palestinian Arab

²³⁹ Edward Said, **The End of Peace Process: Oslo and After**, Pantheon Books, New York, 2000, p.317

²⁴⁰ Christine Buci-Glucksmann, **op.cit.** p. 62

community. Liberal stance of the Rabin's leadership, which was based on admittance of state's responsibility for the socio-economic discrepancies between the Jewish and Palestinian Arab segments of Israeli society, guided exceptionally liberal and meticulously consent-seeking practices of Israeli ruling elite towards the Palestinian Arab citizenry. In his presentation of his government to *Knesset* in 1992, Rabin summarized the vision of the new ruling elite:

Members of the *Knesset*, it is proper to admit that for years we have erred in our treatment of Israel's Arab and Druze citizens. Today, almost 45 years after the establishment of the state, there are substantial gaps between the Jewish and Arab communities in a number of spheres. On behalf of the new Government, I see it as fitting to promise the Arab, Druze, and Bedouin population that we shall do everything possible to close those gaps. We shall try to make the great leap that will enhance the welfare of the minorities that have tied their fate to our own.²⁴¹

Admitting the state's negligence that led to Palestinian Arab discontent with the dominant structures of Israel and their consequent alienation, Rabin government pursued the passive revolutionary path, which resulted in the decline of Palestinian Arab counter-hegemonic activism at the beginning of 1990s. In this respect, the promises given by the Israeli ruling elite to the Palestinian Arab citizenry prior to the Rabin's premiership on minimizing the land expropriations, balancing the levels of housing benefits on egalitarian basis, and eliminating the gaps in municipal services between the Jewish and Palestinian Arab localities were not put aside by the Rabin administration²⁴². In the field of health for example, the government built forty-eight family health clinics in Arab communities between 1993 and 1996 which reflected an unprecedented advancement in this area.²⁴³

²⁴¹ "Address to the Knesset by Prime Minister Rabin Presenting his Government-" 13 July 1992, *MFA newsletter*, Vol.13-14, 1992-1994, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%201947/1992-1994/1%20%20Address%20to%20the%20Knesset%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Rabin>

²⁴² Oren Yiftachel, "Regionalism among Arabs in Israel", *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, New Series, Vol. 22, No. 1.,1997, p.102

²⁴³ Shalom (Shuli) Dichter, 'The Government's Plan for Development in the Arab Localities' Shalom (Shuli) Dichter (ed.) **Sikkuy's Report on Equality & Integration of the Arab Citizens in Israel 2000-**

Israeli ruling elite under the leadership of Rabin introduced similar openings within the context of state's relationship with traditional structures of the Palestinian Arab citizenry. In January 1994, for example, Rabin government has given the first concession to a Negev Bedouin tribe by allowing them to establish an agricultural settlement, following *Azazmeh* tribe's challenge of government's eviction policy that relocated the tribe in 1990 and handing over its lands to Jewish agricultural settlement²⁴⁴. This practice was different from the indifferent or suppressive policies of the previous governments towards the Bedouin reactions against the forceful evictions that took place throughout the 1970s and 1980s²⁴⁵.

In 1995, a similar compromise was made by the Rabin government with regard to the expropriation of the Palestinian Arab lands in the East Jerusalem. Under the threat of no confidence vote in the *Knesset* exerted by six Palestinian Arab MKs, the Rabin government froze the expropriations until another notification²⁴⁶. In this case, as in the case of Bedouin settlements, Israeli authorities presented a compromising standpoint, which resulted in reinforcing the ties of the Palestinian Arab MKs with the parliamentary system. In fact, such response demonstrated the Palestinian Arab MKs of *Democratic Front for Peace and Equality* and *Democratic Arab Party* that they could achieve the goals of the Palestinian Arab citizens by using the mechanisms of the Israeli legislative system.

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's assassination in 1995 marked a turning point in the policies within the framework of hegemony-in-building. It once more revealed gravity of the unresolved crisis within the Jewish historic bloc related to the policies against the Palestinian Arabs in Israel and the *WBGS*. It was one of the severest warnings in the

2001, Sikkuy, The Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality Beit Hakerem, Jerusalem , 2001, <http://www.sikkuy.org.il/english/papers/report2001Eng.htm#Introduction>

²⁴⁴ Nur Masalha, ***A Land Without People***, Faber and Faber, London, 1997, p.141

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.* , p.140

²⁴⁶ Graham Usher, ***Dispatches from Palestine***, Pluto Press, London and Virginia, 1999, p.104

history of Israel to a Jewish political leader and his followers to avoid certain paths of policymaking about a particular issue. Rabin's assassination also signified a turning point for the certain segments of Jewish political elite, who initiated the hegemonic processes and significant passive revolutionary acts under his leadership. The moderate and hegemonic segments of the Jewish political elite took the message, which was delivered by the assassination of Rabin in 1995. They perceived the incident as a warning from unconvinced segments of Jewish historic bloc, which demonstrated discontent about the speed of the processes of hegemony-in-building that were embodied in integrative policies targeting the consent of Palestinian Arab community. In fact, military operations against the refugee camps and civilians Lebanon within the framework of the *Operation Grapes of Wrath* aimed to reassure Israeli Jewish public that the hegemonic processes and openings would not necessarily mean compromise from security priorities of Israel. Nevertheless attacks of IDF to Lebanese towns and villages did not only fail to convince Jewish public about the priorities and capabilities of Peres government but also alienated Palestinian Arab citizens from ethico-political leadership of Peres as well as the processes of hegemony-in-building. This dual failure became one of the important factors that affected Netanyahu's success in the *Knesset* elections of 1996.

Netanyahu's victory in the 1996 elections also disclosed the level of this dissatisfaction among some segments of the Jewish public and political elite regarding the policies of opening within the context of hegemony-in-building. As the discontent of the hawkish segments of Israeli political elite intensified against the initiatives of the other subdivisions of Israeli ruling elite in the direction of a consent-based hegemonic restructuring, their alternative stance became tougher on certain issues. Although the assassination of Rabin caused a soul-searching process among some segments of the hawkish political elite such as Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert and it changed their attitudes in the direction of more integrative policies towards Palestinian Arab community, mainstream exclusionary vision, which was represented by leadership of Benjamin Netanyahu, overshadowed and suppressed such processes. In this respect, the

Netanyahu period that followed the 1996 elections signified an interlude in the hegemony-in-building process.

On the Palestinian Arab side, response of some segments of the Palestinian Arab community to the assassination signified their embracement of the policies and passive revolutionary acts of the Israeli hegemonic bloc towards integrating Palestinian Arab citizenry to the dominant structures and processes. As Haj argued, Palestinian Arab community's acts towards manifestation of grief and resentment about the assassination such as obituaries of the Palestinian Arab public and political elite in the newspapers, large Palestinian Arab representation in Rabin's funeral, activities in Palestinian Arab schools were signs of Palestinian Arab intention to "demonstrate a sense of belonging to Israeli society"²⁴⁷. This sense of belonging was robustly strengthened by the transformational policies and attitudes of the Israeli ruling elite under the leadership of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres. It was however, undermined by the immediate foreign policy changes under the Rabin's successor Shimon Peres especially within the context of regional affairs against neighbor Arab countries such as Lebanon and Syria. Peres aggressive policy against Lebanon to convince Israeli Jewish public about the firm position of the Israeli ruling elite on the security priorities notwithstanding its peaceful openings, served intra-communal reassessment of the dilemmas of belonging among the Palestinian Arab community. The confidential vacuum, which emerged during the processes of such reassessment was reflected in the eroded political support among the Palestinian Arab citizenry to Shimon Peres in his race for the office of Prime Ministry in 1996.

Benjamin Netanyahu's first visit to the Palestinian Arab village of *Taiibe* following his election victory in 1996 gave the impression that the transformation of policies of the Israeli political elite was not limited with the personalities but reflect a structural change in the position of all segments of Israeli ruling elite. Discourse of Netanyahu with regard to the Palestinian Arab community's needs and his appointment of Moshe

²⁴⁷ Al-Haj, 'Whither the Green Line? ...'(2005), op.cit., pp.197-8

Katsav, a moderate *Likud* veteran politician, with an auxiliary ministerial task to undertake Palestinian Arab affairs were initially perceived as signs of change in the dominant approach of Netanyahu and his cadres concerning the relation of state with the Palestinian Arab community.

However, he did not translate the discursive acknowledgement of the concerns and problems of the Palestinian Arab community into concrete policies and systemic integrative openings to overcome those concerns and problems in different fields of communal life such as infrastructural reconstruction, accommodation, employment, industrial and agricultural development, city planning, education, socio-economic security, health. Reintroduction of pre-Rabin institutions, such as the advisor to PM on Arab affairs and ministerial post for the issues of Arab citizenry, which were abolished by Rabin leadership due to their symbolic significance in connoting a discriminatory stance of state towards Palestinian Arab affairs, signified a return to vision and policies of pre-Rabin exclusionary status-quo. Exclusion of Palestinian Arab political elite from the decision-making mechanisms of the Israeli state and the efforts of the Netanyahu In this respect, at political sphere, Netanyahu period was marked by a return to practices of exclusion, selective and controlled integration as well as marginalization of socio-economic and political status of Palestinian Arab citizenry.

Diffident and distanced stance of the Barak's government towards the Palestinian Arab community's political leaders, its ignorance of civic problems of Palestinian Arab citizenry notwithstanding political support granted by the 95% of the Palestinian Arab voters during the 1999 elections, demoralized both Palestinian Arab political elite and public. Contrary to active leadership Yitzhak Rabin in Israeli passive revolution and hegemony-in-building process, Barak remained passive and unproductive. He simply linked solution of the Palestinian Arab civic problems to the successes in the regional peace process. Consequently, with the gradual demise of the peace process, Israeli "intellectual and moral leadership", which began to be built during Yitzhak Rabin's government, faced a deepening crisis of confidence. Ineffectiveness of the ministerial committee in addressing and creating solutions for the problems of Palestinian Arab

citizenry and unrealized economic plan, which was designed for development Palestinian Arab localities, exacerbated the crisis of confidence between the Israeli ruling elite and some segments of Palestinian Arab community.

Barak's distanced positioning toward the Palestinian Arab community and his return to policies of exclusionary status-quo and controlled passive revolutionary practices against them resulted in Israeli intra-structural distress which derived from confidence-liquefying processes between the Palestinian Arab community and the Israeli ruling elite. As the crisis of confidence deepened the alienation of the Palestinian Arab community from the Israeli ruling elite and consolidated their perception of uselessness of the Israeli dominant mechanisms in achieving their socio-economic and political demands, militarization and extra-parliamentary counter-hegemonic methods of resistance became viable options for increasing number of Palestinian Arab citizenry at the beginning of 2000s.

2.6.2. Economic Sphere

At economic level, several developments and policies signified neo-liberal transformation of the Israeli dominant structures and processes in the 1990s. Transformational policy changes took place through pursuing omnipresent neo-liberal economic principles of the 1990s to transform dominant economic institutions and ideology of labor Zionism that was rooted in strict governmental control over the economic activities of the Israeli society. Intensification of privatization parallel to momentous expansion of Israeli stock exchange in 1992-1993, foreign exchange reform that was completed in 1998, liberal reforms to increase the competition in Israeli market, reform in the capital market, construction of an economic environment conducive to growth of private sector and reduction of state involvement were among those policies and developments²⁴⁸. These measures of liberalization, which were accompanied by controlled privatization and prolonged market reform under Rabin

²⁴⁸ Ben Zion Zilberfarb, 'From Socialism to Free Market –The Israeli Economy, 1948-2003', Cohen Almagor (ed.) **Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads**, Routledge Curzon, 2006, pp.15-19

administration, facilitated integration of dominant economic structures of Israel to the world neo-liberal structure²⁴⁹ through an intra-structural reforms and transformations.

Within the context of neo-liberal transformation divisiveness among the different segments of the Jewish ruling elite were reflected in different economic policies pursued against the Palestinian Arab citizenry under Rabin, Netanyahu and Barak respectively. While Rabin's period was marked by the integrative measures towards Palestinian Arab community within the context of economic neo-liberal restructuring under the ethico-moral leadership Israeli dominant economic elite, consecutive leaderships of Netanyahu and Barak reflected antagonism and negligence of the economic elite towards the concerns of Palestinian Arab community within the Israeli economic transformational structures and processes.

In Rabin period between 1992 and 1996, first signs of transformation were noted in the decision-making mechanisms and the institutional structure of the *Histadrut*. In 1994, a neo-liberal, peace and privatization bloc²⁵⁰ under the leadership of Hayim Ramon replaced *Histadrut*'s traditionally conservative republican administration notwithstanding opposition from *Labor* party. "Peace and privatization" became motto of the governments in early 1990s, which interconnected the aspirations of the dominant economic elite towards neo-liberal economic transformation of the country with the necessities of providing intra-societal and regional peace and stability. This groundbreaking change signified an evolutionary shift in the intentions of economic leadership from passive revolutionary alertness towards a more hegemonic vision as the Palestinian Arab citizens were concerned.

Correspondingly, economic conditions of the 1990s and the consequent neo-liberal economic policies of the Israeli economic elite increased the dependency of the

²⁴⁹ Emma Murphy, "Structural Inhibitions to Economic Liberalization in Israel", *Middle East Journal*, Vol.48, No.1, 1994, pp.75-87

²⁵⁰ Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, 'The Dynamics of Citizenship in Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process', Gershon Shafir, (ed.), **The Citizenship Debate: A Reader** (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998, p.259

urbanized and highly educated Palestinian Arab labor force to the lower strata of Israeli economic structures and processes, especially in the industrial and service sectors²⁵¹. As the Rabin government's progress in the Peace Process ignited an environment conducive for economic revitalization, economic denominators such as decline in inflation and unemployment rates²⁵² and stability in economic growth improved with the optimistic economic atmosphere, which derived from expectations from the *Peace Process*. Although the Palestinian Arab citizens were among the groups of people, who were likely to suffer from neo-liberal policies due to their vulnerable economic situation and flawed proletarianization²⁵³, Rabin government's policies and openings generated opportunities for them to improve their economic conditions within the context of neo-liberal economic transformation. Thus, notwithstanding continuity in the disadvantaged position of the Palestinian Arab workforce in Israeli labor market, which was "structured along lines of Jewish super-ordination and [Palestinian] Arab subordination"²⁵⁴, and additional pressures exerted by foreign workers on them from early 1990s onwards²⁵⁵, integrative stance and policies of government disallowed their alienation from dominant economic structures and processes.

Transformational economic policy changes were reflected in the efforts of Rabin towards amending inequitable budget allocations to the Palestinian Arabs through initiation of an equalization plan in 1993²⁵⁶. Significant policies, which were

²⁵¹ Onn Winckler, 'Fertility Transition in the Middle East: The Case of the Israeli Arabs', Alexander Bligh (ed.) **The Israeli Palestinians: An Arab Minority in the Jewish State**, p.54

²⁵² Lea Achdut, "Income Inequality, Income Composition and Macroeconomic Trends: Israel, 1979-93", *Economica*, No.63, 1996, p.10

²⁵³ Beinun, (1998), op.cit., p.135.

²⁵⁴ Moshe Semyonov; Rebeca Raijman; Anat Yom-Tov, "Labor Market Competition, Perceived Threat, and Endorsement of Economic Discrimination against Foreign Workers in Israel", *Social Problems*, Vol. 49, No. 3., 2002, p.419

²⁵⁵ Ibid., 420

²⁵⁶ Adam Garfinkle, **Politics and Society in Modern Israel: Myths and Realities**, M.E. Sharpe Publishers, New York, 1997, p.105

implemented by Rabin government, to fulfill commitments to provide economic progress in the areas of the Palestinian Arab community in several spheres such as transportation, tourism, health, labor, and welfare accompanied the efforts of narrowing socio-economic gaps between the Jewish and Palestinian Arab segments of Israeli society.

Another groundbreaking attempt to integrate the Palestinian Arab citizenry to the dominant structures of Israeli system was made by the Rabin government in the field of socio-economic security. Equalization of children allowances as a part of policies towards broadening the access of the Palestinian Arab to the social security benefits of Israeli state in 1992. The Israeli leadership's decision on the children allowances took place notwithstanding opposition of the hawkish elite concern on its possible impact on the increase of the fertility among the Palestinian Arab citizens to endanger the future Jewish-Non-Jewish demographic balance²⁵⁷. This was considered as the initial stage of discarding use of military service and other affiliations as a criterion for allowance of certain benefits and practice of certain rights²⁵⁸. In this respect, the Israeli ruling elite seemed ready to take steps towards strengthening the basis for their ethico-moral leadership through exercising passive revolutionary acts in spite of the general concerns with regard to demographic balance. In addition, this policy change marked a transformation of inequitable inner logic of former dominant perceptions on Israeli welfare principles and policies that institutionalized exclusion of Palestinian Arab citizens from the Israeli social and economic security mechanisms. As the social security benefits scheme initiated by Rabin government included all citizens of Israel, exclusionary inner logic of social-welfare structure, which was based on the transfer of

²⁵⁷ Onn Winckler, 'Fertility Transition in the Middle East: The Case of the Israeli Arabs', Alexander Bligh (ed.) **The Israeli Palestinians: An Arab Minority in the Jewish State**, p.55

²⁵⁸ David Kretzmer, 'Human Rights', Raphael Cohen Almagor (ed.) **Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads**, Routledge Curzon, 2006, p.46

surplus allowance cuts from Palestinian Arab families to the social security budget was abolished by making family allowances accessible to all citizens²⁵⁹.

Another important step of the Rabin government toward economic integration of the Palestinian Arab community to the dominant structures and processes was the amendment of the Equal Opportunities in Employment Act in 1995. With this amendment, Palestinian Arab community was included in the list of protected groups that would be provided by a legal shield against any discriminatory act of employers on the basis of “age, race, religion, nationality, land of origin, views, and political affiliation” in the course of job recruitments as well as in their working places²⁶⁰. Rabin’s period also witnessed significant rise in the number of Palestinian Arab employees recruited by the state institutions and companies. From 1992 to 1996, a steady 0.5 per cent annual increase in the employment of Palestinian Arab workforce was an outcome of the recruitment program of Rabin administration, which was initiated in 1992 to facilitate integration of Palestinian Arab workforce to Israeli public structure²⁶¹. These steps taken by the ruling elite under Rabin leadership created an atmosphere of optimism among the Palestinian Arab community.

However, optimism and improvement in the economic parameters did not persist for a very long time. Notwithstanding the new opportunities created by peace economy for economic elite and upper-middle strata of Israeli economy, a significant rise in the unemployment rate and economic pressures created by neo-liberal transformational policies between 1995 and 1999 amplified the discontent among the economically

²⁵⁹ Leslie King, “From Pronatalism to Social Welfare? Extending Family Allowances to Minority Populations in France and Israel”, *European Journal of Population*, Vol. 17, No.4, 2001, 305-322

²⁶⁰ Sharon Rabin Margalioth, "Labor Market Discrimination against Arab Israeli Citizens: Can Something Be Done?" *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, Vol.36,2004, p.855

²⁶¹ *Ibid.* pp. 856-7 and Ali Haider, ‘Arab Citizens in the Civil Service’, Shalom (Shuli) Dichter (ed.)Sikkuy’s Report on Equality & Integration of the Arab Citizens in Israel 2000-2001, Sikkuy, The Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality Beit Hakerem, Jerusalem , 2001, [http://www.sikkuy.org.il/english/papers/report2001/Eng.htm# Introduction](http://www.sikkuy.org.il/english/papers/report2001/Eng.htm#Introduction)

vulnerable groups and poor in Israel²⁶². As the 1996 elections replaced the moderate economic elite and the leading cadres of hegemony-in-building with the cadres of status-quo, burden of neo-liberal transformation was encumbered on the weakest segments of the Israeli economic system. Since the Netanyahu government's basis of political power derived from the disadvantaged *Mizrahi* population, a selective socio-economic security scheme was introduced by the new ruling economic elite, which excluded the Palestinian Arab citizenry. Contrary to the introduction of compensatory schemes for the protection of the Jewish communities from the possible negative economic consequences of neo-liberal transformation at local municipal level, Netanyahu government did not implement any protective measure to prevent exacerbation of economic conditions in Palestinian Arab localities.

Contrary to the expectations of extensive amount of Palestinian Arab voters in 1999, election victory of Barak did not herald immediate end of coercive and exclusionary economic policies that were associated with the Netanyahu's leadership. In fact, Barak mainly focused on the successes in the peace process and their probable socio-economic repercussions for the Palestinian Arab citizens rather than finding solutions to domestic socio-economic predicament of Palestinian Arab community deriving from the new dynamics of neo-liberal economic transformation. Combined with his negligence and distance towards the Palestinian Arab community, his foreign policy dominated economic vision intensified gradual re-alienation of Palestinian Arab citizens from the dominant structures and processes of Israeli economic system, which they began to integrate during the Rabin period.

Therefore, as the Israeli economic ruling elite continued neo-liberal policies notwithstanding the absence of effective social security mechanisms, problems of Israeli economy were deepened by the instability that pervaded the economic sphere in 2000 by an international economic crisis and as well as a domestic upheaval of *Al-Aqsa*

²⁶² Jodi Nachtwey and Mark Tessler, "The Political Economy of Attitudes toward Peace among Palestinians and Israelis", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.46, No.2, 2002, p.268

Intifada. In this respect, *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, did not only reflect the amplified identity-based activism among the Palestinian Arab citizens but also their discontent about their insecurity within the as a result of Netanyahu's coercive economic policies and consecutive negligence of Barak's leadership in compensating the destructive impact of those policies.

2.6.3. Socio-cultural Sphere

The anti-Israeli acts of some segments of Palestinian Arab community during the Intifada of 1987 and Gulf War of 1990 indicated increased antipathy and mistrust of the Palestinian Arab citizens against the policies of Israeli authorities towards them as well as the Palestinians in the *West Bank* and *Gaza Strip*. Rabin government's one of the priorities was to reduce mistrust of the Palestinian Arab citizenry to the dominant structures of Israeli system and thus integrating them to the transformational processes in Israeli society. While fulfilling this priority, Rabin did not only use the political apparatuses of compromise and cooperation but also utilized socio-cultural and legal institutions of the Israeli system. These institutions played an important role in reestablishing confidence between the Palestinian Arabs and dominant structures of the hegemony-in-building.

Consequently, notwithstanding abovementioned antipathy derived from liquefied confidence at the beginning of 1990s, efforts of rebuilding trust between the institutions of dominant structure and the Palestinian Arab community flourished with the openings of the Rabin government. Surveys conducted in the early 1990s indicated an increase in the degree of adherence and approval of Israeli institutions among the Palestinian Arab citizens. According to a survey conducted by Benziman and Mansour in 1992, revealed consent of Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel toward the institutions of Israeli system as

55.1% to president, 36.7% to *Knesset*, 58.2% to the court system and 90.1% to the health system.²⁶³

Supreme Court was one of the important Israeli institutions, which acquired the consent of noticeable amount of the Palestinian Arab citizens as an Israeli dominant institution. Notwithstanding the existence of certain amount of criticism against its inadequacy of full protection of human rights of the Palestinian Arab citizens in the Israeli system, it continued to be one of the most trusted institutions among the Palestinian Arab community. In fact, its decisions against the institutional discriminatory acts towards the Palestinian Arab citizens in 1990s continued to consolidate this trust. Thus, *Israeli Supreme Court* appeared to be major apparatus in hegemony-in-building process in socio-cultural sphere. Its decisions about accommodation, education and socio-cultural development of the Palestinian Arab citizens played an important role in the transformation of the policies of some segments of the Israeli ruling elite from 'dictatorial' to 'hegemonic' practices in Gramscian terms. Notwithstanding severe opposition of certain segments of the ruling elite about such a transformation, *Supreme Court's* balanced practices and decisions strengthened the ties between the Palestinian Arab citizenry and the Israeli dominant structures and processes. In fact, Palestinian Arab citizens became more integrated into the Israeli legal, political and socio-economic systems through their increased focus on the in-system ways of claiming their civic rights. Thus, the 1990s witnessed amplification of Palestinian Arab community's institutionalized involvement in the Israeli socio-political sphere through deriving some benefits from the Israeli in-system dominant structures and institutions as well as through utilizing the Israeli bi-communal and Palestinian Arab civil societal organizations. These efforts were accompanied by the passive revolutionary acts of some segments of ruling elite toward a hegemonic restructuring in this period. As the crisis of hegemonic bloc continued among the Jewish political elite notwithstanding,

²⁶³ Uzi Benziman and Atallah Mansour, *Subtenants*, Keter Publishing House, 1992, quoted in Rebecca Kook, 'Dilemmas of Ethnic Minorities in Democracies: The Effect of Peace on the Palestinians in Israel', *Politics and Society*, 1995, Vol. 23, No. 3, p.312

these policies were not immune from intermissions especially during the changes in the Israeli governments.

Following the achievements that were reached through utilization of the Israeli hegemonic structures, the Palestinian Arabs continued to operate within the political and legal framework of Israel in order to reach their objectives. In time, the more they reached their objectives through the utilization of the hegemonic structures of Israel, (like Israeli media, courts, etc.) the more they were involved in the internalization of these processes and the structures. As the head of the *Association Forty*, a Palestinian Arab civil society institution specialized on the problems of the unrecognized villages in Israel, confessed in an interview, before they were accustomed to work against the state now they began to adjust to working with it²⁶⁴.

The Association Forty was not the only civil societal organization, which reached certain achievements within the legal boundaries of Israeli dominant civic structure. The 1990s witnessed expansion of civil societal activism and institutionalization among the Palestinian Arab citizenry. Palestinian Arab non-governmental organizations, which specialized on community's socio-economic and political concerns such as health issues, social security, socio-economic inequities, educational problems, legal counseling, civic rights, and problems of internally displaced persons created an energetic public sphere within the Israeli civil society²⁶⁵. They did not only empower the Palestinian citizens in their relations with the Israeli dominant socio-cultural sphere but also represented their intra-structural demands towards reformation²⁶⁶ to other segments of Israeli civil society and the dominant Israeli institutions. Interactive and cooperative civic interrelations of *Mossawa*, *Adalah*, *Association Forty*, with their Jewish or bi-communal counterparts such as *Sikkuy* and *ASCI* as well as with Israeli

²⁶⁴ Interview with head of *Association Forty* in the unrecognized village of *Ein Hud*, August 2004

²⁶⁵ Jamal, "The Arab Leadership in Israel:...",(2006), op.cit., p.12

²⁶⁶ Shany Payes, "Palestinian NGOs in Israel: A campaign for Civic Equality in a Non-Civic State", *Israel Studies*, Vol.8, No.1, 2003, pp.83-4

dominant institutions like *Supreme Court* and their consequent achievements within the Israeli system played an important role in internalization and reproduction of the Israeli dominant structures and processes among the Palestinian Arab citizenry. Although some of their activities aimed to de-legitimize the Israeli state and dominant structures in domestic and international arenas²⁶⁷, their operation within the Israeli civil society and within the legal boundaries of Israeli dominant system undermined significance of their counter-hegemonic activities.

A parallel civil societal institutionalization took place in the Palestinian Arab Islamic segments of the community. Different from secular mainstream civil societal institutionalization, Islamic civil society appeared as an island within the Israeli civil societal configuration, which did not have permanent interactions with the Jewish and secular Palestinian Arab non-governmental activism within the dominant Israeli civic structure. Islamic civil societal structuring presented counter-public and alternative patterns of an intra-communal civic development to the dominant Israeli public.

Notwithstanding the existence of alternative forms of institutionalized counter-hegemonic civil society, most of the Palestinian Arab citizens preferred to remain within the system as long as they could achieve their civic demands by utilizing the ‘trustable’ mechanisms of dominant structure. *Katzir* case was one of the success stories of intra-system civic achievements in this period. It was an important and symbolic example of the increased civic activism of the Palestinian Arab citizenry and transformation of the policies of some segments of Israeli political elite toward a more hegemonic policy making and implementing against them.

In 1995, following the recognition *Jabarin* family’s right of purchasing a house in *Central Hill* region of *Katzir*, in May 1994 by the *Israeli Ministry of Housing*, another Palestinian Arab family of *Ka’adan* applied to construct a house in the same town but a different neighborhood. This neighborhood, *Western Hill* was a *Jewish Agency*

²⁶⁷ Interview with Amin Makhoul chairperson of al Ittijah, Haifa, August 2004

settlement, a locality with entirely Jewish population. As the Israeli Housing Ministry did not involve in the case, local council of Katzir and Jewish Agency rejected demand of the *Ka'adan* family. They nullified the precedent of *Jabarin* family on the basis of the different nature of the Central Hill and Western Hill in terms of their demographic composition. Once the case was brought to the Supreme Court, the court ruled that *Ka'adan* family could buy land and inhabit in *Katzir* in March 2000²⁶⁸. After a delay of four years with procedural and legal difficulties created by the *Israeli Land Administration* and *Jewish Agency*, the *Supreme Court's* decision was finally implemented in 2004.

The Supreme Court's ruling was noteworthy in the sense that it reflected the cautious attention and symbolism of the ruling elite about stressing the dominant ethnic nature of the state in the course of hegemony building process:

The Court examined the question of whether the refusal to allow the petitioners to build their home in Kztir constituted impermissible discrimination. The Court's examination proceeded in two stages. First, the Court examined whether the State may allocate land directly to its citizens on the basis of religion or nationality. The answer is no. As a general rule, the principle of equality prohibits the State from distinguishing between its citizens on the basis of religion or nationality. The principle also applies to the allocation of State land. This conclusion is derived both from the values of Israel as a Democratic state and from the values of Israel as a Jewish state. The Jewish character of the State does not permit Israel to discriminate between its citizens. In Israel, Jews and non-Jews are citizens with equal rights and responsibilities. The State engages in impermissible discrimination even if it is also willing to allocate State land for the purpose of establishing an exclusively Arab settlement, as long as it permits a group of Jews, without distinguishing characteristics to establish an exclusively Jewish settlement on State land ("separate is inherently unequal").²⁶⁹

Another socio-cultural field in which the hegemony-in-building took place was linguistic arena. Passive revolutionary openings of the Rabin government resulted in rise of in-system linguistic challenges against the dominant position of Hebrew in the public sphere. While some of these challenges were immediate reactionary moves,

²⁶⁸ Laurie Copans, 'Israeli court says Arabs can buy land in Jewish communities', 08 March 2000, *Independent*, http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article282589.ece

²⁶⁹ Communiqué of High Court, 'High Court: Decision on Katzir', 08.03.2000, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2000/High+Court+Decision+on+Katzir+-+8-Mar-2000.htm>

others took place in a more organized and institutionalized way. In this respect, for instance demands activities of the Palestinian Arab educational elite for labeling the year of 1991 as ‘Year of the Hebrew and Arabic languages’ rather than ‘the Year of the Hebrew Language’ as proposed by the *Israeli Ministry of Education*²⁷⁰ was a quick and reactionary response to the state policies of linguistics.

Alternatively, continuous attempts of the Palestinian Arab socio-cultural elite throughout the mid-1990s for founding an academy for Arabic language was an institutionalized form of challenge to the linguistic dominance in Israeli public sphere. These attempts led to emergence of an academy of languages in 2000, as a non-governmental organization²⁷¹. The institutionalized forms of linguistic challenges increased with the involvement of Palestinian Arab and bi-communal civil societal organizations such as *ACRI* and *Adalah*. These organizations played an important role for linguistic openings in Israeli public sphere with their petitions in 1997 and 1999 to the Israeli dominant legal institutions for the replacement of the monolingual traffic and inter-urban road signs with bilingual signs and tables to guarantee presence of Arabic language in this segment of Israeli public sphere²⁷².

Overall, policy changes in the areas of language, civil society, and habitat of Palestinian Arab citizenry indicated an opening toward hegemonic reconfiguration and repositioning of the certain segments of Israeli ruling elite in the relations with the Palestinian Arab citizenry. Although these openings were not immune from coercive and ignorant interruptions that took place during consecutive leaderships of Netanyahu and Barak, they were reconsolidated in the post-*al-Aqsa Intifada* period following the detrimental crisis of hegemony-in-building.

²⁷⁰ Amal Jamal, “The Ambiguities of Minority Patriotism: Love for Homeland versus State Among Palestinian Citizens of Israel”, *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol.10, 2004, p.464

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 465

²⁷² *Ibid.*, p.464-5

2.6.4. Palestinian Arab Response

Israeli ruling elite's civic openings in political sphere towards the Palestinian Arab community from the early 1990s onwards facilitated such in-system political activism of the Palestinian Arab citizenry. In 1992, national elections signified beginning of a new phase in the relationship of the Israeli ruling elite with the political actors of the Arab minority with their inclusion into the coalition politics. After the elections, notwithstanding one of the lowest turnouts of Palestinian Arab voters, they came closest to influencing policy not only with their support given to *Meretz* and *Labor* coalition to win over the *Likud* but also with their five representatives in the *Knesset* as a blocking majority. In this sense, for the first time in Israeli political history Palestinian Arab support became crucial for an Israeli government in its efforts to hold the governmental power intact²⁷³.

During the Rabin period and following the Peace Process, '*Israelization*' of priorities of Palestinian Arabs as a result of the hegemonic openings in the political sphere increased participation of the Palestinian Arabs in the integrative processes aiming to join in the *Israeli national-popular collective*. At the same time, it moderated the contradictions between their Palestinian consciousness and their acquiescence to the Israeli hegemonic structures and processes. In fact, surveys conducted in the post-Oslo period revealed Israelization of the political identity of the Palestinian Arabs in this period. As Smootha noted, in the post-Oslo period in terms of power play and influence, *Israelization* gained over *Palestinization*.²⁷⁴ This observation signified acceleration in the accomplishments and advancement of the structures and processes of hegemony-in-building among the Palestinian Arab citizens in the mid-1990s thanks to the initiatives and openings of Rabin's government.

²⁷³ Rekness, *op.cit.* 1994, p.159

²⁷⁴ Elie Rekness, 'The Arabs of Israel after Oslo: Localization of the National Struggle', *Israel Studies*, Vol.7, No. 3, 2002, p.5

As an external factor with severe domestic repercussions, the Peace Process, which was institutionalized by the Oslo Accords of 1993, assisted hegemony-in-building processes indirectly by changing the priorities of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel with regard to their ethico-political stance. As the priority of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel shifted from the Palestinian nationalism to the civic issues that affected the livelihood of Palestinian Arabs²⁷⁵ within the Israeli hegemonic structure, they became more concerned with individualistic interests of the daily life than the Palestinian national interest. Total negligence of status of the Palestinian Arab community in the Oslo Peace Accords of the 1993²⁷⁶ contributed to the metamorphosis of Palestinian Arab concerns toward an inward process of concentrating on the civic affairs of the community in 1990s.

As the new ruling elite of hegemony-in-building maintained the dominant symbols of the state intact, image of the state continued to be defined by the ethno-cultural denominators of the dominant ruling elite in 1990s as mentioned in the *Basic Laws* such as *Human Dignity and Freedom* and *Freedom of Occupation* which were enacted in 1992²⁷⁷. In parallel however, gradual relaxation and abandonment of the coercive and exclusive mechanisms over the Palestinian Arab community was also observed in the practices of the state in most domains of socio-economic and political relationship. Rabin's initiatives towards allotment of more resources to the Palestinian Arab community and increasing their access to the governmental positions²⁷⁸ were the initial indicators of such relaxation. In fact, within the transforming socio-political environment of 1990s even the previously unquestionable dominant image of the state began to be challenged by the Palestinian political elite. Suggestions of *the Equality Covenant* toward a transformation of the image of state from an ethnic to an all-

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Nadim Rouhana, "Israel and its Arab Citizens: Predicaments in the Relationship between Ethnic States and Ethnonational Minorities", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.19, No.2, 1998, p.286

²⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 280

²⁷⁸ Ibid. p.289

inclusive democratic one for its Jewish and Palestinian Arab citizens²⁷⁹ was an important initiative in this context. This covenant was translated into a parliamentary organization in 1996 elections and was integrated into Israeli legislative system under the name of *The National Democratic Alignment*²⁸⁰. Integrative stance of the Rabin-Peres government, which served to a process of hegemony-in-building through increasing self-confidence and in-system institutionalized activism of the Palestinian Arab citizens, entered an interlude with the confidence-liquefying acts of Peres in 1996. His coercive policies against *WBGS* and Lebanon in the forms of closures and air attacks²⁸¹ respectively instigated a stalemate in the process of hegemony-in-building.

During Netanyahu period between 1996 and 1999, Palestinian Arab community continued to be the only element of the Israeli society, which was denied access to the Israeli dominant policy making establishment. All other segments of the Israeli society such as the oriental Jews, the ultra-Orthodox and Russian immigrants gained access to the power centers of political sphere with the establishment of a coalition government foollowing the 1996 elections. As Joel Peters argued:

The results of the 1996 election underline a more long-term and on-going crisis of confidence in the traditional functioning of the Israeli political system. Elements of Israeli society (such as Oriental Jews, the ultra-Orthodox, the Russian immigrants and Israeli Arabs) frustrated at having failed to fulfill goals and aspirations within the traditional arena of government, mobilized through extra-parliamentary groupings and their own organizational frameworks. With such a base already established, the new electoral system opened the way for them to vent frustrations through the ballot box and in so doing highlight communal, cultural, religious and economic cleavages prevalent in Israeli society. [...] These groups (apart from the Israeli Arabs) have now gained power and having entered the political establishment they, too, will be expected to deliver to their own constituencies.²⁸²

²⁷⁹ Reuven Aharoni and Joseph Ginat, 'The Palestinian Citizens of Israel and the Peace Process: The Case of an Unbuilt Bridge', J. Ginat, E.J. Perkins and E.G.Carr (eds.), **The Middle East Peace Process; Vision versus Reality**, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, 2002, p.114

²⁸⁰ Rouhana op.cit. 1998, p.287

²⁸¹ Asad Ghanem and Nadim Rouhana, "Citizenship and Parliamentary Politics of Minorities in Ethnic States: The Palestinian Citizens of Israel", *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol.7, No.4, 2001, p.75

²⁸² Joel Peters, "Under Netanyahu: The Current Situation in Israeli Politics", in Vol. 1, No. 1 - January 1997, <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue1/jv1n1a2.html>

However, differing from the Rabin period, the Palestinian Arab community did not have a binding political weight on the survival of Netanyahu's government to influence decisions of the Israeli political power center. Thus, notwithstanding the significant Palestinian Arab physical existence in the *Knesset* with the 12 parliamentarians from different segments of the community, their political influence was more limited than the Rabin period. Consequently, all those mainstream (*Labor* and *Likud*), communist (*Hadash*), religious (*United Arab List*) and nationalist (*Balad*) Palestinian Arab members of the *Knesset* experienced similar processes of peripherization in the Israeli political sphere that disallowed them to influence decision-making mechanisms of the dominant political structure. As Netanyahu did not need Arab MKs as a "blocking majority" in the *Knesset*, he easily ignored their concerns and criticisms. Netanyahu's inconsequential emphasis on the problems of the Palestinian Arab citizenry by referring solely to the sewage problem in the villages of Galilee region in his presentation of government program in the *Knesset* provided the hints about his ignorant political stance towards this segment of society²⁸³. In addition, a selective approach toward the Palestinian Arab issues was clear in Netanyahu's policy guidelines, which put emphasis on the commitment to "full integration" of certain minorities "who have joined their faith with the Jewish people and the state of Israel and those who serve in Israeli security forces"²⁸⁴.

In one of his speeches in 1997, addressing the cadets of *National Defense College* he once more emphasized the importance of the military service as gatekeeper of Palestinian Arab full integration to Israeli society.

A major component of our inner strength is the relationship with our minorities. The Druze, Circassians and Bedouins play an important role in national defense. We must

²⁸³ "Address in the Knesset by Prime Minister-elect Netanyahu Presenting his Government-", 18 June 1996, *MFA newsletter*, Vol.16, 1996-1997, <http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%201947/1996-1997/4%20Address%20in%20the%20Knesset%20by%20Prime%20Minister-elect%20N>

²⁸⁴ Elie Rekhess, 'The Arab Parties', Robert O. Freedman (ed.), ***Israel's Fifty Years***, University Press of Florida, Gainesville, 2000, p.186

expand this circle. We should not abandon the field to those who deny their Israeli identity and incite Israeli Arabs to adopt Palestinians or Syrian loyalties.²⁸⁵

Overall Netanyahu period marked a return to exclusionary practices and marginal political status of Palestinian Arab political elite while consolidating the hegemony-in-building for the specific segments of Palestinian Arab community whose loyalty to Israeli state had been tested before such as Druzes and Bedouins. In fact, reference point of Netanyahu was the Druze political elite and community most of whom already internalized the dominant discourses of the Israeli leading structures and institutions.

A very good example of the operation of hegemonic discourse within the approaches of “already integrated” Druze political elite was the statements of MK Asad Asad from the *Likud* during the debates on affirmative action for appointment of women directors to boards of government corporations in 1993. As Dafna Izraeli noticed meticulously and rightly in her analysis of responses to the affirmative action of 1993, Asad Asad, “framed his request to include minorities as beneficiaries of affirmative action within the accepted discourse of desired Arab–Jewish relations in Israel. He made no mention of fairness or justice, but hinted at strengthening loyalty and enhancing peaceful coexistence.”²⁸⁶

His statements indicated how already internalized hegemonic discourse of loyalty and peaceful coexistence operated in the activities and discourses of the Druze political elite:

You say here that we have to take into consideration also the women in appointing directors. Eighteen percent of the population of Israel are minorities. . . There are few minorities among the directors, one or two. The qualifications you require are found among many of the minorities who can be good directors and they will serve the state.

²⁸⁵ ‘Speech by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the Graduation Ceremony of Cadets of the National Defense College’, August 14, 1997, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, http://www.altawasul.net/MFA/MFAArchive/1990_1999/1997/8/PM%20Netanyahu%20Address%20at%20National%20Defense%20College

²⁸⁶ Dafna Izraeli, “Gender Politics in Israel: The Case of Affirmative Action for Women Directors”, *Women’s Studies International Forum*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2003, p.119

Maybe this [more Arab directors on boards] will bring about more inclusion (shiluv) and integration in the state [emphasis added]²⁸⁷

Not all segments of the Palestinian Arab community however, socialized and politicized in a similar process of internalization and reproduction of dominant discourses introduced by the Israeli dominant structures. In this respect, the reference point of Netanyahu excluded a considerable amount of Palestinian Arab citizenry like his policies during his term.

Following a period of exclusionary practices and political marginalization, Palestinian Arab political elite and electorate supported Ehud Barak's election to Prime Minister's office. However, expectations of Palestinian Arab community towards reintroduction of integrative measures and systemic openings by the new leadership did not ensue following the elections. Notwithstanding symbolic significance of the admission of Husnia Jibara of *Taibe* as first Palestinian Arab woman parliamentarian to the *Knesset* and appointment of Rahman Zuabi as first Palestinian Arab judge to in the Supreme Court, Palestinian Arab political elite in general was pushed to its marginal status in Israeli political sphere in Barak's period. Remaining in the isolated benches of opposition without having influential access to Israeli decision-making mechanisms, Palestinian Arab Members of *Knesset* began to question indistinct differences between the essence of policies and commitments of Netanyahu and Barak. Combined with the increased public criticism of their Palestinian Arab constituencies, this questioning led to further alienation of the Palestinian Arab MKs from the Israeli dominant legislative structures and processes. This alienation was reflected especially in their counter-hegemonic discourse in the course of the incidents of September 2000 or Al-Aqsa intifada, that signified a structural crisis of hegemony-in-building.

As discussed above advancement of civic processes and parliamentary activism among the Palestinian Arab citizenry were assisted mainly by the openings of Rabin/Peres

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.* p.119

government until 1996. From 1996 onwards, Palestinian Arab political activism was negatively affected by the consecutive terms of Israeli ruling elite, which were marked by coercive stance of Netanyahu and negligence of Ehud Barak towards the Palestinian Arab affairs. Notwithstanding increased number of Palestinian Arab parliamentarians, who were involved in the activities of *Knesset* in the national political sphere, their marginality in terms of political influence and access to decision-making processes marked the consecutive periods of Netanyahu and Barak. Within this context, Palestinian Arab political elite and activists opted for different tactics to express their discontent from parliamentary activism to civil disobedience and boycotting the legislative elections or Zionist parties in the following elections.

2.6.4.1. Palestinian Arab Parliamentary Movements

Changes initiated in Rabin period within Israeli political sphere signified a transformation in the relations between the Israeli dominant structures and the Palestinian Arabs. Dominant ideology, which was based on the idea of *Israeliness* began to function more smoothly among some segments of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. With the change of priorities in domestic and international arena, the 1990s witnessed adoption of the ideology of *Israeliness* as a leading ideology by some segments of the Palestinian Arabs in their interactions and civic struggle with the established Israeli structures. These groups of Palestinian Arabs began to redefine their *national-popular collective* by emphasizing their *Israeliness* without denying their Palestinian Arab identity.

Following the recognition and acclimatization of Israeli state and institutions as dominant entities notwithstanding some of their legitimacy deficits, they began to accelerate their interaction with the hegemonic structures and processes rather than opting for counter-hegemonic movements. In this respect, during these years, notwithstanding their constant disproportionate political role and mobilization in contrast to their demographic significance, Palestinian Arab citizens gradually developed political strategies and mechanisms in compliance with the dominant

requirements of the Israeli political life in order to preserve their interests and to increase their political influence within the existing Israeli political system²⁸⁸.

Both the Palestinian Arab political support to the Rabin government following the 1992 elections and their backing of Ehud Barak in 1999 elections were good examples of how the Palestinian Arab citizenry determined the political leadership in Israel through their impact on the political structure. As Ehud Barak became prime minister of Israel by receiving 95 per cent of the votes of Palestinian Arab citizens, their potential influence in the Israeli political power structure became more evident. In the same elections, Palestinian Arab Azmi Bishara's declaration of his candidacy for prime minister was a symbolically significant act that indicated self-confidence of the Palestinian Arab political elite within the Israeli political system as a result of increased in-system political activism among the Palestinian Arab citizens. In fact, the decisive impact of the Palestinian Arab votes on the results of the *Knesset* elections of 1992, their exceptional weight in the Israeli political sphere²⁸⁹ and the affective utilization of in-system political mechanisms in expressing Palestinian Arab demands during the Rabin-Peres government from 1992-1996 were significant indicators of their growing influence²⁹⁰.

In 1992, a process of integrative adjustment of the Arab voters to the Israeli political sphere accompanied integration of the Palestinian Arab political representative bodies into the political system of Israel. Significant distribution of Palestinian Arab total votes to the Zionist parties in 1992 elections such as *Labor* 17 %, *Meretz* 10%, *Likud* 9%, and the *Shas* 5% demonstrated the rejuvenated expectations of the Palestinian

²⁸⁸ Mark Tessler and Audra K. Grant, 'Israel's Arab Citizens: The Continuing Struggle', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 555, No. 1, pp. 97-113

²⁸⁹ Shmuel Sandler, Robert O. Freedman, and Shibley Telhami, "The Religious-Secular Divide in Israeli Politics", *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 4, No. 4, June 1999, <http://www.mepec.org/journalvol6/sandfreetelh.html>

²⁹⁰ Osama Fouad Khalifa, 'Arab Political Mobilization and Israeli Responses', *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Winter 2001

Arab communities about the possible in-system solutions for their continuous problems. As Rekheś argued, the substantive vote for Zionist parties of various affiliations in the 1992 elections indicated increased impact of the pragmatic daily considerations and civic concerns of Palestinian Arab community as citizens of Israel rather than their ethnic and other affiliations with the Palestinians in the *WBGS* and Palestinian Diaspora²⁹¹. The determining influence of preoccupation of the Palestinian Arab constituencies with local issues and problems on the voting patterns in the 1993 municipal elections, confirmed the observation of Rekheś²⁹².

This integration process initiated by the Rabin government marked a raising in-system political civic activism among the Palestinian Arab citizenry. As a part of this activism, they got involved in political system, with high participation in parliamentary elections and with the plurality of Palestinian Arab opposition parties throughout the 1990s. They also expressed their views to the Israeli ruling elite through legal means of protest such as general and local strikes, demonstrations, distributions of leaflets and writing in Hebrew newspapers to influence Jewish majority and decision makers. One of the significant examples of such activities was the convention of *the Economic Committee of the Arab Masses in Israel* in December 1996. As an initiative of the Supreme Follow-up Committee for the Affairs of the Arab Citizens and the Committee of the Heads of Local Arab Councils, it expressed the demands of the Palestinian Arab community on several issues. Recognition of Palestinian Arab national identity, defense of lands, the problems of *Waqf*, conditions of the unrecognized localities by the Israeli state, problems of education, welfare, health and financial crisis of the Palestinian Arab localities were among the matters, which were raised and discussed in this convention²⁹³.

²⁹¹ Elie Rekheś, 'The Arab Minority and the 1992 Election: Integration or Alienation?', Efraim Karsh and G Mahler (eds.), ***Israel at Crossroads***, British Academic Press, London, 1994, p.155

²⁹² Aharoni and Ginat, *op.cit.*, p.109

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp.114-5

Increased in-system political activism also generated some paradoxes among the Palestinian Arab political community such as divisiveness of leadership²⁹⁴, limitations of civic competence, surviving the security concerns and ethnic symbolism and nature of the Israeli state. These paradoxes were mitigated during the Rabin period through creating in-system opportunities for the Palestinian Arab citizens to interact with the dominant structures and processes of Israeli system and to influence them in order to achieve political objectives of Palestinian Arab community. Thus, paradoxes did not deepen to cause a *moment of crisis* in the hegemony-in- building process until 1996.

In 1996, regional developments and crisis in Israeli relations with Syria, Lebanon and Iran increased tension in the Middle East²⁹⁵. Domestic repercussions of response of Israeli ruling elite to these developments had critical impact on the hegemony-in-building process as well . In the spring of that year, PM Shimon Peres launched military operation against Lebanon following Hizballah's rocket attacks in the northern parts of Israel.²⁹⁶ As in the case of previous IDF's "Operation Accountability" against Lebanon in 1993, Palestinian Arab political elite and public opposed severely against the operations of Israeli army²⁹⁷. Mass activities opposing the operation took place in the eve of 1996 *Knesset* elections. Aggressive policy and killings of more than 100 Lebanese villagers in *Kana* Lebanon within the context of *Operation Grapes of Wrath* blurred the "ethico-moral" difference between Netanyahu and Peres in the minds of the Palestinian Arab citizenry. Indifferent and/or reactionary stance of the Palestinian Arab voters was reflected to the ballots as a result of confidence-liquefying impact of the attacks assisted the election victory of Netanyahu as well. Most of the Palestinian Arab

²⁹⁴ Jamal, op.cit., 2006, p.10

²⁹⁵ Benny Morris, "Israel's Elections and Their Implications", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 26, No.1, 1996, pp.70-81

²⁹⁶ Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, "Israel's Lebanon Policy", *MERIA*, Vol.1, No. 3, 1997, <http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/meria/journal/1997/issue3/jv1n3a3.html>

²⁹⁷ Hilel Frisch "Positions and Attitudes of Israeli Arabs Regarding the Arab World, 1990-2001", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.39, No.4, 2003, pp.110-4

voters followed the obdurate stances of Palestinian Arab members of *Knesset*, who called Peres for resignation following the IDF operations against Lebanese villages²⁹⁸. Notwithstanding the efforts of some Palestinian Arab politicians and activists of the mainstream Labor party towards convincing the Palestinian Arab electorate on possible depressing repercussions of replacement of Peres with Netanyahu, most of them either did not cast a vote or expressed their discontent by casting blank ballot for the premiership²⁹⁹. Around 20.000 Palestinian Arab citizens voted for Netanyahu in that election, where the Prime Minister of Israel was determined by difference of 29.000 votes.

Israeli *Knesset* elections of 1996 introduced two new Palestinian Arab actors into the Israeli political sphere with different ideological backgrounds. *Al- Tajammu* (later *Balad*) was a coalition of Palestinian Arab progressive, nationalist and communist political elite, who gathered to form “a nationalist party-in-formation” that would struggle for cultural autonomy as a means to transform the ethnic nature of the Israeli dominant structures and state which was associated with their Jewish citizenry to include all of Israeli citizens³⁰⁰. The platform entered the *Knesset* under coalition agreement with *Hadash* in 1996 and maintained its nationalist stance within the legislative structure of Israel notwithstanding its counter-hegemonic criticisms against Israeli dominant structures and processes.

Following the 1996 elections, one of the aforementioned paradoxes of Palestinian Arab political community deepened significantly. Divisiveness among the Palestinian Arab leadership increased with the advent of new political parties and new political elite into

²⁹⁸ Joel Greenberg, “Peres Assailed on All Sides Says Pact Will End Fight”, *New York Times*, 23 April 2006, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9407E1D91F39F930A15757C0A960958260>

²⁹⁹ Benny Morris, (1996), *op.cit.*, p.73

³⁰⁰ Azmi Bishara, Sara Scalenghe, Steve Rothman, Joel Beinin, “On Palestinians in the Israeli Knesset: Interview” with Azmi Bishara, *Middle East Report*, No. 201, Israel and Palestine: Two States, Bantustans or Binationalism? 1996, p. 27

the Palestinian Arab political space within the Israeli dominant political structuring.³⁰¹ Participation of Al- Tajammu (*Balad*) under Azmi Bishara and *Islamic Movement* added to the pluralization as well as existing ideological divisiveness of the Palestinian Arab political elite. Simultaneously, it highlighted the increasing efforts of new generation of Palestinian Arab leadership towards expressing their demands through parliamentary means of Israeli dominant political system. In this respect, integration of the nationalist *Balad* and *Islamic Movement* to the Israeli political system and national legislative institutions indicated increased tendency of Palestinian political leadership toward changing platform of their political struggle regardless of their ideological stance while at the same time reflecting increased divisiveness among the different segments of Palestinian Arab political community.

Campaign period before the 1999 elections for *Knesset* and the position of Prime Minister witnessed a revitalized political activism, which was manifested in number of political coalitions among the Palestinian Arab political parties as well as surprising candidacy of MK Azmi Bishara of *Balad* for prime ministry. While the coalitions of Azmi Bishara (*Balad*) with Ahmet Tibi and Abdalmalek Darawshe (DAP) with southern wing of *Islamic Movement* helped them to secure their presence in the *Knesset*, it also revealed a need for self-criticism among the secular Palestinian Arab parties which lost some of their constituency³⁰². Candidacy of Azmi Bishara for prime minister was important step towards re-attracting attention of the Israeli ruling elite to the concerns and demands of Palestinian Arab citizens for equal rights and civic freedoms. His withdrawal from the candidacy by expressing his support to Ehud Barak in the elections against Netanyahu reflected the expectations of Palestinian Arab community for revitalization of efforts towards peace process and civic equality under

³⁰¹ Jamal, *op.cit.*, 2006, p.10

³⁰² Asad Ghanem and Sarah Ozack-Lazar, 'Israel as an Ethnic State The Arab Vote', Asher Arian and Michal Shamir (eds.), **The Elections in Israel 1999**, State University of New York Press, New York, 2002, pp.132-3

Barak leadership³⁰³. Post-1999 elections period however, was marked by the neglect of Palestinian Arab parliamentary movements by the Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who came to power with the decisive votes of the Palestinian Arab citizens. Preferring not to depend on the Palestinian Arab political buttress during his term, Barak ignored the electoral support given by them and did not include them even into coalition talks. Distancing from the Palestinian Arab political elite, he introduced a hawkish policy line against the Palestinians in the *WBGS* and undermined the civic concerns of the Palestinian Arab citizenry in Israel. Resembling his predecessor PM Benjamin Netanyahu in his emphasis on the Jewish character of the state and its institutions, he diminished the hopes of Palestinian Arab political elite for inclusion in the decision-making processes about the affairs of Palestinian Arab citizenry³⁰⁴. Barak's exclusion of Palestinian Arab political community from the political power centers regenerated mistrust towards the dominant structures and processes of Israeli system among the Palestinian Arab electorate and pushed them toward undertaking more counter-hegemonic discursive stances.

2.6.4.2. Palestinian Arab Counter-hegemonic Movements

The effects of peace-seeking foreign policy initiatives of Israeli state in early 1990s, which initially increased the hopes for systemic transformation in Israel, were obscured by the conflict-driven foreign policy practices of Israeli state in the late 1990s that led deepening of crisis of confidence between the Israeli dominant structures and the Palestinian Arabs. Consequently, increased hopes for the regional peace and improvement of civic status and equalities of Palestinian Arab community by the initiatives of Rabin government towards the hegemony-in-building was replaced by the consecutive exclusionary and ignorant stances of Netanyahu and Ehud Barak which gradually led to crisis of hegemony-in-building. As the crisis deepened, counter-

³⁰³ *Ibid.* p.136

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.* p.137

hegemonic positioning of some segments of the Palestinian Arab community consolidated correspondingly.

Main center of organized and institutionalized center of counter-hegemonic activity was the *Islamic Movement* in this period. It was however, was not immune from the transformational attitudes and practices of Israeli state during Rabin period. Passive revolutionary policies and political openings of the Rabin government in Israel in the early 1990s led to doctrinal-ideological as well as political-tactical controversies³⁰⁵ within the Islamic counter-hegemonic bloc in defining their relation with the Israeli dominant structures and processes. The split of *Islamic Movement* took place on March 13, 1990, when a segment of the *Islamic Movement* leadership began to consider possibility of joining an in-system political formation named *United Arab List* against the *Hadash* within the Israeli political sphere at national level. Some members of the *Islamic Movement* under the leadership of Raed Salah opposed this decision, which would mean the movement's recognition and acceptance of being bounded by the legal and political mechanisms and obligations of Israeli state.

Decision of Ibrahim Sarsour and the Southern Wing of the *Islamic Movement* to participate in the *Knesset* elections of 1996 endorsed the conversion of intra-movement controversies into a formal split in the Islamic counter-hegemonic bloc. Integration of the South Wing of the *Islamic Movement* into the Israeli national politics was significant in the sense that it marginalized remaining segments of the counter-hegemonic bloc both among the Palestinian Arabs and within the Israeli socio-economic and political structures. Following the integration of southern wing of *Islamic Movement* into the Israeli political framework, the efforts of Israeli state concentrated on pacification of the Northern Wing of *Islamic Movement* through its criminalization and imprisonment of its leaders such as *Raed Salah*. however, resisted

³⁰⁵ Issam Aburaiya, "The 1996 Split of the *Islamic Movement* in Israel: Between the Holy Text and Israeli-Palestinian Context", *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol.17, No 3, 2004, pp.439-455

the transformation, which other segments of the movement underwent towards embedding into the Israeli dominant structures and processes.

Marginalization of northern wing of *Islamic movement* was deepened by the impact of the regional and international developments such as Oslo Peace Process of 1993, and Israeli-Jordanian Peace Agreements of 1994³⁰⁶ as well as by the abovementioned passive revolutionary efforts of Israeli state. Notwithstanding this marginalization, North Wing of the *Islamic Movement* maintained its counter-hegemonic stance and established an alternative socio-economic structure to the dominant Israeli structures in some localities such as Umm-al Fahem. From 1996 onwards, parallel to policy changes of Israeli ruling elite intensification of its counter-hegemonic stance was reflected in its galvanized international activities of fundraising and de-legitimization of Israeli state. The funds, which were raised internationally and locally, were transferred to the infrastructural reconstruction and the communal services of health, education, sports and social welfare³⁰⁷ as part of alternative hegemonic project among the Palestinian Arab community. The year 1996 also witnessed beginning of annual gatherings of *Saving Al-Aqsa, and the Islamic Holy Places in Jerusalem*, organized by northern wing of the *Islamic Movement*.³⁰⁸

Establishment of *al Aqsa Association* in 1991 marked beginning of counter-hegemonic civil societal activism in an institutionalized form among the Islamic Palestinian Arab community.³⁰⁹ Although its legal boundaries were determined by the Israeli dominant structures, *Al-Aqsa Association's* activities about the renovation and liberation of Muslim holy sites connoted counter-hegemonic challenge at legal, ideological and

³⁰⁶ Usher (1999), *op.cit.* p.104

³⁰⁷ Alisa Rubin Peled, "Towards autonomy? The Islamist movement's quest for control of Islamic institutions in Israel", *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 55, No.3, 2001, p.390

³⁰⁸ Aharoni and Ginat, *op.cit.* p.119 and Vered Levy-Barzilai, 'Between rocks and a hard place', *Haaretz*, 08.01.2004

³⁰⁹ Jamal, *op.cit.*, 2004, p.462

practical levels³¹⁰. Counter-hegemonic civil societal institutionalization gained impetus during the Netanyahu and Barak periods due to the policies of exclusion and negligence towards the Palestinian Arab community. As the Israeli state did not undertake necessary services, infrastructural development programs and necessary compensatory measures in the Palestinian Arab localities to protect the Palestinian Arab communities from the grave socio-economic impact of the neo-liberal transformation, its vacuum was filled by the Palestinian Arab charities and civil society organizations. *Islamic Movement* emerged as the most systematic counter-hegemonic civil societal organization, which provided profound solutions to the sensitive problems of daily life among the Palestinian Arab community. It presented an alternative organizational and ideological path to be followed by the alienated Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel without interacting with the dominant structures and processes of Israeli system.

In the direction of achieving this goal, *Islamic Movement* concentrated its efforts towards producing an alternative hegemonic infrastructure to the Israeli dominance through self-empowerment of Palestinian Arab communities for sustainable self-sufficiency and survival out of the Israeli dominant system. *Islamic Movement* presented an alternative hegemonic project with penetrating all aspects of Palestinian Arab life in Israel. Through education, media, village talks, sport and cultural activities, campaigns and spreading of religious values and symbolism in the community, it established a counter-hegemonic island within the Israeli dominant spheres. Thus, challenging the very existence and roots of Israeli dominant structures and values with an alternative hegemonic project, *Islamic Movement* became the most important center of institutionalized form of counter-hegemonic resistance outside the Israeli dominant structures and processes in the eve of crisis of Israeli hegemony-in-building in 2000.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

2.6.5. Hamula Structure in This Period

The 1990s continued to witness emergence and consolidation of new generations of Palestinian Arab political leadership, which contested the role of traditional forms and patterns of local and national political mobilization and institutionalization within the Israeli dominant political structuring. These challenges targeted not only the continuing political significance of the *hamula* structure but also its traditional mechanisms of control over societal activities of its members. For the ‘modern’ Palestinian Arab intellectual and political elite *Hamula* structure was considered as an agent of “multilayered form of domination”³¹¹ that continued to serve either defenselessness of ‘traditional’ Palestinian Arab community against the dominant structures and processes of Israeli system or their resistance against the modern forms of emancipation exerted by the Israeli dominant system³¹². This one-dimensional and static understanding of *hamula* as an agent of backwardness and control, caused negligence toward the intra-*hamula* transformations in some Palestinian Arab localities corresponding with the processes of ‘modernization’.

Surviving the challenges of new generation of educated, more assertive, more attentive Palestinian Arab leadership, *hamula* structure continued to be an important actor in national and local politics of the Palestinian Arab community in Israel. Some scholars such as Amal Jamal emphasized on negative role of traditional *hamula* structures on the reproduction of divisiveness of new Palestinian Arab leadership³¹³. However, contrary to this one dimensional approach, intra-communal leadership fractures of the Palestinian Arab leadership and revitalization and persistence of traditional patterns of political competition were mutually reproductive processes. In this respect, persistence of the role and influence of traditional social structures was not simply a cause but also

³¹¹ Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, “ Law, Politics, and Violence Against Women: A Case of Palestinians in Israel”, *Law and Policy*, Vol.21, No.2, 1999, p.206

³¹² *Ibid.* p.207

³¹³ Jamal, *op.cit.*, 2006, pp. 6-7

a consequence of divisiveness of the Palestinian Arab leadership. In fact, fragmented nature of the Palestinian Arab leadership at national level assisted redirection of the support of the Palestinian Arab local population towards the *hamula* structures and leaderships, which also gradually evolved to be more responsive to the demands and participation of *hamula* members in local decision-making processes. Therefore, *hamula* structures regained importance in determining the divisions of labor in the local governance as the posts were redistributed by acknowledging inter-*hamula* power configurations³¹⁴.

In this respect, even in the eve of 2000s scholars acknowledged the continuing role of the *hamula* in political and socio-economic organization of the Palestinian Arab community. As Yaron stated,

The identity structure of the Israeli Arabs accommodates a number of dynamic components, resulting foremost from the Palestinian trauma: a firm Palestinian commitment, a pan-Arab identity and cultural/religious Islamic loyalty. However, the extended family (*Hamula*) that grants its members unconditional protection still occupies a cardinal place in the collective identity. To this must be added a pragmatic Israeli attachment, based on vested interests in the Jewish State, and the modern cultural components internalized by the Arab citizens of Israel³¹⁵.

Some *hamulas* bridged combination of pragmatic attachment to the Israeli state and modern components with its members and made this *mélange* easier to absorb for them in their daily practices. In fact, Israeli ruling elite also preferred to utilize *hamulas* in testing the absorption of its openings towards the Palestinian Arab citizenry as a part of its neo-liberal transformation. Accommodation and gradual integration of the Palestinian Arab citizens to the decision-making mechanisms started from the members of trustable *hamulas*. Abdel Rahman Zuabi, who became first temporary judge of Israeli Supreme Court in 1998 for example, was a member of Zouabis *hamula*, which maintained good relations with the dominant structure from the pre-state period in the

³¹⁴ Interview with Amal Jamal, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 06.09.2006

³¹⁵ Kalman Yaron, 'Israelis and Palestinians: Trauma, Identity and Nationalism', Gershon Baskin and Zakaria al Qaq (eds.) *Creating a Culture of Peace*, IPCRI, Jerusalem, 1999, p.55

village of Nin within Nazareth region. Integration of *hamula* members into the decision-making mechanisms facilitated the processes of confidence building among the *hamula*'s members towards the institutions of the dominant structure. Having access to the high decision-making mechanisms in the Israeli dominant structure, Palestinian Arab members of certain *hamulas* began to reinterpret their relationship with these institutions under the light of more individualized comprehension of their legitimacy and capacity for intellectual and moral leadership for the members of that *hamula*.

In this respect, in 1990s some *hamulas* appeared as a catalyzing institution for their Palestinian Arab members, which helped them to prevail over the dilemmatic relationship between their 'inherent' *Palestinianness* and the 'pragmatic' *Israeliness*. As the *hamula* would help individual in his struggle with this paradoxical relationship between pragmatic and emotional ties in line with the evolving nature of relationship of the community with the dominant structures, members of *hamulas* perceived these formations as an important hub of communal solidarity and identity³¹⁶ at local level. In this respect, the *hamula* structures, which adjusted to the dominant processes in different spheres of modern Israeli socio-economic and political life, gradually became an agent of internalization of the dominant structures and processes of existing system by taking into account their possible consequences for the *hamula*'s internal integrity.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.54

CHAPTER 3

HEGEMONIC CRISIS AND AFTERWARDS: AL-AQSA INTIFADA AND POST AL-AQSA PERIOD

3.1. Fall and Rise of Hegemony-in-Building: Al-Aqsa Intifada and its Aftermath

Initial signs of the unrest between the Israeli security forces and the Palestinian Arab citizens were observed in late September 2000 in the Galilee region. Prior to *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, police commander of Israel Northern district Alik Ron declared arrest of some of the inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem* due to their involvement in “arms smuggling” and “nationalistic charges” in the largest conspiracy uncovered in Israel since the 1980s”.³¹⁷ After a short period, it was revealed that the Palestinian Arabs arrested in the incident were criminals, and they did not involve in any anti-Israeli nationalistic or fundamentalist religious conspiracy. However, revelation of this fact did not prevent the stereotypic representation of all *Umm al Fahem* in media reports as a castle of counter-hegemonic movement of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel³¹⁸. It also did not put a stop to incitement of the inhabitants and representatives of *Umm al Fahem* in particular and Palestinian Arabs in general by the far rightist members of Israeli Jewish establishment.

Such a tense intra-societal atmosphere notwithstanding, declaration of general strike on October 1, 2000 to express Palestinian Arab reaction on the Israeli violent practices against the Palestinians in the territories was an in-system move against the ruling elite in Israel. It signified initial quest of Palestinian Arab citizens to confront the practices of Israeli ruling elite through utilizing the institutions and means within the existing dominant structure. In this respect, despite the fact that the strike took place in order to

³¹⁷ Tanya Reinhart, Israel/Palestine, Seven Stories Press, New York, 2002, p.107

³¹⁸ Ibid., p.108

support the cause of the Palestinians in the occupied territories, its moral and civic fiber reflected its Israeliness.

The violent protests, which took place in *Umm al Fahem*, Nazareth, Arrabe and other Palestinian Arab localities in the Galilee region on the same day, however, signified a severe legitimacy crisis of the dominant Israeli institutions and structures in the eyes of the Palestinian Arab citizens. The roadblocks, stone-throwing, damaging the Israeli state offices translated discontent and despair of the Palestinian Arab citizens into violent rejection of ethico-political leadership of Israeli ruling elite on their community. Israeli authorities responded these protests with the use of force including rubber-coated and real bullets as well as deployment of snipers³¹⁹. Significant amount of the Palestinian Arab citizenry alternated their conformist ways of expressing their demands through the Israeli dominant structures and processes with counter-hegemonic acts against the Israeli state. In fact, most of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel did not involve in such a *war of position* even in the turbulent days of the Intifada of 1987.

The clashes between the Palestinian Arab citizens and the Israeli security forces started on October 1, 2000 in Jaffa, Nazareth, Arrabe, and *Umm al Fahem*.. In the coming days violent clashes between police and Palestinian Arab protesters took place in several Palestinian Arab localities in Israel such as *Umm al Fahem*, Majd al Krum, Dir el Assad, Me'eliya, Kufr Kanna, Taibeh, Yaffa, Laqiyah, Rahat, Shfar'am, and Haifa³²⁰. Violent confrontations also occurred near the entrance to Tamra, and Kafr Manda, Kafr Makr, Jaideh, and Sakhnin in the Galilee³²¹. In these clashes, fourteen Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel were killed and hundreds of them were injured. Erratic clashes between the security forces and the Palestinian Arab demonstrators in Palestinian Arab localities were followed by inter-communal confrontation between Jewish and

³¹⁹ Charles Enderlin, ***Shattered Dreams***, Other Press, New York, 2003, p.295

³²⁰ *Haaretz*, 'Israel at war with its Arabs,' charges community leader', 03.10.2000 and Adalah Report on chronology of *Al-Aqsa* Intifada, www.adalah.org

³²¹ "One dead, scores injured in riots by Israeli Arabs", *Jerusalem Post*, 02.10.2000

Palestinian Arab citizens. In several Israeli localities such as Nazareth³²², Acre³²³, Jaffa, Or Akiva, Caesarea and Haifa³²⁴ Palestinian Arab citizens collided with the Jewish citizens. Jewish citizens attacked property and religious sites of the Palestinian Arab community in Tel Aviv-Jaffa³²⁵, Tiberias, and Hadera. A mob of 1,000 Jewish Israelis assaulted Palestinian Arab neighborhoods in Nazareth and tried to break into the home of Balad MK Azmi Bishara in Nazareth Illit³²⁶. There were also individual cases of attacks to the Palestinian Arab citizens. In Herzliya, for instance, a Palestinian Arab security guard was attacked by the Jewish citizens of Israel. In the Nordau neighborhood of Netanya Jewish citizens burned a car of a Palestinian Arab resident and a clinic owned by a Palestinian Arab citizen of Israel³²⁷. Clashes took place between the Palestinian Arab youth and Jewish groups in Tiberias³²⁸. Many Jewish inhabitants of Petah Tikva neighborhood of Tel Aviv participated in the impulsive demonstrations against the Palestinian Arab residents with the slogans of “Death to Arabs”³²⁹ and a Petah Tikva taxi company’s car was burned morning because it employed Palestinian Arab citizens³³⁰.

Meanwhile, Palestinian Arab citizens utilized counter-hegemonic and violent methods of confrontation against the Jewish segments of the society and the Israeli state. While some of these counter-hegemonic acts were unorganized individual or communal

³²² “Two dead, three critically hurt in clashes in Nazareth”, *Haaretz*, 10.10.2000

³²³ “Intense clashes persist in Israel, territories”, *Haaretz*, 03.10.2000

³²⁴ “A Heavy Hand against Racism”, *Haaretz*, 11.10.2000

³²⁵ “Recriminations follow violence in North”, *Jerusalem Post*, 06.10.2000

³²⁶ “2 Israeli Arab killed in Nazareth clash”, *Jerusalem Post*, 10.10.2000

³²⁷ *Emergency Net News: Crisis, Conflict, and Emergency Service News, Analysis and Reference*, <http://www.emergency.com/2000/intifada2000b.htm>

³²⁸ “Weekend of sporadic clashes between Arabs, Jews”, *Haaretz*, 15.10.2000

³²⁹ *Emergency Net News*, *op.cit.*

³³⁰ *Jerusalem Post*, News in brief, 19.10.2000

reactionary actions without any systematic groundwork, some others were either guided by counter-hegemonic organizations in Israel or took place in coordination with the movements in the *WBGS*. In Jaffa's central street of Rehov Yefet, demonstration turned into a riot and protesters attacked to press and a local bank³³¹. Violent confrontation took place in Umm-al Fahem caused death of two Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel and injury of sixty inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem* including head of Northern wing of the *Islamic Movement*, Ra'ed Salah³³². In the following days, Israeli security services disclosed 25 cells of Palestinian Arab activists, who were suspected to cooperate with *Hamas* movement and the *Fatah* organization against the Israeli state³³³.

In the case of momentary counter-hegemonic upheavals, Palestinian Arab citizens expressed their discontent with the coercive practices of the Israeli state against them as well as the Palestinians in the *WBGS*. Roadblocks, stone-throwing, burning tires and other objects³³⁴ were common methods of protest and expressing the widespread discontent among the Palestinian Arab demonstrators in the course of *Al-Aqsa intifada*. Funerals of the Palestinian Arab citizens who were killed during the conflict became counter-hegemonic platforms that gathered thousands of Palestinian Arab citizens for denouncing the legal hegemony of the Israeli state over their resistive actions. Breaking the hegemonic borders of Israeli law, Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel indicated their unwillingness to internalize and commit the legal framework, which was unable to delegitimize the killings of its own citizens. Funeral of Palestinian Arab demonstrator in *Umm al Fahem*, where thousands of activists blocked *road 65* and the *Wadi Ara* road

³³¹ "Jaffa protest turns violent; situation calmer in North", *Jerusalem Post*, 05.10.2000

³³² Adalah Report on chronology of *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, www.adalah.org

³³³ Zeidan Atashi, "The Islamic Arab Minority in the Jewish State", *The Jerusalem Letter and Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints*, No. 480, 16.06. 2002, <http://www.jcpa.org/jl/hit06.htm>

³³⁴ "Clashes pit Israeli Arabs against police", *Haaretz*, 02.10.2000

along *Umm al Fahem* with burning tires on 3rd of October was a good example of such a momentary counter-hegemonic attitude.³³⁵

In fact, it was not only the de-contextualized images of “old-style demonstrations”³³⁶ of the Palestinians of the *WBGS* and the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel in international and national media with rocks, Molotov cocktails, which diminished the ‘thin’ *Green Line* between these two populations. Perception of peculiarity from the Palestinians in the *WBGS*, which derived from being an Israeli citizen among the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel eroded due to the similarities in the practices of the Israeli state in both sides of the *Green Line* in the context of *Al-Aqsa Intifada*. Their citizenship did not bring about an preferential treatment from the Israeli state and the authorities in the course of demonstrations. Israeli state and the police did not separate them from the Palestinian population in the *WBGS* in their methods of suppressing the protest activities.

Thus, similarity of the counter-hegemonic acts of the Palestinian Arab citizens with the Palestinians in the *WBGS* was not limited to their resemblance at apparitional level. The Palestinian Arab activists utilized these violent methods against the institutional, coercive, economic, political and social apparatuses and symbols of Israeli dominant structures and processes. Utilization of these violent means instead of the legal frameworks signified momentary denial of the legitimacy of Israeli legal structures and processes by the Palestinian Arab community. With these momentary counter-hegemonic activities, the Palestinian Arab citizens rejected dominance of the Israeli legal framework over their actions against the Israeli state and institutions.

Religion was another important unifying factor in the *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, which interconnected the counter-hegemonic stances of the Palestinians of the *WBGS* and the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. Religiosity was one of the most dominant

³³⁵ “*Umm al Fahem* funeral draws thousands”, *Haaretz*, 03.10.2000

³³⁶ Seth Ackerman, “Al-Aqsa Intifada and the U.S. Media”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2001, p.61

component of the resistance which was inbuilt in the counter-hegemonic acts of both communities against Israeli dominant structures and processes. As *Al Aqsa* was the common theme of communal upheaval was "*Al Aqsa* is in danger", religious overtones were emphasized to deform the differences between the Palestinians of the *WBGS* and the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel within the Green Line. For Palestinian Arab religious political elite such as MK Abdulmalik Dehamshe from the *United Arab List* there was no Green Line at *Al Aqsa Mosque*³³⁷.

Albeit significance of religious symbolism, which dominated the discursive sphere of the *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, critical discourse of secular segments of the Palestinian Arab political elite on ethnocratic nature and discriminatory practices of the Israeli state, was also important component of counter-hegemonic practices against the Israeli dominant structures and processes. Some of the Palestinian Arab political elite adapted certain contours religiosity into their nationalistic discourse to mobilize the masses for their momentary counter-hegemonic activities.

Notwithstanding similarities of the counter-hegemonic acts of the Palestinian Arab community with the Palestinians in the *WBGS* in terms of their formats, methods, and discourses, there was a very significant difference in the very essence of these two counter-hegemonic processes. As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, the counter-hegemonic acts of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel were 'momentary' in their nature. In this respect, contrary to the 'Intifada' of the Palestinians in the *WBGS*, Palestinian Arab political elite preferred to refer counter-hegemonic acts of the Palestinian Arab citizens as *habbat al Aqsa*, which meant incidents that would occur and end at once rather than uprising that connoted a continuous process³³⁸. This discursive nuance identified the vital difference between Palestinian Arab citizens and the Palestinians of the *WBGS* in their positioning vis-à-vis Israeli state as well as Israeli dominant structures, institutions and processes. For the Palestinians of the *WBGS*, their

³³⁷ "Reality subverts their rights" *Haaretz*, 03.10.2000

³³⁸ Al-Haj, 'Whither the Green Line? ...'(2005), *op.cit.*, p.199

struggle was a counter-hegemonic 'war of maneuver', which would continue until reaching the alternative hegemonic project, namely the Palestinian State. For the Palestinian citizens of Israel, it was more of a momentary counter-hegemonic battle in its 'war of positions' against the Israeli state to express its discontent about its location within the existing system. In fact, in the further stages of *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, discourse of the nationalist spheres in Palestinian Arab political elite on "a state for all its citizens" and state's unfulfilled civic promises of full and equal citizenship became central aphorisms of this war of positions'.³³⁹

3.1.1. Political Dimensions of Al-Aqsa Intifada

Assessing the Palestinian Arab acts of violence such as throwing stones at passerby cars, damaging Israeli public building, raising the Palestinian flag, burning Israeli flag and cooperating with enemies of Israeli state (i.e. *Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Fatah, and Hizballah*),³⁴⁰ Israeli ruling elite predicted a possibility of intra-societal collusion which could perilously destabilize the Israeli dominant socio-economic and political processes. Notwithstanding the consensus among the Jewish elite on the threatening nature of the incidents for societal cohesion and the Israeli state, there was an overwhelming disagreement between different segments about the ways of responding these counter-hegemonic activities.

For some segments of Israeli political and intellectual elite, *Al-Aqsa Intifada* reflected a manifest discontent of mounting amount of Palestinian Arab citizens about the Israeli dominant structures and processes. Thus, their involvement in violent acts signified a Spartan alteration in attitudes of Palestinian Arab community against the state, which could lead a systematic counter-hegemonic upheaval against the Israeli dominant structures. The hawkish elements within the Israeli ruling elite advocated introduction

³³⁹ Rema Hammami and Salim Tamari "The Second Uprising: End or New Beginning?", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2001, p.14

³⁴⁰ Zeidan Atashi, "The Islamic Arab Minority in the Jewish State", *The Jerusalem Letter and Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints*, No. 480, 16.06.2002, <http://www.jcpa.org/jl/hit06.htm>

of more coercive measures to suppress a possible organized counter-hegemonic upheaval.

For other segments of Israeli political and intellectual elite, *Al-Aqsa Intifada* indicated necessity of returning to the passive revolutionary policies of the Rabin period in order to integrate the Palestinian Arab community to the dominant structures and processes rather than excluding them from the Israeli system. In fact, for this segment of dominant Jewish intelligentsia *Al-Aqsa Intifada* was reflection of drastic discontent of the Palestinian Arab citizenry from systematic alienation, negligence and exclusionary practices of consecutive Israeli governments of Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak. Ehud Barak and his colleagues in the government realized the failure of state's practices against the Palestinian Arab citizenry soon after the incidents. Immediately after the incidents, as a passive revolutionary act, Barak's government decided on assembling a special cabinet meeting "to discuss approval of a long-term annual program to benefit the Arab sector, including a comprehensive discussion regarding the problems and plight of the Arab and Beduin sectors in Israel"³⁴¹. Nevertheless, as the violent confrontation evolved it became evident that it was late for reconstructing the liquefied confidence between the Barak leadership and the Palestinian Arab citizens. In time, even Ariel Sharon, whose infamous visit to *Al-Aqsa* caused the incidents, accepted a necessity of change in the policies of the Israeli ruling elite towards the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel in order to stop their further alienation from the system.

Thus, various circles within the Israeli governing elite seriously deliberated reintroduction of passive revolutionary measures in order to prevent a complete estrangement of the Palestinian Arab community from existing Israeli system, which could cultivate a strong counter-hegemonic movement against the dominant structure. In this respect, *Al-Aqsa Intifada* became also a breakthrough that stimulated revitalization of passive revolutionary mentality and acts of some segments of the

³⁴¹ "Barak appeals to Israeli Arabs for calm", *Jerusalem Post*, 03.10.2000

Israeli dominant ruling elite towards the Palestinian Arab community. As a part of these acts towards rebuilding confidence between the Palestinian Arab citizens and the state, former Prime Minister Ehud Barak and his internal security minister, Shlomo Ben Ami were questioned in November 2001 for their probable responsibilities and roles of in the course of *al-Aqsa intifada* ³⁴². Although this act served appeasement Palestinian Arab political elite to a certain extent, it did not play significant role in refurbish the relationship between the state and the Palestinian Arab citizenry.

Not all segments of the Israeli ruling elite shared the necessity of implementing passive revolutionary acts to gain the consent of the Palestinian Arab community to the dominant Israeli structures and processes. Some groups within the Jewish political elite ardently supported the idea of pursuing auxiliary coercive measures in order to control and contain the growing structural threat exerted by the Palestinian Arab activism to the very essence of Israeli state and system. Jewish political leaders such as Benjamin Netanyahu of *Likud*, Benjamin Elon of *Moledet*, Avigdor Lieberman of *Yisrael Beitanu* and Micheal Kleiner of *Herut* represented coercive wing of the Jewish political elite. Following the October 2000 incidents, these leaders proposed introduction of more coercive policies and legislations in order to control and pacify the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. In this respect, *Al-Aqsa Intifada* generated a division within the Jewish political leaders in terms of the further policies, which would be pursued by the ruling elite regarding the affairs of the Palestinian Arab citizenry. This divisiveness took place particularly among the Israeli right wing politicians in post-*Al-Aqsa Intifada* period and it became more evident following the elections of 2001 for premiership and 2003 *Knesset* elections.

Among some segments of Palestinian Arab community *Al-Aqsa Intifada* was perceived and reflected as byproduct of “symptomatic of the failures of Oslo for Palestinians

³⁴² Jonhattan Cook, “Dodging responsibility for past killings”, *Al-Ahram Weekly Online*, 29 November - 5 December 2001, No.562

inside Israel”³⁴³. In fact, isolation of the Palestinian Arab political and civic elite from the Israeli foreign policy decision-making mechanisms on the issues related to the Palestinian Arab citizenry as well as from the peace process created a sense of alienation among the Palestinian Arab community. This led to amplification of inward political activism of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. Defiance of Palestinian Arab political elite’s struggle for full civic integration into the Israeli state³⁴⁴ by negligence of Netanyahu and Barak’s consecutive governments exacerbated that feeling of alienation. October events occurred in the course of peaked discontent and eroded hopes about resolving the predicament of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel through utilizing the in-system mechanisms. Such feelings were accompanied by the nationalistic and religious discourse, which was revitalized in political sphere before and during the clashes.

Azmi Bishara considered the October events as a turning point in the nature of relationship between the Israeli dominant structures and the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. For Bishara the events signified an Arab nationalist resurrection, which could transform into a systematic counter-hegemonic upheaval of Palestinian Arab community only if this national awareness would be institutionalized through establishment of Palestinian Arab counter-hegemonic national institutions in all spheres of communal life such as education, health, and planning³⁴⁵.

Up until the October events, there was hardly an Israeli institution or television talk show, whose décor did not include an “Israelized” Arab adept at benefiting from Israeli liberals anxious to establish their non-racist credentials. This distorted relationship created the images of moderate and the extremist Arab, the cute one and the not-so-cute-one. It also led some to forsake Arab nationalism within the context of Israeli citizenship as well as to tolerate the Zionist nature of the state and the type of citizenship that resulted. But the polarization brought about by the recent events that has disturbed the smooth surface of these talk shows and wreaked havoc on the

³⁴³ Rema Hammami and Salim Tamari “The Second Uprising: End or New Beginning?”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2001, p.14

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ Azmi Bishara, “Reflections on October 2000: A Landmark in Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.30, No.3, 2001, p.64

dominant rules of the game. It also ruined the ambiance created by using the Arab as “friend” and “guest” or as a type of folklore – not to mention the coddled existence of those Arabs consenting to play such a role. How could such Arabs, who were thrown off course by the October events, go back to their former status after their people had angered the establishment and the “Jewish majority” to such an extent that even domesticated Arabs like themselves became unacceptable? [...] ³⁴⁶

At domestic level, *Knesset* was one of the main spheres of in-system political interaction in which the crisis was reflected. Palestinian Arab members of Israeli *Knesset* participated in a “parliamentary Intifada” that took place through acts of delegitimization of the hegemonic structure and the ‘integrative’ state at both domestic and international levels. *Al-Aqsa Intifada* played an important role in the change of discourse of the Palestinian Arab *Knesset* members. Counter-hegemonic discourse pervaded the Palestinian Arab parliamentarians especially in the early months of *al-Aqsa intifada*. Notwithstanding vital differences in their ideological stances Palestinian Arab parliamentarians from different political parties such as *Balad*, *United Arab List* united in targeting the policies of Israeli ruling elite against the Palestinian Arab citizenry and the Palestinians in the *WBGS* with severest forms of denunciation.

Counter-hegemonic verbal attacks of Azmi Bishara of the *Balad*, Ahmad Tibi of the *Arab Movement for Change*, Taleb as-Sana of the Arab Democratic Party, Hashim Mahamid and Abdalmalek Dehamshe of the *United Arab List*, Isam Makhoul and Mohammad Barakeh of the *Hadash* targeted Israeli ruling elite and institutions. They severely criticized those institutions and units of the state that were involved in implementation of coercive policies against Palestinian Arab citizenry and Palestinians in the *WBGS*. Within the aggressive discourse of the Palestinian Arab *Knesset* members, Israeli government was dubbed as “Israeli Taliban government”³⁴⁷, “anthrax government.”³⁴⁸, “apartheid regime” and its prime minister was labeled as “murderer of

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ “Makhoul calls Sharon government Taliban”, *Jerusalem Post*, 05.07.2001 and “Knesset uproar as Hadash MK likens Sharon gov’t to Taleban” *Haaretz*, 05.07.2001

³⁴⁸ “IDF action in Kfar Rima is a massacre, say Arab party MKs”, *Haaretz*, 25.10.2001

Shabra and Shatila”³⁴⁹, a “fascist worse than Hitler and Mussolini”, and “a bloodsucking dictator.”³⁴ Palestinian Arab MKs also targeted the Israeli Minister of Interior Uzi Landau by calling him as “the minister of assassinations”, ⁷“minister of thugs, the minister of internal terrorism.”⁸, “terror-supporting fascist”, and the institutions under his authority as “execution squads and murderers”. Ahmed Tibi accused Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz of murder and called him as “fascist”³⁵⁰. Arab Democratic Party MK Talib as-Sana referred the IDF as “army of occupation and Israel's machine of oppression” and gave a press conference on his commemoration of *al-Nakba* in the independence day of Israel in his office in the *Knesset*³⁵¹. Moderate wing of Jewish political elite supported critical discourse of Palestinian Arab MKs in the *Knesset*. Yossi Sarid, leader of liberal *Meretz* party criticized the coercive policies of the Sharon government and called actions of the IDF as unacceptable³⁵².

Hawkish segments of Israeli ruling elite also waged discursive attacks against the Palestinian Arab Members of *Knesset*. Uzi Landau, Minister of Internal Security labeled the Palestinian Arab MKs as “foreign agents”³⁵³ of Palestinian Authority in the *Knesset*³⁵⁴. Member of *Knesset* from *Shinui*, a secular right wing party, called the Palestinian Arab MKs as ‘terrorist gang’³⁵⁵. Herut MK Michael Kleiner shared a similar attitude towards the Palestinian Arab MKs. Following of a comment of Taleb

³⁴⁹ “Arab MKs blast Beit Rima incursion”, *Jerusalem Post*, 25.10.2001

³⁵⁰ “Knesset removes Tibi for outburst”, *Haaretz*, 16.05.2001

³⁵¹ “Stormy session expected as Knesset resumes”, *Jerusalem Post*, 30.10.2000

³⁵² “Arab MKs blast Beit Rima incursion”, *Jerusalem Post*, 25.10.2001

³⁵³ “Uzi Landau labels Arab MKs ‘foreign agents’ stirs uproar”, *Haaretz*, 15.11.2001

³⁵⁴ “Landau: Some Arab MKs are agents of PA”, *Jerusalem Post*, 15.11.2001

³⁵⁵ “Shinui member calls Arab MKs ‘terrorist gang’”, *Haaretz*, 31.10.2000

Sana on the interconnection of the Israeli security with the Palestinian security Kleiner identified Arab MKs like *Taleb Sana* as “the political arm of Palestinian terror”³⁵⁶.

Counter-hegemonic discourse against the ruling elite and the dominant structures and processes of Israeli system were accompanied by involvement of the Palestinian Arab MKs in international and regional attempts towards de-legitimatization of the policies of Israeli ruling elite in the course of *al-Aqsa Intifada*. At regional level, the Palestinian Arab MKs indicated their support to the Palestinians in the *WBGS* in their speeches and their joint demonstrations.

At international level, Palestinian Arab MKs such as Azmi Bishara³⁵⁷ and NGOs such as Adalah³⁵⁸ directed severe criticism towards policies and activities of the Israeli ruling elite in worldwide conferences and meetings such as the *United Nations (U.N.)* Conference against Racism in Durban in 2001. Israeli ruling elite was also criticized by the Palestinian Arab political and civil societal elite in an international symposium in Brazil on the occasion of the *International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People*. Palestinian Arab civil societal organizations also participated in this delegitimization campaign of the hegemonic structure and its institutions.

These actions revealed an amplified deficiency of consent even among the Palestinian Arab agents of the hegemonic legislative structure with regard to the legitimacy of the hegemonic institutions and the Israeli state. However, they did not result in emergence or consolidation of counter-hegemonic movements that would severely challenge the existing dominant structures. Notwithstanding initial reactionary radical stance of the Palestinian Arab political elite in the *Knesset* against suppressive and coercive policies of Israeli ruling elite, Palestinian Arab political discourse gradually alleviated its counter-hegemonic overtone in time. Such alleviation was reflected in the discursive

³⁵⁶ “Sharon: Palestinian incitement inspired terrorist”, *Jerusalem Post*, 06.08.2001

³⁵⁷ “Arab MKs Against Israel”, *Arutz Sheva*, 30.08.2001 www.IsraelNationalNews.com and *Palestinian Media Watch*, www.pmw.org.il

³⁵⁸ Yair Ettinger, “Using the tools democracy makes available”, *Haaretz*, 29.08.2002,

choices of the Palestinian Arab citizenry as well. While the Palestinians in the *WBGS* called the incidents of September 2000 as *Intifadat el Aqsa* to refer to a long-term resistance and uprising, Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel labeled these incidents as *habbat el-Aqsa* which emphasized their ‘short-term’ and ‘one-time’ reactionary nature³⁵⁹. Some segments of political elite of Palestinian Arab community such as MK Mohammad Barakeh and the chairperson of Supreme Follow-Up Committee Mohammad Zeidan³⁶⁰, emphasized this difference to indicate the in-system stance of the Palestinian Arab citizenry notwithstanding the disruptive impact of the incidents. In this respect, *Al-Aqsa Intifada* was a moment of crisis of hegemony-in-building, which did not result in total collapse of the interaction between the Israeli dominant structures and processes and the Palestinian Arab citizenry.

3.1.2. Economic dimensions of Al-Aqsa Intifada

Constant unrest, which was created by Al-Aqsa Intifada, directly desecrated and destabilized most of the sectors in Israeli economy. Especially Palestinian labor laden segments such as construction, agriculture, and tourism were affected most. It had detrimental impact on the capital and financial markets as well.³⁶¹ As a study revealed even the single military operations against the political or military leaders or participants of the uprising within or outside the Green Line had different levels of impact on the Israeli stock market³⁶². It also had destructive impact on inter-communal economic transactions between the Jewish and Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel.

³⁵⁹ Al-Haj, ‘Whither the Green Line? ...’ (2005), *op.cit.*, p.199

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁶¹ Imri Tov, “An Economic Agenda for the New Government”, *Strategic Assessment*, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1, April 2001, <http://www.tau.ac.il/jess/sa/v4n1p1.html>

³⁶² Asaf Zussman and Noam Zussman, “Assassinations: Evaluating the Effectiveness of an Israeli Counterterrorism Policy Using Stock Market Data”, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2006, pp. 193-206

Immediate response of the Jewish public and private companies that had pursued good economic relations with their Palestinian Arab counterparts to the unrest in the Palestinian Arab segments of society was cutting economic relations with the Palestinian Arab citizenry. Most of these enterprises and Jewish customers ended their economic interactions with the Palestinian Arab businesses either because of the anxiety or because of intentional boycott to punish them for their involvement in the incidents. The crisis of mutual confidence significantly affected the Arab businesses, which were integrated to Israeli economic structure in the mixed or Palestinian Arab localities. Some Jewish owners of Israeli firms refused to employ Palestinian Arab citizens. Some websites announced Jews-only job advertisements and in some localities such as Safad and Nazareth advised the Jewish inhabitants not to sell or rent real estate to the Palestinian Arab citizens.³⁶³ Palestinian Arab employees of Israeli private companies such as *Avazi Restaurant*'s Netanya branch were fired³⁶⁴ because of the increased stereotypic understanding of Palestinian Arab citizens as security threats. Jewish taxi passengers began to ask nationality of the taxi drivers before they hired the cabs in several cities of Israel including Jerusalem and Tel Aviv³⁶⁵.

A brief economic analysis of the Palestinian Arab localities in Israel indicated that they had very high unemployment rates. *Kafr Manda*, which was one of the Palestinian Arab town in which severe confrontations between the inhabitants and the Israeli security forces took place during first days of *Al-Aqsa Intifada* was at the top of the list of the localities with lowest employment rates. In this respect, an economic reading of violence could also be done by assessing the impact of economic vulnerability and distress on the counter-hegemonic acts of the Palestinian Arab citizenry against a state, which had not provided socio-economic security for its citizens. Such an approach could provide a partial explanation about a specific component of the distress among

³⁶³ Blecher, (2005), *op.cit.*, p. 743

³⁶⁴ Ori Nir, "Restaurant ousts Arab workers", *Haaretz*, 25.10.2000

³⁶⁵ Talks with the Palestinian Arab taxi drivers in Jerusalem, Haifa and Tel Aviv, 2004

the Palestinian Arab community. Nevertheless, violent acts of expressing their economic distress did not prevent Palestinian Arab community from exacerbation of their socio-economic situation due to the increased unemployment rates and disappointing economic indicators before and during *al-Aqsa Intifada*³⁶⁶.

As the level of political violence arising from the *al-Aqsa Intifada* had a noteworthy influence on the decisions of the Israeli entrepreneurs on the location of their investments, this period also witnessed a serious capital flight from the Palestinian Arab localities to more secure areas either in Israel or abroad³⁶⁷. In this respect, as Ora Coren reported for the *Haaretz*, the economic separation had already begun in some segments of the Israeli economic sphere between the Jewish and Palestinian Arab business community with the increased tendency of the Israeli entrepreneurs, who in previously invested in the joint industrial zones, to transfer their ventures to alternative sites abroad³⁶⁸. Construction of a series of industrial estates sponsored by the *European Investment Bank*, *U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)*, and the *World Bank* also halted due to the security situation³⁶⁹. Notwithstanding a number of fragile attempts to revitalize joint business enterprises and economic cooperation such as the Arab-Jewish forum, which was established to promote industry and joint ventures³⁷⁰, Israeli economic sphere was dominated by entrepreneurial hesitation deriving from mutual distrust and likelihood of constant instability in the markets due to security situation. As the upsurge of suicide-attacks within the Green Line significantly decreased economic transactions and eradicated business trade, distrust to stability of

³⁶⁶ Ruth Sinai "Unemployment increased 3.3 percent in September", *Haaretz*, 26.10.2000

³⁶⁷ David Fielding, "How Does Violent Conflict Affect Investment Location Decisions? Evidence from Israel during the Intifada", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 41, No. 4, 2004, p.481

³⁶⁸ Ora Coren, "The economic separation has already begun", *Haaretz*, 20.10.2000

³⁶⁹ Peter Lagerquist, "Privatizing the Occupation: The Political Economy of an Oslo Development Project", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2. 2003, pp. 5-35

³⁷⁰ "Arab-Jewish forum established to promote industry and joint projects", *Haaretz*, 18.10.2000

the Israeli economy spread among domestic and foreign investors many of whom considered carry away their capital, mostly from the hi-tech industries.³⁷¹

Al-Aqsa Intifada halted the Israeli control over the *WBGS* and the Palestinian Arab localities through its supervisory role in the internationally sponsored development projects that were designed to integrate the *WBGS* to the global markets³⁷². As the unrest destabilized indirect authority and control of Israeli mechanisms over the Palestinian economic transactions, it impeded the intermediary role of the Israeli small enterprises who functioned between the Palestinian economic elites and the Israeli ruling elite to integrate the Palestinian subordinate economic structures and labor market to the Israeli dominant economic structure and processes.

Unstable security situation also instigated difficulties for the high tech industry, which had become the key industrial sector in Israeli neo-liberal economy especially after the 1990s. Uncertainty of the Israeli market influenced investment plans of the high tech firms in a detrimental way³⁷³. Huge high tech exhibitions and conferences such as *Telecom Israel 2000*, organized by the *Israeli Ministry of Communications* to promote Israeli communications industry at global level, faced severe problems with the cancellation of participations especially from the Arab countries due to the *Al-Aqsa Intifada*³⁷⁴. Although foreign high-tech investors were not disheartened at the initial stages of *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, they stressed their concerns in the case of its continuation in long-term³⁷⁵. Consequently, executives of Israeli high-tech companies tried to reassure their foreign partners about the temporariness of the unrest and economic instability³⁷⁶.

³⁷¹ "Heavy price for occupation and Resistance", *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 26.September.2002 – 2.October.2002, No. 605, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/605/sup92.htm>

³⁷² Lagerquist, (2003), op.cit., p. 5

³⁷³ "Security situation creates uncertainty for high-tech firms", *Haaretz* 10.10.2000

³⁷⁴ Gwen Ackerman, "Violence likely to limit impact of Telecom 2000", *Jerusalem Post*, 30.10.2000

³⁷⁵ "Foreign high-tech investors not yet deterred by unrest" *Haaretz*, 12.10.2000

³⁷⁶ "High-tech execs calm their foreign partners over alarming news coverage", *Haaretz*, 20.10.2000

Immediate safety measures to end unrest particularly within the *Green Line* seemed necessary in order to re-stabilize the economic environment and convince the foreign investors about the buoyancy of Israeli economic sphere.

Another sector, which was hit by the unrest, was tourism. Although there was not a considerable crisis in the tourism sector at the initial stages of *Al-Aqsa Intifada*³⁷⁷, it did not persevere for a long time. In the later phases of the intra-societal instability resulted in a 30 percent decline in the activities and income of tourism with the cancellations of international organized tours as well as hotel reservations in the first two weeks of October³⁷⁸. As the expectations about rapid resolution of conflict gradually eroded, estimations about the number of tourists and expected amount of revenues from tourism decreased significantly back to the levels of two years ago³⁷⁹. Intra-societal unrest, which forced Tel Aviv hotels to take emergency steps for preventing impoverishment in the sector³⁸⁰, caused closure of six Nazareth hotels³⁸¹ and many other tourism enterprises in Israel.

Al-Aqsa Intifada destabilized financial sector in Israel as well. Israeli banks became more anxious in their crediting, loans and other financial policies due to the unpredictable movements in the financial markets and erosion of confidence to the savings and investments of clients in an unstable economic environment. *Bank Hapoalim* announced an expectation of sharp decrease in the real estate market³⁸², which would have severe repercussions on the loan policies of many financial institutions in Israeli economic sphere. Economic anxiety and distrust was reflected in

³⁷⁷ Irit Rosenblum, "No major tourism crisis yet, despite rioting", *Haaretz*, 04.10.2000

³⁷⁸ "Unrest reduces tourism by 30%" *Haaretz*, 15.10.2000

³⁷⁹ "Violence sends tourist forecasts for next year back to 1999 levels", *Haaretz*, 19.10.2000

³⁸⁰ "Tel Aviv hotels call emergency meeting", *Haaretz*, 18.10.2000,

³⁸¹ "Unrest causes six hotels to close", *Haaretz*, 24.10.2000,

³⁸² "Hapoalim: violence to have strong impact on property market", *Jerusalem Post*, 31.10.2000

the operations of some Israeli financial institutions in the localities, which were predominantly populated by Palestinian Arab citizens. *Bank Discount* reproved that it might not accept checks from bank branches that operated in the Palestinian Arab localities as well as the *WBGS* in order to protect its clients³⁸³. This decision of the *Bank Discount* was not welcomed among the Palestinian Arab traders and businesspersons, who argued that it would further deter the already liquefied mutual confidence between the Israeli financial institutions and the Palestinian Arab citizenry³⁸⁴.

In the light of the developments, *Bishara* proposed establishment of a self-sufficient alternative economic infrastructure, which would be independent from the Israeli dominant economic structures. Local ventures could reduce the structural dependency to Israeli market by developing their own structures, market and labor and by keeping their relations with the Israeli dominant market at minimum level for pragmatic purposes³⁸⁵. In fact, such an economic organization was established by the north wing of the *Islamic Movement* on the basis of principles of self-sufficiency and intra-communal cooperation. For Bishara, October events marked absence of economic infrastructure and apparatuses for self-sufficiency and sustainable development of Palestinian Arab community in Israel. As the Israeli economic sphere lacked strong and independent Palestinian Arab economic institutions such as banks, insurance companies, superstores, businesses or wedding halls targeting Jewish customers³⁸⁶ [with some exceptions such as *Abu Ghosh*] dependency of Palestinian Arab households to the dominant Israeli economic structures and processes was the main pattern of the relationship.

³⁸³ “Discount warns it may reject checks from bank branches in Arab towns” *Haaretz*, 17.10.2000,

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁵ Bishara *op.cit.*, p.65

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

There was a dilemmatic relationship between the security and economy. Although many Jewish employers were unwilling to employ Palestinian Arab citizens due to security concerns, with such exclusion they served to alienation and disintegration of the Palestinian Arab labor from dominant structures and processes of Israeli economic system and thus increased their potential to exert security threat to an alien dominant system. Warnings of *Shin Bet*, internal security organization of Israel, in the midst of *Al-Aqsa Intifada* about necessity of economic integration of Palestinian Arab citizens to the socio-economic life of Israel through allocating more budgets to Palestinian Arab localities and appointing Palestinian Arab citizens to higher positions in working places³⁸⁷.

Overall, economic instability created by unrest of *Al-Aqsa Intifada* had severe impact on the Israeli economic growth, unemployment rates and financial dynamics. It halted fast economic growth of Israel, which had gained momentum prior to the riots³⁸⁸. It raised the unemployment rate significantly especially among the Palestinian Arab sectors of the Israeli society. By the second week of the unrest, the Israeli stock exchange dropped 5 percent due to the clashes and anxiety of the investors about socio-economic and political instability in the following days³⁸⁹. It also destabilized the economic conditions necessary for domestic and foreign investment. In 2002, Finance Minister Silvan Shalom announced the estimated total damage of *Al-Aqsa Intifada* on the economy during the first year of the Intifada as approximately \$5bn, with the loss of 80,000 jobs and considerable amount of foreign investment³⁹⁰. As the recent neo-liberal positioning of Israeli economy within the global economic structure necessitated domestic stability for the foreign investors, some segments of Israeli economic elite

³⁸⁷“Shin Bet: Israel must integrate its Arabs”, *Haaretz* 12.10.2000

³⁸⁸ Moti Bassok, “The situation should not affect 2001 budget”, *Haaretz*, 17.10.2000

³⁸⁹ Boaz Levi, “Tel Aviv Stock Exchange drops 5 percent”, *Haaretz*, 11.10.2000

³⁹⁰ *Al-Ahram Weekly*, (26.09.2002 – 02.10.2002) op.cit.

called for an urgent return to the peace process³⁹¹, which had practically collapsed with the clashes of *Al-Aqsa Intifada*.

3.1.3. Socio-cultural dimension of Al Aqsa Intifada

In socio-cultural arena, *Al-Aqsa Intifada* was an interlude in Jewish-Arab coexistence and bi-communal interactions in the Israeli public spaces. Disturbances and inter-communal frictions in the interactions of the Jewish and Palestinian Arab inhabitants of the Israeli localities such as *Nazareth* and *Nazareth Illit* transformed the coffee houses, the malls and cinemas into inaccessible public spaces for the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel during *al-Aqsa intifada*.³⁹² Inhabitants of *Nazareth* and *Nazareth Illit*, who used to visit public spaces in each other's localities, for instance, realized that they were separated from each other. Neo-liberal processes of hegemony-in-building, which began to take place in the modern public spaces of consumption in *Nazareth Illit* such as cafes, cinema halls and shopping centers, experienced a solemn interval because of *Al-Aqsa Intifada*.

Apart from the Jewish and Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel, who began to avoid visiting certain localities in which they used to dine or consume, Israeli servicepersons of Israeli gas, electric and telephone companies also rejected to serve without police escort in the conflict-driven towns or villages in the course of *Al-Aqsa Intifada*.³⁹³ Notwithstanding the calls of the Israeli officials for normalizing the relations between the Israeli socio-economic institutions and the Palestinian Arab citizens, mutual distrust persisted due to security considerations³⁹⁴.

³⁹¹ Reiner Ephraim, "Our economy needs the peace process", *Haaretz*, 18.10.2000

³⁹² Lily Galili, "Your land is my land", *Haaretz*, 12.10.2000

³⁹³ Herb Keinon, "Wilk calls on Jews to once again visit Israeli Arabs", *Jerusalem Post*, 30.10.2000

³⁹⁴ Ibid.

Mutual fear, trepidation and anxiety deriving from intra-societal violent confrontations instigated inter-communal tension, mistrust and alienation. Intifada also disrupted intra-communal activities in socio-cultural sphere in both Jewish and Palestinian Arab segments of Israeli society. *Fringe Theater festival*, which attracted over 250.000 visitors to Acre every year was canceled in 2000 due to the security situation and inter-communal tension³⁹⁵. Some localities of Israel however, remained unaffected by the inter-communal confrontation such as *Abu Ghosh*. Preparations *Abu Ghosh* traditional vocal music festival remained unaffected by the security conditions. It was held with the participation of the *Copenhagen Bach Choir* and the *Ripieno Choir* from the United Kingdom³⁹⁶.

In media sphere, there was a neo-patriotic shift among the Israeli dominant structures of media in their representation of the incidents within the context of *Al-Aqsa Intifada*³⁹⁷. Such a shift increased their dependence on the government sources while reporting the inter-communal clashes and their consequences. In addition, dehumanization of the ‘enemy’ dominated the mainstream media discourse during the *Al-Aqsa Intifada*. At the initial stages of the incidents, Israeli mainstream media undermined the differences between the Palestinians in the *WBGS* and the Palestinian citizens of Israel in their media reports. They mainly stressed the similarities in the acts of these two populations against the Israeli dominant institutions and the Jewish segments of the society. Gradually mainstream media changed its discourse about the Palestinian Arab citizenry and began to focus on the roots of their upheaval. News reports always differentiated between the good Palestinian Arab citizens who expressed their discontent by utilizing the in-system mechanisms and bad Palestinian Arab citizens who used violent means to harm Israeli state and society. A similar

³⁹⁵ “Fringe Theater Festival canceled”, *Haaretz*, 12.10.2000

³⁹⁶ “Acre Festival postponed, Abu Ghosh still on”, *Jerusalem Post*, 12.10.2000 and “Of Humus and Bach”, *Jerusalem Post*, 13.10.2000

³⁹⁷ Ilene R. Prusher, “Israeli Media Shifts to the Right”, *Christian Science Monitor*, Vol.93, No.225, 16.10.2001

differentiation was made in the course of reporting the actions of Palestinian Arab political elite. While some of the Palestinian politicians such as Azmi Bishara and Abdalmalek Dehamshe³⁹⁸ were severely criticized due to their incitements against Israeli state that were believed to trigger Palestinian Arab involvement in the *habbats of Al Aqsa Intifada*, others were advised not to involve in the acts of incitement.

In the sphere of education, stereotypic attitudes, which were strengthened by the inter-communal unrest, began to affect the behaviors of the educators and students more severely within the context of pedagogical interactions. There were certain cases of attacks and clashes as incidents of stone-throwing and firebomb attacks to Jewish religious school in Jaffa³⁹⁹. However, since the clashes took place before the opening of the schools, direct impact of *Al-Aqsa Intifada* was conciliated through the meetings between the university officials of Haifa, Tel Aviv and Hebrew Universities and the representatives of the Palestinian Arab students⁴⁰⁰. In addition, prior to the semester, Israeli Ministry of Education initiated a more civic curriculum for Jewish and Arab high schools in order to overcome controversies and thus decrease the tension of the Palestinian Arab pedagogical elite and the students⁴⁰¹. However, these acts did not assist immediate reestablishment the shattered inter-communal confidence and pacification of the Palestinian Arab student activism. They did not eliminate the tension and sense of alienation, which derived from banal reproduction of inter-communal hatred and incitement⁴⁰² in the daily lives of Palestinian Arab educators and students. Some Palestinian Arab students, for instance, also faced stereotypic discriminatory

³⁹⁸ "The power of incitement", *Haaretz*, 07.03.2004

³⁹⁹ "Reconciliation efforts continue", *Jerusalem Post*, 13.10.2000

⁴⁰⁰ "Calm expected on campuses today", *Jerusalem Post*, 29.10.2000 and "Classes begin with relative calm on campuses", *Jerusalem Post*, 29.10.2000

⁴⁰¹ Orit Ichilov, Gavriel Salomon and Dan Inbar, 'Citizenship Education in Israel - A Jewish-Democratic State', Raphael Cohen-Almagor (ed.), **Israeli Institutions at Crossroads**, Routledge, New York, 2005, p.40 and Israeli Ministry of Education, [http://cms.education.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/8AD69DE4-2611-4050-907D-EA2FC9D4C264/11036/Final report0.rtf](http://cms.education.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/8AD69DE4-2611-4050-907D-EA2FC9D4C264/11036/Final%20report0.rtf)

⁴⁰² "An intensifying sense of alienation", *Haaretz*, 24.10.2000

behavior outside the school while renting flats due to the security considerations of the Jewish landowners rooted in anxiety of *Al-Aqsa Intifada*⁴⁰³.

Unrest also affected the inter-communal sport activities, which were an important field of integrative interaction among the Palestinian Arab and the Jewish citizens of Israel. As the soccer field had always been beyond a playground for the two teams running after a ball, repercussions of *Al-Aqsa Intifada* were reflected in the games between the Palestinian Arab and Jewish teams in the Israeli soccer league. While some games were postponed or cancelled due to the violent incidents within the Green line⁴⁰⁴, in some games fanatic supporters of the soccer teams such as *Beitar Jerusalem* and *Beni Sakhnin* tried to express their inter-communal antagonism in the soccer fields through slogans of incitement⁴⁰⁵. In the early stages of the unrest, the games between the Palestinian Arab teams and Jewish soccer teams were paralyzed because of the security situation and disinclination of the Israeli police to serve in the football matches in Palestinian Arab localities⁴⁰⁶. In addition, some politicians such as Ahmed Tibi used the slogans of the soccer fields such as “No Arabs No goals” in the *Knesset* in order to deliver his political messages about the contribution of the Palestinian Arab citizens to the Israeli society⁴⁰⁷.

⁴⁰³ “Intifada in the ivory tower”, *Haaretz*, 27.10.2000

⁴⁰⁴ “Arab teams relegated to the bench”, *Haaretz*, 25.10.2000

⁴⁰⁵ Tamir Sorek, “Between football and martyrdom: the bi-focal localism of an Arab-Palestinian town in Israel”, *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol.56, No. 4, 2005, pp.652-3

⁴⁰⁶ Tamir Sorek, “Palestinian Nationalism has Left the Field – A Shortened History of Arab Soccer in Israel”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.35, No. 3, 2003, p.435

⁴⁰⁷ Tamir Sorek, **Arab Soccer in a Jewish State : The Integrative Enclave**, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007, p.54

3.1.4. Reporting the Al Aqsa Intifada: structural and actual assessments of crisis of hegemony-in-building

3.1.4.1. After the Rift

In November 2000, inter-university research team, which was composed of twenty-five Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab scholars, submitted an emergency report to the Prime Minister Ehud Barak. After outlining causes of the intra-societal rift in Israel, the report presented alternative policy options to the Israeli ruling elite in redefining the relations of Palestinian Arab community with the Israeli dominant structures and processes. Addressing the problems and policy options in the spheres of land and planning, local authorities and welfare, identity and civil/cultural inclusion, education and higher education, development and employment, and law and internal security, it aimed to present an egalitarian alternative, which would also entail “fair shouldering of obligations”⁴⁰⁸.

Beginning with the land policies, the report focused on several aspects of the rift such as growing needs and contracting space, systemic and judicial discrimination, exclusion from centers of decision-making, Jewish expansion vis-à-vis Arab containment, problems of housing, economic development and Arab municipal space. First stage of proposed reform on land planning encompassed reorganization of ILA to include Palestinian Arab citizens in the decision-making mechanisms, fair representation of the Palestinian Arab citizens in the dominant processes and structures regarding the land planning and management such as Israel Land Council and the National Council for Planning and Construction and the local committees for planning and construction⁴⁰⁹. Second stage proposed transfer of certain amount of land to the Palestinian Arab citizens especially the lands, which were owned by the Islamic *Waqf*.

⁴⁰⁸ Dan Rabinowitz, Asad Ghanem, Oren Yiftachel (eds.), ‘After the Rift: New Directions for Government Policy towards the Arab population in Israel’, An emergency report by an inter-university research team submitted to Mr. Ehud Barak, Prime Minister of Israel, November 2000, p.10

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.* p. 20

The reform proposal also suggested empowerment of local administrations on self-management of the Palestinian Arab municipal spaces, employment of more Palestinian Arab professionals to the Israeli land planning and management institutions, revision and modification of discriminatory laws and state practices on use of land, and enhancing regional cooperation through initiatives from the municipalities as well as affirmative actions from the government. Finally, it suggested equitable accessibility to land, adapting an affirmative and rehabilitative stance towards historical discrimination in the affairs of land and planning, advancing the conditions of unrecognized villages, and assisting urbanization in Palestinian Arab community. Overall, proposed reform on land policies suggested implementation of parallel processes of democratization and decentralization of land and planning systems.

Second and fifth areas of focus in the proposed reform plan were the welfare and economic development. In these sections scholars including Asad Ghanem, Thaabet Abu Rass, Zeev Rosenhek, Ahmed Saadi Michael Shalev and Izhak Schnell assessed the reasons of economic weaknesses of the Palestinian Arab community and suggested alternative policy options in order to improve socio-economic conditions of Palestinian Arab household. After outlining the factors that affected the socio-economic vulnerability of the Palestinian Arab community as deficient and discriminatory allotment of national economic resources, low self-funded income, lack of business infrastructure in Palestinian Arab localities, marginal position in the employment hierarchy, the academicians proposed several suggestions for a reformative policy on welfare and economic development. The proposed reform scheme on welfare structure emphasized necessity of restructuring the Israeli welfare system to improve conditions of Palestinian Arab household on egalitarian basis, creating cooperative socio-economic networks in Palestinian Arab localities, supporting Palestinian Arab NGOs and their involvement in local development schemes, and encouraging involvement of Palestinian Arab women and youth in productive and communal activities. Overall, projected welfare scheme suggested inclusion of the Palestinian Arab community into an egalitarian socio-economic protection structure as their Jewish counterparts.

Economic development and employment reform plan included democratic and professional institutionalization of policy process through establishment of an Arab Development Authority, which would be staffed by Palestinian Arab professionals and representatives of localities. In addition, equal economic opportunities and equality of individual and collective economic rights and benefits of the Palestinian Arab citizens would be protected through introduction of necessary judicial mechanisms. Furthermore, the scheme would introduce necessary apparatuses for reforming occupational training, industrial infrastructure in the Palestinian Arab localities, and networks of tourism through decentralized reorganization of budgetary system.

Third and fourth areas of reform were civic/cultural inclusion and education respectively. According to report, Israeli national popular collective and the state were established on the Jewish collective memory and narrative. As the Palestinian Arab community was excluded from the Israeli nation-state building processes and structures, they did not replace their communal, familial and personal affiliations and identities with a national identity. Thus they could not develop national consciousness of 'being an Israeli'. For the report, in order to develop such a national identity among the Palestinian Arab citizenry the Israeli state should grant "full legitimacy to expressions of identity by both communities, and conducting these expressions within the framework of an inclusionary social, cultural, and political fabric of equal shared citizenship"⁴¹⁰. Focusing on the symbolic elements in the expression of the identity, the report's first suggestion on civic inclusion was the formal recognition of *al-Nakba*, (the disaster of Palestinian Arabs of 1948). This would be followed with setting a memorial day for the victims of *al Nakba*, an official apology from the government for the past exclusionary practices of Israeli state against Palestinian Arab citizens, and introduction of compensation laws as well as new egalitarian laws on emigration and family reunion, which would allow victims of *al Nakba* to return to their pre-war localities. Apart from the collective memory and Israeli state's responsibilities

⁴¹⁰ *Ibid.* p.34

regarding *al Nakba*, the report emphasized necessity of educational reform for development of civic identity of the Palestinian Arab community. Thus, they proposed modification of Israeli official curriculum to include studies on history, culture and religion of the Palestinian Arab community, development of pedagogical schemes for full inclusion of the Palestinian Arab students in Israeli higher education system, restructuring the Israeli institutions of higher education to function according to the pedagogical models of bilingualism and bi-cultural comprehension. Furthermore, it called for elevating the status of Arab language in Israel through teaching it in Jewish schools, placing it in the road signs all over Israel, introducing its usage together with Hebrew in the state institutions, increasing the number of Arabic programs and hours of Arab broadcasting in the state television, and opening an Arabic TV channel.

Final part of the report emphasized the need for a legal restructuring and reform. In this part scholars such as Gad Barzilai, Ronen Shamir, Musa Abu-Ramdan, Amal Jamal, Menachem Mautner, Amalia Saar and Nadra Shalhoub-Kevorkian proposed restructuring Israeli legal structure to eliminate inferior legal status of the Palestinian Arab citizenry in Israeli judicial system. In order to reach a more egalitarian judicial structure, scholars recommended the elimination of the discriminatory nature of the statutory legislation, laws and regulations, which were legitimized by the governments and dominant legislative structures on the basis of certain affiliations and entitlements such as being “veteran soldier” or “new immigrant”. The new policy scheme urged state’s recognition of collective rights of the Palestinian Arab community as well as pursuing affirmative and reconciliatory legal policy through developing “a jurisprudence that would acknowledge past structural injustices.”⁴¹¹ Referring to the violent containment of protest during the incidents of October 2000, the scholars recommended training of the police officers and establishment of special riot police units which would be equipped with necessary expertise and devices of non-violent containment of the public demonstrations. Overall they focused on the reforming the

⁴¹¹ *Ibid.* p.57

system to include necessary mechanisms of affirmative actions, protection of collective rights and elimination of discriminatory and violent legal practices against the Palestinian Arab citizenry in their relations with the public institutions as well as in their individual legal cases.

Although the report, aimed to outline the systemic requirements for an egalitarian transformation, its reformative rather than revolutionary stance also provided operational traces for revitalization of hegemony-in-building process, which was initiated by Yitzhak Rabin and his cadres between 1992 and 1996. In fact, aiming to reform the policy setting patterns rather than to revolutionize very essence of Israeli dominant structures and processes, the report presented a passive revolutionary stance rather than a counter-hegemonic alternative.

3.1.4.2. The Or Commission Report: Reproducing the status quo?

Another important document, which had an important impact on the future route of state's policies and practices towards the Palestinian Arab community, was the *Or Commission Report*. The report aimed to emphasize the “fundamental problems of the state of the Arab citizens in the State and society of Israel [...] that stood as a backdrop to the October Riots, and which have the greatest significance from a long-term perspective”⁴¹².

On 22 October 2000, then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak appointed a Committee of Examination to inspect the nature and causes of intra-societal clashes in Israel which took place with the involvement of Jewish and Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel beginning from 29 September 2000. Following the initial inspections, the Israeli government decided to establish an official Commission in accordance with the Commissions of Inquiry Law of 1968 with powers to conduct the investigation through requesting and forcing witnesses to appear and testify about the incidents. On 15 November 2000, the Commission of Inquiry which was composed of Supreme Court Justice Theodore Or

⁴¹² Shimon Shamir, (19.09. 2005), op.cit.

Professor Shimon Shamir of Tel Aviv University, and Deputy President of the Nazareth District Court Judge Sahel Jarah began to conduct its investigation. In June 2001, Nazareth District Court Judge *Hashim Khatib* replaced Judge *Sahel Jarah* due to health conditions of Judge Jarah. The commission was known in the Israeli public with the name of its chairperson as Supreme Court Justice *Theodore Or* as the *Or Commission Report*.

The content of the *Or Commission Report*, which was completed in three years, consisted of four main parts. In the first part, it outlined the main characteristics and causes of the incidents which took place within the context of *Al-Aqsa Intifada*. It emphasized violent, inter-communal and synchronized nature of the events with their domestic and regional implications in both sides of the Green Line, “which exceeded the definition of local uprisings”. It also mentioned the stages, intensity, methods and nature of confrontation among the Palestinian Arab citizens, Jewish citizens and the Israeli security forces. In the following section of the first part, the report examined the causes of the incidents. For the Commission one of the main causes of the incidents was government’s negligent and discriminatory treatment towards the Palestinian Arab citizens. *Or Commission Report* acknowledged the government’s inattention in producing comprehensive solutions for the problems of the Palestinian Arab community, unequal allotment of state resources among the different segments of society on ethno-religious basis, and insensitivity of the Israeli ruling elite to the demands of the Palestinian Arab citizenry. Another cause cited by the report was the ideological-political radicalization of the Palestinian Arab segments of the Israeli society as a result of aforementioned practices of state and ruling elite. Finally, the commission considered aggressive and provocative behavior of the Palestinian Arab leadership by as one of the most significant reasons of the incidents. Commission’s report blamed the Palestinian Arab political elite such as MK *Azmi Bishara*, MK *Abdelmalek Dehamshe* and *Sheikh Raed Salah* for their inability to guide the Palestinian Arab community to disseminate its demands through in-system legitimate democratic mechanisms, not taking necessary measures to prevent transformation of

protests into violent acts and not warning the demonstrators against violating the law⁴¹³.

Second part of the report focused on the Jewish and Palestinian Arab personalities who were charged to play role in development of the incidents in the way they had occurred. In this part, the report charged Israeli officials such as Prime Minister *Ehud Barak* with negligence and inattentiveness, Minister of Public Security *Shlomo Ben Ami* with insufficient action, Police Commissioner *Yehuda Wilk* with not fulfilling his duties, and commander of the Northern District Major General *Alik Ron* with contributing to muddled relationship and cutting of communication with Palestinian Arab leadership. The Commission also charged commander of the Valleys District of the Israel police Major General *Moshe Waldman* for “exceeding authority” in excessive use of force against the demonstrators and commander of the Northern District of the Border Police *Bentzi Sao* for his “substantial failures” such as “unjustified opening of fire by sharpshooters on stone throwers at the *Umm al Fahem* junction”. Other officials who were charged with behaving against the orders, judgment deficiencies and excessive use of force in creating grave bodily harm of demonstrators were Chief Superintendent *Yaron Meir*, Chief Superintendent *Shmuel Marmelstein*, Superintendent *Guy Reif*, and a border police officer *Murshad Rashad*⁴¹⁴. In the report, Palestinian Arab leaders such as MK *Azmi Bishara* of Balad, MK *Abdelmalek Dehamshe* of United Arab List and Sheikh *Raed Salah* of *Islamic Movement* were charged with incitement, incapability of controlling the violent acts of the Palestinian Arab demonstrators, not taking necessary precautions to prevent deterioration into violence, not warning the citizens against violating law at demonstrations⁴¹⁵.

⁴¹³ “The Official Summation of The Or Commission Report”, *Haaretz* Online English Language edition, September 2, 2003

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid.

Third part of the report assessed structural problems of the Palestinian Arab citizenry and provided suggestions to overcome these problems. In this part, the Commission addressed the problems of the Palestinian Arab community in the fields of governmental responsibility in promotion of Palestinian Arab community, inter-communal budgetary discrepancies, municipal governance, land use and planning, construction, industrial development, proper representation in employment and public offices, education, and the conditions of the Bedouins⁴¹⁶. In order to resolve these structural problems the Or commission suggested several measures such as direct involvement, management and leadership of the PM in the Palestinian Arab community's affairs, equal allotment of state budget, equalization of socio-economic benefits and securities, strengthening local governance, outlining and implementing master plans for legal residential construction, planning use of land on equal patterns and principles, establishment of industrial zones, increasing Palestinian Arab employment and representation in public sector, equalizing resource allocations for education and introducing special development programs for Bedouins⁴¹⁷. The Commission also suggested a training programs for the police in order to prepare police officers to overcome severe psychological burden in confronting the demonstrations.

Adalah, a Palestinian Arab NGO, provided an alternative reading to the nature and causes of the *Al-Aqsa Intifada*. According to the *Adalah*'s assessment of the incidents of October 2000, policies and practices of Israeli ruling elite and dominant institutions created an environment, which led to uprising of the Palestinian Arab citizens. For *Adalah*, direct reasons of the *Al-Aqsa Intifada* were Ariel Sharon's provocative visit to Haram al-Sharif, extensive use of force by Israeli security mechanisms in suppressing the demonstrations, Ehud Barak's approval of extensive use of force, implementation of "*Kessem Ha-Mangina*" plan that allowed "use of snipers and live ammunition", and

⁴¹⁶ Shimon Shamir, 'The Arabs in Israel – Two Years after The Or Commission Report', Lecture delivered at Tel Aviv University, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, September 19, 2005

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*

hostile coverage of Hebrew-language media to Palestinian Arab citizens⁴¹⁸. Adalah's report also asserted the "deep-rooted causes" of the 2000 October uprising. According to Adalah these causes were historical, social and economic discrimination inherent in the state's relationship and attitude toward the Palestinian minority, exclusion and marginalization of Palestinians by land planning authorities. Following the Adalah's criticism against the efforts of Israeli authorities in undermining principles of freedom of expression and immunity of MKs, the report severely reproved the Or Commission because of its warnings against the Palestinian Arab political elite, whom it accused of incitement in the course of *Al-Aqsa Intifada*. Within this context, in the last part of its report, *Adalah* criticized the *Or Commission's* charges about the political activities and statements of Palestinian Arab leadership, which allegedly encouraged the use of violence to achieve political objectives of the community. *Adalah's* report insisted that the commission should have prioritized the impact of the Ariel Sharon's provocative visit to *al-Haram al-Sharif* on 28 September 2000 in a tense political environment rather than accusing the representatives of Palestinian Arab public for provoking the community⁴¹⁹. In that respect, *Adalah* argued that the Commission was not a transitional justice mechanism, which would "heal the wounds imposed on Palestinian citizens of Israel by the events of October 2000"⁴²⁰.

Ahmad Sa'adi agreed with Adalah's critical view on non-transitioning character of the Or Commission Report in his critical stance against it. He argued that *Or Commission* was an apparatus of a passive revolutionary act of Israeli dominant institutions, which was designed to maintain the status-quo within the "boundaries of legitimacy" rather than changing it.⁴²¹ Sa'adi maintained that focusing on the practices of the police forces

⁴¹⁸ Marvan Dalal, **October 2000: Law & Politics before the Or Commission of Inquiry**, Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, Shafa'amr, 2003, pp.16-29

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.36

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.75

⁴²¹ Ahmed Sa'adi, "The Concept of Protest and its Representation by the Or Commission", *Adalah's Newsletter*, Vol. 6, October 2004, p.3

in the course of a specific event rather than assessing the “its institutional memory, hierarchical structure and responsibilities within the institution”⁴²² could not produce a mechanism and understanding of ‘transitional justice’, which would challenge the dominant structures and processes that presided over police and its practices. Therefore, neglecting main incentives and context of the Palestinian Arab protest and focusing on provocative acts of its leadership as well as the case-specific practices rather than structural denominators of the police behavior, the *Or Commission* operated as a legal apparatus of the state to maintain the “power relations, which governed and controlled the status quo”⁴²³. In this respect, the commission and its report did not surpass reproducing the Israeli dominant discourse with regard to the Palestinian Arab citizenry.

3.1.5. From Reporting to Passive Revolutionary Acts towards Rebuilding Hegemony

These reports and their assessment within different segments of Israeli society provided important insight for the future route and nature of relationship between the Palestinian Arab citizens and Israeli dominant structures and processes in the coming years. Both Jewish and Palestinian Arab political elite considered the assessments of these reports and their critiques in redefining their acts within the Israeli political, economic and socio-cultural spheres in the post *Al-Aqsa Intifada*. As one of its authors, Professor Shimon Shamir noted in a speech he delivered in Tel Aviv University after two years of the report’s publication, “the handwriting remained on the wall” and the reports noticeably underlined the nature of structural problems between the Palestinian Arab citizens and the Israeli political, economic and socio-cultural processes.

Different segments of Israeli ruling elite either acknowledged or ignored the conclusions and policy options offered by these two reports in designing their policies

⁴²² Ibid.

⁴²³ Ibid., p.4

with regard to the Palestinian Arab citizenry in the post-*Al-Aqsa* period according to their political positioning towards the Palestinian Arab community.

While political elite of hawkish right and the cadres of Benjamin Netanyahu opted for ignoring these warnings and continued to pursue discriminatory and coercive policies towards the Palestinian Arab citizenry especially until 2003, Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert and their hegemonic cadres after 2003 pursued their policies by acknowledging most of the warnings and recommendations of these two reports. In this respect, notwithstanding the continuation of challenges from coercive segments of Israeli political and economic elite, post-*Al-Aqsa Intifada* period would witness efforts of the Israeli authorities towards initiating new policies to initiate of a hegemony-in-rebuilding process in line with a more sophisticated reassessment of the problems in the reports that led to crisis.

3.2. 2000-2007: From Crisis of Hegemony-in-Building to Hegemony-in-Building

Post-*Al-Aqsa Intifada* period witnessed mixture of passive revolutionary and oppressive moves of the dominant Israeli political society towards the Palestinian Arab citizens. Increasing divisiveness among the Jewish right wing political elite on the routes of future policy towards the Palestinian Arab citizenry were reflected in the discourses and policy choices of different segments of right wing elite in this era. More hawkish segments of the ruling elite tried to dominate political sphere through activating Israeli mechanisms of control over the discontent Palestinian Arab community in the first two years of the post-*Al-Aqsa* period. Notwithstanding his altering political positioning towards the Palestinian Arab citizenry, Ariel Sharon and his new cadres did not directly confront the coercive moves of the hawkish segments in the Jewish right at the beginning of Sharon's first term as prime minister. They even appeased the aggressive leaders of these segments of the Israeli Jewish right such as *Benjamin Netanyahu* and *Avigdor Lieberman* by accommodating them and providing them a political space of manoeuvre in Sharon's consecutive governments. In this

respect, the period between the 2001 and 2003 witnessed dominance of coercive aspect of hegemony-in-rebuilding process.

Main concerns of the Israeli ruling elite was to prevent strengthening of counter-hegemonic streams among the Palestinian Arab citizenry and to suppress organized Palestinian Arab counter-hegemonic resistance. In this respect, until 2003 elections Israeli ruling elite introduced certain legal measures in order to prevent transformation of disorganized counter-hegemonic acts of Palestinian Arab community into a systematic rejection of the Israeli dominant structures and processes. Most of the amendments, which were made to the Basic Laws of political parties, elections, *Knesset*, immunity of MKs and penal issues, passed in various sessions of *Knesset* in 2002. They signified increase in the anxiety of Israeli ruling elite on possibility of a structured denial of Israeli system by the Palestinian Arab citizenry. Coercive means were utilized to exert physical control over the Israeli political sphere through disallowing transformation of unorganized resistance to a systematic opposition among the Palestinian Arab citizenry against the Israeli dominant structures and processes.

The Israeli parliamentary elections of 2003 signified a breakthrough in the relationship between the Israeli ruling elite and Palestinian Arab citizenry. The elections sharpened the differences between the Sharon's led more moderate Jewish right-wing elite and the hawkish segments of aggressive Jewish elite under the leadership of Netanyahu. It also led emergence of a moderate conservative political movement at the centre of Israeli political spectrum, which claimed to assume leadership of the Israeli hegemony-in-building. The *Knesset* elections of 2006 consolidated the position of the new leadership of hegemony-in-rebuilding in Israeli political, economic and socio-cultural spheres. Centrality of coercive vision, which prevailed in the early years of post-*Al-Aqsa Intifada* eroded and became marginalized gradually following the 2003 elections. Beginning from the 2006 elections the Israeli dominant ruling elite adopted a vision of hegemony-in-rebuilding. Therefore, the passive revolution, which was reinitiated under leadership of Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert in cooperation with the headship of

Israeli left wing from 2003 onwards, became prevalent among the Israeli ruling elite after the 2006 elections.

In this context, new hegemonic bloc attached great importance to the Israeli institutions in re-establishing the institutional basis of the hegemony. Israeliness of the institutions was re-delineated to accommodate Palestinian Arab citizenry and disallow their alienation from Israeli dominant structures and processes. From 2003 onwards, efforts towards strengthening of the attachment and access of Palestinian Arab citizenry to the Israeli political, economic and socio-cultural systems and processes pervaded agenda of the Israeli ruling elite. Israeli political institutions such as *Knesset*, government, political parties and President's office, Israeli legal institutions such as the *Supreme Court of Justice* as well as Israeli dominant economic institutions such as *Histadrut* and public corporations initiated accommodative openings towards the Palestinian Arab citizens.

In fact, as the consent would be “generated by structures of cooperation, institutions that internalize[d] political pressures”⁴²⁴, these institutional openings became noteworthy in this period. Some of the Israeli institutions began to internalize new vision of the Israeli ruling elite and the pressures and dilemmas that could derive from implementation of this hegemonic vision. Consequently, they began to operate as agents of hegemony-in-building processes. However, these systemic hegemonic gateways and accommodative approaches were not immune from occasional use of coercive discourse or practices of the Israeli ruling elite. Israeli ruling elite followed a gradual and controlled transformation from the coercive to consent-seeking practices without complete abandonment of the use of its coercive apparatuses when its efforts towards building hegemony faced with moments of crises.

⁴²⁴ Gad Barzilai, “War, Democracy, and Internal Conflict: Israel in a Comparative Perspective”, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1999, p.325

3.2.1. Political Sphere

On February 6, 2001 Ariel Sharon became the new Prime Minister of Israel and established a national unity government to suppress counter-hegemonic upheavals of the Palestinians in the *WBGS* as well as the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel within the Green Line. He received 62.4% of the vote (78% in Greater Jerusalem), though voter turnout was the lowest in Israeli history (59.1% overall, 18% in Arab areas)⁴²⁵. Following the establishment of broad coalition government with the participation of *Likud*, *One Israel*, *Shas*, *Ichud Leumi*, *Israel Beiteinu*, *Israel Be'aliyah*, *Gesher*, *Center Party* *Labor-Meimad*, *United Torah Judaism* in March 2001, several MKs from the right wing coalition proposed pursuance of coercive policies against the Palestinian Arab community. Prior to the establishment of new government, the *Herzliya Document* of 2000, which put emphasis on the security concerns of Israeli dominant circles, had prioritized strengthening domestic dimensions of security by maintaining dominant ethnocratic nature of the state⁴²⁶. Thus, in the first years of Ariel Sharon's premiership Israeli government focused on maintaining security through utilization of mixture of coercive and passive revolutionary means.

Between 2001 and 2003 utilization of coercive measures in suppressing the counter-hegemonic acts of the Palestinian Arab citizens were more preferable by the Israeli ruling elite than the consent-seeking moves. The level of coercion was occasionally balanced by the passive revolutionary acts but the passive revolutionary approach did not become dominant stance of the ruling elite. There were differentiations among the leading personalities of the right wing Jewish political elite with regard to the future routes of the relationship between the Israeli state and the Palestinian Arab community. However, these differentiations did not transform into a severe divisiveness within the Jewish right-wing historical bloc until the *Knesset* elections of 2003. For the duration

⁴²⁵ Michele L. Kjørlien, "Peace Monitor: 16 November 2000-15 February 2001", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 3. (Spring, 2001), p.127

⁴²⁶ Majid al Haj, *Whither...*, p.201

of two years, notwithstanding their increasing openness towards a new passive revolutionary understanding, Ariel Sharon-led right wing moderates, in cooperation with Labor Party, allowed and monitored implementation of coercive policies against the Palestinian Arab citizens in Israeli political sphere. Thus, the period between the 2001 and 2003 witnessed several coercive policy proposals and practices of Israeli dominant structures over the Palestinian Arab citizens.

Policy of transfer was one of the coercive means, which was voiced by hawkish segments of coalition to suppress the resistive activities of the Palestinian Arab citizens. There were several cases of transfer certain segments of Palestinian Arab community outside the Green Line was presented by the hawkish segments of the Jewish ruling elite as viable option to control counter-hegemonic mobilization and activities against the state of Israel. One of the most persistent Jewish politicians who gave a particular emphasis to transfer issue in his political agenda was Avigdor Lieberman, the former Transportation Minister and leader of the right-wing National Union Party. In various occasions, he urged the necessity of instituting the policy of transfer as a mechanism of control, which would present the Palestinian Arab community a precise choice between internalizing their “conditional citizenship” or leaving the country⁴²⁷.

In 2001, following the coercive stance of Avigdor Lieberman, Michael Kleiner of *Herut*, and Benjamin Elon of *Moledet* proposed laws, acts and programs to encourage Palestinian Arab citizens to move from Israel to either neighbouring countries or to the *WBGS* respectively. In 2001, Kleiner proposed a bill in the *Knesset* for the Israeli state to encourage emigration of Palestinian Arab citizens to neighbouring countries⁴²⁸. Notwithstanding recommendation of *Knesset*’s legal adviser for debarment of the proposal due to its racist nature, Kleiner claimed that proposal was not racist since it

⁴²⁷ Blecher, (2005), *op.cit.*, p.732

⁴²⁸ “Legislative filter or rubber stamp?”, *Haaretz*, 31.12.2001

also targeted Jewish citizens of Israel, who would be eligible to benefit from the incentives if they decide to move to an Arab country⁴²⁹.

Debates on transfer of the Palestinian Arab community continued to occupy political agenda of both hawkish and some moderate Jewish elite in 2002. In March 2002, MK Micheal Kleiner modified his proposal of transfer, which he presented previous year. In the new version he suggested introduction of “immigration incentives” for any Israeli Jew or Arab, who would move to Arab country and renounce the citizenship or residency.. Another proposal was pronounced by moderate wing of the ruling elite in March 2002. Ephraim Sneh from Labor Party introduced the concept of “stationary transfer”, which was based on the idea of transferring the administration of the Palestinian Arab populated Little Triangle to the future Palestinian state without detaching the Palestinian Arab inhabitants from their localities. The former Prime Minister Ehud Barak also supported this proposal on the condition that it would be finalized through an agreement with the Palestinian Authority.

At national level, there was divisiveness between the Jewish and Palestinian Arab segments of Israeli society about the transfer proposals. These plans of transfer encompassed a significant public support up to 63.7 % among the Jewish constituency because of liquefied inter-communal confidence between Jewish and Palestinian Arab segments of the Israeli society after *Al-Aqsa Intifada*⁴³⁰. There were also calls for transfer of Palestinian Arab communities at local level. One of the most significant proposals was made by the Chief Rabbi of Safad following the charges against some Palestinian Arab inhabitants of *Safad* about their involvement in violent acts against the Jewish citizens. The Chief Rabbi of Safad called for removal of all Palestinian Arab inhabitants of the town since they did not follow the principles of peaceful coexistence under Jewish rule.⁴³¹ Contrary to the attitudes of Jewish citizenry, the Palestinian Arab

⁴²⁹ “Kleiner: Encoraging immigration to Arab countries is not racist”, *Haaretz*, 04.12.2001

⁴³⁰ Blecher, (2005), *op.cit.*, p .738

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 733

segments of the society did not welcome the transfer proposals. In 2002, polls indicated that only 18 percent of the Palestinian Arab community would back to such initiatives.⁴³² At the end of 2003, a survey conducted by Sami Smootha revealed that 55.4 percent of Palestinian Arabs feared the possibility of transfer⁴³³.

Coercive stance of the Israeli ruling elite towards the Palestinian Arab community was also materialized in the politico-legal sphere with the passing of amendments to a number of basic laws as well as to the penal law in 2002. Amendments 12 and 35 to the Basic Law on the *Knesset*, which passed in that year, once more emphasized on the dominant nature of the Israeli state as Jewish and democratic. More significantly, they ruled for disallowance of the not only the party lists but also individual candidates, who incited racism, provided support to activities of “negation of existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state” or activities including “armed struggle by an enemy state or terror organization” to participate in the *Knesset* elections⁴³⁴. Amendment 12 maintained that a political party would not be allowed to run for the *Knesset* elections if its goals or actions, ‘directly or indirectly’, supported such an armed struggle exerted by the enemies of Israeli state. The phrase of “directly or indirectly” which was put in the amendment gave opportunity to the Israeli ruling elite to interpret the activities of a possible counter-hegemonic political organization in a broad term, while deciding on its participation into the Israeli national legislation structures and processes. As a complementary measure to assure implementation of Amendments 12 and 35, Amendment 46 to *the Law of Elections* asserted that a candidate who wanted to run for *Knesset* elections must declare “ I commit myself to

⁴³² *Ibid.* p.740

⁴³³ Yair Ettinger, “Extremism isn't growing, but fear is”, *Haaretz*, 25.05.2004, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=431598&contrassID=2&subContrassID=20&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y>

⁴³⁴ Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs webpage, MFA Library Documents on the internet, Basic Law - The *Knesset*-, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1950_1959/Basic%20Law-%20The%20Knesset%20-1958-%20-%20updated%20translatio

uphold the loyalty for the state of Israel and to avoid acting in contradiction with section 7 A of *The Basic Law: The Knesset*.⁴³⁵ Finally, Amendment 29 to the Law of Immunity of Members of the *Knesset: Their Rights and Duties* dated July 2002 restricted the immunity of the *Knesset* MKs whose statement of actions could “support an armed struggle against the State of Israel”⁴³⁶. Thus, any Israeli MK, whose statements directly or indirectly supported armed struggle against the State of Israel, could be subject to criminal inspection⁴³⁷.

In addition, hawkish segments of ruling elite concentrated their efforts on mobilization of the Israeli Jewish public by emphasizing on the security related issues. Security was reintroduced as a means of isolating the Palestinian Arab political elite from core dominant structures of decision-making. As the surveys indicated a secure public support of 79 percent for disallowing the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel to involve in decision-making processes on vital matters related to state’s security such as its frontiers⁴³⁸, several hawkish Jewish members of *Knesset* submitted proposals for denying the participation of Palestinian Arab MKs in these processes in 2003.

Israeli political elite also pursued coercive policies in the sphere of Israeli public law, which restrained and controlled the space of maneuver for the Palestinian Arab citizenry in Israeli public space. Amendment to the *Citizenship Law* was one of those restrictive and coercive measures to maintain control over the demographic configuration of the Palestinian Arab citizens. *The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (temporary provision) 5763 – 2003* which was introduced in 2003, aimed to prevent uncontrolled entry of the Palestinian inhabitants of *WBGS* into Israel through

⁴³⁵ Shira Kamm and Colleagues of the Mossawa Center, “The Arab Minority in Israel: Implications for the Middle East Conflict”, Working Paper, Center for European Policy Studies Middle East and Euro-Med Project, 2003, p.10

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁷ *Ibid.* p.11

⁴³⁸ Asher Arian, ***Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2003***, Memorandum No. 67 Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, October 2003, p.34

the family reunion. As there were Palestinian Arab citizens and the Palestinians from *WBGS*,

During the period in which this law shall remain in force, despite what is said in any legal provision, including article 7 of the Citizenship Law, the Minister of the Interior shall not grant the inhabitant of an area citizenship on the basis of the Citizenship law, and shall not give him a license to reside in Israel on the basis of the Entry into Israel Law, and the Area Commander shall not grant a said inhabitant, a permit to stay in Israel, on the basis with the security legislation in the area⁴³⁹

These amendments rooted in the concerns of the Israeli ruling elite on the disproportional demographic growth in the Palestinian Arab and Jewish segments of the Israeli society. According to estimates of the Israeli Interior Ministry, over 23.000 Palestinians from the *WBGS* were granted residency status in Israel through family unification⁴⁴⁰. Perceiving marriages between the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel and Palestinians of the *WBGS* as a “backdoor” tactic for covert and indirect exercising of “right of return”⁴⁴¹, Israeli ruling elite introduced coercive measures to restrict mass migration of the Palestinians from the *WBGS* to Israel through their marriages with the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel.

Albeit the international pressure⁴⁴² to annul the amendments to the Israeli citizenship law, which disallowed family unifications especially between the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel and the Palestinians of the *WBGS*⁴⁴³, the amendments passed in the Israeli *Knesset* in 2003. In this period, Israeli Supreme Court also asked the Israeli dominant legislative authorities to invalidate the amendments to the Israeli Citizenship Law which denied citizenship to the Palestinians from the *WBGS* who were married to

⁴³⁹ Knesset website, http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/citizenship_law.htm

⁴⁴⁰ Elia Zureik, “Demography and Transfer: Israel's Road to Nowhere”, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 4. , 2003, p.626

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴² “UN: Israel must revoke change to Citizenship Law”, *Haaretz*, 15.08.2003

⁴⁴³ Lily Galili, “Fugitive in his own country”, *Haaretz*, 08.07.2003

the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel⁴⁴⁴. In 2004, *Knesset* decided on prolonging the controversial Citizenship Law for additional six months. Limiting the family unification between the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel and the Palestinians in the *WBGS* and creating pressure on the spouses whose parents were under continuous risk of separation, the decrees were perceived as “racist”, “unconstitutional” or “shameful disgrace” by Palestinian Arab political elite as well as by some segments of Jewish MKs⁴⁴⁵. Palestinian Arab MKs such as Mohammad Barakeh of *Hadash-Ta'al* faction and Jewish MKs like Zahava Gal-On of *Yahad* severely criticized the extension of the Citizenship law and modification of “entry to Israel bill”⁴⁴⁶. Civil societal organizations such as the *Association for Civil Rights in Israel* and *Adalah* initiated legal action in order to prevent implementation of these two decisions of *Knesset*⁴⁴⁷. At the same *Knesset* meeting, preliminary reading of a complementary decree was also accepted by the MKs that would constrict patterns and processes of Israeli immigration policies. The decree proposed a strict control over the Interior Ministry’s issuance of visas⁴⁴⁸.

Notwithstanding intensified efforts of some segments of Israeli ruling elite towards maintaining mechanisms of control over activism of the Palestinian Arab community through implementation of coercive means, other segments of the ruling elite under Sharon’s leadership began to assess possible paths of generating systemic openings toward integration of Palestinian Arab citizenry into dominant structures and processes of Israeli political sphere. Within this context, Ariel Sharon’s exclusion of *National Religious Party (NRP)*, notwithstanding his historically pro-settlement attitude,

⁴⁴⁴ Moshe Reinfeld, “Supreme Court asked to annul law denying citizenship to Palestinians”, *Haaretz*, 04.08.2003

⁴⁴⁵ Gideon Allon, Yuval Yoaz and Yair Ettinger, “Citizenship Law, entry to Israel bill draw fire”, *Haaretz*, 22.07.2004

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid.

reflected a change in the vision of the new cadres of ruling elite under his leadership. His coalition with Labor indicated a transformation among some segments of the nationalist right wing political elite towards a more moderate policy line in their reassessment of the nature of relationship between the Israeli state and Palestinian Arab citizenry. Ariel Sharon's decision to exclude the *NRP* from the initial coalition government following the 2001 elections and his gradual, conditional and "consociational" integration of the *NRP* to the coalition government in April 2002 reflected Sharon's intentions of controlling the influence of hawkish segments of the Jewish political elite on the state's policies in international and domestic politics.⁴⁴⁹ He maintained similar strategy against Netanyahu between 2003 and 2006 and against *Avigdor Lieberman* between 2006 and 2008. He did not directly confront *Netanyahu* until the *Knesset* elections of 2006. He rather appeased Netanyahu's and Lieberman's aggressive stances and coercive policies until they clearly rejected the possibility of returning to processes of hegemony-in-building and opposed systemic openings to include the Palestinian Arab citizens in the Israeli dominant structures and processes. Overall, notwithstanding certain passive revolutionary acts of the new unity government towards the Palestinian Arab community, coercive approaches and practices mostly overshadowed these acts within the Israeli political sphere until 2003.

Knesset elections of 2003 signified a remarkable shift in the dominant understanding among the Jewish political elite with regard to the relations with the Palestinian Arab citizenry. Meeting of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon with the heads of Palestinian Arab councils was a very significant initial sign of this shift and increasing consensus among some segments of Israeli dominant political elite on abandoning exclusionary, discriminatory and coercive policies against the Palestinian Arab community. In his speech during this meeting, Ariel Sharon, an Israeli veteran hardliner politician stated:

⁴⁴⁹ Hillel Frisch and Shmuel Sandler, "Religion, State, and the International System in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", *International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique*, Vol. 25, No. 1, Religion and Politics. Religion et politique, 2004, p.

I see the need to improve the situation and status of Israeli Arabs as being of the highest importance; this is so that genuine equality of rights and obligations may be achieved for all Israeli citizens. I emphasize here the rights and obligations of all Israeli citizens. Today, to my regret, before the conclusion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we have difficult issues. I believe that the day will come in which upon the conclusion of the Israeli Palestinian conflict, it will be possible to demand not only rights but also obligations. Israeli Arabs deserve equality as a right and not as a privilege. My government has set this as a priority, to implement this basic value, and I want to emphasize that you also have the responsibility to achieve these aims. There is distress as a result of the plight that exists in the cities that you lead, and you will also have to make efforts, with our help, but greater efforts.⁴⁵⁰

This meeting and the statements of Ariel Sharon marked a change in the discourse of one of the most hawkish members of Israel's Jewish political elite with regard to affairs of Palestinian Arab community. The coming years would indicate that this change did not only take place at the discursive level. Ariel Sharon's attitudinal change was also reflected in the policies of the new Israeli government towards the Palestinian Arab citizenry.

There were parallel practices of the dominant Israeli institutions towards the Palestinian Arab citizens in line with the passive revolutionary shift in the general understanding among the Israeli political elite. In 2003, Israel's Supreme Court recalled candidacy of two Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel, Azmi Bishara and Ahmad Tibi, who were removed from the parliamentary elections of January 28 2003 by the Israel's Central Election Commission⁴⁵¹. Decision on the removal of those Palestinian Arab MKs from the elections was based on their statements against the nature and existence of the Israeli state as Jewish⁴⁵². The legal basis challenged on the basis of Article 7 of the Basic Law on the *Knesset*, which stated that candidates for *Knesset* could not oppose

⁴⁵⁰ Israeli Prime Minister's Office, Press Release, 17.09.2003, "PM Sharon's remarks at start of today's meeting with Arab Local Council Heads", <http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Archive/Press+Releases/2003/09/Spokesman7482.htm>

⁴⁵¹ Dexter Filkins, "Israel's High Court Reinstates Candidacy of 2 Israeli Arabs", *New York Times*, 10.01.2003 and Moshe Reinfeld, "Court lets Bishara, Tibi and Marzel run for Knesset", *Haaretz*, 10.01.2003

⁴⁵² Ibid.

the Jewish and democratic character of the state, preach racism or support armed attacks by an enemy state or terrorist organization⁴⁵³.

Until the early 2000s, dominant institutional structure did not accommodate any Palestinian Arab citizen in the leadership cadres of Israeli dominant structures and processes. From 2003 onwards, Israeli dominant elite initiated gradual and controlled admission of the Palestinian Arab citizens into the Israeli power centers and decision-making mechanisms. Until the hegemonic crisis of the September 2000, dominant institutional structure did not allocate any Palestinian Arab citizen in the main power centers and decision-making mechanisms of Israel. Thus, although Israeli system allowed admittance of Palestinian Arab citizens as Members of *Knesset* as early as 1950s, as diplomats in 1987, as district judges, as temporary Supreme Court judges in 1998⁴⁵⁴; there was no Palestinian Arab Minister, Palestinian Arab Supreme Court permanent judge until the hegemonic crisis of 2000. In post-al-*Aqsa Intifada* period, these posts gradually opened to the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. In 2004, Salim Joubran was appointed as a permanent judge in the Israeli Supreme Court of Justice and became the first Palestinian Arab citizen who was appointed to one of the highest posts in the Israeli legal system.

The *Knesset* elections of 2006 marked a new phase in the relations between the Israeli dominant structures and the Palestinian Arab community. Following the establishment of new government, the Jewish political elite under the leadership of Ariel Sharon reintroduced Israeli passive revolution and the processes of hegemony-in-building, which were initiated by the Yitzhak Rabin government between 1992 and 1996. Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert became the new leaders of the resumed hegemony-in-building process with their hegemonic and consent-seeking position toward the Palestinian Arab

⁴⁵³ Moshe Reinfeld, "Court lets Bishara, Tibi and Marzel run for Knesset", *Haaretz*, 10.01.2003

⁴⁵⁴ Judge Abd al-Rahman Zuabi was appointed as temporary judge to the Israeli Supreme Court of Justice in 1998 for nine months. BBC news 12.05.1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/91591.stm

community in post-*Al-Aqsa Intifada* period contrary to Netanyahu's coercive and Barak's negligent stances.

Developments in Israeli political sphere after the 2006 elections assisted creation of an environment conducive for ceremonial unification of the hegemonic segments of the Jewish political elite. This momentous unification gave impetus to emergence of new *Israeli historic bloc*. Reconfigured composition of government and presidency by the moderate and consent-seeking Israeli politicians signaled a return to the Rabin era of hegemony in building. As the 2006 elections brought hegemony seeking moderate *Kadima* to power, Israeli public also indicated its support for such a transformation under a right-wing moderate party with a veteran hawkish leadership who were believed to acknowledge and avoid the threats to the dominant structures better than the others. *Kadima* was composed of centrist and moderate segments of the Jewish right wing and nationalist political elite. After coming to power, *Kadima* established a coalition with *Labor*, *Shas*, and *Gil* rather than including the coercive segments of the *Likud* to the government. *Yisrael Beiteinu* of Avigdor Lieberman joined the government afterwards. Thus, the new government under the leadership of *Kadima* unified the hegemonic segments of the right and the left.

One of the most significant aggressive Jewish political actors, which put forward a belligerent discourse in its approaches, was *Yisrael Beiteinu*. However, even the approaches of *Yisrael Beiteinu* transformed over time once it became involved in decision-making mechanisms within the hegemony-in-building process. The change in discourse and approaches of *Avigdor Lieberman* was significant, as by 2007 his party became an integrative party towards the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel, which would donate \$128,600 to the Social Justice Foundation that worked for mobilizing Palestinian Arab citizens to volunteer for national service. In the ceremony, Minister of Strategic Affairs *Avigdor Lieberman*, who had proposed transfer of some Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel four years ago asserted that "his decision to aid the foundation stemmed from civic reasons that outweighed political considerations". His following statement revealed the discursive and attitudinal change in the policies of *Yisrael*

Beitenu with regard to the affairs of the Palestinian Arab citizenry by stating that “These people need to feel wanted here in Israel and not the other way around...the volunteering issue is a crucial one, this kind of volunteer work can bridge gaps between Jews and Arabs and carries a positive message.”⁴⁵⁵

These statements marked a discursive change among the most radical Jewish ruling elite which pointed their increasing consciousness about the significance of Palestinian Arab community in the Israeli political sphere. A similar self-consciousness was also observed among the Palestinian Arab citizenry, which led to their augmented efforts to utilize this significance for achieving a more egalitarian legal and political framework. On the road of reaching this objective, some segments of the Palestinian Arab community even came to the point of accepting symbolically Jewish nature of the state. A poll, which was conducted in 2007 by the *Israel Democracy Institute*, revealed the amplified propensity of the Palestinian Arab citizenry to internalize the Jewish character of the state as long as their rights and equality were guaranteed under an egalitarian legal framework⁴⁵⁶. In fact, the policies of new Israeli ruling elite seemed to endorse such an impression both in symbolic and institutional terms.

In 2006, there were symbolic openings toward the Palestinian Arab citizens following the Israeli military operations in Lebanon. Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz of *Labor Party* adhered to the appeal of the Palestinian Arab MK Talab al-Sana of *United Arab List* about permitting the Palestinian Arab citizens to meet their relatives and family members who resided in the *Gaza Strip* during the *Eid-il-Fitr*⁴⁵⁷. Around four

⁴⁵⁵ “Lieberman donates to Arab volunteer foundation”, *Ynetnews*, 25.12.2007 <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3486766,00.html>

⁴⁵⁶ Yoav Stern, “Poll: 75% of Israeli Arabs support Jewish, democratic constitution”, *Haaretz*, 29.04.2007

⁴⁵⁷ “Peretz allows Israeli Arabs into Gaza for Eid-il-Fitr”, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, *ynetnews*, 19.10.2006

thousand Palestinians from the *West Bank* were also allowed by the Israeli Defense Ministry to visit their relatives during *Eid al Adha* holiday⁴⁵⁸.

In January 2007, *Raleb Majadele* became the first Palestinian Arab minister in the Israeli cabinet. Initially, he was appointed as a minister without a portfolio. In March 2007, he undertook the portfolio of Minister of Sports, Technology and Culture. Appointment of Majadele was considered one of the significant initial steps towards integration of the Palestinian Arab political elite to the Israeli historic bloc. Although there were severe criticisms and signs of mistrust⁴⁵⁹ from some segments of the Jewish political elite, *Majadele* continued to be one of the most important characters in the hegemony-in-rebuilding process. During his ministerial period from 2007 to 2008, *Majadele* epitomized several possibilities of criticizing the existing Israeli dominant structures and processes without surpassing the boundaries of hegemony-in-building and by maintaining his courtesy to the dominant ruling elite as well as to overall Israeli political and legal system. In fact, in this period, he refused singing Israeli national anthem due to its Jewish orientation and character. Besides, he was one of the ardent critics of the policies of Israeli government regarding the Palestinian Arab community. However, he maintained his critical stance within the boundaries of hegemonic structure. His actions and speeches served internalization of hegemonic structure among the Palestinian Arab citizenry. For instance, while criticizing the Jewish symbolism inherent in *Hatikva* on the one hand, he also stressed that he intended to honor allegiance to the laws of Israeli state and would stand up whenever *Hatikva* was sung⁴⁶⁰.

In 2008, Israeli state appointed a Palestinian Arab citizen of Israel as the consul general to an Arab country first time in the country's history. *Hassan Kabia*, a Muslim

⁴⁵⁸ "Concessions, hope in PA for release of prisoners", *Yedioth Ahronoth*, *ynetnews*, 28.12.2006

⁴⁵⁹ "MKs seek to block Majadele's access to space program data", *Haaretz*, 04.03.2007

⁴⁶⁰ Amnon Meranda, "Majadele refuses to sing national anthem", *Yedioth Ahronoth*, *ynetnews*, 17.03.2007, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3377681,00.html>

Bedouin, became Israeli highest official of foreign affairs in Alexandria in Egypt. In the same year, the government initiated an affirmative program in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to assure integration of the Palestinian Arab citizens as well as other non-Jewish segments of the society to the Israeli foreign policy decision-making structures and processes. According to the program, 30% quota was ascertained in favor of the non-Jewish citizens of Israel for attending the high-status trainee program of Ministry of Foreign Affairs⁴⁶¹. In 2008, there were twelve non-Jewish officials in Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs⁴⁶². The Palestinian Arab Deputy Foreign Minister of the cabinet, MK Majalli Whbee of *Kadima*, welcomed the program. He considered this move as “revolutionary step in integrating minorities in the State's most prestigious positions”⁴⁶³.

Another political institution of the hegemony-in-rebuilding, which increased its efforts in bridging the Palestinian Arab community to the Israeli state, was the president's office in post-*Al-Aqsa Intifada* period. Both Moshe Katsav and Shimon Peres built a confidential relationship with the Palestinian Arab community through their passive revolutionary stances. During their respective terms of presidency, they both pursued inclusive policies towards the Palestinian Arab citizens. While Katsav played a role of moderator in the cases of deadlock between the government and the Palestinian Arab citizenry, Peres made significant openings during his first months of presidency, which began in 2007.

President Katsav indicated his moderate stance in several occasions. In 2003, he hosted some 70 Palestinian Arab leaders, including MKs, mayors, and heads of local councils, at a *Id al-Fitr* feast in which he discussed the problems and concerns of the Palestinian

⁴⁶¹ Itamar Eichner, “Bedouin named consul general to Alexandria”, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, *ynetnews*, 17.01.2008, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3495404,00.html>

⁴⁶² *Ibid.*

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*

Arab citizenry⁴⁶⁴. Katsav's call in 2004 before the *Land Day* to the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel to act in moderation, for instance, were not totally neglected by them. For some commentators, his request played a reconciliatory role in the tranquility of the demonstrations throughout the country. He also mediated some deadlocks in inter-clan affairs among the Palestinian Arab community upon the request of state's officials or the clans themselves. One of the cases was his arrangement of *sulha* (reconciliation ceremony) between two Muslim clans of *Kafir Kana* to end an inter-clan conflict⁴⁶⁵. This indicated trust and consent of these two clans to the ethico-political leadership of Katsav in regulating the affairs between them.

Peres was more enthusiastic in implementation of passive revolutionary acts during initial months of his presidency. His groundbreaking declaration on recognition of *Al Nakba* was one of the most significant examples of such a passive revolutionary positioning. In 2007, Israeli President Shimon Peres acknowledged the *Kfar Qasim* massacre of 1956 and apologized from the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel about this incident⁴⁶⁶. This official apology indicated recognition of the massacre's responsibility by the state at the highest official level. This was a sign of increased efforts of the Israeli governing elite towards preventing alienation of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel from the Israeli dominant structures and processes.

3.2.2. Economic Sphere

Israeli economy enjoyed less immunity from the injurious ramifications of domestic, regional and international socio-economic crises as it became gradually more integrated to the global economy from 1980s onwards. Oslo Process was one of the most significant attempts of the Israeli political and economic elite to stabilize regional dynamics on the road to smoother integration into the global economy. Gradual failure

⁴⁶⁴ "Katsav hosts traditional Ramadan feast for Israeli Arab leaders", *Jerusalem Post*, 02.12.2002

⁴⁶⁵ "Interview with President Katsav", *Haaretz*, 26.04.2004

⁴⁶⁶ "President Peres apologizes for Kafer Qasem massacre of 1956", *Haaretz*, 22.12.2007

of the Oslo Process and the Paris Protocol in the late 1990s increased the tension between the Palestinian Arabs both sides of the Green Line and the dominant structures and processes of Israeli economy. In economic terms, *al-Aqsa Intifada* was a response to the austerity⁴⁶⁷, which derived from failure of the repressive economic policies which were legitimized under the legal framework of Oslo Processes. In this respect, *al-Aqsa Intifada* of 2000 exacerbated economic downturn in Israeli economic sphere along with the international crisis in hi-tech industry⁴⁶⁸. Thus, it was an important sign for the Israeli ruling elite to take necessary measures for preventing such a conflict for economic reasons as well as political and socio-cultural ones. In the post *al-Aqsa* period main concern of the Israeli ruling elite was to persevere neo-liberal economic policies. Maintenance of neo-liberal stance necessitated projects to advance economic development, which could be accelerated by integration of Palestinian Arab citizens into the changing dominant economic structures and processes rather than transforming them into crisis-creating alienated segments of society. Although “hierarchical political values” and “binary image of state and society”⁴⁶⁹ continued to influence the policy choices of some segments of Israeli ruling elite in economic sphere, *al-Aqsa Intifada* forced most of them to reconsider the future place of Palestinian Arab citizens in the Israeli economic sphere as well as other spheres.

Under the leadership of Ariel Sharon, Israel’s new government portrayed a more passive revolutionary stance towards the Palestinian Arab working segments of Israeli society following the *al-Aqsa Intifada*. This renewed attitude was embodied in two decrees about the socio-economic status and employment opportunities of the Palestinian Arab citizens in Israeli labor market, which were passed by the *Knesset* immediately after *al-Aqsa Intifada*. One of these decrees, dated 18 December 2000,

⁴⁶⁷ Sara Roy, “Palestinian Society and Economy: The Continued Denial of Possibility”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4. 2001, p.6

⁴⁶⁸ Ben Zion Zilberfarb, ‘From Socialism to Free Market –The Israeli Economy, 1948-2003’, Cohen Almagor (ed.) ***Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads***, Routledge, Curzon, 2006, p. 20

⁴⁶⁹ Shaul Mishal and Nadav Morag, “Political Expectations and Cultural Perceptions in the Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations”, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 23, No. 2., 2002, pp. 341-2.

amended the *Civil Service Law (Appointments)* 5719 of 1959 -, to increase the number of Palestinian Arab employees in the public services. Another decree, which the *Knesset* passed in 2000, was the amendment of the *Government Corporation Act* of 1975. This amendment created legal safeguards, which would be implemented in “all hiring and promotional decisions within the public sector”, to assure adequate representation of the Palestinian Arab citizens in the Israeli public institutions and government corporations as directors and employees. This integrative act aimed reinforcement of the connections of the Palestinian Arab intellectual and economic elite to the dominant structures and processes in the public sector.⁴⁷⁰ In 2003 Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, as head of the Ministerial Committee on Arab Affairs, pushed for employing at least one Palestinian Arab qualified citizen on each of the 105 boards of directors. He even stated that a corporation would not be allowed to appoint a Jew until it appointed at least one Palestinian Arab citizen to its board⁴⁷¹.

With these amendments the government accepted its responsibility to create necessary conditions for the ‘adequate representation’ of the Palestinian Arab citizens in the public companies through containing the employment requests of the Palestinian Arab citizens, reserving available jobs for skilled Palestinian Arab workers, and providing predilection when they possessed similar skills with other candidates⁴⁷². The amendments, which were guided by the initiatives of the Palestinian Arab MKs such as Azmi Bishara and Salah Tarif towards ensuring adequate representation of the

⁴⁷⁰ Sharon Rabin Margalioth, "Labor Market Discrimination Against Arab Israeli Citizens: Can Something Be Done?" *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, Vol.36,2004, pp. 857-8

⁴⁷¹ “Arab parties slam affirmative action”, *Jerusalem Post*, 12.03.2006

⁴⁷² Sharon Rabin Margalioth, "Labor Market Discrimination Against Arab Israeli Citizens: Can Something Be Done?" *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, Vol.36,2004, pp. 855

Palestinian Arab population in the Israeli public sector was passed by the *Knesset* and adopted by the government in 2000⁴⁷³.

As it may be observed from the legal initiatives mentioned above, changes in the attitudes of the Israeli ruling elite in the post-*al Aqsa* period was reflected in the adoption and supervision of legal norms and practices, which aimed to generate necessary legal and legislative background for revitalization of hegemony-in-building process in economic sphere. These legislative steps were followed by economic policies that were put into practice in order to ‘(re-) establish’ confidence of the Palestinian Arab working class to the Israeli dominant economic structures and processes.

On October 2000, Israeli government initiated *Four Year Development Plan* for the North, which was designed to raise development budgets for the Palestinian Arab community by 1 billion NIS a year⁴⁷⁴. Allocation of such amount of development finances in the 2002 Israeli budget for the Arab community, which was higher than many of the Israeli ministries, was another sign of extensive commitment of Israeli dominant elite towards integrating the Palestinian Arab community to the dominant structures and processes. Meeting of Israeli Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) Director-General Ra’anan Dinur with the heads of Palestinian Arab local councils in 2006 on the allocation of the government funds for the infrastructural expenditures in the Galilee and Little Triangle regions was also significant⁴⁷⁵. It was another indicator about Israeli ruling elite’s growing tendency towards incorporating the Palestinian Arab leadership

⁴⁷³ Ali Haider, ‘Arab Citizens in the Civil Service’, Shalom (Shuli) Dichter (ed.) **Sikkuy’s Report on Equality & Integration of the Arab Citizens in Israel 2000-2001**, Sikkuy, The Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality Beit Hakerem, Jerusalem , 2001, <http://www.sikkuy.org.il/english/papers/report2001Eng.htm# Introduction>

⁴⁷⁴ Shira Kamm and Colleagues of the Mossawa Center, “The Arab Minority in Israel: Implications for the Middle East Conflict”, Working Paper, Center for European Policy Studies Middle East and Euro-Med Project, 2003, p.4

⁴⁷⁵ Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, Press Release, 19.09.2006, ‘Prime Minister’s Office Director-General Dinur Meets With Arab Local Council Heads’ <http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Archive/Press+Releases/2006/09/spokegalilmnk190906.htm>

in the decision-making processes of the Israeli dominant structures, which were related to the welfare of their communities.

In 2002, multi-year *Arab Sector Development Plan*, which was initiated by the Ariel Sharon government was an important step towards re-implementation of processes of hegemony-in-building. Intending consolidation of the ties of the Palestinian Arab citizenry with the Israeli dominant structures and processes in economic neo-liberal restructuring, the development plan outlined the direction of budget allocations towards decreasing distress in the areas of physical infrastructure, economy, industrial and human resources.

In the *post-al Aqsa* period, some segments of Palestinian Arab citizenry continued to seek in-system mechanisms to achieve their economic demands individually. In 2006 following the Israeli military operations in Lebanon, four Palestinian Arab businesspersons from the villages of *Fassouta* and *Mailia* submitted a petition to the Israeli Supreme Court of Justice for including villages of *Arab al-Aramshe*, *Fassouta*, *Ma'ilia* and *Jish* within the post-conflict compensation scheme. Criticizing the selective implementation of the post-conflict compensations to the Druze village of *Pek'in* and *Hurfeish*, Circassian village of *Rehaniya* in addition to five Jewish communities, *Eliad*, *Degania Bet*, *Har Odem*, *Kabri* and *Safsufa*, all of which located in relatively safer parts in the south of the four unlisted Palestinian Arab villages,⁴⁷⁶ these businesspersons demanded elimination of discriminatory compensation policies.

Such efforts were also supported by the initiatives of the Israeli dominant economic elite at local and national level. In 2002, some Palestinian Arab firms were invited to *Eurokosher* food exhibition which would serve expanding their markets internationally⁴⁷⁷. In 2003, Jerusalem Municipality initiated a 2.5 million NIS (New Israeli Shekel) campaign with the Ministry of Tourism to stimulate tourism in the

⁴⁷⁶ Aryeh Dayan, "Second-class compensation", *Haaretz*, 21.08.2006, <http://www.Haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=752768>

⁴⁷⁷ "Israeli Arab firms to attend Eurokosher exhibit", *Jerusalem Post*, 29.05.2002

Palestinian Arab sector⁴⁷⁸. In 2005, Center for Jewish- Arab Economic Development's conference hosted many Palestinian Arab and Jewish investors who searched for increasing cooperation in the high-tech sector⁴⁷⁹. In 2006, Israeli cabinet initiated an affirmative program for employment of the Palestinian Arab citizens in the public sector especially in the governmental ministries. It decided to allocate 37.5 per cent of governmental positions for the Palestinian Arab citizens (as well as Circassians and Druze applicants) for the subsequent three years from 2006 to 2009⁴⁸⁰. In the same year, Israeli economic elite initiated “private equity fund” with the preliminary budget of 38 million USD to assist development of Palestinian Arab entrepreneurship and enterprises⁴⁸¹. Similar openings were implemented in the relations with the Palestinian Authority in the *WBGS* in order to stabilize the regional dynamics that might influence the domestic processes of hegemony-in-building in Israeli economic sphere. Ignoring the *Hamas* government in the *WBGS* as a peace partner, Israeli authorities negotiated with Mahmoud Abbas for unbinding 100 million USD of the Palestinian tax funds that were maintained under the Israeli control⁴⁸².

These openings were not welcomed by some segments of hawkish Jewish political and economic elite. Gathered under the leadership of Netanyahu, these segments of Jewish elite proposed an uncompromising stance towards returning to the coercive status-quo before the Rabin period. Netanyahu suggested more coercive policies towards the Palestinian Arab citizens while redefining their place within the Israeli economic sphere after the *al-Aqsa Intifada*. Disbelieving the possibility of their integration to the dominant economic structures and processes, he supported maintenance of hierarchical embeddedness of the Palestinian Arab labor force as periphery to the Israeli economic

⁴⁷⁸ “Jerusalem targets Israeli Arabs in tourism campaign”, *Jerusalem Post*, 30.06.2003

⁴⁷⁹ “Arab Israelis well placed in technology”, *Jerusalem Post*, 21.12.2005

⁴⁸⁰ “Arab parties slam affirmative action”, *Jerusalem Post*, 12.03.2006

⁴⁸¹ “State to raise NIS 160 mn for Arab businesses”, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, *ynetnews*, 12.12.2006

⁴⁸² “Concessions, hope in PA for release of prisoners”, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, *ynetnews*, 28.12.2006

system. Netanyahu's stance against Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert represented a neo-conservative challenge to undertake leadership of Israeli ruling elite, whose agenda would prioritize privatization, liberalization, relegation of the welfare state, and a uncompromising foreign policy in the region⁴⁸³. This challenge led an intra-bloc confrontation between the Netanyahu-led more hawkish segments of the right wing Jewish ruling elite and the more moderate factions, which aimed to return to the practices towards hegemony-in-building during the Rabin era.

Benjamin Netanyahu's coercive stance was materialized in various policies ,which he and his sub-bloc pursued during his tenure as Israeli finance minister between. One of the most controversial moves of the hawkish sub-bloc was initiation cuts in child allowances to the Palestinian Arab families in 2003. He re-introduced the military-service conditionality as the main criterion in accessing socio-economic security benefits such as child allowances, secured the limitation of the cuts with the Palestinian Arab community. Netanyahu's discriminatory and coercive measure of cuts in child allowances did not only aim to create additional funds to the treasury but also to "put a break on the demographic dangers" [exerted by the Palestinian Arabs]⁴⁸⁴. He argued that it was because of such coercive measures that the gap between the birthrate of Jewish and Palestinian Arab women decreased significantly in favor of the Jewish side. However, as Avraham Tal argued, focusing on the impact of coercive measures on the birthrate among the Palestinian Arab women would be a reductionist assessment of the prenatal trends in Palestinian Arab community. Probable impact of hegemonic factors such as "changes in habits, mainly due to the influences of norms from the Jewish sector,"⁴⁸⁵ should also be assessed while analyzing the reasons behind the decrease in birthrate among Palestinian Arab population.

⁴⁸³ Guy Ben-Porat, "Netanyahu's Second Coming: A Neoconservative Policy Paradigm?," *Israel Studies*, Vol.10, No. 3, Fall 2005, pp. 225-245

⁴⁸⁴ Avraham Tal, "It's ideology, not demography", *Haaretz*, <http://www.Haaretz.com/hasen/spages/776636.html>

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid.

Coercive economic policies of Netanyahu led to continuation of inter-communal disequilibrium and discrepancy in wages. A survey of *Adva Center* conducted in 2004 basing on data from National Insurance Institute indicated that Jewish citizens earned almost twice as much as the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel⁴⁸⁶. It once more revealed that the average wage in the Palestinian Arab communities was 30 percent below the Israeli national average⁴⁸⁷ partly due to the cuts in the socio-economic benefits introduced by Netanyahu. Bureaucratic obstacles and delays were also used as a means of coercive policy implementation in economic sphere by the cadres of hawkish Jewish elite in the finance and interior ministries of Israel. Such bureaucratic obstacles and neglect was mainly observed in the case of allotting resources to the Palestinian Arab local councils. Notwithstanding development projects for the Palestinian Arab segments of Israeli society with huge budgets, many local councils such as *Bu'eina Najidat* could not benefit from financial resources due to bureaucratic complications. Ignoring or postponing the assessment of proposed recovery plans for the Palestinian Arab local councils, some hawkish bureaucrats of certain political bloc within the Jewish elite decelerated implementation of development plans in some Palestinian Arab localities⁴⁸⁸.

Until the initiation of the legal mechanisms in 2004, Israeli public sector operated as “a subsidized, sheltered labor market for the dominant group” while the local public sector became an important constituent of “enclave economy” especially in the isolated Palestinian Arab localities of Israel⁴⁸⁹. This served alienation of the Palestinian Arab trained labor from the dominant structures and processes of Israeli economic sphere which were shaped or influenced by the public sector. Within such a context,

⁴⁸⁶ Ruth Sinai, “Jews earn nearly twice as much as Arabs, Adva Center study finds”, *Haaretz*, 19.04.2004

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁸ Eli Ashkenazi, “Galilee local council workers: State has abandoned us”, *Haaretz*, 11.03.2004

⁴⁸⁹ Michael Shalev, “Inequality and the State in Israel: Implications of the Social Services as an Employer”, *Discussion Paper Series* No.06.06, The Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel, 2006, p.3

urbanization also exerted socio-economic pressures on the economically vulnerable segments of Palestinian Arab community. Housing crisis which appeared as a consequence of the rising prices of estate after materialization of new expensive housing projects in Jaffa, was a good example of ‘gentrification’⁴⁹⁰ or a neo-liberal way of de-Arabization of spaces through relocation of Palestinian Arab residents because of their economic inability to afford a residence in these projects.

Sharon on the other hand, preferred to direct its coercive stance towards the foreign workers rather than the Palestinian Arab citizens. Within the context of mitigating the relations with working segments of the Palestinian Arab citizens in economic sphere, Sharon-led Israeli government directed its exclusionary policies from the Palestinian Arab labor towards the foreign workers, who were accommodated in Israeli economic sphere to fill the labor force vacuum in the absence of Palestinian labor from the *WBGS* during the *Al-Aqsa Intifada*. These policies, which were put into practice from 2002 onwards, consisted of victimization, legal targeting and expulsion of the migrant workers⁴⁹¹. None of these policies were implemented against the Palestinian Arab citizens during this period. In fact, exclusion of the foreign workers resulted in return of the Palestinian Arab workers to the jobs, which were previously occupied by the foreign labor⁴⁹². In addition, Sharon’s bloc did not approve economic policies of Netanyahu bloc. They did not directly target Palestinian Arab citizens as Netanyahu did. This differentiation of approaches between Netanyahu and Sharon resulted in a low-intensity intra-bloc crisis among the Jewish political and economic elite. This crisis was reflected in different policies towards the Palestinian Arab citizenry from health

⁴⁹⁰ Eshter Zandberg, “A Brilliant future for authenticity”, *Haaretz*, 07.03.2004

⁴⁹¹ Harvey Thompson, “Sharon government scapegoats foreign workers in Israel”, *World Socialist Website*, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/jan2002/isr-j30.shtml> , 30 January 2002

⁴⁹² “As foreign workers leave, Israelis return to the construction sites”, *Haaretz*, 03.03.2003, and “Arab, Druze building workers are back in business”, *Haaretz*, 04.10.2004

policy⁴⁹³ to the child allowances. Contrary to coercive measures of the hawkish segments of Jewish political elite, moderate sub-bloc sought openings for controlled integration of the Palestinian Arab citizenry to the dominant structures and processes in Israeli economic sphere through gradual improvement of its economic conditions. By such openings, Sharon-led moderate sub-bloc intended to rebuild reliance of the Palestinian Arab citizenry to the dominant structures and processes. Although rebuilding of a hegemonic relationship was not immediate concern of the moderate sub-bloc, their policies assisted creating environment conducive for hegemony-in-rebuilding.

Notwithstanding their failure in providing necessary conditions and mechanisms for full integration of the Palestinian Arab citizens into decision-making and policy-making processes within Israeli economic sphere, these acts indicated changing attitude of the Israeli ruling elite towards the accommodation of the Palestinian Arab citizenry into the dominant economic structures and processes. In fact, antagonism between the hawkish and moderate segments of the Jewish political and economic elite was an important factor, which hindered efforts of moderate sub-bloc towards re-implementation of passive revolutionary economic policies as in the period of Rabin government.

To sum up, post-*al Aqsa intifada* period was characterized by the intra-bloc rivalry between the Israeli Jewish radical and moderate economic elite about the policies to be implemented with regard to accommodating the Palestinian Arab citizenry in the dominant structures and processes of Israeli economic sphere. Although there was an increasing tendency among some segments of dominant Jewish political and economic elite towards rebuilding a hegemonic framework in the relations between the dominant structures and the Palestinian Arab working force, this tendency was not fully put into implementation due to harsh opposition from the hawkish sub-bloc of the Jewish

⁴⁹³ Iris Geva-May and Allan M Maslove, “ What Prompts Health Care Policy Change? On Political Power Contests and Reform of Health Care Systems (The Case of Canada and Israel)”, *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* – Vol. 25, No. 4, 2000, pp. 717-41

politico-economic elite. Following the end of Netanyahu's term as finance minister, moderate sub-bloc became more ascendant in determining the policies in economic sphere. Such ascendancy resulted in rise of hegemonic initiatives at the expense of coercive status-quo.

3.2.3. Socio-cultural sphere

Post-*Al-Aqsa Intifada* period witnessed reimplementation of the passive revolutionary acts or the policies toward hegemony-in-building process, which had been initiated by the Israeli ruling elite under the leadership of Yitzhak Rabin in Israeli socio-cultural sphere between 1992 and 1996. Following the Barak's period of indecisiveness and negligence toward the affairs of Palestinian Arab citizenry and Netanyahu's period of mixed attitudes of coercion and consent-seeking, Ariel Sharon's era was marked by systemic openings for preventing further estrangement of the Palestinian Arab community from the Israeli system and the state. Thus, especially post-2003 elections period witnessed increased passive revolutionary acts of the Israeli dominant elite such as removal of some mechanisms of the checks and controls in most sectors of the Israeli social life, which previously had caused tension between the Israeli dominant structures and the Palestinian Arab citizens.

In the legal arena, Israeli ruling elite initiated legal measures in order to prevent further estrangement of the Palestinian Arab community from the Israeli dominant structures and processes. In the post-*al-Aqsa intifada* period, an attitudinal change toward the Palestinian Arab affairs was observed in the norm-building actions of dominant legislative structures as well in the Israeli legal structures and processes. From 2000 onwards, Israeli dominant legislative institution *Knesset* adopted many laws of antidiscrimination in different areas of private and public sphere such as employment,

health, education⁴⁹⁴, and public accommodations (i.e. restaurants, recreation areas, cafes, cinemas, disco-clubs, aqua-parks, swimming pools, transportation)⁴⁹⁵.

A similar attitude was observed in urbanization and land planning area. By 2007, number of proposals towards “improving the quality of life for Israeli Arabs both culturally and economically” significantly increased in the committees of Israeli decision-making circles. In 2007, the *Knesset* Interior and Environment Committee's planning advisor, Adiv Dahoud, presented a list of recommendations to *Knesset* about land planning and urbanization of Palestinian Arab localities, which aimed at either regaining or consolidating consent of the Palestinian Arab citizens to the Israeli dominant structures and processes of land planning and urbanization. The list consisted of consent-drawing suggestions such as “comprehensively reforming the planning and building laws to allow Arab towns to expand legally; distributing land ownership more equally; and changing the government's land expropriation policy”⁴⁹⁶ and it did not face a major confrontation from the Palestinian Arab *Knesset* members.

In 2000, approval of the *Anti-Discrimination Act in Products, Services and in the Entrance to Places of Entertainment and Public Places* by Israeli dominant legislative institution aimed to prevent spatial and socio-cultural alienation of the Palestinian Arab community from the Israeli public sphere⁴⁹⁷. With this legislation, Israeli ruling elite not only acknowledged discrimination against the Palestinian Arab citizenry in the Israeli public spaces such as restaurants, recreation areas, cafes, cinemas but also undertook legal responsibility of preventing it. Such changes in the patterns of operation of Israeli dominant legislative and judicial institutions was reflected in their

⁴⁹⁴ Moshe Cohen-Eliya, "Discrimination against Arabs in Israel in Public Accommodations" *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, Vol.36, 2004, pp. 727-8

⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.717

⁴⁹⁶ Gideon Alon, “Knesset panel recommends building new Israeli Arab town from scratch”, *Haaretz*, <http://www.Haaretz.com/hasen/spages/683443.html>

⁴⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.718

adoption and supervision of legal norms and practices indicated attitude of Israeli ruling elite toward revitalization of hegemony-in-building process.

Ruling of the Israeli Supreme Court on 25 July 2002, in the case of *Adalah et al. v. Municipality of Tel Aviv-Jaffa et al.*, about obligations of mixed local authorities with respect to the language in which municipal signs are printed reflected an a passive revolutionary transformation in the socio-cultural sphere. The ruling designated mixed Israeli municipalities to take necessary measures to ensure bilingualism in the municipal signs not only in the Palestinian Arab neighborhoods but also all other locations under that municipality's jurisdiction. Difference of opinion among the judges of the Israeli Supreme Court indicated the disunity of Israeli dominant bloc on the future nature of the relationship between the Israeli dominant elite and the Palestinian Arab citizenry. However, the statements of Justice *Barak* reflected the ideas of 'hegemonic' segment of the Israeli ruling elite on the prospects for the relationship, which would try to appeal consent of the Palestinian Arab citizens:

Does our approach not imply that residents of different towns in which there are minority groups of speakers of various languages, will now be able to demand that the signs in their towns will be in their language as well? My response is negative, *since none of those languages are the same as Arabic*. The uniqueness of the Arabic language is twofold. First, Arabic is the language of the largest minority in Israel, *who have lived in Israel for ages*. This is a language that is linked to cultural, historical, and religious attributes of the Arab minority group in Israel. This is the language of citizens who, notwithstanding the Arab-Israeli conflict, wish to live in Israel as loyal citizens with equal rights, amid respect for their language and culture. The desire to ensure dignified coexistence between the descendants of our forefather Abraham, in mutual tolerance and equality, justifies recognizing the use of the Arabic language in urban signs—in those cities in which there is a substantial Arab minority (6%-19% of the population)—alongside its senior sister, Hebrew⁴⁹⁸

A complementary decision, which was taken by the Supreme Court about the changing of the monolingual character of the inter-urban highways and roads, signified a further opening of Israeli ruling elite in line with the hegemony-in-building. The ruling of the

⁴⁹⁸ Saban, (2004), op.cit., p.937

court led to transition from monolingual to bilingual traffic signs on the Israeli inter-urban roads by 2004.

Another space of bilingual openings appeared to be the advertisement billboards within the towns. Upon the insistence of a Palestinian Arab company to advertise only in Arabic in certain neighborhoods in *Nazareth Illit* notwithstanding the opposition of the local council due to the Jewish nature of the locality, the Supreme Court annulled the decision of local council and allowed the company to advertise in Arabic⁴⁹⁹. Palestinian Arab civil societal organizations and intellectuals continued to concentrate their activities on in-system achievements in the linguistic sphere through utilizing the mechanisms of Israeli dominant legal and political structure.

In linguistic sphere, there were also local attempts which aimed promoting the the status of Arabic language in Israeli society. In 2004, Haifa Mayor Yona Yahav declared initiation of a linguistic project, which was financed by the *Abraham Fund* for teaching spoken Arabic to Jewish elementary school students in Haifa district⁵⁰⁰. Notwithstanding difficulties and ambiguities in its implementation such as hiring Palestinian Arab teachers at elementary school level, funding extra-study hours and formulating a syllabus suiting to the elementary school children, the initiative appeared to be a passive revolutionary act to prevent bi-communal alienation in socio-cultural sphere. Despite its egalitarian discourse, as the Israeli dominant pedagogical and ruling elite would monitor the resources as well as decision-making structures and processes with regard to the initiative, it was likely that outcomes would lead to a controlled development of bi-communalism within Israeli socio-cultural sphere. In fact, the immediate limitations, which were raised, by the sponsors and the Israeli Ministry of education concerning practicability of the initiative such as budget restraints, limited scope, and leaving the decision of implementation of the project to Jewish parents'

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁰ David Ratner, "Haifa youngsters to study spoken Arabic, mayor says", *Haaretz*, 11.03.2004

willingness about their children's participation to program⁵⁰¹ implied controlled and ambiguous nature of the initiative.

A football event in the spring of 2004 emerged as an important example of hegemony-in-building process in the sphere of sports. In this year, Bnei Sakhnin, a soccer team of a Palestinian Arab village of *Sakhnin* in the third division of Israeli soccer league, won the Israeli State Cup. *Bnei Sakhnin's* victory on the Israeli football fields was an important incident, which delivered a strong message to the Palestinian Arab football fans about the possibility of accomplishments within the existing system notwithstanding the difficulties⁵⁰². Contrary to the counter-hegemonic messages delivered by the Islamic soccer league that was established by the *Islamic Movement*, *Sakhnin's* victory echoed the hopes of its fans for achievements within the Israeli dominant system. In fact, the case of *Sakhnin* was an opportunity for the hegemonic camp of the ruling elite to deliver the message both in Israel and abroad about integrative attitude of Israeli state towards its Palestinian Arab citizens.

Sakhnin's victory also revealed a transformational trend among some segments of hawkish Jewish political elite. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's undertaking for financial assistance to Sakhnin for construction of a better stadium in the village⁵⁰³ was another sign of transformation in the attitudes of indifference among some segments of the Jewish immoderate political elite towards the integration of Palestinian Arab community to the Israeli dominant structures. Contrary to the unshakably distanced and discriminatory stance of Netanyahu towards the Palestinian Arab community, Sharon and his followers such as Ehud Olmert began to adjust themselves to the idea of hegemonic restructuring of the Israeli state and society.

⁵⁰¹ Ibid.

⁵⁰² Yoav Goren, "Bnei Sakhnin shoulders hopes of Arab community", *Haaretz*, 18.05.2004, p.9

⁵⁰³ Yoav Goren, "Like setting fire to a tank with a lighter", *Haaretz*, 20.05.2004, p.10

3.2.4. Palestinian Arab Response

3.2.4.1. Palestinian Arab Parliamentary Movements

Radicalization of the political discourse of Palestinian Arab elite by the al-Aqsa Intifada in the initial stages of post-*al-Aqsa Intifada* period notwithstanding, Palestinian Arab political elite opted for continuing their war of position within the boundaries of Israeli hegemonic structure. As mentioned above reactionary stances of the Palestinian Arab MKs were reflected in the *Knesset* meetings within the context of “Parliamentary Intifada”. This counter-hegemonic position in the discourses of the Palestinian Arab political parties were also reflected in their decisions regarding participation in the elections of Israeli Prime Minister of 2001.

In the last two weeks before the *Knesset* elections of 2001, most of the Palestinian Arab political parties and extra-parliamentary movements suggested their constituencies to vote either blank ballot or boycott the elections. Among these political actors, Hadash, the Democratic Arab Party of Darawshe and the Southern wing of *Islamic Movement* represented in the United Arab List called their supporters to cast blank ballot. Nationalist Balad party of Azmi Bishara advised its constituency to choose between the options of casting blank ballot or boycotting the elections. Meanwhile, efforts of the Palestinian Arab *Knesset* members towards uniting under the leadership of a commonly determined Palestinian Arab candidate for premiership failed due to the unmanageable divisiveness between the Palestinian Arab political elite. Extra-parliamentary movements such as *Abna al Balad* and northern wing of the *Islamic Movement* under the leadership of Sheikh Raed Salah boycotted the elections and urged the Palestinian Arab citizens to follow their counter-hegemonic stance in order not to serve legitimization of the Israeli dominant legislative structures and processes⁵⁰⁴.

⁵⁰⁴ Jafar Farah “Palestinian Citizens and the Elections for Prime Minister Background and Political Analysis”, Mossawa Center, <http://www.addameer.org/september2000/opinion/mossawa.html>

Notwithstanding his counter-hegemonic discourse which was voiced in the eve of 2001 elections while suggesting his constituency to cast a blank ballot or boycott the elections, Balad's leader Azmi Bishara maintained his existence within the dominant structures and processes of Israel. His maintenance of his membership to the dominant structures and his involvement in the dominant legislative processes while criticizing and de-legitimizing their very essence was considered as a contradiction in the Israeli public debate⁵⁰⁵.

Some scholars interpreted the acts of the Palestinian Arab MKs in the 15th *Knesset* between 1999 and 2003 as a sign of emergence of a new and unique form of Palestinian nationalism among the Palestinian Arab citizens with a considerable emphasis on its uniqueness vis-à-vis other Palestinians as well as the Israeli dominant structures⁵⁰⁶. These moves also led some Israeli political analysts to conclude that the Palestinian Arab political parties were in the search of alternative formulations in their struggle with the dominant structures and processes of Israeli political system. Basing on the proposals raised among the Palestinian Arab MKs some concluded that Palestinian Arab community was "laying the foundations for the creation of its own parliament"⁵⁰⁷. Notwithstanding its tacit emphasis on its uniqueness, this new wave of Palestinian Arab consciousness, which was exemplified by the political behavior of the Palestinian Arab members of 15th *Knesset*, did not create a counter-hegemonic agenda as an alternative to the dominant Israeli one.

In 2004, the tone of counter-hegemonic discourse shifted to a civic criticism against the policies of Israeli ruling elite on specific issues that impaired the community. Thus, oppositional activities such as Palestinian Arab one-day strike to commemorate the Land Day and to protest the land expropriation policies of the government, which also

⁵⁰⁵ Zvi Bar'el, "Fall of the fig leaf", *Haaretz*, <http://www.Haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArtElection.jhtml?itemNo=248443&contrassID=28&subContrassID=3&sbSubContrassID=0>

⁵⁰⁶ Alexander Bligh, "Israeli Arab Members of the 15th Knesset: Between Israeli Citizenship and their Palestinian National Identity", *Israeli Affairs*, Vol. 9, No. 1-2, 2003, pp.1-15

⁵⁰⁷ Ori Nir, "The threat of a 'parliamentary transfer'", *Haaretz*, 16.04.2002

sought support from Jewish movements and individuals, remained within the hegemonic boundaries of civic structure and discourse⁵⁰⁸.

Following the election victory of *Hamas* in 2006 and the gradual dissolution of internal coherence of Palestinian movement in the *West Bank* and *Gaza Strip* further weakened the linkages between the aspirations of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel and the Palestinians under the *Palestinian Authority*. In fact, for some segments of the Palestinian Arab community, *Palestinianness* became an ideological apparatus of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel in their civic (or in-system) struggle against the dominant structures of Israel rather than a common identity denominator, which connected them with the Palestinians of the *WBGS*. They began to influence the content, apparatuses and boundaries of a possible counter-hegemonic process by being less pressurized by the demands of Palestinian counter-hegemonic struggle in the *WBGS*. In this respect, they became more aware of the different dynamics of the two hegemonic struggles against Israeli domination inside and outside the Green Line.

Although some MKs such as Nadia Hilo emphasized the increased resistive capacity of the new generations of the Palestinian Arab citizens against discrimination in employment in public sector, and practices of inequality and the problem of racism in Israel following the 2006 elections⁵⁰⁹, this increased consciousness did not result in coordinated acts or unified moves of Palestinian Arab political parties against the dominant structures and processes of the Israeli political system. Thus Palestinian Arab political parties continued to assist reproduction of the existing structures and processes of hegemony in-rebuilding with their in-system divisiveness and ineffectiveness.

⁵⁰⁸ “Arab sector will strike to mark Land Day”, *Haaretz*, 22.03.2004

⁵⁰⁹ Mike Smith, *Daily Telegraph*, April 4, 2007

3.2.4.2. Palestinian Arab Counter-hegemonic Movements

Asef Bayat's observation about the Arab street is also explanatory for the patterns of protest, which were developed by the Palestinian Arab citizenry of Israel in the post-*Al-Aqsa* period.

The Arab street is neither "irrational" nor "dead," but is undergoing a major transformation caused both by old constraints and new opportunities brought about by global restructuring. As a means and mode of expression, the Arab street may be shifting, but the collective grievance that it conveys remains. To ignore it is to do injustice to both moral sensibility and rational conduct of politics.⁵¹⁰

Helplessness of the Palestinian Authority and international society during *al-Aqsa Intifada* showed the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel that the Palestinian Authority or any other Palestinian entity in the *WBGS* could not create any counter-hegemonic alternative to the Israeli dominant structures and processes. In addition to its ineffectiveness due to Israeli dominance over its acts, transformation of Palestinian Authority into an authoritarian political entity suffering from the divisiveness among the different factions led to further estrangement of Palestinian Arab political elite in Israel from the Palestinian Authority as a counter-hegemonic alternative against the Israeli dominant structures.

The hegemonic system imposed by Israel during twenty-six years of direct rule did not disappear with the implementation of the peace process but was maintained, with certain modifications, via the new Palestinian Authority (PA) set up under Oslo. The Israeli government remained the final arbiter of Palestinian life, though its rule was largely mediated by the PA. Instead of a return to political process or consensus, the emergence of an authoritarian state and de facto one-party system opposed to dissent marked the end of any viable political dialectic at the popular level. The depoliticization of society was seen in the continuing disempowerment of the Palestinian Legislative Council and in official control of the media. Political life among Palestinians during this period was no longer characterized by competing ideologies vying for dominance, but by the lack of any political ideology

⁵¹⁰ Asef Bayat, "The "Street" and the Politics of Dissent in the Arab World", *Middle East Report*, No. 226, 2003, p.17.

whatsoever.[...] With Oslo, the interests of the Palestinian leadership focused on securing political control at the cost of national liberation.⁵¹¹

In this respect, Palestinian Arab community began to focus more on the intra-communal instruments and capabilities of a counter-hegemonic revival. Killing of thirteen Palestinian Arab citizens during *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, and the increased disappointment among the community towards the policies of Israeli ruling elite under the Barak's leadership created the environment conducive to the cultivation of counter-hegemonic activism and mobilization before the Prime Ministerial Elections of 2001. Palestinian Arab reaction was materialized in their unprecedented abstention from the elections. Participation percentage was only 19% among the Palestinian Arab constituency.

Dissatisfaction of the Palestinian Arab citizens from the existing dominant structures and processes as well as their revulsion to the Israeli state's policies in the course of *al-Aqsa Intifada* were reflected significantly in the activities of Palestinian Arab citizens during and after the elections of 2001 as well. Apart from non-participation in the elections, some segments of Palestinian Arab citizenry organized extra-parliamentary and counter-hegemonic action plans to prevent participation of Palestinian Arab constituency. Establishment of the *Committee of Bereaved Families* was one of those acts. The committee became one of the most effective extra-parliamentary organs of the Palestinian Arab citizenry organized counter-hegemonic propaganda activity during and after the Prime Ministerial election of 2001. It organized protest activities on the Election Day, which was composed of pas on the passage of groups of cars carrying black and Palestinian flags in the Palestinian Arab localities of Israel⁵¹². Palestinian Arab activists also recorded the voting process to video in order to create pressure on the Palestinian Arab voters. Another example of this kind of extra-parliamentary

⁵¹¹ Sara Roy, "Palestinian Society and Economy: The Continued Denial of Possibility", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4. 2001, pp.6-7

⁵¹² Jamal, 'Abstention as Participation:...', (2002), op.cit., p.87

movement was *Al-Ahaly Association*. Like the *Committee of Bereaved Families*, it was involved in counter-hegemonic activities such as organization of gatherings against the voting in the election, dissemination of manifestos and political advertisements in the Palestinian Arab newspapers to support boycotting elections and distribution of stickers and political ads criticizing the policies of the Israeli ruling elite in the course of *al-Aqsa Intifada*⁵¹³. Activities of these organizations continued after the elections of 2001. Nevertheless, they did not lead to emergence of unified counter-hegemonic bloc, which would create alternative mechanisms to the existing dominant structures and processes.

Prior to the *Knesset* elections of 2003 several scholars and analysts implied possibility of dissemination and internalization of the counter-hegemonic messages of the post-2001 messages among the Palestinian Arab citizenry. Rekhess, for example, pointed to “the increasing legitimization of the call to boycott the elections and the search for other separatist alternatives” in the eve of 2003 elections.⁵¹⁴ A Palestinian Arab academician As‘ad Ghanem argued that if a significant number of voters boycott the elections, then the possibility of establishing “an Arab-Palestinian political body to be elected in country wide elections should be considered”⁵¹⁵. Possibility of founding alternative parliament was also deliberately elaborated as an option in different segments of the Palestinian Arab community⁵¹⁶. An increasing tendency towards constant and ideological abstention emerged as a viable counter-hegemonic alternative among some factions of the Palestinian Arab citizenry, whose dissatisfaction was represented by the movements such as *Abna al Balad* (Sons of the Village) and the *Islamic Movement*. Both movements delivered manifestos towards continuation of firm stance of the Palestinian Arab citizenry against involvement of the political processes within the existing Israeli system as well as searching for the alternative political

⁵¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 88

⁵¹⁴ Elie Rekhess, ‘The Arab Vote’, Presentation at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, , Washington, 24 January 2003, p.6

⁵¹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁶ Ori Nir, (16.04.2002), *op.cit.*

structuring to contest for the national and civil rights outside the “walls of the *Knesset*”⁵¹⁷. “Abna al-Balad” called even for the institution of an all-Arab parliament⁵¹⁸. These counter-hegemonic acts, however, did not lead to massive abstention of the Palestinian Arab community from the elections. Notwithstanding the calls of various Palestinian Arab movements to boycott the elections, the counter-hegemonic wind, which inflated in the course of the Prime Ministerial elections of 2001 decelerated significantly during the *Knesset* elections of 2003. Percentage of participation of the Palestinian Arab voters to the elections was 62 per cent with 29.4 per cent of the votes gone to the Zionist parties⁵¹⁹.

Meanwhile, intra-societal antagonism in Israel exacerbated with criminal reports about increasing number of Palestinian Arab involvement in the counter-hegemonic violent activities. According to state’s figures there was a rise in the first 10 months of 2002 up to 31 violent activities with involvement of 68 Arab citizens in comparison to 25 cases in 2001, and 2 cases in 1999.⁵²⁰ Although there were individual attempts of Palestinian Arab citizens to express their counter-hegemonic feelings such as cases of clashes with Israeli security forces⁵²¹, aiding enemies of Israeli state in their operatives⁵²², planning violent attacks to Jewish localities⁵²³, assisting and hosting

⁵¹⁷ Jamal, ‘Abstention as Participation...’, (2002), op.cit., p.90

⁵¹⁸ Rekhess, (24 January 2003), op.cit. pp.4-5

⁵¹⁹ Nadim Rouhana, Nabil Saleh, and Nimer Sultany, “Voting Without Voice: About the Vote of the Palestinian Minority in the 16th Knesset Elections”, Asher Arian and Michal Shamir (eds.), **The Elections in Israel- 2003, Transaction Publishers**, New Brunswick and London, 2005, p.235

⁵²⁰ Rekhess, (24 January 2003), op.cit. p.2

⁵²¹ “Two Israeli Arabs critically hurt in exchange of fire with IDF troops in Galilee”, *Haaretz*, 19.04.2004

⁵²² “Israeli Arabs accused of spying for Hizbullah”, *Jerusalem Post*, 06.08.2002, “Shin Bet uncovers Hamas cell operating with help of Israeli Arabs”, *Jerusalem Post*, 18.11.2002, “The power of incitement”, *Haaretz*, 07.03.2004

⁵²³ “Israeli Arabs jailed for planning attacks”, *Haaretz*, 04.03.2004

suicide bombers⁵²⁴, these unorganized activities did not transform into a systematic counter-hegemonic resonance among the majority of Palestinian Arab citizenry. These attempts were mainly due to the increased recruitment activity of the Palestinian organizations from the *WBGS* following the assassination of the *Hamas* leader Sheikh Yasin in March 2004. However, very few Palestinian Arab citizens were involved in such activities. Consequently, at the beginning of 2004, *Shin Bet* declared that involvement of the Palestinian Arab citizens to the counter-hegemonic acts of violence decreased significantly⁵²⁵.

Capturing of *Sheikh Raed Saleh* in 2003 was a breakthrough in the transformation of the counter-hegemonic stance and discourse of the *Islamic Movement*. In May 2003, *Sheikh Raed Saleh* and fifteen leaders of the *Islamic Movement* were arrested with the charges of giving financial support to militant groups such as *Hamas* and *Islamic Jihad*. The *Islamic Movement* denied charges by maintaining that it provided financial support only to the charitable activities in the *WBGS*. Palestinian Arab political elite in Israel supported the cause of the *Islamic Movement* and denounced the charges against the movement.⁵²⁶ Notwithstanding the significant reaction against the charge in different segments of Palestinian Arab community, Raed Saleh and his colleagues were criminalized and imprisoned by the Israeli authorities because of his international and regional counter-hegemonic illegal connections against the state of Israel. He was charged with “harming state security and conspiracy to commit a crime”.⁵²⁷

In 2004, supporters of *Raed Saleh* organized a demonstration to express their demands for the release of Saleh and four other leaders of the North wing of the *Islamic*

⁵²⁴ “Israeli Arab nabbed before ferrying four suicide bombers”, *Jerusalem Post*, 21.07.2002, “Israeli Arab indicted for driving bombers to attack” *Jerusalem Post*, 06.02.2003, “Bakri family members guilty of hosting suicide bomber”, *Haaretz*, 03.06.2004

⁵²⁵ “Shin Bet: Israeli Arab terrorism decreasing”, *Jerusalem Post*, 19.12.2002

⁵²⁶ Blecher, (2005), *op.cit.*, pp.747-8

⁵²⁷ Yoav Stern and Uri Ash, “Thousands rally for jailed Islamic leader”, *Haaretz*, 15.03.2004

Movement. Change of discourse was significant which was presented by the *Sheikh Hasheem* during the demonstrations of 2004. Notwithstanding their self-claimed counter-hegemonic positioning against the dominant system, *Hasheem Abed Rahman* urged that *Raed Saleh* and four other executives of the movement were “leaders of a legitimate political movement, who acted within the framework of the law”.⁵²⁸ Labeling the acts of the leaders of the movement as in-system activities, whose aim was to provide socio-economic security for the Palestinian Arab youth orphaned by the Israeli aggressive policies⁵²⁹, Rahman momentarily abandoned the counter-hegemonic discourse of the movement for pragmatic purpose of facilitating and legitimizing release of its leader. Following the softening of the counter-hegemonic stance and discourse of the *Islamic Movement*, Sheikh *Raed Saleh* was released in July 2005⁵³⁰. The release of the leader accelerated the integration of the *Islamic Movement* to the dominant structures and processes. Consequently, apart from counter-hegemonic discourse in the speeches of its leadership, it did not exert serious and well-organized counter-hegemonic threat to the dominant structures and processes until 2007.

A less sophisticated counter-hegemonic discourse was presented by some of the Palestinian Arab parliamentarians in economic sphere. In 2005 Ahmet Tibi maintained the necessity of creation of alternative economic means to deal with specific and complex problems of the Palestinian Arab community through cooperating with the foreign donors. He suggested establishing a separate aid-scheme for the Palestinian Arab citizenry. His efforts mainly aimed to internationalize the struggle against the policies of Israeli ruling elite in allocation of economic resources.

Foreign aid is given to Israel as a state and not to the Jews only. But it never reaches Arab Israelis. [...] My main struggle is inside Israel, yet in conjunction I will work with foreign countries to ensure Israel adopts a more equal social agenda. Israel is not fulfilling its duties towards its Arab citizens. Its policies are discriminatory. I am trying

⁵²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁰ “Israeli Arabs celebrate Salah's surprise early release. Sheikh immediately says he may defy restrictions on visiting al-Aksa Mosque”, *Jerusalem Post*, 18.07.2005

to narrow the gaps between Arabs and Jews through work within the system and outside of it,⁵³¹

Although Tibi's calls for alternative aid-scheme for the Palestinian Arab community enjoyed affirmative responses from some of the representatives of donor countries such as Belgium⁵³² and Qatar, they did not lead to a systematic counter-hegemonic movement with solid results. Nevertheless, they played important role in warning the ruling elite to adopt non-discriminatory policies towards the Palestinian Arab community⁵³³.

Above mentioned counter-hegemonic discursive acts, which took place in economic sphere were accompanied with the calls for boycotting the economic cooperation with the Israeli dominant economic structures⁵³⁴ as well as for boycotting the elections of *Knesset* in 2006⁵³⁵. Nevertheless, these attempts did not appeal to most of the Palestinian Arab citizenry. In fact, notwithstanding their counter-hegemonic discourses against the Israeli state and its certain policies, Palestinian Arab political leadership tried to persuade their constituency to support them in their in-system struggle for the civic rights and economic welfare. Thus, their role as agents of reproduction of the dominant structures and processes remained intact, despite their counter-hegemonic statements.

⁵³¹ "MK: Arab Israelis should get foreign aid", *Yedioth Ahronoth*, ynetnews, 20.10.2005, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3157382,00.html>

⁵³² "Deputy Belgian prime minister: I'll help Israeli Arabs", *Yedioth Ahronoth*, ynetnews, 13.11.2005, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3168143,00.html>

⁵³³ "Right-winger: Tibi went too far", *Yedioth Ahronoth*, ynetnews, 20.10.2005, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3157475,00.html>

⁵³⁴ "US economist: End Arab discrimination", *Yedioth Ahronoth*, ynetnews, 21.06.2006, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3265516,00.html>

⁵³⁵ "Arab organization calls for election boycott", *Yedioth Ahronoth*, ynetnews, 21.02.2006 <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3219401,00.html>, and "Arab group: Boycott elections Group of Israeli Arabs calls on Arab community to refrain from taking part in elections", *Yedioth Ahronoth*, ynetnews, 25.03.2006, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3232007,00.html>

Efforts towards more organized and unified counter-hegemonic activism regained impetus following the *Knesset* Elections of 2006 with initiation of a movement against the policies of dominant elite. Main concerns and premises of the movement was listed in *the Future Vision Document*, which severely criticized the dominant structures and processes while at the same time proposing alternative and autonomous structures and processes for the Palestinian Arab citizenry, who were alienated from the Israeli political and socio-economic systems by the practices of Israeli state. The document was prepared with contribution of 38 opinion leaders of the Palestinian Arab community under the auspices of The National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel. Defining Israel as an ethnocratic state which engaged its Palestinian Arab citizens to “the political, economic and social aspects of life in a very limited and unequal way⁵³⁶, the *Future Vision Document* set the main strategic goals of the Palestinian Arab community with regard to different aspects of its relationship with the State of Israel such as legal status, land and housing, economic development, social development, education, Palestinian Arab culture, and institutions and political work⁵³⁷.

In the first part of the document, Israeli ruling elite was severely criticized due to its policies towards isolating the Palestinian Arab citizens from the Palestinians in the *WBGS* as well as other Arab and Muslim nations, avoiding parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activism of the Palestinians against the aspirations of Jewish majority, opposing any vision of Palestinian Arab citizenry that would reject Jewish control over the state, resources and abilities, and forcing the Palestinian Arab citizens to accept resource allocation on the ethnic rather than citizenship basis in order to maintain Jewish superiority⁵³⁸.

⁵³⁶ The National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel, ‘The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel’, 2006, p.5

⁵³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.4

⁵³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 6

After stating the nature of relationship, the vision document listed the demands of the Palestinian Arab community from the Israeli state and ruling elite. First, the state was called to recognize its responsibility in al Naqba and compensate the victims of this tragedy as well as discriminatory policies of the state in the post-al Naqba period. Second, Israeli ruling elite was pleaded to recognize Palestinian Arab community as an indigenous national group. In this sense, Palestinian Arab community should be granted opportunity to create and administer its own autonomous institutions relating to all aspects of its daily life⁵³⁹. In addition, the State of Israel should acknowledge the bi-national character of the country, remove all forms of ethnic superiority on allocation of resources and rights and reflect this acknowledgement into future constitution and state laws⁵⁴⁰. The Palestinian Arab leadership also demanded transfer of the control of Palestinian religious and social institutions from the Israeli state to the Palestinian Arab citizenry⁵⁴¹.

The vision paper also presented strategies of Palestinian Arab leadership towards establishing counter-hegemonic autonomous structures and processes through intra-communal institutionalization. Appeals of the Palestinian Arab citizenry for establishment of an Arab university in Israel, for example, signified the attempts of the Palestinian Arab elite of Israel to create alternative educational apparatuses immune from the control of the Israeli dominant structure. Similar goals and strategies were articulated in the field of religion with regard to establishment of full Palestinian Arab control over the affairs of *Waqf* as well as other Muslim and Christian institutions.

Overall, although the document was not purely a counter-hegemonic manifesto, it provided certain strategic guidelines for a counter-hegemonic positioning of Palestinian Arab leadership towards generating necessary mechanisms and institutions to assure self-rule of Palestinian Arab citizenry in fields of education, religion, culture and media

⁵³⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁴¹ Ibid., p.7

as well as to enhance possibilities of self-determination against the Israeli dominant structures and processes ⁵⁴². However, the sharp counter-hegemonic discourse of the Future Vision Document notwithstanding, Palestinian Arab political elite remained divided in 2006 elections and it was far from establishing a united counter-hegemonic front on central issues of Palestinian Arab citizenry, which were once more raised in the document. As Jamal argued:

The nexus of personal ambitions, mutual suspicions, and extreme ideologization prevents Arab leaders from transforming themselves into a united national minority leadership, bearing out the suggestion that Arab leadership falls under the disunited but widely differentiated model of elite leadership [...]. The fragmentation and disunity also lead to frustration, alienation, and disappointment among the Arab public, nourishing mistrust and disengagement from the parliamentary game [...]. The Israeli political elite, [on the other hand] strives to force on the Arab leadership unconditional acceptance of the Jewish defined political boundaries. The fact that this proviso is rejected by the Arab leadership leads to its political, and even legal, de-legitimization [...]⁵⁴³

In this respect, even though it is early to assess consequences of the *Future Vision Document*, the document did not seem to galvanize immediate formation of a well-structured and unified counter-hegemonic bloc, which would eliminate ideological, socio-economic and political divisiveness of Palestinian Arab leadership.

3.2.5. Hamula Structure in This Period

Hamula's mission in this dual process depended on the decisions of its leaders about positioning the *hamula* in these processes. Some *hamulas* already opted for being an agent of Israeli hegemony and serve internalization of the system by the members of the *hamula*. Some other *hamulas* positioned within the counter-hegemonic camp. However, as the *hamula* ties were challenged by the socio-economic and cultural change, it was possible to observe differentiation of the level of *hamula*-affect on the positioning of the *hamula* members in these parallel processes.

⁵⁴² *Ibid.*, p.9

⁵⁴³ Jamal, *op.cit.* 2006, p.20

Hamula members in this period continued to undergo the juxtaposing pressures of modernization and traditionalism⁵⁴⁴. Some *hamulas* responded these pressures with increasing intra-*hamula* mechanisms of control and isolation from the trends of modernization that began to exert significant influence on the patterns of interpersonal relations in Israel. Amplified protectionism as a response to immoral effects of modernization led intensification of intra-*hamula* pressures on certain segments such as women. In winter of 2005, for example, it was not unacceptable for the members of *Hasson hamula*, who lived in Shfaram's El Ayin neighborhood that one of the women named Samar Hasson was killed by the members of her family because she degraded family honor and honor of entire *hamula*⁵⁴⁵.

Openings of some *hamulas* to other families through inter-*hamula* or individual marriages elasticized the *hamula*'s extensive control over the nuclear families. In addition, pressures of modernization, inter-generational and gender-related tensions⁵⁴⁶ compelled leadership of the *hamula* to adopt new strategies in order to sustain *hamula*'s internal coherence. Notwithstanding continuation of the exclusion of women from *hamula*'s power center and political sphere in most of the cases, in some *hamulas* women took the revolutionary steps, which had an impact on the historical political positioning of the *hamulas* in their relations with the Israeli state and dominant structures. In some cases, these 'stranger' (*garib*) wives presented a different political stance against the practices of the Israeli dominant structures and institutions by facing

⁵⁴⁴ Yoav Lavee and Ruth Katz, "The Family in Israel: Between Tradition and Modernity", *Marriage and Family Review*, Vol.35, No.1-2, pp.193 – 217 and Ruth Katz, "Expectations of Family Life in a Multicultural Context: An Israeli Example", *International Journal of Sociology of the Family*, Vol.30, No. 1, 2002 , pp.4-5

⁵⁴⁵ Larry Derfner, "Family, honor, killing-Samar Hasson murdered by her family for dating wrong man. No one's surprised", *Jerusalem Post*, 27.12.2005, <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1547572/posts>

⁵⁴⁶ Ruth Katz, "Expectations of Family Life in a Multicultural Context: An Israeli Example", *International Journal of Sociology of the Family*, Vol.30, No. 1, 2002 , p.5

the possible exclusion and strains between their *hamula* of origin and their husband's *hamula*⁵⁴⁷.

One of such challenges to *hamula* was exemplified in the case of *Ghaida Rinawi-Zouabi*, who, as director of the development unit within the National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities, was one of the authors of the counter-hegemonic document entitled "The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel"⁵⁴⁸. She was also wife of a member of one of the most loyal *hamulas* to the Israeli state. As discussed above, the "Future Vision Document" represented a counter-hegemonic vision for the Palestinian Arab people, which would challenge the dominant structures and processes of existing system. Such a vision was not entirely welcomed and/or approved by the *hamula* of Zouabi's husband. Within this respect, counter-hegemonic stance of *Ghaida Rinawi-Zouabi*, which contradicted with strong relationship of her husband's *hamula* with the Israeli state, epitomized the possible farthest points of such pressures could reach within the *hamula* structure in the post-*Al-Aqsa* period.

In this era, amplified interaction between the national politicians and the locally influential *hamula* leadership also revitalized centrality of clans in national politics. Thus as Amal Jamal argued patterns of *hamula* affiliations became a transforming factor in some of the modern democratic political institutions and processes as the modern organizations (i.e. political parties, municipalities, local authorities, and NGOs) not only utilized these patterns as apparatuses of political mobilization but also transformed gradually into "a sophisticated facsimile" of *hamula* mentality⁵⁴⁹.

⁵⁴⁷ Yahya-Yunis, T. 2001, "The politics of fidelity: voting patterns of 'stranger' wives as emerging in the tension between their *hamula* of orientation and their husband's *hamula*". MA. thesis, Tel Aviv University. [Hebrew] quoted in Amalia Sa'ar, "Lonely in Your Firm Grip: Women in Israeli-Palestinian Families", *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. 7, No. 4. , 2001, p.730

⁵⁴⁸ Yoav Stern, "A matter of making history", *Haaretz*, 22.12.2006, http://www.Haaretz.com/hasen/pages/Sh_Art.jhtml?itemNo=804217

⁵⁴⁹ Jamal, "The Arab Leadership in Israel:...",(2006), op.cit., p.16

CHAPTER 4

CONCEPTUALIZING /THEORIZING HEGEMONY AND ITS AGENTS IN ISRAELI CASE

This chapter aims to put forward theoretical framework of relationship between the tribal structures and the processes and structures of hegemony in Israeli case. Thus, it is organized in three parts. In the first part, it provides a comprehensive interpretation of Gramscian concept of hegemony through elucidating and exemplifying its components, processes, and agents in Gramscian way of thought and Israeli case. Second part evaluates the tribe as a unit of socio-economic organization in Israeli society especially among the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. Third part discusses the possibility of functioning of tribal or clan structures as an agent of hegemony in internalization of the dominant political, socio-economic and cultural processes and structures by the members of the tribe in Israel and in the Middle East.

Thus, this part will delineate a Gramscian methodology for conceptualizing and elucidating the relationship between the processes and institutions of domination in Israel and its Palestinian Arab citizens with a particular emphasis on the place of *hamula* structure in this relationship. It will also discuss the possibility of assessing tribe, a traditional socio-economic formation as an agent of hegemony, a modern process.

4.1. Origins and Evolution of the Concept

Hegemony originated from a Greek word of *hegeisthai* which meant to be a guide” or “to be a ruler”⁵⁵⁰. It incorporated the meanings of leadership and ruling in it. In Ancient Greece, it was used to refer consensual alliance of different city-states under the leadership of a *polis* against a common threat. In debates of Greek historians on the relationships of dominance and alliance, *hegemony* connoted a willingness of

⁵⁵⁰ Luiciano Pellicani, Gramsci, An Alternative Communism?, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1981, p. 32

subordinate to “give itself” or “self-submission” to the guide or the leader (*hegemon*) if the *hegemon* is “a viable candidate” to challenge the common threat.⁵⁵¹

Herodotus, for instance, conceptualized hegemony in explaining the dominance of Athens among the Greek city-states to connote consensual cultural claims for the leadership against the forceful imposition of dominance through utilization of coercive *dunamis*⁵⁵², an oath or document, which marked to the “power or force” the dominant in the ancient Greece. Thus, hegemony did not simply rest on the fear from the *dunamis* and *dunamis* was not the only basis for the hegemony⁵⁵³. It rather connoted a sense of “desirability” among the subordinated Greek city-states for the leadership of Athens.

Most of the Greek philosophers and historians emphasized on consensual aspect and desirability of dominance while conceptualizing the term “*hegemony*”. Consequently, hegemony referred to consent of the subordinate about recognizing the hegemon as its overseer and superior. Distinction between the *despotism*, a situation of dominance based on coercive force and *hegemony* was evident in the intellectual works of Aristotle and Socrates as well. Aristotle differentiated hegemonic dominance from the despotic rule by underlining the differences in motives of leading groups in these two types of governance. According to Socrates, hegemony connoted a domination of the leading group over the subordinates, which would not undermine interests of the subordinates in order to achieve its self-interests. Despotic dominance on the other hand would entail negligence of the interests of the subordinates by the despotic ruler in achieving its own interests⁵⁵⁴. Socrates did not diverge from Aristotelian conceptualization of hegemonic dominance in his analysis of inter-city state relations

⁵⁵¹ John Wickersham, **Hegemony and Greek Historians**, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 1994, p.28

⁵⁵² Ibid., p.23

⁵⁵³ Ibid., p. 4

⁵⁵⁴ Benedetto Fontana, “Logos and Kratos”, *Journal of the History of the Ideas*, Vol.61, No.2, p.317

during the Delian League and afterwards. He distinguished the despotic and hegemonic types of dominance in the example of leadership efforts of Athens on the Delian League. For Aristotle, despotism was simply based on use of force to dominate while hegemony necessitated consent of the subordinates on the leadership of the dominant actor, not only due to its physical power but also ethical, ideational and cultural ascendancy. As the Athens was the center of culture and intellectual activity, its initial dominance over the members of Delian League did not only derive from its brutal power but also from its ideational and intellectual preeminence⁵⁵⁵. Thus, it was the “moral and rational” capability of Athens, which enabled it to claim *hegemonia* over the Greek city-states under its *Hellenic ethnos*⁵⁵⁶.

Hegemony was not only used in ancient times to explain the difference between the coercive and consensual types of leadership. The ancient philosophers and historians also used the concept of hegemony to define a strategy of alliance towards eliminating common threat and/or restructuring the existing dominant system. In his analysis of causes of *Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides highlighted emergence and transformation of such a consensual alliance between the Greek city-states under the leadership of Athens against the Persian Empire. He argued that the *Delian League* was based on common interests of the Greek *poleis*, which submitted their consent for the leadership of Athens against a common enemy. For Thucydides it was the Athens’ manipulation of this consent and its negligence of the interests of the voluntary subordinates that transformed the nature of relations of dominance between *hegemon* and subordinates from hegemony to despotism. Hegemony was seen by Athens as a strategy to achieve and maintain dominance over the subordinate Greek city-states. However, Athens gradually moved toward a despotic leadership, erosion of consent among the subordinate Greek city-states for its dominant position resulted in failure of this strategy in maintaining the hegemonic dominance.

⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid* p.316

⁵⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.316

In his *Histories* about the war between the Persians and the Greek city-states, Herodotus also acknowledged such an alliance. He used the concept of hegemony to define a temporary period of alliance among the city-states under the leadership of a capable superior during which the subordinated units submitted themselves to the viable leader and guide until reaching their common interests. For him perseverance of hegemony was dependent on the life of alliance and should “lapse when the alliance ceases”⁵⁵⁷. It was a strategy for the potential hegemon to challenge the existing dominant structure and the dominant actor by mobilizing consent of the subordinated to its leadership in a war of maneuver against the existing dominant system.

Conceptualization of hegemony as a strategy of changing the dominant structure through mobilizing consent of the subordinate units was adapted and elaborated by the Marxist thinkers and activists in the modern times. In Marxist tradition, the notion has its roots in the discourses of Russian Social-Democratic movement between late 1890s to 1917 to denote the central role of the working class as a leading force for a democratic revolution⁵⁵⁸. In this respect, Hoffman argues that hegemony was defined as “the organized and disciplined proletarian leadership of a broadly based movement extending to all classes” existed in Lenin’s arguments before Gramsci⁵⁵⁹.

For Anderson, on the other hand, *hegemony* was also connoted in the documents of *Comintern* in the 1920s⁵⁶⁰. In the debates of the Third International, hegemony was referred as a strategy of Bolshevik revolution. The term was used in reference to “the Russian proletariat as both a dominant and a directing class; dominance implying dictatorship and direction implying leadership with consent of allied classes (notably

⁵⁵⁷ Wickersham, op.cit., p. 15

⁵⁵⁸ John Hoffman, The Gramscian Challenge, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1984, pp.52-54

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid., p.52

⁵⁶⁰ Robert Cox, ‘Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in method’, Stephen Gill (ed.) Gramsci, historical materialism and international relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p.50

the peasantry)”⁵⁶¹. However, for Adamson “the broadly cultural orientation implicit in hegemony as a form of rule, and the educational orientation implicit in it as an opposition to ‘economic-corporative’ owe a considerable debt to Croce and very little, if anything to Lenin”⁵⁶². Besides, Gramscian focus on the cultural aspect of domination is essentially predisposed by the impact of Croce on the Italian culture. In fact, as Jacobitti argues, notwithstanding their different intellectual positioning deriving from their distinct socio-economic stances and opinions, Gramsci’s assessment of the dominative impact of Croce on Italian culture led him to consider the culture as a front in the war of position together with the economic and political fronts⁵⁶³.

Bates disagrees with Adamson’s negligence on the role of Lenin and Russian revolutionaries such as Plekhanov and Axelrod. He argued that Gramscian conceptualization of hegemony was influenced by both Lenin’s use of the concept as “political leadership of a proletarian vanguard” and Plekhanov’s usage as “elite leadership in a backward cultural situation over the other groups”.⁵⁶⁴ Referring to Bobbio’s arguments, Bates also underlines the impact of Stalin in the conceptual usage of hegemony synonymous with the concept of leadership (*rukovoditel*)⁵⁶⁵.

Both Adamson and Bates agree however, with the Cox’s argument on the essential role of Gramsci in broadening both content and the use of the concept especially after he observed the explanatory capacity of the term in elaborating the relations of domination during his prison years. Until Gramscian conceptualization, hegemony was mainly used by referring to its interpretation in the Third International as a strategy of proletariat

⁵⁶¹ Ibid.

⁵⁶² Adamson, (1980), **Hegemony and Revolution**: ..., op.cit., p.172

⁵⁶³ Edmund E. Jacobitti, “Hegemony before Gramsci: The Case of Benedetto Croce”, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol.52, No.1, 1980, p. 69

⁵⁶⁴ Thomas R. Bates, “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony”, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol.36, No.2, 1975, p.352

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid.

through which it would establish “an alliance of workers, peasants, and perhaps some other groups potentially supportive of revolutionary change.”⁵⁶⁶ Revolutionaries used the concept to denote predominance “of the proletariat in the struggle against the Tsarist absolutism due to political impotence of all other classes”.⁵⁶⁷

At ideational level, Lenin’s use of the term *hegemony* extensively focused on the political society and a relationship of domination. Although ideological and cultural aspect of domination had been referred in some of Marx’s works such as *The German Ideology*, in which Marx associated ruling ideology of every age with the ideology of ruling class⁵⁶⁸, Lenin did not deliberate on the super-structural components of domination such as culture and ideology. In this respect, Gramsci broadened and deepened Lenin’s theory of domination by providing analysis of super-structural basis of domination as well as by developing an alternative assessment of old relationships of domination. He advanced and transformed this conceptualization significantly by embroiling both political and civil societies in the relationship of a *direction*.⁵⁶⁹

Following Gramscian re-interpretation of hegemony, neo-Marxist activists, opinion leaders and intellectuals used the concept to define the structural relationship between ruling class and the subordinate classes rather than solely focusing on its strategic significance for working classes in their struggle to overtake power from the bourgeoisie. Thus, as Pellicani argued in its earlier elaborations, importance of the concept derived from its emphasis on “the need for the proletariat to develop political strategies which undermine the consent of the present ruling class”⁵⁷⁰. This need was a

⁵⁶⁶ Cox (1993), op.cit. p.50

⁵⁶⁷ Joseph V. Femia, “Gramsci’s Patrimony”, *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1983, p. 346

⁵⁶⁸ Paul Piccone, “Gramsci’s Hegelian Marxism”, *Political Theory*, Vol.2, No.1, 1974, p.38

⁵⁶⁹ Paul Piccone, “Gramsci’s Marxism: Beyond Lenin and Togliatti”, *Theory and Society*, Vol.3, No.4, 1976, p.501

⁵⁷⁰ Pellicani, (1981), op.cit., p. 32

tactical and instrumental need, which required establishment of class alliances “under the political and ideological leadership” of the proletariat⁵⁷¹. In this respect, for Bellamy and Schecter, *hegemony* underlined the centrality of organizing class-consciousness heading towards alteration and removal of the State⁵⁷². In this challenge, it assigned a cultural and educative mission to the communist party and the revolutionary state in building “a coherent moral awareness and political will amongst the proletariat. Main goal of such strategies was to establish an alternative proletarian hegemony within the present civil society in which the further dictatorship of proletariat would be built after the revolution.”⁵⁷³

Like Pelicani, Paggi referred to Gramscian definition of hegemony as a strategy of the proletariat in its struggle for revolution. For Paggi, Gramscian conceptualization of hegemony took place within a framework of ‘practical political activity’⁵⁷⁴. Thus, it must be understood as an end of ‘strategic doctrine’ rather than a means for an academic effort to explain the relationship between the superstructure and structure⁵⁷⁵. Quoting Gramsci, Paggi argued that Gramscian realization hegemony referred to a strategy for revolution in Western Europe, which would be based on a new cultural, moral and intellectual leadership of the proletariat “in the larger framework of alliances between the working class and the peasant masses”⁵⁷⁶

⁵⁷¹ Andreas Kalyvas, “Hegemonic sovereignty: Carl Schmitt, Antonio Gramsci and the constituent prince”, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol.5, No. 3, 2000, p.353

⁵⁷² Richard Bellamy and Darrow Schecter, **Gramsci and the Italian State**, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, p.112

⁵⁷³ Pellicani, (1981), op.cit., p. 32

⁵⁷⁴ Dante Germino, “Review Article Antonio Gramsci: Antonio Gramsci: Cronache torinesi (1913-1917; Antonio Gramsci: La città futura (1917-1918)...”, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol.80, No. 1, 1986, p.294

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid.

However, for Pellicani, Gramscian elaboration and use of the notion of hegemony evolved in time to explain the dynamics and the nature and the reasons of the supremacy of one class over the others rather than a strategy of the dominated class to overthrow the dominant one. In this respect, for Pellicani,

Gramsci sought to express the idea that supremacy of one class over others cannot be reduced to a relationship of mere coercion; on the contrary, the dialectic of dominant class-dominated class” is almost based on a tight web of relationships that imply direction,[...] the capacity on the part of the upper class to satisfy certain objective needs of a society[...]⁵⁷⁷

Gittlin’s interpretation of Gramsci also pointed to such evolution. He argued that Gramscian use of hegemony in the late twenties and early thirties signified his increasing awareness about the reasons behind the non-revolutionary stance of the working class “with the rise of fascism and the failure of Western European working-class movements”⁵⁷⁸. For Kalyvas, it was this awareness which guided Gramsci to re-conceptualize hegemony as “stronger form of a moral and intellectual leadership of a radical transformation of the partial identities of dispersed groups that [were] absorbed into a new, broader, and superior political entity” in his *Prison Notebooks*⁵⁷⁹. At that point, Gramsci began to conceptualize hegemony to analyze the conditions of supremacy of the dominant classes and explain the surrender of working classes to the fascism and capitalism rather than assessing it as a strategy for the subordinate groups.

Regardless of its assessment as a strategy for the subordinate group to transform the existing dominant system or an academic doctrine to understand the success of the dominance of one group over the others, Gramscian concept of hegemony accentuated a different comprehension of relations of dominance between the dominant and subordinate actors. It evolved from its narrower meaning in late 19th century, which

⁵⁷⁷ Pellicani, (1981), op.cit., p. 32

⁵⁷⁸ Todd Gitlin, 'Prime time ideology: the hegemonic process in television entertainment', , Horace Newcomb (ed.), **Television: the critical view (Fifth Edition)**, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994, p.516

⁵⁷⁹ Kalyvas, (2000), op.cit., p.353

was shaped in accordance with the historical context of the revolutionary movements. Its conceptual boundary broadened to include the various aspects of coercive-consensual relationships between the dominant and subordinate groups at different levels.

Gramscian intellectuals elaborated these different aspects by prioritizing some of them over others in their detailed analyses. Consequently, they excavated and refined the term by elaborating its main notional components sophisticatedly in explaining the relationship between the dominant and subordinate groups. Next part will provide a brief assessment of these sophisticated efforts towards providing a more convoluted conceptualization of the term by different scholars through prioritization of various notional constituents of the hegemony.

4.2. Conceptualization

In its simple form, hegemony according to Gramsci referred to dominance and ruling through utilization of ideational means rather than simply by using coercive force⁵⁸⁰. In other words, it was domination with consent of the dominated. This simple definition was broadened and deepened by the students of Gramscian studies through introduction and elaboration of the components of “hegemony” in Gramscian conceptualization. According to Isaak for instance, Gramsci defined hegemony as a form of consciousness in which other social classes or the population as a whole accept an order in which one social class is dominant.”⁵⁸¹ Isaak highlighted three important aspects and components of the hegemony in his definition; domination, consciousness about the domination, and acceptance of the domination⁵⁸².

⁵⁸⁰ Thomas R. Bates, “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony”, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1975, p. 351

⁵⁸¹ Robert A. Isaak, **Managing World Economic Change: International Political Economy**, 2nd ed., Prentice-Hall International, Inc.USA,1995, p.24

⁵⁸² Ibid.

Prioritization of different conceptual components of hegemony by various Gramscian scholars generated different definitions of the term in literature. Richard Howson, for instance, prioritized ethico-political leadership component of hegemony in his conceptualization. He defined hegemony by referring to the ethico-political dominance of one group over the other by manufacturing the consent of the latter at super-structural level supported by capacity and capabilities of the former at structural level.

Hegemonic logic then always aspires toward the achievement of an ethico-political or social logic which, in turn, incorporates not just the synthetic organization of the economic and political blocs with the social bloc to produce the historical bloc but, most important, one that is premised on the “dialectic between the intellectuals and mass”. In this way, the ethico-political historical bloc allows Gramsci to incorporate moral and intellectual leadership in the synergy of structural (that is, economic and political) and superstructural (that is, social or moral and intellectual) aspects of hegemony.⁵⁸³

Behrouzi enriched Howson’s definition by elaborating on the linkage between ethico-political occurrences with *historic bloc*. Consequently, he argued that hegemony was not simply “an ethico-political phenomenon but it was rather ethico-political aspect of the historic bloc”⁵⁸⁴. Introduction of historic bloc to the definition of hegemony necessitated clarification of its positioning within the national-popular collective.

Adamson prioritized the components of civil society, consent and class-consciousness in his definition of hegemony. He provided two definitions of Gramscian conceptualization of hegemony. First, hegemony denoted “the consensual basis of an existing political system within civil society”⁵⁸⁵ in Gramscian terms. At this point, he emphasized on components of consent and civil society. He interpreted Gramscian conceptualization of hegemony as a challenge to the state-centric understanding of

⁵⁸³ Richard Howson “From Ethico-political Hegemony to Postmarxism”, *Rethinking Marxism*, Vol.19, No.2, 2007, p.237

⁵⁸⁴ Majid Behrouzi, **Democracy as the Political Empowerment of the People: The Betrayal of an Ideal**, Lexington Books, New York, 2005, p.181

⁵⁸⁵ W p.170

domination, which was simply based on the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion. For Adamson, Gramscian notion of hegemony introduced civil society and consent in definition of the relations of domination. Thus, domination of the ruling classes or groups could not be explained simply by focusing on their coercive capabilities in suppressing the subordinate groups. The term hegemony defined a new type of domination, which encompassed consent of the dominated through dissemination and internalization of the values of the dominant among the subordinate groups within the civil society. In this respect, hegemony was also "conscious or unconscious diffusion of the philosophical outlook of a dominant class in the customs, habits, ideological structures, political and social institutions and even the everyday common sense of particular [civil] society".⁵⁸⁶

Secondly, hegemony was a level of class-consciousness, which went beyond the economic corporative understanding of class by acknowledging other referents such as "a common intellectual and moral awareness and a common culture"⁵⁸⁷. In other words, hegemony was a stage in the awareness of the subordinate groups for pledging a consensual basis for their freedom from the dominance of the other groups⁵⁸⁸. Abrahamsen also put emphasis on the "consensual aspects of political domination and the intellectual and moral leadership of the dominant social group"⁵⁸⁹ in her interpretation of Gramscian definition of hegemony. Furthermore, she stressed two other components of the concept. According to Abrahamsen hegemony also denoted processes of *persuasion* (by the dominant) and *internalization* (by the dominated)⁵⁹⁰.

⁵⁸⁶ Walter L. Adamson, "Gramsci's Interpretation of Fascism", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol.41, No.4, 1980, p.627

⁵⁸⁷ Adamson, (1980), **Hegemony and Revolution**: ..., op.cit. p.171

⁵⁸⁸ Adamson, (1980) "Gramsci's Interpretation of ..., op.cit., p.626

⁵⁸⁹ Rita Abrahamsen "The Victory of Popular Forces or Passive Revolution? A Neo-Gramscian Perspective on Democratisation", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 35(1) , 1997, p.147

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid.

She argued that hegemony as a concept referred to success of dominant classes in persuading others to accept and internalize their views, values and norms.”⁵⁹¹

Stuart Hall highlighted most of the terminological components of hegemony in his definition of the concept. While defining hegemony he accentuated the alliances of classes under an intellectual and moral leadership of historic bloc supported by material capabilities to persuade the whole segments of society about their economic, political and ideological dominance by a combination of consent and coercion at civil societal level.

Hegemony is that the state of ‘total social authority’ which, at certain specific conjunctures, a specific class alliance wins, by a combination of ‘coercion’ and ‘consent’, over the whole social formation, and its dominated classes: not only at the economic level, but also at the level of political and ideological leadership, in civil, intellectual and moral life as well as the material level: and over the terrain of civil society as well as in and through the condensed relations of the State.”⁵⁹²

As it was seen in the case of Stuart Hall, it is possible to define hegemony by referring its ideational components. In such definition, hegemony could be described as ethico-political leadership of a historic bloc with an ideological superiority supported by solid economic roots and institutionalized in a body of integrative state, over a subordinate group by persuading this group and acquiring its consent at civil societal level either by means of passive revolutionary acts or through a *war of position*.

Nigel Todd also provides a sophisticated and eloquent interpretation for Gramsci’s conceptualization of hegemony:

By hegemony Gramsci seems to mean a socio-political situation, [...] “a moment”, in which the philosophy and practice of a society fuse or are in equilibrium; an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutions and private manifestations, informing

⁵⁹¹ Ibid.

⁵⁹² Stuart Hall, ‘Race, articulation and societies structured in dominance’, Malcolm Cross (ed.) **The Sociology of Race and Ethnicity**, Vol. I, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham UK and Northampton USA, pp.66-67. (331-332 in original text)

with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religion and political principles, and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connotation.⁵⁹³

Is it possible to apply these definitions to the relationship between the Jewish and the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel? Each components of the Gramscian definition of hegemony should be evaluated within the context of the nature of such relationship in order understand applicability of this definition to the Israeli case. Next part will assess applicability of hegemonic conceptualization to the Israeli case by elucidating these different components in the analysis of relationship between the Jewish dominant group and the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel.

4.3. Components of Hegemony

4.3.1. Ethico-political leadership (Intellectual and Moral Leadership); political domination/ leadership (direzione)

In his conceptual analysis of hegemony, Gramsci's main stress is on a situation of leadership rather than of domination. Yet he organically distinguishes these two situations and claimed that domination took place in order to liquidate the antagonistic groups (enemies) while leadership got involved in "consensual direction" of kindred and allied groups (friends)⁵⁹⁴. Here hegemony refers to intellectual, moral and political leadership, which is consented by the other groups. It points a process of assuming ethico-political leadership in transforming people's ways of thinking and their conceptions of the world and of their standards of moral conduct.⁵⁹⁵

In this respect, power of dominant group is not simply rooted in the control of the coercive means and means of production. Its leading capacity and ethico-political

⁵⁹³ Nigel Todd, "Ideological Superstructure in Gramsci and Mao Tse-Tung", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol.35, No.1, 1974 , p.151

⁵⁹⁴ John Hoffman, **The Gramscian Challenge: Coercion and Consent in Marxist Political Theory**, Basil Blackwell, GB, 1984, p.70.

⁵⁹⁵ Antonio Gramsci, **Selections from the Prison Notebooks**, Q. Hoore and G. Howell (eds. and trans.) Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1978, p.26

expansion also derives from its ability to attain recognition of the other segments of the society about its intellectual and moral superiority.⁵⁹⁶ This recognition cannot be maintained simply by predominance of material sources and forceful coercion. It can be achieved by establishing supremacy over the other groups at the super-structural level through ethico-political invasion of the various spheres of superstructure from arts to the popular culture⁵⁹⁷. It is rather preserved by individual and collective human act, which are materialized in a political organization (the state) to sustain the moral and political leadership of the dominant.⁵⁹⁸

For Gramsci, cultural hegemony would create an environment conducive for internalization of the ethico-political leadership of the dominant group and its values by the subordinate groups through their representation as the “common sense” of the entire society notwithstanding their benefaction of interests of a single group.⁵⁹⁹ Within this context, the state presents itself as a cultural, moral, intellectual hegemon. Such presentation allows it to exercise power since it claims to be arbitrator of “universal moral values and the carrier of rational and objective principles of independent of narrow socio-economic and socio-cultural interests”⁶⁰⁰. The “proper relation” between state and civil society and between the dictatorship and hegemony also permits dominant group to materialize its ethico-political leadership as the rational and hegemonic posture in the body of the state.⁶⁰¹

⁵⁹⁶ Pellicani, (1981), op.cit., p. 31

⁵⁹⁷ John P. Diggins, “The Misuses of Gramsci”, *The Journal of American History*, Vol.75, No.1, 1988, p.144

⁵⁹⁸ Randall D. Germain and Michael Kenny, “Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.24, No.1, 1998, p.6

⁵⁹⁹ Edmund E. Jacobitti, “Hegemony before Gramsci: The Case of Benedetto Croce”, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol.52, No.1, 1980, p. 6

⁶⁰⁰ Benedetto Fontana, ‘State and Society: The Concept of Hegemony in Gramsci’, Mark Haugaard and Howard H.Lentner (eds.), **Hegemony and Power: Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics**, Lexington, New York, 2006, p.35

⁶⁰¹ Ibid.

In Israeli case, ethico-political leadership was assumed by the *Labor Settlement Movement* (LSM) under the direction of Ashkenazi pioneers from the very early years of nation-state-building process to the mid-1970s. At the initial stages, Israeli ruling elite utilized the modernization discourse in order to disseminate and legitimize its claim for ethico-political leadership in Palestine. Ashkenazi pioneers presented themselves as the progressive settlers who would bring modernity to the undeveloped lands and people of Palestine.

Thus, pretext of modernization discourse provided basis of legitimacy for the ethico-political leadership. It provided the moral and ethical legitimization of domination. Israeli dominant elite continued to use modernization discourse in an instrumental way to evade counter-acts against its ethico-political leadership. Sa'di also pointed such an instrumentalization of modernization discourse in Palestine.

[...] some Israeli-Jewish and Zionist intellectuals found that the sociological theory of modernization could 'provide a convenient shield behind which the analyst who wishes to avoid unpleasant questions with regard to the Palestinians in Israel [and in various periods Palestinians in general], can feel safe'.⁶⁰²

Despite its ability to sustain its ethico-political leadership over most segments of Israeli society until late 1970s, LSM's hegemony was vulnerable to crisis and counter-hegemonic challenges because of its "elitist, sectoral and nationalist limitations"⁶⁰³.

For Shafir and Peled,

[...] Israeli state building was neither fully pluralistic or consociational, because the various social groups were arranged in a rigid hierarchy within the LSM's citizenship framework, nor it was fully hegemonic, because the LSM was unable and unwilling to assimilate all groups into its institutional framework. What did keep LSM's historical

⁶⁰² Ahmad H. Sa'di, "Modernization as an Explanatory Discourse of Zionist-Palestinian Relations", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1997, p. 43

⁶⁰³ Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, **Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.70

bloc together, in spite of its elitist and sectoral tendencies, was the realization of nationalist aspirations.⁶⁰⁴

It was nationalism, which “acted as the cement of the LSM’s hegemony” because it provided the institutional framework of national citizenship, but it did not require the equalization of social conditions, the assimilation of lower status groups into the LSM. In fact, the LSM’s own communal republican, namely elitist, definition of citizenship as voluntary participation in and contribution toward the “common good”, and its attendant institutions, served as a hindrance to the realization of even common ethno-national citizenship.

It led to creation of multilayered citizenship framework [...] [with] third class citizenship to Palestinian Arabs, whose national aspirations were denied and who were admitted to citizenship as individuals only. Instead of creating a single standard of membership by assimilating all groups into its institutional network, the LSM stratified membership in the new society and [...] created a multi-tiered incorporation regime within which each group found its place according to alternative citizenship discourses. But until the nation-state was attained and secured, the LSM’s promise of effective national citizenship was able to mediate these competing citizenship discourses.⁶⁰⁵

However, this passive revolutionary situation generated by the Ashkenazi leadership changed gradually in the post-1967 period. The 1967 War and occupation of the territories by Israel generated ethico-political fissures between different segments of Jewish community while introducing new controversies in the relationship between the Jewish and Palestinian Arab citizenry of Israel. Settlements in the *WBGS* and the endurable borders of Israel became important subjects between both the Jews of European (*Ashkenazi*) and Middle Eastern (*Sephardic*) origin as well as between religious and secular Jews about the nature and legitimacy of the prospective ethico-political leadership. Ideological, moral and political split between the Sephardic and Ashkenazi elite on the borders of Israel and methods of solving intra-societal and inter-

⁶⁰⁴ *Ibid.* p.71

⁶⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.72-3

societal conflicts resulted in an exceptional ethico-political rivalry among Israeli Jewish elite⁶⁰⁶. *Sephardic* political elite increasingly demanded representation of their ethico-political concerns and values within the dominant structures and processes of the Israeli system.

The Israeli national elections of 1977 led materialization of Sephardic challenge to the ethico-political leadership of Ashkenazi Jewish segments of Israeli society. It signified readjustment of the dominant political culture with the integration of Sephardic elite into the ethico-political leadership of Israeli society. It also meant broadening of the Jewish center of the Israeli ethico-political base and structure with the incorporation of values and concerns of the different segments of Jewish community into the national popular collective. With the integration of more hawkish *Sephardic* political elite new Israeli Jewish center became more demanding on the framework of moral conditionality for integration and/or access of the Palestinian Arab community to practical and moral benefits of its ethico-political leadership. In this respect, security for example, has been an important reference of demarcation in defining the morality of leadership of the Jewish ruling classes in Israel. Being a part of Israeli security establishment was important in that sense. Internalization of the security concerns of Israel and thus consolidation of moral embeddedness into the hegemonic structure meant acceptance of one of the important components of ethico-political leadership of the Israeli ruling classes. Israeli ruling elite was generally skeptic about the willingness of the Palestinian Arab citizenry to recognize the legitimacy of security concerns of Israel.

Loyalty was seen as another demarcation of the acceptance of ethico-political leadership of the Israeli ruling elite and ethico-political supremacy of the Israeliness. Israeli ruling elites convinced some segments of Palestinian Arab citizenry about the possibilities of accessing to or integrating into the ethico-political leadership through

⁶⁰⁶ Gad Barzilai, "War, Democracy, and Internal Conflict: Israel in a Comparative Perspective", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1999, pp.331-2

fulfillment of certain requirements of proving their loyalty to the dominant system. Loyalty to the values and ideas which are presented by the Israeli state was seen as an evidence of internalization of the sentiments of Israeliness and thus ethico-political leadership of Israeli ruling elite. However, insistence of majority of Israeli ruling elite on the Jewishness of the state and its ideational formation make it difficult for the Palestinian Arab community to internalize the ethico-political viewpoint of the dominant group.

At that stage, emphasis on “Israeliness” of the society became essential ideological apparatus of ethico-political leadership of the Israeli Jewish center, where the Palestinian Arabs would be convinced to incorporate in the *historical bloc* and where the *transformismo* would evolve into *hegemony* through obtaining the active consent of the Palestinian Arabs to the hegemonic structures and processes. Complexities of creating a sphere of popular-national collective in a bi-national society complicated the establishment of ideological and ethico-political leadership over the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel, who had different ethno-national and cultural background than the ruling alliance.

Smootha’s theory of Israelization fit to the Gramscian methodology in some aspects. For Smootha, “Israeli citizenship, loyalty to the state, and a true desire to integrate in Israeli society to a greater degree on an equal footing with the Jews” are the components of Israelization process. Nevertheless, Smootha did not mention clearly the necessity of acceptance of the ethico-political leadership of the ruling classes within the context of Israelization process while defining the relationship between the Israeli ruling elite and the Palestinian Arab citizenry. In addition, he used the word hegemony as an exclusionary concept, which was based on the “institutionalized dominance” of one group over the popular-national collective and denial of any possible participation of other groups into the historical bloc and the state. He argued that “Jewish hegemony” was well established in the very nature of the state and this situation prevented Arab and other non-Jewish citizens to achieve full equality in Israeli system

both individually and collectively⁶⁰⁷. According to Smootha, Israeli state's unwillingness to become integral state derived from its centralization of the Jews as core nation in the Israeli collective⁶⁰⁸. In fact, being integral state would necessitate redefinition of Israeli popular-national collective embracing Israeli citizens.

Although governments of the 1990s put forward efforts to broaden the boundaries of the ethico-political leadership by reducing the ethno-nationalist limitations that derived from the exclusionist policies, they failed to consolidate hegemony on most segments of the Palestinian Arab citizenry. In fact, with the exception of efforts under Rabin leadership during the early and mid-1990s the Jewish *historic bloc* neglected acute problems of internalization of its ethico-political leadership by the Palestinian Arab citizenry until *Al-Aqsa Intifada* of 2000. As argued by Sa'di, Jewish historic bloc presented the Zionist project as moral and progressive project of nation and state building regardless of its discriminatory stance against the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. It denounced the unconstructive outcomes and the problems of the project as deviations from the otherwise progressive pathway.

[...] Zionists can always present the Zionist project (to themselves as well as to others) as moral and progressive, regardless of actual developments, since its primary motive is claimed to be moral.[...] Behaviours and practices esteemed as negative can always be interpreted as 'unintended results' or as a 'deviation', and so on, from an otherwise moral and progressive pathway.⁶⁰⁹

Al-Aqsa Intifada, revealed once more the problems of ethico-political leadership of Jewish historic bloc over the Palestinian Arab citizenry. In fact, it proved that any attempt to assume ethico-political leadership necessitates integration of the subordinate groups to the processes of construction of the common “ethico-political”, which is able to reflect ethico-political concerns and values of all segments of the society. Rouhana

⁶⁰⁷ Sammy Smootha, “The Implications of the Transition to Peace for Israeli Society”, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 555, January 1998, pp.26-46 (EBSCO)

⁶⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁹ Sa'di, (1997), *op.cit.*, p. 43

and Sultany argued that *Al-Aqsa Intifada* amplified the negative sentiments against Palestinian Arab citizens among the Jewish segments of Israeli society. They argued that new Zionist hegemony re-prioritized and emphasized Jewishness of the ethico-political leadership and called for the Palestinian Arab community's submissiveness to Jewish ideational dominance⁶¹⁰. For Rouhana and Sultany the new hegemonic Zionist discourse, which dominated Israeli political and civil societies after the *al-Aqsa Intifada* was based on revitalized Jewish ethno-centricism, exclusionary practices and hatred speech towards the Palestinian Arab citizenry as well as curtailment of their citizenship boundaries⁶¹¹. They attributed emergence of new Zionist hegemonic discourse to several factors such as demographic concerns of the Jewish historic bloc, fear of spread of counter-hegemonic activism among the Palestinian Arab citizenry against the self-assumed ethico-political leadership of the Jewish ruling elite due to increased Palestinian Arab national consciousness especially after the failure of Oslo process⁶¹².

However, there were also integrative steps towards the Palestinian Arab citizenry especially after 2003. Contrary to presumptions of Rouhana and Sultany, Israeli ruling elite moved to the center rather than far right. Establishment of a center party *Kadima*, by one of the most hawkish politicians of the Israeli Jewish right symbolized changing attitudes among the hawkish segments of political elite towards necessity of integrating Palestinian Arab citizenry into the Israeli ethico-political collective. Changes in the discourse and attitudes of the Jewish political elite towards the Palestinian Arab citizens and elite put forward a necessity of reconfiguring the boundaries of ethico-political collective and leadership especially after the *al-Aqsa Intifada* in order to prevent further alienation of the Palestinian Arab community from the hegemonic order. These changes were also reflected in the policies. Contrary to precedent policies

⁶¹⁰Nadim N. Rouhana, Nimer Sultany, "Redrawing the Boundaries of Citizenship: Israel's New Hegemony" *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2003, p.6

⁶¹¹ *Ibid.* p.16

⁶¹² *Ibid.* p.20

of selective and restricted co-optation, new efforts aimed at gradual inclusion of the value-system of the Palestinian Arab community into the redefinition of the Israeli ethico-political collective. In line with this approach, post-*Al-Aqsa* period witnessed augmented attempts of the ruling elite towards gradual incorporation of some segments of Palestinian Arab community into the ethico-political leadership.

4.3.2. Ideological superiority with solid economic roots

Ideology encompasses a central role in providing the ruling classes a consistent and adequately flexible worldview that would usefully serve persuasion of the subordinate groups about the integrity of the hegemonic relationship⁶¹³. In this respect, although a hegemonic ideology goes beyond reflecting the immediate economic interests of the ruling classes it cannot dominate the subordinate groups unless it has a solid economic basis. Hegemony as ideological leadership supported by strong economic roots refers to a relationship of domination defined in terms of material capabilities with which the dominant groups assure their dominance over the subordinate actor⁶¹⁴. For the hegemonic group, dependency of the subordinate groups to the dominant economic structures and processes would be an important facilitator in disseminating its dominant ideology. Degree of acceptability of the dominant ideology by the members of subordinate groups would be higher where there is little (even negligible) room for auto-centric development of the subordinate groups⁶¹⁵.

Piccone argues that Gramsci's elaboration of the relationship between the political and civil societies marks the end of traditional class politics, which is mainly determined by

⁶¹³ Pellicani, (1981), op.cit., p.28

⁶¹⁴ Applying Keyman's definition of hegemony for our own purposes in a different way. E. Fuat Keyman, **Globalisation, State, Identity, Difference: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Relations**, Humanities Press, New Jersey, 1997, p.115

⁶¹⁵ With auto-centric development I mean "a process of development where the whole cycle of production, reproduction of capital, realization of capital and valorisation of capital and the relationship between producer goods and consumer goods industries are all nicely contained within the same territorial economy and society" as defined in Ankie Hoogvelt, **Globalisation and Postcolonial World**, Macmillan Press Ltd., London and Hong Kong, 1997, p.40

the dialectical intra-societal positioning and consciousness of the socio-economic groups in line with their relations to the means of production⁶¹⁶. As the means of reproduction and propagation of dominant group's ideology began to mediate the everyday life instead of the relations of production, "traditional modes of opposition", which used to operate through politicization of class-consciousness became obsolete due to their integration "within the political-economic machinery of social capital".⁶¹⁷

According to Gramsci, a successful dissemination and internalization of a dominant ideology by the subordinate groups necessitates solid economic roots. In other words, a hegemonic group should have a strong economic basis and control over economic activity, which would enable it to provide the subordinate groups with material capabilities and consolidating its domination over them through augmenting dependency of the subordinates its economic leadership⁶¹⁸. Such dependency becomes apparent in the organization and operation of the dominant economic structures and processes. Controlled integration of the economic forces and capabilities of subordinate group to the dominant economic structures and processes limit scope and diversity of economic activities in the system. Such control also serves consolidation of economic dependency of subordinate group and dominance of ruling group through re-organization of economic structures and processes and maintenance of sub-development processes of the subordinate groups⁶¹⁹.

4.3.2.1. "Israeliness" as Dominant Ideology with Strong Economic Roots?

Here the question is that to what extent dominant ideology, represented by the Israeli state and institutions, is a coherent worldview for the Palestinian Arab citizenry in

⁶¹⁶ Paul Piccone, "Gramsci's Hegelian Marxism", *Political Theory*, Vol.2, No.1, 1974, p.42

⁶¹⁷ Ibid.

⁶¹⁸ Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger (eds.) Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.90

⁶¹⁹ Ankie Hoogvelt, *Globalisation and Postcolonial World*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London and Hong Kong, 1997, p.38.

Israel that can be supported by economic roots? Two important constituents of the Israeli dominant ideology has been Israeli nationalism and modernization. As Israeliness and Israeli nationalism have been interpreted differently among the different segments of Israeli society, different variances of the dominant ideology prevailed especially between the Jewish and Palestinian Arab citizenry. As the class-based and the nationalist divisions overlap in Israel, ideological basis of the relationship has become more related to its economic basis. In this respect, ethnic axis and the class axis of the stratum of the dominant and subordinate groups have been complementary rather than competing⁶²⁰.

At the initial stages, partial acculturation of the majority of the Palestinian Arabs into the Israeli hegemonic processes and the structures developed loosely and gradually rather than being a part of futuristic and pervasive plan of the ruling classes. In this respect, impact of the Israeli ruling-class-led modernization played an important role in gradual acculturation of the Palestinian Arabs into the Israeli system. Besides, priority of the Israeli dominant classes was the integration of the new Jewish immigrants to the historical bloc rather than establishing an integral state for all the inhabitants of Palestine. Therefore, at initial stages of the Israeli nation-state-building process, number of systematic attempts of claiming ethico-political leadership of the Palestinian inhabitants was limited. Main concern of the Israeli Jewish leadership until 1990s was to maintain control over the Palestinian Arab citizenry in order to prevent any organized counter-hegemonic upheaval against the dominant Israeli structures and processes.

Kanaana rejects the evolution of hegemonic relationship between the Israeli state and some segments of the Palestinian Arab citizenry. He evaluated the adjustment efforts of the Palestinian Arabs to the dominant Israeli environment as survival strategies rather

⁶²⁰ Yaish, (2001), op.cit.

than acceptance and internalization of ethico-political preeminence of *Israeliness*.⁶²¹ In fact, carrying Israeli passport despite the Jewish-Zionist character of the state; participating in the *Knesset*'s legislative activities despite its rejection of any political view that denies Israel as homeland of Jewish people; sending Palestinian Arab youth to the Hebrew-language education institutions despite their criticism as apparatuses of acculturation, daily following of Israeli Hebrew-language media despite a high rate of criticism of its one-sidedness can all be interpreted as survival tactics of individual or communal pragmatism. However, these activities also included *de facto* and *de jure* recognition of the leading role of the Israeli ruling classes and the *Israeliness* by the Palestinian Arabs in their daily practices.

Besides, these practices serve reproduction of the *Israeliness* in political, judicial and social interactions as well as within the discourses of Palestinian Arabs with regard to their identity. Furthermore, abovementioned activities have not been forced solely by the Israeli state. Some segments of the Palestinian Arab citizenry give their consent to the existing hegemonic structures and processes by allowing these structures and processes to play leading roles in determining their priorities in their daily lives. In fact, it was possible to observe the strength of the discourse of *Israeliness* in encompassing the identity building processes of the Palestinian Arabs even in the heydays of the Arab and Palestinian nationalisms and communism as alternative hegemonic discourses against the *Israeliness*. Indeed, surveys, conducted in late 1970s, indicated that that significant numbers of Palestinian Arabs classified themselves as Israeli Arabs and acclaimed their inclination to stay in Israel even in the case of establishment of a Palestinian State⁶²².

Positioning and status of the different segments of Palestinian Arab citizenry within the Israeli dominant economic and political structures was important dynamic in

⁶²¹ Sharif Kanaana, "Survival Strategies of Arabs in Israel", *MERIP Reports*, No. 41, October 1975, pp. 3-18

⁶²² William Frankel, **Israel Observed: An anatomy of the State**, Thames and Hudson, London, 1980, p.258

determining their attitudes towards reception of Israeliness. Strong economic roots of Israeliness provoked pragmatic choices some segments of Palestinian Arab community to reconsider their worldviews and ideological stances in line with their concerns about economic safety and wellbeing. As the internalization and banal reproduction of the Israeliness provided them with noteworthy access to the economic means within the dominant economic structure, some Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel received Israeliness as a complementary ideology to their existing worldviews. Although it might be a pragmatic choice for many of the Palestinian Arab citizens at the initial stages, ideology of Israeliness gradually dominated their lifestyles and daily socio-economic practices in time parallel to their integration to the dominant economic processes.

In fact, ideology of *Israeliness* would be a hollow promise for the Palestinian Arab citizens if strong economic mechanisms and processes did not support it. In Israel, Palestinian Arab citizens underwent a process of considerable economic modernization and development partly due to their interaction with the Israeli economic structure. From 1948 onwards, the Palestinian Arab community enjoyed a considerable rise in their living standards compared to other Arab communities in the Middle East. Notwithstanding discriminative distributions of the sources and services, gradual improvement of the facilities of housing, schooling, health care, infrastructure, communications, and transportation served to increased conformism among the Palestinian Arabs and indirectly served their internalization of dependency to the dominant structures of Israeli economy. Failed experimentation of the Palestinian Arab entrepreneurs towards industrialization hampered efforts towards further industrial advancement and eliminated the possibility of establishing infrastructure of an alternative economic structures to the existing dominant Israeli structures. Together with transformation of dispossessed Palestinian Arab farmers into job-seeking unskilled labor, failure of efforts towards proxy industrialization further consolidated the economic dependency and economic peripherization of the Palestinian Arab citizenry.

Parallel to the economic peripherization however, individual success stories of the Palestinian Arabs in sub-industrial sectors, construction, agro-trade and tourism⁶²³ indicated the opportunities within the existing system and served the amplification of the embryonic discourse of *Israeli Dream* among the Palestinian Arab citizens from the late 1960s onwards. Integration of the Palestinian Arab entrepreneurs to the world markets through Israeli economic system further consolidated their dependability to the highly developed Israeli dominant economic structure, which connected them to these markets. Furthermore, increased contact between the Jewish manufacturers and the Palestinian Arab entrepreneurs led emergence of intermediary Palestinian Arab bourgeoisie subordinate to the dominant Jewish economic classes.

Furthermore, urbanization of the Arab population and the shift of areas of its employment redefined the spatial relationship with the working and living places and thus detached most of the Palestinian Arabs from the villages in which they had their roots. In fact, in mid-1970s, half of the employed Palestinian Arab citizens obtained employment outside their localities⁶²⁴. Israeli economic establishment also incorporated the unemployed reserves of Palestinian Arabs, particularly Palestinian Arab women, who did not leave their localities for jobs either due to constraints of their traditions or their unwillingness to search jobs in Jewish dominated economic sectors. With the establishment of small industrial plants in their localities by the Jewish entrepreneurs and their Palestinian Arab counterparts or subordinates⁶²⁵, Palestinian Arab inhabitants of the villages were first proletarianized and then integrated into the periphery of the Israeli economic structure.

Especially after the increased interaction with the *West Bank* and *Gaza Strip* (WBGS), economic status of Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel upgraded. Comparison of their economic situation with the Palestinian labor of the WBGS led acknowledgement of

⁶²³ *Ibid.* pp.258-59

⁶²⁴ Israeli, (1991), *op.cit.*, 1991, p.30

⁶²⁵ Frankel, *op.cit.* , pp.259

their socio-economic differentiation from the Palestinians in these territories because of their Israeli citizenship and alleviated dissemination of ideology of Israeliness among the Palestinian Arab citizens. Interaction of the Palestinian Arab citizens with the Israeli dominant economic institutions as well as their inclusion to the leading economic organizations such as *Histadrut* also served acculturation of them into the Israeli economic system.

In the absence of organized alternative economic structures to the existing dominant Israeli structure, Palestinian Arabs were not able to develop a counter-hegemonic ideological leadership against the ideology of *Israeliness* in many segments of the Palestinian Arab community. In those segments, *Palestinianness* and *Arabness* were utilized to express the inequalities, which were inherent in the ideology of Israeliness. However, they did not transform into leading ideology due to disconnection of their discourses from the material conditions of their followers. Such dissociation from the dynamics and material space of economic dependency in their assessment of the relationship reduced these systematic frames of ideational alternatives into discursive clauses lacking material basis to challenge or create alternative existing dominant structures.

In some other segments of the community, there were serious attempts to diminish dependency from the Israeli dominant economic structures and processes. Supported by religious statements of belief *Palestinianness* and *Arabness* were transformed into counter-hegemonic ideologies with certain alternative economic roots. Success of these attempts was dependent on the economic self-sufficiency of these segments of the Palestinian Arab citizens. *Islamic Movement* was one of the most significant examples of such a search for alternative. The *Islamic Movement* established an alternative economic structure through which it undertook welfare and social security functions of

the Israeli state by providing the community services and improving living standards of its members particularly in Palestinian Arab localities of Israel⁶²⁶.

Al-Aqsa Intifada remarked dependency of the Palestinian Arab community to the Israeli dominant economic structures and processes. It also society vitalized intra-communal consciousness within the Palestinian Arab segment of Israeli about the probable consequences of such dependency.

Even on a pure material plane, the [Palestinian] Arabs discovered the extent to which their daily lives and consumer life-styles inside Israel are dependent on the political whims of the Jewish street and vulnerable to government punishment. After the demonstrations had been suppressed, the Israeli telephone monopoly Bezek suddenly stopped providing services or repairing phone lines in Arab villages, as did the countrywide electric company. [...] Even the rabbinate flexed its muscles with regard to the [Palestinian] Arabs, suddenly revoking Kosher certification from fourteen small Arab food factories, forcing their closure for days until new terms of Kosher certification were devised. [...] This situation, however temporary, brought home to the Arabs the extent to which their situation in Israel was not one of integration, but one of utter dependency.⁶²⁷

In the post-al *Aqsa Intifada* period, while some Palestinian Arab citizens tried to isolate themselves from the dominant economic structures and processes, others concentrated their civic and economic struggle on re-description of the dominant ideology and restructuring of its economic roots in an all-inclusive and/or integrative manner. Palestinian Arab claim for “a state for all its citizens” represented such a demand for redefinition of the dominant ideology of Israeliness with reconfiguring its economic roots through restructuring the Israeli economic system on a more equal basis.

4.3.3. Consent and Coercion

In his works Gramsci puts “consent” and “classes” to the center of his analysis of hegemonic relationship and defines hegemony as a relation of consent by means of

⁶²⁶ Alisa Rubin Peled, “Towards autonomy? The Islamist movement's quest for control of Islamic institutions in Israel”, *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 55, No.3; 2001, p.378

⁶²⁷ Azmi Bishara, “ Reflections on October 2000: A Landmark in Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.30, No.3, 2001, p.59

political and ideological relationship between the classes and other social forces”⁶²⁸. One of the most significant Gramsci’s legacies from the Italian tradition is his conception of the distinction between force and consent, which he took principally from works of Italian political and intellectual elite.⁶²⁹ He also reworked the Hegelian distinction between the political and civil society and revises this distinction by resituating it according to two types of social control based on consent and coercion respectively.⁶³⁰ In the case of coercive control, the dominant groups exert their dominance over the subordinate segments of society by direct use or threat of force. Consent-based control, on the other hand, necessitates intentional acceptance and internalization of the worldview of the dominant group by the subordinate segments of the society.

I believe, however, that consent and coercion are complementary rather than mutually exclusive and/or dialectical in defining the dominance of the dominant over the subordinates. Notwithstanding the perfunctory distinction made by some Gramscian scholars between use or threat of force and voluntary submission in defining the main contours of social control and dominance, I think that coercion and consent are not mutually excluding processes within the context of Gramscian hegemony. They are autonomous but also practically intermingled processes. As John Hoffman argued,

[...] to consent involves a recognition of coercion. [...] consent, although the relatively passive moment of relationship with another, is never simply a fatalistic acceptance of what ‘is’. To consent is also to transform, for in ‘consenting’, the individual enters into a relationship and by participating in such a relationship, social reality becomes something *other* than what it would have been, had the act of consent not occurred [...] Consent can be defined as conscious recognition of the coercion of relationships – a mechanism without which coercion could not be sustained and through which coercion is itself transformed.⁶³¹

⁶²⁸ Roger Simon, **Gramsci’s Political Thought**, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1991, p.22.

⁶²⁹ Randall D. Germain and Michael Kenny, ‘Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians’, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.24, No.1, 1998, p. 10

⁶³⁰ Chris Jenks, **Alt kültür: Toplumsalın Parçalanışı**, Ayrıntı Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p.152

⁶³¹ John Hoffman, **The Gramscian Challenge: Coercion and Consent in Marxist Political Theory**, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1984, pp.124-5

Nevertheless, contrary to Hoffman I do not believe that distinction between consent and coercion is purely methodological⁶³². In this respect, consent may combine forceful coercion with ethico-political leadership. However, reproduction of such dominance and its immunity from counter-dominance movements will be guaranteed only if the subordinate groups continuously submit their consent to this dominance through its voluntary internalization and banal reproduction. For Gramsci, dominant modern political structures function successfully by integrating the groups under control with the ruling groups and thus providing necessary basis for them to support the rulers and legitimizing their coercive authority. Thus, coercion, persuasion and cooperation became intermingled components of ideological strategy of governing polity⁶³³. In fact, for the hegemon consensus and coercion are complementary and uniformly crucial in maintaining order⁶³⁴, which would require hegemon's exercise of authority not only owing to its coercive capacity and determination but also because of its intellectual and moral leadership over the subordinate segments of the society⁶³⁵. Thus while analysis of coercive and material capabilities remains a necessary task in understanding hegemony, reducing hegemony to forceful coercive authority alone misses important insights concerned with moral, social, and ideological control⁶³⁶.

In this respect, although any type of coercion requires 'some' consent, it is the intensity and nature of consent, which determine the permanence of hegemony. The hegemon must therefore ensure that secondary actors undergo some form of socialization that promotes the common acceptance of a consensual order that binds the ruler and the

⁶³² *Ibid.*, p. 128

⁶³³ Chris Jenks, **Alt kültür: Toplumsalın Parçalanışı**, Ayrıntı Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p.152

⁶³⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶³⁵ Antonio Gramsci, **Selections from the Prison Notebooks**, Q. Hoore and G. Howell (eds. and trans.), Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1978, pp.57-8.

⁶³⁶ Robert Cox, "Gramsci, "Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method", *Millenium*, Vol.12, No.2, pp.162-75

ruled and legitimizes power.⁶³⁷ Therefore, hegemony is distinguished from pure coercive control by its legitimatization of political, economic, and social institutions, which are supposed to operate through enjoying the consent of the subordinate segments of society, who internalize their subordinate and submissive position as natural⁶³⁸ “through the negotiated construction of a political and ideological consensus which incorporates both dominant and dominated groups.”⁶³⁹ As Pelicani argued,

[...] a social group becomes a ruling class when it solicits and obtains the consent of the other groups and, on the basis of this consent, reorganizes society and erects a judicial apparatus capable of protecting society from its potential external enemies and of guaranteeing the stability of the new order.⁶⁴⁰

Accordingly, a dominant group can construct and maintain hegemony to the extent that its ideas, values, beliefs and views are successfully dispersed consented and internalized among the members of subordinate groups⁶⁴¹. On the other hand, failure of dominant group in constructing consent among the subordinate groups for dominance of its worldview leads it to use coercion in order to control the resistant segments of subordinate groups and to prevent occurrence of a counter-hegemonic consciousness and activism against it.

In Israeli case state was one of the main actors in manufacturing consent and controlling the dissent. As the Israeli state was not immune from the impacts of

⁶³⁷ G. J. Ikenberry and C.A. Kupchan, “Socialisation and Hegemonic Power”, *International Organization*, Vol.44, No.3, 1990, p.287.

⁶³⁸ Tony Evans, ‘Universal Human Rights: Imposing Values’, Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin (eds.), **Globalization and the South**, Ipswich Book Company, Suffolk, 1997, p.93

⁶³⁹ Dominic Strinati, , **An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture**, Routledge, London, 1995, p. 165

⁶⁴⁰ Pellicani, (1981), op.cit.,, p. 30

⁶⁴¹ Thomas R. Bates, “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony”, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol.36, No.2, 1975, p.353

dominant processes, which reshaped Israeli socio-economic and political orders, patterns of coercion and consent in the relationship between the Israeli dominant structures and the Palestinian Arab citizens was heavily influenced by the positioning of the Israeli ruling elite in line with its efforts towards adjusting to these processes. Among these transformative processes, modernization and liberalization have had determining impact on the policy preferences of Israeli ruling elite in its relationship with Israeli citizenry.

Neo-Marxist and especially elitist theorists are correct in emphasizing the importance of state control and institutions in fostering consent and controlling dissent. Yet, in some contradiction to the elitist arguments, the state was never wholly autonomous from sociopolitical processes. In accordance with the liberal approach the long-term processes of modernization and liberalism have significantly influenced the mechanisms of political order.⁶⁴²

In the first five decades, as Israeli state lacked the hegemony, it generally utilized armor of coercion against the Palestinian Arab citizens to maintain its control over them. Military rule, which was established in the Palestinian Arab villages of Israel just after the declaration of the Israeli state, was an institutionalized form of coercive control. Following the end of the military rule in 1966, coercive policies of the Israeli ruling elite began to be accompanied by consent-seeking practices with increasing the necessity of controlled integration of the Palestinian Arab community to the Israeli dominant structures and processes in line with the transforming impact of the modernization on Israeli economic system. Modernization-led opening in the Israeli economic and socio-political systems generated increased concerns on maintaining dominance over the Palestinian Arab community by utilization of different means other than coercive mechanisms. Socio-economic necessities of the transformation required replacement of the coercive control of the Palestinian Arab community with consent-manufacturing alternatives. Consequently,

⁶⁴² Gad Barzilai, "War, Democracy, and Internal Conflict: Israel in a Comparative Perspective", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1999, pp.332

Initially main concern of the Israeli ruling elite was to incorporate Palestinian Arab citizenry to the processes of Israeli modernization without leading any counter-hegemonic resistance and activism among them rather than including the Palestinian Arab citizenry into Israeli hegemonic framework. In this respect first five decades of the relationship between the Israeli ruling elite and the Palestinian Arab community was characterized by the passive revolutionary acts of the ruling elite and responses of the Palestinian Arab citizens to these acts. Lack of widespread counter-hegemonic movements against the Israeli dominant structures and processes indicated that despite social segregation, economic stratification, and political inequalities, exclusionary policies, Israeli ruling classes cultivated a minimum basis of consent by its passive revolutionary practices among the majority of the Palestinian Arab citizens on coexistence with the Jews within territorial borders of Israeli entity in this period. In fact, during those years the main question of the Palestinian Arab citizens became not whether but how and with what type of institutions they would coexist with the Jewish majority.

Consequent to the neo-liberal transformation that started in 1980s; early 1990s witnessed attitudinal changes among the Israeli ruling elite towards the Palestinian Arab citizens. These changes were translated into the policies as well. Notwithstanding continuation of passive revolutionary acts, Israeli ruling elite began to adopt and implement consent-seeking initiatives towards the Palestinian Arab citizenry. Rabin's period was particularly worth to mention with regard to accelerated efforts towards generating consent among the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel towards the dominant structures and ethico-political validity of *Israeliness* as leading ideational and identity-marking framework of a new Israeli national-popular collective. They had perceived the positive atmosphere created by the Oslo Process in the region as a transformational opportunity not only for intra-regional relations between the Arab states and Israel, but also for intra-societal relations in Israel. Therefore they concentrated their efforts on replacing passive revolutionary mechanisms of control with the consent-based integrative policies. Although these attempts were interrupted with the assassination of

Rabin and failure of the Oslo process in the mid-1990s as well as *al-Aqsa Intifada* of 2000, their ideational framework aiming at initiation of socio-economic and political consent-seeking policies was revitalized and began to be implemented in the post *Al-Aqsa Intifada* period more vibrantly.

Al-Aqsa Intifada signified a crisis in hegemony-in-building, which was initiated by some segments of Israeli ruling elite led by Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres in early 1990s in line with efforts towards adaptation to the processes of neo-liberal transformation in the world and the Middle Eastern region. However, it did not result in abandonment of the policies of towards hegemony-in-building. On the contrary, it indicated to the Israeli ruling elite necessity of manufacturing consent among the Palestinian Arab community to establish and maintain a hegemonic order of through their integration and active participation in dominant structures and processes. The Israeli ruling elite took this message very seriously following the unprecedented participation of its Palestinian Arab citizens in uprising. Consequently, post-*al Aqsa* period witnessed increasing efforts Israeli ruling elite towards seeking consent among the Palestinian Arab community to its ethico-political leadership, dominant ideology and socio-economic structure.

4.3.4. Civil society and Political Society distinction (dichotomy)?

In Gramscian terminology relationship between the political and civil society is an important component hegemony. For Gramsci “society is a structure of hierarchically superimposed classes that are differentiated on the basis of their position and function in the productive organization.”⁶⁴³ Hierarchical organization of the groups in the society takes at both political and civil levels of its superstructure, which is composed of a combination of institutions.⁶⁴⁴ State, with its legislative, executive, judiciary, and coercive institutions such as bureaucracy, governments, courts and police, army and

⁶⁴³ Pellicani, (1981), *op.cit.*, p. 29

⁶⁴⁴ M.Lutfullah Karaman11 & Bülent Aras, “The Crisis of Civil Society in Turkey”, *Journal of Economic and Social Research*, Vol. 2 No. 2, 2000, p.42

other public institutions constitute the political society. In this respect, political society is embodied and institutionalized in the body state and it is a space where coercive mechanisms, norms and principles, and juridical framework are designed and utilized in direct domination of the subordinates.

Civil society on the other hand refers to a super-structural sphere in which individuals discover their places in the super-structural hierarchical organization through constructing their political and social identities at individual and collective levels⁶⁴⁵. In this respect, civil society is the space where such socialization and politicization of the individual is materialized by his participation in the voluntary associations and interactions with ideological and cultural institutions. As Fontana argued,

[it is] a space within which hegemony emerges and within which it is socially and politically defined and concretized [...]. [It] is the sphere where a continual process of conflict and community, dissent and consent is generated. It is here that the dialectic between conflict and consensus, factional strife over particularistic ends and the generation of common goals is conducted⁶⁴⁶

According to Williams, Gramsci considers political and civil societies as two spheres of super-structure which are qualitatively distinct from each other⁶⁴⁷. In Gramscian conceptualization political society refers to “direct rule”, “coercive apparatus” or “power of command” which is embodied in the state. Civil society on the other hand refers to the totality of private and voluntary organisms through which hegemony is exercised⁶⁴⁸. As the hegemony is considered as a sphere of *diretione* and a process of search for “equilibrium”, “persuasion”, “consent”, and “consolidation”, some

⁶⁴⁵ Randall D. Germain and Michael Kenny, “Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.24, No.1, 1998, p.7

⁶⁴⁶ Fontana, (2006), op.cit., p.37

⁶⁴⁷ Gwyn A. Williams, “The Concept of ‘Egemonia’ in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci: Some Notes on Interpretation”, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol.21, No.4, 1960, p.590

⁶⁴⁸ Ibid.

Gramscian scholars tend to distinguish it from the sphere of *dominio*, which is characterized mainly by “coercion”, “state power”, and “the moment of force”⁶⁴⁹.

For Pellicani, for instance, Gramsci accepts the liberal distinction between political society and civil society:

Political society is composed of the judicial-coercive apparatus of the state (power as force), civil society, on the other hand, comprises the thick web of interpersonal relationships and represents the social surface over which is extended the cultural hegemony of the ruling elites (power as consent). It is exactly at this level of civil society that the hegemonic class creates, with its daily and assiduous diffusion of values, myths, beliefs, and ideals, the intellectual and moral unity of the various social groups that articulate society.⁶⁵⁰

Murphy highlights such a ‘disjunction’ in Gramscian elaboration of political society, which represents ‘legality’ and civil society that represents ‘reality’⁶⁵¹ as well. This distinction between *Gramscian* reading of political and civil societies however, is complementary rather than diametrically opposed. In other words, the epistemological relationship between the civil and political societies within the context of hegemony is not necessarily dialectical. They are rather analytical categories to understand a single hegemonic socio-political entity⁶⁵². In this respect, it is not possible to confine meaning of civil society by detaching it from its essential bonds with the political society. As Gramsci put it in *Prison Notebooks*,

What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural 'levels': the one that can be called 'civil society', that is, the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private', and that of 'political society' or 'the state'. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the functions of 'hegemony' which the dominant group exercises

⁶⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p.591

⁶⁵⁰ Pellicani, (1981), *op.cit.*, p.33

⁶⁵¹ Craig N. Murphy, “Understanding IR: understanding Gramsci”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.24, No.1, 1998, p. 421

⁶⁵² Randall D. Germain and Michael Kenny, “Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.24, No.1, 1998, p. 15

throughout society and on the other hand to that of 'direct domination' or command exercised through the state and 'juridical' government.⁶⁵³

Cox also emphasizes the essential connection between the political and civil societies in defining the state and determining hegemonic socio-political organization of the dominant and subordinate groups. For Cox, it is meaningless to restrict description of state with essentials of government while “hegemony of the leading [groups] of a whole social formation” determines practices of the government’s “administrative executive and coercive mechanisms”.⁶⁵⁴ In fact, super-structural equilibrium that is established by the dominant group between political and civil societies without neglecting the modes and processes of production and the economy would create environment conducive for the emergence and maintenance of a hegemonic system⁶⁵⁵.

Joel Migdal’s institutionalist approach in his analysis of state-society relations in Israel underlines such an organic tie between the civil and political society. His ‘*state in society approach*’ maintains that states are parts of society rather than autonomous and homogenous reflection of an isolated political society. He implies a mutually transforming quality of political and civil society relations, which may lead mutual empowerment of the state and different social groups in society. Therefore, political and civil societies are not mutually exclusive and dialectically positioned within the socio-economic structure. In his approach, Migdal articulates a hegemonic state, which allows existence, embeddedness, reflection, representation of different segments of society in its embodiment under an ethico-political leadership. In this respect, political society both shapes and is shaped by the civil society, which it is embedded. Political behavior and the power capacities of social groups are contingent and they should be

⁶⁵³ Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebook, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare & Goffrey Nowell Smith, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971, p.12

⁶⁵⁴ Cox, (1993), op.cit. p.51

⁶⁵⁵ Gwyn A. Williams, “The Concept of ‘Egemonia’ in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci: Some Notes on Interpretation”, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol.21, No.4, 1960, p.590

evaluated in relation to their ties with the dominant political society as well as their positioning within the national-popular collective.

Indeed, Gramsci perceived civil society as a sphere, where political power of the dominant groups - that is partly embodied in the state-, is consolidated in parallel with emergence and fusion of national-popular collective.⁶⁵⁶ In this respect, it is a public domain, where the values, ideologies and norms of the dominant groups are disseminated through various institutions and voluntary associations of society. “Private and voluntary organisms” such as schools, religious institutions, media, political parties, non-governmental organizations, which constitute the civil society enhance in “molecular” construction of socio-political consciousness⁶⁵⁷. Gramsci draws particular attention to the role of those institutions in ensuring the hegemony of the ruling class⁶⁵⁸. As Rupert stated,

[...] the development of civil society [...] entailed the emergence of institutions and practices through which mass political participation might be mobilized or channeled, especially mass-based political parties and trade unions, but also churches, education, journalism, art and literature, and so on.⁶⁵⁹

Abrahamsen agrees with Rupert about the complementarities of political and civil societies in the hegemonic socio-economic orders. In this respect, as the hegemonic order is structured and buttressed by both political and civil societies, hegemony obliterates the traditional distinctions between them. Consequently, “structure and superstructure come together to form an organic unity, or a historical bloc, the

⁶⁵⁶ Craig N. Murphy, “Understanding IR: understanding Gramsci”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.24, No.1, 1998, p. 422

⁶⁵⁷ Thomas R. Bates, “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony”, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol.36, No.2, 1975, p.353

⁶⁵⁸ M. Lutfullah Karamanlı & Bülent Aras, “The Crisis of Civil Society in Turkey”, *Journal of Economic and Social Research*, Vol. 2 No. 2, 2000, p.41

⁶⁵⁹ Mark Rupert, “(Re-)Engaging Gramsci: a response to Germain and Kenny” *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No.3, 1998, p. 432

unification of material forces, institutions, and ideologies.”⁶⁶⁰ In such convergence institutions of civil society operates to assist internalization of the values of the dominant group by the different segments of the society.

Nevertheless, for Gramsci these institutions may well be used to challenge the dominant group. In fact, according to him, cultural institutions are “integral parts of socio-political factors and functions”⁶⁶¹. In this respect, it is not simple to distinguish political and civil societies with clear-cut boundaries. Socio-cultural problems have material basis and they should also be evaluated through politics. In fact, cultural institutions and structures do not only operate at ideational level. They operate materially in the countries where there exist a developed economy, civil society and integrative state⁶⁶². In these cases, main concern of the leadership of the subordinate groups would be political instrumentalization of the cultural institutions and civil societal mechanisms of the existing system in their war of position against the dominant group. Thus as it will be elaborated in this thesis, Gramsci perceived the distinction between the political and civil societies as methodological rather than organic.

Within the context of Israel, Smootha assesses the civil society from the perspective of "structural pluralism." He argues that different cultural groups within the Israeli civil society have discrepant claims and different levels of access to the dominant structures, processes and main collective resources. In this respect, he argued that Israeli democracy is a failing moment of coexistence for the Palestinian Arab citizenry, while it is “a reconciliatory 'consociational democracy' for religious Jews, a restricted democracy for the Oriental [Jews]”.⁶⁶³ Although existence of autonomous institutions

⁶⁶⁰ Rita Abrahamsen, “The Victory of Popular Forces or Passive Revolution? A Neo-Gramscian Perspective on Democratisation” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.35, No.1 , 1997, pp.147-8.

⁶⁶¹ Wallace P. Sillanpoa, “Passolini’s Gramsci”, *MLN*, Vol.96, No.1, Italian Issue, 1981, p.131

⁶⁶² Ibid.

⁶⁶³ Baruch Kimmerling, “Sociology, Ideology, and Nation-Building: The Palestinians and Their Meaning in Israeli Sociology, *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 57, No. 4. 1992, p. 450

like religious courts, Arab-speaking school system, and Arabic language media⁶⁶⁴ seem to mark an autonomous sphere of mobilization for Palestinian Arabs in Israeli socio-economic and political structuring, a detailed analysis of the nature of their relationship with the ruling class is necessary. In fact, relative autonomy of the Palestinian Arab institutions notwithstanding, they are not disconnected from the passive revolutionary and hegemonic structures and mechanisms of the Israeli ruling groups.

With regard to political society, an ordinary dilemma has been inherent in almost all main political options of Palestinian Arab citizens such as incorporation with the Zionist political organizations, communism, Palestinian nationalism, pragmatism and Islamism⁶⁶⁵ : How to contend with the Israeli dominant structures and processes while maintaining their relative autonomy and Palestinian Arab characteristics.

Al-Aqsa Intifada revealed diversity and schism of various segments of Palestinian Arab community with regard to overcoming this dilemma through utilization of existing options within or outside the Israeli political and civil societies. In spite of their emphasis on the Palestinianness and Palestinian nationalism as the main source of their national popular collective, of all segments the Palestinian Arab community's divisiveness was reflected in the diversified and unorganized responses to the Israeli coercive policies during the uprising. Notwithstanding accusations directed to them from the Jewish political elite about their inclinations and exacerbating attitudes towards the incidents against the Israeli state and public space most of the Palestinian Arab political parties remained within the boundaries of Israeli political and civil societies rather than recruiting their constituents for a counter-hegemonic struggle. *Islamic Movement*, on the other hand, opted for an alternative civil society in which it aimed to construct a counter-hegemonic socio-economic structure. It expressed its counter-hegemonic stance throughout *al-Aqsa intifada*.

⁶⁶⁴ Eliezer Ben Rafael, *The Emergence of Ethnicity, Cultural Groups and Social Conflict in Israel*, 1982, Westport Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1982, p.207

⁶⁶⁵ Ibid.

Traditional kinship structures (*hamulas*) responded *al-Aqsa Intifada* differently from each other in line with their positioning within the Israeli economic structure as well as civil and political societies. In this respect, while some *hamulas* operated to maintain and consolidate the hegemonic relationship with the Israeli ruling elite some others sided with the counter-hegemonic movements. Reconstruction of the Israeli civil and political societies in the post-*al-Aqsa* period necessitated a serious assessment of such divisiveness in the Palestinian Arab political society and diversification in Palestinian Arab civil society and their implications for the relationship between the Israeli dominant structures and processes and Palestinian Arab citizenry.

4.3.5. Popular –national collective

According to Gramsci as the hegemony was an inclusive rather than an exclusive process, popular-national collective was neither monolithic nor univocal. It was rather “a syncretic historical residue, fragmentary and contradictory, open to multiple interpretations and potentially supportive of very different kinds of social visions and political projects.”⁶⁶⁶ As Simon argues

A class cannot achieve national leadership, and become hegemonic, if it confines itself only to class interests; it must take into account the popular and democratic demands and struggles of the people which do not have a purely class character, that is, which do not arise directly out of relations of production. [...] radical and popular struggles for civil liberties, movements for national liberation, the women’s movement, the peace movement, movements expressing the demands of minorities [...]⁶⁶⁷

National-popular collective may be either restrictive/assimilative or emancipative for the subordinate groups in hegemonic terms. Integration to the national-popular collective provides the subordinate group with access to entire national cultural structure and processes. On the one hand, such an access may enable the subordinate groups to participate in the process of reconstructing a new cultural and ideational

⁶⁶⁶ Mark Rupert, “Globalising common sense: a Marxian-Gramscian (re-)vision of the politics of governance/resistance”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.29, Supplement 1, 2003, p.185

⁶⁶⁷ Simon, (1991), op.cit., pp.23-4

framework for emergence of a new and more integrative national popular collective through waging a *war of position* against the dominant group. In this case, being an constituent of the new national-popular collective may allow the subordinate groups to emancipate from the cultural hierarchies of the previous national-popular collective⁶⁶⁸.

On the other hand, integration to the national popular collective can take place through assimilation of the subordinate group into the dominant processes of the existing national-popular collective, whose values and ethico-political boundaries were prescribed by the dominant group. In this case, subordinate groups may internalize “false” values and “conformity”⁶⁶⁹. This may lead a process of emancipation from the exclusionary practices from the dominant national-collective through internalization of the cultural hierarchies.

In Israeli case, a historical controversy between the Revisionists and the Labor Zionists dominated the debates on the substance of the *Risorgimento* and boundaries of the national-popular collective. Revisionists ardently desired an *Israeli Risorgimento* anchored in a strong Jewish ascendancy on the historical lands of ancient Israeli tribes on both sides of the Jordan River. The *Italian Risorgimento* had an influence on the ideological stances and political programs of both founder (Viladamir Jabotinsky)⁶⁷⁰ and the leading reformer (Menachem Begin) of the Revisionist Movement⁶⁷¹. Notwithstanding their differences in the methods and policy choices to achieve *Israeli Risorgimento*, both leaders concurred on the idea of a Jewish state, which would enhance the Jewishness of the society. The revisionist program of *Israeli Risorgimento* was either ignorant or unsympathetic towards the Palestinian Arabs in Israeli lands.

⁶⁶⁸ Sillanpoa(1981), op.cit., p.135

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁰ Pinto Vincenzo, “Between imago and res : The Revisionist–Zionist Movement's Relationship with Fascist Italy, 1922–1938”, *Israel Affairs*, Vol. 10, No.3, 2004, pp.90-109 and Jacob Abadi, “Constraints and Adjustments in Italy's Policy toward Israel”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2002, pp. 63-94

⁶⁷¹ Colin Schindler, “Ze’ev Jabotinsky and Menachem Begin”, *Jerusalem Post*, February 5, 2006

Maintaining the idea of a limited and controlled Palestinian Arab existence in Jewish socio-economic processes⁶⁷², program did not perceive them as an integral part of the present or future Israeli society. In other words, the Palestinian Arabs were totally excluded from the Revisionist account of *Risorgimento*.

Alternatively, the Labor Zionists, led by Ben Gurion, represented a more pragmatic and practical program of a *Israeli Risorgimento*. They did not neglect the importance of “the Jewish national values” in shaping the nature and the policies of the state in order to protect Jews with their culture and beliefs. However, they presumed that these aims and values would not “prevent the Jewish state from doing the same for minorities and their cultures, or [...] from encouraging their assimilation”⁶⁷³. This controversy had a decisive impact on the ideological basis and the nature of the new state. It also prevented development of a cohesive historic bloc in Israel as a monolithic establishment. The clash between the romantic and martial doctrines of the Revisionists and pragmatic and practical program of the Labor Zionists was reflected in the struggle for hegemony over the whole society. This controversy intensified and expanded as the Palestinian Arab citizens increasingly incorporated into the Israeli socio-economic and political structures and processes.

For many scholars, the differences between the *Risorgimento* programs did not seem to differ significantly in their position with the Palestinian Arabs. For Smootha, the Israeli state located the Jews in the center of the popular-national collective as the core nation and it refused to create a new Israeli nation embracing all segments of the Israeli society⁶⁷⁴ including the Palestinian Arabs. In fact, congregational rather than integrative state of Israel advanced the disparity in the allotment of privileges, duties and domination by employing a hierarchical membership to the popular national

⁶⁷² Bernard Avishai, “The Jewish State in Question”, *The New York Review of Books*, Vol.21, No. 21-22, January 23, 1975

⁶⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷⁴ Sammy Smootha, “The Implications of the Transition to Peace for Israeli Society”, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol.555, January 1998, pp.26-46

collective. This hierarchical categorization of membership to the popular national collective, which derived from the republican definition of the citizenship, regarded different individuals and groups of Israeli citizenry according to their implicit contribution to the common popular-national collective good defined by the ruling classes⁶⁷⁵.

However, it is not also possible to observe a monolithic Jewish definition of the Israeli popular-national collective. Contrary to arguments of Shamir and Sullivan for instance, there is no solid *Jewish national consensus* on certain critical issues such as recognizing existence of a Palestinian nation, recognition of PLO as a representative of the Palestinians, formation of a Palestinian state in the *West Bank* and *Gaza Strip*⁶⁷⁶. In this respect, distinction did not take place only between the Jewish and Palestinian Arab citizens but also between the *Ashkenazi* and *Mizrachi* Jews as well as among the different *Mizrachi* and *Oriental Jewish* communities. Thus, it is possible to argue about the existence of national-consensus-in-building rather than a consolidated national consensus among the majority in Israel. Thus as in the case of “the somewhat ‘bastard’ Italian state”⁶⁷⁷ of the Italian Risorgimento, the new Israeli state was established with a limited hegemonic base in 1948, which could not succeed at “integrating the people into the framework of the new State”⁶⁷⁸ and evolved gradually into an incomplete hegemonic structure throughout the history.

In fact rather than the hegemony of a whole class or a group over the rest of society, the Ashkenazi dominated Israeli state structure until 1977 represented the hegemony of only a part of an ethnic group over the rest of that ethnic group as in the case of the

⁶⁷⁵ Gershon Shaffir and Yoav Peled, **The Dynamics of Citizenship in Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process**, p.253

⁶⁷⁶ Michal Shamir and John Sullivan, “Jews and Arabs in Israel: Everybody Hates Somebody, Sometime”, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.29, No.2, 1985, p. 290

⁶⁷⁷ Antonio Gramsci, **Selections From Prison Notebooks**, 1971, ed. by Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, ElecBook, London, 1999, p.263

⁶⁷⁸ Ibid.

moderates in Italian Risorgimento. Center and peripheries of the national popular collective were redefined in 1977 with the emergence of a new political culture as a consequence of amalgamation of interests and values of center and some segments in the periphery. Emergence of new political culture did not significantly change the peripheral positioning of the Palestinian Arab citizenry within the Israeli national-popular collective. The center of the Israeli national-popular collective maintained its Jewish character intact. It was only customized by adjustments in the power distribution among the old ruling elite⁶⁷⁹. The core Jewish collective continued to be represented in the symbols and practices of the state and other institutions of political and civil societies. In this respect, the Palestinian Arab citizens have been significantly absent in the symbols of the state and the country such as flag, anthem and national holidays⁶⁸⁰. Association of the image of Israeli state with Jewish sacred and cultural symbols caused estrangement of Palestinian Arab citizens from the dominant institutional structures and processes of Israeli system and thus from the national-popular collective.

Furthermore, establishment of an all-inclusive Israeli popular-national collective requires reduction of the Palestinian Arab citizenry's dissents and alienation from the hegemonic structures and processes of the Israeliness. This is unlikely, however, unless the dilemmas of Palestinian Arabs in defining their identities and their loyalties prevail within the Israeli context. In fact, most of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel discard some constituents of Jewish consensus on the definition of *Israeliness* and their imposition as conditions of participation in the Israeli national-popular collective.

As Rebeca Kook argued, some groups of citizens in Israel were treated differently despite the universalistic claims of the citizenship under the dominant ideology of

⁶⁷⁹ Baruch Kimmerling, "Sociology, Ideology, and Nation-Building: The Palestinians and Their Meaning in Israeli Sociology, *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 57, No. 4. 1992, p.453

⁶⁸⁰ Kook, (1995), op.cit., p.316

*Israeliness*⁶⁸¹. It is also true that this was done intentionally by the regime leaders. However, what Kook undermined was that these differentiated practices of citizenship and different treatment cannot simply be explained by the corporate ethnic identity thesis. In fact, the states treatment of its citizens of a different ethnic identity also differentiated from group to group within the same ethnic group of citizens. In other words, state pursued a selective treatment in its relations with different segments of the Palestinian Arab citizenry. Ethnic component was important but not solely decisive in the differentiation state's practices toward the Palestinian Arab community. It rather pursued a selective approach and distinguished the Palestinian Arab citizens, who internalized the ideology of *Israeliness* from the ones who resisted accepting its ideological preeminence.

Commitment of the Palestinian Arab citizenry to the newly established Israeli national popular collective also necessitated construction of an upper identity of *Israeliness* that would either dominate or co-opt the national, religious, class-based and local identities of the Palestinian Arab citizenry. It was not however, the intention of the Israeli dominant classes until the 1990s to cultivate a compelling identity for the entire Palestinian Arab citizenry. They rather pursued policies of selective hegemonization on limited numbers of the Palestinian Arab groups or individuals, while aggravating the identity-related dilemmas of the most of the Palestinian Arab citizens. In fact, ruling classes did not have a sophisticated project of hegemonization designed for all of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel, which would aim at inculcation of the values of a national-popular collective identified by the ideological contours of *Israeliness*.

Palestinian Arab citizens have also been excluded from the processes of national-consensus-in-building⁶⁸² until the crisis of hegemony-in-building in early 2000s with the exceptional interval of the Rabin's period. *Al-Aqsa intifada* indicated a

⁶⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p.323.

⁶⁸² Majid al Haj, Elihu Katz and Samuel Shye, "Arab and Jewish Attitudes toward a Palestinian State", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.37, No. 4, 1993, p.620

breakthrough in the failure of Israeli ruling elite in imposing the boundaries of national-popular collective particularly on the Palestinian Arab citizenry. However, they continued their civic struggle within the dominant Israeli system in order to have a say in the process of national-consensus-in-building that would include all of Israeli citizens. Consequently, efforts of the Palestinian Arab citizenry in post-*al-Aqsa intifada* period concentrated on achieving their full civic rights within the Israeli national-collective, which would be defined to embrace all members of the society through introduction of value systems and identity denominators of all constituents of the new Israeli national-popular collective.

4.3.6. Trasformismo (passive revolution) and Risorgimento

In Gramscian terms passive revolution is simply a revolution without revolution,. It refers an in-system transformation (*trasformismo*), which is initiated by the ruling classes to maintain its dominant position in the system through incorporation of leadership of antagonistic or subordinate groups into the elite networks of dominant structure and processes⁶⁸³. Such incorporation enables the dominant groups to “absorb, decapitate and annihilate the elites of the enemies”⁶⁸⁴ within the system and prevent emergence of a counter-hegemonic consciousness and activism among the subordinate groups through pacification of potential counter-hegemonic forces in the society.

Passive revolution, in Gramscian terminology, refers to the relationship between the ruling class and the subordinate groups in the countries where the ruling class was not capable or willing enough to establish a functioning hegemony over the subordinate groups. It takes place whenever reasonably important adjustments are made to country’s social and economic structure from above by utilizing the state apparatuses and without relying on the active participation of the people⁶⁸⁵. It is a “revolution

⁶⁸³ Rita Abrahamsen “The Victory of Popular Forces or Passive Revolution? A Neo-Gramscian Perspective on Democratisation” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 35(1), 1997, p.149

⁶⁸⁴ Pellicani, (1981), op.cit., p.30

⁶⁸⁵ Simon, (1991), op.cit., pp.24-5

without revolution”, a process of revolutionary change introduced by the ruling elites to consolidate their power through preservation of the politico-economic status-quo and existing social order.⁶⁸⁶

Therefore, it reflects a society's inability to achieve a full hegemonic relationship. According to LoMer, Gramsci took this concept from Vincenzo Cuoco, whose *Saggio storico sulla rivoluzione napoletana del 1799* had established a causal relationship between the disintegration of the Neapolitan Republic and the erroneous efforts of the ruling classes “to impose the principles of the French Revolution on a very different social environment”⁶⁸⁷

The ideas of the Neapolitan revolution could have been popular had they been drawn from the depths of the nation. Drawn from a foreign constitution, they were far from ours; founded on maxims too abstract . . . they sought to legislate all the customs, caprices and at times all the defects of another people, who were far from our defects, caprices, and customs⁶⁸⁸.

LoMer observed similarities between Gramsci and Cuoco in their perception of passive revolution as revolution without involvement of masses. He distinguished Gramsci from Cuoco by his critical stance on the failure of the Neapolitan elite in gaining support of the masses for implementation of the principles of the French Revolution in Neapolitan Republic rather than for attempting to implement these ideas in a different socio-economic structure.

In his analysis of *Risorgimento*, Gramsci provided a detailed definition of passive revolution in the case of Italian in-system reformation. According to Gramsci *Risorgimento* was

⁶⁸⁶ Rita Abrahamsen, *op.cit.*, 1997, pp.148-49

⁶⁸⁷ David G. LoRomer, **Merchants and Reform in Livorno, 1814-1868**. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1987, p.8

⁶⁸⁸ Vincenzo Cuoco, *Saggio storico sulla rivoluzione napoletana del 1799*, ed. N. Cortese (Florence, 1926), p. 83 quoted in David G. LoRomer, **Merchants and Reform in Livorno, 1814-1868**. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1987, p.9

a revolution from above, successful largely because of Cavour's skillful diplomacy, and the resulting political system, though parliamentary in form, was in practice based on a system of inter-elite collaboration known as *trasformismo*. While they had some input into this collaboration, bourgeois elements were in no position to "defend the unity and integrity of the state against the repeated attacks of the reactionary forces, represented above all by the alliance of the great landowners with the Vatican."⁶⁸⁹

Thus for Gramsci, notwithstanding the existence of adverse elements in addition to its complexities and inconsistencies, Risorgimento produced an "integral" passive revolutionary movement which was led by the moderate-liberal ruling classes under Cavour due to absence of revolutionary potential of the agrarian populations. In fact both Italian radical movement and the democratic Action party which were supposed to represent the revolutionary demands of the agrarian segments of society lacked revolutionary qualifications such as "cohesion, leadership, and a realistic sense of concrete political direction toward the fulfillment of a tangible historic mission"⁶⁹⁰. This situation allowed Cavour to materialize his passive revolutionary acts within the context of Risorgimento more effectively.

In this respect, as Adamson argues passive revolutions are 'progressive' political or cultural initiatives of the dominant groups, which launch "molecular" and subterranean attacks rather than frontal ones. They cannot instigate frontal attacks because they enjoy either extensive hegemonic capacity without a competence for domination or they have ability for domination without an extensive hegemonic capacity⁶⁹¹. For Adamson, the passive revolution of the Italian Risorgimento was an example of the second type⁶⁹², which maintained control over masses through utilization of its capability for domination without being able to disseminate the values of dominant

⁶⁸⁹ Adamson, (1980) "Gramsci's Interpretation of ..., *op.cit.*, pp. 620-1

⁶⁹⁰ A. William Salomone, "The Risorgimento between Ideology and History: The Political Myth of *rivoluzione mancata*", *The American Historical Review*, Vol.68, No.1, 1962, p.47

⁶⁹¹ Adamson, (1980) "Gramsci's Interpretation of ..., *op.cit.*, pp.629-30

⁶⁹² *Ibid.*

group among the Italian society successfully due to lack of its hegemonic capacity. Therefore, after the formal unification, main concern of the ruling elite became social control of the masses rather than their inclusion to the political life. In this respect, *trasformismo* allowed the ruling elite to recruit leaders of the potential antagonistic or counter-hegemonic social forces by preventing emergence of active civil society and inclusion of masses into the dominant processes and structures of political society.

In Israel, the dictatorship era in Gramscian terms between 1948 and 1966, which witnessed monopoly of coercion and excessive use of oppressive and exclusionary mechanisms of control over the Palestinian Arabs. After this period, “a process of extensive reorganization” was a prerequisite for the Israeli ruling classes in order to establish hegemony. Two important factors however, prevented establishment of hegemonic relationship between the Israel’s Jewish ruling classes and the Palestinian Arabs. First, the former was not willing to seek consent of the Palestinian Arabs in the course of leading the processes of structural reorganization. Second, the Israeli ruling classes did not have essential sources to assume ideological, social and economic leadership over the Palestinian Arabs, which were vital to convince them about the legitimacy and capacity of the dominant Jewish classes to lead establishment of an Israeli national-popular collective that would embrace all segments of the Israeli society including the Palestinian Arabs.

If the LSM’s [the Israeli Labor Settlement Movement] hegemony was based on its effective, and ultimately successful, revolutionary strategy for creating a modern sovereign Jewish nation-state, that revolution remained in many respects a “passive revolution”. It resembled the unification of Italy, in that a profound political change was effected, but only partially transformed the social order, because many groups were left out. The LSM failed to assimilate the masses of Mizrahim, the Orthodox and certainly Palestinian Arabs, and assimilated women only in limited fashion into its institutional domain. It failed to provide universal access to the rights ensured by its institutions, since its universalism was limited to gaining and providing national citizenship. Thus the hegemony of LSM’s colonial state-building approach was at once inclusionary and exclusionary. It was built on maintaining, rather than suppressing or alleviating, the social differences that necessitated its construction in the first place,

and for many years it granted social rights only to those who participated in its own particular method of state building.⁶⁹³

As in the case of Italian Risorgimento, Israel had problems in establishing a real alliance among all segments of the *Yishuv* as a historical bloc. There was also an absence of alliance between the Jewish bourgeoisie and Palestinian Arab peasants and labor as well as between the Ashkenazi Jewish ruling class and the Palestinian Arab subordinate masses. In this respect, intra-societal segmentation became important imperatives of socio-economic organization of the Israeli society. Within this context, Israeli ruling class, which was dominated by the Jewish political elite got involved in a passive revolution in which it pursued extensive structural modifications in the country from above, through utilization of the state apparatuses and without relying on the active participation of the Palestinian Arabs. In fact, they mainly pursued passive revolutionary policies and practices that prevented their Palestinian Arabs to organize an anti-passive revolutionary struggle against the existing dominant structure. These passive revolutionary policies and practices were embodied in the political, military and economic strategies of the Israeli state especially after the end of military rule over the Palestinian Arabs in 1966. This was one of the reasons of the why the Palestinian Arabs were not able to unify against the existing hegemonic structure. This also was why their counter-hegemonic movements remained ineffective to challenge the hegemony structurally.

In this respect, until the early 1990s the Israeli ruling classes enforced some limited socio-economic and political reforms that have been demanded by the opposing forces of the Palestinian Arabs. However, these reforms were put into effect in such a way to disorganize the Palestinian Arab forces of opposition and pacify any possible popular struggle that could challenge the dominant structure. It follows that the appropriate strategy for the working class is an anti-passive revolution founded on the continual

⁶⁹³ Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, **Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship**, Cambridge University Press, 2002, Cambridge, p.71

extension of class and popular democratic struggles⁶⁹⁴. It was only in mid-1990s sincere efforts were initiated towards inclusion of masses of Palestinian Arab citizens into the Israeli political society and dominant structures and processes.

Al-Aqsa intifada of 2000 indicated once more the dilemmas of *Israeli Risorgimento* in its relations with Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. After *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, Israeli ruling elite increased its efforts towards inclusion of the Palestinian Arab citizens into the hegemonic structure. They focused on increasing hegemonic capacity of Israeli dominant structures and processes among Palestinian Arab citizens through passive revolutionary and integrative practices, which are analyzed and exemplified in the following parts of this thesis.

4.3.7. War of maneuver and war of position

Gramsci defined *war of maneuver* as a struggle, which is composed of sudden, sharp and lightning attacks that are designed to overwhelm enemy rapidly. War of position, on the other hand, was defined as a slow, methodological, trench warfare for which ‘an unprecedented concentration of hegemony is necessary⁶⁹⁵. Hegemonizing cannot be complete unless dominant groups both exert the control over “resources and institutions” through winning a *war of maneuver* and gain consent of the subordinate groups to its dominance and control through its success in a *war of position*⁶⁹⁶.

In Gramscian terminology, *war of maneuver* refers to revolutionary frontal attack, in which the dominance-seeking social forces aim to gain control over the state apparatuses, dominant structures and processes of society rapidly. This mainly takes place in the countries where the dominance-seeker groups lack hegemonic capacity and necessary basis for internalization of their ethico-political leadership through the

⁶⁹⁴ Simon, (1991), *op.cit.*, p.25-6

⁶⁹⁵ John Hoffman, *op.cit.* p.140

⁶⁹⁶ George Lipsitz, “The Struggle for Hegemony”, *The Journal of American History*, Vol.75, No.1, 1988, p.147

institutions of civil society. It is a short and rapid struggle to gain the control of the political and economic fronts rather than to establish enduring ideational and cultural leadership through dissemination of the values and ideology of dominant group.

War of position is a complex protracted struggle, in which the dominance is not established simply by gaining sudden victories in the economic and political frontal attacks. It aspires to establish an ideational and cultural prevalence over subordinate groups. Thus, it presupposes a deliberate and ordinary struggle of “cultural reshaping”⁶⁹⁷. Therefore, it takes place mainly within the civil society and involves a sophisticated and long-term effort at the level of knowledge and value systems in cultural, ideological, religious spheres of the society.⁶⁹⁸

The war of position demands enormous sacrifices by infinite masses of people. So an unprecedented concentration of hegemony is necessary, and hence a more ‘interventionist’ government, which will take the offensive more openly against the oppositionists and organize permanently the ‘impossibility’ of internal ‘disintegration’ with controls of every kind, political, administrative, etc., reinforcement of the hegemonic ‘positions’ of the dominant group, etc. All this indicates that we have entered a culminating phase in the political-historical situation, since in politics the ‘war of position’, once won, is decisive definitively. In politics, in other words, the war of maneuver subsists so long as it is a question of winning positions, which are not decisive, so that all the resources of the State’s hegemony cannot be mobilized. But when, for one reason or another, these positions have lost their value and only the decisive positions are at stake, then one passes over to siege warfare[...]⁶⁹⁹

For Gramsci, hegemony is established and maintained through war of position. As the hegemony is a constant and volatile process of domination rather than a moment of absolute ascendancy, it can only be maintained through a reciprocal and continuous process of struggle, which would not restrict evocative political contestation, rather

⁶⁹⁷ Nadia Urbinati, “From the Periphery of Modernity: Antonio Gramsci’s Theory of Subordination and Hegemony”, *Political Theory*, Vol.26, No.3, 1998, p.385

⁶⁹⁸ Fontana, (2006), *op.cit.*, p.36

⁶⁹⁹ Antonio Gramsci, ***Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci***, London, GBR: ElecBook, 2001. p. 495, <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/ukibris/Doc?id=10015105&ppg=494>,

than impulsive and instant war of maneuver.⁷⁰⁰ The struggle had to be succeeded in civil society ahead of a revolutionary attack on the state could achieve success. Untimely frontal attack on the state by a war of movement would simply disclose the limitations of the subordinate revolutionary groups and strengthen the position of the dominant groups via consolidating its dominance over the civil society⁷⁰¹.

According to Gramsci, a struggle for continuous and reproducible dominance can only be won through a war of position, which would gradually amplify the potency of the social foundations of a new state that would be built under the ethico-political leadership of dominance seeking groups. As the prevalence in war of position necessitates ideational and cultural hegemony over the civil society, its duration and intensity depends on the nature and intricacy of the civil society that would be hegemonized.

The massive structures of modern democracies, both as State organizations, and as complexes of associations of civil society, constitute for the art of politics as it were “trenches” and permanent fortifications of the front in the war of position: they render merely “partial” the element of movement which before used to be “the whole of war”⁷⁰²

As Israeli state is considered within the terms of the Western European state in above-mentioned Gramscian categorization of the states with its developed civil society and hegemonic social order a war of movement seemed to be a less likely strategy for the Palestinian Arab political elite in achieving counter-hegemonic objectives of Palestinian Arab community. Besides, notwithstanding strong counter-hegemonic discourse spread around most segments of the Palestinian Arab community, only few of the Palestinian Arab citizens are organized to wage such a sudden revolutionary warfare. In fact, from 1948 onwards there has never been a sign or example of such a *war of movement* due to divisiveness and lack of unity among the Palestinian Arab

⁷⁰⁰ Rupert, (1998), op.cit., p. 428

⁷⁰¹ Ibid.

⁷⁰² Fontana, (2006), op.cit., p.36

counter-hegemonic forces, which could overthrow the existing dominant structure through a sudden sharp and lightning attacks.

In Israel, both ruling elite and the subordinate groups have been in a constant *war of position* after incorporation of the Palestinian Arab population into the Israeli structure of citizenship 1948. Although there were some groups which advocated the necessity of a war of maneuver among the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel, this option was not accepted by majority of the community. Notwithstanding various exceptions, political elite of the Palestinian Arab citizenry mainly preferred to wage a struggle within the existing system in order to redefine the social foundations of a new Israeli state rather than revolting to change it structurally. The situation of the Palestinian community and leadership in Israel can thus be considered accordingly in terms of war of position rather than war of movement. Nevertheless, factors such as divisiveness⁷⁰³, did not allow the Palestinian Arab counter-hegemonic leadership to wage a successful war of position against the Israeli historic bloc.

In fact, as Gramsci argues in the case of Western Europe, “the struggle had to be won in civil society before an assault on the state could achieve success”. In fact, majority of the Palestinian Arab political elite as well as leadership of some *hamulas* that preferred to operate within the Israeli dominant structures and processes have followed such a strategy in order to achieve interests of the Palestinian Arab citizenry of Israel. They have waged a war of position in political and civic spheres through use of the apparatuses and institutions of the Israeli civil and political societies. They tried to disseminate counter-hegemonic sentiments among the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel within the Israeli civil society.

Nevertheless, there have also been exceptions to this strategy. It is not, for instance, followed by the groups like *Islamic movement*. In fact, these groups try to de-legitimize the very roots of the hegemonic social order by functioning out of this order and

⁷⁰³ Jamal, op.cit.

creating an alternative social order with a minimum consent to the existing one. In this respect, these movements would reduce the meaning of the Israeli state simply to coercion rather than a hegemonic entity for the Palestinian Arab community living in Israel. In other words, they have tried to exclude the Israeli state from the daily lives and social order of the Palestinian Arabs and thus avoiding the internalization of the dominant social order by the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. By such a move, the Israeli state would be stripped from its hegemonic character (and characteristics of consent and leadership); it is also separated from the civil society of the Palestinian Arab sector and thus it is reduced to an autonomous entity, which is alienated from the community that it claims to represent.

4.3.8. Historical Bloc

Historical bloc in Gramscian terms can be defined as “an organic system of social alliances held together by a common ideology and a common culture.”⁷⁰⁴ The concept of *historical bloc* has been acknowledged by many Gramscian scholars as one of the essential components of hegemonic relationship beyond the state. For Cox, a historic bloc is a dialectical concept whose interacting elements create a larger unity’. It broadens the conceptual scope of hegemony by avoiding its reduction to an exercise of domination by state through its practices of co-optation. It helps to analyze the socio-economic orders in which hegemony takes place not simply as a function of a state⁷⁰⁵ but as a consequence of dialogical alliance among leading and subordinate socio-economic forces in an intellectual and moral bloc.

Emergence of a historic bloc is directly linked to dissemination of the dominant values of a group among the other groups to build an ethico-political alliance of dominance. In fact, according to Adamson’s interpretation of Gramsci, hegemonies always grow out of historical blocs, although not all historical blocs are hegemonic. In this respect, a

⁷⁰⁴ Pellicani, (1981), op.cit., p.32

⁷⁰⁵ Randall D. Germain and Michael Kenny, “Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.24, No.1, 1998, p.6

social group or class that establishes an ‘intellectual and moral bloc’ would be hegemonic in itself. Nevertheless, its political alliances with other groups may or may not transform into a hegemonic liaison⁷⁰⁶.

A historic bloc necessitates co-optation of a variety of political, religious, economic, cultural sub-blocs to enhance substantial primacy of the collectivity among them through attaining their consent on its ethico-political pre-eminence.⁷⁰⁷ It does not simply emerge as a result of practical and coordinative concessions that would be bestowed by the constituent groups of the bloc to accommodate each other’s value systems and ideational formations. Instead, it becomes materialized following a process of amalgamation, which would be transformative for all of its constituent groups as well as the leading group.

... [Gramsci’s] vision of this historic bloc in terms of a dialogic process creates openings for engagement with other situated knowledges in ways, which, his relational ontology implies, will reshape the identities of all participants in the conversation. Gramsci emphasises the transformative potential of such a relational vision by interpreting politics – entailing the historical problem of leaders/led – in terms of education – which to the extent that it is successful is transformative of the teacher/student relation along with the parties embedded within that relation.⁷⁰⁸

Hegemonic success of a historic bloc is dependent on its internal coherence. In fact, a bloc cannot induce other groups in the society to accept and internalize its worldview if it suffers intra-bloc inconsistencies and contradictions. In this respect, it entails an ideological unity and complete consistency of “culture and power” embodied in a particular articulate worldview of the dominant group⁷⁰⁹. Besides, ruling historic blocs cannot simply impose hegemony over the subordinate groups. They should struggle for

⁷⁰⁶ Adamson, (1980), **Hegemony and Revolution**: ..., op.cit. pp.177-8

⁷⁰⁷ Pellicani, (1981), op.cit., p.32

⁷⁰⁸ Rupert, (2003), op.cit., p.187

⁷⁰⁹ John P. Diggins, “The Misuses of Gramsci”, *The Journal of American History*, Vol.75, No.1, 1988, p.145

hegemony. Such a struggle necessitates reflection of ideological, ideational and cultural coherence of the alliance to its political struggle in a *war of position* against the oppositional forces⁷¹⁰.

In Israeli case, main question has been how to conceptualize Israeli state as a historical bloc. Social cultural, economic and even the religious gaps between the Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews indicated the intra-communal dilemmas of a Jewish historic bloc in Israel. Is it possible to create an Israeli *historical bloc*, which would include different segments of Palestinian Arab community?

In hegemonic ideology within Israel, Jewish groups regardless of their country of origin in the world are perceived as the natural members of the historical bloc. Moreover, this membership has been assured by the legal regulations such as *the Law of Return* that allowed practical acceptance of any Jewish immigrant to the Jewish historic bloc of Israel. Membership to the *historical bloc* is consolidated through the interaction among the different groups, which constitute this organic system of social alliances. In Israel, organic system of social alliances has not been receptive to all the segments of Israeli society. It has been selective by its very nature.

Success of Sephardic-based *Likud* in the elections against the *Ashkenazi* dominated *Labor*, and its coalition with ultra-orthodox and national religious parties signified a necessity of re-structuring of Israeli *historic bloc* with the inclusion of new segments of political society. Such hegemonic restructuring and broadening of the historical bloc with the selective inclusion of the subordinate groups to the dominant structures and processes required modification of Israeli institutional framework to incorporate these groups.

For the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel, sharing common security concerns with the leading group and loyalty to Israeli dominant structures were important conditions for incorporation into the Israeli historic bloc. Full inclusion of the Palestinian Arab

⁷¹⁰ Lipsitz, 1988, op.cit., p.146

citizenry to Israeli historic bloc would not be acceptable by the ruling elite unless they share similar security concerns with the other segments of the Israeli political society. Consequently, Israeli ruling elite incorporated some segments of the Palestinian Arab community into the historic bloc selectively, who proved that they shared similar security contemplations with the other constituents of the existing historic bloc. With the exception of limited attempts between 1993 and 1996, Israeli ruling elite excluded Palestinian Arab citizens from such integration to the Israeli historic bloc until the Al-Aqsa Intifada. There were certain demarking allusions, which influenced reluctance of Israeli ruling groups about inclusion of the Palestinian Arab community.

4.3.9. Dictatorship and Integral state

Hegemony has a corollary relationship with the dictatorship. Kalyvas presents a profound definition of the Gramscian concept of dictatorship from a Weberian perspective:

[...] Gramsci's concept of dictatorship denotes a state or central political organization, in the narrow organizational and bureaucratic meaning, a mere juridico-political mechanism, which holds the monopoly of the means of physical violence within a specific territory without however having secured their legitimate use. Dictatorship indicates a legitimation deficit. In other words, for Gramsci, dictatorship is a state without legitimacy⁷¹¹

Gramsci distinguishes two types of state, which were exemplified in the Russian and Western European state-building processes respectively. In Russian case, the state is a vulnerable entity notwithstanding its extensive authoritative and coercive capacity. Its vulnerability derives from its lack of control over the institutions of civil society. In fact, in Russian case, civil society is undeveloped and the supremacy of state is a result of deficiency of genuine insubordination from the civil society⁷¹². It is not as pluralistic, sophisticated and eloquent as the civil societies in Western European

⁷¹¹ Kalyvas, (2000), op.cit., pp.356-7

⁷¹² Cox, (1993), op.cit.

countries⁷¹³. In such situation, state's ascendancy is based on its dictatorial dominance rather than its integrative capacity and hegemony of the values of dominant group, which the state is supposed to represent.

According to Gramsci second type of the state is embodied in the Western European experience. For the subordinate groups in the Western European countries, the moment of dictatorship, which was materialized in Jacobin tradition, is no more pertinent⁷¹⁴. It is not possible to incarnate or impose a new social order by use of force alone. Dominance of a group, which may be embodied in a state, necessitates a widespread consent among the subordinate groups on the integrative and balancing quality of the dominant group. In this respect, Western European state is a product of the ruling elite's protracted quest for "a balance of ethico-political forces" and institutionalization of social equilibrium. Such a balance necessitates satisfaction of particular demands "that emanate from the lower levels of the social pyramid."⁷¹⁵

In this respect, integral state is a state, which is within the society rather than above and/or isolated from it. It is not mere force but a system of rules, values, aims, and life ideals shared by all social classes"⁷¹⁶. It is a symbol of a transformation from economic corporate to the ethico-political phase as well as gradual evaporation of coercive aspects of the political society⁷¹⁷. It also denotes a transformation from institutionalized expression of worldview of a particular class or group to universalistic representation of different segments of society. In this respect, it is a call by the ruling class to the subordinate classes for constructing a joint endeavor that would accomplish "a certain

⁷¹³ Nadia Urbinati, "From the Periphery of Modernity: Antonio Gramsci's Theory of Subordination and Hegemony", *Political Theory*, Vol.26, No.3, 1998, p. 385

⁷¹⁴ Ibid.

⁷¹⁵ Pellicani, (1981), op.cit., p.30

⁷¹⁶ Ibid., p.32

⁷¹⁷ Sue Golding, Gramsci's Democratic Theory: Contributions to a Post-liberal Democracy, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1992, p.111

ideal of collective life”.⁷¹⁸ Finally, it entails a transformation of ethico-political leading party into “a new form of collective [socio-political] self determination”⁷¹⁹

The development of the party into a State [that is, a new form of collective social self determination, ‘an integral state, and not into a government technically understood’] reacts upon the party and requires of it a continuous reorganization and development, just as the development of the party and State into a conception of the world, i.e., into a total and molecular (individual) transformation of the ways of thinking and acting, reacts upon the State and party, compelling them to reorganize continually and confronting them with new and original problems to solve⁷²⁰.

According to Gramsci, notwithstanding its continuing evolution, Western state underwent all through these transformations. It evolved into an integral state, which would allow different expressions of civil society following the era of dictatorship, which was based on the coercive dominance of particular groups. Besides civil society under hegemony of a particular group in Western European countries, which is socio-politically embodied in the West European integral state occurs in multiple ways⁷²¹. In fact, as integral state refers to a stable and legitimate state, which leads the entire society through amplifying its basis of consent on the different segments of the society, it can function as the agent of hegemonic group only by combining coercion with consent and cultural, ideological, political leadership⁷²². In this respect, an integral state cannot exist without hegemony. Thus, for Gramsci the struggle between the groups for domination of the integral state is a struggle between the hegemonies⁷²³. This struggle however, is not simply limited with a political or ideological contestation for taking over the state. It is a hegemonic struggle between the different groups of society in

⁷¹⁸ Pellicani, (1981), op.cit., p.32

⁷¹⁹ Rupert, (2003), op.cit., p.189

⁷²⁰ Ibid.

⁷²¹ Cox, (1993), op.cit.

⁷²² Kalyvas, (2000), op.cit., p.356

⁷²³ Pellicani, (1981), op.cit., p.31

which the state itself transforms “as the new hegemony is being constructed and new ways of organizing social relations are being learned”.⁷²⁴

For Adamson, Gramsci argued that frequent reliance on the coercive mechanisms and use of force for dominance was a sign of weakness of a state in hegemonic terms. In this respect, dictatorships are weak forms of state. Yet, strong states establish their dominance through dissemination and internalization of values, which are embodied in the image and practices of integral state. In other words, they rule through hegemony based on the consent of the subordinate groups towards the dominance of the ruling ones⁷²⁵. In this respect, strong states are equipped with “political and economic reserves”, which would decelerate immediate ramifications of an in-system crisis on the dominant political society⁷²⁶. Migdal elaborates dichotomies of “weak state – strong society vs. strong state-weak society” from an institutionalist perspective in his analysis of Israeli case.

A similar understanding can be observed in Gramscian definition of hegemonic/integral state. According to Gramsci a hegemonic/integral state is the successful combination of political and civil societies.

This is clearly evident in his famous equation ‘state = political society + civil society’. Put another way, while Gramsci could possibly conceive of a state shorn of civil society (which would be by definition a totalitarian one, as for example in tsarist Russia), he could not entertain the reverse. Recognizing such an integral relationship helps to account for the explanatory power of Gramsci’s notion of hegemony.⁷²⁷

Gramsci assesses emergence of integral state as an evolutionary process. In fact, every socio-political, cultural and economic transformation passes through a period of

⁷²⁴ Rupert, (1998), op.cit., p. 431

⁷²⁵ Adamson, (1980), **Hegemony and Revolution**: ..., op.cit., p.171

⁷²⁶ Adamson, (1980) “Gramsci’s Interpretation of ...”, op.cit., 615-633

⁷²⁷ Randall D. Germain and Michael Kenny, “Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.24, No.1, 1998, p. 15

dictatorship at its initial stages, where the dominant group control and oppress the subordinates through use of coercion in order to prevent emergence of counter-dominance activism until it exerts its hegemony.

[...] the beginning of every great sociopolitical formation [...] is characterized by a period of dictatorship, the length of which depends precisely on the ability of the dictatorship to promote general acceptance of the change occurring in the economic structure. [...] A social class cannot convince others of the validity of its world view until it is fully convinced itself. Once this is achieved, society enters a period of relative tranquility, in which hegemony rather than dictatorship is the prevailing form of rule.⁷²⁸

This has been the case regarding the relationship between the Israeli ruling elite and the Palestinian Arab community in Israel. Israeli state has not evolved into an integral state as its relationship with some of the Palestinian Arab citizens is concerned. One of the main reasons of this was that Israeli state did not have intention and capability of “moving from the economic corporate phase to the ethico-political, where the coercive aspects of the state would eventually ‘wither away’”⁷²⁹

In Israel, transformation of the gradually from dictatorship to the integral state is incomplete and partial as its relationship with its Palestinian Arab citizens is concerned. At the beginning of the relationship, as it was established in 1948, Israeli state coercively enforced a new socio-economic and political order over the Palestinian Arabs without the deliberate and active consent of them. In addition, in these early years, Israeli state did not have any legitimacy in the eyes of Palestinian Arabs. In fact, the *Yishuv* was not able to persuade the entire Palestinian Arab population about its *intellectual and moral leadership* prior to and just after the establishment of the state.

⁷²⁸ Thomas R. Bates, “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony”, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol.36, No.2, 1975, p.355

⁷²⁹ Sue Golding, **Gramsci’s Democratic Theory: Contributions to a Post-Liberal Democracy**, University of Toronto press, Toronto, 1992, p.111

It was in 1966 that initial steps were taken by the leading authorities of Israeli state, which would serve the possibility of a future transformation of the Israeli dictatorship into an integral state in the eyes of Palestinian Arabs. From 1966 onwards, with the abolishment of military governance over the Palestinian Arab community in Israel, the state gradually introduced new mechanisms and tools of social control apart from the ‘naked acts of domination’.

Debate on the *ethnocratic* and exclusionary nature of the state in Israel raised the questions about the possibility of a transformation of Israeli state into an integral one in the eyes of entirety of its citizens. For many scholars, Israeli state has been distinctively Jewish-Zionist in its nature. This exclusionary and restrictive characteristic of the state prevented it to overcome the determinism of sectional interests over its practices. Israeli state from the very beginning of its establishment has not designed its interest immune from the dominant interests of the official Jewish leadership. Jewish national identity was strongly stressed especially in the nature of the state, national activities and cultural establishment.

In this respect, although it represented “a system of rules, values, aims, and life ideals shared by [the most of the] social classes” ⁷³⁰ in Israeli society, it has not been able to activate consent of most of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel to its moral and cultural leadership. *Al-Aqsa Intifada* was reflection of such an inability, which compelled Israeli ruling elite to reconsider efficacy of the passive revolutionary methods and processes for maintenance of dominance over the Palestinian Arab community. Thus, abiding symbolic emphasis on Jewishness of its character and concerns about its image notwithstanding, Israeli state began to integrate interests of the Palestinian Arab segments of Israeli society following the crisis of hegemony-in-building in 2000.

⁷³⁰ Pellicani, (1981), op.cit., p.32

4.4. Agents of Hegemony

As Jenks argued, “modern political structures function successfully by integrating the groups under control with the ruling groups and thus providing necessary basis for them to side with the rulers. Thus, coercion, persuasion and cooperation become components of ideological strategy”⁷³¹ of governing polity. Elements of superstructure like education, religion, mass media, law and legal structure, mass culture, sports, leisure, and entertainment play important role in smooth functioning of hegemonic processes⁷³². In other words, they are the *agents of hegemony*.

Beyond the institutional aspect, hegemonic power is sustained by utilization of cultural values, norms, beliefs, myths, and traditions, which seem to be independent from class structures and governments⁷³³. However, they all play important role in continuation of the existing dominant system and functioning of the dominant structures.

...Pop culture and the mass media are subject to the production, reproduction and transformation of hegemony through the institution of civil society which cover the areas of cultural production and consumption. Hegemony operates culturally and ideologically through the institutions of civil society, which characterizes mature liberal-democratic, capitalist societies. These institutions include education, the family, the church, the mass media, popular culture, etc.⁷³⁴

Gramsci also emphasized the significance of phenomena like folklore, myths and national identity in the construction and maintenance of hegemonies by the dominant groups.⁷³⁵ He argued that such construction of hegemonies at the level of symbolisms

⁷³¹ Chris Jenks, Alt kültür: Toplumsalın Parçalanışı, Ayrıntı Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p.152

⁷³² Ibid. 153

⁷³³ Jenks, op.cit.p.153

⁷³⁴ Strinati, (1995), op.cit., pp.168-9

⁷³⁵ Randall D. Germain and Michael Kenny, “Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.24, No.1, 1998, p. 10

and imagination can achieve its goal only through its banal reproduction by the apparatuses of the hegemonic order in civil and political societies respectively.

“In the bourgeois state, which is the first to use an extensive hegemonic apparatus, the autonomous castes of the pre-modern state become transformed into voluntary associations-parties, unions, cultural institutions, etc.- which serve as hegemonic instruments. Yet if all such hegemonic states are necessarily mass-based, at least in the sense that they actively disseminate a dominant ideology throughout society, they nonetheless vary considerably in the pervasiveness and systemization with which their hegemonic apparatuses operate and in the degree of participation they foster.”⁷³⁶

In this respect, from Gramscian point of view it is possible to maintain that subordinate’s submissiveness to dominant ideology and its internalization of the dominant ideas, values and leadership of the dominant group is not only related to its physical and mental inducement or ideological indoctrination.⁷³⁷ Such submissiveness is also a result of widespread belief among the members subordinate group about the agreeability of leadership of the dominant group due to its potential and actual benefits for the interests of the subordinated group.⁷³⁸ Such an impression and agreeability is created by the hegemonic apparatuses, which operate to socialize the subordinate groups to accentuate benefits of subordination.

As the hegemonic processes are dynamic and flexible “to co-opt a plurality of minority groups (political, religious, economic, and artistic)”⁷³⁹ and to acquire “the consent of the subordinate classes”⁷⁴⁰, agencies of state socialization do not impose their own versions of unchallenged state identity as argued by David Newman and Uri Ram⁷⁴¹.

⁷³⁶ Adamson, (1980), **Hegemony and Revolution**: ..., op.cit., p.174

⁷³⁷ Strinati, (1995), op.cit., p.166

⁷³⁸ Ibid., p.166

⁷³⁹ David Newman and Uri Ram, ‘Hegemonic Identities’, Adriana Kemp, David Newman, Uri Ram and Oren Yiftachel (eds.) **Israel in Conflict: Hegemonies, Identities and Challenges**, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton Portland, 2004, p.6

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁴¹ Ibid.

In the following section, the thesis will discuss different agents of hegemony, their implications in Israeli case and possibility of assessing *hamula* as one of those agents contrary to the theoretical oppositions asserted by some scholars such as Adamson who neglected the possibility of pre-modern instruments of the hegemony.

4.4.1. Army as an agent of hegemony

As security operated as “national cult”⁷⁴² and a basis of legitimization for inequitable policies in socio-economic arena towards Palestinian Arab citizens, its major apparatus became main platform of operation selective hegemony. As Pappé argued, Israeli ruling elite utilized the army as one of the key apparatuses of “development and integration” of Israeli society⁷⁴³. Practices of Israeli army like reserve service and regular military exercises functioned as “the hammer and anvil forging national entity”⁷⁴⁴, which continuously reproduce and disseminate the dominant values of national consciousness, while perpetuating militarism in the daily routines of the Israeli people. In other words, army has been one of the key agents, which functioned as the gatekeeper of the hegemonic consolidation within the Israeli society as the compulsory military service has been defined as “a major symbol of belongingness to *Israeliness*”⁷⁴⁵.

Army is an agent of hegemony. Thus, exemption of the Palestinian Arab citizens from the military service is against the hegemonic understanding of the ruling classes. Army has been an important institution in Israel, which melted the differences among the different segments of the society. It both creates the “ethos of state” and consolidates

⁷⁴² Beinun, (1998), op.cit., p.99

⁷⁴³ Ilan Pappé, “Donning the Uniform: The Military and the Media in Israel”, *Middle East Report*, No. 223, 2002, p. 46

⁷⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁵ Eliezer Ben Rafael, *The Emergence of Ethnicity, Cultural Groups and Social Conflict in Israel*, 1982, Westport Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1982, p.206

its impact on the daily lives of the veterans⁷⁴⁶ after leaving the army. Reserve periods of one month a year following the military service are the collective psychotherapy sessions for recalling and re-articulating dominant codes of ethos of Israeli state and nation. In the years of the military service as well as in the reserve period, centrality of Israeliness is emphasized and reemphasized systematically in order to diminish the ethnic or religious differentiation on national basis and to maintain continuance of banal reproduction the dominant ethos. The Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel with some exceptions, however, have been excluded from the hegemonic internalization processes that took place within this important hegemonic institution.

As the military service was considered in Israel as the primary indicator of belongingness to the existing hegemonic structures and processes under the dominant ideology of Israeliness, exemption of Palestinian Arab citizens from it or creation of special units for their recruitment⁷⁴⁷ distanced them from the hegemonization processes within the army. Affected by the concerns among some segments of Jewish community about the thrustworthiness of armed Palestinian Arab citizens within the ranks of Israeli army, the ruling elite preferred either to exclude the Palestinian Arab citizens from army or assign them social work in order to replace military service⁷⁴⁸. Thus, exemption of the Palestinian Arab citizens from the military service is against the hegemonic understanding of the ruling classes.

Army is also important in consolidation of the other agents of hegemony such as language. As a space of acculturation, army serves exposition of the members of the society to Hebrew as dominant means of communication. The Druze males and some of the other segments of the Palestinian Arab community who are recruited to army, for instance, have been particularly exposed to Hebrew in their daily communications for

⁷⁴⁶ Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal, "Liberalism and Right to Culture", *Social Research*, Vol. 61, No.3, 1994, pp. 491-511,

⁷⁴⁷ Eliezer Ben Rafael, *The Emergence of Ethnicity*, Cultural Groups and Social Conflict in Israel, Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1982, p.206

⁷⁴⁸ Interview with Raphael Israeli, En Kerem, Jerusalem, 23.08.2006

three years. Extensive uses of Hebrew during the military service allow penetration of dominant culture in the form of language through infiltration of Hebrew terms⁷⁴⁹ to the daily communication as well as personal meaning systems.

Finally, army is the gatekeeper of selective hegemonic consolidation in Israeli society. As most of the job opportunities and civilian privileges were linked to the fulfillment of military service in Israeli Defense Forces, army serves as controller of incorporation to Israeli hegemonic structures and processes. In this respect, military service is a mechanism for the members of Israeli society for testing their maturity to integrate the hegemonic processes within the Israeli system. In fact, Palestinian Arabs who are accepted to the Israeli army are considered as the potential accomplices of Israeli hegemony in post-military-service period.

Overall, the ruling classes preferred to put Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel under absolute control through the means of military government until hegemonic structures of *Israeliness* could be consolidated among the Jewish citizens of Israel. Meanwhile the Palestinian Arab citizens were expected either to leave the country or to find the ways of adjusting their conformist pragmatism with the Israeli military governance. Besides, under the military rule they were not allowed to access the Israeli hegemonic processes and structures. Israeli military played an important role as a *buffer institution* between the Palestinian Arab citizens and the newly consolidating institutions of the Israeli state. The Palestinian citizens did not have direct relationship with the Israeli ministries or governing bodies. All the interactions of the Palestinian Arab community with the Israeli political society was catalyzed by the institutions of Israeli military such as military courts.

⁷⁴⁹ Devorah Kalekin-Fishman, 'Alienation and Material Culture: Conceptions of Israeli Palestinians', Devorah Kalekin-Fishman (ed.) **Designs for Alienation: Exploring Diverse Realities**, SoPhi, University of Jyväskylä, Finland, 1998, p.61

4.4.2. Law as an Agent of Hegemony

In Gramscian perspective hegemony of the dominant group is consolidated through establishment of certain conception of the law in the state mechanisms and processes. A legal system provides the dominant group with necessary mechanisms and ethico-political grounds for pursuing legitimized repressive actions in sustaining its moral leadership over the other groups. In this respect, endorsement of a particular notion of the law facilitates construction of a moral order that would strengthen the ethico-political leadership of the dominant group. In this process, state and legal institutions play an important role in dissemination and internalization of the ethico-political values and principles of the dominant group. As the subordinate groups begin to interact on the basis of that particular notion of the Law, legal subordination to the moral order of the dominant group proceeds.

In Israeli case, some discriminative practices notwithstanding, guaranteed equal protection under the Israeli law⁷⁵⁰ and the legal protection of their civic rights connected the Palestinian Arab community to the dominant Israeli legal structures and processes. In this respect, the Palestinian Arab advocates seek abolishment of the legal system or its replacement with a more egalitarian one.

Post *al-Aqsa Intifada* witnessed increased activities of the Palestinian legal NGOs such as *Adalah*, which operated within the legal framework of Israeli system and thus served consolidation of the certain conception of law and the existing legal system among the Palestinian Arab citizenry. Legal actions of the *Adalah* on behalf of the Palestinian Arab community increased the interaction between the Palestinian Arab community and Israeli dominant legal structures and processes. Increased interaction with the dominant structures and processes of Israeli legal system incorporated the Palestinian Arab civil societal institutions and assist them to reproduce the existing dominance of Israeli ruling elite in legal arena.

⁷⁵⁰ Michal Shamir and John Sullivan, "Jews and Arabs in Israel: Everybody Hates Somebody, Sometime", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.29, No.2, 1985, p.285

At legal institutional level, the Supreme Court played an important role in the internalization of the legal system by the Palestinian Arab citizenry. *The Supreme Court* was also important institution in the Israeli legal framework in the sense that it is one of the most trusted institutions of the existing Israeli system among the Palestinian Arab citizens. As it became more receptive to the legal demands and claims of multiplied legal actors of the Palestinian Arab citizenry to transform the socio-political appeals into the legal rights' claims⁷⁵¹, its hegemonic stance was consolidated in the eyes of the Palestinian Arab citizens. Its increased receptivity to the petitions of Palestinian Arab legal actors basing on the egalitarian principles of constitutional jurisprudence galvanized the legal activity of the Palestinian Arab community within the existing dominant structures and processes of Israeli legal framework. This increased tendency among the Palestinian Arab legal actors of presenting the legal cases to the dominant legal institutions of Israel paved the way of internalization and daily reproduction of hegemonic relationship in legal arena by preventing emergence of any counter-hegemonic legal structuring alternative to the existing legal organization.

4.4.3. Economic Structure and Processes as an Agent of Hegemony

Palestinian Arab citizens experienced two parallel processes “economic delocalization”⁷⁵² and “proletariatization”⁷⁵³ in Israeli economic sphere. Economic delocalization prevented the Palestinian Arabs to develop a Palestinian Arab economic base on which they could construct a counter-hegemonic front against the growing dominant Israeli economic hegemony. In tandem with the economic delocalization, proletariatization of the Palestinian Arab citizens amplified their dependency to the Israeli dominant economic structures, institutions, and processes. They were also exposed to the dominant ideology of Israeliness of economic structures and processes

⁷⁵¹ Helene Sallon, “The Judicialization of Politics in Israel: Promoting Arab Collective Claims in the Judicial Arena”, *Bulletin du Centre de Reserche Francais de Jerusalem*, No..16, 2005, p.293

⁷⁵² Majd al Haj, ‘The Status of the Palestinians in Israel: A Double Periphery in an Ethno-National State’, University of Haifa, The Centre for Multiculturalism and Educational Research, 2001, p. 7

⁷⁵³ Ibid.

throughout the history. In this respect class interest of the Jewish industrialists did not clash with the social-engineering and state-building projects of Jewish elite in the Zionist movement.

In the Israeli context the historiography has tended to attribute the development of nationalistic ideology to the organized workers and their political parties. The political leaders of the working class, as well as their aspiration to conquer the land, are portrayed as the agency behind nationalist ideology. Industrialists were perceived as putting their own individual interests prior to national objectives. The case of PPL demonstrated otherwise. It shows how industrialists benefited from the expansion of the nationalist ideology and contributed to its diffusion. This realization is rather absent in the historiography of the Israeli society. However, despite the fact that our analysis supports the argument that nationalism served capitalists, we do not adopt the Marxian theoretical assumptions. First, we also argued that capitalism served nationalism. Second, we do not argue that an ideology is either false or true as the Marxist perspective implies. It can be “true” and yet serve as an ideology⁷⁵⁴

In this respect, especially during the state-building period, class divisions overlapped with the ethno-nationalist divisions in the Israeli society. Israeli economy was hierarchically organized to include the Jews in the core, Palestinian Arab citizens at the semi-periphery and the Palestinian labor from the *WBGS* at the periphery. In this framework, Palestinian Arab community appeared as a sub-population whose economic position and intra-class mobility was mainly determined by the dynamics of hierarchical configuration of Israeli labor market.

This structuration, however, began to alter in time, particularly in the post-*al-Aqsa* period. *Meir Yaish* found that although class divisions continued overlap with the ethnic stratification to a great extent, they began to play less significant role in positioning of Palestinian Arab citizens in Israeli class and societal structures⁷⁵⁵. In this respect, he argued that although ethnicity had an impact on the “relative mobility chances of members of Israeli society”, Palestinian Arab community shared the same

⁷⁵⁴ Michael Frenkel, Yehouda Shenhav, Hanna Herzog, “The political embeddedness of managerial ideologies in pre-state Israel: the case of PPL 1920-1948”, *Journal of Management History*, Vol. 3 No. 2, 1997, p.141

⁷⁵⁵ Yaish, (2001), op.cit. , p.409

level of equality of opportunity with Jewish sub-populations⁷⁵⁶. In fact, for him, discrepancies in the equality of opportunity derived mainly from the historical processes and government policies⁷⁵⁷.

Post-*al-Aqsa* period witnessed mixed tendencies among the different sub-blocs of Israeli ruling elite between the continuing exclusionary policies against the Palestinian Arab working force and their integration to the hegemonic structures and processes of the Israeli economy. As mentioned in the historical background, after the removal of the hawkish leadership from the economic governance, attempts of moderate leadership gained impetus towards integrating the Palestinian Arab economic force into the Israeli dominant structures and processes in the post-*al-Aqsa* period.

Although passive revolutionary economic plans and programs, which were initiated by the Israeli governments in the *post-Al-Aqsa Intifada* period, remained ineffective in improving economic conditions of the Palestinian Arab citizenry significantly, they indicated altering attitudes of Israeli ruling elite towards the new positioning of Palestinian arab citizenry in Israeli economic system. Nevertheless, such ineffectiveness did not prevent the gradual and/or controlled integration of the Palestinian Arab working force to the hegemonic *modus operandi* of the Israeli economy. Apart from some segments of the Palestinian Arab community, which were organized under the leadership of *Islamic Movement*, failures of passive revolutionary and reformist acts did not result in a search for establishment of an enclave economy on the basis of a counter-hegemonic stance either.

4.4.4. Education as an Agent of Hegemony

In Israeli case, separation of the education system until the university prevented “inculcation”⁷⁵⁸ of the dominant values of Israeliness and banal recognition and daily

⁷⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.426

⁷⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p.434

⁷⁵⁸ Israeli, (1991), *op.cit.*, p.30

reproduction of the Israeli system among the Palestinian Arab youth. According to Saad, the Israeli education system, as any other majority-controlled settler state, served to the interests of the overriding Israeli ideology and culture while marginalizing the Palestinian Arab citizens through parallel processes of domination and subjugation⁷⁵⁹. In this context, components of Palestinian Arab cultural, historical and political identity were either suppressed or overlooked and marginalized by the denominators of the dominant Jewish culture, history and politics.

At its initial stages, it did not challenge the traditional structures of Palestinian Arab community in the sense that some of those structures were co-opted into the Israeli dominant system. In these initial years main concern of the Israeli education policies with regard to Palestinian Arab community was to prevent any counter-hegemonic pedagogical process of “consciousness-building” based on markers of their Palestinian and Arab identities. Therefore, contrary to the educational efforts towards the integration of the new Jewish communities to the Israeli society by emphasizing on the commonalities in the Jewish culture, Palestinian Arab community was subjected to an educational sub-system based on the control and marginalization of Palestinian Arab culture, values and identity through state-controlled curricula and security checks on the schooling staff⁷⁶⁰.

Absence or ineffectiveness of the Palestinian Arab teachers and school managers within the decision-making structures of the Israeli national educational policies, resulted in an increasing gap of communication between the dominant educational structures and the Palestinian educational elite. In addition, institutionalized security checks of the Palestinian Arab educators and school principals aimed to prevent any message that would be delivered against the dominant objectives of the Israeli educational policies. To assure any form of counter-hegemonic pedagogical practice, system of control and surveillance was institutionalized through appointment of a *Shin*

⁷⁵⁹ Abu Saad, (2006), op.cit., pp.1086-1100

⁷⁶⁰ Ibid., p.1097

Bet representative as the deputy commissioner of Arab education in the Israeli Ministry of Education, who had been the final and ultimate decision-making official in the recruitment and firing of the Palestinian Arab educators and school principals. This position existed until 2005 and it survived even the efforts of the Ministers of Education such as Yossi Sarid, Shulamit Aloni and Amnon Rubinstein towards its abolishment⁷⁶¹.

Israeli education system did not follow an assimilationist program towards the Palestinian Arab citizens. However, it was designed to control and monitor the education of Palestinian Arab citizens in order to prevent any counter-hegemonic institutionalization in schooling of this segment of the society. In this respect, it promoted the pedagogical policies towards spreading dominant Jewish and Israeli values, history and culture among the Palestinian Arab community while subordinating the denominators of Palestinian culture and history.

The education system facilitated two parallel processes. First, it consolidated the divisions and disparity between the Jewish majority and Palestinian Arab minority. Thus, it served curtailment of possible challenges that might be exerted by the intellectually well-equipped Palestinian Arab youth to their Jewish counter-parts and competitors in the Israeli labor market. Association of the promotion scheme in Israeli economic system with the process of Israelization, which necessitated good command of the dominant language and culture for upward mobility in the labor market, further stimulated this process. In this process, the psychometric exam served as an important “gatekeeper”⁷⁶² in steering and placement of the Israelized and non-Israelized Palestinian Arab candidates to the Israeli universities in line with the requirements of Israeli higher education system. As those requirements are determined by the dominant value system inherent in the socio-economic structure, universities also assisted internalization of the requirements of the dominant economic and social structure in

⁷⁶¹ “Shin Bet will no longer scrutinize Arab educators”, *Haaretz*, 06.01.2005

⁷⁶² Abu Saad, (2006), *op.cit.*, p.1094

order to achieve a self-fulfilling position within the labor market as well as to escape from the dilemmas of being “the other” within Israeli social structure. Secondly, Israeli education system exerted pedagogical and cultural control over the Palestinian Arab schooling. This control is exerted through construction and monitoring of the curricula, contents of the textbooks, security-checks of the teachers and school principals as well as by disallowing access to the national policy-making structures, processes and mechanisms.

In the field of education, the post-*Al Aqsa* period witnessed in-system challenge of the Palestinian Arab educators through utilization of the Israeli legal structure and mechanisms against the unequal and inadequate structuring of Israeli educational regime with regard to Palestinian Arab citizens⁷⁶³. They increased their efforts towards involving in dominant pedagogic decision-making mechanisms, structures and processes especially in the issues of budget allocation, textbooks, staffing and curricula of Palestinian Arab schools. The new ruling elite also took significant steps to improve infrastructure in the field of Palestinian Arab education. Israeli ruling elite’s acceptance of opening of around sixty classrooms for the Palestinian Arab pupils in need of special pedagogical care was one of those steps on the road of integrating the Palestinian Arab educators and pupils to the Israeli dominant educative structures and processes.

Another hegemonic step adapted by the government in 2004 in the sphere of education was the acceptance of *Dovrat Commission Report* on advancing the education system and eliminating the inequalities. Its egalitarian discourse and suggestions notwithstanding, the Dovrat Commission report outlined a pedagogical scheme for Israeli education to function as an agent of hegemony-in-rebuilding. Educational goals, which were stated in the report such as reinforcing the school’s role in community, centralizing the resources of education system and strengthening the early

⁷⁶³ Yousef Jabreen, “Law and Education: Critical Perspectives on Arab Education in Israel”, *American Behavioral Scientist* Vol.49, No.8, 2006, pp.1052-1074.

education⁷⁶⁴, would have significant repercussions on the autonomy of the Palestinian Arab education. In this respect, while narrowing the gaps and enhancing equality between Jewish and Palestinian Arab schooling through a structural education reform, plan also aimed at increasing interdependency between the Palestinian Arab schooling and the Israeli dominant educational structures and processes.

As an additional passive revolutionary step, the government terminated the security-check system, which was based on *Shin Bet*'s (Israeli internal security services) control over the recruitment and activities of the Palestinian Arab educators and school administrators. In January 2005, in the light of a report of the *Dovrat Commission on Education Reforms* Israeli Minister of Education Ronit Tirosh declared dissolution of this system, which had been pursued by a *Shin Bet* representative having served as the deputy commissioner of Arab education in the Israeli Ministry of Education for some decades⁷⁶⁵. This act was accepted as an important step by the Palestinian Arab educational elite towards integration of Palestinian Arab education system to the overall Israeli system⁷⁶⁶.

4.4.5. Religion as an Agent of Hegemony

In Israeli case, as the Palestinian Arab organization is concerned, the religion functioned both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic agent. In Israel religious space was an area where a robust Palestinian Arab challenge occurred against the dominant Israeli patterns of behavior, culture and meaning system⁷⁶⁷. In fact, religious arena provided a relatively more autonomous platform for the resistance movements in the Palestinian Arab public sphere against the Israeli dominant structures and processes.

⁷⁶⁴ "The chance to change education", *Haaretz*, 18.05.2004

⁷⁶⁵ "Shin Bet will no longer scrutinize Arab educators", *Haaretz*, 06.01.2005

⁷⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶⁷ Kalekin-Fishman, (1998), *op.cit.*, p.61

However, religious sphere of the Palestinian Arab community was not independent from the Israeli dominant religious institutional structure notwithstanding its relative autonomy. Israeli institutional control over the official religious affairs was reflected in the *Israeli Sharia court system* and control over the Islamic foundations. The Sharia Court system which operated under the supervision of Israeli authorities undertook two important functions. It assured maintainance of control of Israeli authorities over the religio-legal affairs while at the same time it provided the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel with a religio-spatial freedom to accomplish their religious affairs in a relatively autonomous sphere within Israeli dominant system⁷⁶⁸.

The Qadis Law of 1961 institutionalized control of dominant Israeli legislative and judicial mechanisms over religious jurisdiction system of the Muslim Palestinian Arabs. According to this law, *the Nominations Committees*⁷⁶⁹ became heavily influential on selection and appointment of *qadis*. This Committee was composed of the members of dominant ruling and religious elite as well as Palestinian Arab MKs who are determined under the institutional control of the Israeli dominant structures rather than by the Palestinian Arab community. In addition, as *qadis*, judges of Islamic jurisdiction system, became salaried Israeli state officials, their organic ties with the dominant structures significantly assisted incorporation of the Palestinian Arab Islamic jurisdiction system into the Israeli legal structure while alienating from the Palestinian Arab Muslim society. In this respect, some segments of the Palestinian Arab religious and political leadership responded the Israeli interference into the Muslim legal mechanisms and its manipulative acts to exert pressure on the jurisdictional decision-making processes with disapproval and evasion⁷⁷⁰.

⁷⁶⁸ Interview with Yitzhak Reiter, Colony Hotel, Jerusalem, 21.08.2006

⁷⁶⁹ Yüksel Sezgin, "A Political Account for Legal Confrontation between State and Society: The Case of Israeli Legal Pluralism", *Studies in Law, Politics and Society*, Vol.32, 2004, p.214

⁷⁷⁰ Zeina Ghandour, "Religious Law in a Secular State: The Jurisdiction of the Shari'a Courts of Palestine and Israel", *Arab Law Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1990, pp. 25-48

As Sezgin argued, with the incorporation of Muslim Arabs' law into the Israeli state's unified legal system allowed expansion of authority and virtual legitimacy of the dominant legal elite over "a culturally and politically alienated population". However, initially this virtual legitimacy were not internalized by some segments of the Muslim Arab population who perceived the *Sharia* courts as agents of Israeli domination. In fact, Israeli ruling elite maintained control over all levels of selection and decision making processes of the *Sharia* courts. As Ilan Saban put it,

A nine-member committee appoints the *qadis*. A certain degree of self-government is guaranteed by the requirement that at least five members of the committee must be Muslims. Nevertheless, the choice of the Muslim and non-Muslim members is not made by the minority community itself. Apart from the two *qadis* who are members of the appointing committee, two other members are government Ministers, three are Members of the *Knesset* elected by a majority of the *Knesset*, and the two remaining members are chosen by the Israeli Bar. All three bodies are Jewish-controlled.⁷⁷¹

Thus, *Sharia* court system did not serve as de-facto agent of hegemony until this indirect legitimacy began to be gradually internalized by the Muslim Palestinian Arab population in late 2000s. Post-*Al-Aqsa Intifada* period witnessed increased efforts of the well-educated *qadis* such as Ahmet Natur in redefining the relations of the institution with the Israeli dominant legal structures towards broadening its autonomy, scale of activities and institution-building capacity⁷⁷². Before Natur and other *qadis* of third generation, first -generation *qadis* supported the adoption of some *Knesset* legislation as well as provisions of Israeli civil law on either pragmatic basis of conciliating the Israeli legal authorities or on the basis of their worldview⁷⁷³.

Natur and third-generation *qadis* excessively relied on the Islamic resources. They maintained a rejectionist discourse against the Israeli civil law and state legislation.

⁷⁷¹ Saban, (2004), op.cit., p.955

⁷⁷² Interview with Ahmet Natur, President of the Moslem High Court of Appeals, Jerusalem, 15.09.2006

⁷⁷³ Yitzhak Reiter, 'Qadis and the Implementation of Islamic Law in Present Day Israel', R. Gleave and E. Kermeli (eds.), **Islamic Law: Theory and Practice**, I.B. Tauris, London and New York, 1997, p.210

However, as they concentrated their efforts on reforming Sharia judicial system “in accordance with the current conditions” through introduction of new ethical norms and endorsement of qadi’s judicial task, they consolidated the trust to an embedded judicial system. In fact, reformed judicial interpretative authority of the Shariya judges were not utilized by them as a counter-hegemonic tool against the Israeli civil law and jurisprudence. It was rather used as a means of negotiation with the “current conditions” and legal needs of the Palestinian Arab Muslim population within the existing dominant legal structure.

They also played a catalyzing role between the Israeli dominant religio-legal structures and the religious counter-hegemonic movements in the Palestinian Arab Muslim community. Maintaining good communication with the Islamic Movement, Natur played important role in mediating the concerns of this movement in conjunction with requirements of the dominant religio-legal structures and processes⁷⁷⁴. Besides, *Sharia court* was an integral part of Israeli legal system. In this respect, notwithstanding its degree of virtual or discursive autonomy from the Israeli civil law it served internalization of Israeli legal system in the eyes of Palestinian Arab Muslim community rather than creating a counter-hegemonic legal space to the dominant legal structures and processes.

4.4.6. Land Planning as an Agent of Hegemony

For Abu Lughod, evacuation and resettlement policies of the state were designed to absorb territory it conquered while it simultaneously expelling, subjugating or containing the Arab population which, to its unconcealed distress, it was forced to take along with the land⁷⁷⁵. Spatial policies and allocation of resources in line with these policies served emergence and consolidation of hegemonic terrains for the interaction

⁷⁷⁴ Interview with Yitzhak Reiter, Colony Hotel, Jerusalem, 21.08.2006 and Interview with Ahmet Natur, President of the Moslem High Court of Appeals, Jerusalem, 15.09.2006

⁷⁷⁵ Janet Abu-Lughod, “Israeli Settlements in Occupied Arab Lands: Conquest to Colony”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Winter, 1982), p.16

among the dominant Jewish establishments and the Palestinian Arab citizens. Within this context, Israeli state pursued case-specific sophisticated land and housing policies to sustain politico-spatial dominance of the Jewish settlers, immigrants and newcomers at the expense of subordination of its Palestinian Arab citizenry. State's cliental mobilization of new Jewish immigrant communities and its exclusive land policies contributed maintenance of Jewish control over the territory⁷⁷⁶ while alienating the Palestinian Arab community from the state and the land authorities. As Yiftachel argued, the policies of control resulted in increased counter-hegemonic activism among the Palestinian Arab community.

Several notable peaks in Arab protest can be attributed to reaction and opposition to 'control' (planning or socio-economic) policies. The periods of these peaks include early 1976, with events surrounding Land Day and the intense Arab protest against widespread land expropriation; the late 1979/early 1980 period, with a combination of protest against the establishment of *mitzpim* in the Galilee, a lack of development in the Arab sector and financial discrimination against Arab villages[...] the 1985-6, period, with protests on the issue of local authority budgets; mid-1987, with the Equality Day general strike and broad Arab support for the struggle of the Bet Jan village to regain control over its lands; late 1988, with the Dwelling Day general strike; and early 1989, late 1990 and early 1991, with waves of Arab protest against inequality in municipal budgets.⁷⁷⁷

Patterns and levels of Palestinian Arab counter-hegemonic activities and protests were closely connected with the nature of public policies designed and implemented by the Israeli ruling elite. The timing of these peaks in Arab protest followed policy initiatives by the government (usually with adverse impacts on the Arabs), or periods of conflicts over the legacy of these control policies. In this respect, as Yiftachel argued, attitudes of ruling elite towards "compromise" or "control", which were reflected in the Israeli

⁷⁷⁶ Zeev Rosenhek, "Policy Paradigms and the Dynamics of the Welfare State and Zionist Colonial Project"

International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, Vol. 18 No.2/ 3/ 4 , 1998, p.186

⁷⁷⁷ Oren Yiftachel, "Regionalism among Arabs in Israel", *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, New Series, Vol. 22, No. 1.,1997, p.102

public policies towards the Palestinian Arab community, had crucial impact on the community's deprivation and levels of counter-hegemonic activity⁷⁷⁸.

Post *al-Aqsa Intifada* period witnessed passive revolutionary initiatives of the Israeli ruling elite towards the Palestinian Arab citizenry in the field of land planning and housing. Within the framework of *Israel Lands Authority* reform, Israeli government approved the appointment of a Palestinian Arab citizen to the board of Israel Lands Authority in May 2000. This was an important passive revolutionary act, which led involvement of Palestinian Arab citizens in one of the most authoritative institutions of the Israeli dominant structure in designing and implementing policies about the land in Israel. This was followed by activities of Israeli non-governmental organization towards accommodating the Palestinian Arab citizenry in the decision-making mechanisms of the land planning structure. *Association for Civil Rights in Israel* (ACRI), for example, waged a campaign on fair representation of Palestinian Arab citizens on building and planning committees, which decided on the construction of buildings and land use in Israeli localities.

Another important development which took place within the context of hegemony-in-rebuilding in post- *al-Aqsa Intifada* period was the affirmation of the rights of the Palestinian Arab citizens to settle in the 'Palestinian Arab-free' localities of Israel. In 2004, Israel Land Administration's was forced to implement the verdict of the Supreme Court dated March 2000 about Ka'adan family's right to purchase land and build a house in Katzir after its ignorance for four years⁷⁷⁹. This decision and implementation indicated an attitudinal change among the Israeli dominant land authorities from exclusionary and coercive approach to a more inclusive and accommodationist outlook.

⁷⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁹ Yuval Yoaz and David Ratner, "ILA to allow Israeli Arab family build in Jewish town", *Haaretz*, 10.05.2004, p.3

4.4.7. Language and Literature as Agents of Hegemony

Gramsci notably acknowledged the significance of language in the construction and maintenance of hegemony. Connections between the dynamics of the language and community⁷⁸⁰ were considered important in consolidating the hegemonic ideologies through internalization of the ideas by communal use of the dominant language in the daily practices as well as during the expression of ideas. Standardization of the language served social and economic consolidation⁷⁸¹ of different segments of the society in line with dominant cultural ideology. Successes of language-related policies of the dominant elite reflected its intellectual leadership in creation of a national consciousness and will. In this respect, Gramsci's works on hegemony addressed the vital relationship between the consolidation, internalization and operation of the dominant ideology and the functioning of language as a national-popular collective will⁷⁸².

In Israeli case, Hebrew operated at different levels of the hegemonic relationship between the dominant and subordinate groups as an important denominator of Israeliness as well as a pragmatic instrument to promote economic and social status within Israeli system. For some segments of the Palestinian Arab community, learning Hebrew is just a pragmatic concern to survive in Israeli system. Thus, they did not internalize the language and Hebrew did not affect their intra-communal communications as well as cultural meaning-system extensively. However, they utilized Hebrew while dealing with the bureaucratic issues as well as communicating with the members of the majority in order to carry out their businesses⁷⁸³. Thus, they accepted the dominance of the language in their relations with the Israeli dominant

⁷⁸⁰ Peter Ives, Language and Hegemony in Gramsci, Pluto Press, Ann Harbor, 2004, p.15

⁷⁸¹ Ibid., p.15

⁷⁸² Ibid., p.113

⁷⁸³ Kalekin-Fishman, (1998), op.cit. p.54

structures and processes. In this respect, Hebrew operated as an apparatus, which allowed limited absorption of the messages of dominant culture by the Palestinian Arab citizens for instrumental purposes rather than main means of communication and meaning construction. Yet, even such instrumental use of Hebrew allowed penetration of messages and conceptualization patterns of dominant culture in the linguistic practices of the Palestinian Arabs on daily basis. In fact, Arabic of some segments of Palestinian Arab new generation encompasses a considerable dose of Hebrew pervasion⁷⁸⁴. It is possible to observe this penetration in the daily linguistic practices of Palestinian Arab citizens. Notwithstanding the efforts of purifying Arabic from the impact of Hebrew in 1980s and 1990s, some Palestinian Arab citizens internalized usage of Hebrew words and phrases in their daily communications. They did not only use Arabic but they spoke mixture of Hebrew and Arabic which served normalization of Hebrew as part of their daily lives and therefore normalization of hegemony at linguistic and socio-cultural spheres⁷⁸⁵.

Such pervasion was also reflected in the sphere of literature. Examples to the efforts to deal with the hegemonic structure, Emile Habibi's *The Secret Life of Saeed, the Ill-Fated Pessoptimist: A Palestinian Who Became a Citizen of Israel*. Being the first major novel by a Palestinian Arab citizen of Israel, it reflected the dilemmas of the Palestinian Arab citizens in dealing with the dilemmas of citizenship to a country, which they did not feel fully, belong to the Israeli society⁷⁸⁶. On the other hand Anton Shammas's novel *Arabesques* reflected the processes and tendencies of Israelization by referring to the demands of the Palestinian Arab citizens in a bi-national Israel. In this respect, Shamas voiced both demands and dilemmas of the Palestinian Arab

⁷⁸⁴ Ilene R. Prusher, "Two Loyalties Tug at Arabs Who are Israeli, too", *Christian Science Monitor*, Vol.90, No.112, 1998, EBSCO Academic Science Premier.

⁷⁸⁵ Interview with Amal Jamal, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 06.09.2006

⁷⁸⁶ Beinun, (1998), op.cit., p.116

community through a “narrative of his youth and the chronicle of a family in Palestinian Arab populated Galilee region of Israel”⁷⁸⁷.

As Rachel Feldhay Brenner argued, the use of Hebrew in Arabesques derived from an effort to reconcile an “unresolved identity split” between the Israeliness and Palestinianness. In this respect, it was a way of moving within the hegemonic rules in order to challenge the hegemony through “hybridization of language and teachings in destabilizing the definition of nationalism, [and] bringing, for both the dominating and the dominated, the hope of cultural revitalization and of ideological rapprochement.”⁷⁸⁸ As most of the critiques noted, Shammas’ preference of writing in Hebrew was a sign of a semiotic quasi-Marxist revolt against the dominant classes by seizing one of its ideological apparatuses (literature). Thus, Shammas’ *Arabesque* challenges the “identification of Hebrew as an exclusively Jewish language and definition of Israel as exclusively a Jewish state”⁷⁸⁹.

4.4.8. Media as an Agent of Hegemony

According to Gramsci media is one of the ideological apparatuses of the dominant group in creating and disseminating its dominant values and beliefs among the subordinates. Media institutions and professionals serve the perpetuation and internalization of the dominance exerted by the dominant groups⁷⁹⁰.

In Israel, media served as means of hegemony from the early days of the Yishuv. It bridged the needs of ruling elite with the norms of Israeli democracy and provided an ideological platform for the political parties and movements in transmitting messages

⁷⁸⁷ William Gass, “Review of Arabesques”, *The New York Times Book Review*, 17.04.1988

⁷⁸⁸ Rachel Feldhay Brenner, “In Search of Identity: The Israeli Arab Artist in Anton Shammas's Arabesques”, *PMLA*, Vol. 108, No. 3, 1993, pp. 431-445

⁷⁸⁹ Yael S. Feldman, “Postcolonial Memory, Postmodern Intertextuality: Anton Shammas's Arabesques Revisited”, *PMLA*, Vol. 114, No. 3, 1999, p. 373

⁷⁹⁰ David Altheide, “Media Hegemony: A Failure of Perspective”, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 48, No. 2, 1984, p. 476

of different segments of dominant political elite⁷⁹¹. Changes throughout the history altered the formats and ownership of the media but they did not transmute its relationship with the ruling elite.

The structural and ethical changes only assisted in preserving the political control over the media, and together they adapted the social responsibility model to the unique circumstances of Israeli democracy, or what may be designated enlightened authority. The passage from a service orientation to a profit orientation aids the creation of a triopoly of media corporations, which control the press and the broadcast media. Simultaneously, it nurtures the dependence of the 'Media Barons' on the political echelon. The structural changes, and mainly the creation of multiple channels, allegedly indicate the pluralism desirable for any democratic regime. In practice, the passage from a one-channel broadcasting monopoly to a fragmentation into tens of channels preserved political control in the era of burgeoning media technologies.⁷⁹²

In Israeli case, both Hebrew and Arab language media served consolidation of hegemonic perceptions among the Palestinian Arab citizens. As Tamar Liebes argued, Israeli hegemony over the journalists and the editors operated both at technical and ideological level. At technical level, the news sources were mainly Israeli dominant elite and authorities who commented on the Palestinian Arab affairs especially in the course of crisis situations. In this respect, both during the first *intifada* of 1987 and *al-Aqsa intifada* Israeli mainstream media heavily relied on the government sources and dominant political elite in the presentation of the Palestinian Arab communities in connection to with these crises. At ideological level, media functioned as an apparatus of Zionist hegemony with regard to the relationship between the authorities and the Palestinian Arab citizens. The representation and reporting of the first *intifada* in the Israeli newspapers was an important example, which provided insight on operation of dominant structures and processes within the major discursive apparatuses at both technical and ideological levels⁷⁹³.

⁷⁹¹ Dan Caspi, "On Media and Politics: Between Enlightened Authority and Social Responsibility", *Israel Affairs*, Vol.11, No.1, 2005, p.26

⁷⁹² *Ibid.*, p.3

⁷⁹³ Asya, (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.188-9

Particularly in the courses of hegemonic crises, Israeli media played an important role in convincing the Palestinian Arab citizens to carry out in-system protest activities rather than opting for counter-hegemonic moves. In this respect, Israeli media contributed internalization or pragmatic acceptance of the dominant presentations of both dominant and subordinate groups.

Palestinian Arab media in Israel disseminated confused messages with regard to the nature relationship between the Palestinian Arab citizens and Israel both during and after the *al-Aqsa Intifada*. Although the reports of *Al-Quds* and other Palestinian Arab media coded counter-hegemonic messages, they did not offer alternative discursive framework which would create a counter-hegemonic enclave within the Israeli media sphere. Notwithstanding the efforts of the restricted press of the *Islamic Movement* managed to construct such a discursive enclave, their messages were either suppressed or marginalized within the Israeli public sphere.

Openings in the media sphere which took place especially in the post-*Al-Aqsa* period aimed to serve integration of the Palestinian Arab media to the mainstream Israeli media sphere. Israeli ruling elite put forward some initiatives of affirmative action towards the Palestinian Arab citizens. In 2008, a panel on the representation of the Palestinian Arab citizenry on Israeli media revealed that the efforts notwithstanding, absence of the Palestinian Arab citizenry from the mainstream news agencies and the private media companies remained intact⁷⁹⁴. Israeli media elite asserted the need for more integrative steps towards overcoming the under-representation problem of the Palestinian Arab media professionals in the Israeli mainstream media structures and processes⁷⁹⁵.

Commercialization of the media sphere elevated hegemonic processes in Israeli media sphere to another stage. Economic restrictions of the Palestinian Arab media prevented

⁷⁹⁴ Rachelle Kliger, "Panel discusses integration of Arabs citizens in Israeli media", *Yedioth Ahronoth, ynetnews*, 25.01.2006, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3498747,00.html>

⁷⁹⁵ Ibid.

its development as a “fifth estate” within the ‘fourth estate’ of Israeli media sphere due to lack of investors and initiators from Palestinian Arab community, who would invest for Palestinian Arab media at economic and ideational levels. In 2004, for example, Israeli state issued a tender for a commercial Arabic language channel “with a genuine desire to create an independent Arab channel”⁷⁹⁶. The Palestinian Arab investors however, did not embrace this desire enthusiastically due to either lack of awareness about the importance of such medium or the capital limits⁷⁹⁷. Palestinian Arab inactivity in undertaking the control of one of the vital medium of intra-communal and inter-communal communication, which could present “the reality of Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel in an open manner”, led missing of a chance for delivering their messages within discursive corridors of the Israeli dominant structure. As the tender on Arabic channel was given to the *Ananey Communications Group* owned by non-Palestinian Arab personalities with “commercial, hedonistic and consumer-oriented approaches”⁷⁹⁸, the channel appeared as a medium of communication through which its audience would negotiate the messages of the hegemonic structure and processes rather than criticizing them. In this respect, attempts towards creating relatively autonomous Palestinian Arab media sphere with an alternative discourse to the ones of dominant structures did not bring about substantial outcomes.

4.4.9. Symbols as an Agent of Hegemony (Image of the State)

Symbols of the state and dominant institutions of political society play an important role in internalization of the ethico-moral leadership of the ruling elite. One of the most difficult problems of the Israeli ruling elite from the establishment of Israeli state was to persuade the Palestinian Arab community to accept ethico-moral leadership of a state whose symbols and discourses explicitly exclude the Palestinian Arab ethical and moral symbols.

⁷⁹⁶ Anat Balint, “The revolution passed us by”, *Haaretz*, 16.03.2004, p.9

⁷⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁸ Ibid.

Hatikva (Hope), national anthem of Israel, is mainly about the hope of the Jews to return their homeland throughout their history and to reach their freedom after the long years of exile. It does not reflect any feeling with regard to Jewish coexistence with other nations. It does not refer any of the values, traditions or historical event related to the Palestinian Arab community. For a Palestinian Arab citizen, its internalization as a representative symbol of the whole society means his/her rejection of Palestinian Arab component in the symbolic identity of 'national collective'. Singing *Hatikva* even without accepting the meaning of its words in the public meetings, national days, cultural activities, sport ceremonies, civic protests and demonstrations means individual contribution banal reproduction of dominant understanding of national collective, which is based on the dominance of one group over the other.

The easiest way of handling this problem has been imposition of certain discursive guidelines, which were based on the denial of national symbolism from the identity of Palestinian Arab community. The Israeli ruling elite expected that replacement of Palestinian Arab national symbolism by the local imagery would also alleviate consolidation of their loyalty to an "alien" ethico-moral leadership. However, it was never clear how such an alienation from the "Palestinian Arab national collective" would be maintained in a system of exclusion. Alienation of Palestinian Arab community from the symbols of Palestinian Arab symbolism required internalization of alternative symbols in the course of redefining its national identity. However, coercive policies, which forced Palestinian Arabs to make a choice between accepting the Jewish symbols as dominant denominator of their national identity, created reaction rather than sympathy towards these symbols among the Palestinian Arab community. As the Israeli ruling elite did not leave room for symbolic expression of Palestinian Arab communal values and practices within the dominant structures and processes of the Israeli state, some segments of the Palestinian Arab community alienated from the image of the state.

As mentioned by Rabinowitz, Israeli ruling elite's main concern was to create a Palestinian Arab local sub-identity which would be submissive to the upper-identity of

Israelianness and loyal to the Israeli ethico-political leadership. Thus they tried to prevent emergence of an alternative ethico-political consciousness among the Palestinian Arab citizenry through utilization of certain the discursive mechanisms and denial of the common heritage and past⁷⁹⁹. Therefore, following the 1948 War, the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel were not permitted by the Israeli ruling elite to appraise their common fate as victims as well as their collective memories of their communal past before 1948. The coercive measures of the Israeli ruling elite and the disapproving stance of the Jewish civil and political societies in Israel pushed manifestations of Palestinian Arab collective identity to the private sphere.⁸⁰⁰

A quarter of a century after the creation of the Land Day monument, dozens of other monuments have been established all over Arab villages and towns in Israel. These monuments commemorate the martyrs of the rebellion against the British in 1936–1939, the Nakba in 1948, and recently, the 13 victims who were shot and killed by the Israeli police during the violent demonstrations of October 2000. Where possible, there is an effort to draw a direct line between all the victims, emphasizing their common destiny. From a contemporary perspective, looking back on 54 years of the existence of the state of Israel, the crucial place of the Land Day events and Land Day monument is evident. It was the watershed of identity and memory, the moment when the Palestinian identity of the Arabs in Israel started to gain presence in the public space.⁸⁰¹

Celebrations of national days were also significant aspect of banal reproduction of dominant discourse. Celebrations of Israeli “Independence day” by the Palestinian Arab citizens was a good example of participation in the banal reproduction of the discourse which neglected the fact that the day that independence of the Israeli state was achieved meant emergence of existential predicaments for many Palestinian people. Celebration of this day by a Palestinian Arab member of the Israeli national collective meant acceptance of dominant version of historical narrative on the

⁷⁹⁹ Tamir Sorek, “Memory and Identity The Land Day Monument”, *ISIM Newsletter*, Vol.10, 2002, p.17

⁸⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁰¹ Ibid.

emergence of the Israeli state and nation through negligence or denial of the “nakba”, which it created for the internally displaced Palestinian Arab citizens and the Palestinian people outside Israel.

Notwithstanding emergence of a counter-hegemonic “al-Nakba” discourse and commemorations from 1990s onwards, celebrations of Israeli independence days were still common in some segments of the Palestinian Arab community. As it was still accepted a test of loyalty to the Israeli state and national collective in some segments of the Palestinian Arab citizenry, participation in these celebrations are internalized as a part of banal reproduction of symbolic hegemony. In fact, they did not necessarily define independence of Israel and *al-Nakba* as counter-productive incidents. They believed in the possibility of celebrating the emergence of their current state and national collective while commemorating the catastrophe of their people at the same time. In fact, pragmatic de-contextualization of the two historical processes alleviated their dilemma-free co-existence in the hearts and minds of some Palestinian Arab members of Israeli national collective. It becomes easier as today’s individual achievements within the Israeli national collective distorted individual’s emotional attachment to the incidents of history as a determining factor in his/her individual affiliations. Such distortion promote reproduction of a hegemonic relationship through ignorance of the potentially counter-hegemonic significance of symbolism that might be attached to al-Naqba as well as other events such as *Land Day* or Kfar Qasim massacre. The Israeli ruling elite also strengthened such distortion through implementation of passive revolutionary acts which blurred its responsibility in these events. Commemoration of *Kfar Qasim* massacre in the schools all over Israel as a symbol of disobeying the illegal orders by the orders of Israeli Ministry of Education in October 2006, for example, was one of the noteworthy attempts of Israeli ruling elite towards re-contextualizing these events within the framework of hegemony in rebuilding.

4.4.10. Hamula: an Agent of Hegemony?

Traditional structures such as monarchies, feudal entities, tribes, clans and extended families were generally defined as “the other” within the context of modernization. In this respect, they were considered as the social formations, against which evolutionary struggle of modernization take place for the social structural transformation. Flexibility and adoptability of these entities were neglected until very recently. Students of hegemony were not immune from the impact of the modernization approaches in their analysis of the consensual basis of the consolidation of hegemony by the subordinate groups. Consequently, literature on *hamula* generally put emphasis on the static nature of *hamula* and defined it as a counterforce of modernization. Dominant view in these approaches urged that the enhancement of modernization necessitated dissolution of the traditional predecessor structures and their replacement by modern forms and arrangements of socio-economic and political organization was inevitable⁸⁰². However, there is a growing literature on the adoptive nature of *hamula* to the modernization processes. In fact, notwithstanding contradictions and tensions exerted by the competition between the forces of modernization and the dynamics of traditional conservatism, some *hamulas* do not simply dissolve. They rather develop various devices and strategies of adjustment and reorganization within the context of a new modern setting⁸⁰³ without infringing on intra-*hamula* coherence. In this respect, it is not possible to easily exclude *hamula* from the modern processes of hegemony-building and hegemony-consolidation.

Hamula is a platform where the traditions are negotiated to find alternative paths of intra-communal reorganization under the pressure of modernization in order to protect certain traditional values and patterns of behavior. *Hamula* does not immediately adjust to the modern processes. It is rather a gradual process of compromise. The case of

⁸⁰² Majid Al-Haj, “The Changing Arab Kinship Structure: The Effect of Modernization in an Urban Community”, *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1988, p. 237

⁸⁰³ Ibid.

hamula primaries is a good example for such adaptation of modern processes of democracy. In *Hamula* primaries was an attempt to resolve intra-*hamula* disputes among the *hamula* members in running for power in local politics. In the case of primaries, *hamula* adapted modern procedures of democracy into a tool to sustain centrality of *hamula*. Amal Jamal argued that these *hamula* primaries, which took place before the local elections are the mechanisms of control within the *hamula* which prioritize and praise “ties of obligation and commitment” over the individual qualifications such as education. Recent studies however, indicate that notwithstanding continuation of some limitations admittance to power center of *hamula* based on gender identities, primaries grant access to *hamula* members, who are in lower levels in the hierarchy of *hamula* political leadership such as higher education graduates⁸⁰⁴. In addition, as the higher education becomes prevalent among new generations of higher rankings of *hamula* hierarchy, overlaps of the member’s individual qualifications and his position in *hamula*’s ranking of hierarchy began to increase correspondingly. Thus patriarchal system embodied in *hamula* is a political and civil societal space where identities and hierarchies are contested, re/produced, and negotiated as both a political means and an anchor for social identities while negotiating member’s positioning within *hamula*.⁸⁰⁵

Previously it was the heads of *hamulas*, who decided the actions of the whole members of the community no matter the members present their consent on the decisions. As the *hamula* structure evolved in line with the modernization processes, members of the *hamulas* began to have a say on the decisions of the *hamula* leaders. They present their opinions. In fact, they have transformed from submissive serfs to pragmatic beneficiaries within the *hamula* structure. In this respect, they do not solely obey but

⁸⁰⁴ Hanna Herzog and Taghreed Yahia-Younis, “Men's Bargaining with Patriarchy: The Case of Primaries within *Hamulas* in Palestinian Arab Communities in Israel”, *Gender & Society*, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2007, pp.579-602

⁸⁰⁵ Ibid.

they internalize the profitable position of the obedience. Thus, for example, they do not vote for a Jewish party just because their leader order them to do so, but also because they calculate benefits of voting for that party in terms of their future access to the power, sources, job opportunities. Votes obtained by *Nationalist Religious Party* or *Shas* from the *hamulas* of some Palestinian Arab villages such as *Abu Ghosh* in early 1960s and 1990s respectively were not only because of the agreements between the leaders of *hamulas* and these Zionist political parties but also because of the belief of the *hamula* members on the possibility of increased opportunities that would be created by these parties once they assume the ministries in the Israeli governance.

In this respect, role and place of the *hamula*'s leadership in 1960s and 2000s differentiated significantly. Extended family can serve the production and reproduction of the state in the personal meaning systems of the members of *hamula* as long as the dominant cultural values and meanings represented by the states do not threaten the traditional substructure of *hamula*. Another important factors that assist penetration of dominant patterns of behaviors and culture into the daily practices of *hamula* members is the extent of internalization of these patterns by the *hamula* leaders.

Locating *hamula* in economic structure requires a brief analysis of dominant nature of Israeli economic structures. In economic terms, in Israel, class distinctions overlapped with the ethnic differences. *Hamula* was a socio-economic organization, which suppressed the organization of its members in line with the class interests. *Hamula* identity of the member was always superior to the other definitions of his or her identification. *Hamula* also played an important role in dissemination and internalization of dominant ideology of Israeliness with its economic roots among its Palestinian Arab members. Although main incentives of *hamula*'s leadership regarding their economic relationship with the Israeli dominant economic structures and processes arouse from *hamula*'s "pragmatic requirements and structural constraints" in the beginning⁸⁰⁶, in some cases they gradually transformed into ideological and cultural

⁸⁰⁶ Calvin Goldscheider, Israel's Changing Society: Population, Ethnicity, and Development, Westview Press, Oxford, 1996, p.70

commitments to the Israeli system. In this respect, notwithstanding substitution of some economic roles of the *hamula* in providing socio-economic welfare to its members by dominant economic structure and mechanisms, the *hamula* remained as an important catalyzing formation for the Palestinian Arab citizens, which facilitated their internalization of the dominant ideology by referring to their positioning within the Israeli dominant economic structures and processes. In this respect, not only the Israeli dominant structures and processes but also Palestinian Arab counter-publics or counter-hegemonic movements, which competed with Israeli dominant ideology, tried to utilize *hamula* in disseminating their ideological messages among the Palestinian Arab community at local level. That was what communist ideology and the Arab nationalism did until the 1980s. Although it did not announce publicly, the Islamic Movement also acknowledged the intra-*hamula* and inter-*hamula* structures in mobilizing the Palestinian Arab community in 1990s and 2000s⁸⁰⁷.

In the post-*al-Aqsa* period, some *hamulas* did not only adapted democratic procedures into an apparatus of securing their centrality in political sphere at local level but also adjusted their structures in line with the requirements and socio-economic processes modern society. Thus, contrary to Jamal's analysis, these *hamulas* utilized qualifications of its educated members in bridging the traditional structures and values of *hamula* with the processes of modernity in overall Israeli society. In this respect, education did not necessarily led to dissolution of *hamula* structures although it initiated a soul-searching process among the educated members of *hamula*. In fact, notwithstanding the increased amount of university students, graduates and other educated members of *hamula*, patterns of intra-*hamula* relationship continued to be an important factor in the daily lives and considerations of the members. Overall, in some Palestinian Arab localities, *hamula* affiliations, personal qualifications, and socio-economic positions of the members developed to become complementary rather than

⁸⁰⁷ Interview with Amal Jamal, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 06.09.2006

competing or exclusionary in obtaining political and economic positions in or outside the village.

CHAPTER 5

A TALE OF TWO VILLAGES

5.1. Abu Ghosh

Study of Hurwich and Nubani on *Abu Ghosh*, which dated back 1978, revealed that the *Abu Ghosh* community was highly inbred and the villagers had a common ancestry⁸⁰⁸. Another study dated 1982 confirmed the findings about the homogeneity of the *Abu Ghosh* population by maintaining that all members of *Abu Ghosh* are descendants of the brothers of same family⁸⁰⁹. It was a patrilineal community, which was based on tight kinship and genetical connections⁸¹⁰. *Abu Ghosh* has four extended families within its *hamula* structure (Othman, Ibrahim, Abd al-Rahman, and Jaber), each named for one of the four sons of Issa and Wafa.⁸¹¹ The village resisted various waves of immigration at different stages of its history and configuration of its population remained to be homogeneous. Since inter-*hamula* marriages as well as the marriages with the outsiders were not very welcome within the *hamula*, its population's homogeneity was largely maintained until late 1990s.

⁸⁰⁸ Baruch J. Hurwich and Nafez Nubani Blood pressures in a highly inbred community--Abu Ghosh, Israel," *Israel Journal of Medical Science*, Vol.14, No.9, pp.962-9

⁸⁰⁹ Baruch J.Hurwich and Bernard Rosner et.al, "Familial aggregation of blood pressure in a highly inbred community--Abu Ghosh, Israel", *American Journal of Epidemiology*, Vol. 115, No.5, pp.646-56

⁸¹⁰ Baruch J. Hurwich, Nafez Nubani, Frances Lewitter, "Tracing kinship through father's first name in Abu Ghosh, an Israeli Arab patrilineal society", *Human Biology*, Vol.55, No.2, pp. 375-81

⁸¹¹ Michael Gorkin, and Rafiq Othman, **Three Mothers, Three Daughters: Palestinian Women's Stories**, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1996, <http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft4489n8s2/>

5.1.1. Abu Ghosh: Historical Background

Abu Gosh is believed to be constructed on the ruins of the biblical town of *Kiryat Ye'arim* (Town of Forests). It also witnessed the Roman rule which furnished the village with a large fort here as well as reign of the Crusaders, who established a monastery to function as a church and military center of operations for a long time. Ancestors of the current villagers are believed to inhabit in the region from the 16th century onwards. The Ottoman Sultan Yavuz Selim relocated *Abu Ghosh* family into the region in 1520 following his campaign in the Middle East that started in 1516.

At the initial stages of their settlement process in Palestine during the 16th century as a branch of Sultan Selim's Ottoman armed forces and local administration, some big Arab families perceived *Abu Ghosh* family as a threat. There were several reasons behind this threat perception. First, they considered the *Abu Ghosh hamula* as a stranger to the lands, which operated in the service of dominant structure during the Ottoman period. Second, they were not happy with the tax collection practices of the *Abu Ghosh* in the name of Ottoman administration in the region. Third, *Abu Ghosh's* control over the considerable amount of land due to its strategic positioning within the Ottoman's local administration created tension among the other Arab families, which did not have chance to possess similar amounts of land under Ottoman supervision⁸¹².

Abu Ghosh hamula was exposed to violent acts and demands of Bedouin tribes of Negev especially during the Crimean War due to mobilization and transfer of Ottoman troops to battleground in 1850s⁸¹³. This period, however, also created opportunities for reorganization of local authority of *hamula* with the need of establishing necessary control and defense mechanisms for self-reliance against the extra-*hamula* threats, which would be exerted following the decline of Ottoman control over the region.

⁸¹² Interview with Issa Jaber, Abu Ghosh, 22.08.2006

⁸¹³ Clinton Bailey, 'The Ottomans and the Bedouin Tribes of the Negev', Gad G. Gilbar, (ed.), **Ottoman Palestine 1800-1914**, Studies in Economic and Social History, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1990, p. 325

Abu Gosh's relationship with the state authorities, as in the case of its clashes with the state's forces during the reign of Ottoman Empire, had not always been peaceful. In this respect, it is not easy to tell that its relations with Israeli state reflect an institutionalized non-riot culture between the Abu Gosh and state institutions as an historical trajectory. In fact, *Abu Ghosh* was one of the villages, that confronted Ottoman state's policy of reducing the influence of powerful leading "families with a base in the Palestinian countryside" in the mid nineteenth century as a result of centralization efforts by the state⁸¹⁴. Decision of *Abu Ghosh* family to resist the central government's modernization efforts of military forces during the *Mahmud the Second* led to local rebellions in Palestine and brought about a repressive campaign of Ottoman forces, which resulted in removal of *Abu Ghosh* leadership⁸¹⁵. Since the *hamula* leadership was not completely eliminated by the Ottoman authorities, they had the opportunity to re-establish their authority over the localities following the decrease of central authority of Istanbul especially after the end of *Ottomanism* in 1908 and the end of Islamic rule in 1918⁸¹⁶.

In the May 1834, *Abu Ghosh*, with other rebel families, fought against the Egyptian forces, which ruled Palestine between 1831 and 1841. Following the amnesty and some other concessions granted by Muhammed Ali Pasha to *Abu Ghosh*, it ended its rebellion and survived this confrontation⁸¹⁷. As the 19th century was characterized with the reign of local notables as socio-economic and political leaders of the localities in Palestine, the head of clans became one of the most important socio-economic and political agents of regulating and catalyzing the relationship between the members of

⁸¹⁴ Rashid Khalidi, **Palestinian Identity, The Construction of Modern National Consciousness**, Columbia University Press, New York, 1997, p.65.

⁸¹⁵ Illan Pappé, "The Rise and Fall of the Husaynis", 1840-1922, *Jerusalem Quarterly*, No. 10, Autumn 2000, pp.32-33

⁸¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 28

⁸¹⁷ Baruch Kimmerling, "Process of Formation of Palestinian Collective Identities", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2000, pp. 48-81 and <http://www.mideastweb.org/palrevolt.htm>

local society and the inter-*hamula* political and socio-economic structures and processes.⁸¹⁸ In 1840s, *Abu Ghosh* family, began to face with uncertainties within the notables-dominated structures and processes of inter-clan politics, which necessitated reconsideration of its political positioning in the inter-*hamula* alliances (with Husseinis) and animosities (with Qayis) as well as towards the Ottoman authorities⁸¹⁹.

There were instances of cooperation between the *Abu Ghosh* family and the Jews prior to as well as during the massive Jewish settlement movements in late 19th century. One of these instances was the partnership between the Yelin family, a Jewish family from Istanbul, and Sheikh Mustafa *Abu Ghosh* in late 1860s. The partnership between the two families was established on the ownership of a hotel-cum-coffeehouse that was built near the village of *Qalunya*⁸²⁰. During the last phases of Ottoman period the *hamula* leadership did not only improve its inter-*hamula* relations but also established good relations with the foreign representatives who had been appointed to Jerusalem by British, French, and German governments. The village even hosted summer residence of German ambassador, which led improvement of relations with that particular foreign mission until the beginning of First World War⁸²¹.

Regular interaction between the Jews and inhabitants of *Abu Ghosh* started in 1920 with the establishment of kibbutz *Kiryat Anavim* (Town of Grapes) on a hilltop underneath *Abu Ghosh* at the outskirts of Jerusalem. Nature of this interaction was very friendly from the very beginning⁸²². Morris also confirms the friendly and collaborative relationship between the *Abu Ghosh* and Israeli *Yishuv*, which went back to the

⁸¹⁸ Pappe, (2000), op.cit., p.27

⁸¹⁹ Ibid. p.29

⁸²⁰ Amnon Cohen, 'A Coffeehouse in Nineteenth-Century Jerusalem: A Precursor of Modernization', Elie Podeh and Asher Kaufman (eds.) **Arab-Jewish Relations**, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton and Portland: 2006, p. 15

⁸²¹ Interview with Issa Jaber, Abu Ghosh, 22.08.2006

⁸²² Martin Gilbert, **Israel: A History**, Doubleday Publishers, London, New York, p. 45

1920s.⁸²³ Estranged from the Palestinian urban elite, *Abu Ghosh hamula* leadership sought allies in order to maintain control over the local socio-economic and political affairs. In fact, its participation into the *mu'arada* in early 1920s and *Farmer's Party* in 1924 were indicators of such a search, which derived from leadership's distrust to the Palestinian urban elite as well as its concerns about being subordinated in decision-making processes and structures⁸²⁴. As the *Farmer's Party* was supported by the Zionist movement with a considerable enthusiasm - in order to keep urban-village divide among the Palestinian Arabs- relationship between the *Abu Ghosh* local leadership and Zionist leaders improved significantly⁸²⁵.

Nevertheless, these improvements did not lead complete disassociation of *Abu Ghosh* residents from the Palestinian Arab causes in 1930s. They tried to balance their relationship with the Zionist movement and the Arab Higher Committee even in the intricate period of Arab riots in 1936. In this respect, on April 1936, they took the oath of allegiance to the Arab Higher Committee in order to demonstrate their commitment to the Arab cause in Palestine⁸²⁶. However, this oath did not disallow them to continue their friendly relationship with the neighboring Jewish settlements as well as the Zionist movement. As one of the elders of *Abu Ghosh* maintained, they were not actively involved in the Arab riots in 1930s and 1940s, notwithstanding their oath of allegiance to the Arab Higher Committee:

We didn't participate in the riots during the 30's and 40's. We did not join the Arabs from the other villages bombarding Jewish vehicles in 1947. The Palmah fought many

⁸²³ Benny Morris, ***Israel's Border Wars***, 1949-1965, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, p.151

⁸²⁴ Manuel Hassassian , ***Palestine: Factionalism in the National Movement (1919 - 1939)***, PASSIA Publication, Jerusalem, 1990, p.57

⁸²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.66

⁸²⁶ Walid Khalidi, "Before Their Diaspora", Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984, http://www.islamonline.net/English/In_Depth/PalestineInFocus/TheStruggle/History

villages around us. But there was an order to leave us alone. The other Arabs never thought there would be a Jewish government here.⁸²⁷

In fact, attempts of the Zionist organizations to mobilize sympathy and backing of Palestinian Arab community in late 1930s were not unwelcome by *Abu Ghosh* in this period. Besides, some Palestinian Arabs, led by the *Abu Ghosh hamula* leadership, sent a pro-Zionist message to the *Occupied Enemy Territory Administration* (O.E.T.A)⁸²⁸, which further improved the relations between *Abu Ghosh* and the Jewish political and militant elite. Some radical nationalist factions of the Palestinian Arab community severely criticized and cursed leadership and members of *hamula* of *Abu Ghosh* due to their benevolent stance towards the Zionists. They also accused *Abu Ghosh* for being pro-Zionist⁸²⁹.

In 1945, prior to the establishment of the Israeli state, *Abu Ghosh* had been host of the nurseries, which supplied saplings for the forestation projects of the Jewish National Fund⁸³⁰. Nevertheless, this did not avoid the *Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency* to approve occupation of some of the lands of *Abu Ghosh*, which previously remained under the control of the Arab inhabitants according to the Morrison-Grady plan of Jewish settlement in the region⁸³¹.

In the course of 1948 war, *hamula* leadership of *Abu Ghosh* either supported the Jewish armed forces or followed a nonaligned policy of benevolence towards them at different

⁸²⁷ Quoted from Hadassah Magazine 2003, in “Abu Ghosh Mayor attends Chabad rally”, 02.04.2007, <http://israelmatzav.blogspot.com/2007/04/abu-ghosh-mayor-attends-chabad-rally.html>

⁸²⁸ Bernard Wasserstein, ***The British in Palestine***, London Royal Historical Society, London, 1978, p. 70

⁸²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 62

⁸³⁰ Yosi Katz, ***Between Jerusalem and Hebron***, Ramat Gan : Bar Ilan University Press, 1992, p.93

⁸³¹ *Ibid.* p.213

stages of the warfare⁸³². Such a stance and good socio-economic relations with the neighboring kibbutz *Kiryat Anavim* prior to war helped the *Abu Ghosh hamula* leadership and the inhabitants surviving the commotions of the war. During the combats, *Palmach* battalion of *Haganah* was located near *Abu Ghosh*, which did not face any serious challenge or threat from *Abu Ghosh* villagers⁸³³.

However, contrary to common belief *Abu Ghosh* was not completely immune from the expulsion policies of the *Yishuv*'s ruling and military elite during the War of 1948. In fact, notwithstanding its friendly relationship with the *Kiryat Avanim*, some findings indicated that the *Kiryat Avanim* leadership In the course of clashes in the War of 1948, the *Haganah* General Staff decided to implement a policy of clearing out Arab communities located close to the vital routes and some borders.⁸³⁴ It included *Abu Ghosh* to the list of expulsion following the reports which mentioned support of *Abu Ghosh* villagers to the enemy forces by supplying information "either willingly or under duress"⁸³⁵. The military elite of *Yishuv* even proposed expulsion of *Abu Ghosh* population to the enemy Arab territory rather than Jewish inland such as Jaffa. Notwithstanding limited opposition from the leadership of *Kiryat Anavim*, 90 percent of the population of *Abu Ghosh* was expelled to *Ramallah* region, which was under the control of Arab forces following the IDF's instructions. It was only after the Cabinet's decision and "the permission of the authorities" in mid-January 1949 that the villagers of *Abu Ghosh* were gradually allowed to return to their villages⁸³⁶. However, on July 7,

⁸³² Ilan Pappé, **The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-1951**, I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd., London and New York, 1992, p.94

⁸³³ Gilbert *op.cit.* p. 209

⁸³⁴ Benny Morris, **The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p.167

⁸³⁵ Benny Morris, (1990), *op.cit.*, p. 193

⁸³⁶ *Ibid.* 198

of 1950 following a search in the village, some one hundred residents were captured and brought to an "unknown destination."⁸³⁷

Notwithstanding the expulsions and some coercive practices, *Abu Gosh* was one of the exceptional Arab villages, which could not be uprooted by the army mainly due to the “local Jewish pressure and intercession” that derived from historically established mutual trust and friendship between the neighboring Palestinian Arab (*Abu Ghosh*) and Jewish (*Kiryat Anavim*) settlements⁸³⁸. In fact, basing on this mutual trust and confidence, local intercession of *Kiryat Anavim* transformed local blessing into national approval of Minority Affairs Minister *Bechor Shitrit* as well as the other *Mapam* ministers and officials. In this respect, as cabinet debates between May 1948 and July 1948 revealed, *Abu Ghosh* was one of the villages, expulsion of which was repeatedly rejected by various ministers of cabinet through utilization of *Yishuv*’s political structures and processes in avoiding its obliteration notwithstanding concerns, pressures and lobbying of the Israeli Defense Forces⁸³⁹. In fact, the political elite of the state, especially some of the *Mapam* leadership, perceived *Abu Gosh* (among other three villages) as the examples where they could implement their moral-ideological zeal of Jewish–Arab coexistence at least at local level⁸⁴⁰. As a result, national political elite’s decision of protecting *Abu Gosh* from uprooting as planned by the army for strategic reasons proved to be effectual and army acted in line with this decision without significant disobedience.

There were also individual stories of collaboration of residents of *Abu Ghosh* with the Israeli armed forces during the 1940s. In fact, *Abu Ghosh* was cited by the *Lehi* (Jewish underground movement) as the only specific example of Arab support for the [Jewish]

⁸³⁷ Sabri Jiryis, “The Land Question in Israel”, *MERIP Reports*, No. 47, 1976, p.7

⁸³⁸ Benny Morris, (2004), *op.cit.*, p.167

⁸³⁹ Benny Morris, “Response to Finkelstein and Masalha”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1991, p.102

⁸⁴⁰ Benny Morris, (1990), *op.cit.*, p.216

underground [movement] during its struggle in 1947. According to *Lehi* records, *Abu Ghosh* family had given assistance to Geulah Cohen in her escape from prison on April 1947⁸⁴¹. He and two other residents of *Abu Ghosh* actively participated in the operation for freeing Geula Cohen, a *Haganah* member (and former MK) who was imprisoned for operating the *Lehi* radio and carrying arms, from British prison in Jerusalem's Russian Compound⁸⁴². For Heller, support of Yusuf *Abu Ghosh* and other *hamula* members to Cohen was rooted in the *Abu Ghosh* family's feud with the *Husseini* family of Jerusalem⁸⁴³. Thus, it was rather a result of pragmatic considerations of the *Abu Ghosh hamula* rather than its sympathy towards the ideological stance of the *Lehi* movement. Nevertheless, the motivations of *Abu Gosh* family seemed to become more complicated to reveal, when one of the family members, Yusuf Abu Gosh took part within the *Lehi*'s list of candidates for the first *Knesset* elections of 1949⁸⁴⁴. According to some sources, Yusuf *Abu Ghosh* and some other villagers from *Abu Ghosh* were members of *Lehi* (or *Stern*)⁸⁴⁵. According to some other sources, they were not members but sympathizers. In fact, although they cooperated with the Jews during the clashes and wanted to be members of *Lehi*, they were not accepted as members, because "time has not come yet for such an act, but not because it was inconceivable"⁸⁴⁶.

Hence, *Abu Ghosh* remained neutral if not openly supportive to the Yishuv's military activities during the war. Due to such interaction, *Abu Ghosh* was known to be a collaborator by some of Palestinian Arab *hamulas* of that time. For others it was one of

⁸⁴¹ Joseph Heller, ***The Stern Gang***, Frank Cass, London, 1995, p.177

⁸⁴² Peter Hirschberg, ***American Jewish Yearbook***, Vol.98, 1998, http://www.ajcarchives.org/AJC_DATA/Files/1998_14_Israel.pdf p. 475,

⁸⁴³ Heller, (1995), *op.cit.*, p.177

⁸⁴⁴ *Ibid.* p.265

⁸⁴⁵ Hirschberg, (1998), *op.cit.*, p.475

⁸⁴⁶ Ron Kuzar, ***Hebrew and Zionism: A Discourse Analytic Cultural Study***, Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin, 2001, p.226

the villages friendly to the *Yishuv*, which might moderate the interactions of the Palestinian Arab villages with the authorities of the *Yishuv*, which did not have good relationship. During the clashes of 1948, for example, representatives of the villages of *Khirbet al Luz*, *Sataf*, *Suba* and *Umm al Mis* asked leaders of *Abu Ghosh*, to mediate peace between them and the *Haganah*⁸⁴⁷. In fact, looking to the historical context, collaboration with the Jewish forces was not baseless when the pragmatic and inter-tribal balance of power considerations of *Abu Ghosh* were taken into consideration. As maintained by Mohammed Abu Ghosh:

What we did, we did for *Abu Ghosh*, for nobody else. Others who lost their land, hated us then, but now all over the Arab world, many people see we were right. If everyone did what we did, there'd be no refugee problem . . . And if we were traitors? Look where we are, look where they are.⁸⁴⁸

In the post-1948 War era, relations between *Abu Ghosh* and newly established Israeli state were not flawless. Security policies of Israeli ruling elite aimed to establish strict control over logistically and strategically critical villages following increased attempts of infiltration by the criminal gangs and anti-Israeli forces⁸⁴⁹. Change of attitudes and modus operandi of the Israeli security establishment against the infiltrators had its ramifications on people of *Abu Ghosh* as well. As Morris maintained, Israeli security forces amplified their searches, curfews and confinements in the villages in order to detect, arrest and expel the infiltrators⁸⁵⁰. *Abu Ghosh* inhabitants did not welcome these violent acts of the Israeli forces. However, they did not opt for counter-hegemonic or violent confrontation with the Israeli ruling elite either. They rather preferred to write a letter of grievance and protest to the Israeli public to attract the attention of newly emerging Israeli public's opinion to the violent practices of the Israeli state against the

⁸⁴⁷ Benny Morris, (2004), *op.cit.*, p.95.

⁸⁴⁸ Maurice Ostroff, "Academic Freedom and sloppy research", Issues of Concern for Justice and Society Research, <http://www.icjs-online.org/index.php?eid=3444&ICJS=5849&article=1368>

⁸⁴⁹ Benny Morris, (1993), *op.cit.*, p.151

⁸⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

villagers. In the “Open Letter to the Inhabitants of Israel”, they severely complained about the acts of the Israeli Defense Forces.

[Israeli security forces] surrounded our village... taken our women and children, and dumped them over the border, and to the Negev Desert, where many met their deaths... Last Friday... we awoke to shouts from the loudspeaker announcing that the village was surrounded and all those leaving their homes would be shot. We were forced to shut ourselves in our houses, which the police and military forces began to enter and search thoroughly, but they found no...contraband. In the end, they rounded up our women, old people, children, the sick, the blind and pregnant women, using force and blows... Then they took the crying, shouting prisoners to an unknown destination, and we still do not know what has befallen them⁸⁵¹

As it may be seen from the excerpts of the letter above, *Abu Ghosh* had a very good experience of utilizing the in-system communication channels with the Israeli public. Such direct addressing of the Israeli public provided the *Abu Ghosh* with a direct empathetic interaction with the Israeli society through bypassing the state’s catalyzing role in the inter-communal communication between the Arabs and the Jews. Moreover, it caused a change of the policies of the Israeli state with regard to the Arab community. Such a change partly was a result of the Israeli public pressure on the state’s decision-making mechanisms and partly because of the differentiations among the state’s administrative organs regarding the policies to be followed towards the Arab community⁸⁵².

This letter was also significant in demonstrating the attitudes of The Palestinian Arab villagers of *Abu Ghosh* about the nature of the relationship between them and the Israeli ruling elite. This letter exemplified the internalization of Israel’s newly emerging dominant structures and processes notwithstanding its sporadic use of violent measures by the new Israeli state against its citizens. In fact, *Abu Ghosh hamula* deepened the disagreement between the different segments of Israeli ruling elite about the nature of policies which should be pursued towards the Palestinian Arab citizens of

⁸⁵¹ Benny Morris, (1993), *op.cit.*, p.152

⁸⁵² Elie Rekhess, *Israeli State Policies in the Formative Years...*

Israel. While the supporters of a coercive policy supported the restrictive measures implemented by the security forces against the infiltrators as well as the villagers, some other segments of the ruling elite criticized use of coercive measures, which would damage the hegemonic vision of the Israeli state. *Moshe Sharett*, one of the leading figures in *Mapai*, for instance, maintained the necessity of pursuing searches and expulsion practices without alienating the inhabitants of *Abu Ghosh* as well as other segments of Israeli society from the state⁸⁵³.

Letter of *Abu Ghosh* also attracted the attention of the US embassy in Tel Aviv. The US representation in Israel noted impracticality of deterring Israeli ruling elite's coercive policies against the some segments of Palestinian Arab community through a pressure, which would be exerted by international society⁸⁵⁴. Notwithstanding the despair about possibility of this reaction, tactics, which were used against the infiltrators in the case of *Abu Ghosh* and *Arava* incidents created antipathy in international arena against the Israeli ruling elite. This international reaction and the dilemmatic connection between the policies against the infiltration and maintaining confidence of some segments of Palestinian Arab community who remained loyal to the Israeli state, also forced the Israeli ruling elite about the nature of future relationship between them and the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. Foreign Minister Sharett's statement revealed this tension between coercive and hegemonic measures:

If there is a possibility of reducing Arab minority, if there is a possibility of prompting some [Arab] village or community, a certain number of Arabs to leave the country, to send them on their way by peaceful means – this must be done... [...]One must not strive to do this by a wholesale policy of repression and discrimination...First of all, by such [means] the objective will be missed... and they will turn whole [Arab minority] into haters [of Israel]... I say that we must adopt a dual policy, we must stand firm as a wall against infiltration and not be deterred from using harsh measures, but at the same time we must understand that the Arabs who remain in Israel ... must be assured in a minimum.⁸⁵⁵

⁸⁵³ Benny Morris, (1993), *op.cit.*, , p.152

⁸⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p.152

⁸⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.162-3

Following the 1948 War, although there were cases of refuge from *Abu Ghosh*, it was one of the Palestinian Arab villages, which were exempted from Israeli ruling elite's and IDF's policies of displacement and expulsion that intended removal of the Palestinian Arab population from western suburbs and villages to locations inside the country or other side of country's new frontiers⁸⁵⁶.

Looking at the political trajectory of *Abu Gosh*, one may observe that the village has always been open to the political parties, which have been very vital and integrated within the political system of Israel. *Abu Ghosh* did not have problems with the ethnic character of these parties either. The General Zionists for instance founded small party branches in *Abu Ghosh* in 1953 when they became a part of the government coalition⁸⁵⁷. Herut, a militant Israeli political party right of the center, too, did not have any problems in obtaining the cooperation of *mukhtar* of *Abu Gosh* during 1959 elections⁸⁵⁸. In fact, time to time it has been closer to the Jewish political institutions more than their Arab counterparts. In 1965 elections for example, despite the raising nationalism among the Arab sector, GAHAL, a bloc, which was composed of *Herut* and the liberals obtained more political support from *Abu Gosh* than MAQI. In this respect, it can be argued that in *Abu Gosh*, the politics have been perceived and utilized from the point of political and socio-economic gains that could be obtained from the political parties within the Israeli political system.

During the 1967 War, these patterns of state-*Abu Gosh* relationship continued to a great extent. In fact, there were reports about the control of the *Abu Gosh* surroundings by the tank brigades of Israeli army against the Arab armies. Although it was located on a strategic geography controlling the Tel Aviv Jerusalem road, *Abu Gosh* did not have

⁸⁵⁶ Salim Tamari, "Jerusalem 1948: The Phantom City", *Jerusalem Quarterly File*, Institute of Jerusalem Studies, No. 3, 1999, <http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/tamjer.htm>

⁸⁵⁷ Landau, (1993), op.cit.

⁸⁵⁸ Ibid.

problems with the Israeli state during the 1967 war as well. Contrary to three Palestinian Arab villages (*Beit Nuba*, *Imwas –Emmaus-*, and *Yalu*), which were located on the hills facing the Ayalon Valley between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, it was not attacked and demolished during the war⁸⁵⁹.

Anyway, you want to know how the Six-Day War was in *Abu Ghosh*, right? Well, it turned out to be nothing, but before it started we were all very scared. [...] I'm telling you, we were scared. We buried ourselves alive in our houses, waiting and waiting for the war to come. Then one morning it came. People outside began shouting, "War, war, war—it's coming now!" But, as soon as it came, it was over. What was it—five days, right? There was no shooting, no bombing, nothing here. In five days the Jews had beaten all the Arab countries, and that was it. Later, we found out how bad the war had been on the other side. Here in *Abu Ghosh* it was quiet, quiet. Nobody suffered a scratch in the village.⁸⁶⁰

In fact, due to its relationship that was based on trust and mutually cognitive communication, even in these very critical points of history, *Abu Ghosh* became one of the villages, which was granted the permission for the reunification of the families that were separated from each other following the wars of 1948 and 1967. Within this context, several refugee families who evacuated the village during the clashes of 1948 returned *Abu Ghosh* under the supervision of Israeli authorities.⁸⁶¹ Following the 1967 War the relations between *Abu Ghosh* and Israeli state continued to be good. Post-1967 War period paved the way for the residents of *Abu Ghosh* to meet their relatives, especially after the authorization granted by the Israeli authorities about reunification of the families. However, those meetings also revealed the differences between the Palestinian Arabs, who left their villages during the 1948 clashes and the *Abu Ghosh* residents, who managed to stay in their villages.

As soon as the war ended, *fathat al-dunya* [the world opened]. All of a sudden, we were able to go over to the Arab side, and our relatives were able to come here. [...]

⁸⁵⁹ Freda Guttman, "Canada Park: Two Family Albums", *Positions*, Vol.13, No.1, pp.49-54

⁸⁶⁰ Michael Gorkin, and Rafiq Othman, **Three Mothers, Three Daughters: Palestinian Women's Stories**, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1996, <http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft4489n8s2/>

⁸⁶¹ Ori Stendel, **Arabs in Israel**, Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1996, p.156

They came for weeks, months. I swear, after the 1967 War our house was filled with guests all the time. [...] They were our guests and we treated them right. But to tell you the truth, there was something about it that I didn't like. We began to get the feeling that our guests, our relatives, wanted to squeeze out of us what they could. We felt they were looking at us not in the right way, that they were thinking what belonged to us was partly *theirs*. They had left in 1948 and lost everything. Where they went, they didn't do so well. Not as well as we did. We still had our houses, our property and our land—*some* of our land. They envied us. No matter how much we fed them or bought them presents, it never seemed to satisfy them. Really, that's the truth.⁸⁶²

Disclosure of such differences consolidated the belief of the *Abu Ghosh* leadership and most of its residents about advantages of linking their future to consolidation of their membership to Israeli state and society notwithstanding prices they should pay for such linkage as well as internalization of Israeli dominant structures and processes. Such belief was further strengthened during 1970s and 1980s. Voluntary decision of *hamula*'s leadership for application to conscription in Israeli Defense Forces in 1972 was one of the good examples of this consolidation.

In 1980s the smooth functioning mechanisms of hegemony did not confront serious challenges. There were exceptional disturbances between the *Abu Ghosh* residents and the neighboring Jewish settlers. In 1986, it was reported by Al Fajr, for example, that residents of *Abu Ghosh* village in Jerusalem Israeli authorities reportedly claimed that the prayer calls caused disturbance to the Jewish residents at settlements.⁸⁶³ However, such diminutive disputes did not lead severe confrontations between the residents of *Abu Ghosh* and surrounding Jewish communities. In fact, *Abu Ghosh*'s inhabitants even survived the provocative campaigns of Kahane movements extremists, who wrote

⁸⁶² Michael Gorkin, and Rafiq Othman, **Three Mothers, Three Daughters: Palestinian Women's Stories**. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1996, <http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft4489n8s2/>

⁸⁶³ The United Nations General Assembly, A/41/680, 20 October 1986, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, at <http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/85255db800470aa485255d8b004e349a/d2d88498a4bf12d2052566db004e5998!OpenDocument>

racist messages on the walls of a restaurant in the village.⁸⁶⁴ In fact, it was the youth of the surrounding Jewish localities, who came to paint over the racist graffiti⁸⁶⁵.

In this period, the Intifada of 1987 emerged as one of the most important test cases for the strength of hegemonic relationship. In this respect, scale of fusion of the relationship between *Abu Ghosh* and the Israeli dominant structures and processes may best be exemplified with the stance and acts of the *Abu Ghosh hamula* members in the course of intifada of 1987. Headline of the *Maariv*, which revealed stone-throwing cases in one of the most loyal Palestinian Arab villages to the Israeli system following the Peace Day of 1987, was unexpected for most of the readers of this mainstream Israeli Hebrew newspaper. As it was mentioned in the news article, historically *Abu Ghosh* did not involve any violent activities against the Jewish community and the Israeli state. According to news report, it did not involve in such inter-communal confrontations until 1948 in 1921, in 1929, in 1936 contrary to the villages, which were eliminated during the 1948 clashes between the Jewish and Arab communities⁸⁶⁶. Expansion of the violent acts even to the *Abu Ghosh* was reported as an important indicator about the level of extra-parliamentary and violent Palestinian Arab upheaval reached. In this news article, *Abu Ghosh* was also warned by the reporter about the possible consequences of such upheaval by referring to the diminished villages around it which violently confronted the dominance of the majority in previous years. Thus, while on the one hand, it was acknowledged as “an island of peace” which offered refuge to Jews during the 1948 War, it was also warned not to opt for militant means in expressing its dissatisfaction with the existing situation⁸⁶⁷.

For the residents of *Abu Ghosh*, Intifada brought about a necessity of decreasing its relations with the inhabitants of *WBGS*. As citizens of Israel, they had the impression

⁸⁶⁴ Sam Orbaum, “We chose survival”, *Jerusalem Post*, 06.10.1997

⁸⁶⁵ Frucht, (24 November 2000), op.cit.

⁸⁶⁶ Asya, (2003), op.cit., p.196

⁸⁶⁷ Ibid.

that they would not be welcomed in the Palestinian territories unless they would not abandon the symbols, which represented their official attachment to the Israeli dominant structures:

These days we don't go over to the *West Bank* very much anymore. I still do a little shopping in Ramallah once in a while, but that's it. We don't go around visiting, or anything else. Not since the Intifada. At the beginning of the Intifada we got attacked once. In Nablus. We were on our way to buy *kenafeh* [a sweet cheese pastry] in Nablus, it's very good there. I was with my daughter Zahira and my son Ibrahim and his wife. Because we were driving an Israeli car, a car with yellow license plates, we got stoned. It scared us. We turned around quickly and came right back to *Abu Ghosh*. Since then, we go over to the *West Bank* much less. Who wants to get stoned, right? ⁸⁶⁸

Although they were not forced to make a choice between the Palestinian national struggle embodied in Intifada and belligerent policies of Israeli state towards suppressing the counter-hegemonic acts of their Palestinian brothers, most of the inhabitants living in *Abu Ghosh* opted for remaining outside the counter-hegemonic Palestinian upheaval.

If you ask me, I'll tell you frankly—I'm against this Intifada. We've had none of this stone throwing or Intifada here in *Abu Ghosh*, I'm glad for that. *Haram!* I don't agree with killing people, not these and not those. When I see on television or hear on the radio that someone got killed, it bothers me. It doesn't matter to me who it is, I'm against it. It's not God's way for innocent people to be killed. *Haram*, I swear. What we need here is peace, not killing. Right now, they are trying to make a *sulha*, Israel and the Arabs. That's good. Anyone who's against that is wrong. On television I see some people who are against peace, Jews and Arabs. They're wrong. The Muslims who are against it, the Hamas people, they're wrong. To make a *sulha* is good. Why shouldn't we? ⁸⁶⁹

In fact, when a terrorist attack took place against an Egged bus on Tel-Aviv - Jerusalem road by the Cliffside in 1989, *Abu Ghosh* residents were among the first people who arrived the incident place and helped saving Jewish passengers. Empathy of the

⁸⁶⁸ Michael Gorkin, and Rafiq Othman, **Three Mothers, Three Daughters: Palestinian Women's Stories**, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1996, <http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft4489n8s2/>

⁸⁶⁹ Ibid.

residents of *Abu Ghosh* towards the families of Jewish victims of terrorist attack increased with killing of one of the residents of *Abu Ghosh* in 1997, who worked in the Mahane Yehuda market, by a suicide bombing⁸⁷⁰.

Meanwhile, the Jewish political actors continued their integrative activities towards *Abu Ghosh* in the post-Intifada period throughout the 1990s. The Shas party, for example, increased its political constituency in the village by utilizing the traditional and modern mechanisms of political organization. It became popular among the *hamula* members and buttressed a political support network in *Abu Ghosh* by appealing to economic and political concerns of the *hamula* at local level. In this respect it established a functioning political and economic cooperation with some leaders of *hamula* by benefiting from its control over the public investment for funding to local governments through the Interior Ministry. In 1996 elections, this networking provided Shas with 120 out of 3000 eligible voters, which was significant for the beginning.⁸⁷¹ In time the political network managed to convince more villagers through the utilization of local opinion leaders. Pragmatic concerns of some segments of the village also played important role in the consent given to the patronage network established by the Shas in the village. By 1999 elections, more villagers became close to the Shas:

What made us close to Shas is that Shas was able to understand more than the others the problem of the Arab sector and give support with more budgeting. [...] Funding disbursed by the Shas-controlled Interior Ministry made possible the building of a sewerage system, roads, and offices for the local council, he said.⁸⁷²

In this respect, when news appeared in the international and Israeli national media about the increasing support of Abu Gosh to Shas party in the 1999 elections, it was

⁸⁷⁰ Gilbert, op. cit. p.614

⁸⁷¹ Ben Lynfield, "Shas hopes for gains in Abu Ghosh", *Jerusalem Post* <http://info.jpost.com/1999/Supplements/Elections99/News/Article-7.html>

⁸⁷² Ibid.

surprising for many political analysts. Nevertheless, once the political attitudes of Abu Gosh is analyzed from the very establishment of the Israeli state, it is possible to understand that such a political stance is not surprise for an Arab village which has for a long time established its political strategy on supporting the political party that would be most likely to address the demands of the village.

There were also critiques of the support given by the fellow villagers to the Shas within *Abu Ghosh*. Main point of criticism was that the inability of Shas in keeping its promises which it had given prior to the elections. It was also argued that its support was based on pragmatic approaches of certain families within *hamula* and thus did not reflect overall attitude of the village. However, these criticisms were not based on a counter-hegemonic stance. They rather stated possibilities of better alternatives within the system such as mainstream Center Party or Labor.⁸⁷³

In this respect, notwithstanding divergences among the constituency, Abu Gosh traditionally has supported the political parties that have had the possibility of negotiating their demands in the institutions of the state. This however, was not simply done by imposition of the voting patterns and trajectories by the *hamula* leadership. While *hamula*'s leadership was the determining actor in the voting behaviors of the *hamula* members until very recently, last three parliamentary elections, indicated that it has become more of a catalyzing actor rather than an imposing and commanding one. In other words, *hamula* leadership has begun to operate as a hegemonic agent of dominant Israeli civic structure especially following the *Al-Aqsa Intifada*. It has been a regulator of the consent among the *hamula* members to the dominant political structures and processes rather than pressurizing them to vote for certain parties predetermined by the *hamula*'s leaders in line with its prearranged unequivocal interests. In fact, split in the votes during the *Knesset* elections from 1999 onwards indicated such a slow but vivid transformation in the role of *hamula* in voting trajectories and behaviors of *Abu Ghosh* voters. As they became more attentive to the

⁸⁷³ Ibid.

political processes and issues that might have an impact on their daily lives, they began to transform the role of *hamula* leadership as well. In 1999, while 40 per cent of the votes went to Labor, there was significant number of *Abu Ghosh* residents who voted for *Shas* party regardless of its Jewishness and weighty religious background. In fact, for many residents of *Abu Ghosh* the *Shas* was more responsive to the needs of *Abu Ghosh* than the Palestinian Arab politicians whom they voted for previously to represent their demands from the system such as Abdul Wahab Darawshe, the Democratic Arab Party MK⁸⁷⁴. In fact it was thank to the *Shas* Party's involvement that the village was granted municipal status in 1998.

During *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, *Abu Ghosh* morally and materially supported the Palestinian Arab people in both sides of the Green Line. Under the supervision of *hamula*, *Abu Ghosh*'s inhabitants sent three trucks of food, clothing and medical aid to Nablus, Jenin, Ramallah and Bethlehem⁸⁷⁵. They also collected money among the villagers of *Abu Ghosh* and sent financial aid to the Palestinian Arab families affected by the incidents. Nevertheless, *Abu Ghosh* inhabitants continued their daily lives by avoiding any involvement in counter-hegemonic activities. Contrary to other festivals, which were canceled in Acre and in some other Palestinian Arab localities, *Abu Ghosh* local leadership and residents decided to materialize vocal festival in that year. In this sense, while Muslims, Christians and Jews did not hesitate to participate in vocal festival in order to experience mysticism of classical tunes of *Baroque and Renaissance music* together, most of Jews were frightened to visit *Umm al Fahem*, due to critical tunes of dissent, which were choired in demonstrations by Palestinian Arab masses against Israeli state and policies.

In the course of *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, *hamula* leadership recommended its members to refrain from participating in acts of counter-hegemonic protest and violence against the dominant structures as well as against the Jewish citizens of Israel. Political, economic,

⁸⁷⁴ Sam Orbaum, "We chose survival", *Jerusalem Post*, 06.10.1997

⁸⁷⁵ Interview with Issa Jaber, *Abu Ghosh*, 22.08.2006

religious and educational elite of *hamula* operated as agents of Israeli hegemonic structures to prevent any incident that would damage the image of *Abu Ghosh* in the eyes of Israeli state and public. The Council Head, the principal of school, the imam and shopkeepers disseminated the messages of ‘coexistence’ and ‘Israeliness’ in the intra-*hamula* gatherings in the municipality, school, mosque, shops and restaurants⁸⁷⁶. *Hamula* leadership established a Civil Guard to prevent infiltration of troublemakers and provocateurs into the village⁸⁷⁷.

In the elections of *Knesset* of 2003, *hamula* leadership did not involve in the choices of the *hamula* members. It was just suggested by some members and opinion leaders of *hamula*, who had good relations with the campaigners of *Shas* that it could be beneficial for the inhabitants of *Abu Ghosh* to vote for *Shas*. In the Election Day it was possible to come across villagers of *Abu Ghosh*, who wore a t-shirt for *Yisrael B’Aliyah*, Natan Sharansky’s party for improving rights of Russian immigrants⁸⁷⁸. Some other *Abu Ghosh* voters told to reporters that they would vote for *Shas*, a political party of Sephardic Jews, which was supposed to have chance to acquire Ministry of Interior in the negotiations for a coalition government with the leading party after the elections⁸⁷⁹. Ministry of Interior was considered among the most important state ministries for the Palestinian Arab residents of *Abu Ghosh* in the sense that it determined the allocation of funds for the municipalities.

Following the elections, it was revealed that majority of approximately 3000 voters of *Abu Ghosh* voted for *Shas*. Nevertheless, it was not possible to explain this phenomenon simply by *hamula* pragmatism, which was imposed by the leadership of *hamula* in *Abu Ghosh*. In fact, the second party that obtained significant number of

⁸⁷⁶ Frucht, (24 November 2000), op.cit. and Interview with Issa Jaber, 16.08..2004, Abu Ghosh

⁸⁷⁷ Frucht, (24 November 2000), op.cit.

⁸⁷⁸ Gil Sedan, “ Despite little hope, Israeli Arabs get out the vote”, *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 31.01.2003

⁸⁷⁹ Ibid.

votes from *Abu Ghosh* was *Balad* of Azmi Bishara, which was known as one of the radical Palestinian Arab parties in the Israeli political sphere⁸⁸⁰. *Balad* did not receive such support from *Abu Ghosh* constituency until this election. In this respect, notwithstanding the low rate of participation to national elections considerable amount of the valid votes went to Azmi Bishara and Ahmed Tibi.

In 2006 elections, Palestinian Arab political parties continued to receive significant number of votes from *Abu Ghosh* constituency. Especially Azmi Bishara and Ahmed Tibi enjoyed political support from some segments of *hamula* in the *Knesset* elections. Issa Jaber correlated the increase in the educational level of the residents with the increased support, which was received by the Palestinian Arab political parties. He argued that as the *hamula* did not restrict its members about their voting patterns and choices, voting behavior of more educated segments of the *hamula* became more open to the outside factors and variables. In fact, as the number of university graduates or students who were politicized by realizing the problems about their semi-peripheral place within the existing system, their voting choices shifted towards more ethno-nationalist parties of the Palestinian Arab citizenry within the Israeli political system. Yet their in-system positioning remained intact although their questions about the contradictions of the hegemonic system seemed to increase due to their daily experiences with the system as well as their intellectual development. As they want to be equal Israeli citizens with the Jewish segments of society.

For Alon Liel, significant increase in the number of votes received by the Palestinian Arab nationalist political parties mainly derived increased frustration of the *Abu Ghosh* inhabitants against the policies of the Israeli authorities. For him, voting patterns of *Abu Ghosh* constituency as reflected to the ballot boxes in the elections of 2006 were reflection of an in-system reaction against the dominant structure and processes particularly due to continuation of land expropriation practices for building military

⁸⁸⁰ Paul Martin, "Arab Israeli village votes for party run by religious Jews; Shas understands 'minorities like us'", *Washington Times*, 29. 01. 2003

bases as well as enlarging neighboring Jewish settlements⁸⁸¹. However, as Jawdat Ibrahim most of the residents still believe that the solutions to their problems should be found within the system by utilizing the mechanisms of the system. He stated , “[...] As an Arab-Israeli, I have seen that in order for there to be equality we have to be in the system. Arab-Israelis are 20% of this country - that's a sector, not a minority. If we want to be a part of this country we must integrate.”⁸⁸²

Thus, by 2007 *Abu Ghosh* remained to be model for the Israeli hegemony building process through utilization of *hamula* structures in obtaining the consent of Palestinian Arab citizens to leadership of the Israeli dominant structures and processes under the dominant discourses of co-existence of communities and Israeliness.

5.1.2. Abu Ghosh: Agents of Hegemony

5.1.2.1. Army

Army is an important agent of hegemony in Israel. Efforts towards recruitment to Israeli army were initiated by the leadership of the *hamula* in *Abu Ghosh* in early 1970s. In fact, a recurring demand of Arab civil rights groups such as one of *Abu Gosh* on late 1972 was to be conscripted like the *Druzes* into the *Israel Defense Forces*, which they saw as a means of integrating into Israeli society.⁸⁸³ However, it was only after 1990s when the group of *Abu Ghosh* inhabitants was accepted to Israeli army. *Hamula*'s initiative for the recruitment of the youth of *Abu Ghosh* by the Israeli army can be interpreted within the context of tribe pragmatism. The Israeli authorities, however, rejected this request in the 1970s. They did not consider it within the collaborationist pragmatism and they did not try to utilize tribal pragmatism in order to

⁸⁸¹ Interview with Alon Liel, Mevasseret, 08.08.2006

⁸⁸² Joseph Flesh, “Israeli Arab restaurateur is a true optimist”, 19.03.2006, <http://www.israel21c.org/bin/en.jsp?enZone=Profiles&enDisplay=view&enPage=BlankPage&enDispWhat=object&enDispWho=Articles^11257>

⁸⁸³ Bernard Avishai, *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. 21 No. 21822, 23.01.1975 <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/9286>

integrate the inhabitants of *Abu Ghosh* to the system. It was only when the hegemonic processes gained impetus in late 1990s that the ruling classes considered the option of integrating the inhabitants of *Abu Ghosh* into these processes and into the hegemonic institutions.

Post-*al-Aqsa Intifada* period witnessed an amplification of integrative acts of *Abu Ghosh*'s *hamula* leaders towards the Israeli dominant structures and processes through utilization of agents of hegemony. Israeli army was the most important agent of hegemony through which *Abu Ghosh*'s *hamula* leadership tried to consolidate its relations with the hegemonic processes of Israeliness. These efforts were welcomed by the Israeli army elite who considered integration of *Abu Ghosh*'s Palestinian Arab residents to the defense establishment of Israel as a symbol of normalization of relationship between the *Israeli Defense Forces* and Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel after *al-Aqsa Intifada*.

In 2002, Israeli Defense Forces decided in cooperation with the leadership of *hamula* in *Abu Ghosh* to establish a "[the IDF's] *Homefront Command*'s advance [commando] unit in the professional field of rescue operations", which would be composed of Palestinian Arab residents of *Abu Ghosh*⁸⁸⁴. By 2006, it had 60 volunteers all of which were *Abu Ghosh* inhabitants. Although main task of the *Abu Ghosh* unit seemed to be providing first aid and involving in rescue operations in the course of disaster, it was also regarded as an integral part of the *IDF Homefront Command*, which participated in "all the battalion-level exercises as well as preparation and training that the *IDF Homefront Command* performed⁸⁸⁵.

Enthusiasm and willingness of the Palestinian Arab community of *Abu Ghosh* in integrating one of the most significant agents of hegemonic relationship in Israel was

⁸⁸⁴ "The Abu Ghosh Commandos", Israeli Defense Forces official website, 21.09.2006, <http://www1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?sl=EN&id=7&docid=57683.EN>

⁸⁸⁵ Ibid.

emphasized by the commander of the *IDF Homefront Command*, Deputy Chief of the Jerusalem District's population department, Captain Ben-David:

The unit's strength lies in its skilled and experienced members, "but more than that, they're also men who very much want to contribute. They volunteer because they want to help the country in which they live. They give above and beyond. They have incredible motivation. It's important to emphasize that we are not just talking about volunteers who respond to emergency situations if they feel like it, and if not, not. They are first of all obligated to the unit. At times of emergency they are confined to the unit. That is to say that they are first and foremost Homefront Command rescuers, before anything else."⁸⁸⁶

Major General Yosef Mishlav, *Commander of the Homefront*, also commented on the integration of Palestinian Arab citizens of *Abu Ghosh* to the Israeli security framework as a good development on the road of "strengthening of ties [of the IDF] with the Israel-Arab population is a priority"⁸⁸⁷. In fact, commanded by one of the leading *hamula* members, the unit played an important role in consolidating the relations between the inhabitants of *Abu Ghosh* and the Israeli defense establishment.

Notwithstanding some oppositional arguments from some segments of the villagers about immorality of wearing IDF uniform while the Israeli occupation in the *WBGS* continued, majority of the inhabitants did not seem to face serious difficulties in internalizing their role and positioning within the defense establishment of Israel. For group commander Hunni Jaber for example, wearing the uniform symbolized his full attachment to the Israeli dominant processes and structures as well as his village's enthusiasm about coexisting with the Jewish segments of the society in harmony even within the existing hegemonic system. In his words he seems to be proud as he says "Now I walk around with my head held high, [...] the home front is involved in saving

⁸⁸⁶ "The Abu Ghosh Commandos", *Israeli Defense Forces official website*, 21.09.2006, <http://www1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?sl=EN&id=7&docid=57683.EN>

⁸⁸⁷ "The Abu Ghosh 'Search and Rescue' Unit", *Israeli Defense Forces official website*, 11.06.2003, <http://www1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?clr=1&sl=EN&id=7&docid=21148>

human lives regardless of religion and race. [...] Our voluntary work is a prime example of Jewish and Arab coexistence and cooperation"⁸⁸⁸

For another member of the commando group Ismail Jaber, who was employed as a baker at one of the big hotels in Jerusalem, fulfillment of reserve duty in Israeli Defense Forces was a way of demonstrating the possibility of coexistence and consolidating peaceful relations among the Jewish and Palestinian Arab segments of Israeli society⁸⁸⁹.

In this respect, initiatives that were implemented by the leadership of *hamula* with regard to regulating the relations with one of the most important agents of hegemony resulted in gradual internalization of the place of this agent in the daily lives of the large number of *Abu Ghosh* residents. Decisions jointly taken by the *hamula* council and the Israeli security authorities towards establishing commando units not only aimed symbolic integration of the *Abu Ghosh* to the Israeli security establishment but also targeted further stimulation of the values of Israeliness through fulfillment of national service by the Palestinian Arab residents of *Abu Ghosh* under the guidance of *hamula* leadership. The IDF's attitude in providing legal solutions to *Abu Ghosh* residents about the socio-economic benefits of joining voluntary commando units indicated the supportive stance of the Israeli military ruling elite in gradual integration of the Palestinian Arab community into Israeli security framework. These solutions, including payments for the reserve duty and issuance of salary slips also provided socio-economic basis for consolidation of hegemonic relationship between the Palestinian Arab community of *Abu Ghosh* and one of the most vital agents of hegemony.

⁸⁸⁸ "Abu Gosh: Hummus and coexistence", *Yedioth Ahronoth*, ynetnews, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3308173,00.html>,

⁸⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

5.1.2.2. Law

Abu Gosh hamula leadership played an important role in internalization of dominant legal structure of Israel. *Abu Ghosh* did not host any politically oriented crime against the State of Israel as well as other institutions and symbols of the dominant structure. Its activities against the dominant structures and processes always took place within the boundaries of Israeli laws.

Notwithstanding the existence of traditional intra-*hamula* structures of punishment for the inappropriate behaviors that would be endangering for the integrity and harmony of the *hamula*, *hamula*'s members also became respective and obedient to the national legal structures of Israel in addition to the intra-*hamula* micro-legal system. In fact, *hamula* sub-legal structure which derived from the customs and traditions was transformed into a complementary framework to the dominant legal structures and processes rather than defining itself autonomous from them.

Hamula members who committed crimes such as murder, theft, robbery, were subject to the procedures and practices of Israeli dominant legal framework. Israeli police force was responsible from the overall public order within the village in coordination with the public administrative actors and *hamula* leadership. *Hamula* leadership cooperated with the Israeli legal authorities in maintenance and internalization of the Israeli legal structures and processes by the members of *hamula* in *Abu Ghosh*. *Hamula* did not involve in settling colossal criminal offenses or legal disputes, which took place among members of the *hamula*. It encouraged its members to appeal Israeli legal institutions to resolve legal issues among them.

Encouraged by their leadership, *hamula* members did not hesitate to utilize Israeli courts in settling the legal disputes among them. They used both Sharia courts and Israeli civil courts in accordance with the nature of the legal dispute. They mainly appealed to Sharia Courts for the legal disputes that are related to intra-family affairs. However, in the post-*al-Aqsa Intifada* period, the newly established Israeli family courts became an option for increasing number of *Abu Ghosh* residents in resolving

their family-related legal disputes. For all other issues most of the *hamula* members pleaded to Israeli civil courts. *Hamula* leadership only mediated some inter-personal disagreement or insignificant legal disputes. There was no hesitation among the *hamula* members for applying to the Israeli courts in solving the legal disputes among them and with other Israeli citizens outside the village. In this respect, in the case of *Abu Ghosh*, law and legal system seemed to function effectively as an agent of hegemony in assisting residents of the village in their routine internalization and reproduction of the consent for the Israeli dominant structures and processes.

5.1.2.3. Economy

Land policies of the Israeli ruling elite, which were initiated until late 1990s, resulted in transformation of nature of economic activity in *Abu Ghosh* as well as in many other Palestinian Arab localities in Israel. Expropriation of lands for extending the area of inhabitation for the neighboring kibbutzes and settlements reduced the cultivable fields and diminished competitiveness of *Abu Ghosh* with big kibbutz farms. Villagers who were dislocated from the agricultural activity as means of living sought economic refuge initially in the construction sector⁸⁹⁰. Some of the inhabitants left the village to find jobs and better living conditions abroad. As the economic activity of the village shifted from the agriculture to tourism and service sector in time, most of the *Abu Ghosh* residents began to own or work in the restaurants or places for weddings and other ceremonies. After the *intifada* of 1987, *Abu Ghosh* rapidly transformed into a center of attraction for both Jewish and foreign visitors. Although geographic location had an impact on the integration of the village to the dominant structures processes of Israeli economy, it was not the main factor which facilitated the internalization of these structures by the inhabitants, who gradually became integral elements of them. It was rather the initiatives of *hamula* leadership, which gradually turned geographical

⁸⁹⁰ Avner Avrahami and Reli Avrahami, "Family affair : The Abd al-Rahmans", *Haaretz*, 14.04.2007, <http://www.Haaretz.com/hasen/spages/847889.html>

location into an instrument of integrating the village into dominant schemes of Israeli economy in different sectors.

In early 1990s, *Abu Ghosh* became a part of the tourism investment scheme of the Israeli Ministry of Tourism. *Hamula* leadership sought to develop projects to expand tourism activities in cooperation with Jewish and Arab investors as well as the *Ministry of Tourism* and the *Government Tourist Corporation*. These projects comprised of expansion of the tourist attractions such as biannual festival of religious music, opening of archeology center, exhibition of Oriental folk dancing, and initiation of weekly bazaar⁸⁹¹. Following the consultations with the Minister of Tourism Uzi Baram during his visit to the village in 1994, *Abu Ghosh* was listed among the areas, which the Israeli Ministry of Tourism intended to make investments for development of touristic activities⁸⁹². Within this framework, *hamula*'s leadership and Israeli authorities also cooperated in promotion of the 'Abu Gosh Vocal Music Festival of Baroque and Renaissance Music' in late 1990s and early 2000s to host Israeli and foreign visitors⁸⁹³.

In the post-*al-Aqsa* period, *Abu Ghosh* began to receive important share from public investments programs of Israel. Israeli political and economic elite supported integration of *Abu Ghosh* to the dominant economic system by providing considerable economic means to its municipal administration for the public investments. These investments included renovation and construction of public administration buildings, erection of a high school and a 10 million shekel invested sports hall, renovation of kindergarten, construction of a community center and modernization of transportation facilities as well as asphaltting the village roads⁸⁹⁴. In all these investment projects *hamula* leadership played an important role in bridging the villagers to the investments

⁸⁹¹ "Tourism in Abu Ghosh", *Bussiness Today*, January 1993

⁸⁹² "Abu Ghosh to undergo NIS 10 million face lift", *Bussiness Today*, May 1994

⁸⁹³ Quoted from *Hadassah Magazine* 2003, 'Abu Ghosh Mayor attends Chabad rally', 02.04.2007, <http://israelmatzav.blogspot.com/2007/04/abu-ghosh-mayor-attends-chabad-rally.html>

⁸⁹⁴ Interview with Issa Jaber, Abu Ghosh, 26.08.2006

schemes and processes. It co-administered the allocation of investments with the Israeli authorities, it provided jobs to the unemployed members of *hamula* in construction of the buildings as well as management of investment projects, and it coordinated the villagers for the success of the investment programs in the village.

In the case of investments in tourism as well as other spheres of economic interaction (such as public finance) within Israeli economic system, *hamula* played an important role in catalyzing economic relations between the Israeli dominant economic structures and the economic activities of the residents of *Abu Ghosh*. It also provided socio-economic security for its members. In this respect, even the periods of high the unemployment⁸⁹⁵ did not create extensive anxiety and economic pressure among the members of *hamula*, which could transform into counter-hegemonic revival against the dominant structures of Israeli economic system thanks to the supervisory and supportive role of *hamula* leadership.

Individual members of *Abu Ghosh hamula*, also internalized the hegemonic relationship between their economic positioning and dominant Israeli economic system. Jawdat Ibrahim, owner of *Abu Ghosh Restaurant*, was aware of the fact that his economic welfare was strongly interconnected with the Israeli economic dynamics and structures. His personal story of integration to the Israeli dominant economic structures and processes was one of the good examples of how hegemonic parameters of the relationship operate and internalized by the Palestinian Arab citizenry in economic sphere. His vision for the future of the Palestinian Arab citizenry, which was based on the model of American Jewry in the US, also could provide insight about general attitudes of majority of *Abu Ghosh* economic elite towards their prospective positioning within the Israeli economic system.

They [American Jewry] are an example of how it is possible to have your own separate identity and still be loyal to the country that you live in [...] And like American Jews, who use their double identity to improve relations between the US and Israel, Arab-

⁸⁹⁵ Dr. Murad Abd el-Rahman "Filling Cavities, Building Bridges", 06.06.2007, *Yad Sarah volunteers webpage*, <http://www.yadsarah.org/index.asp?id=171&newsid=497>

Israelis can use their double identity to bring Israelis and Palestinians closer to peace. American Jews are only 3% of the population there, and we are 20%. We could do so much if we were united and focused. [...] Arab Israelis in the *Knesset* talk about relations with Syria and Lebanon. They need to concentrate on the Arabs in Israel, on day-to-day things, like education and poverty. We need to get past the slogans and do real things. [...] Look at this town, what we have done here. Jews and Arabs live side by side. Part of my business is renting apartments, and many of my tenants are Jewish. And Jews come to the restaurants and shops here all the time - it's just like going to downtown Jerusalem.⁸⁹⁶

Following such a line of thought, Ibrahim invested in consolidation of ties between the Palestinian Arab segments of Israeli society and the Israeli state as well as the Jewish segments of the society. He established a scholarship fund to support both Jewish and Palestinian Arab students in order to improve prospects for Jewish –Arab coexistence. In fact, through internalizing the dominant ideology of coexistence under the leadership of dominant Israeli ruling elite, his acts served consolidation of status-quo rather than providing openings or alternatives to the status-quo. Operating within the boundaries of relationship, which were determined and catalyzed mainly by the framework of interactions between his *hamula* and the Israeli dominant structures and processes, he served reproduction of hegemonic patterns of behavior between the members of his *hamula* and Israeli dominant system. Dominant motto of the *Abu Ghosh* leadership in economic sphere was reflected in the words of “an exemplary citizen of the Zionist State” from *Abu Ghosh*: “If you make peace with Israel, you become prosperous”⁸⁹⁷. In other words, if Palestinian Arab citizens would not be involved in counter-hegemonic activism against the status-quo and internalize existing dominant economic structures of Israeli economic system, they would find their place in the bright future of Israel⁸⁹⁸.

⁸⁹⁶ Joseph Flesh, “Israeli Arab restaurateur is a true optimist”, 19.03.2006, <http://www.israel21c.org/bin/en.jsp?enZone=Profiles&enDisplay=view&enPage=BlankPage&enDispWhat=object&enDispWho=Articles^11257>

⁸⁹⁷ Ami Isseroff, “An exemplary citizen of the Zionist state”, *Zionism & Israel Center*, 20.03.2006, <http://www.zionism-israel.com/log/archives/00000018.html>

⁸⁹⁸ Ibid.

This understanding was also reflected in the accommodating policy of *hamula*'s leadership and economic elite. They tried to promote proliferation of Jewish business in *Abu Ghosh* by endorsing Jewish entrepreneurs and businesspersons to invest in the village as well as through partaking in establishment of joint Jewish-Palestinian Arab ventures. Local administration also supported investment in the municipality borders by stipulating low municipality taxes in cooperation with Israeli authorities. It allowed Jewish entrepreneurs to operate in micro-economic sphere of *Abu Ghosh*, which became an organically integrated sub-system of Israeli dominant economic structures and processes by enjoying the special benefits such as municipal tax-cuts, cheap labor and investment-encouraging environment.

Restoration Company of Dorit Cohen –Alloro of Jerusalem and *Abu Ghosh* resident Sami Ibrahim was one of the successful examples of such joint business enterprises⁸⁹⁹. The company was established in mid-1990s and it operated as an exemplar of Jewish-Palestinian Arab co-existence within the Israeli economic sphere. It played an important role in integration of Ibrahim and his family into the dominant structures and processes of Israeli economic system. Investment of the Jewish entrepreneurship was also encouraged by the low municipal taxes that allowed Jewish businesspersons to undertake or participate in various investment projects that would include a Kessel candle factory, a linen store and a plant nursery.⁹⁰⁰

Integrative approach of the *hamula* leadership towards the dominant economic structures of Israel paved the way for internalization of hegemonic processes by the inhabitants of *Abu Ghosh*. They did not have any problems in working together with their Jewish colleagues by routinely using the dominant symbols of Israeli state and Hebrew language in the municipality and other public institutions inside and outside

⁸⁹⁹ Quoted from *Hadassah Magazine* 2003, in 'Abu Ghosh Mayor attends Chabad rally', 02.04.2007, <http://israelmatzav.blogspot.com/2007/04/abu-ghosh-mayor-attends-chabad-rally.html>

⁹⁰⁰ Ibid.

the village⁹⁰¹. They began to celebrate the Jewish religious holidays such as Shabbats as times of trade and wealth in which Jewish visitors fill the restaurants and cafes of the village when the restaurants in some other Israeli towns were not open⁹⁰². They also acquiesced with Jewish weddings, *bar mitzvas* and other religious ceremonies, which took place at the *Bustan*, a big garden that was allocated for numerous ceremonies and celebrations in exchange for economic benefit⁹⁰³. They also assured “kosherness” of spaces of the ceremonies as well as the restaurants and other eateries in order to indicate their harmony with the values of Jewish majority⁹⁰⁴.

Such economic integration supervised by the *hamula* leadership also helped Palestinian Arab inhabitants of *Abu Ghosh* in remaining relatively disassociated from the overall process of alienation that was experienced by some other Palestinian Arab communities in the course of *al-Aqsa Intifada*. Notwithstanding the decrease in the interaction with the Jewish entrepreneurs and consumers particularly at the beginning of the Second Intifada, hegemonic relationship survived the temporary crisis due to the accommodating efforts of *hamula* leadership and the Israeli authorities. Following *al-Aqsa Intifada* days, *Abu Ghosh* returned to its days of the traffic jams on most Shabbats and other Jewish religious holidays during which the local restaurants and stores became packed with the Jewish customers, mostly from Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv, looking for some authentic Arab food.⁹⁰⁵

⁹⁰¹ Interview with Issa Jaber, Abu Ghosh, 26.08.2006

⁹⁰² “Abu Ghosh - The Saga of an Arab Village”, *Israel Magazine On-Web*, June 2000, at website of Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/MFA/Israel%20beyond%20the%20conflict/Abu%20Ghosh%20-%20The%20Saga%20of%20an%20Arab%20Village>

⁹⁰³ Quoted from *Hadassah Magazine* 2003, in ‘Abu Ghosh Mayor attends Chabad rally’, 02.04.2007, <http://israelmatzav.blogspot.com/2007/04/abu-ghosh-mayor-attends-chabad-rally.html>

⁹⁰⁴ Frucht, (24.11. 2000), *op.cit.*

⁹⁰⁵ Barry Davis, “Living in perfect harmony, Arabs and Jews share common ground in village near Jerusalem”, *Jewish Independent*, 28.04.2006, <http://www.jewishindependent.ca/archives/April06/archives06Apr28-07.html>

In terms of socio-economic class differences, *Abu Ghosh* does not belong to a completely different social class⁹⁰⁶ compared to some contended Jewish segments of Israeli society. In this respect, *Abu Ghosh hamula* leadership located itself within the economic framework of the Israeli dominant structures and processes rather than comparing the welfare of its residents with the other Palestinian Arab villages. This also indicated their integrative view in relation to their positioning within the dominant Israeli economic system. *Hamula* leadership undertook the catalyzing role in adapting the economic patterns of behavior of the Palestinian Arab residents of *Abu Ghosh* within the existing system in order to maximize their individual gains from the system. Concurrently it also served internalization of dominant values and conduct of the Israeli economic structures and processes by the *hamula* members through eliminating the possible dilemmas that might derive from nature of the hegemonic relationship.

5.1.2.4. Education

Education was another important sphere where hegemonic relationship operated between the Israeli dominant structures and processes and the Palestinian Arab citizens living in *Abu Ghosh*. Notwithstanding the relatively unproblematic relationship between the Israeli ruling elite and *Abu Ghosh*, it remained outside of the dominant structures and processes of general Israeli higher education system until 1980. Until this year, since *Abu Gosh* lacked a physical schooling facilities at high school level, the pupils, who were considered as “prospective loyal citizens of Israel” had to travel to east Jerusalem in order to follow a Jordanian curriculum in their studies.⁹⁰⁷

The village lingered at the periphery of the overall Israeli higher education scheme until mid-1990s with its poorly equipped and highly crowded schooling facilities. There was only one school in *Abu Ghosh*, which hosted around 1300 pupils from kindergarten through high school in a poorly equipped building until this period. The

⁹⁰⁶ Interview with Wafa Srour, http://www.justvision.org/en/profile/wafa_srour/questions,

⁹⁰⁷ Frucht, (24.11.2000), [op.cit.](#)

village became a more integrated part of Israeli secondary and higher education system only in 1994 by the establishment of the first separate high school. From mid-1990s onwards, Israeli ruling and pedagogical elite began to pay particular attention in potential of the *Abu Ghosh* being an exemplar for the Palestinian Arab educational sub-system for manufacturing consent among the prospective “loyal citizens of Israel” to the hegemonic structures and processes.

From early 1990s development of hegemonic nature of relationship between the Israeli educational authorities and *hamula* leadership gained impetus. During the Gulf War, Israeli Ministry of Education approached *Abu Ghosh hamula* leadership to accommodate some of the Kurdish settlers from Iraq in the village and provide their children with educational through integrating them into the education system of the village. Perceiving the village’s educational sub-system as a loyal subordinate pedagogical micro-system, Israeli authorities did not hesitate to convey such an offer to the educational and political elite of the *hamula*. For Israeli ruling elite, as *Abu Gosh* had a very coordinated education system starting from kindergarten up until high school, which followed Israeli core curriculum with some emphasis on particular values of Palestinian Arab and Muslim heritages, it would be one of the most convenient Israeli localities to accommodate these refugees for pedagogical purposes in their adjustment period. Although *Abu Ghosh hamula* leadership did not accept this offer based on their cultural differences with these refugees, consultations of Israeli Ministry of Education with the leadership in this particular case indicated increasing awareness of the Israeli ruling and educational elite about potential role of *hamula*’s leadership in both catalyzing and adopting national and local pedagogical policies of the state. Consequently, Israeli authorities also would also realize *hamula* leadership’s aptitude in manufacturing consent among its members for internalization of hegemonic pedagogical structures and processes.

For its side, *Hamula* leadership played an important role in providing the mechanisms and means for the manufacturing such a consent among the youth and their families in coordination with Israeli ruling and educational elite. Means and apparatuses of

attachment to the overall dominant Israeli educational system was coordinated with the Israeli educational authorities under the supervision of *hamula*'s leadership and pedagogical elite such as schoolteachers and principals. One of the means of consolidation of attachment to the dominant Israeli education system was institutionalization of hegemonic relationship through promotion of investment on the initiatives under the dominant banners of coexistence and Israeliness. Both inter-intifada and post *al-Aqsa Intifada* periods, witnessed establishment of certain pedagogical mechanisms to increase integration of *Abu Ghosh*'s education sub-system to the Israeli dominant pedagogical structures and processes. Individual initiatives such as establishment of education fund for Palestinian Arab and Jewish university students by one of the civic leaders and entrepreneurs of *Abu Ghosh* assisted this integration under the insignia of 'peaceful coexistence'. Initiation of joint schooling programs and sending of joint delegations of students from *Abu Ghosh* and Jerusalem's schools to the international pedagogical events⁹⁰⁸ were the other significant examples of educational efforts towards consolidating the dominant discourses of 'co-existence' and 'Israeliness'.

The schoolteachers and principals also played a significant role in preventing emergence of organized counter-hegemonic movements among the youth of the village through buffering the impact of external counter-hegemonic factors and actors. This role became evident especially in the times of hegemonic crisis. In the course of first intifada for example, school principals of *Abu Ghosh* gathered the pupils and he strictly advised and warned them to stay away from the clashes. The pedagogical elite of the village showed a similar attitude during the *Al-Aqsa Intifada*. They continued to behave as the agents of the hegemonic structure within which they had been operating. During *al-Aqsa Intifada*, the council head of *Abu Ghosh*, Salim Jaber, gathered students and "strongly recommended" to renounce demonstrations or throwing stones. Teachers and principals of the schools in *Abu Ghosh* undertook a similar advisory guidance in order

⁹⁰⁸ Interview with Issa Jaber, Abu Ghosh, 26.08.2006

to convince the students refraining from counter-hegemonic activities against the coercive policies of the Israeli dominant structures. This guidance led maintenance of the tension between the pupils and the teachers about the positioning of village in these events within the classes of the schools. The pedagogical elite managed to prevent transformation of pupils' tension which was reflected their class discussions regarding Al-Aqsa incidents into counter-hegemonic activities that would dominate streets of the village.

In the *post-al-Aqsa Intifada* period, *hamula* leadership increased its efforts towards regulating development and implementation of an education policy, which was based on the advancement of feelings of coexistence with the Jewish majority by internalizing the existing dominant structures and processes. Words of *Nabil Abdallah*, a Moslem biology and science teacher at the *Abu Ghosh* High School indicated internalization of this approach by the teachers and principals:

In *Abu Ghosh* we have had a strategy of coexisting with our Jewish and Christian neighbors since before the State of Israel was established, [...] And we have prospered. For some Palestinians we are traitors, while many quietly tell me that they only wish all the Palestinian people had behaved like us.⁹⁰⁹

The schooling sub-system, which was controlled by the *hamula* leadership, served as a pedagogical apparatus of hegemony in *Abu Ghosh* with the initiatives of educational elite in the village. The teachers and principals of the village's educational sub-structure put substantial effort in order to acclimatize and integrate village's schools into the dominant structures and processes Israeli educational system. While trying to maintain relative autonomy of their pedagogical micro-structure through rejection of proposals towards establishment of pedagogical institutions for the immigrants in the village, the *hamula* leadership spent considerable time and energy in order to locate *Abu Ghosh's* micro-system in the broader hegemonic Israeli pedagogical system. To do

⁹⁰⁹ "Israel's Jews, Moslems and Christians still seek Common Ground", *New at Schechter*, Vol. 5, No.1, Schechter Institute of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, 2002, p.3

that, for example, they instigated many initiatives in order to increase encounters between the children from village's high school and Jewish high schools in Jerusalem and surroundings⁹¹⁰.

Reflection of *Abu Ghosh* in the Israeli textbooks also provides evidence about the attitudes of the Israeli educational and political ruling elite towards reflecting the Palestinian Arab residents of this village as the loyal citizens of Israel who had begun to internalize the dynamics of hegemonic relationship from the very early days of their coexistence with *Yishuv*. In the textbooks such as K. Tabibian's *Journey to the Past – The Twentieth Century, By Dint of Freedom* for example, *Abu Ghosh* is presented as a village which had developed good relations from the early days of *Yishuv*'s struggle for establishment of Israeli state.

In those places where there were good relations between Jews and Arabs an express order was issued not to expel the inhabitants. This is what happened in *Abu Ghosh*, near Jerusalem, in Fureidis, near Zichron Yaakov, and also in Haifa and Acre. In contrast to this, the expulsion of the inhabitants of Ramla and Lod was authorized by the political echelon.⁹¹¹

As the textbooks provided the main guidelines in pedagogical framing of the Israeli youth, such presentation was significant in demonstrating the attitudes of Israeli dominant elite in positioning *Abu Ghosh* in the minds of the Jewish and Palestinian Arab youth who followed these textbooks.

5.1.2.5. Religion

Abu Ghosh integrated into the dominant religious framework of Israel through several channels notwithstanding its religious composition predominantly differed from the Israeli dominant religious structure and processes. First, it became an important non-

⁹¹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹¹ Report on “Arabs, Palestinians, Islam and Peace in Israeli School Textbooks”, Institute for Monitoring Peace and Cultural Tolerance in School Education <http://www.edume.org/docs/reports/Israel/Israel2002.toc.pdf>

Jewish element of Jewish religious ceremonies through the ties it established by the initiatives of the *hamula*'s leadership. Its integral place in the annual ritual of selling *hametz* (products such as bread, rolls and pita or any other leavened product) during the Jewish Passover from 1995 was a one of the significant examples of such initiatives⁹¹². In 2004, Hussein Jabber of *Abu Ghosh* contributed the smooth functioning of the ritual for the ninth time by paying 20,000 NIS (New Israeli Shekels) to the two chief rabbis as a partial requirement for fulfillment of a Jewish religious ritual.⁹¹³

Another important characteristic of *Abu Ghosh*, which served as an ideological apparatus of hegemonic view that operated through discourse of harmony and coexistence of religions, was the importance of *Abu Ghosh* for both Christianity in general and the Hebrew-speaking Christians in particular. In fact, from 1950s onwards *Abu Ghosh* hosted Christian movements such as 'The Work of Saint James' in its *Monastery of the Resurrection*, which were founded under the authority of the Patriarch of Jerusalem to serve Hebrew speaking Catholics in Israel as well as to engage in dialogue with Judaism⁹¹⁴. The Church was established during the Crusaders and its control was given to the French government by the Ottoman Empire following the French-German War of 1870-71⁹¹⁵. In 1955, French Benedictine abbot Fr. Jean Baptiste Gurion founded a Christian movement led from *Abu Ghosh*'s Crusader's Church, which mainly targeted Hebrew-speaking Catholic community through re-

⁹¹² As the law dated 1986 prohibited the consumption, possession and business of *hametz* during Passover, Muslim villages such as Abu Ghosh became main location of attraction for the non-observant Jews and non-Jews for providing *hametz* food during the Passover. The prohibition begins at noon of the 'Seder' (beginning of the Passover period) and ends at sunset of the seventh day of Passover.

⁹¹³ "Interior Minister: Let Them Eat Bread", *ICEJ News*, 05.04. 2004, <http://www.icej.org/cgi-local/view.cgi?type=headline&artid=2004/04/05/3361813>

⁹¹⁴ John L. Allen JR, "A response to the interview with Israel's outgoing ambassador to the Holy See; Debate in Israel's tiny Catholic community; Evangelizing Roman youth; The Kazan icon" 16.05.2003 <http://www.nationalcatholicreporter.org/word/word0516.htm>

⁹¹⁵ **Studium Biblicum Franciscanum**, <http://www.christusrex.org/www1/ofm/sbf/escurs/www/g.html>

enacting the Christian church of the *Acts of the Apostles*, whose members had been vigilant Jews.⁹¹⁶

Hosting of this movement became an important part of *Abu Ghosh*'s religious heritage, which also played a role in shaping of its relationship with the dominant religious structures and processes in Israel. In fact, represented mainly by the French Benedictine abbot, Fr. Jean-Baptiste Gourion with an interlude of the French Lazarist rule in 1958 under Father Jean Galaup,⁹¹⁷ *Abu Ghosh*'s Christian-Hebrew heritage played an important role in strengthening the dominant discourse of *hamula* leadership and Israeli authorities about the grace of religious co-existence and incongruity of religious exclusion.

Thus, *Abu Ghosh* became a member of the *Inter-religious Coordination Council in Israel* (ICCI), which was established to coordinate "the inter-faith activities to reinforce and expand pleasant relations and to endorse inter-religious and intercultural appreciation among different religious communities in Israel"⁹¹⁸. Issa Jaber an important figure in the *hamula* and Director of Education in *Abu Ghosh* became ICCI co-chairperson. Under his leadership, *Abu Ghosh* participated in many inter-religious activities. On May 1st, 2006, for example, members of *Westchester Reform Temple*, led by Rabbi Jonathan Blake met with Issa Jaber, in his home, for a discussion on "Arab-Jewish Coexistence in Israel"⁹¹⁹. The event took place in the presence of *Abu Ghosh* community members, students, and parents of the students from the *Abu Ghosh*

⁹¹⁶ "The pope's too liberal; down on American culture; champion of 'dynamic orthodoxy'; Disowning 'primacy of conscience'; hubbub in Holland; hot, hot, hot; some brief notes" *National Catholic Reporter*, Vol. 2, No. 49, 22.08. 2003

⁹¹⁷ **Studium Biblicum Franciscanum**, *op.cit.*

⁹¹⁸ The Association for Jewish-Arab Coexistence website, <http://www.ajds.org.au/icci.htm>

⁹¹⁹ Ibid.

Comprehensive High School, in which Issa Jaber presented Rabbi Jacobs with a *Hanukkah* present on behalf of the *Abu Ghosh* municipality.⁹²⁰

In 2007, Salim Jaber, the mayor of *Abu Ghosh*, participated in at a pre-Passover rally of the *Chabad-Lubavitch* movement in Ramat Gan. He also gave a speech along with 'right wing Rabbis' were among the speakers in which he expressed his commitment to observing the seven Noahide commandments⁹²¹. Although he faced some opposition from some segments of the *Abu Ghosh* community, who considered this move as a step towards alienation from the Arab world, Islamic values and Palestinian Arab cause, the mayor of *Abu Ghosh* maintained his stance. He stated that his visit and speech was a step towards further consolidation of the ties between the Palestinian Arab community of *Abu Ghosh* and Jewish segments of Israeli society in religious sphere.

More to the point, Israeli authorities contributed promotion of the image of *Abu Ghosh* as a model village for other Muslim Palestinian Arab localities of Israel to indicate inappropriateness of counter-hegemonic mobilization around a religious exclusionary vision against the Israeli dominant structures and processes. A news article in the website of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs would cite the village as the meeting point of the three monotheistic religions:

Another fascinating feature of *Abu Ghosh* is the unique convergence of the three monotheistic faiths. The churches and monasteries stand near the mosque and in the midst of the local Muslim residents, creating a special atmosphere for the wide variety of visitors who stroll through the village during the Festival - Muslims, Jews, and Christians.⁹²²

⁹²⁰ Ibid.

⁹²¹ "Abu Ghosh Mayor attends Chabad rally", 02.04.2007, <http://israelmatzav.blogspot.com/2007/04/abu-ghosh-mayor-attends-chabad-rally.html>

⁹²² "The Abu Ghosh Vocal Music Festival October 6-9", website of Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Israel+beyond+politics/Celebrating+Sukkot+in+Israel+2004.htm?DisplayMode=print>

Correspondingly, *Abu Ghosh hamula* leadership functioned as an agent of hegemony in the religious sphere by internalizing this discourse as well as by operating within its discursive boundaries. In this respect, *hamula*'s leading personalities utilized historical significance of their villages for the Christianity and its good relationship with the Jewish religious elite to disseminate the message of inter-religious coexistence among the Muslim Palestinian Arab inhabitants of the village. As the peaceful co-existence of religions became the dominant theme among the Muslim inhabitants of the village, counter-hegemonic mobilization of the villagers by the Islamic political organizations became less possible. In this respect, amplification of religiosity and observance of religious rules among the *Abu Ghosh*'s inhabitants in their daily lives notwithstanding in the post-*Al-Aqsa Intifada* period as well as many other Muslim villages⁹²³, religious sphere of the village remained immune from the impact of religious counter-hegemonic movements.

5.1.2.6. Land Planning

Until 1968, many neighboring villages were under the control of *Abu Ghosh hamula*. State's land policies which led to expropriation of these villages, which started in early 1948 gradually decreased the amount of the land which were previously under command of the *hamula*⁹²⁴. Out of 72.000 dunam of land before the 1948 War, *hamula* was able to maintain control over 2500 dunams by 2006 with another 2,000 dunams in the Matteh Yehuda Regional Council area⁹²⁵ and negotiating for 500 to 1000 dunams for enlarging the municipality⁹²⁶. Israeli ruling elite first owned the 70000 dunams, then gave either to the neighboring kibbutzes and the settlements such as *Neveh Ilan* or Jewish communities to build a new Jewish neighborhood, *Telz Stone*.⁹²⁷ As the *hamula*

⁹²³ Interview with Issa Jaber, Abu Ghosh, 26.08.2006

⁹²⁴ Ibid.

⁹²⁵ Barry Davis, (28.04.2006), op.cit.

⁹²⁶ Interview with Issa Jaber, Abu Ghosh, 16.08.2004

⁹²⁷ Sam Orbaum, "We chose survival", *Jerusalem Post*, 06.10.1997

leadership faced increasing demands of the *hamula*'s young couples and new families for land to build their houses, it intensified its negotiations with the Israeli land authorities to expand the boundaries of the municipality. *Hamula*'s in-system stance and intra-hegemonic positioning helped the *hamula*'s leadership in persuading the Israeli authorities to grant some amount of the land to the village.

There were some families, which tried to regain their disputed lands through in-system mechanisms without challenging the dominant structures and processes. In this respect, rather than participating in counter-hegemonic or extra-parliamentary demonstrations in the course of Land Day or gatherings alike, they opted for utilizing Israeli institutions in order to reach their goals. Considering the sensitivity of the land issue for the hegemonic structure they even avoided some in-system mechanisms such as Israeli courts or the Supreme court whose affirmative actions or decisions could provide example for the future Palestinian returnees. In this respect, they rather negotiated about the disputed lands with a special committee of Ministry of Justice⁹²⁸.

Spatial and demographic policies of the Israeli authorities with regard to the *Abu Ghosh* neighborhood were also supported by the local initiatives of the Jewish families, settlements and kibbutzes in the same region. In this respect, integration of *Abu Ghosh* to the real estate market of Israel was an important step towards opening the spatial sphere of the village to the dominant structures and processes in the fields of land planning and 're-population'. Different from some towns such as Umm-al Fahem, *Abu Ghosh*'s *hamula* allowed the members of Jewish majority to become an integral part of spatial configuration of the village. In the post-*al-Aqsa* period, around forty Jewish families moved to *Abu Ghosh* to live in the village⁹²⁹.

We have been living here about a year [...] we were looking for somewhere quiet close to Jerusalem and we checked out all the local *moshavim* (villages) and kibbutzim. *Abu Ghosh* is the cheapest place in the area [...] [we] had no problems about living here as

⁹²⁸ Interview with Issa Jaber, Abu Ghosh, 26.08.2006

⁹²⁹ Barry Davis, (28.04.2006), op.cit.

a Jewish minority. To begin with, I felt like a bit of a tourist. But now we all just get on with our lives. It feels perfectly natural to live here.⁹³⁰

Although there were no political motives behind these relocations, move of these Jewish families resulted in a slight change in the demographic and spatial structure of the village. Consent of *Abu Ghosh's* *hamula* leadership to accommodating Jewish families within the municipal borders of the village was also important for consolidation of dominant discourses of "Israeliness" and "inter-communal peaceful coexistence of Jewish and Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel". Therefore, in the case of *Abu Ghosh* land planning practices served as an agent of hegemony to a great extent.

5.1.2.7. Culture, Language and Literature

Biannual classical music festival, which took place from 1957 onwards in *Abu Ghosh*, played an important role in integrating this Palestinian Arab village to the dominant structures and processes of Israel in cultural sphere. Linkage between the Israeli Jewish public and the cultural event that took place in *Abu Ghosh* for decades was significant to note in understanding the development of hegemonic relationship between *Abu Ghosh* and Jewish majority.

It might be assumed that the audience at the Festival was drawn mainly from the older generation of Israelis originating from Europe who still recalled brilliant performances of church music in their countries of origin and who attend the Abu Gosh concerts for nostalgic reasons. But it so happened that Israeli youth forms a considerable part of the audience. Here, a hitherto unknown world was opened before them - the world of church music created by Bach and other great composers. For once these young Israelis were afforded an opportunity of listening to this kind of music in its original setting, text and language.⁹³¹

That year, 1957, also witnessed the formation of the *Association of the Abu Ghosh-Kiryath Yearim Music Festival* for the purpose of operating this musical venture. The

⁹³⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹³¹ "Original Abu-Gosh Music Festival History 1957-1972", <http://www.bach-cantatas.com/AG/AG.htm>

Committee, which was elected annually by the General Meeting of the Association, was responsible for organizing the festival; this task was carried out voluntarily and with great devotion.

In 1971, *Abu Ghosh* experienced the coercive face of the state when a cultural group of the village applied for funds from the Ministry of Education to organize an Arabic music festival. The Ministry of Education declined the demands of the group by maintaining that state institutions cannot support the art activities, which would promote Christian music⁹³². *The Supreme Court* also refused the petition of the group on legal basis by stating that the State of Israel did not have obligation to promote Christian music. In early 1990s, the Israeli authorities lifted the ban on the music festival and related cultural activities in line with the efforts towards consolidating tourism in *Abu Ghosh*. Thus after a twenty-year interval biannual music festival began to take place during the Jewish festivals of Shavuot and Sukkot in the Crusader Church and the Convent of Our Lady of the Ark⁹³³. Such passive revolutionary act was a significant step towards reinforcing linkage between the Israeli public cultural sphere with the *hamula* pragmatism in transforming the village into a tourist attraction for Israelis as well as foreigners.

Contrary to many other Palestinian Arab localities, inter-communal cultural activities did not suspend in *Abu Ghosh* during al-Aqsa Intifada. *Abu Ghosh* music festival took place despite the negative atmosphere which dominated the inter-communal relations between the Jewish and Palestinian Arab segments of Israeli society. Post-al-Aqsa intifada period witnessed re-galvanization of cultural interaction between the Jewish majority and the Palestinian Arab residents of *Abu Ghosh*.

⁹³² “Adalah: Legal Violations of Arab Minority Rights in Israel”, **The Palestine Yearbook of International Law 1998-1999**, Vol. 10, Kluwer Law International, 2000, p.139

⁹³³ “Abu Ghosh - The Saga of an Arab Village”, *Israel Magazine On-Web*, June 2000, at website of Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/MFA/Israel%20beyond%20the%20conflict/Abu%20Ghosh%20The%20Saga%20of%20an%20Arab%20Village>

5.1.2.8. Media

Mainstream Israeli media represented *Abu Ghosh* as a model village for the other Palestinian Arab localities of Israel in terms of its internalization of dominant values, structures and processes of Israeliness. In the press reports of newspapers such as *Haaretz*, *Jerusalem Post*, *Maariv*, *Yedioth Ahronoth* *Abu Ghosh* was referred as a village, which is known to have good relationship with the Israeli state and Jewish community. Jewish blogs and journals on internet also praise loyalty of *Abu Ghosh* to the vision and values of Israeliness.

During al-Aqsa Intifada, local paper of Telz Stone once more praised the stance of *Abu Ghosh* within the Israeli hegemonic framework by suggesting the other segments of the Palestinian Arab community to follow the *Abu Ghosh*'s example in organizing their relations with the Israeliness even in the times of hegemonic crises. The local newspaper's headline in Telz Stone read as: "Arabs of Galilee: Learn from the example of *Abu Ghosh*"⁹³⁴. As the number of readers of this local newspaper was limited with Telz Stone and the neighboring Jewish and Palestinian Arab localities, its main concern was to restate the confidence of its residents to the Palestinian Arab community of Abu Ghosh in the course of inter-communal crisis that occupied the agenda of national and international media.

In the post-al-Aqsa Intifada period, the mainstream media continued to consolidate the dominant view about *Abu Ghosh* with its discursive choices in their reporting about the village. They published news articles, which put emphasis on the dominant themes of co-existence and Israeliness while referring to *Abu Ghosh*. It was possible to observe some orientalist overtone in some of media reporting which was disseminated along with the dominant message of exquisiteness and reasonableness of co-existence. The headlines such as "*Abu Ghosh*: Humus and co-existence"⁹³⁵ presented such combined

⁹³⁴ Frucht, (24 November 2000), [op.cit.](#)

⁹³⁵ "Abu Gosh: Hummus and coexistence", *Yedioth Ahronoth*, ynetnews, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3308173,00.html>,

messages to its readers. Some news articles went beyond the discursive boundaries of orientalism and argued that it was “More than just humus”⁹³⁶ by referring to *Abu Ghosh*’s consolidated ties with both Israeli state and Jewish community. Jewish Diaspora’s media reflected even more positive image about *Abu Ghosh* than the Israeli mainstream Hebrew-language media. *Jewish Independent* of Canadian Jewish Diaspora for instance, represented *Abu Ghosh* to its readers as a village common ground of Jews and Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel “living in perfect harmony”⁹³⁷

In 2008, one of the mainstream Israeli newspapers listed *Abu Ghosh* among the “Sixty Israeli Place” in its news article published in the honor of sixtieth anniversary of establishment of the Israeli State. Defining Israeliness as a complicated variety of things including the Hebrew language, our joint history, the same feelings we have on Remembrance Day, Holocaust Day and Independence Day and the places that Israelis visited⁹³⁸, listing of *Abu Ghosh* was significant to indicate its integrated status in the mainstream media discourse.

5.1.2.9. Symbols

Abu Ghosh became a symbol of “Israeli Dream” for the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. For the Israeli ruling elite, it was one of the best examples of a successful integration to the dominant structures and processes through internalization of dominant values and consenting to the preeminence of existing leadership. Israeli authorities glorified loyalty of *Abu Ghosh* to the Israeli system and presented it as a model for the other villages of Palestinian Arab community. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocated considerable space for *Abu Ghosh* in its official website as an example of coexistence of Jewish and the Palestinian Arab segments of Israeli society.

⁹³⁶ Yehuda Litani, “More than just humus”, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, *ynetnews*, 13.05.2005, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3084961,00.html>

⁹³⁷ Barry Davis, (28.04.2006), [op.cit.](#)

⁹³⁸ Tal Sagi, “The 60 Israeli hotspots”, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, *ynetnews*, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3541810,00.html>

Hamula leadership attended religious ceremonies of the state. In some cases they even become integral elements of these ceremonies. Israeli mainstream newspapers celebrated in 2007 attendance of Muslim mayor of *Abu Ghosh* to a Chabad rally⁹³⁹. The event had a symbolic value because it indicated the possible levels of integration to the dominant structures and processes of Israeli hegemony even at the spheres, which had been a demarcation for divergence of Palestinian Arab and Jewish communities such as religion. Being a part of Jewish religious routines either by buying *hametz* from the Head Rabbi as for the last decade or attending to Shabbat ceremonies as in the case of abovementioned example served reproduction of symbolism of dominant themes of hegemonic structure: co-existence and inter-communal harmony.

Dominant discourse of the Israeli state on the “coexistence” is reflected almost all institutions or committees established in the town (i.e. Association of Tolerance and Coexistence, Israel Inter-faith Coordination Council)⁹⁴⁰, which interacted with the Jewish community. Symbolism of “coexistence” became a banal exercise of the *hamula* members in their discourses communicating with the outsiders as well as with the dominant institutions of the Israeli state.

Contrary to counter-hegemonic stances towards non-recognition of Judaic symbols associated with local or national processes and institutions, *Abu Ghosh* did not hesitate to participate in the social, cultural or political processes where the Jewish or Israeli symbolism dominant. The local council of the village was a member of *Judean Hills Council* whose name would obscure any counter-hegemonic entity from participation.

Street names in *Abu Ghosh* also were not products of a counter-hegemonic naming practices and symbolism as in the case of *Umm al Fahem*. They also reflected the attitude of town towards banal practice of dominant discourses of hegemonic structure on co-existence and inter-communal peace. Derekh Hashalom Road – The Road to

⁹³⁹ “Arab mayor attends Chabad Party”, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, *ynetnews* <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340, L-3383967,00.html>

⁹⁴⁰ Rochelle Furstenberg, “A Town With Real Neighbors, *Hadassah Magazine*”, Vol. 85, No.4, 2003

Peace-, where the main restaurants and shops were situated was a very good example of this attitude.

It was also possible to observe dominant symbolism of co-existence in the name of the soccer team, which played in the Israeli Football League fourth division. Contrary to the counter-hegemonic naming practices of *Umm al Fahem's Islamic Movement* soccer teams, which played in the Islamic League, the soccer team of *Abu Ghosh* was named as *Abu Ghosh-Mevasseret* which symbolized co-existence of two neighboring Jewish and Palestinian Arab localities in the field of sports.

In this respect, contrary to some segments of *Umm al Fahem Abu Ghosh* did not exert a counter-hegemonic stance against religious or ethnic symbols of the Israeli state. Yet, by incorporating symbols of dominant themes of hegemony to its routine interactions with the Israeli state and community served banal reproduction of this symbolism among both members of *hamula* and among the other segments of the Israeli society.

5.1.2.10. Sports and Leisure

Gramscian research tradition perceived popular sports such as soccer as an agent of hegemony⁹⁴¹ through which the dominant views operated and possible counter-hegemonic mobilization would be pacified through the consolidation of existing false consciousness among the potential opposition groups to remain within the system rather than opting for a counter-hegemonic upheaval. Gramscian view would consider Palestinian Arab football as one of the semi-autonomous institutions of civil society which eventually endorse the internalization of the worldview of the dominant political group in Israel by the subordinated Palestinian Arab community⁹⁴².

⁹⁴¹ See J. Hargreaves, **Sport, Power and Culture**, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1986 and J. Sugden, and A. Bairner, **Sport, Sectarianism and Society**, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1993.

⁹⁴² Tamir Sorek, "Arab football in Israel as an 'integrative enclave', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.26, No.3, 2003, p.442

As the football became one of the essential institutions within the popular culture of Palestinian Arab community, its centrality provided different ‘identity agents’ with prospects on entailing different overtones on soccer depending on the agents’ definition of the identity⁹⁴³ as well as the relationship of community with the dominant structures and processes. *Hamulas* and local leaderships of the Palestinian Arab localities were among these agents, which assigned instrumental role to the football in mobilizing the Palestinian Arab citizens in their localities in defining, redefining or reproducing the patterns of relationship with the Israeli dominant structures and processes. They operated either in cooperation with the Israeli dominant structures in disseminating and adopting of hegemonic integrative meanings of soccer or created alternative counter-hegemonic meanings of the game in order to mobilize Palestinian Arab citizens against the Israeli dominant structures and processes.

In *Abu Ghosh*, *hamula* leadership followed the first path and undertook active role in convincing the inhabitants of village to establish a soccer team, which would be composed and managed jointly by Palestinian Arab and Jewish inhabitants of *Abu Ghosh* and neighboring Jewish settlement of *Mevaseret*. In 2004, they ardently cooperated with the local authorities of *Mevaseret* to establish *Abu Ghosh-Mevasseret* soccer team. The Head of the *Abu Ghosh* side of the project Muhammad *Abu Ghosh* expressed the enthusiasm of the *Abu Ghosh* leadership in supporting such a project in coordination with the local authorities of *Mevaseret*:

"The idea which was created from Doctor Allon and the head of the council which is to establish a team from the two villages, *Abu Ghosh* and *Mevaseret*, is a new model. I think this model is a good one and one that hasn't happened before in this country. I think it is a good idea."⁹⁴⁴

Receiving full support of the *hamula* leadership and the Israeli local and national authorities, *Abu Ghosh-Mevasseret*, fourth-division soccer team in Israeli Football

⁹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p.422

⁹⁴⁴ “Jewish and Arab players unite to form an Israeli-Arab soccer team”, A Television Program of Reuters News Agency, <http://rtv.rtrlondon.co.uk/2007-03-12/35c5635f.html>

League, confirmed a soccer term “connection among the blocs”. This term did not only indicate the balances and connections to be established within the team among the Palestinian Arab and the Jewish players but also referred to the connections which is established between the team and the political environment outside the football. In addition, it connoted the relationship between the Palestinian Arab community of *Abu Ghosh* and Israeli hegemonic bloc. As the very existence of the team served to consolidation of hegemonic structures and processes through assisting reproduction of the dominant discourses of the dominant group such as peaceful co-existence and the brotherhood of the Palestinian Arab and Jewish citizenry of Israel, it also signify internalization of dominant structures and processes by the Palestinian Arab community. In fact, rather than establishing or joining a counter-hegemonic Palestinian Arab soccer league or ‘playing in the first division of Palestinian Arab soccer league’ as in the case of *Umm al Fahem* and some other villages, *Abu Ghosh* opted for being an integral part of Israeli Football League’s fourth division, mainly thanks to the catalyzing efforts of *hamula* leadership. As Tamir Sorek argued, *Abu Ghosh*’s Palestinian Arab residents identified themselves with “Israeliness” and its dominant discourses, structures and processes by partaking a “shared public sphere with the Jewish majority”. Thus most of them perceive soccer as an opportunity to integrate into the dominant structure and processes of Israeliness.⁹⁴⁵

Allon Liel, the Jewish president of *Abu Ghosh*-Mevasseret, highlighted warmth of connections among the players and fans within and outside the team. This receptiveness was observed from composition of the team with equal numbers of Jewish and Arab players, coaches and board members to its sponsorship policies and sponsor portfolio⁹⁴⁶. In this respect, contrary to Tamir Sorek’s isolated view of stadiums from other realms of public sphere, example of *Abu Ghosh*–Mevasseret validated the Gramscian dialectic’s assumption that “sports as a civil institution

⁹⁴⁵ Sorek *op.cit.*, p.441

⁹⁴⁶ Michele Chabin, “Arab players key to Israel's success”, *USA Today*, 06.03.2005, <http://www.usatoday.com/sports/soccer/world/2005-06-03-arab-israel-team x.htm>

promotes the hegemonic political worldview not only within its borders but also in the general public sphere”.⁹⁴⁷

The Jewish football player *Ozz Izabag* of the team also confirmed the hegemonic discourse that was disseminated by the *Abu Ghosh*-Mevaseret to both Palestinian Arab and Jewish public spheres, while criticizing the extreme forms of exclusion and praising the team as a model for co-existence:

All of this racism, and all of this -- I do not know how to describe it, it is only on the surface of things but if we go deeper inside we are all human beings. He is like a brother to me; I am like a brother to him. Whenever I need a ride he is there to take me, I take him. There is always sharing, mutuality between us, which means that anybody can experience it. It is simply that in this country it looks like there is an ongoing war and (people) do not look deeply enough, I think that our project can push things forward.⁹⁴⁸

These dominant messages were also welcomed and supportively decoded by the *Abu Ghosh*'s Palestinian Arab residents. Their focus on the important topics in the agenda of sports activities overshadowed the structural problems that might have derived from the practices of dominant structures and processes in the sphere of sports. Focusing on their team's significance as a model for coexistence, Palestinian Arab citizens of *Abu Ghosh* did not question the hegemonic nature of its relationship with the Israeli dominant structures and processes of football. In this respect, *Abu Ghosh*'s fans and soccer players in the team were a good exemplar of adoption and internalization of 'hegemonic interpretation' and 'hegemonic integrative meanings of football'⁹⁴⁹ rather than opting for counter-hegemonic alternatives as in the case of *Umm al Fahem*'s participation in the *Islamic Football League*.

⁹⁴⁷ Sorek, (2003) "Arab football in Israel as an..." , *op.cit.*, p.443

⁹⁴⁸ "Jewish and Arab players unite to form an Israeli-Arab soccer team", A Television Program of Reuters News Agency, <http://rtv.rtrlondon.co.uk/2007-03-12/35c5635f.html>

⁹⁴⁹ Sorek, (2003) "Arab football in Israel as an..." , *op.cit.*, p.442

5.1.2.11. Hamula

Abu Ghosh hamula catalyzed two hegemonic processes with regard to identity-formation of its members in its history. Palestinianness/Arabness and Israeliness were absorbed and internalized respectively under the guidance and catalysis of local *hamula* identity.

Ancestors of *Abu Ghosh* were said to be Circassians, who arrived and settled to strategic western outskirts of Jerusalem in 1516, which controlled the road between Jerusalem to *Jaffa* during the reign of Sultan Selim the Ottoman Empire⁹⁵⁰. As it became and acted as the leaders of *Yamanis*, a branch of Arab people whose descendents were from Southwestern regions of Arabian Peninsula, *Abu Ghosh* family first instrumentalized this group affiliation as a means of control over the peasants⁹⁵¹. In the course of consolidation control over the local masses, the leadership *Abu Ghosh hamula* led gradual internalization of Palestinian Arab identity among its members. Affective inter-*hamula* interaction between the *Yamanis* and *Abu Ghosh* family further consolidated such internalization⁹⁵².

From 16th century onward, there was a growing interaction with the Arab community in Palestine. Inter-marriages between the Palestinian Arab families and the *Abu Ghosh* family also contributed the integration of the *Abu Ghosh* family into the Palestinian Arab community. Many families within the *hamula* had emerged blending of Circassian and Palestinian Arab ancestors⁹⁵³. In fact, in time as the Arabic language, cultural patterns and living style was internalized by the *hamula*, Circassian language and traditions were replaced mainly by Arabic language and traditions although they

⁹⁵⁰ Alexander Schölch, Palestine in Transformation: 1856-1882, Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington D.C., 1993 , p.229

⁹⁵¹ Ibid. p. 232

⁹⁵² Hassassian (1990), op.cit., p.37 p.38

⁹⁵³ Interview with Issa Jaber, Abu Ghosh, 26.08.2006

maintained certain food culture and very few customs. Palestinian Arab identity became the dominant identity among the *hamula* members.

Some analysts established direct correlation between the *hamula* structure, which was characterized mainly by inter-*hamula* conflicts, and the non-development of systematic counter-hegemonic challenge against the Zionist movement in late 19th century.

[...] divisions and rivalries which characterized relations among big families of Palestine were in part a by-product of a rigid social structure. [...] The clan was the social class' basic unit. Headed by a shaykh, the clan in the small village aligned itself with a particular clan in the larger village and also with a clan in the town or city where the powerful landowning families always resided as absentee landlords. [...] Palestinian factionalism carried with it no ideological connotations, for the simple reason that big families competed for the control of existing resources and did not aim at changing the social structure.[...] In fact, the Palestinian national movement never manifested genuine ideological inclination. At any rate, prior to 1948, family feuds and factional politics were responsible for the failure of Palestinians to successfully challenge the Zionist movement in its attempt to create a Jewish state.⁹⁵⁴

Although *Abu Ghosh's hamula* managed to maintain the intra-*hamula* integrity and monolithic socio-cultural structure intact, this did not lead complete isolation of the villagers from the other segments of the Palestinian Arab community in Israel. Members of *hamula* were not immune from the trends, which influenced the overall Palestinian Arab citizenry of Israel. Some of them adopted changing patterns of religiosity; some others participated in the nationalistic activities in line with the rise of Palestinian Arab nationalism among the Palestinian Arab citizenry. In addition, despite the fact that they significantly differentiated themselves from the Palestinians living in the territories, they maintained their ties with them intact. Most of the villagers contributed to the aid campaigns, which were organized to help Palestinian people in the refugee camps of the *WBGS* during the religious fests like Ramadan.

In the post-*Al-Aqsa* period, transformation of *Abu Ghosh hamula* leadership gained impetus. Until that period, the elders of the *hamula* had significant role in the socio-

⁹⁵⁴ Hassassian (1990), *op.cit.*, p.37; and See J. Coleman Hurewitz, **The Struggle for Palestine**, Schocken Books, New York, 1976 and 1987, p. 35.

economic and political behaviors of the *hamula* members. As the young members of *hamula* became more educated and active in the political life of the *hamula*, the elders began to lose their control over the population. This contributed to change of the *hamula*'s significance for the dominant structures and processes as its role transformed from uncomplicated mechanism of control to a more sophisticated agent of hegemony. In fact, transformation was mainly about the policy choices and prospective practices of the *hamula* within the dominant structures and processes in order to improve its situation rather than essence of *hamula*'s positioning in relation to those structures and processes. In this respect, transformation of *hamula* leadership, which accelerated in the *post-Al Aqsa* period served consolidation of in-system positioning of the *hamula* rather than leading to a movement towards igniting counter-hegemonic consciousness against the dominant processes and structures.

5.2. Umm al Fahem

5.2.1. Umm al Fahem: Historical Background

Umm al Fahem, (Mother of the Charcoals in Arabic) was believed to be constructed as a settlement on the ruins of Roman, Hellenistic and Muslim heritage in the mid-13th century. Demographical, socio-economic and political structures of *Umm al Fahem* were organized along inter-*hamula* ties of four big *hamulas* namely: Jabareen, Mahamin, Mejahineh and Agbariyeh. In this respect, while the non-tribal villages in Palestine were socio-politically fragmented and thus volatile against external interventions and occupation, a 'productively balanced competition' among the four strong *hamula* in *Umm al Fahem*⁹⁵⁵ allowed the village to manage internal socio-economic rivalries and elude those outside threats. In this respect, *hamula* structure in *Umm al Fahem* did not confront serious challenges in adjusting itself to the imperial and colonial systems, which did not try to transform this internally coherent inter-*hamula* system based on such a balanced competition. Thus both land tenure system of

⁹⁵⁵ Scott Atran "Hamula Organization and Masha'a Tenure in Palestine", *Man*, New Series, Vol.21, No.2, 1986, pp.271-2

the Ottoman Empire and the land policies of the British colonial administration posed only minor threats to the coherence of this sub-system. It was only after the dissolution of this inter-*hamula* sub-system by the Israeli state's policies following the 1948 War that the village began to experience a radical transformation in all spheres.

From the 16th century onwards, *Umm al Fahem* became a part of Ottoman administrative structure and processes. Its lands in the *Plain of Esdraelon* were registered in the Ottoman communal land tenure (*masha'a*) system, which was based on intermittent reallocation of agricultural areas among peasants in Ottoman localities⁹⁵⁶. As the communal land tenure system mainly targeted to achieve stable agricultural production in those politically volatile localities, the Ottoman local authorities tried to exploit *Umm al Fahem*'s socio-economic and political organization along *hamula* lines to attain this goal⁹⁵⁷. Consequently, they seriously regarded inter-*hamula* balance of power structure in allocation of the tenure lands among them. In this respect, allotment of *Umm al Fahem*'s lands among took place exactly along *hamula* lines and capabilities of these *hamulas* in accessing, controlling and cultivating the land. By late 19th century, for example Agbariyah and Mahameed *hamulas* controlled 100 *feddan* (amount of land that a team of oxes and villagers could work in a harvest season) while the Jabareen 79.5 and Mahajneh 67.5 *feddans* respectively⁹⁵⁸.

Ottoman *Masha'a* system, which was organized along *hamula* lines in *Umm al Fahem*, dominated socio-economic organization of village until the establishment of the Israeli state throughout the Ottoman period, British Mandate and Zionism. Notwithstanding the pressures of Zionist movement for evacuation or purchase of their land throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century, *Umm al Fahem*'s locals maintained

⁹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.275

⁹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵⁸ Scott Atran "Hamula Organization and Masha'a Tenure in Palestine", *Man* , New Series, Vol.21, No.2, 1986, p.280

control on considerable amount of their lands until establishment of the Israeli state in 1948 due to strong inter-*hamula* ties inherited from the Ottoman and colonial eras.

During inter-communal clashes of the 1940s, *Umm al Fahem* became one of the standpoints of Palestinian and Arab resistance movements against the Jewish armed forces. In the course of further stages of the conflict, it gained a reputation among the Palestinian Arab population as one of the important strongholds of the *Arab Liberation Army* (ALA). To deserve this reputation, its local administrators and militia commanders either encouraged or severely warned neighbor villages not to abandon their lands under the pressure of Jewish armed forces through utilizing different methods such as threat of confiscation or military orders⁹⁵⁹. As *Umm al Fahem* remained within the Arab-controlled territory during the clashes, it became one of the final routes for the immigrants and displaced people, who fled following the occupation of their villages such as *Shabbarin* by the Jewish military organizations such as *Haganah* or *Irgun Zva'i Leumi*⁹⁶⁰. In addition to immigrants from the villages, inhabitants of *khurab* (small border-hugging sites) in Wadi Ara and the Little Triangle such as *Khirbe Salim*, *Ein Ibrahim*, *Iraq ash Shabab*, *Khirbet al Biyar* and *Qasr Sharayi* were also steadily and systematically removed to *Umm al Fahem* by the regional Military Government just after the end of War between May and November 1949⁹⁶¹, the population of *Umm al Fahem*, which was around 4500 inhabitants in 1948 continued to grow due to the processes of immigration after the war. This population flow in the town led to a gradual change in the socio-economic and demographic structure of the village especially from 1948 onwards.

Following the War of 1948, *Umm al Fahem* was among villages, which were incorporated into Israeli borders as a result of agreement between Israel and Jordan. Contrary to *Abu Gosh*, *Umm al Fahem* was one of the last Arab strongholds that came

⁹⁵⁹ Benny Morris, (2004), *op.cit.*, p.179

⁹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 244

⁹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 533

under Israeli rule only in April 1949. For Morris, *Umm al Fahem* was initially among the fifteen or sixteen Arab villages “whose inhabitants would have preferred to remain under Arab rule.”⁹⁶² Ruling elite of the newly established Israeli state did not have detailed and durable plans for the future of border villages such as *Umm al Fahem* in the early years of their ascendancy. According to Heller, Ben Gurion was in favor of autonomy in the Arab areas under Israeli control rather than allowing these parts to be annexed by Jordan⁹⁶³ in the course of post-1948 war framework. At the beginning, it was not clear whether Ben Gurion’s plans included Umm-al-Fahem. In fact, *Umm al Fahem* did not come under Israeli rule in the first peace agreement dated 1948.

Since it was located in the border with the *West Bank* and harbored one of Israel’s most important transportation routes, it became strategically very important from the very early days of Israeli state. In addition as well as some other Palestinian Arab villages, *Umm al Fahem* was at the target of infiltration activities of Palestinian Arab *fellahin*, who were expelled to *West Bank* under Jordanian rule (mostly to cultivate ‘their’ lands and reap ‘their’ crops) and anti-infiltration policies of the Israeli state⁹⁶⁴. In this respect, it was one of the villages, which was affected by the ramifications of the Israeli anti-infiltration and expropriation policies in the post-1948 period.

In 1950s, political arena of *Umm al Fahem* was not immune from the activities of social movements, which sought to de-legitimize the growing interaction between the Israeli state and Palestinian Arab community. To achieve this end, they launched a struggle not only against the state but also against the Arabs (such as the ones living in Abu Gosh) who participated in the regular political activities within the Israeli institutional system of 1950s and 60s. This struggle was mainly based on rejection of the state in determining the faith of the Palestinian Arab people.

⁹⁶²Benny Morris, (1993), *op.cit.*, pp. 3-4

⁹⁶³ Joseph Heller, ***The Birth of Israel 1945-1949***, University Press of Florida, Gainesville, 2000, p. 101

⁹⁶⁴ Benny Morris, (1993), *op.cit.*, p.4

An example of this struggle was materialized in the course of 1958 Land Day demonstrations which was marked by clashes between the police and the *Umm al Fahem* inhabitants, who were mainly motivated by the communist groups. Particularly *Maki*, which was formed within the Communist Party in late 1957 to achieve radical goals such as destroying Israel throughout a phased strategy⁹⁶⁵ tried to use *Umm al Fahem* as a headquarters for its extra-institutional operations. *Maki*'s May Day demonstrations of 1958, accompanied by the "violent rioting and deliberate clashes" with Israeli security forces in Nazareth and *Umm al Fahem*⁹⁶⁶ appeared to be an example of extra-institutional struggle against the state in 1950s. For Stendel, *Maki*'s ultimate goal was indeed to destroy Israel through adoption of a 'phased strategy'.

Therefore, it refrained from broadcasting its goal at once. The objective of the first phase was to implement the 1947 partition plan, i.e., to constrict Israel's post-1948 boundaries and to obtain the right to self-determination for Israeli Arabs and the right of return for Arab refugees. This would ready Israel for the coup de grace, the country collapsing from within and masses of returning refugees embracing it in a deadly vice.⁹⁶⁷

Absence of *hamula* as in the case of *Abu Ghosh*, which would regulate interactions between the inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem* and Israeli dominant structures and processes led emergence of semi-counter-hegemonic movements to fulfill this role such as *Maki* in 1950s. Nevertheless, the movements did not completely diminish the impact

⁹⁶⁵ Stendel, (1996), op.cit., p. 96-97

⁹⁶⁶ Ibid. p.97

⁹⁶⁷ Ibid. p.96. In fact, this resembles very much of *Islamic Movement*'s goals in 1980s and 1990s which have become active in *Umm al Fahem* as well. What was the reason that two different ideologically oriented social movement chose *Umm al Fahem* to implement extra-institutional strategies against the Israeli state? Because the people of *Umm al Fahem* has never been in state and the relationship between *Umm al Fahem* has never been institutionalized apart from the citizenship documents. Israeli state has never become day to day routines or practices of *Umm al Fahem* people. They did not need state's institutions to continue their lives in *Umm al Fahem*. Thus, the state has always been defined as 'the absolute other' by the inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem*. They have always been out of the state and their relations with the state reduced to a relationship with the coercive part (security forces) of the state rather than the consent part of it.

of *hamula* legacy in socio-economic, political and cultural organization of the societal structure in the town. They rather preferred to cooperate with *hamulas* and incorporate and consider inter-*hamula* dynamics in mobilizing the residents of *Umm al Fahem* for their counter-hegemonic struggles. In fact, when Israeli authorities granted *Umm al Fahem* status of local council 1960, the inter-*hamula* balances were taken into account in the configuration of power distribution within the administration.

Under the military government between 1949 and 1966, the socio-political relations between the state and society was mainly determined through the lines of relationship between the state and families or *hamulas*. In this respect, the nature of inter-*hamula* and inter-family relations in *Umm al Fahem* appeared as an important catalyzing factor for the state-society relations. Contrary to *Abu Ghosh*, *Umm al Fahem* was fractioned among several *hamulas* in terms of socio-economic and political organization. Therefore, balance of power among the *hamulas* and inter-*hamula* struggle for political domination has largely dominated the principles and practices of intra-village politics, until the process of urbanization, which significantly transformed and/or integrated *hamula* politics into a broader ideologically oriented political framework. Thus, as mentioned above balance of power between the four dominant *hamulas* of *Umm al Fahem*, namely *Agbariyyeh*, *Jabbarin*, *Mahajneh* and *Mahamid* was reflected in the composition of the first local council of *Umm al Fahem*, which was elected in 1960.

Urbanization served this transformation through changing the nature of relations of production and within the contexts of de-ruralization and industrialization. Differing from *Abu Ghosh*, this process did not take place under the control of *hamulas* in *Umm al Fahem*. Traditional control and mechanisms of governance that were connected to inter-*hamula* structure became extremely weak in terms of managing intra-village socio-political institutional structure in line with the processes of massive decrease in the agricultural land and unmanageable population growth due to immigration from the neighboring villages. Dynamics of urbanization also significantly differed from the surrounding Jewish settlements such as Megiddo. In this respect, interaction with the Jewish communities within the context of urbanization revealed the dimensions of

differentiation between the two developmental trajectories, which were supervised by the dominant structures and processes of Israeliness.

[...]Every detail in the story of *Umm al Fahem* intimates that Zionist “modernization” has taken place at the expense of Palestinian dispossession that one community’s development is another’s deprivation and that entities in the troubled landscape of the region share two opposing sides of a shared narrative. [...] While Arab children play in dirty ponds, Israeli children enjoy the tranquility and beauty of an immaculate park; while Palestinian old men crouch in battered tents, the adults of Megiddo exercise in a luxurious gymnasium; while an Arab doctor complains about the lack of medical facilities, a fully-equipped ambulance stands in front of settlement school. For each image of life in *Umm al Fahem*, there is a counter-image in the surrounding Israeli settlements⁹⁶⁸.

In this respect, for each reason that would consolidate hegemony of Israeli dominant structures and processes over the inhabitants of *Megiddo*, there was a counter-reason that would reject hegemony of Israeli dominant structures and processes over the inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem*. Absence of regulatory and catalyzing actor, which could have provided socio-economic and psychological shelter against the severity of these dilemmas, also added intensification of residents’ alienation from the Israeli dominant system.

Following the uplifting of the military government, *Umm al Fahem* witnessed emergence of organized counter-hegemonic revival. As Israeli ruling elite was not able to transform the Israeli state into a Gramscian integral state, which would manage mobilization of the *hamulas* as agents of hegemony into the local practices of dominant structures and processes, counter-hegemonic movements nourished from amplified feeling of alienation of residents towards the Israeli system.

Abna al Balad, which emerged in *Umm al Fahem* in early 1970s was one of the most significant Palestinian Arab counter-hegemonic movements against the dominant structures and processes of Israeli system, *Muhammad Kiwan* formed *Abna al Balad* in 1972 in a response to communist calls for in-system activism and for a struggle towards

⁹⁶⁸ Taline Voskeritchian, “Ala Ardna (On Our Land)”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.13, No.4, 1984, pp.111-2

changing the system from within. While the communists called for activism within the legal framework, Abna al-Balad argued against it and did not vote in the general elections for the *Knesset*. In this period, *Umm al Fahem* was also stronghold of the Israeli communist party (Hadash) until 1989. In this respect, residents of town were mobilized to partake in a secular struggle for Palestinian Arab rights at national level championed by the Arabs and Jews of the Israeli Communist Party (*Hadash*)⁹⁶⁹. As the *Hadash* represented a joint Jewish and Palestinian Arab struggle against the dominant structures and processes of Israeli ruling elite from within the Israeli system, it signified a shift from a “war of maneuver”, which was based on denial of legitimacy of existing system, to a “war of position” waged through utilization of in-system mechanisms to challenge it. In addition, focus of *Hadash* and its local representatives with the national issues of the Palestinian Arab community rather than the vital local problems of the town resulted in gradual alienation of the residents from the party. Negligence of Israeli authorities towards integrating the town to local investment schemes added to failure of the Hadash controlled municipality and diminished confidence of the population about the ability of local government under Hashem Mahameed in solving the acute problems of the town.

The 1980s differed from 1970s in terms of the nature of ideologies or value-systems of the social movements rather than their extra-institutional stances against the state. The counter-hegemonic revival of religious movements against the dominant structures and processes of Israeli system marked 1980s. In January 1980, Palestinian Arab residents of *Umm al Fahem* recited slogans calling the leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Slogans praising Khomeini and his revolution in Iran⁹⁷⁰, which dominated the demonstration, indicated initial signs of the new direction of counter-hegemonic restructuring in some segments of *Umm al Fahem*. *Islamic Movement* however, did not establish its counter-hegemonic positioning only on slogans. As early as 1985, *Rabitat*

⁹⁶⁹ Donna Rosenthal, **The Israelis: Ordinary People in an Extraordinary Land**, Free Press, New York, 2003, p.267

⁹⁷⁰ Israeli, (1991), op.cit., p.34

Islamiya (the Islamic League) set up alternative infrastructural institutions at local basis in the spheres of religion, culture, education, health, sports, commerce, and finance in *Umm al Fahem*. This development resembled emergence of a pseudo-city state at local level. Within this context, *Rabitat al-Islamiya* set up three bookshops with discounts on books, computer courses, a clinic where the people were charged very little amount of money for health services, eleven mosques with kindergartens, cultural and sports clubs; and money lending mechanisms for founding commercial enterprises⁹⁷¹. In addition, they addressed the social problems of the *Umm al Fahem* community such as drug problem through founding the *Committee of Mercy* in 1987 to deal with the issue. Israeli authorities responded these developments with initiation of passive revolutionary acts such as granting the town municipality status in 1985.

The local elections of February 1989 witnessed the success of *Islamic Movement*, which won the elections in *Umm al Fahem* as well as four other Palestinian Arab villages. *Umm al Fahem*'s defeated mayor *Hashem Mahamid* (of Mahamid *hamula*) accused the Israeli authorities for providing *Umm al Fahem* with very insignificant budget for the development purposes in comparison to other Jewish towns of the same size and thus indirectly serving the overtake of the city council by the *Islamic Movement*⁹⁷². For the supporters of the *Islamic Movement*, the victory of it at local level meant it was the only real Palestinian Movement and salvation for the Arab minority in Israel as well as in *West Bank* and Gaza. It also indicated for many of them a success in the war of maneuver against the domination of Jewish values and culture⁹⁷³

This was also a response to the radicalizing movements among the Jewish majority against the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel and particularly against the inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem*. In 1984, *Meir Kahane*'s activists went to *Umm al Fahem* and opened

⁹⁷¹ Amina Minns and Nadija Hijab, **Citizens Apart: A Portrait of the Palestinians in Israel**, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd Publishers, London and New York, 1991, p.19

⁹⁷² Ibid., p.20

⁹⁷³ Ibid., p.199.

an emigration office for all inhabitants of the village within the context of his campaign of transferring Arabs out of Israel. Kahane's campaign in *Umm al Fahem* created severe discomfort among the Palestinian Arab residents of the village⁹⁷⁴. Although the campaign did not acquire massive support from Jewish community and Israeli state, inadequacy of Israeli authorities in taking uncompromising measures against acts of Jewish radical movements assisted erosion of confidence among the Palestinian Arab citizenry towards the Israeli dominant structures. The counter-hegemonic movements such as *Islamic Movement* proficiently utilized this erosion in mobilizing the residents of *Umm al Fahem* towards considering alternative socio-economic and political structures immune from Israeli hegemony.

Replacement of venerable communist mayor of *Umm al Fahem* following the victory of *Islamic Movement* in the municipal elections of 1989 was one of the initial signs of an ascending counter-hegemonic discourse and political activism among some segments of Palestinian Arab community. This counter-hegemonic stance of *Islamic Movement* did not challenge Palestinian Arab nationalist discourse, which the Communists had also utilized predominantly in their struggle with the discriminatory practices of the Israeli ruling elite. On the contrary, it successfully blended the dominant nationalist sentiments among the Palestinian Arab citizenry with the renewed dynamics of a well-structured religious stimulus⁹⁷⁵. Such a stance was also consolidated due to the disenchantment of the Palestinian Arab citizens with the status-quo prior to Yitzhak Rabin period⁹⁷⁶.

Contrary to the case of *Abu Ghosh*, the inhabitants and political local elite, or representatives of *Umm al Fahem* did not have an access to the policy making/ decision making mechanisms on the affairs concerning the lives of the city's inhabitants] It was

⁹⁷⁴ Micah Morrison, "Kahane's Ploy", *New Republic*, Vol.191, No.14, 10.01.1984, pp.16-7

⁹⁷⁵ Theodore H. Friedgut, 'Israel's Turn Toward Peace', Robert O. Friedman (ed.), **Israel under Rabin**, Westview Press, Boulder, San Fransico and Oxford, 1995, p.76

⁹⁷⁶ Ibid.

isolated from the local democratic institutions [from local political system as well as national political structure. In February 1991, the Minister of Interior announced that the area of jurisdiction of the Arab city of *Umm al Fahem* would be reduced; the area taken out of its sphere of influence included some of the land surrounding the city and 800 meters each side of a road leading to a small Jewish locality. Furthermore, complete blocks belonging to the inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem* that had been without municipal status were given to regional councils on which there was little Palestinian representation⁹⁷⁷.

Until the mid-1990s the *Islamic Movement* presented united counter-hegemonic stance against the practices of Israeli dominant structures and processes at local level. In 1996, the movement split into two factions the following disagreement on the nature of the struggle that should be pursued against the Israeli dominant structures and processes. Dispute between the supporters of transformation in the tactics in the struggle through engaging a “war of position” within the system and the advocates of continuation of “war of maneuver” against the existing dominant structures led to internal diversification within the *Islamic Movement*. In this respect, following the decision of the *Islamic Movement* on participating in *Knesset* elections of 1996, supporters of “war of maneuver”, who believed necessity of continuing struggle by remaining outside the Israeli dominant structures and processes formed the Northern Wing of the *Islamic Movement* under leadership of Sheikh *Raed Salah*. Following the split, The Northern Wing explicitly declared its commitment to the ‘war of position’ by entioning its unchanged positioning towards non-recognition of the State of Israel and Israeli dominant structures and processes in political, socio-economic and cultural areas⁹⁷⁸.

⁹⁷⁷ Hussein Abu Hussein and Fiona McKay, Acces Denied, Palestinian Land Rights in Israel, Zed Books, London and New York, 2003, p.219

⁹⁷⁸ Rosenthal, (2003), op.cit. p.270

In September 1998, clashes resembling the days of Intifada took place between Israeli police and security forces and local people in *Umm al Fahem*, following reports that some thousands of dunam of land already planned to be expropriated for military training would be expanded.⁹⁷⁹ Furthermore, the rumors that hidden objective was to secure land for a new Jewish town as part of Israeli government's policy to "Judaize" Wadi-Ara inflamed tension among the inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem*⁹⁸⁰. Consequently, demonstrations, which were premeditated by the local Palestinian Arab leadership as peaceful expression of dissatisfaction of the residents from government's policy escalated into violent clashes. In the events that took place on September 27, Israeli security forces either arrested or injured around 500 demonstrators most of whom were young people⁹⁸¹.

In June 2000, following the Israel's withdrawal from south Lebanon, some of *Umm al Fahem*'s inhabitants demonstrated in favor of Hizballah⁹⁸², to indicate their support to other counter-hegemonic struggles against Israeli dominant structures and processes beyond the borders of Green Line. In August 2000, Sheikh Raed Salah, mayor of *Umm al Fahem* organized fifth annual "*al-Aqsa in Danger*" rally, a fundraiser for his Temple Mount construction work, with the participation of about seventy thousand people at the *Umm al Fahem*'s soccer stadium. The slogans in the rally such as "with blood and fire we will redeem Palestine" [...] and Salah's speech on disinclination of the Palestinian Arab community about accepting the Israeli dominant discourse on 'co-existence' and 'Israeliness' explicitly reflected counter-hegemonic stance of the *North Wing of the Islamic Movement*.⁹⁸³ Many of *Umm al Fahem* residents responded this call

⁹⁷⁹ Interview with advocate Tawfiq Jabareen, *Umm al Fahem*, 06.09.2004 and Hussein Abu Hussein and Fiona McKay, *Acces Denied, Palestinian Land Rights in Israel*, Zed Books, London & New York, 2003, p.10

⁹⁸⁰ Rebecca Kook, **The Logic of Democratic Exclusion**, Lexington Books, Lanham, 2002, pp.89-90

⁹⁸¹ *Ibid.* p.90

⁹⁸² Andrea Levin, "Israeli Arab Rights and Wrongs", *Jerusalem Post*, 14.02.2003

⁹⁸³ Rosenthal, (2003), *op.cit.*, p.275

and gathered to express their dissatisfaction of Israeli dominance and their counter-hegemonic stance against the practices of Israeli dominant structures that threatened Palestinian Arab sacred symbols.

In the following year, many of *Umm al Fahem*'s inhabitants did not hesitate to attend sixth annual "*al-Aqsa* in Danger" rally only three days after al-Kaide bombings in New York notwithstanding the warnings of Israeli authorities as well as the amplified skepticism and the increased pressures on the *Islamic Movements* all around the world⁹⁸⁴. The Northern Wing of the *Islamic Movement* did not retreat from its discursive 'war of maneuver' even in the tense days of September 11 bombings, which created enormous international and national pressure on the Islamic activist movements. On September 14, 2001 *Raed Salah* addressed the Palestinian Arab masses in *Umm al Fahem* Stadium, who gathered for the annual "*al-Aqsa* in Danger" rally in front of a poster of Saladin Ayubi, notwithstanding warnings of Israeli authorities towards deferral of the rally.⁹⁸⁵ Around 40,000 Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel who commenced in *Umm al Fahem*'s soccer stadium to express their counter-hegemonic stance in defense of the *Haram al-Sharif* and to support *Raed Salah* against the accusations made by the Israeli politicians and media. In the rally *Mohammed Barakeh* a Palestinian Arab MK and a prominent figure in the Communist-led *Hadash* also addressed the Palestinian Arab masses, in an show of solidarity between in-system opposition forces and the counter-hegemonic *Islamic Movement* against the practices of Israeli ruling elite within the context of *Al-Aqsa Intifada*⁹⁸⁶.

This display of solidarity however was not reflected in the ballot boxes in the local and national elections of the same year. On September 20, 2000 local elections were held for the first time in four Palestinian townships in the Negev. The Islamist movement

⁹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸⁶ Graham Usher, "Israel's Palestinians and the Politics of Law and Order", *Middle East Report Online*, 23.09.2000, <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero092300.html>

won two of them. Obtaining the support of around 25 percent of Palestinian Arab constituencies and municipal control over three of big Palestinian Arab localities such as Nazareth, *Umm al Fahem* and Kafr Qasim the *Islamic Movement* became one of the most popular movement among Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel.⁹⁸⁷ Calls for participation in the parliamentary elections from the in-system Palestinian Arab political parties notwithstanding, *Knesset* elections in February 6, 2001 witnessed massive abstention of Palestinian Arab voters in *Umm al Fahem* like many other Palestinian Arab localities, as a respond to failure of Israeli ruling elite managing the inter-communal crisis within the context of *Al-Aqsa Intifada*. *Umm al Fahem* which was at 'the center of gravity of Arab political activities'⁹⁸⁸ during the *al-Aqsa Intifada* acknowledged the calls of counter-hegemonic movements such as North Wing and *Abna al Balad* for boycotting the elections with a turnout as low as 4 per cent.⁹⁸⁹

In November 2002, Palestinian Arab political elite called a strike to express solidarity with the Palestinians living in the *WBGS* following the raids in autonomous towns and refugee camps in the *WBGS*. *Umm al Fahem*'s local elite responded this call by ceasing economic and educational activities as well as public transportation within the boundaries of the town⁹⁹⁰. In March 2003, pro-Iraq rally took place in *Umm al Fahem* with the participation of considerable number of Palestinian Arab residents of the town in which they expressed their support for Iraqi resistance and called for Saddam Hussein respond the aggressors by attacking Tel Aviv with chemical weapons⁹⁹¹.

Practices of counter-hegemonic activism during the *al-Aqsa Intifada* as well as in the post-*al-Aqsa Intifada* period preceded a new public debate in Israel about contiguous

⁹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸⁸ Majid Al-Haj, 'The Status of the Palestinians in Israel: A Double Periphery in an Ethno-National State', Alan Dowty (ed.) ***Critical Issues in Israeli Society***, Praeger, London, 2004, p.121

⁹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹⁰ "Israeli Arabs strike to mark Black Friday", *The Australian*, 11.03.2003

⁹⁹¹ Rosenthal, (2003), *op.cit.*, p.266

Palestinian Arab localities such as *Umm al Fahem*. Some radical Jewish politicians such as Avigdor Lieberman severely voiced their intentions about transferring *Umm al Fahem* and localities alike to patronage of Palestinian Authority⁹⁹² as a respond to amplified counter-hegemonic activity in this town during and after *al-Aqsa Intifada*. Until 2004, *Umm al Fahem* remained at the center of transfer debates within Israeli public discourse. “Transfer debates” seriously and disapprovingly occupied *Umm al Fahem*’s public agenda well. Concerns about the ‘transfer’ imposed severe pressure on both inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem* and counter-hegemonic activists.

In the 2003 Elections for the *Knesset*, although the residents of *Umm al Fahem* did not visit polling stations until the afternoon, they did not fully boycott the elections as it was urged by some segments of the *Islamic Movement* and the *Sons of the Village* organization⁹⁹³. In fact, domination of the *United Arab List* by the *Islamic Movement* helped some of the *Umm al Fahem* voters to overcome their hesitation about voting. Some others indicated their continuous support for the left wing nationalism represented by *Hadash*, notwithstanding their religious beliefs⁹⁹⁴.

Post-2003 local and national elections period witnessed gradual transformation of counter-hegemonic image of *Umm al Fahem* as well as practices of counter-hegemonic movements in the town. Besides, even the North Wing of the *Islamic Movement* became entrenched to this transformation especially after the imprisonment of its leaders and activists in 2003 and controversial release of its leader *Raed Saleh* in 2005⁹⁹⁵. In his speeches after his release in August 2005, Sheikh *Raed Saleh* gave the explicit signals of transformation in the counter-hegemonic discourse of his movement.

⁹⁹² Alan Dowty, ‘A Question That Outweighs All Others: Israel and the Palestinians in Broad Perspective’, Alan Dowty (ed.) (2004), *op.cit.*, p.176

⁹⁹³ Gil Sedan, “Sharon Wins but Israel Divided: Arab Vote”, *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 31.01.2003,

⁹⁹⁴ Gil Sedan, “Despite little hope, Israeli Arabs get out the vote”, *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 31.01.2003,

⁹⁹⁵ Isabelle Humphries, “Not welcome here: Attacks on Palestinians in Israel continues”, *Washington Report on the Middle East Affairs*, Special Report, 01.11.2005, at

Election of *Hashem Abdal Rahman* was the flag bearer of this transformation. His policies and statements signified a significant shift in the discourse and practices of the northern wing of the *Islamic Movement*. *Hashem Abdal Rahman* followed a more moderate policy line than his predecessors in his relations with the dominant structures and processes of Israeli system. The movement's 'war of maneuver', which it had waged through utilization of counter-hegemonic discourse and practice transformed into a 'war of position', in which it repositioned its means and goals to struggle with dominant the Israeli system by integrating into it. This integrative approach was observed in the utilization of dominant themes of the Israeli hegemonic system such as "co-existence" and "inter-communal peace/harmony" in the discourse and policies of the north wing of the *Islamic Movement*. This period also witnessed efforts of the local elite in *Umm al Fahem* to transform public image of *Umm al Fahem* in Israeli public sphere. Changes in the nature of strategies in dealing with inter-communal disputes and communicating with the dominant structures of Israeli system also appeared as signs of transformation in the counter-hegemonic stance of the *Islamic Movement*. In his respect, *Umm al Fahem*'s emblematic significance remained intact for Palestinian Arab political opposition and resistance movements in Israel by 2008 notwithstanding⁹⁹⁶; its counter-hegemonic stance and reputation has eroded significantly.

5.2.2. Umm al Fahem: Agents of Hegemony and Counter-hegemony

5.2.2.1. Army

Israeli army was not an integrative institution for most of the inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem*. for several reasons. First of all, historically *Umm al Fahem* had been one of the strongholds of Palestinian Arab resistance against the Jewish armed forces during

<http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Not+welcome+here:+attacks+on+Palestinians+in+Israel+continue-a0137758778>

⁹⁹⁶ Sharon Roffe-Ofir, "Thousands of Arab-Israelis protest Gaza Operation", *Yedioth Ahronoth*, ynetnews, 04.03.2008, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3514984,00.html> and Sharon Roffe-Ofir, "Someone planning new holocaust", *Yedioth Ahronoth*, ynetnews, 04.03.2008, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3515000,00.html>

the 1948 War, which then were incorporated into the Israeli national army. In this respect, IDF was perceived by residents of *Umm al Fahem* as an alien coercive apparatus of Zionist ideology rather than an integrative instrument of an integral state, which would harmonize Jewish, and Palestinian Arab communities under the “common values of Israelianness and co-existence”. As the IDF was not considered as an agent of an ‘integral state’, which was supposed to acknowledge security concerns of all of its citizens rather than some segments of its citizenry, its role in the eyes residents of *Umm al Fahem* residents reduced to coercive apparatus of a discriminative practices of non-integral state.

Secondly, as Edward Said also acknowledged, the Israeli government expropriated thousands of dunams of *Umm al Fahem*’s land for the military purposes⁹⁹⁷. Thus, many *Umm al Fahem* residents perceive the Israeli army as apparatus and reason of expropriation of their lands by the Israeli dominant structure which not only historically but also contemporarily. The physical confrontation of 1998, which took place between the Israeli armed forces and the *Umm al Fahem*’s residents over the plans of expropriation of 4500 dunums of municipality land for military purposes, was one of the recent examples of materialization of such perception. Disputes during the demarcation of the town’s borders in line with Security Fence (Seam Line) were also significant to indicate the dominant perception among the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem* about the link between the expropriations and the Israeli dominant military structures and processes.

Thirdly, in *Umm al Fahem* image of Israeli Defense forces had been associated with anti-Palestinian Arab violence rather than integration of the Palestinian Arab citizens to the Israeli society contrary to the common perception in *Abu Ghosh* and some other Palestinian Arab and Druze communities in Israel. Practices of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) towards the residents of *Umm al Fahem* generally represented coercive arm of

⁹⁹⁷ David Barsamian and Edward Said, Culture and Resistance: Conversations with Edward Said, Pluto Press, London, 2003, p.49

the Israeli dominant structures and processes rather than consent-seeking courses of action. In this respect, for considerable number of *Umm al Fahem*'s residents, IDF referred to coercive apparatus of suppression their which they mainly associated with interrogations, security checks, armored personnel carriers rather than guarantor of their individual or communal security⁹⁹⁸. Therefore, ideological stance and value-system, which was associated to the recruitment to IDF and defending Israel from the enemies, was not consented by the town's population contrary to the case of *Abu Ghosh*. Absence of consent among the *Umm al Fahem*'s population for mobilization under integrative guidance of the most important cultivator of Israeliness further distanced them from the Israeli hegemonic system.

For these youth, the IDF is the second state institution- the first one being the school - that demarcates them from their Jewish cohorts. At first glance, this separation appears unproblematic, as the IDF has been continuously fighting their Palestinian co-nationals across the borders, and military service might present them with serious moral dilemmas. But military service means more than fighting in wartime; it is a central formative experience for those Israeli youth who serve. For Israeli Palestinian youth who come into contact with Israeli Jewish youth, the denial of military service carries with it a sense of loss that adds to the sense of class and national distance from the Israeli mainstream⁹⁹⁹.

Finally, *hamula* structure in *Umm al Fahem* was not supportive for operation of Israeli army among the residents of town as an agent of hegemony. First, contrary to the case of *Abu Ghosh*, *hamulas* in *Umm al Fahem* did not perceive Israeli army as an instrument for their integration to Israeli society and a proof of their Israeliness. In fact, their encounters with Israeli army often took place within a framework of conflict. Many members of the *hamulas* were either injured or killed in the clashes with *Israeli Defense Forces*. Mohammed Ahmed Jabareen of Jabareen *hamula*, who was killed in the first day of al- Aqsa Intifada became an icon of resistance against Israeli army. He was entitled as martyr, the term that was used to honor killed people in the struggle for

⁹⁹⁸ 'Umm al Fahem, Israel: Walling Themselves Out', <http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/fellows/israel/nfl.html>

⁹⁹⁹ Mark B. Ginsburg, *Politics and Education in Israel: Comparisons with the United States*, Garland Science, London, 1999, p.129

defending values of Islam against the infidel armies¹⁰⁰⁰. Counter-hegemonic movements in *Umm al Fahem*, effectively utilized this symbolism to block any possibility of recruitment of *Umm al Fahem*'s youth by main coercive instrument of Israeli dominance over Muslim Palestinian Arab community. They also rejected civil and military proposals that aimed at consolidating the ties of Palestinian Arab youth with dominant structures and processes through the utilization of IDF or any other agency of Israeli security establishment. In this respect, for example, town's political elite strictly confronted ideas of obligatory social service, which was supposed to substitute the military service for the Palestinian Arab citizens, who were troubled with the idea of serving IDF.

In addition, fragmented structure of *hamulas* in *Umm al Fahem* prevented them to catalyze the relations of different segments of Palestinian Arab community of *Umm al Fahem* and the Israeli security establishment. Contrary to *Abu Ghosh*, *hamula* leaderships did not have much interest in consolidating their ties with the 'Israeli security establishment'. In fact as mentioned above, as their control over the land and population were frequently exposed to the Israeli state's acts of land expropriations and Jewish settlement activities through utilization of military, the *hamulas* did not develop a liaison based on mutual trustworthiness towards Israeli armed forces. In this respect, they did not encourage their members for recruitment to IDF in order to indicate their loyalty to the Israeli dominant structures and processes. Absence of *hamula* as a balance or catalyzer of the relationship between the Israeli security structures and *Umm al Fahem*'s residents, intensified the mutual feeling of insecurity and decreased the ability of army to operate as an agent of hegemony in *Umm al Fahem*.

From 2003 onwards, there was a change in relations between the *Islamic Movement* and the Israeli military authorities. Following the erection of the Security Fence, which

¹⁰⁰⁰ Faisal Bodi, "Israel's third-class citizens learn to stand proud", *New Statesman*, 11.12.2000, Vol. 29, No.4516, p. 32

did not face any strong opposition from the *Umm al Fahem*'s residents¹⁰⁰¹, relationship between the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of the town and IDF improved guardedly. As the previous image of the town as a no-go security area changed significantly by 2007, the IDF modified its policies and practices in its relations with local population and authorities by opening new channels of communication with the *Umm al Fahem*'s local elite and leadership. Hitherto, this change did not lead transformation of the dominant counter-hegemonic stance about the recruitment of Muslim Palestinian Arab residents of *Umm al Fahem* in Israeli army. .

5.2.2.2. Law

Law did not operate effectively as an agent of hegemony in *Umm al Fahem*. According to Gramsci, legal institutions and norms are important agents of hegemony. Obedience to law is one of the important indicators of level of internalization of dominant structures and processes by the subordinate groups. High rate of political and economic crime may be interpreted as a marker of uneasiness of the subordinate group with the dominant structures and processes. In *Umm al Fahem*, high crime rate among the youth¹⁰⁰², considerable amount of oppositional political activity, which frequently transcended the boundaries of Israeli legal system and existence of politically oriented organizations that were criminalized by the state provide insight about the difficulty of internalization of legal structures and processes by some segments of Palestinian Arab inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem*.

In *Umm al Fahem* although majority of inhabitants obeyed the laws exerted by the Israeli dominant legal institutions, a severe distrust to the Israeli legal system was widespread¹⁰⁰³. Most of them considered Israeli legal structure as a legitimizing agent

¹⁰⁰¹ Vered Levy-Barzilai, , "Sitting on a Fence – A view of the new border' ", *Haaretz*, 04.10.2003

¹⁰⁰² Usher, (23.09.2000), op.cit.

¹⁰⁰³ Interview with advocate Tawfiq Jabreen, Umm al Fahem, 06.09.2004 and, Rosenthal, (2003), op.cit., p.266

of exclusionary and discriminative practices of Israeli coercive apparatuses,¹⁰⁰⁴ which overtly functioned in favor of the benefits of Jewish citizenry. This consideration of inhabitants and opinion leaders of *Umm al Fahem* was exemplified especially in the legalization of expropriation of the village's lands by both state and Jewish public institutions by the force of law. As the Israeli legal institutions also served expropriation of the lands for the benefit of Jewish citizenry, mistrust that grew drastically among the residents of *Umm al- Fahem* against them, seemed to lead alienation of the Palestinian Arab citizens of the town from Israeli dominant legal structures and processes.

[...] almost all of Israel lands (some 93 percent of the territory of the state of Israel) are designated in law for exclusive Jewish development, settlement and housing, to the exclusion of non-Jewish citizens of Israel, notably, its Palestinian citizens. As a result, the Palestinian community in Israel has been ghettoized in mixed cities (e.g. Acre), overcrowded in under-serviced towns (e.g. *Umm al Fahem*) and villages (e.g. Arivara); and underdeveloped in unrecognized localities (e.g. Kommana), many of the latter totally lacking basic services such as running water, sewerage and electricity, while being threatened with eviction and demolition.¹⁰⁰⁵

In fact, although it was a relatively respectable institution in the eyes of many Palestinian Arab citizens, even the *Israeli High Court* was not able to erode this distrust until early 2000s. Contrary to common view among some segments of Palestinian Arab community about the Israeli High Court, neither local legal elite nor majority of the *Umm al Fahem* residents considered the court as a more integrative apparatus of Israeli dominant legal structure. They rather perceived the court as an integral part and apparatus of discriminative and exclusionary practices of Israeli ruling elite and Jewish public institutions. In fact, from early 1970s to mid-1990s out of hundreds of petitions that were submitted by the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem* to the Israeli legal institutions about the land issues an exceptionally small number of appeals were

¹⁰⁰⁴ Interview with advocate Tawfiq Jabreen, Umm al Fahem, 06.09.2004

¹⁰⁰⁵ Uri Davis, **Apartheid Israel: Possibilities for Struggle within**, Zed Books, London and New York, 2003, p.188.

concluded in favor of the petitioners¹⁰⁰⁶. Some scholars and Palestinian Arab legal elite referred to the *matruka* case of *Umm al Fahem*, which was resolved in 1970 by the Israeli High Court, to exemplify operation patterns of the court within the dominant legal structure by favoring the interests of Israeli state in critical issues such as land ownership and planning.

In 1970, the High Court heard an appeal concerning Matruka land in *Umm al Fahem* that was claimed both by the local authority, which had by then been established and the state. The land in question had originally been used for grazing of animals by residents of the village but since 1948 had been built on, needed for the expansion of the community. The Court held that in order for the land to be recognized as Matruka and registered in the name of local authority, its use as grazing land must continue right up to the time a claim was submitted in settlement of title proceedings, which is in this case had not occurred, so the land had lost its character as Matruka and should be registered in the name of state.¹⁰⁰⁷

Such distrust even led local legal elite to warn the committee, which was established in 1998 for defending the lands of *Umm al Fahem* against expropriation for military use about waging its struggle outside the legal framework of the Israeli dominant structure through extra-institutional means. Thus, notwithstanding the suggestions of some political elite to bring the case to the Israeli courts (including the Supreme Court), significant number of *Umm al Fahem* residents opted for extra-institutional methods outside the dominant Israeli legal framework to express their dissatisfaction with overriding land expropriation policies and practices of Israeli authorities in 1998.

Extra-institutional movements such as *Al Ard*, *Abna al Balad*, and *the Islamic Movement* also exploited this distrust in mobilizing the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem* against the Israeli dominant structures and processes. They emphasized incompatibility of dominant legal apparatus of the Israeli state with the existential interests of Palestinian Arab community. Israeli coercive policies, which were legitimized under Israeli law and accompanied by occasionally indistinct discourse of

¹⁰⁰⁶ Interview with advocate Tawfiq Jabreen, *Umm al Fahem*, 06.09.2004

¹⁰⁰⁷ Hussein Abu Hussein and Fiona McKay, **Acces Denied, Palestinian Land Rights in Israel**, Zed Books, London and New York, 2003, p.125

criminalization of Palestinian Arab counter-hegemonic movements during and after al-Aqsa Intifada¹⁰⁰⁸ also amplified alienation of the *Umm al Fahem*'s residents from the Israeli dominant legal structures and processes. Ineffectiveness of the Israeli legal system in finding and punishing the members of security forces who were charged with extensive use of force and provocation in the course of October 2000 incidents added to estrangement and strengthened the influence of counter-hegemonic movements among the residents of *Umm al Fahem*. This alienation was mainly reflected in the inhabitants' passive or active support to the counter-hegemonic movements either by acknowledging their calls for non-engagement in the politico-legal processes of Israeli system such as *Knesset* elections or by participating in their counter-hegemonic activities such as demonstrations and rallies.

In this respect, legalized coercive practices of state led intensification of counter-hegemonic challenge of extra-institutional movements such as north wing of *Islamic Movement* against the legitimacy and legality of the Israeli state. It began to mention their disbelief explicitly about the capability of Israeli state to protect the rights of the Muslim Palestinian Arab people as a legitimate and legal entity. Message of the north wing of *Islamic Movement*'s argument was very clear: We would continue to delegitimize the existing Israeli state and its practices through isolating Palestinian Arab localities from Israeli dominant structures and processes as well as through mobilizing the Palestinian Arab population for extra-institutional activities against Israeli dominance. Although south wing of the *Islamic Movement* accepted in 1996 to operate within Israeli dominant politico-legal system by sending two of its members to the Israeli parliament (Abdelmalek Dehamshe and Tawfiq Katib)¹⁰⁰⁹, north wing of the *Islamic Movement* believed that it was against Islamic law for any Muslim to take loyalty oath to "illegal Zionist entity". As Sheikh *Raed Salah* plainly stated

¹⁰⁰⁸ Usher, (23.09.2000), op.cit.

¹⁰⁰⁹ "Israel's own Islamists", *Economist*, Vol. 340, No. 7976, 27.07.1996, (EBSCO Academic Search Premiere.)

Israel is illegal, built entirely on unsurged holy Islamic land. The *Knesset* is against what Allah ordered and bequeathed to us. Israel is an alien state, against the goals of the umma [Islamic community]. The Islamic religious position towards the illegal Zionist entity is total rejection, continuous resistance and constant jihad. It has no right to exist.¹⁰¹⁰

Hashem Abdal Rahman then spokesperson of the movement, also asserted that the *Islamic Movement* would use every opportunity to establish shari's laws wherever there was a loophole in the Israeli law¹⁰¹¹. Such counter-hegemonic statements and practices caused banning of the North Wing of the *Islamic Movement* by the Israeli legal authorities. Its rejection of internalizing the existing legal structure resulted in imprisonment of its leadership including its head Sheikh Raed Salah. During his trial, *Raed Salah* continued to express his refusal recognizing the Israeli state as a legal entity, which could exert its legal supremacy his and Palestinian Arab people's behaviors¹⁰¹². During his imprisonment, Salah maintained his counter-hegemonic positioning against the Israeli dominant legal structures and justice system. In an interview with Iranian News Agency, which he conducted in 2004 from his prison cell through one of his lawyers he denounced the Israeli justice system for its "fascist practices through twisting of facts, far-fetched interpretation of the law and treating non-Jewish suspects as guilty unless proven innocent."¹⁰¹³

From 2003, counter-hegemonic position of *the Islamic Movement*, including its northern wing, began to alleviate under the local governance of Sheikh Hashim. In fact, this transformation had already started in 1996, when the south wing of the *Islamic Movement* split from the north wing and decided to participate in *Knesset* elections.

¹⁰¹⁰ Rosenthal, (2003), *op.cit* , p.270

¹⁰¹¹ Alisa Rubin Peled, "Towards Autonomy? The Islamist Movement's Quest for Control of Islamic Institutions in Israel", *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 55, No.3, 2001, p. 384

¹⁰¹² Interview with Raphael Israeli, Ein Kerem, Jerusalem, 23.08.2006

¹⁰¹³ Iran News Agency (IRNA), 'Islamic Movement's leaders in Israel are on hunger', *Arabia 2000*, 12.11.2004

Another important stage of the transformation was the imprisonment of Sheikh Raed Salah by the Israeli authorities and his replacement with a more pragmatic figure in the *Islamic Movement*, Sheikh Hashem Abdal Rahman, as the head of *Umm al Fahem* local council in 2003. From that year onwards, a significant change began to have effect in both discourse and practices of the *Islamic Movement* with regard to the dominant structures and processes within the Israeli legal system.

In 2004, Sheikh Hashem Abdal Rahman, digressed *Islamic Movement's* uncompromising strategies of 'war of maneuver' in the course resolving a land dispute with the neighbor Jewish settlement of *Megiddo* through utilization of dialogue as well as in-system legal and political mechanisms. He gained the control of disputed land on behalf of *Umm al Fahem* by convincing the mayor of Megiddo for disclaiming the land and by operating within the legal framework and through cooperating with relevant committees of the Israeli Interior Ministry¹⁰¹⁴. In the same year, legal and political representatives of imprisoned *Sheikh Raed Salah* began to change their discourse against the State of Israel and its dominant structures. A similar discursive change was observed in the speeches of Raed Saleh after his release in 2005. In this respect, regardless of main intentions behind it, (pragmatic or hegemonic) this transformation signified an important shift from the "war of maneuver" strategies of the *Islamic Movement* against the Israeli dominant legal framework towards a struggle within a "war of position" within the Israeli legal system.

Fragmented and subordinated *hamula*-structure in *Umm al Fahem* served inefficiency of Israeli legal dominant structures in disseminating their dominant messages by establishing a hegemonic relationship with the inhabitants of the town. In the absence of strong catalyzing role of *hamula*, which could mediate 'legal' practices of domination, as in the case of *Abu Ghosh*, legalized coercive acts of the Israeli authorities caused extensive alienation of the *Umm al Fahem's* Palestinian Arab citizens from the dominant legal structures and processes. Besides, *hamula* structure

¹⁰¹⁴ Interview with Tawfiq Jabareen, *Umm al Fahem*, 06.09.2004

was not totally futile in *Umm al Fahem*'s socio-political and legal affairs. It played certain role in catalyzing relations between the *Umm al Fahem*'s inhabitants and Israeli dominant legal structures until late 1980s. In fact, Mahamid *hamula* governed the local council until the defeat of Mahamid in 1989 against the candidate of the *Islamic Movement*.

However, *Islamic Movement* either eroded or subordinated their influence on legal interactions of the inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem* with the Israeli dominant structures and processes. In late 1990s and early 2000s, some prominent *hamula* members such as became key Palestinian Arab legal elite at local and national level Ahmed Jabareen for example became head of *Adalah*, one of the most important legal NGOS in Israel representing the legal rights of Palestinian Arab citizens within the framework of Israeli legal structure. Dr. Yousuf Jabareen was a well-known scholar in law who began to work at the Law Department of Tel Aviv University, one of the prominent educational institutions of Israel to instruct future Jewish and Palestinian Arab legal elite alike. Advocate Tawfiq Jabreen and Fathi Mahamid became precedence¹⁰¹⁵ for the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel by succeeding to acquire land in a Jewish communal settlement through utilization of Israeli dominant legal structures and processes. These examples however remained individual examples of integration to the Israeli hegemonic legal structure rather than results of systematic catalyzing operation of the *hamulas*.

5.2.2.3. Economy

Umm al Fahem lost almost ninety percent of its total lands which it had in 1948 as a result of land policies of Israeli authorities by 2006. Besides, it was the one of the most condensed localities in Little Triangle, whose lands were significantly reduced by the political boundaries of 1948 and successive land expropriation policies of Israeli

¹⁰¹⁵ Uri Davis, (2003), op.cit. pp.187-98

authorities¹⁰¹⁶. As its expropriated lands were granted to the neighboring kibbutzim of *Mapam* as well as others Jewish localities¹⁰¹⁷, welfare and the spatial borders of *Umm al Fahem* was mainly redefined opposed to borders and frontiers of those neighboring Jewish spatial and socio-economic entities.

As the central field of economic activity was peasantry in *Umm al Fahem* like many other Palestinian Arab villages, dislocation from the lands resulted in transformation of nature of economic activity in the village. Within this context, gradual expropriation of the lands of *Umm al Fahem* following the 1948 War caused a process of steady proletarianization of its inhabitants, who tried to find employment in other towns of Israel. As in the case of *Abu Ghosh*, many villagers, who were dislocated from agricultural activity sought economic refuge in the construction sector in different localities of Israel. Contrary to *Abu Ghosh* however, transformation did not take place gradually in a relative harmony with the hegemonic processes and in coordination with the hegemonic structures. Majority of villagers opted for either establishing their own small businesses in the village or working as construction laborers in various Israeli cities, “where they underwent daily humiliation in their encounters with Israeli prosperity and cultural assertiveness”¹⁰¹⁸. In this respect, rather than adjusting to Israeli dominant structures and processes through accommodation in other sectors (such as tourism or trade) under supervision of a regulatory mechanism that coordinated economic transformation in coordination with Israeli authorities as in the case of *Abu Ghosh*, many *Umm al Fahem*’s residents had to face dilemmas of economic transformation in a more disorganized way.

As the displacement of some villagers took place because of Israel’s land policies, these people cultivated feelings of antagonism rather than attachment towards its

¹⁰¹⁶ Abraham Ashkenasi, *Palestinian Identities and Preferences: Israel’s and Jerusalem’s Arabs*, New York: Praeger, 1992, p.28.

¹⁰¹⁷ Fouzi el-Asmar, *To be an Arab in Israel*, The Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 1978, p.124

¹⁰¹⁸ Quoted by B. A. Roberson in his review of , Raphael Israeli, Muslim Fundamentalism in Israel, *International Affairs*, Vol. 70, No.1, 1994, p.177

dominant structures and processes. At the initial stages of interaction with Israeli economic system, they pragmatically tried to adopt its main requirements as a part of their survival strategy rather than internalizing leading role of those dominant structures and processes in providing welfare for Palestinian Arab citizenry. As the “productively balanced inter-*hamula* competition” was diminished both by urbanization and coercive socio-economic and land policies of Israeli ruling elite, there was no resilient catalyzing mechanism in the town, which could regulate or mediate these relations, hegemonic transformation in economic sphere did not take place in *Umm al Fahem* as easily as in the case of *Abu Ghosh*.

Precipitate urbanization added to obscurity of this transformation by changing the relations of production and thus the nature of the relationship of production within the contexts of de-ruralization and industrialization. Differing from Abu Gosh, this process did not take place gradually under the control of *hamulas* in *Umm al Fahem*. Traditional instruments of demographic control and mechanisms of local governance that were connected to “productively balanced inter-*hamula* competition” became extremely weak in terms of managing intra-village socio-economic structure in line with the processes of massive decrease in the agricultural land and unmanageable population growth due to immigration from the neighboring villages.

In this respect, immigration and subsequent change in the demographic and socio-economic structures of the village emerged as important dynamics that seriously curtailed possibility of establishment of an operational hegemonic system through the *hamula* structures. In 1948, *Umm al Fahem* was a reasonably flourished agricultural locality with a population of around 5500 people¹⁰¹⁹, which mainly consisted of the members of four big *hamulas* of the village. From the early years of the Arab-Israeli conflict in Palestine onwards, it became a constant direction of socio-economic and

¹⁰¹⁹ Quoted by B. A. Roberson in his review article of Raphael Israeli, **Muslim Fundamentalism in Israel**, *International Affairs*, Vol. 70, No.1, 1994, p.177

political refuge for the displaced Arab populations in its region¹⁰²⁰. Thus, the village hosted many Palestinian Arab immigrants from the evacuated and destroyed Arab villages before and after the establishment of the Israeli state. Embracement of the internally displaced people of depopulated or destroyed Palestinian Arab villages produced a number of transformational complications for the demographic and socio-economic structures of *Umm al Fahem*.

Above all, massive immigrations from the destroyed villages had an important impact on restructuring of the existing *hamula* structure. It changed the demographic and socio-economic nature and balances of *Umm al Fahem* and created additional demographic entities along with the four leading *hamulas* in the village. This process eroded the traditional influence of *hamulas* on economic activities of a large amount of inhabitants, most of whom did not have any affiliation with neither of four big *hamulas*. Therefore, different from *Abu Ghosh*, *Umm al Fahem*'s labor force was not only composed of the *hamula* members. Due to semi-migrant nature of its population¹⁰²¹, many internally displaced Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel had become a part of the labor framework of *Umm al Fahem*. *Umm al Fahem* was also meeting point of the temporary workers from the *West Bank* because of the Israeli checkpoint located close to the village¹⁰²². Such exposure to the daily flow of Palestinian workers from the territories added to the complicated configuration of labor force sub-structure in *Umm al Fahem*. In this respect, *hamulas* in the village were not able to play a significant role in catalyzing economic relations of these villagers with the dominant employment schemes and processes of Israeli economic system.

In addition, rapid erosion of traditional socio-economic structure, which was based on "productively balanced inter-*hamula* competition", resulted in weakening of *hamulas*'

¹⁰²⁰ Norman G. Finkelstein, ***Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict***, Verso, London and New York, 2001, p.54

¹⁰²¹ Abraham Ashkenasi, *Palestinian Identities and Preferences: Israel's and Jerusalem's Arabs*, Praeger, New York, 1992, p.28.

¹⁰²² Vered Levy-Barzilai, , "Sitting on a Fence – A view of the new border' ", *Haaretz*, 04.10.2003

role in providing socio-economic security of their members. These parallel processes led both *hamula* members and new comers to seek new mechanisms in order to secure their socio-economic welfare. At the same time as the Israeli state and public institutions did not indicate persuasive signs of willingness towards providing necessary economic means for their integration to the dominant economic processes and meeting their economic demands, most of the residents either alienated from the Israeli economic system or sought refuge in the peripheries of Israeli economic processes. In this respect, while some of them established their small enterprises in the village, some others worked outside the village as labor force in Jewish enterprises. More alienated segments sought shelter under sub-systems of socio-economic welfare, which were administrated by the extra-institutional social movements such as *the Islamic Movement*.

Absence or weakness of a regulatory mechanism such as *hamula* structure in *Abu Ghosh* left many villagers with socio-economic insecurity and vulnerability against the dominant structures and processes of Israeli economic system. Absence of such regulatory and catalyzing mechanism also resulted in exacerbation of the feeling of alienation among the villagers from the dominant structures and processes of Israeli economy that derived from the exclusionary economic policies of the Israeli ruling elite. These exclusionary practices of the Israeli dominant structures as well as the vulnerabilities and insecurities of the villagers were successfully exploited by the counter-hegemonic mobilization by both Communist and *Islamic Movements* respectively.

Contrary to *Abu Ghosh*, *Umm al Fahem* was excluded from the public investment scheme of Israel for a long time. It did not, for instance, have access to electricity and thus it did not enjoy the basic infrastructure for development of industrialization until 1970s¹⁰²³, which could have created local opportunities for employment under the dominant economic framework. Furthermore, it was omitted from Israeli irrigation

¹⁰²³ Fouzi el-Asmar, *To be an Arab in Israel*, The Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 1978, p.124

schemes serving the new Jewish settlements in “The Triangle” as well as some other Palestinian Arab localities in the 1970s.”¹⁰²⁴ Finally, *Umm al Fahem* was granted its municipal status, which would increase its chances of benefiting from public investment schemes, only in 1985. Israeli authorities became more reluctant to include *Umm al Fahem* into the public investment programs especially after the *Islamic Movement*’s control over the local governance in 1989.

Nevertheless, some argued that the restrictions and economic coercive policies notwithstanding, *Umm al Fahem* also benefited from passive revolutionary acts of the Israeli ruling elite. In fact, for some scholars such as *Steven Plaut*, *Umm al Fahem*’s Palestinian Arab enterprises became *de facto* immune from the obligations Israeli tax-system due to either political choice or unwillingness of Israeli state in not using coercive measures to collect these taxes from them. According to *Plaut*, by 2003, while the average percentage of Jewish citizens, who disbursed their property taxes per town was around 80% (including property tax exemptions), 72.9% of the Palestinian Arab residents of *Umm el-Fahem* did not pay property taxes¹⁰²⁵. *Alisa Rubin Peled* also argued that the *Islamic Movement* developed an “excellent working relations” with the Israeli authorities in economic sphere in early 1990s¹⁰²⁶. In this period, the *Islamic Movement* noticeably benefited from public investment schemes, which were granted to most Palestinian Arab municipalities during the Rabin government¹⁰²⁷.

In late 1990s, two parallel processes marked the nature of economic interaction between the Israeli dominant economic system and local economic sub-structure of *Umm al Fahem*. Continuance of pragmatic relations with the Israeli dominant

¹⁰²⁴ Abraham Ashkenasi, *Palestinian Identities and Preferences: Israel’s and Jerusalem’s Arabs*, New York: Praeger, 1992, p.28.

¹⁰²⁵ Andrea Levin, “Israeli Arab Rights and Wrongs”, *Jerusalem Post*, 14.02.2003

¹⁰²⁶ Alisa Rubin Peled, “Towards Autonomy? The Islamist Movement’s Quest for Control of Islamic Institutions in Israel”, *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 55, No.3; 2001, p. 384

¹⁰²⁷ Vered Levy-Barzilai, , “Sitting on a Fence – A view of the new border’ ”, *Haaretz*, 04.10.2003

structures and processes notwithstanding, the town also underwent a counter-hegemonic economic transformation at local level through concentration of efforts on development of a self-sufficient economy under the leadership of north wing of *Islamic Movement*. This complexity of economic intentions in the town added to returning to coercive and restrictive policies towards the Palestinian Arab localities following the Rabin period, led further exclusion of the town from the integrative public investment schemes of the dominant structures. Protectionist and isolationist economic policies of the *Islamic Movement* amplified explicit unwillingness of the Israeli economic and political elite in incorporating *Umm al Fahem* to the dominant structures and processes of Israeli economy such as public investment, industrialization, development of trade or tourism. In this period, absence of active political economic leadership, which would either catalyze or regulate the economic interactions between the local economic sphere and the Israeli dominant structures and processes, resulted in limited interaction with the Israeli dominant economic structures and processes via individual initiatives.

Within this framework, the municipality became one of the main distributors of public welfare both as the biggest employer and investment regulator in the town. Consequently, economic interests of the residents became more interconnected with the political configuration of local council leaderships. As the *Islamic Movement* dominated the local council of *Umm al Fahem* from 1989 onwards, distributive role of *hamulas* of socio-economic welfare began to be redefined in line with their positioning towards *Islamic Movement*. As the system of local government became central source of economic welfare¹⁰²⁸ for many families in the town, affiliation to the *Islamic Movement* became instrumental for some segments of the population. By 2004, the number of contracted employees was 680, who worked for *Umm al Fahem*'s municipality, while the local businesspersons needed municipality permits to establish or expand their enterprises.

¹⁰²⁸ Issa Aburiaya, *The 1996 Split of Islamic Movement*, p.444

Following the *al-Aqsa Intifada*, *Umm al Fahem*'s economic subsystem passed through two parallel economic processes, which forced the local decision-makers to take some steps towards transforming their economic policies. First, interactions of *Umm al Fahem*'s economic subsystem with Jewish elements of Israeli economic system severely impeded. In post-*Al-Aqsa* period, most of the Jewish citizens of Israel avoided economic interaction with the residents of *Umm al Fahem*. Incomes from the main areas of economic interaction with the Jewish community such as olive oil trade and car-repair significantly decreased due to the extensive decline in the number of Jewish customers¹⁰²⁹. Second, economic sources of the *Umm al Fahem*'s economic subsystem, which were previously supplied by the *Islamic Movement*'s economic mechanisms and through local, national, and international fund-raising activities, began to suffer severe restrictions of the Israeli dominant structures particularly after arrestment of movement's leaders on suspicion of transferring funds to *Hamas* in 2003¹⁰³⁰. These processes led local decision-makers and economic elite to reconsider possibilities of increasing economic interaction with the Israeli dominant structures and processes in economic sphere.

From 2003 onwards, *Umm al Fahem* began to attract more public and private investment compared to its economic isolation during and after the *al-Aqsa Intifada* both from Jewish and Palestinian Arab localities. Moderate and pragmatic policies of local council under administration of *Hashem Abdal Rahman* and private local entrepreneurs began to re-integrate the town to the periphery of dominant economic structures and processes through either initiating or promoting some businesses within the village. Abdal Rahman also offered incentives to both Jewish and Arab businesspersons to establish joint ventures in *Umm al Fahem*¹⁰³¹. These initiatives led

¹⁰²⁹ Rosenthal, (2003), *op.cit* , p.266

¹⁰³⁰ Vered Levy-Barzilai, "Between rocks and a hard place", *Haaretz*, 08.01.2004

¹⁰³¹ *Ibid.*

transformation of socio-economic landscape of the town, whose signs became noticeable by the end of 2003.

It is easy to see the changes: a lot of new construction, dozens of renovated homes, covered with orange, pink and other up-to-date shades of plaster, well-tended gardens, with bougainvillea of every hue climbing the fences. In the Iskander neighborhood at the heights of the city, there are villas that are amazingly beautiful and immense. But also in other parts of the city, you can see sections of streets that seem to have undergone a facelift. [There is] a new school that has been built and a new sports auditorium. There are new shopping areas, stores and hair salons. [...] the old and familiar *Umm al Fahem* still exists, where neglect, peeling plaster and scenes of poverty and misery are dominant. [...] But here and there, in the midst of all this, a new *Umm al Fahem* is emerging. And it is growing and developing day by day [...] ¹⁰³²

Investments that were made in furniture sector and other areas, under pragmatic mayor Sheikh Abdal Rahman's administration paved the ways for a transformation from more isolationist economic policies of capacity-building, protectionism and self-sufficiency to practices of economic (re-)opening towards Israeli dominant economic system. In fact, main elements of his vision which he mentioned in an interview in 2004 about economic restructuring of the town necessitated establishment of functioning relations with the dominant structures and processes of Israeli economic system:

Do you want to know the gist of my credo as mayor? One: to change the image of *Umm al Fahem*, to topple the fear barrier, to familiarize the Jewish public with the city's finer aspects. Two: to improve tax collection, so that tax payment here will reach accepted standards. [...] The time has come for the residents to start paying taxes. Three: to launch a massive reform plan in the municipal system. [...] Four: to bring entrepreneurs and investors, to encourage construction in the city. That's already happening. Of course, it started before me. We have new schools, sports halls, a new country club with a pool and saunas - the city is getting a face-lift. We have a lot of plans. ¹⁰³³

The new club, which Sheikh Abdal-Rahman acknowledged as one of the indicators of economic development of the town was owned by one of the prominent members of *Agbariyeh hamula*. Mahmoud Khader Agbariyeh, invested some \$4 million to the

¹⁰³² Vered Levy-Barzilai, "Sitting on a Fence – A view of the new border' ", *Haaretz*, 04.10.2003

¹⁰³³ Vered Levy-Barzilai, "Between rocks and a hard place", *Haaretz*, 08.01.2004

club, which became one of the symbols of economic advancement with its 1000 members, who were entitled to pay its NIS 2400 annual membership fee. A member of another big *hamula*, Mohammed Abd al-Latif Mahamid, was a co-owner of a furniture company with annual turnover of around \$10 million¹⁰³⁴. These examples were significant to provide some insight about the volume of economic interaction between the *hamulas* of *Umm al Fahem* as entrepreneurs and the *Islamic Movement* as holder of municipal authority. As the municipal administration was under the control of the *Islamic Movement*, economic interests of both *hamulas* and individual members of *hamulas* became interconnected with the *Islamic Movement's* socio-economic policies and preferences. Some Israeli scholars considered these two successful entrepreneurs as potential agents of Israeli hegemonic structure within which their economic interests transcended their *hamula* affiliations as well as their *hamula's* economic boundaries¹⁰³⁵.

In fact, Individual *hamula* members operated to two parallel processes in their economic activities with the Israeli dominant economic structures. Hence, while some members of *hamulas* established eloquent interconnections between their economic positioning and dominant Israeli economic system as in the case of *Abu Ghosh*, some others defined their economic interests in line with the economic structures and processes led by the counter-hegemonic forces at local level. Besides, some members of *hamulas* had been integrated to the dominant economic structures and processes of Israel even before the beginning of a systematic economic transformation under the leadership of Sheikh Abdal-Rahman. Some of the entrepreneurs even denounced their *hamula* surnames and pursued their businesses under other names in order to prevent any misunderstanding that could negatively affect their enterprises¹⁰³⁶. Although such a move did not necessarily indicate their internalization of the values as in the case of

¹⁰³⁴ Yossi Klein, "The Other Israelis" *Haaretz*, 08.07. 2002

¹⁰³⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰³⁶ Ibid.

Abu Ghosh, it marked implicit consent of these members to operating within the dominant economic system, which would serve reproduction of dominant structures and processes. It also demonstrated increasing inability of *hamulas* of defining or catalyzing the economic interactions between their members and the dominant economic structures and processes notwithstanding their continuing organizational role in the economic lives of their members. Thus, pragmatic or hegemonic ties of *hamula* members with the Israeli economic system were not necessarily determined in line with political-economic interests or concerns of their *hamulas*.

5.2.2.4. Education

In *Umm al Fahem*, education served as an agent of counter-hegemony rather than hegemony until 2003. According to *Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics*, there were 17 schools and 9,106 students in the city at the beginning of the 2000s. Among them there existed 11 elementary schools with around 5500 pupils, and 7 high schools with around 3800 high school students.¹⁰³⁷ Although *Umm al Fahem* was virtually a part of Israeli educational system it did not become an integral part of it until 2000s. Mutual reluctance of the Israeli pedagogical institutions and local educational elite towards integrating the local educational sub-system to Israeli dominant structures and processes of education led gradual alienation of *Umm al Fahem* from the Israeli education system.

In this respect, education in *Umm al Fahem* did not successfully serve to the hegemonic principles such as cultivating loyal intellectuals and citizens to the State of Israel through indoctrination of dominant messages of co-existence under the roof of Israeliness. This was partly because of inability of Israeli pedagogical elite to provide local educational institutions with an internally coherent, simple and universally applicable formulation of Israeliness¹⁰³⁸. Yet it was also strongly related to isolationist

¹⁰³⁷ Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Umm_al-Fahem

¹⁰³⁸ Mark B. Ginsburg, *Politics and Education in Israel: Comparisons with the United States*, Garland Science, London, 1999, p.119

educational attitude and policies of Israeli ruling elite towards the Palestinian Arab localities. As the Israeli ruling elite perceived some Palestinian Arab localities such as *Umm al Fahem* as educational enclaves to be controlled rather than to be integrated to the dominant pedagogical structures and processes of Israeli education system, state's practices with regard to these localities were involved more coercion than consent. In this respect, *Umm al Fahem* was one of the Palestinian Arab localities, in which the local educational sub-system severely suffered from security checks, curriculum problems, lack of integrative curricular narratives, infrastructural scarcities, outmoded educational sources, shortage of teaching materials, malfunctioning of legal mechanisms to protect right of education, high rate of dropouts, and dearth of qualified educators¹⁰³⁹.

As a consequence of negligence and discriminative policies of the Israeli ruling and pedagogical elite, local educational sub-system lacked pedagogical infra-structure to serve preparing youth and adults of the town for in line with dominant educational principles of Israeliness. In this respect, high rates of dropouts, which approached almost 50% of the Palestinian Arab students attending the local educational institutions at secondary and high school levels prior to 2000s indicated the level of their alienation from the Israeli educational structures and processes¹⁰⁴⁰. This alienation was fulfilled by alternative educational sub-system, which positioned outside the dominant principles of Israeli educational system. Utilizing autonomous status, which the Israeli pedagogical system granted to the religious education¹⁰⁴¹, *Islamic Movement's* educational institutes provided the local population with an alternative education different from the Israeli dominant framework.

¹⁰³⁹ *Ibid.* pp.165-75

¹⁰⁴⁰ Interview with Majid al Haj, Haifa University, Haifa, 03.09.2006

¹⁰⁴¹ Mark B. Ginsburg, *Politics and Education in Israel: Comparisons with the United States*, Garland Science, London, 1999, p.112

Educational structure of *Umm al Fahem* significantly changed with the rapid increase of alternative pedagogical institutions under the supervision of the *Islamic Movement* from early 1980s onwards. Under the local administration of the northern wing of the *Islamic Movement*, mosques became important educational institutions, which functioned to generate and galvanize counter-hegemonic consciousness among the residents of *Umm al Fahem* through a religious education based on Islamic values. Sheikhs and imams became important components of adult education in line with the Islamic premises. Friday sermons emerged as a counter-hegemonic educational activity, which provided public platforms for inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem* to elaborate and discuss various religious and non-religious issues in an Islamic public sphere.

The *Islamic Movement* also controlled some other pedagogical institutions for dissemination counter-hegemonic consciousness based on Islamic acculturation. In this respect, pedagogical sub-system of the Movement included private schools¹⁰⁴², libraries¹⁰⁴³, three bookstores with discounts on books, and eleven mosques with kindergartens, cultural clubs and specialized courses on different religious and non-religious subjects such as computer operation¹⁰⁴⁴. The Movement's organizational and architectural policies towards coalescing religious and educational institutions as in the case of religio-educational complexes, which contained mosque, library, and kindergarten, indicated its approach towards the joint deployment of two interconnected agents of counter-hegemony in its 'war of maneuver' against the Israeli dominant pedagogical structures and processes. Summer camps of the *Islamic Movement*, which targeted the *Umm al Fahem*'s youth created additional pedagogical environments conducive for dissemination of the Movement's counter-hegemonic messages as well¹⁰⁴⁵. The *Islamic Movement* also opened the *Center of Contemporary*

¹⁰⁴² Stendel, (1996), op.cit., p. 137

¹⁰⁴³ Rosenthal, (2003), op.cit., p.266

¹⁰⁴⁴ Minns and Hijab, (1991), op.cit., p.19

¹⁰⁴⁵ Rosenthal, (2003), op.cit., p.277

Studies in Umm al Fahem,¹⁰⁴⁶ in order to prepare educational elite in line with the counter-hegemonic vision of the *Islamic Movement*. All these educational initiatives increased the impact of the *Islamic Movement* on *Umm al Fahem*'s dominant educational processes and structures as well on its educational elite.

Contrary to *Abu Ghosh*, local pedagogical elite was not integrated to the Israeli dominant educational structures and processes until 2003 in *Umm al Fahem*. Although majority of pedagogical institutions in the town followed Israeli curriculum and operated within the dominant pedagogical framework of Israel¹⁰⁴⁷, *Umm al Fahem* remained outside the hegemonic boundaries of the Israeli educational system mainly due to deficiency of hegemonic institutional infrastructure and lack of consent among local educational elite to Israeli dominant educational structures and processes. Limited interactions with the Israel's Jewish educational sphere, which mainly took place via Jewish instructors teaching at some of these institutions such as the Center for Science, Technology and Art, were not enough to create an environment conducive for hegemony-in-building at educational sphere in *Umm al Fahem*. In fact, it was possible to observe different interpretations of Gramscian conceptualization of struggle against the Israeli hegemonic structure among the educational elite of *Umm al Fahem*. While the *Islamic Movement* opted for following Gramscian advise about challenging hegemonic powers through establishment of new pedagogical organizations alternative to the existing ones, some local pedagogical elites such as Yousuf Jabreen searched for methods of challenging 'hegemonic structure' from within through utilizing "discursive venues of Israeli society" (i.e. universities, media, academic forums, NGOs)¹⁰⁴⁸ or pedagogical networking¹⁰⁴⁹ within Israeli system.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Ali Sharp, "A kernel of truth and/or justice", *Palestine Report*, 15.12.2004 <http://www.palestinereport.org/article.php?article=605>

¹⁰⁴⁷ Rosenthal, (2003), *op.cit*, p.266

¹⁰⁴⁸ Ofira Seliktar, "Tenured Radicals in Israel: From New Zionism to Political Activism", *Israel Affairs*, Vol.11, No.4, 2005, p.721

¹⁰⁴⁹ *Ibid.* p.724

In 2003 however, even the most radical segments within the *Islamic Movement* acknowledged the necessity of recognizing Israeli dominant pedagogical structures and processes in order to deal with educational problems in *Umm al Fahem*. In fact, it was not possible to open educational institutions and maintain an educational sub-system autonomously without involvement of the Israeli dominant pedagogical institutions. As various areas of educational advancement from infrastructure (i.e. opening schools, educational investments and projects) to appointment of pedagogical staff (i.e. schoolteachers and principals) were not possible without permission of Israeli Ministry of Education as well as other relevant Israeli institutions¹⁰⁵⁰, *Islamic Movement's* space of maneuver in its "war of maneuver" was significantly restricted. In this respect, it began to search for methods of maintaining a relatively autonomous educational sub-system, which would not compromise significantly from its pedagogical principles about producing and reproducing counter-hegemonic consciousness among the Palestinian Arab youth against the Israeli dominance.

However, operating within the system through increasing interaction with the dominant structures and processes led to transformation of the dominant counter-hegemonic pedagogical discourse of the movement into a more pragmatic positioning within a 'war of position' within Israeli educational system. In 2003, the municipality of the town accepted implementation of a joint pedagogical program in order to decrease drop-out rates in the secondary and high schools of *Umm al Fahem* in cooperation with Israeli pedagogical institutions and authorities. The program succeeded to eliminate the entire problem of dropouts in three years after its initiation. It also appeared to be a significant example of increasing cooperation between the Israeli dominant pedagogical structures and the *Umm al Fahem's* local authorities in solving the educational problems in the town. The program and additional educational measures, which were taken by the local educational elite in coordination with Israeli pedagogical structures and processes, led to noticeable improvement in the success of *Umm al*

¹⁰⁵⁰ Interview with advocate Tawfiq Jabreen, *Umm al Fahem*, 06.09.2004

Fahem's high school students in the matriculation exams for the entrance of Israeli universities¹⁰⁵¹. In this respect, while Israeli matriculation system and exams were previously seen as an instrument of exclusionary practices of Israeli dominant pedagogical structures, by 2007 a signpost standing at the entrance to the town read "*Umm al Fahem*: State Champion in Mathematics" to praise success of *Umm al Fahem*'s high school students on those Israeli matriculation exams.¹⁰⁵² Considering that only 50.4% of 12th grade students were entitled to a matriculation certificate in 2001¹⁰⁵³, this was a significant indicator of in-system upward mobility, twchich would encourage incorporation of more students from *Umm al Fahem* into the Israeli dominant structures and processes of higher education.

5.2.2.5. Religion

Religion became an important arena of self-identification and socialization for the inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem* especially after the loosening of restrictions for the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel on getting religious education from the religious institutions in the *WBGS* by 1967. Islamization of the population gained impetus from the late 1960s notwithstanding, this "outward Islamization" was not accompanied with persevering counter-hegemonic politicization until 1980s. In 1980, there were only four mosques, which served to the pious inhabitants of in *Umm al Fahem*. This number increased up to twenty-five particularly after the *Islamic Movement*'s victory in local elections of 1989¹⁰⁵⁴. In this respect, from early 1990s onwards religion, with its institutions, began to transform into an agent of counter-hegemonic mobilization of Palestinian Arab residents of *Umm al Fahem* (as well as some other Palestinian Arab localities in Israel) under the supervision of *Islamic Movement*.

¹⁰⁵¹ Interview with Majid al Haj, Haifa University, Haifa, 03.09.2006

¹⁰⁵² Eli Ashkenazi, "*Umm al Fahem* flood damage hits NIS 11m, *Haaretz*, <http://www.Haaretz.com/hasen/spages/704150.html>

¹⁰⁵³ Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Umm_al-Fahem

¹⁰⁵⁴ Rosenthal, (2003), *op.cit*, p.267

Consequently, mosques and educational centers of Islamic religion transformed into religio-political institutions/forums, where intra-communal political discourse was shaped and/or influenced. In this period, control of the mosques by counter-hegemonic groups such as the *Islamic Movement* resulted in conversion of mosques into political centers of extra-institutional activism which began to serve counter-hegemonic indoctrination of Palestinian Arab community through stimulating religious consciousness among them. Thus, from early 1990s onwards religion and religious institutions mostly served as means of legitimization of counter-hegemonic political discourse, which aimed to de-legitimize the very existence of Israeli dominant structures and processes at religio-political basis in *Umm al Fahem*. In this respect, there existed a process of Islamization of politics or politicization of Islam as a platform of reactionary counter-hegemonic movement against the state.

In this respect, contrary to *Abu Ghosh*, religious affairs, religious institutions, and religious education were not supervised by the *hamula* structure, which could bridge the inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem* to Israeli religious structures and processes under their dominant discourse about necessity of inter-faith dialogue in solving inter-communal problems, harmony of religions and peaceful co-existence of Jews and Muslims. It was rather the *Islamic Movement*, which superseded *hamula* ties among *hamula* members by presenting them an alternative based on values and communal order of Islam in which there would not be any separation private and public or in line with familial ties¹⁰⁵⁵. In fact, some members of *hamulas* such as *Suleiman Agbariyeh* of *Agbariyeh hamula* and former deputy mayor of *Umm al Fahem* became important figures in the north wing of the *Islamic Movement*.

Similar to *Abu Ghosh* religion was used as an agent in mobilizing the inhabitants for clarification of their religio-political positioning towards the Israeli hegemonic structures and processes. In *Abu Ghosh* religion was instrumental for *hamula* to create ‘communal consciousness’ on religiosity, which would dominant religious discourse of

¹⁰⁵⁵ Quoted from *al Hadaaf* newsletter of March 1989, in Minns and Hijab, (1991), *op.cit.*, p.22

hegemonic system whose success would depend on internalization of messages such as co-existence of religious communities and irrationality of “clashes of religions”. In *Umm al Fahem* religion was an agent of counter-hegemonic mobilization of the Palestinian Arab residents of the town. In this respect, religion was instrumental for the *Islamic Movement*, particularly the northern wing, to defy the “false consciousness” of Muslim Palestinian Arab community, which was propelled by Israeli dominant structures and processes to pacify their religious revival.

5.2.2.6. Land Planning

Land planning processes, which resulted in gradual socio-economic and political transformation of *Umm al Fahem*, took place under the supervision of dominant Israeli institutions such as ILA Israeli Land Authority (ILA) and Jewish Agency in coordination with other apparatuses of Israeli political, military and socio-economic establishment (i.e. Israeli Defense Forces, Ministry of Interior, *Histadrut*). In fact, both four big *hamulas* and small farmers lost significant amount of land, which altered the patterns of intra-village socio-economic organization and led to inability of developing meaningful planning and zoning mechanisms¹⁰⁵⁶. In 1945, *Umm al Fahem* residents owned 77242 dunums of land which significantly decreased to 12400 dunums by early 1970s¹⁰⁵⁷. By early 2000s some 40,000 residents of the town owned around 20,000 dunams¹⁰⁵⁸.

As a consequence of land policies of Israeli authorities, sizeable territory of *Umm al Fahem* and the villages of Muawiya, Musmus Musher and Biada became under jurisdiction of the [local] commission of Yizraelim, which did not have any Palestinian

¹⁰⁵⁶ Usher,(23.09.2000), op.cit.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Bakir Abu Kishk, Arab Land and Israeli Policy, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.11, No.1, 1981, p.130

¹⁰⁵⁸ Usher,(23.09.2000), op.cit.

Arab representative¹⁰⁵⁹. Notwithstanding the possibility of placing these localities and others alike under jurisdiction of the *Irron* local commission, situated in the same area, in which Palestinian communities had representatives, Israeli ruling elite preferred to put them under authority of Jewish dominated commissions such as *Yizraelim* even though there was no territorial link between some of their territory and those commissions¹⁰⁶⁰. In fact, apart from some exceptions such as *Irron*, Israeli Ministry of Interior and land planning elite had not been enthusiastic to exercise their discretion to integrate Palestinian Arab local authorities to the dominant land planning processes.¹⁰⁶¹ Israeli authorities also implemented other policies such leaving many sensitive areas in Palestinian Arab localities such as *Umm al Fahem* (recognized community without a municipality status until 1985) unaffiliated to any local planning commission in order to maintain central control over these lands for central planning initiatives.¹⁰⁶² Israeli land planning authorities implemented similar obstructive policies with regard to developmental planning of *Umm al Fahem*.

More than 60 per cent of the planning area of the Arab city *Umm al Fahem* that [was] designated for development [was] subject to series of detailed plans at varying stages of preparation and approval. Even in 2000s, valid local outline scheme for *Umm al Fahem* [dated] from 1963 and [was] unable to provide planning solutions for a population that [had] increased enormously since that year. Such measures can actually serve to prolong the time taken to consider proposed plans by taking away the urgency of the need for a decision.¹⁰⁶³

In this respect, prioritizing the developmental concerns of Jewish localities (i.e. infrastructure, housing) surrounding *Umm al Fahem*, Israeli dominant structures and processes of land planning severely restricted expansion of the town notwithstanding

¹⁰⁵⁹ Hussein Abu Hussein and Fiona McKay, *Acces Denied, Palestinian Land Rights in Israel*, Zed Books, London and New York, 2003, p.221

¹⁰⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p.221

¹⁰⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p.222

¹⁰⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶³ Abu Hussein and McKay, (2003), *op.cit.* p.227

its demographic and developmental needs.¹⁰⁶⁴ Israeli ruling elite implemented similarly restrictive policies on issuing building permits to Palestinian Arab residents of *Umm al Fahem*, caused issuance of numerous building demolition orders that would further strain their relationship with the town's population.¹⁰⁶⁵ These policies accelerated alienation of the Palestinian Arab residents of *Umm al Fahem* from the dominant structures and processes of land planning in Israel. Thus, for the *Umm al Fahem*'s inhabitants, state's dominant discourse of "development" remained to connote development for the Jewish settlements or communities at the expense of their needs of urbanization and growth¹⁰⁶⁶.

According to Masalha, politics of denial and different policies of the Israeli state like land expropriation for military-strategic and demographic-land settlement reasons was one of the main factors, which led inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem* to opting for counter-hegemonic methods in communicating with the Israeli dominant structures to express their concerns about the dominant land planning processes¹⁰⁶⁷. In this context, the crisis that erupted in May 1998 following the government's announcement of its plans about expropriation of 4500 acres of agricultural land for establishing military compound and resulted in serious violent clashes between the residents and the Israeli security forces was a good example of utilization of such counter-hegemonic methods¹⁰⁶⁸. Abraham Ashkenazi concurred Masalha's approach about association between the exclusionary land planning practices of Israeli ruling elite and alienation of *Umm al Fahem* from the

¹⁰⁶⁴ 'The status of the Palestinian minority in Israel, International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH)', in Reporters without Borders (ed.), *Israel/Palestine, The Black Book*, Pluto Press, London, 2003, p.145

¹⁰⁶⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Center website, Country Report Israel, "Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel: identity and location (2001-2004)", at [http://www.internaldisplacement.org/Idmc/website/countries/nsf/\(httpEnvelopes\)/3E1A52BA1E66D9ED802570B8005A7275?OpenDocument](http://www.internaldisplacement.org/Idmc/website/countries/nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/3E1A52BA1E66D9ED802570B8005A7275?OpenDocument)

¹⁰⁶⁶ Bakir Abu Kishk, Arab Land and Israeli Policy, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.11, No.1, 1981, p.132

¹⁰⁶⁷ Nur Masalha, **The Politics of Denial**, Pluto Press, London 2003, p.152

¹⁰⁶⁸ Ibid.

Israeli dominant land planning structures and processes. For Ashkenazi land expropriation schemes that were pursued by Israeli dominant land authorities in line with the socio-economic or security needs of Jewish citizens of Israel living in the surrounding settlements or villages of *Umm al Fahem* paved the way to “radicalism and self-isolation”¹⁰⁶⁹.

Controversial ‘transfer proposals’, which suggested handover of *Umm al Fahem* to the Palestinian Authority,¹⁰⁷⁰ and inclusion of some of its neighboring villages to ‘Seam Line Project’ (Separation Fence) that aimed to separate Israeli localities from Palestinian villages and towns in the *West Bank* intensified scrutiny among inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem* against the Israeli dominant land planning structures and processes¹⁰⁷¹. Although post-2003 period witnessed some signs of transformation in the nature of interaction between the Israeli land planning authorities and *Umm al Fahem*’s population, this did not lead transformation of the dominant counter-hegemonic stance against the policies of land expropriations. In fact, this change was mainly reflected in methods of *Umm al Fahem*’s local elite in dealing with land expropriation practices of Israeli land planning authorities within the boundaries of Israeli legal and political frameworks as in the case of Sheikh Hashem Abdal Rahman’s resolution of a land dispute with *Megiddo* through dialogue and in-system politico-legal mechanisms in 2004.¹⁰⁷²

In this respect, land planning did not operate as an agent of hegemony in *Umm al Fahem* for several reasons. Firstly, Israeli authorities and land institutions such as Israeli Land Authority and Jewish Agency were reluctant to integrate the community

¹⁰⁶⁹ Abraham Ashkenasi, **Palestinian Identities and Preferences: Israel’s and Jerusalem’s Arabs**, New York: Praeger, 1992, p. 55

¹⁰⁷⁰ Alan Dovty, ‘A Question That Outweighs All Others: Israel and the Palestinians in Broad Perspective’, in A. Dovty (ed.), (2004),op.cit., p.176

¹⁰⁷¹ “*Umm al Fahem*, Israel: Walling Themselves Out”, at <http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/fellows/israel/nf1.html>

¹⁰⁷² Interview with Tawfiq Jabareen, *Umm al Fahem*, 06.09.2004

leaders or local administrators into the dominant structures and processes of land planning. Secondly, land planning took place explicitly in favor of the needs of the Jewish population, who settled around *Umm al Fahem* and prevented further expansion of the town despite the internal pressures and demands of its population for housing and farming. Unresolved demands of the population exacerbated alienation of *Umm al Fahem*'s population from the dominant structures and processes of Israeli system in spatial arena. Dominant institutions of land planning such as Israeli Land Authority were perceived by the inhabitants of the village as a coercive mechanism of Israeli dominance in spatial sphere. Thirdly, fragmented and de-territorialized *hamula* structure prevented four big *hamulas* of *Umm al Fahem* to catalyze and mediate the land planning practices of the dominant Israeli structures and the inhabitants of the village. In fact, as the Israeli state and land planning mechanisms diminished the 'productively balanced inter-*hamula* competition' that survived the British colonialism in *Umm al Fahem*, *hamulas* did not cultivate sympathy towards the leadership of Israeli ruling elite from the beginning of their encounters with dominant Israeli structures and processes. Thus, it was not easy for Israeli ruling elite to expect from *hamulas* to play a catalyzing role between the Israeli land authorities and the inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem* in persuading inhabitants of village to accept and internalize expropriation practices of the dominant land planning structures.

5.2.2.7. Culture, Language and Literature

In *Umm al Fahem*, Israeli ruling elite initially lacked both necessary hegemonic willingness and apparatuses in incorporating *Umm al Fahem* to the dominant schemes of Israeli culture. In the absence of necessary mechanisms and local partners to integrate *Umm al Fahem* to the Israeli dominant cultural structures and processes, the town became one of the battlegrounds in a cultural "war of maneuver" between the Israeli cultural system and counter-hegemonic groups such as *al-Ard*, *Abna al Balad*, *Usrat-al Jihad*, and *the Islamic Movement*. In this respect, contrary to *Abu Ghosh*, Israeli dominant cultural structures and processes, which operated through cultural identifiers of Israeliness, modernization and capitalism faced a severe counter-

hegemonic resistance in *Umm al Fahem*. The *Islamic Movement* gradually and selectively adopted both modernization and capitalism to its religious vision about reorganization of the Muslim society as an alternative to the 'Israeli cultures of modernization and consumption'. In this respect, it provided the insecure inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem* with a safe haven for adjusting the processes of modernization and consumption without contradicting their customs, beliefs, and other traditional culture-identifiers.

From 1990s onwards, the *Islamic Movement* represented a more organized counter-hegemonic stance against the cultural identifiers of Israeliness and Westernization. It became a flagship of a cultural counter-revolution at local level against the "distorted" culture of Israeliness and its dominant structures and processes, which mainly operated the "deceitful" logic and ideals of western colonial modernization. In this respect, the *Islamic Movement* also condemned cultural innovation of the West¹⁰⁷³, which were mainly embodied in Israeli dominant cultural structures and processes such as fashion, rock music, television programs and movies, as corrupt and corrupting apparatuses of Western cultural dominance.

Significant increase in banal use of the alternative cultural identifiers by the *Umm al Fahem*'s residents in their daily lives was a sign of gradual internalization of a counter-hegemonic cultural rationale alternative to the 'Israeliness'. Headscarves became one of the important components of counter-hegemonic clothing practices¹⁰⁷⁴. Beard became a symbol of cultural rejectionism against the embodiment of dominant western cultural values in the appearance of a male human body. Increase in the religious observance among the residents of *Umm al Fahem* also served banal reproduction of alternative value-system based on Islamic principles.

¹⁰⁷³ Stendel, (1996), *op.cit.*, p. 137

¹⁰⁷⁴ Faisal Bodi, "Israel's third-class citizens learn to stand proud", *New Statesman*, 11.12.2000, Vo1. 29, No.4516, p. 32

Within this context, neighborhoods and *hamulas* became sub-cultural identifiers under the Islamic culture, which dominated cultural sphere of *Umm al Fahem* by the 1990s. Notwithstanding its considerable number of non-religious inhabitants, *Umm al Fahem* became one of the strongholds of counter-hegemonic cultural struggle against the culture- identifiers of Western/Israeli modernism and dominance. In this cultural “war of maneuver”, *Islamic Movements* vitalized elements of Islamic culture in all kind of social activities in *Umm al Fahem*’s public sphere.

A research conducted in 1990 indicated that the ambivalence in *Umm al Fahem* to contact with Jews was much greater than villages like Shfaram or Usifiya.¹⁰⁷⁵ In other words, contrary to *Abu Ghosh*, the *Umm al Fahem* people were less willing to communicate with the Jews. Frailty of inter-cultural interaction, which was further deteriorated during Al-Aqsa Intifada prevented unproblematic pervasion of dominant culture of “Israeliness” into *Umm al Fahem*. Lack of inter-cultural activities and counter-hegemonic cultural policy of *Islamic Movement* also obscured operation of elements of dominant culture among the *Umm al Fahem*’s residents.

This counter-hegemonic cultural framework began to change by mid-1990s following few delicate initiatives that were initiated during *Rabin* period in Israel to increase cultural interaction with the Jewish community. Art Gallery of *Umm al Fahem*, established in 1996, was oone of such initiatives which played an important role in bridging the Jewish community and Palestinian Arab residents of *Umm al Fahem* in cultural sphere. In this respect, it represented an alternative means of interaction to the counter-hegemonic cultural framework established by the *Islamic Movement* based on the praising and prioritization of Islamic cultural heritage. Art Gallery of *Umm al Fahem* provided a trench in the battleground within ‘war of position’, which took place in the cultural sphere (as well as other spheres) against the Israeli dominant structures and processes.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Abraham Ashkenasi, **Palestinian Identities and Preferences: Israel’s and Jerusalem’s Arabs**, New York: Praeger, 1992, pp. 47-50

Post-2003 period witnessed increase of the cooperative cultural activities and initiatives that targeted at increasing cultural interaction between the residents of *Umm al Fahem* and Jewish community. New positioning of the *Islamic Movement* in the cultural war of position led to significant change in its discourse about the instrumentality of cultural activities. Disclosure of plans of establishment of the first Arab modern art museum in *Umm al Fahem* at a ceremony in Tel Aviv with participation of local and national cultural and political elite was a groundbreaking example for indicating the level which the cultural interaction reached by the end of 2006. Mainstream Israeli press put it to its columns by emphasizing its significance for cultural co-existence. A news article in *Yedioth Ahronoth* about the night stated:

Muslims and Jews, Palestinians and Israelis, women covered head to toe alongside women sporting modern clothing, all packed the exedra of the Tel Aviv museum, which was festively decorated in honor of one of the most important events in the history of the Arab community in Israel. [...] The attendance list was unprecedented and included ministers and *Knesset* members from a wide range of political factions, including Tourism Minister Isaac Herzog, Science, Technology, Culture, and Sports Minister Ophir Pines-Paz, MK Nadia Hilou (Labor-Meimad), and MK Jamal Zahalka.¹⁰⁷⁶

Sheikh Abdal Rahman's statements did not differ or reject the dominant discourse of "co-existence", which was reflected in the statements by the high representatives of the dominant structures of processes who attended the momentous night of cultural co-existence in the course of celebrating the opening.

The situation is not such that we are making peace in the Middle East, but any hope and ray of light is important. We all have one goal, and it is for a better life, so I call on the Jewish community and say that the Tel Aviv and *Umm al Fahem* museums have brought us here together. That means it's possible to disagree but live together. [...] To all those who have plans to separate and divide us, I hope there is a bit of soul for art, because art brings people together, and even if not, we will be there building another museum, another theatre, another library, and other classrooms, and we will prove that its possible to live as partners in Israel¹⁰⁷⁷

¹⁰⁷⁶ Merav Yudilovitch, "First Arab modern art museum to be established", *Yedioth Ahronoth*, ynetnews, 14.12.2006, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3339849,00.html>

¹⁰⁷⁷ Ibid.

Prior to 2003, the *Islamic Movement* emphasized, several times, the incompatibility Israeli cultural dominant structures and processes with the Islamic values. However, by 2007 the culture became a bridge for “co-existence” between the Jewish and Palestinian Arab communities of Israel. Contrary to the counter-hegemonic discourse of the *Islamic Movement* in the pre-2003 period, adaptation of the dominant discourse of co-existence by Sheikh Abdal Rahman was impressive for its significance in revealing insights about his and his movement’s repositioning in the cultural war of position.

5.2.2.8. Media

Media functioned as an agent of both hegemony and counter-hegemony in *Umm al Fahem* contrary to their hegemonic instrumentality in the case of *Abu Ghosh*. In fact, until 2004, Israeli media did not undertake an integrative and educative mission towards cognitive incorporation of *Umm al Fahem*’s residents into the dominant structures and processes through absorption of dominant discourse on Israeliness and peaceful coexistence as Israelis in Israel. Exclusionary and distrustful approach of Israeli media towards the town was reflected in their news articles and reporting practices about the town throughout the history due to the town’s oppositional stance within and/or outside the Israeli dominant system. Highlight the anti-Israel activities and discourses of the local political elements, and ignoring the hegemonic processes, which took place among some segments of the *Umm al Fahem*’s residents they renounced their “hegemonic instrumentality” either for news-marketing purposes¹⁰⁷⁸ or because of their ideological positioning.

This idiosyncratically distrustful stance of Israeli media towards the town became apparent in late 1980s with the active support of some of *Umm al Fahem*’s residents to the counter-hegemonic acts, which took place in the course of Intifada of 1987 and emergence of *Islamic Movement* as a political phenomenon in Israeli public space. For

¹⁰⁷⁸ Interview with Dr. Yousef Jabreen, *Umm al Fahem*, 07.09.2006

many Palestinian Arab citizens living in the town, media reports during late 1980s especially after the Intifada, served dissemination of the Israeli state's discourse associating *Umm al Fahem*, which increasingly engaged in anti-state activity. In this way, the state would justify its coercive actions during the clashes to the Israeli public in advance by convincing them that Umm-al-Fahem was a "no-go area"¹⁰⁷⁹. Exemplifying an article published in one of the mainstream newspapers, *Haaretz*, Palestinian Arab community's publication *al Hadaaf newsletter* criticized instrumental role of the Israeli mainstream media in disseminating a violent and anti-Israeli image of *Umm al Fahem* in the public discourse. For *al-Hadaaf*, efforts of *Haaretz*, in its reporting about a public meeting in *Umm al Fahem*, to portray the town "the people's republic of *Umm al Fahem*" where flying Palestinian flags replaced the Israeli ones, was a significant example of criminalization and de-legitimization of *Umm al Fahem* and its residents in Israeli public discourse.¹⁰⁸⁰ In this respect, even prior to the *al-Aqsa Intifada*, *Umm al Fahem* had an image as hub of Islamic fundamentalism and activism in some segments of Israeli society¹⁰⁸¹.

Mainstream Israeli media's attention on *Umm al Fahem* intensified with the rise of *Islamic Movement* as a socio-economic and political actor in early 1990s. In late 1990s *Umm al Fahem* covered the first pages of mainstream Israeli media with the clashes of Land Day in 1998 and terrorist attacks in 1999. After these violent incidents, Israeli media began to deliver messages of forewarning to Israeli public about the town. Headline of a news article about *Umm al Fahem* on September 17, 1999 in one of the mainstream newspapers read "Something new and dangerous?". In the article the town was presented as a center of 'new' and 'dangerous' Islamic activism which might threaten the Israeli dominant structures and processes by referring to comments of academics

¹⁰⁷⁹ Minns and Hijab, (1991), op.cit., p.36

¹⁰⁸⁰ Ibid. p.36

¹⁰⁸¹ Israeli, (1991), op.cit., p.34

and members of *Islamic Movement*¹⁰⁸². Other articles alike consolidated the threat perception about the town in the Israeli public sphere by referring to alarming statements of Israeli security authorities and by depicting town with phrases such as “nationalist Arab underground,” a seedbed for “errant weeds” and even an “Islamic autonomy” in the heart of the Jewish state.¹⁰⁸³. Consequently, image of *Umm al Fahem* in Israeli public sphere was not very pleasant prior to *al-Aqsa Intifada*.

Al-Aqsa Intifada exacerbated this image in Israeli public discourse. In the course of *al-Aqsa Intifada* *Umm al Fahem* became the one of the symbols of Palestinian Arab upheaval in the Israeli and Palestinian Arab media. Its oppositional stance became center of attention even for the international media¹⁰⁸⁴. By presenting *Umm al Fahem* as the hub of devilish acts against the Israeli dominant structures and processes, Israeli media played a role in further alienation of *Umm al Fahem* from the hegemonic system. In this respect, they did not assist integration of the Palestinian Arab citizens to the Israeli dominant structures and processes through disseminating messages in support of dominant discourses of Israeliness and co-existence as in the case of their news reports about *Abu Ghosh*. In fact, six years after the October events of the 2000, it was its violent image which would allow an Israeli Russian immigrant political personality, Avigdor Lieberman, to propose *Umm al Fahem*’s transfer to the Palestinian Authority as a part of ‘greater project on exchanging the lands for peace’¹⁰⁸⁵. It was also this image which would force the local administrators of the

¹⁰⁸² Larry Defner, “Something new and dangerous?”, *Jerusalem Post*, 17.09.1999

¹⁰⁸³ Usher, (23.09.2000), op.cit.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Mary Curtius, “Violent Eruptions in Middle East Cause Over 50 Deaths”, *Los Angeles Times*, 03.11.2000; Phil Reeves, “West Bank violence sweeps into Israel's heartlands”, *Independent*, 03.11.2000

¹⁰⁸⁵ Yigal Walt, “Lieberman: I have international support”, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, ynetnews, 23.03.2006 <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3231662,00.html> and Lily Galili, “Divided by a common hatred”, <http://www.Haaretz.com/hasen/spages/715098.html>

town to marketing [the new mayor's friendlier] image in Israeli media sphere as well¹⁰⁸⁶.

Events that took place in *Umm al Fahem* in October 2000 led further criminalization of the image of the town in both mainstream Israeli public discourse and Palestinian Arab public discourse in Israel in the initial years of post al-Aqsa period¹⁰⁸⁷. Both Palestinian Arab media and Hebrew-language Israeli media associated *Umm al Fahem* with counter-hegemonic activities as well as criminal behavior. As Usher indicated media reports about *Umm al Fahem* before and during the *al-Aqsa Intifada* were exclusive¹⁰⁸⁸, which contradicted the integrative role of media as an agent of hegemony. In fact, most of the media reports seemed to acknowledge unfeasibility of integrating *Umm al Fahem* to the dominant structures and processes of Israeli hegemony. In this respect, most of the mainstream media located *Umm al Fahem* outside the hegemonic discourse in their reports about the town.

Within this context, *Saut al-haq wal-huria* (The Voice of Divine Truth and Freedom) weekly newspaper, the mouthpiece of the northern faction of the *Islamic Movement*, operated through an alternative discourse about *Umm al Fahem*, which was exceptionally different from the mainstream and secular discourses that dominated both Jewish and Palestinian Arab media spheres in Israel. It was periodically banned in Israel due to its radical stance against the Israeli dominance. According to Tawfiq Eirer, editor-in-chief of the newspaper, such image could be related to "Israel's brazen Islamophobia."¹⁰⁸⁹ *Assirat* the and movement's local newspaper *Al-Madina*, two other publications of the *Islamic Movement*, also provided alternative media discourse in reporting on *Umm al Fahem*. Other Palestinian Arab media institutions did not

¹⁰⁸⁶ Joseph Algazy, 'New Image for *Umm al Fahem*', *Haaretz*, 08.08.2003

¹⁰⁸⁷ Interview with Yousuf Jabareen, *Umm al Fahem*, 07.09.2006

¹⁰⁸⁸ Usher, (23.09.2000), op.cit.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Iran News Agency (IRNA), 'Islamic Movement's leaders in Israel are on hunger', *Arabia 2000*, 12.11.2004

seriously challenge the dominant discourse while presenting *Umm al Fahem*. Their supportive stance towards reporting and interpretation of *Islamic Movement* and resistance activities in *Umm al Fahem* notwithstanding, newspapers like *Kull al Arab* and *Al-Ittihad* did not provide an explicitly counter-hegemonic discourse in support of these activities¹⁰⁹⁰.

From 2003 onwards, media discourse about the image of *Umm al Fahem* began to change considerably. Israeli media began to integrate the previously marginal figures of the *Islamic Movement* into its dominant discourse of ‘peaceful co-existence and Israeliness’. Interviews with important figures of the *Islamic Movement* about their plans on development of *Umm al Fahem*¹⁰⁹¹, news reports about necessity of improving living conditions in the town¹⁰⁹², news briefs on intentions and acts of municipality to prevent acts of radicalism¹⁰⁹³ and reports on art activities with emphasis on coexistence theme¹⁰⁹⁴, seemed to signify a change about image of the town in Israeli mainstream media discourse.

Hamula members frequently appeared in the news reports of the Israeli mainstream media. However, the Israeli media did not refer to *hamula* connections of the residents in their reporting practices about *Umm al Fahem*. Contrary to clear emphasis on the *hamula* ties in media reporting about *Abu Ghosh*, there was no explicit indication of resident’s affiliation with *hamulas* of *Umm al Fahem*. In *Umm al Fahem*, affiliations

¹⁰⁹⁰ For examples of such stance see, Palestinian Arab Media Reports on the “The *Islamic Movement*’s Rally (16 September 2001)”, at <http://www.chretiens-et-juifs.org/article.php?voir%5B%5D=475&voir%5B%5D=1166> and the media reports on “Expropriation of More Lands on Separation Fence” in June 2002 at Arab Human Rights Association website, <http://www.arabhra.org/publications/wrap/2002/wrap81.htm>

¹⁰⁹¹ Joseph Algazy, ‘New Image for *Umm al Fahem*’, *Haaretz*, 08.08.2003

¹⁰⁹² Vered Levy-Barzilai, “Between rocks and a hard place”, *Haaretz*, 08.01.2004

¹⁰⁹³ Sharon Roffe Ofir, “Umm al Fahem braces for possible retribution for Jerusalem attack”, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, *ynetnews*, 21.03.2008

¹⁰⁹⁴ Merav Yudilovitch, “First Arab modern art museum to be established”, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, *ynetnews*, 14.12.2006, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3339849,00.html>

with the *Islamic Movement* or positioning towards religiosity were more emphasized than the traditional ties. In this respect, Israeli media contributed reproduction of implicit awareness about the main catalyzing actors through which the residents of these localities realize hegemonic interaction with the dominant system. In this respect, as an agent of hegemony, Israeli mainstream media seemed to elucidate their counterparts within the hegemony-in-building process in different segments of Palestinian Arab community through which they could disseminate their hegemonic messages to the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel.

5.2.2.9. Symbols of the State

In *Umm al Fahem*, symbols of the state were considered as symbols of suppression and discrimination rather than as indicators of ‘co-existence and Israeliness’ as in the case of *Abu Ghosh*. Counter-hegemonic symbolism was reflected in numerous public occasions and locations in *Umm al Fahem*. This course of action gained impetus especially after *Islamic Movement* gained control over the local government in 1989. Streets of *Umm al Fahem* literally experienced discursive ‘war of maneuver’ between symbols of Islam and Palestinian Arab nationalism and socio-cultural symbols of the Israeli dominant cultural structures and processes.

Umm al Fahem local council under the control of the *Islamic Movement* began to change the street names from early 1990 onwards. In this period, the local council named the streets after important personalities, places, and occasions in the history of Islam. Main themes, which the council eulogized in the street-naming practices, were heroes of Islam (i.e. caliphs, military commanders, religious authorities, poets and scientists), early Islamic victories (Bader, Uhad, el Handak and el Qadissiaa), Muslim glories in Palestine (i.e. battles of Yarmuq, Hittin), Muslim-Arab golden age of

scientific, intellectual and religious accomplishments; early converts to Islam; Muslim presence in Spain and Islamic conquests¹⁰⁹⁵.

Creation of such a “symbolic content of the local landscape”, which inherently reflected defiant stance of the *Islamic Movement*¹⁰⁹⁶ against the Israeli dominance also aimed to assist internalization and reproduction of counter-hegemonic spatial discourse against spatial practices of Israeli dominant structures.

[...] the most significant development is the attention given by the *Islamic Movement* to the use of street names as commemorations in localities under its control in accordance with the movement's ideology. This is the case with Umm el Fahem and Kafr Kasm, where the *Islamic Movement's* control of local government was also evident in the creation of a comprehensive set of street names according to the movement's notion of Islamic heritage. The resolve of local representatives of the *Islamic Movement* to utilise street names as a commemorative instrument testifies to the movement's political vigour and sophistication. In this context, street-naming is another method of the Islamisation of the public domain[...] ¹⁰⁹⁷.

Although it was possible to observe ideologically-oriented street-naming in other Palestinian Arab localities such as Nazareth, intensity of the of the naming differed significantly from *Umm al Fahem*. In fact, in Nazareth the number of streets, which were named after Palestinian Arab or Islamic symbols, was twenty including some leaders of the Communist Party, that remained as the main actor of town's local governance from early 1970s onwards. ¹⁰⁹⁸

In this respect, the local council of *Umm al Fahem* used its autonomy in naming the streets by creating set of street names that would operate as discursive markers of counter-hegemonic political stance of the *Islamic Movement* against the dominant discourse of Israeli ruling elite about ‘Israeliness’ and ‘co-existence’ under Jewish

¹⁰⁹⁵ Maoz Azaryahu and Rebecca Kook, “Mapping the nation: street names and Arab-Palestinian identity: three case studies”, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 8, No.2, 2002, p.207

¹⁰⁹⁶ *Ibid.* p.205

¹⁰⁹⁷ *Ibid.* p.196

¹⁰⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.196

leadership. Street naming practices of the *Umm al Fahem* local council were important attempts towards spreading of counter-hegemonic discourse among the residents of *Umm al Fahem* in their daily spatial routines. These practices mainly aimed to produce (and reproduce) counter-hegemonic spatial consciousness in the town based on movement's conception of Islamic heritage.

[...] the 'geography' entailed in Umm el Fahem's street names asserts Islam, defined in both religious and historical terms, as an essential property of Filastin that transcends contemporary political conditions. Such an ideological argument may also be seen as potentially subversive, ignoring, as it does, the recent history of the region and hence providing a basis for the delegitimisation of the state of Israel¹⁰⁹⁹.

Soccer pitches were also important public platforms for counter-hegemonic symbolism from the names of the teams to the flags and chants of the players. As the street names, the names of the soccer teams in the Islamic soccer league served as counter-hegemonic identifiers of all-embracing Islamic heritage and identity against the dominant discourse of localism and co-existence. In this respect, symbols of counter-hegemonic consciousness were reflected in the names which referred to either victories of Islam such as Hitin (defeat of Crusaders by Salah al Din), or Islamic heroes or figures such as "Alburak" (the Prophet Mohammad's horse)¹¹⁰⁰. Counter-hegemonic symbolism was also reflected in the clothing culture of the *Umm al Fahem*'s inhabitants. Islamic style beards of men and headscarves of women became counter-hegemonic symbols against the dominant Israeli cultural system which was dominated mainly by Jewish symbolism.

Counter-hegemonic activism through utilization of symbols reached to its peak during al-Aqsa Intifada. Acts of Palestinian Arab inhabitants of *Umm al Fahem* against the Israeli state's symbols during *Al-Aqsa Intifada* were noteworthy examples of counter-hegemonic mobilization of some residents through activation of 'anti-symbolism'. In

¹⁰⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.207

¹¹⁰⁰ Tamir Sorek, "The Islamic Soccer League in Israel: Setting Moral Boundaries by Taming the Wind", *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, Vol.9, No.4, 2002, p.455

the course of demonstrations, some segments of *Umm al Fahem*'s Palestinian Arab community burned symbols of the Jewish State, such as a bank, a post office, and attacked public transportation vehicles, which carried Israeli plates.¹¹⁰¹

The *Islamic Movement* combined this anti-symbolism against the state symbols with counter-hegemonic symbolism during and after the *al-Aqsa Intifada*. As Sheikh Raed Salah mentioned in an interview in 2000, *Al-Aqsa* became a central symbol of such counter-hegemonic symbolism in the war of maneuver against Israeli dominance:

With this uprising we have tried to deliver a message to the Islamic world that Al-Aqsa is important to us. We're not simply showing solidarity with our brothers and sisters in the *West Bank*, but we're showing them that it also means a lot to us. Aqsa is more valuable than our blood. And we should sacrifice everything in our duty to protect Al-Aqsa.¹¹⁰²

A similar counter-hegemonic symbolism was observed in the posters and other visual materials in the public meetings, which were organized by the *Islamic Movement* in the town. On September 14, 2001 for example Raed Salah addressed the Palestinian Arab masses in *Umm al Fahem* Stadium, who gathered for the annual "*al-Aqsa* in Danger" rally in front of a poster of Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi¹¹⁰³.

From 2003 onwards, counter-hegemonic symbolism lost its impetus in *Umm al Fahem*. (examples) Symbols of counter-hegemonic activism (such as anti-Israel graffiti, Palestinian flags, slogans, posters) seemed to stand side by side with the symbols of dominant structures and processes (Israeli flags, symbols of state) especially in the public spaces¹¹⁰⁴. In 2007 a signpost which stood at the entrance of the town

¹¹⁰¹ Rosenthal, (2003), *op.cit.*, p.274

¹¹⁰² Faisal Bodi, "Israel's third-class citizens learn to stand proud", *New Statesman*, 11.12.2000, Vo1. 29, No.4516, p. 32

¹¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰⁴ Observations from field trips to *Umm al Fahem* in September 2004 and August 2006

symbolized the degree of change in the attitudes of local elite about association with the state. The signpost read: "*Umm al Fahem*: State Champion in Mathematics"¹¹⁰⁵.

5.2.2.10. Sports and Leisure

In *Umm al Fahem*, sports operated as both agent of hegemony and counter-hegemony for different segments of Palestinian Arab community residing in the town. Soccer and boxing were two important fields of sports, in which these processes took place in parallel to each other. In fact, in the case of *Umm al Fahem*, soccer served as both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic agent. Contrary to *Abu Ghosh*, soccer did not operate as a hegemonic/counter-hegemonic agent under the guidance of *hamulas*. It rather operated as an instrument of hegemonic structure or counter-hegemonic movements in their sequential "war of maneuver" and war of position".

Under the supervision of the *Islamic Movement*, soccer became an agent of counter-hegemonic organization of some segments of *Umm al Fahem*'s Muslim Palestinian Arab community. Acknowledging widespread popularity of football matches of Palestinian Arab youth, the Movement established its own soccer league in 1986 as a new battle in its "war of maneuver" with the Israeli dominant structures and processes. The league was immune from any interference from Israeli sports authorities and had no official contact with the Israeli Soccer League as well as Israeli Football Federation. Establishment of the league was an explicit counter-hegemonic challenge to the broader tendency of utilization of soccer as an agent of Israeli hegemony in facilitating dominant discourses of "integration" and "Israeliness" among the Palestinian Arab players and fans¹¹⁰⁶. In fact, it was possible to observe counter-hegemonic stance of the league in the names of the teams, rules about disciplinary misbehaviors, clothing of the players, chants of the fans, and accessories, which were carried by the fans during the games. The games also served the movement's religious leaders and activists as public

¹¹⁰⁵ Eli Ashkenazi, "*Umm al Fahem* flood damage hits NIS 11m, *Haaretz*, <http://www.Haaretz.com/hasen/spages/704150.html>

¹¹⁰⁶ Sorek, "The Islamic Soccer League in Israel..." (2002), *op.cit.* p.445

platforms in disseminating counter-hegemonic messages of the north wing of the *Islamic Movement*¹¹⁰⁷ especially after the league was divided into two in line with the split of the *Islamic Movement* in 1996.

Sheikh Kamal Khatib, deputy leader of the northern wing of the *Islamic Movement*, acknowledged instrumental role of soccer for the Movement as well as for the Muslim Palestinian Arab community in Israel in his article which was published in the sports supplement of north wing's mouthpiece newspaper *Saut al-Hak wal-Huria* :

We must say to our brothers, whatever their activity and position may be in relation to The *Da'wa*, that they must guard and defend those positions more than the goalkeeper guards his goal, that we will defend our The *Da'wa*, we will support it and give it our backs to rest on with more skill than that of a defender. We will act to present our ideas and to bring our The *Da'wa* to everybody with more enthusiasm and true will than those of an attacker running after the ball, trying to reach it so as to score a beautiful goal. Your efforts will be blessed, brothers, as you strengthen the fortress of you're the *Da'wa*, along with your brothers and sisters. A blessing upon you, brothers of the General Islamic League for Sports, blessings upon the Saut al-Hak wal-Huria, blessings upon you all...¹¹⁰⁸

Counter-hegemonic stance of *Islamic Movement* about necessity of establishment of an autonomous soccer league ironically resembled the counter-hegemonic standpoint of *Yosef Yekuteli*, a prominent member of Maccabi sports club while commenting on the role of the sports team as an apparatus counter-hegemonic propaganda in challenging the dominant structures and processes of British Mandatory system in 1926.

As many opportunities experts have noted the great propagandistic value of Hebrew sport for national movement... the propaganda will be different and the results will be different with the appearance of an Eretz-Israeli team, speaking live Hebrew, called by Hebrew names and sunburned by the sun of Eretz-Israel. Such a team, with a blue-white flag at its head, will have no foreign partners. It will be ours, and its victories and propaganda will be ours.¹¹⁰⁹

¹¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*456

¹¹⁰⁸ Sorek, "The Islamic Soccer League in Israel..." (2002), op.cit, p.445

¹¹⁰⁹ Haggai Harif, " Israeli Sport in the Transition from a Mandatory Community to a Sovereign State: Trends of Continuity and Change, *Israel Affairs*, Vol.13, No.3,2007, p.534

A similar approach was presented in one of the booklets published in 1940s by the Betar Sports Club whose fans were known to have severe problems with the soccer teams of the Palestinian Arab localities.

Sport plays a role in the national Hebrew revival. Maccabi and Hapoel looked upon sport as a goal in itself, just another cultural area in which the some of Israel could participate as Jews. The sports associations cultivate strong muscles and a 'culture of the body', and perhaps they succeed in this field... We want the youth from Israel to be fully aware that every sports exercise, all physical education activity, is training to become a fighting soldier... To the Betar athlete, all sporting activities are maneuvers driving him forward, because the nation fights for its liberation, while lacking state authority must treat all efforts, including physical efforts, as tools at the service of the war. Herein lies the main difference between cultivation of sports at the Betar and cultivation of sports in other sports associations. Exercises, jumping, boxing [...] should infuse the blood of the trainee with an instinctive reflex in the specific field, so opportunities that arise for the achievement of Zionist goals... It is this spirit that Betar aspires to conduct its work in the field of physical education... We are establishing a muscular Judaism.¹¹¹⁰

The words of a Jewish *Betar* fan from the suburbs of Haifa paradoxically and empathetically resembled the feelings of the supporters of *Umm al Fahem* soccer league and its teams in a different context. They are also significant in terms of displaying the similarity of discourses of the subordinate groups within Israel against the dominant groups regardless of their ethno-religious origins, notwithstanding their paradoxical and mutually incompatible positioning within the Israeli hegemonic system:

My connection to Betar developed mainly because, for me, Betar stands for the regular people, equality, and the sense that every man, just by being human being, can feel legitimate. The political identification of Betar with the *Likud* is based on the same idea – regular people. It's the effort to give real representation to those people who don't belong to the elite. We have always felt like we're the ones on the outside, us Betar fans¹¹¹¹

¹¹¹⁰ Shlomo Reznik, "Betar: Sports and Politics in a Segmented Society", *Israel Affairs*, Vol.13, No.3,2007, p. 622

¹¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.638

In *Umm al Fahem*, sports did not only operate as an agent of counter-hegemonic mobilization and activism but also operated as an agent of hegemony of Israeli dominant structures and processes towards some other segments of Palestinian Arab citizenry. *Umm al Fahem* also had several teams, which were registered to Israeli Football Federation and containing Jewish players in their squads¹¹¹². In fact, a significant change of discourse was also observed in the speeches of important figures of north wing of *Islamic Movement* with regard to instrumental role of soccer after 2003. As Sheikh Hashem Abdal Rahman, succeeding mayor of *Umm al Fahem* after Sheik Raed Salah, began to consider soccer games as an instrument of increasing interaction with Jewish public, significance of soccer for the *Islamic Movement* as an agent of counter-hegemony began to erode seriously. Hashem Abdal Rahman's contentious call for Israeli soccer team *Betar Jerusalem*, whose fans were famous with their anti-Arab sentiments and chants, to play friendly games the teams of *Umm al Fahem* was significant for indicating the magnitude of such transformation¹¹¹³.

Boxing was another important field of sport that particularly served consolidation of hegemonic ties between the Palestinian Arab citizenry and Israeli dominant structures and processes in the sphere of sports. Contribution of members of one extended family, which bestowed Israeli boxing many champions, to this process, was noteworthy. Mohammed, Amar, Riham, Fatma and Tawfiq Agbaria were the past and present Israeli boxing champions, some of whom represented Israel in many international boxing tournaments¹¹¹⁴. They are also members of one of the four largest *hamulas* (Agbariyeh) in *Umm al Fahem*. Three years ago the *Umm al Fahem* amateur boxing club hosted the Israeli boxing championship. It was an indicator of willingness of some segments of *Umm al Fahem*'s Palestinian Arab citizenry to be integrated in the Israeli dominant processes of sports. It was also partly related to the catalyzing role of some

¹¹¹² Interview with Dr. Yousef Jabreen, *Umm al Fahem*, 07.09.2006

¹¹¹³ Vered Levy-Barzilai, "Between rocks and a hard place", *Haaretz*, 08.01.2004

¹¹¹⁴ Yoav Stern, "All in the family in *Umm al Fahem*", *Haaretz*, <http://www.Haaretz.com/hasen/spages/682392.html>

hamulas such as Agbaria between its members and the structures and processes of Israeli dominance.

Tawfiq Agbaria's views about the role of sport in consolidating the coexistence and friendship was not different from the Palestinian Arab directors of the *Abu Ghosh* - Mevaseret's soccer club.

[While *Umm al Fahem* hosted the Israeli boxing championship in 2004] At first the Jews were afraid, but when they turned up they couldn't believe the reception they received. Our doors are open to all guests. The whole aim of sport is coexistence. Our fans supported Jews against Arab clubs. With us it isn't like in soccer - there is no cursing, and when the bouts are over the boxers embrace and kiss [...] I'm in favor of us all living in one state. The elderly Mizrahi Jews always told me about their lives in Arab countries. We're cousins, why shouldn't we live in peace? Which mother wants her son killed in war? ¹¹¹⁵

It is also possible to observe such integrative and hegemonic discourse in his elaboration of his son's efforts towards securing a place at the 2008 Beijing Olympics to represent Israeli Olympic Team of Boxing. His words reveal his integrity to Israel as he said "I hope [my son] represents Israel at the Olympics with honor. For my part I will do everything to make it happen [...] But I'm a believer. Allah Carim. He will bring 'us' results."¹¹¹⁶

Israeli official sports authorities also contributed consolidation of integrative approach of some segments of the Agbaria *hamula* to the Israeli dominant frameworks. The Olympic Committee of Israel granted around 40.000 NIS budget for Amar Agbaria's competitions and training overseas. In this respect, the Agbaria family was one of the good examples to the internalization of Israeli dominant structures and processes by some segments of *Umm al Fahem*'s residents in the field of sports. Nevertheless, Agbariyeh family's intentions about internalizing the dominant structures and processes did not necessarily reflect unified *hamula*'s unified stance towards these

¹¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹¹⁶ Ibid.

processes. Besides, many other members of the *hamula* were known with their strong affiliations with the *Islamic Movement* as well as their strict counter-hegemonic positioning and activism against the Israeli dominance at all levels. Therefore, *Islamic Movement* remained as the most organized social entity through which the individuals regulated their relations with the dominant structures and processes through utilization of sports as well as agents of hegemony/counter-hegemony.

5.2.2.11. Hamula

In terms of *hamula* structure, differing from Abu Gosh, *Umm al Fahem* was fractioned historically among several *hamulas*. Thus, balance of power among the *hamulas* and inter-*hamula* struggle for political domination has largely dominated the principles and practices of intra-village politics, until the process of urbanization, which significantly transformed and/or integrated *hamula* politics into a broader ideologically oriented political framework. In fact, this balance of power between the four dominant *hamulas* of *Umm al Fahem*, namely Agbariyyeh (Agabaria), Jabbarin (Jabareen), Mahajneh and Mahamid (Mahameed) was reflected in the composition of the first local council of *Umm al Fahem*, which was elected in 1960.

Basing on his analysis of the local elections in Palestinian Arab localities from 1978 to 1998, Ghanem argued that due to its cosmopolitan structure and a long historical and active experience of political life *Umm al Fahem* deviated from other localities in the Arab sector in terms of the nature of struggle for controlling the local councils¹¹¹⁷. As Ghanem put it, in other local council elections, until very recently the *hamula* and confession have been important factors in determining the nature of struggle for the control and governance of the Arab localities¹¹¹⁸. In fact, the process of localization of Arab politics -in line with the decline in power of Palestinian political formations at

¹¹¹⁷ Ghanem, (2002), op.cit. p.147

¹¹¹⁸ Ibid.

national level- has gained impetus lately and resulted in revitalization of “*hamula*, primordial or confessional” links in the local politics among the Arab minority.

Nevertheless, in *Umm al Fahem* (like Nazareth) the situation differed from this general picture. As the *hamula* links became relatively insignificant in the struggles between the ideological forces to control the locality, the balance of power between the primordial groups have been replaced by the struggles shaped by ideological and political activism which have functioned through the lines of broader political objectives within local constituencies. In this respect, *Umm al Fahem* has been among the exceptional cases in local politics where the political power bases and constituencies of the council heads and mayors rooted in their affiliation with national parties and social movements and thus transcended a *hamula* or confessional boundaries¹¹¹⁹.

For Majid al Haj, although the *Islamic Movement* was above the kinship structure, it had to consider the *hamula* relations in several issues from establishing political coalitions to allocating socio-economic resources¹¹²⁰. Sustaining “productively balanced inter-*hamula* competition” among the four big *hamulas* of *Umm al Fahem* within its organizational structure, the *Islamic Movement* seemed to confirm Haj’s approach about the nature of relationship between the *hamula* structure and the *Islamic Movement*. In 2003, for example, except Hashem Abdal Rahman, all four other candidates of the movement’s Shura Council for the headship of municipality were *hamula* members. (namely, Suleiman Agbariyeh, attorney Mustafa Mahameed, Sheikh Taher Jabarin and Zaki Agbariyeh)¹¹²¹. In this respect, embeddedness of some segments of *hamulas* in *Umm al Fahem* turned intra-*hamulas* subdivisions into instruments of counter-hegemonic consciousness.

¹¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.147

¹¹²⁰ Interview with Majid al Haj, Haifa University, Haifa, 03.09.2006

¹¹²¹ Joseph Algazy, “New image for *Umm al Fahem*”, *Haaretz*, 08.08.2003

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Traditional structures of kinship such as *hamula* have long been considered as conventional and inflexible forms of socio-economic, political and cultural organization. They were defined as a counter-force of modernization as well as modern structures and processes. For many scholars, *hamula* was an ‘ancient’ form of socio-economic organization of past rather than a progressive or modern form of present. In this respect, modernization and modern processes were supposed to undermine the role of *hamula* in political, economic and socio-cultural organization of its members. According to classical Marxist thought, being a part of feudal structuring, *hamula* was not progressive unit of economic and political organization. Neo-Marxist literature also ignored the possibility of adaptation of *hamula* to the modern processes as an agent of modern transformations. They did not consider the instrumentality of *hamulas* in socio-economic transformations of individuals within modern world. In this respect, there existed a theoretical necessity in elaborating the transformative capacity and roles of traditional forms of socio-economic and political organization of communities in accordance with modern structures and processes. This dissertation aimed to contribute slowly growing literature on the possibility of integrating *hamula* sub-system to the dominant structures and processes.

Scholarly literature on the relations between the Israeli dominant structures and the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel also neglected the role or positioning of the traditional *hamula* structures within the framework of hegemonic relationship. Like many studies in the Middle East, most of the studies about the *hamula* in Israel mainly focused on the *hamula pragmatism* while discussing its positioning within the modern structures and processes such as hegemony. In this respect, narrow understanding of pragmatism seemed to dominate most of the scholarly works, which considered *hamula*

as a conventional structure, which operated to maintain its survival in an antagonistic environment. However, a detailed analysis of modernization processes, which took place through involvement of *hamula* structures in *Umm al Fahem* and *Abu Ghosh* would disagree with these assumptions.

Looking at the political and economic trajectories in Abu Ghosh and Umm al Fahem, it does not seem easy to agree with Yiftachel in discarding Gurr's notion of "ethno-class"¹¹²² in defining the socio-economic relations between the Israeli ruling elite and the Palestinian Arab community. Basing on the comparative analysis of these two cases one could argue that it is possible to observe two contested trends in hegemonic positioning of these two Palestinian Arab localities within the Israeli system: ethno-religious (or ethno-ideological) localism versus primordial ethno-localism. These two trends have been defined and shaped in accordance with their positioning within a broader process, which is Israeli capitalist modernization. Here enters the significance of positioning of state and Palestinian Arab community in this relationship: state as an agent of ethno-national capitalist modernization process and Palestinian Arab community as collective organized acts of the individuals towards this process, which either negotiated or clashed capitalist modernization both in and out of the Israeli dominant system.

Detailed assessment of this relationship in the cases of Umm al Fahem and Abu Ghosh, revealed that the Israeli processes of capitalist modernization seemed to take place at the expense of Umm al Fahem's dispossession while they were catalyzed by traditional structures in the case of Abu Ghosh. In this respect, it did not take necessarily place at the expense of Abu Ghosh's dispossession. In fact, hamula structure in Abu Ghosh adopted itself to the modernization process and appeared as an agent of cognitive

¹¹²² Oren Yiftachel, "The Political Geography of Ethnic Protest: Nationalism, Deprivation and Regionalism among Arabs in Israel", *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, New Series, Vol. 22, No. 1. 1997, p.93

interaction between the Jewish agents of capitalist modernization and local population in the village. In the case of Umm al Fahem, the hamula did not necessarily transform into intermediating agents of cognitive communication between the state and local community. They rather became socio-economic agents that situated themselves within socio-economic restructuring processes in which the Palestinian Arab social movements aimed to mobilize the increasingly urban immigrant population of Umm al Fahem against the Israeli state-led capitalist modernization. In this respect notwithstanding their varying discursive stances towards the modernization (pro-modernization /anti-capitalist discourse in the case of communist movement and anti-modernization one in the case of Islamic movement), social movements appeared as systemic challenges against the 'Israeli capitalist modernization', which was led mainly through institutional mechanisms of Israeli state in cooperation with some segments of Palestinian Arab local elite.

Although these movements initially exerted challenges against the traditional primordial links embedded in the hamula structure, in time they repositioned themselves by considering the inter-hamula balance and intra-hamula dynamics in Umm al Fahem. In this respect, on the one hand hamula ties were transcended by the affiliation to the Palestinian Arab social movements (such as Islamic Movement) that challenged the Israeli hegemony. On the other hand, however, they needed to consider hamula structures in mobilizing the local population in their counter-hegemonic struggles. Therefore hamula became an agent which should be addressed in both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic mobilization of Palestinian Arab community.

Contextualizing hamula in Israeli capitalist modernization and assessing it as an evolving agent of socio-economic and political organization of Palestinian Arab community in Israel, this thesis discarded the limited methodologies that distinguished the "village" and the "modern" in their analysis of relationship between the Palestinian Arab citizens with the Israeli state. In terms of capitalist modernization debate on the compatibility of *hamula* structures to the modern processes one should briefly look at

modernization trajectories of the two localities. In both *Umm al Fahem* and Abu Gosh, the Israeli modernization took place at the expense of dispossession of both of these Palestinian Arab localities. In the case of Abu Gosh this modernization was catalyzed through the traditional structures of *hamula* in coordination with the 'modernizer'. In fact, the Abu Gosh *hamula* adopted itself to the modernization process and appeared as an agent of cognitive interaction between the Israeli dominant structures and processes and Palestinian Arab local modernization processes in Abu Gosh. In Abu Gosh, the *hamula* did not make any differences among the Jewish or Palestinian modernization as long as it was negotiated in relation to internal homogenous structure and value system of the village. In this respect, they did not discriminate between two types of ethnicity of modernization. It has taken part in the institutional mechanisms of Israeli state and appeared as the agents of cognitive communication in dealing with the issues regarding state-society relationship in Abu Gosh as well as at national level.

In the case of *Umm al Fahem*, the *hamulas* were not transformed into the intermediating agents of cognitive interaction between the Israeli political society and *Umm al Fahem*'s civil society. In fact, dichotomy between the political and civil societies became evident with the alienation of *Umm al Fahem*'s residents from both Israeli civil society and the dominant structures and processes of Israel in late 1980s. The *hamulas* in *Umm al Fahem* were transformed into relatively incapable social forces against the counter-hegemonic social movements that aimed to mobilize the increasingly urban immigrant population of *Umm al Fahem* against the ethno-modernization, which was embedded in Israeli state and its institutional mechanisms. In this respect, notwithstanding differences in their discursive stances towards the modernization (pro-modernization in the case of communist movement and anti-modernization in the case of *Islamic Movement*) resistive movements in *Umm al Fahem* appeared as counter-hegemonic challenges against the system. This counter-hegemonic challenge was directed both against the Israeli modernization, which was implemented mainly through the institutional mechanisms of Israeli state in cooperation with the local elite and against the traditional primordial links embedded in

the *hamula* structure which has been open to the influence of the state through its relations with the clan leaders. In this respect, the main target of the social movements was the Jewish/Israeli modernization, which was perceived to be embedded in the institutional mechanisms of state.

Therefore, while *Abna al Balad* and *MAQI* challenged this ethno-national capitalist modernization through promoting a Palestinian counter-modernization; *Islamic Movement* confronted Jewish/Israeli modernization project through alienating the Palestinian population from the agents of this modernization, namely the state and institutional frameworks. In this respect, both movements relied on the urban immigrants who did not have traditional ties with the *hamula* structures in *Umm al Fahem*. Thus their reaction was not only to the state as an agent of alien oppression and occupier of their land but rather as an agent of ethnically oriented modernization process, an alien value system, that would create obedient citizens of alien domination based on the false consciousness of the Palestinian Arab Muslim citizens. In this respect, the social movements emerged in *Umm al Fahem* as the agents of counter-hegemonic confrontation, which would mainly be based on a ‘war of maneuver’ over dissemination of clashing and mutually exclusive social and cultural values among the local population.

In this respect, acceptance of institutional structures of the traditional links or the Israeli state as the legitimate grounds for interaction (even for confrontational basis) of such a struggle would implicitly mean recognition of the value system on which they were established. Thus, rather than yielding to the previously established “productively balanced inter-*hamula* competition” in *Umm al Fahem*, the *Islamic Movement* opted for subordinating members of all four *hamulas* by offering them a counter-hegemonic path based on Islamic values and practices. Although it was initially perceived as a challenge for the integrity of *hamula* structures in *Umm al Fahem*, the Movement’s sensitivity towards inter-*hamula* balances in its recruitment practices of *hamula*

members helped the maintenance of inter-*hamula* balance of power and encouraged internalization of counter-hegemonic values without clashing their *hamula*.

Therefore, *hamula* appeared as a more flexible social group formation in adopting the value-systems of different projects of modernization as long as they did not challenge the internal autonomy and coherence of the *hamula* existentially. In this respect, the clans can transform into the agents of controlled modernization in the sense that their definition is not necessarily made against the ethno-national modernization processes. In fact, the religious or ideological social movements, which transcend the primordial ties and patterns of relationships, exert more threat on the clan structures than the gradual cognitive processes of the modernization. In fact, while these movements claim for replacement or suppression of the primordial relationships by the new collective relationships based on class or religion, modernization does not have an immediate claim on the transformation of the primordial patterns of relationship.

Another contribution of this thesis to the literature on the Middle Eastern Studies is its Gramscian stance in conceptualizing the state society relations in the region. As this thesis disclosed, Gramscian conceptualization offers an alternative and comprehensive assessment of the relationship between the Palestinian Arab citizens and the Israeli capitalist state. In Israeli case, definition and explanation of hegemony and hegemonic processes is problematic. In fact, Gramscian use of hegemony is not common in defining the relationship between the Israeli dominant structures and processes and the subordinate situation of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. Most of the students of minority studies in Israel defined hegemony as an exclusive process. (Amal Jamal, Nadim Rouhana and Nimer Sultany, Ilan Peleg, Elie Rekhess, Asad Ghanem,) They mainly prioritize coercive aspect of hegemony. However, as this study indicated Palestinian Arab community was not simply controlled by use of force. It was not suppressed by coercive use of the Israeli state. Patterns of domination in Israel are more complicated than the classical definition of hegemony.

Some scholars considered use of Gramscian conceptualization of hegemony for Palestinian Arab citizens as *void ab initio* due to explicitly exclusionary character of the Israeli dominant structures and processes. In this respect, they argued that such conceptualization might be used in explaining the intra-communal relations only in Jewish sector. However, as *Abu Ghosh* indicated hegemony was not simply an ethno-nationalist or religio-nationalist project, which targeted consensual approval of the members of certain ethnic or religious groups in Israeli case. On the contrary dominant themes of Israeli hegemony such as 'Israeliness' and 'peaceful inter-communal co-existence' successfully gained consent of the *Abu Ghosh* residents through mediation of *hamula*.

Although a relationship between traditional forms of social organization and a modern process might initially seem paradoxical, such misperception mainly derives from presumed dialectic between the traditional structures and modern processes. This dialectic defines the traditional kinship structures as monolithic and inflexible forms of social organization, which are destined to diminish with the dissemination of values and practices of modernization processes. This dialectic also undermines possibility of adjustment of these traditional formations to the modern processes.

Comparative analysis of *Abu Ghosh* and *Umm al Fahem* indicated possibility of such adjustment within the context of evolving relationship between traditional structures of *hamulas* and modern structures, processes and agents of hegemony. Empirical data on *Umm al Fahem* and *Abu Ghosh* revealed that traditional structures of kinship like *hamula* should be acknowledged in analysis of internalization of hegemonic/counter-hegemonic structures and processes by the members of subordinate groups. In fact, *hamula* can serve as an agent of hegemonic processes, notwithstanding the ethno-religious differences between the dominant and subordinate groups as in the case of *Abu Ghosh*. It also may influence the intra-organizational balance of power structuring within the counter-hegemonic movements as in the case of *Umm al Fahem*.

In this respect, interaction of the *hamula* with the modern processes such as hegemony-building or counter-hegemonic revival might serve internalization of these processes by the individuals. In *Abu Ghosh*, *hamula* adopted to modern process of hegemony as an agent. *Abu Ghosh* case indicated that *hamula* could function as an agent of hegemony mobilizing its members to dominant structures and processes. In *Umm al Fahem*, diffusion of *hamula* balance did not allow its transformation to an agent of hegemony. It rather became a part of counter-hegemonic structuring which was organized under modern movements such as *Abna al Balad* and the *Islamic Movement*.

In *Abu Ghosh*, *hamula* served as an important mediator between the members of *hamula* and hegemonic structures in consolidation of hegemonic processes by addressing different components of hegemony. It facilitated transformation of Israeli state as an integral state in its practices towards the inhabitants of *Abu Ghosh* by assisting dissemination and internalization of dominant ideology and ethico-political leadership (*direzione*) of the Israeli ruling elite among the members of *hamula* in cooperation with the hegemonic structures and agents. It also catalyzed the coercive policies of the state and played a key role in generation of consent among the villagers towards the passive revolutionary acts of the Israeli ruling elite especially in the course of Israeli Risorgimento as well as during the crises of hegemony-in-building process. It also balanced the tensions between the Israeli political society and village's public and thus decreased possibility of intensification of mutual alienation that might derive from dichotomies from the political and civil society distinction. In fact, in *Abu Ghosh*, amalgamation of Palestinian Arab civil society to Israeli political society was reconciled through the coordinative acts of *hamula*.

Hamula also functioned as a buffer zone between the coercive acts of the Israeli dominant structures and residents of the village by providing economic, political and cultural safe havens against coercion. It facilitated production and reproduction of consent among the *hamula* members to hegemonic processes by creating necessary platforms for negotiating the messages, themes, ideology and demands of the Israeli

dominant structures. In addition, *hamula* helped integration of its members to the Israeli national-popular by prioritizing the dominant values of being an Israeli and co-existing with other segments of Israeli society in line with those values. In a similar way, *hamula* also played a significant role in preventing emergence of counter-hegemonic consciousness among its members by disseminating messages of Israeli *historic bloc* about “peaceful inter-communal co-existence” and “Israeliness”. In this respect, it alleviated access of its members to the Israeli historic bloc.

In *Umm al Fahem* erosion of “productively balance of inter-*hamula* competition” as a consequence of Israeli coercive policies led absence of a catalyzing mechanism between the hegemonic structures and residents of *Umm al Fahem* in the course of consolidation of hegemonic processes at local level. As the existing *hamula* structure did not represent all residents of *Umm al Fahem* as a result of changed demographic structure following rapid impromptu urbanization and immigration, *hamulas*’ spheres of influence were strictly curtailed in terms of mediating or confronting the hegemonic processes. The counter-hegemonic movements exploited erosion of *hamula*’s efficacy of social mobilization to become main actors in socio-economic, political and cultural organization of the town. Counter-hegemonic movements such as *Abna al Balad* and the *Islamic Movement* flourished as a to challenge ideological superiority of Israeli dominant structures and processes. While *Abna al Balad* defined *hamulas* as an obstacle in front of its progressive counter-hegemonic upheaval due to their conventional and conservative stance and tribal pragmatism, the *Islamic Movement* recruited members of these *hamulas* by acknowledging delicate balances among the *hamulas*.

Consequently, while the *Islamic Movement* managed to mobilize the members of *hamulas* for its counter-hegemonic ‘war of maneuver’ against the dominant structures and processes of Israel, *Abna al Balad* lost its significant support due to its negligence towards possibility of transformation of the *hamulas* into progressive and revolutionary formations. In its war of maneuver, which continued until 2003, the *Islamic Movement*

explicitly rejected ethico-political leadership of the Israeli ruling elite. It clearly separated the civil society of *Umm al Fahem* from Israeli dominant political society and thus deepened the dichotomy between the state and residents of the town. It also created an alternative 'national-popular collective' based on the cultural and religious heritage of Islam.

These differences were also reflected in the relationship between the agents of hegemony and local structures of *Abu Ghosh* and *Umm al Fahem*. In *Abu Ghosh*, relation of *hamula* with the other agents of hegemony was cooperative and harmonious. Apart from low-intensity disputes with the land planning, *Abu Ghosh's hamula* cooperated efficiently with the other agents of hegemony (i.e. army, education, media, culture, economy, land planning, symbols, law, culture, and sports). *Hamula* facilitated smooth functioning of these agents in dissemination of hegemonic messages and persuasion of the residents on consenting to hegemony-in-rebuilding process in the post al-Aqsa Intifada.

In *Umm al Fahem*, agents of hegemony did not function efficiently in disseminating the dominant messages of the Israeli ruling elite among the residents of the town. All the agents of hegemony operated within the framework of a counter-hegemonic resistance, which was regulated under the supervision of the *Islamic Movement* against the Israeli dominant structures and processes. In this respect, in some areas of interaction these agents operated to consolidate counter-hegemonic sentiments rather than providing consent to the Israeli dominant structures and processes.

Al-Aqsa Intifada was a breakthrough in transformation of nature of relationship between the Israeli dominant structures and the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. It represented a crisis of 'hegemony-in-building' processes which was initiated by Israeli ruling elite during the Yitzhak Rabin period. Its severity convinced the Israeli ruling elite about necessity of initiating a new *Israeli Risorgimento*, which would require new systemic openings towards the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. Such a *Risorgimento* would also necessitate revitalization of 'agents of hegemony' in order to consolidate

the ‘components of hegemony’ among the Palestinian Arab citizens through seeking their consent to repositioning in line with recovery of their ‘Israeliness’ and ‘peaceful inter-communal co-existence’ under Israeli dominant structures and processes. Post-*Al-Aqsa Intifada* period signified beginning of hegemonic openings of the dominant structures and processes. Different segments of Palestinian Arab community responded differently in line with their intra-communal structuring as well as the nature of their relationship with the Israeli dominant structures and processes. In this respect, while *Abu Ghosh*, which had a developed and unified *hamula* structure took necessary steps towards integrating the processes of the Risorgimento, some segments of *Umm al Fahem*, which had a more fragmented *hamula* structuring rejected these openings under the supervision of the counter-hegemonic movement which simply operated beyond the boundaries of *hamula* pragmatism. Comparative analysis of the *Abu Ghosh* and *Umm al Fahem* provided insight about the ability of *hamula* structures in dealing with the agents, processes, structures and components of hegemonic/counter-hegemonic processes.

Hamula structures are widespread in the Middle East. There has been extensive scholarly work on the role and possible patterns of change of the *hamula* structures in line with or opposing to Western interpretation of modernization. In the example of Kuwait, *Thakeb* argued that extended family structures could not be free from certain patterns of change. However, nature of change should not necessarily follow the Western patterns¹¹²³. Locating clan to the modern Marxist analysis of class relations was also problematic in the sense that intra-*hamula* positioning of *hamula* members would not provide any hints about their location in the class structuring¹¹²⁴. In this respect, Talal Asad, for instance, undermined the adaptive capacity of *hamula* to the modern transformations in line with patterns of class formation or consciousness. In his analysis of *hamula* structures in the Palestinian territories, Ted Swedenburg also

¹¹²³ Fahed T. Al-Thakeb, “The Arab Family and Modernity: Evidence From Kuwait”, *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 26, No. 5. 1985 , p.579

¹¹²⁴ Talal Asad, “Class Transformation under Mandate”, MERIP Reports, No 53, 1976, p.3

defined *hamula* as an integral component of “traditionalist village order”, which was instrumental for Israel in suppressing the emergence of social forces alternative to Israeli nationalist and popular forces. He also perceived *hamula* as a part of disarticulated economy, which would be replaced by the vision of a modern, integrated economy, based on agriculture and industry¹¹²⁵. There were also studies, which put forward centrality of *hamula* in socio-economic and political organization of its members. Yossi Shavit and Jennifer L. Pierce considered *hamulas* as important axis for political organization and mobilization, which might exert control over nuclear families socio-economic welfare as well as over educational attainment of its members¹¹²⁶.

However, there have been very few studies about the instrumentality of *hamula* for integrating or bridging its members to the modern processes. In addition, most of the studies about the role of *hamula* in socio-economic and political organization of Palestinian Arab communities particularly emphasized the *hamula pragmatism*. *Hamula* was mainly analyzed through narrow framework of pragmatism by ignoring its possible catalyzing or mediating role the hegemonic processes in Gramscian terms. This approach derived from domination of the literature by the conventional understanding about the *hamula* and its role in social organization. The studies did not focus on the evolution of role and structure of *hamula* in line with the processes of modernization. This restricted view resulted in undermining of the interaction between the *hamula* structures and dominant processes, and it led to a reductionist assessment of interaction between members of *hamula* and dominant structure.

As comparative analysis of *Abu Ghosh* and *Umm al Fahem* indicated, *hamulas* are not fixed unchangeable structures, which solely operate through *hamula* pragmatism. In fact, short-term plans and practices of *hamula* pragmatism could not survive

¹¹²⁵ Ted Swedenburg, “The Palestinian Peasant as National Signifier”, *Anthropological Quarterly*, Vol. 63, No. 1, 1990, pp.22-4

¹¹²⁶ Yossi Shavit and Jennifer L. Pierce, “Sibship Size and Educational Attainment in Nuclear and Extended Families: Arabs and Jews in Israel” *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 56, No. 3, 1991, p. 323

complicacy of relationship between the dominant structures and processes of hegemony and their members. Besides, such reductionist approaches cannot assess the complicated relations of *hamula* with the agents, processes, components of hegemony. As Majd al Haj noted, today kinship structures which evolve compliant with political structure and processes at local level as well as national processes such as Islamization¹¹²⁷. In this respect, *hamula* is in a dynamic reconstruction process in line with the changes in hegemonic and counter-hegemonic processes. In other words, *hamula* is an evolving sub-structure of organizing, regulating, catalyzing or affecting the relationship between its members and the hegemonic/counter-hegemonic structures and processes. New research, which will be conducted on *hamula* and other similar traditional structures in the Middle East, should also assess their evolution in line with the modern dominant processes and structures.

Another route of research should center on the Gramscian conceptualization of the state and society in the Middle East. As this dissertation indicated the concepts of Gramsci provides serious openings in elucidating the nature of relationship between the dominant and subordinate groups in the Israeli case. Analogous studies can be conducted to assess the relations of domination in the other countries of the region. Notwithstanding the specificity of Israel as an example of Westernized (or Westernizing) type of modern capitalist state in the region, other entities of domination and subordination may well be assessed by utilizing the Gramscian methodology. As it was done in this thesis, each component of Gramscian notion of hegemony can be tested in order to understand applicability of this conceptualization to the other cases in the region.

As Gramscian methodology indicated in this thesis, different segments of the subordinate groups may interpret the crisis of hegemony in completely dissimilar ways in line with the capacity and success of dominant classes in manufacturing consent among these groups. Moments of hegemonic crisis such as al Aqsa intifada appeared as

¹¹²⁷ Interview with Majid al Haj, Haifa University, Haifa, 03.09.2006

test cases for the dominant classes in Israel to assess their capability in obtaining or maintaining consent of the Palestinian Arab citizens to the hegemonic structures and processes. Notwithstanding certain occurrences of counter-hegemonic upheaval as in the case of the North Wing of Islamic Movement in *Umm al Fahem*, political and economic trajectories of the Palestinian Arab citizens in the post-Al Aqsa period pointed to a general tendency among them towards a transition from a “war of maneuver” to a “war of position” against the Israeli dominant classes. In this respect, even the most counter-hegemonic Palestinian Arab movements went through a transformation, which led them to integrate into the hegemonic structures of the dominant classes in Israel. Meanwhile, hegemonic structures, processes and agents operated less problematically in some other segments of the Palestinian Arab community such as in Abu Ghosh. Subordinate classes in those segments of the Palestinian Arab community willingly submit their consent to the ethico-political and economic leadership of the Israeli dominant classes. As indicated in this thesis hegemonic processes and structures may operate differently in the relations of the dominant classes with the different segments of the subordinate classes in different contexts and periods. In fact, hegemonic processes are not static processes. Socio-economic entities and movements are not static either. As in the case of Abu Ghosh and Umm al Fahem they may adopt the vibrant hegemonic structure and substructure via operating with or against them. They may transform into either hegemonic or counter-hegemonic agents in line with the nature of their relationship with the dominant classes.

Middle East is a region where the relationships of domination take different forms in line with the political and economic trajectories of the dominant and subordinate classes in the countries. These trajectories should be analyzed in a refined way in order to understand and explain the sources and prospects of hegemony in the countries of the region. In this respect, further case studies based on Gramscian conceptualization about the structures and processes of domination in the Middle East would enable the sophisticated assessment of the nature of relationship between the dominant and subordinate groups in the region. They can also open new methodological windows in

enhancing comprehension of the structures, processes, agents and dynamics of hegemony and counter-hegemony in the region.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

TURKISH SUMMARY

İKİ KÖYÜN HİKAYESİ:
HAMULA VE İSRAİL DEVLETİYLE FİLİSTİNLİ ARAP İSRAİL
VATANDAŞLARI ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİLERİN GRAMŞİYAN ANALİZİ

Ariel Şaron'un Eylül 2000'de Mescid-i Aksa'yı ziyaretinden sonra patlak veren olaylar İsrail'deki Arap azınlıkla Yahudi çoğunluk arasındaki ilişkilerin kırılma noktasını bir kez daha gösterdi. Bu olaylar sırasında Filistinli Arap nüfusunun değişik katmanlarının İsrail devletinin politikaları karşısındaki konumlanışlarındaki farklılık İsrail devletiyle Filistinli Arap vatandaşları arasındaki ilişkinin doğasının çözülmesi noktasında önemli soruları da beraberinde getirdi.

Örneğin bu olaylar sırasında aynı etnik ve dini özelliklere sahip Abu Ghosh ve Umm al Fahem'in İsrail devletine tepkilerini birbirinden çok farklı şekillerde dile getirdi. Abu Ghosh köylüleri bu olaylar sırasında günlük hayatlarına devam ederken İsrail devletine karşı herhangi bir karşı duruş sergilemediler. Umm al Fahem köylüleri ise İsrail'deki en sert ve şiddet içeren tepkiyi verdiler. Söz konusu iki köy halkının el Aksa Intifadası sonrasında seçmiş olduğu davranış ve yaklaşım biçimlerindeki farklılığın sebeplerini anlayabilmek için öncelikle İsrail devleti ve baskın yapılarıyla Filistinli Arap vatandaşları arasındaki ilişkiyi tarihsel bir çerçeveye oturtmak faydalı olur. Bu tarihsel analiz aynı zamanda ilişkinin doğası gelişimiyle ilgili ipuçlarına ulaşmak açısından da önemlidir.

İsrail baskın yapılarıyla Filistinli Arap vatandaşları arasındaki ilişkiyi dört tarihsel dönemde incelemek mümkündür. Bu dönemleri takip eden ve 2000 yılının sonbaharında meydana gelen el Aksa İntifadası süreci ve sonrası ilişkinin dönüşümü ve kazandığı yeni boyutlar açısından tarihsel bir dönüm noktası olarak ortaya çıkmıştır.

Tarihsel sürecin ilk dönemi İsrail devletinin kurulmasından önceki yılları kapsar. Filistine yoğunluklu Yahudi göçlerinin ve sistematik yerleşiminin başladığı 19 yüzyılın sonundan 1948 yılında İsrail devletinin kurulmasına kadar olan bu dönemdeki Yahudi politik ve ekonomik seçkinleriyle Filistinli Arap nüfusu arasındaki ilişkinin niteliğine bakıldığında Filistin’de *Yişuv* adı verilen yerleşim yapısını oluşturmaya başlayan ve bölgedeki sosyo-ekonomik ve politik organizasyonunu geliştiren Yahudi liderliğinin bu bölgede yaşayan Filistinli Araplarla geliştirilecek ilişkinin içeriği hakkında görüş ayrılığında olduğu görülmektedir. Siyonizmin muhafazakar-sağ ve sosyalist yorumlarının ideolojik sınırlarını çizdiği bu ayrışma İsrail liderliğinin bu iki kesiminin politik-ekonomik pratiklerindeki farklılaşmada da kendisini gösterir.

Bu noktada sosyalist ideolojiyi temsil eden *Brit Şalom*, *Poalei Siyon Smol*, *Haşomer Hatzair* ve *Yahudi-Arap Yakınlaşması Ligi* gibi örgütlerde kendisini ifade eden Yahudi liderliğinin bir bölümü Filistinli Araplarla sınıfsal temele dayalı bir ortak geleceği öngörürken bu öngörü *Yişuv*’da baskın durumda bulunan muhafazakar-sağ Yahudi liderliği için kabul edilemez bulunmuştur. Sosyalist liderliğin tersine muhafazakar-sağ Yahudi seçkinler Yahudi ve Filistinli Arapların farklı ulusal çıkarlarını sınıfsal ortaklık tabanında eriten ya da bunları dengeleyen iki uluslu bir devlet yapılanması yerine Yahudi baskınlığını garanti eden bir toplum içi yapılanmayı tercih etmekteydiler. 1930’lu yılların sonuna doğru muhafazakar-sağ Yahudi seçkinlerin görüşü etkin hale geldi. Bu çerçevede Filistin’deki Yahudi liderliğinin iki ayrı kanadı arasında devam eden bu yaklaşım ve görüş ayrılığı 1948’de İsrail devleti’nin kurulmasıyla birlikte yerini Yahudi baskınlığını İsrail devletinin bünyesinde kurumsallaştıran Gramşiyen kavramsallaştırmada “diktatörlük” olarak adlandırılan rızadan ziyade güce ve zora dayalı bir kontrolü ön plana çıkaran bir siyasi-ekonomik yapılanmaya bıraktı.

1948 ile 1966 yılları arasında yeni kurulan İsrail devletinin sınırları içinde yaşayan Filistinli Araplarla İsrail'in baskın yapı ve süreçleri arasındaki ilişki bir kontroller sisteminin süzgecinden geçerek şekillendi. Politik anlamda bu dönem Filistinli Arap vatandaşların kendileri için kurulan askeri yönetim altında kontrol edildiği ve İsrail ulus oluşturma hareketine dahil edilmediği bir süreci ifade etti. Bu ulus inşa süreci dışında kalış Filistinli Arap liderliğinin isteksizliğinden ve oluşmakta olan İsrail politik ve ekonomik yapılarına eklemelenme konusundaki kararsızlığından olduğu kadar İsrail baskın politik seçkinlerinin ayrımcı ve dışlayıcı politikalarından kaynaklandı. Bu dönemde İsrail politik liderliği Filistinli Arapların rızasına dayalı bir hegemonya kurmaktansa onları kontrol ederek oluşmakta olan İsrail yapılarına olası bir karşı-hegemonyal direniş oluşturmalarını engellemeyi temel alan bir yaklaşım sergiledi. Bu bağlamda Filistinli Arap vatandaşların kontrolü askeri yönetim aracılığıyla ve güç kullanımına dayalı bir kontroller sistemi ile gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Ekonomik açıdan bakıldığında İsrail'in yeni ekonomik seçkin ve karar alıcılarının temel kaygısı Filistinli Arapların bu sisteme eklemelenmesinden ve onların yeni ekonomik sisteme yönelik rızalarını kazanmaktan ziyade merkezi ekonomide onların ucuz işgücünden faydalanarak Yahudi göçmenlerin sosyal güvenliğini ve ekonomik sistemle bütünleşmesini sağlayacak ekonomik bir yapılanmayı sağlamak oldu. Bu doğrultuda kurulmuş olan Histadrut (işçi sendikası) merkezi ekonomik kurum ve kuruluşların denetiminde Filistinli Arap işgücü Yahudi göçmen işgücünün çıkarlarına zarar vermeden kontrollü bir şekilde yeni oluşan İsrail ekonomik yapı ve süreçlerine dahil edildi.

Sosyo-kültürel yönden incelendiğinde İsrail baskın seçkinlerinin hedefi Filistinli Araplar arasında sistemli bir karşı-hegemonya bilinçlenmesini sağlayabilecek eğitim kurumlarını ve sosyo-kültürel altyapıyı kontrol altına alarak böylesi bir bilinçlenme sürecinin önüne geçmek oldu. Bu doğrultuda İsrail eğitim yapılarına bağımlı ve sıkı kontrol altında bir Filistinli Arap alt-eğitim yapılanması oluşturularak Filistinli Arap

nüfusun kendini geliştirme ve yönetmeye yönelik atacağı adımlar üzerinde ciddi bir kontrol sistemi oluşturuldu. Bu çerçevede askeri yönetim sosyo-kültürel ve eğitimsel araçları Filistinli Arap toplumunu Yahudi kültürünün baskın değerlerini kabul etme ve İsrail devletine sadık yurttaşlar olma yönünde eğitime amacıyla kullandı. Bu yolla Filistinli Araplık çerçevesinde bir karşı-hegemonyal bilinçlenme sürecinin engellenmesi amaçlandı.

Filistinli Arap toplumu bu kontrol politikalarına hem yeni oluşmakta olan İsrail sistemi içinde hem de sınırlı da olsa bu sistemin dışında örgütlemeye çalıştığı karşı-hegemonyal hareketlerle karşılık verdi. Filistinli Arapların sistem içi karşılıkları çoğunlukla İsrail siyasi sistemine ile bu sistemdeki Yahudi partilere eklemlenmiş ve genelde varoluşçu bir pragmatizmin etkisinde hareket eden siyasi listeler aracılığıyla gerçekleşti. Bu listelere seçilen Filistinli Arap temsilciler İsrail siyasi yapılanması içinde temsil ettikleri toplumun kaygılarını ve taleplerini mevcut yapının izin verdiği ölçüde ve kendilerinin Filistinli Arap cemaati içindeki konumlanışlarını da göz önünde bulundurarak dile getirdiler. Bununla birlikte varolan baskın yapı ve süreçlerin kendilerini temsil etmediğine inanan Filistinli Arapların bir kısmı *Al Ard* gibi karşı-hegemonyal hareketlerin içinde bulunarak İsrail sisteminin meşruluğunu reddettiler. Bu karşı-hegemonyal hareketler her ne kadar önemli ve sistemli bir karşı duruşu simgeleseler de İsrail baskın yapıları tarafından etkisiz hale getirilerek süreklilikleri engellendi. Karşı hegemonya hareketlerinin zayıflaması ve dönemin sonuna doğru İsrail yönetsel seçkinlerinin Filistinli Araplar üzerindeki kontrol mekanizmalarını gevşetmeleri Filistinli Arap toplumunun kontrollü bir şekilde varolan baskın yapı ve süreçlere eklemlenmesinin yolunu açtı.

Bu çerçevede 1966 sonrası dönemde Gramşiyen kavramsallaştırmada diktatörlük olarak nitelendirilebilecek İsrail baskın yapıları bir çözülme süreci içine girdi. Bu dönemde İsrail politik ve ekonomik liderliği ve seçkinleri Filistinli Arap seçkinleri ve düşünce liderlerini baskın yapıların içine çekmeye yönelik politikaları yürürlüğe koydular ve Gramşiyen kuramda pasif devrim olarak tanımlanan uygulamalarla mevcut

baskın yapı ve süreçlere karşı sistemli bir direnişin önüne geçmeye çalıştılar. Bu yöntem değişikliği İsrail yapıları ile Filistinli Arap nüfusun ilişkilerinin gerçekleştiği tüm alanlarda kendisini gösterdi.

Bu dönemde politik anlamda İsrail siyasi yönetsel seçkinlerinin amacı öncelikli olarak Filistinli Arap cemaati arasında oluşabilecek karşı-hegemonyal bir kurumsallaşmayı ve bilinçlenmeyi engellemek oldu. Bir önceki dönemden farklı olarak bu engellemeyi gerçekleştirirken şiddete ve zora dayalı kontrol mekanizmaları yerine Filistinli Arapların liderlik kadrolarını baskın sisteme eklemleyerek toplumsal anlamda bu cemaat içinden geliştirilebilecek direnişi başlamadan etkisizleştirmeye yönelik yöntemleri uygulamaya koydular. Gramşiyen kavramsallaştırmada “pasif devrim” olarak tanımlanan ve varolan baskın sistemin temel taşlarına zarar vermeden sisteme tehdit oluşturabilecek karşı-grupların sisteme eklemlesmesini sağlayacak yukarıdan aşağıya yapılan sistem içi değişiklikler anlamına gelen bu süreç bu dönemde etkin bir şekilde uygulamaya kondu. Filistinli Arapların İsrail politik yapısında önemli yere sahip politik partilere katılımlarının önünün açılması ve bu siyasi yapılanmaların bazıları tarafından Filistinli Arap cemaatinin sorunlarını çözmeye yönelik toplantıların düzenlenmesi politik alanda yapılan pasif devrim uygulamalarına verilebilecek örneklerdi.

Ancak pasif devrim uygulamalarındaki belirgin artışa rağmen İsrail yönetsel seçkinlerinin bir bölümünün zora dayalı uygulamalar ve kontrol sistemi konusundaki yaklaşımlar tamamaen bir kenara itilmedi. Nitekim 1976 yılındaki “Toprak Günü” törenleri sırasında İsrail kolluk kuvvetleri tarafından Filistinli Araplara uygulanan şiddet ve yine aynı yıl yayınlanan ve Filistinli Arap vatandaşların baskı ve zor yoluyla kontrolüne yönelik bir dizi önlem paketi içeren ‘Koenig Raporu’ İsrail yönetsel seçkinlerinin bir kısmının şiddet ve zora dayalı yaklaşımlarının değişmediğini göstermesi açısından önem taşımaktaydı.

1966-1992 dönemi ekonomik alanda da pasif devrimsel yöntem değişikliğine tanıklık etti. İsrail ekonomisinin 1967 sonrası yaşadığı gelişme ekonomik alanda pasif devrim uygulamalarının işlevselliğini artıracak bir rol oynadı. Özellikle inşaat sektöründe artan işgücü açığının yaratmış olduğu istihdam sistem içi açılımlarla birleştiğinde Filistinli Arap vatandaşları sistemle bütünleştirme noktasında pasif devrimsel uygulamalara önemli ölçüde katkı sağladı. Ayrıca bu dönemde sınırların açılmasıyla Batı Şeria ve Gazze Şeridi'nden İsrail topraklarına akın eden Filistinli vasıfsız işgücü İsrail vatandaşı olan vasıflı Filistinli Arapların istihdam piramidinde yükselerek sistemle barışıklığının artmasına katkıda bulundu. Bununla birlikte İsrail ekonomisinin yönetsel seçkinleri pasif devrimleri uygulamak için uygun olan bu ekonomik ortamı kullanarak bu eklemlenmenin artırması yönünde önemli adımlar attılar. Nitekim 1970'de Filistinli Arap nüfusunun yaşadığı bölgelerdeki tarım verimliliğini artırmaya yönelik hazırlanan 'Pan Önerisi' ve Filistinli Arapların yaşam standartlarını ve istihdam yapılanması içinde yukarı doğru hareketlenmesine yol açan ekonomik politikalar bu adımların en belirginleriydi.

Ancak bu pasif devrimsel açılımlara ve uygulamaya koydukları kısa dönemli taviz yaklaşımlarına rağmen İsrail ekonomik ve siyasi seçkinlerinin Filistinli Arap vatandaşlara yönelik baskı içeren ve belli noktalarda ayrımcılığa varan politikaları tam olarak ortadan kalkmadı. Nitekim, örneğin 1970 yılında yürürlüğe giren bir sosyal güvenlik programı programdan yararlanmanın önkoşulu olarak askerlik şartını getirerek Filistinli Arap yurttaşları söz konusu programın faydalarından mahrum bırakıyordu. Yine 1977 yılında İsrail başbakanı Menahem Begin tarafından geri kalmış ve ihmal edilmiş İsrail yerleşim birimlerinin yeniden inşasına ve yenilenmesine yönelik olarak geliştirilmiş eylem planı Filistinli Arap vatandaşları bu imkanlardan mahrum bırakmaktaydı. Yine de bu İsrail toplum içi etnik yapısıyla örtüşen sınıfsal konumlanıştaki çelişkiler ve ayrımcı politikalar Filistinli Arap vatandaşlar arasında sistemli bir karşı-hegemonyal bilinçlenme ve örgütlenişe neden olmadı. Nitekim Siyonizm dışı söylemiyle Filistinli Arap işçi sınıfının önemli ölçüde desteğini alan Yeni Komünist Listesi bile sistem dışı bir manevra savaşından ziyade sistem içi bir

konumlanışı ve sistem aygıtlarını kullanarak gerçekleştirilecek bir muhalefet anlayışını benimsedi. Yeni Komünist Hareketinin bu sistem içi konumlanışı bazı sistem dışı hareketler tarafından varolan ayrımcı sistemi yeniden üretmeye hizmet eden bir konumlanış olarak da yorumlandı.

Bu dönemde sosyo-kültürel alan da pasif devrimsel açılımları ve uygulamaları savunan İsrail seçkinleriyle baskı ve zora dayalı kontrol politikalarını savunanlar arasında ciddi bir çekişme yaşanmaktaydı. Bu bağlamda sosyo-kültürel alanda bir yandan barış kültürü, İsrail devletine sadakat, etnik farklılıklara bakılmaksızın tüm vatandaşların ortak çıkarları ve sistemle bütünleşme gibi konuları ön plana çıkaran ve bunları pasif devrimsel uygulamalarla destekleyen bir yaklaşım göze çarparken diğer yandan özellikle *Koenig Raporu*'nda temel ilkeleri belirlenmiş baskın pedagojik yapıyı zor yoluyla da olsa Filistinli Arap vatandaşlarına kabul ettirerek baskın sosyo-kültürel yapıyı benimsetmeyi amaçlayan bir duruş bulunmaktaydı. Bununla birlikte yine pasif devrimsel açılımların bir sonucu olarak bu dönemde Filistinli Arap sivil toplum örgütlerinin sayısında çok önemli bir artış gözlemlendi. Bu gelişmenin önemi 1990'ların ortasından itibaren başlayacak olan hegemonya kurma sürecinde daha belirgin bir şekilde ortaya çıkacaktı.

Bu dönemde Filistinli Arap vatandaşlar pasif devrimsel açılımlara ve devam edegelen baskı politikalarına karşı hem sistem içi hem de sistem dışı aygıt ve örgütlenmelere başvurdular. Sistem içi örgütlenmelerin en önemlisi Rakah hareketiydi. Komünist ideolojiyle Filistin Arap milliyetçiliğini harmanlayan bu hareket İsrail yönetsel seçkinlerine karşı verilecek bir mücadelenin sistem içi aygıt ve kurumları kullanarak yapılması gerektiğinden hareketle İsrail parlamentosu ve yasaları düzleminde bir siyasi mücadeleyi önermekteydi. Bu tür bir siyasi mücadelenin sistem içi olduğu sürece varolan yapıların meşruluğunu devam ettireceği ve bu yolla baskı sistemini yeniden üreteceği görüşünde olan Filistinli Arap vatandaşlar ise mücadelenin sisteme karşı sistemi reddederek ve sistem dışında olarak verilmesi gerektiğinden hareketle Abna al Balad ve İslami hareket gibi İsrail baskın yapılarını reddeden hareketlere katıldılar. Bu

iki mücadele paralel olarak el Aksa intifadası sonrasına kadar devam etti ve bu dönemden sonra yeni bir boyut kazandı.

1977 ile 1992 yılları arasındaki dönem İsrail'deki Yahudi *tarihsel blokunun* dönüşümüne işaret etmesi açısından önem taşımaktaydı. Bu dönüşüm aynı zamanda İsrail baskın yapılarıyla Filistinli Arap vatandaşlar arasındaki ilişkinin niteliğinin evrilmesi açısından da önem arz etmekteydi. Yahudi tarihsel blokunun kendi içindeki sorgulama süreçlerinin belirlediği bu dönemde İsrail yönetsel seçkinleri arasında da Filistinli Arap vatandaşlara uygulanacak politikalar konusunda ciddi görüş ayrılıkları vardı. Bu görüş ayrılıkları 1977-1984 tarihleri arasında *Likud* partisinin karar alma mekanizmalarına hakim olduğu dönemlerde baskı ve zora dayalı politikaların uygulanması, 1984-1987 döneminde pasif devrimsel açılımların artması, 1987 Intifadası döneminde şiddet politikalarının yarattığı kriz ve 1987 sonrası güvenin yeniden oluşturulması yönünde pasif devrimsel yaklaşıma yeniden dönüş şeklinde politika uygulamalarına yansdı .

Filistinli Arab vatandaşların İsrail yönetsel seçkinlerinin ve kurumlarının iç çekişmesi ve karışık politik uygulamaları karşısındaki duruşu özellikle 1970'lerde ivme kazanan iki paralel akım tarafından etkilendi. Bu akımlardan Filistinlilik bilincinin yeniden etkinleştirilerek toplumsal hareketlerin temel unsuru haline getirilmesini savunan ulusalcılık özellikle sistem içinde etkinlik gösteren Filistinli Arap hareketlerin baskın söylemi haline geldi. Bu çerçevede Rakah'ın giderek ulusalcılaştıran çizgisine ek olarak Filistinli ulusalcılar *Barış için Gelişimci Liste* ve *Demokratik Arap Partisi* 'ni kurdular. Ulusalcı söylem bu dönemde sistem dışı hareketlerin de temel çıkış ve propaganda noktalarından birini oluşturdu. Nitekim bu çerçevede Abna al Balad, sisteme yönelik mücadelesini ulusalcı söyleminin dozunu artırarak daha da sertleştirdi. Bununla birlikte birçok karşı-hegemonyal örgütü çatısı altında birleştiren *Ulusal Koordinasyon Komitesi* bu dönemde ciddi bir ulusalcı karşı-hegemonyal yapılanma olarak ortaya çıktı.

Bu dönemde dikkat çekici diğer bir karşı-hegemonyal örgütlenme de Filistinli Araplar arasında siyasi bilinçlenme noktasında gittikçe önem kazanan bir akım olan siyasi İslam çerçevesinde gerçekleşti. 1979'da yarı gizli sistem dışı bir örgütlenmeyle ortaya çıkan İslami Hareket, *Usrat al Cihat* adı altında İsrail baskın yapılarına karşı sistem dışı bir duruşu ve mücadele yolunu seçti. 1981'de önemli isimleri İsrail güvenlik kuvvetleri tarafından yakalanan hareket bu tarihten sonra sistemle yarı pragmatik bir ilişki biçimi geliştirdi. Bu çerçevede yerel yönetimlerde söz sahibi olabilmek için İsrail hukuksal düzenlemeleri içinde hareket edip yerel seçimlere girebilecek bir yapılanma içine girerken İsrail ulusal politik süreçlerinin ve sisteminin dışında konumlanmaya devam etti.

1992 yılı İsrail baskın yapıları ve Filistinli Arab vatandaşları arasındaki ilişkinin niteliğinde önemli bir dönüşüme tanıklık etti. 1990'ların başında dünyadaki liberal ekonomik yapıya daha sıkı eklemlenen İsrail'in "ilk burjuva devrimini" takip eden bu dönemde artan ekonomik ve politik liberalleşme ve uluslararası ortamda Oslo Barış Süreci ile filizlenen barış umutları İsrail politik ve ekonomik yönetsel seçkinlerini Filistinli Arap vatandaşlara yönelik politikalarını yeniden gözden geçirerek ciddi açılımlar yapmaya yönlendirdi. Bu döneme kadar temel kaygısı Filistinli Arap vatandaşlarla hegemonyal bir ilişki geliştirmekten ziyade onların sisteme karşı olası örgütlenmelerini engellemek olan İsrailli yönetsel seçkinler bu dönemde Filistinli Arap vatandaşların sistemsal hegemonyaya rızasını hedefleyen politik ekonomik ve sosyo-kültürel açılımları uygulamaya koymaya başladılar. 1996 ve 1999'da Netanyahu ve Barak hükümetlerinin baskı yollu politik çizgiye dönüşüyle geçici bir sekteye uğrayan hegemonya inşa süreci özellikle ilişkilerde yapısal bir krize yol açan el-Aksa Intifadası sonrasında önemli ölçüde ivme kazanarak devam etti.

Bu çerçevede 1992 ile 2000 yılları arasında özellikle Izak Rabin döneminde politik alanda hegemonyanın inşasına yönelik ciddi adımlar atıldı. Rabin hükümeti ve onun döneminde görev yapan yönetsel seçkinler İsrail devletini Filistinli Arap vatandaşları ile olan ilişkisinde Gramşiyen anlamda kapsayıcı hegemonyal bir devlete dönüştürme

yönünde önemli adımlar attılar. Bu dönemde ayrımcı ve baskı yollu politikalardan ciddi oranda uzaklaşarak Filistinli Arap vatandaşların sistemle barışması yolunda önemli politikalar uygulamaya konu.

Hegemonya inşa sürecine yönelik uygulamalar ekonomik platformlarda da kendisini gösterdi. Özellikle Rabin döneminde İsrail'in Yahudi ve Filistinli Arap vatandaşları arasındaki sosyo-ekonomik eşitsizliğin kaldırılabilmesi için yoğun çaba sarfedildi. Bu bağlamda öncelikle toplumun bu iki katmanı arasındaki eşitsizlikler kabul edilerek bunların nedenleri ve ortadan kaldırılmasını mümkün kılacak politikalar üzerinde yoğunlaşıldı. Bunu takiben özellikle belediye ve sağlık hizmetlerinde ciddi düzeltmeler gerçekleştirildi. Ayrıca iskan politikalarında Filistinli Arap vatandaşların kaygıları gözetilerek bu konuda istisnai düzenlemeler ve uygulamalar yapıldı. Yahudi ve Filistinli Arap vatandaşların gelir eşitsizliğinin önemli nedenlerinden biri olan askerlik yapma önkoşuluna bağlı çocuk yardımında düzenlemeye gidilerek askerlik yapma koşulu kaldırıldı ve Filistinli Arap vatandaşların İsrail sosyal güvenlik yapı ve süreçlerine erişimi sağlandı. 1995'te çıkarılan *Eşit Fırsatlar ve İstihdam Yasası* ile kamu kuruluşlarına ve özel sektöre işçi alımında yaş, ırk, din, fikirler ve siyasi bağlantıların bu süreci etkilememesi yönünde önemli bir yasal adım atıldı.

Bu dönemde hegemonya inşa süreci sosyo-kültürel alanda da etkili oldu. Rabin döneminde özellikle İsrail baskın kurumlarıyla Filistinli Arap vatandaşlar arasında karşılıklı güvene dayalı bir ilişkinin kurulması yolunda düzenlemeler yapıldı. Filistinli Arap sivil toplum örgütlerinin İsrail politik, ekonomik ve sosyo-kültürel yapıları içinde temsil ettikleri toplumsal katmanın sorun ve taleplerini sistemle çatışmaya girmeden ifade edebilecekleri ve çözüm bulabilecekleri bir güven ortamı yaratılması yönünde uğraş verildi. Bunun bir sonucu olarak sorunlarına çözümlere sistem içi aygıt ve yolların kullanarak ulaşan Filistinli Arap vatandaşlar kendi haklarını aramak noktasında ssistemle daha organik bir bağ kurmaya başladılar. Bu dönemde dil ve kültür alanında Filistinli Arap vatandaşları sisteme içselleşen uygulamalar da bu organik bağ pekiştirdi.

Filistinli Araplar bu açılımlara ilk önce kuşkuyla yaklaşmakla birlikte bunları baskın sistemle ilişkilerini yeniden gözden geçirmek noktasında yeniden değerlendirdiler. Nitekim Rabin dönemi uygulamaları Filistinli Araplar arasındaki karşı-hegemonyal hareketlerde ciddi bir azalmaya yol açtı.

2000 yılının sonbaharında başlayan El Aksa İntifadası İsrail baskın yapıları ve Filistinli Arap vatandaşların ilişkileri açısından bir dönüm noktasını teşkil etti. İnşa sürecinde olan hegemonyanın derin bir krizine işaret eden bu çatışma dönemi karşı-hegemonya hareketlerinin özellikle bazı Filistinli Arab yerleşimlerde etkin olduğu bir sürece tanıklık etti. Ancak el-Aksa intifadası sonrası dönemin ilk aşamalarında etkili olan bu karşı hegemonya hareketleri ilerleyen aşamalarda ciddi bir dönüşüme uğramış ve giderek İsrail baskın sisteminin hegemonyayı yeniden inşa sürecine eklemlenmeye başladı.

Hegemonyanın yeniden inşasında birçok aracı yapılanma ve oluşum rol oynadı. Gramşiyen kavramsallaştırmada “hegemonya aygıtları” olarak tanımlanan bu yapılanma ve oluşumlar Filistinli Arap vatandaşların İsrail baskın alt ve üst yapılarını içselleştirmesini ve mutad olarak bu yapıları yeniden üretmelerini kolaylaştırıcı bir işlevi yerine getirdiler. Bu bağlamda ordu, hukuk, ekonomik yapı ve kurumlar, eğitim, din, iskan planlamaları, dil, medya ve devletin sembolleri gibi aracı yapı ve oluşumlar hegemonyanın Filistinli Arap cemaatinin bazı katmanlarında etkin bir şekilde işleminde etkili oldular.

Hegemonyanın yeniden inşası sürecini özellikle bazı Filistinli Arap yerleşkelerinde kolaylaştıran ve Filistinli Arap vatandaşlarının İsrail baskın yapı ve değerlerini içselleştirmesini ve yeniden üretmesini sağlayan önemli aktörlerden biri de bu yerleşimlerde siyasi ve sosyo-ekonomik ve kültürel organizasyonunda etkisini sürdüren geleneksel aşiret (*hamula*) yapıları oldu. İsrail ve bölge üzerine verilmiş eserlerdeki tezlerin ve genel kanının aksine yerel aşiret yapılanmaları durağan ve statükocu

olmamışlar, modern hegemonyal süreçlerle birlikte devinerek ve evrilerek İsrail'in baskın alt ve üstyapılarıyla Filistinli Arap aşiret üyeleri arasında hegemonyal uygulama, yapı ve değerlerin damıtılıp içselleştirilmesinin kolaylaştırılmasında önemli bir rol oynadılar.

Hamula yapılarının hegemonyal işlevselliği tüm Filistinli Arap yerleşkeleri için geçerli değildir. Saha çalışmalarından da anlaşılacağı üzere Abu Ghosh örneğinde hamula yapılanmasının hegemonyal aygıtsallığını açıkça görmek mümkünken Umm al Fahem'de hamulalar baskın sistemle daha sorunlu bir ilişki içinde bulunmuşlar ve bazı dönemler karşı-hegemonyal hareketlerin iç-örgütlenmelerinde İsrail'in baskın sistemine karşı bir duruş sergilediler.

Abu Ghosh köyü sistem içi duruşuyla ve İsrail'in bu tezde Gramşiyen anlamda çözümlenmiş olan hegemonyasının köylüler arasında içselleştirilmesi açısından Umm al Fahem'dan ciddi bir farklılık gösterdi. Nitekim el Aksa Intifadası sırasında bu köyle İsrail güvenlik kuvvetleri ve İsrail'de yaşayan Yahudi toplumu arasında şiddet içeren bir etkileşim meydana gelmedi. Aksine köy halkı şiddetli çatışmaların yaşandığı dönemde günlük hayatına devam ederek İsrail karşıtı şiddet içeren eylemlere karışmadı. Tezde değişik boyutlarıyla incelendiği üzere bunun en önemli nedeni İsrail hegemonik yapılarının bu köy özelinde özellikle de köyün sosyo-ekonomik, politik ve kültürel örgütlenmesinde önemli etkisi bulunan hamula yapılanması sayesinde bu hamulaya bağlı köylüler tarafından büyük oranda içselleştirilmesi ve bu içselleştirilmiş hegemonik yapı ve süreçlerin rutin olarak köyde yaşayan bitreyler tarafından yeniden üretilmesi oldu.

Bu içselleştirme ve yeniden üretme sürecine etki eden ve çoğu zaman bu süreçleri kolaylaştıran değişik hegemenoya aygıtları söz konusu idi. Bu aygıtlar kuram bölümünde detaylı bir şekilde incelendiği üzere hegemonyanın kurulması ve sürdürülebilmesi noktasında Filistinli Arap vatandaşların mevcut İsrail baskın yapı ve süreçlerine karşı bir ortak bilinçlilik ve bunun olası sonucu olarak karşı-hegemonyal

hareketler yaratmasını engelleyici rol oynadılar. Bu çerçevede Abu Ghosh'taki hamula yapılanması ile bu aygıtlar arasındaki ilişkinin niteliği bu köyün yaşayanlarının hegemonyal yapıyı Umm al Fahem'den çok daha kolay bir şekilde kabul etmesini ve buna karşı sistemli bir tepki oluşturmamasına yol açtı.

Bu bağlamda Abu Ghosh özelinde örneğin İsrailcilik bilinci ve toplumiçi sosyalleşmesi açısından çok önemli bir kurum olan İsrail ordusuna katılım İsrailciliğin gösterilmesi yönünden önemli bir aşama olarak görüldü. Abu Ghosh köylülerinin bir bölümü İsrail güvenlik yapılanmaları bünyesinde oluşturulan özel birliklere katılarak İsrailciliklerini belirgin bir şekilde ifade etme yolunu seçtiler. Hamula liderliği bu yaklaşımları destekleyerek ve ordu ile ortak programlar düzenleyerek bu sürece önemli katkıda bulundu. Bu anlamda bu tezde Gramşciyan anlamda anlaşılan ve analiz edilen hegemonyanın içselleştirilmesi ve yeniden üretilmesi bakımından hamula aygıtsal ve işlevsel bir rolü yerine getirdi. Aynı aygıtsallık ve işlevsellik hamulayla hegemonyanın diğer aygıtları arasındaki ilişkide de gözlenebildi. Abu Ghosh'taki hamula yapılanması hegemonyal sürecin ve yapılanmanın önemli aygıtları olan eğitim kurumları, medya, din, hukuk sistemi, semboller, kültürel yapılanmalar, ve istihdam süreçleriyle uyumlu bir şekilde çalışarak hem hegemonyanın köydeki bireyler bazında içselleştirilmesini ve rutin olarak yeniden üretilmesini kolaylaştırdı hem de bu Filistinli Arap yerleşkesinde İsrail baskın sistem ve süreçlerine yönelik olası bir karşı hegemonyal hareketin düşünsel ve faaliyetel altyapısının oluşumunu engelledi.

Eğitim konusunda Abu Ghosh hamula yapılanması İsrail eğitim sisteminin temel prensiplerini önemli takip ederken aynı zamanda Yahudi toplumunun eğitsel kurum, kuruluş ve birimleriyle gerçekleştirilen ortak kültür ve eğitim etkinlikleriyle İsrailcilik baskın yaklaşımı ve bilincinin köy halkı tarafından içselleştirilerek yeniden üretilmesine önemli bir katkıda bulundu. Eğitimle birlikte kültürel ve dilsel etkinlikler de hegemonyanın Abu Ghosh halkının düşün dünyasında yeniden üretilmesine ve içselleştirilmesine katkıda bulundu.

Din Abu Ghosh'da hegemonyal sürecin önemli bir aygıtı olarak işlev kazandı. Dinlerin uzlaşısı ve inançsal diyalog kültürü üzerinden geliştirilen hegemonik söylem Abu Ghosh'da din üzerinden gelişebilecek olası bir karşı-hegemonyal bilinçlenmeyi engelleyerek böylesi bir farklılığın Filistin Arap halkının değişik katmanlarında faaliyet gösteren karşı-hegemonyal toplumsal hareketlere hizmet edecek bir boyuta gelmesine izin vermedi.

İsrail medyası genel olarak yaptığı yayınlarda Abu Ghosh'u diğer Filistinli Arap yerleşkelerine örnek teşkil edebilecek önemli bir entegrasyon ve sistem içilik modeli olarak sundu. Bu bağlamda özellikle 1987 ve 2000 yıllarında meydana gelen ve Gramşiyen anlamda hegemonya ya da hegemonya inşa krizleri olarak da algılanabilecek intifadalar sırasında Abu Ghosh örnek alınması gereken Filistinli Arapların yaşadığı bir İsrail köyü olarak yansıtıldı.

Spor alanında Abu Ghosh ileri gelenleri ve hamula liderleri mevcut baskın İsrail spor yapılanmasının içinde yer almanın ötesinde komşu Yahudi yerleşimi Mevaseret ile yaptıkları iki toplumlu etkinliklerle ve kurmuş oldukları iki toplumlu spor takımları ile İsraillik baskın bilincinin günlük yeniden üretiminde önemli bir örnek teşkil ettiler. Nitekim İsrail futbol liginde mücadele veren Abu Ghosh – Mevaseret takımı İsraillik ve iki toplumluluk yaklaşımlarını spor alanında yansıtan ve bu iki yaklaşım çevresinde geliştirilen baskın bilinci Filistinli Arap vatandaşlara bir entegrasyon modeli olarak sunma noktasında önemli bir katkı sağladı.

İsrail ulusal sembolleri Abu Ghosh'da önemli bir hegemonyal aygıt olarak İsrail baskın sisteminin köydeki Filistinli Arap toplumun düşün ve duygu dünyasında rutin olarak içselleştirilmesi yönünde çalıştı. İsraillik sembolizmi hamulanın da katkılarıyla hamula üyeleri arasında günlük yaşam pratiklerinin bir parçası haline geldi. Hamula liderlerinin İsrail devletindeki Yahudi kültürünü temsil eden ve yahudilik kültürünün simgelerini barındıran tören ve etkinliklere katılımları İsrail sistemindeki baskın sembollerin hegemonyal işlevselliğinin kabulünü kolaylaştırıcı bir etkide bulundu.

Umm al Fahem ise gerek hamula yapılanması içindeki dengeler içinde bulunmuş olduğu gerekse tarihsel döngüler açısından İsrail baskın yapı ve süreçlerine karşı Abu Ghosh'dan daha farklı bir konumlanış içinde bulundu. Tarihsel olarak Umm al Fahem İsrail sistemi içinde karşı-hegemonyal hareketler açısından önem taşıyan bir Filistinli Arap yerleşimi oldu. Bu duruşu etkileyen önemli faktörler arasında özellikle 1948 savaşı sonrası aşılınan iç göçle köyün nüfus yapısına İsrail'e tepki duyan bir Filistinli Arap topluluğun eklenmesi, ekonomik olarak İsrail ekonomik yapılanmasının dışında kalınması ve İsrail devletinin uygulamış olduğu bazı politikalar yer aldı. Ancak hegemonyal değer, yapı ve süreçlerin içselleştirilme sürecine etki eden en önemli unsur yine bu köydeki hamula yapılarının gerek çözülmesi gerekse İsrail devleti ve baskın yapılarına karşı konumlanışlarının Abu Ghosh'takinden farklı bir şekilde biçimlenmesi oldu. Nitekim bu köyde yaşayan hamula üyeleri yerel hamula denge ve dengesizliklerini İsrail baskın sistemi içinde konumlanışlarına da yansıtılar. Bu çerçevede örneğin hamula-ilişkilerini aştığı iddia edilen karşı hegemonyal komünist ve İslami hareketlerin içinde bile bu hamula içi ve hamulalar arası dengeleri görmek mümkün oldu. Umm al Fahem'deki hamula yapılanması ilk aşamada hegemonyal sürecin ve yapılanmanın önemli aygıtları olan eğitim kurumları, medya, din, hukuk sistemi, semboller, kültürel yapılanmalar, ve istihdam süreçlerine yönelik bir sistem dışı karlı hegemonyal duruşu bir ölçüde temsil eden ya da temsil ettiğini savunan komünist ve İslami hareketlere eklenmişken bu hareketlerin zaman içinde çözülmelere uğramasıyla birlikte kendisini inşa sürecinde olan İsrail hegemonyal yapısına uyarlama sürecine girdi.

Ancak bu tezde detaylıca gerçekleştirilen ampirik veri ve bulgularla beslenen alan analizinden de anlaşılacağı gibi hegemonya aygıtlarının Umm al Fahem'deki işleyişleri Abu Ghosh'tan daha farklı oldu. Örneğin Abu Ghosh'un aksine İsrail hegemonyal yapı ve süreçlerinin önemli bir aygıtı olan İsrail ordusu Umm al Fahem halkı tarafından kendilerini İsrailcilik ortak bilincine bağlamanın bir aracı olarak kabul edilmedi. Bu çerçevede ordu bir öteki olarak algılandı ve karşı hegemonyal hareketin

önemli hedeflerinden biri haline geldi. Bu yaklaşım her ne kadar 2000’li yılların başında bir dönüşüm içine girse de Abu Ghosh kadar içselleyici bir nitelik kazanmadı.

Eğitim konusunda Umm al Fahem’deki karşı hegemonyal yapılanmalar İsrail eğitim sisteminin temel prensiplerini reddederken aynı zamanda Yahudi toplumunun eğitsel kurum, kuruluş ve birimleriyle ciddi ve düzenli bir işbirliğine gitmekten de kaçındılar. Özellikle İslami Hareket’in kuzey kanadı İslami ve Filistin ulusal değerleri çerçevesinde alternatif bir eğitim sistemini geliştirmeye çalıştı. Bu doğrultuda açılan okulların ve camilerin bu karşı hegemonyal düşünce biçimi doğrultusunda eğitsel bir rol oynamasını hedeflediler. Ancak 2003 yılı sonrasında karşı hegemonyal hareketlerdeki çözülme beraberinde Umm al Fahem için yeni bir eğitsel hareketliliği de beraberinde getirdi. Bu bağlamda İsrail’in baskın eğitsel yapılarıyla girilen işbirliği sonucunda köyde yeni bir eğitim bakışı gelişmeye başladı. Nitekim bu hamula ileri gelenlerinin de cesaretlendirdiği ve katkı koyduğu bu çalışmalar köy gençlerinin İsrail eğitim sistemi içindeki başarısını artırırken aynı zamanda onları bu eğitsel yapıyla daha da bütünleştirmeye başladı. Bunun sonucu olarak karşı hegemonyal hareketlerin amaçladığı eğitsel direnişte önemli çözümler söz konusu oldu.

Umm al Fahem’de din Abu Ghosh’un tersine karşı-hegemonyal sürecin önemli bir aygıtı olarak işlev kazandı. Bu sürecin en önemli aktörlerinden biri olan *İslami Hareket* dini İsrail hegemonyal yapısına alternatif bir karşı-bilinçlilik geliştirmenin en önemli yolu olarak gördü. Din üzerinden geliştirilen karşı-hegemonyal duruş el Aksa Intifadası sonrasındaki çözülme sürecine kadar etkili oldu. Bu dönemden sonra Umm al Fahem içindeki karşı-hegemonyal unsurlar da dinlerin diyalogu söylemine sıcak bakmaya ve değişik açılımlarla hegemonik yapıya eklemlenmenin yolunu açmaya başladılar.

İsrail medyası 2003 yılına kadar yayınlarında Umm al Fahem’i diğer Filistinli Arap yerleşkelerine örnek teşkil etmemesi gereken bir direniş merkezi olarak sundu. Daha çok yerleşkede İsrail karşıtı şiddet ve direniş eylemlerine dikkat çeken İsrail basın

yayın organları Umm al Fahem içindeki İsrail sistemi karşıtı örgütlenmeleri ve eylemleri ön plana taşıdı. Ancak 2003 yılından itibaren Umm al Fahem’de meydana gelen değişimler İsrail medyasının da bu köye yönelik yayınlarında bir değişikliğe gitmesini beraberinde getirdi. Nitekim 2004 yılından itibaren yapılan yayınlar dahaa çok –bu köyün baskın İsrail yapı ve süreçlerine eklenmesi için neler yapılabileceği ve iki toplumlu etkinliklerin bu amaca hizmet etmek noktasında nasıl geliştirilebileceği konularına odaklandı.

Spor alanında Umm al Fahem’in bir kısmı İsrail baskın spor yapılanmasının dışında alternatif bir yapılanma oluşturma yolunu seçerken bir başka bölüm ise İsrail spor sistemi içinde kendilerini ifade etme çabasında bulundular. İsrail baskın yapılarına karşı bir alternatif yapı içinegiren ve İslami hareketin kuzey kanadının önderliğinde karşı hegemonyal bir spor yapılanması oluşturmaya çalışan gruplar kurmuş oldukları futbol ligleri ve baskın sistem dışında gerçekleştirdikleri spor etkinlikleriyle sistem dışı bir konumlanmış sergilediler. Ancak bu yaklaşım yine 2003 ve 2004 yıllarında başlayan çözülme ile birlikte yerini iki toplumlu spor etkinliklerini de destekleyen bir yaklaşım tarzına bırakmaya başladı.

İsrail ulusal sembolleri özellikle intifada gibi kriz dönemlerinde Umm al Fahem’deki karşı-hegemonyal hareketlerin hedef noktasında oldu. Bu sembollerin kendi kültür ve kimliklerini temsil etmediğini savunan bu hareketler kriz dönemlerinde bu sembolere karşı şiddeti de içeren değişik direniş ve dışlama yöntemlerine başvurdular. Spor sahalarında ve kültürel etkinliklerde din ve Filistinli Arap ulusalcılığına dayalı alternatif bir karşı-hegemonyal sembolizmi üretmeye ve pekiştirmeye çaba gösterdiler. Ancak diğer aygıtların işleyişinde olduğu gibi ulusal sembolere karşı geliştirilen tepkiler de el Aqsa intifadasını takip eden üç yıl sonrasında yeni bir boyut kazandı. İsrail ulusal sembollerine karşı geliştirilmiş olan tepkisellikte görülen azalma karşı-hegemonyal hareketlerdeki söylemsel ve yapısal çözülmeye de işaret etmekteydi.

Yukarıdaki örneklerde değinilen ve bu tezde detaylıca incelenen hegemonya aygıtlarının köyler özelinde nasıl işlediği incelendiğinde hamula yapılanmasının yalnızca geleneksel değişime kapalı bir toplumsal ve ekonomik örgütlenme biçimi olmadığını gözlemlemek mümkündür. Nitekim bu köylerin karşılıklı incelemesinde görüldüğü üzere hegemonyal sürecin değişik aşamalarında hamula yapılanmaları da evrilmiş ve gerek hegemonyanın hamula üyeleri tarafından içselleştirilerek yeniden üretilmesi noktasında gerekse hamula dengelerinin karşı hegemonyal yapılanmalar içinde korunması noktalarında bu süreçlerin önemli bir etkileyeni olmuşlardır. Buradan hareketle bu tez geleneksel toplum örgütlenmelerini bu süreçler içinde analiz edecek derinlikli çalışmaların gereğine işaret etmektedir.

Nitekim Ortadoğu Çalışmaları bünyesinde eserler üretenler genelde hamula ile modern süreçler arasındaki ilişkinin problemlili ve birbirini dışlayan bir nitelikte olduğunu belirtmişlerdir. Ancak bu tezdeki ampirik ve kuramsal bulgu ve tartışmalardan anlaşılabileceği üzere hamula gibi geleneksel toplum örgütlenme biçimleri hegemonya gibi modern süreçleri uyarlayarak bu süreçlerin içselleştirilmesi ve günlük yaşamda yeniden üretilmesi noktasında bu yapılanmaların üyeleriyle modern süreçler arasında damıtım ve katalizörlük rollerini üstlenebilir ve söz konusu üyelerin geleneksel yaşam biçimlerini modern süreçlere uyarlama çabaları sırasında yaşamış oldukları çelişki ve problemleri aşmasında bu bireylere yeni açılımlar getirirerek dönüşümlerine etki edebilirler. Abu Ghosh ve Umm al Fahem örneklerinin analizi bu anlamda bir taraftan Filistinli Arap vatandaşları ile baskın İsrail yapı ve süreçleri arasındaki ilişkinin doğasının değişik boyutlarının çözümlenmesi açısından önemli ampirik ipuçları sunarken aynı zamanda hamula türü geleneksel toplum örgütlenme biçimlerinin modern süreçlerden biri olan hegemonya süreci ve bu sürecin başat aktörlerinden biri olan devlet ve yönetici seçkinler ile ilişkilerinin anlaşılması açısından yeni kuramsal açılımlara için de bir hareket noktası oluşturabilir.

Bu tez genel olarak hamulanın ve aşiret yapılanmalarının durağan, değişime kapalı ve modern süreçlere kendisini uyarlama yeteneği olmayan sosyo-ekonomik ve siyasi

toplumsal organizasyon birimleri olduđu tezine karşı çıkmaktadır. Genel yaklaşımın ve konu üzerinde yazılmış çođu eserin ifade ettiğinin aksine *hamula* ya da aşiret yapılanmaları üyelerinin hamula-üstü yapılarla gerçekleştirecek karmaşık ve çok boyutlu ilişkilerini süzen ve düzenleyen modern yapılara dönüşebilirler. Abu Ghosh örneğinde olduđu gibi hegemonyanın içselleştirilmesinde bir aracı ya da katalizör rolü oynayabilirler.

Bununla birlikte hamula üyelerinin bu yapılar üzerinden ve bu yapılarla kurmuş oldukları aidiyet ilişkileri bu yapıların dışında da modern süreçler içinde yeniden üretilebilir. Bu anlamda *hamula* ilişkileri ve aidiyetleri hatta iç dengeleri Umm al Fahem'daki komunist ve İslami hareketler örneğinde olduđu gibi kendilerini modern yapılanmalar içinde yeniden üretebilirler. Bu çerçeveden bakıldığında bu tez hamulanın geleneksel tanımına bir karşı çıkışı getirirken bu yenii tanım çerçevesinde bu önemli sosyo-ekonomik ve siyasi organizasyon biriminin hegemonyal ilişkiler sistemindeki konumlanışlarını da örneklemlendirmiş ve Gramşiyen kuramın bu ilişkilerin çözömlenmesinde nasıl kullanılabileceğini göstermiştir.

Bu tezde geliştirilen ve ampirik bir örnekten yola çıkılarak geçerliliği tartışılan Gramşiyen kuram Ortadođu çalışmalarıda gerek devletin çözömlenmesi gerekse hegemonya ilişkilerinin incelenmesinde metodolojik açılımlar sunmaktadır. Bölgede yapılacak çalışmalarda bu yaklaşımların göz önünde bulundurulması baskınlık ilişkilerinin çözömlenmesinde araştırmacılara metodoloji açısından ciddi katkılar sağlayabilecektir.

APPENDIX A

CURRICULUM VITAE

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2006- Present	Cyprus International University Department of International Relations	Instructor
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