

MIGRATION TRENDS AND POLICIES IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA

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ABSTRACT

MIGRATION TRENDS AND POLICIES IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA

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This thesis seeks to examine the internal and external migration trends in the Russian Federation. The thesis also examines the internal migration trends in the Soviet Union as well as Soviet emigration and migration policies. The thesis focuses mainly on the migration policy of the Russian Federation. The main argument of the thesis is that although ethnic dynamics, armed conflicts and nationalist clashes play important roles in Russia's migration trends, the main force of Russia's internal and external migration trends are economic.

The thesis has four main chapters. After the introduction the first chapter examines migration in the Soviet Union. The second chapter explores migration policy of Russia. The third chapter deals with internal migration in the Russian Federation. The last main chapter discusses external migration in the Russian Federation.

Keywords: Russian Federation, Migration, Internal Migration, External Migration, Illegal Migration

ÖZ

SOVYET SONRASI RUSYA'DA GÖÇ EĞİLİMLERİ VE GÖÇ POLİTİKALARI

Ünsal, Duygu

Yüksek Lisans, Avrasya Çalışmaları

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Bu tez, Rusya Federasyonu'ndaki iç göç ve dış göç eğilimlerini incelemektedir. Bu bakımdan Sovyetler Birliği dönemi; Sovyetler Birliği'ndeki iç göç, Sovyetler'den dışa göç ve Sovyet göç politikaları çerçevesinde ele alınmaktadır. Tez aynı zamanda Rusya Federasyonu'nun göç politikalarını da incelemektedir. Tezin temel argümanı olarak, etnik dinamikler, silahlı çatışmalar ve milliyetçi uyuşmazlıklar, Sovyet sonrası Rusya'nın iç göç ve dış göç eğilimlerinde etkili faktörler olmalarına rağmen, Rusya Federasyonu'ndaki iç ve dış göçün temel nedeninin ekonomik faktörler olduğu öne sürülmektedir.

Tez dört ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. Giriş kısmından sonra ilk bölüm Sovyetler Birliği'nde göç konusunu inceler. İkinci bölüm Rusya'nın göç politikalarını ele alır. Üçüncü bölüm Rusya Federasyonu'nda iç göç konusunu incelemektedir. Son ana bölüm ise Rusya Federasyonu'nda dış göçü tartışır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Rusya Federasyonu, Göç, İç Göç, Dış Göç, Yasadışı Göç

To My Grandfathers

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATIONS

CARITAS	International Confederation of Catholic Organizations of Church Charity and Social Help
CCARFM	Coordinating Council for Aid to Refugees and Forced Migrants
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
EU	European Union
FMS	Federal Migration Service
FSU	Former Soviet Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDR	German Democratic Republic
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
KGB	Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
TMS	Territorial Migration Services
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Primary aim of this thesis is to analyze migration patterns of the Russian Federation. In this regard the thesis presents a general framework of internal and external migration trends of Russia and the laws and institutions of Russia regarding the migration policy. The thesis explores the communist heritage and its impacts. It concerns with the Soviet migration policy and its efficiency in the context of Soviet internal migration and Soviet emigration. In addition, the migration policy of the Russian Federation is examined. The motivations of internal and external migrations trends and the patterns of internal and external migration in Russia are analyzed. In this manner, the aim of the thesis is to discuss the migration trends and policies.

The broad definition of migration is permanent or semipermanent change of residence. There are no restrictions concerning the distance of the move or the voluntary or involuntary nature of the act and there is no distinction made between external migration and internal migration in this definition. Everett S. Lee argues that “No matter how short or how long, how easy or how difficult, every act of migration involves an origin, a destination, and an intervening set of obstacles, we include the distance of the move as one that is always present.”¹

Russia is a significant country with its huge population and varied culture. The Russian culture has developed and altered over hundreds of years.

¹ Everett S. Lee, “A Theory of Migration”, *Demography*, Vol.3, No. 1, 1966, p.49.

Simon Franklin and Emma Widdis define Russia as a distinct place with a distinct history.²

Simon Franklin underlines the ‘Land of the Rus’ in the native historical thought of Russia. The term, ‘Land of the Rus’ refers to “the area associated with the authority of a people, or at any rate a ruling dynasty, known as the Rus.”³ This land was defined as Rhosia by the Greek writers and as Russia by the Latin writers. p.16 According to Simon Franklin “the Muscovite invocation of a Roman heritage” was purely abstract, ideological and quasi-theological.” The reforms of Tsar Peter the Great in the eighteenth century was an approach towards Western Europe. Tsar Peter the Great’s reforms introduced a new approach to the style of the urban environment, technology, education, language, dress and personal appearance and chronology. During the formation of the Soviet Union, the Russian Empire has been abolished. Soviet ideology abolished any narrative which might legitimize the continuation of the Soviet Union. This is not to say national identities were thereby also abolished, or that national identities could no longer be set in terms of linear temporal narratives.⁴

The relationship between national and supra national stories in Soviet ideology was complex and not entirely consistent, but to over generalize again: the linear narrative of nation -states was concluded- even of a multinational state bearing a national name (such as Russia) - but ethno cultural narratives could to some extent continue. ... Russian culture did nevertheless acquire a kind of meta-political status, through the imposition of the Russian language as the *lingua franca* of the Soviet Union.⁵

² Simon Franklin; Emma Widdis, *National Identity in Russian Culture An Introduction*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.9.

³ Simon Franklin; Emma Widdis, *National Identity in Russian Culture An Introduction*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.18.

⁴ Simon Franklin; Emma Widdis, *National Identity in Russian Culture An Introduction*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.16-18.

⁵ Simon Franklin; Emma Widdis, *National Identity in Russian Culture An Introduction*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.18.

The abolition of the Russian Empire was not the 'end of history'. Accordingly the fall of the USSR cannot be defined as the 'end of history'. The collapse of the Soviet Union has introduced a new period with new actors and new participants.⁶

The end of the Soviet Union has brought independent countries. Among these independent countries Russian Federation is the largest and most powerful. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union raised new political, social and cultural issues such as the position of Russian speaking population in newly independent states and their reaction to the new situation. The post-Soviet region and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union faced complex political, ethnic and cultural problems after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The newly independent states of the former Soviet Union are ethnically heterogeneous. Many ethnic groups are divided by territorial boundaries. Accordingly these states need to cope with secession and irredentism.⁷

Migration has been a significant dynamic of the post-Soviet space especially for the Russian Federation that has complex problems and issues such as the national identity, the distribution of power between a central governing authority and regional/local powers, and the socio political identity of ethnic minority groups. It is argued by James W. Warhola that the ethnic problems of post-Soviet Russia are equivalent to those of USSR.⁸

It is indicated by Douglas S. Massey and J. Edward Taylor that the total world population of immigrant people living outside their country of birth or citizenship reached approximately 160 million in 2000. Between 1985 and

⁶ Roman Szporluk, *National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994, p.3.

⁷ James W. Warhola, *Politicized Ethnicity in the Russian Federation Dilemmas of State Formation*, Lewiston New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1996, p. 69.

⁸ James W. Warhola, *Politicized Ethnicity in the Russian Federation Dilemmas of State Formation*, Lewiston New York,: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1996, p. i-5.

1990 the total number of the world population of immigrants increased at a rate of 2.8 million per year and between 1990 and 1997 the number was more than 4 million per year. The importance of the number can be seen when it is compared with 0.8 million per year between the years 1965 and 1975. The breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia is a turning point. Those events added 20 million new international migrants to the world in 1991. The huge number is not a result of people moving across borders instead of borders moved across people.⁹

International migration in the post-Soviet space has had a significant impact on the development of all Eurasian states. In the territory of the former Soviet Union millions of people changed their residency, jobs, social environment and lifestyles. Migration has influenced the composition of the populations of these countries. Igor Zevelev underlines the point that repatriants¹⁰ whose number is 4,207,000, constitute the largest migrant group in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region. The majority of the Russian speaking repatriants is Russians and their destination country is the Russian Federation.¹¹

Post- Soviet population movements are complex and they cannot be discussed through simple categorizations. Several different forms of population movement between the former Soviet republics can be identified. Igor Zevelev focuses on refugees fleeing the horrors of armed conflicts and direct violence; forced migration of people suffering ethnic discrimination and hostile attitudes;

⁹ Douglas S. Massey; J. Edward Taylor, *International Migration Prospects and Policies in a Global Market*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p.1.

¹⁰ Repatriants are defined as defined as persons returning voluntarily to the country of their citizenship or origin for the purpose of permanent residence in Igor Zevelev, *Russia and Its New Diasporas*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 2001, p.115.

¹¹ Igor Zevelev, *Russia and Its New Diasporas*, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001, p.115.

movement occurring because of gloomy economic, career, or education prospects in host societies; and temporary labor moves as examples.¹²

In the context of the post-Soviet Russia the issue of migration is significant because of the demographic dynamics and demographic problems of the country.¹³ The population of Soviet Union was 148.7 million in 1992 and the number decreased to 143.6 million in a decade.¹⁴ “Projections regarding the future of the Russian population are uniformly pessimistic.”¹⁵

The population of Russia decreased between 1990 and 1995. This trend continued during 1995 and 2000. In 2000 the population was equalized to the number that it had been in 1987.¹⁶

Barbara A. Anderson argues that the change in the size of a country’s population is a balance between the number of births in excess of deaths and the number of migrants into the country in excess of the number of migrants out of the country. People born in Siberia and the Far East migrated to European Russia. There was the net immigration in Central Russia. Barbara A. Anderson discusses fertility, mortality and migration in order to understand the dynamics behind this recent change in growth in Russia. According to Barbara A. Anderson the shift in the timing of fertility, reduced fertility and worsened

¹² Igor Zevelev, *Russia and Its New Diasporas*, Washington D.C.:United States Institute of Peace Press, , 2001, p.116.

¹³ *Population of Russia 2000*, Eight Annual Demographic Report, Moscow, University Book House, 2001.

¹⁴ David E. Powell, “Death as a Way of Life: Russia’s Demographic Decline”, *Current History*, Vol. 101, No. 657, October 2002, pp. 344-348.

¹⁵ David E. Powell, “Death as a Way of Life: Russia’s Demographic Decline”, *Current History*, Vol. 101, No. 657, October 2002, p. 344.

¹⁶ Barbara A. Anderson, “Russia Faces Depopulation? Dynamics of Population Decline”, *Population and Environment*, Vol. 23, No. 5, May 2002, p. 440.

economic conditions as some of the reasons for the decline in total fertility rate in Russia.¹⁷

According to Nicholas Eberstadt, the factors against a significant upsurge in the Russian birthrate are infertility, the question of marriage, the influence of the European demographic context.¹⁸

Modern fertility control only became in evidence throughout Russia after World War II. The total fertility rate of Russia declined to replacement level, with some increase in the late 1980's, before declining sharply in the 1990's.¹⁹

The mortality aspect is threatening for Russia. "Broad segments of the Russian populace have suffered a disastrous long-term retrogression in health conditions."²⁰ Between the years 1961 and 2002, life expectancy at birth in Russia fell by nearly five years for males and three years for females. Russia's upswing in mortality was especially concentrated among its working age populations. Russia's cause of death statistics attributes nearly all of the increase in the mortality rates of men and absolutely all of the increase for women to cardiovascular disease and injuries concentrated in the 40-59 age groups. Especially between mid 1960's and the 1990's, there was the explosion of cardiovascular death in Russia.²¹

¹⁷ Barbara A. Anderson, "Russia Faces Depopulation? Dynamics of Population Decline", *Population and Environment*, Vol. 23, No. 5, May 2002, pp.437-464.

¹⁸ Nicholas Eberstadt, "Russia's Demographic Straightjacket", *SAIS Review*, Vol.24, No. 2, Summer-Fall 2004, p.13.

¹⁹ The total fertility rate is "the number of births a woman would have if she went through her life having children at the rates by age that occurred in the population in the given time period." Barbara A. Anderson, "Russia Faces Depopulation? Dynamics of Population Decline", *Population and Environment*, Vol. 23, No. 5, May 2002, p. 443.

²⁰ Nicholas Eberstadt, "Russia's Demographic Straightjacket", *SAIS Review*, Vol.24, No. 2, Summer-Fall 2004, p.15.

Russia's dismal health record can be explained in terms of a multiplicity of unfavourable social, behavioural and policy tendencies: pervasive smoking; poor diets; sedentary lifestyles; increasing social atomization and anomie; the special economic stresses of Russia's "transition"; the weaknesses of the Soviet medical system; and the limited coverage of its successor.²²

Moreover there is the role of the high rates of alcohol consumption. By 1984, the per capita level of alcohol drinking in Russia was nearly three times as high as in 1913. By the mid-1990's, Russian per capita alcohol drinking, surpassed the rates of the previous period. "In 1994, for example, the estimate of pure alcohol consumed by the population aged 15 and older amounted to 18.5 litres per capita-the equivalent of 125 cc. of vodka for everyone, every day."²³

Thus in the context of the demographic crisis, migration is a core issue for the Russian Federation. The estimates of irregular migrants in the Russian Federation range from three to five million. In addition, it is estimated by the Ministry of Interior that 12-15 million migrants come to Russia annually especially for temporary employment. There are 300,000 work permits obtained by the Russian employers annually. It is critical that the majority of foreigners work illegally, in the informal brands of the economy. Approximately 500,000 Russian citizens are currently working beyond the borders of Russia, however there are various estimates about the number such as 1,5 million including both regular and irregular migration flows. It is important to note that the majority of Russian employees abroad have an irregular status. Put differently illegal

²¹ Barbara A. Anderson, "Russia Faces Depopulation? Dynamics of Population Decline", *Population and Environment*, Vol. 23, No. 5, May 2002, pp.437-464.

²² Nicholas Eberstadt, "Russia's Demographic Straightjacket", *SAIS Review*, Vol.24, No. 2, Summer-Fall 2004, p.15.

²³ Nicholas Eberstadt, "Russia's Demographic Straightjacket", *SAIS Review*, Vol.24, No. 2, Summer-Fall 2004, p.15.

migration is an important point of the migration issue in the Russian Federation.²⁴

In this framework migration management is an important task. The priority spheres of the Russian government are basically migration data management, upgrading border and immigration controls, regulation for labour migrants, institutionalizing a human rights based approach for asylum seekers, improving voluntary return programmes.²⁵

...enhancing control over migration flows through establishment of a federal-level inter-agency information system to support migration data management; upgrading border and immigration controls through the development and introduction of “new generation” identification documents with biometric data; optimising labour migration management through a legalisation/regulation procedure for labour migrants (e.g., centralised database of job vacancies or employment needs); institutionalising a human rights-based approach to asylum seekers and irregular migrants by establishing processing centres conforming to international standards and extending assisted voluntary return programmes; introducing a coordinated set of measures to tackle cross-border crime particularly human trafficking and smuggling.²⁶

Migration is a complex issue for all countries since in most cases, countries are not even aware how many immigrants they host or send abroad. Thus it is not an easy task to answer the question how to control immigration effectively or influence its impacts. In the twenty first century it is inevitable that the international migration trends and policies have a complex background.²⁷

Immigration is changing with respect to its in scale and character in the whole world. The world’s population of immigrants has increased more then

²⁴ The website of the International Organization for Migration
<<http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/811>> (Accessed on 08 August 2008)

²⁵ The website of the International Organization for Migration
<<http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/811>> (Accessed on 08 August 2008)

²⁶ The website of the International Organization for Migration
<<http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/811>> (Accessed on 08 August 2008)

²⁷ Douglas S. Massey; J. Edward Taylor, *International Migration Prospects and Policies in a Global Market*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p.2.

the rate of the world population growth. The widening income gap between rich and poor countries, the transportation and communication revolutions and newly emerging economies have a role in the expansion of international migration. The diversity of international migration diversity in terms of origins and destinations, social, demographic and economic characteristics, increases. Developed countries' share of the world's international migrants is growing.²⁸

Most of the world's immigrants live in developing countries instead of developed countries. However when the recent immigration flows are considered mostly developed countries is the destination. Douglas S. Massey and J. Edward Taylor defines immigration visible and volatile especially throughout the 'North' since immigrants often are concentrated in a few regions and economic sectors. The composition of immigration has changed.²⁹

From North African vendors in the streets of Florence to Mexican and Hmong meat packers in Iowa to Brazilian and Indonesian factory workers in Japan, immigrants are increasingly diverse in their origins, destinations and characteristics.³⁰

There are four points to explain the increasing demand for international migration. First point is the demographic gap between developing and developed countries. Secondly high population growth and age structures resulted with high rates of entry into the labour market. This situation is defined by 'pool of potential migrants' by Brubaker. Third point is the massive urbanization. Urban residents have better access to communications and transportation systems. They are exposed to transnational linkages. Fourth point is the ecological factors that lead to the ecologically driven migration. Fifth point is the political; factors that lead to the increasing demand for international

²⁸ Douglas S. Massey; J. Edward Taylor, *International Migration Prospects and Policies in a Global Market*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p.2,3.

²⁹ Douglas S. Massey; J. Edward Taylor, *International Migration Prospects and Policies in a Global Market*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p.1.

³⁰ Douglas S. Massey; J. Edward Taylor, *International Migration Prospects and Policies in a Global Market*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p.1.

migration. Political violence, civil wars, ethnic conflict or repressive regimes can be the reason for a demand for migration. Finally the global linkages have enhanced and will continue to enhance demand for international migration. Global networks of information, communication and transportation gives the opportunity to compare one's circumstances with those in other countries. From my point of view Brubaker indicates a critical point that the interaction of these points engenders an increasing demand for admission.³¹

There are certain tendencies that play a major role with respect to contemporary migrations. Firstly there is the globalization of migration. Since there is the diversity of origin, more and more countries are affected by migratory movements at the same time. Secondly there is the acceleration of migration. International movements of people are growing quantitatively in all major regions of the present time. Parallel to increase in volume there is the difficulty of government policies. A third tendency is the differentiation of migration. In most of the countries instead of a specific type of migration various types such as refugee migration, labour migration and permanent settlement can be seen at the same time. Through the differentiation of migration, it became complicated to stop or control the movement. Fourthly, there is 'the feminization of migration'. When we compare the contemporary migration trends with the past, it is seen that in the past especially the labour migrations and refugee movements were male dominated. In contrast today, women have a major role in migratory movements. The fifth tendency that is seen regarding the contemporary migrations is 'the growing politicization of migration'. International migration became a factor influencing domestic politics, bilateral and regional relationships and national security policies of

³¹ Rogers Brubaker, "International Migration: A Challenge for Humanity", *International Migration Review*, Vol. 25, No. 4, Special Issue: U.N. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Winter 1991, pp. 946-957.

states all around the world.³² Castles and Miller indicate that migrants were divided into categories and those categories were investigated by different departments, such as labor offices, aliens police. The systematic attention regarding migrants was formed in the late 1980's. The position of the EU countries can be given as an example to the high level and systematic attention. There is the concern about strengthening the external borders of the EU especially after the removal of the internal borders. According to Castles and Miller by the 1990's the issue of immigration was moved to the center of the political agenda.³³

The volume of immigration has grown throughout the world over the past thirty years. The number of persons, living other than their country of origin legally or illegally, is 170 million by 2002.³⁴ Immigration has shifted towards Asia, Africa and Latin America. In Europe, countries that had been sending out migrants became immigrant receiving societies. "After 1945, virtually all countries in Western Europe began to attract significant numbers of workers from abroad."³⁵ For instance Italy, Spain, and Portugal, which were the migrant sending countries of Southern Europe a decade before, began to import workers from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East by the 1980's.³⁶ As a consequence of the increase in the volume of immigration today, developed countries have become multiethnic societies.

³² Stephen Castles, Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 9.

³³ Stephen Castles, Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 13.

³⁴ United Nations Populations Division, 2002, International Migration Report 2002. <<http://www.un.org/esa/populations/ittmig2002/ittmig2002.htm>> (Accessed on 10 July 2008)

³⁵ Douglas S. Massey, Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, J. Edward Taylor, "Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal", *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 19, No.3, Sep., 1993, pp.431-466.

³⁶ Douglas S. Massey, Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, J. Edward Taylor, "Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal", *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 19, No.3, Sep., 1993, pp.431-466.

There are disagreements about how to conceptualize and study migration. Massey classifies four dimensions of conflict.

The first dimension is about time. “Analysts disagree about whether migration may be legitimately studied in synchronic terms or whether a diachronic, historical perspective is required.”³⁷

Some scholars argue that sequence of specific social and economic changes is critical to understand migration. In contrast, there are also scholars, who to develop general models that are broadly applicable.³⁸

The second disagreement is whether migration is an outcome of individual or structural terms. Is it discussed whether individual decisions are effective or powerful structural changes in society. There are theorists, who focused on the individual actor.³⁹ Some scholars opposed this approach and have argued that migration is structural. They evaluate migration as a consequence of social and economic transformations that mobilize labour as a result of the creation of geographic inequalities in wealth.⁴⁰

Thirdly some anthropologists, economists and sociologists criticize the individual level analysis and focuses on households or families as the principal agents of decision-making. According to these scholars households or families

³⁷ Douglas S. Massey, “Social Structure, Household Strategies, and the Cumulative Causation of Migration”, *Population Index*, Vol. 56, No. 1, Spring 1990, pp.3-26. On the importance of time series analysis see also Michael J. Greenwood, Gary L. Hunt and John M. McDowell, “Migration and Employment Change: Empirical Evidence on the Spatial and Temporal Dimensions of the Linkage”, *Journal of Regional Science*, 1986, Vol.26, No. 2.

³⁸ See E. G. Ravenstein, “The Laws of Migration”, *Journal of the Statistical Society of London*, Vol. 48, No.2, Jun. 1885, pp.167-235.

³⁹ See Michael P. Todaro, “A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less Developed Countries”, *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 59, No. 1, 1969, pp. 138-148.

⁴⁰ Douglas S. Massey, “Social Structure, Household Strategies, and the Cumulative Causation of Migration”, *Population Index*, Vol. 56, No. 1, Spring 1990, pp.3-26.

as units of analysis should be used as unit of analysis instead of individuals since migration is a part of broader system of socioeconomic improvement.⁴¹

The dispute concerns the importance of causes versus the effects of migration.⁴² The relation between migration and employment has long been an issue of debate. According to Blanco migration is a consequence of employment opportunities.⁴³ Muth argued that employment and migration cause each other.⁴⁴ Todaro underlines the role of job opportunities and probabilities of employment in the actual migration decision-making process.⁴⁵ According to Massey most of the studies on migration focus on the causes instead of the consequences.⁴⁶ A significant point is underlined by Massey about the conflicts and disputes of scholars. According to Massey

This fragmentation has prevented analysts from recognizing key relationships among variables that affect one another across time and between levels of analysis, dependencies that are intrinsic to migration and build a strong

⁴¹ Douglas S. Massey, "Social Structure, Household Strategies, and the Cumulative Causation of Migration", *Population Index*, Vol. 56, No. 1, Spring 1990, pp.3-26.

⁴² On the impacts of migration see J. Edward Taylor, "The New Economics of Labour Migration and the Role of Remittances in the Migration Process", *International Migration*, Vol. 37, No.,1, 1999.

⁴³ See Cicely Blanco, "Prospective Unemployment and Interstate Population Movements", *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 46, No. 2, May, 1964, pp. 221-222. On the model's of migration's causes and consequences see also Michael J. Greenwood, "Human Migration: Theory, Models and Empirical Studies", *Journal of Regional Science*, Vol. 25, No. 4, , 1985, p.541.

⁴⁴ Richard F. Muth,. "Migration: Chicken or Egg", *Southern Economic Journal*, January 1971, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 295-306. On migration and employment see also Michael J. Greenwood, Gary L. Hunt and John M. McDowell, "Migration and Employment Change: Empirical Evidence on the Spatial and Temporal Dimensions of the Linkage", *Journal of Regional Science*, , Vol.26, No. 2, 1986.

⁴⁵Michael P. Todaro, "A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less Developed Countries", *The American Economic Review*, Vol.59, No.1, 1969, pp.138-148.

⁴⁶ Douglas S. Massey, "Social Structure, Household Strategies, and the Cumulative Causation of Migration", *Population Index*, Vol. 56, No. 1, Spring 1990, pp.3-26.

momentum into the migration process. As a result, our theoretical understanding of migration is incomplete and inaccurate, providing a weak base for research and policy.⁴⁷

The importance of the interaction of regulatory linkages and family networks is also underlined by Fawcett. Fawcett examines the linkages between countries and migration systems.⁴⁸

Today there are different forms of population movements such as trafficking, smuggling and transit-migration. As a consequence of the diversity of the global migration the migration discourse has changed. Recent discussions on global migration movements put the emphasis on the security issues. The new security discourse is related with the new approach to terrorism that is symbolized by the September 11 attacks. Security, human rights, democracy and gender issues became significant while discussing migration.⁴⁹

As a consequence of the different forms of population movements there are various types of migrants such as refugees, forced migrants, seasonal or temporary migrants, labour migrants, illegal migrants. Not all of these types are discussed in this thesis. Instead some points such as illegal migration, illegal migrants and brain drain discussed in detail while others are broadly mentioned such as forced migrants or temporary migrants.

To sum up, the issue of international migration has underlined by various people for a long time. The issue is not static. It influences and it is

⁴⁷ Douglas S. Massey, "Social Structure Household Strategies, and the Cumulative Causation of Migration", *Population Index*, Vol. 56, No. 1, Spring 1990, p.4.

⁴⁸ James T. Fawcett, "Networks, Linkages, and Migration Systems", *International Migration Review*, Vol. 23, No. 3, Special Silver Anniversary Issue: International Migration an Assessment for the 90's, Autumn, 1989, pp. 671-680.

⁴⁹ IOM, *World Migration 2003: Managing Migration- Challenges and Responses for People on the Move*, Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
<<http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/cache/offonce/pid/1674?entryId=4992>> (Accessed on 15 March 2008)

influenced by contemporary social, political and economic dynamics. The literature on migration is not stable accordingly. This chapter focused on the importance of the Russian Federation and the issue of migration in post-Soviet Russia.

CHAPTER II

MIGRATION IN THE SOVIET UNION

It is critical to examine the period of the Soviet Union, before a discussion of the dynamics of migration in the Russian Federation. In this regard the core focus of this chapter is the migration during the Soviet Union. First, the administrative structure and regulations regarding migration are discussed. Afterwards the chapter examines the internal migration in the Soviet Union. The chapter also aims at focusing on the Soviet emigration.

2.1. Soviet Migration Policy; the System of Restrictions

The former Soviet state attempted to regulate patterns of population movement and urban growth through an internal passport and city registration systems, limits on central city registration and residence permit, *propiska*.⁵⁰ Although the regulations of passport and *propiska* were seen as a scientific

⁵⁰ A *propiska* is a permit issued by the authorities to registers the place of residence. A *propiska* was a legacy of the Tsarist government's internal passport regime. It was a mean to control population movements throughout the Empire and to manage urbanisation in the late 19th century. "Restrictions on peasants' movements were lifted in 1906 and the entire internal passport system was abandoned shortly after the 1917 Revolution. In December 1932, however, the Soviet government aped its predecessors by re-introducing internal passports." Susan Brazier, *Propiska*, <<http://www.nelegal.net/articles/propiska.htm>> (Accessed on February 2008)

approach to the management of the population, overall a system of restrictions was created.⁵¹ It is critical to discuss how the passport regime developed in time.

Mervyn Matthews argues that the Bolshevik leaders faced a dilemma regarding the issue of registering residence. The new socialist state required a measure of locational control however they declared freedom from oppressive administration. Bolshevik controls on residence and movement were quickly put into place.⁵²

The most significant development regarding the residence control was the introduction of 'work book', which was a sort of work passport. The 'work book' served until the publication of a decree on 'general labor service'. The labor book had several locational functions. First, it contained registration of residence. Secondly, the labor book in fact had to be presented whenever identification was required. The labour book was to replace former certificates of identity, passports, etc., primarily for people in certain 'bourgeois' categories.⁵³

It is discussed by Mervyn Matthews that the labour book was intended to be an instrument of control and oppression. The holder had to ensure that any work he did was entered at least once a month. The labour book contained detailed information in comparison with the registration cards that preceded it.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Cynthia Buckley, "The Myth of Managed Migration: Migration Control and Market in the Soviet Period", *Slavic Review*, Vol.54, No.4, Winter, 1995, pp. 896-916

⁵² Mervyn Matthews, *The Passport Society Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR*, the USA: Westview Press, 1993, p.14.

⁵³ Mervyn Matthews, *The Passport Society Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR*, the USA: Westview Press, 1993, p.18.

⁵⁴ Mervyn Matthews, *The Passport Society Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR*, the USA: Westview Press, 1993, p.17.

During the mid and late 1920s, there was the relaxation of the system to some extent. The ruling on labour books in Moscow and Petrograd were turned back by a decree 'On the Establishment of Identity' of 20th June, 1923. Passports and other residence registration documents together with labour books were annulled from 1st January, 1924. The obligatory presentation of passports or other documents registering residence, which limited the right to move and settle on the territory of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was reversed.⁵⁵

In contrast, the April 1925 law intended to reintroduce the wholesale registration of residence. Accordingly, a new decree entitled "On Establishing Identities" repealed the liberalizing decree of June, 1923 and introduced a uniform identity card for the whole of the RSFSR.⁵⁶

At the core of the 'managed' population flows, there was the Soviet internal passport system.⁵⁷ The Soviet internal passport regime was established by the decree of 27th December, 1932. Gijs Kessler argues that the central role of the passport system was policing the urban population during the 1930s and afterwards.⁵⁸ According to Gijs Kessler "...the passport system had from the very outset been meant in the first place as an instrument of repression and police control, and in the short run even more crudely as a purging tool."⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Mervyn Matthews, *The Passport Society Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR*, the USA: Westview Press, 1993.

⁵⁶ Mervyn Matthews, *The Passport Society Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR*, the USA: Westview Press, 1993, p.18.

⁵⁷ Stephen Wegren, A. Cooper Drury, "Patterns of Internal Migration During the Russian Transition", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.17, No.4, December 2001, pp.15-42

⁵⁸ Gijs Kessler, "The Passport System and State Control over Population Flows in the Soviet Union, 1932-1940", *Cahiers du Monde russe*, Vol. 42, No. 2-3-4, April-December 2002, p.477. <<http://monderusse.revues.org/docannexe3921.html>> Accessed on 16 June 2008.

⁵⁹ Gijs Kessler, "The Passport System and State Control over Population Flows in the Soviet Union, 1932-1940", *Cahiers du Monde russe*, Vol. 42, No. 2-3-4, April-December 2002, p.478.

At the beginning the “passportisation” of the urban population was carried out in Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, Kiev, Minsk, Rostov and Vladivostok, however the regime was extended to other urban centers in 1933.⁶⁰

The passport was the only document to be used for purposes of identification. The purposes of the passport were declared as to obtain better statistics of the populations in towns, worker’s settlements and the settlements built around the newly constructed factories, and also in order to secure the deportation from these places of persons who are not connected with industry or with work in offices and schools, and who are not engaged in socially useful labour and also in order to cleanse these places of kulak, criminal and other anti-social elements.⁶¹ According to the 1932 decree ‘passportisation’ was to be effected in towns, permanent settlements, district centers. The rural or sparsely inhabited areas of the country were excluded from the system. In other words a majority of the population peasants, nomads, minority ethnic groups got no passport. Since the document was essential for residence and employment applications in all passportised or ‘regime’ areas, especially economically the rural dwellers and ethnic minorities were disadvantaged.⁶² The regime underwent very little change, of character over six decades. Thus Mervyn

<<http://monderusse.revues.org/docannexe3921.html>> Accessed on 16 June 2008.

⁶⁰ Gijs Kessler, “The Passport System and State Control over Population Flows in the Soviet Union, 1932-1940”, *Cahiers du Monde russe*, Vol. 42, No. 2-3-4, April-December 2002, p.483. <<http://monderusse.revues.org/docannexe3921.html>> Accessed on 16 June 2008.

⁶¹ Mervyn Matthews, *The Passport Society Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR*, the USA: Westview Press, 1993, p.28.

⁶² Stephen Wegren, A. Cooper Drury, “Patterns of Internal Migration During the Russian Transition”, *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.17, No.4, December 2001, pp.15-42.

Matthews defines the regime as Stalinist throughout.⁶³ The passport was an instrument for intensifying social, economic and political control.

Ultimately the passport regime was extended to the whole Soviet Union including the territories which came under Soviet occupation or control. Firstly the system was extended to Soviet occupied Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in February 1941.

A corner stone of the system, for over twenty years was destalinization⁶⁴ that came in October, 1953, a few months after Stalin's death. Destalinization had a moderating effect on passportisation.

First of all, the period of validity of the passport was lengthened from five years to; 5 years for 16-20 years olds, 10 years for 20-40 years olds, and permanence thereafter. Secondly, the validity of the temporary certificate was extended from three to six months. "Thirdly there was a provision allowing rural inhabitants to make visits of up to thirty days to regime areas on the basis of permits issued by rural soviets."⁶⁵ Fourthly, the requirement to enter employment details in the passport was abolished, though presentation of it was certainly required for a job. "Fifthly, persons released from places of confinement... had the right to passports, but only on the basis of their release papers which could impose conditions of residence."⁶⁶

⁶³ Mervyn Matthews, *The Passport Society Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR*, the USA: Westview Press, 1993, p.27.

⁶⁴ Dmitry Pospelovsky defines 'stalinization' as "... a one-man dictatorship in which a single dictator ruling arbitrarily, uncontrolled by any party organs, is the sole interpreter of the Marxist-Leninist dogma, and is surrounded by the cult of his personality" in Dmitry Pospelovsky, "Restalinization or Destalinization?", *Russian Review*, Vol. 27, No. 3, Jul. 1968, p. 309.

⁶⁵ Mervyn Matthews, *The Passport Society Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR*, the USA: Westview Press, 1993, p.31.

⁶⁶ Mervyn Matthews, *The Passport Society Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR*, the USA: Westview Press, 1993, p.31.

Destalinization increased residence associated freedoms. Some forms of migration were encouraged, through the virgin land and new construction campaigns.

In the immediate post-Stalin years the passport regime acquired certain new functions. It was needed to control the massive outflow of inmates from the prison camps, to retain some displaced peoples in virtual exile, and to repress the new, incipient “dissident” movements.⁶⁷

The fourth Soviet passport statute was approved in August, 1974, and was valid in October, 1992. According to the 1974 Statute on the Passport System “citizens residing in rural localities to whom passports have previously not been issued, shall be issued passports when they depart for other places for a long term.”⁶⁸

The statute incorporated a key change; it was the granting of passports to rural dwellers, including the peasantry, who had previously been kept outside the system. “For the first time the passport was made obligatory for Soviet citizens throughout the country, regardless of whether they lived in areas where *propiska* was operative, or not.”⁶⁹ Local officials continued to control the issuing of passports to peasants. Peasants’ rights to leave the collective farm, to move freely through the country, and to freely choose their work *de facto* none existed.⁷⁰

The internal passport system was supported by the residence permit, *propiska*. It was necessary to present the passport and register it with the police

⁶⁷ Mervyn Matthews, *The Passport Society Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR*, the USA: Westview Press, 1993, p.27.

⁶⁸ Victor Zaslavsky, “Socioeconomic Inequality and Changes in Soviet Ideology”, *Theory and Society*, Vol.9, No.2, Special Issue on Actual Socialisms, March 1980, p.387.

⁶⁹ Mervyn Matthews, *The Passport Society Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR*, the USA: Westview Press, 1993, p.33.

⁷⁰ Victor Zaslavsky, “Socioeconomic Inequality and Changes in Soviet Ideology”, *Theory and Society*, Vol.9, No.2, Special Issue on Actual Socialisms, March 1980, p.387.

in order to obtain a residence permit of the locality after the arrival at the intended destination.⁷¹

According to the law a propiska was required if a person were to reside in a locality for more than three days. If the person were moving to a given locality permanently, a propiska was necessary for obtaining employment.⁷²

Administrative restrictions on foreign travel were reduced with perestroika, and in some places it affected the internal passport regime. In 1986 the border procedures were simplified to include the use of internal passports for frontier crossing.

During the late eighties there was the expansion in politics and the appearance of political parties in the Soviet Union.

In January, 1989 the Soviet government signed the concluding document of the Vienna Meeting on Human Rights. Demands for full freedom of movement and residence figured in a number of constitutional and political programmes.⁷³

The formal abolition of regulatory propiska was in the December, 1990 draft of the RSFSR Constitution. It accorded all citizens equal rights and freedoms, regardless of place of residence and the freedom to move and choose their place of residence inside the Federation, to leave the Russian Federation and return to it.⁷⁴

At this point the issue of travel abroad in the Soviet Union will be discussed. The legislative structure concerning the emigration from the Soviet

⁷¹ Gijss Kessler, "The Passport System and State Control over Population Flows in the Soviet Union, 1932-1940", *Cahiers du Monde russe*, Vol. 42, No. 2-3-4, April-December 2002, p.477. <<http://monderusse.revues.org/docannexe3921.html>> Accessed on 16 June 2008.

⁷² Stephen Wegren, A. Cooper Drury, "Patterns of Internal Migration During the Russian Transition", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.17, No.4, December 2001, p.17.

⁷³ Mervyn Matthews, *The Passport Society Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR*, the USA: Westview Press, 1993, p.80.

⁷⁴ Mervyn Matthews, *The Passport Society Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR*, the USA: Westview Press, 1993, p.80.

Union is a significant part of the Soviet migration policy. There were regulations that were introduced for the arrangement of travel abroad. Lenin introduced a new frontier regime. The regulations approved by Lenin became a barrier to anyone wishing to leave Russia. The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was obliged to obtain, from any Soviet organization sending employees abroad on business, sight of the actual departure orders and undertakings regarding the individual's respectability and loyalty by the decree of the 3rd June, 1919.⁷⁵

In September 1921 payment was introduced for foreign passports, exit entry and transit visas issued to ordinary travelers. The rates of payment were as high as a month's pay for a top grade specialist in Moscow. On 10th May 1922 more restrictive rules were introduced. With this law travel abroad was permitted only with the special permission of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Any application to this commissariat had to be accompanied by a certificate from the secret police attesting to the absence of legal obstacles to travel. Six documents were necessary to apply for the certificate. Moreover the passports were normally valid for six months.⁷⁶

A crucial milestone in Bolshevik policy was the Statue on Entering and Leaving the USSR, which was approved on the 5th June, 1925. At this point the legislation for foreign passports and internal passports were separated and the two parts of law never came together.

Three types of passports were defined; diplomatic, service and civil. The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs was responsible for the issue of passports at all-union or union republican levels, and of authorized local soviets.

⁷⁵ Mervyn Matthews, *The Passport Society Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR*, the USA: Westview Press, 1993, p.22.

⁷⁶ Mervyn Matthews, *The Passport Society Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR*, the USA: Westview Press, 1993, p.22.

“...After the mid-twenties private travel abroad became administratively impossible, even for the better-off Soviet citizen, and even enquiries about it politically hazardous.”⁷⁷ Under the terms of the 1922 RSFSR criminal code illegal entry and exit without a proper passport or authorization entailed a penalty of up to six months’ forced labour, and a fine of five hundred gold roubles. In 1936 the forced labour penalty was increased to between one and three years in a labour camp. This provision was valid in 1990.

The chances of Soviet citizens’ going abroad improved a little after Khrushchev came to power... Crossing Soviet frontiers remained an impossibility for all except a narrow circle of citizens, but a sea change had nevertheless occurred.⁷⁸

In the mid sixties, a modest level of emigration was permitted for the émigrés renounced Soviet citizenship. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979, strains in United States of America (USA) -Soviet Union relations and other factors led to a sharp reduction in emigration, which by 1986 had dropped to only two thousand. The next corner stone came with the introduction of perestroika that reduced the restrictions on foreign travel. The administrative structure that was brought with perestroika and the liberalizations during the Russian Federation will be discussed in the next chapter of the thesis.⁷⁹

2.2. Internal Migration in the Soviet Union

Between 1959 and 1979, the population of the Soviet Union increased by approximately 53.6 million persons. The average annual growth rate was 1.3

⁷⁷ Mervyn Matthews, *The Passport Society Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR*, the USA: Westview Press, 1993, p.24.

⁷⁸ Mervyn Matthews, *The Passport Society Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR*, the USA: Westview Press, 1993, p.37.

⁷⁹ Mervyn Matthews, *The Passport Society Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR*, the USA: Westview Press, 1993, p.75.

percent between 1959 -1970 and 0.9 percent from 1970 to 1979.⁸⁰ There were interregional differences regarding the population growth. Since 1959 the population in the northern and western zones was redistributed. While there was the massive depopulation of these regions, the southern part of the Soviet Union experienced rapid population growth. The republics of Transcaucasus, Central Asia and Kazakhstan experienced population increase higher than the average rates. Differences in regional growth rates lead to the geographical redistribution of the population. Moreover the goal to promote economic development in 'backward' areas paved the way to migration to Central Asia.⁸¹ In 1959 the southern zone accounted for 15.6 percent of the population of the USSR, and by 1979 it increased to 20.7 percent. In the same period the northern zone has witnessed a significant decline of its share of the total USSR population. For the period 1959 to 1970 net in migration was highest in the North Caucasus Region, the South Region of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. During the same period the regions Volgo-Vyatsk, Central Chernozem, Urals, West Siberia, and Southwest had very slow growth.⁸²

The eastern zone, was characterized by the rural decline while the Far East region gained rural population in both intercensal periods.

By 1959 and 1979, by far the largest absolute increases were found in the northern and western zones; the number of urban inhabitants added to the northern zone was almost twice that of the southern zone and three times that of the eastern zone.⁸³

⁸⁰ Ralph S. Clem, "Regional Patterns of Population Change in the Soviet Union 1959-1979", *Geographical Review*, Vol.70, No.2, April, 1980, p.139.

⁸¹ Peter Gatrell, *Crossing Borders: Migration in Russia and Eastern Europe during the Twentieth Century* <<http://www.history.ac.uk/ihr/Focus/Migration/articles/gatrell.html>> (Accessed on 10 April 2008)

⁸² Blaine Ball, George J. Demko, "Internal Migration in the Soviet Union", *Economic Geography*, Vol.54, No. 2, April 1978, pp. 95-114.

⁸³ Ralph S. Clem, "Regional Patterns of Population Change in the Soviet Union 1959-1979", *Geographical Review*, Vol.70, No.2, April, 1980, p.154.

Urbanization of the regions was very critical. In the 1979 the Northwest, Center, Urals, Far East, and Donetsk-Dnepr regions were highly urbanized almost three quarters of the population of these regions resided in cities. The growth of the rural population has a role in urbanization. For instance in the republics of Central Asia and in the Transcaucasus, the level of urbanization changed slightly because of the rapid growth of the rural population. Also in the regions with slow growth of the rural population or the depopulation of the rural, the level of urbanization increase.⁸⁴

As stated by Ralph S. Clem that demographic trends and regional population changes reflect the efficacy of two stated policies of the Soviet government. The two stated policies of the Soviet government; policy on regional economic development and the policy on urban growth. The policy on regional economic development was based on two goals; equalization of the levels of development among regions and developing the eastern regions of the country.⁸⁵ The key reason for the equalization policy was the desire to avoid an increase of interethnic socioeconomic inequalities. There are studies that indicate the greater interregional inequality and to a shift in the direction of equality during the postwar era. The development of Siberia and the Far East was also a goal of the Soviet government. The majority of the Soviet resources were in the east and the labor supply of the region was very critical. Because of the low standard of living in the eastern region compared with the other regions, there was the net out-migration. To prevent the population flow from the East, the government intended to increase wages and improve services and housing for workers there. The out-migration from Siberia has declined. “West

⁸⁴ Ralph S. Clem, “Regional Patterns of Population Change in the Soviet Union 1959-1979”, *Geographical Review*, Vol.70, No.2, April, 1980, p.154.

⁸⁵ Ralph S. Clem, “Regional Patterns of Population Change in the Soviet Union 1959-1979”, *Geographical Review*, Vol.70, No.2, April, 1980, p.154.

Siberia and the Far East were the only regions in the USSR to experience an increase in the rate of growth between 1959-1970 and 1970-1979.”⁸⁶

In 1970, Moldavia, Belorussia, the Southwest Region of the Ukraine, and the Black Earth Center of the RSFSR. were experiencing rapid rates of urban growth based on heavy rural out-migration.⁸⁷

Urban growth policy of the Soviet government was focused on limiting the growth of large cities. “Policy involves not only controls on the movement of people but also restrictions on industrial expansion to limit the growth of jobs.”⁸⁸ The policy has not successfully distributed the population in small to medium sized cities.

In 1959, for example 24.2 percent of the urban population lived in cities of more than 500,000 inhabitants, and by 1979 that figure rose to 31.7 percent. The share of the urban population in cities with populations between 100,000 and 499,999 increased from 24.4 percent to 28.7 percent during this period.⁸⁹

The most critical consequence of the demographic trends is the imbalance between the regional supply of and the demand for labor. The work force is concentrated in the southern zone particularly in Central Asia that does not have resources like Siberia.

From the late 1920’s to the late 1980’s the main migration pattern of the Soviet Union was rural to urban. Especially between the period 1920 and 1970, the Soviet rate of urbanization exceeded the major world regions. The period

⁸⁶ Ralph S. Clem, “Regional Patterns of Population Change in the Soviet Union 1959-1979”, *Geographical Review*, Vol.70, No.2, April, 1980, p.155.

⁸⁷ Chauncy D. Harris, “Urbanization and Population Growth in the Soviet Union, 1959-1970”, *Geographical Review*, Vol. 61, No. 1, January 1971, p. 111.

⁸⁸ Ralph S. Clem, “Regional Patterns of Population Change in the Soviet Union 1959-1979”, *Geographical Review*, Vol.70, No.2, April, 1980, p.155.

⁸⁹ Ralph S. Clem, “Regional Patterns of Population Change in the Soviet Union 1959-1979”, *Geographical Review*, Vol.70, No.2, April, 1980, p.155.

between 1926 and 1939 witnessed the highest rate of urbanization, growing at an annual rate of about 6.5 per cent.⁹⁰

The introduction of the collectivization of agriculture in the late 1920s strengthened the rural to urban migration. During 1928-1932, 12 million individuals migrated to urban areas and about 7 million rural households migrated to urban areas between 1929 and 1937. It is argued by Stephen Wegren and A. Cooper Drury that the outflow of peasants to urban areas during the collectivization was both a consequence of 'pull' and 'push' factors. The employment opportunities in industry, construction, state trade and food processing attracting the voluntary departures was the 'pull' factor. The forced deportation and resettlement of the rich peasants (kulaks) as part of the policy to liquidate kulaks as a class in the countryside, was defined as the 'push' factor.⁹¹ The rate of the involuntary departures to the towns was estimated as 30 per cent during 1928-1932. Also 25 million rural residents departed and resettled in an urban locality.⁹²

During the post-Stalin years the rural outflow continued. In the USSR the percentage of workers engaged in agriculture declined from 38 to 20 per cent within two decades (1960-1980). A corresponding transformation occurred during 50 years. By 1979 the rural population in Russia had decreased by more than-one third in comparison with 1959.⁹³

⁹⁰ Stephen Wegren, A. Cooper Drury, "Patterns of Internal Migration During the Russian Transition", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.17, No.4, December 2001, pp.15-42.

⁹¹ Stephen Wegren, A. Cooper Drury, "Patterns of Internal Migration During the Russian Transition", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.17, No.4, December 2001, p.20.

⁹² Stephen Wegren, A. Cooper Drury, "Patterns of Internal Migration During the Russian Transition", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.17, No.4, December 2001, p.21.

⁹³ Stephen Wegren, A. Cooper Drury, "Patterns of Internal Migration During the Russian Transition", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.17, No.4, December 2001, p.21.

The urban population of the Soviet Union was increased by 36 million between 1959 and 1970.⁹⁴

...14.6 million, or 41 percent, came from natural increase within the cities, 5 million, or 14 percent, from administrative changes of settlements from rural to urban, and about 16.4 million, or 45 percent, from migration of rural dwellers to the cities.⁹⁵

The young and the skilled were prone to depart to the city. The most critical motivation for rural out migration was the amenities and higher standard of living in town. It is indicated in surveys that the farther a distance from a district, the higher the rate of rural out migration. Education is also indicated as a reason for migration in the surveys until mid-1980's. The schools in rural areas suffered from deficiencies. The schools in rural areas were not adequately staffed, often one teacher taught different age groups in a combined class. The rural teachers were undertrained and overworked. Thus rural dwellers needed to leave the countryside and obtain further education in urban areas.⁹⁶

As a consequence of decades of rural out migration the number of large and medium cities increased. In 1926 the number of cities with 100,000 or more residents was 31 and three cities had more than 500,000 residents. The 1959 census indicated that there were 78 cities with 100,000 residents or more in the Russian Republic alone and the number of cities with the number of residents 500,000 or more was 14. By the 1979 census the number of Russian

⁹⁴ Chauncy D. Harris, "Urbanization and Population Growth in the Soviet Union, 1959-1970", *Geographical Review*, Vol. 61, No. 1, January 1971, pp. 102-124.

⁹⁵ Chauncy D. Harris, "Urbanization and Population Growth in the Soviet Union, 1959-1970", *Geographical Review*, Vol. 61, No. 1, January 1971, pp. 103.

⁹⁶ Stephen Wegren, A. Cooper Drury, "Patterns of Internal Migration During the Russian Transition", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.17, No.4, December 2001, p.21.

cities of at least 100,000 residents increased to 126 and there were 26 cities with 500,000 or more residents.⁹⁷

Another consequence of rural out-migration was the rural labour shortages. As a result of ineffective state controls on rural out-migration, departures were heaviest in regions where rural workers were already in short supply such as the Russian non-black earth region. For several decades the Soviet government encouraged rural out-migration in order to facilitate urbanization and provide a labour force for the expanding industrial capacity of the nation. In 1964, when Brezhnev came to power the Russian non-black earth regions were defined as 'futureless' villages and the state policy shifted away from encouraging rural out-migration to combat rural out flow. Accordingly from the mid- 1960's to the mid 1980's, a number of state programmes were adopted.⁹⁸

It is not possible to say that the programmes were successful. The greatest reduction in the rural population was seen between 1977 and 1989. Rural out migration in the Russian Republic averaged nearly one million persons a year during the second half of the 1970's and continued to decline during the 1980's. By the 1980's, since the population became older and less mobile the rural outflow was stabilized in 5 of the 11 economic regions. By the end of 1980's in 15 provinces of the Russian Republic 30- 40 per cent of the rural population was of pension age. "These consequences in turn placed

⁹⁷ Stephen Wegren, A. Cooper Drury, "Patterns of Internal Migration During the Russian Transition", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.17, No.4, December 2001, p.21.

⁹⁸ Stephen Wegren, A. Cooper Drury, "Patterns of Internal Migration During the Russian Transition", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.17, No.4, December 2001, p.21.

inherent limitations on an agrarian reform programme begun in 1990 that emphasized the creation of a private farming sector.”⁹⁹

2.3. The USSR Emigration

Until 1991 the Soviet Union remained an isolated country whose migratory exchanges with other countries were negligible. Emigration was allowed only for certain citizens in exchange for financial or political advantages of the Soviet state. Jean Claude Chesnais states that except the population movements due to the consequences of the Second World War such as frontier modifications, repatriation of prisoners, emigration affected only 500 000 people over the period 1946-1985. “The corresponding net emigration is only one tenth that of Romania, itself a closed country.”¹⁰⁰ When we compare with Sweden, a country where immigration is higher than emigration, with a population only one thirty fifth of the Soviet Union, had a flow of emigrants twice as great. “This is a measure of the enormous difference between a free country with high mobility and the Russian world where freedom of movement remains an aristocratic privilege.”¹⁰¹

It is difficult to reconstruct statistical series for the past going back to the nineteenth century, except for emigration to the United States, the country by far the most affected by emigration from the Russian Empire and even here we can consider only orders of magnitude because of the lack of detail on the nature of the migratory flows recorded (and in particular on the proportion of permanent settlement)¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Stephen Wegren, A. Cooper Drury, “Patterns of Internal Migration During the Russian Transition”, *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.17, No.4, December 2001, p.21.

¹⁰⁰ Jean Claude Chesnais, *The USSR Emigration: Past, Present and Future*, OECD, 1991, p.4

¹⁰¹ Jean Claude Chesnais, *The USSR Emigration: Past, Present and Future*, OECD, 1991, p.4.

¹⁰² Jean Claude Chesnais, *The USSR Emigration: Past, Present and Future*, OECD, 1991, p.4.

During the quarter century before the Revolution, Tsarist Russia saw about 3 million people leave for the United States. Migration during the Revolution is little documented, but the number of departures is generally estimated as 2 million or 1,5 million. According to existing estimates, between the period 1917 and 1991 the volume of emigration to the United States was only one sixth as great, approximately 500 000.¹⁰³

World War II had important consequences regarding population movements. There was the Soviet emigration into Western Europe. George Fischer lists three groups of emigrants; Soviet prisoners of war, forced laborers, "...Soviet Russians who went over to the German side during the war as on their own volition."¹⁰⁴

There were the Soviet annexations of territory on the western borders of the Soviet Union. These annexations brought huge transfers of population. For instance apart from the demographic exchanges between Poland and the Soviet Union it is estimated that between 1945 and 1950, 2.3 million Russians settled in the newly acquired territories of the Baltic states, Moldova, Belorussia, ex-Polish Ukraine and subcarpathian Ruthenia, while 220 000 Balts migrated or were deported to Russia and a further 200 000 emigrated to Western Europe.¹⁰⁵

Emigration was almost impossible because of the strict checks at frontiers, under KGB control. The case of the Baltic states was exceptional, with their advantage of access to the sea. Even in March 1991 Soviet emigration was a controlled phenomenon which, depends on a decision by the

¹⁰³ Jean Claude Chesnais, *The USSR Emigration: Past, Present and Future*, OECD, 1991, p.5.

¹⁰⁴ George Fischer, "The New Soviet Emigration", *Russian Review*, Vol.8, No.1, January 1949, p. 6.

¹⁰⁵ Lilia Shevtsova, "Post-Soviet Emigration Today and Tomorrow", *International Migration Review*, Vol.26, No.2, Special Issue: The New Europe and International Migration, Summer 1992, pp.241-257.

central authorities. There is the long and costly administrative procedure before the departures.

They are subject to quotas and for the most part take place under bilateral agreements, under western pressure, and are affected by fluctuations in the climate of international relations. The Jackson- Vanick amendment adopted by the United States Congress in 1974 linked the development of United States commercial relations with the Soviet Union to allowing Soviet Jews to emigrate. (Widgren 1990) and during the 1970s, at the time of the disarmament negotiations, the Soviet Union made the good will gesture of issuing several thousand additional exit visas for Jews waiting to emigrate to the United States and Israel.¹⁰⁶

In 1979, a year that marked a climax in Soviet emigration before the recent changes, the number of permanent departures amounted to only 48 193, of which 45 414 to Western countries and 2 779 to socialist countries.¹⁰⁷

As mentioned previously some liberalizations of the regime were introduced regarding the travel abroad in 1980s. As a consequence of the changes the regime governing exit from the country seems to become gradually more liberal and the opportunity to travel was no longer limited to the upper echelons of the Party. There was the rising trend in the number of Soviet citizens going abroad for a short stay (tourism, business or other) or permanent settlement between 1986 and 1991. In three years after 1986 the number of trips and departures increased eightfold.

The number of emigrants, which was only a few thousand each year in the mid 1980s, should reach 450 000 in 1990. This figure breaks down roughly as follows: 200 000 Jews, 145 000 Germans, 50 to 60 000 Armenians, 20 000 Greeks, etc. Thus almost 95 per cent of the emigrants belong to one of the four big minorities Jews, Germans, Armenians and Greeks with Western links, whereas these minorities make up only 2 per cent of the Soviet population. Although it is on the increase, emigration remains an “ethnic privilege”, each of the main minorities concerned being linked with countries that are powerful on the international scene (United States, Germany, Israel).¹⁰⁸

In total, between 1950 -1990, Soviet emigration is estimated as 1 200 000 people. It is critical that over half of this emigration was seen during 1989-

¹⁰⁶ Jean Claude Chesnais, *The USSR Emigration: Past, Present and Future*, OECD, 1991, p.6.

¹⁰⁷ Jean Claude Chesnais, *The USSR Emigration: Past, Present and Future*, OECD, 1991, p.6.

¹⁰⁸ Jean Claude Chesnais, *The USSR Emigration: Past, Present and Future*, OECD, 1991, p.7.

1990. Among these emigrants, about half were Jews, one third Germans and the rest either Armenians or Greeks or members of Christian religious sects with branches in the United States.¹⁰⁹ The various cases of these nationalities will be discussed separately.

It is argued by Lilia Shevtsova that the growth of self-consciousness among selected population groups whose ethnic homelands are outside the Common wealth territory, became a key motivation behind the emigration.¹¹⁰ Among the emigrants, Jews had a significant part. Most of the Jewish emigration has been to Israel. There is the influence of the change in United States policy in October 1989 about the entry limitations and the application of an Israeli-Soviet agreement. From the birth of the state of Israel 1948 to 1990, the number of immigrants from the Soviet Union totaled close to 400 000.¹¹¹

Between 1965 and 1990 the number of Soviet Jews emigrated to Israel was 370 000 people and 190 000 people emigrated to other countries including 173 000 to United States, 9 000 to Canada, 5 000 to Australia, 3 000 to Europe. There was no balance regarding the flow of emigration. The end of 1970's was the peak, it decreased sharply in the mid 1980s (Cold War), but has greatly increased afterwards.¹¹²

The second nationality that emigrated with high numbers is the Germans. The Federal Republic of Germany has the obligation to accept immigrants of German stock to its territory.

¹⁰⁹ Lilia Shevtsova, "Post-Soviet Emigration Today and Tomorrow", *International Migration Review*, Vol.26, No.2, Special Issue: The New Europe and International Migration, Summer 1992, pp.241-257

¹¹⁰ Lilia Shevtsova, "Post-Soviet Emigration Today and Tomorrow", *International Migration Review*, Vol.26, No.2, Special Issue: The New Europe and International Migration, Summer 1992, pp.241-257

¹¹¹ Lilia Shevtsova, "Post-Soviet Emigration Today and Tomorrow", *International Migration Review*, Vol.26, No.2, Special Issue: The New Europe and International Migration, Summer 1992, pp.241-257

¹¹² Jean Claude Chesnais, *The USSR Emigration: Past, Present and Future*, OECD, 1991, p.7.

Once the certificate of German origin is duly established, because of the *jus sanguinis* these are no longer considered to be either foreign refugees or economic immigrants, but immediately acquire German citizenship and, by virtue of this, full access to the civil and social rights of German nationals.¹¹³

Between the period 1950 and 1990, the Federal Republic of Germany received on its territory over 2 million refugees from the Soviet bloc except the GDR Germans, of these almost 20 per cent came from the Soviet Union.¹¹⁴

Between 1950 and 1970 emigration of the German minority from the Soviet Union was around only a thousand people a year. Starting from 1989, the number began to increase. The German emigration from the Soviet Union was 145 000 in 1990. The total number of Soviet emigrants from the Soviet Union to Federal Republic of Germany, was 400 000 between 1950 and 1990. Immigration into Germany by Soviet citizens not of German stock is not significant. In the decade 1980-1989, the number of Soviet people applying for asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany, which accepts more Soviet refugees than any other country in Europe, totaled only 783.¹¹⁵

Thirdly Armenian emigrants had a high departure rate. The descendants of the Armenian emigrants are attracted by promises of a better life made to them after the Second World War by the Soviet authorities. Mostly the Armenian emigrants are from Soviet Armenia. Low standard of living, political difficulties and confrontation with the Azerbaijanis led were defined as the pressure to return to the West: 11 000 Armenians left the Soviet Union in 1988, 20 000 in 1989, 50 to 60 000 in 1990. Most of these emigrants were destined to

¹¹³ Jean Claude Chesnais, *The USSR Emigration: Past, Present and Future*, OECD, 1991, p.8.

¹¹⁴ Jean Claude Chesnais, *The USSR Emigration: Past, Present and Future*, OECD, 1991, p.8.

¹¹⁵ Lilia Shevtsova, "Post-Soviet Emigration Today and Tomorrow", *International Migration Review*, Vol.26, No.2, Special Issue: The New Europe and International Migration, Summer 1992, pp.241-257

California. The total number of Armenian emigrants were estimated as 100 000.¹¹⁶

The Greek repatriation is also critical. The emigration of Greeks from the Black Sea to Athens affects only small numbers: 10 600 in 1989, about 20 000 in 1990.¹¹⁷

Until 1991, few countries have been concerned by Soviet emigration. Those countries are; Israel, Germany, United States, Greece, Canada. Traditionally, the United States and to a lesser extent Canada and Australia have been receiving countries for Russian and Soviet emigrants.

The number of Soviet refugees was less than 1 000 a year in the mid 1980s in the United States. The number began to grow rapidly until it reached the maximum allowed by the law: 50000 in 1990. The United States is the only country where the number of Soviet refugees exceeds the number of refugees from Eastern European countries. The Soviet refugees in the United States are mostly the members of the Jewish and Armenian communities.¹¹⁸

During the period 1946-1989, the number of Canadian immigration from the Soviet Union, excluding the Baltic States was 50 000. The rate of the Baltic emigration to Canada was very high during the Second World War, the annexation of the Soviet Union. 30 000 people emigrated during the post war period. The rate decreased to 106 between 1981 and 1989.¹¹⁹

Australia and South Africa take only very small flows of Soviet emigrants. As it is mentioned, the Soviet emigration affects only certain

¹¹⁶ Jean Claude Chesnais, *The USSR Emigration: Past, Present and Future*, OECD, 1991, p.8.

¹¹⁷ Russia, Goskomstat
<<http://www.gks.ru>> (Accessed on 1 August 2008)

¹¹⁸ Jean Claude Chesnais, *The USSR Emigration: Past, Present and Future*, OECD, 1991, p.8.

¹¹⁹ Jean Claude Chesnais, *The USSR Emigration: Past, Present and Future*, OECD, 1991, p.9.

westernized minorities. There are approximately 15 minorities with a strong ethnic consciousness.

Besides the Germans and Jews that had high emigration rates, certain Soviet citizens are considered not to be the members of the 'indigenous nationalities'. Poles are the largest group with more than 1 million. Then come the Koreans with 439 000 and the Greeks, 330 000 at the end of 1990. The desire to emigrate is the strongest among the members of these minority groups. Jean Claude Chesnais identifies four groups of potential migrants. After the first group made up of Germans and Jews (their total number is nearly 3 million at the end of 1990), there is a second group made up of members of non-indigenous minorities, also totaling some 3 million people.¹²⁰

A third group is composed of the other members of westernized minorities. It totals 14 million people, 5.5 million of them Balts, who have a territory and the hope of national reconstruction, but also substantial family networks abroad, in Europe, North America and Australia.¹²¹

Populations uprooted from European Russia and now living outside their ethnic territory is another group, which is also seen as potential migrants. This group consists mainly of Russians and Ukrainians living outside their republic of origin.¹²²

The fifth and last group is made up of populations with their roots within the Soviet Union and very little contact with the western world. Because they have no bonds with the outside world these populations are unlikely to be represented to any extent among the emigrants.

¹²⁰ Jean Claude Chesnais, *The USSR Emigration: Past, Present and Future*, OECD, 1991.

¹²¹ Jean Claude Chesnais, *The USSR Emigration: Past, Present and Future*, OECD, 1991, p.10.

¹²² Paul Kolstoe, *Russians in the Former Soviet Republics*, London: Hurst Company, 1995, p.49.

As a consequence of Soviet isolationism there were no Soviet citizens living in other countries, including countries that are geographically close and in the position of privileged trading partners with the Soviet Union.

Thus at the end of 1989, there were only 11 533 Soviet citizens in West Germany, the Soviet Union's biggest trading partner, while the active Soviet population was even smaller than that of Bulgarians and represented no more than 2 percent of the labor force from the socialist countries, even though three quarters of the population of these countries are Soviet citizens.¹²³

2.4. The Efficiency of Migration Policies of the USSR

The former Soviet state attempted to regulate the patterns of population movement and urban growth through an internal passport system and limits on central city registration. The passport system had difficulties in implementing a systematic control over population movements that had been planned at the beginning.¹²⁴

The Soviet emigration specialists argued that the passport and *propiska* system was necessary since the efficient use of labour can only be achieved through the managed migration. Passports and *propiska* regulations were a part of the scientific approach of management of population.¹²⁵

The internal mobility restrictions of the former Soviet Union (FSU) were put in place for various reasons. First some cities were restricted because they involved significant military activities. Among those cities some were totally secret and not even appeared on the map while others were "closed" because much of their production was of a military character. Second reason for

¹²³ Jean Claude Chesnais, *The USSR Emigration: Past, Present and Future*, OECD, 1991, p.12.

¹²⁴ Gijs Kessler, "The Passport System and State Control over Population Flows in the Soviet Union, 1932-1940", *Cahiers du Monde russe*, Vol. 42, No. 2-3-4, April-December 2002, p.501. <<http://monderusse.revues.org/docannexe3921.html>> (Accessed on 16 June 2008).

¹²⁵ Cyntia Buckley, "The Myth of Managed Migration: Migration Control and Market in the Soviet Period", *Slavic Review*, Vol.54, No.4, Winter, 1995, pp. 896-916.

the restrictions was the desire of the planners to control the distribution of economic activity and labor force. Third reason was based on the understanding of a socialist city.

The socialist city would be a city in which all aspects of urban activity including production, and outcomes often observed in capitalist less developed economies, for example, poverty resulting from excessive immigration vis-à-vis available employment and infrastructure, would be eliminated.¹²⁶

The influence of the passport and *propiska* restrictions is extensively questioned and discussed.

...the passport and "*propiska*" system generated a situation in which potential migrants either acquired *propiskas* through semi-legal avenues, denied themselves access to distributional networks or elected not to migrate.¹²⁷

Cynthia Buckley argues that macro analyses of population trends indicate that passport and *propiska* restrictions exerted only a slight influence on aggregate urbanization patterns and migration flows. "By failing to motivate potential migrants to remain in their locations of origin, they did not fulfil their expressed intent of scientifically managing migration through administrative means."¹²⁸

It is discussed by Ira N. Gang and Robert C. Stuart that the rural to urban migration flows responded to the factors that are underlined by the market economies especially the costs and benefits associated with sending and receiving regions. In the FSU efforts to control population movement for the most part did not focus on the basic reasons for that movement.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ Ira N. Gang, Robert C. Stuart, "Mobility Where Mobility is Illegal: Internal Migration and City Growth in the Soviet Union", *Journal of Population Economics*, Vol.12, 1999, p.118.

¹²⁷ Cynthia Buckley, "The Myth of Managed Migration: Migration Control and Market in the Soviet Period", *Slavic Review*, Vol.54, No.4, Winter, 1995, pp. 896-916.

¹²⁸ Cynthia Buckley, "The Myth of Managed Migration: Migration Control and Market in the Soviet Period", *Slavic Review*, Vol.54, No.4, Winter, 1995, pp. 896-916.

¹²⁹ Ira N. Gang, Robert C. Stuart, "Mobility Where Mobility is Illegal: Internal Migration and City Growth in the Soviet Union", *Journal of Population Economics*, Vol.12, 1999, p.121.

City growth and population distribution under the regimes with socialist political and economic institutions cannot be illuminated by market oriented economic frameworks. In the example of the Soviet Union with the state controlled centrally planned economy there was no market that may function as intervening mechanisms. In migration decision making the non existence of functioning markets to reflect scarcity, would prevent the connection of individual- level preference sets and collective priorities. Theoretically it is expected for individuals to act according to personal preferences without taking into account the concerns of scarcity, distribution or equity. Significant factors would be religious affiliation, age, ethnicity or family related variables.

In the Soviet Union the costs for goods were not significantly differentiated by region but access was highly differentiated. The higher quality and more consistent supply of cultural and economic goods were found in urban areas. Thus the Soviet economy was a system of differential allocation. “The allocation system provided motivation for migration, while the wage and price structure worked to minimize the potential costs of individual decision making concerning migration.”¹³⁰

Soviet policies were focused on restricting choices available rather than on addressing motivations for migration. The state eliminated potential destination points from the official list. The policies of the Soviet state were focused on impediments to true socialist migration, with the assumption that the elimination of the impediments would bring the problem-free migration. Migration was to be scientific, predictable and planned. The movement of population was seen as a process that could be directed and presumably perfected.

In 1956, restrictions on new inhabitants were expanded to cover a total of 48 cities which were “closed” to immigration. In another 23 cities the

¹³⁰ Cyntia Buckley, “The Myth of Managed Migration: Migration Control and Market in the Soviet Period”, *Slavic Review*, Vol.54, No.4, Winter, 1995, pp. 896-916.

expansion of employment was restricted considering the future economic and investment plans. In closed cities the total population grew but there was larger proportional growth for urban areas free from *propiska* limitations. The general result indicates that non-closed cities grew slightly faster than closed cities in the USSR and Russia. In contrast the exact effects of restrictions cannot be assessed since the trajectories of non-restricted growth for “closed” cities are not known. It is possible to say that the *propiska* limitations did not prevent the growth of the “closed” cities.¹³¹

As long as motivations for migration persisted methods to avoid administrative restrictions could be found. There were two categories of circumvention. First category was the inclusive methods, through which *propiskas* were obtained through semi-legal and illegal means. Second category was the exclusive methods, by which migrants without official documentation resided where they chose. It is indicated by some that there was widespread corruption and fraud at a Moscow passport office in the mid 1980s. Marriages in name only between restricted city residents were means of acquiring a *propiska*. Also bribes to officials in passport offices were common.

The inability to constantly monitor the population, high labour demand for low prestige jobs and prevalence of a second economy all increased the opportunities for migration without official registration. Motivated migrants doubled up with relatives, rented apartments from “legal” residents and in extreme cases resided in train stations and public buildings. Lack of official registration in most cases prevented them from accessing urban distributional networks, such as polyclinics, schools and ration coupons. Thus, their illegal status kept them marginalized.¹³²

There is no specific data concerning the composition of the migration streams into “closed” cities, however the age selective nature of urban in-migration is seen by the last four Soviet censuses that indicate the aggregate

¹³¹Cynthia Buckley, “The Myth of Managed Migration: Migration Control and Market in the Soviet Period”, *Slavic Review*, Vol.54, No.4, Winter, 1995, pp. 896-916.

¹³²Cynthia Buckley, “The Myth of Managed Migration: Migration Control and Market in the Soviet Period”, *Slavic Review*, Vol.54, No.4, Winter, 1995, p. 908.

age-composition by rural and urban location. Starting from 1975 urban populations mostly resided in “closed” cities, have a greater work force than rural areas.

While evaluating the general, it is possible to say that the managed urbanization was ineffective however restricted urban in-migration had some effect. There was competition for the ability to migrate. Education, age, family ties were key factors in the competition. Since the motivations for migration existed, the passport regime was unable to prevent migration to the restricted cities. Those motivated to migrate, who were mostly the young, educated and unmarried, employed various methods of circumvention.¹³³

Cynthia Buckley argues that the inability of the propiska and passport system to either control the total growth of major cities or to stop rural out-migration illuminates the myth of managed migration under the Soviet regime. In the example of the Soviet Union the intension of the state was to create the proper population distribution via administrative control over migration. “But the system failed to scientifically manage migration flows; instead migrants selected destinations by level of provision and access to means of circumvention.”¹³⁴ Since it is not possible learn the possible migration patterns in the case of an unrestricted migration, it is difficult to say the passport and propiska system was ineffective. “In addition to excluding illegal migrants from the distribution of scarce goods, the punitive framework encouraged them to keep their presence hidden. They were kept out of sight, contributing to the illusion of control.”¹³⁵

¹³³Cynthia Buckley, “The Myth of Managed Migration: Migration Control and Market in the Soviet Period”, *Slavic Review*, Vol.54, No.4, Winter, 1995, p. 910.

¹³⁴ Cynthia Buckley, “The Myth of Managed Migration: Migration Control and Market in the Soviet Period”, *Slavic Review*, Vol.54, No.4, Winter, 1995, p. 910.

¹³⁵ Cynthia Buckley, “The Myth of Managed Migration: Migration Control and Market in the Soviet Period”, *Slavic Review*, Vol.54, No.4, Winter, 1995, p. 911.

Housing rights to a particular state apartment or space in a state dormitory; access to education, and health care and the ability to purchase deficit items, such as shampoo or paper napkins required the presentation of propiska. Migrants were circumventing the propiska restrictions however the Soviet state became able to restrict access to distributional networks by this way. “A minimum level of control for rationing purposes in times of scarcity was provided.”¹³⁶

The average annual growth rate of the Soviet population was 1.09% in 1959, 1.20% in 1970 and 0.84% in 1980 and 0.89% in 1988. The share of the urban Soviet population increased from 48% in 1959 to 66% in 1989.¹³⁷

Between 1959 and 1969, natural increase (that is excess of births over deaths within the urban sector) accounted for 40% of total urban growth, while rural to urban migration accounted for 46%, the remaining 14% derived from reclassification. For the period 1970-1979, natural increase accounted for 44% of total while reclassification and rural to urban migration together accounted for 56% of urban growth.¹³⁸

Ira N. Gang and Robert C. Stuart analyze a sample of 308 Soviet cities to indicate the effects of city controls. According to their findings there are pervasive differences between controlled and uncontrolled cities. The uncontrolled cities grow faster in almost all cases. Gang and Stuart argue that the rate of net migration improved through the 1960's and slowing afterward. Moreover migration into smaller cities generally proceeded at a faster rate than larger cities. In most of the cases unrestricted cities grew more rapidly than restricted cities. There are also some exceptions. “In 1959 and 1970, for cities less than 250 thousand, cities with an expansion restriction grew more rapidly

¹³⁶ Cynthia Buckley, “The Myth of Managed Migration: Migration Control and Market in the Soviet Period”, *Slavic Review*, Vol.54, No.4, Winter, 1995, p. 911.

¹³⁷ Ira N. Gang, Robert C. Stuart, “Mobility Where Mobility is Illegal: Internal Migration and City Growth in the Soviet Union”, *Journal of Population Economics*, Vol.12, 1999, p.121.

¹³⁸ Ira N. Gang, Robert C. Stuart, “Mobility Where Mobility is Illegal: Internal Migration and City Growth in the Soviet Union”, *Journal of Population Economics*, Vol.12, 1999, p.121.

than those without any restriction.”¹³⁹ This exception can be defined as a consequence of lack of implementation of restrictions and the emphasis on promoting economic activity in generally smaller cities. Administrative capitals generally grew more slowly than unrestricted cities. Totally restricted republic capitals grew faster in 1980 and 1988 in comparison with other cities with total restrictions .

The Soviet Union experienced crucial and varying city growth from the 1940s through the 1980s. The rate of city growth is increasing through the 1960s and after declining through 1980s. Gang and Stuart argue that according to the analysis of the sample cities, unrestricted cities grew significantly more rapidly than restricted cities, by a factor of more than 2, a difference largely sustained over time. There are five points underlined by Gang and Stuart as the analysis of the sample Soviet cities. First, “...restrictions mattered in the 1980s but not in 1970 or 1959, in the sense that restricted cities had lower immigration than those cities without restriction.”¹⁴⁰ Second, the distinction between an expansion restriction seemed to be modest. “Third with the exception of 1988, our control for city size matters, understandable insofar as we would expect larger cities to be growing at lower rates, than smaller cities.”¹⁴¹ Fourth starting from 1970 cities that were republic capitals grew faster than cities that were not republic capitals. Finally net migration into the cities of the FSU varies according to republics. Russian and Ukrainian cities were likely to have larger net migration in comparison with those in other republics.

¹³⁹ Ira N. Gang, Robert C. Stuart, “Mobility Where Mobility is Illegal: Internal Migration and City Growth in the Soviet Union”, *Journal of Population Economics*, Vol.12, 1999, p.125.

¹⁴⁰ Ira N. Gang, Robert C. Stuart, “Mobility Where Mobility is Illegal: Internal Migration and City Growth in the Soviet Union”, *Journal of Population Economics*, Vol.12, 1999, p.128.

¹⁴¹ Ira N. Gang, Robert C. Stuart, “Mobility Where Mobility is Illegal: Internal Migration and City Growth in the Soviet Union”, *Journal of Population Economics*, Vol.12, 1999, p.128.

Gang and Stuart argue that the economic factors were important in the growth of expansion cities, and restrictions on them had a greater effect on their net migration than on the totally restricted cities. Moreover “in expansion restricted cities, housing has a large, positive and statistically significant impact on net migration. For totally restricted cities the effect of housing is close to zero. Similar patterns can be observed with the other interaction terms.”¹⁴² Another point underlined by Gang and Stuart is the significance of being a republic capital that became evident in the 1980s.

Through the analysis of a large sample of 308 cities and a smaller sample of 29 cities, Gang and Stuart concluded that restricted cities grew via net migration less rapidly than unrestricted cities, however there are exceptions. Restrictions mattered less in the earlier post war years and more in latter years. The study of Gang and Stuart also underlines the regional differences such as the faster expansion of cities in the Russian Republic.¹⁴³

2.5. Conclusion

The Soviet Union experienced traumatic population changes at various times. War, revolution, internal strife and famine caused serious population losses. Migrations were also very critical regarding the redistribution of the populations. The case of the Soviet Union was unique with respect to migration. First the nature of migration was different; it was not spontaneous, but closely controlled, organized and planned.¹⁴⁴ The government of the Soviet

¹⁴² Ira N. Gang, Robert C. Stuart, “Mobility Where Mobility is Illegal: Internal Migration and City Growth in the Soviet Union”, *Journal of Population Economics*, Vol.12, 1999, p.131.

¹⁴³ Ira N. Gang, Robert C. Stuart, “Mobility Where Mobility is Illegal: Internal Migration and City Growth in the Soviet Union”, *Journal of Population Economics*, Vol.12, 1999, p.131.

¹⁴⁴ Jean Claude Chesnais, *The USSR Emigration: Past, Present and Future*, OECD, 1991, p.4

Union operated one of the strictest internal passport regimes on record. All citizens of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) were issued internal passports. A number of medium and large cities were “closed”, explicitly limiting growth of city population from migration. There were two types of administrative restrictions of cities; total and expansion. The total restriction implied a residence permit, *propiska* limitation and an expansion restriction limited the expansion of enterprises.¹⁴⁵

Parallel to the regulations introduced by the Soviet state the population was redistributed. The internal migration of the Soviet Union was characterized by rural out migration that brought the depopulation of northern and western regions. Besides the massive depopulation of these regions, the southern part of the Soviet Union experienced rapid population growth. For the period 1959 to 1970 net in migration was highest in the North Caucasus Region.¹⁴⁶

As a consequence of strict control system emigration was almost impossible in the Soviet Union for a long period. The number of emigrants was only a few thousand each year in the mid 1980s. Emigrants were Jews, Germans, Armenians or Greeks with Western links.¹⁴⁷

Although there were grand legislative obstacles against migration in the Soviet Union, the Soviet system based on the management of migration did not motivate the potential migrants to remain in their locations of origin. Since the motivations persisted, informal methods to avoid the administrative restrictions were found by the Soviet citizens.

¹⁴⁵ Ira N. Gang, Robert C. Stuart, “Mobility Where Mobility is Illegal: Internal Migration and City Growth in the Soviet Union”, *Journal of Population Economics*, Vol.12, 1999, p.128.

¹⁴⁶ Blaine Ball, George J. Demko, “Internal Migration in the Soviet Union”, *Economic Geography*, Vol.54, No. 2, April 1978, pp. 95-114.

¹⁴⁷ Jean Claude Chesnais, *The USSR Emigration: Past, Present and Future*, OECD, 1991, p.4-8.

CHAPTER III

MIGRATION POLICY OF RUSSIA

The collapse of the Soviet Union, encouraged an increase in migration, including internal and cross-border movements. Also the number of undocumented migrants rapidly increased. New migration patterns were introduced. The post-Soviet region is one of the world's most critical regions regarding migration and Russia is the second largest immigration country worldwide. Also the number of undocumented immigrants in Russia is estimated as 3 million and 3.5 million.¹⁴⁸ Thus the issue of migration policy is very critical in the Russian context. This chapter focuses on the migration policy of Russia. At the beginning of the chapter the notions of migration policy and migration policy failure is discussed. In addition Russian legislative and institutional framework of migration policy is examined in this chapter.

Russian Federation experienced important turning points in its history. Although there is the Soviet heritage, the structure of the contemporary Russia is socially, economically, culturally and politically different from the Soviet Union. The dissolution of Russia, not only introduced new borders but also changed the political, economic and social system in Russia. Russia's experience of migrations needs to be considered in this context.

¹⁴⁸ Ali Mansoor, Bryce Quillin, *Migration and Remittances Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, Washington: The World Bank, 2006, p.1.

3.1. Migration Policy

International migration influences social, economic and political changes. Today there is increasing population movements, however effective immigration controls have rarely been put in place.

Although there are undocumented migrations, the state policies of migration still cannot be ignored. There is still the significant role of migration policies on migration patterns.¹⁴⁹

Gary P. Freeman defines the notion of migration policy as the

... state efforts to regulate and control entry into the national territory and to stipulate conditions of residence of persons seeking permanent settlement, temporary work or political asylum.¹⁵⁰

Eytan Meyers argues that immigration control policy is the process of the admission of permanent immigrants, temporary migrant workers and refugees. Furthermore combating illegal migration is a part of immigration control policy.¹⁵¹

There are two parts of immigration policy. First; “immigration control policy or immigration regulation, namely the rules and procedures governing the selection and admission of foreign citizens...”¹⁵² Second part is the immigrants policy, which refers to the conditions provided to resident immigrants such as educational opportunities or work and housing conditions.

¹⁴⁹ Stephen Castles, “Why Migration Policies Fail”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.27, No.2, March 2004, pp. 205-227.

¹⁵⁰ Gary P. Freeman, “Migration Policy and Politics in the Receiving States”, *International Migration Review*, Vol.26, No.4, Winter 1992, pp. 1145.

¹⁵¹ Eytan Meyers, “Theories of International Immigration Policy- A Comparative Analysis”, *International Migration Review*, Vol. 34, No.4, Winter 2000, pp. 1246.

¹⁵² Eytan Meyers, “Theories of International Immigration Policy- A Comparative Analysis”, *International Migration Review*, Vol. 34, No.4, Winter 2000, pp. 1246.

Since the issue of migration policy is interdisciplinary. The issue is discussed by various fields. There is the interest in migration within anthropology, demography, economy, education, geography, history, political science, psychology and sociology.¹⁵³ Accordingly several approaches were introduced regarding the theory of immigration policy.

In most of the host states there is the public resistance against migration, however popular demand for tighter immigration control is most of the times faces limited state responses. Immigration policy making consists of different dynamics. There is the influence of domestic interest groups, political institutions and international relations.¹⁵⁴

First, the role of the domestic interest groups is significant in explaining immigration policy. In democratic states the role of interest groups are seen critical. "Migration is perceived as advantageous by some groups, and as negative by others."¹⁵⁵ As a consequence of the migration inflows, wages fall and owners of the land and capital benefit. This point is also underlined by the Marxist approach. The Marxist approach sees the labour immigration as a part of capitalism. Labour immigration is to the advantage of capitalist ruling class according to Marxist approach. Marxism underlines several points that capitalists benefit from immigration. For instance capitalists use immigrant labour as a tool in order to lessen wages of the working class. Immigration prevents instability in economy, immigration influences production costs and counteracts structural inflation, and immigration prevents the tendency of profits to fall. "...according to some Marxists, immigrant labour enters the

¹⁵³ Tomas Hammar, Grete Brochmann, Kristof Tamas, Thomas Faist, *International Migration, Immobility and Development Multidisciplinary Perspectives*, Oxford, New York, 1997, p.13.

¹⁵⁴ Wayne A. Cornelius and Marc R. Rosenblum, "Immigration and Politics", *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol.8, 2005, pp.99-119.
<<http://polisci.annualreviews.org>> (Accessed on 5 March 2008)

¹⁵⁵ Stephen Castles, "Why Migration Policies Fail", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.27, No. 2, March 2004, pp.205-227.

society at the lowest tier of the socioeconomic ladder, thereby raising the native workers to a higher tier and lessening the intensity of class conflict.”¹⁵⁶

Another point is the position of labour unions with respect to migration. Traditionally labour unions opposed new waves of immigrants, however recently the attitudes of unions towards immigrants have changed. Today especially U.S. and European Union countries are organizing immigrants as new members instead of blocking their entry into the labour market.

There are also noneconomic interest groups including recently arrived immigrant and ethnic groups. In contrast anti immigration groups underline national identity concerns and ecological capacity.

...it is argued that the benefits of migration are concentrated and accrue to privileged groups with powerful peak associations, whereas the costs of migration are diffuse and its opponents divided.¹⁵⁷

Second there is the influence of political institutions in the process of immigration policy making. Various approaches of migration policy theory underlines a variety of points. For instance the Marxist approach argues that economic factors shape immigration policies. The class based political process is seen as a factor of immigration policies. The Marxist approach underlines the relation between economic dynamics and immigration policies. The rational/institutionalist approach focus on the interaction between policy coalitions and legislative institutions. Moreover according to another view, institutions such as constitutions and judicial systems are the factor that

¹⁵⁶ Eytan Meyers, “Theories of International Immigration Policy- A Comparative Analysis”, *International Migration Review*, Vol. 34, No.4, Winter 2000, pp. 1249.

¹⁵⁷ Wayne A. Cornelius and Marc R. Rosenblum, “Immigration and Politics”, *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol.8, 2005, pp.107.
<<http://polisci.annualreviews.org>> (Accessed on March 2008)

constrains the states with respect to the enforcement of strong immigration control laws.¹⁵⁸

Third, besides national political dynamics international pressures have influenced migration policies.¹⁵⁹ There are three arguments based on the interaction between immigration policy and the international system. First argument is about the global, economic and political integration. Globalization, increasing economic integration, creation of global metropolises became pressures against tighter immigration control. Second argument is about the relationship between population movements and national security. With the end of the Cold War, new threats do not come from sovereign states instead from non-state actors. In this context international migration is interpreted as a security threat.¹⁶⁰ Many migration flows are the result of international conflict. Also there are examples of cases in which migration flows are a source of international conflict and insecurity.

Before a discussion of the Russian migration policy, it is significant to examine the policy failure. Through an analytical perspective migration policy "...failure can be said to occur when a policy does not achieve its stated objectives."¹⁶¹ In this perspective there is the assumption that the objectives of the migration policy are open, however there may be unclear points. Politicians may not declare their true objectives all the time. Thus it is also critical to be able to examine the true objectives. Moreover it is not possible to evaluate

¹⁵⁸ Wayne A. Cornelius and Marc R. Rosenblum, "Immigration and Politics", *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol.8, 2005, pp.108.
<<http://polisci.annualreviews.org>> (Accessed on March 2008)

¹⁵⁹ Gary P. Freeman, "Migration Policy and Politics in the Receiving States", *International Migration Review*, Vol.26, No.4, Winter 1992, pp. 1144 -1167.

¹⁶⁰ Tomas Faist, "The Migration Security Nexus. International Migration and Security before and after 9/11", *Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration Ethnic Relations*, Vol.4, No.3, 2004.

¹⁶¹ Stephen Castles, "Why Migration Policies Fail", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.27, No. 2, March 2004, pp.207.

migration policy success strictly, since there may be both successful and unsuccessful consequences according to the objectives. Policies may achieve some of the objectives but not all.¹⁶²

3.2. Russian Legislative Framework

Timothy Heleniak argues that there are several stages of the Russian migration policy.¹⁶³ In 1989-1991, there was no framework of legislation or institution and the migration issues were not dealt systematically. In 1992-1993, social, political and economic conditions have totally changed and there was the need for the reformation of the Russian migration policy. Thus this period can be defined as formation. 1995-1999 was the period of improving regulation and development of migration legislation. During 2002-2004 there was the focus on combating irregular migration and restrictive policies. Since 2005 there is the reformation of the migration policy.¹⁶⁴

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the population movements between the former republics of the Soviet Union necessitated the adoption of legislation to manage these flows. The issue of the displaced persons determined the approach towards the notions of nationality, citizenship, territory and state responsibility.

¹⁶² Stephen Castles, "Why Migration Policies Fail", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.27, No. 2, March 2004, pp.207.

¹⁶³ Timothy Heleniak, *Migration Dilemmas Haunt Post-Soviet Russia*, October 2002 <<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=62>> (Accessed on 20 May 2008)

¹⁶⁴ Natalia Voronina, "Outlook on Migration Policy Reform in Russia: Contemporary Challenges and Political Paradoxes", in Roger Rodriguez Rios (ed.), *Migration Perspectives Eastern Europe and Central Asia*, Austria: International Organization for Migration, October 2006.

The Russian legislative introduced “a dual category of displaced person entitled to refuge and assistance upon entry to Russia: the refugee and ‘the forced migrant’”.¹⁶⁵ The Russian legislative introduced “a dual category of displaced person entitled to refuge and assistance upon entry to Russia: the refugee and the forced migrant”. The settlement in Russia of all displaced people on former USSR territory and the refugees from the ‘far abroad’ was permitted by this legislation. The legislation was based on the 1951 UN Convention, to which Russia became a signatory in December 1992. Although this characteristic of the legislation seem ‘liberal’, the all encompassing nature of the legislation is parallel with the approach of the Russian imperial state especially that was seen during the World War I.

There are three laws at the base of the legislative framework about displaced persons in the Russian Federation. ‘The Law on Refugees’ passed on 19 February 1993; ‘The Law on Forced Migrants’ also passed on 19 February 1993; and ‘The Law on Citizenship’ came into effect on 6 February 1992. However there were significant amendments. The Law on Refugees was amended on 28 June 1997, 21 July 1998, 7 August, 7 November 2000, 30 June 2003, 29 June, 22 August 2004.¹⁶⁶

The amendments were critical turning points since the migration policy of the Russian Federation has changed accordingly. Stages of the migration policy of the Russian Federation were shaped through the amendments.

¹⁶⁵ Russian Federation, Immigration Law and Policy
<<http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=131&lid=529&less=false>>, is an internet-based free-of-charge legislative database published and maintained by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. (Accessed on 10 June 2008)

¹⁶⁶ Russian Federation, Immigration Law and Policy
<<http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=131&lid=529&less=false>> (Accessed on 10 June 2008)

According to article 1 of the Russian Federation the Law on Refugees, granting of asylum and refugee status is in accordance with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.

According to the Law on Forced Migrants of 1995, citizens from the former Soviet Union may also be granted "forced migrant" status. Article 1 of the Law on Forced Migrants defines forced migrant status. The definitions of 'refugees' and 'forced migrants' are significant since there is a significant distinction. First,

A refugee is an individual who does not have citizenship of the Russian Federation and who has, or wants to, come to the Russian Federation and who has been forced to leave, or who has the intention of leaving, his or her place of residence on the territory of another state as a result of violence or other form of persecution towards him or herself, or who is under real threat of being subjected to such on the grounds of his or her race, nationality, religion, language, affiliation to a particular social group or political conviction.¹⁶⁷

Second,

A forced migrant is an individual who has citizenship of the Russian Federation and who has left, or intends to leave, his or her place of residence on the territory of another state or on the territory of the Russian Federation as a result of violence or other form of persecution towards him or herself or members of his or her family, or who is under real threat of being subjected to persecution on the grounds of his or her race, nationality, religion, language, affiliation to a particular social group or political conviction in connection with the conducting of hostile campaigns towards individuals or groups of individuals, mass violations of public order or other circumstances significantly restricting human rights.¹⁶⁸

The essential difference between a legally defined 'refugee' and 'forced migrant' is Russian citizenship. Thus the Law on Citizenship is the third branch of the legal framework. The Law on Citizenship came into effect on 6 February 1992. Article 18 of the Law on Citizenship allows Russian citizenship to all

¹⁶⁷ Hilary Pilkington, *Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.37.

¹⁶⁸ Hilary Pilkington, *Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.37.

those who held USSR citizenship on that day and who were resident in a former Soviet republic prior to that day. Application within three years of the law's promulgation and not being a citizen of another republic, were necessary however an amendment on 18 January 1995 extended the three year period to apply to 31 December 2000.

Foreign citizens and stateless persons must fulfil a five year residence requirement to qualify for citizenship. Also important for refugees and forced migrants was the addition to this law, passed on 17 June 1993 which abolished the requirement for 'permanent residence' and documental proof of refusal of any former citizenship.¹⁶⁹

It is critical to note that "In spite of this law, the policy towards the diaspora was not to encourage a mass return to the Russian homeland, but rather to protect their rights in the new countries where they resided."¹⁷⁰

With the introduction of these laws, Russia enacted liberal domestic legislation and accepted the humanitarian international refugee regime on surface. At the end of 1992 Russia signed the 1951 United Nations convention and the 1967 protocol on the status of refugees that came into force from 4 May 1993. "...this meant that as a country of first resort Russia had to make provision for the care of foreigners fleeing their countries outside the former Soviet Union and seeking refuge in Russia."¹⁷¹

It is the general comment that the 1992-1993 legislative structure comply with the international structures. According to Yuri Andrienko and

¹⁶⁹ Hilary Pilkington, *Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.38.

¹⁷⁰ Timothy Heleniak, *Migration Dilemmas Haunt Post-Soviet Russia*, October 2002 <<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=62>> (Accessed on 20 May 2008)

¹⁷¹ Hilary Pilkington, *Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.38.

Sergei Guriev the general orientation of the migration regime was quite liberal.¹⁷² The laws clearly arrange the rights of refugees and forced migrants. Also it is possible to evaluate the laws as a development towards lessening the problems encountered by refugees before the adoption of legislation. The status of refugees and forced migrants had some benefits such as a one-off payment to the most socially vulnerable categories of refugees and forced migrants.

There were also some problematic points of the legislation. The basic difficulty with the legislation passed in 1993 was the lack of clarity. Although in theory the distinction of refugee and forced migrant was clear, there were problems in practice. For instance, people leaving very different circumstances had the same legal status. Another problem was about the status of those arriving from the 'near abroad'. Eligibility for status was determined through a bureaucratic process. Each individual case was not evaluated instead a list of refugee producing regions of the former Soviet Union was created. Individuals out of these regions, had to apply to the local migration services. The regional policies of the local migration service commission were determining whether to grant status. Thus regional variations were inevitable.¹⁷³

Another problematic point of the legislative system of the 1990's was the contradictory status of the *propiska*. The residence permit, *propiska* was abolished as of 1 October 1993. The use of *propiska* as a mechanism to control population movements was ended. "...but key areas, most notably Moscow and the provinces of the North Caucasus, openly flout the law."¹⁷⁴ Although the abolition of *propiska* was popular, the central and local bureaucracies believed

¹⁷² Yuri Adrienko, Sergei Guriev, "Understanding Migration in Russia", Center for Economic and Financial Research at News Economic School (CEFIR), Policy Paper Series, No.23, November 2005.

¹⁷³ Hilary Pilkington, *Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.39.

¹⁷⁴ Dominique Arel, "Demography and Politics in the First Post-Soviet Censuses: Mistrusted State, Contested Identities", *Population*, Vol.57, No. 6, Nov-Dec 2002, p. 805.

that abolition could encourage a wave of illegal migration. This approach of the bureaucracy encouraged local authorities and local authorities continued to use the residence permit to resist the registration of refugees and forced migrants. Local authorities have been able to introduce their own procedures.

Without doubt the greatest violations of the right to choose one's place of residence have occurred in Moscow. The Moscow authorities have exploited widespread belief in Moscow's 'refugee problem' to violate the laws on refugees and forced migrants directly.

The nature of the legislation for the period 1993 -1995 was non-uniform and in an *ad hoc* fashion. Especially after 1994 a tendency towards restrictive migration policy started slowly through amendments.¹⁷⁵

Another stage of Russian migration policy was introduced through the amendments of 2002.

In 2002 and 2003 laws on Citizenship were adopted; 'On Introducing Amendments to The Law on Entry and Exit to the Russian Federation', and 'The Law on Legal Status of Foreign Nationals in the Russian Federation'. Adoption of the Law on Legal Status of Foreign Nationals in the Russian Federation allowed to somewhat reduced an inflow of irregular migrant-workers, increased the number of registered foreign workers. Moreover the law improved control over the entry and stay of foreign nationals in the country.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁵ Yuri Adrienko, Sergei Guriev, "Understanding Migration in Russia", Center for Economic and Financial Research at News Economic School (CEFIR), Policy Paper Series, No.23, November 2005.

¹⁷⁶ Natalia Voronina, "Outlook on Migration Policy Reform in Russia: Contemporary Challenges and Political Paradoxes", in Roger Rodriguez Rios (ed.), *Migration Perspectives Eastern Europe and Central Asia*, Austria: International Organization for Migration, October 2006.

The Law on Legal Status of Foreign Nationals in the Russian Federation is criticized by the international human rights organisations for being anti-immigrant.

31 May 2002 Law on Citizenship in the Russian Federation restricted granting Russian citizenship. The difference between the positions of nationals of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and non CIS was lessened. Obtaining Russian citizenship became a lengthy process; a new five year waiting period until the submission of an application for Russian citizenship was introduced. 'Temporary residence permits' were provided for a one year waiting period until an application for the permanent residency permit could be submitted. Amendments to the articles 13 and 14 allowed former country fellows to use a simplified process if they had been legally residing in Russia for a prolonged period of time.

In 2002 article 14 of the law was changed. "These changes extended the time frame for the former country-fellows to receive Russian citizenship in a simplified way until January 1, 2008."¹⁷⁷

There were problems of irregular and illegal migration, also the problems about labour migration such as quotas that does not apply to CIS citizens, who can enter Russia without a visa. These problems necessitated a new approach in the migration policy.

The new migration policy was announced at the Meeting on the Security Council on 17 March 2005. Russia has to attract highly qualified labour migrants.

This was the beginning of the liberalization of the national migration policy. One of its manifestations was an experiment conducted in autumn of 2005 by the FMS in cooperation with the Federal Taxation Service and the Federal Agency for Labour and Employment. The essence of this experiment was the

¹⁷⁷ Natalia Voronina, "Outlook on Migration Policy Reform in Russia: Contemporary Challenges and Political Paradoxes", in Roger Rodriguez Rios (ed.), *Migration Perspectives Eastern Europe and Central Asia*, Austria: International Organization for Migration, October 2006, p.80.

legalization of foreign nationals and stateless persons residing in Russia. In ten regions of the country over 7,000 labour migrants working in 403 enterprises were legalized.¹⁷⁸

In March of 2006 the State Duma passed a new draft law ‘On Migration Registration of Foreign Nationals and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation’. Also an amendment of the law ‘On Legal Status of Foreign Nationals and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation’ was introduced. These two changes were significant as they introduced a new conceptual approach.

The basic goal of the draft law on migration registration was to form new administrative legal mechanisms to register foreign nationals. This was seen as the first step of creating more effective immigration control system. It was aimed to attract skilled labour force. “This mechanism covers all areas of immigration control: upon crossing the Russian state border, upon changing a place of residence and at the place of stay.”¹⁷⁹ The draft law suggests a notification based system instead of a permit based one.

Draft law ‘On Amendments to the Law On Legal Status of Foreign Nationals in the Russian Federation’ developed the legal status of foreign nationals from CIS countries, who make a majority of both regular and irregular migrants in Russia.

Amendments proposed by the draft law regarding the labour migration quotas, underline the qualitative characteristics of labour migrants. The proposed law may bring the regulation of labour migrations.

¹⁷⁸ Natalia Voronina, “Outlook on Migration Policy Reform in Russia: Contemporary Challenges and Political Paradoxes”, in Roger Rodriguez Rios (ed.), *Migration Perspectives Eastern Europe and Central Asia*, Austria: International Organization for Migration, October 2006, p.82.

¹⁷⁹ Natalia Voronina, “Outlook on Migration Policy Reform in Russia: Contemporary Challenges and Political Paradoxes”, in Roger Rodriguez Rios (ed.), *Migration Perspectives Eastern Europe and Central Asia*, Austria: International Organization for Migration, October 2006, p.83.

The Programme for Socio Economic Development of Russia (2006-2008) illuminated the aim of the migration policy.

The main goals of the migration policy include facilitation of sustainable economic growth and balanced social development in the country, protection of national security interests, and prevention of international terrorism through regulating migration processes.¹⁸⁰

Two parts of legislation passed on 18 July 2006 and became effective in January 2007. The law “On Migration Registration of Foreign Nationals and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation” and “On the Introduction of Amendments and Changes to the Federal Law On the Legal Situation of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation”. The first law introduced the registration of foreign citizens, in which the refusal by authorities is eliminated. The second law simplified the system of temporary residence permits. There is the requirement to submit fewer documents. Applicants are required to submit fewer documents. The conditions of citizens of the Commonwealth of Independent States who have the right to travel to Russia without visas (except of citizens of Georgia and Turkmenistan) are improved now.¹⁸¹

In 2007 migration 2.1 million foreigners received work permits in Russia. Legal migration has grown and illegal migration decreased significantly. This has positive consequences on the collection of tax revenues and on the situation of labour migrants. It is possible to define the contemporary migration mechanisms as simpler and more transparent. However, there are still problematic points. “Certain activities have also been prohibited for foreigners, such as collective farm market retail which was

¹⁸⁰ Natalia Voronina, “Outlook on Migration Policy Reform in Russia: Contemporary Challenges and Political Paradoxes”, in Roger Rodriguez Rios (ed.), *Migration Perspectives Eastern Europe and Central Asia*, Austria: International Organization for Migration, October 2006, p.83.

¹⁸¹ Country Reports 2006: Belarus, Moldova Russian Federation, and Ukraine Situation for Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPS), European Council on Refugees and Exiles
<<http://www.ecre.org/files/Annual%20report%20General%20English.pdf>> (Accessed on 16 July 2008)

previously dominated by ethnic groups as well as operations with medicine and alcohol.”¹⁸² The quota system for immigration is still in practice and the Federal Migration Service of Russia sets the limits for immigration.

3.3. The Institutional Framework

The Federal Migration Service (FMS), is the main body responsible for developing and implementing policies related to refugees and forced migrants in the Russian Federation. The Federal Migration Service was established as an independent body by the presidential decree on 14 June 1992. The functions of the Federal Migration Service were previously held by the Committee for Migration within the Ministry of Labour.

Subsequent government decrees had ordered the governments of all administrative units of the Russian Federation to set up ‘migration services’ under their labour and employment administrations and established the principle of their acting as a single migration service headed by the Committee on Migration Affairs.¹⁸³

There are three subdivisions among the Federal Migration Service. These can be listed as; executive departments, functional departments and departments serving the central apparatus and territorial branches.

Before April 1996, the unitary Federal Migration Service had regional branches that were called Territorial Migration Services (TMS). There were

¹⁸² Nikita A. Lomagin, *Annual Overview of International Migration in Central and Eastern Europe – 2007, Fifteen commentaries from ten different countries on the important events and changes which took place in the field of migration last year* <<http://www.migrationonline.cz/centraleasterneurope/2007/#n8>> (Accessed on 02 June 2008)

¹⁸³ Hilary Pilkington, *Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.60.

also offices of the FMS opened at Russian Embassies in CIS countries. There was TMS in all the Russian regions and republics. “In theory the service has a strictly vertical structure- all territorial migration services being directly subordinate to Moscow where 243 officials work in the FMS structure.”¹⁸⁴ In contrast in practice, TMS was subordinate to the FMS and the head of the regional administration. Thus there was a dual subordination.

In practice significant policy and implementation decisions, were taken at the district and regional levels. The system of ‘commissions’ was influential in this process. The system of ‘commissions’ met monthly to approve the applications for registration put forward by the migration service worker, and resolve individual cases that are unusual or disputed. This commission consisted of the representatives of the district administration at the district level.

The financial aspect also has duality. Officially the TMS was financed by the federal funds. In contrast Regional or city budgets compose an important part of the TMS financing in reality.

There were four areas of work of the FMS. These can be listed as; first

the protection of the interests of citizens of the Russian Federation whether they live within the Russian Federation or beyond its borders. This includes the defense of the rights of migrants in accordance with the law and the preparation of suggestions for the improvement of legislation as deemed necessary. It also means the recognition, in accordance with legislation, of the legal status of individuals who have migrated or who intend to migrate to Russia and cooperation with international and foreign organizations on questions of migration.¹⁸⁵

The second area of work is revealed as the regulation of migratory processes. There is the task of the FMS, which is to formulate and implement the policy relating to labour out-migration by Russian citizens and to foreign migrant workers coming to the Russian Federation. Other areas of work of the

¹⁸⁴ Hilary Pilkington, *Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.61.

¹⁸⁵ Hilary Pilkington, *Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.63.

FMS are; the provision of aid to refugees and forced migrants and the facilitation of the socio economic adaptation of refugees and forced migrants.

These areas of work are listed in the federal programme 'Migration' of March 1993 and in amended and supplemented programmes of 9 August 1994 and 3 August 1996. In contrast most of the times actual tasks of the FMS did not comply with the previously stated ones. Thus it is critical also to list the tasks that are undertaken in practice.

First, registering, data collection and returning figures on the number of refugees and forced migrants was the basic responsibility of FMS and its regional branches.

Second, although the stated aim of the FMS is to help all refugees and forced migrants, is not possible to achieve this because of the budget limits. The financing of FMS is both insufficient and irregular. Thus, instead of helping all FMS can only help the most vulnerable groups of migrants. During the 1990's even the urgent housing and employment needs of the refugees were not met by the FMS.¹⁸⁶

Third, there is the task of controlling migrational processes. "The FMS is evolving from an organization defending the rights of forced migrants and refugees into one which controls and polices migrational flows."¹⁸⁷

Also nongovernmental organizations are among the institutions of migration policy in the Russian Federation. Since especially during 1990's the FMS did not fulfil the tasks such as aid to refugees and forced migrants, the emergence of regionally based self-help groups was inevitable. There were also two key federal level, non-governmental organizations; The Coordinating

¹⁸⁶Irina Gavrilova, "Migration Policy in Modern Russia: To Be or Not to Be", Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol.2, No.2, pp.261-287.

¹⁸⁷Hilary Pilkington, *Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.70.

Council for Aid to Refugees and Forced Migrants (CCARFM), The Compatriots' Fund (Russian Fund for Aid to Refugees)¹⁸⁸

The Coordinating Council for Aid to Refugees and Forced Migrants (CCARFM) was officially founded by a collective of forty-seven individuals and twenty-nine organizations in April 1993 as an outcome of an international conference on 'The protection of refugees in Russia;. However, the Council's roots go back six years, growing out of the early work of the organization Civil Assistance(Grazhdanskoe sodeistvie) which had been formed originally by a group of ten individuals in reaction to events in Baku when the first 'Soviet refugees' emerged.¹⁸⁹

The aim of the CCARFM is to defend their interests in state and international organizations. In order to achieve this, the Council unite public to resolve the problems of refugees. The Council acts as a pressure group and as an umbrella organization for refugee self-help groups. Moreover another function of the Council is to facilitate aid provision. There are the achievements of the Council especially about influencing FMS and government policy through lobbying. The basic points of the lobbying agenda are stated as; encouragement of the right of refugees and forced migrants to decide freely whether to remain in the former place of residence or to move to another republic, the acceptance by Russia of her responsibility regarding all former Soviet citizens wishing to become citizens of Russia and to create a positive climate for their reception, the acceptance by Russia that current migratory processes are base on repatriation and there is the need for the creation of the legislative framework accordingly.

¹⁸⁸ Moya Flynn, *The Role of Migrant Organizations and Personal Networks in the Russian Federation*
<<http://www.fmreview.org/text/FMR/21/22.htm>> (Accessed on 16 July 2008)

¹⁸⁹ Hilary Pilkington, *Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.74.

“The highly critical stance adopted by CCARFM in its lobbying role has brought it into conflict rather than cooperation with the FMS, particularly with its leadership.”¹⁹⁰

CCARFM tries to strengthen its position through contacts and cooperation with international organizations. These contacts support its lobbying activity.

The role of the Compatriots’ Fund has a more unclear position in comparison with CCARFM. The Compatriots’ Fund was a non commercial organization, registered in 1991. The basic goal of the Fund was to ensure the legal protection of refugees and forced migrants. Moreover another task was to assist their settlement and employment.

However in reality it was always a semi-state organization and a government decree of 1992 ordered local administrations, ministries and departments to set up territorial branches of the Fund and help it meet its aims.¹⁹¹

Accordingly there was a critical link between TMS and the Fund.

In 1994 the Fund called “...for its recognition as the official mediator between migration organizations, the Russian government and local organs of power.”¹⁹²

During the period between 1994-2004 activities of regional and federal migrant organisations changed the situation in Russia with respect to the migration policy. It is possible to criticize the organizations for not the limited engagement of the migrant community with organizations at regional level, however the organizations are in some of the cases migrant initiatives that have practical support. Moreover “Migrant organisations and informal networks

¹⁹⁰ Hilary Pilkington, *Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.77.

¹⁹¹ Hilary Pilkington, *Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.78.

¹⁹² Hilary Pilkington, *Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.78.

indirectly foster the building of connections with the state, contributing to the regeneration of social, economic and political life.”¹⁹³ Also the role of the migrant organizations can be defined as an input into policy making and legislative development. Their influence is critical especially for the emerging migration regime of 2006.

The assistance of international organizations is essential with respect to the development of NGOs and to counter Russian scepticism and towards non-governmental actors.¹⁹⁴

During the 1990’s the role of the international organizations was at the minimum especially regarding the issues of migration in Russia. CCARFM encouraged the international organizations to have a more efficient role in examining Russian government policy from a human rights angle. Other points underlined by CCARFM were the establishment of an arbitration court to settle disputes over violation of migrant’s rights and the establishment of a body with the support of the UNHCR, IOM and OSCE to execute decisions adopted at international forums concerning migration and refugee issues.¹⁹⁵

Main international actors can be listed as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Red Cross and Red Crescent.

Main function of the IOM Moscow is to consult with state bodies and NGOs in Russia concerning the migration and aid to migrants; refugees and

¹⁹³ Moya Flynn, *The Role of Migrant Organizations and Personal Networks in the Russian Federation*
<<http://www.fmreview.org/text/FMR/21/22.htm>> (Accessed on 16 July 2008)

¹⁹⁴ Moya Flynn, *The Role of Migrant Organizations and Personal Networks in the Russian Federation*
<<http://www.fmreview.org/text/FMR/21/22.htm>> (Accessed on 16 July 2008)

¹⁹⁵ Hilary Pilkington, *Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.82.

forced migrants. Subjects of consultation are institution building, developing reliable information systems, and resettlement programmes. The European Union (EU) project entitled 'Prevention of human trafficking in the Russian Federation' fulfilled by the International Organization for Migration in Moscow.¹⁹⁶

While examining the position of international organizations in the context of the migration in the Russian Federation, 'International conference on refugees, returnees, displaced persons and related migratory movements in the CIS and relevant neighboring states' held on May 1996, was critical. The conference was organized with the cooperation of the UNHCR, the IOM and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The conference did not achieve its declared aims especially because of the unclear objectives or commitments of governments; however the conference was still important as a symbol of the international effort.¹⁹⁷

Since 1991 the UNHCR, has been a part of assisting refugee related problems in the former Soviet Union states. The most important activities of the UNHCR are providing data on refugee and giving consultations to state bodies and NGOs in Russia especially concerning the legal protection of refugees and people seeking refuge.¹⁹⁸

There is also Delegations of the International Committee of the Red Cross, which is active in the territory of the former Soviet Union. The

¹⁹⁶ Prevention of Human Trafficking
<<http://www.iomrussia.ru/>> (Accessed on 8 August 2008)

¹⁹⁷ Hilary Pilkington, *Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.82.

¹⁹⁸ Luise Druke, Developing National Refugee Regimes in Post-Communist Countries in Transition in *Series Refugee and Migration Studies, From Ethnicity to Migration Vol.1*
<http://www.unhcr.bg/serms/serms_en.pdf> (Accessed on 12 March 2008)

International Federation of Societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent has a delegation in Moscow. It provides guidelines for working with refugees.¹⁹⁹

Another example of international organizations is International Confederation of Catholic Organizations of Church Charity and Social Help (Caritas). Caritas is active in a number of former republics of the USSR.²⁰⁰

Especially during the process of migration policy formulation, it is not possible to say that international organizations have an active role. Thus it is possible to say that while examining the Russian migration policy it is critical to emphasize internal actors.

The points emphasized in the European Council on Refugees and Exiles Country Reports 2006, are key to understand the future of the Russian migration policy. It is argued in the European Council on Refugees and Exiles Country Reports 2006, that the migration policy of the Russian Federation should

Ensure that all those seeking international protection in Russia have access to a comprehensive and fair refugee status determination procedure; ensure all asylum seekers are issued with documents, which recognise their status and guarantee them the right to legally stay in Russia until their applications for refugee status have been considered, and they have had opportunity to exhaust all appeal stages; uphold its international obligations to provide effective protection against refoulement and to not return people to countries where their life could be at risk or where they could be at risk of torture, inhumane or degrading treatment; ensure that asylum seekers and refugees have full and

¹⁹⁹ International Committee of the Red Cross website
<<http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/russia?opendocument>> (Accessed on 08 August 2008)

²⁰⁰ The Catholic Agency for International Aid and Development (Caritas) website
<http://www.caritas.org.au/AM/Template.cfm?Section=About_Us2> (Accessed on 08 August 2008)

unimpeded access to the labour market and that any discriminatory legislation or restrictions are removed...²⁰¹

3.4. Conclusion

The Russian migration policy has several parts. In this chapter the legislative and institutional parts are examined. There are several stages of the Russian migration policy. During different periods of time migration policy had different characteristics. What is critical about the identification of stages is not to ignore the contradictions. In most of the cases laws with different objectives were initiated in the same period and it is not possible to say that there was consistency. Moreover it is possible to say that most of the times the harmony between institutions and legislative cannot be seen in the Russian case exactly.

²⁰¹ Country Reports 2006: Belarus, Moldova Russian Federation, and Ukraine Situation for Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPS), European Council on Refugees and Exiles
<<http://www.ecre.org/files/Annual%20report%20General%20English.pdf>> (Accessed on 16 July 2008)

CHAPTER IV

INTERNAL MIGRATION IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The demise of the Soviet Union raised questions concerning the internal and cross-border migration. Especially the early years of transition witnessed high levels of cross-border migration. The populations that were not able to move due to Soviet restrictions moved to their ethnic or cultural homelands. Migration in the region of the Former Soviet Union is significant. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the causes and patterns of migration have changed. The changes influenced both the internal and external migration of the Russian Federation. In this context the internal migration of the Russian Federation needs to be discussed.²⁰² This chapter firstly discusses the motivations of internal migration in the case of the Russian Federation. Secondly at the core of the chapter there are the internal migration patterns of Russia. Ultimately the regional aspect of the issue is examined.

4.1. Motivations

There is the great variation of migration patterns in the Russian Federation and in the region of the Former Soviet Union. Migration theory introduces different approaches to explain the motivations of migration.

Castles and Miller indicates the distinction of three main approaches; economic theory, historical structural approach and migration systems theory. It

²⁰² Ali Mansoor, Bryce Quillin, *Migration and Remittances Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, Washington: The World Bank, 2006, p.1.

is indicated by Castles and Miller that the neo-classical economic perspective is based on the earliest systematic theory on migration. Nineteenth century geographer Ravenstein formulated statistical laws of migration.²⁰³ This model is individualistic and ahistorical. The individual decision to migrate is seen as a rational decision based on the comparison of relative costs and benefits.

People are expected to migrate if the advantages of higher wages in the destination country is greater than the costs of migrating.

Neo-classical theory assumes that individuals search for the country of residence that maximizes their well-being...The search is constrained by the individual's financial resources, by the immigration regulations imposed by competing host countries and by the emigration regulations of the source country.²⁰⁴

On the basis of the assumptions of the neo-classical theory the economic differences between various areas would be sufficient enough to generate migrant flows. The intermediate social status people migrate more frequently in comparison with the poorest people from the least developed countries. Castles and Miller argue that this point generates a doubt on the value of the neo-classical theory. Push pull model predicts movements from densely populated areas to more sparsely regions.²⁰⁵ In contrast countries of immigration like Germany are amongst the world's more densely populated. Also Castles and Miller emphasizes that push pull model cannot explain why certain groups migrate to one country rather than another.²⁰⁶

Böröcz and Portes underlines that push pull theories defines labour flows as a consequence of poverty and backwardness in the sending areas. Political, economic or social disadvantages of the sending areas are defined as

²⁰³ E. G. Ravenstein, "The Laws of Migration", *Journal of the Statistical Society of London*, Vol. 48, No.2, Jun. 1885, pp.167-235.

²⁰⁴ S.Castles; M. J. Miller, *The Age of Migration*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p.23.

²⁰⁵ On push pull model see also Guido Dorigo and Waldo Tobler, "Push-Pull Migration Laws", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 73, No. 1, Mar., 1983, pp. 1-17.

²⁰⁶ S.Castles; M. J. Miller, *The Age of Migration*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p.24.

push factors, whereas the comparative advantages of the advanced regions are defined as the pull factors. According to Böröcz and Portes there are the two assumptions of push pull theories. Firstly there is the idea that “the most disadvantaged sectors of the poorest societies are most likely to participate in labour migration.”²⁰⁷ Second assumption is the spontaneous emergence of the flows. According to Böröcz and Portes these theories are incapable of predicting two differences in the origin of migration. The first difference is the differences among collectivities. This point implies the directionality and size of migrant flows. Second point is the differences in the tendency to migrate among individuals of the same region or country. Not every individual, who face the same expelling forces, migrate.²⁰⁸ Thus Böröcz, Portes underlines the weak points of the push and pull theories.

Castles and Miller indicate that “the neo-classical migration theories have been criticized as simplistic and incapable of explaining actual movements or predicting future ones.”²⁰⁹ Castles and Miller rejects the assumption of neo-classical migration theories, which individual market players who have full information on their options and freedom to make rational choices. Castles and Miller underlines the point that historians, anthropologists, sociologists and geographers have shown that migrant’s behaviour is strongly influenced by various factors historical events besides family and community dynamics.²¹⁰ According to Castles and Miller it seems vital to introduce a wider range of factors into economic research. One attempt to do this was ‘dual labour market

²⁰⁷ Portes A., Böröcz J. Autumn, 1989, ‘Contemporary Immigration: Theoretical Perspectives on Its Determinants and Modes of Incorporation’, *International Migration Review*, vol.23, no.3, Special Silver Anniversary Issue: International Migration an Assessment for the 90’s, p. 607.

²⁰⁸ Portes A., Böröcz J., “Contemporary Immigration: Theoretical Perspectives on Its Determinants and Modes of Incorporation”, *International Migration Review*, Vol.23, No.3, Special Silver Anniversary Issue: International Migration an Assessment for the 90’s, Autumn, 1989, p 612.

²⁰⁹ S.Castles; M. J. Miller, *The Age of Migration*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p.24.

²¹⁰ S.Castles; M. J. Miller, *The Age of Migration*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p.24.

theory'. This theory is significant since it emphasizes the role of the institutional factors as well as race and gender regarding the labour market segmentation. Also 'the new economics of labour migration' approach appeared in the 1980's. According to this approach the markets do not always function in the ideal way suggested by the neo-classicists. Moreover Castles and Miller reveals another point ignored by the neo-classical migration theories. According to Castles and Miller migration cannot only be evaluated through the income differences. The factors such as the chance of secure employment and availability of investment capital also need to be taken into consideration.²¹¹ The neo-classical model tend to treat the role of the state as an irregularity which disrupts the 'normal' functioning of the market. In contrast the examination of contemporary and previous migrations illuminate that states play a major role in initiating, shaping and controlling movements. From my point of view Castles and Miller indicates a critical evaluation. According to Castles and Miller migrations are collective phenomena, which should be examined as sub systems of an increasingly global economic and political system. "Thus the idea of individual migrants who make free choices which not only 'maximize their well-being' but also lead to 'equilibrium in the marketplace' is so far from historical reality that it has little explanatory value."²¹²

It is indicated by Castles and Miller that an alternative explanation of international migration was provided by the historical-structural approach. The historical and structural approach was based on Marxist political economy and the world systems theory. The economic and political power are not equally distributed in the world economy and this is underlined by the historical structural approach. Migration was evaluated as a way of directing cheap labour for capital. Castles and Miller underlines the fact that while the push-pull

²¹¹ S.Castles; M. J. Miller, *The Age of Migration*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p.24.

²¹² S.Castles; M. J. Miller, *The Age of Migration*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p.25.

theories focus on voluntary migrations of individuals, historical structural approach has the centre of attention on the mass recruitment of labour by capital. According to Castles and Miller the historical structural approach was

...criticized by many migration scholars: if the logic of capital and interests of Western states were so dominant, how could the frequent breakdown of migration policies be explained, such as the unplanned shift from labour migration to permanent settlement in certain countries?²¹³

Both the neo-classic perspective and the historical-structural approach have one-sided analysis.

The neo-classic approach neglected historical causes of movements, and down played the role of the state while the historical functional approach often saw the interests of capital as all-determining and paid inadequate attention to the motivations and actions of the individuals and groups involved.²¹⁴

Another issue expressed by Castles and Miller is the migration systems theory and the trend to a new interdisciplinary approach. Castles and Miller underlines the point that migration systems theory includes a wide range of disciplines and cover all dimensions of the migration experience. The notion of migration system is defined by Castles and Miller as constituted by two or more countries which exchange migrants with each other. There is the tendency to analyze the regional migration systems.²¹⁵ It is critical that distant regions may be interlinked.

It is indicated by Castles and Miller that migration systems theory suggests that migratory movements are a result of the links between sending and receiving countries. These links are political influence, colonization, trade, investment or cultural ties. According to Castles and Miller the migration systems approach is part of a trend towards a more inclusive and interdisciplinary understanding. The migration systems approach is defined by

²¹³ S.Castles; M. J. Miller, *The Age of Migration*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p.25.

²¹⁴ S.Castles; M. J. Miller, *The Age of Migration*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p.26.

²¹⁵ S.Castles; M. J. Miller, *The Age of Migration*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p.26.

Castles and Miller as a new mainstream of migration theory. According to Castles and Miller the basic principle of the migration systems approach is that migratory movement can be seen as the consequence of interacting macro and micro structures. The notion of macro structures is defined as the institutional factors by Castles and Miller. The world market, interstate relationships and the laws are some of the macro structures. According to Castles and Miller, the micro structures are the networks, practices and beliefs of the migrants themselves. Castles and Miller indicates that the micro structures are the informal social networks developed by the migrants to cope with migration and settlement.²¹⁶

Another point revealed by Castles and Miller is the transnational theory. Thomas Faist argues that there are four types of transnational spaces. These are small groups such as kinship systems, issue networks²¹⁷, transnational communities and transnational networks.²¹⁸ According to Castles and Miller the notion of transnational community puts the emphasis on human agency.

In the context of globalization, transnationalism can extend previous face to face communities based on kinship, neighborhoods or workplaces into far flung virtual communities, which communicate at a distance.²¹⁹

The term ‘transmigrant’, which is used to identify people whose existence is shaped through participation in transnational communities based on migration, is defined by Castles and Miller. According to Castles and Miller transnational activities are a person’s life. One can speak of transnational community, when there is a group of people. Moreover it is illuminated by

²¹⁶ S.Castles; M. J. Miller, *The Age of Migration*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p.27.

²¹⁷ Issue networks are defined by Thomas Faist as “sets of ties between persons and organizations in which information and services are exchanged for the purpose of achieving a common goal.” in Thomas Faist, *The Transnational Social Spaces of Migration*, Centre on Migration Citizenship and Development Working Papers, No.1, 2006, p.4.

²¹⁸ Thomas Faist, *The Transnational Social Spaces of Migration*, Centre on Migration Citizenship and Development Working Papers, No.1, 2006, p.4.

²¹⁹ S.Castles; M. J. Miller, *The Age of Migration*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p.30.

Castles and Miller that the term transnational communities are new. In contrast transnational communities are not new. The new factor is the rise of transnational communities with globalization. According to Castles and Miller transnational communities will be important to organize activities and relationships and construct identity for the people with links in two or more countries.²²⁰

“The collapse of the Soviet state in late 1991 eliminated most, though not all, of the conditions discouraging inter-regional migration.”²²¹ Market reforms were introduced by the Russian government in January 1992. The period after the market reforms witnessed recession, hyper-inflation, spiralling inequality and labour market turmoil. Economic motives become more influential during crisis. Regional differences in incomes, living standards and labour grew in the post-Soviet period. Besides these economic incentives, the political changes paved the way for freer migration. The residence restrictions were formally banned by the 1993 Russian Constitution.

There are economic determinants of migration. “According to the neo-classic economic theory of migration, individuals move from one region to another when the economic benefits of doing so exceed the costs.”²²² Put differently, it is expected that individuals move from regions with low wage levels to the regions with high wage levels. Moreover the migration from regions in which there is high unemployment to the regions with low unemployment is expected. The studies of economists reflect that changes in

²²⁰ S.Castles; M. J. Miller, *The Age of Migration*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p.30.

²²¹ Theodore P. Gerber, *Individual and Contextual Determinants of Migration in Russia, 1985-2001*.
<http://www.gdnet.org/pdf2/gdn_library/annual_conferences/sixth_annual_conference/gerber_paper.pdf> (Accessed on 26 June 2008)

²²² Theodore P.Gerber, “Regional Economic Performance and Net Migration Rates in Russia, 1993-2002”, *International Migration Review*, Vol.40, No.3, Fall 2006, pp.664-697.

wages or unemployment have a predictable effect in the short run but in the long run, the effects lessen.²²³ The economic perspective expect the migration patterns to become more market-based and sensitive to economic opportunities and restraints, and migration flows to occur towards the most economically active oblasts.

Stephen Wegren and A. Cooper Drury argue that there is a positive relationship between capital investment levels and rates of in migration.

Rates of inflow were high in areas where the complex of living conditions was attractive, the climate was moderate, employment opportunities were growing, and rural to urban migration was preceding relatively slowly.²²⁴

Although there are these basic models such as push-and-pull model explaining international migration, there are a great variety of economic and social motivations.²²⁵ The motivations of migration have changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet social and economic structure. Different classifications and categorizations were introduced to examine diverse motivations of migration in Russia.

Timothy Heleniak identifies four categories. Four factors influencing the migration associated with labour market transition in post-Soviet Russia, are identified. First, the differentiation among regions in terms of quality of life or economic dynamics would cause people to move. Second, elimination of administrative barriers is expected to increase mobility. Third, the formation of a national labor market and finally the factors indicated by the neoclassical model are expected to influence the patterns of migration. There are studies indicating "...regions with lower unemployment, higher real wages, and more

²²³ Theodore P. Gerber, "Regional Economic Performance and Net Migration Rates in Russia, 1993-2002", *International Migration Review*, Vol.40, No.3, Fall 2006, pp.664-697.

²²⁴ Stephen Wegren, A. Cooper Drury, "Patterns of Internal Migration During the Russian Transition", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.17, No.4, December 2001, p.31.

²²⁵ Ali Mansoor, Bryce Quillin, *Migration and Remittances Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, Washington: The World Bank, 2006, p.8.

profitable enterprises attracted more migrants.”²²⁶ Put differently, people migrate to regions that have better labour market prospects. Regions with high levels of out migration for instance in the north and east have higher gross regional products, but especially those in the south that share a border with a CIS state tend to have high rates of in migration. The post-Soviet migration patterns are determined by various factors. It is significant that economic and social factors operate independently. Some studies indicate that reforms or the quality of life measures including housing availability, crime rates, and share of regional budget did not have a strong influence on migration.²²⁷

Most of the motivations involved in internal migration are similar to those involved in external migration. “Political and ethnic unrest, economic turmoil, professional and daily life and insecurity, all contributed to population movements in Russia”²²⁸

There is a problematic point of analyzing the motivations of migration. Although statistical analysis of migration data enables these examinations, there is the lack of systematic, nation-wide data on individual motivations for migration. Moreover there is the problem of the illegal migration. Since the

²²⁶ Timothy, Heleniak, Migration and Restructuring in Post-Soviet Russia, *Demokratizatsiya*, fall 2001, pp.531-549.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/is_200110/ai_n9001185/printFindArticles>Demokrati zatsiya>Fall2001>Article (Accessed on 25 March 2008).

²²⁷ Timothy, Heleniak, Migration and Restructuring in Post-Soviet Russia, *Demokratizatsiya*, Fall 2001, pp.531-549.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/is_200110/ai_n9001185/printFindArticles>Demokrati zatsiya>Fall2001>Article (Accessed on 25 March 2008).

²²⁸ Helen Kopnina, *East to West Migration Russian Migrants in Western Europe*, USA: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005, p.27.

precise extent of illegal migration is not known²²⁹ or there does not exist any data, the motivations cannot be even estimated through statistics.

4.2. The Patterns of Internal Migration in Russia

In the example of Russia, the internal migration has a key role especially regarding the economic transition. Yuri Adrienko and Sergei Guriev discuss three reasons for this role. First, the Russian geographical structure dates back to the Soviet times. The Soviet industrialization was not based on the economically decided locations. There was the serious problem of misallocation of production. “During tsarist and especially Soviet times many Siberian and Far East permanent settlements were created in places where they never would have been located under a market economy.”²³⁰ There was the misallocation of human resources and capital during the Soviet times. The long term negative consequences of it can be seen even in the post-Soviet times. Thus, there is the need for the reallocation of the economic activity. Second Russia’s capital market needs to be developed as a consequence of insecurity of property rights and problems with contract enforcement. It is a difficult task to reallocate the capital. “Also, there are regions to which capital would not flow, even if there were no barriers, simply because of the cold temperature and transportation costs.”²³¹ Those regions were overinvested by the Soviet government to sustain the production. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union

²²⁹ Dominique Arel, “Demography and Politics in the First Post-Soviet Censuses: Mistrusted State, Contested Identities”, *Population*, Vol.57, No. 6, Nov-Dec 2002, pp.801-827.

²³⁰ Yuri Adrienko, Sergei Guriev, “Understanding Migration in Russia”, *Center for Economic and Financial Research at News Economic School (CEFIR), Policy Paper Series*, No.23, November 2005.

²³¹ Yuri Adrienko, Sergei Guriev, “Understanding Migration in Russia”, *Center for Economic and Financial Research at News Economic School (CEFIR), Policy Paper Series*, No.23, November 2005.

those regions lost their economic attractiveness. Thus the destination regions of migrants started to experience emigration. Third the liberalization of foreign trade created the inequality of wages across industries. Since the Soviet industry was geographically concentrated, an important inequality between regions was also created. "...there has been very limited convergence in income and no convergence in unemployment rate across Russian regions."²³² Thus it is possible to say that these income and employment differences between regions had a role in the internal migration trends of the post-Soviet Russia. For instance the migration patterns were out of Siberia, Far East and European North regions. Even though the interregional differences are high, the internal migration rates can be defined as low in comparison to the United States. It is argued that mobility due to regional shocks is higher in Russia than the countries of the European Union. "Russian regulation and social benefits provide little incentive to move out of depressed regions."²³³

During the 1990's, new patterns of migration were seen in the Russian countryside. First during the period between 1991 and 1998, the countryside was a net recipient of migrants. Second, during 1991 and 1994, rural immigration exceeded the decline in rural birth and death ratios and as a consequence the rural population increased in size. Third pattern is about the balance between urban-rural and rural-urban migration. The urban-rural migration exceeded the rural-urban migration between 1991 and 1992.²³⁴

In 1991, the Russian countryside became a net recipient of migrants. Net rural immigration totalled 57,400 in 1991, and during 1992 it was at the

²³² Yuri Adrienko, Sergei Guriev, "Understanding Migration in Russia", *Center for Economic and Financial Research at News Economic School (CEFIR), Policy Paper Series*, No.23, November 2005.

²³³ Yuri Adrienko, Sergei Guriev, "Understanding Migration in Russia", *Center for Economic and Financial Research at News Economic School (CEFIR), Policy Paper Series*, No.23, November 2005.

²³⁴ Theodore P.Gerber, "Regional Economic Performance and Net Migration Rates in Russia, 1993-2002", *International Migration Review*, Vol.40, No.3, Fall 2006, pp.661-697.

highest, 289,500. During 1993-1994 the number declined and the average was 268,200 persons a year. During 1995-1998 the number of rural in migrants remained positive but there was a drop and the average was just under 58,000 persons annually.²³⁵

High volumes of migration that were seen with the break-up of the USSR during 1992-1994, were evaluated as deviant and the ratios of the post-1994 as normal.²³⁶

In order to prevent overcrowding and competition for scarce urban housing, the Federal Migration Service placed immigrants from the Near Abroad into rural areas. Most of the rural inflow originates from former republics, however it is critical that the estimated 50-80 percent of migrants from former Soviet republics were urban residents previously and it is not expected for them to settle in the countryside permanently.

Although there is the positive migration flows into the countryside in the post-Soviet period, the relation between rural births and deaths has changed. In 1992, the population coefficient became negative for the first time in post-war Russia. Between 1995 and 1998 the countryside experienced net in migration, but as a consequence of low birth rates and high death rates the rural population declined.²³⁷

²³⁵ Stephen Wegren, A. Cooper Drury, "Patterns of Internal Migration During the Russian Transition", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.17, No.4, December 2001, pp.15-42.

²³⁶ Stephen Wegren, A. Cooper Drury, "Patterns of Internal Migration During the Russian Transition", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.17, No.4, December 2001, pp.15-42

²³⁷ Stephen Wegren, A. Cooper Drury, "Patterns of Internal Migration During the Russian Transition", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.17, No.4, December 2001, pp.15-42

There was a net urban-rural movement during 1991-1992. In 1991 6 000 persons moved from urban to rural. The total number increased to 113,000 in 1992.²³⁸

The patterns of both internal and international migration in the post-Soviet period reflect a reversal of the outcomes of the centrally planned migration. As mentioned in the second chapter, the predominant internal migration pattern during the Soviet period was outward from the Central core to the periphery in Siberia and the North. The predominant internal migration flow became out of Siberia, the Far East, and the European North toward central Russia.²³⁹

4.3. Regional Dynamics

It is critical to examine the internal migration of Russia in the context of economic restructuring with a specific emphasis on geographic scales. There were three trends that shaped the regional patterns of internal migration in Russia. First, Russian north and Russian Far East, which were recipients of immigration since 1959, experienced a net outflow. Harsh weather conditions and the lack of adequate social services were the motivations to leave the region. Second, the migration to St. Petersburg and Moscow declined, however there is an estimated 200 000 illegal workers in Moscow. Third, the out migration from central Russia was reversed.²⁴⁰

²³⁸ Anne White, "Internal Migration Trends in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.59, No.6, 2007, pp.887-911.

²³⁹ Anne White, "Internal Migration Trends in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.59, No.6, 2007, pp.887-911.

²⁴⁰ Stephen Wegren, A. Cooper Drury, "Patterns of Internal Migration During the Russian Transition", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.17, No.4, December 2001, pp.15-42.

Among eleven larger economic regions of Russia, eight of them reversed their direction of net migration between the 1980s and 1990s. The periphery regions of the North, East Siberia, West Siberia, and the Far East had the net in-migration in the 1980s; during 1990s they became net out-migration regions. Four central regions, the Volga-Vyatka, Central Chernozem, Volga and Urals regions switched from being donor to recipient regions. Not only the population that left the periphery regions were concentrated in areas of central Russia, but also those returning to Russia from the non-Russian states.²⁴¹

During the 1990s, the population of 40 regions increased and that in 49 regions declined. “By 1999, only 10 of 89 regions were still growing.”²⁴² In only 10 regions there were more people arrived than left and more births than deaths during 1990s. “In 1999 only three of these regions continued to combine net in-migration with positive natural increase.”²⁴³

To reflect the general picture and the regional growths, it is essential not to ignore demographic trends such as the rates of fertility and death while examining migration dynamics. There was the negative natural increase and net immigration in 23 regions and in Russia. The oblasts in the Northwest region including St. Petersburg, most of the regions in the Central region, including

²⁴¹ Timothy, Heleniak, Migration and Restructuring in Post-Soviet Russia, *Demokratizatsiya*, fall 2001, pp.531-549.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/is_200110/ai_n9001185/printFindArticles>Demokratizatsiya>Fall2001>Article (Accessed on 25 March 2008).

²⁴² Timothy, Heleniak, Migration and Restructuring in Post-Soviet Russia, *Demokratizatsiya*, fall 2001, pp.531-549.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/is_200110/ai_n9001185/printFindArticles>Demokratizatsiya>Fall2001>Article (Accessed on 25 March 2008).

²⁴³ Timothy, Heleniak, Migration and Restructuring in Post-Soviet Russia, *Demokratizatsiya*, fall 2001, pp.531-549.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/is_200110/ai_n9001185/printFindArticles>Demokratizatsiya>Fall2001>Article (Accessed on 25 March 2008).

Moscow city and oblast and most of the oblasts in the Central Chernozem region had negative natural increase and net immigration. “By 1999, 45 regions were experiencing similar demographic trends, including nearly all of Central Russia, the Urals, and regions in West Siberia.”²⁴⁴ The population of 16 regions were declining as a consequence of net out-migration even they had higher birth rate than death rates. These 16 regions were the periphery regions in the European north and most regions in east Siberia and the Far East. There was both the negative natural increase and net out migration in several large regions in Siberia and the Far East such as Irkutsk, Primorsky and Khabarovsk kraia and Sakhalin. The population in these regions declined “By 1999, the number of regions experiencing these combined trends was 22 and included nearly all regions in the Far East and the North, and many others in both East and West Siberia.”²⁴⁵

Interregional migration is a significant part of internal migration. Regional economic conditions are important both regarding interregional migration and internal migration.

As it is mentioned in the previous chapter, the policies of the Soviet government directed the distribution of the labour force. Although there were debates about the efficiency, the break up of the control policies was a significant change. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the policy-driven labour distribution was removed and individuals incentives became significant.

²⁴⁴ Timothy, Heleniak, Migration and Restructuring in Post-Soviet Russia, *Demokratizatsiya*, fall 2001, pp.531-549.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/is_200110/ai_n9001185/printFindArticles>Demokratizatsiya>Fall2001>Article (Accessed on 25 March 2008).

²⁴⁵ Timothy, Heleniak, Migration and Restructuring in Post-Soviet Russia, *Demokratizatsiya*, fall 2001, pp.531-549.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/is_200110/ai_n9001185/printFindArticles>Demokratizatsiya>Fall2001>Article (Accessed on 25 March 2008).

...following the collapse of the Soviet Union, people born in Siberia and the Far East started following into European Russia, while many of the people born in Central Russia who had been living in Siberia and the Far East returned to central Russia.²⁴⁶

The density of the population in the Soviet Union and lately in Russia has been concentrated in European Russia. The European Russia has been the centre for the economic activity. The freedom of movement did not remove the previous imbalances instead it paved the way to massive migrations to already densely populated regions. Moscow and its hinterland have the highest population and gross regional product in the Russian Federation.

The top regions for per-capita gross domestic product are the Yamal-Nenets and Khanty-Mansi autonomous districts (Russia's biggest crude oil and natural gas producing regions) east of the Urals, Chukotka Autonomous District and Magadan Oblast (precious-metal producing Far Eastern regions), Komi Okrug (a base for oil refining), Nenetsia Autonomous District (a sparsely populated Far North region in which oil has recently been discovered), and Koryakia Autonomous District (which, despite having the second smallest population of all the Russian federal subjects, is one of the centres for the export of marine products to Japan and South Korea).²⁴⁷

These regions are Far North regions.

4.4. Conclusion

There are several approaches among the migration theory that are introduced to examine the motivations of migration. These approaches are

²⁴⁶ Kazuhiro Kumo, *Interregional Population Migration in Russia: Using an Origin to Destination Matrix*, Paper Presented at the European Association for Comparative Economic Studies (EACES) 9th Bi-Annual Conference: Development Strategies- A Comparative View <http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/~kumo/EACES06_kumo.pdf> (Accessed on 15 May 2008)

²⁴⁷ Kazuhiro Kumo, *Interregional Population Migration in Russia Using an Origin to Destination Matrix*, Paper Presented at the European Association for Comparative Economic Studies (EACES) 9th Bi-Annual Conference: Development Strategies- A Comparative View <http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/~kumo/EACES06_kumo.pdf> (Accessed on 15 May 2008)

important while discussing the Russian case. Moreover the creation of new social and economic conditions also affected the patterns of migration. The society was divided as natives and immigrants. Economic conditions were difficult and unemployment was high.

The migration patterns of the Soviet period totally changed after the end of the Soviet Union. The major pattern of internal migration in the Russian Federation, became out of Siberia, the Far East, and the European North toward central Russia.

The patterns of both internal and international migration in the post-Soviet period reflect a reversal of the outcomes of the centrally planned migration. As mentioned in the second chapter, the predominant internal migration pattern during the Soviet period was outward from the Central region to Siberia and the North. The predominant internal migration flow became out of Siberia, the Far East, and the European North toward central Russia.²⁴⁸ When the issue is examined regionally, it is seen that the imbalances of the Soviet period have not changed positively in the Russian Federation, instead the regional imbalances are sharpened. The example of Moscow is among the most concrete. The highest rates of population and gross regional product is in Moscow (including its hinterland) in the Russian Federation.

²⁴⁸Anne White, "Internal Migration Trends in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.59, No.6, 2007, pp.887-911

CHAPTER V

EXTERNAL MIGRATION IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

In 2000 the people, who are not living in their place of birth, was estimated as 175 million. This number was highest regarding previous years. Among these 175 million people, 158 million were international migrants. Approximately 16 million were recognised refugees and 900,000 were asylum seekers.²⁴⁹

In the context of a world troubled by mass population movements, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, formed new international borders and potential refugees. “The process of decolonization and nation-state building in the newly independent states only encouraged further population displacement in the region.”²⁵⁰ After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the issue of migration became a challenge for Russia. Russia became the net recipient after 1993, however both the in-migration and out-migration from the Russian Federation is very critical. 3 million people moved from the former republics to Russia, over a million among those were registered as forced migrants or refugees. This chapter of the thesis focuses on the external migration in the Russian Federation. Motivations of immigration and emigration in the Russian Federation, basic facts on immigration and emigration are discussed in this chapter. Moreover, the essential points of the issue such as illegal migration and brain drain are examined.

²⁴⁹ Michael W. Doyle, “The Challenge of Worldwide Migration”, *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.57, No.2, Spring 2004.

²⁵⁰ Hilary Pilkington, *Migration Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.2.

5.1. Motivations

The approaches of migration theory; economic theory, historical structural approach and migration systems theory that were mentioned in the previous chapter can be applied to external migration. Although it is possible to explain the immigration and emigration in the Russian Federation through economic theory, historical structural approach and migration systems theory, it is critical not to ignore the unique characteristics of the Post Soviet geography that create motives for migration. “Political and ethnic unrest, economic turmoil, professional and daily life and insecurity, all contributed to population movements in Russia”²⁵¹

Zhanna Zaionchkovskaya identifies four categories affecting the contemporary migration within the former Soviet Union.

The first group of factors are the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The breakup of the country was unexpected for the citizens and it was a shock for the population. The breakup created a division among population as natives and immigrants. It was problematic that there was no guarantee of citizenship, inheritance, pensions or other basic rights. This situation lead to the mass repatriation flows of refugees and forced migrants from areas of armed conflict and nationalist clashes.²⁵²

²⁵¹ Helen Koprina, *East to West Migration Russian Migrants in Western Europe*, USA: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005, p.27.

²⁵² Zhanna A. Zaionchkovskaya, *Migration Patterns in the Former Soviet Union*, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF130/CF130ch2.pdf> (Accessed on 7 March 2008)

“The second group of factors is related to the initial stage of the creation of the new economic system.”²⁵³ The introduction of the market reforms brought a deep economic crisis. High inflation, an increase in the cost of living, worsened living standard and growing unemployment. These factors create the social discomfort and confusion that may lead to migration.

The third category is about the development of market relations such as privatization, private entrepreneurship, land ownership, commerce, private financing and a capital market. Since the economic structure of Russia is totally different from the Soviet heritage, new forms of migration were introduced according to the new economic landscape. Short-term labour migration and shuttle trade can be listed as examples.

The fourth group of factors are the results of the liberalization of life and transition to an “open door” policy.

All of the new countries founded on the ruins of the Former Soviet Union gave people the freedom to enter and exit the country and established systems to allow international migration.²⁵⁴

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, restrictions against emigration and immigration were abolished. Educational travel, work trips, temporary residence abroad became easy.

There have been ethnic and religious conflicts within the Commonwealth of Independent States since the disintegration of the USSR. Nearly all of them remain unresolved, and those are defined as ‘frozen’ ethnic and religious conflicts. The earliest conflict erupted between Armenia and

²⁵³ Zhanna A. Zaionchkovskaya, *Migration Patterns in the Former Soviet Union*, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF130/CF130ch2.pdf> (Accessed on 7 March 2008)

²⁵⁴ Zhanna A. Zaionchkovskaya, *Migration Patterns in the Former Soviet Union*, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF130/CF130ch2.pdf> (Accessed on 7 March 2008)

Azerbaijan in 1988 over Nagorno-Karabakh. About 400,000 persons from Armenia and Azerbaijan moved to the other one. Moreover the secessionist conflicts in Georgia; South Ossetia and Abkhazia, induced 100,000 refugees. Nearly half of the refugees were Russians who have moved to Russia. Another example from the region of the former Soviet Union is Ferghana Valley. The area is separated among Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Ferghana Valley has the potential for religious-based conflict.²⁵⁵

Since there was no functioning and legitimate political, social and economic institutions the corruption of public officials became important and organized criminal network activities was challenging. Organised clandestine migration activities are advantageous for those engaged in them; contain fewer risks. This kind of migration pressure through the Commonwealth of Independent States is growing.²⁵⁶

Some of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) states are not stable. The problems among these states are based on a history of political and religious discrimination of minorities, forced mass deportations and natural disasters. Economic problems and conflicts have weakened governmental institutions. The ethnic, religious or linguistic conflict increases the migration pressures.

During the Soviet times there were important deportations. The deportees compose a significant potential for return migration. In the early to mid 1990s the Ingush and other South Ossetians migrated to North Ossetia. More than 220,000 ethnic Dagestanis, were returning to Dagestan from several other Commonwealth of Independent States states. There are also significant

²⁵⁵ Zhanna A. Zaionchkovskaya, *Migration Patterns in the Former Soviet Union*, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF130/CF130ch2.pdf> (Accessed on 7 March 2008)

²⁵⁶ Dr. Demetrios Papademetriou, Senior Associate and Co-Director International Migration Policy Program, Carnegie- Endowment for International Peace, *Migration Trends in the CIS and their Potential Consequences for Europe*, Symposium, Illegal Migration. <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/files/trends_russia.pdf> (Accessed on 20 February 2008)

returns of former deportees to the Russian Republics of Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkessia. Moreover there is the migration of approximately 30,000 Meskhetian Turks from a variety of Central Asian States to Azerbaijan.²⁵⁷

An important part of the emigration to Russia, was composed of the citizens of the countries of the former Soviet Union. The social and economic conditions of the post-Soviet states influenced migration trends. Those socio economic conditions can be listed as, economic backwardness, the presence of armed conflicts, the strength of mass based nationalism among the titular groups, the exclusiveness of the newly independent states policies towards Russians.

First, the economic conditions vary greatly throughout the former Soviet Union. Transcaucasia and Central Asia are relatively less developed in comparison with the three Baltic states; Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. The predictions for rapid improvement in the near future are scarce however, some of them notably Uzbekistan, demonstrate relatively stable economic growth and little social discontent.²⁵⁸

Second, as a consequence of armed conflicts in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Moldova, Russians living in these countries are particularly vulnerable. Russians living in these countries perceive their environment as dangerous and hostile because of the armed conflicts.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁷ Dr. Demetrios Papademetriou , Senior Associate and Co-Director International Migration Policy Program, Carnegie- Endowment for International Peace, *Migration Trends in the CIS and their Potential Consequences for Europe*, Symposium, Illegal Migration. <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/files/trends_russia.pdf> (Accessed on 20 February 2008)

²⁵⁸ Igor Zevelev, *Russia and its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, p.103.

²⁵⁹ Igor Zevelev, *Russia and its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, p.104.

Third, mass based nationalism in the former Soviet republics, have a negative influence on the conditions of the Russian minorities. In the Baltic States, Georgia and Armenia, the intensity of indigenous national consciousness is highest. In the Baltic states national liberation movements national liberation movements had a significant anti-Russian component. During the late 1980s and 1990s the leaders of the national protests in these states seemed democratic but concerned primarily with the well being of the titular ethnos, rather than individual human rights or civil liberties.

Fourth, the post Soviet states policies towards Russians in the former Soviet republics manifest themselves in citizenship and language issues. “Latvia and Estonia are the only two countries of the former Soviet Union where citizenship was not automatically granted to all legal residents.”²⁶⁰

5.2. Patterns of External Migration

The period of transition from the former Soviet Union, introduced a new social and political system. During this complex transition period, migration systems have significantly changed and became varied.

...sharp distortions of migratory processes, disruptions, and even reversals of evolutionary trends, evidencing the enormity of the social shock to which the population of the former USSR was subjected.²⁶¹

Emigrations from Russia and immigrations to Russia are the two main branches of external migration in the Russian Federation.

Immigration is a key issue in the case of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation is second after USA in the world, in terms of both stock and

²⁶⁰ Igor Zevelev, *Russia and its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, p.104.

²⁶¹ Zhanna A. Zaionchkovskaya, *Migration Patterns in the Former Soviet Union*, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF130/CF130ch2.pdf> (Accessed on 7 March 2008).

flow of immigrants. According to the Russian Census of 2002, 11 million had immigrated to Russia since the 1989 Census. (Net immigration was indicated as 5.6 million in the 1989 census.) 99.5 percent of 11 million immigrants were from Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries. Most of those immigrants were repatriating ethnic Russians.²⁶²

After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, a large diaspora population emerged with 25.2 million Russians. The members of the Russian diaspora saw their homeland as the entire Soviet Union. With the break up of the Soviet Union the status of the ethnic Russians in the non-Russian Republics has changed. The reaction of some of the Russians to this change was to leave the non Russian states. Although the role of the diaspora migration is significant among post-Soviet migrations, it is not the only example and it should be discussed among overall migration streams.²⁶³

“Between 1989 and 2002, the population increase from migration was 3.8 million; net immigration from the non-Russian FSU states was 5 million, and net emigration to outside the Former Soviet Union was 1.2 million.”²⁶⁴

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the reasons for migration and the nature of migration flows have changed. Different from the Soviet period the socio-political factors became important concerning the migration flows of the post-Soviet period. Ethnic repatriation became an important reason for migration from the northern and eastern Kazakstan. The political changes such

²⁶² Yuri Adrienko, Sergei Guriev, “Understanding Migration in Russia”, Center for Economic and Financial Research at News Economic School (CEFIR), Policy Paper Series, No.23, November 2005.

²⁶³ Yuri Adrienko, Sergei Guriev, “Understanding Migration in Russia”, Center for Economic and Financial Research at News Economic School (CEFIR), Policy Paper Series, No.23, November 2005.

²⁶⁴ Timothy Heleniak, “Migration of the Russian Diaspora after the Breakup of the Soviet Union”, *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.57.No.2, Spring 2004.

as the abolition of dual citizenship, introduction of the titular-nationality language as a national language, closing of some Russian-language schools excluded the Russians from the society in the former Soviet Republics.²⁶⁵

There has been net migration to Russia, of 13.2 percent of the Russian diaspora population. This net migration to Russia has composed of immigration of 5.3 million Russians and an emigration of 1.9 million. These numbers are equivalent to the 21.1 percent of the Russian diaspora population. In some states half or more of the Russian populations have chosen migration. In Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, nearly a quarter of the Russian populations have left.²⁶⁶

The largest migrant group in the region of the Commonwealth of Independent States, is composed of the repatriants, who are defined as the persons returning voluntarily to the country of their citizenship or the country of their origin for permanent residence. The number of repatriants is estimated at 4,207,000. There is the migration of the Russian speaking repatriants toward the Russian Federation.²⁶⁷

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russians in the regions of armed conflict emigrated to Russia. For instance between 1989 and 1995, Armenia lost more than 50 percent of Russians, while Tajikistan lost 48 percent, Azerbaijan 42 percent, Georgia 39 percent. The total loss of the non-

²⁶⁵ Olga Lazareva, "Russian Migrants to Russia: Choice of Location and Labor Market Outcomes", Centre for Economic and Financial Research at New Economic School, *CEFIR / NES Working Paper series*, Working Paper No. 117, April 2008.

²⁶⁶ Timothy Heleniak, "Migration of the Russian Diaspora after the Breakup of the Soviet Union", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.57.No.2, Spring 2004.

²⁶⁷ Igor Zevelev, *Russia and its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, p116.

Slavic states of the former Soviet Union was 17 percent of the Russian populations between 1991 and 1996.²⁶⁸

The percentage of Russians in overall immigration increased from 46 percent in 1989 to 61-66 percent in 1992-1995. In the 1990's the major sources of migration to Russia were the five Soviet successor states with predominantly Muslim populations: Kazakhstan (738,000 in 1991-1995), Uzbekistan (420,000 in 1991-1995), Kyrgyzstan (225,000 in 1991-1995), Azerbaijan (211,000 in 1991-1995), and Tajikistan (191,000 in 1991-1994).²⁶⁹

²⁶⁸ Igor Zevelev, *Russia and its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, p117.

²⁶⁹ Igor Zevelev, *Russia and its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, p118.

Table 1: The Total Number of Arrivals to the Russian Federation

	1997	2000	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
The Total Number of Arrivals to the Russian Federation	597651	359330	184612	129144	119157	177230	186380	286956
of which from:								
CIS countries	571903	346774	175068	119661	110374	168598	177657	273872
Azerbaijan	29878	14906	5635	4277	2584	4600	8900	20968
Armenia	19123	15951	6802	5124	3057	7581	12949	30751
Belarus'	17575	10274	6841	5309	5650	6797	5619	6030
Georgia	24517	20213	7128	5540	4886	5497	6806	10595
Kazakhstan	235903	124903	55706	29552	40150	51945	38606	40258
Kyrgyzstan	13752	15536	13139	6948	9511	15592	15669	24731
Republic of Moldova	13750	11652	7562	6391	4816	6569	8649	14090
Tajikistan	23053	11043	5967	5346	3339	4717	6523	17309
Turkmenistan	16501	6738	4531	6299	3734	4104	4089	4846
Uzbekistan	39620	40810	24951	21457	14948	30436	37126	52802
Ukraine	138231	74748	36806	23418	17699	30760	32721	51492
far abroad countries	25748	12556	9544	9483	8783	8632	8723	13084
Australia	57	27	22	30	42	30	28	38
Afghanistan	208	288	107	82	55	60	86	212
Bulgaria	750	245	238	212	125	118	109	207
Germany	2379	1753	1962	2692	3117	3025	2900	3164
Greece	183	182	150	224	182	200	176	260
Israel	1626	1508	1670	1808	1486	1004	1053	1094
Canada	73	50	70	103	87	99	77	118
China	2861	1121	410	346	212	432	499	1687
Cuba	110	37	22	23	12	17	12	44
Latvia	5658	1785	990	906	819	726	766	887
Lithuania	1785	945	722	535	339	360	371	537
Poland	247	61	53	39	48	55	48	96
Syrian Arab Republic	483	358	144	101	56	68	67	93
USA	668	439	455	484	518	396	411	578
Turkey	176	164	144	112	77	86	172	315
Finland	140	83	136	125	141	129	137	172
Sweden	32	14	19	22	16	23	32	39
Estonia	3483	786	534	445	446	432	347	508
other countries	4829	2710	1696	1194	1005	1372	1432	3035

Source: Russia, Goskomstat

<http://www.gks.ru/wps/portal!/ut/p.cmd/cs.ce/7_0_A/s/7_0_3QA/th/J_0_9D/s.7_0_A/7_0_2BD/me/7_0_2BC-7_0_A/s.7_0_A/7_0_3QA> (Accessed on 29 July 2008)

In 1994, approximately 1.1 million people moved to Russia however a downward trend in immigration to Russia was seen in 1995-1998. In 1995 the number of immigrants to Russia was 842,000. In 1996 the number was 700,000. In 1997 the number of immigrants dropped to 490,200 and in 1998 439,400 people immigrated to Russia. It is seen in Table 1 there is a considerable decline in the number of people arriving to the Russian Federation from 1997 to 2007. The decline is parallel with the decrease in the number of emigrants from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Georgia. Kazakhstan was the only country of the CIS, where the number of emigrants to Russia increased. The basic reason for the decline was the difficulties that the newcomers faced in Russia such as the lack of governmental support and jobs below the level of their skills.²⁷⁰

Also it is seen in Table 1 that the shares of the countries change importantly in different years.

The number of people who migrated to Belarus from the Russian Federation was 42 percent higher than the number of people who left Belarus and moved to Russia.²⁷¹

Temporary work force contributing to population shifts from Ukraine and Belarus to Russia. Migrant workers from Ukraine and Belarus make up more than 70 percent of the total number of foreign workers in Russia. There are several forms of population movement between the former Soviet republics and Russia. There are refugees influenced by armed conflicts and direct violence, forced migrants, who suffer ethnic discrimination and hostile attitudes. Also there are the population movements that occur as a consequence

²⁷⁰ Igor Zevelev, *Russia and its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, p120.

²⁷¹ Oleg G. Bukhovets, "The Post-Soviet Great Migration of Peoples", *Sociological Research*, , Vol.41, No. 5, September-October 2002, p.80.

of gloomy economic, career, or educational prospects in host societies and temporary labour moves.²⁷²

The Russian diaspora considered either the non-Russian republic that they resided in or Russia as their homeland. The stand point about the homeland is important in the migration decision. A majority of Russians in the non-Russian states were born in the republic they resided in. The rate is 66.6 percent in Kazakhstan and 42.2 percent in Belarus. In 1989, according to the 1989 all union census, there were 3,305,000 Russians Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. As a consequence of the high unemployment, ethnic unrest, armed conflict, growing Islamization and the requirements that Russians learn indigenous languages in the region, the majority of Russians in Central Asia were expected to leave the region before 2000. In 1992, 150,000 Russians and so-called “Russian speakers” were to be displaced from Tadzhikistan as a result of conflicts.²⁷³

There is the migratory pressure in Russia, especially in the capital cities and major towns as well as in the border regions. The number of illegal migrants in the territory of Russia is estimated as 4.5 million, consisting of foreign citizens and also persons with no citizenship, the majority of who were illegal labour migrants. As the illegal migration to Russia increase, the problems of illegal migration became acute. There are the difficulties of controlling illegal migration on both the federal and regional levels.²⁷⁴

²⁷² Igor Zevelev, *Russia and its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, p116.

²⁷³ John. B. Dunlop, “Will a Large Scale Migration of Russians to the Russian Republic Take Place over the Current Decade”, *International Migration Review*, Autumn 1993, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 605-629.

²⁷⁴ E.S. Krasinets, “Illegal Migration in Russia”, *Sociological Research*, January-February 2005, Vol.44, No. 1, pp.7-25.

5.3. Illegal Migration in Russia

Illegal migration has become an important issue concerning Russia's migration policy. Illegal migration is one of the most urgent problems of migration, it needs to be reacted to quickly and requires that considered decisions be made. The problem is expected to worsen with the economic growth of Russia and demographic decline and shortage of manpower in particular regions and spheres of occupation. "Illegal migration is not only a large-scale process but also a dynamic one."²⁷⁵

A significant part of the illegal migrants in Russia are the citizens of the former USSR countries. These migrants in Russia entered the Russian Federation legally to work, to go to school, or to travel or as guests of individual persons. Later, they stayed in the territory of Russia illegally.

Visa free regimes based on bilateral agreements between the majority of the CIS countries. However due to bureaucratic obstacles on the way to Russian citizenship and legal employment the overwhelming majority of migrants find themselves illegal in status.²⁷⁶

The majority of the illegal migrants come into both Russia and North Caucasus from the countries of the CIS, in particular from the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. The largest flows of latent migration were from Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Tajikistan. Moreover the main illegal flows come in

²⁷⁵ E.S. Krasinets, "Illegal Migration in Russia", *Sociological Research*, January-February 2005, Vol.44, No. 1, p.10

²⁷⁶ Irina Ivakhniouk, "Illegal Migration: Russia", *European Security*, Vol.13, No.1, 2004, pp. 35-53.

over the segments of the borders between Russia and Kazakhstan. The total number of illegal migrants in Russia is estimated at 3-4 million.²⁷⁷

After Russia signed the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees and its supplementary 1967 Protocol in 199, hundreds of thousands of refugees from Afghanistan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Turkey, Sri Lanka and Angola reached Russia. Some were granted refugee status. Some either preferred to move to the West or stay in Russia illegally. Their number is estimated at 200,000.²⁷⁸

Transit migrants from Asian and African countries are another part of the illegal migrants in Russia. They overstay the transit term and they lose their legal transit migrant status. It is estimated that their number is around 500,000. Most prominent in terms of the size of illegal migrants flows from countries of the far abroad are those coming in from China, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. Moreover the main illegal flows come in over the segments of the borders between Russia and China, Russia and Mongolia.²⁷⁹

The majority of illegal migrants are concentrated in the oblast centre and in a number of the biggest cities such as Azov, Volgodonsk, Novocheerkassk and Taganrog. Those are the places where it is easiest to find work and to get lost in the crowd without having a legal permit to live there or have a job. The border areas with Ukraine are also prominent as zones where illegal are concentrated. Most of the illegal migrants are the members of the most active age groups, with lower level education and training.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁷ Irina Ivakhniouk, "Illegal Migration: Russia", *European Security*, Vol.13, No.1, 2004, pp. 35-53.

²⁷⁸ Irina Ivakhniouk, "Illegal Migration: Russia", *European Security*, Vol.13, No.1, 2004, pp. 35-53.

²⁷⁹ Irina Ivakhniouk, "Illegal Migration: Russia", *European Security*, Vol.13, No.1, 2004, pp. 35-53.

²⁸⁰ E.S. Krasinets, "Illegal Migration in Russia", *Sociological Research*, January-February 2005, Vol.44, No. 1, p.10.

While analysing the general characteristics of illegal migrants, the citizens of the countries of Central Asia and Kazakhstan have the lowest level of education. More than 8 percent of these illegal migrants have no education or had only a primary education. In contrast the illegal migrants coming from Ukraine or Moldova had the highest level of education. According to Krasinets this situation can be explained by the differentiation between the educational structure of these countries. Illegal migrants are most of the times, former unemployed persons or former occasional workers without a regular job. "...these are persons who have not been able to adapt in their own homelands to the conditions of transformation processes in the economy and in the labour market."²⁸¹

It is a key point that the illegal migrants are basically employed in the nonstate sector, with the "...widespread prevalence of unofficial and informal relations and broad opportunities for working outside of the legal scope."²⁸² An important part of the illegal migrants are employed in the small enterprises, which have activity in the shadow economy. After moving to Russia illegal migrant's were concentrated in trade and the sphere of services, blue-collar workers of low qualifications, unskilled blue and white collar workers and workers in the construction professionals.²⁸³

There are contradictory consequences of illegal migration to Russia. There are influences of illegal migration both on the economy and on the society. With respect to the jobs that are not attractive, illegal migration provides considerable balance in the labour market. Put differently, illegal

²⁸¹ E.S. Krasinets, "Illegal Migration in Russia", *Sociological Research*, Vol.44, No. 1, January-February 2005, p.14.

²⁸² E.S. Krasinets, "Illegal Migration in Russia", *Sociological Research*, Vol.44, No. 1, January-February 2005, p.16.

²⁸³ L.B. Karachurina, "The Migration Component of the Labour Market in Major Russian Cities", *Sociological Research*, , Vol.47, No.3, May-June 2008pp.6-17.

migrants are taking vacant jobs that are not in demand among Russia's citizens. In contrast there are various negative consequences of illegal migration to Russia. The shadow sphere of employment is improving through illegal migration. It is not possible to receive revenues from the use of foreign man power, the evasion of taxes or contributions to social funds. Thus there is a negative influence of illegal migrants on the budget. Foreign workers, who do not have a definite legal status, are engaged in the labour market where citizens of Russia could be employed.

“Illegal migration leads to more and more pressure on employment in the nonshadow sector, makes it hard to equalize conditions for competition in the market, and tends to flood the labour market with unqualified manpower.”²⁸⁴ Illegal migrants encourage the creation of an unmonitored market in goods and services, stimulating the development of shadow segments in it, and distorting the system of relations among subjects of the market and the state. The creation of an effective labour market in Russia is prevented by illegal migrants.

Other negative consequences of illegal migration in Russia are; the cheapening of the value of the local workforce, increase in crimes, increase in trafficking of narcotics, strengthening the organized ethnic crime gangs, worsening of ethnic and interethnic conflicts, increase in the unemployment among the local population with results in the increased tension between local population and migrants, increase in the costs of housing, destruction in the cultural standards of the native population through the adoption of alien cultures. “The rising numbers of illegal migrants are also creating problems

²⁸⁴ E.S. Krasinets, “Illegal Migration in Russia”, *Sociological Research*, Vol.44, No. 1, January-February 2005, p.21.

when it comes to sanitation, which is fraught with the possibility of the spread of dangerous infectious diseases.”²⁸⁵

There is the necessity of the differentiated regulations of the state with respect to illegal migration. Irina Ivakhniouk defines the character of illegal migration in Russia as ‘multi-layer’. Accordingly Ivakhniouk argues there is a need for a diversity of approaches to fight against the security threats rooted in the illegal migration to Russia.²⁸⁶

The issues of migration cannot be evaluated independent from the social, economic and political dynamics of the country. The emigrations from the Russian Federation are an example of interaction between population movements and social economic and political conditions.

In 1985, the introduction of the policy of perestroika was a turning point regarding the emigration from the Soviet Union. “The overall number of Soviet citizens who left the country, from 1948 to 1990 is 1,130,000, 40 percent of whom departed during the period from 1987 to 1989. In 1990-91, around 450,000 people left the USSR.”²⁸⁷ The basic reason for the rise was the introduction of a more liberal political regime with contact with the West. Lilia Shevtsova argues that emigration turned into an external policy tool of the Soviet leadership with perestroika. Opening wider exit doors was a policy of Gorbachev to enhance economic ties with the industrially developed nations.

The emigration policy was, in those years, seen as a transient one and necessitated by the political situation; it was not associated with a radical and irreversible shift in the Soviet leadership’s attitude toward problems of people’s civil and political rights and, in particular, the freedom of their movement. The pendulum could at any movement start going in the opposite direction, and it was only the complete transformation of power in Soviet society on a

²⁸⁵ E.S. Krasinets, “Illegal Migration in Russia”, *Sociological Research*, Vol.44, No. 1, January-February 2005, p.22.

²⁸⁶ Irina Ivakhniouk, “Illegal Migration: Russia”, *European Security*, Vol.13, No.1, 2004, pp. 35-53.

²⁸⁷ Lilia Shevtsova, “Post-Soviet Emigration Today and Tomorrow”, *Internal Migration Review*, Vol. 26, No.2, Summer 1992, pp. 241.

democratic basis and decisive rejection of communist principles of society's life that could guarantee against the development. The movement in this direction only started in 1990.²⁸⁸

During the perestroika period both the number of emigrants increased and the nature of the emigration has changed. Previously the main motives of the Soviet emigrants were political harassment and infringement of their rights and freedoms. In contrast starting from the late 1980's Soviet emigration, the Soviet emigration had an economic nature. Worsening living standards and unemployment was influential. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 336,000 citizens left the country within the first ten months of 1991. Most of the emigrants are young people between 20 and 35 years of age, residents of large industrially developed and culturally advanced centres, and representatives of the intellectual, scientific and cultural elite. In terms of nationality, Jews, Germans, Armenians, Poles and Greeks have an important ratio among the total number of emigrants.²⁸⁹

First the emigration trends of Jews, was high between 1987 and 1991. Over 308,000 departed for Israel between 1987 and 1991. Between 1991 and 1993 the emigration of Jews declined. The problems of housing and high unemployment in Israel can be defined as the reasons for the reduction.²⁹⁰

The second considerable group of emigrants from Russia are ethnic Germans. In 1990 to 1991, the amount of German repatriates was 200,000 persons, according to the Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The German government allocated money to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Soviet-born Germans. Although there have been efforts to prevent the migration of German population, there is a strong flow of Soviet-born

²⁸⁸ Lilia Shevtsova, "Post-Soviet Emigration Today and Tomorrow", *Internal Migration Review*, Vol. 26, No.2, Summer 1992, pp. 242.

²⁸⁹ Lilia Shevtsova, "Post-Soviet Emigration Today and Tomorrow", *Internal Migration Review*, Vol. 26, No.2, Summer 1992, pp. 242.

²⁹⁰ Lilia Shevtsova, "Post-Soviet Emigration Today and Tomorrow", *Internal Migration Review*, Vol. 26, No.2, Summer 1992, pp. 247.

Germans. Third nationality to be considered is the Greeks. Before the mid-1991, about 30,000 emigrants of Greek origin from Russia, emigrated to Greece. Most of these emigrants are the descendants of ancient Hellenians who settled on Northern coast of Black sea.²⁹¹

In 1991-1993 about 308,000 persons left Russia for permanent residence abroad. In 1993 emigration was 114.1 thousand persons while the number was 103.7 thousands in 1992. The emigrants were the most economically active, industrious and work-capable part of the population.²⁹²

²⁹¹ Stanislav Simanovsky, Margarita P. Strepetova, Yuriy G. Naido, *“Brain Drain” from Russia: Problems, Prospects, Ways of Regulation*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1995, p.57.

²⁹² Stanislav Simanovsky, Margarita P. Strepetova, Yuriy G. Naido, *“Brain Drain” from Russia: Problems, Prospects, Ways of Regulation*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1995, p.58.

Table 2: The Total Number of Departures from the Russian Federation

	1997	2000	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
The Total Number of Departures from the Russian Federation	232987	145720	106685	94018	79795	69798	54061	47013
of which from:								
CIS countries	146961	82312	52099	46081	37017	36109	35262	31329
Azerbaijan	4302	3187	1704	1771	1336	1274	1366	1355
Armenia	2578	1519	1114	1098	654	620	686	728
Belarus'	18928	13276	8829	7016	5671	6034	6318	5302
Georgia	3286	1802	964	939	740	691	593	603
Kazakhstan	25364	17913	13939	14017	12504	12437	11948	10211
Kyrgyzstan	6296	1857	1080	959	656	473	605	668
Republic of Moldova	5715	2237	1385	1234	907	786	636	629
Tajikistan	2474	1158	827	922	549	434	424	464
Turkmenistan	1532	676	272	251	168	125	112	111
Uzbekistan	7370	3086	1400	1130	717	595	648	722
Ukraine	69116	35601	20585	16744	13115	12640	11926	10536
far abroad countries	86026	63408	54586	47937	42778	33689	18799	15684
Australia	297	176	144	146	167	209	167	139
Afghanistan	146	25	7	17	2	11	11	12
Bulgaria	668	180	133	156	160	124	116	132
Germany	48363	40443	42231	36928	31876	21458	8229	6486
Greece	886	314	190	186	157	155	139	116
Israel	12873	9407	2764	2048	1733	1745	1408	1202
Canada	1333	841	725	701	783	628	552	571
China	1222	658	151	86	154	456	196	56
Cuba	89	27	6	8	8	2	3	5
Latvia	636	365	256	259	226	211	223	271
Lithuania	1162	376	293	268	282	213	228	276
Poland	376	135	80	72	57	76	84	77
Syrian Arab Republic	256	54	66	58	55	54	42	38
USA	9087	4793	3134	3199	2919	4040	3109	2108
Turkey	356	104	80	88	60	85	78	78
Finland	923	1142	1110	737	910	737	695	692
Sweden	151	195	162	151	158	110	132	137
Estonia	702	385	321	351	265	225	270	280
other countries	6500	3788	2733	2478	2806	3150	3117	3008

Source: Russia, Goskomstat

<http://www.gks.ru/wps/portal!/ut/p/cmd/cs.ce/7_0_A/s/7_0_3QA/th/J_0_9D/s.7_0_A/7_0_2BD/me/7_0_2BC-7_0_A/s.7_0_A/7_0_3QA> (Accessed on 29 July 2008)

Although the external migration from Russia has a wide geographic pattern, there are four main countries of destination. Until 1993, among the total number of emigrants from Russia, 45% went to Israel, 37% went to Germany, 12% to the USA and 2% to Greece. In 1993 the ratios have changed as 18% to Israel, 64% to Germany, 13.1% to the USA and 2% to Greece. It is seen in Table 2 that CIS countries, Ukraine and far abroad countries have always been important destinations.²⁹³

The United States, Australia, Canada, Finland, Sweden are attractive for emigrants from Russia. The population movements for the permanent residence in these countries are increasing.

The most science-intensive emigration is to the United States, countries of Western Europe and Israel.²⁹⁴ In 1992, 33% of the emigrants from Russia to USA had higher education and, 44% were employees. Between 1990 and 1993 about scientists, mainly mathematicians, physicists, biologists emigrated to the USA for permanent residence.²⁹⁵

Besides USA and Western Europe, Latin American countries are the destination for the emigrants from Russia. There are intellectual emigrants from Russia in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela and Uruguay.

These countries introduce several programs to attract the highly-skilled scientists and specialists of the post-Soviet region.

²⁹³ Stanislav Simanovsky, Margarita P. Strepetova, Yuriy G. Naido, *“Brain Drain” from Russia: Problems, Prospects, Ways of Regulation*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1995, p.58.

²⁹⁴ Tatyana Kouznetsova, “Brain Drain: Problem of Contract Migration in Russia”, *International Scientific Migrations* <http://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins_textes/divers4/010022327-15.pdf> (Accessed on 1 July 2008)

²⁹⁵ Stanislav Simanovsky, Margarita P. Strepetova, Yuriy G. Naido, *“Brain Drain” from Russia: Problems, Prospects, Ways of Regulation*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1995, p.58.

In Brazil, the matter is in attraction of high skill specialists and scientists from CIS countries for work in local research centres and universities. Accordingly there are Russian specialists of mathematics, mechanics, chemistry, biomedicine, biotechnology, physics of elemental particles, and manufacture of composites work in universities in Brazil.

Mexico is another destination country for the high-skill specialists from Russia. “In 1993 about 300 scientists and top experts from Russia and Ukraine worked on a contractual basis in its universities and research centres. The goal of the Mexicans is to increase the level of their science, which is behind Western research and development. Especially the specialists in physics, chemistry, mathematics, oceanography were welcomed.

Also Venezuela and Uruguay invited emigrants from CIS and Eastern Europe.

During the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s economy experienced recession. Drop of production output, growth of inflation and unemployment, investment paralysis, crisis of non-payment, related rupture of production links and bartering of exchanges between enterprises and regions of this country became a part of the Russian economy. Parallel to the economic problems, there was a decline in the living standards and quality of life of the population. During the period of 1990-1993 real wages decreased by more than 2.6 times. Accordingly during this period, the proportion of least paid workers and employees increased from 5 to 37.8%, whereas that of moderately and highly paid people reduced from 47.4 to 18.3%.²⁹⁶

The conditions of insufficient housing, poor dwelling, low level of medical care, high prices for consumer goods and services creates pessimism among Russia’s population and creates a motive for emigration in general.

²⁹⁶ Stanislav Simanovsky, Margarita P. Strepetova, Yuriy G. Naido, “*Brain Drain*” from Russia: *Problems, Prospects, Ways of Regulation*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1995, p.53.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the integrity of the research and development complex was destroyed and important disproportions were created. Nearly one third of previously Soviet scientific and technological potential was alienated from Russia. Thus it became even impossible for Russia to carry research in many areas of science and technology.

‘Brain drain’ occurs in all spheres in Russia. In 1992 16,100 specialists emigrated from industry, transport and communications. 8,700 from agriculture and forestry and 4,600 specialists from trade and public catering sector emigrated. The number of persons who left Russia for permanent residence abroad increased in 1991 by 4.5 times compared to 1988, the growth in the category of employees was 5 times, students 6 times. There is an important shift in the ratio of the employees among the total population between 1988 and 1991. “Employees were 21% of the total number of emigrants in 1988 and 23.4% in 1991.”²⁹⁷

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union until 1993, approximately 55,000 engineers emigrated to Israel from the former Soviet Union republics. The number of doctors, who emigrated was 12,000 and 10,000 researchers and persons with occupations in culture and arts. The number of professors and teachers was 22,000. The destination countries of emigrants from science and public education sectors are Germany, Israel and USA. “Scientific and engineering personnel, as well as representatives of higher and secondary education have a high proportion of emigrants to these countries according to sectors: in 1993 their shares were 8.1%, 8.8, 10.3% respectively for all sectors”²⁹⁸

²⁹⁷ Stanislav Simanovsky, Margarita P. Strepetova, Yuriy G. Naido, *“Brain Drain” from Russia: Problems, Prospects, Ways of Regulation*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1995, p.53.

²⁹⁸ Stanislav Simanovsky, Margarita P. Strepetova, Yuriy G. Naido, *“Brain Drain” from Russia: Problems, Prospects, Ways of Regulation*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1995, p.57.

5.4. Conclusion

Social, economic, cultural and political conditions created challenges to the Russians both living in the Russian Federation and in other former Soviet republics. Thus it is necessary to evaluate the migration patterns in the former Soviet Union among these challenges. High unemployment, ethnic unrest, armed conflict and division among population as natives and immigrants are some of these challenges. The status of the ethnic Russians in the non-Russian Republics has changed. Some of the Russians reacted to this change by leaving the non –Russian states. Most of them immigrated to the Russian Federation. In 1994, approximately 1.1 million people moved to Russia however a downward trend in immigration to Russia was seen in 1995-1998. The emigrants of Russia are also critical. In terms of nationality Jews, Germans, Armenians, Poles and Greeks are some of the emigrant groups. In the issue of external migrations of Russia the aspects of illegal migration and brain drain are critical since they have consequences influencing various sectors.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This thesis has attempted to analyze the internal and external migration in the Russian Federation. In this regard, firstly the thesis aimed at outlining the migration in the Soviet Union as a historical background. Soviet migration policy and its effectiveness were discussed. The nature of the internal migration in the Soviet Union and Soviet emigration was examined. Secondly, the thesis focused on the migration policy of the Russian Federation concerning the legislative and institutional framework. Thirdly, the thesis examined the motivations and patterns of internal migration in the Russian Federation. Fourthly, external migrations in the Russian Federation were discussed concerning the motivations and trends of external migration. Finally the chapter focused on the issue of illegal migration in the Russian Federation.

As examined in the Second Chapter, Soviet migration policy had a restrictive character that was based on the Soviet internal passport system. The Soviet internal passport regime was established by the decree of 27th December, 1932. Gijs Kessler argues that the system was concerned with the control of urban and non-rural population.²⁹⁹ The restrictive character of the Soviet migration system was supported by the residence permit (*propiska*). In order to obtain a *propiska*, it was necessary to register the passport with the police.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁹Gijs Kessler, "The Passport System and State Control over Population Flows in the Soviet Union, 1932-1940", *Cahiers du Monde russe*, Vol. 42, No. 2-3-4, April-December 2002, p.478. <<http://monderusse.revues.org/docannexe3921.html>> Accessed on 16 June 2008.

³⁰⁰Gijs Kessler, "The Passport System and State Control over Population Flows in the Soviet Union, 1932-1940", *Cahiers du Monde russe*, Vol. 42, No. 2-3-4, April-December 2002, p.483. <<http://monderusse.revues.org/docannexe3921.html>> Accessed on 16 June 2008.

Starting from late 1920's to the late 1980's the main migration pattern of the Soviet Union was rural to urban. Especially during the period between 1926 and 1939 the highest rate of urbanization was seen. Especially the young and the skilled were prone to depart to the city that had higher standard of living.³⁰¹

Until 1991, the Soviet Union remained an isolated country with migratory exchanges at the minimum. Some liberalizations of the regime were introduced regarding travel abroad in 1980s. While during the previous periods travel abroad was limited to the upper echelons of the Party, in 1980s Soviet citizens started to go abroad. Between 1950 and 1990, Soviet emigration is estimated as 1 200 000. It is important to note that more than half of this emigration was seen during 1989-1990. Jews, Germans, Armenians and Greeks were the major nationalities of emigrants. Israel, Germany, Greece, United States and Canada were the major destination countries.³⁰²

It is argued by Cynthia Buckley that the passport and propiska restrictions did not fulfil managing migration through administrative means. They failed to motivate potential migrants to remain in their locations of origin. Potential migrants preferred to obtain passports and *propiskas* through semi-legal and illegal means or migrants without official documentation resided where they chose as a consequence of widespread corruption and fraud.³⁰³

In the Third Chapter migration policy of the Russian Federation is examined. Russian migration policy experienced changes in time. In 1989-1991, there was no legislative or institutional framework regarding the

³⁰¹ Stephen Wegren, A. Cooper Drury, "Patterns of Internal Migration During the Russian Transition", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.17, No.4, December 2001, pp.15-42.

³⁰² Jean Claude Chesnais, *The USSR Emigration: Past, Present and Future*, OECD, 1991, p.4-8.

³⁰³ Cynthia Buckley, "The Myth of Managed Migration: Migration Control and Market in the Soviet Period", *Slavic Review*, Vol.54, No.4, Winter, 1995, pp. 896-916.

migration policy in Russia. In 1991-1993, Russian migration policy was formed. 1993-1999 was the period of improving regulation and development of migration legislation. Especially during 1993-1995 the legislation concerning migration was non uniform and in an ad hoc fashion. Between 2002 and 2004 the main focus was combating irregular migration. Starting from 2005, the reformation of the migration policy has started.³⁰⁴

At the core of the institutional framework of the Russian migration, there is the Federal Migration Service (FMS), which is the main body responsible for developing and implementing policies related to refugees and forced migrants in the Russian Federation. There were regional branches of the Federal Migration Service (FMS) that were called Territorial Migration Services. In practice policy and implementation decisions were taken at the district and regional levels.³⁰⁵

There are the non-governmental organizations such as The Coordinating Council for Aid to Refugees and Forced Migrants (CCARFM), The Compatriots' Fund (Russian Fund for Aid to Refugees) and international organizations such as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration, the International Labour Organization (ILO), Red Cross and Red Crescent are functioning concerning migration in Russia.³⁰⁶

When the migration policies of the Russian Federation were observed in the Third Chapter, it was seen that the harmony between institutions and legislative cannot be seen in the Russian case. In addition it is not possible to

³⁰⁴ Yuri Adrienko, Sergei Guriev, "Understanding Migration in Russia", Center for Economic and Financial Research at News Economic School (CEFIR), Policy Paper Series, No.23, November 2005.

³⁰⁵ Hilary Pilkington, *Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.60.

³⁰⁶ Hilary Pilkington, *Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.82.

say that there is consistency of laws. It was seen that laws with different objectives were initiated in the same period. Thus it is not possible to say that the migration policy of the Russian Federation totally shapes the emergence and perpetuation of migration patterns.

It could be observed that the ‘open door’ policy that was effective after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, had an important role regarding the large scale migration to the Russian Federation during 1991-1992. In addition the citizenship policies enacted after 2002 was significant concerning the migration to the Russian Federation from the post-Soviet states.³⁰⁷ Still, it is not possible to say that the migration policies of the Russian Federation shape the migration trends. The problem of illegal migration is the most imminent example of the weakness of the Russian migration policy.

The Fourth Chapter discusses the internal migration in the Russian Federation. It is seen through the examinations of the Fourth Chapter that the imbalances of the Soviet period were not destroyed instead they were sharpened in the Russian Federation. Already densely populated regions experienced immigration.³⁰⁸ The analysis of the Fourth Chapter demonstrates that economic conditions are important concerning the internal migration in the Russian Federation. The regions that promise jobs and higher income became the destination regions.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union a new economic system was created. The introduction of market reforms was followed by an economic crisis. High inflation, an increase in the cost of living, worsened living

³⁰⁷ Yuri Adrienko, Sergei Guriev, “Understanding Migration in Russia”, Center for Economic and Financial Research at News Economic School (CEFIR), Policy Paper Series, No.23, November 2005.

³⁰⁸ Kazuhiro Kumo, *Interregional Population Migration in Russia*, Paper Presented at the European Association for Comparative Economic Studies (EACES) 9th Bi-Annual Conference: Development Strategies- A Comparative View
<http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/~kumo/EACES06_kumo.pdf> (Accessed on 15 May 2008)

standards and growing unemployment created the conditions that would lead to migration. Moreover, the new economic structure introduced new forms of migration such as short term labour migration or shuttle trade.³⁰⁹ The economic system was totally changed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Migration patterns were reversed as a response to the economical changes. During the Soviet Union, there was the misallocation of production. The regions with cold temperature and transportation costs were overinvested. The migration pattern was towards these regions during the Soviet Union since it was economically beneficial to migrate to those regions however in post-Soviet Russia the economic attractiveness of the region was lessened this migration pattern was reversed. European Russia and Moscow and its hinterland are the centre for the economic activity and following the collapse of the Soviet Union, people born in Siberia and the Far East started to migrate to European Russia, while many of the people born in Central Russia who had been living in Siberia and the Far East returned to central Russia.³¹⁰

As discussed in the Fifth Chapter most of the Russians immigrated to the Russian Federation. In the 1990's major sources of migration to Russia were Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan. After 1995, the number of immigrants declined. The decline was seen as the result of the problems faced by the newcomers such as lack of governmental support and jobs below the level of their skills.³¹¹ Thus the changes of economic conditions have directly influenced the

³⁰⁹ Zhanna A. Zaionchkovskaya, *Migration Patterns in the Former Soviet Union*, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF130/CF130ch2.pdf> (Accessed on 7 March 2008)

³¹⁰ Kazuhiro Kumo, *Interregional Population Migration in Russia: Using an Origin to Destination Matrix*, Paper Presented at the European Association for Comparative Economic Studies (EACES) 9th Bi-Annual Conference: Development Strategies- A Comparative View <http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/~kumo/EACES06_kumo.pdf> (Accessed on 15 May 2008)

³¹¹ Igor Zevelev, *Russia and its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, p118.

migration trends however the influences of social conditions and policies cannot be ignored.

The economic factors affected the migration flows to Russia especially in the late 1990's.³¹² At the core of the economic factors there is the issue of expected lifetime earnings. The expectation of higher income is a motivation for migration. "Utility maximizing individuals migrate to the place offering the highest expected future income stream."³¹³

There is no reliable labor market data covering the whole post-Soviet space. According to the economic motivations, people are expected to move to countries that perform relatively well in transition with higher GDP per capita and high growth rates. Regarding the rates of GDP and growth rates, there are differences between the countries of the former Soviet Union. Baltic countries and Russia are relatively well, however Central Asian countries; Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have lower rates. Armenians, Ukrainians and Tatars have migrated to Russia, besides ethnic Russians.³¹⁴ The higher rates of arrivals of migrants to the Russian Federation were from Uzbekistan, Ukraine and from Kazakhstan in 2007. Kazakhstan, Ukraine and far abroad countries are the major destinations of migrants from the Russian Federation in 2002.³¹⁵

Illegal migration is an important problem in Russia. The majority of illegal migrants in Russia are from the countries of the CIS especially from the

³¹² Olga Lazareva, "Russian Migrants to Russia: Choice of Location and Labor Market Outcomes", Centre for Economic and Financial Research at New Economic School, *CEFIR / NES Working Paper series*, Working Paper No. 117, April 2008.

³¹³ Lilo Locher, "Migration in the Soviet Successor States", *Institute for the Study of Labour Discussion Paper Series IZA DP*, No 602, October 2002.

³¹⁴ Lilo Locher, "Migration in the Soviet Successor States", *Institute for the Study of Labour Discussion Paper Series IZA DP*, No 602, October 2002.

³¹⁵ Russia, Goskomstat
<<http://www.gks.ru>> (Accessed on 1 August 2008)

regions of Transcaucasus and Central Asia. The majority of the illegal migrants are concentrated in the oblast centre and in a number of big cities such as Azov, Volgodonsk, Novocherkassk and Taganrog.³¹⁶ The economic aspect of the issue is important concerning illegal migration. As mentioned, illegal migrants are most of the times, former unemployed persons or former occasional workers without a regular job. Illegal migrants are the persons, who could not adopt the economic and labour market transformations of their homelands.³¹⁷ Moreover the economically less developed regions Transcaucasia and Central Asia are the main sources of illegal migration. The main motive behind the illegal migration is the economic problems experienced in the homeland country.

As mentioned, worsening living standards and unemployment was influential after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 336,000 citizens left the country within the first ten months of 1991. Most of the emigrants were young people between 20 and 35 years of age, residents of large industrially developed and culturally advanced centres, and representatives of the intellectual, scientific and cultural elite. In terms of nationality, Jews, Germans, Armenians, Poles and Greeks have an important ratio among the total number of emigrants.³¹⁸

In conclusion it is possible to say that the internal and external migration trends in post-Soviet Russia are basically determined by economic motivations however the role of ethnic dynamics, armed conflicts, nationalist clashes and Russian migration policies cannot be ignored.

³¹⁶ E.S. Krasinets, "Illegal Migration in Russia", *Sociological Research*, January-February 2005, Vol.44, No. 1, p.14.

³¹⁷ E.S. Krasinets, "Illegal Migration in Russia", *Sociological Research*, January-February 2005, Vol.44, No. 1, p.14.

³¹⁸ Lilia Shevtsova, "Post-Soviet Emigration Today and Tomorrow", *Internal Migration Review*, Summer 1992, Vol. 26, No.2, pp. 242.

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<<http://www.ecre.org/files/Annual%20report%20General%20English.pdf>>
(Accessed on 16 July 2008)

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