THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY:
AN EFFECTIVE FOREIGN POLICY TOOL
FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION?

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF EUROPEAN STUDIES

JULY 2007

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

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July 2007, 133 pages

This thesis assesses whether the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) could evolve as an effective foreign policy tool of the EU. It aims to analyze the ENP's impact on the EU foreign policy in general and the Union's transformative capacity over its neighbours in particular. To this purpose, the thesis initially explores the underlying motives behind the origins and emergence of the ENP and further elaborates its policy framework and its phase of implementation so far.

The thesis then identifies the limits of the ENP, namely the internal and external constraints of the policy and on the basis of these shortcomings, discusses the overall impact of the ENP on the EU foreign policy. More specifically, the thesis focuses on the ENP's impact analysis for the EU's transformative capacity in its direct neighbourhood. Finally, the thesis assesses the main reasons of why it seems unlikely that the ENP could not evolve as a fully-fledged foreign policy tool for the Union and highlights the need for a major reform or re-adjustment of the policy.

Keywords: Neighbourhood Policy, EU Foreign Policy, Enlargement, EU's Normative / Civilian Identity

ÖZ

AVRUPA KOMŞULUK POLİTİKASI:
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ İÇİN
ETKİN BİR DIŞ POLİTİKA ARACI MI?

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Yüksek Lisans, Avrupa Çalışmaları Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Sevilay Kahraman

Temmuz 2007, 133 sayfa

Bu tezde, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası'nın Avrupa Birliği (AB)'nin etkin bir dış politika aracı olarak gelişip gelişemediği incelenmiştir. Tezin amacı, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası'nın genel olarak AB ortak dış politikası, özel olarak ise AB'nin komşuları üzerindeki dönüştürücü kapasitesini ele almaktır. Bu amaçla, tezde, öncelikle, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası'nın ortaya çıkışı ve mantıksal temelinin altında yatan nedenler ele alınmış ve politikanın çerçevesi ve günümüze dek süren uygulama aşaması incelenmiştir.

Tezde, daha sonra, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası'nın iç ve dış zorluk ve sınırları tanımlanmış ve bunlara dayanarak politikanın AB dış politikası üzerindeki etkisi tartışılmıştır. Bu bağlamda, tezde, özellikle, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası'nın AB'nin yakın coğrafyasındaki dönüştürücü kapasitesi üzerindeki etkisi analiz edilmiştir. Tezde, son olarak, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası'nın, AB'nin etkin bir dış politika aracı olarak gelişemeyeceğinin nedenleri incelenmiş ve politikanın yeniden düzenlemesi veya güçlendirilmesine gerek duyulduğu ortaya konulmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Komşuluk Politikası, AB Dış Politikası, Genişleme, AB'nin Normatif / Sivil Kimliği

To My Family

To Cihan Kayhan

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Association Agreement
CARDS	Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization
CEECs	Central and Eastern European Countries
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
EEA	European Economic Area
EFTA	European Free Trade Area
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENPI	European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PHARE	Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies
TACIS	Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States
TAIEX	Technical Assistance Information Exchange Unit
WNIS	Western Newly Independent States
WTO	World Trade Organisation

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The debate on the European Union (EU, Union) foreign policy has revolved around the enlargement issue and its impacts on the EU's international identity since the early 1990s. However, the attention has recently shifted towards a new foreign policy framework, namely the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) which is one of the most debated issues in the current EU foreign policy literature.

Unlike enlargement, which is the traditional foreign policy tool of the EU, the ENP has been designed as a new foreign policy instrument offering no membership perspective, but rather a more structured and systematic partnership with neighbouring countries. Although the enlargement and the ENP differ from each other in terms of their end-goals, the latter could be considered as the outcome of the former. This is mainly because of the fact that last round of enlargement and its subsequent implications on the EU foreign policy had a tremendous impact on the ENP's formulation, rationale and policy framework. First of all, the Union has responded to the geopolitical challenges of recent enlargement by formulating the ENP. The possibility of spillover of non-traditional security threats (such as terrorism, migration, cross-border crime) from the European neighbourhood into its borders has compelled the Union to engage with the countries of this region. Moreover, economic and political divergences between the EU and its new neighbours enforced the Union to formulate a new foreign policy framework to promote security, stability and prosperity in the EU's near abroad. Thus, the EU has chosen exporting security and stability to these new neighbours, rather than importing instability from them. Secondly, the ENP's rationale has been strongly affected by the enlargement fatigue and consecutive constitutional crisis which resulted in neither inclusion nor exclusion of the neighbouring countries in the ENP's

final design. In other words, while the EU refrained from offering membership to its neighbours, it also could not take the risk of totally excluding them, mainly due to its security-driven interests. Finally, the ENP's policy framework has been highly influenced by the enlargement experience which is mostly reflected in the ENP's instruments (e.g. conditionality, benchmarking, progress report etc.).

Facing the aforementioned context of developments, the Union launched the ENP in 2003 which combined its Eastern European, Southern Mediterranean and Southern Caucasus neighbours under a single policy framework. The policy has been declared to promote ring of well-governed countries around the Union with whom the Union could enjoy close cooperative relations.[1] To achieve this aim, the Union offers enhanced cooperation in political, economic, security and cultural realms, but falls short of membership. Instead, the partner countries are offered "everything but institutions"[2] in exchange for internal political and economic reform process. In brief, the ENP is offered in the form of "partnership for reform"[3] through which the Union attempts to promote its political and economic norms in its near abroad as it previously achieved in the case of the recent enlargement.

Thanks to the EU's remarkable success in political and economic transformation of the ex-communist Eastern European countries, their accession has come to represent a case study to demonstrate that the EU is "deepening its self-identity"[4] in its foreign policy. This achievement further revived the debate which often defines the Union as a 'normative' or 'soft power' due to the voluntary adoption of EU norms and type of governance by the third countries. Moving on this model, the ENP's normative claim to promote economic and political reform in neighbouring countries contributed to a broader debate on the ENP's impact on the EU's international identity. Like

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[1] European Council, "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy", Brussels, 12 December 2003.
[2] Romano Prodi, "Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the key to stability", Brussels, December 2003, SPEECH/02/619.
[3] Interview with Andreas Herdina, Head of ENP Sectoral Coordination Unit, Brussels: EU Commission, 5 March 2007.
[4] Richard Youngs, "Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU's External Identity", *Journal of Common Market Studies* Vol. 42 No. 2 (2004), pp. 415- 435, p. 416.

enlargement, the ENP relies on the EU's transformative capacity to persuade the partner countries to involve in internal reform process. However, this capacity has been very much dependent on the membership offer and, when this is absent, the EU's powers of attraction or soft power diminish substantially. Therefore, the main problematic arises from the EU's attempt to promote economic and political transformation of neighbouring countries without exploiting its conventional tool of membership conditionality. At this point, the arguments are divided in two main groups. On the one hand, it is argued (mostly by Eurocrats) that the ENP, for the first time, allows the EU to act as a fully-fledged actor because it moves independently from the question of membership. On the other hand, it is claimed by most analysts that the absence of membership perspective severely deteriorates the EU's leverage to exert its 'soft power' which entails the promotion of economic and political reforms in the partner countries.

In the light of the initial findings, the thesis seeks to respond whether the ENP could make any difference in the EU's foreign policy in terms of its transformative capacity or 'soft power'. It aims to analyze the policy's evolution, its implementation phase, relevant constraints and its impact on the EU foreign policy. The next chapter initially focuses on the ENP's evolution phase through a detailed analysis of the context and background prior to its launch with an aim of finding the motives behind the policy. Then, the launch of the policy is explained on the basis of two official documents which introduced and designed the policy in a comprehensive manner. The chapter also compares the ENP with the EU's other foreign policy initiatives in order to find the policy's novel features. The differences and similarities previously between the ENP and enlargement, and then the ENP and other neighbourhood policies are found out. The chapter finally sets out the novelties introduced by the ENP which totally differentiate it from the Union's previous foreign policy initiatives.

Third chapter complements the second chapter since it provides a comprehensive overview of the ENP's policy framework and its implementation stage. It begins with

the configuration of the ENP's geographical scope. Then, it examines the policy objectives and incentives offered to the partner countries respectively. Consequently, the impacts of the partnership conditionality on the policy outcomes are elaborated through the discussion of its effectiveness. The chapter concluded with the practical side of the ENP by analyzing the Action Plans, the content, major principles, implementation and monitoring stages of the plans with an emphasis on the record of the action plans so far.

The fourth chapter builds on the arguments which underline the existence of several limits in the policy's implementation. The chapter examines these limits and attempts to clarify to what extent they impede the effectiveness and coherence of the policy. It firstly deals with inherent constraints embedded in the ENP, namely conditionality and compliance, capability-expectations gap, and skeptical approaches of the partner countries. Secondly, it investigates the constraints set by the Union's internal dynamics which are composed of the constitutional failure and legitimacy decline, and decision-making deadlock. The chapter finally analyzes the constraints posed by the external dynamics, mainly focusing on the challenges arising from the Union's near abroad, its relations with Russia, and Transatlantic relations.

The fifth chapter attempts to respond whether the ENP could make any difference in the EU's foreign policy. The main aim of the chapter is to make an impact analysis of the ENP on the EU's transformative capacity. To this purpose, the first section briefly explains how the ENP has influenced the Union's foreign and security policy. The debate on the EU's transformative identity is elaborated by the second section in a detailed manner, through the analysis of the civilian / normative power EU argument and relevant critical arguments. Finally, the third section responds whether the ENP could impact the EU foreign policy concerning its transformative capacity.

CHAPTER II

WHAT IS EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY?

The ENP has recently been introduced as a new foreign policy initiative towards the EU's neighbouring countries. Although the ENP has been officially launched in 2003, its roots can be traced back to the post-Cold War era which requires a further analysis of the policy's evolution.

This chapter aims to shed light on the ENP's evolution through a detailed analysis. In this regard, the first section focuses on the context and background to the policy mainly elaborating the significant developments which affected its rationale and motives prior to its official launch. Then, the launch of the policy is explained on the basis of two official documents, namely the Wider Europe Communication and the ENP Strategy Paper, which introduced and designed the policy in a comprehensive manner. The final section compares the ENP with the EU's other foreign policy initiatives, which are enlargement, the European Economic Area, the Northern Dimension, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, in order to find the policy's novel features.

2.1 Evolution of the ENP

2.1.1 The Context and Background to the ENP

> Even in the age of globalization, geography is still important.
> (Javier Solana, European Security Strategy, 2003)

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union presented a major challenge to Western Europe and the EU. It not only led to newly independent ex-communist Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) seeking to accede to the EU but also created a strong demand for further EU engagement in the broader regional context. This demand for the EU was to undertake the responsibilities of

engaging actively and decisively in the political and economic stabilization of the region.

The initial and traditional response by the EU came in the form of the enlargement, which has been the most effective instrument of the EU's common foreign policy over the past twenty-five years. Relying on the promise of the enlargement through conditionality on the acceptance by candidate states of political and economic criteria set out by EU, the last wave of enlargement has succeeded in extending the democracy, prosperity and stability to the CEECs. In other words, the accessions of ten new member states represented "a key success story of the EU's adaptation to the challenges of the end of the cold war and to the vocation of East Central Europe to integrate into European political and economic structures."[5] According to Karen Smith, the major challenge for the EU in the post-Cold War period has been "the essential dilemma of where its final borders should be set."[6] She defines this dilemma as an 'exclusion/ inclusion dilemma' and perceives the 2004 enlargement as a temporary solution which came in the form of 'inclusion'. For Smith, the solution to the dilemma is temporary or 'unresolved' as the queue of candidates and potential candidates keeps on growing.[7]

Although the Union successfully handled the 'inclusion' of ten new member states, difficult questions remained concerning the objectives and instruments of common foreign policy towards the EU's new neighbours.[8] Indeed, the impact of recent enlargement has been much greater than expected in terms of neighbourhood policy, varying from border issues, the rights of transnational minorities, to the ultimate *finalite geographique* of the EU.[9] Therefore, it took very short time for the EU to

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[5] Roland Dannreuther, "Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: the European Neighbourhood Policy", *European Foreign Affairs Review* 11: 183-201, 2006, p. 183.
[6] Karen E. Smith, "The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy", *International Affairs* Vol.81, No. 4 (2005), pp. 757-773, p. 757.
[7] Ibid, p. 758.
[8] These ten new members are Cyprus, Malta, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia.
[9] Antonio Missiroli, "The EU and its changing neighbourhood: stabilization, integration and partnership", in Roland Dannreuther (ed), *European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p. 16.

realize that the impact of recent enlargement is also not limited to the accession of new member states but involves the definition of new borders and the creation of new neighbours with their particular expectations and interests.[10]

As Christopher Hill argues, the extension of the EU's border is "the most important of all the foreign policy implications of enlargement".[11] In terms of geopolitical consequences of the 2004 enlargement, the EU acquired borders with Belarus and Ukraine, and extended its frontier with Russia. The accession of two island states, Cyprus and Malta, has brought a number of Mediterranean countries closer to the EU territory. With the accession of Romania in January 2007, the EU began to share its borders with Moldova. Moreover, prospective membership of Turkey would result in the creation of new neighbours located in the Southern Caucasus. Despite they are located in different geographical regions, all neighbouring states, from Russia to Morocco, experience similar problems and difficulties. Firstly, they depend on access to the EU market as their dominant trade partner, and many of them are also dependent on access to the EU's labour market. Secondly, almost all neighbours suffer from political and social instability, with weak economies and slow growth. These instabilities are concerning the EU with their potential to spill over into its borders which, in turn, endanger the stability and security of the whole European continent. To aggravate, a sharp division between prosperity within the EU's borders and poverty outside could foster cross border crime such as the smuggling of goods, drugs and people through criminal networks.[12] This new division between the EU and its neighbours has also been noted by the European Commission:

> Existing differences in living standards across the Union's borders with its neighbours may be accentuated as a result of faster growth in the new Member States than in their external neighbours; common challenges in fields such as the environment, public health, and the prevention of and fight

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[10] G. Amato and J. Batt, *The Long Term Implications of EU Enlargement: the Nature of the New Border*, Florence: European University Institute, 1999.

[11] Christopher Hill, 'The Geopolitical Implications of Enlargement', in Jan Zielonka (ed.), *Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union*, London: Routledge, 2002, p. 97.

[12] One scholar defines this division as a 'welfare curtain' replacing the earlier 'iron curtain. *See* Roland Dannreuther, "Conclusion: towards a neighbourhood strategy?", in Dannreuther (ed), *European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy*, p. 210.

against organised crime will have to be addressed; efficient and secure border management will be essential both to protect our shared borders and to facilitate legitimate trade and passage.[13]

It could be interpreted from these statements that the EU seeks to keep clear off another wave of enlargement due to the onset of 'enlargement fatigue' which will be explained below.

In addition to its geopolitical implications, 2004 'big bang' enlargement also influenced the rationale of the ENP as a foreign policy initiative. In the first years of the enlargement process the focus was on the candidate states themselves, on the establishment of the Copenhagen criteria, developing a pre-accession strategy and so on. However, this situation changed in the second half of the 1990's when attention began to turn to the impact of enlargement on the EU's policies, external as well as internal, regional as well as global.[14] In its 1997 paper, *Agenda 2000*, the Commission emphasized the significance of its new neighbours for the enlarged Union and the need to ensure stability through cooperation in the wider Europe region.[15] Moreover, Progress Reports and Strategy Papers in the following years mainly stressed the benefits of enlargement for the new neighbours while remaining vague about the nature of any possible new relationship.[16]

In 2002, following a joint initiative by the Commission and High Representative Javier Solana, the development of a 'proximity' or 'neighbourhood policy' moved onto the agenda of the Council. The Council recognised the need to take an initiative with respect to its new neighbours, expressing this in terms of opportunity:

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[13] European Commission Communication, "Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument", COM(2003)393, 1 July 2003, p. 4. As enlargement means the eventual extension of the Schengen rules, which create a 'hard' border, new member states must impose visa requirements on nationals from neighbouring countries.
[14] Marise Cremona, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: Legal and Institutional Issues", *CDDRL Working Papers* No. 25, 2 November 2004, p. 2.
[15] European Commission 1997, *Agenda 2000*, For a Stronger and Wider Union, Part I The Policies of the Union, sect. IV The Union in the World, p.43.
[16] Commission Composite Paper on Progress towards accession by the candidate countries, 1999; Commission Composite Paper on Progress towards accession by the candidate countries, 8 November 2000, sect 1.5; Commission Strategy Paper, 13 November 2001, "Making a Success of Enlargement"; Commission Strategy Paper, 9 October 2002, "Towards the Enlarged Union".

> EU enlargement will provide a good opportunity to enhance relations between the European Union and the countries concerned with the objective of creating stability and narrowing the prosperity gap at the new borders of the Union.[17]

Accordingly, the Council decided to take this opportunity "to take forward relations with the new neighbours of the EU which should be based on shared political and economic values."[18]

While 2004 enlargement strongly affected the rationale of the ENP, various internal and external developments also paved the way for the evolution of the ENP. Two of these, which dominated EU agenda of 2003-2004, were particularly important in the creation of the ENP.[19] The first one was the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) by the European Council in December 2003 mostly as a result of the lack of cohesion and capacity for unified action within the EU over the Iraq war. Being the first security strategy in the Union's history, the document officially identifies the external challenges coming from the EU's neighbourhood. While the awareness of an "increased interdependence"[20] is clearly visible throughout the document, the ESS identifies new, increasingly asymmetric threats facing the Union like terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, active or frozen regional conflicts, corrupt states and organized crime. If it comes to the neighbours as political entities themselves, the ESS speaks of the need of a 'ring of well-governed countries' as explained below:

> It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe. The reunification of Europe and the integration of acceding states will increase our security but they also bring Europe closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote *a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of*

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[17] GAER Council Conclusions on the new neighbours initiative, 30 September 2002.
[18] GAER Council Conclusions on the new neighbours initiative, 18 November 2002.
[19] Dannreuther, "Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 186.
[20] The document even speaks of 'increased European dependence', "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy", p. 2.

the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.[21]

According to Karen Smith, the repeated emphasis on the need to be surrounded by 'well-governed' countries implies a clear concept of how the EU expects partners to act and to organize themselves internally.[22]

The second development stemmed from an internal EU pressure: the bitter process of reaching agreement on the EU's draft constitution, which culminated in the French and Dutch rejections of the Constitutional Treaty in their national referendums in 2005. As Ulrike Guerot points out, the constitutional crisis has been highly related with the recent enlargement in a sense that:

> It ultimately opens 'Pandora's box' and puts into question the undertaking of European integration as a whole, especially the notion of further political integration along the lines of 'an ever closer union.' Many in the 'old' member states who had never had warm feelings about the European integration can now easily hide behind the new difficulties and challenges to claim the project's end.[23]

Constitutional crisis also contributed to the increasing "sense of enlargement fatigue"[24] within the EU, not only driven by the concerns over the EU's 'absorption capacity' of new comers, but it is also linked to the controversy over the countries who were given the promise of accession such as Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Croatia and the potential candidate states of Western Balkans. Concerning the absorption capacity, Eneko Landaburu contends that:

> The EU cannot expand ad infinitum - everything has its limits. We must honour our present basic commitments, while strictly insisting on the criteria. One of these criteria is our own absorption capacity - it is clear that in some member states the pace and scale of enlargement is approaching the limits of what public opinion will accept. To overstretch, rather than consolidate, the Union would be detrimental not only for us but also our partners.[25]

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[21] Ibid. *Emphasis added.*
[22] Smith rightly identifies a will 'to create good neighbours'. *See* Smith op. cit., p. 763.
[23] Ulrike Guerot, "Consequences and Starategic Impact of Enlargement on the (Old) EU" in Esther Brimmer and Stefan Fröhlich (eds), *The Strategic Implications of European Union Enlargement*, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Washington: Johns Hopkins University, 2005, p. 53.
[24] Dannreuther, "Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: the European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 186.
[25] Eneko Landaburu, "From Neighbourhood to Integration Policy: Are there Concrete Alternatives to Enlargement?", *CEPS Policy Brief* No. 95, March 2006, p. 1.

Landaburu's words truly represent the sense which has substantially grown both within the EU circles and European public opinion that the EU has reached or exceeded its membership limits, or at the very least needs a long period of internal adaptation and consolidation. In other words, enlargement fatigue has been in evidence in many EU capitals "with suggestions that a 'pause' will be needed after 2004 while the 15 'old Europeans' and 10 'new Europeans' adjust to each other."[26]

It is apparent that two aforementioned developments have strongly influenced the evolution and rationale of the ENP. External security dimension is particularly evident in the emphasis placed on the EU's interest in ensuring a strong and effective external border, to which the neighbourhood countries are welcomed to cooperate for the elimination of the perceived threats like 'migration, asylum, visa policies, terrorism, organized crime, trafficking in drugs and arms, money laundering and financial and economic crime'.[27] On the other hand, the 'enlargement fatigue' dimension is evident in the emphasis that the ENP is about 'reinforcing relations between the EU and partner countries' and not about the possibilities of accession. Chris Patten, the former External Relations Commissioner, made this blatant in his speech:

> Over the past decade, the Union's most successful foreign policy instrument has undeniably been the promise of EU membership. This is not sustainable. For the coming decade, we need to find new ways to export the stability, security and prosperity we have created within the enlarged Union. We should begin by agreeing on a clearer vision for relations with our neighbours.[28]

Patten's statements have been strengthened by Benita Ferrero-Waldner, current Commissioner for External Relations and ENP, who stated that:

> We still have work to do to consolidate 2004's enlargement and there are new enlargement commitments on which we must deliver. Yet it is clear that the

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[26] William Wallace, "Looking After the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25", *Notre Europe Policy Papers* No.4, July 2003, p. 7.

[27] European Commission Communication, "European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper", COM(2004)373, May 12, 2004, p. 17.

[28] Quoted in Commission of the European Communities, 'Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: Proposed New Framework for Relations with the EU's Eastern and Southern Neighbours', IP/ 03/358, 11 March 2003, p. 9.

EU cannot enlarge ad infinitum. So how else can we pursue our geostrategic interest in expanding the zone of stability, security and prosperity beyond our borders? How best can we support our neighbours' political and economic transitions, and so tackle our own citizens' concerns? ENP provides the answer.[29]

Although Ferrero-Waldner maintains that the ENP provides the solution to the post-enlargement dilemma, Karen Smith challenges this view arguing that "the ENP does not resolve the basic dilemma facing the EU- how large should it become? - but it does provide the EU with additional tools for fostering friendly neighbours."[30] Therefore, it seems clear that the ENP is not the final remedy for the dilemma concerned; but, it is generally accepted that the ENP represents "a way to safeguard two of its short-to medium-term foreign policy priorities in terms of its neighbourhood: how to stay clear of further enlargements and how to manage the new external borders."[31]

2.1.2 The Launch of the ENP

Facing the aforementioned developments and challenges in its neighbourhood, the Union has realized the necessity of formulating a new foreign policy tool towards its neighbouring countries. As already mentioned, the dilemma experienced by the EU was that it could not reinforce its new borders and shut them out to its new neighbours, but, at the same time, it could not continue with its traditional foreign policy tool, enlargement. For the EU, to continue to enlarge across the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe would threaten its cohesion, and would not be supported by the European public. In fact, the choice for the EU has been either to export security and stability to these new neighbours, or to risk importing instability from them. Choosing the first option, the EU introduced the ENP as a common foreign policy framework towards its new neighbours.

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[29] Benita Ferrero-Waldner, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: the EU's Newest Foreign Policy Instrument", *European Foreign Affairs Review* 11: 139-142, 2006, pp. 139-140.
[30] Smith, "The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 757.
[31] Elisabeth Johansson-Nogues, "A 'Ring of Friends'? The Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy for the Mediterranean", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2004), pp. 240-247, p. 241.

It was in this context that the Brussels European Council (12-13 December 2003) introduced the ENP as a new framework initiative for specific countries in what will be the enlarged EU's new neighbourhood, from Russia in the north to North Africa in the south: the geographical coverage of the ENP was originally designed to include Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova; and, in the Mediterranean, for Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and the Palestinian Authority. In 2004, it was extended to include the countries of the South Caucasus - Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia has rejected to participate in the ENP preferring to involve in a strategic partnership with the EU. Besides Russia, the ENP does not cover countries in the accession perspective (Turkey, Croatia) and potential candidate countries of the Western Balkans.

First adopted at the Thessalonica European Council (June 2003), the objective of the new neighbourhood policy is to establish a new type of relationship with those countries that will border the EU-25. To this end, in March 2003, the Commission issued a Communication entitled "Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours"[32], which officially launched the ENP for the first time. The Communication not only demonstrates the high priority that the Union accords to shaping its future relations with its neighbours, but also describes the new challenges and opportunities facing the enlarged EU in relation to its new neighbours. As already mentioned, enlargement has led to the creation of new EU border areas, in which economic, political and social disparities between the EU and its neighbours would increasingly be evident and would create new challenges. In this regard, the primary objective of ENP declared by the EU is 'to share the benefits of EU enlargement with the neighbouring countries' in order to strengthen stability, security and well-being in the whole region. EU has also declared that the ENP has been designed to prevent the new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and to offer them

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[32] European Commission Communication, "Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours", COM(2003)104, March 11, 2003 (hereinafter Wider Europe Communication).

13

an opportunity to participate in various EU activities, through enhanced political, security, economic and cultural cooperation.

To sum up, the ENP offers a gradual integration of the partners in key EU policy areas. However, the policy also makes it explicit that these countries will not have the ability to opt for EU membership. Whereas the ENP falls short of full integration into the EU structures, it is envisaged that the ENP partners will 'share everything but institutions' in exchange for internal reforms, as Romano Prodi has declared.[33]

2.1.3 The Wider Europe Communication and ENP Strategy Paper

Two documents have played a crucial role in the launch and evolution of the ENP. For the launch of the ENP, the Commission's Wider Europe Communication is vital as it formally introduced the ENP for the first time as the new foreign policy initiative of the EU. Being the first comprehensive proposal on the ENP, the Wider Europe Communication enunciated the rationale of the new policy, outlined eleven 'incentives' on which the EU's approach could be based, and set out the policy's methodology that is explicitly modeled on the enlargement process - including the progressive implementation of country-specific benchmarks agreed in Action Plans.

The Communication, in general terms, proposes a progressive integration of the partner countries into the EU's internal market and its regulatory structures, including those pertaining to sustainable development (health, consumer and environmental protection) and the four freedoms (free movement of goods, services, capital and persons).[34] Moreover, it also opens the door to enhancing trading relations, supports World Trade Organisation (WTO) accession and seeks to intensify co-operation in a host of other areas ranging from 'terrorism to air-borne pollution'.[35] In specific terms, the Wider Europe Communication sets the methodology of the ENP in which increased economic integration and political

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[33] Romano Prodi, "A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the key to stability", p. 3.
[34] European Commission Communication, "Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours", p. 4.
[35] Ibid, p. 14.

cooperation would be conditional. Clear benchmarks, defined in action plans, would indicate the actions that the EU expects from its partners, and would be used to evaluate progress in reform process. In turn, new benefits would be offered only to the partner countries whose progress is reflected in political and economic reforms.[36]

For the evolution of the ENP, Commission's 'ENP Strategy Paper'[37] is crucially important because it has adjusted the policy according to the changing circumstances. Issued even after 2004 enlargement, the Strategy Paper defines the fundamental objectives and principles of the policy, its geographical scope, and the methods to be used for implementing the ENP. The Paper also introduces some new concepts like "joint ownership", "monitoring" and the "added value" and identifies European Neighbourhood Instrument. While the first two concepts are relevant with the implementation side of the ENP through the Action Plans, the 'added value' concept concerns the very nature of the policy. Thus, the Strategy Paper stresses the ENP's added value by arguing that the Union policy would be enhanced and more focused, offering respectively a greater degree of integration than the previous instruments, an upgrade in the scope and intensity of political cooperation, the definition of priorities and increased funding.[38]

The Strategy Paper also re-defines the ENP as a response to the challenges and opportunities set by enlargement and extends the geographic coverage of the policy to the Southern Caucasus countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia).[39] Although formally included in the ENP, the Strategy Paper states that the participation of Belarus and Libya would be conditioned on fundamental political and economic reforms in these authoritarian regimes. The Paper summarizes how the ENP progressed so far and draws a strategic framework to carry the ENP forward through the implementation of the Action Plans. The Strategy Paper is significant as it has provided a new momentum by promoting the issue of the Action Plans and the

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[36] Ibid, p. 16.
[37] European Commission Communication, "European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper".
[38] Ibid, p. 8.
[39] Ibid, p. 2.

signing of new European Neighbourhood Agreements to replace the existing agreements with neighbours when Action Plan priorities are met.

2.2 The ENP as the EU's New Foreign Policy Initiative

In order to identify the novelty of the ENP, the comparison of the ENP and the EU's other foreign policy initiatives should be made. With this respect, this section initially begins with comparing enlargement and the ENP, and then continues with the comparison of the ENP and the EU's previous neighbourhood policies. The section finalizes with describing the innovative characteristics of the ENP.

2.2.1 Enlargement versus the ENP

Before analysing how the ENP differs from enlargement, it is worth mentioning the impact of enlargement on the ENP. The impact is so profound that the ENP is even considered to be a 'child of enlargement' due to its following results: geographical change and enlargement experience.[40] The impact of 2004 enlargement on the framing of the ENP is commonly perceived as 'undeniable' due to commonly accepted phenomenon that "enlargement, borders and foreign policy are inextricably bound up with each other."[41] Since the recent enlargement, combined with the other developments inside the EU, pose "important changes in the way the EU interacts with the world and especially its neighbours"[42], the response of the EU to these changes has been to launch the ENP, a new foreign policy framework towards its neighbourhood which offers closer links with the EU, stopping short of membership, in exchange for commitments to political and economic reform as well as to key foreign policy goals of the EU. Therefore, the ENP could be assessed as a new foreign policy tool which enables the EU act beyond the constraint of the membership / non-membership dilemma.

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[40] Interview with Andreas Herdina.
[41] Hill, "The Geopolitical Implications of Enlargement", p. 97.
[42] Dov Lynch, "The European Neighbourhood Policy", <http://eurojournal.org/files/dov_prague.pdf>, p. 1.

As a well-known fact, EU foreign policy revolved around the question of membership / non-membership for much of the 1990's: if membership was offered, EU would have considerable policy leverage over the candidates, if it was not, than the EU would only have little policy impact and transformative potential over its partners. This situation seems to change with the ENP's launch which could provide opportunity for the EU to act as a foreign policy actor without offering the prospect of membership. Or, as argued by Dov Lynch, "we are witnessing the birth of the EU as a fuller foreign policy actor, able to act beyond the dichotomy of accession/ non-accession, drawing on a range of tools to promote its interests."[43]

The difference between the enlargement and the ENP regarding the participation of the neighbours has been further clarified by the Council Conclusions of June 2003.[44] According to these conclusions, the Union wishes to define an ambitious new range of policies towards its neighbours based on shared values such as liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. However, this should be seen as separate from the question of possible EU accession and prospective membership as quoted below:

> Today, the question in foreign policy terms is not really whether there is an alternative to enlargement. Continuing to view our neighbourhood from an enlargement angle is an unhelpful distraction, involving protracted and unanswerable discussions of whether or not country X or Y will, one day in the future, in a different political environment, have a realistic perspective of joining the EU. Many of those now asking for closer relations are not on track for membership or are very far from meeting its requirements.[45]

Drawing a clear-cut line between the enlargement process and the ENP, the EU has declared that the overall goal of the policy will be "to work with the partners to reduce poverty and create an area of shared prosperity and values based on free trade, deeper economic integration, intensified political and cultural relations, enhanced cross-border cooperation and shared responsibility for conflict prevention and

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[43] Ibid, p. 2.
[44] European Council Conclusions of 16 June 2003.
[45] Landaburu, "From Neighbourhood to Integration Policy: Are there Concrete Alternatives to Enlargement?", p. 1.

conflict resolution."[46] The absence of the membership prospect has further been confirmed by Prodi's impressive words that "we have to be prepared to offer more than partnership and less than membership without excluding the latter categorically", and he continued by offering "the concept of sharing everything except institutions".[47] At this point, Michael Emerson argues that the ENP "has yet to reveal clearly what is meant to be"[48] and he continues by discussing three models regarding the future shape of the policy. The first model is that this is a modest, pragmatic tool to prevent the undesirable effects of the enlargement for border countries. The second model is that this is an attempt to promote 'Europeanisation' of neighbouring states in political, economic and social realms, despite the non-existence of membership prospect. The third model is that it is just a weak political 'gesture' to try and conciliate the excluded. Emerson continues by maintaining that the ENP has an element of Model 1, although its geographic coverage is far wider than the border regions, and, that if the ENP is to become more Model 2 than Model 3 the incentives should be strengthened. As for the current status of the ENP concerning these models, Emerson concludes that:

> As of now the balance of obligations in relation to incentives is too heavy for the policy to achieve strategic leverage in the sense of Europeanisation and transformation of the target states. The optimist can say that this is a case of a glass half full, rather than half empty. At least the glass has been constructed, it is reasonably transparent, and more could be poured into the container in due course.[49]

Being one of the optimists in the current debate, Dov Lynch considers the ENP's main characteristic -the absence of membership perspective- as an advantage for the development of the EU's new foreign policy framework[50], but some others challenge this view. For instance, according to Andreas Marchetti, "there is an increasing awareness that without conditionality, the ENP will face the same shortcomings as its

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[46] European Commission Communication, "Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours", p. 9.
[47] Prodi, "A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the key to stability".
[48] Michael Emerson, "Two Cheers for the European Neighbourhood Policy", Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2004, <http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=338&>
[49] Ibid.
[50] Dov Lynch, "The European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 2.

predecessors".[51] Missiroli contributes to this comment, maintaining that the difficulty regarding the ENP lies in the fact that "the most effective regional policy tool at the disposal of the Union has been the conditionality; conditionality, however, really works only when eventual membership is at stake".[52] Dannreuther puts emphasis on the impact of enlargement on the EU's 'transformative capacity' and claims that "it has been very much dependent on the offer of 'prize' of future membership and, when this is absent, the EU's powers of attraction diminish substantially."[53] Moreover, he argues that "the whole history of the success of promoting a 'logic of generosity', whereby the essentially altruistic offer of EU membership provides the necessary incentive for radical domestic economic and political transformation."[54] The EU's response to these concerns over the ENP's ineffectiveness is clearly reflected in the words of Ferrero-Waldner:

> Questions have been raised as to whether the incentives on offer are sufficient to encourage reform, and whether this is not simply a repackaging of old policies in new clothes. My response is two-fold. First, the impetus for meaningful reform must always come from within. If that desire is not there, no amount of external assistance or pressure will build sustainable reform. That is why the EU believes in encouraging not imposing reform. Second, the EU's offer through ENP is not a second-best option to enlargement, but rather a highly-desirable step-change in our relations offering substantive benefits to all involved.[55]

The quotation might refer that the EU attributes higher responsibility to the ENP partners regarding the effectiveness of the policy than the incentives of the policy. Concerning the comparison of the enlargement and the ENP in this regard, EU claims that the neighbouring countries are not losers as many of the benefits which the EU currently offers to the eastern and southern neighbours are similar to those

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[51] Andreas Marchetti, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU's Periphery", *ZEI Discussion Paper* C 158, 2006, p. 16.
[52] Missiroli, "The EU and its changing neighbourhoods: stabilisation, integration and partnership", p. 21.
[53] Dannreuther, "Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: the European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 188.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ferrero-Waldner, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: the EU's Newest Foreign Policy Instrument", p. 140.

previously associated only with membership, such as a stake in the internal market, involvement in EU programmes, and cooperation in many sectoral policies.[56]

It might be concluded that the ENP starts the game as a natural loser vis-à-vis enlargement as it does not offer membership perspective for the neighbouring countries. In fact, considering that the EU faced a new geopolitical environment after the 2004 enlargement, it was inevitable for the EU to reframe its external relations by establishing innovative forms of cooperation within its geographic proximities as EU's the most successful instrument to build cooperation – the 'golden carrot' of membership- is not anymore sustainable.[57] However, this relative deficiency does not prevent the emergence of ENP as the EU's new foreign policy tool in the form of "partnership for reform"[58], providing a new strategic framework and tools for engaging with the neighbours on wide-ranging issues which are of mutual importance and which could be dealt together.[59] It is obvious that enlargement has remarkably influenced the rationale of ENP, but these two foreign policy instruments should be perceived as separate, due to their end-goals. Thus, ENP could be considered as a mature but potential foreign policy initiative of the EU, whose outcomes should be evaluated through a 'wait and see approach' in the long-term.

2.2.2 The ENP and Previous Neighbourhood Policies

As for the EU's previous neighbourhood policies, the European Economic Area, the Northern Dimension and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are worth analysing, since the content of the ENP builds on the experiences of these models. Although they constitute one of the neighbourhood dimensions of the EU, Western Balkans is excluded from the scope of this section because they are considered as potential candidates rather than neighbours by the Union.

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[56] Ibid.

[57] Rosa Rossi, "The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective" in Fulvio Attina and Rosa Rossi (ed) *European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Economic and Social Issues*, Jean Monnet Centre "Euro-Med", University of Catania, 2004, p. 8.

[58] Interview with Andreas Herdina.

[59] Landaburu, "From Neighbourhood to Integration Policy: Are there Concrete Alternatives to Enlargement?", p. 2.

2.2.2.1 The European Economic Area and the ENP

At present, the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) between the EU and the three European Free Trade Area (EFTA) states (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) is "the most comprehensive agreement between the EU and any third country short of full EU membership."[60] In other words, the EEA is "the most advanced multilateral arrangement the EU has concluded with EFTA countries"[61], providing these countries with the opportunity of sharing in the EU's single market, with the partial exception of the common policies on trade, agriculture and fisheries. In contrast to their participation in single market, EFTA countries could not involve in the relevant law-making process.[62] However, this exemption could not impede well-established institutionalization of the EEA and the EFTA countries' role in shaping EEA-relevant legislation. As Fraser Cameron points out the EEA countries are the most closely linked to the EU through the double impact of this decision-shaping role and increased integration into the Community acquis.[63]

The EEA aimed to create a European economic sphere between the EU and EFTA states as an alternative to the membership, and it has achieved this objective to a certain extent. However, some EFTA countries (Austria, Finland, Sweden) were not satisfied with the EU's 'all but institutions' approach, and chose to join the EU in 1995. With this respect, it might be concluded that the EEA has accelerated the accession of the aforementioned countries, rather than effectively functioning as an alternative to the membership.[64]

The EEA has recently been discussed as a possible long-term model which the EU could follow in its relations with other neighbouring countries. For instance, the potential of the EEA as a model for other neighbours was discussed in the

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[60] Marius Vahl, "Models for the European Neighbourhood Policy: The EEA and the Northern Dimension", *CEPS Working Document* No.218, February 2005, p. 3.
[61] Sevilay Kahraman, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: The EU's New Engagement Towards Wider Europe", *Perceptions* Vol. 10, Winter 2005, pp.1-28, p. 4.
[62] Smith "The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 761.
[63] Fraser Cameron, "EEA Plus? Possible Institutional Arrangements for the European Neighbourhood Policy?", *EPC Commentary*, 19 April 2005, p. 2.
[64] Kahraman, op. cit.

Convention on the Future of Europe in 2002-03, in connection with a provision for establishing special arrangements with them. In its draft proposal for the EU Constitution of 18 October 2002, the European People's Party suggested that the "EU should offer institutionalised cooperation to states which can not become members for the time being."[65] The Party proposed the creation of a 'European Partnership', open both to Eastern Europe and to Mediterranean countries - similar to the EEA - but including a political component."[66] The EEA was also mentioned in the 'Wider Europe' Communication in which the Commission stated "the long-term goal... is... an arrangement whereby the Union's relations with the neighbouring countries ultimately resemble the close political and economic links currently enjoyed with the EEA".[67]

Although the ENP resembles the EEA with the EU's offer of a stake in the single market through 'everything but institutions' approach, the EEA arrangement with its advanced characteristics does not seem to provide a relevant model for the EU's neighbourhood. This difference mainly stems from the composition of the EFTA countries with higher level of political and economic development. In contrast, nearly all ENP countries are facing with the challenges of economic and political transition which prevent them from fully adopting and implementing the *acquis* in the short and medium term. This fact has also been assented by Prodi's statement that "the situation of countries like Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus differs completely from that of Norway".[68] Additionally, the fact that EU membership is not on the agenda of the current EEA states distinguishes them from those Eastern neighbours which are committed to EU membership. Although the ENP partners would be given an opportunity of partial economic integration in return for internal reform, this objective remains a long-term commitment of the EU. Moving from the proclaimed linkage between integration and reform in the ENP, it is concluded that Europe

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[65] Vahl, "Models for the European Neighbourhood Policy: The EEA and the Northern Dimension", p. 6.
[66] Ibid, p. 8.
[67] European Commission Communication, "Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours", p. 15.
[68] Quoted in Tim Gould, "The European Economic Area: A Model for the EU's Neighbourhood Policy?", *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 5:2, 2004, pp. 171-202, p. 177.

Agreements and Stability and Association Agreements would provide models for the ENP instead of the EEA model.[69]

2.2.2.2 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the ENP

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) also known as the Barcelona process is the general framework for the relations between the EU, its member states and the countries located in the south and east of the Mediterranean area (referred to as the 'Mediterranean partners').[70] At the Barcelona Conference of November 1995, the parties adopted an agreement made up of a declaration and a work programme launching a partnership in three spheres: political and security partnership aiming to establish a zone of peace and stability; an economic and financial partnership aimed at creating an area of shared prosperity mainly through the establishment of a free trade area; and a social and cultural partnership dedicated to human resources development, mutual understanding between cultures and exchange between civil societies.[71] The Barcelona process soon established a comprehensive institutional framework, with its bilateral and multilateral dimensions. As Karen Smith clarifies the EMP combines bilateralism (the conclusion of Euro-Med agreements with individual countries), multilateralism (regular meetings among the partners, at many levels and on various issues) and EU encouragement for regionalism (such as the formation of a Mediterranean free trade area by 2010).[72]

Unlike ENP, whose rationale has been highly affected by enlargement 'phobia', Barcelona Process was not framed principally to postpone enlargement or placate disappointed membership candidates, since most of the non-European partners have not been considered potential members (with the exception of Cyprus, Malta and

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[69] Kahraman, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: The European Union's New Engagement towards Wider Europe", p. 5; and, Vahl, "Models for the European Neighbourhood Policy: The EEA and the Northern Dimension", p. 13.

[70] Originally there were 12 partner states: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority. Cyprus and Malta have since acceded to the EU and Turkey has been within the framework of accession negotiations since 2005.

[71] Eric Philippart, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: A Critical Evaluation of an Ambitious Scheme", *European Foreign Affairs Review* 8: 201-220, 2003, p. 201.

[72] Smith, "The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 762.

Turkey), but was seen as a strategic approach aimed at creating a zone of peace, stability and prosperity through its contribution to conflict resolution and, to a lesser extent, domestic reform in the southern partner states.[73] According to Sevilay Kahraman, two basic features of the EMP make it an innovative policy: the scope of three baskets (political-security, economic-financial, social-cultural-human), and the combination of two dimensions (bilateral / economic, multilateral / political-security).[74] However, the 'imported' problems from Arab-Israeli dispute have so far impeded real progress on multilateral policy and security issues.[75]

After more than a decade since its launch, the EMP is evaluated to have a mixed record of success. For its transformative dimension of the Barcelona Process in terms of economic trends, the Barcelona Process has not been so successful: the economic performance of the region as a whole has declined compared to Central and Eastern Europe and most of Asia.[76] Progress towards political reform has also been almost absent, and societal trends, for instance tendencies in favour of Islamic fundamentalism, are worrying.[77] Moreover, EMP has not been progressive in the promotion of democracy and human rights in the region.[78] With this regard, Fred Tanner argues that Barcelona partners, including the EU countries have adhered to conditionality at a declaratory level and conceived it mainly in economic and governance terms rather than as a democratic principle.[79] On the other hand, Barcelona Process is perceived to achieve considerable success in terms of establishing a working partnership between the region and Europe through its

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[73] Ibid.

[74] Kahraman, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: The European Union's New Engagement towards Wider Europe", p. 5.

[75] Martin Ortega, "A New EU Policy on the Mediterranean?" in Judy Batt et.al., Partners and Neighbours: A CFSP for a Wider Europe, EU Institute for Security Studies *Chaillot Paper* 63, September 2003, p. 90.

[76] Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva, "From Barcelona Process to Neighbourhood Policy: Assessments and Open Issues", *CEPS Working Document* No. 220, March 2005, p. 8.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Ortega, op. cit., p. 92.

[79] Fred Tanner, "North Africa: Partnership, Exceptionalism and Neglect" in Dannreuther (ed), *European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy*, p. 141.

comprehensive political and institutional infrastructure.[80] Drawing from this point, Michael Emerson and Gergana Nouthcheva argue that:

> The EU's initiative is surely *not* in the category of a strategic mistake that has had unexpected and counter-productive effects, such as causing conflict, destabilising societies or aggravating tensions between the European and Arab communities. This is not an empty remark, given the political tensions generated by American policies in much of the region. On the contrary, relations between the EU and its partners are relatively cordial and constructive, and thus provide a plausible foundation for a deepened relationship.[81]

Despite this positive argument, the EMP is also considered to have been unsuccessful in transforming the EU from a civilian power into a strategic actor in the sense of restructuring the Mediterranean region and of promoting conflict resolution through multilateralism.[82] According to Fred Tanner, the main problem with the EMP was not only a gap between the rhetoric and action, but also the contradiction between the ideal of a Euro- Mediterranean zone of peace, stability and prosperity and the embedded "Fortress Europe" approach of the Union.[83] This contradiction imposed limits to political conditionality and the partners' sincere interest in reforms.[84] Moreover, Sevilay Kahraman sustains that "the lack of effective use of conditionality constitutes an important difference between the EMP as an example of stabilisation approach through partnership and the EU enlargement as an approach of integration and accession."[85] In conclusion, the debate on the EMP's overall record suggests that the policy has had substantial restrictions in terms of democracy promotion, conditionality and economic reform although it established a well-founded institutional partnership between the EU and Mediterranean countries.

The ENP has general objectives which are similar to the EMP, namely to cooperate with the partners to reduce poverty, create a zone of prosperity and shared values, increased economic integration based on free trade, stronger political and cultural

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[80] Emerson and Noutcheva, op. cit.
[81] Ibid, p. 9.
[82] Kahraman, op. cit., p. 6.
[83] Tanner, op. cit., pp. 144-147.
[84] Ibid, p. 147.
[85] Kahraman, op. cit.

ties, greater cross-border cooperation and shared responsibilities in the prevention and resolution of conflicts. These objectives overlap with those of Barcelona Process but with a new emphasis on certain aspects. The most important is the prospect of gradual participation in the EU internal market and its regulatory structures, including those relating to sustainable development (health, consumer and environmental protection), based on the approximation of legislation. Whereas the idea underlying Barcelona, implemented through association agreements, was trade integration which stopped at the EU borders due to tariff dismantling, the ENP is expected to go beyond provision of greater political and economic integration, and going beyond borders by a means of approximation of legislation.[86] More emphasis has also been put on integrating two sides of the Mediterranean in transport, energy and telecommunications networks.[87] Depending on these 'enhanced' incentives, the Union considers that the ENP provides an 'added value' for the Mediterranean partners, yet how much value it could / would add is open to question.[88]

As for the relationship between the ENP and the EMP, the EU has declared that "the ENP complements the Barcelona process and should not supplant the current framework of the EU's relations with its southern Mediterranean partners established under the Barcelona process and complemented by association agreements and a common strategy".[89] Similarly, Martin Ortega does not propose an abandonment of the EMP nor its replacement with the ENP. He maintains that the Barcelona process is still an appropriate framework for the south by virtue of its three characteristics: regional construction, diverse relationships and comprehensive dialogue.[90] As the Union has previously established a comprehensive Mediterranean policy based on the partnership and the creation of a zone of stability and prosperity, the ENP's new

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[86] Margot Wallström, "The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership", *Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly*, Speech 05/171, Cairo, 14 March 2005, p.3.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Marise Cremona, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: Legal and Institutional Issues", *CDDRL Working Papers* No. 25, 2 November 2004, p. 5.
[89] Wallström, op. cit., p. 2.
[90] Ortega, "A New EU Policy on the Mediterranean?", p. 102.

'differentiated, progressive and benchmarked' approach "may complement and to some extent correct the Union's 'traditional' policy but does not transform it."[91]

According to Elisabeth Johansson-Nogues, the ENP represents the EU's general disappointment arising from the limited achievements of the Barcelona Process and its bilateral and regional co-operation initiatives in the past decade, and there is an expectation in the EU that the ENP would serve to revive the EMP with a new dynamic.[92] Despite its achievements in some common issues, the EMP remains a relatively weak regional policy due to its low level of bilateral path.[93] In this sense, the ENP is complementary to the EMP through its increased bilateralism which seeks to strengthen bilateral relationship between the Union and the Mediterranean partners. Richard Whitman argues that the Mediterranean partners seem to be much more satisfied with the ENP's bilateralism than the Barcelona Process' multilateralism: Morocco, for instance, has moved further with the ENP's bilateralism as compared to the limited multilateral structure of the Barcelona process.[94] While the ENP's adherence to bilateralism principle is appreciated by the academic circles, the future success of the policy remains:

> An open question, that is, whether the Union will manage to establish its vaunted 'ring of friends' in the Mediterranean. The ENP might become a victim of its own success in that its emphasis on political reforms (democracy, human rights, etc.) that are essential for long-term political stability in the Euro-Mediterranean region, concerns issues that are always very much in tension with the Union's recurrent preoccupation with short-term stability (border management) in the area of Mare Nostrum. This has impeded advances in Euro-Mediterranean relations in the past, and raises the question - whether the new neighbourhood policy will be able to change this negative dynamic.[95]

Analysis of the debate on the EMP reveals that the ENP would not put an end to, or replace, the Barcelona Process. However, it is expected among European politicians

[91] Ibid.
[92] Johansson-Nogues, "A 'Ring of Friends'? The Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy for the Mediterranean", p. 246.
[93] Interview with Bernard Brunet, Morocco Desk Officer, ENP Unit, Brussels: EU Commission, 6 March 2007.
[94] Interview with Richard Whitman, London: Chatham House, 13 March 2007.
[95] Johansson-Nogues, op. cit., p. 247.

and Eurocrats alike that the ENP could offer a new dynamic in Euro-Mediterranean relations by revitalising bilateral EU-partner relations and consequently allowing for greater flexibility in the different southern Mediterranean countries' relations with the Union compared to the status quo.[96]

2.2.2.3 The Northern Dimension and the ENP

With the accession of Finland and Sweden in 1995, the EU has acquired an entirely new 'northern' dimension which increased the strategic impact of the Baltic Sea region for the EU and imposed the pressure upon three Baltic countries to join. The latter's submission of the membership application in late 1995 acted as a catalyst for Finland to launch a proposal for a Northern Dimension in 1997 which was formally initiated by the then Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen. Drawing on the Southern Dimension (the EMP) as a model for the Northern Dimension, Lipponen linked the 'Northern Dimension' slogan with a reorientation of the EU's external relations. In his famous speech in 1997, he argued that the Union and its member states share vital common interests in Northern Europe and that those interests should be translated into a new EU policy.[97] In general, the Finnish initiative built on two tracks: it tried to bring attention of the whole Union to the challenges and opportunities coming from the direct neighbourhood with Russia, while stressing the primacy of soft security threats and the role of multilateral cooperation in combating them.[98]

The Finnish initiative was met with a generally positive reaction from various member states which resulted in the smooth elevation of the initiative in the EU agenda: it was discussed in the European Councils of Luxembourg (1997) and Cardiff (1998), and finally the Commission presented its views on the initiative in the form of an interim report at the Vienna European Council in December 1998. In this report, the actual content of the Northern Dimension emphasized only

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[96]Ibid, p. 243.
[97] Paavo Lipponen, "The European Union Needs a Policy for the Northern Dimension", *Speech at Conference on the Barents Region Today*, Rovaniemi, 15 September 1997.
[98] Hiski Haukkala, "The Northern Dimension: A Presence and Four Liabilities", in Dannreuther (ed), *European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy*, p. 99.

negotiations: no new institutions, no more money, and no new form of regionally based cooperation in Northern Europe.[99] Instead, the central notion was the 'added value' that the Northern Dimension should bring, mainly through increased coordination of national, European and other existing policies and instruments directed towards the North.[100] The report also clarified the geographical coverage of the initiative which included the EU member states together with the so-called partner countries Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland and Russia.[101]

The Northern Dimension combined the elements of stabilisation and integration due to the policy's priority on cross-border cooperation and the inclusion of the non-EU countries.[102] Moreover, the policy marked a new orientation in the EU's relations with its neighbours: the preference for bilateralism through association agreements has been tempered by more active regional policies towards the Baltic region.[103] While minimizing the exclusive effects of enlargement as such, the Northern Dimension offered the non-EU partner countries the option of having a voice in the framing of EU policies and a contribution to the drafting of the first Action Plan in 2000.[104] The Union's commitment to the policy after the 'big-bang' enlargement was exemplified by the adoption of the Second Action Plan for the period 2003-2006. However, from 2004 onwards, the Northern Dimension has largely become a regional element of EU-Russia bilateral cooperation.[105]

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[99] Ibid, p.102. This was also evident in the subsequent official documents from the EU on the Northern Dimension, one of which stated that "the Commission considers that neither new permanent structures nor new budget lines should be considered". *See* European Commission, "A Northern Dimension for the Policies of the Union: An Inventory of Current Activities", Working Document, 1999.

[100] *See* also European Council, "Action Plan for the Northern Dimension with external and crossborder policies for the European Union 2000-2003", 14 June 2000, 9401/00, which states that the "aim [of the Northern Dimension] is to provide added value through reinforced co-ordination and complementarity in the EU and Member States' programmes and enhanced collaboration between the countries in Northern Europe".

[101] *A Northern Dimension for the Policies of the European Union*, COM (1998)589, 25 November 1998.

[102] Kahraman, op. cit., p. 6.

[103] Vahl, "Models for the European Neighbourhood Policy: The EEA and the Northern Dimension", p. 4.

[104] Christopher Browning and Pertti Joenniemi, "The European Union's Two Dimensions: The Eastern and the Northern", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (2003), p.469 quoted in Kahraman, op. cit., p.6.

[105] *See* Haukkala, "The Northern Dimension: A Presence and Four Liabilities", p. 113.

In brief, the Northern Dimension "represents a regional approach to the EU's neighbours, and stands in contrast to a bilateral approach whereby the EU conducts with its neighbours on a country-by-country basis".[106] With this respect, Marius Vahl claims that the Northern Dimension could be a useful model for the ENP, in particular vis-à-vis the Eastern neighbours, although the regional approach has played a limited role in dealing with strategic challenges and resolving politically contentious issues in EU neighbourhood policies.[107] However, the Northern Dimension initiative is mainly criticized for its inadequate response to the increasing need for cross-pillar and cross-organizational framework of the EU's policies in the region.[108] Therefore, considering the Union's growing presence in wider Europe, the ENP might be seen as an attempt to combine the new and old neighbours under a single framework through the harmonization of the goal prioritization within a cross-pillar structure.[109]

2.2.3 ENP's Innovative Features

From the comparison of the ENP with the enlargement and previous neighbourhood policies, it is observed that the ENP "does not quite resemble any of the existing strategies, but picks elements from many of them and attempts to complement their inputs."[110] This is to mean that the ENP draws on the experiences of the Union's previous foreign policy initiatives. As for the enlargement experience, the ENP builds on the conceptual rationale of enlargement because the EU, mostly considered as a 'civilian' and 'soft power', through the ENP "does not aim to force to impose but to persuade its neighbours; it does not aim to coerce them but to attract them."[111] The major difference between the ENP and enlargement is that the ENP sticks to the partnership approach with an aim of stabilizing and reforming the neighbours by

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[106] Vahl, op. cit., p. 1.
[107] Ibid.
[108] Kahraman, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: The European Union's New Engagement towards Wider Europe", p. 7.
[109] Ibid.
[110] Fabrizio Tassinari, "Security and Integration in the EU Neighbourhood: the Case for Regionalism", *CEPS Working Document* No. 226, July 2005, p. 8.
[111] Ibid, p. 7.

externalizing its governance, while the latter aims at internalizing neighbours through its membership approach.

Concerning the ENP's experience with previous neighbourhood strategies, it needs to be recognized that the ENP maintains the basic principle of these strategies which is to exclude the perspective of future membership. Whereas the ENP might be defined as an attempt to comprehend previous neighbourhood strategies under a single policy framework, it is not designed as a radically novel policy and does not seek to replace but rather to reinforce the *acquis* of earlier neighbourhood policies and the institutions and policies set up by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) and the Association Agreements (AA).

Although the ENP builds on the EU's other foreign policy initiatives, it represents "a new attention and concentration in order to accelerate the progress within these policy frameworks and to provide new incentives and paths for economic and political reform."[112] This aspect is explicitly found in the draft Constitutional Treaty which contains an entirely new provision, Article I-57, on the 'Union and its neighbours': the Union 'shall' develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, 'aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness', and may conclude specific agreements with them.[113]   Until now, there has been no particular reference to the neighbouring countries within the Treaties. Thus, it provides clear evidence that the neighbours are now considered particularly privileged which makes the ENP as a special and distinct area for external policy-making, and the neighbours as special partners.

Besides its distinct legal foundation, Roland Dannreuther identifies four main innovative aspects or 'reforms' within the ENP which can be said to provide an 'added value' to existing policies and thereby to convert the legacy of failure into

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[112] Dannreuther, "Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: the European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 190.
[113] *See* 'A Constitution For Europe', available at:
<http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/external_en.htm>

success.[114] The first is the claim that the ENP offers a bigger 'slice' (a better 'silver carrot') to its partner countries which, while falling short of membership, is nevertheless attractive and substantial. The offer of a 'stake in the EU's internal market' and 'further integration and liberalization to promote the free movement of - persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms)' represents the most concrete expression of this improved offer or prize.

The second innovation within the ENP is the shift towards a more selective and differentiated approach. The ENP represents a direct move to correct the failures of previous neighbourhood policies which stemmed from their ambitious rhetoric together with their unfulfilled plans for regional integration and 'strategic' partnerships.[115] The emphasis in the ENP is on the need for a more differentiated approach which takes into account the 'existing state of relations within each country, its needs and capacities, as well as common interests'.[116] This indicates a recognition of the heterogeneity of countries included in the ENP and that a 'one size fits all' policy is "counterproductive and frustrates the ambitions of those genuinely seeking to engage substantively with the EU".[117] Dannreuther claims that this 'inclusive' regional approach, where progress is dependent on poorer performers catching up, is one significant factor behind the delays in the establishment of a Mediterranean Free Trade Area. He continues by directing attention to the EU's considerable experience, drawn from the last accession process, more specifically designing country-specific priorities, Action Plans, annual reviews and other benchmarks and targets for economic, social and political reforms. This is reflected in the ENP Action Plans declared in December 2004 which cover a considerable range of topics and issues.

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[114] Dannreuther, op. cit.
[115] This is particularly valid in the case of the Euro-Mediterranean policy s*ee* Raffaella A. Del Sarto and Tobias Schumacher, 'From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy Towards the Southern Mediterranean?' *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10: 17-38, 2005.
[116] European Commission Communication, "European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper".
[117] Dannreuther, op. cit.

The third reform is that the ENP seeks to promote is a greater coherence and consistency in its neighbourhood policy. During the 1990s, the regional policies to the Western Newly Independent States (WNIS), the Balkans, and the Mediterranean have all developed independently of one another and each having their specific financial instruments, institutions and rationales. Moreover, the internal complexity of the EU policy-making process increased this confusion, most notably with the three different pillars of the EU all having their distinctive contributions to make to these policies. Dannreuther underlines that "the resulting Byzantine bureaucratic structure weakened the prospect of a genuine partnership between the EU and its neighbours, limited the effectiveness of the instruments available to the EU, and contributed to the failures in policy implementation".[118] Therefore, the ENP seeks to overcome this weakness by setting up a new European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) which covers all the new neighbours under the same framework, replacing already existing financial assistance instruments.

The fourth and final innovation of the ENP is that it seems to be better resourced than the earlier neighbourhood policies through the creation of the ENPI as a new comprehensive financial instrument of the ENP. In June 2003, the Thessaloniki European Council asked for the Commission to present a second proposal (after Wider Europe Communication), designing the content of the new Neighbourhood Instrument, which would govern technical and financial assistance to the ENP countries for the 2007-2013 financial perspective. In response to the Council's request, the Commission generated ideas for a new Neighbourhood Instrument and proposed a Communication named 'Paving the Way for a new Neighbourhood Instrument'.[119] The Communication was followed by a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council, laying down general provisions establishing the ENPI.[120] The Commission proposed a two-stage approach for restructuring EU external assistance to the countries covered by the ENP. In the first

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[118] Ibid, p. 192.
[119] European Commission Communication, "Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument", COM(2003)393, July 1, 2003.
[120] European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) Proposal, COM(2004)628 final.

phase, until the end of 2006, the emphasis would be to coordinate the existing financial instruments (INTERREG, PHARE, TACIS, MEDA, CARDS) in order to support the key objectives of the ENP. In the second phase, the 2007-2013 financial perspective, a new legal instrument, the ENPI, would replace pre-existing programmes covering the countries in concern.

Promoting sustainable development in regions on both sides of common borders by working together through joint actions to address common challenges, in fields such as environment, public heath, and the prevention of and fight against organized crime, ensuring efficient and secure common borders through joint actions, and promoting local cross-border "people-to-people" type actions are the key objectives that the ENP focuses on.[121] A significant feature of the ENPI is the financing of 'joint programmes', modelled on the principles of the EU Structural Funds such as multi-annual programming and co-financing. In fact, the proposed reform of the ENP financial provisions has been reflected in the Commission's wider plans to restructure EU external assistance beginning from 2007. Whereas, for the financial perspective 2000-2006, the EU allocated 8.4 billion for the countries which are now covered by the ENP, the Commission has requested an almost doubling of funds for the ENPI, a sum of 14.9 billion Euros for the 2007-2013 financial package.[122] Although the ENPI has received less funding (than requested) in the package, it seeks to overcome the failures of the previous financial instruments providing more effective and coordinated assistance for cross-border and sub-regional cooperation across the external borders of the EU.[123] It is also expected that the aid and finance provided by the ENPI would be more effectively allocated than the previous instruments so that it could be more clearly targeted to fulfillment of the objectives of the country-specific Action Plans.

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[121] European Commission, "European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper", p. 27.

[122] Although the Council did not approve the amount requested by the Commission, the total ENPI budget (just under €12 billion) is a 30% increase on the previous level of funding. Of this, €300 million will be used to reward the countries that make most progress in improving governance, and €700 million to support additional lending from international financial institutions. S*ee* European Commission Communication, "Financial Perspectives 2007-2013", COM(2004)487.

[123] Dannreuther, "Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: the European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 193.

In brief, the ENP's innovative features might not represent a radical shift from previous policies but they nevertheless indicate the EU's increased awareness of a need for a new strategic commitment and greater policy coherence in order to influence future developments in its neighbourhood.

2.3 Conclusion

This chapter seeks to answer how the ENP has evolved as a new foreign policy framework of the EU. In the first section, where the context and background is analyzed, it is observed that the implications of recent enlargement and security-driven concerns strongly influenced the rationale of the policy and motives behind it. Within the former, the most effective challenges could be counted as geopolitical change, enlargement fatigue and consecutive constitutional deadlock. As for the latter, spill-over effect of instability and insecurity from the neighbours comes to the fore which is to aimed to contained by the establishment of 'ring of well-governed states around the Union' as declared by the ESS.

The launch of the ENP came as a response to these challenges as reflected in two official documents dealing with the ENP, namely Wider Europe Communication and Strategy Paper. The emphasis of these documents is on the ENP's evolution as a new comprehensive foreign policy framework, without offering the membership prospect to the partner countries. In other words, the policy offers 'everything but institutions' which sets the main difference between the ENP and enlargement. Moving on this point, second section tries to compare the ENP and enlargement initially, then the ENP and other neighbourhood policies. The finding is that the ENP emerges as a distinct foreign policy tool although it draws on the experiences of previous initiatives. After a brief analysis, legal foundation, offer of further integration, differentiated approach and ENPI are found to the policy's innovative features.

While the ENP is officially declared to have a new comprehensive foreign policy framework, this can not be understood only by looking into this chapter as it focuses

on the initial phase of the policy. In order to complete the full picture, an overview of the ENP's policy framework is also required which will be conducted by the next chapter.

CHAPTER III

FRAMEWORK OF THE ENP

This chapter attempts to elaborate the ENP's policy framework and its implementation stage. In the first section, geographical scope of the policy is explained mainly emphasizing the reasons of the partner countries' inclusion and their previous relations with the Union. The second section examines the ENP's objectives, which is to be complemented by the third section dealing with the incentives offered. The fourth section focuses on the impacts of the partnership conditionality on the policy outcomes. The final section concentrates on the practical side of the ENP by analysing the action plans, the content, major principles, implementation and monitoring stages of the plans respectively.

3.1 Geographical Coverage

The original design of the ENP's geographical coverage dates back to early 2002, when the United Kingdom (UK) in particular pushed for a 'wider Europe' initiative,[124] directed towards Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, but not the southern Mediterranean (already involved in the Barcelona process) or distant western former Soviet republics, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. In December 2002, the Copenhagen European Council approved the idea, but included the southern Mediterranean countries in the initiative, on the insistence of the southern member states. In June 2004, after lobbying by the Southern Caucasian countries and a peaceful 'rose revolution' in Georgia, the Council extended the initiative to cover Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.[125] Although originally included in the initiative, Russia has rejected to participate, preferring to develop its cooperation with the EU

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[124] The name of the initiative has been changed as many times as the list of neighbours included in it: from 'wider Europe' to 'proximity policy' to 'new neighbourhood policy', and finally to 'European neighbourhood policy'.

[125] The Rose Revolution was a peaceful revolution in Georgia in 2003 that displaced the then President Eduard Shevardnadze.

on a more 'equal' basis, in the form of a 'strategic partnership' through the creation of four common spaces (economic; freedom, security and justice; external security; and research and education), as defined at the 2003 St. Petersburg summit.[126] Besides, the ENP is not 'activated' for four countries, namely Belarus, Libya, Syria and Algeria, since no Action Plan is in force yet.

What is remarkable about the ENP's geographical scope is its combination of three distinctive regions with wide diversity of countries under a single policy framework. The inclusion of these regions, in retrospect, brings about the heterogeneity of the partner countries which "comprise very different political, cultural and socio-economic realities, not only on a country-by-country but also on a regional and sub-regional basis."[127]

3.1.1 The Eastern European Partners

In the Eastern Europe, the ENP partner countries consist of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Until 2004 enlargement, these Eastern European countries were not a major priority for the Union. However, they have become quite important for the EU as the enlargement brought these countries on the Union's land border. Therefore, the EU revised its previous policies toward WNIS through the launch of the ENP.

As for Ukraine, bilateral relations were formalized by the ratification of the PCA in 1998. In this regard, financial assistance has been provided for political and economic reform, nuclear safety programmes concerning Ukraine's power stations, border management and also humanitarian assistance. However, the implementation of the PCA proved problematic due to the failures of the Ukrainian government to keep promises for required reforms, the ongoing widespread corruption within the Ukrainian administration, and cross-border crime (smuggling of goods, drugs and people through criminal networks).[128] On the other hand, Ukraine has begun

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[126] European Commission Communication on relations with Russia, COM(2004)106, 9 February 2004, as well as the Council Conclusions of 24 February 2004.
[127] Roberto Aliboni, "The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy", *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10: 1-16, 2005, p. 2.
[128] Wallace, "Looking After the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25", p. 16.

declaring its persistent demand to become a future member since the mid-1990s. While the negative conditions have been alleviated since the 'Orange Revolution' in 2004, there is no formal offer of the Union for Ukraine's future membership but the country's persistence continues. Further considering that the pressure has increased due to the support of the Eastern European member states (particularly Poland) to the Ukraine's membership, the ENP might be perceived as a policy partly designed to deal with this 'Ukrainian problem' in the short term vis-à-vis the intense pressure on the EU to move Ukraine from the ENP to the 'pre-accession' policy.[129]

Like Ukraine, Moldova also signed a PCA with the Union in the same year, implementation of which has proved even more problematic. While Moldova has been experiencing similar economic and political problems similar to those of Ukraine, the situation has been further aggravated by the deadlock over Transdniestria which has weakened the whole process of economic and political transition.[130] Although Moldova aspires to be an EU member in the future, it is not as much persistent as Ukraine. It is even argued that Moldova primarily prefers to be recognized as a full partner in the regional establishments of South East Europe as well as in the ENP.[131]

Unlike Ukraine and Moldova, Belarus has no formal agreement with the Union. The PCA, signed in 1995, with this country was suspended in 1997 before its ratification as a consequence of serious setbacks in the development of democracy and human rights in Belarus. Although Belarus falls within the scope of the ENP, relations with the country remain stagnant under the current authoritarian regime. Given the Belarus' rejection of the EU's offer of assistance for economic and political reform, the Union seeks to promote internal security co-operation with Belarus, although the country does not meet the political conditions for participation in the ENP.

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[129] Smith, "The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 768.
[130] Transdniestria, also known as Transnistria, is a *de facto* independent territory within the internationally recognised borders of Moldova. Transdniestria's independence is not recognised by any state or international organisation, and it is *de jure* part of Moldova.
[131] Michael Emerson, "European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy or Placebo?", CEPS Working Document No. 215, November 2004, p. 8.

3.1.2 The Southern Mediterranean Partners

In the Southern Mediterranean region, the ENP applies to all the non-EU participants in the EMP with the exception of Turkey, which is pursuing its relations with the EU in a pre-accession framework: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia.

Compared to the EU's relations with the WNIS in the past, the relationship between the Mediterranean countries has been realized on a more straightforward basis, mainly through the EMP. Since the EMP has been explained in the previous chapter, this section does not provide detailed information on the issue. However, it is worth stressing that the ENP supplements the EMP process and continues to further pursue the objectives set out by the AAs separately contracted with Mediterranean countries. Currently, the Union has established formal links with the all Southern Mediterranean countries, with the exception Libya, Syria and Algeria with whom the Union does not have any previous formal contract.

3.1.3 Southern Caucasus Partners

The ENP partner countries in the Southern Caucasus are Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The ENP's final extension to these countries mainly stems from the Union's interests in the stability and development of the Southern Caucasus.[132] On stability, the Union's engagement in the region stems from its interest in the prevention of weak state spillovers throughout the region. Concerning development of these countries, the EU is interested in the promotion of liberal values (pluralist democracy, market economy, the rule of law, human rights).[133] The region is also important for the EU due to its energy sources (the Caspian basin). The Union's awareness of its increasing dependence on the Middle East and North Africa, yet the fragile political structure of the countries concerned, makes the cooperation inevitable with the Caucasian countries for the transit of energy. The EU is also concerned with the increasing dependence on Russia for natural gas supply, due to its

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[132] European Commission, "European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper", p. 10.
[133] S. Neil MacFarlane, "The Caucasus and Central Asia: towards a non-strategy", in R. Dannreuther (ed), *European Union Foreign and Security Policy: towards a Neighbourhood Strategy*, p. 125.

fear that such dependence might give Russia a high degree of leverage in their mutual relations. In brief, the key imperative is diversification of energy supply for the EU and the Southern Caucasian countries might play a significant role in this diversification through their proximity to the Caspian Basin.[134] On these grounds, the ESS clearly identifies the South Caucasus as one of the regions, in which the EU should take a "stronger and more active interest, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region."[135] Therefore, the EU declares that it "wishes to see reinforced, credible and sustained commitment towards democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and progress towards the development of a market economy and stands ready to support credible, concrete and sustained reform efforts"[136] as a consequence of the ENP actions.

As for the Union's former relations with Armenia, the PCA, which entered into force in 1999, was an important step. Although Armenia has achieved some success in economic, political and judicial reforms, major challenges remain for the country, particularly in the field of democracy and human rights.[137] Moreover, the unresolved conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh impedes the county's transition. On these grounds, Armenia was included in the scope of the ENP in order to assist this country through its Action Plan.

Azerbaijan's PCA also entered into force in 1999 which developed bilateral relations with the Union. Azerbaijan faces similar economic and political challenges with Armenia, including Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which justifies this country's inclusion in the ENP.

Like Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Union improved its relations with Georgia through the PCA in 1999. The country experiences various economic and political problems, such as widespread poverty, weak rule of law, high levels of corruption, and internal

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[134] John Gault, "EU Energy Security and the Periphery" in R. Dannreuther (ed), *European Union Foreign and Security Policy: towards a Neighbourhood Strategy,* p. 136.
[135] European Council, "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy", p. 8.
[136] European Commission, "European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper", p. 11.
[137] For detailed information *see* CEPS Neighbourhood Watch, Issue 2, March 2005.

conflicts, involving in particular the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The ENP aims to strengthen Georgia's weak economic and political situation through the country's Action Plan.

3.2 The Objectives of the ENP

The Wider Europe Communication introduces two objectives as ENP's overarching objectives for the next decade or longer:[138]

> - To work with the partners to reduce poverty and create an area of shared prosperity and values based on deeper economic integration, intensified political and cultural relations, enhanced cross-border cooperation and shared responsibility for conflict prevention between the EU and its neighbours.

> - To anchor the EU's offer of concrete benefits and preferential relations within a differentiated framework which responds to progress made by the partner countries in political and economic reform.

These objectives indicate that the EU prefers to maintain a partnership approach towards its neighbourhood rather than integration approach at least for the time being. This, in turn, reflects the EU's intention of stabilizing neighbours rather than internalizing them.[139] Stability would be provided through realization of the overall objective of the ENP which has been declared as "to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged Union and its neighbours" by sharing "the benefits of the EU's 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being."[140]

Realizing increased interdependencies between the Union and its neighbours in the post-enlargement period, the EU began to frame the ENP on "helping ourselves

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[138] European Commission Communication, "Wider Europe- Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours", p. 9.
[139] Tassinari, "Security and Integration in the EU Neighbourhood: The Case for Regionalism", p. 7.
[140] European Commission Communication, "European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper", p. 3.

through helping our neighbours" premise.[141] In this respect, the ENP aims to bring the EU's eastern and southern neighbourhood countries under a single framework which is consisted of a reinforced partnership centred on economic and political goals including human rights and the fight against terrorism. The final objective is to create a 'ring of friends' from Morocco to Russia and the Black Sea with whom the EU enjoys close peaceful and co-operative relations.[142] Thus, the emphasis is on promoting stability both within and between the neighbouring states, and economic and social development leading to increased prosperity and increased security on the EU's borders.

While the aforementioned objectives are declared to serve the mutual interests of the EU and its neighbours, there is a tendency in the current debate that the ENP works only for the sake of the Union's own interests. Many scholars argue that this is valid, in particular, for the EU's security interests as they pre-dominate the rationale of the ENP. According to Manuela Moschella, the ENP aims at fulfilling EU's security objectives "allowing it to control what happens in neighbouring countries, and in this context mutual benefits are just a consequence of unilateral European concerns."[143] Similarly, Michael Leigh highlights that the EU's fundamental objective is "to export stability to neighbouring countries so that its own peaceful development is not hampered by instability in its new hinterland".[144] A related objective of the ENP, for Leigh, is to maintain and strengthen the security at the borders of the enlarged EU, without excluding neighbouring countries. Leigh also claims that the ENP's objective to improve living standards in partner countries serve for the EU's interest as a means to enhance political stability and to weaken migratory pressures on the borders of the EU. Moreover, Laszo Kiss underlines that "a ring of well-governed

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[141] Benita Ferrero-Waldner, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: helping ourselves through helping our neighbours", *Conference of Foreign Affairs Committee* Speech/05/658, London, 31 October 2005.
[142] European Commission Communication, "Wider Europe- Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours", p.4.
[143] Manuela Moschella, "European Union's Regional Approach towards its Neighbours: the European Neighbourhood Policy vis-à-vis Euro-Mediterranean Partnership", in Fulvio Attina and Rosa Rossi (ed), *European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Economic and Social Issues*, p. 65.
[144] Michael Leigh, "The EU's Neighbourhood Policy" in Esther Brimmer and Stefan Fröhlich (eds), *The Strategic Implications of European Union Enlargement*, p. 108.

countries around the EU, offering perspectives for democracy and economic growth, is in the interests of Europe as whole."[145] Looking from a more ambitious perspective, Fulvio Attina contributes that if the EU, under ENP framework, achieves to eliminate the problems in its adjacent countries through the establishment of strong, consistent and effective partnership with them, this outcome would make the Union a credible foreign policy actor.[146]

The arguments indicate that the EU's security and political objectives receive strong emphasis under the ENP framework. In this regard, EU attempts to increase security and prosperity in its neighbourhood by exporting its values and standards including democracy, the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights, and the principles of market economy, free trade and sustainable development, as well as poverty reduction, which, in turn, result in the creation of 'good neighbours'.[147]

3.3 Incentives Offered

If the membership perspective is absent for all the ENP partner countries, at least in foreseeable future, the question arises: what incentives does the ENP offer? And would these incentives be adequate and strong enough to fulfill the diverse objectives of the ENP? As emphasized before, the initial policy offer was "everything but the institutions, which means very close economic and political integration".[148] "Developing new structures with our neighbours ... innovative concepts such as institutions co-owned by the partners" has also been raised, without elaborating what forms these may take or what incentives they may contain. Then, the Wider Europe Communication proposed several incentives: a stake in the EU's Internal Market and further integration and liberalization to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services, and capital (four freedoms); extension of the internal market and acquis based regulatory structures to ENP partners; preferential trade relations and

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[145] Laszlo J. Kiss, "The Strategic Implications of EU Enlargement on Central and Eastern Europe" in Esther Brimmer and Stefan Fröhlich (eds), op. cit., p. 84.
[146] Fulvio Attina, "European Neighbourhood Policy and the Building of Security around Europe" in Fulvio Attina and Rosa Rossi (ed), op. cit., p. 16.
[147] Smith, "The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 763.
[148] Romano Prodi, "The Future of the Europe of Twenty Five", 23 September 2004, available at <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference= SPEECH/04/417>

market opening; the perspective of lawful migration and softening of visa requirements; integration into transport, energy, and telecommunications networks; enhanced financial assistance from the EU; and support for integration into the WTO.[149] These incentives, in the short term, are offered in the form of reinforced political, security, economic and cultural cooperation and then they are transformed into deeper political and economic integration in the long-term.

While the ENP appears to be rich in its rhetoric with various incentives, their effectiveness is criticized by many scholars. In this regard, Heather Grabbe considers the proposed incentives too weak to move neighbours towards market economies and fully democratic political system.[150] Moreover, she finds the EU's offer of aid and trade concessions to its neighbourhood too insufficient not only for the persuasion of the governments but also for the EU's leverage to exert on them. In a similar way, Fraser Cameron conceives the Union's approach in the ENP as "low key and unlikely to capture headlines."[151] He further argues that "if the Union does not offer more than what is currently on the table, it may find itself facing a ring of states in distress rather than a ring of friends."[152]

Concerning the implementation of the offered incentives in reality, Amichai Magen maintains that the inclusion of the incentives has been undermined despite their reflection in the Action Plans.[153] Then, he draws attention to the complaints of ENP country officials that "the EU continues to be reluctant to liberalize precisely those sectors in which southern Mediterranean countries possess the greatest interest, notably market access for agricultural products and greater movement of persons,

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[149] European Commission Communication, "Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours", pp. 10-14.

[150] Heather Grabbe, "How the EU should help its neighbours", *Centre for European Reform Policy Brief*, June 2004, p. 3.

[151] Fraser Cameron, "The European Neighbourhood Policy as a Conflict Prevention Tool", *EPC Issue Paper* No. 47, June 2006, p. 17.

[152] Ibid.

[153] Amichai Magen, "The Shadow of Enlargement: Can the European Neighbourhood Policy Achieve Compliance?", *CDDRL Working Papers* No. 68, August 2006, pp. 382-426, p. 413.

including legal cross-boundary employment and immigration".[154] Sven Biscop also contributes to this argument:

> It seems as if the Mediterranean partners are suffering all the hardships entailed by economic reforms necessitated by the projected free trade area, but without gaining much in terms of effective benefits in return, or even the near-term prospect of benefits. Undoubtedly, the most sensitive area in this regard is the EU's agricultural policy, the protectionist character of which produces major negative effects for its Southern trade partners. But in the textile sector as well, limits have been imposed; real free trade applies only to oil, gas and industrial products.[155]

Fred Tanner argues that these half-hearted policies of the Union have actually resulted in worsening of socio-economic conditions in the partner countries.[156] Therefore, scholars agree on the need for a substantial effort by the EU for providing specific incentives with clear conditions and benchmarks for amending the vagueness of the situation.

3.4 Conditionality and Expected Policy Outcomes

Conditionality concept refers that the EU first clarifies what incentives it offers, and then it sets out the conditions on which these incentives will be delivered.[157] Conditionality has been milestone of the accession policy over the last decade, and also of the EU's foreign policy towards the Western Balkans, and in both of these cases it has developed into a highly structured policy. ENP is based on the same kind of conditionality which the Union has already used to promote reform in aforementioned policies. While the ENP adheres to the Union's traditional tool of conditionality for promoting reforms, the difference of the policy comes in the form of 'partnership' rather than membership, hence in its outcome.

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[154] Ibid.

[155] Sven Biscop, "The European Security Strategy and The Neighbourhood Policy: A New Starting Point for a Euro-Mediterranean Security Partnership?", in Fulvio Attina and Rosa Rossi (ed) *European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Economic and Social Issues*, p. 8.

[156] Tanner, 'North Africa: Partnership, Exceptionalism and Neglect', in Dannreuther (ed.), 'European Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy', pp. 135-150.

[157] Emerson and Noutcheva, "From Barcelona Process to Neighbourhood Policy: Assessments and Open Issues".

In the case of ENP, the Union and partner countries jointly identify the primary reforms which would culminate in a deeper relationship. Parallel to the ENP partners' fulfillment of their commitments on the rule of law, democracy, human rights, market-oriented economic and sectoral reforms and cooperation on key foreign policy objectives, the EU offers deeper political and economic integration. By deeper political integration, the EU means more frequent and higher level political dialogue, reflecting the importance of mutual relationship, and assistance to further strengthen domestic institutions protecting democracy and the rule of law.

On the side of deeper economic integration, the Union has an ambitious agenda. As well as the traditional forms of financial and technical assistance, the Union offers a stake in the internal market in return of the promotion of reforms which the ENP partners have agreed through their Action Plans. Thus, the EU also pursues an aim of supporting transition, in particular institution and capacity-building. These reforms would, in turn, provide the partner countries with an advantage of the enhanced preferential trade relations which the Union offers, as well as its support for WTO membership. Moreover, the EU also offers gradual participation in some of its programmes and agencies and, the most far-reaching offer of all is a 'stake in the EU's internal market'. The extent of deepened links is said to depend on the degree of commitment to "shared values", notably democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law, as set out within the EU by the Charter of Fundamental Rights.[158]

In brief, conditionality mechanism works in two ways in the case of ENP. On the one hand, traditional sectoral conditionality is applied to the contractual relation where aid to neighbours is dependent on the specific reforms. On the other hand, there is progressive or positive conditionality, meaning no penalties for poor performance but additional benefits for good performance. In other words, "the further a partner is ready to go in taking practical steps to implement common values, the further the EU

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[158] European Commission Communication, "Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours", p. 4.

will be ready to go in strengthening our links with them."[159] This, in principle, appears to encourage a partnership, in which the partners shape their own integration fate.[160] At this point, Fabrizio Tassinari directs attention to the EU's exclusive control in the functioning of the conditionality: "… it is Brussels that decides the meaning of 'common values'; Brussels decides whether or not, and to what extent, partners have taken 'practical steps' towards them; and it decides if and when it is time to strengthen links with them."[161]

Although Tassinari accepts the justification of this 'unilateral' conditionality by political and managerial reasons, such as the financing of the ENP by the Union, he argues that this situation not only prevents the neighbours' progress but also alters the finality of the policy. Therefore, he finalizes as follows:

> … while the Commission stresses joint ownership, reciprocity and enhanced partnership as paramount innovations of the policy, conditionality defines criteria, draws limits and is bound to become the most stringent criterion of the ENP.[162]

Similarly, Marise Cremona underlines the problems arising from the enhanced use of conditionality in the ENP such as the moving target problem, the double standards problem, the measurement and consistency problems.[163] Like Tassinari, Cremona argues that the ENP conditionality, which substitutes the EU policy objectives for domestic policy goals, has an altering impact on the outcome of the ENP by undermining its capacity for autonomous policy development of the partners.

Current debate on the ENP further suggests that the outcome of the policy create problems for the smooth functioning of its 'partnership' via conditionality. For instance, Michael Emerson argues that the ENP conditionality inspires from and imitates the comprehensive reform and harmonisation processes set by the

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[159] Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Press Conference to Launch First Seven Action Plans under the European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, 9 December 2004.
[160] Tassinari, "Security and Integration in the EU Neighbourhood: The Case for Regionalism", p. 9.
[161] Ibid, p.11.
[162] Ibid, p. 9.
[163] Marise Cremona, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: Legal and Institutional Issues", *CDDRL Working Papers* No. 25, 2 November 2004, p. 7.

membership conditionality, but an imbalance between the ENP's obligations and commitments brings about the lack of credibility for the policy.[164] In a similar way, Tassinari claims that:

> … when the EU talks membership to its neighbours, it is inclusive: it sets conditions, offers significant incentives and most of all signals the strength of its integration process. When Brussels talks partnership to its neighbours, it is exclusive: it is often ineffective, rather unattractive and unable to exert influence or to preserve security on the continent.[165]

Drawing from ongoing debate, it could be concluded that the ENP's adherence to 'partnership conditionality' potentially weakens the partners' commitments to the political and economic reform process which will, in turn, negatively affect the outcome of the policy.

3.5 ENP in Implementation: The Action Plans

The Action Plans not only constitute the basic method to implement the ENP but they also establish a "testing ground"[166] to evaluate the success of the policy. Agreed jointly between the EU and the partner country, Action Plans are comprehensive 'political documents' which define the framework of relations between the Union and its neighbours "in order to set out clearly the overarching strategic policy targets and benchmarks by which progress can be judged over several years."[167] Action plans identify key priorities for the country in concern and offer real incentives for reform.[168] Minimum duration for the Action Plans is three years and they are subject to renewal by mutual consent.

The initial step on progress towards the Action Plans is the Commission's presentation of 'Country Reports' which are used to identify priorities for each partner country. Therefore, Country Reports could be perceived as the signal of the

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[164] Emerson, "European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy or Placebo?", p. 17.
[165] Tassinari, "Security and Integration in the EU Neighbourhood: the Case for Regionalism", p. 5.
[166] Interview with Richard Whitman.
[167] European Commission Communication, "Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours", p. 16.
[168] European Commission Communication, "The Commission Proposals for Action Plans under the European Neighbourhood Policy" COM(2004)795 final, Brussels, 9 December 2004, p. 3.

Union's intention to 'get serious' with the country concerned.[169] With this respect, the Commission prepared Country Reports for seven countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Jordan, Israel, Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, and Morocco) in 2004 and their Action Plans were negotiated and formally adopted in 2005. Likewise, Country Reports for Egypt, Lebanon, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were prepared in 2005 and their Action Plans were adopted in the same year. Four other countries qualify in principle for the ENP, namely Algeria, Belarus, Libya and Syria, but no action plans have been proposed for these countries yet.

An important note is that the Action Plans have been designed only for the partners with those partners with which the EU already has AAs (Mediterranean countries) or PCAs (WNIS) in force. This is to mean that the Action Plans do not have a separate contractual legal basis, but, instead, they are built into the existing legal-institutional framework of the EU's bilateral relations with a respective ENP partner country.[170] Moreover, the implementation of the Action Plans is to be monitored within the existing institutional framework of the relevant association or co-operation agreement (Association or Cooperation Councils, committees and sub-committees). Financial support for ENP partner countries is to be provided through a single ENPI from 2007 whose features have been mentioned in earlier sections.

3.5.1 Content of the Action Plans
Although the Action Plans are similar in their essential features, their content is specific to each country with whom the Union negotiates and jointly define an agenda of political and economic reform in the short and medium-term (between 3 and 5 years). Action Plans lay out a number of core priorities and include wide range of issues as follows:

  ➢ Political dialogue and reform,
  ➢ Economic and social cooperation and development,
  ➢ Trade-related issues, market and regulatory reform,

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[169] Interview with Andreas Herdina.
[170] Ibid.

- ➢ Cooperation in justice and home affairs,
- ➢ Cooperation in sectors (such as transport, energy, information society, environment, research and development),
- ➢ Human dimension (including people-to-people contacts, civil society, education, public health).

As seen above, the scope of the Action Plans is cross-pillar, containing both political and economic objectives relating to issues covering three pillars. Therefore, in monitoring partners' progress, the Commission has to coordinate not only with the ENP partner in concern but also with the member states, Council Presidencies and the CFSP High Representative. Additionally, precise benchmarking, timeframes and monitoring have to be included in the documents as the success of the Action Plans rests upon the Union's incentive strategy. Only by this way, the EU could set out the values and standards that the neighbours should adopt, with detailed objectives and 'precise' priorities for action.[171]

For the recently adopted Action Plans, the Commission held exploratory talks with all the partners in close coordination with the member states. Successive Council Presidencies, the Council Secretariat and Secretary-General / High Representative Javier Solana have participated in all consultations with partners. In the end, there emerged 5-year valid action plans, which constitute a kind of 'check list' of more than a hundred political, juridical and economic reform steps, which partner countries define with more precision, including appropriate timetables in accordance with their political priorities.[172] It should be noted that the Action Plans offer a 'bargain': in exchange for the progress in the co-defined priorities towards political and economic reform, neighbours are promised to benefit from the prospect of closer economic and political integration.[173] This, at the same time, provides the Action Plans with the notion of 'future' meaning that the possibility of moving beyond the

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[171] Smith, "The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 763.
[172] Action Plans are available at <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm>
[173] Lynch, "The European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 4.

AAs or PCAs is raised for those partners that fulfill the priorities of their Action Plans.[174]

Action Plans are considered to be 'innovative' in comparison to the past practice of bilateral cooperation.[175] This is due to the fact that they provide an all-inclusive method for harmonisation of legislation and executive practices and their scope covers not only the economic and financial spheres but also political issues, ranging from election practices to freedom of assembly and media and full respect of the rule of law. Therefore, those governments, who wish to launch an internal reform process, might well find the Action Plans to be a useful steering tool which makes the Union's encouragement and continuous support indispensable for their smooth functioning.

3.5.2 Basic Principles of the Action Plans

Action Plans build on four key principles: 'differentiation', 'bilateralism', 'progressivism' and 'joint ownership'. Differentiation principle means that the Action Plans are 'tailor-made' according to the individual needs and specific circumstances of each ENP partner country:

> The intensity and level of ambition of relations with each ENP partner is differentiated, reflecting the degree to which common values are effectively shared, the existing state of relations with each country, its needs and capacities, as well as common interests.[176]

The quotation implies that the ENP does not constitute a sort of 'one-size-fits-all policy', mainly due to the heterogeneity of the partner countries. Indeed, Action Plans differ with respect to the partner country's geographic location, political and economic situation, relations with the Union, reform programmes, needs and capacities, as well as perceived interests and mutual goals in the context of the ENP. In the case of Ukraine, for example, there are almost 300 priorities while there are nearly 100 priorities in the case of the Palestinian Authority across a wide variety of

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[174] Ibid, p.5.
[175] Fraser Cameron and Eberhard Rhein, "Promoting Political and Economic Reform in the Mediterranean and Middle East", *EPC Issue Paper* No. 33, 18 May 2005, p.7.
[176] European Commission Communication, "The Commission Proposals for Action Plans under the European Neighbourhood Policy", p.3.

issue areas from political cooperation to implementing single market legislation. While Action Plans are specifically designed to meet the specific conditions of the partners, they are also coherent and complementary to the other processes in which the partners involve, such as the EMP. Moreover, the Union underlines that "the differentiation should at the same time be based on a clear commitment to shared values and be compatible with a coherent regional approach, especially where further regional cooperation can bring clear benefits."[177]

The second principle, bilateralism is so vital that, without this principle, the ENP could not be established as a single policy for those countries as different as Morocco and Russia, Libya and Belarus.[178] Bilateralism provides the EU with an opportunity to deal with the partners in a bilateral way in order to differentiate individual priorities and mutual interests for the Action Plans. In this framework, each neighbouring state negotiate separately with the Commission on the details of its 'Action Plan' and the implementation of the programme agreed, in a process of bilateral adaptation to the EU rules.[179] There is also a strong relationship between bilateralism and differentiation principle because the latter builds on the former in the preparation phase of the Action Plans. In other words, differentiation emerges as a result of a series of bilateral relations between the EU and each of the ENP partners, with the Commission regularly assessing progress and offering concessions in return.[180]

Progressivism principle connotes that the partner countries could move further if they fulfill the priorities in defined areas. Progress is rewarded by greater incentives and benefits as follows:

> The Action Plans will define the way ahead over the next three to five years. The next step could consist in the negotiation of European Neighbourhood Agreements, to replace the present generation of bilateral agreements, when Action Plan priorities are met. Progress made in this way will enable the EU

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[177] European Commission Communication, "European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper", p. 8.
[178] Attina, "European Neighbourhood Policy and the Building of Security around Europe", p.16.
[179] Wallace, "Looking After the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25", p.18.
[180] Ibid, p.7.

and its partners to agree on longer term goals for the further development of relations in the years ahead.[181]

Progressivism principle is highly related with the conditionality concept because the level of the further progress depends on the fulfillment of the partners' commitments to the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights, market-oriented economic reforms, key foreign policy objectives such as counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In other words, implementation of the Action Plans brings the perspective of moving beyond cooperation to a significant degree of integration, as set out in the Wider Europe Communication, including through a stake for partner countries in the EU's Internal Market. Thus, deeper and progressive relationship is envisaged and would be made conditional on meeting agreed targets for reform, which means that the partners would not be offered these opportunities in the absence of their progress.[182] Conditionality pursued in the ENP is not a 'political conditionality' but rather benchmarks: clear and public definitions of the actions that the EU expects the partners to implement.[183] Accordingly, political or economic benchmarks may be carried out, depending on which targets and reforms are agreed. Progressivism is also expected to serve for increasing regional cooperation, in the sense that it will evolve according to the achieved results.[184]

The last principle reflects the Union's offer of "joint ownership" of the ENP institutions and of the Action Plans "based on the awareness of shared values and common interests."[185] In this respect, jointly adopted Action Plans provide for an increased sense of ownership because they are negotiated with, rather than unilaterally imposed upon the ENP partners.[186] This is to mean that the priorities and mutual interests are defined cooperatively by the EU and the partner countries so that

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[181] European Commission Communication, "European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper", p. 5.
[182] European Commission Communication, "Wider Europe- Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours", p. 16.
[183] Rosa Rossi, "The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective", in Fulvio Attina and Rosa Rossi (ed), *European Neighbourhood Policy: Political , Economic and Social Issues*, p. 16.
[184] Moschella, "European Union's Regional Approach towards its Neighbours: the European Neighbourhood Policy vis-à-vis Euro-Mediterranean Partnership", p. 64.
[185] European Commission Communication, "European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper", p. 8.
[186] Landaburu, "From Neighbourhood to Integration Policy: Are There Concrete Alternatives to Enlargement?", p.2.

"there can be no question of asking partners to accept a pre-determined set of priorities."[187] By means of joint ownership, the partner countries are ensured to meet the objectives set out in the Action Plans. Joint ownership also brings the concepts of 'burden sharing' and 'joint responsibility' to the scene for the resolution of the problems emerging during the implementation of the Action Plans.

3.5.3 Implementation and Monitoring of the Action Plans

As mentioned earlier, the ENP builds on the existing legal and institutional arrangements (AAs, PCAs, Barcelona Process) and established instruments (Association or Cooperation Councils, committees and sub-committees) to implement and monitor the policy. Implementation phase of the Action Plans is vital because the words will be transformed into the action at this phase. The central priority for the Union, at this phase, is to work cooperatively with the partner countries and thus to support their reform efforts. Considering the ENP's broad scope, effective implementation requires the active participation of most branches of the Commission.[188] However, the EU has not much control over the implementation of the Action Plans in the partner countries. Therefore, it should offer as much technical assistance (TAIEX), twinning devices and financial support (e.g. for educational reforms or population policies) as possible to carry out administrative reforms and alignment with the EU in practice.[189]

As for the monitoring stage, the Union has declared in its ENP Strategy Paper that it is to take place within the bodies set up under aforementioned arrangements, which provide the opportunity of bringing together representatives of the the partner countries, member states, the European Commission and the Council Secretariat:

> Monitoring in this setting should reinforce joint ownership. Partner countries will be asked to provide detailed information as a basis for this joint monitoring exercise. The sub-committees, with their focus on specific issues,

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[187] European Commission Communication, "European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper", p. 8.
[188] European Commission Communication, "Implementing and promoting the European Neighbourhood Policy", SEC(2005)1521Brussels, 22 November 2005, p. 5.
[189] Cameron and Rhein, "Promoting Political and Economic Reform in the Mediterranean and Middle East", p.7.

as well as the economic dialogues, will be particularly useful for monitoring.[190]

After this preliminary monitoring exercise, the Commission draws up periodic reports on progress and on areas requiring further efforts, taking into account assessments made by the authorities of the partner country. Action Plans are reviewed and may be adapted in the light of progress towards meeting the priorities for action, which, at the same time, constitute the 'benchmarks'. A "mid-term" report is suggested to be prepared by the Commission, with the contribution of the High Representative on issues related to political co-operation and the CFSP, within two years of the approval of an Action Plan and a further report within three years. These reports can serve as a basis for the Council to decide the next step in its contractual links with each partner country. These could take the form of European Neighbourhood Agreements whose content and scope will be defined in the light of progress in meeting the priorities set out in the Action Plans.[191]

Karen Smith argues that the implementation stage might become problematic due to the some 'tricky' points contained in the Action Plans.[192] The first problem stems from the vague definition of the owner of action in Action Plans. To exemplify, whereas the responsibility to 'develop possibilities for enhanced EU–Ukraine consultations on crisis management' probably applies to both sides in Ukraine's Action Plan, it is not clear who is to 'undertake the first assessment of the impact of EU enlargement on trade between the EU and Ukraine'. The second problem is that while it is clear when the neighbour should take action, it is not always equally clear how progress will be evaluated. Accordingly, whereas many Action Plans talk much about how neighbours must 'enhance institutional or administrative capacity' in specific areas, the content is not specified. The third problem is about the absence of any time limit for meeting particular objectives. Action plans are for three years, but

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[190] European Commission Communication, "European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper", p. 10.
[191] European Commission Communication, "Commission Proposals for Action Plans under the European Neighbourhood Policy', COM(2004)795 final, 9 December 2004; and "European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper".
[192] Smith "The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 764.

it is not clear how many of the priorities are to be realized within that time period, or to what extent, hence reflecting the insufficiency of the benchmarks.

While these are some practical problems, there are also examples of achieved targets such as progress with Ukraine on market economy status, visa facilitation and energy issues; setting up a border assistance mission on the Moldova - Ukraine border; expanding political dialogue with Mediterranean partners, including, for the first time, the creation of sub-committees to launch regular discussions on democracy, human rights and governance.[193] Despite these current achievements, the official tone refrains from evaluating the overall success of the ENP so far.[194] The Union considers that it is quite early and difficult to provide a clear answer to the question 'which country progressed more', as the starting levels and ambitions of the ENP partners are very different from each other.[195] For instance, Ukraine and Jordan could not be compared with each other due mainly to their distinct characteristics. Likewise, Israel cannot be compared with the other ENP partners, because it is a more developed country and has more advanced relations with the EU.

On the official side, it is also argued that the success depends on the sector in question: while Egypt achieved success in information society (e.g. e-government), Morocco has progressed further in the transport sector (e.g. liberalisation in air transport)[196] Or, whereas Ukraine's Action Plan has achieved some success in terms of the improvement of the judiciary system, increased freedom of media and triumph of free elections, Jordan's Action Plan was successful in other prioritized areas for reform such as public finance management, human rights, transport, education and environment.[197] Moreover, the Union finds difficult to measure political progress: whereas Morocco established a human-rights sub-committee within the framework of its Action Plan, some other Mediterranean countries do not even want to hear the

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[193] CEPS Neighbourhood Watch, *Issue 10*, November 2005, p. 11.
[194] Interview with several Commission officers, ENP Unit, Brussels: EU Commission, 5-9 March 2007.
[195] Interview with Andreas Herdina.
[196] Interview with Andreas Herdina and Bernard Brunet.
[197] Interview with Miriam Brewka, Ukraine Desk Officer, and Cecile Abedie, Jordan Desk Officer, ENP Unit, Brussels: EU Commission, 7 March 2007.

word of 'human rights'.[198] Although the Union deliberately does not compare the progress of the ENP partners, Morocco and Ukraine are considered to be the leading ones, but the Union this has not yet been declared officially.[199]

As mentioned before, implementation of the Action Plans is supported by the Twinning and TAIEX instruments to provide assistance in many areas. For example, in Morocco, ten twinning projects have been carried out in various sectors such as consumer protection, customs and maritime transport.[200] Jordan also involves in many twinning projects in the areas of security, customs and trade policy together with its active involvement in TAIEX.[201]

Before concluding this section, it is worth emphasizing that the time is still early to evaluate the overall success / failure of the Action Plans. This is mainly because of the fact that learning and socialization processes play important role at the implementation stage which in turn requires the full assistance of the EU for those partner countries who have the political will to engage in internal reform process. Later on, the others might follow the suit, when they realize the benefits of reform in their neighbourhood.[202]

3.6 Conclusion

The policy framework of the ENP and its implementation dimension are elaborated in the current chapter. The most important point regarding the geographical scope of the policy is the heterogeneity of the partners which poses a major challenge for the ENP to combine wide diversity of the partner countries under a single policy framework. This, in turn, culminates in major differences in the expectations and interests of the partner countries which affect the implementation of the policy. After analyzing the policy objectives, it is observed that the Union has set ambitious

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[198] Interview with Bernard Brunet.
[199] Interview with Andreas Herdina.
[200] Interview with Bernard Brunet.
[201] Interview with Cecile Abedie.
[202] Cameron and Rhein, "Promoting Political and Economic Reform in the Mediterranean and Middle East", p. 8.

objectives which are difficult to be achieved through the incentives currently offered. Looking to the criticisms about the ineffectiveness of the incentives in the third part, it is understood that the incentives fall short of promoting economic and political transformation of the partner countries which has been declared as one of the main targets of the ENP. This becomes more apparent in the fourth section which deals with the impact of partnership conditionality on the policy outcomes. While the ENP relies on the EU's traditional type of conditionality to promote reforms in the partner countries, its end goal - partnership rather than membership- decreases the leverage of the policy vis-à-vis the neighbouring countries. Therefore, many scholars expect few (even any in some cases) policy outcomes from the ENP due to its adherence to the partnership conditionality.

Implementation dimension also reveals the existence of many problematic areas in the ENP. Analysis of the action plans shows that they can not promote the reform process in the partner countries mainly because of being political documents rather than legally binding ones. Although action plans have been strengthened through the adaptation of some key principles, serious practical problems have emerged in the implementation side and they could not have been as successful as expected before their implementation. Therefore, the record of the action plans so far is considered to achieve success in 'some' cases, but there is hardly any remarkable progress in most cases. Indeed, the success mostly achieved in sectoral / economic cooperation while the cooperation in the political issues lagged behind mainly due to the partner countries' reluctance to promote political and democratic reform process. Despite this fact, the EU expects a spill-over from sectoral / economic areas into political ones in the long-run and refrains from making an overall assessment on the ENP due to the evolving nature of the policy.[203]

In brief, elaboration of the ENP's framework and its implementation dimension points out the existence of many shortcomings in the policy. Although some already

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[203] Interview with several Commission Officers.

introduced by this chapter, ongoing debate leads a further analysis on the limits of the policy in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV

LIMITS OF THE ENP

Current debate identifies many constraints to impede the ENP's evolution into a fully-fledged, effective and coherent foreign policy tool. This chapter looks into these constraints and tries to answer to what extent they hamper the proper functioning of the policy. First section examines the inherent constraints embedded in the ENP, namely conditionality and compliance, capability-expectations gap, and skeptical approaches of the partners. Second section investigates the constraints set by the Union's internal dynamics which are composed of constitutional failure and legitimacy decline, and decision-making deadlock. Third section analyzes the constraints posed by the external dynamics, mainly focusing on the challenges arising from the Union's near abroad, its relations with Russia, and Transatlantic relations.

4.1 Inherent Constraints of the ENP

This section elaborates the inherent constraints of the ENP which are embedded in the policy's framework, namely conditionality and compliance, capability-expectations gap, and the skeptical approaches of the partner countries.

4.1.1 Conditionality and Compliance

As mentioned in Chapter III, the ENP offers economic and political conditionality through which the rewards (institutional ties, market access, technical and financial assistance) are linked to the acceptance and internalization of the EU rules concerning political, legal and economic realms.[204]   In other words, benefits are provided after the partner country's government complies with the conditions set by

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[204] Magen, "The Shadow of Enlargement: Can the European Neighbourhood Policy Achieve Compliance?", p. 410.

the EU. At this point, the effectiveness of conditionality gains importance as it becomes a determining factor in evaluating the overall compliance of the policy associated with its expected outcomes.

According to the "external incentives" model developed by Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, effectiveness of the EU conditionality depends on four factors: the size and speed of the rewards, the determinacy of conditions, the credibility of EU conditionality, and the size of adoption costs for domestic decision-makers.[205] Concerning the first factor, the question is whether the ENP's incentives are competent enough to achieve its fundamental objective of promoting a ring of well-governed countries in the Union's neighbourhood. The immediate answer tends to be negative: ENP's power of compliance declines due to its inherently weak mechanism in which the final offer is not as much attractive as the partner countries have expected. In this respect, Amichai Magen argues that the credibility of ENP conditionality decreases because it does not offer membership perspective and the vagueness of the ENP incentives decrease the leverage of the policy.[206] Heather Grabbe also underlines the 'feebleness' of the incentives proposed so far by the Union and maintains that the EU should offer more interesting incentives if it wishes to stimulate reform process in the partner countries.[207] Defining the inadequacy of the ENP incentives as a challenge for the EU-27, William Wallace emphasizes that "without an acceptable alternative to membership, the EU is likely to be faced either with a lengthening queue of applicants, from governments resentful of their exclusion and envious of the privileges others have won."[208]

The second factor, namely, the degree of determinacy of rules and norms promoted by an external actor like EU is important because it will have decisive impact on policy-makers of the partner countries: "the more legalized the rule and the clearer it

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[205] Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds), *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, Ithaca: New York , Cornell University Press, 2005.
[206] Magen, "The Shadow of Enlargement: Can the European Neighbourhood Policy Achieve Compliance?", p. 411.
[207] Grabbe, "How the EU should help its Neighbours", p. 6.
[208] Wallace, "Looking after the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25", p. 4.

is about the type and the extent of domestic change expected, the higher is determinacy value."[209] With this respect, the determinacy of ENP rules tends to be low. First of all, Action Plans are political documents with no formal legal force (unlike legally binding Europe Agreements applied in the pre-accession strategy). Moreover, the ENP has no specific *acquis* of its own and the policy seems to disassociate relations with the neighbouring countries from the *acquis*, preferring reference to the vaguer term "European standards" for some ENP countries.[210] Observing these deficiencies, Magen argues that the absence of a comprehensive and detailed roadmap for reform undermines the ENP's compliance by decreasing its leverage in terms of legal basis.[211]

Although the third factor, namely, the credibility of conditionality, is strengthened by the principles of bilateralism and differentiation contained in the ENP, it is nonetheless, weakened by several other factors. First, the lack of specificity concerning the incentives such as a "stake in the internal market," and the linkages between requirements and rewards is undermining the sense of certainty among domestic decision-makers regarding what incentives are offered and which ones are deliverable. Second, both the Commission and the Council, in their relevant documents and statements, have sent ENP partners mixed signals of their seriousness about conditionality. Whereas the Wider Europe Communication clearly states that "in return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including alignment of legislation with the *acquis*, the EU's neighbours should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU"[212], the Strategy Paper emphasizes "joint ownership" and stresses that "the EU does not seek to impose priorities or conditions on its partners. ... There can be no question of asking partners to accept a pre-determined set of priorities. These will be defined by common consent and will thus

[209] Magen, "The Shadow of Enlargement: Can the European Neighbourhood Policy Achieve Compliance?", p. 414.
[210] *See* Moldova and Ukraine Action Plans.
[211] Magen, op. cit., p. 415.
[212] European Commission Communication, "Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours", p. 4.

vary from country to country".[213] Therefore, conditionality is practically declined vis-à-vis the progressive institutionalization of the ENP. Conditionality further runs the risk of being undermined by the ENP's goals of promoting short-term security and stability which decreases compliance with long-term reform-oriented policy objectives.

The last factor, the size of adoption costs, refers to the domestic costs of compliance according to the external incentives model:

> the size of adoption costs and their distribution among domestic actors strongly impacts their decisions whether to accept or reject EU conditions. Since EU rules have to be accepted and implemented by state decision-makers, the effectiveness of external incentives depends on the preferences of the government and other key players whose agreement is required in order to change the status quo.[214]

The quotation underlines the importance of the existence of political will among the policy makers of the partner countries for the eventual success of the reform process and underlines the dependence of the reforms on the political will. When ruling elites of a partner country decides to engage in political and economic reform process, it takes the risk of paying its costs.[215] Considering that one of the declared goals of the ENP is the promotion of liberal political and economic norms, it is not difficult to foresee that the domestic costs of compliance would be higher in most of the partner countries which are run by non-democratic regimes and illiberal democracies. Therefore, due to the existence of either authoritarian or hybrid regimes in those countries, the leverage of EU conditionality is likely to decrease which in turn contributes to the compliance problem.

The compliance problem limits the ENP as it will certainly have further negative effects on the coherence and future potential of the policy. The problem becomes even worse due to the capability-expectations gap inherent to the implementation of the ENP which will be explained in the following section.

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[213] European Commission Communication, "European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper", p. 8.
[214] Magen, op. cit., p. 417.
[215] Interview with Andreas Herdina.

4.1.2 The Capability-Expectations Gap

The ENP has been introduced as a well-founded cross-pillar foreign policy with far-reaching objectives and sufficient incentives (including funding) at its outset. However, its three-year implementation has revealed the incapability of the policy in many respects mainly due to its insufficient means to achieve ambitious objectives, which signalizes the existence of a "capability-expectations gap."[216]

Similar to the compliance problem, capability-expectations gap is associated with the incentives offered by the ENP. While the former problem arises due to weakness of the incentives, the latter stems from a distance between the ambitious objectives and ineffective incentives. According to Karen Smith, the gap is evident on both sides.[217] It is expected on the EU side that the ENP would work properly as a foreign policy tool to promote partnership for reform in the partner countries. On the other side, the ENP has so far failed to meet the expectations of the partners although it has been designed as the most ambitious geostrategic policy of the EU.[218] In this regard, Richard Whitman underlines that the ENP has taken on a hard task of uniting 'different fingers' due to the high level heterogeneity between the partner countries, and that is why the capability-expectations gap becomes a crucial point in evaluating the limits of the policy.[219] Major tension arises from the diverse expectations of the partners and the level of expectations substantially depends on how the partners perceive the ENP. For instance, the Eastern European partners, particularly Moldova and Ukraine, perceive the ENP as a pre-accession mechanism so that they expect that their membership aspirations would be realized one day in the future. As for Ukraine, even the Commission officers are aware of the country's perception of the ENP as a

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[216] Christopher Hill defines the notion of capability-expectations gap as the discrepancy between the EU's "ability to agree, its resources, and the instruments at its disposal", on the one hand, and the increasing expectations within the EU and of third countries vis-à-vis the EU in "Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 3, 1993, pp. 305-328.
[217] Interview with Karen Smith, London: London School of Economics, 13 March 2007.
[218] Interview with Richard Whitman.
[219] Ibid.

'waiting room' before accession and its tendency to use it as a mechanism in order to prepare itself to the membership conditions.[220]

Perceptions of the Mediterranean partners are quite different as they do not have any membership aspirations at least for the time being. Most Mediterranean countries perceive the ENP as a mechanism to provide technical and financial assistance to their own countries, and that is why they want to consume the facilities offered through the ENP.[221] For instance, Morocco, whose membership application was rejected in 1987, conceives the ENP as a step to modernize the country, in particular in the economic area. As a poor country (with 50% poverty), Morocco struggles with poor social conditions, huge unemployment, poverty-breading extremism and illegal immigration to Europe.[222] Morocco aspires for modernization in order to eliminate these problems and conceives the ENP as a tool to exploit the EU's experience in its modernization process.[223] Similarly, Jordan considers that the ENP is relevant for the country as long as they benefit from it. While Jordan is keen on continuing internal reform process, but it still expects that the ENP's package of opportunities should be clearly explained for them as the concrete expectations and outcomes from the ENP is not clear for the country.[224]

Given the absence of membership offer, the ENP's capability declines vis-à-vis the high expectations of some partners which, in turn, weaken the Union's leverage to promote economic and political transformation in the partner countries. Concerning this point, Romano Prodi stated in 2002 that "the goal of accession is certainly the most powerful stimulus for reform we can think of. But why should a less ambitious goal not have some effect? A substantive and workable concept of proximity would have a positive effect."[225]

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[220] Interview with Miriam Brewka.
[221] Interview with Bernard Brunet.
[222] Ibid
[223] Ibid.
[224] Interview with Cecile Abedie.
[225] Prodi, "Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the key to stability", p. 3.

Nevertheless, the 'less ambitious goal' seems to be a 'bad substitute' for some partner countries, particularly the eastern ones.[226] As for Ukraine, Andrei Zagorski argues that 'conditionality will not be the efficient tool for dealing with Ukraine unless the EU decides to grant Kiev a prospective membership option'.[227] While Ukraine poses the immediate problem, the membership issue might potentially arise also with respect to the other East European countries in the ENP- particularly if they would successfully launch political and economic reform process. When the reform process is in question even the Commission officers accept that it can be pushed easily only when there is a membership perspective.[228] In this respect, Karen Smith defines the endurance of membership issue as the "ghost of enlargement" and points out that "the inclusion of potential EU members and outsiders in the ENP has not diluted the membership aspirations of the East European countries and might raise the aspirations of the Mediterranean countries."[229] Keeping in mind Morocco's application in 1987, it is not beyond imagination that other Mediterranean partners would aspire for EU membership when they geographically become closer after an eventual Turkish accession (if it happens). Moreover, while the ENP's capabilities consist of enhanced assistance to the partner countries, "expectations have been managed by the EU in such a way that it created ambiguities vis-à-vis future accession possibilities."[230] For instance, it is not clear how the Union would respond if Lebanon or Morocco moves further towards liberal democracy. If this happens, the ENP may not be adequate in meeting expectations of these Mediterranean countries as happened in the case of the Eastern European partners.

A notable side effect that the capability-expectations gap produces is the lack of motivation on the side of the ENP partners. Since the level of motivation of the partners to adapt and implement the ENP depends on their satisfaction with the

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[226] Interview with Miriam Brewka.
[227] Andrei Zagorski, 'Policies towards Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus', in Dannreuther (ed)., *European Union Foreign and Security Policy*, p. 94.
[228] Interview with several Commission officers.
[229] Smith, "The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 767.
[230] Damien Helly, "EU's Influence in Its Eastern Neighbourhood: The Case of Crisis Management in the Southern Caucasus", *European Political Economy Review* No. 7 (Summer 2007), pp. 102-117, p. 109.

fulfillment of their expectations, any failure to meet these expectations would have an adverse effect on their motivation. For instance, Moldova and Ukraine are not satisfied with the ENP as there is no prospect of membership. Therefore, a decrease in their motivation to engage in political and economic reform process is observable although they have progressed more than the other partner countries.[231] However, this progress is much more associated with their pragmatic approach (rather than a high motivation) to realize membership conditions as soon as possible since they believe that the Union's doors would be opened to them at a certain date in the future. For instance, Ukrainians "want 'what is in the box', because they know 'what is in the box' moves them closer to the EU."[232] That is why they continue to involve in the reform process despite their disappointment with the gap between their expectations and incentives offered by the ENP.

The picture is less complicated in the case of the Mediterranean partners who generally have low level of motivation towards the ENP. Many of the Mediterranean partners, such as Algeria, Syria and Libya, show so little attention to the ENP's incentives that they are not aware of the existence of the capability-expectations gap. The gap does not concern even Morocco and Jordan who have shown more positive and pragmatist attitude towards the ENP, so the gap seems to have no impact on their motivation. Instead of the gap in concern, their lack of motivation might be related with the third constraint which will be analyzed below.

4.1.3 Skeptical Approach of the Partner Countries

A third inherent constraint grows out of the partner countries' skeptical approaches which further impede the proper functioning of the policy. Skepticism merits attention because it has a negative impact on the performance of the partners who are the main players to accept and implement the policy. Two factors establish the ground for the skeptical approaches of the ENP partners. The first factor is built into the bilateral negotiations in which the EU is dominant and the partners are dependent

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[231] Interview with Miriam Brewka.
[232] Ibid.

on the EU concessions.[233] Through this bilateral structure, the Union becomes "the dominant actor in the relationship, with no multilateral framework that might balance the partners."[234] Therefore, the EU maintains a 'hub and spoke' approach for its bilateral relations with the neighbours, similar to the one that it had developed with the Central European countries. William Wallace argues that differentiated bilateralism contributes to the Union's hub-and spoke approach in the ENP: the Commission defines the objectives and methods of the policy on a non-negotiable basis, and then issues regular reports on progress in meeting criteria set out by the EU in Action Plans- similar to the EU's approach to political and economic transition within the former socialist states- and the ENP partner negotiates separately with the Commission on the details of its 'Action Plan' and the implementation of the programme agreed, hence the process turns into one-sided adaptation to EU rules.[235] In other words, partners are only consulted when the benchmarks and timetables are being negotiated in the context of individual Action Plans.

The Union's dominant approach seems to bear serious consequences for the ENP. As regards, Hiski Haukkala emphasizes that "… in the future, the new neighbours are not likely to have a large say in matters that will have a profound effect on their future development and place in Europe."[236] Furthermore, Pál Dunay criticizes this approach for not encouraging the mutual identification that would ease the integration of the ENP partner countries into the Union structures.[237] Such integration might be possible if the Union becomes fully prepared to struggle directly with the underlying difficulties in the ENP. Drawing on this point, William Wallace underlines the need for a new effort on the EU side to balance this inherent unequal relationship or 'one-sided dependence' which arises from the Union's dominance in almost all aspects of the ENP.[238] With this respect, only Russia and Algeria might be

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[233] Wallace, "Looking after the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25", p. 18.
[234] Smith, "The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 772.
[235] Wallace, op. cit., p. 18.
[236] Hiski Haukkala, "A Hole in the Wall? Dimensionalism and the EU's 'New Neighbourhood Policy", UPI Working Papers, 41, 2003, pp. 18-19.
[237] Pál Dunay, 'Strategy with fast-moving targets: East-Central Europe', in Dannreuther (ed), *European Union foreign and security policy*, p. 40.
[238] William Wallace, op. cit.

considered to have limited counter-leverage as energy suppliers of Europe, while the others only have the potential threat of exporting instability and insecurity to the Europe. With the awareness of this fact, Dov Lynch sustains that the challenge for the EU is "to follow through on the recognition of its interdependence with its neighbours"[239] rather than overwhelming them. Accepting this challenge, Wallace argues that the Union has "to design a set of institutions, and policies, which can reasonably be presented to both sides as a balanced package, rather than a relationship between patron and client - or *demandeur* and reluctant recipient."[240]

The second factor is associated with the skeptical perception of the ENP as the Union's unilateral action to promote its own security and stability interests. As mentioned before, the Wider Europe Communication cites that mutual interests exist between all neighbourhood partners in terms of proximity, prosperity and poverty in spite of the differences between the ENP partners. At this point, Marise Cremona argues that "although these mutual interests may exist, they are more obvious to the EU than to the neighbours"[241]. Moreover, Karen Smith highlights that most of the Action Plans reflect some amount of EU self-interest.[242] For example, the Action Plans of Moldova, Morocco, Tunisia and Ukraine, insist that they must conclude readmission agreements with the EU. Furthermore, Ukraine's Action Plan contains the objective of 'continuing consultations on the possible EU use of Ukraine's long haul air transport capacities'- capacities which the EU desperately needs for the sake of its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).[243] The exception is Israel's Action Plan, which is less a list of things for Israel to do, and more a list of things for the EU and Israel to do together: for some, a clear indication of the more equal standing of the two sides; for others, another sign of the EU offering Israel too much of a carrot and not using enough of a stick.[244] Karen Smith claims that "Action Plans with the other neighbours are certainly much, much more commanding - and this

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[239] Lynch, "The European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 5.
[240] Wallace, op. cit., p. 19.
[241] Cremona, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: Legal and Institutional Issues", p. 8
[242] Smith, "The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 765.
[243] Ibid.
[244] Khaled Diab, 'Commission wants closer EU-Israeli ties', *European Voice*, 16 December 2004-12, January 2005, quoted in Smith, "The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 765.

gave rise to perceived inconsistency in the EU's treatment of its neighbours which may reduce its credibility and legitimacy."[245]

Aforementioned arguments provide a legitimate basis for the perceptions of 'some' partner countries to perceive of the ENP as the EU's pragmatic tool to promote its own security and strategic interests. The phrase 'some' mainly refers to the Mediterranean partners as they are much more skeptical than the Eastern European ones. The difference lies in the absence of membership option for the southern neighbours while it is not totally invalidated in the case of two eastern neighbours, Ukraine and Moldova.[246] Thus, it may be argued that the skeptical approach towards the EU and the ENP tends to decline if the partner countries are more membership oriented. According to Karen Smith, skepticism of the Mediterranean partners prevents the development of the ENP.[247] Not only they are skeptical towards the ENP's security and stability objectives in the region, but they are also skeptical because of the simultaneity of the ENP with the USA's Greater Middle East Strategy and their similarities in rhetoric. Moreover, the Union's increasing demand for cooperation on terrorism issues raises this skepticism which further hampers the ENP's progress with the Mediterranean partners. With this regard, only Morocco might be counted as an exception with its enthusiasm to promote reform process.[248] In contrast to Morocco, most of the Mediterranean partners are reluctant and suspicious about the ENP. Tunisia might be counted as a good example with its high level of skepticism that the ENP is the Union's unilateral action providing nothing useful for the partner countries other than promoting the EU's own interests.[249] Therefore, Tunisia thinks that, under the ENP, the Union is too much thinking for itself and consequently does not engage in high level of cooperation with the EU.[250] To aggravate the picture, Libya does not have even any formal link within current ENP framework. Jordan is somewhere in between: it is aware of good opportunities

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[245] Ibid, p. 766.
[246] Interview with Miriam Brewka.
[247] Interview with Karen Smith.
[248] Interview with Bernard Brunet.
[249] Ibid.
[250] Ibid.

provided by the ENP, but at the same time, it perceives the ENP as an unbalanced policy which is mainly directed towards Eastern European countries.[251]

Whatever the level of skepticism, an urgent need for the EU's further effort has already arisen in order to eliminate the suspicions for the proper functioning of the ENP particularly in the Mediterranean case. In other words, the Union further needs to help its partner countries in achieving their economic and political transformation which would serve for its own sake at the same time. This might be realized if the EU provides more attractive incentives "to help its neighbours become constructive partners instead of sources of bad news."[252] It is not too much in the interest of the neighbouring countries to achieve EU-centric priorities like becoming full market economies and combating terrorism. Thus, if the EU wants to persuade its neighbours to co-operate in the ENP, it needs to offer them much more assistance with the areas they really care about, not just its own concerns.[253]

4.2 The EU's Internal Constraints

Besides its inherent constraints, the ENP also suffers from the EU's internal problems which constraint the policy's functionality and implementation. These constraints consist of the constitutional Failure, the decline of EU legitimacy and the deadlock in EU decision-making as explained below.

4.2.1 Constitutional Failure and the Decline of EU Legitimacy

The EU is currently suffering from a deep crisis due to two basic factors: the failure of the national referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005, and a subsequent decline of the legitimacy of the EU institutions in the eyes of the European public.[254] The first one has culminated in an acute crisis as the Constitutional Treaty contains some significant amendments in both institutional and

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[251] Interview with Cecile Abedie.
[252] Grabbe, "How the EU should help its neighbours", p. 1.
[253] Ibid, p. 6.
[254] Stefano Micossi and Daniel Gros, "Confronting Crisis in the European Union: A Fresh Start", *CEPS Policy Brief* No. 117, December 2006, p. 1.

political aspects regarding the future shape of the Union.[255] As a result of the failure of the referenda process, there emerged a stalemate concerning the future of the Union which has a profound impact on all EU policies, varying from budgetary policy to external relations. Considering that there is not yet an emerging consensus on the controversial issues of the draft Constitutional Treaty, it is difficult to anticipate that the Union would highly concentrate on its external relations, particularly the ENP. Therefore, it might be expected that the Union would be more influential foreign policy actor in its relations with its neighbours, when the stalemate on its future is disappeared after the resolution of current constitutional crisis.[256]

Constitutional crisis has further accelerated an already declining public support for the EU in general and for its institutions in particular. Before national referendums in France and Holland, the European public opinion does not seem too reactive against the EU policies and was not so much concerned about the agenda of the EU official circles as it is today.[257] Instead, national governments dominated the EU agenda as they involve with each other during the intergovernmental negotiation and bargaining process through which the 'permissive consensus' of European citizens is assured. Stefano Micossi and Daniel Gros argue that it is no more possible to rely on 'permissive consensus' after the aforementioned referendums, which represents that "domestic political weakness in key member countries is spilling over to the EU level."[258] By this way, the legitimacy crisis is transformed from the national level to the EU level and the popularity of the European institutions sharply decline although majority of the Europeans still continue to favor a stronger Union in such areas as internal and external security and foreign policy.

Considered together with the constitutional deadlock, the legitimacy problem appears to hamper the EU's hand in rendering its policies bearable in the eyes of the

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[255] Interview with Neil Melvin, Brussels: CEPS, 9 March 2007.

[256] For the scenarios for the evolution of the EU and their implications for the ENP, *see* Michele Comelli, Ettore Greco and Nathalie Tocci, "From Boundary to Borderland: Transforming the Meaning of Borders through the European Neighbourhood Policy", *European Foreign Affairs Review* 12: 203-218, 2007.

[257] Micossi and Gros, op. cit., p. 10.

[258] Ibid.

European people. This dilemma has the potential to impede further the development of the ENP as already happened in the case of the enlargement process which turned out to be an enlargement fatigue due to the repudiation of the European public. Therefore, without the support of the European public, it seems difficult to maintain the smooth progress in any EU policy initiative, including the ENP.

4.2.2 Deadlock in EU Decision-Making

Besides the current constitutional crisis and the associated legitimacy decline, the EU also suffers from a deadlock in its decision-making process which is observable along two dimensions: The first one suggests that the Union has begun to produce weak and ineffective policies in addressing twin challenges of integration and globalization.[259] The former challenge forces the EU to adapt to the conditions set out by the big-bang enlargement. Accordingly, EU decision-makers have to pay much more attention to the issues driven by integration rationale, such as institutional reform process (or 'deepening') and so-called 'absorption capacity'. This shift in decision making process denotes that the foreign policy matters, like the ENP, capture little attention vis-à-vis the EU's intense internal agenda. The situation is further deteriorated by the dynamics of globalization which enforce the Union and its member states to acquire a more protectionist / defensive attitude against the external developments.[260] This is also evident in the evolution of the ENP whose rationale has been pre-dominated by the Union's protectionist security and strategic interests.

The second aspect highlights the increase in the complexity of the decision-making process especially due to the enlargement fatigue. First of all, the inter-institutional balance has appeared to become more complex and disturbed as a result of the Commission's dominant role in the agenda-setting process. When the Commission's proactive role in the enlargement process is taken into account, this situation might be considered as a natural outcome. Similarly, the Commission seems to be in charge (together with the ENP officers coming from the enlargement experience) of the

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[259] Ibid, p. 14.
[260] Interview with Andreas Herdina.

implementation of the ENP.[261] Given the official ambition to repeat the enlargement's success in the case of the ENP, a further shift in the inter-institutional balance in favor of the Commission might be anticipated. If realized, this would presumably disturb other important decision-making institutions, namely the European Parliament, the Council within the scope of the ENP.

Subsequent problems may emerge as a result of prevailing differences in the foreign policy priorities of the EU member states. Since its establishment, the impact of foreign policy priorities of member states has always been visible the making of EU foreign policy. For instance, while the northern and eastern dimensions have been supported by the Northern member states, the southern dimension has always been favored by the southern member states. The North / East - South divide is also visible in the allocation of financial resources to the third countries. Whereas the northern member states are keen on spending more towards the North and East, the southern member states are concerned about being sidelined in terms of accession for the future funds.[262] As a result of the divergence between the foreign policy interests of the member states, the EU decision-making process has become more complicated and slow. The situation has been further worsened when the EU-15 transformed into EU-27: "the original balancing of interests between member states has been fundamentally altered by successive enlargements leading to near paralysis in decision-making on major issues."[263] In other words, the original equilibrium of interests has been disturbed to such great extent that reaching consensus has become apparently very difficult, if not inevitable.

Divergence between the political and financial priorities of the member states has also been apparent in the course of the ENP's evolution phase. On the one hand, some member states (e.g. Germany, Poland, the UK) supported an initiative seeking an inclusion of the Eastern partners only and pushed for the allocation of more ENPI

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[261] Judith Kelley, "New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy", Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 44 No. 1(2006), pp. 29-55.

[262] Haukkala, "The Northern Dimension: A Presence and Four Liabilities", p. 110.

[263] Micossi and Gros, "Confronting Crisis in the European Union: A Fresh Start", p.14.

funds to these countries. On the other hand, some others (e.g. Italy, Portugal, Spain, France, Greece) insisted on the extension of the policy to the Mediterranean neighbours and opted for the allocation of funds to these countries. As regards this divergence of prioritization, Karen Smith has argued that "the southern Mediterranean countries have been included in the ENP in order to balance the EU's southern and eastern 'dimensions' (and thus respond to concerns of southern member and non-member states)."[264] Similarly, William Wallace has pointed out that in terms of internal balance, combining the east and the south axis would help avoiding a damaging conflict of interests between member states:

> If the EU is to achieve a more consistent and coherent approach to the management of its new borders and the economic and political development of its neighbouring states, a global approach that places southern and eastern neighbours within the same framework is therefore desirable: to avoid contradictory demands from different member governments, and to make more evident the implications of decisions taken with respect to one neighbouring state for policy towards others.[265]

Differences also prevail with regard to the perceptions of the neighbouring countries by the member states. The current situation suggests that there is a tendency among the member states to view the Eastern European neighbours as potential member states, while the Mediterranean partners have not been considered as eligible for EU membership. For instance, nearly all of the new member states, particularly Poland and Czech Republic are in favor of Ukraine's membership, while the others, such as France, Italy, and Spain dislike the idea.[266] Moreover, the conflict is also fomented by the attitude of the Council Presidency. For instance, whereas the current German presidency boosts the policies directed towards the Eastern Europe, it is expected that the next Portuguese presidency will back up the south axis of the Union.[267]

In brief, the deadlock in the EU's decision-making process curtails the ENP's maneuverability: "the complexities of building compromises and sharing resources, among twenty-seven member states risks pushing the needs and interests of those

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[264] Smith, "The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy", p.758.
[265] Wallace, "Looking after the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25", p.10.
[266] Interview with Miriam Brewka.
[267] Interview with Andreas Herdina.

still outside to the margins of political attention."[268] Besides, the realization of the neighbours' interest is also to be hindered by the institutional fatigue concomitant with recently emerged enlargement malaise in the Union.[269] Therefore, a new momentum in the ENP could only be expected after by the elimination of the deadlock in concern.

4.3 The EU's External Challenges

This section explains how the EU's external challenges (the larger EU and its near abroad, its relations with Russia and transatlantic relations) further limit the ENP's maneuverability and capability.

4.3.1 The Larger EU and Its Near Abroad

As mentioned before, enlargement has always played a crucial role in the evolution of the EU foreign policy. After each round of enlargement, the Union has not only enclosed new member states, but has also begun to share a direct border with its new neighbours. This situation has enforced the Union to launch new foreign policy initiatives towards its neighbourhood which is defined by Hiski Haukkala as 'dimensionalism'.[270] In the case of last rounds of enlargement, the Union appears to have been encircled by three geographical dimensions (eastern, southern, south-eastern) which pose several challenges for the implementation of the ENP.

Immediate challenges on the eastern and southern dimensions come from the ENP partner countries. The first challenge arises from the heterogeneity of the partner countries having very different political, economic and socio-economic conditions. While the EU has tried to eliminate the side effects of the heterogeneity via tailor-made Action Plans for each partner country, a potential challenge still originates from more problematic partner countries or the 'countries of concern' namely,

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[268] Wallace, op. cit, p. 7.
[269] Ibid.
[270] Haukkala, "The Hole in the Wall? Dimensionalism and the EU's 'New Neighbourhood Policy'", p.2.

Belarus, Libya and Syria.[271] These countries are problematic not only because of their failure in complying with the principles of human rights and democratic governance, but also due to security concerns. Despite their inclusion in the ENP, the EU could not effectively implement the policy towards these countries. With this respect, Karen Smith has emphasized that:

> Neither Belarus nor Libya is currently linked to the EU by a formal agreement, and the 'conditional' carrots so far offered by the EU - conclusion of the PCA for Belarus, inclusion in the Euro-Med framework for Libya-have had some effect arguably only with respect to Libya.[272]

Achievement of no considerable progress has had the side effect of limiting the ENP's overall cohesion because those countries remain outside the scope of the ENP's practical sphere although they fall within the geographical scope of the policy. This fact might result in the isolation of these countries in the long run. Therefore, it is required as soon as possible that the Union should advance a better method of dealing with them as soon as possible.

The second challenge stems from the existence of serious 'conflicts in' and 'between the neighbours' whose list is lengthy: the Middle East conflict (primarily between Israel and the Palestinian Authority); Transdniestra conflict (Moldova); Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenia and Azerbaijan); and Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia). The EU has not been directly engaged in several of those conflicts, especially those involving Moldova, Georgia, or Armenia and Azerbaijan, instead supporting the conflict resolution efforts primarily of the OSCE. The fact that the Union has generally not engaged with those neighbours in totality demonstrates the gap between the EU's rhetoric and its grasp: the Union's occasional pronouncements go unheeded.[273]

Despite its previous partial involvement in those crises, an increase in the EU's involvement might be expected since the ENP has brought the Union closer to the aforementioned crises. Accordingly, Roberto Aliboni has underlined that "integration

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[271] Smith, "The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 769.
[272] Ibid.
[273] MacFarlane, 'The Caucasus and Central Asia: towards a non-strategy', p. 131.

will provide structural stability in the long run, but in the meantime, it will bring instabilities closer to the EU."[274] However, a broader picture suggests that ongoing conflicts in the EU's near abroad might potentially prevent the ENP's progress as a conflict resolution and prevention tool. In this regard, the dispute between Israel and the Palestinian Authority has been a paramount obstacle to deepening of the EMP as well as that of the ENP in the political and security field. For instance, Syria and Lebanon have consistently rejected to take part in EMP activities that involve high level political discourse or developing confidence-building measures because of the presence of Israel.[275] As the dispute is still continuing, it has the potential to stall further cooperation to stall the cooperation with the Mediterranean partners in concern. On the other hand, it may be argued that the existence of aforementioned conflicts might increase the geopolitical significance that the Union attaches to its neighbourhood. As a result, EU security interests are highly prioritized in the operation of the ENP. This situation establishes a ground for the partner countries to perceive the ENP as another policy tool for pursuing the Union's particular security interests. As explained in the previous section, this perception puts a notable constraint on their willingness to comply with the ENP.

While the Union is trying to deal with the challenges arising from its eastern and southern dimensions the framework of the ENP, a third dimension, a 'south-eastern' one has emerged as a result of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania into the EU. Since the Union presently shares a direct border with the Black Sea, the significance of this sub-region has increased in the ENP context. With this regard, the first signal has come from the Commission who recently issued 'Black Sea Synergy' Communication in April 2007. The Communication emphasizes the rising importance of the region for the EU and calls for a coordinated action at the regional level in order to promote stability and stability.[276] The increase in the Union's involvement in the region mainly stems from the objective of maintaining regional

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[274] Aliboni, "The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 5.
[275] Tanner, "North Africa: Partnership, Exceptionalism and Neglect", pp. 139-140.
[276] Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, "Black Sea Synergy - A New Regional Cooperation Initiative", COM(2007) 160 final, 11 April 2007.

stability which has a potential to spread towards the Union's borders. In this respect, Mustafa Aydın has underlined that "finding ways to prevent likely destabilising factors from arising at the regional level and dealing with them before they affect the EU area will be a trial for the enlarged Union."[277]

Aside from the developments mentioned above which may act as a challenge to the international presence of the EU in its near abroad, Hiski Haukkala has drawn attention to the addition of a prospective dimension when Turkey's membership is realized in the future, which would present the EU with a host of new geographical dimensions: "the EU would not only share a common border with such countries as Armenia, Georgia, Iran, Iraq and Syria but also become more directly engaged in the 'Great Game' over the resources of the Caspian Sea and the conflicts in the Caucasus."[278] If this happens, the Union would have to revise the ENP due to the need for its involvement in the emerging dimensions in its far abroad. Moreover, as Gilles Dorronsoro highlights, Turkish membership would be a clear signal for Israel, Morocco and maybe some Caucasian states eager to apply for EU membership.[279]

In brief, the main question posed by an ever-widening EU is about defining the final frontiers of the EU, perhaps less so in the case of its Eastern frontiers that already stretch to Southern Caucasus and more so in the case of the South-Eastern ones. The concern is that new challenges might emerge in parallel with the acquisition of new frontiers and hence new neighbours as a result of further enlargement. Given that the Union has already acquired three geographical dimensions with the last enlargement, the repercussions of the next one and particularly the accession of Turkey, "would exceed by far that of all earlier enlargements."[280]

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[277] Mustafa Aydın, "Europe's Next Shore: the Black Sea Region after EU Enlargement", ISS Occasional Paper, No. 53, June 2004, p. 3.
[278] Haukkala, "The Northern Dimension: A Presence and Four Liabilities", p. 110.
[279] Gilles Dorronsoro, "The EU and Turkey: between geopolitics and social engineering" in R. Dannreuther (ed), *European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy*, p. 48.
[280] Ibid.

4.3.2 The EU-Russia Relations

Although Russia remains to be an important player in the EU's neighbourhood, the ENP does not cover this country due the latter's "self-exclusion"[281] from the policy. Russia's position has been formally declared by the European Council Presidency Conclusions of June 2004 which emphasize Russia's unwillingness to participate in the ENP (despite the Union's previous plans) because it contains a principle of conditionality that Moscow does not accept.[282] Instead, Russia has preferred to involve in a more or less equal bilateral relationship in the form of 'strategic partnership' (in a number of areas including energy, the development of a Common European Economic Area, and also "could entail working together in the international security arena, increasing the export Russian energy resources to Europe and stimulating the investment process."[283]

Zagorski argues that 'strategic partnership' approach corresponds to Russian self-perception as a regional power who does not want to be fully integrated into the multilateral framework of the EU, but at the same time, needs to maintain closer bilateral cooperation.[284] In other words, Russia pursues a policy of self-exclusion from the EU structures in order to preserve its freedom of action, or as expressed in the Russian official documents, in order to 'retain its freedom to determine and implement its domestic and foreign policies, its status and advantages as an Euro-Asian state and the largest country of the CIS, and the independence of its positions and activities in international organizations'.[285] On the other side, the EU seems to have realized its restricted impact on Russian domestic developments and seems engage itself more towards the partnership approach which helps to make cooperation in specific areas more operational and more focused. In fact, given the geographic proximity and the range of potential non-military threats from the East, the EU can not risk excluding Russia from its sphere of influence or, as Prodi put it,

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[281] Smith, "The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 759.
[282] Aliboni, "Geopolitical implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 2.
[283] Timofei Bordachev, "Russia and EU Enlargement: Starting the Endgame", in Esther Brimmer and Stefan Fröhlich (eds), op. cit., p. 163.
[284] Zagorski, "Policies towards Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus", p. 86.
[285] Ibid, p. 85.

from the "circle of friends" of the Union.[286] Thus, it is not difficult to see that both sides pursue a pragmatic approach in developing a strategic partnership.

Despite the pragmatic nature of current EU-Russia relations, Russia's self-exclusion imposes various constraints on the EU's neighbourhood policy. The initial constraint arises from Russia's perception of the ENP as a geopolitical zero-sum competition for regional influence.[287] In contrast, the Union thinks that the ENP establishes the basis for a 'win-win' game concerning its relations with Russia.[288] This fact is even expressed in the EU Common Strategy:

> Russia and the Union have strategic interests and exercise particular responsibilities in the maintenance of stability and security in Europe, and in the other parts of the world. The Unions considers Russia an essential partner in achieving that objective and is determined to cooperate with her.[289]

Nevertheless, the Russia's suspicion (that European strategic involvement dilutes its interests) compels the Union to convince the country about the equal basis of strategic partnership. The conciliation of Russia is vital as the Union depends on Russia's energy resources and needs to maintain closer cooperation in security and defence issues.[290]

Another challenge stems from the clash of EU's interests with those of Russia in the Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus in their attempt to exercise influence. This is mainly because of the fact that Russian policy-makers conceive their country as a 'strategic competitor' of the EU (and the US) in what they regard as their natural sphere of influence.[291] Therefore, Russia tries to re-assert its influence over the countries of these countries located in its 'near abroad', whereas the EU also seeks to deepen its engagement many of them.[292] The conflict further arises from the EU's

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[286] Bordachev, "Russia and EU Enlargement: Starting the Endgame", p. 167.
[287] Dannreuther, "Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 200.
[288] Interview with Andreas Herdina.
[289] 'Common Strategy for the European Union of 4 June 1999 on Russia', (1999/414/CFSP), L 157/2.
[290] Zagorski, "Policies towards Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus", p. 85.
[291] Grabbe, "How the EU should help its neighbours", p. 3.
[292] Ibid.

attempt to exert influence upon these countries by means of the ENP vis-à-vis Russia's status as "economically and politically the most influential neighbour."[293] While the conflict is not necessarily a hostile one, some potential tensions have already emerged. For example, Ukraine has been invited to take on EU market regulations, but also the Russian ones through a 'common economic space'. Russia wants its citizens to be able to travel freely in the former Soviet countries, but the EU wants its eastern neighbours to strengthen their border controls with other non-EU countries including Russia. Further tensions might arise if the EU attempts to increase its involvement in resolving conflicts, in which Russia is heavily involved, such as Transdniestria in Moldova or South Ossetia in Georgia.

Considering the sensitiveness of Russia's relations with the countries in its near abroad, it is not difficult to foresee that the prospect of closer relations with these countries risks disturbing the Union's relations with Russia. The EU's task becomes much more problematic within this neighbourhood, as "the absence of Russia from the framework that is supposed to address difficult cross-border issues leaves a large hole in the middle of the policy."[294] In order to achieve success in its strategic partnership, the Union needs to maintain its engagement with Russia, set well-defined objectives and persuade Russia that its involvement will not endanger Russia's interests in its sphere of influence.[295] Therefore, as far as Russia is concerned, the Union has to pursue more traditional, intergovernmental means of cooperation, and this strategy is essential for the success of the ENP, in particular on the eastern dimension of the EU's neighbourhood.[296]

4.3.3 The US-EU (Transatlantic) Relations

The EU's new strategic engagement in its neighbourhood has considerable significance not just for the EU and the surrounding countries, but also for the United States (US) and transatlantic relations, mainly because of the strategic interests of US

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[293] Nicolae Idu, "The Larger EU and the New In-Between Lands: Ukraine and Belarus", in Esther Brimmer and Stefan Fröhlich (eds), op. cit., p. 171.
[294] Smith, "The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 759.
[295] Leigh, "The EU's Neighbourhood Policy", p. 112.
[296] Aliboni, "The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy", pp. 13-14.

who is an important actor in the European neighbourhood. Therefore, the ENP represents opportunities and constraints for the transatlantic relations.

As for the opportunities, the Union and the US have various common interests in the European neighbourhood which could stimulate increased cooperation in the areas such as the enhancement of regional security and stability, the promotion of democracy and human rights, and energy security.[297] For instance, the Union and the US have combined their efforts to promote democratic change in Eastern Europe (particularly in Ukraine and Belarus) and resolve the 'frozen conflicts' in Moldova and the South Caucasus.[298] These efforts are promising and a further prospect for cooperation exists in many areas (e.g. conflict resolution, anti- terrorism, energy security, democracy promotion) in the European neighbourhood. However, transatlantic cooperation is constrained by the differences in the foreign policy attitudes of the US and EU which will have an impact on their policy agendas and approaches.[299]

Key difference stems from geographical proximity as Michael Baun suggests. For the US, the European neighborhood is geographically distant and, with the exception of the Persian Gulf energy resources and close ties with Israel, its level of economic, social, and political interdependence with the ENP area is relatively low. As a consequence, the American vulnerability to the negative developments in the ENP area is also relatively low, leaving aside the attacks of 9/11 and the threat of global terrorism. For the EU, however, the reality is quite different: the EU shares land borders (Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova) or sea borders (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Georgia) with the majority of the ENP partners, and is geographically proximate to those (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Jordan) with whom it does not share any border. Geographic proximity and close historical

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[297] Michael Baun, "The United States and European Neighborhood Policy", paper prepared for the European Consortium for Political Research, 3rd Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, Bilgi University, Istanbul, 21-23 September 2006, p. 1.
[298] In the Mediterranean and broader Middle East, however, cooperation has been more problematic and the divergence of policy views more pronounced.
[299] Baun, op. cit., p. 10.

and political ties have, in turn, led to extensive economic relations between many of these countries and the EU and the significant movement of people from these countries into Europe. Therefore, EU is more sensitive to likely developments in its neighbourhood.

Different perceptions of the Middle East by the EU and US set the best example with this regard. For the US, the Middle East is important not only because of the 'Greater Middle East' Project, but also because of the region's rich energy resources, and widespread security threats (terrorism). Nevertheless, despite the potential impact of Middle Eastern developments on the US interests and American people, the US and most Americans view the problems and challenges posed by the Middle East from a distance. In contrast, these developments are much more immediate for the EU and European people due to geographical proximity, high level of economic interdependence and the presence of large Muslim minorities living in the EU countries. Moreover, the US has lost considerable influence in the Middle East because of its one-sided support for Israel, its unwillingness to deal with unfriendly regimes, and its intervention in Iraq and confrontation with Iran, while the EU's position and status have grown, which would have important consequences for a future US-EU cooperation in the Middle East.[300] This shift of influence was a result of difference in the approaches of the EU and the US to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Union is more interested in maintaining long-term stability than promoting short-term regime change in the Middle East and that is why it is concerned about the destabilising effects of the US policies. Therefore, it maintains a more critical view of Israel and seeks to pursue a more balanced policy on the conflict in contrast to the pro-Israel stance of the US government, especially that of the current Bush administration.

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[300] Ibid, p. 8.

To summarize, for the EU the priority in dealing with the ENP countries is its "position as a neighbor"[301] while the US views the region from a distant perspective. This difference makes the US policy agenda for the ENP area relatively "thin" with specific geopolitical and security interest whereas the EU has a "thick" policy agenda due to its wide-spectrum interests in the European neighbourhood.[302] However, a more assertive EU engagement in the ENP region, particularly in the Middle East and Israeli-Palestinian conflict, could disturb the strategic interests of the US in the ENP area and could even contribute to a deterioration of the transatlantic relations.[303] The only way to get rid of this constraint is to provide increased cooperation (in common incentives such as fighting terrorism, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, improving energy security, promoting democracy) between the US and EU in the European neighbourhood which would be beneficial for both sides of the Atlantic.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter is devoted to find out the extent at which the existing constraints challenge and prevent the proper functioning of the ENP. After analyzing the constraints in question, it becomes apparent that they negatively affect the compliance and coherence of the policy. Looking to the ENP's inherent constraints analyzed in the first section, it seems difficult for the ENP to evolve into a fully-fledged foreign policy tool. First of all, the mismatch between the inputs and outcomes occurs as a result of the difficulty of providing compliance through currently offered 'partnership conditionality'. The mismatch indicates the ambitious character of the policy objectives which can not be achieved through the incentives currently offered to the neighbouring countries. The situation is aggravated by the existence of famous 'capability-expectations gap' which further signals the inefficiency of the incentives offered. After examining the gap, it is interpreted that

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[301] Dov Lynch, 'Catalysing Change', in Dov Lynch (ed.), *Changing Belarus*, EU Institute for Security Studies Chaillot Paper No. 85 (November 2005), pp. 97- 124, p. 123.

[302] Dov Lynch, 'Same View, Different Realities: EU and US Policy towards Russia', in Zabrowski (ed.), *Friends Again? EU-US Relations after the Crisis,* Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2006, pp. 157-170, p. 158.

[303] Aliboni, "The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy", p. 14.

the ENP falls short of meeting not only the expectations of the partner countries, but also those of Union. Therefore, the gap is evident on both sides decreasing the overall success of the policy. The ENP's success further declines due to the skeptical approaches of the ENP partners mainly due to the Union's dominant status and the perception of the ENP as the Union's pragmatical tool by the neighbouring countries. After examining these factors, it is concluded that the Union should make forth an effort to increase its dialogue and cooperation with the partner countries if it wants to achieve positive results through the ENP.

Turning to the EU's internal constraints elaborated in the second section, it is observed that constitutional crisis, legitimacy decline and decision-making deadlock seriously challenge the ENP as well as the Union's other policy initiatives. Constitutional crisis and legitimacy decline compel the EU and its member states to concentrate much more on internal problems than foreign policy issues. As two issues highly concern the Union's future shape and its policies, it is not difficult to foresee that the Union will put more energy to the settlement of the constitutional debate and legitimacy decline, rather than wasting time on the ENP. The situation is further deteriorated by the decision-making deadlock in the Union. First of all, EU is highly absorbed in the issues driven by enlargement, such as so-called absorption capacity and internal reform process. Moreover, as a result of the last round of enlargement, the decision-making process has become much more complicated and slow due to the divergences between the foreign policy priorities of the member states. Therefore, it is not right time for the ENP to get more attention from the EU institutions and member states at least for the time-being.

The third section analyzes the external constraints which deteriorate the picture further. Although the EU has responded the enlargement's geo-strategic challenges by the ENP's launch, the heterogeneity of the ENP partners, existence of many active or frozen conflicts, challenges coming from the Black Sea, and possible membership of Turkey seriously concern the EU. In this respect, it seems urgent for the Union to consistently re-consider and adopt the ENP according to the developments taking

place in its neighbourhood. On the other hand, the Union needs to take into consideration its relations with Russia and the US who are important players in the ENP region. Since the relations with these two countries are crucial in many respects, it is a necessity for the Union to take each step carefully in its neighbourhood policy in order to not to disturb the sensitiveness of these countries.

Existence of the aforementioned challenges put several constraints on the ENP because they make the achievement of policy coherence and compliance complicated. Therefore, it is hard to expect a considerable success in the short-run without the elimination of these constraints. Although it might be concluded that the ENP fails to evolve into a fully-fledged foreign policy framework due to serious limits imposed upon it, this should be confirmed by further making the ENP's impact analysis on the EU foreign policy which will be handled by Chapter V.

CHAPTER V

ENP'S IMPACT ON THE EU FOREIGN POLICY

The ENP constitutes only a partial dimension of the EU's foreign and security policy. However, it is considered to be a critical one, since the EU seeks to provide geopolitical stabilization in its immediate neighbourhood and to disseminate its 'unique' type of economic and political governance and democratic ideal to the partner countries.[304] The EU's pursuit of this ideal through the ENP makes the policy a test case for the EU's strategic actorness at least at the regional base. Moreover, the nature and scope of the EU's strategic engagement in its immediate neighbourhood contributes to a broader debate about the EU's normative or transformative identity.

Building on the framework and policy limits set out by the Chapter IV, this chapter attempts to clarify whether the ENP could make any difference in the EU's foreign policy. The main aim of the chapter is to make an impact analysis of the ENP on the EU's transformative capacity. To this purpose, the first section briefly explains how the ENP has influenced the Union's foreign and security policy. The debate on the EU's transformative identity is elaborated by the second section in a detailed manner, through the analysis of the civilian / normative power EU argument and relevant critical arguments. Finally, the third section responds whether the ENP could impact the EU foreign policy concerning its transformative capacity.

5.1 ENP and the EU Foreign Policy

As most accounts of the EU foreign policy highlight, the EU is a more coherent international actor concerning economic and trade issues; the EU is also an influential actor in some distant regions of the world, such as Asia and Latin

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[304] Dannreuther, *European Union Foreign and Security Policy: towards a Neighbourhood Strategy*, p. 9.

America; and the EU is a significant development and aid organisation particularly for the former colonial countries of Africa and the Caribbean.[305] However, the EU's recent involvement in its near abroad can be considered a new distinctive and dynamic feature of Europe's foreign and security policy, which differentiates the EU foreign and security policy from the Cold War period.[306]

In the post- Cold War era, EU's immediate neighbourhood gained a new centrality and significance in its foreign and security policy. This has mainly been resulted by the strategic challenge for the EU to fill the vacuum which had emerged with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and the shift of US' interests away from European continent. Therefore, EU's near abroad began to challenge the EU's foreign and security objectives and its capacity to emerge as a more coherent and strategic actor.[307] While geostrategic consequences of the end of the Cold War have required the EU to prioritize its foreign and security policy towards the neighbouring regions, the need became more pressing after the last wave of enlargement. As emphasized by Laszlo Kiss, after the recent enlargement "which is nothing like the previous ones the EU faces the task of reinventing itself as a foreign policy actor towards the new neighbourhood."[308] Therefore, it is not difficult to imply that the ENP would have substantial repercussions on the EU foreign and security policy as a "multi-dimensional chess"[309].

Current debate suggests that the ENP has emerged as a new testing ground for the EU's foreign and security policy with its direct and immediate implications for the future evolution of the EU, its external identity, and its capacity to be a powerful and strategic actor in international affairs. Roland Dannreuther argues that the EU's

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[305] For general overviews of EU foreign policy, see C. Bretherton and J. Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, London: Routledge, 1999; R. H. Ginsberg, *The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire*, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001; R. Whitman, *From Civilian Power to Superpower?*, Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1998; and C. Piening, *Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1997.
[306] Dannreuther, op. cit., p. 1.
[307] Ibid, p. 3.
[308] Kiss, "The Strategic Implications of EU Enlargement on Central and Eastern Europe", p. 82.
[309] Interview with Andreas Herdina.

concentration in its near abroad represents one of the most dynamic and important areas of its foreign and security policy which has a potential to contribute to the ongoing debate on the EU's transformative identity because the ENP offers "something more than a traditional geopolitical opportunity, it also had a more fundamental and even existential quality to it, reaching into the very heart of the European project."[310] This quality mainly stems from the EU's attempt to promote ring of well governed states through the dissemination of its economic and political norms to the neighbouring countries. In other words, the ENP relies on ensuring peace and geopolitical stability through the lines of liberal-ideal principles which lie at the very heart of the European project. Such an ideal has recently become an important element of the EU foreign policy-making mainly as a result of the successive enlargement waves and the Union currently seeks to replicate the success of enlargement process in the ENP case.

Looking to the arguments above, it is interpreted that the ENP have -more or less- acquired a considerable place in the EU foreign policy debate. As it is difficult to deal with its impacts in all foreign policy realms at the same time, this chapter specifically focuses on the ENP's transformative contribution to the EU foreign policy. To this purpose, the next chapter begins with the debate on the EU's transformative identity and critical arguments.

5.2 The Debate on the EU's Transformative Identity

In the past decade the view of the EU as a relevant and important international actor has gained increasing acceptance. The EU is the world's largest trading power as well as a major distributor of humanitarian assistance and financial aid to the third countries. When combined with its capabilities in security and defence, this fact makes it difficult to neglect the EU's international role.[311] The EU's international role is further strengthened by the increase in its EU's transformative identity through the successive rounds of enlargement. Concerning this capacity, the Union is

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[310] Dannreuther, op.cit, pp. 1-3.
[311] Helene Sjursen, "What kind of power?", *Journal of European Public Policy* 13:2 March 2006: 169-181, p. 169.

often described as a 'civilian' and / or 'normative' power relying on liberal-idealist notions which have shaped much of the debate of European Studies and International Relations since the end of the Cold War. This section elaborates the civilian / normative power EU argument and critical arguments in a comprehensive manner.

5.2.1 EU as a Civilian / Normative Power

Efforts to conceptualize and theorize the EU's transformative identity date back to François Duchène's definition of Europe as a 'civilian power'.[312] In his original contribution, Duchène claimed that traditional military power had given its place to civilian power as a means to exert influence in international relations. The notion of 'civilian power' refers to the fact that Europe represents a particular actor in international relations which prioritizes economic and political means rather than military ones when dealing with the third parties.[313] According to Duchène, the particularity of the EU's international role is linked to the 'nature' of the polity itself which is perceived as unique or *sui generis*. In Duchène's view, the EU's strength and novelty as an international role is based on its ability to extend its own model of ensuring stability and security through economic and political rather than military instruments.[314] In other words, the EU, as a civilian power, relies primarily on persuasion and negotiation in dealing with third countries and international issues.[315] A number of authors have built on this idea and developed it further. For instance, Twitchett and Maull have both identified civilian power with three key features: the centrality of economic power to achieve national goals; the primacy of diplomatic co-operation to solve international problems; and the willingness to use legally-binding supranational institutions to achieve international progress.[316]

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[312] François Duchène, 'Europe's Role in World Peace', in R. Mayne (ed.), *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead*, London: Fontana, pp. 32-47, 1972; and, François Duchène, 'The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence', in M. Kohnstamm and W. Hager (eds), *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign- Policy Problems before the Community*, London: Macmillan, pp. 1-21.

[313] Sibylle Scheipers and Daniela Sicurelli, "Normative Power Europe: A Credible Utopia?", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 45. No. 2 (2007), pp. 435-457, p. 436.

[314] Sjursen, "What kind of power?", p. 169.

[315] Karen E. Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003, p. 22.

[316] K. Twitchett (ed.), *Europe and the World: The External Relations of the Common Market*, New York: St. Martin Pres, 1976, pp. 1-2; H. Maull, 'Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 5, pp. 91-106, 1990, pp. 92-3.

A further contribution to the 'civilian power' notion has been made by 'normative power' debate in which remarkable literature has been produced by many prominent analysts of International Relations and European Studies.[317] The common argument in this literature tends to be that the EU is distinguished from other actors not only because it is a civilian power (because it does not have military instruments at its disposal), but also a normative, civilizing or ethical power in the international arena.[318] One of the most important figures of this debate is Ian Manners who picked up the 'civilian power' notion as a starting point for re-conceptualization of the impact and the role of EU as an international actor.[319] By describing the Union as a 'normative power', Manners attempts to eliminate the deficiencies of the 'civilian power' concept, which he identifies as a strong underlying orientation towards a 'Westphalian' concept of state, an objectivist understanding of power and a focus on rational interest as the moving force of external policies. In contrast, the notion of 'normative power', Manners argues, provides an understanding of power in the sense of "power over opinion", 'idée force', or "ideological power" and aims at moving 'beyond the debate over state-like features through an understanding of the EU's international identity'.[320] Therefore, as Manners claims, the impact and the particularity of EU rest in its ability to 'redefine what can be "normal" in international relations.'[321] The particularity of the EU is also highlighted by Rosencrance:

> Europe's attainment is normative rather than empirical… It is perhaps a
> paradox to note that the continent which once ruled the world through the

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[317] R. Rosencrance 'The European Union: a new type of international actor', in J. Zielonka (ed.), *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 15-23; K.E., Smith, 'The end of civilian power EU: a welcome demise or cause for concern?', International Spectator 35(2): 11-28, 2000; I. Manners, 'Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?', Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2): 235-58, 2002; S., Stavridis, 'Militarizing the EU: the concept of civilian power Europe revisited', International Spectator 36(4): 43-50, 2001; T., Diez, 'Constructing the self and changing others: problematising the concept of "normative power Europe"', Paper presented at the Millennium Conference 'Facets of Power in International Relations', London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 30-31 October, 2004; S. Lightfoot and J. Burchell, 'The EU and the World Summit on Sustainable Development', Journal of Common Market Studies 43(1): 75-95, 2005.

[318] Sjursen, op. cit.

[319] Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?".

[320] Ibid, p. 239.

[321] Ibid, p. 253.

physical impositions of imperialism is now coming to set world standards in normative terms.[322]

According to Manners, these normative terms are the principles of peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights and freedoms which constitute the EU's normative basis.[323] These norms are identified with the EU and accepted as very 'European' both in internal and external realms. Marise Cremona underlines that the identification of the EU with a set of common values- not always fully conceptualized but with human rights and democracy at the centre- has become increasingly important in the EU's internal and external policy-making.[324] Similarly, Karen Smith indicates that the promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance, the prevention of violent conflict and fight against international crime all appear on the foreign policy agenda of the Union.[325] She further suggests that the objectives and the values that the EU promotes internationally- its international identity- are inherently linked to the internal dynamics of the Union itself.[326] In line with these suggestions, Javier Solana has also declared that the EU common foreign policy "is about improving the coherence of our shared objectives and interests in the world. And it is about promoting the values which lie at the foundation of the European Union."[327]

Manners underlines that the acceptance of its normative basis is not solely sufficient to define the EU as a normative power, but the diffusion of norms is also required.[328] This criterion is common element of both 'civilian' and 'normative' power arguments as their main emphasis is on 'civilizing' international relations as part of a wider transformation of international society.[329]   These liberal-idealist views

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[322] Rosencrance, 'The European Union: A New Type of International Actor', p. 22.
[323] Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" p. 242.
[324] Marise Cremona, "Values in the EU Constitution: the External Dimension", *CDDRL Working Papers* No. 26, 2 November 2006, p. 1.
[325] Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, p. 195.
[326] Ibid, p. 17.
[327] Javier Solana, 'Reflections on a year in office', Speech to the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and Central Defence and Society Federation, Stockholm, Sweden, 27 October 2000.
[328] Manners, op. cit., p. 244.
[329] Adrian Hyde-Price, 'Normative' power Europe: a realist critique', *Journal of European Public Policy* 13:2 March 2006: 217-234, p. 217.

perceive the EU as a novel and unique entity in international relations and claim that "the apparent weakness of the Union as an international actor - its lack of coercive instruments and its consequent reliance on declaratory politics and 'soft power'- in fact constitute the roots of its strength."[330] In other words, the Union's reliance on civilian means to pursue its international objectives (unlike a classic Westphalian state) does not mean that it is a 'powerless' international actor since its soft power can be used in an assertive manner as experienced in some cases.[331]

The debate on the EU's civilian / normative identity has been very fruitful. Studies have stressed value-driven feature of EU foreign policy and most analysts have taken normative dynamics as central focus to the EU's distinctive international role. However, the debate on 'civilian' / 'normative' power has recently come under harsh criticisms which are elaborated in the next section.

5.2.2 Critical Debate on the EU's Civilian / Normative Identity

The liberal-idealist perceptions of the EU as a civilian / normative entity have stirred up a scholarly debate with its proponents and opponents. The most opposing criticisms have been directed by neo-realist account. It is basically argued that structural realism can shed more considerable light on the EU's international role because it focuses on the systemic dynamics of EU foreign and security policy as compared to the liberal-idealist notions which they find highly reductionist and normative.[332] Conducting an alternative neo-realist research, Adrian Hyde-Price identifies three problematic areas regarding liberal-idealist notions of the EU as a 'normative' or 'civilian' power.[333] First of all, he finds these notions 'reductionist' as they 'explain international outcomes through elements and combinations of elements located at national or sub-national levels.'[334] Secondly, Hyde-Price argues, they suffer from inherent weakness of liberal-idealism which refers to 'the almost total

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[330] Ibid.

[331] Jan Zielonka, *Europe as Empire: the Nature of the Enlarged Union*, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 143.

[332] Hyde-Price, "Normative' power Europe: a realist critique", p. 217.

[333] Ibid, p. 218.

[334] K. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979, p. 60 quoted in Adrian Hyde-Price, 'Normative' power Europe: a realist critique', p. 218.

neglect of power.'[335] With this respect, Hedley Bull notes that civilian power concept is a contradiction in terms because 'the power of influence exerted by the European Community and other such civilian actors was conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not control.'[336] The third problem put forward by Hyde-Price is that liberal-idealist conceptions are highly normative, in that they regard civilian and normative power as a 'good thing'. At this point, he identifies the problem as "when the object of study is seen as embodying the core values one believes in, it is difficult to achieve any critical distance."[337]

Due to the existence of aforementioned problems, Hyde-Price argues that neo-realism offers a much 'bleaker view' on EU's international role than the dominant liberal-idealist approach headed by Duchène and Manners. Although he accepts that structural-realist approach cannot explain all aspects of European affairs, he suggests it (thanks to its emphasis on the structural distribution of power) can explain post Cold-War developments in the EU foreign and security policy better than the liberal-idealist accounts. In this respect, Hyde-Price explains why the 'milieu shaping' role has been attributed to the EU in its near abroad (particularly Eastern Europe) in the post-Cold War era.[338] According to him, while addressing the economic, social and economic transformation of its newly independent neighbours, "the EU was used by its most influential member states as an instrument for collectively exercising hegemonic power, shaping its 'near abroad' in ways amenable to the long-term strategic and economic interests of its member states."[339] Hyde-Price points out that the EU shapes its milieu by means of both 'soft power' (diplomatic persuasion, negotiation, compromise etc.) and 'hard power' which allow it to act as a 'collective hegemon'. As Karen Smith suggests, the EU's hard power is composed of coercive

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[335] E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis: an Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, New York: Palgrave, 2001 quoted in Adrian Hyde-Price, 'Normative' power Europe: a realist critique', p. 218.
[336] Hedley Bull, "Civilian power Europe: a contradiction in terms?", *Journal of Common Market Studies* 21(2): 149-82, 1982, p. 151.
[337] Hyde-Price, "Normative' power Europe: a realist critique", p. 218.
[338] Ibid, p. 226.
[339] Ibid, p. 227.

economic statecraft (primarily in the form of 'conditionality clauses') in order to impose its vision of political and economic order on the post-communist democracies.[340] This fact constitutes the ground for Hyde-Price's argument that the EU does not act as a 'normative power' whose international role is shaped not by 'what it does or what it says, but what it is.'[341] Rather, he concludes, the Union "serves as an instrument of collective hegemony, shaping its external milieu through using power in a variety of forms: political partnership or ostracism; economic carrots and sticks; the promise of membership or the threat of exclusion."[342]

Helene Sjursen develops a set of criticisms some of which are in parallel with neo-realist account.[343] Like Hyde-Price, Sjursen begins her analysis by arguing that conceptions of the EU as a 'civilian' and 'normative' are not only reductive but also normatively biased. Although she admits that the EU's foreign policy has distinctive civilian or normative dimensions (such as democracy promotion, introduction of human rights clauses in trade agreements, the emphasis on encouraging regional co-operation), she argues that liberal-idealist conceptions of the EU should be examined more closely and further criteria should be developed to "qualify, substantiate or reject their implicit claim that the EU is a 'force for good'".[344] Sjursen criticizes the conception of the EU as a 'normative' or 'civilian' power as it corresponds very closely to the EU's own description of its international role. In this respect, the criticism goes to Duchène and Manners who emphasize the EU's distinctiveness and normativity: 'the central component of normative power Europe is that the EU exists as being different to pre-existing political forms, and that this particular difference predisposes it to act in a normative way.'[345] For Sjursen, the question arising from this perception is that "how, if at all, can we know, as it is implied, that 'acting in a normative way' is a 'good thing'?"[346] Even the answer is 'yes', how can we ensure

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[340] Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World.*
[341] Manners, "Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?", p. 252.
[342] Hyde-Price, op. cit.
[343] Helene Sjursen, ''The EU as a 'normative' power: how can this be?", *Journal of European Public Policy* 13:2 March 2006: 235-251.
[344] Ibid, pp. 235-6.
[345] Manners, op. cit., p. 242.
[346] Sjursen, op. cit., p. 236.

that the Union would consistently act in a normative manner particularly in the light of recent developments in the EU's common security and defence policy?[347] These questions form a basis for Sjursen's argument that the normative or civilian power concepts need to be further specified, analysed and legitimized.

Sjursen also draws attention to the tendency to evaluate the EU as a normative power because of its lack of military instruments.[348] For instance, Karen Smith considers this to be the core element of the EU's international role: 'the EU still clearly prefers positive civilian to coercive military measures'.[349] Similarly, Menon et al. argue that the EU is:

> A pioneer in long term interstate peace building, a pioneer actor through trial and error and thus designing options for peaceful governance. In this vision, the EU is one of the most formidable machines for managing differences peacefully ever invented.[350]

According to Sjursen, dependence of the EU on civilian or 'soft' instruments does not mean that they "are not necessarily benign and neither are they necessarily non-coercive."[351] With this regard, she exemplifies economic sanctions which might negatively influence the people's life. Therefore, she claims that the EU's reliance on non-military instruments is not solely enough to characterize it as a normative or civilian power.[352] Furthermore, Sjursen directs attention that the EU has recently shown tendency to acquire state-like features by developing its own security strategy and enhancing its operational military capabilities.[353] She underlines that such tendencies might raise questions about whether the EU can be considered a 'normative' or 'civilizing' power.[354]

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[347] Sjursen, "What kind of power?", p. 170.
[348] Sjursen, ''The EU as a 'normative' power: how can this be?", pp. 236-7.
[349] Smith, *EU Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, p. 111, and "The end of civilian power EU: a welcome demise or cause for concern?", *International Spectator* 35(2): 11-28, 2000.
[350] A. Menon, K. Nicolaidis and J. Walsh, "In Defence of Europe - A Response to Kagan", *Journal of European Affairs* 2(3): 5-14, 2004, p. 11.
[351] Sjursen, op. cit., p. 239.
[352] Ibid, p. 249.
[353] Sjursen, "What kind of power?", p. 171.
[354] Even Ian Manners is skeptical about the EU's ability to remain a 'normative' power, due to the increasing militarization of its external policies *see* Ian Manners, "Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads", *Journal of European Public Policy* 13:2 March 2006: 182-199.

Sjursen's proposal to further explore and theorize normative and civilian power concepts has found acceptance by many scholars. Like Sjursen and Hyde-Price, Nicolaidis and Howse finds the anomaly in the EU's self-projection in international arena as an 'ideal Europe' instead of 'what the EU actually is'.[355] According to the authors, this anomaly results in 'EU*topia*' in which "the EU falls short of engaging in the reflexive dimension and, rather than exporting what the EU is, it tries to export what the EU would like to be."[356] That is why Thomas Diez calls for a 'greater degree of reflexivity, both in academic discussion about normative power and in political representations of the EU as a normative power.'[357] This proposition is also welcomed by Manners who argues that only if the EU displays reflexivity in its external policies can it be considered as 'both normative and powerful'.[358] For Nicolaidis and Howse, reflexivity could be interpreted as 'consistency between the internal and external planes' of EU policy.[359] Moreover, it could also be understood in the sense of refraining from 'utopian normativity'[360] and the 'missionary zeal'[361] that it entails. Although reflexivity concept is considered to be crucial to the 'normative power' concept in recent debate, Sibylle Scheipers and Daniela Sicurelli conclude that this aspect still remains 'under-explored'.[362]

Aforementioned critiques and contributions provide valuable insights as they seek to re-conceptualize and further specify the ideas of civilian and normative dimensions to the EU rather than rejecting them from the outset in a biased manner. Although they offer different analytical framework with proposals and solutions, the common approach maintained is that the EU's international identity could not be characterized as purely civilian or normative. Instead, the Union's identity should be

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[355] K. Nicolaidis and R. Howse, " 'This is my EUtopia . . .': Narrative as Power", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 4, 2002, pp. 767–92.

[356] Scheipers and Sicurelli, "Normative Power Europe: A Credible Utopia?", p. 438.

[357] Thomas Diez, "Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe'", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2005), pp. 615-36, p. 623.

[358] Ian Manners, "The European Union as a Normative Power in the Global Polity", Paper presented to the PSA Annual Conference, Leeds, 4-7 April 2005, p. 10 quoted in Scheipers and Sicurelli, op. cit., p. 438.

[359] Nicolaidis and Howse, op. cit., p. 771.

[360] Ibid, p. 789.

[361] Diez, op. cit.

[362] Scheipers and Sicurelli, op. cit., p. 453.

conceptualized within a broader framework in which the EU's foreign policy is driven by various normative and interest-based dynamics as in the case of the ENP.

5.3 ENP's Impact on the EU's International Role

As mentioned before, EU's engagement in its near abroad has stirred a wider debate on whether the ENP could contribute to the Union's normative capacity. Most analysts in this debate are curious whether one can attribute a normative value to the EU's engagement which provides a distinctive feature to European foreign policy.[363] Looking into the contradictions in normative drives behind its rationale and normative weaknesses in its instruments and capabilities, this section seeks to respond whether the ENP could make any normative difference in the Union's foreign policy.

5.3.1 Contradictions in the ENP's Normative Rationale

The ENP's strong rhetoric in terms of the promotion of normative values in the immediate neighbourhood revived the debate whether the EU is a normative power. ENP's normative rationale does not only stem from its emphasis on democracy, rule of law, and human rights which have also been part of previous EU foreign policies, but also its focus on political conditionality.[364] In its Wider Europe Communication, the Commission declared that relations with neighbouring countries should not only be made dependent on effective implementation of EU-promoted political, economic and institutional reforms, but also made "a function of concrete progress in demonstrating shared values."[365] The language of value promotion was later strengthened by the ESS implying that it was in Europe's interest to have well-governed countries on its borders and that "spreading good governance…dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights" are the "best means of strengthening the international order."[366]

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[363] Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms".
[364] Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, "The (Non-)Normative Power EU and the European Neighbourhood Policy: An Exceptional Policy for an Exceptional Actor?", *European Political Economy Review* No. 7 (Summer 2007), pp. 181-194, p. 182.
[365] European Commission Communication, "Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours".
[366] European Council, "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy".

Despite this apparent normative rationale behind the ENP, two inherent contradictions in the ENP make it difficult to conclude that the Union acts as a pure normative power at least for the time being. First of all, as Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués argues, the EU's normative ideas and objectives in the EU's foreign policy become much more politicized in the ENP region which forces the Union to act in a very careful manner:

> In the aftermath of the US-led intervention in Iraq, where the lack of democracy and human rights has frequently been cited as motives behind the toppling of the Saddam Hussein's regime, many countries, especially non-democratic Arab countries, see in the Western normative rhetoric a veiled threat against their regimes.[367]

The quotation underlines the negative impression of value-driven Western policies on the Arab countries most of whom are the ENP partner countries. Combined with their skeptical approaches mentioned in Chapter IV, the Union's normative commitment to liberal norms in the ENP might potentially disturb recently emerged sensitiveness in these countries. Therefore, the normative objectives are politicized in this particular ENP region which compel the Union to abstain from using a strong normative language in order to not to trigger security dilemma and instability in its immediate neighbourhood.

The second contradiction stems from the question whether the EU promotes norms and values rather than its own particular interests in its external policies. There is a general tendency that the EU's foreign policy is not solely derived from a motivation to promote its own interests, but also it is inspired by an idea of what 'ought' to be done.[368] However, it proves problematic because focusing only on normative dynamics of the EU foreign policy runs the risk of overlooking the other important rationales behind it. In this respect, Federica Bicchi underlines that the EU intentionally exports norms from which it benefits, with only enough attention to the

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[367] Johansson-Nogués, "The (Non-)Normative Power EU and the European Neighbourhood Policy: An Exceptional Policy for an Exceptional Actor?", p. 185.

[368] Manners, 'Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms?'; Rosecrance, 'The European Union: a new type of international actor'; and Whitman, *From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the European Union.*

receiving end for the beneficial effect to occur.[369] She exemplifies region-building in which the EU's normative action could provide further gains in economic and security realms as well.[370] Looking from a similar perspective, Richard Youngs seeks to demonstrate that strategic and ideational dynamics co-exist in EU's external relations.[371] He focuses on how instrumentalist security oriented dynamics persist within the EU's normative objectives especially with regard to its human rights policies, and concludes that the way in which normative dynamics have been conceived and incorporated into external policy reveals a certain security-driven rationalism.[372]

Aforementioned problematic has recently become the most controversial dimension of the ENP. As mentioned many times before, the ENP's normative agenda relies on exporting liberal political and economic norms which would spill over stability, security and economic development of the whole region and benefit the EU in the long-run. Therefore, at a first glance, norm promotion might be assumed as the EU's most important priority in the ENP. Nevertheless, current debate underlines that various (geopolitical, normative, economic etc.) considerations compete with each other in the ENP, even if not on an equal basis.[373] It is true that norm promotion in the third countries provides far-reaching benefits to the Union, but it has not been pursued as the ENP's primary aim at least so far. Instead, it seems that the Union exploits its transformative agenda to realize it security and stability interests through the ENP. That is why most analysts consider that the interest-based dynamics lie behind the curtain of the ENP's normative agenda. Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum argue that the Union acts in line with "soft imperialism" by which they refer to its 'soft power' used in a hard way, that is "an asymmetric form of dialogue or even the imposition or strategic use of norms and conditionalities enforced for

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[369] Federica Bicchi, " 'Our size fits all': normative power Europe and the Mediterranean", *Journal of European Public Policy* 13:2 March 2006: 286-303, p. 291.
[370] Ibid.
[371] Youngs, "Normative dynamics and strategic interests in the EU's external identity", 2004.
[372] Ibid, p. 421.
[373] Johansson-Nogués, 'The (Non-)Normative Power EU and the European Neighbourhood Policy: An Exceptional Policy for an Exceptional Actor?', p. 186.

reasons of self-interest rather than for the creation of a bilateral dialogue."[374] While bilateral dialogue is paid importance in the ENP's rhetoric[375], the implementation side reveals the Union's dominance and inequality of the dialogue.[376] Likewise, Raffaella Del Sarto and Tobias Schumacher argue that the Union openly acknowledges the unequal power relations between itself and its neighbours in the ENP, while showing its willingness to use this power for pursuing its foreign policy interests.[377] Thus, rather than being a normative power in the ENP, EU tends to emerge as a 'power bloc' model in which it uses its economic and diplomatic strength in pursuit of its own self-interested objectives.[378] In many aspects of the ENP, the Union seems to be willing to use its power in the pursuit of its own objectives through promoting specific policy objectives, using carrots and sticks and enforcing its trading neighbours to align their legislation.[379]

Therefore, in the context of multi-polar world and post-modern security threats, the EU seems to facilitate its so-called normative dynamics in order to promote security and stability in its neighbourhood. With this regard, Andreas Marchetti holds that geopolitical considerations constitute the essence of the ENP, rather than normative motives. [380] More precisely, he argues that the ENP implies the EU's will to create a ring of states in its immediate neighbourhood in order to protect itself and to exert influence:

> The European Neighbourhood Policy is designed to establish a semi-periphery around the European Union. This functionalisation of neighbours

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[374] Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum, "Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? The EU as a Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism", *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10: 535-552, 2005, p. 539.

[375] *See* European Commission Communication, "Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours".

[376] *Refer* to Chapter IV.

[377] Del Sarto and Schumacher, "From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy Towards the Southern Mediterranean?", p. 28.

[378] For the conceptualizations of the EU as 'civilian model' and 'power bloc', see Christopher Hill, "European Foreign Policy: power bloc, civilian model- or flop?", in Reinhardt Rummel (ed.), *The Evolution of an International Actor*, Boulder, CO: Westview Pres, 1990.

[379] *See* Marise Cremona, "The European Union as an international actor: the issues of flexibility and linkage", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 3, 1, 1998; and Karen Smith, "the Use of Political Conditionality in the EU's Relations with third countries: how effective?", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 3, 2, 1998.

[380] Marchetti, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU's Periphery", p. 16.

has the advantage of buffering and protecting by at the same allowing for an increased exchange between the entities involved.[381]

Del Sarto and Schumacher also identify a 'buffering logic' and a 'centre-periphery approach' in the ENP through which the Union aims at making the EU's old and new neighbours closer to itself, while 'interconnecting' its neighbourhood in terms of trade and political relations, energy, infrastructure, and telecommunication networks.[382] As a result, the distinction between the EU's external borders has been blurred, moving new dividing lines away. According to Jan Zielonka, this fuzzy character of the EU's borders make the Union more sensitive to external shocks, and that is why the Union acts with geopolitical rationale in order to preserve peace and stability in its neighbourhood and extends its system of governance to its unstable neighbouring countries.[383] In this sense, Zielonka claims, the Union resembles more a 'medieval empire' than a Westphalian super-state whose international objective is to overcome internal conflicts and to stabilize its external environment through the export of laws and regulations, economic aid and state-building efforts.[384]   In contrast, Antonio Missiroli concludes that the EU's focus on stabilisation and securitization of its neighbourhood serves to strengthen its status as a 'regional power' rather making it a fully-fledged international actor.[385]

5.3.2 Normative Weakness in the ENP's Instruments and Capabilities

Besides contradictory aspects in its normative rationale, the ENP also suffers from normative weaknesses of its instruments and capabilities, which stem from the gap between the policy rhetoric and action. While the ENP's normative claim is apparent (to transform the neighbouring countries) in its rhetoric, it could not facilitate efficient instruments and capabilities in practice. Therefore, the capability-

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[381] Ibid, p. 27.
[382] Del Sarto and Schumacher, "From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy Towards the Southern Mediterranean?", p. 26.
[383] Zielonka, *Europe as Empire: the Nature of the Enlarged Union*, p. 148.
[384] Ibid, p. 162.
[385] Antonio Missiroli, "The EU and its changing neighbourhoods: stabilisation, integration and partnership", in Judy Batt et al., *Partners and Neighbours: a CFSP for a Wider Europe*, EU Institute for Security Studies *Chaillot Paper* 64, September 2003, pp. 9-30.

expectations gap analyzed in Chapter IV is transformed into the rhetoric-action gap when analysing the ENP's impact on the EU's normative capacity.

As underlined in the previous section, Ian Manners figures the transmission of norms as an imperative element to define the EU as a normative identity.[386] Manners identifies six principal substantive and symbolic ways in which the EU promotes values: contagion (EU as a source of attraction for third parties); informational (declarations, demarches), procedural (institutionalized relationships), transference (trade norms, political conditionality), overt diffusion (EC delegations) and cultural filter (political learning).[387] Applying these principles to the ENP, it is observed that the policy allows both for substantive (political dialogue, trade norms, cooperation, financial and technical assistance etc.) and symbolic (EU attraction, political learning) transmission of norms.[388]

As for the 'substantive' transmission of norms, the Action Plans constitute the ENP's most important component. However, a contradiction has emerged between the proposals in the Commission's ENP 'Strategy Paper'[389] and principles accepted by the partners in Action Plans. Strategy Paper makes various references to normative action, some of which are very concrete in dealing with different regions of the ENP area. However, these references to normative values nearly disappeared in the Action Plans and commitments to normative reform were minimized to a very general language "without specifying what exact measures in terms of democracy, human rights and liberties should be taken by partners in order to obtain new 'privileges' from the EU."[390] In this regard, the EU's not so normative and ambivalent attitude towards Ukraine and Tunisia presents a case study.[391] The EU first responded very cautious towards revolutionary movement in Ukraine. However, once the blow turned in favour of the democratic revolutionaries, the Union seemed to intervene

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[386] Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", p. 244.
[387] Ibid, pp. 244-5.
[388] Johansson-Nogués, 'The (Non-)Normative Power EU and the European Neighbourhood Policy: An Exceptional Policy for an Exceptional Actor?', p. 188.
[389] European Commission Communication, "European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper".
[390] Johansson-Nogués, op. cit., p. 189.
[391] Ibid, p. 186.

normatively in favour of democracy by sending Javier Solana and representatives of member states to negotiate with Russia and Ukrainian opposition parties to allow a second round of elections to take place. Yet, once the democratic government of Yushchenko took office, other non-normative concerns driving the EU's foreign policy came to the fore. The EU-Ukraine ENP Action Plan (originally accorded with Kuchma) was re-designed after the elections and in principle offered better trade relations, more aid, easier visas and closer cooperation.[392] Nevertheless, various problems flourished especially in commercial issues: trade restrictions on Ukraine's basic export products, such as agricultural goods, textiles and steel continued either in the form of non-tariff barriers or trade quotas. Furthermore, financial assistance to the newly democratized country has been delayed due to inter-institutional conflicts between the Council and the Commission and the promise of visa liberalization has become troublesome. In contrast, non-reformist Tunisia obtained a more far-reaching Action Plan without having to make any substantial concessions in the normative realm (e.g. neither in terms of free and fair elections or even easing restrictions on political opposition or civil society).[393]

As for the 'symbolic' transmission of norms in the ENP, the Union relies on its "soft power"[394] which reflects its will to become 'centre of attraction' for its neighbouring countries:

> How can we [the EU] use our soft power, our transformative power, our gravitational influence, to leverage the reforms we would like to see in our neighbourhood? (…) We are a 'pole of attraction' for our region - countries along our borders actively seek closer relations with us and we, in turn, want closer relations with these neighbours.[395]

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[392] Kataryna Wolczuk, "Ukraine after the Orange Revolution", *CER Policy Brief*, 4 February 2005.

[393] Johansson-Nogués, "A 'Ring of Friends'? The Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy for the Mediterranean".

[394] Joseph S. Jr Nye has introduced and popularized the expression "soft power" referring to the ability of an actor to use its attractiveness in terms of culture, political ideals and policies to draw other actors closer in *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power,* New York, Basic Books, 1990; and *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,* New York, Public Affairs, 2004.

[395] Landaburu, "From Neighbourhood to Integration Policy: Are there concrete alternatives to enlargement?", pp. 2-3.

Relying on soft power concept, the Union tries "to position itself on the international stage by preferring civilian over coercive means and thus seeks to increase the ENP's legitimacy through attraction instead of accession."[396] On this ground, the ENP is criticized for being 'ambitious' or 'assertive' because it attempts to achieve this aim without an effective conditionality tool. As acknowledged before, the EU's most influential 'carrot' or 'reward' has been membership to promote transformative change beyond its borders which is mostly achieved because of the acceding countries' political will. However, the ENP lacks both this carrot and sufficient political will in the ENP countries, which has been cited as one of its primary limits of the policy in the former chapter. In this respect, Sandra Lavenex argues that when the soft power is applied towards third countries without the prospect of membership, the EU's attempt to extend its type of governance becomes "not only a benevolent projection of acquired civilian virtues but also a more strategic attempt to gain control over policy developments through external governance."[397] In other words, the absence of membership offer in the ENP severely reduces the Union's power of attraction vis-à-vis the neighbouring countries. Notwithstanding this, the partnership conditionality can still have an effect on the economic and political transformations of some partner countries who perceive the ENP as a tool to realize their membership aspirations, particularly Ukraine.[398] Regarding the rest, the ENP needs to improve its internal consistency and to enhance its experience about them in order to keep and increase its legitimacy.[399] Otherwise, the Union would fail not only to maintain its external coherence but also to respond highly heterogeneous demands of its neighbours which would result in the increase of criticisms that the ENP qualifies as a form of empire or hegemonic state, with neighbouring countries becoming the EU's periphery.[400]

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[396] Elsa Tulmets, "Can the Discourse on "Soft Power" Help the EU to Bridge its Capability Expectations Gap?", *European Political Economy Review* No. 7 (Summer 2007), pp. 195-226, p. 195.
[397] Sandra Lavenex, "EU external governance in 'wider Europe', *Journal of European Public Policy* 11:4 August 2004: 680-700, p. 685.
[398] Interview with Miriam Brewka.
[399] Tulmets, op. cit., p. 214-5.
[400] Marchetti, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU's Periphery".

5.4 Conclusion

After elaborating the debate on the EU's transformative identity, can we conclude that the EU acts in accordance with a pure normative identity in the ENP area? In other words is the EU a soft power and the ENP is an exceptional policy on this ground? As examined in the first section of this chapter, the normative power EU argument fails to show the complete picture concerning the EU's international role. Various elements pre-define the EU's foreign policy actions notwithstanding normative ones. Therefore, the Union could not be considered as a pure normative identity and focusing merely on the normative dimension of the EU foreign policy runs the risk of undermining its other dimensions and components.

As far as the ENP's current record of performance is analyzed, the EU seems to have abandoned its normative claims embodied in its ambitious language at the policy's outset. Rather than being an innovative normative policy, the ENP represents various conflicting interests, ideas and norms which co-exist within the multifaceted EU foreign policy. Thus, the ENP hardly makes any normative difference in the EU's foreign policy in general and its international role in particular. Taking the ENP as a case study, it might be further concluded that the EU acts, rather than an exceptional identity, as a 'normal' force in international relations.[401] This might be due to the fact that most international actors position themselves somewhere between ideal / utopian models of civilian and military, with no actor positioned at either extreme.[402]

The ENP's failure to contribute the EU's normative identity can be based on its normative weaknesses to acquire an exceptional foreign policy framework in certain aspects. In terms of its rationale, a further elaboration of the policy reveals that the ENP's blends both normative and interest-based dynamics. It is even argued that security-driven interests pre-dominate the normative objectives of the policy. These contradictions indicate that the EU sometimes acts as a regional hegemonic power

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[401] Johansson-Nogués, "The (Non-)Normative Power EU and the European Neighbourhood Policy: An Exceptional Policy for an Exceptional Actor?", p. 191.
[402] Karen E. Smith, "Still 'civilian power EU'?", *European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper,* 1, 2005.

rather than a global normative player. Moreover, the ENP fails to be an exceptional normative foreign policy due to inherent weaknesses in its capabilities and instruments. Action Plans, ENP's most important instruments, contradict with the ENP Strategy Paper which had previously made various references to normative action. It is further seen in Ukraine and Tunisia's Action Plans that the EU does not pay much attention to these references and acts in an indifferent manner towards the partner country's normative efforts. As regards its capabilities, the ENP relies on the Union's soft power and aims to export the EU's values and norms by extending its internal policy networks abroad as happened in the case of enlargement. However, the EU seems to lose its attractiveness as a 'soft power' due to the absence of the membership prospect in the ENP. The fact that the ENP fails to respond very different expectations of neighbours decreases the EU's transformative power vis-à-vis them.

In brief, the ENP has failed to transform itself into an effective foreign policy instrument despite its potential value at the outset. The ENP's ineffectiveness stems from not only its failure to contribute the Union's international role, but also several shortcomings in its implementation side. This failure concerns both scholars and the Union. Whereas the EU institutions seems to recognize the need to reinforce the ENP at least in principle[403], scholars call for a more concrete effort on the EU side to re-adjust and improve the policy. Despite it is generally agreed that the immediate action should be targeted towards increasing the ENP's coherence and consistency, the methods vary. While the suggestions vary, the most preferred method is the re-grouping of the partner countries in order to respond different expectations of the partners which would in turn contribute to the overall effectiveness of the policy.[404] However the suggestions differ, it is obvious that there is an urgent need to upgrade the ENP. Thus, the Union should reinforce and improve the policy through consistent

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[403] *See* European Commission Communication, "Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy", COM(2006)726 final, 4 December 2006.
[404] Rosa Balfour and Antonio Missiroli, "Reassessing the European Neighbourhood Policy", *EPC Issue Paper* No. 54, June 2007; and Michael Emerson, Gergana Noutcheva, and Nicu Popescu, "European Neighbourhood Policy Two Years on: Time indeed for an ENP plus", *CEPS Policy Brief* No. 126, March 2007.

and coherent measures. Otherwise, it would be very difficult for the EU to counterbalance the arguments which accuse the ENP of pursuing 'unilateralist', 'imperialist' or 'hegemonic' agenda behind the curtain of normative claims.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The impact of the recent enlargement has not been limited to the accession of twelve member states. It also posed difficult questions to the EU about the objectives and instruments of its foreign policy towards its new neighbours, varying from border issues, the rights of transnational minorities, to its ultimate *finalite geographique*. Therefore, it took very short time for the EU to realize that the impact of recent enlargement is also not limited to the accession of new member states but involves the definition of new borders and the creation of new neighbours.

As a result of last rounds of enlargement, the Union acquired new neighbours, from Moldova to Morocco, some of which it shares a direct border with. While the geographical location of the neighbours varied, they experienced similar problems and difficulties, such as political and social instability, and stagnant economies which might spill-over into the Union's borders. Moreover, the proximity of security threats, namely regional conflicts, illegal migration, cross-border crime, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism deeply concerned the Union. These challenges compelled the Union to better define its relationship with its new neighbours. Policy discussions in the Commission and the Council intensified from December 2002, when then Commission President Romano Prodi spoke of the enlarged EU for a 'ring of friends'. The Policy was first outlined by the Wider Europe Communication in March 2003 which included the EU's eastern and southern neighbours. The major emphasis of the Communication was on the aforementioned security concerns and its security dimension was subsequently enhanced by the ESS in December 2003 which makes a secure neighbourhood one of the EU's strategic objectives. The ENP's final shape was designed by the ENP Strategy Paper of May 2004, which extended the

policy coverage to further include the Southern Caucasus countries. Thus, 16 countries came to fall within the scope of Prodi's 'ring of friends' concept.

The ENP aims to respond three major concern of the EU: to promote stability and security around the EU's borders to conciliate the possible negative effects of enlargement on the neighbouring countries, and to define an alternative offer to the EU membership to attract the neighbours. To this purpose, the ENP offers 'everything' (integration into the EU's internal market and its regulatory structures) but not 'institutions' in the form of 'enhanced partnership' through which the partner countries promote 'particular' economic and political reforms. This 'particular' refers to the jointly prioritized areas for reform whose promotion makes the partnership progressive. In other words, the progress is conditional on the partner countries' commitment to their domestic reform process which will be measured by the benchmarks proposed by the Action Plans. These Plans are designed according to the circumstances, needs and priorities of each partner country and their implementation is monitored by relevant EU institutions. Despite the ENP has been declared to be a novel policy in official terms, it builds on other foreign policies of the Union, mainly enlargement and previous neighbourhood policies. Their comparison reveals that the ENP offers less than enlargement and a little more than its predecessors (particularly the EMP) thanks to its differentiated bilateral approach and financial instrument, namely the ENPI.

Nevertheless, the ENP's distinct features could not bring as much success as expected prior to the policy's implementation phase. The policy is severely criticized for the EU's ambitious attempt to promote reform process in partner countries without offering an effective conditionality tool. The inconsistency between its inputs and outcomes is apparent mainly due to the weakness of the partnership conditionality and non-binding character of the Action Plans. Besides, there are many other constraints are identified to limit the effective implementation of the policy. First of all, the ENP suffers from its inherent constraints which lie in the

policy framework and instruments. Partnership conditionality results in a mismatch between the inputs and outcomes representing the ambitious character of the policy.

The situation is aggravated by the existence of famous 'capability-expectations gap' which further signals the inefficiency of the incentives offered. After examining the gap, it is interpreted that the ENP falls short of meeting the expectations of the partner countries as wells as those of the Union. Therefore, the gap is evident on both sides decreasing the overall success of the policy. The ENP's success further declines due to the skeptical approaches of the ENP partners. Second group of the limits is composed of the EU's internal constraints, namely constitutional crisis, legitimacy decline and decision-making deadlock which seriously challenge the ENP. Constitutional crisis and legitimacy decline compel the EU and its member states to concentrate much more on internal problems than foreign policy issues. As two issues highly concern the Union's future organization and policies, it is not difficult to foresee that the Union will put more energy to the settlement of the constitutional debate and legitimacy decline, rather than wasting time on the ENP. The situation is further deteriorated by the decision-making deadlock in the Union. First of all, EU is highly absorbed in the issues driven by enlargement, such as so-called absorption capacity and internal reform process. Moreover, as a result of the last round of enlargement, the decision-making process has become much more complicated and slow due to the divergences between the foreign policy priorities of the member states. Therefore, it is not right time for the ENP to get more attention from the EU institutions and member states at least for the time-being.

The Union's external constraints further deteriorate the picture for the ENP. Although the EU has responded the enlargement's geostrategic challenges by the ENP's launch, the heterogeneity of the partner countries, existence of many active or frozen conflicts, challenges coming from the Black Sea, and possible membership of Turkey seriously concern the EU. In this respect, it seems urgent for the Union to consistently revise and adopt the ENP according to the developments taking place in its neighbourhood. On the other hand, the Union needs to take into consideration its

relations with Russia and the US who are important players in the ENP region. Since the relations with these two countries are crucial in many respects, it is a necessity for the Union to take each and every step carefully in its neighbourhood policy in order to not to disturb the sensitiveness of these countries.

Looking to the aforementioned challenges it is found out that the ENP has so far failed to evolve into a fully-fledged coherent foreign policy framework. The thesis further confirms this finding with its response to the main problematic: whether the ENP could make any difference in the EU foreign policy on normative grounds. Final analysis reveals that, rather than being an innovative normative policy, the ENP represents various conflicting interests, ideas and norms which co-exist within the multifaceted EU foreign policy. Thus, the ENP hardly makes any normative difference in the EU's foreign policy in general and its international identity in particular.

The ENP's failure to contribute the EU's normative identity can be based on its normative weaknesses to acquire an exceptional foreign policy framework in certain aspects. In terms of its rationale, a further elaboration of the policy reveals that the ENP's blends both normative and interest-based dynamics. It is even argued that security-driven interests pre-dominate the normative objectives of the policy. Moreover, the ENP fails to be an exceptional normative foreign policy due to inherent weaknesses in its capabilities and instruments. Action Plans, ENP's most important instruments, contradict with the ENP Strategy Paper which had previously made various references to normative action. As regards its capabilities, the ENP relies on the Union's soft power and aims to export the EU's values and norms by extending its internal policy networks abroad as happened in the case of enlargement. However, the EU seems to lose its attractiveness as a 'soft power' due to the absence of the membership prospect in the ENP. The fact that the ENP fails to respond very different expectations of neighbours decreases the EU's transformative power vis-à-vis them.

To summarize, the ENP failed to transform itself into an effective foreign policy instrument despite its potential value at the outset. The ENP's ineffectiveness stems from not only its failure to contribute the Union's normative identity, but also several shortcomings in its implementation side. The failure concerns both scholars and the Union. While the Union has recently become aware of the need to reinforce the ENP, scholars call for a more concrete effort on EU side to re-adjust and improve the policy. Thus, it is immediate that the EU should revise and upgrade the policy in order to establish a solid ground for its implementation. Whatever the method the EU choices, the ENP should be equipped with more effective instruments which would eliminate the gap between its objectives and incentives. As the EU can not project its soft power without offering a more attractive tool to its neighbours, it should be realistic rather than ambitious. Therefore, the EU should re-design the ENP as a more coherent and consistent policy. Otherwise, it will fail to respond its neighbours' needs and expectations, which, in turn, deteriorates its regional and international credibility.

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