

**EUROPEAN IDENTITY & THE EUROEPAN UNION:  
THE PROSPECTS AND LIMITS**

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **EUROEPAN UNION & THE EUROEPAN IDENTITY: THE PROSPECTS AND LIMITS**

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The objective of this thesis is to analyze the concept of ‘European identity’ within the context of the European Union (EU) in terms of constructivist approach. This thesis is based on the idea that European integration project needs a shared identity; it is essential means for the success and continuity of an ‘ever closer Union’. In this context, the aim of the thesis is to find out the answers to the questions of whether the EU has a European identity; whether a post-national European identity is viable and desirable; if so, which model of identity is more viable and desirable.

Through adopting the constructivist approach the main argument of this thesis is that a European identity is as a process and project. The thesis further argues European identity as a ‘thin’ identity is still in the process of formation and its uncertain content and ‘future-oriented’ character is open to new codifications. Accordingly, the thesis contains three main parts ; the viable and desirable post-national European identity ; the EU’s identity building strategies ; the impact of European integration and the effects of identity-building strategies on both national and European identities since the 1950s to present.

Key Words: Europe, European Identity, European Union, Post-National identity, Constructivism

## ÖZ

### AVRUPA KİMLİĞİ VE AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ: OLASILIKLAR VE SINIRLAR

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Bu çalışmanın amacı Avrupa kimliği kavramını Avrupa Birliği (AB) süreci çerçevesinde Konstruktivist (inşacı) teori açısından incelenmektir. Bu tez Avrupa bütünleşme projesinin ortak bir kimliğe ihtiyaç duyduğu inancına dayanır ; bu kimlik ‘daha yakın bir birliğin’ başarısı ve devamı için hayati bir araçtır. Bu çerçevede, tezin amacı AB’nin bir Avrupa kimliğine sahip olup olmadığını; ulus-sonrası bir Avrupa kimliği olasılığını ve gerekliliğini ve hangi kimlik modelinin daha muhtemel olduğu sorularının cevabını bulmaktır.

Konstruktivist yaklaşımı benimseyen bu tezin temel iddiası Avrupa kimliğinin bir süreç ve proje olduğudur. Bunun yanında, tez Avrupa kimliğinin ‘zayıf’ bir kimlik olarak henüz oluşma sürecinde olduğunu; belirsiz içeriği ve gelecek-odaklı yapısıyla yeni tanımlamalara açık olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Bu çerçevede, ulus-sonrası bir Avrupa kimliğinin olasılığı ve gerekliliği; AB’nin kimlik inşa etme stratejileri; Avrupa bütünleşme sürecinin ve kimlik yaratma çabalarının 1950’den günümüze ulusal kimlikler ve Avrupa kimliği üzerindeki etkisi olmak üzere bu tez üç kısımdan oluşur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa, Avrupa kimliği, Avrupa Birliği, ulus-sonrası kimlik, konstruktivism

...to all who gives inspiration and strength to me

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## **CHAPTER I**

### **INTRODUCTION**

The absence, emergence, or presence of a European identity across the European Union is one of the most prominent issues for scholars and policy-makers. The concept of ‘European identity’ is a problematic in itself. It is called for a wide-ranging approach across academic literature. In the literature, there are many interpretations; the heterogeneity of the ideas of scholars on the ‘crisis of European identity’ is more intense than ever.

The concept in its various historical, cultural, social, political and economic aspects is at the centre of the debate in Europe. Initially, one could ask why this concept has become the focus of attention. The concept of “European identity” has been introduced into the political discourse and European agenda during the last three decades. It has been subject of a number of treaties and official documents.

Although the European integration project was mainly based on economic integration in its early years of 1950s; political integration was inherent to the project. If the European integration was seen by the founding fathers only as a political form of interstate co-operation, the question of a “European identity” would not arise.

In other words, the trends towards ‘ever closer Union’ from the early 1950s onwards have always rooted in normative political ideals. This means that there has been an intention to establish a ‘broader and deeper community’ and a ‘union of states and citizens’. This highly normative goal requires a ‘sense of European consciousness’ among the peoples of community, which is a European identity. For that reason, the

concept of European identity has been crucial for the success of European integration from its foundation.

In the political discourse of the integration process a “genuine” political community needs the development of a “sense of belonging”. This requirement has been recognized by European policy makers. The emergence of the concept of “identity” dates back to the early 1970s and institutional attempts to create a shared identity by strengthening of the publics’ identification with the European project emerged. In particular, the political attempts regarding the idea of a “European identity” have constantly been observed since 1970s.

The aim of the European policy-makers is to give form to a sense of belonging among the peoples of the community: so-called ‘identity of the European Union’. On this point, the essential elements of such an identity should be examined in terms of European integration project. This integration project emerged after the decline of the European hegemony in the post-colonial times as a result of the breakdown of the balance of power in the two world wars. In that time, the previous essential elements of European identity, i.e. “a superior or threatened” Europe, transformed into new elements which were “form of modernity among many” and “unity in diversity” of Europe. (Kaebler, 2005:25) That is to say, general elements of European identity have changed in the twentieth century.

With these developments, Europe has increasingly been shaped by the process of the European integration in the post-war era. In relation with this, the European integration process has been driving force in shaping the European “self”. During the Cold War, by the term ‘European identity’ the ‘West European community’ was meant.

However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breakdown of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe have led to the expansion of the EU eastwards. Since the late 1980s many of Central-East European countries have moved to join the European Union (EU), which implies the most recent redefinition of ‘Europe’ or

borders of Europe. In 2004 eight former communist countries joined the EU, which makes the question of “what it means to be European” much more complex.

In addition to these, the EU has deepened with new policy areas and widened with new members during the last decade. With these huge transformations, the flourishing in the discussion about the future of the EU has been organized around the concept of ‘European identity’. Moreover, this has created the debate of how the additional, national, religious and culture-linguistic diversity will be integrated and how the EU’s dynamic will change. And, the idea of European identity is now much more open to debate. There is a huge disagreement about the future design in the EU having twenty-five member states. For that reasons, the development of a European identity is now more critical than ever.

The initial point of this thesis is that it defines European identity in terms of identification with the EU. The thesis does not deal with European identity in terms of identification with ‘Europe’. It argues that the concept of Europe refers to civilizational dimension of such an identity and covers much broader area than the EU. This refers European cultural identity which identity exists on wider cultural models of identity; it is different form personal and collective levels of European identity. As the subject of the thesis is identification with the EU, the Council of Europe- as one of the European political institutions- is beyond the scope of the thesis. In this respect, ‘European institutions’ suggest the institutions of the EU in this thesis.

The main argument of this thesis is that the current academic and political debate concerning the problematic of European identity stems from the normative desirability and theoretical viability of a collective, post-national European identity at the EU level. Regarding the issue of European identity in the context of the EU, the problem is whether the institutional and ‘identitive’ aspects of European integration project are closely interconnected to the formation of political community. More specifically, the thesis assumes that the European institutions and “European identity” stand in a mutually constitutive relation. Not ignoring the cultural aspects of European identity, the institutions intend to contribute to the construction of

European political community in a positive way. In this sense, a shared European identity seems normatively desirable for generating a strong sense of political legitimization in evolving *sui generis* international institutions of the EU. Additionally, its possible effects on the process of European integration in the post-war era and its vital significance for launching ambitious projects of deepening and enlarging the EU in contemporary Europe highlight the desirability of European identity.

The policy-makers of the European institutions have attempted to construct an identity as an instrument in order to promote new political projects. In other words, like nation-states, the EU institutions acting as ‘identity producers’ have tried to create a political community by producing and promoting a shared identity. In sum, European identity is a relevant matter in the European integration project.

In this thesis, European identity and its components are regarded as dependent variables. That is to say, the content of identity is changing in terms of the social and political context in which it is enacted. Moreover, this thesis takes into account both institutional and empirical aspects of process of identity formation. By doing so, it could find out the effects of European integration process since 1950s.

From this background, in exploring the relationship between European identity and the European integration project in the attempt to construct and or develop a political community within the EC-EU context, it is aimed in thesis to answer to the three major questions; firstly, whether a European identity is viable and desirable at the supranational level; secondly, how the European institutions seek to construct a European identity in a political community; and thirdly whether European integration process have impact on collective identities in Europe. So this thesis consists of three chapters. It firstly examines the normative desirability and theoretical viability of a post national European identity. Later, the institutional efforts of the EU on identity with “European cultural policy” are addressed. Finally, the effects of official initiatives and policies on European identity are evaluated.

The first chapter addresses theoretical framework of the thesis and tries to clarify theoretical concepts with regard to the European identity. The concepts of European identity will be considered by seeking an answer to the desirability and the possibility of the question whether there is a European identity, and if so, what is the substance and content of such an identity. This chapter discusses why there is a need for a European identity and tries to establish links with the issues of democracy and legitimacy. After normative desirability of such an identity has been discussed, then it examines the theoretical viability of postnational European identity. In this chapter, the problem of European identity is approached from the constructivist perspective. In this context, then, the meaning of such an identity; Europe's Self and Other in widening and deepening the EU, is focused on.

The second chapter tries to examine the Union's initiatives to introduce and forge a sense of European identity or European consciousness. It focuses on the EU's official discourse and policies on identity and culture. To do so, it addresses the question of European identity as it is appropriated and shaped by the EU in the process of becoming an 'imagined community'. The main point of focus in this chapter is the 'formal' ways in which the Union is involved in building a European identity to create a political community. For that aim, the chapter examines the following questions: Which tools have been used to create such an identity? What kind of European identity emerged from these texts? Are Europe and European identity used interchangeably? Then it is questioned whether or not the appropriate means have been chosen in order to achieve the declared goals in the official documents.

The last chapter examines the previously discussed theoretical question of whether a post-national European identity is empirically possible. The purpose of the chapter is to assess the contribution of European institutions to the realization of a European identity among the EU peoples. The chapter examines the questions of whether European identity could be measured; if so, what have been the effects of the strategies of European institution on collective identities in Europe. The thesis will try to draw up the findings of theoretical and empirical conclusions in order to provide a future outlook for the European identity.

The novelty and *sui generis* character of the EU makes it difficult to examine the process of identity formation and change in Europe. Therefore, this thesis should be seen as an attempt to combine the ideas on this broad debate, rather than an attempt to find definitive answer to such complex questions.

Lastly, it should be mentioned that this thesis does not aim to touch upon all the developments in the periods of European integration since 1950s. Although European identity is closely related to a wide variety of issues ranged from legitimacy, enlargement, foreign and security policy to immigration, this thesis has not covered all aspects of the concept of European identity. The thesis limits its subject of study to the issue of European identity which constitutes the political dimension of the process of European integration. It leaves aside the question of European identity in terms of cultural and civilizational aspects. By doing so, the effects of the identity formation process can be determined since the early years of European integration. Moreover, the point of focus in this thesis is the ‘internal identity’ of the EU; ‘international identity’ of the EU is beyond the scope of this thesis.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **THEORIZING EUROPEAN IDENTITY: THE POSSIBILITY AND LIMITS OF A POST-NATIONAL EUROPEAN IDENTITY**

This chapter focuses on the problem of European identity within the context of the EU. It examines how postnational European identity is being created in a large-scale and heterogenous society like the EU. This chapter assumes that the EU integration project demands European identity, and such an identity is possible in terms of constructivist logic of identity in the EU context. Moreover, it would not replace national, regional and local identities, but complement them. Accordingly, this chapter tries to discuss possible answers to the following questions: whether or not the EU as a post-national polity has a European identity; what kind of identity is desirable and viable; what the sources of attachment and loyalty of such an identity could and should be.

#### **2.1. The Emergence of Debate on European Identity IR and European Integration Theory**

Before mentioning clear aspects of theorizing European identity, the reasons of why European identity matters in the discipline of International Relations (IR) and European integration theories should be examined. It is important to begin with the 'return journey of identity' into the discipline of IR. (Lapid, 1996) Identity is not only an analytical concept, but it is also a political concept which has gained unexpected attention in the 1990s. The end of the bloc politics and the Cold War led to the 'return of identity' into the European politics. (Lapid, 1996)

The failure of positivist approaches to deal with the end of the Cold War and the ongoing events have decreased the popularity of positivist approaches and have increased the popularity of identity as an analytical tool in IR. With the turn of constructivism into the IR theory, scholars of international relations have become

concerned with the possibility of identification beyond nation states. Thus, the discipline has begun to discuss the role of supranational identities, after discussing the role of national identities during the 1950s and 1960s.

In similar vein, the notion of European identity was ignored during the first decades of European integration theories, which are so-called conventional integration theories. The functionalist logic of those integration theories supposes that European unification automatically create the necessary identification. (Howe, 1995: 38) As a result of the developments both in European integration and in the nature of the European polity in the 1990s, constructivist approach has come to dominate theoretical and methodological approaches to integration theories in study of EU. The concept of European identity has become one of the most popular issues in European integration theories. (Cowles& Curtis, 2004:301)

Actually, the break-up of the Soviet Union, the re-unification of Germany and the end of the Cold War increased momentum of the European political integration. All of these crucial changes also stimulated the “renewed debate” on the “nature of European unity”, (Heater, 1992:192) mainly the issue of European identity. Moreover, increasing movement of migrants, workers and refugees throughout Europe have contributed to the debate concerning the emergence of new identities and new boundaries. (Laffan 1996; Cederman, 2001) The ongoing disagreements about the EU’s legitimacy deficit, the debate on eastern border of the EU, reappearance of ethnic nationalism and xenophobic reactions to the growth of multicultural diversity in Europe are other reasons for the current identity-related debates. (Cederman, 2001:1) From this background, the question of “identity” at national, ethnic and European level has become a crucial issue for both social scientists and policy-makers in Europe.

All these enormous changes are defined by some scholars as “collective identity crises, which are vertical and lateral and occur at sub-state, state, and EU levels”. (Schlesinger, 2001:92) In this sense, the debate could be seen as an effort to “give a

more specific content to the idea of European identity”. (Weaver& Kelstrop, 1993:65)

## **2.2. The Concept of Identity**

Since the Ancient times, philosophers and psychologists have been interested in how and why an individual defines him/herself. However, the concept of identity has started to attract the attention of social scientists since 1970s. It is true that the concept of identity is one of the most controversial issues in social sciences. Many disciplines have made many definitions of identity from ‘identification theory’ to the ‘social psychology’.

Actually, the discussion on identity is very complicated because of the presence of many dimensions of different approaches and various definitions of the term of identity and its constituting elements. In other words, the meaning of the term identity is ambiguous since it changes from one person to another. Also, some do not use such a concept, whereas, some ignore the concept’s coherence or it’s potential for authoritarianism. For that reason, the concept of identity should be viewed from a multidisciplinary perspective to evaluate its dept in social sciences.

It is difficult to conceptualize European identity without identifying some components of the concept of identity in general and collective identities or political identities in particular. Thus, it is necessary to outline some general assumptions of the concept, which underline the argument of this thesis. In this sense, the main questions can be asked as how we should understand and conceptualize identity and what the sources of identity are. To begin with, it is very important and useful to define the concept of “identity”. An identity consist a set of ideas and values that enable an actor to determine “who I am -we are”. (Wendt, 1994:385) It provides symbolic meaning to people’s life, by enhancing their “self” definition and their feelings of belonging. (Castells, 2001) Furthermore, the identity has a negative dimension and involves a sense of distinctiveness; it is formed and transformed through communication with others. (Kostakopolou, 2001:11) In other words, it distinguishes the Self from the Other, the ‘in-group’ from the ‘out-group’ ; it defines

their relationship. From this logic, self and other are two sides of the same coin. This self-other nexus used for the construction of all identities involve exclusivity of identity, since definition of the “Self” inevitably establishes boundaries to the “Other”. Moreover, this defining role of the other implies the subjectivity of the ‘identification process’. In this sense, “identity is a fluid, many-stranded, and negotiated phenomenon and so all identities are ipso facto ambiguous”. (Neumann, 2001:159)

According to Iver Neumann the concept of identity theorize human collectives in world politics, by “giving them an ontological status and by discussing the ways in which they are constituted and maintain themselves- the construction and continuity of them”. (Neumann, 1999: 139) As a social phenomenon, identity is a process that changes, transforms and ceases to exist. Moreover, it is certainly true that identities are multiple and exclusive, because identities can also be changing like individual’s life experience.

It is clear that the debate concerning European identity is derived from the concepts: ‘nation’ and ‘state’. (Wintle, 1996: 16) Therefore, it should be determined what is meant by political identity and collective identity in the context of nations and states, and then apply them to the European case.

It is said that there are two possible forms of identities: an individual identity and collective identity. That is to say, an identity could be individual and or collective feeling; one belongs to an entity or category which is determined by common characteristics. These two perspectives are defined as ‘personal’ and ‘social’ identities in the literature. A ‘personal’ identity refers to the individual characteristics of a being derived from his/her perception of him/herself.(Bruter, 2003) On the other hand, the ‘social’ identity emerges from the consciousness of a pre-existing group with which number of individuals will ‘identify’, and which they will together define.

Political identity as a new identity category transcends the distinction between social and personal identities. It could be defined as “the set of social and political values and principles that we recognize as ours, or in the sharing of which we feel like ‘us’, like a political group or entity”. (Cerutti, 2003: 27) Political identities are often conceived in accordance with territorial politics and citizens’ attachment to their town, nation or continent.

The concept of collective identity is another kind of identity. The concept has become important to many social scientists since the growth of the debate on state-formation and nation-building (Calhoun, 2001) The discourse of collective identity formation is based on the dichotomy between identity and difference, which means “the identification of something by separating it from the rest” (Eder, 2001: 222) It could be defined as collective “we feelings”, collective consciousness belonging and group attachments”, i.e. peoples’ sense of belonging to a community. (Delanty, 2005a: 129) In other words, a collective identity refers to large-scale social groups which have an identity. (Delanty: 2005a: 129) And, it contains norms, values and principles of political order, as in the case of national identities. (Peters, 2005: 93) Thus, it implies shared understandings of identity that have become consensual among social groups. (Risse, 2000: 201) According to Wendt, the EU is a good example of ‘collective identity formation’ in international relations, where states begin to see each other as an extension of self rather than as other. (Wendt, 1994) In the light of these considerations, this thesis examines the possibility and desirability of a collective European identity.

### **2.2.1. The Logic of Identity Formation**

The literature of theoretical debate on European identity is very rich. There are various theories on the concept of identity and identity formation. ‘Identification theory’ and ‘social identity theory’ are some of the examples. It is true that the discussion of identity occurs on several grounds. In fact, there is a disagreement about the nature of identity in the literature, which originates from the existence of various and competing views about the nature of identity concept.

It could be argued that the debate concerning the nature of identity formation revolves around essentialist and constructivist approaches. The essentialist approach insists on the relative fixity of identity. Thus, collective identity is conceived as “given” and “fixed”. It is supported by Anthony D. Smith. He argues that national collective identities are unmoved by global processes, because they are based upon ethnic or blood ties. Thus, collective identities are well established and cannot be deconstructed; and they can only remain at the national level. For this reason, Smith accepts collective identities as perfectly formed and unmoving. (Smith, 1992,1996)

In contrast to the essentialist approaches, in recent years the origins of identities have been conceived as ‘inventions’, that is ‘realities’ are imagined and constructed which are the result of a cultural, or socioeconomic process (Anderson, 1992; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983) Constructivist logic of identity emphasizes the re-constitution of the material and social worlds, and the significance of norms, rules, and values. From constructivist point of view, identities are not “given”, but the “outcome of complex systems of identification mediated through difference”.(Kostapolou,2001:11)For that reason, collective identities are constructed and imagined; hence identities are ‘felt’ rather than defined as a real; the efforts for the creation of a collective identity are “social construction of reality”. (Eder, 2001: 222)

### **2. 3. Theorizing European Identity Formation**

Considering two distinct identity formation logics, two main approaches have been used by those who have studied European identity. It is true that the discussion on the nature of identity takes place on several grounds, but the discussion is essentially between positivists and constructivists’ approaches in the literature of IR. Positivist logic is based on rational-choice approaches that assume identity as ‘given’ and ‘unchanging’. However, the constructivist view of European identity in the EU context is essentially different from rational-choice approaches as it argues that institutions include formal rules, informal norms, values, which “constitute” actors by shaping their identities and preferences.(Pollack, 2005: 22) As already indicated constructivists consider identity as socially constructed and changeable. (Lapid,

1996:7-8) Accordingly, preferences of actors are not given and fixed; and individuals' identities are shaped and reshaped by their social environment. On this view, "European identity is "is a specific construction in time and space whose content actually changes depending on the social and political context in which it is enacted" (Risse, 2001: 171).

In this respect, European identity highlights the transformative capacity of societies and expression of new conceptions of social reality (Delanty, 2005a :131) With the "rise of a constructivist turn" in the social sciences European identity has come to be considered as a 'social construct'; so it is continually constructed in a complex identification process. In other words, at collective level, identity is being continually "re-evaluated" in an ever-increasing globalized world. Therefore, constructivist approaches define European identity's fluidity and multiplicity. In this sense, European identity is not a substantive entity, but a more fluid form of identity. From this point of view, collective loyalties can be formed in a complementary manner on the regional, national and continental level.

### **2. 3. 1. The Scope of European Identity Formation: Post-National or Supranational**

The question of whether a European identity could be formed or not has been one of the most important issues in the literature of European studies since 1990s. From theoretical perspective, the concept of European identity raises the issue of possibilities of collective identity beyond territorial boundaries of nation-state.

Moreover, the question of viability of identification beyond the nation-state raises many other questions. Some of them can be asked as: Does European identity has to displace or transform national identities? How much transformation is necessary or how much loyalty for Europe is enough? Does European identity be a novel, post-national or supra-national type of identity? Indeed, all of these questions are complex and controversial both in theoretical and empirical sense. (Fossum, 2001) The questions have also political dimensions.

In the current discourse of European identity, the central problem is the possibility of emergence of European identity, that is “identity beyond nation- state”. However, it is not the question of whether the EU can create its own version of national identity. Thus, a supranational identity is the wrong model for European identity. (Delanty, 2005a: 131)

This thesis considers European identity within the context of the Union as a post-national identity formation. It means that European identity as a “form of post-national self-understanding expresses itself within, as much as beyond, national identities”. (Delanty, 2005a :131) In that respect, the problem is not the possibility of formation of the EU’s own version of national identity. Therefore, supranational identity that supposes the viability of a European identity beyond national identities is the wrong model for European identity.

### **2.3.2. The Paradox of the Search for a European Identity: The EU as an Identity Category**

Theorizing European identity is a problematic issue. Multidisciplinary review of literature indicates that there are various conceptual problems in studying the subject matter of European identity. The challenges in conceptualizing European identity stem from the concept of identity. As argued before, the concept of identity is ambiguous and contested. In addition, the concept of European identity could not be easily defined due to the unclear boundaries the concept of Europe. Thus, European identity could not be clearly and easily defined.

For some, the applicability of the EU as “superordinate category” to the concept of identity might be doubtful since the concept of identity is often defined as homogeneous unity. Yet, the EU as a highly heterogenous entity is consists of many member states which have different political, cultural and social traditions. What is more, the rapidity and the complexity in political and economic changes make the study of collective identities difficult in general and European identity in particular. (Schlesinger, 1991)

More specifically, some argue that the current requirements of theorizing identity are different from the past, since the meaning of identity with its boundaries and content might be controversial in an increasingly globalized and fragmented world. On the other hand, the contested nature of the EU's institutional structure with fuzzy boundaries raises the question of what category of identity it belongs to. In that sense, Europe or the EU can not be considered like unity of nation-state.

From positive perspective, one implication of the conception of European identity is that national loyalties and interests are subordinated to collective norms and policies. (Citrin& Sides, 2004:162) From negative point of view, the concept of European identity serves as the "disdained other" by drawing psychological and political boundaries. (Citrin& Sides, 2004:162) Furthermore, for some Euro-skeptics, the process of European integration that means the creation of a federal super-state is seen as a threat to sovereignty and policy autonomy of nation-state and to the very coherence of national identity.

Because of the reasons that are mentioned above, this chapter adopts a multidisciplinary approach. Examination of the concept from various approaches and various disciplines might provide a powerful framework for defining the meaning and prospects of the contested nature of European identity.

### **2.3.3. 'The Identity of the EU'**

Theorizing European identity needs a clearly defined the framework of analysis. Many questions should be asked to make clear about the persistence or absence of certain characteristic that are distinct, identity-building character and the depth of such an identity. And, the guiding question must focus on how the European identity should be interpreted.

In this respect, some preliminary explanations are needed for theorizing the concept. Firstly, the idea of Europe, as a broadly defined, cultural category and the concept of European identity should be clearly differentiated. Indeed, this thesis is based on the two distinct meanings of European identity. The first one is the attachment loyalty

and identification with European integration project, whereas, the second one is concerned with the broader cultural and civilizational identity of Europe. (Risse, 2004a: 271) This thesis also stresses that Europe and the EU are not the same thing. The concept of 'Europe' and the 'EU' mean different things for different people. (Breakwell 2004; Bruter 2004) Relatedly, it is very important to make a distinction between 'European identity' and 'the identity of the EU'. It is true that the former refers to the identification with the whole continent of Europe as a cultural category. However, the latter refers to the identification of the EU as an entity. From this distinction, individual could feel a sense of belonging to Europe, but they could not feel attached to the EU; and vice versa. (Risse, 2004a: 271) Therefore, the sense of belonging to Europe and the EU has different connotations.

However, some scholars argue that the EU has increasingly gained monopoly on the idea of Europe and identity. According to Brigid Laffan, identification with Europe and identification with the EU could be used interchangeably. (Laffan, 2004) It would mean that the EU increasingly fills the meaning of Europe. Hence, 'the identity of the EU' implies "institutional construction of European identity" within the EU context.(Delanty, 2005b) To put it another way, a need for a shared European identity could be called as a search for the "European Union's identity". (Cederman, 2001: 233) However, the construction of the "European self" as an individual or "feeling of Europeanness" or "being a European" could not be seen as the same being of a citizen of a member states of the EU.(Risse, 2004a: 252)

Another problem while trying to define European identity is asking the question of what a collective identity is: Is it an identity for Europe or for individuals? This thesis supposes that collective European identity should not be "understood as a consequence of the political identity or cultural 'idea' of Europe, or as a result of institutional processes, or as the outcome of conscious constructive efforts". (Kohli, 2000) To some extent, it should not be regarded as a "variety of interlinking collective identities, an aggregation of personal identities, or civilizational idea or an official EU cultural or political identity". (Delanty, 2005a: 129) This thesis argues

that European identity is a collective identity construction in a much more complex society and large-scale entity than national societies. (Eder, 2005: 197)

#### **2.4. Normative Desirability of European Identity**

European identity and identity-related issues are increasingly gaining a central role in the debates about the future of the EU. To the extent, a shared European identity is related to the critical policy areas of the EU such as, enlargement, constitutional policy and immigration policies. In this respect, it is very important to ask the question is whether the process of co-operation in Europe could not successfully be continued without European identity or not. More specifically, the issue is whether the European citizens really need to develop an identity or not.

While the European community was founded as an economic entity, its founding fathers always had a goal to create a political union. Initially, the Single European Act marked this goal. Then, the Treaty of Maastricht established the European Union as a political institution. It is definitely true that the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Amsterdam provided greater power to the EU institutions. The EU has become to affect politically sensitive areas that had hitherto been dealt with at the nation-state level and the institutions of the EU have begun to affect even deeper people's everyday lives. (Brewer & Herman, 2004: 3) In sum, these remarkable progress highlight that the EU is more than transnational decision-making and security community.

Meanwhile, the theme of "legitimacy crisis" or the so-called "democratic deficit" has become a common theme in the discussions of the EU's post-Maastricht evolution. In fact, institutional weakness of the EU and enlargement towards Eastern Europe has created the growing 'legitimacy crisis' among the members.

Then, the notion of European identity has emerged on the European policy agenda since the formation of European collective identity is seen vital for creating a democratic European polity in a political union. To put it another way, the process of European integration needs a collective identity.

In addition, in terms of continuity or stability of the system, an identity is seen as a necessary precondition for the stability of political entity. It can be considered as one of the reasons why the concept of identity obtains such an important significance in the European integration debate. Moreover, unprecedented success of European integration on peace and prosperity create the question whether the success could remain in times of crises, such as depressions or wars when perceived benefits may withdraw. More specifically, European identity decreases popular resistance against the forging of Europe.

It has been argued that the obstacles for the formation of a European collective identity have arisen in efforts on the creation of a post-national political union. (Schmidtke, 1998:45) Therefore, normative desirability of the European identity should be discussed in the context of formation of a political union. The logic of desirability of European identity is based on the idea that every institutional order needs a collective identity which creates loyalty and defines the membership. It is true that currently vast majority of democratic theorists tend to agree that democratic governance requires *demos*. The supporters of “demos needed thesis” argue that the EU regard the common identity as crucial for the legitimation of the EU (Brewer, 2004; Eriksen 2005) In sum, making the European institutions completely legitimate requires the development of common identity which is different from both national and cultural identity and is not opposite to diversity and change. (Cerutti: 2003: 26–45)

## **2.5. Theoretical viability of European identity**

As it is mentioned before, the idea of postnational identity formation is based on the possibility of loyalty changes beyond nation-state. In fact, a collective identity beyond the level of the nation state raises many questions. Firstly, it is needed to ask whether a single European identity is possible or not. And then, how it ought to be produced and what models it ought to be understood. To evaluate on these questions, it is very important to figure out certain aspects on the issue. There are various

classifications about the viability of European identity that is based on different standpoints.

### **2.5.1. Primordialism versus Constructivism**

It might be said that the debate of viability of such an identity revolves around essentialist and constructivist approaches. (Cederman, 2001: 10) It can be possible to mention that current tendency on the conceptualizing of European identity may be viewed as a move from the essentialist to the constructivist approach. Yet, the tension between two approaches is continuing. The first approach sees European identity as a threat to the national identities; the second approach sees it as an opportunity.

For some scholars, the possibility of a European identity is based on essentialist approaches. Essentialist articulations of European identity are rather pessimistic about the formation of European identity. Primordialist version of essentialist logic of identity is primarily based on cultural variables that are seen as “given”.(Risse, 2004b: 166) On the other hand, ethno-nationalist version of essentialism regards national identity as “the combination of modern socio-political constitutions and the pre-modern, ethnic elements”. (Kostakopoulou, 2001: 23) Therefore, the approach is based on the idea that structure and substance of identities are unitary, fixed and inflexible. For instance, Anthony D. Smith’s skepticism about European identity is based on ethno-nationalist assumptions. He argues that national identities are vivid, accessible and well established. For Smith, Europe lacks a “pre-modern past- , a pre-history which can provide it with emotional substance and historical dept.” (Smith, 1991: 62)

As stressed before, social constructivism has become prominent in European integration theories and in IR in the last decade. (Smith, 1999) It also has come to dominate the ways of conceptualizing European identity. As Constructivists’ approaches are based on socially constructed identities, they are essentially optimist about the viability of a European identity. However, there are some disagreements among constructivists scholars about the viability of a European identity. Some

constructivists are doubtful about the feasibility of “European identity-building enterprise” because of the salience of existing national loyalties and identifications. Others are less skeptical by assuming that post-national European identity is already in the making process; in spite of the presence of disagreement about its substance and content. (Risse, 2004b) According to constructivist logic of identity formation, the connection between cultural variables such as ethnic belongings, religious affiliations and collective identities is considered as conditional, weak and reconstructable. (Risse 2004b: 167) For that reason, the emergence of collective identities does not depend on preexisting cultural essence, but socially constructed identities. Accordingly, the question of how European identity is being created or which European identity is being created should be examined in terms of political and collective European identity.

### **2.5.2. The Possibility of Political Identity and Collective Identity**

As argued above, the argument of viability of European identity raises the question of what kind of European identity is viable for the EU. Moreover, the deep effects of European integration process leads to create a crucial question of what kind of identity should be possible for the future of the Union. This thesis uses constructivist perspective to understand elusive European identity. The optimistic visions on the formation of European identity could be categorized in three types of identity: political identity, cultural identity and collective identity. However, the thesis explores the possibility of political and collective identity in a heterogonous society like the EU can be possible.

One classification of European identity is political identity. Supporters of European political identity argue that reject the link between European history and culture for the success of European project. (Weaver, 1997: 67) Unlike the arguments of Smith about the critical importance of shared traditions, myth and memory, Ole Weaver regards history and myth as less relevant to the politics. (Weaver, 1997: 67) On that view, the “lack of cultural identity among the Europeans cannot be used as an argument against the possibility of their political identity”.(Cerutti, 2003: 28) Because of the weak cultural basis of a sense of common cultural identity within the

context of the EU , some scholars propose a civic sense of European identity that is based on a shared commitment to civic values. To the extent, the absence of a European cultural core would not prevent the potential emergence of a European political identity since political culture is separated from national culture through establishing a democratic political culture with which citizen's identify at the European level.(Huymans, 1997: 159) In this sense, the nation could be reference point of cultural identification but no longer for political identification. Thus, the EU is the main focus of political identity which would unite Europe by a shared political culture. (Huymans, 1997: 159)

The supporters of European political identity assume that the possible contradiction of European and national, sub-national identities could be prevented by defining Europe with civic terms rather than cultural-ethnic ties. Thus, European political identity is established by European law, politics, the public sphere and civil society, which relies on attachment that arises through participation in shared institutions based on liberal political principles. (Citrin and Sides, 2004: 162) As a result, a new concept of pluralistic and inclusive European identity would recognize the significance of diversity as a defining characteristic of European identity. (Laffan, 1996; Schmithke, 1998)

It is widely agreed that developing an overarching European identity seems necessary in order to support and to stabilize the EU. However, it is argued that this identity should not be an ethno-cultural identity, but it should be developed as a political identity. (Weaver, 1997: 92) The new identity landscape is seen as a “complex model of different kinds of politics and identities regional, national and European”. (Weaver, 1997: 92) Indeed, political identities are not based on pre-existing commonalities. On the contrary, they are based on shared interests, objectives and projects. In this view, ‘we-feeling’ the nations of Europe are increasingly drawing their identities from an increasing EU civic culture.

In the light of these considerations, European political identity relies on “pluralistic and complex sense of belonging” and provides “identification with Europe as a new

political space”. (Kastaryano, 2001:4) Thus, ethnic, regional, religious and national identities are considered private identities. Moreover, national identity has emotion and ethnic defined content; so, European identity should be rooted in normative values such as peace, democracy, human rights and diversity and tolerance.

In fact, the main concern of this thesis is to examine the possibility and limits of a collective identity in a *sui generis* polity, i.e. in the EU. The emergence of concept of “collective identity” within the European context seems the search for a more profound foundation of the process of European integration. (Habermas, 1992:17) In this respect, the emergence of a European collective identity would provide a strong sense of belonging to each other. However, there are various approaches and various classifications concerning collective European identity, which is based on different standpoint in relation to the perceptions of the integration process as a polity.

### **2.5.3. National-Identity Theory and European Identity**

Theories of nation-state formation and of national identity are used to understand the possibility of post-national European identity in an enlarged EU. (Cederman, 2000) Most scholars consider the question of European identity from the existence of well-established national identities of the EU. (Fossum, 2001) In the last ten years, in terms of the possibility of European identity, scholars have been faced with many questions about the compatibility of European and sub-European (particularly national) identities. Since the EU is composed of many nation-states, the compatibility of national identities and European identity have been the subject of controversy in the context of European integration project.(Kostakopoulou, 2001 17) However, serious doubts about the ability of the EU for generating a collective identity stem from various obstacles in creation of national identities. Thus, the concept of European identity unavoidably creates the question of what the relationship of such an identity with national identity is. Moreover, ongoing enlargement process have intensified the question of how European and other identities go together to build a European polity. For these reasons, European and national identities are related to each other, but this relatedness is controversial.

The concept of national identity is usually used by scholars in defining the role and meaning of European identity. (Cederman, 2000) More specifically, the debates about European integration and European collective identity are derived from the concepts of 'nation' and 'state'. Therefore, it will be useful to determine what is meant by collective identity in the context of nations and states, and then apply it to the European case. Detailed discussion of the use of the concepts of nationalism and national identity in the literature is beyond the scope of this thesis. The concepts of nationalism and national identity are used in different meanings. This chapter tries to capture some aspects of the concepts in the literature that are used in the debate about European unification.

It is widely accepted that nation-states and national identity are the concepts of the nineteenth century, when political leaders intentionally tried to foster an idea of national community. After the French Revolution, "identification of nationality with the state" indicates that nations gave to the nation-state cultural basis, an idea of belonging and togetherness. European nation-state as a political unit has been built on the notion of common cultural belonging that is based on a shared language, territory, cultural habits. (Schmidtke, 1997: 45) This was the construction of collective identity in national building process. In other words, nation-states as an organizing force in Europe played a decisive role in the development of national identity and scholars underline assumptions about European identity formation and expectations about European integration.

From national-identity, it is assumed that community-building in the EU needs some form of homogeneity, such as ethnic, cultural homogeneity. The nation-state model would lead to the pessimistic conclusion. The prospects of a European identity is weak since the EU lacks the shared myths, symbols, common history, memories, shared cultural heritage and ethnic history. In sum, the Union has not had vital elements which are needed for national community building. Some other scholars argue that the uniqueness of the Union structure needs new conceptual tools and needs to reconceptualize old concepts. (Howe, 1995: 27-46)

#### **2.5.4. The Relationship of European and National Identities: Clash or Coexistence**

The fall of the iron curtain in 1989 reinforced the debate about the concepts of European identity, national identity and their relationship. There are various ways in conceptualizing the relationship between European and other identities. The relationship between collective identities could be competing or conflicting. There could be different reasons why national identities and transnational identity, in this case European identity, may be both conflictual and complimentary. National, sub-national identities and European identity might clash in some social and political contexts on both the European and national level, politicians have used of these concepts in order to promote either European integration or a Europe-skeptic attitude. Those opposing the idea of European identity assume that the development of the EU reduces the importance of the nations and of sub-national units.

There are many theoretical positions defining the options for analyzing the national-European combination of collective identities. Accordingly, collective identities could be nesting each other (as in the case of national, sub-national or regional identities) or overlapping. (Peters, 2005: 93) From a pessimistic interpretation, collective identities through overlapping memberships may be competing. On the other hand, one identity gaining strength might weaken allegiance of another identity. (Peters, 2005: 93) In this sense, some kind of competition might emerge between national identities and regional identities or national identities in the EU and European collective identity. More importantly, in the case of the relationship between national and European identities, one possibility is whether European identity would replace national identities.

Another possibility in relationship between collective identities is whether there would be a co-existence of multiple identities in a compatible with each other. One can argue that the issue of European identity is no longer discussed in terms of the compatibility of European and national identities. Currently, the question is “how multiple identities relate to each other”. (Risse, 2004b: 168) Against the model of competition between European and national identities, the second approach considers

the multiplicity of identities in a complementary relationship between national and European identities. Europeans have multiple identities like all other peoples. Accordingly, European identity should not be defined as an opposite or as an alternative to national identity.

### **2.5. 5. The Compatibility of National Identity and European Identity**

There are various approaches trying to describe the process of European identity formation.

From one perspective, “European and national identities are always fluid and contextual, contested and contingent, and discursively shaped under various forms of inclusion and exclusion”. (Strath & Malborbg 2001:5) On that view, the creation of the peoples of Europe is not more controversial than national citizens.

There is a tendency in the literature that a process of formation of European identity does not resemble the nineteenth-century process of national identity or nation-building. (Schlesinger, 1996; Laffan, 1996) It is argued that European identity should not be compared with national and sub-national identities. The distinction between European and national identity formation stems from the lack of “nationhood and statehood” in the EU. (Delanty, 2005b) Moreover, the lack of cultural unity, that is shared language, a uniform media, education systems may distinguish the EU from the nineteenth-century nation-state. For this reason, Europe could not be defined in terms of the concepts ‘state’ and ‘nation’; nation-type identity could not be applied to the Europe. (Fossum, 2001; Schmithke, 1997 :44) If the possibility of creating European identity in this type is weak, so other alternative approaches like transformation of national identity or the emergence of a postnational identity as a novel type of identity could be explored.

In this respect, some scholars are now primarily concerned with the question that is whether constructing a salient European identity is possible without the features of national-type identity or not. For that reason, the focus is on the lack of fundamental element for identity development such as clear physical or intellectual lines of differentiation between Europeans and non-Europeans.

In Europe, national identities are strongly influenced by profound common experiences and shared cultural histories that will not easily be replaced by European identity. (Peters, 2005) There are many national identities and their contents are different, but those national identities are conditioned by existing diversities in specific historical developments. However, they share several common elements that would allow for the formation of a common European identity. It can be possible to say that all national identities in Europe contain elements of European identity to some extent. Thus, European identity is not an identity that exists beyond or outside national identities. (Malmberg & Strath 2002) It implies that there could be multiple identities and European identity preserve in national identities. (Risse, 2004b: 167) One could feel a sense of belonging both to the EU and to nation-state. After accepting the complementary relationship between European identity and national identity, it is possible for the European identity not necessarily to exclude national and sub-national identities.

While the appeal to national identity is complicated in each country, it is often argued that national identity has some primacy over other collective identities. (Peters, 2005:93) As Delanty argues that “the idea of morally superior European identity transcends national identity must be rejected as an implausible construction”. (Delanty, 2005a:138) It is true that European identity does not replace the national identity, but “reinterprets it as another repository of the same ideals and principles for which Europe stands”. (Soysal: 2002: 65) Since national identities are not likely to disappear, the possible option is to impose or to create a wider sense of belonging. This wider sense of belonging at EU level might be thin, which has a minimal common identity in sense of the national identity. As a result, European identity as a “composite identity” complements national and regional identities”. (Soysal: 2002: 65)

## **2. 6. Models for European Identity Formation**

Having clarified the conceptual framework of European identity through utilizing the essentialist-constructivist divide and national-identity model, different types of

identity formation should now be examined. There are many approaches in the literature, which try to present a model for the formation of a viable European identity. There is also a continuing tendency to posit the alternative models in European identity. However, three models of collective European identity are examined in this chapter in order to find out the consequences of each option for a viable European identity within the EU context. These are the Lars-Erik Cederman's "bounded integration", Habermasian "constitutional patriotism" and Gerard Delanty's "cosmopolitan European identity". (Cederman, 2000)

### **2.6.1. Bounded Integration Model**

The first model for a viable European identity that will be analyzed in terms of theoretical viability of European identity is the 'bounded integration' approach, which is introduced by Cederman. It is within the current post-national approaches. It relies on constructivist identity formation theory. Cederman claims that the "bounded integration" provides analytical starting point for supranational identity formation. However, he does not deny the difficulties of creating a supranational identity that transcends beyond the nation-state. This approach suggests that the European identity is unlikely to form on the supranational level. Therefore, nation state will remain the main locus of identification where the existing national identities will continue to stay in power. (Cederman, 2000: 7)

Cederman's bounded integration approach as an 'interactive approach' is based on social boundaries, which is seen as central to the identity formation instead of culture (Cederman, 2001: 3). It is the social boundaries that shape the process of European identity through inclusionary or exclusionary mechanisms. He assumes the external interaction as the main "independent variable" and the European identity as "dependent variable". Using social boundaries as a starting point, this approach excludes European cultural identity as the basis of assumption. Instead, it analyzes reproduction of the national identities and the emergence of "new mass-based layer of political identification" that will ultimately constitute a viable European *demos*. (Cederman, 2000: 28)

In this regard, the European identity is formed in internal and external processes of identity formation at the European and national levels; thus it is not a “given” phenomena. In other words, the self-images of the EU emerge in its interaction with the non-European environment in both inclusion and exclusion processes.(Cederman, 2001) For that reason, the possibility of ‘trade-offs’ between exclusion and inclusion processes make a new post-national European identity. This as an ‘external logic of identity formation’ is a fluid and affected by new conditions.

Lastly, Cederman argues that “in the cultural sense a thick, coherent European identity does not exist”, but it might be a “thin post-national identity”. (Cederman, 2001: 248) He further argues that the “bounded integration” could be more possible model for the European identity formation than the other post-national models in the situation where national identity is still most powerful collective identities. (Cederman, 2001: 249)

### **2.6.2. Constitutional Patriotism**

The ‘constitutional patriotism’ has been presented by its best known contemporary proponent, Jürgen Habermas. Habermas stresses on the necessity of separation of democratic political culture from national culture. (Huymans, 1995:159) According to this view, nation could remain as a reference point for cultural identification, and the EU is the main reference point for political identification. More specifically, because of the weak cultural basis of a common European identity, ‘constitutional patriotism’ is based on a civic European identity. (Habermas,1994)

This model is one of the post-national approaches, which is based on an identity with constitutional principles and “the recognition of constitutionally entrenched democratic values and human rights”. (Fossum, 2001: 27) This constitutional Europe is beyond the nation-state in terms of identification and democracy. According to Habermas, in a liberal democracy, citizens should not be identified with a common cultural identity; the constitutional principles like human rights, the rule of law should be the core elements of collective identities and constitutional principles guarantee Europeans’ rights and freedoms.

It might be argued that the idea of a ‘constitutional patriotism’ model is an attractive conception of European identity for at least three reasons. Firstly, it does not need to identify an ‘other’ to exclude it as a means of self-definition. Secondly, it is not an identity connected to the European Union and its institutions but to European constitutional practice which is seen as a whole. Its commitment is to constitutionalism and the ideals, not to a particular constitution. For this reasons, it also provides that constitutional patriotism is deeper than an exclusive focus on the institutions of the European Union could provide. Moreover, it means that a European identity is not in conflict with national identities, but enriches and deepens the understanding of various nationally focused identities.

### **2.6. 3. Cosmopolitan European Identity**

The third model, ‘cosmopolitan European identity’ is advanced by Delanty. He rejects reductive attempts to define European identity as a cultural or political identity; he suggests that the emerging European identity is not a supranational European identity, but a ‘cosmopolitan identity’. (Delanty, 2005a: 139)

According to Delanty, one of the most striking features of European identities is that they arise in ‘discursive contexts’, which means that they are highly diverse and reflexively articulated.(Delanty, 2005a, 2005b) As a kind of cosmopolitan societal identity it is based on the option of the EU as post-national right-based polity. (Delanty, 2005a) It is “embodied in the cultural models of a “societal or civilizational” identity rather than as official EU identity in tension with national identities”. (Delanty, 2005a: 131) He argues that “a cosmopolitan European identity is not supranational identities that transcend the identities but one that exists within and alongside them”. (Delanty, 2005a: 128)

In his view, ‘cosmopolitan European identity’ does not rely on shared culture but on “recognition of difference consisting of ability to see other within the self and oneself as other”. Thus, in the cosmopolitan heritage of Europe, the European identity is defined by Europe’s conflict, traumas and fears.(Delanty, 2003 :354) These conflicts

has been transformed from religious conflicts to national conflicts and to the current multicultural conflicts. In the light of these considerations, Delanty rejects to define European identity as a cultural or political identity based on peoplehood in the traditional sense. For him, in Europe “cosmopolitanism entails precisely the absence of secure reference points for identity, whether constitutional or those associated with specific political, national or cultural traditions”. (Delanty, 2005b: 9) Stemming from the fact there is the mosaic of national, regional and political identities, “to be European” is neither a matter of culture nor of politics. Instead, the condition of being European might be identified with the “cosmopolitan spirit”.(Delanty, 2005b)

Delanty rejects particularistic and universalist models of European identity in order to define some distinctive elements of such an identity. (Delanty, 2005b) For him, there is not difference between ‘European’ and ‘global’ in the universalistic model of European identity. Therefore, a distinctive or meaningful European identity should have some distinctive characteristics. However, both cultural and political identities are not part of a coherent collective European identity in any meaningful sense. The absence of a strong, clearly defined European identity does not mean that there are weaker expressions of European identity. This means that European identity as belongings of a “European people” is not an already existing identity, but an open-ended process of cultural and institutional experimentation”.(Delanty, 2003: 356-357)

These three different models regard the emergence of post-national European identity as viable. Stemming from this fact, some conclusions concerning the political implications of the approaches should be mentioned. Initially, the multiplicity of models raises the question of which kind of a model of European identity is more desirable and suitable among various models and what kind of identity needs for what kind of politics. Regarding these different conceptual models, it should be noted that all of the above statements on the possibility of a post-national European identity try to balance the perceived negative aspects of national identities. Yet, they remain as projections and uncertain possibilities of the relationship between the national and European identities. This is because of abstractness that

these theoretical models, the real life cannot be clearly explained only by one theoretical approach. For that reason, it is difficult to say that one theoretical approach could be more suitable and desirable than other models.

## **2.7. Self and Other in the EU**

After underlining the various approaches concerning European identity in terms of political and collective meanings, (the center of attention does not on a discussion of whether such an identity could exist at all, if so,), then the question emerges who is included and who is excluded. The collective identities not only describe the content and substance of what it means to be a member of a group, but also describe the boundaries of the group who is in and who is out. From the same logic, it is expected that European identity, through its Self and Other(s), describes ‘who the Europeans are’ and ‘who the non-Europeans are’. By this way, European self and European others could be clarified. In this context, the first problem emerges as the unclear boundaries of Europe. One of the reasons of the vagueness of European identity stem from unclear boundaries of such identity. The EU now ends at the former East-West border of the Cold War. Yet, it will expand toward the East and South-East the next ten years.

As Hartmut Kaelble stresses, the European self-understanding has come to be shaped by European integration. (Kaelble, 2005: 25) The EU has formally defined European Self - “who the European is”- those who have EU citizenship and those Europeans who are supposed to share a collective identity. (Eder, 2005:198) However, European Self should be different from being Western or from being American at least in the sense that “the nature of self-recognition in the description ‘European’ is distinctive. (Delanty, 2005b)

As “the boundaries of the collective identity of Europeans are still contested”, the Self of the EU is not clear within this context. The vagueness of the boundaries brings about the questions of “who should be a European” and “who should not”, which has created the problem of European identity (Eder, 2005: 198) For instance, “some identify themselves as Europeans but are not considered by Europeans to be

Europeans” as the Turkish people (Eder, 2005: 200)

In recent debates, it is assumed that the EU needs an “Other” to increase the integration of its “Self”. (Neumann, 2001: 159) Neumann considers the Self as an “active and ongoing part of identity formation” and states that the creation of social boundaries is “a priori ingredients” of identity formation.(Neumann, 2000: 35) Furthermore, it is essential to define the Others of the EU in order to describe the substance of European identity. This is because if the “Europeans” could not say “who we are”, it could be much easier to say who “we are not”. During the Cold War, the image of common enemy- Communism- was used to foster integration and help people identify with supranational collective entity. However, the widening and deepening efforts the EU has come to go together with a redefinition of its former Other(s) as seen in the last Central and Eastern enlargement. By doing so, the EU has reconstructed the images of the Other.

For some scholars, the EU has many others that are referred to and represented in a context-dependent way such as there are many Others of Europe like Islamic fundamentalism, the United States of America (USA), Turkey (Risse, 2004b :167, Risse 2004a: 259;Yurdusev, 2005) The major expressions of negative identifications against the USA consolidated itself in the protests in 2003 after the Iraqi War. (Habermas& Derrida, 2003) Yet, the otherness of the USA is not widespread in all members of the Union, namely new comers from the East. With regard to Islam, the main question is whether or not European identity can represent Islam; that is, Islam is the Europe’s Self or Other. According to Talad Asad, the European identity should be able to “allow for multiple ways of life” in order to embody Islam (Pagden, 2002 : 227)

In fact, there is an intensive debate in the EU on the limits of external and internal exclusion. It is clear that “there is no fixed assessment of what Europe constitutes positively” and that “there are no fixed European others”. (Risse, 2004a: 258) As enlargement debates show, it can be argued that the EU is still lacking clear boundaries as well as its Self and Other(s). As Delanty argues “if there is not a

European self, there cannot be an easily defined other”. From this background, it might be argued that there is no European self confronting the Other.(Delanty, 2005b) Thus, Europe is still defined by “overlapping and unclear boundaries”.(Risse, 2004 :170)

Actually, it is not clear that all identities are formed in against external, non-European (Cederman, 2001:235) According to Weaver, attempt to define European identity in terms of Other could not be viable as a result of the absence of a significant external threats.(Weaver, 1997: 204) Similarly, Neumann claims that the attempt to create a European identity could not be similar as demarcation of boundaries between “self” and “other” in the “digital” and exclusionary manner of the nation-state. (Neumann, 2001: 160) For him, to make a uniform European identity with a homogeneous group and clear boundaries might not be possible because the institutional structure of the EU is “very graded and overlapping set of political entities”.(Neumann: 2001: 161) In this view, the new European identity formation and institutional demarcation occurs in an ‘analogy way’. (Neumann, 2001: 161) In the view of Weaver, European identity should be defined in its “internal characteristics and inherent principles” (Wilson, 1997:204) Therefore, it might be said that within the context of the EU the European identity implies “the idea of a European “self” which is emerging to fill the space created by European integration” (Delanty, 2001: 32) Yet, the idea of European Other might not be needed in order to create and support European Self.

## **2. 8. European Identity and the EU Enlargement**

The debate about the European identity is closely related to the issue of enlargement. The possibility and development of a European collective identity is often analyzed within the context of the enlargement since territorial expansion of the EU requires to be considered in the construction of a common European identity. In fact, the debate on enlargement has been at the heart of the EU’s identity and self-understanding from the beginning. Furthermore, “Europe has started to rediscover itself as a possible identitarian space linking the North and the South, the East and the West” since the end of East-West divide in 1989.(Eder, 2006 :262). In other words, the

expansion of the European integration to the East and North has increased the discussion of the European identity. In that sense, the EU faces big challenges from the enlargement process concerning the problem of its own identity. In this respect, the debate on enlargement raises the question of what is the meaning of membership in emerging EU polity.

The debate on enlargement of the EU could be conceived from the contradictions between rationalist and constructivist approaches. While rationalist approaches emphasize “material cost/ benefit calculations” (Schmielefning & Sedelmeier, 2002: 523), constructivist approaches underline the vitality norms, identity and values on the consideration of enlargement process. From constructivist logic, the ‘enlargement puzzle’ of the EU and its link to the issue of European identity can be explained by the border of the EU, its exclusionary and inclusionary politics. In this approach, “community” is defined as shared collective identity, essential beliefs, norms and values (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002)

More specifically, the member states of the EU share the constitutive values and norms that are the essence of the so-called to “be European” or the “European identity”; thus, the applicant states should be “European” in this logic and in official sense. From this logic, the relationship between the member states and the applicant states is defined by those values and norms. As Laffan argues the membership rules of the EU is one dimension of the EU as “identity builders”. (Laffan, 2004: 77) If “to be European” is based on liberal-democratic political values, which are the foundations of the EU (Schimmelfennig, 2001), the decisions of enlargement show that the applicant states share collective identity, values and norms of the Union. (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002: 515) On that view, the limits of enlargement and the borders of the Union accord the cultural borders of the community and formal borders of the organization.

It is clear that the successive enlargements of the EU have brought a “greater diversity of membership to the EU, in terms of individual historical experiences, relationships with the rest of the world, political traditions, conceptions of

nationhood, ethnicity and religion”. (Farell, 2001: 3) In other words, the enlargement of the EU leads to the further pluralization of identities, which means that expanding EU dilutes European identity. This means that the question of how European identity can be developed under the condition of the EU's increasingly diverse nature. For that reason, the possibility of a single European identity is less expectable. (Delanty, 2005a: 139)

From the point of the constructivist approach, identities are flexible and they are shaped and reshaped through communicative process. (Sjuersen, 2002: 509). In this respect, one of the most controversial issues regarding the EU enlargement is the membership of Turkey. The acceptance of Turkey as a candidate shows that European identity is dependent on ‘malleable and shaped by public-political discourses’.(Sjuersen, 2002: 509) Some scholars argue that there is a clear difference between how the EU addressed the former communist countries of Eastern Europe in the accession negotiations compared to the EU’s attitude towards Turkey. The former groups were held to be “one of us” while with regard to Turkey the questions were held to be compliance with the criteria for democracy and human rights. (Eriksen, 2005: 257) As Eriksen argues that though “there is no kinship feeling with Turkey “, the EU has committed itself to enlarge it. (Eriksen, 2005: 257)

According to Klaus Eder, there are ‘three overlapping circles of Euroepans’; “the core Europeans, not-yet core-members, and potential Europeans”. (Eder, 2005 :201). In this view, ‘not-yet Europeans’ and ‘potential Europeans’ constitute the peripheral Europeans ; the division between those core-peripheral Europeans shape the dynamic of European identity construction. (Eder, 2005 :201). In other words, the construction of a European identity is located in struggles among these core and peripheral Europeans. From this point of view, “the construction of a European collective identity is constantly being challenged” because of the “variety of not-yet Europeans or those considered not be Europeans”. (Eder, 2005: 201)

Moreover, ongoing enlargement of the EU indicate that creating the European identity takes time since identification and loyalty among Europeans are still in the

process of being created. Yet, such process does not emerge out of a ‘smooth political development’. (Spohn, 2005: 13) As Willfried Spohn stresses that “the construction of social evolution of a European identity” requires both “a successful short-term completion of Eastern enlargement and a long-term socio-economics and cultural integration of an enlarged European society”. (Spohn, 2005: 13) As a result, the analysis of the EU’s enlargement process suggests that the constitutive values of the European Union, “normative dimension of the EU as identity builder”, what ‘Europe’ represents and what has been manifested in the Copenhagen criteria; represent the key building blocks for this enlargement round. (Laffan, 2004)

## **2. 9. ‘Sui Generis’ European Identity in Open-Ended, Future-Oriented Union**

As we have seen above, the answer of the question of what should be basis of European identity changes according to various positions. Despite absence of a consensus among scholars, some agreement can be reached. Recently, there is a tendency to conceptualize European identity in novel terms. It is argued that the European identity is different from the conventional type of identities. The uniqueness of the European identity stems from spatial and temporal dimensions of collective identities. The temporal dimension of collective identities rooted in traditions, commonly shared memories. In terms of temporal dimension, the EU is weak in comparison with nation-states. Spatial dimension of collective identities linked to land or territory. In a nation-state territorial boundaries define the limits of national identity. The EU’s unclear borders create elusive, ambiguous European identity.

Therefore, the EU creates the question of how the European identity should be conceived. (Calhoun, 2001: 51) The answer of the question is that the basis of the European identity is contested, which means that European identity is a contested concepts and the “efforts of its conceptualization occurs in flux” (Cederman, 2001: 21) For this reason, there is no concise definition that would capture all essential elements of that identity. But there are some general agreements.

It is clear that the EU is increasingly complex and multilayered; hence it tends to be characterized by many authorities, loyalties and identities of many actors. In this sense, the construction of European identity takes place in a multi-layered context where ‘multiple identities’ confront each other. Thus, “Europe is on level of identity formulation that intersects with the national level or other levels”. (Ifversen, 2000: 14) This highlights contested and unique nature of European identity which might be called as “sui generis identity”. (Delanty, 1997: 32)

For that reason, many scholars underlying the uniqueness of the Union structure argue a need for re-conceptualization of the old concepts through new conceptual tools. (Howe, 1995) On that view, it becomes difficult for theorizing the concept of European identity in terms of existing type of identity formation and community building. European identity-building process does not resemble the nineteenth-century process of national identity and community-building. (Kostakopoulou, 2001; Schlesinger, 1992; Laffan, 1996) From this perspective, only the “poly-national, poly-ethnic and multi-centric Europe” could be able to articulate a different kind of European identity that is not based on the fiction of a European people or a territorial domain. (Delanty, 2004: 20) Moreover, the EU is a complex entity with its supranational, translational and intergovernmental features. (Fossum, 2001) This suggests that it may be contributing to a wide range of identities and forms of belonging, hence European identity could be defined a novel type of identity. In this sense, the EU could be defined as a novel model for “postmodern identity construction”. (Eder, 2002: 238) And, the concept of European identity as a “uniquely, contextualized’ phenomenon in time and space; the formations of post-national identity-building should be considered as a unique experience. (Cederman, 2001: 21)

If we take Europe as a case of “post-national collective identity”, then, the search for a common “denominator” is likely to be different from the construction of national identity. In the similar vein, Klaus Eder argues that “the search for a European identity disenchantments in the course of its realization of the idea of collective identity itself”. (Eder, 2001: 239) Due to this disenchantment, the discourse of European

collective identity should be minimalist conception of collective identity. (Eder, 2001:239)

From this background, considering the European identity as a collective identity, then the question is whether a strong identity is desirable and viable in large-scale political, economic or cultural units. (Calhoun, 2001:36) Theoretically, the possibilities of thick or thin European identity are often discussed. A thick identity is usually exclusive, but thin identities are more inclusive. It is often said that thick identities tends to be particularistic identities, but thin identities tend to be universalistic (Delanty, 2003: 346) Thus, a larger entity unavoidably has the more diffuse identity. It is widely accepted that in the cultural sense, thick European identity might not be exist. But a “more unified” “thin” and “post-national” identity would emerge. (Cederman, 2001: 250)

Therefore, the “incompleteness and non-teleological character of European integration” highlights that the EU is an ‘unfinished project’. ”(Kostakopoulou, 1997) Moreover, the project of European integration and process of formation of European identity are open-ended in terms of constructivist approaches. For that reason, ‘what European identity is’ and ‘what it should be’ at European, national and sub-national levels highlight that there is no clearly defined European identity with its substance and content. It is likely claimed that the nature and shape of Europe will be shaped by the future development of the EU.

### **2.10. The Limits of European Identity**

One can find many reasons in the literature to be pessimistic about the prospects for establishing a European post-national identity. The main obstacles on the formation a European collective identity result from ambiguity concerning theoretical viability of a European identity in the EU context beyond nation-state and the concerns about compatibility of national identities and a such an identity. Moreover, due to the institutional structure of the EU, to achieve a coherent, comprehensive, and consistent Union’s identity is unlikely to be possible (Breakwell, 2004: 35) All of these obstacles and lack of clearly defined borders of Europe create big a challenge

on the possibility of a 'genuinely' European identity.

For the above-stated reasons, it has been argued that the possibility of a single European identity is weak because of the fluidity of identities.(Neuman, 2001:160) Therefore, there could be many European identities which “clash and reconstruct one another in the process of identity politics” (Neumann, 2001:160) As Karlheinz Reif argued, the “European identity is made up of a multiplicity of local identities, and it may be just as important to accept without fear the identity of others as to recognize one’s own identity.” (Reif, 1993: 151)

It is often said that a democratic Europe is not possible since there is not European people or demos which are independent from the process of its political constitution. (Kostakopoulou, 2001: 9) The structural conditions for a democratic formation, such as the European political discourse regarding the public sphere that transcends the national public sphere, are lacking. (Grimm, 1995: 297) Despite the EU’s substantially integrated economy and the increasingly integrating administrative framework, it has not produced an integrated public sphere. (Calhoun, 2001: 51) Therefore political discussion is still organized at national level.

The EU is trying to solve the problem of democracy deficit. The ongoing enlargement might have detrimental effects on the problems of democracy deficit since the increased diversity would deepen the problem of legitimacy and lack of a European public sphere. In order to go beyond this paradox, a new sense of European identity that is not exclusive but inclusive has to be constructed. The development of public sphere, which means “for engagement across lines of different opinions” in diversity of models, together with the development of a social space, may facilitate the development of a more coherent European identity in the future. (Calhoun, 2001:51)

To conclude, in spite of various approaches on European identity, there are conceptual ambiguities that make defining the concept difficult. However, there might be some reachable and concluding remarks in terms of theoretical perspective.

Here comes the logic of constructivist identity formation. Accordingly, the thesis considers European identity as a process; hence it is not an established one, but it is continually happening. In this sense, a future oriented, post-national, collective European identity would be theoretically viable. As the integration process continues, the EU will try to define its identity. Stemming from this point, the following chapter will examine political initiatives of the EU to create a European identity. It will examine the institutional basis of European identity formation by utilizing the constructivist approach.

## CHAPTER III

### IDENTITY POLITICS OF THE EU: ‘UNITY IN DIVERSITY’

As the previous chapter argues, European identity could be defined as a project in the process of building European political community. ‘Identity and culture’ are used in identity-building process as two of the key political tools in European integration project. In this sense, the attempts at identity-building from above have been one of the main concerns of the European authorities in the last three decades and the Commission and the Parliament have become important actors in identity building efforts.

In this chapter, it is argued that the EU has been trying to develop a distinct form of European identity which is closely linked with the political challenges it faces. Here, it is important to question how European identity is being created discursively. And, the focus is on the political and symbolic uses of identity in official documents. At this point, one of the major goals is to understand identity-building process and identity-building character in the EU. Therefore, the chapter examines the EU policies and initiatives on identity and culture in order to realize European identity, to promote Europeans’ awareness and to support European integration project. To do so, the chapter addresses the question of European identity as it is appropriated and shaped by ‘identity politics’ and ‘cultural policy’ through their limitations, contradictions and outcomes. On this ground, this chapter explores the reasons behind the efforts of the EU to construct a European identity as well as the tools that the European institutions have utilized in constructing such an identity.

#### **3.1 The EU: “Identity Builder” and European Identity: Political Project**

The European community was constructed with the broader political aim “to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interest ; to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community

among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts” and “to establish the foundations of an ever closer union among the European peoples, as mentioned in the preamble of Treaty of Rome. In the same way, William Wallace explains identity building strategy of European policy-makers as below;

This was a “political institution-building” strategy to promote economic integration that would accompany social integration and “the interest and loyalties of elites” would thus be progressively transferred from each nation-state to the broader institutionalized community”. As a result, political union would be created “from and beyond nation-state”. (Wallace, 1990: 1)

As argued before, the European integration project has always been more than an economic union. The European elites thought that new European order would be possible by overcoming national interests of the European nation-states. In fact, the aim of the European community is to create “ever closer union”, mentioned in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which was not an end in itself and might result in a political community through the process of institutionalization.

On the other hand, it is widely accepted that 1990s has been the evidence for the failure of “permissive consensus” or end of “functional integration theory” in European integration process.(Cederman, 2001:1) Moreover, some scholars consider that the evolution of European integration process from the European Coal Steel Community to European Union has been a “paradigm shift” that rational product of economic prosperity and legal harmonization integration approach has changed. According to Cris Shore, integration is also a cultural process. (Shore, 2000:1) Additionally, this is a transformation in which European integration project in its early years were seen as a technical and economic issue, and then it has been seen as cultural process. (Shore, 2000: 1) As a result of this understanding, Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the European communities, stated that “if we were beginning the European Community all over again, we should begin with culture”.

It can be said that this transformation of the EU elites approaches on integration is remarkable step in order to construct a European identity. In fact, this shift has occurred in the relationship between peoples and the EU as a result of the

‘politicization’ of European integration. This transformation in the nature of European project has accompanied the EU officials’ and politicians’ concern how political union “go beyond” the existing order and transform post-national, transnational governance (through legitimacy and European identity).

Considering the developments in the late of 1980s, Brigid Laffan argues that this growing power of the Union as a result of the politicization of integration has created the “possibilities of a reconfiguration and redefinition of identities” in Europe (Laffan, 2004: 77) Similarly, Glyniss Breakwell argues that the EU with its formal institutions and legal procedures have a powerful impact on identities.(Breakwell, 2004:26) In this view, the EU with the actions of its institutions and by fostering transnational, intergovernmental and non-governmental networks have become key player for a profound “identitive transformation” in Europe.(Fossum, 2001) In other words, it is argued that the EU as a political creation has significant impact on identity by creating and changing its formal institutions. (Breakwell, 2004: 26) In this respect, for instance; specific changes in the EU institutional structures such as the adaptation of Euro as the common currency and the enlargement of the EU with its new member states might have capacity in order to change “identity development at the level of individual citizen or at the level of groups of people.” (Breakwell, 2004: 25-26)

Furthermore, Laffan argues that the EU as an “identity builder” and as a “macro-social organization” has had major impact on the politics of identity in Europe. (Laffan, 2001:95) Laffan states that there are four dimension of the EU as an identity builder: “the existence of the EU as an institution and EU membership rules, the EU international identity, normative dimension of identity building: in a systems of values and beliefs about civic statehood, cognitive dimension of identity building in the EU specific symbols”. (Laffan, 2004) In this view, the EU has become a powerful part of normative and cognitive structures in Europe.

It is important to note that European leaders are engaged in a deliberate process of manufacturing and legitimizing a European identity. (Laffan, 1996: 96) In the same

logic, Jacques Delors argues that it is not possible “to reunite Europe without pondering on the European identity and without trying to identify” with Europeans. (Delors, 1999) Thus, European identity needs to be constructed and nurtured. To the extent, the official approach is based on the belief that the EU could be enhanced with the construction of a common identity in order to create and enhance the legitimacy.

It is important to emphasize here that European organizations such as the EU and the Council of Europe have a specific interest in the construction of European identity and both institutions define European identity in a different ways. (Soysal, 2002: 280) Although the institutions of the EU have been involved in identity-building efforts, some have been more powerful than others. According to Laffan, the capability of EU institutions for the creation of identity depends on their place on the institutional landscape, the roles, and identity-building policies. (Laffan, 2001: 84) By separating supranational institutions from representative institutions Laffan argues that European Commission and the European Court of Justice as supranational institutions and the European Parliament (EP) as a representative institution are the more effective actors than other EU institutions on the construction of a European identity. (Laffan, 2001: 84)

Within this context, the EU has recognized the culture and identity as the key dimensions of European integration. The European Union elites, particularly the European Commission and the European Parliament have tried to gain power to shape and enhance a European identity. The Commission, primarily, has engaged in the building European identity. In fact, it is widely accepted that the European Commission as “motor of integration”, including individual Commissioners, has been the driving force behind the construction of a European identity with its competencies in the construction of a European identity. (Shore 2000; Banus, 2002: 162)

For this aim, the institutions of the EU have initiated a number of efforts on the level of politics, economics and culture as well as on the individual level of the citizens.

(Kohli, 2000) In fact, the institutions of the EU seek to create “awareness” among people about their European identity and to construct “one”. (Soysal, 2002:266) It is wanted to achieve “Europeanness”, which the citizens of the EU regard themselves as European. In this sense, identity building process in the EU refers to the creation of “common present”. (Neumann,1998: 166) In this respect, the official goals for creating a European identity and fostering “we-feeling” could be seen the creation of Benedict Anderson’s “imagined community” approach which is often applied to the EU. ‘Imagined’ community refers to a community that does not lie in the tangible relations and binding ties between its people, but exists as a reality of the mind, as the *image* of the community its members share. (Anderson, 1992)

In general terms, the concept of European identity refers to construct the feeling of cohesion, loyalty, and identification in the ‘imagined’ community’. The concept of ‘imagined community’ highlights the significance of ideas in processes of community building and “discursive strategies” employed by political institution. (Rosemond, 2005:158) In this view, the community at the level of mass popular consciousness is forged through modern communication technologies and various identity-building strategies.

From this logic, The EU could be defined as an ‘imagined community’ in the making and the initiatives of the Union to create a European consciousness as the basis for the this “imagined community”.(Shore, 1993: 794) Namely, the EU has come to search for “invented traditions” and its efforts have been sustained to invent an “imagined community”. According to Anderson, the basis of imagined community as well as its cultural unity and uniqueness are largely products of the “imagination”. (Neumann, 1997: 166) The community can be imagined but not really experienced.

In the light of above considerations, the EU elites assume that “Europe is going to be invented”. (Eder, 2002: 222) It is obvious that the EU elites have sought to build ‘Europe’ as an imagined entity from top-down. In this respect, according to the EU’s top-down approach, European identity comes from the ‘administrative center and moves towards the periphery’. (Shore, 2004) For that reason, the efforts of European

leaders for building European identity is characteristically “technocratic” and “top-down”.(Smith,1992; Shore,2000,2004) In other words, European identity construction is “the more or less bureaucratic project of European construction”. (Snopfn, 2005) Hence, it is an ‘elite-driven project’. This European identity project as a political project is not self-creating. It seems as a political invention that the political institutions of the EU have focus on.

Considering the transition from the European Coal and Steel Community to European Union, the economic and political integration have move further. For this reason, increasing power of the EU institutions has come to directly affect the everyday lives of European citizens. However, these developments have triggered a discussion on a need to give Europe a “soul”. Since, the project of economic integration cannot be accomplished without the support of mass loyalties to ‘Europe’. The major motive of the EU institutions is to construct a political union “go beyond” the existing order by overcoming the legitimacy problem that faces.

In the context of these developments, since the early 1990s, the traditional approach of the EU on integration has changed. Although the early approach has regarded integration as a technical and economic issue, the new logic of European integration has been seen as a “cultural project”. (Shore, 2000: 1) This “paradigm shift” for the EU integration project might be defined as an advanced “spillover strategy”, which is based on the idea that European identity comes from the “administrative center and moves towards the periphery”. (Shore, 2004) In this respect, the official goals for creating a European identity and fostering “we-feeling” could be examined in terms of the EU identity politics and cultural policies of the EU.

### **3. 2. Identity and Culture on the EU Agenda**

Although identity-building attempts from above have been one of the main concerns of the European authorities in the last three decades, the EU has accepted the vitality of a ‘human face’ as a result of politization of integration process in 1990s. At that time, The EU elites has come to accept that “it is not possible to reunite Europe

without pondering on the European identity and without trying to identify” with Europeans

In this process, the attempts at identity-building from above have been one of the main concerns of the European authorities and the idea of identity has become important elements in the European integration project. In other words, the concept of identity has become political instrument to further the European construction process. In this respect, the EU has institutionalized European identity as a political project “by adopting historically and institutionally grounded perspective”.(Kostakopoulou, 2001,39) This could be defined as ‘identity politics’ of the EU, which is one way in which European elites relate to their larger public” and is one among many factors influencing European policies and general attitudes towards European integration”. (Risse, 2002:63) The EU official discourse indicates that policy-makers have used the concepts of identity culture, social cohesion and collective consciousness as mobilizing means for building European culture , European identity, and European consciousness.(Shore, 2000:25)

In accordance with the official discourse as mentioned before, cultural initiatives are seen by the EU officials as instruments for “fostering of loyalty, a sense of European identity” and supporting the process of economic and political integration. (Witte, 1991:205) This means that the mission of EU institutions is to construct the EU as a real political union by overcoming the legitimacy problem that faces to the Union. For this aim, “cultural and identity policies” are the strategies used by the EU to strengthen the legitimacy of the supranational institutions and remedy the democratic deficit by creating and fostering a collective sense of European identity. In this sense, it is crucial to study which policies and initiatives are used by the EU in the identity-building process with their limitations, contradictions and their outcomes.

### **3. 2. 1. The Concept of Identity Politics**

The efforts of Brussels to create and foster a collective sense of European identity in the EU might be defined as “identity engineering”. (Hedetoft, 1998:147)The link between European identity and political integration is clearly seen in the official

documents: “Europe cannot proceed to a greater degree of political integration without the underlying structure of a unifying European identity”. (Tindemas Report 1975) At this point, Castells argues that the construction of European identity implies a “common project” or “project of identity” which is shared by the member states of the EU. For him, identity building efforts are the “mobilization of societies towards new, shared values that would be widely diffused throughout Europe”. (Castells, 2001) Thus, the efforts of the EU on identity could be seen “building identity by making society”. (Castells, 2001)

Here, it is important to define the concepts ‘identity politics’ and ‘cultural policy’ of the EU in the light of evaluations of the EU’s efforts concerning creation and promotion of European identity, defining the concept of European identity is a problematic issue. However, in general, the concept of European identity at the EU level is often understood as a “politics of identity”. (Delanty, 1997: 25) In sum, the concept of ‘identity politics’ has become the subject of politics. To put another way, it is the “politics of networks of professional collective actors, then the making of identity becomes daily political business”. (Eder, 2002:238)

Additionally, it has been argued that the term of “identity politics” highlights “shift from culture to identity” (Delanty, 1997: 25) that “a change...from traditional historicism to constructivist approaches”. (Ifversen, 2000) More specifically, the idea of “European culture” is invoked to provide an essence for identity in the search for a new centre (Delanty, 1997:26) in order to form the symbolic space or discourse of identity. (Hedetoft, 1997: 11) By this way culture has decomposed into “identity politics”. (Delanty, 1997: 29) Then identity politics “open up to a political field where European culture and identity is becoming a “token” in the hand of political actors.”(Ifversen, 2000)

By this logic, identity is not only something that must be created, but also strategic interest in order to enhance the European integration process. So, this creation of identity as a political object takes place in what is called “identity politics”. In the case of the EU, identity politics means that the EU has tried to promote its model and

its vision of European identity. To do so, the institutions of the EU have sought to overcome the obstacles concerning building European identity

### **3. 2. 2. The Concept of Cultural Policy**

As argued before, the concept of culture has become one of the new battlefields as a result of the political and social changes in 1990s. The concept of “culture” could be seen as a ground or a soil for the possibility of post-national identity in the European context. In parallel to these developments, the concepts of ‘identity politics’ and ‘cultural policy’ have become the subjects of policy of the EU. (Shore, 2000: 7)

Here, it is valuable to give some explanations to understand and make clear the ‘cultural policy’ of the EU by addressing the link between the concept of culture, political entity and identity. This growing awareness on the importance of common cultural communicative space resulted in initiatives of the European institutions in the 1980s and the inclusion of ‘culture’ in the Treaty on European Union. Yet, the Treaty does not provide for a ‘cultural policy’, but ‘cultural action’ in the general framework of European policymaking, which is composed of a number of different subsidy programmes, regulations and initiatives at the EU level. In this sense, for instance; activities of the EU on culture range from language, literature, performing arts, visual arts, architecture, crafts, the cinema to broadcasting. Furthermore, the cultural action of the European Commission consists of the “Culture 2000 Program, European Capital of Culture,” and various programmes related to culture to develop “Europe’s common cultural and historical heritage”.<sup>1</sup> However, these different policies for the promotion of culture indicate ‘cultural policy’ of the European Union as not a coherent policy.

The concept of identity politics and its implications for legitimacy is closely linked to the concept of the EU’s ‘cultural policy’; since it has been tried to construct

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<sup>1</sup> “The programmes related to culture to promote organizations and activities of cultural interest audiovisual media, regional development, human resources, technological development , agriculture, information society, environment tourism, small and medium-size enterprises” and other programmes of the EU having impact on culture are defined in the official site of the EU: [www.europa.eu.int/scadplus](http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus)

European identity through complementary efforts of cultural policy”. (Banus, 2002: 159) In other words, the primary theme of European cultural policy - unity-in-diversity – is closely related to another conception of identity politics and its implications for legitimacy. According to the European Commission, the “cultural policy forms part of the European enterprise and, in this respect, is an integral factor within an ever closer union between the people of Europe. It must allow strengthening of citizens’ feeling of belonging to one and the same Community....” (Moreira, 2002:466)

The EU’s ‘cultural policy’ is often used in the sense of “the various cultural strategies that are being used to mobilize mass opinion and foster European consciousness among the citizenry (Shore, 2000:4) From official sense, cultural policy” forms part of the European enterprise, and ... is an integration factor within ever closer union between the peoples of union”.(Shore, 2000:40) On this ground, European officials and politicians consider culture as a significant instrument which brings Europe closer to its citizens. For them, by European identity the EU could reach their objectives of the Union. Therefore, it can be said that culture is a way of expressing or acquiring this identity. (Banus, 2002:159) In this respect, the EU institutions have promoted the sense of belonging of “Europeans’ as well as the sense of awareness of their identity” under the name of “cultural policy” via a number of policies, programmes, activities.

### **3. 3. Historical Development of Identity Politics and Cultural Policy**

Although the emergence of the ideas “identity building” and “identity change” have been crucial issues for policy-makers (Laffan, 2004: 84), the concept of European identity has not been used since the 1970s. For instance; in the founding treaties of European Community the 1951 Treaty of Paris and the 1957 Treaty of Rome, there was no mention concerning “culture” or “identity”. On the other hand, the term of ‘European consciousness’ was rarely evoked. However, there was not such things ‘European culture’ or ‘identity policy’ in that time. The concept of European identity on the Community discourse was a child of the 1973 Declaration on European Identity adopted by EC leaders at Copenhagen Summit.

Through this Declaration, while the Community was employing the notion of the European integration as “the buzz word” during the 1950s and 1960s, instead, in the 1970s and the following years the Community began to use the notion of ‘identity’. This shift was the first and the most obvious step to characterize European identity on the official level. (Strath, 2000:14) The Declaration on European Identity highlighted both shared values of the Community and diversity of cultures in a common “European civilization”. (Sjursen, 2005: 183) Hence, EC has become to use the concept of a European identity as a “political resource” (Schlesinger & Foret, 2006: 70) as well as a “strategy”. It has been also intensified by the Commission’s campaign of “a People’s Europe” in 1980s. (Witte, 1990:205)

The emergence of the notion of European identity in European Community agenda was based on different factors such as the economic crisis of the 1970s and “feeling of lack of legitimacy in the European Community”. (Boxhoorn, 1996:137) During these years, the European Community needed a new formula to promote European integration. Consequently, the concept of European identity emerged in a situation where economic crisis in 1970s reinforced cooperation of the member states of Community. With this process, intergovernmental initiatives were launched in order to overcome those problems. (Strath, 2000)

For instance, 1975 Tindemas Report was considered as one of the first significant statements for promoting European identity. In subsequent years in the 1985 Adonnoni Reports and the 1993 de Clercq report focused on the necessity of more effective communication of Europe to EU citizens. (Dunkerley, 2002: 117) However, due to the oil shocks and economic recessions of the 1970s and the relative weakness of the Commission and the Parliament, little effort was made concerning the articulation of European identity. Nevertheless, the European institutions continued to form a European identity among the peoples of Community.

According to Bo Strath, the emergence of the European identity on Community discourse implies that the EU policy-makers accepted European identity not to exist.

Hence, it needs to be constructed and nurtured.(Strath, 2000) Therefore, the political attempt of the EC has been interpreted for some scholars as a weakness of integration process to create a common identity.(Kraus, 2003) With the Maastricht treaty, “European project itself adds a new dimension to the politics of identity” in member states and in wider Europe. (Laffan, 1996:82) Consequently, the concept of European identity as a political resource has gained increasing popularity in the period of transition from the EC to the EU. In this sense, it might be argued that the concept of European identity has become a sensitive matter in European politics.

In the light of emergence of the European identity on EU agenda, it is also important to clarify the emergence of concept “culture” on the EU discourse. In the 1950s, the “strategic choice” of Community was based on “spill over” mechanism. Economic and cultural spheres were separated on the formal level. Cultural dimension of integration was absent in the institutional treaties.(Witte,1990:204) Until the Maastricht Treaty, this initial choice was not formally changed. Therefore, though it was on the agenda since 1960s, the concept of culture was not quickly introduced as a policy area.

Meanwhile, Article 151 of the Treaty of Rome only included “a single financing and programming instrument for cultural cooperation”. Although the Community recognized the importance of culture and wanted to create a close cultural cooperation and the European Parliament and the European Commission had struggled to initiate cultural activities, the neutral term ‘cultural field’ were used in official documents (Banus, 2002: 161.) Therefore, in the 1950s and 1960s, there was not such a thing a “European cultural policy”. Community’s discourses on culture in the 1960s were mainly about co-operation between states.

Even though culture was mentioned as a source of a European identity in Copenhagen Declaration of 1973 the Community’s first action came out in 1977, ‘Community Action in Cultural Sector’. While culture was seen as a tool to solve economic and social problems in the document, it did not obviously propose how the Community was going to instrument culture. During the 1970s and 1980s, the

European Commission began to be involved in the cultural sphere. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the meeting of European Heads of States resulted in the adoption of a number of declarations, such as Tindemas Report on European Union in 1974 and the Solemn Declaration on European Union in 1983.

The initiatives in order to create and forge a cultural identity have increased in the mid-1980s. During the 1980s, it was clear that the continuity of European integration depended on European citizens who were needed to identify with the European integration process and with the institutions more closely. In other words, “European citizens’ loyalty needed to be established”. (CEC, 1983) To do so, The Solemn Declaration “invited member-states to promote European awareness and to undertake joint actions in various cultural areas.” (CEC, 1983) Significantly, for the European Commission’s involvement in the cultural realm and the origins of its ‘cultural policy’, these declarations and the 1983 Solemn Declaration, in particular, became the basis for the actions of the European Commission.

Moreover, the Adonnino Committee was created in 1984 by the European Council to define strategies for bolstering the image and identity of the Community as well as to make Europeans ‘more aware of their common cultural heritage’ as mentioned in Adonnino Report. That’s why; the Adonnino Committee proposed various “cultural actions” by creating new symbols for the sense of ‘Europeanness’. These new symbols consisted of a new logo, flag and anthem for Europe, and the standardized European passport. (Shore, 2004:28)

Before the Maastricht- Treaty on European Union (TEU), there was only a number of ‘cultural actions’ based on resolutions from the European Parliament and Ministers of Cultures. (Shore, 2000:45) The founding article relating to the cultural responsibility of the Union, Article 151 of TEU mentions that the role of the Union is to “contribute to the covering of the cultures of the member states” and to “encourage”, “support” and “supplement” and co-operation between member states. (Banus, 2002: 161) For that reason, the nature of “activities” on culture of the EU seems supplementary and complementary. It is important to note that Treaty on

European Union gave the institutions of the Union the legal basis for its involvement in the cultural field.

So far, it is examined the motivation of the EU toward constructing a European identity by 'identity politics' and 'culture policy'. In parallel with this examination, it will be questioned 'how the concept of European identity is manifested' in the texts of the EU institutions and speech of the EU policy-makers. Here, it is important to understand how Europe is imagined by the EU in the discursive practice of the Union.

Concerning the discourse of EU on identity, according to the constructive perspective, "the notions of a European identity can only be understood with reference to discourse in which competing claims are worked out". (Delanty, 2005:131) In this sense, It is intended to underline Europe's 'distinctive cultural entity' with its 'shared values', 'common culture' and 'European cultural heritage'. As it is said before, in the political discourse on integration, the creation of a European identity is generally consider as a precondition for taking further steps towards political union. The Community has indented to create an 'overarching European identity' that includes all Europeans. (Delanty, 2005b) For this aim, EU institutions have tried to promote the sense of being "Europeans' as well as 'awareness of their identity'" by introducing a number of policies, programmes, activities promoted. By this way, it is intended to create a kind of EU's models of European identity.

On the basis of the idea of multiplicity and compatibility of the various identities, many EU policy makers argue that creating an overarching 'European identity' is only a matter of 'stimulating awareness' of Europeans' shared values, 'shared cultural heritage' and 'common culture'. The discourse of European integration assumed that the evolution of a European integration would lead to the promotion of European identity. (Spohn, 2005:12)

In this respect, the problem for the Union officials is not whether a common European identity exists or not. Rather, the problem is how to make the peoples of the enlarged Union to realize their shared identity. Considering this perspective, it is important here to find the answers of these questions: What kind of European identity emerges from the official rhetoric? How is European identity being created discursively through the main treaties, main official regulations and declarations of the EU?

For the first time, as said before, the Declaration on European Identity in 1973 defined the concept of European identity as below;

The diversity of cultures within the framework of common European civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the determination to take part in the constructions of a united Europe, all give the European identity its originality and its own dynamism”.

Moreover, the ‘Declaration of European Identity’ included a strong reference for the term ‘European values’ which member-states shared such as the rule of law, principles of representative democracy, and the respect for human rights. Consequently, these values were accepted as ‘fundamental values of the European identity’. In this sense, the EU elites stress that “the European Union is a community based on common values and rules”. (Rehn, 2006) Similarly, some scholars argue that the EU is “founded upon post-national, liberal collective identity”. (Schimmelfennig, 2001: 82) Similar formulations could be found in various official EU documents. Since Maastricht Treaty, these values have become common legal principles. It has been stated in article F of Treaty on European Union and then in Treaty of Amsterdam that : “the Union is founded on the principles of liberty , democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law , principles which are common to the Member states”. Furthermore, these fundamental values together with ‘cultural diversity’ and ‘protection of difference’ create the EU’s “core values” (Laffan, 2004:82), which have come to be accession criteria with the Copenhagen criteria. By this way, one state could not become a member of the Union without subscribing them. (Risse: 2004a: 170)

Promoting common values has continued with Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Although the Charter, formally adopted at Nice European Council in 2000, is not legally enforceable for European citizens, its political implication stem from its common values with which all the citizens of Europe can identify.( Culture General Report: 2005) Additionally, the Constitutional Treaty of the EU uses the term ‘values’ not only in the Preamble but also in the provision on the common legal principles, namely its Art. II-2 (“The Union’s Values”). The article 1 of Constitution says that the promotion of its values is one of the Unions objectives. These ‘fundamental elements of the European Identity’ are all political; it seems that the EU emphasizes civic aspects of European identity. In other words, the EU “deliberately try to construct a post-national civic identity in the Habermasian sense emphasizing democracy, human rights, market economy, the welfare state, and cultural diversity”. (Risse, 2004a: 170)

On the other hand, the discourse of the EU on European identity is also filled by Europe’s ‘common culture’ “European cultural heritage” and “shared history”. By this view, the Greek and Roman legacy, Renaissance humanism and Enlightenment, parliamentary democracy and the Christian past are offered as the elements of European cultural identity, which is supposed to be what naturally unites and makes Europeans and what distinguishes them from others. (Soysal, 2002 :267) Thus, a greater appreciation of cultural characteristics of Europeans could facilitate the development of European identity.

Concerning mentioned discourse, in 1992, European Commission stressed that “...geographical, historical, and cultural elements, absolutely all contribute to the European identity. The shared experience of proximity, ideas, values, and historical interaction cannot be condensed into a simple formula, and is subject to review by each succeeding generation.”(Mikkeli ,1998, 213-14) Nevertheless, it is difficult to describe what constitutes the “common heritage” in “European culture”. The rhetoric of the EU on European cultural heritage and common history stress similarities among Europeans rather than cultural homogeneity. (Pantel, 1999: 50) Therefore, the

EU efforts to promote the development of a European cultural identity could not impress a clearly defined a notion of “Europeanness.” (Pantel,1999 :50) What’s more; a cultural border of Europe has not been officially defined in EU documents. Accordingly, the concept of Europe refers to both the East and West Europe.

On the basis of the idea related with the multiplicity and compatibility of the various identities, many EU policy makers argue that creating an overarching ‘European identity’ is simply a matter of ‘stimulating awareness’ of “shared cultural heritage” of Europe to form a European identity. It could be seen as an attempt to create a single, binding European cultural identity from above. On the one hand, various official documents emphasize that “common heritage” (Delanty, 2003:350) might be seen as the promotion of “partially shared historical traditions and cultural heritages” in the creation efforts of cultural identity. (Smith, 1992: 70)

On the other hand, there are also some official documents and representatives of the EU that support universalistic characteristic of European identity by defining European political identity by universal values. In this view, the idea is that “the European community... is in need of a political identity”, as Jacques Delors said. By this way, the EU is defined as a ‘community based on common values and rules’ in EU official documents and EU representative speech.

In the light of these explanations, the discourse on European identity has both universalistic and particularistic characteristics. (Delanty, 2003)That is, universalistic and particularistic characteristics of the discourse of European identity are a result of cultural and political implications of the EU’s initiatives. (Delanty, 2003: 350) The efforts of the Union through the EU initiatives to promote an ‘ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ might be seen the history of creation a ‘supranational European identity’, i.e. the history of the constructions of ‘Europeans’ with the EU. Moreover, these could be seen as attempts of EU in order to make the institutions legitimate through constructing institutions, formation of European political identity and “selling an elitist cultural identity”. (Leonard, 1997:141) As a result, it has not

been created a single meaning of European identity in the EU treaties and other official documents.

### **3. 4. The EU's Discourse on the Cultural Policy: "Unity in Diversity"**

Considering culture as a significant source of identity for many groups (Smith, 1998: 321), the EU's "cultural policy" seems as the basis of notion of European cultural identity founded on the concept of "unity in diversity".(Delanty, 2005a:132) Firstly, the concept of "unity in diversity" was created in the process of making the community more popular for the peoples of Europe in the early seventies. (Wintle, 1996: 5) At the same time, in the 1980s, "unity in diversity" as "the official cultural formula" (Smith: 1997:334) has been increasingly utilized for that cultural policy. Kaebler argues that the concept of 'unity in diversity' as motto of the EU has been used instead of 'European civilization'. (Keable, 2005:26)

The notion of 'unity in diversity' as a concept is a controversial issue. At this point, it is valuable to give some explanations to understand what this concept is. Some argue that the theme of 'unity-in-diversity' as a simply "empty rhetoric" in the imagination of European cohesion where it does not exist. (Pantel, 1999: 52) Others suppose that as a rhetorical device 'unity in diversity' is based on the rejection the clash between 'unity' and 'diversity'. According to Michael Wintle, 'unity in diversity' means that "Europe is very diverse, but there is also some kind of common quality, if not unity, in Europe". (Wintle, 1996: 5) In this sense, it means that various nations of Europe possibly would join together under the some common denominator. (Mikkeli, 1998: 221)

With the greater salience of the EU 'cultural policy' from the mid-1980s and onward, it is intended to increase the identification with the EU and legitimate the integration process as a whole. Thus, the theme of 'unity-in-diversity' has been employed as a legitimacy-building strategy. In other words, the EU's "cultural policy" to create a European identity is the accumulation of the strategies used by elites to create 'Europe' as an imagined entity.

The rhetoric of ‘unity in diversity’ reflected in the Maastricht Treaty stress that “the Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the member states, while respecting their national and regional diversity” and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore. To sum up, the “unity- in-diversity” approach at the level of rhetoric indicates that EU efforts to construct a common European identity based not only on ‘shared culture’ and history’, but also ‘cultural diversity’. The EU ‘cultural policy’ consists of two strategies of ‘unity” and ‘diversity’ which are mutually reinforcing.(Pantel,1999:56) Within this framework, it is significant to give a general explanation for two strategies to better understand the distinction between what ‘unity’ is implied and what ‘diversity’ is implied in the EU discourse.

#### **3. 4. 1. Unity**

The concept of unity is often understood in terms of ‘cultural unity’. The construction of European identity is questionable issue due to the lack of insufficient raw materials for cultural unity. (Pantel, 1999:27) Therefore, the EU officials have support for deeper integration in association with the European cultural unity since the birth of the Community. (Pantel, 1999: 47) The Commission and the Parliament, the two European institutions have been more active in this field. They have sought to foster a ‘European cultural unity’ rooted in a common history and set of symbols. However, by those efforts it is not aimed to create a European identity over existing national ones. Consequently, at the level of rhetoric, related to ‘unity’, “the EU has never been about homogeneity”. (Rehn, 2006) Hence, cultural unity of Europe does not refer to a kind of uniformity.

#### **3. 4. 2. Diversity**

The EU policy has underlined not only the existence of a European identity, but also the resilience and importance of national, regional, and local identities. It might imply that “one of the distinctive features of Europe that is recognition of and accommodation of diversity”. (Garcia, 1993:132) In 1992, in the Treaty of Maastricht it has taken obligatory decisions on "respect for the national identities of its Member States". (Art. 6 EU) This provision has been reinforced by the EU

Charter of Fundamental Rights in its Article 22; “the Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity”. (Art. II-22 of the Constitutional Treaty) This as an obligation or responsibility of the EU that has become one of the Union’s formal objectives. Similarly, Article 3 paragraph 3 of the Constitutional Treaty (The Union’s objectives) lists the following objectives: “The Union shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.”

As a result of the recognition of diversity, it is assumed that European cultural identity could not be regarded as a challenge to national identities; it could only be an alternative. In that respect, ‘diversity’ tended to reinforce a weak notion of cultural identity, as opposed to a strong one based on ‘unity’. (Delanty, 2005: 132) Therefore, it seems as a tendency of a weak notion of cultural identity rather than a strong cultural identity based on ‘unity’. (Delanty, 2005a:132)

The roots of ‘unity’ and ‘diversity’ as two aspects of cultural policy of the Union are seen in the main treaties and other official documents of the Community. For instance; in the Treaty of Rome of 1957, the existence of ‘European cultural unity’ was associated with the words of the existence ‘solidarity which binds Europe’. (Pantel, 1999: 47) Moreover, “the foundations of an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe” (in the preamble to the Treaty of Rome) implies that these ‘peoples’ will retain their distinct identities.

EU policy elites of the Commission have repeatedly emphasized on the themes of promoting ‘unity in diversity’ as well as respecting the ‘mosaic of cultures’ that together create European identity. (Shore, 2004: 38) According to its official narratives, the European Union seeks to develop a stronger sense of European identity and citizenship above the level of the nation state while simultaneously contributing to the ‘flowering’ of local, regional and national cultures and identities below it. (Shore, 2004:28)

In this sense, it is aimed to foster a sense of cultural ‘unity’ by supporting cultural exchanges and the promotion of visible European symbols. Besides, it is aimed to sustain an awareness of cultural diversity by supporting for regional and local cultures. In sum, European documents on cultural policy involved specific conceptions of unity, diversity, and the connection between them. ‘Unity in diversity’ motto of the EU is based not only on the support for ‘common culture and heritage’; but also it respects the existing cultural and linguistic diversity within the European Union. Hence, the discourse of the EU cultural policy has underlined not only the existence of a European identity, but also the resilience and importance of national, regional, and local identities, each has its own rich history and symbols. (Pantel, 1999: 46) As pointed out earlier, the Commission utilizes this diversity as well as the common values that Europeans share in the construction of a European identity.

### **3. 4. 3. Changed Discourse of the EU**

It is important to mention that there is not a unified approach. Different European institutions, including the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the Commission, and the Parliament, have articulated the themes of unity and diversity in different ways over time. (Pantel, 1999: 47) At the level of rhetoric, the emphasis changed from notions of ‘unity’ to ‘diversity’; the EU gradually embraced notions of cultural diversity. (Pantel: 1999, Schlesinger 2001) In that sense, it is argued that this tendency suggested a shift from a concern with ‘unity’ to ‘integration’. (Delanty, 2005a: 132)

In parallel with above background, some argue that the discourse of the EU on European identity has been transformed from a formal declaration of ‘The European Identity’ to the recognition of ‘united in diversity’. This is a shift towards a more reflexive kind of European identity due to the growing recognition of social concerns. By contrast, some argue that the main components of the European identity discourse have not changed since the declaration of the European identity. (Kraus: 2003: 6) While unity relies on a set of common political values, cultural diversity maintains its central normative status. (Kraus: 2003: 6) In this view, the treaty on

European Union has not led the evolution on culture sphere. The Treaty approach on culture and identity are compatible with both the new “subsidiary” philosophy of the Union and also the approach of all previous documents. (Banus, 2002: 161)

In fact, it might be argued that cultural and identity policies of the EU indicate that the efforts of institutions of the EU, especially the European Commission, have changed over time concerning the creation of European cultural identity. (Weaver, 2004: 211) The late 1970s and the 1980s were shaped by the symbols of nation state such as anthem, flag, and passport. By the early years of 1990s, the institutions of the EU have much more emphasized the identity of Europe with its pluralist and distinct characteristics. This change has accompanied with the shift in financial supports of the Union from Euro symbolism to local symbols.

In this sense, the new motto of the EU -- ‘united in diversity’-- in EU Constitution might be seen as recognition of the unusual degree of national and sub-national diversity in the Union. The new motto is thought to strengthen the identity protection of member states. It implies that the EU aims further ‘unity’ under the condition of a maintained ‘diversity’ amongst the states. Thus, the motto seems to foster the diversity of member States’ identities. However, as Weaver argue, the strategies of EU on identity and culture have continued their “ potential to weaken national identities by breaking up their uniformity and harmonization, not by integration from above but through fragmentation from below”(Weaver, 2004 :211)

### **3. 5. Top-Down Strategies of the EU for Winning Hearts and Minds of Europeans**

While trying to consolidate Europe through ‘identity project’ i.e. ‘identity politics’, the initiatives, strategies of European policy-makers have not only remained at the level of basic treaties and official declarations. It is emphasized that there are broad range of efforts in order to form and or promote an European identity that takes place at the level of politics, economics and culture as well as on the individual level, as seen EU cultural policy. (Kohli, 2000) More specifically, the EU have employed “modern communications technologies, and other familiar nation-building strategies”

in its continual attempts to ‘manufacture’ European identity and consciousness at public level. (Shore, 2004: 38)

Within this context, this section of the chapter tries to demonstrate the ways in which the theme of ‘unity-in- diversity’ has informed policies aimed to strengthen identification with the integration project. As said before, the EU’s politics on identity has unfolded since 1970s and then particularly the European Commission’s efforts to forge a sense of European identity have gradually intensified over years.

All these strategies of the EU could be defined as “winning hearts and minds” of people’s of Europe strategies (Bruter, 2003), many of those are explicitly aimed to forge European identity. Various policies and programs in the EU are not only interrelated; but also they complement each other. These could be seen as instruments in the construction of a European identity. For example; the European Commission’s language policy is designed to help Europeans to learn various European languages are directly linked to the education policy. Consequently, it is argued that the top-down policies of the EU design to “embellish” European identity; namely it has mainly three dimensions: the introduction European citizenship, the proliferation of European symbols, the adaptation of several European programs about education and culture.(Krause, 2003; Laffan, 1996)

### **3. 5. 1. The EU Citizenship**

Although many rights associated with EU citizenship existed in various forms since the Treaty of Rome, the EU citizenship was formally established with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 with seven rights and two limited political rights. By this way, it confirmed the right of free movement among the member states, the right to assess and appeal to the European Parliament and to the European Ombudsman.

Many scholars and policy makers assume that the idea of a common citizenship in member states of the Union could finally serve as the basis for a European identity. In this view, the process of creating a common European identity is determined with

the establishment of common European citizenship. Therefore, the institutionalization of the citizenship of the Union in Maastricht Treaty seems as one of the most important efforts of building bridge between the Union institutions and the citizens. The EU citizenship as a new legal category seems as a distinct and explicit citizenship that relies on multiple identities. The EU define the 'European people' in terms of European citizens those who already possess national citizenship. (Delanty, 2005:137) Thus, 'being European' citizen means in official discourse that these citizens share a collective identity. (Eder, 2005: 198)

The primary aim of EU citizenship is an inclusion of European nationals in a common economic, cultural and political project. (Jacob& Maier, 2001) Yet, this aim, at the same time, is accompanied by internal exclusion of foreign residents from non-European origin. (Jacob & Maier, 2001) As the citizenship of the EU is derived from the possession of state citizenship of the member state, the freedom of movement for EU citizens has been achieved at the expense of increasing discrimination against non-EU nationals.(Shore, 2004: 39) For 'third country' nationals European citizenship has become a most effective symbol of exclusion. In this sense, it could be argued that the notion of peoplehood in the EU is based on exclusion rather than inclusion. (Delanty, 2005a: 137)

It is argued that the establishment of European citizenship as a means of forging a European identity is weak, because it has no consequence at the level of public attitudes. Many provisions of European Union citizenship are not yet fully incorporated into member-states' law and policies. Many Europeans seem to know little of EU citizenship itself. Although the specific rights and duties entailed by European citizenship remain vague and limited, European citizenship is an important step for the creation of EU people who has been transformed from the 'EU consumer' to EU citizen.

### **3.5.2. EU's Symbols and European Identity**

It is significant to note that the official construction of European identity is symbolic construction of Europe. Union's discourse on identity and culture is also seen EU

symbols. The initiatives of the EU on symbols could be defined as constructing Europe through the EU's symbols. It is widely accepted that a collective identity is expressed with its symbols. Thus, it requires shared symbols. From this logic, the reconstruction process of European identity within the EU requires new symbols that are relevant to the present. (Bakır, 1996:190)The political idea behind the introduction of symbols is to gradually modify the consciousness of the peoples of Europe. Thus, it is crucial to study the EU's policy on identity and culture to appreciate how Europe is imagined. For this aim, it should be examined both EU symbolic initiatives and the specificity of these symbols as well as the peculiar conditions of their use.

On the basis of the role of cultural symbols in the shaping of communities, the EU symbolic initiatives indicate how Europe is imagined. It should be noted that the identity formation process needs a symbolic dimension; since symbols connect individuals, social sphere and then political order. (Laffan, 2004: 83)

The implicit rationale of the efforts of European institutions with a comprehensive set of symbols is the idea that it would reinforce the citizens' sense of belonging to their new political community. (Bruter, 2003) To put it to another way, the symbols could be defined "the symbolic dimension in the construction and legitimization of social reality. The EU is tried to be constructed as a "symbolic and political entity" to make it "more knowable and governable space". (Shore, 2000: 4) In this sense, European identity could be created and maintained in the broad field, monuments, celebrations, myths, heroes, holidays, hymns, flags, museums. In addition, this goal of European policy makers is quite explicitly mentioned in several official documents of the EU.

The greater salience of cultural policy from the mid- 1980s onward was evident in the promotion of certain symbols which were not intended to replace national symbols. However, they were additional symbols. These were similar to traditional state-building emblems, a flag, common passport cover, an EU driving license and an anthem. Therefore, attempts to create a European identity through European symbols

could be seen as efforts for the “invention of tradition” in the process of creation of emblems and slogans in the new official culture of the EU. (Delanty, 1995: 8)

In fact, various political symbols are being invented in order to pursue political ends in the framework of European identity formation. The EU’s efforts has intended to strengthen European feelings of shared values are look like national identity model via the initiatives and policies. Within this context, the report of Adonnino Committee in June 1985 created a European symbolic repertoire: an anthem, a flag, Europe Day, passport, driving license, European monuments for the ‘glorious dead’, European ceremonies, universities and museums for ‘European heroes’ or Europe’s ‘Founding Fathers’ are created.

All of these exchanges and symbols should not be conceived as the imposition of a homogeneous European identity from above. Actually, the EU’s promotion of European symbols reflects the compatibility of national symbols and these EU symbols and peoples attitudes toward the Union. (Laffan, 2004:83) More specifically, it took thirty years for the flag to become officially recognized by the EU. Similarly, it took seven years before the community adopted Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy” as the European anthem without words. Marc Abeles argues that these deficiencies stem from the “lack of European symbolism” or ‘symbolic deficit’ (Abeles, 2003:6) According to Breakwell, the symbolic and mythological identity markers of Europe are weakly developed. (Breakwell, 2004) In this sense, it could be argued that the modest success of these symbols emphasize the absence of a coherent set of political concepts and discourse owing to the inherent limits of the EU identity-building project as accepted its own official documents.(Schlesinger& Foret, 2006:70)

Political elites have always used money to construct specific political identities. Money is a purposeful political tool in the construction of identities. In this sense, the relationship between money, collective identity, and European integration is assumed to be for crucial on the creation a European identity. (Kaelberer, 2004 ; Risse, 2003) It has been pointed out that the European the Euro with its legal or economic

substance, as symbols of European unity and items of a common history are crucial for the creation of European identity. The introduction of single currency is a deliberate elite efforts to construct a European identity

It is reasonable to assume that Europe is the most important symbol of European integration. In this respect, for some, the euro is perceived as challenge of national sovereignty as well as the essential elements of national identity. Hence, it is rejected as a common currency. The symbols of the Euro shows that the designs do not refer to a “particular building but to what are obviously symbols of openness and access, bridges, windows and gateways. (Delanty & Jones, 2002: 461) The central image of Euro as a “bridge” might be seen a universalistic culture that is removed from national contexts. For these reason, it is argued that euro refers to “the official memoryless trans-culture of the EU” through faceless banknotes. (Delanty & Jones, 2002: 461)

### **3. 5. 3. Educational Policies of the EU**

As a consequence of the impact of educational systems on national-identity building to foster a sense of belonging, the policy-makers of Union has formally involved in an education policy with the article 149 TEU. European dimension in education is based on the EU’s framework programs Erasmus, Socrates and Leonardo. The name of programs highlight the EU historiography representing the last three thousand years of European history” and the last “a gradual coming together in the shape of the European Community”. (Shore:2000:57) By these programs the EU supports and supplements the action taken by member states in some areas such as cooperation between educational establishments, student and teacher mobility, youth exchanges and language teaching. (Dinan, 2004: 429). In spite of the potential for creating a sense of shared identity, education remains as the areas of nation- states.

Furthermore, mass education, the mobilization of history and memory are crucial, especially among the young for the creation of national-identity and nation state. Therefore, European Commission has emphasized and supported the efforts of rewriting history form a European perspective and inserted ‘European

content/dimension' into school curricula. According to Yasemin Soysal, school books and curricula are important texts for the creation of European consciousness. In educational spheres, Europe is narrated and conceptualized as hosts to multiple geographies, multiple boundaries and multiple cultural references (Soysal, 2002: 278). Though Europe's Roman, Christian and Greek origins are seen as the particular European achievements in history textbooks, they have increasingly embraced universalistic principles. In this sense, recent school books define Europe a much more peaceful land than what its history empirically dictates. Concerning the activities of the EU on education Soysal argues that "European identity is a loose collection of civic ideals and principles, such as democracy, progress, equality and human rights. (Soysal, 2002, 266) While in textbooks it is increasingly situated nation and identity within a European context, curricular development and content are still guarded by the nation-states.

Increasing student mobility across Europe and developing the "European dimension" of higher education programs since 1980s could be regarded as the success of education policy in creating a European consciousness.(Wintle, 1996 :20) It is the fact that language remains a key barrier to further integration. While despite the increasing emphasis on language acquisition in schools, relatively few Europeans speak or read foreign languages. However, the attempts of the Commission to Europeanize education remain limited and ineffective. (Soysal, 2002)

### **3. 6. The Dilemmas and Contradictions in the EU's Approach to Identity and Culture**

This chapter argues that the policy on European identity through cultural politics is ambiguous and incoherent. That is; there are some paradoxes and limitations on the process of European- identity building (Kostakopoulou, 2001: 62) According to EU rhetoric, the Union seeks to develop a stronger sense of European identity and citizenship beyond the nation state. At the same time, it contributes towards the 'flowering' of local, regional and national cultures and identities below it. (Shore, 2004: 28) However, it is questionable whether these objectives are complementary or contradictory. (Shore, 2004: 28)

The EU has tried to promote its model and its vision on European identity and the institutions of the EU has concerned with the obstacles in the building process of such identity. Official rhetoric assumes that European identity could play in attaining the objectives of the Union and could overcome the obstacles. It is supposed that identity politics could discover an existing identity, thus the task of the Union is being to discover it. (Ifversen, 2000: 9) In this sense, European identity could be created simply by exploiting existing 'patterns of European culture' (Smith, 1991:174) as well as producing awareness of cultural diversity. Thus, various identities will fit together harmoniously. (Delanty, 2005: 132)

Shore argues that the EU model of identity is flawed in terms of two reasons. One flaw is that various identities will fit together where the EU institutions produce cultural diversity. (Shore: 2000: 225) According to Shore, this view ignores politics in that, once identities become politicized, tiers of loyalty become "enmeshed in the issues of power and sovereignty". (Shore: 2000: 225) Furthermore, Shore argues that the assumption of the compatibility of national and regional identities in a European identity is "a dubious and ideological assumption based on uncritical and Eurocentric visions of a higher 'European Civilization'". (Shore 2004: 37) Second flaw is that the European historical heritage could simply be used to build a European identity.

Moreover, the concept of 'European culture' often used in official documents is problematic. Since, "those cultural elements which give shape and form to existing national identities (including language, history, religion, myth, memory, folklore and tradition – in a word, 'culture') are precisely those factors that most divide Europeans".(Shore 1996) For these reasons, the EU model of European identity seems "fixed and monolithic", that is an essentialist model of identity. (Shore: 1993:792)

Although the institutions of the EU have desired to forge a common European cultural and political identity in order to stimulate popular support, the institutions are not very skillful in defining that identity. More specifically, the limitations stem

from political constraints and intergovernmental resistance, competing interests and conflicting claims among the member states and institutional constraints of European institutions. (Kostakopoulou, 2001:62)

In this respect, some scholars argue that the limited success of initiatives of Community stem from the support of cultural co-operation between member states. Legitimacy of cultural initiatives is based on the nation-state. In this view, EU's cultural actions serve provide to strengthen the interests of the states. (Banus, 2002: 172) To put it another way, the EU has not have a coherent cultural policy. Rather, the definition of the EU's cultural policy is contested. Furthermore, it might be said that the term of cultural policy is ambiguous. Considering the reason of ambiguousness, such definition stems from its complex nature that includes many different policy areas as language education and various different programs, initiatives that complement each other.

Besides, the cultural policies of the EU are inherently supplementary to the cultural policies of the member states of Union. The actions are limited that the European Commission can under take. As its initiatives and programs are designed to support the cultural policies of the member-states and member-states still retain veto powers over the cultural realm. However, for some, ambiguous content of symbolic actions of the EU is seen by some that "peculiarity and flaw as an ideological instrument lies in that it can work for opposite ends" not as a weakness or confusion. (Sassatelli, 2002: 440) It would suggest that Europe's ambiguous content might strengthen the possibilities of identification with it.

In this view, the 'unity-in-diversity' strategy is the only one suitable to the creation of a meaningful European identity. (Pantel, 1999: 59) It keeps this identity open to multiple interpretations. Furthermore, it has encouraged regional actors to conceive of their identities in new ways which include a European component. (Pantel, 1999: 59) In addition to political constraints and intergovernmental resistance, the process of the institutional and social construction of European identity is lack of a clear conceptual framework and cohesive vision. That is, European identity is designed

with “national statist” model in identity-building. (Kostakopoulou, 2001: 62) In other words, there is lack of a clear political programme or design for institutional construction for European identity. (Hedetoft, 1997: 13)

Furthermore, the EU dimension in the cultural field is not strong as well as less structured than other policy field such as monetary or economic or security issues. It is argued that “flag symbolize an object without a particular meaning; euro coins represent a common monetary space without surplus meaning”. (Eder, 2005: 219) Therefore, the EU needs a “symbolic space” that “must reach beyond flags and coins”. (Eder, 2005: 219)

Actually, in the official discourse, it is stated that the struggle for European identity has a primary goal the furthering of possibilities for European integration by reducing the weight of ethno-nationalism. The primary aim of integration project is inclusion of European nationals in a common economic, cultural and political project. (Jacob& Maier, 2001) Yet, this aim, at the same time, is accompanied with internal exclusion of foreign residents from non-European origin. For these reasons, European identity entails both inclusion and exclusion around identities. (Jacob& Maier, 2001) However, the real problem stem from internal exclusion in the Union.

In this sense, it seems that official discourse of the EU on European identity is ambiguous. Indeed, the EU policies have deliberately provoked the decrease of national and cultural barriers. (Dunkerley, 2002: 93) however, when the so-called third country nationals inferiors are compared to EU nationals, they do not have the right of free movement throughout Europe. (Dunkerley, 2002: 93) Although rhetorically citizenship have a tendency in terms of inclusive civic mode of identity, the EU has concerned civic and exclusive mode of identity (Kostakopolaou, 2001:7) as seen in the restrictive immigration regimes. In other words, European citizenship and the discourse of identity in the EU are still closer to the exclusionary characteristics and cultural basis.

In this sense, Dunkerley argues that the EU itself has contributed to the “racialisation of Europe” through its vision of a European identity. (Dunkerley, 2003: 123) According to Shore, this discourse of European identity does not refer to the contributions of non-European or other Europeans which has created a selective, elitist and ‘Euro-centric’, and essentialist model of identity. (Shore,1993:792) By contrast, Cederman argues that there is an inclusive tendency in the EU political culture in spite of exclusive tendencies in some areas such as immigration regime. (Cederman, 2001:248)

In the light of these considerations, building process of the Union could be defined as ‘multifaceted, ambiguous, uneven, and contested’(Laffan, 2004: 77) As a result, in spite of the EU elites’ desire to create a democratic and inclusive European identity, exclusive tendencies in European identity discourse are stronger than inclusive tendencies. As a result of the embryonic character of the EU, the interaction between nested national identities and cross-cutting European identities the EU’ top-down approach is still failing to give a definite content to its abstract and ambiguous slogans (Shore, 2000).

### **3. 7. The Limited Success of the EU’s Initiatives**

Since the early 1970s, with a gradual building of identity politics, cultural policy, various programmes and regulations EU elites have tried deliberately to codify a European consciousness and European culture. Despite particular strategies, politics and discourses, the EU has created ‘Europe’ which is more than legal norms, rules and political institutions. Moreover, Europe is a symbolic space where the collective identifications of the people of Europe are represented (Eder, 2002: 245).

It could be argued that the EU policy-makers succeeded in creating a European consciousness in some fields: a currency, a European flag, capital, a European anthem, maps, a passport, and textbooks written ‘from a European perspective’. Yet, it seems that these attempts have had limited success in creating a European supranational consciousness. Both the EU policy makers and scholars complain about the limited success of identity politics and cultural policy of EU. Identity-

formation in the EU goes through several channels, (Cerutti, 2003: 26) While some efforts of the EU seem successful, some are less successful.

The output is not limited when taking into consideration the policies and regulations in the making in this field. The popular identification with the EU would be achieved only if the European enterprise became less elitist and more citizen-friendly. (Kostakopoulou, 2001) Nevertheless, much of these efforts might contribute to the formation of a shared sense of belongingness in the future. Moreover, the possibility of success of the EU in making stronger connections to the lives of its citizens depends on the capacity of the EU as well as bottom-up initiatives to complement top-down efforts.

To conclude, 'unity in diversity' as a top-down rhetoric has been utilized by the institutions of the EU in the process of identity construction. This refers that European identity has been constructed and reconstructed according to the evolution of the EU. The process of the institutional and social construction of European identity has not clear conceptual framework and cohesive vision in consequence of embryonic character of the Union and stable power of national identities. The EU's discourse on identity and culture is ambiguous and contested. Moreover, the processes of identity formation show inconsistency in accordance with the different policy areas. (Cederman, 2001:248)

In the ongoing search for legitimate governance, it has been argued that the EU as a 'imagined community' in the making and the initiatives and policies of the Union to create a European consciousness are the basis that 'imagined community' will continue in the future. (Shore, 1993: 794) Here, in the light of these evolutions, it remains controversial whether collective European identity is gradually emerging as a result of the identity politics, which will be addressed in the next chapter.



## **CHAPTER IV**

### **THE ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE EU IDENTITY POLITICS**

The existence and strength of a shared sense of European identity is an important variable, since it has significant implications for individuals' support of the European integration project. This chapter tries to examine whether there is a European identity, if so, how strong European identity is across different groups and policy areas. By examining this question, it is aimed to understand the contribution of European institutions in making of a European identity among European citizens.

#### **4. 1. The Need for Measuring European Identity**

The EU polity revolves around the question of how much and what forms of political power should be turned over from the national to the supranational level. (Kohli, 2000) Evolving integration process raises the question of whether people have a shared sense of identity that distinguishes them from the non-European. However, it is difficult to identify the policies designed to achieve a shared identity at the European level and to evaluate their results. The concept of common identity and the emergence of a sense of community are contested, because of the difficulties on the evaluation. There have been extensive empirical researches on the question of public support for integration for over nearly thirty years. Yet, the concept of European identity is an empirically less studied issue by scholars. The focus of this chapter is whether this goal should, could and did produce a European identity in both elite and public level.

The effect of the strategies trying to promote European identity has been studied. The surveys show that it is very difficult to measure identity; there are various obstacles that create serious limitations. Some argue that various data, namely Eurobarometer

data, do not measure identification with Europe and the EU, but measure support for the EU. As identities are not singular and exclusive, individuals maintain affective ties to many levels of political associations simultaneously. Besides, the debate on the impact of the EU upon the citizens' sense of identification and the EU citizens' subjective perceptions about European integration is extremely contested. (Wallace, 1991; Bruter, 2000; Bruter, 2003) As explained in previous chapters, one of the main difficulties is that the concepts of 'European identity' and 'Europe' have no common definition across individuals. (Bruter, 2003:1155) There is little agreement among the citizens of the EU about 'what a European identity is'. That is to say, it is not clear what individuals mean when they say that 'they feel (or do not feel) European'. (Robyn, 2005: 229) It seems difficult to find differences across levels of European identity without understanding what people can mean when they explain that they do feel European. (Bruter, 2003: 1155) Different ways of measuring European identity used various methods to study and measure identity. Different surveys employing different methods from multidisciplinary backgrounds reach different conclusions, concerning the compatibility of national, local and European identities the substance and the depth of European identity.

#### **4. 2. Identity Change in the Context of EU**

Within the context of European integration, one of the most debated issues has understood how political institutions of the EU could influence the level of identification of citizens. (Bruter, 2003) In fact, the role of the political institutions on the creation of identity is an old debate. It is said that if "institutions and political identities stand in a mutually constitutive relation", "the empirical implementation of institutions' reforms suggest a change in human consciousness for its success and long term viability". (Kostakopoulou, 2001: 164)

Community building efforts to forge European identity and their consequences has come to the agenda of both policy makers and academic community since the 1970s. This search refers to the 'trade-off' the perceptions of ordinary people between local, national and European communities. The literature on the EU's integration highlights the deep disagreement in the relevant academic community over the impact of the

EU institutions on national and European identities. Recently, scholars have begun to study the possible effects of the European Union through identity building strategies on elites and public opinion.

Some studies have assessed the effects of the EU's identity building strategies on citizens' attitudes toward European integration. (Risse, 2004; Bruter, 2004; Robyn 2005) As said before, essentialist approach assumes that identities are either unique or fixed; and unlikely to change under the effect of political institutions. However, recently, the possibility of an identity change has begun to be conceived as a result of the co-evolution of political institutions and identities in Europe. Constructivist approaches assume that a political entity could affect identity, both at the level of individual and collective. (Jorgensen:1998: Christiansen, Weiner ,1999 : 529 ; Risse, 2004) In this view, political "institutions have the power to encourage or impede the formation of ...European identity". (Bruter,2003 : 1169)

According to Glyniss Breakwell, the initiatives of EU's institutions would change "existing baseline of national identity elements" in terms of legal, financial, welfare and other systems of nation-states. (Breakwell, 2004: 36) Similarly, Brigid Laffan stresses that identity-building capacity of the institutions of the EU stems from the centrality of their decision-making process at the European level of governance and their impact on the political, economic and social structure of Europe. (Laffan, 2004; Risse, 2004; Breakweel, 2004: 26) In other words, the EU as a powerful political entity could significantly change "Europeans' conception of politics and identity. (Abeles, 1996: 25) In that respect, top-down policies of the European Union might influence and modify people's perception of "who they are" and "what political communities they belong to". For some, currently "deterritorialized Europe does not change people's identity; but it brings them a completely new perspective on their own traditions". (Abeles, 1996: 25) For others, Europe is already in the process of identity change. (Hermann&Brewer, 2004)

#### **4. 2. 1. 'Entitativity: Increasing Sense of Community**

The 'European space' has been broadened as a result of the creation of new

supranational roles and the growing national and European elites. (Eder & Giesen, 2001; Laffan, 2004: 96) The Constitutional Treaty is the last example of the institutionalization of the EU as a polity. (Delanty, 2005a:135) From social psychological perspective, a “sense of community” or ‘entitativity’ is one of the crucial elements in the construction of European identity. The concept of “entitativity” provides “a visible link from Brussels to daily lives of citizens”, i.e. “psychological existence of the EU for individuals”. On that view, identification with the EU stems from the perception of the EU as a real entity. (Castano, 2004:53) So, “increasing the ‘entitativity’ of the European Union led to an increase of identification with it, and decreasing ‘entitativity’ led to a decrease in identification”. (Castano, 2004: 53)

In other words, European identity has strong cognitive dimension; the more the EU exists as a real entity, the more identification with it occurs. (Castano, 2004, Laffan, 2004) According to Shore, the EU’s invented traditions have provided the “EU institutions and ideals an increasingly visible and concrete reality in the everyday lives and memories of its citizens”.( Shore, 2000; 64) As a result, ‘Europe’ has become increasingly synonymous with the EU. (Laffan, 2004: 96) This increasing psychological existence of the EU in daily lives of Europeans has affected their identification with Europe as a political community. (Risse, 2004: 270) From this logic, weak level of identification might be partly as a result of “the lack of a psychological existence of the EU in the minds of Europeans”. (Castano, 2004:53) Moreover, elite-mass differences in self-identification with the EU might partially be explained by different degrees of “entitativity” or “realness” of European institutions in the lives of elites and masses, respectively.

#### **4. 2. 2. Elite and Masses Identification with the EU**

One of the aims of European integration is to create “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’s stated in Treaty of European Union. The politization of European integration project has led to power transfer from national level to European level; “faceless European institutions” has come to define even how people dispose of their garbage. (Erlanger, 2002) This distance of Europeans from the

institutions of Union has created a large gap between mass public and elite support for the EU. Even the EU's official documents confirm that "the gap between the European Union and its citizens is widely recognized"(CEC, 2006) The impact of the EU's institutions on the formation and the expression of collective identities is much higher in the case of societal elites than in the case of "ordinary" citizens. The current ambivalence in elite discourses on the EU also contributes to this state.

The EU remains as an elite driven project, since it is still a more distant community from its citizens in spite of all these rules and regulations which cover almost every political issue. Furthermore, the citizens of the Union have seldom involved in the major political decisions. Recent Eurobarometer (EB) opinion polls indicate that many of the people "know little about the EU and feel they have little say in its decision-making process." (CEC, 2006)

If European identity is an elite phenomenon, the EU institutions could simply contribute shared identity among their officials, but not among ordinary citizens. In other words, one can expect that identification with and support for the institutions of the EU is the highest among political and social elites.(Risse , 2004: 260) Even Eurobarometer (EB) data confirmed the huge gap between elite support for the EU and widespread scepticism among the masses. For this reason, this chapter is primarily concerned whether ordinary citizens have developed a psychological attachment to Europe. However, European identification is not exclusively elite phenomenon. At European level, individuals identify more with European institutions than their own national representatives. (Mayer& Palmovski, 2004: 585) By 2006, public approval for the institutions of Union is rather high, despite of the lower approval ratings for national institutions. (EB, 2006)

#### **4. 2. 3. Emerging European Identity**

This increasing sense of attachment raises the issue of whether the development of the EU has created a shared sense of European identity. Different surveys reach different conclusions on this question. The answer to the question depends on how

European identity is defined. In fact, Europeanization could be defined as the “emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance of political, legal, and social institutions” impacts upon “domestic processes, policies, institutions and identities.”(Risse, Cowles Caparaso, 2000:2) Indeed, the EU through its institutions, norms and rules could influence identity at the individual and collective level. (Breakwell, 2004)

Surveys regarding the feeling of belonging to the European Union and the possibility of the existence of a common European identity show quite a heterogenic picture; thus there is a lack of unity among citizens of different member states in the EU. Moreover, there are different views among scholars concerning the impact of the EU on identities both at individual and collective level in Europe. Actually, the differences between different levels of identification at individual (personal identity) and group levels (collective identity) make it difficult to reach conclusions about the impact of the EU on identities. (Meinhof, 2004 :243) It is often argued that there are occurring profound changes at the individual level in the European scene. (Robyn, 2005 :228) For instance, there is a widespread skepticism at the individual level in the United Kingdom. However, some aspects of the people’s national and sub-national identities are derived from the EU membership. (Breakwell, 2004:32) This means that the impact of Europeanization on collective identities is controversial. According to Delanty, in the EU “more and more people expressing an identity with Europe” as a result of ‘Europeanization of lifestyles’. (Delanty, 2005: 138)

However, as it is argued in the previous chapters, the ‘proliferation of Europeanized personal identities’ do not automatically produce a collective European identity. (Delanty, 2005, 130) At the individual level, this growing numbers of personal identification with Europe, that is ‘Europeanization of identities’ should not be considered as political or cultural European identity’. (Delanty, 2005a:131) According to Eriksen, the lack of demos called ‘European people’, the EU as value-based entity has not a collective identity beyond national borders. (Eriksen, 2005: 260) According to Manuel Castells European identity does not exist, but “there are embryos of a European identity project”. (Castells, 1997: 365) In theory, the EU,

socially and culturally fragmented, with its diverse historical experiences in member states could construct a collective European identity. So far, the EU as a polity has not created a demos of 'European people', but there is emerging to be "Europeans". (Delanty: 2005b:17)

In many surveys, this collective European identity is seen as a 'composite identity' made up of layers of a large number of national identities. (Mayer & Palmovski, 2004: 90) More specifically, there is not one "European integrative identity" shared by elites and masses of the EU member states. Therefore, "there are varying mixtures of aggregated national and European identities in relation to the European integration framework".(Spohn, 2005: 9) Similarly, Iver Neumann supposes that "there cannot be such a thing as European identity in the singular but only a plurality of European identities that will clash and reconstruct one another in the process that is identity politics". (Neuman, 2001:158) These considerations might mean that the EU as an 'identity category' is continually developing. Also, it has not a 'comprehensive, coherent and consistent' identity elements. (Breakwell, 2004 :35) as a result, the EU lacks an 'all-encompassing' inclusive identity that it can offer its members citizens".(Breakwell, 2004:31)

The complexity of contemporary collective identities in Europe stem from the national, sub-national and transnational levels of identification. In fact, European identity is often assessed in comparison with national identity. In all member states of the EU, people prioritize their national or sub-national identities; and European identity has not superseded national and sub-national identities. It is often expected that the salience and stability of national identity constrain the possible effects of EU strategies in creating European identity. As seen in the previous chapter, it is difficult for building a different notion of identity from essentialist conceptions of national identity. (Robyn, 2005: 228) However, data does not confirm this expectation. Although attachment to the nation remains strong in all European countries, the attachment to Europe also grew throughout the 1990s. (Citrin & Sides, 2004: 164) In fact, the European nation states have become less powerful under the impact of European integration process. Yet, identification with nation is still stronger than

identification with the EU. Identification with European identity varies from country to country. Moreover, citizens within the different member-states interpret the concept of a common European identity in different ways. As Michaler Bruter stressed “when two individuals claim to “feel European,” they might mean totally different things in terms of both the intensity of the feeling they describe and the imagined political community they refer to”. (Bruter, 2003: 1154) In other words, there is not a common understanding of what is ‘European identity’ among member-states’ citizens.

The fear of losing one’s national identity and cultural diversity as a result of European unification might explain changing strength of European identity in member states of the EU. (Citrin & Sides, 2004: 164) Furthermore, the analysis of survey demonstrates that the feelings of national identity are strong to influence individuals’ feelings of European integration and European identity. For example, British citizens tend to identify themselves with ‘Europe’ less than Italians do. (Risse, 2002) Despite of significant support for European integration, research find that ‘national pride’ is high in each member states, apart from Germany. (Robyn, 2005: 229) It has been stated that “Europeans are not affiliating with the EU as people are not willing to die for Brussels” as “they have been and still are willing to die for their countries”. (Robyn: 2005, 234) In fact, “Europeans might be less willing than in the past to die for their countries in the future”. (Robyn: 2005, 234)

#### **4. 3. ‘Dual Identification’ in the EU**

The official discourse of the EU on the multiplicity and compatibility of various identities is considerably supported by statistical analysis. EB data and other surveys confirm this multiplicity of identities. From 1991 to 2000, the number of those who felt attachments to their nation-state only declined to 20 percent across in the EU. (Risse, 2004a: 260) In that period, the support for the EU membership and the perceived benefits from EU membership has decreased. However, ‘dual identification’, which is identification with Europe and with the nation, has increased. (Citrin Sides, 2004) Even the people who strongly identify themselves with their nation-state, they also feel a sense of belonging to the Union. From this

logic, possible increase in European identity does not inevitably decrease one's loyalty to national or other communities in zero-sum terms.

This means that European identity is not empirically conflicting to national identity. (Kohli, 2000) European identity has become a 'viable and positive, supplementary identity' for many people. (Citrin & Sides: 2004; Delanty, 2005b) It can and should be conceived as multi-level or multi-layered, comprising global and national (and possibly regional and local) attachments. (Kohli, 2000) It is the fact that national identities and identity patterns have been changing in the light of the evolving institutional structures of EU, which could be defined as 'complexification' of identities. The data confirm constructivist logic that "Europeanization transformed national identities, but they are not dissolved by European identity". (Spohn, 2005: 3) More specifically, the relation between national and European identity is more than coexistence, for the various identities co-evolve. (Delanty, 2005; 139)

It is widely argued that national identity is no longer 'unique and away from its familiar self'. (Soysal, 2002: 266) In this respect, the important question is to measure the relative strengths and weakness of these multiple identities to recognize their developments and 'decomposes' over time.(Wallace, 1991:19) European collective identity is limited to the political communication within the public sphere, does not consist cultural aspects of private life. (Cederman 2001: 5) For this reason, it is 'thin' in comparison with the national identity. (Cederman: 2001:5) Moreover, European identity is likely remaining thinner than the national identities, since it has little prospect in order to equal national identity.

#### **4. 4. The Consequences of Dual Identification on Support for the EU**

As argued earlier, the question of development of collective European identity is crucial for the support and legitimacy of European integration. First of all, the relationship between the support for European integration and European identity should be clarified. The support for European integration and identification with the EU are two different variables, in spite of the existence of close correlation between them. These distinctions are confirmed by different surveys. (Bruter, 2004: 208)

Many surveys indicate that attachment to Europe and support for integration are positively correlated.

Considering the rational choice approach and constructivist approach in conceptualizing collective identity, the survey data indicate that two approaches could be combined since they often occur simultaneously. In other words, people in Europe support for the EU resulted from both material and ideational reasons. From rational choice (utilitarian approach), the determinant of a citizen's sense of European identity and his/her support for the EU is based on subgroup objectives such as income, education and subjective economic evaluations. From constructivist approach, citizens' sense of belonging to the EU relies on identification with the values they associate with it. As stressed before, constructivist approach assumes that the political institutions could shape values, norms and identities. In turn, those values, norms and identities shape attitudes of people. In this respect, it is the fact that European identity is one of the essential elements in explaining the support for European integration.

Nevertheless, there is not little study concerning the casual mechanism between European integration and European identity. (Risse, 2004: 270) Existing surveys have not clearly explained the development of European identity and its links to the evolution of European institutions. EB data and some surveys indicate that there is "a remarkable reservoir of support in all countries for the EU". Yet, there is "much less support for any specifically defined contours of European identity". (Robyn, 2005: 229) In this sense, a sense of European identity might have a stronger impact on support for integration than the impact of European integration on European identity. The results of various surveys suggest that there is a need for much more mass surveys. There are a few studies whose findings offer insight into European identity phenomenon. Nowadays, the real problem is how multiple identities go together and how they relate each other. It is true that there has been little investigation concerning potential clash between European and national identities. The analysis of the surveys highlights the need for more comprehensive and coherent empirical

surveys about the impact of both the EU actions on European identity and the emerging European identity on the EU integration.

To conclude, despite remaining uncertainties of conceptualization and measurement of European identity, the available evidence shows clearly that there is an increasing sense of community in European elites and ordinary people. The intention of the EU to create an “overarching European identity” that includes all Europeans has achieved a limited success.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **CONCLUSION**

This thesis has examined the question of European identity within the context of the EU, the strategies of identity-building, the results of these strategies and the European integration process on collective identities in Europe. By reviewing the literature and conducting an empirical survey, this thesis has examined some elements of the so-called ‘European identity project’.

The starting point of this thesis has been that the issue of European identity is interconnected to the construction of the EU since desirability and possibility of a collective European identity are directly linked to the issue of legitimacy of the European Union.

As argued throughout the thesis, the issue of legitimacy has become an important reason for the interest in the construction and the fostering of a European identity at the European level of governance. Therefore, European institutions have come to use the idea of a “European identity” and actively involved in constructing a common identity for the last three decades.

Currently, a sense of European identity is much more needed to give a sense of legitimacy to the European project in a period of intense political integration after the last enlargement with the Central and Eastern countries. In this new phase of ‘European history’ European identity has been one of the main problems for the continuity of integration project.

At the end of this study, there are some points to be mentioned which have come into prominence in the debate of the possibilities and limitations concerning the EU’s post-national European identity. This thesis has not attempted to find a conclusive

definition on European identity; it has tried to find some constitutive elements of the concept.

Firstly, much evidence suggests that, as a process, European integration has impact on the state system and national identities in Europe. As the process of European integration has evolved, nations' identities and interests have changed. It should be mentioned that there remain certain conceptual ambiguities concerning the concept of European identity. However, the contradictory approaches about "what European identity is" and "what it should be" at European, national and sub-national levels highlight that there is no clearly defined European identity with its substance and content. Moreover, the lack of a common definition of European identity makes it difficult to understand the complexity of the perceptions of people concerning the nature of their attachment to their political community. The multiplicity of voices on the debate reflects the complex and contested nature of the subject matter- European identity. European identity has not a clear and distinctive set of identity characteristics because of enduring power of national identities.

Secondly, European identity has been invoked by political actors to legitimize an institutional construction. It has attempted to be created institutionally. Yet, the EU lacks a clear political program. This lack of clear conceptual framework and cohesive vision in the process of the institutional and social construction of European identity has resulted from the different political, religious ethnic-cultural backgrounds of the EU's member states. Therefore, identity- building process in the EU has been conflicting and fragmented.

In fact, identity and culture have become increasingly significant within the European integration context as a result of "politicization" of European integration. The European institutions have come to use the idea of a "European identity" and actively involved in constructing a common identity over the last three decades. The EU's top-down political strategies utilized as instrumental devices for creating European consciousness have not produced a unified political community. It seems that official discourse of the EU about European identity is ambiguous. While

rhetorically European identity has a tendency of inclusive civic mode of identity, the EU has still relied on civic and exclusive mode of identity as observed in restrictive immigration regime policy. In sum, the discourse of European identity in the EU has still displays the exclusionary characteristics.

Thirdly, the survey data have indicated that European integration has affected collective identities in the EU member states but in different degrees among elites and masses. Top-down policies of the Union have, at least to some extent, affected and changed people's perception of 'who they are' and 'what political communities they belong to'. By this way, European self understanding has been affected by the EU policies; the EU has come to define what it means to be European. The concept of Europe and the EU has come to be used interchangeably, which could be seen as one of the considerable successes of the European integration project.

Still, the feeling of national identity is stronger than the feeling of a European identity and this will likely to continue in the foreseeable future. More importantly, available data confirm that European identity has not existed beyond or outside national identities since national identities contain the elements of a European identity in varying degrees. Thus, European identity has not transcended national identities.

In sum, empirical evidence confirms that the growing power of the Union as a result of the politicization of integration in the late 1980s has created 'dual identification'. This means that political loyalty in Europe has been dependent on the combination of a European identity and national identities. Moreover, the results of the analysis suggest that the relationship between national, sub-national and European identity is complex. Future research might investigate the dynamic implications of national identity and European identity for the support for European integration.

The degree of identification with the EU and degree of attachment to the EU among the European elites and masses; the distinction of European identity from other identifications; the evolution of European identity since the beginning of the

European integration project; increasing salience and psychological existence of the EU; all of which indicate the 'embryonic character' of the EU and the interaction between nested national identities and cross-cutting European identities.

In the light of these considerations, the question is no longer whether European identity exists or not. The debate is now revolving around the content of such an identity. What is the essence of this vague notion of 'being European' continues to be unclear. Despite the uncontroversial success of the European integration project, the EU has been facing enormous challenges stemming from enlargement, deepening and the question of its own identity. European enlargement is one of the major challenges facing the union because of increasing diversity and the risk of fragmentation.

European identity in the EU context remains to be problematic. All efforts to forge European identity remain as the major obstacle for EU policy-makers since the collective identities in the EU continue to be territorially shaped by the member states. However, both attachments to the nation and Europe are likely to increase in the future.

The challenges and the limitations of existing conceptual framework on European identity and of articulating a theoretical framework for European identity more or less stem from the novelty and complexity of the European project. As identities are formed in a long-term period rather than in response to short-term policy, empirical effects of increasing power of the EU institutions which will pave the way for the intensified policies and initiatives of the EU with regard to the European identity should be considered in the long term.

The concept of European identity is multidimensional, ambiguous and dynamic phenomena. Moreover, its constantly changing content depends on its social and political context. In sum, there is not an agreed and static meaning of the concept. Moreover, the project of European integration and process of European identity formation are open-ended. All of these contradictory approaches- as a result, about

“what European identity is” and “what it should be” at European, national and sub-national levels highlight that there is no clearly defined European identity with its substance and content. Whether understood as a consequence of the political identity, as a result of the institutional processes, or as the outcome of conscious constructive efforts, European identity has been experienced by the citizens of the EU. It is substantially different from national identities; thin, collective, post-national European identity that has been experienced by individuals as a reality within the context of the EU.

From the point of the constructivist approach, the developments in European cultural and political sphere continually are being transformed by the dynamics produced by national and European policy-makers through top-down and bottom-up approaches. It is reasonable to assume that the realness of the EU as an “imagined community” in people’s lives, the perception of shared values and clearly defined boundaries could help to increase the sense of belonging of the citizens with the EU in the long term.

Finally, the uncertainty of the future is also apparent. The variable geometry of European integration gives rise to the construction of contested, incomplete, future-oriented European identity. As Norman Davies stated, “Europe border has been imagined as a line beyond which live non- Europeans” and “this line has ebbed and flowed over the past five hundred years”.(Davies, 1997:8) As the finality of European integration and its values could not be “firmly defined and delimited”, the borders of the EU are necessarily open. With unclear and changing borders, the EU project remains and will remain to be an unfinished project.

In the light of theoretical framework, institutional discourse of European identity and the empirical data with regard to the debate over European identity is far from reaching an end. Thus, the problem of forging of a collective European identity will remain in the foreseeable future. The EU’s persistent attempts to construct European identity and consciousness at the level of public opinion will also continue. It can be anticipated that the political priorities of elites and the expectations of masses will shape the substance, content and debt of European identity.

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