POST-SOVIET POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION IN UKRAINE
(1991-2004)

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ABSTRACT

POST SOVIET POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION IN UKRAINE
(1991-2004)

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This thesis seeks to examine the post-Soviet political transformation in Ukraine between 1991 and 2004. Since Ukraine declared independence in 1991, the problems of political transformation to democracy in Ukraine have affected the outbreak of the Orange Revolution. The thesis attempts to examine the problems of post-Soviet political transformation in Ukraine under Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma in order to analyse the dynamics of the Orange Revolution in 2004. The dynamics of the Orange Revolution are in part a result of the mass movements against the ongoing problems of the post-Soviet political transformation to democracy in Ukraine. This thesis also argues that the Orange Revolution does not indicate the conclusion of the political transformation in Ukraine, since the problems of the political transformation in Ukraine still remain as it has been seen in the short-term evolution of the political progress of Viktor Yushchenko, who elected to the presidency in the 2004 presidential elections.

Keywords: Ukraine, Political Transformation, Orange Revolution, Leonid Kravchuk, Leonid Kuchma, Viktor Yushchenko

ÖZ

UKRAYNA'DA SOVYET SONRASI SİYASAL DÖNÜŞÜM
(1991-2004)

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Bu tez 1991 ve 2004 yılları arasında, Ukrayna'daki Sovyet sonrası siyasal dönüşümü incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. 1991'de Ukrayna'nın bağımsızlığını ilan etmesinden itibaren, Ukrayna'da demokratikleşmeye yönelik siyasi dönüşümde yaşanan problemler Turuncu Devrim'e yol açan etkenlerdendir. 2004'teki Turuncu Devrim'in dinamiklerini analiz edebilmek için, tez, Leonid Kravchuk ve Leonid Kuchma dönemlerinde Sovyet sonrası siyasi dönüşüm sürecinde yaşanan problemleri açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Ukrayna'da Sovyet sonrası siyasi dönüşümde yaşanan problemlere karşıt olarak gelişen kitle hareketleri belli oranda Turuncu Devrimin dinamiklerini oluşturmuştur. Viktor Yuschenko'nun. 2004 Başkanlık Seçimlerinde Ukrayna devlet başkanı olarak seçilmesinin ardından sonra geçen kısa dönemde Ukrayna'da Sovyet sonrası siyasi dönüşümün problemlerinin izlerinin hala silinememesi nedeniyle, bu tez aynı zamanda da Ukrayna'da yaşanan Turuncu Devrim'in Ukrayna'nın siyasi dönüşümünün sona erip ermediğini tartışmayı amaçlar.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ukrayna, Siyasal Dönüşüm, Turuncu Devrim, Leonid Kravçuk, Leonid Kuçma, Viktor Yuşçenko.

To the dearest, who taught me all I know,

H. Necati Ergül,

always living in our hearts…

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis seeks to explore the factors affecting Ukraine's political transformation under Leonid Kravchuk, and Leonid Kuchma in order to examine the dynamics of the Orange Revolution. Problems of post-Soviet transformation to democracy in Ukraine resulted in the mass mobilisation generally accepted as the Orange Revolution. The revolution was the reaction of the opposition movement led by Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, with the youth NGOs reacting to the interruption of the post-Soviet political transformation to democracy.

Ukraine's post-Soviet transformation had been interrupted many times prior to the 2004 presidential elections. Due to these interruptions, the Orange Revolution broke out with the participation of approximately one million demonstrators led by well-organised volunteers and two opposition parties Our Ukraine under Viktor Yushchenko, and National Salvation Front under Yulia Tymoshenko which protested the Central Election Committee's release of the runoff results of the 2004 presidential election. Thanks to their efforts, the second round of the presidential elections was repeated in Ukraine; however, the political problems and the post-Soviet political traditions were not abandoned, and in contrast to the wide spread opinion, Ukraine's post-Soviet political transformation have not come to an end yet since Viktor Yushchenko came to the power in Ukraine. Within this framework, this thesis seeks to examine Ukraine's factors challenging its political transformation

1.1. Why Ukraine

This thesis seeks to explore the dynamics of the political transformation in Ukraine. In order to explore the dynamics of the post-Soviet transformation to democracy in Ukraine, the thesis focuses upon Ukraine due to its important role that Alexander Motyl quoted,

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> …Ukraine is important for a variety of reasons that ensure it a central role in the future of Europe…First on the list are Ukraine's impressive physical size, economic potential, and resource endowment. Second is Ukraine's propinquity to-indeed, some might argue that Ukraine is part of-Central Europe in general and to Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary in particular. Third is Ukraine's defining impact on Russia. Fourth is Ukraine's resultant importance to the stability and security of Europe as a whole…[1]

Having been the breadbasket of the Soviet Union, with her coal, iron, manganese deposits, rich reserves of petroleum and natural gas and high quality human capital, Ukraine[2] not only occupies a space between the East and the West, located on the edge of Europe, but also Ukraine occupies a space at the edge of a cultural boundary. The religious fault line between Catholicism and Orthodoxy runs through Ukraine. The frontiers between the Latin and the Cyrillic alphabet and the Eastern limits of Gothic Architecture lie between Ukraine's borders with Russia and East European countries.

The fifth largest population in Europe and the second largest county in Europe, Ukraine has a geo-strategic importance for European countries, and the US as well as the Russian Federation. Besides its critical role in the Former Soviet space and in Eastern Europe, thanks to Ukraine's geo-strategic location, Ukraine is one of the leading actors within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Additionally, Ukraine has a special relationship with Russia thanks to their historical and cultural interconnections and common Slavic ancestors.

Defined as the historical nonexistent borders of a historically nonexistent state by Konstantin Zatulin,[3] the space occupied by Ukraine's geo-strategic location has determined the basic political dilemma of the political transformation: Russophiles versus Ukrainophiles, which were divided by means of not only ethnicity, but also language.[4] Demographic problems deepened the gap between the

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[1] Alexander J. Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993: p.1.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine, Russia and the CIS." *Ukrainian Quarterly,* Vol.20, No.5 (1996): pp.30-45.

[4] See: Naulko Vsevolod, "Ethnodemographic Processes in Present-day Ukraine" [Online] Available: http://www.cishsydney2005.org/ima_ges/VsevolodNaulkoA IO 13.doc. [Accession: 12 November 2005]

western and eastern identity within the Ukraine and continuously these identities have been playing a leading role as challengers of the political transformation in Ukraine.

Similar to the lingual and the ethnic differences between Eastern and Western parts of Ukraine, the religious differences separate the Western Ukraine from the Eastern portion. People living in the Eastern parts of Ukraine are Orthodox Christians, whereas most Galicians and Transcarpathians and Chernivtsians are believers of the Greek Catholic, or Uniate Church. Most of the population is adherents of Christianity with the major denominations being the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church.[5] Thus, these problems which have historical roots have been increasing the gap between the two different identities in the country.

1.2. Literature Review

The concept of transition and the transitology literature is introduced by the developments in the post-colonial Latin American states in the 1960s and 1970s. Later, the newly independent post socialist states and post-Soviet states started to be focused by the transitology after the collapse of communism in the late 1980s and dissolution of the USSR in 1991. By the end of the 1990s, it became rather clear that transition must also take into consideration *Sovietology* when examining the case of the post-Soviet states.[6]

In post-Soviet space; it was more difficult to erase the remnants of the Soviet experience than the socialist experience in Eastern Europe for three reasons. First, most of the post-Soviet states had no experience with political tradition. Second, some of those countries, including Ukraine, did not experience an independence period before they incorporated into the Union. Third, they were exposed to a process of Sovietisation to Sovetisation during the Soviet era. Different from the other former Socialist countries, subjected to the semi-periphery, and

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[5] Alexander.J Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism.* New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993. pp. 8-9.

[6] Mykola Riabchuk, "From Dysfunctional to Blackmail State Paradoxes of the Post-Soviet Transition." Wolodymyr George Danyliw Occasional Paper Vol:1. (2000). [Online] Available: http://www.danyliwfoundation.org/docs/paradoxesofpostsoviettransition.pdf. [Accessed 15 July 2005].

different from the former Socialist countries subjected to the periphery, Ukraine was subjected to the core in ideological and geographical means. Being a post-Soviet state, but geographically belonging to Europe, Ukraine could not be examined by a theoretical framework which was designed to explore processes of relatively regular transitions, not only because the post-Soviet space has been a laboratory for social engineering since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but also due to Ukraine's geo-strategic importance and historical background.

In order to explore the progress of this dynamic process, transitologists have pointed out the need for defining more than one of the pillars of the process or examining areas for transitology architecture. Evaluation of the transitology management of a country was needed to examine more than two dimensions separately, instead of examining the process by means of double transition; authoritarianism to democracy and state controlled economy to market economy.

It was soon claimed that one more pillar was needed to build upon the theory; however, there was no consensus on what the third pillar of triple transition should be. Carol Skalnik Leff thinks that the third dimension has to be the core national identity of the state.[7] Being convinced on the triple transition, Rainer Münz and Rainer Ohliger define the third dimension as the ruling elites' aim to transform regarding the democratization of politics and society.[8] Anna Grzymala-Busse and Pauline Jones Luong think that it is needed to mention the special issue of the interrelation between politics and society more broadly,[9] besides the marketisation and democratisation. In 2002,inspired by Linz and Stepan's argument which is based upon that illuminating to separate stateness and the national question as overlapping but conceptually and historically different processes,[10] Taras Kuzio defined

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[7] Carol Skalnik Leff, "Triple Transition in Eastern Europe." YMCA Friday Forum Series, (1992) [Online] Available: http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/Research/S&Ps/1992-93-Wi/S&_VII-2/triple_tansitn html [Accessed 23 August 2005]

[8] Rainer Münz and Rainer Ohliger. "The Ukraine After Independence: The Making of A Nation Between East And West." (2004) [Online]. Available: http://www2.rz.hu-berlin.de/population/info/ epub/pdfdateien/ukraine.pdf [Accessed: 15 July 2005]

[9] Anna Grzymala-Busse and Pauline Jones Luong. "Re-Conceptualizing the State: Lessons from Post-Communism." [Online] Available: http://www.brown.edu/departments/political_science/pauline/P &S%20article%20dec%202002.pdf [Accessed 23 August 2005]

[10] Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press (1996): pp. 37-61

transitology by not subsuming stateness and nationhood into one category.[11] Thus, he suggested examining transitology by means of what he called quadruple transitology. He pays more attention to the emergence of an organised civil society in order to meet the requirements of the process.[12]

Transitology literature developed to examine post-Soviet realities by paying attention to the various dimensions of socio-political transformation, originated from the dissolution of the authoritarian structure of the state. The early theoretical agenda was primarily about democratization, especially the speed with which it would occur and the factors seen to be accelerating or slowing it.[13] New terms, concepts and interest areas were developed to examine these countries; however, the literature has not developed to the level exploring where a country stands between authoritarianism and democracy and when the transition is completed.

Herman Hoen points out that many might address the criteria, which indicate the end of transition.[14] For some, the criteria follow on from pragmatic considerations, such as the accession to the EU. In order to consider accession to the EU as the end of the transition, the transition has to be considered complete with a return to Europe, returning from the periphery to the centre. This may partly be a goal for East European countries or the Balkans but not for Central Asia. The end of transition can also be perceived from the point of view that focuses on performance, but the end remains vague. For example, Hoen argues the Baltic States' growth figures converge with those of highly developed countries in the West.[15] Currently, economic growth in transition countries is higher than in the EU, but differences in

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[11] Taras Kuzio, "Transition in Post-Communist States Triple or Quadruple." *Politics* Vol.2, No.3. (2002): pp.168-177.

[12] Ibid., pp.174-177.

[13] See: Geraldo Munck, "The Regime Question: Theory building in Democracy Studies" *World Politics,* Vol. 54, No. 4, (2001): pp.119-44.

[14] Herman. Hoen, "Is There Such a Thing as 'Transitology?" *Social Economic Research On Transition In Central And Eastern Europe Paper Presented At The Eleventh World Congress For Social Economics.* (8–11 June 2004) [Online] Available: http://sociaeconomics.org/uploads/HOEN .doc [Accessed 8 May 2005]

[15] Ibid.

welfare remain enormous. According to Hoen, in studying these differences, it is less important to depict the strategies and the outcomes than to explain them.[16]

In Ukraine, the debates over the end of the political dimension of the transition process entered the discussion after the Orange Revolution. Kuzio claimed that, The Orange Revolution implied the end of the political transformation. According to Kuzio, the elections of 2004 completed Ukraine's transition from a post-Soviet state to a European state.[17] Nevertheless, the focus on endpoints has sometimes given rise to see almost every short-term development as indicative of a long-term trend toward one of endpoints.[18] Therefore, it could not be said that the political transformation completes, since transition is an open ended dynamic process. Moreover, the progress of the political transformation is needed to be examined by giving attention to such factors as social structure, values, culture, historical processes, patterns of elite interaction, governance, democracy, transparency, and civil society, as well as the elections.

Elections are accepted as the litmus test of the progress of the political transformation.[19] At least two free elections should be experienced before debating that political transformation has been achieved (or not). These indexes are quiet valid instruments while evaluating the fate and the progress of the transition, yet they did not mark when the transition is completed. Some prominent theorists seek to deemphasize the focus on endpoints, concentrating attention instead on general processes of transition that is said to be highly uncertain and quite open-ended.[20]

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[16] Herman. Hoen, "Is There Such a Thing as 'Transitology?" *Social Economic Research On Transition In Central And Eastern Europe Paper Presented At The Eleventh World Congress For Social Economics.* (8–11 June 2004) [Online] Available: http://socialeconomics.org/uploads/ HOENdoc [Accessed 8 May 2005]

[17] Taras Kuzio, "Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine's 2004 Elections and "the Orange Revolution." *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.52, No.2 (2005): pp.29-44.

[18] Juan Linz, and Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press (1996): pp. 37-61

[19] See Olaf. Hillenbrand, "Good Governance and the Need for Consensus Building- A Framework for Democratic Transition". *Presidential Election and The Orange Revolution Implications for Ukraine's Transition.* Eds., Helmut Kurth, Iris Kempe, Kiev: Zapovit, 2005: pp.7-31

[20] Herman Hoen, "Is There Such a Thing as 'Transitology?" *Social Economic Research On Transition In Central And Eastern Europe Paper Presented At The Eleventh World Congress For Social Economics.* (8–11 June 2004) [Online] Available:http://socialeconomics.org/uploads/HOENd oc [Accessed 8 May 2005]

1.3. The Argument

The main argument of this thesis is that the problems of the post-Soviet political transformation to democracy affected the outbreak of the Orange Revolution, but the problems that caused the mass mobilisation widely defined as the Orange Revolution have remained since Viktor Yushchenko became president in the third round of the 2004 presidential elections. While the Orange Revolution is accepted as the conclusion of the political transformation to democracy in Ukraine, this thesis tries to argue that some of the problems affected the outbreak of the Orange Revolution still influence the political transformation in Ukraine; thus, it is not wrong to say that the political transformation has not completed in Ukraine.

The problems affecting the post-Soviet political transformation in Ukraine are the dynamics of the Orange Revolution, but the Orange Revolution does not imply the end of the transition to democracy, since transformation is an open ended dynamic process. Originated as a reaction to the problems of the post-Soviet political transformation, the Orange Revolution is the visible activity to replace the party in power by the people in power in Ukraine. On the way to democracy, re-emergence of a politicised civil society is a milestone one step closer to the goal of democracy, but not an end of the transition in Ukraine. Therefore, this thesis argues that the problems of the political transformation affected the outbreak of the Orange Revolution. Yet the Orange Revolution is not implication the completion of political transformation in Ukraine, because in the transitology has not been yet reached a consensus on where the transformation is completed. However there is a consensus on the starting point of the political transformation which began with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

In the twentieth century, Ukrainian nationalists have tried three times to build their own state: first in 1917-1921, when they failed, in 1941-1945 when they failed again and in 1989-1991 when they finally succeeded.[21] According to Motyl, success came the third time not because the nationalists tried harder or because they were stronger, but because the external conditions were convenient.[22] Similarly,

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[21] Alexander J Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism.* New York: Council on Foreign Relations Pres. 1993: p.23.

[22] Ibid., p.23.

Hillenbrand argue that the Orange Revolution's timing and its staging could hardly have been better.[23] From this point on, the relation between two events could be argued on the terms of the timing.

In 1991, political conjuncture in the Soviet Union was convenient for Ukraine's declaration of independence. That is to say the mass movement against the attitude of the authorities which tired to hide the Chernobyl nuclear disaster was not the only one factor affected the declaration of independence. Thirteen years later, the problems of political transformation affected the outbreak of the Orange Revolution; nevertheless, the Orange Revolution did not break the past from the present political conjuncture.The Orange revolution is not the completion of the political transformation. On the other hand, it could not be said that the dynamics affecting the political transformation of Ukraine were influenced and remotely controlled by the external powers or dynamics. However, it is true that internal dynamics could never isolate themselves from the international developments in the globalised world. Therefore, The Orange Revolution is a mass movement originated as a reaction to the ongoing problems and supported by international actors such as NGOs and the media organs which are operating in the supra-national arena. The Orange Revolution is the result of the success of the organisation of political and civic opposition that is complementary to democracy; meanwhile it results from the reactions within the society to the problems of the political transformation of Ukraine which had been usually interrupted by many reasons. The Orange revolution implies the emergence of politicised civil society but not the end of the political transformation; thus, it is a milestone or a watershed of the political transformation in Ukraine.

A post-Soviet state belonging to Eastern European countries, Ukraine has experienced many problems challenging political transformation since thedissolution of the Soviet Union. At first, Ukraine was needed to create national identity while dealing with the transformation to democracy. Thus, the architecture of transition in Ukraine was required in the task of reconfiguring national identity in consonance with state boundaries. Yet, in Ukraine, the nation building process was challenged by the differences between the Eastern and Western Ukraine. Because of the differences

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[23] Olaf Hillenbrand, "Good Governance and the Need for Consensus Building- A Framework for Democratic Transition". *Presidential Election and The Orange Revolution Implications for Ukraine's Transition.* Eds., Helmut Kurth, Irıs Kempe, Kiev: Zapovit, 2005: pp.7-31

between historical backgrounds, languages, identities in terms of ethnicity, language, culture and religion, Leonid Kravchuk and his successor Leonid Kuchma were not able to create a Ukrainian national identity. The polarisation between the eastern and the western regions in Ukraine and the very existence of the Russian speaking minority in the eastern parts of the country are the main reasons why not creating a national identity in Ukraine could not be created.

Here, it is noteworthy to mention that, the heterogeneity of the population in Ukraine is different from the other non-Russian states in the post-Soviet space because many Soviet successor states started to engineer a nation-state, in spite of the destructive forces of minorities in the state which are the neighbouring majority. Indeed in such countries as Kazakhstan, the number of population of the titular nationality was less than the number of Russians living in Kazakhstan in the first half of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the destructive forces of the minority to nation-building in Ukraine are different from the Russian or other minorities living in the other former Soviet republics, since the destructive force is not the minorities, but the Russianised Ukrainians (Russophiles) in Ukraine. Therefore, the nation-building process is more complicated in Ukraine than most of the post-Socialist states and post-Soviet successor states. Thus, transition is more than that regime-based double transition of democratisation and marketisation in Ukraine. Similarly, Leonid Kuchma, second president of independent Ukraine, mentioned the need to define transition by means of the triple method, as a road map of Ukraine at the World Summit for Social Development in 12 March 1995:

…Those states, Ukraine in particular, are solving tasks of the dual transition: from totalitarianism to democracy and from over centralized economy to a market one. Ukraine, whose culture and language suffered a destructive blow in those years, is facing another task of vital importance: to restore its national identity, to unite the society around the national idea, to consolidate itself as a nation...[24]

However, Kuchma noted that triple transition would be the best answer as a response to the transition question in Ukraine since the problems challenging state-

[24] Leonid Kuchma, Presidential Statement at The World Summit For Social Development, Copenhagen, B-12 (March 1995).[Online] Available: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf166/gov/950311 080544.htm [Accessed 23 August 2005]

building is more complex than the former socialist Bloc member states and the Latin American states experienced. In order to examine the political transformation in Ukraine, the process has to be analysed by focusing upon the performance of the politicians. Münz Rainer and Ohliger Rainer point out that Eastern Europe and the Baltic states have experienced basic political and economic transformation, but the ruling elites aimed to transform regarding the democratization of politics and society.[25] Yet in many post-Soviet states, the ruling elite aim to establish an origin of authoritarian or semi-authoritarian rule which is the factor that accelerates the process. With regarding to Ukraine, the regime could not be defined either an authoritarian or a democratic regime. Instead the Regime could be considered a hybrid regime. Therefore, the performance of the politician has influence on the future of the regime. The regime had been too vulnerable to be converted to either an authoritarian regime or a democratic regime prior to the Orange Revolution. After the Orange Revolution, Yushchenko achieved to be the third president of Ukraine. Political transformation in Ukraine has been affected by mostly the performance of the politicians and their will on implementation of the reforms, which depend upon the politic stability. Nevertheless, the country is still experiencing problems affecting the transformation process under Yushchenko.

Within this framework, this thesis examines the problems of political transformation and the instability within the parliament particularly affected by the rapid circulation of the cabinet of ministers during the Kravchuk and Kuchma era which were the main factors affecting the outbreak of the Orange Revolution. Resulted from the problems of post-Soviet political transformation in Ukraine from an authoritarian rule to democracy, The Orange Revolution could not be accepted as a braking point between the past and the present.

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[25] Rainer Münz and Rainer Ohliger. "The Ukraine After Independence: The Making of A Nation Between East And West" (2004) [Online]. Available: http://www.2.rz.hu-berlin.de/popula tion/info/ep ub/pdfdateien/ukraine.pdf. [Accessed: 15 July 2005]

1.4. Structure of the Thesis

This thesis analysis the post-Soviet transformation in Ukraine between 1991 and 2004, by paying attention to the indicators, dynamics, and the challengers of the political transformation. The period examined is limited between Ukraine's declaration of independence in 1991 and the Orange Revolution in December 2004. Due to the fact that the pre-Soviet and Soviet history of Ukraine have influence on the progress of the post-Soviet political transformation in Ukraine, this thesis examines the problems of post-Soviet political transformation in Ukraine, after briefly exploring the historical background of the country in Chapter Two.

In Chapter Two, the historical background of Ukraine is examined by giving attention to the history of the pre Soviet and Soviet period. This chapter examines the Ukrainian identity and the regional polarisations between Eastern and Western parts of Ukraine in the pre-Soviet era. After reviewing the policies of Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev during the Soviet period, this chapter concludes by paying attention to the political conjuncture in Ukrainian SSR during the perestroika years.

In order to explore the political transformation in Ukraine under Leonid Kravchuk, Chapter Three focuses on the political conjuncture and the political developments beyond independence. After exploring Kravchuk's policies and priority arenas, internal and external problems of political transformation are examined in this chapter. Lastly, this chapter explains the factors which affected the 1994 elections which resulted in Kuchma's victory.

The political conjuncture after the 1994 elections is examined in Chapter Four. In this chapter, the political transformation in Kuchma's first term and second term are explored while giving attention to the presidential elections in 1999. Focusing on the problems of political transformation affecting the outbreak of the Orange Revolution, this chapter includes the political crises during Kuchma period. In order to explore the differences between the two terms of Kuchma in the presidency, this chapter is concluded by an overall examination of this 10 year period.

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine is the main focus of the Chapter Five. This chapter starts off by examining the Orange Revolution and the post-

Revolutionary Ukraine by paying attention to the candidates of the 2004 presidential elections. While seeking to explore the factors affecting the Orange Revolution, this chapter examines the actors of the Orange Revolution, and the organisation of the civil opposition. Lastly, this Five tries to analyse the first critical months of Ukraine under Yushchenko in order to seek Ukraine's capability to manage the political transition instead of addressing any end point implying the end of the political transformation and emphasis upon the very fact that the political transformation in Ukraine has not yet ended.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

2.1. Introduction

Transition is a process including *sui generis* factors affecting the examined country's progress in terms of meeting the criteria accepted to be democratic and common factors that any transition country has to face during the process. Within this framework, history is a *sui generis* factor affecting the political transformation in Ukraine. However, Andrew Wilson claims that "modern Ukraine has been shaped as much by the Soviet experience as by the legacy of the national idea of 1917-20".[26] It is needed to mention to the role of the whole history in the political transformation, since certain problems and the challengers of the political transformation stem from in different periods.

In order to provide a historical background for the recent problems of post-Soviet political transformation to democracy, this chapter starts with the pre-Soviet history of Ukraine and examines the pre-Soviet period by paying attention to the origin of Ukrainian identity and the regional polarisation in Ukraine.

This chapter, also examines the origins of the problems affecting the post-Soviet political transformation and the influence of polices towards Ukraine during the Soviet era. After exploring the origin of the Ukrainian identity and regional polarisation, both of which affects the national consolidation in Ukraine, this chapter analyses the Soviet policies during the Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev Eras and the political conjuncture in Ukraine during the perestroika years.

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[26] Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation*. New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2000: p. 151.

2.2. Origin of the Ukrainian Identity

Ukrainians are the descendants of the Eastern Slavic people living around the Kiev.[27] Vladimir, leader of the Kievan Rus', accepted Christianity from Constantinople in 988. Ukraine's politics and culture had been influenced by the Byzantine Empire in a long period, until the demise of the Byzantium Empire in 1453. The believers of Orthodoxy increased in the Ukrainian and Russian Territory. Even the Mongol Yoke could not prevent the increase of the number of the Christians in the territories of current Ukraine. However, the Kievan Orthodox Patriarchate moved north to the space in which Russia is located now, after the destruction of Kiev by the Mongols, and The Metropolitanate of Moscow claimed ecclesiastic jurisdiction over *Rus'* in its entirely.[28]

Later, Tsarist Russia declared Russia's will to be the third Rome for being the protector of all Orthodoxy. In fact, Orthodoxy remained as the anchor that drew the people to the Russian Nation during the Polish invasion of the Western Ukraine in those years.[29] Ukrainians played a key role in encouraging the *Muscovite* to state accepting itself as the heir of Rus' and protector of all the Orthodox.[30]

Especially in the late 16th and 17th centuries, a number of prominent Orthodox monks moved from Ukraine to *Muscovy*. This was the part of the movement of many thousands of Ukrainian and Belarusian nobles and peasants who preferred to live under the rule of the Orthodox Tsar to that of the Poles. Because the incursion of the Ottoman Empire ended by its controlling all of coastal Ukraine by 1520, Ukraine was divided between the Ottomans and the Polish Empire. However,

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[27] Kiev is pronounced as Kyiv in Ukrainian language. For this reason, in some writings the name of the capital city could be written as Kyiv. Nevertheless this thesis uses Kiev.

[28] Mykhaylo Hrushevs'kyi, "Abridged History of Ukraine-Part Three." Translated and Abridged By George Skoryk. (1998) [Online]. Available: http://www.users.bigpond.com/kyroks/ukr hist.html# [Accessed: 28 January 2004]

[29] Elif Şimşek, "Sovyetler Birliği'nin Dağılmasından Sonra Rus Ulusal Kimliğinin Yeni Çıpası Olarak Ortodoksluk." *Cumhuriyet Strateji Eki,* 19 November 2004.p. 9.

[30] Mykhaylo Hrushevs'kyi, "Abridged History of Ukraine-Part Three." Translated and Abridged By George Skoryk. (1998) [Online]. Available: http://www.users.bigpond.com/kyroks/ukr hist.html# [Accessed: 28 January 2004]

Ukrainian Cossacks[31] eventually formed a state that, although officially under Polish and later Russian Rule, was to a significant degree self-ruling, but 20 years later the state was divided between Poland and Russia.

In 1596, relations between the Polish State and most of its Orthodox subjects worsened since a large section of the Ukrainian and Belarusian Orthodox Clergy recognized Papal Supremacy under the Union of Brest while retaining the traditional Orthodox Liturgy and maintaining the Eastern Rite.[32] The Uniate Church was born in the same year. While the western Ukrainians tended to liturgy the Uniate Church, the eastern portion followed Moscow Rites and this division deepened the regional differences between east and west by means of religion. Since then the Uniate Church has played a critical role in shaping the culture and identity of Galicia and Volhynia, giving these regions an identity wholly separate from that of Orthodox Russia. In the same year, the Polish government forced the Orthodox Christians of Ukraine and Belarus to be in the Union with Rome. This resulted in Ukrainian discontent, which led to the national revolution of 1648 against the Polish landlords, and Poland itself.

According to Anatol Lieven, the split between the Uniate and Orthodox Rites have remained important in present-day Ukraine, since they play a role in distinguishing the West of Ukraine culturally from the East and South.[33] In the sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries, Poland's expansion southward ended when Ukraine was able to include the Ukrainian-speaking area around Kharkiv to the east of Kiev.[34]

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[31] Military devastation and plague had wiped out much of the population of the Ukrainian steppe by the 15th century, when the region became popular with runaway serfs and Orthodox refugees escaping more tightly controlled neighbouring domains. These people came to be known as Kazaks (Cossacks), a Turkic word meaning outlaw, adventurer or freebooter. See: Mykhaylo Hrushevs'kyi, "Abridged History of Ukraine-Part Three." Translated and Abridged By George Skoryk. (1998). [Online]. Available: http://www.users.bigpond.com/kyroks/ukrhist.html# [Accessed: 28 January 2004]

[32] Mykhaylo Hrushevs'kyi, "Abridged History of Ukraine-Part Three." Translated and Abridged By George Skoryk. (1998) [Online]. Available:http://www.users.bigpond.com/kyroks/ukrhist.html# [Accessed: 28 January 2004]

[33] Anatol Lieven, *Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry.* Washington D.C: Institute of Peace Press, 1999: pp. 17-25.

[34] Ibid.

The alternatives for Ukrainians were limited: Seeking help from the Muslim Ottoman Sultan or seeking protection of the Russian Orthodox Tsar. They chose to look to *Muscovy*. Regarding the Tsar as natural leader of the Orthodox world, the leaders of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, played key roles in this decision. As a consequence at the town of Pereislav, the title of Tsar Alexei changed from Tsar of All *Rus'* to Tsar of All Great and Little *Rus'*.[35] Despite working in military issues, the Pereislav Treaty was not concluded in a political sense. The treaty of Pereislav of 1654 has always been of great symbolic importance in both Tsarist and Soviet Propaganda. It was a treaty based on conditions guaranteeing Ukraine independence, connected it to Moscow only by virtue of common monarch.[36] Apart from its content, the Pereislav Agreement gave Russia the control over Ukrainian territory. Before the agreements, *Muscovy* could only expand to the north and the east. Pereislav gave Russia direct contact with Central Europe.

In fact, the Russian and the Ukrainian point of view differed in the content of the treaty. According to the Russians, Ukraine's submission of the treaty, signified re-unification of the lands of *Rus',* destined by religion and history, into one state under the rule of one Monarch. Moscow considered Ukraine as an acquisition of another country by its growing empire whereas, Ukrainians saw their relationship based on equality. According to Ukrainians who hoped for an autonomous Ukraine in alliance with Russia, this was simply a union between two states under the rule of one monarch, but with separate administrative, judicial, educational, and military institutions and traditions[37].

Not too long after the Pereislav, Russians broke all the promises of the Pereislav, including the guarantee of effective legal and administrative autonomy for the part of Ukraine except for the rights of the Cossack Nobility. However, Cossacks and Russians marched on Poland together; the Russian force was defeated, and

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[35] Anatol Lieven, *Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry.* Washington D.C.: Institute of Peace Press, 1999: pp.17-25.

[36] Taras Kuzio. Ukraine's "Little Russian" Foreign Policy Proclaims "To Europe with Russia!" .[Online].Available:http://www.ukrweekly.com/Archive/2002/250204.shtml [Accessed. 12 November 2005]

[37] Ibid.

Cossacks had to submit to another union with Poland.[38] In 1663, Ukraine was divided between the authorities of Muscovy and Poland. Muscovy had control of the all Ukrainian territories except for Galicia in the west by partitions of Poland in the 18th century.[39] Thus, Ukraine remained as a battleground for Poland, Russia and even the Ottoman Empire.

Ukraine was partitioned along the Dnieper River: the Western Side (Right Bank) came under Polish control, the Eastern Side (Left Bank), including Kiev, became the autonomous Hetman State or Hetmanate under Russian protectorate in 1667. By the treaty of Andrysovo,[40] the Right Bank accepted Ottoman Sultan Mehmed as its superior in exchange for help to liberate Ukraine from domination by Poland and Moscow. Later Cossacks on the Left Bank rebelled against Moscow.[41] Nevertheless, Russians attacked and once again to the rebellions and the Left Bank fell under their domination.

Polish forces also invaded Ukraine from the West but in Spring 1671, the Ottoman Sultan sent in a large army and helped to expel Poles from Western Ukraine. Then negotiations on Ukraine's unification began. However, this did not please Moscow. Finally, on March 15, 1674, *Hetman* (president) of whole Ukraine was proclaimed to be under the Moscow protectorate, and the Right Bank was taken over by Poles in 1683.[42] By the time people began to return from the east to the left bank, the Uniate Church disappeared and the Orthodox Kievan Metropolitanate herself transferred in 1686 from the Patriarchal Authority of Constantinople to that of Moscow. The main implication of this transfer was seen in Ukrainian art and education, since they progressively lost their traditional Ukrainian character.[43]

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[38] Mykhaylo Hrushevs'kyi, "Abridged History of Ukraine-Part Three." Translated and Abridged By George Skoryk. (1998) [Online]. Available: http://www.users.bigpond.com/kyroks/ukrhist.html# [Accessed: 28 January 2004]

[39] Peter Duncan, "Ukraine and The Ukrainians" *The Nationalities Question in The Post-Soviet States.* ed. Graham Smith, London, and New York: Longman 1996. pp. 188-210.

[40] Mykhaylo Hrushevs'kyi, "Abridged History of Ukraine-Part Three." Translated and Abridged By George Skoryk. (1998) [Online]. Available:http://www.users.bigpond.com/kyroks/ukrhist.html# [Accessed: 28 January 2004]

[41] Ibid.

[42] "Historical Facts about Ukraine" [Online] Available: http://ukraine-today.com/reference/facts/16.Sh tml [Accessed: 12 July 2005].

[43] Ibid.

Thus, Ukrainian statehood and culture started to be invisible in the left bank. The years between 1712 and 1783 are the period that Ukrainian statehood and culture declined in the left bank,[44] since Tsar Peter the Great intensified his efforts to subjugate Ukraine soon after defeating the Cossacks rebellions demanding freedom and liberty. By plundering Russian military units, Ukraine's population dispersed throughout the country. In 1730, Ukraine almost became a province of Russia. Russification of political, religious and cultural life had started to be intensified and intermarriages with Russians were encouraged. During this period, Ukraine was divided into several parts. [45]

The Russification process of Tsarist Russia went hand in hand with the activities and influences of the Moscow Patriarch that was totally under the control of the Tsar. While Ukrainians on the east side of Dnipro (Left Bank) was being Russianised, the Western Ukraine was under Polish influence. Polish authorities were preventing national and economic development of Ukrainians. The rest of the Transcarpathian Ukraine was under Hungarian rule. Ukrainian population there did not display much enthusiasm for independence but managed to retain their language, customs and religion.

One hundred fifty years after Pereislav's accession, Russian government started to remove all separate Ukrainian institutions. Two empires, Russian and Austrian, occupied Ukraine. Galicia, Bukovina and Carpathian Ukraine were incorporated into the Austro Hungarian (Habsburg) Empire and the rest of Ukraine became part of Russia.[46] These two powers had strong central governments; armies and powerful police ready to suppress any attempts by Ukrainian population to regain freedom and self-determination. Nevertheless, Ukrainians under Austria began to improve their lives and national consciousness, whereas standard Ukrainian life under Russian occupation deteriorated. Inspired by the raising nationalism in Europe, the

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[44] "Historical Facts about Ukraine" [Online] Available: http://ukraine-today.com/reference/facts/16.Sh tml [Accessed: 12 July 2005].

[45] Ibid.

[46] Mykhaylo Hrushevs'kyi, "Abridged History of Ukraine-Part Three." Translated and Abridged By George Skoryk. (1998) [Online]. Available: http://www.users.bigpond.com/kyroks/ukr hist.html# [Accessed: 28 January 2004]

renaissance of Ukrainian culture and political activities emerged in western Ukraine in the period between 1783 and 1913, known as Ukrainian Renaissance.[47]

2.3. Polarisation of the Western and the Eastern Ukrainian Identity

In order to examine the differences in national consciousness, political tendencies, and the lingual preferences in the Western Ukraine and the Eastern part of Ukraine, it is necessary to mention to the years that Western Ukraine was under the Habsburg Monarchy and the Eastern was under Tsarist rule. In the Western Ukraine under Habsburg Monarch, educational reforms in 1775 allowed for instructions in Ukrainian language. However on balance government policies favoured the Poles.[48] On the other hand, leading by church activities, schools with Ukrainian language began to develop. That is why the church is attached to the national affiliation in the western Ukraine. The Polish increased their influence on Austrian authorities after 1790, and Ukrainian language replaced by Polish language in state schools. Ukrainian language was allowed only in private schools and in private life. Ukrainian clergy had resisted to this language policy since 1820, and was able to organise small groups to protect Ukrainian Culture.[49] Similarly, those nationalist groups protected Ukrainian tradition, language and religion during the Soviet era in western Ukraine.

By this time in Europe, the empires started to dissolve. Thus, the revolutions in Europe forced the Austrian Empire to make some liberal reforms including the end of censorship and a promise of a national constitution in Galicia. In order to respond to Polish ambitions for independence, Austrian authorities began to lift restrictions on Ukrainian culture. In 1848 autumn, the Congress of Ukrainian Scientists was held to promote exclusively Ukrainian Culture; planning activities such as establishing a standard grammar for Ukrainians under Austrian and Russian rule.[50]

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[47] Mykhaylo Hrushevs'kyi, "Abridged History of Ukraine-Part Three." Translated and Abridged By George Skoryk. (1998) [Online]. Available: http://www.users.bigpond.com/kyroks/ukr hist.html# [Accessed: 28 January 2004]

[48] Ibid.

[49] Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation.* New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2000: pp. 72-88.

[50] "Historical Facts about Ukraine" [Online] Available: http://ukraine-today.com/reference/facts/16.Sh tml [Accessed: 12 July 2005].

In the same year, Western Ukrainians under Austria contended not only with the Austrian authorities but also with Poles in Galicia, Romanians in Bukovina and Hungarians in Carpathia in their demand for self-determination.[51] They were kept under control as were other nationalities within the empire, but it was the beginning of quiet reaction to the authoritarian regimes of Austria and Russia. At the same time, Western Ukrainians under Austria were accused of having sympathy towards Russia, yet Eastern Ukraine under Russian domination was accused of siding with Poland. In Western parts, the reflection of this perception resulted in Polish dominance of culture and politics in Galicia. Many Ukrainians started to think that the only salvation was to be with Russians who they called as *Moscowphiles* or *Russophiles*. They were ready to sacrifice Ukrainian National Identity for support from Russia against Poles, Romanians and Hungarians. Nevertheless, there were also many others remained pure Ukrainian. They tried to ensure the survival of Ukrainian politics, culture and language by publications.[52] Those publications were later cited by many nationalist during the Soviet era in the *Samizdats* and after independence for re-writing history and creating national identity.

Significantly, in the 1890s, participating in political movements intensified among the Ukrainians living in Western Ukraine.[53] The national movement gained strength and it attracted more and more people. Fractions and branches within this movement emerged whereas, the progressive element of the movement, promoting democratic socialism based on national values, remained as the same. As result of all these political activities and competitions among the activists, Ukrainian national awareness and consciousness spread into wide masses of population.[54]

Meanwhile, Eastern Ukraine's experiences under Tsarist rule were much more different from the nationalist experience of Western Ukraine. People in Eastern

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[51] Zenon E. Kohut, "History as a Battleground: Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Historical Consciousness in Contemporary Ukraine". *The Legacy of History of Russia and the New States of Eurasia.* ed. S. Frederick Starr .New York: M.E. Sharpe 1994.

[52] Mykhaylo Hrushevs'kyi, "Abridged History of Ukraine-Part Three." Translated and Abridged By George Skoryk. (1998) [Online]. Available: http://www.users.bigpond.com/kyroks/ukr hist.html# [Accessed: 28 January 2004]

[53] Ibid.

[54] Zenon E Kohut, "History as a Battleground: Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Historical Consciousness in Contemporary Ukraine". *The Legacy of History of Russia and the New States of Eurasia.* ed. S. Frederick Starr .New York: M.E. Sharpe 1994.

Ukraine and Russianised intelligentsia still carried on their Ukrainian way of life, using their language, following traditions.[55] After death of Tsarina Catherine in 1796, the first publications in Ukrainian language began to appear in Eastern Ukraine. The cultural activities in Ukraine during the 18th century were taking place mainly in church settlers. The literature generally contained scholastic and religious disputes. Nevertheless this relatively free atmosphere disappeared as Tsar Alexander I began to revert to strict Russian rule.[56]

There was hope for renewal of Hetmanate in 1812 and later in 1831, however, Russianisation of Ukraine continued. In fact, many literary works reflected Ukrainian customs, history and customs, but they were written in Russian. Clandestine societies called *Hromadas* started to promote Ukrainian culture. Schools, universities and theatres began to open and books and journals started to be published.[57] Ukrainian's reaction to Russian rule renewed in 1850s, with the recommendation of St. Petersburg Education Committee to introduce Ukrainian language into state schools in 1862. In this period, many Russian also writers started to be interested in Ukrainian literature.[58] Yet, soon after the Polish uprising in 1863, this relatively free era came to an end, because Russian authorities accused Ukrainians of being in favour of the Poles and of supporting their effort to gain independence from Russia during the rebellion.[59]

Thanks to the far-sighted Ukrainian intellectuals, the centre of Ukrainian nationalism was in Kiev because censorship was relatively relaxed in Kiev and its location distanced from Russia. Therefore, Ukrainians in Kiev made literary and

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[55] Mykhaylo Hrushevs'kyi, "Abridged History of Ukraine-Part Three." Translated and Abridged By George Skoryk. (1998) [Online]. Available: http://www.users.bigpond.com/kyroks/ukrhist.html# [Accessed: 28 January 2004]

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Taras Kuzio, "History of Nationalism in Ukraine" (2003). [Online]. Available: https://www.taraskuzio.net/articles/nationalism. [Accessed: 04.March 2004]

[59] "Historical Facts about Ukraine" [Online] Available: http://ukraine-today.com/reference/facts/16.Shtml [Accessed: 12 July 2005].

scientific advances at the beginning of the 1870s.[60] Nonetheless, a commission instituted "Censorship of Ukrainian Literature" and banned the importation of books written in Western Ukraine, except those published by Russophiles supporting Moscow in 1875. One year later, the restrictions were expanded, and finally publications of all books in Ukrainian language were banned in Eastern Ukraine. Thus, Ukrainian cultural activities moved towards West.[61]

According to Russian national history, Russia was equated with all the Russian lands including Ukraine and Belarus; therefore, the scheme left very little room for a separate history for Ukrainians and Belarusians.[62] Russians defined Ukraine (Little Russian) and Belarus (White Russian) as organically linked to Russia, differing from Russia only in dialect spoken by each region's inhabitants. However, the Ukrainians perceived themselves to be different than the Russians. As such, nationalist Ukrainian historians were trying to define Ukrainians as separate from Russians and Poles. In doing so, they were able to create the Ukrainian literary language in the 19th century, in the same century that small underground nationalist groups started to call for Ukrainian autonomy often in the context of a Slavic Federation. Nevertheless, when 1905-1906 Revolution started, the use of the Ukrainian language in the Russian Empire was restricted. Among others, those factors played important roles in the lingual differences in Ukraine, since even early writings that contain nationalist themes were in Russian, due to lack of a Ukrainian literary language until the 19th century.[63]

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[60] Zenon E Kohut, "History as a Battleground: Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Historical Consciousness in Contemporary Ukraine". *The Legacy of History of Russia and the New States of Eurasia.* ed. S. Frederick Starr .New York: M.E. Sharpe 1994. pp: 123-127

[61] Ibid.,pp: 123-127

[62] Ibid., p.125

[63] "Historical Facts about Ukraine" [Online] Available: http://ukraine-today.com/reference/facts/16.Sh tml [Accessed: 12 July 2005].

2.4. The *Hetmanete* Years and the Bolshevik Revolution

According to Ukrainian Scholars, Ukraine completed the formation of a modern Ukrainian nation in the early 20th century.[64] Nevertheless, Wilson claims that the independent Ukraine of 1991 was very different from the several Ukraines of 1914, and the creation of the Ukrainian nation in its present form was far from inevitable.[65] Ukraine's territories at the beginning of the 20th century were divided, however an independent Ukraine was founded in the western part of Ukraine in 1900.

Three years later, the Bolshevik factions began in Russia, then in Eastern Parts of Ukraine under Russian annexation, spread to the pro-Russian intellectuals in the western part of Ukraine.[66] The Bolshevik Revolution resulted in the fall of the Russian Tsar in 1917 and the Ukrainian State was reborn when Ukrainian Nationalists formed a Central Rada (council) in Kiev at the same time. Then Rada declared Ukraine's independence, which lasted only three years, between 1917 and 1920,[67] John Reshetar argues that Ukrainian People's Republic proclaimed by Rada was the first government of Ukraine in modern times[68] since he believes that the Bolshevik coup, which destroyed the Provisional Government in November 1917, compelled the Ukrainians to proclaim independence of their nation.[69] Nevertheless, independence was declared only when it became evident that the Bolsheviks were prepared to destroy Rada by force of arms. Then the new Polish State annexed Western Ukraine including Lyiv, and the rest of the country formed the Ukrainian SSR.[70]

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[64] Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation.* New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2000: p.119.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation.* New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2000: p.109-118.

[67] John Jr Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920: A Study in Nationalism.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1952: p.vii.

[68] Ibid., pp. 3-4

[69] Ibid., p.3

[70] Peter Duncan, "Ukraine And The Ukrainians" *The Nationalities Question In The Post-Soviet States,* Ed., Graham Smith. London and New York: Longman. 1996. pp 185-223

After partial consolidation of power, the Bolsheviks intended to go to the peace conference with the Central Powers as the representative of all parts of the former Russian Empire in Brest Litovsk. The Ukrainian People's Republic sent its own delegation to the peace conference with the Central Powers. They managed to obtain recognition from the Central Powers at Brest Litovsk and signed a peace treaty with them. Wolodymyr Stojko claims that the Bolsheviks were not in position to disregard the obligations imposed on them by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty[71] under which the Bolshevik authorities ceded Ukraine to Germany, though they were not ready to give up Ukraine. However, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty obligated the Russian Soviet Government to conclude a peace treaty with Ukraine, to remove her troops from Ukraine, and to stop her anti-Ukraine agitation yet Bolshevik Russia did not obey this obligation.

In April 1918, the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic was replaced by a pro-German administration, headed by Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky. John Reshetar argues that it was a military occupation of Ukraine by the Central Powers which resulted in the expulsion of the Bolshevik forces but also led to the demise of Rada and the paradoxical reestablishment of the Ukrainian monarch by means of a coup.[72]

With the defeat of Germany, the Hetman abdicated on December 1918. At that time, Ukrainian National Republic was re-established[73] and united with the Western Ukrainian People's Republic formed in Galicia and Bukovina, which had been independent since the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy in the previous year. During the *Hetmanete* years, Bolshevik propaganda started among the Ukrainians. Pressured by Russia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed following the occupation of that area by the Soviet Red Army. The republic signed a treaty of alliance with the Bolshevik administration in Russia in December 1920. In March of

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[71] Wolodymyr Stojko, "The Hetman State And The Bolsheviks" *The Ukrainian Quarterly,* Vol.3, No.6 (2000): pp. 278-279

[72] John Jr Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920: A Study in Nationalism.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1952: pp. 3-4

[73] Wolodymyr Stojko, "The Hetman State and the Bolsheviks" *The Ukrainian Quarterly,* Vol.3, No.6 (2000): pp. 284-285.

the following year, the Soviet-Polish war ended by signing the Treaty of Riga[74] according to which Poland and Soviet Russia shared Ukraine's territories.[75] The Sovetisation process began in the portion under Russian domination.

2.5. Leninist and Stalinist Policies towards Ukraine

Under Lenin and Stalin, the Sovetisation of Ukraine began. However Stalin was the successor of Lenin, there are differences between the Leninist policies and Stalinist policies towards Ukraine. While Lenin engaged in political consolidation, which paid attention to reform of needed areas in accordance with socialism, Stalin gave importance to the more practical areas such as implementation of the Supreme's decisions. Lenin tried to build the socialist consciousness within the society while Stalin adopted his policies as response to the disorganized areas, i.e., Stalin's response to nationalism was a great purge of the nationalist intellectuals, his response to the disobedience of the farmers was famine, his response to the German sympathizers during the World War II was deportation of Volga Germans and Crimean Tatars to Siberia and Central Asia.

While the attempts at consolidation were underlay, in the eastern parts of Ukraine, the regime initially found more supporters. Russian and Russophile population acted pro-Russian, which meant pro-revolutionarist at that time. Russian organizations were best organized in Lviv, where eight societies with close Communist ties are active. The Russians in the other cities (Kiev, Donetsk, and Odessa) were notable to be organised; because their language, religion and culture were not under threat.[76] At the same time, in the western parts of Ukraine, the language, culture and religion were under the threat of being Russianised. Thus, foundation of Ukrainian SSR implied the end of the military events, but not the end of the thread to Ukraine's culture, tradition, and religion.

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[74] "Historical Facts about Ukraine" [Online] Available: http://ukrainetoday.com/reference/facts/16.Sh tml [Accessed: 12 July 2005].

[75] Ibid.

[76] Peter Duncan, "Ukraine and the Ukrainians" *The Nationalities Question In The Post-Soviet States* Ed. Graham Smith, 185-223. London and New York: Longman. 1996. pp. 188-210.

In 1921, the formation of Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, apart from Russian Orthodox Church, was the reflection of the emergence of the national feelings within Ukrainian society.[77] In the initial years of Soviet era under Lenin, patriotic motifs of each republic including Russia were eliminated and were subsequently banned from historical research. Nevertheless, the underground churches and the mosques acted as the centres of culture, and history during the Soviet era. The Sovetisation process started in economy, politics, and cultural arenas.

The Sovietisation process did not only influence the social life, but the restrictions on the economy affected the traditional economic activities of the peasants of Ukraine. Farmers and the peasants of Ukraine exposed to the Soviet program of restoration and development of industry.[78] In the winter of 1920-1921, Ukrainian peasants raised up against the trade prohibition and surplus appropriation system introduced by the Soviet power. The Red Army struggled with those peasants but the army did not succeed. As a result, V. Lenin refused the surplus-appropriation system and renewed free trade. [79]

New Economic Policy (NEP) replaced the former communist policy in the spring of 1921. Nevertheless, NEP did not effectively go into force because the famine embraced the Volga region, Northern Caucasus, and Southern provinces of Ukraine. In fact, the harvest in most regions of the right and left bank was sufficient, but Lenin did not allow for the re-distribution of the harvest in the southern provinces of Ukrainian in order to prevent famine, require Ukrainians to go on supplying industrial centres of Russia. Under the guidelines of the Leninist approach to the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) was formed on December 30, 1922. In addition to the fact that Ukraine's status changed from independent republic to a union republic, Ukraine was a founding member with her new name Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.[80]

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[77]. See: Mykhaylo Hrushevs'kyi, "Abridged History of Ukraine-Part Three." Translated and Abridged By George Skoryk. (1998) [Online]. Available: http://www.users.bigpond.com/kyroks/ukr hist.html# [Accessed: 28 January 2004]

[78]. See: "Strengthening of the Soviet System" Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine [Online] Available: http://www.mfa.gov.ua/mfa/en/publication/content/363.htm [Accessed 12 July 2005]

[79] "Historical Facts about Ukraine" [Online] Available: http://ukraine-today.com/reference/facts/16.Sh tml [Accessed: 12 July 2005].

[80] Ibid.

When Lenin became ill in 1922, Joseph Stalin started to play a more dominant role in decision-making processes and leaded by Stalin, the All-Union party adopted the first five-year plan.[81] Industrialization of the USSR and development of the national economy from 1928 to 1933 were Stalin's top priorities including a principal decision for complete use of this method of confiscation of peasants' incomes in 1927.[82] However, peasants did not want to sell their products for low prices. Therefore, state grain procurements crises materialised in last 1927 until 1929.

Traditionally, the wealth of Ukraine lay in its agriculture, and later in its raw materials. Fertile lands made Ukraine the breadbasket of Tsarist Russia and Soviet Union until Stalin abolished Ukrainisation in 1929.[83] By the rapid industrialisation goal of the Soviet Administration, Ukraine started to change its economic structure, which allowed ethnic Ukrainian working classes to emerge by the 1930s. Over half of the industrial workers in Ukraine in those years were Ukrainians.

In 1928, Josef Stalin abandoned the NEP and replaced it with a system of forced collectivization of agriculture. The Communist Party on January 5, 1930, as part of the first Five Year Plan, started the machinery of collectivisation rolling in the whole Soviet Union. Ukrainians were opposed to the idea of collective farming, because they used to traditional farming. Ukrainian farmers showed their opposition to collectivisation by slaughtering their livestock before joining. Later, a death penalty was passed for such an action.

In fact, the Ukrainian opposition was not only ideologically rooted against Communism, but also politically against Russian nationalism. It is alleged that that in 1935 about 25,000 people died daily in the villages of Ukraine.[84] In the first half of

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[81] Wolodymyr Stojko, "The Hetman State and the Bolsheviks" *The Ukrainian Quarterly* Vol. 56, No.3 (2000): pp.278-285.

[82] Ibid.

[83] During Soviet Era, Ukraine produced nearly ¼ of the USSR's total agriculture output, ¼ of USSR's grain, almost ½ of the Soviet corn, and over ½ of the Sugar beets in the Soviet Era. and still produces soybeans, tobacco, flax, vegetables, eggs, and animal products. Ukraine's coal was accounted as nearly 1/4 and iron ore deposits were accounted as ½ of the Union and Ukraine has significant deposits of manganese, potassium, titanium, mercury, magnesium, uranium, graphite, mineral salts, gypsum, alabaster and also has rich reserves of petroleum and natural gas. See, Peter, Hole Et Al. Ukraine.; Encyclopaedia Of Ukraine Vol I. Toronto: University Of Toronto Press, 1984, Pp. 36-37; Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia, Vol II. Toronto: University Of Toronto Press, 1971, pp 734-740.

[84] "Historical Facts about Ukraine" [Online] Available: http://ukraine-today.com/reference/facts/16.Sh tml [Accessed: 12 July 2005].

1933, foreign travel in Ukraine was banned. No newspaper correspondents were allowed to visit the besieged country until the late summer and fall when signs of the famine had been cleared up. The results were catastrophic with 3.5 million people starveing to death in Soviet Ukraine. Total losses, including the decrease in the birth rate, reached close to 5 million between the famine years of 1932-1933.[85] Ukraine's losses in 1932-33 were greater than that of any nation that fought in the First World War. Later, these years were defined as the black famine[86] or human-made famine.

Two years after the famine, in 1935, Stalin decided to announce the victory of socialism and introduced changes to the constitution directed at democratising the election system. He replaced unequal elections with equal ones, and open elections with secret ones. The constitution of the USSR was adopted on December 5, 1936, and the constitution of the Ukrainian SSR was adopted at the end of January 1937.[87] Apart from those political and relatively progressive attempts, the 1930s were difficult years for Ukrainian political and cultural elites. The outward democratisation of power had been accompanied by the ongoing political repression since 1934. Millions of people died or were sent to concentration camps during the mass repression of 1937-1938. During this period which is known as Great Purge, large numbers of the Ukrainian cultural and political elite suffered.[88]

Beside those repressive polices, Ukrainian territories were turned into a battle ground again soon after the German occupation on 22 June 1939. However, at the end of 1944, the war came to an end with the re-unification of western and eastern Ukraine that had been divided by Riga Peace Agreement between Poland and Russia.[89] At the end of the war, in 1945, Ukrainian SSR became a member of the United Nations and Transcarpathia was annexed by the Ukrainian SSR.[90] Duncan

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[85] Ibid.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Ibid.

[88] "Historical Facts about Ukraine" [Online] Available: http://ukraine-today.com/reference/facts/16.Shtml [Accessed: 12 July 2005].

[89] Wolodymyr Stojko, "The Hetman State and the Bolsheviks" *The Ukrainian Quarterly* Vol. 56, No.3 (2000): pp.278-285.

[90] "Historical Facts about Ukraine" [Online] Available: http://ukraine-today.com/reference/facts/16.Shtml [Accessed: 12 July 2005].

claims that it is not surprising that Stalin thought there was some collaboration between Ukrainians and the Nazis who occupied the country during the World War II,[91] similar to his accusation of Crimean Tatars and Volga Germans of being supporters of the German army and deporting them to Central Asia and Siberia.

Since Ukraine's losses were more than many European countries during Word War II, a restoration process took place soon after the end of the World War II in accordance with the first five year plan after World War II, which required rapid industrialisation of the destroyed regions. After the World War II, the Western Parts of Ukraine were incorporated to the USSR.

The new annexed part of the union, especially Galicia, was the most problematic region for cultural restoration. Ukrainian culture and language had been prevented by Church activities for a long period in Western Ukraine. Religion comprised an important part of the intellectual culture of the people. However, the communist party wanted to annihilate the church, which was the only element of pre-revolutionary social structure that still existed. Religious music, literature, philosophy and even church architecture were annihilated. One could not find an Orthodox bishop in Ukraine at the end of the 1940s. Attempts against Ukrainian Nationalism required the Russian Orthodox Church to absorb the Uniate Church, which was linked with nationalism. Nevertheless, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army waged an armed struggle for independence into the early 1950s.[92]

According to Brodsky, the Soviet authorities considered Ukrainian Nationalism as the most menacing challenge to the preservation of the union.[93] There were some good reasons for the authorities' anxiety, such as a large and powerful diaspora abroad and a problematic population inherited together with the annexed Western Territories. Yet Brodsky claims that the main trouble was elementary

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[91] Peter Duncan, "Ukraine and The Ukrainians" *The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States* Ed. Graham Smith, London New York and Longman. 1996. p. 185-223.

[92] Ibid., p. 190.

[93] Dina Zisserman Brodsky, *Constructing Ethno Politics in the Soviet Union; samizdat, Deprivation and the Rise of Ethnic Nationalism*. Palgrave: MacMillian, 2003: pp.112-118

arithmetic: Ukrainians comprised about one–sixth of the total population of the USSR.[94]

Similar to Lenin's period and under Stalin, many churches and mosques within the Soviet territories closed. Their buildings were transformed into schools and libraries with an exception of the Stalin's policy on the eve of the World War II. Stalin re-opened the churches and the mosques in order to build a religious barrier to Germany, and then closed again after the end of the war. Despite such oppressed policies, dissident organizations and illegal *samizdat* literature had already appeared three years before Stalin's death in March 1953.[95] After the Stalin Era, neither Khrushchev nor Brezhnev extended relative freedom to the religious affiliations. Therefore, not being a state controlled church, the Ukrainian Church went about its activities as an underground church and therefore Ukraine remained as the protector of the Ukrainian language and cultural heritance during the Soviet Era, as it did when Western Ukraine was under Poland domination in the past.

In spite of the differences in many arenas including politics and the economy, a common feature shared between Lenin and Stalin was their support for the migration of the Russians to the Ukrainian territories. After the demise of the union, ethnic and linguistic affiliations deviated strongly from each other in regions with a large Russian-speaking population. After Ukraine declared her independence, the first problem of the political transformation, arose because of the heterogeneity of her population. Moreover, the systematic flow of Russians to Ukraine, and the Russophiles resulted in many-folded heterogeneity: ethnicity, language, religious and denominational affiliation.

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[94] Ibid.,p:115.

[95] Dina Zisserman Brodsky, *Constructing Ethno Politics in the Soviet Union; Samizdat, Deprivation and the Rise of Ethnic Nationalism.* Palgrave: MacMillian, 2003: p. 115.

2.6. De-Stalinisation under Khrushchev and Brezhnev

During the Khrushchev era restrictions on political activities were reduced to the level that allowed for the emergence of the underground nationalist organisations, especially in Western Ukraine, because of the de-Stalinisation. After Khrushchev, Brezhnev came to the power. In spite of Brezhnev's strict policy towards Ukraine, these activities found more supporters from western Ukraine, because the western Ukraine was incorporated to the Union after the World War II and the peoples of this region were more nationalistic than the rest of Ukraine. Thus, after being interrupted by Brezhnev, the emerging activities during Khrushchev era accelerated during the initial years of perestroika and played role during the dissolution period of the USSR.

After Stalin's death, Nikita Khrushchev strove to consolidate power only in 1957.[96] With Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in 1956, the de-Stalinisation process began in the USSR. The gradual change in the political climate resulted in awareness of the Ukrainian political and cultural life. Concentration Camps were closed and those changes in the political climate were legitimised by the decisions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In order to keep up with country's delay in the sphere of newest technologies and levels of their scientific provision, which threatened to undermine the defence potential,[97] technology was selected as the first item of the agenda at the initiative of Khrushchev.

Khrushchev adopted a policy which lasted up to Brezhnev's rule that was specifically designed for the Slavic peoples of the union. According to this new policy, Ukrainians and Russians from Ukraine had a chance to occupy prominent positions in the other thirteen non-Russian republics of the Union. According to this hypothesis, if the Russians were the elder brother of Soviet nationalities, the Ukrainians were the junior elder brother.[98] Moreover, Khrushchev gave the Crimean

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[96] "Historical Facts about Ukraine" [Online] Available: http://ukraine-today.com/reference/facts/16.Shtml [Accessed: 12 July 2005].

[97] Ibid.

[98] Peter Duncan, "Ukraine and The Ukrainians" *The Nationalities Question In The Post-Soviet States* Ed. Graham Smith, London and New York: Longman. 1996. pp. 185-223.

Peninsula as a gift of the 300th anniversary of the Pereislav Agreement in 1954 to the Ukrainian SSR.[99]

During the Khrushchev era, the first illegal organisations[100] with an aim of seceding from the union emerged in Western Ukraine.[101] In 1963, Petro Shelest became the first Secretary of the CPU Central Committee. He was under pressure from both Moscow and the political and cultural forces in Ukraine which were resisting against Russification policy. Due to his protection of the nationally minded intellectuals, a nationalistic intellectual movement developed in Ukraine, and many *Samizdat*s were produced. The Khrushchev era ended with his replacement by Brezhnev in October 1964.

The arrest and sentencing years of 1965 and 1966 followed the fall of the Khrushchev. At least thirty of the most active defenders of the Ukrainian language were arrested and most of them were sentenced. The new Moscow leadership seemed to place attention a increasing the role of Russians in the Union. However, with cultural-linguistic demands particularly from Western Ukraine addressed to the Soviet Authorities during the 1960s, Brodsky claims that "despite the vigorous separatist demands of the 1960s and early 1970s, the mainstream Ukrainian dissident movement generally regarded secession as being merely the vaguely possible outcome of distant political developments or even as a political extreme."[102]

Indeed, Ukraine thought that the Ukrainian ethnic strategy and demand had been only radicalized in the years between the mid-1970s and the demise of the union.[103] Nevertheless, the demands for secession in western Ukraine, especially in Transcarpathia including Galicia, had been always present since the region's incorporation with the rest of Ukraine, at the end of Work War II. Thus, it could be wrong to assume the secessionist demand as a movement started in the mid 1970s, as

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[99] Ibid.

[100] Dina Zisserman Brodsky, *Constructing Ethno Politics in the Soviet Union; Samizdat, Deprivation and the Rise of Ethnic Nationalism*. Palgrave: MacMillian, 2003. p113.

[101] Ibid., p.113

[102] Ibid., p.117

[103] Ibid., p117.

a result of the on going problems within the union. However, their demands had been had visible in this period.

According to Lieven, in the period between 1955 and 1970, "Ukraine reflects the fact that the Soviet Russian leaders trusted and identified with the Ukrainians to a far greater degree that they did with any nationality".[104] He is right since Khrushchev, thanks to his long term Ukrainian experience,[105] allowed the Crimea's transfer to the Ukrainian lands in 1954 and the Ukrainisation of the educational system and media.[106] However, it is clear that Ukraine was not pleased with the Brezhnev Era, especially since the early years were filled with sentencing and arresting of the nationalists in Ukraine.

Within this framework, Lieven gives priority to what extent the ordinary Ukrainians identified themselves with the Soviet Union.[107] They did not see the Soviet Union as their state completely as did most Russians and Belarusians, but they did not see it as an alien state as did the Baltics and the Galician Ukrainians.[108] Lieven's argument stresses a key point, which is that of the background to Ukrainian national attitudes and behaviours today. Indeed, nativisation of the cadres in order to create national elite did not result in the Ukrainisation of the cadres. Moreover, nativisation policy went hand in hand with the appointment of the Russophiles to the top positions in Ukrainian SSR.

Shelest was replaced by Volodymyr Shcherbytsky who was loyal to the all-Union government in 1972. Shcherbytsky would be able to maintain his position until the dissolution of the USSR. Under his administration, there was a widespread repression of dissidents. Four years after he came to power, the Helsinki Group was founded[109] in order to monitor the effects in the republic of the Helsinki Final Act [110]

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[104] Anatol Lieven, *"Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry."* Washington Dc: Institute of Peace Press, 1999: p.41

[105] Ibid., p.42

[106] Ibid.p.42

[107] Ibid., p:41

[108] The Galician identity is the dominant figure in the Ukrainian national identity after the emergence of Ukraine as a sovereign state, since the region incorporated into the union, never totally merged into the Soviet Idea

[109] Anatol Lieven, *"Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry."* Washington Dc: Institute of Peace Press, 1999: p.41.

in 1976. The group was suppressed by the authorities, but it re-founded as Ukrainian Helsinki Union in 1988.

2.7. Perestroika and Dissolution of the USSR

Following the death of Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov came to power in 1982. Two years later, he died and was succeeded by Konstantin Chernenco, in 1984. In a period of less than one year's leadership, Chernenco died, too. When Mikhail Sergevich Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he met with great political and economic challenges to the USSR. Among other problems related to the economy and the nationalities question, this rapid circulation of three leaders within three years complicated the ruling such of a union. In order to keep the Union together, Gorbachev introduced perestroika and glasnost.

Elsewhere in the Union, the nationalist tendencies were popular with the Ukrainians in these years. Nevertheless, it is required to mention two factors, which are the locomotives of the national movement in Gorbachev Era: On April 26, 1986, a serious explosion took place at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in Northern Ukraine. This explosion resulted in the widespread discharge of large quantities of radioactive material which was two or three times harmful than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima at the end of the World War II.[111]

The second and the most dominant factor related to the awakening of the nationalistic movement is that Gorbachev granted amnesty to large number of political prisoners in 1987 and 1988.[112] After Soviet authorities emptied the Soviet Gulag of prisoners, all of the activists, including Ukrainian prisoners, allowed to return to their homelands. After returning to Ukraine, those nationalist activists re-founded the Ukrainian Helsinki Union in 1988. In the following years, Ukrainian Helsinki Union aligned itself with the cultural intelligentsia to launch the Ukrainian

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[110] The Human Rights Final Agreement, Helsinki Accords for Human Rights and Respect for Border Integrity was signed by 35 countries in 1975.

[111] David R. Marples, *Chernobyl Ten Years Later-The Facts* (1996).[Online].Available: http://www. infoukes.com/history/chornobyl/marples / [Accessed: 28 January 2004]

[112] Nicholas Fr Chirovsky, "The Genesis and the Development of the Three East-Slavic Nations." The Ukrainian Quarterly Vol.54,No:1-2 (1998) pp.33-50.

People's Movement for Restructuring (Rukh), which was founded by Writer's Union in Kiev in 1989.[113] Not too long, after doing so the Rukh movement was able to ally with the other civic groups in Ukraine and Rukh and its allies obtained one quarter of the seats in the new Supreme Soviet in the USSR's first relatively free elections to the republican parliament in March 1990.

2.8. Conclusion

Ukraine means borderland, and Ukraine has been a borderland for much of this millennium.[114] During the pre-Soviet period, Ukraine was the borderland between Tsarist Russia and the rest of Western Europe. Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, two different Ukraines emerged as the result of the regional polarisation in her territories. The regional polarisation and the difference between the identities remained as the main challenger of the post-Soviet political transformation.

After Ukraine was incorporated into the USSR, the increasing nationalist tendencies within the Ukrainian Communist ended in Stalin's growing suspicious and forcing the policy of collectivisation on Ukraine and imposing demands for grain delivery from the republic to the centre. After World War II, Western Ukraine incorporated to the rest, and thus the cultural, lingual, and regional heritage enriched the existing Ukrainian idea. The *Samizdat*s were produced mostly in western Ukraine during the Khrushchev era. In spite of the pressure of Brezhnev, Ukrainian culture and religion were able to revive. Thus the nationalism in western parts of Ukraine was reinforced by anti-Russianism, where nationalism meant pro-Europeanism in Ukraine.

When Gorbachev introduced glasnost and perestroika, the background for cultural re-birth had been ready for the independence. In the same manner, the Ukrainian Renaissance served as a historical basis for the Ukrainian nationalist movement after the Chernobyl disaster. The nuclear catastrophe served the theoretical background for the ultra-nationalists of Ukrainians in the very early years of the

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[113] Paula J Dobriansky, "Nationalism and Democracy in Ukraine." Ukranian Quarterly Vol.51, No.1. (1995): pp. 34-44.

[114] Alexander J. Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism.* New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993. p.24

independence. Nevertheless, differentiation between the eastern and western parts of the current Ukraine, because of the partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795, served as one of the most important problems challenging the political consolidation and the fate of transformation in the first years of independence.[115]

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[115] Alexander J. Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993. p.24

CHAPTER III

POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION DURING THE KRAVCHUK ERA

3.1. Introduction

According to Roman Szporluk, Ukraine owed her independence to a coalescence of the objective and subjective factors. The objective-external factor is the conditions on which Ukraine is dependent; however, the objective factor's influence was limited.[116] These conditions included major crises such as the Baltic problem, and the political developments in Russia. The second factor, which Szporluk defines as the subjective factor, is merely domestic. Szporluk argues that Ukraine's people seized the arising opportunities, some of which they did not create themselves.[117] According to Szporluk, they created their forces, built coalitions amongst former rivals, and attained their goal of national independence without fighting against outside forces, and without civil war or unrest.[118] In this circumstance, Ukraine entered into the transition period, which Kuzio summarises as a voyage started from four different departures to four arrivals. According to Kuzio's point of view, Ukraine has been transforming from a subject of empire to an independent state, from an ethnos to a population nation, from a commands administrative system to a market economy, from totalitarianism to democracy.[119]

These four different transition areas examine the multi-dimensional effects of the transition period on any layer of the governance and decision making process. To begin with the first, Ukraine was subjected to the multi-ethnic Russian Empire in the tsarist period, and then to a multi-ethnic socialist union; the USSR, as a pro-

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[116] Roman Szporluk, *Russia, Ukraine and the Break Up of The Soviet Union* Hoover. California: Institution Press, 2000. p: 315

[117] Ibid., p:316

[118] Ibid., p:316

[119] Taras Kuzio, "National Identity in Independent Ukraine: an Identity Transition", *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*. Vol:2, No:4 (1996) pp.582-608.

existing state. After independence, Ukraine was faced with building a nation with a heterogenic population in terms of language, religion, ethnos, and identity. Moreover, the insufficient political performance on implementing reform program relating to transformation to a market economy resulted in acceleration of the existing economic difficulties. The complexity of those three transitions affected the performance of the transition from a totalitarian regime to a democratic one. Thus, Ukraine's performance to achieve these goals will be the indicators of the progress of the country.

Starting with these four departure points, this chapter explores the political transformation in the Kravchuk era under four titles. After mentioning the political transformation in Ukraine under Kravchuk in the first part, the second portion examines the problems of the political transformation. Since elections are accepted as the litmus tests[120] of the progress of the transformation from an authoritarian rule to democracy, the third part of this chapter will try to argue the 1994 presidential elections. This chapter concludes with an analysis of the political transformation in Kravchuk era.

3.2. Beyond Independence

Political transformation in Ukraine began after implementation of perestroika (reconstruction) and glasnost (openness). The socialist ideology lost its authority, the society being quickly politicised and immediately acquiring political coloration in Ukraine. Actions of protest began against closing the schools with education in Ukrainian, and forcing out the national language from the sphere of state management, book publishing, as well as mass media. Nevertheless, conservative politician Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, first secretary of the CPU in Ukraine, hesitated to implement, moreover he prevented republic to accord with these reforms attached to both economical and social life to some extend.

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[120] Olaf Hillenbrand, "Good Governance and the Need for Consensus Building- A Framework for Democratic Transition". *Presidential Election and the Orange Revolution Implications for Ukraine's Transition.* Eds., Helmut Kurth, Irıs Kempe, Kiev: Zapovit, 2005: pp.7-31.

Protesting the Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster, the first mass meeting took place in Kiev, in November 1988.[121] One year later, political strikes burst out in Donbas, and the People's Movement of Ukraine appeared in Kiev. For the first time after 1917, the first free elections were held in the USSR in the spring of 1989. This led to the appearance of a new centre of power in a form of the two-level representative system: the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and the permanently acting Supreme Council of the USSR. Discontent with these developments, Shcherbytsky resigned and shortly died afterwards.[122]

On January 22, 1990, the Human Chain across Ukraine delivering the message that Ukraine was on the road to independence. In March 1990, elections were held for the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR and local councils. Many new political figures, mostly the adherents of reforms, appeared on the political scene. The nationalist democratic parliament managed to reach an accord with important segments of the Soviet Ukrainian establishment on how Ukraine should respond to the events in Moscow, after the elections.[123]

As a result, the Parliament adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine on July 16, 1990. To save the Soviet Union, Gorbachev started negotiations with the leaders of the republics on the conditions of a union agreement that could not be coordinated with the principles of state sovereignty declared by Republican Parliaments. Meanwhile, Kravchuk avoided condemning the August 1991 Moscow Coup until it appeared to be defeated,[124] however, the nationalists and democrats in Ukraine strictly opposed to Kravchuk. Five days after the attempted *coup de'tat*, on August 24 1991, Supreme Soviet, adopted the declaration of independence by 346

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[121] It was the first time in the history of Ukrainian SSR that Shcherbytsky and other leaders were publicly blamed for concealing information about the after-effects of the Chernobyl catastrophe.

[122] After the departure of Shcherbytsky, the CPU remained in conservative hands, first under Volodymyr Ivashko (September 1989-July 1990), and then under Stanislav Hurenko (July 1990-August 1991). See: Roman Szporluk, *Russia, Ukraine and The Break Up of The Soviet Union* Hoover. California: Institution Press, 2000. p: 300-321.

[123] Roman Szporluk, *Russia, Ukraine and the Break Up of The Soviet Union* Stanford California Hoover Institution Press, 2000. p:317

[124] Peter Duncan, "Ukraine and the Ukrainians" *The Nationality Questions In The Post-Soviet States* Ed. Graham Smith. London and New York: Longman 1996. pp.188-209.

votes to 1,[125] even though the parliament had a communist party majority. According to the declaration, independence was based conditionally on its confirmation in a referendum on December 1st.[126]

Kravchuk asserted that the Supreme Soviet repudiated the plan for an economic union which was initiated by the Chairperson of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minster) Vitold Fokin on 6 November. The presidential elections were held in Ukraine simultaneously with a referendum on confirmation of The Bill of Independence Announcement of Ukraine on December 1, 1991. Kravchuk was elected as the first president of independent Ukraine, thanks to that CPU which would have agitated against the yes vote. Kravchuk had won 61.6 per cent of the total amount of the votes, while his nearest rival Vyacheslav Chornovil, the official Rukh candidate, was able to get 23.3 per cent of the votes.[127] An overwhelmingly 90.3 per cent of the votes were yes for independence. The turnout of 84 per cent in the election and referendum[128] reflected a high level of political mobilisation. Every oblast voted yes; even the Crimea voted 54 per cent for Ukrainian independence.[129]

Kravchuk's victory resulted from several other factors besides his attitude towards the ethnic minorities. His nearest rival Chornovil was respected for his suffering in Brezhnev's labour camps, but many voters also saw him as too extreme for his nationalistic tendencies. Despite the critiques for being pragmatist and allegations that he had stolen the programme of his national rivals, Kravchuk was much more moderate than Chornovil. On the other hand, Duncan argues that Kravchuk's origin from western Ukraine, like his rival, Chornovil, was an asset during his campaign[130] and, it is true that Kravchuk was able to use the traditional Communist means of control over the mass media,especially the televisions to ensure

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[125] Roman Szporluk, *Russia, Ukraine and The Break Up of The Soviet Union* . Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000 p.317

[126] Peter Duncan, "Ukraine and The Ukrainians" The Nationality Questions In The Post-Soviet States Ed Graham Smith London and New York: Longman 1996: p. 198

[127] Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine Russia And The Successor States" *Briefing Service ,* Vol 1 No: 11 (1993) p.11-23

[128] Ibid., pp.11-13

[129] Peter Duncan, "Ukraine and the Ukrainians" *Nationality Questions in the Post-Soviet States* Ed., Graham Smith London and New York: Longman 1996. pp. 188-209

[130] Ibid., pp. 199-200

support for himself and his programme for independence. As Duncan briefly describes, the popular direct election conferred Kravchuk south to gain the legitimacy for his presidency.[131] In fact, this election did not result in a reformist legislature. The president appointed only conservative prime ministers to head the cabinet of ministers. Different groups within the Rada persisted on numerous different drafts of constitution and consensus on one text could be reached only after the presidential election of 1994.[132] Apart from those domestic problems, Ukraine had to deal with Russia which was not able seem to digest an independent Ukraine. Thus, Kravchuk promoted a centrist path of consensus politics that placed greater emphasis on stability than reform. He adopted economic and political policies that would not disturb those of his allies among the former Soviet Ukrainian elite who had joined the nationalist Communist camp.[133] He found supporters within the parliament: Rukh under Chornovil stood in constructive opposition to Kravchuk who allied himself with some national democrats.

3.3. Political Performance of Kravchuk

According to Kuzio, the election of Kravchuk reflected the inability of democratic and nationalist leaders to obtain majority support from the population, particularly in the Russian-speaking south and east.[134] From this point on, Kravchuk's election to the post did not imply that the transformation process began as it did in the Baltic States. However, having begun in July 1990 by adopting the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine,[135] the constitutional processes implied the beginning of the transformation process, since constitutional and legislative organs, as well as

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[131] Peter Duncan, "Ukraine and the Ukrainians" *Nationality Questions in the Post-Soviet States* Ed., Graham Smith London and New York: Longman 1996. p. 199

[132] Taras Kuzio, "Eastern Europe, Russia And Central Asia" *Regional Surveys of The World* Vol.1, No.1, (2000): pp. 5-32

[133] Ibid.

[134] Ibid.

[135] This document ratified the principles of sovereignty, democracy, inviolability of the territory of Ukraine, power division into legislative, executive and court branches, equality of citizens and state guarantee of their rights and liberties. See: Taras Kuzio, "Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia" *Regional Surveys of the World* Vol.1, No.1, (2000): pp.5-32.

clearly drown a state borders, were among the most important determinants of the stateness.

On the other hand, Kravchuk was supposed to deal with the international problems. Since the referendum, Ukraine has become an independent nation which would establish its relations with the outer world without union's umbrella. Nevertheless, the political transformation process that began soon after the referendum had been complicated by the unsolved problems, which remained after the fall of the USSR such as the division of the military ports, dependence on energy and the structure of the mode of production that had all former members dependent to the union and new problems such as the establishment of a successor structure, which would arrange the relations among the post-Soviet states. At this conjuncture, Kravchuk met with Yeltsin, President of RSFSR, and Shushkevich, Head of the Supreme Council of Belarus, in order to argue for the fate of the union, a week after Russia's recognition of Ukraine's independence. At the meeting in Minsk, three leaders announced that the USSR no longer existed as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality; moreover, these three Slav leaders agreed on the urgent need to dissolve the union, and to remove its non-elected president Gorbachev.[136]

On December 8, 1991, Presidents Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine, Boris Yeltsin of Russia, and Stanislav Shushkevich of Belarus met in Belovezha to sign a statement of denunciation of the Union Treaty and an agreement on the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Nonetheless, Ukraine and Russia were not able to compromise on the issue of the nature of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which the USSR would be replaced by. The disagreement was not related to the structure, but on the content of the agreement. Despite the disagreements, they reached a consensus as a result; Leonid Kravchuk and eleven former republics of the USSR signed a protocol on the formation of the Commonwealth at the Almaty meeting in Kazakhstan on December 21st, soon after Gorbachev resigned as the last Soviet President on 25 December 1991.[137]

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[136] Taras Kuzio, "Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia" *Regional Surveys of The World* Vol.1, No.1, (2000): pp.5-32.

[137] Taras Kuzio, "Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia" *Regional Surveys of The World* Vol.1, No.1, (2000): pp.5-32.

While the structure of the relations among the post-Soviet Republics were being designed in such meetings, and while Kravchuk was trying to defend Ukraine's interest in the region, the government was not able to defend its popularity. Prime Minister Fokin's government resigned, having been heavily defeated in a vote of no confidence of Rada. This was the first political crisis that arose from lack of political culture and experience of independence. As a result, on October 13th 1992, Leonid Kuchma was elected as prime minister.[138] The new government under Kuchma aimed to promote radical economic reforms. Members of the new government included several numbers of Rukh Movement and New Ukraine party. One month later, Ukraine left the rouble zone and its economy introduced the *Karbovanets.[139]* Transformation started to be shaped with the introduction of Karbovanets. This change in the currency reflected that Ukraine had been transforming to democratic state, which was based on a market-oriented economy. Nevertheless, economic problems started to threaten the planned reforms. Therefore, the parliament granted Leonid Kuchma emergency powers to rule by decree for a period of six months in order to implement economic reforms. Against Kuchma, the first dissatisfaction within the Rada started to be visible when Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma bided on extension of the period. As a response to Kuchma, President Leonid Kravchuk started to force parliament to give him extraordinary power to head the Cabinet of Ministers, which promoted Kuchma to tender his resignation. Ukrainian Parliament refused both of the two bids but the high tension seemed not to be normalised.

On September 9, 1993, polarisation and dissatisfaction within the ruling elites resulted in the resignation of Kuchma in protest to a continued parliamentary opposition to his economic programme. This was his third resignation in four months. His resignation was accepted by the parliament, which simultaneously passed a vote of no confidence in the entire cabinet. On September 22, 1993, Kravchuk appointed a proponent of increased state involvement in the economy, Yuhym Zvyahilsky to the

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[138]Taras Kuzio, "Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia" *Regional Surveys of The World* Vol.1, No.1, (2000), p.7

[139] On November 13, 1992 the Ruble ceased to be legal tender in Ukraine. It was replaced by the Karbovanets, a currency coupon intended as a transitional stage to the introduction of a new currency. See: Kathleen Mihalisko,. "Ukrainians and Their Leaders at a Time of Crisis" *Radio Free Europe Research Report* vol 2. no:31 (30 July, 1993)

prime ministry.[140] Five days later, President Kravchuk assumed direct leadership of the Cabinet of Ministers again. However, the increasing economic problems forced the cabinet declare a state of emergency in Ukraine owing to the critical economic situation.

The political atmosphere directly shaped the economic indicators in Ukraine, which had never been in such a worse conjuncture, the inflation rate increased to nearly 9000 per cent. On a nation-wide basis, the trust in the government dramatically dropped because of the ongoing problems, the rise of opposition to Kravchuk, and strikes in the industrial, pro-Russian Eastern Ukraine. Thus, Kravchuk had to call early parliamentary and presidential elections. The distribution of the votes in the parliamentary elections on 27 March 1994[141] in Ukraine and specifically in Crimea, showed the deficiencies of the reforms in the transition. The rise in the votes in favour of the Communists was not ideology or ethnicity. The main problem in Crimea and elsewhere in Ukraine directly related to the no confidence to the future of the reforms. Within this conjuncture, the electoral campaign for the Ukrainian presidency began in early 1994. Among the candidates to the presidency, Kuchma refrained from calling Ukraine a Central European country and stressed Ukrainians cultural and historical ties to Russia in order to attract the votes from Eastern Ukraine, which has stronger ties with Russia than with the central and western regions included in his election campaign. When Kravchuk had little to show for his country, it was understood that the election would contested by Leonid Kuchma and Leonid Kravchuk, while two of stronger candidates were Volodymyr Lanovoi and Oleksandr Moroz.[142]

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[140] Taras Kuzio, "Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia" *Regional Surveys of The World* Vol.1, No.1, (2000) pp.5-32.

[141] According to results, the Communists won the largest proportion of the seats (86) with their allies the Peasants' Party of Ukraine and the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) gaining 18 and 14 seats respectively Rukh secured 20 seats, a total of 112 seats remained unfilled; Subsequent rounds of voting gradually reduced this number. Olexsandr Moroz, the leader of the SPU was elected as the Chairperson of the Parliament, and in June, Vitaliy Masl who served as Prime Minister between 1987 and 1990 was re-elected to the post. See Kathleen Mihalisko, "Ukrainians and Their Leaders at a Time of Crisis" *Radio Free Europe /Radio* Liberty Research Report Vol 2. No:31 (30 July, 1993).

[142] Kathleen Mihalisko, "Ukrainians and Their Leaders at a Time of Crisis" *Radio Free Europe Research Report* vol 2. no:31 (30 July, 1993)

3.4. The 1994 Presidential Elections

Initial analyses have of the dynamics and implications of the Ukrainian Presidential elections been off the mark because they accepted the conventional wisdom of dividing Ukraine politically between eastern and western Ukraine. Rather, Ukraine is divided into four distinct zones: western, central, eastern, and southern Ukraine, based on the voting pattern. More than regional divisions the election campaigns and the future of the reforms played a more effective role in the electorate behaviour. During the election campaigns, the major factor driving the electorate behaviour was candidates programme in reform-needed sectors. In addition to the economic illness, relations with Russia and the nature of the Ukrainian state were among the most serious problems. Finally, widespread organized crime and associated corruption was an issue.[143]

Kuchma's campaign focused on pro-Russian priorities: Kuchma promised recognition of Russian language as the second officially recognised state language with Ukrainian, education in Russian language in eastern parts of Ukraine, integration and good neighbourhood with Russia, instead of a bid for being European which were the priority arenas in Kravchuk's pro-Western election campaign. Therefore, he took the most of the votes in the eastern regions for his pro-Russian tendency, and was supported by western regions because of the ongoing economic illnesses. As a comparison, the concept of Europeanisation accepted as the most important factor influencing the electoral behaviour in the presidential elections in 2004 in which pro-Kuchma candidate Yanukovich could not succeed to be elected as president, while moderation played the most important role for Kravchuk's election and the economic illness for the Kuchma.

Sharing the same idea with the other scholars, Andrew Wilson stresses that two key themes dominated Kuchma's election campaign: The first is opposition to Ukrainian Nationalism combined with a spirited defence of the Russian-speaking half of the Ukrainian population, and the second is the increasingly urgent need for radical

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[143] Kathleen Mihalisko, "Ukrainians and Their Leaders at a Time of Crisis" *Radio Free Europe Research Report* Vol 2. No.31 (30 July, 1993)

economic reforms.[144] Wilson argues that Kuchma has largely concentrated on the latter at the expense of the former, disappointing some of his original backers on the left while winning over many of his former nationalist opponents.[145] In addition to his performance on the election campaign, another reason could be added to Kuchma's victory; the 1994 Elections could be accepted as the elections that were accepted as free of fraud when compared to the rest of the elections held in Ukraine but, according to OSCE reports none of the elections held in Ukraine is accepted as neither free nor free of fraud.[146]

According to the results of the first round of the voting in the presidential election, the most successful two candidates were in the first ballot, President Kravchuk and the former Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma were contested in the second round on 10 July 1994. On 11 July 1994, Leonid Kuchma, former prime minister of Ukraine after independence, won the run-off election for President of Ukraine over the incumbent. The overall tally was 52.1 per cent for Kuchma against 46 per cent for Kravchuk, with nearly 70 per cent of registered voters participated. This outcome represented an upset because Kravchuk had won the preliminary round in the Presidential elections on 26 June with 38 per cent of the vote to 31 per cent for Kuchma. Moreover, the latest poll taken before the election had Kravchuk ahead of Kuchma by 51 per cent to 45 per cent.[147] While a casual reading of the voting results by oblast would lead to claiming an East-West split between the candidates,[148] a more careful breakdown would show four regions,[149] as it is displayed in the Table 3.1 below;

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[144] Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine under Kuchma". *Russia and the Successor States Briefing Service* Vol 2. No. 6 (1995): pp 2-17.

[145] Ibid., p:3

[146] "Presidential Elections in Ukraine" Available http://osce.org/elections_Ukraine.htm# [Online] [Accessed: 26 June 2005]

[147] Petro Dziubaniuk, "Kuchma Presented with Presidential Certificate"; *Radio Free Europe* Daily Report No. 133, (15 July 1994)

[148] Misha Glenny, "Ukraine's Great Divide" *New York Times,* (14 July 1994) [Online] Available: http://www.nytimes.com/divide#Ukrained.htl. [Accessed: 17 September 2005].

[149] "The Facts on the Second Round of the Presidential Elections of Ukraine." Available :http://www.globalsecurity.orgmilitary/library/report/1994/ukrbelel.htm#7a#7a. [Accessed: 19 July 2005]

Table 3.1.

Breakdown of Voting in the 1994 Presidential Elections

REGION/OBLAST	KRAVCHUK	KUCHMA
WESTERN		
Volyn	84	14
Zakarpats'ka	70	25
Ivano-Frankovs'k	94	4
Lviv	94	4
Rivne	87	11
Ternopil'	95	4
Khmelnitsky	57	39
Chernivtsy	62	35
CENTRAL		
Vinnitsia	54	42
Zhitomir	56	42
Kiev	58	38
Kirovograd	46	50
Cherkassy	51	46
Kiev(City)	60	36
EASTERN		
Dnipropetrovsk	30	68
Donets'k	18	79
Luhansk	10	88
Poltava	37	59
Sumy	29	68
Kharkiv	26	71
Chernihiv	25	72
SOUTHERN		
Crimean Republic	9	90
Zaporozhia	27	71
Mikolayiv	45	53
Odessa	29	67
Kherson	32	65
Sevastopol(City)	7	92

Source: "The Facts on the Second Round of the Presidential Elections of Ukraine." Available:http://www.globalsecurity.orgmilitary/library/report/1994/ukrbelel.htm#7a#7a. [Accessed: 19 July 2005]

Of these regions, the West voted heavily for Kravchuk, the Central represented the most balance between Kravchuk and Kuchma, and the East and South primarily supported Kuchma, the East more so than the South Oblasts of the eastern and southern regions, which voted more than 60 per cent for Kuchma, contain nearly 60 per cent of the nation's population, while the Western region oblasts, which voted more than 60 per cent for Kravchuk, contain only about 20 per cent of the nation's

population.[150] In addition to their voting for president in the runoff, the regions differ in their attitudes about three key issues: Ukrainian nationalism, nature of the state, and effects from the economic decline.

On 8 August 1994, President Kuchma placed himself directly in charge of the government and subordinated all local councils to the presidency. In fact, the results of the 1994 elections reflected the dissatisfaction of the electorates with short-lived cabinets under Kravchuk's presidency more than confidence in Kuchma's programme and personal victory. Another factor of Kuchma's victory was that Volodymyr Lanovoi and Oleksandr Moroz, who were presidential candidates in the June elections, surprisingly threw their support to Kuchma in the runoff.[151] The next surprise was the decisiveness of the vote for Kuchma in the eastern provinces. The pro-Kuchma vote substantially exceeded the proportion of the minority Russian population in those oblasts.[152] That the majority of the Ukrainians voted for Kuchma underscored the importance of economic issues in deciding the results of the election. Finally, for the first time, the central region displayed a divide along the Dnieper River, with the Left Bank oblasts of the region supporting Kuchma and the Right Bank ones supporting Kravchuk.[153] These divisions in the regions had remained until the 2004 presidential elections.

3.5. Problems of Political Transformation during the Kravchuk Era

Kravchuk was third in command in Ukraine's CPSU leadership before the fall of Soviet Union even thought he was not a part of the ruling Dnipropetrovs'k group. He avoided inflexible positions towards democratic changes. Kravchuk has attempted to achieve and strengthen formal sovereignty of the country and develop its relations with the West. He has withstood the enormous pressure from Russia and refused to retain the common Armed Forces and currency inside the CIS. Another of

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[150] Kathleen Mihalisko, "Ukrainians and Their Leaders at a Time of Crisis" *Radio Free Europe* Research Report vol 2. no:31 (30 July 1993)

[151] Ibid.

[152] Ibid.

[153] Dominique Arel, and Andrew Wilson "Ukraine Under Kuchma: Back To Eurasia?". *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty* Rfe/Rl Research Report Vol.3, No.32 (19 August 1994)

his stands has been the refusal of nuclear weapons based on Ukrainian territory. Despite the performance in these arenas, Leonid Kravchuk definitely became the negative figure of Ukrainian history because of his economic policy. He failed to avoid corruption in the privatization of the country's industry and did not promote effective financial decisions. Under Kravchuk, transition to a democratic state in Ukraine was challenged by many factors, such as state and nation building; religious, ethnic and lingual divisions as well as Russia's interest in Ukraine.

Holding office between 1990 and 1994, President Leonid Kravchuk failed to increase his powers despite a strong showing in the elections and the prospect of serving as the unifier of the nation as the first President of post-communist Ukraine. Despite the fact that Rukh stood in a constructive opposition to Kravchuk, Kravchuk's attempts to gain greater power at the expense of the parliament were consistently rebuffed by the majority in parliament.[154] Kravchuk faced a parliament that was largely controlled by a single group of deputies: the so-called group of 239, a bloc of deputies elected from the Ukrainian Communist Party that primarily served the interests of the nomenclature. This group held a majority of the seats and demonstrated a tendency to vote as a bloc.[155] This constellation of forces only changed after the parliamentary elections of March 1994. The number of effective political parties increased to 12 and the bloc of 239 was split.[156] Due to the political crises and the rapid circulation of the parliament, Kravchuk was unable to get up the speed of the reforms. That is to say both the problems left behind the USSR, and the problems related to the post-Soviet state building remained untouched during the Kravchuk Era.

According to Claus Offe, many post-Communist states are still faced with the challengers of the triple transition.[157] Paul Kubicek claims that these three transition arenas are consolidation of democratic institutions, creation of market

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[154] Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine: Two Presidents and Their Powers," *Post-Communist Presidents*, ed. Ray Taras, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997: pp. 90-91

[155] Ibid.

[156] Ibid.

[157] Claus Offe, "Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing The Triple Transition In East Central Europe" *Social Research*, Vol:58, No:4, (1991), pp.856-902.

structures and imperatives of state building.[158] On the issue of state building, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan go one step further and claim that state building constitutes a logical prerequisite for the creation of market structures and consolidation of democratic institutions, as an established and agreed political community with functioning institutions is necessary to carry out the other tasks.[159] Ukraine, as a post-Soviet transition state had to keep up with all those problems during the Kravchuk Era. At first, the state building process began despite the fact that there were more Ukraines. The state building process in Ukraine was challenged by two factors: nation building and the regional polarisation between Russophiles and Ukrainophiles.

Nation building under Kravchuk was challenged by many factors. At first, the nation-state building requires a nation connected to the state thanks to citizenship. According to Smith, a nation can be defined as political, ethnic, territorial, cultural or religious groups united by a common economy, mass culture, common legal rights and duties and a belief system that emphasizes either shared history and genealogy or other common myths distinguishing this group from others.[160] Thus, this process requires one more factor: national identity; however, Ukrainian elites could not reach a consensus; they have been trying to define the geographical components of the national idea since the first quarter of the 20th century.[161]

According to nationalists in Ukraine, Ukraine belongs to the European family; thus the county is needed to apply the national idea to Europeanism, yet Ukraine could not find more supporters from Europe that could assist it to experience the post soviet political transformation to democracy moderately during the Kravchuk era. The nation state was not built upon a well-founded argument that would attract people of eastern Ukraine. Thus, state building under Kravchuk remained an unsolved problem of transformation, particularly because of the non-existence of the national identity attaching people to the state.

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[158] Paul Kubicek, "Regional Polarization in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting And Legislative Behaviour" *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 52, No.2, 2000: pp.273-294

[159] Juan Linz, and Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press (1996): pp. 37-61.

[160] Anthony Smith, *National Identity*, London: Pengin Publishing, 1991. p:14

[161] Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation*. New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2000: p.279

While examining the political dilemma of state building, Smith underscores the importance of the national identity. According to Smith, a nation state on the western model can be created only by national identity, since in the Soviet era political evolution did not generate an overarching political culture and political community that included, even when it did not erode, peripheral ethnic cultures and communities.[162] As he pointed out, Ukraine had to describe the national idea that attaches people to the nation-state, within a conceptual framework of selective or official nationalism without a political culture, a political community and experience.[163]

Within this framework, dealing with the problems of political consolidation, Kravchuk tried to give a priority to the political dimensions of nationalism. Kravchuk sought to build a Ukrainian identity by only stressing the differences between Ukrainian culture and the culture and ideology of Russia, yet he failed to build Ukraine as a non-ethnic based civil society.[164] According to Kuzio, the nation building process seeks to integrate regionally, socially, and politically divided peoples into a united consciousness that binds together a formally heterogeneous population.[165] Therefore, Kravchuk's period was too short to build a nation in the post-Soviet space. As national identity is a dynamic process where identity and the differences between others and us are always changing, the nationality can also remain multi-layered,[166] and in Ukraine, national identity remained multi-layered during the Kravchuk era.

Within this framework, the Russian speaking Ukrainians in southern and eastern Ukraine, although they seem to be integrated into the Ukrainians, existed as

[162] Anthony Smith, "Ethnic Identity and Territorial Nationalism in Compete Perspective" *Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities*,. Ed.,Alexander J. Motyl. New York: Colombia University Press, 1992. pp.56-57.

[163] According to Michail Molchonov, a strategy of selective nationalism has been used to secure more benefits from the country's geopolitical position in Ukraine. Official nationalism, promulgated by the elite has been met with a less than overwhelmingly response on the part of the general public. See : Michail Molchonov, "A Post Communist Nationalism as a Power Resource: A Russia-Ukraine Comparisons" *Nationality Papers* Vol. 28, No,2 . p:263-286

[164] Anatol Lieven, *"Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry."* Washington Dc: Institute Of Peace Press, 1999. pp. 135-136.

[165] Taras Kuzio, "National Identity In Independent Ukraine: An Identity In Transition." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*. Vol 2. No.4.(1996). pp. 582-608

[166] Peter Alter, *Nationalism* London: Edward Arnold, 1994. p.14

sub-national identities.[167] In fact, neither Russians nor the very large number of Russian speaking Ukrainians in Eastern and Southern Ukraine felt any great loyalty to the Russian Government.[168] Thus the mixed Ukrainian/Russian identity, which many Eastern Ukrainians have, may also have preventing such a domestic conflict between the Russians and the Ukrainians by acting as a buffer.[169] Stipulating the demand for determining who the Ukrainian is and creating a national identity in Ukraine played a key role in Kravchuk's defeat in the 1994 elections in addition to his insufficient performance in adopting and implementing the political and economic reforms. Since the political instability negatively affected the fate of the democratic and economic reforms, Kravchuk could not focus on the fate of the reforms, as well as adoption and implementation of strict measures in order to deal with the ongoing problems.

Thus the Russians and the Russophiles in Ukraine remained one of the most serious obstacles against state building during the Kravchuk era. Moreover, the situation of the Russians in Ukraine was different from the rest of the post-Soviet states. However, there is a tendency in the literature to define the Russian Minority in the post-Soviet space as an ethnic minority left behind in a multi-national union. In Ukraine, this is not particularly true. Not only the Russian minority but also Russian minority plus Russianised Ukrainians, Russophiles, were the obstacles against the national consolidation under Kravchuk. Sources of identity differed in Ukraine as it is demonstrated in the table 3.2 below:

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[167] Taras Kuzio, "National Identity in Independent Ukraine: an Identity in Transition." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*. Vol 2. No.4.(1996). pp.582-608

[168] Fifteen percentage of the Russian-speaking minority develops a stronger Russian consciousness, whereas 85 percent is to develop a stronger Ukrainian consciousness. See: Taras Kuzio, National Identity in Independent Ukraine: an Identity in Transition." Nationalism *and Ethnic Politics.Vol* 2. No.4. (1996). pp.582-608.

[169] Maurice Pearton, "Nations in Nationalism" *Nations and Nationalism* Vol 2 No 1 (1999). pp.1-15

Table 3.2

Sources of Ethnic Identification in Ukraine in the Kravchuk Era*

ELEMENTS	UKRAINIANS	RUSSIANS
Parents	79,8 %	78,4 %
Territory/Residence	68,7 %	22,4 %
Citizenship	67,6 %	24,0 %
Language	60,8 %	78,7 %
Closeness of Traditions/ Culture	55,7 %	43,6 %
National Consciousness	52,5 %	47,7 %
Common Historical Fate	51,6 %	37,5 %
Religion	30,2 %	26,3 %
Indefinable	29,6 %	26,8 %
Physical Appearance	20,9 %	17,4 %

Source: *The Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology in Moscow (1994),*in Taras. Kuzio, "National Identity in Independent Ukraine: an Identity Transition", Nationalism and Ethnic Politics. Vol 2 No 4 Winter 1996:pp. 582-608

According to the table given above, both Ukrainians and Russians are keen on the fact that parents are the roots of ethnic identification. Figures support the fact that a child of Ukrainian parents perceives himself or herself to be Ukrainian, whereas, a child of Russian parents identifies as a Russian. In the case of mixed marriage, the child defined himself or herself as Russian in the Soviet Era, when the authorities supported mixed marriage in order to merge the ethnicities in the same pot and when speaking Russians, which were enough to be appointed to higher positions. The table provides a breakdown of the multi-layered sources of ethnic identification in post-Soviet Ukraine. As it is displayed in the table, both parties accept language as a marker of identification. For this reason, Russians and Russophiles in Ukraine preferred to enrol their children in Ukrainian language schools in Kiev due to their expectations that Ukrainian would become the future language of social advancement.[170]

According to table above, nearly 69 per cent of Ukrainians believe that territory/residence is one of the roots of ethnic identification, whereas, only 22.4 per cent of Russians do. This figure demonstrates that Russians did not internalise the space, as it is their homeland. However, the common thought that arose in the post-

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[170] Maurice Pearton, "Nations in Nationalism" *Nations and Nationalism* Vol 2 No 1 (1999). pp.1-15.

Soviet space regarding the Russian diaspora as a Muscovite fifth column in waiting is not true in Ukraine. Neither the Russians nor the very large number of Russian speaking Ukrainians in eastern and southern Ukraine feel any great loyalty to the Russian government. Their spokespersons often say we are ethnic Russians, but we are not Russian citizens.[171] Similarly, this attitude is supported by the fact that citizenship defined as the root of the ethnic identification by nearly 68 per cent of Ukrainians, whereas the percentage is not much than 24 per cent among the Russians. The last interesting finding of the poll was 52 per cent of Ukrainians define themselves by means of common historical fate, whereas this percentage is 38 per cent of Russians.[172] That is to say, in Ukraine, the Russian Minorities in Ukraine have no organizational links to their homeland.

The second problem of the post-Soviet political transformation under Kravchuk is the Russian Ukrainian relations. While, Kravchuk succeeded in refusing to be a part of a body which would be the successor of the USSR, he could not achieve a treaty with Russia on the fate of the unsolved problems. Thus, Russian Ukrainian relations remained as the main problem of the Ukraine's foreign policy orientation during the Kravchuk era. In the words of Motyl the historical interconnections between Ukraine and Russia have penetrated ever aspect of their current relationship. [173] There is an almost organic entangling of tasks. Moreover Lieven found that the threat to Ukraine (from Russia) does not exist in the classical military sense. But that does not mean that one should completely reject the idea of a strategic threat in other ways.[174] According to Lieven,

> ...Ukraine's national security is not threatened by Russian military expansion, but by Russia's potential use of social, cultural and psychological means... The contradictions and dynamics in Ukrainian- Russian relations are similar to those when you try to separate two Siamese twins. ...There is no event in world history, which

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[171] Anatol Lieven, *"Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry."* Washington Dc: Institute Of Peace Press, 1999. pp:11-16

[172] Ibid.,p 8.

[173] Alexander J. Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine After Totalitarianism.* Council on Foreign Relations Pres: New York. 1993: p.5

[174] Anatol Lieven, *"Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry."* Washington Dc: Institute Of Peace Press, 1999. p:8.

> parallels in complication the phenomenon of Russian-Ukrainian combined separation and co-existence, both in its quality and in its sheer scale…[175]

As he claimed, Russia and Ukraine, although separate nations, are also closely linked. These links have not just been forged over the centuries by Russia and Soviet governments but have also developed organically through millions of human contacts over hundreds of years, resulting in very important aspects of common psychological, religious, cultural, linguistic, and historical identification. Nevertheless, soon after the dissolution of the USSR, Russia and Ukraine started to deal with problems influencing their relationship. Kohut summaries the problems of Russian-Ukrainian relations in Kravchuk era as the future of the CIS, economic integration, nuclear disarmament, the fate of the black sea fleet and border disputes.[176] Moreover, he pays attention to such problems in Ukrainian-Russian relations such as the perception of history and perception of the other.

The problems of Ukrainian-Russian relations, was even deeper than which Leonid Kravchuk labelled as Russia's imperial disease or imperial thinking.[177] Some nationalist Russians like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn was still willing to let go of most of the former Soviet Union for a reconstituted Russia during this period.[178] Thus, Russian-Ukrainian relations was the only external problem of political transformation in Ukraine under Kravchuk, since the threat coming from Russia was more important than any external threat. While, Kravchuk was able to draw a limit for the Russian threat, the Russian factor and the Soviet heritage remained as one of the unresolved issues.[179] Moreover, Russian language and the Russian minority emerged as more influential threats than the Russian threat as a military power in the Kravchuk era.

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[175] Anatol Lieven, *"Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry.*" Washington Dc: Institute Of Peace Press, 1999. p:8.

[176] Zenon E. Kohut, "History as a Battleground-Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Historical Consciousness in Contemporary Ukraine" *The Legacy of History in Russia and The New States of Eurasia.* Ed. S. Frederick Star New York: M.E Sharpe. 1994. pp.123-147.

[177] Ibid., p.143

[178] Roman Solchanyk, "Commentary Piece Of Rebuilding Russia: Reflections And Tentative Proposals:1991" *Ukrainian Weekly* vol: 11. No:2 (1993): pp.39-61.

[179] Roman Szporluk. *Russia, Ukraine and the Break Up of the Soviet Union* Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000: p.xxvii.

3.6. Conclusion

In the perestroika years, the politicisation of the society gave first signals. The first demonstrations against the government's attitude to hide the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the strike of the Donbas region in 1989, the Human Chain across Ukraine in 1990 were all the signals of the awakening of the civil consciousness and civil society in Ukraine. Similar to the conjuncture of the pre-Orange Revolution process in Ukraine, the opposition movement and nationalist tendencies started to be more popular especially among the university students. With the weakening of the Soviet Union, politicians that were more democratic started to be seen in the political arena. Leonid Makarovych Kravchuk began to support the Ukrainian independence movement. Kravchuk's election reflected the inability of nationalists and democratic leaders to obtain the majority support from the population particularly in the Russian-speaking east and the south. First president of Ukraine from early December 1991 to July 1994, Kravchuk allied himself with some national democrats, and Rukh under Chornovil stood in constructive opposition during his presidency. Kravchuk promoted a centrist path of consensus politics that placed greater emphasis upon stability than reform, and he adopted economic and political policies that would not disturb those of his allies among the former Soviet elite who had joined the national Communist camp. The election of Kravchuk did not result in a reformist legislature, since he appointed only conservative prime ministers to head the cabinet of ministers. In addition to the problems inherited from the Soviet Union, such issues as regional polarisation and Russian Ukrainian relations could not be solved by transformation management, as a result of the lack of post-Soviet political transformation strategy during Kravchuk Era.

Kravchuk could not solve most of these problems, particularly thanks to the political crisis within the Rada. Moreover members of Rada were not able to reach a consensus on the Ukrainian Constitution. The problems and the high tension within the Rada resulted in Kuchma's resignation three times and Kravchuk's call for early elections. Kravchuk could not implement a well-designed reform pocket that could improve the economic situation in Ukraine. As a result of this lack of strategy, Leonid Kuchma was elected as the second elected president in the 1994 presidential elections

in Ukraine. However, Kravchuk failed in adopting a serious reform agenda including strict measures. The Kravchuk era signalled that Ukraine would not be Belarus which is ruled by an authoritarian regime

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION DURING THE KUCHMA ERA

4.1. Introduction

This chapter seeks to explore the general political conjuncture, and the *sui generis* problems such as regionalism, which were reinforced by tribal affiliations and temporary challenges such as political scandals during the Kuchma era. Chronologically, this chapter focuses on the political developments in Kuchma's first and second terms in the office. After reviewing Kuchma's performance between 1994 and 1999 and the dynamics of the 1999 elections, Kuchma's second term in the office and the recent developments in the political arena are examined by paying special attention to factors affecting the political transformation. The problems in the Kuchma era affected the outbreak of the Orange Revolution.

Within this framework, this chapter examines the post-Soviet political transformation in Ukraine, paying attention to the domestic and external dynamics of the post-Soviet transformation to democracy. After analysing Leonid Kuchma's first term in the presidency, chapter also argues Kuchma's foreign policy orientation. During his second term in the presidency, Kuchma's priorities and his performance are analysed in this chapter. The political crisis and the referendum problem are also examined in this chapter. The problems of political transformation in Ukraine are analysed in this chapter and also he factors affecting the outbreak of the Orange Revolution are examined by paying attention to the post Soviet political transformation management under Leonid Kuchma. Thus this chapter analyses a ten year period between 1994 and 2004.

4.2. Political Transformation in Kuchma's First Term

According to his speeches during the election campaign,[180] Ukraine under Kuchma seemed to be a little Russia. Many Ukrainians living in the Western Ukraine viewed Kuchma as a man oriented towards a fraternal union with Russia.[181] In contrast to the expectations, Kuchma surprisingly changed his priorities soon after his election. In October 1994, he announced a reform program to accelerate the transformation to the market economy, to stabilize Ukraine's monetary and financial systems, and to integrate Ukraine into the world economy. However, he stressed that the Ukraine would continue strong ties with Russia and CIS, it was soon understood that Kiev placed great hopes for assistance to facilitate these reforms ties the United States of America and Western Europe.

Kuchma changed his priorities because the economic problems and government's inability to sustain the reform process forced him to search for foreign investment and support. Indeed, there were other reasons driving his political orientation towards more moderate stance than what he announced in his election campaign. The first reason is that Yeltsin changed Russia's foreign policy orientation and adopted Eurasianism to which Ukrainian society negatively reacted. Second, integration with the east was no longer effective, while its substitute west was serving many advantages including financial aid. Third, Poland and Hungary came to recognize that Ukraine would play a key role in the evolving European Security System and they signalled that the Central Europeans would try to assist Ukraine in rejoining Europe. Central Eastern countries' support for returning to Europe could be caused later to Western Europe's support for the country. Nevertheless, refraining from the probability of being criticized by his supporters, Kuchma found a third way. In accordance with the Ukrainian third way he visited six of G-7 states in 1994-95,

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[180] Stephen R Burant, "Ukraine and East Central Europe" *Ukrainian Studies* Vol 20 No.1, (1996): pp.9-28

[181] Anatol Lieven, *Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry*. Washington Dc: Institute Of Peace Press, 1999. p.146

while imposing direct rule in Crimea, which remained in force until 28 August, on April 4 1995.[182]

When Kuchma engaged in one of the two priorities areas that he proposed, in his election campaign, it was understood that the second priority economy started to be accepted as the reason of the political crisis. In protest against the radical economic policies, parliament passed a vote of no confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers under Marchuk; however, the government failed to resign. In a period of less than one year, this was the third problem that arose in the Rada. The first was the resignation of Masol after Kuchma's election to the presidency. Then Kuchma confirmed Yergeniv Marchuk as prime minister in initially as an acting capacity.[183] Nevertheless, problems between Marchuk and Rada negatively affected the legislative process. The problem between the Rada, and Kuchma and pro-Kuchma cabinet of ministers started to be more visible when Rada refused to grant Kuchma additional executive powers. Then Kuchma threatened the Rada with calling a nation-wide referendum of confidence in the presidency and the legislature. The Rada vetoed this decree, whereupon Kuchma revoked the veto in May 1995.[184]

Then Yevhen Marchuk was dismissed in November owing to the economic crisis and was succeeded by Pavel Lazerenko. Under Lazerenko's prime ministry, a new cabinet of ministers was subsequently formed and by 1996-97, a new cabinet of ministers was able to install a reform program. In September 1996, in accordance with the reform program, a new currency, the Hryvnya, was introduced. Introduction of the Hryvnya indicated Kuchma's commitment to the improvement of the economy. Nevertheless, Pavel Lazerenko was removed in 1997 from office, presumably due to illness, but it is alleged that he was accused of corruption.[185] Nevertheless, the tension among the members of the governmental body did not decrease. Vasyl Durdynets was appointed as prime minister on 19 June 1997, but soon was replaced by Valeriy

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[182] "Foreign Economic Policy Guidelines Detailed Infobank" [Online]. Available: http://www.nti.org/e _research/profiles/Ukraine/index.html [Accessed: 8 May 2005]

[183] Paul Kubicek, "What Happened to The Nationalists in Ukraine." *Nationalism and Ethnic Policies* Vol.5; No.1 (1999), pp. 29-46

[184] Ibid., pp. 29-46

[185] Ibid.

Pustovoytenko on 16 July 1997.[186] When the tension within the parliament started to decrease, three years after Kuchma's election to the post, the nationalist parties, although, they were not represented in the government, had already served as constructive oppositions[187] similar to what the nationalist and centre parties did during Kravchuk's presidency. While some of Kuchma's first term policies pleased the nationalists, Kuchma's main opponent was a more conservative parliament and nationalist parties. Some economic reform programmes were pushed through, but their passage through the legislature was guaranteed only by the support of a centrist bloc composed largely of enterprise directors and owners. The nationalist forces were unable to push forward many items on their agenda, particularly more rapid free-market reforms.

Corruption rates started to increase to the high levels. The power and fortune went to the Donetsk clan.[188] That is to say the tribal affiliations started to play more dominant role in public affairs, in the employment processes to the public sectors, and the privatisation processes. Apart from these, peoples of Ukraine still had doubts in trusting institutions, especially in political parties, and the Ukrainian third way. The pessimistic idea nobody is waiting for us in the West had been the driving motive of the society. Moreover, either an ally or enemy, Russia, was closer than the rest of the Europe. For this reason, Central European Initiative (CEI) membership had no meaning for the Ukrainians and was not enough to change their prejudices.[189] In fact, nobody was waiting for Ukraine in Europe, but nobody wanted to leave Ukraine. Within this framework, approving Ukrainian membership in the CEI in September 1995 meant Europe's need for time in order to see what would happen next in Ukraine. Kuchma received this message and by mid-1996, he started to refer to Ukraine as a Central European country.[190] Nevertheless, he named Ukrainian third

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[186] Paul Kubicek, "What Happened to The Nationalists in Ukraine." *Nationalism and Ethnic Policies* Vol.5; No.1 (1999), pp.29-46.

[187] Ibid.,pp.29-46.

[188] Ibid., pp.29-30

[189] In fact, CEI's precedence was transportation, energy, science and technology; one of its most important objectives is to prepare non-EU Members for participation to The EU, a mission which Ukraine could benefit considerably.

[190] Lidove Noviny, "Czech Commentator Views Polish-Ukrainian Relations," *Fbis-Eeu* Vol: 46.No:1 (1996)

way as multi vectorism policy in 1996. In the early 1997, as a result of the multi vectorism policy, fundamentals of national security were passed by the parliament and Kuchma did the new formula of his policy as cooperation with Eurasia and integration with Europe.[191]

However, Russian leaders were not willing to treat Ukraine as an equal partner in these years. Kuchma was able to sign an agreement with Russia on the division of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet on 28 May 1997 and finally, the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Partnership, three days later.[192] With this agreement, Russia recognised for the first time the sovereignty of Ukraine.[193] Nevertheless, his successes to defer the Russian threat and to decrease the tension in the Crimea were not enough to increase public confidence in Ukraine's new political institutions. The reason is what Wilson found: corruption in Ukraine was on a truly Olympian scale by 1998.[194]

In the same year, parliamentary elections were held in Ukraine under the protection of the new electoral law, which provided for a combination of proportionally and directly elected seats and approved by Kuchma in 1997. According to the results of the parliamentary elections 1998, Rukh won 45, nationalist parties 13, leftist parties was able to won 166 seats in the parliament and centrist or others won 210 seats.[195] Specifically, of the 30 parties and electoral blocs that contested the general election, eight parties gained the 4 per cent of the votes necessary for representation in the Rada. The CPU secured a total of 123 seats; of the 225 directly elected seats, the greatest number 136, were won by independent candidates and repeat elections were held in August of the same year. Rada was rather slow in electing the speaker, and finally succeeded to appoint Alexander

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[191] Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians. Unexpected Nation.* New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2000: pp.199-200.

[192] Ibid., p.200

[193] The treaty was ratified by Ukraine on 14 January 1998. See: Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians. Unexpected Nation*. New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2000: pp.199-200

[194] Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians. Unexpected Nation*. New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2000: pp.199-200

[195] "Central Electoral Commission Official Data" (April 1998) [Online] Available: http://www.rada. org.ua.en#.htl. [Accessed: 15 June 2005]

Tkachenko, a former Communist party official, to the post on 7 July 1998.[196] Meanwhile, two legal arrangements in political and economical arenas were designed quickly. A new trading band for the Hryvnya was announced, and Rada adopted a new law on presidential elections.[197] According to the law on presidential elections adopted on 22 March, presidential candidates were to be supported by 1 million signatures from the members of the public who are eligible to vote, and a candidate needed over 50 per cent of the votes cast in order to win in the first round, whereas a simple majority was to suffice to secure victory in subsequent rounds.[198]

Before the election, Kuchma might account that he would be elected by attracting the votes of the electorates who does not want the other candidate's success. Despite his success in some transformation arenas, the allegations of corruption, tribal affiliation, very existence of a *raison de'tat,* censorship of the media, as well as his alleged financing by the new emerged post-Soviet oligarchs was decreasing his credibility on the eve of the presidential elections 1999.

Indeed, Kuchma's election in 1994 did shift the centre of political gravity to the east, so the nationalists found themselves marginalized as it was in the Kravchuk Era. However, Kubicek summarises Kuchma's first term in the presidency by writing that,

> …Kuchma bucked expectations that he would be the puppet of Moscow and the Eastern Ukrainian elite. He pushed for closer ties with the West, rebuffed Russian efforts to strengthen the CIS, held firm on maintaining Crimea in Ukraine, lobbied for a radical economic reform programme, and flip-flopped on his policy of adopting two official languages. As Kravchuk had before him, he became, as head of state, the defender of all things Ukrainian. And as with Kravchuk, he endeared himself to the Ukrainian nationalists and his popularity in the western regions of the country soared…[199]

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[196] Paul Kubicek, "What Happened to the Nationalists in Ukraine, *Nationalism and Ethnic Policies* Vol:5; No:1 Spring 1999, pp.29-46

[197] Ibid., pp.29-46.

[198] However, it will seen in the next presidency elections that the legal arrangements in the law is not reflect who the majority of the population want to elect, but it reflects who the majority do not want to elect in the second round. See: Paul Kubicek, "What Happened to the Nationalists in Ukraine, *Nationalism and Ethnic Policies* Vol:5; No:1 Spring 1999, pp.29-46

[199] Paul Kubicek, "What Happened to the Nationalists in Ukraine," *Nationalism and Ethnic Policies* Vol:5; No:1 Spring 1999, pp.29-46

Kuchma was weak on implementing reforms related to democratisation, partly because of the rapid circulation of the cabinet of ministers. In such transition states, the lack of politic tradition in the pre-communist period, and the lack of consensus culture in the communist period results at this rapid circulation of the cadres within the governmental body who are not keen on the head of the state. Thus, rapid circulation of the cabinet of ministers resulted in the half finished implementation of the reforms for the transformation. However, this does not mean that the replacement of the head of the government which is also one of the main actors in a system of authoritarian rule. The replacement of the head of government, therefore, in many cases could be done only by revolutions, even in some cases flower or coloured revolutions.

Another reason for the coloured revolutions is a candidate or the head of the government applying illegal methods for the elimination of another candidate, such as the poisoning of Victor Yushchenko. Nevertheless, it was not the first instance of Ukraine. For example, Vyacheslav Chornovil registered a new breakaway faction following his replacement as chairperson of Rukh in March 1999, but he was killed in a car accident one month later. Seven months later, Nataliya Vitrenko, the candidate of the Progressive Socialist party in the presidential election 1999, was injured by a grenade attack during a regional campaign meeting in Southern Ukraine. After that, Vitrenko's ratings also increased, while Moroz's rating declined; because the assailants were members of his local campaign team and held criminal records.[200]

4.3. The 1999 Presidential Elections

On the eve of the 1999 elections, Wilson stressed two approaches that divided society into two poles: The pessimistic and the optimistic approaches to the future of the state. From his point of view, "the pessimists might also point out that civil society remains weak, the wealth and economic power are not sufficiently dispersed to create a true polyarchy."[201] Although he did not mention the optimistic point of

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[200] Taras Kuzio, "To Europe with Russia, Ukraine's 'Little Russian' Foreign Policy (2 June 2002) [Online]. Available: http://zeus.hri.org/news/balkans/ rferl/2002/02-06-04.rferl.html. [Accessed: 2 July 2005]

[201] Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians. Unexpected Nation.* New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2000. p.199

view in Ukraine, it could not be much more than the belief in the need to view the brilliant future in the Europe.[202] However, the foreign policy was not an important item of the agendas of the candidates on the eve of the presidential elections of 1999, the success of the multi vectorism policy persuaded by Kuchma is subjected to a debate on the eve of the presidential elections. The parliament was composed of two camps: the pro-Kuchma oligarchic centrist factions who backed the "Ukrainian Third Way" and the anti-Kuchma factions supporting a transparent, pro-Western reform process.

In addition to establishing a large election bloc, Kuchma, in his election campaign, determined three areas to focus on. First, he targeted oligarchs, such as former Prime Minister Pavel Lazerenko less for his corruption than willingness to back opponents. Second, he coerced government and regional elites into supporting him in order to prevent a repetition of the defeat of the incumbent in the summer 1994 elections. Finally, independent media outlets were put under pressure; either being closed or bought out by supporters of Kuchma. According to many scholars, Kuchma's game plan was similar to the Russian 1996 presidential election.[203] Kuzio claims that Kuchma acted as the leader of the reformist side by accusing all other candidates on the left of being a threat to both the reform process and an independent Ukraine.[204]

Different from 1994 election, Ukrainian independence was no longer an issue. Kuchma gave attention to the language issue, which had been important in 1994. Nevertheless, Kuchma did not keep his words on the elevation of Russian as the second state language in his first period in the office; therefore, his promises on the language issue were not perceived as something, different from usual promises in an election campaign, and statehood had not been subjected to a debate for a long time. In the 1999 elections Kuchma pursued a negative campaign against his leftist

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[202] Taras Kuzio, "To Europe with Russia, Ukraine's 'Little Russian' Foreign Policy (2 June 2002) [Online]. Available: http://zeus.hri.org/news/balkans/ rferl/2002/02-06-04.rferl.html. [Accessed: 2 July 2005]

[203] Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians. Unexpected Nation*. New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2000.p. 200.

[204] Taras Kuzio, "To Europe with Russia, Ukraine's 'Little Russian' Foreign Policy (2 June 2002) [Online]. Available: http://zeus.hri.org/news/balkans/rferl/2002/02-06-04.rferl.html. [Accessed: 2 July 2005]

opponents. His election programme called for more state capacity, the rule of law, a reduction in taxes, the stimulation of the private sector, social welfare, and a balanced budget. During his election campaign, Kuchma promised to continue and speed up economic reforms, complete administrative reforms, introduce a bicameral parliament in order to dilute leftist control over parliament, increase regional devolution, move to a professional army, create one million new jobs, pay wage and pension arrears, and maintain Ukraine's non-alignment in his electorate campaign. He declared his intention to press for the formation of a new majority in parliament.[205]

The basis for the change in the policy is the adoption of a new constitution in June 1996, since he prepared it to face re-election. The provision in the 1996 constitution is well designed to protect him against the constant campaigning for early elections that had plagued Kravchuk.[206] Nevertheless, it was a compromise document. Conflict continued between the executive body and the Rada whose leadership continued to be dominated by the left until parliamentary elections in 2000. It is noteworthy to add that Russian-Ukrainian relations played less of a role in the October-November presidential 1999 elections than they had in the June-July 1994 elections because Russia was less an acute question after the State Duma and Federation Council ratified the Ukrainian-Russian treaty. Keen on Russia playing a lesser role, Kuzio found a different argument. According to his point of view, the left could not use the Russia factor in the 1999 elections because the Russian executive backed Kuchma. Yeltsin and his entourage had no wish for a leftist victory in Ukraine on the eve of Russian parliamentary elections in December 1999, which would have boosted the chances of Russian communists.[207]

While the Ukrainian-Russian relations played a less important role in the campaigns, EU membership played a key role on the eve of the Presidential elections. Seven out of thirteen candidates backed the continuation of Ukraine's vaguely defined multi-vector, non-bloc, active neutrality foreign policy. When the election

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[205] Ibid.

[206] Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians. Unexpected Nation*. New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2000. p.200.

[207] Taras Kuzio, "To Europe with Russia, Ukraine's 'Little Russian' Foreign Policy (2 June 2002) [Online]. Available: http://zeus.hri.org/news/balkans/rferl/2002/02-06-04.rferl.html. [Accessed: 2 July 2005]

campaigns of thirteen candidates[208] were compared, it is seen that admission to NATO and the EU was not likely in the near future and only three candidates, Kostenko, Udovenko and Onopenko mentioned this policy goal in a serious matter. Three of the candidates (Udovenko and Kostenko from Rukh and Onopenko from The Social Democrats) were the only ones to advocate a radical pro-Western orientation, but they all came in low in the polls. At the end of the spectrum the other, Symonenko, (Leader of the Communists), Vitrenko (head of the Progressive Socialists) and Oleksandr Bazyliuk, (Head of the tiny Slavic Unity Party) advocated Ukraine's membership in the Russian-Belarusian Union and even a revived USSR.[209] Among these three, Vitrenko and Symonenko always followed Kuchma with 14-27 per cent and 10-15 per cent while Kuchma led in the polls with 16-34 per cent. Moroz, leader of the Socialist Party, and Marchuk, leader of the tiny Social Democratic Union, held fourth and fifth places.[210]

According to results of the first round (see Table 4.1), none of the thirteen candidates achieved an overall majority. Kuchma won 36.5 per cent of the votes cast, while Communist candidate Petro Symonenko obtained 22.2 per cent. Thus, the second round of the elections gave voters a clear choice between the anti-communist Kuchma and the communist Symonenko. (see Table 4.2)

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[208] "Results of the 1999 Presidential Elections in Ukraine" [Online]. Available: http://www.electi onworld.org/ukraine.htm [Accessed 11.September.2003]

[209] See: "The Election Program of the Candidates on the eve of the 1999 Parliamentary Elections" [Online] Available: http://www. infoukes.com.elect1999%Ukr.html. [Accessed: 14 March 2004.]

[210] Taras Kuzio, "To Europe with Russia, Ukraine's 'Little Russian' Foreign Policy (2 June 2002) [Online]. Available: http://zeus.hri.org/news/balkans/ rferl/2002/02-06-04.rferl.html. [Accessed: 2 July 2005]

Table 4.1

Results of the 1999 Presidential Elections

Candidate	Party or Bloc	Result %
Leonid Kuchma	Zlahoda	36.49
Petro Symonenko	Communist	22.4
Oleksandr Moroz	Socialist	11.29
Natalia Vitrenko	Progressive Socialist	10.97
Yevhen Marchuk	Social Democratic Union	8.13
Yuriy Kostenko	Rukh	2.17
Hennadiy Udovenko	Rukh	1.22
Vasyl Onopenko	Social Democratic	0.47
Oleksandr Rzhavskyi	One Family	0.37
Yuriy Karamzin	Fatherland	0.35
Vitaliy Kononov	Greens	0.29
Oleksandr Bazyliuk	Slavic Unity	0.14
Mykola Haber	Patriotic	0.12

Source: "Results of the 1999 Presidential Elections in Ukraine" [Online].

Available: http://www.electionworld.org/ukraine.htm [Accessed 11.September.2003]

Table 4.2

Runoff Results of the 1999 Presidential Elections

Candiadate	Party or Bloc	Result %
Leonid Kuchma	Zlahoda	56.18
Petro Symonenko	Communist	37.49

Source: "Results of the 1999 Presidential Elections in Ukraine" [Online].

Available: http://www.electionworld.org/ukraine.htm [Accessed 11.September.2003]

Before the second round, Symonenko issued an appeal backed by six other leftist candidates and promised the rule of law and voluntary renunciation of some presidential power.[211] Nevertheless, even on the possibility of left unity, it was impossible for Symonenko to be elected since the combined leftist votes were decreasing in direct proportion to the time of the USSR's collapse to the beginning of independence. The maximum leftist vote in both the March 1994 and the March 1998

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[211] Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians. Unexpected Nation*. New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2000. pp. 203-204.

parliamentary elections had never gone above 40 per cent. Five leftist candidates only increased this percentage by another five to nearly 45 per cent.[212] However, Symonenko's vote reduced to 37.5 per cent from the combined leftist vote in the first round of 45 per cent since many moderate voters who had backed leftist candidates in the first round backed Kuchma in the second by accepting him better than the worst.

According to the information provided at two roundtables of Ukrainian sociologists, which was organised by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation after the first round of the 1999 presidential elections, over 40 per cent of the electorates who voted for Kuchma intended to vote for him as the lesser evil.[213] Similarly a large proportion of the votes given to Kuchma were in reality more votes against Symonenko rather than in support of Kuchma. While winning in 15 of Ukraine's 28 administrative regions in the first round, Kuchma won in 13 in the second. Symonenko won in 8 regions.[214] Moreover, the second round of the presidential elections had pointed to an urban-rural divide in Ukraine with Communist leader Symonenko obtaining his major support from rural central Ukraine. Here, it is noteworthy to mention that the urban-rural divide meant that the rural areas of Ukraine were more conservative than the rural arenas. This meant that the willingness to accelerate the political transformation was more obvious in the urban areas.

4.4. Political Transformation in Kuchma's Second Term

Concerned that "the common Soviet heritage has led to similar patterns in the exercise of power emerging in two states,"[215] Wilson expresses his thoughts, as "Ukraine may be even more prone to the authoritarian rule of the former Soviet bureaucratic elite." Nevertheless, Kuchma surprised him, by appointing Viktor Yushchenko as the new prime minister, after a short-term reappointment of

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[212] "Results of the 1999 Presidential Elections in Ukraine" [Online].Available:http://www.electionworld.org/ukraine.htm [Accessed 11.September.2003]

[213] Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians. Unexpected Nation*. New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2000. p.204

[214] Taras Kuzio, "To Europe with Russia, Ukraine's 'Little Russian' Foreign Policy (2 June 2002) [Online]. Available: http://zeus.hri.org/news/balkans/rferl/2002/02-06-04.rferl.html. [Accessed: 2 July 2005]

[215] Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians. Unexpected Nation*. New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2000. p.199

Pustovoitenko who was the former prime minister on the eve of elections 1999.[216] Within this framework, what drove Kuchma to appoint Yushchenko to the post, was the 1998 economic crisis in Russia, which influenced Ukraine's economy dramatically. As Yushchenko would serve as a good example reflecting the reformist vision of the new government, he was a role model. Thus, international institutions could grant Ukraine structural and financial aid thanks to Yushchenko's prime ministry.

Although the leftist majority within the Rada was in conflict with the president and stalled an already faltering reform programme, Yushchenko's reformist point of view was supported by Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, who was attempting to take measures to prevent the theft of Russian gas in order to clean up the energy sector and to reduce Ukraine's debt for Russian energy supplies in order to hold open tenders for the privatization of gas distribution companies. Finally, Kuchma and Yushchenko were able to implement their reform pocket.[217] In accordance with the new reform pocket, Kuchma signed three decrees aimed at reducing and streamlining the Cabinet of Ministers on December 14, 1999.[218] On March 22, Kuchma played an important role in the promulgation of the law, which abolished the death penalty The reform pocket seemed to address its purpose,[219] for the IMF, and World Bank emitted good signals by praising Yushchenko's success on implementing the reform programme; nevertheless, the financial and structural aid from international financial institutions were suspended, after a disinformation campaign against Yushchenko.[220]

In the political conjuncture, Kuchma planned to hold a referendum on six questions on 16 April 2000. Although President Kuchma claimed that the referendum was required to enable him to speed up reforms, the referendum was particularly attacked by the left and the Communist Party who called for an additional referendum

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[216] Ibid.

[217] Taras Kuzio, "Analysis Ukraine's Little Russian Foreign Policy Proclaims to Europe with Russia". [Online] .Available: http://www.ukrweekly.com/archive/2002/250204.Shtml. [Accessed: 4 July 2005]

[218] Taras Kuzio, "End Note: Who's Behind KuchmaGate?" *Radio Free Europe*/Radio Liberty, RFL/Rl Newsline (7 December 2000)

[219] Ibid.

[220] Ibid.

to abolish the presidency. The right, such as Rukh factions, were also sceptical of the referendum fearing that regional councils in Eastern Ukraine would add additional questions. Although the Constitutional Court announced that two of the six questions were unconstitutional, the referendum was finally held on 16 April 2000. The referendum results would have provided an ambiguous outcome that would lead to greater executive power and a reduction in parliamentary influence. Coupled with the decline in independent media, Ukraine would have been set to move into an authoritarian era. After the referendum, the growing dissatisfaction and the distrust of Kuchma started to be visible not only in the Rada, but also in the society. In late 2000, opponents and students started to organise via the internet since there was the strict censorship over media and the freedom of speech as well as distribution of information.

Despite the censorship the opposition against Kuchma was supported more people. But, Kuchma could not implement the referendum results not for being criticised, but for a political crisis in which he involved. Nevertheless, he did not abandon implementing the referendum results, and he increasingly threatened to introduce the referendum results by decree. For the first time in Ukraine's political history, Ukraine's centre-left and centre-right allied against the oligarchic centre in spring 2000[221] though the Communists remained ambivalent about joining the anti-Kuchma camp. Apart from the referendum results, Kuchmagate, which came to the agenda of the parliament, was the leading factor uniting the centre-right and centre-left of the Rada.

It was sensed that Ukraine was heading for a standoff between parliament and the executive, which was not likely to be resolved peacefully. Indeed, a new law on Temporary Investigative and Special Commissions of the Parliament, which opened the way for Kuchma's impeachment, was passed in this year, even though it was not passed more than a year from the break-out of the political scandal Kuchmagate. On

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[221] Taras Kuzio, "Kuchmagate Continues to Dominate Ukrainian Politics" Jamestown Journal, Vol.7, No.1, (2001).

April 30, 2001, the Ukrainian parliament passed a no confidence motion in the government of Viktor Yushchenko. [222]

After his replacement, Yushchenko and his party, Our Ukraine, joined the opposition bloc headed by Tymoshenko after the abduction of a Ukrainian journalist, Heorhiy Gongadze. At that time, the opposition movement was accepted as the Ukrainian Velvet Revolution, since both wings in the parliament, other opposition parties who were not eligible to take seats in the Parliament, and the youth organisations, especially university students supported the movement. The opposition replaced the Kuchma cadre three years later.

Three actors of the revolution -Tymoshenko, Yushchenko and the youth organisations- started to attract more supporters. Many forums began to take place in Ukraine. For an instance, Our Ukraine, KPU, the Socialists, and the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc were able to coordinate mass protests calling for early presidential elections on 16 September, the eve of the second anniversary of opposition journalist Heorhiy Gongadze's abduction It was the first time that four-opposition groups organised a mass mobilisation despite Kuchma's pressure. Meanwhile, Yushchenko wrote his most critical open letter to date to Kuchma on 29 August.[223] However, Kuchma did not pay any attention to the letter, which emphasised the leading role of Yushchenko and his capacity to transform the Ukrainian Velvet Revolution into the Orange Revolution.

On the eve of parliamentary elections, opposition groups signalled that they would dominate the parliament after the parliamentary elections 2002. Kuzio notes that Kuchma and his supporters would no longer be active in the political scene, if the elections were held without fraud. Nevertheless, two-thirds of Ukrainians did not believe that the authorities would ensure a free and fair election on the eve of parliamentary elections in 2002.[224] Indeed another finding of the same poll conducted

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[222] Taras Kuzio, "The Curtain Falls on Reform efforts to Eliminate Corruption Suffered: A Serious Blow Last Week with the Ouster of Viktor Yushchenko," *Radio Free Europe*, Radio Liberty. Rfe/Rl Reports (30 April 2001.)

[223] Taras Kuzio, "Kuchmagate Continues to Dominate Ukrainian Politics" Jamestown Journal, Vol.7, No.1, (2001).

[224] Taras Kuzio, "End Note Ukraine Debates The Role Of Civil Society" *Radio Free Europe*/Radio Liberty, Rfe/Rl Newsline Vol. 6, No. 31, (15 February 2002)

by international organisations indicated that half of the polled did not believe that the regime was a democracy.[225] The Voter's Committee of Ukraine reported that three-quarters of election irregularities in October 2002 were undertaken by the pro-Kuchma party For a United Ukraine (ZYU).[226]

On 21 November, the opposition factions gained more seats than the previous parliamentary elections, but pro-presidential factions still had enough seats to support Kuchma. Two hundred thirty four deputies comprising the pro-presidential parliamentary majority from the eight factions that grew out of the For a United Ukraine (ZYU) election bloc and the Social Democratic-united party (SDPU-o) voted to support President Leonid Kuchma's candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, as Ukraine's 10th prime minister.[227] As soon as he was appointed, Yanukovych issued his programme based upon a model that he brought from Donbas, which was of a socially regulated market economy combined with political authoritarianism.[228] This model, according to Freedom House's annual report "Nations in Transit," has become the political norm in the Commonwealth of Independent States, including in Russia.[229] Ukrainian scholars termed Yanukovych's Donbas model, which he would wish to apply to the remainder of Ukraine, as Ukraine's Belarusianisation. According to a sceptical point of view, Yanukovych's appointment would also affect two other key areas. First, the new prime minister supported the transformation of the parliament into a bicameral institution where the upper house would be composed of regional representatives.[230] This issue was not incorporated in the 1996 constitution

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[225] Taras Kuzio, "End Note Ukraine Debates The Role Of Civil Society" *Radio Free Europe*/Radio Liberty, Rfe/Rl Newsline Vol. 6, No. 31, (15 February 2002)

[226] Ibid.

[227] See: "Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, official web page" [Online] Available: http://gska 2.rada.gov .ua/contro l/en/index . [Accessed 15 July 2005].

[228] Taras Kuzio, "Kuchma Replaces Prime Minister and Appoints A Possible Successor". *Radio Free Europe*/Radio Liberty, Rfe/Rl Report Vol 4, No 45 (26 November 2002)

[229] "Nations in Transit" [Online] Available: http://www.freedomhouse.org/nationstranstit_Ukraine0 05.6.htm. [Accessed: 19 July 2005]

[230] Taras Kuzio, "Kuchma Replaces Prime Minister and Appoints A Possible Successor". *Radio Free Europe*/Radio Liberty, Rfe/Rl Report Vol 4, No 45 (26 November 2002)

but was raised in the April 2000 constitutional referendum. Second, Yanukovych would have been pressed into elevating Russian a second official language.[231]

After the parliamentary elections in 2002, Kuchma announced his intention to reform which would reflect the change in his policies and his attitude towards the state apparatus and institutions,[232] by backing opposition calling for a fully proportional election law, Although, he had always supported a presidential system modelled on Russia's and had opposed a law on proportional elections. Moreover, he vetoed such a law five times during last years by defining the society as insufficiently mature and parties as inadequately developed.[233] Thus, Kuchma's U turn could only be a political manoeuvre in accordance with the new political conjuncture in Ukraine since many mass demonstrations organised by the opponents emphasised upon society's inconvenience with his performance.

Kuchma's popularity rating had never decreased to such a low level. It was a difficult task for Kuchma to increase his popularity ratings at either national or international level, while his rival Yushchenko's popularity ratings increased up to 25-30 in these years.[234] This percentage was far higher than any pro-Kuchma oligarch could obtain, but the percentage was insufficient for the success in the presidential election. Ukraine's regional and linguistic divisions had a negative impact on any chance of increasing Yushchenko's popularity in eastern Ukraine, but in contrast, positive in western parts of the country, because of the regional polarisation.

In fact, the society remained indifferent to the political crises between Kuchma and the Parliament. While, people voted in favour of Kuchma's proposal in the 2000 referendum, Kuchma thought that he would be backed by society and threatened the Parliament that he could apply a nation wide referendum on the condition that they refused the reform[235] when submitting draft political reforms to

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[231] Ibid.

[232] Taras Kuzio, "End Note Can Glasnost Save President Kuchma And His Regime?" *Radio Free Europe*/ Radio Liberty Rfe/Rl Newsline (30 August 2002)

[233] Ibid.

[234] Taras Kuzio, "Kuchma Replaces Prime Minister and Appoints A Possible Successor". *Radio Free Europe*/Radio Liberty, Rfe/Rl Report Vol 4, No 45 (26 November 2002)

[235] Taras Kuzio, "End Note Back to the USSR? Ukraine Holds Soviet-Style Discussion Of Political Reform" *Radio Free Europe*/Radio Liberty, Rfl/Rl Vol. 7, No. 80, (28 April 2003)

Parliament, on March 6, 2003. Nevertheless, this time, problems between the pro-reformist majority and the pro-Kuchma camp seemed not to be overcome by such proposals of Kuchma.[236] The system needed to be reformed. According to findings of an opinion poll conducted in the same month trust in Kuchma had been ranked at the lowest level that he had ever had since he first came to power, implying that Kuchma's popularity was at an all time low, hovering at 5-8 percent.[237] Similarly, according to findings of a November-December poll conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Fund, 55 percent of Ukrainians distrusted Kuchma, while three-quarters wanted to see him step down early.[238]

4.5. Problems of Political Transformation during the Kuchma Era

Political transformation proceeds from stateness. The second precondition of the process is the creation of democratic institutions[239] for democratic consolidation. The third and most important variable is the need for free and organised civil society. In Ukraine it is seen that civil consciousness started to be visible as a reaction to the problems of the democratic consolidation and the problems of the stateness.

Democratic consolidation requires all significant actors, especially governments and state institutions, to respect and to uphold the rule of law. It also entails a relatively strong consensus about the constitution, an independent judicial system, a clear sense of the hierarchy of laws, a strong legal culture, and a commitment to not changing the laws unless so favoured by a large majority of

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[236] Ibid.

[237] Ibid.

[238] Taras Kuzio, "End Note Will Political Reform Lead Ukraine out of Crisis?". *Radio Free Europe*, Radio Liberty. Rfe/Rl Newsline Vol. 7, No. 52, (19 March 2003).

[239] Linz and Stephan discovered five variables that are important for the fate of the political transformation. The first is the persistence through time of a stable territorial state with an effective bureaucracy. Second, democratic consolidation requires all significant actors, especially governments and state institutions, to respect and to uphold the rule of law. Thirdly, a free and lively civil society. Fourthly, political society fifth and final condition of democratic consolidation is an institutionalized economic society. See Juan Linz, and Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press (1996). pp. 37-61

voters.[240] From this point on, after the adoption of the Ukrainian Constitution in 1996, the stateness problem was partly solved. However, in the Kuchma era, several interruptions of the political transformation impeded the democratic consolidation. Apart from the common problems of the transformation process, the *sui generis* problems emerged as obstacles against the transformation management. For example the external challenger to the political transformation was Russian-Ukrainian relations, since the instability of bilateral relations left a small room for Kravchuk's manoeuvre capability in the international arena. Moreover, the heterogeneity of the population in favour of the Russians and Russophiles, and the problems in Crimea weakened Kravchuk's reform policies related to nation-building. However, Kuchma was able to sign a treaty with Russia in 1997, but he could not accelerate the transformation process, since new more complicated and serious problems arose which interrupted the process.

In such a conjuncture, it is hard to manage the transformation. Thus the prime ministers during the Kuchma era were not able to implement their reform pockets. The emergence of the post-Soviet oligarchy was another obstacle against the transformation. The Donbas elite emerged and started to dominate the politics in the Kuchma Era. The lack of a political tradition and a culture of consensus, Ukraine experienced three turning points during Kuchma's ten year presidency. The first surprise was Kuchma's multi-vectorism which he released as soon as he became president. The second turning point was his appointing Viktor Yushchenko as Prime Minister as soon as his re-election in the 1999 presidential elections. The third performance was his proposal to limit presidential powers in favour of the prime minister, soon after the parliamentary elections were held in 2002; however, he had vetoed this proposal five times before. Thus, he changed his mind soon after the three elections in each time. For this reason, he could be defined as pragmatist.

Among other factors, two crises interrupted the political transformation in Ukraine. First, the referendum crisis in 2000, which created a feeling of mistrust in Kuchma polices and ended in great reaction to Kuchma in 2003. Second, an opponent journalist's death ended in a political crisis, which was later termed as KuchmaGate.

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[240] Juan Linz, and Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press (1996). pp. 37-61

As a result of these two crises, an organised civil society emerged within Ukraine. The first reactions against Kuchma were organised as a movement "Ukraine without Kuchma". It was clear that Kuchma lost most of his popularity at the end of his second and last term of his presidency. However, he was able to solve two problems left behind by Kravchuk: the introduction of the Ukrainian Constitution in 1996 and he was able to sign a treaty with Russian Federation. The new problems arose. The Referendum Crisis in 2000, Kuchmagate and media censorship emerged as the problems of the political transformation under Kuchma.

To start with, the referendum crisis is related to the preamble of the Ukrainian Constitution of June 1996. The preamble refers to the declaration of independence in August 1991, and the preamble also refers the referendum on independence on December 1991 as guiding the Ukrainian state because, Ukraine decelerated its independence legally based on the results of the referendum on independence in 1991. While Kuchma demanded a referendum in 2000, Ukraine experienced one the most serious challenges to transformation, because this referendum was related to redistribution of the power between the Parliament and the president. When the items that put into the referendum agenda are analysed, it is understood that Kuchma intended to control the Parliament, because he was sceptical of the pre-reform majority within the Parliament.

After Kuchma's second election to office, a pro-reform majority within the parliament started to organise, reformist factions announced that the creation of a pro-reform majority with the aim of speeding up reforms and harmonising relations between the Parliament and executive. They also began to collect the necessary one hundred fifty signatures to place on the Parliament agenda the task of replacing the three top positions of Parliament.[241] This group was able to collect three and half million signatures over the course of only two weeks in late December 1999 to early January 2000.[242] The political conjuncture resembled the eve of a velvet revolution.

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[241] Taras Kuzio, Ukraine "After the Elections: Domestic and Foreign Policy Orientations in Kuchma's Second Term" [Online] Available: http://www.taraskuzio.net/lectures/kuchmaer.pdf [Accessed: 2 July 2005]

[242] Taras Kuzio, "End Note Back to the USSR? Ukraine Holds Soviet-Style Discussion of Political Reform" *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,* Vol. 7, No. 80, (28 April 2003)

Kuchma therefore planned to hold a referendum on 16 April in order to extend his powers. Six items were put into the referendum agenda:

> No confidence in the Rada and changes to the constitution to enable the President to dissolve it if it adopts a motion of no-confidence,
>
> The dissolution of the Rada if it fails to form a majority within one month or pass the budget within 3 months,
>
> Abolition of deputies' immunity
>
> Reduction in the number of deputies from 450 to 300,
>
> The creation of a bicameral Rada
>
> The adoption of the June 1996 constitution by popular referendum.[243]

The first two questions in the referendum were proposed to create a higher control mechanism for the president over the Rada. The questions advocates for the creation of a pro-presidential majority in the Rada, indicates minimisation of the Rada's control over presidential decrees, and eliminates the Rada's right to question presidential decisions. The third question, compared with the others, seems to be less harmful to a good working government. The removal of parliamentary immunity from deputies may be a popular decision because many individuals with criminal backgrounds were indeed hiding behind their immunity. The fourth question is that Ukraine would have proportionately a very low number of deputies. The fifth question was the most confusing question to understand. The fifth question was related to the creation of a second parliamentary chamber. Kuchma's proposal, however, offered a legislative structure similar to Russia's. The proposed Ukrainian upper chamber would consist of unelected regional governors who would be Kuchma appointees, unlike in Russia.[244] This pro-presidential second house, coupled with a shrunken lower one, would greatly reduce the effectiveness of parliament as a counterweight to the executive.

The last question impeded people to vote against the adoption of these six questions. The final question was related to whether or not the legality of the constitution could be questioned. Such a question could launch another political crisis

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[243] Taras Kuzio, Ukraine "After the Elections: Domestic and Foreign Policy Orientations in Kuchma's Second Term" [Online] Available: http://www.taraskuzio.net/lectures/kuchmaer.pdf [Accessed: 2 July 2005]

[244] Ibid.

in Ukraine. Moreover, Kuchma could have proposed a sixth question as a political manoeuvre. It is clear that, if most of the voters voted in favour of Kuchma, Kuchma would have had power over Rada as he wanted. On the condition that less that 50 per cent of the voters interested in the referendum, the referendum results were invalid according the constitution 1996. Yet this result could have caused a legitimacy crisis, and could have resulted in a proposal of a new constitution, which could give similar rights to the presidency.

Recognising that the executive has no right to dissolve the Rada or change the constitution by referendum, the Constitutional Court declared two of the six questions illegal. Those were the questions which received the greatest degree of criticism from the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe welcomed the decision of the Constitutional Court, but its legal advisory body, the Venice Commission, believed the remaining four questions violated its principles and that the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly would still go ahead and vote to suspend Ukraine.[245] Nevertheless, Kuchma refused to drop the four remaining questions or declare that the results would be non-binding. The Council of Europe had feared that if these questions had remained, Kuchma would have been able to establish an authoritarian regime in the same manner as after a similar referendum in Belarus in 1996.

The referendum was finally held at its scheduled time on 16 April 2000,[246] resulting in approximately 80 per cent support for each of four questions. Nevertheless, Kuchma could not implement the results of the April 2000 referendum, which would turn Ukraine into a presidential republic and give Kuchma unlimited powers. When Kuchma threatened to introduce the referendum results by decree, Kuchmagate strengthened the opposition party, and Kuchma could not attempt to implement the referendum results spontaneously or even by decree.

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[245] Ibid.

[246] 84.78 per cent voted in favour of the right of the president to dissolve parliament if it fails to pass a budget within one or create a majority within three months. 89.06 per cent supported the withdrawal of immunity from parliamentary deputies. Another 89.97 per cent supported the reduction of the number of deputies from its current number of 450 to 300. The fourth, and most controversial, on introducing a second parliamentary chamber, was backed by 81.81 per cent. The highest turnouts were reportedly in Western Ukraine and the lowest in Sevastopol. Some 81 per cent of the electorate participated in the referendum on constitutional change, of which 85 per cent were in favour of the dissolution of Supreme Council for non approval of the budget within three months of its submission. See: Taras Kuzio, Ukraine "After the Elections: Domestic and Foreign Policy Orientations in Kuchma's Second Term" [Online] Available: http://www.taraskuzio.net/lectures/kuchmaer.pdf [Accessed: 2 July 2005]

Kuchmagate broke out when Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz, revealed that he had listened a recording of conversations conducted among Kuchma, head of the presidential administration and Internal Affairs Minister.[247] During those conversations, the officials discussed how to get rid of editor of Ukrayinska Pravda, Heorhiy Gongadze.[248] On 16 September 2000, Gongadze went missing on his way home in Kiev, and in early November 2000 in a village of Kiev, a farmer found a decapitated and mutilated body believed to be that of Gongadze.[249] According to tape records Kuchma seemed to be involved in the assassination of Gongadze. Moreover the tape records contained other discussions of many illegal acts, including undeclared sales of weapons abroad, reducing powers to parliament, as well as persecution of independent journalists.[250] However, Ukraine's media stayed indifference to the suspicious death of Gongadze because of media censorship. European media paid more attention than the media organs in Ukraine.[251]

Kuchma refused to discuss the allegations of the murder of Gongadze and the tape recordings; nevertheless, he neither admitted to nor denied his voice being on the tapes. Demonstrations started in December 2000. Moreover, the lists of accusations were alleged to be prolonged.[252] For this reason, the demonstrations against Kuchma started to resemble to those organised by hunger-striking students in the late perestroika years in central Kiev. A joint appeal by seventeen former Soviet Ukrainian prisoners of conscience and political activists, entitled "Do We Need to

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[247] Taras Kuzio, "End Note: Who's Behind KuchmaGate?" *Radio Free Europe*/Radio Liberty, RFL /Rl Newsline (7 December 2000)

[248] Ibid.

[249] Ibid.

[250] Taras Kuzio, "End Note Ukraine One Year after Kuchmagate". *Radio Free Europe*/Radio Liberty, Rfe/Rl Newsline Vol. 5, No. 224, (28 November 2001)

[251] Kuchmagate has been reported by The New York Times, on December 6;2000. Wall Street Journal, on December 8; 2000. Christian Science Monitor, on December 12; 2000. Financial Times, on December 13; 2000. The Independent, on December 14; 2000. The Daily Telegraph, on December 15; 2000. The Guardian, on December 15; 2000. Washington Post, on December 21 and 26; 2000. and Los Angeles Times, on December 26, 2000.

[252] Anders Aslund "The National Interest"; (22 September 2003); [Online]. Available: http://www.high beam.com/library/doc0.asp?DOCID=1G1:109220706&refid=ip_almanac_hf [Accessed: 14 July 2005]

Start All over Again?" summed up the prevailing mood.[253] The demonstrators experienced in managing the crowds in these demonstrations. When the Orange Revolution broke out, they easily organised the movement. On the other hand, Ukraine's centre-left and centre-right allied against the oligarchic centre for the first time in Ukraine's political history; however, the Communists remained ambivalent about joining the anti-Kuchma camp, because the Communist waited for reaction of Kuchma. If Kuchma's policy orientation had shifted to leftist side, they would have supported Kuchma.

The parliamentary majority was destroyed in the spring of 2000. A Gongadze commission was founded in parliament in order to examine the political murders.[254] Most of the political and civil opponents united for the Ukraine "without Kuchma movement". Soon, the pro-Kuchma party started to organise "Ukraine with Kuchma" meetings.[255] Nevertheless the number of participants of the latter lagged behind the former. The scandal tarnished Kuchma's reputation both domestically and internationally. Kuchmagate strengthened Yushchenko's position when public support for Kuchma was at an all time low. However, Yushchenko refrained from participating in the opposition movement leaded by Tymoshenko. After his dismissal from the prime ministry, he and his party Our Ukraine started to play a leading role, and Kuchma appointed Viktor Yanukovych to the post.

The authorities under Kuchma and Yanukovych arrested many opposition activists and university students. From their point of view, demonstrations against Kuchma equalled being against Ukraine's government. The Radio Frees Europe's (RFE/RL) Ukrainian Service was jammed for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union because it broadcasted extracts from the tapes.[256] The European Union, Council of Europe, and many international non-profit organisations (NGOs) condemned the activity and started to be more interested in what has happening in

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[253] Taras Kuzio, "Kuchmagate Continues to Dominate Ukrainian Politics" Jamestown Journal, Vol.7, No.1, (2001). [Online]. Available: http://www.taraskuzio.net/media/jamestown.pdf .[Accessed: 29 March 2005]

[254] Taras Kuzio, "End Note: Who's Behind KuchmaGate?" *Radio Free Europe*/Radio Liberty, Newsline (7 December 2000)

[255] Ibid.

[256] Taras Kuzio, "End Note Ukraine one Year after Kuchmagate". *Radio Free Europe*/Radio Liberty, Rfe/Rl Newsline Vol. 5, No. 224, (28 November 2001)

Ukraine. However, the officials and Kuchma stressed that this jamming was their internal affair.[257] Yet it was too late to ban the demonstrations. As Kuchma had been discredited as a leader and the institutions in Ukraine were no longer accepted as the ones that people trusted, neither Kuchma's efforts nor precautions taken in order to prevent such movements were useful instruments in order to take measures against ongoing demonstrations.

The main reason for the rapid organisation of masses was that the public trust in Ukrainian institutions and elites had dropped to a degree that had never been so low. The second factor was that the university students, who were born after 1980 and therefore could be titled as post-Soviet generation, had no link with the past and no experience with socialism. They were more nationalistic and identified as more European. On the other hand, young people being the most dynamic parts of the each society, they could mobilise rapidly and organise the rest of the society. The third factor was the alliance between Our Ukraine headed by Yushchenko and National Salvation Front headed by Tymoshenko in order to form a block to contest the March 2000 elections. The unification of the powerful opponents in the same bloc gave them the opportunity to act together and organise more well-attended meetings. The fourth factor was that people were frightened by Kuchma's activities. They feared that Ukraine would be Belarus, unless they did something. They did not want to live in an authoritarian state.

These crises could be defined as temporary problems of the post-Soviet political transformation and were also defined as the factors of the outbreak of the Orange Revolution. Nevertheless, state and nation building remained as a permanent problem of post-Soviet political transformation in Ukraine, since these problems had still remained unsolved during the Kuchma Era. However, Kuchma contributed to one of the leading factors accelerating state and nation building in Ukraine by signing a treaty with the Russian Federation, Ukraine remained as a state still while seeking out its national identity. However, Kuchma's Ukrainian nationalism was far from being ethnicized or intolerant. It was mostly moderate, and was not irritating for many Russians and Russian speaking elites of Eastern and Southern Ukraine.

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[257] Ibid.

4.6. Conclusion

This chapter tried to explain the political transformation and the problems of the political transformation during the Kuchma era while giving attention to Kuchma's polices. During the Kuchma Era, Ukraine dealt with many challenges to its political transformation. As a post-Soviet state, the remnants of the Soviet Union affected the reform process. Moreover, Ukraine's *sui generis* problems, such as regional differences exacerbated the problems in the democratisation process. The cabinet crises were followed by referendum and Kuchmagate. Thus the political transformation during the Kuchma era was interrupted, especially since after the Kuchmagate crisis, both the party in power and the executive were isolated, and Kuchma lost his popularity and never be gained it. As a result of those crises, the problems of the transformation such as the media censorship, the illegal actions of the government, and the *raison de'tat* in Ukraine were visible. As a response to these demonstrations started and were supported by civil society, the centre right parties and the centre left parties in the Rada. After the participation of Yushchenko and his party Our Ukraine, the demonstrations enlarged their scope by means of the quantity and the quality of the supporters. Here, it is noteworthy to mention that the right and the left had united for the first time in Ukrainian history.

To compare with Kravchuk, it is clear that Ukraine's domestic and foreign policies remained without any radical changes in the Kuchma Era. On the issue of Ukraine's capacity to manage the transformation, it could be said that Kuchma remained weaker in the democratisation process either evaluated by indicators of shock or gradual therapy. In addition to the neglected areas, civil society, free media, Kuchma did not produce effective policies for either on state or nation building.

CHAPTER V

THE ORANGE REVOLUTION AND POST-REVOLUTIONARY UKRAINE

5.1. Introduction

It has been difficult to re-construct Soviet institutions in 10 year period in accordance with the transparency and governance and it has been difficult to replace the former institutions by new institutions in order to manage the transformation. For these reasons, many post-Soviet states, which had not a political tradition prior to Soviet period in their history, have held elections not as a free democratic competition of political powers since the dissolution of the USSR.

Moreover elections are accepted as the legitimizing process of ruling elites and their parties of power; however they should be the litmus tests for transformation to democracy, because, it is widely accepted that the level of the democracy in a country could be analysed only after it has experienced at least two democratic elections. Unfortunately, fair elections, similar to the existence of the opposition parties and civil society, are usually postponed to the next coming agenda of the head of states, if there are no compulsions of international organisations. The executive branch and the party of power seek to exercise monopoly control over parliament, civil society, the media, and the economy. Thus there was little room for the rest of the unfinished business of transition management. For this reason, transparency, participatory democracy, governance did not exercise yet in Ukraine. The unfinished business gave rise to civil oppositions and thus the former socialist states experienced revolutions. In many of the examples, the university students organised and led the opposition movement generally termed flower or coloured revolutions.

However, most of the post-Soviet countries are generally accepted as transformation states, their regimes could remain authoritarian or semi-authoritarian. Nevertheless, political transformation is a dynamic and quite open-ended process, thus the process spontaneously requires progress in the transforming areas. Unprecedented reactions could be resulted from the interruption of the process

because the authoritarian and semi authoritarian regimes are vulnerable during the transition period. Nevertheless, the success of the revolution depends upon the performance of the post-revolutionary policies pursued. It is worth to mentioning that it could not be determined whether the country completed the political transformation after experiencing a revolution, even before at least two elections held democratically in the country because political transformation is a dynamic process from authoritarian rule to democracy. For this reason short term explorations could be incomplete.

From this point on, this chapter seeks to explore the Orange Revolution, focusing on the dynamics of the revolution. After examining the factors which affected the outbreak of the Orange Revolution, this chapter analyses the arguments of both parties of the election. However the period focused upon, in this thesis is limited between 1991 and 2004, the new cabinet of ministers and their performance until the dismissal of Tymoshenko is chronologically examined in this chapter.

5.2. The 2004 Presidential Elections

The first opponents of Kuchma were the Communist Party (KPU) and the Socialist Party (SPU) during the period between 1993 and 2001 when KPU again was legalized as a political party.[258] In 2001, Yulia Tymoshenko, leader of the National Salvation Front, participated in the opposition bloc and started to play a leading role in the organisation of the civil society. After parliament issued a no confidence vote in Yushchenko's government in April 2001, Yushchenko's Our Ukraine Party took its part in the opposition bloc. Yushchenko's shift to opposing Kuchma changed the "colour" of the opposition. For the first time in Ukrainian history the right and left wings united in the same group. As a result of the political and civic opposition, the distribution of the seats in the parliament changed when Our Ukraine Party gained half of them in the March 2002 parliamentary elections, marking the first time that the KPU was knocked out of its usual leading position.

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[258] Taras Kuzio, "From Kuchma to Yushchenko Ukraine's Presidential Election and The Orange Revolution" Problems of Post-Communism Vol. 52, No. 2, (2005): pp. 10-20. [Online]. Available: http://orangeukraine.Squarespace.com/kuzio/2 005/3/19/from-kuchma-to-yushchenko.html [Accessed: 14 July 2005]

On the eve of the Presidential elections 2004, it seemed that Yushchenko would be the candidate of the opposition. On Kuchma's side, there was no consensus on a candidate that would be the successor to Kuchma at first. Therefore, some members of Kuchma's team clearly stated the need for Kuchma to run for a third term. According to their point of view, Kuchma's first term should not count as it began two years prior to the adoption of the 1996 constitution, which bans an individual from holding that office for more than two consecutive terms. In December 2003, the Constitutional Court ruled that Kuchma could run again, based on a ruling that his first term (1994-99) had begun before the adoption of the June 1996 constitution and therefore did not count.[259] Nevertheless, Kuchma found no support from the parliament dominated by the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko front. Finally, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych was *de facto* appointed as Kuchma's successor in April 2004.[260] Beyond the 2004 election, it was understood that the situation was more than a presidential pre-election period. It was clear that the results would mark either the end of Kuchma's second term in office or Kuchma's *de facto* third term in the in office by means of a shadow Kuchma government behind Yanukovych's presidency.

According to Kuzio, Yanukovych's image suffered from three shortcomings. First, he had been in prison twice. His criminal past dogged him throughout the campaign.[261] Second, Yanukovych hails from Donetsk, Ukraine's most criminalized region which has a reputation for criminality, brutality, and heavy-handed business tactics. Ukrainians did not want Donetsk methods to be exported to the rest of the country.[262] Third, Yanukovych was not able to attract young voters since most of the university students suffered from his strict policies during the demonstrations against Kuchma. Therefore, younger voters backed Yushchenko whereas Yanukovych, on the

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[259] Taras Kuzio, "From Kuchma to Yushchenko Ukraine's Presidential Election and The Orange Revolution" Problems of Post-Communism Vol. 52, No. 2, (2005): pp. 10-20. [Online]. Available: htt p : //orangeukraine.squarespace.com/kuzio/2005/3 /19/from_kuchma_to_yushchenko.html [Accessed: 14 July 2005]

[260] Ibid.

[261] Ibid.

[262] Ibid.

other hand, attracted uneducated and older voters, especially former communist pensioners attracted by his pre-election pension hike.[263]

Within this political conjuncture, three candidates of four major opposition groups registered for the 2004 elections: Yushchenko, Symonenko, and Moroz. Tymoshenko was the only principal opposition leader who did not run for the elections.[264] The KPU and SPU leaders, Symonenko and Moroz, finished the first round in fourth and third place. On the eve of the run off, Moroz agreed to back Yushchenko in round two. From the very beginning of the election campaigns, it is understood that there were two main rival camps: The pro-Yushchenko camp and the pro-Yanukovych camp. However, these camps were divided into sub-groups; after the first round of the elections, the opponent group to the Yanukovych managed to unite, just as they did during the Kuchmagate crisis.[265] There were three mainstreams constituting the opposition: first was the core opposition, which emerged at the very early stages of Kuchmagate and later gained strength. While the communists drove the second stream, the last could be defined as the socialist line.

The core opposition which formed in time for the 2002 elections consisted of the core opponents who had always been in opposition to the president: Tymoshenko led the National Salvation Front and the SPU had taken their position since Kuchmagate. Yushchenko and the Our Ukraine bloc took their places in this group only after Yushchenko's government was removed in April 2001. Not having joined the Kuchmagate protests in 2000-2001, the second group consisted of the communists and after the second round they divided into two groups, one supported Yushchenko, while the other part supporting Yanukovych. The third party of the opponents was the Socialists. Moroz who was the first to bring the Gongadze issue to the Rada's agenda, was registered as candidate of Socialists. After the second round, Moroz supported the Yushchenko Bloc.

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[263] Taras Kuzio, "From Kuchma to Yushchenko Ukraine's Presidential Election and The Orange Revolution" Problems of Post-Communism Vol. 52, No. 2, (2005): pp. 10-20. [Online]. Available: http://orangeukraine.Squarespace.com/kuzio/2005/3 /19/from-kuchma-to-yushchenko.html [Accessed: 14 July 2005]

[264] Ibid.

[265] Ibid.

Against those opposition groups, Kuchma's candidate Yanukovych started his election campaign. He predicted two issues, first of which he was correct: two candidates would compete in the run off, Yanukovych and Yushchenko. According to their false prediction, Yanukovych would have succeeded in attracting left-wing votes as Kuchma did in the run-off of the 1994 election.[266] But the attempt to repeat this successful strategy failed, not when the KPU refused to endorse either candidate and divided into two camps, but when the SPU backed Yushchenko. Apart from the miscalculations, the dynamics of the Presidential elections were different when compared to the 1999 and 1994 presidential elections in Ukraine.

To begin with the language policy, electorate behaviour in 2004 can be said to be different from the electorate behaviour in 1994. Nevertheless, linguistic issues consistently scored very low in electorates' concerns. Secondly, the priority arenas had changed in 10 year period since the 2004 election, unlike the one in 1994, was not influenced by the conflict between Russophiles and Ukrainophiles. The 2004 election was different in the Eurasian versus Europeanism issue which was the most important dynamic that drove the 1999 election.[267] The issue represented a choice between a return to Soviet communism with Ukraine as a part of revived Soviet Union (Symonenko) and a continuation of post-Soviet reform (Kuchma). The 2004 election was different in that the central issue was no longer statehood but what kind of state Ukraine would be.[268]

The 2004 election, therefore, represented a dilemma between two political cultures: Eurasian Yanukovych and European Yushchenko. Beside these differences between the key arenas, the Kuchma factor was the driving force that led people not to vote for Yanukovych, since Yanukovich's candidacy was perceived as "Kuchma's Unfinished Business."[269] Nonetheless, the election campaigns did not directly affect the results. When Yanukovych's election program is examined, it can be said that

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[266] Taras Kuzio, "From Kuchma to Yushchenko Ukraine's Presidential Election and The Orange Revolution" Problems of Post-Communism Vol. 52, No. 2, (2005): pp. 10-20. [Online]. Available: http://orangeukraine.Squarespace.com/kuzio/2005/3 /19/from-kuchma-to-yushchenko.html [Accessed: 14 July 2005]

[267] Ibid.

[268] Ibid.

[269] Ibid.

Yanukovych's election program included every positive policy. Kuizo stressed that "No politician, Yushchenko included, would ever be able to implement most of Yanukovych's program."[270] Among others, Yanukovych called for upgrading Russian to an official language in his election campaign as Kuchma did in the 1994 campaign. Whether or not Yanukovych were elected, he upgraded Russian is subjected to the debate, because Kuchma ignored this issue after the 1994 election.[271] On the other side, Yushchenko focused on domestic issues, without failing to pay attention to mention his support for EU and NATO membership.[272] Yanukovych took an anti-NATO position as part of his attempt to play the Russian card, but NATO membership had been declared as a government objective in 2002.[273] On the issue of EU membership, he portrayed this goal as unrealistic and only to be pursued as an afterthought to Ukraine's deep integration with the CIS. Nevertheless, Yanukovych's, Eurasian political culture was criticised for being only a way to find a home in the Commonwealth of Independent States.[274]

[270] Taras Kuzio, "From Kuchma to Yushchenko Ukraine's Presidential Election and The Orange Revolution" Problems of Post-Communism Vol. 52, No. 2, (2005): pp. 10-20. [Online]. Available: http://orangeukraine.Squarespace.com/kuzio/2005/3 /19/from-kuchma-to-yushchenko.html [Accessed: 14 July 2005].

[271] Taras Kuzio, "Russian and Ukrainian Authorities Resort to Inter-Ethnic Violence to Block Yushchenko," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* [Online] Available: http://www.jamestown.org/publicatiosdet ails.php volume_id=401& issue_id=3001&article_id=2 368166 [Accessed: 15 July 2005]

[272] See Taras Kuzio, "Deep Contradictions Cloud Yanukovych's Foreign Policy," Eurasia Daily Monitor (November 12, 2004) [Online] Available: http://www.taraskuzio.net/academic/elections_o range_revolution.pdf [Accessed: 15 July 2005]

[273] Richard Holbrooke, "From Tent City to NATO." Washington Post (14 December 2004) [Online] Available: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A623 50-2004 Dec13.html [Accessed: 29 September 2005]

[274] Taras Kuzio, "From Kuchma to Yushchenko Ukraine's Presidential Election and The Orange Revolution" Problems of Post-Communism Vol. 52, No. 2, (2005): pp. 10-20. [Online]. Available: http://orangeukraine.Squarespace.com/kuzio/2 005/ 3/19/from-kuchma-to-yushchenko.html [Accessed: 14 July 2005]

5.3. The Orange Revolution

The first round of Ukraine's presidential election was held on October 31, 2004. As Kuzio wrote, "the election also represented a *de facto* referendum on President Leonid Kuchma's ten years in office, which was marred by political crisis and scandal throughout most of his second term."[275] Yushchenko portrayed the election as a choice between change and a continuation of the status quo.[276] The first round elections were released by the Central Election Commission at the end of ten days which was the maximum duration allowed by law. Meanwhile, the first signs of the mobilisation within the society were signalled; however, little wonder that Ukrainians poured onto the streets after round two.[277]

According to the results there would be a run off between Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko on November 21. Round two was different from round one because the fraud was far more blatant. The Committee of Voters NGO calculated that 2.8 million votes had been falsified in Yanukovych's favour. This was accomplished mainly through abuse of absentee ballots, by massive voting at home.[278] After the run off between Yanukovych and Yushchenko, on November 22, Vladimir Putin congratulated Yanukovych on his victory,[279] two days before the Central Election Commission announced the results on November 24. Giving

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[275] Taras Kuzio, "From Kuchma to Yushchenko Ukraine's Presidential Election and The Orange Revolution" Problems of Post-Communism Vol. 52, No. 2, (2005): pp. 10-20. [Online]. Available: http://orangeukraine.Squarespace.com/kuzio/2 005/ 3/19/from-kuchma-to-yushchenko.html [Accessed: 14 July 2005]

[276] Taras Kuzio, "Is A Free Election Possible in Ukraine?" Eurasia Daily Monitor (July 13, 2004) [Online] Available: http://.www.ualberta.ca/~csp/cas/nletters/nletter_fall_2001.pdf-[Accessed: 27 September 2005].

[277] The scores of thousands of demonstrators who made the Orange Revolution a success were largely apolitical, but they were galvanized into action by the blatant fraud in the November run off. As a typical protestor explained, "This is a first for me. I did not expect it of myself. My patience just ran out." See: Daniel Williams, "Revolutionary Love," [Online] Washington Post (December 9, 2004). Available: http://www.washingtonpost.com.ukraine/revlove.wiiiliams.html.[Accessed: 14 September 2005]

[278] Taras Kuzio," Is A Free Election Possible In Ukraine?" Eurasia Daily Monitor (July 13, 2004) [Online] Available: http://.www.ualberta.ca/~csp/cas/nletters/nlet ter_fall_2001.pdf [Accessed: 27 September 2005].

[279] Olexiy Haran, and Rostyslav Pavlenko, "The Oradoxes of Kuchma's Russian Policy" , Ponars Policy Memo, Vol. 291, No.1 [Online] Available: Oaradoxes of Kuchma's Russian Policy", Ponars Policy Memo, Vol. 291, No.1 [Online] Available: http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars /po licymemos/ pm_0291.pdf .[Accessed: 28 September 2005].

Yanukovych a 3 percent margin of victory, second round results are displayed in the table below.

Table 5.1.

Distribution of the Votes in the Second Round of the 2004 Elections*

Yanukovych	Regions of Ukraine	Yushchenko
49.39%	Total	46.71%
81.99%	Autonomous Republic of Crimea	14.59%
21.14%	Vynnitska Oblast	75.87%
11.86%	Volynska Oblast	85.79%
63.61%	Dnipropetrovska Oblast	29.62%
96.20%	Donetska Oblast	2.03%
35.21%	Zhytomyrska Oblast	60.41%
40.07%	Zakarpatska Oblast	55.00%
70.33%	Zaporizka Oblast	24.13%
5.13%	Ivano-Frankivska Oblast	93.44%
19.98%	Kyivska Oblast	76.27%
43.04%	Kirovohradska Oblast	51.93%
92.72%	Luhanska Oblast	4.76%
6.63%	Lvivska Oblast	91.79%
69.75%	Mykolaivska Oblast	25.17%
67.51%	Odeska Oblast	26.34%
34.50%	Poltavska Oblast	60.86%
20.09%	Rivnenska Oblast	76.63%
26.42%	Sumska Oblast	69.16%
5.17%	Ternopilska Oblast	93.53%
70.25%	Kharkivska Oblast	24.05%
52.20%	Khersonska Oblast	42.12%
24.87%	Khmelnytska Oblast	71.45%
24.10%	Cherkaska Oblast	71.93%
21.73%	Chernivetska Oblast	74.50%
30.01%	Chernihivska Oblast	65.65%
19.93%	City of Kiev	74.69%
88.97%	City of Sevastopol	7.61%

*These results are not official. Number of Electorate: 30,297,195, Percentage of Ballots Counted 99.48%, Number of electorate, that did not support either candidate: 694,024 (2.29%)

Source: "Distribution of the Votes in the Second Round of the 2004 Elections" [Online] Available:http://www.infoukes.com/orange_revolution/election_data/geographic_distribution. [Accessed: 15 July 2005].

According to the results of the second round of the presidential election held in 2004, Viktor Yanukovych won 49 per cent of the total votes cast, while Viktor Yushchenko succeeded to attract 46.71 per cent of the votes. The official results

increased the number of the participants of the demonstrations, and a great mass mobilisation against the government started to be organised. Most of the demonstrators were wearing an orange ribbon or a flag, which is the symbol of solidarity with Yushchenko's movement in Ukraine. Thus orange became the symbol of this uprising.

Meanwhile the media started to give great attention to the demonstration, since Ukrainian press changed their position.[280] During the election campaigns and the first round of the presidential election in Ukraine, most of the television and media campaigns directed against Yushchenko,[281] because of media censorship. At the same time, Yushchenko's poisoning was not mentioned by the national media, because of the censorship.[282] Except for Channel 5, the media were controlled by the government, at least by pro-Kuchma oligarchs. Supported by international and national media, the demonstrations in Kiev started to gather supporters from other cities in Ukraine.

Sometimes called the Chestnut Revolution due to the chestnut trees in Kiev, the Orange Revolution is a transition process that started soon after the official results releasing of the second tour results of the 2004 parliamentary election which was different from exit polling results. It traces its roots back to Kuchmagate; therefore, it accelerated the organisation of the civil society. With the release of the run-off results, protests began. Yanukovych supporters claimed that Yushchenko's connections to the Ukrainian media explained this disparity. Nevertheless, Yushchenko supporters and many of foreign observers alleged electoral fraud in favour of the government-backed Yanukovych.

As the Orange Revolution was the part of the transformation which highlighted the re-emergence of civil society, here it is needed to mention the

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[280] For instance, the "tv5" which was accepted as the only free television channel in Ukraine, broadcasted a program in the prime-time, and invited Oleksandr Vyshniak vice Director of the National Institute of Strategic Research, as a speaker. Oleksandr Vyshniak compared the poll results of the pro-Russian /anti-Russian wings of institutions for the first time on a TV programme, which could be accepted as the first relatively free programme during the campaign on November 19, 2004. [Online].Available:http://5tv.com.ua/eng/newsline/119/0/2594/ [Accessed: 17 September2005]

[281] Taras Kuzio, "Yanukovych-Gate Unfolds after Ukrainian Elections," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* (December 3, 2004). [Online] Available: http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?Volume _id =401&issue_id=3162&article_id=2368952. [Accessed: 14 September 2005]

[282] Ibid.

historical background of civil society in Ukraine. Ukraine without Kuchma was the most crowded mass protest campaign that ever took place in Ukraine in 2000–2001, which was organized by the political opposition influenced by the Kuchmagate scandal and focused on the resignation of President Leonid Kuchma until the Orange Revolution. The demonstrations against Kuchma started in 2000, but the number of the demonstrators never before reached such a mass that could be counted as hundreds of thousands people.

Ukraine's youth led the Orange Revolution. Most of Generation Orange was born in the 1980s and was socialized in a non-communist, independent Ukrainian state during the 1990s. For this reason, their ideological position had never been affected by communism. Thus, they are the most nationalist sector of Ukraine. As nationalism means Europeanism in Ukraine, this generation primarily voted for Yushchenko and defended democracy on the streets of Kiev after Yanukovych was declared the victor in the first runoff.

Protests began the day after the second round of voting in the contest between Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych and opposition candidate.[283] When the scale of alleged fraud started to emerge, the Yushchenko team made public calls for action. Beginning on November 22, 2004, the demonstrators participated in massive protests in cities across Ukraine. Meanwhile, Yushchenko entered into negotiations with President Leonid Kuchma in an effort to resolve the situation, but the negotiations broke down on November 24, 2004.[284] After Yanukovych was officially certified as the successor of the elections, Yushchenko spoke to supporters in Kiev that morning, urging them to begin the "the Orange Revolution" of general strikes and sit-ins with the intent of crippling the government and forcing them to concede defeat.

On the other side, blue-clad miners rally in support of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych in Kiev started counter-demonstrations. Shows of public support for Yanukovych were organized throughout Eastern Ukraine and some of his supporters arrived in Kiev. However, in Kiev the pro-Yanukovych demonstrators were far

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[283] Taras Kuzio, "From Kuchma to Yushchenko Ukraine's Presidential Election and The Orange Revolution" Problems of Post-Communism Vol. 52, No. 2, (2005): pp. 10-20. [Online]. Available: http://orangeukraine.Squarespace.com/kuzio/2 005/3/19/from-kuchma-to-yushchenko.html [Accessed: 14 July 2005]

[284] Ibid.

outnumbered by protesters from Kiev and those arriving from all regions of Ukraine to protest the electoral fraud. The demonstrations in Kiev were unheard of in scale. By many estimates, on some days the demonstrators drew over one million people to the streets.[285] A parliamentary vote and a ruling by the Supreme Court denounced round two and refused to legitimize it. Kuchma pushed for a complete rerun of the elections. It meant that Kuchma would stay in power until the spring of 2005, and on that condition, the Kuchma camp could have a chance to change the candidate. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled that the rerun of the November 21 runoff would be held on December 26.[286]

After round three, the Rada announced the election results which were different than Yanukovych government released before. According to corrected official results, Yushchenko gained 0.15 per cent more votes than Yanukovych had. Yushchenko increased his support in other parts of eastern and southern Ukraine during the repeat of round two. This greatly surpassed Kuchma's victory in 1994, which saw a country far more deeply divided.[287] On December 28, 2004, after the 100 per cent of the votes were counted the official results were released as below:

Table 5.2.

Official Results of the 2004 Presidential Elections

Round	Yushchenko	Yanukovych
Round I (October 31)	39.90 %	39.26 %
Round II (November 21)*	49.61%	49.46 %
Round III (December 26)	51.99 %	44.19%
Round III (votes)	15,115,452	12,848,087

Source: "Central Election Commission" [Online] Available: http://www. infoukes.com/orange_revolutionn/election_data/geographic_distribution/[Accessed:29 September 2005]

*The official results of the second round was announced by a Parliamentary Vote (November 27) and by Supreme Court Ruling (December 3)

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[285]"Results of the 2004 Parliamentary Elections" [Online] Available: http://www.infoukes.com /orange_revolution/election_data/geographic_distribution/. [Accessed: 29 September 2005]

[286] Ibid.

[287] Taras Kuzio, "From Kuchma to Yushchenko Ukraine's Presidential Election and The Orange Revolution" Problems of Post-Communism Vol. 52, No. 2, (2005): pp. 10-20. [Online]. Available: http://orangeukraine.Squarespace.com/kuzio/2 005/3/19/from-kuchma-to-yushchenko.html [Accessed: 14 July 2005]

At the very beginning of the protests against the official results of Round two including the mobilisation of the crowds of people, the political, governmental, non-governmental organisations, and concern of the international society, there were two plus one actors of the Orange Revolution. There was a consensus on the two actors of the Orange revolution, yet, Yanukovych's supporters added one more actor to the list. According to Yanukovych's supporters, the west and the western NGOs played the key role in the outbreak of the Orange Revolution. Meanwhile, Yushchenko's supporters believed that among others, the protests, candidates and their supporters, Ukrainian intelligentsia, and nomenclature played the key role during the Orange Revolution.

The two actors of Orange revolution that two parties reached on a consensus were the opposition group and the youth NGOs in Ukraine. The first actor was the opposition group, which was compound of civil and political organisations as well as the protestors. The opposition bloc embodied its recent structure in 2002, with Yushchenko and Our Ukraine's participation to the ongoing demonstrations. Julia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yushchenko united the opposition bloc and started to enlarge the scope of the movement.

The second actor was the civil initiative *ZNAYU* (I know). After its foundation by university students, *ZNAYU* achieved to gain almost one hundred NGOs support. During the elections, volunteers of *ZNAYU* instructed voters in many oblasts, and they oriented people in seminars on voting behaviour and consciousness. The second civil actor was *PORA!*. (it is time) It organised the street activists. *PORA!* was a student initiative founded by a few students. They educated and oriented 30,000 participants, before the demonstrations. They coordinated demonstrations including the camping arena in Kiev and the rock concerts. They organised activists with a number of four thousand in front of the Supreme Election Committee's building and wrote Yushchenko with four thousand red laser pointers in their hands.[288]

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[288] Erhan Başyurt, "Turuncu Devrim'in Gizli Mimarları." *Aksiyon Dergisi* Vol:526 (03.01.2005) [Online] Available:http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/detay.php?id=19339 [Accessed: 29 September 2005]

Another approach was developed by Sergei Tekleshun, a political scientist and Kuchma's advisor. According to his point of view, the demonstrations were not revolution but social metamorphoses.[289] Moreover, he compares the Orange Revolution with Kuchma's second election to the office in 2001 and claims that the country was democratic, but democracy remained as formality. The power was dominated by oligarchs and before the mass mobilisation, the dispute on privatisation started among those groups.[290]

In returning to the alleged third factor, Yanukovych's party Regions of Ukraine, the SDPUo, and KPU and most of the Russian population believed that the Orange Revolution was alleged to be built on a pattern, which was first developed in the ousting of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia and continuing with the Rose Revolution in Georgia.[291] According to those alleging that the coloured revolutions have peculiarities, the common peculiarities of these revolutions are summarised under six titles. Each were a spontaneous result of grassroot campaigning and coalition building among the opposition; each of these social movements included extensive work by student activists. The protests were notable for the important role of NGOs and particularly student activist organizations in organizing creative non-violent resistance; their participants used mostly non-violent revolutionary change to protest against governments seen as entrenched and authoritarian, and to advocate democracy, liberalism, and national independence; each included election victories followed up by public demonstrations after attempts by the incumbent to hold onto power through electoral fraud, they usually adopted a specific colour or flower as their symbol; activists in each of these movements were funded and trained in tactics of political organization and non-violent resistance by a coalition of Western pollsters and professional consultants funded by a range of Western government and non-

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[289]Ibid.

[290] Erhan Başyurt, "Turuncu Devrim'in Gizli Mimarları." *Aksiyon Dergisi* Vol:526 (03.01.2005) [Online] Available:http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/detay.php?id=19339 [Accessed: 29 September 2005]

[291] OTPOR (resistance) is the organiser of the protests in Serbia; OTPOR was founded at Belgrade University in October 1998 and began protesting against Milosevic during the Kosovo war. Many of its members were arrested or beaten by the police. Despite this, during the presidential campaign in September 2000, OTPOR launched its campaign that galvanized Serbian discontent with Milosevic and resulted in his defeat. See: Erhan Başyurt, "Turuncu Devrim'in Gizli Mimarları." *Aksiyon Dergisi* Vol:526 (03.01.2005) [Online] Available:http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/detay.php?id=19339 [Accessed: 29 September 2005]

government agencies.[292] However; the last common peculiarity is not subjected to an academic debate and is not defined by a literature developed, the last item is subjected to the debate over the external dynamics of the Orange Revolution.

As a result of the similarities, these processes were named as colour revolutions or flower revolutions. Colour revolutions or flower revolutions are the names given collectively to a series of related movements that developed in post-communist societies in Central and Eastern Europe and are possibly spreading elsewhere including some places in the Middle East.

5.4. Political Developments in post-Revolutionary Ukraine

After the third round of the elections, Yushchenko was inaugurated to the post in the late January 2004. He appointed Yulia Tymoshenko as prime minister. Tymoshenko's cabinet was composed of reform minded ministers. A new era is thought to have started in Ukraine since the newly appointed government and the reform minded majority of the parliament displayed a harmonised structure that Ukraine has never had since Ukraine declared its independence. The first performance of the new elected president was the constitutional changes[293] which increased the powers of the prime minister that were radically at the expense of the presidency.[294]

Due to many factors, the government has lost its support for a short period. They were not able to the arrest the people engaged in suspicious death of the journalist Georgy Gongadze.[295] However, two former police officers were arrested in April, a key witness, formerly Kuchma's minister for internal affairs, who could have been heard on the secret tapes promising to do away with Gongadze, killed himself. One day after Yuschenko declared that the case had been solved and the killers

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[292] "Report on Ukraine" [Online] Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/ukraine/story/or_rev.156550 9,00.html [Accessed 16 October 2005]

[293] The constitutional changes will come into force in 2006.

[294] Staff and Agencies. "Yushchenko Dismisses Ukraine Cabinet" *The Guardian* (8, September 2005) [Online] Available:http://www.guardian.co.uk/ukraine/story/0,15569,15 65 509,00.html [Accessed 16 October 2005]

[295] Ibid.

identified.[296] Therefore, Yushchenko and the government have condemned suggestions that the investigators are reluctant to admit the tapes.[297] Yushchenko started to loose his control over the governmental institutions. David Crouch notes whether the results of the 2004 presidential elections were accepted as the victory of the reformist party of the Ukrainian political scene, it is difficult to claim that a transition country successfully completed transition.

People have not been satisfied with the performance of either the president or the government for a nine month period. Therefore, the public support has decreased to 37 per cent in August, while it was 52 in April 2005.[298] The performance of the government was insufficient to deal with the ongoing problems. Julia Tymoshenko adopted a combative style as a prime minister, clashing with Russia over the prices it charges Ukraine for energy.[299] When Tymoshenko agreed to buy oil from Kazakhstan instead of Russia, the government confronted the first problem with the Russian energy companies.[300]

Meanwhile, in a press conference, chief of staff, Oleksandr Zinchenko, charged Petra Poroshenko,[301] secretary to Security Council of Ukraine and, Aleksandr Tryetikov, vice president, for corruption and resigned in protest on 3 September 2005.[302] Poroshenko denied the charges but resigned on the pretext of allowing an unimpeded investigation.[303] After resignations and the allegations of corruption,

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[296] David Crouch, "What Happening in Ukraine". (April 6, 2005) [Online] *The Guardian* Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,1452 833,00.html. [Accessed 16 October 2005]

[297] Ibid.

[298] Sinan Oğan, "Ukrayna'da Turuncu Hükûmet Görevden Alındı: Karşı Devrim Ihtimali Gündeme Gelebilir mi?" (8 Eylül 2005)[Online] Available: http://www.avsam.org/tr/gunlukbulten .asp?id=696. [Accessed 16 October 2005]

[299] Tom Parfitt, "Ukraine Faces Crisis as Orange Leaders Split" *The Guardian* (September 10, 2005) [Online] Available:http://www.guardian.co.uk/ukraine/story/0,15569,1566963,00.html [Accessed: 16 October 2005]

[300] See Mirza Çetinkaya,"Turuncu Hükümet Sallantıda" [Online] (09 September.2005) Available :http://www.zaman.com.tr/?hn=208747&bl=dishaberler&trh=20050909 [Accessed: 16 October 2005]

[301] Petra Poroshenko is the owner of the Channel 5, which was the only one independent TV Channel in Ukraine.

[302] Staff and Agencies. "Yushchenko Dismisses Ukraine Cabinet" *The Guardian* (8, September 2005) [Online] Available:http://www.guardian.co.uk/columnistscolumn/0,5673,1591794,00.html [Accessed: 16 October 2005]

[303] Ibid.

Yushchenko dismissed Tymoshenko in order to protect the credibility of the principles of the Orange Revolution on September 8. After the dismissal of Tymoshenko, Yushchenko appointed Yuriy Yekhanurov, as the acting prime minister.[304] On September 21, 2005, Ukraine's political crisis deepened when Rada refused to approve the prime minister nominated by Yushchenko. After Tymoshenko's dismissal, five criminal cases stemming from the accusations of corruption that triggered the crisis have been opened against officials. Seeking a parliamentary majority to approve his new prime minister, Yushchenko even signed a memorandum of understanding with Viktor Yanukovych, the man he defeated last December who was widely accused of rigging the first two rounds of the presidential election.[305]

Within these circumstances, Ogan claims that Yushchenko had been the opposition candidate with his allies, as a coalition. 2,3 million votes that Yushchenko won more than Yanukovych in the third round was not for only himself but for the coalition. Therefore, the problems within the coalition and resignation of the government meant another factor could decrease the public support.[306] Tymoshenko's dismissal raised another question. After the parliamentary election in March 2006, Tymoshenko could win the majority. Within this framework, it is debated that Yushchenko would implement the changes including the plan to reduce the president's power in 2006 and give parliament the right to name the prime minister, for if he implements, the chance he will only control defence and foreign policy as president.

Since her dismissal, Tymoshenko has regularly addressed the nation from Independence Square, with her popularity rivalry that of Yushchenko. Tymoshenko underscored the deep cleft in the country's new leadership. Moreover, she added

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[304] Jonathan Steele, "The Orange Revolution Oligarchs Reveal Their True Colours" (14 October 2005) [Online] *The Guardian* Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/columnistscolumn/0,56 73,1591794,00 .html [Accessed: 16 October 2005]

[305] Jonathan Steele, "The Orange Revolution Oligarchs Reveal Their True Colours" (14 October 2005) [Online] The Guardian Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/columnists/ column/0,5673,1591794,00 .html [Accessed: 16 October 2005]

[306] Sinan Ogan,"Ukrayna'da Turuncu Hükûmet Görevden Alındı: Karşı Devrim Ihtimali Gündeme Gelebilir mi?"(8 Eylül 2005) [Online] Available: http://www.avsam.org/tr/gu nlukbulten.asp?id=696. [Accessed 16 October 2005]

"Ukraine and the president would go to parliamentary elections in March on parallel paths with her bloc running as a separate and very powerful political force".[307]

On October 16, 2005, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko in an interview with the BBC said the government was "failing as a team" and therefore "he was forced to take action when the country's economy stopped growing."[308] Thus, it is not wrong to say that the political developments after the Orange Revolution were no more than a political struggle within a coalition. In order to sum up the performance of the 10 month old government, many started to think that "Ukraine under Yushchenko remains what it was when he took office a pseudo-democracy and a pseudo-market economy where neither the rules of business nor of political competition are transparent, fair and honest. Access to power is blocked to those outside the newly rich managerial elite from Soviet times."[309]

According to Jonathan Steele, the western press withdrew its support after Tymoshenko's dismissal, describing the event as the "Orange Alarm." Steele offered that the end of the corruption could solve the crisis in Ukraine.[310] According to newspaper, Independent, Yushchenko wasted his time and credibility during the first months of his presidency; instead he had to convince the people by directing Ukraine towards more integration with west. According to same newspaper, his efforts on the election of a more orange parliament would be more difficult.[311] The rift between the two charismatic leaders of the people-power revolution that gripped Ukraine in December signalled an end to the euphoria that brought tens of thousands of supporters on to the streets in their support.[312]

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[307] Tom Parfitt, "Ukraine Faces Crisis as Orange Leaders Split" (September 10, 2005) [Online] *The Guardian* Available:http://www.guardian.co.uk/ukraine/story/0,15569,1566963,00.html [Accessed: 16 October 2005]

[308] Ibid.

[309] Jonathan Steele, "The Orange Revolution Oligarchs Reveal Their True Colours" The Guardian (14 October 2005) [Online] Available:http://www.guardian.co.uk/Columnists/Column/0,5673,1591794,00.html [Accessed: 16 October 2005]

[310] Ibid.

[311] Tom Parfitt, "Ukraine Faces Crisis as Orange Leaders Split" (September 10, 2005) [Online] *The Guardian,* Available:http://www.guardian.co.uk/ukraine/story/0,15569,1566963,00.html [Accessed: 16 October 2005]

[312] Ibid.

5.5. Conclusion

The majority of CIS states have either already moved to fully authoritarian regimes, or, like Ukraine, they remained as unstable competitive authoritarian regimes which could be described as hybrid. In the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, elections are categorized as an important step toward implementing the rules and procedures of a democratic system, and also as the mechanism for the democratic division of power. Free and fair elections are the most probable opportunity to implement a reform pocket. Nevertheless, in many CIS countries, political actors use elections to seek legitimacy. Within this point of view, the electoral fraud in Ukraine implied that the transformation process in Ukraine still had deficiencies.

The truth of the matter is that the process known as The Orange Revolution is a process which is supported by both the internal and the external dynamics. As it was mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, Alexander Motyl argued that Ukrainian nationalists have tried three times to build their own state, and they finally succeeded in 1989-1991, not because the nationalists tried harder or because they were stronger, but because the external conditions were right.[313] This explanation was verified during the Orange Revolution since there was sufficient external support as well as internal support. But soon after, the elected president Yushchenko lost his credibility both inside of the country and abroad.

The Orange Revolution confirmed a thesis first proposed by Mykola Ryabchuk and further developed by other scholars with regard to the close link between national identity and civil society in Ukraine,[314] Therefore, having built upon the socio-political background shaped by ongoing social movement since 2000, The Orange Revolution organised by the opposition, the society and the international society. Inspired by Rybchuk, Kuzio found a link between nation building and

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[313] Alexander J. Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine After Totalitarianism.* Council on Foreign Relations Pres: New York. 1993: p.23.

[314] Mykola Riabchouk, "Civil Society and Nation Building in Ukraine" *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation*, ed. Taras Kuzio, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998, pp. 81–98.

emergence of civil society in Ukraine.[315] Civil society and opposition groups had been organizing and preparing for the 2004 election since the Kuchmagate crisis in 2000. Between 2000-2003 these groups had been able to mobilize a maximum of 50,000 people on Kiev's streets. Therefore, they were experienced in crowd management and organisation in a peaceful manner. Nevertheless, they could not reach the rest of the society. Most of the participants had never before been involved in politics and had never taken part in protests. Although the Orange crowds included people from across the country, the bulk of its participants were from central and western Ukraine.

As in Serbia in 2000 and Georgia in 2003, the neutrality of the security forces eliminated the option of a violent crackdown. According to sceptics, the Orange Revolution was imported from the United States via Serbia and Georgia. Depending upon the question that was behind the Orange Revolution: PORA! which was modelled on Serbia's OTPOR and Georgia's KMARA gave substance to those critics. Yanukovych's party Regions of Ukraine, the SDPUo, and KPU and most of the Russian society believes that it was an American plot. In contrast, the defenders of the Orange Revolution alleged that Russia gave Yanukovych far more money than did the United States. Moreover, the funding it provided, unlike what was received from the U.S. and European sources, was non-accountable and non-transparent.

When Yushchenko was inaugurated in January, many Ukrainian and most of the scholars engaged in the region claimed that the transition came to an end in Ukraine. Nevertheless, political transformation is a dynamic and quite open ended process. Thus, the political transformation has not been completed in Ukraine. The political developments after the Orange Revolution indicate that the transformation process is a long way and Ukraine is still in transit.

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[315] Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine State and Nation Building*. London: Routledge Studies of Societies in Transition, 1998. pp: 144-167.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis aimed to explore the factors affecting Ukraine's political transformation under Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma in order to analyse the dynamics of the Orange Revolution in 2004, since the Orange Revolution was a milestone of the transition to democracy. The political transformation is dynamic and open-ended process, therefore, the argument of this thesis is that the problems affecting the post-Soviet political transformation in Ukraine are the dynamics of the Orange Revolution. Yet the Orange Revolution does not indicate the end of the transition to the democracy since transformation is a quiet open ended process challenged by many factors. That is to say the mass movement termed the Orange Revolution was the political reaction of the civil society led by Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko to the problems affecting the post-Soviet political transformation in Ukraine.

In order to explain the problems of the post-Soviet political transformation, the historical background of the regional and religious polarisation in Ukraine were examined in Chapter Two, because the historical background is an essential factor affecting the post-Soviet political transformation in Ukraine. Without the political culture of nation building, Ukraine's political transformation to democracy, at first being affected by pre-Soviet period and the remnants of the Soviet Era. The regional polarisation in Ukraine emerged in the pre Soviet history as a result of the division of the territories of Ukraine among various empires. The emergence of the religious division between the regions was also a result of long lasting wars among the empires of the medieval era. Divided between Poland and Tsarist Russia, the regional polarisation in Ukraine started. Signing the Pereislav Agreement with the Tsarist Russia the eastern part of Ukraine united with the Tsarist Russia, and their common history took a official start, and the eastern regions of Ukraine remained under Russian influence. Meanwhile, influenced by nationalism in Europe, the first

nationalist awakening in Ukrainian culture and literature started to have more supporters in the western regions under the Hapsburg Monarch in the late 1800s. Therefore, the regional and religious polarisation created two Ukraines on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution.

After the Bolshevik's interruption of the independence period in the Hetmanate years, much of the Ukrainian territories were incorporated into the USSR. After World War II, the remaining parts in western Ukraine were incorporated to the Ukrainian SSR. During the Soviet period, the population of the western parts of Ukraine remained as Ukrainophiles, while the east was Russophile. Although under Lenin, Ukraine was exposed to de-nationalisation, under Stalin, Ukraine experienced famine and great purge; thus, the polarisation between the Ukrainophiles and Russophiles remained. Under Khrushchev, Ukrainians were elevated as the junior elder brother in the Union; thus, they were appointed to the white collar positions in non-Slavic republics of the Union. For this reason, they were treated as if they were Russians. But those elevated to those positions were not Russians, but Russianised Ukrainians.

Under Khrushchev, first *Samizdat*s appeared and, despite the strict policies of Brezhnev, the illegal organisations protected Ukrainian culture in western Ukraine. Thus, the theoretical background for the nationalist movement being visible at the first years of perestroika was completed during this period, but the cultural gap was deepened between Russophiles and Ukrainophiles on the eve of independence. Under Gorbachev, the first civil opposition emerged as a reaction to the conservative attitude hiring the facts on the Chernobyl Disaster. The prisoner of consciousness allowed returning to Ukraine, founded the Rukh Movement and supported the nationwide demonstrations especially in western Ukraine and in Kiev. After organising the human chain across the country and the first strikes of the workers, conservative Communist Party Secretary Shcherbytsky resigned and later Ukraine declared its independence in 1991.

The very beginning of the independence period was examined in Chapter Three. The referendum on independence was held simultaneously with the election of the first president of independent Ukraine. Thus, the post-Soviet political transformation of Ukraine took a start under the first elected president of independent

Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk. In Chapter Three, this thesis argued the problems of the political transformation under Kravchuk, and found that problems of post-Soviet political transformation could not be resolved under Leonid Kravchuk. The initial phase of Ukraine's independence was marked primarily by national consolidation. A key factor in this consolidation was the task of maintaining national unity, despite regional and ethnic differences between eastern Ukraine, which had been shaped by Soviet Russia, the actual core of Ukraine in the west, and the Crimea, which historically belonged to Russia. Different from many transition states, nationalism means Europeanism in Ukraine; however, conservatism, different from many transition states means pro Russianism. For this reason, the regional differences in Ukraine played a key role in the political transformation in Kravchuk Era. In addition to regional polarisation, Kravchuk had to deal with Russia because Ukraine's independence was threatened by the strong neighbouring nation of Russia. These problems of political transformation in Ukraine impeded it from taking part either in the post-Soviet re-configuration of Eastern and Central Europe, which have been reshaped by the twin enlargements of NATO and EU, or Eurasia, which has been reshaped by Russian interest and the very existence of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) during the Kravchuk Era.

Whereas these problems limited Kravchuk's political manoeuvre that could include a returning Europe, the problems within the Rada impeded him to reach a consensus on the text of the constitution which is accepted as part of the stateness principle of political transformation. Kravchuk had to deal with the problems of the pre-Soviet and Soviet era, while trying to establish new institutions in accordance with globalisation and called for an early election in 1994 which resulted in the success of Leonid Kuchma.

Leonid Kuchma's 10 year presidency is examined in Chapter Four. Both terms of Kuchma's presidency started with surprises. When he was first elected to the presidency in 1994, Kuchma started to pursue a foreign policy called the Ukrainian Third Way; however, he announced that he would have pay attention to strengthen Ukraine's relations with Russia during his election campaign. During his first term in the presidency, he signed a treaty with the Russian Federation, and Ukraine became a member of Central European Initiative. Thus, the Ukrainian Third Way meant

integration with the west and cooperation with the east as formulated by Kuchma's Multi Vectorism Policy.

With the adoption of the new constitution on 28 June 1996, the problem of the division of power between the president and parliament seemed to be solved; however, Kuchma called for a referendum on changing the system to a bicameral system, a presidential regime. In fact, Kuchma's second term in presidency began with the surprise appointment of Viktor Yushchenko to the prime ministry. Kuchma's intention resulted from his willingness to secure more financial aid from international organisations. Moreover, he abolished the death penalty at the same time for the sake of financial aid. Thus, Kuchma managed to put a stop to political and economic instability during his second term. Together with Prime Minister Yushchenko, the President was able to establish a reform-oriented government. Moderate growth and structural reform halted the economic downturn. Yet Kuchma was unwilling to implement reform on democracy. Inter alia, censorship over independent media, Kuchma's eagerness to take precautions against corruption and tribal affiliations interrupted political transformation in the country.

As was typical for post-Soviet states, conflicts arose between the members of the administration, who styled themselves as backers of reform, and the rest of the Parliament, which was seen as an impediment to reform. However, the problems between Kuchma and the Rada were solved to some extent, the opposition within the Rada acquiesced, taking a more constructive stance. Nevertheless, Kuchma's call for referendum which intended to transform the regime into an authoritarian rule deepened the problems. Kuchma could not implement the results of the referendum since his popularity had fallen to an all time low due to the breakout of Kuchmagate. Kuchmagate was the starting point of the demonstrations, whose number of participants increased up to one million during the Orange Revolution. In fact the Orange Revolution meant more than demonstrations against Kuchma, for it indicated the emerging opposition to the old style cadres, which are accepted as the main barriers against the transformation, and having began in the late 2000, the opposition united under the logo "Ukraine without Kuchma" easily transformed itself as a huge mass mobilisation after the electoral fraud in the second round of the 2004 presidential elections.

Chapter Five examined the dynamics of the Orange Revolution and post-revolutionary Ukraine. In this chapter, it is argued that the Orange Revolution does not imply that the post-Soviet transformation to democracy has been accomplished. Post-Soviet political transformation in Ukraine started with the declaration of independence since Ukraine has not been subjected any concern to the Soviet Union and chose to transform into a market-oriented democratic state. Transformation began not only from a starting point, but also departure from an endpoint indicating the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It is understood that the beginning of transformation implies the willingness of a state transforming into a democracy, at the beginning of the period which is also the end of the former *statue quo ante*. Thus, the beginning point of the transformation and the end of the former *statue quo* are the preconditions of the willingness of the political elite; nevertheless, it has passed too recently to decide whether or not the transformation was accomplished. Indeed, the performance of Yushchenko's presidency, public support to which was decreased during the first month, did not resolve the remaining problems. The removal of Tymoshenko from the prime ministry showed that the upcoming parliamentary elections in March 2006 would be another litmus test evaluating where the country stands between authoritarianism and democracy. Moreover, it not easy to attach an ending point implying the completion of the transformation to democracy since the transitology literature has not yet created a final end point of the process. However, indexes such as the level of transparency, governance capability, existence of the independent media, political opposition and organised civil society are indicative of the endpoints of the status. The indexes evaluate the transformation management of the country in a period of short term performance of a country.

Determination of the endpoint displaying the transformation to democracy requires a long term analysis and real anchors that attach the county with democracy such as at least two elections that country should experience. Moreover, in countries such as Iran, elections are held freely, but the regime could not be assessed as democratic. For this reason, the political transformation is an open ended process, because there is no consensus on the criterion that displays the end of a dynamic process due to the unpredictability of the social sciences. For this reason it is difficult to equalise the political conjuncture of the 1991 and the 2004 Elections, while the former implies the beginning, the latter could be a milestone, or a short term end

point. When the short term progresses of the transformation management of Kravchuk and Kuchma are evaluated, it is clear that the political transformation had been interrupted by many reasons in each of them. Thus, the factors affecting transformation management resulted from the temporary, permanent and *sui generis* problems. Having been influenced by those factors, internal and external dynamics played a leading role on the eve of the Orange Revolution.

The Orange Revolution does not indicate that the Ukraine completed political transformation. On the eve of the Orange Revolution, the civil opposition equated themselves with those in the Perestroika years. From this point on, many claims that the Orange Revolution implied that Ukraine has completed her transformation into a European State. There are conceptual similarities between these two periods, but the conjunctures are different. After the demonstrations against the authorities in 1991, Ukraine declared independence, but not due to only their effort, but also due partly to the dissolution of the USSR, which was not only decided by Ukraine, but by Ukraine plus the other members of the union. In 2004, the demonstrations resulted in the decision of repeating the second round of the presidential elections. Nevertheless, it is difficult to claim that the declaration of independence was the result of the demonstrations. The demonstrations and the independence was the result of the perestroika and glasnost which were implemented in order to struggle with the nationalities question and the ongoing economic illnesses. In 2004, the demonstrations were raised from the ongoing political problems and the interruption of the political transformation and came to an end soon after the Central Commission on Election announced the results of the round II as being illegal. Round III of the 2004 presidential election is, therefore, the result of the Orange Revolution, but the accomplishment of the post-Soviet political transformation to democracy is related to the performance of the post-Soviet political elites of the country.

As a reaction to not only the latest fraud, but also all the factors impeding the fate of the transformation in the streets of Kiev, about one million people demonstrated until the Rada decided to run for the third round. Named after the colour of the opposition party, the Orange Revolution thus highlighted the civil renaissance in independent Ukraine. In fact, civil society has emerged in Ukraine

since 1986 soon after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. Therefore, civil consciousness is expected to have deeper roots in Ukraine. In accordance with this argument, the number of civic groups in post-Soviet Ukraine has to be grown each year. This argument could be true since, in the last decade, civil society in Ukraine has become more professional and efficient in its activity, but the argument is wrong because, civic groups remain fragmented. However it the role of the civil society could not be predicted, since Ukraine is a transition state.

With its 14 years' independence period, Ukraine had never close to a U turn to Europe in political senses. Moreover, many pro-reformer Ukrainians interpreted Yushchenko's predetermined victory as an indispensable part of the Europeanisation. One year has nearly passed since the first round of the presidential elections 2004, however it is understood that the political transformation has not completed yet. Thus, transition is an open ended process where Ukraine removes between authoritarianism and democracy.

From this point on, the theory could not suggest a more optimistic way out of the cyclical pattern: authoritarianism toward democracy. It has been seen in recent revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan but not in countries such as Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, while addressing post communist cases. Thus transitology is not the one-size fits all. Political transformation requires social engineering, but the political developments could not be predicted beforehand. It was expected that Yushchenko would be president after the second round of the 2004 elections, but the second round resulted in the Orange Revolution. It was pre-determined that Ukraine would turn its face to west under the new president Yushchenko who was willing to work together with the pro-reformers, as well as the architect of his success, Tymoshenko. Nevertheless, only 9 months after the revolution, Tymoshenko's dismissal was unpredicted even by Yushchenko and Tymoshenko herself. Apart from arguing whether Ukraine completed the political transformation or not, the short-term evaluation of the pre-revolutionary political conjuncture in Ukraine is not very different from the past.

After each presidential election, Ukraine went two steps forward and in less than one year one step backwards. The challenges to the political transformation in the Kravchuk era were minimised during the Kuchma Era. Kuchma not only deferred

the Russian thread by signing a friendship treaty with Russia, but also Ukraine minimised the secession demands in Crimea. Nevertheless, the censorship of the media, political scandals and corruption were added to a list of threats to transformation in the agenda of the challenges to the post-Soviet political transformation in Ukraine. Due to both internal and external dynamics, after Yushchenko came to the power, many scholars started to debate Ukraine's accession date to the EU. Yet after 9 months performance, it looks as if Ukraine is going two steps forward and one step backwards. Thus, it seems that the regime type which is theoretically accepted as a point between democracy and authoritarianism may termed a hybrid regime, closer to democracy compared to Central Asian states, but closer to authoritarianism compared to Baltic States.

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