HEGEMONIC INTERVENTION IN THE FORM OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis aims at developing a conceptual framework for advancing basic research on questions about coercive diplomacy and the management of intrastate conflicts by relying on hegemonic stability theory and its most fundamental concept: public good. In the light of the failure of international community in developing a unified response to the most cases of intrastate conflicts, the study investigates the role of leadership in international attempts to manage such conflicts. I argue that in the absence of a direct threat to the interests of each individual member, there will be a need for a leader that is capable to provide public goods associated with efforts to bring a solution to the conflict. Findings from several phases of Kosovo crisis which support this proposition is used to illustrate and evaluate the accuracy of this assumption. Thus, the study is not only concerned with coercive diplomacy as a form of intervention but also the process that finally culminates into that instrument as evidence of the necessity for a leader.

Key Words*:* Intervention, Coercive Diplomacy, Collective Action, Public Good, Leadership.

ÖZ

GÜÇ DİPLOMASİSİ BİÇİMİNDE HEGEMONİK MÜDAHALE

Demir, İmran

Mastır, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tez hegemonik denge teorisine ve bu teorinin en önemli kavramı olan kamu yararı terimine dayanarak güç diplomasisi ve ülke içi çatışmaların kontrol altına alınması ile ilgili soruları temel alan araştırmayı ilerletmek için kavramsal bir çerçeve geliştirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma, uluslarası toplumun ülke içi çatışmaların söz konusu olduğu bir çok olayda ortak bir tutum sergilemedeki başarısızlığı ışığında, bu tür çatışmaların kontrol altına alınabilmesi için gerekli olan çabalardaki liderlik rolünü incelemektedir. Herhangi bir ülkenin çıkarlarını doğrudan tehdit etmedikçe, bu tür çatışmaların çözüme kavuşturulması için sarfedilen çabalar için gerekli olan kamu araçlarını sağlayabilecek güce sahip bir lidere ihtiyaç duyulacağını savunmaktayım. Bu savın doğruluğunu irdelemek ve göstermek için, bu öngörüyü destekleyen Kosova krizinin bir çok aşamasındaki bulgulardan faydalanılmaktadır. Bu anlamda çalışma sadece müdahalenin bir biçimi olan güç diplomasisi ile değil aynı zamanda liderlik gereksiniminin bir kanıtı olarak güç diplomsi ile sonuçlanan süreçlede ilgilenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Mudahale, Güç Diplomasisi, Kollektif Eylem, Kamu Yararı, Liderlik

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ABBREVIATIONS

CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
EU	European Union
ECCY	European Community Conference on Yugoslavia
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
ICFY	International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
ICG	International Crisis Group
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JNA	Jugoslovenska narodna armija (Yugoslav People's Army)
KDOM	Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission
KFOR	Kosovo (International Security) Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
LDK	Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (Democratic League of Kosovo)
MUP	Military Uniformed Police
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SAJ	Specialne antiteroristi˜ke jedinice Ministerstva unustraãnjih poslova Republike Srbije (Special Anti-Terror Units of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia)
SC	Security Council
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
UÇK	Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (Kosovo Liberation Army)
UN	United Nations
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America

VJ	Vojska Jugoslavije (Army of Yugoslavia)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

International action in response to intrastate conflicts characterized by violence is nothing new, nor is debate regarding these international actions. However, the proliferation in the number of such conflicts since the end of the Cold War has turned them into one of the major problems of the international community. There has been a growing tendency among states to view them being more than internal matters of a state suffering from internal strife. This has contributed to efforts in search for appropriate means and methods to respond to and prevent such conflicts. An equally rising trend has been the tendency in the international community to act collectively under an international organization or an ad hoc coalition in the management of violent internal conflicts by means of coercive intervention.

Nevertheless, while not all the internal conflicts achieved the same degree of attention, the intensity or the amount of violence has not always been the only condition for international involvement. Although the absence of established norms, rules and procedures, which can make international involvement easier and efficient, can be suggested as the primary obstacle in front of the effective response from international community, this does not explain the selectivity of international involvement. Another common explanation for the failure of international community in dealing with internal conflicts is linked to the absence of vital interest at stake, or divergent interests and perceptions of the correct type and extent of involvement and other problems arise under collective action.

This study, in the light of the failure of international community in developing a unified response to the most cases of violent ethnic conflicts, investigates the role of leadership in international attempts to manage ethnic conflicts. Approaching the issue from hegemonic stability theory perspective, I argue that in the absence of a direct threat to the interests of individual members, there will be a need for a leader that is capable to provide the public good associated with the

efforts to bring a solution to the conflict. An equally emphasized theme is the form such interventions are carried out. In this regard, I argue that coercive diplomacy is the most common form used by a coalition of states in dealing with such conflicts. Findings from several phases of Kosovo crisis are demonstrated to support the argument developed here.

1.1 Literature review

It is possible to distinguish between three tendencies in literature on international involvement in intrastate conflicts. While in general scholars have devoted their attention on understanding why states intervene in internal conflicts, most recently there has been a shift in favor of studies conducted on legal, political and normative aspects of the concept with a special emphasis on its humanitarian attribute. Another category of studies that focuses on involvement of international community by developing prescriptive strategies that will enable international community to deal with potential conflicts more effectively in the future. Against this background very little attention has been paid to the collective action and leadership aspect of the international involvement in internal conflicts.[1]

The question of intervention and its practice has been some what mixed for the major states of international community. Along with the sense of moral obligation to act in the face of gross humanitarian crisis[2] it has been argued that refuge flows, and potential spill over effects of such conflicts that are inherently a serious threat to international peace and security create a demand for external involvement by major powers.[3] As Dowty and Loescher indicate, "there is a

[1] Due to having no relevance for the study conducted here, the literature on the second and third category of research area is not included in the literature review conducted here.

[2] Smith, Michael J, "Humanitarian Intervention Revisited: Is there a Universal Policy", *Harvard Review* (Fall 2000); Blechman, Barry M. "The Intervention Dilemma", *Washington Quarterly* (Vol.18, No. 3, Summer 1995); Finnemore, M., Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention", in P. Z. Katzenstein (editor), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1996), pp.153-185.

[3] Carment, David, Dane Rowlands, and Patrick James, "Ethnic Conflict and Third Party Intervention: Riskiness, Rationality and Commitment", in Gerald Schneider and Patricia Weltsman (editor), *Enforcing Cooperation*, (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 104; Brown, Michael, *The International Dimension of Internal Conflict*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), p. 8; Mitchell, C. R., " Civil Strife and The Involvement of External Parties", *International Studies Quarterly* (Vol. 14, No. 2, June, 1970).

growing international awareness of the linkage between human rights abuses, forceful displacement of populations and local regional and international security."[4] However, massive or gross humanitarian crisis have not always been a sufficient condition to attract intervention or the appropriate form of involvement. Despite recognizing the need for new tools and methods to deal with internal conflicts, evidence suggests that in the absence of a direct threat to their interests, major powers tend not to involve in such conflicts. In general, the lack of public support due to high costs and military casualties associated with such operations makes western capitals to back away from taking an active role in intrastate conflicts.[5] Above all, as Regan puts it, "intervening in civil conflicts is a risky business."[6] Thus, as Lake and Rothschild has observed, states in the absence of strong interests at stake, tend to lack any incentive to carry the burden and seek to free ride on the efforts of others in finding a solution to internal conflicts.[7]

What is it that makes it possible to act collectively in certain ethnic conflicts, while the absence of which hinders cooperation and prevents taking a firm stance even in worse humanitarian catastrophes? A quick response to this question might be the so called CNN effect, which implies that the media drive Western conflict management by forcing Western governments to intervene militarily in humanitarian crisis against their will.[8] Nevertheless, to what extend media has that power on its own is questionable. As Michael Desch suggests, one should not complicate the power of the media on public and its effect on policy makers, the latter of which is overstated.[9] Another explanation, but a relatively old one, would involve

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[4] Dowty, Alan, and Gil Loescher, "Refugee flows as Grounds for International Action", *International security* (Vol.21, No.1, Summer 1996), p. 43.
[5] Blechman, *op. cit.*, p. 65; Lund, Michael, *Preventing Violent Conflicts* (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 25,26.

[6] Regan, Patrick M., "Choosing to Intervene: Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts", *The Journal of Politics*, (Vol. 60, No. 3, August 1998), p. 755; Blechman, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

[7] Lake, David A. and Donald Rothschild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflicts", *International Security* (Vol. 21, No. 2, Autumn 1996).

[8] Jacobsen, Peter Viggo, "Focus on the CNN Effect Misses the Point: The Real Media Impact on Conflict Management is Invisible and Indirect", *Journal of Peace Research*, (Vol. 37, No. 2, 2000), pp. 131-143.

[9] Desch, Michael, "Humanitarian intervention: Liberals, Neocons, and Realcons", *Orbis* (Fall 2001).

paradigmatic response. Realist theories, for instance, would argue that state would intervene only when their direct and indirect geo-strategic and economic interests are at stake.[10] However, Martha Finnemore, pointing to the post-Cold War interventions argues that most of those interventions in this period were carried out in states where geo-strategic or economic interests of interveners were negligible.[11] For instance, analyzing international intervention in Somalia, David Gibbs argues that the operation was conducted on purely humanitarian purposes with altruistic motivations without concern for any national interests.[12] According to Finnemore, who considers the issue in a broad historical context, the answer is found in the shift in normative understandings about which human beings merit military protection, an assumption which entails any and every human being.[13] Although Finnemore is right in her criticism of the realist assumption while building her constructivist explanation for intervention, she fails to explain why certain people deserve intervention on their behalf while others barely receive attention.

Writing on the topic under the Cold War circumstances, Mitchell proposed transactional and affective motivations as driving forces behind third party involvement in civil strives between contending groups within another state.[14] While transactional motivations involve military, political, economic linkages between the intervening party and one between intervener and the target or one of the parties within the target state in strife, the latter emphasize the role of ideological, religious, or ethnic ties. A similar type of explanation has been provided by Carment, James, and Rowlands as the primary motivations mobilizing the intervening state.[15]

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[10] Bull, Hedley, "Introduction", in Hedley Bull (editor), *Intervention in World Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Morgenthau, Hans, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene" *Foreign Affairs* (Vol. 45, No. 3, 1967) pp. 425-36.

[11] Finnemore, *op. cit.,* p. 156.

[12] Gibbs, David, "Real Politik and Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of Somalia", *International Politics* (Vol. 37, No: 41, March 2000), pp. 41-55.

[13] Finnemore, *op. cit.,* pp. 153-155.

[14] Mitchell, *op. cit.,*

[15] Carment, David, "The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, Indicators, and Theory", *Journal of Peace Research,* (Vol.30, No.2, May 1993); Carment, James, and Rowlands, *op. cit.*

Elsewhere, elaborating on third-party intervention in intrastate conflicts using game-theoretic model, Carment and Rowlands addresses practical issues that interveners usually take into consideration before they embark upon and during an intervention.[16] These issues are the mission's intensity, the salience of the conflict to the intervener, the capabilities of the belligerent, and the belligerents expected gains from continued fighting. Furthermore, the model evaluates how the core concerns for the intervener affect the calculation of costs and benefits associated with each strategy.

The most relevant study conducted in the area of intervention to the topic undertaken here is that of Peter Jacobsen. Building on studies of Thomas Schelling, on the one hand, and that of the Alexander George and William Simons' studies on coercive diplomacy, on the other hand, Jacobsen investigates why coercive diplomacy fails or succeeds when employed against military aggressors.[17] In doing so, Jacobsen not only tackles the problem of interest, which confronts the western capitals while taking action, but also collective action problems and the leadership question. Yet Jacobsen fails elaborate on the role assumed by the leader.

1.2 Aim and Approach

Recognizing this gap in literature, this thesis aims at developing a conceptual framework for advancing basic research on questions about coercive diplomacy and the management of internal violence by relying on hegemonic stability theory and its most fundamental concept: public good. Although the theory has been known widely for its assumptions over the nature, organization and working of the international economic system, in its broader terms, it emphasizes the role of leadership for the emergence of international regimes in various issue areas. In its most general form, the theory of hegemonic stability is used to imply that "the presence of a single, strongly dominant actor in international politics leads to collectively desirable outcomes for all states in international system."[18]

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[16] Carment, David and Dane Rowlands, "Three's Company: Evaluating Third-party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts", *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* (Vol. 42 No. 5, October 1998).

[17] Jacobsen, Peter Viggo, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998).

Charles Kindleberger, who first developed the theory in 1973, argued that international free trade was a public good dependent on a reliable hegemon ready to supply it.[19] Accordingly, he claimed that "for the world economy to be stabilized there has to be a stabilizer." Thus, the theory implies instability and disorder in the absence of a hegemon. In this regard, the theory posits the existence of a power ready to provide the public good associated with a specific issue. The theory builds much of its assumptions on Mancur Olson's explanations over the difficulty of groups in achieving their collective goals. Olson argues that given the absence of selective incentives, public goods are unlikely to exist unless the group is "privileged" so that a single state has sufficient interest in the good to be willing to bear the full costs of its provisions.[20]

Following from these assumptions, I claim that prevention and resolution of internal conflicts are one of those issue areas that require the presence of a hegemon or, to put it more appropriately, a leader. The leader not only mobilizes international organizations to take an active role in efforts for the prevention, management and resolution of such conflicts but also encourages/forces other states to either participate into the solution finding process and/or contribute the payment for the good. The public good associated with the efforts in finding a solution to ethnic conflicts include diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions, use or threat of the use of force and several other actions that requires coordination. Thus, the success of the preventive diplomacy or coercive diplomacy will depend on the degree of willingness on the part of the leader to be ready to provide or encourage others to make commitments for the supply. Although in the case of involvement in internal conflicts, the costs of public good are relatively high, and benefits are not so tangible to be directly observed, it is still possible to discern several interests associated with hegemonic intervention. Jacobsen, for instance, distinguishes between vital,

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[18] Snidal, Duncan, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory", *International Organization* (Vol. 39, No. 4, Autumn 1985), p. 579.

[19] Kindleberger, Charles P., "Systems of International Economic Organization" in David P. Calleo (editor), *Money and the Coming World Order*, (New York: New York University Press, 1976), p. 304.

[20] Olson, Mancur, *Logic of Collective Action*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965).

strategic, stability and moral/ideological interests.[21] Thus, the benefit can be securing the stability of a region, and security of an ally or even enhance legitimacy among the other members of the international community.

1.3 Methodology

I employ qualitative research technique in the form of case study method to demonstrate the validity of the argument raised here. The process of international engagement in ethnic conflict in Kosovo, a self autonomous province in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), beginning from the second half of 1990s, when international community began to take the conflict seriously into consideration, until the agreement signed between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Serbia that ended NATO's intervention in the conflict in June 1999 is examined. If the case of Kosovo does not serve as a good model how to settle armed internal conflicts, it gives us clues about how the collective action towards resolution of such conflicts require a leading state that is ready to either provide or impose public goods associated with such an involvement. Therefore, a detailed study of Kosovo case will be conducted to reveal the validity of the argument.

The choice of this technique will require the use of materials not limited to only books and articles. I rely on papers presented at conferences; UN Security Council Resolutions concerning Kosovo crisis in particular; several draft agreements aimed to bring a solution to the conflict; summit communiqués; press releases; relevant decisions taken by several international organizations and newspaper articles as my primary resources.

1.3.1 Game in the game

In this regard, building on the assumptions raised here and developing from prisoners' dilemma of game theoretical model, I develop two games, which I call game in the game modeling of collective interventions. While the first game takes place within the coalition, more specifically between the leader and the other

[21] Jacobsen, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

members of the coalition, the second game takes place between the coalition and the target state, which is subject to coalitional coercion.

The second model, on the other hand, builds on the game theoretical model developed by Carment and Rowland, which models an order in which the third party intervention takes place and the degree of commitment allocated by the third party at each stage.[22] This model is further important in the sense that it provides credence to the conceptualization of interventions as public good and how this public good affects the delineation of the strategy.

In this context, instead of employing different terms for different forms of international engagement at different levels of an internal conflict, i.e. preventive diplomacy, conflict management, conflict resolution and intervention, through out the paper, I employ the eclectic concept of "coercive diplomacy as a form of intervention." The concept of intervention is used to imply dictatorial interference by a sovereign state, a group of such states, or an international organization, involving the threat or use of force or some other means of coercion, in the domestic jurisdiction of an independent state against the will or wishes of the government of the targeted country.[23] The approach taken here leaves those interventions by one state into the domestic matters of another with the goal of controlling domestic policies or political arrangements in the target out side the scope of the study. While I do not exclude the interest motivation from the scope of interventions, I do exclude those interventions purely undertaken on the grounds of self interest. Thus, despite the variety of definitions provided for the concept, it is employed to mean any form of external collective action involving the use of military and/or nonmilitary means and undertaken in response to the achievement of certain collective interests.

Coercive diplomacy, on the other hand, implies the practice of intervention through the range of possible alternatives available to intervener; along a continuum

[22] Carment and Rowland, *op. cit.*

[23] Bull, *op. cit.,* p. 1. More recent definitions of the concept emphasize the humanitarian aspect of interventions. Martha Fennimore, for instance, defines intervention as the use of force "with the goal of protecting the lives and welfare of foreign civilians." Fennimore, *op.cit.,* p. 155. Likewise, Adam Roberts (1993) defines the concept as a "military intervention in a state, without the approval of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants." Roberts, Adam "Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights", *International Affairs* (Vol. 69, No.3, July 1993), p. 426.

of threats through an ascending scale of intensity to the most sever. In this regard, barrowing from Alexander George, the concept suggests the use of threats of punishment and/or limited use of force short of full scale operations to persuade the target state to stop and/or undo an action he is already embarked upon.[24]

Consequently, my analysis proceeds in four steps. A section that examines hegemonic stability theory and extends its basic assumption of leadership requirement for the management of international trade to the management and resolution of intrastate conflicts is followed by a discussion of coercive diplomacy. The forth section argues that any collective action undertaken for the resolution of an internal conflict involves a two pillar processes. Therefore, I develop a two pillar model that reveals the interaction between the coalitional pillar and that of the coalition and the target state. Finally, the fifth part of this study uses Kosovo conflict both before and after it become violent to demonstrate the relevancy of the argument put forward by this paper.

[24] George, Alexander, "Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics." in A. George and W. Simons (editors), *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, (Westview Press: Boulder, 1994), p. 7.

CHAPTER 2

INTERVENTION AS PUBLIC GOOD

3.1 Theoretical Assumptions of Collective Action and Hegemonic Stability Theory

Hegemonic stability theory can be considered as a reaction to the assumptions of realism skeptical to cooperation among nations from within the realist school, and indeed, a response to the question of why states cooperate to realize their common goals under the condition of anarchy. Given the anarchic nature of international system defined in terms of the absence of a central authority, realist perspective assumes that states act primarily in their own self-interest and will not cooperate with each other.[25] Arguing that states are motivated by relative gains rather than absolute gains- how well they do relative to each other rather than how well they do themselves- adherents of realist school such as Kenneth Waltz, Joseph Grieco and Robert Gilpin contend that in a self help system no one can rely on any other. Therefore, to ensure their survival and independence in the long run, countries have a predominant interest in avoiding a loss in their relative capabilities even in the short run.[26]

This does not necessarily mean that states do not cooperate at all. Indeed, Duncan Snidal argues that relative gains matter only for issues involving a small number of states, and become irrelevant for issues involving more than two states.[27] Then, the question to be asked is how states succeed to cooperate in some cases and

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[25] Milner, Helen, "The assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A critique" in David A. Baldwin (editor), *Neo-realism and Neo- liberalism: The contemporary debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

[26] Grieco, Joseph, "The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation", *American Political Science Review* (Vol. 87, No. 3, September 1993); Gilpin, Robert, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Waltz, Kenneth N., *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

[27] Snidal, Duncan, "Relative Gains and Patterns of International Cooperation", *American political science Review* (Vol. 85, No. 3, September 1991), p. 388.

fail in others under the condition of anarchy.[28] An explanation to this question varies considerably. Neo-liberal institutionalists are usually considered at the other end of the continuum in comparison with realist perspective regarding cooperation. Without disputing the anarchic structure of international system they emphasize the role of international institutions in promoting cooperation. According to institutionalists, Robert Keohane being the most prominent, argue that increasing need for coordination, created by interdependence leads to more cooperation among states.[29] However, as Lisa Martin demonstrates, institutions are not always the best solution for cooperation. The difficulty in establishing consensus among the members having diverse interests in organizations with large numbers, and the problems of temptation to free ride are two of the most prominent problems in front of cooperation in international institutions.[30]

Likewise, Oran Young argues that it is difficult to reach at successful outcomes in institutions. Due to their operating procedure under the unanimity rule, cooperation either is doomed to failure and broad formulas they incorporate have little content utility to the issue underhand.[31] Thus, even if multilateral organizations provide the context for cooperation, this does not necessarily imply that they will secure and ensure it. Although most of its assumptions have been widely challenged hegemonic stability theory, as mentioned above, is another explanation suggested for the success or failure of cooperation among states.[32]

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[28] Oye, Kenneth A., "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions", *World Politics* (Vol. 38, No. 1, October 1985); Young, Oran R, "The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural Recourses and the Environment", *International Organization*, (Vol. 43, No. 3, Summer 1989).

[29] Keohane, Robert O., *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

[30] Martin, Lisa L., "The Rational State Choice of Multilateralism" in John Gerard Ruggie (editor), *Multilateralism Matters. The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 96-100.

[31] Young, Oran R., "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society", *International Organization*, (Vol. 45, No. 3, Summer 1991), pp. 281-308.

[32] For different critiques of hegemonic stability theory see Conybeare, John A.C., "Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemmas and the International Political Economy", *International Studies Quarterly* (Vol. 28, No. 1, March 1984), pp.5-22.; Lake, David A., "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential", *International Studies Quarterly*,

"Hegemony," the way Keohane and Nye define it, is "a situation in which one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and willing to do so."[33] The theory's basic tenet is that the emergence of cooperation among states depends on the presence a single strongly dominant actor capable of mitigating cooperation problems arising from collective action. The absence of such power is associated with undesirable outcomes and disorder.[34] In this regard, the theory builds much of its assumptions, as noted by Joanne Gowa, on the theory of collective action developed by Mancur Olson.[35] Therefore, a good point to start elaborating on the topic is to mention briefly what collective action is. Apart from serving a better understanding of hegemonic stability theory such a clarification is further in place to establish the link between hegemonic stability theory and interventions.

Todd Sandler defines the concept as a condition which involves the activities to further the interests or well being of a group and thereby necessitates the efforts of two or more individuals to accomplish an outcome.[36] However, does the desire or necessity to cooperate and to act collectively an enough condition to bring about cooperation? According to Olson this is not certainly the case.

Writing in *The Logic of Collective Action*, Olson argues that "rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests."[37] Because people would be less enthusiastic to undertake any commitment for the provision of such interests or goods called collective or public, unlike the private ones which people buy and consume in market place depending on a demand for them. Olson's claim is that, when interests are shared, open to free participation in

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(Vol. 37, No. 4, December 1993), pp. 459-489; Keohane, Robert O., *op. cit*.; Snidal, Duncan, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory", *International Organization* (Vol. 39, No. 4, Autumn 1985), pp. 579-60.

[33] Keohane, *After Hegemony*, p. 34.

[34] Snidal, t*he Limits*, p. 582.

[35] Gowa, Joanne, *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade*, (New Jersey, Princeton: Princeton University Press1994), p. 12.

[36] Sandler, Todd, *Collective Action: Theory and Applications* (Michigan, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1992), p. 1.

[37] Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

terms of their provision and free consumption, rational actors are inclined to free-ride, that is, to let others pay the cost of goods that will benefit everyone.[38]

Two distinguishing properties of public goods create incentives in individuals to free ride rather than assume any of the cost's of the good: non-excludable and non rival or indivisible between users. Any individual's consumptions of these goods does not preclude their consumption by others; and no one can be excluded or prevented from consuming such goods whether or not they have paid for them.[39] Under these conditions, Olson argues that larger groups are less likely than smaller ones to succeed in providing themselves collective benefits. He states that given the absence of selective incentives public goods are unlikely to exist unless the group is "privileged" so that each of its members or at least one of them would be better of if the collective good were provided, even if they had to pay the entire cost of providing it themselves, than they would be if it were not provided.[40] The problems with collective action and the supply of public goods that Olson demonstrates, according to Hardin has the same logic as to that of the Prisoners Dilemma. If defection is the dominant strategy, no one would contribute to supplying of public good and there by no public good will be produced.[41]

Thus, building on the assumptions of collective action theory, Charles Kindleberger argued that in order to overcome this dilemma a hegemon must exist.[42] Because of its relative size in international system a hegemon "has an incentive to see that the collective good is provided, even if it has to bear the full burden of providing it himself."[43] In sum, as Duncan Snidal summarizes, the theory has two

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[38] Hardin, Russell, *Collective Action*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 9).

[39] Public goods, as Mancur Olson, *op.cit.*, has defined the concept, is "any good such that, if any person Xi ….,in a group X1….., Xi ….,Xn consumes it, it can not feasibly withheld from the others in that group …The very fact that a goal or purpose is common to a group means that no one in the group is excluded from the benefit or satisfaction brought about by its achievements", pp. 14-15.

[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 34, 50.

[41] Hardin, *op. cit.*, p. 23-30.

[42] Kindleberger, Charles P., *The World in Depression, 1929-39* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

[43] The theory originally emerged as an attempt to explain the genesis of the post World War economic order. Although it was first Robert Keohane who coined the term to explain the relationship between

general conclusions. The first assumes that the presence of a dominant actor will lead to the provision of a stable international regime in various issues areas and more significantly in trade. Second, by implication, although the dominant actor benefits from the provision of the public good, smaller states gain more because they share the benefits without having to pay any cost.[44]

The theory, of course, is much more complicated and has several different variants than being formulated here.[45] Furthermore, the implications suggested by hegemonic theory and its public good aspect is not necessarily restricted to international trade. Environmental and security issues are the other two areas, to which the assumptions of hegemonic stability theory are mostly applied. Nevertheless, the point here is not to discuss hegemonic stability theory, verify or refute its assumptions. Rather the aim here should be understood more of demonstrating the extension of the public goods into the international domain and the problems that precludes the production of such goods among rational actors where there is no overarching authority. Thus, drawing a link between the difficulty in the production of public goods and the reluctance of states in dealing with intrastate conflicts, the leadership assumption of hegemonic stability is relied on to understand "how to make collective action work" in intrastate conflicts.[46] Therefore, it is necessary to demonstrate how intrastate conflicts fit into the notion of international public goods, before demonstrating how effective resolution of such conflicts requires provision of leadership.

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hegemony and international trade regimes, as an idea the theory was first developed in 1973 by Kindleberger, who sought to find an answer for the primary reason behind the World Depression of 1929. In his book with the same title Kindleberger argued that order in world politics is created by a single great power, a hegemon, who will stabilize the world economy. In this regard, along with Kindleberger, adherents of the theory argue that in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Britain supplied the public good essential to global economic stability. In the post world war two periods, the US did so.

[44] Snidal, t*he Limits*, p. 581.

[45] *Ibid.*; Lake, *op. cit*.

[46] Hardin, *op. cit*., p. 17.

3.2 Intervention as Public Good

Compared with the interests and benefits that states associate to the issue areas such as international trade, collective security, or environmental regimes, the consideration of intrastate conflicts in terms of public goods might in the first place seem quiet hard to accept. The question to be asked, in the way that Russell Hardin asks to distinguish between public goods and public bads, is: What would make an intrastate conflict the subject of collective action in the way that de facto impossibility of exclusion makes a good the subject of collective action?[47] The public goodness of intrastate conflicts is as straight forward as the other concrete issues at hand when considered in terms of the by products of private goods whose costs are borne collectively. As individuals pursue their interests independently, they frequently create external economies (or externalities for other actors). These externalities are, most of the time, considered in terms of benefits available to all members of a group without any cost involved.[48] However, private activities of individuals do not necessarily always create benefits. An externality may arise in terms of the imposition of undesired outcome on the society as a byproduct of such private activities. The air pollution is an excellent case of negative externalities, produced privately but requires collective action for its removal. The following example from Hardin illustrates the point more vividly. The broadcasting of a loud music in a public place is a public bad due to the fact that one cannot reject or be excluded from it. However, as Hardin clarifies, "the impossibility of rejection is not really the issue- rather, de facto infeasibility or costliness of rejecting a bad is sufficient to provoke collective action problems." The rest of the paragraph is further important to be quoted.

> If the broadcasts are a bad, their absence is a good, and what people would do to prevent the bad is surely equivalent to what they would do to provide the obverse good. A group's members may uniformly perceive either that they suffer from a bad or that they fail to benefit from a good, and although the logical account of costs and benefits might be strategically the same, the group's action may depend on

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 61.

[48] Russett and Sullivian, *op. cit.*, p. 846.

> whether its members see their problem as the elimination of a bad or the provision of a good.[49]

By the logic of this analogy and Hardin's distinction between public goods and public bads, intrastate conflicts in many respects can be considered as public bads produced as byproduct of private activities of parties involved in an internal conflict to promote their respective interests. Conflicts do not exist separate from the rest of the international system. They have externalities or costs to the broader community, which must find ways to deal with them and share those costs associated with the efforts for their solution. In this context, intrastate conflicts can be compared with pollution, which affect the wider international society as a whole and thereby requires collective action. The potential threat they pose to international peace and security makes them an immediate concern of international community.

An internal conflict is a potential challenge to regional stability simply due to what is called spill over effect. A situation of violent intrastate conflict has the potential of attracting an external party becoming involved in the conflict on the side of one of the parties. This can occur when either one or both of the parties involved in the conflict attempt to seek external assistance. By contrast, external involvement might occur when one of the regional states act preemptively to prevent the involvement of any other external party.[50] Yet, an internal conflict jeopardizes international peace and security not merely because it might create conditions for external involvement and thereby transform the nature of the conflict.

Neighboring countries can be involved in the conflict even without having to intervene or undertake any substantial activity that will exacerbate the situation. The territory of the neighboring countries will most of the time be used for the supply of arms which might create potential frictions between the neighboring country and one of the parties.[51] Refugee flows that such conflicts create are equally a potential threat international peace and security. Refugees not only impose a heavy burden on the

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[49] I*bid,* p. 62.

[50] Mitchell, C. R., "Civil Strife and The Involvement of External Parties", *International Studies Quarterly* (Vol. 14, No. 2, June, 1970).

[51] Brown, Michael, *The International Dimension of Internal Conflict*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), p.7.

host state but have disruptive effects with in that country. And after all, even if having been stated as a weak cause for the mobilization of the international community, such conflicts causes tremendous suffering usually civilians being the target.

In this context, by the logic of the negative symmetry between public goods and public bads, intervention becomes a collective or public good. Although produced outside the group, when the negative externality that the action of the parties to the conflict create influence the welfare, or as in the example of loud music, its rejection or elimination requires a cost for the group to bring the wellbeing of the group back into equilibrium then we can claim that a condition that involves a collective action has been created.

Efforts to prevent contain or stop a war result in conditions that convey broad benefits both for the parties to the conflict and for wider international community.[52] As Ruben Mendez puts it, the provision of the peace like the provision of defense at national or international level is a public good that everyone can enjoy.[53] This is not a pure naiveté. Consider for instance the case of Kosovo Crisis, which will later be mentioned. The eruption of the conflict had repercussions not simply limited to Balkan region. On the other hand, the intervention to bring a solution to the conflict similarly had repercussions with differing magnitudes for different segments of international community. While those closest were the most to be effected from the diffusion or prevention of the conflict, other states had at differing levels to lose or benefit from its diffusion or prevention. Not to mention the fragile situation the conflict had created for Albania, Macedonia and other neighboring states, for the European Union (EU) countries, for instance, the conflict was another deadly incident on its periphery, for the NATO. It implied possible splits within the organization among the member states, i.e. Turkey and Greece more likely to become a party to the conflict.

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[52] Hamburg, David A. and Jane E. Holl, "Preventing Deadly conflict: From Global Housekeeping to Neighbor Watch" , in Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A Stern (editors), *Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century* (New York: Oxford University Press 19993), p. 366.

[53] Ruben Mendez, "Peace as a Global Public Good" in Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A Stern (editors), *ibid.,* p. 388.

3.3 Leadership and Intervention

Now that I have demonstrated the connection between hegemonic stability, collective action and public goods, on the one hand, collective action, public goods and intervention on the other hand, the remaining task is to establish the link between leadership and intervention. Two questions need to be answered at this juncture. The first question is whether a small group of n states is capable of performing the tasks that a leading state can perform? The second question is what leadership is and how it applies to coercive diplomacy as a form of intervention.

Can a small group of n provide the international public goods to deal with public bads? According to Snidal if a hegemon is needed because somebody has to provide the international public good, such a good can be provided without requiring the existence of a hegemon. Making reference to public goods theory, which hegemonic stability builds on, Snidal argues that there is nothing in the former that limits privileged groups to a single state. Using Thomas Schillings n-person binary choice model which shows the relation of the interest of individual actors to their collective interests, according to Snidal, it is possible for two or more states, through strategic interaction, to obtain sufficient net benefits for them to produce international collective goods.[54]

Snidal is right in taking into consideration strategic interaction, the impact of bargaining and cooperation through coordination in a small group, which is willing to undertake the provision of the public good. Certainly, a small group can provide a public good or costs of dealing with a public bad. But can it ensure or facilitate its provision? Or can a small group make collective action work in the absence of leadership? As Michael Brenner points out, a leader fulfils a number of technical functions in multilateral cooperation, in the absence of which they are difficult to be achieved. These are problem identification, problem definition, option identification, deliberation and decision, and finally implementation.[55] Therefore, it is not enough whether voluntarism will suffice in the provision of the public good. As has been demonstrated above while discussing collective action theory, a coalition of equals

[54] Snidal, *the Limits*, p. 600.

[55] Brenner, Michael, "The Multilateral Moment" in Michael Brenner (Editor) Multilateralism and Western Strategy (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 17.

"will exhibit a strong tendency to underplay situation, to strain toward consensus at some price in efficacy, and then to resist major changes in either basement or strategy out of fear that agreements and understandings laboriously reached could become unraveled.[56] Thus, as Inis Claude puts it:

> Effective multilateralism begins with the initiative of a state that is willing to accept the risk of having to do more than its share and the certainty of being criticized for excessive unilateralism or for manipulating the international agency to support its own purposes.[57]

If leadership is a required condition for the achievement of successful outcomes, what does it imply? As mentioned earlier, it is possible to distinguish between several strands of the theory attributing distinct meanings to the provision of leadership or hegemony. Snidal describes two circumstances in which a hegemon will provide an international public good where there would otherwise be collective action failure: the 'benevolent leadership model' and the 'coercive leadership model'. The former draws upon the notion of "exploitation of the big by the small" to show that if the dominant power places a higher absolute valuation a particular good than the smaller powers, it will provide that non-excludable good irrespective of free riding, and may still generate a net relative benefit despite unilaterally baring the full cost burden. Meanwhile, the latter suggests that the hegemon can coercively induce provision from others by establishing a de facto "tax" through mobilizing its dominance.[58]

The assumption of leadership employed here deviates from the main stream versions of the hegemonic stability theory. Leadership, as Young puts it, is not merely a form of benevolent behavior by privileged groups who act in such a way as to supply public good to others regardless of their unwillingness to contribute toward the supply of such goods.[59] Nor is leadership having the power to coerce other states in resolving the problems of provision by imposing itself as a centralized authority

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[56] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

[57] Claude Jr., Inis L., "The Tension between Principle and Pragmatism in International Relations", *Review of International Affairs*, (Vol.19, 1993), p. 225.

[58] Snidal, *the Limits*.

[59] Young, *the Policies*, p. 355.

able to extract the equivalent of taxes.[60] Instead, as Keohane argues, although successful hegemonic leadership depends on a certain form of asymmetrical cooperation, hegemony is not alternative to cooperation. "The hegemon plays a distinctive role, providing its partners with leadership in turn for deference; but unlike an imperial power it cannot make and enforce rules without a certain degree of consent from other sovereign states. Cooperation may be fostered by hegemony, and hegemon require cooperation to make and enforce rules."[61]

In this context, the concept of leadership employed here takes its meaning from the combination of three forms of leadership identified by Young. These are structural leadership, entrepreneurial leadership and intellectual leadership. Structural leader translates the possession of material resources into bargaining leverage over the issues at stake in specific interactions. The entrepreneurial leader "leads by making use of negotiating skills to influence the manner in which issues are presented in the context of institutional bargaining and to fashion mutually acceptable deals bringing willing parties together on the terms of constitutional contracts yielding benefits for all." Intellectual leader, on the other hand, "relies on the power of ideas to shape the way in which participants in institutional bargaining understand the issues at stake and to orient their thinking about available to come to terms with this issues."[62] Unlike Young who treats the leader as an individual person who acts in the name of the state, I treat the leader as an individual state itself, though with agents acting in the name of it.

[60] *Ibid.*, p.386.

[61] Keohane, *op. cit*., p. 46.

[62] Young, *Political Leadership*, p. 288.

CHAPTER 3

COERCIVE DIPLOMACY AS A FORM OF INTERVENTION

Coercive diplomacy to achieve certain goals probably has not been more prominent at any other time since the emergence of the concept to explain the threat based discourse of the post Second World War than in the post Cold War period. In comparison to war, relatively low psychological, economic and political costs it requires, makes coercive diplomacy an elusive strategy. However, against the frequency of its practice, coercive diplomacy, has not only failed to attract recognition but also proved not to be as elusive to analyze as it is practiced. When compared with the amount of attention paid to interventions in general and humanitarian intervention in particular almost no attention has been devoted to coercive diplomacy, which is indeed the most common form an intervention is carried out. Most often, that the concept is indeed a form of intervention with the capacity to grasp the notion of present day interventions better than the concept of intervention itself has gone unnoticed.

One can speculate on a number of reasons why the phenomena has not been recognized as the most common form of intervention. One reason might be because interventions have merely attracted attention for their purposes, both politically and legally, rather than the processes that accompanied these purposes. Another possible reason might be due to the bias that confines interventions to the use of force without taking into consideration the process that involve before and after the use of force. These possible explanations for the failure to acknowledge coercive diplomacy as a form of intervention are legitimate queries requiring detailed elaborations. Yet this is a task that fall beyond the scope of this study. Instead, to serve the primary purpose of this study, I attempt to develop the study of coercive diplomacy further while discussing not only what the concept has been presented to be by its pioneers but in the light of recent attentions devoted to the concept what it has been refined to be.

To serve this purpose, I will give a brief definition of diplomacy followed by that of coercion to demonstrate the relationship or more appropriately continuity between diplomacy and use or the threat of the use of force. Following the definition of coercive diplomacy, I will outline its variables and discuss the forms it takes. In the remainder of this section, I discuss some aspects of the concept and make some modifications to its original formulation.

Although taking Thomas Schelling and Alexander George's assumptions as the starting point and stick to the definition of the concept as defined by George, I reformulate these assumptions in the light of recent modifications to the general framework. In this regard, like Freedman and Jacobson I use the concept to entail the use of coercive diplomacy for both offensive and defensive purposes. As a part of the same argument, I question the logic that considers coercive diplomacy legitimate. Next I discuss how much force is appropriate to evaluate any use force to match the criteria of the use of force in coercive diplomacy. Within this context, I will argue that coercive diplomacy in any particular situation is not simply made up of one particular form. Rather, as I will elaborate later, coercive diplomacy is a continuous strategy that from inception to completion makes use of all the forms it takes in one particular situation. It is dynamic, adaptive, and changing, and it constitutes a continuum.

2.1 What is Diplomacy?

Any discussion of coercive diplomacy needs in the first place a demonstration of the continuity between diplomacy and its coercive variant. This in turn requires an understanding of what diplomacy is. The term "diplomacy" refers to the interaction between nation-states. In its daily usage diplomacy denotes the work of diplomats involving a political process by which a state is represented in another country.[63] Apart from denoting day to day business of a diplomatic mission, diplomacy at the same time means "the management of international relations by means of

[63] Plischke, Elmer, "Diplomacy: Search for its Meaning, in Elmer Plischke (editor), *Modern Diplomacy, the Art and Artisans*, (American Enterprise Institute, 1979), p.1- 33; Lerche Jr., Charles O and Abdul A. Said, "Diplomacy: Political Technique for Implementing Foreign Policy", in Plische Elmer Plischke (editor), *op. cit.*, p. 19.

negotiation."[64] Rathore defines it as the "art of negotiations in international politics for furthering one's interests."[65] Likewise, Thomas Schelling defines diplomacy simply as a bargaining process through which each party tries to attain what the other has or controls.[66]

Whatever its function is, the principal objective of diplomacy is to advance the interests of a state ranging from protecting the state' s independence, security, and territorial, political, and economic integrity.[67] In this regard, it has been argued that diplomacy is most effective when it secures maximum national advantage without resort to military force and while at the same time preserving positive external relations. Thus as Rathore notes, "a diplomacy that ends in war has failed in its primary objective.[68]

2.2 The Theory of Coercive Diplomacy

Perhaps the conceptualization of diplomacy in this sense might in the first place seem quiet contrary to coercive diplomacy to which coercion is of its defining characteristic. That is any attempt to influence another's behavior or impose external regulation and control upon persons by threat of use of force or power.[69] However, that diplomacy is most effective without recourse to threats or use of force does not mean that it leaves them out of its scope. Indeed, coercion is an integral part of

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[64] Nicolson, Harold, *Diplomacy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1939), p.15; Rathore, L.S., *The Foundations of Diplomacy* (New Delhi: ML. Jain, 1974), p. 6.

[65] Rathore, *op. cit*., p. 14.

[66] Schelling, Thomas C., *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 1. In everyday language bargaining usually refers to a process of give and take between parties who both would benefit from some agreement but who would suffer no harm or cost if no agreement is reached. Following Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing it is possible "to treat bargaining as a concept that denotes a process of deciding on a distribution of utilities between two parties, and bargain or outcome as an allocation of utilities." The process of bargaining as they put it consists of conflicting wants and demands. Two parties both want the same good or set of goods, and they can not both have the whole set. Snyder, Glenn H. and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations*, (Princton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

[67] Watson, Adam, *Diplomacy*, (New York: New Press1983).

[68] Rathore, op. cit., p. 12.

[69] See Pennoc, J. Roland, "Coercion an Overview" in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (editors), *Coercion,* (Chicago: Aldine and Atherton, 1972), p. 1.

diplomatic process. It is hardly possible to imagine compliance with certain demands that are not backed by the implicit or explicit potential of inflicting harm. As Fredric the Great has put it "diplomacy without arms is music without instruments."[70] Schelling justifies the role of force in diplomacy while stating that "the power to hurt is a kind of bargaining power…Military force can sometimes be used to achieve an objective forcibly…used as bargaining power it is part of diplomacy."[71]

A closer analysis of the concept of bargaining clarifies this point better. For instance, Oran Young maintains that "it is fundamentally erroneous to conceptualize bargaining as an alternative to coercion." Accordingly, "while bargaining refers to certain types of interaction processes involving two or more actors, coercion refers to one of the principal modes such processes can take." Thus as Young maintains, bargaining activities in international relations occur along a continuum from persuasion without coercion to the most violent forms of coercion.[72] Likewise, Deising and Snyder distinguishes between accommodative and coercive aspect of bargaining which involves intimidation, blackmail, the use of some kind of force (persuade, influence) another party to do something that he ordinarily would not wish to do.[73]

In this regard, coercive diplomacy is not an alternative to diplomacy but is a means of achieving state interests in other ways. The concept has some linguistic connotations. As an attribute of diplomacy, coercion restricts or more appropriately redefines that concept by conditioning the process to a form of exercise of power, in which state X carries and demonstrates the intention of harming state Y if Y does not act as X intends or desires.[74] Viewed in this context, the distinction between diplomacy and coercive diplomacy is not one of type but one of ordering of the

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[70] Lauren, Paul Gordon, "Theories of Bargaining with Threats of Force: Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy, in Paul Gordon Lauren (editor), *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1979), p. 184.

[71] Schelling, *op. cit*., p. v-vi.

[72] Cited in Lauren, *Theories of Bargaining*, p. 129.

[73] Deising and Snyder, *op, cit*., p.26

[74] Bayles, Michael, "A Concept of Coercion" in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (editors), *op. cit.*, p. 19.

forms at hand to achieve the pursued goals. While the possible order in a pure diplomatic process might involve communication, negotiation, maneuvering, compromise, and exchange, or collaboration, a process which accompanied by the passive presence of force without being invoked in the background, this ordering can be considered in reverse when coercive diplomacy is in question. Viewed in this context, one can argue that diplomacy and coercive diplomacy often cycle hand in hand. Diplomacy will be followed by coercive diplomacy, while coercive diplomacy will usually be followed by diplomacy. Or the two may occur in concert, suggesting a division of labor.

Obviously, the practice of coercion as a part of diplomacy is not something new. The accompaniment of diplomacy with some sort of military measures has been a factor since ancient times when other techniques failed to achieve desired outcomes.[75] What is new about coercive diplomacy is theorizing about it. The concept, like many other developments in the field of international relations, owes its deeds to the Cold War circumstances. Thomas Schelling, in his book *Arms and Influence,* is the first to use the term to describe the exploitation of military potential to influence other countries by the harm it could do to them. In this regard, Schelling describes coercive diplomacy as:

> There is a difference between taking what you want and making someone give it to you, between fending of an assault and making someone to afraid to assault you, between holding what people are trying to take and making them afraid to take it […..] It is the difference between defense and deterrence, between brute force and intimidation, between conquest and blackmail, between action and threats. It is the difference between the unilateral, "undiplomatic" recourse to strength, and coercive diplomacy based on the power to hurt.[76]

Yet despite being coined by Schelling, the concept is most of the time associated with Alexander George, who has articulated a systematic framework for coercive diplomacy in a number of theoretical works.[77] George defines coercive

[75] Rathore, *op. cit.,* p. 17-18

[76] Schelling, *op. cit.,* p. 2.

[77] George, Alexander and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1994); George, Alexander, *Forceful Persuasion* (Washington: United States Institute of

diplomacy as the use of a threat of punishment and/or limited force short of full scale military operations to persuade an actor to stop and/or undo an action he is already embarked upon.[78] The logic behind coercive diplomacy, as George describes, is "to back one's demand on an adversary by injecting threats of punishment for non compliance into the adversaries calculations "that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply with the demand."[79]

George identifies four variables or questions whose answers he considers to be essential for the success of this strategy.

> 1. What to demand of the opponent;
> 2. Whether and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with the demand;
> 3. What punishment to threaten for noncompliance, and how to make it sufficiently potent and credible;
> 4. Whether also to offer positive inducements and, if so, what "carrot" to offer together with the stick to induce acceptance of the demand.[80]

While threats are central to coercive diplomacy, whether recourse to them will result in desired outcomes depend on several other contextual factors to the particular case and the demand that the threat is accompanied by.[81] Therefore, it is important to take into consideration some contextual variables that influence the calculations of both the coercer and the target. George maintains that these variables play the most significant role in determining the success or failure of a coercive strategy in a particular situation. Accordingly, he outlines three of such contextual variables, all of which are influenced from "the coercer's choice of a demand,": magnitude of the demand(s) made on the opponent, the magnitude of the opponents motivation not to comply, and the factor of whether the opponent will feel the

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Peace, 1991). Indeed, Peter Jacobson maintains that while laying down the basic tenets of coercive diplomacy George has used Schelling' s rational theory of compelence as his starting point, although he never explicitly credits him. Jacobsen, Peter Viggo, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998) p. 18.

[78] George, *Forceful Persuasion*, p. 5.

[79] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

[80] George, *The limits*, p. 17

[81] *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

threatened punishment is sufficiently credible and potent to cause him to comply. [82] The first two variables simply suggest the importance of the value each side attributes to the demand in question and the willingness and readiness of each side to pay the price to attain or retain what is at stake. George explains this situation as follows:

> If the coercing power demands something that is more important to it than to the adversary, then the coercer should benefit from what may be called asymmetry of interests. Conversely if the coercing power peruses ambitious objectives that go beyond its own vital or important interests, and if it demands infringe on vital or important interests of the adversary, then the asymmetry of interests and balance of motivation will favor the adversary and make successful application of coercive diplomacy much more difficult.[83]

The third variable, on the other hand, implies that it is not sheer military preponderance that gives credibility to a threat. It is the relative balance between the value of the demand to the coercer and how much force the coercer can invest to achieve compliance. In other words, it does not matter how many nuclear bombs you have but what matters is under what circumstances you are prepared to use them. To illustrate this balance, Schelling emphasizes that "the difference between the national homeland and everything "abroad" is the difference between threats that are inherently credible and, and even if unspoken threats that have to be made credible."[84]

Along with these variables, George at the same time distinguishes between four possible forms that states might rely on while engaging in the practice of coercive diplomacy: (1) *Ultimatum*: involves a demand from an opponent; a time limit or sense of urgency; a threat of punishment for non-compliance. (2) *Tacit Ultimatum*: when the above criteria are not necessarily detailed, but the message is demonstrated through action. (3) *Gradual Escalation*: the threat or the intention to step up pressure gradually is conveyed from the outset. (4) *Try-and-See*: a demand is

[82] *Ibid.,* p.14.

[83] *Ibid.,* p.15.

[84] Schelling, *op. cit.,* p. 36.

made of the opponent without time or threat (although still implied), followed by a waiting period to see whether the demand is complied with.[85]

Before moving on discussing some aspects of coercive diplomacy it is important to highlight the importance of communication as well as the role of positive inducement as parts of coercive diplomatic process. Indeed, the primary task of coercive diplomacy is to communicate "the coercing power's demands for a resolution of the conflict and those threats of unacceptable costs."[86] It implies that earlier attempts communicating the demands of the coercer have been ineffective that other channels are tried. George identifies two levels of communication: words and actions. While he places emphasis on actions in terms of performing the function of reinforcing the credibility of words, he warns against the risk of being perceived by the opponent as equivocal. It is highly possible that the target might believe that the coercing power is bluffing and is not prepared to act if its demand is not accepted. Therefore, he suggests that "actions may be needed in some situations to reinforce strong words, explicit ultimata may be needed to reinforce and to define the meaning and credibility of the threatening actions the defender is taking as part of his attempt to make coercive diplomacy work.[87] As will be discussed below in detail this aspect of coercive diplomacy needs further attention in coercions requiring collective action. Because any equivocal signal might be perceived as bluff and thereby raise hesitations about the credibility of threats transmitted by a coalition of states engaged in a collective action.

Finally, another point that needs to be addressed is whether coercive diplomacy should rely solely on the threat of punishment or concessions should be included into the strategy of coercive diplomacy, on behalf of a compromised settlement. Of course whether coercion semantically entails deprivations and harms or can rewards and benefits be included under the category of coercion is a controversial topic. Some scholars strictly adhering to the semantic implications of coercion, excludes the use of positive inducements from the scope of the concept.

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[85] George, *The limits*,

[86] Lauren, Paul Gordon, "Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy", *International Studies Quarterly* (Vol. 16, No. 2, June 1972), p. 135.

[87] George, t*he Limits*, p. 30.

For instance, Michael Bayles considers that the concept of coercion excludes positive sanctions from its scope.[88] Therefore, he strictly leaves "a promise of benefit" outside the scope of coercion. However, just as the assumption of diplomacy can not be refined from conflict and threatening to use force, so it would be misleading to view coercive diplomacy exclusively focusing on the threat of force and/or use of limited force. As a component of diplomacy, coercion loses its primary implications. One should not ignore the fact that the presence of concession is often a fundamental requirement for the management and resolution of conflicts. Coercive diplomacy, therefore, needs to be distinguished from pure coercion; it includes the possibility of bargains, negotiations, compromises as well as coercive threats. Thus, as George argues, what the threatened stick cannot achieve by itself, unless it is formidable, can possibly be achieved by combining it with a carrot."[89]

2.3 Conceptual Clarification

Against this background, the theory of coercive diplomacy as formulated by George, if not in essence, has been recently challenged or modified by a number of scholars in terms of its content. It is possible to identify five points on which the theory of coercive diplomacy as formulated by George has been evaluated and modified. In the first place, George distinguish coercive diplomacy from other threat based strategies relying on the distinction between attempts aimed at the preservation of status quo and the alteration of status quo. George distinguishes coercive diplomacy from other threat based strategies in terms "being a response to an action already under taken."[90] Explicitly, George confines the use of coercive diplomacy to defensive purposes and designed to preserve status quo as opposed to altering it.

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[88] Bayles provides three reasons that he considers to be restricting the concept of sanctions in coercion to be limited to harm. In the first place, benefits obscure the distinction between coercion and bribery. Second, he argues that "rewards are given for compliance with an agent's wishes; punishment and harms are given for non compliance. He makes his third objection on linguistic grounds: coercion involves threats and threats refer to harms, not benefits. Bayles, *op. cit*., p. 17-23.

[89] George, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

[90] George maintains such threats, which are employed offensively to persuade a victim to give up something of value that it would have preferred not, as blackmailing. "Coercive diplomacy differs from blackmailing in that it aims at stopping or undoing an action already initiated by the target. In such a situation, the adversary makes the first move and the coercer than issues a threat aimed at stopping and/or undoing the action undertaken by the adversary." George also distinguishes between

This heavy reliance on defensive-offensive dichotomy has been challenged recently by a number of scholars. Paul Gordon Lauren maintains that coercive diplomacy can be defensive or offensive in nature. Defensive coercion may be attempted, for example, to persuade an opponent to stop or undo an encroachment viewed as highly dangerous to peace. Its purpose clearly is to maintain status quo. Offensive coercion, on the other hand, may be attempted to black mail an adversary in an effort to make him give up something that he already possesses simply because it is easier to take it peacefully rather than by using force.[91]

Lawrence Freedman, on the other hand, argues that "the instance that coercive diplomacy is defensive is neither tenable in practice nor useful analytically." Especially when George's delineation that one of the objective of coercive diplomacy is "a cessation of the opponent's hostile behavior through a demand for change in the composition of the adversary's government or in the nature of the regime along with two other objectives which are respectively stopping an action and reversal of what has already been accomplished, is taken into consideration, it becomes difficult to sustain the offensive defensive delineation. As Freedman notes, "if this objective is defensive it is difficult to come up with offensive ones."[92] In this regard, Jacobson maintains that an action that is defensive

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coercive diplomacy and deterrence and compellence, respectively. In this context, while coercive diplomacy is a response to an action already undertaken, deterrent threats are passive in nature and entails "threats to dissuade an adversary from undertaking a damaging action not yet initiated. The objective of deterrence is to discourage an opponent from taking certain actions in the first place from fear of consequences." It involves a massage that a pain will be inflicted if the opponent initiates or undertakes certain actions. By contrast, coercive diplomacy is distinguished from compellence in terms of an action initiated by the sender that would get the opponent do something. According to George, the distinction between coercive diplomacy and compellence relies in the fact that the latter does not distinguishes between defensive and offensive uses of threat. In this regard, he argues that "the concept of compellence implies exclusive or heavy reliance on coercive threats, where as coercive diplomacy emphasizes the possibility of a more flexible diplomacy that can employ rational persuasion and accommodation as well as coercive threats to encourage the adversary either to comply with the demands or to work out an acceptable compromise. George, *the Limits*, p. 7.

[91] Lauren, *Theories of Bargaining*, p. 193.

[92] To overcome this confusion, Lawrence Freedman totally abandons the concept and offers an alternative term, "strategic coercion," which he defines as "the deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another's strategic choices". This conceptualization, contrary to George's limitation of coercive diplomacy exclusively to defensive purposes, entails all categories of "threat based strategies." See Freedman, Lawrence, "Strategic Coercion", in Lawrence Freedman (editor), *Strategic Coercion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 15.

in nature to one actor can well be regarded by the receiver of the sanction as offensive.[93]

Following from George's offense defense distinction another confusion that emerges from George's conceptualization is the association of the concept to cases where the preservation of status quo is the primary goal and the determination of such events as legitimate. Calling this misrepresentation as status quo bias, due to the association of status quo with legitimacy, Jacobsen argues that legitimacy of a threatfull action is not only a contextual issue but also a point of view."[94] For instance one would never have straightforward answer to the legality and defensiveness of humanitarian interventions undertaken throughout 1990s. Non-intervention principle, which is the preservation of status quo in its own right, has been a subject of attack by many legal experts. In such cases for instance offense is considered legitimate while noninterference is condemned for being unethical and indeed a threat to the international system in wider sense. [95].

Remember that coercive diplomacy is articulated as a form of diplomacy. This is strictly the view held by Thomas Schelling and George. Thus, distinguishing between force as it is used for what he calls pure coercion and force used as a means of coercive diplomacy, George argues that it is used in an exemplary discrete and controlled manner to strengthen diplomatic efforts at persuasion. The primary purpose of the use of force is to demonstrate resolution and willingness to escalate high levels of military action if necessary. By contrast, the use of force in traditional military strategy the concern is affecting an opponent's military capabilities.[96]

While the delimitation to the use of force to differentiate it from pure coercion is among the essentials of the logic of coercive diplomacy, the way it is portrayed has been questioned by Jacobson and Freedman.[97] Accordingly, Jacobson argues that it is not the amount of force as George's notion of exemplary, tailored use

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[93] *Ibid, op. cit.,* p. 18.

[94] *Ibid*., p. 14

[95] *Ibid.*

[96] George, t*he Limits*, p. 2; Lauren, *Ultimata*, p. 135; Schelling, *op. cit*., p. 10.

[97] Lawrence, *op. cit.,* p. 20; Jacobsen, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

of force that should distinguish the use of force as it is applied in coercive diplomatic purposes from full scale force but the objective for which the force is used. This argument echoes Schelling's differentiation of coercion from brute force in terms of intent as much as instrument. To illustrate this point Schelling draws attention to the distinction between hunting down Comanche and exterminating them, which is an example of brute force; and raiding their villages and making them behave as an example of coercive diplomacy, which is based on the demonstration of the power to hurt.[98] With similar implications, Freedman and Jacobson use objective for which the force is used as what constitutes coercive diplomacy or not. Such distinction cannot be based on a threshold number of troops or air strikes.

Apart from this major semantic problems regarding the boundaries of the concept as George defines it, there are a number of other points in George's framework that needs refinement. One such topic is the way that George outlines the possible form that a coercive diplomacy will take. Confining the practice of coercive diplomacy to four different possible forms, George not only creates a limited notion of coercive diplomacy but also the way he outlines them gives the impression as if each of these concepts were isolated from each other. Yet, the forms that coercive diplomacy can take are not limited to these forms. Nor any sender employing coercive diplomacy would simply stick itself to one particular form. Instead, the process takes many forms from inception through to completion, rather than involving one single form. As this study will demonstrate the use of coercive diplomacy requires a wide array of options available to the intervener through out the process of behavioral change creation attempt in the target rather than relying exclusively on one specific variant of that strategy.

This image of coercive diplomacy is best captured by Lauren who depicts the strategy on a continuum of threats through an ascending scale of intensity to the most sever.[99] Not only wide variety but also variability characterizes coercive diplomacy. That is coercive diplomacy will change over the course of a crisis. Changes in the overall strategy of coercer reflect changes in the relationship between the coercer and

[98] Schelling, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

[99] Lauren, *Ultimata, p*. 144.

the coerced. In Chapter Four, therefore, I will formulate a model that takes many forms from inception through to completion, on the broad spectrum of coercive diplomacy, to persuade an opponent to terminate those policies that are viewed as undesirable. Diplomatic, economic military and, psychological measures for example can be threatened in varying combinations and sequences with differing degrees of intensity to achieve the desired level of coercion.

Another condition that limits George's theory is their heavy embeddedness into the Cold War circumstances. In this regard the model not only ignores coalitional use of the strategy but also its use as a form of intervention in intrastate conflicts. Jacobson, for instance, thinks George's framework needs refinement because "the frame was originally conceived during the Cold War when the scope for the coalitional action was limited and conflict was thought of primarily in interstate terms."[100] Without experience from most of the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s to draw on, it is of no surprise that Alexander George's account remains framed in the realities of the Cold War since by definition coercive diplomacy is a defensive strategy undertaken in response to an opponent's encroachment or aggressive action. Indeed the fact that this is the most form of intervention has gone unnoticed not only in the cold War but also in the post cold war literature**.**

In summary, although the concept of coercive diplomacy as coined by Thomas Schelling, and formulated by Alexander George, is still fundamental to my understanding, in applying the concept to explain interventions undertaken by the international community to stop armed conflicts with massive human rights violations erupted within the boundaries of a state, I take into considerations the refinements that have been addressed here. Also it is necessary to note that given the fact that coercive diplomacy is contextual, the forms it takes will be case sensitive. Although the general framework forms a bases it will still be the particular case that will determine the strategy. Yet it is also maintained that the strategy will develop from the least threatening to the use of force. Finally, as the notion of diplomacy can not be considered in isolation from the notion of potential coercion so can the notion of coercion be detached from that of diplomacy. Indeed the process is one of circular

[100] *Ibid.,* p.63.

that starts with diplomacy proceeds with coercive diplomacy at the stage of which several variants are employed, and one that finally ends in diplomacy.

CHAPTER 4

GAME IN THE GAME

4.1 Assumptions

Drawing on the prisoners' dilemma of game theoretical model, I develop two games that model the interaction between the members of the coercing coalition, on the one hand, and between the former and the state which is the target of coercion, on the other hand. While the first game is about the production of the public good, tools of coercion, the second is concerned with the operationalisation of these tools. The second process, of course being influenced from the first process depicts tendency of sub-optimality. That is to say, the members of the group will not provide as much of the good as it would be in their common interest to provide.

Before developing the games it will be in place to make certain clarifications. In the first place, the games assume that all the parties, both interveners and those engaged in intrastate conflict are unitary rational actors. Furthermore, even if lack of cohesion is the foundation of the first game, the intrastate parties will perceive the coalition in terms of its most powerful member. Therefore, they will consider the intervening coalition as a unitary actor. Yet, they will still have conflict expectation within the coalition, at least the party that is being coerced. An additional assumption is about the possible order of the occurrence of these two games. The position taken here is that the first game is bound to emerge as a result of an intrastate conflict, while for the second game to occur the first game should be in place. However, once the second game starts, I argue that they will develop simultaneously, in interaction and taking feedback from each other.

For both games to evolve into an upper stage all possible options at one particular stage of the second game should be exhausted. For instance, coalition members among themselves will be less willing to proceed before seeing the results of non-military coercion. Thus, for the coalition to move on another stage of

cooperation and the second game to develop into the stage of military coercion, all the possible options at the stage of non-military coercion should be exhausted. This assumption is further important, in the sense that as the options condenses, disagreements decrease and the coalition shrinks towards position of the primus inter pares. To be able to lead, the potential leader needs cooperation.

The success of the first game depends on the ability of the leader to persuade or coerce the other members of the coalition to remain in line, as much as it depends on the failure of coalition to coerce the target. The success of the second game depend on the ability of the cohesion within the coalition as much as it depends on the merits of the coercive diplomacy inflicted upon the target and the vulnerability of the target to what it is exposed to. Nevertheless, the success of the second game depends equally on the ability of the leader to keep both games separate from each other. In other words, it should be able to prevent the target from exploiting possible frictions within the coalition.

Finally, when considered with the case study, Kosovo crisis, examined to show the validity of arguments raised here, the models I developed might be challenged for being post facto deliberations. However, two counterarguments provide me safe guard against such possible criticisms. In the first place several cases of intra state conflicts which could not be focused here can be identified that fits into the context of the models developed here. Take, for instance, the hesitancy of the United States in taking a leadership role in Bosnia, as interpreted by David Lake and Donald Rothschild. In this view, presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton held back hoping that the Europeans would step forward and carry the financial and military burden; only when Europeans proved unprepared to assume the costs did the US states take the leadership.[101] The second counter argument is that the second model has been tested not only conceptually and analytically by students of coercive diplomacy but also quantitatively tested by David Carment and Dane Rowlands in the light of six case studies.[102]

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[101] Lake, David A. and Donald Rothschild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflicts", *International Security* (Vol. 21, No. 2, Autumn 1996).

[102] Carment, David and Dane Rowlands, "Three's Company: Evaluating Third-party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, (Vol. 42 No. 5, October 1998).

4.2 Intra-coalition Game

This game is about the strategic interaction among the coalition members for the provision of public good defined in terms of the efforts to end intrastate conflict. As has been indicated through out this study the first thing that members of a coalition will do when faced with an intrastate conflict is to evaluate the conflict in terms of their own interests. In doing so they will consider the proximity of the conflict to them, or their allies, or to what extend the conflict poses threat to some of their strategic and political and economic interests. For instance, the more the conflict is away from ones boarder the least one will be ready to undertake the costs. Such considerations will create an order of preferences among the members of coalition in question.

Obviously, for the game within the coalition to develop there should be an intra state conflict that needs to be acknowledged. We should expect that one of the parties to the conflict will appeal to external help. Especially in intrastate conflicts with ethnic dimension the weakest party usually will appeal to wider international community or to any other state that might identify itself to the weakest party due to some kind of religious or ethnic ties. The demand for an appeal is an invitation for the intensification of the conflict, out of which both parties will try to make a capital. While the dominant party will find an excuse to crush the opposition, the weakest party will use the actions of the dominant party for its victimization and use it as a substantive ground for its appeal.

The conflict itself, however, will not be enough to determine the type of international reaction or its intensity. Several reasons at the initial stage of the conflict will prevent the leading members of the international community to acknowledge the problem. Some of these reasons can be identified as the conflict being taking place within the boarder of a sovereign state, the absence of violence, domestic constraints, several other international problems that needs to be addressed, good relations with the government of the country in which the conflict occurs. Thus, we cannot expect any kind of international engagement at early stages of the conflict. There will be, however, an informal process that has been initiated by several nongovernmental or governmental organizations help setting the scene for future action.

The second stage of the game is launched with the problem realization. Given the dense organizational aspect of today's international life, problem realization will not be a difficult task. We should expect the involvement of several international organizations that will help identify the conflict. In this regard, the question is not whether the problem is realized or not, but whether individual states acknowledge its existence or how they define it.

The judgment that a problem exists carries with it the implied obligation to do something about it.[103] States, including the potential leader itself, will be reluctant to volunteer the full costs of producing a public good. Given the diplomatic, economic and military resources associated with such conflicts leading actors will be reluctant to go alone. Consider, for instance, the situation of an individual bystander witnessing a crime. The person is less likely to intervene to protect the victim from the crime unless there are a couple of them ready to act together. The chance that the volunteer will be hurt prevents such an action to take place.

Yet, for two reasons states will not completely turn their back to the conflict. The first possibility is that the conflict might transform into a situation in which the outsiders' interests might be threatened. The second reason why states might want to intervene in an intrastate conflict is "fear that rivals will become involved and thus secure an increasing measure of influence in the domestic affairs of another state."[104] These two dilemmas in turn force different international actors to work collectively to find a solution. It is probable that various international organizations and ad hoc coalitions might secure cooperation at this stage. After all, the reaction of the international community has not come to a stage to make firm commitments.

However the probability that cost sharing will occur does not guarantee that an interventive behavior will emerge. Decision to act collectively as is the case with any collective action will create collective action problems due to the same reason why they would not want to act alone or due to having different sets of preference ordering. Furthermore, I expect all the members to be equal at the early stages of the

[103] Brenner, Michael, "The Multilateral Moment" in Michael Brenner (editor) *Multilateralism and Western Strategy* (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 18.

[104] Mitchell, C. R., "Civil Strife and The Involvement of External Parties", *International Studies Quarterly* (Vol. 14, No. 2, June, 1970), pp. 172.

conflict, if not in terms of their capabilities, in terms of qualitatively having the same weight in affecting the process. Yet, the balance is likely to change in favor of the potential leader as the options condense and the coalition moves towards firm commitments.

Once the realizations stage takes place the process will develop on three stages: the definition of the problem, deliberation and decision and implementation. The most evident problem will be the definition of the situation by coalition members. At this particular stage of the conflict the members will narrowly define the conflict according to their parochial interests that will prevent them to make any substantial commitment. Equivocacy is expected to be the dominant strategy of each member. Because coercion is a costly strategy, not only in terms of costs associated with its production but also in terms of losses, in the context of economic, political and strategic relations, if they exist with the target.

Therefore, not all the coalition members will have the same degree of political will to see the target being coerced or agree on the type of strategy to coerce. Disagreements over the right course of action will be deep and defections will be high. As Brenner notes, in then absence of a leader member sates will adopt "coping behavior" rather than solving the conflict.[105] Therefore, there will be discrepancy between rhetoric and actions of coalition members and different coalition members will pursue different strategies. These inconsistencies will obviously strain several non-coercive and coercive attempts, short of war, engaged to resolve the conflict. Thus, once the coalition begun to involve into the conflict we expect the game between coalition members to develop in interaction with the second game. The failure of each adopted non-coercive and coercive attempt will carry coalitional cooperation to a further stage.

The failures will in turn have negative implications in communicating the intentions of the coalition to both parties to the conflict. They have the potential of intensifying tensions that might have regional implications. The coalition has two options: either to break up or to display a firmer stance. At these stage we expect the most powerful state in the coalition to engage more actively in changing the preference order of other members of the coalition, not simply because the conflict

[105] Brenner, *op. cit.,* p. 21

has been intensified that requires a more robust approach, but at the same time because being the most powerful member of the coalition, the potential leader, has much to lose than the others if the coalition fails to act.[106]

Yet we do not expect that all the problems in the coalition are bound to be resolved once the leader takes matters in hand. There will still be disagreements regarding how and when to appeal force. One strategy that the leader might pursue to overcome such problems is to engage in creating a coalition that supports its case within the coalition. As Lawrence notes, "the most efficient way to either resist or initiate coercion may be to draw in another, stronger actor on your side.[107] Such efforts will be undertaken to mitigate the problems of deliberating plans and achievement of consensus that will move beyond the lowest common denominator. Furthermore, the leader will make it more feasible to implement decisions once they are reached. Nevertheless, the entire success of the game among coalitional members will depend on the failure of the second game. Coalitional cohesion will largely depend on the feedback it receives from the target. In this game we expect that the more provocative the target is the more resolute will coalition act.

4. 3 Coalition and the Target: From Pseudo-engagement to Intervention

The game as in any other coercive diplomatic attempt will eventually be context dependent.[108] It will depend in part on the magnitude of the threat to the coalition, the specific circumstances of the challenge and many other variables that might simultaneously effect the situation. In other words, the strategic environment of the case will determine the type of the interventive behavior: The strategic environment is comprised of "the salience of the conflict to the intervener, the strength of the combatants in the conflict, and the gains the combatants expect to achieve should the fighting continue."[109]

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[106] Freedman, Lawrence, "Strategic Coercion", in Lawrence Freedman (editor), *Strategic Coercion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 34.

[107] *Ibid*., p. 39.

[108] George, Alexander and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1994), p 9.

[109] Carment and Rowlands, *op. cit.*, p. 577.

Turning now to the physical process that proceeds and encompasses coercion, the model is a modified version adopted from Carment and Rowland who actually apply the model to third party interventions in general. The game will develop in four stages each presenting the parties alternative courses of action. For the game to start there is a necessary condition to be satisfied. The first game should be in place. It does not matter whether the collation has resolved its conflicts or not. The collation might still be negotiating the terms of engagement while they have already embarked upon coercive diplomacy. Second, the coalition must make a move for the game to start.

At the first stage of the game, Carment and Rowlands distinguish three alternative strategies available to a coalition to begin persuading the target to stop doing or undoing certain actions. "The first is to remain aloof from the conflict with no military involvement. The tasks here include mediation, fact finding, preventive diplomacy, and sanctions. The second strategy commits troops to a low-intensity conventional peacekeeping mission. The final strategy is to engage in forceful intervention that requires substantial and favorable military capabilities."[110] Most of the time, the type of the strategy will depend on the salience of the conflict to each member of the coalition as well as to the coalition as a whole. Nevertheless, for the reasons stated in the first game, the coalition will go for the strategy with less material, "fewer political and psychological costs, and often with less risk of unwanted escalation."[111]

Therefore, the first stage of the game is marked by pseudo engagement. The coalition identifies the conflict, tries to bring parties together and articulates proposals for a negotiated solution. Here, it acts as a peace broker rather than a party to the conflict. There are two possible alternatives at the end of this game. If the coalition can find a solution that parties will agree upon, the game terminates. By contrast, if the efforts of the coalition falls on deaf ears then the game moves on to the second stage. At this stage of the game it is expected the party acted upon will assess the will of the coalition and rather than accepting the proposal devised by the

[110] *Ibid.,* p. 576.

[111] George, *op. cit.,* p. 9.

former will be more inclined to demonstrate its resolve. Coalitional disunity is an important indicator for the target in devising its response.

In the second stage of the game, once the target refused the good services of the coalitional efforts to settle the conflict through a negotiated agreement, coercive measures short of military action will be introduced. In practice, given the non-negotiable attitude of the target this stage serves to provide grounds for the third stage, rather than expecting to produce a solution. The coalition will make use of an array of options ranging from economic sanctions, political isolation of the target state from international society, threat of termination of agreements, thereat of the use of force, and several other measures short of the use of forceful intervention. This stage in Alexander George's terminology is "try and see stage". If the target complies with the demand of the coalition the game terminates. In the case of resistance the coalition has three options: withdraw, accommodate, or escalate.[112]

Given the fact that the coalition has by now resolved much of its differences through the exhaustion of several options, and came to a level of acting more cohesively under a leader, withdrawal will be humiliation, especially for the leader. Therefore, the coalition has to choose between accommodation and escalation. The coalition, instead of escalation may provide carrots before escalating its pressure. If carrots do not work, the next option is to demonstrate the credibility of the threat of the use of force which has been launched at the end of the second stage of the game. At this stage the conflict is no longer between two intra state parties but turns into one between the coalition and the target.

The third stage of the game is where military intervention takes place. The military intervention does not mean that the target will capitulate. Instead, it is possible to observe a strong resistance from the target accompanied by rallying of the public around the flag. The coalition might either search for accommodation or escalate the intensity of military intervention. A coalition that would search for accommodation is less likely to engage in military intervention. Therefore, escalation whose outcome is dependent on the relative strengths of the two parties, although rises the costs, will probably be the strategy opted by the coalition.

[112] Carment and Rowlands, *op. cit*., p. 579

CHAPTER 5

KOSOVO CRISIS AS A CASE OF HEGEMONIC INTERVENTION

In this part of the study, using the conflict in Kosovo between ethnic Albanians and Serbian administration that eventually culminated in NATO's air campaign "Operation Allied Force" against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) from March 24 through June 10, 1999, I demonstrate the validity of the arguments raised throughout this paper. The case is not only a good example of illustrating how intrastate conflicts can be consider as negative externalities, having repercussion for the wider international community but also how the presence or absence of leadership might effect the prospect of international engagement. Furthermore, the crisis, before and after the operation was launched reflects a good example of coercive diplomacy modeled above. However, before focusing on these points, it will be in place to give a brief summary of the background of the crisis. It should be noted from the start that the aim is not to give a full historical account of the mater, which is beyond the scope of this study.

5. 1 Background of the Conflict:

NATO was not the first external power whose attack on Yugoslavia had been welcomed by Yugoslav Albanians. Approximately six decades earlier to NATO's operation, the occupation of the Albanian inhibited areas of Yugoslavia by Axis powers, namely Germany and Italy, had aroused the same kind of sympathy. Out of their resentment to two decades of repressive and colonizing Serbian rule, Albanians collaborated with axis powers during the World War II.

After the end of the war, the Yugoslav communist leader Joseph Tito designated Kosovo as a province of the Republic of Serbia. It was not until the passage of constitutional amendments beginning in 1968 (and resulting in a new

constitution in 1974) that Kosovo gained the status of autonomous Province with rights similar to the Federal Republics of Serbia, Bosnia, Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro and Macedonia, except for the right to secede from the Federation. Although Kosovar Albanians enjoyed a considerable degree of freedom relative to pre-1968, their ambitions were still focused on achieving the status of a republic for Kosovo, with rights equal to those of the six Yugoslav republics, including the implied right to self-determination.

In 1980s, the Albanian political and cultural dominance in Kosovo became a major source of Serbian nationalism, fueled and exploited by a communist bureaucrat, Slobodan Milosevic, who rose to power by pledging to restore Serbian control over Kosovo. Following his accession to power Milosevic orchestrated a nationalist campaign, put down Albanian resistance with force, and finally stripped Kosovo of its autonomous status in 1989/90.[113] The Serbian Assembly imposed greater control over Kosovo in 1989, and then in 1990 the Kosovo Provisional Assembly and Government were dissolved. The status of Kosovo as an autonomous province was effectively ended. A state of emergency was imposed and the army was called in. These majors were accompanied by the expulsion of Albanians from almost all major public and economic spheres in Kosovo. In summary, Serbian administration implemented an apartheid regime which would feed Albanian resentment for the rest of 1990s.[114]

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[113] For a very detailed historical coverage of the Kosovo conflict see Judah, Tim, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2000); Malcolm, Noel, *Kosovo. A Short History* (New York: N.Y University Press, 1999); Mertus, Julie A., *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1999); Vickers, Miranda, *Between Serb and Albanian — A History of Kosovo* (London: Hurst & Company, 1998).

[114] Relying on several reports of UNCHR and UN General Assembly Resolutions Marc Weller outlines the human rights violations committed against the Albanians by the Serbian administration throughout 1990s as follows, p.122

- General discrimination;
- Discriminatory legislation in relation to property;
- Resettlement and demographic manipulation;
- Removal of ethnic Albanian from government offices and commercial enterprises;
- Interference with judiciary;
- Education;
- Freedom of press;
- Arbitrary arrests;
- Torture and mistreatment;
- Disproportionate use of force.

Viewed in this context, the violent conflict that started at the end of 1997 or beginning of 1998 can be seen as a continuation of a trend in the history of Kosovo between Serbs and Albanians. Nevertheless, given the historical resistance of the Kosovar Albanians against their annexation to Yugoslavia, why it emerged so late, only after Croatia in 1991 and Bosnia in 1992, was surprising. The Kosovar Albanians, however, from the lessons of the past, instead of being crushed by the Serbs, opted for another way to attain their goal. Initially unifying around the Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK) led by Ibrahim Rugova, the Albanians launched a Gandhi style non-violent resistance against Serbia after declaring their independence along with other Yugoslav republics.[115] Following the declaration of independence after a (unofficial) referendum in 1991, Albanians engaged in developing parallel state structure to that of the Serbian imposed rule.[116]

These efforts at home were supplemented by an intense diplomatic activity abroad to get international support fort their cause and ultimately recognition.[117] The main expectation of Rugova and his circle was that if Milosevic succeeded in creating a Greater Serbia, then the international community could hardly oppose the secession of Kosovo from Serbia and its eventual union with Albania. Neither calculation turned out to be correct. However, even if tempered with reservations each display of sympathy for passive resistance was taken as a victory[118].

For a comprehensive edition of relevant documents on the crisis, from its origins through NATO's intervention in 1999, see Marc Weller (editor), *The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999: From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia to Rambouillet and the Outbreak of Hostilities, International Documents & Analysis, Vol.* 1 (Cambridge, UK: Documents and Analysis Ltd, 1999). Also see, Allex J. Bellamy, "Human Wrongs in Kosovo: 1974-1999," in *The Kosovo Tragedy:* The Human Rights Dimensions, ed. Ken Booth, *The International Journal of Human Rights*, Vol.4, No. 3/4, Autumn/ Winter 2000, pp. 114-119

[115] For a detailed account of the passive resistance see Howard Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo* (London: Pluto, 2000).

[116] For attempts to develop autonomous political, economic and socio-cultural institutions in parallel with those officially controlled by the Serbian administration see March, Andrew and Rudra Sil, "The "Republic of Kosova" (1989-1998) and the Resolution of Ethno-Separatist Conflict: Rethinking "Sovereignty in the Post-Cold War Era Browne Center for International Politics. Available at www.ciaonet.org/wps/sir01/index.html, Attempts to develop autonomous political, economic and socio-cultural institutions in parallel with those officially controlled by the Serbian administration.

[117] Schmitt, Fabian, "Strategic Reconciliation in Kosovo", *Transition* (25 August 1995), p. 18.

[118] Judah, *op. cit*., p. 92; Vickers, *op. cit*., p. 282; Beshiri, Ismije, "Kosovar Independence Lacks International Backing", *Transition* (22 March 1996), pp. 52-54.

5.2 International Prevention I

Contrary to these perceptions on the part of Albanians, the agenda of international community at large was shaped totally by different considerations. International community at that stage, under the pressure of other serious developments in former Yugoslavia, was concerned with how to prevent Kosovo from turning into another international issue. Therefore, beyond appreciation, the absence of trouble to the degree that it would keep the stalemate in Kosovo from their sight was what Western capitals in general and the European states in particular were interested in. The London Conference –International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) - was symbolic of the character of international approach to Kosovo [119] for the next couple of years. Despite the request of Rugova for the participation of Albanians to the peace conference, the response of Lord Carrington, chairman of the conference together with Cyrus Vance, UN Secretary General Special envoy to Yugoslavia, was far from encouraging. Rugova was allowed to participate not as the representative of Kosovar Albanians but as an observer.[120]

The concern to separate Kosovo from the rest of the former Yugoslavia and eventually exclude it from several international activities such as European Community Conference in Yugoslavia (ECCY), and Badinter arbitration commission to find a peaceful solution to the dissolution of former Yugoslavia was motivated by three considerations. The first reason is considered as the absence of an armed conflict in Kosovo. The second concern was due to the fact that the recognition of Kosovo as a constituent element of the federation on equal terms with other republics would have legitimized the claims of the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs who waged a war for their independence.[121] Finally, it was argued that Kosovar Albanians were

[119] Weller, *the Crisis in Kosovo*, 276.

[120] Judah, *op. cit*., p. 93.

[121] While refraining from granting recognition to Kosovo, international community grounded its decision on 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, which sanctions cessation of the regions from the Federation. The constitution devised Socialist Federative Republics of Yugoslavia into six nations (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes Montenegrins, Macedonians and Bosnian Muslims), which have the right to cease and two autonomous regions (Kosovo and Vojvodina) lacking the right of cessation. For legal arguments regarding the right of constituting parts of Yugoslavia to cease from the Federation see Weller, Marc, "The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", *American Journal of International Law* (Vol. 86, No. 3, July 1992), pp. 589.

not in control of the province's territory whose independence they pursued.[122] Therefore, instead of approaching Kosovo in terms of the right of people to self determination, international community preferred to consider the province in terms of the rule of "*utis possidetis*" (the principle of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states).[123]

When the European states granted recognition to the new Republic of Yugoslavia in turn for Dayton Agreement, prospect for an independent Kosovo was almost lost.[124] Not being taken into consideration at Dayton peace negotiation, the Kosovar Albanians felt that they were betrayed. This sense of betrayal coupled with a further increase in Serbian repressive measures over Kosovo discredited the passive resistance of Rugova and the LDK. As an alternative to Rugova and his strategy, "Kosovo Liberation Army" (KLA, or — in Albanian — Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës: UÇK) emerged to attain freedom through violence with the belief that "those that want freedom must fight for it."[125] Beginning in 1997 the KLA with arms it obtained from Albania after the financial and governmental collapse of that country began to launch attacks on the Serbian forces.[126] This development, which further created anxiety over the stability of the region, transformed the perceptions of the international community.

Consequently, the perception of the international community toward Kosovo until the emergence of KLA was determined by the absence of violence in the province as much as its presence elsewhere in Yugoslavia. Conditioned by these circumstances, the passive resistance of Albanians not only pacified international community but also stimulated it to further pacify passive resistance, in turn. In this

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[122] Bellamy, Alex, *Kosovo and the International Society* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), p. 24-25.

[123] See Weller, *The International Response*. Uti possidetis is a legal principle formulated during the process of decolonization. According to this principle, existing boarders can not be changed during the process of decolonisation, unless through consent. With Yugoslavia, these boarders were interpreted as being the internal boarders of the constituent entities of the federation.

[124] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

[125] Hedges, Chris, "Kosovo's Next Masters?" *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 1999), p. 29.

[126] Lani, Remzi, "Rugova and the UCK: Chronicle of a Shifting Balance", *The International Spectator* (Vol. 34, No. 4, October-December 1999), pp. 29-40.

regard whenever international community involved, it did so not due to a concern for Kosovo but to prevent it from becoming a concern. Therefore rather than establishing a firm stance on the eve of the eruption of violence they limited their engagement to equivocal speeches and statements that observed balance between two sides of the conflict. Although these statements were modified in parallel with escalation in conflict their ultimate massage remained the same: no status quo no independence.

Viewed in this context, any efforts taken in regards to Kosovo were either directed against peripheral issues or did not go beyond monitoring and registering activities. However, Dayton removed leverage on all sides. While for the international community there remained no other issue, in the case of Yugoslav crisis to subordinate Kosovo to, it credited the policies of Serbian administration in Kosovo. For Albanians, on the other hand, it removed the attraction to passive resistance.

5.3 International Prevention II: Pseudo-Engagement

As a result of activation in circumstances on the ground international community reluctantly found itself in a chain of reactions. However, the failure of the strategy of prevention did not prevent international community to proceed with a modified version of the same strategy. Indeed, when international community seriously begun to take interest in Kosovo, this was not out of concern for the plight of Albanians but because Kosovo had begun to be a pain in the head. In 1996, alarmed by the increase in the number of Albanians seeking asylum in the Western Europe, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe "draw attention to the systematic human rights violations against the Albanian population in Kosovo"[127]

On the other hand, demand for independence, whether passive or active was an idea that found no supporter in the international quarters. According to Richard Caplan, the United States and the west European states—the chief architects of the Dayton agreement—were concerned that the establishment of an independent Kosovo would make it easier for the forces of separation to triumph over those of integration in Bosnia and that the fragile peace they have constructed there would be

[127] Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe: 1996 Ordinary Session, 5th Sitting, "Resolution 1077(1996) on Albanian Asylum Seekers from Kosovo," Strasbourg 24, January 1996.

shattered. It was also feared that an independent Kosovo would destabilize neighboring Macedonia where the Albanian minority, constituting at least a quarter of the population, was also unhappy with its status. Another potential threat an independent Kosovo posed to the stability of the region was that it might well seek to unite with Albania. Finally there was the concern, more generally, that an independent Kosovo will serve as a positive example for the numerous self-determination movements bent on separation elsewhere in Europe.[128]

Thus, once it became obvious that the eruption of violence was inevitable, international community diverted its efforts for the achievement of a viable solution that would prevent the emergence of an independent Kosovo, yet free from the images of violence in Bosnia. In this regard, several resolutions taken by different international organizations throughout 1996 and 1997 adopted a balanced approach to the conflict. While these resolutions recognized the need to grant Kosovo a large degree of autonomy as a viable solution to the conflict, they heavily emphasized respect for the internationally recognized boarders of Yugoslavia.

Therefore, by the time violence had became real in Kosovo international community had already reached clear cut assumptions over what was acceptable and what was not. The statement issued at September 1997 Contact Group meeting made the international position quiet explicit: "we do not support independence and we do not support status quo. We support enhanced status quo Kosovo within Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."[129]

With these goals in mind international community at the second level of preventive strategy developed three forms of engagement to solve the conflict on the local level before its engagement to solve the conflict through the diplomacy of coercion. These are pseudo-engagement, diplomacy of persuasion and coercive diplomacy.

At this stage of the conflict along with the United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU) it is

[128] Caplan, Richard, "International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo", International *Affairs* (Vol. 74, No. 4, October 1998), p. 755.

[129] Contact Group Statement on Kosovo, NY 24 September 1997, reproduced by Weller, *the Crisis in Kosovo,* p. 234.

possible to observe involvement of major powers through the Contact Group of the US, Russia, Britain, France, Germany and Italy, previously established to bring a solution to the Bosnian crisis. According to Weller, Contact Group combined three elements of persuasion:

> Russia was perceived as a sate which could "deliver Milosevic" due to its general support for the position of the FRY/Bosnia. The EU members would be able to dangle in front of Belgrade the prospect of closer economic integration with Europe, and direct financial incentives. The US would come to represent the driving force behind the tougher action, including the possibility of the use of military force.[130]

Nevertheless, the initial approach of the Contact Group as a coalition was hampered by the parochial interests of the member states. The Contact Group mainly served as a forum for the accommodation of member states' interests. While Russia considered the crisis as an opportunity to counter the US as a way of fixing its image by emphasizing a pan-Slavic ties with Serbia, individual European countries of the group were concerned with their trade relations with Serbia. Italy's attitude regarding the solution of the conflict "within the limits of diplomacy" was illustrative of the stance of the European capitals.[131] Although the US with Britain insisted on a firmer action against Serbia, to what extend they were ready to undertake obligations alone will remain as a question mark. These differences or reluctance among the major powers to act, severely constrained the ability of the coalition to act collectively and thereby undermined several diplomatic attempts for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. Thus, international efforts to call them pseudo-engagement for their weak and halfhearted attitude were still determined by the absence of violence.

The most significant international initiative taken at this stage of the conflict was opening of an information office by the US administration in Pristine on 5 June 1996.[132] According to Junusz Bugayski, this initiative was quiet important in demonstrating the US support for Rugova's peaceful strategy even if Washington

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[130] Weller, *the Crisis in Kosovo*, p. 221

[131] Bellamy, *Kosovo*, p. 73.

[132] Troebst, Stefan, "Conflict in Kosovo: Failure of Prevention? — An Analytical Documentation, 1992-1998", *ECMI Working Paper*, (No. 1, May 1998), p. 75.

disagreed with his objectives. Madeline Albright's letter, the US Secretary of State, urging Milosevic to take positive steps to resolve the situation in Kosovo and cautioning against the use of force was another major step in drawing international attention to the conflict.[133] Although as Caplan puts it such conducts might in the first place were equivocal and hardly ever conveyed an impression of unyielding determination,[134] they formed the ground for future involvement. As discussed earlier states would barely invest all their focus in matters in which their crucial interests are at stake. Even in situations where crucial interests are a matter of question their involvement will begin from the lower stages of the ladder to keep the option of gradual escalation in reserve.

It was, nevertheless, the intensification of the conflict and escalation of violence in the province that stimulated international attention. The activities of KLA in the province to the degree that its representatives could declare liberated areas in the province and Yugoslav/Serbian repression during 1998 did not go unnoticed.[135] When U.S. special envoy Richard Gelbhard during his visit to Pristine on February 23, 1998, called the KLA a "terrorist group", a view echoed by the Contact Group meeting in Moscow two days later, Milosevic was given a pretext to crack down on the rebels. The use of disproportionate force by Serbian special police in the Drenica region on February 28 and March 5 left more than 80 Albanians dead, among them many women and children.

The massacres marked a turning point. For the first time since the outbreak of Yugoslavia a violence of this scale had occurred in Kosovo. Until that time merely limited to the every aspect of life brought under repression through police measures, with the offensive launched by the Army of Yugoslavia and Special Police Units (MUP) Kosovo had become risky enough to consider. Absence of violence, which had conditioned international attention, was no longer present. It was not, however, the death toll which made Drenica events significant. After all when compared to the violence in Bosnia the death of some eighty people was quiet minor. Instead the

[133] See Troebst for several of the resolutions adopted in this period.

[134] Caplan, *op. cit*., p. 753.

[135] Bellamy, Kosovo, p.70; International Crisis Group, "Kosovo Spring Report", March 20, 1998 (www. crisis.web.org/projects/sbalkans/reports.htm), pp.30-32

leaders of the west were haunted with what might follow from Drenica. The symptomic character of violence, evoking the Bosnian syndrome, the refugee syndrome and Balkan wars syndrome as outlined by Bellamy urged international community to devise a more conscious approach towards the crisis.[136]

Without doubt Drenica events had triggered members of the Contact Group for a more robust approach before the events gone out of hands. This realization on the part of the international community, however, was not transformed into concrete actions that would bring definite solutions.[137] Despite these shared assumptions regarding the future of Kosovo, the international community was not so cohesive over the type action to be developed.

Divisions came to surface within the Contact Group, which by that time emerged as the major international mechanism reflecting the concerns of the international community. Despite the efforts of Madeline Albright and her British colleague Robin Cook to push for a firmer stance, the dominant tendency among the members of the Contact Group was to facilitate a political settlement by reliance on positive incentives rather than being directly involved into the matter.[138]

From the beginning of the eruption of violence Albright favored for an immediate action. In response to Drenica events she asserted that "we are not going to stand by and watch Serb authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away in Bosnia." Further trying to push for a though stance at the London meeting of the Contact Group countries on March 1998, Albright insisted that "the only way to stop violence in that region is to act with firmness, unity and speed." [139] The degree of commitment present in Albright's words was not shared equally by the other contact group countries. For instance, while Lombardo Dini, Italian foreign minister considered that they "must make every effort to redirect the situation within the limits of diplomacy," his German colleague insisted on a UN Security Council

[136] Bellamy, *Kosovo*, p. 69.

[137] Daalder and Ohenlon, *Wining Ugly* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 23-27.

[138] *Ibid*., p. 26.

[139] *Ibid*.

authorization before any action against Yugoslavia can be taken.[140] Dini' s accommodation involved the following measures:

> We must make it plain to the Serbs and Milosevic that if they play along, we have things to offer: You need the financial assistance of international institutions, the IMF. You need the IMF, you need the World Bank, and first and foremost you need the Europe we want to help you which presupposes that you play along in Kosovo […] but there are some things which we are not going to be able to relax or take more laid-back attitude upon, unless things improve in Kosovo.

Yet it was not really the attitude of allies that prevented the adoption of a more confrontative approach to deal with the problem. It was in essence the reluctance of the US administration that did not share the same vision with Albright that prevented the activation of such an approach. According to Nation the tendency in Washington was to distance itself from both sides, while at the same time encourage dialogue between Yugoslav government and LDK's leadership, and contain the conflict.[141] Therefore, each time Albright made such statements that opened prospects for a military intervention, her approach created an anxiety among leading policy makers of the US administration like the President's National Security Adviser Sandy Burger who did not want to get to far ahead in terms of making threats.[142] In this regard, it would not be until the second half of 1998 that the international attitude to the conflict would approach to Albright's position.

Prevention, as indicated earlier, assumed the policy makers of the west, was the only viable option to avoid risks posed by the conflict. Kosovo should be prevented from not only becoming independent but also turning into another Bosnian horror.[143] Yet as to how this should be done there was neither a unified stance nor a willingness to undertake firm obligations. Therefore, as observed by Daalder and O'Hanlon,

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[140] Bellamy, *Kosovo*, p. 73.

[141] Nation, Carig, "US Policy and the Kosovo Crisis", *International Spectator*, Vol. 33, No. 41, 998), p. 28.

[142] See Daalder and Ohenlon, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

[143] For a coverage of the Western approach to the conflict and possible spill over risks the crisis in Kosovo carried see ISS Strategic Comments, *Another Balkan Crisis: Containing the War in Kosovo*, (Vol. 4, No. 5, 1998)*; A Balkan Intifada in Kosovo: Ruing out of Time* (Vol. 4, No. 2, 1998).

> [the] US and its European partners sought to defer making difficult decisions, preferring instead to muddle through in the hope that somehow and someway a solution would present itself that would at once end the violence, provide firm political basis for a settlement and avoid international community with the need to use massive force.[144]

In this context, although after Drenica events some foreign leaders employed the term "ethnic cleansing" the term, however, was immediately dropped from the discourse. It was considered if they considered that an ethnic cleansing was taking place, then the international community was obliged to react more forcefully.[145]

Thus, even if at certain times, in correlation with the escalation in violence, there was an increase in international engagement, 1998 for the most part was characterized by what can be called as diplomacy of persuasion. Implicit as it is from the suggestions of the term; international focus was allocated to creating an environment through diplomatic activity that would encourage the parties to engage in negotiations for an internationally desired settlement.[146] Following from deliberations at the level of pseudo engagement and therefore, without immediately showing a radical departure, initiatives taken were directed toward the achievement of three conditions that would make negotiations possible: Persuading Kosovar Albanian leadership, with the exclusion of KLA from much of the process to abandon their claim for an independent Kosovo and persuading Milosevic to end the violent crackdown in Kosovo and accept negotiations with the Kosovar Albanian leadership.

5.4 Diplomacy of Persuasion

Following the Contact Group meeting, diplomacy of persuasion became the core of the international activity and mediation its substance. The United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) first resolution, 1160, regarding Kosovo adapted on March 23, 1998 is illustrative of the international stance. Particularly the resolution was proposing a comprehensive arms embargo on the FRY and was condemning

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[144] Daalder and O'Hanlon, *op. cit.* p. 27

[145] International Crisis Group, *Kosovo's Long Hot Summer: Briefing on Military, Humanitarian and Political Developments in Kosovo* (ICG Balkans Report No.4, 12 September 1998), p. 8.

[146] Daalder and O'Hanlon, *op. cit*., p. 23.

Serbia and KLA for engaging in atrocities. The authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovo Albanian community were called upon "urgently to enter without preconditions into a meaningful dialogue on political status issues", which would include "the participation of an outside representative or representatives". [147]

These conclusions, according to Daalder and O'Hanlon, in the absence of a consensus over a unified action, were the least common denominator policies of the international community. They were at the same time determining the limits of international engagement at this stage. [148] Accordingly initiatives undertaken by international organizations and individual actors were limited to diplomatic activity directed towards the persuasion of the parties and especially Milosevic to take steps for a negotiated settlement compatible with the demands of international community.

As persuasion, without necessarily implying a direct participation into the process, became the primary approach to be followed, no fixed pattern was determined. Instead the methods to be instrumentalized were spontaneously adopted to meet the fundamental need: prevent direct involvement. For instance, despite in the first place KLA was isolated and drawn out of the scene and LDK was heavily supported, later this was modified as it turned out that a settlement without involving KLA was futile.

On the other hand, the type of persuasion, changed according to whom it was being employed. In this regard while the tendency of EU and Russia was to use the carrot, the US preferred the stick aspect of this diplomacy. The first of the initiatives to be taken regarding the carrot aspect of persuasion was that of French and German foreign ministers, respectively Hubert Vederine and Klaus Kinkel. According to International Crisis Group Report "Kosovo Spring" the two foreign ministers during their visit to Milosevic, in return for readmission to OSCE and some other economic concession such as the easing of the economic embargo, which had been implemented during the Bosnian crisis, persuaded Milosevic to allow for the opening of EU office in Pristine and take concrete steps towards the implementation of an education accord with Kosovo Albanian leadership.

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[147] UN Security Council Resolution 1160 on 31 March 1998 [http://www.un. org/Docs/scres/1998/sres1199.htm].

[148] Daalder and O'Hanlon, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

Yet none of these mixed signals were enough to persuade Milosevic to reiterate from insisting that Kosovo was an internal matter of Serbia and to refuse international mediation. After all Kosovo was the place on which Milosevic had built his entire political career by exploiting Serbian nationalism to which Kosovo was the Promised Land. Furthermore once the requests of international community were accepted this would legitimize Rugova's claims and thereby lead to another Dayton.[149] It would be Richard Holbrook, the leading diplomat articulating Dayton Peace negotiations, who engaged in diplomatic persuasion on behalf of the Contact Group to break Milosevic' s resistance.

In his dealings with both parties in early May, he succeeded to persuade both sides to engage in talks to end the conflict. Furthermore, Holbrook managed to persuade Milosevic to accept US mediation in facilitating dialogue for a political settlement. Also he convinced Milosevic to accept the demands of international community expressed by the UN, the EU and the Contact Group to allow access to diplomatic observers to travel from Belgrade to Kosovo, which form the basis of Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM).[150]

In carving out this achievement, however, Holbrook did not merely rely on his personal skills. On the way to the region he had both carrots and sticks in his pockets for both sides. The US President Bill Clinton on a press conference with the Italian Prime minister Romano Prodi in Washington had indicated that "we must and will be ready to substantially turn up the pressure on Belgrade should it keep blocking the search for a political solution or resort to indiscriminate force."[151] Also, the day before he flew to London, the Contact Group at its London meeting on 9 May enforced new economic sanctions against Yugoslavia and threatened to adopt

[149]To inhibit the pressures from the international community he organized a referendum on 23 April in which the overwhelming majority endorsed rejection of international mediation and any negotiations with Albanians. However, it should be noted that it was not only the international community that has engage in the diplomacy of persuasion. In response to the initiatives taken by he international community, Milosevic was equally manipulating the situation by making use of the tactics of persuasion to decrease the pressures from the Western capitals. Not more than two weeks following the referendum he would not only gave up rejecting international mediation but also he would accept international monitoring.

[150] See Daalder and O'Hanlon, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-22.

[151] Washington Post, 7 May 1998.

additional ones.[152] Yet when Holbrook returned with positive results, Contact group countries agreed to ease sanctions on Yugoslavia in their meeting on 19 of May.[153] Rugova, on the other hand, while was threatened with the increasing strength of the KLA,[154] his compliance to engage into negotiations with Milosevic was rewarded with meeting President Clinton.[155]

Initiating the talks, however, revealed how complex the situation was. The complexity was not merely due to the "differences that divided both sides as wide as ever,"[156] the division among the Kosovar Albanians, which the Western diplomats preferred to ignore by pushing KLA out of the scene, was equally problematic.[157] On the other hand, compelling parties to engage in talks was not at all a condition to end hostilities. Not long after the first meeting of Milosevic and Rugova in Belgrade another round of violence erupted in Kosovo. Milosevic after being persuaded to engage in talks launched an offensive campaign against the KLA in the Drenica region near the border of Albania involving several thousand heavily armed special police officers and soldiers. The aim of the campaign was to destroy the KLA's new base of operation by cutting its supply routs to Albania. These systematic attacks targeting civilians along the boarder area created an influx of displaced people inside the Kosovo and across the boarder into Albania, Montenegro and Macedonia. By the 15th of June the total number of displaced Albanians was estimated to be more than 60.000.[158]

Not surprisingly, the latest offensive plunged the process initiated by Holbrook into death. For the first time, however, the fears of the Western capitals had became likely to be real with the sliding of clashes between KLA guerillas and

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[152] Contact Group Statement on Kosovo, London, 9 May 1998, reproduced by Weller, *the Crisis in Kosovo,* p. 235.

[153] Washington Post, 19 May 1998.

[154] Troebst, *op. cit*., p. 53

[155] Judah, *op. cit.,* p. 154.

[156] Cited in Washington Post, 14 May 1998.

[157] See, for example, Daalder and O'Hanlon, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40; Judah, *op. cit.,* p.147.

[158] See Amnesty International, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: A human Rights Crisis in Kosovo Province, Document Series A, No: 1-4 (June 1998).

Serbian security forces to the border with Albania and tens of thousands of refuges flowing from Kosovo.[159] Obviously, it was possible to observe an identifiable shift in hardening of tone in Western capitals and resolutions taken by several international bodies that denounced the campaign.

Still, however, it should be noted that this hardening in discourse without the actual use of force fits well into the assumption of coercive diplomacy. Eventually, Milosevic managed to soften the hardening tone by playing up Russian fears.[160] On 16 June after his meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, he agreed to the presence of an observation mission in Kosovo whose task was to observe and report the situation in Kosovo.[161] Furthermore, Milosevic pledged to prevent repressive actions against civilian population and to continue negotiations with Rugova.[162] Yet these concessions hardly had any impact over the fighting between UCK and Serbian security forces and the deteriorating conditions of civilians on the ground. As the Serbian Security forces were restrained under the watchful eyes of the west the initiative was taken by the KLA.[163] During late June and July, KLA offensives to size and held places in Western Kosovo resulted in the intensification of the conflict throughout the summer. In response to KLA activities, the counter offensive operations launched by security forces, not only was KLA almost defeated but also Kosovo was nearly evacuated.[164] According to UN Commissioner for High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) estimates by mid September the number of the displaced Albanians reached 241,700. [165]

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[159] See Alice Ackerson for the possible spill over effects of the conflict into Macedonia.

[160] Judah, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

[161] Bellamy, *Kosovo*, p.85

[162] Washington Post, 17 June 1998

[163] Judah, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

[164] Troebst, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

[165] The number of Albanians displaced within Kosovo 170,000; displaced into Montenegro 35,000; displaced into other parts of Serbia 20,000; refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina 4,700; Refugees into Albania 14,000; Visitors into Macedonia 1,000, Cited in ICG Report: Kosovo's Long Hot Summer: Briefing on Military, Humanitarian and Political Developments in Kosovo, ICG Balkans Report No.41 2 September 1998, p. 8.

At this point international diplomacy led by Holbrook, now the US ambassador to the UN and Christopher Hill, US ambassador to Macedonia, and a senior member of Holbrook's negotiating team at Dayton, run along two tracks. What Holbrook was trying to do on the ground was spearheaded on the paper through plans produced by Hill for a settlement. Yet contrary to earlier perceptions and efforts, which characterized KLA as a terrorist organization and trying to sideline it, American diplomats had recognized a necessity to include the KLA into the negotiation process to reach a viable resolution.[166] The insurgency attacks of the KLA had proved that relying merely on Rugova was not enough to resolve the conflict.[167] Therefore, in his search for a diplomatic solution in the form of what he called "extended proximity negotiations," Hill not only shuttled between Belgrade and Pristine but also between the LDK and the KLA yet with no substantial results being achieved.[168] An informal understanding reached at the end of the summer between Rugova and Milosevic on an interim plan that postponed the final decision on Kosovo's political status was rejected by KLA representatives.[169]

Consequently, what diplomacy of persuasion succeeded in the end of the process was no more than persuading international community that it was not working. In the light of these developments international community gradually yet reluctantly found itself drawn into the Kosovo's bombing pot. The threat that Kosovo posed was not limited to merely flow of refugees to the Western countries. Once explode, the most powerful countries of international community were well aware of the fact that the damage it would cause would not be limited to Kosovo. In sum, what, however, diplomacy of persuasion succeeded in the end of the process was no more than persuading international community that it was not working.

[166] Daalder and O'Hanlon, *op. cit*., p. 39.

[167] See, for example, *ibid.*, p. 57; Judah, *op. cit*., p. 189.

[168] See Weller for the content of the draft agreement p. 348; Bellamy, p. 82

[169] Judah, *op. cit.,* p. 192

5.5 Towards Coercive Diplomacy

The summer long escalation of the conflict did not go unnoticed in the international community. The Serbian operations to counter the KLA attacks by burning villages and sending tens of thousands fleeing turned out to be a disaster for the Serbs in galvanizing the Western opinion.[170] As the summer passed away so were the initial assumptions over the prevention of the conflict through the use of diplomatic channels. Consequently, by the end of the summer international community had come to the conclusion that new tools of engagement were needed to push the parties for a settlement. Apart from the fear that events may get out of control and spread fighting to Albania and Macedonia, the potential humanitarian catastrophe waiting at the door with the coming winter conditions and displaced people hiding in Kosovo hills urged international community, if not intervene, to interfere with what is going on in the province. [171]

In this regard, diplomacy of persuasion had amounted no more than persuading international community to change its approach especially with intensifying American involvement into the issue. Threat of the use of force was introduced to support diplomatic activity. However, it should be noted that these threats should not be perceived as a substitution for the diplomacy of persuasion instead should be considered as the continuation of persuasion by other means. Also it is important to note that the use of the threat of force was in the form of "try and see" rather than being in the form of a formal ultimatum. As noted earlier, different from an ultimatum, in the case of try and see strategy, the sender issues a threat but does not set any specific deadline to achieve compliance with a specific demand.

This phase of international engagement was also important in the sense that it drew international community and particularly NATO and its member states into the conflict. In essence, despite the eagerness in the rhetoric of the Western capitals the threat of the use of force was employed to urge the parties to reach a solution before it become necessary to actualize the implications of the threats. Nevertheless, these threats created a sense of commitment to stand behind, which it was not possible to

[170] Judah, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

[171] Daalder and Ohenlon, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

draw back from. In this regard, the conflict gradually transformed from being an internal matter into an international one.

Threat of the use of force was not a policy approach that international community in the context of Kosovo adopted for the first time in 1998. The first threat in relation to Kosovo was first made by the US administration in December 1992. Known as the "Christmas Warning" US President George Bush sent an ultimatum, which was quiet clear as it was short, to Milosevic indicating that "in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the US will be prepared to employ military force against Serbians in Kosovo and Serbia proper."[172] As indicated earlier similar kinds of threats, at least efforts to issue such threats were revealed by Albright as early as March. However unlike the earlier threats that were made on individual basis the threats that were issued in the second half the 1998 were given legal cover under the UN resolutions and institutionalized under NATO's collective security umbrella, if not actualized.

The achievement of no substantial results and the raise in Yugoslav military offensive which resulted in enormous civilian causalities and the displacement of over 230.000 from their homes" the UNSC adapted Resolution 1199 on September 23, 1998. Along with what it had called upon in Resolution 1160, the UN determined the situation as a threat to peace and security in the region. The resolution was indicative of the changing tone of the international community. It, in a way, marked the beginning of the internationalization of the conflict. Yet the resolution at the same time reflected and once again revealed persisting division among the major powers. Despite the fact that the resolution was determining the crisis as a Chapter VII situation, no reference was made to military intervention.[173] As expected, Russia raised a strong protest against the threat of air strikes against Yugoslavia that circumvented the Security Council.[174]

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[172] Cited in Bellamy, *Kosovo*, p. 34.

[173] UN Security Council Resolution 1199 on 23 September 1998 [http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres1199.htm].

[174] However, as Judah notes it, according to Holbrook at the meeting of the Contact Group at London Heathrow Airport Igor Ivanov, the Russian foreign minister sent a signal of tacit assent to indepnndent NATO action while stating that "If you take to the UN we will veto it…If you don't we will just denounce you…we will just make a lot of noise", p. 183.

After the issue had been determined to be posing a threat to peace and security, Kosovo became a matter of NATO as well. In order to press Serbia' s compliance with Resolution 1199, The Northern Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO's parliamentary body, voted on September 24, 1998 for Activation Warning (ACTWARN), which allowed NATO forces for both a limited air option and authorized its supreme commander to commence air strikes. Due to its impact on the stability of the region NATO became to be interested in developments in Kosovo as early as March. In its several meetings the Alliance had began to discuss the possibility of threatening Serbia with air strikes to end the conflict. To demonstrate organization's readiness to prevent the conflict from spillovering to neighboring countries it launched an air exercise, "Operation Determined Falcon" in Albania and Macedonia.[175]

Obviously, NATO's exercise was an act of coercive diplomacy. Yet it was a failed one because of the differences among the member states. According to Micah Zenko, recognizing "cracks in NATO's public display of unity, Milosevic did not make any attempt to terminate the Serbian activities in the province."[176] As Judah notes it, NATO's exercise was "nothing more than the fact that NATO had planes in the region, which could fly very fast."[177]

While most of the NATO member states, French, Germany and Italy, in particular, insisted that any NATO action in or over Kosovo be authorized by the UN Security council. Italian prime minister, for instance, even after the decision of the activation of order was still insisting that "his government did not see grounds for military action which would have to be legitimized by the United Nations." The US disagreed, stating that NATO retained the right to act independently of the UN, while Great Britain was on the fence."[178] As was true in Bosnia, American action would be necessary to compel its European allies to confront the crisis in Kosovo. According

[175] The decision to launch an exercise had been taken at the meeting of NATO Defense ministers on 11 June in Brussels.

[176] Zenko, Micha, "Coercive Diplomacy before the War in Kosovo: America's Approach in 1998", Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy: Case 252), p.2

[177] Judah, *op. cit.*, p. 166. See also Daalder and O'Hanlon, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

[178] Zenko, *op. cit*., p. 3

to Zenko, the US insisted that an outside settlement on the parties was necessary for the resolution of the conflict. Therefore, presenting Belgrade with military ultimatum was considered necessary to bring Serbia to the table.[179] Such authorization, on the other hand, as seen in the context of the adoption of resolution 1119 was under the threat of the veto of Russia and China, two permanent members of the UN Security Council together with France, Britain and the US.[180]

Only it was the failure of the diplomatic efforts that resolved the differences within NATO.[181] To support Holbrook's efforts on the ground NATO unilaterally issued another "activation warning" for air strikes in 96 hours if Belgrade did not comply with UNSCR 1199 on October 13, 1998 known as October Ultimatum.[182] This authorization was a clear indication of the fact that international engagement was moving towards the use of coercive diplomacy, issuing threats to achieve intended results in the diplomatic front.

Coercive diplomacy, seem to be giving its fruits when Holbrook succeeded cutting a deal with Milosevic in early October.[183] The agreement between Milosevic and Holbrook envisioned a cease fire, as stipulated in UNSC Resolution 1199. The agreement envisioned the establishment of a Kosovo verification mission (KVM) by the OSCE to observe the compliance to the ceasefire and of an air-verification mission by NATO.[184]

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[179] *Ibid.*, p. 3-4

[180] Ivo Daalder, "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force", International Peacekeeping, January-April 1999,p: 32; Judah, *op. cit*., p. 182

[181] Daalder, *op.cit* p: 33.

[182] Judah, *op. cit.*, p. 186

[183] The agreement stipulated that: Serbian forces in the province were to be reduced to their pre-conflict levels (around 10.000 police and 11,000army troops, compared tot of more tha 50,000 before the agreement); Refugees should be able to return their homes; and Up to 2,000 compliance verifiers' from the organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe would be deployed to monitor the situation on the ground. IISS Strategic Comments " War Suspended in Kosovo: Serbian retreat, Albanian defiance, p. 1.

[184] UN Security Council Resolution 1203 on 24 October 1998. The KVM's mandate was to verify compliance with the military aspects of Holbrook- Milosevic agreement; verify maintenance of cease-fire and monitor movements of forces; provide assistance with the return of the refugees and displaced persons; Supervise elections; Helping forming elected bodies and self-administration and police forces; and promote human rights and democracy building.

Both of these agreements were endorsed by the UN Security Council on October 24 in its Resolution 1203. Since the agreement was a transitory one without providing a guideline for a final settlement, the resolution still maintained the situation as "continuing threat to peace and security in the region."[185] Indeed the resolution was not easy to adopt for it was hardly secured from the veto of China and Russia. The US and the British attempt to get a security mandate authorizing enforcement action by incorporating "all necessary means to enforce compliance with this demands" was objected by Russia and China which obviously meant the authorization of a military intervention[186] and consequently removed from the resolution.

The agreement not only removed the immediate threat of air strikes but also marked an important step towards the internationalization of the conflict. According to Bellamy the agreement marked "a new phase of unarmed intervention." The Holbrook initiative under the mediation of the Contact Group, however, could not calm down the atrocities in Kosovo although Serbia initially implemented the agreement and withdrew its forces accordingly.[187] Not only was the mission toothless but also as the head of the mission William G. Walker stated, both parties did not live up to their promise.[188] Especially, KLA made things complicated. As Judah puts it, "the fact was that the Holbrook agreement was with Milosevic and the Serbs. The KLA were not party to it, and as far as they were concerned, not bound by it either."

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[185] Ibid.

[186] Daalder, *op.cit*. p: 32.

[187] See for a critique of the Holbrook Milosevic Agreement in Gow, James, Kosovo after the Holbrook-Milosevic Agreement. What now? In *International Spectator*, V. 38 N. 4 1998 available at www.ciaonet.org /olj/iai/iai_98goj01.html.

[188] See G. Walker, William, "OSCE verification Experiences in Kosovo: November 1998-June 1999", in Ken Booth (editor), "The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions", *The International Journal of Human Rights* (Vol.4, No. 3/4, Autumn/ Winter 2000), pp. 126-142 on the mandate, its performance and difficulties encountered by KVM verifiers that rendered it effectiveness throughout its presence in the Province. Daalder and O'henlon, points to three major problems that rendered the October/Holbrook-Milosevic agreement ineffective. In the firstt place the agreement was ambiguous in terms of what exactly the monitors on the ground and in the air were supposed to verify. Second the agreement lacked credible means of enforcement. Finally, the exclusion of the KLA and other Kosovars from the arrangement constituted the other major short coming of the agreement. Daalder and O'henlon, *op. cit*., p. 49-58.

[189] Taking advantage of the new situation KLA forces moved in to take up positions vacated by the redeployed Serbian forces. A report presented to the Security Council by the UN Secretary-General on December 24 made this point quiet clear:

> Kosovo Albanian paramilitary units have taken advantage of the lull on the fighting to re-establish their control over many villages in Kosovo as well as over some areas near urban center and highways. These actions […] have only served to provoke the Serbian authorities, leading to statements that if the Kosovo Verification mission cannot control these units the Government would.[190]

In response to KLA provocations, the Serbian forces once again begun to retaliate disproportionately. Not only the Serb military operations expanded the measures claimed by Belgrade to be necessary to "hunt down terrorists", but also the verification mission proved to be an ineffective means of constraining Yugoslav forces. Against these developments, by the end of December 1998, the Alliance issued a statement urging the parties in Kosovo to maintain the ceasefire and threatening that NATO was ready to intervene if the situation required. Nevertheless, the threat seems not to have much effect when the Racak events brought Kosovo once again on TV screens. The execution of, according to OSCE-KVM investigation, 45 unarmed ethnic Albanians by the Yugoslav forces in the village of Racak on January 15, 1999, stormed international perceptions. Despite the denial of Serb authorities that any civilians had been killed and stating that it was simply an action against the KLA The event shifted the balance toward Albright's position.[191] According to Steven L. Burg "Racak massacre provided the emotional impetus for policy makers to abandon what appears to have been a White House strategy of negotiating with Milosevic." In this regard, the event revealed that try and see diplomacy could not deliver a comprehensive peace for Kosovo and forced the Contact Group to continue with the diplomacy of ultimatum.[192]

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[189] Judah, *op. cit.,* p. 189.

[190] Report of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to Resolution 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) of the Security Council, un Doc. S/1998/1221, Dec. 24, 1998, p. 3.

[191] See Bellamy, *Kosovo,* p. 115-118.

5.6 Diplomacy under the Threat of the Use of Force

Despite being the event to trigger a more robust engagement, Racak was not the only reason to force international community take the issue in its hand. Several attempts made by Christopher Hill to persuade the parties to reach a peaceful settlement had demonstrated that, if left to their own initiative, Albanians and Serbs would never be able to find a solution. By early December 1998, it was evident that a draft agreement devised by Hill and presented to the parties in October and November, after being revised, would not succeed to bridge the differences between the parties on the basis of autonomous status for Kosovo. While Serbia presented an alternative draft agreement that preserved Serbia's position in Kosovo, the Albanians refused to acknowledge an accord that specified a legal status for Kosovo as a part of Yugoslavia and Serbia. [193]

Following Racak, Albright was quick to engage in diplomatic consultations "to build consensus for her idea that future diplomacy had to be backed by the threat of force."[194] Renewed international efforts made by the Contact Group to find a solution to the conflict were shaped under this dictum. According to Bellamy, Albrights plan involved using a credible threat of force to coerce parties into accepting a comprehensive peace plan. This would be based on the Hill plan yet involving a robust NATO-led peacekeeping force to enforce compliance.[195] Therefore, in February and March 1999, the international community exerted intense diplomatic pressure on the FRY authorities, accompanied by threats of military action.

In its meeting on 29 January, Contact Group with the efforts of Madeline Albright summoned the Yugoslavs and Kosovar Albanians to engage in proximity talks with the direct involvement of the Contact Group. Along with deliberation of ten "Non-negotiable Principles/Basic Elements" agreed upon, Contact group

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[192] Burg, Steven, "Coercive Diplomacy in the Balkans: the US use of force in Bosnia and Kosovo", In Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin (editors), The United States and Coercive Diplomacy. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), p. 90.

[193] Weller, *the Crisis in Kosovo*, p. 349-350; see also Caplan, Richard, "Christopher Hill's Road Show", The World Today, January 1999, p. 13-14.

[194] Judah, *op. cit.,* p. 194

[195] Bellamy, *Kosovo*, p. 122.

members concluded that both sides would be hold accountable if they failed to comply with what "now" offered to them at the end of 21 day negotiation period.[196] The consensus within the Contact Group, according to Marc Weller echoed aggressively within the Alliance.[197] NATO on 30 January issued a statement that determined the crisis as a "threat to international peace and security." It stated that

> NATO's strategy is to halt the violence and support the completion of negotiations an interim political settlement for Kosovo, thus averting a humanitarian catastrophe. Steps to this end must include acceptance by both parties of the summons to begin negotiations…on an interim political settlement within the specified timeframe; full and immediate observance of the ceasefire by both parties …and the ending excessive and disproportionate use of force [by VJ and MUP] in accordance with this commitments. If this steps are not taken, NATO is ready to take whatever measures are necessary in the light of both parties' compliance with international commitments and requirements, including in particular assessment by the Contact Group of the response to its demands, to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, by compelling compliance with the demands of the international community and the achievement of a political settlement. The council has therefore agreed today that the NATO Secretary General may authorize air strikes against targets on the FRY territory. The NATO Secretary General will take full account of the positions and actions of the Kosovar leadership and all the Kosovar armed elements in and around Kosovo reaching his decision on military action. NATO will take all appropriate measures in case of a failure by the Kosovar Albanian side to comply with the demands of the international community.[198]

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[196] *Ibid*., p. 131-2.These principles were:

- An immediate end to violence;
- Peaceful settlement of the dispute through dialogue;
- The agreement would be an interim one for the period of three years;
- There could be no unilateral change to this interim status;
- The territorial of Yugoslavia and its neighbors must be respected;
- The rights of members of all national communities must be respected;
- There would be free and fair elections, supervised by OSCE;
- Neither party should prosecute anyone for crimes related the Kosovo conflict with the exception of International Criminal tribune for Yugoslavia.
- There would be an amnesty and release o political prisoners,
- There would be international involvement and full cooperation by the parties on the implementation.

[197] Weller, *the Crisis in Kosovo*, p. 392

[198] Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Kosovo, 30 January 1999, reproduced by Weller, *the Crisis in Kosovo*, p. 416.

As obvious from the statement, NATO's threat carried all the characteristics of an ultimatum. A demand is made from the opponent, a time limit has been included into the demand; and a threat of punishment for non-compliance that is both credible to the opponent and sufficiently potent to impress upon him that compliance is preferable. In this regard, according to Bellamy despite the lack of sufficient forces available to the alliance in the region, to solve credibility problem along with the deployment of USS Enterprise, aircraft carrier, Pentagon, the British and French government increased their presence in the region by deployment of aircrafts in Italy.[199] Also it has been stated that threat will be retreated if compliance is seen. This time however both sides were the target of the coercive diplomacy. As Judah notes "while the Serbs were being told that if they failed to sign up to draft proposals they would be bombed, the Albanians were in effect, being told that if failure was their fault, they would be left to the tender mercies of the Serbia security forces and paramilitaries."[200] Yet still it leaves doors open for the determination of the future action by stating indicating that the situation will be reviewed by Contact Group. The Security Council issued a similar statement, supporting the efforts undertaken by the Contact Group.

Despite the hesitation of the FRY about a conference, which they thought would internationalize an internal matter of Serb Republic, Russia succeeded in persuading Milosevic.[201] What Belgrade was not willing to accept was that the issue had already been internationalized. According to Bellamy, however, the reason why Milosevic was not purported by the renewed coercive diplomacy was due to the fact that he had heard much the same before.[202] According to Burg, on the other hand, the credibility of coercive threat mounted by the US and its NATO allies also was weakened by Russian and Chinese diplomatic opposition to Security Council authorization of the use of force.[203]

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[199] Bellamy, *Kosovo*, p. 124.

[200] Judah, p. 197.

[201] Weller, Marc, "Enforced Negotiations: The Threat and Use of Force to Obtain an International Settlement for Kosovo", *International Peacekeeping* (January-April 1999), pp.5-6.

[202] Bellamy, *Kosovo*, p. 151.

The major concern of the Serb government, however, was the fact that KLA would also be present on the negotiation table. Serbs reasoned that negotiating with KLA was in way recognizing its agenda. Nevertheless, as previous experiences demonstrated not much could be achieved from an agreement without KLA's consent behind. Therefore, Contact Group members agreed that it was necessary to put together a negotiating team, comprised of all political persuasions and especially KLA.[204]

On accepting to engage in negotiations, both parties, Serbian representatives and the Kosovar Albanian delegation (including both the KLA and the LDK), met at Rambouillet, a castle near Paris on February 6, 1999 for a settlement, they had only one viable option: to agree. The following day, NATO declared that it was "ready to take whatever measures are necessary" to enforce the parties' compliance. That included possible air strikes against targets on Yugoslav territory and measures to curb arms smuggling into Kosovo, respectively.[205]

Obviously, as Weller phrases it, "the Rambouillet Conference represented an odd example of enforced negotiation." The presence of Yugoslavia at the talks was to be obtained through the threat of the use of force." Therefore, the FRY compared the Rambouillet with Munich Conference of 1938.[206] As will be discussed below this

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[203] Burg, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

[204] See Judah, op. cit., p.

[205] See Judah, *op. cit.*, p. 195. The talks were chaired by French Foreign Minister Hubert Vaderine, and British foreign Secretary Robin Cook, Cristopher Hill (for US), Wolfgang Petritsch (for the EU) and Boris Mayorski (for Russia) conducted negotiations on behalf of the Contact group.

[206] Weller, *Enforced Negotiations*, p. 9. Seen in this context, NATO's threat of the use of force at certain levels of crisis by taking decisions and issuing announcements, however might it be a violation of the international law, for being inconsistent with the Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, is justified in terms of "preventive humanitarian action". The NATO's justification for this attitude is indicated to be an action done not for its own purposes but on behalf of the international community. The fact that the situation was identified in the SCR 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) as a threat to peace and security, and that a humanitarian emergency that has to be responded was at stake was presented as an excuse for NATO's attitude which is considered to be "preventive" rather than "palliative". Nevertheless, the absence of any mandate by the SC to do so obscures the legitimacy of this justification. In this regard, NATO's "sign this or we will bomb you," approach, that is the threat of the use of force, has been considered as a a fait accompli by many critiques of NATO's intervention. Therefore, critiques of Rambouillet view it as a dead born attempt before which the possibility of reaching an agreement had already been consumed. See, for instance, Gowan, Peter, "The NATO Powers and the Balkan Tragedy", *New Left Review* (No. 234, March-April 1999), p. 96; Blackburn, Rabin, "Kosovo: The War of NATO Expansion", *New Left Review* (No. 234, March-April 1999), pp: 112-5; Ali, Tariq,

feature of the negotiations has been considered as the main failure of securing compliance of Serbian delegation. By contrast, Weller argues that the treats were issued merely to increase pressure upon the parties to reach an agreement. Therefore thinks that Rambouillet was a failure not because of the threat of the use of force but because of the doubts on the side of the FRY about the credibility of that threat, which had already been tested by the violation of the terms of Holbrook agreement. Also, against the contention that there was no room left for negotiation, Weller brings forward the modifications made on the final draft of the Interim Agreement for many times in the light of the demands of the Yugoslav delegation to Rambouillet.[207]

At Rambouillet the negotiators relied solely on the threat of punishment while dealing with Serbian delegation. By contrast next to the threat of punishment, Albanians were offered positive incentives to secure an acceptance of the agreement. As mentioned earlier the choice of strategy depends on what type of relation is envisaged with the opponent. Burg maintains that there was little evidence that US policy makers hoped to have a constructive relationship with Milosevic after the Kosovo crisis. They appear to have been motivated largely by a desire to punish him for his actions in Kosovo, and in no small part by a desire to atone for what some felt to have been their failure in Bosnia. For Secretary Albright and others use of force offered an opportunity to pay Milosevic back for Bosnia a well as Kosovo.[208]

In summary, the plan offered to the parties for a settlement by the Contact Group was an "Interim Agreement for Peace and Self Government in Kosovo" having political and military provisions. At the end of more than two weeks of intensive efforts to reach an agreement, the negotiations ended with the achievement of no substantive results. Although under the pressure of Albright, the Kosovar Albanian delegation agreed to sign the agreement; yet with the reservation of consulting with people of Kosovo. The Serb delegation, on the other hand, indicated

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"Springtime for NATO", *New Left Review* (No. 234, March-April 1999), pp 64-65 ; Malakos, Tolis, "Globalization via Ethnocratic 'Ghettoization': Post-historical Myths on Yugoslavia", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* (Vol. 1, No. 2, 1999), pp. 114-138.

[207] See the process of negotiations in Weller, *Enforced Negotiations.* Also Bellamy, *Kosovo*, Chapter 5.

[208] Burg, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

that they would be prepared to grant autonomy but not on Contact Group terms, and it was ready to discuss the scope and character of an international presence in Kosovo to implement the agreement. The Contact Group convened a second round of talks on 15 March 1999 at the Kleber Centre in Paris, primarily to gain agreement on the implementation of the framework that the two sides had accepted in principle. The Kosovar Albanian delegation signed the Rambouillet Accords as a whole. The FRY delegation on the other hand, presented their version of the agreement, which simply rendered proposed agreement.

The draft agreement, proposed to the Serb delegation at Rambouillet, contained many unacceptable elements for the Milosevic regime in Belgrade. Giving up controls over Kosovo region under a peaceful agreement would be a political suicide for Milosevic who had built all his political career on Serbian nationalism and its most immediate symbol, Kosovo. The most provocative provision of the agreement that caused refusal from the Serbs, is considered to be the military provisions of the agreement which evoked NATO's protectorate tendencies in Kosovo, and which were considered to be an open violation of the sovereignty of the FRY.[209] The agreement required Serbia to accept a Kosovo force (KFOR) to oversee the implementation process and is allowed to use force if necessary against any parties violating the agreement.[210] The provision of the agreement read as follows:

> Together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, free and unrestricted passage throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not limited to, the right of bivouac, manoeuvre, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for support, training, and operations.[211]

In brief, the Serbian delegation considered this provision as an attempt to occupy the whole Serbia.[212] A second reason that is provided for the failure of Rambouillet is the provision concerning the future of Kosovo. Accordingly,

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[209] Blackburn, *op.cit*, p: 107.

[210] Weller, *Enforced Negotiations*, pp: 20-21.

[211] *Ibid.*

[212] Bellamy, *Kosovo*, p. 210. Weller, *op.cit* pp: 22-23. The counter-argument is that the status of KFOR was not so much different from the IFOR and SFOR, to make it unacceptable vis-à-vis them. Therefore although it seems reasonable that the military terms of the agreement rendered it

> [t]hree years after the entry into force of this agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, opinion of the relevant authorities, each party's efforts regarding the implementation of this Agreement and the Helsinki Final Act, and to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this Agreement and to consider proposals by any party for additional measure.[213]

Reading this provision as a guarantee of independence for the Kosovar Albanians, Milosevic did not hesitate in rejecting the agreement, despite the fact that this provision was balanced by the strong emphasis on the territorial integrity of the FRY.[214]

NATO, however, did not immediately begin to coerce Belgrade. Importantly, when employing coercive diplomacy, the opposition must be given an opportunity to "stop", or "back off", before proceeding to the next stage, military coercion. As George maintains, "the coercing power…must leave the opponent with a way out of the crisis that enables him to save face or at least humiliation."[215] In the intervening period between the collapse of negotiation and the initiation of air campaign, the international community gave another chance to diplomacy by sending Holbrook once again to Belgrade on 23 March. Yet, this time Holbrook was asking Milosevic not to stop but undo an action or else face the consequences. As Judah points out "[when] Holbrook returned for his last meeting with Milosevic […] instead of mentioning that tens of thousand were in flight, he says he told Milosevic that Serbia would be bombed, "if you do not change your position, if you do not agree to negotiate and accept Rambouillet as the basis of negotiations.[216]

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unacceptable, "why the FRY did not seek clarification or even modification" both during the Rambouillet, and the Paris Conference preceding it, while it put its reservation to many other points, has created question marks.

[213] *Ibid*., p: 20.

[214] Against this background, Weller argues that the Serbian side was expecting the Kosovo Albanian delegation to Ramboullet to reject the agreement for it was not providing Kosovars with a full status of independence. He contends that, when it became apparent that they would sign and indeed signed the only remaining alternative for Serbian who was not willing to reach an agreement on those terms was to breakdown the peace process.Ibid., p: 23.

[215] George, *the Limits*, p. 14

5.6 Coercion backed by Diplomacy

On 24 March 1999, NATO initiated Operation Allied Force whose objective has been outlined by Daalder and O'Hanlon stated as follows:

- A verifiable stop to all Serb military action, and the immediate ending of violence and repression.
- The withdrawal from Kosovo of all Serb military, police, and paramilitary forces.
- An agreement to the stationing in Kosovo an international military presence.
- The acceptance of the unconditional and safe return of all refugee and displaced persons and unhindered aces to them by humanitarian aid organizations.
- Credible assurances that Belgrade would work, on the basis of the Rambouillet accords, to establish a political framework agreement for Kosovo.[217]

When the Yugoslav leadership did not respond to negotiation proposals after four weeks of bombing, Alliance leaders, at a NATO summit in Washington on April 23, 1999,decided to further intensify the air campaign by expanding the target set to include military-industrial infrastructure, media, and other targets in Serbia itself.[218]

While the force had been used to communicate the intentions of the alliance, it is important to note that, the air campaign did not end the efforts on diplomatic front. Actions may reinforce strong words, or they may communicate demands when the words remain weak. However, diplomacy continues to play an important role throughout the process. Indeed, as Bellamy notes "the decisive turning point came not on the battlefield but around the negotiating table."[219]

The first main diplomatic initiative was promoted in April by the German government. This plan insisted that the UN should be brought into the process and should have some role in the administration of Kosovo. Nevertheless, Russia played a key role in finding a diplomatic solution to end the operation despite being

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[216] Judah, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

[217] Daalder and O'Hanlon, *op. cit*., p. 102.

[218] See Judah, *op. cit*., Chapter 9; Bellamy, *Kosovo*, Chapter 6.

[219] Bellamy, *ibid*, p. 177.

adamantly opposed to it. At the G8 meeting in Cologne Russia and the G7 countries developed a seven-point peace plan that closely followed the original German initiative. This became the framework for subsequent diplomatic efforts and discussion between Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin and Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade on May 19.

A final round of negotiations completed in early June averted the need for a ground invasion. EU envoy Martti Ahtisaari and Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin brought a proposal to Belgrade that was based on G8 principles. These principles called for an immediate and verifiable end to the repression and violence in Kosovo; the withdrawal of FRY military, police, and paramilitary forces; the deployment of effective international civil and security presences; and the return of all refugees. While the plan stated that "the people of Kosovo will enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," no timeline or mechanism for resolving Kosovo's long-term status was included in the agreement. On June 1, 1999, the Yugoslav government advised the government of Germany that it would accept the G8 principles.

As noted earlier, coercive diplomacy is a form of crisis bargaining, therefore it involves all three components in bargaining: coercive threats, accommodative offers and persuasion. One of the concessions offered the Serbs in May was elimination of the three-year limit on the transitional period included in the Rambouillet document, which seem to establish a road map to secession and independence for Kosovo. The NATO –EU-Russian "principles" for resolution of the crisis accepted by the Milosevic on June 2 and incorporated as annex 2 to Resolution 1244 included "establishment of an interim administration…under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations."[220] Indeed, despite being a minor concession, "promising to allow small number of Serb security personal to return to Kosovo to provide a presence at Serb patrimonial sites and border crossings, to mark and clear minefield, and to establish a lesion with the

[220] UN Security Council Resolution 1244 on 10 June 1999 [http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sres1244.htm].

international civilian and security presence"[221] is another point that supports the idea of coercive diplomacy – to accommodate the interests of one's opponent.

On June 3, the Serb Parliament formally approved a peace plan based on the G8 principles. After delays caused by difficulties working out a technical agreement, NATO ceased its bombing campaign after concluding a Military Technical Agreement with the FRY authorities. Under this agreement all FRY forces, Serb police and paramilitary groups left Kosovo and a NATO-led military force named Kosovo Force (KFOR) took control of Kosovo. The agreement was endorsed by the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which established the framework for UN civil administration of the province and the establishment of an international security presence.

In the absence of any concrete norms of law which would justify NATO's air campaign on the FRY, the NATO states had to go around the international law to legally justify the intervention. In doing so, they chiefly denied the association of the intervention with war. Immediately after NATO launched the air strikes, Javier Solana the then Secretary-General of NATO, stated in a press conference that the operation was legitimate and not a war. NATO states made reference to UNSCR which they interpreted to be in support of the Air campaign: The failure of Yugoslavia to fulfil the requirements set out by Resolutions 1160 and 1199 and 1203 based on the chapter VII of the UN charter to provide justification for NATO's intervention. [222]

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[221] Daalder and O'Hanlon, op cit., p.102

[222] Under the UN collective security system, which is the major principle of the organization, member states agree that all member nations resolve their international disputes peacefully. The security regime established in the UN Charter requires member states to refrain in their relations from the threat or use of force; any breach of the peace is declared to be the concern of all the participating states and will result in a collective response. Article 1 of the U.N. Charter mandates the primary goal "to maintain international peace and security, and... take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression." An integral aspect of this security is the principle of nonintervention,
Despite the given emphasis on human rights in the UN Charter, as a response to holocaust, it does not contain any provision concerning humanitarian intervention. With a strict positivist reading of "the UN charter and its underlying customary law", most of the students of international law consider intervention for humanitarian purposes unlawful. The charter of the UN while in article 2(1) recognizes sovereign equality of all its members cements this equality in Article 2(4) and Article 2(7) by respectively outlawing "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of", and intervention "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state".

Therefore despite George's insistence that coercive diplomacy should be legitimate and launched for defensive purposes, in the case of Kosovo one can not be persuaded by the legal justifications suggested by the alliance regarding its legitimacy. Furthermore, it is hardly difficult to consider it to be undertaken on defensive purposes. Indeed, if we stick to the semantic implications of defensive and offensive dichotomy, the operation quiet well falls into the offensive category.

Only two exceptions remain outside the scope of these Charter provisions: the right of individual and collective self defence under Article 51 and Security Council enforcement action in the determination that a threat to peace, break of the peace, or act of aggression has occurred. Article 51 states the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the UN until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security...."

In strictest reading of these conditions advocates of the restrictive interpretation of the Charter even contends that the Security Council is limited to authorize enforcement action under those conditions and can not authorize armed humanitarian intervention since "it has to abide by the Article 2(7) injunction that it can not intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states." Set against this position, those scholars who view intervention for humanitarian purposes legitimate draw attention to the Charter provisions concerning regional organisations or collective defense organizations. Louise Henkin, for instance, indicates that it is unrealistic and perhaps undesirable to ask the Security Council to give general approval in advance for regional groupings to engage in military humanitarian intervention". A collective defence organization such as NATO unlike a collective security organization, which settles disputes among its members, establishes a commitment among the members to engage in collective self defense in a situation when a member state is under an attack by an outside country. For instance, Article V North Atlantic Treaty states that "an armed attack against one or more of" the parties "shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked."

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter recognizes the existence of regional arrangements among States that deal with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional actions (Article 52). Regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Arab League, attempt to resolve regional disputes peacefully, prior to the issue being referred to the UN Security Council. Regional organizations do not, however, have the ability to authorize, on their own, the use of force (Article 53). Rather, the Security Council may utilize the regional organization to carry out Security Council enforcement actions.

For interesting debates over the legality of the use of force in Kosovo see, for instance Charney, Jonathan I., "Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo," in "Editorial Comments: NATO's Kosovo Intervention," *American American Journal of International Law* (Vol. 93, No. 4, October 1999), [Online] Available from http://www.asil.org/kosovo.htm ; Guicherd, Catherine, "International Law and the War in Kosovo", *Survival* (Vol. 41,No.2, Summer 1999), pp. 19-34; Roberts, Adam, "Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights", *International Affairs* (Vol. 69, No.3, July 1993), pp. 329-349. Ronzitti, Natalino, "Lessons of International Law from NATO's Armed Intervention Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," The International Spectator (Vol. 34, No.3, July-September 1999), pp. 45-54; Wedgwood, Ruth. "NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia," in "Editorial Comments: NATO's Kosovo Intervention", *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 93, No. 4, October 1999, [Online] Available from http://www.asil.org/kosovo.htm; Wheeler, Nicholas J. "Reflections on Legality and Legitimacy of NATO's Intervention in Kosovo," in The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions, ed. Ken Booth, *The International Journal of Human Rights*, Vol.4, No. 3/4, Autumn/ Winter 2000, pp. 145-162.

Nevertheless, the ceasation of the hostilities without stretching the scope of campaign to remove Milosevic from power after achievement of all five objectives set by the alliance fits well within the assumptions raised by George.

The use of force and its infliction in gradual escalation does not constitute a deviation from the strategy of coercive diplomacy. Obviously, it is important to note that coercive diplomacy is a cost effective strategy. It is mostly successful when it secures certain interests with least costs or use of military power possible. Nevertheless, as noted while discussing the premises of coercive diplomacy in theory, "the success of a demand will heavily depend on the relative interests at stake for each actor. Indeed, it was not the alliance's use of force that seems to be problematic but the longitude of the campaign that has raised question on the validity of coercive diplomacy in the context of Kosovo. When NATO started bombing Serbia, it did not expect this to last for 74 days. The underlying NATO assumption was that a relatively short bombing campaign would persuade Milosevic to come back to sign the Rambouillet agreement.[223]

The failure to persuade Milosevic at Rambouillet and the stretch of 74 days air campaign, nevertheless, should be understood within the context of motivations involved for both parts. As George makes it clear "if coercing power pursues ambitious objectives that go beyond its own vital or important interests, and if its demands infringe on vital or important interests of the adversary, then the asymmetry of interests and balance of motivation will favour the adversary and make successful application of coercive diplomacy much more difficult."[224]

For the United States the articulated interests were, for the most part, abstract. Secretary Albright defined these in a key public speech before the United State institute of peace in early February 1999. They included peace and stability in Southern Europe, strengthening the institutions that keep the peace, preserving Bosnia's progress towards peace and strengthening democratic principles and practices in the region. Albright also identified three more compelling interests. The first of this is preventing the flood of refugees and creation of heavens for

[223] Daalder and O'Hanlon, op. cit., p. 125

[224] George, *the Limits*, p. 275.

international terrorists, drug traffickers and criminals. The second and third were interrelated: preventing the spread of conflict to Albania and Macedonia and the involvement of Greece and Turkey, and preserving NATO's credibility as the guarantor of peace and stability in Europe.[225]

To Robert Adams the main underlying reason for the willingness of the NATO states to take action is "the sense of shame" that they had failed in the Bosnian Catastrophe.[226] Similarly, for David Rieff along with the "ethnic cleansing at the door of Europe", the possibility of being humiliated by Milosevic once again on the eve of its fiftieth anniversary made Kosovo unignorable for the NATO states.[227] Among all this stated motivations the credibility of NATO seems to be the moist credible argument done in favour of the operation. As Sean Kay notes the Kosovo crisis of 1998–99 provided NATO members an opportunity to establish a credible relationship between rhetoric and will. Following the collapse of peace talks at Rambouillet, France, where NATO force was threatened to coerce Belgrade into cooperation, the allies had little choice but to fight a war in the name of credibility. British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared in the House of Commons: "To walk away now would destroy NATO's credibility."[228]

For Milosevic, on the other hand, not only the territorial integrity of Serbia was at stake but his own personal power which he had so much associated with Kosovo was at hand.[229] Thus Burg rightly puts that "in the case of Kosovo the interest at stake appear, at least at the outset, to have been relatively greater for

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[225] Burg, p. 86

[226] Roberts, Adam, "NATO's 'Humanitarian War' over Kosovo", *Survival*, (Vol. 41, no. 3, Autumn 1999), p: 104.

[227] Rieff, David, "Kosovo's Humanitarian Circus", *World Policy Journal*, (Fall 2000), pp: 25-6.

[228] Judah, *op. cit.*, p. 263. Yet for alternative explanations on motivations of NATO in its engagement of Kosovo crisis refer to foot note, 103. Viewing the issue from a wider context of the post-Cold War window, this line of thinking considers the NATO involvement as an extension of a further step in NATO's desire to expand to the Eastern Europe, and accordingly as an outcome of the tensions among the NATO members over the future security design of Europe. Therefore opposing to the assumption that NATO's involvement was interest free, this line of thinking contends that NATO indeed had a hidden agenda, which the Kosovo served as a pretext. Refer to foot note, 103

[229] See Vekaric, Vatroslav "Beyond NATO intervention in Yugoslavia: Motivations and Behavior of the Serbian Leadership during the Kosovo crisis", The Independent Centre for Strategic Studies (25 May 2000), pp. 1-41.

Milosevic than for US policy makers." Nevertheless, the unexpected resistance and "Milosevic's escalation of ethnic cleansing," Burg argues, "created the incentives necessary for Western policymakers to carryout a strategy of coercion. Preservation of the NATO alliance was a powerful motivation for the use of force to ensure success and reinforce the shift among the US policymakers from a strategy of coercive diplomacy to straightforward coercion."[230]

A good indicator of how intervening states viewed the crisis in terms of public goods, which they prefer to sub-optimally produce, was the discussion among NATO states over the deployment of ground troops. Although in April, planning for a ground invasion began at NATO headquarters, there was, however, strong political resistance against ground troops in several of the NATO countries, and including the US itself. The discussion about ground troops demonstrated how member states were less enthusiastic to undertake any commitment for the provision of goods called collective or public.

[230] Burg, *op. cit*., p. 95

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has analyzed the role of leadership in the success of collective coercive attempts. Throughout the paper two themes have been strongly emphasized: the leadership requirement for collective international involvements in intra-state conflicts and the management of such conflicts by means of coercive diplomacy. I developed my arguments in four steps. A section that examined hegemonic stability theory and extended its basic assumption of leadership requirement for the management of international trade to the management and resolution of intrastate conflict was followed by a discussion of coercive diplomacy. In line with these assumptions, I argued that any collective action undertaken for the resolution of an internal conflict involves a two pillar process. Accordingly, I developed a two pillar model that reveals the interaction between the coalitional pillar and that of the coalition and the target state.

Finally, to demonstrate the validity of these arguments, I analyzed Kosovo conflict beginning from the second half of 1990s, when international community began to take the conflict seriously into consideration, until the agreement signed between NATO and Serbia that ended NATO's intervention in the conflict in June 1999. The conflict and the intervention that it caused demonstrated how collective action towards resolution of intra-state conflicts require a leading state that is ready to either provide or impose public goods associated with such an involvement. It at the same time served as a good case supporting the model that developed to demonstrate the interaction between the member of intervening coalition and the coalition and the target.

The study begun with drawing attention to the growing international awareness of the linkage between human rights abuses, forceful displacement of populations and local regional and international security. However, given the poor record of international community in dealing with intrastate conflicts, I argued that in the absence of a direct threat to the interests of each individual member, there will be

a need for a leader that is capable to provide public goods associated with efforts to bring a solution to the conflict. To this end, I discussed some of the assumptions of hegemonic stability, and collective action theory, respectively, that might be helpful in understanding the logic behind coercive diplomacy as a form of intervention undertaken collectively in intrastate conflicts.

The primary challenge in this regard was to show public goodness of the intrastate conflicts. Utilizing the concept of external economies as employed by the students of collective action theory, I advanced the idea that intrastate conflicts should be considered as public bads produced as a by-product of private activities of parties involved in an internal conflict to promote their respective interests. As illustrated in the case analyzed here, conflicts do not exist separate from the rest of the international system. They have externalities or costs to the broader community, which must find ways to deal with them and share those costs associated with the efforts for their solution.

The conflict between Kosovar Albanians and Serbian administration in the process of advancing their respective interests over Kosovo created a public bad for the larger international community to be dealt with. As outlined above the public bad associated with the conflict was the potential threat it posed to international peace and security. That the eruption of the conflict had repercussions not simply limited to Balkan region made it an immediate concern of international community. Refugee flows caused by the conflict was one of the potential threats to international peace and security. Indeed, when the international community seriously begun to take interest in Kosovo, this was not out of concern for the plight of Albanians but because the increase in the number of Albanians seeking asylum in the Western Europe, alarmed Western capitals to consider the issue seriously.

The threat that Kosovo posed, however, was not limited to merely flow of refugees to the Western countries. It was feared that once exploded, the damage it would cause would not be limited to Kosovo. While those closest were the most to be effected from the diffusion or prevention of the conflict, other states had at differing levels to lose or benefit from its diffusion or prevention. Not to mention the fragile situation the conflict had created for Albania, Macedonia and other neighboring states, for the European Union countries, for instance, the conflict was

another deadly incident on its periphery. For NATO it implied possible splits within the organization among the member states, i.e. Turkey and Greece which were likely to become a party to the conflict. And after all, even if having been stated as a weak cause for the mobilization of the international community, the human suffering that the conflict has caused by burning villages and by displacing tens of thousands of civilians was another reason to draw international community into the conflict.

In this context, by the logic of the negative symmetry between public goods and public bads, intervention becomes a collective or public good. Therefore, I argued that although produced outside the group, when the negative externality that the action of the parties to the conflict create influence the welfare, or as in the example of loud music, its rejection or elimination requires a cost for the group to bring the wellbeing of the group back into equilibrium then we can claim that a condition that involves a collective action has been created.

Intervention to bring a solution to the conflict similarly had repercussions with differing magnitudes for different segments of international community. The benefit can be securing the stability of a region, security of an ally or enhance legitimacy among the other members of the international community. In the case of Kosovo, the articulated benefits varied. They included peace and stability in Southern Europe, strengthening the institutions that keep the peace, preserving Bosnia's progress towards peace and strengthening democratic principles and practices in the region, preventing the flood of refugees and the creation of heavens for international terrorists, drug traffickers and criminals, preventing the spread of conflict to Albania and Macedonia and the involvement of Greece and Turkey, and preserving NATO's credibility as the guarantor of peace and stability in Europe, and finally overcoming the sense of shame that the West had failed in the Bosnian catastrophe.

The public goods associated with the efforts in finding a solution to ethnic conflicts included diplomatic efforts, political and economic majors, use or threat of the use of force and several other actions that required coordination. However, as is the case in the production of any public goods, the states in the absence of strong interests at stake, tend to lack any incentive to carry the burden and seek to free ride on the efforts of others in finding a solution to internal conflicts. The process of

international involvement in Kosovo crisis, in this regard, is illustrative of the public goodness of such conflicts.

As observed in Kosovo, the initial approach of the international community in general and Contact Group in particular demonstrated how states were less enthusiastic to undertake any commitment for the provision of such interests or goods called collective. For instance, the efforts of Contact Group were hampered by the parochial interests of the member states. It mainly served as a forum for the accommodation of member states' interests. Therefore, the activation in circumstances on the ground was not a sufficient condition for international involvement. Thus rather than establishing a firm stance on the eve of the eruption of violence they limited their engagement to equivocal speeches and statements that observed balance between two sides of the conflict.

A good indicator of how intervening states viewed the crisis in terms of public good was the discussion among NATO states over the deployment of ground troops, which they prefer to sub-optimally produce. Although in April, planning for a ground invasion began at NATO headquarters, there was, however, strong political resistance against ground troops in several of the NATO countries, and including the US itself. The discussion about ground troops demonstrated how member states were less enthusiastic to undertake any commitment for the provision of goods called collective or public. The lack of public support due to high costs and military casualties associated with deployment of ground troops made the intervening states to back away from realizing this option.

The case, in this regard, is not only a good example of illustrating how intrastate conflicts can be consider as negative externalities, having repercussion for the wider international community but also how the presence or absence of leadership might effect the prospect of international engagement. I suggested that the leader not only mobilizes international organizations to take an active role in efforts for the prevention, management and resolution of such conflicts but also encourages/forces other states to either participate into the solution finding process and/or contribute the payment for the good. In this context, the US played a crucial role throughout the process in the identification of the problem, option identification, deliberation and decision, and finally implementation. It actively involved in

mediation in facilitating dialogue for a political settlement, activating Contact Group, the UN and NATO to take a more robust approach. Indeed, American action shaped under the position of Secretary of State Madeline Albright came out to be necessary to compel Europeans to confront the crisis in Kosovo. From the early stages of international engagement Albright insisted that an outside settlement on the parties was necessary for the resolution of the conflict. However, for the most part the US initiatives required cooperation and consent from the other members of the Contact Group. Only after taking the support of other NATO members and taking a tacit consent from Russia could the US actively led international efforts. This fits well into the assumption that leadership depends on consent from the followers.

The second theme emphasized in this study was the form such interventions are carried out. Apart from demonstrating the need for a leader, the process in which a coalition of states involve for dealing with such conflicts takes the form of coercive diplomacy. The major task accomplished in this regard was to depict an intervention in terms of two models which interact with each other. The first model derived from possible interactions within the intervening coalition, particularly between the lesser members of the coalition and the potential leader who is capable of providing the public good or persuades others to participate in its production. The second game, on the other hand, models the process which the coalition utilizes several tools of coercive diplomacy to induce the target comply with the demands of the coalition.

While the first game modeled the interaction that takes place within the coalition, more specifically between the leader and the other members of the coalition, the second game takes place between the coalition and the target state, which is subject to coalitional coercion. The second game models an order in which the third party intervention takes place and the degree of commitment allocated by the third party at each stage. This model is further important in the sense that it provides credence to the conceptualization of interventions as public good and how this public good affects the delineation of the strategy.

When considered in terms of the games developed above, Kosovo crisis and the engagement of international community provides credence to the assumptions raised here. As has been predicted in the model, despite the fact that Kosovo was a bomb waiting to explode, the initial approach of the international community was to

sideline the conflict. The task of leadership as provided in the case of Kosovo by the US was not only crucial in minimizing the intra-coalition differences over the right course of action but also in shaping perceptions of the credibility attributed to non-coercive and coercive measures undertaken by the coalition.

Kosovo crisis is further illuminating in reflecting the process of four phases of international engagement outlined in the second model. We observed that following the realization and identification processes at the second level of preventive strategy, the international community developed three forms of engagement to solve the conflict on the local level before its engagement to solve the conflict through the diplomacy of coercion. These were pseudo-engagement, diplomacy of persuasion and coercive diplomacy.

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