

SOCIO-POLITICAL IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP PERCEPTION:
THE CASE OF “ÜLKÜCÜ GROUP” IN TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

SOCIO-POLITICAL IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP PERCEPTION: THE CASE OF “ÜLKÜCÜ” GROUP IN TURKEY

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This thesis consists of two studies together with a preliminary study, focusing on the issue of ingroup representation of the ülkücü group. The first study, addressing the problems of stereotype content, stereotype accuracy, and stereotype consensus, was based on in-depth interviewing with twenty members of the ülkücü group. It was hypothesized that the group members, when their social identities were salient, would locate the ingroup within a chronic way of looking at the world, namely the perceived context. The accuracy of stereotypes and the stereotype consensus commonly observed among group members depended upon the efficiency of this perceived context as an explanation. Moreover, the favorability of stereotype content also derived heavily from this perceived context.

The second study, based on two hundreds ülkücü group members, examined the effects of target group (ingroup, close outgroup, distant outgroup), type of attributes (favorable, unfavorable), comparative context (intragroup, intergroup with close outgroup, intergroup with distant outgroup, multigroup), and level of identification with the ingroup (high-identifiers, low-identifiers) on the perceptions of homogeneity. A number of hypotheses were tested and the following results were found: First, group members perceived the ingroup as more positively homogeneous than both the close and

the distant outgroup. Moreover, the close outgroup was perceived as more positively homogeneous than the distant outgroup. In fact, the distant outgroup was perceived as negatively homogeneous. Second, group members perceived both the ingroup and the close outgroup as more positively homogeneous in terms of unfavorable attributes than in terms of favorable ones. On the contrary, they tended to perceive the distant outgroup as more negatively homogeneous in terms of favorable attributes than in terms of unfavorable ones. Third, the above perceptions were less accentuated in the intragroup context, while they were more accentuated in the multigroup context. Fourth, the above perceptions were more accentuated for the high-identifiers than for the low-identifiers. Apart from these main effects, a number of complicated interactions were also discovered and these results were discussed with reference to the relevant literature.

Keywords: attribute type, close outgroup, collectivism, comparative context, distant outgroup, distinctiveness-differentiation hypothesis, group representation, identity-differentiation hypothesis, individualism, ingroup, ingroup bias, ingroup favoritism, ingroup homogeneity, outgroup, outgroup derogation, outgroup homogeneity, perceived context, perceived variability of groups, positive-negative asymmetry, relational groups, self-categorization theory, social identity, social identity theory, socio-political identity, stereotype, stereotyping, *ülküçü* group.

ÖZ

SOSYO-POLİTİK KİMLİK VE GRUPLAR ARASI ALGI: TÜRKİYE'DE ÜLKÜCÜ GRUP ÖRNEĞİ

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Bu tez, ülkücü grubun iç-grup temsili konusuna odaklanan iki çalışmanın yanısıra bir de hazırlık çalışması içermektedir. Kalıpyargı içeriği, doğruluğu ve kalıpyargı ile ilgili fikir birliği konularına yönelik ilk çalışma, yirmi ülkücü grup üyesi ile yapılan derin mülakat yöntemine dayanmaktadır. Sosyal kimliğin belirgin olduğu durumlarda, grup üyelerinin iç-grubu kronik bir dünya görüşünün, yani algılanan bağlamın, içine yerleştirecekleri varsayılmıştır. Grup üyelerinde genel olarak gözlenen stereotip doğruluğu ve stereotip ile ilgili fikir birliği olguları bu algılanan bağlamın bir açıklama olarak etkinliğine bağlı bulunmuştur. Dahası, stereotip içeriğinin olumluluğu da bu algılanan bağlamdan oldukça güçlü bir şekilde etkilenmektedir.

İkinci çalışma, hedef grubun (iç-grup, yakın dış-grup, uzak dış-grup), nitelik türünün (olumlu, olumsuz), karşılaştırma bağlamının (sadece iç-grup, ikili grup ve üçlü grup), ve içgrupla özdeşleşme düzeyinin (yüksek-özdeşleşenler, düşük-özdeşleşenler) homojenlik algıları üzerindeki etkisini incelemiştir. Ülkücü grup üyelerinin katıldığı çalışmada bir dizi denence sınanmış ve aşağıda özetlenen sonuçlar bulunmuştur: İlk olarak, grup üyeleri iç-grubu hem yakın dış-gruptan hem de uzak dış-gruptan olumlu yönde daha homojen algılamışlardır. Bundan başka, yakın dış-grup da uzak dış-gruptan olumlu yönde daha homojen algılanmıştır. Daha doğrusu, uzak dış-grup olumsuz yönde

daha homojen algılanmıştır. İkinci olarak, grup üyeleri hem iç-grubu hem de yakın dış-grubu olumlu niteliklerden çok olumsuz niteliklere göre daha olumlu olarak homojen algılamışlardır. Bunun aksine, uzak dış-grubu olumsuz niteliklerden çok olumlu niteliklere göre daha olumsuz olarak homojen algılamışlardır. Üçüncü olarak, yukarıdaki algılar iç-grubun yalnız ele alındığı koşulda daha az vurgulanırken, üçlü grup bağlamında daha çok vurgulanmıştır. Dördüncü olarak, yukarıda özetlenen algı eğilimleri yüksek-özdeşleşenlerde, düşük-özdeşleşenlere kıyasla daha belirgin olarak gözlenmiştir. Bu ana etkilerden başka, bir dizi karmaşık ortak etkinin varlığı da bulunmuş ve bu bulgular ilgili yazın çerçevesinde tartışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: nitelik tipi, yakın dış-grup, toplulukçuluk, karşılaştırma bağlamı, uzak dış-grup, ayırdedicilik-ayrıştırma hipotezi, grup temsili, kimlik-ayrıştırma hipotezi, biecilik, iç-grup, iç-grup önyargısı, iç-grup kayırmacılığı, iç-grup homojenliği, dış-grup, dış-grubu küçültme, dış-grup homojenliği, algılanan bağlam, grupların algılanan değişkenliği, olumlu-olumsuz bakışsızlığı, ilişkili gruplar, kendini-sınıflandırma kuramı, toplumsal kimlik, toplumsal kimlik kuramı, sosyo-politik kimlik, basmakalıp yargı, basmakalıp yargılama, ülkücü grup.

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“I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work”.

Date: 04.09.2003

Signature:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZ.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	x
LIST OF TABLES.....	xvi
LIST OF FIGURES	xviii
CHAPTER	
I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. DEFINITIONS OF STEREOTYPE	3
1.2. HISTORY OF STEREOTYPE RESEARCH.....	4
1.2.1. Lippman: Picture in Our Heads.....	6
1.2.2. Katz and Braly: The Checklist Methodology	10
1.2.3. The Frankfurt School: The Authoritarian Personality	16
1.2.4. G.W. Allport: The Nature of Prejudice	19
1.2.5. The Kernel of Truth Debate	23
1.2.5.1. Individual and Group	25
1.2.6. Tajfel: Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice	32
1.2.7. The Social Cognition Approach.....	35
1.2.7.1. Inconsistency Management.....	36
1.2.7.2. Salience as a Property of the Stimulus	42

1.2.7.3. Spontaneous Information-Processing.....	44
1.3. SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY (SIT)	48
1.3.1. Main Assumptions and the Intellectual Predecessors	50
1.3.1.1. Karl Marx: The Struggle between Social Classes.....	51
1.3.1.2. Max Weber: Status Groups and the Life Styles	53
1.3.2. Basic Principles of SIT	56
1.3.3. SIT: A Theory of Intergroup Relations	64
1.3.4. SIT: A Theory of Group Processes	68
1.3.5. Tajfel: Social Stereotypes and Social Groups	72
1.3.6. Self-Categorization Approach to Stereotyping	76
1.3.6.1. Selective Activation of Social Categories.....	81
1.3.6.2. A Self-Categorization Theory of Accentuation	85
1.3.7. A Simple Typology of Group or Group Situations	90
1.4. THE NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY IN TURKEY AND ÜLKÜCÜS	96
1.4.1. The Birth of Turkish Nationalism	97
1.4.1.1. The Young Ottomans and the Policy of Ottomanism	99
1.4.1.2. The Young Turks and the Revolution of 1908.....	102
1.4.1.3. Ziya Gökalp the National Thinker	109
1.4.1.4. Turkish Houses	112
1.4.2. Turkish Nationalism in the Republic of Turkey	113
1.4.2.1. Nationalism in the Single Party Period	115
1.4.2.2. Nationalism in the Transition to Multi-Party Period.....	117
1.4.2.3. Political and Ideological Environment in the 1960s	119
1.4.3. The Birth of the Nationalist Action Party.....	120
1.4.3.1. The Doctrine of Nine Lights	121

1.4.4. Ülkücü Group after the September 12 Coup D'état	130
II. PERCEIVED CONTEXT AND INGROUP REPRESENTATION OF MEMBERS OF THE ÜLKÜCÜ GROUP	135
2.1. INTRODUCTION	136
2.1.1. Stereotype Content	136
2.1.2. Stereotype Accuracy.....	144
2.1.3. Stereotype Consensus.....	150
2.2. METHOD	154
2.2.1. Interviewees	155
2.2.2. Materials and Procedure	157
2.3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION.....	159
2.3.1. The Perceived Context of the Interviewees.....	160
2.3.1.1. Imperialist Enemies and Their Treacherous Compradors.....	160
2.3.1.1.1. Imperialist threat against the unity of Turkey	166
2.3.1.1.2. Imperialist threat against the Turkish culture	171
2.3.1.2. Sacredness of Independence and Indigeneity.....	183
2.3.1.2.1. Independence as the highest value of a nation.....	185
2.3.1.2.2. Unity of the motherland and the endlessness of the state	187
2.3.1.2.3. Imported thoughts should be dismissed.....	190
2.3.1.2.4. The synthesis of Turk-Islam	192
2.3.1.3. Ülkücüs as the Saviour of the Country	194
2.3.1.3.1. Ülkücüs as an organized movement of Turkish Nationalism	195
2.3.1.3.2. Ülkücüs as a group being continuously attacked by the traitors....	203
2.3.1.3.3. Ülkücüs as ascetics	208
2.3.2. Ingroup Representations of the Interviewees	212

2.3.2.1. Ülkücüs as “Men” of Idea	218
2.3.2.1.1. Ülkücüs as Turkists.....	220
2.3.2.1.2. Ülkücüs as Islamists.....	222
2.3.2.2. Ülkücüs as Men of Struggle.....	225
2.3.2.2.1. Ülkücüs as warriors against the enemies of the Turkish nation.....	226
2.3.2.2.2. Ülkücüs as a group struggling to exalt the Turkish nation	233
III. CHANGES IN THE CONTENT OF STEREOTYPES AS A FUNCTION OF COMPARATIVE CONTEXT AND INGROUP IDENTIFICATION LEVEL	242
3.1. INTRODUCTION	243
3.1.1. Ingroup Bias: Ingroup Favoritism or Outgroup Derogation.....	244
3.1.1.1. The positive-negative asymmetry	246
3.1.1.2. Identity-differentiation hypothesis	250
3.1.2. Perceived Variability of Groups.....	253
3.1.3. Comparative Context as a Determinant of Stereotype Content.....	258
3.1.4. Intergroup Similarity: Distinctiveness–Differentiation Hypothesis	261
3.1.5. The Scope of the Present Study.....	264
3.1.5.1. Expectations related to the ingroup.....	265
3.1.5.2. Expectations related to the close and the distant outgroups.....	266
3.1.5.3. Expectations related to the intergroup contexts and the multigroup context.....	268
3.2. PRELIMINARY STUDY	270
3.2.1. Method.....	270
3.2.1.1. Participants.....	270
3.2.1.2. Materials and Procedure.....	271
3.2.1.2.1. Adjective Checklist	271
3.2.1.2.2. Collective Self-Esteem Scale.....	273

3.2.1.2.3. Party Identification Scale.....	274
3.2.2. Results and Discussion.....	275
3.2.2.1. A Note on Cluster Analysis Method.....	276
3.2.2.2. Hierarchical Structure of 103 Adjectives.....	279
3.2.2.3. Reliability and Validity of Collective Self-Esteem (CSE) Scale	286
3.2.2.4. Analyses Related to Political Party Identification.....	288
3.3. MAIN STUDY	291
3.3.1. Method	291
3.2.1.1. Participants.....	291
3.3.1.2. Materials and Procedure.....	292
3.3.1.2.1. Favorability of attributes.....	293
3.3.1.2.2. Ratings of the attributes	295
3.3.1.2.3. Collective Self-Esteem Scale.....	297
3.3.1.3. An Overview of the Design.....	297
3.3.2. Results	297
3.3.2.1. Perceived Homogeneity of the Ingroup	298
3.3.2.2. Perceived Homogeneities of the Ingroup Versus the Close Outgroup.	302
3.3.2.3. Perceived Homogeneities of the Ingroup Versus the Distant Outgroup	307
3.3.2.4. Perceived Homogeneities of the Ingroup Versus the Close Outgroup Versus the Distant Outgroup.....	316
3.3.3. Discussion	319
3.3.3.1. Ingroup Favoritism and Outgroup Derogation as Two Forms of Ingroup Bias.....	319
3.3.3.2. Positive-negative asymmetry (or Symmetry).....	321
3.3.3.3. Identification Level as a Determinant of Intergroup Differentiation ...	325

3.3.3.4. Comparative Context: Not Two Types but Possibly Many	327
IV. CONCLUSION	332
REFERENCES	338
APPENDICES	385
APPENDIX A QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE PRELIMINARY STUDY	
APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE MAIN STUDY	
TURKISH SUMMARY	400
VITA.....	407

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1. Historical developments in the study of stereotyping.....	7
Table 1.2: The Five Traits Most Frequently Assigned to Each of Various Racial and National Groups by 100 Princeton Students in Katz and Braly (1933)	11
Table 1.3: (a) Average rank order of ten racial groups: preferential ranking, (b) The ranking of ten races on the basis of the rating of their alleged typical traits by 65 students	13
Table 2.1: Demographic properties of the interviewees	156
Table 2.2: Frequencies of units referring to categories and sub-categories of the perceived context of ülkücüs	161
Table 2.2 (continued): Frequencies of units referring to categories and sub- categories of the context as perceived by ülkücüs	162
Table 2.2 (continued): Frequencies of units referring to categories and sub- categories of the context as perceived by ülkücüs	163
Table 2.3: Frequencies of units referring to the categories of the affirmational ingroup representation of ülkücüs.....	214
Table 2.3 (continued): Frequencies of units referring to the categories of the affirmational ingroup representation of ülkücüs.....	215
Table 2.3 (continued): Frequencies of units referring to the categories of the affirmational ingroup representation of ülkücüs.....	216
Table 2.3 (continued): Frequencies of units referring to the categories of the affirmational ingroup representation of ülkücüs.....	217

Table 3.2.a. The sub-clusters of the cluster of positive adjectives and their Cronbach's alpha values	284
Table 3.2.b. The sub-clusters of the cluster of negative adjectives and their Cronbach's alpha values	285
Table 3.3. Factor loadings and communalities of items of the CSE scale	287
Table 3.4. Means and Standard Deviations of Party Identification Scale.....	288
Table 3.5. The correlations between identification level with the NAP and those with the other parties.....	290
Table 3.6: Means and standard deviations of the favorability (unfavorability) ratings of the selected attributes in the preliminary and the main study.....	294

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: Example of a payoff matrix used in the original minimal group experiment by Tajfel et al. (1971; p.157)	59
Figure 1.2: The hypothetical positions of the person (P), the target (T) and others (O) about a social issue.	87
Figure 2.1: A schematic summary of the perceived context of the interviewees	211
Figure 2.2: A schematic presentation of ingroup representation of the interviewees.	239
Figure 3.1.a. Dendrogram showing the first cluster of adjectives	280
Figure 3.1.b. Dendrogram showing the second cluster of adjectives.....	281
Figure 3.2: Perceived ingroup homogeneity in terms of favorable and unfavorable attributes in four contexts.	299
Figure 3.3: High- and low-identifiers' perceived ingroup homogeneity in terms of favorable and unfavorable attributes.....	301
Figure 3.4: Perceived ingroup homogeneity in terms of favorable and unfavorable attributes in three contexts.	302
Figure 3.5: High- and low-identifiers' perception of homogeneity related to the ingroup and the close outgroup in both the dual with close outgroup and triple contexts.	304
Figure 3.6: Perceived homogeneities in terms of favorable and unfavorable attributes in both the dual with close outgroup and triple contexts.	305
Figure 3.7: Perceived homogeneities of the ingroup and the close outgroup in terms of the favorable and unfavorable attributes.	306

Figure 3.8: High- and low-identifiers' perception of homogeneity related to the ingroup and the close outgroup in terms of the favorable and unfavorable attributes.	307
Figure 3.9: Perceived homogeneities of the ingroup and the distant outgroup in terms of the dual with distant outgroup and the triple contexts.	309
Figure 3.10: High- and low-identifiers' homogeneity perceptions of the ingroup and the distant outgroup.....	310
Figure 3.11: High- and low-identifiers' perception of homogeneity related to the ingroup and the distant outgroup in both the dual with distant outgroup and triple contexts.	311
Figure 3.12: Perceived homogeneities of the groups in terms of the favorable and unfavorable attributes in the dual with distant outgroup and triple contexts.	312
Figure 3.13: High- and low-identifiers' homogeneity perceptions in terms of the favorable and unfavorable attributes.....	313
Figure 3.14: Perceived homogeneities of the ingroup and the outgroup in terms of the favorable and unfavorable attributes.....	314
Figure 3.15: High- and low-identifiers' perception of homogeneity related to the ingroup and the distant outgroup in terms of the favorable and unfavorable attributes in both the dual with distant outgroup and triple contexts.	315
Figure 3.16: High- and low-identifiers' homogeneity perceptions related to the ingroup, the close outgroup, and the distant outgroup.....	317
Figure 3.17: Homogeneity perceptions related to the ingroup, the close outgroup, and the distant outgroup in terms of favorable and unfavorable attributes.....	318

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

This thesis is concerned with the psychology of intergroup relations, depicted by Muzafer Sherif as ‘the psychology of the most overriding, the most anxiety-ridden, and therefore the most challenging of human problems in the modern world.’ (1966: p.1). We approached this most demanding human problem by converging on the notion of stereotype that has played a key role within social psychological theorizing related to the intergroup relations (Schaller, Rosell, and Asp, 1998). More particularly, we examined the ingroup and outgroup stereotypes of a particular group in Turkey, known as Ülkücüs.

There are four chapters in the thesis. The first chapter, General Introduction, has three objectives. The first objective is the clarification of the concept of stereotype. To this end, we reviewed various definitions of stereotype and the history of stereotype research in some depth. The second objective is to present an account of the theoretical background, namely The Social Identity Theory (Abrams and Hogg, 1990; Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Tajfel and Turner, 1979, 1986) that steered the studies, reported in the thesis. By this means, we hope that the reasons behind opting for such a theoretical framework and the novelties this thesis brought into the literature will be grasped more completely. And the last objective is to introduce both the history and the makeup of the group under study (i.e., Ülkücüs) in order to familiarize the reader with this group and pave the way for a better understanding of the ingroup and outgroup(s) stereotypes held by this group.

The second chapter presents the results of a study based on depth interviewing method with twenty ülküçüs. The purpose of this chapter is to propose and commence a workable method and a conceptual construction to research the content of stereotypes. To this end, stereotype content is considered as a kind of social representation (Farr and

Moscovici, 1984; Moscovici, 1981, 1984, 1988) and related to the self-literature developed mainly within mainstream social psychology (Brown, 1998; Osborne, 1996). In this way, we hope to contribute to the Social Identity Theory, which gives much importance to studies of stereotype content but could not divest itself of the shortcomings of traditional studies.

The third chapter presents the results of two studies based on questionnaire method with 99 and 200 ülküçüs, respectively. The first study is a preliminary study by means of which we wished to single out 20 workable Turkish trait-descriptive adjectives from a list of 103 to be used in the main questionnaire study. Besides, the reliability and validity assessment of a Collective Self-Esteem scale (Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992) was made and the close and distant outgroups of Ülküçüs were ascertained within this preliminary study. The second study is the main study whereby we explored the effects of context (intragroup vs. dual with close outgroup vs. dual with distant outgroup vs. multi-group conditions), target group (ingroup vs. close outgroup vs. distant outgroup), and ingroup identification level (low identifiers vs. high identifiers) on the fabrication of group representations in terms of positive / negative homogeneity. By this factorial design, we tested a number of hypotheses derived from the Social Identity Theory and the Self-Categorization Theory (Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994; Turner et al., 1987). Our chief aim was to contribute to the idea that stereotype content may be variable. In this regard, we argued that stereotypes might have several components, which tend to be more or less related to the group defining characteristics. And we tried to demonstrate that intergroup context, within which intergroup comparisons are made, and the level of identification with the ingroup plays a significant role in determining the content of stereotypes by activating their certain components rather than others.

In the last chapter, we underlined the general pattern of the findings and discussed them in terms of the related literature. Moreover, we mentioned the strengths and weaknesses of the studies reported in the thesis and pointed to the possible lines of future research in this area.

Below in the first section, the definitions of the concept of stereotype will be appraised. In order to make the content of these definitions more explicit, basic cornerstones of the history of stereotype research will be reviewed in the second section. The discussion of history will be kept long enough to pave the way toward understanding

the novelties introduced by the Social Identity Theory, the subject of the third section. As has been noted above, the fourth section will be devoted to a recount of Ülkücü, the case study in this thesis.

1.1. DEFINITIONS OF STEREOTYPE

The word stereotype is a derivative from the Greek words of stereos and typos. Stereos means solid and typos means the mark of a model. Originally, stereotyping was a method of printing designed to reproduce the same pages. Walter Lippman first employed this word to refer to the specific type of social perception, as we know it today, in his book Public Opinion in 1922. It seems the message Lippman tried to express was that, first, the process of stereotyping in social life results in identical products, and second, the end results of stereotyping are inflexible and enduring (Miller, 1982; Stroebe and Insko, 1989).

People obsessed with details may see as many definitions of stereotype as the number of scholars who have studied it so far. However, in a bird's-eye view, it is easy to see that almost all scholars have agreed that the process of stereotyping is an act of social perception where people assign one or more dispositional qualities to most members of a group. In a good review, Miller (1982) categorized definitions of stereotype on two basic dimensions. These dimensions refer to the “inferiority” inherent in stereotypical perception in comparison to individualized perception and “consensus” that renders stereotypes widely shared among a large collection of people.

Some definitions emphasize both inferiority and consensus as properties of stereotypes (e.g. Harding, Proshansky, Kutner, and Chein, 1969; Katz and Braly, 1935).

A stereotype – by which is meant a fixed impression which conforms very little to the facts it pretends to represent and results from our defining first and observing second... Even in the case of groups unknown personally to the students, characteristics were assigned with a high degree of consistency. (Katz and Braly, 1935, p. 181)

Another group of definitions put emphasis on inferiority but not consensus as a property of stereotypes (e.g., Brown, 1965; Brigham, 1971).

Stereotypes are not objectionable because they are generalizations about categories; such generalizations are valuable when they are true. Stereotypes are not objectionable because they are generalizations that have been proven false; for the most part we do not know whether they are true or false –in their problematic form... What is objectionable about them? I think it is their ethnocentrism and the implications that important traits are inborn for large groups. (Brown, 1965, p. 181)

Another group of definitions underline consensus but not inferiority as a property of stereotypes (e.g., Mackie, 1973; Secord and Backman, 1974; Vinacke, 1957).

[Stereotypes] are shared beliefs about person attributes, usually personality traits, but often also behaviors, of a group of people. (Leyens, Yzerbyt, and Schadron, 1994, p. 12)

The last group of definitions highlights neither inferiority nor consensus (e.g., Ashmore and Del Boca, 1981; Schneider, Hastorf, and Ellsworth, 1979).

Stereotyping is the process of ascribing characteristics to people on the basis of their group memberships... The collection of attributes believed to define or characterize the members of a social group is a stereotype. (Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994, p. 1)

In this thesis, we tend to see stereotypes consistent with the third and fourth definitions above. However, mere focusing on the definitions cannot validate (or falsify) such a standing. Moreover, definitions may often be misleading. Thus, it seems better to try to grasp the meaning of stereotype by tracing its historical development. Such a journey may also make it easy to understand why social psychologists have felt it compelling to incorporate such intricate nuances into the definitions they devised.

1.2. HISTORY OF STEREOTYPE RESEARCH

In a review of the history of stereotyping research, Ashmore and Del Boca (1981) could identify three major traditions; the sociological, the psychodynamic, and the cognitive traditions. The sociological tradition conceives of stereotypes as social norms concerning how members of certain groups should be treated and points to the prominent role of culture and history in transmitting stereotypes from generation to generation. In short, this tradition sees stereotypes as cultural products acquired by individuals in the process of socialization. The psychodynamic tradition explains stereotypes with the help

of such mechanisms as displacement of aggression or projection. The main theme has been that not all but people with certain pathological personalities tend to stereotype members of outgroups. In contrast, the cognitive tradition conceptualizes stereotypes as products of normal cognitive functioning such as categorization, concept formation, and judgmental inference. Since people have a limited cognitive capacity to process information about the social world, the cognitive tradition emphasizes the functional value of stereotypes in reducing complexity of raw material into a more manageable form.

In a more recent paper, Schaller, Rosell, and Asp (1998) also distinguished three approaches. What makes one approach different from the others is the concept given priority in its explanation of intergroup relations. The first approach is the rationalization approach, which gives priority to “discrimination”. Proponents of this approach presuppose that history and culture beget a variety of discrimination. In a usual case of discrimination, there are, at least, two groups of which one is discriminating and the other being discriminated. In terms of the rationalization approach not only the discriminating group but also the discriminated group is motivated to rationalize and justify the existing system of relationships. Stereotypes and prejudice are developed to serve the functions of rationalization and justification. Thus, a study of stereotypes should tackle with both the history of the relations between groups and the culture within which these intergroup relations arise.

The second approach is the social categorization approach, which gives priority to “prejudice”. This approach assumes that the motive for a positive self-concept is fundamental for people. When they are categorized into a group, they tend to evaluate their group more positively than outgroups for group membership provides them with a group identity, which is thought to be a part of the general self-concept. As a result, discriminatory behavior favoring ingroup and against outgroup together with stereotypic perceptions of both ingroup and outgroup emerge. The resultant discriminatory behaviors and stereotypical perceptions are so unconsciously manipulated that the prejudicial attitude is strengthened.

The third approach is the information-processing approach, which gives priority to “stereotype”. This approach maintains that the limits inherent in normal cognitive capacity inevitably produce stereotypes related to the groups. Since stereotypes are based

on incomplete information, they generally draw a faulty and erroneous picture of the respective groups. Consequently, these erroneous and faulty pictures lead to the development of prejudice and discrimination.

It is easy to understand that the rationalization and information-processing approaches alluded by Schaller, Rosell and Asp are distinct names given correspondingly to the sociological and cognitive traditions alluded by Ashmore and Del Boca. By the time Ashmore and Del Boca wrote their chapter, the social categorization approach had not been able to pose a satisfying account of stereotyping. In contrast, by the time Schaller, Rosell and Asp wrote their chapter, the psychodynamic tradition lost its charm as a feasible explanation of both intergroup relations and stereotyping.

We should note that the classifications above are far from presenting an inclusive understanding. Firstly, they exclude several important social psychologists' idiosyncratic contributions, which proved exceptionally influential in shaping the subsequent literature. Secondly, these traditions and approaches were not orthogonal categories. As a matter of the fact, you can observe many issues overlapping two or more traditions or approaches in the writings of individual theorists. For these reasons, we find it useful to take a closer look at some of the classical writings. (Table 1.1 gives a sketch of historical developments in the study of stereotyping)

As we noted above, it was Walter Lippman who inserted the concept of stereotype into the agenda of social psychologists through his Public Opinion published in 1922. We shall start our inquiry into the history of stereotype research by giving a succinct account of his ideas.

1.2.1. Lippman: Picture in Our Heads

Lippman argued that subjective impressions play a subtle and powerful role in determining social action. He generally assumed a phenomenological point of view and stressed the necessity to understand the perceived world, rather than the objective one. Like William James (1950), who had depicted raw experience as the “great blooming, buzzing confusion”, Lippman wrote that,

Table 1.1:
Historical developments in the study of stereotyping
(Adapted from Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994, p. 9)

<u>Key publications</u>	<u>Conceptualization of stereotypes</u>	<u>Focus of empirical work</u>
Lippman (1922)	Rigid, over-simplified and selective, but necessary for simplification	-
Katz and Braly (1933)	Unjustified and contradictory fictions	Description of the content of various stereotypes
Adorno et al. (1950)	Erroneous products of pathological personality	Study of authoritarian and non-authoritarian individuals
G. Allport (1954)	Based on rational process of categorization, but rationality contingent on individual's nature	-
Sherif (1967)	Products of intergroup relations	Examining the effects of changing social relations
Tajfel (1969)	Based on rational processes of categorization common to all	Analysis of processes of accentuation
Hamilton (1981a)	Products of generalized and necessary cognitive processes that inadvertently produce error	Identification of various cognitive biases
Tajfel (1981a)	Shared products shaped by group membership and intergroup relations	Demonstrating the contribution of groups and values to the stereotyping process

... the real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and combinations. And although we have to act in that environment, we have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can manage with it. (p. 16)

Lippman called this simpler model as pseudo-environment upon which people impose structure so that it turns out to be more manageable, more predictable, and thus, more controllable.

Having such assumptions in mind, Lippman proposed stereotyping as one of the most necessary processes in the perception of others. For him, stereotyping is basically a process of simplification by which people bring social categories into the foreground and ignore uniqueness of target person. Thus, its function is to help people make sense of the social environment and not to be suffocated in too many details. As we shall see later, Lippman's starting point was quite consistent with and anticipatory of modern attribution and social cognition understanding (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Schneider, Hastorf, and Ellsworth, 1979).

Though Lippman did not present us with a definition of stereotypes, he characterized their use as "a very partial and inadequate way of representing the world" (p.72). He also noted that, once stereotypes are formed, they tend to be extremely rigid and resistant to change. Note that the content of the concept of stereotype was filled with negative connotations from the very beginning. Stereotypes are not only incomplete, if not totally erroneous, but also biased. Moreover, neither education nor criticism is likely to bring about a shift upon these fallacious and biased beliefs. In other words, Lippman's description of stereotypes had much in common with prejudice, bigotry, and closed-mindedness. A semantic association between these concepts has prevailed much of the stereotyping literature since then (Leyens, Yzerbyt, and Schadron, 1994; Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994).

Lippman did not describe stereotyping as a passive process, referring just to its aspect of abstracting common attributes of people. Rather, he pointed to its constructive nature. He maintained that people always carry preconceptions in their minds and they tend to be more receptive to information consistent with these prejudgments.¹ In other words, stereotypes do not belong only to the cognitive realm but also the affective realm. The affective process operating in parallel with stereotyping is ethnocentrism.

A pattern of stereotypes is not neutral. It is not merely a way of substituting order for the great blooming, buzzing confusion of reality. It is not merely a short cut. It is all these things and something more. It is the guarantee of our self-respect; it is the projection upon the world of our own sense of our own value, our own position, and our

¹ Today, this phenomenon is handled under the heading of self-fulfilling prophecy (Snyder, 1981a, 1981b)

own rights. The stereotypes are ... highly charged with the feelings that are attached to them. (p.96)

Having acknowledged self- or group-serving nature of stereotypes, Lippman was able to demonstrate their relevance to intergroup conflict and interpersonal strife.

Since my moral system rests on my accepted version of the facts, he who denies either my moral judgments or my version of the fact is to me perverse, alien, dangerous. How shall I account for him? The opponent has always to be explained, and the last explanation that we ever look for is that he sees a different sets of facts ... It is only when we are in the habit of recognizing our opinion as a partial experience seen through our stereotypes that we become truly tolerant of an opponent. Without that habit, we believe in the absolutism of our own vision, and consequently in the treacherous character of all opposition. For while men are willing to admit that there are two sides to a "question" they do not believe that there are two sides to what they regard as a "fact". (p.126)

These last remarks pose the problem whether stereotyping is desirable or not. Lippman's answer to this problem must be clear so far. Since he depicted stereotypes as overgeneralized and exaggerated images, he disapproved of their usage. He believed that in order to reach a true understanding of the world "there is no shortcut through, and no substitute for, an individualized understanding" (p.59) and expressed his admiration for those "whose consciousness is peopled thickly with persons rather than types, who know us rather than the classification into which we might fit" (pp.88-89).

However, he also added that since stereotypes fulfill a necessary function of economizing attention, the "... abandonment of all stereotypes for a wholly innocent approach to experience would impoverish human life. What matters is the character of the stereotypes and the gullibility with which we employ them" (p.90). It seems that while Lippman saw the process as functional, he regarded its products as erroneous. As social identity theorists rightly noted, this is an apparent paradox that has prevailed throughout the history of stereotyping research (Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994).

Lippman was the person who first conceptualized stereotyping. His influence upon subsequent developments has been great. Almost all of his propositions in Public Opinion turned out to be a research question for subsequent generations. Even The Authoritarian Personality theorists, who represented the most alien tradition to the mainstream, found a point of legitimacy in Lippman's ideas. Yet, Lippman was never involved in any of these

studies. In fact, he was not a social psychologist in the technical sense. Stereotyping became a property of social psychology only after the pioneering works of Daniel Katz and Kenneth W. Braly. In the next section, we shall deal with their two famous studies.

1.2.2. Katz and Braly: The Checklist Methodology

Before Katz and Braly initiated their research, other scholars such as Bogardus and Thurstone had shown that the patterns of discrimination against various races were quite uniform throughout the United States. In those studies, Americans had exhibited a high degree of consensus in their expressions of relative liking or disliking of different foreign groups.² One possibility to account for this consensus was that the foreign groups possessed varying degrees of undesirable qualities upon which most Americans based their preferential ratings. Katz and Braly found this possibility unlikely for there had to be wide individual differences within any nationality groups. Instead, they tended to explain this consensus in terms of prejudice absorbed from the stereotypes of American culture and wanted to examine the link between stereotypes and prejudice (Katz and Braly, 1947).

In order to examine the content of stereotypes, Katz and Braly developed a checklist method, which was going to reign stereotyping research for more than thirty years. They asked 25 students to list as many specific characteristics or traits as were thought typical of Germans, Italians, Irish, English, Negroes, Jews, Americans, Chinese, Japanese, and Turks. Having finished their task, Katz and Braly supplemented the list by characteristics commonly reported in the literature. At the end, the final checklist consisted of 84 descriptive adjectives.

In the main study (Katz and Braly, 1933), they presented this list to 100 Princeton undergraduates and asked them to select those, which seemed to them to be typical of the Germans. The students' task was to write as many of those traits as they thought were necessary to characterize the Germans adequately. If the students did not find proper

² Interestingly, Turks had always been found to be one of the most disliked groups.

Table 1.2:
The Five Traits Most Frequently Assigned to Each of Various Racial and National Groups
by 100 Princeton Students in Katz and Braly (1933)

<u>Traits Checked,</u> <u>Rank Order</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Traits Checked,</u> <u>Rank Order</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
GERMANS		NEGROES	
Scientifically-minded	78	Superstitious	84
Industrious	65	Lazy	75
Stolid	44	Happy-go-lucky	38
Intelligent	32	Ignorant	38
Methodical	31	Musical	26
ITALIANS		IRISH	
Artistic	53	Pugnacious	45
Impulsive	44	Quick-tempered	39
Passionate	37	Witty	38
Quick-tempered	35	Honest	32
Musical	32	Very religious	29
ENGLISH		CHINESE	
Sportsmanlike	53	Superstitious	34
Intelligent	46	Sly	29
Conventional	34	Conservative	29
Tradition-loving	31	Tradition-loving	26
Conservative	30	Loyal to family ties	22
JEWS		JAPANESE	
Shrewd	79	Intelligent	45
Mercenary	49	Industrious	43
Industrious	48	Progressive	24
Grasping	34	Shrewd	22
Intelligent	29	Sly	20
AMERICANS		TURKS	
Industrious	48	Cruel	47
Intelligent	47	Very religious	26
Materialistic	33	Treacherous	21
Ambitious	33	Sensual	20
Progressive	27	Ignorant	15

(Adapted from Katz and Braly, 1947, Table 1)

words in the list, they were free to add traits of their own. This procedure was repeated for other national and racial groups: Italians, Irish, English, Negroes, Jews, Americans, Chinese, Japanese, and Turks. When all these tasks were finished, the students were asked to go back over the ten lists of words, which they had chosen, and to mark the five traits of each list, which seemed the most typical of the group in question. Table 1.1 presents the contents of stereotypes elicited in Katz and Braly's study.

Katz and Braly (1947) interpreted the findings about the Germans as consistent with the portraits of Germans one can find in newspapers and magazines of the time. The students pointed to their science, industry, ponderous and methodical manner, and intelligence. While Italians were characterized as hot-blooded Latin peoples, the characteristics assigned to the Negroes were somewhat similar to the picture of the Negro as furnished by the racist magazines of the time. The English "gentleman" governed the characteristics the students assigned to the English and the qualities of the competitive business world were used to describe the Jews. While the picture of the Japanese seemed quite clear with some recognition of the Westernization of Japan, the stereotypes of the Irish, the Chinese, and the Turks were blurred. The Irish were found to be pugnacious, the Chinese as superstitious, sly, and conservative, and the Turks as cruel. Interestingly, the students' American (ingroup) stereotype was not different from that held by non-Americans, which might be taken as an indication of objectivity.

Katz and Braly thought that the adjectives employed to depict these ten groups must be a rough index of the esteem in which they are held. In order to furnish more precise measures, in a subsequent study (Katz and Braly, 1935), they asked 65 students to rate the 84 traits in terms of desirability in friends and associates. These students did not have any knowledge of the previous experiment or any idea that the traits were associated with any racial and national groups. In this way, the authors could calculate the overall favorability of the traits used to characterize each of the ten groups. Table 1.2.b illustrates the ranking of ten races on the basis of the rating of their alleged typical traits by 65 students.

Moreover, a further group of 60 subjects were directly asked to rank order these ten racial and national names in the order of preference. The average rank order of ten groups is given in Table 1.2.a. These two rank orderings were quite similar. The only changes observed were that the Italians dropped from fifth to eighth place; the Irish dropped two

places, while the Japanese moved up two places; and the Jews, the Chinese, and the Negroes moved up one place.

Table 1.3:

(a) Average rank order of ten racial groups: preferential ranking,

(b) The ranking of ten races on the basis of the rating of their alleged typical traits by 65 students

	(a) <u>Average</u> <u>rank order</u>	(b) <u>Average value of assigned</u> <u>traits</u>
Americans	1,15	6,77
English	2,27	6,26
Germans	3,42	6,02
Irish	3,87	5,42
Italians	5,64	4,40
Japanese	5,78	5,89
Jews	7,10	4,96
Chinese	7,94	4,52
Turks	8,52	3,05
Negroes	9,35	3,55

(Adapted from Katz and Braly, 1947, Tables 2 and 3)

In the light of these two studies, Katz and Braly (1935) concluded that prejudice is more than a single, specific affective response to a racial or national name. It is part of a general set of stereotypes of a high degree of consistency:

The student, for example, not only has a prejudice against the word Turk, but holds the belief that the Turk is cruel, physically dirty and sensual, and has a low opinion of these traits. This whole complex is his racial attitude and can be called out by the stimulus of the race name. This does not mean, of course, that it is justified. None of these ideas and attitudes need be based upon the true characteristics of Turks. But the prejudice is strongly bolstered by the rationalizations concerning the Turkish character. In other

words, prejudice does not exist toward an empty race name, but toward a race name which represents an imaginary individual of nasty character (1935, p. 190)

In other words, Katz and Braly saw stereotypes in association with prejudice. They thought that the function of stereotypes is to provide information about groups to bolster the prejudiced emotional reactions. Later, Katz and Schank (1938) illustrated this nicely in the following excerpt:

The essential secret of the matter is that through the stereotype, or collective representation, man sees an identity in nature, or in society, where none exists. The stereotype is an indiscriminating construct which assimilates varying types of experience into the same pattern on the basis of a minor resemblance or a fallacious similarity ... The corollary to this process is that men will hold absurd and contradictory views, since stereotypes are not governed by the sharpness of inclusion and exclusion of scientific concepts. (p. 89)

Katz and Braly's influence upon later developments was two-fold. Firstly, the checklist methodology was widely accepted as an appropriate tool to study stereotypes and shaped the nature of subsequent literature until the launch of social cognition. This methodology has been criticized for it led early stereotyping research to be obsessed with content, since it was not suitable to study processes (e.g., Ashmore and Del Boca, 1981; Brigham, 1971; Miller, 1982). Secondly, after Katz and Braly's research, the notions of stereotype and prejudice have been inextricably linked. This research was a good representative of the sociological tradition we sketched above (see, Ashmore and Del Boca, 1981). Katz and Braly characterized stereotypes as the product of socialization for their emergence did not need subjects' actual interpersonal encounters with the groups in question. Likewise, the function of stereotypes, and hence prejudice, was just to rationalize previous acts of discrimination. Moreover, this research can be taken as the starting point of the rationalization approach, mentioned by Schaller, Rosell, and Asp (1998).

Katz and Braly's realist position should also be noted for, as we shall see later, this has posed a grand problem for the whole field of social psychology:

Stereotyped pictures of racial and national groups can arise only so long as individuals accept consciously or unconsciously the group fallacy attitude toward place of birth and skin color. To the realist, there are no racial or national groups which exist as entities

and which determine the characteristics of the group members. It is true that certain behavior traits may be more frequently found among individuals of one nationality than those of another, but the overlapping is obviously very great. This can furnish no real basis for the race-entities which are ordinarily accepted and applied to foreigners (as well as to ourselves). (Katz and Braly, 1933; p. 289)

In brief, Katz and Braly thought that since a stereotype is a generalization about all members of a group, it has to be inherently erroneous for there is no such thing as group in objective reality. The notion of group was just a “nominal fallacy” (Allport, 1924). We shall have more to say about this position later. At this point, it may be sufficient to say that this realistic logic could not differentiate between objects and relations (Asch, 1952). That is, the ontological status of groups may be different from that of a stone but this does not necessitate the conclusion that they do not exist. Instead, its reality should be understood on a different plane.

After Katz and Braly linked stereotypes with prejudice by presenting the scholars with an applicable method, a storm of empirical research launched in the area of stereotyping. The aim of most research was to uncover the content of specific stereotypes, together with the aim of testing the hypotheses derived from the writings of Lippman. Two of these hypotheses are worth considering.

Lippman, Katz and Braly believed that a stereotype is just a misrepresentation or distortion of reality by the prejudices of the stereotyper. To test this idea, many researchers tried to pit stereotypes against some kind of “objective facts”. For example, in a well-known study, LaPiere (1936) explored the stereotypic belief that the Armenians living in California were lawless people. He reasoned that if the Armenians were lawless people, the ratio of crimes they committed or they were involved in over the total crimes had to be higher than the ratio of the Armenian population over the total population. However, he found that though the Armenians were representing 6% of the population in California, they appeared only in 1.5% of the court cases. That is, the observable, objective fact gave little, if any, support for the Armenian stereotype held by WASPs of California in LaPiere’s study. Similar findings led Klineberg (1951) to conclude that the stereotypes “... may occasionally contain some truth, but if they do so, it appears to be largely by chance” (p.505). That is, the belief that the stereotypes cannot be true seems to have been shared among many scholars. Schoenfield (1942) expressed the most popular

position about the relationship between stereotype and objective reality by saying that, “to the extent that a stereotype corresponds to objective facts, it is not a stereotype at all” (p.12).

The second hypothesis derived from Lippman’s ideas was that stereotypes are extremely rigid and resistant to change. In fact, as noted previously, the name of the concept was basically chosen to express this feature. In a review, Rokeach (1948) claimed, “It is not necessary to go far beyond common experience to convince ourselves that there is probably nothing more resistant to change than stereotypic attitudes towards outgroups” (p. 259). Harding, Kutner, Proshansky, and Chein (1954) adduced tens of studies exhibiting that national stereotypes are not prone to change. However, this literature was not free from anomalies. Some researchers brightly observed selective changes in the content of stereotypes. As a result of these observations, a movement known as “kernel of truth hypothesis” was commenced. Yet, before getting into a discussion of this hypothesis, it seems more appropriate to review two more views about stereotyping.

So far, it was seen that early scholars presented stereotype as a very poor device to be utilized in social perception. Stereotypes were considered to consist of over-simplified, over-generalized, rigid beliefs about outgroups. For this reason, their relation to the objective reality was very low. As a matter of the fact, since they were outgrowths of prejudicial attitudes, their main function was not to reach a veridical representation of reality but to ridicule or discredit outgroups in question (Zawadzki, 1942). Two voluminous books strengthened and added to this negative view of stereotype. These are Adorno et al.’s The Authoritarian Personality and Gordon W. Allport’s The Nature of Prejudice. Below, an account of these two books will be given. After that, the suggestions and different meta-theoretical assumptions of the kernel of truth hypothesis can be appreciated more fully.

1.2.3. The Frankfurt School: The Authoritarian Personality

The record of social psychology is full of rapid reactions to or efforts to understand events of historical importance. The most known reaction to the atrocities humankind witnessed during the Second World War is the emergence of the theory of the

Authoritarian Personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford, 1950). The theory was a mixture of Marxist social philosophy, psychodynamic view of family dynamics, and quantitative psychometric attitude research (Brown, 1995) and its basic aim was to link the phenomenon of prejudice (in fact, fascism) to a particular and pathological type of personality. The theory became so popular that it has been recognized by many intellectuals in other social sciences as the only legal psychological explanation of prejudice [see Giddens (1996; p. 185-187) for psychological interpretations of prejudice and discrimination).

Adorno et al (1950) maintained that an individual's social and political attitudes are "... an expression of deep lying trends in personality" (p. 1). What makes people susceptible to prejudiced doctrines like fascism or racism in a particular society at a particular time was their personality. It should be noted that the authors of the Authoritarian Personality were not concerned with the origin of such ideas in society and they restricted their mission to accounting for individual variation in the receptivity of those ideas.

Following Sigmund Freud who saw the child as father of the man (Hall and Lindzey, 1978), the Authoritarian Personality theorists believed that all personality types are the produces of familial history within which the child is socialized. Again, like Freud (1961, 1964), they believed that personality development involves regular repression, identification, and displacement of instinctive urges by the constraints of social life. Since the course of the personality development is determined in the very early ages, the parents are seen as the most powerful agents of socialization. In normal conditions, the parents observe a balance between allowing their offspring a certain degree of autonomy while requiring them to comply with the acceptable limits of societal norms. However, child-rearing practices are very different in prejudiced people's families where parents are excessively concerned with good behavior and right way of doing things. In such families, the children are forced to conform strictly to conventional moral codes, especially when sexual behavior is concerned. When the children transgress these norms, the identification figures, usually the father, employ harsh disciplinary measures for punishment.

Such experiences put a child in a situation where almost all of his/her instinctual drives are frustrated. According to frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard, Doob,

Miller, Mowrer, and Sears, 1939), frustrated person aggresses toward the frustrating target. For this reason, the child develops aggressions toward the parents. Yet, neither the social norms nor the powerlessness of the child allows him/her display this aggression so directly to its real targets. Instead, the anxiety arising from the consequences of this feeling led the child to displace his/her aggression away from the parents on to substitute targets. This process is known as scapegoating. Generally, ethnic minorities (e.g., Blacks, Jews) or socially devalued categories (e.g., homosexuals, criminals) are the groups most likely to be chosen as scapegoats. In addition, when the aggression toward the parents is denied, due to the process of reaction formation, they start to be idealized. This idealization is a life-long process. As the child grows up, he/she starts to idealize other authority figures since these figures symbolize the parents. As a result, the child becomes an over-deferential person toward authority figures. When this hypothesis is combined with the scapegoating theory, it is easily concluded that the social groups shown as target by the authority figures are the ready candidates against whom the individual in question develops prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behavior.

By this thesis, Adorno et al. hoped to explain why and how a whole nation of Germans had developed such irrational prejudice against the Jews and condoned the “Holocaust”. Of particular interest to our study, Adorno et al. maintained that such a family regime leads the child to have a particular cognitive style. Since the parents are overly concerned with conventional morality, it becomes functional for the child to develop a simplistic way of thinking based on categorizing the “rights” and the “wrongs”. As a result, the child starts to think in terms of very clearly drawn categories and becomes intolerant of any fuzziness between these categories. In situations where social groups are concerned, the child quickly develops distinctive and immutable stereotypes of outgroups:

A basically hierarchical, authoritarian, exploitive parent-child relationship culminates in a political philosophy and social outlook which has no room for anything but a desperate clinging to what appears to be strong and a disdainful rejection of whatever is relegated to the bottom. The inherent dramatization likewise extends from the parent-child dichotomy to the dichotomous conception of sex-roles and moral values as well as the dichotomous handling of social relations as manifested especially in the formation of stereotypes and of ingroup-outgroup cleavages. (p. 971)

Adorno et al. called this type of person as the Authoritarian Personality. The most important characteristics of the Authoritarians can be listed as follows:

1. Rigid, unthinking adherence to conventional moral codes,
2. Respect for and submission to authority,
3. Oversimplified and stereotypical thinking

It should be noted that Adorno et al. did not impose any novel meaning onto the concept of stereotype, instead they retained all of its connotations introduced by Lippman. Moreover, they strengthened the link between stereotype and prejudice, which had been suggested by Katz and Braly. Early scholars depicted stereotyping as an undesirable cognitive process or a state of mind, but by presenting stereotyping as an outgrowth of a pathological personality, the authors of the Authoritarian Personality reached the peak. Now, stereotyping was not only inferior and unwarranted but those who stereotype were people with a severe pathology.

This view was first challenged by another prominent figure, Gordon W. Allport (Pettigrew, 1979). His book The Nature of Prejudice, which was published only four years after the publication of The Authoritarian Personality, was another landmark in the history of stereotyping research. Allport (1954) was the first scholar who explicitly attracted attention to the crucial role played by the process of categorization in the process of stereotyping. Below, his ideas will be considered.

1.2.4. G.W. Allport: The Nature of Prejudice

The Nature of Prejudice appeared at the time of the Supreme Court ruling against school segregation. Allport was one of the experts who expressed his opinions against segregation before the Court. As has been noted, stereotypes had been regarded as indicative of maladjustment until he brought up this matter. Though he also believed that stereotyping is intimately related to the phenomenon of prejudice, he did not believe that it is a product of maladjustment. On the contrary, he maintained that it is an outgrowth of ordinary cognitive processes:

Why do human beings slip so easily into ethnic prejudice? They do so because the two essential ingredients ... –erroneous generalization and hostility- are natural and common capacities of the human mind. (p. 17)

Allport stressed the importance of the concept of categorization in a discussion of prejudice. He pointed to the abundance and diversity of social groups in social life and to the capacity of these groups in characterizing human interaction. Like William James and Walter Lippman, he thought that mere relying upon raw information about individuals or groups certainly brings about a huge complexity that presents severe adjustment problems. What protects people from such adjustment problems is the process of categorization. That is, according to Allport, categorization is an inevitable process that serves as a guide for behavior:

When an angry looking dog charges down the street, we categorize him as a “mad dog” and avoid him. When we go to a physician with an ailment we expect him to behave in a certain way toward us. On these, and countless other occasions, we “type” a single event, place it within a familiar rubric, and act accordingly. (p. 19)

A category can be likened to a summary. By gathering different instances into a compact form, people may think, feel, and behave much more efficiently. In other words, categorization simplifies social perception and people are not bothered by details:

It costs the Anglo employer less effort to guide his daily behavior by the generalization “Mexicans are lazy” than to individualize his workmen and learn the real reasons for their conduct. If I can lump thirteen million of my fellow citizens under a simple formula, “Negroes are stupid, dirty, and inferior,” I simplify my life enormously. I simply avoid them one and all. What could be easier? (p. 20)

However, it is clear that Allport was also influenced by the theory of Authoritarian Personality. He introduced the notions of rational and irrational uses of categorizations. Categorizations like scientific laws are instances of rational use of categorizations. But, according to Allport, this type of categorizations is rare, that is, most of the categorizations are doomed to be irrational for a categorization does not have a substantive or explicit meaning but involves emotionality and evaluation. When a category does not coincide with the evidence, the phenomenon of re-fencing occurs. That is to say, the individual acknowledges the evidence as an exception and sticks with the rule already established in his mind. In summary, Allport meant that the cognitive

function of stereotyping is to simplify the social world, but by pointing to evaluative dimension inherent in this process, he warned about its capacity to satisfy other needs like rationalization.

Allport believed in the existence of some very rare individuals who are habitually open-minded. In other words, he implied that the phenomenon of prejudice is not only concerned with contextual factors but individual differences might also be involved. However, for him, what is the most important element in determining the nature of prejudice is plain self-interest. He maintained that prejudice is most likely to occur when the categorization is associated with differences in value between the categories. No doubt that “the most important categories a man has are his own personal values” (p.24), which are derived from individuals’ membership to various ingroups. Thus, he argued, the determinant of prejudice is to categorize others in relation to categories associated with the self. Individuals tend to like people and objects associated with ingroup categories, while they tend to reject those associated with outgroup categories. Allport was concerned with eliminating the unwarranted consequences of prejudice. For this reason, he examined the ways self-interests may reduce such prejudicial attitudes:

He may think that Italians are primitive, ignorant, and loud until he falls in love with an Italian girl of a cultured family. Then he finds it greatly to his self-interest to modify his previous generalization and act thereafter on the more correct assumption that there are many, many kinds of Italians. (p. 24)

Allport might be regarded as one of the first scholars who drafted an essay on the sociology of body (for an account of this newly emerged branch of sociology see Gatens, 1995; Synnott, 1993) in his discussion of facilitatory effects of visible cues or marks on the process of categorization. By looking at the widespread gender, ethnic and racial stereotypes, Allport noted, “where visibility does exist, it is almost always thought to be linked with deeper lying traits than is in fact the case” (p.130). That is, expectations of behavioral differences might be based on differences of appearance. In the case of prejudice against Blacks, dark skin may take on a detestable meaning, though many Whites desire darker skins. Allport did not believe that prejudice against Blacks is a matter of color, rather it is because of their lower status: “Their skin implies more than pigmentation, it implies social inferiority” (p.134). The existence of visible marks is so important to invigorate prejudicial attitudes that Jews were forced to wear a yellow Star

of David on outer garments in Nazi Germany. Allport noted that since it was impossible to apply the criterion of visible distinctiveness to Jews in Germany, such a mark would make the Jews immediately visible, and in this way, the star would provoke ordinary Germans to make generalizations about its wearer as wanted by the power-holders. Both the star of Jews and the skin color of the Blacks were social rather than biological.

Allport defined a stereotype as “an exaggerated belief associated with a category” (p. 187). He was convinced that the main function of a stereotype is to rationalize or justify the stereotype holders’ conduct toward the object of stereotype. By citing numerous studies documenting self-contradictory stereotypes in the same observer, he concluded that:

The fact that prejudiced people so readily subscribe to self-contradictory stereotypes is one proof that genuine group traits are not the point at issue. The point at issue is rather that a dislike requires justification. (p. 191)

He seemed to believe in the kernel of truth of stereotypes and insisted that their accuracy should be tested against objectively derived group characteristics. However, even this proposal may be sufficient to demonstrate that his discussion concerning the stereotypes, in general, emphasized their falseness.

It is not easy to indicate Allport’s contribution to the social psychology of stereotyping and prejudice within the limits of a few pages. His book consisted of too many ideas to make a concise, and still satisfactory, summary. He had his own priorities. For our purposes, his linking of the process of stereotyping with the basics of human nature, that is the need to interpret the social world, is the most important and this theme has been what influenced the subsequent scholars. His arguments concerning the role of categorization in the phenomenon of prejudice paved the way for Henri Tajfel’s influential article Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice published in 1969. However, before a discussion of Tajfel’s ideas, it seems appropriate to consider the Kernel of Truth Hypothesis. A number of social psychologists held that stereotypes might not be totally incorrect; rather they may reflect some kind of social psychological truth in their contents. This idea was an output of a meta-theoretical position in social psychology that is directly related to the idea on which this thesis is based. For this reason, this meta-theoretical position will be reviewed in the following section.

1.2.5. The Kernel of Truth Debate

So far, we have seen that Lippman (1922) depicted stereotypes as rigid, oversimplified and selective. By pointing to stereotypes' connection with prejudice, Katz and Braly (1933) added that they are unjustified and contradictory fictions emphasizing the implication that they are generally incorrect. We have also noted that these two ideas received widespread acceptance in the following decades (Harding, Kutner, Proshansky, and Chein, 1954).

However, early research did not seem to provide complete endorsement with the idea that stereotypes are rigid and inflexible (Buchanan, 1951). A number of studies showed that the content of stereotypes of such nations as Germany and Japan held by American students underwent radical changes during and after the Second World War (e.g., Meenes, 1943; Seago, 1947). As noted in Section 1.1.2., Germans had been depicted with such favorable traits as scientifically-minded, industrious, intelligent and the like in Katz and Braly's study. However, they came to be seen as cruel and treacherous only ten years later (Meenes, 1943). Similarly, the Japanese, who had been portrayed as artistic and progressive in Katz and Braly's study, started to be described as sly, treacherous, and deceitful. In a longitudinal study, Seago (1947) found that the Japanese stereotype held by Americans became very unfavorable especially after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Even so, it should be noted that such alterations were observed only in the stereotypes of the nations that came into conflict with the United States, the stereotypes of other nations staying indifferent with the War did not change. It is worthwhile to cite one more study at this point. In a study, Sinha and Upadhyaya (1960) examined the stereotypes of a number of nations held by Indian university students both at the beginning and at the end of 1959. During this time, a border dispute arose between India and China. At the beginning of 1959, the Chinese had been perceived as possessing such favorable traits as artistic, religious, industrious, friendly, progressive, and honest. However, after the border dispute, they came to be seen as aggressive, cheat, selfish, warmonger, and cruel. In spite of these remarkable changes, Sinha and Upadhyaya concluded, "the Sino-Indian border dispute has not substantially affected the stereotypes of university students" (p.35). Since there was almost no change in the stereotypes of

other ethnic groups not involved in the border dispute, they regarded the change in the Chinese stereotype as an exception and continued to argue for the idea that stereotypes are rigid. When G.W. Allport's discussion about re-fencing is remembered, we can argue that social psychologists of the time seem to have stereotyped the phenomenon of stereotype as rigid, no matter how flexible they appeared at the end of their studies.

As noted in Section 1.1., early scholars adopted a sociological approach to stereotyping and believed that the function of stereotypes is to rationalize intergroup relations. If so, it should be unreasonable to expect any alteration in the content of stereotypes unless there is a change in the relations between the groups in question (Fishman, 1956). In this regard, Sherif (1967) offered that since stereotypes serve to reflect the nature of relations between groups, stereotype change is a product of specific alterations in intergroup relations. Or else, no stereotype change can be expected.

Main arguments about the factual basis of stereotypes were mentioned at the end of the Section 1.1.2. Many prominent figures (e.g., Bogardus, 1950; Fishman, 1956; Klineberg, 1951), including G.W. Allport, proposed that the problem of whether stereotypes correspond to reality should be tested against the objective truth about the stereotyped group. However, as we saw it, even among those scholars, there was disagreement about what should be taken as this so-called objective truth.

As a matter of fact, it is suspicious that efforts to find objective truths to declare stereotypes to be false would work. For this problem does not seem to be an empirical problem, rather it seems to be a meta-theoretical problem. It can be argued that there was an a priori belief in the minds of early scholars who were against the factuality of stereotypes. This belief was that "the group does not have an ontological reality". Thus, it is baseless to attribute characteristics of individuals to their collections as if that collection had an independent existence. The realist position represented by Katz and Braly was recapitulated in Section 1.1.2. This position has been dominant in social psychology since right after it was formally recognized (Farr, 1995; Fraser and Gaskell, 1990). In an effort to tie this individualistic thinking to a philosophy of logic, McGary (1999) employed Alfred North Whitehead's argument of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness in relation to racial stereotypes. Whitehead says that this fallacy is committed when one mistakes the abstract for the concrete. McGary generalizes this argument to the realm of racial prejudice:

The fallacy occurs in reference to RACE when we assume that a concrete individual (say a BLACK person) has characteristics that are thought to belong to black people in general. We are not warranted in inferring that a specific black person has C from the claim that black people in general have C. Racial stereotyping is thought to involve the improper use of racial generalizations. (pp. 719-720)

However, though stereotyping process ensues in the mind of individuals, a social stereotype is not a product of individual efforts. Being about a group is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a belief to be a social stereotype. By definition, a social stereotype should also be a shared belief, that is, it should be widely diffused among a certain group of people. In other words, a social stereotype is a belief held by a group of people about ingroup or outgroups (Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994). In this way, it can be said that social stereotypes take precedence over the lives of individuals who have them. They are acquired in the course of group socialization. Thus, the application of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness argument to the phenomenon of social stereotype is, on its own, vulnerable to the conclusions of the same argument. Such an application should imply that a group may commit the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, which is absurd according to the same argument.

So far, we have seen that early scholars in the mainstream had been quite radical. They did not only despise the stereotypes as undesirable but also denied the existence of groups. F. H. Allport (1962) described the relation between individual and group as the master problem of social psychology. If the discussions about the reality of groups are understood, then it may be easier to understand what the proponents of kernel of truth hypothesis really wanted to say.

1.2.5.1. Individual and Group

It seems that the fate of all social scientific disciplines is to start with a controversy on the problem of individual versus society (or group). Sociology, as a formal discipline, launched with the discussion whether society or individual heads the other (Berger, 1967; Mills, 1959). In one of the most famous controversies, Emile Durkheim (1950) argued that society is a reality sui generis and its existence is independent of individuals comprising it while Gabriel Tarde (1903), on the opposite side, retaliated that since society is made up of individuals, it cannot have an existence beyond its constituent parts.

Similarly, the first years of social psychology saw a similar controversy, this time in the guise of group versus individual (Brown, 1988; G.W. Allport, 1985; Turner et al., 1987).

Like Durkheim, some psychologists (e.g., Freud, 1921; LeBon, 1947; McDougall, 1921) claimed that a group has its own mind. This group mind is qualitatively different from those of individuals who compose the group:

The group spirit, the idea of the group with the sentiment of devotion to the group developed in the minds of all its members, not only serves as a bond that holds the group together or even creates it, but it renders possible truly collective volition. (McDougall, 1921; p. 63)

It should be noted that all these authors drew a darkened picture of group by pointing out that such a group mind reflects the basic, common and unconscious instinctual urges of a race or id. They contrasted the characteristics of group mind with those of individual mind, and meanwhile, they always favored the latter. They mainly argued that whereas individuals are conscious and guided by their reason, groups are unconscious and guided by instincts (Reicher, 1987).

On the other hand, some other psychologists, especially F.H. Allport (1924), adopted an approach similar to Tarde. He rejected the idea of group mind by saying that:

To answer the question where this mental structure of the group exists, we must refer to the individual. It is learned by each individual from the specific language and behavior of other individuals. Where such continuity of social contact ceases the organized life of the group disappears. Were all the individuals in a group to perish at one time, the so-called 'group mind' would be abolished forever. (p. 9)

F.H. Allport did not only oppose the idea of group mind but also rejected the reality of group. He is the first person who explicitly declared the commonsense belief that the groups are real as a nominal fallacy. For him, groups do not exist, there are only individuals. The notion of group is a kind of fiction for summarizing the actions of individuals.

F.H. Allport was a representative of the behaviorist tradition and the zeitgeist of the time was on his side. In those years, not only the reality of the concept of group but also the reality of the concepts like self and consciousness were also questioned (e.g. Watson, 1913, 1919). F.H. Allport preferred to call his position as realist, but in fact, in

philosophical epistemology, his position was not that of a realist but a materialist for he accepted only the reality of concrete individual and denied the reality of what he did not see, hear, touch, taste, or smell [see Dalmış (1997; pp. 2-3) for a similar argument in the realm of self]. As a matter of fact, representatives of the realist meta-theoretical position were Muzafer Sherif and Solomon E. Asch.

These two social psychologists were highly influenced by the Gestalt psychology whose basic motto was “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” (Hillner, 1984). According to this tradition, people do not experience stimuli as isolated, elementary units, but as organized wholes or fields or configurations.³ For this reason, they react to the total perceptual field. It is not possible to understand this total perceptual field by considering its parts for what gives meaning to these parts is their relation with the other parts in that whole. In other words, any stimulus in a perceptual field is in a functional relationship with the other stimuli. This interdependence attributes individual stimuli new higher order properties, and so, they become qualitatively different from their properties in isolation.

Sherif (1936) successfully adapted this law of the interdependence of parts into social psychology in his discussion of the psychology of social norms:

When the organism is stimulated by different parts of a stimulus field, the parts fall into a functional relationship and each part influences the other parts. The result is ... that the properties of any part are determined by its membership in the total functional system.
(p. 84)

He depicted kinds of social interaction as total functional systems where new whole properties such as slogans, values, etc. are produced. He maintained that these whole properties take precedence over individual properties in that system. Thus, for Sherif, the group is different from a mere aggregation of individual actions. His analysis of the formation of social norms is a classic and may be relevant to understand how this thesis conceives the relation between individual and group.

Sherif argued that social perception and social judgment are relative. Their characters are likely to be determined by the frames to which they are referred (i.e. frame of reference). At this point, it should be noted that, this axiom did not lead Sherif to adopt a relativist approach. He maintained that these frames of references are not idiosyncratic,

³ These are the possible English counterparts of the German word Gestalten.

rather they are provided by culture. In the process of socialization, they are internalized in the form of social norms, that is, as “customs, traditions, standards, rules, values, fashions, and all other criteria of conduct which are standardized as a consequence of the contact of individuals” (p. 3).⁴ These social norms are tightly connected with people’s self-identity. More correctly, self, or ego as called by Sherif, is made up of these social norms: “Values are the chief constituents of the ego ... These values are the social in man. In this sense, one may say, the ego is the social in him” (pp. 185-186). In other words, according to Sherif, the self, which had been supposed to be the most personal part of mind, is also socially constructed [see C.H. Cooley (1902) and G.H. Mead (1934) for similar arguments]. Thus, Sherif implied, it is nonsense to assume that it is a nominalism to believe in the reality of groups. Though individuals create a group, once it is formed, it starts to control the actions of its members (Asch, 1952) for its reality lies in the very minds of related individuals.

It is not easy to delineate Asch’s position for his arguments are quite sophisticated and too extensive to be reviewed here. Firstly, he noted that the rejection of group concept as a nominal fallacy is itself based upon an erroneous distinction between concrete things and abstract relations. Individualists like F. H. Allport believe that only things are real. However, Asch maintained that relations are as real as things. In fact, all things are systems of relations between lower level elements and all systems of relations appear as things when viewed from a broader perspective. For example, a molecule is a system of atoms, which are, in turn, systems of protons, neutrons, etc..

Second, there is a mutually shared psychological field where human interaction takes place. Asch formulates a phenomenological understanding of human interaction as follows:

They [human interactions] are happenings that are psychologically represented in each of the participants. In our relation to an object, perceiving, thinking, and feeling take place on one side, whereas in relations between persons these processes take place on both sides and in dependence upon one another ... We interact via emotions and

⁴ Though this argument is generally interpreted as the premise of cultural relativism [e.g., see the interpretation of Turner et al. (1987)], Sherif’s argument seems to have more to do with an ontology and epistemology, which are contrary to the atomized individual view of classical liberalism. In this regard, Sherif precedes many contemporary theories that will be briefly accounted in the Chapter of Social Identity Theory.

thoughts that are capable of taking into account the emotions and thoughts of others” (p. 142).

As can be seen, though the tone of depicting interaction is idealistic rather than materialistic, as it was the case for Sherif, Asch also stressed the inter-subjective nature of human interaction. People take others as references in their actions and since this is valid for everybody, they act in a shared field of mutual reference. This shared psychological field is a requirement of group formation:

... group actions ... are possible only when each participant has a representation that includes the actions of others and their relations. The respective actions converge relevantly, assist and supplement each other only when the joint situation is represented in each and when the representations are structurally similar. Only when these conditions are given can individuals subordinate themselves to the requirements of joint action. These representations and the actions that they initiate bring group facts into existence and produce the phenomenal solidity of group processes. These are also the conditions necessary for the idea of a goal that can be achieved jointly” (pp. 251-252)

Consequently, Asch argued that individuals’ capabilities make groups real, but since these capabilities are referential to others, groups cannot be reduced to individual facts. Individualists do not appreciate the individual capability of representing the shared social facts in their minds. Once these shared social facts are represented, as Sherif argued, they are likely to transform the mind. For Asch, the individual-group relationship is a “part-whole relation unprecedented in nature” (p. 257). For this relation is based upon a summary representation of the whole in the part. Later, social identity theorists called this individual-group relation as “the group in the individual” (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Turner et al., 1987).

Having seen the basic arguments about the reality of groups, we can now return to the kernel of truth debate. Scholars like Sherif and Asch were dissatisfied with the mainstream that had been analyzing the process of stereotyping as an aspect of prejudice for such an approach had been leading to a characterization of stereotypes as irrational. They argued that the psychological processes underlying the stereotypes could not be taken as faulty just because the content of stereotypes is likely to be related to prejudicial attitudes. Moreover, attempts to establish the factual basis of stereotypes do not have any logical support. On the contrary, Asch (1952) maintained that treating people as identical

members of a group rather than as unique entities is not necessarily deficient for people behave as members of a group in a great number of situations:

Group-properties are the forms that the inter-related activities of individuals take, not simply the actions of separate individuals. A flying wedge of policemen has a quality of power or threat that is a direct consequence of its organization. A picket line in front of a plant has a quality of unity that is a product of its organization. In each of these instances the group-property cannot be rediscovered in the individuals taken singly. (p. 225)

Asch was aware of the individualist argument claiming that since no two persons can have identical experiences, they develop such unique personalities that any attempt to classify them within a single category will be erroneous. However, as noted in his view of individual-group relation, for Asch, group membership is not something external to people, rather its home is present in the very minds of individuals. In other words, when people act in terms of their group membership, this act will not spring from something apart from their true personalities. For this reason, stereotyping as a process of social perception may sometimes be necessary:

Observing the distortions that follow from merging individuals with their groups, some have counseled that it is misleading to judge persons in terms of group relations and that the canons of objectivity require of us to understand persons first and foremost as individuals. It is correct to urge that we should strive to see persons in their uniqueness. But it is wrong to assume that we can best achieve a correct view of a person by ignoring his group relations... If there are group forces and if they exert effects, we should understand them to understand individuals. (p. 238)

The most coherent particular position against the mainstream understanding of stereotyping and prejudice was developed by Sherif in his Realistic Conflict Theory of intergroup relations (Sherif, 1966). He and his colleagues conducted three field experiments with eleven- and twelve-year-old boys at summer camps. The most renowned of these studies is known as The Robber's Cave Experiments (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif, 1961). A comprehensive account of the results of all these three studies is out of the scope of this thesis. In the first two experiments, Sherif observed that functional tasks requiring interindividual cooperation lead to the formation of groups. The most salient outcome of group formation is the development of a group culture, which

involves inventing nicknames for group members and constructing group secrets and symbols spontaneously.

In the Robber's Cave experiment, Sherif wanted to demonstrate that intergroup conflict results from intergroup competition for scarce resources. Once, intergroup conflict starts, group members' perceptions are biased, being positive toward ingroup members and negative toward outgroup members. Meanwhile, group members start to reward aggressive leadership:

Intergroup hostility arises from conflicts over vital interests and changes when the groups are directed towards superordinate goals. Apparently, both hatred and friendship are characteristically human, depending upon man's relationship to his groups and their position vis a vis others. (Sherif, 1966; p.153)

Sherif observed that negative stereotypic images were quickly developed as a result of intergroup conflict. However, when the groups were cooperated to do a superordinate goal, these images changed into much more favorable ones. Thus, Sherif concluded, there is no deficiency in stereotypes but their function is restricted to reflect the nature of the relations between relevant groups:

The choice and the salience of particular attributes ... reflect the stance of our own group in past and/or current relationship with the particular group in question. Both the generalized and vague descriptive character of the attributes and their singular point of view make the search for 'kernels of truth' in stereotyping unrewarding. (Sherif, 1966; p.37)

Nonetheless, it should be noted that in spite of these opposing theoretical and empirical studies, Lippman and G.W. Allport's ideas continued to be dominant in the mainstream. Yet the anomalies introduced by Asch and Sherif started to blur the picture and could not be resolved by the mainstream. Such anomalies led stereotyping research to be more and more susceptible to a revolutionary change, as proposed by Thomas Kuhn in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). John Brigham was one of the first scholars who felt the need of this change. In an extensive review, he made a harsh critique of the stereotyping literature both conceptually and methodologically (Brigham, 1971).

Firstly, he raised the idea that social psychologists view stereotypes undesirable because of their personal biases. Since most of the social psychologists had liberal attitudes, they did not find the nature of stereotyping as moral [this idea was shared by Brown (1965) and Levine & Campbell (1972)]. Secondly, Brigham noted that an objective criterion for validating or falsifying a stereotype is not present. Thus, the kernel of truth debate is doomed to be endless. Lastly, he directed his sharpest criticisms against the checklist methodology. Though he agreed that this procedure elicits trait selections with a fair degree of consensus, he did not find its results valuable:

[The findings of checklist methodology] do not prove of any value in elucidating what a stereotype is, how they are developed, or even how many people hold a stereotype. For example, how many subjects actually endorse (agree with) or use the generalization in behavior, and how many subjects are just reporting on their knowledge of the traits that persons in one's culture most commonly attribute to the given ethnic group? ... we do not know whether the subject believes that a trait which is "typical" is found in 20%, 50%, 90%, or all of the members of an ethnic group.(pp. 29-30)

Above all, he discussed that the checklist methodology became the most important obstacle in front of a theoretical advance for it relegated stereotypes to the role of dependent variable rather than as predictors of social behavior. He noted that the checklist methodology was so obsessed with content and so susceptible to the influence of prejudicial attitudes that the process of stereotyping always remained in the background. Thus, a well-defined empirical research strategy with a coherent theoretical analysis of psychological process is needed. Henri Tajfel made a plausible proposal in his 1969 article Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice. The impact of Tajfel's ideas was so powerful that a new stage in stereotyping research launched (Taylor, 1981a). This stage is known as social cognition approach. Contributions made by this approach will be reviewed after considering Tajfel's article.

1.2.6. Tajfel: Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice

Tajfel's approach to stereotyping and prejudice was completely different from the mainstream of the time. Firstly, he rejected the idea that these phenomena are irrational or pathological. Like, Lippman and G.W. Allport, he noted the paramount importance of the process of categorization in stereotyping:

Stereotypes arise from a process of categorization. They introduce simplicity and order where there is complexity and nearly random variation. They can help us to cope only if fuzzy differences between groups are transmuted into clear ones, or new differences created where none exist... in each relevant situation we shall achieve as much stereotyped simplification as we can without doing unnecessary violence to the facts. (Tajfel, 1969; p.82)

However, unlike Lippman and G.W. Allport, Tajfel proposed that the process of stereotyping, rather than stereotypes as end products, should be studied and these studies should be directed with a cognitive approach. Tajfel's cognitive approach was heavily influenced by the New Look movement in perception (Bruner, 1957; Bruner and Goodman, 1947; Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin, 1956). According to this approach, people have the capacity to modify their behavior as a function of their own subjective perception and understanding of a situation.

Moreover, like Asch and Sherif, Tajfel was aware of the important role, which groups play in people's lives. However, his emphasis on intergroup relations was more pronounced:

Much of what happens to us is related to the activities of groups to which we do or do not belong; and the changing relations between these groups require constant readjustments of our understanding of what happens and constant causal attributions about the why and the how of the changing conditions of our life. (Tajfel, 1969; p. 81)

Tajfel believed three cognitive processes are responsible for stereotyping: categorization, assimilation, and the search for coherence. Categorization process gives shape to intergroup attitudes. Assimilation of social norms and values determines the content of emerging categories. The search (or need) for coherence makes people susceptible to account for group behavior in terms of inherent, stable group characteristics. Tajfel's paper was influential in launching an intergroup attribution literature (e.g., Hewstone, 1989). Yet, his analysis of categorization was the most important for it launched a social cognition approach to stereotyping (Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994; Leyens, Yzerbyt, and Schadrone, 1994). This point is important for social cognition approach can be regarded as a new start to stereotyping research. Apart from some length of conceptual development made by Lippman and Allport, it can be said that

social cognition approach neglected or denied almost all empirical developments achieved since Katz and Braly's pioneering study in 1933.

At this point, it seems appropriate to review the discussion of Tajfel, which proved so revolutionary.⁵ Tajfel's interest in the process of categorization can be traced back to an experiment he conducted with Wilkes in 1963. In this experiment, Tajfel and Wilkes presented their subjects with a series of eight lines differing from each other in length by a constant ratio. The subjects were divided into three groups: classified, unclassified, and random. In the classified condition, the four shorter lines were labeled "A" and the four longer lines were labeled "B". In the unclassified condition, there was no label associated with the lines. And in the random condition, there was no predictable relationship between the length of the lines and the labels attached to them. Tajfel and Wilkes observed that subjects in the classified condition tend to exaggerate the difference between the shortest of the longer four and the longest of the shorter four. Moreover, they tended to minimize the difference between the lines within each classes of lines. These tendencies were not observed among the subjects in the other two conditions. Tajfel and Wilkes called this observation accentuation principle:

When a classification is correlated with a continuous dimension, there will be a tendency to exaggerate the differences on that dimension between items which fall into distinct classes, and to minimize these differences within each of the classes. (Tajfel, 1969; p.83)

This means that under certain circumstances, stimuli can be perceived as more similar and different than they really are. Apparently, this is a perceptual distortion. Tajfel maintained that the same process could account for many features of social stereotypes. For example, when people observe a correlation between skin color (e.g., White-Black) and certain personality characteristics (e.g., intelligence, laziness), it is natural for these people to perceive members of one racial category as very similar to each other and very different from members of the other racial category in terms of those personal characteristics. The end products of this process are distinct and exaggerated stereotypes of each group, "Whites are intelligent and industrious whereas Blacks are stupid and lazy".

⁵ Incidentally, his article was awarded the first annual Gordon Allport Intergroup Relations Prize by the Society for Psychological Study of Social Issues.

Tajfel appreciated the ideas of the Authoritarian Personality theorists but found them unrelated to other topics in person perception research. Further, he proposed that the checklist methodology should be exchanged for experimental studies of categorization and other cognitive processes. Simple cataloguing of the contents of specific stereotypes cannot contribute to a theoretical improvement. He offered that the goal of social psychology should be to discover underlying cognitive mechanisms responsible for social stereotypes.

As repeatedly noted above, starting from early 1970s social psychology has entered into the sovereignty of social cognition approach. A cognitive miser model guided early social cognition research (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Taylor, 1981b). According to this model, mind is viewed as an information processing system with a limited capacity. This capacity limitation makes it necessary to employ selective and potentially biased information processing strategies. Early social cognition research was almost exclusively concerned with studies revealing diverse cognitive errors and biases (for a review, see Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Markus and Zajonc, 1985; Ostrom, 1984). When the traditional conceptualization of stereotype as erroneous and biased person perception is recalled, it can be appreciated that the notion of stereotype fitted well with the concerns of these early social cognition researchers. In the end, consistent with the early stereotyping literature, social cognition literature started with a prejudgment that stereotypes are erroneous and biased but this time they came to be seen as the unfortunate outcome of normal cognitive functioning (e.g., Fiske and Neuberg, 1990; Jones, 1982). Below, we shall give an account of this approach.

1.2.7. The Social Cognition Approach

Leyens, Yzerbyt, and Schadron (1994) identified four meta-theoretical and methodological changes social cognition tradition has brought into the study of social stereotypes. Firstly, social cognition tradition has come to emphasize processes and ignore content. Secondly, it has employed elaborate analyses of cognitive processes with the aid of paradigms borrowed from cognitive psychology. Thirdly, it has focused exclusively on the cognitive processes and started to develop models of information-

processing and memory. Fourthly, it has experimented with several dependent variables such as reaction times, recall and recognition measures rather than global evaluations.

Social cognition studies appeared first in the area of person perception within which the process of stereotyping is also handled. However, we should note that there is not a monolithic approach within this tradition. When the ideas of prominent figures are considered, at least, two orientations can be distinguished. On the one hand, there are some scholars who describe social cognition as “a consideration of all factors influencing the acquisition, representation, and retrieval of person information, as well as the relationship of these processes to judgments made by the perceiver” (Hamilton, 1981b; p. 136). That is, these scholars emphasize person memory and they are concerned directly with the intake of information and its representation within the memory. On the other hand, there are some other scholars who define social cognition as the study of “how ordinary people think about people and how they think they think about people” (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; p. 1). In other words, these scholars emphasize impression formation and the naive psychology as developed by Asch (1952) and Heider (1958). They assume that people behave in terms of their beliefs either knowingly or unknowingly. Thus, according to these scholars, what should be studied are such beliefs as perceived by people themselves.

Though it may be possible to unite these two orientations, critical reviews conclude that their concerns have led them to produce quite different literatures (Leyens, Yzerbyt, and Schadron, 1994). In this section, we shall try to delineate those aspects of stereotyping studied commonly by the social cognition researchers in each orientation. Following Leyens, Yzerbyt, and Schadron (1994), the issues of inconsistency management, salience, and spontaneous information-processing will be reviewed below. In this review, the ideas of scholars in both impression formation and person memory orientations will be considered separately and the studies in each orientation, which became classics of today, will be summarized briefly.

1.2.7.1. Inconsistency Management

The way people handle inconsistent information has been a lasting problem for social cognition researchers. Apparently, the notion of inconsistency implies that people

have an expectation about new information or new information may be incompatible with already acquired information. Since this issue has been regarded as a key to find out whether people rely on theory-driven or data-driven processes in person perception, it has occupied an important place in the impression formation literature. Actually, this literature starts with the pioneering work of Asch.

Asch (1946) was interested in the problem whether people can integrate various pieces of information about a person into a single, unified impression. He presented his subjects seven personality traits: intelligent, skillful, industrious, warm, determined, practical, and cautious. He told his subjects that these traits characterized a fictitious person and asked them to write down a personality description about this person. Moreover, he asked his subjects to characterize this person on a series of other personality traits. Subjects could easily write down a personality description about the target person. Moreover, they exhibited a high degree of consensus in selecting further personality traits about the target person. Asch concluded that his subjects built up a single view of the target person from the available information and this single view enabled them to make inferences about other, not-given characteristics.

In a subsequent study, Asch observed that when the trait of “warm” in the stimulus list was replaced with the trait of “cold”, the total impression of personality and the inferences made about the other personality traits differed radically. No replacement of other traits with their reversals could result in such a significant change. From this observation, Asch developed the notions of central versus peripheral traits and noted that central traits have more weights in determining the nature of total impressions (cf. Rosenberg, Nelson, and Vivekanathan, 1968).

Asch also thought that the order of traits given to the subjects could change the total impression. In fact, the first trait given in the list was the most important trait for it would determine the direction of impression:

When the subject hears the first term, a broad, uncrystallized but directed impression is born. The next characteristic comes not as a separate item, but is related to the established direction. Quickly the view formed acquires a certain stability, so that later characteristics are fitted –if conditions permit- to the given direction. (p. 271-272)

In order to test this primacy effect, Asch presented a group of his subjects with the traits of intelligent, industrious, impulsive, critical, stubborn, and envious. He presented another group of his subjects with the same traits but in the reverse order: envious, stubborn, critical, impulsive, industrious, and intelligent. As in the original study, he told both groups of subjects that these traits depicted a fictitious person and asked them to write down their impression about this person. He found that subjects in the first condition evaluated the target person more positively than subjects in the second condition. In other words, even in this pioneering work, Asch demonstrated that identical stimuli could result in quite different total impressions.

The above experiment has been replicated several times and the results always came out to be similar. It seems that the first adjectives activate a certain schema that causes the following traits to be interpreted in a consistent manner (Zanna and Hamilton, 1977). In short, the emotional valence of first traits is crucial in determining the nature of total impression. While subjects in the first condition of the Asch's experiment seem to have perceived the trait of impulsive as spontaneity, subjects in the second condition seem to have perceived it as recklessness. As a generalization, the first traits activate their quasi-synonyms but the valences of these synonyms depend on the direction given by the first traits (cf. Peabody, 1967).

Asch noted that both theory-driven and data-driven processes can explain these results but he explicitly favored a theory-driven explanation of impression formation. He believed that information pieces are important for people as long as an impression is formed. Once the impression is formed, though people may still be responsive to new information, they just integrate them with the constructed structure.

Norman H. Anderson (1974) disagreed with the idea that people mainly follow a theory-driven process in impression formation. Rather, he argued for the predominance of data over theory and maintained that a bottom-up process prevails much of impression formation. He put down an algebraic model within which total impression is depicted as a linear combination of each trait under a weighted average rule. He dismissed the concept of trait centrality as vague and useless. Moreover, he attributed the primacy effect to a decrease in attention. Anderson replicated Asch's findings consistent with his own model and proposed some further studies that are not likely to be resolved by Asch's model.

This challenge launched a series of critical experiments, designed to rule out the possibility of alternative interpretations, between supporters of both Asch and Anderson. In the end, Ostrom (1977) noted the sterility of such studies for the results of any experiment conducted by an approach are susceptible to post hoc explanations of the proponents of the other approach. As a compromise, Fiske and her associates (Fiske and Neuberg, 1990; Fiske and Rusher, 1993) proposed that schemas or data alone cannot guide impression formation. Rather, sometimes schemas and sometimes data are more important. She maintained that people have a tendency to categorize target person. However, if they are motivated, which is usually achieved by ego-involvement, or if they have enough cognitive resources, they will also tend to take into consideration the specific characteristics of the target person. Whenever possible, people have a tendency to confirm their initial category. Otherwise, they will try a re-categorization. If this confirmation or re-categorization process fails and if there is enough motivation and cognitive resources, they will utilize those pieces of information to arrive in a piecemeal integration (Erber and Fiske, 1984).

So far, we have sketched the ideas developed by the social cognitivists in the impression formation orientation. The ideas of social cognitivists in the person memory orientation have been very similar to Fiske's. They maintained that memory is basically biased for it mainly operates on the basis of schemas. Since these schemas guide information-processing, the system tends to encode and retrieve from memory information consistent with the existing representations. This view is known as the schema view (Rothbart, Evans, and Fulero, 1979; Taylor and Crocker, 1981). There are numerous studies testing the hypotheses derived from this view and it can be said that it is the orthodox truth for many social cognitivists (Leyens, Yzerbyt, and Schadron, 1994; for reviews see Markus and Zajonc, 1985; Stephan, 1985). It is worth considering some main propositions developed within the schema view. Firstly, schemas make people selective in attending to information that conforms to their expectations. Secondly, people remember schema-consistent information better because it is easier to assimilate them into existing representations. Thirdly, people tend to discount schema-inconsistent information as exceptions to the rule. Fourthly, people tend to interpret schema-inconsistent information so as to make it more manageable with the existing hypothesis. Fifthly, schema makes people forget inconsistent information that displeases them. It is

possible to lengthen this list by citing the research of other prominent figures (e.g., Slusher and Anderson, 1987; Snyder and Uranowitz, 1978). Yet, it is generally believed that the influence of schema is highest when they are well developed, utilized in cognitively demanding situations, and when the delay between encoding and retrieval is long (Markus and Zajonc, 1985). At this point, it seems appropriate to note that social psychologists in this orientation recognize stereotypes as a special kind of schema. Thus, it can be said that all those outcomes listed above may also be taken as valid for stereotypes.

For some scholars, the schema view seems very conservative. If everything complies with the status quo, if no inconsistent information has a chance to enter into the mind, these scholars argue, how is change possible? To answer this question, some social psychologists in the person memory orientation relied on a different memory model, called the Associative Network Model (e.g., Hastie, 1980; Hastie and Kumar, 1979; Srull and Wyer, 1989). According to this model, the structure of the cognitive system consists of several components. Inputs from external and internal environment are processed by the sensory-perceptual system and their traces are encoded into memory. The memory is divided into two components: declarative and procedural. The declarative memory consists of abstract and concrete factual knowledge and the procedural memory consists of rules and skills by which declarative knowledge can be manipulated and transformed. Thus, everything as internal as self and as external as heavenly bodies is represented in declarative memory (Kihlstrom and Cantor, 1984; Kihlstrom et al., 1988). The associative network model tends to represent declarative memory as a graph structure with nodes representing concepts and associative links representing the relations between them. These associated nodes form propositions consisting of subjects and predicates, relations and arguments, and the like. When people encounter a piece of information about a node of, let's say, group, that information is linked to a path to the central node of that group. That information may be consistent, inconsistent, or irrelevant to the existing content of the node. When inconsistent information is encountered, people try to explicate its occurrence for incongruent cognitive elements lead to a state of imbalance (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958). In order to reconcile inconsistent information with all other inconsistent and consistent information, people need to employ an extensive processing. Thus, any inconsistent information should be linked to all other information together with

the central node. In contrast, since consistent information does not pose any difficulty in being assimilated into the existing structure, it may not be linked to one another. Finally, irrelevant information is linked only to the central node. According to the associative network model, between information linkages play a direct role in the retrieval of the information. Thus, the recall of inconsistent information should be superior to that of consistent information. Though this and many related hypotheses have been confirmed in several studies, the proponents of the schema view have also made successful retaliations (for reviews see Rojahn and Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor and McMillan, 1992).

To link ideas emerged within person memory orientation to those within impression formation orientation, it can be said that like Asch and his supporters, the schema view maintained that people prefer categorical thinking. On the other hand, the associative network model, like Anderson and his supporters, claims that individuating information is more important in reaching a judgment about a person or a group. However, in their meta-analytic review, Stangor and McMillan (1992) concluded that neither model could make an adequate explanation of all findings. They maintained that the key is the motivation people have as they process information. There may be two general motivational orientations. In one of these, people may need a careful and accurate processing, which will motivate them to be very receptive to inconsistent information. In the other, they may need a coherent and simple impression, which will motivate them to avoid inconsistent information and focus on consistent information. No doubt, this last solution is very similar to that proposed by Fiske and her associates in the impression formation orientation. In fact, such dual-process models are highly welcomed in social cognition (Brewer, 1988; Fiske and Neuberg, 1990; for a recent evaluation of all dual-process models in social psychology see Chaiken and Trope, 1999)

At this point, it is noteworthy that what makes inconsistent information so crucial as a topic for study is their unexpectedness and rareness. For this reason, it also stands salient when the background is filled with consistencies. This is the second issue social cognition researchers have given a privileged status. Fiske and Taylor (1991) defined salience as the extent to which particular stimuli stand out relative to others in the environment. Below, classical studies addressing the issue of salience will be reviewed.

1.2.7.2. Salience as a Property of the Stimulus

Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, and Ruderman (1978) adapted the paradigm developed by Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) to study how the categorization process might work in person perception (for a summary for these studies see Taylor and Fiske, 1978). In the first study, subjects listened to a taped-discussion between six persons. While the discussants spoke, their faces were shown on slides. There were three conditions of the experiment. In one condition, all faces were white, in the second condition, three were white and three were black, and in the last condition, five were white and only one was black. Consistent with the predictions, subjects remembered more what the single Black had said. Interestingly, it was observed that subjects seem to have heard different things in the solo Black and three Blacks conditions. Subjects perceived that the solo Black spoke more and the content of his discussions was evaluated as being of better quality. He seemed more persuasive than his counterpart in the three Blacks condition. Finally, he was evaluated more positively. Moreover, when subjects were asked to indicate the role discussants play in the discussion, the Black person in the solo Black condition was perceived as fulfilling a specific role than the other speakers and the role assigned to this person was more prestigious than the roles assigned to other Blacks in the three Blacks condition.

Taylor et al. (1978) conducted a conceptual replication of the same study but this time they employed gender rather than race as the distinctive feature. In the experimental conditions, there were either one male-five females, or three males-three females, or five males-one female. The results were similar to those obtained in the first study. These studies centered on the impact of increased salience in the impression of a particular target.

Apart from the effects of salience, the paradigm developed by Taylor, Fiske, and their associates is suitable to study the impact of social categorization on the way people organize information. In both experiments, Taylor et al. (1978) found that when subjects were asked to remember what a certain person said, they made more between-category errors than within-category errors. In other words, subjects were fairly good at remembering whether a black or white (or male or female) discussant had made a given discussion, but were much less able to make accurate distinctions within the racial (or gender) categories. After, these experiments, such error rates have been taken as the

evidence of accentuation effect in social categorization (e.g., Hewstone, Hantzi, and Johnston, 1991; Stangor, Lynch, Duan, and Glass, 1992).

Taylor et al.'s study was a classic of impression formation orientation. It can be readily seen that these studies followed the footsteps of Tajfel (1969). This wave of research that link social cognition with studies on stereotyping is still widespread. Scholars in the person memory orientation have also been influenced by the ideas of Tajfel. David L. Hamilton is one of the most outstanding representatives of this orientation (e.g., Hamilton, 1979, 1981b) and the first person who laid a social cognitive explanation to stereotype formation.

Hamilton (1979) reasoned that stereotypes are usually of a correlational nature. People are likely to attend to distinctive features of a distinctive social group. For this reason, they may develop distorted beliefs about members of that social group. In other words, like Taylor and Fiske, Hamilton maintained that people attend most to salience and it is this fact behind stereotyping of social groups.

In a classical experiment, Hamilton and Gifford (1976) told their subjects that the purpose of the study was to find out "how people process and retain information presented to them visually" (p. 395). They presented subjects with a series of slides, showing a sentence about a particular behavior attributed to a member of either group A or group B. For example, "John, a member of group A, visited a sick friend in the hospital". There were 26 behaviors performed by members of group A, and 13 behaviors performed by members of group B. In other words, the group A was the majority and the group B was the minority in this experiment. Moreover, the number of positive behaviors was also more than the number of negative behaviors and their proportion was equal in both groups. While 18 behaviors performed by the members of group A were positive, 8 were negative. Equally, while 9 behaviors performed by the members of group B were positive, 4 were negative. In other words, the negative behavior was the distinctive behavior in this experiment. The content of behaviors dealt with sociability and intelligence; two important dimensions in person perception (Rosenberg, Nelson, and Vivekanathan, 1968). Having gone through all the behaviors, the subjects' tasks were (1) to rate the members of group A and group B on a series of attributes related to sociability and intelligence, (2) to remember the group membership of an actor performing one of

the presented behavior, and (3) to indicate the number of behaviors described each of the groups and to estimate the frequency of undesirable behaviors.

The results showed that the subjects rated group B more negatively than group A. Or group A was rated more positively than group B. In other words, though the correlation between positive/negative behavior and group membership was the same for both groups, the subjects perceived group A more positively and group B more negatively. In fact, this was not a surprise for it had been well-known that people are quite bad at calculating simple correlations (e.g., Nisbett and Ross, 1980). As for the attributions of group membership, subjects were quite correct in positive behaviors. However, they underestimated the negative behaviors for group A and overestimated for group B. In other words, they perceived an “illusory correlation” between minority (distinctive) group and minority (distinctive) behavior.

In summary, both impression formation and person memory orientations have noted that the reason behind stereotyping, or making erroneous information processing in general, is people’s heavy reliance upon distinctive stimuli. This idea has been based upon a “cognitive miser” model of human beings that will be elaborated later. In the next section, another topic, automatic activation of stereotypes, which has been another extensively studied topic, will be considered.

1.2.7.3. Spontaneous Information-Processing

In many cases, people go along with a series of spontaneous cognitive processes (Bargh, 1984; Shiffrin, 1988). Usually, these spontaneous processes involve “the bedrock trust that people place in the validity of their subjective experience, and especially those forms of information that are the ‘givens’ of conscious experience (i.e. for which people do not feel that much active inferential work was needed or done)” (Bargh, 1989; p. 40).

So far, it has been seen that research on impression formation has relied heavily on the use of personality traits. Scholars in the impression formation orientation since Asch have assumed that people are very quick in inferring traits (Leyens, Yzerbyt, and Schadron, 1994). This assumption was strengthened by the research on attribution, which has yielded that there is a tendency to explain behavior in terms of actors’ dispositional qualities under certain circumstances (e.g., Jones and Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1972). James

Uleman and his associates tried to demonstrate the validity of this assumption in a series of studies.

In a study, Winter and Uleman (1984) presented their subjects with a series of sentences. These sentences described the behavior of a target person (e.g., “The secretary solves the mystery halfway through the book”). They instructed the subjects to memorize as many sentences as possible. There were three conditions of the experiment. A third of the subjects recalled the sentences when there was no cue related to the sentences. Another third fulfilled their task in the presence of a cue, which is semantically related to the actor. For example, “typewriter” was used for the above sentence. Another third of the subjects recalled the sentences again in the presence of a cue but this time the cue was a trait related to the behavior. For example, the trait of “smart” was used for the above sentence. It was found that subjects in the trait-cue condition recalled more sentences than subjects in the other conditions. Winter and Uleman concluded that the traits were spontaneously inferred at the time of encoding and stored with the original information. This conclusion was consistent with research on encoding and retrieval processes in episodic memory (Tulving and Thompson, 1973).

Uleman and his associates corroborated this conclusion by other studies, which tried to rule out alternative interpretations (e.g., Winter, Uleman, and Cunniff, 1985). However, their conclusions were criticized from two points (Higgins and Bargh, 1987). Firstly, if trait-inference is an automatic process, the motives at the beginning of an impression formation should be irrelevant, which is absurd especially when this discussion is made at the context of stereotyping. For example, in a conceptual replication, Bassili and Smith (1986) found that recall performance was improved when the subjects were explicitly instructed to form an impression rather than just to memorize sentences. Second, if trait-inference is an automatic process, it should not be affected by limitations in cognitive resources. However, a number of studies have exhibited that this process suffers in the presence of other cognitively demanding tasks (e.g., Newman and Uleman, 1989, 1990; Uleman, Newman, and Winter, 1992). Thus, it was concluded, trait inference is not an automatic process but it might take place even at the encoding process of a social stimulus, depending on people’s motives and their level cognitive resources.

Scholars in the person memory orientation have also dealt with the issue of spontaneous information-processing. Most of these social psychologists have been

influenced by the ideas developed by New School approach to perception (e.g., Bruner, 1957; Tajfel, 1957) which had maintained that perception is linked to the norms, the social values and the cultural characteristics of perceivers and some personality theorists (e.g., Kelly, 1955) who had maintained that people have chronic ways of perceiving the world. Today, the paradigm developed within the person memory orientation is known as the priming paradigm.

In the first formal example of the priming paradigm, Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977) explained the purpose of study to the participants as a study on color perception. In the first part of the study, they secretly presented the subjects with positive or negative personality traits. In the second stage of the study, supposedly on reading comprehension, they gave the subjects a series of evaluatively ambiguous behaviors in a vignette and asked them to form an impression of the actor. They found that subjects were influenced by earlier exposure to traits in their evaluation. Higgins et al. concluded that the traits that got activated in the first stage became more accessible in the second stage. In other words, they were primed.

Instead of traits, Srull and Wyer (1979) presented their subjects with behavioral dimensions (e.g., hostility and kindness) in the first stage of their study. Having primed, subjects read a paragraph narrating the day of a person named Donald. The behaviors in the paragraph were evaluatively ambiguous in terms of hostility. Having read the paragraph, subjects rated Donald on several scales, some of which was related to hostility. Wyer and Srull observed that subjects' ratings were affected by priming. Moreover, Wyer and Srull could identify a number of factors intensifying the priming effect. For example, strengthening the priming task by using more behaviors and shortening the interval between priming and impression formation. In another study, Srull and Wyer (1980) found that priming was effective when the stimulus preceded rather than succeeded the impression formation task. This finding suggested that priming had its impact at the encoding stage, which is quite consistent with Uleman's research.

In a subsequent study, Bargh and Pietromonaco (1982) demonstrated that it is not necessary for the priming task to be explicit. Even when the subjects were primed with non-recognizable images of traits, they were affected in their subsequent impression formation task. The fact that the priming has an explicit influence upon subsequent impression led social cognitivists to assume the priming effect to be automatic.

One important issue raised by these studies, together with those reviewed under the subheadings of inconsistency management and salience as a property of stimulus, has been whether stereotypes are unavoidable or not. When this problem is considered in the general framework of social cognition research, the answer is obviously positive (e.g., Macrae, Milne, and Bodenhausen, 1994). That is, stereotypes are unavoidable. Patricia Devine (1989) addressed this issue directly. She began with the stereotypic belief of WASPs that “Blacks are aggressive”. In her first experiment, she found that not all of their subjects were aware of this stereotype regardless of their prejudice level, measured by the Modern Racism Scale. In the second experiment, she presented the subjects with one hundred words via a tachistoscope at a speed that prevented recognition of the words. For half the subjects, 80 words were related to the category of Black (e.g., nigger, Harlem, jazz, etc.) and the other 20 were unrelated to this category. For the other half the subjects, 20 words were related to the category of Black and the other 80 were unrelated. After this presentation, she asked the subjects to form an impression of a person called Donald on a series of scales. Note that there was no indication of ethnicity. The results showed that the number of primes but not the level of prejudice affected the evaluation of Donald. Subjects exposed to 80 Black-related words perceived Donald as more aggressive. This was true for both prejudiced and non-prejudiced subjects. Note that this was true for both subjects who were and were not aware of the WASP cultural stereotype of “Blacks are aggressive”. In other words, Devine pointed to the intricate and automatic nature of stereotypes. To be sure, she was challenged (e.g., Gilbert and Hixon, 1991) and the controversy does not seem to end in the near future. For the purpose of this thesis, so much review of social cognitive studies of stereotyping is sufficient. In fact, it is almost impossible to cover them within a limited space for any attempt to such an end is likely to do injustice to this huge literature.

From early 1970s, social cognition started to dominate the mainstream social psychology in the United States. Just about the same times, social psychology in Europe started to be influenced by another movement (Jaspars 1980, 1986). This movement was the Social Identity Theory. Ironically, Henri Tajfel, who made substantial contributions to social cognitive analysis of stereotyping, was also the pioneering figure of this theory. In his 1981 article, Social Stereotypes and Social Groups, Tajfel attacked the individualistic studies of stereotyping in the social cognition approach and laid down the basics of

studying social stereotypes in terms of the social identity approach. Since this theory forms the theoretical framework of this thesis, the next chapter will be devoted to its consideration.

1.3. SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY (SIT)

In Section 1.2.5.1., we looked at the debate pertaining to the relation between individual and group. We saw that while the group mind approach depicted group behavior as qualitatively different from and irreducible to individual behavior, the individualistic approach argued that group behavior was just a form of individual behavior. Moreover, we saw that the latter approach tended to reject the existence of group *per se*. Again, in the same section, we considered the efforts of Asch and Sherif to reconcile these two approaches. To begin with the present chapter, we can say that the starting point for SIT was an effort to resolve this problem with reference to the concept of social identity (Turner and Oakes, 1986).

Henri Tajfel defined social identity as “... that part of the individual’s self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that membership” (1981b; p. 255). As for the social group, in one of the earliest formal statement of SIT, Tajfel and Turner (1986) defined it “... as a collection of individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category, share some emotional involvement in this common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of social consensus about the evaluation of their group and of their membership in it” (p. 15). Note the interdependence between the concepts of social group and social identity within these two definitions (Hogg and Abrams, 1988). In other words, social identity theorists have generally conceived of the concept of social identity in relation to a social group and the concept of social group in relation to a social identity. Not much later, John Turner (1982, 1985; Turner et al., 1987) adopted a totally phenomenological point of view by referring the existence of a social group to two or more persons perceiving themselves as members of the same social category. Today, this simple definition seems widely accepted (Brown, 1988).

The commencement of SIT coincides with a crisis in social psychology [see Israel and Tajfel (1972); Strickland, Aboud, and Gergen, (1976) for related arguments]. An important aspect of the crisis was concerned with the methodology prevalent in the mainstream social psychology. Critics tended to reject experimental method as a valid tool to understand people in their social context and asked for its replacement by either social constructionism (e.g., Gergen, 1982), or humanistic psychology (e.g., Shotter, 1984), or ethnomethodology (e.g., Garfinkel, 1967), or ethogenics (e.g., Harré, 1979) or dramaturgical method (e.g., Goffman, 1959). Although Tajfel also complained concerning the role experimentation had been playing in social psychological research (Tajfel, 1972a), neither he nor his students made a total rejection (Turner, 1981).

The other important aspect of the crisis was concerned with the place of social in social psychology (Turner and Oakes, 1986). This aspect is closely linked to the aforementioned debate about the relation between individual and group. In that debate, the individualists represented a reductionist meta-theoretical position, which seeks to explain phenomena in terms of a lower level analysis (Hogg and Abrams, 1988). Though prominent figures like Asch and Sherif pointed to the inconveniences such a position might bring into social psychology, the individualistic approach has dominated the discipline since then (Cartwright, 1979; Pepitone, 1981; Sampson, 1977).

SIT's critique of the mainstream social psychology has mainly concentrated on this issue. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, many social psychologists of European background, of whom Tajfel in England and Moscovici in France were the leading figures, rejected this reductionist ideology and determined to break their ties with the American social psychology by forming an independent association and creating the European Journal of Social Psychology [see Doise (1982); Jaspars (1980); Tajfel (1972b) for a historical account]. From then on, these scholars have sought to forge a non-reductionist social psychology and commenced the effort to understand mainly the social dimension of human behavior (Tajfel, 1984).

SIT has developed within this context and become the foremost achievement of the European social psychology. Although originally it was a theory of intergroup relations, later it evolved into a movement or a grand theory, which allegedly has the potential to explain many aspects of the social behavior (Jaspars, 1986). As for the present, it seems that it started to lead the mainstream understanding of intergroup relations not only in

Europe but also in the other parts of the world including the United States (Abrams and Hogg, 1998; Brown and Capozza, 2000). In his chapter “Intergroup Relations” in the 1985 edition of the Handbook of Social Psychology, Walter Stephan did not give any reference to SIT. However, thirteen years later, this time the same chapter was written by two prominent figures of SIT, namely Marilyn Brewer and Rupert Brown (see Brewer and Brown, 1998).

Below, we shall make an account of SIT under seven sections. We shall outline the main assumptions of the theory in the first section and the basic principles of the theory in the second section. We shall devote the third section to the elucidation of SIT as a theory of intergroup relations and the fourth section to that as a theory of group processes. We shall see how the theory explains stereotyping in the fifth and sixth sections. In the seventh section, we shall point to some weaknesses of the theory.

1.3.1. Main Assumptions and the Intellectual Predecessors

SIT begins with certain assumptions concerning the nature of society. Since its explanations are tightly connected to these assumptions, it seems suitable to understand the conception of society the theory posits. To be sure, since SIT is a social psychological theory, it has nothing to do with proposing a model of society. In this regard, without extending our polemic, we can say that SIT borrows this conception directly from the ideas of Karl Marx (1963, 1976) with some modifications made on the basis of the ideas of Max Weber (1958). These two sociologists are known as conflict structuralists and their theories can best be understood in opposition to the ideas of those known as consensus structuralists (e.g., Durkheim, 1933; Parsons, 1951).

Both consensus and conflict structuralists maintain that society consists of several different social groups. The contents of these groups and the relations between them provide the society with a distinctive social structure that precedes the life of individuals constituting the society. In a sense, structuralist sociologists believe that it is not individuals that create society but it is society that creates individuals.

Consensus structuralists believe that the existence of these groups is a consequence of the necessity for the differentiation of roles and division of labor. All groups fulfill a different but complementary function. In general, all of these groups agree with the rules

of the game. As a result, order and stability are the general characteristics of a society. On the other hand, conflict structuralists point to deep ideological differences between social groups. They hold that these groups are not in a functional but power and status relations. For this reason, society cannot be characterized by order and stability, but by conflict. Order and stability, if exist at all, are just temporary states.

SIT's conception of society fits with the conflict structuralists' views. In this regard, the influence of Karl Marx upon SIT is great. For this reason, we shall assign the next section to an elucidation of his ideas.

1.3.1.1. Karl Marx: The Struggle between Social Classes

Karl Marx (1818-1883) begins with the observation that any given social organization is historically transient. All social organizations appear at a particular stage in history and disappear at the next stage. Since this has been the way it is, for Marx, the belief in the naturality of the dominant patterns of social behavior or organizing activities of the present is one of the most elementary errors. For example, anthropology shows that, even in Marx' times, not all societies in the world operate on the basis of a capitalist economy. Likewise, history shows that capitalism was not the dominant mode of production in earlier times. Marx thought that most of the philosophers before him had fallen on this same mistake. As a matter of the fact, he urged, it should be recognized that capitalism was a specific form of economic organization arisen out of earlier systems. Thus, capitalism itself should be understood in a historical context.

Marx can best be understood in comparison to G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) who argued that human life is understandable only through its relation to human history. For him, human history is essentially a process of change in the direction of development. By development, Hegel refers to general and complete freedom (Taylor, 1975). This development takes place through the growth of human consciousness, which exhibits itself in religious, artistic, and philosophical thinking. In this way, people become conscious of their relationship to history. This is freedom (Worsley, 1987).

Though Marx agreed with Hegel in recognizing history as a progress toward comprehensive freedom, he rejected the idea that religious, artistic, and philosophical thinking is the end product of history. These spiritualistic components may be important

but, for Marx, what really matters is human's struggle to control over the world (Bottomore and Rubel, 1963).

Hegel maintained that the development of history is not dependent upon individual activities but the general development of the human spirit, which may be seen as the collective creation of ways of thinking and understanding. Marx agreed that individuals acting alone could not achieve this transformation. It must be a collective matter, that is, only collectivities can have the power to achieve this. It should be noted that by collectivities Marx referred to organized groups of human beings, not mere gatherings of people.

Hegel conceived of conflict as a creative and constructive force, not as negative and destructive. He thought that old forms of life are broken up to permit the full development of new ones only by means of conflict, disruption and revolution. Thus, struggle, conflict, violence, etc. are not temporary deviations from desirable order and stability. Instead, they are the driving force of change and development. Or more correctly, "they are the very essence of history" (Worsley, 1987, p. 454).

Accordingly, Marx argued that progress depends on the conflict between social groups. However, not all social groups are significant or powerful enough to bring about any change in the history. In this regard, he assigned this role to specific social groups what he called social classes. The notion of social class denotes to the organization of production and the exploitation of one group of people by another. Marx believed that this is a crucial division existing in any society.

Marx's intricate analysis of capitalism will not be reviewed here. For the purposes of this section, it is sufficient to understand the notion of social class. In the first place, a class is an economic category for it is defined in relation to the conditions of production. Since the relationship between a dominating class and a subject one is that of exploitation, there is continuous conflict of interest between them. The dominating class tries to improve its own life conditions by increasing the proportion of production and its position by exploiting the subject class. On the other hand, the subject class can improve its condition only by reducing the exploitation it is subjected to. Marx maintained that wherever a minority gains private ownership of the means of production, they tend to

exploit the majority who makes the production. Thus, for Marx, conflict is inherent in economic relations between social classes.

Though social classes are basically economic categories, their relationship is by no means confined to the economic sphere. Rather, this relationship extends into political sphere and involves inequalities of power, political domination, and political conflicts of interest. The class, which dominates in the economic sphere, is likely to have enough power to dominate in the other spheres. Those who are master at work may easily turn into superior while those who are servant at work may easily turn into subordinate. For Marx, this is inescapable because those with economic power can provide favorable conditions for their business only by converting their economic power into political power. Thus, some classes exploit the other classes in all spheres of society and both the dominating and the dominated classes are always the same.

It is not easy to do justice to the ideas of Marx within such a limited space. However, for the purposes of the thesis, so much reflection seems sufficient. Another influential sociologist upon the idea of society in SIT was Max Weber, the topic of the next section.

1.3.1.2. Max Weber: Status Groups and the Life Styles

When Max Weber's (1864-1920) seminal work The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Weber, 1976) is taken into account, it can be seen that he was in sharp dispute with Marxism. As a matter of fact, Weber also believed that the economic organization of society was of fundamental importance to grasp its whole structure (Weber, 1968). Yet, his views concerning the power are very different from those held by Marxists.⁶

In the preceding section, we saw that economic power is basic for the Marxists for both social and political powers are derived from economic power. As a result, the economically dominant class is the ruling class in a society. However, Weber thought that economic domination is just one of the sources of power in society. Economic

⁶ By the time of Weber, Marx' ideas had been institutionalized. Thus, they were no longer the ideas of an isolated person but the ideology of a group of people all around the world. This group came to be known as Marxists.

domination is a neither sufficient nor necessary condition for political and/or social power.

Weber maintained that there is a power struggle in society where groups and individuals try to dominate one another. The conflict may be open or latent depending on effectiveness of one group in undermining the opposition. He introduced the concept of social stratification as the institutionalized distribution of power. Although he accepted the notion of social class as the crucial division between those who have property and those who do not, he could identify two more groups in the competition for power (Gerth and Mills, 1948). The most important of these is the status group, which is defined not by property but by esteem. Weber defined a status group as a collection of individuals who regard themselves as equals but are regarded as either superior or subordinates by the other groups. Contrary to Marx, he held that what determines the type of regard this group receives is not their place in production, but their pattern of consumption is decisive in being regarded as superior or subordinate. Weber called this pattern of consumption as life-style. Individuals in these groups regard themselves as equal for they share the same life-style and separate themselves from others who have different life-styles. The other kind of group important for Weber is the party. A party can be defined as a group of people, which is consciously organized for the purpose of taking power.

Marx believed that when the number of workers would have increased up to a certain point, they would have got a class consciousness defined in opposition to the capitalists'. Weber agreed that consciousness is required for any collective action but disagreed that increase in the number of workers will inevitably produce a class consciousness and maintained that consciousness can arise only if members are aware of each other. In this regard, by definition, both status groups and parties require some mutual awareness among their members. Thus, they are more likely to develop a sense of group consciousness.

According to Weber, what leads to development is the struggle between status groups. Often, a status group bears innovation to and brings about change in a society. Once it starts to impose on the whole society, then it turns out to be the status quo. In the next stage, this status group tries to prevent further change (Bendix, 1960). Yet, it is inevitable that another status group will challenge the status quo sooner or later.

Another point that distinguishes Weber from the Marxists was his belief that not only economic interests are real and important. He could identify many sorts of interest as important as, and in some cases even more important, than economic ones. Most notably, Weber pointed to the importance of religious interests. For example, Weber claimed, in many religions people believe in an eternal life after death which involves being condemned to endless suffering or awarded eternal bliss. When such a belief is concerned, Weber noted, nothing might be more important than the fate of his/her soul to a person in his/her life for this life is very brief when compared to eternity. In other words, religious interests may often override economic interests.

As can be seen, both Marx and Weber addressed to similar questions. Basically, they represented the same tradition and were affected by the same sources like Hegel. Both of them proved to be very influential in shaping the subsequent social thought. From our concerns, we should keep three points in mind. Firstly, society has a social structure, which is as real as a stone and beyond isolated individuals' capacity to affect. Secondly, varying numbers of organized groups in power and status relations determine the nature of this social structure. Thirdly, some groups have more status and power than some other groups.

Like conflict structuralists SIT assumes that "society comprises social categories which stand in power and status relations to one another" (Hogg and Abrams, 1988, p. 14). By social category, SIT refers to a collection of people having some common achieved or ascribed characteristics. Note that a social category can be meaningful only when there is, at least, another category which does not have the same characteristic or do have a contrasting characteristic. SIT also maintains that some social categories gather more power, status, or prestige than others. As a result, power and status relations characterize the transactions among social categories.

SIT also believes that the content of social categories and the nature of relations between these social categories determine the social structure of a society. This social structure exists before individuals. That is, individuals are born into a society and become members of pre-existent social categories. As we said, this is the starting point for the structuralists. Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) can be taken as the champion of this view (Nisbet, 1965). He tended to treat social structure as a material thing (Durkheim, 1950) and maintained that society exerts its influence on individuals by producing a collective

consciousness that dictates different individuals to behave in a similar manner. The reflection of this view into social psychology was the group mind theory, reviewed in Section 1.2.5.1. At this point, SIT tries to produce an answer to “... the question of precisely how, through what psychological process, society or the group actually installs itself in the mind of the individual and thereby shapes behavior ... [SIT] explores the psychological processes involved in translating social categories into human groups” (Hogg and Abrams, 1988, p. 16-17). Thus, contrary to small group research tradition, which focuses on the individual in the group, the main concern of SIT has been the group in the individual.

So far, we reviewed the sociological background of SIT. Undoubtedly, the theory owes much more to theories developed within psychology. Above, we noted that early Tajfel was a member of and made significant contributions to the New Look approach in perception. Especially, the analysis of categorization within this approach has been the starting point of SIT. Yet, since SIT employs these conceptualizations heavily, it is redundant to review them here. For this reason, it seems suitable to look at the basic principles of SIT.

1.3.2. Basic Principles of SIT

William G. Sumner (1906) described the essential form of within-group and between-groups relations briefly as follows:

A differentiation arises between ourselves, the we-group, or ingroup, and everybody else, or the others-groups, outgroups. The insiders in a we-group are in a relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry to each other. Their relation to all outsiders, or others-groups, is one of war and plunder, except so far as agreements have modified it. (p. 12)

He coined the term ethnocentrism to express this phenomenon. After him, one of the basic efforts of all students of intergroup relations has been to offer an explanation to this fascinating phenomenon (Hogg and Abrams, 1988). However, it was not easy to grasp this slippery notion in experimental research. To our knowledge, it was Sherif who made the first reasonable demonstration of ethnocentrism in his aforementioned Robbers Cave Experiment.

The experimenters got the boys to play a game of bean toss, in which they tried to collect as many beans scattered on the ground as possible within a limited time. The boys worked individually and collected the beans in a sack with a restricted opening. Though it was not possible to count the correct number of beans collected, all boys were asked to estimate their number in each sack.

The experimenters exposed the contents of each sack to the boys briefly and informed them only about the group membership of the collector. As a matter of the fact, the experimenters always showed the same collection of 35 beans. Then, each boy wrote down his estimate of the number after each exposure. It was found that the boys tended to overestimate the number of beans collected by the ingroup members and underestimate the number collected by the outgroup members. Sherif et al. explained this ingroup bias, a form of ethnocentrism, as an unavoidable consequence of intergroup conflict (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994).

Rabbie and Horwitz (1969) made another significant contribution to the experimental study of ethnocentrism. In order to find out the most minimal condition for the formation of a group, they designed an experiment. They divided school children into small groups of four on a random basis. The children did not know anybody else in their group before the experiment. There were two groups labeled as either "green" or "blue". While the groups were working on irrelevant tasks, the experimental groups were told that the experimenter was going to give a reward to only one of the groups for assisting the research and that since the resource was scarce the other group would not be rewarded. Thus, in the experimental condition, while one group would be rewarded, the other would be deprived. Which group would be rewarded or deprived was determined either (1) by the toss of a coin, or (2) by the arbitrary decision of the experimenter, or (3) by one of two groups involved. In other words, in the experimental condition, subjects in both groups were to experience a common fate, that is they would either obtain a reward or not. On the other hand, no reward or deprivation was presented to the subjects in the control condition. They just tried to complete the irrelevant tasks. As a result, they had nothing in common with the others in their group other than their label. At the last stage, subjects, both in the experimental and control condition, were asked to rate each other (those both in the ingroup and the outgroup) on a number of sociometric scales. The results showed that subjects in the experimental condition consistently rated the ingroup

persons more favorably than persons in the other group. This result did not change as a function of being rewarded or being deprived nor of the way this fate was determined. However, Rabbie and Horwitz observed no such favoritism in the control condition and concluded that they seemed to have created a group where persons felt some degree of interdependence and mere categorizing people into groups did not prove to be sufficient to produce a sense of groupness. This result was consistent with Sherif et al.'s explanation and the mainstream social psychology where it was assumed that the essential factor in group formation is the interdependence among its members [e.g., Campbell, 1958; Cartwright and Zander, 1968; Lewin, 1948; for a discussion of the importance of the notion of interdependence in group processes research see Turner et al. (1987)].

However, though such a conceptualization might be suitable to explain the small group processes, it is far from explaining the groupings around broader social categories. Today, many social theorists (e.g., Emerson, 1960; Laclau, 1994) have agreed that the distinctive feature in being member of a nation or of an ethnic community is usually people's identification with that community, a movement known as "identity politics". In this regard, the famous historian Emerson wrote, "The simplest statement that can be made about a nation is that it is a body of people who feel that they are a nation; and it may be that when all the fine-spun analysis is concluded this will be the ultimate statement as well" (1960; p. 102). Then, the problem arises as to how social psychological theorizing can be consistent with these macro observations. It seems that SIT initiated its research to resolve this consistency.

Note that Rabbie and Horwitz wanted to discover the minimal conditions for the group formation. However, they tried to demonstrate their hypothesis with reference to ingroup favoring behaviors. Another group of researchers wanted to discover the minimal conditions necessary for differential intergroup behavior (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). They designed an experiment resembling that of Rabbie and Horwitz in many respects. This study is important for it gave rise to the development of a paradigm known as minimal group experiment (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995; Brown, 1988; Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994).

Tajfel et al. (1971) announced, "The aim of the minimal group experiment was to examine whether [intergroup categorization] can, on its own, determine differential

intergroup behavior" (p.153). To repeat, note that the researchers were not trying to discover the minimal conditions for group formation but differential intergroup behavior. The subjects of the experiment were adolescent schoolboys who attended the experiment lonely and anonymously. In the first part of the experiment, subjects were asked to estimate the number of dots projected quickly on a screen. When they completed their estimation task, the experimenter labeled them as either "overestimators" or "underestimators", allegedly on the basis of their performance but in fact randomly. Then, the second part of the experiment started. The subjects were informed that a second experiment was going to be conducted. This experiment was going to involve rewards and penalties and the groups in the first experiment, namely overestimators and underestimators were going to be used again. After that, subjects were handed a booklet of 18 pages on each of which there was a payoff matrix (see Figure 1.1. for a sample), and asked to allocate points to two people by choosing only one column of the matrix. On each page of the booklet next to payoff matrices, there were only the group and the code number of these people. Sometimes these two people would be from the same or different group with the subject. And sometimes, there would be one person from each group, and of course, the experimenters were interested in what would happen in this last condition. Subjects were told that the number of points allocated by all the subjects to each person would be added up at the end of the experiment and that person would receive an amount of money proportional to the number of points.

Member 26 of the overestimators	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Member 17 of the underestimators	1	3	5	7	9	11	13	15	17	19	21	23	25

Figure 1.1:
Example of a payoff matrix used in the original minimal group experiment by Tajfel et al. (1971; p.157)

As can be seen in the Figure 1.1., these payoff matrices were arranged in such a way that subjects could make their decisions on a variety of allocation strategies. For example, a subject could choose 19/25 response from the matrix and follow a strategy of "maximizing joint profit". Or, if the subject was a member of the overestimators, he or

she could follow a strategy of "maximum difference between the groups" and choose the 7/1 response. Again, he or she might follow a strategy of "maximizing ingroup profit" by choosing 19/25 response. Or he or she might adopt a strategy of "fairness" and choose 13/13 response.

The results of the experiment showed that subjects exerted some effort to be fair in their allocations. But they consistently exhibited the tendency to grant more to ingroup recipients than to outgroup recipients. For example, the mean response of an overestimator faced with payoff matrix in the Figure 1.1. was somewhere around 12/11. That is, according to the authors, subjects showed clear ingroup favoritism.

In the second experiment reported in the same article (Tajfel et al., 1971), the categorization was made on the basis of subjects' preference for abstract paintings allegedly drawn by either Klee or Kandinsky. Though allocation of subjects into groups was random, subjects believed that there was a Klee and a Kandinsky category. That experiment also produced the same results, that is, subjects discriminated ingroup members over outgroup members. In a subsequent experiment (Billig & Tajfel, 1973), similar results were again obtained even when the experimenters had let subjects see that their assignments were being made on the basis of tossing a coin. The same experiment was replicated with the same results on a variety of different places including Australia (e.g., Vaughan, 1978), the United States (e.g., Brewer & Silver, 1978), and Switzerland (e.g., Doise & Sinclair, 1973). In the end, the results of minimal group experiments seemed to be universal. A meta-analytic review by Mullen, Brown, and Smith (1992) concluded that the effect of ingroup bias phenomenon in the minimal group experiment is beyond any doubt.⁷

Tajfel et al. (1971) have reported that the variable of social categorization per se is sufficient as well as necessary to induce forms of ingroup favoritism against the outgroup ... The mere perception by subjects ... that they belonged to two separate groups seemed sufficient to cause intergroup discrimination. (Turner, 1978a, p.101)

⁷ Rabbie and Horwitz announced that their earlier conclusion was a little hasty thanks to the unreliability of significance tests (Horwitz & Rabbie, 1982). They found that when the number of cases in the experiment was increased, it could be seen that subjects in the control condition, too, that is subjects in the category-only condition, rated ingroup members more highly than outgroup members.

SIT was developed mainly to explain this result. According to SIT, people are motivated to have positive view of their selves. This motive leads group members to evaluate their groups more favorably than outgroups for an important part of their self-concept is comprised by the social identities derived from their membership to this group. This prejudicial attitude explains ingroup favoring behaviors as well as stereotypical perception of outgroup.

The theory seems to have three interrelated components: categorization, identity, and comparison. In order to fully appreciate the predictions and explanations of the theory, these processes should be illuminated. Then, it would be appreciated that SIT is not only a specific theory of intergroup behavior but also a general framework to look at the social world.

We noted that SIT assumes a society with full of social categories. The theory left the meaning of the concept of social category as quite fuzzy. While some social categories such as gender may involve millions of people, some other social categories such as hobby groups may involve only a few people. While the boundaries of some groups are rather rigid, that is, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to enter or exit, some of them are very transient. For any person, these categories are either ingroup or outgroup, depending on whether he or she is a member of it or not. Also, these categories do not exist in an isolated space. Most of them exist in status or power relations to one another. We saw that this is a conflict structuralist view of society.

It seems that the starting point of SIT is a perceptual consequence known as accentuation effect. As delineated in Section 1.2.6., this effect is likely to happen when we impose categories to stimulus objects in a perceptual field. In such instances, people's cognitive systems tend to exaggerate both similarities among members of one category and differences between members of different categories. That is, we tend to put the accent on both inter-category differences and intra-category similarities. Empirical studies have provided clear support for the thesis of accentuation of inter-category differences. Yet, evidence for the accentuation of intra-category similarities is rare (e.g., Doise, 1978; Doise, Deschamps, & Meyer, 1978; Eiser, 1980, 1986; Eiser and Stroebe, 1972; Eiser and van der Plight, 1984; McGarty & Penny, 1988). In other words, people are in a quest for distinctiveness between the categories but they are more tolerant towards within category diversities.

Like many other cognitive psychologists, SIT believes that categories are functional for they bring order and simplicity to the world that, otherwise, would be too complex and chaotic to make sense (Doise, 1978; Rosch, 1978; Tajfel, 1981). People cannot respond uniquely to every single object or person they encounter. The ability to categorize objects and persons makes cognitive functioning more economical. SIT adds that this function of social categories is possible only when they discriminate clearly between members and non-members. That is, social categories are functional to the extent that they sharpen the differentiation between and blur the differences within categories. Thus, the starting point of SIT is the application of the accentuation effect to social categorization.

Nevertheless, though SIT assumes that the basis of social categories lies in the nature of perceptual processes, it would reject a conclusion that these categories are or may be idiosyncratic. It would be naive to deduce subjectivity from SIT's emphasis on the fact that people impose their own categories on the social world. SIT underlines that a category is social only and if only it is shared. Thus, the reality of social categories is not perceptual but inter-subjective in the sense that they have a societal significance (for the ontological status implied by the term inter-subjectivity see Taylor, 1985).

The second component of SIT, namely identity, refers to that people are members of some categories and not the others. This point is important for the most fundamental category in the social world is "us" versus "them". We noted that this knowledge and its emotional counterpart comprise one's social identity (Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1987). The psychological studies of self are full of evidence that self-concept has an enormous impact on people's cognitions, emotions, and behaviors (see Greenwald, 1980; Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; Tesser, 1988 for reviews). There is also evidence that self-concept influence the way people categorize social world. For example, in a study, Sedikides and Skowronski (1994) found that the process of categorization is influenced by the most chronically accessible categories in the memory, and of course, the most chronically accessible categories in the memory are those related to the self-schema (Markus, 1977). Moreover, people especially notice the social categories relevant to their perceived characteristics, e.g., femininity (Markus, Crane, Bernstein, & Siladi, 1982), extraversion (Fong & Markus, 1982), or racism (Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & Glass, 1992).

Not only SIT but also most of the recent social cognitive theorists of self (e.g., Greenwald, 1980; Tesser, 1988) assume that people are motivated to think well of one's self and to have a positive evaluation of one's identity. As an extension of this assumption, SIT holds that this motive propels much of the intergroup behavior in which people strive to evaluate their ingroup memberships positively. At this point, social comparison processes, the third component of Social Identity Theory, start to operate.

It was Leon Festinger who first formulated the social comparison processes into a theory (Festinger, 1954). In his theory, Festinger held that people have a desire for an accurate evaluation of themselves. Thus, they prefer the objective criteria when available. However, since there are few such criteria in social world, they turn to others for evaluation. For Festinger, social comparison operates on the basis of the principle of similarity. That is, people prefer to choose similar others for comparison referents for the selection of dissimilar others will not be diagnostic. He also suggested different mechanisms for the evaluation of abilities and opinions. He thought that, in the case of opinions, people would seek consensus because it is almost impossible to demonstrate that an opinion is better than another. However, in the case of abilities, people are likely to make upward comparisons. That is, people are likely to compare themselves with those who are slightly better. In this way, they will be motivated to pass beyond their present level because there is a universal drive upward, at least for Western people. Though SIT agrees with Festinger in people's use of social comparisons in social occasions, it differs on many other respects [see Tajfel (1981) for a criticism of Festinger's social comparison theory].

Like many social cognitive researchers (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Greenwald, 1980; Tesser, 1988; Wood, 1989), SIT believes that it is self-enhancement rather than accurate self-evaluation that is sought in many social comparisons. Particularly, for there can be little rational and logical point in claiming that "we are better than them". However, people need to reach such a conclusion. Thus, accuracy is out of question in group-based comparisons.

This point is especially important for it is intimately related to the content of this thesis. People should make social comparisons with an outgroup to differentiate their ingroup favorably but which of the outgroups available for there may be many? This problem is known as "referent" selection. And also, people should decide along which

dimension this comparison will be made which is known as “dimension” selection. These are the problems of social comparison theory that has not been handled yet (Pettigrew, 1967; Wood, 1989). SIT offers no solution, either. For SIT, what is important is the results of a social comparison, neither referent nor dimension. To return to the minimal group experiment, SIT’s explanation is as follows.

In minimal group experiments, subjects are faced with an almost empty situation. There are only two groups and their members who are unknown personally. SIT suggests that subjects recognize their group membership and try to enhance this social identity in this minimal situation. As a result of this desire, they try to differentiate ingroup positively from outgroup. The only way to do this is to place their group to a higher position in comparison to outgroup. And they do this by allocating more points to ingroup members (Brown, 1988, 1995; Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1987b).

This simple explanation with a long list of principles has been extended to large-scale group relations (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Taylor and McKirnan, 1984). In the end, an intricate analysis of intergroup relations emerged. Below, SIT as a theory of intergroup relations will be considered.

1.3.3. SIT: A Theory of Intergroup Relations

Once again, it is useful to remember that SIT proposes the concept of social identity as a mediating variable within the dialectical relationship between individual and society. Society consists of various social groups that are in power and status relations with each other. History endows some inequalities between groups. Some groups establish their dominance over some others and impose their ideology in which they promulgate their understanding of the nature of society, of the groups within it and of the relationships between these groups. The main function of this ideology is to legitimize and perpetuate the status quo (Larrain, 1979). Individuals are born into this social structure. They become members of a number of social groups just by virtue of birth. In the process of socialization, they internalize the dominant ideology and identify with the social groups attached to them after they are born. If they are ascribed to the social identity of dominant social groups, this social identity mediates them to positive self-perceptions. However, if they are ascribed to the social identity of submissive social

groups, this social identity mediates them to negative self-perceptions (Tajfel and Turner, 1979).

Remember that SIT proposes a universal drive to form and maintain positive self-evaluation. Thus, the status quo is trouble-free for the members of dominant social groups since their group memberships provide them with a positive social identity. But the status quo is threatening to the members of submissive groups for their group memberships provide them with a negative social identity. This threat poses an unsatisfactory state, which mobilizes people to find ways to get rid of it. SIT expects members of dominant social groups to act for the maintenance of the status quo. On the other hand, what determines the nature and the content of actions of people having a negative social identity is their subjective belief structures, i.e., their beliefs about the nature of society and the relations between groups within that society. Note that this subjective belief structure is heavily influenced by the dominant ideology.

There are two general types of subjective belief structure: social mobility and social change. Social mobility refers to the belief that group boundaries are permeable so it is possible to pass from the submissive group to the dominant one. Of course, this belief structure includes the conditions of exit from the submissive group and passing into the dominant group. For example, there may be a belief that a blue collar can become a white collar by hard work. As can be seen, social mobility gives rise to individualistic strategies to remedy the unwanted consequences of negative social identity. It has nothing to do with changing the status quo. Moreover, it prevents some potential collective actions of the subordinate group. For these reasons, it is in the interests of the dominant group to foster an ideology of social mobility. However, even if there is such a belief structure, exiting one group and passing to another is not as easy as it sounds. First, many groups have sanctions against leaving and may exert pressure upon their members. Second, when group membership is externally designated with such attributes as sex and skin color, the possibility of leaving becomes more difficult. Third, dominant groups would control the level of social mobility for social mobility with large numbers might yield a threat to the status quo. Such considerations lead many scholars to argue that social mobility belief is just a myth (e.g., Billig, 1976; Hogg and Abrams, 1988).

Social change refers to a belief structure that group boundaries are not permeable; instead they are rigid and fixed. It is not possible to cast aside the subordinate group

membership and become member of the dominant group. In such cases, people are stuck with their negative social identities. Surely, this belief does not refrain people from finding ways of remedying the state of affairs. However, this time, contrary to social mobility beliefs, people are motivated to try group strategies rather than individualistic strategies. There are two broad types of strategies: social creativity and social competition.

Recall that one of the main propositions of SIT was that people evaluate their groups in comparison to other groups. What causes people in submissive groups to get a negative social identity is the outcome of this social comparison made with the dominant groups. At this point, Tajfel (1981) draws a distinction between secure and insecure intergroup comparisons. Secure comparisons refer to those made within a consensually legitimate and stable context. As can be appreciated, this kind of comparisons is also in the interest of the dominant group. For example, the caste system in India has been explained by religious ideologies so that the submissive group has been convinced that their inferior position had been divinely ordained. Insecure comparisons occur when there is not consensus on the status quo between the dominant and submissive group. In other words, the submissive group may not see the status quo as legitimate and stable. The belief that the status quo can change and there may be other ways of living is generally known as cognitive alternatives.

When the submissive group conceives of no cognitive alternative and believes that the intergroup relations are legitimate and stable, it tends to adopt social creativity strategies. These strategies do not make any modification on the status quo, either. Yet, they aim to turn the negative social identity of the submissive group into a more positive, and thus endurable identity. One type of social creativity strategies is to change the dimension of social comparison on which the submissive group can be more positively evaluated. For example, having no military power, the minorities in Turkey would believe that they may be less powerful than Turks but they produce more in science and arts. They may go one step further and derogate the quality of powerfulness by characterizing it as warmongerness or aggressiveness. Of course, this strategy may be more successful when the dominant group is forced to accept it as legitimate (van Knippenberg, 1984). Another social creativity strategy is to redefine the value traditionally attached to negative characteristics. This strategy seems especially useful if

the characteristic is criterial of the group. For example, in the 1960s American Blacks promulgated the slogan of “Black is beautiful”. The last social creativity strategy is to change the comparison target altogether. The submissive group ceases to make comparisons with the dominant group, instead start to evaluate itself in comparison to other submissive groups. Generally, the submissive group selects a lower group to make downward comparison. It is a common observation that sexist attitudes or racism are more common among lower classes, a phenomena known as “working class sexism” (Firestone, 1970) and “poor white racism” (Schönbach, Gollwitzer, Stiepel, and Wagner, 1981; Wagner and Schönbach, 1984), respectively. As can be appreciated, this last strategy does not develop any reaction on the part of the dominant group, yet the first and the second strategies may be retaliated in case the high status group feels threatened and try to impose its own standards once again.

When the submissive group calls into question the legitimacy of the status quo, the nature of intergroup relations and the existing social order are not seen stable and immutable. If the submissive group envisions any cognitive alternative, that is, if it believes that an alternative social order is possible, it starts to search for the means of bringing it. The employment of these means is known as social competition. These strategies are direct attempts to change the status quo. For this reason, they receive harsh retaliations from the dominant group. Politicization of the discontent from the state of affairs, terrorism, civil war, revolution, and passive resistance are all but strategies of social competition.

Until the end of the 1980, numerous researches tested and corroborated the predictions derivable from SIT (Brewer and Kramer, 1985; Brown, 1986; Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Messick and Mackie, 1989; Turner and Giles, 1981; for a review see Ellemers, 1993). Yet, Tajfel (1981) insistently noted that social psychological explanation is just a part of the whole story. In order to understand the nature of any intergroup phenomena, the social psychological explanation can just make an implementation to historical, economical, sociological, and political explanations. In other words, Tajfel always found illegitimate any explanation of intergroup relations without reference to the explanations developed by the other social sciences. We shall return to this point later. Though Tajfel was well aware of the fact that SIT questioned the existing status of the notion of group, it was John Turner who extended SIT framework to the area of group

processes. Below, we shall review the application of the principles of SIT to the phenomenon of group.

1.3.4. SIT: A Theory of Group Processes

SIT draws a distinction between interpersonal and intergroup behavior (Tajfel, 1978a; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In terms of this distinction, interaction between individuals solely on the basis of their individual qualities is called interpersonal, while that by their group memberships is called intergroup behavior. It is maintained that these two types constitute two poles of a continuum on which all social behavior fall somewhere.

Tajfel proposed three criteria in making a distinction between these two types of behavior. The first criterion involves the presence or absence of social categories. The second criterion is whether variation within each group members' behaviors and attitudes is low or high. And the third criterion is whether the variability of a person's behaviors or attitudes towards outgroup members is high or low. The intergroup behavior pole of the continuum requires the existence of at least two clear social categories, low variation within ingroup members' attitudes and behaviors, and low variation within people's reactions towards outgroup members. On the other hand, interpersonal behavior requires just the opposites; the absence of any social categories, high variation within people's behavior and attitudes both within ingroup and towards outgroup (Tajfel, 1978a).

Tajfel (1981) and many others (e.g., Augoustinos & Walker, 1995; Brown, 1988; Brown & Turner, 1981; Turner et al., 1987) maintained that pure interpersonal end of the continuum, described above, is just a fiction, having no counterpart in the real world. Indeed, if the criteria, laid down by Tajfel (1978a), are recognized as valid, a pure interpersonal behavior cannot be thought for, in almost all contexts, people's minds cannot operate without the aid of categories. However, pure intergroup behavior is possible as usually happened in wars for most of the soldiers' behaviors and attitudes in a war meet extreme conditions of the three criteria for intergroup behavior.

In chapter 1.3.3., it was seen that the main idea behind SIT of intergroup relations was that intergroup comparisons are focused on the achievement of positive ingroup distinctiveness. Though the concepts of social identity and inter-individual-intergroup

continuum were developed, SIT did not give them much credit in its explanation of intergroup relations. This is evident in Tajfel's three chapters (Tajfel, 1978a, 1978b, 1978c) appeared in his edited book Differentiation Between Social Groups, frequently cited as the first formal presentation of SIT. On the contrary, Turner (1985; Turner et al., 1987) believed that these two concepts lie at the heart of psychological group and developed the Self-Categorization Theory (SCT):

The self-categorization theory makes social identity the social-cognitive basis of group behavior, the mechanism that makes it possible (and not just the aspects of the self derived from group memberships), and by asserting that self-categorizations function at different levels of abstraction makes both group and individual behavior 'acting in terms of self'. (Turner et al., 1987; p. ix).

Turner told that he might prefer to call his theory as the social identity theory of group but since this name had been attached to Tajfel and Turner's analysis of intergroup behavior and there was a close link between these two theories, he labeled his new theory as the SCT in order to prevent others to lump them together as one (Turner, 1999).

Turner (1985; Turner et al., 1987) also referred to a distinction traditionally made between personal and social identities (e.g., Gergen, 1971). This distinction is quite close and related to previous distinction made between interpersonal and intergroup behavior. While personal identity refers to people's strictly individual and personal characteristics, as mentioned above, social identity refers to "that part of the individual's self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that membership" (Tajfel, 1981; p.255). Of course, there is controversy about which of these aspects is more important for the individual than the other (Brewer, 1991). The cause of this controversy is not different from the one on the group-individual relation described above.

The SCT represents, first of all, an original approach to this distinction. Turner held that personal and social identities do not refer to qualitatively different forms of the identity. Rather, they are different levels of the categorization of self. Adapting Rosch's (1978) conceptualization on categories, Turner noted that people could categorize themselves (self-categorization) on three levels: superordinate, intermediate, and subordinate. For the theory, the superordinate level of self-categorization may entail defining the self as part of humanity. As for the other levels, while the intermediate level

may refer to defining the self by particular group memberships, the subordinate level may refer to defining the self in individual, personal terms. Turner held that higher-order categories include all other lower-level categories, that is, the superordinate level self-categorization includes both the intermediate and subordinate levels while the intermediate level includes only the subordinate level.

By incorporating the accentuation effect (Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963) into the SCT, Turner maintained that the activation of one level of self-categorization rather than other depends on the principle of meta-contrast:

Any collection of individuals in a given setting is more likely categorize themselves as a group (become a psychological group) to the degree that the subjectively perceived differences between them are less than the differences perceived between them and other people (psychologically) present in the setting (i.e., as the ratio of intergroup to intragroup differences increases). (Turner, 1985; p. 101)

Since categorization always occurs within a social context, there are always several classificatory possibilities. It is the meta-contrast ratio what determines one possibility rather than another. From the above formulation, it can be inferred that when the value of meta-contrast ratio is small, people are more likely to categorize themselves on personal terms rather than social ones and when the value of meta-contrast ratio is large, then people are more likely to use social self-categorizations. Thus, if inter-category differences are greater than intra-category differences, social self-categorizations, if inter-category differences are not greater than intra-category differences, personal self-categorizations are more likely to be activated. It should be noted that the reality of these differences is phenomenological and cognitive in the strict sense of the term.

As can be seen, the SCT assumes a dynamic view of man. And this capacity to change, to a large extent, depends on the social context. There is no a similar or a different thing for the entire contexts. A similar thing in one context may be perceived as a different thing in another, and vice versa. For example, imagine a person's self-definition when he or she is in his hometown and when he or she is in a cosmopolitan city center like İstanbul and when he or she is abroad. The SCT holds that the salience of a social category in a specific context is dependent on the interaction of the accessibility of category which is based on current intentions and past experience and fit between the stimuli and the category specifications (Oakes, 1987). It should be noted that, salience of

a category, for the SCT, refers to the extent to which a categorization is applied to a set of stimuli, that is, salience does not refer to conditions relating to prominence or subjective importance of a categorization.

According to the SCT, any members of a group become member in terms of their prototypicality of the group in question. Prototypicality is a perceptual construct and defined as the ratio of the difference between the particular individual and the other individual members of the ingroup over the difference between that individual and outgroup members. Thus, for the prototypicality of a person, being unlike the outgroup members is as important as resembling other members of the ingroup (Hogg and Hardie, 1991).

The SCT developed the term depersonalization in order to explain the occurrence of group phenomena including social stereotyping, group cohesion, ethnocentrism, co-operation, altruism, emotional contagion, empathy, collective behavior, shared norms and mutual influence process (Turner, 1985). But this is not an after-the-fact concept. In fact, leaping into a higher-order level of identity requires accentuating the group prototypicality, stereotypicality and normativeness of people. Thus, at the intermediate level, the individual is depersonalized perceptually and behaviorally in the sense that he or she drops the personal characteristics from their selves.

Turner seems to have taken pains with the assumptions of the theory be recognized by the majority of social psychologists. In this respect, while he was a member of European social psychology, he seems to have recognized much of the American social psychology as valid. For example, he adapted the principles of categorization from Rosch into his theory and his conceptualization of self-concept is not much different from that of symbolic interactionism (e.g., Zurcher, 1977; Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). Nevertheless, the SCT announced, “Self-Categorization Theory is ... the product of a distinct European tradition of research on social categorization processes and social identity” (Turner et al., 1987; p. viii).

Neither SIT nor the SCT have been formulated as finalized versions. Both of them are still in the process of development (Abrams and Hogg, 1998; Brown and Capozza, 2000; Turner, 1999). At this point, we are ready to look at the way SIT dealt with the issue of stereotyping. Remember that Tajfel was very influential in the beginning of a

cognitive analysis of stereotyping. However, he could not be interested in this topic during the 1970s for he was busy with laying down the principles of SIT. Fortunately, he was able to finish an essay about the social stereotypes just a few years before his death. In this essay, he expressed his discontent from the current cognitive analysis of stereotyping and drew an outline how it can be viewed from SIT perspective. Below, we shall review this essay.

1.3.5. Tajfel: Social Stereotypes and Social Groups

As we saw in Section 1.2.7., 1970s saw a revival of interest amongst social psychologists in the study of stereotypes. Many innovations including the phenomenon of illusory correlation (Hamilton and Gifford, 1976), the effect of salience (Taylor et al., 1978), and outgroup homogeneity effect (Rothbart et al., 1978) were introduced during these years. Tajfel summarized these developments very briefly as follows:

... once an array of stimuli in the environment has been systematized or ordered through their categorization on the basis of some criteria, this ordering will have certain predictable effects on the judgements of the stimuli. These effects consist of shifts in perceived relationships between the stimuli; these shifts depend upon the class membership and the relative salience of the stimuli in the total array. The resulting polarization of judgements and the special weight given to some of the stimuli serves as guidelines for introducing subjective order and predictability into what would have been otherwise a fairly chaotic environment. (Tajfel, 1981; p. 150)

Although he was well aware of his contribution to these developments through his earlier articles (e.g., Tajfel, 1959, 1969; Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963), he did not find this explanation sufficient for the issues of social categorization and stereotyping. He did not deny the fact that stereotypes are certain generalizations that derive from the general cognitive process of categorization. He also believed that they are individual products that simplify and systematize the incoming information. However, he was discontent with the negligence of its social aspect. He announced, "... such stereotypes can become social only when they are 'shared' by large numbers of people within social groups or entities – the sharing implying a process of effective diffusion" (Tajfel, 1981; p. 145; italics original).

Moreover, Tajfel identified two problems that cannot be addressed by the cognitive analysis cited above. The first problem concerns the functions that social stereotypes serve for a social group within which they are widely diffused. He called these functions as social or group functions of social stereotypes. The second problem concerns the nature of the links between these group functions and the consensus related to the content of a social stereotype within a social group.

Tajfel was mainly interested in the value-loaded nature of the categorization process in the social stereotyping. He noted that when value differentials are concerned, even people's judgments related to the physical magnitudes of individual stimuli are likely to be shifted. We saw that the most significant of such effects is demonstrated by the principle of accentuation. To the extent these shifts or biases do not lead to a maladaptive condition, they tend to survive. In other words, people are sensitive to feedbacks they obtain from the environment when they used categorizations as a guiding device. When they discover that the categorizations they employ are not functional, they can discard them.

However, this is not possible in the case of social stereotypes because the information, upon which stereotypes are based, is very ambiguous. Often, people do not have clear-cut criteria to check the validity of their stereotypes. At this point, remember that a stereotype becomes social insofar as it is shared by a large number of people. This social consensus is likely to provide people with a positive feedback on its own. In other words, self-preservation is an inherent quality of social stereotypes for people seeking validity of their stereotypes will encounter others sharing the same stereotype. In this regard, social stereotypes form a part of social reality.

Related to the above discussion, Tajfel identified another distinction between neutral and value-loaded social categorizations. Note that, for Tajfel, some social categorizations may be neutral. The stereotype of "Swedes are tall" may be an example. When the holder of such a stereotype meets a short Swede, this does not pose a great problem for him or her. What is more, if he/she meets quite a large number of short Swedes, his or her stereotype may modify. However, when the social categorization into groups is endowed with a strong value differential, it is not so easy to handle with disconfirming exemplars. In such instances, the stereotype is tightly connected to the value system and people base the intergroup differentiation upon such value systems. In

short, Tajfel identified this value-preserving function of social stereotypes as the most important individual function of stereotyping:

... the maintenance of a system of social categories acquires an importance which goes far beyond the simple function of ordering and systematizing the environment. It represents a powerful protection of the existing system of social values, and any 'mistakes' made are mistakes to the extent that they endanger that system. (Tajfel, 1981; p. 154)

After discussing the value-preserving function of social stereotypes, Tajfel turned to the issue of stereotype content. We saw that this issue was the dominant problem until the early 1970s. Again as we saw, Tajfel (1969) himself was discontent with the lack of theoretical advancement and favored a cognitive approach to stereotyping. However, by 1980, Tajfel realized that cognitive approach to stereotyping led to more and more individualistic explanations. As social psychologists moved away from the content of stereotypes, they forgot its social aspect for what makes a stereotype into a social phenomenon is its content widely diffused within a given social group. Thus, Tajfel urged that both the experience in the early work on stereotype content and the findings in the social cognitive approach should be combined to construct "... a theory of contents of stereotypes as shared by social groups" (Tajfel, 1981; p. 155).

For Tajfel, the first step towards the construction of such a theory might be the identification of social (or group) functions of social stereotypes. He maintained that an interdisciplinary approach is needed to reach a more complete understanding of these functions for social history and social anthropology are related to these discussions as much as social psychology. For Tajfel, it can be readily seen that consensual social stereotypes concerning outgroups tend to emerge to fulfill three functions. The first function is social causality that provides people with an explanation of complex and distressful large-scale social events. For example, in an effort to explain the plague in the 17th century, the English accused the Scots of poisoning the wells of Newcastle. Billig (1978) points to a related function in anti-Semitism:

The emotional ferocity of the crudest anti-Semitism makes it easy to forget that anti-Semitism can provide an extensive cognitive interpretation of the world. Above all, crude anti-Semitism is based upon a belief that Jews have immense powers of evil in the world. Modern anti-Semitic dogma asserts that Jews control both communism and

capitalism and that they aim to dominate the world in a régime which will destroy Western civilization. All facts are explained in terms of this pervasive and perverse belief. (p. 132)

The second function is social justification that leads to a “justification of actions, committed or planned, against outgroup” (Tajfel, 1981; p. 156). This function enables people to escape the adverse effects of even such catastrophic events as war. For example, European powers made up a “mission” during the age of exploitation and colonization. They started to believe that it would be impossible for such eastern communities as Turkey and China to begin to advance before they were educated under a European conquest (Kiernan, 1972).

The third function is social differentiation that ensures a differentiation of ingroup positively from the relevant outgroups. Note that SIT regards the last motive as the basis of all intergroup phenomena. Thus, by attaching such a function to social stereotypes, Tajfel pointed to their importance for SIT. To be sure, social stereotypes serving the function of social differentiation are required in cases where the relations between groups are perceived to be insecure or the differentiation imposed by the status quo is not a positive one.

Tajfel noted that a bridge between individual and social functions of social stereotyping could be constructed. In this regard, he thought that SIT perspective is suitable to deal with the social justification and differentiation functions while social attribution theory (Hewstone, 1989; Hewstone and Jaspars, 1981) is suitable to deal with the social causality function. After Tajfel, John Turner could develop his theory of self-categorization by 1985 and applied his theory to a number of group phenomena including group cohesiveness (Hogg, 1992), crowd behavior (Reicher, 1987; Reicher, Spears, and Postmes, 1995), salience of social categories (Oakes, 1987) and social influence (Turner, 1991). He and his students’ attention has turned toward the issue of stereotyping in the 1990s (e.g., Haslam, 1990; McGarty, 1990, 1999; Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994; Spears, Oakes, Ellemers, and Haslam, 1997) and started to form a frame, consistent with their general theory, to study social stereotypes. Below, we shall review this frame.

1.3.6. Self-Categorization Approach to Stereotyping

Though the process of categorization plays a central place in the self-categorization approach to stereotyping, self-categorization theorists disagree with the social cognition approach about the purpose and outcome of this process. Remember that social cognition approach tends to see categorization basically as an information-reduction mechanism. In other words, the social cognition approach assumes that the primary function of categorization is to help individuals cope with limited information processing capacity. Since making categorizations reduces information extractable from the perceptual field, it generally overgeneralizes and exaggerates individuals' true characteristics. Thus, its outcome usually happens to be a distortion of perception. This view is known as the cognitive miser model of stereotyping. On the contrary, remember that the SCT employs the process of categorization in its explanation of group formation. According to this theory, categorization helps individuals reach “information about real similarities and differences between people occurring at varying levels of abstraction” (Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994; p. 104). In other words, the purpose of categorization is not an outgrowth of the limitations inherent in the human cognitive system but to produce a veridical and selective representation of a complex and varying reality. Thus, its outcome is not an overgeneralization or an exaggeration or a distortion.

Since social cognition researchers saw categorization as a side effect of capacity conservation, they tended to contrast stereotyping with interpersonal perception (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Fiske and Neuberg, 1989, 1990). In general, they tended to characterize stereotyping as a “loss of the complexity and richness of detail that a more personalized representation of that individual would contain” (Fiske and Neuberg, 1990; p. 15). In other words, they assumed that interpersonal perception is richer and more accurate than group perception. Note that the assumption of the social cognition approach depended on a simple logic. We can picture its conclusion with reference to person A and person B having the characteristics of (x and y) and (x and z), respectively. When we categorize these two persons into the group of x, then we will ignore the characteristic of y in person A and z in person B. Thus, this categorization will lead to an incomplete perception.

The SCT challenges this simple logic by referring to an established fact that perception is always bound to be a selective process. People do not passively take in all

stimuli that hit their sensory registers; rather, they actively encode some stimuli and not some others to construct a meaningful representation of reality. In this regard, Bruner (1957) says, “all perception is necessarily the end product of a categorization process” (p. 124). The main function of categorization is not to simplify the perceptual field; rather it is to give stimuli meaning by placing them “... in a network of hypothetical inference concerning its other observable properties, its effects, and so on” (p. 126). Thus, categorization does not reduce or impoverish but expands and enriches perceptual experience. In this way, people go beyond raw sensations, from which it is impossible to extract human relevance, to objects and events with “more elaborated, connotative meaning” (p. 148; italics are mine).⁸

In a related field, scholars studying concept formation also developed ideas consistent with Bruner. One of the major figure, D.L. Medin (1988) rejected the idea that categorization process evolved to tackle with the problem of information overload and claimed, “categorization ... is primarily to cope with the problem of too little rather than too much information” (p. 122; see also Medin, 1989). Like Medin, his collaborator E.E. Smith (1989) also pointed to the fact that, without categorization, people would have to react every stimulus as a new and unique experience and commented, “the mental lexicon required would be so enormous that communication as we know it might collapse” (p. 501; see also Smith and Medin, 1981). In short, prominent scholars in the fields of both perception and concept formation disagree with the social cognition approach that categorization is a process whose function is to reduce the complexity of the world. On the contrary, categorization endows raw stimuli with elaborated meaning and turns them into objects and events that people can construct relevance with what they already know.

Remember that the SCT borrowed the concepts of prototype and levels of inclusiveness from Rosch (1978; see Section 1.3.4). Apart from these important contributions, Rosch also argued that there are discontinuities in the nature, which work as the basis of categorizations. In other words, we do not construct arbitrary and idiosyncratic category systems. Rather, we categorize the material world in terms of real and relevant invariances existing out there. For example, if a creature has wings and

⁸ Ironically, Bruner's this seminal paper is shown as the proof of information-reduction function of categorization process (e.g., Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, and Tota, 1986).

feathers, we categorize it into the category of bird for wings and feathers really co-occur frequently (for a related discussion, see Neisser 1987).

The above argument does not mean that similar things will always be categorized into the same category for two objects may share numerous similar attributes. For example, there are many potential similarities even between an apple and a book (both can be dropped, both cannot see, both weigh less than 100 kg, etc.). However, the similarities in these attributes do not lead us to make a meaningful categorization decision related to these two objects. Thus, in order to be categorized into the same category, similarities between objects should define a meaningful categorical identity shared by each object. Then, the problem that which similarities are decisive for a given categorization arises. In a chapter dealing with this problem, Medin and Wattenmaker (1987) argued that the similarities chosen as the basis of categorization should be consistent with “background theories or naïve knowledge of the world”. They did not reject the possibility that there may be a number of ways to categorize any given two objects. Yet, they introduced the concept of “good category” and maintained that to the extent any categorization effort is compatible with the existing knowledge, the resulting category is a good one. In other words, categorization is determined by an interaction of both the nature and the perceiver. Nature provides us with joints that can be used as the basis of categorization. However, these joints are much more than we can ever apprehend. At this point, human factor has to intervene with the process and pick some of the joints rather than others. Normally, the selected sample is consistent with the existing knowledge structure. This is known as the selectivity of perception. Referring to this argument, Oakes, Haslam, and Turner (1994) wrote,

... the critical mechanism for adaptive selectivity is not so much the fact of categorizing but the process through which particular categorizations become activated to produce one subjective representation of a stimulus context. For example, a given perceptual scene could be categorized and therefore experienced as ‘traffic’, or as ‘cars and trucks’, or as ‘Hondas, Fords, BMWs etc.’. Whilst the objective stimulus information on which these different instances of categorization operate may well remain unchanged, what does vary is the subjective experience of similarity and difference. Objects perceived as similar in one instance (e.g., as all ‘cars’) are perceived as differing in another (‘Hondas’, ‘Fords’, etc.). (p. 112)

Remember that the social cognition approach saw the categorization as deficient relative to individualized perception. So far, it must be clear that there is no perception free from categorization but there are only categorizations differing in the degree of abstractness. Moreover, it may also be a misunderstanding that less abstract categorization provides us with richer information about the environment. The issue here is not to perceive so much or so little but the basis upon which one categorization is employed rather than another. For example, if we are trying to cross a busy road, trying to perceive the distinctions between Hondas and Fords are not informative. Perceiving such distinctiveness may be useful, for example, if we are looking out for a friend driving Honda. Thus, “information is what the perceiver needs to know at any given moment in order to construct a meaningful representation of reality, and to achieve their goals” (Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994; p. 113).

Having outlined the views of the SCT about the categorization process, we are now in a position to look at their ideas related to social categorization and person perception. Social cognition approach saw the categorization process primarily as an information reduction mechanism. As a result, scholars adopting this approach characterized stereotyping as impoverished relative to interpersonal perception. Moreover, for these scholars, stereotyping has to be less accurate, too, if it contains any accuracy at all. For the individual personality represents not only richer information about the person, but also the real person. As can be appreciated, the social cognition approach represented the individualistic meta-theoretical perspective in social psychology (see Section 1.2.5.1). However, in Section 1.3.1, we saw that SIT recognizes the social and psychological reality of the group. Like Sherif (1966), SIT sees stereotypes as group-level products determined by the relations between groups, a field not reducible to interpersonal perception or behavior. Instead, SIT proposes the concept of social identity to explain psychological emergence of group phenomena.

We saw that Asch (1952) criticized the individualism of F.H. Allport's distinctions between things and relations. F.H. Allport (1924) had accorded full reality only to things for they are concrete and tangible. For him, the relations are just imaginations having no counterpart in the real world. Asch's criticism was based on the idea that what is so-called thing is also a system of relations in a lower level of analysis. For example, a stone is perceived as a thing to a naked-eye but at the microscopic level it is perceived as a

system of relations consisting of atoms, and so on. The SCT adds that since all perceptions involve categorization and categorization is concerned only with relations, we cannot perceive the things but just relations. Thus, in our conception of the world, relations have more psychological importance than things.

If we return to the issue of the reality of person, we can understand that individualistic perspective accorded full reality to the individual person for it is a thing, while group is a relation. We can agree that a person is a thing. However, this might be true insofar as we consider the physical properties of that person. We cannot base reality of his or her personality on the idea that he or she is a thing because personality itself is a matter of judgments, abstractions, and categories (see Cantor and Mischel, 1979; Kihlstrom and Cantor, 1984; Kihlstrom et al., 1988; Mischel, 1981). Thus, perceiving the individual person involves as much categorization as social stereotyping. What differentiates these two types of categorization is the level of inclusiveness at which they define similarity and difference. In other words, while a stereotype involves similarities across a group and differences from a comparison group, individual perception involves similarities within the individual across situations and differences from other comparable individuals. In this regard, the SCT is consistent with many recent theories of self (e.g., Deschamps and Devos, 1998; Doise, 1998; McGuire and McGuire, 1988). For example, in order to stress the importance of others in the construction of identity, McGuire and McGuire (1988) wrote, "...one notices not things but distinctions between things, not what is there but what is absent, with the result that the most pervasive characteristics, those shared by everyone, go unnoticed..." (p.112). Thus, like what makes you similar to ingroup and different from outgroup refers to your social identity, what makes you similar to yourself and different from others refers to your personal identity (Deschamps and Devos, 1998).

Having seen the basic differences of the SCT from the social cognition approach,⁹ we can see how the SCT explains the phenomenon of stereotyping. One of the most important contributions of the SCT is to provide an analysis of the selective activation of social categories, the topic of the next section.

⁹ We should note that some of the leading social cognition researchers have started to emphasize the motivational and social aspects of stereotyping during the 1990s (e.g., Fiske, 1998, 2000).

1.3.6.1. Selective Activation of Social Categories

As we saw above, Bruner (1957) held that categorization results from a selective perceptual process whose main function is to produce a representation of reality as veridical as possible. Having pointed to the importance of both the perceiver and the environment in the categorization process, he argued that the category activation depends on the interaction between the relative “accessibility” of the category within the perceiver’s repertoire and the “fit” of the input to the stored category specifications. Accessibility refers to the susceptibility of a perceiver to employ the category in question. Thus, many factors related to the perceiver including past experiences and personality characteristics have effects on rendering a category accessible. In a sense, this is the selective and subjective component of category activation. The fit can be seen as the objective component of category activation. Regardless of the extent of accessibility of a category within mind, people do not act in terms of the same category all the time. In order for a category to be employed, it needs to satisfy some requisite characteristics.

The SCT based their theory of social category salience to this “accessibility X fit” hypothesis (Oakes, 1987; Oakes, Turner, and Haslam, 1991; Turner and Oakes, 1986, 1989). Though the hypothesis involves two components, the SCT has mainly concentrated on the specification of fit for social categorization and tried to provide an answer to the problem of why people perceive groups rather than individual personalities within a given context.¹⁰ We saw that the SCT depends its answer on the principle of “meta-contrast”. As we noted, the main function of this principle is to contextualize the categorization process by relying it on a context-specific judgment of relative differences. The SCT uses this principle in its explanation of stereotyping as well.

The principle of meta-contrast holds that “a given categorization is likely to form or become salient to the extent that differences within categories are less than differences between those categories in the comparative context” (Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994; p. 117). Thus, if intergroup differences are more predominant than intragroup differences, relevant social categories will be salient within that context. This principle is also termed as “comparative fit” for it defines the nature of comparative relations between people.

¹⁰ In fact, many of the research in the social cognition tradition have dealt with the issue of category accessibility (see Section 1.2.7)

Nevertheless, comparative fit alone is not sufficient for the activation of a social category. The content of the relevant category should match with the reality, too. The SCT termed this as “normative fit”. This refers to the fact that we know beforehand what ingroups and outgroups are like and we use social categorizations consistent with these prior knowledge. Thus, social categorizations and defining stereotypical dimensions should match the observed specific content dimensions and the direction of the observed differences.

The main prediction of the comparative fit principle that social identity tends to be salient in contexts involving intergroup comparisons and personal identity tends to be salient in contexts involving intragroup comparisons have been illustrated in many studies (e.g., Abrams and Hogg, 1987; Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, and Dovidio, 1989; Haslam and Turner, 1992, 1995; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, and Hayes, 1992; Hogg and Turner, 1987; Oakes, 1987; Oakes, Turner, and Haslam, 1991; Wilder, 1984; Wilder and Thompson, 1988). The importance of normative fit had also been appreciated for a long time. For example, Rothbart and his associates limited the effect of intergroup contact on stereotype change, known as Contact Hypothesis (Allport, 1954), to the conditions where people associate their experience with the social category, not individuals. In this regard, Rothbart and his associates noted that individuals in contact belonging to different groups should be prototypical members of their ingroups (e.g., Rothbart and John, 1985; Rothbart and Lewis, 1988). Similarly, Fiske and Neuberg (1989, 1990) added a normative fit component into their model. Like the SCT, they defined fit as the level of consistency between a target’s attributes and a category label. In a famous study (Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie, and Milberg, 1987), they presented the subjects with stimulus individuals depicted by occupational category labels and a number of attributes. In some occasions, the attributes were consistent with the categories (e.g., the stimulus person was a politician described as selfish, power-hungry, pragmatic, opinionated and smiley) and in some other occasions they were inconsistent (e.g., the stimulus person was a doctor described as bored, obedient, unenterprising, uneducated and inefficient). They found that while consistent conditions led to a category-based impression, inconsistent conditions brought about attribute-oriented impressions. In other words, a match between the content of category and stimulus information is a determinant of category activation.

However, as we saw, the SCT essentially puts forward that the category salience is a function of both comparative and normative fits. Oakes, Turner, and Haslam (1991; the second experiment) tested the effect of these two components in a now-classic experiment. The subjects in this study were British undergraduate science students. The experimenters got the subjects to watch video presentations of six-person stimulus groups ostensibly comprising three arts and three science students. Thus, the categorization in the experiment was the undergraduate faculty membership of university students. The individuals in the video presentation discussed their attitudes towards university life. It was a known fact that in England the art students emphasize an active social life and extensive extracurricular activities as priorities in university life (i.e., pro-social life) whereas science students emphasize the importance of hard work, good grades and the beginning of an impressive career (pro-hard work).

The experimenters manipulated the normative fit by means of the attitude expressed by a female art student (target individual). Her attitude was either consistent or inconsistent with the arts faculty stereotype (consistent vs. inconsistent conditions). They manipulated the comparative fit in terms of the pattern of agreement within the stimulus group. In one condition all six individuals agreed on the issue (consensus condition); in a second condition, three arts students expressed one attitude and three science students expressed the opposing attitude (conflict condition); and in the third condition, the target individual disagreed with the other five students (deviance condition). Thus, the experiment was a 2 X 3 factorial design (normative fit: consistent vs. inconsistent X comparative fit: consensus vs. conflict vs. deviance).

Subjects rated both the target and the stimulus group as a whole on measures assessing the degree to which the arts and science categories were differentiated from each other and attributions for the expressed attitude; i.e., whether the expressed attitude was related to (1) the objective facts of the case, or (2) the target's personality, or (3) her arts faculty membership? The major hypothesis of the experiment was that arts/science categorization would be most salient in the consistent-conflict condition. According to the SCT, since three arts students would express pro-social life and three science students would express pro-hard work attitudes, both the normative and comparative fit would be maximized to activate arts/science students categorization. The second hypothesis of the

experiment was that subjects would attribute the expressed attitudes to the category membership of the target in the same condition.

Both of the hypotheses received support in the experiment. Subjects rated the target individual more similar to the other arts students and different from the science students in the consistent-conflict condition. In other words, subjects tended to stereotype the target individual more as an art student in this condition. They also expected the target individual to like the arts students more and the science students less in the same condition, indicating an increased intercategory differentiation. Moreover, they explained the attitude of the target individual in terms of her arts faculty membership and more interestingly they seemed to make this attribution as if they referred to an internal locus of causality. In short, when the input fitted well with the comparative relations and the stereotypical content, the categorization of arts/science faculty membership becomes activated.

It should be noted that the SCT views the content matching in the normative fit not as a passive process because the prior knowledge we have about the groups may not exhibit a one-to-one correspondence with the social category constructed to represent them in a given setting (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, and Hayes, 1992). We can observe deep differences between people on specific content dimensions and have to be selective in constructing a meaningfully matching category. In other words, the content of diagnostic differences between groups will vary in specific contexts and so will the meaning of salient social categorization. Thus, we will selectively vary the content of categories to match what is being represented in terms of our prior knowledge.

It is therefore not a fixed category content being applied: the stereotype content is selectively constructed to describe, make sense of and rationalize the context-specific differences observed, to differentiate the groups meaningfully in terms of the interplay between background knowledge and immediate data. (Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994; p. 122)

To illustrate this point, Haslam et al. (1992) conducted a study on 200 Australian university students in a period of international tension centered on 1990-1991 Gulf War. The study was a two-way design. The first phase was conducted just after Iraqi army invaded Kuwait. The second phase conducted right after the launch of the Gulf War. Basically, the studies focused on the students' stereotypes of people from the US, one of

the two major antagonists of the War. In order to manipulate the frame of reference, subjects were asked to characterize people from the US across three conditions in which other countries were also included. In the restricted range condition, the other countries were Australia and Britain; in the medium range condition, the other countries were Australia, Britain, and the Soviet Union; and in the extended range, the other countries were Australia, Britain, the Soviet Union, and Iraq. It should be noted that both Australia and Britain acted as the coalition forces involved in the War right beside the US. Though the Soviet Union also approved the sanctions posed by the United Nations, it deployed no forces in the War. As for Iraq, it was the second major antagonist of the War.

The studies employed an identical checklist with the one developed by Katz and Braly (1933; Section 1.2.2). The experimenters expected to find that both the social change within the time lag between two studies and the varying frames of reference would change the students' stereotypes of Americans. Indeed, results exhibited that the overall of stereotype of Americans held by the students was unfavorable. Yet, the experimenters could be able to find a number of different patterns consistent with the hypotheses. In general, both the escalation of the War and extending the frame of reference in the first phase of the study (first including the Soviet Union and then Iraq) led to more negative stereotypes. Yet, we shall have more to say about the results of this study later.

In summary, the SCT viewed both the comparative and the normative fits as interactive and inseparable components. Categorizations must optimize meta-contrast on the right dimensions and the differences used to optimize this contrast determine the content of categories. Thus, the content of a stereotype is not fixed; rather, it is shaped selectively in terms of the context. Remember that the cognitive analysis of stereotyping began with the application of accentuation phenomenon to person perception (see Section 1.2.6). In the next section, we shall look at the SCT's explanation of this important phenomenon.

1.3.6.2. A Self-Categorization Theory of Accentuation

So far, we saw that the SCT views stereotyping as a valid tool of social perception. Since the theory recognized the reality of groups, it held that it is appropriate to perceive

people in terms of their group membership in intergroup contexts. More importantly, stereotypical perception is more valid and accurate than interpersonal perception in such contexts (Oakes and Reynolds, 1997). However, many prominent scholars including Allport and Tajfel mistrusted stereotyping for its outcome generally involves accentuated outcomes. In other words, stereotyping leads to a state where “within-category similarity is perceived to be greater than it actually is ... and between-category differences are perceived to be greater than they actually are” (Stephan, 1985; p. 161). Thus, stereotyping is inherently a distortion of perception no matter at what level it is used (e.g., Krueger and Rothbart, 1990; Stephan, 1985).

To be sure, the SCT does not accept this argument, either. But before getting into a discussion of its analysis, we should note that studies related to accentuation effect is not only limited to stereotype research. It can be said that scholars frequently observed its effects in the area of social judgment, too (e.g., Eiser and Stroebe, 1972; Sherif and Hovland, 1961). Nevertheless, unlike scholars in stereotype research, these scholars did not see accentuation effect as an abnormal outcome; instead, they emphasized its normality and sensitivity to contextual changes. In short, the claim that accentuation produces distorted outcomes is peculiar to scholars in stereotyping research. Moreover, both stereotyping and social judgment research have neglected the association between accentuation effects with group membership of the perceiver or the judge, respectively (McGarty and Penny, 1988).

At this point, it may be useful to remember some of the main points in the SCT. The SCT proposed that higher levels of inclusiveness in self-categorization are achieved through a depersonalization process, which also leads to the development of stereotypical perception (see Section 1.3.4). As a result, people start to perceive both self and other people as members of groups, that is, an intergroup context (Turner, 1982, 1985). An inevitable consequence of this categorical perception is that people in the same group are psychologically interchangeable. In other words, any effort to make a distinction between individuals comprising the group will be meaningless and invalid in intergroup contexts (Turner, 1982, 1985). The psychological significance of these groups is a function of characteristics of both perceiver and objective environment (Oakes, 1987).

Derived from these ideas, the SCT proposed two more arguments for an analysis of accentuation (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, and McGarty, 1994). Firstly, to the extent a person

sees others as ingroup members, he or she tends to perceive them as similar to the self. Conversely, to the extent a person sees others as outgroup members, he or she tends to perceive them as different from the self. Secondly, these perceptions are not rigid, but flexible for they are based on context-specific social comparisons.

It should be noted that the principle of meta-contrast is especially relevant here. As a corollary to this principle, Haslam and Turner (1992) hypothesized that if the difference between a stimulus and a person's own position is lesser than the difference of the person's own position from the rest of the stimuli in the perceptual field, then that stimulus will be perceived as belonging to the same social category as the person. They also hypothesized that to the extent the stimulus is perceived to share the same category membership, that stimulus will be assimilated to the person's identity. Conversely, to the extent the stimulus is perceived to belong to different categories, that stimulus will be contrasted from the person's identity. Let's try to make sense of these hypotheses on the example given by the authors.

Consider a case in which the person (P) who has a moderately left-wing position about a social issue makes a judgment about the Target (T) who assumes a moderately right-wing position about the same issue. Let's think that their positions are shown on a seven-point scale as in a typical judgmental task (see Figure 1.2). Apart from the positions of P and T, there may be other social groups (O) tapping the other positions in the scale.




Figure 1.2:
The hypothetical positions of the person (P), the target (T) and others (O) about a social issue.

The SCT is able to predict the likelihood of P to perceive T as belonging to the same category or not through the use of meta-contrast ratio (MCR). In this case, the formula should be the mean difference between T and the Os divided by the difference between T and S. The resulting MCR applied to this case is 0.6. Thus, it is likely that P will perceive T as member of a different category because the difference between P and T

is larger than the difference between T and all other scale positions (Note that in such formula any result below unity will refer to intergroup perception).

In terms of Haslam and Turner's (1992) second hypothesis, described above, once P categorized T as an outgroup member, it is expected that P will contrast T from his or her own position. When we look at the Figure 1.2 again, we can understand that P will perceive T on the position of +3, rather than +2. Note that such contrasts are not faulty or invalid insofar as it helps the perceiver differentiate the positions better (see the SCT's discussion related to categorization in Section 1.3.6). However, the general principles of SIT and the SCT teach us that some unfavorable emotional contents will also be attached to this perception. For example, in our case, P may start to see T as a reactionary person.

Thus, the accentuation process can be influenced, at least, by three variables; (1) the extent of the comparative frame of reference, (2) person's own position, and (3) the position of the target on this frame of reference. Any change in one of these variables, according to the SCT, would lead to a change in the pattern of assimilation and contrast effects. In a follow-up paper, Haslam and Turner (1995) discussed the patterns of assimilation and contrast in terms of P's own position. In theoretical terms, P's own position may be either extreme or moderate. Consistent with the MCR calculations above, they hypothesized that people occupying extreme positions tend to display greater assimilation of certain stimuli and greater contrast of others than people occupying moderate positions. Moreover, they hypothesized, extreme people tend to assimilate fewer and contrast more other stimuli than moderates. These hypotheses are consistent with a huge body of literature about social judgment (e.g., Sherif and Hovland, 1961).

The same calculations can be made on the frame of reference having varying extensions (Haslam and Turner, 1992). The SCT hypothesized that as the frame of reference extended, the absolute difference to perceive a target as member of an outgroup will tend to be larger. In other words, a target that is perceived as not sharing the same identity in a frame of reference having a small extension will be perceived as belonging to ingroup if the extension of that frame is expanded. In this regard, the most restrictive frame of reference would be one where there are only two positions. If the target does not occupy the same position with the person, then the target will inevitably be perceived as a member of outgroup. The likelihood to perceive the target as a member of ingroup will

increase as the number of positions in the frame of reference increases (Biernat, Manis, and Nelson, 1991; Manis, Nelson, and Shedler, 1988).

We think that so much exposition of SIT and SCT of stereotyping is sufficient. Now, let us return to Miller's classification of the definitions of stereotype at the beginning of this chapter (see Section 1.1). Remember that Miller (1982) grouped all definitions of stereotype across two orthogonal dimensions. One of the dimensions was related to an emphasis on the inferior nature of stereotyping in comparison to interpersonal perception. That is, some social psychologists tended to define stereotyping as a faulty or inferior way of representing other people, while others saw stereotyping as carrying a kernel of truth. The second of the dimensions was related to an emphasis on the consensual character of stereotypes. That is, some social psychologists tended to define stereotypes as widely diffused beliefs or perceptions among a large number of people, while others did not see this as a distinctive feature of stereotypes. So far, it must be clear that SIT sees stereotypes as the product of social categorical perception. Since social categories are as real as individual persons, SIT tends to believe the process of stereotyping as a valid way of representing groups. Moreover, stereotyping has nothing to do with persons as unique individuals; rather, stereotypical perception tends to emerge when individuals depersonalized into their social identities. Thus, any belief or perception is stereotypical to the extent it is shared among a certain group of people having the same social identity. In other words, stereotypes are consensual products by nature.

In the Section 1.2 "History of Stereotype Research", we tried to make the readers acquainted with the general literature. In the Section 1.3 "Social Identity Theory" we tried to put down the principles of this specific theory upon which the bulk of the thesis rests. We hoped that these two chapters would help in not repeating the same accounts over and over again throughout the thesis. Now, it seems suitable to start to explain what the present thesis tries to achieve. A salient feature of this thesis is its use of a real, ideological group to observe some effects described in SIT and the SCT. In deciding to study such a group, we were primarily inspired by a taxonomy developed by Steve Hinkle and Rupert J. Brown (1990).

Remember that SIT was developed primarily to explain ethnocentrism. In its explanation, the theory puts forward the concept of social identity as a mediating variable between macro socio-structural variables and ethnocentrism. For this reason, one of the

direct hypotheses derivable from SIT is that there should be a positive correlation between strength of group identification and the level of positive intergroup differentiation (Brown and Ross, 1982). However, the first review of the studies testing this relationship failed to find a strong support for SIT (See Hinkle and Brown, 1990). In one sense, this conclusion might lead to the abolition of SIT for one of its vital concepts seemed to stand as redundant among a well-established and widely observed relationship, namely relations between groups lead to ethnocentric vision of the world among members of respective groups (Sumner, 1906). However, Hinkle and Brown pointed to a huge variation in the size and direction of the correlations across studies. Thus, any conclusion based on measures of central tendency (i.e., mean, median or mode) would be unwarranted. As a result, Hinkle and Brown thought that there might be some boundary conditions in which the identity processes hypothesized by SIT applies better and proposed a simple taxonomic model. Below, we shall look at this model and discuss the relevance of the group we study in this thesis.

1.3.7. A Simple Typology of Group or Group Situations

Hinkle and Brown (1990) based their taxonomy upon two orthogonal constructs; individualistic-collectivistic cultural orientations and autonomous-relational group ideologies. Cultures emphasizing interpersonal competition, individual achievement and separation from the ingroup are called individualist while cultures emphasizing cooperation, collective achievements and relatedness with the ingroup are called collectivist (Triandis, 1995). We should note that this dichotomy is reminiscent of a number of dichotomies developed to categorize world societies. These dichotomies include modern-traditional, the First World-the Third World, Developed-Underdeveloped, Industrialized-Agrarian, Western-Eastern, Northern-Southern, etc. (see Frank, 1969; Marx and Engels, 1972; Rodney, 1972; Rostow, 1960; Shils, 1972; Weber, 1976). We shall not dwell on this issue here but we should note that though there are other classification efforts that dilute these distinctions (e.g., developing countries), Turkey is generally placed within the second categories of these dichotomies (e.g., Giddens, 1996; Worsley, 1987). Moreover, we should note that any ideological formation in such countries as Turkey cannot be fully appreciated without a consideration of the issue of development. Thus, we shall be forced to return to this issue later. For now, we

can say that it is generally believed that modern, developed, industrialized, urban, First-World countries have individualistic cultural orientations, while traditional, underdeveloped, agrarian, peasant, Third-World countries have collectivistic cultural orientations (e.g., Hofstede, 1980).

Collectivist cultures tend to disseminate such group-oriented values as affiliation, conformity, harmony, integrity, interdependence, loyalty, and obedience. On the other hand, individualist cultures tend to give importance to such individual-oriented values as achievement, autonomy, independence, self-reliance, and self-sufficiency (e.g., Triandis, 1994, 1995). Consistent with these value-orientations, people in collectivist cultures tend to develop interdependent self-construals, while people in individualist cultures tend to develop independent self-construals (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). In other words, while people in collectivist cultures prefer to define themselves with reference to their group memberships, people in individualist cultures try to draw their portrait free from bindings with others. Triandis et al (1988) suggested that individualistic-collectivistic tendencies are also manifested both at the group and individual level (i.e., idiocentric vs. allocentric personalities, respectively).

Hinkle and Brown (1990) argued that social identity processes emerging as a reaction to the outputs of group comparisons (see Section 1.3.3) are most applicable to collectivist cultures, groups, or individuals. However, they thought that this component is more bound up with dynamics within group than with relations between groups. Thus, being collectivist does not guarantee that group membership contributes to the social identities of members. Further, they argued that there are inherently comparative groups and group contexts. Business organizations, sports teams and political parties are examples of such groups. Thus, groups with comparative ideology or within a comparative context are more likely to compare themselves with other relevant groups and tend to exhibit social identity processes as conceived in SIT. In sum, Hinkle and Brown (1990; see also Brown and Williams, 1984) argued that it is not reasonable to expect that the explanations of SIT are universally valid for all kinds of groups (Brown, 2000); rather, groups with comparative ideologies within collectivist contexts should be the focus of studies in SIT (see, Brown et al., 1992; Kelly, 1988; Meeres & Grant, 1999).

The case group in this thesis, namely Ülkücüs, fits in well with the collectivist-relational group type in Hinkle and Brown's taxonomy. Firstly, it is widely accepted that

the Turkish culture exhibits collectivistic tendencies (e.g., Göregenli, 1997; İmamoğlu, 1998). Secondly, Ülkücüs is an ideological socio-political group, in the sense that it struggles for a model of both society and politics in Turkey. Thirdly, this group has been competing with a number of other political groups, taking the form of direct armed-confrontation from time to time.

Two criticisms against the present status of SIT and the SCT literatures can be derived from Hinkle and Brown's ideas. The first critique is related to the type of groups employed in the studies (see also Wilder and Simon, 1998 for a related discussion). With the influence of the minimal group experiments (Tajfel et al., 1971; see Section 1.3.2), artificial categories such as overestimators-underestimators have been employed in the bulk of the literature. Gender, racial and ethnic categories have been the second mostly employed categories. Moreover, only college students served as subjects in most of these studies. It seems when Tajfel et al. (1971) demonstrated that mere categorizing people into groups, no matter how artificial they would be, is sufficient to produce differential intergroup behavior, they provided the scholars with an intriguing research tool. Like the child, who was given a hammer, sees everything as something to be nailed down, scholars started to test all hypotheses derivable from SIT by using a modified version of the minimal group experiment. All of a sudden, the very raison d'être of the minimal group experiment, that is discovering the minimal conditions required to produce differential intergroup behavior, has been forgotten. Its convenience and simplicity was so seductive that researchers exhibited no hesitation to generalize their findings to "the most overriding, the most anxiety-ridden, and ... the most challenging of human problems in the modern world" (Sherif, 1966; p. 1). Because all groups, be they minimal or not, should be psychologically equivalent for their members. In a sense, they started to see no difference between assigning mere points to group members and fighting in a battlefield for the nation. After about thirty years experience, Brown (2000) concluded that "It seems to me that an important step for SIT to take is ... no longer to assume that a group is a group as far as key social psychological mechanisms are concerned" (p. 761).

This issue is tightly concerned with the concept of group entitativity (Campbell, 1958). Entitativity refers to the degree to which a collection of persons is perceived as being bonded together in a coherent unit. For example, while we tend to perceive people walking near each other on a sidewalk as an aggregate of individuals, we tend to perceive

military platoons as a coherent unit. Recently, this concept received considerable attention (e.g., Hamilton and Sherman, 1996; Hamilton, Sherman, and Lickel, 1998). In a recent paper, Hamilton and Sherman (1996) compared the way people represent groups with the way they represent individuals. They argued that people perceive individuals and groups as differing with respect to their entitativity. Generally, they perceive individuals as more unified and coherent than groups. They proposed that this perception influences the processes by which people make dispositional judgments, organize information in memory, and process new information about individuals and groups. In other words, Hamilton and Sherman (1996) argued that information about individuals and groups is processed quite differently. Indeed, they found support for their arguments in a series of studies. In these studies, people tended to make spontaneous dispositional inferences more for individuals than for groups (Susskind, Maurer, Thakkar, Hamilton, and Sherman, 1999) and they tended to recall and organize in memory better when behavioral information is about individuals than it is about groups (McConnell, Sherman, and Hamilton, 1994).

Note that the above argument and related studies have certain meta-theoretical similarities with those of Fiske and Neuberg (1990) and Brewer (1988). Thus, they are susceptible to the same criticisms made by Turner and his associates (see Section 1.3.6). However, we should note that the groups Hamilton and his associates employed in their studies have certain similarities with the minimal groups employed in the bulk of SIT literature. For this reason, we doubt that the interactionist criticism against individualism is applicable to this issue. Likewise, Hamilton and his associates failed to observe such distinct cognitive processing when the studied group is high in entitativity (McConnell, Sherman, and Hamilton, 1997; see also Yzerbyt, Rogier, and Fiske, 1998). In other words, people tend to process information about the groups high in entitativity in much the same fashion as is typically followed for individuals. Furthermore, the perception concerning the potency of groups as causal agents is also correlated to the perception of group's entitativity (Abelson, Dasgupta, Park, and Banaji, 1998). In other words, only groups in high entitativity are perceived to have capacity for collective action. In the light of these discussions and findings, we can argue that social identity processes discussed in SIT and the SCT tend to be more valid for groups high in entitativity for only these

groups have a reality comparable to that of individuals, a prerequisite for the emergence of social psychological group.

Researchers could identify a number of properties of groups that lead people to perceive varying entitativity in groups. The first of these properties is similarity among group members (Brewer and Harasty, 1996; Brewer, Weber, and Carini, 1995; McGarty, Haslam, Hutchinson, and Grace, 1995). When members of a group are similar to each other in terms of physical or psychological aspects, people could form a group prototype more readily. When the group is represented as a prototype in memory, it is more likely to be seen as a homogeneous unit. Another important antecedent of perceptions of entitativity is group size (Brewer and Harasty, 1996; Brewer, Weber, and Carini, 1995). However, while Brewer and her associates argue that minority groups are more likely to be perceived higher in entitativity (see also Mullen, 1991), there are other research indicating large groups are perceived as more coherent than small groups (McGarty, Haslam, Hutchinson, and Grace, 1995). When the groups are perceived to be inalterable, they seem to acquire a perceptual essence, which contributes to their entitativity (Rothbart and Taylor, 1992; Yzerbyt, Rogier, and Fiske, 1997). The perception of inalterability of groups, in turn, is dependent upon perceived permeability of group boundaries (Campbell, 1958) and the duration of groups (Lickel, Hamilton, Uhles, Wiczorkowska, Lewis, and Sherman, 2000). Groups with impermeable boundaries are perceived higher in entitativity than groups with relatively more permeable boundaries. Similarly, long-lasting groups are perceived higher in entitativity than groups of shorter durations. One more antecedent of perception of group's entitativity is the interdependence among its members (Cartwright and Zander, 1968; Gaertner and Schopler, 1998). The existence of common goals and outcomes in the group and the degree of interaction among group members are three well-known criteria of interdependence (Cartwright and Zander, 1968; Freeman and Webster, 1994; Homans, 1950; Tajfel, 1981; Weldon and Weingart, 1993). And the last property of the group as an antecedent of group's entitativity is the importance of group to its members (Cartwright and Zander, 1968; Tajfel, 1981). In short, groups, which have similar members, which have impermeable boundaries, which are long-lasting, which have common goals and common outcomes for their members, which have a high group-member interaction, and which are important for their members

are likely to be perceived high in entitativity (see also Lickel, Hamilton, Uhles, Wierzchowska, Lewis, and Sherman, 2000).

As we shall see in the next section, Ülkücü group carries all these properties mentioned above. Since Ülkücüs is an ideological group, its members have similar beliefs related to the value system, the socialization system, the social stratification and social mobility system, the economic and the political systems. Moreover, though its boundaries are permeable, this is more valid for joining than for exiting. Like other ideological groups, this group also has both material and moral sanctions against exit. The group emerged about thirty years ago but its history can be extended as far back as the late Ottoman Empire. Moreover, it has been striving for an ideal and envisages a high interdependence among its members. Lastly, the group is so important for its members that it is possible to see its members engaging in all kinds of intergroup competition with members of rival groups.

Like Hinkle and Brown (1990), Lickel et al. (2000) also proposed that perception of entitativity is likely to be influenced by the level of collectivism and the existence of a competition between the target group and the related outgroups. When we add these components to the discussion above, we can conclude that SIT literature is full of studies employing irrelevant groups that are not suitable to observe the social identity processes described in SIT. On the contrary, Ülkücüs satisfies all the conditions mentioned above. Thus, our utilization of such a group like Ülkücüs in our study can be regarded as originality on its own.

The second criticism is closely related to the above discussion. Recently, some scholars argued for the necessity to differentiate between different kinds of groups (Brown, 2000; see also Augoustinos, 1991; Deaux, 1991; Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, and Ethier, 1995; Frable, 1993; Lickel, Hamilton, Uhles, Wierzchowska, Lewis, and Sherman, 2000). In an attempt to make such a differentiation, Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, and Ethier (1995) asked their subjects to sort 64 different category memberships into separate groups on the basis of similarity. A cluster analysis of these similarity ratings revealed five basic clusters: (a) personal relationships (e.g., wife, friend), (b) vocations and avocations (e.g., musician, scientist), (c) political affiliation (e.g., Democrat, pacifist), (d) stigmatized groups (e.g., alcoholic, homeless person), and (e) ethnic or religious groups (e.g., Catholic, Asian American). Moreover, multidimensional scaling of the data yielded

that these basic identity groups exhibit important differences in terms of four evaluative dimensions based on fifteen trait properties. Deaux et al (1995) argued that vocations/avocations, political affiliation, and ethnic or religious groups are more suitable to observe social identity processes described in SIT for only these groups are associated with the collectivist/relational type in the Hinkle and Brown's taxonomy. In short, the authors concluded that all identities are not the same and the difference between them may produce important consequences.

In a similar study again based on cluster analysis, Lickel et al (2000) also distinguished five types of groups; intimacy groups (e.g., family, two people in a romantic relationship), task-oriented groups (e.g., committees, work groups), social categories (e.g., Women, Jews, Americans), weak social relationships (e.g., people who live in the same neighborhood, people who love classical music), and transitory groups (e.g., people waiting at a bus stop, people in line at the bank). They also found that intimacy groups are perceived to be the highest in entitativity, while task-oriented groups are perceived to be the second highest in entitativity. Social categories and weak social relationships have somewhat intermediate entitativity ratings. And finally, transitory groups are perceived to be lowest in entitativity. These group types and their entitativity ratings appeared exactly the same both in the US and Poland (see Lickel et al., 2000; Study 2).

We shall come to the issue of plurality of groups in the General Discussion. For now, we think that Ülkücü group is a suitable selection to observe processes depicted in SIT is established. Nevertheless, we did not give any information about this group so far. To appreciate the relevance of this group with the thesis more fully, the last section of this lengthy general introduction is devoted to an account of the group of Ülkücüs.

1.4. THE NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY IN TURKEY AND ÜLKÜCÜS

The Nationalist Action Party (NAP) and Ülkücüs as the youth branch of the party appeared in the late 1960s and have always been accused of ultra-nationalism and fascism (e.g., Ağaoğulları, 1987; Arslan, 1999; Keyder, 1995; Landau, 1974; Sencer, 1971). However, neither the party nor Ülkücüs recognized these claims as valid. On the contrary, they produced the slogan of “No to Communism, Fascism, and all kinds of Imperialism”

and retaliated that who try to attach this label to Ülkücüs are communists and separatists (e.g., Türkeş, 1995).

Indeed, one often cannot discriminate between scientific information and ideological prejudice in the writings of Turkish social scientists when the issue is concerned with the NAP and Ülkücüs. For this reason, we shall rely on such writings as little as possible and try to trace the development of the NAP and Ülkücü movement with reference to concrete historical facts. And when needed, we shall prefer to take a look at the issues with the eye of Ülkücüs, an approach that may be seen as the essence of social constructionist method [Gergen, 1982; see Berger and Luckmann (1966) for a detailed account of this approach]. In so doing, we hope to make the reader more familiar with the mentality of Ülkücüs.

The NAP and Ülkücü movement stamped their marks on the social and political life in Turkey for the last 35 years. However, their distinctive feature, namely Turkish nationalism, has a much longer history, reaching back to the last and the longest years of the Ottoman Empire (Ortaylı, 1983). Many of the sensitivities of today's Turkish nationalists were inherited from the Turkists and Ottomanists of the past. Below, we shall overview the developments of the nationalist ideas and movements in the Ottoman Empire. Next, we shall try to understand the significance of this movement within the newly founded nation-state, Republic of Turkey. Then, we shall look at the formation of the NAP and Ülkücü movement.

1.4.1. The Birth of Turkish Nationalism

Before beginning with our topic, it seems appropriate to say a few words about the basics of the Ottoman political culture from which Turkish nationalism flourished. Ottoman political culture can best be understood with reference to the concept of "state". State as a transcendental being used to provide the Ottoman people with a criterion of legitimacy (Heper, 1985, 1991). In fact, it seems that there were two such criteria, the other being religion. This duo was pronounced as din-ü devlet (religion and state) in the Ottoman political literature. People and institutions including the Sultan had to act in terms of religion and state. Any other motive was illegitimate. Ironically, even when the

Ottoman subjects rebelled against the legitimate authority, for example when they dethroned the Sultan, they had to depend on this legitimacy.

Dündar Taşer (no date), a prominent member of the NAP, preferred to depict the mentalities of the Ottoman subjects as fena fi'd-devle, a concept borrowed and adapted from the concept of fena fi'l-lah in Islamic mysticism. By this concept, Taşer seems to have meant that the Ottoman people's identification with the state was so strong that they were willing to sacrifice their personalities for the sake of the state. To be sure, such a generalization would be true, at least, for those having a position in the state. Already, it is known that the main aim in forming the institution of kulluk was just to produce statesmen who were very loyal to the state and had no ties with persons and institutions other than the state (Berkes, 1972). According to Taşer, the Ottoman subjects took pride in the greatness of their state and were afraid of casting a little shadow on it. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that as if they had been worshipping the state. Attesting to Taşer, Kırşehirlioğlu (no date) generalizes this mentality not only to the Ottomans but also to the earlier periods of Turks. According to him, state and Turk have always been interconnected for "Başsız bürk, ilsiz Türk olmaz" (There cannot be hat without head, Turk without state).

The Ottoman state was mainly based on conquests made by the army. In fact, all earlier states established by the Turks also had this characteristic. For this reason, an important aspect of the Turkish state was its identification with the army. It can even be said that the strength of a state was perceived to be parallel with the strength of its army. This understanding was reflected in Kutadgu Bilig of Yusuf Has Hacib of the 11th century and echoed in the writings of Koçi Bey of the 17th century. In terms of this understanding, the relation between state and society was restricted to the state's reception of taxes from the subjects to feed the army. In return, the obligation of the state was to provide its subjects with justice, a term generally defined consistent with the concept of equity [see Rawls (1971) for the philosophical basis of this concept]. In other words, the most important political value attached to the state was the establishment of justice within society. We see that, to some extent, the value of justice was also extended to the world. The aim of the state in conquering the lands of other communities was generally explained with the motive of nizam-ı alem (world order) and to ensure people of the

world to live with justice. Ziya Gökalp, who was one of the most important figures in Turkish nationalism, labeled this motive as Kızıl Elma (Red Apple).

By the 17th century, Ottoman state entered into a stage of decline. The regression showed itself first in the battlefield. When the Ottoman army started to undergo defeats, the Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals became aware of the rooted change in the European states. We mentioned the high regard the Ottoman people held for their state. When these people realized that the state was in danger, they started to seek a solution. “How can this state be saved?” has become an ever-lasting question (Berkes, 1964; Kushner, 1977), and after that time, most of the learned Ottomans devoted themselves to answering it.

The answers produced to the question of “how can this state be saved?” have generally been large projects that aim to transform the mentalities of the Ottoman subjects. Akçura (1976) tells that there were three such large projects: Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism. Two things should be noted. First, state elites adopted these projects and put them into effect. Second, these projects were rarely seen as competing ideologies. It can be said that their appearing followed the order of Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism. When it was realized that Ottomanism failed, Islamism emerged. And when it was realized that Islamism failed, Turkism emerged. In other words, the aim of all these ideologies was common: the restoration of Ottoman power and the maintenance of the state (Aydın, 1995).

Ottomanism was the official ideology of Tanzimat statesmen. Moreover, this policy was endorsed by a group of intellectuals, known as Young Ottomans. We find this group important for they invented or introduced many of the concepts highly regarded by Ülkücüs and Turkish people in general. Moreover, it can be said that this group sewed the seeds of nationalist thought. For this reason, we shall have a brief look at their ideas below.

1.4.1.1. The Young Ottomans and the Policy of Ottomanism

Young Ottomans consisted of such figures as İbrahim Şinasi (1824-1871), Namık Kemal (1840-1888), Ziya Paşa (1829-1880) and Ali Süavi (1839-1878). In their times, the idea of nationalism was a foreign concept to the Ottoman Empire because the

distinctions among groups of people had generally followed religious lines (Ortaylı, 1985). Moreover, in those times, the term “Turk” had a somewhat derogatory connotation. Thus, Young Ottomans opted for an Ottomanist type of nationalism. The most important concept these Ottoman nationalists developed was watan (Fatherland). By this word, Young Ottomans meant the same meaning with the French patrie or the German vaterland. In fact, this concept did not connote a sentiment of nationalism but a spirit of patriotism. The concept of watan gained its meaning through the stages in which the boundaries of the Empire shrank more and more. It was Namık Kemal who filled this concept with emotional content. However, even for Namık Kemal the concept did not refer to something Turkish but Ottoman and the emotional content was Islamic as well as patriotic (Davison, 1990). These feelings are well represented in the following excerpt:

Blood and sword on our flag are flying,
On our hills and plains roams no fear of dying,
A lion in each part of our land is lying,
We rejoice in the fray martyrs' lives to lay down,
We are Ottomans, giving up life for renown¹¹

Furthermore, Namık Kemal made a definition of watan as follows:

The Vatan does not consist of imaginary lines drawn on a map by the sword of a conqueror or the pen of a scribe. It is a sacred idea sprang from the union of many lofty sentiments, such as nation, freedom, welfare, brotherhood, property, sovereignty, respect for ancestors, love of family, memory of youth. (Cited in Lewis, 1992)

As we mentioned, these ideas were consistent with the official ideology of the time, a policy that tried to infuse the Ottoman subjects a new kind of loyalty to the Ottoman fatherland and to an Ottoman nation (Findley, 1989). However, it was also consistent with a nationalist look at the concept watan, which can be freed from religious and patriotic bonds. It is possible to connect the concept of watan with the notion of “generalizing, integrating and legitimizing state” for this notion has always been a concern for Turks (Heper, 1991). As a result, these two concepts emerged something not only to be loved but also to be saved and to be served.

¹¹ This is a song of Namık Kemal in his play Vatan yahut Silistre (Fatherland or Silistre). Its English translation is cited from Davison, 1963, p.299.

Young Ottomans were also in favor of a more democratic regime, an idea that got them into trouble with the imperial bureaucracy. They reinforced this idea by the claim that the Islamic state had originally been a democratic, constitutional institution (Mardin, 1962). However, they held, it was later changed by the tyranny of rulers. One can find much legitimization efforts in the writings of Young Ottomans. This points to another important characteristics of early nationalists. They were ardent Muslims. They were very sensitive to Western criticism of Islam and retaliated to show that Western civilization actually derived from Islam or that the most desirable aspects of Western civilization had originally existed also in Islam. However, they knew that Islam had been in decline. Ziya Paşa complained about this issue as follows:

To impute fanaticism to men of zeal
 To ascribe wisdom to men without religion is now the fashion
 Islam, they say, is a stumbling-block to the progress of the state
 This story was not known before, now it is the fashion
 Forgetting our religious loyalty in all our affairs
 Following Frankish ideas is now the fashion
 (Cited in Lewis, 1964, p. 139)

Young Ottomans thought that Islam is compatible with Western science and technology. Thus, for them, material aspects of Western civilization can be incorporated into the Ottoman community. For these aspects had given progress, prosperity, and superiority to the European nations. Thus, together with Ottomanism and Islamism, Young Ottomans also welcomed Westernism, a combination known as “trinity” (Berkes, 1964).

Islam ... would provide the moral and legal bases of society; the Ottoman tradition of statecraft, together with its multinational and multireligious cosmopolitan policy of toleration, would be the political framework of the Ottoman (not Turkish) state; and Western civilization would furnish the material and practical methods and techniques to enable this system to survive in the contemporary world of power and economic progress. (Berkes, 1959, p. 18)

However, Young Ottoman project lost its feasibility when almost all non-Muslim elements rebelled against the Ottoman state and gained their independence. However, their thought bequeathed such notions as watan, constitution, patriotism, purified Islam, Western technology to later generations. In the time of Abdulhamid II, the second large

project, namely Islamism, was put into effect. When the Ottoman statesmen ceased the hope that all elements can be gathered under the Ottomanism flag, they tried to unite get and only Muslim elements under control. These policies did not directly serve to the development of Turkish nationalism but during this time a group, known as “the Young Turks”, emerged and started to disseminate nationalist ideas.

1.4.1.2. The Young Turks and the Revolution of 1908

Young Turks were heavily inspired by the Young Ottoman ideas. They were called Young Turks after the name of a newspaper, called La Jeune Turquie, published in Paris at the end of the nineteenth century. One of the most important characters among Young Turks was Ahmet Rıza (1859-1930). He was attracted to the positivist philosophy of Comte and started to attend to the positivist circles in Paris (Korlaelçi, 1986). While he was trying to further his intellectual equipment, he founded a periodical called Mechveret (Consultation), which was to become the official organ of the Young Turks. “Union and Progress”, the famous positivist jargon, was the official motto of the periodical. In this periodical, Rıza showed that he was after an Ottomanist policy rather than a nationalist one. In fact, these intellectuals never ceased their hopes from this policy until the Balkan Wars. The most original contribution of Rıza was his efforts to introduce the Ottoman intellectuals with the positivist ideas and his insistence that the Ottomans should advance in the path of civilization. Though he seemed to be concerned with keeping the originality of Oriental civilization of the Ottoman society, he could not clarify the relationships among the concepts of civilization and originality of a culture. Remember that the Young Ottomans had also been involved in this issue. In fact, all third-world nations seemed to produce similar kinds of arguments at the turn of the 20th century. However, theorists criticizing the colonial mentality believed that it is very difficult to refer to an originality or distinctiveness of the national culture because the elements of Western civilization also determine the local elements (e.g., Chatterjee, 1993). In other words, both the Young Ottomans and Ahmet Rıza, together with many other Young Turks, believed that the Western civilization should be incorporated into the Ottoman culture but they did not know how they could keep the originality of their culture during this integration. Nevertheless, this ignorance did not bother these intellectuals much for their main aim was not to make a theoretical advancement, rather their aim was very practical. They

were just trying to overcome the uneasiness that would lead to the dissolution of the unity of their state [see Mardin (1992) for a more elaborate analysis of the ideas of Young Turks].

Mechveret was not the only publication of the Young Turks. There were various people with rather different sorts of ideas. The periodical of Mizan was another important organ for Young Turks to disseminate their ideas. The editor of this periodical, Mizancı Murad Bey (1854-1917), offered more practical and concrete administrative and bureaucratic reforms and prescriptions than the relatively abstract program of Mechveret. He implicitly accepted a European intervention to provide the reforms in the Empire. Moreover, he was so radical that he did not find it sufficient to restore the Constitution of 1876. These ideas led other Young Turks to criticize Murad (Mardin, 1992). More importantly, he gave much importance to the term “Turk” in his writings. In several articles, he pointed to the significance of the Turkish language and Turkdom by saying that “Let’s discuss all kinds of philosophical and literature contributions of Arabs, but not forget that we are Turk” (Mardin, 1992; p.114). However, the main trend of Mizan was also Ottomanist and opposed to the nationalist tendencies (Kushner, 1977).

Another important figure among Young Turks was Prens Sabahaddin (1878-1948). His ideas differed from other Young Turks and the mainstream Ottoman intellectuals in important respects. Most importantly, he was a true liberal, heavily influenced by Anglo-Saxon liberal political thought. He favored a minimal, decentralized government and saw private initiative and free enterprise as the motor of progress (Zurcher, 1984). In other words, his ideas were in considerable opposition with the centralized government. At this point, we should stop and say a word about this issue for its importance not only for the Ottoman state but also for the modern Republic of Turkey.

Ottoman political system was generally explained with the concept of traditional authority (e.g., Heper, 1980, 1985; Mardin, 1969, 1973; Sunar, 1974). This kind of authority is known as the authority of eternal past (Weber, 1958). A patriarch or a patrimonial prince can have such an authority as a result of becoming sacred through old habits of conformity and obedience. In other words, this type of authority depends on tradition and expresses itself as patriarchalism or patrimonialism in which there exists a system of sacred and irresistible norms. These concepts imply that both the country and the people living in the country are the property of the ruler (Heper, 1977). In this system,

primary relationships between inferior and superior are dominant, the initiation of political governors is vast, central authority is viewed as “father state”, and the whole state organization can be used for personal ends. Moreover, in this system, only the sovereign represents the legitimacy. The sovereign ensures its authority through a patrimonial bureaucratic class whose interests are dependent upon the sovereign. For this reason, no independent feudal class emerges in such systems. In short, there are only sovereign and its subjects and the sovereign exerts its authority through bureaucratic elites who do not need to be responsive to the people.

Though such a system requires a powerful central state, the vastness of the Ottoman lands necessitated the emergence of a kind of local authorities, known as Ayans consisting of notable people in a certain region. During the reign of Selim III, these Ayans reached their maximum power (Uzunçarşılı, 1942). Though they forced the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II to sign the famous Sened-i İttifak (The Deed of Agreement), which gave formal recognition to feudal rights and autonomies in the Ottoman Empire, the life of this agreement became short. At the end, in the time of Mahmud II, almost all Ayans were eliminated. Their remnants were removed with the launch of Tanzimat reforms. The imperial bureaucracy believed that the Ottoman state declined due to an ineffective centralization of government and thought that when the governance was more and more centralized, things would be better. In other words, the central government saw the remedy in furthering the centralization process (Aydın, 1995). There is every reason to believe that this process has been lasting since then. Even in the 1990s, all major parties have the aims of de-centralizing the governance and giving more initiative to the peripheral authorities. Yet, it is also a fact that as soon as these parties captured the power, they forget this aim for no power-holder wish to distribute its power. Anyway, it can be said that the first realistic program to de-centralize the government and strengthen the private sector was prepared by Prens Sabahaddin in the Ottoman Empire. In this regard, he was opposite to almost all other Young Turks, who mainly followed the lines posed by the Tanzimat statesmen.

Prens Sabahaddin was so against the Hamidian regime that he was in favor of interventions of Great European Powers. He was not against the commercial and political domination and influence of the European countries in the Ottoman Empire if it would accelerate the development of the Empire. Prens Sabahaddin has been criticized mainly

from this point for even the most Westernists of the Young Turks were against any foreign intrusion. For example, Ahmet Rıza wrote in Mechveret on December 3, 1895 “We are opposed to the substitution of direct intervention by the foreign powers for Ottoman authority. This is not from fanaticism, because, for us, the religious question is a private affair – but from a legitimate sentiment of civil and national dignity” (cited in Ramsaur, 1957; p. 25). These disagreements led the Young Ottomans to divide into two fractions. One of the fractions was in favor of de-centralization and free private enterprise, the other was in favor of centralization, and thus, against free market. While Prens Sabahaddin represented the first fraction, Ahmet Rıza represented the second fraction. Ahmet Rıza and his supporters interpreted Prens Sabahaddin’s wish of European Powers’ intervention as treachery and used this argument as a point of legitimacy for their other arguments.

Apart from this fragmentation, which was mainly related to the nature of the government, another fragmentation appeared related to the ideological stance of the Young Turks. One group, represented by Sait Halim Paşa (1863-1921), held that the decline of Ottoman Empire was due to the increasing removal of the Islamic doctrines and practices from the institutions of the government. Like Young Ottomans, this group believed that Islam was compatible with Western science and technology. In fact, they maintained, Islam in its originality carried all the elements that had led to the development of Western societies. Thus, it was necessary to revive the fundamental Islamic ideas for the development of the Empire. Since they believed the universality of Islam as a religion, they were against nationalist sentiments. This group is known as Islamists (Karpat, 1967).

The second group was Westernists, represented by Abdullah Cevdet (1869-1932). They aimed to “educate”, “civilize” and “enlighten” the people and to integrate the Ottoman masses to the contemporary civilization (Mardin, 1992). In a poem, Abdullah Cevdet wrote:

I tried to enlighten you night and day
 I went to the sun from the moon and came to the moon from the sun
 Prophets promise paradise in the other world
 I came to make this world into a paradise for you
 (cited in Mardin, 1992)

The Westernists saw the ignorance of people as the biggest obstacle against progress. In order to overcome this problem, they maintained, the fatalist and supernatural beliefs should be abolished and replaced by the construction of a mentality based on cause-effect relationship of the events. They asked for the replacement of indigenous cultural elements by those of Western civilization. For example, the Sheriah laws should be replaced by civil laws and the Latin alphabet should replace the Arabic letters; religious schools should be abandoned; a national economy and industrialization should be set up (Karpat, 1967). However, they were still Ottomanist, not nationalist.

The third and the most influential group in the Young Turk era was Turkists. At the beginning, Turkism was merely a cultural movement and appeared primarily in the field of literature. A number of intellectuals pointed to the importance of language in preserving the national culture. An outcome of this concern was the effort to purify the language from the invasion of foreign words. In a paper, Sait Bey wrote that “Let the one who seeks Arabic go to the Arabs, those who seek Persian, to the Persians, and the ‘Frenks’ to ‘Frengistan’; but we are Turks and we need Turkish.” (Cited in Kushner, 1977; p. 63). This new understanding of literature, called Edebiyat-ı Cedide, centered around the magazine of Servet-i Fünun. Şemseddin Sami, a representative figure in the magazine, wrote:

The first symbol of a nation and a race, its foundation, and its common property, shared equality by all its members, is the language in which it speaks. People speaking one language constitute one nation and one race. Each people and nation must therefore first of all bring order [to] its languages. (Cited in Kushner, 1977; p. 62)

Apart from concerns related to Turkish language, the works of European Turcologists also influenced the national sentiments. Such prominent figures as A. J. de Guignes, A. L. David, Mustafa Celaleddin Paşa, Arminius Vambery and Leon Cahun discovered the Turkish past, their historical background in the great Central Asian civilization, and the importance of their language and history in the history (Shaw and Shaw, 1985). In other words, Ottoman Turks was acquainted with their ancient history and language mainly owing to the works of the Orientalists. Later, Akçura, a prominent figure in Turkish nationalism, lamented that:

We learnt the ideals of watan and nation, not in our own schools, but from the foreign books that we obtained accidentally and from the activities of foreign nations living inside us. Aren't those what I have just said true, even if they are painful?

Beside the works of Edebiyat-ı Cedide and Turcology, Turkish nationalism gained the most significant acceleration by the move of intellectuals from Russia to the Ottoman Empire. This move happened toward the end of the nineteenth century. The national awakening of the Turks in Crimea and Kazan had started several years before than that of the Turks in the Ottoman Empire as a reaction to the Russian domination and pressures (Kırımlı, 1994). The nationalist intellectuals in Crimea and Kazan were influenced by the thoughts of modern Islamic thinkers Jamaladdin Al-Afghani, Muhammed Abduh and Abdurrahman Al-Kawakabi as well as the writings of Young Ottomans. These Islamic thinkers had seen nationalistic sentiments as desirable and provided the nationalist movements with a point of legitimacy in Islam. The most outstanding figure of the nationalist movement in Crimea was İsmail Gaspiralı (1851-1914). He believed that all Turks should be united against the Russian imperialism. To this end, he gave much importance in developing a common literary dialect that can be understood by all Turkic elements (Shaw and Shaw, 1985). His slogan "Unity in language, idea, and deed" has been an ideal for all Turkist groups. In fact, İsmail Gaspiralı was not among those who moved to the Ottoman Empire but his two disciples, Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935) and Ahmed Ağaoğlu (1868-1939), were among the most significant figures that launched the nationalist movement in Turkey. We shall deal with these figures later for their effect started after the Young Turk Revolution in 1908. Thus, for now, it is appropriate to talk about the factors that paved the way for this revolution.

One of the most significant events in the history of Turkish nationalism in particular and recent Turkish history in general was the formation of a committee, called İttihad ve Terakki (Union and Progress). Ironically, none of the founders of this committee was Turk. İbrahim Temo was an Albanian, Mehmed Reşid was a Caucasian, and Abdullah Cevdet and İshak Sukuti were two Kurds. This point is important for it shows that Turkish nationalism was not something mainly based on race. For example, in a letter İbrahim Temo wrote to İshak Sukuti:

Don't be so dejected. Turkey cannot be wiped away from the World Map so quickly as imagined by some. Even if it seems impossible to stop her disappearance from Europe

and Africa, she can rule in Asia for many, many years. (Cited in Hanioglu, 1989; p. 634)

Originally, the Committee laid down a program of constitutionalism, Ottomanism, freedom, and a demand to replace Abdulhamid II with one of his brothers. In the course of time, this Committee spread all around the Empire. Among its supporters, there were students, lower rank officers in the army, some bureaucrats and intellectuals. Numerous underground activities were made against Abdulhamid II, and in the end, he was forced to recall the Parliament to establish a constitutional government. In other words, a bloodless revolution took place on July 23, 1908.

When the Committee of Union of Progress (CUP) took over the government, it was faced with three possible policies that we mentioned earlier; namely, Islamism, Ottomanism, and Turkism. Both Ottomanism and Islamism had been tried before and neither had proved successful. For this reason, the CUP leaders preferred Turkism as the policy to save the state. However, since the Ottoman society consisted of many non-Turkish elements, they felt the need to find ways to ensure their loyalties. It seems that the only way they imagined was their Turkification (Khadduri, 1983). Earlier, we tried to say that most intellectuals preferred the Ottomanist or Islamist policies to nationalist one for the former two implied pluralism. They feared that a policy of nationalism would be separatist by offending the other nations (Hanioglu, 1991). It seems what they feared happened in the reign of the CUP and the Turkification policies brought about a quick development of Arab nationalism (Haddad and Ochsenwald, 1977; Khalidi and Anderson, 1991).

Nevertheless, as we saw in the quote by Ibrahim Temo, as a result of a series of Wars, the Ottomans lost many of its lands. There was no reason to preserve the expectation that the unity of country can be ensured with an Ottomanist type of policy. At this juncture, the most important figure of Turkish nationalism, namely Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924) emerged. His importance comes from his contribution to the intellectual development of both the Empire in her latter days and the Turkish Republic that followed.

1.4.1.3. Ziya Gökalp the National Thinker

Ziya Gökalp was the person who systematized the ideas, we have reviewed so far, into a coherent doctrine of Turkism. In his writings, one can easily observe his transition from Ottomanism, the community of peoples living under the Ottoman rule and in the brotherhood of Islam, to Turkism, the assumed racial and cultural unity of all the populations speaking a Turkish language and looking upon Turan as their common home (Kohn, 1962).

The main concern of Gökalp was the question of how the Turks should adopt the Western civilization and how this effort should be harmonized with the Turks' two historical traditions, i.e., Turkish and Islamic background (see Gökalp, 1959). Though he was quite critical of the Western civilization in his early writings, as the time passed and the hope to save the state started to vanish, he became aware of the fact that "European civilization must not be underrated" (Heyd, 1950; p. 79). His conclusion was that:

Ottoman civilization, being a part of Eastern civilization, will be destroyed in any case, to be replaced by Islamic religion and Turkish culture on the one hand and by Western civilization on the other. The mission of Turkism is to seek out the Turkish culture that has remained only among the people and to graft onto it Western civilization its entirety and in a viable form. (Gökalp, 1968; p. 33)

As can be seen, as it had been the case for the Young Ottomans, Gökalp tried to combine three ideological concerns in his writings, namely Turkism, Islamism, and Westernism. He always dealt with the dichotomies of tradition-modernity, continuity-change, nationalism-internationalism, and Islamism-secularism. Though he seemed in the efforts to reconcile the extreme ends of these dichotomies, at the end, he always favored the second terms of the dichotomies (Parla, 1985).

Gökalp defined a nation as a society speaking the same language, having the same education and being united in its religious, moral and aesthetic ideals. Shortly, if a society has a common culture and religion, according to Gökalp, it is a nation (Heyd, 1950). Such a homogeneous view of society led Gökalp to adopt a democratic attitude in dealing with social issues. He believed that the nation should be taken as the final and unerring criterion of what is desirable or undesirable and what is to be taken or rejected. Whatever the "collective conscience" of the nation accepts is normal and whatever it rejects is

pathological.¹² In sum, he transformed the political nationalism of Pan-Turkism into a cultural nationalism of Turanism (Heyd, 1950; Kohn, 1962).

The concepts of state and watan occupied a major place in the Gökâlp's thinking. For him, the state derives its power from the nation. Since it depends on the nation, it is sacred. Watan is also a sacred concept for Gökâlp for the nation sheds its blood for its sake. However, watan may not refer to arbitrary lines drawn on a map, as we saw in the case of Namık Kemal. Gökâlp had a pan-Turkist ideal summarized in the ideal of Turan:

For the Turks, Fatherland means neither Turkey, nor Turkestan; Fatherland is a large and eternal country: Turan. (Gökâlp, 1959; p. 78)

Though we held that Gökâlp adopted a democratic attitude for he took the nation as the determinant of policies, this may true only for a country where a homogeneous population lives and the rule of majority reigns. This is certainly an attitude compatible with Republicanism but its compatibility with democracy, especially in its modern sense, is debatable [see Çaha (1999) for an excellent discussion about the distinctions between republic and democracy]. We noted this point for the corporatist and solidarist aspect of Gökâlp's ideology contains an uncontroversial totalitarianism and anti-individualism. In his thinking, what is important was just the nation. There was no room for the absolute value of the individual (Heyd, 1950). These ideas are well reflected in one of his poems:

Do not say "I have rights";
There is only duty, no right.

There is no "I" and "you", but "We";
We are both Ruler and [the] Ruled, to be.
We means One;
I and You worship the One.

Whatever is your service,
That is your assistance.
Your merit do[es] not reveal,
So that it may be real.

¹² Note that Gökâlp was heavily influenced by Durkheim's sociology.

Heyd (1950) maintained that though Gökalp was influenced much by French sociology and had almost no information about the German nationalism, his ideas were akin to German nationalism. He saw the reason of this similarity in the similarity of cultural background of both Gökalp's ideas and German nationalism:

Autocratically ruled like Prussia, the Ottoman Empire assigned to the Army and bureaucracy a similar prominence. Officers and officials were the most respected citizens in both countries. Gökalp's demand for the complete subordination of the individual to society, though adapted from Durkheim, confirms to the Prussian ideal of absolute devotion of the citizen to the state even to the extinction of his personality. (Heyd, 1950; p. 165)

So far, we have seen that nationalism in the Ottoman Empire emerged as a device to save the existing state. The person who gave this ideology its autonomy from the Ottoman state was Ziya Gökalp. In this respect, he has been rightly revered as the theoretician of Turkish nationalism. Nevertheless, the ideology could never totally free itself from the concerns of the time it developed. Concepts such as nation, watan, and state remained sacred. As a matter of the fact, these concepts reached its peak in sacredness by means of nationalistic ideas (Sargent, 1987). Moreover, though imperialism had never been a problem for the Ottoman society until the end of the World War I, even in early 20th century, nationalists started to express their hostility against imperialism. This was mainly because of the influence of Turkist scholars who moved from the Crimea, Kazan and Azerbaijani that were under Russian rule in those times.

To be sure, though our discussion was limited to individuals, these individuals derived their influence from the institutions they formed. In the leadership of Yusuf Akçura, Necip Asım and Velel Çelebi, prominent Turkists formed Türk Derneği (Turkish Association) in Istanbul in 1908 (Akçura, 1981). The honorary president and the sponsor of this association was heir apparent Yusuf İzzettin Efendi. Another important institution of the Turkists was Genç Kalemler Hareketi (Young Pens Movement) gathered around the periodical Genç Kalemler. Among the founders of this movement, there were Ali Canip, Ömer Seyfettin and Ziya Gökalp. In 1911, Mehmed Emin Yurdakul, Ahmed Hikmet Müftüoğlu, Ahmed Ağaoğlu, Hüseyinzade Ali, Dr. Akif Muhtar Özden and Yusuf Akçura established Türk Yurdu Cemiyeti (The Society of Turkish Homeland) (Sarinay, 1994). The journal of Türk Yurdu, whose editor was Yusuf Akçura, has the

most longevity in Turkish intellectual life (Georgeon, 1986). Nevertheless, the most significant and important institution formed by the Turkish nationalists was Türk Ocakları (Turkish Houses). Below, we shall give a brief account about the activities of these Houses.

1.4.1.4. Turkish Houses

Turkish Association, Young Pens and Turkish Homeland were established directly by the intellectuals for cultural and scholarly purposes. However, the thought and initiative to found Turkish Houses came from the students of Military Academy of Medicine. These students had a tradition of organization. They received a modern education and had a positive science mentality. They had the ability to diagnose social and political problems and begin to act to find a solution (Hanioğlu, 1989; Mardin, 1990). It seems that these students felt the need to be united as a reaction against the activities of non-Turkish students in the same school (Sarp, 1955). They prepared a program, to establish a society based on the idea of nation, and a proclamation in 1911 and presented this proclamation to the foremost intellectuals of the time (Orkun, 1977). In this proclamation, they stressed that a comprehensive social reform is needed for the development of Turkish nation and a national and social society should be founded to this end (Akçura, 1981).

After a series of meetings, the society was officially founded in 1912. Ahmet Ferid Tek was the president of the society while Yusuf Akçura undertook the task of second presidency. Nevertheless, soon after it was founded, the society was subjected to serious shocks in the time of Balkan Wars. Ahmed Ferid Tek left the presidency to found the Milli Meşrutiyet Fırkası. In 1913, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver was elected for the presidency and the society entered into an active stage.

Ziya Gökalp and other members of the Young Pens came to Istanbul and joined the Turkish Houses. Moreover, the Party of Union and Progress started to give more importance to Turkish nationalism and endorse this society to help its functions. Furthermore, Balkan Wars awakened the nationalist sentiments of the people all around the country. All these factors led the Society to be one of the most influential associations in the history of Turkish intellectual life. Most importantly, Turkish military and civil

intellectuals, raised within this tradition, formed a considerable portion of the cadres who would realize the National Struggle in the Anatolia and found the Republic of Turkey after the World War I. Nevertheless, Turkish Houses were closed down in 1931 allegedly for its mission was taken over directly by the government, and thus, there remained no need for it to survive.

In fact, the function of Turkish Houses had changed much before it was closed down. It is true that the most influential group in founding the Republic was Turkish nationalists but later the state elites started to change the definition of nationalism and by the 1930s Turkish nationalists were totally discarded from the governance of the state. For these reasons, Turkish nationalism in the Republic of Turkey should be handled under a different chapter.

1.4.2. Turkish Nationalism in the Republic of Turkey

Both the Union and Progress and Turkish Houses had a special place among the leaders of National Struggle. Nationalist intellectuals believed that their ideas started to be realized by means of the new state emerged in Anatolia. They believed that both the national struggle and the organizations appeared during this struggle represented the nation's determination for existence. For them, this state might be the last chance for an independent Turkish nation. For these reasons, until closed down in 1931, the Turkish Houses became one of the strongest supporters of the new state's policies. Of course, their belief that unity was crucial in such times of transition reinforced the level of their support.

Having founded the Republic, the leader cadres started to seek an ideology that gives legitimacy to the new state and its aims (Aydın, 2002). In this regard, nationalist movement, systematized in the writings of Gökalp and Akçura, was their main source of inspiration. We mentioned that Gökalp had always been in a process of developing projects about the nature of both society and state. It is true that these projects guided the founders of the Republic to some extent but shortly after his untimely death in 1924 the influence of his thinking on the new state started to disappear. By 1929, there was no compatibility between Gökalp's ideas and the aims of the Republic (Ülken, 1966).

Beginning from the second half of the 1920s, “Kemalism” started to emerge as the ideology of the Republic and concretized in the early 1930s. During this stage, Westernist-secular intellectuals started to have more influence in the state and re-define the understanding of nationalism.¹³ Remember that Gökbalp’s nationalism reflected a synthesis of three ideologies. He defined himself as belonging to the Turkish nation, Islamic community and European civilization. However, the Kemalist version of nationalism tended to discard the Islamic component. Westernist-secular intellectuals said that they were only Turkish and European. They held that Islam could not be incorporated into such an identity (Güngör, 1978, 1980).

Moreover, the ultimate aim of the nationalism was restricted to the protection of independence and existing borders. The ideal of Turan was no longer valid. These ideas were concretized in the 1931 and 1935 party programs of the Republican People Party (RPP) (Tunaya, 1952). Furthermore, the belief in historical continuity of the nation, one of the most essential elements of Turkish nationalist thinking, was broken. The founders of the Republic ignored the Ottoman past and treated a period of 600 years as if it was not a history of the Turks (Aydın, 2002). These policies and narratives were continued in the time of İsmet İnönü. Even, humanist and Marxist cadres, employed in the state, served to strengthen this understanding (Aydemir, 1979; Koçak, 1996).

Nationalist thinkers did not approve of all of the reforms made by the state. Such figures as Ziya Gökbalp, Yusuf Akçura and Sadri Maksudi Arsal opposed to the replacement of Arabic letters with the Latin alphabet, the adoption of Gregorian calendar, and the purification efforts in the language (Güngör, 1980). Recall that the leading Westernist Abdullah Cevdet had envisaged all these reforms. In this regard, some historians of the Turkish Revolution concluded that though the ideas of Ziya Gökbalp helped the formation of the Republic in its early years, the ideas of Westernists such as Abdullah Cevdet and Celal Nuri became more dominant in the Kemalist ideology after 1925 (e.g., Çalık, 1995).

In short, the formal nationalism of the Republic could not satisfy the Turkish nationalists. As early as 1930s, Turkist groups emerged and started to criticize the

¹³ “Westernist-secular” and “Orientalist-Islamist” are two terms coined by İdris Küçükömer (1994). See Dalmış (1997) for a discussion of Turkish socio-political structure based on this distinction.

government. When these groups are observed closely, it can be seen that Turkish nationalists have been involved in almost all opposition movements and these cadres have formed the skeleton of almost all right-wing parties. Below, we shall undertake such an attempt and we hope that the specific points of the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) and the Ülkücü movement will be appreciated more fully.

1.4.2.1. Nationalism in the Single Party Period

The most important figure among the Turkish nationalists in the single party period was Hüseyin Nihal Atsız (1905-1975). Later, he and his friends like Suut Kemal Yetkin, Nihad Sami Banarlı, Vasfi Çobanoğlu, Orhan Saik Gökyay, Abdullah Tansel would be called as the Second Generation of Turkist intellectuals. These Turkists published the periodicals of Adsız, Orkun, Çığır and Birlik in the 1930s but none of these periodicals lasted a significant period of time. In those times, the state could not tolerate any civil movement. Any movement had to be in the circle of the state. Intellectual movements of all different ideologies were trying to find protectors from the notables of the state (Aydın, 2002).

1920s and 1930s were the most sterile period for the Turkish intellectual life in general and Turkish nationalists in particular (Erdoğan, 1996). Yet, in the time of World War II, the intellectual movements both in the right and in the left resurrected. Especially, İnönü regime started not to hinder the activities of such pan-Turkist figures as Nihal Atsız and Reha Oğuz Türkkan. Such Turkist periodicals as Orhun, Bozkurt, Gök-Börü and Ergenekon emerged (Müftüoğlu, 1974). The main narrative of these periodicals was focused on the ideal of Turan. Contrary to the Turkish nationalism of the First Generation, these periodicals ignored the element of religion in the nationalist identity. Instead, they frequently referred to the history of Central Asia and Shamanism. In other words, these new Turkists had a more racist appearance. The most significant characteristic of the Turkism in this era was its harsh opposition against communism and Soviet imperialism. As a matter of the fact, such an opposition was inevitable for the Soviet imperialism had been the only present obstacle against the ideal of Turan. Almost all Turks outside Turkey had been living under the Soviet rule. On the other hand, Turkish communists were supporters of the Soviet Union. For this reason, they were

accusing the Turkists of being the extension of Nazis in Germany (e.g., Yalçın, 1944a, 1944b, 1944c).

Indeed, in those times, the Nazi Germany wanted a strong pan-Turkist movement in Turkey for this might cause their enemies, the Soviet Union, to get into trouble with the Turks living in the territories of the Soviet Union (Karpas, 1966; Koçak, 1996).¹⁴ It is highly probable that İnönü regime of the time condoned the Turkist activities due to an oppression from the Nazis or to please them (Çavdar, 1995; Erdoğan, 1996; Türkeş, 1992). However, by 1944, the Nazis started to decline and the Soviet Union turned out to be the dominant side. Ironically, this time, the communist activities in Turkey increased and the existing government, while condoning these activities, found an opportunity to hit a strike to the rising Turkism. In this way, the government aimed both to halt the development of Turkism in the country and to appear nice to the Soviet Union by punishing a pan-Turkist group, which would be very dangerous for the unity of Soviet Union in the long-run (Özden, 1997; Türkan, 1997). However, this event, happened in May 3 1944, was one of the most significant events in the history of Turkism and later started to be celebrated by the NAP as Türkçülük Bayramı (The Festival of Turkdom).

On March 1 1944 Nihal Atsız wrote an open letter to the prime minister of the time¹⁵ in his journal Orhun. In this letter, Atsız pointed to the increasing socialist / communist activities in the country. He lamented that some of the prominent communists were entrusted in government offices. In a second open letter on 21 March 1944, Atsız mentioned about the same issues but this time he gave some names as instances of the communists. One of these persons, Sabahattin Ali, opened a court case against Atsız. In his defending, Atsız claimed that this court was not related to two independent individuals; rather he depicted the court as a clash between nationalism and communism. Indeed, the court was later named as Irkcılık ve Turancılık Davası (the Court of Racism and Turanism) (Körüklü, 1994). In the hearing day of the court on May 3 1944, a few thousands people consisting mainly of university and high school students gave support to Atsız by making a demonstration. However, the National Chief, i.e., İsmet İnönü perceived this demonstration as a rebellion against the regime due to the efforts of such

¹⁴ In fact, Germany followed the same policy in the World War I, which caused a disaster for the Ottoman Empire (Aydemir, 1978)

¹⁵ The prime minister was Şükrü Saraçoğlu and he was known as close to Turkist ideas.

figures as Hasan Ali Yücel, who was the minister of national education, Falih Rıfkı Atay and Nevzat Tandoğan. Türkeş (1992) describes the mentality of the time and the leaders as follows:

How can these [people] make a demonstration against the National Chief and his favorite minister? Until that time, no demonstration can be made without the permission of the National Chief. Democracy ... Freedom ... Equality ... Youth ... All these concepts were palavers of the government in 1944. The claps of the people, the “hurrah” yells of the youth had to be remained in the monopoly of İnönü with no condition. (Türkeş, 1992; p.39)

After this demonstration, 23 famous Turkish nationalists were arrested. Among those arrested, there were Zeki Velidi Togan, Hasan Ferid Cansever, Nihal Atsız, Hüseyin Namık Orkun, Necdet Sançar, Fethi Tevetoğlu, Alparslan Türkeş, Reha Oğuz Türkkan, Hikmet Tanyu and Said Bilgiç. Later, these 23 persons were named as Tabutluklar (Coffins). On May 19 1944, the president İsmet İnönü delivered a speech against these arrested intellectuals and condemned Turanism / Turkism as being a racist movement and harmful for the security of the state (Saraç, 1994). Atsız (1994) evaluated this event as a positive development for the Turkist movement because this event turned Turkism, which had been just a sentiment and thought, into a movement. In other words, May 3 1944 demonstration was the first political action of Turkism.

Shortly after this event, Turkey entered into a multi-party system. In this period, Turkists, who had not been able to find a place within the party in the single-party period, started to find a number of ways to express themselves. Below, we shall look at the story of Turkists in the multi-party period.

1.4.2.2. Nationalism in the Transition to Multi-Party Period

Nationalist activities, which received a blow after 3 May 1944, regained its vigor by means of the launch of the multi-party period. In a few years, Turkish nationalists published many periodicals, though some of them were short-lived, and founded a few organizations. Türk Kültür Ocağı (Turkish Culture Houses), Türk Kültür Çalışmaları Derneği (Turkish Cultural Studies Association) and Türk Gençliği Teşkilatı (Turkish Youth Organization) were the most famous of these organizations. Moreover, Turkish

Houses, closed down in 1931, re-opened by the efforts of Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver. The main aims of all these organizations were to disseminate Turkist ideas and struggle against communism. In 1951, all nationalist organizations were united under a large and single organization. The name of this new organization was Türk Milliyetçileri Derneği (Turkish Nationalists Association). The function of this organization was to eliminate differences in the ideas of different nationalist groups. However, Menderes government of the time felt indisposed with the organization and it was closed down in 1953. This event demonstrated that when the groupings outside of the state were concerned, the mentality of Menderes was not quite different from the mentality of İnönü even if the former was a prime minister in a multi-party period and the latter one was the National Chief of the single-party period. In fact, the president of the Turkish Nationalist Association was Tahsin Tola, who was also Isparta deputy of Democrat Party. When the organization was closed down, Tola was also expelled from the Party. Many Turkish nationalists had supported the Democrat Party until the early 1950s. After this event, these nationalists started to exit from the Party and established their own parties (Eroğul, 1970). For example, Türkiye Köylü Partisi (Turkey Peasant Party) was one such party.

As a matter of the fact, many prominent nationalist and conservative figures left the Democrat Party as early as 1948 and established Millet Partisi (Nation Party). The first president of this party was famous soldier and former president of general staff Marshal Fevzi Çakmak (1876-1950). This party was closed down as a result of the efforts of Menderes government in 1954 (Eroğul, 1970). Yet, its members formed another party called Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi (Republican Nation Party). Its president was famous orator Osman Bölükbaşı. This party became more successful in the elections than its predecessor and by uniting with Turkey Peasant Party in 1958, its name changed into Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi (Republican Peasant Nation Party), which would be the predecessor of the Nationalist Action Party. We shall come to this transformation shortly but at this point it seems suitable to look at the conditions that prepared the foundation of a nationalist party.

1.4.2.3. Political and Ideological Environment in the 1960s

In the Democrat Party era, a stable democracy could not be formed. The struggle between the government and the opposition was so sterile that many of the problems of the country became insoluble. This atmosphere encouraged various groups in the army and led to a military strike on May 27 1960. The country started to be governed by Milli Birlik Komitesi (National Unity Committee), which consisted of 38 officers. Nevertheless, this committee was not a homogeneous group. While Alparslan Türkeş and his thirteen associates, known as Ondörtler (Fourteens) constituted a nationalist group, the others, whose prominent figure was Cemal Madanoğlu, were leftist and Westernist-secular. For this reason, after a short time, the majority group discharged the Fourteens and sent them into exile in the guise of external missions (Gökdemir and Öztuna, 1987).

The constitutional assembly was convened by the National Unity Committee, which consisted of only leftist and Westernist-secular members. As a result, the Assembly was mainly made up of Republican People Party (RPP) members and supporters.¹⁶ This Assembly prepared the Constitution of 1961. Members of the Assembly thought that their constitution represented progression, freedom and contemporariness, thus, the social and political order produced by this Constitution would have the same qualities. In short, they thought that the RPP would come to the power not by the use of military forces but by the voluntary will of the people exhibited in the general elections. However, soon it was realized that the votes of the RPP did not increase and the majority of the Parliament, formed after the 1961 general elections, was the representatives of right-wing politics. Even, after the 1965 elections, Adalet Partisi (Justice Party), which was the successor of the Democrat Party, came to power alone. In other words, the Constitution of 1961 did not change anything in the Parliament composition.

However, the civil realm gained liveliness during the 1960s. Socialist / communist activities reached its peak. Many communist books were written, translated and compiled. Influential periodicals, Yön of Doğan Avcıoğlu was the most famous, were published. Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Turkey Laborer Party), under the leadership of Mehmet Ali Aybar,

¹⁶ However, RPP was defeated by Democrat Party three times in the general elections from 1950 to 1957 (Ahmad and Turgay, 1976).

turned into a radical leftist party and started to promulgate communist ideas. Though the leftist movement favored independence and national elements in the early 1960s, it developed an international understanding by the late 1960s. The RPP underwent a similar change. Though the leftists of the RPP had an understanding of Kemalism based on the principles of “progressivism” and “reformism” in the early 1960s, this understanding slid towards a Marxist-Leninist line by the late 1960s. Moreover, some leftist groups were under the control of Moscow.

On the other side, though Turkish nationalists were worried with the development of communism, their efforts to retaliate were generally restricted to individual attempts. In addition, Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP) entered into a stage of weakening (Güngör, 1992). Moreover, the representative of nationalist-conservative wing in the Justice Party (JP) lost the competition for presidency. Osman Turan, one of the leaders of Turkish nationalism, was drugged into a passive position in the JP. In other words, the general policy of the new president, Süleyman Demirel, was to eliminate the nationalist-conservative figures from the party (Levi, 1991).

Alparslan Türkeş and his associates returned Turkey within this context in 1963. Soon he was arrested with the claim that he was involved in the strike attempt of Talat Aydemir. Yet, he was acquitted. Then, he and his associates entered into the RPNP and captured the party by the 1965. In fact, the story of the NAP and Ülkücü movement starts here.

1.4.3. The Birth of the Nationalist Action Party

When Türkeş and his associates returned to the country, it was understood that they were prepared for the politics and developed a number of projects. They started to deliver conferences in the Turkish Houses and founded an association named as Türkiye Huzur ve Yükseltme Derneği (Turkish Peace and Raising Association). Though on different days, in 1964, Türkeş and other members of the Fourteens together with about 60 politicians known as their closeness to Türkeş joined the RPNP (Ahmad and Turgay, 1976).

Since Türkeş and the other members of the Fourteen were in the leading cadre of the Military Strike of the May 27, he was accused of Menderes’ execution. In fact, Türkeş

could never get rid of this accusation throughout his life. However, many right-wing intellectuals did not blame, rather saw him as an important figure of Turkish nationalism. Anyway, Türkeş served as the general inspector of the party till the first big convention on August 1 1965. Within those two years, Türkeş tried to form warm relationships with the party's organizations in the provinces. This effort gave its fruit and Türkeş was elected as the president in the same convention. Though the participation of Türkeş and his associates to the RPNP led to an active period in the party, when he became the president many former RPNP members departed from the party. For this reason, Türkeş and his associates' efforts in the 1960s were limited to create and get the supporters to adopt a new program and organization (Çalık, 1995).

In the Convention of 1967, the new doctrine of party, known as Dokuz Işık (Nine Lights), was declared, and in the Convention of 1969, the name of the party was changed as Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (the NAP). Üç Hilal (Three Crescents) was adopted to be the emblem of the party, which had been a scale in the time of the RPNP. As for the youth branch of the party, Hilal İçinde Kurt (A Wolf within a Crescent) was used as an emblem. In this way, Türkeş and his associates wanted the name and symbols of the party to remind the synthesis of Turk-Islam (Öznur, 1999; Poulton, 1997).

Turkish nationalism or the ideal of Turk-Islam dominates the program of the NAP [see party of program of the NAP (MHP, 1993)]. The NAP recognizes the tradition from Ziya Gökalp through Mümtaz Turhan to Erol Güngör and the shared ideas of other first-, second-, and third-generation Turkish nationalists as its predecessors. It recognizes the formula "Turkification, Islamization, Westernization" developed by Ziya Gökalp as its motto. Though the doctrine of Nine Lights did not bring anything new to the Turkish nationalist thinking, since it was produced as a national doctrine, that is it gave no references to foreign philosophers or ideologues, it is worthwhile to consider it in some length.

1.4.3.1. The Doctrine of Nine Lights

The NAP always states that its mission is to make the Turkish nation superior than the other nations in the world (MHP, 1993). Indeed, it is aware of that this is a bold project. However, it makes a warning by an anthropomorphic analogy. Like the case that

an individual should have self-esteem, self-respect and self-confidence in order to achieve appreciated deeds, members of a nation should esteem, respect and be confident in their own nation if they want to live in a self-sufficient state and be happy and prosperous. If a nation does not have self-esteem and self-respect, it cannot expect to be respected by the other nations. For this reason, according to the NAP, the foremost principle should be “nationalism”.¹⁷

Nationalism depends on the naïve observation that human collectivities in the world live as nations. The lives of individuals in these nations are interdependent. For this reason, in the international realm, the efforts of all nations are reflected as a struggle to preserve and develop their indigenous qualities and to make itself more advanced in comparison to other nations. That is, there is a competition among the nations in the world. Thus, it is a necessity that members of a nation should develop a common sentiment and be united around a common aim and national consciousness to be successful in this competition. For this reason, nationalism emerges as the most potent agent to this end and since the people in Turkey compose the Turkish nation, the name of their nationalism should be Turkish nationalism.

Türkeş described Turkish nationalism with different statements but in a consistent way. Turkish nationalism, he says, is the expression of a deep sentiment of love and loyalty for the Turkish nation. Moreover, it reflects the consciousness of a common history and aim. In this regard, Turkish nationalism sees all Turks as brothers to each other. Türkeş stressed that Turkish nationalism is not a reaction against any other ideology. For this reason, it is not based on any kind of rancor or malice but love. Furthermore, Turkish nationalism is the wish that any event both inside and outside of the country should be for and not against the Turkish nation. In short, all events should be evaluated in terms of the national interests and losses.

Another important concept in Turkish nationalism is the definition of the Turkish nation. This definition is important for it reveals who is and is not accepted as a Turk by Turkish nationalism. Türkeş said that the Turkish nation is a collection of people, who came from a common history, who have a common historical consciousness, who are members of the same religion, who have the same culture, who founded and kept alive

¹⁷ This summary is based on Türkeş (1995b).

the same state, who are the owner of the same state, and who live under the same flag and inside the same borders. To a great extent, this definition encompasses people living in Turkey. However, it should be noted that minorities are excluded from this definition, that is, Türkeş did not recognize them as Turks. This is an incompatible attitude with the Kemalist version of nationalism. Moreover, Türkeş said, since the Turkish nation is a big nation, there are Turks living in the other parts of the world. Though these Turks have the same religion, culture and historical consciousness, they cannot live inside the same borders. Many of these Turks are captives under the imperialist rule of Soviet Russia and may unite with Turkey in case the Soviet obstacle is overwhelmed. Thus, living inside the same borders is not a determining characteristic of being from the same nation.

Furthermore, the Republic of Turkey is the last and only independent country of the Turks; for this reason, only she can be the owner of all problems of Turkdom. Thus, the first task of the Turkish nationalists should be to protect and ensure the continuity of this state. Having made these explanations, Türkeş redefined being a member of Turkish nation as loving the Turkish nation, carrying the love of servitude to the Turkish state, being loyal to the Turkish homeland and self-sacrificing for the advancement of Turkish nation. Anybody who carries this sentiment and consciousness are Turks. One more condition to be a Turk is not to carry a yearning or a desire to imitate a foreign nation.

Türkeş also said that Turkish nationalism should be concerned with not only the Turks living in this country but also the Turks living outside, especially in the Soviet Union. But he was aware of the criticisms that the unification of Turks formulated in the idea of Turanism is just an imaginary project. One of the reasons for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was the Turanism yearning of such state elites as Enver Paşa (see Aydemir, 1978). Türkeş was also well acquainted with the criticisms of İsmet İnönü and Adnan Menderes against May 3 1944 movement and the Turkish Nationalist Association, respectively. The critics claimed that Turanism would lead Turkey to an adventure and worsen the relationships with the other states. In short, Turanism as a policy would do nothing but make other nations of the world enemy to the Republic of Turkey. Having these criticisms in mind, Türkeş maintained that the relationships with the other Turks outside of Turkey should be in such a level that would not put the existing state into danger.

The second principle of the doctrine is “Ülkücülük” (Idealism). Türkeş put forward the followings as the main ideals of the Turkish nationalists: (1) Turkish nation should live the highest level of the sentiments of morality, spirituality and humanity; (2) Turkish nation should be the most advanced society in science and technology; and (3) Turkish nation should be an economically developed society where modern agriculture, industry and welfare state are established.

Türkeş gave much importance to independence for these ideals can be achieved only by means of an independent state. For Türkeş, independence means not only being ruled by the Turkish state but also having enough power not to beg mercy of other nations, to be able to stand alone, to be able to protect its existence on its own, and to be respected all around the world. In short, for Türkeş, independence means having the right for self-determination of Turkish nation.

Apart from such broad ideals, Türkeş stated that there are micro ideals related to specific profession of individuals. Generally, all Turkish people should try to excel in his/her own profession that would contribute to the common good. Moreover, ideals may not be short-term. Ideals may not be realized within a short time. Rather, some ideals may involve years, even centuries to be realized. However, ideals are indispensable parts of a nations’ life and nations without ideals look like ships with no rudder and compass. Thus, idealism is another very important part of the Turkish nationalist doctrine.

The third principle is Ahlakçılık (Moralism). Türkeş said that the life of Turkish society should be governed by rules of national morality. Turkish morality is mainly derived from the basic Islamic principles and beliefs. Moreover, national culture and national historical experience also contribute to Turkish morality.

Moralism is important from two aspects. Firstly, an immoral society cannot develop. Development requires self-sacrifice and self-abandonment on the part of many individuals. Since immoral people do not find anything worth suffering, such sacrifice and abandonment cannot be expected of them. Only moral people can have ideals that do not have direct relations with their own lives and may involve a term longer than their lives. Thus, societies are exalted on the shoulders of moral people. Secondly, an immoral society cannot reach happiness, which is the ultimate aim of the Turkish nationalism. The police cannot put a stop to injustice and sufferings if the society is immoral. However, the

conscience of moral people does not let them do evils. In a moral society there is minimum need for the police force for moral people have such force internalized within them.

In this part, Türkeş specified a number of virtues derived from Islam and Turkish culture. These are (1) to accept the interests of nation, country and state superior to individual interests; (2) to be honest and patient; (3) to be respectful of and obedient to the Elders; (4) to show kindness and compassion to the Youngers; (5) to pursue a disciplined life; (6) to have a sense of duty and to consider duty as a matter of honor.

Though people should feel high regard for the Islamic beliefs and Turkish customs, Türkeş said, contemporary conditions should also be taken into consideration. However, when a need to introduce novelty emerges, this novelty should be compatible with Turkish customs, Turkish spirit and Turkish beliefs.

The fourth principle is Toplumculuk (Social Mindedness). This principle derives from the above-mentioned virtue that the existence of society is superior to the existence of individuals. For Türkeş, individuals should consider the national interest above everything and evaluate all actions in terms of the criterion whether it is beneficial for or harmful to the society.

Social Mindedness is divided into two parts as economic and social. Türkeş adopted a model of mixed economy, which was in favor during 1960s and 1970s. He believed that both the private sector should be endorsed and the public sector should continue to make investments. Moreover, large social slices of the Turkish nation should make cooperative investments like OYAK (Army Cooperation Institution). Türkeş stated that there are six such large social slices: peasants, laborers, traders and small-scale retailers, government officials, employers, and self-employeds. To this end, Türkeş believed that these social slices should form organizations of their own.

Türkeş recognized the right to property as a sacred human right. However, he was opposed to forming monopolies and abusing the property as a device of making others into slave. For this reason, Türkeş believed that the private property should be so diffused and widespread that everybody has a property of his/her own. Moreover, he said, social justice should be established in the country. Such organizations as social security and social cooperation should be set up and people in need can apply to these organizations

for job, food, health problems, lawyer, etc.. In other words, people should feel that they are claimed by their state and the functions, once served by such institutions as yakıf and lonca, should be revived.

The fifth principle is İlimcilik (Scientific Attitude). The scientific attitude of Türkeş did not come from a heavy reliance upon positivism, a case valid for the Westernists of Turkey. Rather, Türkeş saw a correlation between the level of advancement in science and the level of prosperity in a country. Moreover, he believed that the military power of a country also depends on its advancement in science and technology. Thus, the ideals posited by the principle of idealism are possible only through a scientific attitude. To this end, Turkey should raise her men of science and technicians in a short time by having recourse to all methods.

As for the national education, Türkeş proposed the existence of four interrelated aims. Firstly, national education should provide that the Turkish people from all age groups have consciousness of Turkdom and virtues of Islam. Secondly, the level of qualified workers, technicians, etc. necessary for the advancement of the state should be determined and the schools should be directed to rise up to this level. Any schooling without plan is useless. Thirdly, national education should raise self-sufficient and productive citizens. People with unnecessary knowledge cannot help their country but be a burden. Moreover, Türkeş pointed out the danger that people graduated from the schools should not look at the state to get a government job. Fourthly, a great significance should be given to the technical education.

Türkeş touched on the scientific method, too. This method, which is observation, experimentation, research, and analysis, is likely to produce more positive results than approaching the problems with prejudice and hidden intents. Thus, it should be necessary to inoculate Turkish people with such a mentality.

The sixth principle is Hürriyetçilik, Şahsiyetçilik ve Halkçılık (Support for Personal Freedom and Populism). According to this principle, human happiness depends on freedom because the most inferior state for people must be slavery. Turkish people neither ask for servitude of others nor become a servant. Freedom is not restricted to the political realm but also economic, social and scientific. In short, this principle implies all

kinds of freedom expressed in the Declaration of Human Rights and the Constitution of the United Nations.

Türkeş explained what kind of regime he envisages within this principle. The name of this regime is libertarian democracy. The relation with freedom and public enters into the scene at this stage. Democracy requires everything together with the people, for the people, towards the people, and by the people. This principle rejects any actions against the people. Democracy is the guarantee of the rise of the Turkish nationalism and idealism.

The seventh principle is Köycülük (Support for Peasant). It should be recalled that the NAP of the 1970s was the heir of the RPNP of the 1960s. In those times, around 70% of the population was living in rural areas. Thus, being concerned with peasantry might have two political advantages. Firstly, the peasants were the determining force in the general elections. Thus, it was impossible for a party to get a high level of votes unless it has specific policies towards the peasants. Secondly, any ideological party should keep the fact in mind that its target population consisted mainly of peasants. In a time when the life conditions even in urban areas were not good, it was ruined in the rural areas. For this reason, it was an imagination to develop the whole country before solving out the problems in rural areas. Likewise, this principle concentrates on the latter issue. We mean the principle of Support for Peasantry does not denote that the people of the country would be turned into peasants. On the contrary, it states that the people in the rural areas would be equipped with the same possibilities the people have in the urban areas. To this end, this principle proposes to establish agriculture cities and realize the reform in agriculture and land. Contrary to Marxist literature, this principle states that the main problem in the agriculture was the shrinking of land too much that it becomes sterile and non-productive. The population in the agriculture should also be diminished and directed to the industry and service realms.

The eighth principle is Gelişmecilik (Support for Development). Turkish people should always work to attain the better and more advanced. However, this principle rejects revolution, rather it prefers reformation of the predecessor. Türkeş was in favor of an evolutionary change, not revolutionary change. The conservative character of the Turkish nationalism appears at this juncture. Revolution refers to destruction of the past. However, Turkish nationalists are confident in the culture they inherit from their

predecessors. This culture is an accumulation of the experience of centuries. It is solidified as a result of thousands of trial and error method, which may be taken as the essence of scientific method. Thus, mere trusting the reason alone and discarding the tradition cannot be acceptable for the Turkish nationalists. When we recall the importance the nationalists give to the historical consciousness, we can say that conservative mentality is a direct outgrowth of nationalist sentiments.

The ninth principle is Endüstri ve Teknikçilik (Support for Industry and Technology). Türkeş saw the main problem of Turkey lying in the fact that while other nations entered into the age of atom, nuclear weapons or space, Turkey still rely on body and animal power. Thus, industrialization is necessary for Turkey to be a modern country and a powerful state and society.

The doctrine of nine lights has always been the basis of the party program of the NAP. In the 1973 general elections, to which the party attended with its new name, the NAP received 3.4% of the votes and started to be represented by three deputies in the Parliament. After this election, a coalition government by the RPP and Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party; NSP) was formed. This coalition broke in 1975. Süleyman Demirel, the leader of the Justice Party, formed the new government. The NSP, the NAP, and Milli Güven Partisi (National Trust Party) joined this new government as the coalition partners. This coalition is known as I. Milliyetçi Cephe (First Nationalist Front) in the history of Turkish politics.

In the 1977 general elections, the votes of the NAP were doubled (6.4%) and the number of the deputies in the Parliament rose to sixteen. After this election, the NAP again joined a coalition government with the JP and the NSP. This coalition is known as II. Milliyetçi Cephe (the Second Nationalist Front) in the history of Turkish politics. However, this coalition caused an opposition to emerge within the JP and Bülent Ecevit removed this coalition from the power with the help of this opposition, the NTP and the DP (Democratic Party). From December 31 1977 to November 12 1979, the minority government of Bülent Ecevit stayed in power. The JP emerged as the first party from the by-elections in 1979 and Süleyman Demirel formed the next minority government with the assistance of the NSP and the NAP. However, this government was removed from the power by a coup d'état on September 12 1980. We shall not deal with the reasons of this military strike here. Yet, it should be noted that the terrorist actions prevailing the country

provided the leaders of the coup d'état with a degree of legitimacy. In fact, the significance of the NAP in Turkish politics is related to these terrorist actions rather than being a political party in the political spectrum.

We noted above that the communist activities exhibited a rise during the 1960s. These activities ceased to be intellectual movements by the late 1960s. Many communist groups saw the conditions ripe for a communist revolution in Turkey. To this end, Mihri Belli and Doğu Perinçek turned Fikir Klubleri Federasyonu (the Federation of Idea Clubs), which had been formed by the participation of many leftist/communist organizations, into Dev-Genc (The Federation of Revolutionary Youth Associations) (Belli, 1967, 1989). The aim of this group was to speed up the transformation from feudalism to socialism. They believed that Turkey should pass through the stage of bourgeoisie before entering into the stage of socialism. Since there was no such class of bourgeoisie in Turkey, first it should be created. Then, this class should be endorsed against feudalism, imperialism and the compradors. After the bourgeoisie come to the power with a National Democratic Revolution, the conditions would be ripe for a socialist revolution within a short time as explained in the writings of Marx.

Some other communists did not believe such long-term projects. Instead, they believed in the necessity to open an advance courier war against feudalism and imperialism, mainly concretized in the structure of the state. With this aim, Deniz Gezmiş and his comrades established THKO (Turkish People Emancipation Army); Mahir Çayan and his comrades established THKPC (Turkish People Emancipation Party Front). However, these communist groups disagreed about the details of the struggle and could not be united under a single organization. Doğu Perinçek departed from the Dev-Genc and, with İbrahim Kaypakkaya, established TİİKP (Turkey Revolutionary Laborer Peasant Party) around the periodical Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik (Proleter Revolutionary Illumined). İbrahim Kaypakkaya departed from Perinçek and established Marksist-Leninist Türkiye Komunist Partisi (Marxist-Leninist Turkish Communist Party) and TİKKO (Turkish Laborer Peasant Emancipation Army). By 1980, many leftist/communist organizations showed off and made armed and violent actions in Turkey.

As we said, the significance of the NAP in Turkish politics is tightly connected with these developments. Against the communist organizations, the NAP organized its

youth branches known as Ülkü Houses and Ülkücü Youth Associations all around the country. It can be said that Turkish politics in the second half of the 1970s was characterized by the struggle between Ülkücü and leftist/communist groups both in schools and the streets. The result of this struggle was thousands of deaths from each side. Nevertheless, we are not in a position to evaluate the consequences of this clash in terms of other social psychological aspects other than the number of deaths. Since September 12 coup d'état put an end to this clash, it was welcomed mainly in the major cities. However, the military strike also put the democracy on a shelf. The military strike implied that those appointed can solve the problems better than those elected. To be sure, this implication was totally against the philosophy of democracy (Arcayürek, 1986). Türkeş, the most active member of the 1960 coup d'état, said, "... it is not possible to serve to a country by means of revolutions... The worst order of law is better than the best revolution".

1.4.4. *Ülkücü* Group after the September 12 Coup D'état

Though the leftists have depicted September 12 military strike as a counter-revolution or a movement against leftist groups and implied that there were Turkish nationalists behind the scene (e.g., Bora and Can, 1991; Velidedeoğlu, 1990), Ülkücü group believed that the main target of the strike was Ülkücüs and Alparslan Türkeş. The NAP was closed down on October 16, 1981 and its properties were confiscated. On April 29, 1981, the state brought a suit against the NAP and Ülkücü Organizations with a 945-pages indictment.

The case lasted five years, eleven months and eight days. After 333 hearings, it came to a conclusion on April 7, 1987. Türkeş was sentenced to prison for a time of 11 years, 1 month and 10 days. All of the members of the General Administration Committee of the party were acquitted. Of the others, five suspects were sentenced to death, 219 were sentenced to prison with a time ranging from six months to 36 years. Another 150 suspects were acquitted, while the general attorney gave up its claim related to three suspects and two suspects died during the trial.

Apart from this case, many other Ülkücüs were sentenced to prison of varying times including life sentences and nine Ülkücüs were executed. Later, Türkeş depicted this military strike as a raid to the Ülkücü caravan (Türkeş, no date).

Ülkücüs tried to continue to organize within a political party as soon as the leaders of the strike, the National Security Council,¹⁸ pressed the button for the start of democracy. On July 7, 1983, some prominent Ülkücüs founded the Conservative Party. However, the National Security Council vetoed many of the names among the founders of the party. This was followed by other vetoes. In the end, the Conservative Party had to change its president three times in a year and could not join the November 6, 1983 general elections. In fact, the fate of the Ülkücü movement was not certain in those dates. The Conservative Party could not convene all Turkish nationalists under its flag. Thus, many prominent Ülkücüs like Eyüp Aşık and Ayvaz Gökdemir joined other parties, especially the Motherland Party and the True Path Party (Acar, 1991; Ergüder, 1988, 1991).

The name of the party was changed as Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi (Nationalist Work Party; NWP) on November 30, 1985. The president of this party was Abdülkerim Doğru, who had a NSP background. Devlet Bahçeli was elected to the post of General Secretary. This cadre directed the party until 1987. By a referendum on September 6, 1987, the political bans brought about by the September 12 regime came to an end. On September 20, 1987, Alparslan Türkeş joined the NWP and declared it as the only place where the mission of Turkish nationalism can be carried out. As can be appreciated, the party still could not realize the unification of Ülkücü group. Two weeks later, Türkeş was elected to the presidency of the party. Party members thought that everything returned to SITuation before 1980.

The NWP could join the general election on November 29, 1987. Since Türkeş had just got the presidency and the group was still in a dispersed state, nobody expected a success. In the same way, it could get only 2.9% of the total votes (SIS, 1999). After 1980, the election system had changed and the condition of passing 10% national dam in order to be represented in the Parliament was put into effect. For this reason, the NWP

¹⁸ This council consisted of five members. Its president was the president of the general staff, Kenan Evren and the members were the commanding officers of the army, navy, air force and gendarmerie.

could not send any deputy to the Parliament Nevertheless, from then on, the votes of the party exhibited a steady rise, being 4.2% in 1989 local elections.

In order to overcome the national dam, the NWP made an election alliance with Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) and Islahatçı Demokrasi Partisi (Reformist Democracy Party) before the general elections in 1991. This alliance could get 16.9% of the votes and 19 deputies together with Alparslan Türkeş started to represent the party in the Parliament (SIS, 1999). Soon, these deputies departed from the alliance and re-joined the NWP.

So far, we tried to show that the struggle of the Ülkücü movement and Türkeş during the 1980s was to unite all Turkish nationalists and recover the position the party had before 1980. However, this was not easy and one of the most dramatic events happened in 1992. Sivas deputy Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, the most influential leader of the former Ülkücü youth organization, left the party with five of his associates. This group harshly criticized the leadership of the party and founded Büyük Birlik Partisi (Great Unity Party: GUP). It was known that some Ülkücüs felt uncomfortable with the leadership of Alparslan Türkeş but nobody had been able to dare to undertake such an action before. As we saw, the ideology of the NAP was quite rigid against voices and exits. It always required an unconditional loyalty. This separation brought this uncomfortable to the light.

In the same year, National Security Council permitted to re-openings of the closed political parties. In this way, Türkeş and his associates turned the NWP into the NAP and started to use its former symbols. The NAP received 7.8% of the votes in the 1994 local elections. The rise continued in the 1995 general elections and the NAP received 8.2% of the votes (SIS, 1999). However, since it could not pass the national dam, it could not be represented in the Parliament again. Two years later, on April 4, 1997, Türkeş died and Devlet Bahçeli was elected as the president of the party on July 6, 1997. On April 18, 1999 general elections, the NAP got the biggest success in its history by receiving 18.0% of the votes (SIS, 1999). After this election, the NAP joined a coalition government with Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party) and Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party).

As we said, the vote of the NAP has steadily risen in all general and local elections since 1987. Three macro developments should be mentioned at this point so that it may be easier to understand the reasons behind the support given to the NAP. Firstly, Turkey

has undergone an experience of separatist terrorism starting from early 1980s and the activities PKK, a terrorist organization, have been the most important problem of Turkey for a long time. The main aim of this organization has been to found a Kurdish state mainly on the lands of Southern East Anatolia. In return, Turkish state adopted a military struggle with PKK, resulting in the loss of 30.000 lives (Özcan, 1999). During this time, patriotic and nationalist sentiments rose. Secondly, by the late 1980s, the Soviet Union collapsed and the national elements consisting of this Union started to declare their independence one after another. Almost half of these newly emerged states were from Turkish origin. As a result, the Cold War ended and communism declined all around the world. Turkey relieved from communism, generally seen as a Soviet threat. Moreover, the unification of Turkic elements, an idea always defended by the Turkish nationalists, seemed not a dream but a realistic project. Thirdly, 1999 general elections were held in the process of February 28, a process known as a post-modernist coup d'état. The Welfare Party, the main Islamist party in Turkey, had emerged as the first party from the 1995 general elections and established a coalition government with Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party). Soon after the establishment of the government, all significant civil elements including the media started to harshly criticize the Welfare Party as being opposed to secularism. The army was also actively involved in these criticisms. While many people were expecting a direct military intervention, the National Security Committee declared a manifesto on February 28, 1999. Essentially, this manifesto asked for a return to the revolutions made in the single party era of the RPP in order to eliminate reactionary movements and establish secularism. Not much later, Necmettin Erbakan, the president of the Welfare Party and the prime minister of the time, had to resign and his party was closed down. In short, a prime minister who came to the power by democratic means was overthrown by undemocratic means. After that, governments and bureaucratic agents started to take aim at not only reactionary groups but also ordinary conservative people. The NAP extensively used these anti-conservative measures in its propagandas. To be sure, this may not be the entire story but these three macro developments may help in understanding the sharp rise of the votes received by the NAP in the 1999 elections. No doubt that not all these voters were true Ülkücüs, they were just sympathetic to nationalist-conservative ideas. However, they ensured the Ülkücü cadres to get an important position in the governance of the state first time in their history.

Now, we are in a position to finish our discussion concerning the history of Ülkücü group. As can be noted, we cannot get into a detailed analysis of the Ülkücü group especially after the 1980s. In fact, this may be also true for all other groups in Turkey since you can find few books or articles about the recent happenings in Turkish social science literature. Besides, unfortunately, most of these recent books and articles adopt a certain political position in their analysis and limit their use (e.g., Bora and Can, 1991). One of the practical use we expect from the present thesis is to present a relatively more value-free and objective approach to evaluate socio-political groups in Turkey and we believe that such studies will contribute to the development democratic attitudes and empathy among groups.

II.

PERCEIVED CONTEXT AND INGROUP REPRESENTATION OF MEMBERS OF THE ÜLKÜCÜ GROUP

In the present chapter, we shall present and discuss the results of a study based on depth interviewing with twenty members of the ülkücü group. In this study, we explored the way members of the ülkücü group represent the ingroup in their mind. In other words, we studied the self-stereotype or ingroup stereotype (or representation) of ülkücüs. We tried to show that ingroup representation, or group representation in general, was not as strategical as suggested by recent works. That is, the fact that the group members might change their ingroup or outgroup perceptions in terms of differing comparative contexts did not mean that they developed an arbitrary or an artificial perception in order to save the day. This was because, first, real social groups had well-established ingroup representations, seen as consensually valid by all members of the groups. Second, ingroup representations did not exist in a semantic realm from which group members could extract suitable adjectives when asked. In other words, ingroup representations were not just simple list of attributes attached to the ingroup. Instead, ingroups had their stories again consensually shared by their members. These stories placed the ingroups in a concrete world where they tried to serve their functions. We preferred to call this world as perceived context of the ingroup and suggested that this was the most important element that validated the ingroup representation. We believed that the perception related to the context is a chronic way of looking at the world, and for this reason, stereotypes are not easily subjected to change or modification. Below, we shall try to make explicit the rationale and problems of the study.

2.1. Introduction

Since Tajfel's paper "Social Stereotypes and Social Groups" and Turner's "Self-Categorization Theory", interest in social aspects of stereotypes has revived (Leyens, Yzerbyt, and Schadron, 1994; Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994; Schaller and Conway, 1999; Worchel and Rotherberger, 1997). Three ancient problems have especially attracted the attention of scholars. The first problem was concerned with the very content of stereotypes (Fiske et al., 2002; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, and McGarty, 1995; Madon et al., 2001; Schaller and Conway, 1999; Spears, Doosje, and Ellemers, 1999) while the second was connected with the related problem of stereotype consensus (Gardner, 1993; Haslam, 1997; Haslam et al., 1998; Stangor and Schaller, 1996). And the third problem was another related problem; stereotype accuracy (Judd and Park, 1993; Oakes and Reynolds, 1997; Stangor and Lange, 1994). Below, we shall examine these problems more closely.

2.1.1. Stereotype Content

Though the study of stereotype has undergone remarkable changes throughout its history, its definition has remained relatively fixed. Researchers have generally preferred to portray stereotype as a set of attributes ascribed to people on the basis of their group memberships (see Section 1.1). That is, the content has taken the precedence in the definition of stereotypes (Worchel and Rothgerber, 1997). Researchers have often tried to find such attributes as industrious, intelligent, cruel, and the like as the building stones of stereotypes and taken them as the indicators of whether the general perception of the group in question was good or bad.

It was noted that the study of stereotype content had fallen out of favor for it did not lead to satisfactory theorizing as well as it seemed to afford little insight into the cognitive approach, the rising trend of the period. It was also noted that the checklist method, developed by Katz and Braly (1933), had been the dominant method till the decline of the study of stereotype content (Brigham, 1971; Leyens, Yzerbyt, and Schadron, 1994; Messick and Mackie, 1989; Miller, 1982; Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994; Tajfel, 1969; Stroebe and Insko, 1989; see Section 1.2). As was seen, this method involves attributing traits to groups. Very brilliantly, Katz and Braly conceptualized

groups as if they were concrete individuals. The adjectives included in the list they provided for their subjects were personal characteristics to depict people in everyday language. For this reason, it is meaningful that, in a subsequent study, they asked their subjects to rate the same traits in terms of desirability not in groups or collectivities but in friends and associates (Katz and Braly, 1935). Thus, though they were not aware, Katz and Braly seem to have produced one of the first measures of the self-concept. Nevertheless, though they prepared their list of 84 adjectives with care, it had a major limitation; it lacked of a prior study. In fact, it was so original that its aim was just to prove that the stereotypes exist. No theoretical considerations were made as to the content of these stereotypes. Subsequent researchers, especially due to the concern to make their findings comparable, insisted on using similar sets of adjectives. At least, this original study was replicated three times with similar samples to find out the longitudinal changes (Gilbert, 1951; Karlins et al, 1969; Madon et al., 2001). Since the deficiencies in the original list were not rehabilitated, it has always been difficult to find regularities in the contents emerged from these studies.

However, the methodology used in the studies related to the content of self-concept was sounder from the beginning. In the same decade with Katz and Braly, Gordon Allport categorized roughly 18.000 terms, taken from an unabridged dictionary, primarily in terms of whether they represent authentic traits of personality, temporary states, or evaluative terms (Allport and Odbert, 1936). He was able to list around 4.500 trait names. Since then, various scholars tried to systematize this set of traits with various techniques (e.g., Allport, 1966; Cattell, 1968). Though, when all these traits have been applied to individuals, the images vary from one person to another, five dimensions have been found to be necessary and sufficient to describe all these inter-individual differences (Goldberg, 1990; Peabody and Goldberg, 1989). These dimensions, known as the Big Five, have been labelled as surgency (or extraversion), agreeableness, conscientiousness (or dependability), emotional stability (vs. Neuroticism), and Culture (Intellect).

Another huge tradition in the self-studies, including the theories of such giant figures as W. James, C.G. Jung, E.H. Erikson, G. Klein, D. McClelland and H. Markus, has discovered that the content of self-concept seems to be organized around two major thematic lines; agency (power/ mastery/ separation) and communion (intimacy/ surrender/ union) (McAdams, 1985). Though, we shall not be concerned with the details of these

studies, it is clear, they show that, the content of self-descriptions is not arbitrary, rather they depend upon a rule. The present study suggests that the description of social identity or ingroup representation is also not arbitrary and might follow a similar rule.

As noted, the interest in the content of social stereotypes declined for it resulted in much enumeration but little theoretical understanding. In fact, the decline of interest in content was the first reaction. The second reaction has been to find a more suitable method to study stereotype content. For example, Adjective Generating Technique has been employed in many recent studies (Allen, 1996; Holaday et al., 1996; Holaday and McPhearson, 1996). This technique shares a similar logic with the "Twenty Statements Test" (Kuhn and McPartland, 1954) and "Who Are You?" tests (Bugental and Zelen, 1950) in self-content studies. It asks subjects to generate a certain number of words (usually three) to describe their ingroup or outgroup. Nevertheless, like it is the case in the checklist method, it restricts the nature of words into adjectives alone. That is, no nouns or verbs are allowed. This seems to be a weakness of this approach for when adjectives are involved, the evaluative component of the descriptions generally overrides the structure of stereotype. That is, the resultant does not seem to be a description, rather the expression of a feeling (for a related discussion see Jarymowicz, 1998). As a matter of fact, this might be the reason behind the claims that stereotypes are constructed just to favor the ingroup and speak ill or make fun of outgroup. We shall come to point later.

The nouns and verbs have found to be important in self-descriptions. In a series of works, McGuire and McGuire (1988) based their explanation of content in self-concept on the analysis of nouns and that of process on the analysis of verbs. Just as an adjective qualifies a noun, so an adverb qualifies a verb. Thus, it might be plausible not to focus on one type of word, namely adjectives, and ignore the rest. Instead, all elements of the language should be treated as revealing something related to either the process or the content of the group.

More importantly, Rosenberg (1979) maintained that while individuals tended to express their social identities by nouns, they tended to reveal their personal identities by adjectives. In this way, while social identities (expressed by nouns) placed individuals in a broader social context, personal identities (expressed by adjectives) distinguished them from others. In other words, the insistence to force people to describe their ingroups through the adjectives presented to them might not be suitable or it might force the

individuals to do something that is not culturally accessible. As a result, there emerged some efforts to employ open-ended formats to study stereotype content (Bell, Esses, and Maio, 1996) mainly because of the concern not to lose information by using a reactive measure (for a critique of reactive measures see McGuire and McGuire, 1988).

The present study holds that the same reasoning might be applied to the problem of stereotype content, especially that of self-stereotype (ingroup representation). It was already noted that the content of stereotypes has been depicted as comprising attributes not only special to groups but also to individuals. In other words, researchers implicitly assumed stereotypes as including similar building blocks with the self-concept. Moreover, when the principles of SCT are focused, it has become apparent that the ingroup representation held by members of a group is nothing more than the social identity that the related group provided for its members. Remember SCT maintains that when an intergroup context is perceived, individuals' social identities are more salient than their personal identities. Salient social identities lead individuals to feel more similar, equivalent, and interchangeable with other ingroup members. The theory calls this state as depersonalization and no doubt that this depersonalization operates on the basis of the ingroup and outgroup stereotypes that the group holds (Turner, 1985, 1987). From this, it can be deduced that the content of social identity is equivalent to the content of that group's ingroup representation.

Indeed, though never elaborated directly, this point has been known, at least implicitly, since the first empirical study of stereotype (Katz and Braly, 1933). The subjects in that study were one hundred white-American Princeton University students and the results revealed that these students tended to see Americans as industrious, intelligent, materialistic, and ambitious. The uniformity of this stereotype came out to be quite high [8.8 in a scale ranging from 2.5 to 42 (lower numbers indicates greater uniformity)]. Nevertheless, scholars have not focused on ingroup stereotype by despising it under the complete influence of ethnocentric tendencies (Brown, 1965). They seemed to think outgroup perception as more critical to understand intergroup behavior. However, as we shall see below, ingroup perception might be more vulnerable to the constructive processes in cognition and what is, in fact, critical is that which renders the sharpest distinction between the ingroup and the relevant outgroups. Moreover, SIT tends to define social identity with reference to self-concept (see also Brewer and Gardner,

1996; Gergen, 1971; Gordon, 1968; James, 1950; Zurcher, 1977), which many scholars saw as the most important construct in the whole psychological system (e.g., Cantor and Mischel, 1979; Greenwald, 1980; Greenwald and Pratkanis, 1984; Kihlstorm et al., 1988; Markus, 1977). Thus, the study of ingroup representation might be tied with the general study of self.

Long ago, William James (1950/1895) made a distinction between the I and the me. In this distinction, the I referred to the self as the active agent of psychological processes and the me referred to the self as the object of psychological processes toward oneself. James declared these aspects of the self as the legitimate subject matter of psychology and coined the term empirical self to refer to all possible ways people think of themselves. He further divided this empirical self into three components: material, social, and spiritual selves. While the material self referred to all objects, people, or places that belong to the individual, the spiritual self referred to individuals' inner psychological qualities. In a sense, spiritual self could be likened to the term of personal identity in SIT (Brown, 1998). As for the social self, it referred to the individuals' recognition by others. This component of the me might be thought as the social identity (Gergen, 1971). However, as James put it, individuals might have "as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize [them] and carry an image of [them] in their mind." (p. 294). In other words, the empirical self was a part of the total self, the social self, in turn, was a part of the empirical self, and finally, the present study holds, ingroup representation is just a part of the social self (for similar classifications see also Brewer and Gardner, 1996; Gordon, 1968; Zurcher, 1977). There have been efforts to determine the types of social identities, too. In a relatively recent study, Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, and Ethier (1995) identified five types of social identities: personal relationships, ethnic and religious groups, political affiliation, stigmatized groups, and vocation or avocation. Indeed, all these relationships and groups might provide individuals with social identities but some of these groups' social identities could best be described by the term social role. At this point, it should be noted that many micro-sociological theory, including symbolic interactionism, saw these social roles as so important that they presumed individuals to have no self-identity other than the social roles they acquired through their positions in society (see Becker, 1963; Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Goffman, 1959, 1968). It might not be appropriate to equate these social roles with the term of social identity being

handled in intergroup research. Brewer and Gardner (1996) seemed to have been more aware of this distinction. They made a four-fold classification of the self-concept: personal, social, relational, and collective. Personal self-concept referred to perceived physical characteristics, traits, abilities, and possessions; social self-concept referred to social roles and reputation in the minds of other people; relational self-concept referred to other people with whom the individuals have direct, personal contact; and collective self-concept referred to social categories to which the individuals belong (for an elucidation of these distinctions see also Brown, 1998). Thus, the term of social identity in intergroup research corresponds mostly to the collective self-concept in Brewer and Gardner's classification.

As can be seen, not only SIT but also theories of self-concept regarded social identity as a part of the general self-system. Nevertheless, theories of self-concept restrict the use of attributes, traits, and abilities to the depiction of personal identity alone. According to this view, social identities are just names of vocations, nations, ethnic or religious groups, and the like (Rosenberg, 1979). For example, if an individual is an accountant, theories of self-concept seem to assume that the uniformities in perception and behavior the individual exhibits due to his or her particular social identity are not the work of social psychologists. In other words, they tend to view social identity as one of many characteristics of the individuals. They tend to focus on the traits of personal identity and believe that what differentiate individuals from others are their personal identities (see Rosenberg, 1979; for a conflicting view see Brewer, 1991). However, as should be clear so far, the existence of stereotypes in the social life denotes that a particular social identity has characteristics of its own in such a way that its boundary with the relevant social identities could be easily differentiated (Stangor and Ford, 1992; Stangor and Lange, 1994).

A study by Hopkins and Murdoch (1999) shows this tendency very clearly as well as the constructive character of ingroup representations. In this study, the experimenters asked British subjects to stereotype two national groups, namely Americans and British, with a modified version of Katz-Braly checklist. They also divided the subjects into the one-group and the two-groups conditions. In the one-group condition, subjects are asked to characterize only one of the groups, while in the two-groups condition, they were to rate one group but consider the characteristics of the other at the same time. Results

showed that the stereotype of the Americans (outgroup) was not affected by this manipulation. However, the stereotype of British (ingroup) changed dramatically. The subjects constructed ingroup stereotype in such a way that its content was nothing but a comparison with the American other. In the end, subjects achieved differentiation by filling the ingroup stereotype with a more favorable content.

As can be seen, these theoretical and empirical suggestions are consistent with the self-literature, which stresses the importance of others in the construction of identity (see also Deschamps and Devos, 1998; Doise, 1998; McGuire and McGuire, 1988; Rosenberg, 1979). McGuire and McGuire (1988) noted "... that one notices not things but distinctions between things, not what is there but what is absent, with the result that the most pervasive characteristics, those shared by everyone, go unnoticed..." (p.112). Thus, people tend to seek distinctive information that could only be obtained by the presence of others. When conceived in such a way, social identity is what makes people similar to ingroup and different from outgroup. The same definition might apply to personal identity as well: "Personal identity is what makes you similar to yourself and different from others" (Deschamps and Devos, 1998, p.3). As can be seen, there is agreement that ingroup representation (i.e., social identity) is a part of the general self-concept and the rationale behind the self-studies is similar to studies of social identity. Having recognized that ingroup representation might be conceived as the social identity of individuals, it can be deduced, it might also be subjected to studies similar to self-studies.

The question of how such a study can be conducted is matter of choice rather than necessity. Two lines of work have been found especially relevant for the present study. The first was the McGuires' studies related to spontaneous self-concept (McGuire and McGuire, 1981, 1988) and the second was McAdams' personal narrative (McAdams, 1985, 1996). The McGuires were very critical of using reactive measures, and for this reason, they used an open-ended questionnaire in their studies. They asked the participants to describe themselves in their own terms and coded the resulting descriptions along a number of dimensions. In the final phase, they related the results of this content analysis to the context of the participants' social environments. The results revealed that people tended to use the terms that distinguished them from their social surroundings. For example, more children who were very tall or very short tended to mention their height as a quality of their selves than those who is of average height. As

can be seen, this result is consistent with the above definition of personal identity (Deschamps and Devos, 1998).

Nevertheless, even such open-ended questionnaires might leave the researcher with a disorganized compilation of perceived characteristics. It is unreasonable to think that individuals perceive themselves in a haphazard fashion for this might result in dissonance in cases of inconsistent characteristics (see Festinger, 1957). Even if the self-concept might include characteristics that might appear inconsistent objectively, it is assumed that people organize their characteristics in such a way that no such dissonance is experienced (Anderson and Sedikides, 1991; Park, DeKay, and Kraus, 1994). McAdams (1996) maintained that this organization was achieved in the context of a personal narrative, namely, through a constructed story about one's life. In other words, an individual's perception of him- or herself could be apprehended through the ways he or she contextualizes his or her attributes which is in turn achieved with the help of memories, feelings, and experiences (see also Fiske, 1993; Sedikides and Anderson, 1994). Undoubtedly, in the case of ingroup stereotype, the participants might tell about the history of the ingroup, the factors that give rise to the development of the ingroup, and the relations of the ingroup with other groups present in the same context. In short, the ingroup narrative that the participants relate might be a depiction of the context as perceived by themselves. To the extent all ingroup members share this perceived context, that is, to the extent this is an inter-subjective perception, this perception might be taken as a component of ingroup stereotype. We shall turn to this issue later again.

McGuire and McGuire (1988) maintained that when people describe themselves in terms of what they are, this description referred to their affirmational self-concept. On the contrary, when they describe themselves in terms of what they are not, this description referred to their negational self-concept. These concepts could be adapted to the present case. Affirmational social identity might be the group members' description of the ingroup in terms of what it is, and negational social identity might be their description of the ingroup in terms of what it is not. According to Tory Higgins' self-discrepancy theory, apart from an actual self, people are likely to have an ideal and an ought selves (Higgins, 1987; Higgins, Klein, and Strauman, 1985; Higgins, Strauman, and Klein, 1986). The ideal self referred to what people would like to be and the ought self referred to what people think they should be. These concepts could also be transformed into the

realm of ingroup representation. In this way, ideal ingroup representation might refer to what group members think an ideal ingroup member should be.

In the present study, these three components of ingroup representation of members of the *ülküci* group will be examined through a non-reactive method, depth interviewing. This method is also known as unstructured interviewing and life history. In such interviews, the interviewer assumes a non-directive role and encourages the interviewee to talk about whatever they feel is relevant. In the end, the interviewee is generally drawn into telling a story in his or her own words (Seale, 1998). In this way, it is assumed that the suggestions of the McGuires and McAdams will also be fulfilled. However, before getting into the details of the study, another related issue, stereotype accuracy will also be addressed.

2.1.2. Stereotype Accuracy

Researchers have long questioned the validity of stereotypes, especially those with an unfavorable content (Oakes and Reynolds, 1997). They recognized that the heterogeneity of people in a large collectivity could be enormous and found it difficult to apprehend that this community could be summarized by a few traits. Particularly, when the group in question was a nation, they became increasingly critical of stereotypes. This led them to reject all elements of stereotypes as inaccurate and to feel a yearning for a world free of these unwarranted constructs. As a matter of fact, what makes stereotypes as a significant topic for research is not its specific content, but the fact that this content is not the product of an isolated mind. Rather, stereotypes are widely shared by large numbers of people (Haslam, 1997; Tajfel, 1981a). Accordingly, it is a group product serving several social functions including value-preserving, social causality, social justification, and social differentiation (see Section 1.3.5). In other words, stereotypes are condemned to stay as an object of concern regardless the issue of accuracy. In this regard, referring to the past conflict between Serbs and Bosnians in the former Yugoslavia, Oakes and Reynolds (1997) rightly asks,

If personality tests of the judgements of unbiased clinicians revealed that individual Bosnian Serbs were, on average, towards the non-aggressive end of the 'aggressiveness' scale, would this render a Bosnian Government-held stereotype of the Serbs as 'highly

aggressive' inaccurate? If the Serbs' self-stereotype did not confirm their characterization as 'aggressive' ..., would this invalidate the Bosnian Government's view of them? Would it be reasonable to tell the government side that their perception of the Serbs as aggressive was inaccurate and wrong? (p. 57)

Thus, the question of stereotype accuracy might be irrelevant when the factors that give rise to that stereotype are considered. Referring to the issue in Section 1.2.5, the same question might be handled with a totally different approach. SCT convincingly argues that both individuated and stereotypical perception is the result of categorization in equal degree (Turner et al., 1994; Spears and Haslam, 1997). They are just variations in the level of categorization. Activation of individuated or stereotypical perception is a function of the comparative and normative fit of the stimuli and the readiness of the perceiver. In other words, variation in levels of categorization is related to variation in social reality. Thus, the concepts of individual and group have equal psychological and social realities and representing people in terms of their group memberships might be as psychologically valid as representing them as unique individuals. In this regard, Oakes and Reynolds (1997) said,

... stereotyping is psychologically valid, in the sense that the process responsible for it (categorization) is designed to provide the perceiver with an accurate representation of reality. From this perspective there is no reason to assume that stereotyping is, by definition, less accurate than any other type of impression formation. Since both individuals and social groups exist objectively, both personal and social categorizations are necessary for the accurate representation of social life. Indeed, given that groups are real, not to represent them would be inaccurate. (p. 61)

As can be seen, SIT oriented researchers are reluctant to view stereotypes as false. In this regard, another SIT oriented team of researchers argued that stereotypes were not just a list of attributes to describe a particular social category, they “work as enlightening gestalts; they supply perceivers with extra information by building upon a rich set of interconnected pieces of data ... They also ... include the underlying explanation that links these attributes together” (Yzerbyt, Rocher, and Schadron, 1997; p. 21). As a result, these scholars tended to view stereotypes as providing subjective meaning to the world. In other words, people integrate pieces of information in order to produce a coherent story about the target group.

Several recent works supported the view that stereotypes are explanatory frameworks. For example, Wittenbrink, Gist, and Hilton (1997) identified two causal models that white American people hold about the Blacks; the perpetrator and the victim models. According to the perpetrator model, the Blacks lack the necessary motivation and proper values to achieve success in society, while the victim model blames the structural disadvantages for the lower status of the Blacks. Having identified these models, the researchers presented their high and low prejudiced subjects with a jury decision task about an interracial assault. As expected, the subjects' level of prejudice was found to be associated with their guilt and sentence decisions. Moreover, the open descriptions coded for locus of causality indicated that high and low prejudiced subjects made up very different stories consistent with the perpetrator and the victim models, respectively.

A series of work demonstrated that the maintenance of stereotypes is very high when an explanatory framework backs up the stereotype in question (Anderson, Lepper, and Ross, 1980; Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard, 1975). This effect is known as belief perseverance (Koehler, 1991) and it has been found that concrete data such as life histories were much more efficient in persevering the beliefs than abstract data like statistical information (see C.A. Anderson, 1983). In other words, unless a stereotype is protected by a plausible and sufficient explanation, it is susceptible to change or likely to disappear. For example, in the original study, Anderson et al. (1980) presented their subjects with a scenario that contains a detailed case history. Half of the subjects read the scenario that suggested risk-seeking behavior predicted future success in firefighting and the other half read the scenario that suggested just the opposite. Post experiment tests revealed that the subjects were influenced by the scenarios, and in the short-term, even when the subjects were told that the descriptions were fictitious, they hold on the belief they were presented with in the scenario. Then, the experimenters asked half of the subjects in each group to produce a causal explanation for the scenarios and found that these subjects exhibited more belief perseverance than the others in the long-term.

People were also found to be skilled in producing an explanation in order to reconcile the character of others who combine conflicting features such as Harvard-educated and carpenter (Kunda, Miller, and Claire, 1990). This point is closely related with the process of subtyping (Hewstone, 1994), which refers to the tendency to form subtypes to concentrate the stereotype inconsistent information in a few members of the

target group. As a result, the general pattern of the stereotype remains intact. Kunda and Oleson (1995) questioned the automaticity of this process and suggested that encounters with deviant group members resulted in stereotype change unless there were sufficient cues for an explanation of this deviance. In their studies, Kunda and Oleson presented their subjects with the description of a successful but introverted lawyer. It should be noted that the attribute of extroverted is a distinctive component of the lawyer stereotype. After the study, the subjects started to perceive the lawyers as less extroverted. In short, these subjects tended to change their stereotype of the lawyers. However, a second group of subjects were informed that this lawyer worked for either a large or a small company and these subjects did not exhibit a change in their previous stereotype of the lawyers. Although the size of the firm was unrelated to the lawyers' extroversion or introversion, these subjects tended to use this information to explain the introversion of the target lawyer and stuck to their view of the lawyers as extroverted. These studies suggest that the stereotypes are not only simple list of attributes but they are well-organized theoretical structures (Yzerbyt, Rocher, and Schadron, 1997).

Thus, it might be a waste of time to prove or disprove the objective validity of stereotypes. Stereotypes exist and they have a subjective validity for their holders. Already, social psychologists should be more concerned with this subjective validity for, as G.H. Mead argued, understanding human behavior requires understanding the meaning of the action to the actor (Strauss, 1964). About this issue, W.I. Thomas was more explicit. He argued that there was always a dialectic between the objective and the subjective in social life. Subjective things like ideas, values, beliefs, purposes, and the like were as real in their consequences as wage-packets or malnutrition, for not the absolute amount of wage-packets or the food people took in but people's ideas about whether their wages were reasonable or not determine their social responses. In this sense, the seemingly subjective constructs like ideas are quite as objective as stones, even if they are not material. In order to live in society, people had to construct versions of reality for themselves. The interpretations they make might be accurate or they might be total fantasies. Nevertheless, what influenced the way people act were these interpretations, called as the definition of the situation by Thomas (Berger, 1967; Coser and Rosenberg, 1976; Mills, 1959). In short, for Thomas, how people defined the situation they were in determined the way they perceived, felt, and acted.

From the above theoretical arguments, it can be deduced that explanatory aspect of stereotypes rather than stereotypes as lists of attributes might be more relevant for the problem of stereotype accuracy. When the explanation of the stereotype is received as valid, then the content of stereotype as representing a certain social category might also be received as valid. For example, we saw that industry has been a common component of the American self-stereotype. Probably, an American might think that the industry of her citizens led the United States to be the most powerful state in the world. See that the explanation might depend upon an objective reality, that is, the United States is the most powerful state in the world in terms of all criteria of the development. Thus, it might be reasonable that since her citizens are very industrious, they accumulated too much wealth and developed their country. In other words, the attribute of industrious becomes meaningful only when the explanation is taken as valid. On the contrary, Russians might depict the Americans as colonist and use the same objective reality for their explanations. They might think that the United States exploited the wealth of many nations in the world, and for this reason, she is the most powerful state in the world. However, as can be seen, what is of interest here is not the fact that the United States is the most powerful state in the world, rather the position of the United States, and hence the Americans, in the larger frame of reference (see also Bar Tal, 1988; Keil, 1991; Welman and Gelman, 1992; Wisniewski and Medin, 1994). Thus, it can be argued that what makes stereotypes as psychologically valid might be the way the stereotype-holder places the target group in the frame of reference. With reference SCT's emphasis on the comparative context in determining the salience of social or personal identity, the present study preferred to call this as perceived context of the group. However, before elaborating this point, it might be useful to review two lines of work related to stereotype formation.

Eagly and her colleagues argued that stereotypes stemmed from social structural relationships and represented these relationships accurately (Eagly and Kite, 1987; Eagly and Steffen, 1984; Eagly and Wood, 1982). It has long been known that while women are seen as communal, men are seen as agentic. In other words, while women are seen as selfless, concerned with others and wanting to be at one with others, men are seen as self-assertive and motivated to master the environment. Eagly and Steffen (1984) maintained, "the cause of gender stereotyping is the differing distributions of women and men into social roles" (p. 752) of homemaker and employed, respectively. That is, there was an

actual correlation in society between gender and the homemaker, namely communal, and the employed, namely agentic, variables. Thus, the cause of the gender stereotype was this correlation (see Eagly and Steffen, 1984; Experiment 3).

In a later paper, Hoffman and Hurst (1990) maintained that the observation of the correlation between gender and roles could not explain why the relevant attributes characterize males and females in general. They asked, “Why do we have gender stereotypes in addition to homemaker and breadwinner stereotypes?” (p. 198). They agreed that gender stereotypes might have developed in response to certain social structural realities, however, it could not be claimed that they were valid representations of the characteristics of men and women. Instead, Hoffman and Hurst held that gender stereotypes were “explanatory fictions that rationalize and make sense of the sexual division of labor” (p. 199). The communal and agentic characteristics were generalized to all women and men because the explanations tended to make reference to inherent, natural differences “Women care for children, and understandably so – they are by nature kinder, gentler, and more sensitive than men” (p. 199). As a result, it became a common belief that if caring children was more suitable to the nature of women, and then they should do it.

As can be seen, theories emphasizing the importance of social structure rather than cognitive processes have been more likely to give stereotypes a point of accuracy, albeit this accuracy is resulted from a fictional explanation. As a matter of fact, what makes the content of stereotypes as valid seems to be the explanation attached to that stereotype. In the cases of gender and race, a biological explanation might best serve the purpose (see Wittenbrink, Gist and Hilton, 1997). However, when the intergroup differences could not be explained by biological differences, how will group members tend to explain the favorable ingroup and unfavorable outgroup stereotypes? For example, most people in the modern world want to participate in the political decision-making process and support a political party in the cases of representative democracies. How will the members of political parties explain their favorable perception related to the own party and their unfavorable perception related to other parties? Undoubtedly, a biological explanation is out of question. In the present paper, we argue that members of such groups define the larger context where the groups are present in such a way that the ingroup fulfills an important function while outgroup is either irrelevant or represents a dysfunctional

position. When such explanations become widely shared by the group members, the social functions of stereotypes would be achieved (Tajfel, 1981a).

So far, we have seen that all group stereotypes accompany with their explanations, unless these groups are fictional ones. What make the stereotypes as valid representations of reality are these explanations attached to them. In other words, stereotypes are not only homogeneous, extreme and value-laden images but also define the place of groups and individual group members within a broad social system (Haslam, 1997). However, it is a fallacy to think that these explanations are idiosyncratic, varying from person to person. As a matter of fact, these explanations derive their power from the fact that they are widely shared by a large number of people (see Jost and Banaji, 1994; Wittenbrink, Gist, and Hilton, 1997). This issue, namely stereotype consensus, is the subject of the next section.

2.1.3. Stereotype Consensus

Though the individual features of stereotypes has been one of the most vehemently studied field in social psychology, collective and inter-subjective properties of stereotype has been relatively ignored (Gardner, 1993; Stangor and Schaller, 1996). However, as argued before, stereotypes gain their strength and become a significant topic of research just because they are widely shared by large numbers of people (for contradictory views see Hamilton, Stroessner, and Driscoll, 1994; Judd and Park, 1993). As a matter of fact, the original invention of the concept of stereotype as well as the concepts of attitude, social representation, and ideology was to understand the widespread nature of beliefs within a specific community (Fraser and Gaskell, 1990; see also Moscovici, 1984). About this issue, Moscovici (1972) was the most radical:

The central and exclusive object of social psychology should be the study of all that pertains to ideology and to communication from the point of view of their structure, their genesis and their function. The proper domain of our discipline is the study of cultural processes which are responsible for the organization of knowledge in a society, for the establishment of inter-individual relationships in the context of social and physical environment, for the formation of social movements (groups, parties, institutions) through which men [and women] act and interact, for the codification of inter-individual and intergroup conduct which creates a common social reality with its

norms and values, the origin of which is to be sought again in the social context. (p. 55-56)

The problem of stereotype consensus seems to be the most prominent problem that the self-categorization theorists have been trying to handle recently (e.g., Haslam, 1997; Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, and Turner, 1999; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, Reynolds, Eggins, Nolan, and Tweedie, 1998). SCT argues that the sharedness of stereotypes does not derive from the common experience or exposure to similar stimuli. Rather, stereotype consensus directly springs from common group membership which structures information-processing. Group membership requires the continuous processes of social influence (Turner, 1991). Group members actively seek agreement with other ingroup members about the truth and falsity of their stereotypes. As a result, the information they received during this process leads them to endorse or reject those beliefs (Haslam, 1997).

We have reviewed SCT in Section 1.3.4. Remember SCT treats social identity as a part of the self-concept that the individual develops and uses in response to particular (intergroup) contexts. However, SCT implies more than such a view of social identity. Apart from determining the individual's perception and behavior in intergroup contexts, social identity has the function of structuring the psychologies of individuals by forming a basis for mutual influence (Turner, 1985, 1991). Social identity enables group members to agree and to expect to agree with other ingroup members. For meta-contrast principle holds that the dimension of agreement or disagreement may be a powerful basis for categorization, leading to perceive those in agreement as one group and those in disagreement with this group as another group.

Moreover, group members tend to identify other ingroup members as “sources that can consensually validate (their) subjective beliefs” (Haslam, 1997; p. 133). This point is important for personal reality testing is not sufficient to be confident of the correctness of our beliefs in social interaction. People need social reality testing accompanying the personal reality testing. In other words, it is not sufficient to seek the truth with reference to individual perceptions and observations, the beliefs should be validated by other people.

The psychological processes of relative perception and the social processes of collective discussion and conflict are interdependent means of achieving valid social stereotypes,

each building on and correcting for the limitations of the other (Oakes et al., 1994; p. 210)

Normative beliefs are formed and become consensual through this process, which Turner (1982, 1991) called referent informational influence. Undoubtedly, stereotypes may be viewed as one the most important of such normative beliefs, and thus, the process of referent informational influence is valid for the consensuality of stereotypes (Haslam, 1997).

Apart from SIT, another European tradition also deals with the consensual nature of social phenomena. This is Serge Moscovici's theory of social representations. Moscovici defined social representations as consensual ideas, thoughts, images and knowledge:

Social representations concern the content of everyday thinking and the stock of ideas that gives coherence to our religious beliefs, political ideas and the connections we create as spontaneously as we breathe. They make it possible for us to classify persons and objects, to compare and explain behaviours and to objectify them as parts of our social setting. While representations are often to be located in the minds of men and women, they can just as often be found 'in the world', and as such examined separately. (Moscovici, 1988; p. 214)

In other words, social representations referred to common knowledge shared by all individuals in a particular collectivity. These representations were in the form of common sense theories related to social world and enabled the individuals to construct the social reality (Moscovici, 1981; see also Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Social representations might be in the form of hegemonic structures shared by everyone in a specific collectivity, which might be as large as a nation, or they might be differentiated knowledge sets of specific subgroups within a collectivity (Moscovici, 1988). Moscovici saw the hegemonic structures as characteristics of small traditional societies and argued that they might not be found in modern industrial societies. However, knowledge structures shared by subgroups within contemporary societies might establish the identity of these groups and served the function of differentiating these groups from the other groups in society (Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983).

Moscovici (1984) identified two processes about the development of social representations; anchoring and objectification. Anchoring referred to the classification

and naming of unfamiliar objects, persons, or events. At this stage, the stimulus was compared with the existing familiar categories. Objectification referred to the transformation of abstract notions and images related to the unfamiliar stimulus into concrete and objective social realities. At the end of these two processes, an object, a person, or an event, which were once unfamiliar, turned into something known and mastered.

From the above explanations, it can be argued that stereotypes, especially social stereotypes as defined by Tajfel (1981a), are a distinct form of social representations (Augoustinos and Walker, 1995). They may be taken as objectified and widely shared beliefs about social groups within society. Since social stereotypes are socially constructed in the course of communication among group members, they may be thought as having an independent reality from the minds of individuals who hold them. Moreover, one of the most important functions of stereotypes is to ensure differentiation between social groups. Thus, it is reasonable to treat stereotypes as social representations rather than as an aggregate of attributes. This approach seems to have two advantages for the present study. First, it is directly linked with the content of socially constructed cognitions. Since stereotypes are mental representations of social groups (Hamilton and Sherman, 1994; Stangor and Lange, 1994) inherited from culture (Jost and Banaji, 1994), their content can be studied within the social representation framework. Second, social representations are consensual cognitive elements, shared by a large number of people within a specific culture. This characteristic makes it prepotent in understanding the psychology of widespread beliefs (Farr, 1990). Thus, two recent problems of social stereotypes, i.e. content and consensus, seem to be handled within one framework.

In the present study, the method of depth interviewing was employed. This has been one of the most widely employed methods in the study of social representations (Breakwell and Canter, 1993). The verbal material emerged from these interviews were analyzed via content analysis and the results were discussed with reference to the documentary review in the Section 1.4. This was a novel approach for the study of ingroup representation. By this method, the participants were allowed to characterize the ingroup through all elements of the language, rather than just adjectives (Jarymowicz, 1998; McGuire and McGuire, 1988). In this regard, the present study also diverged from the studies of self-concept, which treats social identities as just nouns (Rosenberg, 1979).

By also questioning the participants' affirmational, negational, and ideal ingroup representations, the present study meant to reach a more differentiated and more dimensional content of ingroup stereotype. Furthermore, depth interviewing allowed the participants to construct the story of their ingroup (McAdams, 1996), and in this way, the consensualities not only in the content of ingroup representations but also in the constructed stories were also observed. As noted above, these constructed stories were taken as the perceived context where the ingroup was present. The accuracy of the ingroup perception was seen as dependent upon the validity of perceived context. It was expected that the participants would construct the perceived context in such a way that the ingroup with all of its favorable characteristics filled an important gap. Thus, the validity of the perceived context guaranteed the validity of the ingroup stereotype. However, we did not expect that all social groups in Turkey would have similar perceptions related to the context. For this reason, the validity of ingroup representation would be limited to the group in question. In other words, all social groups might develop perceived contexts of their own and since none of these groups had a dominant status over others, it might not be reasonable to expect one version of perceived context to be shared by a number of social groups (Jost and Banaji, 1994).

2.2. Method

Interviewing is a tiresome data gathering procedure for both the interviewer and the interviewee. That's why the number of respondents an interviewer can handle is limited. Thus, we were forced to reach an unrepresentative sample from the beginning. In order to reach the best possible sample, we asked all *ülküçüs* we happened to be acquainted with the persons who would be eligible for such an interview. In this way, we started to prepare a list of names. More importantly, we asked them to help us in contacting and mediating with these persons. It is difficult to find a name for such a sampling method but I think that it resembles the so-called snowball sampling, utilized when the sample units are difficult to reach (Czaja and Blair, 1996; Seale and Filmer, 1998).

We took into consideration two factors in reaching the sample. The first factor was that there had to be some degree of consensus on a particular name. In other words, we tended to disregard the names mentioned by one or two people. Nevertheless,

determining the suitable names was not sufficient alone, the persons had to be reachable. Some of these people looked so busy that we failed to get an appointment. Moreover, some of them were so mobile that we could not find them.

The obstacles were not limited to reaching these names. Even when we reached, got an appointment, and went for the interview it proved to be a problem to finish the interview. For example, six of the interviews were left half-finished since the interviewee had to leave for an urgent work. Apart from defects resulting from interviewees, in two instances, the interviews lasted so long that we ran out of empty cassettes though we had brought an empty cassette of ninety minutes recording time before the interviews. Also, in one instance, we ran out of battery of the tape recorder. In other words, three interviews were wasted due to technical impairments, and unfortunately, we could not find other opportunity to finish these interviews later on. Furthermore, it was difficult to control the interview process, too. In four instances, we could not get proper answers to our questions. Instead, the interviewees preferred to talk about either the history of Turkish nationalism and *ülkücüs* or a book they read or wrote or other not much relevant matters. That is to say, these interviewees treated the issue as if they had not been an actor but an observer, not a part of the social identity we were talking about but someone from outside. In two other instances, we failed to isolate the interview from the intrusion of others. Some other people appeared during the interview and we had to conduct the interview in front of a number of others. Surely, this affected the interviewees deeply. Lastly, I as the interviewer was not very successful in the first two interviews. When we transcribed the interviews, it became apparent that I was very dominant in most parts of the dialogues and explicitly directed the answers of the interviewees. As a result, we failed in about seventeen interviews. Below, we summarize demographic properties of the respondents with whom we finished relatively more reliable interviews.

2.2.1. Interviewees

We carried out semi-structured interviews with 20 persons (5 females, 15 males). Mean age was 42.9 with a range between 35 and 58. Of these, only two (one male, one female) were single, the other 18 interviewees were married. Four interviewees had

Table 2.1:
Demographic properties of the interviewees¹

	Gender	Age	Marital Status	Education	Profession
Interviewee 01	Male	45	Married	University	Agriculture engineer
Interviewee 02	Male	43	Married	High School	Small-scale retailer
Interviewee 03	Male	41	Married	High School	Building contractor
Interviewee 04	Female	41	Married	Master	Mechanical engineer
Interviewee 05	Male	36	Married	Master	Engineer of informatics
Interviewee 06	Male	41	Married	Doctorate	Academician
Interviewee 07	Male	36	Married	Master	Journalist
Interviewee 08	Male	39	Married	High School	Writer
Interviewee 09	Male	40	Married	Doctorate	Veterinarian
Interviewee 10	Male	49	Married	University	Accountant
Interviewee 11	Female	51	Married	University	Veterinarian
Interviewee 12	Female	37	Married	University	Pharmacist
Interviewee 13	Male	39	Married	University	Civil engineer
Interviewee 14	Male	58	Married	Master	Real estate agent
Interviewee 15	Male	51	Married	University	Teacher of literature
Interviewee 16	Male	36	Married	University	Computer engineer
Interviewee 17	Male	35	Single	University	Mining engineer
Interviewee 18	Female	42	Single	Doctorate	Agriculture engineer
Interviewee 19	Female	44	Married	University	Economist
Interviewee 20	Male	54	Married	Doctorate	Historian

doctorate, another four interviewees had master's degrees, and nine interviewees had graduated from a university. Only three interviewees were graduated from a high school. We took pains in selecting interviewees having as different occupations as possible. Since we shall make citations from these interviewees later while we discuss the results, it seems appropriate to summarize this information for each interviewee (see Table 2.1)

¹ In order to ensure anonymity of the interviewees, we find it suitable to mention only so much demographic information. Otherwise, since most of these interviewees are quite famous in certain circles, their identities can be guessed.

All of the interviewees had joined the *ülküci* group during their high school years. Those whose age are 49 and above (5 interviewees) had been present in the Turkish nationalist activities before the *ülküci* movement appeared and were active in founding the first *Ülkü Houses* in their own regions. Those between 39 and 45 (10 interviewees) have been active in *ülküci* group since pre-1980 times. In a sense, these interviewees had developed their social identities in the most turbulent times when the conflict between *ülküci*s and leftist groups had been at its peak. Those aged 37 and below (5 interviewees) were *ülküci*s of the post-1980 period. As can be appreciated, we purposively selected the age of the interviewees to represent different stages *ülküci* group has undergone.

2.2.2. Materials and Procedure

Like Jones (1985) and Banister, Burman, Parker, Taylor, and Tindall (1994), we view interview as a kind of social interaction between two individuals that can never be replicated. For this reason, I had met all interviewee candidates in various places a few times before the interview took place. In this way, we were able to inspect whether the candidate was suitable for the interview. Within this process, we eliminated a number of people due to differing reasons. In some cases, we felt that though the person is known as an *ülküci*, he or she had ceased to be an *ülküci* in the technical sense. For example, the person in question no longer preferred to be called *ülküci*. In some other cases, the person was so suspicious, even paranoiac, that we thought he or she would never reveal his or her sincere cognitions, feelings or behaviors. Apart from forming a prior impression, we also tried to construct a sense of trust with the interviewees before the interviews, which might be taken as the first condition of speaking about intimate matters (Seale, 1998).

Interviews were held in interviewees' working places or houses and tape-recorded on cassettes of ninety minutes recording time (SONY C-90EFB). The device used in the interviews was SONY TCM-465V Cassette-Corder. Moreover, we took paper-pencil notes in a search of cues to deepen the interview.

Though we planned the interviews to be semi-structured and prepared a topic guide, once the interview started, we generally adopted a non-directive role. Since we

wanted to expose the ingroup representations, we essentially used the following questions to prime the interviewees:

1. What comes into your mind when you think about *ülküçüs*?
2. What kind of image do you have in your mind concerning *ülküçüs*?
3. Who do you think cannot be an *ülküçü*?
4. When do people cease to be an *ülküçü*? Or when are people expelled from the *ülküçü* group?
5. Which properties do you think an ideal *ülküçü* should have?
6. Do you consider the present *ülküçüs* as ideal *ülküçüs*?
7. Are there any properties of the present *ülküçüs* that you don't like? If so, which properties?
8. What are the most salient features of the present *ülküçüs* that render them *ülküçü*?

Apart from these questions pertaining to ingroup, we also asked one more question about each of the two most relevant outgroups: Islamists and Communists. The question was "What kind of image do you have in your mind concerning Islamists/Communists?" During this process, we made some minor intrusions to guide the interviewee on to certain topics that seem promising and we asked for clarification when the points they made seemed unclear.

Mean length of the interviews was 2 hours (ranged between 80 minutes and 4 hours). In line with the suggestions made by Coffey and Atkinson (1996), we transcribed the content of interviews. Transcribing is a very laborious and technical process, especially for such lengthy interviews (Atkinson and Heritage, 1984; Silverman, 1998) and it must be admitted that we did not know its proper techniques. In addition, we soon realized that transcribing process requires a degree of intervention to make the dialogues intelligible. When we combined the difficulty in transcribing the interviews and the need to intervene with the dialogues, we thought that the resulting texts might involve too many errors other than a veridical recording of the interview contents. To avoid these errors, we quitted transcribing and decided to make our analysis by just listening to the tape-recorded interviews. We recorded not the whole dialogues but the items collected as reflecting the contents of categories in the coding scheme. Having finished this task, we were left with a blend of sentences, phrases and words independent of the persons who uttered them. In a sense, only after this stage we seemed to start to deal with a text arisen out of the mentality of a group of people. At this stage, we started to try to figure out

what this or that particular item refers to, rather than why a particular person spoke this or that way. It can be claimed that such an approach seems more appropriate to study social representations for we were concerned with the mentality of a group, not individuals (Farr, 1984).

2.3. Results and Discussion

We examined the perceived context of the interviewees in which they positioned *ülküci* group. For this reason, we looked for the cues of the perceived context in two kinds of thematic units. Firstly, we picked any thematic unit (usually one or more statements) that makes a state determination (e.g., “We call Turkey as a Western country but the West does not recognize us as Western. They treat Turkey as if she was a step-child.”, “Today, our country is in a very difficult situation.”, “We are surrounded by enemies.”). Secondly, we picked those thematic units that make historical or contemporaneous explication of why *ülküci*s have particular attributes or standings rather than some others (e.g., “We support MHP for it is the only party that believes in the idea of Turk-Islam.”, “We are struggling against tyranny for we believe that it is better to die as a free man rather than to live as a slave.”, “We are against separatism because separatism does not serve anybody apart from our enemies.”).

We identified 1695 thematic units referring to the perceived context. The shortest unit was generally a whole sentence (in most cases, a few sentences). We developed a coding scheme that includes three categories and thirty-eight sub-categories and made the analysis of the verbal material in terms of this coding scheme. The verbal material of five interviews (25%) was used to compute inter-coder reliability. Inter-coder² agreement was 89% but we were able to reach perfect consensus after a brief discussion session. The categories and sub-categories of the coding scheme are given in Table 2.2. Below, we shall point to and discuss these general themes in accompaniment with verbatim quotations from the interviewees. We should note that we preferred to give the quotations in Turkish for the English translation would have resulted in too much intrusion. But in spite of this, we had to turn many sentences into smooth sentences in order to make them intelligible.

² I was the first coder and a friend having PhD in philosophy served as the second coder.

2.3.1. The Perceived Context of the Interviewees

We counted the units falling into the categories in the coding scheme and presented the resulting frequencies in Table 2.2. While examining the Table, it should be noted that each category was integrated into one level higher category. For example, the category 1 consisted of the sub-categories of 1.1 and 1.2. There were 296 units in the category 1.1 and 269 units in the category 1.2. The category 1 took in these 565 units, including 26 units that could not be classified under any of the sub-categories. The same rule applied to all further sub-categories. Below, we shall explain and discuss these categories together with verbatim quotations from the interviews.

2.3.1.1. Imperialist Enemies and Their Treacherous Compradors

The interviewees seemed to believe that there were external enemies fostering imperialist aims against the Turkish nation. Besides these enemies' direct policies to extend their power and influence over Turkey, some compradors inside the country were serving as their agents. These compradors were observing the interests of enemies and trying to make Turkey into one of their slaves. In other words, they were betraying the motherland. An excerpt from SUBJECT 19 summarizes this issue.³

³ Yaklaşık iki yüzyıldan beri emperyalist güçler Türk ve İslam dünyasını yok etmeye çalışıyor... Genç nesilleri hem milliyetlerine hem de dinlerine yabancılaştırmaya uğraşıyor. Ne zaman kendi kültürümüze kendi medeniyetimize sıkı sıkıya sarılmaya çalışsak, bu sefer de hemen "böl ve yönet" taktiğini devreye sokuyor. Bunun için de içimize düşmanlık tohumları serpiyor... Emperyalist güçlerin en tehlikelisi Batı blokudur. Bu blok az gelişmiş ya da gelişmekte olan ülkelerin halklarına yardım ediyoruz ya da özgürlük ve medeniyet getiriyoruz kisvesi altında işgallerini gerçekleştirir. Yirmi, otuz sene önce, komünist emperyalizm diye bir başka çeşidi vardı. Komünistler diğer milletlerin hem topraklarını hem de insanların kafalarını işgal ediyordu. Onlar da benzer söylemler ürettiyordu. Görünüşte, onlar da, baskı altındaki ya da sömürülen ülkelerin insanlarına özgürlük, bağımsızlık ve adalet götürdüklerini iddia ediyorlardı. Sınıf savaşları diye bir sloganı kullanıyorlardı. Bu slogan sayesinde dünyanın her tarafında sayısız iç savaşa neden olmuşlardır. Bu iki emperyalizm üçüncü dünya adlı, çok sayıda küçük ve zayıf devletten oluşan ayrı bir kategori oluşturdu. Öyle ki, neticede aynı milletin insanları iki ya da daha çok devlete bölündüler... Maalesef, üçüncü dünyanın önemli bir bölümü müslümandır. Ve yine maalesef ki, emperyalistlerin elinde esir durumda olan Türklerin sayısı bugün Türkiye'de yaşayan Türklerin sayısının iki katından fazladır... Emperyalist güçler Türk ve İslam dünyasını bazen güç kullanarak bazen de hile ile ele geçirmişlerdir. Bundan sonra da bu milletlerin zenginliklerini yağmalayıp, milli ve dini değer ve duygularını yok etmişlerdir. Kendilerine karşı koymaya çalışan bireyleri de ya insanlara rezil olacak bir duruma sokmuşlar ya da ortadan kaldırmışlardır. Amaçlarına uygun

Table 2.2:
Frequencies of units referring to categories and sub-categories of the perceived context of ülkücüs

No	Items	fr.
1.	THERE ARE EXTERNAL ENEMIES AND INTERNAL COMPRADORS HAVING IMPERIAL AIMS ON THE TURKISH NATION.	591
1.1.	The enemies and their compradors threaten the unity of Turkish country and Turkish state.	296
1.1.1.	Communists are traitors who want Turkey to be under Russia's command.	76
1.1.2.	The masons have become established in the state and the financial world.	65
1.1.3.	PKK is a tong of external powers.	53
1.1.4.	Religion is employed as a tool to divide people into camps.	46
1.1.5.	One of the most sensitive issues exploited by the enemies is the conflict of Shiite-Sunnite.	44
1.2.	The enemies and their compradors try to degenerate the Turkish culture.	269
1.2.1.	The compradors try to degenerate Turkish language.	71
1.2.2.	The compradors present various foreign ideologies as remedies of the problems of Turkish people.	51
1.2.3.	The compradors try to abolish Islam.	44
1.2.4.	The compradors try to destroy people's respect to the Turkish state.	35
1.2.5.	The compradors use Turkey's membership to European Community as a tool for their evil purposes.	29
1.2.6.	The compradors try to raise slave-minded generations.	23
1.2.7.	The ignorance of people in Turkey facilitates the ambitions of the compradors.	16

kadrolar yetiştirmiş ve bunların ülkenin en etkin konumlara gelmesini sağlamışlardır. Bu durumdan kurtulmaya yönelik tüm gayretleri de sabote etmişlerdir...

Table 2.2 (continued):
Frequencies of units referring to categories and sub-categories of the context as perceived by ülkücüs

No	Items	fr.
2.	NO IMPERIAL AIMS AGAINST TURKS CAN BE ACCEPTABLE.	339
2.1.	The consciousness of Turbdom and the morality of Islam should be taught to the young generations.	155
2.2.	Imported thoughts cannot be accepted.	83
2.3.	The undividable wholeness of Turkey and the endlessness of Turkish state are essential.	57
2.4.	Independence is the highest value of a nation.	26
3.	ÜLKÜCÜS ARE THE ONLY GROUP THAT CAN SAVE THE COUNTRY.	765
3.1.	Ülkücüs are an organized movement of Turkish nationalism.	344
3.1.1.	Ülkücüs try to realize the ideals of Turanism and Nizamı Alem.	72
3.1.2.	Ülkücüs try to revive the consciousness of Turbdom and Islam.	58
3.1.3.	Ülkücüs struggle against the traitors.	53
3.1.4.	Ülkücüs try to make Turkey the most powerful state in the world.	40
3.1.5.	Ülkücüs are organized to represent Turkish nationalists in the social realm.	36
3.1.6.	MHP is organized to represent Turkish nationalists in the political realm.	32
3.1.7.	Alparslan Türkeş who founded both MHP and Ülkü Houses is the leader of Turkish nationalists	29
3.2.	Ülkücü movement is an ascetic road.	211
3.3.	Ülkücüs have been subjected to unjust treatment.	210
3.3.1.	Turkish nationalists are subjected to injustice today.	115

Table 2.2 (continued):
Frequencies of units referring to categories and sub-categories of the context as perceived by ülkücüs

No	Items	fr.
3.3.1.1.	The media tries to show ülkücüs as a monster.	79
3.3.1.2.	Fundamentalist groups set up alliances with the communists to attack ülkücüs.	32
3.3.2.	Turkish nationalists were subjected to injustice in the past.	85
3.3.2.1.	The September 12 military strike injured ülkücüs as much as communists.	63
3.3.2.2.	İnönü regime in the 1940s tortured Turkish nationalists.	22
TOTAL		1695

Turkish nationalism sees states as political counterparts of nations in the international realm (MHP, 1993). Thus, it is understandable that almost all of the interviewees viewed history as a struggle between nations. Nevertheless, as SUBJECT 12 expressed, this struggle was not realized between equivalent rivals.⁴

We should note that when emotional loadings from the above sentences are removed, the remaining content is quite consistent with the explanations of modern sociology of development (see Giddens, 1996; Worsley, 1987). At this point, it is easy to understand why the interviewees saw imperialist powers as enemies. Before all else, they perceived these powers as having an eye on the national wealth. Undoubtedly, this perception alone is sufficient to claim enmity and hold very unfavorable attitudes against imperialist powers (Sherif, 1966). Additionally, the interviewees did not believe that the superiority of imperialist powers was legitimate. Instead, they saw these powers like

⁴ Günümüzde Batılı milletlerin dünyadaki diğer milletlerden daha üstün olduğu bir gerçek. Kim ne derse desin, bu üstünlük, büyük ölçüde, yeryüzündeki maddi zenginliğin çoğunu ellerinde bulundurmalarından kaynaklanıyor. Bu da, Batılıların diğer dünya milletlerini uzun zamandan beri sömürmelerinin bir sonucu. Yani, Batılıların üstünlüğü diğer milletlerin az gelişmişliğine bağlı. Batılılar da bu konumlarını korumak ve güçlendirmek için onaltıncı, hatta onbeşinci yüzyıldan beri muhtemel tüm sömürü çeşitlerini deniyor, gün geçtikçe de yenilerini icad ediyorlar...

thieves, which may be conceived as the most unethical position in terms of economic relations. For the interviewees, these imperialist powers had seized the wealth of feeble nations and used the power they obtained from this surplus wealth in exploiting other nations. In other words, the order of the contemporary world was illegitimate (for the importance of legitimacy perception in intergroup relations, see Major, 1994).⁵

All anti-imperialist, nationalist movements around the Third World share similar sentiments against the West (e.g., Fanon, 1965; Warren, 1980). However, Turkish nationalism had an important distinctive characteristic. Unlike other countries of the Third World, Turkey had never been invaded and exploited directly by a foreign power. Instead, it was the heir of one of the greatest empires in the history, namely the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman state itself was a state of conquest and chose to expand in the direction of the West. The present rulers of the world were once the main targets of the Ottomans. Nevertheless, as time passed, things changed. Apart from the Ottomans' failure to keep in step with the novel (technological, political, economical, etc.) developments in Europe, some mistakes and numerous conspiracies weakened the state. Throughout the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, every corner of the Ottoman lands became the setting for the imperial aims of Great Powers including Russia. Moreover, the Republic of Turkey herself was established on the last land that had hardly been rescued in the end of a long Independence War. For this reason, we can say that anti-imperialism developed in the Turkish nationalism has not directly been against an exploiting power,

⁵ Dikkatlice bakılırsa görülür ki, Batı dünyasının dışında Orta Doğu'da, Türkistan'da, Uzak Doğu'da hemen hemen her yerde adaletsizlik, kötülük ve kargaşa hüküm sürüyor. Tarihe bakıldığında da durum farklı değil aslında. Batı dünyaya hükmetmeye başladığından bu yana adaletsizlikler, kötülükler, kargaşa, düzensizlik hiç bitmemiş. Batılı devletlerin umurunda değil ama dünya devleti olmak beraberinde bazı sorumluluklar da getirir. Batılılardan önce en büyük güç Osmanlılardı. Atalarımız Batılılar gibi menfaatini hükmettiği milletlerin kötülüğünde aramamıştı, işini yapılması gerektiği gibi yapmıştı. Halbuki, ne onsekizinci ve ondokuzuncu yüzyıl İngilteresi ne de çağımızın ABD'si dünyada adaleti tesis edebilmiştir. Daha doğrusu böyle bir ideali hiçbir şekilde düşünüyor görünmemişlerdir de. Dahası, düşünen herkese göre dünyadaki adaletsizliğin onlar dışında herhangi bir sorumlusu da yoktur. Üstünlüğü ele geçirir geçirmez dünya düzenini bozmuşlar ve bu düzensizlikten yararlanmaya çalışmışlardır. Yani, hem İngiltere hem de ABD üstünlüklerini diğer ülkeleri kasıp kavuran bir düzensizliğe dayandırmışlardır. (INTERVIEWEE 05)

but rather against the possibility of such a threat. This is evident in the following quotation from INTERVIEWEE 03.⁶

The number of such militaristic accounts in our interviews was very high. We shall touch on this issue from time to time. Yet, the interviewees noticed that the militaristic interventions to realize imperialist aims almost ceased since the end of World War II. Any attempts to invade smaller countries through militaristic means started to be faced with very harsh protests on the part of other world nations. For this reason, two superpowers of the post-war period, namely the United State and the former Soviet Union, developed other strategies to extend their powers. This period is also known as the Cold War (Cronin, 1996; Leffler and Painter, 1994; Walker, 1993).

Among the strategies, the foremost was to form sympathizer groups and support them to capture the power in their homeland. Still another strategy was to raise spies among the natives and help these spies get important positions both in the state and the market. The interviewees believed that Turkey was one of the focus points of these two strategies. By the concepts of compradors and traitors, the interviewees referred to these groups and individuals. Thus, their identification is important for they do not only comprise an important part of the perceived context but also the relevant outgroups of *ölkücü* group.

The interviewees saw two imperialist threats against the nation. While the first threat involved the unity of the country and the state, the second threat was directed to the indigenous culture.

⁶ Türkiye Osmanlı İmparatorluğundan kalan son toprak parçasıdır. Halbuki, Osmanlı zamanında Akdeniz bizim gölümüz gibiydi. Geleneksel düşmanlarımız Osmanlı toprağını teker teker ele geçirdi ve bu yüzyılın başlarında bizi bu küçük toprağa sıkıştırdı. Bu topraklara sahip olmak da bir nimet... Avrupalıların asıl amacı Avrupa ve civarındaki Türk varlığını tamamen yok etmektir. Biz bu vatani çok zor koşullar altında kurtarabildik. İstiklal Savaşı'nda milletimiz inanılmaz bir çaba gösterdi... Neticede, Türkiye bir avuç Türk'ün hür olarak yaşadığı son toprak parçasıdır. Bu yüzden de, bizim en önemli amacımız bu ülkeyi korumaktır. Bugün için yoksul bir ülke olabiliriz ama en azından bağımsız bir ülkemiz. İşte, bu bağımsızlığı korumak için de elimizden geleni yapmalıyız...

2.3.1.1.1. Imperialist threat against the unity of Turkey

The first threat the interviewees perceived had more relation with the traditional imperialist strategies. In order to weaken the target nation, the imperialist powers formed separatist groups and tried to launch a civil war in Turkey. In this regard, the first group that comes into mind seemed to be the communists.⁷

The interviewees gave a special importance to the communists while narrating the ingroup's relevance in the recent history. In the eye of the interviewees, the value of the

⁷ 1970'lerde komünizme karşı mücadele ediyorduk. Görünüşte bir sürü komünist grup vardı ama hepsinin amacı Türkiye'yi Rusların emri altına sokmaktı. Yöntemleri de iğrençti. Bir terör ortamı yaratmak istiyorlardı. Terörü köy, kasaba ülkenin her tarafına yaymaya çalışıyorlardı. Aslında, o günlerde dünyada Soğuk Savaş dönemi vardı. Sadece Türkiye'de değil, dünyanın her yerinde komünist gruplar terörist eylemler yapıyordu... Rusya açısından Türkiye dünyanın diğer yerlerinden çok daha önemli olmuştur. Bu yüzden Türkiye'deki tezgah, her yerdekinden daha büyüktü. Rusya, çok eski zamanlardan beri sıcak denizlere ulaşmaya yönelik bir siyaset gütmüş, ancak her zaman bir Türk engeli ile karşılaşmıştır. 1970'lerde de, Türkiye [Rusya'nın] karşısındaki son engeldi. Yani, bilerek ya da bilmeyerek komünistler bu politikanın aleti oluyorlardı... (INTERVIEWEE 14)

Ülkücülerle komünistler arasındaki çatışma bir sağ-sol çatışması değildi. Türkiye'ye karşı bir saldırı vardı ve ülkücüler ülkeyi bu saldırıdan korumaya çalışıyorlardı. Komünistlerin amacı Türkiye'yi küçük küçük parçalara bölmekti. Doğu'da bir Kürdistan, Kuzey'de bir Lazistan, Batı'da bir Rumistan, başka bir yerde başka bir istan, başka bir yerde başka bir istan kurmak istiyorlardı. Velhasıl ülkenin her tarafı bir sürü istan ile dolacaktı. Türkler için bir istanları var mıydı bunu da bilmiyorum... Sanki bu topraklarda doğmuş, bu toprakların bir insanı değillerdi... Kelimenin tam anlamıyla haindiler. Hainliklerine hala da devam ediyorlar. Aksi taktirde, bir Türk bu tür amaçları nasıl makul bulabilir?... Güvenlik güçlerinin bu grupları durdurmak için uğraşları, aldıkları tedbirler yetmiyordu. Komünistler devletin içine de sızmışlar, hatta çok önemli konumları ele geçirmişlerdi. Başta Bülent Ecevit, bu grupları açıkça koruyan devlet adamları vardı... (INTERVIEWEE 07)

Komünistler toplumun gerçeğine öyle yabancıydılar ki... İşçi sınıfına yapılan baskılardan dem vurup duruyorlardı. Sanki Türkiye'de böyle bir sınıf varmış gibi... Sonraları baskı altında olan sınıf olarak köylüleri ileri sürmeye başladılar. Ancak, köylüleri baskı altında tutan, köylülerin çektiği yoksulluğun ve sefaletin nedeni olan toprak ağalarını bir türlü bulamıyorlardı. Aslında, Türkiye'nin gelişmemiş, geri kalmış bir ülke olduğu iddiası doğru bir iddiaydı. Ancak, bunun nedeni zenginliğin bir kaç kapitalistin elinde toplanması değildi. Tam tersi, kapitalizm henüz Türkiye'ye girmemişti. İşin komik tarafı, Tanrı bildikleri Marks'ın kendisine göre bile, eğer kapitalizm girmiş olsaydı Türkiye'nin geri kalmış bir ülke olmaması lazımdı. O halde, komünizmin anlamı neydi?... İki kutuplu bir dünyada, devlet Batı'ya yönelmeye çabalarken, komünistler Türkiye'yi Doğu Blok'una bağlamak istiyorlardı. Doğu Bloku ki, Türk dünyasının geri kalanını bütünüyle kendine köle yapmıştı. Yani, komünistler son bağımsız Türk devletini de bu despot dünyanın esiri haline getirmeye çalışıyorlardı... Bu mantığı kabul edersek, komünistleri destekleyen Sovyet Rusya olduğu konusunda herhangi bir şüphemiz kalmaz. Kısaca, komünistler bilerek ya da bilmeyerek kendi ülkelerine ihanet içindeydiler. (INTERVIEWEE 09)

ülküci group derived from the struggle against communists harboring evil intentions toward the national independence. Another dangerous group against Turkish nation was the masons. There were qualitative differences between the communists and masons. Firstly, the masons were not armed murderers. They were not in an armed struggle with the state. Moreover, the masons had nothing to do with the society. They were not trying to form a numerically crowded group. Unlike the communists, each mason was an important person on his own. They established themselves in the top positions of the bureaucracy and the business world. In other words, they held a great political and financial power at their hands. And they were not using this power for the good of the nation but they were observing the interests of the members of their group.⁸

The interviewees gave detailed accounts about the origins and developments of the masons. As a matter of fact, they made similar accounts about the communists and the other groups that we shall touch on soon. These accounts would be very beneficial to understand their perception. Yet, in spite of this fact, we did not deal with these accounts in order not to enlarge the scope of our discussion.

When we return to the masons, we saw that the interviewees attributed almost all negativities related to national issues to this group. As we noted, this group was not as concrete as the communists. In a sense, this was a secret group whose main function was to prepare plots against the nation. Since it was a secret group and had no ties with the

⁸ Türkiye'nin idaresinde uzun zamandan beri masonların borusu ötmektedir. Bu adamlar hem üst düzey bürokrasiyi hem de iş dünyasını ellerinde bulundurmaktadır. Bürokrasideki masonlar hem seçilmiş iktidarları nötralize etmekte hem de mason iş adamlarına devletin imkanlarını peşkeş çekmektedir. İş dünyasındaki masonlar da buradan elde ettikleri haksız kazançlarını Türkiye'nin ilerlemesine değil, Türkiye'nin ilerlemesini yavaşlatacak yatırımlara harcamaktadır. Bunların şeytani planlarını anlamak, anlatmak gerçekten zor iş ancak bildiğimiz bir şey varsa bunlar orada durduğu sürece Türkiye'nin silkinip ayağa kalkabilmesi, ilerleyip çağdaş devletleri yakalaması sadece hayaldir... (INTERVIEWEE 02)

Düşman sadece dışarıda değil ki içimizde de var. Hatta iliklerimizin içine işlemiş bir güruh var ki, ben bunları kanser mikrobuna benzetiyorum. Bunlar tam da millet için en iyi çalışılabilecek alanları işgal etmiş, ne Türklükle ne de müslümanlıkla alakası olmayan masonlardır. Osmanlının son döneminden günümüze babadan oğula geçen krallıklar gibi bu masonlar da devletin en üst kademelerini babadan oğula devreder hale getirmişlerdir. Bir Türk-müslümanın bu makamlarda bulunması haram olmuştur. Türk gençliğinin eğitimi, vatanla ilgili dış politikaların belirlenmesi bu masonların elinde bulunmaktadır. Her alanda kendi biraderlerini gözetmekte, devletin malını mülkünü dışarıdaki masonlara hibe etmektedirler. Bunları şikayet edebilecek bir merci yoktur. Bunlarla mücadele edip başarı gösteren kimse olmamıştır. Bilakis, bunlarla mücadele edenler vatan hainliği ile suçlanmış, rezalete ve sefalete mahkum edilmiştir... (INTERVIEWEE 18)

society, they were unobservable. The present mason communities were just the visible part of an iceberg over the sea. For the interviewees, the leaders and the most dangerous members of this group could never be found. Almost all statesmen including Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Kenan Evren, and many more names were just enlisted men of this group. The properties the interviewees attributed to the masons were so unbelievable that, it happened to us, the interviewees seemed to formulate this group as an imagined enemy. They were held responsible for almost all unfortunate things. Even all other separatist groups were just the pawn in the chess the masons were playing against the patriots of Turkey. If this group had been overcome, the interviewees seemed to argue, there would not have remained any problem in Turkey. However, as we noted, the most important parts of this group were unobservable. Then, how could you beat an enemy that you could not see, hear, or touch? The interviewees could not produce a definitive answer. This seemed to mean that the threats Turkey had been experiencing would not come to an end in the future. We shall have more to say about this group later.

Another important group against the integrity of Turkey was PKK. By making the discrimination of Turkish-Kurdish, this group tried to establish a Kurdish state on the Southeastern lands of Turkey. For the interviewees, this group was the continuance of the communists, and like its predecessor, it was also the tong of external, imperialist powers.⁹

⁹ Türk milletinin düşmanları her zaman aynı oyunu oynarlar. Türkiye'nin içinde bir grup bulurlar ve bu grubu kendi amaçları için kullanırlar. Ne var ki, bugüne kadar hiçbir grup PKK kadar tehlikeli olmadı. Çünkü PKK, kendi davasını Doğu ve Güneydoğu'da yoğunluklu olarak yaşayan Kürt etnisitesine dayandırıyor. Dış koruyucularının yardımıyla, bölgede aktif olan diğer terörist grupları elimine etmiş veya bu grupların mensuplarına kendi üstünlüğünü kabul ettirmiştir. Bundan sonra da öyle bir güce sahip olmuştur ki Türk ordusuna meydan okumaya başlamıştır. PKK zamanına kadar hiçbir örgüt böyle birşeye cesaret edememiştir... Tabii ki, amaçları gerçekçi bir amaç değildi. Ne var ki, üzücü olan bu amaçlara sahip olmaları değil, birçok polisin, askerin ve vatandaşın ölümüne sebep olmalarıdır. Zaman geçtikçe örgütün vahşiliği öyle arttı ki, iki aylık bebeklerin üzerine kartuşlar dolusu mermi boşaltmakta bile tereddüt etmediler. Anaların gözyaşları dinmez oldu... (INTERVIEWEE 18)

ABD, Rusya, Almanya ve dünyanın liderliği için yarışan diğer tüm devletler Türkiye'nin parçalanmasından bir çıkar ummaktadır. Bu insanı hem üzüntüye hem de öfkeye boğuyor. 1960 ve 1970lerde, bu ülkeler Türkiye'yi bölmek için DEV-YOL, DEV-GENÇ, THKP-C ve benzeri komünist örgütleri kullanmışlardır. 1980 ve 1990lı yıllarda ise, PKK'yı kullanmışlardır... PKK, artık ortadan kayboldu mu bunu bilmiyorum ama eğer ortadan kalktıysa yarın da başka bir örgütü kullanacaklarını biliyorum. Türkiye'yi bölmek, en azından biz yaşadığımız sürece, imkansız olmakla birlikte, bu grupların varlığının Türkiye'nin gelişmesinin önüne set çektiği de bir gerçek. Dahası, bu grupların eylemlerinden birçok insanımızın çok büyük acılar çektiği de ortada... (INTERVIEWEE 11)

Communist groups were the product of Cold War period. Their aim was to ensure the reign of the Soviet Union on Turkey. When the Cold War came to an end, this time PKK appeared and tried to divide a part from Turkey. This threat was based on Kurdish-Turkish discrimination. The interviewees believed that there was another discriminatory threat based on Shiite-Sunni dichotomy. Though it is certain that the interviewees belonged to the Sunni side, they were not eager to accuse Shiites of instigating the conflict. As a matter of fact, they did not accuse either working class or peasants in the case of communist groups. Nor they accused Kurds in the case of PKK. They always accused external powers and their local compradors of causing these struggles. Shiite-Sunni dichotomy was no exception.¹⁰

In other words, though overt conflict between Shiites and Sunnites was rare, the interviewees believed that Shiites provided leftist divisive groups with a social basis. However, the interviewees still believed that there was no reason for a conflict between Shiites and Sunnites but it was true that some external powers scratched this open sore to cause disturbances inside the country.

Lastly, the interviewees believed that some compradors tried to employ religion in their malicious intent to divide Turkish people into camps. Yet, this point was a little

Yetmişli yıllarda eşkiya şehirlerdeydi, üniversitelerdeydi. ülkücüler bu eşkiyaları sokaklarda, caddelerde karşılamak zorunda kalmıştı. İşin gerçeği, polisin gücü de vatandaşları bu eşkiyanın şerrinden korumaya yetmiyordu. Mesela, teşkilatlanmış olmasaydık, üniversitelere giremezdik. Polisin de hiçbir yardımı olmazdı. Kısaca, bu eşkiyalarla çarpışmak zorundaydık. Eşkiya bugün dağda... Şehirlerde de destekçileri var ve biz bunların kimler olduğunu biliyoruz. Buna rağmen, bunlarla doğrudan karşı karşıya gelmiyoruz. Çünkü, devlet, 12 Eylül'de, bize de bu hainlere yaptığı muameleyi reva gördü. Tabii, devlete küsmek olmaz. Çünkü her ne kadar devleti yönetenler bizim değerimizi anlamamazlıktan gelse de biz bu ülkeye aşığız. Bu yüzden, biz de eşkiya ile hem polis hem de ordu saflarında savaştık. Artık herkes biliyor ki, bu eşkiyanın en büyük korkusu, en korkunç kabusu hala ülkücülerdir. (INTERVIEWEE 05)

¹⁰ Türkiye'deki en tehlikeli ayrımlardan biri Alevi-Sünni ayrımıdır. Bu iki mezhebi birbirinin düşmanı gibi göstermeye çalışan bir sürü insan vardır. Halbuki, bunların ikisi de müslüman ikisi de Türk'tür. Birbirleri ile ortak yönleri saymakla bitmez. Şükür ki, Sünnilerle Alevileri birbirine düşürme planı çoğu zaman başarısız olmaktadır. Bu çatışmanın belirli bir tarihsel arkaplanı vardır. Bu yüzden, sonuçlarının diğer tüm çatışmaların sonuçlarından daha yıkıcı olacağından korkarım... Yine de, Alevi-Sünni çatışmasının başka çatışmalar kisvesi altında ortaya çıktığı da bir gerçek. Hemen hemen tüm bölücü hareketler Aleviler arasında kolayca taraftar bulabilmektedir. Mesela, 1970'lerdeki komünist militanların çoğu Alevi kökenli insanlardı... (INTERVIEWEE 14)

more complicated than the earlier ones for the interviewees tended to define themselves as religious, too. In this regard, INTERVIEWEE 01 said the following.¹¹

However, as we shall see shortly, Islam as part of the national culture is very important for ülkücü group. For this reason, it should be noted that they were not against religiosity but the groups that saw religion as the only point of departure and ignore nationality.¹²

In this regard, the interviewees seemed to accuse the former National Salvation Party and its successors, namely Welfare Party and Virtue Party.¹³

¹¹ ... Türkiye’de bazı gruplar insanları din bazında ayrıma tabi tutuyorlar. “Bu müslümandır”, “bu laiktir” şeklinde ayırım yapıp, devletin üzerinde hassas olduğu bir konuyu kaşıyorlar. Bundan dolayı da demokrasimiz kesintiye uğruyor, askeri rejim ülkeyi bir on sene daha geriye götürüyor, bir türlü gelişme yolunda hızlı bir şekilde ilerleyemiyoruz. Rahmetli Türkeş’in de dediği gibi, en kötü hukuk düzeni en iyi askeri idareden daha iyidir ... Bahsettiğimiz gruplar sadece dindar-laik ayrımı da yapmıyor. Bunlara göre kendilerinden başka müslüman yok. Yani, müslümanım diyene de, namaz kılana da müslüman değildir diyebiliyorlar. Mesela, bize diyorlar. O kadar anlatıyoruz, izah ediyoruz. Müslümanlığın bir ülkücü için ne kadar önemli olduğunu söylüyoruz. Bu adamları müslüman olduğumuz konusunda ikna edemiyoruz. Kısaca, bu gruplar müslümanlar arasında da nifak ve ayrılık tohumu ekiyorlar, ya da buna uğraşıyorlar. İnsanların dini duygularını kötüye kullanıp ülkede bir düşmanlık ortamı çıkartmaya çalışıyorlar. Türkiye’de bundan daha sunni, bundan daha yapay bir ayırım yoktur...

¹² Biz müslümanız. Bu ülkedeki insanlar da Türklük ve İslamlıktan oluşan sentetik bir kültürün ürünleri... Dünyada başka hiçbir millet Türkler kadar İslam ile haşır neşir olmamışlardır. Türk milliyetçiliği hiçbir zaman İslamı reddetmemiş ve böyle bir ret de zaten yapılamaz... Türkiye’de bazı ne idüğü belirsizler var. Bunlar İslam’ın Arap versiyonunu gerçek İslam olarak lanse edip, bizim de İslam’ı Araplar gibi yaşamamız gerektiğini söylüyorlar. Bir anlamda, Arap milliyetçisi gibi davranıyorlar ancak çoğu bunun farkında bile değil... Gerçekten de, son zamanlardaki Arap milliyetçiliği İslam’ı kendi emperyalist amaçları için bir araç olarak kullanmakta, ve ne yazık ki, birçok vatandaşımız bu amacın kurbanı olmaktadır... (INTERVIEWEE 16)

¹³ Erbakan ve ekibi hiçbir zaman ciddi bir politika yürütememiştir. Milliyetçi Cephe hükümetleri zamanında ne Adalet Partisi ne de biz onlara tam bir güvenle hareket edememiştir. Bu güveni tesis etmek için de en ufak bir girişimleri olmamıştır. Aksine, devamlı surette bizi en büyük rakibimiz olan CHP ile koalisyona girmekle tehdit etmişlerdir. Düşünsenize, hem sizle bir araya geliyor hem de her an size ihanet edebileceğini söylüyor. Böyle devlet adamlığı olur mu?... Partilerinin taraftarları da kendileri gibiydiler. O zamanlar, Milli Selamet Partisi’nin gençlik kolları vardı. Bunlara Akıncılar denilirdi. Daha doğrusu kendileri kendilerini böyle adlandırırdı. Bu grup hem üniversitelerde hem de sokaklarda çok rahattılar. Çünkü müslümanlar diye biz onları da korurduk. Ama, çoğunluk oldukları yerlerde, ki bunların başında Konya geliyor, buralarda tıpkı komünistler gibi Akıncılar da ülkücü avına çıkarlardı. Bundan dolayı, biz de bu grubu “Yeşil komünistler” diye adlandırmaya başladık... (INTERVIEWEE 20)

Erbakan’ın Milli Görüş’ü hep laik ve dindar insanlar arasındaki gerilimden beslenmiştir. Hep kendilerini bu gerilimde mağdur olan kesim olarak göstermişler ancak bundan da bir çıkar sağlamayı bilmişlerdir. Aksi takdirde, Erbakan’ın zenginliği, serveti nereden

When they have counterparts in the social reality, all social categories may be potentially divisive. The interviewees saw rightist-leftist, Turkish-Kurdish, Shiite-Sunnite, and religious-secular discriminations as threats to the unity of the nation and the motherland. And, in their eye, recent Turkish history was full of attempts to divide Turkey through the uses of such discriminations. Now, we'd better turn to the issue of cultural imperialism receiving a similar emphasis in *ölkücü* discourse.

2.3.1.1.2. Imperialist threat against the Turkish culture

The interviewees seemed to perceive a variety of threats against Turkish culture. These threats aimed at producing a certain mental outlook (preparedness) among Turkish people so that they could no longer observe the interests of their own nation. Rather, they would start to think, feel, and behave as the foreign powers wished them to do. The interviewees called this phenomenon as "cultural imperialism".

The interviewees tended to define culture as the essence of a nation. In other words, for them, culture was what makes an aggregate of people into a nation. Indeed, starting from Ziya Gökalp, culture has been a distinctive concept in the doctrine of Turkish nationalism (Heyd, 1950; Kohn, 1962). Accordingly, the interviewees' understanding of nationalism could be defined as a cultural nationalism. Though most of them did not reject the racial basis of nationalism, in our interviews, we did not meet any

gelmektedir? Bundan daha önemlisi, Türk insanının dini duygularını sömürmüşler ve bu sömürüyü en fazla da bu insanların milli duygularını köreltmek, hatta yok etmek için kullanmışlardır. Kendilerine taraftar ararken, *ölkücü*leri kendilerinin rakipleri olarak seçmişlerdir... (INTERVIEWEE 05)

Türkiye'yi laik, dindar gibi kategorilere ayırmaya kimsenin hakkı yoktur. Erbakan ve çevresindekiler her zaman böyle bir ayırım yapmaya çalışmışlardır. Bir zamanlar partisi yüzde beş oy aldığı anda, Türkiye'nin yalnızca yüzde beşinin müslüman olduğunun anlaşıldığını söyleyecek cesareti bile bulmuştur. Ona göre, onun partisine oy vermeyen müslüman da değildir. Halbuki, din ile siyaset iki farklı şeydir. Bunu hiç anlamamış ya da insanların bunu böyle anlamasını istememiştir. Sonuçta ne olmuştur? Hem kendisi hem de liderliğini yaptığı parti devletin gözünde illegal bir duruma düşmüştür. Ve devlet bununla da kalmamış, dindar insanların hepsine birden yaptırımlar uygulamaya başlamıştır. Her dindar insanın Erbakan ve partisinin görüşlerini paylaşmadığı, bu fikirleri desteklemediği doğrudur. Aslına bakarsanız, MHP her zaman dindar insanları Erbakan ve onun partilerinden daha çok ve daha iyi temsil etmiştir. Bundan dolayı da, Erbakan'ın günahlarından kendisi olduğu kadar biz de çekmişizdir. (INTERVIEWEE 12)

argument for the superiority of race. Rather, the interviewees tended to blame other thoughts for bringing the issue of ethnicity into the fore.¹⁴

INTERVIEWEE 01 explicitly stated that Turkish nationalism was a cultural nationalism, and in fact, it was bound to be a cultural nationalism.¹⁵

Having seen the importance of culture, we can now turn to the issue of threats the interviewees perceived against Turkish culture. Firstly, the interviewees argued that the compradors in Turkey had been insistently attacking to the determining values of the Turkish culture. These compradors tried to convince people that such values did not have any place in modern times. In short, they accused the tradition of being something invalid and something to be transformed into the cultures of developed Western nations.¹⁶

¹⁴ Son zamanlarda değişik kesimler, özellikle de solcular, mozayik kültür diye birşeyden sıkça söz etmeye başladılar. Sadece komünistler olsa anlayacağım da, dost bildiğimiz çevrelerde de bu kavramın sıklıkla kullanılması bu kavramla ilgili bazı yanlış anlamalar olduğu konusunda şüpheler doğuruyor. Kanaatime göre, bu çevreler bu kavramın ne tür dolayimleri olduğunu bilmeden bu kavramı kullanıyorlar... Mozayik kültür kavramı ırkçı bir kültür anlayışına dayanıyor. Halbuki bizim Anadolu'daki milliyetimiz ve kimliğimiz bin yıllık bir tarihi süreç sonrasında oluşmuştur. Ve esasında, bizim kültür anlayışımıza göre, oluşma süreci bitmemiş hala da oluşmakta, olgunlaşmakta, zamana göre gerekli değişimlerden geçmektedir. Mozayik kültür kavramı bu gerçeğe karşıt, bu gerçeği tehdit eden bir kavramdır. Milliyetimizi, kimliğimizi bozmak isteyenler bu kavramla surların arasında bir delik açmayı planlamaktadır. Ve bütün kötülüklerini bu delikten içimize akıtmaya çalışmaktadırlar. Öyle görünüyor ki, bu hainler Türkiye'yi ırksal ya da başka bir farklılığa dayanan kırk elli parçaya bölmeyi de başarmışlardır... İnsanı en fazla üzen de, Yunanistan ve Almanya gibi ülkelerde çöreklenen bölücülerin çıkardığı yayınlar durumu öyle bir boyuta taşımışlardır ki bazı insanlar Türkiye'de Türklerin hiç var olmadıklarına inanmaya başlamışlardır. (INTERVIEWEE 09)

¹⁵ ... Biz hiçbir zaman ırka dayalı bir milliyetçilik yapmamışızdır. Ziya Gökalp'te veya Atatürk'te olduğu gibi, Türk kültürünün Türk milletinin en önemli belirleyicisi olduğuna inanmışızdır. Milliyet, kültürel bir birlikteliktir. Aynı şeylere inanmanın ve aynı tarihi paylaşmanın sonucunda oluşur. Eğer insanlar ortak bir kültürü paylaşıyorlarsa, ancak o zaman aynı insanların ortak bir gelecek beklentisi de oluşabilir... Bir milletin en önemli, gerçek izi, işareti ortaya koyduğu yüksek kültürdür. Eğer Türkiye'de tek bir millet yoksa, birden fazla, hatta onlarca millet varsa, bütün bu milletler Fuzuli'yi, Şeyh Galib'i, Yunus Emre'yi, Mevlana'yı, Karacaoğlan'ı, Mimar Sinan'ı, İttri'yi veya Dede Efendi'yi nasıl paylaşacaklar? Bu değerler bu ülkede yaşayan herkese aittir ve bu değerler Türk kültürünün mimarlarıdır. Mesela, Mimar Sinan'ın Kayseri'li mi, Edirneli mi yoksa İstanbullu mu olduğunun hiçbir anlamı var mıdır? Eğer ırk olarak bakılacak olursa, Mimar Sinan Türk müdür yoksa değil midir? Türk olmasa bile bunun bir önemi var mıdır? Bu topraklarda insanları belli bir yöne doğru iten kültürel bir güç var olagelmıştır ve bu güç bir Rum'a ya da bir Ermeni'ye Türk müziğinin en güzel melodilerini yarattırmıştır...

¹⁶ Her milletin kendine has bir kültürü vardır. Esasında, bu söylediğim totolojik bir söz oldu. Çünkü eğer çağlar boyunca ortaya koydukları, biriktirdikleri ortak bir kültür yoksa, bir insan topluluğu millet olarak adlandırılmaz. Dolayısıyla, milletin kültürünün olması zaten bir zorunluluk... Bir insanı kendi kültüründen koparırsan, bu insan artık kendi milletinin bir

The change in mentality across generations may not pose a problem for the culture (see Kottak, 1997). Such changes may be seen as inevitable for the life conditions of a generation cannot be exactly the same with the life conditions of the next generation. In fact, the value of a culture may be assessed against this criterion. A culture continues to live as long as it is flexible enough to give adaptive responses to the changing conditions of life.

Undoubtedly, the interviewees were well educated enough to appreciate this fact. To paraphrase, we should note that the interviewees had similar reflexes against rapid transformations of society with those of conservatives all around the world. They did not favor revolutionary changes, as is the case in classical and neo-conservatism (see Kendall and Carey, 1964; Kirk, 1982; Meyer, 1964; Scruton, 1980). However, the danger they perceived here was not something flourishing from their conservative character. Rather, they talked about the cultural components that could not be dismissed at the present global context. In the interviewees' opinion, abolishing some components might provide no help other than destroying the consciousness of Turkdom. For example, state and the respect for the state authority were important components of Turkish culture. However, the interviewees argued, the compradors had been trying to present the state as an obstacle before the development of people as if the state and society were two distinct entities. Mainly, they argued that Turks were collectivist people and the state was the embodiment of this collectivist character. When you attacked and dropped the rank of state in the eye of its subjects, you would not help Turkish people. On the contrary, you would leave them without one of their most important social motives. In this way, they

üyeyi de olamaz. Çünkü insanın ırk olarak bir millettten olması pek birşey ifade etmez. Hatta hiçbir şey ifade etmez. Bir millettten olmak demek o milletin harsına, medeniyetine sahip olmak, böylece oradaki insanlar gibi düşünmek, hissetmek ve davranmak demektir. Dahası, şu veya bu şekilde insan bir kültürü yaşamak da zorundadır. Çünkü kültür, insanı hayvandan farklı kılan şeylerin toplamıdır. Yani, kültürden soyutlanmış bir insanın hayvandan bir farkı yoktur... Türk milletini yok etmek isteyenler, çok uzun zamandan beri, insanlarımızı kendi kültürlerinden koparmaya çalışmaktadır. Maalesef, bu politikalarında oldukça başarılı da olmuşlardır. Artık, bir nesil kendinden önceki bir nesli zorlukla anlayabilmektedir. Nesillerin dilleri, arzuları, inançları, zihniyetleri birbirinden öyle farklılaşmıştır ki tarihsel süreklilik dediğimiz şey o babasıydı, bu da onun oğlu demenin ötesinde birşey ifade etmeyecek duruma gelmiştir. (INTERVIEWEE 19)

would become pushed toward immorality, which could not be acceptable for any society in the world.¹⁷

When cultural values are concerned, political ideologies inevitably enter into the discussion. The interviewees seemed to harshly oppose the ideologies invented in the West. In this regard, they were against not only communism but also capitalism, liberalism, fascism, and all other ideologies of Western origin. Indeed, this was a motto of *ülkü*cü group in the 1970s, “Down with communism, fascism, and all sorts of imperialism”. They looked at all these ideologies as products of definite cultural contexts. Since particular incidents accompanied with particular values led to their developments, the efforts to apply them directly into the Turkish culture would be condemned to fail. More importantly, all these political ideologies carried important tenets and values inconsistent with the Turkish culture. For this reason, their application in Turkey would signify abolishing Turkdom. As a matter of fact, *Türkeş* (1995b) affirmed these as the

¹⁷ Türklerin en ayırd edici özelliklerinden biri güçlü cihan devleti kurabilme kabiliyetleridir. Birleştirici, bütünleştirici bir devletin bayrağı altında teşkilatlanma konusunda çok becerikli insanlarıdır. Bugün alay konusu olan bu durum esasında tek övünç kaynağımız olmalıdır. Dedelerimizin güçlü olmasının arkasında yatan neden de budur. Avrupa bir sürü prenslik arasındaki bitmek tükenmek bilmeyen savaşların kıskacındayken, bizim dedelerimiz devletlerini de arkalarına alarak dıştan gelebilecek muhtemel her türlü tehdit için hazır bir şekilde beklemekteydiler... Bugün devlet teşkilatımızın birçok zayıflıkları olduğu doğrudur. Ancak, bu zayıflıklar bizim devletimize olan sevgimiz ve saygımızdan kaynaklanmamaktadır. Ehil olmayan devlet yetkilileri bu zayıflıkları devlet makinesinin içine enjekte etmişlerdir. Mesela, populist politikalar devleti baştan ayağa memur ve işçi doldurmuştur. Bu memur ve işçi sayısı arttıkça da gereksiz bürokratik işlemler artmıştır. Çalışana iş lazımdır. Bir anlamda, gerekli gereksiz bir sürü adama gerekli gereksiz bir sürü iş üretilmiştir. Demek istediğim, devlet değil onu yönetenler suçlanmalıdır. Milliyetçi, yurdunu, vatanını seven kadrolar iş başına geldiğinde, bu sorunlar kolayca çözülebilir... (INTERVIEWEE 05)

Biz her zaman devletimize karşı derin duygular beslemişizdir. Bugün birileri bu duyguların, ilerlemenin önünde engel teşkil ettiğini iddia ediyor. Halbuki, sadece biz değil, atalarımız da her zaman devletlerini kendi hayatlarından daha üstün saymışlardır. Dolayısıyla, devlete bu denli saygılı olmanın bizi gerilediğini ileri sürmenin herhangi bir mantığı yoktur çünkü bu mantıkla atalarımız altı ya da yedi yüzyıl boyunca dünyanın tek hakimi olmuşlardır. Dahası, ne zaman ehil olmayan insanları üst düzeylere atamaya başlamışsak, o zaman bizim de inişe geçmemiz başlamıştır. Yani, devlet ikinci plana atıldığında, ki ehil olmayan insanlar bunu yapmışlardır, çökme sürecimiz başlamıştır. Bir açıdan, bu durum Türklerin kurtuluşunun kendi devletlerinde yattığını göstermektedir. Devleti aşındırmaya çalışmak Türk insanına değil, kaçınılmaz olarak Türk'ün düşmanlarına yarayacaktır... (INTERVIEWEE 02)

incentive behind the development of the *ülkü* doctrine: Nine Lights. We can trace his thought in the following quotations.¹⁸

As we told, *ülkü* doctrine can be regarded as a reaction against these ideologies. For this reason, we shall have more to say about the Western ideologies later in different sections.

Another important cultural institution perceived in danger by the interviewees was Turkish language. This threat was articulated under three headings. Firstly, the interviewees were very disparaging concerning the purification efforts in language. For them, the purification in language would lead people to lose the connection between present and the past. Since language was a historical entity, they argued, when you made artificial, substantial changes, its function of transmitting culture from generation to generation would vanish. Though there might be some goodwill behind these efforts, most of the proponents of the purification expected evil consequences from this policy. The interviewees believed that the main aim of these proponents had been to disconnect

¹⁸ Sosyalizm, komünizm, kapitalizm, faşizm ve benzeri diğer ideolojilerin hepsi Türk insanına yabancısıdır. Bu ideolojiler Türk insanının sorunlarına yabancısıdır. Bunlar İngiltere’de, Almanya’da ya da diğer Batı ülkelerinde yaşayan insanların sorunlarına çözüm bulmak için geliştirilmiştir. Bu ideolojileri kurgulayan teorisyenler gerek yazılarını yazarken, gerekse diğer faaliyetlerinde kafalarında Türkiye ile ilgili hiçbir kaygı taşımamışlardır. Bu halde, bu tür ideolojilerin Türkiye’nin özel sorunlarına uygulanması nasıl mümkün olabilir? (INTERVIEWEE 02)

Batıyı taklit etmek bizde bir hastalık olmuş ve bu hastalıktan çok uzun zamandan beri muzdaribiz. Bu hastalığın etkilerini en iyi ideolojiler alanında gözlemek mümkün. Karl Marks’ın, Thomas Madison’un veya John Locke’un uğraşları, bu uğraşlarının sonucunda ürettikleri gerçekten takdire şayan şeyler... Böyle devasa teorileri nasıl ürettikleri çok iyi incelenmeli. Ne var ki, bizim okumuş yazmış kesim hiçbir zaman süreçle uğraşmamışlardır. Onlar sadece muhtevayı almakla meşguldür ve bu muhtevayı almaya öyle heveslidirler ki... Neden? Çünkü muhtevayı almak kolaydır... Neden? Çünkü bu adamların kalıcı şeyler üretecek kapasitesi yok, zamanı kurtarmaya çalışıyorlar... Neden? Çünkü bunların derdi üzüm yemek değil, bağcıyı dövmek... Bir milletin kurtuluşu içsel dinamiklerinde saklıdır. Eğer bir millet kendini kurtaracak gerekli yeteneklere sahip değilse, zaten yok olmaya mahkumdur... (INTERVIEWEE 13)

Eğer sen kendini düşünmüyorsan, senin düşmanların seni niye düşünsün ki? Allah, panzehiri zehirin içinde yaratır. Türk insanının sorunları Türk insanının zihninde yatmaktadır, başka bir yerde değil. Dolayısıyla, bu sorunların çözümü de Türk insanının zihninde aranmalıdır. Eğer sorunlarımızın çözümü bizim düşmanlarımızın elindeyse, bize neden versinler ki? Çarpıcı bir örnek vereyim. İstiklal Savaşı zamanlarında, bazı insanlar İngiliz himayesine girerek Türkiye’nin kurtulacağını düşünüyorlardı. Gel gör ki, ülkeyi işgal edenler zaten İngilizlerdi. Bu adamların zihniyeti ülke geneline hakim olsaydı ne olacaktı? Sömürülen, resmen sömürge olarak ilan edilen birçok devletten sadece biri olurduk. Ancak, biz ne yaptık? Bu saldırgan, sömürgeci devletlere karşı büyük bir zafer kazandık. Çünkü atalarımız, Amasya Tamiminde ülkeyi Türk insanının kararlılığından başka hiçbir şeyin kurtaramayacağını ilan etmişlerdi... (INTERVIEWEE 14)

the present and future generations from a magnificent past and to leave Turkish youth with a history that began only in 1923. In this regard, INTERVIEWEE 15 said the following.¹⁹

Above, we noted that Turkish nationalism might be thought as a kind of cultural nationalism. These quotations show that the interviewees were not bothered from non-national additions into the culture. Rather, they were critical of the attempts to impoverish cultural elements. When such attitudes for and against purification in language were brought into the realm of intergroup relations, different words to refer to the same meaning seemed to have started. In this regard, what INTERVIEWEE 16 said may be interesting.²⁰

¹⁹ Biz dünyanın en mobil milletlerinden biriyiz. Binyıllar süren tarihimiz boyunca oradan oraya göç etmiş, değişik coğrafyaları yurt edinmişiz. Gittiğimiz her yerde oranın yerleşik kültürleriyle sıkı bir temas içine girmişiz. Bazıları bizim gittiğimiz her yerde savaştan başka bir şey yapmadığımızı, dünyanın her yerine kan ve şiddeti götürdüğümüzü iddia ediyorlar. Bu bir talihsizliktir. Biz her zaman güçlü medeniyete sahip bölgelere doğru göç etmişiz ve buradaki medeniyetlerden muhtelif kültürel unsurlar asimile etmişiz... Türk kültüründe bozkırın, Çin'in, İran'ın, Bizans'ın, ve tabii ki, İslamın izleri kolaylıkla gözlenebilir... Ne var ki, bütün bu keşmekeş içinde ortaya çıkan şey, bir Türk kültürüdür çünkü bu kültüre sahip olan milletin adı Türk'tür... Dil bir kültürün en önemli ögesidir. Diğer medeniyetlerin etkisinin dil üzerinde de yansımaları olacağı şüphe götürmez. Eğer diğer medeniyetlerden geçen etkiler bir milletin yaşamı için işlevsel olmasaydı, bu etkiler herhangi bir müdahaleye gerek kalmadan kaybolurdu. Cumhuriyet döneminde ortaya çıkan sadeleştirme çabaları Türk kültürünün diğer medeniyetlerle alışverişini göz ardı eden bir red çabasıdır. Bu yüzden de saçmadır... Osmanlılar zamanında İstanbul çevresindeki eğitimli kişilerin kullandığı dil ile milletin kullandığı dil arasında büyük bir uçurum vardı. O dönemin eğitimli kişileri Farsça ve Arapçadan çok etkilenmişlerdi. Çünkü bu dillerin Türkçe'den çok daha zengin bir edebiyatları vardı. Ancak, zaman geçtikçe, dil oturmaya başladı ve gerek Arapçadan gerekse Farsçadan birçok kelime çok başarılı bir şekilde Türkçe tarafından özümsemi. Sonrasında, Cumhuriyet döneminde, Osmanlı-İslam geçmişimizi bizim hayatımızdan kazıyıp çıkarmayı arzulayan bir grup, sadeleştirme politikasını başlattı. Aslında, bu sadeleştirme politikasını savunanların Türkçülükle hiçbir ilgisi yoktu. Hatta, bu adamlardan bazılarının asılları itibarıyla Türk olmadıkları da herkesin malumudur. Bu sadece dış güçlerin tezgahladığı bir oyundu. Bu hainlerin niyeti de dilin sadeleştirilmesi kisvesi altında genç nesilleri kendi parlak geçmişlerine yabancılaştırmaktı... (INTERVIEWEE 19)

²⁰ Komünistler milliyetçiliği reddeder. Onlara göre, milliyetçilik burjuvazinin icadından başka birşey değildir. Halbuki, Türkiye'ye baktığımızda, görüyoruz ki, komünistler dil alanında çok farklı şeyler söylüyor. Türkçede Türkçe dışında kelimelerin kullanılmaması gerektiğini, bundan dolayı da, bütün Arapça ve Farsça kökenli kelimelerin dilden atılması gerektiğini ileri sürüyorlar. Bu ne perhiz, bu ne lahana turşusu! Şüphesiz, bu hainlerin milliyetçiliklerinin dil söz konusu olduğunda kıpırdanmaya başladığını düşünmek saflıktır. Aslında, bu adamlar Türk kültürüne bir bütün olarak karşıdirlar. Bu iddialarıyla da Türk kültürünün en önemli parçasını, yani Türkçeyi bozmayı hedeflemektedirler...

Indeed, the policy of purification has been associated with leftist cadres and the reason behind this policy was to disconnect people from the Ottoman past and to create a totally novel culture (Çolak, 2000). However, no matter how much this policy served Turkism, the belief in historical continuity was an important component in *ülcücü* doctrine and the Ottoman period was regarded as the brightest period of Turkdom. For this reason, a policy based on the denial of Ottoman period would never be acceptable for *ülcücü*. Rather, when explicit compradors of Russia, namely the communists, gave support to this policy, *ülcücü*' related unfavorable attitude seems to have become more extreme. In a sense, being against purification has turned into an important component of *ülcücü* social identity.

The interviewees lamented that there was another threat not as direct as the policy of purification, yet not less dangerous. In fact, this threat had a closer relation with the cultural imperialism we have been discussing so far. According to the interviewees, learning foreign languages or using foreign words in everyday life turned into a fashion in Turkey.²¹

Komünistlerle ayrılıklarımız o düzeye gelmişti ki bizim "cevap" dediğimize onlar "yanıt" diyorlardı. Bizim "millet" dediğimize onlar "ulus" diyorlardı. Ecevit "acele" kelimesini kullanmayı bırakmış, bunun yerine "ivedi" diye bir kelime icad etmişti. İşin en kötü ve kışkırtıcı yanı, komünistlerin bizim dil kullanımımızı kendilerine bir reaksiyon olarak lanse ediyor olmasıydı. Var olanı reddedip ortaya çıkan kendileriydi, reaksiyon gösterense bizdik. Bunun gibi, mantığı allak bullak eden bir dönemdi. Dönemdi dediğime bakıp bugün durumun değiştiğini anlatmak istediğimi sanma. Hiçbirşey değişmedi. Aslında yüzyıllardan beri keyfiyet olarak değişen birşey yok... Aslında biz onlara reaksiyon göstermiyorduk, sadece milletin kullandığı kelimeleri kullanıyorduk. Biz sadece Türk insanının temel değerlerini temsil etmeye çalışıyorduk. Millete herhangi birşey dayatmıyorduk. Sosyal mühendisliğe hevesli olanlar esasında komünistlerin kendileriydi. Devlette yerleşik olan jakoben kadroyla ittifak halindeydiler ve sadeleştirme politikasına destek vermeye çalışıyorlardı. Çünkü hem onlar hem de bu jakoben kadrolar milletin kendisine, varolduğu şekliyle düşmandı... (INTERVIEWEE 04)

²¹ Günlük konuşmada bile yabancı kelime kullanmak moda haline geldi. Bir nevi entelektüellik göstergesi oldu. Bazıları işi o derece abartıyor ki mükemmel bir Türkçe karşılığı olmasına rağmen İngilizce kelime kullanmayı tercih ediyor. Bazı semtlerde, dükkanının ismini Türkçe koyamıyorsun. Buna karşı bir kanun yok ama sosyal hayatın içinde bu bir norm halini almış. Bu semtlerde yürüyüşe çıktığında Türkiye'de miyim yoksa yabancı bir ülkede mi diye düşünmeden edemiyorsun. Bazı şirketler iş ilanlarını İngilizce veriyorlar. Öyle görünüyor ki yakında bakkal manav da yanında çalıştırdığı çıraktan İngilizce bilmesini koşul olarak dayatacak... (INTERVIEWEE 17)

Undoubtedly, the interviewees were not against learning foreign language, they were against the motive behind learning them.²²

The interviewees argued that the youth started to cease to care for Turkish. As a result, uncanny groups having no relation with Turkish culture started to emerge. These groups did not take pleasure in listening to Turkish music, reading Turkish novels, and the like. In other words, Turkish high culture did not appeal to these youngsters. Instead, they were moved by the Western arts and literature. The interviewees explained this by the help of the concept of “alienation”. Since members of a nation would not be insensitive to the high culture produced by their fellow artists and people of literature, these youngsters must have been alienated to their own culture.²³

The last threat against Turkish language was political more than cultural. The official language in Turkey is Turkish but there are people whose mother tongues are Kurdish, Circassian, or Laz. The interviewees complained that there were efforts to make these languages official, too. They saw these efforts as a threat against the unity of

²² Kişisel olarak, ben yabancı dil öğrenilmesine karşı değilim. Yıllar önce İngilizce öğrendim ve o günden bugüne hiçbir zararını görmedim. Ben çocuklarımların bir değil birkaç yabancı dil öğrenmesini istiyorum. Ama burada söz konusu olan, bizim karşı olduğumuz nokta bu değil. Aslında, o İngilizce ya da Fransızca biliyor görüntüsü vermeye çalışanlar bu dilleri doğru dürüst bilmiyorlar da... En azından, bildiğini ima etmeye çalıştığı dili, yeterli düzeyde bilmiyor. Yine de, biliyormuş gibi yapma ihtiyacı duyuyor. Neden? Bana göre, bu insanlar diğer insanları yabancı dil bildiklerine inandırılırsa bir nevi sosyal statü, bu statü her neyse, kazanacaklarını sanıyor. Daha da önemlisi, diğer insanlar da bu insanlara ulaşmaya çalıştıkları sosyal statüyü de veriyor. Belki tam açıklayamıyorum ama yabancı dil konuşma yetisi başlı başına bir değer olarak alkışlanmaya başladıysa burada bir sorun var demektir. (INTERVIEWEE 07)

²³ Gençlerin birçoğu Batı müziğini, sinemasını, veya romanını yerel edebiyata ve sanata tercih ediyor... Gerçi ben de bunlardan biriyim ama ben genç değilim... Yani, bu gençler Batı sanatından daha fazla zevk alıyorlar. Bu bir fenomen ama bunu onaylıyorum. Elbette ki her üst kültür ürünü, evrensel güzellikler taşır. Bundan dolayı da, bütün milletlerin fertlerine hitap edebilir. Ama biz böyle birşeyden konuşmuyoruz. Bu gençler sadece ama sadece Batı sanatından zevk alıyor. Kendi milletinin sanatından, edebiyatından zevk almıyor. Diğer bir deyişle, artık bu gençler kendi milletinin yüksek kültürünün ürünlerindeki güzellikleri algılayamıyor. Bazı sanat ve edebiyat dallarında gerçekten berbatız ama Münir Nurettin Selçuk'tan Aziz İstanbul'u dinlerken zevk alamayan birine nasıl Türk denilir ben bilemiyorum. Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar'ın Beş Şehir'ini eline alıp da sonuna kadar okumadan bırakan birine, bu kitaptaki dilin kullanımının güzelliğini anlayamayan birine Türk denilebilir mi?... (INTERVIEWEE 10)

Turkey. Especially, the experience of PKK seems to have made the interviewees more suspicious about Kurdish.²⁴

Apart from the language, the religion of Turk, that is Islam, was also in danger. It should be noted that religion was regarded as a defining component of nation in Turkish nationalism (Gökalp, 1968, 1976). Indeed, religion provided a society with many of its cultural norms (see Ridgeway, 1983). The interviewees particularly pointed to the role of religion, Islam in our case, in Turkish identity. They held that Turks had been historically united with Islam. One could not distinguish the contributions of Islam into Turkish culture.²⁵

The interviewees stressed that Islam was another cultural component threatened by the activities of compradors. For them, in the guise of secularism, these compradors tried to eradicate all traces of Islam from the social lives of Turkish people.²⁶

²⁴ Bazı bölücüler anadilde eğitim hakkından söz ediyor. Buna göre, Kürt vatandaşlarımız da eğitimlerini Kürtçe alacaklardır. Bunu ne izleyecek? Bundan sonra da kendi kaderini tayin hakkından söz edecekler. Dil, millet olmanın birincil faktörüdür. Belli yörelerimizde bir kısım insanlarımız sadece Kürtçe konuşmaktadır. Buna göre, bu insanlar Kürt milletinin birer üyesidirler. Dolayısıyla, kendi kaderini tayin hakkı ilkesine göre, bunlar kendi devletlerini de isteyeceklerdir. Eğer bir devletin hükümrانlığını kurduğu bir toprak parçası yoksa devlet de yok demektir. Dolayısıyla, bu insanların bir toprak parçasına da ihtiyaçları olacaktır. Güneydoğu Anadolu bölgesinde yaşayan insanların çoğu Kürt olduğuna göre, buradaki topraklar neden kurulacak Kürt devletine bırakılmasın ki?... Diğer bir deyişle, sonuçta Türkiye bölünecektir. (INTERVIEWEE 20)

²⁵ Bin yıldan beri Türkler İslamın bayraktarlığını yapıyorlar. Türk adı İslam ile öyle özdeşleşmiş ki Avrupalılar eskiden Türk adını İslam dinini ifade etmek için kullanırlarmış. Gerçekten de, eski Türkler İslam dinini benimsedikten sonra eski yaşamlarına ait neleri var neleri yoksa hepsini terketmişler. Dahası, İslamı birincil kaynağından öğrenmiş ve öğrendiklerini sosyal hayatlarının her yönünde kullanmışlardır. Bu süreç binyıldan uzun bir süre sürmüştür. Sonuçta bizim toplumumuzda yaşandığı şekliyle İslam, Türk kültürünün vazgeçilemez bir parçası haline gelmiştir. Artık, ne bir ateistin ne de başka dinden birinin gerçek bir Türk olması söz konusu değildir. Gerçek bir Türk aynı zamanda gerçek bir müslümandır... Her müslüman Türk olmayabilir ama her Türk müslümandır... (INTERVIEWEE 04)

Bizim dinimize karşı derin bir saygımız vardır. Aslında, saygı kelimesi de bizim İslam ile olan ilişkimizi tam olarak karşılamıyor. Biz, İslam dininin mensuplarıyız. Bazı ülkücülerin İslam ilke ve kurallarını tam olarak yerine getiremedikleri doğrudur. Ama, bunun anlamı bizim müslüman olmadığımız değil, kötü bir müslüman olduğumuzdur... Türklük ve İslamlık birbirinden ayrılamaz iki kavramdır. İslamın daha kapsayıcı olduğu da doğrudur ancak Türklük bütünüyle İslam dairesinin içerisindedir. Bundan dolayı da, İslam dairesinden çıkan biri, Türklük çemberini de terketmiş demektir. (INTERVIEWEE 15)

²⁶ Batının uşakları onaltıncı yüzyıldan bu yana İslama karşı sistemli bir saldırı başlatmıştır. Çünkü İslam irili ufaklı birçok devleti, milleti bir araya getiren bir bağ oluşturmuyordu. Bu bağın somutlaştığı konum ise Osmanlı hilafeti idi. Bundan dolayı da Osmanlı'daki işbirlikçiler daha sistemli bir çalışmayla İslama zarar vermeye

The interviewees pointed to a novel mentality as a consequence of this policy. They called this mentality as Batı hayranlığı “Admiration of the West”. This admiration was so deep that, in a sense, the West turned into a touchstone that discriminated between right and wrong. In other words, the Republic seemed to have replaced religion with the West.²⁷

In this context, the interviewees were very critical of the concept çağdaşlık (contemporariness). They found this concept vague and argued that Kemalists and other state elites never wanted to erase this vagueness from the concept. For this vagueness yielded them a powerful weapon that could be used against anyone at anytime. Mere

uğraşıyorlardı. Cumhuriyetin kurulmasından sonra birçok olay bahane edilerek, devletin laikliği resmi olarak benimsemesine de dayanılarak İslam karşıtı eylemler had safhaya ulaştı... Ne zaman insanlar dinlerine biraz daha hevesle sarılmaya başladıysa hemen güce başvurarak bu insanların önleri ve birçok durumda başları kesildi. Amaç, Türk insanını bir araya getiren en önemli unsurlardan biri olan dini, hayatın merkezinden uzaklaştırmak, mümkünse insanların kalbinden de silip atmaktır. Böylece ahlaksız bir nesil yetiştirilecek, hiçbir ahlaki değeri olmayan bu nesil de ülkeyi Türklük düşmanlarının istediği gibi yönetecekti... (INTERVIEWEE 08)

Türkiye’de din kadar saldırılan başka hiçbir kurum yoktur. Sırf bu yüzden üç kez askeri darbe yapılmıştır. 28 Şubat’ı da katarsak bu darbelerin sayısı dört eder. Tüm dünyada acayip acayip istekleri olan marjinal gruplar vardır. Bunlara bakılarak devlet politikaları belirlenmez. Yok falanca dini tarikat şunu yapıyormuş, yok falanca nurcu grup bunu yapıyormuş, yok bu yılanın başı küçükken ezilmezse yarın Türkiye’ye şeriat gelirmiş. Böyle palavralarla sadece dinini yaşamaya çalışan milyonları mağdur etmişlerdir. Milletimiz dini bütün, dinine saygılı bir millettir. Eğer kamu kurumlarına başörtülülerin girmesi yasaklanıyorsa, bunun Cuma grubu ya da aczmendiler gibi marjinal gruplar için yapılmadığını anlayacak kadar sağduyuludur da... (INTERVIEWEE 10)

²⁷ İnsanlara doğru ile yanlış göstermede en etkin kurum dindir. Bu Batıda da Doğuda da bütün dünyada böyledir. Sadece bizim Batı hayranları hariç... Bunlar için Batı neyi yapıyorsa doğru, neyi yapmıyor ya da neyi yapmayı terkettiye yanlıştır. Modernizmin dünyayı hakimiyeti altına almaya başlamasından bu yana bizim gibi ülkelerin hepsinde bu tür soytarılar çıkmıştır. Ama bugün diğer ülkelerde gülünç hikayeler olarak anlatılan şeylerin çok daha şiddetlisi Türkiye’de yaşanmış, hala da yaşanmakta... Avrupa’dan damızlık erkek getirme fikrinden tut, boşta kalmış Avrupa prenslerinden birini getirip ülkeyi yönetme fikrine kadar her tür deli zırvası bu ülkede makul fikirler olarak tartışılmış... Bugün belki bu kadar radikal teklifler yok ama bu sadece bir nicelik meselesi. Keyfiyet hala aynı. Aynı zihniyet, aynı anlayış devam ediyor. Bir sorunla karşılaşılıyorlar. Efendim İtalya’da benzer bir sorun vardı, şöyle hallettiler biz de öyle yapalım diyorlar. Böyle bir talebe karşı en güçlü argüman ise benzeri bir soruna daha güçlü bir Batı ülkesinden örnek getirmekle yapılabilir. Kimsenin aklına kendi bünyemize uygun, kendi iç dinamiklerimizi, yani Türklüğünü, İslamı kullanarak bir çözüm üretme fikri gelmiyor. Bu gayri meşru. Meşru olan Batılıların yaptığı gibi yapmak... İşin en vahim tarafı. Dini de bu duruma getirdiler. Avrupa dinde reform yaptı, yükseldi. Biz de yapalım. Ne reformu yapacaklarsa. Dinle ne alakaları varsa... Avrupa’da din adamı sınıfı ortadan kalkmış ya da bütünüyle pasifize edilmiş, bizde de öyle olmalıymış. Sanki bizde bir din adamı sınıfı varmış ya da mevcut din adamlarının devlet işlerine bir müdahalesi varmış gibi... (INTERVIEWEE 07)

accusing someone or his ideas of deviating from contemporariness started to be perceived as a powerful argument on its own. Yet, most of the time, the meaning of the concept of contemporariness was equal to thinking, feeling and behaving like the Westerners do.²⁸

These threats against Turkish culture were important for the interviewees as the abolishment of these cultural components brought about a mentality facilitating to be captive in the hands of external powers. For them, when people were devoid of moral support, they could not resist against material difficulties. The cultural components mentioned above provided people with such a support. Only, in this way, people kept working for their own country.²⁹

The interviewees believed that the compradors had also been exploiting Turkey's struggle for the membership to European Community. In other words, they thought that the compradors had been using this Community as a means of cultural imperialism. They argued that European Community was shown as the last chance of Turkey, and as a result, people were persuaded to accept all terms that had numerous anti-national

²⁸ Biz de cumhuriyetçiyiz. Bana kalırsa Türkiye'de herkes cumhuriyetçi. Ama bizim çağdaş, laik cumhuriyetçi olmadığımız kesin. Bu vurgulama sıklıkla yapılır ve vurgulamayı yapana baktığımızda ya eski bir komünist militan ya da halkla uzaktan yakından alakası olmayan, kendi fildişi kulesinde rahat rahat yaşayan, Türkiye'nin bugüne kadar yaşadığı sıkıntılardan pek nasibini almamış bir kadın ya da kadından pek farkı olmayan bir erkek bozuntusu olduğunu görüyoruz... Demek ki bizim cumhuriyet ne çağdaş ne de laik. Yani, biz başka cumhuriyetlerden söz ediyoruz. Zaten ne zaman çağdaşlık ve laiklik kavramı ayrı ayrı ya da bir arada kullanılarak söze başlanırsa bunun ardında bir çapanoğunun yattığını bileceksin. Gerçekten de bugüne kadar laiklik ya da çağdaşlığın ne olduğunu kimse tam olarak anlatamamış ve anlayamamıştır. Ama zaman içinde sizdeki Pavlov'un köpeklerine öğrettiği şekilde bu kavramların anlamını da öğrendik. Bunun anlamı birazdan bağcı dayak yemeye başlayacak demektir. Bunun anlamı yine milletin içine düşmanlık ve nefret tohumu atılmaya çalışılacak demektir... Bu laik kesimin de hepsi hin değil, bazı safları da var... Bunlar için çağdaşlık Batılılık demek. Batılı gibi yaşamak... Bunu da göğsünü gere gere söylerler. Eğer Batılılaşacaktıksa Atatürk'ün milliyetçilik dediği şey neyin milliyetçiliği ki acaba?... (INTERVIEWEE 04)

²⁹ Millet olma bilincini yitirmiş bir insan topluluğunun diğer milletler karşısında başarıma şansı sıfırdır. Batılıların tüm doğu toplumlarına karşı yürüttükleri kültür emperyalizminin ardında da bu gerçek yatmaktadır. Kendi milletin değerlerinden kopmuş biri için artık hayatın maddiyat dışında herhangi bir anlamı kalmamıştır. Tabii, bazıları ruhlarını tam yitirmediklerinden huzuru başka bir maneviyat bularak gidermeye çalışıyor. Bunları dışarıda tutuyorum. Ama normal insan hırsına sahip biri için önceki söylediğim söz geçerlidir. Bunlar maddiyat dışında birşeye önem vermemeye başlarlar. Maddiyat Batıda ise Batının, Doğuda ise Doğunun borusunu çalarlar. Bugün bazı araştırmacılar söylüyor. İmkani olsa memleketteki önemli oranda bir insan kitlesi yurtdışında bir ülkede yaşamak istermiş. Yani, Türkiye'den kaçmak isterlermiş. Belki bu iyi bir örnek değil ama belki bu da bu insan kitlesinin kendi vatanına yabancılaşmasını gösteriyor. Yani, gidip Almanya'da Amerika'da ikinci, üçüncü sınıf vatandaş olmayı Türkiye'de birinci sınıf vatandaş olmaya tercih edebiliyor... (INTERVIEWEE 20)

implications. If these terms were accepted, they commented, Turkey would be divided into two or three states and her rights of sovereignty would disappear completely.³⁰

The interviewees believed that most of the people in Turkey were ignorant. Their ignorance enabled these imperialist policies to be extremely effective. Though the interviewees did not doubt the sincerity of people, they complained about the narrowness of the sources of information people deliberately exposed themselves to. For this reason,

³⁰ Bu işbirlikçiler gerek ekonomik açıdan gerekse siyasi açıdan Türkiye'yi öyle açmazlarla doldurdular ki, ilk bakışta Türkiye'nin kendi iç dinamikleriyle bu felaketlerden kurtulması mümkün değil gibi gözüküyor. Hem iç hem de dış borçlar gırtlığı aşmış, yatırım denilen şeyin zerresi yok, nüfus gün geçtikçe artıyor, ekonomi olduğu yerde bile saymıyor, geriye gidiyor. Bunları sıralamanın anlamı yok. Milleti öyle aç bir hale getiriyorlar ki, sonuçta değil üye olarak bir topluluğa girip bu dertlerden kurtulmayı istemek... Amerika, Almanya gelse de bizi bu dertlerden kurtarsa, bağımsızlık falan istemiyoruz diyecek hale getirdiler... Tabii, AB de tam bu sırada devreye giriyor. Efendim, bize üye olabilmemiz için şu şu şartları yerine getirmeniz lazım. Sanki, kendileri aynı şartları yerine getirmiş ülkelermiş gibi... Şartların içinde neler yok ki. Kürt devletinin kurulmasından tutun da, Kıbrıs'ın Rumlara teslim edilmesine kadar her şey... Kısaca, Sevr antlaşmasında yer alan hükümleri bundan seksen sene sonra yerine getirmemizi istiyorlar... Demokratikleşmenin, hukuk devleti olmanın kimseye zararı olmaz kardeşim. Ama bu meretler devleti bölmeksizin, toprak kaybetmeksizin olmaz mı dediğimizde, işinize gelirse diyorlar. Valla, benim işime gelmiyor... (INTERVIEWEE 06)

Avrupa Birliği'nin Türkiye'yi üye yapacağı falan yok. Belki zamanla yaparlar ama o zaman da Türkiye açısından bu üyeliğin bir anlamı kalır mı bunu bilemem... Biz yıllarca Avrupa'nın efendiliğini yapmışız. Bunların yarısı bağımsızlıklarını elimizden ancak onsekizinci, ondokuzuncu yüzyıllarda alabilmişler. Diğer yarısı da daha düne kadar bize vergi ödüyormuş... Onlar hristiyan, biz müslüman. Bugüne kadar din adına yaptığımız savaşların haddi hesabı yok. Adamlar çocuklarını Türkler geliyor diye korkutuyor. Ondan sonra da bize bu adamların Türkiye'yi kendilerinden biri saydığı, kurdukları ekonomik-siyasi oluşumun içine alacakları masalı anlatılıyor. İnsanlar buna nasıl inanıyor, ben anlamıyorum... Tabii, bu adamların arasına girebilmemiz için bazı değişimlerden geçmemiz de gerekiyor. Hani, alacaklar dediysek o kadar da değil. Peki, bu şartlar nedir? Bakıyoruz, görüyoruz ki kısaca hem Türklükten hem de İslamlıktan çıkmamız gerekiyor... Peki, o zaman alacaklar mı? O zaman bile alacağız demiyorlar, belki diyorlar. Yahu, bunun bir oyun olduğunu anlamak bu kadar zor mu? (INTERVIEWEE 04)

Avrupa Birliği üyeliği hainlerin en büyük dayanak noktası haline geldi. Yok Kopenhag kriterleri, yok bilmem ne diyerek açıkça bölücülüğe, Türkçülüğe, İslamcılığa karşı konuşulmaya başlandı. En önemli değerlerimizden vazgeçmemiz gerektiği konusunda milletimizi ikna etmeye yönelik müthiş bir kampanya başlatıldı... Bazıları şahsi menfaatlerini diğer milletlerin siyasi emelleriyle tevhid etti. Gözleri hırstan hiçbir şeyi görmez oldu. Dün vatansever, milliyetçi olduğunu bildiğimiz çevreler bile bu hainlerin söylediklerinde mantıklı bir şeyler bulmaya başladı. İktidarda kalmak için memleketi satmakta bir beis görmemeye başladı... Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne falan alınacağı yok. Bunların hepsi masal, adam kandırmaca... İyi niyetli olsalar, hiç üyelik işini bu kadar yokuşa vururlar mıydı?... (INTERVIEWEE 09)

they argued, people in Turkey were subjected to a one-way communication whose main function was to brainwash people.³¹

In view of their above-mentioned concerns, the interviewees envisaged an education program that alerted people against such threats. Surely, this was an ideological education. We shall see the basic principles of this education in the next section. So far, we have dealt with the interviewees' concern with the threats against Turkish state and Turkish culture. We saw that they perceived a danger of high degree surrounding Turkey and Turkish people both from outside and inside.

This was the situation of Turkey as defined by the interviewees. Affective loadings within these perceptions were quite clear in the preceding quotations. The interviewees were very ill at ease with this situation. We shall devote the next section to their suggestions for solutions. Undoubtedly, we shall not deal with their suggestions directly related to real politics. Instead, we shall concentrate upon themes seeming to serve as the premises of *ölkücü* positioning. In a sense, we intend the following section to include the social axioms of *ölkücü* group.

2.3.1.2. Sacredness of Independence and Indigeneity

In the preceding section, we saw the interviewees deeming that the external foes of the Turkish nation and the internal compradors had been trying to deteriorate the Turkish state, break Turkish land into many pieces and do away with the consciousness of Turkdom and Islam. Though the concept does not fit in well with the *ölkücü* jargon, we preferred to label these threats as strategies of imperialism, which refers to a policy of exploiting or confiscating material and spiritual resources of other societies. Before the nation-states were taken under the guarantee of the United Nations in the middle of the

³¹ İnsanımız cahil. İnsanımız okumuyor, yazmıyor. Ama insanımız okumuş, yazmışı sever. İşte, bu durumu çok daha tehlikeli yapabiliyor. Yahu, ben bilmiyorum ama bu adam okumuş öğrenmiş, o biliyordur diyor ve bunların dediklerine olduğu gibi inanıyor... İnsanımızın çoğu zamanı televizyon başında geçiyor. Televizyon ister şarkısında olsun ister komedi dizisinde olsun, belli bir ideolojiyi insanımıza dayatıyor. Tabii, bunu anlamak için belli bir altyapı gerekli. İnsanımız bundan yoksun. Oradan ne veriliyorsa, pasif alıcı olarak bu verilenleri alıyor... Belli bir yaşı geçmiş, artık değişmesi imkansız olan kitle için bu pek bir sorun teşkil etmeyebilir ama genç dimağlar, henüz yolunu tespit etmemiş olanlar, kendine bir yol arayanlar için bu cahilce tutum çok etkili oluyor. Sonuçta, gittikçe kültüründen uzaklaşıyor. Acube bir tip oluyor... (INTERVIEWEE 13)

20th century, there had been a fervent competition among the European states to make other societies of the world dependent. Nationalist movements all around the Third World seem to have arisen out of a concern against the intrusions of European states (Anderson, 1983; Chatterjee, 1993; Smith, 1993). Mental development of Turkish nationalism appears to follow a similar course. For this reason, the notions of independence of the nation and sovereignty of the state without any conditions seemed to occupy an important place in the discourse of the interviewees.

The interviewees powerfully argued that a nation's independence or preserving the independence at hand was possible only by means of being powerful. When the era of exploitation started, nations living independently for centuries but lacking necessary material power to protect themselves from external intrusions had become the prey of powerful nations within a short time. Almost all people living in Asia, Africa, North and South America had become the property of Western exploiters. That's why, the interviewees concluded, Turkey needed to be powerful.

The interviewees believed that Turkey was indeed powerful. Her strategic location together with her surface and subsurface wealths gave her a unique power no international bloc could undermine. However, this power was also the soft abdomen of Turkey sheltering many risks from both the West and the North. The interviewees maintained that the enemies of Turkey did not want a strong Turkey in her region, and hence, they engaged in a series of conspiracies to break her power. These conspiracies were generally concerned with the threats against national and land unity of Turkey. The enemies wanted satellite states to be formed within and around Turkey so that an unstable state would be created in the region. Accordingly, Turkey would be weakened by endless struggles with these satellite states having no definitive consequence, as this had been the case in many Eastern and Middle-Eastern countries. Consequently, for the interviewees, the indivisibility of Turkish home was directly concerned with the national independence and comprised another crucial value in *ülküci* discourse.

At this context, it would be a mistake to think that there are only *ülküci*s depicting the situation of Turkey as such. Indeed, we can claim that the state itself carries similar worries. Likewise, the lawmaker in Turkey claimed these values as the basic ends and duties of the state in the Constitution (see Article 5 in the Constitution). In other words, it is de facto state that these values have been taken under the Constitutional guarantee.

Having been aware of this guarantee, the interviewees brought the concept of state to the fore.

State was the most important indicator of being independent. By definition, a nation without a state was under the sovereignty of another state. In other words, Turkish state symbolized the independence and the unity of Turkish nation. The interviewees seemed to believe that the existence of these values depended on the existence of Turkish state.

Apart from these beliefs in the political realm, the interviewees nourished some other important beliefs in the cultural realm. One of these beliefs was that foreign ideologies and thought systems would not adjust to the constitution of Turkish people. For this reason, they argued that Turkish nation should not turn her steps toward these imported ideologies, and instead, she should emphasize the main components of Turkish culture. The interviewees argued that ideas emerging from the nation herself, of course after these main components became widespread in society, should be appreciated. The remedies of the problems of Turkish nation would reside only within these ideas. As noted before in relation to identity, the Turkish culture consisted of two main components: Turkdom and Islam. A synthesis of these two components formed the basic structure of Turkish culture. If one of these components was absent, then Turkish culture was not present, either. Thus, these two components should be spread all around the country and young generations should be raised in terms of the principles arising from these two components. Below, we shall clarify these points in the accompaniment of quotations from the interviews.

2.3.1.2.1. Independence as the highest value of a nation

“Independence vs. slavery” seemed to be a basic dichotomy in the minds of the interviewees. However, independence in *ülküçü* jargon did not refer to a value belonging to isolated individuals. In other words, the interviewees did not take the notion of independence as an individual value as is the case for the notion of freedom in liberal thinking (see Yayla, 2000 for the utility of this notion in liberalism and other ideologies). Instead, they emphasized a communal understanding of independence. They talked about

the independence of nation(s). For them, one could not talk about individual freedom unless the whole nation was free of foreign intrusions of any kind.³²

When the concept of independence was concerned, the military character in ülkücü jargon appeared. Such slogans as “independence or death”, “it is better to die as free rather than to live as slave” seemed to be widely recognized beliefs.³³

It is clear that independence was a value that could be obtained only through struggle. The interviewees did not regard independence as a matter of being or an end-state. That is, there was no such thing that once you got your independence, you did not need to do anything about it anymore. They regarded independence as a matter of becoming. First, you got your independence, and then you tried to protect that independence. In short, struggle for independence, for the interviewees, seemed to be an endless process. This belief led to a perception that all members of the nation should act like soldiers. In the final analysis, the interviewees perceived all jobs as qualitatively similar. Making bread, making science or making war, all these should serve for the good

³² Türkes uşaklık etmek insani değlerlerle bağdaşmaz derdi. Elbette burada birisinin bir başkasının emrine girmesini ya da birisinin bir başkası için çalışmasını kastetmiyordu. Burada kastettiği bir milletin başka bir milletin boyunduruğu altına girmesiydi... Geçtiğimiz yüzyıllar bir milletin toptan nasıl esir edildiğinin örnekleriyle dolu. Senin milletin başka bir milletin esiriyken senin hür olman düşünülemez. Hangi özelliklere sahip olursan ol, hangi kabiliyetlere sahip olursan ol, eğer milletin hür değilse sen de hür olamazsın. Başka bir milletin sana vereceği değer ikinci, üçüncü sınıf vatandaşlıktan öte bir şey olmaz...

(INTERVIEWEE 14)

³³ Biz hiçbir milletin başka milletlere uşaklık etmesini, başka milletlerin kölesi olmasını istemiyoruz. Daha doğrusu, bizim gelecekle ilgili planlarımızda başka milletlere yönelik tehditkar bir tutum yok. Her millet kendi bölgesinde emniyet içinde olsun, diğer milletlerle işbirliği ve barış içinde yaşasın istiyoruz. Tabii, burada en çok istediğimiz de kendi milletimizin, yani Türk milletinin, hür olarak diğer milletlerle barış içinde yaşaması. Ne var ki, bu arzu bugün için sadece bir arzudan başka bir şey değil. Yakın gelecekte gerçekleşmesi de imkansız gözüküyor. Zira, diğer milletlerin üzerinden menfaat temin etmek durumunda olan devletler var. Bunların hemen hepsi de Türkiye üzerinde oyunlar oynuyor. Bizim yapmamız gereken bu oyunları bertaraf edecek kadar uyanık olmak ve bağımsızlığımızı korumak. Bağımsız olarak yaşadığımız en kötü şartlar, bağımlı bir köle olarak yaşadığımız en iyi şartlardan daha iyidir. Altından veya gümüşten de olsa, insanı esir eden zincir, sadece bir zincirdir... (INTERVIEWEE 08)

Türklerin en önemli özelliklerinden biri hür yaşamalarıdır. Tarih boyunca hiçbir milletin esiri olmamalarıdır. Mehmet Akif'in de dediği gibi, “Ben ezelden beridir hür yaşadım, hür yaşarım. Hangi çılgın bana zincir vuracakmış şaşarım...”. Diğer milletlerden farklı olarak biz, başka bir milletin esiri olmaktansa ölmeyi yeğleriz. Bu cesareti başka insanlarda bulamazsın... Bu kararlılığı tarihin değişik dönemlerinde defalarca göstermişizdir. Yakın tarihimizdeki İstiklal Savaşı buna en çarpıcı örnektir. Tüm dünyayı dize getiren, dünyanın hakimleri olduklarını ispat eden en büyük devletleri, bizi esir etmeye çalıştıkları anda, yenip yurdumuzdan kovmuşuzdur. Bugün çok basit gibi gözükse de bu olay, aslında, tüm Türklük tarihinin dönüm noktalarından biridir. (INTERVIEWEE 09)

or independence of the nation. We will have more to say about this idea later. For now, we can turn to another issue that derives from the idea of independence of the nation.

2.3.1.2.2. Unity of the motherland and the endlessness of the state

Motherland and state were two terms related to the concept of nation. The interviewees attributed some high emotional meanings to both of these terms. In their opinion, motherland did not seem to be a piece of land on which Turkish nation was living. Similarly, state did not seem to be an organization, which had some specific functions. Both motherland and state seemed to refer to some lofty entities in the minds of the interviewees. We can follow the tracks of this thinking in the ideas of late Ottoman thinkers. For example, Namık Kemal, known as the Vatan Şairi (Poet of Motherland), made a definition of motherland as follows:

The Vatan [motherland] does not consist of imaginary lines drawn on a map by the sword of a conqueror or the pen of a scribe. It is a sacred idea sprang from the union of many lofty sentiments, such as nation, freedom, welfare, brotherhood, property, sovereignty, respect for ancestors, love of family, memory of youth. (Cited in Lewis, 1992)

As for the state, it was probably a more important concept than motherland. Dündar Taşer (no date), who used to be a prominent member of the NAP, preferred to depict the mentalities of the Ottoman subjects as fena fi'd-devle, a concept borrowed and adapted from the concept of fena fi'l-lah in Islamic mysticism. By this concept, Taşer seemed to mean that the Ottoman people's identification with the state was so strong that they were willing to sacrifice their personalities for the sake of the state.

Surely, such a generalization would be true, at least, for those having a position in the state. Already, it is known that the main aim in forming the institution of kulluk was just to produce statesmen who were very loyal to the state and had no ties with persons and institutions other than the state (Berkes, 1972). According to Taşer, the Ottoman subjects took pride in the greatness of their state and were afraid of casting a little shadow on it. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that as if they had been worshipping the state. Attesting to Taşer, Kırşehirlioğlu (no date) generalized this mentality not only to the Ottomans but also to the earlier periods of Turks. According to him, state and Turk

had always been interconnected for “Başsız börk, ilsiz Türk olmaz” (There cannot be hat without head, Turk without state).

We noted that the late Ottoman thought is the foundation of Turkish nationalist thinking. Thus, it is not a surprise that the interviewees had a high perception of both the motherland and the state. And we also saw that the interviewees perceived these two concepts in a present jeopardy. As a reaction, they seemed to build on the ideals of undividable wholeness of motherland and the endlessness of the state.³⁴

The interviewees made similar evaluations for the state, too. To tell the truth, they never tended to discuss the value of these notions. In many cases, we had to ask why the unity of the nation and the country was so important, what happened if a Kurdish state was established in the Eastern parts of Turkey, if it was possible to be without state, and the like. In other words, for the interviewees, the values of the motherland and state were just taken for granted. They did not prefer to make a logical discussion about these terms, rather they concentrated on the issue that these high entities were in danger and they should be saved.³⁵

³⁴ Anadolu yaklaşık bin yıldan beri bizim vatanımızdır. Her ne kadar bizim varlık alanımız bundan çok daha geniş idiyse de, Birinci Dünya Savaşı bir dönüm noktası olmuş ve Osmanlının çok milletli bir devlet olması bahane edilerek Anadolu dışındaki Türk varlığı hemen hemen tamamen yok edilmiş veya esir edilmiştir. Esasında, Türklerin Anadolu'daki varlığı da yok edilmeye çalışılmışsa da bunda başarılı olamamışlardır. Bugün bu varlığı gayri meşru duruma getirme çabaları vardır. Türkiye'deki hainler de buna destek vermektedir. Sanki, biz buradan çıkacağız da Hititler, falan tekrar ortaya çıkacak gibi... Ancak, bunların entellektüel bir polemik olmaktan öteye gidecek yeri yok. Ne var ki, Türkiye üzerinde uyduruk uyduruk milletlerin varlığından bahsedip de bunların da kendi topraklarında hakları olduğu yönündeki telkinler ciddi tehditlerdir. Bu tehditler vatanın bütünlüğüne yöneliktir. Bölünmenin ise sonu yoktur. Dolayısıyla, göz ardı edilecek, adam sen de denilecek birşey değildir. Bütün milli güçlerle üstesinden gelinmesine çalışılacak bir tehlikeydir... (INTERVIEWEE 01)

Vatanın bütünlüğü tehlikeydedir. Ülkemizi bölmeye, milletimizi Rusyanın, Amerikanın ya da Avrupanın boyunduruğu altına sokmaya çalışan hainler vardır... Bunlarla mücadele tam da bu noktada hayati bir önem kazanmaktadır. Türk vatani bölünemez. Bunun tartışması olamaz. Böyle bir tartışmayı başlatmaya yönelik hiçbir hareket meşru değildir, meşru olamaz. Vatan hainliğinin ta kendisidir... Bu konunun akademiyle, ilimle, bilgiyle, falan alakası yoktur... Bu, bir milletin varoluş meseledir. Milletin varlığını devam ettirmesini ya da yok olmasını ilgilendirmektedir. Yani, mantık yürütmek, ahlaktan soyutlayarak bakmak gibi filozofvari düşünceler bu konuda geçersizdir. Biz yok olduktan sonra vatanımızın bölünmez bütünlüğü ile ilgili tartışmaların herhangi bir temeli olmadığını ileri sürmenin anlamı olamaz... (INTERVIEWEE 03)

³⁵ Türk devleti ve bu devletin tüm kurumları Türk milletinin uzantılarıdır. Esasında, Türk devleti Türklük bilincinin siyasi arenadaki somutlaşmış ifadesidir. Türkleri temsil etmektedir. Devlete yönelik her tür hakaret ve tehdit, millete yapılmış demektir.

As we noted, Turkish nationalism is the heir of the late Ottoman thought. So, the root of the ideas above should also be sought within that era. By the 17th century, Ottoman state entered into a stage of decline. The regression showed itself first in the battlefield. When the Ottoman army started to undergo defeats, the Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals became aware of the rooted change in the European states. We mentioned the high regard the Ottoman people held for their state. When these people realized that the state was in danger, they started to seek a solution. “How can this state be saved?” had become an ever-lasting question (Berkes, 1964; Kushner, 1977), and after that time, most of the learned Ottomans devoted themselves to trying to find an answer to this question. Turkish nationalism was just one of the answers produced for this question (Akçura, 1976). Since saving the state can be taken as the *raison d’être* of Turkish nationalism, it is understandable that the affective and behavioral components of *ülkü* attitude toward the state were much stronger than its cognitive component. For this reason, they could not express well the reasons why people should develop very favorable attitudes toward the state (for a related phenomenon see Anderson and Scheler, 1986). However, they were very sure of the necessity of this favorable attitude and very tough against any words or actions that did not exalt the state.

The interviewees believed that all threats to the nation came from outside. In fact, almost all non-national elements might be viewed as enemies of the Turkish nation. Though we did not observe very harsh arguments among the interviewees to justify the

Dolayısıyla, milliyetçiliğin gereklerinden biri de devletini sevmek ve hürmet etmektir. Onu her türlü saldırıya karşı korumaktır... Bu toprakların bizim olduğunun garantisi devletimizdir... (INTERVIEWEE 04)

Türkler büyük devletler kurmaya muktedir olabilen nadir milletlerden biridir. Türklerde tarihin en eski çağlarından beri bir “Kızıl Elma” *ülkü*sü vardır. Bu *ülkü* Türk’ün cihan hakimiyetini temsil eder. Alparslan Anadolu’ya kızıl elmayı bulmak için gelmiştir. Fatih’in İstanbul’u fethetmesi de aynı amaçladır. Bu amaçla Viyana kapılarına kadar gitmişizdir. Bugün elimizde var olan devlet, son bağımsız Türk varlığını temsil etmektedir. Bundan dolayı, çok değerlidir. Kendimizden, ailemizden, akrabalarımızdan, velhasıl değerli bildiğimiz ne varsa hepsinden daha değerlidir. Ve hepsi bu uğurda feda edilebilir... Devleti sevmemek, devleti korumamak, hangi millete bakarsan bak hainliktir. Bu sadece bize has bir şey değildir. Devletine ihanet eden insanların ise, yaşaması caiz değildir. Bu hainlerle savaşmak her Türk’ün boynunun borcudur. Türkler tarih boyunca bu tür hainliklere müsaade etmemiştir. Bundan dolayı da değişik dönemlerde dünyanın efendisi olmayı başaramışlardır. Bizim de müsaade etmememiz lazımdır. Eğer birgün tekrar dünyanın önde gelen milletlerinden biri olmak istiyorsak, bu devletimizi küçültmekle değil, yüceltmekle mümkün olacaktır. (INTERVIEWEE 01)

above statement, Nihal Atsız, a prominent figure of Turkish nationalism in the 1940s, is known to say the following:

The Jews, ... the Russians, the Chinese, the Iranians, and the Greeks are our historical enemies; the Bulgarians, the Germans, the Italians, the English, the French, ..., the Arabs, the Romanians are our new enemies; the Japanese, the Afghans, and the Americans are our future enemies; the Armenians, the Kurdish, the Circassians ... are our internal enemies (Güvenç, 1993; p. 363)

As can be seen, Atsız seemed to list almost all people he happened to know as enemies of the Turkish nation. Though we did not meet such callous generalizations among the interviewees, it should be noted that there were some remarks resembling Atsız.³⁶

This dichotomy of fellowship-enmity seemed to extend into the realm of ideas. The interviewees did not favor any foreign ideology. In short, like the nations that produced those ideologies, their ideologies also seemed to be perceived as enemies of the Turkish nation.

2.3.1.2.3. Imported thoughts should be dismissed

Ülkücü group came into existence when communism as an ideology started to rule many of the intellectual circles. Alparslan Türkeş, the leader of ülkücü movement, wanted to challenge communism in the realm of idea and developed the doctrine of Nine Lights. While putting forth his ideas into consideration, he explicitly showed his distaste against not only communism, but also all other foreign ideologies. For him, the emancipation of Turks should be sought within a national ideology (Türkeş, 1995).

³⁶ Avrupalı milletlerin bize neden düşman olduklarını anlamak kolay. Senelerce Türkler geliyor diye korkudan titremişler... Balkanlardaki milletler de öyle. Hatta bunlar yüzyıllarca bizim hakimiyetimiz altında yaşamışlar. Her ne kadar biz onlara adaleti getirmiş, onları zulümden kurtarmışsak da sonraki milliyetçi akımlar kendileri için Türk karşıtı bir meşruiyet kaynağı oluşturma ihtiyacı duymuşlar. Kendilerini Türk düşmanlığı ile meşrulaştırabilmişler. Ondan sonra da tarih boyunca ne yaptysan hepsini çarpıtmışlar. Din kardeşimiz olduğu söylenen Araplar bile ellerine geçen ilk fırsatta bizi arkadan vurmuşlar. Doğu'daki İran tarih boyunca güvensizlik içinde yaşadığımız devletlerin başında gelmiş. İçimizdeki Alevileri kışkırtmak için hiçbir fırsatı kaçırmamış. Ruslar, Akdeniz'e inebilmek için önüne gelen her milleti kendine esir yapmış, gelmiş Türk sınırına dayanmış, orada kalmış. Sonuç olarak, her ne kadar şovenist bir laf gibi gözükse de, gerçekten de, Türkün Türkten başka dostu yok gibi gözüküyor... (INTERVIEWEE 13)

The interviewees mentioned about the same issue, and by the way, the most powerful argument was that the ideologies produced by the Western societies was an extension of their imperialist aims. Western countries did not only conquer the lands or wealths of other nations, but also they tried to make the mentality of other nations liable to be exploited by disseminating their ideologies among them.³⁷

When ideologies were concerned, not only Western but also Islamic ideologies could be a threat. The interviewees observed such terrorizations from other Islamic countries, too. They believed that both Iranian Shiite and Wahhabi Arabs had similar games on Turkey.³⁸

Furthermore, the interviewees argued, foreign ideologies did not fit in with the constitution of Turkish people. All ideologies were products of specific cultural contexts. The specific circumstances prevailing in England led to the development of liberalism

³⁷ Biz komünizme olduğu kadar kapitalizme de, faşizme de karşıyız. İnsanlar bizim sadece komünizme karşı olduğumuzu sanıyor. Gerçekten de ülkücüler komünizmle büyük bir mücadele yapmışlardır. Ancak, bunun nedeni tek düşmanımızın komünizm olması değil, diğer ideolojilerin komünizm kadar örgütlü bir tehdit oluşturmamasıdır. Mücadelemizin şiddetini de komünizmin örgütlenme şekli belirlemiştir. Silahlı komünist militanlara karşı silahlı mücadele yapmışızdır. Silahsız olanlara ise biz de fikirle karşı çıkmışızdır... Batılıların bizim gibi ülkelere ihraç etmeye çalıştıkları fikirler, bizim zihin olarak köle olmamızı kolaylaştırıcı fikirlerdir. Kapitalistler serbest piyasa deyip kendilerine yeni pazarlar bulma, komünistler halkların özgürlüğü deyip Türkiye'yi bölme peşindedir... Bunların ardında Türkiye'nin gerçek sorunlarıyla uğraşmak, Türkiye'yi içine düştüğü bataktan kurtarmakla ilgili projeler yatmamakta, aksine, Türkiye'nin başına yeni çoraplar örme, sorunları işin içinden iyice çıkılmaz duruma getirme isteği yatmaktadır...

(INTERVIEWEE 04)

³⁸ Türkiye İran'dan gelen Şiilik ve Arabistan'dan gelen Vahhabilik akımlarının kesişme noktasıdır. Bu iki İslam yorumu birbirine çok karşıttır, ve bizdeki Ehli Sünnet inancına göre, her ikisi de sapkın mezhepler arasındadır... Türkler Ehli Sünnet ekolüne bağlıdır. Hem Şiiliğe hem de Vahhabiliğe karşı müslümanları koruyan güçlerden biridir... Bugün Türkiye'de İran ya da Arabistan destekli bir sürü örgüt vardır. Bunlar Ehli Sünnet fikirlerine savaş açmışlar, kimi Şii anlayışı kimi de Vahhabi anlayışı gerçek İslamı gibi sunmaya çalışmaktadır. Bizim görevlerimizden biri de bu anlayışlarla çarpışmaktır...

(INTERVIEWEE 15)

Türkiye'de İran destekli Şiilik ve Arabistan destekli Vahhabilik yayılmaya çalışmaktadır... Bu iki mezhep, bizim mezhebimiz Hanefiliğin ve Ehli Sünnetin rakipleri ve düşmanlarıdır. Birçok alime göre sapık mezheplerdir. Gel gör ki bugün bunlar gerçek İslamın ta kendisiymiş gibi sunulmaktadır... Ayrıca, bu mezhepleri diğer müslümanlara yaymaya çalışan milletler de Türklüğün en büyük düşmanları arasındadır. Gerek İran gerekse Arabistanlı Araplar Türklerin İslamın bayraktarlığını yapmasından, bu şerefi taşımalarından en fazla rahatsızlık duyan, her fırsatta bu rahatsızlığı dile getiren ya da eyleme çeviren milletlerdir... Tarih tekerrürden ibarettir. Değişenler teferruattan başka birşey değildir. Asıl hep aynı kalır. Bunlar tarihte nasıl Osmanlıyı yıkmak için ellerinden geleni yapıyordusalar bugün de Türkiye'yi yıkmak için yine ellerinden gelen gayreti göstermektedir. (INTERVIEWEE 19)

while Germany was the cradle of both socialist and fascist ideologies. Indeed, these ideologies would have relevance in their own environments for they were produced to find solutions to the problems of people of their own country. In other words, while these ideologies were produced, Turkish people or the problems of Turkey were not considered. For this reason, they could not provide Turkish people with any solutions.³⁹

Foreign ideologies could not pose solutions to the problems of Turkey; instead, they might increase the level of distress people suffered. The solutions to the problems in Turkey should be sought within Turkish culture. The interviewees were quite sure that the solutions provided within culture would be the best solutions to the problems of Turkey. To repeat, the Turkish culture was a synthesis of Turkdom and Islam. Hence, the problems Turkey had been facing could be overcome just with reference to this synthesis.

2.3.1.2.4. The synthesis of Turk-Islam

Nationality provides people with an ascribed identity. That is, nobody could choose their nationality beforehand; people are born into a nation. While describing why *ölkücüs* were Turkish nationalists, the interviewees seemed to recognize this fact.⁴⁰

However, for the interviewees, being a Turk seemed to be a good fortune. Turkish nation had many favorable characteristics and the interviewees were quite proud of sharing those characteristics by being a Turk.⁴¹

³⁹ Bir milletin yükselmesi kendi iç dinamiklerine dayanmakla olur. Dışarıdan yardım beklemek, eğer hainlik değilse bile, saflıktan başka birşey değil... Marks komünizmi formüle ederken baktığı tek şey Almanya ve İngiltere'deki işçilerin durumu. Bu işçilerin durumundan çıkarak komünizmi geliştirmiş... Locke, liberalizmi geliştirirken baktığı tek şey İngiltere'deki mezhep çatışmaları. Bütün derdi, mezhep çatışmalarını durdurmak ve yeni kurulmakta olan parlamentoya bir meşruiyet kaynağı bulmak... Adam Smith soylulara karşı burjuvaziye bir meşruiyet dayanağı bulmak için kapitalizmi geliştirmiş... Yani, herkes kendi milleti, kendi ülkesi için bir çözüm bulmaya çalışmış. Bu çabalarda bir sorun yok, hatta bir bakıma hepsi takdire şayan çabalar. Sorun bizdeki kafalarda... Balo için dikilmiş giysiyi bizim tarlada çalışan bacılara giydirmeye çalışmalarında... (INTERVIEWEE 12)

⁴⁰ Biz, Türk milliyetçisiyiz. Çünkü milletimiz Türk milletidir. Bedenimiz Türk'tür. Damarımızda Türk kanı dolaşmaktadır. Bu değiştiremeyeceğimiz bir gerçektir. Milliyetçilik, Türklüğe has birşey değildir. Bunu kabul etmek lazımdır. Arap olsaydık Arap milliyetçiliği, Alman olsaydık Alman milliyetçiliği yapabilirdik. Esasında, yapmamız lazım gelirdi. Ama biz Türküz, bundan dolayı da Türk milliyetçiliği yapıyoruz... (INTERVIEWEE 10)

In short, the stuff of Turks was strong. They, as a nation, had necessary abilities to get rid of all difficulties they meet. What was necessary was to set the nation's Turkdom into action. As we saw above, as said by the interviewees, Turkdom was nothing but the Turkish culture. In other words, people should think, feel, and behave consistent with the Turkish culture.⁴²

Essentially, there seemed to be a trend to divide Turkish history into two periods: pre-Islamic and post-Islamic. The interviewees accepted the culture formed by the pre-Islamic Turks as very high and believed that those Turks were also Muslims of their time.⁴³

However, this attitude did not exceed beyond a praise of the pre-Islamic period. In a sense, the interviewees wanted to say that Turks had been a valuable nation before Islam, too. Otherwise, all spiritual elements attributed to the Turkish culture sprang from Islam. While Turkdom formed the body, Islam was the spirit of the Turkish culture.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Bizim milliyetçiliğimiz Üçüncü Dünya milletlerinin milliyetçiliğinden biraz farklıdır. Geri kalmış ülkelerdeki milletlerin çoğunun bir tarihi yoktur. Millet bilincine ancak sömürülmeye başladıklarında ulaşmışlardır. Batılı ülkelerdeki milliyetçilik ise ya Kiliseye ya da Osmanlılara gösterdikleri tepkiden doğmuştur. Bir anlamda onlar da kölelik yapmış ve kölelikleri esnasında bir bilinç geliştirmişlerdir. Biz ise tarihin hiçbir döneminde ne sömürülmüş ne de köle olmuşuzdur. Tarihin çoğunluğunda dünyanın efendisi olarak yaşamışızdır... Dünyada Türkler kadar parlak bir tarihe sahip başka bir millet yoktur. Türklerin maddi ve manevi kuvvetleri diğer milletlerin üzerindedir. Bu yüzden, Türk milliyetçiliğinin kaynakları çok zengindir. Diğer milletlerin aksine, Türk olmaktan gurur duymak için bir çok neden vardır. (INTERVIEWEE 15)

⁴² Türk kültürü yüksek bir kültürdür. Biz kendi kültürümüzle gurur duyar ve kültürümüze uygun bir şekilde yaşamaya çalışırız. Burada ırktan bahsetmiyoruz. Kim olursa olsun Türk kültürüne uygun bir yaşam yaşıyorsa, o kişi Türktür. Aslen Ermeni de olsa, Rum da olsa, Çingene de olsa, Türk kültürünü yaşayan kişi Türktür. Bunun örnekleri mevcuttur. Milletimizin hepsinin Türk kültürünü iyi bilmesi, yüksekliğini anlaması ve bu kültürü yaşamaya çalışması lazımdır. Kabilecilikten gelen, fakirlikten gelen, geri kalmışlıktan gelen bütün özellikler Türk kültüründen ayrı tutulmalı, bunlar kurtulunması gereken özellikler olarak görülmelidir. Bir an önce de bunlardan kurtulunmalıdır. Geriye tüm millet tarafından yaşanan arı Türk kültürü kalmalıdır... (INTERVIEWEE 01)

⁴³ Türkler İslamdan önce de ahlaken yüksek bir medeniyet kurmuşlardır. Bugün değerli bildiğimiz birçok şey o günün Türkleri için de değerliydi. Gök Tanrı'ya inanıyorlardı. Her ne kadar İslam geldiğinde tüm diğer dinler batıl olduysa da, Türklerin İslamdan önce de semavi bir dine inandıklarını sanıyorum. Belki de bu yüzden, Türklerin İslamı kabulleri çok kısa bir zamanda ve çok derinden olmuştur... (INTERVIEWEE 03)

⁴⁴ Türklük bizim bedenimiz, İslamiyet ise ruhumuzdur. Peygamber efendimiz mükemmel ahlakı tamamlamak için gönderilmiş ve bu görevini de başarıyla yerine getirmiştir. Gerçek müslüman aynı zamanda dünyanın en ahlaklı insanıdır da... Bunun ötesinde bir maneviyat aramak gereksizdir, zaten yoktur da. O halde, yapmamız gereken tam bir müslüman olmaktır. İslamı milletimize doğru anlatmaktır. (INTERVIEWEE 18)

So far, we saw that the enemies wanted to disintegrate Turkey by breaking the unity of the nation and destroying the Turkish state. Against this threat, the interviewees gave priority to the notions of the wholeness of motherland and the endlessness of Turkish state. We also saw that the enemies wanted to dissolve Turkish culture. On the contrary, the interviewees retaliated that the synthesis of Turk-Islam should be disseminated among Turkish people and all foreign ideologies should be dismissed.

The interviewees argued that only one group was completely aware of these threats and only one group knew the remedies of the problems of Turkey. This group was *ölkücü* group that had been organized under the leadership of Alparslan Türkeş. This point is important for it shows how the interviewees positioned their group within the context they perceived. That's why, we preferred to handle this topic under a new section. In short, Turkish nation, motherland, and state were in danger and *ölkücüs* were the only group that tried to save them.

2.3.1.3. Ölkücüs as the Saviour of the Country

The interviewees highlighted that *ölkücü* movement was organized to bring Turkish nationalists together. Only in this way, it was possible to bring nationalist ideas into life. There were several local and international ideals of *ölkücüs*. These ideals seemed to be formulated in such a way that, once they were attained, the threats we noted earlier would be eliminated.

Nevertheless, since these ideals were in complete opposition to the interests of enemies and traitors, they had been doing their best to hinder the progress of *ölkücü* movement. Though their industry was remote from blocking *ölkücü* movement, it was a

Türkler müslümandır. Müslüman olmayan Türk diye bir olay yoktur. Müslüman değilse Türk de değildir... İslamiyet, Türklerin kutlu güç kaynaklarından birisidir, belki birincisidir. Bu kaynaktan beslenmeyen biri Türk olamaz... O halde Türkiye'de dinin yükselmesi milliyetçiliği köreltmez, bilakis güçlendirir... Ahlaksız bir toplumun yükselmesi mümkün değildir. Zaten bizim anlayışımıza göre ahlaksız bir toplum nelerin sahibi olursa olsun yükselmiş sayılmaz. Bir hayvan güruhundan farksızdır... Biz de elbette ki maddi gücü istiyoruz ama bunun yanında maneviyatımızın da güçlü olmasını istiyoruz. Maddi gücü dengeleyen, bunu gem altında tutan maneviyattır. Yoksa güç adalet için kullanılmaz. Zulüm için kullanılır. Halbuki biz maddi gücü dünyada adaleti tesis etmek için istiyoruz... Kısaca, amaçlarımız için de İslam kilit rol oynamaktadır. Bundan dolayı da milletimizi İslam ahlak ve faziletiyle donatmalıyız... (INTERVIEWEE 05)

fact that the obstacles they laid were capable of hassling many ülkücüs. In short, many ülkücüs suffered for the sake of this movement. Hence, ülkücü movement was bound to be an ascetic road. In this section, we shall discuss how the interviewees drew this picture in detail.

2.3.1.3.1. Ülkücüs as an organized movement of Turkish Nationalism

Ülkücüs seemed to have appeared in order to bring the above-mentioned threats to a halt. Undoubtedly, these were the state's duties. Yet, there were many obstacles hindering the state to serve these functions.⁴⁵

We argued that the interviewees held some unquestionable values, which they perceived to be in danger. What ülkücüs tried to do was to remove this danger. Their efforts could be summarized under four headings. Firstly, the Turkish nationalists needed to be organized both in the social and political realms. In this way, the power of individual Turkish nationalists would be combined to resist against the traitors. Secondly, physical assaults against the Turkish nationalists had to be stopped. Otherwise, the traitors would not allow nationalist ideas to spread among the youth. Thirdly, national and cultural elements should be exalted both theoretically and practically. Subsequently, the effects of foreign ideologies trying to be spread by the traitors would be removed. Fourthly, strategies to make Turkey into the most powerful state in the world should be sought. When this happened, the injustice prevailing in the world would be halted.

The interviewees argued that there were several groups that disparaged, even fought, with the state. These groups had feigned to be the unique representative of the so-called civil society. However, civil society, by definition, could be regarded as a bridge between state and society. In a sense, civil society was an organized form of the societal demands. If these groups were representing the civil society, this meant that there had

⁴⁵ Ülkücüler, vatani, milleti, devleti korumak için ortaya çıkmışlardır. Aslında, bu görevler devletin görevleridir, ancak unutulmamalıdır ki, ülkücü liderler devlette etkin görevler almış, ülkemizi ilgilendiren tehlikeler hakkında birinci elden bilgi edinmişlerdir. Devletin içinde bu tehlikelere karşı mücadele ederlerken, gerek dışarıdan gelen baskılar gerekse içerdeki hainlerin komploları sonucu görevlerinden ayrılmak zorunda kalmışlardır. Devlet kurumlarında mücadele imkanları kalmadığını anladıklarında da, bu tehlikelere karşı devletin dışından mücadele etme yollarını aramışlardır. Ülkücülük böyle bir arayışın sonucudur. (INTERVIEWEE 05)

been a state in Turkey that was in harsh opposition with her subjects. In other words, in appearance, there was a huge gap between the state and the society. Nevertheless, these groups were not the civil society and they were not representing the whole nation. On the contrary, they were representing the interests of enemy states and a handful of compradors. Yet, since they were materially and financially supported by the enemies, they were making a powerful noise. This deceptive situation had to be remedied. It had to be shown that the goals of state and society were one and the same. In the end, *ülkücüs* appeared to attend to the values of nation, motherland, and state. In this way, Turkish nationalists found a means to express themselves in the social realm.⁴⁶

In this topic, Alparslan Türkeş was a key name for he was the first person who felt the need to organize Turkish nationalists. To this end, he turned a nationalist-conservative party, namely Republican Peasant Nation Party, into MHP (Nationalist Action Party).

⁴⁶ Kuramsal olarak, tabanı olmayan bir sosyal grubun uzun vadede yaşaması mümkün değildir. Büyük olsun, küçük olsun her sosyal grup belirli bir tabana dayanır. Hele, ülke yönetimi ile ilgili büyük beklentileri olan, bütün düzeni değiştireceğini ilan eden grupların tabanlarının oldukça güçlü olduğu varsayılır. Devlet düşmanı, vatan düşmanı tüm grupların oluşturmaya çalıştıkları imaj da budur. Her ortamda, her platformda ortaya atılıp, doğru yanlış her zaman öne çıkmaya çabalarlar. Ülkücülerin ortaya çıktıkları zamanlarda bu olaylar had safhadaydı. Açıkta vatan hainliği yapan kişiler, nerede bir ortam bulursa hainliklerini örgütlemeye çalışmaktaydı. Görünüşte işçinin, çiftçinin, fakirin, yoksulun haklarını savunuyorlardı. Görünüşte bu kesimleri temsil ediyorlardı. Gel gör ki, hiçbir bu kesimlerden olmadığı gibi, bazıları hayatları boyunca bu kesimden insanlarla en ufak bir teşriki mesai yapmamışlardı... Üniversitelerde, sendikalarda bu hainlerin çaldığı düdükten başkası çalınamıyordu... Ülkücülük, bu gidişattan hoşnutsuzluğun sonucu olarak doğdu. Bireysel olarak yapılanlardan hoşnut olmayanlar teşkilatlanmanın gerekliliğini anladı ve teşkilatlanmayı başardı. (INTERVIEWEE 13)

Türkiye’de teşkilatlanmak kolay değildir. Her teşkilatlanma girişimine şüpheyle bakılır. Bu konuda sağ ve sol gruplar arasında fazla ayrım yapıldığını sanmıyorum ancak bazı dönemlerde sağcıların bazı dönemlerde ise solcuların örgütlenmelerine daha fazla göz yumulmuştur. Sol grupların aksine Türk milliyetçileri hiçbir zaman illegal örgütlenme yoluna gitmemişlerdir. Illegal örgütlenmede hiçbir sakınca görmeyen sol gruplarla karşılaştırıldığında, zaman içinde milliyetçi, veya sağcı, gruplar daha zayıf, daha cılız kalmışlardır. Altmışlı yıllarda durum öyle bir boyuta gelmiştir ki sol gruplar devletin dışında kalan kamusal alanın tamamını ellerine geçirmişlerdir. Solcu olmayanların kamusal alanda göğüslerini gere gere dolaşacağı bir ortam tamamen safdışı bırakılmıştır. Türkeş ve arkadaşları bu durumun doğurduğu sakıncaları görmüş ve Türk milliyetçilerini teşkilatlandırma çabalarına başlamışlardır. Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi siyasi arenada Türk milliyetçiliği ile uyuşan siyasetleri belirlerken, Ülkü Ocakları özellikle gençleri teşkilatlandırarak sosyal alanda önemli bir boşluğu doldurmuştur... (INTERVIEWEE 20)

And he established Ülkü Houses to spread Turkish nationalism among the Turkish youth.⁴⁷

Both MHP and Ülkü Houses were the projects of Alparslan Türkeş. For this reason, he received a part from all the praises the interviewees directed to these two institutions. Indeed, Türkeş was not the originator of Turkish nationalism but since his institutions filled the gap of nationalist thought both in the social and political realm, he was considered to be one of the most important figures in Turkish nationalism.

As we repeatedly noted above, the emergence of ülkücü group coincides with the rise of communist groups in Turkey. We also saw that the interviewees regarded the communists as the tong of Russia. Since the communists were traitors, the interviewees regarded their fight against the communists as a holy war (jihad in Islamic terminology). The ülkücüs were trying to save the schools, the universities, the streets, and shortly, the motherland from the incursion of those traitors.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Türkeş, mensubu olduğu dönemlerde ordunun en değerli subaylarından biriydi. İlerinin genel kurmay başkanı olmasına kesin gözüyle bakılıyordu. Gerek orduda gerekse yurtdışında aldığı eğitimlerle mükemmel bir asker ve strateji uzmanıydı. Kişiliği de bu özellikleri barındıracak kadar güçlüydü... Ordudan ayrılmasını ve sürgünden dönüşünü müteakiben bütün bu özelliklerini Türk milliyetçilerini örgütlemek için kullanmaya başladı. Arkadaşlarıyla birlikte kendisine en yakın bulduğu Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi'ne katıldı. Kısa zamanda Partinin genel başkanı oldu. Ancak, bu partinin 1947'den beri gelen bir imajı vardı. Bu kimliği ile girdiği iktidar yarışını kaybetmeye mahkumdu. Partinin adını, bayrağını, hülasa tüm imajını değiştirdi. Türk milliyetçiliğini bir fikir kulübü olmaktan çıkarmak ve gerçek bir güç yapmak istiyordu. Eski milliyetçileri harekete geçirmek ve bunlara ilaveten yenilerini kazanmak istiyordu. Bu amaçla, Ülkü Ocaklarını kurdurdu. Bu ocakları, kahvelerde ya da başka yerlerde hayatlarını tüketen Türk gençliğini eğitmek için kullandı. Türkiye'de hiçbir proje bundan daha başarılı olmamıştı. Kısa zamanda, binlerce Türk genci milliyetçi saflara katıldı. Devletin okullarının başaramadığını Ülkü Ocakları kısa zamanda gerçekleştirdi. Okuyan, yazan, düşünen bir nesil yetişmeye başladı. Milletinin, devletin derdini kendi derdi addeden bir nesil yetişmeye başladı. Türkeş, kısa vadeli düşünen, iktidarın hemen kendisine geçmesini bekleyen biri değildi. O, onyıllar, hatta yüzyıllar sonrasını düşünürdü. Bütün amacı gelecekte ülkücü kadroların devlete hakim olmasıydı. Başarı ancak bu şekilde mümkündü... (INTERVIEWEE 02)

⁴⁸ Ülkücülerin ilk görevi komünizmle mücadele etmek oldu. Bu görevin altından yüzünün akıyla çıktı. Bu vatan hainlerinin ülkeyi ele geçirmelerine engel oldu. Bu uğurda beşbin şehit verdi... Ülkücü mücadele destan oldu diye şiirler yazarlardı da ben abartı yapıyorlar diye bu adamları kınardım. Şimdi düşünüyorum da, o beşbin kişi çok saf niyetlerle mücadele etti ve canından oldu. Beşbin kişinin gözünü kırpmadan ölüme gitmesi gerçekten de destansı bir hareket. Kahramanlık başka nasıl olur?... (INTERVIEWEE 15) Bugün komünistleri masum istekleri olan gençler gibi göstermeye çalışıyorlar. Halbuki, bunlar hakim oldukları okullarda başka görüşlü insanların var olmasına tahammülü olmayan, demokrasi ile, masumlukla uzaktan yakından alakası olmayan militanlardı. Lise gençlerine bile ellerinden gelen işkenceleri yaparlardı. Birçok genç bunların hazırladığı

In point of fact, ülkücüs was not a group reserved only for the communists. Ülkücüs wanted only the national interests to be sought and they were skeptical of all individuals and all groups seeking foreign interests in Turkey. Especially, they were trying to keep those governing the state under their thumb. As we noted, they believed most of those governing the state and bureaucracy were the masons who sought the interests of masonry. The interviewees argued that ülkücüs were aware of the conspiracies of these traitors and tried to break their games.⁴⁹

Nevertheless, it seemed ülkücüs' struggle with the masons did not come to an end. The interviewees seemed to argue that the country would be saved only when these traitors were ripped out of the state. Yet, this was not an easy business.⁵⁰

sözde "Halk Mahkemeleri"nde yargılanıp ölüm cezasına çarptırılıp idam edildi. Üniversitelerdeki eğitim öğretimi baltalamak, öğrencileri okutmamak için ellerinden geleni yapıyorlardı. Hakim oldukları mahallelerde herkesten "bağış" adı altında çok yüklü para topluyorlardı. Vermeyenlere türlü eza, cefa ediyorlar, hatta öldürüyorlardı. Genç çocuğu olup da komünist gruplarda yer almayan ailelerin zaten hiçbir şansı yoktu. Hatta böyle çocuğu olmayan yaşlı, başlı insanlara bile acımıyorlardı. Sokak ortasında sakallı, bıyıklı insanları fena halde dövdüklerine kaç kez şahid olmuşumdur. Sözün kısası, şehrin ortasında tam bir terör havası estiriyorlar, insanları evden çıkmaya korkar hale getiriyorlardı. Bunlara karşı çıkan tek grup ülkücülerdi. Ülkücüler sayesinde, hiç değilse, ülkücülerin hakim olduğu mahallelerde insanlar normal yaşantılarını devam ettirebiliyorlardı... (INTERVIEWEE 03)

⁴⁹ ... Memleket dahilinde iktidara sahip olanların Türk-müslüman kesimi gaflet ve dalalet, mason kesimi ise hıyanet içindeydi. Bugün daha iyi şerait (şartlar) altında olduğumuzu söylemek fazla iyimserlik olur. Ülkücüler bu kesimlere ne kadar uğraşırlarsa uğraşsınlar, hatta kendilerini en güçlü konumda sandıkları bir durumda bile, vatanın ve milletin sahipsiz olmadığını gösterdi. Bu hainler meydanın boşaldığını, istedikleri gibi at koşturabileceklerini sanıyorlardı. Ülkücülerin ortaya çıkması bunların oyununu bozdu. Gördüler ki devleti bu hainlerin ellerinden kurtarmaya çalışan, bu amaçla teşkilatlanan bir kitle var. Yanlış yaptıkları taktirde ipliklerini piyasaya çıkartacak, bunları deşifre edecek yeni kadrolar yetişiyor. Böylece ayaklarını denk almaya başladılar. Böylece en azından mevkilerini aleni bir şekilde milletin aleyhine kullanmamaya başladılar. (INTERVIEWEE 03)

⁵⁰ Masonlar ülkedeki kilit noktaları tutmuş. Ülkesini seven, milletine bağlı birilerinin buralara gelmesine imkan yok. Bunların yolları hemen kesiliyor ve basit işlerle zamanı dolduruluyor. Medya zaten bunların oyuncağı durumunda. Kimin önünü açmak, kiminkini kapamak istiyorlarsa medyayı kullanıyorlar. Vatansever, milliyetçi birisiyle ilgili birkaç günlük yayın yaptırıp, türlü iftiralarla adamı birkaç gün içinde insan içine çıkamaz hale getiriyorlar. Bunu yapamadıklarında çeşitli istihbarat örgütlerini kullanarak bu insanlardan tamamen kurtulma yoluna gidiyorlar. Her ne kadar komünistler de çoğu zaman bunların kuklası olarak çalışmışsa da, zamanında komünistlerin işlediğini sandığımız bazı cinayetlerin ardında yabancı istihbarat örgütlerinin olduğunu bugün artık biliyoruz. Kısaca, bu masonlar, öyle PKK gibi, komünistler gibi basit düşman değiller. Belki bunlar desteklemese öyle terörist grupların ortaya çıkması bile mümkün değil... (INTERVIEWEE 08)

As we noted above, the masons were depicted as the enemy behind the scene. They were the devil from which all evils against the Turkish nation were poured out. For this reason, elimination of the masons, by definition, would lead to the emancipation of the nation. It would be the final victory to destroy them. However, we were far from this final victory, and thus, the struggle should continue sometimes overtly and sometimes covertly.

The interviewees believed that *ülkücüs* also did away with the Armenian terror that reached its zenith during the 1970s. Many *ülkücü* militants were organized by the state to fight with ASALA, the Armenian terrorist organization, in the early 1980s. This was not a legal formation. The state authorities knew the level of love and devotion *ülküçüs* feel toward their country and they wanted to benefit from this sentiment.

We saw the importance the interviewees gave to the national unity and the unity of the homeland. PKK represented a danger against these values. In a sense, PKK was the materialized form of the enemy depicted in the *ülkücü* discourse. The interviewees alleged that the harshest protest against the PKK terror in Turkey was voiced by *ülküçüs*.⁵¹

In the case of PKK, the interviewees said, *ülküçüs* did not want to cause a civic turmoil inside the country. For this reason, they did not use their organization for a direct confrontation with the PKK supporters. Instead, they relied on *ülkücü* cadres in the army and the police.⁵²

⁵¹ PKK terörünün devam ettiği yıllar içinde bu terörü lanetlemek ve bu terörün mantıksal köklerini çürütmek işini *ülküçüler* yürütmüşlerdir. Her şehidin cenaze töreni bir miting ortamına dönüştürülmüş ve böylece PKK'nın ihtiyaç duyduğu yığınlık ortamının, veya belki de sosyal tabanının, doğmasına izin verilmemiştir. Türkiye'nin bölünmez bütünlüğü, vatanın ve milletin birliği fikirlerinin tartışmaya açılmasına izin verilmemiştir. Aksi taktirde, yarattığı terör ortamıyla bu grup amacına biraz daha yaklaşmış olurdu. Bu da Türk milleti için olabilecek en kötü şey olurdu. *Ülkücülerin* teşkilatlılığı ve sosyal tabanının genişliği bu grubun halkın içine nüfuz etmesinin önündeki en büyük engel olmuştur. Dikkat ederseniz, *ülküçülerin* güçlü olmadığı bölgelerde PKK'nın ve onun uzantısı durumundaki HADEP'in belli bir sosyal tabana sahip olduğunu görebilirsiniz. (INTERVIEWEE 12)

⁵² Devlet, zaten PKK'ya karşı iyi, kötü bir mücadele içindeydi. Bu aşamada devreye girmek ortalığı karıştırmaktan başka bir işe yaramayacaktı. Zaten gerek orduda gerekse poliste birçok *ülkücü* mevcuttu. Bunlar bizim yapmamız gerekeni zaten yapıyordu. Dışarıda olanların yapması gereken, bunlara moral destek olmaktı... Nitekim, ordu ya da polis saflarında PKK'ya karşı mücadele eden *ülküçülerin* yaptıklarını herkes bilmektedir. Bu kişiler PKK ile mücadelede efsane isimler haline gelmişlerdir. Bunlar gerilerinde bulunan diğer kolluk kuvvetlerine birer örnek teşkil etmişlerdir. Neticede dünyanın en

As can be seen, the interviewees evaluated that ülkücü group had been fighting with the traitors who sought interests other than those of nations. We can now turn to another function of ülkücü group. Ülkücüs tried to breathe life into the consciousness of Turckdom and Islamdom potentially available in every individual of Turkish nation.

The main function of ülkücüs was to spread nationalist ideas among the Turkish youth. In other words, ülkücü group was originally a movement of idea.⁵³

In other words, ülkücü group tried to instill the consciousness of Turckdom and the morality of Islam into the Turkish youth. Nevertheless, ülkücü group could not remain as an idea club. As a matter of fact, it was a group of action as well as idea. Its aim was to bring nationalist thought to the power.⁵⁴

güçlü gerilla örgütü olduğu söylenen PKK çökertilmiştir. Bu küçük bir iş değildir. Dünya tarihinde ilk defa olmaktadır ve bunda en büyük pay ülkücülerindir. (INTERVIEWEE 17)

⁵³ Komünizm, çok güçlü bir kapitalizm eleştirisine dayanır. Kapitalizmin tüm kötülüklerini ortaya serdikten sonra, kendi ütöpik toplumunu kurmaya başlar. Kurduğu toplum kapitalizmin tüm kötülüklerinden azade olduğu için de mükemmel bir toplumdur... Bu fikir bugün iflas etmiştir ancak bundan otuz, kırk sene evvel çok güçlüydü. Düşünen, okuyan kesimi ikna edecek gücü vardı... İkna edemese bile tartışma ortamlarından galip çıkacak bir entellektüel birikime sahip olmuştu... Gençliğin heveslerini tatmin etmede de başarılıydı. Ar, namus, ahlak gibi mefhumları yoktu. Bu yüzden özellikle genç erkeklerle sunacak nimeti çoktu. Sunuyordu da... Anlayacağın, komünistlerin hepsi fikren tatmin olmuş insanlardan oluşmuyordu, sadece kadın hevesinden komünist olmuş ya da komünist gibi davranan bir sürü adam tanıyorum... Devlet, güya milliyetçiydi. Milliyetçiliği temsil ediyordu. Halbuki, Türk milliyetçiliğinin fikir kaynaklarının çoğu unutulmuştu. Gerek Osmanlıyı gerekse Türkiye Cumhuriyetini kuran o dinamik fikirler, bu fikirleri doğuran nedenler artık bilinmiyordu. Ülkücüler bu fikirleri ortaya çıkardı. Bunları çağın gereklerine göre yeniden yorumlamaya çalıştı. Bunları gençlerimize anlatmaya çalıştı. İnsanlara yeniden bir umut ışığı bulmaya çalıştı. Onlara ne Rusya'nın ne Avrupa'nın ne de Amerika'nın kölesi olmadan yaşayabileceğimizi, kültürümüzde, milletimizde, geleneklerimizde, örfümüzde, adetlerimizde bir sorun olmadığını anlattı. Sorunun kaynağının bizim kafamızda olduğunu gösterdi. Böylece, komünizmin alternatifsiz olmadığı da gösterilmiş oldu... (INTERVIEWEE 10)

⁵⁴ Ülkücülük kısa zamanda çığ gibi büyüdü. Türkiye'nin en ücra köşelerine kadar Ülkü Ocakları kuruldu. Bunda Türkes'in payı büyüktür... Ne var ki, bana göre en büyük pay millete aittir. Ülkücülerin dile getirdiği fikirler ortalama Türk'ün genlerinde varolan fikirlerden başka bir şey değildir. Karşılaştığınız insanlar ülkücü fikirleri benimsemeye çok müsaittir. Dolayısıyla, yapılan iş potansiyeli gerçekleştirmekten ibarettir... Bir fikrin fikir olarak kalması hiçbir işe yaramaz. Bunların hayata geçirilmesi lazımdır. Bunun için de iktidar olmak durumundasınız. Demokratik rejimlerde bunun başka bir yolu yoktur. MHP, bu amaçla kurulmuş ve şekillenmiştir. Yani, MHP'nin amacı ülkücü düşüncüyü iktidara taşımaktır. (INTERVIEWEE 07)

When ülkücü ideas were brought to the power, nationalist cadres would be able to make Turkey into the strongest state in the world. This was assured for the reliable cadres with goodwill were the first prerequisite of the advancement.⁵⁵

The interviewees were aware of the fact that persons who do their job well were also necessary for the advancement of the country. In other words, in order to develop the country, the existence of the nationalist cadres was not sufficient. These cadres also should know their job well.⁵⁶

The interviewees said that Turkey had no more patience left to remain as an underdeveloped country. They wanted to get Turkey to join in the ranks of developed, industrialized countries by taking the shortest route. Otherwise, as we tried to catch other nations' present level of development, they would move forward more. As we tried to catch their next level, they would move forward more, and so on. For this reason, the progress leap should be very fast. In the end, Turkey needed to make up for the lost time by modernizing with lightning rapidity.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Milliyetçi kadrolar devletin çıkarlarını kendi şahsi menfaatlerinin üstünde tutarlar. Devlete gelebilecek zararlara karşı çok duyarlı olurlar. Belirli kesimleri kayırmak için devletin parasını çarçur etmezler. Bugün devletin bu denli kötü durumda olmasının başlıca nedenleri bunlardır. Dolayısıyla, milliyetçi kadroların iktidara gelmesi başlı başına bir kazanç olacaktır. İsrar, rüşvet, adam kayırma, devlet malını peşkeş çekme olayları bıçakla kesilmiş gibi sona erecektir... (INTERVIEWEE 10)

⁵⁶ Bizde işin ehline teslim edilmesi geleneği vardır. Bu geleneğin bozulmaya başlamasıyla birlikte biz de inişe geçmişizdir. Cumhuriyet döneminde de işinin ehli olmayan insanlar devleti yönetmiş, bürokraside üst düzeylere getirilmiştir. İşin ehline teslim edilmesi için bu görevlendirmeyi yapanın halis niyetler taşıması lazımdır. Eğer niyetiniz halis değilse göreve getirdiğiniz kişinin işinin ehli olması ya da olmaması umurunuzda olmaz. İşte, MHP iktidarı en azından bunu garantilemektedir. Ülkücü kadrolar işi ehline teslim edeceklerdir. Çünkü amacımız milletimizi kısa zamanda dünyanın önde gelen milletlerinden biri yapmaktır. Bu amaca hizmet edecek herkes, bizim için aynı düzeydedir. İyi bir kimyacıyı kötü bir kimyacıya, iyi bir mühendisi kötü bir mühendise tercih etmemiz için makul nedenlerimiz vardır. Kötü olan kardeşimiz bile olsa, göreve getirilmemelidir, getirilmeyecektir de... (INTERVIEWEE 14)

⁵⁷ Batılı ülkelerle karşılaştığımızda Türkiye çok geri bir durumda... Türkiye'nin geri kalmışlığı birçok sorunun ana kaynağı... Bir an önce kalkınma hamlesinin gerçekleştirilmesi lazım. Ülkücüler olarak bizim amacımız Türkiye'yi sadece kalkınmış bir ülke yapmak değil. Türkiye'yi çağlar üstünden atlatarak Batılı ülkelerle aramızdaki zaman mesafesini de kapatmak. Çünkü gelişmişlik ya da geri kalmışlık nisbi bir şey. Batılı ülkeler bizden daha gelişmiş olduğu sürece biz geri kalmış olacağız. Tam gelişmişlik ancak onların düzeyine ulaştığımız zaman mümkün olabilecektir... (INTERVIEWEE 05)

The interviewees admitted that the development would have effects on the individual level. In other words, development would lead more and more people to spend more prosperous lives.⁵⁸

Yet, there seemed to be something more important. The interviewees discussed a collective development. What was important did not seem to be individual development but total development. More importantly, for the interviewees, development seemed to mean strengthening of the state. When talking about making up for the lost time, they appeared to talk about making the state as the leader of the world. Of course, they knew that such an aim for the present Turkish state was just an imagination. Yet, the interviewees believed that this was not something impossible. If people with Turkic origin could be united, then the state these people would form would be one of the strongest states in the world. This ideal was known as Turan and the interviewees told that, in the final analysis, all *ölkücüs* want to realize the ideal of Turan.⁵⁹

As can be seen, the interviewees regarded the formation of Turan as the ultimate solution for the threats they perceived to come from the enemy states. When Turkish state would reach such a great power, Turks would no more need to fear the imperialist attacks.

⁵⁸ Birçok insanımız yoksulluk sınırının altında yaşamaktadır. Bunların gereken refah düzeyine ulaşması devletin görevidir. Ancak, devlet bu insanlara yardım etmekten uzaktır. Türkiye, gelişme düzeyini yükseltip bir an önce sosyal devletin gereklerini yerine getirmek zorundadır. İnsanların hastanelerde rehin alınmadıkları, herkesin sağlık sigortasına sahip olduğu bir ülke olmak zorundadır... (INTERVIEWEE 16)

⁵⁹ Bizim amacımız Turana ulaşmaktır... Turan nedir? Turan, tüm Türk kökenli insanları bir araya getirmek, bir devletin, bir bayrağın altında yaşatmak *ölküsüdür*. Her ne kadar burada bir kargaşa mevcutsa da, bu belki pratikliğin içinde çözülebilecek bir sorundur. Oturup tartışmayla çözülecek bir sorun değildir. Öncelikli amaç Anadolu Türkçesine yakın dilleri konuşan ve Türkler olarak bilinen Azerileri, Türkmenleri, Özbekleri, Uygurları ve diğerlerini Türkistan birliğinde toplamaktır. Bundan sonra da tüm Altay kökenli boyları, kabileleri bir araya getirmektir ki bunların hangi insanlar olduğu, doğrusunu istersen, benim de kafamda tam yer etmemiş. Ama dediğim gibi, sanırım bu teorik olmaktan çok pratik bir sorun. Sonuçta kimlerle birleşebiliyorsan sanırım onlarla birleşirsin... (INTERVIEWEE 02)

Tüm Türkleri içeren bir devlet kurduğumuzda Türklerin sorunu da bitmiş olacak. Çünkü egemen güçlere karşı koyabilecek gücü ancak böylesi bir birlikle sağlayabiliriz. Halihazırda derhal birleşebileceğimiz toplumlar arasında Türkmenler ve Azeriler ilk sırada gelmektedir. Bundan sonra Özbekler, Uygurlar ve daha nice bu birleşmeye katılacaktır. Adriyatikten Çin Seddine kadar dünyanın en geniş toprakları Türk birliğinin topraklarıdır. Buradaki yeraltı ve yerüstü kaynakları ve insan gücü dünyanın en büyük gücü olmaya namzettir. Bu elbette hemen yarın olacak bir olay değildir. Belki on yıl, belki yüzyıl sonra olacaktır. Ama zaten *ölkücü* demek kısa vadeli düşünen, günü kurtarmaya çalışan insan demek değildir. Tam aksine, *ölkücü* bu kadar uzun zamanı düşünür ve o günün politikalarının temelini bugünden atmaya çalışır. (INTERVIEWEE 11)

At this point, one question arises: would the to-be-founded Turkish state export its ideology and impose its policies over the other weaker states? The interviewees seemed to give a positive answer. They argued that, in the final analysis, the aim of *ülküci* movement was to ensure justice and peace in all nations in the world. This ideal was known as Nizam-ı Alem (Order of the World). As we mentioned earlier, the interviewees regarded the world as out of order. The present rulers of the world made a world based on injustice. They believed the maxim “might makes right”, which was regarded as the basis of injustice in the Turkish-Islamic culture. The Turks would be strong enough to stop injustice, that is, Turks would employ their power in the service of justice.⁶⁰

So far, we saw that *ülküci* movement appeared to represent Turkish nationalist groups and politics. This group aimed to come to the power and govern Turkey consistent with the principles of Turkish nationalism. The interviewees believed that these principles with the ideal of Turan had the power to make Turkey into the strongest state in the world. When the Turkish Union or Turan became the ruler of the world, then the order of the world would be assured.

Nevertheless, it was not an easy job to achieve these ideals. *Ülkücüs* were meeting numerous obstacles in their struggle. The most important obstacle seemed to come from the compradors established in the state. These compradors tried to hinder the development of the *ülküci* movement by making numerous conspiracies. This part seemed to be another component of the perceived context and we shall deal with it in the next section.

2.3.1.3.2. *Ülkücüs* as a group being continuously attacked by the traitors

Two events seemed to put their marks in the minds of the interviewees. One of these events was the demonstration made by the Turkish nationalists on May 3, 1944.

⁶⁰ Her idealist örgütlenmenin nihai amacı dünya ile ilgili olmak zorundadır. Her ne kadar milliyetçi isek de bunun anlamı kesinlikle kendi milletimizle sınırlı kalmak değildir. Belki, bunun anlamı, kendi milletimizden başlayacağız gibi birşeydir. Çünkü neticede biz de dünyanın iyi bir yer olmasını istiyoruz. Sadece kendi ülkemizin iyi durumda olması, diğer milletlerin ise yoksulluk içinde olmasını istemiyoruz. Bu durum bugün Amerika’nın yaptığı, dün İngiltere’nin yaptığı şeydir. Biz adaleti ve zenginliği kendi milletimizden başlayarak tüm dünyaya yaymak istiyoruz. Bu atalarımızın yüzyıllardan beri peşinde olduğu Nizam-ı Alem ülküsüdür... (INTERVIEWEE 14)

The interviewees believed that Turkish nationalists were under oppression throughout the single-party period. İnönü and his cadre were seen to be chiefly responsible for this maltreatment.⁶¹

Another important date for the interviewees was September 12, 1980. Though the leftists have depicted September 12 military strike as a counter-revolution or a movement against leftist groups and implied that there were Turkish nationalists behind the scene (e.g., Bora and Can, 1991; Velidedeoğlu, 1990), ülkücü group believed that the main targets of the strike were ülkücüs and Alparslan Türkeş.

The interviewees complained mainly about the leaders of the military strike, especially Kenan Evren and Tahsin Şahinkaya.⁶²

Apart from these historical events, the interviewees argued that ülkücüs were suffering in our times, too. Remember that ülkücüs were in a struggle to make Turkey

⁶¹ Türk milliyetçiliği hareketi 3 Mayıs 1944'te başlamıştır. O zamana kadar Türk milliyetçiliği bir fikir olarak kalmıştır. Ancak, 3 Mayıs'ta toplumsal bir aksiyon olduğunu göstermiştir. Tabii, bunun ne anlama geldiğinin çok iyi farkında olan kesimler buna hemen gereken tepkiyi göstermişlerdir. Gösterinin önderi durumundaki isimler Tabutluklara konulmuş, türlü türlü işkencelere tabi tutulmuştur. Böylece, Türk milliyetçilerinin ızdırabı da başlamıştır. Olayın büyüklüğünü en iyi İsmet İnönü ortaya koymuştur. O sene 19 Mayıs'ta yaptığı konuşmayı bütünüyle Türkçülüğü lanetlemeye ayırmıştır. Türkçülük ile komünizm arasında hangi tarafın kendi hükümeti tarafından tehlikeli addedildiğini de, bu şekilde yetkililere bildirmiştir. Bundan sonra da Türkçü, milliyetçi kadrolar bir daha rahat yüzü görmemişlerdir. (INTERVIEWEE 19)

⁶² 12 Eylül'ü düzenleyenler Türkeş'i yakından tanıyan kişilerdi. Hemen hemen aynı zamanlarda Harbiye'den mezun olmuşlardı. Bunlar zamanının en silik askerleriydi. Türkeş ve arkadaşları 60 ihtilalinde başrolü oynarlarken bu adamlar Albay olmalarına rağmen herhangi bir etkileri olmayan, memleket gibi, devlet gibi mefhumlara yabancı tiplerdi. Hile ve desise ile kurmay, paşa ve nihayet kuvvet komutanı oldular. Bu arada Türkeş sürgüne gitmiş, geri dönmüş ve siyasi hareketine çoktan başlamıştı. Darbecilerin Türkeş ve ülkücü hareketi ile ilgili düşünceleri daha sonra Uğur Mumcu'nun araştırmasıyla gazetelerde bile yazıldı. Bunlar bırak Türk milliyetçisi olmayı, tamamen Türk milliyetçilerine karşı bir ekipti. (INTERVIEWEE 07)

12 Eylül ülkücülere büyük bir darbe vurmuştur. Hapishaneler birer işkence odasına çevrilmiştir. Zemheri soğuklarda tutuklular gecenin karanlığında çıplak ayak kilometrelerce yol yürütülmüştür. İnsanlar C-5 tezgahlarından geçmişlerdir. Suçunun sabitlenmesine bakılmaksızın ülkücüler idam edilmiştir. Bazıları ise ardı arkası kesilmeyen mahkemelere terkedilmiş, bu arada tutukluluk hali devam etmiştir. Milliyetçi kadroların önde gelenlerinin hemen hepsi hapse atılmış ve adi bir mahkum gibi muamele görmüştür. Yılların emeği sonucu ortaya çıkan herşey bir anda yok edilmiştir. Bu dönemde komünistlere iyi davranıldığını söylemiyorum ama 12 Eylül darbecileri ellerine düşenlerin kimliklerine göre ayırım yapmamışlardır. Vatani satacağını ilan eden hainlerle, bunlara karşı mücadele ettiğini, vatanını, devletini canından çok sevdiğini gösteren ülkücülerini aynı kefeye koymuştur. Dünya tarihinde böyle bir basiretsizlik örneği yoktur... (INTERVIEWEE 11)

into the most powerful state in the world. Turkey was still in the hands of compradors and they held their positions to hinder the realization of such a goal. For this reason, though it was unarmed, the conflict between ülkücü cadres and the compradors still continued almost in all public realms.

In a context related to Haluk Kırıcı, INTERVIEWEE 16 said the following.⁶³

The interviewees also felt uncomfortable by the prejudice related to ülkücü group. The compradors deliberately slandered ülkücü group and tried to spread the biased belief that ülkücüs had been racist. They also tried to cover up all counter-arguments of ülkücüs. In a sense, they wanted to associate nationalism with racism and skullism, and in this way, they wanted to form distaste against nationalist ideas in the country.⁶⁴

The interviewees told that when ülkücüs were concerned, such concepts as self-respect and individual rights were out of question. Out-groups could easily attack such rights of ülkücüs and ülkücü people could not find an office to seek their rights. In all controversial matters, ülkücüs were always launched as the wrongdoers and their opponents were always presented as the injured party. In this regard, the target of the interviewees was media. Though ülkücüs owned a printed media according to their own standards, by the term media, the interviewees seemed to mean popular newspapers like *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Sabah*, etc. and the TV channels like *ATV*, *Kanal D*, *Show TV*, etc..

⁶³ Devlet, komünistleri, PKK'lıları yakalıyor, diyor ki "Bu adam şu, şu suçu işlemiştir, cezası da budur". Aslında düşününce bunun güzel bir şey olduğunu anlıyorsun. Çünkü, ülkücülere geldi mi işler değişiyor. Ülkücü bir adamın suçu ne?, eğer ortada bir suç varsa buna nasıl bir ceza verilmeli? Hakimlerin, savcılarının bilgisi burada bitiyor. Adamın suçlu olduğu bir türlü ispat edilemiyor. Tüm mahkemelerinde idamdan yargılanıyor. Hepsinde suçu sabit görülemiyor. Ama yine de hapiste bırakılıyor. Adam hapis yatmaya devam ediyor. Dünyada böyle bir adalet anlayışı yok. İşin en orijinal tarafı af çıkarılıyor. PKK'lısından tut en azılı komünistine kadar herkes bu afdan yararlanabiliyor. Ama ülkücü mahkum yararlanamıyor. Hem de adamın suçlu mu suçsuz mu olduğu bilinmemesine rağmen... Anlayacağın ülkücüye komünist kadar, PKK'lı kadar değer verilmiyor. Vatandaşlık hakları, insan hakları ayaklar altında çiğneniyor...

⁶⁴ Ülkücüleri yeraltı faaliyetlerine iten başlıca neden, bana göre, rakiplerin dürüst oynamamaları. Gerek komünistler gerekse onların hamileri, ülkücüler ne yaparlarsa yapsınlar, kafalarındaki ülkücü imajından bir türlü vazgeçmemişlerdir. Kendilerini ifade etmeye ayırdıkları zamandan çoğunu ülkücüleri karalamaya, ülkücülere iftira atmaya ayırmışlardır. Ne ırkçılığımız, ne şamancılığımız kalmıştır. Ne kadar böyle değiliz dediysek de bunlar bu propagandalarını bırakmamışlardır. Ne kadar böyle olmadığımızı gösterir şekilde davrandıysak da, bunlar yine bildiklerini okumuşlardır. Bir insana kendini ifade etme şansı tanımazsan, o insanla bütün sağlıklı iletişim kanallarını kapatırsan, o insan ne yapar? O da seni tanımaz. Madem entellektüel çabalar bu insanlarla mücadelede herhangi bir etkiye sahip değil, ben de bütün gayretimi bu insanları nasıl ekarte ederim diye harcarım... (INTERVIEWEE 18)

There was a monopolist and very powerful media in Turkey and this media were serving to the non-national interests.⁶⁵

Though the interviewees tended to unite the media of diverse backgrounds as serving the non-national interests, they seemed to oppose media largely because the bulk of the media members were composed of the communist militants of the past. Many prominent communists of the 1960s and 1970s seemed to have trained themselves in the media and related realms. Though these communists could not find the support they sought among people, they captured the media and related realms, supposed to be the voice of the public. In this way, they became the ruler of what-is-called the fourth power.⁶⁶

The interviewees seemed to believe that though the communists of the past and the media employees of the present changed their minds in relation to ideological matters, they continued some of their habits. Among these, the most important seemed to be their enmity against *ülkücüs*. It did not seem to bother these communists to be serving the greatest capitalists in Turkey, but when *ülkücüs* were concerned, they seemed to recall their blood feud.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Medya bir iki kişinin tekeli altında. Bu tekelci medya, devleti istediği gibi şekillendiriyor, partileri iktidar yapıyor, iktidarlara yıkıyor. Hangi konunun üzerine giderse hem polis, hem savcı, hem de hakim rolünü oynuyor. Gerçeği istediği gibi şekillendiriyor. Hakkı bătıl, bătılı hak gösterebiliyor. Bu cerbeze gücü ile hem vatandaşı kandırıyor hem de kandıramadığı insanlara gözdağı veriyor... Medya patronları Türkiye'nin zenginliklerini sömürüyorlar ancak Türk değiller. Türk olmadıkları gibi, madem bu ülkedeyiz ülkeye hizmet edelim de demiyorlar. Menfaatlerini dış güçlerle birleştirmişler. Milli meselelerin hepsinde ellerinden geldiği kadarıyla Türkiye aleyhine olan durumları savunuyorlar. Milli menfaatler söz konusu olduğunda ister İslamcı olsun, ister komünist olsun, isterse liberal olsun bütün medya sanki kutsal bir ittifak yapmış gibi Türkiye'ye karşı cephe alıyorlar. Milli menfaati savunanları ise arka planda bırakıyorlar... (INTERVIEWEE 12)

⁶⁶ Dünün silahlı eylem yapan komünistleri bugünün büyük gazetecileri, televizyoncuları oldular. Adam Filistin'deki kamplarda teröristlik öğrenirken, devran değişti, bugün Ortadoğu uzmanı oldu. Komünistliği ile medyada tutunamayanlar dün söylediklerinin tam tersini söylemeye başlayıp liberal olarak medyada yer buldular. Ahlak, hak, adalet, vefa, sadakat, utanma gibi değerlere sahip olmadıklarından, arkadaşlarını satmaktan, inanmadıklarını yazmaktan çekinmedikleri için medyada tırmanıp çıktılar. Medya patronlarının ihtiyacı olduğu tipler bunlardı. Orada haysiyetli duruşu olan ilke sahibi insanlara yer yoktu. Yaşadığın gibi inanırsın derler ya. Belki de, zamanla bu komünistler de eskiden inandıkları çoğu şeyin çok da önemli olmadıklarına inanmaya başladılar. Mesela, mülkiyeti reddetmenin çok da gerekli olmadığını, Engels'in bu konuda hatalı olabileceğini falan düşünmeye başladılar... (INTERVIEWEE 20)

⁶⁷ Medyada çalışanların çoğu *ülkücülere* karşı sanki bir kan davası güdüyor gibi hareket ediyor. Ne zaman bir fırsat bulurlarsa, *ülkücülere* karşı nefretlerini yazılarına,

As we noted above, the interviewees believed that *lkc* group had been subjected to mal-treatment in the past. Though the compradors of the present were far from doing physical harm against *lkc*, they were doing their best. In this regard, the interviewees seemed to believe that all ideological outgroups were united to discard *lkc*. In a sense, they formed a front of wickedness against *lkc*. Apart from the communists, there was only one more group having a social basis in Turkey, namely Islamists. In most cases, this group preferred to unite with the communists and attack *lkc*.⁶⁸

As can be seen, in the final analysis, the interviewees seemed to form a homogeneous impression of outgroups. They recognized the multitude of social groups in Turkey but exaggerated the differences among these groups and equated them within the labels such as “groups seeking non-national interests”, “groups against *lkc*”, or simply, “outgroups”.

When so many groups were in opposition, life did not seem to be easy for *lkc*. *lkc* had ideals hardly less than a utopia. It was already very difficult to materialize these ideals. Moreover, outgroups sacrificed themselves to halt *lkc*. For this reason, *lkc* were forced to live a long-suffering life. This theme of asceticism was alluded many times by the interviewees. That’s why, we preferred to devote a separate section to this theme. This theme seemed to be connected closely with the mystical Islam to which most *lkc* feel connected.

programlarına taşıyorlar. *lkc*lerin milli meselelerle ilgili duyarlılıkları ve bu duyarlılıkları alternatif bilgilendirme araçlarıyla gençlerin arasında yayma çabaları komünistleri kudurtuyor... Hürriyeti olsun, Milliyeti olsun, Sabahı olsun, *lkc*lerle ilgili bir durum söz konusu olduğunda, yargısız infaz yapmak için birbiriyle adeta yarışıyorlar. Bütün iftiralar, dedikodular kesin delillermiş gibi ortaya konuyor. Tartışılması gereken tek konu kalıyor. *lkc*lerin hakettiği kırk satır mı, kırk katır mı?

⁶⁸ Milli çıkarları önceliği yapan tek parti MHP. Tüm diğer partilerin başka öncelikleri var. Tabii ki, bu öncelikler çoğu zaman milli menfaatlerle bağdaşmıyor. İşte, tam bu noktada MHP, bu insanların tekerine taş koyuyor. Bunlar da anlıyorlar ki, MHP olduğu sürece istedikleri gibi at oynatamayacaklar. Köprüden geçinceye kadar ayıya dayı diyelim deyip kendi aralarında geçici de olsa ittifak yolları arıyorlar... (INTERVIEWEE 11)

Milli görüşçüler en eskiden beri komünistlerden çok bize düşmandırlar. Güçlü oldukları yerde *lkc*lere zulmederler ve bunu da bir hizmet aşkıyla yaparlar. Zayıf oldukları yerde *lkc*lerden yardım beklerler. Yardım etmezsen adını haine çıkarırlar. Yardım edersen, yardım ettiğine pişman ederler. Çoğu platformlarda komünistlerle ya da liberallerle işbirliği yaparlar, *lkc*lere karşı tavır alırlar. (INTERVIEWEE 11)

2.3.1.3.3. Ülkücüs as ascetics

The interviewees seemed to give the concept of “blood” a special place in their discussions. Turkey was the land of Turks for many Turks had shed their blood for the sake of Turkey. In a sense, the first condition of owning a piece of land as watan seemed to involve engaging in a struggle and shedding blood. Ideologies were not exceptions to the rule. Turkish nationalism was a valuable ideology, for many people died for it.⁶⁹

Ülkücüs wanted to make Turkey into the strongest state in the world, to unite all Turkic elements under the same banner, and to get justice to rule in the world. These were not simple aims. In other words, ülkücüs were following a great cause. Great causes required great men and a man could not be great unless he suffered enough on the road to the destination he tried to reach. The history was the witness of this rule. The most salient example was the life of the Prophet. He was the greatest man ever came to the world. He endured numerous poverties, harassments, and assaults but he never turned back from his cause.⁷⁰

Anyway, the interviewees told, ülkücüs got used to living with sufferings. They knew that even loving the rose had its own price: you should endure its thorns. For this

⁶⁹ Türkçülük, öyle bazılarının sandığı gibi zamanın şartlarıyla alevlenen, şartların değişmesiyle ortadan kalkacak bir fikir veya aksiyon değildir. Türkçülük, diyeti ödenmiş bir davadır. Bu uğurda canını veren vatan evladının sayısı tam olarak bilinmemektedir. Bu hareketi kalıcı kılan, uğruna akan kandır... Bir insan için hayatından önemli ne olabilir? Bu öyle bir davadır ki, binlerce insan uğruna canını feda etmekten çekinmemiştir. Yani, bu dava binlerce insan için canından daha değerlidir. Böylece, davanın değeri de ortaya konulmuş olmaktadır. Bunu yapacak taraftarları olmadığı sürece bir ideolojinin insanlar arasında yaygınlaşması mümkün değildir... (INTERVIEWEE 06)

⁷⁰ Bizden öncekilerin yaptığı fedakarlıklara baktığımızda utanmamak elde değil. Peygamber Efendimizin İslam elçiliğini yapmak için çektiklerini bir düşünsene. Davasına başlarken en yakınları başta olmak üzere, dünyanın tamamını karşısına almıştı. Türlü eza, cefa çekmesine rağmen davasından asla dönmedi. Kendisine türlü dünya nimeti sunulmasına rağmen de davasından dönmedi, ki belki de bu bir dava adamının en önemli özelliğidir. Desise sahipleri doğru insanları yollarından çevirmek için kötülüğü denediği gibi iyiliği de deneyebilir. Ama bunların hiçbirisi Peygamber Efendimizi yolundan çevirmedi. Çünkü dava adamı olarak insanların kendisine verebileceklerinin ya da insanların kendisine yapabileceklerinin üzerinde olduğunu biliyordu... (INTERVIEWEE 08)

reason, they were well aware of the fact that the ideal of Red Apple was not something easy to reach. In other words, pain and suffering were inevitable on this road.⁷¹

Having drawn such a picture, the interviewees made a substantial change in their discourses. They started to depict *ülkü* not as a member of a group but as a man on his own. This man had nothing but God as his helper. *Ülkü* should take refuge in the Creator and begin to act.⁷²

Though the interviewees envisaged such a painful struggle, they were sure that *ülkü*s would be the victor. In a sense, this was the promise of God. They seemed to hold the belief that goodness would be victorious over evil. Since they were representing goodness, it was predestined that they would be victorious. What was needed was just to work hard.⁷³

⁷¹ Yapmaya çalıştığımız, hedefimiz, gayemiz kolay birşey değil. Bunu herkes biliyor. İyilik yolunun kolay yol olacağı gibi bir kural yok. Aksine, iyiliğin yolu her zaman taşlı, dikenli olmuştur. Güneşin doğmasından rahatsız olan yaratıklar her zaman olmuştur. Kendisini bu denli kötülüğe angaje etmiş insanlarla uğraşmak elbette zordur. Çünkü bu mücadelede ahlak ve merhamet yoktur. Acıyı büyüten de zaten budur... Ama biz bu mücadelenin başımıza açtıklarına artık alıştık. Bizim tecrübemiz de bizden sonrakileri alıştıracaktır. Hapishaneler artık evimiz gibi oldu, bir anlamda, acı çekme düzeyimiz de rütbemizi tayin eder oldu. Kısacası, *ülkü*lerin bu dava uğruna başlarına geleceklerden bir korkusu yoktur. Korkan adamın da zaten bizim aramızda bir işi yoktur.

(INTERVIEWEE 19)

⁷² *Ülkü* Yaraticısına sığınır ve bu davaya yer ile gök arasında yalnız olarak girdiğini bilir. Yanında birilerinin olması veya olmaması onun için önemli değildir. Diğer insanların varlığı davanın olabilirliğini gösterir. Ama davanın olup olmaması *ülkü*nün işi değildir. Bu Allah'a kalmış birşeydir. *Ülkü*nün görevi bu yolda çalışmak, gerekirse canını vermektir. Yani, *ülkü* mücadele etmekle yükümlüdür. Gerisi Allah'a kalmış bir şeydir. Bu bana bir hikayeyi hatırlattı. Cengiz ile Harzemşahların savaşı zamanında büyük Türklerden Celalleddin Harzemşah, bu dünyanın en büyük gücüne karşı koymaya devam ediyordu. Hatta elinde kalan bir avuç savaşıyla Cengiz'in ordularını birçok kez yenilgiye uğratmıştı. Birgün yeni bir savaşa çıkacakken, yanında bulunan veli ve ermiş kişiler "Allah seni muzaffer edecek" demişler. Celalleddin Harzemşah ise, "Benim görevim muzaffer olmak değil. Benim görevim Cengiz'in ilerlemesini durdurmak için çıkıp onunla savaşmak. Muzaffer olmak Allah'ın bileceği, onun bahşedeceği bir şey" diye cevap vermiş. Biz de öyle. Biz çıkar, mücadelemizi ederiz. Gerisi Allah'ın bileceği birşey. *Ülkü*lerimiz gerçekleşmiş ya da gerçekleşmemiş, biz bunları görmüşüz ya da görmemişiz bu Allah'a kalmış. Ama burca bayrağı dikmeden canımızın çıkmasını da istemiyoruz. Bu da ayrı birşey... (INTERVIEWEE 09)

⁷³ Şu kısacık zaman içinde Türk milliyetçileri her türlü işkence tezgahından geçmişlerdir. Ancak, bu budamalar ağacın daha da serpilip gelişmesine yardımcı olmaktan başka işe yaramamıştır. Sonunda kazanan hep Türk milliyetçileri olmuştur... Türkçülerin hedefi akıl dışı, mantık dışı değildir. Bunların olabilirliğini anlamak için yıllardır dayatılan Misak-ı Milli zihniyetini biraz aşmak, Batılı sömürgecilerin dayattığı sınır zihniyetinin biraz ötesine geçmek yeterlidir. Çin Seddinden Adriyatik'e kadar olan tüm bölge, bizim atalarımızın kanıyla sulanmıştır. Tüm bu yerler bizim atalarımız tarafından imar edilmiştir. İmkansız

So much discussion about the perceived context of the interviewees may be sufficient. Figure 2.1 gives a summary of this perception. The interviewees envisaged the existence of enemies nourishing imperial aims on the nation. Moreover, there were some compradors inside the country that were backing these enemies. These enemies and compradors tried to break the unity of the country and the state. Furthermore, they were aiming to dissolve the Turkish culture.

However, the interviewees argued, Turkish people should not permit such aims to be realized. For the realization of such aims denoted the violation of the principle of independence of nation. Nobody could take their right for self-determination away from Turkish people. For this reason, the state and the unity of the country had to be defended. Imported thoughts had to be rejected, and instead, the most indigeneous Turkish culture, namely the culture of Turk-Islam, should be spread among the people.

Only *ölkücüs* could do what should be done, for *ölkücüs* were the organized Turkish nationalists. *Ölkücüs* had been struggling with these enemies and the traitors for a long time. During this time, *ölkücüs* had been subjected to numerous injustices and they were still suffering. In short, the struggle *ölkücüs* were involved in was an ascetic road.

The lengthy discussion thus far has pointed to how the interviewees positioned their group within the context, or the worldviews they perceived. With this definition of situation in mind, we can appreciate the properties the interviewees attributed to their ingroup better than would be yielded by a simple checklist method. Below, we shall give the results of the content analysis we performed on the interview materials.

olan bu izleri silmektir. İmkansız olan Türklüğün dünyaya yaptığı katkıyı reddetmektir. Düşmanlar sadece kaçınılmaz olanı geciktirebilir, gerçekleşmesini engelleyemez... (INTERVIEWEE 03)




Figure 2.1:
A schematic summary of the perceived context of the interviewees.

2.3.2. Ingroup Representations of the Interviewees

We picked any thematic unit (a sentence or a phrase or a word) that seemed to be a reply to the question of what the ingroup is. Nevertheless, the participants did not always name the ingroup as *ülküçüs* or the *ülküçü* group. They also employed the terms nationalists, Turkish nationalists, Turkists, Turks. Moreover, they frequently referred to model persons such as *Türkeş*, *Bahçeli*, *Atatürk*, *Peygamber*, and the like to explicate the characteristics of *ülküçüs*. Inter-coder agreement was 76.4 percent. However, after a brief discussion session, the agreement rose up to 100 per cent. I shall spend some time thinking about why we could not reach a higher consensus in the initial coding later in discussing the results.

We identified 2451 units that referred to the ingroup representation of *ülküçüs* and prepared a coding framework. However, as was the case for the perceived context, it was difficult to produce a coding framework with non-overlapping categories. Largely for this reason, inter-coder agreement came out to be not very high (52.6%) though we reached perfect consensus after a brief discussion session.⁷⁴ Some themes were so dominant that they were implied in too many items. So, in many instances, we were left with items fitting more than one category. In such cases, we preferred to classify these units under the categories with fewer units.

The major categories and subcategories of the content analysis are given in Table 2.2. Below, we shall give an account of and discuss these categories. Since the number of categories was quite high (i.e., 98), we shall consider just the major categories and make a hint of the sub-categories only when it is necessary.

The ingroup representation seems to be divided into two major categories. The first major category tapped a description of *ülküçüs* as men of idea where the interviewees repeatedly stated that these ideas directly sprang from the indigenous Turkish culture. The second major category referred to a characterization of *ülküçüs* as men of struggle where

⁷⁴ The verbal material from five interviews (25%) was used in computing the inter-coder reliability.

the interviewees emphasized the point that this struggle was in the name of a blessed cause. Undoubtedly, *ülkücüs'* cause derived heavily from the *ülkücü* ideas. That's why, when we regard the former as the theory and the latter as the action, in many cases, we find it difficult to discern where the theory ends and where the action begins. As a matter of fact, the theory itself seems to have been designed as a tool for action. In this regard, INTERVIEWEE 07 characterized the realm of idea as a realm of war and claimed that only a national idea could make Turks successful in this war.⁷⁵

In a similar vein, INTERVIEWEE 13 thought that communism was an idea and it could be defeated only by another idea. Otherwise, military precautions could not stop this danger. The Nine Lights were developed to serve this function.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Bütün dünyada bir fikir savaşı vardır. Çelişen fikirler birbiriyle çarpışma halindedir. Benzer bir çatışmanın Türkiye'deki kapitalizm ve sosyalizm arasında yıllardan beri devam ettiğini de gözlüyoruz. Aslında, bunların ikisi de dışarıdan ithal edilmiştir. Bunların her ikisi de maddecidir. Bunların her ikisi de Türk milletine yabancıdır. Bu ideolojilere karşı, biz bütünüyle yerli, bütünüyle milli, manevi bir doktrinle ortaya çıktık. Bu doktrin Dokuş Işık'tır... Türkeş yerellik konusunda o kadar duyarlı birisiydi ki kendi doktrinindeki ilke sayısının dokuz olmasını seçti çünkü dokuz rakamı Türkler tarafından her zaman kutsal sayılmış bir rakamdır... Sadece yüzde yüz yerli, yüzde yüz milli bir fikir ile bu savaştan galip çıkabilirdik. Tabii ki, bu milli fikrin diğer bütün fikirlerden daha sevimli, daha iyi ve daha ileri bir fikir olması da lazımdır.

⁷⁶ Komünizm bir fikirdir. Bir fikri askeri tedbirlerle durdurmak mümkün değildir. Bir fikir ancak kendinden daha güçlü diğer bir fikir tarafından alt edilebilir. Bundan dolayı, 1970'lerin sıkı yönetimleri komünizm tehlikesi karşısında etkili olamamıştır. Bu tehdit ancak güçlü bir milli ideoloji ile durdurulabilirdi. Ülkücü hareketin doktrini bu boşluğu doldurmuştur. Aslında, *ülkücü* hareketin gücü de bu doktrinden gelmiştir. Milliyetçilik, tarihinde ilk kez bir aksiyona dönüşmüştür... Ülkücülük sadece komünizme karşı bir reaksiyon değildi. Bu hareket bu fikirle sadece komünizme karşı çıkmamıştır, Türk gençliğinin önünde yeni bir ufuk da açmıştır. Yani, bir reaksiyon değil, aynı zamanda bir aksiyondur.

Table 2.3:
Frequencies of units referring to the categories of the affirmational ingroup representation of *ülkücüs*

	fr.
1. ÜLKÜCÜS ARE “MEN” OF IDEA WHICH SPRINGS FROM INDIGENOUS CULTURE	906
Ülkücüs struggle to realize the ideal of Turk-Islam	45
Islam is the spirit and Turkdom is the body of <i>ülkü</i> ideas	42
Ülkücüs are proud and conscious of their Turkdom and they are equipped with the morality and virtues of Islam	35
1.1. Ülkücüs are Turkist	489
Ülkücüs are proud of their Turkdom	48
Ülkücüs try to nationalize everything in the social and cultural realm	47
Turks are a heroic nation	38
The main aim of <i>ülkü</i> is to be a good Turk	38
Ülkücüs work for the nation and the state	37
Turkdom involves high morality	34
Ülkücüs want to live in a national state	34
Ülkücüs try to stamp the mark of Turkdom in all their deeds	33
Ülkücüs believe in a national doctrine	27
Ülkücüs defend the value judgments of the Turkish nation	23
Ülkücüs are Turkish nationalists	20
Ülkücüs look after the Turkish state	16
Ülkücüs try to mold indigenous Turkish culture with contemporary developments	16
Ülkücüs make everything for Turk, in terms of Turk and by Turk	15
Ülkücüs have a deep love towards the Turkish nation	15
Turks are a noble nation	14
Ülkücüs are conscious of their Turkdom	12
Ülkücüs believe in the importance of Turkish culture	11
Ülkücüs try to learn and live the customs of Turks	11
1.2. Ülkücüs are Islamist	295
Ülkücüs try to bring morality back into the Turkish nation	48
Ülkücüs try to learn and live Turkish religion	40

Table 2.3 (continued):
Frequencies of units referring to the categories of the affirmational ingroup representation of *ülkücüs*

	fr.
Ülkücüs believe in the importance of Islamic faith	39
Ülkücüs are on the right road for they are on the road of Allah	34
The power of Turks derive from its Islamic faith	27
Ülkücüs believe in Islam	24
Ülkücüs are respectful to the religion	19
Ülkücüs are brothers of religion	19
Ülkücüs are believers	19
Ülkücüs have the virtues of Islam	14
Allah helps ülkücüs for they have a sound faith	12
2. ÜLKÜCÜS ARE MEN OF STRUGGLE FIGHTING FOR A CAUSE	1545
Ülkücü ideals are more important than their lives for ülkücüs	49
Ülkücüs are in a war for Turkism	34
Life is war for the real men	22
2.1. Ülkücüs are fighting against the enemies of Turks	1026
Ülkücüs are fighting to protect the Turkish nation from all kinds of imperialisms	50
Ülkücüs are voluntary soldiers of the Turkish nation	47
Ülkücüs are the main targets of the enemies of the Turkish nation	34
<i>2.1.1. Türkeş and his ideas guide ülkücüs through their struggle</i>	<i>137</i>
Ülkücüs are followers of Türkeş	45
Ülkücüs trust and believe in Türkeş	38
Ülkücüs fulfill the orders of Türkeş	30
Ülkücüs are soldiers of Türkeş	24
<i>2.1.2. Ülkücüs have been fighting against Communism</i>	<i>69</i>
Communism is the foremost enemy of Turkish nationalism	37
Ülkücüs' resolution and determination have caused communism to collapse in Turkey	18
Ülkücüs cannot live in a system like communism	14
<i>2.1.3. Ülkücüs are in favor of unity and against separation</i>	<i>141</i>
Ülkücüs are in favor of unity	41

Table 2.3 (continued):
Frequencies of units referring to the categories of the affirmational ingroup representation of *ülkücüs*

	fr.
Ülkücüs are against separatism	38
Ülkücüs want peace at home	31
Ülkücüs have been fighting against separatist traitors	18
One of the characteristics of Turks is to be in unity	13
2.1.4. <i>Ülkücüs have been suffering for their cause</i>	274
Ülkücüs have suffered much for the nation	49
Ülkücüs have been subjected to injustice	47
Ülkücüs are subjected to much more difficult conditions than separatists and communists	41
Ülkücüs have been tortured	36
Ülkücüs live the most difficult of the conditions in their struggle	32
Ülkücüs have been subjected to untruths and slanders during their struggle	31
Ülkücüs die for the sake of Turkism	23
Ülkücüs paid the blood money of Turkism	15
2.1.5. <i>Ülkücüs have acquired certain social and intellectual traits through their struggle</i>	274
Ülkücüs are self-confident and determined	51
Ülkücüs are dignified, sober, and serious-minded	47
Ülkücüs are democrat	35
Ülkücüs are faithful and loyal	31
Ülkücüs have a broad horizon	26
Ülkücüs are self-sacrificing	24
Ülkücüs are courageous and brave	23
Ülkücüs give importance to justice	23
Ülkücüs are conservative	14
2.2. <i>Ülkücüs are struggling for the advancement of Turks</i>	414
Ülkücüs have high ideals for the Turkish nation	40
"Men" come to the world to do a job	36

Table 2.3 (continued):
Frequencies of units referring to the categories of the affirmational ingroup representation of ülkücüs

	fr.
<i>2.2.1. Ülkücü cause is to save and exalt the Turkish nation</i>	<i>180</i>
Ülkücüs are against imperialism and exploitation	39
Ülkücüs try to get Turks to make up for the lost time by modernizing them with lightning rapidity	29
Ülkücüs try to advance the Turkish nation to the highest in science, morality and technology	28
Ülkücüs want to save the state	25
Ülkücü cause is to save the Turkish nation	18
Ülkücü cause is to exalt the Turkish nation	16
Ülkücüs want to build a strong state	14
Turks prefer to die for independence rather than living as a slave	11
<i>2.2.2. Ülkücü cause is to unite all Turkic elements and establish a world order</i>	<i>158</i>
Ülkücüs want to realize Nizam-ı Alem (World Order) in the world	42
Ülkücüs want to realize Turan	40
Ülkücüs want all people in the world to find their humanness	37
Ülkücüs want the world to live in terms of the rules enacted by Turks	22
Ülkücüs want Turks to be powerful all around the world	17
TOTAL	2451

As can be seen, the interviewees regarded idea itself as a kind of action. At this point, while bringing the notion of action to the fore, we should not miss the point. In the ülkücü discourse, almost all forms of action are mainly depicted with militaristic terms (see Bora and Can, 1991; Çalık, 1995). Idea is no exception. It is easy to infer this characteristic from the above quotations but we can sample it more directly with an excerpt from INTERVIEWEE 13: “Today, the most powerful weapon in the world is idea. It is not possible for an action to be successful without idea. Nine Lights have provided ülkücüs with such a weapon”. Though it may seem peripheral, we urge that this point should be kept in mind while evaluating the discussion below.

2.3.2.1. Ülkücüs as “Men” of Idea⁷⁷

In Section 2.2.1.2.4, we saw that the interviewees brought to the fore the concepts of Turkism and Islamism while opposing the foreign ideologies. They formulated this duo as the saviour of the nation: “Your physician will be Turk and your medicine will be Islam” (INTERVIEWEE 15). Simultaneously, these two components referred to what was national, indigenous and local that comprised the *hars* of Turkish people (Gökalp, 1959, 1976; see also Section 2.2.1.1.2). While the former derived from nationality, the latter derived from religion and these two together satisfied the conditions for a collection of people to become a nation.⁷⁸ “If the language and the religion are one, this means that you are from the same nation” (INTERVIEWEE 14).

Indeed, the interviewees did not see Turkdom and Islam as separated components; rather they argued that Turkdom and Islam were historically unified into the idea of Turk-Islam (for comprehensive treatments of this idea from *ülkü*cü perspectives, see Arvasi, 1990; Boyunağa, 1970; Kafesoğlu, 1985). In this regard, INTERVIEWEE 05 said the following.⁷⁹

The notion of synthesis implies the existence of a thesis and an anti-thesis. This trio is generally associated with the ideas of Karl Marx who was one of the founders of communist ideology (see Marx and Engels, 1965). Some *ülkü*cü theorists appeared to feel at ill with employing similar notions with the Marxists. Moreover, they went up against the idea that there might be a dialectic relationship between religion and nation. Instead, they preferred to label their position not as the synthesis but as the ideal of Turk-Islam

⁷⁷ We preferred to use “men” in these headings, rather than a generic neutral term, for we got the impression that the *ülkü*cü in the minds of our interviewees, even in those of the female ones, was a male.

⁷⁸ Though the official ideology does not recognize religion as a component in the definition of nation, following Gökalp (1959, 1976) *ülkü*cüs give Islam a special place in the Turkish culture.

⁷⁹ Bizim fikirlerimiz Türk-İslam sentezi olarak özetlenebilir. Bu iki kelime bizim hem Türk hem de müslüman olduğumuz gerçeğini yansıtır. Yani, bu senteze ulaşmak için yapay bir çaba söz konusu değildir. Bu sentez tarihin ortaya koyduğu doğal bir sonuçtur. Bizim milliyetçiliğimiz İslamı dışarıda bırakamaz çünkü İslamsız bir Türk kültüründen söz edilemez. Dolayısıyla, bizim milliyetçiliğimiz, laikliği öne çıkaran diğer Batı milliyetçiliklerinden farklıdır. Alman ve Fransız milliyetçiliklerinin aksine, bizim milliyetçiliğimiz daha başlangıcında dini, temel unsurlarından biri sayar.

(e.g. Arvasi, 1990). The following excerpt from INTERVIEWEE 04 exhibited this tendency.⁸⁰

It seemed that the interviewees' emphasis about the ideal of Turk-Islam was also a reaction against Islamist groups. Islamist groups seem not to recognize the notion of nation based on racial or ethnic groupings as legitimate. Instead, they prefer to raise the notion of Muslim nation that foresees the unification of all Muslim societies. In other words, not only seculars but also the Islamist groups seem to challenge the idea that the notions of nation and religion can be compatible. We should note that such intellectual problems do not seem to have a conclusive solution. On our part, we can say that even if Turkdom and Islam are incompatible notions, they can reside in the same social identity as long as the persons, who carry these properties, perceive them as compatible (Gergen, 1971). Furthermore, the interviewees seemed to settle this problem by assigning different realms to each component of Turkism and Islamism. For example, INTERVIEWEE 09 said, "We have the pride and consciousness of Turkdom and the morality and virtues of Islam". Supporting this, INTERVIEWEE 08 told, "Turkish nationalism receives its spirit from Islam and its body from the Turkish culture". Accordingly, the interviewees agreed with the conclusion that *ölkücü*s were Turkist in the political and international realms and Islamist in the personal and societal realms.

Anyway, we preferred to deal with these components separately for, as the interviewees implied above, each component might be given varying weight in terms of different context. It may be said that an *ölkücü* might emphasize the Islamist component in a context with a nationalist, but *laik* Turk or emphasize the Turkist component in a context with an Islamist but non-nationalist Turk.

⁸⁰ Osmanlı döneminde bile, Avrupa'daki milliyetçi ideolojinin dine karşı olduğunu ileri süren fikirler ortaya atılmıştır. Bunlar milliyetçi ve dini duygular arasında zorlama bir karşıtlık ileri sürmüş ve sorunu sanki bir insan aynı zamanda hem milliyetçi hem de dindar olamazmış gibi sunmuşlardır. Katolikliği düşündüğümüzde bu sunuş tarzı doğru da olabilir... Ama biz *ölkücü*ler olarak bu oyunu en azından kendi *ölkemizde* bozmak istiyoruz. Türkiye'de birbirine karşıt bir Türkçü ve İslamcı cephe yoktur. Eğer var gibi gözüküyorsa, herkes bilmelidir ki, bu cephele yapay cephelelerdir. Din ve milliyet birbiriyle çelişen değerler değildir ve *ölkücü*ler sadece Türkçü değil aynı zamanda İslamcıdır da.

2.3.2.1.1. Ülkücüs as Turkists

The interviewees employed the terms of nation, state, and motherland interchangeably. They expressed a deep love and affection towards these concepts and symbols related to these concepts such as flag, national antheme, and army. In a sense, Turkism was this attitude and the beliefs nourishing that attitude.⁸¹

To be a member of the Turkish nation, to be a citizen of the Turkish state, or to live in Turkey, all these forms of existence seemed to be one and the same. At this point, the interviewees made no reference to ethnic origin.⁸²

This point seemed to result in a degree of confusion for the interviewees gave reference to the history of Turks in many cases.⁸³

Moreover, they maintained that the Turkish nation had a privileged place even in the presence of God and the Prophet.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Bizim fikri önkabulümüz, her şey Türk içindir, Türk'e göredir ve Türk tarafındandır şeklinde özetlenmektedir. Yani, aksiyonun niyeti de, öznesi de, nesnesi de, kısaca herşeyi Türk olmak durumundadır. Milli bir doktrinin hedefi de ancak bu olabilir. Dokuz Işık da bunu öngören milli bir doktrindir. (INTERVIEWEE 10)
Biz vatanımızı, milletimizi, devletimizi severiz. Her işimizde vatan, millet, devlet menfaatini kendi menfaatimizin önünde tutarız. Ülkücülüğe tam gönül verenlerde ise kendine yönelik menfaat diye birşeyi zaten bulamazsın. Bunlar böylesi kutlu ülküler uğrunda kendi nefislerini eritmiş kişilerdir. Bir su damlası olarak kalmaktansa, okyanusa katılıp bir yüce varlığın parçası olmuşlardır. Bu yüce varlığın bir parçası olarak da kendi benlikleri aynı ölçüde değer kazanmıştır. (INTERVIEWEE 03)

⁸² Biz ırkçı değiliz. İnsanların kafataslarını ölçmek gibi bir niyetimiz yok. Hiçbir zaman da olmadı. Türklüğü benimseyen herkesin Türk olduğuna inanırız ve bundan sonrasını sorgulamayız. Yani, bize göre, kendini Türk hissedenden herkesin Türk olmaya hakkı vardır. Asıl itibariyle azınlıklardan bile olsa, Türk milleti, Türk devleti için çalışan biri Türk'tür. Asıl itibariyle Türk olsa bile, milletini, devletini gözetmeyen biri Türk değildir, Türk olamaz. (INTERVIEWEE 12)

⁸³ Türk milleti asıldır. (INTERVIEWEE 05)

Türk milletin tarihi gökteki yıldızlar gibi kahramanlarla doludur ve türlü kahramanlıklarla bezenmiştir. (INTERVIEWEE 12)

Milletimiz saygıdeğer bir millettir. Çünkü her daim tarihteki kahramanları tekrardan çıkarabilmek potansiyeline sahiptir. (INTERVIEWEE 06)

⁸⁴ Türk milleti bin yıldan bu yana İslam'ın bayraktarlığını yapmıştır. Bu yüzden Allah Türk milletini sever ve çok büyük sıkıntılara uğramasını istemez. Ne zaman sıkıntı dayanılmaz hal almışsa, Allah Türk milletine bir kurtarıcı nasip etmiştir. (INTERVIEWEE 01)
Türk milletin kutluluğunu Peygamberimiz de bilmekte ve haber vermekteydi. Peygamberden geldiği bilinen Türklerle ilgili bir sürü hadis vardır. Mesela, bunlardan en meşhuru İstanbul'un fethiyle ilgili olanıdır. Bu hadisinde "İstanbul mutlaka fetholunacaktır. Onu fetheden komutan ne güzel komutan, onu fetheden ordu ne güzel ordudur" demiştir.

In short, for the interviewees, Turkish nation seemed to have merits above of other nations. Yet, this conclusion seems to contradict with the above conclusion that says Turkdom does not overlap with an ethnic category. INTERVIEWEE 14 was aware of this contradiction and he seemed to resolve it as follows.⁸⁵

Having clarified the concept of Turkdom, we can continue that Turkism represented an extremely positive attitude toward Turkdom.⁸⁶

Remember that we discussed the connection between theory and practice in the *ülkü* discourse at the beginning of this section. Turkism was not only a positive sentiment toward the nation but also an idea emerging during the struggle against other groups. In this regard, the communists again seemed to be the most relevant group. It seems that Turkism was formulated against the communists' internationalism.⁸⁷

Bu övgüye Türkler mazhar olmuştur. İslam'ın fetih döneminde açık bir şekilde Türklerle savaş yapılmamasını emretmiştir. Nitekim, Türkler herhangi bir savaşa gerek olmaksızın kendiliklerinden müslüman olmuş tek millettir. Hatta Allah'ın çok sevdiği bir millet olduğunu, hangi millettten intikam almak isterse onların üzerine bu sevdiği milleti gönderdiğini, bu milletin Türkler olduğunu söylediği de rivayet edilmektedir. Esasında, bu sözler pek sahih olmasa bile tarih bunları doğrular şekilde geliştirmiştir. Araplar ve Farslar, İslam dininin içine fitne sokmaktan başka bir işe yaramamışlardır. İslam'ın en gelişmiş dönemleri elbette Hazreti Peygamber ve Dört Halifeler dönemidir. Ancak, bundan sonra İslam'ın en parlak dönemleri Türk hakimiyetinin başladığı dönemlerle gelmiştir.

(INTERVIEWEE 02)

⁸⁵ Kùltürlerin birbiriyle karşılaşması sonucunda hep zayıf kùltür güçlü kùltürün içinde erimiştir. Tabii, burada güç kavramını farklı anlamda kullanıyorum. Daha çok Lamarck'ın evrim teorisinin kùltür alanına uygulanması gibi bir şey. Zayıf milletler güçlü milletlerin dilini ve tarihini kullanmaya başlamışlar ve zaman içinde o milletin bir ferdi durumuna gelmişlerdir. Bizim anladığımız Türklük de bir Türk milleti ile başlamıştır. Tarihin bilinen noktasının ötesinde diğer kùltürlerle ne tür ilişkilere girdiğini bugün için bilemiyoruz ama Türkoloji çalışmaları gün be gün yeni bilgileri günyüzüne çıkarıyor. Bu Türk milleti zaman içinde değişik milletlerle değişik biçimlerde ilişkilere girmiştir. Bu ilişkilerin olağanüstü yoğun olduğunu da biliyoruz. Özellikle evlenmeler ile ırksal olarak insanlar birbirine ayırt edilemeyecek kadar kaynaşmışlardır. Ancak, neticede asıl olarak Türk olan o unsurun kùltürü ayakta kalmış, elbette diğer kùltürlerden de beslenmiş ve hatta daha da güçlenmiş, ama kendisini devam ettirmiştir. Bu aşamada bu kùltüre her kim katkıda bulunmuş ise etnik olarak bunun aslına bakmanın bir anlamı kalmamıştır. Bu insanlar Türk'tür. Buna göre, Türklük Türk dili, Türk kùltürü ve Türk tarihinin ortaya koyduğu bir kimliktir.

⁸⁶ Biz Türk olduğumuzu unutmaya karşıyız. Türklük şuuru sahibiz ve bu ülkedeki her Türk evladının bu şuura sahip olması için çalışıyoruz. Türkiye'nin diğer milletlerden daha fakir olmasına, daha geri olmasına bakıp Türklüğümüzden utanmıyoruz. Bilakis, biz Türklük gururuna sahibiz. Dünyanın en şerefli milletlerinden birinin ferdi olduğumuz için gururluyuz. Atatürk'ün dediği gibi, taşıdığımız kanın bizi tekrardan hakettiğimiz yerlere getirecek güce sahip olduğuna inanıyoruz. (INTERVIEWEE 14)

⁸⁷ Komünistlerin yapmaya çalıştığı çok şey vardı. Bunların tümüne karşı *ülkü* bir tepki geliştirmek mümkündür. Aslında komünist kaygıların bir kısmını bizim taşıdığımızı da

As can be seen, the interviewees regarded Turkism as a natural sentiment of the Turkish people. Ülkücüs meant to make this sentiment into an idea and this effort seemed to have provided them with their most distinctive attribute. The interviewees recognized that there were other political groups sharing some attributes with ülkücüs. However, no other groups in Turkey would define themselves as Turkist even if they had, to some extent, nationalist feelings. By unknowingly alluding the most central principle of the Social Identity Theory, INTERVIEWEE 16 touched upon this issue.⁸⁸

Our content analysis seemed to confirm this quotation that Turkism was a distinctive component of the social identity of the interviewees. However, as we saw above, the interviewees believed that Turkdism comprised only the material component of ülkücü thought. There was another component tapping the moral realm, namely Islamism. In other words, Islamism could be taken as another distinctive component of their social identity. Below, we shall deal with this moral component.

2.3.2.1.2. Ülkücüs as Islamists

In the preceding sections, we saw that the interviewees considered Islam as an essential constituent of the Turkish culture. However, Islam was not just an element of the Turkish culture, or to put it differently, if culture was conceptualized as having an existence independent of the people's minds, Islam was not something external to the interviewees. First, there was no doubt that the interviewees were Muslims who tried to

söyleyebilirim. Örneğin, biz de sosyal adalet anlayışını esas alıyoruz ama komünizmle bunun gerçekleşeceğine asla inanmıyoruz. Neyse! ... Bizim komünizme en fazla karşı çıktığımız nokta, beynelmilelci söylemleridir. Varşova Paketi'ne girilecek, o gün KOMERON diye ekonomik bir örgüt vardı. İşte bu örgütün üyesi olunacak falan filan. Dahası, komünist ülkelerle Türkiye arasında sınır diye birşey olmayacak. Tüm halklar kardeşler gibi hikayeler okuyorlardı. Anlayacağın, hikayenin bu bölümü bize tümünden yabancı idi. Sırf bu nazariyeler komünizm ile ilişkimizin keyfiyetini belirleyebilirdi. Biz bu anlamda çok doğal bir duygu olan Türkcülüğü fikir durumuna getirmek zorunda kaldık. İnsanların doğal olarak sahip oldukları duyguların teorisini yapmaya çalıştık. (INTERVIEWEE 14)

⁸⁸ Türkcülük, Türk milliyetçiliği demektir. Ancak, bu kavram artık bütünüyle ülkücülere mal olmuş gözüküyor. Yani, Türk milliyetçiliği ile Türkcülük arasında bir ayrışma yapılıyor. Hatta, bazıları bu ayrışmayı daha da belirgin kılmak için milliyetçiyiz ama Türk milliyetçisi değiliz diyor. Halbuki, milliyetçi isen bir milletin milliyetçisisin demektir. Türk olduğuna göre Türk milliyetçisisin demektir. Yoksa, ne milliyetçisi olabilirsin ki? Ama Türk milliyetçiliği de ülkücülükle çok ilişkili bir duruma geldiği için olsa gerek, ülkücülerle aynı kimliği paylaşmıyorum dercesine milliyetçi olduğu halde, Türkcülüğü, hatta Türk milliyetçiliğini reddedenler var.

observe the requirements of Islam completely. Yet, they were not as tough as orthodox Islamist groups concerning Islamic practices like prayer. What is more, they did not take these practices as the solitary indicator of being Muslim.⁸⁹

At this instant, it should be noted that most of the interviewees expressed similar views regarding Islam. All of them seemed to be Muslims who tried to fulfill worshipping practices of Islam. However, worshipping practices were not considered critical in being Muslim.⁹⁰ The critical thing was the morality Islam brought to the world. For the interviewees, Muslims should carry the virtues of Islam. In other words, not Islam but worshipping practices were related to the private realm. Islam, on the contrary, was directly concerned with the social life.⁹¹

As can be seen, the Islamist component of *ölkücü* identity was mainly concerned with the social life. Human beings as social creatures should have certain properties that render the social life possible. Islam ensured *ölkücü*s to have such properties. In other words, Islamism in the minds of the interviewees had nothing to do with political aims.⁹² However, the interviewees believed that there was an organized attack against the morality of people since 1930s. Turkism without morality was meaningless. Consequently, Islamism in the *ölkücü* thought had to have a political flavor, too. Firstly, defending morality had to be a political action in itself.⁹³

⁸⁹ Ben bir müslümanım. Bir müslüman olarak da, dinimin gereklerini yerine getirmeye çalışıyorum. Namazımı kılıyorum, orucumu tutuyorum. Dinimin doğruluğuna samimiyetle inanıyorum. Diğer *ölkücü*lerin de benimle aynı inançları paylaşmasını, aynı pratikleri yapmasını istiyorum. Ve birçoğunun bu inancı paylaştığına ve namaz, oruç gibi pratikleri yerine getirdiğine eminim. Ama bazılarının İslami ritüelleri düzenli bir şekilde yerine getirmediğini de biliyorum. Bunu onaylamasam da, onları reddetmiyorum. Çünkü din özünde özel bir meseledir. Herkes Allah'a karşı sorumludur, bana sorumlu değildir. (INTERVIEWEE 14)

⁹⁰ We should note that these remarks were made in contrast to Islamist groups in Turkey.

⁹¹ *Ölkücüler*, İslam ahlak ve faziletine sahiptir. Hepimiz toplumun içinde yaşıyoruz. Bir toplumda insanlar bir arada yaşamayı mümkün kılan belirli özelliklere sahip olmaz ise, toplum hayatı felç olur. *Ölkücüler*, elinden, dilinden ve belinden diğer insanların emin olduğu kişilerdir. Yani, kısaca *ölkücülerden* diğer insanlara zarar gelmez. *Ölkücülerin* diğer insanların canında, malında ve namusunda gözü yoktur. Bu İslam ahlakının başlangıç noktası ve temelidir. (INTERVIEWEE 02)

⁹² As a matter of fact, the term Islamism has generally been used to refer to the ideal of uniting all Muslim nations in the world.

⁹³ İslam Türklerin dinidir, maneviyatıdır. Bununla sakın İslam'ın milli bir din olduğunu iddia ettiğim anlaşılmaz. Peygamber Efendimiz sadece Türklere değil, tüm insanlığa gönderilmiştir. Kuran sadece Araplara ya da Türkler için değil tüm insanlar için indirilmiştir. Ama Türkler için böyle bir ayrıcalık söz konusudur... Biz, İslam dışında bir

Secondly, Turkism was not solely related to a racial ideal. Since Turkdome was tightly connected to Islam, the rise of Turkdome would mean the rise of Islam, too. Just as the rise of Turkdome in the periods of the Seljuks and the Ottomans had brought about the most brilliant times of Islam, realization of the *ülküçü* ideals would lead to the rise of Islam in the world. That's why, the interviewees regarded their road as the road of God.⁹⁴

Relatedly, the interviewees regarded members of other Muslim nations as brothers of religion. They were closer to Turks than Christians, Jews, and other nations of other religions. In the long run, Islamism of the interviewees encompassed these Islamic nations, too.⁹⁵

As we saw in the Section 2.2.1.2.4, the interviewees presented Turkism and Islamism as the only emancipation recipe of the Turkish nation. In a sense, the interviewees had the knowledge of both maladies and their cures. Undoubtedly, this allegation had a high internal reliability and perceived validity when we consider the perceived context of the interviewees as true. Thus, above anything else, *ülküçü*s were the men who produced and claimed the ideal of Turk-Islam, and as the owner of this ideal, they rightly deserve to be called as "men" of idea.

In the beginning of the Section 2.2.2.1, we noted the connection between idea and practice in the discussions of the interviewees. We held that they took even the realm of

maneviyat kaynağına ihtiyaç duymuyoruz ve İslam'ı yürürlükten kaldırarak yerine başka bir ahlak kurma çabalarına karşıyız. Bu tür çabalar içinde olanları Türk milletinin düşmanı addediyoruz. Esasında, Türkçülüğü, bir anlamda, maneviyata yeniden dönüş olarak görüyoruz. İslam ahlak ve faziletinin yeniden Türk insanının maneviyatına egemen olmasını istiyoruz. Bu açıdan bakıldığında bu ideal de siyasidir. Çünkü siyasi olmak zorundadır. Çünkü ortada siyasi cebirle yok edilmeye çalışılan bir toplumsal gerçeklik söz konusudur. Ateist, dinsiz düşmanlara karşı, inançlı, dindar bir kesimi temsil ettiğimizi ilan etmek zorundayız... (INTERVIEWEE 08)

⁹⁴ Türklerin kutlu güç kaynaklarından birisi İslam'dır. Başarılarının ardında Allah'ın yardımı vardır. Ne zaman Allah yolundan ayrıldılarsa başarısız olmuşlardır... Bizim de eninde sonunda kazanan taraf olacağımıza inancım tamdır. Çünkü yolumuz Allah yoludur. Selamet ve zafer Allah yolunda olanlarındır. Ve gelecek, sağlam bir inanca sahip olanların olacaktır. (INTERVIEWEE 05)

⁹⁵ Biz İslam'ın bayraktarlığını yapma şerefine ulaşmış bir milletiz. Asırlar boyunca, tüm İslam alemini kafirlerin saldırılarından korumuş ve kollamışız. Bugün bazı anlaşmazlıklar olsa da, diğer müslüman milletlerin Türklere minnettar olduğunu ben şahsen gördüm. Özellikle, Afganistan ve ötesinde yaşayan müslüman halkın Türklere muhabbeti insanı gururlandırıyor. Hilafet kaldırılmış ve Türkler felç edilmiştir. Osmanlı'nın yıkılmasından sonra İslam dünyası bir daha hiç rahat yüzü görmemiştir. Bizim amacımız, İslam dünyasının da eski huzurlu günlerine ulaşmasını sağlamaktır. Gerek Filistin sorunu gerekse diğerleri, ancak, Türklerin yükselmesiyle ortadan kalkacak sorunlardır. (INTERVIEWEE 15)

idea as a state of struggle. In a sense, they seemed to have developed the ideal of Turk-Islam to fight against such foreign ideologies as communism and capitalism. This component of *ölkücü* social identity will be clearer in the following section, devoted to a discussion of *ölkücü*s as men of struggle.

2.3.2.2. Ölkücü as Men of Struggle

As noted above, the distinction between idea and action in the thinking of the interviewees was slippery. Action seemed to have a superior position, or to put it differently, idea seemed to be noteworthy provided that it contributed to action. The significance of Turkism and Islamism was derived from the fact that they were supposed to shape the nature of *ölkücü* action. In other words, for the interviewees, these two components were the most important dimensions that differentiated *ölkücü* action from actions of other ideological groups.

The interviewees were quite explicitly stating that *ölkücü*s were in a struggle. They were doing this struggle for a certain ideal. This ideal was so imperative for *ölkücü*s that they were determined to do everything including sacrificing their lives.⁹⁶

This component of *ölkücü* social identity seemed to consist of two large sub-components. In the first one, the interviewees talked about a war against enemies of the *ölkücü* group. Indeed, these enemies were not peculiar to *ölkücü*s. That is, this war was not between two or more groups. Instead, the enemies in question were enemies of the Turkish nation, and in this war, *ölkücü*s were representing the Turkish nation. Shortly, *ölkücü*s appeared to engage in a war to protect Turkish people from evil-doings of the enemies.

In the second sub-component, the interviewees pointed to the ideals *ölkücü*s had been nourishing for the Turkish nation. They were struggling to make Turkey into the strongest state in the world, to unite all Turks under the same banner, and to correct the order of the world. Below, we shall examine these two sub-components more closely.

⁹⁶ Biz, davamız uğruna hayatlarımızı tehlikeye atmış insanlarız. Davamızın hayatlarımızdan daha önemli olduğuna yürekten inanmışız... Amacımız Türklük davasının sonsuza kadar sürmesi... Kim bu davanın karşısına çıkarsa düşmanımızdır. Bu insanlarla ya onlar ya da biz yok oluncaya kadar savaşmak, *ölkücüyüm* diyen herkesin görevidir. (INTERVIEWEE 18)

2.3.2.2.1. Ülkücüs as warriors against the enemies of the Turkish nation

We noted that Alparslan Türkeş, leader of the ülkücü movement, was a soldier. This seems to have led him to organize the ülkücü group like a military troop. Moreover, the ideas he indoctrinated among his followers were quite akin to military ends. Probably, for these reasons, the interviewees preferred to depict themselves as “the voluntary soldiers of the Turkish nation” (INTERVIEWEE 04).

They were fighting to protect the Turkish people from dangers posed by the enemies. Yet, the enemies were very powerful. That’s why, it was not easy to deal with these enemies, and since ülkücüs had been the greatest obstacle before their aims, they took ülkücüs as their main targets. They were trying to do their best to eradicate ülkücü existence in Turkey. In short, the war the interviewees were talking about was not a small fight between street gangs.⁹⁷

In this struggle, Alparslan Türkeş had been the undebatable leader. It was him who laid down the principles and formulated the action plan of the movement.⁹⁸

As can be seen, military character of the ülkücü group was the most apparent in this topic. Türkeş was depicted as the leader of a group engaging in a great war. In this sense, Türkeş did not seem to be the president of a political party but the commander of an army. He used to give orders and ülkücüs used to follow these orders without hesitation. As is the case in the army, nobody could question the logic of these orders.

⁹⁷ Ülkücüler basit hesapları olan, günlük çıkarlar peşinde koşan insanlar olarak görmemek lazım. Bu şekilde düşünmek bu davaya yapılabilecek en büyük hakarettir. Ülkücülük çok büyük bir davanın adıdır. Hattı değil, sathı müdafa etmektedir ve bu müdafaayı hayatın her alanında yapmaktadır... Türkiye’ye yapılan saldırıların büyüklüğü düşünülürse, ülkücülerin uğraşlarının büyüklüğü de takdir edilmiş olur. (INTERVIEWEE 06)

⁹⁸ Alparslan Türkeş, ülkücülük davasını ortaya atmış ve bu davayı herkesten daha büyük bir gayretle savunmuştur. Türkeş davanın doğal lideridir ve Türkler için kutsal sayılan Başbuğ ünvanının tek sahibidir... (INTERVIEWEE 14)
Hareketin lideri Türkeş’tir. Ülkücü, Türkeş’in peşinden giden, ona güvenen ve ona inanan kişidir... Türkeş kadar ülkücü hareketle özdeşleşen başka biri yoktur. Hayatını ülkücülerini teşkilatlandırmaya ve ülkücü fikirleri yaymaya adanmıştır. Bu uğurda hiçbir zaman yorgunluk ya da yılgınlık emaresi göstermemiştir. Hareketle ilgili en ufak bir olay için Hakkari’den Edirne’ye, Sinop’tan Mersin’e tüm Türkiye’yi durmadan dolaşmıştır. Ülkücülerini yerinde ve zamanında denetlemiştir. Bunun sonucu olarak da, kendi bölgesinden hiç çıkmayan ülkücüler bile Türkeş ile birinci elden tanışıklık geliştirmiştir. Herhangi bir aracı olmaksızın Türkeş’i kendi Başbuğu olarak selamlamıştır... (INTERVIEWEE 18)

About this issue, Türkeş himself said, “Absolute obedience to orders is necessary. Our cause does not move forward with informal, loose, undisciplined, unmethodical people (Türkeş, no date; p. 54; my translation). In a context about those who departed from the ülkücü movement, INTERVIEWEE 03 echoed the same theme as follows.⁹⁹

We noted that Türkeş originally organized the ülkücü movement against the rising communism in Turkey. However, the interviewees did not accept the claim that the ülkücü movement was a reaction against communism. They argued that Turkism had been an action developed independently from the rising communism. On the contrary, they maintained, communism was a reaction against Turkist, Islamist tendencies within society. Nevertheless, as the time passed, the opposition against communism seems to have become a determining component in the social identity of interviewees. In other words, we can infer that anti-communism has been a crucial part of ülkücü identity. This was because, firstly, most of the Turks had been living as captives under the satellite communist regimes of the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁰

When we look at the history, we see that communism had received this inheritance from the Tsarist Russia. Turkic societies around the Caspian Sea had been entered the sovereignty of Tsarist Russia long before the Bolshevic Revolution. Turkism had started to take its shape in Crimea and Kazan as a reaction against the Russian domination and pressures (Kırımlı, 1994). Many prominent Turkists including İsmail Gaspralı, Yusuf Akçura, and Ahmet Ağaoğlu were from these lands and it was these persons who exported Turkism into the Ottoman lands. Thus, we can say that the communist Soviet Union was subjected to an ancient hatred of Turkists inherited from the Tsarist Russia.

⁹⁹ Savaşta emirleri sorgulamak olmaz. Komutan neferin erişemediği bilgilere sahiptir ve bu bilgiler ışığında icabında neferden canını vermesini ister. Vatanın korunması için insanların canını vermesi gerekebilir ve seve seve de bu can feda edilir. Bu durum sorgulanmaya başlanırsa savaşın kaybedilmesi muhakkaktır. Bundan dolayı da savaş durumunda emirleri sorgulamak hainliktir. Nitekim, en ağır şekilde cezalandırılır... Biz de bir savaşın içindeyiz. Bu savaşı Türkeş’in idaresindeki ülkücü saflarda veriyoruz. Bu halde, yapmamız gerekenler bize söylendiğinde, bunları harfiyyen yerine getirmek durumundayız. Aksi taktirde, davaya ihanet etmiş oluruz...

¹⁰⁰ Komünizm, Türk milliyetçiliğinin en büyük düşmanıdır. Azeriler, Kazaklar, Türkmenler, Özbekler, velhasıl Türkiye dışındaki Türk varlığının hemen hemen tamamı yıllarca komünist rejimlerin esiri olarak yaşamışlardır. Bu rejimler, burada yaşayan Türklerin Türklüklerini unutmaları ve bu bölgelerin geri kalması için ellerinden geleni yapmışlardır. Bu insanları Demir Perde’nin arkasına kapatmış ve dış dünya ile temaslarını kesmiş, dış dünyadakilere de buralarda Türklerin yaşadığını unutturmuşlardır. (INTERVIEWEE 11)

Besides, as we repeatedly quoted in relation to threats against Turkey, communist groups in Turkey were seen as the tongs of Soviet Union whose aim had been to make Turkey into another of her Turkish slaves. Ülkücüs fought with these communist groups in the schools and the streets. In the present time, the influence of these groups in the public realm was much lesser than they enjoyed during the 1960s and 1970s. The interviewees attributed this decline to the effort of ülkücü group.¹⁰¹

Apart from such historical enmities, the interviewees seemed to oppose the communist doctrines in a variety of ways. Most particularly, the interviewees seemed to hate the social life of people in the Soviet Union. They characterized this life as very immoral and claimed that such a living could not be compatible with Turkish Islamic tradition.¹⁰²

In short, the interviewees did not believe that the Turkish people could live in a communist regime. One more reason lying behind the anti-communism we observed among the interviewees was that communism represented a threat against the unity of

¹⁰¹ Komünistler her daim Türk milliyetçilerinin düşmanı idiler. Yani, komünist milliyetçi çekişmesi 1970'lerden çok önce başlamıştı. Ülkücü teşkilatlanmanın hemen ardından mücadele bu iki grup arasında odaklandı... Ülkücülerin varlığı vatandaşın nefes alabileceği bir alanın doğmasına neden oldu. Aksi takdirde, komünist olmayanlara hayat hakkı yoktu... Komünistlerin dış desteği müthişti. Nitekim, 12 Eylül sonrasında Fatsa ve Güneydoğu hareketlerinde hemen hemen bir ordunun teşkilatlanmasına yetecek kadar silah bulundu. Bunlardan birçoğu polisin ya da askerin elinde olandan daha etkili silahlardı. Düşünün ki ülkücüler bu şekilde silahlanmış katillere karşı mücadele ediyorlardı. Bu yüzden birçok ülkücü şehit oldu. Ancak, ne mücadelenin şiddeti ne de şehitlerin çokluğu o günün ülkücülerini yıldırdı. Bilakis, bu durum ülkücülerini daha da hırçılı bir hale getirdi, daha bir hırsıyla mücadeleye sarılmasını sağladı... Komünizm tüm dünyada çöktü ancak birçok milletten neleri aldıktan sonra çöktüğünü Allah bilir. Türkiye de bu milletlerden biri olabilirdi. Ancak, ülkücülerin direnişi böyle bir son yaşanmasını engelledi. (INTERVIEWEE 10)

¹⁰² Bizde bir insanın ailesi, hanımı kutsaldır. Kimse buna yan gözle ya da kem gözle bakamaz. Bırak fiili bir hareketi, böyle bir niyet farkedildiğinde bile, bunu yapanı katletmek ya da bu yolda ölmek meşrudur. Komünist rejimde bırak böyle bir tutumu devam ettirmeyi, aile kurumunu toptan yok etme isteği vardır. Kadınlar herkesin malı, doğan tüm çocuklar ise anasız-babasızdır. İrz, namus gibi değerler bu sistemde geçerli değildir... (INTERVIEWEE 19)

Komünizm, özel mülkiyeti reddeder. Böyle bir anlayış Türklerin hiçbir döneminde geçerli olmamıştır. Mal alma, satma, biriktirme, kullanma hakkı vardır. Ve insanların malları kutsaldır. Bunlara yönelik herhangi bir dış tasarruf cezalandırılır... Çalışıp kazanmış veya anasından babasından kalmış malları gaspedecek ve malı olmayanlara dağıtacakmışsın! Daha da kötüsü kimseye dağıtmayacak devletin tekeline alacakmışsın. Yani, devleti yöneten birkaç bürokrat ülkedeki tüm zenginliğin tek hakimi olacak. Ve bunların kafalarına gore, diledikleri kadar sana verilecek ve senin bundan fazlasını isteme hakkın olmayacak. Türk geleneğinde bu anlayışın yeri yoktur... (INTERVIEWEE 11)

nation. They were trying to divide the nation into artificial classes. The end result of this dividing was civic turmoil.¹⁰³

In the case of separatism, as have seen in the perceived context, communists were not the only threat against the unity. There were a variety of groups threatening the unity of the motherland and the nation in some way or another. Against this threat, the interviewees told, *ülkücüs* were in favor of unity.¹⁰⁴

Indeed, being in unity was a characteristic of the Turks. In this regard, history taught the Turks many lessons. For example, ancient Turks suffered too much from the Chinese when they were separate from each other.¹⁰⁵

Accordingly, later generations had never tolerated the actions that were likely to cause separation. The permission to kill rival brothers in the Ottomans was a dramatic instance of this sensitivity.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Komünist söylemde ezen ve ezilen sınıflar diye birşey vardır. İşveren ezen, işçi ise ezilen sınıftandır. İşveren birçok ailenin geçimine sebep olan bir iş sağladığı, bir işyeri kurduğu için suçludur. İşçinin emeğini sömürmektedir. Bize göre, işçinin şükran duyması gereken kişiye, komünistler nefret duyulması gerektiğini öğretmektedir. Nitekim, bu uğraşlarının sonucu işverenle işçi, birbirinin açığını arıyan düşmanlar olmuşlardır... Komünistlere göre, bir köyde saygı duyulan makamda oturan birinin bilgisi, görgüsü diye birşey yoktur. Bu ya bir ağadır ya da bir şeyhtir ve köylüyü sömürerek bu konumu işgal etmektedir. Yani, insanlar ellerinde bulunan maddi zenginliğe göre muamele görürler ve bu maddi zenginlik maddi zenginliğe sahip olmayanların sırtından kazanılmaktadır. Kısaca, komünizm insanların arasına düşmanlık tohumları serpen bir ideolojidir. Halbuki, biz işçisiyle, patronuyla, köylüsüyle, ağasıyla milletin tüm fertlerinin birleşmesini ve aynı amaç için çalışmaları gerektiğini düşünüyoruz... (INTERVIEWEE 06)

¹⁰⁴ Biz birlikten yanayız, bölmeye, parçalamaya değil, birleştirmeye çalışıyoruz. Türk'ü olsun, Kürd'ü olsun bu ülkede yaşayan herkes için bölünmenin zarardan başka birşey getirmeyeceğini söylüyoruz. Kimseyi reddetmiyoruz. Laikiyle, dindarıyla, Lazıyla, Çerkeziyle, devleti için aşk ile çalışan herkesin bu ülkede birinci sınıf vatandaş muamelesi görmesini istiyoruz. Herkesin menfaatinin birlik içinde olmakta yattığını anlatıyoruz... (INTERVIEWEE 13)

¹⁰⁵ Birlik, beraberlik, uyum gibi hasletler Türk insanının genlerinde vardır. Türkler bu hasletlerin önemini bundan binlerce yıl önce görmüşler ve bu tehlikeleri destanlarına, mitlerine yansıtmışlardır. Ne zaman boylar birbirine düşse o zamanki düşmanlarımız olan Çinliler bu husumetten faydalanmış ve Türkleri ezmişlerdir. Bu zulmü ancak tüm Türkleri bir araya getirebilen bir lider durdurmuş ve bu lider zamanında Türkler en parlak günlerini yaşamışlardır. Oğuz Kağan destanının özeti, destandaki kıssadan hisse budur. (INTERVIEWEE 13)

¹⁰⁶ Kim veya hangi değer bir insan için kardeşinden daha aziz olabilir? Osmanlı'daki büyüklerimiz, devletin ve milletin birlik ve beraberliğinin kardeşten daha önemli olduğunu bilfiil göstermişlerdir. Böyle bir tehlike hasıl olduğunda padişahlar, kardeşlerinin ölüm emrini gözünü kırpmadan vermiştir... (INTERVIEWEE 17)

The best way to erode and weaken a nation was to break unity among her members. For this reason, the enemies of the Turkish nation incessantly attacked this value. Yet, ülkücüs were aware of this conspiracy and had been fighting for the unity of the nation.¹⁰⁷

We saw that, in the eye of the interviewees, ülkücüs was a group continuously attacked by the enemies. Ülkücüs were subjected to not only material attacks but also spiritual tortures. As a result, they preferred to depict ülkücüs like the ascetics in Islamic mysticism. Life would never be easy for the ascetic. That's why he would not like to live in this world and long for death because he would be able to get the yields of his strivings only in the other world. However, only God, who granted the life, had the authority to take it back. For this reason, the ascetic would have to continue to suffer on the road of God (see quotations in Section 2.2.1.3.3).

The interviewees believed that ülkücü cause was the road of God and on this road they were equipped with a variety of characteristics valued by the Turkish culture. "Self-confidence", "resolution" and "determination" seemed to be the most straightforward of these characteristics.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Biz, bölücülüğe karşıyız. Temelde vatanın ve milletin bölünmez bir bütün olduğunu savunmak tam da bu karşıtlıkla açıklanabilir. Komünistler olsun, PKK olsun, radikal dinciler olsun hepsi şu veya bu şekilde ülkedeki birlik ve dirliği bozmak istemektedir. Karşı olduğumuz, mücadele ettiğimiz budur... Herşeye müsamaha gösterebiliriz ama birliği bozmak istemede herhangi bir iyi niyet olamaz. Böyle dediğimizde bizi statükocu olmakla suçluyorlar. Eğer statükoculuk buysa statükocuyuz. Ama varolan herşeyin iyi olduğunu iddia etmiyoruz ki. Birçok şeyin değişmesi gerektiğini biz de söylüyoruz. Ama aynı zamanda diyoruz ki, bu değişim birbirimizi kırmadan, milleti birbirine düşman etmeden de yapılabilir. Zaten değişim ancak böyle olunca bir sonuca ulaşabilecektir. Birlik ve dirliğin bozulmasının ardından gelen değişim, hayırlı bir değişim olmayacaktır. Bu yüzden, sonu belli olan bu eyleme müsamaha göstermemiz, bu eylemi yapanlara müsaade etmemiz düşünülemez. (INTERVIEWEE 02)

¹⁰⁸ Ülkücü, belli idealler için hareket eden kişidir. Bu ideallere giden yol çok taşlı ve dikenlidir. Zaten, tarihin hiçbir döneminde bu yolda ilerlemek kolay olmamıştır. Cenabı Allah, bu yola girenleri hep en değerli gördüğü şeyleri ellerinden alarak imtihan etmiştir... Hedeflerine ulaşabilmek için ülkücü kararlı olmalıdır. Bugüne kadarki hareketleri ile ülkücüler bu kararlılığı göstermişlerdir. Canlarını ve mallarını bu yolda feda etmişlerdir. Bu fedakarlıklarının meyvesini yiyemediklerinde de davalarına devam etme azim ve kararlılığını göstermişlerdir. Böylece, Türk milletinin düşmanlarının cesaretini kırmışlardır. (INTERVIEWEE 09)

Türklerin sembolünün bozkurt olması raslantı değildir. Bozkurt olağanüstü kararlı ve kendine güveni olan bir hayvandır. Hareketlerinde tereddüt yoktur. Bundan dolayı da, hayvanlar aleminde seçkin bir yere sahiptir. Türkler de kararlı ve kendine güveni olan bir

Another widely cited property of *ülkücüs* was “serious-mindedness”, “soberity”, and “dignity”. As we noted above, *Türkeş* did not favor “informal, loose, undisciplined, unmethodical people”. Therefore, *ülkücüs* had to be serious, sober, and dignified since the perpetuation of their cause demanded such properties within her followers.¹⁰⁹

As can be seen, the above-mentioned characteristics were the outgrowth of being members of an important cause. One more characteristic that seems to be demanded by this cause was “courage” and “bravery”.¹¹⁰

Another important characteristic that a man of struggle should have was “faithfulness”, “fidelity”, and “loyalty”. The opposite of this characteristic seemed to be

millettir. Türk için imkansız denilen birşey yoktur. Özellikle hayat memat konusu olan durumlarda Türkler yüzünü asla geriye dönmez. (INTERVIEWEE 12)

Ülkücünün kendine güveni Allah'a olan inancından gelir. Allah'a iman etmiş birinin dünyanın önüne koyacağı tehlikelerden korkmasına, gerilemesine gerek yoktur. Peygamber Efendimizin hayatı bu anlayışın en güzel örneğidir. En barbar, sadece güce tapan bir topluluğun içinde tek başına onlara meydan okumuştur. Bundan sonra da ne tehditlerine ne de iltifatlarına aldırmanmıştır. Doğru bildiği yoldan en ufak bir sapma göstermemiş, neticede zafere ulaşmıştır. (INTERVIEWEE 09)

¹⁰⁹ Ülkücü adam ciddi olur. Kendi ne olursa olsun veya ne iş yaparsa yapsın temsil ettiği davanın ciddiyetini yansıtır. Çok gülen, olur olmadık yerde şaka yapan, etrafında sulu, cıvık olarak görülen biri ülkücü olamaz. Böyle biri olsa bile, harekete girdikten sonra bu kötü özelliklerden arınır. Hangi Türk büyüğüne bakarsan bak ilk göreceğin hasletlerden biri ciddiyettir. (INTERVIEWEE 17)

Bizde ağırbaşlılık bir değerdir. Eğer gerçekten konuşacak önemli bir şeyin yoksa susarsın. Öyle laf olsun diye konuşmazsın. Ortada bir olay varsa öyle hemen zıpçıktı gibi olayın üstüne atlamazsın. Beklersin, müdahale edilmesi gerektiğine kanaat getirirsen müdahale edersin. Tabii, sen müdahale edince de olayın sonuna kadar gidersin. Eğer sonuna kadar gidilmeyecekse olaya müdahale ettikten sonra geri çekilmek ülkücüye yakışmaz. (INTERVIEWEE 03)

Biz Türkler, cıvık adamı sevmeyiz. Hele hele önemli mevkileri işgal eden ya da önemli işler ile iştigal eden insanların ciddi, vakar sahibi insanlar olmasını bekleriz. Bir şekilde, ciddi işlerle uğraşan insanların gayri ciddi hareketleri bizim gözümüzde şık olmaz. Belki bazen bunun ucunu biraz kaçırıyoruz ama ne yapalım ki durum böyle... (INTERVIEWEE 12)

¹¹⁰ Ülkücülerin komünistlerden tek üstünlüğü cesaretti. Çatışma ortamlarında komünistler çoğu zaman hem sayı bakımından hem de silahlanma bakımından ülkücülerden üstündü. Ama yürekleri yoktu. Az sayıdaki ülkücünün çok daha kalabalık komünist grupları dağıttığına birçok kez şahit olmuşumdur. Silahsız olarak silahlı komünistlerin üstüne yürüyen ülkücülere de birçok kez şahit olmuşumdur. Bunlar çok yalın cesaret örnekleriydi. Komünistler ise, ancak kalabalığın içinde vardılar. Hepsi hareketi bir başkasından beklerdi. Esasında, fikirlerindeki samimiyetsizlik buradan belliydi. (INTERVIEWEE 06)

Bizler, Hazreti Ali geleneğindeniz. Harbi, darbı severiz. Cesuruz. Öyle, biraz itme kakmayla hemen yolumuzdan dönmeyiz. Hele hele davamızla ilgili konularda kaçmak gibi, korkmak gibi kavramlara tamamen yabancıyız. Canımızdan, malımızdan, çoluğumuzdan çocuğumuzdan daha kıymetli bildiğimiz bir dava için mücadele ediyoruz. Bu yolda ölürsek şehit, kalırsak gazi olacağımızı biliyoruz. O zaman niye korkalım ki? (INTERVIEWEE 03)

treachery. For this reason, it can be claimed that this is a prerequisite not only for the ülkücü group but for all groups. Yet, as will be clear soon, the content of this characteristic included the content of ülkücü ideology. That's why, the loyalty of enemies and compradors to their own causes could not be depicted with this favorable characteristic. The interviewees argued that ülkücüs were faithful and loyal to their cause, the fellow ülkücü, the leader, and the values of nation.¹¹¹

Above, we mentioned about the military character of ülkücü movement. The interviewees seemed to think that the success of the movement warranted the absence of hoarse voices and the absolute obedience to the authority of leaders. Loyalty seemed to have a related dimension with this belief.¹¹²

So far, we saw that ülkücüs were conceived as self-confident, determined, dignified, sober, serious, brave, courageous, faithful, and loyal. All these characteristics were very favorable for a man of cause. The interviewees alluded one more personal characteristic that ülkücüs possessed; "self-sacrifice".¹¹³

¹¹¹ Ülkücüler davalarına sadıktırlar, güvenilirlerdir, değil dostunu düşmanını bile arkadan vurmazlar. Her ülkücü bir ya da birkaç dava arkadaşını bu yolda kaybetmiştir. Değil davaya ihanet etmek, günlük yaşantısında bile ülkücü olduğunu unutmak, davayı değil de nefisini ön plana çıkarmak, bu şehitlerin hatıralarına yapılacak en büyük saygısızlıktır. Bir ülkücü en azından bu yolda yitirdiği şehitlerine sadık olmak zorundadır... (INTERVIEWEE 14)

Ülkücülerin olmazsa olmazlarından biri sadakattir. Sadakati sorgulanan bir ülkücü artık bitmiş demektir. Bugün [Devlet] Bahçeli'ye saldıranlar, hem Bahçeli'nin hem de ekibinin Türkeş'e sadık olmadıklarından, Türkeş'in yolundan saptıklarından dem vuruyorlar. Normal şartlar altında, fikir olarak Bahçeli'nin Türkeş'in yolundan saptığına dair birşey bulamıyorlar. Çünkü herhangi bir Türk milliyetçisinin olaylar karşısında aldığı duruşta yorum farkı olabilir. Burada önemli olan bu duruşu hangi değerlerin kılavuzluğunda yaptığıdır. Bahçeli'de fikri bir sapma bulamayınca da bazı hal ve hareketlerini öne çıkararak iftiralar atmaya başlıyorlar. Yok bu sene [Türkeş'i] anma törenleri çok sönük geçmiş, demek ki Bahçeli ve ekibi Parti'den Türkeş'in izini silmek istiyormuş falan filan. Halbuki, kendi nefisleri öne çıkarılmadı diye davayı ilk terk edenler de bu kişiler. Bahçeli, davasına da, Türkeş'e de sadıktır. Bu sadakati koruyamayan birinin ülkücülerin lideri olarak kalamayacağını da Bahçeli'den daha iyi kimse bilemez... (INTERVIEWEE 07)

¹¹² Bizde lidere, davaya bağlılık esastır. Türkeş'e Başbuğ dememizin bir nedeni de bu bağlılığı ifade etme niyetidir. Ülkücü, Başbuğ'a teslim olmuş kişidir. Eti senin, kemiği benim derler ya, ülkücü etiyle kemiğiyle kendini Başbuğ'a vermiş kişidir. Onun iradesi dışında istek, arzu beyan etmeyen; sorulmadıkça söylemeyen; yap denildiğinde nasıl, niye diye sormayan, hemen emri yerine getiren kişidir. (INTERVIEWEE 09)

¹¹³ Ülkücülüğün çıkış noktası fedakarlıktır. Canını ve malını herhangi bir karşılık beklemeksizin bu dava uğruna feda etmek istek ve arzusudur. Fedakarlığın bundan ötesi yoktur. Bu düşene el uzatmak gibi bir yardımseverlik değildir. Kendinden birşey gitmeyeceğine emin olduktan sonra yapılan bir iyilikseverlik değildir. Bu en aziz bilinen şeylerin kaybedilmesi hemen hemen kesin olan bir durumda bunların gitmesine gözünü

There were some other characteristics that the interviewees attributed to *ülküci*s but they were more closely connected to the following section. So far, we saw that the *ülküci* whom the interviewees depicted was a warrior. This man was aware of the importance of the cause he was fighting for. He took a determined, serious position and defended his ideals bravely. He was very faithful to his group and would make all possible sacrificing to realize his ideals.

We argued that Turkism and Islamism formed the components of *ülküci* social identity as men of idea. However, we noted, it was not easy to make a discrimination between idea and action in *ülküci* discourse. They did not only believe these ideals but they were also trying to realize these ideals as an organized group. That's why the struggle to realize these ideals seemed to be a component of *ülküci* social identity as men of struggle. This is the subject of the next section.

2.3.2.2.2. Ülkücüs as a group struggling to exalt the Turkish nation

As we saw in the perceived context and the Turkist-Islamist components of *ülküci* social identity, the interviewees summarized the ideals of *ülküci* group as saving and exalting the Turkish nation. For centuries, the enemies and the compradors tried to annihilate the Turks. To this end, they designed numerous conspiracies (See Section 2.2.1.1). Although the efforts of some national forces saved the nation and the state from total destruction, the Turks had lost much of their previous strength. The interviewees argued that the Turkish nation should be advanced to the highest in science, morality, and technology and this should be done with lightning rapidity to make up for the lost time. Otherwise, Turkey would continue to be one of those underdeveloped countries (See Section 2.2.1.3).

Despite the fact that the compradors occupied most of the positions that determine the future of the country, the interviewees emphasized that the *ülküci* struggle should be

kırpmadan razı olmaktır... Ülkücü bilir ki, bu can ve bu mal bizim elimizde olduğu sürece bu dava yükselmeyecek. Yani, eğer dava diyorsan bunlar gidecek, eğer nefsim diyorsan dava gidecek... (INTERVIEWEE 05)

made within democratic framework. They argued that all experience of humanity exhibited that democracy was the best possible government system.¹¹⁴

In this sense, the interviewees depicted *lkcs* as “true believers of modern democracy”. Before deepening this discussion, we’d better look at the view of society as conceived by the interviewees. The interviewees seemed to assume nation as a homogeneous group and saw no ideological difference among the sub-groups within a nation. For the interviewees, there could not be micro ideals of a sub-group for the interest of any sub-group was closely bound up with interests of the whole nation. In this regard, INTERVIEWEE 03 said the following.¹¹⁵

Before elaborating much further, we should note that this homogenizing perception seems to be characteristic of almost all authoritarian-totalitarian political groups (for a related discussion see ErdoĖan, 2001). Such groups seek homogeneity among the citizens of a state. They do not believe ideological differences between different racial, national, ethnic or religious groups.

Similarly, for the interviewees, there were only Turks and minorities, and as long as these minorities recognized themselves as Turk, they could be regarded as Turk, too. Though this view is inconsistent with modern theories of democracy (see ErdoĖan, 2000),

¹¹⁴ Bizim partileřmemiz demokrasiye duyduėumuz inançtan kaynaklanıyor. Demokratik rejimlerde siyasi arenada yarıřan bir parti aracılıėı dıřında iktidar olmanız mmkn deėildir. Meřru deėildir. Meřru olmayan bir hareket ise, lkclerle baėdařtırılmaz... (INTERVIEWEE 01)

Teoride demokrasiye alternatif sistemler retmek mmkndr. Demokrasi, insanoėlunun znden kaynaklanan, alternatifi olmayan, iyiliėi kendinden menkul bir sistem deėildir. Hatta, akli olarak tasavvur edilen sistemler arasında demokrasi, belki de, en ktsdr. Ancak, yařadıėımız hayat, olması gereken hayat diye bir ayırım yapmak problemi ortaya koyup tahlil etmeye deėil, daha fazla problemin ortaya çıkmasına yarar. Nitekim, komnizm bunun en bariz rneėidir. İnsanlık tecrbesi, demokrasinin, btn hatalarına raėmen, olası rejimler iinde en iyi rejim olduėunu gstermiřtir. Dolayısıyla, biz dveriz, kırarız, yıkarız, istediėimizi yaparız gibi bir anlayıř davasına samimiyetle inanan biri iin geerli deėildir. Eėer davanın gerekten iktidar olmasını istiyorsan, bu davayı uygulamayı dřndėn kitleyi ikna etmek durumundasın. Kitleleri ikna ederek, bu gce dayanarak iktidarı ele geirmek zorundasın. Aksi taktirde, davanı yceltmiř deėil, davana ihanet etmiř olursun... (INTERVIEWEE 02)

¹¹⁵ Milli menfaatler bireylerin ya da sınıfların menfaatlerinin zerinde olmalıdır. Bireylerin ya da sınıfların menfaatleri birbiriyle çatıřabilir. Millet, paraları birbiriyle çatıřma halinde iken ykselemez. Ancak, milli menfaatler ne alındıėında, bu menfaat bir takım birey veya sınıfların menfaatine ters dřse bile, bu kısa vadeli bir durumdur. Uzun vadede, milli menfaate uygun iřler, milletin her bir ferdinin menfaati ile uyumlu olacaktır. Kısaca, btn millet kerken, bir bireyin veya bir sınıfın ykselmesi mmkn m? Mmknse bile, bunun anlamı nedir?

when the homogeneity of society was guaranteed, the interviewees were eager to emphasize democratic values.¹¹⁶

Güngör (1978, 1980), who examined the relationship between nationalism and democracy, seems to have come to the same conclusion. Since nationalism depended on the values and the culture of the nation, the governmental system that permit the development of people's will would lead to strengthening of nationalist sentiments. Recent theories of democracy oppose this idea for this idea seems to reject the plurality inherent in almost all modern societies (Erdoğan, 2001). In other words, recent theories of democracy emphasized the rights of marginals and minorities rather than those of majorities. In this regard, we can say that the understanding of democracy among ülkücüs is a little bit old-fashioned.

Nevertheless, such a conclusion would seem hasty when we think that the democrat character of the interviewees derived not from the concern to live harmoniously in a plural society but from an anti-imperialist tendency. In this regard, democracy was almost equaled with the rule of people. Democracy was needed for all nations (i.e., people living in the same state) had the right for self-determination. One could not talk about democracy where people were exploited by foreign imperialist powers. Since the interviewees perceived Turkey to be still under imperialist threat, at this point, they made no reference to plurality. As long as this threat was concerned, unity of the nation rather than plurality of the society should be emphasized.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ Milliyetçilik, millete dayanır. Millet hür olduğunda, milliyetçi duyguların toplumda yayılması doğal bir durumdur. Bundan dolayı, biz daima milletin hür iradesinin hakim olması gerektiğini vurguluyoruz. Aslında, biz kendi milletimizle birlikte, diğer milletlerin de hür olarak yaşaması gerektiğini söylüyoruz. Köleliği reddediyoruz. Gerek sömürüye gerekse emperyalizme şiddetle karşıyız. Kısaca, inançlarımız kelimenin gerçek anlamıyla demokrat olmamızı gerektiriyor. (INTERVIEWEE 01)

¹¹⁷ Biz Osmanlı'nın devamıyız. Osmanlı'nın yaşama tarzı şu veya bu şekilde bizim genlerimizde devam ediyor... Osmanlı'yı yıkanlar karşılarında güçlü bir Türkiye de istemiyor. İster istemez, bu memleket hepimizin. Ona sahip çıkmak durumundayız... Başka bir Türkiye yok. Avrupalıların, Amerikalıların aksine bizim birlikte yaşama gibi bir sorunumuz yok. Bilakis dünya içinde Türk varlığının devamı gibi bir sorunumuz var ve bizim içimizde varmış gibi gözüken sorunlar dünyadaki Türk varlığını daraltmaya çalışanların içimize attığı oyunlardan başka bir şey değil. O halde, yapmamız gereken bölünmeye yol açacak, bizi daha da zayıflatacak konularla ilgilenmek değil, bilakis birlik ve bütünlüğümüzü güçlendirecek işlerle uğraşmak... Hele bir kendimize gelelim, hele biraz daha iyileşelim, ondan sonra geri kalmış bölgeler veya Kürt sorunu zaten büyük ölçüde ortadan kalkacaktır. (INTERVIEWEE 12)

Such a conceptualization of democracy led the interviewees to claim that *ölkücüs* were respectful to their customs and traditions. In other words, they argued that *ölkücüs* were “conservative” people in the social realm. *Ölkücüs* did not deny the way people had been living. They recognized the nation as she was. They were never inclined to social engineering and eager to design an appropriate way of living for the people.¹¹⁸

At this point, the interviewees approached theoretical conservatism. They did not deny the existence of change in the cultural realm. Yet, this change should be subjected to the principles of evolution, rather than those of revolution. Everything should be left to the test of time. In the end, while functional elements of the culture would continue to survive, dysfunctional elements would inevitably disappear. That’s why, the interviewees esteemed rather than questioned the continuing customs and traditions.

We elaborated the ideology of the *ölkücü* group before. For this reason, we shall not repeat it here. In this section, so far, we have seen that democratic and conservative character of *ölkücüs* would help in exalting the Turkish nation, but of course, with fulfillment of the requirements of *ölkücü* ideology.

Nevertheless, as has been seen in Section 2.2.1.3.1., the rise of Turkey was only a middle range aim of the *ölkücü* group. *Ölkücüs* had also the aims of Turan and Nizam-ı Alem. That is, *ölkücüs* wanted all Turkic elements to unite in the same state and, when this was assured, they wanted to grant a just order not only in the Turkic but also in the non-Turkic world. This was truly a utopia. For this reason, the interviewees warned, *ölkücüs* had such a broad horizon that they could imagine the days this ideal would be realized. *Ölkücüs* did not think about the present, tomorrow, or near future. They could think about tens and even hundreds years of future. Otherwise, they were well aware of the fact that all these deeds were impossible to realize within a short time.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ Bizim solculardan önemli bir farkımız topluma tepeden bakmamamızdır. Toplumu olduğu gibi kabul etmemizdir. Aksi taktirde, bizim milliyetçiliğini yaptığımız varlık gerçek hayatta neye karşılık gelebilir? ... Solculuk, bütünüyle sosyal mühendisliktir. Olandan nefret ederler. İhtilal, herşey için geçerlidir. Sosyal hayattaki değerler de tamamen yıkılmalı, yerine akla, bilime uygun kurallar getirilmelidir. Solculara göre, işin en güzel yanı da, bu kuralların çoğunu Marks’ın zaten söylemiş olmasıdır... (INTERVIEWEE 03)

¹¹⁹ *Ölkücünün* ufku geniştir. *Ölkücü*, bugün ne oluyor veya yarın ne olacak diye düşünmez. *Ölkücü*, bundan yıllar sonrasını düşünür. İdeallerinin gerçekleşmesi için yüzyıllar gerekiyorsa, bu zaman zarfında nasıl bir eylem planı yapılması gerektiğine kafa yorar. (INTERVIEWEE 14)

The motive behind this ideal was to establish justice in the world. The world consisted of interdependent societies. Any evil in any society would reach out to other societies. For this reason, justice should prevail all around the world. The interviewees argued that the main function of state was to establish justice in the society she ruled.¹²⁰

As can be seen, the interviewees found justice as having a unique importance. Indeed, justice had been the most important concept in the socio-political discourse of Turkish-Islamic tradition. From Kutadgu Bilig of Yusuf Has Hacib to Tanzimat Fermanı of Mustafa Reşid Paşa, a famous aphorism was included in the beginning. This aphorism had been known as Daire-i Adalet (The Circle of Justice).¹²¹

According to this aphorism, justice was the source of the world's emancipation. The world was a garden and the state was the sofa. It was the law that put the state in

İdeallerimizin gerçekleşmesinin çok zor, hatta imkansız gibi gözüktüğünü biliyoruz. Zaten, adı üstünde bunlar ideal. Belki ulaşılması gerçekten de imkansız. Ama ulaşmaya çalışılması gereken ve yaklaşıldıkça da dünyanın daha güzelleşeceği idealler bunlar. On yıl içinde Türk Birliğini kuracağız onbeş yıl içinde de tüm dünyada adalet tesis edilecek diye kesin tarih belirten bir iddiamız yok. Bunlar belki elli, belki yüzyıl belki de yüzyıllar sürecek diyoruz. Ama sonunda olacağına inanıyoruz. İyimser olmamız için elimizde her neden de mevcut. Bu fikirler ortaya atıldığında bugün olduğu gibi elimizi kolumuzu sallaya sallaya Türkmenistan'a, Azerbaycan'a gidemiyorduk. Buralardan Türkiye'ye kimseler gelemiyordu. Türklerin hepsi dünyanın tamamını eline geçirecek gibi gözükten bir Sovyetler Birliği'nin esiri durumundaydı. Halbuki, Türkler hala duruyor ve ilişkilerimiz gün geçtikçe artıyor. Sovyetler Birliği'nin yerinde ise yeller esiyor. Hatta, en katı olan Çin rejiminden bile buraya Türkler geliyor ve Türkiyeliler de Çin'e Doğu Türkistan'ı ziyarette gidebiliyor. Demek istediğim, ülkücü fikirleri ortaya atanların çoğu bu derece gelişmeyi bile göremeden gittiler. Ama birgün bunların gerçekleşeceğine öyle inanıyorlardı ki, sanırım görselerdi de sevinirlerdi ama şaşırmazlardı. Çünkü bunların gerçekleşeceğini düşünebilecek kadar ileri görüşlüydüler... (INTERVIEWEE 18)

¹²⁰ Devletin asli işlevi toplumda adaleti tesis etmektir. Diğer bütün işlevler, bu işlevi sağlamaya yönelik tali işlevlerdir. Adaletin tanımı ise çok geniştir. Türkler, kendilerini yönetenlerin adil olmasını isterler. Bu konuda en açık örnek Hazreti Ömer'dir. Mehmet Akif'in deyimiyle "Kenarı Dicle'de bir kurt kaçırsa bir koyunu, gelir de adl-i İlahi sorar Ömer'den onu". İslam Devleti Irak'a, İran'a kadar uzanmış. Hazreti Ömer Medine'den bu devleti yönetiyor. "Dicle kenarında bir kurt bir koyunu kaçırsa, Tanrının bunun hesabını benden soracağını düşünüp korkuyorum" diyor. Bundan dolayı da, Ömer dönemi İslam tarihinin en parlak dönemi oluyor. İşte, biz de yöneticilerimizden böyle adil olmalarını, tek kaygılarının tebasını adaletle yönetmek olmasını isteriz. (INTERVIEWEE 11)

İnsanlar kendilerine karşı adaletle davranılmasını ister. Bütün kötülüklerin arkasında adaletsizlik yatar. Bundan dolayı da devletler ortaya çıkmıştır. İnsanlar arasında taraf tutmayan, haklı ile haksızı ayırt eden, haklıya hakkını veren, haksızı cezalandıran, daha doğrusu böyle olması gereken devletler... (INTERVIEWEE 05)

¹²¹ "Adldir mûcib-i salah-ı cihan, cihan bir bağıdır, divarı devlet, devletin nazımı şeriattir, şeriate olamaz hiç haris illa melik, melik zabteyleyemez illa leşker, leşkeri cem'edemez illa mal, malı cem'eden raiyyettir, raiyyeti kul eder padişah-ı aleme adl." (İnalcık, 1968; p. 42)

order. Unless there was land, the law could have no influence. Land could not be captured without an army. Unless there were riches, the army could not be gathered. It was the subjects who accumulated the riches. In case the King of the world ruled justly, his subjects obeyed him heartily (Mardin, 1996).

The Turks had usually been the sovereign nation in the territories they lived. For the last millennium, they had migrated toward the West and tried to establish this understanding of justice on the lands they conquered. The interviewees called this as the ideal of Red Apple (see quotations in the Section 2.2.1.2.2.) and saw the ideal of World Order as an extension of this past experience.

Figure 2.2 presents the ingroup representation of the interviewees. Though we did not discuss the details in the present section, this Figure should be read with reference to the perceived context of the interviewees, the topic of the previous section. To summarize, *ülküci*s were conceived as men of both idea and struggle. The way of being men of idea derived from the simple fact that they believed in the doctrine of Turk-Islam. In this sense, *ülküci*s were Turkists and Islamists.




Figure 2.2:
A schematic presentation of ingroup representation of the interviewees

The doctrine of Turk-Islam was formulated against the foreign ideologies imposed by the enemies having imperial aims over Turkey. In other words, it was a tool to fight for the good of the Turkish nation. The realities of the present Turkey demanded a more direct struggle from the nationalists. She was threatened by the attack of enemies and *ülküçüs* were trying to protect Turkey against these attacks. In this fight, *Türkeş* and his ideas had been commanding the *ülküçüs*. Anti-communist and anti-separatist struggle were two of the most distinctive feature of this struggle. The distress of this struggle caused *ülküçüs* to be ascetic people and they seemed to have been decorated with many favorable social characteristics. These characteristics were most notably self-confidence, serious-mindedness, faithfulness, self-sacrifice, and courage.

Ülkücüs wanted to get the power to develop Turkey but they did not believe that all roads to the end were legitimate. Instead, they saw democracy as the only legitimate tool. In other words, *ülküçüs* were democrat in the truest sense of the term. They believed in the commonsense of people living in Turkey. This led them to assume a conservative position in the social realm. We can say that the interviewees believed that a conservative democratic government with the ideal of Turk-Islam would ensure the development of Turkey.

Nevertheless, the principles of the doctrine of Turk-Islam were not confined to Turkey but the other Turks and the entire world in the final analysis. These ideals, looking as fantasies for the present, required *ülküçüs* to have a broad horizon. In other words, *ülküçü* was not a man struggling for the present but for the remote future. This was because *ülküçü* struggle could not come to an end before justice reigned all around the world. The present order of the world was broken and it should be remedied. *Ülkücü* was the person who felt uncomfortable and responsible when a man in any part of the world was treated unjustly.

So much discussion related to ingroup representation of the participants might be sufficient. When this representation is combined with the perceived context, the summary was crudely that the participants perceived Turkey to be in danger from all directions. The danger was not only from the outside, but also from the inside. Moreover, the danger was not only material, but also moral. For this reason, Turkey needed to be protected from the outside and the inside both materially and morally. *Ülkücü* group was the only

group that had the consciousness and the talent to do this. Having placed the ingroup into the context in such a way, the participants perceived the ingroup as both men of idea, protecting the country morally, and men of struggle, protecting the country by force.

Having identified these components, although the participants mentioned a number of attributes, it can be predicted that they would attribute almost all favorable properties in the Turkish culture with some socio-political relevance to the ingroup. As a matter of fact, when these components were identified, it might appear redundant to explore the relevant attributes of the *ülküci* group for ingroup representation emerged as much more than a list of favorable attributes. This might be taken as a chronic way of seeing the ingroup. As a result, this perception might not exhibit remarkable changes unless great social and cultural transformations appear. For this reason, this perception might be taken as one of the most important factors in determining the transactions between the *ülküci* group and the other socio-political groups in Turkey.

It has been noted that former conceptualizations related to stereotypes pointed to the rigid character of stereotypes. In other words, one of the most prominent characteristics of stereotypes was their resistance to change. In contrast, SCT maintained that stereotypes might change in response to differing comparative contexts. The description of a group might be different when the comparative context consisted of a particular outgroup, rather than another outgroup. This claim seems to have been misunderstood by many researchers. These researchers seem to have thought that group members might arbitrarily change the stereotypes they held in response to the varying comparative context. The basic motive behind this change was believed to be ingroup favoritism or outgroup derogation. In other words, the group members might be thought of as arbitrarily characterizing the ingroup and outgroups in order to promote their social identities. However, the present study demonstrated that the group members had a chronic way of looking at the world and a differentiated ingroup representation. Thus, it is not reasonable to expect that this self-stereotype will differ in terms of the varying context. Otherwise, it should have been concluded that the group members had no idea as to the essence of their ingroup. In the next chapter, we shall report the results of a study related to this issue.

III.

CHANGES IN THE CONTENT OF STEREOTYPES AS A FUNCTION OF COMPARATIVE CONTEXT AND INGROUP IDENTIFICATION LEVEL

In this chapter, the results of a study, involving a questionnaire application that comprises an experimental design, are presented and discussed. This study examined the change in the contents of both ingroup' (i.e., Nationalist Action Party, the NAP) and two outgroups' (i.e., Great Union Party, the GUP, and Republican People's Party, the RPP) stereotypes as a function of the participants' identification level with the ingroup and the comparative context. The change in the contents of stereotypes was observed through the combined processes of ingroup bias and perceived group homogeneities. Moreover, since favorable and unfavorable attributes were treated separately, whether there is asymmetry in terms of the nature of the comparison dimension was also observed. Unlike the traditional distinction, the number of comparative context was not two, but four. The study introduced the distinction of close and distant outgroups and suggested that the group members with varying identification levels might react differently to these two types of groups in different contexts. As a result, four experimental conditions emerged: ingroup only context where there was only the ingroup (i.e., the NAP), dual with close outgroup context where there were the ingroup and the close outgroup (i.e., the GUP), dual with distant outgroup context where there were the ingroup and the distant outgroup (i.e., the RPP), and triple context where there were the ingroup, the close outgroup, and the distant outgroup. The rationale behind designing such a study will be clarified in the following sections, and then, the questions and hypotheses of the study will be formulated.

3.1. INTRODUCTION

Ingroup bias has always been seen as one of the most basic processes of intergroup relations (Brewer and Brown, 1999; Mullen, Brown, and Smith, 1992; Stephan, 1985). Social identity theory owes its fame to its explanation of this basic intergroup phenomenon (Augoustinos and Walker, 1995; Brewer and Brown, 1999; Brown, 2000a; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994; Turner, 1999). However, latest research suggested that this was not a universal phenomenon. For example, many studies suggested that group status and identification level moderate the exhibition of ingroup or outgroup favoritism (e.g., Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears, 1995; Ellemers, 1993; Ellemers, Wilke, and Van Knippenberg, 1993; Jackson, Sullivan, Harmish, and Hodge, 1996; Reichl, 1997; Sachdev and Bourhis, 1987; Turner, 1978b). Moreover, more recent phenomenon of positive-negative asymmetry has indicated that group members were not inclined to exhibit ingroup bias when negative outcomes or negative evaluations were concerned (Mummendey and Otten, 1998; Mummendey, Simon, Dietzw, Grünert, Haeger, Kessler, Lettgen, and Schäferhoff, 1992), suggesting that group members were not prepared to punish outgroup members so much as they tend to reward ingroup members. In other words, apart from outgroup bias, the question of whether ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation are parallel processes is a still hotly debated issue (see Brewer, 1999; Levin and Sidanius, 1999). More importantly, studies examining the relationship between group identification and ingroup bias provided weak supports, falsifying some very fundamental principles of social identity theory (Brown, 2000a; Hinkle and Brown, 1990). This failure has led the researchers to continue to test this relationship to this day (e.g., Branscombe and Wann, 1994; Duckitt and Mphuthing, 1998; Lalonde, 2002; Perreault and Bourhis, 1998).

Another widely cited phenomenon in the literature of intergroup relations has been outgroup homogeneity effect (Linville, Salovey, and Fischer, 1986; Quattrone, 1986; Park and Rothbart, 1982; Sedikides and Ostrom, 1992). This effect explains that group members are more prone to perceive outgroup as more homogeneous than the ingroup. However, this effect has not gone unchallenged, instead some scholars demonstrated the existence of ingroup homogeneity effect (Simon, 1992; Simon and Brown, 1987; Simon, Glässner-Boyerl, and Stratenwerth, 1991). There have been attempts to explain these

contradictory findings with reference to an asymmetry in terms of group status and majority-minority status of the groups (e.g., Simon, 1993; Simon and Mummendey, 1991). Furthermore, John C. Turner and his associates took this phenomenon as a challenge to social identity and self-categorization theories and preferred to explain its existence with reference to an inherent deficit in the methodology of these studies (Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994).

Finally, there is the issue of intergroup similarity. According to the principle of accentuation, when the distinction between group boundaries is blurred, i.e., when there is intergroup similarity, group members will be especially motivated to engage in intergroup differentiation. While this hypothesis was supported by a number of studies (Jetten, Spears, and Manstead, 1996, study 2; Roccas and Schwartz, 1993; White and Langer, 1999), some other studies indicated just the opposite (Jetten, Spears, and Manstead, 1996, Study 1; Roccas and Schwartz, 1993). In the end, the issue still remains unresolved (see Brown, 2000a).

To our knowledge, no study has attempted to deal with these problems together. As a matter of fact, all these problems have been treated as if they had been separate issues, resulting in the development of huge but weakly related literatures. Moreover, again to our knowledge, no study attempted to deal with these problems by examining the contents of both ingroup and related outgroup stereotypes, which Sherif (1966) declared as a reflection of the nature of relations between groups. In this regard, the study reported in this chapter involves a comprehensive and original approach. Yet, before specifying the expectations of the study, it seems suitable to be more familiar with the problems the present study tries to tackle.

3.1.1. Ingroup Bias: Ingroup Favoritism or Outgroup Derogation

As noted, social identity theory begins with the assumption that people are motivated to assess themselves positively. When they are members of a social group, or more correctly, when a group membership is significant to their self-definition, they will be motivated to evaluate that group positively. Nevertheless, the value of a social group can be determined only by comparing it with other relevant groups. Thus, a positive social identity can only be achieved through the positive distinctiveness of the ingroup

from relevant outgroups (Tajfel, 1978b, 1981b; Tajfel and Turner, 1979, 1986). The corollary of this process is known as ingroup bias and has been a routine knowledge in our days (Brewer, 1979, 1999; Brewer and Brown, 1999; Brown, 2000a; Crocker and Luhtanen, 1990; Messick and Mackie, 1989; Mullen, Brown, and Smith, 1992; Sidanius, Pratto, and Mitchell, 1994; Turner, 1999).¹⁴⁰

Ingroup bias might be in the form of ingroup favoritism, outgroup derogation, or both (Brewer, 1999; Brown, 2000; Rüstemli, Mertan, and Çiftçi, 2000; Sidanius, Pratto, and Mitchell, 1994). However, there is debate as to whether these processes are reciprocally related and this debate seems to be a deep-seated one. On the one hand, Gordon W. Allport (1954) says that:

Although we could not perceive our own in-groups excepting as they contrast to out-groups, still the in-groups are psychologically primary. Hostility toward out-groups helps strengthen our sense of belonging, but it is not required. The familiar is preferred. What is alien is regarded as somehow inferior, less “good”, but there is not necessarily hostility against it. Thus, a certain amount of predilection is inevitable in all in-group memberships, the reciprocal attitude toward out-groups may range widely. (p.42)

On the other hand, William G. Sumner (1906) states that:

The relation of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that of hostility and war towards others-groups are correlative to each other. The exigencies of war with outsiders are what make peace inside. Loyalty to the group, sacrifice for it, hatred and contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within, warlikeness without - all grow together, common products of the same situation. (p.12)

However, we should note that, to our knowledge, no scholar denied the existence of outgroup hate. And again to our knowledge, no scholar proposed outgroup hate as the basis of group formation, either. The controversy seems to have focused on the assumption that there is an inevitably reciprocal relationship between ingroup favoritism

¹⁴⁰ We should note that the operational definition of ingroup bias in the literature has generally been in terms of discriminatory behavior or prejudiced evaluations. The bulk of the literature has depended on the strategy subjects choose to allocate points (or rewards) in the minimal group experiments. For example, when subjects adopt a strategy of maximum difference between ingroup and outgroup, he or she is said to show ingroup bias (Bourhis, Sachdev, and Gagnon, 1994). The rest of the literature involves measuring prejudiced evaluation, e.g., liking versus disliking (Jetten, Spears, and Manstead, 1996, 1997a, 1997b).

and derogation of outgroup (see Brewer, 1999). On our part, we are not much concerned with this theoretical debate. However, this controversy seems to have been blazed by the so-called positive-negative asymmetry in social discrimination (Mummendey et al., 1992) that we shall elaborate in the next section.

3.1.1.1. The positive-negative asymmetry

Many current studies have found that group members are more prone to discriminate when they make allocation of positive goods or ascribing positive attributes than when they allocate punishment or ascribe negative evaluations (for a meta-analytic review see Buhl, 1999). For example, though it has been repeatedly observed that individuals divided into two minimal groups such as Klee and Kandinsky groups tend to exhibit ingroup bias when they allocate money or they are more willing to attribute favorable characteristics to the ingroup members with whom they had no previous contact. Remember that these studies had led to the development of social identity theory (Tajfel et al., 1971). However, as late as 1990s, it has been observed that members of such groups are reluctant to show ingroup bias when they allocate punishment (e.g., duration of noise) or they do not attribute more unfavorable attributes to outgroup (Mummendey et al., 1992). We should note that most of the evidence for the positive-negative asymmetry comes from such minimal group experiments, and to our knowledge, only a few field studies examined the existence of this asymmetry (see Buhl, 1999; Reynolds, Turner, and Haslam, 2000). Surely, the positive-negative asymmetry poses a problem that social identity theory should meet (Brown, 2000a; Reynolds, Turner, and Haslam, 2000). However, an implication of this asymmetry seems more than a theoretical challenge. This phenomenon seems to recognize only those forms of social discrimination where some groups are hindered from the issues of rewarding consequences (e.g., providing better occupational prospects or getting higher salaries). However, it does not seem to recognize the existence of those social discriminations whereby some people might be victims of racist propaganda due to their skin color, that some people might be despised due to their social, political, or religious beliefs, and that some people might be unjustly treated just due to the fact that they are from different nationalities, and so on (see Sidanius, Pratto, and Mitchell, 1994). If we happen to observe such prejudice and

discrimination related to the negative domain even in daily life, how shall we account for this positive-negative asymmetry?

First, Mummendey and Otten (1998) suggested that after the experimenter divided the college students into artificial groups (e.g., Klee and Kandinsky groups), when he or she asked the subjects to do something unusual or normatively inappropriate, the subjects might develop the consciousness of “we the experimental participants” versus “the experimenter” and behave according to this new superordinate identity. It is a known fact that the feeling of common fate is a sufficient condition of group formation and might be a sufficient basis for such a recategorization (see Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachevan, and Rust, 1993). A different but another post hoc explanation was offered by Reynolds, Turner, and Haslam (2000). They maintained that even if the experiments of positive-negative asymmetry seemingly provided the subjects with an opportunity for positive differentiation from outgroup, this was not a positive but just a less negative differentiation. Since people have an aversion to see themselves negatively, even belonging to a less negative category might hinder the subjects to sufficiently identify with the minimal categories the experimenter introduced. In other words, this manipulation might not bring about salient social identities. Thus, unless the social identities were made salient, no discrimination might be expected. We shall not dwell on these explanations that seem to be efforts to rescue social identity theory (see Brown, 2000a). Instead, we shall follow the reasoning of Marilynn B. Brewer who brilliantly discussed the conditions under which there might be a reciprocity between ingroup love and outgroup hate (Brewer, 1999).

Brewer (1991) saw group membership as the product of needs for both assimilation and differentiation. She conceived these needs as opposing and suggested that these two contrasting needs hold each other in check. While feelings of detachment and isolation arouse the need for assimilation, she maintained, feeling of being lost in excessively large and undefined collectivities arouses the need for differentiation and distinctiveness. Membership to distinctive social groups meets both needs simultaneously and helps people achieve equilibrium. In other words, assimilation to the group satisfies the need for inclusion while differentiation of the group from other groups satisfies the need for distinctiveness. This optimal distinctiveness model of social identity, as Brewer (1991) called it, implies that small and distinctive groups bring about the most effective ingroup

loyalty, depersonalized trust and cooperation within the group. Thus, there might be no need for the hostility toward outgroups.

Nevertheless, by confirming Sumner's doctrine of ethnocentrism (1906) and Sherif's realistic conflict theory (1966), Brewer (1999) argued that when groups were in competition over scarce resources or political power, there might be a reciprocal relationship between ingroup cohesion and outgroup hostility. She held that people needed to band together in groups to compete with other groups for survival in such contexts. As a result, the requirements of conflict gave rise to institutions both to maintain ingroup loyalty and cohesion and to combat outgroups. In other words, both ingroup love and outgroup hate might develop as the common products of the same situation. In short, Brewer (1999) implied no positive-negative asymmetry in real, competing groups.

We should add that group members might react differently to different outgroups, no matter they are relevant or not. Some outgroups represent a position so distant from the ingroup and the relationship between two groups proves so conflicting in the past that opposition to these outgroups might have a crucial residence in the social identity of the ingroup (see Billig, 1996; Triandafyllidou, 1998; for a discussion of the importance of Oriental identity for the Western identity, see Said, 1978). Recall that anti-communism was an important component of *ölkücü* social identity. Communists were so distant and represented such an opposite position from *ölkücüs* that even digressing from this position might result in a feeling of closeness on the part of *ölkücüs*. When communists are concerned, it is reasonable that *ölkücüs* will bolster their identities by both favoring the ingroup and derogating outgroup regardless of the negativity or positivity of the dimension of social comparison. In other words, a positive-negative symmetry, rather than asymmetry, might be expected when a distant outgroup is concerned. A quotation from the INTERVIEWEE 19 might be illuminating at this point.¹⁴¹

As can be seen, there is no asymmetry in the preceding quotation. Even though the September 12 regime executed and imprisoned more communists than *ölkücüs*, Interviewee 19 did not seem to find this enough. Instead, he maintained that no *ölkücü*

¹⁴¹ 12 Eylül vatanı, milleti, devleti için hayatını ortaya koyanlarla, vatanı, milleti, devleti yok etmek için savaş açanları bir tuttu. Ölkücüler, idam sehpaalarına, işkence odalarına ve hapisanelere layık görüldü... vatan haini olduğu sabit olan komünist başları bile hapisanelerde alıkoymakla yetindi ve devletin parasıyla bu hainleri beslemeye devam etti...

should have been punished while the communists should have been subjected to a more severe treatment. In other words, even if an asymmetry is concerned here, this asymmetry is in the opposite direction of the one proposed by the positive-negative asymmetry phenomenon.

On the other hand, some other outgroups might represent a position not too distant from the ingroup and the intergroup relations might be more friendly in the past though these outgroups compete with the ingroup on the same lane. Issues of disagreement between these groups might be perceived as more peripheral. It is true that ingroup favoritism might also apply to the relationship with these groups; however, worsening of these groups might not be sought for this has little to contribute to the ingroup identity. Moreover, when such outgroups are too close to the ingroup, group members might have a degree of positive identification with this outgroup, though less than that with the ingroup. For example, in two surveys with representative Turkish samples, the supporters of the NAP were found to feel second most closely to the Great Union Party (the GUP) (ANAR, 2000, 2001). Thus, it is plausible to expect a positive-negative asymmetry when the comparative context includes such groups as the NAP and the GUP. In this regard, a quotation from INTERVIEWEE 05 might be informative.¹⁴²

As can be seen, there was a huge difference between the interviewees' perception of the communists and the GUP. While a negative identification seemed to characterize the perception of communists, a degree of positive identification overlap seemed to characterize the perception of the GUP. In the end, it can be deduced that this overlap would motivate group members to see the close outgroup in a relatively more positive and less negative light. Nevertheless, we should note that this positivity depends on the favorable relations between the groups. When the relations become worsened, the perception of even close outgroup might gain an unfavorable flavor. For example, during the interview phase, there happened a big fight between two student groups from Nizam-ı

¹⁴² Büyük Birlikçiler bizim arkadaşımızdır. Eskiden davayı birlikte sırtladığımız dürüst ve samimi dostlarımızdır. Ancak, MHP'den ayrılmakla fazla ileri görüşlü olmadıklarını, güncel siyasetin alavere-dalavereleriyle biraz kirlendiklerini göstermişlerdir. Ama büyük çoğunluğunun iyiniyetinden şüphem yoktur. Özellikle, hayati önemi olan konularda bizim yanımızda yer alacaklarından ve tehlikeyi savuşturmak için bizimle birlikte çarpışacaklarından kesinlikle eminim... Kötülüklerini asla istemediğim gibi bir gün akıllarını başlarına devşirip tekrar dava arkadaşlarıyla bir araya gelmeleri de en büyük dileğimdir...

Alem Hearts (having informal ties with the GUP) and Ülkü Hearts at Gazi University. The effect of this incidence in deteriorating the perception of the GUP was evident in the following quotation.¹⁴³

As can be seen, the perception of the GUP was worsened quite readily when the context involved a direct confrontation. Recall that Hinkle and Brown (1990) proposed a taxonomic model which suggested that social identity processes could best be observed on groups having a relational ideology in collectivistic cultures, which is quite akin to the intergroup relations as conceived by the realistic conflict theory (see Brown, Hinkle, Ely, Fox-Cardamone, Maras, and Taylor, 1992). This brings us to the issue of the relationship between group identification and ingroup bias that led Hinkle and Brown to propose the mentioned model.

3.1.1.2. Identity-differentiation hypothesis

A basic prediction of social identity theory is that discriminatory behavior is related to an individual's degree of ingroup identification to which we shall refer to as identity-differentiation hypothesis (Brown, 2000a; Kelly, 1988; Perreault and Bourhis, 1999; for a contradictory view see McGarty, 2001; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1999; Turner, 1999). However, having made a meta-analytical review of 14 studies till 1990, Hinkle and Brown (1990) concluded that the support for this hypothesis was just modest and proposed the taxonomic model mentioned above. In the end, Brown (2000a) noted that the relationship between identification and ingroup bias was quite strong in particular contexts, especially in relational ideology X collectivist culture taxonomy (Meeres and Grant, 1999; see also Capozza, Voci, and Licciardello, 2000).

Another factor that strengthens the relationship between identification and ingroup bias seems to be intergroup threat. It was found that high-identifiers in the high

¹⁴³ Bizim kaderimiz midir nedir? Kimi iyidir, falan diye kollasak, sonradan en büyük ihanetleri bunlardan görüyoruz. Eskiden Selametçiler vardı. Hiçbir ülkücüden en ufak bir kötülük görmemişlerdir. Ama bizi komünistlerden daha kötü görürlerdi. Şimdi de Büyük Birlikçiler... Türkeş'i bahane edip davayı bölmeye çalıştıkları yetmezmiş gibi, şimdi de ülkücü hareketin önüne set çekmeye çalışıyorlar. Sanki karşılarında en büyük düşmanları varmış gibi, silah falan da çekip ortalığı iyice kızıştırıyorlar. Ama ülkücülerin nasıl tipler olduğunu en iyi de onlar bilirler. Bizle uğraşırsan sonucuna katlanırsın ve bu sonuç çok acı olur. Bunlar aslında Türk-İslam milliyetçiliği kisvesi altında dincilik yapıyorlar ama bazılarına saygımızdan dolayı dile getiremiyoruz... (INTERVIEWEE 07)

intergroup threat conditions engage in more discriminatory behavior (Branscombe and Wann, 1994; Cadinu and Cerchioni, 2001; Grant, 1992, 1993; Gagnon and Bourhis, 1996; Moreland and McMinn, 1999; Perreault and Bourhis, 1998, 1999). Furthermore, Perreault and Bourhis (1999) claimed that the reason behind the failure of early research to observe the relationship between identification and ingroup bias was that they ignored the distinction between identification degree and identification quality. Identification degree refers to people's strength of identification with the ingroup regardless of the positivity or negativity of affective content, which in turn, refers to identification quality. They noted that the sought relationship could be found only in the identification degree. When viewed in this way, many studies yielded a strong, positive relationship between identification and ingroup bias (Branscombe and Wann, 1994; Branscombe, Wann, Noel, and Coleman, 1993; Gagnon and Bourhis, 1996; Gibson and Gouws, 2000; Levin and Sidanius, 1999; Perreault and Bourhis, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, and Mitchell, 1994; Verkuyten, Drabbles & Van den Nieuwenhuijzen, 1999).

Lastly, since the review by Hinkle and Brown (1990), several field studies have also found support for the identity-differentiation hypothesis. For example, Simon, Kulla, and Zobel (1995) found strong regional identity of members of two political parties in Germany to be related to greater differentiation between their regional identity and German national identity. Karasawa (2002) found that intergroup bias in attribution was related to stronger ingroup identification. Kelly (1990) found the strength of identification with a political candidate to be related to the degree to which an individual differentiated between his or her own position on certain political issues and the position of outgroup members on these same issues. Jackson (2002) also found a strong relationship between group identity and intergroup prejudice, only for the majority group members, but not for the minority group members. Terry, Carey, and Callan (2001) found that the strength of pilot identity from two airlines was related to differentiation on status-irrelevant dimensions; identification was also found to be related to differentiation on status-relevant dimensions, but only for pilots of the higher-status airline. In a study with East and West Germans examining the effects of relative deprivation, Schmitt and Maes (2002) also found that identification with East German identity (i.e., low-status group) to be related to ingroup bias. Smith and Tyler (1997) found identification to be positively related to intergroup differentiation on a set of positive trait ratings for members of

sororities. Verkuyten and his colleagues (Kinket & Verkuyten, 1999; Verkuyten, 1991, 2001; Verkuyten & Kwa, 1996; Verkuyten & Nekuee, 1999) examined this hypothesis with a number of ethnic groups in the Netherlands in relation to the majority Dutch and found weak, but consistent, support for the hypothesis (for a recent meta-analysis of the studies testing this hypothesis see Aberson, Healy, and Romerson, 2000). Finally, in a well-thought recent study, Lalonde (2002) found that support for the hypothesis was limited to highly relevant dimensions of social comparison (e.g., stereotypical attributes) and highly relevant social comparison group (e.g., Americans for the Canadians).

In short, identification seems to be an important factor in determining the degree of ingroup bias. This relationship holds true for almost all field studies and especially when the context is composed of groups of comparative ideology and prevailed by a collectivistic culture. Since such a group is dealt with in the present study, it is reasonable to expect the same relationship as valid. Moreover, it can be reasoned that a study examining the existence of outgroup derogation as well as ingroup favoritism as strategies of ingroup bias or a study related to positive-negative asymmetry in ingroup bias should take this variable into account. To our knowledge, the moderating effect of this variable on these phenomena has not been systematically studied before.

Furthermore, the effect of this variable might be a matter of more important concern depending on the level of closeness or distantness of the target group of comparison. High and low-identifiers' reaction to both close and distant outgroups might differ deeply. Let's explain this expectation with an illustration. Let's accept that the group members' overall identification with the close outgroup is 3 and with the distant outgroup is 1 on a seven-point scale. Let's also accept that the high-identifiers represent 7 and the low-identifiers represent 5 on the same scale. In objective terms, while the difference between the high-identifiers' identifications with the ingroup and the close outgroup is 4, the difference between the low-identifiers' identifications with the ingroup and the close outgroup is 2. Moreover, while the difference between the high-identifiers' identifications with the ingroup and the distant outgroup is 6, the difference between the low-identifiers' identifications with the ingroup and the distant outgroup is 4.

Sherif and Hovland (1961) told that individuals tended to exhibit assimilation-contrast effects in such situations. In other words, individuals tended to represent a clearer picture of the situation by displacing the other positions either toward or away from their

own position (assimilation and contrast, respectively). Thus, it can be expected that while high-identifiers would assimilate only low-identifiers to their own position, they might differentiate both the close and the distant outgroup to a more distant position. On the contrary, low-identifiers might assimilate both high-identifiers and the close outgroup to their own position and they might differentiate only the distant outgroup to a more remote position. In the end, while high-identifiers might perceive the close outgroup as a separate group, low-identifiers might perceive it as united with the ingroup. Thus, not only the size of ingroup bias but also its affective direction might be influenced by the variable of identification level. To our knowledge, neither the studies testing the identity-differentiation hypothesis nor the studies examining the positive-negative asymmetry have taken this possibility into consideration. One of the aims of the present study is to fill this gap. However, before formulating our thoughts about these problems, it seems suitable to review another phenomenon where group identification emerged as a determining factor again; perceived variability of groups.

3.1.2. Perceived Variability of Groups

Another commonplace knowledge like ingroup bias is that people have a tendency to perceive outgroups as more homogeneous than ingroups (Linville, Salovey, and Fischer, 1986; Mullen and Hu, 1989; Park, Judd, and Ryan, 1991; Park and Rothbart, 1982; Quattrone, 1986; Wilder, 1986). To put it differently, people are inclined to accentuate intragroup similarity within outgroups more than within ingroups (Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994). This is such a well-established phenomenon that most introductory textbooks present this asymmetry as an inevitable consequence of intergroup perception (Baron and Byrne, 2000; Myers, 1996). As a result, there have been efforts to explain this phenomenon either in terms of differential familiarity with ingroup and outgroup members (Linville, Fischer, and Salovey, 1989) or in terms of different information storage mechanisms (Judd and Park, 1988; Park and Judd, 1990; Park, Judd, and Ryan, 1991), or in terms of different ways of processing information related to ingroup and outgroup (Ostrom, Carpenter, Sedikides, and Li, 1993). Even, some scholars attempted to make neural network simulations of this effect (see Read and Urada, 2003). Since the mainstream social psychology under the influence of the ideology of individualism has seen over-generalization as one of the most important reasons of

prejudice against outgroups, this phenomenon has fitted with the common expectations. As a result, scholars especially in the social cognition tradition hastily declared the universality of this phenomenon. Nevertheless, the existence of outgroup homogeneity effect poses a problem for social identity theory (Mullen and Hu, 1989; Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994) since self-categorization theory argues that when people's social identities are salient, they tend to behave and perceive consistent with their group norms and identities (Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987). Thus, both ingroup and outgroup should be viewed as equally homogeneous. To complicate the matter, other social identity oriented scholars questioned the universality of outgroup homogeneity effect (Simon, 1992, 1993; Simon and Brown, 1987; Simon and Mummendey, 1991).

A number of studies found that minority group members tended to see ingroup as more homogeneous than outgroup (i.e., majority group) (e.g., Boldry and Kashy, 1999; Brown and Smith, 1989; Guinote, 2001; Hortaçsu, 2000; Simon and Brown, 1987; Simon, Glässner, Boyerl, and Stratenworth, 1991; Simon and Mummendey, 1991). Moreover, the same effect was observed when the dimensions of comparison were some group defining attributes or characteristics (Kelly, 1989; Simon, 1992, 1993). It is known that minority status leads to enhanced group identification, and in addition, ingroup homogeneity effect has been observed only on identity relevant attributes. These two pieces of information led scholars to suggest that the underlying process of ingroup or outgroup homogeneity effect seems to be identity maintenance or protection rather than some kind of faulty cognitive processes suggested by the social cognition researchers (Brown, 2000a; Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994; Simon, 1993).

Several studies showed that high-identifiers perceived both ingroup and outgroup as more homogeneous than low-identifiers (Doosje and Branscombe, 2003; Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears, 1995; Doosje, Spears, Ellemers, and Koomen, 1999; Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje, 1997). Moreover, Castano and Yzerbyt (1998) found that, in intergroup context, while high-identifiers tended to perceive ingroup as more homogeneous, low-identifiers tended to see outgroup as more homogeneous. All these studies were social identity oriented and wanted to show the importance of social identity processes in the perception of groups. However, self-categorization theorists approached the problem from another perspective. But before elucidating their views regarding this issue, it is better to make one point clear for the purposes of the present study.

In the usual studies of perceived group homogeneity, the participants are presented with a series of positive and negative attributes and asked to indicate the percentage of the target group that have the attribute in question (for different methods see Park and Judd, 1990). The reason behind using both positive and negative attributes has been just to avoid response set. In the end, by reversing the ratings of either the positive or negative attributes, the mean percentage ratings are calculated and an overall homogeneity index is found. However, as we argued, group members might develop different strategies of ingroup bias in terms of affective content of comparison dimension. Why shouldn't they develop different perceptions of group homogeneity in terms of affective content of comparison dimension? To our knowledge, no study has addressed this question so far. Moreover, we have seen that identification level with the ingroup is a crucial variable in intergroup differentiation and perception of group homogeneity. Then, it is also a matter of concern whether identification moderates the perception of group homogeneity in terms of positive and negative comparison dimensions. Perceived homogeneity of the close and the distant outgroups might also be added to these problems but it is not possible to make specific predictions for, to our knowledge, these issues have not been studied before.

Now, we can return to the ideas of self-categorization theory concerning outgroup homogeneity effect. According to self-categorization theorists (Turner et al., 1987), it is a fallacy to approach group variability judgments of people as the reproduction of stable cognitive representations of groups. Instead, they argued, these judgments seem to be heavily influenced by contextual factors where crucial social comparison processes occur. In almost all studies, judgments of outgroup are made in an intergroup context, whereas the judgment of the ingroup is usually made in an intragroup context—that is in a context in which no reference is made to outgroup. As a result, while social identities are salient in the judgments of outgroup, personal identities are salient in the judgment of the ingroup (see Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987). That is, experimental procedure of most studies might have affected the occurrence of outgroup homogeneity effect. On the contrary, if both the ingroup and outgroup are to be evaluated in an intergroup context, it seems more likely that the ingroup will be perceived as equally homogeneous with outgroup. This hypothesis found support in a number of recent studies (see Castano and Yzerbyt, 1998; De Cremer, 2001; Haslam, Oakes, Turner, and McGarty, 1995). Since

comparative context plays a crucial role in the present study, we shall review its relevance for stereotype content more closely in the following section. However, before passing into the comparative context, one point should be made.

So far, it must be clear that there might be cases where some groups are perceived as more homogeneous or more heterogeneous than some other groups. Yet, the discussions must also indicate that motivational processes, rather than cognitive processes, have more important roles in determining the magnitude and the direction (i.e., toward homogeneity or heterogeneity) of these perceptions of variability. In other words, when being a homogeneous group contributes to the social identity, group members might perceive the ingroup as more homogeneous than the relevant outgroups. On the other hand, when being a heterogeneous group is perceived as more important for the group identity, group members might perceive the ingroup as more heterogeneous than the relevant outgroups. Two extracts from the interviews might illuminate this point.¹⁴⁴

As can be seen, while the INTERVIEWEE 02 regards the homogeneity of the *ölkücü* group as a favorable phenomenon, INTERVIEWEE 15 regards the heterogeneity of the *ölkücü* group as a favorable phenomenon. As a matter of fact, these views are not contradictory. When the frame of reference brings about a favorable perception of

¹⁴⁴ Bizim en önemli özelliğimiz olaylar karşısında ortak bir tepki koyabilmektir. Bu ortak tepkinin ortaya çıkması için teşkilatların kullanılmasına bile gerek yoktur. Önemli bir olay, Türkiye'nin, hatta dünyanın neresinde olursa olsun her *ölkücü*de aynı tepkinin ortaya çıkmasına yol açar. Yani, *ölkücülük* öyle birşey ki, bir kez *ölkücü* olunca, bu kişinin eyleme geçmesi için öyle propagandaya ya da endoktrinasyona fazla ihtiyaç kalmaz... Hoca Ahmet Yesevi'nin dünyanın her taraflarına müritlerini saldırdığı gibi, bir *ölkücü*yü gönül ferahlığıyla dünyanın her yanına gönderebilirsin. Bundan sonra, bu kişi *ölkücülüğü* tam olarak anlatabilir mi?, temsil kabiliyeti var mıdır? diye de düşünmezsin. Eğer gerçekten *ölkücü*yse, herhangi bir olayla ilgili yorumu tüm *ölkücü*leri temsil edebilecek düzeyde olacaktır. Yani, bir nevi özün anlaşılması ve içselleştirilmesi meselesi... (INTERVIEWEE 02)

Ölkücüler demokrasiyi içlerine sindirmiş bir gruptur... Komünistler, demokrasiden, insan haklarından dem vururlar ama kendi aralarında ne demokrasinin, ne ifade özgürlüğünün, ne de insan haklarına saygının bir anlamı vardır. İçlerinden biri en önemsiz konuda grubun geneli ile çatışmaya girse, bu kişiyi tekrardan grubun ortak paydası durumuna getirmek için en iğrenç yollara başvururlar. Alay ederler, küçümserler, velhasıl adamı dediğine diyeceğine pişman etmek için her yolu denerler. Vazgeçirtemezlerse aralarından kovarlar veya, kovulacak biri değilse, hatta öldürürler. TİKKO, THKP-C gibi örgütlerin ortaya çıkışını, komünistlerin kendi aralarındaki hesaplaşmaları iyi analiz edersen, bu oluşumların çok kıyırık ayrışmalar sonucu ortaya çıktığını görürsün. Biz de ise, görüş bildirmek, olaylara değişik açılardan bakmak bırakın cezalandırılmayı, bilakis teşvik edilir. Öyle ki, bazı durumlarda her kafadan bir ses çıkar. Ama insan haysiyeti susturmayı ya da susturulmayı değil bilakis konuşmayı ve konuşturulmayı gerektirdiğinden buna müdahale edilmez. Fikirlerin farklılığı hoşgörü ile karşılanır. (INTERVIEWEE 15)

homogeneity, group members might be more motivated to see the ingroup as more homogeneous. On the contrary, when the frame of reference brings about an unfavorable perception of homogeneity, group members might be more motivated to see the ingroup as more heterogeneous. In other words, there might be a close connection between discriminatory and homogeneity perceptions of the groups, an expectation that the literature have ignored for a long time.

More importantly, it is very difficult to fit the outgroup homogeneity effect into a unified theory of group apart from a general denigration of over-generalization processes in perception (see Haslam, Oakes, and Turner, 1994). Insofar as the psychological validity of the groups is taken for granted, the outgroup homogeneity effect could mean nothing more than a matter of degree. Moreover, in certain situations, this effect disappears, or even, can be reversed. What is of more concern seems to be the affective direction of the homogeneity. As was illustrated in the quotations, homogeneity is not something negative in itself. Rather, it might be either a positive or a negative phenomenon. It may be proposed that group members are inclined to perceive positive homogeneity in the ingroup while they tend to perceive negative homogeneity in the outgroups. In other words, they might be inclined to develop homogeneity perceptions of both the ingroup and the outgroups in such a way that these perceptions contribute to their social identities. Note that such a conceptualization constructs a bridge between intergroup differentiation and the variability perception. However, this time, the emphasis is on the affective direction of the homogeneity perception, not on the magnitude of the homogeneity. In the present study, such a conceptualization of homogeneity is preferred over the usual conceptualization in the literature. It is thought that the perception related to the magnitude of homogeneity is very vulnerable to the specific status of the groups and specific designs of studies. However, the perception of positive and negative homogeneity in groups might refer to a more global process, which could be observed in all groups.

Having suggested the distinction of positive-negative homogeneity perceptions, it can be thought that these perceptions might be observed in terms of both the favorable and the unfavorable attributes as applied to the groups. To the extent group members perceive members of a group as having a favorable attribute or not having an unfavorable attribute, this might refer to a perception of positive homogeneity in the related group.

Moreover, to the extent group members perceive members of a group as not having a favorable attribute or having an unfavorable attribute, this might refer to a perception of negative homogeneity in the related group. The present study suggests that these homogeneity perceptions are valid for both the ingroup and the outgroups although the magnitude of these perceptions might differ. When the present conceptualization is combined with the intergroup differentiation literature, it is reasonable to expect that while the ingroup will be perceived as more positively homogeneous, the outgroup will be perceived as more negatively homogeneous. Now, we can return to the issue of comparative context.

3.1.3. Comparative Context as a Determinant of Stereotype Content

Though we reviewed both social identity and self-categorization theories in detail previously, it would be beneficial to remember some related points. Social identity theory (Turner, 1985, 1987) holds that personal and social identities can be likened to two sides of the same coin, or put in a different way, they represent two opposite poles of a continuum. This continuum suggests that as people approach towards personal identity, they move away from social identity and as they approach towards social identity, they move away from personal identity (for contradictory views see also Stephenson, 1981; Serino, 1998). While personal identity refers to a unique combination of characteristics that makes an individual different from others (Augoustinos and Walker, 1995; Deschamps and Devos, 1998), social identity refers to, “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1978b, p.63).¹⁴⁵

Social identity theory maintains that what determines the activation of personal or social identity is the level of salience of these identities within a specific context (Oakes, 1987). Salience, in turn, is a function of two factors; accessibility and fit. Accessibility denotes to individual differences in categorial perception. Personality characteristics such

¹⁴⁵ It should be noted that such a conceptualization of social identity seems to fill an important gap in the general self-studies, and as a result, we see efforts to combine and furnish social identity theory with specific self-theories (e.g., Cinnirella, 1998a; Stets and Burke, 2000).

as authoritarianism (Adorno et al., 1950) and need for closure (Kruglanski, 1990), social and cultural values (Bruner and Goodman, 1947; Tajfel, 1953), widespread beliefs (Fraser and Gaskell, 1990), social representations (Farr and Moscovici, 1984), category priming (Higgins, Rholes, and Jones, 1977), and the like all have the potential to affect the salience of a category.¹⁴⁶ To paraphrase, it has to be apparent so far that the most promising factor of accessibility seems to be identification level with the ingroup. As for the fit as a factor affecting the salience of a social category, it has two further components; normative and comparative. Comparative fit is generally summarized by the principle of meta-contrast, which is based on the ratio of perception of the difference between groups over the difference within groups. When the perceived difference between groups is higher than the perceived difference within groups, an intergroup context is likely to be perceived and social identity is more likely to be salient. When the perceived difference between groups is lower than the perceived difference within group, an intragroup context is likely to be perceived and the personal identity will be salient. The implications of meta-contrast have been the most intensively studied subject by the self-categorization theorists. As for the normative fit, it refers to the requirement that the content of categories involved should match with the known content of the real categories. For example, a leftist who speaks of the virtues of the Turkish nation is not likely to arise the category of communist. That is, normative fit entails the existence of a normative perception, namely the content, of the category in question.

Moreover, according to self-categorization theory, when social identity is salient, individuals are likely to identify more with the ingroup. They start to feel more similar, equivalent, and interchangeable with other ingroup members. Consequently, they become depersonalized in terms of the stereotypes determining the group (Turner, 1987). Thus, according to social identity theory and the other interactionist views (e.g. Asch, 1952; Sherif, 1967), stereotype will be involved only when there is an intergroup context. Also, when an intergroup context is perceived, not only outgroup stereotypes but also ingroup stereotypes to define one's self are activated.

¹⁴⁶ Nevertheless, no study has been made about this component within social identity theory tradition (Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994), though, at the other end, there are others who try to explain all intergroup phenomena on the basis of these individual differences (see Section 1.2.3).

Derived from the principle of meta-contrast, self-categorization theory predicts that the content of social stereotypes is not fixed but may be highly dependent upon the comparative context (Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994). This point was nicely illustrated in an experiment where Australian students characterized Americans using the Katz-Braly checklist both before and during the 1991 Gulf War (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, and Hayes, 1992). The researchers manipulated the comparative context by the list of other countries that the students were asked to characterize. In one list, the comparative context consisted of Australia and Britain. In the second, the Soviet Union was added to this list. And in the third, Iraq was also added to these three countries. Interestingly, the overall American stereotype of Australian students came out to be quite negative in general but it was significantly worse when the comparative context included only Australia and Britain in the study conducted at the end of the war. And also, in the initial stages of the Gulf War, when the frame of reference included Iraq, American stereotype was again more unfavorable.

Thus, according to the meta-contrast principle, any variation in the comparative context results in a variation in the comparative meaning of the categories involved (Cinnirella, 1998b). For this reason, the content of stereotype exhibits a tendency to change. The direction of this change could be predicted, too. Hopkins, Regan, and Abell (1997) asked Scottish subjects to stereotype their own national group after rating either the English or the Greek or without any explicit reference to any other nation. This manipulation led to dimension-specific changes in the content of ingroup stereotype. That is, the stereotype content varied only when the dimension of judgment was relevant for capturing the differences between the Scottish and outgroups, which constitutes the frame of reference. When we combine the above findings with those of Doosje et al. (1998), the picture becomes clearer. These authors found that people vary their description of the ingroup as a function of the possibility of comparing the ingroup favourably with other groups in the judgmental task. In a similar vein, the evaluation of an ingroup characteristic was also found to be not fixed, but depends on its relative favourability within the comparative context. Thus, the motive to differentiate ingroup favorably from others, which is ethnocentrism, seems to determine the direction of change in stereotype content.

As can be seen, the effect of contextual variation on ingroup bias has been studied quite intensively, but to our knowledge, the effect of comparative context on either the positive-negative asymmetry or identity-differentiation hypothesis did not attract the attention of self-categorization theorists (but see Reynolds, Turner, and Haslam, 2000). Moreover, the contextual effects were studied to examine either ingroup bias or group homogeneity but not both. Furthermore, the context in self-categorization theory has been limited only to ingroup only context, where there is only ingroup, and to intergroup context, where there are ingroup and outgroup. However, this distinction is valid only for societies where the social structure is composed of two large social categories (e.g., Black-White). When we move toward narrower social categories (i.e., small groups), this distinction starts to lose its significance for there might be several outgroups, and thus, a multigroup context, in real-life. In addition, self-categorization theorists have made no distinction between similar and dissimilar outgroups and presumed that the principles of theory would hold all types of outgroups, especially ignoring the tendencies to form coalitions in multigroup contexts (see Wolff, 1950). In the following section, we shall touch on this issue and challenge a basic principle of social identity theory.

3.1.4. Intergroup Similarity: Distinctiveness–Differentiation Hypothesis

We repeatedly noted that intergroup differentiation results from the motive for positive distinctiveness (Tajfel and Turner, 1979, 1986). By distinctiveness, we refer to “the perceived difference or dissimilarity between one’s own group and another group on a relevant dimension of comparison” (Jetten, Spears, and Manstead, 2001; p. 621). This definition implies that the present level of group distinctiveness affects the beliefs, attitudes, and cognitions of group members and determines the level of positive differentiation they are motivated to display. This implication has led to the expectation that group members will feel especially threatened when they compare the ingroup with too similar outgroups and display more intergroup differentiation. This expectation was supported by several studies (Dovidio, Gaertner, and Validzic, 1998; Roccas and Schwartz, 1993; Spears, Doosje, and Ellemers, 1997). However, earlier research has shown just the opposite. These studies indicated that clear differences in values or linguistic, religious, and national differences might be used as the basis of intergroup differentiation whereas intergroup similarity might sometimes form the basis of a

common group identity and mutual attraction (Brewer and Campbell, 1976; Hensley and Duval, 1976; Rokeach, 1960).

Several factors have been presented as moderating the relationship between distinctiveness and differentiation. Henderson-King, Henderson-King, Zhermer, Posokhova, and Chiker (1997) found support for this relationship only when the dimension of comparison that threatens the distinctiveness was very important for the group members (see also Roccas and Schwartz, 1993). Dovidio, Gaertner, and Validzic (1998) examined this relationship after imposing a superordinate categorization into the context (see also Hornsey and Hogg, 2000). Nevertheless, almost all research in this area regarded the identification level as the most important moderating variable (Henderson-King et al., 1997; Jetten et al., 1996, 2001). The general finding was that high-identifiers tended to react more differentially than low-identifiers when similarity between groups threatens the intergroup distinctiveness. In an effort to explain these findings, Jetten et al. (2001) argued that since low-identifiers were not sufficiently invested in or aware of their group identity, they might be more inclined to recognize a superordinate identity that includes both groups.

At this point, a question should be raised: If low-identifiers are insufficiently invested in or aware of their group identity, then on what basis can we call them as group members? For this reasoning leads us away from the definition of social identity. If a group membership is not sufficiently meaningful to an individual's self-concept, then neither social identity theory nor self-categorization theory would expect this individual to behave in accordance with the social identity of that group. Thus, it is unnecessary to research the moderating role of identification level. However, in the present study, we follow a different rationale. According to this rationale, high- and low-identifiers are likened to those extremists and moderates in the social judgment-involvement theory (Sherif and Hovland, 1961). As known, this theory argues that individuals are inclined to assimilate all stimuli (attitude, opinion, etc.) that fall within their latitude of acceptance and contrast all other stimuli that fall in their latitude of rejection. Thus, the scope of the latitudes of acceptance and rejection is crucial in perceiving a stimulus as similar or dissimilar. Sherif and Hovland (1961; see also Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall, 1965) maintained that the extent of these latitudes was determined by the individuals' involvement with the issue: those highly involved had a smaller latitude of acceptance

and a larger latitude of rejection, while those less involved had a larger latitude of acceptance and a smaller latitude of rejection. Heavily influenced by Sherif and his associates' reasoning, self-categorization theory makes hypotheses related to accentuation effect along the similar lines (see Haslam and Turner, 1992, 1995). Following this reasoning, we can deduce that high-identifiers, by definition, may not be prone to perceive similarity for they would be likely to reject almost all positions outside the ingroup. In contrast, since low-identifiers, as members of a social group, have larger latitude of acceptance and smaller latitude of rejection, they may be more vulnerable to the threats coming from intergroup similarity. Thus, contrary to the suggestions of Jetten et al. (2001), the distinctiveness-differentiation hypothesis concerning intergroup similarity should be especially relevant for the low-identifiers, as will be considered again, later in this section.

So much review of the literature seems sufficient for the purposes of the present study. In this study, it is assumed that all intergroup phenomena are closely related to each other. In this sense, stereotype, prejudice, and discrimination are seen as interconnected manifestations springing from the same source, namely social identity (see Schaller, Rosell, and Asp, 1998). Thus, any consequence of social identity processes could be observed from the content of stereotypes as well as it could be deduced from the behaviors of group members. Moreover, it is assumed that all consequences of social identity processes are related, too. In this regard, perception of group variability, for example, is not a distinct consequence from intergroup differentiation. Social beliefs, prevalent cultural values, and especially the cultural milieu are especially relevant for the last assumption. It is assumed that these beyond-group factors will affect the nature of intergroup phenomena (see Jost and Banaji, 1994). For example, it is unreasonable to expect that group members will exhibit outgroup homogeneity effect in a culture where ingroup cohesion is highly valued. Thus, a conclusive answer to the above problems could be generated only through more comprehensive studies examining all relevant variables simultaneously.

3.1.5. The Scope of the Present Study

In the present study, members of a real socio-political group, namely *ülküciüs*, are used as subjects in order to avoid the drawbacks of minimal groups created in the laboratory. Moreover, as shown in Chapter II, this group has a relational ideology, competing with several other groups for power. Thus, it is more akin to the groups conceived by Hinkle and Brown's taxonomy than those ascriptive social categories (such as gender and age) leading to no real conflict in many places of the world. Positive and negative homogeneity perceptions are used as the dependent variables. It is assumed that both having favorable attributes and not having unfavorable attributes refer to a positive position related to a group. Similarly, both having unfavorable attributes and not having favorable attributes refer to a negative position related to a group. If more members of a group are perceived to have favorable attributes or if less members of a group are perceived to have unfavorable attributes, then this group is perceived to be positively homogeneous. On the contrary, if more members of a group are perceived to have unfavorable attributes or if less members of a group are perceived to have favorable attributes, then this group is perceived to be negatively homogeneous. While the perception of positive homogeneity refers to the process of favoritism, that of negative homogeneity refers to the process of derogation. Positive and negative attribute evaluations are kept intact for both variables in order to observe whether there is symmetry or asymmetry in the affective direction of evaluations. Moreover, a multi-item scale of collective self-esteem is used to measure ingroup identification, instead of one-item measures used in many studies (see Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992; Perreault and Bourhis, 1999). The present study expands the concept of context beyond ingroup only and intergroup and includes a triple context, which, to our knowledge, has not been examined before. Furthermore, the present study introduces the concepts of close and distant outgroups and explores the consequences of social identity processes in the contexts of both dual with close outgroup and dual with distant outgroup.

In the present study, answers to a number of questions were sought in the accompaniment of several expectations, specified in the following section.

3.1.5.1. Expectations related to the ingroup

Question 1. Do the participants exhibit ingroup favoritism by perceiving the ingroup as positively homogeneous in terms of both the favorable and unfavorable attributes or do they exhibit ingroup derogation by perceiving the ingroup as negatively homogeneous in terms of the same kinds of attributes?

- ✓ In the light of massive evidence (Brewer and Brown, 1999; Mullen, Brown, and Smith, 1992; Stephan, 1985), the participants were expected to perceive the ingroup as positively homogeneous in terms of both the favorable and unfavorable attributes. In other words, the participants were expected to exhibit ingroup favoritism. Though ingroup derogation may be concerned when people have an inevitably negative social identity (Guimond, Dif, and Aupy, 2002; Hewstone and Ward, 1985; Hinkle and Brown, 1990), when we remember that *ülküçüs* are over-concerned with a return to the indigenous essence and very opposed to imitating others, we could not find a reason to expect that they would exhibit such a tendency.

Question 2. Do the participants' perceptions related to the ingroup differ in terms of the comparative context?

- ✓ The participants were expected to perceive the ingroup as more positively homogeneous in the intergroup contexts than in the intragroup context (see Cinnirella, 1998b; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, and Hayes, 1992; Young, Van Knippenberg, Ellemers, and Devries, 1997). Consistent with self-categorization theory, it was expected that the social identities of the participants would be more salient in the intergroup conditions, which in turn, would lead to an enhanced perception of the ingroup. Though no difference was expected between two intergroup contexts, the present status of the literature does not enable us to make a certain prediction related to the triple context.

Question 3. Do the participants' perceptions related to the ingroup differ in terms of their identification level with the ingroup?

- ✓ The high-identifiers were expected to perceive the ingroup as more positively homogeneous than the low identifiers (Branscombe and Wann, 1994; Branscombe, Wann, Noel, and Coleman, 1993; Burn, Aboud, and Moyles, 2000; De Weers and Klandermans, 1999; Gagnon and Bourhis, 1996; Gibson and Gouws, 2000; Levin and Sidanius, 1999; Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, and Blanz, 1999; Perreault and Bourhis, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, and Mitchell, 1994; Verkuyten, Drabbles & Van den Nieuwenhuijzen, 1999). Thus, consistent with the identity-differentiation hypothesis, it was expected that the high-identifiers were more likely to exhibit ingroup favoritism.

Question 4: Do the high- and the low-identifiers' perceptions related to the ingroup differ in terms of the comparative context?

- ✓ The main effect of identification was expected to dominate all types of context. However, note that an overall enhanced view of the ingroup was expected in the intergroup contexts including the triple context. Accordingly, both the high- and the low-identifiers were expected to exhibit more ingroup favoritism in these contexts than in the ingroup only context.

3.1.5.2. Expectations related to the close and the distant outgroups

Question 5. Do the participants exhibit outgroup favoritism by perceiving the close and distant outgroups as more positively homogeneous or do they exhibit outgroup derogation by perceiving them as more negatively homogeneous?

- ✓ The answer to this question was expected to differ in terms of the closeness and distantness of outgroups. The participants were expected to perceive the close outgroup as more positively homogeneous. In other words, the participants were expected to exhibit a close outgroup favoritism. As a matter of fact, this is a requirement of the definition we made about this outgroup. We preferred to call this group as "close" rather than "similar". If a group is found close, then it did not seem plausible to derogate this close group.

- ✓ On the contrary, the participants were expected to perceive the distant outgroup as more negatively homogeneous, indicating distant outgroup derogation (see Sidanius, Pratto, and Mitchell, 1994).

Question 6. Do the participants' perceptions related to the close and distant outgroups differ in terms of the comparative context?

- ✓ Since the evaluations of these groups would always be made in intergroup contexts, no difference in the participants' perception related to both the close and the distant outgroup was expected in terms of the comparative context.

Question 7. Do the participants' perceptions related to the close and the distant outgroups differ in terms of their identification level with the ingroup?

- ✓ The present status of the literature does not enable us to make specific predictions concerning the high- and the low-identifiers' perceptions related to the close outgroup. Thus, this remains as an empirical issue.
- ✓ However, the high-identifiers were expected perceive the distant outgroup as more negatively homogeneous than the low-identifiers. That is, the high-identifiers would tend to exhibit an accentuated distant outgroup derogation than the low-identifiers.

Question 8: Do the high- and the low-identifiers' perceptions related to the close and the distant outgroups differ in terms of the comparative context?

- ✓ Since the low-identifiers' perception of the ingroup would not be as favorable as that of the high-identifiers, they would be more threatened by the existence of the close outgroup in the dual with close outgroup context. For this reason, they were expected to engage in more intergroup differentiation. Accordingly, the low-identifiers were expected to perceive the close outgroup as less positively homogeneous than the high-identifiers in the dual with close outgroup context. Note that this prediction is contrary to other research on intergroup similarity (see Jetten et al., 2001). However, in the triple context, a reversed pattern was expected. The low-identifiers were expected to assimilate the close outgroup toward the position of the ingroup, while the high-identifiers were expected to contrast them toward the position of the distant outgroup. In other words, the low-identifiers were

expected achieve differentiation from the distant outgroup by forming a common ingroup identity with the close outgroup and the high-identifiers were expected to achieve differentiation of the ingroup by forming a common outgroup identity.

- ✓ The main effect of identification related to the distant outgroup was expected to prevail throughout the intergroup with distant and the triple contexts.

3.1.5.3. Expectations related to the intergroup contexts and the triple context

Question 9. Do the participants' perceptions of the ingroup, the close outgroup, and the distant outgroup differ?

- ✓ The participants were expected to perceive the ingroup as more positively homogeneous than the close outgroup.
- ✓ The participants were expected to perceive the ingroup as more positively homogeneous than the distant outgroup. As a matter of fact, the participants were expected to perceive the distant outgroup as negatively homogeneous.
- ✓ The participants were expected to perceive the close outgroup as more positively homogeneous than the distant outgroup. In other words, the participants were expected to exhibit both ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation at the same time. Moreover, the participants were expected to show favoritism for the close outgroup relative to the distant outgroup.

Question 10. Do the participants' perceptions of the ingroup, the close outgroup, and the distant outgroup differ in terms of the comparative context?

- ✓ Ingroup favoritism and derogation of the close and the distant outgroups were expected to be valid in both the intergroup with close or distant outgroup and triple contexts.

Question 11. Do the participants' perceptions of the ingroup, the close outgroup, and the distant outgroup differ in terms of their identification level with the ingroup?

- ✓ Ingroup favoritism and derogation of the close and the distant outgroups were expected to be more accentuated among the high-identifiers than the low-identifiers.

Question 12. Do the high- and the low-identifiers' perceptions related to the ingroup, the close and the distant outgroups differ in terms of the comparative context?

- ✓ Identification X context interaction was expected concerning perceptions of the ingroup and the close outgroup. While the difference between the perceptions of the ingroup and the close outgroup was not expected to differ in terms of the identification level in the dual with close outgroup context, it was expected that this difference would be smaller for the low-identifiers and larger for the high-identifiers in the triple context.
- ✓ Identification main effect on the difference between the perceptions of the ingroup and the distant outgroup was expected to be observed both in the dual with distant outgroup and in the triple contexts.

As can be seen, no hypothesis was stated concerning the types of attributes (i.e., favorable versus unfavorable). Generally, the participants were expected to react similarly regardless of the type of the attributes. In other words, we expected no positive-negative asymmetry. Having determined the expectations of the study, we conducted a pilot study through which we aimed to determine the structure of trait-descriptive adjectives commonly used in the Turkish language in terms of the *ülküçü* group. Ideally, the whole list of these adjectives would have been presented to the participants and they would have been asked to indicate the degree of each attributes' applicability to each group in each context. However, as can be appreciated, this would have been such a laborious task on the part of the participants that it might have been detrimental for the results of the study. Thus, we had to employ a much shorter list. Nevertheless, we could not rely on an arbitrarily chosen list of traits for several studies (e.g., Hinkle and Brown, 1990; Turner, 1999) have shown the importance of the relevance of the comparison dimension. Surely, the traits presented on the list would have served for the dimensions of social comparison. We would have employed the attributes we observed most frequently during our interviews, but it has been found not enough to focus only on stereotypic attributes when looking at the process of intergroup differentiation (Lalonde, 2002). In short, we decided to conduct a pilot study to specify the relevant traits in the Turkish language.

3.2. PRELIMINARY STUDY

3.2.1. Method

Before specifying the characteristics of the sample in the preliminary study, it may be appropriate to explain how it was reached. Departing from the assumption that people sharing the same identity are likely to know each other (Czaja and Blair, 1996), three persons, known to be *ülküçüs* in advance, were contacted. All these three persons were male but belonged to different age groups and had different jobs. One of these persons was a university student, another was a government official, and the last one was a small-scale retailer. They served as the first participants in the study and were asked to help find further eligible participants. In other words, the sample in this study consisted mainly of the acquaintances of these three persons.

Since the sample selected through such a method is a non-probability sample, it is not possible to know how well the final sample represents the *ülküçü* population. Though this is a handicap, it can be appreciated that it may be impractical to employ a random sampling for it is almost impossible to provide a sampling frame, i.e. a list from which eligible participants can be drawn, of such a population.

3.2.1.1. Participants

Ninety-nine persons, defining themselves as *ülküçü*, participated in the preliminary study (28 females and 71 males). Mean age was 31.9 with a range of 19 and 48. Seventy-eight percent of the participants were married while the other 22% were single. Of the married participants, 80.5% had self-initiated marriages while the remaining 19.5% had partly arranged and partly self-initiated marriages.

Education level of the participants was high. This was mainly because only people graduated from a high school or above were allowed to participate in the study. Thirty percent of the participants had graduated from high school; 24% had graduated from university; and 16% had post-graduate education. The remaining 30% were university students. As for the distribution of the professions, 39% were government officials with

differing ranks, 16% were professionals (i.e., doctor, lawyer, etc.), 30% were university students, 7% were small-scale retailers, 5% were blue collar workers, and 3% were research assistants.

Seventeen percent of the participants were from Kayseri; 11% were from Konya; 10% were from Adana; 9% were from Çorum; 7% were from Erzurum; the rest were from different cities such as Tokat, Trabzon, Kırşehir, Kahramanmaraş, Nevşehir, Yozgat, Gaziantep, Afyon, Amasya, Burdur, Antalya, and Artvin. Thirteen percent of the participants reported that they had spent most of their lives in a town, 48% in a city and the remaining 39% in a metropolis (i.e., İstanbul, Ankara, or İzmir).

3.2.1.2. Materials and Procedure

We noted that the main aim of the preliminary study was to develop a practical and workable adjective checklist. To this end, a questionnaire encompassing favorability rating tasks of 103 adjectives together with the questions related to the demographic characteristics was prepared (Appendix B.1). Two more sets of items were included in the questionnaire. One of them was a Turkish translation of Collective Self-Esteem Scale, originally developed by Luhtanen and Crocker (Crocker and Luhtanen, 1990; Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992). Since we planned to use this scale as an indicator of ingroup identification level, its reliability and validity check was made in this preliminary study. The other set of items was a political party identification scale, which was used to find out the perceived close and the perceived distant parties of the participants. A detailed account of these scales and the checklist is provided below.

3.2.1.2.1. Adjective Checklist

As we noted in the introduction, research in stereotype content has been dominated by the checklist method developed by Katz and Braly in their original research in 1933. After these researchers introduced their carefully prepared adjective list, most subsequent researchers preferred to use it without making notable changes or revision (e.g., Gilbert, 1951; Karlins, Coffman, and Walters, 1969). That list which consisted of 84 adjectives served as the starting point to develop an item pool.

Moreover, Gough and Heilbrun's (1983) adjective list was also included in this pool. These authors had picked almost all adjectives used in the early studies employing a checklist. The number of adjectives in this list, after eliminating the adjectives that tapped those in Katz and Braly's list, was 254.

Some relatively more recent studies (e.g., Devine and Elliot, 1995; Dovidio and Gaertner, 1986) implied that the adjectives used in early stereotyping research might be out-dated. In a recent effort to update this list, Madon, Guyll, Aboufadel, Montiel, Smith, Palumbo, and Jussim (in press) produced 68 new adjectives and uncovered that these new items were more suitable to study national stereotypes. When these adjectives were included, the number of items in the pool reached 406.

As can be seen, Devine and Elliot (1995) and Madon et al. (in press) maintained that the adjectives used to depict group characteristics might be susceptible to temporal change. Thus, there is point to suspect that the linguistic repertoire to portray groups might also be different across cultures. For example, though not directly related, to mention as an illustration, the number of ethnophaulisms (i.e., ethnic slurs to refer to outgroups) in the United States has been found to be enormous (Mullen, Rozell, and Johnson, 2000, 2001) though one can find few such ethnophaulisms in the Turkish culture. For this reason, an indigenous source was also included in the study's item pool. It was thought that 235 trait-descriptive adjectives in the Turkish language, reported by Somer (1998), could serve this function well. It should be noted that, Somer had dig these 235 traits from a total of 1300 Turkish personality adjectives.

Contrary to most stereotype content research, this thesis did not deal with national stereotypes nor did it have to do with personal identities, as is the case in most personality research. Instead, it was concerned with an ideological socio-political group. Thus, the adjectives which proved to be suitable to describe national groups or individuals without any reference to their social identities might not be appropriate to describe members of such groups. To this end, 130 personality traits adduced in the interviews, reported in the preceding chapter, were also added into our item pool.

Adjectives in the English language were translated into Turkish in terms of their most frequent usage (Avery, Bezmez, Edmonds, and Yaylalı, 1990). There were cases where more than one English adjective stood for the same adjective in Turkish. For

example, the meanings of the English adjectives of “courageous”, “brave”, and “bold” in Turkish were only “cesur”. Such overlappings helped in reducing the number of items in the pool. Moreover, many items pulled out from the international sources and the interviews overlapped with those found in Somer’s list. When these overlappings were also removed, the number of items was reduced to 398. Later, items such as “gregarious” which are not widely used in Turkish language and those such as “tramp” and “artistic” which might not have anything to do with socio-political descriptions were also removed. Lastly, items such as “virtuous” and “moral” which have similar meanings in Turkish language were combined to form one item. In the end, the resultant checklist consisted of 103 adjectives.

These adjectives were presented as attributes used to describe people and the participants were asked to indicate the degree of negativity or positivity of each item on a 5-point scale ranging between “1” (very negative), “3” (neither positive nor negative) and “5” (very positive). In other words, the preliminary study intended to explore the favorability (or unfavorability) of each adjective in terms of the participants.

3.2.1.2.2. Collective Self-Esteem Scale

As discussed in the Introduction, the prime motive in the Social Identity Theory’s explanation of intergroup perception is to conserve and continue the self-esteem of the beholder. Nonetheless, researchers have diverged whether self-esteem is a predictor or a consequence of intergroup differentiation. Moreover, studies exploring this relationship produced no decisive conclusion (Abrams and Hogg, 1988; Hogg and Abrams, 1990). A number of scholars (e.g., Branscombe and Wann, 1994; Crocker and Luhtanen, 1990; Long, Spears, and Manstead, 1994; Long and Spears, 1997) believed that this failure partly resulted from the usage of personal self-esteem scales, such as Rosenberg’s self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965). They maintained that since intergroup phenomena are related to individuals’ social identity, measures of personal self-esteem might be inapt in the search for an explanatory motive. Thus, they held, instruments measuring social self-esteem directly are needed. Collective self-esteem (CSE) scale is the product of such a concern (Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992).

CSE scale consists of four sub-scales. Each of these sub-scales contains four items. Thus, the total number of items in CSE scale is sixteen. The first sub-scale is “Membership Scale” assessing the attitude toward performance as a member of the group (e.g., “I am a worthy member of the group”). The second sub-scale is “Private Collective Self-Esteem Scale” measuring the attitude toward the group and the person’s group membership (e.g., “I feel good about being a member of this group”). The third sub-scale is “Public Collective Self-Esteem”, which is related to the member’s perception of how the group is viewed by others (i.e., non-members) (e.g., “In general, others respect this group”). The last sub-scale is “Importance to Identity” gauging the contribution of group membership to person’s general self-concept (e.g., “Belonging to this group is an important reflection of who I am”).

Consistent with other studies in the literature (e.g., Branscombe and Wann, 1994; Long and Spears, 1998), we modified these items to concentrate on the specific social identity of *ülküci*. In this way, the above-mentioned items turned out to be “I am a worthy member of the *ülküci* group”, “I feel good about being a member of the *ülküci* group”, “In general, others respect the *ülküci* group”, and “Belonging to the *ülküci* group is an important reflection of who I am”, respectively. In the procedure, we asked the participants to indicate their degree of agreement with each of sixteen statements on a 5-point scale ranging between “1” (completely disagree), “3” (neither agree nor disagree) and “5” (completely agree).

3.2.1.2.3. Party Identification Scale

As noted in the Introduction, The *ülküci* group was designed as the youth branch of the Nationalist Action Party (the NAP). This was especially the case before 1980 (Çalık, 1995). After 1980, many prominent *ülküci*s were located in the central right parties, namely Motherland Party and True Path Party. And some others participated in the Welfare Party of the time. Still, a group of considerable size among *ülküci*s broke their ties with the NAP and established another party called Great Unity Party. As a result, though the bulk of the *ülküci* group remained as partisans of the NAP, some others started to strive for the success of other parties while they still retained the label of

ülküci. Thus, it is conceivable to think that not all parties occupy the same distance to ülkücü. In other words, they might see some parties as close and some others as distant.

A list of ten parties was presented to the participants. The parties in the list were, in Turkish alphabetical order, Motherland Party (MP), Great Unity Party (the GUP), Republican People's Party (the RPP), Democratic Left Party (DLP), True Path Party (TPP), Virtue Party (VP), People's Democracy Party (PDP), Liberal Democrat Party (LDP), Nationalist Action Party (the NAP), and Freedom and Solidarity Party (FSP). The reason to include these parties was that only these parties, with the exception of the FSP and the LDP, had a considerable amount of vote in the general election of April 18, 1999. FSP was included as a representative of extreme leftist parties and LDP was taken in due to its original position that it is the only party recognizing liberal democracy as its formal ideology. We found it unnecessary to include all parties in the Turkish political realm for the parties, other than those in the list, occupy too marginal positions. The the NAP was the second biggest party in terms of the April 18, 1999 General Election results (State Institute of Statistics, 1999). Thus, it might be implausible to think that the NAP partisans would choose a party with a vote of one or less percent as its collocutor. Furthermore, almost all of these small parties have such an unstable structure that the general public including ülkücü might know neither their leader nor their program.

The participants were asked to indicate their degree of closeness or distantness to each of these parties. The answers were taken on a five-point scale ranging between "1" (very distant), "3" (neither close nor distant) and "5" (very close). Since similar instruments have been used in the literature as an operational definition of the identification level (e.g., Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade, and Williams, 1986; Hogg and Hains, 1998), we believed that this simple instrument might also be viewed as a measure of the participants' level of identification with different parties.

3.2.2. Results and Discussion

Ratings of adjectives were analyzed through cluster analysis method. This analysis method groups a number of variables (or cases) into clusters with the intention that the association between members of the same cluster is high while the association between members of the different clusters is low. In other words, its logic is quite similar to

categorization process in social perception. The purpose of using this analysis in this study was to find internally consistent clusters. In this way, the most representative items would be identified and the scale could be shortened without losing much from the structural properties of the original list.

The aim in the analysis of CSE scale was restricted to a demonstration of its validity and reliability. The construct validity was explored by factor analysis and the Cronbach's alpha value was used as the indicator of internal reliability.

The the NAP was the target party in this study. That is, one of the key assumptions of the study was that the participants would find this party as the closest party. Other parties' closeness or distantness to the participants was investigated by the correlation between the participants' ratings of the other parties and those of the NAP. Before reporting the results of the study, it seems appropriate to give some information about the cluster analysis method for its usage in psychological research is not too common.

3.2.2.1. A Note on Cluster Analysis Method

Cluster analysis is an exploratory data analysis method to solve classification problems. The purpose of using cluster analysis is generally to sort cases or variables into groups (Aldenderfer, 1984; Lorr, 1983). In this sorting process, cluster analysis seeks maximum degree of association between members of the same cluster and minimum degree of association between members of different clusters. To put it differently, cluster analysis reveals similarities and dissimilarities in data (Duda, 1998). Thus, each cluster describes the class to which its members belong and this description can proceed from the particular to the general.

Özdamar (1999) identifies four different purposes of using cluster analysis. The first is to divide n cases into sub-groups, which exhibit maximum within-group homogeneity and between-groups heterogeneity, in terms of attributes determined by p variables. The second is to divide p variables into sub-groups, assumed to explain common attributes, in terms of n cases. The third is to divide common n cases into sub-groups in terms of p variables by taking both cases and variables into consideration. And the fourth is to biologically or typologically classify cases in terms of the values determined by p variables.

The aim of using cluster analysis on the ratings of adjectives was to determine internally consistent groupings within these adjectives. This function of cluster analysis is very close to the logic behind other data reduction techniques like factor analysis (Everitt, 1993). However, cluster analysis had, at least, one practical and one theoretical advantage over using factor analysis in this study. The practical advantage was that cluster analysis can be used even with a single case while the number of cases should be many times more than the number of variables in the factor analysis (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996). If a factor analysis was to be conducted on the ratings of adjectives, the sample size should have been around 300 and more. Second, factor analysis operates on the basis of the accounted variance while cluster analysis operates on the basis of similarity or dissimilarity measures (Fife-Schaw, 1993). Since this study was more concerned with the consensual character of the ratings of adjectives, cluster analysis based on similarity measures seemed more appropriate. It is true that when the level of measurement is interval, like factor analysis, cluster analysis also produces a correlation matrix as the basis of similarity measures but it never combines negatively associated items into a single cluster no matter how strong the correlation between the relevant items is. On the contrary, they are clustered within the distinct and distant clusters.

The term cluster analysis encompasses numerous different classification algorithms, many of whose fall within two categories: hierarchical and non-hierarchical. A “hierarchical cluster analysis” was utilized in this study, for this reason, it might be sufficient to give information of some length about this type. The purpose of hierarchical clustering is to join together cases or variables into successively larger clusters by using a measure of similarity or distance. In many cases, a cluster consists of sub-classes within it. These sub-clusters also have their own sub-clusters. To give a famous example from biology, man belongs to the primates, the mammals, the amniotes, the vertebrates, and the animals. This belongingness is true for a chimpanzee. It should be noted that the higher the level of aggregation the less similar are the members in the respective class (sub-class). Such hierarchical reasoning is not foreign to psychologists, especially to those studying long-term memory (Collins and Quillian, 1969; Klatzky, 1980).

There are basically two types of hierarchical clustering: agglomerative and divisive. “Agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis” starts with each case (or variable) in a class by itself. In very small steps, it relaxes the criterion as to what is and is not

unique within these cases (or variables). To put it differently, it lowers the threshold regarding the decision when to declare two or more cases (or variables) to be members of the same cluster. As a result, it links more and more cases (or variables) together and aggregate larger and larger clusters of increasingly dissimilar elements. Finally, in the last step, all cases (or variables) are joined together. In this study, agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis was used but a divisive hierarchical cluster analysis could have also been used. Its logic is exactly the opposite of agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis. It begins with a big cluster encompassing all cases (or variables) and proceeds towards each of the cases as distinct clusters.

The result of a hierarchical cluster analysis is usually a horizontal hierarchical tree plot (a dendrogram), as shown in Figure 3.1.a and 3.1.b. In these dendrograms, the horizontal axis denotes “the linkage distance”. Thus, the criterion distance, at which the respective cases (or variables) are linked together into a new single cluster, can be read for each node in the graphs. When the data contain a clear structure in terms of clusters of cases (or variables) that are similar to each other, then this structure will often be reflected in the dendrogram as distinct branches. As the result of a successful analysis with the agglomerative method, one can be able to detect and interpret these branches.

Agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis method uses similarities/dissimilarities or distances between cases (or variables) when forming the clusters. Though cluster analysis is flexible enough to base these distances on a single dimension, in many cases it does this with multiple dimensions. There are many methods of measuring distances. The most straightforward way of computing distances between cases (or variables) in a multi-dimensional space is to compute “Euclidian” distances. This measure is the actual geometric distance between cases (or variables) in a two- or three-dimensional space. However, it is not necessary for the distances to be of real or of some other derived measure. It is up to the researcher to select the right method for his/her specific application. The advantage of this method is that it is not affected by the addition of new cases (or variables), even if they are outliers (Duda, Hart, and Stork, 1998).

As can be seen, cluster analysis, like factor analysis, is not a typical member of statistical significance testing. Because, unlike many other statistical methods, cluster analysis is employed mostly when there is no a priori hypothesis. In a sense, it strives to find the most significant solution possible. Below, we shall report the results of the

cluster analysis performed on the positivity (negativity) ratings of the 103-items adjective checklist.

3.2.2.2. Hierarchical Structure of 103 Adjectives

An agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis was performed on the positivity (negativity) ratings of 103 adjectives. The appearing dendrogram is shown in Figure 3.1.a and 3.1.b.¹⁴⁷ It should be noted that the cluster analysis revealed two large clusters. For simplicity, these clusters are shown in different pages.

Fifty adjectives were grouped within the first cluster. When the mean ratings of these adjectives were inspected (see Appendix C.1), it was seen that they were the most positively evaluated adjectives [means ranged between 4.77 (patriot) and 3.59 (witty, joker)]. Interestingly, the ratings were so similar that it was not easy to discern any more sub-clusters within this huge cluster. The linkage distance value of all sub-cluster nodes was below 5. As a result, the computed Cronbach's alpha value of this cluster was extremely high, .96. For these reasons, this first cluster was labeled as positive adjectives.

The second cluster consisted of two distinct sub-clusters. The first of these sub-clusters showed similar statistical characteristics to the cluster of positive adjectives. The linkage distance value of all sub-clusters within this sub-cluster was below 5. Accordingly, the related Cronbach's alpha value was .91. However, the mean ratings of the adjectives grouped within this sub-cluster were those of the lowest [ranged between 1.10 (traitorous, treacherous, perfidious) and 2.43 (revengeful, vindictive)]. For these reasons, this sub-cluster was called as negative adjectives.

¹⁴⁷ This dendrogram is drawn via the aid of Visio 5 Drawing. Since the number of variables entered into the analysis was quite high, the dendrogram output of SPSS was huge. It was very difficult to transport that output to the Microsoft Word in a meaningful manner. Moreover, when it is transported, it required more than three pages that would hinder understanding the structure of the clusters.




Figure 3.1.a. Dendrogram showing the first cluster of adjectives




Figure 3.1.b. Dendrogram showing the second cluster of adjectives

The second sub-cluster of the second cluster consisted of ambiguously rated adjectives. It seemed that, with respect to these adjectives, the consensus among the participants was low (as a further indicator of homogeneity in the ratings, see the standard deviations of these items in Appendix C.1). The linkage distance value of the cluster nodes of the sub-clusters within this sub-cluster was high (above 10), showing that the items within this cluster failed to form an internally reliable cluster (Cronbach's $\alpha = .01$).

These results had both an advantage and a disadvantage. The advantage was that it posed such a clear pattern that it ruled out any alternative interpretation from the beginning. The disadvantage was that such huge clusters could help little in selecting structurally distinct adjectives. The results suggested that a random selection of a number of adjectives from the first and the second clusters would work with comparable efficiency.

In order to hinder the selection of parallel adjectives as much as possible, the distance between the adjectives within the same cluster and any sign of clustering, albeit it was under the linkage distance of 5, were examined. It was decided that the cluster of positive adjectives was made up of ten and the cluster of negative adjectives was made up of five sub-clusters. Tables 3.2.a and 3.2.b indicate the contents of these clusters and their Cronbach's α values.

Ten internally consistent sub-clusters could be identified within the cluster of positive adjectives. Only four adjectives stayed out of these groupings. "Liberal in terms of freedom" and "Indigenous, local" seemed to group within the same cluster but since their contents were not similar and their correlation was not high ($r = .18, p > .05$), they were dropped. Likewise, "Religious" and "Traditional, conservative" grouped within the same cluster. Though these two adjectives seemed to share related contents, their correlation was low ($r = .15, p > .05$). These low correlations suggested that the *ülküci* group in our study did not have a consensual understanding of these adjectives. Thus, since their usage in the subsequent studies might impair the results, they were also dropped.

The cluster of negative adjectives seemed to shelter five internally consistent sub-clusters. All of the adjectives were grouped within one of these five sub-clusters. As for the cluster consisting of ambiguous adjectives in terms of positivity-negativity dimension, its existence was totally ignored. Since there was not agreement among the participants about the direction of the emotional loadings of these items, it was thought that their usage in the next studies would not be informative.

We decided that a list of 20 adjectives would be sufficient in the main study. In order to prevent response set, this list should include equal number of positive and negative adjectives (Altemeyer, 1981; Campbell and Fiske, 1959). Thus, we selected one adjective from each of the ten sub-clusters of the positive adjectives and two adjectives from each of the five sub-clusters of the negative adjectives. The selection of these adjectives was not random; rather those adjectives exhibiting the highest correlation with the total sub-scale to which they belonged were picked (see the underlined adjectives in Table 3.2.a and 3.2.b).

Table 3.2.a.

The sub-clusters of the cluster of positive adjectives and their Cronbach's alpha values

No	Content	Cronbach's alpha
1.	"Defending the unity of country", " <u>Patriot</u> ", "Self-respecting"	.81
2.	"Nationalist, loving nation", " <u>Believing the idea of Turk-Islam</u> ", "Loving the state, faithful to state"	.90
3.	"Honest, smooth", " <u>Virtuous, moral</u> ", "Broad-minded", "Just"	.67
4.	"Self-confident, cool-headed", "Responsible", "Clever, intelligent", "Investigative, searching", " <u>Rational, logical</u> ", "Determined, resolute"	.82
5.	"Modest, humble", "Self-sacrificing, philanthropic", "Tolerant, understanding", "Refined, respectful, mannerly", " <u>Reliable, loyal, faithful</u> "	.90
6.	"Warm, lovable", "Tender, compassionate", "Skillful, capable", "Egalitarian", "Cautious, prudent, wary", "Sincere, frank", " <u>Sober, sensible, serious</u> "	.87
7.	" <u>Believer</u> ", "Merciful, compassionate"	.68
8.	"Disciplined, obedient", "Strong, powerful", "Witty, joker", "Enterprising, adventure loving", " <u>Brave, courageous, fearless</u> ", "Active, vivid"	.79
9.	" <u>Learned, cultured</u> ", "Innovative, modern, progressive", "Peaceful, at ease, calm", "Democrat", "Competitive"	.82
10.	" <u>Humanist</u> ", "Leader", "Optimistic", "Docile, amicable, harmonious", "Partisan of freedom"	.75

Table 3.2.b.

The sub-clusters of the cluster of negative adjectives and their Cronbach's alpha values

No	Content	Cronbach's alpha
1.	<u>"Quarrelsome, aggressive"</u> , <u>"Not giving a damn, irresponsible"</u> , "Boring, tedious", "Cold, distant", "Radical, fundamentalist", "Insensitive, thick-skinned", "Revengeful, vindictive"	.87
2.	"Independent", "Believing in sexual freedom", "Communist", <u>"Materialistic"</u> , "Socialist", <u>"Cosmopolitan"</u>	.78
3.	<u>"Anarchist"</u> , "Lustful, sensual", <u>"Talkative, chattering, noisy"</u>	.79
4.	"Jealous, capricious", "Arrogant, conceited", "Superstitious, bigoted", "Coward, fainthearted", "Weak, weak-willed", "Lazy, indolent", "Ignorant", "Biased, bigot", "Difficult, irritable, peevish", "Stingy, miser", "Merciless, pitiless", "Greedy, ambitious, self-seeker", "Insensitive, intolerant", "Rough, coarse, disrespectful", Terrorist", <u>"Imitator, submissive"</u> , "Traitorous, treacherous, perfidious", "Atheist", <u>"Despising the public"</u> , "Faceless, unassertive"	.91
5.	<u>"Pessimistic, hopeless"</u> , <u>"Sluggish, inactive"</u> , "Anti-secular religious", "Gullible", "Hypochondriac", "Ostentatious, pretentious", "Angry, furious, hot-tempered"	.78

In the end, the chosen positive adjectives were “patriot”, “believing the idea of Turk-Islam”, “virtuous, moral”, “rational, logical”, “reliable, loyal, faithful”, “sober, sensible, serious”, “believer”, “brave, courageous, fearless”, “learned, cultured”, and “humanist”. And the chosen negative adjectives were “quarrelsome, aggressive”, “not giving a damn, irresponsible”, “materialistic”, “cosmopolitan”, “anarchist”, “talkative, chattering, noisy”, “imitator, submissive”, “despising the public”, “pessimistic, hopeless”, and “sluggish, inactive”.

3.2.2.3. Reliability and Validity of Collective Self-Esteem (CSE) Scale

A Principal Component Analysis with “eigenvalue greater than 1 criterion” was performed on sixteen items of CSE Scale. Factor analysis revealed four factors explaining 78.8% of the total variance. Though the number of factors was consistent with that expected by theory (Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992), the contents of these factors were not. The Turkish translation of CSE scale was not composed of four equally important factors. The first factor explained most of the variance by itself (50.7%). For this reason, the scale was considered to be one-dimensional (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996). As can be seen in Table 3.3, while eight items loaded positively, eight items loaded negatively under the first factor. The scale alpha value was quite high (.92), suggesting that it is a global collective self-esteem scale.

As an indicator of convergent validity (Anastasi, 1982), this scale was highly related to the NAP item of party identification scale ($r=.73$, $df:81$, $p<.000$) that will be considered in the next section. In other words, as the CSE scores got higher, the NAP was found to be closer. Moreover, as the CSE scores of participants got higher, the leftist parties (e.g., CHP) were found to be more distant ($r=-.41$, $df:81$, $p<.000$). Thus, it was concluded that this scale might be beneficial in gauging the participants’ ingroup identification level.

Table 3.3.
Factor loadings and communalities of items of the CSE scale.

<i>Items</i>	<i>Factor loadings</i>	<i>Communalities</i>
I am an active and participating member of the ülkücü group.	.900	.905
Generally, I am pleased to be a member of the ülkücü group.	.894	.897
Belonging to the ülkücü group is generally an important part of my self-identity.	.894	.816
I am happy to be an ülkücü.	.859	.774
Being ülkücü is an important indicator of who I am.	.847	.825
Other people generally evaluate the ülkücü group positively.	.780	.867
Generally, I feel that ülkücüs are not valuable enough.	-.774	.796
I am a valuable member of the ülkücü group.	.759	.829
Generally, others respect the ülkücü group.	.723	.699
Generally, being ülkücü does not exert any influence upon my thoughts and emotions.	-.564	.852
Often, I think that I am a useless member of the ülkücü group.	-.653	.535
Being an ülkücü does not have an effect upon my identity and the kind of person I am.	-.608	.754
I think that I have nothing to give to the ülkücü group.	-.486	.721
Generally, other people think ülkücüs as worthless.	-.475	.837
Often, I feel sad to be an ülkücü.	-.453	.593
Most people think ülkücüs less productive and less efficient than the other groups.	-.388	.908

3.2.2.4. Analyses Related to Political Party Identification

It was expected that the participants would find the NAP as the closest party to their own political position but it was not known which other parties were in a close and which of them were in a distant position. Means and standard deviations of this scale were given in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4.
Means and Standard Deviations of Party Identification Scale

	Mean	Std. Dev.
Nationalist Action Party (the NAP)	4.03	0.97
Great Union Party (the GUP)	3.00	1.08
True Path Party (TPP)	2.39	1.10
Liberal Democrat Party (LDP)	2.10	1.00
Motherland Party (MP)	2.00	0.85
Virtue Party (VP)	1.90	0.93
Democratic Left Party (DLP)	1.68	0.78
Republican People's Party (the RPP)	1.55	0.67
Freedom and Solidarity Party (FSP)	1.23	0.61
People's Democracy Party (PDP)	1.06	0.25

It was clear that the participants found the NAP as the closest party. In fact, as we discussed previously, the NAP represents the ingroup position of the *ülküçü* group. The mean rating of the NAP out of a 5-point scale may seem a little lower than the expected one. Yet, it should be noted that the NAP has been a partner of the coalition government at the time of the study and it had been criticized for not fulfilling its promises before the election, establishing a coalition government with a leftist party, and so on. In other words, there was uneasiness among the *ülküçüs*. This might have resulted in lowering the

ratings of the NAP. Anyway, the existence of differential identification levels with the NAP seemed beneficial for the general purposes of the study.

The means suggested that the GUP was seen as the second closest party to the *ülkücü* group. In fact, about one third of the participants rated the GUP as distant or very distant, while about another third rated as close or very close, and still about another third rated as neither close nor distant. Thus, the GUP seemed as a good candidate for being “the close outgroup” in the main study.

The other parties, in general, were rated as fairly distant. The PDP was perceived as the most distant party among all. The ratings of the PDP were so uniform that only a few participants’ ratings were only distant, the bulk of the participants rated it as very distant. Thus, it might not be a good candidate for being “the distant outgroup” in the main study for the reason behind finding the PDP as distant would be irrelevant to the participants’ identification with the NAP. For these reasons, we decided to use the correlations between the identification level with the NAP and those with the other parties. We chose to employ the party, which would exhibit the highest positive correlation with the NAP, as “the close outgroup” and the party, which would exhibit the highest negative correlation with MHP, as “the distant outgroup” in the main study. The correlations are given in Table 3.5.

The participants’ identification with the NAP exhibited the highest positive correlation with their perceived closeness to the GUP and the highest negative correlation with their perceived distantness with the RPP. That’s why, we decided to use the GUP as “the close outgroup” and the RPP as “the distant outgroup” in the main study.

Table 3.5.
 The correlations between identification level with the NAP and those with the other parties
 (df : 93 for each correlation)

	<i>r</i>	<i>p</i>
GUP	.50	.000
VP	.22	.035
PDP	-.01	.934
MP	-.04	.706
TPP	-.13	.203
DLP	-.16	.131
FSP	-.18	.089
LDP	-.20	.049
RPP	-.28	.007

3.3. MAIN STUDY

3.3.1. Method

In the main study, our method to reach the participants was similar to those in the interview and the preliminary studies. Eleven trained volunteer interviewers, known to be *ülküçüs*, took part in this study and helped us in applying the questionnaires. Moreover, we took pains to include active participants of the activities of *Ülkü Hearts* into the sample. The characteristics of the sample were specified below.

3.2.1.1. Participants

Two hundred persons participated in the study (34 females, 166 males). Mean age of the participants was 29.0 with a range of 17 and 51. Thirty-four percent of the participants were married, 64.5% were single, and 1.5% were divorced or widowed. Of the married participants, while 26.8% made arranged marriages, 36.6% made self-initiated marriages. The remaining 36.6% made partly arranged and partly self-initiated marriages.

As was the case in the preceding studies, only people graduated from a high school or above were allowed to join the study. Six percent of the participants had post-graduate education; 27% had graduated from university, 39.5% were still university students; 25.5% had graduated from high school. Four participants did not specify their education level. As for the professions of the participants, as just noted, 39.5% were university students. Five percent were small-scale retailer, 10% were laborer, 21.5% were government official, 12% were professional (i.e., lawyer, doctor, etc.), and 1.5% were retired. Only one female specified her profession as housewife and 20 participants did not specify their professions.

In terms of home of origin, 10.5% of the participants were from Ankara; 5.5% were from Kayseri; 4.5% were from Giresun; 4% were from Konya; 3.5% were from Adana and Sivas for each city; 3% were from Aydın, Kırşehir, Samsun, and Yozgat for each city; the rest were from different cities such as İstanbul, Kırklareli, Malatya, Niğde,

Tokat, Çankırı, Erzurum, Isparta, Manisa, Nevşehir, Trabzon, Amasya, Edirne, Erzincan, Hatay, Kastamonu, Aksaray, Kırıkkale, Balıkesir, Bursa, Mersin, Kahramanmaraş, Rize, Sakarya, Van, Karaman, Ardahan, Antalya, Artvin, Bilecik, Bolu, Çanakkale, Çorum, Eskişehir, Gaziantep, Gümüşhane, Kars, Ordu, Siirt, Şanlıurfa, Zonguldak, Iğdır, and Düzce. Nine participants did not specify their home of origin. As can be seen, though there were people from all around Turkey, the bulk was from the Interior Anatolia (43%) and the Black Sea (16.5%) regions. Especially, people from the Southeastern Anatolia were quite few (1.5%).

Only 2.5% of the participants reported that they had spent most of their lives in a village. While 9.5% had spent most of their lives in a town, 52.5% had spent most of their lives in a city. The remaining 35.5% reported that they had spent most of their lives in a metropolis (i.e., İstanbul, Ankara, or İzmir).

3.3.1.2. Materials and Procedure

A questionnaire consisting of four sets of items was prepared (Appendix B.2). The participants were informed that the research was related to the structure of socio-political identities and social perception forms of *ülküçüs*. It was noted that there were no correct or incorrect answers and that their honest responding to the items was important for the health of the study. They were also informed that there were no questions about the private identity of the participants for this information was unimportant for the study. Moreover, the participants were guaranteed that the information they gave would be kept secret and that this information would not be used outside the unscientific purposes.

The first part of the questionnaire contained questions regarding the demographic characteristics such as the participants' gender, age, marital status, (if married) how he or she was married, education, occupation, home of origin, the level of urbanization of the place where the participants spent most of their lives. The other sets of items were explained below.

3.3.1.2.1. Favorability of attributes

This scale consisted of the 20 attributes extracted out of 103 attributes in the preliminary study. These attributes were presented to the participants and they were asked to indicate the degree of negativity or positivity of each item on a 5-point scale ranging between “1” (very negative), “3” (neither positive nor negative) and “5” (very positive). As had been the case in the preliminary study, the purpose of this scale was to find out the perceived favorability (or unfavorability) of each attribute. Mean favorability ratings of these attributes in comparison to those in the pilot study were given in Table 3.6.

As can be seen in the Table 3.6, the participants both in the preliminary study and the main study rated very favorably the attributes of “patriot”, “believer”, “virtuous, moral”, “believing the idea of Turk-Islam”, “reliable, loyal, faithful”, “humanist, valuing the people”, “rational, logical”, “sober, sensible, serious”, “learned, cultured”, and “brave, courageous, fearless”.¹⁴⁸ When we remember the discussion material of the interviews, this result should not appear as a surprise for these attributes reflect some of the most important values of the *ülküçü* group. Accordingly, the participants rated very unfavorably the attributes of “imitator, submissive”, “anarchist”, “despising the public”, “sluggish, inactive”, “not giving a damn, irresponsible”, “talkative, chattering, noisy”, “materialistic”, “pessimistic, hopeless”, “quarrelsome, aggressive”, and “cosmopolitan”. At the beginning of the study, we intended to use these positivity (negativity) ratings as an index of favorability. However, as we shall clarify it in the following topic, both the favorable and the unfavorable attributes grouped very reliably with each other. For this reason, we preferred to deal with these attributes by lumping them together.

¹⁴⁸ We should note that none of the respondents in the preliminary study were allowed to participate in the main study.

Table 3.6: Means and standard deviations of the favorability (unfavorability) ratings of the selected attributes in the preliminary and the main study.

	The preliminary study		The main study	
	<u>M</u>	Std. Dev.	<u>M</u>	Std. Dev.
Patriot	4.77	.42	4.88	.33
Believer	4.33	.69	4.64	.57
Virtuous, moral	4.73	.44	4.61	.67
Believing the idea of Turk-Islam	4.67	.59	4.61	.62
Reliable, loyal, faithful	4.42	.61	4.51	.64
Humanist, valuing the people	4.29	.85	4.47	.63
Rational, logical	4.58	.49	4.37	.67
Sober, sensible, serious	4.44	.79	4.30	.74
Learned, cultured	4.25	.71	4.34	.66
Brave, courageous, fearless	4.06	.65	4.08	.72
Cosmopolitan	1.94	.88	2.06	1.06
Quarrelsome, aggressive	1.88	1.03	1.90	.90
Pessimistic, hopeless	1.87	.84	1.74	.75
Materialistic	1.60	.66	1.73	.78
Talkative, chattering, noisy	1.72	.72	1.57	.79
Not giving a damn, irresponsible	1.66	.71	1.55	.66
Sluggish, inactive	1.63	.65	1.55	.64
Despising the public	1.19	.39	1.36	.56
Anarchist	1.67	.81	1.33	.58
Imitator, submissive	1.25	.43	1.33	.56

3.3.1.2.2. Ratings of the attributes

The same attribute list in the attribute favorability scale was presented to the participants and they were asked to rate how many members of the target group (or groups) have each of these attributes. It should be noted that this scale is where we introduced the experimental manipulation of the study. Remember that we had a number of hypotheses related to the context where group perception occurs. Consistent with the literature (e.g., Cinnirella, 1998b; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, and Hayes, 1992; Young, Van Knippenberg, Ellemers, and Devries, 1997), we made a distinction between intragroup and intergroup contexts. We called the context where only the ingroup is present as the ingroup only context. When there is another group in the context, we called this context as the intergroup context. We thought that the intergroup context might be varied, too. In an intergroup context, there might be only one outgroup (i.e., intergroup with one outgroup context) or more outgroups (i.e., triple context). Furthermore, we challenged the assumption that all outgroups are one and the same from the ingroup perspective. In other words, we held that not all outgroups occupy the same distance to the ingroup. Some outgroups are closer to the ingroup than some other outgroups, or to put it differently, some outgroups are more distant to the ingroup than some other outgroups. Thus, as a result of this reasoning, we introduced the concepts of close and distant outgroups. In the end, we reached four kinds of contexts: ingroup only, dual with close outgroup, dual with distant outgroup, and triple contexts. The variation within triple context might be numerous but, for matters of simplicity, we found it sufficient to examine only one triple context where there were one close and one distant outgroups together with the ingroup.

In the study, the participants were divided into four equal groups randomly. All groups rated how many members of the NAP (the ingroup) have each of the attributes. In the “ingroup only context”, there was no other group. In the “dual with close outgroup” context, the participants made the same ratings also for the members of the GUP while the participants in the “dual with distant outgroup” context made these ratings for the members of the RPP. Finally, the participants in the “triple” context made these ratings not only for the members of the NAP, but also for those of both the GUP and the RPP

(for studies employing similar designs, which Verkuyten and De Wolfe (2002) call as experimental questionnaire study, see Hopkins and Murdoch, 1999; Hopkins, Regan, and Abell, 1997; Verkuyten and De Wolfe, 2002).

The participants made the ratings on 5-point scales. If they think that no member (i.e., 0%) of the target group has the attribute in question, they were instructed to answer as “1”. If they think that some (i.e., 20% or 30%) members of the target group (or groups) have and the remaining (i.e., 70% or 80%) do not have the attribute in question, they were instructed to answer as “2”. If they think that about half (i.e., 50%) of the members of the target group (or groups) have the attribute in question, they were instructed to answer as “3”. If they think that most (i.e., 70% or 80%) members of the target group (or groups) have and the remaining (i.e., 20% or 30%) do not have the attribute in question, they were instructed to answer as “4”. Finally, if they think that all members (i.e., 100%) of the target group have the attribute in question, they were instructed to answer as “5”.

As noted, we would compute a favorability index for the groups by using the ratings of the attribute favorability scale. However, both favorable and unfavorable attributes exhibited quite reliable groupings with each other. The Cronbach’s alpha values of the favorable attributes for the NAP, the GUP, and the RPP were .91, .91, and .86, respectively. Likewise, the Cronbach’s alpha values of the unfavorable attributes for the NAP, the GUP, and the RPP were .77, .81, and .78, respectively. That’s why, we preferred to compute the means of both the favorable and the unfavorable attributes separately and used these means as the total homogeneity score for each target group, ranging between “1” and “5”.

In order to render the data more comparable for repeated-measure-type analyses, the ratings of unfavorable attributes were reverse coded so that higher ratings (i.e., those significantly higher than 3.00) of both the favorable and unfavorable attributes pointed to positive homogeneity of the group(s) in question. In the same way, lower ratings (those significantly lower than 3.00) of both the favorable and unfavorable attributes indicated negative homogeneity of the group(s) in question.

3.3.1.2.3. Collective Self-Esteem Scale

The same scale in the preliminary study was used with the same procedure in the main study. The results handed down a similar structure of the scale to the one obtained in the preliminary study. Principal Component Analysis with eigenvalue greater than 1 criterion yielded four factors, explaining 61.7% of the total variance. However, as in the preliminary study, most of the variance was explained by the first factor (37%) and the Cronbach's alpha of the resulting scale was quite high (.88).

Remember we planned to use this scale to measure the participants' identification level with the NAP. In order to render it more suitable for the ANOVA-type analyses, we split the sample from median score (i.e., 3.88; $M = 3.85$, Std. dev. = 0.53). In the following analyses, those participants scoring higher than the median will be called "high-identifiers", and those participants scoring lower than or equal to the median will be referred to as "low-identifiers".

3.3.1.3. An Overview of the Design

There were four independent variables in the study: CONTEXT (ingroup only, dual with close outgroup, dual with distant outgroup, and triple), IDENTIFICATION (low and high), TARGET GROUP (ingroup, close outgroup, and distant outgroup), and ATTRIBUTE TYPE (favorable and unfavorable). While CONTEXT and IDENTIFICATION were between-subject factors, TARGET GROUP and ATTRIBUTE TYPE were within-subject factors. In other words, there were six combinations of repeated-measure variables: ingroup-favorable attributes, ingroup-unfavorable attributes, close outgroup-favorable attributes, close outgroup-unfavorable attributes, distant outgroup-favorable attributes, and finally, distant outgroup-unfavorable attributes.

3.3.2. Results

The results are presented in four sections: In the first section, analyses related to the differences in the perceived homogeneity of the ingroup are presented. Analyses

related to the differences in the perceived homogeneities of the ingroup versus the close outgroup and the ingroup versus the distant outgroup are given in the second and the third sections, respectively. In the final section, analyses related to the differences in the perceived homogeneities of all three groups in the triple context are given. In all sections, differences due to the effects of the comparative context and the participants' level of identification with the ingroup are specified. These differences are analysed via MANOVA with repeated measures variable, and when the existence of a significant difference is determined, the source of this difference is explored by computing the related Tukey HSD tests ($p < .01$) (Armitage, 1971).

3.3.2.1. Perceived Homogeneity of the Ingroup

In order to investigate differences in terms of the context and the identification level in the perceived homogeneity of the ingroup, a 4 (CONTEXT: ingroup only, dual with close outgroup, dual with distant outgroup, triple) X 2 (IDENTIFICATION: high, low) X 2 [ATTRIBUTE TYPE: perceived homogeneity of the ingroup in terms of favorable attributes, perceived homogeneity of the ingroup in terms of unfavorable attributes] MANOVA with repeated measures on the last variable was conducted.

Main effect of ATTRIBUTE TYPE was significant [$F(1, 192)=15.00$, $MSE=1.88$, $p<.000$, $\eta^2=.07$], indicating that the participants perceived the ingroup as more positively homogeneous in terms of the unfavorable attributes than the favorable ones ($M_s = 4.18$ and 4.05 , respectively).

Main effect of CONTEXT failed to reach significance [$F(3, 192)=1.712$, n.s.], suggesting that perceived homogeneity of the ingroup did not differ in terms of any conditions of the context. However, CONTEXT X ATTRIBUTE TYPE interaction was significant, qualifying the above-mentioned ATTRIBUTE TYPE main effect [$F(3, 192)=3.00$, $MSE=0.38$, $p<.05$, $\eta^2=.05$]. Post hoc comparisons indicated that while the participants in the two dual group contexts, namely dual with close outgroup and dual with distant outgroup contexts, saw the ingroup as being equally positively homogeneous in terms of two types of attributes, the participants in both the ingroup only and triple contexts saw the ingroup as more positively homogeneous in terms of the unfavorable attributes than in terms of the favorable ones (see Figure 3.2).




Figure 3.2: Perceived ingroup homogeneity in terms of favorable and unfavorable attributes in four contexts.

As shown in Figure 3.2, the participants in the ingroup only context tended to perceive the ingroup less positively homogeneous in terms of the favorable attributes than the participants in the other three (dual and triple) contexts; furthermore, the participants in the triple context perceived the ingroup as more positively homogeneous in terms of the unfavorable attributes than the participants in the other three contexts. As can be seen in Figure 3.2, the two dual contexts involving close or distant outgroups did not differ in terms of mean perceived homogeneity.

IDENTIFICATION main effect reached significance [$F(1, 192)=32.70$, $MSE=16.77$, $p<.000$, $\eta^2=.15$], indicating that the high-identifiers perceived the ingroup as

more positively homogeneous than the low-identifiers ($M_s = 4.32$ and 3.91 , respectively). Both this and the above-mentioned ATTRIBUTE TYPE main effects were qualified by the IDENTIFICATION X ATTRIBUTE TYPE interaction [$F(1, 192)=17.06$, $MSE=2.13$, $p<.000$, $\eta^2=.08$]. Post hoc analyses indicated that while the high-identifiers perceived the ingroup as equally positively homogeneous in terms of both type of attributes, the low-identifiers perceived the ingroup as more positively homogeneous in terms of the unfavorable attributes than the favorable ones (see Figure 3.3), thereby implying that the attribute type main effect was valid only for the low-identifiers. Accordingly, the difference between perceptions of the high and the low-identifiers was greater for favorable attributes relative to unfavorable ones.

Neither CONTEXT X IDENTIFICATION nor CONTEXT X IDENTIFICATION X ATTRIBUTE TYPE interactions were significant [$F_s(3,192)=.34$ and $.70$, n.s.].

Since the two dual contexts involving close and distant outgroups did not differ in terms of respondents' homogeneity perceptions, as noted above, the related data were collapsed over close and distant types and the MANOVA analysis was repeated with three levels of context. Since this recoding was expected to influence only the CONTEXT main effect and interactions involving CONTEXT, results related to ATTRIBUTE TYPE and IDENTIFICATION will not be repeated.

CONTEXT main effect was not significant again, but there was a trend [$F(2,194)=2.46$, $MSE=1.25$, $p<.10$, $\eta^2=.03$]. Post hoc analyses indicated that the participants in the triple groups context perceived the ingroup as more positively homogeneous ($M=4.24$) than the participants in both the single group and dual groups contexts ($M_s = 4.02$ and 4.10 , respectively). This trend and the above-noted ATTRIBUTE TYPE main effect were qualified by CONTEXT X ATTRIBUTE TYPE interaction [$F(2,194)=4.58$, $MSE=.57$, $p<.02$, $\eta^2=.05$]. Post hoc comparisons showed that while the participants in the dual groups context perceived the ingroup as equally positively homogeneous in terms of both types of attributes, the participants both in the single group and the triple groups contexts perceived the ingroup as more positively homogeneous in terms of the unfavorable attributes than the favorable ones. Moreover, while the participants in the single group context perceived the ingroup as less positively homogeneous in terms of the favorable attributes than the participants in the other two

contexts, the participants in the triple group context perceived the ingroup as more positively homogeneous in terms of the unfavorable attributes than the participants in the other two contexts (see Figure 3.4).




Figure 3.3: High- and low-identifiers' perceived ingroup homogeneity in terms of favorable and unfavorable attributes.




Figure 3.4: Perceived ingroup homogeneity in terms of favorable and unfavorable attributes in three contexts.

CONTEXT X IDENTIFICATION and CONTEXT X IDENTIFICATION X ATTRIBUTE TYPE interactions were not significant, as in the previous analysis [$F(3,192)=.45$ and $.96$, n.s.].

3.3.2.2. Perceived Homogeneities of the Ingroup Versus the Close Outgroup

In order to investigate differences in terms of the context and the identification level in the perceived homogeneities of the ingroup and the close outgroup, a 2 (CONTEXT: dual with close outgroup, triple) X 2 (IDENTIFICATION: high, low) X 2 (TARGET GROUP: the ingroup, the close outgroup) X 2 (ATTRIBUTE TYPE: perceived homogeneity in terms of the favorable attributes, perceived homogeneity in

terms of the unfavorable attributes) MANOVA with repeated measures on the last two variables was conducted.

TARGET GROUP main effect was significant [$F(1,96)=66.72$, $MSE=41.76$, $p<.000$, $\eta^2=.41$], indicating that the participants perceived the ingroup as more positively homogeneous than the close outgroup ($M_s=4.19$ and 3.53 , respectively). While TARGET GROUP X CONTEXT interaction was not significant [$F(1,96)=.02$, n.s.], TARGET GROUP X IDENTIFICATION interaction pointed to a trend that while high-identifiers perceived the ingroup as more positively homogeneous than the low-identifiers ($M_s=4.40$ and 3.97 , respectively), both the high- and the low-identifiers perceived the close outgroup as less but equally positively homogeneous ($M_s=3.60$ and 3.46 , respectively) [$F(1,96)=3.61$, $MSE=2.26$, $p<.10$, $\eta^2=.04$].

Nevertheless, the above trend was qualified by a significant TARGET GROUP X CONTEXT X IDENTIFICATION interaction [$F(1,96)=8.18$, $MSE=5.12$, $p<.005$, $\eta^2=.08$]. Post hoc comparisons indicated that the high- and the low-identifiers perceived the ingroup as equally positively homogeneous in both the dual with close outgroup and the triple contexts, the high-identifiers being more so than the low ones in both contexts. However, while the low-identifiers' perception of positive homogeneity related to the close outgroup increased from the dual with close outgroup context to the triple context, a reverse trend was true for the high-identifiers (see Figure 3.5).




Figure 3.5: High- and low-identifiers' perception of homogeneity related to the ingroup and the close outgroup in both the dual with close outgroup and triple contexts.

Moreover, while the high-identifiers perceived the close outgroup as more positively homogeneous in the dual with close outgroup context, the difference between the low- and high-identifiers' perceptions related to the close outgroup in the triple context was not significant. Furthermore, while the low-identifiers perceived the ingroup as more positively homogeneous than the close outgroup in the dual with close outgroup context, the significance of this difference disappeared in the triple context.

ATTRIBUTE TYPE main effect was significant, too [$F(1,96)=26.98$, $MSE=6.54$, $p<.000$, $\eta^2=.22$], indicating that the participants' perception of positive homogeneity in terms of the unfavorable attributes was higher than that in terms of the favorable attributes ($M_s=3.99$ and 3.73 , respectively). While ATTRIBUTE TYPE X IDENTIFICATION and ATTRIBUTE TYPE X CONTEXT X IDENTIFICATION interactions were not significant [$F_s(1,96)=2.43$ and $.51$, n.s.], ATTRIBUTE TYPE X CONTEXT interaction indicated a trend that the participants in the triple context perceived the groups as more positively homogeneous in terms of the unfavorable attributes than the participants in the dual with close outgroup context [$F(1,96)=3.04$,

$MSE=.74$, $p<.10$, $\eta^2=.03$]. However, such a difference was not in question in terms of the favorable attributes (see Figure 3.6).

The above ATTRIBUTE TYPE main effect was also qualified by TARGET GROUP [$F(1,96)=38.06$, $MSE=2.42$, $p<.000$, $\eta^2=.28$] (see Figure 3.7). Post hoc analyses indicated that while the participants saw the ingroup as equally positively homogeneous in terms of both the favorable and the unfavorable attributes ($M_s=4.14$ and 4.23 , respectively), they perceived the close outgroup as more positively homogeneous in terms of the unfavorable attributes than in terms of the favorable ones ($M_s=3.74$ and 3.32 , respectively).




Figure 3.6: Perceived homogeneities in terms of favorable and unfavorable attributes in both the dual with close outgroup and triple contexts.




Figure 3.7: Perceived homogeneities of the ingroup and the close outgroup in terms of the favorable and unfavorable attributes.

Neither TARGET GROUP X ATTRIBUTE TYPE X CONTEXT nor TARGET GROUP X ATTRIBUTE TYPE X CONTEXT X IDENTIFICATION interactions were significant [$F(1,96)=1.58$ and $.42$, n.s.], but TARGET GROUP X ATTRIBUTE TYPE X IDENTIFICATION interaction was significant [$F(1,96)=3.97$, $MSE=.25$, $p<.05$, $\eta^2=.04$] (see Figure 3.8).




Figure 3.8: High- and low-identifiers' perception of homogeneity related to the ingroup and the close outgroup in terms of the favorable and unfavorable attributes.

Post hoc analyses showed that ATTRIBUTE TYPE main effect was concerned with both the high- and the low-identifiers' perception of the close outgroup. However, while the high-identifiers perceived the ingroup as equally positively homogeneous in terms of both the favorable and unfavorable attributes, the low-identifiers perceived the ingroup as less positively homogeneous in both but particularly in terms of the former than the latter attributes.

3.3.2.3. Perceived Homogeneities of the Ingroup Versus the Distant Outgroup

In order to investigate differences in terms of the context and the identification level in the perceived homogeneities of the ingroup and the distant outgroup, a 2 (CONTEXT: dual with distant outgroup, triple) X 2 (IDENTIFICATION: high, low) X 2 (TARGET GROUP: the ingroup, the distant outgroup) X 2 (ATTRIBUTE TYPE: perceived homogeneity in terms of the favorable attributes, perceived homogeneity in

terms of the unfavorable attributes) MANOVA with repeated measures on the last two variables was conducted.

TARGET GROUP main effect was significant [$F(1,96)=544.62$, $MSE=360.21$, $p<.000$, $\eta^2=.85$], indicating that the participants perceived the ingroup as more positively homogeneous than the distant outgroup ($M_s=4.15$ and 2.25 , respectively). In a different way, the participants perceived the distant outgroup as more negatively homogeneous than the ingroup.

Though TARGET GROUP X CONTEXT interaction did not reach significance, there was a trend [$F(1,96)=3.57$, $MSE=2.36$, $p<.10$, $\eta^2=.04$]. Post hoc analyses indicated that there was very weak trends that the participants in the triple context perceived the ingroup as more positively homogeneous and the distant outgroup as more negatively homogeneous than the participants in the dual with distant outgroup context (see Figure 3.9).




Figure 3.9: Perceived homogeneities of the ingroup and the distant outgroup in terms of the dual with distant outgroup and the triple contexts.

TARGET GROUP X IDENTIFICATION interaction was significant [$F(1,96)=25.35$, $MSE=16.77$, $p<.000$, $\eta^2=.21$], indicating that the high-identifiers perceived the ingroup as more positively homogeneous and the distant outgroup as more negatively homogeneous than the low-identifiers (see Figure 3.10).




Figure 3.10: High- and low-identifiers' homogeneity perceptions of the ingroup and the distant outgroup.

There was a trend that the above interaction was further qualified by a TARGET GROUP X CONTEXT X IDENTIFICATION interaction [$F(1,96)=3.36$, $MSE=2.23$, $p<.10$, $\eta^2=.03$]. Post hoc analyses indicated that the high-identifiers perceived the ingroup as more positively homogeneous than the low-identifiers in both contexts, but only the high-identifiers in the triple context perceived the distant outgroup as more negatively homogeneous than the low-identifiers in the same context. Moreover, the high-identifiers in the triple context perceived the distant outgroup as more negatively homogeneous than the high-identifiers in the dual with distant outgroup context (see Figure 3.11).




Figure 3.11: High- and low-identifiers' perception of homogeneity related to the ingroup and the distant outgroup in both the dual with distant outgroup and triple contexts.

ATTRIBUTE TYPE main effect was also significant [$F(1,96)=49.77$, $MSE=5.88$, $p<.000$, $\eta^2=.34$], indicating that the participants perceived the groups as more positively homogeneous in terms of unfavorable attributes than in terms of the favorable ones ($M_s=3.33$ and 3.03 , respectively). However, this main effect was qualified by ATTRIBUTE TYPE X CONTEXT interaction [$F(1,96)=4.11$, $MSE=.49$, $p<.05$, $\eta^2=.04$]. Post hoc analyses indicated that ATTRIBUTE TYPE main effect was more accentuated in the triple context than in the dual with distant outgroup context (see Figure 3.12). Yet, it should be noted that the difference between the homogeneity perceptions in terms of the favorable and the unfavorable attributes was still significant in the dual with distant outgroup context ($p<.01$).




Figure 3.12: Perceived homogeneities of the groups in terms of the favorable and unfavorable attributes in the dual with distant outgroup and triple contexts.

ATTRIBUTE TYPE X IDENTIFICATION interaction also qualified the ATTRIBUTE TYPE main effect [$F(1,96)=9.78$, $MSE=1.18$, $p<.002$, $\eta^2=.09$]. Post hoc analyses indicated, firstly, that the high-identifiers perceived the groups as more positively homogeneous in terms of both the favorable and the unfavorable attributes than the low-identifiers, and secondly, that while the low-identifiers perceived the groups as equally positively homogeneous in terms of both the favorable and the unfavorable attributes, the high-identifiers perceived the groups as more positively homogeneous in terms of the unfavorable attributes than in terms of the favorable ones (see Figure 3.13).

Finally, ATTRIBUTE TYPE X CONTEXT X IDENTIFICATION interaction did not reach significance [$F(1,96)=1.24$, n.s.].




Figure 3.13: High- and low-identifiers' homogeneity perceptions in terms of the favorable and unfavorable attributes.

TARGET GROUP X ATTRIBUTE TYPE interaction also reached significance [$F(1,96)=34.82$, $MSE=2.06$, $p<.000$, $\eta^2=.27$]. Post hoc analyses indicated that the participants perceived the ingroup as more positively homogeneous in terms of both the favorable and the unfavorable attributes than the distant outgroup. Moreover, though the participants perceived the ingroup as negligibly more positively homogeneous in terms of the unfavorable attributes ($p<.05$), they perceived the distant outgroup as more negatively

homogeneous in terms of the favorable attributes than in terms of the unfavorable ones (see Figure 3.14).




Figure 3.14: Perceived homogeneities of the ingroup and the outgroup in terms of the favorable and unfavorable attributes.

Neither TARGET GROUP X ATTRIBUTE TYPE X CONTEXT nor TARGET GROUP X ATTRIBUTE TYPE X IDENTIFICATION interactions were significant [$F(1,96)=.36$ and $.03$, respectively, n.s.]. However, TARGET GROUP X ATTRIBUTE TYPE X CONTEXT X IDENTIFICATION interaction pointed to a mind-boggling trend [$F(1,96)=2.99$, $MSE=.18$, $p<.10$, $\eta^2=.03$] (see Figure 3.15).




Figure 3.15: High- and low-identifiers' perception of homogeneity related to the ingroup and the distant outgroup in terms of the favorable and unfavorable attributes in both the dual with distant outgroup and triple contexts.

Post hoc analyses indicated that the low-identifiers perceived the ingroup as equally positively homogeneous in terms of the favorable attributes in both the dual with distant outgroup and triple contexts. Similarly, they perceived the distant outgroup as equally negatively homogeneous in terms of the favorable attributes in both the dual with distant outgroup and the triple contexts. Finally, while both the low- and the high-identifiers in the dual with distant outgroup context perceived the distant outgroup as equally negatively homogeneous in terms of the favorable attributes, high-identifiers in the triple context perceived the distant outgroup as more negatively homogeneous in terms of the favorable attributes than the low-identifiers in the same context.

3.3.2.4. Perceived Homogeneities of the Ingroup Versus the Close Outgroup Versus the Distant Outgroup

In order to investigate differences in the perceived homogeneities of the ingroup, the close outgroup and the distant outgroup as perceived by the high- and the low-identifiers, a 2 (IDENTIFICATION: high, low) X 3 (TARGET GROUP: the ingroup, the close outgroup, the distant outgroup) X 2 (ATTRIBUTE TYPE: perceived homogeneity in terms of the favorable attributes, perceived homogeneity in terms of the unfavorable attributes) MANOVA with repeated measures on the last two variables was conducted.

Main effect of TARGET GROUP was significant [$F(1, 48)=458.49$, $MSE=210.94$, $p<.000$, $\eta^2=.91$]. Tukey tests indicated that the participants perceived the ingroup as more positively homogeneous than the close outgroup which was in turn perceived as more positively homogeneous than the distant outgroup, which in fact was perceived as negatively homogeneous ($M_s=4.24$, 3.59 , and 2.16 , respectively). Moreover, IDENTIFICATION qualified this main effect [$F(1, 48)=34.00$, $MSE=15.64$, $p<.000$, $\eta^2=.42$] (see Figure 3.16).




Figure 3.16: High- and low-identifiers' homogeneity perceptions related to the ingroup, the close outgroup, and the distant outgroup.

Post hoc analyses indicated that while the high-identifiers perceived the ingroup as more positively homogeneous than the low-identifiers, the low-identifiers perceived the close outgroup as slightly more positively homogeneous than the high-identifiers ($p < .05$). Moreover, the high-identifiers perceived the distant outgroup as more negatively homogeneous than the low-identifiers. Furthermore, while the TARGET GROUP main effect was valid for the high-identifiers, the difference between the low-identifiers' perceptions of positive homogeneity toward the ingroup and the close outgroup was not

significant, while they saw both groups as more positively homogeneous than the distant outgroup.

Main effect of ATTRIBUTE TYPE was significant, too [$F(1,48)=63.55$, $MSE=11.09$, $p<.000$, $\eta^2=.57$], indicating that the participants perceived the groups as more positively homogeneous in terms of the unfavorable attributes than in terms of the favorable ones ($M_s=3.52$ and 3.13 , respectively). Nevertheless, ATTRIBUTE TYPE X IDENTIFICATION interaction was not significant [$F(1,48)=.64$, n.s.].




Figure 3.17: Homogeneity perceptions related to the ingroup, the close outgroup, and the distant outgroup in terms of favorable and unfavorable attributes.

TARGET GROUP X ATTRIBUTE TYPE interaction was significant, too [$F(1, 48)=26.07$, $MSE=1.25$, $p<.000$, $\eta^2=.35$] (see Figure 3.17). Post hoc analyses indicated that the participants rated the ingroup as more positively homogeneous in terms of both the favorable and unfavorable attributes than the close outgroup. In turn, they rated the close outgroup as more positively homogeneous in terms of both the favorable and unfavorable attributes than the distant outgroup, which, in fact, was seen as negatively homogeneous. However, while they rated both outgroups as being relatively more positively homogeneous in terms of the unfavorable attributes than in terms of the favorable ones, their homogeneity perception related to the ingroup did not differ significantly in terms of the attribute type. In this regard, it should be noted that the participants perceived the distant outgroup as more negatively homogeneous in terms of the favorable attributes than in terms of the unfavorable ones. And finally, TARGET GROUP X ATTRIBUTE TYPE X IDENTIFICATION interaction did not reach significance [$F(1,48)=1.47$, n.s.].

3.3.3. Discussion

In the present study, the effects of four types of contexts, i.e., ingroup only, two dual contexts (of ingroup with close outgroup and ingroup with distant outgroup), and triple (consisting a context of all three groups), identification level (high-identifiers, low-identifiers), target groups (i.e., the ingroup, the close outgroup, and the distant outgroup), attribute type (i.e., favorable and unfavorable attributes) on the processes of discriminatory and variability perceptions were examined. Below, the results of the study will be discussed with reference to the relevant literature.

3.3.3.1. Ingroup Favoritism and Outgroup Derogation as Two Forms of Ingroup Bias

The results revealed that the participants perceived the ingroup as positively homogeneous. In other words, they exhibited ingroup favoritism rather than ingroup derogation. Thus, the present study produced one more support to the huge literature of ingroup favoritism (Brewer, 1999; Brewer and Brown, 1999; Brown, 2000a; Turner,

1999). Undoubtedly, this perception can be more readily appreciated in comparison to those related to the other groups. As predicted by SIT (Tajfel and Turner, 1979, 1986), the main effect of target group in all comparative analyses indicated that the participants perceived the ingroup as more positively homogeneous than both the close and the distant outgroups. With the terms of SIT, this result might be read as the group members achieved a positive social identity through the positive distinctiveness of the ingroup from both outgroups.

It should be noted that the present study has introduced the distinction between close and distant outgroups. This distinction refers to the fact that the social world is not black and white but there are also different tones of gray. Not all outgroups represent a completely opposite position to the ingroup. Different outgroups may hold different positions about different social issues. Some of these positions may be closer to and some may be more remote from the position of the ingroup. Even, in some issues, some outgroups might hold the same position with the ingroup. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the perception of group members related to the close and the distant outgroups might not be the same. Group members might develop a degree of positive identification with the close outgroups enabling them to see these outgroups somewhat more positively than the distant outgroup.

Apart from this structural argument, it is also the case that a group might have had friendly relationships with some groups and hostile relationships with some other groups in the past. In SIT terms, while group members might have positive identifications with some groups, they might have negative identifications with some other groups. Even, this negative identification might be a component of social identity. Then, it can be deduced that while some outgroups might be perceived quite positively, some other outgroups might be perceived quite negatively.

The results of the present study have provided support for these arguments. The participants perceived the close outgroup as positively homogeneous. Especially, target group main effect in the triple context demonstrated that the participants perceived the close outgroup as more positively homogeneous than the distant outgroup. In other words, the participants exhibited a degree of close outgroup favoritism relative to the distant outgroup. Moreover, the participants perceived the distant outgroup as negatively homogeneous. Undoubtedly, this might be taken as an indicator of outgroup derogation

(see Sidanius, Pratto, and Mitchell, 1994). Thus, the present study suggested that the outgroup denigration might be limited to the distant outgroups while relatively more peaceful perceptions might be limited to the close outgroups.

Having seen that not only ingroup favoritism but also outgroup hate might also be a possible form of ingroup bias, we can turn to the issue of positive-negative asymmetry which Brown (2000a) regarded as an important challenge to SIT.

3.3.3.2. Positive-negative asymmetry (or symmetry)

The results indicated that the participants perceived the ingroup and the close outgroup as positively homogeneous in terms of both the favorable and unfavorable attributes. In a similar vein, the participants perceived the distant outgroup as negatively homogeneous in terms of both the favorable and unfavorable attributes. In other words, the present results suggested that there is positive-negative symmetry in social discrimination.

As will be remembered, positive-negative asymmetry suggested that the group members are more prone to social discrimination in the cases of positive goods or attributes than in the cases of negative ones. Moreover, it has been maintained that in the cases of punishments and negative attributes, the phenomenon of ingroup favoritism might disappear (see Buhl, 1999; Mummendey et al., 1992). However, the main effect of attribute type in most analyses of the present study revealed that attribution of positive homogeneity related to the ingroup and the close outgroup was more accentuated for the unfavorable attributes than the favorable ones. The only seemingly consistent finding with the positive-negative asymmetry may be that attributing negative homogeneity to the distant outgroup was relatively more accentuated for the favorable attributes than the unfavorable ones. Yet, as argued before, the absence of favorable attributes in a group might be as undesirable as the presence of unfavorable attributes. For this reason, it can be argued that the accentuated negative homogeneity attribution to the distant outgroup for favorable attributes does not provide support for the positive-negative asymmetry phenomenon, either.

When the contents of stereotypes are examined in detail, it can be seen that the group members saw most members of the ingroup as patriotic, believing the idea of Turk-

Islam, believer, brave, courageous, fearless, reliable, loyal, and faithful but they saw only few members of the ingroup as anarchist, submissive, imitator, despising the public, materialistic, sluggish, inactive, cosmopolitan, pessimistic, hopeless, not giving a damn, and irresponsible. In contrast, they saw most members of the distant outgroup as talkative, chattering, noisy, materialistic, cosmopolitan, imitator, and submissive but they saw only few members of the distant outgroup as believing in the idea of Turk-Islam, believer, brave, courageous, fearless, reliable, loyal, and faithful. In other words, they characterized the distant outgroup in opposition to the ingroup. The distant group had almost none of the favorable attributes that the ingroup had, but instead had almost all the unfavorable attributes that the ingroup did not have.

At this point, it cannot be claimed that such a negative perception of the distant outgroup springs from the nature of the group in the present study. Because members of the same group saw the other outgroup, i.e., the close outgroup, in a quite positive light. They portrayed most members of this outgroup as believer, patriotic, and believing in the idea of Turk-Islam, but only few members as anarchist, cosmopolitan, imitator, and submissive. In other words, they perceived a considerable overlap between the stereotype of the close outgroup and the ingroup. As a result, the distant outgroup denigration observed in this study cannot be a group-specific phenomenon.

Brewer (1999) argued that outgroup hostility might breed ingroup cohesion in the conditions where the groups are in competition over political power. In such conditions, the existence of outgroup is generally perceived as a threat to the interests of the ingroup. As a result, both identification with the ingroup and hostility toward the threatening outgroup serve similar functions for the group members. The present study suggested that this might be the case for the distant outgroup. In a conceptually similar study, Duckitt and Mphuthing (1998) found Black African identity in South Africa to be highly related to negative attitudes toward Afrikaners. Though such results are generally read as a sign of anti-White tendencies, they did not find a relationship between this identity and attitude toward English Whites or Whites in general. In other words, the relationship between ingroup favoritism and outgroup hate seems to require a conflict-based intergroup relations. As has been seen in Chapter II, such intergroup relations were depicted between the *ülküçüs* and the communists. While the NAP was the party of the *ülküçüs*, the RPP was perceived to receive the communists with open arms. As a result,

the RPP might be perceived as the threatening outgroup depicted in Brewer's conceptualization.

Having seen that outgroup hate is also possible, we can now turn to the phenomenon of positive-negative asymmetry. Mummendey and Otten (1998) and Reynolds et al. (2000) suggested that this phenomenon might be limited to minimal groups. Consistently, no such asymmetry was observed in the present field study. However, what is of more concern is that the present study found a reversed asymmetry (see also Sassenberg, Kessler, and Mummendey, 2003). The participants rated the number of ingroup members not having unfavorable attributes as higher than the number of ingroup members having favorable attributes. In a sense, the participants meant to tell, "even if there are not as many people among us who are as good as desired, the majority of us are not bad". As a matter of fact, as we shall discuss below, this seemed to be valid only for the low-identifiers. The high-identifiers seemed to assume the position of "there is aplenty of good but you can't find a bad person among us". In contrast, the participants rated the number of the distant outgroup members not having favorable attributes as higher than the number of the distant outgroup members having unfavorable attributes. They seemed to be saying, "even if not all of them are bad, the majority of them are not good enough, either". In the end, while they accentuated the absence of unfavorable attributes in the ingroup, they accentuated the absence of favorable attributes in the distant outgroup. The following quotations from the interviews seem to be connected with this phenomenon.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁹ Esasında, hedefimiz sadece milliyetçilikle sınırlı değil. Milliyetçi olmasının yanı sıra, bilgili, kültürlü ve görgülü bir nesil yetiştirmek te hedeflerimiz arasında. Ne yazık ki, bunda tam başarılı olabildiğimizi söyleyemeyeceğim. Özellikle mevcut ülkücü kadrolar idealden çok uzak... Okumuyorlar, yazmıyorlar, yazarların bile yazdıkları okunmaya değmeyecek kadar sık... Durum böyle olunca, insan kendini avutma ihtiyacı duyuyor. Çevresindekilere pek bir yararı yoksa da, ülkücünün elinden, dilinden ve belinden zarar gelmez diye kendimizi avutuyoruz. (INTERVIEWEE 04)

Biz ne kadar ülkücü şöyle üstün bir kişidir, böyle yüce bir kişidir desek de gerçek durum pek öyle değil. Hele hele geceleri ülkücü nüfusun iki üç katına çıktığı söyleniyor ki bu ne kadar içler acısı bir durumda olduğumuzu gösteriyor. Eline bir şişe şarap alıp kafayı çeken başlıyor ülkücüyüm diye nara atmaya. Kimsenin bunu yadırgamaması daha da kötü. İşi gücü olmayan her boşta gezen vatandaş ülkücü... Bunlarda ülkücülük olduğu kısmen doğru da,.. Yine de komünistlerle falan karşılaştırıldığında, en azından bunların kendi vatanlarına ihanet etmemeleri bile bir sempati kaynağı olabiliyor. (INTERVIEWEE 13)

Undoubtedly, the absence of favorable and the presence of unfavorable attributes in a group might arouse a very unfavorable image. On the contrary, the presence of some favorable and the absence of unfavorable attributes might invoke a quite positive image. Especially, since the concept of ehven-i şer (the lesser of two evils) has a degree of validity in the Turkish culture, an emphasized weight might be given to the absence of unfavorable attributes.

Apart from such cultural and historical explanations, the results seem to support a recent motivational analysis, too. In an effort to adapt Regulatory Focus Theory of Tory Higgins (1997, 1998) to the realm of intergroup relations, Sassenberg, Kessler, and Mummendey (2003) made the distinction of promotion focus and prevention focus mental states. Promotion focus referred to the mental state where people were generally concerned with the gains of their ingroup (presence or absence of positive outcomes) while prevention focus referred to the mental state where people were generally concerned with the losses of their ingroup (presence or absence of negative outcomes). Sassenberg et al. (2003) argued that the positive-negative asymmetry was the result of promotion focus generating conditions of typical minimal group experiments. If a prevention focus was formed, they predicted, the positive-negative asymmetry would disappear, or even be reversed. Thus, it can be maintained, the groups of relational ideology, and of course, the group in the present study, might be more concerned with prevention focus than promotion focus. The group members might be as much motivated not to dishonour the ingroup as to sublimate it. Thus, the prevention focus prevailing among the group members might lead them to exhibit the asymmetry just opposite of the one suggested by the positive-negative asymmetry.

More importantly, Lee, Aaker, and Gardner (2000) observed that while promotion focus was more dominant in individualistic cultures, prevention focus was more dominant in the collectivistic cultures. In other words, the culture factor might extend to the motivational realm, too. Since the group in the present study was in a collectivistic culture (Göregenli, 1997; İmamoğlu, 1987, 1994, 1998; İmamoğlu ve Gültekin, 1993; Kağıtçıbaşı, 1987, 1994, 1998; Karadayı, 1998), then it may be suggested that the dominant mental state was prevention focus rather than promotion focus. Thus, the group members might find it more relevant not to allow anything to be said against the ingroup than praising it.

3.3.3.3. Identification Level as a Determinant of Intergroup Differentiation

The prediction that the high-identifiers would exhibit more ingroup favoritism than the low-identifiers received unequivocal support. Firstly, the high-identifiers perceived the ingroup as more positively homogeneous in terms of both favorable and unfavorable attributes than the low-identifiers. Of more interest, high-identifiers did not tend to exhibit the asymmetry discussed above. They saw the ingroup as equally positively homogeneous in terms of both the favorable and the unfavorable attributes. However, the low-identifiers perceived the ingroup as more positively homogeneous in terms of the unfavorable attributes than in terms of the favorable ones.

No specific prediction was made concerning the high- and the low-identifiers' perceptions related to the close outgroup. It was found that both the high- and the low-identifiers perceived the close outgroup as equally homogeneous. Moreover, both identification groups tended to perceive the close outgroup as more positively homogeneous in terms of the unfavorable attributes than in terms of the favorable ones.

The prediction that the high-identifiers would exhibit more outgroup derogation concerning the distant outgroup received unequivocal support, too. They saw the distant outgroup as more negatively homogeneous in terms of both the favorable and unfavorable attributes than the low-identifiers.

In sum, the present study provided support to the identity-differentiation hypothesis (Hinkle and Brown, 1990; Perreault and Bourhis, 1999). In fact, almost all field studies, especially those dealing with groups of relational ideology, had demonstrated the existence of this relationship (Aberson et al., 2000; Brown et al., 1992; Lalonde, 2002). However, neither the phenomenon of outgroup derogation nor the phenomenon of positive-negative asymmetry had been studied by taking the moderating effect of this variable into consideration. Apart from the existence of outgroup derogation when the outgroup in question is a distant one, these results suggested that it is more accentuated among the high-identifiers.

The moderating effects of identification seem to have much in common with the studies in social judgment. For example, Sherif and Hovland (1961) maintained that the process of social judgment was highly influenced by the judges' level of involvement with the issue to be judged. While those highly involved had smaller latitude of

acceptance and larger latitude of rejection, those less involved had larger latitude of acceptance and smaller latitude of rejection. This led highly involved people to seem extreme in their judgments while less involved people seem quite moderate. High-and low-identifiers may be likened to these extremists and moderates. When depicted in such a way, identification level seems to be an important factor of accessibility in SCT.¹⁵⁰

At this point, it can be suggested that identification level may be thought of as being related to one's personality such that some types of people may be more likely to identify with the groups strongly regardless of the experience they have with the group. Consistent with this suggestion, some recent studies focused on the variables that affect the level of identification. For example, Mullin and Hogg (1999) demonstrated that people having high need for uncertainty reduction were more willing to embrace group membership. Investigating the self-construal orientations of the *ülküçü* group in terms of the Balanced Integration-Differentiation Model (BID; İmamoğlu, 1998, 2002), İmamoğlu and Dalmış (2003) demonstrated relational self-orientation to be a significant predictor of one's level of ingroup identification. Moreover, individuation self-orientation was found to be negatively associated with authoritarianism, which in turn was strongly related to the level of ingroup identification. These results suggested that people who tend to have related and normatively patterned self-construals were more likely to be highly identified with their ingroup. Exploring the self- and family-related correlates of the relational and individuation self-orientations, İmamoğlu (2003) demonstrated that the relational self-orientation was related to perceived parental acceptance both directly and indirectly through the medium of affective properties (e.g., satisfaction with family and self); whereas, individuation self-orientation was negatively related to perceived parental control through the medium of intrinsic motivational properties (e.g., need for cognition). She (1995, 1998) assumed these tendencies to be distinct and complementary and argued that the balanced state of self-construal was related-individuation whereby individuals can satisfy both integrative and differentiative needs simultaneously. In line with these basic assertions of the BID model, it can be argued that the individuals with unbalanced self-construals of the related-normatively patterned type, who fail to develop their unique potential but instead tend to rely on extrinsic referents, might give their

¹⁵⁰ This theory formulated category salience as a function of fit and accessibility (Oakes, 1987)

groups undue importance. Since they fail to satisfy their need for differentiation as individuals, they might try to achieve the needed distinctiveness as group members. As a result, they might develop such a strong identification with the ingroup that this membership occupies a considerable portion of their total self-identity, and the need for differentiation might motivate them to seek uniqueness of their ingroup more than other states of self-construals (see also Brewer, 1991). In short, the level of identification might have an intrapersonal, as well as, an interpersonal basis. Nevertheless, for the time being, this remains as an empirical issue.

3.3.3.4. Comparative Context: Not Two Types But Possibly Many

It was predicted that the participants in the intergroup contexts would perceive the ingroup as more positively homogeneous than the participants in the ingroup only context. It was thought that the social identities of the participants would be more salient in these contexts and that this would result in the enhancement of the ingroup (see Cinnirella, 1998b; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, and Hayes, 1992; Young, Van Knippenberg, Ellemers, and Devries, 1997). It was also thought that since both the presence of the favorable and the absence of the unfavorable attributes might contribute to the enhancement of the social identity, the effect of the context would be valid for both types of the attributes. This hypothesis was partly supported.

The participants in the intergroup contexts (i.e., dual with close outgroup, dual with distant outgroup, and triple contexts) perceived the ingroup as more positively homogeneous in terms of the favorable attributes than the participants in the ingroup only context. However, the participants in the ingroup only context perceived the ingroup as positively homogeneous in terms of the unfavorable attributes as the participants in the two dual groups contexts did. This finding might be thought of as further supporting the above-mentioned discussion of promotion-prevention focus related to positive-negative asymmetry. When the ingroup losses are concerned, group members in the ingroup only context seem as alert as those in the intergroup contexts, suggesting a chronic prevention focus. However, when the ingroup gains are concerned, the existence of outgroups in the comparative context seems to lead group members to assume promotion focus as much as

prevention focus while the group members in the ingroup only context do not find this motive so compelling.

Nevertheless, the participants in the triple context exhibited a more enhanced view of the ingroup in terms of the unfavorable attributes than the participants in the ingroup only and the two dual-group contexts. This seems to disprove the above discussion. Yet, it should be noted again that the participants in the triple context perceived the ingroup as positively homogeneous in terms of the favorable attributes as the participants in the other intergroup contexts did. The difference was that they perceived the ingroup as more positively homogeneous in terms of the unfavorable attributes than all other participants. In other words, the participants in this context exhibited the most positive image of the ingroup. Then, it can be argued that since the most ready (or accessible) mental state was the prevention focus for the group members, they tended to achieve this most positive ingroup image by removing the unfavorable attributes, rather than attaching the favorable ones.

When taken singly, neither context nor ingroup identification affected the perception of the close outgroup. However, when they were combined, the most interesting interaction of the present study appeared. It was found that while the low-identifiers perceived the close outgroup as less positively homogeneous than the high-identifiers in the dual with close outgroup context, this relationship was inverted in the triple context. In other words, the high-identifiers perceived the close outgroup as less positively homogeneous than the low-identifiers in the triple context. Moreover, while the low-identifiers' attribution of positive homogeneity to the close outgroup increased from dual- to the triple-group context, that of the high-identifiers decreased.

Remember that the close outgroup was defined as a group that the participants had a degree of positive identification. When this definition was combined with the fact that the low-identifiers' perception of positive homogeneity related to the ingroup was lower in comparison to that of the high-identifiers, it can be argued that the existence of the close outgroup led the low-identifiers to feel more threatened than the high-identifiers. In other words, the existence of the close outgroup in the comparative context might be a more compelling motive for the low-identifiers to achieve positive distinctiveness on the part of the ingroup. In contrast, since the high-identifiers' perception related to the ingroup was already very favorable, they might not be so threatened concerning the

intergroup boundaries and positive distinctiveness (for a contrary view see Jetten et al., 2001).

The low-identifiers could achieve the positive distinctiveness by either raising the ingroup image or lowering the close outgroup image or both. Nevertheless, the low-identifiers' ingroup image was already very favorable, and for this reason, raising the ingroup image was not consistent with the definition of low-identification. Remember that the low-identifiers were defined as group members not making extreme judgments. Instead, they seem to have preferred to lower their image of the close outgroup¹⁵¹ so much that the difference between the ratings of the ingroup and the close outgroup was sufficient to produce positive distinctiveness. It should be noted that this argument is contrary to the claims that ingroup stereotype is more flexible and in such cases ingroup stereotype, rather than outgroup stereotype, is more likely to be changed (see Hopkins et al., 1997). However, the groups in the Hopkins et al.'s study were national groups of Scottish, English, and Greek. While the irrelevant group of Greek did not exert any influence on the stereotype of the Scottish, the stereotype of Scottish was constructed in contrast to the stereotype of relevant group of English. With the help of SIT terms, it can be argued that there might be psychologically real dimensions of difference between the Scottish and English. However, as noted above, the stereotype of the ingroup and the close outgroup had a considerable overlap in our case. SCT has never put forward that its motivational explanation disregards the content of the categories in the objective reality (the notion of normative fit; see Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994; see also Section 1.3.4). Thus, having been aware that the contents of both groups' stereotypes were quite similar, the low-identifiers could just judge that fewer members of the close outgroup had the favorable attributes and more of them had the unfavorable attributes than the ingroup.

Nevertheless, the triple context where there was the distant outgroup together with the close outgroup led both the high- and the low-identifiers to develop different perceptions related to the close outgroup. While the low-identifiers assimilated the close outgroup toward the position of the ingroup, the high-identifiers contrasted it away to the position of the distant outgroup. While the low-identifiers enhanced their social identities

¹⁵¹ It should be noted that since there is no way to assess the image of the close outgroup in an isolated context, the verb lower might not be appropriate. Yet, it should be appreciated that we use this verb in comparison to the high-identifiers in the dual with close outgroup context and the low-identifiers in the triple context.

by discriminating both the ingroup and the close outgroup positively from the distant outgroup, the high-identifiers achieved this state by discriminating the ingroup positively from both the close and the distant outgroups. In other words, while the low-identifiers tended to form a common ingroup identity (see Brewer and Campbell, 1976), the high-identifiers tended to form a common outgroup identity in the triple context.

By definition, the high-identifiers are more invested in their group identity than the low-identifiers (Jetten et al., 2001). When the comparative context consisted of only the ingroup and the close outgroup, they seem to develop a sufficient level of positive distinctiveness of the ingroup from the close outgroup. Moreover, they do not seem to be disturbed even if the close outgroup is quite positively perceived for the basic motive for group members is to achieve positive distinctiveness rather than outgroup denigration (Brewer, 1991, 1999), especially when the outgroup in question is a close one. However, when they are confronted with a context where there are two outgroups, they seem to be more engaged in positive distinctiveness of the ingroup. The fact that one of these outgroups is close and the other is distant in the present study seems to have posed a further problem for the high-identifiers. The relative positions of the ingroup did not only entail the positive distinctiveness of the ingroup from the two outgroups but also the positive distinctiveness of the close outgroup from the distant outgroup. This seems to have led the high-identifiers to increase their positive image of the ingroup and lower that of the close outgroup so that the difference between these two groups, and hence, the level of positive distinctiveness of the ingroup was more. As a matter of fact, it had been predicted that the high-identifiers would tend to see the close outgroup as unfavorable as the distant outgroup in the triple context. Nevertheless, this hypothesis was not supported. Yet, the trend of the high-identifiers' perception related to the close outgroup endorsed this reasoning. The content of the social categories in the present study, i.e., the normative fit, was so explicit that the realization of the prediction would have been a real distortion of reality. Thus, as can be seen, the motivational explanation of intergroup phenomena has some limits. And usually, the history of economic, social, and political relationships between the groups is a more important determinant of the group members' psychology (Tajfel, 1981b).

In contrast, the low-identifiers seem to be under the influence of a different motive. They reacted to the triple context by perceiving the close outgroup as favorable as the

ingroup, and they seem to have achieved positive distinctiveness of the ingroup and the close outgroup from the distant outgroup by forming a common ingroup identity (Dovidio, Gaertner, and Valisizic, 1998; Gaertner et al., 1993). This common identity might be “we-the nationalist conservatives”. The outgroup of this identity might not be only the members of the RPP but the whole leftist-seculars (for a study demonstrating the existence of these two social identities in the Turkish society see Dalmış and İmamoğlu, 2000). In other words, the superordinate social identity of the low-identifiers seems to be more salient in the triple context (see Sherif, 1967; Turner et al., 1987).

As for the distant outgroup, the triple context seems just to have enhanced its negative homogeneity perception. While there was no difference between the negative homogeneity perceptions of the high- and the low-identifiers in the dual with distant outgroup context, in the triple context the high-identifiers tended to perceive the distant outgroup as more negatively homogeneous than both the low-identifiers in the same context and the high-identifiers in the dual with distant outgroup context. In other words, while the high-identifiers in the triple context raised their image of the ingroup, they lowered their images of both the close and the distant outgroups. As noted, the participants exhibited the most remarkable ingroup bias in the triple context. It seems that the total level of ingroup bias resulted, to a large extent, from the reactions of the high-identifiers.

The above trend was true for the type of attributes, too. The triple context resulted in a more accentuated negative homogeneity perception related to the distant outgroup in terms of the favorable attributes than in terms of the unfavorable attributes. However, again, the low-identifiers exhibited moderate ratings, this general increase in the negativity related to the distant outgroup resulted from the reactions of the high-identifiers. These findings are consistent with the conceptualization of identification with reference to social judgement-involvement concepts. While the high-identifiers tended to exhibit more extreme perceptions, the low-identifiers tended to produce more moderate perceptions in the triple context.

In the next section, we shall discuss the relevance of the present study with the preceding study together with the strengths and limitations of each study.

IV.

CONCLUSION

One of the two basic aims of the present thesis was to shed light to the traditional problems of stereotype content, stereotype validity, and stereotype consensus. The second aim was concerned with that the context where the ingroup was compared with outgroups played a determining role in activating one component of ingroup representation rather than another so that the distinction between the ingroup and outgroups became the maximum. Nevertheless, as usually happen in theses, these basic aims have been divided into a number of sub-aims in the present thesis. Below, the most prominent of these sub-aims will be highlighted.

Brown (2000) stated, “It seems to me that an important step for SIT to take is ... no longer to assume that a group is a group as far as key social psychological mechanisms are concerned” (p. 761). He always insisted that not all groups but only the groups with comparative ideologies existing in a collectivistic context were suitable to examine the consequences of social identity (Hinkle and Brown, 1990; Brown, 2000). His view was also endorsed by the concept of group entitativity (e.g., Hamilton and Sherman, 1996; Hamilton, Sherman, and Lickel, 1998), referring to the fact that it is a matter of degree to perceive an aggregate of people as being bonded together in a coherent unit. People tend to treat groups like individuals only when the group is high in entitativity (McConnell, Sherman, and Hamilton, 1997; see also Yzerbyt, Rogier, and Fiske, 1998) but not when the group is low in entitativity (McConnell, Sherman, and Hamilton, 1994; Susskind, Maurer, Thakkar, Hamilton, and Sherman, 1999). In other words, people tend to see groups as concrete as individuals when the group is high in entitativity. The group taken as the case in the present thesis, i.e., the *ülküçü* group, was a real and comparative group

that has been competed several other groups. It is commonly assumed that the Turkish culture where this group is present is collectivistic (e.g., Göregenli, 1997; İmamoğlu, 1998). Thus, this group was suitable to examine expectations and predictions of SIT.

Research on stereotype content has been dominated by the checklist method (Brigham, 1971; Leyens, Yzerbyt, and Schadron, 1994; Messick and Mackie, 1989; Miller, 1982; Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994; Tajfel, 1969; Stroebe and Insko, 1989). Though there have been attempts for different methods, they could not slip out of the shortcomings of this traditional method. All of them forced individuals to depict the social identity only through the adjectives, which were suitable to examine personal identities (Rosenberg, 1979; Zurcher, 1977). The first study argued that neither the nouns nor the adjectives alone might be able to pose a comprehensive picture of the group representations in people's minds. As a matter of fact, reactive measures as a whole might not be appropriate to study the group representations. Instead, studies relying on open-ended formatted methods might have more potential in examining the content and leading to theoretical development. For this reason, the first study employed depth-interviewing method to examine stereotypes. To our knowledge, this was an original approach. By considering the ingroup stereotype as a form of social representation, the first study examined the content of the ingroup stereotype by also taking the archival information given in the preceding section into the account. In this way, it demonstrated that the structure of the ingroup representation might be much differentiated.

The first study also demonstrated that the individuals perceive the groups not in isolation but within a concrete context. In this sense, a stereotype is accompanied by its perceived context, which might be taken as a chronic way of looking at the world when the social identity is salient. Thus, the fact that a stereotype is not easily changed might be dependent upon the existence of the perceived context, where not only the ingroup is located but also which provides an explanation for the components of a stereotype. In fact, the validity of stereotypes might also rely upon its consistency with the perceived context. Moreover, the perceived context might be seen as the basis where the stereotype consensus lies. Individuals might not communicate about the abstract characteristics of the ingroup or outgroups, rather they communicate about the context from which the characteristics of the groups might easily be inferred.

The second study introduced the concepts of close and distant outgroups as another original approach of the present thesis. This distinction refers to that group members do not perceive all outgroups as one and the same. This belief on its own is a stereotypic look at the world of intergroup relations. On a continuous dimension, some groups might represent a closer position while some other groups might represent a more distant position to the ingroup. The second study has shown that this distinction was a useful one, which should be taken into account in all cases of intergroup relations. Moreover, the ingroup-outgroup distinction commonly made within the social identity tradition might be limited to the distant outgroups but not to the close outgroup.

In this regard, the distinction of close and distant outgroups revealed findings contrary to the distinctiveness-differentiation hypothesis. Group members did not produce a distorted perception whereby the difference between the ingroup and the close outgroup was perceived as greater than the difference between the ingroup and the distant outgroup. In contrast, group members perceived the close outgroup as in-between the ingroup and the distant outgroup. This finding seemed to give support to the idea of kernel of truth and to the claims of SCT (Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994). The close outgroup was objectively close to the ingroup and the distant outgroup was objectively distant to the ingroup. And the group members perceived both types of outgroups according to this objectivity. In other words, motivational processes assumed to herd group members did not emerge as forceful as fancied in theory.

Moreover, in contrast to the relevant literature, the variable of close outgroup, which could be taken as a threat to the intergroup boundaries, affected the low-identifiers rather than the high-identifiers. While the low-identifiers tended to rate the close outgroup less favorably in the dual-group context than the high-identifiers, they tended to unite it with the ingroup in the triple context where there was also the distant outgroup. In other words, the triple-group context caused the low-identifiers to develop a common ingroup identity (Dovidio, Gaertner, and Valisizic, 1998; Gaertner et al., 1993). By the influence of accentuation theory, we expected that the triple context would produce a common outgroup identity in the high-identifiers. But the effect of objective reality proved stronger, and though we observed such a trend, the high-identifiers did not unite the close outgroup with the distant one.

The second study also suggested that the intergroup context might be more variable than those assumed by the social identity theory (i.e., intra- versus intergroup contexts). The nature of outgroup in the intergroup context might lead the perceivers to produce different reactions. Moreover, the number of groups in a context might be more than two. The most prototypical instance of such a context is where there are three groups, namely the triple context. Indeed, the perceptions of group members related to the ingroup WERE quite similar in dual-group contexts, though their perceptions of the close and the distant outgroup were quite different. The former study had demonstrated that the group members had a differentiated ingroup representation. The nature of outgroup in the dual-group contexts seemed to lead group members to accentuate different dimensions of the ingroup representation. Group members seemed to be under the influence of ingroup bias and ingroup distinctiveness processes. Being patriotic, believer, and the like were quite distinctive components when the comparative context included only the distant outgroup. Thus, the group members did not find it inconvenient to stress the most core elements of ingroup representation. In this way, they achieved a quite favorable image of the ingroup relative to the distant outgroup. In fact, they achieved this image quite easily for the image of the distant outgroup was very unfavorable. However, these elements did not prove useful when the comparative context included the close outgroup. Being patriotic, believer and the like were also the characteristics of the close outgroup. For this reason, the image of the close outgroup was much more favorable relative the distant outgroup from the start. The group members seem to have achieved their distinctiveness from the close outgroup through more peripheral elements of the ingroup representation such as bravery, being cultured, and the like. More interestingly, the triple-group context seemed to have led he group members to develop more accentuated perceptions of the ingroup and the distant outgroup. The existence of two outgroups seem to have motivated the group members, especially the high-identifiers, to exert more effort to achieve group distinctiveness.

The second study suggested that the distinction between positive versus negative outcomes or attributes in intergroup relations might be useful for a better understanding of widely observed intergroup phenomena like ingroup bias and perceived group variability. Most notably, the group members tended to see the ingroup more favorably

when the attributes were unfavorable. This was also true for the close outgroup. However, they tended to perceive the distant outgroup more negatively when the attributes were favorable. In this regard, a reversed positive-negative asymmetry was discovered contrary to the pattern commonly emerged in the minimal group experiments. However, the present study suggested that this observation was limited to the low-identifiers. The high-identifiers, on the other hand, perceived the ingroup equally positively regardless of the type of attributes.

Accordingly, the second study presented a new conceptualization of the ingroup identification. The concepts of extremist and moderate were adapted to the realm of group identification, and in this way, the second study suggested that relative to the low ones, the high-identifiers tended to be more extreme in their perceptions related to the ingroup and outgroups in all contexts. When conceptualized and measured as in the present study, identification level emerged as a significant variable in determining the level of intergroup discrimination, and the present results provided support for the identity-differentiation hypothesis.

Lastly, the second study suggested that both ingroup bias and perceived variability of groups were related intergroup phenomena. It introduced the concept of positive versus negative homogeneity perception and showed that when relevant positive and negative outcomes or attributes were concerned group members tended to attribute more positive homogeneity to the ingroup while they tended to attribute more negative homogeneity to the distant outgroup. In such a way, the second study demonstrated the existence of outgroup derogation together with ingroup favoritism as two forms of intergroup discrimination.

Thus, the present studies may be said to have demonstrated the unique benefits of considering real group in this area of research. Nevertheless, some limitations of the present effort may also be considered. Firstly, the group taken as the case was a socio-political group having a particular ideology. It may be suggested that the results might be applicable only to such groups having similar ideologies. In other words, present studies should be supplemented with further studies related to different types of groups. For example, the content of stereotypes related to larger social categories such as gender,

nationality, race and the like and that related to social roles such as parent, boss, teacher and the like may depend upon different kinds of structures. Furthermore, the present studies should be supplemented with, at least, another study on one more ideological socio-political group, such as the communists. Then, a comparative analysis of each stereotype might have been made. Moreover, this study was applicable just to the ingroup. In other words, the results might not be generalized to the perception of outgroups. As a matter of fact, though we collected information about the communists and Islamists in the interviews, the participants' representation related to these outgroups were not included within the scope of this thesis. Another interesting study would be to study the *ülküciü* stereotype held by its relevant outgroups, such as the communists and Islamists. In this way, the difference between two representations related to the same group might have been examined. Furthermore, the fact that the high-identifiers seemed to have developed quite a chronic perception related to the ingroup and intergroup relations suggests that the intrapersonal factors might also affect the processes related to social identity. For this reason, studies combining personal, motivational and social structural variables may be more fruitful to understand intergroup phenomena. In other words, future research in this area need to make more complicated designs.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE PRELIMINARY STUDY

SOSYO-POLİTİK KİMLİK VE GRUPLAR ARASI ALGI ANKET FORMU

Bu araştırma Türk insanının sosyo-politik kimlik yapısı ve sosyal algı biçimleri ile ilgilidir. Araştırma birkaç aşamayı içermektedir. Elinizdeki anket formu bu aşamalardan biridir. Aşağıda bazı sorulara cevap vermeniz istenmektedir. Doğru ya da yanlış cevap söz konusu değildir. Araştırmanın sıhhati açısından önemli olan, sizin düşündüklerinizi en iyi yansıtan cevabı seçmeniz ve boş soru bırakmamanızdır. Araştırma açısından özel kimliğiniz önemli olmadığından herhangi bir kimlik belirleyici soru sorulmayacaktır. Cevaplar gizli tutulacak ve bilimsel amaçlar dışında kesinlikle kullanılmayacaktır.

Uzman Psikolog İbrahim Dalmış
ODTÜ Psikoloji Bölümü Araştırma Görevlisi

Cinsiyetiniz	:	1. Kadın	2. Erkek
Yaşınız	:	
Medeni durumunuz	:	1. Evli	2. Bekar
(Evli iseniz)			3. Dul/Boşanmış
Nasıl evlendiniz	:	1. Görücü Usulü	2. Hem görücü usulü hem anlaşılarak
Eğitim durumunuz	:	1. Lise	2. Üniversite
			3. Lisansüstü
Mesleğiniz	:	
Asıl memleketiniz	:	
Hayatınızın çoğunu geçirdiğiniz yerleşim biriminin türü nedir?			
1. Köy	2. Kasaba	3. Şehir	4. Metropol

İnsanları tanımlamak için kullandığımız bir dizi özellik aşağıda listelenmiştir. Lütfen bu özelliklerin, sizin için ne kadar olumlu veya olumsuz özellikler olduğunu belirtiniz.

Eğer bir özellik size;

çok olumsuz görünüyor, bir insanın kesinlikle bu özelliğe sahip olmaması gerektiğini düşünüyorsanız “çok olumsuz” sütunu altında yer alan “1” rakamını;

daha az olumsuz görünüyor, ancak yine de bu özelliğin bir insanda bulunmaması gerektiğini düşünüyorsanız “olumsuz” sütunu altındaki “2” rakamını;

ne olumlu ne olumsuz görünüyor, bir insanın bu özelliğe sahip olup olmamasının fazla bir şey değiştirmeyeceğini düşünüyorsanız “ne olumlu ne olumsuz” sütunu altındaki “3” rakamını;

olumlu görünüyor, bir insanın bu özelliğe sahip olmasının uygun ya da iyi olacağını düşünüyorsanız “olumlu” sütununun altındaki “4” rakamını;

çok olumlu görünüyor, bir insanın muhakkak bu özelliğe sahip olması gerektiğini düşünüyorsanız “çok olumlu” sütununun altındaki “5” rakamını daire içine alınız.

	<i>Çok olumsuz</i>	<i>Olumsuz</i>	<i>Ne olumlu ne olumsuz</i>	<i>Olumlu</i>	<i>Çok olumlu</i>
Acımasız, merhametsiz	1	2	3	4	5
Açgözlü, hakis, çıkarıcı	1	2	3	4	5
Açık sözlü, samimi	1	2	3	4	5
Açıkgöz, uyanık,	1	2	3	4	5
Adil	1	2	3	4	5
Ağırbaşlı, akıllı başında, ciddi	1	2	3	4	5
Akılcı düşünen, mantıklı	1	2	3	4	5
Akıllı, zeki	1	2	3	4	5
Alçak gönüllü, haddini bilen	1	2	3	4	5
Anarşist	1	2	3	4	5
Anlayışsız, hoşgörüsüz	1	2	3	4	5
Araştırmacı, inceleyici	1	2	3	4	5
Asi, dik başlı	1	2	3	4	5
Ateist, Allah’a inanmayan	1	2	3	4	5
Az konuşan, sessiz	1	2	3	4	5
Azimli, kararlı	1	2	3	4	5
Başına buyruk, söz dinlemeyen	1	2	3	4	5
Batıl inançlı, bağnaz	1	2	3	4	5
Becerikli, yetenekli	1	2	3	4	5
Bilgili, kültürlü	1	2	3	4	5
Cahil	1	2	3	4	5
Cana yakın, sıcak	1	2	3	4	5
Canlı, hareketli, faal	1	2	3	4	5
Cesur, korkusuz	1	2	3	4	5
Cinsel özgürlüğe inanan	1	2	3	4	5
Dayanıksız, iradesiz	1	2	3	4	5
Delidolu, ateşli, hararetili	1	2	3	4	5
Demokrat	1	2	3	4	5
Devletini seven, devletine sadık	1	2	3	4	5
Ekonomik açıdan devletçi					
Dışa bağımlı, taklitçi, teslimiyetçi	1	2	3	4	5

	Çok olumsuz	Olumsuz	Ne olumlu ne olumsuz	Olumlu	Çok olumlu
Dikkat çekmeyen, silik, iddiasız	1	2	3	4	5
Dikkatli, ihtiyatlı, tedbirli	1	2	3	4	5
Dindar	1	2	3	4	5
Disiplinli, itaatli	1	2	3	4	5
Dürüst, düzgün	1	2	3	4	5
Erdemli, ahlaklı	1	2	3	4	5
“Erkek adam”, sert	1	2	3	4	5
Esprili, şakacı	1	2	3	4	5
Eşitlikçi	1	2	3	4	5
Evhamlı, kuruntulu	1	2	3	4	5
Fedakar, yardımsever	1	2	3	4	5
Geçimsiz, huysuz, aksi	1	2	3	4	5
Geleneksel, muhafazakar	1	2	3	4	5
Geniş görüşlü, ufku geniş	1	2	3	4	5
Geveze, gürültücü, yaygaracı	1	2	3	4	5
Girişken, atılgan, maceracı	1	2	3	4	5
Gösteriş meraklısı, ilgi çekmeyi seven	1	2	3	4	5
Güçlü, kuvvetli	1	2	3	4	5
Güvenilir, sadık, vefakar	1	2	3	4	5
Hain, arkadan vuran, sinsî	1	2	3	4	5
Halkına tepeden bakan	1	2	3	4	5
Hiddetli, asabi, öfkeli	1	2	3	4	5
Hoşgörülü, anlayışlı					
Hoşsohbet, tatlı dilli, sevecen	1	2	3	4	5
Huzurlu, rahat, sakin	1	2	3	4	5
İlerici, yenilikçi, modern	1	2	3	4	5
İnançlı	1	2	3	4	5
İnsana değer veren, insancıl	1	2	3	4	5
İntikamcı, kinci	1	2	3	4	5
İyimser	1	2	3	4	5
Kaba, saygısız, terbiyesiz	1	2	3	4	5
Kaprisli, kıskanç	1	2	3	4	5
Karamsar, ümitsiz	1	2	3	4	5
Kavgacı, saldırgan	1	2	3	4	5
Kendine güvenen, serinkanlı	1	2	3	4	5
Kendini beğenmiş, kibirli	1	2	3	4	5
Kibar, saygılı, terbiyeli	1	2	3	4	5
Komünist	1	2	3	4	5
Korkak, pısırık	1	2	3	4	5
Kozmopolitliği savunan	1	2	3	4	5
Kurnaz	1	2	3	4	5
Laik	1	2	3	4	5
Laiklik karşıtı dindar	1	2	3	4	5
Laik dindar	1	2	3	4	5
Özgürlükler açısından liberal	1	2	3	4	5
Lider ruhlu	1	2	3	4	5
Maddecî, materyalist	1	2	3	4	5
Merhametli, vicdanlı	1	2	3	4	5
Milletini seven, milliyetçi	1	2	3	4	5

	<i>Çok olumsuz</i>	<i>Olumsuz</i>	<i>Ne olumlu ne olumsuz</i>	<i>Olumlu</i>	<i>Çok olumlu</i>
Nemelazımcı, sorumluluktan kaçan	1	2	3	4	5
Olayları akışına bırakan, vurdumduymaz	1	2	3	4	5
Onurlu	1	2	3	4	5
Önyargılı, bağnaz	1	2	3	4	5
Özgürlükçü	1	2	3	4	5
Paragöz, cimri	1	2	3	4	5
Radikal, köktenci	1	2	3	4	5
Rekabetçi, yarışmacı	1	2	3	4	5
Saf, kolay aldanan	1	2	3	4	5
Sıkıcı	1	2	3	4	5
Soğuk, uzak	1	2	3	4	5
Sorumluluk sahibi	1	2	3	4	5
Sosyal Demokrat	1	2	3	4	5
Sosyalist	1	2	3	4	5
Şehvani, zevkine düşkün	1	2	3	4	5
Tembel	1	2	3	4	5
Terörist	1	2	3	4	5
Türk İslam ülküsüne inanan	1	2	3	4	5
Uysal, uyumlu, uzlaşıcı	1	2	3	4	5
Uyuşuk, hareketsiz	1	2	3	4	5
Ülke bütünlüğünü savunan	1	2	3	4	5
Vatansever, vatanını seven	1	2	3	4	5
Yerli, yerel değer ve kurumlara dayanan	1	2	3	4	5

Aşağıdaki siyasi partileri kendinize ne kadar yakın bulduğunuzu lütfen uygun rakamı yuvarlak içine alarak belirtiniz.

	<i>Çok uzak</i>	<i>Uzak</i>	<i>Ne yakın ne uzak</i>	<i>Yakın</i>	<i>Çok yakın</i>
Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP)	1	2	3	4	5
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP)	1	2	3	4	5
Fazilet Partisi (FP)	1	2	3	4	5
Anavatan Partisi (ANAP)	1	2	3	4	5
Doğruyol Partisi (DYP)	1	2	3	4	5
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)	1	2	3	4	5
Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (HADEP)	1	2	3	4	5
Büyük Birlik Partisi (BBP)	1	2	3	4	5
Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi (ÖDP)	1	2	3	4	5
Liberal Demokrat Parti (LDP)	1	2	3	4	5

Lütfen aşağıdaki ifadelere ne kadar katıldığınızı veya katılmadığınızı, bu ifadelerin sizin için ne kadar doğru veya yanlış olduğunu belirtiniz. Eğer bir ifade size çok yanlış görünüyor, bu ifadeye kesinlikle katılmıyorsanız “kesinlikle katılmıyorum” sütunu altındaki “1” rakamını; size daha az yanlış görünüyor, ancak yine de katılmıyorsanız “katılmıyorum” sütunu altındaki “2” rakamını; ne doğru ne yanlış görünüyorsa “ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum” sütunu altındaki “3” rakamını; size doğru görünüyorsa “katılıyorum” sütunu altındaki “4” rakamını; size çok doğru görünüyor, düşündüklerinizle tam bir paralellik gösteriyorsa “tamamen katılıyorum” sütunu altındaki “5” rakamını daire içine alınız.

	Kesinlikle katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum	Katılıyorum	Tamamen katılıyorum
Ülkücü grubun değerli bir üyesiyim.	1	2	3	4	5
Çoğu zaman ülkücü olmaktan üzüntü duyuyorum.	1	2	3	4	5
Diğer insanlar ülkücüleri genellikle olumlu değerlendirir.	1	2	3	4	5
Ülkücülüğün benim duygu ve düşüncelerim üzerinde genellikle pek bir etkisi yoktur.	1	2	3	4	5
Ülkücülüğe verecek pek bir şeyimin olmadığını düşünüyorum.	1	2	3	4	5
Ülkücü grubun bir üyesi olmaktan genel olarak memnunum.	1	2	3	4	5
Çoğu insan, ülkücülerin diğer gruplardan daha etkisiz ya da verimsiz olduklarını düşünür.	1	2	3	4	5
Ülkücülük benim kim olduğumun önemli bir göstergesidir.	1	2	3	4	5
Ülkücülüğün aktif ve katılımcı bir üyesiyim.	1	2	3	4	5
Genelde, ülkücülerin yeterince değerli olmadıkları hissine kapılıyorum.	1	2	3	4	5
Başkaları ülkücülere genel olarak saygı duyarlar.	1	2	3	4	5
Ülkücülüğün, nasıl bir kişi olduğum ya da kimliğim üzerinde pek bir etkisi yoktur.	1	2	3	4	5
Çoğu zaman ülkücü grubun işe yaramaz bir üyesi olduğumu düşünüyorum.	1	2	3	4	5
Ülkücü olmaktan mutluluk duyuyorum.	1	2	3	4	5
Genel olarak, diğer insanlar ülkücülerin pek değerli olmadığını düşünürler.	1	2	3	4	5
Ülkücü gruba ait olmak benliğimin genel olarak önemli bir parçasını oluşturur.	1	2	3	4	5

APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE MAIN STUDY

SOSYO-POLİTİK KİMLİK VE GRUPLAR ARASI ALGI ANKET FORMU

Bu araştırma ülkücülerin sosyo-politik kimlik yapısı ve sosyal algı biçimleri ile ilgilidir. Araştırma birkaç aşamayı içermektedir. Elinizdeki anket formu bu aşamalardan biridir. Aşağıda bazı sorulara cevap vermeniz istenmektedir. Doğru ya da yanlış cevap söz konusu değildir. Araştırmanın sıhhati açısından önemli olan, sizin düşündüklerinizi en iyi yansıtan cevabı seçmeniz ve boş soru bırakmamanızdır. Araştırma açısından özel kimliğiniz önemli olmadığından herhangi bir kimlik belirleyici soru sorulmayacaktır. Cevaplar gizli tutulacak ve bilimsel amaçlar dışında kesinlikle kullanılmayacaktır.

Uzman Psikolog İbrahim Dalmış
ODTÜ Psikoloji Bölümü Araştırma Görevlisi

Cinsiyetiniz	:	1. Kadın	2. Erkek
Yaşınız	:	
Medeni durumunuz	:	1. Evli	2. Bekar
			3. Dul/Boşanmış
(Evli iseniz)			
Nasıl evlendiniz	:	1. Görücü Usulü	2. Hem görücü usulü hem anlaşılarak
			3. Anlaşılarak
Eğitim durumunuz	:	1. Lise	2. Üniversite
			3. Lisansüstü
Mesleğiniz	:	
Asıl memleketiniz	:	
Hayatınızın çoğunu geçirdiğiniz yerleşim biriminin türü nedir?			
1. Köy	2. Kasaba	3. Şehir	4. Metropol

İnsanları tanımlamak için kullandığımız bir dizi özellik aşağıda listelenmiştir. Lütfen bu özelliklerin, sizin için ne kadar olumlu veya olumsuz özellikler olduğunu belirtiniz.

Eğer bir özellik size;

çok olumsuz görünüyor, bir insanın kesinlikle bu özelliğe sahip olmaması gerektiğini düşünüyorsanız “çok olumsuz” sütunu altında yer alan “1” rakamını;

daha az olumsuz görünüyor, ancak yine de bu özelliğin bir insanda bulunmaması gerektiğini düşünüyorsanız “olumsuz” sütunu altındaki “2” rakamını;

ne olumlu ne olumsuz görünüyor, bir insanın bu özelliğe sahip olup olmasının fazla bir şey değiştirmeyeceğini düşünüyorsanız “ne olumlu ne olumsuz” sütunu altındaki “3” rakamını;

olumlu görünüyor, bir insanın bu özelliğe sahip olmasının uygun ya da iyi olacağını düşünüyorsanız “olumlu” sütununun altındaki “4” rakamını;

çok olumlu görünüyor, bir insanın muhakkak bu özelliğe sahip olması gerektiğini düşünüyorsanız “çok olumlu” sütununun altındaki “5” rakamını daire içine alınız.

	<i>Çok olumsuz</i>	<i>Olumsuz</i>	<i>Ne olumlu ne olumsuz</i>	<i>Olumlu</i>	<i>Çok olumlu</i>
Cesur, korkusuz	1	2	3	4	5
Geveze, gürültücü, yaygaracı	1	2	3	4	5
Erdemli, ahlaklı	1	2	3	4	5
Kavgacı, saldırgan	1	2	3	4	5
Ağırbaşlı, akli başında, ciddi	1	2	3	4	5
Anarşist	1	2	3	4	5
İnsana değer veren, insancıl	1	2	3	4	5
Uyuşuk, hareketsiz	1	2	3	4	5
Vatansever, vatanını seven	1	2	3	4	5
Karamsar, ümitsiz	1	2	3	4	5
Güvenilir, sadık, vefakar	1	2	3	4	5
Nemlâzımcı, sorumluluktan kaçan	1	2	3	4	5
Akılcı düşünen, mantıklı	1	2	3	4	5
Maddecî, materyalist	1	2	3	4	5
Türk-İslam ülküsüne inanan	1	2	3	4	5
Halkına tepeden bakan	1	2	3	4	5
İnançlı	1	2	3	4	5
Dışa bağımlı- taklitçi, teslimiyetçi	1	2	3	4	5
Bilgili, kültürlü	1	2	3	4	5
Kozmopolitliği savunan	1	2	3	4	5

Size göre, aşağıdaki özelliklere Milliyetçi Hareket Partili'lerin (MHP) ne kadarı sahiptir? Eğer ilgili partinin hiçbir taraftarının (yani, %0'ının) belirtilen özelliğe sahip olmadığını düşünüyorsanız (...) şeklinde verilen boşluğa "1"; eğer ilgili parti taraftarlarının sadece bazılarının (yani %20 ya da 30'unun) belirtilen özelliğe sahip olduğunu, çoğunluğunun (yani, %70 veya 80'inin) ise sahip olmadığını düşünüyorsanız (...) şeklinde verilen boşluğa "2"; eğer ilgili parti taraftarlarının yarısının (yani, yaklaşık %50'sinin) belirtilen özelliğe sahip olduğunu, diğer yarısının (yani, yaklaşık %50'sinin) ise sahip olmadığını düşünüyorsanız (...) şeklinde verilen boşluğa "3"; eğer ilgili parti taraftarlarının çoğunluğunun (yani, %70 veya 80'inin) belirtilen özelliğe sahip olduğunu, sadece bazılarının (yani, %20 veya 30'unun) ise sahip olmadığını düşünüyorsanız (...) şeklinde verilen boşluğa "4"; eğer ilgili parti taraftarlarının hepsinin (yani, yaklaşık %100'ünün) belirtilen özelliğe sahip olduğunu düşünüyorsanız (...) şeklinde verilen boşluğa "5" rakamını yazınız.

	<i>MHP'lilerin ne kadarı bu özelliğe sahip?</i>
Cesur, korkusuz
Geveze, gürültücü, yaygaracı
Erdemli, ahlaklı
Kavgacı, saldırgan
Ağırbaşlı, akli başında, ciddi
Anarşist
İnsana değer veren, insancıl
Uyuşuk, hareketsiz
Vatansever, vatanını seven
Karamsar, ümitsiz
Güvenilir, sadık, vefakar
Nemelazımcı, sorumluluktan kaçan
Akılcı düşünen, mantıklı
Maddeci, materyalist
Türk-İslam ülküsüne inanan
Halkına tepeden bakan
İnançlı
Dışa bağımlı, taklitçi, teslimiyetçi
Bilgili, kültürlü
Kozmopolitliği savunan

(This scale was used in the condition of İNGROUP ONLY context)

Size göre, aşağıdaki özelliklere Milliyetçi Hareket Partili (MHP) ve Büyük Birlik Partili'lerin (BBP) ne kadarı sahiptir?

Size göre, aşağıdaki özelliklere Milliyetçi Hareket Partili'lerin (MHP) ne kadarı sahiptir? Eğer ilgili partinin hiçbir taraftarının (yani, %0'ının) belirtilen özelliğe sahip olmadığını düşünüyorsanız (...) şeklinde verilen boşluğa "1"; eğer ilgili parti taraftarlarının sadece bazılarının (yani %20 ya da 30'unun) belirtilen özelliğe sahip olduğunu, çoğunluğunun (yani, %70 veya 80'inin) ise sahip olmadığını düşünüyorsanız (...) şeklinde verilen boşluğa "2"; eğer ilgili parti taraftarlarının yarısının (yani, yaklaşık %50'sinin) belirtilen özelliğe sahip olduğunu, diğer yarısının (yani, yaklaşık %50'sinin) ise sahip olmadığını düşünüyorsanız (...) şeklinde verilen boşluğa "3"; eğer ilgili parti taraftarlarının çoğunluğunun (yani, %70 veya 80'inin) belirtilen özelliğe sahip olduğunu, sadece bazılarının (yani, %20 veya 30'unun) ise sahip olmadığını düşünüyorsanız (...) şeklinde verilen boşluğa "4"; eğer ilgili parti taraftarlarının hepsinin (yani, yaklaşık %100'ünün) belirtilen özelliğe sahip olduğunu düşünüyorsanız (...) şeklinde verilen boşluğa "5" rakamını yazınız. Lütfen, bu işlemi hem MHP hem de BBP taraftarlarının her ikisi için de yapınız.

	<i>MHP'lilerin ne kadarı bu özelliğe sahip?</i>	<i>BBP'lilerin ne kadarı bu özelliğe sahip?</i>
Cesur, korkusuz
Geveze, gürültücü, yaygaracı
Erdemli, ahlaklı
Kavgacı, saldırgan
Ağırbaşlı, akli başında, ciddi
Anarşist
İnsana değer veren, insancıl
Uyuşuk, hareketsiz
Vatansever, vatanını seven
Karamsar, ümitsiz
Güvenilir, sadık, vefakar
Nemmelazımcı, sorumluluktan kaçan
Akılcı düşünen, mantıklı
Maddecı, materyalist
Türk-İslam ülküsüne inanan
Halkına tepeden bakan
İnançlı
Dışa bağımlı, taklitçi, teslimiyetçi
Bilgili, kültürlü
Kozmopolitliği savunan

(This scale was used in the condition of DUAL WITH CLOSE OUTGROUP context)

Size göre, aşağıdaki özelliklere Milliyetçi Hareket Partili (MHP) ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partili'lerin (CHP) ne kadarı sahiptir?

Size göre, aşağıdaki özelliklere Milliyetçi Hareket Partili'lerin (MHP) ne kadarı sahiptir?

Eğer ilgili partinin hiçbir taraftarının (yani, %0'ının) belirtilen özelliğe sahip olmadığını düşünüyorsanız (...) şeklinde verilen boşluğa "1"; eğer ilgili parti taraftarlarının sadece bazılarının (yani %20 ya da 30'unun) belirtilen özelliğe sahip olduğunu, çoğunluğunun (yani, %70 veya 80'inin) ise sahip olmadığını düşünüyorsanız (...) şeklinde verilen boşluğa "2"; eğer ilgili parti taraftarlarının yarısının (yani, yaklaşık %50'sinin) belirtilen özelliğe sahip olduğunu, diğer yarısının (yani, yaklaşık %50'sinin) ise sahip olmadığını düşünüyorsanız (...) şeklinde verilen boşluğa "3"; eğer ilgili parti taraftarlarının çoğunluğunun (yani, %70 veya 80'inin) belirtilen özelliğe sahip olduğunu, sadece bazılarının (yani, %20 veya 30'unun) ise sahip olmadığını düşünüyorsanız (...) şeklinde verilen boşluğa "4"; eğer ilgili parti taraftarlarının hepsinin (yani, yaklaşık %100'ünün) belirtilen özelliğe sahip olduğunu düşünüyorsanız (...) şeklinde verilen boşluğa "5" rakamını yazınız. Lütfen, bu işlemi hem MHP hem de CHP taraftarlarının her ikisi için de yapınız.

	<i>MHP'lilerin ne kadarı bu özelliğe sahip?</i>	<i>CHP'lilerin ne kadarı bu özelliğe sahip?</i>
Cesur, korkusuz
Geveze, gürültücü, yaygaracı
Erdemli, ahlaklı
Kavgacı, saldırgan
Ağırbaşlı, akli başında, ciddi
Anarşist
İnsana değer veren, insancıl
Uyuşuk, hareketsiz
Vatansever, vatanını seven
Karamsar, ümitsiz
Güvenilir, sadık, vefakar
Nemelazımcı, sorumluluktan kaçan
Akılcı düşünen, mantıklı
Maddeci, materyalist
Türk-İslam ülküsüne inanan
Halkına tepeden bakan
İnançlı
Dışa bağımlı, taklitçi, teslimiyetçi
Bilgili, kültürlü
Kozmopolitliği savunan

(This scale was used in the condition of DUAL WITH DISTANT OUTGROUP context)

Size göre, aşağıdaki özelliklere Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) , Büyük Birlik Partisi (BBP) ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partilerinin (CHP) ne kadarı sahiptir?

Eğer ilgili partinin hiçbir taraftarının (yani, %0'ının) belirtilen özelliğe sahip olmadığını düşünüyorsanız (...) şeklinde verilen boşluğa "1"; eğer ilgili parti taraftarlarının sadece bazılarının (yani %20 ya da 30'unun) belirtilen özelliğe sahip olduğunu, çoğunluğunun (yani, %70 veya 80'inin) ise sahip olmadığını düşünüyorsanız (...) şeklinde verilen boşluğa "2"; eğer ilgili parti taraftarlarının yarısının (yani, yaklaşık %50'sinin) belirtilen özelliğe sahip olduğunu, diğer yarısının (yani, yaklaşık %50'sinin) ise sahip olmadığını düşünüyorsanız (...) şeklinde verilen boşluğa "3"; eğer ilgili parti taraftarlarının çoğunluğunun (yani, %70 veya 80'inin) belirtilen özelliğe sahip olduğunu, sadece bazılarının (yani, %20 veya 30'unun) ise sahip olmadığını düşünüyorsanız (...) şeklinde verilen boşluğa "4"; eğer ilgili parti taraftarlarının hepsinin (yani, yaklaşık %100'ünün) belirtilen özelliğe sahip olduğunu düşünüyorsanız (...) şeklinde verilen boşluğa "5" rakamını yazınız. Lütfen, bu işlemi hem MHP hem BBP hem de CHP taraftarlarının her üçü için de yapınız.

	<i>MHP'lilerin ne kadarı bu özelliğe sahip?</i>	<i>BBP'lilerin ne kadarı bu özelliğe sahip?</i>	<i>CHP'lilerin ne kadarı bu özelliğe sahip?</i>
Cesur, korkusuz
Geveze, gürültücü, yaygaracı
Erdemli, ahlaklı
Kavgacı, saldırgan
Ağırbaşlı, akli başında, ciddi
Anarşist
İnsana değer veren, insancıl
Uyuşuk, hareketsiz
Vatansever, vatanını seven
Karamsar, ümitsiz
Güvenilir, sadık, vefakar
Nemelazımcı, sorumluluktan kaçan
Akılcı düşünen, mantıklı
Maddeci, materyalist
Türk-İslam ülküsüne inanan
Halkına tepeden bakan
İnançlı
Dışa bağımlı, taklitçi, teslimiyetçi
Bilgili, kültürlü
Kozmopolitliği savunan

(This scale was used in the condition of TRIPLE context)

Lütfen aşağıdaki ifadelere ne kadar katıldığınızı veya katılmadığınızı, bu ifadelerin sizin için ne kadar doğru veya yanlış olduğunu belirtiniz. Eğer bir ifade size çok yanlış görünüyorsa, bu ifadeye kesinlikle katılmıyorsanız “kesinlikle katılmıyorum” sütunu altındaki “1” rakamını; size daha az yanlış görünüyorsa, ancak yine de katılmıyorsanız “katılmıyorum” sütunu altındaki “2” rakamını; ne doğru ne yanlış görünüyorsa “ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum” sütunu altındaki “3” rakamını; size doğru görünüyorsa “katılıyorum” sütunu altındaki “4” rakamını; size çok doğru görünüyorsa, düşündüklerinizle tam bir paralellik gösteriyorsa “tamamen katılıyorum” sütunu altındaki “5” rakamını daire içine alınız.

	Kesinlikle katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum	Katılıyorum	Tamamen katılıyorum
Ülkücü grubun değerli bir üyesiyim.	1	2	3	4	5
Çoğu zaman ülkücü olmaktan üzüntü duyuyorum.	1	2	3	4	5
Diğer insanlar ülkücüleri genellikle olumlu değerlendirir.	1	2	3	4	5
Ülkücülüğün benim duygu ve düşüncelerim üzerinde genellikle pek bir etkisi yoktur.	1	2	3	4	5
Ülkücülüğe verecek pek bir şeyimin olmadığını düşünüyorum.	1	2	3	4	5
Ülkücü grubun bir üyesi olmaktan genel olarak memnunum.	1	2	3	4	5
Çoğu insan, ülkücülerin diğer gruplardan daha etkisiz ya da verimsiz olduklarını düşünür.	1	2	3	4	5
Ülkücülük benim kim olduğumun önemli bir göstergesidir.	1	2	3	4	5
Ülkücülüğün aktif ve katılımcı bir üyesiyim.	1	2	3	4	5
Genelde, ülkücülerin yeterince değerli olmadıkları hissine kapılırım.	1	2	3	4	5
Başkaları ülkücülere genel olarak saygı duyarlar.	1	2	3	4	5
Ülkücülüğün, nasıl bir kişi olduğum ya da kimliğim üzerinde pek bir etkisi yoktur.	1	2	3	4	5
Çoğu zaman ülkücü grubun işe yaramaz bir üyesi olduğumu düşünüyorum.	1	2	3	4	5
Ülkücü olmaktan mutluluk duyuyorum.	1	2	3	4	5
Genel olarak, diğer insanlar ülkücülerin pek değerli olmadığını düşünürler.	1	2	3	4	5
Ülkücü gruba ait olmak benliğimin genel olarak önemli bir parçasını oluşturur.	1	2	3	4	5

TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu tez birbiriyle ilişkili iki çalışma içermektedir. Bunlardan birincisi “Ülkücü Grup Üyelerinin Algıladıkları Bağlam ve İç grup Temsili”, ikincisi ise “Karşılaştırma Bağlamına ve İç grupla Özdeşleşme Düzeyine Bağlı Olarak İç-gruba ve Dış gruba İlişkin Kalıpyargılar” olarak adlandırılmıştır. Aşağıda bu iki araştırma kısaca özetlenmektedir.

Ülkücü Grup Üyelerinin Algıladıkları Bağlam ve İç grup Temsili

Bu çalışma kalıpyargıların içeriği, geçerliliği ve ilgili görüşbirliği konularına odaklanmıştır. Çalışmada iç grup temsiline, ilgili grubun üyelerine yüklediği toplumsal kimliğe karşılık geldiği kabul edilmiştir. Genel kabul gören bir tanıma göre, toplumsal kimlik bireylerin benlik-kavramının bir parçası olarak ele alınmakta; bu parçanın bir toplumsal gruba üye olma bilgisinden ve bu üyeliğin birey açısından taşıdığı değer ve duygusal anlamdan türediği varsayılmaktadır (Tajfel, 1981). Bundan dolayı, iç grup temsiline somut bir bireye atıfta bulunuluyor gibi incelenmesinin uygun olacağı ileri sürülmektedir.

Ne var ki, kişisel kimliğin aksine, iç grubun bireylere göre değişen bir temsiline olamayacağı da tartışılmakta; bunun yerine, iç grup temsiline grup üyeleri arasında belirli bir düzeyde geçerliliği olacağı ileri sürülmektedir. Dolayısıyla, iç grup temsili, grup üyeleri arasında yaygınlaşmış bir çeşit toplumsal temsil olarak ele alınmaktadır.

Moscovici’ye göre (1988), toplumsal temsiller, dini ve siyasi inançlar ile benzeri toplumsal zihniyet öğelerine tutarlılık kazandıran fikir yığınının ve gündelik düşüncenin içeriğiyle ilgilidir. Toplumsal temsiller insanları ve nesneleri sınıflamayı, davranışları karşılaştırıp açıklamayı ve bunları sosyal ortamın parçaları olarak nesneleştirmeyi mümkün kılarlar.

Somut birey kavramı, genel olarak sıfatlar aracılığıyla betimlenen kişisel kimliği çağrıştırmaktadır. Kişisel kimliği betimlemede sıfatların kullanılması ise, bireyin kendisini diğer insanlardan ayırıştırma işlevini görmektedir. Ancak, bu işlev sadece sıfatlarla sınırlı olmayıp, dilin diğer öğelerinin de bu işleve sahip olabileceği tartışılmaktadır. Daha önemlisi, bireyler genel olarak kimliklerini bir bağlama oturtabilmek için kişisel bir hikaye inşa etmekte, diğer bir deyişle, kendilerini tanımlarken soyut kavramlarla yetinmemek yönünde bir eğilim gösterip, her bir soyut özelliği belirli bir somut bağlama dayandırmak istemektedirler. Bu nedenlerden dolayı, bu tezde iç grup temsili çalışılırken, kalıpyargı içeriği çalışmalarında sıklıkla kullanılan liste yöntemi gibi geleneksel reaktif ölçümler yerine, derin görüşme yöntemini kullanmak daha uygun bulunmuştur.

Bu çalışmada, grup üyelerinin iç grubu belirli bir bağlam içerisinde algılayacakları “algılanan bağlam” beklenmiştir. Buna göre, grup üyeleri iç grubu bu bağlama önemli bir dizi işlevi yerine getirecek şekilde yerleştireceklerdir. Esasında, iç grup, olumlu özelliklerini bu bağlamda doldurduğu boşluklardan aldığı varsayılmaktadır. Aynı sözcüklerle nitelenmesi beklenmemekle birlikte, grup üyelerinin algılanan bağlamla ilgili zihniyet yapılarının ortak olması beklenmiş, grup üyelerinin iç grup (veya dış grup) temsillerinde gözlenen görüşbirliğinin de bu ortak algılanan bağlamdan türeyebileceği düşünülmüştür.

Bu çalışmaya yirmi ülkücü (15 erkek, 5 kadın) katılmıştır. Örneklemenin ortalama yaşı 42.9’dur (ranj 35 - 58). Araştırmaya sadece lise ve daha üstü eğitime sahip olan kişiler katılmıştır. Görüşmelerin ortalama uzunluğu 2 saattir (ranj 80 dk. – 4 saat). Görüşmeler kasede kaydedilmiş ve daha sonra yazıya geçirilerek üzerinde içerik analizi yapılmıştır.

Sonuçlar, oldukça farklılaşmış yapıda bir bağlam algısının varlığını ortaya koymuştur: Öncelikle, görüşülen kişiler ülkeyi çevreleyen harici ve dahili düşmanların varlığına inanmaktadır. Bu düşmanlar Türk milletine yönelik emperyal amaçlar gütmektedir. Emperyal amaçların ilki, bu kavramın geleneksel tanımı ile daha tutarlıdır. Düşmanlar ülkenin ve devletin birliğini bozmak istemektedir. Emperyal amaçların ikincisi ise kültürle ilgilidir ve daha ince bir tehlikeye dikkat çekmektedir. Düşmanlar, aynı zamanda, Türk kültürünü de bozmak istemektedir. Türk kültürü ise bu ülkede yaşayan insanların ayırt edici kimliğini oluşturacak şekilde tanımlanmaktadır.

Görüşülen kişiler genel olarak emperyalizme karşı oldukça olumsuz fikirler ileri sürmüş, bağımsızlığın bir milletin en önemli değeri olduğunu belirtmişlerdir.

Bağımsızlığın karşıtı ise kölelik olarak nitelendirilmiştir. Buna ek olarak, görüşülen kişiler vatanın bölünmez bütünlüğünü ve devletin ebediyetini milliyetçi düşüncenin olmazsa olmazı olarak kabul etmişler; ayrıca, yerel olmayan tüm fikirlere karşı tepkili durup, yabancı fikirlerin ülke sorunlarını çözemeyeceğini, aksine ülke insanını köleliğe daha da yatkın hale getireceğini ileri sürmüşlerdir. Varsayımların sonuncusu olarak da Türklük ve İslamlık bilincinin gençler arasında yaygınlaştırılmasının, bu şekilde Türk kültürünün pekiştirilmesinin gerekliliğini vurgulamışlardır.

Görüşülen kişiler ülkeyi bu tehlikelere karşı sadece milliyetçi bir hareketin koruyabileceğini düşünmektedir. Bu doğrultuda, Ülkücüler teşkilatlanmış bir Türk milliyetçisi hareketi olup, aynı zamanda bu özelliğe sahip yegane grup olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Bunun sonucu olarak da, ülkeyi içinde bulunduğu kötü durumdan sadece Ülkücülerin kurtarabileceğine inanmaktadırlar. Bu grup mensuplarına göre, düşmanlar da bu gerçeğin farkındadır ve bundan dolayı da devamlı olarak Ülkücülere saldırılmakta ve zarar verilmeye çalışmaktadırlar. Bu aşamada, Ülkücülerin sadece kendilerini müdafaa ettiği, diğer bir deyişle, mücadelenin mağdur tarafını temsil ettiği öne sürülmektedir.

İç grubu, bağlama bu şekilde yerleştirdikten sonra, görüşülen kişiler iki genel bileşene bölünmüş bir iç grup temsili ortaya koymuşlardır. İlk bileşen, Ülkücülerini fikir adamları olarak ele almakta, bu grubun milli ilke ve değerleri savunduğuna atıfta bulunmaktadır. İkinci bileşen ise, Ülkücülerini birer mücadele adamı olarak ele almakta ve bu mücadelenin kutsal bir dava uğruna verildiğine atıfta bulunmaktadır.

Türk kültürünün ayırt edici özellikleri Türklük ve İslamlığın kendine has bir harmanlanmasından kaynaklandığı için, görüşülen kişiler Ülkücülerini hem Türkçü hem de İslamcı olarak nitelemişlerdir. Buna göre, Ülkücüler, Türkçü ve İslamcı fikirlere inandıkları ve savundukları için birer fikir adamıdır. Görüşmelerde, Türkçülük, ırktan çok kültüre vurgu yapan bir ideoloji olarak ele alınmış, İslamcılık ise Arap ve İran İslam anlayışından farklı bir şekilde tanımlanmıştır. İslam'ın milli bir din olduğu reddedilmiş, ancak bu ülke için Türk insanının bünyesine daha uygun İslam yorumlarının geçerli olabileceği de ileri sürülmüştür.

Ülkücü mücadelenin davası ise, iki boyutlu olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. İlk olarak, Ülkücüler Türklerin düşmanlarına karşı mücadele etmekte; ikinci olarak da Ülkücüler Türklerin ilerlemesi için çalışmaktadır. İlk boyutta, komünistler, PKK, masonlar, vb. iç düşman olarak nitelenen gruplara karşıtlık, ülkücü kimliğin önemli bir parçası olarak belirmiş; ikinci boyutta ise, bilim ve teknikteki gelişmelere işaret edilerek Türklerin bir an önce bu alanlarda gelişmiş ülkeleri yakalamasının gerekliliğinin ülkücü idealler açısından önemine vurgu yapılmıştır. Ayrıca, “Turan”, “Kızıl Elma” gibi ideallere göndermede bulunularak, uzun vadede, ülkücülerin sadece Türkiye için değil tüm dünya insanları için adaleti tesis etmeyi amaçlayan bir düşünceleri olduğu da belirtilmiştir.

Algılanan bağlamda olduğu gibi, görüşülen kişilerin sahip olduğu iç grup temsilinin yapısı da oldukça farklılaşmış bir şekilde ortaya çıkmıştır. Çalışmada bu iki olgunun iç gruba yönelik kronik bir bakış açısına yol açtığı tartışılmış, büyük toplumsal ve kültürel değişimlerin olmaması durumunda bu iç grup temsilinde herhangi bir değişimin beklenmesinin makul olmayacağı ileri sürülmüştür. Buna ek olarak, iç grup temsilinin grup üyeleri arasında yaygın biçimde paylaşılmasının ise, grup üyelerinin bağlam ile ilgili ortak algılarından kaynaklanabileceğinin düşünülmesi vurgulanmıştır. Ancak, görüldüğü gibi, iç grup temsili basit yapıli bir temsil değil, oldukça farklılaşmış bileşenleri olan bir temsildir. Bundan dolayı farklı karşılaştırma bağlamlarında, grup üyelerinin belirli bir boyutu ya da bileşeni, diğer başka bir boyuttan veya bileşenden daha fazla vurgulayabilecekleri düşünölmüştür. Yani, iç grup temsiliinde herhangi bir değişim olmaksızın, farklı gruplar arası bağlamlarda farklı iç grup temsillerinin öne çıkabileceğı ileri sürölmüştür. İkinci araştırma bu konuyu aydınlatmak amacıyla tasarlanmış; ve, aşağıda daha ayrıntılı anlatıldığı gibi, farklı karşılaştırma bağlamlarında gerek iç grup gerekse iç gruba yakın veya uzak olarak algılanan dış grup üyeleri arasında olumlu ve olumsuz özelliklerin yaygınlık derecesine ilişkin yargılar, ve ilgili yargıların ülkücü grupla özdeşleşme düzeyine bağılı olarak gösterdiği değişimler incelenmiştir.

Karşılaştırma Bağlamı ve İç-Grupla Özdeşleşme Düzeyine Bağlı Olarak İç grup ve Dış gruba İlişkin Kalıpyargılar

Bu çalışmada beş sorun ele alınmıştır. İlk olarak, iç grup yanlılığı stratejileri olarak hem iç grubu kayırma hem de dış grubu aşağılama olguları araştırılmıştır. İkinci olarak, pozitif-negatif asimetrinin varlığına bakılmıştır. Bu olgu, asgari grup deneylerindeki deneklerin iç grup üyelerini sadece ödüllendirici bir sonuç söz konusu olduğunda kayırdıkları, cezalandırıcı bir sonuç söz konusu olduğunda ise böyle bir kayırmanın olmadığı şeklindeki görgül gözleme dayanmaktadır. Üçüncü olarak, iç grupla özdeşleşme düzeyi ile gruplararası ayrıştırma arasındaki ilişki incelenmiştir. Dördüncü olarak, sadece iç grubun bulunduğu, iç grup ile birlikte bir dış grubun da bulunduğu ve iç grup ile birlikte iki dış grubun bulunduğu değişik karşılaştırma bağlamlarındaki gruplar arası algılar irdelenmiştir. Son olarak da, yakın ve uzak dış grup ayrıştırması ortaya konulmuş ve gruplar arası benzerliğin, gruplar arasında daha fazla ayrıştırmaya yol açtığı hipotezi test edilmiştir.

Araştırmaya iki yüz ülkücü (166 erkek, 34 kadın) katılmıştır. Ortalama yaş 29.0'dır (ranj = 17-51). Önceki çalışmada olduğu gibi, araştırmaya sadece lise ve daha yüksek eğitilmiş kişiler katılmıştır. Veri toplama aracı olarak, yüz ülkücü ile yapılan ön çalışma sonuçlarından yararlanılarak geliştirilen bir deneysel anket kullanılmıştır. Araştırmanın desenlemesi şöyledir: Araştırmada gruplar arası ayrıştırma ve algılanan grup homojenliğinin birleştirilmesinden türetilen bir bağımlı değişken kullanılmıştır. Gruplar arası bağlamlarda, grup üyelerinin, hem iç grubu hem de dış grubu eşit düzeyde homojen olarak algılayacakları varsayılmıştır. Ancak, gruplara atfedilen homojenliğin pozitif yönde ya da negatif yönde olmasında bir farklılık olması beklenmiştir. Eğer bir grup, üyelerinin çoğu olumlu özelliklere, çok azı ise olumsuz özelliklere sahip olarak algılanıyorsa, o grubun algılayanın gözünde pozitif bir homojenliği olduğu varsayılmıştır. Bunun tam tersi olarak, eğer bir grup, üyelerinin çoğu olumsuz özelliklere ve ancak çok azı olumlu özelliklere sahip olarak algılanıyorsa, bu grubun algılayanın gözünde negatif bir homojenliği olduğu varsayılmıştır.

Araştırmanın birinci tekrar ölçümlü değişkeni "hedef grup"tur: iç grup, yakın dış grup, uzak dış grup. Ön çalışmada ülkücülerin Büyük Birlik Partisi'ni yakın, Cumhuriyet

Halk Partisi’ni ise uzak dış grup olarak algıladıkları bulunmuştur. Bu doğrultuda söz konusu iki parti sırasıyla yakın ve uzak dış gruplar olarak kullanılmışlardır.

Araştırmanın ikinci tekrar ölçümlü değişkeni ise “nitelik türü”dir. Nitelik türü olumlu ve olumsuz olmak üzere ikiye ayrılmaktadır. Hem ön çalışma hem de ana çalışma vatansever, inançlı, ahlaklı, Türk-İslam fikrine inanan, güvenilir, sadık, vefalı, insancıl, insana değer veren, akılcı, mantıklı, ciddi, vakar sahibi, bilgili, kültürlü, cesur, korkusuz gibi özelliklerin olumlu özellikler olduğunu, taklitçi, anarşist, halkına tepeden bakan, uyuşuk, hareketsiz, sorumsuz, nemelazımcı, geveze, gürlütücü, maddeci, karamsar, umutsuz, kavgacı, saldırgan, kozmopolit gibi özelliklerin ise olumsuz özellikler olarak algılandığını göstermiştir. Her bir özellik ile ilgili değerlendirmeler oldukça tutarlı bir şekilde gruplandığından dolayı, analizlerde bu özelliklerle ilgili bir bileşik puan kullanılmıştır. Buna göre, her bir grup ile ilgili hem olumlu hem de olumsuz özellikler açısından homojenlik yargıları ölçülmüştür.

Denekler arası faktörlerden ilki dört farklı bağlamı içeren “karşılaştırma bağlamı”dır. Birinci bağlam, sadece iç grubun bulunduğu “yalnız iç grup bağlamı”, ikincisi, hem iç grubun hem de yakın dış grubun bulunduğu “yakın dış gruplu ikili bağlam”, üçüncüsü, hem iç grubun hem de dış grubun bulunduğu “uzak dış gruplu ikili bağlam”, dördüncüsü ise, hem iç grup, hem yakın dış grup hem de uzak dış grubun bulunduğu “üçlü grup bağlamı”dır.

Denekler arası faktörlerden ikincisi “iç grup ile özdeşleşme düzeyi”dir. Katılımcıların iç grup ile özdeşleşme düzeylerini belirlemek amacıyla Kolektif Öz Saygı Ölçeği kullanılmıştır. Bu ölçekte ortancaya eşit ya da daha az puan alanlar iç grup ile “özdeşleşmesi düşük olanlar”, ortancadan daha yüksek puan alanlar ise iç grup ile “özdeşleşmesi yüksek olanlar” olarak kabul edilmiştir.

Araştırmanın bulguları genel olarak şöyledir: İkili grup bağlamındaki katılımcılar iç grubu her iki nitelik türünde de eşit düzeyde pozitif homojenliğe sahip olarak algılamışlardır. Ne var ki, hem yalnız iç grup bağlamındaki hem de üçlü grup bağlamındaki katılımcılar iç grubu, olumlu özelliklere kıyasla, olumsuz özelliklerde pozitif homojenliğe daha çok sahip olarak algılamışlardır. Diğer katılımcılarla karşılaştırıldığında, sadece iç grup bağlamındaki katılımcılar iç grubu olumlu özelliklerde pozitif homojenliğe daha az sahip olarak algılamışlardır. Üçlü grup bağlamındaki

katılımcılar ise, diğer katılımcılarla karşılaştırıldığında, olumsuz özellikler bakımında iç grubu pozitif homojenliğe daha sahip olarak algılamışlardır.

İç-grupla özdeşleşmesi yüksek olanlar, özdeşleşmesi düşük olanlara kıyasla, iç grubu pozitif homojenliğe daha sahip olarak algılamışlardır. Ayrıca, özdeşleşmesi yüksek olanlar iç grubu hem olumlu hem de olumsuz özellikler bakımından eşit düzeyde pozitif homojenliğe sahip olarak algılarken, özdeşleşmesi düşük olanlar iç grubu, olumlu özelliklere kıyasla, olumsuz özelliklerde pozitif homojenliğe daha sahip olarak algılamışlardır.

Katılımcılar genel olarak iç grubu yakın dış gruptan pozitif homojenliğe daha sahip olarak algılamışlardır. İç-grup, hem yakın dış gruplu ikili bağlamda, hem de üçlü grup bağlamında eşit düzeyde pozitif homojenliğe sahip olarak algılanırken; iç grupla özdeşleşmesi yüksek olanlar her iki bağlamda da özdeşleşmesi düşük olanlardan daha yüksek puanlar almıştır. İç grupla özdeşleşmesi düşük olan katılımcıların yakın dış gruba ilişkin pozitif homojenlik algıları, ikili grup bağlamından üçlü grup bağlamına giderken yükselme eğilimi gösterirken, iç grupla özdeşleşmesi yüksek olanlar tam tersi bir eğilim göstermişlerdir. Yani, özdeşleşmesi yüksek olanlar yakın dış grubu, ikili grup bağlamıyla karşılaştırıldığında, üçlü grup bağlamında pozitif homojenliğe daha az sahip olarak algılamışlardır.

İç-grupla özdeşleşmesi hem yüksek hem de düşük olanlar yakın dış grubu, olumlu özelliklere kıyasla, olumsuz özelliklerde pozitif homojenliğe daha sahip olarak algılamışlardır. Özdeşleşmesi düşük olanlar aynı eğilimi iç grup için de gösterirken, özdeşleşmesi yüksek olanlar iç grubu her iki nitelik türünde de eşit düzeyde pozitif homojenliğe sahip olarak algılamışlardır.

Katılımcılar genel olarak iç grubu uzak dış gruptan pozitif homojenliğe daha sahip olarak algılamışlardır. Daha doğrusu, katılımcılar uzak dış grubu, iç grup ve yakın dış grubun aksine, negatif homojenliğe sahip olarak algılamışlardır. İç-grupla özdeşleşmesi düşük olanlarla karşılaştırıldığında, özdeşleşmesi yüksek olanlar iç grubu daha pozitif homojenliğe sahip, uzak dış grubu ise daha negatif homojenliğe sahip olarak algılamışlardır. Uzak dış gruplu ikili bağlamda katılımcılar iç grubu, olumlu özelliklere kıyasla, olumsuz özelliklerde pozitif homojenliğe daha sahip olarak algılarken; uzak dış

grubu, olumsuz özelliklere göre, olumlu özelliklerde negatif homojenliğe daha sahip olarak algılamışlardır.

Son olarak, üçlü grup bağlamında, iç grupla özdeşleşmesi yüksek olanlar, özdeşleşmesi düşük olanlarla karşılaştırıldığında, iç grubu daha pozitif yönde homojen; dış grubu ise daha negatif yönde homojen olarak algılamışlardır. Buna karşın, özdeşleşmesi düşük olanlar, özdeşleşmesi yüksek olanlarla karşılaştırıldığında, yakın dış grubu pozitif yönde homojen algılamışlardır. Özdeşleşmesi yüksek olanlar, iç grubu yakın dış gruptan daha pozitif homojenliğe sahip olarak algılarken, özdeşleşmesi düşük olanların her iki gruba yükledikleri pozitif homojenlik anlamlı bir farklılık göstermemiştir.

Sonuç olarak, katılımcılar açık bir şekilde iç grubu kayırma eğilimi göstermişlerdir. Bu durum Toplumsal Kimlik Kuramı'nı destekler niteliktedir. Dış grubu aşağılama eğilimi ise, sadece uzak dış grubun bulunduğu bağlamlarda söz konusu olmuş, yakın dış grup ile ilgili olarak herhangi bir aşağılama gözlenmemiş, aksine bir anlamda yakın dış grubu kayırma denilebilecek bir olgu da ortaya çıkmıştır. Buna göre, Toplumsal Kimlik Kuramı'nda iç grubun tam bir karşıtı olarak sunulan kavramın sadece uzak dış gruplara karşılık geldiği, her dış grubun grup üyeleri için benzer tepkilere yol açmadığı söylenebilir.

Bu çalışmada, genel olarak herhangi bir pozitif-negatif asimetri gözlenmemiştir. Bu daha çok, iç grupla özdeşleşmesi yüksek olan katılımcılar için doğrudur. Özdeşleşmesi düşük olan katılımcılar ise, iç grubu olumsuz özelliklerde, olumlu özelliklere göre, daha pozitif homojenliğe sahip olarak algılamışlardır. Bu durum, pozitif-negatif bakışsızlık olgusunun tam tersi bir olguya işaret etmektedir. Bunu destekler nitelikte, uzak dış grup, olumsuz özelliklerle karşılaştırıldığında, olumlu özellikler bakımından daha negatif homojenliğe sahip olarak algılanmıştır. Bu iki gözlemden yola çıkarak, birbiriyle çatışan ideolojilere sahip gerçek gruplar söz konusu olduğunda, uzak dış gruba duyulan nefretin, toplumsal kimliğe iç gruba duyulan sevgi kadar katkıda bulunduğu söylenebilir.

Bazı bireylerin kazançlarına, bazı bireylerin ise kayıplarına daha fazla önem verdikleri ileri sürülmektedir. Bu olgular, sırasıyla yükselmeye odaklanma ve önlemeye odaklanma olarak adlandırılmaktadır. İdeolojik grup üyeleri yükselme ile

karşılaştırıldığında, daha çok önlemeye odaklanma eğilimi gösterebilir. Yani, bu tür grupların üyeleri iç grubun kayıplarıyla daha ilgili olabilir. Dahası, toplulukçu kültürlerde bulunan bireyler, bireyci kültürlerde yaşayan bireylerle karşılaştırıldığında, daha önlemeye odaklanma gösterebilir ve kendi gruplarının kötü olmadığı noktasına daha çok önem verebilirler.

Bu çalışmadaki sonuçlar, ayrıca, kimlik-ayırıştırma hipotezini de desteklemiştir. İç grupla özdeşleşmesi yüksek olanlar, özdeşleşmesi düşük olanlarla karşılaştırıldığında, daha çok gruplar arası ayırıştırma eğilimi göstermişlerdir. Özdeşleşmesi yüksek olanlar toplumsal yargı araştırmalarındaki ilgisi yüksek (high involvement) kişilere benzetilirken, özdeşleşmesi düşük olanlar ilgisi düşük (low involvement) kişilere benzetilmiştir. İlgisi yüksek kişilerde gözlemlendiği gibi, özdeşleşmesi yüksek olanların da gruplarla ilgili algıları aşırı olmuş, buna rağmen özdeşleşmesi düşük olanlar grup algılarında daha ılımlı bir konum takınmışlardır. Özdeşleşmesi yüksek olanlar, siyah beyaz bir dünya algılama eğilimi gösterirlerken, özdeşleşmesi düşük olanlar yeni koalisyonlar kurmaya ve kapsayıcı kimlik tanımları yapmaya daha açık olmuşlardır. Bu durum özellikle özdeşleşmesi düşük olanların üçlü grup bağlamında yakın dış grup ile ilgili algılarında gün yüzüne çıkmıştır.

Yukarıdaki kavramlaştırma gruplar arası olguları açıklamada bireysel farklılıklarla ilgili değişkenlerin potansiyeline de işaret etmektedir. Buradan tüm grup süreçlerinin kişilik değişkenleri ile açıklanabileceği şeklinde bir anlam çıkarılmamalıdır. Ancak, bu değişkenler gruplar arası olgulara farklı bir renk verebilir ve bu renk geleneksel gruplar arası ilişkiler kavramlarıyla açıklanamayabilir.

Bu çalışma, ayrıca, gruplar arası araştırmalarda grup içi ve gruplar arası bağlamlar şeklindeki kuramsal ayırımın da ötesine gidilmesi gerektiğini ileri sürmektedir. Çünkü gerçek dünya, nicelik ve nitelik olarak birbirinden farklı çok sayıda grup içermektedir. Dolayısıyla, asgari grup deneylerinin sonuçları tüm bu farklılıkları kapsayamayabilir. Dahası, bu çalışmada belirli bir soruna birden fazla yöntemle yaklaşılması gerektiği, en önemlisi de, nitel ve nicel eğilimli araştırmaların birleştirilmesi savunulmaktadır. Çeşitli insan topluluklarını sadece soyut bir grup kavramı kapsamında incelemek yerine, çalışılan gruplarla ilgili bir sınıflandırmaya gidilmesinin yararlı olacağı önerilmiştir.

VITA

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