

THE ROLE OF IMAGINATION IN KANT'S FIRST CRITIQUE

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

ÖZLEM BARIN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF SCIENCE

IN

THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

DECEMBER 2003

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Yasin Ceylan
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Yasin Ceylan

Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam

Prof. Dr. Sabri Büyükdüvenci

ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF IMAGINATION IN KANT'S FIRST CRITIQUE

Barın, Özlem

M. S., Department of Philosophy

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Yasin Ceylan

December, 2003, 224 pages

The purpose of this study is to examine the role of imagination in Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* by means of a detailed textual analysis and interpretation. In my systematic reading of the Kantian text, I analyse how the power of imagination comes to the foreground of Kant's investigation into the transcendental conditions of knowledge. This is to explain the mediating function of imagination between the two distinct faculties of the subject; between sensibility and understanding. Imagination achieves its mediating function between sensibility and understanding through its activity of synthesis. By means of exploring the features of the activity of synthesis I attempt to display that imagination provides the ground of the unification of sensibility and understanding. The argument of this study resides in the claim that the power of imagination, through its transcendental synthesis, provides the ground of the possibility of all knowledge and experience. This is to announce imagination as the building block of Kant's Copernican Revolution that grounds the objectivity of knowledge in its subjective conditions. Therefore, the goal of this study is to display imagination as a distinctive human capacity that provides the relation of our knowledge to the objects.

Key Words: transcendental, a priori, knowledge, sensibility, understanding, receptivity, spontaneity, space, time, intuition, category, representation, synthesis, apperception, possibility of experience, productive imagination, reproductive imagination, unity, schema, schematism, objectivity.

ÖZ

KANT'IN İLK ELEŞTİRİ'SİNDE İMGELEM YETİSİNİN ROLÜ

Barın, Özlem

Yüksek Lisans, Felsefe Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Yasin Ceylan

Aralık, 2003, 224 sayfa

Bu çalışmanın amacı Immanuel Kant'ın *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi* adlı yapıtında imgelem yetisinin rolünü ayrıntılı metin çözümlemesi ve yorumla araştırmaktır. Kant'ın eserinin sistemli bir okuması yapılarak bilginin aşkınsal koşullarının incelenmesinde imgelem yetisinin nasıl ön plana çıktığı incelenmektedir. Bu, imgelem yetisinin öznenin iki farklı yetisi -duyarlık ve anlak- arasındaki arabulucu işlevini açıklamaktır. İmgelem yetisi duyarlık ve anlak arasındaki bu arabulucu işlevini bireşim edimi yoluyla kazanmaktadır. Bu bireşim ediminin belirleyici niteliklerinin incelenmesi yoluyla imgelemin duyarlık ve anlak arasındaki birleşimin temelini oluşturduğu gösterilmeye çalışılacaktır. Bu çalışmada öne sürülen iddia imgelem yetisinin aşkınsal bireşim edimi yoluyla bilginin ve deneyimin temelini oluşturduğudur. Bu, imgelemin bilginin nesnelliğini öznel koşullarında temellendiren Kantçı Kopernik Devrimi'nin temel yapıtaşı olduğunu bildirmektir. Sonuç olarak bu çalışmanın amacı imgelem yetisini bilginin nesneleriyle ilişkisini sağlayan ayrıcalıklı bir öznel yeti olarak ortaya koymaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: aşkınsal, a priori, bilgi, duyarlık, anlak, alımlama, kendiliğindenlik, mekan, zaman, sezgi, kategori, tasarım, bireşim, tam algı, deneyimin olanağı, üretken imgelem, yeniden-üreten imgelem, birlik, şema, şematizm, nesnellik.

For the dreams...

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It is not an overstatement to say that this thesis would have never been written if Prof. Dr. Yasin Ceylan had not been my supervisor. I am deeply grateful for his wide-ranging support and friendship. I must acknowledge my debts to Dr. Elif Çırakman for her constructive suggestions and motivating advice, especially in times of crisis. I am deeply grateful to Assist. Prof. Dr. Gerrit Steunebrink for his meticulous reading and encouraging advice. I owe the elaboration of the main arguments of this study to our discussions. Thanks go to Burak Gürbüz and Ecehan Balta for their help in providing the books and the articles that I couldn't find in Turkey. I especially owe too much to the friendship of Selma Aydın and Selda Salman throughout the writing process. For sharing the frustrations and joys of this process I thank all my friends.

And finally, Yunus Emre Gürbüz... Through his warmth and wisdom he has taught me more of life than one can acknowledge either here or in person. I owe him much more than words can tell.

I hereby declare that the research and results presented herein are fully based on my own work. The resources consulted and included within this work have been fully cited and referenced in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct.

Signature:

Date:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
ÖZ.....	v
DEDICATION.....	vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	x
CHAPTER.....	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SENSIBILITY AND UNDERSTANDING.....	
AND THEIR UNIFICATION THROUGH IMAGINATION	9
2.1 The Distinction Between Sensibility and Understanding	16
2.1.1 Unitary Structure of Divine Knowing	20
2.1.2 Dualist Structure of Human Knowing and Its Finite Character.....	25
2.1.2.1 Human Sensible Intuition	26
2.1.2.2 Human Discursive Thought.... ..	36
2.2 Towards a Unification of Sensibility and Understanding:.....	
Imagination as a Third Faculty.....	42
2.2.1 Synthesis, Pure Concepts and Imagination	44
2.2.2 The Official Metaphysical Deduction.....	51
3 MEDIATING FUNCTION OF IMAGINATION: THE TRANSCENDENTAL.....	
DEDUCTION(S).....	61
3.1 Imagination in the A-Edition Transcendental Deduction	67
3.1.1 The Threefold Synthesis	69

3.1.1.1	The Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition	72
3.1.1.2	The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination.....	76
3.1.1.3	The Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept.....	81
3.1.2	The Unity of Threefold Synthesis	87
3.1.3	The Relation Between Transcendental Apperception and	
	Transcendental Imagination.....	93
3.1.3.1	Transcendental Apperception	93
3.1.3.2	Transcendental Synthesis of Imagination in Its.....	
	Relation to Transcendental Apperception.....	102
3.1.4	Transcendental Synthesis: Is It a Distinct Kind of Synthesis.....	
	From the Empirical?.....	110
3.1.4.1	The Problem of A Priori Synthesis	110
3.1.4.2	Imagination in Its Productive and.....	
	Reproductive Capacities.....	120
3.1.5	Conclusion to A-Deduction: Imagination As a Mediating Faculty .	129
3.2	Imagination in the B-Edition Transcendental Deduction	132
3.2.1	Synthesis: A Function of Understanding or Imagination?.....	133
3.2.2	The Structure of the Argument in the B-Deduction	134
3.2.3	Intellectual Synthesis	140
3.2.4	The Transition from Intellectual to Figurative Synthesis.....	143
3.2.5	Figurative Synthesis.....	145
3.2.6	Conclusion to B-Deduction.....	152
4	IMAGINATION AS CONCEALED IN THE DEPTHS OF HUMAN SOUL	155
4.1	Imagination: An Independent Faculty or a Function of Understanding?...	157
4.2	General Views on the Schematism	168
4.3	Schematism: Subsumption or Sensibilisation?.....	171
4.4	Transcendental Schema As Pure Intuition.....	181

4.5	Transcendental Schema as Transcendental Time Determination.....	190
4.6	Schematism: An Art Concealed in the Depths of Human Soul.....	197
4.7	Concluding Remarks.....	205
5	CONCLUSION.....	208
	BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	220

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

*And as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.*

Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, v.i

The history of philosophy, in its metaphysical thinking, offers nothing similar to that, which Shakespeare states about imagination. The metaphysical thinking has never relied on imagination and tried to keep itself at a distance from it. Imagination, since Plato has banished the artists from his ideal site, has been the “bastard child” of philosophy. It has been condemned as the source of fancy and equated with error, illusion, sophistry, or with sin, heresy or with the deception. If it had been given a positive role it has been by locating it within the lower cognitive faculties. It has generally been treated as the source of darkness threatening the light of reason. So, why to study on imagination in the philosophy of Kant, who is the great philosopher of enlightenment and of reason? The present study aims to display that the all-powerful reason that Kant investigates is in need of imagination in its act of knowing. It aims to reveal imagination as a distinctive human capacity, which constitutes the relation of reason to the objects. It attempts to show that imagination both empowers reason in its theoretical employment and inhibits reason by limiting this employment.

The centrality of imagination to the Kantian project, which this study aims to reveal, finds its articulation in the “Copernican Revolution” that Kant accomplishes in the direction of metaphysical investigation. As Kant states at the very beginning of

Critique of Pure Reason his main concern is to determine the possibility of metaphysics, that is, the possibility of a priori knowledge of objects independent of their being given in experience. He states that the explanation of the possibility of a priori knowledge requires a shift in the orientation of metaphysical investigation. This shift consists in the reversal of the concern of metaphysics from objects of knowledge to the subject of knowledge. Hitherto the traditional metaphysics has assumed that all our knowledge must conform to the objects. But any attempt to acquire a priori knowledge of objects on this assumption has failed. So, Kant proposes to make a reversal in this assumption and offers that the only explanation to the possibility of a priori knowledge of objects can be given if we assume that objects must conform to our knowledge. He argues that insofar as objects conform to the structure of our knowledge that we can know something a priori about them and determine them in advance prior to their being given in experience. This something that we can determine in regard to them prior to their being given is what Kant calls the *transcendental conditions* of knowledge. The "Copernican Revolution" gains its meaning in this insight that any object in order to be known must conform to the transcendental conditions of knowledge. These transcendental conditions are the a priori elements that underlie any knowledge as its necessary condition. These are the conditions by which an object can be known as an object of experience. Given that these conditions have their seat in the nature of human subjectivity, the Copernican Revolution that Kant achieves in any philosophical investigation consists in grounding the possibility of knowledge and the very objectivity of this knowledge in the nature of human subjectivity. Any object to be known must conform to the subjective conditions of its knowability. This is to ground the objectivity of the object in the subjectivity of the subject and it is by means of this revolution that imagination comes to the foreground of critical investigation. The objects must conform to the structure of objectivity that is predetermined by the subjective conditions of their

knowability and the critical investigation discovers imagination as the distinctive capacity of the subject, which forms the structure of objectivity that must be met with any object in order to become an object for us.

This centrality of imagination is due to its mediating role between the two distinct faculties of human subject: sensibility and understanding. These two faculties are completely different in nature and cannot be reduced to each other. Sensibility is the faculty, which provides the immediate relation to objects that Kant calls intuition. In providing the intuitions sensibility is a completely passive faculty that let objects to appear. It is the capacity to receive the representations through the manner in which we are affected by the objects. But sensibility as a passive reception of the immediate representations of objects can only yield undetermined appearances. The sensible intuition can only yield a dispersed manifold of appearances and lacks any capacity to organise them into a meaningful experience. Understanding is then the active faculty that unifies the manifold into coherent representations and determines the undetermined manifold of intuitions as objects of knowledge. Sensibility through its passive reception of the manifold can never supply knowledge and requires the determining activity of thinking that connects the manifold into unity. Knowledge is obtained from this function of understanding that unites the sensible content under its concepts. But understanding, as the faculty of producing concepts, is itself not capable of yielding knowledge on its own right. It always requires the sensible manifold as its content for its function of unification. It cannot supply its own content and always requires sensibility to supply its content. Insofar as these two faculties cannot yield knowledge on their own right, knowledge arises through the unification of them; they must work together. But sensibility and understanding are totally diverse faculties; they are the two extremes. Due to the problem of their unification Kant introduces the power of imagination as sustaining the mediation of them. Imagination prepares the manifold of intuition to be conceptually unified. It achieves

this function through the activity of synthesis that gathers the manifold of intuition into unity as to form a certain content. In this sense, imagination synthesises the sensible material and prepares them as to be available for understanding to reflect them under its concepts and determine them as objects. By means of its function of synthesis imagination bridges the gap between sensibility and understanding.

The picture that I draw above in regard to the mediating function of imagination is not the only words of Kant about the issue. Imagination is made responsible for the unification of sensibility and understanding and put as the source of synthesis in general. The term synthesis and the problem of the unification of sensibility and understanding are the most complex issues of his philosophy. Kant always starts with a simple assertion of the problem and seems to provide a simple solution. But the initial formulation of the problem and the solution get transformed in every stage of the analysis. The role of imagination and the centrality that it gains in Kantian philosophy can be captured only by noticing the transformations and the deepening of the initial formulations. In this respect, imagination becomes a real worry for a student of Kant and as Eva Schaper puts it

Imagination, it seems, has a function which is hardly comprehensible apart from the Kantian system. And the function is that of a kind of glue, joining everything disparate, bridging gaps, and sealing the whole off against any attempt to understand it from outside. Only by being in the system, by speaking its language, can Kant's doctrine of imagination then be expounded¹.

So, this study attempts to reveal the role of imagination "by being in the system, by speaking its language" and by following the transformations of Kant's thought that undergo through the Critique. It does not recourse to any psychological or phenomenological analysis of imagination in order to render Kant's usage clear, or again it does not get any assistance from the comparison of Kant's imagination to

¹ Eva Schaper, "Kant on Imagination", *Philosophical Forum*, 1970, 2, pp. 432-433.

any of those philosophical theories of imagination that are held by his predecessors². It does not draw on Aristotelian or Humean or any medieval conceptions of imagination and does not attempt to clarify Kantian usage by means of comparison. It attempts to reveal the role of Kantian imagination by means of a systematic analysis of the Kantian text itself.

So, this study begins from the point where Kant begins and Kant begins “from the point at which the common root of our faculty of knowledge divides and throws out two stems” (A835/B863)³. The two stems are the irreducible sensibility and understanding. Kant begins with the distinction between these two elements of knowledge and analyses the two firstly in isolation, then, attempts to show their necessary unity in the knowledge of objects. Both faculties have their own forms, which they impose on the objects of experience and imagination provides the ground of the unification of these formal requirements that must be met with any object. Although the distinction between sensibility and understanding is so essential in the formulation of the critical problem and the solution reached by the entire investigation, Kant nowhere gives an explicit account of the distinction. On this account, he is generally criticised by generating an unnecessary problem for himself through creating an artificial distinction and then struggling desperately to unify them in complicated ways by means of introducing a third thing that sustains the unification.

Contrary to such criticisms I find the distinctiveness of Kant’s philosophy in this distinction and therefore first attempt to provide a ground for this distinction. In Chapter II I argue that the distinction between sensibility and understanding and the

² For a study of the theories of imagination, which are held in the history of philosophy, in their comparison I can list three outstanding studies: Eva T. H. Brann, *The World of Imagination*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Maryland, 1991; Richard Kearney, *The Wake of Imagination*, Routledge, London, 1998; John Sallis, *Force of Imagination*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2000. For a phenomenological study of imagination: Edward S. Casey, *Imagining, A Phenomenological Study*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2000.

resulting dualisms of Kantian philosophy, such as the dualisms of intuition-concept, subject-object, appearances-things in themselves are based upon the finite character of human reason. I argue that the distinction rests on a metaphysical contention that human reason is essentially finite and this finitude is manifested by its incapacity to have any immediate relation to objects. Insofar as it cannot supply its object out of itself, it relies on some other faculty for relation to objects, namely, on sensibility. I ground this dualist structure of human knowledge in the finitude of human reason by comparing it with the unitary structure of divine knowing. I argue that Kant illustrates the essence of the dualist structure of human knowledge by means of the contrast between it and divine knowing, which Kant names as “original intuition”, “intellectual intuition”, or “intuitive understanding”. By analysing these different names and linking them together by means of revealing the contexts Kant uses, I claim that all these usages refer to the same divine way of knowing, which is constituted by the unity of intuition and thinking. By contrasting this unity of intuition and thinking that is consisted in divine way of knowing to the human way of intuiting and thinking, I ground the distinction of sensibility and understanding in the finitude of human knowledge. I argue that this finitude rests on both the finitude of its intuition and finitude of its thinking. In discussing the issue, I also clarify the structure of sensibility and understanding with reference to the Kantian text as it explores them in the **Transcendental Aesthetic** and in the opening parts of **Transcendental Analytic**. After this clarification I discuss the problem of their unification through discussing the way Kant introduces the need of *synthesis* and *imagination* as the source of this synthesis. Given from the side of pure thinking of objects, this problem of unification gets the character of unification of pure understanding that has its own pure concepts, and the pure intuition supplied by sensibility as its forms. The relation

³ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1965. References to the *Critique of Pure Reason* are to the standard A and B pagination of the first and second editions.

between pure understanding and pure intuition is sustained with the pure synthesis of imagination. I end the chapter with the discussion of the relation between this pure synthesis of imagination and pure concepts of understanding and thereby with the problematisation of Kant's derivation of pure concepts of understanding.

In Chapter III, I concentrate on the problem of the unification of the two elements by following the transformation of the problem into a different level. This different level is the justification of the use of pure concepts that Kant examines in **Transcendental Deduction**. Kant wrote this part of the *CPR* twice once in its first edition and once in its second edition. So, my chapter is divided into two main sections, the one discussing the problem as it is laid in the first edition and the other discussing the problem as it is laid in the second edition. I firstly provide a systematic analysis of the **First Edition Deduction** and then read the **Second Edition Deduction** by noticing the differences and the change that underwent in Kant's thought. I argue that besides their differences, it is still possible to detect a coherent theory of imagination in the Kantian text. I claim that both have their advantages and disadvantages of their own in providing the solution to the problem of unification of the two elements and due to the role of imagination that it plays in the solution of the problem. My main concern in reading these two deductions is to reveal that the distinction between sensibility and understanding itself becomes transformed and problematic and their unification through the synthesis of imagination becomes more fundamental than their distinction. I argue this by trying to clarify the nature of synthesis and the relation of this synthesis on the one hand to thought and on the other hand to intuition. By patiently proceeding within the technicalities of the deduction I try to reveal that imagination becomes the ground of all knowledge and of experience.

I open Chapter IV by giving a systematic summary and the comparison of my readings of the deductions as exemplified in first and second editions of *CPR*. In

doing this I concentrate on the advantages and disadvantages of both deductions in providing a clear account of the role of imagination. I especially enumerate the problems that are not given a solution and left open in the deductions due to the role of imagination and by comparing them to each other I claim that these obscurities can be made clear only in the discussion of the Chapter on **Schematism**. After this systematic reading of the outcomes of the deductions I pass to the discussion of the **Schematism**. The **Schematism** provides a new formulation of the problem of the relation between the two elements of human knowledge and provides a new kind of solution by concentrating on the synthesis of imagination and the products of this synthesis. The centrality of imagination and the *time* factor in human experience find their clear announcements in this chapter. I find this chapter of *CPR* as the most important part of it and believe that it provides a new insight to the problems of Kantian critique. I argue that the **Schematism** provides a re-reading of the previous parts of the Critique, especially the **Transcendental Aesthetic** and also transform the initial distinction of two stems and the need of their unification into a deep level. By noticing the transformation of the issue, I argue that the distinction between sensibility and understanding becomes extremely problematic in a way that makes it even impossible to assert a distinction. I argue this by discussing how they stand in unity in the synthesis of imagination. This unification of the two stems through imagination as it is given in **Schematism** gives the full significance and centrality of imagination to the Kantian philosophy.

CHAPTER II

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SENSIBILITY AND UNDERSTANDING AND THEIR UNIFICATION THROUGH IMAGINATION

This chapter serves as an introduction to the Kantian problematic insofar as it bears upon the function of the faculty of imagination. Given that Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* concerns itself with synthesis, it converges on the faculty of imagination since "synthesis in general, as we shall hereafter see, is the mere result of the power of imagination" (A78/B103). However, Kant's remarks about the blindness of imagination and about our scarce awareness of its function render it difficult to draw its role clearly through *Critique*. Not only the blindness of imagination, but also Kant's usage of the term *synthesis* in multitude senses makes it difficult to trace the path of imagination, but at least bring us to the complicated relation between reason and imagination. What is decisive in this complex relation is that reason as a logical faculty is in need of imagination, and that it must join with the faculty of synthesis in its act of knowing. This chapter first examines this dependence of reason on imagination as a result of the finitude of reason. The reason which Kant investigates is human reason; the intellectual faculty of finite-embodied subjects. The finitude of reason is manifested by its incapacity to have any immediate relation to objects. Insofar as reason cannot posit its object out of its own spontaneity, it must go beyond itself and relate itself to objects. Reason as a logical faculty cannot set up a relation to objects in its pure logical activity, therefore, besides its logical act reason must perform a synthetic activity in order to relate itself to objects. In this synthetic activity imagination stands as a distinctive human capacity which

constitutes the relation of reason to intuitions of objects. Reason needs such a mediating faculty which gathers the dispersed manifold of intuition into something that can be known or judged. The clarification of the functions of imagination in this mediating function and in its relation to reason serve to characterise a distinctive human way of knowing.

The significance and need for a characterisation of human knowledge in its distinctiveness can be traced back to Kant's attempt to lay a foundation for a new metaphysics. This foundation consists in reason's self examination of its powers and limits. Kant remarks that metaphysics is a natural disposition of human reason and by blindly following this natural disposition reason "precipitates itself into darkness and contradiction" (Aviii). Against this blindness and darkness what is proposed by Kant is enlightenment and self-knowledge: "reason must undertake a new the most difficult of all its tasks, namely that of self-knowledge" (Axii). This difficult task of self-knowledge is a matter of maturity of reason; undertaking a critique of its powers and limits. This critique will be assured in a court of law by reason's bringing itself into question. It is through this self-examination of reason that the foundation of a new metaphysics will be laid. Therefore, the foundation is reason itself and the new metaphysics, which will be established on this foundation, is "nothing but the inventory of all our possessions through pure reason systematically arranged" (Axi). Kant defines pure reason as "the faculty which supplies the principles of a priori knowledge" (A11/B24). Metaphysics as a science, with its completeness, is thus a system of all principles of pure reason. And preliminary to this system, the general investigation into its possibility and limits is called **critique** of pure reason.

In *Critique of Pure Reason*, reason will be investigated in its theoretical employment. What is under critique is the possibility of theoretical knowledge; reason's a priori cognition. Insofar as metaphysics consists in rational, purely conceptual knowledge of things, the possibility of metaphysics will be investigated

through the possibility of reason's a priori knowledge; what and how much reason can know independent of experience. Kant formulates the possibility of reason's a priori cognition in terms of judgements. For Kant knowing occurs as judging, thus he reduces the problem of the possibility of metaphysics to the question: how are synthetic a priori judgements possible? He sets this problem as the fundamental problem of pure reason and puts the success or the failure of metaphysics upon the solution of this problem and claims that the failure of previous metaphysics is due to the fact that the problem of synthetic a priori judgements and even the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements have not been considered. He presents his distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements as a novelty in realm of metaphysics by claiming that metaphysical judgements are synthetic, not analytic as they were previously taken to be. He first draws the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments in the **Introduction** of the *CPR*, but the originality and the philosophical significance of the distinction comes to light in the stages of analysis which gets deeper in each stage through the *Critique*. In his initial formulation of the distinction, Kant presents it in two versions. In the first version he presents the distinction in terms of the relationship of containment between the concepts used as subject and predicate in a judgment. Analytic judgments are judgments in which the predicate is already contained in the subject and the relationship between subject and predicate is thought identical. Synthetic judgments, on the other hand, are judgments whose predicates are not contained in the subject but added to it, therefore the relation between subject and predicate is not thought identical. This first version seems to present the distinction as a logical distinction concerning two different ways of relation of predicate and subject concepts in a judgment, but it does not stick to the heart of the problem. The second version presented in the initial formulation of the distinction, comes closer to the point, but still leaves it untouched. In the second version, Kant states that analytic judgments are explicative, and do not

give any information, but analyse the subject concept “into its constituent concepts that have all along been thought in it, although in a confused manner”, whereas synthetic judgments are ampliative, giving new information about the subject, because, they “add to the concept of the subject a predicate which has not been in any wise thought in it, and which no analysis could possibly extract from it” (A7/B11). Although the statement of the extension of our knowledge through synthetic judgments gives a new direction to the distinction, it does not make it clear unless it responds in what this extension consists. In his *Logic*, Kant talks about the formal extension of our knowledge through analytic judgments and the material extension of our knowledge through synthetic judgments⁴. Formal extension involves uncovering what is implicit by means of a logical analysis of given concept into its constituent parts. The material extension of our knowledge concerns the content of our knowledge and involves a reference to an object. Synthetic judgments materially extend our knowledge by going beyond a given concept and relating it to an object. While in analytic judgments the predicate stands in a logical relation to the subject depending on the law of contradiction, in synthetic judgments the predicate stands in a real relation to objects in the form of determination. What is under issue in analytic judgments is the logical relation between the concepts of predicate and subject, but in synthetic judgments, besides this logical relation, a real or transcendental relation concerning the relation between objects or between concepts and objects is under issue. So, the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments is not a logical distinction concerning the two different ways of relation between predicate and subject in terms of whether the predicate is contained in the subject or not, but the distinction is made on the basis of the grounds of these judgments. While analytic judgments have a logical ground for the relation of the predicate and subject, synthetic judgments need something more for grounding the connection between the

⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Logic*, trans. Robert Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz, Dover Publications, New

subject and predicate. This ground of the synthetic judgments is established by relating concepts to objects. So, the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments serves to problematise the ground of the relation of reason to objects. In the case of synthetic a posteriori judgments, this ground is established by an appeal to experience. Experience itself grounds the connection of subject and predicate concepts. But besides analytic judgments which are, by definition, always a priori and empirical judgments which are always a posteriori, reason forms judgments which are at once synthetic and a priori. Synthetic a priori judgments assert an a priori relation to objects. The philosophical significance of synthetic a priori judgments lies in this a priori relation to objects: How can reason assert something a priori about objects, determine them in advance prior to their being given in experience? How can reason go beyond itself, or go beyond its mere concepts and relate them to objects prior to their being given in experience? What is the ground of reason's a priori relation to objects? What is the ground of synthetic a priori judgments?

Synthetic a priori judgments trouble reason with itself and the trouble begetting character of them arise from the fact that they can be grounded neither empirically as in the case of synthetic a posteriori judgments nor logically as in the case of analytic judgments. So, synthetic a priori judgments need non-logical, extra-conceptual as well as non-empirical ground. In the **Introduction** Kant signals this non-logical and non-empirical ground by an "X" and calls it a mystery. He states that "a certain mystery here is concealed, and only upon its solution can the advance into the limitless field of the knowledge yielded by pure understanding be made sure and trustworthy" (A10n). However, this mystery refers to knowledge; it grounds the a priori knowledge of objects. The significance of this mysterious X arises from the fact that the problem of the synthetic a priori judgments cannot be posed as a purely

logical problem. However, this does not imply that the problem is free from any logical status. Reason's a priori relation to objects must be articulated in the form of a judgment and this articulation must exhibit a logically necessary and universal character in regard to the very definition of a priori. But, besides this logical issue, what is crucial for synthetic a priori judgments is that the concepts used as predicate and subject cannot be connected by mere analysis, rather the connection is achieved by means of a synthesis. Insofar as the connection is thought a priori, it cannot be established by an appeal to the objects of experience but must be grounded in pure synthesis. It is this pure synthesis which "for the sake of alone whole critique is undertaken" (A14/B28). The answer to the ground of the possibility of this pure synthesis is given in two sections of the *CPR*; in the Transcendental Deduction(s) of the Pure Concepts of Understanding and in the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding. These laborious works at the end reveal that the pure synthesis can only be attained by a wedding of reason and imagination. The mysterious X of the synthetic a priori judgments refers to the imagination having a productive power, and reason can set up its a priori relation to objects only by encountering with this power⁵.

The investigation into the possibility of metaphysics brings imagination to the foreground of critical philosophy in virtue of the revolution achieved in the direction of any philosophical investigation. The "Copernican Revolution" proposes a reversal in the attention of metaphysics from the objects of knowledge to the subject of knowledge, and addresses subjectivity as the sole ground of any knowledge and the very objectivity of this knowledge. Kant states that the possibility of a priori knowledge can only be explained by a recourse to subject's contribution in the formation of knowledge because "we can know a priori of things only what we

⁵ For a discussion of this mysterious X of synthetic a priori judgments and how it refers to imagination, see, John Rundell, "Creativity and Judgment" in *Rethinking Imagination*, ed. Gillian Robinson and John Rundell, Routledge, New York, 1994, pp.87-117

ourselves put into them" (Bxvii). So, to investigate into the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge is to uncover the subjective conditions of knowledge and Kant calls the knowledge attained by such an investigation transcendental:

I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori (A12/B26).

The transcendental knowledge does not concern with the content of knowledge but with the mode of knowing, of having knowledge, so it is sharply opposed to the transcendent knowledge which refers to going beyond the world of experience to the reality as it is in itself. Contrary to the term transcendent, transcendental refers going beyond any knowledge to its grounds: to the a priori elements which underlie any knowledge as its necessary condition. The term signifies the conditions of the a priori possibility of knowledge and in turn refers these conditions to the nature of human subjectivity. It is by means of such a referral that the possibility of a priori knowledge can no more be explained by an appeal to the rational order inherent to transcendent reality, but rather by a recourse to the a priori conditions which have their seat in the nature of human reason and its cognitive faculties.

In order to uncover such a priori conditions and demonstrate how they enable knowledge a priori possible, Kant begins his investigation by analysing the elements of human knowledge. He distinguishes two elements of human knowledge, namely intuitions and thought, and analyses each respectively in **Transcendental Aesthetic** and **Transcendental Analytic**. Kant finds the distinction of two elements of human knowledge or the two stems of human knowledge, namely, sensibility and understanding as so essential to the structure of human knowledge and continually emphasises the irreducibility of the distinction. However, imagination remains concealed in such a distinction and in the architectonic of *Critique of Pure Reason*, but nevertheless comes to the foreground of the investigation as a fundamental

faculty sustaining the unification of these two stems in order to make knowledge arise out of two distinct elements. The investigation into the grounds of the distinction and the need of their unification serve to characterise the role of imagination in the field of human knowledge.

2.1 The Distinction Between Sensibility and Understanding

The novelty of Kantian philosophy as it differs from previous philosophies of rationalism and empiricism lies in its insistence on the distinction between two faculties of the subject; sensibility and understanding. Kantian *Critique* begins with and proceeds from the affirmation of this distinction. At the end of the introduction, just before the main text, Kant states:

(...) there are two stems of human knowledge, namely sensibility and understanding, which spring perhaps from a common, but to us unknown, root. Through the former, objects are given to us; through the latter, they are thought. (A15/B29)

While both rationalism and empiricism took one of them as the fundamental source of knowledge and treated the other to differ in degree of confusion or liveliness, Kant insists that these two faculties cannot be assimilated to each other; they are completely distinct and different in nature. Their difference is an original difference; not a difference of degree but rather a difference in kind. These faculties refer to different powers or capacities of the subject and are based upon their functions. Sensibility is the “capacity of receiving representations”, and provides the immediate relation with the objects which Kant calls intuition. Understanding is the “power of knowing an object through these representations” and produces concepts out of its own spontaneity. Neither the function of any of those two faculties can be reduced to each other nor can they exchange their functions. Kant highlights this irreducible duality of sensibility and understanding by asserting their coequality: “To neither of these powers may a preference be given over the other” (A51/B74). But besides this radical duality, neither of these two stems is capable of yielding

knowledge on its own right, “only through their union can knowledge arise” (A52/B76). Kantian *Critique* is entirely devoted to the investigation of the nature of this union. The problem of their union or pure synthesis “for the sake of alone whole critique is undertaken” (A14/B28) both arises and attains its solution on the basis of this radical dualist structure of human knowledge. Although this dualist structure has priority in the formulation of the critical problem as pure syntheses and in the solution reached by the entire investigation, Kant nowhere gives an explicit account of the duality. He begins “from the point at which the common root of our faculty of knowledge divides and throws out two stems” (A835/B863) and analyses the two elements of knowledge first in isolation then, attempts to show their necessary unity in our knowledge of objects. But this synthetic method renders the distinction problematic. Many critics of Kant argue that if the two elements are necessarily unified in any experience, it becomes impossible to have any access to intuitions in isolation from conceptual representations and therefore to claim that they are fundamentally distinct⁶. Or beginning from Reinhold and Maimon, German Idealist philosophers claimed that their necessary unity cannot be deduced on the basis of prior assumption of their distinction, but rather must be deduced from their original unity⁷.

In *Logic*, Kant states that the distinction between sensibility and understanding as two heterogeneous stems of human knowledge can be viewed in different aspects⁸. By reflecting on our cognitions on the basis of these two faculties, we come up with the difference between intuitions and concepts. In this aspect sensibility is characterised as “faculty of intuitions” and understanding as “faculty of concepts”. Kant notes that, in this view, the distinction between sensibility and

⁶ For a discussion of such criticisms and their inadequacy, see Daniel C Kolb, “Thought and Intuition in Kant’s Critical System”, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 24, 1986, pp. 223-241.

⁷ See, Frederick C. Beiser, *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte*, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1987, esp. pp. 226-323.

understanding is a “logical distinction” and underlies the distinction between singular representations and general representations corresponding, respectively, to intuitions and concepts⁹. The distinction between sensibility and understanding can also be viewed from a different aspect which Kant calls “metaphysical” and which characterises sensibility as “faculty of receptivity” and understanding as “faculty of spontaneity”¹⁰. To view the distinction as a metaphysical distinction between receptivity and spontaneity supplies more account for revealing the origins and the philosophical significance of the distinction. In this section I argue that the metaphysical distinction rests on a metaphysical contention that human intellect is essentially finite and this finitude is manifested in Kant’s denial of intellectual intuition to human beings. Contrary to an intuitive understanding, human reason lacks the power of giving itself its object or bringing it forth out of its own spontaneity that it relies on some other faculty for relation to objects, namely on sensibility. Human knowledge rests on this prior receptivity for relation to objects and therefore it is marked with a dualist structure. The duality of sensibility and understanding and the resulting dualisms of intuition-concept, subject-object and appearances- things in themselves are based upon the finite subject’s relation to its objects.

Kant sets the very dualisms of human knowledge by means of a comparison with an ideal of knowledge where all these dualities of finite human knowledge are gathered into an original unity. *Intellectual intuition* is the term generally used in denoting such an original unity, which is also ascribed to the knowledge of God. The term articulates the original unity of differentiated elements of human knowledge and is linked up to the problem of overcoming the finitude of man in favour of infinitude of

⁸ Immanuel Kant, *Logic*, trans. Robert Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz, Dover Publications, New York, 1974, p. 40.

⁹Kant, *Logic*, p.40.

¹⁰Ibid., p.40.

the Absolute by Idealist philosophers¹¹. However, Kant uses the term as an *idea* in order to compare it with the dualist structure of human knowledge in its finitude and to draw the limits of human knowledge that cannot be exceeded. Heidegger directs our attention to this comparison: “the essence of finite human knowledge is illustrated by the contrast between it and the idea of infinite divine knowledge, or *intuitus originarius*”¹². Besides intellectual intuition, Kant uses different terms such as “original intuition”, “intuitive understanding”, “infinite understanding” in denoting the infinite divine knowledge and uses these terms in discussing different problems. These different usages render Kant’s appeal to the divine knowledge problematic, and lead to undermine its importance in Kant’s analysis of human knowledge¹³. As mentioned above, Kant’s problem is with the possibility of knowledge of objects and the relation to the objects. He gives the characterisation of this knowledge and this relation as:

In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, *intuition* is that through which it is in

¹¹See, Kenneth R. Westpal, “Kant, Hegel and “the” Fate of Intuitive Intellect”, in *The Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy*, ed. Sally Sedgwick, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp.283-305.

¹²Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problems of Metaphysics*, trans. Richard Taft, Indiana University Press, Indiana, 1997, p.17.

¹³It is not easy to decide whether Kant uses different terms such as original intuition, intuitive understanding as denoting a single meaning or in reference to logically independent problems. Moltke Gram argues contrary to what he calls “continuity thesis” that Kant uses the term not in a single meaning, but rather uses it in discussing different-independent problems and therefore gives it different meanings in the context of these problems. What Gram calls “continuity thesis” assumes a continuity in the use of notion from Kant through Fichte and Schelling and assumes that the notion denotes a univocal sense and a single problem in Kant. Contrary to this thesis, Gram claims that Kant uses the notion in three different ways in relation to three independent problems: 1- in describing an intellect that knows things-in-themselves independent of the conditions of sensibility. This problem is linked to the applicability of categories to objects, 2- in describing an intellect that would intuit the sum total of all phenomena and, 3- in describing an intellect that would create its own object. According to Gram, Kant uses the term intellectual intuition in discussing all these three problems, but these problems have nothing in common and stand entirely independent from each other. See, Moltke S. Gram, “Kant on Intellectual Intuition: The Continuity Thesis”, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 42, 1981, pp. 287-304. But as Westphal argues, in discussing Gram’s essay, there can be one case in which all these three accounts will be compatible; it is the case of God’s divine intuition of creation as a whole. He argues that the problem with Gram’s interpretation is his interpreting these three accounts within Kant’s transcendental idealist account of human knowledge. See, Kenneth R. Westpal, “Kant, Hegel and “the” Fate of Intuitive Intellect”, in *The Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy*, ed. Sally Sedgwick, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp.283-305. Gram’s basic claim about the use of intellectual intuition assumes that Kant uses the notion in discussing different problems of human knowledge. But a closer look on Kant’s usage will show us that Kant uses the term *in contrast* to dualist structure of human knowledge.

immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed. But intuition takes place only in so far as object is given to us (A19/B33).

In this first determination of knowledge as intuition, Kant opens up two different ways of immediate relation to objects. The immediate relation to objects is possible in so far as the object is given to us and they may be given in two alternative ways: either the object gives itself to the subject or the subject gives itself the object¹⁴. The first way represents human sensible intuition, which is dependent on and limited by the affection of objects. The second way represents an original-unlimited intuition, which is not limited by the object intuited but rather original in the sense that object originates in intuition. These two ways of intuition Kant calls respectively, derivative intuition (*intuitus derivativus*) and original intuition (*intuitus originarius*) (B72), and they serve to characterise the radical difference between dualist structure of human knowledge and unitary structure of divine knowing.

2.1.1 Unitary Structure of Divine Knowing

Kant directly ascribes original intuition to the mode of intuition of divine being and characterises the essence of this mode of intuition as creativity. Original intuition, in its immediate representation, brings the object forth, creates it in the very act of intuiting. In such an intuition, the origin of the object does not lie outside the subject, but rather subject contains the very origin of the object within itself. It gives itself the object, lets it come into existence. The object springs forth in intuition; it does not stand outside the sphere of the intuition or does not stand in itself as released from that intuition. The original intuition is not separated from its object, but is itself in an immediate unity with its object. The subject and object in this act of original intuition are immediately present to each other in such a way that original

¹⁴John Sallis, *The Gathering of Reason*, Ohio University Press, Ohio, 1980, p.20.

intuition prescribes the unity of subject and object¹⁵. This unity of subject and object in original intuition implies the completeness of the intuition. Since the intuition brings forth the object in immediate unity with itself, it is immediately in full possession of the object in its coming into being. In bringing forth the object into existence, the divine intuition has the object totally in its vision; it possesses the object in its full presence. Posed in its full presence, the object stands as it is in itself, it discloses itself in its complete essence. In this sense, original intuition is infinite and absolute intuition. It has no exteriority, it gives itself its object from itself and in this giving it brings the object forth in its full essence. The essence of the object completely coincides with its existence; the object is given in its wholeness and unique singularity. So, infinite intuition is a direct and immediate vision into the essence of the object and it is so complete in its possession of the object in its full presence to its vision. This completeness of divine intuition implies that divine knowing is full intuition. Insofar as divine being possesses its object in its wholeness and full presence in its intuition, it does not need anything further in knowing its object; its knowing coincides with original intuition. In this sense Kant excludes thinking from divine knowing by asserting that God does not think: "for all of his knowledge must be intuition, and not thought, which always involves limitations" (B72). Knowing by means of thought is a knowing, which includes limitations and insofar as such a limitation cannot be attributed to God, his knowledge is full intuition.

Kant describes divine knowing as full intuition in **Transcendental Aesthetic** in order to compare it with human intuition which always depends on prior existence of objects and therefore remains incomplete and in need of determining activity of

¹⁵John Sallis, in his book on Kant; *Gathering of Reason*, investigates into four-fold unity, which are prescribed by intellectual intuition and into four-fold corresponding disunity in finite human knowledge. Sallis states that the four unities prescribed by infinite knowing through intellectual intuition are: the unity of subject-object; the unity of intuition; the unity of thought; and the unity of intuition-thought. My analysis of Kant's usage of intellectual intuition follows that of Sallis's. At this point, it is necessary to note that the investigation into divine knowing, as Sallis states, is not a matter of knowledge of God, rather it is a matter of situating human knowing. See John Sallis, *The Gathering of Reason*, Ohio University Press, Ohio, 1980, especially pp.18-40.

thought. Divine knowing as full intuition gets its importance in this comparison, but to treat it as full intuition never exhaust the essence of ideal knowledge, that consist in divine knowing. Heidegger claims that the essence of all knowledge lies in intuition and divine knowing as full intuition is a sufficient description of the ideal of knowledge, and the difference between divine knowing and human knowing gets its departure from the difference of divine mode of intuition and human mode of intuition. He claims that while divine knowing is full intuition, human knowing requires thinking and this requirement is an essential consequence of finitude of human intuition; its dependence on prior existence of objects. Heidegger is quick in drawing the essence of knowledge as intuition from the context of Transcendental Aesthetic. Heimsoeth states in contrast to Heidegger:

It is a conviction of Kant's, which endures to his last period, that complete and immediate knowledge is present only where the subject posits the object of knowledge. Knowledge is always knowledge primarily a priori, and that always means in this context: a purely spontaneous activity¹⁶.

Kant ascribes spontaneity to the power of thought and purely spontaneous activity means pure thinking. In **Transcendental Analytic** human knowledge is again characterised in comparison to ideal of knowledge, which this time posited as pure thinking and gets the names of “**intellectual** intuition” and “**intuitive understanding**”. In the context of **Transcendental Analytic**, thought gains primacy over intuition and this time the ideal of knowledge is characterised from the perspective of thinking; it is posited as self-sufficient thinking and unlike human thinking, it does not rely on a faculty of intuition.

Kant firstly describes divine knowing as original intuition, but also gives another name to this intuition. He states that original intuition is also an intellectual intuition (B72). It is intellectual because the object intuited is not a sensible object as it appears under the forms of sensibility, but it is the object in its full presence as it is

in itself. The object as it is in itself is not sensible, but is intellectual¹⁷. Both in the framework of *Dissertation* and *Critique* what is intellectual is also determined as what is being thought. Kant directly ascribes non-sensible intuition to understanding (A249). Divine being in its act of knowing, creates, brings forth, produces the object known and creation or producing is an act of spontaneity. And “power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called understanding”. (A51/B75) In this context, Kant uses the term intuitive understanding in denoting divine knowledge:

(...) an understanding which is itself intuitive (as for example, a divine understanding which should not represent to itself given objects, but through whose representation the objects should themselves be given or produced) (...) (B145)

Intuitive understanding is an understanding, which gives itself its object and thus is in no need for another faculty (intuition), which will supply understanding with its object. The original intuition, which was the name for divine knowing in **Transcendental Aesthetic**, now becomes intuitive understanding in **Transcendental Analytic**. In **Transcendental Aesthetic**, divine knowledge was self-sufficient intuition, now in **Transcendental Analytic** it is self-sufficient thought, infinite understanding¹⁸. As self-sufficient it does not depend on a faculty of intuition for its manifold, but rather is essentially detached from intuition. In this sense it is full thinking. Whether the divine knowledge is described as original intuition or intuitive

¹⁶Heinz Heimsoeth, “Metaphysical Motives in the Development of Critical Idealism”, in *Kant: Disputed Questions*, ed. Moltke Gram, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1967, p.161.

¹⁷The usage of the term intellectual in this way goes back to Kant’s distinction between phenomena and noumena and his further distinction between logical and real use of intellect in his *Inaugural Dissertation*. In *Dissertation* Kant states that the knowledge of phenomena; the knowledge of appearances given under the forms of sensibility, is gained by the logical use of intellect. But there is also a real use of intellect by which the intellect determines objects according to concepts that are not derived from sense but produced by pure activity of itself. The knowledge of noumena; the knowledge of things in themselves can be gained by intellect only in its real use, namely by determining things in themselves with the a priori concepts of itself. In this sense things in themselves are purely intellectual. Immanuel Kant, “Dissertation on the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World”, in *Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation and Early Writings on Space*, trans. John Handyside, Hyperion Press, Connecticut, 1979, pp. 35-85.

¹⁸John Sallis, *The Gathering of Reason*, Ohio University Press, Ohio, 1980, p.23.

understanding, still a question remains: Does the concept of original intuition denote the same thing with intuitive understanding? Or, if God does not think in his original intuition, can pure thinking be ascribed to its knowing? At this point it is necessary to remember the passage where Kant excludes thinking from divine knowing: "...we are careful to remove the conditions of time and space from his intuition –for all his knowledge must be intuition and not thought, which always involves limitations" (B72). Here Kant defines thought as involving limitations and excludes such a thought from divine knowing. And he also excludes the conditions of sensibility, time and space from that divine knowing. The question what kind of limitations can thought involve and divine knowing does not involve finds its answer in the second excluded item: forms of sensibility¹⁹. Insofar as the object is limited by the forms of sensibility, thought involves such limitations of the object. The thought, which is excluded from divine knowing, is human thought, but not all thought. In original intuition the object is not given from outside, but is created, posited in the act of knowing. And since creation or positing is an act of spontaneity, original intuition must involve such spontaneity, the power of thought. The object in original intuition is not firstly created and then intuited, but rather is posited in its being intuited and vice versa. So, intuition that is the reception of object as it is in itself, is at the same time a spontaneous act of positing. In divine knowing intuition and thought forms a unity. The terms "**intellectual** intuition" and "**intuitive** understanding" denote this unity of thought and intuition. The original intuition of **Transcendental Aesthetic** denotes the same thing with the intuitive understanding of **Transcendental Analytic**. At this point Sallis states:

¹⁹Gram notes that a logically consistent concept of intellectual intuition can be given through the possibility of conceiving an intellect that is acquainted with the same things, which we intuit under the forms of sensibility in the absence of those forms. And Kant's denial of intellectual intuition to human beings depends on the distinction between the objects as we intuit them under the forms of sensibility and objects independent of sensibility. For a further discussion of this relation of the notion of intellectual intuition with the forms of sensibility and the distinction between appearances and things in themselves, see Moltke S. Gram, "Kant on Intellectual Intuition: The Continuity Thesis", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 42, 1981, pp.289-295.

In both cases it is a matter, not of one faculty to the exclusion of the other, but rather of their unity. It is a matter of thinking that unity from two different perspectives: In the Transcendental Aesthetic the unity of intuition and thought is considered from the perspective of intuition; in the Transcendental Analytic this same unity is considered from the perspective of thought or understanding²⁰.

Divine understanding immediately represents its object through positing it in unity with intuition. Divine knowing is essentially consisted in this unity of the act of positing and intuiting. In contrast to divine knowing, human knowing is essentially marked with a radical dualism of these two faculties. Since human intuition rests on affections of objects, the object of such intuition is not posited by a spontaneous act of thought in unity with intuition itself. Instead of such a unity of positing and intuiting, there is a separation between receptivity and spontaneity, namely, there are two stems of human knowledge: sensibility and understanding.

2.1.2 Dualist Structure of Human Knowing and Its Finite Character

The dualist structure of human knowledge gets its departure from the mode of its relation to objects. The immediate relation to objects is provided by the intuitions, but human intuition is dependent on affections of objects. Rather creating its own object of intuition, human intuition is characterised by its capacity to receive representations. Human intuition is not original but sensible; it receives the representations present to its sensibility. This sensible intuition lacks the completeness of original intuition; rather grasping the object in its singular unity, human sensible intuition only receives the immediate representations of objects and can only yield undetermined appearances. This incompleteness of intuition always requires thinking activity in order to determine what is intuitively given. Without such a determining activity, intuitions cannot yield knowledge on their own right. But from the side of thinking, human understanding is also not capable of yielding knowledge

²⁰ John Sallis, *The Gathering of Reason*, Ohio University Press, Ohio, 1980, p.23.

on its own right. Human understanding cannot posit its objects in its pure thinking and always looks for intuitions to supply its content. Insofar as the objects are given through intuitions, human understanding can never have an immediate relation to objects, but only has the mediate representations of them. Human understanding is not intuitive, but discursive; rather having an immediate representation of an object it thinks through general representations (concepts) which bring many representations under one representation by means of common marks. The receptivity of sensibility yields intuitions and the spontaneity of understanding produces concepts. Corresponding to these two elements of knowledge, intuitions and concepts, the investigation of the elements of knowledge is two fold: **Transcendental Aesthetic** as the science of sensibility and **Transcendental Logic** as the science of understanding.

2.1.2.1 Human Sensible Intuition

In contrast to the unity of subject and object involved in original-infinite intuition of divine being, human intuition properly takes its departure from the disunity of subject and object²¹. Human intuition corresponds to the way in which the object gives itself to subject. Human intuition proceeds from the side of the object and is dependent on the givenness of the object. After stating that “intuition takes place only in so far as the object is given to us”, Kant continues: “This again is possible, to man at least, in so far as the mind is affected in a certain way” (A19/B33). Human intuition rests on this affection of objects and is not capable of creating or producing what is intuited in the very act of intuition, but rather is a passive faculty, which lets objects to give or announce themselves. Kant calls this mode of intuition “derivative

²¹ Sallis states that if divine knowing is characterised by four forms of unity, then human knowing in contrast to divine knowing, contains corresponding four forms of disunity: the disunity of subject and object; the disunity of intuition; the disunity of thought and the disunity of thought and intuition. And it is these four forms of disunity that determines or constitutes the finitude of human knowing. See Sallis, *The Gathering of Reason*, p.26.

intuition”; the intuited is derived from the object, which exists on its own right, independent from the subject. This radical breach between subject and object in human intuition constitutes the finite character of human intuition. Whereas the essence of infinite intuition is creativity, the essence of finite human intuition lies in its dependence on the prior existence of object. If human intuition takes place by the affection of objects, the essence of this intuition lies in its capacity to receive representations, namely, in its receptivity. Kant calls this capacity of receiving representations, sensibility. Sensibility means receptivity; being dependent on the affection of objects and, in this sense, human intuition is a sensible intuition²². Sensibility marks the finitude of human intuition and this finitude is carried further when Kant asserts that sensations are effects of an object: “The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by it, is sensation” (A20/B34). Sensations are effects of an object or mere modifications of subject’s receptivity. As being modifications of the subject, sensations are radically distinct from the object as it stands in itself. From the side of the subject, intuitions are subject’s modifications and, from the side of the object, they are appearances of the object.

Appearances as Kant calls them are “undetermined objects of empirical intuition” (A20/B34), but still this definition does not specify what belongs essentially to empirical intuition. Appearances, as undetermined objects, are not yet determined by thinking, but nevertheless are not devoid of any determination. To appearances belong the sensations, which Kant calls the matter of appearances as the effects of an object, but the manifold of sensations are not encountered as a confused muddle,

²²Heidegger warns us against the view that the finitude of human intuition results from the fact that affection takes place through sense organs. Our intuition is not sensible because we intuit through sense organs, but rather the essence of sensibility lies in the fact that our intuition depends on prior existence of objects and the finitude of our intuition is not the result of the limitation of sense organs but constitutes the essence of our sensibility. Heidegger states that “Kant for the first time attains a concept of sensibility which is ontological rather than sensualistic”. Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problems of Metaphysics*, trans. Richard Taft, Indiana University Press, Indiana, 1997, p.19.

but as being ordered in certain relations. Appearances also have a form which “allows (the manifold of appearance) of being ordered in certain relations (A20/B34). Further, this form in which the sensations is ordered “cannot itself be a sensation” and “must already lie ready for the sensations a priori in the mind, and so must allow of being considered apart from all sensation” (A20/B34). Considered apart from sensations this form is “pure form of sensible intuitions in general” and “may also itself be called pure intuition” (A21/B35). It is by means of introducing pure intuition that the investigation of human intuition takes its transcendental character. Kant opens his investigation in **Transcendental Aesthetic** by saying what generally belongs to any knowledge of objects, but his concern is not the knowledge of objects, but the conditions of the possibility of a priori knowledge of objects as articulated in synthetic a priori judgments. All synthetic judgments refer to objects as the ground of the synthesis of the concepts of subject and predicate, and insofar as the objects are given in intuition, all synthetic judgments need intuitions that make synthesis possible. But the intuition needed for the possibility of synthesis cannot be an empirical intuition for synthetic a priori judgments. So, a pure intuition is necessary for the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments.

In order to uncover pure intuitions, Kant states that first sensibility must be isolated from understanding and further everything empirical must be put off. But to isolate sensibility from everything that belongs to knowledge along with it, renders the arguments of **Transcendental Aesthetic** problematic. Such isolation can only be achieved at the cost of concealing imagination as a mediating faculty between understanding and sensibility. Kant reveals the function of imagination in sensibility in the **Transcendental Deduction** and the **Schematism**. In the Aesthetic Kant defines sensibility in regard to its receptivity, that is, its passivity. In the next chapters I shall argue that sensibility, besides its receptive character, also involves a spontaneous activity of imagination. I also discuss the issue briefly below. But,

besides this concealment of imagination, such isolation is indeed necessary to draw the distinction of sensibility from understanding. The main arguments of the Aesthetic are put forward in order to draw such distinction.

The main argument of the Aesthetic begins with Kant's assertion of space and time as pure intuitions and hence as the forms of sensibility; space as the form of outer sense and time as the form of inner sense. Kant uses four arguments for the demonstration of space and time as a priori intuitions in the metaphysical exposition of these concepts. It is generally recognised that the first two arguments of the expositions are devoted to show that space and time are a priori and the other two arguments are devoted to show that they are intuitions. I shall just discuss the arguments generated for space since the same arguments hold for time. In the first argument Kant states that space is not an empirical concept derived from outer experience but itself must be presupposed in order to represent things as spatially distinct (both distinct from the subject and distinct from each other). Such a representation of things spatially distinct presupposes the representation of space. And in the second argument Kant asserts what he negatively asserted in the first argument positively that space is a necessary a priori representation as the condition of the representations of appearances. These two expositions give the main argument concerning space as the form of outer sense; the first establishes that it is a priori form of sensibility as the presupposition of outer sense and second establishes its necessity. The representation of space cannot be removed from the representation of appearances; however, space can be still represented when the appearances removed. This means that space can be represented on its own right. While Kant gives this argument in order to prove that space is the necessary condition of the possibility of appearances, he also prepares the claim that space can be represented as an intuition. In claiming that space is an intuition, he generates his arguments in regard to the distinction between concept and intuition.

Space as an intuitive representation radically differs from discursive representations and it is due to Kant's aim to draw this distinction that imagination remains concealed in generating the representation of space as pure intuition. The first argument for the intuition thesis states the difference between a discursive concept and an intuition in regard to the one-many relationship obtained in these different representations. A concept is a general representation containing marks or partial conceptions and represents what is common to these different representations. A concept is a composite formed out of its components which are logically prior to the whole and it is a discursive representation which runs through these prior marks and grasps what is common to many. On the other hand, space is a single representation, it is essentially one and the particular spaces are the parts of this one, single space. Space cannot be represented through joining together particular spaces, but the "one all-embracing space" precedes all its parts. The parts of space presuppose and can be given in and through this one space and particular spaces are determined by introducing limitations to the whole. Space is not formed as a general representation out of pre-given elements, but it is itself given prior to all its parts. Space is a single, one representation but it is also a unity which is given prior to all its parts. The unity of space and its givenness is the matter of the fourth exposition. The second argument for the intuition thesis starts by stating that "space is represented as an infinite given magnitude" and proceeds with a comparison of discursive representation and an intuitive representation in respect of the different senses of infinity involved in those representations. Every concept in regard to its extension involves an infinite number of possible representations *under* itself as their common character, but no concept can involve infinite number of representations *within* itself in regard to its intension²³. On the contrary, space involves infinite number of parts within itself or "all the parts of the space coexist ad infinitum". Insofar as every part of

²³ Such an infinite concept; a concept which contains within itself an infinite number of other concepts

space is a limitation of the whole space, space as a whole underlies the particular spaces which are limitable. However large a space can be it is always bounded by space or always in space. In this sense, the infinity of space implies the limitlessness of space.

To sum up, these four expositions reveal that space and time are forms of intuiting, but in addition to this, they are themselves intuitions which are originally given as unified wholes. But this givenness of unity in pure intuiting transgresses the borders of Aesthetic. First of all, space and time cannot be given in the way as the empirical objects are given in intuition, space and time can never come about in terms of sensation. But then the question arises: "If they are not given as objects of intuition, in what sense can they be said to be given at all?"²⁴ The possible answer to this question can be found in Kant's identification of space and time with original representation. Original representation implies that the givenness of space and time is an original givenness in the sense that the given cannot originate from the side of the object, but originates from the side of the subject. In such an original representation subject gives itself something out of itself, this something is not an object created in the act of intuition as in the case of original intuition of divine being. But also this something is not an object given through sensation; it is nothing in comparison with empirical things, but it is still something which Kant calls *ens imaginarium*, being of imagination²⁵. Space and time as infinite given magnitudes can never be represented as an object, but they are pre-intuited²⁶ (given) as unified

as its component parts is the Leibnizian complete concept of an individual substance.

²⁴ Henry A. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, Yale University Press, Michigan, 1983, p.94.

²⁵ Kant rejects the possibility of grasping space and time as objects that are intuited. They are not themselves objects which are intuited, but rather they are nothing, empty intuitions. In his division of the concept of nothing in Concepts of Reflection, Kant calls them *ens imaginarium*. They are nothing in regard to empirical objects; they are not themselves objects but formal conditions of objects (A291/B347). For a further discussion of pure space and time as *ens imaginarium* see, Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Indiana University Press, Indiana, 1997, pp. 74-90.

²⁶ If space and time are not objects that are intuited, they are the pre-intuited frameworks of every intuition. They are not what is intuited, but they are also not intuitions without what is intuited. They are pre-intuited with every intuition. Allison borrows the expression "pre-intuition" from Melnick and

wholes with every determinate intuition as the ground of the possibility of limitation to particular spaces and times. Space and time are the pre-intuited frameworks or essential structures that they are forms of intuition. Space and time as given, and as original representations imply an activity from the side of the subject, but what is crucial for this activity is that it is not the spontaneous activity of thinking, but preliminary to such spontaneity it is the activity of imagination.

Not only the givenness of space and time implies such an activity, but also the unity of space and time refers to it. In the Aesthetic, Kant treats this unity as unproblematic, but in Analytic he returns to it and states that it presupposes a synthesis, and he also distinguishes this synthesis from conceptual synthesis. The problem of the unity of intuition and the nature of synthesis which is the source of this unity is the issue of the famous footnote attached to §26 of the Second Edition of Transcendental Deduction where Kant makes a distinction between form of intuition and formal intuition. The footnote is attached to a passage in which Kant states that space and time are not merely forms of sensible intuition but they are themselves intuitions which contain a manifold that is determined with respect to its unity (B160). He states that form of intuition gives the manifold and formal intuition gives unity of representation (160n). He identifies form of intuition with manifoldness and the formal intuition with the unity. The nature of this unity is the issue of the footnote. There Kant tells that he discussed this unity in the Aesthetic and attributed it to sensibility, but now he states that it presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses, but also does not belong to the concepts of understanding, but still belongs to space and time. The synthesis is due to the third faculty, transcendental power of imagination which was hidden in the preliminary synopsis²⁷ of two stems of

make use of it in explaining the givenness of space and time. See, Henry A. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, Yale University Press, Michigan, 1983, pp. 94-98.

²⁷ I borrow the term synopsis from Bernard Freydberg. He uses the notion in a quite complex way but as he mentions it is at least in Kantian lines. Kant maintains that insofar sense contains a manifold, it involves a synopsis; these manifold must be seen together. But in order for this synopsis take place, a synthesis, putting together must take place (A114). Every synopsis is based upon a synthesis.

knowledge as treated in Aesthetic. In the Aesthetic this synthesis remains concealed, but it has already taken place in order to make the synopsis possible. Space and time as infinite given magnitudes; given unities or as pure intuitions are products of imagination. But this conclusion about space and time gives rise to two problems; one is the relation of this synthesis to understanding and the other is its relation to sensibility. It is the first relation which is discussed in the footnote. In that footnote Kant characterises this synthesis as the effect of understanding on sensibility (in that the understanding determines sensibility), and therefore it is subject to categories. Such a characterisation distorts the distinction of sensibility from understanding, and dissolves sensibility into understanding²⁸. Although the solution to this problem cannot be given in this chapter before examining how understanding determines sensibility through synthesis of imagination, I initially take the position of not identifying formal intuition with the pure intuition as a given unified whole²⁹. Formal intuition (of space) is the representation of space as an object and it is subject to categories through the determination of sensibility by understanding, but pure intuition is the *pre-intuited* framework as a unity which grounds the possibility of the limitation of its parts by the determining activity of understanding. Any unity of determinate representation of space presupposes the original unity of space which is

Freydberg broadens the usage of the term synopsis as denoting anything given to us at all. (p.15) By means of such broadening, Freydborg maintains that *CPR* has its own synopsis and an already occurred synthesis which enables this synopsis. The synopsis of *CPR* refers to the oversimplified theory of two stems of knowledge; sensibility and understanding. Imagination, although rendering this synopsis possible, remains concealed and implies the depths of *CPR*. To isolate sensibility as treated in Aesthetic can be achieved on the lines of this synopsis, which is based upon a concealed synthesis of imagination. See, Bernard Freydborg, *Imagination and Depth in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Peter Lang, Literature and Sciences of Man Vol. 6, 1994, esp. pp. 11-42.

²⁸ Heidegger accuses Marburg School for explicating forms of intuition in terms of formal intuition and dissolving transcendental aesthetic into transcendental logic. Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1997, p.90. The mentioned footnote; the distinction between form of intuition and formal intuition constitutes one of the basic tenets of Heidegger's controversy with Marburg School.

²⁹ Throughout this study I do not decide explicitly whether pure intuition is identifiable with formal intuition. Rather than deciding on the issue once and for all, I prefer to mark the transformation of the problem of pure intuition into deeper levels in a way to prepare the unconcealment of the power of imagination in producing pure intuition that remains concealed in the Aesthetic. Only towards the end

itself given by more original synthesis. Besides the problem of the relation of this synthesis to the understanding, another problem arises with respect to the relation of the pure manifold of space and time to the unity of space and time which contain within themselves the manifold. In the Aesthetic Kant characterises space and time with respect to their oneness (singularity) and wholeness (unity), but in Analytic, he states that they contain a pure manifold. Since Kant identifies pure intuition with form of intuition in the Aesthetic, Henry Allison introduces a distinction between two senses of the form of intuition in order to capture the manifoldness of space and time³⁰. Form of intuition can mean either “form of intuiting”, as a capacity or disposition to intuit or “form of the intuited” as the essential structure of the objects intuited. Form of intuited characterises space and time as single unified wholeness, as the pre-intuited framework of the intuited and form of intuiting refers to the subjective constitution of our mind, to its receptive capacity that supplies the pure manifold of intuition. This pure manifold is given through and in original representations of space and time as single unified wholes, but it is supplied by the form of intuiting, our subjective capacity of receptivity and space and time as unified wholes are intuitive representations of this manifold (not as contained under itself, but rather within itself). I have characterised space and time as pure intuitions as the products of imagination, but space and time are not the products of imagination in the sense that we freely create them in our imagination. On the contrary, these products of imagination are possible only if they contain within themselves the manifold supplied by our mode of receptivity. This means that pure intuition is possible if it contains the forms of its own receptivity, and the reason of the spatiotemporal character of our manifold of intuition is due to our nature of sensibility, not to our imagination on its own right. Allison states that pure intuition is

of the study, in my discussion on the schematism (Section 4.4), I argue about the issue explicitly and claim that pure intuition and formal intuition are identical.

³⁰ Henry A. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, Yale University Press, Michigan, 1983, p.97.

possible if it represents as its content the form of the intuited (the formal features of objects intuited) and this form determines objects in virtue of the form of intuiting (subjective constitution of our mind, its receptive capacity)³¹. This argument also constitutes the transcendental ideality of space and time that they do not represent any property of things in themselves or their relation to one another, but they are only forms of appearances. Space and time as pure intuitions do not contain any property of things in themselves when they are considered apart from their relation to subjective conditions of intuition. Therefore, human intuition is “nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things which we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them as being” (A42/B59).

Human intuition is essentially remote from the things in themselves and while divine intuition brings the object forth in its full essence and thus is complete, human intuition is not capable of grasping the inner essence of the object and therefore lacks the completeness of its intuition. Human intuition never coincides with itself, never encloses itself on its own intuition and human knowing is firstly and essentially determined by this incompleteness³². This incompleteness of human intuition is further determined by its fragmented character: “every appearance contains a manifold” and they “occur in mind separately and singly” (A120). Human intuition yields a dispersed manifold of appearances and Kant calls these appearances as “undetermined object” (A20/B34). Human intuition is not capable of grasping the object in its wholeness and unique singularity; in its full determinacy, but just possesses undetermined manifold of appearances and therefore is not self-sufficient, but is in need of determining activity; i.e. thought to gather the fragmented manifold into unity. In this sense Kant describes thinking as a means directed to intuition; thinking is in service of intuition in order to repair the limitations of intuition;

³¹ Henry A. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, Yale University Press, Michigan, 1983, p.107.

³² See, Brian Hansford Bowles, “Sensibility and Transcendence in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics”, *Philosophy Today*, Winter 2000, pp.347-365.

determine the undetermined manifold of intuition. While divine knowing is constituted with original intuition, human knowing is constituted by unification of thinking and intuition.

2.1.2.2 Human Discursive Thought

Kant's analysis of human thinking takes its departure from his statement that there are two stems of knowledge; sensibility and understanding. Sensibility is analysed in isolation from thinking in **Transcendental Aesthetic**, the science of sensibility. Now understanding will be analysed under the general label logic. Kant firstly determines understanding in general with respect to its opposition to sensibility and this opposition is rooted in the difference of human understanding from divine understanding. While divine understanding is intuitive, posits its object in unity with its intuition, human understanding lacks such a capacity of intuitive positing and therefore instead of an immediate representation of objects, it can only yield a mediate knowledge of them. Its relation to objects is mediated through their representations in intuition supplied by the faculty of sensibility. Rather being an intuitive faculty, human understanding is a discursive faculty of thinking.

Kant calls discursive thinking "cognition through concepts" and defines a concept as "a general representation or a representation of what is common to several objects, a representation, therefore, so far as it may be contained in different objects"³³. Concepts, in contrast to intuitions, cannot represent things immediately in their singularity, but represent them mediately by means of common features which are also able to be predicable to other objects. In this sense, a concept unifies several representations into one representation through holding them together by means of a mark that is a property common to them. Whatever its content may be, a concept as regards to its form is always universal or general. The generality of

concept lies in its being contained in several different things, being able to be attributed to a plurality of possible objects. But this generality as the form of a concept is never given through experience, but produced by understanding: “the form of a concept, as a discursive presentation, is always made”³⁴. Concepts as regards to their form originate from the spontaneity of understanding. Unlike sensibility, understanding is productive; it produces the form of concepts out of its own spontaneity by bringing many under one. In his *Logic*, Kant remarks that the form of a concept is generated by a series of logical acts of understanding. These logical acts are *comparison*, *reflection* and *abstraction*. Comparison is the act of likening different representations to one another; reflection is the act of reflecting on what is common to those different representations and abstraction is the act of removing the specific differences³⁵. Kant gives the example of producing the concept of a tree: by comparing a fir, a willow and a linden tree and noting their difference in respect to their trunk, branches, leaves and so forth, then by reflecting on what is common to them i.e., trunk, branches, leaves, and by abstracting from the other aspects which they differ (size, shape, etc.). These three acts produce the generality of a concept, but Kant notes that reflection is the primary act and comparison and abstraction are subordinate acts³⁶. The act of reflection attributes a partial representation to more than one object as a common property regardless of their difference. The act of reflection reveals the discursive nature of human thinking: it represents an object not in its singular representation but only mediately by means of other representations. Reflection brings about concepts as discursive unities and at the level of conceptualisation the basic act of thinking emerges as unification. In *CPR*, Kant calls this basic act of unification as function: “Whereas all intuitions rest

³³ Immanuel Kant, *Logic*, trans. Robert Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz, Dover Publications, New York, 1974, §1.

³⁴ Ibid. §4.

³⁵ Ibid. §6.

³⁶ Ibid. §6

on affections, concepts rest on functions. By 'function' I mean the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation" (A68/B93). Concepts rest on spontaneous function of unification and the basic activity of thinking is functioning in the manner of unifying. The act of unification of thinking at the level of conceptualisation becomes more evident in the way in which concepts are used. Kant asserts that "the only use which understanding can make of these concepts is to judge by means of them" (A68/B93). According to Kant, discursive knowledge is judgmental and only through judgments concepts can be applied to objects and in this sense he characterises concepts as "predicates of possible judgments" (A69/B93).

Although Kant gives different definitions of judgment both in *Logic* and *Critique*, his general definition that can be treated in formal logic establishes a connection between conceptualisation and activity of judgment. In *Logic* he states: "A judgment is the representation of the unity of the consciousness of various representations, or the representation of their relation insofar as they constitute a concept"³⁷. In this definition Kant establishes a connection between judgment and forming a complex concept. And this interconnection between conceptualisation and judgment is given more explicitly in the definition given in section **The Logical Employment of the Understanding** in *Critique*. After pointing out that no concept can relate to an object immediately and therefore stating judgment as the mediate knowledge of an object as the representation of representation of it, he continues:

In every judgment there is a concept which holds of many representations, and among them of a given representation that is immediately related to an object. Thus in the judgment, 'all bodies are divisible', the concept of the divisible applies to various other concepts, but is here applied in particular to the concept of body, and this concept again to certain appearances that present themselves to us. These objects, therefore, are mediately represented through the concept of divisibility. Accordingly, all judgments are functions of unity among our representations; instead of an immediate representation, a higher representation,

³⁷ Ibid, §17

which comprises the immediate representation and various others, is used in knowing the object, and thereby much possible knowledge is collected into one (A68-69/B93/94).

This definition characterises judgment as concept subordination by means of which the objects contained under the subject-concept are subsumed with various others under the predicate-concept³⁸. In a judgment, two concepts, that is, subject and predicate are brought into relation by subordinating the subject concept under predicate concept and this subordination of concepts is at the same time subsumption of objects under the subordinated concepts. In order to explicate such a relation Kant introduces the term *x* as denoting the objects subsumed under the concept in his definition of judgment in *Logic*: “To everything *x*, to which the concept *A* belongs, belongs also the concept *B*”³⁹. For the example, “all bodies are divisible”, all set of *x*’s thought under the concept of body, or subsumed under the concept of body are also thought with various other *x*’s through the concept of divisibility. Here the concept of body stands in a direct relation to certain intuitions of the objects and these objects are mediately represented through a concept of greater universality, the concept of divisibility. It is in this sense that judgment is “a higher representation” and “much possible knowledge is collected into one”. The definition of judgment given in *Logic* as “the representation of the relation of various representations, insofar as they constitute a concept” refers to the subsumption of what is thought under the concept *A* with other various representations under a concept *B*. Judgment as “functions of unity among our representations”, also serves to underline the same relation of conceptualisation and judgment; unifying various representations under a concept. Kant explains such a connection more clearly when he states that every judgment contains two predicates. Every concept in bringing what is common to

³⁸ For a further discussion of judgment as concept subordination see, Béatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of Critique of Pure Reason*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1998, pp. 85-90.

³⁹ Kant, *Logic*, §36.

many under a single representation function to determine those many representations; it asserts something of the representations, that is, it assigns a predicate. In this sense concepts are predicates of possible judgments and cannot be reduced to logical predicates and judgment is the comparison of these predicates with one another and assertion of that they pertain to the same identical x^{40} . In a judgment this x which is thought through the predicates that constitute subject-concept is also thought through the predicates that constitute predicate-concept.

All the analyses of judgment and its relation to conceptualisation reveal characterisation of thinking in a two fold manner: Firstly, thinking is characterised both at the level of concept-formation and at the level of judgment as function of unification. Judging is essentially unifying, it produces unity among our representations and the functions of understanding (logical forms of judgment) can be discovered through examining various functions of unity in judgments (A69/B94). Secondly, thinking is characterised in its relation to objects. Judgment is not merely a combination of concepts, but it is an act of understanding in its thought of objects. Kant insists on this relation to objects even for analytic judgments by introducing x which denotes the intuition of objects as contained under concepts. But what is decisive in this relation is that how this x as the singular intuition of an object is generated as to be subsumed under concepts cannot be given in the analysis of thinking in isolation from sensibility. The x of the judgment indicates the limits of formal logic that treats thinking in abstraction from the content of thinking and conceals its dependence on synthesis of imagination. The relation of thinking to objects cannot be treated apart from its intrinsic connection with sensibility. This intrinsic connection is the theme of transcendental logic and it introduces imagination as the third fundamental faculty alongside two stems of knowledge as sustaining the connection by its transcendental power of synthesis. I shall discuss the way Kant

⁴⁰ Henry A. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, Yale University Press, Michigan, 1983, p.71.

introduces imagination in the next section. I end this section by comparing human thinking with divine thinking.

Insofar as human understanding cannot supply its object out of its own spontaneity, it always directs itself to something given, to the manifold of intuitions. It cannot generate immediate representations of objects but only mediate representations by means of a higher representation. Human thought cannot unify the manifold of intuitions into a singular essence of the object and cannot gather its object fully present with all its determinations in a way akin to that of intellectual intuition, rather it determines its object by unifying it with various others under a generic unity. Thought necessarily moves away from immediate representation to a higher representation in determining its object, and thus necessarily is discursive. Discursive and mediate nature of human thought reveal its finitude; its through-going dependence on the manifold of intuition. Hence, spontaneity of thought; its positing of unity always remains relative to a given manifold. It cannot posit the unity of all the determinations of the object in a single act but posits partial determinations by means of conceptualisation. The unity which thought imposes on the manifold of intuition always remains bound to this manifoldness, the knowledge yielded by understanding remains manifold. Even in the case of reason's demand for completion and totality upon the manifold knowledge of understanding, the immediate unity cannot be grasped:

We are, he maintained, capable of an indefinite progression in our cognition of the world, but we proceed always on a horizontal plane. We cannot make the vertical movement to reality in itself even by an infinite horizontal movement within experience. Immediacy is lost at the beginning and is not to be recovered by the further elaboration of the mediation⁴¹.

Human finitude, marked by its finitude of intuition, always remains bound to manifoldness. It can never have the immediate unity as given in original intuition.

⁴¹George Schrader, "The Philosophy of Existence", in *The Philosophy of Kant and Our Modern World*, ed. Charles W. Hendel, The Liberal Arts Press, New York, 1957, p. 37.

Although human thought attempts to unify the manifold always into higher unities, this cannot be achieved even in the case of reason's demand of totality. The immediate unity is lost at the beginning and can never be obtained by gathering the manifold into higher unities.

2.2 Towards a Unification of Sensibility and Understanding: Imagination as a Third Faculty

In the opening paragraphs of **Transcendental Logic** Kant starts from his distinction of two stems of knowledge and he declares their necessary unification for knowledge. In the preceding section, I discussed that their radical distinction reveals the finite character of human knowledge, but this finitude is not only marked with their distinction and opposition but also with their being dependent on each other in knowing objects. These two faculties cannot yield knowledge on their own right; knowledge can rise only with the complementary relation between them. "Receptivity can make knowledge possible only when combined with spontaneity" (A97). Receptivity is in need of spontaneity that would render the manifold of intuition intelligible and spontaneity is in need of receptivity that would supply understanding with its content. Spontaneity of understanding must always direct itself to something given, and can only be conceived in its connection with this irreducible element of receptivity. Receptivity is always condemned to incompleteness and must be combined with spontaneity. Kant declares the interdependence of these two faculties by a motto: "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" (A52/B75). Although Kant states that "only through their union can knowledge arise" he continues as follows: "that is no reason for confounding the contribution of either with that of the other; rather it is strong reason for carefully separating and distinguishing the one from the other" (A52/B76). And he states that thinking will be

separately investigated within logic, that is, the science of the rules of understanding in general. But even he sets two stems of knowledge as a theme of separate investigation, he is forced to abandon his isolation of understanding from sensibility when he introduces two separate fields of investigation of understanding within logic: general logic and transcendental logic. General logic or formal logic treats “the form of thought in general” and abstracts from all content “that is, from all relation of knowledge to the object” (A55/B79). Transcendental logic unlike general logic does not abstract from all relation of knowledge to the object but indeed investigates into the possibility of this relation. Transcendental logic is the investigation of pure thinking in its relation to objects, it is science of pure thought of objects and if such a science is possible, by anticipation there must be pure concepts of understanding that relates a priori to objects. As pure intuitions are the forms under which something be intuited, such pure concepts must be only forms of thought of an object in general (A51/B75). In this sense, Transcendental Logic, in its portion of **Analytic of Concepts** will be:

(...) the dissection of the faculty of the understanding itself, in order to investigate the possibility of concepts a priori by looking for them in the understanding alone, as their birthplace, and by analysing the pure use of this faculty (A66/B91).

But the pure use of this faculty can no longer be treated in its isolation from intuitions, not empirical but pure intuitions. Insofar as understanding relates to objects mediately through intuitions, pure understanding in its thought of objects must be mediated by pure intuition. The problem of the pure thinking in its relation to objects becomes the relation between pure understanding and pure intuition; their unification. Although Kant puts the issue of their unification from the side of thinking alone, the issue will become transformed and deepened as the investigation proceeds. But at least, Kant gives the signal of this deepening in his first introduction of pure concepts of understanding in **Metaphysical Deduction** by means of introducing the necessity of synthesis for human knowledge. This is the first passage

that he mentions imagination. He introduces imagination as the fundamental faculty as the source of synthesis. This introducing of imagination as a third faculty comes just before the passage where he lays the generally accepted official claim of **Metaphysical Deduction** that attempts to deduce categories from the logical forms of judgment. These passages are the most difficult passages of the *Critique*, in which pure concepts of understanding are first introduced in their relation to the synthesis of imagination and then they are deduced from logical forms of judgment. I shall discuss each in turn.

2.2.1 Synthesis, Pure Concepts and Imagination

Kant opens the section so-called **Metaphysical Deduction** by stating the difference between general and transcendental logic. Whereas general logic abstracts from all content, transcendental logic does not. He not only repeats the distinction but also clarifies the issue. General logic not only abstracts from all content but “looks to some other source, whatever that may be, for the representations which it is to transform into concepts by process of analysis” (A76/B102). This statement not only clarifies that general logic is indifferent to the source or origins of our representations but also clarifies something about thinking in general, that is, something must be given to thought for its employment of its function of analysis which is a process of dissection of the given without adding anything to its content. On the other hand, transcendental logic “has lying before it a manifold of a priori sensibility, presented by transcendental aesthetic, as material for the concepts of pure understanding” (A77/B102). Pure thinking, in its relation to objects, with which the transcendental logic deals, must be essentially related to pure intuition. The problem of the transcendental logic is the problem of the relation between pure understanding and pure intuition. The relation between pure understanding and pure intuitions is reciprocal: Not only does pure understanding

employ its spontaneity to the material supplied by pure intuitions in its pure thought of objects but also the pure intuitions of space and time as the conditions of our receiving the representations of objects “must always affect the concept of these objects” (A77/B102). This statement is crucial since Kant talks about pure concepts of understanding in relation to pure intuitions, but this reciprocal relation seems to be played down in his derivation of categories from logical forms of judgment.

After such introductory remarks Kant continues: “But if this manifold is to be known, the spontaneity of our thought requires that it be gone through in a certain way, taken up, and connected. This act I name *synthesis*” (A77/B103). Kant’s putting of the issue is instructive, in the sense that he introduces a distinction between thinking and knowing. It is human thought which requires a synthesis for its knowledge, but for divine understanding there is no such requirement because it creates its object in its thinking and, therefore, free from a separation between knowing and thinking. An act of synthesis is necessary for a discursive thought such as ours for its relation to sensible intuition. The act of synthesis occurs for bridging the gap between sensibility and understanding initially opened due to the finitude of human beings. What is crucial for this passage is that human understanding needs that the manifold of intuition must be prepared for its act of conceptualisation. Here Kant marks the difference between synthesis and conceptualisation. The paragraphs following this initial definition are established on this difference. Kant further defines the act of synthesis as “putting different representations together, and grasping what is manifold in them in one act of knowledge” (A77/B103) and compares this act with the act of analysis performed by understanding. It is apparent from the definition that synthesis is an act of unification and Kant is so sensitive in drawing the difference between this kind of unification and the unification performed by analytic use of understanding. Understanding analyses our representations in order to unify them under concepts by means of logical acts of comparison, reflection and abstraction.

The term analysis is the name given to the activity by which understanding elevates given representations to a discursive form, that is reflects them into concepts⁴². The kind of unification performed by means of the act of reflection does not provide a content for knowledge but only gives a form to an already given content, that is, “as regards to content no concepts can first arise by means of analysis” (A77/B103). It is the act of synthesis which provides the content: the “synthesis is that which gathers the elements for knowledge, and unites them to form a certain content” (A78/B103). The act of unification performed by the act of synthesis is distinct from the act of unification performed by understanding and further more the act of analysis presupposes a prior synthesis. “Before we can analyse our representations, the representations must themselves be given” and it is “synthesis of a manifold which first gives rise to knowledge” (A77/B103).

At this point it is necessary to explicate the difference between conceptualisation and synthesis since Kant’s definition of both displays parallelisms and it is due to such parallelisms that many commentators ignore these passages and reduces the act of synthesis to conceptual or judgmental unification performed by understanding. Kant defines both the act of conceptualisation or act of judging and act of synthesis as an act of unification, of grasping many in one representation. But the difference lies in that conceptual representing represents what is common to many in one representation, and synthesis provides this many as a given many in one act of knowledge. Kant’s example of forming a concept of tree can be illustrative at this point. In order to compare the differences and reflect the common, a pine tree, a willow tree and a linden tree must already be given. These manifold intuitions of trees are given by our sensibility successively; first a pine tree, then a willow tree, then a linden tree. But these intuitions are not grasped successively by losing sight

⁴²See, Béatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of Critique of Pure Reason*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1998, p.11.

of the one seen before; rather they are held together in one dimension without losing sight of the many. As Heidegger puts it:

What encounters me must in a certain way belong to me, must lie before me in a surveyable zone. The unity of this zone, which, so to speak, antecedently holds the manifold together in advance, is what is ultimately meant by “grasping in one”⁴³.

Synthesis is an act of spontaneity, but it is not an act of thinking. This synthesis, the “first origin of our knowledge” does not belong to understanding and also to intuition; it is in between them and cannot be captured with the initial theory of two stems. It belongs to imagination:

Synthesis in general, as we shall here after see, is the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious (A78/B103).

This passage directly points to the end of the oversimplification of the theory of two stems of knowledge. In this passage imagination emerges as a fundamental third faculty without which we should have no knowledge. Understanding and sensibility as the two stems of knowledge can never yield knowledge on their own right, knowledge occurs due to the third faculty lying in between them and sustaining their unification. Imagination as a *blind* faculty, which we are *scarcely ever conscious*⁴⁴, appears as the original meeting ground of sensibility and understanding sustaining the knowledge to arise out of these two stems. After attributing synthesis; i.e. the first origin of our knowledge to the power of imagination, Kant, without giving way to any erroneous interpretation, explicitly distinguishes this power from understanding. The source of all synthesis is imagination and “to bring this synthesis to concepts is a function which belongs to the understanding” (A78/B103). Imagination is the first origin of our knowledge, but “knowledge properly so called” is

⁴³ Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1997, p.187.

⁴⁴ The reason for Kant's attaching certain obscurity to imagination by calling it blind or that which we are scarcely aware will become clear towards the end of this study. In Chapter IV, I shall argue that these metaphors reveal imagination's true nature.

obtained through this function of understanding. Although, imagination and understanding are both spontaneous functions of the soul, they are not identical. The differentiation of their role is carried further when Kant moves from synthesis in general to pure synthesis, which represented generally, gives the pure concepts of understanding (A78/B104). The synthesis of imagination is pure if it unifies the pure manifold of pure intuitions of space and time and, also, if this unification, i.e. synthesis “rests upon a basis of a priori synthetic unity” (A78/B104). The differentiation of the role of imagination and understanding is further manifested with the terms *synthesis* and *unity of synthesis*. The pure concepts of understanding give unity to the pure synthesis of imagination, and they serve as the common ground of unity according to which the synthesis is enacted and rendered necessary. Not until the **Chapter on Schematism** does the relationship between pure concepts of understanding and pure synthesis of imagination become clear; i.e. how these concepts of understanding serve as pure rules governing pure intuitions by means of the synthesis of imagination in knowledge of objects. Synthesis of imagination occurs as the meeting ground of sensibility and understanding by uniting the manifold of intuitions in accordance with the rules; concepts of understanding. The knowledge of objects occurs due to this synthesising function of imagination. Kant further elaborates the centrality of imagination in knowledge of objects with the distinction between analytic function by means of which “different representations are brought under one concept” and the function of *bringing to concepts*, “not representations, but the pure synthesis of representations” (A78/B104). General logic deals with representations, which can be either concepts or intuitions, but transcendental logic deals with the synthesising of these representations; for a representation to be a representation, it must be a product of synthesis. Kant suggests a much more complicated relation between concepts and intuitions that cannot be captured by general logic and also by any empiricist account of mind that

manipulates the discrete sense impressions. Insofar as transcendental logic concerns with the a priori knowledge of objects it concerns with the pure synthesis of imagination. If pure concepts of understanding yield pure knowledge of objects, it is due to their taking place in pure synthesis. As Kant puts it, what is needed for a priori knowledge of objects is firstly the manifold of pure intuition, and secondly the pure synthesis of this manifold by imagination and lastly the concepts of understanding which give unity to this pure synthesis of imagination (A79/B104). So, contrary to the initial theory of two stems of knowledge, there are not two but three elements of knowledge; sensibility, imagination and understanding.

These preparatory paragraphs to the proposed table of categories introduce imagination as a fundamental third faculty and attribute to it a unique and pivotal role in the act of knowledge. It is not just a third faculty alongside sensibility and understanding, but it is the fundamental faculty of mediation between sensibility and understanding. It bridges the gap between sensibility and understanding and emerges as the unifying centre of the two stems as to give rise to knowledge. As the transcendental investigation into the possibility of knowledge a priori requires a careful distinction of the elements of knowledge, it also requires the unification of these elements. Kant presents the problem of transcendental logic as the unification of two stems and introduces imagination as the source of pure synthesis, which joins pure understanding and pure intuition together and therefore, gives rise to a priori knowledge of objects. Although imagination emerges as a third element of a priori knowledge by means of its act of pure synthesis, Kant leaves this third bridging element unexplained. The unification of sensibility and understanding through synthesis of imagination remains mysterious. It becomes explicit only when Kant mentions that all our representations are subject to time and only when he lays the temporal structure of human knowledge. Kant's whole conception of imagination and synthesis is based upon the temporal structure of human knowledge and especially

becomes clear in the **Schematism** where Kant defines schemata, produced by the synthesis of imagination, as *transcendental time determinations*. Although in its first introduction imagination remains unexplained, the place of its introduction is of crucial importance. Kant first introduces imagination and the necessity of its act of synthesis when he first introduces pure concepts of understanding. Prior to any examination of understanding and analysis of its pure concepts Kant mentions the necessity of synthesis for human understanding. Insofar as the human understanding lacks the capacity of immediate relation to objects, it requires an act of synthesis for its knowledge. The necessity of synthesis for human understanding reveals its finite character; its through-going dependence on intuition. The unity of knowledge, the unity of thought and intuition cannot come from conceptual thought alone, but only from its intrinsic relation to imagination. It is in this sense that Kant introduces pure concepts of understanding in relation to pure synthesis of imagination. The pure synthesis of imagination, the pure unification of the manifoldness of space and time, represented generally gives us the pure concept of understanding. Understanding brings pure synthesis into concepts by means of representing the synthesis of pure manifold in general, that is, by means of representing the unity of the synthesis. Pure concepts of understanding give unity to the synthesis of imagination and consist in the representation of this synthetic unity or as will become clear they serve as rules for the determination of the synthesis of imagination.

Although Kant introduces pure concepts of understanding in their intrinsic relation to the synthesis of imagination in the introductory paragraphs of Metaphysical Deduction, he seems to cut off this relation when he attempts to derive the table of categories from the table of judgments of formal logic in the famous sixth paragraph of the same passage. The paragraph has been and still is subject to serious debates about the status and the significance of the categories. The

derivation of categories from the logical forms of judgments is generally accepted as the proper intent of the Metaphysical Deduction. But such an attempt to derive categories from the table of judgments seems to destroy what Kant had said in the earlier paragraphs. This not only opens a difference in the same passage, but gives way to two different transcendental deductions of categories as exemplified in the **A-Edition** and **B-Edition** versions of the *Critique*. While the A-edition version of the transcendental deduction analyses categories in their intrinsic relation to the synthesis of imagination and preserves the unique role of imagination in human knowledge, the B-edition version of the transcendental deduction takes its point of departure from the official claim of Metaphysical Deduction and asserts that categories are just logical functions of judgment and the unique role of imagination seems to be shrank back and absorbed by understanding in the B-Deduction.

2.2.2 The Official Metaphysical Deduction

The above-discussed introductory paragraphs of the **Metaphysical Deduction** firstly clarifies the distinction between general logic and transcendental logic and states that transcendental logic deals with pure understanding in its relation to pure intuitions. The relation of pure understanding to pure intuitions is supplied through the synthesising function of imagination. Imagination synthesises pure manifoldness of space and time in accordance with the necessary synthetic unity contained in pure concept of understanding. The pure concepts of understanding are firstly introduced in their intrinsic relation to synthesis of imagination and are presented as that which give unity to the synthesis of imagination and consist in the representation of this synthetic unity. These introductory paragraphs present a brief, though unexplained claim of the whole *Critique* that an act of synthesis of the manifold of intuition is necessary for a discursive thought in order to supply it with a content. Hence, if the pure concepts of understanding, as concepts of an object in

general, supply a priori knowledge of objects, it is due to their relation to pure synthesis of imagination that they perform their role. But the proper intend of the passage under consideration called Metaphysical Deduction is not to investigate into the nature of this relation, but to provide a systematic and complete list of pure concepts of understanding and to prove that they are purely intellectual concepts having their seat in understanding alone.

By pure concepts of understanding Kant means concepts that are not entangled with intuitions, even with pure intuitions and which have their origin in the nature of understanding. Following Aristotle, he calls these pure concepts categories and claims to have made an advance upon Aristotle by providing a complete and systematic list of them (A80/B105). Kant insists on the completeness of his table of categories due to his belief in the unity of reason and understanding. Pure reason or understanding in its narrower sense, is a perfect unity, self-subsistent and self-sufficient unity and is present to itself that it has complete knowledge of its own possessions and operations and it is from this unity that the possibility and even the necessity of completeness derives⁴⁵. Pure understanding in its self-sufficient unity, in its isolation from all sensibility is merely a logical faculty and the basic function of its logical employment is judgment. So, the list of pure concepts of understanding with its completeness is obtained by deducing them “systematically from a common principle” (A81/B106), which is nothing, but the nature of judgment. The functions of understanding in judgment serve as a clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of understanding. General logic specifies the functions of understanding by giving systematic account of the functions of unity in judgment and the table of these logical functions is the right place to look for pure concepts of understanding. This relation

⁴⁵ For a further discussion of the unity of reason and its implications –not only for the derivation of categories but also for the possibility of the Critique itself- see, John Sallis, *Spacings-of Reason and Imagination*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987, pp. 1-23.

between table of logical forms of judgment and the table of categories is established in the famous sixth paragraph of Metaphysical Deduction:

The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding. The same understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytic unity, it produced the logical form of a judgment, also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general (A79-B105).

The paragraph asserts the identity of the functions of understanding as treated in general logic and transcendental logic, and its due to this identity of logical and transcendental employment of understanding⁴⁶ that the agreement between the table of judgments and table of categories is obtained. The first sentence asserts that the function of judgment, the logical function of unification among our representations is also the same function of giving unity to the synthesis of representations in intuition, which Kant assigns to the function of pure concepts of understanding, both in this paragraph and in the preceding one. This identity between logical and transcendental functions of understanding is further stated in the second sentence with more clarity. The second sentence asserts that the understanding, by its logical function produces a transcendental content into its judgment. Same understanding through same activities, meaning the activity of judgment, produces the logical form of a judgment by uniting its concepts (analytic unities) and also introduces a transcendental content by means of synthetic unity of the manifold. The sentence is subject to serious debates due to the ambiguity of the

⁴⁶ In *Dissertation* Kant makes a sharp distinction between logical and transcendental employment of understanding. While understanding produces pure concepts out of its own laws in its transcendental employment, it subordinates sensible representations under common concepts in its logical employment. When he comes to Metaphysical Deduction in *Critique* he abandons such a distinction and maintains that the laws of the understanding from which the pure concepts emerge are same as the laws from which its logical use emerge. For a further discussion of the issue see, Béatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of Critique of Pure Reason*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1998, pp. 26-30.

words “analytic unity” and “transcendental content”⁴⁷. The term analytic unity is taken to be the unity of analytic judgments by many commentators, which imply that the logical form produced by means of analytic unity is the form of analytic judgments⁴⁸. Such a reading of the sentence renders it impossible to move from the determination of logical forms of analytic judgements to the categories. But as a matter of fact the term analytic unity refers to concepts not to unity of analytic judgments. For Kant concepts are analytic unities or discursive unities, which unite a series of marks or partial conceptions that pertain to various objects under a single representation. The concepts are analytic unities that they can be combined in a judgment by means of subordination and much knowledge is collected into one⁴⁹. So, understanding produces a logical form of a judgment by combining its concepts and the forms produced by various ways of combination are not only the forms of analytic judgments but forms of all judgments, both analytic and synthetic⁵⁰. In its judgmental activity, by uniting its concepts, understanding produces the forms of unification. The same understanding, in its same activity also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, which means an extralogical content involving a relation to objects. Understanding introduces this objective content by producing the synthetic unity of the manifold, which is the form of the thought of an object in general. What is crucial at this point is that understanding has an objectifying function in its judgmental activity. This objectification function of understanding is valid for intuition

⁴⁷ Paton summarises and corrects the misunderstandings that have been aroused from the term analytic unity. H.J. Paton, “The Key to Kant’s Deduction of the Categories”, in *Kant: Disputed Questions*, ed. Moltke Gram, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1967, pp.247-268. Heidegger focuses on the term transcendental content and rejects the claim that understanding gives a transcendental content to its representations by its logical function. He claims that the transcendental content is supplied by pure synthesis of imagination and categories have their seat in regard to their content in transcendental synthesis of imagination. Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1997, pp.195-205.

⁴⁸ H.J. Paton, “The Key to Kant’s Deduction of the Categories”, in *Kant: Disputed Questions*, ed. Moltke Gram, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1967, pp.247-268.

⁴⁹ Henry A. Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, Yale University Press, Michigan, 1983, p.125.

⁵⁰ H.J. Paton, “The Key to Kant’s Deduction of the Categories”, in *Kant: Disputed Questions*, ed. Moltke Gram, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1967, pp.247-268.

in general, regardless of the nature of intuition⁵¹. Apart from any relation to particular nature of intuition, understanding produces categories which are the thought of an object in general in its intellectual activity. This objectifying or transcendental function of understanding is exercised through the same activity of judging. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the pure concepts of understanding are nothing but the logical forms of judgment applied to the manifold of intuition:

If we assume that the understanding has such a transcendental or objectifying function, and that it exercises it through the same operations by means of which it judges, then it follows that the logical forms of judgment, which are the forms in accordance with which the understanding unites its concepts in judgment, will also be the forms in accordance with which it unites the manifold of intuition in order to determine an object for judgment. We are thus led to the conclusion that the pure concepts of understanding, which introduce the requisite transcendental content, are nothing other than the logical functions of judgment, viewed in connection with the manifold of intuition⁵².

So, Kant arrives at the complete and systematic list of categories by deducing them from logical forms of judgment by means of such identification of pure concepts of understanding with those logical forms. But, this identification of the pure concepts of understanding and logical forms of judgment which are nothing but the forms of discursive thought in its isolation from sensibility cuts off the intrinsic relation of pure concepts from pure synthesis of imagination and thus from pure intuition. Due to this fact, the question arises: how is it possible that purely logical forms, which are nothing but the forms of the unification of concepts in judgment can be the forms of the unity which must be produced in intuition before such unification of concepts can occur? How can such forms of unity serve as rules for the synthesis of the manifold of intuition if they have no intrinsic relation to the unification enacted by imagination? These questions find their complete answer in the **Schematism** where Kant asserts

⁵¹ Kant always leaves open the possibility of another forms of intuition different than ours. The objectifying function of understanding is valid not only for our spatiotemporal intuition but intuition in general given that it is sensible, not original. In this way Kant cuts off the relation of categories to our spatiotemporal intuitions and therefore to synthesis of imagination and deduces them from the laws of discursive thought in general.

⁵² Henry A. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, Yale University Press, Michigan, 1983, p.126.

that the categories can be applied to the manifold of intuition only if they are schematised. Insofar as the transcendental schemata, as the product of imagination, is defined as “transcendental time-determinations”; serious questions arises as Wolff asks: “How is it that there are just the right number of transcendental determinations of time”⁵³ corresponding to each category if these categories are completely independent from such time determinations? Many commentators claim that Kant is not justified in deducing categories from table of judgments and the right place of the derivation of categories is Schematism chapter⁵⁴.

Besides these criticisms, to discuss the source and origin of categories is beyond the sphere and aim of this study, although this study goes hand in hand with such a problem. It seems obvious to me that Kant assigns purely intellectual, logical function to pure concepts apart from their transcendental roles as the forms of a priori determination of the objects of experience. My aim in this section is to mark the difference opened in Metaphysical Deduction and to carry it as to imply the difference between the **A-Edition** and **B-Edition** version of **Transcendental Deduction**. As repeated several times, Metaphysical Deduction firstly introduces the necessity of synthesis for human knowledge and assigns a unique role to the faculty of imagination as the source of this synthesis and introduces pure concepts of understanding in their relation to imagination. Pure concepts of understanding serve as rules for the determination of pure synthesis of imagination and by means of this they give unity to the pure synthesis and consist in the representation of this synthetic unity. On this account the significance of categories lie in their intrinsic relation to the synthesis of imagination, that is to say in their intrinsic relation to time.

⁵³ Robert Paul Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1969, p.208.

⁵⁴ See, Robert Paul Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1969, pp.206-223. Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problems of Metaphysics*, trans. Richard Taft, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1997. Michael J. Young, “Functions of Thought and the Synthesis of Intuitions”, in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, ed. Paul Guyer, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1992, pp. 101-122. T.K. Seung, “Kant's Conception of the Categories”, *Review of Metaphysics*, 43, 1989, pp. 107-132.

But the sixth paragraph cuts off this relation and assigns a purely intellectual, that is logical function to categories. The A-Edition version of the Deduction is oblivious to that logical function of categories. Categories are defined as rules of synthesis of imagination and as rules of the synthesis they are indistinguishable from this synthesis. The A-Edition Deduction takes its departure from the investigation of the nature of this synthesis and assigns a fundamental role to the faculty of imagination as the source of this synthesis. In its synthesising activity, imagination stands as a mediating faculty between sensibility and understanding being dynamically related to both. It integrates the manifold of intuition within the form of inner sense, of time and brings it under the unity of apperception as to make them conceptually unified. The synthesis of imagination gains a transcendental character in its connection with the unity of apperception and it is due to this relational activity of unity of apperception and transcendental synthesis of imagination that categories gain their significance and characterised as “pure a priori modes of knowledge which contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of imagination in respect of all possible appearances” (A119). However, the B-Edition Deduction cuts off this intrinsic relation between categories and synthesis of imagination and draws a different picture. The B-Edition Deduction takes its departure from the official claim of Metaphysical Deduction and therefore from the investigation of the nature of discursive thought in general, independent from its relation to any particular nature of intuition, that is, to time. While the investigation into the nature of the synthesis of imagination and its relation to unity of apperception entails the affirmation of the temporal structure of consciousness and of human experience in A-Edition Deduction, the investigation in B-Edition Deduction takes a logical-rational character and asserts that categories relates to objects of intuition in general through a purely intellectual synthesis without regard to the specific form of human intuition, to time. In the introduction to B-Edition Deduction Kant attributes the function of synthesis to understanding and due to this

reduces imagination to the mere function of understanding. While in A-Edition Deduction the functions of imagination and understanding are clearly distinguished, in B-Edition this distinction seems to be lost. In A-Edition Deduction the synthesis of the manifold of intuition is performed by imagination and the unity of the synthesis by means of the consciousness of the unity of the act is produced by transcendental apperception, and imagination by its act of synthesis mediates between sensibility and understanding. But in B-edition Deduction such a distinction between the functions of imagination and understanding and therefore the mediating role of imagination seems to be played down, and everything seems to take a rational character.

It is due to these differences between two versions of the Deduction that Heidegger claims that a preference must be made between these two versions. He prefers the A-Edition version and completely ignores the second due to the unique and pivotal role of imagination given in A-Edition. Heidegger accuses Kant of confusing the opposition between the transcendental and the psychological and claims that because Kant found his discussions on imagination too psychological in A-Edition, he fell back into the traditional affirmation of the primacy of understanding and logic in B-Edition. He claims that the only alternative to psychology for Kant was the rational and logical that he failed to orient upon the basic problem: transcendence. By separating categories from intuition and giving them a logical function Kant failed to see the primacy of transcendence and the requirement of fundamental ontology of Dasein⁵⁵. But many commentators follow Kant in preferring the B-Edition Deduction because of the psychological overtones of the A-Edition.

This study rejects the idea that a preference must be made between one of the versions due to the success of them. Besides, the aim of this study is to detect a

⁵⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1997, pp.210-216.

coherent theory of imagination in two Deductions and Schematism by making a systematic analysis of these chapters. Although I have stated the difference opened in Metaphysical Deduction leading to two different versions, I do not regard this difference as a matter of preference. Although the starting points of the two deductions are different, they resemble each other in their outcomes due to the significance of imagination in human knowledge. But this claim is completely dependent on demonstrating that the unique role of imagination given in A-Edition is not recoiled in B-Edition, contrary to the assertions by Heidegger. In my attempt to demonstrate this I shall adopt the interpretation of B-Edition as involving two steps in a single proof initiated by Henrich and continued with modifications by Allison. The first part of the Deduction investigates into the nature of discursive thought in general under the name of “intellectual synthesis” and the second part investigates the relation between discursive thought and human sensibility under the name of “figurative synthesis”, defined as transcendental synthesis of imagination. It is traditionally viewed that the first part establishes the objective validity of categories for intuitions in general and the second part establishes it for human intuitions and because the second is contained in the first as a species is contained in genus, the second part is altogether unnecessary. On the contrary, the interpretation of B-Edition as involving two steps in a single proof rejects this view and asserts that the passage from the first step to the second is not a logical passage from genus to species. What breaks down such a smooth passage is the introduction of the function of imagination into the core of the argument. It is by means of explicating the introduction of the imagination into the argument that the structure of the Deduction and the significance of imagination can be made clear. At this point I agree with Seung that the passage involves the passage from logical function of categories to their material-real function⁵⁶. Seung claims that not only the difference between the

⁵⁶ T.K. Seung, “Kant’s Conception of the Categories”, *Review of Metaphysics*, 43, 1989, pp. 107-132.

two steps in B-deduction is opened by two functions of categories, but also the difference between A-Edition and B-edition Deductions is opened due to that different functions. The A-Deduction takes its starting from the material use of categories and remains oblivious to their logical function. On the other hand, the B-Deduction starts from logical categories and investigates their development into material categories. The logical categories develop into the material ones through the transcendental function of imagination and these material categories can only be considered in their intrinsic relation to synthesis of imagination and cannot be derived until the Schematism⁵⁷. Considered in this structure, the B-Deduction preserves the significance of imagination in realm of human knowledge.

I shall attempt to demonstrate the preserved significance of imagination in B-Deduction through reading it in the mode explained above. On the other hand, I shall try to reject the criticisms raised against the A-Edition that take it as a psychological inquiry, by discussing the relation between transcendental and empirical employment of faculties as exemplified in the three-fold synthesis. To clarify the relation between the empirical and the transcendental and to explicate how “the transcendental makes the empirical possible” will serve to unfold the arguments of A-Edition Deduction.

⁵⁷ Ibid, p.124.

CHAPTER III

MEDIATING FUNCTION OF IMAGINATION: THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION(S)

The present chapter investigates the role of imagination in the realm of human knowledge as it is laid in the **Transcendental Deduction**. The Transcendental Deduction assigns a central function to imagination through its transcendental activity in the constitution of human experience. However, the status of imagination within the complex network of the faculties of the subject (in its relation to the faculties of sensibility on the one hand and understanding on the other) and its status in two different versions of the deduction are as much in dispute as are other features of this extremely difficult section of the *Critique*. There is a commonplace agreement on the claim that the Transcendental Deduction constitutes the heart of Kant's doctrine but there is a little agreement on what thesis it is supposed to prove, what goal is to be reached, what it accomplishes, as well as on its structure and arguments it contains. The difference between the two versions of the deduction is also subject to many disputes due to discussion of whether the two deductions attempt to prove the same thing through the same arguments or draw different pictures. This chapter restricts itself to the discussion of the role of imagination and avoids going into the details of the most controversial issues of the Transcendental Deduction, and will be as brief as possible without loss of sufficient clarity. The chapter contains two main sections, each discussing the one version of the deduction for the sake of detecting a coherent theory of imagination beyond the differences of these two versions.

The main problem of the Transcendental Deduction is to answer the question, how can pure concepts of understanding relate to objects? Kant puts the issue in terms of a juridical formulation through his famous distinction between *quid juris*; the question of right and *quid facti*; the question of fact. The word deduction is not used in its philosophical or logical sense but as to answer the question of right, that is, to justify a legal claim to possession of the categories. Deduction of categories is a demonstration of their legitimate employment, that is, the justification of their application to objects. This juridical formulation of the Transcendental Deduction is put forward both against the claims of dogmatic metaphysics and empiricist accounts about the origin of concepts. Dogmatic metaphysics works with the presumption that reason is capable of knowing things in themselves with its a priori concepts without establishing its right to do so. Raising the question of right is thus a critique of this supposed right of extending categories beyond experience. But also, the question concerning the legitimacy of the employment of categories is fundamentally distinct from the physiological inquiry concerning the de facto origination of consciousness of these concepts. Kant opposes transcendental justification of concepts with empirical derivation of them by asserting that an empirical study can discover the “occasioning causes of their production” that is how they are “first brought into action” by the first stimulus supplied by sense impressions (A86/B118), but can never provide the justification of their a priori application which must be in complete independence of all experience. A physiological derivation cannot respond to the justification of the possession of pure knowledge, but can only supply an explanation of that possession (A87/B119), and the only deduction that can be given to categories must be in transcendental lines.

Kant pays particular attention for distinguishing transcendental philosophy from empirical psychology due to the fact that both investigate human knowledge in reference to human subjectivity. Empiricist accounts of human knowledge regard it

as a process of human mind that can be explained in physiological and genetic terms, whereas transcendental philosophy concerns with going beyond the empirical to the a priori elements, which necessarily condition it. But the transcendental philosophy with its Copernican orientation refers these a priori elements to the nature of human understanding and studies with a dual conception of human subjectivity; empirical vs. transcendental subjectivity. The difference between transcendental and empirical investigation has its seat in this dual conception of human subjectivity and much more complicated relation between the *transcendental* and the *empirical*. The difference and the link between the transcendental and the empirical is made clear in Kant's discussion of the function of the transcendental faculty of imagination and its relation to reproductive imagination that works with the empirical laws of association in three-fold synthesis of A-Deduction. I discuss the issue in length in Section 1 due to its importance in explicating the function of Kantian transcendental-productive imagination.

Different from an empirical deduction, a transcendental deduction is then "the explanation of the manner in which concepts thus relate a priori to objects" (A85/B117). The problem is how categories can apply to objects in an a priori manner and can yield a priori knowledge of them independent from experience. The whole *Critique* turns around this problem and the conclusions drawn from it. The problem put in this way defines the subject of the Critical Philosophy better than the problem of synthetic a priori judgments, which problematises nothing, but this a priori relation of concepts and objects. But, Kant continues by stating that the problem with the pure concepts of understanding rises in a way, which does not apply to pure intuitions. Space and time, as pure forms of sensibility, do not require such a justification of their a priori relation to objects due to the fact that since only by their means alone can an object appear to us, they are pure intuitions which contain the conditions of the possibility of objects as appearances (A89/B121). The

transcendental deduction of space and time does not lead to any serious problem; their objective validity is granted by the fact that they are the conditions of the possibility of appearances and thus the source of a priori knowledge of objects as they appear. Geometry is in no need of philosophy to justify its claims to objective validity, their validity is guaranteed by limiting them to appearances. But pure concepts of understanding are entirely different in nature; they are not grounded in intuition, but they relate to objects “universally, that is, apart from all conditions of sensibility” (A88/B121). This emphasis on the complete independence of categories sharpens the Kantian distinction between sensibility and understanding and, thus leads to the question: how can subjective conditions of thought have objective validity? (A89/B122) Given the heterogeneous nature of intuitions and categories, how can categories relate to objects of experience? Objects must “conform to the formal conditions of sensibility” in order to be objects for us but there is no reason to suppose that they must likewise conform to the conditions of thinking. They can be given in such a way that understanding finds no application to them and the concepts of it, say the concept of cause, can be “altogether, empty, null and meaningless” (A90/B123).

This radical distinction between sensibility and understanding generates the problem of the deduction as *quid juris*, and also dictates how the solution to the problem must be attained: the legitimacy of categories can consist only in their relation to what is intuitively given, otherwise they would not relate to objects and would be empty. The solution to the problem can be achieved by establishing a necessary connection between pure concepts and sensible manifold. The problem of deduction becomes the nature of the relation between the functions of sensibility and understanding and the connection between these two heterogeneous elements is supplied by the term *possibility of experience*. The provisional solution lies in the fact that knowledge of objects requires two elements; firstly intuition through which the

object is given, but only as appearance, and secondly concept through which an object that corresponds to this intuition is thought. Then, just as pure intuitions serve as antecedent conditions for the possibility of objects as appearing, pure concepts of understanding may provide “antecedent conditions under which alone anything can be, if not intuited, yet thought as object in general” (A93/B125)⁵⁸. Pure intuitions make possible the objects as objects of intuition, that is, as appearances and experience that is the knowledge of empirical objects requires, “in addition to the intuition of the senses through which something is given, a concept of an object as being thereby given, that is to say, as appearing”(A93/B126). Pure concepts of understanding are thus the concepts of an object in general through which appearances are determined as appearances of something, that is, as appearances of an object, and thus they “underlie all empirical knowledge as its a priori conditions”(A93/B126). Objects must conform to pure intuitions in their sensitive aspect and to the categories in their intellectual aspect in order to become objects of experience. The objective validity of categories, therefore, rests on the fact that they are a priori conditions of the possibility of experience.

This outline for the solution of the problem of transcendental deduction with an appeal to the term *possibility of experience* provides the key to the Copernican turn of critical philosophy: Objects must conform to the subjective conditions of our knowledge and the term possibility of experience refers to these a priori conditions which must be satisfied if something is to be an object of experience at all. The task of transcendental deduction is then to uncover the a priori grounds of the possibility of experience and in the course of investigation transcendental imagination comes to the foreground of critical philosophy “as conditioning the very possibility of all

⁵⁸ This provision to the solution of the problem of transcendental deduction is put forward through the formulation of two alternative ways of relation between a representation and an object: either the object makes the representation possible or the representation makes the object possible (A92/B125). Kant states that in the first case the relation is empirical and cannot be relevant for the study of pure concepts. The second alternative states the case for pure concepts: a concept relates to an object in an

experience" (A101). The faculty of imagination becomes crucial in the realm of knowledge due to the fact that mere possession of pure concepts and the presence of sensible manifold do not suffice to indicate their activity in connection with one another as to make experience possible. What makes experience possible is the third element, which is nothing, but the function of transcendental imagination that mediates between the function of understanding and the function of sensibility. These two elements cannot automatically conjoin with one another through their own functioning, but the conjunction is sustained through the activity of imagination. The transcendental deduction investigates into the relation between pure concepts and appearances and comes up with the conclusion that categories are indeed applicable to appearances. But it should be noted that the relation between pure concepts and appearances rests on the relation between the faculties, that is, on the relation between the receptivity of sensibility and the spontaneity of thought: "But the possibility, indeed the necessity, of the categories rests on the relation in which our entire sensibility, and with it all possible appearances, stands to original apperception" (A111). The relation between categories and appearances thus rests upon the relation between the faculties of sensibility and apperception and, therefore, upon the functions of imagination which brings these two faculties into connection through its activity of synthesis.

The relation between apperception and sensibility and thus the relation between pure concepts and appearances are investigated through different starting points in two editions of the Transcendental Deduction. While the A-edition Deduction takes its departure from the three subjective sources of sense, imagination and apperception and investigates into the nature of the synthesis carried out by imagination that brings sense and apperception into connection, the B-Deduction starts from the unity of apperception and the intellectual synthesis

a priori manner only if it makes the object possible, not in regard to its existence, but as the a priori

performed by understanding without regard to the specific form of intuition. The discussion of imagination appears with the figurative synthesis that brings human form of intuition to the unity of apperception. What is crucial in this second step of the B-Deduction is that it indicates the insufficiency of the unity of thought to set up a relation with the given manifold of human sensibility. The relation is again sustained through the transcendental synthesis of imagination which Kant names figurative synthesis. However, the B- Deduction gives up the tripartite division of sense, imagination and apperception of the A-Deduction and dissolves the autonomous role of imagination into understanding. Although the two deductions have different starting points and seem to make prominent changes in the role of imagination, the present chapter tries to show that the differences do not indicate significant changes in the role of imagination and it is still possible to uncover a coherent theory of Kantian imagination despite the changes on emphasis.

3.1 Imagination in the A-Edition Transcendental Deduction

The Deduction in A-Edition consists three sections, the first of which introduces the need for a deduction and the outline of the solution and which is also retained in the B-Deduction. The second section, which is known as Subjective Deduction, investigates into the subjective sources of mind that contain the conditions of the possibility of experience⁵⁹. These three original sources are sense, imagination and apperception. The basic framework of the argument in A-Deduction is based upon the analysis of these subjective sources, firstly in detail then in their interconnectedness. The third section known as the Objective Deduction intends to show that categories apply to all objects of experience and have objective validity⁶⁰.

determinant of the object *as an object*.

⁵⁹ The Subjective Deduction is given in Section 2 entitled “The *A Priori* Grounds of the Possibility of Experience”; A95-A114. The Objective Deduction is given in Section 3 entitled “The Relation of the Understanding to Objects in General, and the Possibility of Knowing Them *A Priori*”; A115-A130.

⁶⁰ In the Preface to First Edition Kant makes a distinction between subjective and objective sides of his deduction. The objective one “refers to the objects of pure understanding, and is intended to

Despite the *patchwork theories*⁶¹ concerning the Subjective Deduction, the A-Deduction is subject to many controversies concerning the status of Subjective Deduction in entire deduction. The Objective Deduction is generally taken as the official deduction and it is claimed that it can stand on its own without the assistance of the Subjective Deduction, in conformity with Kant's own words, which tell that "it does not form an essential part of it [the chief purpose of the Deduction]" (Axvii). The Subjective Deduction is neglected for its psychological overtones, but it is indeed an investigation into the transcendental constitution of the subject. The subjective sources, which are necessarily involved in any experience, constitute the domain of transcendental subjectivity, that is, the transcendental activities of the subject that give rise to the knowledge of objects. What is crucial in the Subjective Deduction is that it contains the clearest explication of the relation between transcendental and empirical subjectivity. The investigation into the subjective sources of the mind is not an investigation into the psychic process of mind in dealing with the given sensory data, but is an investigation into the "a priori elements or foundations, which make the empirical employment itself possible" (A115). As Kant puts it, each of these subjective sources has transcendental as well as empirical employment (A95) and the Subjective Deduction is the analysis of these elements in their transcendental constitution in which the transcendental employment of these faculties "make the empirical employment possible".

expound and render intelligible the objective validity of its *a priori* concepts". The subjective side "seeks to investigate the pure understanding itself, its possibility and the cognitive faculties it rests". He continues: "For the chief question is always simply this: -what and how much can the understanding and reason know apart from all experience? Not: -how the faculty of thought itself possible?" (Axvi-xvii)

⁶¹ In my reading of A-Deduction I do not discuss the patchwork theories since, by following Paton's criticism, I believe that the argument in A-Deduction is a consistent argument rather than a patchwork. For the patchwork theory see, Hans Vaihinger, "The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the First Edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*" in *Kant: Disputed Questions*, ed. Moltke S. Gram, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1967, pp. 23-61. For Paton's criticism of Vaihinger see, H.J. Paton, "Is Transcendental Deduction a Patchwork?", in *Kant: Disputed Questions*, ed. Moltke S. Gram, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1967, pp.62-91.

Kant presents his Subjective Deduction as a preliminary to the deduction proper, which proves the a priori relation of categories to objects. The legitimacy of categories lies in their necessary relation to objects, and it is the *possibility* of this relation which first calls explanation and can be given through the analysis of the subjective sources in their transcendental constitution (A97). The crucial point is that the possibility of this relation cannot be established through the functions of the understanding alone, but rather rests upon the structural connection of understanding to the power of imagination and pure intuition. This structural connection between the faculties is sustained through the activity of *synthesis*. The Subjective Deduction contains the most elaborative analysis of this central term of the *Critique* and thus appears as the basis of all other arguments. The following part offers an analysis of the nature of synthesis as it is put in Subjective Deduction.

3.1.1 The Threefold Synthesis

In Section 10 of the *Analytic* known as the Metaphysical Deduction, Kant states that the manifold of intuition must be synthesised in order to become known and defines the act of synthesis as “the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one act of knowledge” (A77/B103). He attributes this act of synthesis to the power of imagination, which he defines as “a blind but indispensable function of the soul” (A78/B103). Although Kant explicitly regards imagination as a fundamental element of knowledge as the source of synthesis, he leaves unexplained how imagination performs its function and just calls it a blind faculty. The obscurity in this first appearance of imagination is removed in the A-Deduction through working on the details of the activity of synthesis. But in the A-Deduction we are faced with three acts of synthesis instead of one act performed by imagination. These three acts are *the synthesis of apprehension in intuition, the synthesis of reproduction in imagination, and the*

synthesis of recognition in a concept. Kant does not attribute these three acts of synthesis to the power of imagination but mentions that the spontaneity of the subject is the ground of this threefold synthesis (A97). At first sight Kant seems to contradict with himself: In *Metaphysical Deduction* he talks only about one synthesis and attributes synthesis in general to the function of imagination but now, he introduces three acts of synthesis and refers only one of these syntheses to the power of imagination. The crucial point in this change of language focuses on the role of imagination: Is imagination the mediating centre of sensibility and understanding as the source of all synthesis as put in *Metaphysical Deduction* or just one element among others carrying out its distinct kind of synthesis, that is, the synthesis of reproduction? As will become clear, the three acts of synthesis are not just three independent separate acts but rather three aspects of a one unified act of knowledge. It is not the case that three faculties, that is, sensibility, imagination and understanding, carry out three distinct syntheses but rather the process of synthesis involves three stages, which are distinguishable for the purpose of analysis, but at least they are the three moments of a one and the same act of the synthesis of the spatio-temporal manifold. Béatrice Longuenesse draws attention to this issue by warning that they are the *representations*, “in which” there is an act of synthesis, not the faculties themselves:

The intuition “in which” there is synthesis of apprehension is what Kant defines elsewhere as a “singular and immediate representation”, whose “matter”, when the intuition is empirical is sensation. The imagination “in which” there is reproduction is not the imagination as a faculty or power (*Einbildungskraft*), but the *representation produced by this faculty* (*Einbildung*). And, finally, the concept “in which” there is synthesis of recognition is what Kant defines elsewhere as a “universal or reflected representation”⁶².

⁶²Béatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of Critique of Pure Reason*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2000, p. 35.

Longuenesse pays particular attention to the confusion created by the translation of the term imagination. She mentions that translating *Einbildung* as imagination leads to the confusion that the power of imagination performs just one kind of a specialised act of synthesis, although it is the power that carries out the very act of synthesis as a unified cognitional process⁶³. Besides this issue, Kant's listing of the threefold synthesis successively, beginning from the intuition then proceeding to imagination and then to concept, seems to suggest the sequence of the empirical genesis of representations. Although Kant begins with empirical synthesis and seems to follow the empirical sequence, his main point is to show that each empirical synthesis presupposes a pure synthesis. Throughout the analysis of threefold synthesis Kant argues that each empirical synthesis, which is the combination of the sensible intuition assumes a pure synthesis, which abstracts from the sensible content of intuition and considers only space and time as pure intuitions. In explicating this pure synthesis, Kant gives ample examples taken from geometry and arithmetic. But, pure synthesis does not only refer to geometry or construction in pure intuition, but also refers to transcendental conditions of empirical synthesis. He gives examples taken from geometry and arithmetic in order to make the transcendental synthesis comprehensible. Kant's main point is to demonstrate that each empirical synthesis requires a transcendental synthesis, which makes the empirical possible. At this point it is necessary to make clear that Kant does not talk about two distinct syntheses, one of which is empirical and the other is transcendental, but attempts to offer a transcendental definition of synthesis. This point will especially become clear in Kant's account of the transcendental synthesis of imagination.

While Kant starts from the empirical and moves to transcendental synthesis as its condition in the detailed and separate analysis of three syntheses as a

⁶³ *ibid*, pp.35-36.

propaedeutic to the deduction of categories, he supplies a more systematic presentation of the triune synthesis due to its structural unity in the deduction proper, known as Objective Deduction, once starting from above and once starting from below⁶⁴. Before examining the structural unity of threefold synthesis, the separate analysis of its three elements serves only as a preparation to the deduction proper that is “a matter of such extreme difficulty, compelling us to penetrate so deeply into the first grounds of the possibility of our knowledge in general” (A98). Only after the systematic exposition of the integral unity of the threefold synthesis, the structure of human experience can be revealed and the objective validity of categories be demonstrated. But, before examining the unity of synthesis, Kant must examine what synthesis is. The detailed analysis of threefold synthesis provides the clearest account about the theme of synthesis, which is nothing but the central term of the *Critique*.

3.1.1.1 The Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition

At the beginning of the first synthesis, which takes place at the level of intuition, that is, the *synthesis of apprehension*, Kant makes a remark, which throughout the entire discussion of the theme of synthesis, “must be born in mind as being quite fundamental” (A99). He states that all our representations as modifications of mind, whether they are empirical or a priori, are subject to inner sense and therefore to time and in it “they must all be ordered, connected and brought into relation” (A99). In the **Aesthetic**, after showing that time is the form of inner sense, Kant continues by stating that “time is the formal a priori condition of all appearances whatsoever” (A34/B50). All our representations, since they are determinations of the mind, are subject to the condition of time, that is to say they are in time and therefore must be ordered in terms of temporal sequence or

⁶⁴A115-A119 for the exposition “starting from above”; A120-124 for the exposition “starting from

succession. This given priority of time in the structure of human knowledge forms the basis of Kant's entire discussion of the theme of synthesis.

The first synthesis, that is, the *synthesis of apprehension* is the process by which the given manifold of intuition is first apprehended as a manifold and as contained *in a single representation*. Kant starts first by reminding that “every intuition contains in itself a manifold” (A99), but representing this manifold as a manifold requires a synthetic activity in addition to the receptivity of sensibility. Sensibility presents a manifold of impressions through its passive receptivity, but cannot present it as a manifold; rather it presents the manifold in an undifferentiated manner in the synopsis of sensible intuition. The undifferentiated manifold of impressions contained in the synopsis of senses must be distinguished as elements of sensible intuition and this act of differentiation is possible only through a synthetic activity of mind by which it “distinguishes the time in the sequence of impressions upon one another” (A99). The manifold of intuition can be apprehended *qua* manifold by distinguishing each moment of time in the manifold of intuition, otherwise each representation “in so far as it is contained in a single moment” (A99) can be nothing but absolute unity. In order that what is contained in a single moment turn into a manifold, it must be distinguished as a temporal, successive manifold. But this differentiating act, which distinguishes the different elements of intuition successively and apprehend them as a manifold, at the same time involves a unification. The manifold must not only be distinguished as a manifold, but also must be apprehended as “contained *in a single representation*” (A99). The manifold apprehended as a manifold is at the same apprehended as a manifold *of* intuition, that is, a manifold of a singular representation. Therefore, the act, which distinguishes the manifold as a manifold also unifies what is distinguished in one representation by first “running through” the manifold and “holding them together” in

below”.

a single representation. This act Kant names the synthesis of apprehension and describes it as “directed immediately upon intuition” (A99).

Up to now, what is described is the empirical synthesis of apprehension, which generates the manifold of sensible impressions as a manifold and produces the unity of an empirical intuition, say, of a house, out of diverse impressions –the walls, the roof, the windows, the door, etc. Kant starts from the description of empirical synthesis but intends the pure synthesis. He argues that the synthesis of apprehension “must also be exercised a priori” (A99), that is to say it not only unifies the empirical given, but also unifies the pure manifold of space and time. It is by means of this pure synthesis that the a priori representations of space and time are first produced. He states: “They can be produced only through the synthesis of the manifold which sensibility presents in its original receptivity” (A100). What is crucial in this statement is that it contains an important modification of the doctrine of the **Aesthetic**. In Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant directly equates pure intuition with the form of intuition, which is given through the original receptivity of the subject. But now, he claims that original receptivity which supplies the manifold of space and time is insufficient for the representations of space and time as pure intuitions. What is required for representing space and time as pure intuitions is a pure synthesis of apprehension.

Given the necessity of pure synthesis of apprehension without which “we should never have a priori the representations either of space or of time”(A100), it is important to note that time in which we order sense impressions is not given prior to the act of apprehension. When Kant states that “mind distinguishes time in the sequence of one impression upon another”, it is not the case that mind distinguishes time by following the sequence of impressions or time in which we order impressions as sequential is given in itself prior to that ordering, that is, to synthesis of apprehension. What is the case is that mind generates time in the very act of

apprehending. As Kant puts it, the synthesis of apprehension “must be exercised a priori”, that is to say there must be a pure synthesis of apprehension, which generates time in order to apprehend the manifold in the form of time. Thus, pure synthesis of apprehension is time forming and therefore, is the transcendental condition of the empirical synthesis of apprehension.

Before leaving the synthesis of apprehension, it is necessary to point out that this synthesis occurs at the level of intuition; it is “directed immediately upon intuition” without the mediacy of thought. But, this is not to say that the synthesis is a synthesis of intuition. It is not *sense* that carries out the synthesis, but it is the *power of imagination*. Although Kant does not make the point in this first explication of the synthesis of apprehension, he directly attributes this synthesis to the power of imagination in the systematic portion of the argument:

There must therefore exist in us an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty I give the title, imagination. Its action, when immediately directed upon perceptions, I entitle apprehension. Since imagination has to bring the manifold of intuition into the form of an image, it must previously have taken the impressions up into its activity, that is, have apprehended them (A120).

The mediating character of imagination first occurs at the level of apprehension. While the spatio-temporal form of appearances is attributed to the passive receptivity of sensibility in the **Aesthetic**, now Kant introduces an activity by which the impressions are taken up into the forms of space and time. This activity does not belong to spontaneity of thought but it is the activity of imagination. With this activity of imagination, which occurs at the level of intuition, Kant gives up the sharp division between passive sensibility and active thought, and introduces the mediating function of imagination from the side of intuitions. But, if imagination is responsible for the synthesis of apprehension, it cannot be identical with the imagination (*Einbildung*: the representation produced by the power of imagination) “in which” the synthesis of reproduction occurs. Imagination as a power, that is,

Einbildungskraft is responsible for the apprehension of the manifold of intuition as well as bringing them into the form of an image by means of synthesis of reproduction. But, the link between these two syntheses and attribution of both to the power of imagination can become clear after a detailed and separate analysis of the synthesis of reproduction.

3.1.1.2 The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination

Kant's second synthesis, that is, the synthesis of reproduction in the representation of imagination deals more explicitly with the temporality of inner sense and the way in which the representations are subject to it. Kant's main remark in this synthesis is that bringing different representations together necessitates the reproduction of the past representations. Kant again begins with the empirical synthesis of reproduction and then moves to the transcendental synthesis as the condition of the empirical. His discussion of the empirical synthesis of reproduction is in parallel with the empiricist accounts of imagination, which provides the association of the ideas or the disposition to associate. In a way quite reminiscent of these empirical accounts, especially the Humean account, of imagination, Kant writes:

It is a merely empirical law, that representations which have often followed or accompanied one another finally become associated, and so are set in a relation whereby, even in the absence of the object, one of these representations can, in accordance with a fixed rule, bring about a transition of the mind to the other. But this law of reproduction presupposes that appearances are themselves actually subject to such a rule, and that in the manifold of these representations a coexistence or sequence takes place in conformity with certain rules (A100).

In this passage, Kant tells nothing new about imagination and its capacity to associate past representations with the present ones⁶⁵. According to Hume, it is the

⁶⁵See, Béatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of Critique of Pure Reason*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2000, p. 40

regular repetition of the conjunction and succession of impressions in the past that one idea naturally introduces the other. Imagination acquires a custom or habit to associate perceptions and develops a natural tendency to associate through the regular repetition of impressions. So, imagination does not operate freely but associates the current perceptions with others and unites them according to some principles, that is, according to laws of association. But, these laws are themselves based upon past experience; they are the results of past conditioning. The regularity in nature is nothing more than the connection of impressions in imagination, which are contingent and based upon repetition of past conjunction and succession of impressions. In this Humean account, imagination is merely an image-making faculty; it engages in mental imaging. Hume calls ideas “faint images” of impressions. Imagination reproduces impressions, and gives rise to images and in turn associates various images with other images or with present impressions or recalls images when prompted by a current impression or an image⁶⁶.

At first sight, Kant seems not to have departed from this Humean account. Kant maintains that the associability of appearances requires that the reproduction must follow a rule. He insists on the issue that appearances must be subject to a rule and the association must take place in accordance with such a rule. However, the statement that there must be a rule for the reproduction of appearances is not a contribution from the side of Kant, Hume also insists on the issue. But different from Hume, Kant does not accept to refer these rules back to experience, since experience can never supply the necessity of the connection among our representations. For Kant's own program, the possibility of the association of appearances in experience must have an a priori ground. Kant states: “There must then be something which, as the a priori ground of a necessary synthetic unity of appearances, makes their reproduction possible” (A101). After this point, Kant

⁶⁶ For Hume's theory of imagination see, Mary Warnock, *Imagination*, University of California Press,

completely diverges from the Humean account since his aim is to give the transcendental grounds of the possibility of experience and therefore cannot be satisfied with a merely empirical account of synthesis. His program consists in providing the transcendental condition of the possibility of this empirical synthesis.

For this purpose, he reminds that appearances are not things in themselves but they “in the end reduce to determinations of inner sense” (A101). As determinations of inner sense, all representations are subject to the condition of inner sense, that is, to time (A99). This is equivalent to saying that the appearances themselves cannot provide the ground for their reproduction; their reproducibility must be due to the power of synthesis, which is “grounded, antecedently to all experience, upon a priori principles” (A101). Thus, empirical reproducibility of appearances which “experience as such necessarily presupposes” (A102) must depend on a pure transcendental synthesis. Kant states this demand explicitly: “we must assume a pure transcendental synthesis of imagination as conditioning the very possibility of all experience” (A101). The transcendental character of synthesis is due to the non-empirical, pure nature of the manifold synthesised. The transcendental synthesis of imagination is thus a synthesis of space and time. Kant exemplifies this pure synthesis with the acts of drawing a line, representing a period of time and a number:

When I seek to draw a line in thought, or to think of the time from one noon to another, or even to represent to myself some particular number, obviously the various manifold representations that are involved must be apprehended by me in thought one after the other. But if I were always to drop out of the preceding representations (the first parts of the line, the antecedent parts of the time period, or the units in the order represented), and did not reproduce them while advancing to those that follow, a complete representation would never obtained (A102).

These mathematical examples serve to clarify Kant's notion of reproduction and how it relates to the temporality of inner sense. The passage explicitly states the

necessity of reproduction in the activity of gathering diverse representations into unity. It states that the successive nature of representations requires that the preceding parts be reproduced as one goes on to the next. In the absence of such reproduction, that is, if the mind loses sight of the preceding representations, it would just have isolated and discrete representations given in each moment and will never connect these discrete representations as to form a whole. Thus, the successive apprehension of the manifold requires the reproduction of the preceding elements of an apprehended manifold when the mind passes to the following ones. If the synthesis of apprehension depends on distinguishing time in the manifold of intuition, this distinguishing requires reproduction. The “running through” activity of the mind in the synthesis of apprehension is thus “inseparably bound up” (A102) with the synthesis of reproduction and only with this reproduction that the manifold is “held together” in a single representation. A “complete representation” requires the reproduction of each element⁶⁷. The reproduction of the past representations as to form a whole representation suggests that the significance of reproduction lies in retaining or reviving the past representations in the present. As Makkreel suggests, it is not the case that the past representations “persists through time and must therefore be actively reproduced from one moment to the next”, but it is the case that they are revived or read into the present⁶⁸.

Through the mathematical examples given above Kant not only clarifies his notion of reproduction but at the same exemplifies the pure reproductive synthesis of imagination. He states that without this pure synthesis exercised on pure manifold “non of the above-mentioned thoughts (line, number, period of time), not even the

⁶⁷ Longuenesse argues that this may be taken in two ways: the complete representation can mean any *singular intuition* insofar as the intuition contains a manifold that can be represented “as” a manifold. It can also be taken as constituting the *whole of experience*, which this time empirical intuition is the unit that must be reproduced. Béatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of Critique of Pure Reason*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2000, pp.42-43.

purest and most elementary representations of space and time, could arise” (A102). In the synthesis of apprehension he maintained that the representations of space and time could only be produced through a pure synthesis of the manifold presented by original receptivity. Now, he connects this pure synthesis of apprehension with the pure synthesis of reproduction. In the synthesis of apprehension mind distinguishes the manifold as a successive manifold in virtue of the fact that it generates the succession of time through pure synthesis of apprehension. Now, it is obvious that this time generating activity of pure apprehension necessitates pure reproduction. It is only by means of the pure synthesis of imagination produced in the pure manifold of time that the succession of time is generated. Thus, pure synthesis of imagination integrates past and present moments and forms time; it is time –forming⁶⁹.

It is on the basis of this time-forming activity of imagination that the empirical synthesis of reproduction becomes possible. In order to reproduce past representations alongside with the present, there must be a pure reproductive synthesis that integrates past and present moments of time. Thus, as Kant states this “reproductive synthesis of imagination is to be counted among the transcendental acts of the mind. We shall therefore entitle this faculty the transcendental faculty of imagination” (A102). Although cited statement calls transcendental faculty of imagination as reproductive, Kant nowhere else calls it reproductive. In latter passages Kant calls the transcendental synthesis of imagination *productive* and contrasts it with the reproductive synthesis, which “rests upon empirical conditions” (A118). This change of terminology creates confusion and

⁶⁸ Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994, p. 24, also see, Sarah Gibbons, *Kant's Theory of Imagination*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999, p.24.

⁶⁹ Heidegger reads the threefold synthesis as time forming. The three syntheses form three modes of time. The synthesis of apprehension presents the “present in general”, the synthesis of reproduction forms the past as such, and the synthesis of recognition is the formation of future. In this sense Heidegger takes three syntheses as the exercise of imagination, which he identifies with primordial time. Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. Richard Taft, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1997, esp. pp. 125-132. For the criticism of Heidegger's reading of threefold

reduces the synthesis of reproduction to a mere psychological analysis. But, indeed the *productive synthesis* is a re-naming of the pure reproductive synthesis. Kant calls the reproductive synthesis of imagination productive when the act of reproduction is exercised on the manifold of pure intuition. The reproductive function of imagination is exercised in two levels; on the empirical and the transcendental levels and the empirical depends on the transcendental. So, when Kant talks about productive synthesis and contrasts it with the reproductive synthesis, he is not talking about two distinct syntheses taking place independently of each other. The reproductive imagination employed in a transcendental manner is called productive imagination. But, indeed the relation between transcendental or productive imagination and the reproductive imagination is extremely complex and cannot be put explicitly in this context. I shall discuss the issue in a separate section below. But as will become clear in the *Synthesis of Recognition*, the synthesis of imagination takes its transcendental character when it is viewed in connection with the unity of apperception⁷⁰.

3.1.1.3 The Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept

The third synthesis, which Kant names *recognition in a concept*, expresses the last requirement in the process of synthesis. But this last requirement does not mean that the three syntheses are carried out in a cumulative order, beginning from apprehension and moving to reproduction and then to recognition. As became clear in the discussion of synthesis of reproduction that the successive apprehension of the manifold presupposes the reproduction of preceding elements alongside the present ones, this third synthesis puts a requirement on reproduction. This third synthesis expresses the need for the recognition of the sameness or the identity of

synthesis see, Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994, pp. 20-25.

⁷⁰ Henry Allison makes this point in "Kant's Transcendental Humanism", *Monist*, 55, 1971, p.200.

the reproduced elements, that is, what is reproduced must be recognised as identical with what is apprehended a moment ago. In order for reproduction to fulfil its function of bringing past representations up to the present ones, the reproduced representations must be recognised as same with the original one given in the past. In Kant's words: "If we are not conscious that what we think is the same as what we think before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless" (A103). Without the consciousness of this sameness, the reproduced element would be a new representation and it would be impossible to distinguish it from the present representation. So, the reproduction necessitates the consciousness that what is reproduced is something past, not a new representation. But it is not enough to recognise the past representation as past but it must be also recognised as related to the present as to form a whole. This recognition of the combination of past and present representations depends on the consciousness of their belonging to the same unified act of synthesis. Therefore, the synthesis of the manifold by which it is successively apprehended and reproduced must be subject to "that unity which only consciousness can impart to it" (A103). Kant makes his point clear through the example of counting:

If, in counting, I forget that the units, which now hover before me, have been added to one another in succession, I should never now that a total is being produced through this successive addition of unit to unit, and so would remain ignorant of the number. For the concept of the number is nothing but the consciousness of this unity of synthesis (A103).

Kant's third synthesis is then a synthesis, which produces unity in the manifold of intuition. This synthesis is necessarily a conceptual synthesis; it is the concept in which the manifold is united. Kant makes this point clear: "For this unitary consciousness [concept] is what combines the manifold, successively intuited, and thereupon also reproduced, into one representation" (A103). Whereas the previous syntheses, which provide the successive apprehension and the reproduction of the manifold, are imaginative syntheses, this third synthesis occurs as a conceptual

synthesis. The concept through which the synthetic unity of the manifold is represented renders the imaginative synthesis intellectual, which otherwise would remain blind. Without this activity of bringing synthesis to concepts, imagination remains blind in its sensible aspect. This is why Kant calls imagination and all intuition blind without concepts (A51/B75; A78/B103).

The third synthesis, which consists in the recognition of the unity of synthesis by means of rendering the imaginative synthesis intellectual, also enables the relation of representations to an object. The conceptual recognition of the synthesis is at the same time the recognition of the successively apprehended and reproduced representations as representations of the same object. It is this reference to an object that prevents our representations “from being haphazard or arbitrary” in their combination, since “our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it an element of necessity” (A104). So, if the successively apprehended and reproduced elements are to form knowledge, they must be regarded as representations of a single object. But given the critical standpoint that the appearances are just sensible representations but not “objects capable of existing outside our power of representation” the main critical question arises: What is “an object of representation?” How are representations referred to an object as standing over against our knowledge? Kant’s answer is simple:

It is easily seen that this object must be thought only as something in general= x , since outside our knowledge we have nothing which we could set over against this knowledge as corresponding to it (A104).

The statement indicates that the object to which we refer our representations as standing over against and distinct from them is something, which is not given, but is something thought. As something thought, this object= x cannot contain any determinate intuition; it cannot be this or that object but refers only “to that unity which must be met with in any manifold of knowledge which stands in relation to an object” (A109). So, if the representations are to relate to objects, they must have that

unity which constitutes the concept of an object. The object= x or the *transcendental object* as later called (A109), contains nothing but the unity in the given representations.

But this unity of the manifold which the object makes necessary cannot be found in the object itself, since we are given only the manifold of representations object is nothing to us. It is the *concept* of the object in which they are united, not an independent or an unknown entity. So, in Kantian lines this unity “can be nothing other than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations” (A105). But this unity of consciousness is not something given, but must be produced through a synthetic activity. Therefore, it is only by means of producing synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition that we can know the object (A105). But the synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition can be produced if the synthesis is carried out in accordance with a rule. In order for representations to gain a unity they must be combined according to a rule. The rule keeps the reproduction of the manifold from being random and arbitrary and renders it a priori necessary and therefore makes possible the relation of representations to an object. Kant explains this point as follows:

Thus we think a triangle as an object, in that we are conscious of the combination of three straight lines according to a rule by which such an intuition can always be represented. This *unity of the rule* determines all the manifold, and limits it to conditions which make unity of apperception possible. The concept of this unity is the representation of the object= x , which I think through the predicates, above mentioned, of a triangle (A105).

The passage argues that the concept of triangle represents an object by virtue of the fact that it involves the rule of the combination of the manifold. The unity of consciousness, which realises itself in the concept of the object demands that the manifold is synthesised according to a rule. The concept of the triangle serves as a rule for the synthesis of the manifold and the concept of object= x in conjunction with

the empirical concept⁷¹ establishes the *unity of the rule* for the given manifold. The concept of the object=x provides the relation of empirical concepts to an object through subjecting the manifold to a unitary rule and therefore, limiting it “to the conditions which make unity of apperception possible”. Caird explains the point:

The conception of anything as an object is, in fact, nothing but the recognition of a rule according to which the manifold of perception is put together in it. Hence, it is a mere tautology to say that we must always proceed according to the same rule of construction, when we are dealing with the same object⁷².

So, Kant’s third synthesis, which is the recognition of the synthesis in concept is nothing but the recognition of the rule of synthesis. The unity of the synthesis represented by the concept is the representation of the rule, which directs the synthesis. This gives us one of the basic features of the Kantian philosophy: the definition of concepts as rules⁷³. As Kant puts it “a concept is always, as regards to its form, something universal which serves as a rule” (A106). The concept serves as a rule for the synthesis of the manifold by rendering the reproduction of the manifold necessary and thus relates them to an object. Kant gives another example, the concept of body, to illustrate the point: the concept of body, as the unity of the manifold, serves as a rule for the synthesis of the manifold by representing the necessary reproduction of the manifold and “thereby the synthetic unity in our consciousness of them” (A106).

The definition of concepts as rules and the examples of the concept of triangle and body anticipate Kant’s discussion of schematism where he defines a schema as a rule of synthesis⁷⁴. Insofar as “the schema is in itself always a product

⁷¹The concept of triangle is a pure sensible concept, but in this context it can serve as an example of empirical concept.

⁷²Edward Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, Vol. I, James Maclehose and Sons, Glasgow, 1909, p.338.

⁷³For how Kant’s definition of concept as rule differs from traditional definitions of concept, see, Robert Pippin, “The Schematism and Empirical Concepts”, in *Immanuel Kant Critical Assessments*, Vol. II, Edited by Ruth Chadwick and Clive Cazeaux, Routledge, London, 1992, pp. 286-303.

⁷⁴A140/B180: “The schema of triangle can exist nowhere but in thought. It is a rule of synthesis of the imagination, in respect to pure figures in space”. Also, an empirical concept “always stands in immediate relation to the schema of imagination, as a rule for the determination of our intuition”.

of imagination” (A140/B179), the concepts stand in immediate relation to imagination. The third synthesis, which occurs as the conceptual synthesis of understanding has behind itself the working of imagination. As Walsh puts it “the understanding goes hand in hand with the imagination and powerless without it”⁷⁵. So, it is not the case that, as generally accepted, only the first two syntheses of the threefold synthesis belong to the functioning of imagination and the third one is completely the synthesis of understanding. Although the third synthesis is not an imaginative synthesis as the previous two were, but rather a conceptual synthesis, the understanding has behind itself the work of imagination as the motivator of conceptual recognition. Imagination appears as the source of threefold synthesis and it is in this sense that “synthesis in general, ... is the mere result of the power of imagination” (A78/B103).

While imagination is the source of synthesis, the unity and the necessity of synthesis and therefore the concepts, which reflect these features of the synthesis, must have a transcendental ground. And Kant states: “This original and transcendental condition is no other than transcendental apperception” (A107). The transcendental apperception is the “pure original unchangeable consciousness” (A107), the “abiding and unchangeable I” (A123) to which all the representations belong. It is the “thoroughgoing identity of the self in all possible representations” (A116) and also the “consciousness of identity of the self” (A108). And without this numerical identity or unity of self-consciousness “there can be no modes of knowledge, or no unity of one mode of knowledge with another” (A107) and therefore no relation of knowledge to objects. But this identity of the apperception is impossible if the mind cannot become conscious of the identity of its act whereby it synthetically combines the manifold in one knowledge:

The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self is thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally

⁷⁵ W. H. Walsh, *Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1975, p. 75.

necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, that is according to rules, which not only make them necessarily reproducible but also in so doing determine an object for their intuition, that is, the concept of something wherein they are necessarily interconnected (A108).

Hence, the transcendental unity of apperception is nothing, but the consciousness of this necessary unity of synthesis and demands that appearances be conformed to this unity. Therefore, the transcendental unity of apperception supplies the principle of unity for all appearances that they are subject to the conditions that make unity of apperception possible. It is this condition that provides the deduction of categories. Insofar as all possible appearances must stand in necessary relation to the unity of apperception, they must conform to the *universal functions of synthesis*, that is, to the unity of synthesis that brings appearances to the unity of apperception. Now, categories are nothing else other than the concepts, which contain the necessary unity of the synthesis in respect to all possible appearances. They serve as a priori rules for the synthesis of the manifold and are necessarily involved in the unification of consciousness. It is by means of the categories that the mind produces necessary connections among the manifold of its representations and becomes aware of its identity. Therefore, categories are “nothing but the conditions of thought in all possible experience” (A111). And since, “the a priori conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of objects of experience” (A111), the *subjective conditions of thought*, that is, categories have objective validity. And it was this that Kant wanted to prove. The outcome of this deduction is nothing but the *Copernican Revolution*: all appearances are necessarily subject to the a priori conditions of knowledge, that is, to the laws supplied by categories.

3.1.2 The Unity of Threefold Synthesis

In his initial formulation of the threefold synthesis in Subjective Deduction, Kant maintains that the separate analysis of three syntheses serves only as a

preparation to the deduction proper, which supplies a systematic exposition of these three elements. Kant provides the systematic exposition of these three elements twice in the Objective Deduction, once beginning from above and once beginning from below⁷⁶. These two expositions attempt to show that categories are involved in every act of knowledge and are the conditions of the possibility of experience. The exposition starting from below follows the sequence of the initial exposition of threefold synthesis in Subjective Deduction: it begins with the sensible intuition and ascends to the transcendental unity of apperception and therefore to categories. The exposition starting from above begins with the transcendental apperception and descends to the sensible intuition. These two expositions reveal that the three syntheses form a structural unity as to make knowledge possible. The three syntheses are not three separate and single acts, which take place side by side on their own, but rather they are integrally unified as belonging to one and same act of knowledge.

Although Kant presents a separate analysis of three syntheses in Subjective Deduction, his presentation gives rise to two different interpretations in regard to the internal relation of these three syntheses. Kant's listing of three syntheses successively, beginning from intuition then proceeding to imagination and then to concept seems to suggest that these three syntheses are taking place in a cumulative sequence. This cumulative sequence suggests that we first apprehend the manifold, then reproduce what we apprehended, and thereupon recognise the sameness of the reproduced. However, Kant's analysis also suggests that the each synthesis is conditioned by the next and the relation between these three syntheses is presuppositional rather than cumulative. The presuppositional sequence suggests that in order to apprehend the manifold as a manifold, we must reproduce the previously apprehended and in order for this reproduction take place we must

⁷⁶ For the exposition from above: A116-A119; for the exposition from below: A120-A125.

recognise the previous representation as identical with the reproduced. Thus, the act of reproduction must be accompanied with the consciousness of the unity of the act of synthesis and the act of reproduction, which is presupposed by the act of apprehension, presupposes itself the act of recognition. Due to this problem of two sequences Makkreel reminds Kant's remark, which has been made at the beginning of Subjective Deduction that representations "must all be ordered, connected and brought into relation in time" (A99) and points out:

Here Kant may be taken to mean that the three syntheses can be placed in a *cumulative* sequence in which intuitive apprehension orders, imaginative reproduction connects and conceptual recognition unifies. However, Kant's descriptions also suggest that the relationship among three syntheses is *presuppositional*. The synthesis of apprehension is said to be 'inseparably bound up with the synthesis of reproduction' (A102), which itself 'would be useless' without the synthesis of recognition' (A103)⁷⁷.

Makkreel argues that the Subjective Deduction taken on its own allows for both interpretations. He argues that Kant's assertion that all representations must be "ordered, connected and brought into relation" can be treated in a different way other than a cumulative sequence of the three syntheses. He claims that "ordering, connecting and bringing into relation may be synonymous and expressions of a prior synthesis of recognition"⁷⁸. He also notes that this interpretation is the dominant view on this manner and he especially refers to Kemp Smith who holds that the movement from apprehension to reproduction then to recognition reverses what is really going on. As Makkreel quotes, Kemp Smith maintains that "reproduction conditions apprehension and both rest on recognition"⁷⁹.

After maintaining that the Subjective Deduction gives rise to two different interpretations in regard to the internal relation of three syntheses, Makkreel goes on to note that the Objective Deduction, which presents the three syntheses in their

⁷⁷Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994, p. 26.

⁷⁸ *ibid*, pp. 26-27

interconnection, lacks a clear account of the relation and still gives support to both the cumulative and the presuppositional interpretations. He argues that contrary to presuppositional theories Kant seems to suggest cumulative sequence in the Objective Deduction at A 119 where he uses the expression “starting from below”. Here Kant seems to suggest that the apprehension constitutes the basis for reproduction and reproduction prepares recognition. Makkreel states that it is possible to defend cumulative thesis if we regard “the synthesis of apprehension as a gathering synthesis, the synthesis of reproduction as an associative synthesis and the synthesis of recognition as a connecting or unifying synthesis”⁸⁰. He also notes that in this way each synthesis becomes “slightly more specific than its predecessor”⁸¹. Moreover he maintains that beside the passages, which appear to lend support to cumulative thesis, the Objective Deduction seems to defend both the cumulative and the presuppositional theories in the same passage where Kant gives a summary of his argument. At A 124-125 Kant asserts:

Actual experience, which is constituted by apprehension, association (reproduction) and finally recognition of appearances, contains in recognition, the last and the highest of these merely empirical elements of experience, certain concepts which render possible the formal unity of experience (...)

However, after this passage, which suggests the cumulative sequence, Kant goes on in such a manner that suggests the movement in reverse order. After identifying these concepts with categories, he states: “Upon them is based not only all formal unity in the synthesis of imagination, but also ... all its empirical employment (in recognition, reproduction, association, apprehension)...” (A125). Makkreel asserts that if these presentations of syntheses are taken together, the two sequences indicate a circular process. He states that the sequence that begins with apprehension provides the content of experience and the sequence that begins with

⁷⁹ *ibid*, p. 27; other than Norman Kemp Smith, Makkreel mentions the names of H.J. Paton, A.C. Ewing for the supporters of dominant view.

⁸⁰ *ibid*, p. 27

recognition provides its formal unity⁸². But, against this circular process Makkreel favors the presuppositional thesis. He claims that the cumulative sequence can only be accepted if it is taken in the language of precritical theory of formation (*Bildung*) in which Kant employed his theory of imagination. He claims that given the overall view of the synthesis developed in the *Critique*, it becomes obvious that the synthesis of recognition must prevail⁸³. Indeed, Makkreel comes to this conclusion by reducing all synthesis to the function of understanding and its categories. He defends his position by favoring the B-Edition of Deduction over the A-Edition. In the B-Deduction Kant drops the Subjective Deduction and gives a fundamental role to the understanding and its categories from the beginning. Makkreel claims that in the B-Deduction the synthesis of apprehension becomes the empirical employment of the transcendental synthesis made possible by understanding⁸⁴.

Leaving the discussion of Kant's account of synthesis in B Deduction to the next section, I argue against Makkreel's claim that Kant comes up with the conclusion that reduces all synthesis to the function of understanding and its categories at the end of the Deduction in A- Edition. I argue that the circular process, which Makkreel mentions, in the sequence of three syntheses is the manifestation of the finitude of human knowledge. The process starting from above, that is, from the transcendental apperception reveals the dependence of human understanding on intuition. This dependence is manifested through the mediating function of imagination. Although Kant puts the transcendental apperception as the highest principle of synthetic unity, he declares that "this synthetic unity presupposes or includes a synthesis" (A118). He further asserts the dependence of self-consciousness on the synthesis of imagination as: "Thus the principle of the necessary unity of pure synthesis of imagination, prior to apperception, is the ground

⁸¹ *ibid*, p. 27

⁸² *ibid*, p. 28

⁸³ *ibid*, p. 28

of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience" (A118). Besides this dependence of thought on synthesis of imagination which is manifested through the exposition "starting from above", the exposition "starting from below" demonstrates the finitude of human knowledge from the side of intuition. Using the expression starting from below, Kant starts with the discreteness of our perceptions and states the necessity of the power of imagination in order to synthesise them into unified representations. Imagination synthesises the manifold in accordance with the a priori rules and provides their conformity to the principle of apperception. This conformity to the principles of apperception, that is, the affinity of appearances as Kant calls, "is a necessary consequence of synthesis of imagination which is grounded a priori on rules" (A123). The synthesis of imagination brings the manifold of sense intuitions into relation with the unity of apperception through synthesising them in accordance with the a priori rules. Through this function imagination provides the necessary connection between sensibility and understanding and conditions all a priori knowledge (A124).

Both expositions, the exposition starting from above and the exposition starting from below, manifest the dependence of thought and intuition on each other. This interdependence of thought and intuition necessarily brings imagination to the foreground of the investigation since "the two extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must stand in necessary connection through the mediation of this transcendental function of imagination" (A124). Rather than attributing all synthesis to the function of understanding at the end of the A-Deduction as Makkreel claims, Kant discovers the power of imagination as the source of synthesis, as one of the fundamental faculties of human soul and the source of the possibility of experience.

Turning back to the problem of the internal relation of the three syntheses, the circularity of the sequences cannot be eluded simply through reducing all

⁸⁴ *ibid.*, p. 28

synthesis to the function of understanding. The problem requires a much more attention, which takes into consideration the mediating function of the power of imagination. The presuppositional sequence, that is, the sequence, which gives priority to the synthesis of recognition, cannot be defended simply by reducing all synthesis to conceptual synthesis and treating the imaginative synthesis as a precritical residue or an empirical application of the understanding. The fact that Kant attributes the synthesis of recognition to the transcendental apperception, to the understanding and its categories does not reduce all synthesis to the function of understanding. The given priority of the transcendental apperception as the ground of the unity in the Kantian system cannot be treated apart from its close relation to the transcendental synthesis of imagination. Indeed, the Kantian problem tends to converge on the complex relation between transcendental apperception and transcendental imagination. The obscurities present in Kant's analysis of synthesis require the clarification of the relation between transcendental apperception and transcendental imagination and therefore the relation between imagination and understanding. The section below discusses this complex relation.

3.1.3 The Relation Between Transcendental Apperception and Transcendental Imagination

3.1.3.1 Transcendental Apperception

The issue of transcendental apperception occupies a preeminent place in Transcendental Deduction, constituting the supreme principle of our thought in general and at the same time involves a notorious complexity. Its preeminence in the overall argument of the deduction and the problems posed by its complexity led Kant

to rewrite the whole deduction in the second edition. The introduction of the topic of transcendental apperception in both editions differs to a greatest extent and reflects the difference of the structure of the arguments in both editions. The main difference between A and B deduction lies in that while Kant formulates the principle of the unity of apperception in its relation to human intuition in the A-Deduction, the B-Deduction introduces it as a formal principle of thought in general in its abstraction from a specifically human form of intuition. Due to this difference, the A-Deduction directly discusses transcendental apperception in its relation to the transcendental synthesis of imagination, but the exploration of this relation in the B-Deduction comes only in the second step of the argument with the mediation of a discussion on inner sense and self-knowledge. But, besides this significant difference, the theme of apperception finds its clearest expression in the B-Deduction since the A-Deduction presents a limited conception of it due to its role in threefold synthesis and especially in the synthesis of recognition. The structure of the argument in the A-Deduction conceals some of the complexities involved in the issue of apperception. Although, my concern is not to discuss transcendental apperception in its full structure, but rather to discuss it in its relation to imagination, I will be taking the advantage of its exploration in the B-Deduction, and at the same time ignore the differences concerning the structure of the arguments in both editions. After clarifying the theme of apperception with getting help from the B-Deduction I shall discuss its relation to imagination as exemplified in the A-Deduction.

Kant introduces the issue of transcendental apperception in the A-Deduction in regard to the requirement of a “transcendental ground” of the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of intuition. He writes: “This original and transcendental condition is no other than transcendental apperception” (A107). He defines transcendental apperception as the a priori unity of consciousness, that is, the unitary, one consciousness that precedes all special experience and that which makes

experience possible (A107). This consciousness is pure and original: it is prior to experience and it is independent from the empirical. It is unchangeable, atemporal, prior to the order of time. It is the “abiding and unchangeable I” (A123), “the thoroughgoing identity of the self in all possible representations”(A116). Transcendental apperception is the self-identical self to which all the representations belong. All the manifold of representations must belong to this one, single consciousness. This principle of transcendental unity of apperception finds its clearest expression in the B-Deduction:

It must be possible for the “I think” to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to say that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me. (B132).

Kant sets this single principle as “the highest principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge” and calls this highest principle as “identical and analytic proposition”(B135). The analyticity of the principle relies on that it says nothing more than that if anything to be my representation, that is, to be anything to me at all, it must be possible for me to be aware of it as mine. This principle states the necessary possibility of reflectively attaching “I think” to all representations. What is crucial at this point is that Kant establishes an essential link between the numerical identity of the self and its reflective activity. It is the fact of logic that there must be a single subject that possesses various representations if these representations are to be grasped as a unity. This is implied in the very concept of thought, which is discursive, that is, which involves grasping of multiplicity in a unity. Thus Kant writes:

That the “I” of apperception, and therefore the “I” in every act of thought, is *one*, and cannot be resolved into the plurality of subjects, and consequently signifies a logically simple subject, is something already contained in the very concept of thought, and is therefore an analytic proposition (B408).

It is due to the nature of discursive thought that the grasping of multiplicity of representations as a unity entails a logical simple subject and in the absence of such

a subject there would be only discrete representations and not their unity. So, the “I think” that is able to be attached to each representation must be a numerically identical “I think” and it must be possible for this “I think” to become aware of its own numerical identity⁸⁵. The “I think” that attaches itself to its each representation and so that grasps them as a unity, that is as its own (mine) must also be able to be conscious of its numerical identity. Therefore, the “I” of the I think does not only denote the identity of the self, but it is inherently also “consciousness of the identity of the self” (A108). This is equivalent to saying that every consciousness is intrinsically self-consciousness⁸⁶. The proposition “it must be possible for the “I think” to accompany all my representations,” says that not all the representations must belong to one identical I, but also it must be possible to refer these representations back to the I to which they belong. What is crucial here is that this referral of representations to the I is accomplished by the same I that possesses those representations, not by a further I. It is in this sense that Kant calls transcendental apperception as original, that is, “it cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation” (B132). As Sallis states:

This is also why Kant can identify transcendental apperception both as the I of the ‘I think’ *and* as that, which generates the

⁸⁵Both Allison and Kirkland emphasises the relation between the numerical identity of the self and its reflective activity. Henry Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1983, pp. 138-139. Frank Kirkland, “Apperception and Combination: Some Kantian Problems”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. XLIX, No. 3, 1989, pp. 449-450.

⁸⁶Pippin argues that consciousness is inherently self-consciousness, although it is not explicitly a self-consciousness. In discussing the inherent reflexivity in consciousness, he objects to two interpretations. The first is the “austere” or “non-idealistic” interpretation of Critique favored by Strawson, who takes the argument of the deduction based on “the logical possibility of the self-ascription of all my representations”. Pippin argues that Kant makes a much more stronger claim when he says that all my representations are subject to the conditions of one self-consciousness. This does not refer to a logical possibility of self-ascription, but refers to a necessary condition for representations. The second interpretation that Pippin objects to is the “conflation thesis” favored by Henrich. The conflation thesis asserts that every consciousness is self-consciousness and takes self-consciousness as an explicit awareness of the numerical identity of the self. Pippin reminds that Kant says my representations “even if I am not conscious of them *as such*” must conform to the condition under which alone they can stand together in one self-consciousness (B132). Robert Pippin, *Idealism as Modernism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, pp. 40-41. Allison also criticises Henrich by stating that we have not an explicit awareness of our numerical identity, but this numerical identity is the presupposition of knowledge as its necessary condition. It refers not to the actuality of self-consciousness with respect to all representations, but it refers to a “necessity of a possibility”. Henry Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1983, p. 140.

representation 'I think' (B132). Apperception is both the I to which the representations are referred *and* the I which thus refers them; it is both the I that is represented as the subject of representations *and* the I which thus represents it – and this I is one and the same. Apperception is the self-representing I⁸⁷.

In transcendental apperception self represents itself. But at this point it is crucial to ask in what way the self represents itself. How and as what is the self conscious of itself in its self-consciousness? At the outset, in the representation "I think" the self represents itself as thinking. In transcendental apperception I am conscious of myself as thinking. As the consciousness of the activity of thinking it is inseparable from the consciousness of spontaneity; it is the consciousness of spontaneous activity of thinking. As Kant puts: "The consciousness of myself in the representation 'I' is not an intuition, but a merely intellectual representation of the spontaneity of a thinking subject" (B278). He makes the same point when he states that in transcendental apperception "I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am. This representation is thought, not an intuition" (B157). Transcendental apperception is a thinking in which I am conscious of myself only as I am. The first thing to be noted in these passages is that transcendental self-consciousness is not an intuition of self. It is an intellectual representation, that is, thinking. In its self consciousness, the self represents itself or thinks itself as spontaneous, but does not intuit itself as spontaneous, since spontaneity is itself can not be intuited. Kant puts this as follows:

Now since I do not have another self-intuition which gives the determining in me (I am conscious only of the spontaneity of it) prior to the act of *determination*, ...I cannot *determine* my existence as that of a self-active being; all that I can do is to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought...(B157n.)

Since the self cannot have the intuition of it as spontaneous, it cannot determine itself as a spontaneous or self-active being⁸⁸. The representation of

⁸⁷John Sallis, *The Gathering of Reason*, Ohio University Press, Athens, 1980, p.70.

⁸⁸This constitutes Kant's critique of Descartes. For Kant as well as for Descartes "I think" is an active determination, which implies an indeterminate existence: "I think I am". The "I think" contains in

spontaneity is itself an act of spontaneity and “cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility” (B133). So, the consciousness of spontaneity is nonempirical and therefore intellectual consciousness. In this sense transcendental apperception is not empirical but “pure apperception”(B133). But to say that in transcendental apperception the self cannot have an intuition of itself does not mean that the self does not have an intuition of itself. Indeed, the self has an intuition of itself in the form of inner sense, that is, under the form of time. In inner sense the self intuits itself as it appears, not as it is in itself⁸⁹. From the beginning, Kant opposes the consciousness of the self as it is given as an appearance in inner sense with transcendental apperception. He calls the former empirical apperception or inner sense (A107). Empirical apperception is the actual consciousness with a determinate content. This determinate content is supplied by the inner sense⁹⁰. In contrast to the empirical consciousness, which becomes rich in content through inner sense, the transcendental apperception is devoid of any determinate content. Although Kant states that “all empirical consciousness has a necessary relation to a transcendental consciousness which precedes all special experience, namely, the consciousness of myself as original apperception” (A117n), it must not be taken as that Kant is positing a distinct transcendental consciousness. Indeed, he calls transcendental

itself the proposition “I exist”. From this Descartes assumes that I think determines indeterminate existence as a thinking being: “I am a thinking being”. But for Kant this indeterminate existence cannot be determined without the intuition, which gives the determinable, and this determinable can only be given in inner sense, under the form of time. So, the existence implied in I think can only be determined as a phenomenon in time, but not as a substance.

⁸⁹This is the place where Kant makes a distinction between self-consciousness and self-knowledge: “for knowledge of myself I require, besides the consciousness, that is besides the thought of myself, an intuition of the manifold in me, by which I determine this thought” (B158). In self-consciousness, I am conscious of myself only as I am, but can never have knowledge of myself as I am; but only as an appearance.

⁹⁰Kant generally identifies empirical apperception with inner sense. This identification is most explicitly stated in *Anthropology*. Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. Viktor Lyle Dowdell, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 1996, esp. p. 49. But given Kant’s distinction between apperception and sense, this identification may not be regarded as legitimate. Indeed Kant’s definition of apperception contradicts with this identification: “sense represents appearances empirically in *perception*, ... *apperception* in the *empirical consciousness* of the identity of the reproduced representations with the appearances whereby they were given, that is, in recognition”. (A115) But insofar as the empirical apperception is the consciousness of a

apperception “completely empty representation” (A346/B404), “bare representation ‘I’” (A117n). As he puts: “Through this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of the thoughts=X” (A346/B404). Through the apperception nothing further than I as the subject of thoughts is represented: not only that it cannot be represented as a thinking being, also it cannot be thought as possessing a special set of determinate content analytically implied through its consciousness of its numerical identity⁹¹. As stated, through apperception “I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am” (B157)⁹². In this respect the thought that “I think” is nothing, but the empty thought of a logical subject. It is not a distinct transcendental consciousness somehow producing empirical consciousness, but the formal condition of consciousness. It is the “logical form of all knowledge” (A117n)⁹³.

Now, we must turn to the Kant’s claim that the principle of apperception expressed in the proposition “It must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations”, serves as the highest principle of all human knowledge. The principle says that in order for the representations to be my representations, that is, to call them my representations (mine), they must “all belong to one self-consciousness” (B132). This is to say that only if they already belong to one self-consciousness that I can reflectively refer them to myself and call them mine. This puts a requirement on all representations: “As my representations (even if I am not conscious of them as such) they must conform to the condition under which alone they *can* stand together in one universal self-consciousness”(B132-133). The

determinate content, and insofar as this content is supplied by inner sense, Kant might have seen no inconvenience in identifying them.

⁹¹In the representation “I think” nothing manifold is given, if it is given, this would turn it into an intuitive intellect. But for such an intuitive intellect, nothing can be implied analytically in its self-consciousness, since it is not a discursive intellect. It provides itself all the determinations with an immediate intuition.

⁹²For Kant the proposition I think implies the proposition I am. Kant states that I think therefore I am, that is “the Cartesian inference, *cogito, ergo sum*, is really a tautology” (A355).

representations must be unified in one consciousness; they must be gathered into the unity of self and only insofar as they are unified in one consciousness that they can be called mine. What is crucial at this point is that this requirement put on the manifold of representations by the principle of apperception reveals the necessity of a synthesis of them. As Kant puts: "This thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a manifold which is given in intuition contains a synthesis of representations, and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesis" (B133). The relation of the representations to the identity of the self can only be assured if they are combined with one another, that is, synthesised. Kant puts the issue as follows:

That relation comes about, not simply through my accompanying each representation with consciousness, but only in so far as I conjoin one representation with another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them. Only in so far, therefore as I can unite a manifold of given representations in *one consciousness*, is it possible for me to represent to myself the *identity of the consciousness in these representations* (B133)⁹⁴.

What makes my representations mine is not that I am simply aware of them as having them, not that they are accompanied with consciousness, but rather they are mine in the sense that they are in principle referable to one self-consciousness. But this referral is possible only if they are already gathered to the unity of self-consciousness, that is, if they are already synthesised. In another words "the analytic unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of certain synthetic unity" (B133). The identity of the self is not something given but it is itself the product of a synthesising activity: "the 'I think' is brought into being as identical with itself only through the synthesis of representations"⁹⁵. Or in Kant's words: "Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions, as generated a priori, is thus the ground of the identity of the apperception itself" (B134).

⁹³Pippin objects to take the "I think" only as a logical subject of experience, but claims that it has metaphysical implications due to its spontaneity. See, Robert Pippin, *Idealism as Modernism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, pp. 29-55.

⁹⁴For I detailed analysis of this passage see, Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp.140-144.

⁹⁵Bernard Freyberg, *Imagination and Depth in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Literature and the Sciences of Man, Peter Lang, New York, 1994, p. 61.

It must be noted that the necessity of the synthesis that is required for the identity of apperception is the result of the discursive nature of human thought. An intuitive understanding, which gives itself all the manifold of intuition through its self-consciousness, would not need a synthesis of the manifold. But human understanding is discursive, that is, “can only think and for intuition must look to the senses”(B135). What it means to think for human understanding is to form discursive concepts, namely analytic unities that bring multiplicity of representations under one representation by means of what is common to those multiplicity. And in order to perform this act of reflection, the manifold of intuition must already be given and synthesised so that the understanding analyses this manifold into concepts⁹⁶. The identity of the apperception which “belongs to all general concepts” (B133n), and becomes conscious of its identity through an act of reflection presupposes the synthesis of the manifold of intuition. So, to be conscious of the identity of the self with respect to the manifold given in intuition is to be conscious “*a priori* of necessary synthesis of representations” so that this consciousness can be entitled “original synthetic unity of apperception” (B135). The representations must stand under the synthetic unity of apperception to which “they have also first to be brought by means of synthesis”. (B136).

Starting from the identical and analytical principle of apperception that defines the nature of discursive thought, Kant derived the necessity of the synthesis of the manifold and therefore the sensibility through which the manifold of intuition is given. But what is crucial in this derivation of the necessity of sensibility from the apperception principle is that this derivation cannot account for the nature of sensibility, namely it cannot supply any explanation of the sensibility in terms of its form. Insofar as Kant cannot derive the form of sensibility from the nature of discursive understanding, but can only derive its necessity, he cannot provide a

⁹⁶I have discussed the relation of analysis and synthesis, that is, how discursive understanding

detailed analysis of the synthesis of the manifold, since this synthesis necessarily concerns the form of intuition. He can only provide an analysis of synthesis in regard to the “intuition in general” with respect to the nature of understanding that is thought in abstraction from the specifically human form of intuition which is spatio-temporal. So, he necessarily attributes this synthesis to the understanding, that is, to its logical functions. But what must be kept in mind, as Kirkland warns us, is that “the manifold of intuition is given not simply by being in relation to the apperceptive subject, but by being subject to these forms [forms of sensibility]”⁹⁷. But, this is to say that the synthesis, which is necessary for the unity of apperception, must be viewed in its relation to these forms. With respect to this point, the structure of the A and B Deduction completely differs. The A-Deduction as exemplified in threefold synthesis takes this synthesis from the start as a synthesis of a spatio-temporal manifold and therefore attributes it to imagination. However, the B- Deduction comes to this synthesis in its second step in a completely different manner. Although, at the end of the chapter I shall suggest that these two accounts of synthesis are reconcilable, I now turn to the explanation of the synthesis of imagination in its relation to the transcendental apperception as it is exemplified in the A-Deduction.

3.1.3.2 Transcendental Synthesis of Imagination in Its Relation to Transcendental Apperception

While in the B-deduction Kant derives the necessity of the synthesis of the manifold from the analytical principle of apperception, he directly puts forward this necessity in the A-Deduction without any additional discussion. In the systematic portion of the argument, which “starts from above”, he starts from the a priori certainty of the identity of the self, which means that the representations must belong

presupposes synthesis of the manifold in order to analyse it into concepts in Chapter II.

⁹⁷Frank Kirkland, “Apperception and Combination: Some Kantian Problems”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. XLIX, No. 3, 1989, pp. 452-453.

to one consciousness with all the others and therefore must be capable of being connected (A116). He then directly states:

This principle holds *a priori*, and may be called the transcendental principle of the *unity* of the manifold in our representations, and consequently also in intuition. Since this unity of the manifold in one subject is synthetic, pure apperception supplies a principle of the synthetic unity of the manifold in all possible intuition (A116-117).

Although the passage seems similar in its claim that the apperception principle can be hold as the principle of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition as it is maintained in the B-Deduction, Kant puts this principle in a different manner in the A-Deduction. In a footnote attached to this passage he states that the principle of apperception asserts that “all the variety of *empirical consciousness* must be combined in one single self consciousness” and it is the “*absolutely* first and synthetic principle of our thought in general” (A117n). What makes it differ from the B-Deduction is that while there the first principle of thought is called analytic, it is being called synthetic in the A-Deduction. What is the reason of this change? Heidegger takes our attention to the statement that “...this unity of the manifold in one subject is synthetic”. He tells that this statement, which is usually by-passed, is the most crucial statement of the deduction⁹⁸. The statement asserts the indispensable finitude of human knowledge. The unity of the manifold is not given all at once as in the case of original intuition of divine knowing, but produced through the act of synthesis. Indeed, Kant continues the above passage by affirming this fact: “This synthetic unity presupposes or includes a synthesis” (A118). Although the B-Deduction states the same point, it arrives at it analytically from the principle of apperception, which takes the finitude, discursive nature of human thought as granted. But the argument in the A-Deduction firstly says that human thought is

⁹⁸ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of pure Reason*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1997, especially p. 277.

finite, that is, discursive⁹⁹. But what makes the principle synthetic is not just that it asserts the finitude of human thought, that it presupposes a synthesis. But what makes it synthetic is also that in the overall argument of the A-Deduction, this synthesis is attributed to the power of imagination. Kant cannot analytically progress from the necessity of the synthesis to the attribution of this synthesis to the power of imagination since this synthesis concerns *how* the intuitions are given, not just the givenness of intuitions. But insofar as the synthesis, from the beginning, is taken as the work of imagination in the A-Deduction, the statement that the apperception presupposes a synthesis cannot be derived analytically. Besides the problem of its being a synthetic proposition, the statement of the necessity of the synthesis is made in a very complex and difficult passage:

This synthetic unity presupposes or includes a synthesis, and if the former is to be a priori necessary, the synthesis must also be a priori. The transcendental unity of apperception thus relates to the pure synthesis of imagination, as an a priori condition of the possibility of all combination of the manifold in one knowledge. But only the productive synthesis of the imagination can take place a priori; the reproductive rests upon empirical conditions. Thus the principle of the necessary unity of pure (productive) synthesis of imagination, prior to apperception, is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience (A118).

This extremely complex passage involves many problematic assertions in regard to the nature of the synthesis of imagination: 1-What does it mean that the synthesis is presupposed or included? Can the terms presuppose and include be taken as synonymous? 2-What does it mean that the synthesis must be a priori? In what sense is the synthesis a priori? 3-What does it mean that the unity of the synthesis of imagination is prior to apperception if the apperception is the ground of the unity of the synthesis of the manifold? Which one does ground the other? Although all these questions are closely related to each other, I firstly discuss the first and third questions leaving aside the problem of the nature of a priori synthesis.

⁹⁹ Robert Paul Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1969, p. 118.

The nature of the a priori synthesis can be discussed after the relation between transcendental apperception and transcendental imagination, which the first and third questions directly address, is clarified

In the A-Deduction, Kant continuously states that the apperception and imagination is in relation to each other. He often states this relation in an ambiguous way by asserting that the synthesis of imagination “relates to” or is “in relation to” apperception (A118-119). The above-cited passage seems to give a clear account of this relation by asserting that the synthesis of imagination is prior to apperception, but this time leading to the contradictory results due to the role and priority of transcendental apperception in the overall argument. What is crucial in this passage is that imagination spreads over everything and becomes the fundamental unity, giving rise to knowledge. It is put as the “ground of the possibility of all knowledge” and it is “prior to apperception”. But, in what sense can the synthesis of imagination be prior to apperception? This question is of crucial importance since it reveals a contradiction due to the status of apperception. Kant firstly puts transcendental apperception as the “transcendental ground” of the unity of the synthesis of the manifold and called it “pure, original and unchangeable consciousness” (A107). But now he is claiming that this original ground of the unity of the synthesis is itself grounded upon the synthesis that it itself grounds. In what way must we understand this conflicting ranking of grounds? Is it possible to prefer the one and ignore the other as the original ground? Indeed, before answering these questions we must direct our attention to the twofold meaning of the term “prior to”. It is again Heidegger who directs our attention: He argues that the German term, which Kant uses for “prior to” is the term “*vor*”, which have the meaning of “before” in English¹⁰⁰. Kant

¹⁰⁰Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of pure Reason*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1997, p. 278.

uses the expression “*Einbildungskraft vor der Apperception*”¹⁰¹. Heidegger argues that the term *vor*, that is, *before* can be taken in two different meanings: It can mean the priority in the order of grounds, which in this context will also mean the temporal priority of the synthesis of imagination to transcendental apperception. In this sense of the term, transcendental apperception is no longer the original, but is grounded in, dependent upon the productive synthesis of imagination. But, the term “*vor* (before)” can also be taken in a spatial or an intentional sense, which this time will have the meaning of “before its eyes”. In this way, the synthesis of imagination is before the apperception, in the sense that it takes place “before the eyes of” apperception. That is to say that the apperception guides the synthesis of imagination. If the term before is taken in its second, namely spatial sense, transcendental apperception will again gain the priority as the principle of the unity of the synthesis¹⁰². Actually, Kant is not clear at this point and gives no clue about in what sense being prior to is to be taken. Although some passages in the deduction support the first meaning as in A124, some other passages as in A125 support its second meaning¹⁰³. Kant seems to preserve the twofold meaning of the term. Indeed, this twofold meaning is on the scene from the start when he writes, “synthetic unity presupposes or includes a synthesis”. The term presupposes is in parallel lines with the first meaning of the term *vor*. If the synthesis of imagination takes place prior to apperception, then it is presupposed by apperception. Heidegger maintains that it is easy to understand what *presuppose* means, but he claims that how the power of imagination is *included* in transcendental apperception cannot be demonstrated phenomenologically¹⁰⁴. He argues that the term *include* puts a reservation on the priority of the synthesis of

¹⁰¹Immanuel Kant, *Kritik Der Reinen Vernunft*, in Kants Werke Akademie Textausgabe IV, Walter de Gruyter&Co. Berlin, 1968.

¹⁰²Heidegger seems to claim that this second meaning also shows the synthesis of imagination is already taken place before apperception, but also adds that the term must be taken in its first sense.

¹⁰³A124: “It is this apperception which must be added to pure imagination...”. A125: “Upon them (categories) is based not only all formal unity in the (transcendental) synthesis of imagination...”

¹⁰⁴Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of pure Reason*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1997, p. 279.

imagination as the original ground of unity and indicates turning back to the traditional supremacy of apperception, of understanding and of logic and threatens the independent function of imagination. And he claims that Kant indeed, turned to this traditional, rationalistic conception of apperception giving it all the supremacy and sacrificed the independency of imagination and made it a function of understanding in the B-Deduction.

In these lines, Heidegger prefers “presupposes” and ignores “or includes” and grounds apperception in the synthesis of imagination¹⁰⁵. He comes up with the conclusion that apperception is dependent upon the synthesis of imagination and it is not the supreme principle of unity but rather reflects or represents the original unity of the pure productive synthesis of imagination. In this interpretation pure productive power of imagination is the original, fundamental unifying force and the common root of sensibility and understanding. With this retrieve of Kant, Heidegger takes his own way, but we are not in a position to give up the supremacy of apperception in Kantian lines. We must reconcile the two ways of being prior to, that is, being before.

At this point I shall adopt Sallis’ interpretation of the transcendental apperception as the “transcendental ground” of the unity¹⁰⁶. He argues that transcendental apperception is the “transcendental ground” of the unity in the sense that it grounds both “the requirement of unity” and “the unity required” for appearances. The principle of apperception requires that the manifold of intuition is to be unified in one self-consciousness and conform to the conditions in order to belong one self-consciousness. Actually, this requirement is most explicitly put in the B-Deduction:

(...) *my* representations in any given intuition must be subject to that condition under which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as *my* representations, and so can comprehend them as

¹⁰⁵Charles M. Shereover, *Heidegger, Kant & Time*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1972, p. 97.

¹⁰⁶Sallis, *The Gathering of Reason*, pp. 69-76.

synthetically combined in one apperception through the general expression '*I think*' (B138).

The apperception principle says that the representations must stand under one self-consciousness, and they can so stand “only if they are gathered into the unity of self consciousness, only if they conform to that unity”¹⁰⁷. Representations can conform to that unity of self-consciousness if they conform to the conditions of that unity, that is to say, if they are brought under the forms of unity corresponding to apperception itself. In this sense, Sallis states: “Transcendental apperception, as to which conformity is required, thereby grounds both the requirement of unity and the form of unity that is required”¹⁰⁸.

If transcendental apperception grounds the “requirement of unity” and the “form of unity” that is required, that is, if it serves as the transcendental ground, principle of unity, in what sense can it be dependent on imagination or grounded in the synthesis of imagination? Sallis answers the question as follows:

(...) but apperception does not perform the synthesis by which the manifold is brought to such unity and thus does not in the full sense ground the actually accomplished unity of the manifold. On the contrary, that unity is the accomplishment of transcendental imagination, and thus to the extent that apperception is dependent on the actual synthetic unification of the manifold, it is dependent on imagination; it is in this sense that the ‘synthesis of imagination (is) prior to apperception’ (A118). But this is only one side: Transcendental apperception is also prior to the synthesis of imagination; and it is original in a way that the synthesis is not, since it grounds both the requirement of unity and the form of unity which is actually realised in that synthesis¹⁰⁹.

So, what at first sight seems contradictory and force us to make a preference in regard to the original ground is actually a manifestation of a complexity. Although transcendental apperception is original in a way the synthesis is not, and is the ground of the unity, it requires the synthesis of imagination, which actually accomplishes the unity of the manifold. And the synthesis of imagination

¹⁰⁷ *ibid*, p.71.

¹⁰⁸ *ibid*, p.72.

¹⁰⁹ *ibid*, p.72.

takes place prior to apperception, that is, it must be already taken place in order for the apperception to reflect the unity of the manifold and call it as its own (mine). But this synthesis of imagination, which has already taken place, must also conform to the unity of apperception, to the forms of unity provided by apperception. This mutual dependence of apperception and imagination to each other implies that they function as a structural whole. Kant calls this structural whole *understanding*:

The unity of apperception in its relation to the synthesis of imagination is the understanding; and this same unity, with reference to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, the pure understanding (A119).

Defined in this way, understanding is composed of apperception and imagination. The synthesis of imagination under the unity of apperception produces the synthetic unity of the manifold and thus yields understanding. This definition of understanding gives us the clarification of the relation between understanding and imagination, which Kant tried to keep separate. When he first introduced the necessity of the synthesis and attributed this synthesis to the imagination in the Metaphysical Deduction, he treated imagination and understanding as separate faculties. He stated that synthesis is the work of imagination, while “to bring this synthesis to concepts” is the function of understanding (A78/B103). He further emphasised the difference between understanding and imagination with the terms “synthesis” and “unity of synthesis”. These differences were operative in the “synthesis of recognition in a concept”, which appears as the conceptual synthesis of understanding. In discussing this third synthesis I claimed that although it is seen as the conceptual synthesis of understanding different from the previous syntheses of imagination, this synthesis also has the work of imagination behind itself as the motivator of conceptual synthesis. We are now in a position to understand how imagination is involved in the synthesis of recognition. It is the understanding, which is now defined as the synthesis of imagination under the unity of apperception that generates the consciousness of the unity of synthesis and thereby renders it

intellectual. This understanding is not the logical understanding as the faculty of concepts, which can be defined as the apperceptive thought, but rather the understanding in its broader, inclusive sense including imagination¹¹⁰. Used in its inclusive sense, understanding includes the synthesis of imagination, and here the term “presupposes” and “includes” (the terms discussed above) can be taken as synonymous. But the understanding in its exclusive sense as the faculty of concepts, that is, as the apperceptive thought presupposes the synthesis of imagination and can operate only on the basis of the unity that is brought about by imagination. The principle of apperception and its forms of unity, that is, categories supply the necessary conditions of thought, but they are not sufficient conditions of knowledge. In fact the condition of the possibility of all knowledge is “the necessary unity of pure (productive) synthesis of imagination”, which is “prior to apperception”. The self becomes conscious of its identity and represents itself as an identical self only on the basis of already accomplished synthesis of the manifold. In this respect, transcendental apperception is the representation of the unity of pure synthesis of imagination. But, still the notion of the *pure synthesis* must be clarified in order to obtain a clear account of the function of imagination, which is nothing, but the ground of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience.

3.1.4 Transcendental Synthesis: Is It a Distinct Kind of Synthesis From the Empirical?

3.1.4.1 The Problem of A Priori Synthesis

It is obvious from the above-discussed passage and along with it from the many passages in the deduction that Kant posits an a priori synthesis of the manifold

¹¹⁰I borrow this distinction between the inclusive and exclusive uses of the term understanding from Llewelyn. The understanding in its exclusive, narrower sense refers to understanding as an apperceptive thought, as the faculty of concepts; in its inclusive, broader sense it refers to the spontaneity including imagination. John Llewelyn, *The HypoCritical Imagination*, Warwick Studies in European Philosophy, Routledge, London, 2000, pp. 34-35.

independent from the empirical synthesis. But, the deduction contains many different statements in regard to the nature of this a priori synthesis. In the first passage, where the necessity of pure synthesis is first introduced, Kant puts this synthesis as the synthesis of the pure manifold of space and time that gives rise to his philosophy of mathematics. In the *synthesis of apprehension* Kant writes that the synthesis “must also be exercised a priori, that is, in respect of representations which are not empirical. For without it we should never have *a priori* the representations either of space or of time” (A100). This same definition of the pure synthesis is also present in the *synthesis of reproduction*. Indeed, Kant clarifies his notion of reproduction through the mathematical examples, so that the pure synthesis can be taken as a synthesis of pure manifold of a priori intuitions of space and time, pertaining to the mathematical synthesis. Although it is evident that Kant presents the threefold synthesis on the basis of the model of mathematical synthesis, he also gives other definitions of a priori synthesis, which imply that this synthesis is more than a mathematical synthesis. It is not just the synthesis conditioning the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments of mathematics, but it is also the synthesis conditioning the very possibility of experience. This synthesis counts more than the mathematical synthesis of pure manifolds of space and time¹¹¹.

The other definition of a priori synthesis that is inherent in many passages of the deduction gives a different notion of a priori synthesis. According to this definition, the a priori synthesis is nothing, but the expression of the theory that the empirical syntheses must be carried out in accordance with the a priori rules that are being supplied by the categories¹¹². In A113 he states that since the identity of

¹¹¹At this point it must be mentioned that Kant cannot introduce the distinction between “mathematical” and “dynamical” synthesis in the context of deduction and therefore gives only the examples of mathematical synthesis. In the System of Principles he makes a distinction between mathematical synthesis, which is constitutive of its object and is arbitrary and dynamical synthesis, which is regulative and depends on the condition of the empirical given (A178-180/B221-223).

¹¹²In my classification of different views of a priori synthesis I am following Guyer’s classification. See, Paul Guyer, “Kant on Apperception and *A Priori* Synthesis” *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 17, 1980, pp. 205-212.

apperception must necessarily be involved in “the synthesis of all the manifold of appearances, so far as the synthesis is to yield empirical knowledge, the appearances are subject to a priori conditions, with which the synthesis...must be in complete accordant”. In this definition, there is not a postulation of a synthesis actually taking place a priori, but it is being suggested that the empirical syntheses must have a priori rules. This kind of definition of a priori synthesis is mostly implied in the B-Deduction, which seems to reduce imagination to an empirical employment of understanding. What is problematic with this definition is that it turns back to the two stems theory of knowledge: the appearances given through the affection of sensibility are connected through the rules derived from the nature of understanding, that is, apperception. In this kind of explanation, there is no need of an independent power of pure imagination, save that it serves to understanding to employ its rules to empirically given. In this respect, it cannot be the condition of the possibility of all knowledge, but rather can be regarded as just a function of understanding. But, although even the A-Deduction seems to involve such a theory of a priori synthesis, it also explicitly posits pure synthesis of imagination.

But, if these two definitions of a priori synthesis are avoided, we face with a very problematic notion of a priori synthesis: it is the synthesis of all the manifold, independent from and antecedently to all experience. Such a notion of a priori synthesis, which is independent from and prior to experience, is expressed in many passages of the deduction. In the synthesis of reproduction after stating that “there must... be something which, as the a priori ground of a necessary unity of appearances, makes their reproduction possible”, Kant grounds their reproducibility in the synthesis of imagination which is itself “grounded antecedently to all experience, upon a priori principles”(A101). He then continues that “we must assume a pure transcendental synthesis of imagination as conditioning the very possibility of

all experience”(A101). This transcendental synthesis of imagination is necessitated by Kant’s conception of the “affinity” of appearances, which he defines as “the thoroughgoing connection of appearances according to laws” (A114). In the systematic portion of the argument Kant states that all the association of appearances must have an objective ground, which subjects all the appearances “to universal rules of a thoroughgoing connection in their reproduction”(A122). Kant calls this objective ground of the association of appearances their “affinity”. While in the synthesis of reproduction Kant attributed the ground of the reproducibility of appearances to the synthesis of imagination “grounded antecedently to all experience, upon a priori principles”, he now calls this ground objective in reference to the unity of apperception since it is the unity of apperception that relates representations to an object. He firstly claims that this objective ground is found nowhere “save in the principle of unity of apperception” (A122). The unity of apperception supplies the synthetic unity of the connection of appearances, but insofar as it is imagination which actually accomplishes this unity, Kant immediately attributes the affinity of all appearances to the synthesis of imagination, “which is grounded a priori on rules” (A123)¹¹³. And states:

That the affinity of appearances, and with it their association, and through this, in turn, their reproduction according to laws, and so experience itself, should only be possible by means of this transcendental synthesis of imagination, is indeed strange but is none the less an obvious consequence of the preceding argument” (A123).

What is striking in this theory of transcendental affinity is that Kant seems to posit a transcendental kind of synthesis, which is distinct from the empirical synthesis. This transcendental synthesis “takes place” or is “exercised” a priori, that is, it is above and beyond the empirical and “makes empirical possible”. This theory

¹¹³Kant, sometimes attributes this affinity to apperception, sometimes to imagination. Gibbons argues that Kant attributes affinity to apperception and categories when he emphasises the conditions of thought alone. But he attributes affinity to the transcendental synthesis of imagination when he

of objective affinity not only posits two acts of synthesis but also the doubling of the faculty of imagination as empirical and transcendental. This doubling is expressed by the distinction Kant makes between reproductive and productive imagination. The reproductive imagination rests on empirical conditions and therefore operates with the laws of association and the productive imagination is the faculty of a priori synthesis and produces the affinity of appearances. As Wolff states

Finally, the problem of objective affinity... is resolved by the distinction between transcendental and empirical faculties. The associations of empirical imagination are grounded in the objective connections of transcendental imagination. As Kant indicates by his names for these faculties, we reproduce in association what we have already produced by a transcendental synthesis. In this way the laws of nature are seen to be the products of the mind itself¹¹⁴.

What justification can be given to this postulation of a distinct, transcendental kind of synthesis? Paul Guyer, in his provocative article "Kant on Apperception and A Priori Synthesis" claims that this theory of a priori synthesis is the result of Kant's conception of transcendental apperception¹¹⁵. Guyer argues that Kant's conception of transcendental apperception requires that there must be a synthesis. (I have discussed this requirement above). But what Guyer claims is that Kant's conception of transcendental apperception necessarily requires an a priori synthesis of the manifold antecedent to all particular experience. Guyer claims that what leads to this a priori synthesis in Kant's conception of transcendental apperception is the *certainty* that Kant attributes to it. Guyer argues that the representation of transcendental apperception is a priori, it is a transcendental representation and numerical identity is inseparable from it and it is a priori certain. Indeed, all these definitions of transcendental apperception is summarised by Kant in a single sentence: "We are conscious a priori of the complete identity of the self in respect of all representations

emphasises the conditions of knowledge. Sarah Gibbons, *Kant's Theory of Imagination*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 32-34.

¹¹⁴Robert Paul Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1969, p. 171.

¹¹⁵Paul Guyer, "Kant on Apperception and A Priori Synthesis" *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 17, 1980, pp. 205-212.

which can ever belong to our knowledge, as being a necessary condition of the possibility of all representations" (A116). Guyer takes this passage and along with it the many others as implying the a priori certainty of the consciousness of the numerical identity of the self. He states that transcendental apperception is "comprised by 'Cartesian evidence' for or a priori certainty of our continuing self-identity"¹¹⁶. Guyer claims that if the transcendental apperception is taken in this way as an a priori insight into one's own identity, then there must be an a priori synthesis:

If we can be certain *a priori* that we can represent our continuing identity in any empirical manifold, then we must be certain *a priori* that we can synthesize it in accordance with the rules that are the conditions of our consciousness of apperception. This will be possible only if our attempts in empirical synthesis, the success of which must otherwise wait upon experience, are preceded by an act of transcendental synthesis, or if we otherwise actively impose order on nature¹¹⁷.

Guyer gives many examples from the deduction that will confirm his claim. The most explicit ones confirming this claim are: "the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts" (A108), and insofar "this synthesis must presuppose or includes a synthesis, and if the former is to be a priori necessary, the synthesis must also be a priori" (A118).

¹¹⁶ibid, p. 211. In his article, Guyer criticises this conception of apperception. This conception of apperception as an a priori certainty of one's continuing identity is favored by Henrich. For the criticism of Henrich analysis of apperception principle see again Paul Guyer's review of Henrich's *Identität und Objektivität* in *Journal of Philosophy*, 76, 1979, pp. 151-167. For the same line of criticism of apperception principle and Guyer's own reconstruction it on the basis of Principles of Understanding, see, Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987.

¹¹⁷Paul Guyer, "Kant on Apperception and A Priori Synthesis" *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 17, 1980, pp. 207-208. Guyer goes on to discuss the analyticity and the syntheticity of the apperception principle. He thinks syntheticity with the explicit a priori awareness of the identity of the self and with the necessity of the self- ascription of all the representations. He argues that if the apperception principle is analytic then it does not require that all the representations must be self-ascribable. For Guyer if the apperception principle is synthetic it asserts an unconditional necessity of the self-ascription of representations. If it is analytic, this asserts only conditional necessity. Guyer's conception of analyticity and syntheticity is mostly criticised. For its criticism see Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 137, 353. Although Guyer's analysis of the relation between apperception and a priori synthesis is based on wrong assumptions for me, I use it to oppose one way of treating the synthesis of imagination, which is a widespread theory on Kant's transcendental imagination.

Although Guyer is right in claiming that such a conception of transcendental apperception necessarily requires an a priori synthesis distinct from the empirical, I do not agree with Guyer that Kant's conception of transcendental apperception implies such an a priori certainty of the identity of the self. What I find problematic with Guyer's analysis and with it all the claims that Kant is positing an a priori synthesis is a misconstruing of the term a priori. Kant uses the term in many different contexts ambiguously, but for a critical philosophy this term refers to transcendental and necessary conditions of the experience¹¹⁸. It is not distinct and above or beyond the empirical, but rather the condition of the empirical, or that which makes the empirical possible. This is to view the relation between transcendental and empirical in a perspectival way. The distinction of the empirical and transcendental is the distinction between two perspectives by which we can consider the same thing. In the beginning of the Objective Deduction Kant states that each of the three subjective sources of knowledge, that is, sense, imagination and understanding, "can be viewed empirically, namely in its application to given appearances". But when he states that "all of them are likewise a priori elements or foundations, which make the empirical possible" (A115), this must not be taken in the sense that Kant is positing transcendental faculties, which generates the world of experience. It must be taken as that they can be viewed transcendently as the condition of the empirical, as that which makes the empirical possible¹¹⁹. Kant in the beginning of **Transcendental Logic** gives this perspectival conception of the relation between transcendental and empirical: "the distinction between transcendental and empirical belongs... only to the critique of knowledge" (A57/B81).

¹¹⁸Of course Kant himself notes that not all the a priori knowledge is transcendental, i.e., mathematical knowledge. My equation of a priori with the transcendental must be taken contextually.

¹¹⁹Allison develops this perspectival conception of the relation between transcendental and empirical in *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, and in "Kant's Transcendental Humanism", *Monist*, 55, 1971, pp. 182-207.

If we turn to Guyer's analysis, it must be noted that transcendental apperception is not a consciousness of a distinct transcendental self, having a "Cartesian evidence" of its numerical identity. But as Allison states, "what we are aware of is not numerical identity; it is rather the 'fact' that this identity must be presupposed as a necessary condition of knowledge" in terms of a "necessity of a possibility" ¹²⁰. But if it is seen as such, that is, as a necessary condition of knowledge in terms of its possibility not its actuality, the a priori synthesis must likewise be taken as a synthesis, which unifies the manifold as to make possible for the I think to become reflectively aware of its identity. This however, does not imply that the synthesis is taking place prior to or before any particular experience as Guyer himself claims¹²¹. It is rather the synthesis, which "aims at nothing but the necessary unity in the synthesis of what is manifold in appearances" (A123). This is to take transcendental synthesis in terms of the perspectival conception of the relation between transcendental and empirical. The synthesis gains its transcendental character if it aims at the unification of the manifold in conformity with the unity of apperception. The dependence of apperception to the synthesis of imagination does not require that the synthesis is taking place prior to experience since the apperception is comprised by the a priori certainty of the identity of the self prior to any experience, but rather it requires its realisation in the experience, which is accomplished by the synthesis of imagination. Its realisation does not necessarily mean that it actually becomes aware of its identity, still this remains as a possibility, but rather it means that it serves as the ground of the requirement of unity of the manifold and the forms of unity that is required.

¹²⁰Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p.140.

¹²¹However, Guyer admits this on a different line, that is, he takes the possibility of reflectively becoming aware of the identity as indicating a conditional necessity. He claims that if it is conditional that is to say if apperception principle is analytic for Guyer, then there is no need to pose a priori synthesis, Guyer, "Kant on Apperception and A Priori Synthesis", p.208.

Although Guyer does not discuss this point, I think that the problem of a priori synthesis if it is to be taken as a distinct synthesis not only reveals a problem in Kant's conception of transcendental apperception, but also implies a strange doctrine of affection. Since the synthesis is always a synthesis of a manifold, what is the nature of the manifold, which this distinct transcendental synthesis synthesises? I have no answer to this question save the one given by the theory of double affection. Without adopting the perspectival view of the relation between transcendental and empirical we are led to presume that there is two affections, one is transcendental and the other is empirical providing two manifolds and requiring two syntheses¹²². The affection of the transcendental self by the independent things in themselves gives rise to transcendental synthesis, which produces the world of nature and the empirical self. And then the empirical affection of the empirical self by the empirical objects, which are produced by transcendental synthesis, gives rise to empirical synthesis. Therefore, the empirical synthesis just *reproduces* what is *produced* by the transcendental synthesis. This theory of double affection, which culminates in the doubling of activities and faculties, depends on a conception of things in themselves as substantial entities existing independent from us. Although I cannot discuss the issue here, this theory of double affection depends on a misconstrual of the term transcendental and relies on the confusion of the transcendental and transcendent-metaphysical conception of things in themselves, which cannot be defended in "critical" lines¹²³.

So, by adopting the perspectival conception of the relation between transcendental and empirical we have not a distinct kind of transcendental synthesis, but a synthesis, which can be conceived transcendently as to make the knowledge of objects possible. For one thing, this transcendental conception of synthesis is the

¹²²For the discussion of double affection theory see, Robert Paul Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1969, p. 170.

¹²³See, Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp.247-248

result of taking synthesis in its relation to the unity of apperception. The synthesis of imagination can be regarded as transcendental if this synthesis aims the unification of the manifold under the unity of apperception. Kant puts this as follows:

We entitle the synthesis of the manifold in imagination transcendental, if without distinction of intuitions it is directed exclusively to the *a priori* combination of the manifold; and the unity of this synthesis is called transcendental, if it is represented as *a priori* necessary in relation to the original unity of apperception (A118)

Due to this passage it must be noted that the synthesis of imagination cannot be treated apart from the unity of the synthesis, since it always aims the necessary unity in the combination of the manifold. It is in this sense that the synthesis is transcendental, that is, it operates under the unity of apperception. Kant puts this explicitly: "In so far as it aims at nothing but necessary unity in the synthesis of what is manifold in appearance, it may be entitled the transcendental function of imagination" (A123).

Up to now, the transcendental synthesis of imagination has been discussed in its relation to the unity of apperception, in its activity of bringing the manifold into unity. But this synthesis must also be seen in its relation to the sensibility, which provides the material on which this synthesis operates. But the manifold being synthesised by the imagination must be non-empirical manifold if it is to be counted as pure synthesis: "Such a synthesis is pure, if the manifold is not empirical, but is given *a priori*, as is the manifold in space and time" (A77/B103). The transcendental synthesis of imagination is essentially a synthesis that is produced in the pure, *a priori* manifold. Although Kant maintains this point in the synthesis of apprehension and reproduction that the imagination must also unify the pure manifold of space and time, he explicitly gives priority to time in two passages. The one is given at the beginning of the threefold synthesis as a remark that must be born in mind throughout the discussion of synthesis: all our representations are subject to time and "they must all be ordered, connected and brought into relation" in time (A99).

The second mention of time is in the Objective Deduction: “All consciousness as truly belongs to an all-comprehensive pure apperception, as all sensible intuition, as representation, does to a pure inner intuition, namely to time” (A124). So, the transcendental synthesis of imagination brings manifold into unity in time, and it is thus a synthesis giving form to time. Although the deduction pays no particular attention to this time factor, but yet introduces it in crucial places, it gives way to **Chapter on Schematism**. The fundamental role of time in the sphere of human knowledge finds its full articulation in the **Schematism**, and many problematic assertions of the deduction find their answer in that chapter. So, to discuss pure, productive imagination in its full length is not possible in the context of the deduction alone and must wait the **Schematism**. This is why the deduction must be followed by the **Schematism**, contrary to the claims that it is not a necessary chapter if the deduction is successful in its claims¹²⁴. Although the discussion of the pure productive imagination, that is, time in its full length must wait the schematism, the distinction between reproductive and productive imagination must (at least partly) be clarified in this context. The section below discusses this distinction.

3.1.4.2 Imagination in Its Productive and Reproductive Capacities

In order to understand the transcendental role of imagination in human knowledge, it is necessary to understand in what sense it is pure and productive. The theme of imagination had been studied exclusively by the predecessors of Kant, especially by Wolff and Baumgarten under the title of psychology¹²⁵. Although Kant shares many features of these studies and makes use of them, he breaks down the traditional conception of imagination as a psychological faculty with his distinction

¹²⁴I discuss these claims in Chapter IV, under the section General Views on the Schematism.

¹²⁵Kant follows these studies in his Lectures on Metaphysics. Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, trans. Karl Ameriks, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001. Also for Kant’s pre-critical theory of imagination, see, Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant*, esp. pp. 9-25.

between productive and reproductive imagination. Whereas the reproductive imagination, which depends on the empirical laws of association and merely reproduces the previously given empirical intuitions belongs to empirical psychology, the productive imagination belongs to transcendental philosophy. He states that “only the productive synthesis of imagination can take place *a priori*; the reproductive rests upon empirical conditions” (A118). However, Kant never gives a separate analysis of the power of pure imagination and an explicit account of the distinction between reproductive and productive imagination. The exception to this silence is the text *The Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View*, in which Kant offers a separate section on imagination. Although nothing in this text directly corresponds to the treatment of imagination in the *Critique*, the distinction between reproductive and productive imagination made in the *Anthropology* can supply crucial hints in order to clarify the distinction made in the *Critique*. In what follows I firstly present a summary of Kant’s treatment of imagination in the *Anthropology* and then discuss its relevance to the *Critique*. The discussion will help us to clarify the pure productive, transcendental synthesis of imagination as it is laid in the *Critique*.

Kant firstly presents imagination in the *Anthropology* in his consideration of sensibility for its own sake. Sensibility supplies the irreducible given for human knowledge and understanding is empty without this content. In this regard understanding has no privilege over sensibility and the *Anthropology* gives an apology for sensibility by investigating it on its own right. Imagination is introduced in this consideration of sensibility in its complex structure as one of the two powers of this faculty: “Sensibility in the cognitive faculty is twofold: sense and imagination. Sense is the faculty of intuition in the presence of an object. Imagination is intuition without the presence of the object”¹²⁶. Imagination then is making present the object in intuition, which is no longer present, which to a certain extent remains absent. In

this regard imagination cannot be a passive-receptive faculty like sense but exhibits a certain activity. In rendering something present, it is the active stem of sensibility; it is the activity in the passive receptivity. But, however much it is an active power it still belongs to sensibility, to receptivity. Kant further defines this active power of sensibility as:

The imagination (*facultas imaginandi*), as a faculty of perception without the presence of the object, is either productive, that is, a faculty of the original representation of the object (*exhibitio originaria*), which consequently precedes experience, or it is reproductive, that is, a faculty of the derived representation (*exhibitio derivativa*), which recalls to mind a previous empirical perception. Pure perception of space and time belongs to the productive faculty; all the others presuppose empirical perception (...)¹²⁷.

Kant correlates the distinction between productive and reproductive with the distinction between original and derived representation of the object. Calling to mind the distinction between original and derivative intuition of the *Critique* made in the **Aesthetic**, the original representation of the object is bringing the object forth from itself, giving itself its own object. The derivative intuition is the recalling, bringing back to mind a previously given empirical intuition and depends on affection. In this regard reproductive imagination depends on the empirical givenness of the intuition by the senses whereas the productive imagination gives itself its object and this exhibition, intuiting of the object precedes experience. The object made present by the productive imagination is not the empirical object since the empirical always depends on affection and cannot be original. But still this object cannot be the object created in its full structure as in the case of the original intuition of the divine knowing. Human finite intuition is not capable of such creation and Kant writes that imagination is “either poetical (productive) or merely recollective (reproductive)” and immediately adds that the productive imagination is “nevertheless not creative,

¹²⁶Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. Viktor Lyle Dowdell, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 1996, p. 40.

¹²⁷ *ibid*, p. 56.

because it does not have the power to produce a sense impression which has never before occurred to our senses"¹²⁸. So, if the productive imagination is not creative but still capable of original representation, the only representations it can intuit independent from empirical affection are the a priori intuitions of space and time, the mere forms of intuition. So, productive imagination only produces the forms of space and time; it gives the spatial and temporal forms to objects¹²⁹.

The productive imagination presents original representations that precede experience in the sense that it produces, brings forth the forms of object, the forms of space and time. This definition of productive imagination seems to accord with the productive imagination of the *Critique*. Rudolphe Gasche summarises the similarities of transcendental imagination of the *Critique* and the productive imagination of the *Anthropology* as follows:

Like transcendental imagination, productive imagination presents, that is renders present, effective, actual, not concepts of understanding, or ideas of reason, but non-present objects. And like transcendental imagination, productive imagination brings such presence about by means of pure perceptions of space and time¹³⁰.

Besides these similarities, the productive imagination of the *Anthropology* cannot be the transcendental-productive imagination of the *Critique*¹³¹. The productive imagination of the *Anthropology* refers to empirical-psychological faculty and has nothing to do with the conditions of experience and the objects of experience. When we look closer to the object brought forth by the productive imagination, we face with the dissimilarities of the accounts. The productive imagination in the *Anthropology* is the poetical imagination, which creates fictitious, imaginary objects. But this creation as mentioned is very different from the creation

¹²⁸ *ibid*, p. 57.

¹²⁹ Sallis, *The Gathering of Reason*, p. 157.

¹³⁰ Rudolphe Gasche, "Leaps of Imagination", in *The Path of Archaic Thinking*, edited by Kenneth Maly, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1995, p. 38.

¹³¹ Heidegger and Longuenesse claim that the productive imagination of *Anthropology* is same with the transcendental imagination of the *Critique*. Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 280-281. Longuenesse, *Kant and Capacity to Judge*, pp 206-208.

of divine intuition. Kant clarifies the issue: “Therefore, however great an artist the imagination may be, even if it be a sorceress, it still is not creative but must gather the material for its images from the senses¹³²”. What is crucial at this point is that productive imagination forms images, and for the content of these images it depends on the reproduction of the material previously given to the senses. Productive imagination creates the form of its objects but for the material it is dependent on the reproductive imagination and to the senses. But this dependence of the productive on the reproductive imagination does not dissolve the productive function into the reproductive one:

What distinguishes productive from mere reproductive imagination is that it produces, invents, the form of the object rather than merely reproducing a previous form. Productive imagination *forms* images, brings sense content together into the spatial form of an image¹³³.

Although imagination is an active power, it remains both in its productive and reproductive function an imitative power and this imitation involves both an activity and passivity¹³⁴. The active moment in the case of reproductive imagination is the recollecting, reproducing of the content and in the case of the productive imagination is the forming of that content¹³⁵. But this active moment is inseparable from the passive moment since imagination, either reproductive or productive, depends on the content provided by the passive receptivity of the senses. But this passivity of imagination is different from the passivity of the senses. The passivity of imagination is not the immediate passivity of the senses, but is a mediated passivity since it is not tied to the present presence of the content as in the case of the senses, but to

¹³²Kant, *Anthropology*, p. 58

¹³³Sallis, *The Gathering of Reason*, p. 157.

¹³⁴Gashe argues that imagination is an imitative faculty by following Mörchen., Rudolphe Gashe, “Leaps of Imagination”, in *The Path of Archaic Thinking*, edited by Kenneth Maly, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1995, p. .39.

¹³⁵ Sallis, *The Gathering of Reason*, p. 158.

the past presence of the content, that is, the givenness of the content in the past and therefore bringing past to the present¹³⁶.

Given this elaboration of imagination in the *Anthropology*, it seems that the *Critique* does not diverge from the general account of imagination discussed in the *Anthropology*. The *Critique* holds the distinction of productive and reproductive imagination as well and gives a similar definition of imagination to that made in the *Anthropology*: “Imagination is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is *not itself present*” (B151). But this definition of imagination completely differs in its implications in the framework of the *Critique*. The power of imagination is introduced and discussed in the context of the conditions of the possibility of experience in the *Critique* and therefore attached to the problem of synthesis. The distinction between reproductive and productive imagination is correlated with the distinction between empirical and a priori, transcendental synthesis. The reproductive-empirical imagination is responsible for the empirical synthesis of the manifold and therefore subject to the empirical laws of association and falls within the domain of psychology. The productive-transcendental imagination on the other hand is responsible for the pure synthesis and is the condition of the combination of all the manifold and therefore falls within the domain of transcendental philosophy. This distinction between the empirical and transcendental imagination does not coincide with the framework of the *Anthropology*, but at least becomes more understandable on the basis of the account given in the *Anthropology*.

To begin with the reproductive imagination of the *Critique*, it must be noted that it is not responsible from the mere reproduction of the previous content but also from forming that content into an image. Kant writes that reproductive imagination “has to bring the manifold of intuition into the form of an image” (A121). However, in the *Anthropology* it was the productive imagination, which forms the content, brings it

¹³⁶ibid, p. 158.

into an image. The reproductive imagination of the *Critique* falls on the side of the productive imagination of the *Anthropology*, which involves both a productive and reproductive moment. Therefore, the reproductive-empirical imagination both provides the content by reproducing the previously given manifold alongside the present ones and forms this content into an image. It is form giving, but this form giving activity of reproductive imagination is subject to the empirical conditions¹³⁷. Although, the reproductive imagination of the *Critique* corresponds to the productive imagination of the *Anthropology*, there is an important difference between them which has not to be by-passed: the reproductive-empirical imagination in the *Critique* is a “necessary ingredient of the perception itself” (A121n), but the productive imagination in the *Anthropology* has nothing to do with the perceptual experience, it is poetical, produces imaginary objects and therefore is not a constituent of the empirical perception¹³⁸. This difference is due to the differences of the context of the two texts¹³⁹.

On the other hand, the transcendental imagination as Kant calls it productive, shares some characteristics with the productive imagination of the *Anthropology* and also radically differs from it. To begin with, it is noteworthy to mention that both give form to a manifold and as Heidegger mentions, to form means to shape, to bring forth, to produce, *producere*¹⁴⁰. In this respect imagination is active, has the character of spontaneity, which characteristically belongs to understanding. But, alongside with this spontaneity imagination is also intuitive, it belongs to sensibility.

¹³⁷ Kant describes three ways of this form giving activity in the *Anthropology*: 1-the way in which the pictorial sensory faculty constructs spatiality; 2- the way in which associative sensory productive faculty assures the reproducibility through temporalising formation; 3- the way in which the sensory productive faculty of affinity connects the manifold on the basis of a single foundation. Kant, *Anthropology*, pp. 64-68. For the elaboration of these form giving activities see, Rudolphe Gashe, “Leaps of Imagination”, in *The Path of Archaic Thinking*, edited by Kenneth Maly, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1995, pp. 40-44.

¹³⁸ Young discusses how imagination is an ingredient of perception in reference to difference of Kant’s view from empiricist accounts of perception. Michael Young, “Kant’s View of Imagination”, *Kant-Studien*, 79, 1988, esp. Pp. 140-147.

¹³⁹ Sallis, *The Gathering of Reason*, p. 158.

¹⁴⁰ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 281.

And in this respect both productive imagination of the *Anthropology* and that of the *Critique* produce, from the a priori intuited, which is nothing but the a priori intuitions of space and time. But on the other hand productive-transcendental imagination radically differs from the productive imagination of the *Anthropology* in some respects. The first thing to be noted is that the transcendental imagination is completely independent from a reproductive moment contrary to the productive imagination of the *Anthropology*. The transcendental imagination has nothing to do with the sensible content, and therefore does not depend on the reproduction of that content. But it is only concerned with the forming of the pure manifold, pure intuitions of space and time, and especially time¹⁴¹. Although the productive imagination of the *Anthropology* brings forth the spatial and the temporal form of the objects, the transcendental imagination differs from that forming due to the fact that it does not form the manifold into an image. It forms the pure a priori manifold, it forms time, but this formed time cannot be brought into any image. Here we have the distinction between the schema and the image given in the **Schematism**. The image is always “a product of the empirical faculty of reproductive imagination¹⁴²” (A141/B181) and the schema, which is a “representation of a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept” (A140/B180), is a product of pure a priori imagination. In this sense transcendental synthesis of imagination is purely productive and does not involve any reproductive moment. What is crucial here is that the productive imagination of the *Anthropology* depends on the reproductive imagination but now the reproductive imagination of the *Critique* (which, to a certain extent is the productive imagination of the *Anthropology*) depends on the

¹⁴¹ Although Kant treats space and time equally in the Aesthetic, the deduction gives priority to time, since all the representations insofar as modifications of the mind are subject to inner sense. In this respect time is the a priori and universal condition of all appearances.

¹⁴² Different from Kemp Smith’s translation, Kant calls image-producing faculty, not reproductive but “empirical productive faculty” in this passage. This accords with my reading of the productive imagination of *Anthropology* as analogous to the reproductive imagination of the *Critique*. Given this, to use the term “reproductive” or “empirical productive faculty” does not make a difference, since the reproductive faculty of the *Critique* involves a productive moment.

transcendental-productive imagination and is conditioned by it. The productive imagination produces synthesis in the pure manifold of time and thus forms time and this formed time must be presupposed by the reproductive imagination in order to bring the manifold into the form of an image.

The time factor in the pure synthesis of imagination can be discussed in its full length only in the **Schematism**, but still a point must be discussed in clarifying the pure synthesis of imagination. This crucial point is that Kant firstly named the transcendental synthesis of imagination as reproductive in the *synthesis of reproduction* and later called it productive and denied any status to the reproductive function in the domain of transcendental philosophy. One possible answer to this change is to distinguish the associative reproductive function, which depends on the empirical laws, that is, upon the past experiential associations from the reproductive function of imagination, which reproduces what has just been apprehended a moment ago for obtaining a complete representation. Indeed, this imaginative reproduction firstly generates the intuitions that can be associated. But besides the fact that the associative imagination requires the generation of the elements through the reproduction of the successive manifold, what is important is that in this act of reproduction the time is generated in the distinction of its moments. Therefore, this act is actually productive; it produces time. But here we have a paradox: how can an act of reproduction that takes place in time (the reproduction of the successive elements presupposes the succession of time as given) also generate successive time? I shall discuss the issue in the next chapter and here leave it open since the discussion of such questions require the reconsideration of what pure intuition is. These questions can become answerable only through the Chapter on Schematism. Although, the transcendental deduction makes a sharp distinction between the productive and reproductive functions of imagination, it will turn out that this distinction can only be made in speech, but actually the productive and reproductive

imagination is a unity¹⁴³. As Eva Schaper warns us, to treat them as two different kinds of imagination or even as two uses of imagination or again to think that there are two kinds of synthesis, empirical synthesis and the transcendental synthesis “curiously aping without actually being an empirical synthesis, is misleading: “No doubt what Kant says is misleading, but it is not as misleading as this”¹⁴⁴.

To sum up: The *Anthropology* supplies crucial hints in order to clarify the distinction but the *Critique* presents a much more complicated account, which gets deeper in its every step. So, in this chapter I have just pointed out the difficulties and the ambiguities and in the next chapter I shall discuss them in length.

3.1.5 Conclusion to the A-Deduction: Imagination As a Mediating Faculty

Although Kant has started his investigation of the conditions of the possibility of human knowledge with the two stems of knowledge, the A-Edition Deduction gives up this oversimplification and introduces imagination as “one of the fundamental faculties of human soul” (A124), mediating between sensibility and understanding. The knowledge arises due to the necessary connection of these two stems and imagination is the unifying center of sense and thought and thus the condition of all knowledge. Kant summarises the role of imagination towards the end of the Deduction:

¹⁴³ This seems to contradict with my analysis above. In noticing the difference of the relation between reproductive and productive imagination of *Anthropology* and the *Critique* I claimed that the productive imagination of the *Critique* does not involve any reproductive moment, but now I am stating that reproductive and productive imagination is a unity. This implies that the relation between reproductive and productive imagination in *Anthropology* is much more similar to that given in the *Critique* contrary to my analysis. But the difference lies in that the *Anthropology* is oblivious to the distinction between transcendental and empirical. Viewed in complete isolation from the empirical, the transcendental does not involve any reproductive moment, since reproduction is characterized with the given content in *Anthropology*. But here the point is that the transcendental synthesis does not take place in isolation from the empirical. The difference between the productive imagination of *Anthropology* and the *Critique* lies in Kant’s distinction between an image and a schema. The point will become clear in the Schematism.

¹⁴⁴ Eva Schaper, “Kant on Imagination”, *Philosophical Forum*, 2, 1970, p. 439.

A pure imagination, which conditions all a priori knowledge, is thus one of the fundamental faculties of the human soul. By its means we bring the manifold of intuition on the side, into connection with the condition of the necessary unity of pure apperception on the other. The two extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must stand in necessary connection with each other through the mediation of this transcendental faculty of imagination...(A124).

Imagination performs its mediating function through its synthesising activity by means of which it brings the manifold of intuition under the unity of apperception. What is important at this point is that the categories as the forms of unity arising from the unity of apperception “are brought into play through relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception” (A124). And insofar as the manifold is brought under the unity of apperception through the synthesis of imagination, “it is only by means of the imagination that they can be brought into relation to sensible intuition” (A124). In this regard imagination mediates between the sensible intuition and the unity of apperception and therefore sustains the application of the categories to the intuitions.

Imagination performs its mediating function by being dynamically related to both of them. Imagination operates on the sensible given; it integrates the manifold of intuition within the form of inner sense, that is, time and in this sense what its synthesis produces is always the sensible intuition. In this aspect, imagination belongs to sensibility; it supplies the content of the understanding and therefore, to a certain extent, remains receptive. But on the other hand, it also operates in relation to the unity of apperception and gains its transcendental character as the condition of the possibility of all knowledge in this relation. The combination it produces within the inner sense must be in conformity with the unity of apperception, that is to say that imagination synthesises the manifold according to the rules supplied by the categories. In this aspect, imagination is spontaneous, an active power and belongs to understanding. Indeed understanding is itself “the unity of apperception in its relation to the synthesis of imagination” (A119). Imagination is a mediating faculty

not in the sense that it is a third stem, third thing or faculty alongside with the faculties of understanding and sensibility, but rather in the sense that it has a dual status –both receptive and spontaneous- being dynamically related to both of them. What is crucial at this point is that imagination is one of the three subjective sources of knowledge, which the other two are *sense* and *apperception*. On the other hand, imagination belongs both to *understanding* and *sensibility*, which are the two stems of knowledge and in a sense makes them what they are. In this respect imagination can be taken as the “common root” of sensibility and understanding as the original unifying force by means of which thought and sense are united, in Heideggerian lines. But still, this does not dissolve apperception into the pure productive power of imagination in the Kantian lines. In its narrower sense, that is, as apperceptive thought, understanding is independent from the temporality of imagination. Actually, here we have the Kantian distinction between thinking and knowing and this distinction can be read from Kant’s twofold definition of categories. Categories, as the conditions of thought apart from the conditions of sensibility are grounded in the unity of apperception and they are the “fundamental concepts by which we think objects in general for appearances, and have therefore a priori objective validity” (A11). But as the conditions of knowledge they are pure a priori modes, which “contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of imagination in respect of all possible appearances” (A119). In the next chapter, it will become clear that this definition of categories necessarily implies and involves the schematism of imagination. But now, I turn to the discussion of the B-edition Deduction in which it will become clear that the categories, apart from their *objective validity*, gain their *objective reality* by means of the transcendental synthesis of imagination, which this time Kant calls *figurative synthesis*.

3.2 Imagination in the B-Edition Transcendental Deduction

The A-Deduction has come across with the conclusion that transcendental power of imagination is a fundamental power that grounds the possibility of all knowledge and experience. In regard to the functioning of imagination the B-Deduction seems to differ radically from the A. The B-Deduction gives up the tripartite division of sense, imagination and thought, and turns back to the two stems of knowledge; sensibility and understanding and treats imagination as a mere functioning of understanding. Imagination is no longer treated as a fundamental and independent power, which unites sense and thought, but rather as a “mere functioning distinction within understanding”¹⁴⁵. In the B-Deduction, Kant calls the transcendental synthesis of imagination as “an action of understanding on the sensibility” (B152) or again he states that “understanding determines inner sense under the title of imagination” (B153). What is crucial in this change of exposition is that while the A-Deduction puts understanding as a structural whole yielded by the transcendental imagination in its relation to the unity of apperception, now the B-Deduction gives supremacy to understanding and imagination emerges as a mode of understanding in which it restricts itself to the sensible given in order to apply its categories. Apart from this restriction of understanding to the sensible given, it alone carries out a distinct intellectual synthesis “without the aid of imagination” (B152). Indeed, Kant puts forward this supremacy of understanding over imagination at the very beginning of the B-Deduction by attributing all synthesis to understanding. In what follows I discuss the opening section of the B-Deduction entitled *The Possibility of Combination in General* and propose that the section, in its attributing all synthesis to understanding conceals the power of imagination, which lies at its depth and makes it possible at the surface.

3.2.1 Synthesis: A Function of Understanding or Imagination?

Kant opens the B-Deduction in section 15 by repeating the general claim of the *Critique* that the manifold of intuition is given through the senses but the combination of this manifold requires a spontaneous activity of synthesis. Different from the A-deduction, he attributes this synthesis not to the power of imagination but to understanding. He states: “all combination-be we conscious of it or not, be it a combination of the manifold of intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts-is an act of understanding” (B130). The question is: Does this apparent difference denote a radical change in status or a mere change in terminology? The answer of this question lies in Kant’s defining of understanding. After stating that combination is “an act of spontaneity of the faculty of representation”, he continues by asserting that “this faculty, to distinguish it from sensibility, must be entitled understanding” (B130). Here Kant turns back to the theory of two stems; sensibility, which is “nothing but receptivity” and understanding as the spontaneous faculty. The understanding to which Kant attributes all synthesis is the understanding defined in its difference from sensibility as being spontaneous, that is to say the understanding in its broader sense. The understanding here defined in opposition to sensibility is not just the faculty of concepts or judgment in its narrower sense as the apperceptive thought, but the understanding in its broader sense including imagination, which the A-deduction defined as “the unity of apperception in its relation to the synthesis of imagination”. This two-fold characterisation of understanding serves to clarify many statements of the deduction¹⁴⁵. The understanding in its narrower sense is the apperceptive thought as opposed to imagination, which is nothing but the faculty of

¹⁴⁵ Charles M. Shereover, *Heidegger, Kant & Time*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1972, p. 175.

¹⁴⁶ This line of interpretation of Kant’s use of the term understanding is given by Freydberg, Llewelyn and Longuenesse. John Llewelyn, *The HypoCritical Imagination*, Warwick Studies in European Philosophy, Routledge, London, 2000, pp. 34-35; Bernard Freydberg, *Imagination and Depth in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, Literature and the Sciences of Man, Peter Lang, New York, 1994, pp. 59-60; Béatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the*

concepts as defined at the beginning of the Transcendental Logic and that which produces the combination of concepts in order to form complex concepts or judgments. The understanding in its inclusive sense, or in its second aspect is the understanding, which is “the unity of apperception in its relation to the synthesis of imagination” and produces the combination of the manifold of intuition, be it empirical or pure. For the A-Deduction the term synthesis refers to the combination of the manifold of intuition, but now in the B-Deduction Kant broadens its usage to the combination of concepts. The section as obvious from its title concerns the possibility of combination in general, “be it a combination of the manifold of intuition...or of various concepts” not just the combination of the manifold of intuition. In this regard, the B-Deduction takes its departure from the theory of two stems and imagination remains concealed. Indeed, there is no need yet to introduce imagination into the argument, although it is ever present there¹⁴⁷. In reading B-Deduction I shall concentrate on revealing this ever presence of imagination and this necessarily requires a discussion of the structure of the argument of B-Deduction.

3.2.2 The Structure of the Argument in B-Deduction

Dieter Henrich, in his article “The Proof Structure of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction”, which is now a classic essay on the issue, has challenged to those commentators who tries to establish a parallelism between the A and B Deductions¹⁴⁸. Contrary those commentators who interpret the B-Deduction from the perspective of the structure of the A-Deduction in terms of a distinction between subjective-objective deduction or deduction “from above” and deduction “from below”, Henrich claims that the B-Deduction consists not two distinct proofs, but

Transcendental Analytic of Critique of Pure Reason, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2000, pp. 61-64.

¹⁴⁷I claim this concealment of imagination by following Freydberg’s analysis in *Imagination and Depth in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*. My reading of B-Deduction and Schematism heavily relies on Freydberg’s analysis.

rather one proof in two steps¹⁴⁹. Henrich argues that Kant gives a conclusion of the deduction in two completely different passages one in section 20 and the other in section 26, and these two conclusions cannot be treated as “two proofs of the same proposition”¹⁵⁰. He directs our attention to the statement, which Kant makes in section 21. In section 21, just after the conclusion drawn in section 20, Kant states that “a beginning is made of a deduction of the pure concepts of understanding” and will be completed in section 26 (B144). From this statement Henrich concludes that the deduction is given in two steps and calls it “two-steps-in-one-proof”. After that, Henrich presents his own reconstruction of the argument and argues that the first part gives a restricted deduction of the categories and the second part removes this restriction and shows that categories are valid for all the objects of the senses. The restriction Henrich finds in the first part is consisted in that “intuitions are subject to categories *insofar* as they, as intuitions, already possess unity”¹⁵¹. The first part proves that categories are valid only for intuitions “*which already contain unity*”, but this leaves undetermined “the *range within which* unitary intuitions can be found”¹⁵². The second step shows that categories are valid not only for the unitary intuitions, but for all our sensible intuitions since space and time are themselves unities, the sensible intuitions, which are given in space and time also contain unity. This second step of the argument involves linking the conclusion of the first part with the results of the Transcendental Aesthetic, which is developed before. Henrich also notes that this shows that the B-Deduction is constructed by a synthetic method and does not proceed analytically from the principle of apperception¹⁵³.

¹⁴⁸Dieter Henrich, “The Proof Structure of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction”, *Review of Metaphysics*, 22, 1969, pp. 641-659.

¹⁴⁹Adickles and Paton read B-Deduction in terms of the distinction between subjective and objective deduction. Erdman and de Vleeschauwer read it in terms of the distinction between deduction “from above” and deduction “from below”. Henrich discusses and criticises these readings in his article.

¹⁵⁰ Henrich, p. 641.

¹⁵¹ *ibid*, p. 645

¹⁵² *ibid*, p. 645

¹⁵³ *ibid*, p. 649

Although Henrich's "two-steps-in-one-proof" criterion for the interpretation of B-Deduction has widely accepted, his own reconstruction of the deduction has not met the same approval as a solution to the problem of what the two steps actually consist. Among the commentators who criticise Henrich's solution, Allison and Robinson oppose to Henrich's interpretation of the deduction as involving a restricted validity of categories in the first part and unrestricted validity in the second¹⁵⁴. Both Allison and Robinson argue that the direction of the restriction is the opposite of Henrich's claim. They both remind that in the first part Kant establishes the relation of categories with the *manifold of intuition in general* and in the second step he establishes this relation with the *manifold of human sensible intuition*. The intuition in general, "be the intuition like or unlike ours, if only it be sensible and not intellectual" (B148) is broader than and contains under itself the human sensible intuition. Allison states that although the human sensible intuition is contained under the intuition in general as a species is contained under a genus, the deduction does not analytically progress from the genus to species, but instead introduces the transcendental synthesis of imagination at the core of the passage from genus to species. Allison claims that the first part proves the objective validity of the categories in respect to intuition in general and the second step proves the objective reality of categories by linking them to human sensible intuition, and this second step necessarily involves the synthesis of imagination in order to apply categories to sensible intuition¹⁵⁵.

The above-mentioned criteria in distinguishing two steps are organised by Kant around the problem of synthesis, which radically differs from the A-Deduction. In B-Deduction he offers two distinct syntheses, intellectual synthesis carried out by understanding and figurative synthesis, which he attributes to imagination. The

¹⁵⁴ Henry Allison, "Reflections on the B-Deduction", *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXV Supplement, 1986, pp. 1-15; Hoke Robinson, "Intuition and Manifold in Transcendental Deduction", *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 22, 1984, pp. 403-412.

¹⁵⁵ Allison organises his reconstruction around the two senses of the term object: *Object* as an object in the logical sense, and *Gegenstand* as an object in the weighty sense, an object of possible experience.

intellectual synthesis is carried out by understanding and relates categories to objects of intuition in general (B150), and understanding carries out this synthesis “without the aid of imagination” (B152). Imagination, on the other hand performs a figurative synthesis, which brings the form of human intuition under the unity of apperception. The role of imagination in the figurative synthesis of the B-Deduction is same with the transcendental synthesis of the A-Deduction, which is nothing but to bring the manifold of sensible intuition under the unity of apperception. While this synthesis of imagination has examined in its three aspects in the A-Deduction, now it is set alongside an intellectual synthesis. In the B-Deduction Kant distinguishes intellectual and figurative synthesis as two distinct syntheses, they are not two stages of one act of synthesis, or two different accounts of one act. At first sight, the distinction between intellectual and figurative synthesis can be seen as the distinction between synthesis of reproductive/productive synthesis of imagination and the synthesis of recognition in a concept. And also Kant proposes a synthesis of apprehension in section 26, and this can also be taken as resembling the synthesis of apprehension in intuition given in the A-Deduction. Actually, here any attempt to reconcile the threefold synthesis of the A-Deduction with these two distinct syntheses is useless. As discussed, the synthesis of recognition in a concept is not an intellectual synthesis of understanding carried out in complete independence from imagination, but it is carried out by the understanding, which is “the unity of apperception in its relation to synthesis of imagination”. In this regard any simple matching is impossible between the different elements of synthesis of the A and the B Deduction.

Kant’s separating of two syntheses bears on many reasons; his attempt to keep distinct the conditions of thought from the conditions of sensibility, to stress the distinction between thinking and knowing – the distinctions which will operate in

Allison’s reconstruction is also widely criticised due to the fact that his distinction between Object and

establishing the practical realm. But, these distinctions also serve to characterise human knowledge in terms of its dependence upon sensibility. The categories are realised through their relation to the sensible intuition, which is achieved by the figurative synthesis, and this realisation is at the same time a restriction of the use of categories. Through the figurative synthesis the application of categories are restricted to the domain of sensibility. But all these indicate that, the role of imagination, which was central in the A-Deduction, is played down with its being introduced in terms of the restriction of the application of categories in the B-Deduction. Defining the problem in this way secures the supremacy of understanding and its independence from imagination. It seems that imagination is no longer a fundamental power, which is a structural component of understanding that makes it what it is, but rather a function of it that limits it.

In regard to this seemingly changed status of imagination, any interpretation that attempts to establish a fundamental role for imagination in the B-Deduction akin to that of the A-Deduction must put into question the possibility of making a strict distinction between intellectual and figurative synthesis. When we look at Kant's definition of intellectual synthesis, we notice that this synthesis is an abstraction from the conditions of sensibility and refers to the formal aspect of the synthesis from the side of understanding: "I must abstract from the mode in which the manifold for an empirical intuition is given, and must direct attention solely to the unity which, in terms of the category, and by means of the understanding, enters into the intuition" (B144). In this regard, the understanding, which carries out this intellectual synthesis, is the logico-discursive understanding of general logic. General logic abstracts from all the content of knowledge and is indifferent to the source or origins of representations. But still, general logic assumes that something is given to thought for its employment and investigates this employment of thought to the given in

Gegenstand has no textual evidence. Henry Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 133-172.

abstraction from all the specific characteristics of the given. In this sense, intellectual synthesis concerns the manifold of intuition in general, in abstraction from all the specific features of that intuition, that is, its spatio-temporality. Therefore, this synthesis “relates only to the unity of apperception” (B150), but not to the conditions of sensibility. As Kant states, it only concerns the possibility of intuition from the side of the understanding and leaves the same possibility from the side of sensibility undetermined. It only concerns the subjection of the manifold of intuition to the unity of apperception, but the understanding, which carries out this synthesis, cannot “take them up *into itself* in such manner as to combine them as the manifold of its *own* intuition” (B153). In this respect, this synthesis is itself not an actual synthesis performed on the manifold of intuition: “if the synthesis be viewed by itself alone, is nothing but the unity of the act.” (B153). This synthesis concerns the unity of the act in abstraction from the act itself, which necessarily concerns the conditions of the givenness of the intuitions. And this synthesis can be viewed alone, only on the basis provided by that act, and this act is nothing but the synthesis of imagination. The intellectual synthesis is an abstraction from the figurative, that is, extra-conceptual synthesis of imagination, not in the sense that it is a distinct kind of synthesis performed in complete independence from imagination, but in the sense that it is an abstraction made from the basis provided by imagination and concerns only the formal aspect of the synthesis in regard to its unity. Therefore, imagination “must be present in this so-called intellectual synthesis as well, however suppressed”¹⁵⁶.

The first step of the deduction views the conditions of knowledge from the side of thought alone, but the conditions of thought is not sufficient to render knowledge possible. The second step concerns the sufficient conditions, that is, the conditions of sensibility as laid in Transcendental Aesthetic. In this scheme, imagination again comes about as a mediating faculty through which these

¹⁵⁶ Bernard Freydberg, *Imagination and Depth in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Literature and the

conditions meet each other. But this necessarily implies that the second step of the deduction will also involve a reevaluation of **Transcendental Aesthetic** and reveal the function of imagination in pure intuitions, which has remained concealed in their first exposition.

3.2.3 Intellectual Synthesis

At the very beginning of B-Deduction, after attributing all combination to the understanding, be it a combination of concepts or of intuitions, Kant states: “But the concept of combination includes, besides the concept of the manifold and its synthesis, also the concept of the unity of the manifold” (B130-131). The act of combination, which Kant attributes to understanding, is not just the synthesis of the manifold, but it is “representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold” (B131). In the first part of the deduction Kant’s concern will be the ground of this unity, which contains “the ground of the unity of diverse concepts in a judgment, and therefore the possibility of understanding, even as regard to its logical employment” (B131). This is to say that the first part of the deduction will concern the possibility of the employment of understanding as a logico-discursive faculty, of which the basic function is unification. But this function of unification is concerned in abstraction from the nature of the manifold to be unified.

The ground of the unity in question is the original synthetic unity of apperception, indicating that the manifold of intuitions must be brought under one self-consciousness by means of a synthesis. This synthetic unity of apperception constitutes the supreme principle of all employment of understanding. Kant puts it as the supreme principle in regard to the *possibility of intuition*:

The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in its relation to sensibility is, according to the Transcendental Aesthetic, that all the manifold of intuition should be subject to the formal conditions of space and time. The supreme principle of the same possibility,

in its relation to understanding, is that all the manifold of intuition should be subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception (B136).

Two things are striking in this passage. Although the first step of the deduction does not concern the conditions of sensibility, Kant mentions it at the beginning and continues with a long footnote discussing the unity of space and time. The footnote tells that the unity in intuition differs from the unity produced by thought since the unity in intuition involves a synthesis of representations *in one intuition* and therefore considered as singular and composite. Kant mentions that “the singularity of such intuitions is found to have important consequences” (B136n). Sarah Gibbons argues that this mention of extra-conceptual synthetic unity in intuition in the first step of the deduction marks that the abstraction from the nature of human intuition is “at best partial”¹⁵⁷. She claims that the note “offers an interpretation of ‘original synthetic unity’”, since Kant describes the unity in intuition as synthetic and original. Although the first step discusses the original synthetic unity of apperception in regard to the possibility of understanding, its unity is not just the discursive unity of concepts and therefore cannot be fully abstracted from the extra conceptual synthetic unity in intuition.

The other remarkable point of the passage is linking the possibility of intuition to apperception. In the **Aesthetic** Kant defined intuition as mere givenness through receptivity. But this definition of intuition is made in isolation from thought and therefore it is partial. Now, Kant states that the possibility of intuition also requires its subjection to the conditions of unity of apperception. Without the combination of the manifold given in intuition in one consciousness, nothing can be known or thought, and hence would be nothing. As Freydborg states: “no apperception, no individual intuition in space and time”¹⁵⁸.

¹⁵⁷ Sarah Gibbons, *Kant's Theory of Imagination*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 45.

¹⁵⁸ Freydborg, *Imagination and Depth in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 64.

The possibility of intuition rests on two conditions; one supplied by sensibility and the other by thought. The **Transcendental Aesthetic** investigated the first condition in isolation from the conditions of thought. And now, the first step of the deduction investigates the second condition in isolation from the conditions of sensibility. But these two investigations, which are made by an abstraction from the other, are partial in themselves. What is required for knowledge is that these two conditions must meet each other. Imagination occurs as this meeting ground of the conditions of sensibility and thought. The investigation of sensibility and understanding in their own, in isolation from each other can be achieved by means of an abstraction from their meeting ground and thereby concealing imagination.

So, the investigation of understanding in its own right, that is, the intellectual synthesis, “relates only to the unity of apperception” and can involve only the combination of the manifold in concepts as “mere forms of thought” (B150). Kant argues that it is by means of this intellectual synthesis that the given representations are related to an object. The characteristic activity of understanding consists in relating the representations to an object and “an object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is *united*” (B137). It is the unification of the manifold under a concept that constitutes the relation of representations to an object. This unity of representations is assured by the unity of apperception:

Now all unification of representations demands unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently it is the unity of consciousness that alone constitutes the relation of representations to an object, and therefore their objective validity... (B137).

Kant establishes a reciprocal relation between unity of consciousness and the representation of an object. As Allison argues, unity of consciousness is a sufficient as well as necessary condition of the representation of objects¹⁵⁹. It is the ground of

¹⁵⁹Allison states that the relation between transcendental apperception and the representation of objects is reciprocal. He calls this *reciprocity thesis*, which asserts that unity of consciousness is the necessary condition of the representations of objects, and the representation of an object is necessary

objectivity since it is by means of this unity that “all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of object” (B139). In regard of this Kant entitles unity of apperception *objective unity of apperception* (B139).

So, every intuition in order “*to become an object for me*” must stand under the synthetic unity of apperception and Kant identifies the act of understanding through which the manifold of representations are united in one consciousness with the act of judgment: “Judgment is nothing but the manner in which given modes of knowledge is brought to the objective unity of apperception” (B142). If so, the manifold of representations must conform to the logical functions of judgment in order to be united in the concept of an object or to be brought under the objective unity of apperception. The manifold is objectively determined “in respect of one of the logical functions of judgment” (B143). Given the results of Metaphysical Deduction that equates categories with the logical functions of judgment, Kant concludes that the manifold of intuition is necessarily subject to the categories (B143). The objective validity of categories is demonstrated by this definition of categories as the logical functions of judgment “in so far as they are employed in determination of the manifold of a given intuition” (B143). By this demonstration of the objective validity of categories Kant ends the first step of the deduction.

3.2.4 The Transition from Intellectual to Figurative Synthesis

The first step of the argument in its identification of categories with logical forms of judgment does not move far beyond the Metaphysical Deduction. It proves the objective validity of categories as just logical forms. In this respect categories are mere “*forms of thought*” and through them alone no determinate object is known (B150). For this very reason categories relate only to “objects of intuition in general”

condition of the unity of consciousness. In this respect, unity of consciousness is necessary and sufficient condition of the representation of an object. But, he adds that this object must be taken in its

but not to the objects given in human sensible intuition¹⁶⁰. The synthesis in them as mere *forms of thought* “relates only to the unity of apperception” and therefore concerns only the unity which “by means of the understanding enters into the intuition” (B144) and abstracts from the mode in which the intuition is given in sensibility. If so, the intellectual synthesis performed by understanding is considered at a level of abstraction and proves not so much for categories. But as Kant states after the first step “only a beginning is made of a deduction of pure concepts of understanding” (B144).

Now, in the second step, Kant must relate categories “to the objects which can be given *us* in intuition” (B150) (emphasis is mine) and prove not their objective validity but their objective reality. This is equivalent to saying that Kant must still prove that categories have empirical employment apart from their transcendental employment, which is proved in the first step but also which does not provide any knowledge of objects. So, categories, if they are to yield any knowledge of objects, must be related to objects of the senses, that is to say that it must be shown that they apply to empirical intuition. For that very reason, the application of categories must be restricted to the domain of the sensible since they can yield no knowledge of objects apart from this limitation.

What is crucial for this second step of the deduction is that the restriction put on the employment of categories is not a demand arising out of thought, but rather it is a demand of sensibility. It is the nature of human sensibility that requires the limitation of the employment of categories, and this limitation is necessarily due to the mode in which the empirical intuition is given in sensibility. This is the reason why the argument of the deduction cannot progress analytically from the apperception

judgmental-logical sense, that is, as *Object*, not *Gegenstand*, Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p. 146.

¹⁶⁰Allison argues that while the first step establishes the relation of categories to the objects in judgmental sense and therefore proves the objective validity of categories, the second step establishes the relation of categories to the objects in weighty sense, that is, the real of objects of experience and therefore proves the objective reality of categories.

principle. The conceptual requirements of unity of apperception cannot account for the requirements brought about by the forms of sensibility:

Instead, it shows merely that insofar as unity is introduced into the manifold of intuition by the understanding...it must conform to the conditions of unity of consciousness... This result leaves completely unsettled the question of whether the data given in accordance with the forms of sensibility are capable of being unified in a single consciousness according to categories. This is no longer a question about the nature of understanding, but rather...about the manner or 'form' in which data are given in human sensibility¹⁶¹.

So, the second step of the deduction concerns not with the conceptual unity introduced into the manifold by the understanding, but with the extra-conceptual unity in intuition. This unity in intuition necessarily concerns the form of intuition, that is to say it is the unity of space and time that the second part investigates. This unity of space and time is brought about by the figurative synthesis of imagination. It is only on the basis of this figurative synthesis of imagination that the understanding represents itself the unity of the manifold. This is the very reason why the intellectual synthesis is an abstraction from the basis provided by the imagination; viewing it in its own is made possible by the figurative synthesis of imagination.

3.2.5 Figurative Synthesis

Kant introduces figurative synthesis of imagination after stating the inadequacy of unity of thought in knowing determinate objects. The mere understanding is incapable of relating its concepts to sensible intuition and this relation comes about through a synthesis of imagination. The deduction of categories requires that they be related to sensible intuition and it is the synthesis of imagination by means of which this relation is established. Therefore, the deduction of categories in the B-Deduction, as well as in the A-Deduction, converges on the synthesis of imagination:

In any case, it is the figurative synthesis with which the deduction is primarily concerned, which Kant finally calls by its right name of *transcendental synthesis of imagination*. After remaining largely dormant throughout the B deduction, suddenly imagination spreads over everything, revealing itself to be the fundamental unity actuating human thought of objects¹⁶².

Kant calls the synthesis of imagination figurative in order to emphasise its extra-conceptual nature and its difference from the intellectual synthesis, which is a mere conceptual synthesis. As Allison states, this figurative synthesis involves any imaginative synthesis including formation of images, but Kant's concern in the deduction is with the transcendental dimension of this synthesis¹⁶³. Kant calls synthesis of imagination transcendental "if it be directed merely to the original synthetic unity of apperception" (B151). This synthesis produces the combination of the manifold of intuition in accordance with the unity of apperception. Although the deduction of objective reality of categories is primarily concerned with this synthesis, Kant does not provide a clear account of it. But in his exposition of this figurative synthesis he credits understanding and this is obvious from the first introduction of this synthesis:

(...) the understanding, as spontaneity, is able to determine inner sense through the manifold of given representations, in accordance with the synthetic unity of apperception, and so to think synthetic unity of apperception of the manifold of a priori sensible intuition (...) (B150)

Kant further defines this synthesis as "an action of understanding on sensibility" (B152) through which the understanding determines inner sense in respect of its form¹⁶⁴. The inner sense to which all our representations are subject "contains the mere form of intuition, but without combination of the manifold in it" (B154). So, the combination of the manifold is not given in inner sense, but produced by understanding by means of affecting that sense (B155). This inward

¹⁶¹ Henry Allison, "Reflections on the B-Deduction", *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXV Supplement, 1986, p. 10.

¹⁶² Bernard Freydberg, *Imagination and Depth in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 76.

¹⁶³ Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p. 160

determination of sensibility is performed by the understanding “under the title of a *transcendental synthesis of imagination*” (B153).

Although all these expositions credit understanding, Kant at least defines understanding in the second step of the deduction as *spontaneity* in opposition to receptivity as done in the quoted passage above. It is not the *mere understanding*, which Kant mentions at the beginning of the section (section 24) and which is considered in abstraction from sensibility, but it is the spontaneity in opposition to receptivity. This spontaneity does not refer to the understanding in its narrower sense, but refers to spontaneity including the power of imagination. This understanding is nothing but that which the A- Deduction had defined as “the unity of apperception in its relation to synthesis of imagination”. In this sense Kant can say that “the understanding, under the title of a *transcendental synthesis of imagination*” given that the synthesis of imagination gains its transcendental character in relation to unity of apperception. The understanding in the second step of the deduction is not the understanding considered in abstraction from sensibility, but it is the understanding, which is already in relation to sensibility. So, the synthesis of imagination as belonging to understanding is “an expression of spontaneity” (B151) since it determines sense “ *a priori* in respect of its form in accordance with unity of apperception” (B152). It is this spontaneity of imagination that Kant highlights by crediting understanding and it is owing to this spontaneous character of imagination that Kant entitles it the *productive* imagination (B152).

Although Kant emphasises the spontaneous character of imagination, its spontaneity cannot be considered apart from its receptive dimension. He also states that imagination belongs to sensibility: “...the imagination, owing to the subjective condition under which alone it can give to the concept of understanding a corresponding intuition, belongs to *sensibility* (B152). The product of transcendental

¹⁶⁴ B150, 152, 153, 155

synthesis of imagination is always an intuitive representation. The synthesis of imagination unifies the manifold in intuition and therefore its synthesis differs from mere conceptual unity produced in thought alone. Kant highlights this aspect in an earlier footnote attached to **Section 17**, which I have briefly mentioned above in intellectual synthesis¹⁶⁵. Although Kant does not mention in the footnote, the unity of intuition, which is represented as singular and composite, presupposes the synthesis of imagination, which combines the manifold in one intuition. In this sense, the unity produced by imagination is not the conceptual unity, which provides the general representation of what is common to many representations, but is an intuitive unity, which represents the manifold as parts of a single whole. Therefore the representation it produces is singular and composite and therefore extra-conceptual.

What is important is that Kant calls the unity of the consciousness of that representation as synthetic and original. In **Section 16** Kant stated that the representations in order to be called my representations must be apprehended as “constituting *one* intuition” (B135). This indicates that the identity of apperception is possible on the ground that the manifold has already been unified into one representation. Kant calls the consciousness of this necessary synthesis of representations original synthetic unity of apperception under which all the representations must stand but must also first be brought by means of a synthesis. Although the first step of the deduction concerned with the necessity of synthesis for the unity of apperception, it did not concern with the nature of this synthesis. Now, in the second step it becomes clear that the manifold is unified into one intuition by means of the synthesis of imagination. So, the representations can be thought as belonging to single consciousness, that is, as my representations only if they have

¹⁶⁵ The footnote says: “Space and time, and all their parts, are intuitions, and are therefore, with the manifold which they contain, singular representations (vide the Transcendental Aesthetic). Consequently they are not mere concepts through which one and the same consciousness is found to be contained in a number of representations. On the contrary, through them many representations are found to be contained in one representation, and in the consciousness of that representation; and they

already been unified by the synthesis of imagination. The unity of the consciousness of this unified manifold by means of the synthesis of imagination is as Kant calls synthetic and original. But this, as Gibbons argues, indicates that the original synthetic unity of apperception does not signify “simply the discursive unity attributable to categories as pure concepts”:

The analytic principle of apperception stated in section 16—that all my representations must conform to the conditions under which I can call mine—implies a unity common to both pure formal intuition and transcendental apperception. Hence, the original synthetic unity of apperception possesses a unity that can be manifested in both intuition and thought¹⁶⁶.

As manifested in thought it is “conscious solely of its power of combination” (B159), in abstraction from the nature of the manifold it has to combine. But the combination it thinks must be represented in intuition: “in respect of the manifold it has to combine I am subject to a limiting condition (entitled inner sense), namely, that this combination can be made intuitable only according to relations of time” (B159). This is to say that the unity of apperception must be represented in intuition so that the “synthetic unity of apperception of the manifold of *a priori sensible intuition*” becomes possible. As Gibbons argues the unity of apperception “may itself be characterised extra-conceptually with respect to its unity”¹⁶⁷. It is on the ground of this that categories relate to sensible intuition. The combination or the unity thought in categories must be represented, that is, must be made intuitable in terms of the unity of time, or in terms of temporal relations¹⁶⁸. The combination of the given manifold of intuition is produced in this single, unified time. But in order for this combination in thought to be made intuitable in terms of relations of time, the subject

are thus composite. The unity of that consciousness is therefore synthetic and yet is also original. The *singularity* of such intuitions is found to have important consequences (vide section 25)” (B136n).

¹⁶⁶ Sarah Gibbons, *Kant’s Theory of Imagination*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 45-46.

¹⁶⁷ *ibid*, p. 50.

¹⁶⁸ This act by means of which the categories are related to sensible intuition is nothing but the schematism of imagination. It is by means of the production of schema through the productive synthesis of imagination that the categories are represented in terms of temporal relations. In the next chapter I shall argue that this schematisation of categories is not an act of adding a temporal tag to

must affect itself: “we intuit ourselves as we are inwardly affected by ourselves” (B156). It is by means of the synthesis of imagination that this self-affection takes place¹⁶⁹. Although Kant attributes this self-affection to the synthesis of imagination, he does not clarify how this act takes place. He calls it a paradox indicating that the self is simultaneously active and passive in the act of self-affection. I shall discuss the paradox of inner sense and self-knowledge in the next chapter by relating it to the paradox of time, which was mentioned at the end of the discussion of the A-Deduction, that is, how the act that generates time presupposes time as given. But here my concern is the product of that act, which is nothing but the representation of the unity of time. Indeed, time itself as a unified whole, that is, as an intuition, which is singular and composite is generated by means of this synthesis, and apart from this determination of it through the synthesis of imagination it is nothing to us.

In the **Aesthetic** Kant showed that time is the form of inner sense to which all our representations are subject. All the given manifold is subject to time that is to say that they must be unified within time. But in order for this unification of the manifold take place time itself must be unified. Kant makes this point clear by considering the production of the unity of time in parallelism with that of space although it is time that the deduction is primarily concerned. Kant says that space and time are not merely forms of intuition, but themselves intuitions, which contain a manifold and therefore can be represented by the unification of this manifold (B160). It is the transcendental synthesis of imagination that is responsible for this unity. As Kant states this unity of pure intuition belongs to sensibility as treated in the **Aesthetic** indicating that it

otherwise a-temporal concepts. On the contrary I shall discuss that categories, as logical forms are abstractions made from their occurrences in schema.

¹⁶⁹Zoeller, distinguishes two senses of self-affection: “the process of self affection is related, on one side, to how inner experience comes about, and, on the other side, to the synthetic apprehension of a pure manifold in acts of productive synthesis (figurative synthesis or *synthesis speciosa*). This means that the intrusion of the discussion of inner sense and self-knowledge is indeed essential to the second step of the deduction and is “not a digression from the path way of the deduction proper” as Freyberg claims. Guenter Zoeller, Making Sense out of Inner Sense: “The Kantian Doctrine as Illuminated by the Leningrad Reflexion”, *International Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. XXIX, No. 3 Issue NO. 115, 1989, p. 267. Bernard Freyberg, *Imagination and Depth in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 78

differs from the unity of concept as a mere form of thought (B160n). But this at the same time indicates a certain revision of Transcendental Aesthetic. This unity of pure intuition still belonging to the sensibility does not belong to the senses; it presupposes the synthesis of imagination and space and time are first given as intuitions (as single wholes) through this synthesis of imagination (B160n)¹⁷⁰. This necessity of synthesis in intuition was concealed in the **Aesthetic**. The **Aesthetic** abstracts from all thought and considers sensibility in isolation and therefore conceals the synthesis of imagination like the intellectual synthesis which abstracts from sensibility.

So, understanding and sensibility must not be considered as two isolated elements standing on their own right prior to their unification through the synthesis of imagination, but they can only be thought as two distinct stems after the synthesis of imagination, which have already gathered them together¹⁷¹. In this respect imagination again occurs as a mediating power having a dual status of being receptive and spontaneous at once. It brings the two elements of human knowledge, that is, sense and thought together and therefore belongs both to understanding and sensibility. It is in this dual status of imagination that Kant's famous description of it gains its meaning. Kant defines imagination as "the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is *not itself present*" (B151). This definition of imagination radically differs from its definition in the *Anthropology* in the framework of the *Critique*.

¹⁷⁰This is the famous footnote that introduces the distinction between form of intuition and formal intuition, which I have discussed in Chapter II. In Chapter II I have left the nature of formal intuition, that is, whether it is distinct from pure intuition as a given unified whole or not, undecided. In that chapter I have characterised formal intuition as a determinate representation of space or time and argued that this determinate representation presupposes all inclusive single space or time as a unified whole. While I claimed that the former is subject to categories through the determination of sensibility by understanding, I refrained to affirm the subjection of the latter to categories due to the doubt of dissolving sensibility into understanding. But, now it is obvious from the deduction that all the unity of intuition is subject to categories through the transcendental synthesis of imagination. But this time my concern is not the distinction between sensibility and understanding, but is to show that they can be regarded as two distinct stems through abstraction from their meeting ground provided by imagination. I shall discuss the issue in length and make myself clear in the next chapter in discussing the function of imagination in its producing schema.

¹⁷¹ In this claim I am following Freydsberg analysis.

Imagination brings apperception and time together as to make the knowledge of objects possible. It is by means of the power of imagination that the possibility of experience and therefore the possibility of objects of experience first become possible. The object represented in intuition, which is not itself present is the *possible object*. With respect to Copernican turn of critical philosophy, object is not merely given through senses; it is a product of a spontaneous activity of the subject. But the object as the object of experience cannot be represented by means of a combination in thought alone, but requires that the two conditions, which are sense and thought, be gathered together. It is imagination that brings these two conditions together and makes the objectivity and the objects possible.

3.2.6 Conclusion to the B-Deduction

The B-Deduction in regard to its proof structure completely differs from the A-Deduction, but in terms of the problems it addresses and its outcome, it does not radically differ from A-Deduction. The A-Deduction presents two distinct proofs of the applicability of categories one given in Subjective Deduction and the other given in Objective Deduction. But these two proofs are organised around Kant's tripartite division of sense, imagination and apperception and the threefold synthesis. In this respect, although the Subjective Deduction emerges as an introduction and secondary to the deduction proper, the deduction proper, that is, the Objective one cannot be considered apart from the Subjective, insofar as the possibility of knowledge arises from the side of subject.

The argument of the B-Deduction, on the other hand, cannot be read into the structure of the A-Deduction since it involves two steps in one proof. The first step investigates the faculty of understanding only in its relation to the formal principle of unity of apperception and therefore abstracts from the relation of understanding to sensibility. At this level of abstraction, the understanding is investigated as a logico-

discursive faculty to which the manifold of representations must be given from elsewhere but also which is indifferent to the source of these representations. The second step investigates understanding in its relation to sensibility and therefore relates the conclusions of the first part to the conclusions of the **Transcendental Aesthetic**. But Transcendental Aesthetic had investigated sensibility at another level of abstraction, which was an abstraction from all thought. But these two levels of abstraction conceal the ever presence of imagination in these two stems. In the second step of the deduction the power of imagination comes about as to remove these abstractions and therefore as a mediating faculty.

But, imagination is not a mediating faculty in the sense that it mediates between two isolated elements that stand on their own. It is not a third faculty alongside sensibility and understanding, but it is the deep power that makes them possible. Its mediating character reveals itself through the act of self-affection in B-Deduction. It brings apperception and inner sense, that is, the spontaneous and receptive aspects of the subject together as being both spontaneous and receptive. Apart from their relation to each other provided by the synthesis of imagination, apperception and time have no real existence as Freydborg claims¹⁷². This is equivalent to saying that there is no apperceptive subject constituted before its determination in inner sense and also there is no inner sense standing in its purity before its determination in accordance with the unity of apperception. It is in the act of self –affection that they come together, and the self recognises itself as both spontaneous and passive and this act is performed by imagination. This problem of self –affection and self knowledge is lacking in the A-Deduction, but it is, that is, the problem of how thought and sense are brought together is pertinent to the problem of Subjective Deduction. Indeed, the subjective aspect of the problem of the relation

¹⁷² Freydborg, p. 79.

of categories to the objects of senses is not irrelevant to its objective aspect in the B-Deduction as well.

In the next chapter I shall argue that the A and the B deductions are compatible and complementary to each other in their outcomes concerning the function of imagination. I shall argue this by considering the issues remained undiscussed in both deductions through relating them to each other. In my discussion of these problems I shall trace the similarities and differences and the advantages and disadvantages of both editions and read my conclusions into the Chapter on Schematism.

CHAPTER IV

IMAGINATION AS CONCEALED IN THE DEPTHS OF HUMAN SOUL

The Transcendental Deduction has aimed to prove that categories relate or have application to objects of senses and therefore have objective reality. The outcome of the deduction is that all the objects of experience must conform to the categories in order to become objects at all. At the beginning of the deduction, Kant said that the objects must conform to the conditions of sensibility in order to become objects, but there is no reason to suppose that they must also conform to the conditions of thought. He stated: "Appearances might very well be so constituted that the understanding should not find them to be in accordance with the conditions of its unity" (A90/B123). Now in the deduction, Kant shows that appearances are not just in conformity with the space and time in which they are given, but they are also in conformity with the categories. This conformity of appearances to the categories is assured with the principle that asserts the necessary subjection of the manifold of intuition to the unity of apperception. Insofar as the manifold must conform to the unity of apperception, they conform to the categories since categories are the forms of unity corresponding to apperception. As Kant states categories "are brought into play through the relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception" (A124). What is crucial in this investigation of the relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception is that it brings the power of imagination as an indispensable function into the foreground of the deduction. The relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception is provided by the synthesis of imagination. It is the synthesis of imagination that

brings unity into the manifold and this synthesis of imagination conforms to the forms of unity provided by the categories.

Although transcendental synthesis of imagination has been put forward as an indispensable activity that provides the relation of categories to the sensible intuition in both deductions, it has been examined differently in the two deductions. While it has been presented as the ground of the possibility of experience in the A-Deduction, it has seemingly reduced to a function of understanding when the synthesis of understanding is directed upon sensibility in the B-Deduction. In the previous chapter I have argued that the importance and significance of imagination has not been “shrank back” in the B-Deduction as Heidegger claims. Rather I have claimed that the differences between the two deductions do not indicate a change in status in regard to the role of imagination but are due to a change in exposition and terminology. By means of discussing the structure of the argument in B-Deduction I have claimed that the significance of imagination in realm of human knowledge is preserved rather than being recoiled.

In this chapter I firstly expound that Kant offers a coherent theory of imagination in both deductions besides the differences of them. My main purpose in this chapter is to show that Kant’s full view of imagination comes out in the chapter on **Schematism**, which remains same in both editions of the *Critique*. The **Schematism** not only expounds the role of imagination and the related topics but also provides a new look to the problem of the deduction, that is, to the possibility of application of categories to sensible intuitions. The chapter on Schematism reveals the temporality of human experience, which has not been discussed in its full significance in the deductions. Categories apply to sensible intuitions through the medium of time and it is by means of the power of imagination that combines the manifold of intuition in one time that the application of categories is sustained. It is

only by means of revealing this temporal nature of imagination that the nature of the synthesis can be understood.

4.1 Imagination: An Independent Faculty or a Function of Understanding?

The transcendental deduction of the categories is commonly accepted as the heart of Kant's doctrine, but it is subject to many disputes concerning its structure and arguments it contains as well as its details. One of the main problem subject to discussions is the difference between the two versions of the deduction as given in A and B editions. Some commentators claim that the B-Deduction adds nothing new to the A-Deduction and attempt to read the structure of the argument in B in terms of the structure of A-Edition. On the other hand some commentators argue that the structure of the B-Deduction completely differs from the A-Deduction and cannot be read in reference to it. Not only the structure of the two deductions but related with it the success of the each deduction is under dispute. Some claim that only the B-Deduction provides a successful proof and is more adequate to the Kantian system as a whole and others claim that it is the A-Deduction, which is genuinely Kantian although it has its specific problems. Among the commentators it is especially Heidegger who puts the problem of the difference between two versions as a matter of preference. But Heidegger's concern is not the structure or the success of them but the philosophical problems that the each one addresses. According to Heidegger the difference of two deductions is not due to the difference of exposition but rather due to the philosophical standpoint each takes.

Heidegger's point of departure for his preference of the A-Deduction is akin to that of de Vleeschauwer's suggestion due to the difference of two versions. Shereover tells that de Vleeschauwer suggests that the difference between the two deductions is due to an "implicit change in the problem of the Critique itself from the 'question of objectivity...(to) the problem of the limitation of reason to

phenomena”¹⁷³. The A and the B Deductions start from different points and these different points indicate a change of the problem for Kant. While the A-Deduction starts from the possibility of experience, the B-Deduction starts from a general investigation of thought and relates this investigation to the possibility of experience in terms of the restriction of the employment of understanding to the sensible world. In this respect the A-Deduction seems to have an ontological tendency due to its concern with the possibility of experience and the objects of experience, but the B-Deduction appears as an epistemological study concerning the role of conceptual thought in knowing objects.

The deduction in A-Edition gets its start with the investigation into the conditions of the possibility of experience. The term possibility of experience is introduced by Kant as a solution to the problem of the deduction. At the outset of the deduction, Kant maintained that the deduction of the categories could only be achieved by establishing a necessary connection between categories and sensible intuition. The term possibility of experience is introduced as a middle term that indicates the connection between these two heterogeneous elements of knowledge. This appeal to the term possibility of experience is the key to Kant's Copernican Revolution that grounds the objectivity of the object in the subjectivity of the subject. The term possibility of experience then refers to the subjective conditions of our knowledge and demands the investigation of the subjective sources in their transcendental constitution. This investigation is given in the Subjective Deduction in its tripartite division of subjective sources into sense, imagination and apperception. The Objective Deduction, which concerns with the question “what and how much can the understanding and reason know apart from all experience?” (Axvii), is given on the basis of the structural connection of these three sources. Since, it is this

¹⁷³ Charles Shereover, *Heidegger, Kant and Time*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1972, p. 172.

structural connection of apperceptive thought to the power of imagination and sense that limits the employment of understanding and reason.

This structural connection between the three sources is supplied by the activity of synthesis, which in general is attributed to the function of imagination. Imagination carries out a threefold synthesis by means of which the sense and thought are gathered together. In its synthesising activity, imagination gains a mediating character that sustains the connection of sense and thought, and therefore is the condition of the possibility of experience. Imagination attains this role by means of synthesising the manifold given through the senses in accordance with the unity of apperception. Imagination combines the manifold in the form of inner sense, that is, in time and it is through this medium of time that the manifold is brought into relation with the unity of apperception. Although Kant does not explicitly refer to the relation of time to the synthesis of imagination, the analysis of synthesis cannot be understood apart from this relation. The crux of the argument in the A-Deduction is that the categories are brought into relation to the sensible manifold through the medium of time and imagination is the power that generates this medium in its pure synthesis. Kant leaves the nature of the relation between time and imagination open in the deduction, so that this vagueness gives rise to two erroneous interpretations due to the synthesis of imagination. The first is that the synthesis of imagination, insofar as it combines the manifold in time, takes place in time and therefore is an event in experience. This line of interpretation indicates that the synthesis, which is itself an event in experience, that is, empirical, cannot be the condition of experience. This is to take the synthesis of imagination as a psychological process in which the mind deals with the sensory data. This line of interpretation, as Paton points, takes the view that “we first have intuitions and then synthesise them under the categories, or that we first are aware of the categories and then apply them to an

indeterminate manifold”¹⁷⁴. This view takes sense and thought as two pre-given isolated elements that must be combined externally through the synthesis of imagination. This view is completely rejected by Kant in the Chapter on Schematism and I discuss it below. The other interpretation holds the view that transcendental synthesis of imagination is a distinct synthesis from the empirical and unknowable and noumenal in character. Again Paton says that this view takes the syntheses as “to work on raw impressions, and turn these into ordered appearances in space and time, before the experience can begin”¹⁷⁵. According to this view, which finds its expression in double affection theory, the transcendental synthesis, which is a-temporal and unknowable, generates the phenomenal world and the empirical subject and conditions the empirical synthesis which gives rise to the empirical knowledge of the objects of this phenomenal world. In the previous chapter, I have argued that these interpretations can be avoided by adopting a perspectival view of the relation between transcendental and empirical. The transcendental as the condition of the empirical does not mean that the transcendental must temporally precede the empirical and must take place before the empirical, but it refers to “what is contained in experience” as its condition¹⁷⁶. As Paton indicates Kant’s concern is not the genesis of experience, but rather the necessary elements of experience.

But besides the fact that Kant’s theory of synthesis is mistaken by these interpretations, they at the same time reveal the problems of Kant’s analysis of synthesis. One of these problems concerns the temporality of the synthesis. It is apparent that Kant presents the threefold synthesis as taking place in time, but also this threefold synthesis is responsible for the generation of time in which the synthesis takes place. The problem is that how an act can both generate the time and presuppose time as given for the very act in which it generates time. I shall

¹⁷⁴ H.J. Paton, *Kant’s Metaphysics of Experience*, Volume I, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1970, p. 573.

¹⁷⁵ *ibid*, pp. 573-574.

discuss this problem below and this discussion will reveal why Kant defines the synthesis of imagination as blind and the schematism as an art concealed in the depths. I shall discuss that the blindness and darkness of imagination is not due to its being an a-temporal, noumenal synthesis distinct from the empirical, but rather due to its being a mediating power that can not be reduced to thought or sense. But if the transcendental synthesis of imagination is not a distinct synthesis that takes place prior to the empirical, it necessarily implies the unity of the productive and reproductive functions of imagination. It is not the case that the productive imagination firstly produces the time and then the reproductive imagination combines the sensible manifold in time, rather it is the case that these acts take place at the same time. These issues will become clear in the **Schematism**, but are not clearly expressed and given a solution in the deduction.

If we turn to the argument of the A-Deduction in order to underline its difference from the B-Deduction, we must note the definition of understanding and the categories given in the A-Deduction. The A-Deduction asserts that there are three subjective sources, which are sense, imagination and thought, and shows that these sources form an integral unity through the activity of synthesis of imagination. The synthesis of imagination takes place in intuition, and this activity of combining the manifold of intuition into unity is in conformity with the unity of apperception. Imagination both unifies the manifold into a singular representation, which is nothing but always intuition, which claimed to be given through sensibility in the Aesthetic, and at the same time acts in accordance with the unity of apperception that the manifold is prepared as to be recognised under concepts. In this respect imagination, although it is in itself always sensible, forms a structural unity with the unity of apperception that Kant calls understanding. Understanding defined as “the unity of apperception in its relation to the synthesis of imagination” is not one of the

¹⁷⁶ *ibid*, p. 575.

sources of knowledge, but rather it is the result of the synthesis of imagination under the unity of apperception. Imagination under the unity of apperception synthesises the manifold in conformity with the demands of apperception, and therefore produces the synthetic unity of the manifold and thereby yields understanding. Categories as the pure concepts of the understanding are the a priori modes, which “contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of imagination in respect of all possible appearances” (A119). Categories rather than being a priori concepts waiting to be applied to sensible manifold are themselves yielded by the transcendental synthesis of imagination under the unity of apperception. But this definition of categories are directly related to or made clear in the **Schematism** and completely oblivious to the definition of categories as the logical forms apart from all relation to sensibility. I have argued in the previous chapter and shall discuss it again in the Schematism that categories can be taken as logical forms only when they are abstracted from the synthesis of imagination, which have already brought them into relation with time. Therefore, they are not first logical forms which then are applied to the sensible manifold through the synthesis of imagination, but they are already gathered into the synthesis of imagination.

While the A-Deduction gets start with the investigation of the conditions of the possibility of experience and comes out with the conclusion that transcendental imagination is the condition of the possibility of experience and of all knowledge, the B-Deduction gets start with the investigation of thought in general apart from its relation to human sensibility. Heidegger claims that the B-Deduction investigates the “finite rational creature in general” and then “the separate realisation of such a creature, which is the human being” but not investigates from the start the human rationality, which its peculiar kind of finitude is grounded in intuition, that is, in

temporality¹⁷⁷. The change in the B-Deduction reveals itself in its elimination of the Subjective Deduction. The B-Deduction, instead of directly addressing itself to the problem of the possibility of experience in terms of the transcendental constitution of the subject, starts from rationality-in-general and in this respect favours understanding over sensibility. It introduces the formal principle of the unity of apperception as the highest principle of thought in general and replaces the finitude of rationality in thought itself. Kant derives the necessity of synthesis and therefore givenness of the manifold from the principle of apperception. The apperceptive thought cannot supply its own manifold and therefore requires that the manifold is given to it from elsewhere, and in this sense it is finite, that is discursive rather than intuitive. This finitude is not the finitude of human rationality, which is bound to spatio-temporal manifold, but the finitude of rationality-in-general regardless of the specific nature of the manifold given to it. Insofar as it is impossible to derive the specific manner in which the intuitions are given from the nature of thought in general, but just the necessity of the synthesis of the manifold, this synthesis can only be investigated in its relation to unity of apperception. In this regard, synthesis is attributed to the faculty of understanding and to the logical functions of judgment. The synthesis, which is considered apart from all relation to human sensibility, is nothing but the logical function of judgment that brings the manifold under the unity of apperception. With regard to this intellectual synthesis, categories are defined as the logical functions of judgment “in so far as they are employed in determination of the manifold of a given intuition” (B143). In the B-Deduction categories are not defined in their relation to the synthesis of imagination, but posited as forms of thought apart from all relation to human sensibility. This definition of categories reduces the difference between formal and transcendental logic to a difference of application and removes their essential difference. At the beginning of the

¹⁷⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trnas. Richard Taft, Indiana University

Metaphysical Deduction, Kant stated that formal logic deals with the form of thought in abstraction from the content, but transcendental logic “has lying before it a manifold of a priori sensibility, presented by transcendental aesthetic, as material for the concepts of pure understanding” (A77/B102). But now, in the B-Deduction Kant loses this radical difference of formal and transcendental logic: Formal logic deals with the form of thought and transcendental logic deals with the same forms if they are employed to the manifold of a given intuition, but this intuition is *intuition in general*, not the pure intuitions of space and time presented by transcendental aesthetic.

After this general investigation of rationality in general, Kant investigates its realisation in the human understanding through restricting the use of categories to the domain of human sensibility. This realisation of categories is supplied by transcendental synthesis of imagination. But this time, different from the A-Deduction, this synthesis is introduced by favouring understanding. Kant defines this synthesis as “an action of understanding on the sensibility” (B152), or again “synthetic influence of the understanding upon inner sense” (B154). Indeed, Kant identifies understanding and imagination: “It is one and the same spontaneity, which in the one case, under the title of imagination, and in the other case, under the title of understanding, brings combination into the manifold” (B162n). Due to these definitions of imagination, Heidegger claims: “this synthesis... belongs to the understanding. ‘Synthesis’ is just ‘called’ ‘power of imagination’ insofar as it refers to intuition, but fundamentally it is understanding”¹⁷⁸. Heidegger claims that the B-Deduction in its attributing all synthesis to the understanding shrinks back the fundamental role of imagination given in the A-Deduction as an independent power mediating between sensibility and understanding in their original unity. The power of

Press, Bloomington, 1997, p. 118.

¹⁷⁸ Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. Richard Taft, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1997, p. 115.

imagination is no longer an independent faculty, but a function of understanding related to intuition. Heidegger also claims that the synthesis of imagination is “now just the name of empirical synthesis, i.e., for the synthesis related to intuition”¹⁷⁹. He argues that although it is called a transcendental synthesis, it is not the pure synthesis but an empirical synthesis, which relates understanding to sensible intuition. In this sense, imagination is no longer a mediating faculty bringing sense and thought together but just synthesising in reference to sensibility. Indeed, naming this synthesis as *figurative* reveals this point:

And even if Kant first introduces an apparently distinctive proper name for the transcendental power of imagination in the second edition with the title *Synthesis Speciosa*, then it is precisely this expression which proves that the transcendental power of imagination has forfeited its former independence. It only has this name because in it the understanding refers to sensibility, and without this reference it is *Synthesis Intellectualis*¹⁸⁰.

So, if the synthesis of imagination is tied to sensibility and if it is an action of understanding on sensibility, then imagination falls between two separate, pre-given sources. This is equivalent to saying that we first have intuitions then synthesise them under categories, or first aware of categories and then apply them to the indeterminate manifold of intuitions. But this view becomes absurd in the Schematism.

In the previous chapter I have argued against the Heideggerian claim that the significance of imagination is not recoiled in the B-Deduction. I have claimed this by means of reading the deduction as involving two-steps-in-one-proof. At this point Heidegger is right in his claim that the first step investigates the rationality in general, and the human rationality is a species of this rationality in general. But the realisation of rational creature in general in human being, which is equivalent to the realisation of categories through their relation to human sensibility, is not achieved analytically from genus to species, which will reduce the synthesis of imagination to an empirical

¹⁷⁹ *ibid.* p. 115.

synthesis as Heidegger claims. It is true that the first step describes the transcendental employment of understanding and the second step describes the empirical employment of understanding. The empirical employment of understanding does not mean that it just gives rise to empirical knowledge of objects, but it consists in the application of categories “only to objects of senses under the universal conditions of a possible experience” (A246/B303). The empirical employment of understanding refers to the conditions of the possibility of empirical knowledge, that is, to the possibility of experience, not just to the empirical knowledge. And Kant states that the figurative synthesis is transcendental and distinguishes it from the reproductive synthesis. In defining it transcendental Kant emphasises that through this synthesis understanding determines inner sense *in respect to its form*. Heidegger seems to forget that Kant posits pure sensibility, that is, pure intuition as well as empirical intuition. Indeed, the B-Deduction discusses the problem of pure intuition more directly than the A and reveals the time factor explicitly through its discussion of inner sense. This discussion of inner sense indicates that Kant does not fully give up the problems pertaining to the Subjective Deduction. Moreover, the realisation of categories through which they become the condition of the possibility of experience is given with the injection of this discussion of the inward affection of inner sense. This discussion of inner sense does not only refer to how inner experience in which the self-affection takes place empirically comes about and therefore does not imply a “digression from the pathway of the deduction proper”¹⁸¹. But this discussion of inner sense directly refers to the “realization of the understanding through the synthetic determinations brought about in the pure

¹⁸⁰ *ibid.* p. 115-116.

¹⁸¹ Bernard Freydsberg, *Imagination and Depth in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Literature and Sciences of Man, Peter Lang, New York, 1994, p. 78.

sensory manifold” or “to the synthetic apprehension of a pure manifold in acts of productive imagination”¹⁸².

The other point that must be mentioned is that the first step of the deduction investigates the rationality-in-general and the second step investigates the realisation of this rationality in human understanding. So, when Kant talks about understanding’s determining of sensibility, it is the human understanding that he talks about, not the understanding in complete isolation from the specific nature of the intuition we have. This human understanding is realised through the synthesis of imagination and it is the understanding defined in the A-Deduction as “the unity of apperception in its relation to synthesis of imagination”. It is not the understanding in general that possesses the categories as its logical forms, but the understanding, which has already been gathered into the synthesis of imagination. In this sense, imagination is a function of understanding or is same with the understanding. Here there is no need to distinguish understanding and imagination in order to preserve imagination as an independent faculty. Indeed, imagination has not been treated as a separate faculty even in the A-Deduction, but it has been put as a structural component of understanding. In this sense the both editions put imagination as belonging both to understanding and sensibility. Both sensibility and understanding as two stems involve imagination and can be treated in isolation from each other on the ground of their unification made possible by the imagination. Imagination cannot be reduced to one of them. This point will become explicit in the Schematism. Now, I turn to the Chapter on Schematism in order to clarify the problems of the deduction(s), which from the beginning I have been addressing to that chapter.

¹⁸²Guenter Zoeller, “Making Sense Out of Inner Sense: The Kantian Doctrine as Illuminated by the Leningrad *Reflexion*”, *International Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XXIX, No. 3 Issue No. 115, September 1989, p. 263.

4.2. General Views on the Schematism

At the beginning Kant puts the problem of the **Schematism** with the question “How is the *application* of a category to appearances possible?” He states that this question is of crucial importance for the transcendental doctrine of judgment and not so necessary in all the other sciences. The problem how pure concepts, which are radically different from all other kinds of concepts, are applicable to appearances rise because of the radical heterogeneity of pure concepts and intuitions, since this application requires a homogeneity between them. So, for the applicability of categories to the appearances “there must be a third thing, which is homogeneous on the one hand with the category, and on the other hand with the appearance...” (A138/B177). Kant defines this third thing as transcendental schema and calls it a product of imagination. In this respect, the **Schematism** concerns with the products of transcendental synthesis of imagination.

Although Kant puts the problem of the Schematism as a necessary and important problem, many commentators of Kant find the Schematism as an unnecessary and obscure chapter. Many of them believe that Kant creates an unnecessary problem for himself since he proved the applicability of categories to the appearances in transcendental deduction. Why does Kant ask the same question again and put in question everything that he has already proved? Eva Schaper argues that the commentators in Anglo-Saxon tradition respond to this question in the form of a dilemma: “*either* Kant had already proved the applicability of the categories in the Deduction, and then Schematism is unnecessary, *or* Schematism continues the argument, but then the Deduction cannot be regarded as valid”¹⁸³. For these commentators whether the Schematism is necessary or not is due to the success of the Deduction¹⁸⁴ and many of them regard it as creating an unnecessary

¹⁸³ Eva Schaper, “Kant’s Schematism Reconsidered”, *Review of Metaphysics*, 18, 1964, p. 274.

¹⁸⁴ Among these commentators especially H.A. Prichard and G.J. Warnock take Schematism as unnecessary and confusing. The dilemma is especially formulated by Prichard who claims that if the

confusion¹⁸⁵. Again Schaper suggests that contrary to the Anglo-Saxon commentators the Continental ones do not formulate the problem in terms of a dilemma but treat the Schematism as “either continuation or replacement of the Deduction” avoiding questioning the success of the deduction. They generally take the Schematism as the elaboration and the application of the results of the deduction.

In order to understand what the problem of Schematism is it is important to understand what the deduction left to be solved in the Schematism. The deduction aimed to prove that categories are involved in every act of knowledge. In this respect the deduction proves *that* they apply to appearances, and the Schematism discusses *how* they apply. Indeed, the deduction is not oblivious to this *how* question, but as I have discussed in the previous chapter and summarised in the above section, this *how* side of the deduction leaves many problems open that must be given explicit solutions. In this sense, the Schematism can be taken as an elaboration of the results of the deduction and solves the problems that the deduction left open. But my contention is that although Schematism is an amplification of the deduction and advances on those that have already been proved, it at the same time provides a new insight into the problems and the solutions of the deduction. As Paton says “it suggests a possibility of making a fresh start”¹⁸⁶.

This possibility of making a fresh start lies in focusing on two points that Kant makes due to the nature of schemata: schemata as the product of imagination and

deduction proves that they are applicable to objects, then there is no need to determine special conditions for their application. Warnock claims that if the deduction proves that we have certain concepts (categories), there would not be any need to ask the question of their applicability, since to have a concept already inheres the ability to use it. According to Warnock, Kant unnecessarily makes a separation between them. For the discussion of these commentators, see, Eva Schaper, pp. 270-271; Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 174-175; Gibbons, *Kant's Theory of Imagination*, pp. 54-55.

¹⁸⁵ Schaper, p. 271n.

¹⁸⁶ H.J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience*, Volume II, George Allen&Unwin Ltd, London, 1970, p. 20.

schemata as transcendental time determinations¹⁸⁷. What is important for the problem of the Schematism is that it does not concern with conceptual conditions of having experience, but with the sensible conditions “under which alone the category can be applied to any object” (A140/B179). This sensible condition under which objects are given is *time*, which in the **Aesthetic** defined as the form of inner sense and now in the **Schematism** is taken as unified by productive imagination. In this sense Schematism concerns with the specific characteristics of the objects as they appear to human sensibility and they can so appear in the unity of time. Schemata define the temporal characteristics of the objects that appear to human sensibility. The Schematism announces time with its transcendental determination through the synthesis of imagination as the universal condition of all experience, that is, the condition of the possibility of experience and the objects of experience. To view Schematism from this point is to take it as providing “metaphysics of experience”:

On that level, Schematism brings in new material and new suggestions. Every Kant student will have to decide for himself whether to read the *Critique* on the level of providing a metaphysical foundation of science-then Schematism can be skipped or treated as elaborating in isolation a point which the Deduction makes in a more complex context; or whether to read the *Critique* as an admittedly imperfect and often obscure attempt to give a metaphysics of experience¹⁸⁸.

To read the *Critique* as providing a metaphysics of experience by means of making a fresh start with the **Schematism** is in parallel lines with A-Deduction that discovers imagination and therefore the unity of time as the condition of the possibility of experience and seems to contradict with the B-Deduction that concerns with the conceptual requirements of knowledge. But Kant's initial introducing of the problem of Schematism seems to accord with the B-Deduction that takes categories as independent logical forms apart from their temporal determination and invokes that we first have the pure categories and then impose them on time. This is invoked

¹⁸⁷ Schaper also grounds her reading of Schematism on these two features of schema, p. 274.

¹⁸⁸ Schaper, p. 275.

by introducing the problem of Schematism in terms of the possibility of the *subsumption* of appearances under pure concepts. The issue is discussed below.

4.3 Schematism: Subsumption or Sensibilisation?

Kant introduces the problem of the Schematism in terms of the subsumption “of an object under a concept” and tells that in order for this subsumption take place the “the representation of the object must be *homogeneous* with the concept; in other words, the concept must contain something which is represented in the object” (A137/B176). From this general description of the subsumption of an object under a concept, he directly passes to the problem of subsumption of intuitions under pure concepts. He tells that since a pure concept is not homogeneous with the intuitions, how the subsumption of appearances under the pure concepts takes place is in need of explanation. The pure concepts are “quite heterogeneous” from intuitions since they can never “be met with in any intuition”. The empirical concept under which an object is subsumed can be met in intuition, that is, can be regarded as a class concept and can be used extensionally as designating a particular as a member of that class. On the other hand, categories cannot be met in intuition, since no intuition corresponds to a category. This heterogeneity of pure concepts and intuitions generate the problem of Schematism: “How, then, is the subsumption of intuitions under pure concepts, the application of a category to appearances, possible?” (A138/B177) The necessity of a third thing is introduced in response to this question:

Obviously there must be a third thing, which is homogeneous on the one hand with the category, and on the other hand with the appearance, and which thus makes the application of the former to the latter possible. This mediating representation must be pure, that is, void of all empirical content, and yet at the same time, while it must be in one respect be *intellectual*, it must in another be *sensible*. Such a representation is the *transcendental schema* (A138/B177).

Kant further defines this transcendental schema as “transcendental determination of time” since it is homogeneous with the category, “which constitutes

its unity" (A138/B177) and homogeneous with the appearances since as the formal condition of the manifold in inner sense, it is "contained in every empirical representation of the manifold" (A139/B178). It is through this transcendental determination of time that the category is applied to appearances. Thus, the transcendental determination of time "as the schema of the concept of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of the appearances under the category" (A139/B178).

Apart from the solution he proposes, that is, transcendental schema as transcendental time determination, Kant's introducing of the problem of Schematism in terms of subsumption has been subject to criticisms. Kant's introducing the problem in terms of the traditional conception of judgment, that is, the subsumption of particulars under universals has taken as to destroy the nature of categories defined by Kant as the pure concepts containing the unity of the synthesis of the manifold. As Kemp Smith states the relation between categories and the sensible intuition is not a relation between universals and particulars but "of synthetic interpretation"¹⁸⁹. Instead of judgmental conception of subsumption, it is argued that Kant had in mind the syllogistic conception of subsumption, which involves the application of a rule¹⁹⁰. The application of a rule to a particular instance necessitates a middle term, which gives the condition of the rule under which the instance is subsumed. Analogous to this syllogistic reasoning, the categories as universal rules are applied to the appearances by means of this "third thing", which Kant calls transcendental schema. In this sense transcendental schema represents the condition of the rule and provides the relation between two heterogeneous elements.

¹⁸⁹ Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003, p. 335.

¹⁹⁰ Reconstructing the problem of Schematism analogous to the syllogistic conception of subsumption is given by Kemp Smith and Allison. Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 336; Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp.178-179.

My contention is that whether judgmental or syllogistic, introducing of the problem in terms of subsumption and providing a solution by means of a third thing between concept and intuition destroys the Kantian insight in the Schematism. To reconstruct the problem of Schematism in terms of the syllogistic conception of subsumption can help us to understand why a third thing is necessary. But if this third thing is taken as a further entity somewhere in between concept and intuition, it leads to some kind of a “third man” argument: there must be some further mediating things between the mediated and that which mediates and so ad infinitum. If schema is a substantial entity between concept and intuition, it would be impossible to understand why there is not a further third thing, for instance between the category and its schema, which provides their mediation. If Kant holds that we have the category here and the appearance there, waiting to be subsumed under the category, he cannot prevent the third man objection.

This third man objection results from taking sensibility and understanding as two isolated elements as waiting to be externally combined with a mediation of some third element. According to such reading, we possess on the one side pure concepts as the forms of unity and on the other side the given manifold as undetermined and fragmented in inner sense. And then we determine and gather the manifold into unity through the imposition of forms. In this reading, the synthesis of imagination is a constructing synthesis through which we construct the object of experience out of the given manifold. We achieve this since we structure the manifold through the synthesis that gives form to otherwise unformed, confused muddle of sensible material. Eva Schaper calls this interpretation of Kant “constructionalism” and summarises it as follows:

Here we have the usual, and for many readers inescapable, interpretation of Kant as holding a *synthesizing* or *integrating* process to be at work in thoroughgoing imposition of structure, starting with the unifying grasp of perceptual consciousness, and continuing into the range of purely intellectual demand made upon

the “given”, if it is to be given at all; that is to say, it is to be “my” experience, it must be molded to *my* demands of intelligibility¹⁹¹.

As Schaper maintains Kant’s treatment of imagination as a power of synthesis does not necessarily imply such a thoroughgoing activity of the building the manifold up into an object through the imposition of forms¹⁹². This interpretation results from taking the conditions of thought radically separate from the conditions of sensibility. Indeed, in the B-Deduction, Kant himself makes a rigorous effort to separate these conditions. But as discussed in the previous chapter, they can be taken separate only after the synthesis of imagination, which has already gathered them together. Here in the Schematism, Kant again takes his start “as usual, from those very conceptions which it is the result of his argument to transform” and therefore “obliged to restore the lost synthetic movement by an external reflexion of the forms of thought upon the forms of perception”¹⁹³. Therefore, Kant introduces the problem of Schematism as subsumption in order to restore the lost synthetic movement, which has already taken place. But this is to say that to present the problem of Schematism as subsumption is to present the issue after it has already been resolved.

So, if the problem of Schematism is not to be taken as subsumption but still as a genuine problem, we must take seriously into consideration why Kant insists on the “how” question, that is, how categories are applicable to appearances. It is in this insistence on the “how” question that the real insight of the Schematism reveals itself. The answer to this how question is given by Kant in putting the transcendental schemata as transcendental time determinations and as the products of imagination. It is only on the basis of these two characterisations of transcendental schema that the Kantian problem of Schematism can be reconstructed. In regard to this I argue

¹⁹¹ Eva Schaper, “Kant’s Schematism Reconsidered”, *Review of Metaphysics*, 18, 1964, pp. 275-276.

¹⁹² Also Paton in *Kant’s Metaphysics of Experience* repeatedly declares that such a reading of Kant is undoubtedly an absurd reading, i.e., Vol II, p. 27.

against two views of schema, which are generally assumed to be Kant's answer to this how question. These two ways of answering the question, which are common in their assumptions, take transcendental schema as analogous to conceptual representation. But the two characterisations of schema given by Kant reveal the non-conceptual character of it, that is, its intuitive character. The first way of taking schema as a conceptual representation consists in making a distinction between pure and schematised categories. It is generally assumed that the how question is answered in Schematism by stating that the categories as forms of thought, that is, as logical forms must be schematised, that is, must be determined in terms of time relations so that they become applicable to sensible objects. And it is through this schematisation of categories that they are restricted to the domain of sensibility. If Kant's answer is this, then it is necessary to make a distinction between pure and schematised category, a distinction, which as Allison notes that Kant did not make¹⁹⁴. As Allison notes to make a distinction between a pure and schematised category "pushes the problem back one step, to the connection between the pure and schematised category"¹⁹⁵. It invites the third man objection. The Schematism does not tell us that the categories must be temporalised or must be added a temporal tag in order to become applicable to objects. At this point it is necessary to note that if the Schematism is not superfluous, but a legitimate chapter, the problem cannot be answered by simply asserting that the categories must be temporalised. Even if they are temporalised categories still the question how they apply to sensible intuitions remains. Kant's concern in the Schematism is then not to prove that categories must be related to time in order to become applicable, since Kant had already proved it in the deduction. In the Schematism Kant lists what he has already proved: firstly he says that it has been proved that categories do not apply to things in themselves, but

¹⁹³ E. Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, James Maclehose and Sons Publishers, Glasgow, 1909, p.402 and p.404.

¹⁹⁴ Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p. 188.

only to sensibly given objects, that is, their employment cannot be viewed “independent of all question as to whether and how these may be given to us” (A139/B178). Secondly, it has been proved that “the only manner in which objects can be given to us is by modifications of sensibility” (A139/B178). And finally it has been proved that “pure *a priori* concepts, in addition to the function of understanding expressed in the category, must contain *a priori* certain formal conditions of sensibility, namely those of inner sense” (A140/B179). He calls this formal and pure condition of sensibility transcendental schema. So, if the category contains the condition of sensibility, that is, if it contains its schema, there is no need to call it a schematised category, which is obtained through the temporalisation of pure logical form. It is not the case that we first have the pure logical form then temporalise it through schematisation and obtain the schematised category, which contains its schema. This line of thought identifies the schema with the schematised category¹⁹⁶. Paton, who also makes a distinction between schematised and pure category admits that the talk about schematisation of categories conceals the real order: “The pure category is obtained when we abstract from the references to time and space contained in the schematised category”¹⁹⁷. In this regard schematised category is not derived by translating the logical forms into temporal relations, but the pure logical forms are derived from these categories by abstracting the sensible condition that they contain. The schematised categories, that is, categories defined by Kant in the A-Deduction as containing the unity of the synthesis of imagination are original and the pure forms are derived. Kant’s problem in the Schematism is not to show that categories must contain the formal conditions of sensibility, but to investigate and expose what these formal conditions of sensibility are. But here still the problem of

¹⁹⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ Norman Kemp Smith makes the identification. See, Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 339-340.

¹⁹⁷ H.J. Paton, *Kant’s Metaphysics of Experience*, Volume II, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1970, p. 69. Kant also states this in B-163: Now this synthetic unity, as a condition *a priori* under

the relation between a category and its schema remains. The category contains its schema and the schema is the formal condition of sensibility to which the employment of category is restricted. The problem is then in what way the schema is contained in the category and so, what these formal conditions of sensibility are.

These formal conditions are generally taken to be the rules for the synthesis of imagination, which combines the given manifold in one time. This “rule theory”¹⁹⁸ of Schematism is implied by Kant himself when he calls a schema the “rule of synthesis of imagination” (A141/B180). Kant gives this definition of schema when he refers to the *general* schema operative in the use of mathematical and empirical concepts, not specifically to the transcendental schema. He defines the schemata of these concepts as rules for the construction of images: “The schema of triangle can exist nowhere but in thought. It is a rule of synthesis of imagination, in respect to figures in space” (A141/B180). And “the concept of ‘dog’ signifies a rule according to which my imagination can delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in a general manner, without limitation to any single determinate figure” (A141/B180). From this general definition of schema as a rule for producing images either in pure or empirical intuition, many commentators draw the conclusion that the transcendental schema is a rule for the transcendental synthesis of imagination. But here Kant puts a difference between transcendental and empirical schema: “the schema of a pure concept of understanding can never be brought into any image whatsoever” (A142/B181). If schemata are rules that generate images in intuition and if the pure concepts cannot be brought into image, that is, cannot “be met in intuition”, how can the transcendental schemata be the rules of the synthesis of imagination, if this synthesis cannot generate an image or an object corresponding to a category¹⁹⁹?

which I combine the manifold of an *intuition in general* is –if I abstract from the constant form of my inner intuition, namely, time– the category of cause...

¹⁹⁸This rule theory is especially developed by Robert Paul Wolf in his *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1969, esp. pp.121-132 and pp. 212-213.

¹⁹⁹This line of criticism to rule theory is developed by Gram. Moltke S. Gram, *Kant, Ontology & the A Priori*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1968, pp. 95-100.

But here still the problem is not that the category cannot correspond to an entity, an image or an object²⁰⁰. But the problem with the rule theory is that if schemata are rules there arises the difficulty of distinguishing the schema and the concept and this destroys the intuitive character of schema. As Paton states, the only way of distinguishing schema consists in taking the schema as the rule of synthesis and the concept as the concept of the rule of synthesis²⁰¹. But given that Kant already defined concepts as rules (A106) and categories as the rules of unity of the manifold, why is there a need of specifying further rules for the application of rules? This is to beg the question of how rules are applied to objects. Here the problem is to explain how schema makes possible the application of the rule, and this cannot be given simply through specifying further rules for rule following. The schemata cannot be “second order rules”²⁰² or “rules for rule following”²⁰³ since this is to ignore the intuitivity of schemata and their being the products of imagination²⁰⁴.

In the introduction to the **Transcendental Doctrine of Judgment** Kant states that general logic can supply “general instructions how we are to subsume under rules” but “that could only be by means of another rule” (A133/B172). But different from general logic:

Transcendental philosophy has the peculiarity that besides the rule (or the universal conditions of rules), which is given in the pure concept of understanding, it can also specify *a priori* the instance to which the rule is to be applied. ... It must formulate by means of universal and sufficient marks the conditions under which objects can be given in harmony with these concepts. (A136/B175).

This passage precedes the **Schematism** and provides the outline for the solution of the problem. It indicates that the Schematism will not provide further

²⁰⁰Wolff provides a solution for this problem by making a distinction between first-order rules and second-order rules. First order rules are empirical concepts and categories are second-order rules: “The real reason why categories cannot be brought to images is that they are not ordinary first-level rules at all. Rather they are *types* of rules. They bear the same relation to empirical schemata that empirical schemata bear to images”. Wolff; *Kant’s Theory of Mental Activity*, p. 212.

²⁰¹ H.J. Paton, *Kant’s Metaphysics of Experience*, Volume II, p. 35.

²⁰² Wolff, *Kant’s Theory of Mental Activity*, p. 212.

²⁰³ Bennet claims that in Schematism Kant offers rules for rule following. Jonathan Bennet, *Kant’s Analytic*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1966, pp. 146-147.

rules, which are conceptual but will specify a priori the instances, which the rules are to be applied and for this will formulate the “conditions under which objects can be given harmony with these concepts”. These conditions as Kant states are the sensible conditions and as the products of imagination they are intuitable forms. If there is any rule theory that we find in the Schematism it is that the schemata are not rules but the presentations of the rules in intuitable form. With respect to this point Gibbons says that The Schematism specifies the conditions for the recognition of instances and states:

The recognition of instances requires that the sensibly given manifold be recognized as something which may be taken as an instance of a concept, so schemata present in intuitable form the unity that is thought in the categories. Since concepts cannot be used to indicate this harmony (without the threat of an infinite regress in rules for rule following), the fittedness of manifold to concept must be exhibited non-conceptually²⁰⁵.

The schematisation of categories is then not to provide further conceptual representations by means of determining categories in terms of time, but to represent in intuition the unity that is thought in the categories. Kant states: “We therefore demand that a bare concept be *made sensible*” (A240/B299). The schematism is not the translation of pure concepts into temporalised categories but rather the sensibilisation of them, that is, making them intuitable. This sensibilisation does not only consists in the intuitive representing of the conceptual unity, but insofar as this intuitive unity is the formal condition of sensibility it consists in making the range within which objects become intuitable, that is, appear. It exhibits the conditions under which objects can be given to us, namely provides the field in which objects appear. In her article, cited above, Schaper argues that Kant’s insistence on the question “how is it possible to apply categories to the sensible intuitions?” in Schematism is understandable for her just in one sense: “What must the given *be*,

²⁰⁴ H.J. Paton, *Kant’s Metaphysics of Experience*, Volume II, pp. 35-37.

²⁰⁵ Gibbons, *Kant’s Theory of Imagination*, p. 62.

so that it is orderable?²⁰⁶ In Schematism, Kant's concern is much more than the conceptual conditions of knowledge; indeed, he states that concepts cannot be viewed applicable to the things "independent of all question as to whether and how these things may be given to us" (A139/B178). As Schaper indicates he "enters the tortuous argument about what the given must *be*, so that the synthesis can pronounce the categorical conditions as fulfilled"²⁰⁷. The Schematism outlines the sensible conditions under which the things are given to us and therefore, the conditions for the application of categories. The lesson to be derived from Schematism and its appeal to imagination is that the structure of experience is not due to the imposition of pure concepts to the material sensibly given through a structuring synthesis. But rather, it is schematic, which means that " 'the synthesis of imagination' 'produces' schemata in the given"²⁰⁸ that the categorical conditions of experience are realised. This is to say that we do not first have the sense impressions then impose on them the forms through the synthesis of imagination, but it is to say that the objects in their givenness already given as categorically determined. This means that we do not encounter an indeterminate manifold of intuition and then construct it into an object, but we encounter always objects. We do not encounter the appearances defined as undetermined empirical intuition, but we encounter the phenomena, which is an already conceptually determined appearance²⁰⁹. We encounter not fragmented sensations but with the objects due to synthesis of imagination, which has already connected the formal requirements that must be met with any object. This is to say that the synthesis of imagination has already taken place, that is, the intuitions are already brought to concepts and apprehended as phenomena and the question of subsumption can be asked only after this synthesis has taken place.

²⁰⁶ Eva Schaper, "Kant's Schematism Reconsidered", *Review of Metaphysics*, 18, 1964, pp. 277.

²⁰⁷ Ibid, pp. 277-278.

²⁰⁸ Ibid, p.279.

²⁰⁹ See, Bernard Freyberg, *Imagination and Depth in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 90.

But still this conclusion can be derived from the Schematism only after discussing the role of time, since the field produced by imagination is a temporal field. Kant states that transcendental schemata as the product of imagination are transcendental determinations of time, and time is contained in every empirical intuition. Actually, what is worked out in the Schematism is this point, that is, how time is contained in every empirical intuition and it involves a certain revision of the arguments of **Transcendental Aesthetic**. This revision of Transcendental Aesthetic has been implied by Kant in the deduction(s) sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly. These implications find their full meaning in the Schematism and I discuss the issue below.

4.4 Transcendental Schema As Pure Intuition

In above section I have argued against the views, which take schema as analogous to conceptual representation. The first view I have opposed was the identification of transcendental schema with the schematised category and the second view was the equation of schema with the rule. I have opposed these views on the basis of Kant's characterisation of schema as "a transcendental product of imagination". The view that schema is the *rule* of transcendental synthesis of imagination contradicts with its being a product of imagination. Indeed, Kant himself instead of calling it a rule of synthesis, calls it the pure synthesis itself:

It is simply the pure synthesis, determined by a rule of that unity, in accordance with concepts, to which the category gives expression. It is a transcendental product of imagination, a product which concerns the determination of inner sense in general according to conditions of its form (time), in respect of all representations (A142/B181).

So, with regard to the role of imagination in producing schema I emphasise its intuitive character. It is not a conceptual representation, but an intuitive representation produced by the synthesis of imagination. Kant calls it not only the product of the act of imagination, but the act itself. As a product of imagination, still it

cannot be equated with an image, but at least has an imagery character. In distinguishing schema and image, Kant states:

the image is a product of the empirical faculty of reproductive imagination; the schema of sensible concepts, such as figures in space, is a product and as it were, a monogram, of pure a priori imagination, through which, and in accordance with which, images themselves first become possible (A142/B181).

Kant uses the term monogram to describe the schema. Paton explains that “a monogram is now commonly regarded as a series of letters so interwoven as to constitute a whole”²¹⁰. He also adds that “there is an older usage in which ‘monogram’ meant a sketch or outline, and Kant himself seems to use it in this sense”²¹¹. In a later passage Kant himself describes the products of imagination, as a “monogram”, “individual qualities determined by no assignable rule”, “a blurred sketch” “shadowy image” (A571/B599). Schema is then a wavering sketch, or plan or diagram that cannot be fully pictured. As Kant calls them in *Critique of Judgment* they are intuitive representations: “hypotyposes, i.e., exhibitions (*exhibitiones*), not mere characterisations, ie., designations of concepts by accompanying sensible signs”²¹².

If schema is an intuitive presentation, and if it is pure, that is void of all empirical content, then it is a pure intuition. In this section I argue that schema is a pure intuition and this definition of schema requires a re-reading of **Transcendental Aesthetic** in order to reveal the synthesis of imagination that has been remained concealed in Kant's first introduction of pure intuition²¹³. Although, Kant defined pure intuition and form of intuition as belonging to the receptivity of the subject and stated that they are mere “given” in the Aesthetic, both in the deduction(s) and in the

²¹⁰ H.J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience*, Volume II, pp. 36.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. Werner Pluhar, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1987, p.227.

²¹³ There are many commentators who construe schema as pure intuition. See, Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 180-185; Gram, *Kant, Ontology & the A Priori*, pp101-106; Gibbons, *Kant's Theory of Imagination*, pp. 63-78; Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, pp. 212-228.

Schematism he manifests an activity belonging to pure intuition calling it a pure synthesis.

To construe schema as pure intuition is not only compatible with schema's being an intuitive representation, but also with its being a pure and formal condition of sensibility. Schema, as Kant defines it, is the sensible condition under which things are given to us. The **Schematism** in this sense outlines "the manner in which things are given to us". This characterisation of schema as pure intuition and the manner in which things are given to us is compatible with **Transcendental Aesthetic**, which identifies pure intuition with form of intuition. In Chapter II and Chapter III, especially in my discussion of the B-Deduction, I have argued that space and time, in order to be represented as pure intuitions, require the synthesis of imagination and are products of this synthesis. Kant himself explicitly states this in the B-Deduction, in **Section 26**, where he relates categories to sensible intuitions. This is the section where he makes a distinction between form of intuition and formal intuition and I have left open in my discussion of the issue, to identify pure intuition with formal intuition. I did not do the identification since it distorts the identification of pure intuition with form of intuition made in the Aesthetic. Due to this contradiction, many commentators take formal intuition as determined, that is, as conceptualised intuition and take form of intuition as undetermined intuition²¹⁴. And this reading is in accord with schema's being a third thing between pure intuition and categories. This line of reading is especially advocated by Henry Allison in his *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*.

Reading schema as determined pure intuition accords with schema's being a product of imagination, but disaccords with my initial claim that pure intuition as given in the **Aesthetic** is also a product of imagination. Contrary to my initial standpoint of resisting to identify formal intuition with pure intuition, in this section I

²¹⁴ See, Allison Kant's Transcendental Idealism, pp. 180-185 .

argue that pure intuition and form of intuition of the Aesthetic is same with formal intuition of the Deduction; and these are nothing but the schema produced by pure synthesis of imagination. In doing this I follow Longuenesse's interpretation of the discussion of space and time in the B-Deduction²¹⁵. Here it is necessary to quote the discussed passages of the deduction:

(...) space and time are represented a priori not merely as *forms* of sensible intuition, but as themselves intuitions which contain a manifold (of their own), and therefore are represented with the determination of the *unity* of this manifold (vide the Transcendental Aesthetic). (B160)

Kant attaches to this passage the famous footnote:

Space, represented as *object* (as we are required to be in geometry), contains more than mere form of intuition; it also contains *combination* of the manifold, given according to the form of sensibility, in an *intuitive* representation, so that the *form of intuition* gives only a manifold, the *formal intuition* gives unity of representation. In the Aesthetic I have treated this unity as belonging merely to sensibility, simply in order to emphasize that it precedes any concept, although as a matter of fact, it presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible. For since by its means (in that the understanding determines sensibility) space and time are first *given* as intuitions, the unity of this *a priori* intuition belongs to space and time, not to the concept of the understanding. (B160n)

These passages are given in **Section 26**, where Kant relates categories to sensible, that is, empirical intuitions. In **Section 24** Kant introduced the figurative synthesis of imagination through which the inner sense is determined in respect to its form and now, on the ground of this synthesis, Kant relates categories to sensible intuitions through the synthesis of apprehension. Kant's main argument here is that the condition of the apprehension of objects in space and time are same with the conditions of the unity of representations of space and time produced by transcendental synthesis. But, Longuenesse argues that the real intent of the section

²¹⁵ Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, pp.214-225. Her interpretation is criticised by Allison and Sedwick. See, Henry Allison, "Where Have all the Categories Gone? Reflections on Longuenesse's Reading of Kant's Transcendental Idealism", *Inquiry*, 43, 2000, pp. 67-80; Sally Sedwick, "Longuenesse on Kant and the Priority of the Capacity to Judge", *Inquiry*, 43, 2000, pp. 81-

is not the relation of categories to our sensible intuition, but the space and time themselves. She claims that the section involves the reworking of **Transcendental Aesthetic**, through providing a new light of “the manner in which things are given to us”²¹⁶.

In the Aesthetic, Kant maintains that space and time are not discursive representations, but rather they are intuitions, which are singular and immediate. While concept is a general representation containing what is common to different representations, and in this sense formed out of its component parts that are logically prior to the whole, intuition is a singular representation, which precedes all its parts. Space and time contain their parts not *under* themselves, but *within* themselves. Space and time are one all embracing wholes preceding their parts, and their parts presuppose and can be given in and through this one space and time and are determined by introducing limitations to the whole. Space and time are single, one representations and are given as unities preceding their parts. They are given as unified wholes and this characterisation of them transgress the borders of the Aesthetic and now being reworked in B-Deduction in **Section 26**.

As I have discussed in previous chapter, **Section 26** tells that the unity of space and time requires a synthesis and are given as intuitions through this synthesis. As single-unified wholes, they are the products of imagination. This unity of space and time as produced by imagination is different from and prior to the discursive unity of concepts and therefore, belongs to sensibility. This reveals the hidden synthesis in the Aesthetic. This reading implies that space and time as described in Transcendental Aesthetic are the formal intuitions described in the footnote. If space and time as pure intuitions and as forms of intuition are products of

90. Longuenesse responds to these criticisms in “Kant’s Categories and the Capacity to Judge: responses to Henry Allison and Sally Sedwick” *Inquiry*, 43, 2000, pp. 91-110.

²¹⁶ Longuenesse, in her response to Allison’s criticism states that section 26 involves a re-reading of the Aesthetic, not a revision of it. Longuenesse, “Kant’s Categories and the Capacity to Judge: Responses to Henry Allison and Sally Sedwick”, p. 104.

imagination, this as Longuenesse states brings into new light the “manner in which things are given to us” and reveals the insight of Schematism. But this bringing into new light “the manner in which things are given to us” is obscured by the distinction between form of intuition and formal intuition made in the footnote. If the form of intuition of the footnote refers to the form of intuition of the Aesthetic, this means that Transcendental Aesthetic has nothing to do with the synthesis of imagination. If this is the case then **Section 26** is not so radical:

It does not bring into new light the “manner in which things are given to us” but merely introduces a distinction Kant could not introduce in the Aesthetic, the distinction between what depends on sensibility or receptivity alone (space and time as forms of sensible intuition) and what depends on the transcendental synthesis of imagination or figurative synthesis (space and time as formal intuitions)²¹⁷.

If the role of imagination is to be preserved in the unity of pure intuition and form of intuition and therefore if these are to be identified with formal intuition, then the form of intuition of the footnote must be accounted without falling into contradiction. Here it is important to note that the forms of intuition are characterised in the Aesthetic with respect to their singularity and unity, but in the footnote Kant states that the form of intuition “gives only the manifold”. To begin with it is noteworthy to remember that in the Aesthetic, Kant equates form of intuition with pure intuition: “The pure form of sensible intuitions in general, in which all the manifold is intuited in certain relations, must be found in the mind a priori. This pure form of sensibility may also itself be called pure intuition” (A20/B34). The point is that only insofar as space and time are themselves intuitions (pure intuitions) that they can be forms of intuition. They are the preceding “undivided and unlimited”, that is, unified intuitions “in which all the manifold is intuited in certain relations”. As Longuenesse claims space and time are pure intuitions in themselves and they are

²¹⁷ Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, pp. 216-217.

form of intuitions when paired with matter²¹⁸. But if so, what is the form of intuition of the footnote, which Kant characterises as that which “gives only the manifold” (of its own)?

In Chapter II I have referred to Allison’s analysis of the difficulty. In order to capture the manifoldness of space and time, as well as their unity, Allison makes a distinction between two senses of the form of intuition: “the form of the intuited” as the structure of the objects intuited; and “form of intuiting” as a capacity or disposition to intuit²¹⁹. He maintains that space and time as single unified wholes refer to the “form of the intuited” and “forms of intuition”, which gives the manifold refer to the subjective capacity of receiving representations. Allison states that the “form of intuition” in the footnote refers to the form of intuiting. At this point Longuenesse agrees with Allison that the “form of intuition” in **Section 26** is mere form of intuiting, capacity to intuit. However, Longuenesse objects Allison to take this mere capacity to intuit directly as form of sensibility. She makes a distinction between two definitions of sensibility and therefore two definitions of form of intuiting. She argues that if sensibility just means “capacity...for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected” (A19/B33), and then the form of sensibility is a “mere capacity to take in a manifold, devoid of any power to unify the manifold”²²⁰. But if sensibility is also “the capacity to order what we receive in space and time” then the form of sensibility is also a form of intuiting, but this time the capacity to “yield intuitions” “related to an object”. She claims that the form of intuiting in the sense of form of the receptive capacity is a “merely potential form” and is actualised only by means of synthesis of imagination²²¹.

All these sophisticated analysis of Longuenesse aims to reveal the manifestation of an activity in sensibility, which is nothing but the synthesis of

²¹⁸ *ibid*, 218.

²¹⁹ Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 96-97.

²²⁰ Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, p. 221.

imagination. She draws interesting conclusions from her complicated analysis, and I believe that they are the real insights of the **Schematism**. She argues that sensibility refers to “the capacity for receiving representations through the manner in which we are affected”. But this capacity alone does not yield intuitions, since intuition is “a conscious representation related to an object”²²². At this point she refers to Kant’s own division of the term representation. At the beginning of the Dialectic Kant states:

The genus is *representation* in general (*repraesentatio*). Subordinate to it stands representation with consciousness (*perceptio*). A *perception* which relates solely to the subject as the modification of its state is *sensation* (*sensatio*), an objective perception is *knowledge* (*cognitio*). This is either *intuition* or *concept* (*intuitus vel conceptus*). The former relates immediately to the object and is single, the latter refers mediately by means of a feature which several things may have in common (A320/B376-377).

From this Longuenesse concludes:

In contrast with sensation, then, intuition is a conscious representation *related to an object*, even this relation is ‘immediate’ and if the representation is ‘singular’, thus prior to concept. ...Now in the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant characterizes sensibility as the capacity that “yields us intuitions”. This means that sensibility is not merely a capacity to be consciously affected, but a capacity for conscious representations *related to an object*. But we now know, after sections 24 and 26 of the Deduction, that if sensibility is such a capacity, then it must be receptive not merely to affections received from *outside*, but also to affection from *inside*, from the *spontaneity* of the mind, or the act of *figurative synthesis*, which alone can transform the outer affection into an object of intuition²²³.

Longuenesse’s conclusion is in accord with what I have argued as the real insight of the Schematism at the end of the above section: the real problem of the Schematism implied in the how question is “what must be the given”, and the answer to this question destroys the constructionalist views of synthesis. We do not encounter indeterminate manifold of intuition and then construct it into an object through the imposition of categorical forms, but thanks to the synthesis of imagination, which has already taken place, we are already in the world of objects.

²²¹ *ibid*, p. 221.

²²² *ibid*, p. 219.

Given the above analysis that space and time are the products of imaginative synthesis and this synthesis as Kant states in the B-Deduction refers to the inward affection, it follows that the inward affection produces the form of outer affection and “transforms the outer affection into an intuition of an object”. If this is so, we must respond to two objections. The first one is that which is brought by Allison to Longuenesse’s analysis:

But her claim about the generative function of the synthesis speciosa points to a more Fichtean picture, according to which our form or manner of sensibly intuiting is conditioned by the form of what is intuited, while the latter is itself a product of the transcendental synthesis and therefore *ens imaginarium*. In that event, however, it is difficult to understand what remains of Kant’s conception of sensibility as a distinct faculty with an a priori form²²⁴.

After raising this objection, Allison himself withdraws it by admitting that the “potential form”, which is actualised by synthesis of imagination “preserves an essential role for sensibility and its a priori contribution to human cognition”. It is not the case that imagination produces space and time freely, the condition of its production lies in the nature of irreducible receptivity potentially. The spatiotemporality of our manifold is not due to imagination on its own right, but is due to our nature of sensibility. Imagination actualises what lies potentially in our nature of receptivity. This does not destroy Kant’s distinction of sensibility from understanding, but as Longuenesse states, is “radically challenging what we have come to call, after Sellars, ‘the Myth of the Given’”²²⁵.

The second objection is the Heideggerian one. Heidegger himself takes space and time as products of imagination, but opposes to identify pure intuition with formal intuition. His reason for this lies in Kant’s definition of figurative synthesis, which is responsible from the production of formal intuitions. Insofar as Kant defines

²²³ *ibid*, pp. 219-220.

²²⁴ Henry Allison, “Where Have all the Categories Gone? Reflections on Longuenesse’s Reading of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism”, *Inquiry*, 43, 2000, p. 76.

figurative synthesis as “an action of understanding on sensibility”, Heidegger opposes this identification of pure and formal intuition, since for Heidegger pure intuition is the product of pure imagination, which as an independent faculty is the “common root” of sensibility and understanding, not the product of imagination, which is a function of understanding. I have already given the reasons of my disagreement with Heidegger, and my main point was that the definition of figurative synthesis as “an action of understanding on sensibility” is given at the surface after the synthesis of imagination has already taken place, and thus this figurative synthesis does not dissolve sensibility into understanding.

4.5 Transcendental Schema as Transcendental Time Determination

At the beginning of the discussion of the **Schematism** I have proposed that the central issue of the Chapter on Schematism lies in two central features of schema given by Kant: schema as the product of imagination and schema as transcendental time determination. I have argued in the above section that to treat schema as the product of imagination requires construing it as pure intuition. To construe schema as pure intuition necessitates a re-reading of **Transcendental Aesthetic** in the light of **Schematism**. Along the lines of this reading, the insight of Schematism becomes that the unity of space and time under which we apprehend objects are *ens imaginarium*. But Kant’s concern in Schematism is not space, but rather it is time. This priority of time over space is already given in the Aesthetic: “Time is the formal a priori condition of all appearances whatsoever” (A34/B51). It is not space but time, which is the universal and formal condition of all appearances. As Kant puts it in the Schematism: “time is the pure image of all objects of the senses in general” (A142/B182). So, given this priority of time, schemata are nothing but transcendental determinations of time:

²²⁵ Longuenesse, “Kant’s Categories and the Capacity to Judge: responses to Henry Allison and Sally

The schemata are nothing but a priori determinations of time in accordance with the rules. These rules relate in the order of categories to the time-series, the time-content, the time-order, and lastly to the scope of time in respect of all possible objects (A145/B184).

These determinations of time are the specific modes of time regulated in accordance “by a rule of that unity, in accordance with concept, to which the category gives expression” (A142/B181). These determinations of time are then homogenous with the category “which constitutes its unity” and homogenous with appearances, since they are apprehended under these modes of time. What is crucial for the argument of Schematism is that these determinations of time are at the same time the determinations of objects in time. As Paton argues, these time determinations do not refer to characteristics of time itself, but to characteristics of objects in time²²⁶. Insofar as the problem of Schematism is “what must be the given so that it can be categorically determined?” these time determinations specify the characteristics of the given, that is, the objects of the senses. These transcendental time determinations are nothing else than the formal characteristics that must be met with any object to become an object at all. Kant gives a summary of them in the **Schematism** and expounds them in the **Principles**. The generation of time as series provides that objects have extensive magnitude, that is, they are quanta and hence numerable. The second mode of time, that is, time content demands that objects have intensive magnitude, that is, they have a degree, that they fill time. The time order demands that objects are represented in necessary connection to each other in time, they can be represented as successive, co-existing, or as permanent. And lastly, within the scope of time, objects are represented as possible, actual or as necessary.

The significance of Schematism lies in that time is revealed as the ground of the possibility of experience and objects of experience. Time, through its

Sedwick” *Inquiry*, 43, 2000, p. 107.

determination by schema, becomes the universal condition of all experience. The Schematism reveals that the structure of experience is essentially temporal; the unity of experience is provided by the unity of time, as its formal condition. It is only under this temporal unity that objects become objects for us. That is to say that it is only insofar as objects are temporally structured that we can attain knowledge of them. In this respect the **Schematism** throws light on the **Deduction**: The Deduction showed that objects, in order to become objects at all must be subject to our conditions of thinking them, that is, they must conform to categories. Now, in Schematism it is revealed that they can so conform only if they are temporally structured. As Paton states: "He is deriving categorical characteristics of objects from the fact that they are temporal"²²⁷. The objects fulfil the categorical features on the ground of unified time. So, time is not only the condition of the apprehension of objects, but it is at the same time the condition of the intelligibility of the objects. It is the condition of all knowledge of objects. Time is not just the form of passive receptivity of the subject, such like "a passive screen through which the manifold just happens to pass" as Wood maintains²²⁸. It is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge and all experience.

If we turn back to the initial problem of Kant, that is, the applicability of categories to objects, it becomes clear that it is only in relation to time that categories gain meaning and significance. So, if categories are to relate to objects, that is, obtain objective reality, they can only relate to them as they appear in the unity of time. The schema then, "realizes the understanding in the very process of restricting it" (A147/B187). It is only by means of schema that they can become applicable to objects of experience, but in this realisation they are at the same time limited to the phenomena, which is apprehended under the form of time. "The schema is properly,

²²⁶ H.J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience*, Volume II, pp. 28-30.

²²⁷ H.J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience*, Volume II, pp. 76.

²²⁸ M. Woods, "Kant's Transcendental Schematism", *Dialectica*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1983, p. 218.

only the phenomena, or sensible concept, of an object in agreement with the category" (A146/B186). It is only through this schematisation, that is, through the process, which makes categories sensible that the experience becomes possible, and categories relate to objects. Apart from this schematisation, categories lack meaning; they represent no object. The schema is the "true and sole condition under which these concepts obtain relation to objects and so possess *significance*". (A146/B185). The Schematism establishes the truth for the categories, that is, their agreement with the object. This logic of truth as Freydberg states:

(...) includes imagination as its foundation and limitation...Imagination alone, in restricting the categories by keeping them bound to their sensible condition, established their truth. The logic of truth is seated in imagination²²⁹.

This logic of truth rests on imagination since the temporal unity under which we apprehend objects is an imaginative unity. Through its time forming activity in the production of schemata, imagination becomes the *sine qua non* of all knowledge and truth. As the source of temporality imagination makes possible for us the objectivity of the object; it produces the horizon in which objects can be apprehended as objects. The schematism is an imaginative opening of the unity of the field in which we find appearances in objective temporal relations. This horizon opened by imagination, Kant names, the field of *possible experience*. In the A-Deduction, Kant has already declared that "necessary unity of pure (productive) synthesis of imagination, prior to apperception, is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience" (A118). Now in the Schematism, it becomes clear that imagination gains this grounding role through its function of time-forming.

Kant begins to Schematism with the question, How is the application of categories to appearances possible? He states that this application requires a *tertium quid*, which in one respect is *intellectual* and in another is *sensible*. Throughout my discussion of the issue I have concentrated on the sensible, that is,

on the intuitive character of schema, because of the fact that schema is the product of imagination and it is transcendental time determination. But, as discussed in the deduction(s), imagination also operates in relation to the unity of apperception. Its synthesis conforms to the unity of apperception, that is to say that it synthesises the manifold according to the rules supplied by the categories. Here in Schematism, Kant makes the point clear by stating that the synthesis of imagination produces the a priori determinations of time in accordance with rules. The transcendental time determinations are intellectual as well as intuitive, since the intuitive unity of time is homogenous with the category “which constitutes its unity”. The four determinations of time as *time-series*, *time-content*, *time-order* and *scope of time* are not developed from the nature of time itself, but from the categories. Kant does not derive the order of time from time itself, but he determines it by the categories²³⁰. Insofar as time is determined by categories it is “universal and rests upon an a priori rule” (A139/B178). The homogeneity between a category and schema rests on their shared common universality.

But, this reading of schema as time determined by a category must not be taken along the lines of constructionalist view that takes on the one side the category and on the other side the undermined manifold of time. As I have argued above time as pure manifoldness and category as pure form does not stand in isolation waiting to be combined externally. This has been already occurred and apart from their determination in schema they are dead abstractions. The schematism has already taken place and they have already been gathered together as to open the field of

²²⁹ Bernard Freydberg, *Imagination and Depth in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 97.

²³⁰ The issue is one of the most painful issues for Kant commentators. As Paton argues the Schematism provides a new approach to the derivation of categories. Paton, Vol. II, p. 20. He states that if Kant's derivation of categories from the logical forms of judgment is to be rejected, Schematism provides that they can be justified from the nature of time. The Schematism provides the insight that the pure category is not original, but derived from the schematised category by abstracting the schema it contains. This is to say that, categories are given to us as already containing their temporal determination. But I am not sure that whether this makes them completely derivable from the nature of time itself, without any reference to judgment. It seems to me that such an attempt eliminates the distinction between sense and thought in the favor of intuition.

experience. And I find the real significance of the term intellectual in this characterisation of schema as that which has already taken place. The intellectual does not only mean that the synthesis of imagination is determined by categories. But intellectual also means spontaneity, an activity. Imagination, although what it produces is always sensible, is at the same time a spontaneous power. But its spontaneity differs from the spontaneity of thought, which is a reflective activity. Actually the real significance of spontaneity lies in that it is not reflective, but that it is a blind activity. Kant puts this point when he writes:

It is evident therefore, that what the schematism of understanding effects by means of the transcendental synthesis of imagination is simply the unity of all the manifold of intuitions in inner sense, and so indirectly the unity of apperception which as a function corresponds to the receptivity of inner sense (A145/B185).

The synthesis of imagination aims only the unity of the manifold, and this synthesis is affected without reflection. Through this synthesis the unity of apperception is indirectly affected, that is to mean that an act of reflection is required in order to call my representations as mine, but not an act of reflection is necessary to unify them. This is why "I think" must be able to accompany my representations, but not that it actually does so. The Schematism reveals that objects in order to be objects for us must appear under the unity of experience. This unity of experience is nothing other than the unity of time, it is not the unity thought in the categories. The unity that is thought in the categories must be represented intuitively so that they can become applicable. So, the unity of experience, which we ourselves project, is an intuitive unity. But this does not mean that the synthesis of imagination is unconscious, and therefore noumenal synthesis. In order to apprehend objects we must be aware of their standing under the unity of time, but this awareness is not yet the reflective awareness of concept, but rather it is an intuitive awareness. This is why imagination is "a blind but indispensable function of soul". So, the application of categories, or rules, cannot be achieved by an appeal to some further concepts or

rules. In my reading of schema I emphasised its intuitive character and resisted to take schema as analogous to conceptual representation, either as a concept or as a rule. I have argued that the schema cannot be a rule for rule following; or second order rule for the application of a rule, since this begs the question and invites an infinite regress in searching rules. As David Bell argues the Kantian doctrine in Schematism is similar to Wittgenstein's when he says that "when I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule *blindly*". Bell continues:

The disturbing conclusion to which Wittgenstein would force us, then, is that an inescapable blindness lies at the very center of our rational and cognitive capacities. It is worth recalling, moreover, that Kant, too, concluded that our understanding rests upon 'a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever (B.103). And as we know from his famous slogan that 'intuitions without concepts are blind', the blindness that Kant refers to is precisely that which is invoked by Wittgenstein: a state or act is 'blind' in so far as it remains necessary inaccessible to prior rational and objective justification. In this sense, then, an act is blind if it is spontaneous²³¹.

The application of categories to objects necessarily requires a blind activity. This is the reason why Kant tells that judgment is a talent and cannot be thought. After stating that understanding is the faculty of rules and judgment is subsuming under rules and formal logic cannot contain rules for judgment, he states: "though understanding is capable of being instructed, and of being equipped with rules, judgment is a peculiar talent which can be practiced only, and cannot be thought" (A133/B172). Formal logic cannot supply rules for judgment, and transcendental logic finds itself as grounded on schematism of imagination that operates blindly. Rather than rendering it intelligible, Kant confesses that "it is an art concealed in the depths of human soul". (A141/B181). This blindness and concealment of schematism require further elaboration since, I believe that the true nature of imagination consists in its remaining enigmatic.

²³¹ David Bell, "The Art of Judgment", *Mind*, 96, 1983, p. 226.

4.6 Schematism: An Art Concealed in the Depths of Human Soul

Although Kant discovers the power of imagination as the ground of all knowledge and experience in his critical investigation, which becomes in its full light in the **Schematism**, he never provides a clear account of this power. Apart from any clarity in his investigation, he finally confesses that the activity of imagination can never be brought to light since it conceals itself:

This schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances and their mere form, is an art concealed in the depths of human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze (A142/B181).

In Schematism it becomes clear that imagination is the ground of objectivity for us; it opens the horizon of objectivity and makes objects to appear and known. It achieves this through its function of time-forming in producing schema. Through this function, it gives the unity of experience, which is nothing other than the unity of time. It is under this temporal unity that we apprehend objects. The unity of time is our product; it is an imaginative unity that we project in advance the objectivity of the object. But we take this unity of time as objective, not as something issuing from us. So, as Ricoeur states, imagination as a mediating power, unifies sense and thought not in itself, but in the object:

It is the profound discovery that this duality is overcome somewhere, in the object, but that this unity is not susceptible of being fully reflected: whereas the objectivity of the object is what is clearest and most manifest-it is *lumen naturale*-the transcendental imagination for which is the correlate remains an enigma²³².

The imaginative synthesis makes the objects possible, and in doing this it conceals itself. Its own activity remains obscure, since it can be represented only in terms of the results of its own action. It represents objects, but cannot represent its own act of representing. The reason for this concealment of the activity of imagination lies in that time in which objects appear to us is the product of

²³² Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, trans. C.A. Kelbley, Fordham Press, New York, 1986, p. 41.

imagination. But time produced by imagination is not only the form of the objects that appear, but also the form of its own activity. As Kant puts it, time is “the mode in which the mind is affected through its own activity” (B67-68). So, this activity can only be represented in time, but not in itself. The in itself of imagination forever remains concealed.

Actually this issue is nothing other than the issue that we have encountered in the discussion of synthesis in the A-Deduction. The problem was simply that the act that generates time seems to presuppose time as given. I named this a paradox in previous chapter and left it undiscussed. I shall argue the issue again by turning back to threefold synthesis in the A-Deduction, since the examination of synthesis in its threefold structure is the most explicit examination of the theme of synthesis. To remember: Kant opens the threefold synthesis by reminding that all representations are subject to time and must be combined in time, and he states that this issue must be born in mind throughout the discussion of synthesis. The statement of the fact that all representations are in time and must be combined in time invokes that the time in which they are combined is given previously, before the act of combination. Kant’s talk about the combination of the manifold through the synthesis of imagination always invokes that imagination is just responsible from the combination of the manifold. It seems that the time in which the combination is assured is pre-given. Actually this is implied by the arguments of the Aesthetic that show time as pre-given form of inner sense. This implies that the manifold is given to mind successively, and imagination unites this successive manifold into a “complete representation”. Indeed, this is invoked in Kant’s describing this activity of unification in threefold synthesis. Kant begins with the synthesis of apprehension and states that in order to apprehend a manifold qua manifold, “mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of one impression upon another” so that the manifold is apprehended as a successive manifold. This describing implies that the impressions are given

sequentially and mind distinguishes time by following the sequence. But this is completely rejected in Kantian lines since time is the form of inner sense. But if this is not the case the description then invokes that time in its successiveness is given prior to the ordering of the manifold as a successive manifold. Indeed, this is further implied in Kant's description of the synthesis of reproduction. In the synthesis of reproduction Kant tells that in order to apprehend the manifold as a manifold of a single intuition, the *preceding* parts must be reproduced as one goes on to the *next*. This act of reproduction is necessary to obtain a complete representation since, if one loses sight of the *preceding* part as one *advance* to the *next* there will be only the discrete representations given in each moment, but never a series of representations as to form a whole. But especially this description of reproduction implies that the successive time already exists, that is, time is already at hand as a succession of past and present moments. This is to mean that the act of reproduction presupposes time in its successive character: the synthesis takes place in time; it combines the manifold in an already given time.

If this is the case, it means that synthesis of imagination has nothing to do with the Aesthetic; time is already given in its unified character. But after Schematism, this cannot be taken as the case. Apart from the synthesis of imagination time is nothing for us. Indeed, Kant himself declares in the Schematism that time is produced by synthesis of imagination: "...due to my generating of time itself in the apprehension of the intuition" (A143/B182). Time is my product; I generate the time. Time cannot be given prior to the synthesis of imagination, since its successive character requires that the past and present moments be held together, and this is impossible apart from the reproductive act that brings the past moments into present. This is already given in threefold synthesis. To grasp a successiveness of the manifold requires that the past moments be not lost and reproduced along the present ones. If this act is lacking, there would be only discrete

representations, not their successiveness and so a complete representation of them. This is to say that the successiveness is itself generated through the reproductive act²³³. And here we have the paradox: reproductive act both generates the successiveness, and therefore generates time as a series, and presupposes successiveness.

If we necessarily have this paradox in threefold synthesis, it cannot simply be eliminated by dropping the Subjective Deduction from the critical examination as Kant himself did in the B-Deduction. In the B-Deduction, we again encounter a paradox due to the nature of synthesis of imagination. This time the paradox reveals itself in the relation between outer and inner sense. In the B-Deduction Kant argues that the unity of time is generated through the figurative synthesis by means of the inward determination of inner sense through understanding. Kant gives the description of this inward determination of inner sense as:

...the understanding, as spontaneity, is able to determine inner sense through the manifold of given representations, in accordance with the unity of apperception, and so to think synthetic unity of apperception of the manifold of a priori sensible intuition... (B150).

I have quoted this passage before in my discussion of the B-Deduction, but I have not given a separate analysis of it. For one thing, the understanding in this passage refers to transcendental imagination. It is the understanding that Kant defined in the B-Deduction as “the understanding under the title of *transcendental*

²³³ James Mensch gives a formulation of this generation of successiveness: he argues that “each ‘advance’ to subsequent impression involves a reproduction of the preceding part” does not imply that the act of reproduction consists only this. He states that “it also signifies that, in the next advance, this reproduction will itself be reproduced along with the preceding impression. The same necessity governs both the reproduction of this reproduction and that of the preceding impression”. In the footnote he gives a formulation of this serial act: “Suppose I have an original impression, I1. As I advance to the next impression I2, the first is reproduced. Letting pairs of brackets symbolize reproduction, this advance can be symbolized as I2[I1]. Similarly, the advance to the next impression would be symbolized as I3[I2[I1]]. We thus have the series, I1, I2[I1], I3[I2[I1]],... which can be thought as long as we hold the individual impressions, I1, I2, I3,...as part of a ‘complete representation’. James Mensch, “Temporalization as the Trace of the Subject”, *Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung, Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001, Vol. II, pp. 409-417. http://www.stfx.ca/people/jmensch/Temporalization_as_the_Trace_of_the_Subject.doc p. 5n.

synthesis of imagination" (B153). Here also we have an interesting use of the term apperception. The second use of apperception in the passage is the synthetic unity of apperception of the manifold of a priori *sensible* intuition. The unity of apperception as given in the first part of the deduction is indifferent to the nature of the intuition. But as I have argued in the previous chapter, this apperception can be manifested both in thought and intuition. And here its use refers to its representation in intuition. That is to say that it is the apperception, manifested in the unity of time. Given these readings of the terms, the passage tells that imagination determines inner sense through the *manifold of given representations*. As Kant already put in the Aesthetic the only manifold available for inner sense is the representations of outer senses; "The representations of the outer senses constitute the proper material which we occupy our mind" (B67). So, the determination of inner sense is firstly the combination of the manifold given through outer sense. Here the combination of the given manifold is nothing but the synthesis of the manifold in space²³⁴. The synthesis of imagination produces the intuition of space. But this production of spatial form is possible if the mind is affected through its own act of combination. In combining the manifold, imagination affects the mind as inner sense with this combination²³⁵. The inner sense, that is, the intuition of time is produced in this act of self-affection. And it is only through this self-affection that we can "think the synthetic unity of apperception of the manifold of a priori sensible intuition" meaning that we become aware of the unity of time. But here we have the paradox: the determination of the

²³⁴ See, H.J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience*, Volume II, pp. 393-396, also Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, pp. 228-229.

²³⁵ Again Mensch reconstructs this act of self-affection in terms of reproductive act: "Each act of reproduction adds or combines the reproduced to the originally given impressional material. It does this again and again as I advance to new impressions.... Now, what I reproduce is, in each case, my being affected by an impression. Reproduction thus presents to the self its being-affected. Given that this presentation itself has an affective quality, the presentation to itself of its being affected is a process by which the self affects itself. ...This follows because the immediate focus of the act is, after the first instance, not an impression but a reproduction of an impression. ...Insofar as the focus of reproduction is reproduction itself, self-reference is inherent in it". James Mensch, "Temporalization as the Trace of the Subject",

[http://www.stfx.ca/people/jmensch/Temporalization as the Trace of the Subject.doc](http://www.stfx.ca/people/jmensch/Temporalization%20as%20the%20Trace%20of%20the%20Subject.doc), p.8-9.

inner sense presupposes the determination of outer sense, and the determination of outer sense is achieved by the determination of inner sense with self-affection. Kant puts this by giving an example:

We cannot think a line without *drawing* it in thought, or a circle without *describing* it. We cannot represent the three dimensions of space by *setting* three lines at angles to one another from the same point. Even time itself we cannot represent, save insofar as we attend, in the drawing of a straight line (which has to serve as the outer figurative representation of time), merely to the act of the synthesis of the manifold whereby we successively determine inner sense (B154).

Here, Kant tells that we can have the intuition of time only if we attend to our act of successive generation of the spatial intuition of a line. Only by attending to this act we can grasp the successiveness of inner sense. Time is the form of our act of combining the manifold, that is, the spatial manifold. This means that apart from this act, time is nothing: "The understanding does not, therefore, find in inner sense such a combination of the manifold, but produces it, in that it affects that sense" (B155). Or again: "Inner sense.. contains the mere form of intuition, but without combination of the manifold in it, and therefore contains no *determinate* intuition" (B153). Here, both the unified intuitions of space and time are produced by figurative synthesis. In this figurative synthesis Hoke Robinson finds two "contradictory pair of theses, both of which Kant appears to hold"²³⁶. He calls the first "Outer Apriority Thesis", which holds that "time determination of outer sense is prior to the time-determination of inner sense"²³⁷. The second is the "Inner Priority Thesis" that holds that "temporality accrues first to inner sense, and only then derivatively to outer sense". After mentioning that neither can be the whole story he states:

This view indeed exhibits a kind of circularity, in that we assumed the successiveness of inner sense representations in order to establish outer sense temporal order; but it is only on the basis of

²³⁶ Hoke Robinson, "Inner Sense and the Leningrad Reflexion", *International Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XXIX, No. 3, Issue No. 115, 1989, p. 275.

²³⁷ *ibid*, p. 275.

this outer sense order that time determination in inner sense, and hence its successiveness can be established²³⁸.

These ambiguities that are available both in the A and B Deduction show that, the act of imagination can be described only on the basis of that, which it produces. For the B-Deduction, the successiveness of inner sense can be represented only in reference to the outer sense, which itself is generated through the imaginative synthesis that generates the successiveness. We can represent time by drawing a line, but we cannot represent time itself. As Kant says “time cannot by itself be perceived” (B205). And for the A-Deduction, the act, which generates time, can only be described in terms of the successiveness of time, generated by that act.

The crucial point here is that time is the condition of all appearing. Anything can appear only in time. It is the universal condition of all appearances. So, in generating time, imagination generates the medium in which things appear and be represented, this also applies to its own appearing. The act that generates time can only be represented in terms of time. This is to mean that the act that generates the succession can only be grasped and described as a successive act. We can represent objects; we can make them appear to us by generating the medium in which they appear, but we cannot represent our own act of representing. If this representation is possible, it can only be represented in its appearing in time, but not in itself. The act of imagination that generates time can only be described as a temporal process. As Kant says in the B-Deduction by attending to our act we can grasp the *successiveness* of inner sense. To grasp it as successive already presupposes time as a succession. But what is important here is that only in reference to outer sense that we can grasp the succession of our states: “All determination of time presupposes something permanent in perception” (B275). As Kant states this permanent cannot be something in me, but must be something outside me (B276). This something permanent is something permanent in space. But

²³⁸ Ibid, p. 278

this something permanent in space is already the result of our own act. This is to say that we can represent our own act, that is, intuit the successiveness of inner sense only against the results of our own act. Everything has already been taken place and we are too late to vision the act in itself. It is forever concealed. This is the reason why self can know itself only as it appears in time, but not as it is in itself. As Kemp Smith states: "If our mental activities and states lay open to direct inspection, we should have to recognise in the mind a non-sensuous intuitional power"²³⁹. But the human beings are not capable of intellectual intuition. If it had been possible for imagination to represent its own act, this would turn it into an intellectual intuition. But imagination in making representing possible, cannot represent its representing.

The inability of imagination in representing its own act is also apparent from Kant's insistence on the distinction between an image and a schema. An image is a determinate empirical representation, but a schema is a blurred outline or a wavering sketch that cannot be brought to any image. The distinction between image and schema refers to that we can never represent a schema sensibly; we can never obtain a determinate image of it. It makes images possible; it is form-giving to images, but it itself does not have a determinate form. Therefore, it cannot be represented adequately. Its representation is always blurred. A complete representation of it cannot be obtained, but it makes a complete representation of objects possible. But as Kant shows in threefold synthesis, the production of a complete representation is achieved through an activity of reproducing past moments alongside the present ones. In this sense, schema is not a static thing, but an activity, or a dynamic process. This is why Kant calls it "simply the pure synthesis" (A142/B181). Schema of a category makes the category intuitable, and by means of this the category gains an imagery dimension. But this imagery cannot itself be represented as an image; it cannot give an adequate and full representation of itself.

²³⁹Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 296

This is to say that it cannot be perceived and this is the reason why Kant states “time cannot by itself be perceived”. Although it cannot be perceived by itself, it makes all perception possible, since it is the medium that the perception occurs. Here some metaphoric expressions can be used for this medium. The one is the metaphor of light: we see in the light, but we do not see the light. Another metaphoric term is the nice Wittgensteinian one: the eye cannot see itself.

4.7 Concluding Remarks

At the beginning of my discussion of the Chapter on Schematism, I have told that many commentators of Kant find the Schematism obscure and confusing. Due to its obscure character, it has usually been by-passed. The obscurity first presents itself in Kant’s introducing the problem of Schematism in terms of subsumption of appearances under categories. Putting the problem in this way, that is, as a relation between a universal and a particular obscures the relation between intuitions and concepts. Not only putting the problem in terms of the subsumption but Kant’s introducing of the need of a “third thing” that supplies the relation of categories to appearances also obscures the issue. If this third thing is taken as a third entity somewhere between concept and intuition, the problem of the relation between categories and intuitions couples itself both on the side of the relation between a category and schema and on the side of the relation between a schema and intuitions. If seen as this, the relation between categories and intuitions can never be established and many philosophers after Kant claimed that Kant fails to establish the relation, even by introducing a third element. Many claimed that Kant creates an unnecessary problem by making a distinction between sensibility and understanding and then tries to solve the problem of their relation with introducing a third element. It is generally argued that not only he creates an unnecessary problem but also fails to supply a clear explanation due to their unification. He introduces imagination and

schema as responsible for this unification, but he never supplies an explicit account of this. The Schematism not only lacks a clear account, but is also full of contradictory statements. David Bell gives a list of them:

The procedure of schematisation, for example, is variously ascribed to sensibility (B186), to understanding (B179), to empirical reproductive imagination (B180), and to a priori productive imagination (B181). Schema are distinguished from concepts (B180), and then identified with them (ibid); they are said to be determinate (B176), and also indeterminate (B180); and it is in one place implied that empirical concepts do not require schemata (B176), but in another they do (B180). And at B 186 Kant calls schemata 'sensible concepts'- through from the critical standpoint such things out to be irrelevant to us as 'intellectual intuitions'²⁴⁰.

I take all these contradictions neither as a failure of philosophy that begins with the distinction between sensibility and understanding nor as a failure of Kant, but as belonging to the nature of imagination itself. Imagination and its activity cannot be treated as clearly as sensibility and understanding, since imagination is not itself a faculty at the same level with them. But rather, it operates at a deep level as the meeting ground of sense and thought. It brings different formal requirements together, but it lacks its own forms. Time as the form of sense and pure concepts as the forms of thought are gathered together in schema, but schema itself does not belong neither of them. It is not a concept or an indeterminate intuition; it is not just spontaneous, or just receptive; it is not sense or thought, rather it is "no man's land"²⁴¹ between all these dualisms.

So, imagination is not a third faculty between sensibility and understanding and schema is not a third thing between concept and intuition since these dualist elements are not isolated elements waiting to be connected by a mediation of third element. But they are already gathered together in schema. I have discussed that the Schematism concerns with the how question, which refers to the question what must be the given so that it can be categorically determined. Kant's answer to this

²⁴⁰ David Bell, "The Art of Judgment", *Mind*, 96, 1983, p. 229.

question is that it must be temporal. It can only be given under the unity of time. But this unity of time as the product of imagination has already gathered the formal requirements together that must be met with any object. It is not the case that we apprehend the appearances under the form of time and then further determine them with the categories and assure their objectivity. But the objects apprehended under the form of time already fulfill categorical determinations. The temporal determination of objects is at the same their categorical determination. Imagination through its time forming activity in the production of schema makes objects for us possible, but in doing this it conceals itself. It is not at the surface, at the same level with sensibility and understanding, but it is operating at a deep level. As Kant states its function is “an art concealed in the depths of human soul”. Understanding and sensibility as two different faculties that can be analysed in isolation from each other are the surface of this depth²⁴². But in the depths they are already unified. But this depth cannot be captured in itself, but can only be grasped in terms of the results that it makes possible. It can be attributed both to sensibility and to understanding, but can never be equated with one of them. It mediates between the receptivity and the spontaneity of the subject by being both spontaneous and receptive, though irreducible to any of them. It circulates in the both without ending in one of them; it is spontaneous and receptive, intellectual and sensible but escapes being caught up as one of them. It makes their unification possible, but it lacks itself, denies its identity and eludes the basic question of “what it is”. Thus to a certain extent it remains a mystery; “an art concealed in the depths of human soul”. But this mystery refers to objectivity for us.

²⁴¹ *ibid*, 229

²⁴² I borrow these metaphors of surface and depth from Freydberg. See, Bernard Freydberg, *Imagination and Depth in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, esp.p. 96.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This study began “from the point at which the common root of our faculty of knowledge divides and throws out two stems” (A835/B863), namely, from the distinction of sensibility and understanding and ended up with their fundamental unity in schema. The Kantian imagination has a function, which is hardly comprehensible apart from the dualist structure of human knowledge. It is the great mediator between sensibility and understanding; it is the *tertium quid* that sustains the homogeneity of concepts and intuition; it is the synthetic power of subject that brings the manifold of intuition into unity in accordance with concepts. But not only the function of imagination is hardly comprehensible apart from the dualisms that it is said to combine, but the dualisms themselves cannot be understood apart from their combination through imagination. The distinct elements gain their functions within the network in which the imagination is the actuating force of knowledge. The role of imagination can be traced only within the complex network of the capacities of the subject and such a tracing requires that one must continuously alter the initial assumptions and the formulations as one advances within the Kantian text. Without attending to the transformations of initial assumptions and formulations into deeper levels, the only thing that one would encounter in the Kantian text in regard to the role and status of imagination is nothing but contradictory statements. The Kantian text presents a certain resistance in regard to the function of imagination and renders it extremely difficult to find a way between the contradictions. Kant begins with the distinction of sensibility and understanding and asserts that the distinction is so

essential to the human knowledge and the two elements are irreducible. He then posits a third faculty between sensibility and understanding that sustains their unification. This third thing has no stability on its own and sometimes it is attributed to sensibility and sometimes to the understanding, and sometimes it is posited in a middle position. This third thing is said to be responsible for the synthesis of manifold, but one might always be confused about to which faculty Kant assigns the synthesis; to understanding or to imagination. This study has suffered from all these contradictions and ambiguities and tried to find a consistent way out of these obscurities. For this purpose it has questioned the reliability of the distinction between sensibility and understanding as it is first presented at the very beginnings of the Kantian text, in order to reveal the fundamental unifying force of imagination. So, in this concluding chapter, let me reconstruct the story that has gone through this study.

In his *Logic* Kant states that the distinction between sensibility and understanding can be viewed from different aspects: as the distinction between intuitions and concepts; or as the distinction between receptivity and spontaneity. To view the distinction as a distinction between intuitions and concepts gives the criteria of the distinction as: concepts are general representations of what is common to many and intuitions are singular representations. Kant states that to view the distinction from this aspect is to view it as a logical distinction. But there is another aspect that views the distinction between sensibility and understanding as a distinction between receptivity and spontaneity. To view the distinction in this way is to view it as a metaphysical distinction. Spontaneity is the act of positing something out of itself and receptivity is the mere capacity to receive something given. In this regard sensibility is the receptive faculty of intuiting something given to it from outside and understanding is the spontaneous faculty of producing concepts out of itself. I have argued that the metaphysical distinction between receptivity and

spontaneity rests on the metaphysical contention that human intellect is essentially finite. I have discussed this finitude of human reason by contrasting it with the divine way of knowing. Divine intuition consists in the unity of positing and intuiting; it posits its object in its very reception, that is, intuiting, of the object. In this unitary act of positing and intuiting, divine knowing has its object as it is in itself, in its immediate singular unity. In contrast to divine knowing human intellect lacks the capacity of positing its object in its own spontaneity in unity with intuition, and therefore relies on some other faculty for relation to objects. Its spontaneity consists in producing concepts, which are nothing but the forms of unity. Insofar as it cannot give its object in its singular unity, it can only posit the form of unity under which the intuitions will be unified. And also human intuition lacks the capacity to create its own object of intuition in its very reception of it, but is dependent on affections from outside. It is merely receptive and does not involve any spontaneity. Insofar as it depends on affections from outside, it cannot receive the object in its singular, immediate unity as it is in itself, but receives only the dispersed manifold of intuition. So, in the case of human knowing there is a dualism between receptivity and spontaneity in contrast to the unity of positing and intuiting. Insofar as they are distinct capacities, neither receptivity nor spontaneity supplies knowledge of objects on their own right. The receptivity requires the spontaneous activity of determining and the spontaneous activity requires the receptivity that gives the determinable. The Kantian imagination comes to the foreground as the power that supplies their relation by being both spontaneous and receptive. It is receptive since it takes up the manifold of intuition from the senses and it is spontaneous since it unifies the manifold in accordance with the form of unity posited by thought. The mediating role of imagination between sensibility and understanding, as a third element reveals itself in its spontaneous-receptive character. This spontaneous-receptive character of imagination makes it's

belonging both to understanding and sensibility clear and removes the contradictions that arise from its being the third thing.

So, the problem with the Kantian imagination, if the contradictory statements will be read into a consistent theory is this: what does it mean to be a third thing? Throughout this study it has been argued that imagination is not a third faculty at the same level with sensibility and understanding, but rather it is the deep power of subject that makes sensibility and understanding as two distinct stems of human knowledge possible. It makes them possible since they are not isolated elements to be unified by a third faculty, but that third power already belongs to them. As Kant states throughout the *Critique*, imagination belongs both to sensibility and understanding. To put in other way round, is equivalent to say that both understanding and sensibility inheres imagination; both understanding and sensibility includes imagination as their structural component. In this regard imagination is the actuating force of sensibility and understanding. If these two faculties would be investigated not in their unification but in their isolation, this could only be achieved by concealing the deep power, which makes them what they are. If these two faculties are taken in isolation, they are two irreducible heterogeneous faculties. If they are taken in their relation, it becomes obvious that they have a common element as their structural component and therefore they are already homogeneous. I think that this is the crux of **Schematism**. In **Schematism** Kant does not posit a new entity in between intuition and concept, but articulates that, which already belongs to both of them. This belonging of imagination both to sensibility and understanding is put by Kant in two different contexts: once in **Transcendental Deduction**, putting emphases on the conceptual conditions of knowledge, and once in the **Schematism** putting emphasis on the sensible conditions of knowledge. The Deduction reveals in what way imagination belongs to understanding, and the Schematism reveals in what way imagination belongs to sensibility. Therefore, the

problem in the Deduction is the problem of the relation between imagination and apperception, and the problem in Schematism is the problem between imagination and time.

The crucial transformation of the problem of the distinction and unification of sensibility and understanding is made at the beginning of the A-Deduction. At the beginning of the A-Deduction Kant gives up his talk of two distinct stems of knowledge, that is, his talk of the distinction between sensibility and understanding. Instead of a two-fold distinction, he introduces the three subjective sources: sense, imagination and apperception. Here, sense does not refer to sensibility as a faculty, or apperception to understanding. They are not the faculties of the subject, but the subjective sources of knowledge. Sense is the mere capacity to take in the given, the mode in which we are affected by the objects. Apperception refers to mere spontaneity of the subject; it is the principle of the unity of all the manifold. And also what is crucial in this transformation is that they do not stand in isolation from each other, but they form a structural unity in the synthesis of imagination, which is threefold. The synthesis of imagination brings sense and thought together by means of synthesising the manifold supplied by the senses in accordance with the unity of apperception. Within the context of the deduction Kant puts emphasis on the relation of this synthesis with the unity of apperception, since the concern of the deduction is the conceptual conditions of knowledge, that is, the justification of the categories.

The relation between the synthesis of imagination and the unity of apperception is put in a very complex way. The complexity arises due to the fact that they both require each other. To remember: Kant puts the transcendental unity of apperception as the principle of the synthetic unity of all the manifold in intuition. This principle states that all the intuitions must belong to one-identical self in order to represent anything at all. As he states, intuitions are nothing to us if they are not taken up in one consciousness. What is crucial in Kant's positing of this principle of

the synthetic unity of apperception is that it includes or presupposes a synthesis. He not only states that this apperception presupposes a synthesis but also states that the unity of the synthesis is prior to apperception. I have analysed these complex statements in Chapter III in length. What is crucial in these statements is that apperception both supplies the principle of the unity of synthesis and requires that the synthesis take place prior to it. It both grounds the unity of synthesis and is grounded in the synthesis that it itself grounds. Both the synthesis of imagination and apperception presuppose each other. This relation between apperception and imagination, which at first sight seems contradictory, is the result of the fact that apperception as mere spontaneity, cannot involve any receptive moment and cannot accomplish the unification. As spontaneity it posits the requirement of the unity and the forms of the unity but it itself requires the synthesis of imagination, which accomplishes the actual unification of the manifold. As mere spontaneity it cannot take up the manifold into itself and unite it as its own. In this sense, it requires the synthesis of imagination that takes the manifold up and unites it in accordance with the form of the unity that it posits. Imagination can accomplish this actual unification of the manifold since it is both receptive; takes up the manifold and spontaneous; unites it in accordance with the unity of apperception. Only after this unification of the manifold by the synthesis of imagination that apperception can reflect the unity of the manifold and call it as its own (mine). In this sense, the unity of apperception is dependent on the synthesis of imagination, but also the synthesis of imagination depends on apperception, since its synthesis must conform to the forms of unity supplied by apperception. In this regard the unity of apperception and the synthesis of imagination function as a structural whole. This structural whole is nothing, but the understanding. Kant defines understanding as “the unity of apperception in its relation to synthesis of imagination” (A119). Defined in this way, understanding is not one of the sources of knowledge but it is the result yielded by the complementary

relation between apperception and the synthesis of imagination. This clarifies that imagination belongs to understanding and it's being the third thing does not consist in it's being a distinct faculty from understanding lying somewhere in between understanding and sensibility.

But, understanding does not only involve imagination as its structural component, it also involves apperception. So, abstracted from the synthesis of imagination that it involves, it is the apperceptive thought as the faculty of concepts. As mere spontaneity it produces the combination of concepts in order to form complex concepts or judgments. Due to this nature of understanding, I have made a distinction between two senses of understanding: understanding in its narrower sense as the apperceptive thought in isolation from the synthesis of imagination and understanding in its broader sense including the synthesis of imagination, that is , the understanding defined as "the unity of apperception in its relation to synthesis of imagination". These two senses of understanding correspond to two definitions of categories given by Kant: pure concepts as forms of thought, that is, as the logical forms correspond to understanding as mere apperceptive thought and categories as the a priori modes containing the necessary unity of the synthesis of imagination in respect to all possible appearances corresponds to understanding in its inclusive sense. What is crucial is that understanding as apperceptive thought and categories as pure concepts cannot supply knowledge, since they lack the content. If Kant defines understanding as the faculty of knowledge and categories as the conditions of experience, it is the understanding that includes the synthesis of imagination. In this regard imagination is the actuating force of understanding and becomes the ground of all experience and knowledge.

But imagination, although it conforms to the unity of apperception and forms a structural whole with it as to yield understanding also belongs to sensibility; what it produces is always sensible. Although Kant puts in the deduction that the synthesis

of imagination takes place in intuition and unites the manifold into a singular representation, which is nothing but the intuition, it is not worked well enough. Kant deals with this relation of sensibility and the synthesis of imagination in the **Schematism**. Kant puts the problem of Schematism as the problem of the subsumption of intuitions under categories and raises the question “how is it possible?” In formulating this question he turns to the distinction between sensibility and understanding as two heterogeneous faculties. The how question arises from the heterogeneity between categories and appearances and states that the application of categories to appearances, or the subsumption of appearances under categories require that there be a third thing, which is homogeneous both with the categories and with the appearances. This third thing will suffice the homogeneity of categories and appearances by being both sensible and intellectual. This third thing is nothing but the schema defined as transcendental time determination. It is homogeneous with the category since category constitutes its unity and homogeneous with appearances since time, as the universal form of all appearances, is contained in every empirical intuition. In my reading of **Schematism** I have resisted interpreting schema as analogous to conceptual representation and emphasised its intuitive character. My reason in doing this was the two features of schema as given by Kant: schema as product of imagination and schema as transcendental time determination. Given these definitions of schema I concluded that it must be an intuitive representation. Kant also defines schema as the formal conditions of sensibility to which the employment of category is restricted. I have argued that these formal conditions of sensibility cannot be the “designation of concepts by accompanying sensible signs” as Kant rejects in *Critique of Judgment*, but they must be intuitive representations if they are products of imagination. From this I concluded that the process of schematism is a process of sensibilisation. It is sensibilisation both in the sense that it is the intuitive presentation of the unity

thought in the categories and insofar as this intuitive unity is the formal condition of sensibility it is sensibilisation in the sense that it makes the range within which objects become intuitable, that is, the range within which objects appear. In this sense schema provides the manner in which things are given to us. This is to equate schema with pure intuition, which in the **Aesthetic** is defined as the form of sensibility. If schema is an intuitive representation and if it is pure, that is, void of all empirical content as Kant defines it, then it must be pure intuition and given that Kant identifies pure intuition and form of sensibility in the **Aesthetic**, schema is the form of sensibility.

This entails a re-reading of the **Transcendental Aesthetic**, which defined sensibility as mere receptivity, and indicates the manifestation of a spontaneous activity in receptivity. In the **Aesthetic** Kant defines space and time as single unified wholes preceding their parts. This is the very definition of intuition for Kant. In the deduction he has declared that space and time as unities presuppose a synthesis of imagination, and this unity that is made possible by the synthesis of imagination does not belong to concepts and does not belong to senses but belongs to space and time as pure intuitions. If so, we have two definitions of sensibility: sensibility as mere receptivity, and sensibility as including the synthesis of imagination. And corresponding to these two definitions of sensibility we have two definitions of form of sensibility. In its first aspect, sensibility is “the capacity... for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected” (A19/B33) and the form of sensibility in this sense is the form of mere intuiting, that is, the mere capacity to take in the given. But sensibility is also the capacity by which we intuit the given in certain relations, and the form of sensibility as Kant defines it in the **Aesthetic** is that, which “allows the appearances in being ordered in certain relations” (A20/B34). In this sense, sensibility is not mere receptivity but also the capacity to order what we receive in space and time. In this sense, form of sensibility is the capacity to yield

intuitions related to an object. Intuitions, which Kant first defined as mere given elements, are indeed products of the synthesis of imagination. Sensibility, which yields intuitions, is composed of sense and imagination. In this sense imagination belongs to sensibility and it is the actuating force behind it.

Given that it is the same synthesis of imagination that both belongs to sensibility and understanding, it becomes that sensibility and understanding are not two distinct heterogeneous faculties. They can be viewed as two heterogeneous elements if they are abstracted from the synthesis of imagination, this time they are mere sense and apperception. But neither sense nor thought has anything to do with the knowledge apart from their unification in schema. What is crucial at this point is that they do not stand in isolation waiting to be combined externally with the synthesis of imagination. We never have mere sensations waiting to be combined, or mere forms of thought waiting to be applied to the given. They always stand in unity in schema and apart from their fundamental unity they are dead abstractions. In this sense imagination is the common root of sensibility and understanding as the actuating force that gives life to sense and thought as elements of knowledge. But still, I hesitate to call imagination as the common root of sense and thought as Heidegger does. Imagination cannot be reduced to sense and thought; it is not mere receptivity or mere spontaneity; it is both spontaneous and receptive at the same time. But still, neither sense nor thought can be reduced to imagination. Space and time in which we apprehend objects are products of imagination, but our imagination does not freely create them on its own right. They potentially lie in our receptivity; imagination actualises these potential forms and turns them into the forms in which we apprehend objects in certain relations. And categories contain their schema due to the synthesis of imagination, but they are not themselves derivable from the nature of time itself. They are the pure forms of thought irreducible to the modes of time. Although they are fundamentally unified in imagination as to give rise to

knowledge, imagination is not the original unity preceding them, but rather it is still a supervenient unity. Imagination is not the original unity that precedes the moments it will unite, but rather it supervenes on them. What is important here is that, the forms of thought and the forms of mere intuiting are not the forms of imagination. Imagination lacks its forms, but makes these forms to operate conjointly possible by producing schema.

What imagination makes possible in its gathering diverse formal requirements together is the experience itself. Imagination does not unite sense and thought in itself but in the object. Imagination, by producing the formal condition of sensibility in accordance with the categories provides the range within which objects can be apprehended and be known. What imagination produces as the unity of two formal requirements is the unity of time. At this point, in **Schematism**, Kant no more calls these objects intuitions or appearances. Now they are phenomena, which are already categorically determined in their apprehension under the form of time. The talk of intuition and appearance is abandoned, since they were introduced as tools for the purpose of analysis. We do not apprehend appearances as being the undetermined empirical intuition, but we apprehend real objects as phenomena being already categorically determined. In this sense the unity of time as the universal condition of appearances becomes the universal condition of experience and objectivity. It is not the condition of mere appearance, but the condition of their being known. But this unity of time under which we apprehend objects is an imaginative unity produced by the pure synthesis of imagination. This makes imagination with its time-forming activity in producing schema the essential building block of Kant's "Copernican Revolution": objects must conform to our conditions of knowing them and they can so conform by being apprehended under temporal relations. This is to say that they conform to form of unity produced by imagination. In this sense, imagination makes the objectivity of the objects possible. But in doing

this, imagination conceals itself; it generates time, but time in itself cannot be perceived. We perceive the objects in time, in temporal relations, but we cannot perceive time and our act of generating time. Imagination makes the representation of objects possible, but cannot represent its own act of representing. If it could represent time itself and its act of generating time, this would turn it into an intellectual intuition. But human beings are not capable of intellectual intuition. Time in itself is nothing; it is the form of our apprehending objects. Imagination by producing the formal unity of the field of experience through its time-forming activity makes objects for us possible and in concealing its own act it makes us humans.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Allison, Henry A., *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, Yale University Press, Michigan, 1983.
- _____ "Kant's Transcendental Humanism", *Monist*, 55, 1971, pp. 183-207.
- _____ "Reflections on the B-Deduction", *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXV Supplement, 1986, pp. 1-15.
- _____ "Where Have all the Categories Gone? Reflections on Longuenesse's Reading of Kant's Transcendental Idealism", *Inquiry*, 43, 2000, pp. 67-80.
- Beiser, Frederick C., *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte*, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1987.
- Bell, David, "The Art of Judgment", *Mind*, 96, 1983, pp.221-244.
- Bennet, Jonathan, *Kant's Analytic*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1966.
- Bowles, Brian Hansford, "Sensibility and Transcendence in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics", *Philosophy Today*, Winter 2000, pp. 347-365.
- Brann, Eva, T. H. *The World of Imagination*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Maryland, 1991.
- Carid, Edward, *The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, Vol. I, James Maclehose and Sons, Glasgow, 1909.
- Casey, Edward S., *Imagining, A Phenomenological Study*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2000.
- Freyberg, Bernard, *Imagination and Depth in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Literature and the Sciences of Man, Peter Lang, New York, 1994.
- Gashe, Rudolphe, "Leaps of Imagination", in *The Path of Archaic Thinking*, edited by Kenneth Maly, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1995.
- Gibbons, Sarah, *Kant's Theory of Imagination*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999.
- Guyer, Paul, "Kant on Apperception and A Priori Synthesis" *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 17, 1980, pp. 205-212.

- _____. *Identität und Objektivität* in *Journal of Philosophy*, 76, 1979, pp. 151-167.
- _____. *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987.
- Heidegger, Martin, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. Richard Taft, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1997.
- _____. *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Indiana University Press, Indiana, 1997.
- Heimsoeth, Heinz, "Metaphysical Motives in the Development of Critical Idealism", in *Kant: Disputed Questions*, ed. Moltke Gram, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1967.
- Henrich, Dieter, "The Proof Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction", *Review of Metaphysics*, 22, 1969, pp. 640-659.
- Kant, Immanuel, "Dissertation on the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World", in *Kant's Inaugural Dissertation and Early Writings on Space*, trans. John Handyside, Hyperion Press, Connecticut, 1979.
- _____. *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. Viktor Lyle Dowdell, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 1996.
- _____. *Critique of Judgment*, trans. Werner Pluhar, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1987.
- _____. *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, St Martin's Press, New York, 1965.
- _____. *Kritik Der Reinen Vernunft*, in *Kants Werke Akademie Textausgabe IV*, Walter de Gruyter&Co. Berlin, 1968.
- _____. *Lectures on Metaphysics*, trans. Karl Ameriks, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001.
- _____. *Logic*, trans. Robert Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz, Dover Publications, New York, 1974.
- Kearney, Richard, *The Wake of Imagination*, Routledge, London, 1998.
- Kirkland, Frank, "Apperception and Combination: Some Kantian Problems", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. XLIX, No. 3, 1989, pp. 447-461.
- Kolb, Daniel C., "Thought and Intuition in Kant's Critical System", *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 24, 1986, pp. 223-241.

- Llewelyn, John, *The HypoCritical Imagination*, Warwick Studies in European Philosophy, Routledge, London, 2000.
- Longuenesse, Beatrice, "Kant's Categories and the Capacity to Judge: Responses to Henry Allison and Sally Sedwick" *Inquiry*, 43, 2000, pp. 91-110.
- _____. *Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of Critique of Pure Reason*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1998.
- Makkreel, Rudolf A., *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994.
- Mensch, James, "Temporalization as the Trace of the Subject", *Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung, Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001, Vol. II, pp. 409-417.
[http://www.stfx.ca/people/jmensch/Temporalization as the Trace of the Subject.doc](http://www.stfx.ca/people/jmensch/Temporalization%20as%20the%20Trace%20of%20the%20Subject.doc)
- Moltke, S. Gram, "Kant on Intellectual Intuition: The Continuity Thesis", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 42, 1981, pp. 287-304.
- _____. *Kant, Ontology & the A Priori*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1968.
- Norman, Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003.
- Paton, H.J., "Is Transcendental Deduction a Patchwork?", in *Kant: Disputed Questions*, ed. Moltke S. Gram, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1967, pp.62-91.
- _____. *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience*, Volume I, George Allen&Unwin Ltd, London, 1970.
- _____. *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience*, Volume II, George Allen&Unwin Ltd, London, 1970.
- _____. "The Key to Kant's Deduction of the Categories", in *Kant: Disputed Questions*, ed. Moltke Gram, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1967.
- Pippin, Robert, "The Schematism and Empirical Concepts", in *Immanuel Kant Critical Assessments*, Vol. II, Edited by Ruth Chadwick and Clive Cazeaux, Routledge, London, 1992.
- _____. *Idealism as Modernism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997.
- Ricoeur, Paul, *Fallible Man*, trans. C.A. Kelbley, Fordham Press, New York, 1986.

- Robinson, Hoke, "Intuition and Manifold in Transcendental Deduction", *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 22, 1984, pp. 403-412.
- "Inner Sense and the Leningrad Reflexion", *International Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol.XXIX, No. 3, Issue No. 115, 1989, pp. 271-279.
- Rundell, John, "Creativity and Judgment" in *Rethinking Imagination*, ed. Gillian Robinson and John Rundell, Routledge, New York, 1994.
- Sallis, John, *Spacings-of Reason and Imagination*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987.
- Sallis, John, *The Gathering of Reason*, Ohio University Press, Ohio, 1980.
- *Force of Imagination*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2000.
- Schaper, Eva, "Kant on Imagination", *Philosophical Forum*, 2, 1970, pp. 430-445.
- "Kant's Schematism Reconsidered", *Review of Metaphysics*, 18, 1964, pp. 267-292.
- Schrader, George, "The Philosophy of Existence", in *The Philosophy of Kant and Our Modern World*, ed. Charles W. Hendel, The Liberal Arts Press, New York, 1957.
- Sedwick, Sally, "Longuenesse on Kant and the Priority of the Capacity to Judge", *Inquiry*, 43, 2000, pp. 81-90.
- Seung, T.K., "Kant's Conception of the Categories", *Review of Metaphysics*, 43, 1989, pp. 107-132.
- Shereover, Charles M., *Heidegger, Kant & Time*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1972.
- Smith, Norman Kemp, *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003.
- Vaihinger, Hans, "The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the First Edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*" in *Kant: Disputed Questions*, ed. Moltke S. Gram, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1967, pp. 23-61.
- Walsh, W. H., *Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1975.
- Warnock, Mary, *Imagination*, University of California Press, Berkeley.
- Westpal, Kenneth R., "Kant, Hegel and "the" Fate of Intuitive Intellect", in *The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy*, ed. Sally Sedgwick, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000.

Wolff, Robert Paul, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1969.

Woods, M., "Kant's Transcendental Schematism", *Dialectica*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1983, pp. 201-220.

Young, Michael J., "Functions of Thought and the Synthesis of Intuitions", in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, ed. Paul Guyer, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1992.

_____ "Kant's View of Imagination", *Kant-Studien*, 79, 1988, pp. 140-164.

Zoeller, Guenter, "Making Sense Out of Inner Sense: The Kantian Doctrine as Illuminated by the Leningrad *Reflexion*", *International Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XXIX, No. 3 Issue No. 115, September 1989, pp. 263-270.