

HUSSERL'S CONCEPTION OF INTENTIONALITY
PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF NOESIS AND NOEMA

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

SERVET GÖZETLİK

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN

THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

SEPTEMBER 2003

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences.

Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam
Supervisor

Examining Comitee Members

Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam

Prof. Dr. Yasin Ceylan

Prof. Dr. Sabri Büyükdüvenci

Assoc. Prof. Dr. David Grünberg

Asst. Prof. Dr. Ertuğrul Turan

ABSTRACT

HUSSERL'S CONCEPTION OF INTENTIONALITY PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF NOESIS AND NOEMA

Gözetlik, Servet

Ph. D., Department of Philosophy

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam

September 2003, 226 pages

Husserl's phenomenology can be analyzed simply by relying on the conception of intentionality. What I want to do is to put forward the logical grounds on which I can construct an acceptable account of Husserl's theory of intentionality. For this aim, firstly, I need to put some light on the nature of intentional acts or experiences. This suggests us that there is a close connection between the acts and what they are directed towards. Actually many have specified the relation between the act and the object, but what they have ignored was to give an exclusive explication of how such a relation can be connected with the content component.

The phenomenological content mediates between the intentional act and the intended object. There are some disagreements as regards whether the act is also directed towards the content or not. One of the significant aims of this research is to shed some light on the adequate arguments by which I will try to clarify that one can speak of such a directedness of intentional acts. In other words I believe that one can not only describe an intentional relation between the act and the intended object but also similar relations between the act and the content.

There seem to be three parts to be examined interconnectedly: these, namely, are act, content and the object. For, the act is directed towards the object with the intermediation of the content. So his theory is not the same as the object theory of intentionality of which there are some defenders. Husserl's content theory is firstly examined in *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas* respectively.

Keywords: Husserl, Intentionality, Intention, Intentional Content, Ideal Unity, Real Content, Specific Determination, Noesis and Noema

ÖZ

**HUSSERL'İN YÖNELMİŞLİK KAVRAMI
NOESİS VE NOEMA KAVRAMLARININ FENOMENOLOJİK
ÇÖZÜMLEMESİ**

Gözetlik, Servet

Doktora, Felsefe Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam

Eylül 2003, 226 Sayfa

Husserl'in fenomenolojisi yönelmişlik kavramına dayanarak analiz edilebilir. Başarmak istediğim şey, Husserl'in yönelmişlik kavramının kabul edilebilir bir çözümlemesini mantıksal temeller üzerinde yeniden inşa etmektir. Bu amaçla, öncelikle yönelimsel edimler ya da deneyimler üzerine ışık tutmalıyım. Bu bize yönelimsel edimler ile neye yöneldikleri arasında yakın bir bağlantı olduğu gerçeğine götürür. Aslında, biçokları yönelimsel edim ile

nesnesi arasındaki ilişkiyi vurgulamışlardır, fakat gözden kaçırdıkları şey böyle bir ilişkinin anlam ögesiyle nasıl ilişkilendirileceğinin geniş bir açıklamasını vermemektedir.

Fenomenolojik anlam yönelimsel edim ile yönelinen nesne arasında aracılık eder. Yönelimsel edimin fenomenolojik anlama yönelip yönelmediği konusunda bazı uzlaşmazlıklar vardır. Bu çalışmanın en önemli amaçlarından birisi yönelimsel edimlerin böyle bir yönelmişliğini tartışanların argümanlarına ışık tutmaktır. Başka bir deyişle, sadece yönelimsel edim ile yönelinen nesne arasında değil aynı zamanda edim ile anlam arasında da benzer ilişkiler olduğuna inanıyorum.

Birbiriyle ilişkili üç kısmı gözden geçirmemiz gerekiyor: bunlar yönelimsel edim, anlam ve de objedir. Çünkü, yönelimsel edim fenomenolojik anlam aracılığı ile objeye yönelmektedir. Böylece, Husserl'in teorisi yönelmişliği nesne aracılığı ile açıklamaya çalışanları ile aynı değildir. Husserl'in fenomenolojik anlam teorisi önce *Mantıksal Soruşturmalar* ve *Ideas*' ta tartışılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Husserl, Yönelmişlik, Yönelim, Yönelimsel Anlam, Soyut Birlik, Somut anlam, Özel Belirlenim, Akıl ve Anlam

To My Father

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In particular, I am especially indebted to Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam, who served as the supervisor of my dissertation. I also wish to declare my grateful thanks to Prof. Dr. Yasin Ceylan, Prof. Dr. Sabri Büyükdüvenci, Assoc. Prof. Dr. David Grünberg and Asst. Prof. Dr. Ertuğrul Turan. To my mother, Sevim, I offer sincere thanks for her unshakable faith in me and her willingness to endure with me the vicissitudes of my endeavors. Special thanks also go to my brother who have supported my research from beginning to the end.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

The Following abbreviations are used throughout the whole text in this thesis:

LI: Husserl, E.(1970) *Logical Investigations*, vol. 1 and vol. 2, translated by J. N. Findlay, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, New York: The Humanities Press.

Ideas: Husserl, E.(1931) *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. New York: Humanities Press Inc.

CM: Husserl, E.(1973) *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, translated by Dorion Cairns, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

FTL: Husserl, E.(1978) *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, translated by Dorion Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague.

OCOP: Twardowski, K.(1977) *On the Content and Object of Presentations*, translated by R. Grossmann, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZ	v
DEDICATION	vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS	x

CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. FUNDAMENTAL REMARKS REGARDING HUSSERL'S INTENTIONALITY	
2.1. The Idea of Intentionality.....	8
2.2. The Primary Analysis of the Nature of Intentional Acts.....	14
2.3. Phenomenological Account of Intentional Relations.....	26
2.4. Definite or <i>De re</i> Intentions.....	36
3. ONTOLOGICAL CHARACTERIZATION OF THE OBJECTS OF INTENTIONS	
3.1. Incomplete Character of Transcendent Objects as the Objects of Intentional Relations.....	46
3.2. The Ontological Claims about the Objects of Intentions.....	58
3.3. The Actualization of Intention against Epoche.....	67

3.4.Individual Character of Intentions as to the Intended Object.....81

4. A MAIN DEMARCATION BETWEEN THE THEORIES OF INTENTIONALITY

4.1.Brentano’s Thesis.....94
4.2Meinong’s Theory of Intentionality; Meinongian Approach to the Ontological Status of the Objects of Acts.....106
4.3.Twardowski’s main claims as regards the Intentionality of the Act.....115
4.4.A Primary Consideration of Husserl’s Theory of Intentionality.....124

5. THE CONSTRUCTION OF HUSSERL’S THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY

5.1.An Analysis of the idea of Content in *Logical Investigations*133
5.2.An Analysis of the idea of Content in *Ideas*; Noesis and Noema.....148
5.3.The Phenomenological Components of Act’s Noema; “Sinn” and “Thetic” Aspects.....157
5.4.Acts of Perception and Its Content; Noesis and Hyle.....164

6.AN EVALUATION OF NOEMA AND ITS CONSTITUENTS

6.1.Phenomenological Significancy of the Noematic Sinn as Content.....172
6.2.The Components of Noematic Sinn; the “determinable X” and the “Predicate-Senses”.....177
6.3.The Phenomenological Characterization of the “Object as Intended”.....183
6.4.Ontological Properties applicable to the Noema of the Act.....191

7. CONCLUSIONS.....195

BIBLIOGRAPHY	198
APPENDICES; (FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE CONTENTS OF THE ACTS)	
A. Husserl’s Theory of Linguistic Reference and Meaning.....	204
B. Frege’s Notion of Sense and Reference.....	209
C. TURKISH SUMMARY	214
CURRICULUM VITAE	225

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

My main aim is to investigate the fundamental structure of the theory of “intentionality” in Husserl. In this investigation I have limited myself to the *early period of Husserl*. I have also been involved in the comparative study of the intentionality theory in both *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas*. It is also true that the intentionality theory of Husserl underwent a radical change during the preparation of the *Ideas* in which an important aspect of the phenomenology has been introduced. This aspect namely can be connected with the announcement of the notion of epoché in *Ideas*. In *Logical Investigations* Husserl formulates the intentional experiences, as the psychological entities of which there can be an empirical study. This namely becomes clear in the study in which we encounter with the Husserlian notion of the *real content* as suggested in *Logical Investigations*. Real content represents the act and its modifications. I

defend that the directedness of the intentional act does derive from the internal structure of the act of consciousness. In a more precise way, the whole argument of Husserl regarding the act's intentionality can be reduced to the investigation of the act-structure and its other components as discussed by many others. What makes an act intentional is the central constituent of the act, namely, the intentional content as suggested in *Logical Investigations*. The intentional content is introduced in distinction with the intended object. Husserl defends that beside the *intended object* we encounter with the *object as it is intended*. This latter item has become noema in *Ideas*. Husserl strongly claims that the act becomes intentional by the mediation of the noema. I also agree that the noema mediates between consciousness and the intended object. Intentional character of the noema is reinforced by the fact that it always determines an object for the act. Compared to the intentional content in *Logical Investigations*, the noema in *Ideas* became an abstract or ideal unity. Before *Ideas*, Husserl claimed that the intentional content is Species of the intentional act. That is to say, every particular act suggests an instantiation of the act-species. What has remained the unchanged throughout the time was the ideal and abstract character of the intentional content. Intentional content in *Logical Investigations* has

pointed to a further distinction between the *quality* and the *matter* of the act. The “quality” of the act implies the general kind to which it belongs. The “matter” determines the object part of the intention. In fact, Husserl seems to be using the “matter” synonymously with the content of the act. The notion of “matter” has changed into the noema of the act by means of which we are directed towards a specific object. Husserl’s theory can be called a content-dependent theory just as it is the case in the theory of Twardowski. In this connection it should be said that I identify the intentional content or noema with the *specific determination*, which we get from the intended object. Also, we argue that the noema or content-component is connected with the object part of the relation of intending. Being in agreement with Føllesdal, I support the view that the act is not directed towards the noema or content-component in virtue of which we are directed to the intended object. I also tried to establish the view that there is always an object towards which we are directed. And this object is an actual object even though it may be fictitious. So, Husserl seems to be recommending a non-familiar notion of the “actuality” which one may describe for a certain object. For Husserl, whatever we think of is the object, which may or may not exist. It is also extensively argued that the original object of the act (perception) is *the tree in the garden*.

In *Ideas* Husserl seems to suggest that the noema of the act is the same thing as the “sense” of an expression on the basis of the interconnection between Husserl and Frege. But we must say that we are not volunteer to stress the linguistic character of the mediator entity, namely, the noema. This is owing to the fact that I agree with Gurwitsch on Husserl’s original example via which he introduces the notion of noema as the *perceived as such*. So the veridical field for the definition of the act’s directedness is the sensory experience or perception. In fact, I have also tried to draw attention to the distinction between sensory and non-sensory acts in some of the arguments, which we suggested. By thinking so, I come to the adequacy of the idea that every sensory act also has a sensory content or *hyle*, which is not intentional. The hyle is the sensory surface by which one may come to a connection with the external world on the basis of the five sense organs. The sensory hyle is fulfilled by the related noema adequately or inadequately. Because of the deceptive character of the sensory experience the sensory content can not be fulfilled adequately each time. This case gives rise to the change of the related noema. It is also convenient that the related noema of the sensory experience is provided by the noetic phase or namely the noesis. Noesis suggests an “interpretive sense” by which the act becomes intentional in the sense

that we are directed towards a certain object. So, noesis in *Ideas* turns into a reduced act in connection with the introduction of the epoché. The noesis attempts to represent an ideal entity to which we have access via the reflexive acts of consciousness. In similar words, after the gainment of the reduced experience, we start to speak of the directedness of the consciousness in the realm of the noematic description.

The noematic description enables us that we can reflect back upon the act itself. Such a change of the attitude introduces the comprehensive significance of the transcendental act and its radical field in which the act gains a different meaning. In this thesis, I argue that one should make a distinction between the arguments of Husserl before and after epoché. This results from phenomenological character of the ontology of the act and its object under the significance of the epoché.

In more specific terms, in chapter II I have suggested the definition of both the intentionality and the analysis of the intentional acts. Additionally, I spoke of the central role of the intentional relations. And I argue that the intentional relations have a difference compared to the other relations. In the analysis of the intentional relations, I came to the point that even though Husserl eliminates the

empirical judgements about the objects, the object of the intentional relation is the tree in the garden.

In chapter III, firstly, I argue that the physical objects are always perceived from a certain perspective. That is to say, they are not known *wholly* and *entirely*. On the basis of this point, I come to the idea that I always gain a specific determination by which I refer to the intended object. Secondly, I suggest that Husserl's theory of intentionality is not an ontological inquiry. Husserl is not concerned with the ontological status of the intended object even though the object character has a long story on which we have put some light. Also what causes some ambiguity as regards the ontological status of the object is the presence of the epoché. According to Husserl, the final objects of the intentional relations are the tree in the garden. Even after epoché, Husserl insists on the fact that we are directed towards a natural object. Finally, I argue that the intentions have an individual character on the basis of holding that each intention presents a particular intended object. So, the method for assuming differences between the intentions is dependent upon the differences between intended objects.

Chapter IV suggests the comparison of the well-known theories of intentionality. It is specified that Husserl's theory of

intentionality is different from Meinong's and Brentano's. The only similarity between the Husserlian approach and Twardowski is the notion of content and its philosophical structure. So, both can be called a content-dependent theory.

In chapter V I have tried to establish the logical basis of the theory of Husserl. I made a comparison of the account provided in *Logical Investigations* with the account, which is available in the *Ideas*. And I clarify the other components of the act, namely the Sinn,thetic character of the act and hyletic data.

Chapter VI introduces two independent components of the content of the act, namely, "determinable X" and "predicate-senses". Finally, I concentrated on the intentional character and ontological characterization of the noematic Sinn.

CHAPTER II

FUNDAMENTAL REMARKS REGARDING HUSSERL'S INTENTIONALITY

2.1. The Idea of Intentionality

Some believe that the whole discussion of phenomenology has been developed by the argument of intentionality. As Husserl clarifies, the transcendental phenomenology is the result of the analysis of the claims on consciousness or intentional experiences. “This idea, often known as Brentano’s thesis, can be expressed by saying that one cannot believe, wish, or hope without believing or wishing something. Beliefs, wishes, desires, hopes, and the like are therefore often called “intentional states”. Contemporary philosophers sometimes describe the intentionality of mental states as their “aboutness”.¹ Actually, the very best known dictum, “every consciousness is consciousness of something”, is the implication of this assumed thought. In the traditional philosophy the investigations made on pure consciousness may lead us back to the philosophy of

Descartes. In spite of this, it is rather difficult to attribute Descartes any exclusive study of intentionality which he may possibly have done at some stage of his philosophy. It can be said that Husserl tried to characterize consciousness in terms of intentionality. Intentionality is the mind's directedness towards objects of any kind.²

Intentionality, as a fundamental property of my psychic life, is a real property belonging to me, as a man, and to every other man in respect of his purely psychic inner being.³

The term “intentionality” comes from the medieval Latin verb *intendere* (intendo). This Latin term has been translated from two Arabic terms, namely *ma'qul* and *ma'na*. Intentionality has always been considered as the characteristic of mental states (acts) like perceiving, hoping, desiring, thinking in the sense that they are directed towards an object of which we are conscious in the stream of consciousness. And this characteristic of mental acts has been used to distinguish them from physical phenomena⁴ though Husserl's aim was not to distinguish them. Husserl aimed at clarifying the structure of consciousness by means of the comprehensive study of the intending

¹ See, T.C. (1995) “Intentionality” in T. Honderich (ed.) *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, pp. 412-413

² Though not here but we shall later on concentrate on the nature of the intentional objects which can be of very different ontological kind. Indeed Husserl's theory of intentionality constitute an alternative to those, which cannot provide an answer to the intentionality of acts, which are directed towards non-existent objects.

³ See, Husserl, E. (1973) *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 82

acts⁵ and the intended objects. An investigation of this type necessarily concentrates on the phenomenological constitution of consciousness⁶ and its components. Husserl's contribution to the classical approaches seems to be that the phenomenological content is the key notion which the phenomenological structure of consciousness introduces us. Husserl assumes that it is rather difficult to describe a primary direct relation between the intending act or intentional experience and the intended object because of the complex structure of acts and their objects.⁷ In a similar way I can say that the act and the object can not be contemplated as a substance in the sense that there are some other components of both which are in association with the constitution of consciousness to which they necessarily belong.

As everyone assumes, we live in a physical world. This world introduces some separate objects of which we are conscious in different ways by way of some distinct intentional acts. In the stream of consciousness we may contemplate the existence of several intentional acts directing towards the same object. For example, we can think, love and hate or ignore the tree in the garden. Husserl says,

⁴ See, Brentano, F. (1973) *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, ed. by L.L. McAlister, translated by A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrel, and L.L. McAlister, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

⁵ See, ch. 1, 1.2 and ch. 4,5

⁶ See, ch. 4, 5

⁷ See, ch. 4, 5

Now the same die (the same for consciousness) can be intended in highly diverse modes of consciousness- simultaneously, or else successively in separated modes of consciousness- for example: in separate perceptions, recollections, expectations, valuations, and so forth.⁸

On the other hand the objects of which we are conscious comprise a broad category. In this category we can suppose the existence of physical objects, numbers, propositions and persons.⁹ By this point I come to the idea that every conscious experience is a representation of something, which has its own peculiar ontological chracterization. In fact the ontological¹⁰ status of the object is a separate subject to deal with however for the moment I will only assume the acts which have an intended object. But in this connection Husserl believes that not all mental acts are intentional. Because there are such acts as moods which are not directed towards an intended object. So it is the case that Husserl stands against Brentano's thesis that all mental phenomena are intentional.¹¹

As I said above, the intentionality can be characterized as ways of "being conscious of" or "being directed toward" some object. Husserl's own words are also helpful;so

(acts in the very wide sense of the *Logical Studies*); in so far as they are a consciousness of something they are said to be "*intentionally related*" to this something.

⁸ See, Husserl, E.(1973) *Cartesian Meditations*, p.42

⁹ See, ch. 3, 3.2

¹⁰ See, ch. 2, 2.1, 2.2

¹¹ See, ch. 3, 3.1

We must, however, be quite clear on this point that *there is no question here of a relation between a psychological event-called experience (Erlebnis)-and some other real existent (Dasein)-called object*-¹²

Actually, such an intentional relation seems to hold between two separate components, namely, the subject of the act and the intended object. It will be my central concern to deal with both, in a detailed manner, in the following sections of this chapter.¹³ At this point we can refer to some remarks which one may make regarding the intentional act of consciousness and its object. So the determination of consciousness and the natural world as separate fields to which some modifications of their own type belong goes back to the philosophy of Descartes.

Cartesianism claims that all the modifications of consciousness are subjective and mind-events. Now the connected claim of Gurwitsch¹⁴ is that it is this subjective occurrences which claims an intentional directedness towards some objects other than themselves. Namely, these subjective occurrences have traditionally been contemplated as Ideas. When considered that Ideas represent some external objects, it seems to follow that one may describe a relation between a subjective event and an external object. If when I

¹² *Ideas*, §36, p.119

¹³ See, ch. 1, 2

know an object I am not independent of Ideas, then I can claim that Ideas have a claim of “objective reference”. Such a reference has two separate claim referring to the relation of the Idea and object. The multiplicity of Ideas means that several separate Ideas can refer to the same identical object. This point has been clarified more sharply in the following words of Gurwitsch, so

Since we approach the theory of intentionality from a specific point of view- namely, the problem of the consciousness of identity,¹⁵

¹⁴ See, Gurwitsch, A. (1967) “Husserl’s Theory of the Intentionality of Consciousness in Historical Perspective” in Edward N. Lee and M. Mandelbaum (ed.) *Phenomenology and Existentialism*, pp. 25-57

¹⁵ See, Gurwitsch, A.(1984) “Husserl’s Theory of the Intentionality of Consciousness” in Hubert L. Dreyfus with Harrison Hall (ed.) *Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, pp. 59-71

2.2.The Primary Analysis of the Nature of Intentional Acts

As Phenomenology suggests, consciousness is composed of numerous components¹⁶ of either sensory or non-sensory character. However, it is the case that, for Husserl, consciousness represent the intentional acts of a wide variety. Also Husserl claims that mental acts are intentional in the sense that they are directed toward something. On the basis of this claim it becomes clear that he does not want to consider the class of intentional acts which have no an object. For this class of acts many have suggested simple emotions and sensations. Husserl strongly argues that sensations are not intentional though they play an implicit role in the intentionality of *perceptual acts*.¹⁷ As we have already noted, the recognition of the intentional act can only be accomplished by the identification of the phenomenological elements in experience. Experience can render it obvious by reflecting upon itself with the help of epoché. To put it in a similar way, in order to be able to describe the nature of intentional acts one should leave out the empirical facts relevant to the intended object to which the intentional act refers.¹⁸

¹⁶ See, ch. 4, 5

¹⁷ See, ch.4, 4.4

¹⁸ See, *Husserl and Intentionality*, p.3

The further arguments made by Smith and McIntyre is such that; if we consider perceptual acts such as seeing, hearing, smelling etc., it is conceivable that there can be cases where non-phenomenological elements can constitute the another aspect of intentional experience¹⁹; let us consider the act of seeing the tree, this intentional act relates us (the act of seeing) to the intended object, tree. Now it can be said that the intentional relation between me and the tree in the question has also a causal structure in which both the experiencer and the perceived object are involved. As an alternative solution to this difficulty we suggest that the intended tree is only a correlate²⁰ of consciousness. And this correlation does not necessarily need to be explained as a causal (physical) relation if we limit ourselves to the transcendental consciousness by referring to epoché. As I shall argue to a large extent the intentional relation between the intentional experience, the act of seeing and the intended object, the tree in the garden, is mediated by an entity called noema.²¹

Within the framework of phenomenology there are many types of intentional acts or “lived experiences”; sensory or perceptual acts such as seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, tasting, and non-

¹⁹ See, *Husserl and Intentionality*, p.4

²⁰ See, ch. 4, 5

²¹ *ibid.*

sensory acts, such as thinking, remembering, imagining, hoping, feeling, judging, loving, hating etc., and their related modifications.

Acts of consciousness include experiences of perception, judgment, phantasy, desire, emotion, volition, etc. The term “act” in Husserl’s technical sense means not a bodily action but a mental occurrence, not a state or disposition (or “attitude” in familiar analytic parlance) but an actual episode of perceiving, thinking, desiring or what have you.²²

There is also a further modification on the basis of which we can differentiate between the above mentioned mental acts. Accordingly, what distinguishes one from the other is the status of objects toward which they are directed. Indeed, in Husserl’s phenomenology the intentional acts play a fundamental role in virtue of which we become aware of the phenomenological structure of consciousness. In the stream of consciousness a wide variety of intentional acts can be characterized as intentional by referring to the mediation of an *intentional content*²³ of which I will have a comprehensive account in one of the next sections. I will suggest that not only the structure of consciousness but also the ontological status²⁴ of the objects directed will present us an intentionality of consciousness and its components.

²² See, Smith, B. And Smith, D.W (1995) “Introduction” in Barry Smith and David Woodruff Smith (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*, p. 21

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ See, ch. 1, 2

The analysis of the structure of intentional acts can provide us with the idea that the intentional acts necessarily involve some further components within their own intentional characterization. The first characterization of intentional acts is their *being conscious*. And also in the multiplicity of their occurrence it is impossible to accept a numerical identity between them. Moreover, in association with the ego to which they belong they also claim a subjective nature in the sense that one is distinguishable from another with the distinctive character of being a unique sort. Furthermore one cannot be reduced to another. By what means can one suppose the difference of an intentional act from another? As a first thing, we can mention the time of occurrence at which it takes place. Secondly, there is a differentiation referring to the subjects of the intentional acts. That is to say, one may even distinguish between two tokens of my act of seeing the tree in the garden on the basis of the fact that though there is an intimate relation between them, these are different representations of their objects. In fact there is a theoretical difference between my two acts; namely, a cognitive value they may have will not be identical. Because there is such an argument that to know an object (my act of seeing the tree in the garden) epistemologically is not to have an idea of the object as the traditional epistemology

suggests. Because the act of knowing or intentional experience can also be regarded as a natural phenomenon. However we are not speaking of the validity of “naturalized epistemology”.

Indeed it is necessary to mention that Husserl takes intentional acts as psychological *real* temporal events taking place in the stream of consciousness.

Every subjective process has its internal temporality. If it is a conscious process in which (as in the perception of the die) a worldly object appears as cogitatum, then we have to distinguish the objective temporality that appears (for example: the temporality of this die) from the “internal temporality of the appearing (for example: that of the die-perceiving).²⁵

But the characterization of intentional acts as psychological events does not give us the right to conclude that the consciousness and its acts are totally empirical. This is because of the fact that the transcendental epoché shows that the transcendental pure ego has a superiority over the other characterizations of the ego and its acts.

The new insights concerning the pure ego to which Husserl had come between 1900 and 1913, and to which he merely alluded in the second edition of *Logical Investigations*, are developed in greater detail in the first volume of *Ideas*. Husserl there states, in agreement with Natorp, that the pure ego belongs necessarily to every actual experience insofar as the ego’s “glance” goes through every actual experience toward the object.²⁶

²⁵ See, Husserl, E. (1973) *Cartesian Meditations*, p.41

²⁶ See, Kockelmans, Joseph J. (1977) “Husserl and Kant on the Pure Ego” in Frederick A. Elliston and Peter MC Cormick (ed.), *Husserl, Expositions and Appraisals*, p. 272

The idea of pure ego suggests that the consciousness and its all constituents are devoid of naturalistic or empirical assumptions. If so, I can also point to an ambiguity in which Husserl seems to be largely involved. According to this view, on the one hand Husserl claims that the consciousness and its acts are empirical facts on the other hand exclusively he stresses on the necessity of the transcendental pure ego which is gained from the internal structure of epoché. Relatively, the epoché²⁷ has two separate task to achieve; so, firstly it puts in brackets the existential status of the intended object, secondly it enables us the determination of *acts of reflection* by which the *intentional content*²⁸ of the acts becomes available. Actually, the intentionality of the act of consciousness is established by the epoché. For epoché reveals the availability of the factual and non-factual or phenomenological components of the transcendental pure ego. Transcendental reduction wants to open up a way to investigate the pure ego and its acts. Now as I have already pointed out, there are two ways to deal with the consciousness and its acts; so, firstly we can regard the acts and act-structures²⁹ as directed upon the intended object, or secondly one may think of the act-structures in terms of the

²⁷ See, ch. 2, 2.3

²⁸ See, ch. 4, 5

²⁹ *ibid.*

further act-components which makes the act intentional. Act-structure is a complex structure and its intentionality is completely formulated by its own intrinsic phenomenological character.

A further investigation of the act-structure suggests that there seems to be two distinguishable accounts that one may take into consideration. These, namely, are present in the two volumes of *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas*. So, without getting into the details of these considerations there, I can make some general remarks which can also apply to the intentional act-structures. Following a Husserlian line of reasoning, I can say that the intentionality of act constructs a ground on which we may establish an intimate relation between the act-structure and the *intentional* or *phenomenological content*.³⁰ Indeed, a possible consideration, that the act-structure and the intentional content is distinguishable but not separate, is consistent with the Husserlian view, as I shall clarify later on.³¹ To simplify the matter I can conceive that the determination of the intentional content of the act-structures remains within the limitations of the acts again. In other words, the act-structure and the intentional content comprise a whole, by which we account for the intentionality of an act of

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

consciousness. To put it in a similar way, what makes an act intentional is still found within the limits of the act-structure. From this I can conclude that the act and the act-structures are intentional in their own side. One can even go so far as to say that the intentionality of the act do not need a direct relation with the intended object which presumably is a natural individual. On this ground I can claim that the intentional content *in general* is part of the act-structure of consciousness.³² Here, by the intentional content I understand an independent ingredient, by which one may count the act as intentional. Also, in the remarks made above I was independent of the consideration of the intentional content in *Logical Investigations* as act-unity. So, if the act and the intentional content is involved in the same act-structure, then I have the right to conclude that they will also be considered as belonging to the same ontological type. In fact Husserl conceives that they are of a different ontological type. Because he claims that the intentional acts are real temporal parts of consciousness while the intentional contents are either universal or essences, or abstract entities as claimed in *Ideas*.

As seen above, there is not a direct relation of the intentional act to the intended object. To conceive consciousness as

³² Ibid.

that of something is resulted from the phenomenological structure of the act to which I have referred as the intentional content.³³ However, it is not true to say that the intentionality of an act is accomplished by a single entity. For, later on, I shall speak³⁴ of some further components that make the act intentional. It becomes clear that I am in a need of making a sharp distinction between the act and the intended object towards which it is intentionally directed. The intended object is independent of the act-structure where the intentionality of the act of consciousness is phenomenologically characterized with its own distinguishing character. The intentional relation between the act and the intended object is established by the phenomenological structure of the act. As have been seen, this structure of the act assumes a different entity, namely, the intentional content³⁵, by which the act becomes intentional. I can also characterize the intended object as the only entity which is not involved in the mind *in the general sense of the word*. According to Husserl, the “of-ness” or “aboutness” of the intentional act is not resulted from the presence of the intended object before the mind. Instead, the *acts of reflection* by epoché reveals that there is a structure of the acts where one may speak of the directedness

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

of the consciousness and its further components. And it can be remembered that although the act is real, the intended object may not be so. However, Husserl seems to be imposing a sort of actuality on the intended object when it is even an unreal object. So the actuality of the object is not determined by referring to the real properties it has. Instead, one phenomenologically assigns to it an actuality which does not need to share the same criteria as the objects existing in the physical world. One may even read Husserl as claiming that the hallucinated tree is not completely different from the tree in the garden. As one can assume, Husserl suspends judgment regarding the empirical facts that characterize the existence of the intended object as existing in physical nature.

The distinguishing characteristic of doubting is that it annuls the positing of an object's existence or the validity of a judgment. But this annulment is not a negation; doubt does not transform the positing into its opposite, into the denial of the existence of the object or the validity of the judgment. Instead, the positing remains as a positing in Question. The natural attitude, as we have seen, is characterized by a universal positing of an existent world and valid cognition. The attempt to doubt universally, therefore, is the attempt to call this universal positing into question, to hold it reflectively in front of oneself as a positing whose possible validity is to be examined. In other words, our affirmation is suspended; our participation in the positing is "disconnected", and along with this, the transcendent world and its objects are "bracketed".³⁶

So the only actuality or factuality one may speak of the intended object is made possible by referring to the phenomenological

³⁶ See, Drummond, John. J (1990) *Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism; Noema and Object*, p. 47

structure of the act and its constituents. But I should also not be involved in the supposition that the physical world does not exist. For Husserl clearly states that as the Cartesian philosophy suggests, the external world does exist independently of us. All Husserl maintains is that one may speak of the intended object and its real properties by remaining within the limitations of the transcendental ego. With a phrase of Husserl's later philosophy, I can state that the intended object is *constituted* in consciousness with all significant phenomenological properties. In fact, there is another idea of Husserl which seems to support this conclusion; so, Husserl thinks, I can never know a physical object with all the properties it has. In other words, I know the tree from a certain aspect which does not include all possible judgements defining the tree as it is in itself. Such a characterization of the intended object, in fact, becomes clear in the phenomenological perception of the tree in the garden. For there is not an one-to-one correspondence between the intentional act and the intended object in the sense that one and the same object can need a multiplicity of intentional acts, which are essential to the perception of the object. I can think, imagine, love or see the tree in the garden. One can even suppose a differentiation between the intentional acts *of the same type* without thinking of the differences between the objects they are

directed upon. Consequently, it can be said that phenomenology tries to build up a ground where, as Husserl assumed, one may speak of the intentional relation between the act and the intended object. All the following considerations of intentionality will aim to do this to a certain extent.

2.3. Phenomenological Account of Intentional Relations

Actually, there are two ways of speaking of the intentionality of intentional acts or experiences. One is to emphasize the directedness of intentional acts towards the entities of a certain sort. The other is to describe an intentional relation between an act and the object by depending upon the phenomenological characteristics of the relation. It is possible to say that perhaps to call intentional relation a genuine relation holding between two individual would not be true. So, I am coming to the idea that one may suppose a differentiation between the intentional relations and other relations. An adequate characterization of the difference seems to depend on the ontological kind of the object towards which the intentional act is directed. In spite of that, it is true that intentional relation is a kind of relation which always requires the contribution of conscious part of the subject or experience, namely, consciousness. As Smith and McIntyre points out³⁷, the intentional relations are different from non-intentional or ordinary relations. The difference, mainly, is dependent upon the ontological status of the objects upon which the acts of relation are directed. From the point of Husserl intentional relations are directed upon physical objects or

concrete individuals. But many others have assumed that what is peculiar to the intentional relations is that they are directed towards unusual objects which are quite distinct from ordinary objects.

Smith and McIntyre³⁸ claim that there are two distinguishing points that give a kind of peculiarity to the intentional relations. So, “intentional relations....are independent of the existence of objects to which they relate conscious subjects, and are in each case dependent on a particular conception of the intended object”.³⁹ Let us briefly clarify these two properties of intentional relations; the “existence-independence” characteristic of intentional relations simply assumes that the object towards which the intentional act of relations are directed *do not need exist*. In order to strengthen this claim I can refer to Husserl’s own words in *Logical Investigations, V*;

If this experience is present, then, *eo ipso* and through its own essence (we must insist), the intentional ‘relation’ to an object is achieved, and an object is ‘intentionally present’; these two phrases mean precisely the same. And of course such an experience may be present in consciousness together with its intention, although its object does *not exist at all*, and is perhaps incapable of existence.⁴⁰

As the above passage suggests, for Husserl, the ontological status of objects of intentional relations is distinct from the objects of non-intentional relations. Such a line of argument seems to

³⁷ See, D.W. Smith and R. McIntyre, *Husserl and Intentionality*, p.10

³⁸ See, *Husserl and Intentionality*, pp. 10-11

suggest that even when the intended object is absurd or fictitious, there will be a describable intentional relation between the act and the intended object towards which the act is directed. Let us consider the acts, the act of seeing the red table standing over there and the act of seeing the red tree(in the sense of seeing the redness via a natural individual). Now for the first act Husserl would suggest an intentional relation which holds between the act of seeing and the intended object, namely, the red table. But equally for him the second act of seeing is also considered as directed towards the red tree as its object. The only difference one may describe between these two acts is that the second act is directed towards another phenomenological determination of the tree in the garden. In fact one may characterize the red tree as the one that has different properties from the natural individual I perceive as it is in the physical world. This idea partly clarifies that I can have different determinations or intentions of one and the same object.

Consequently, in discussing intentional relations, we must say more than “ S intends x,” where “x” names an object without qualification. We must say instead that “S intends x-as-y,” where “y” identifies the particular aspect under which we intend x.⁴¹

³⁹ See, *Husserl and Intentionality*, p.11

⁴⁰ See, *LI*, V, §11, p. 558

⁴¹ See, Drummond, John (1990) *Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism; Noema and Object*, p. 12

This is what Smith and McIntyre meant by the “conception dependency” of intentional relations.⁴² They hold that intentional relations depend on a certain conception which we may have of the intended object. This idea maintains that I may conceive one and the same entity in many different ways. This conclusion leads us to the fact that a certain object may have different determination or ways of characterization under which they become the object of intentional relations.

Adequately, one can identify a relevant way of shedding some light on these two characteristics of intentional relations. As is known, phenomenology aims to be built up as a rigorous science with its own applicable eidetic laws. According to a possible view, the uniqueness of intentional relations can be characterized on the basis of the objects intended in the acts. According to Husserl, the intended object of an act is the tree in the garden. But there seems to arise a difficulty concerning the involvement of the tree as the intended object of the intentional relations. Because it is clear that Husserl eliminates the tree and the existential judgements about it from the true nature of phenomenological description of the object. So, it seems that there are two independent notions of the intended object in

⁴² See, *Husserl and Intentionality*, pp. 13-15

Husserl; according to this view, the first conception of the intended object supposes the existence of the tree as existing in physical nature. The second conception refers to the tree which is phenomenologically constituted in consciousness.

...it allows us to say that there is an object of intentional reference even in those cases where there is clearly no object in actuality. While the presentation which is associated with expressions such as “Jupiter” has no object in actuality, we nonetheless present *something* in this case, namely a particular (immanent) object.⁴³

In spite of this, it is possible to say that the intended object is *transcendent* to consciousness. In fact this view is supported by the fact that epoché itself can construct a phenomenological domain where one may still speak of the tree in the garden. Husserl clearly states that,

Together with the whole physical and psychical world the real subsistence of the objective relation between perception and perceived is suspended; *and yet a relation between perception and perceived is obviously left over* (my italic).⁴⁴

If one supposes that there is a difference between the actual objective relation and the intentional relation, then I should take one of these relations as the main type of relation to which Husserl possibly refers. As far as I can say, it seems that even though Husserl assumes the independent existence of physical objects, that is, the tree

⁴³ See, Rollinger, Robin D. (1999) *Husserl's Position in the School of Brentano*, p. 51

⁴⁴ *Ideas*, §88, p. 259

in the garden, I have no a direct access to them due to that the class of physical objects constitute a separate field from that of consciousness. At this point one may raise the question, can Husserl be taken as a Naïve Realist, holding that I have a direct access to the ordinary objects to which not a sceptical approach is applicable? This view suggests that I have an epistemological access to the tree in the garden without assuming that there is some other components accompanying the perception of the tree. Let us remember the specification that the object of perception, for Husserl, is the tree itself, so there may be a case where I may consider Husserl as holding the above point. But my crucial point is different. Namely that on one occasion Husserl speaks of the intuitive presence of the physical object which can only be involved in an actual relation, on other occasions he seems to suggest a notion of consciousness which is intentionally directed to the intended object in a different way. So, I am coming to the conclusion that the intentional experience and its intentional relation introduce a different notion of object, that some attempted to call it *intentional object*.⁴⁵

If epoché is right, then it is acceptable that one is left with the object which our consciousness provides for the directedness of

⁴⁵ See, ch. 2, 2.2

intentional acts. By the epoché Husserl is involved in a different case in which he has to be able to construct the intentionality of consciousness without appealing to the intended object. So, it can be said that for Husserl, phenomenology is not concerned with the ontological⁴⁶ basis of the intended object. Instead, he has to focus on the act-structure by which he may account for the intentionality of an act of consciousness. This idea in fact points to the fact that what makes an act directed towards the object is the mediation of the intentional content⁴⁷ rather than the intuitive presence of the intended object. There is a related point made by Husserl, that he seems to have ignored the difference between the existent and non-existent objects. For Husserl seems to have thought of both as the adequate correlate of consciousness in the sense of being an object. This is due to the fact that Husserl does not deal with the actuality or non-actuality of the intended objects, instead he aims to clarify the basis where how they become the object of an act of consciousness. So, even if the intended object does not exist, Husserl still takes the act as intentional in the sense that it is directed towards an object. As have been pointed out, what makes an act intentional is not the intended object which is

⁴⁶ *ibid.*

⁴⁷ See, ch. 4, 5

distinct from the act of consciousness. The independency of the intended object from the act is also considered by the fact that it is put in bracket by epoché. From the above remarks it becomes clear that the intentionality of an act of consciousness is not dependent upon the intended object. Let us refer to Husserl own words as regards the point I made above, so

In the very essence of an experience lies determined not only *that*, but also *whereof* it is a consciousness, and in what determinate or indeterminate sense it is this.⁴⁸

The idea in the above passage seems to be that the intentionality of an act of consciousness derives from the intentional experience itself rather than the presence of the intended object. Even before epoché, Husserl seems to be involved in the maintenance that his theory of intentionality is not concerned with the existence or non-existence of the intended object.⁴⁹ If this is so, then I may point to a difficulty here; Husserl clearly asserts that the object of perception is the tree in the garden. If so, on what ontological ground one may speak of the tree as the thing existing in the nature. Or does the perception not require the actual existence of the tree towards which we are directed? As long as one does not make a distinction between

⁴⁸ *Ideas*, §36, p. 120

⁴⁹ See, ch. 3, 3.2

the theory of perception and that of intentionality, then the above question seems to be indispensable. But a separation of one from the other shows the expediency of the claim held by Husserl. Accordingly, in the next section I shall investigate the theories of intentionality which focus on the existence conditions of the object of the act. Namely, Brentano and Meinong⁵⁰ question the details of the existential status of the object towards which we are directed.

Let us remember the conclusion, I reached above, that the intentional experience and its intentional relation suggests a different notion of object called intentional object. As a first thing, I can affirm that there is a sense in which Husserl seems to be speaking of only the intentional objects which stand in a certain relation to consciousness. By intentional object I mean *what is conceptually present* to consciousness without appealing to the empirical determination for which a certain actuality is required. Although Husserl himself does not need such a distinction within the framework of his philosophy, I shall refer to this classification of the objects for a better understanding of the account of Husserl ideas. Husserl sometimes refers to intentional object as the entity which accounts for the intentionality of the act of consciousness. Namely, this is to be

⁵⁰ See, ch. 3, 3.1, 3.2

thought of as the intentional content in virtue of which the act becomes intentional.

2.4. Definite or *De re* Intentions

Although I have attempted to characterize intentionality of an act as a sort of relation between the consciousness and the “thing-like” entity, it has also been emphasized that the relation of intending is likely dependent upon a certain *determination* of the intended object in the sense that it is conceived in a particular way. The textual manifestation of this characteristic of intentional relations can be found in the following words of Husserl; So,

Many new presentations may arise, all claiming, in virtue of an objective unity of knowledge, to be presenting the same object. In all of them the object *which* we intend is the same, but in each our intention differs, *each means the object in a different way* (my italic).⁵¹

As I have already clarified, for Husserl, one always conceives the object in a particular way. Now, the related claim is that even the particular manner by which we conceive the intended object does not give us an all-inclusive or complete apprehension of it. As one may suppose, the intended object is a complete object in the sense that there are numerous properties which is considerable in the total unity of the knowledge of it. A certain determination of an physical object does not conceive all the properties and determine the intended

⁵¹ See, *LI*, V, §17, p. 578

object in a whole manner. Possibly, I can refer to the particular way in which the intended object is conceived as depending upon a certain determination *in the general sense of the word*. According to a possible view, the relation between the intentional act and the intended object may not be *determinate* or *definite* to the effect that by the related intentional content I may not be given not only the whole properties of the object but also the whole identity of it. Let us give an example for a better understanding of the case; So, my act of thinking of Atatürk as the founder of Turkey will present us the person in question in an incomplete way in the sense that there are some other significant qualities applicable to Atatürk such as being the first president of Turkey and his national leadership etc., This is to say that an intention achieved in an act is always confined to a certain “way of givennes” or determination of the intended object. This incomplete intention can also fail to determine the intended object in a determinate way. Because the qualities conceived for a specific entity can be shearable by more than one individual even if this is not the case for the example we gave above. I may even go further and claim that even the cases where an intended object is not conceived in a comprehensive way can give rise to the maintenance that sometimes

intentional content⁵² cannot introduce a certain entity with all the specific determinations⁵³ it has. One may call such an intention *indefinite* or “*de dicto*” intention. As some people have stressed, it seems that Husserl does not deal with acts which are claiming an indefinite intention. A consideration of intentions of this type can be exemplified by the acts such as my desiring a new house, my expecting that someone will give me ring today or my believing that a team will be champion in the Turkish national league; In all these cases an indetermination can be applied to the each above-mentioned state of affairs for which one may have either a belief or an expectation. The above intentions achieved in an act “are indefinitely directed to”⁵⁴ their objects for which we may not speak of a certainty of *which* or *what* it is. At this point it can also be said that the indeterminacy imposed on the intended object seems to have resulted

⁵² See, ch. 4, 5

⁵³ By specific determination I mean some aspect-dependent character of the intended object. But we are not saying that the specific determination is a physical object, however it is closely connected with the object part of the relation of intending. We suggest that it is an ideal structure which gives an aspect of the intended object. We are also mainly relying on this last idea by limiting ourselves to the perceptual acts and their cases of being lived. It cannot be contemplated as separate from both, the act and the object. Its aspect dependency can be connected with just seeing a tree from the front but not wholly and entirely. Finally, the notion of specific determination has emerged from the cases of perception for which Husserl has accepted the aspect-dependent character of knowing or seeing the object. This aspect property can be explained in the cases of non-perceptual acts as meaning that the object we intend is not a complete object in the sense that we need a mediation of conceptual thinking. We believe that thought does not correspond to the object directly. It signifies it in a limited manner. This limitation turns out to be the aspect-dependent character of the intellectual acts as long as we do not claim that thinking of the tree is capable of giving the all aspects of the tree when it becomes an object before our mind.

⁵⁴ See, *Husserl and Intentionality*, p. 18

from the incomplete determination by which I conceive the intended object as having certain specific determinations but not other. In *Logical Investigations* there is a passage where Husserl tries to formulate the phenomenological characteristics of such intentions achieved in a certain type of act; So,

Much the same holds in the sphere of desire and volition. If difficulty is felt in the fact that *desire does not always seem to require conscious reference to what is desired* (my italic), that we are often moved by obscure drives or pressures towards unrepresented goals, and if one points especially to the wide sphere of natural instinct, where goal-consciousness is at least absent at the start, one may say: This is a case of mere sensations without needing to affirm the existence of an essentially new class of sensations- i.e. of experiences really lacking intentional reference, and so also remote in kind from the essential character of intentional desire. Alternatively one may say: Here we are dealing with intentional experiences, but with such as *are characterized by indeterminateness of objective direction* (my italic), an 'indeterminateness' which does not amount to a privation, but which stands for a descriptive character of one's presentation. The idea we have when 'something' stirs, when there is a rustling, a ring at the door, etc., an idea had before we give it verbal expression, has indeterminateness of direction, and this indeterminateness is of the intention's essence, it is determined as presenting an indeterminate 'something'.⁵⁵

In contrast, Husserl's main concern is the intentions which are *definitely* directed towards their objects. It can be remembered that the directedness of the intention lies in the realization or acceptance of an intentional content⁵⁶ as the entity that determines *which object* we are directed towards. Husserl believes that the intention achieved in an act is *definite* or *determinate* in the sense that it is directed towards *a specific entity* but not other. Husserl says, " this means there is an act having a determinate intention, and

⁵⁵ See, *LI*, V, §15, p. 575

determinate in a way *which makes it an intention towards this object* (my italic)”.⁵⁷ To differentiate an act directing to a certain object from the other acts directing towards the same object is to depend on the further considerations involved in the analysis of the intentional content of which I shall have a comprehensive examination in one of the following sections.⁵⁸ This intentional content is that “which makes its object count as this object and no other”⁵⁹ As it becomes clear, the definiteness of the intention achieved in an act is due to that there is a component of the act, namely, intentional content which determines which specific object is intended in the act, if such an object exists.

Adequately, Smith and McIntyre think⁶⁰ that if an intention is definite, it means that it is individuated as to the subject of the act to the effect that the subject of the act has an opinion which (or who) the intended object is. And, they believe, there is an intimate relation between the conception, under which the intended object is intended, and the identity of the intended object. According to their opinion, the intention is not definite or determinate by itself, rather they are taken to be so on the ground that the intention itself

⁵⁶ See, ch. 4, 5

⁵⁷ See, *LI*, V, §20, p. 587

⁵⁸ See, ch. 4, 5

⁵⁹ See, *LI*, V, §20, p. 589

⁶⁰ See, *Husserl and Intentionality*, pp. 18-19

presupposes its definiteness by means of two ways, namely, one is to have certain degree of knowledge about the intended object, the other is to have an “acquaintance” with a particular object.

As has already been noted, the object of perception is the perceived tree in the garden. And I have specified that the tree in the garden is an transcendent entity in the sense that a single intention cannot give us all about its complete constitution. We are confined to an incomplete or inadequate representation of a transcendent object. And Husserl claims that the identity of the perceived object is itself transcendent.⁶¹ For we know that the determination we have of a certain intended object is to result in the phenomenological description of the object only by being limited to certain set of determinations. By following a similar line of reasoning, we can say that for Husserl the perception of the tree in the garden is definite. This is due to the fact that, without assuming a conception of the identity of the tree, it is given in perception as *this* object rather than being the other, and the assumed definiteness is accomplished “by virtue of subject’s perceptual acquaintance with a particular object”.⁶² For the perceptual acquaintance with the intended object characterizes

⁶¹ See, *Ideas*, §149

⁶² See, *Husserl and Intentionality*, p.20

it as having a certain temporal occurrence for a specific subject, for whom the intuitional presence of the intended object is inevitable. But if remembered that the perception of an intended object is *possibly* subject to a relevant determination, then it becomes clear that the definiteness of the perceptual intention achieved in an act is not entirely independent of the subjective constitution of the intended object. This is in the sense that the specific determination I have of the intended object does not tell us all the story of the object. So, the identity of the intended object largely extends from the present to the past. In other words, there seem to be a network by which every specific determination of the intended object presupposes the sameness of the object, in spite of that there may be common properties of different objects.

From a possible point of view, I can argue that insofar as we are confined to the perceptual acts such as seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, then it may be the case that I am completely free of the *particular determinations* we have of the intended object. In contrast to Kant, it may be argued that the acts of perception present the object with a determinate structure by which the object is differentiated from the other objects. The following words of Kevin Mulligan supports the above view;

Husserl's description of perceptions fall under three headings: what we see, the way we see, and how we see. His central thesis concerning *what we see* is that the primary object of perception is public things, the things we all think we see most of the time, which stand before us in *propria persona*. In this respect Husserl is decidedly "a naive realist". But he also wants to claim that this direct, straightforward perception of public things is mediated by what he calls *perceptual content*.⁶³

This is to say that there is a possibility of separating the object of my act of seeing a table from the act of seeing a tree. Simply, because we have a *perceptual access* to the object upon which we are directed. That I have perceptual access to the intended object means that I perceptually *sense* the object in a way that one can make so many judgements about its distinguishing characteristics that I may not fall into a confusion as regards the true nature of the object. It can also be added that the sensing of a certain object, say, the table in question is, to a large extent, supported by the other senses from which we may possibly gather some other epistemological access to the intended object. To exemplify the case we can simply see, touch, smell one and the same object, say the apple. But we must say that talk about the physical objects does not always contain a direct perceptual or sensory access to the object in question. A judgement made in one case of perception can refer to the objects of the same type without needing a sensory experience of them. On such a line of

⁶³ See, Mulligan, K. (1995) "Perception" in Barry Smith and D. W. Smith (ed.), *The Cambridge*

inquiry I can also assume that as long as I am confined to the sensory experience of the table, one may speak of the identity of the table, even though there may be some confusions with respect to the sensory experience of the true nature of the object. Additionally, even the multiplicity of separate sensory experiences can increase the degree of certainty applicable to the perception. If I assume that the hallucinated tree has some common properties with the tree in the garden, then it may be rather difficult to deny the central role of perceptual access to the tree itself. It is not true to say that when I hallucinate a tree we are dependent upon the appropriate conception of it which I had sensed formerly. For I cannot see the conception just as we see the tree in the garden. If I am not a Platonist, then I can believe that the experience has a priority over the possible formed conceptions of the tree in the garden. And if I admit that a property of the tree is not identical with the general conception under which it is conceived, then the tree is always there as the object of the experience or perception. As a consequence, it seems reasonable to say that the physical objects or perceptual objects has a large number of phenomenological determinations and for each of them one can form an intention by which it is contemplated. In fact I can precisely

conclude that as a mode of experience, perception seems to give us an independent notion of the tree in the garden. What I try to say is this when one can perceive the tree in the garden, he or she may not be able to perceive the general conception of the tree. Therefore, as long as I confine myself to the perceptual or sensory acts, then it seems possible to say that one is partly independent of the phenomenological determination of the tree in the garden.

By being compatible with the above-mentioned view, I can come to the significant idea that for each single determination of the tree in the garden, there seems to exist a particular intention by which it can be contemplated as having certain characteristics. It seems that the individuation of a certain property of an object results in the acquisition of a general conception by means of which one represents the object, say the tree, as having certain characteristics. However, every determination of the tree cannot share the same properties and determine the tree as this object rather than the other.

CHAPTER III

ONTOLOGICAL CHARACTERIZATION OF THE OBJECTS OF INTENTIONS

3.1. Incomplete Character of Transcendent Objects as the Objects of Intentional Relations

So far, it has been specified that we have an adequate access to the transcendent objects, such as physical objects, but determine them in an indeterminate way in the sense that we cannot know an intended object with all the determinations they have. Because, Husserl holds that the transcendent things as the objects of intentional relations are apprehended as being subject to a relevant *aspect* as to which they are conceived. In order to illustrate this characteristic of transcendent objects Husserl again applies to the perception, for which we have already supposed the intuitional presence of the intended object. Let us refer to the words of Husserl in *Logical Investigations*, so

The object is not actually given, *it is not given wholly and entirely as that which it itself is* (my italic). It is only given 'from the front', only 'perspectively foreshortened and projected' etc. Even if, for phenomenological purposes, ordinary perception is composed of countless intentions, some purely perceptual, some merely imaginative, and some even signitive, it yet as a *total act*, grasps the object itself even if only *by way of an aspect* (my italic).⁶⁴In one percept the object appears from this side, in another from that side; now it appears close, now at a distance etc. In each percept, despite these differences, one and the same object is 'there', in each it is intended in the complete range of its familiar and of its perceptually present properties. To this corresponds phenomenologically a continuous flux of fulfilment or identification, in the steady serialization of the percepts 'pertaining to the same object'. (Cf. *LI*, VI, §14, p.714)

From the above remarks we can draw the conclusion that the transcendent object, namely, the tree in the garden, is not given *wholly* and *entirely* but only from a certain aspect. It may be added that the transcendent object is a complete object in the sense that it has a large number of "way of givenness" by which its constitution is definable. However, this is not to say that we are limited to an improper representation of the object to the effect that we may be misled as regards the true nature of the object as a Lockean tradition claims. Instead, it seems that for Husserl it is possible to have a direct and reliable access to the natural object. As it may be seen, the transcendent object is a real object in the sense that it possesses temporal and spatial properties with all of which it becomes definable as a natural individual. Now, what Husserl claims is that what one perceives is always the same, it is always 'there' as it is. The only

⁶⁴ See, *LI*, VI, §14, pp. 712-13

thing we question is that one can only perceive the natural objects through aspects from which we can come to know a distinguishing appearance of the object. Accordingly, there seems to be two ways by means of which I can understand Husserl's argument here; so, the first is to suppose that by aspect he means that the transcendent object always appears to us within the general description of the phenomenological research, however the second is to assume that I cannot know the object in virtue of a single act of consciousness. My choice will be on the second view if we are to remain within the theory of intentionality Husserl suggests. According to such a view, I can be directed towards an object by virtue of many different acts, such as I may *see* or *touch* the tree just as I can *imagine* or *think of* it. In each act of consciousness I will know the object from a different aspect by which it introduces itself to us. "Second, real things (what is transcendent) are given in a merely phenomenal way (i.e. they are given through one-sided "ways of appearing" or "aspects"". ⁶⁵ Husserl believes that the acts of consciousness always changes from occasion to occasion. On these considerations, thus it becomes difficult to suppose that all acts are directed towards one and the same object in

⁶⁵ See, Kern, I (1977) "The Three Ways to the Transcendental Phenomenological Reduction in the Philosophy of Edmund Husserl" in Elliston, F. A and MC Cormick, P (ed.), *Husserl, Expositions and Appraisals*, pp.126-149

one and the same way. One reason for this difference is to assume that because they have a different location in mind. That is to say that they belong to a different type of which there is some distinguishing characteristics. In this connection one can see the difference between seeing the tree and thinking it. Adequately, I can simply suppose a differentiation between sensuous and conceptual acts and assigne them different properties in the constitution of their objects.

Having recognized the above difference between both types of acts, namely, sensuous and conceptual acts, I can come to the adequacy of characterizing this aspect-property of transcendent objects in terms of the sensuous acts which are directed towards a certain sensible object. Each sense organ corresponds to a different sense capacity by which I become aware of a certain object, say, the tree in the garden, in a different way. So it becomes clear that I seem to have supposed the differences between the sensuous acts themselves as well as the differences between the sensuous and conceptual acts. For example, the seeing the tree is not similar to the touching it due to that different sense organs are affected by the object. Insofar as I am confined to the sensuous acts it becomes obvious that I can never see an object with all the determinations they have. This is owing to that I am limited to my sense capability for

which everyone describes a limitation in accessing to the natural object. In spite of such a limitation, Husserl insists that the object is always the same and does not change. What changes is the intentional acts directed towards them. Before I say more about the sensory acts, I want to point to the fundamental characteristic of conceptual acts by which I also become aware of the transcendent objects. From a possible point of view it can be claimed that even the conceptual acts are founded on some other presentations which are also sensory. To put it in a similar way, it can be said that if I have no a sensory presentation of an object it seems impossible to have a conceptual apprehension of this object; now I can definitely think of a tree but only relying on the earlier sensory experiences of the tree existing in the natural world. This is to say, there is not a tree existing in the mind in contrast to Hume. Without seeing a tree we cannot think of a red tree or contemplate a tree type which does not belong to the already defined type. All the possible types and tokens of tree type should share some common properties with the tree in the garden, otherwise it would be rather difficult to conceive this token or type as a tree type on which there is a certain dependency of the subjects. One may even go so far as to claim that the red tree with muscle is partly dependent upon the mundane tree type in terms of being defined as a tree type

beside the tree in the garden. But if I accept a type of tree of an unusual kind, then in order to be able to speak of it as a tree we must be able to indicate the properties which is common with the tree in the garden. If not, then it would either constitute another type or be something else which is worldly non-definable. Let us suppose somebody who is blind and has no any other sensory experience of the tree; for this subject all the verbal expressions will not be enough to create a visual sample of the tree of any kind. As long as I rely on the defined type of the tree, without having a sensory experience of the tree I cannot even imagine or think of the tree. In fact Husserl claims that the objects of imagination is also apprehended from a certain aspect. If this is correct, then certainly I must admit that the conceptual acts, such as thinking or imagining, are founded on the perceptual or sensory acts in the sense that sensory acts are prior to the others. After showing the adequacy of taking into consideration the sensory acts, I can come to the clarification of the aspect-structure of the intentional acts. From the remarks I made so far I can be certain that it is the intentional acts, namely, sensory acts, which have given rise to the aspect-structure of the transcendent objects. This view suggests that the transcendent objects are not themselves incomplete or aspectual entities. Rather, the aspect-structure of the transcendent

objects results from the commitment to the sense capability by which I gain a limited experience of the object. An act of seeing the tree is limited to the perception of this object from a certain location, say, from the front. When seen from the front, it obviously has some other sides from which it has not been seen yet. This leaves open the possibility that there may be several other acts which faces us with the unseen sides of the object. An object's being perceived by many acts in relation to one another seems to imply an important notion of Husserl's philosophy, namely, an act's "horizon". One can associate the plurality of the acts with the aspect-structure of the intended objects. For each act apprehends the object from a certain perspective to the effect that they inform us about unknown properties of the object. In order to be able to arrive at the final constitution of the object, consciousness provides us with various other intentional acts which are directed upon one and the same object. Similarly, when I perceive sensory objects from a certain perspective there will also be some accompanying presentations which are also aspect-dependent in terms of providing us with some relevant notion of the object. An independent claim seems to be that the most important conceptual act is the act of memory, namely, the remembering. Because as soon as I sense an object I can also reflect back upon the act itself by an act of

memory. The question is, what do we remember is essentially the same as what I perceive apart from some of the conceptual or introspective elements involved in the phenomenological constitution of the object.

So far I have tried to characterize the aspect- dependency of transcendent objects from the part of the intentional acts, namely, sensory acts. But there is also an aspect from which I can also put some light on the same character of them by referring to the object part of the same relation. According to such a view, firstly, I can assume that the transcendent objects are complete individuals. This is in the sense that transcendent objects constitute a complex structure of which I can only have an aspect-dependent apprehension and determine it in an incomplete way.⁶⁶ That transcendent objects are complete and comprise a complex structure indicates that they are instantiated by means of several distinct individuals. That is to say, the transcendent object is a whole from which some other object-components can originate. For example, bear in the mind the tree in the garden, thus I can produce several different object-components from the tree in question, such as the tree with muscle or the tree with

⁶⁶ See, ch. 3, 3.2

window. Here I am not concerned with the ontological status⁶⁷ of the object, and thus it may exist or not. This will not make any change with respect to the intentionality of our acts of consciousness. Because it seems adequate that the intentionality of consciousness is to be accounted for in terms of the role of act-structure and its components for which I have not used certain names yet.⁶⁸ At this point it can be thought that the multiplicity of the object-components can be associated with the aspect-dependent characteristic of the complex object, namely the tree in the garden. According to a possible interpretation, I can take these complex objects as a type to which many individuals or namely, the object-components belong. Even though I know the complex object directly, however there is a sense in which I can think that the involvement of the object-components can give rise to the view that they are indirectly apprehended, for if there is a limited number of properties that the complex objects possess, then how can I accept them as complete objects in the sense that all related properties are instantiated by them? Accordingly, the object-components can give us only a small part of what is true of the complex or transcendent objects. They cannot provide us with an all-

⁶⁷ See, ch. 2, 2.2

⁶⁸ See, ch. 4, 5

inclusive apprehension of the complex object. Conversely it can be suggested that the complex object cannot have all possible properties which one can associate with it.

There is a separate argument by virtue of which I can also explain the aspect-dependent characteristic of transcendent objects. Smith and McIntyre⁶⁹ develops such an idea that there is always a certain conception or idea under which an intention is accomplished. Husserl says that,

e.g., various new presentations can arise, all claiming, in virtue of an objective unity of knowledge, to be presenting the same object. In all of them the object which we intend is the same, but in each our intention differs, each means the object in a different way”.⁷⁰

From these words of Husserl it becomes clear that when I am directed towards one and the same object, the intentions achieved in an act may differ on the basis of the fact that they refer to the intended object by the different *specific determinations* which contemplates the object as having “way of givenness” properties. However, I can be led to the assumption that there is an intimate connection between the specific determination and the properties that the objects have. Similarly, there is an one-to-one correspondence between the specific determination we have of the intended object and the properties which

⁶⁹ See, *Husserl and Intentionality*, pp.13-14

partly is instantiated with the intended object. According to Smith and McIntyre, the conception I have of the intended object is incomplete in terms of characterizing the object in all respects and in a specific way. Therefore, I cannot determine the object in all respects by a single act in the sense that the object itself will always have many more properties than what is prescribed of it by the conception under which it is conceived.

Actually, my own way of thinking suggested that the intended object is a complex object of which there is some additional object-components. They contemplate the some other respects in which the complex or intended object can be instantiated by introducing that it also has this or that specific property just as the intentional content⁷¹ of the act aims to do. An object may possibly have more than one property not specified in a given act but determinable by an additional act of consciousness. For example, the act of thinking Napoleon as *the victor at jena* characterizes Napoleon as the one who won a victory at a certain war but the act of thinking the same person, namely, Napoleon as *the vanquished at Waterloo* will attempt to characterize him as the loser of another war. So, one

⁷⁰ See, *LI*, V, §17, p. 578

⁷¹ See, ch. 4, 5

and the same person is contemplated in virtue of different specific determinations by which the different respect of the same object is instantiated.

But it must be remembered that the indeterminacy of the intentions of an object becomes meaningful as long as I assume that the intended object is a physical or naturally perceivable object. In fact the main idea referring to the above argument is dependent upon Husserl's notion of "predicate-senses" of which I shall give an account later on.⁷² Briefly, I can say that "the predicate-senses" ascribe certain properties to an object. Consequently, there will always be a certain manner in which I intend an object, and that this intended object in a given act, if it exists, will be contemplated from a certain aspect in the sense I discussed, not only for sensory acts but also for the conceptual acts.

⁷² See, ch. 5, 5.2

3.2. The Ontological Claims about the Objects of Intentions

I have adequately characterized intentionality as a relation between a consciousness and its object about which there are some ambiguities with regard to its ontological status. Within the framework of Husserl's philosophy it seems clear that the intended object towards which I am directed is an actual object just like the tree in the garden. And it can be seen that Husserl's theory of intentionality is an alternative to those that cannot explain the directedness of the acts which are directed upon non-existent objects. From the previous remarks it becomes clear that the directedness of consciousness results from the act-structure and its further intentional components.⁷³ Therefore, the ontological status⁷⁴ and the existence of the intended object is irrelevant to the directedness of consciousness. So, "More significantly, Husserl does not appear to have been influenced by concerns relating to the ontological status of nonreal objects as Brentano and Meinong were".⁷⁵ So there is not a necessary

⁷³ See, ch. 4, 5

⁷⁴ See, ch. 3, 3.2

⁷⁵ See, Olafson, Frederick A.(1977) "Husserl's Theory of Intentionality in Contemporary Perspective" in Elliston, Frederick A. And MC Cormick, Peter (ed.) *Husserl, Expositions and Appraisal*, pp. 160-167

relation between the existence of the intended object and the intentionality of consciousness. Furthermore, consciousness does not necessitate the actuality of the intended object. In this connection what one seems to be doing is to run beyond the limitations of consciousness by means of the transcendency of the intended object. Briefly, the intended object is transcendent to consciousness in the sense that it is something different from consciousness, and that it cannot be identified within the limitations of consciousness. However, it cannot simply be decided that the relation between consciousness and intended object is an actual relation as to which both terms of the relation must exist. Husserl's theory of intentionality suggests that the act is intentional even if the intended object does not exist. In this sense an act of imagining a centaur is also intentional even though the object does not actually exist. According to Husserl, what makes an act intentional is the phenomenological content⁷⁶ in virtue of which the act is taken to be directed towards a certain object, irrespective of the ontological type of the object. According to this view, the directedness of the act is not due to the fact that there actually exists an object towards which I am directed. However, the idea is that the

⁷⁶ See, ch. 4, 5

phenomenological content⁷⁷ determines a certain type of object as the correlate of consciousness. Another view, which suggests an indeterminacy regarding the ontological status of the object, is mainly dependent upon the fundamental results of epoché. For Husserl, epoché does not simply abandon an actual relation between perceiving and the perceived, but it also leaves over the basic empirical assumptions concerning the existence of the object of an intending act. Epoché⁷⁸ seems to have established a new kind of relation between the object and the act of consciousness; so, according to this relation there is a structure within the constitution of the act by which I assume the existence of the object if it actually exists. Epoché does not deny the *de facto* ontological status of the object, rather what it aims to put in brackets the intended object but not to deny that it actually exists. To hold that the intended object is put in brackets is to hold that there still remains a ground on which we may refer to the phenomenological description of the constitution of the object. Such a constitution of the object is accomplished by the general description of the act-structure and act-components.⁷⁹ What one may claim by this is that the intentionality of the act is not owing to the fact that there actually

⁷⁷ *ibid.*

⁷⁸ See, ch. 2, 2.3

⁷⁹ See, ch. 4, 5

exists an intended object but phenomenologically we are aware of the noetic⁸⁰ character of intentional act. The act-structure is such that every act of consciousness assumes an intended object, irrespective of whether it is actual or non-actual. However if Husserl speaks of a non-actuality of an object as intended object, then he should be able to give a different account of intentionality of consciousness. As I suggest, this is achieved by the act-structure and its intentional or non-intentional phases.⁸¹ For the phenomenological intention never supposes the objective existence of the intended object, even in the cases where it exists we are not concerned with the ontological existence of the object. Husserl says,

And of course such an experience may be present in consciousness together with its intention, although *its object does not exist at all* (my italic), and is perhaps incapable of existence.⁸² ...If I have an idea of the god Jupiter, this god is my presented object, he is 'immanently present' in my act, he has 'mental inexistence in the latter, ...this means that I have a certain presentative experience, the presentation-of-the-god-Jupiter is realized in my consciousness. The 'immanent', 'mental object' is not therefore part of the descriptive or real make-up of the experience, it is in truth not really immanent or mental. But it also does not exist extramentally, it does not exist at all. This does not prevent our-idea-of-the-god-Jupiter from being actual,.....If, however, the intended object exists, nothing becomes phenomenologically different. It makes no essential difference to an object presented and given to consciousness whether it exists, or is fictitious, or is perhaps completely absurd.⁸³

In the above passage Husserl seems to think that the object of intending act does not need to exist. But, surprisingly, he

⁸⁰ See, ch. 4, 4.2

⁸¹ See, ch. 4, 4.4

⁸² See, *LI*, V, §11, p. 558

⁸³ *ibid.*, 558-59

goes so far as to claim that the non-existent objects of intention can also be called 'actual' just as the apple tree in the garden. So as I suggest, the actuality of the intended object does not derive from the object's being real but it is dependent upon the constitution of it by consciousness. Even so, it is not true to call such an object, for Husserl, a mental or immanent object. From this it becomes clear that Husserl suggests a different ontology for the objects of intentional acts within which the term 'actual' or 'real' is used in a different manner. Appropriately, it can be said that the actuality of the intended object is also put in brackets on the ground that the actual relation is abandoned by the epoché. Whatever the ontological status of the object may be, we are always limited to the related phenomenological description by which I am provided a new constitution of both consciousness and its object. Accordingly, the supposition that there is an object is able to be accounted for by the view that the act-structure provides us with an intentional content⁸⁴ in virtue of which we are directed towards a certain object. This entity even in the case of hallucinating suggests an object towards which we are directed. However, there is no such a necessity that the object assigned by the intentional content⁸⁵ should

⁸⁴ See, ch. 4, 5

⁸⁵ *ibid.*

exist extramentally. Similarly, the non-existence of the intended object does not eliminate the noetic character of acts; for example, consider the act of seeing a tree and hallucinating a tree. In both cases the object is the same even though the presentation of it differs from one another. The essential claim here is that even the hallucinating is dependent upon the presentative act of seeing. Because the seeing is a sensory or sensuous act by which I get a sight of the object, namely, the tree. Can one ever get a hallucination of the tree without having the presentation of it by a sensory act, namely, the act of seeing? Reasonably the answer is no. For, of course, we can imagine some sort of creatures that have not been observed before but this does not mean that I can imagine the tree without seeing a certain token of this type if a tree actually exists in the natural world. There is a distinction between thinking of non-existent objects and hallucinating or imagining an object which is worldly. In the former case I cannot speak of an instantiation of the object in question, say, a centaur. That is to say, there will not be a general type of which I can show some particular tokens having the common properties with the others. However in the latter case there certainly will be a significant dependency on the existent objects and of which there is a general type or species to which many individuals or tokens belong. In sharper

terms I can say that the imagined tree is the same as the tree which I see in the garden. The only difference between them is that they are presented by the different presentative acts. In this connection Husserl is also of the opinion that the imagined object does not exist. He gives the example of a centaur and claim that imagining a centaur presents an object which does not exist and “is in fact “nothing”, mere “imagination”; or, to be more precise, the living experience of imagination is the imagining *of* a centaur”.⁸⁶ As can be seen, the ontological status of the object, namely, centaur is irrelevant to the intentionality of consciousness or of the act, namely, imagining. But questions about the *objects* of intentional relations are in fact not Husserl’s concern. The object intended in an act, if such an object exists at all, is ordinarily some mundane sort of entity, distinct from the act and independent of it.⁸⁷

If I return to the point I have been making, then it can be said that as long as the presentative act of imagining relies on the act of seeing, it will not be possible to imagine an object without seeing it. A support can also be gained from the general observation that even the day dreams do present object and object-components

⁸⁶ See, *Ideas*, §23, p. 91

⁸⁷ See, McIntyre, R(1982) “Husserl’s Phenomenological Conception of Intentionality and its difficulties”, *Philosophia*, vol. 11, pp. 223-247

which I face in the world surrounding us. There is a distinction between Husserl's argument and my claim that suggests that the imagined or hallucinated tree exists just as the tree in the garden. Husserl speaks of the consideration of the acts of imagining which is directed upon a *non-existent* object, namely, a centaur. But I preferably claim a reference to a worldly object, namely, the tree by means of different acts such as seeing and imagining or hallucinating. On this line of reasoning we come to the conclusion that insofar as the object imagined or hallucinated is not a non-existent object, it is difficult to make a differentiation between the imagined tree and the seen tree. But I must also support this point by saying that if the presentative act, imagining is founded on that of seeing, then it seems reasonable that the former should follow the latter in terms of not only a dependency but also of providing the efficient ontological grounds for considering the type of the object that I have described. As a conclusive remark I can say that the intentionality of both type of acts, namely, seeing and imagining or hallucinating is accomplished by the appropriate act-structure and its further components, namely, the intentional content.⁸⁸ In the following sections of this thesis I shall

⁸⁸ See, ch. 4, 5

assigne a task to the intentional content⁸⁹ by assuming that it is also the intentional content which always establish a relation between the act and the intended object, irrespective of what ontological status of the object may be.

⁸⁹ ibid

3.3. The Actualization of Intention against Epoché

Phenomenology suggests a new way of looking at the physical world, irrespective of the considerations provided by the related formal or natural sciences. One way of being involved in a relation with the world is to have an idea about it. If I am not phenomenalist, we should be able to suppose a difference between the idea and the world itself. In similar words, they must be contemplated as being different in terms of the type to which they belong. In Husserlian terms I can say that the objective world is *transcendent* to consciousness in the sense that we cannot gain a complete apprehension of the world by a single act of consciousness. In the former discussions I argued that the presentation of the tree in the garden is aspect-dependent and intention-dependent in respect of not being apprehended wholly and entirely by a particular act of consciousness.⁹⁰ From this I am driven to the conclusion that the multiplicity of intentional acts is against “oneness” of the transcendental world. If I accept that consciousness is not a substance but consists of separate intentional acts occurring in the stream of consciousness, then I have to be able to describe an intentional

relation between these acts and the world itself. If the world cannot be presented by an unique act, call it consciousness, then I am naturally left with the plurality of the intentional acts which attempt to represent the world within the domain of phenomenological constitution of consciousness. And the arguments, I made before, will convince one of that the intentional relation between consciousness and the world is not a complete relation. This is in the sense that there is an aspect by which I can suggest an intention-dependent character of consciousness. By this idea I must understand that there are *numerous intentions* by which I am directed towards one and the same world. The question arises, is the world the cause of the multiplicity of the intentional acts or are they independently related to the world without assuming the empirical facts about it? Both question deserves a radical “yes”. For, indeed, by the intentional relation Husserl seems to be thinking of a world-instance which is completely different from the world of the tree in the garden. It can be remembered that the ontological status⁹¹ of the world is irrelevant to the intentional relation if phenomenology aims to be built up as a science of which there will be some eidetic laws applicable to the actual existence of

⁹⁰ See, ch. 2, 2.1

⁹¹ See, ch. 2, 2.2

consciousness. So the phenomenological representation of the world is not to be the same as that of natural sciences even though they give a model for the phenomenological science of the consciousness. By thinking so, I come to the total phenomenological exclusion of external reality from the phenomenological sphere of eidetic science. As I have already specified, when epoché eliminates one of the poles of the actual relation, it simultaneously opens up another realm where we may speak of a new kind of relation. Indeed, I believe, there is some old traces which seems to be involved in this new fashion, namely, epoché. Actually, the elimination of the external reality from the realm of intention will certainly point to the fact that I must provide another object-pole for the act, if I am to stay within the domain of pure consciousness. There seems to be a way of reading this conclusion as suggesting that one may be in a confusion with regard to the actuality or veridical nature of the *perception*. In similar words, shall I understand Husserl as recommending that after epoché, I shall only be concerned with a mental tree rather than *the tree in the garden*. The replacement of a real tree with a related idea can be associated with a form of idealism. However, the point is not to decide, is Husserl idealist or not? Rather, I read Husserl as arguing that the actuality or the actual existence of the natural world is

indubitable even though he eliminates it from his phenomenology. For a better understanding of the exclusion of the external reality from the workable confines of the phenomenology, let us return to Husserl's own words,

The epoché can also be said to be the radical and universal method by which I apprehend myself purely: as Ego, and with my own pure conscious life, in and by which the entire *Objective world exists for me and is precisely as it is for me*. Anything belonging to the world, any spatiotemporal being, exists for me—that is to say, is accepted by me— in that I experience it, perceive it, remember it, think of it somehow, judge about it, value it, desire it, or the like. Descartes, as we know, indicated all that by the name *cogito*. The world is for me absolutely nothing else but the world existing for and accepted by me in such a conscious *cogito*.⁹²

Now the question arises, if Husserl does not deny the existence of sensory world, why does he put it in brackets? The answer of this question is closely connected with the admission that I must be able to describe the phenomenological properties not only of consciousness but also of the sensory world as well. This idea finds its foundation in the development of Husserl's later philosophy, claiming that the new world in which they are constituted is consciousness. What Husserl denies by epoché is the independency of the sensory world from consciousness in the sense that we no longer have to consider the separation of sensory world from consciousness. Such a separation, indeed, can be based on the interest in the individual

⁹² See, Husserl, E. (1973) *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 21

objects rather than the types to which they belong. Such a separation is grounded by Husserl by the following words, so

The existence of a world and, accordingly, the existence of this die are “parenthesized in consequence of my epoché; but the one identical, appearing die (as appearing) is continuously “immanent” in the flowing consciousness, *descriptively “in” it*; as is likewise the attribute “one identical”. This being-in-consciousness is a *being-in of a completely unique kind*: not a being-in-consciousness as a really intrinsic component part, but rather a being-in-it “ideally” as something *intentional*, something appearing- or, equivalently stated, abeing-in-it as its immanent “*objective sense*”. The “object” of consciousness, the object as having identity “with itself” during the flowing subjective process, does not come into the process from outside; on the contrary, it is included as a sense in the subjective process itself- and thus as an “*intentional effect*” produced by the synthesis of consciousness.⁹³

By the abandonment of the judgement as regards the sensory or external world, I am not totally taken away from the significance of the constitution of natural world within the region of consciousness. To put it in a similar way, I shall be able to have an assumption of the natural world, but this world and its real properties are actualized by the efficient phenomenological contribution of the consciousness. At this point I can ask the question, is the external world conveyed into the consciousness where I shall no longer have to make a distinction between the consciousness and its object pole, namely, the sensory world.? Husserl starts off with consciousness and end up with a phenomenological constitution of the object world. And there will be no emphasis of the actual or non-actual property of the object world,

⁹³ *ibid.*, 42

because, for Husserl, even the object of imagination is real or actual. In place of an actuality originating from the existential conditions of the objects that exist in the natural world, one has necessarily to consider the object components which my consciousness provides for its own act.

The skeptical term 'epoche' conveyed exactly (and more accurately than the Cartesian term 'doubt' what could guarantee that the phenomenological description of a physical object would not be confused with the kind of account that is given by physics: in a phenomenological description of the appearance of an external object one has to abstain from making any claims concerning the actual reality of this object; namely, all questions concerning actual reality have to be bracketed, set aside, left unanswered.⁹⁴

In addition, I shall neither accept that the intentional act is directed toward *a natural object* nor deny the directedness of the act toward an object in *the general sense of the word*. I have already indicated that the intention is aspect-dependent due to the philosophical transcendency of the external object. Therefore, the directedness of an intentional act toward a spatio-temporal object is abandoned by the phenomenological epoché. But if remembered, the act is still directed upon an object, is this object the natural individual just as the tree in the garden or some other version of that object? Indeed, Husserl's answer is that it is the natural object, that is, the tree in the garden which is actually put in bracket. So, what is it that

⁹⁴ See, Küng, Guido (1977) "The Phenomenological Reduction as Epoche and Explication" in Elliston, Frederick A and MC Cormick, P (ed.) *Husserl, Expositions and Appraisals*, p. 340

enables us to speak of an object in spite of epoché? It seems that it is the act-structure⁹⁵ and its phenomenological components that establish an internal relation between the act and what it is directed upon. So, it seems that there will be a shift of attention from the objects of “natural attitude” to the act- structure which establishes a directedness of the intentional experience.

We put out of play our natural and naive belief in the independent existence of objects of consciousness, and this allows us to realize that the *meaning (Sinn)* of these objects can be made evident without reference to their *being (Sein)*.⁹⁶

That relation forms an intention or an intentional relation for which there is a certain type of object. It is possible to say that Husserl is not clear concerning his words characterizing the ontological status of the object towards which I am directed. Although Husserl claims the existence and actuality of the natural world and the objects, sometimes he accepts the non-existence of the objects of intentional relations. From this I can come to the conclusion that the objects that one confronts in the phenomenological sphere of consciousness are not the same as those of the natural world. Perhaps what Husserl wants to say is the necessity of the determination of object component within the field of consciousness from which an intentional relation is

⁹⁵ See, ch. 4, 5

⁹⁶ See, Casey, Edward S (1977) “Imagination and Phenomenological Method” in Elliston, Frederick A and MC Cormick, P (ed.), *Husserl, Expositions and Appraisals*, p. 74

originated. The way by which we can construct the object pole of intentionality or intentional relation is the identification of the “ofness” of the intention. Similarly, consciousness provides us with a relation ingredient, namely, the “ofness”⁹⁷ of consciousness by which we construct the adequacy of the relatedness of the act. This relatedness character of the act is transcendent to itself. For it is this property of the act that relates it to an object, irrespective of whether it exists or not. As a conclusion, in spite of the philosophical achievement of the epoché, I should be able to speak of an object structure for which one can assume some intentional acts. When followed such a line of reasoning, a need arises for the consideration of the distinction that I have drawn earlier on between sensory and non-sensory acts. Let us consider the act of seeing the tree in the garden; this tree is not the tree that I see when we looked at the garden, however I am not saying that it is phenomenologically *represented* by means of an image in consciousness. Husserl clearly denies the *representative theory of perception* according to which perception or the act (sensory) provides us with certain sensory and mediatory data before confronting with the object existing in the external reality. I must explain that even before epoché, the

⁹⁷ *ibid*

phenomenologist is not interested in the causal relations between consciousness' act and the physical object which has some effect on us by the mediation of the sensory organs. Instead, he tries to establish a link between the act and its intentional object in virtue of the phenomenological properties of consciousness. So, the tree I see in the garden is not a phenomenological object when we think of the significance of the epoché. If I confine myself to the phenomenological domain of consciousness which has a distinctive legacy, the object-structure that one finds in it is not subject to the relations which I describe between the objects of sensory or external world. For, " The phenomenological *epoché* place into brackets the existential facts and leaves only the the *phenomenon*, what is given for consciousness."⁹⁸ So, this case leads us to the acknowledgment that the object-structure should be definable in terms of "appearances" present to the consciousness. As can be seen, the term "appearance" has already slipped into our discussions. According to this new view, as soon as I see the tree in the garden, I am given a phenomenological "appearance" of the tree in question, and consciousness contemplates it as the object-pole of the intentional act. The phenomenological datum or "appearance" does not share the property of being spatio-

⁹⁸ See, V.Velarde-Mayol, *On Husserl*, p. 48

temporal with the physical object that causes the related presentation. Certainly, the epoché reconstructs a ground where one may form an intention of which the object is distinct from that of physical world. It seems reasonable to conclude that the intention phenomenologically contemplates an object even though I am confined to the absolute region of consciousness from which the exclusion of physical objects is necessiated by the epoché. A further characterization of the object-pole of consciousness seems to be possible by the following words of Husserl.

Accordingly the difference between the sense of a psychological, and that of a transcendental-phenomenological, exploration of consciousness is immeasurably profound, though the contents to be described on the one hand and on the other can correspond. In the one case we have data belonging to the world, which is presupposed as existing—that is to say, data taken as psychic components of a man. In the other case the parallel data, with their like contents, are not taken in this manner, because the whole world, when one is in the phenomenological attitude, is not accepted as actuality, but only as an actuality-phenomenon.⁹⁹

It must also be pointed out that I live in a conscious life which is familiar with the external world and its individual objects even before the accomplishment of the transcendental reduction or epoché. All I want to say is that the world type that one finds within the confines of consciousness has certain affinities with the world of natural objects. This similarity shows the adequacy of supposing that the appearance is appearance of something which belongs to a spatio-

temporal world. It seems rather difficult to set up a connection between an appearance and its final object; to consider an appearance as a pure datum which is a non-spatial entity seems to cause an ambiguity, that how something spatio-temporal can give rise to an entity not so. The answer seems to lie in the traditional philosophy of Locke and Hume. Without needing a further remark on this point, I can say that the phenomenological description certainly establishes a link between the pure datum and the real object. Actually, such a relation has also an implication on the intentional characteristic of consciousness. Because appearance is always an appearance of something which is objectified by a relation of consciousness. Also it is even necessary to work out that the appearance of an intended object is not confined to the one instance, and as already noted, one can associate the multiplicity of appearances of one and the same object with the multiplicity of the specific determinations¹⁰⁰ of the same intended object. For I have pointed out that the consciousness provides us with an intention in virtue of which I think of a certain determination of the intended object. If the appearance is a phenomenological data, then this material can be gained not only from

⁹⁹ See, Husserl, E. (1973) *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 32

¹⁰⁰ See, ch. 4, 5

sensory world objects but also from abstract or universal objects. Now, I can raise the question, that is the phenomenological appearance *sensory* or some other type of entity? In order to be able to decide on this point, it should be remembered that the appearance itself does not appear but it results from the intuitive presence of an intended object perceived by a certain perceiver. So, it becomes clear that the region, namely, consciousness in which we gain the phenomenological datum or appearance constitutes the object-structure for the directedness of the intentional acts. Furthermore, the epoché does not only exclude the external object but also provides us with certain ontological domain in which one can describe an intentional relation between the act and what the act is directed upon. Briefly the epoché presents us a new phenomenological area with which consciousness will be in an immediate and direct contact. So the new object-structure is what is immediately given for my consciousness, however there are words of Husserl from which I come to the conclusion that at the end I am always related or directed upon a natural or physical object. The distinction which Husserl in CM draws between *natural* and *transcendental reflection* seems to be putting some light on the nature of this new ontological realm.

Perceiving straightforwardly, we grasp, for example, the house and not the perceiving. Only in reflection do we “*direct*” ourselves to the perceiving itself and to its perceptual directedness to the house. In the “*natural reflection*” of everyday life, also however in that of psychological science (that is, in psychological experience of our own psychic processes), we stand on the footing of the world already given as existing- as when, in everyday life, we assert: “ I see a house there” or “ I rememberhaving heard this melody ”. In *transcendental-phenomenological reflection* we deliver ourselves from this footing, by universal epoché with respect to the being or non-being of the world. The experience as thus modified, the *transcendental experience*, consists then, we can say, in our *looking at* and describing the particular transcendently reduced *cogito*,...¹⁰¹

Indeed, in radical terms his characterization of the intentionality of the phenomenological act ends up with the presentation of a physical object. Now I want to put some light on the existential status of this new phenomenological domain; thus, Husserl claims that the intended real object does not need to exist. If so, the question arises, shall I be able to speak of an “appearance” when it does not actually exist? As I shall clarify later, the act-structure is such an structure that enables us to speak of the *directedness of the consciousness toward* an intended object. The act-structure is such organized that it considers *as if* there is an intended object even if there is no object at all. By the epoché, I admit that the acts themselves contain a structure via which I relate it to a specific object. The intentional character of the act-structure results from numerous noetic phases of which I shall give a separate account in one of the

¹⁰¹ See, Husserl, E. (1973) *Cartesian Meditations*, pp. 33-34

following sections.¹⁰² So, on the basis of the further investigations, I shall somehow decide that the directedness of the intentional act is mediated a further component of the act, namely, intentional content (noema).¹⁰³

¹⁰² Ibid

¹⁰³ Ibid

3.4. Individual Character of Intentions as to the Intended Object

So far I have tried to describe the directedness of an intentional act towards an intended object if it exists at all. Husserl clearly expresses that the presentation of the intended object differs from act to act, due to the fact that in each case I refer to a different phenomenological determination¹⁰⁴ of the intended object, irrespective of whether it exists or not. However, it is also the case that there may be several different acts by which the intended object is presented in the same way. For example, the acts such as thinking, seeing, imagining, loving may present Atatürk with the same phenomenological properties of consciousness. Even so, the qualitative presentation of the intended object, namely, the presentative character¹⁰⁵ of Atatürk may differ from act to act. This is not because of that the specific determination¹⁰⁶ of the intended object is different in each phenomenological act. For every act of consciousness has a unique phenomenological time of occurrence as soon as I speak of an intentional relation between the act and the

¹⁰⁴ Ibid

¹⁰⁵ See, ch. 4, 4.3

¹⁰⁶ See, ch. 4, 5

intended object. But I must point to the fact that the consciousness or *ego* to which the intentional act belongs is *psychological* and *empirical* in the sense that I have not yet arrived at the eidetic acts and their laws in this respect. However, it can be said that all the remarks that I make before *epoché* as regards the intentionality of consciousness seems to have eliminated the significance of the supposition of the transcendental ego. For, before epoché, I am inevitably dealing with a psychological ego and its real temporal acts. In this sense, the psychological ego can become a subject matter of the empirical psychology. But the phenomenological psychology remaining within the region of eidetic science aims at constructing the laws of phenomenological consciousness. So, I recognise the necessity of making a distinction between the psychological ego and the transcendental ego. It should be seen that I shall speak of the individuation of intentions from the point of both ego insofar as I am capable of showing the directedness of the intentional acts. From a possible point of view, it seems that the argument of individual acts becomes indispensable when I consider the temporality of the psychological ego, for it is possible to suppose a differentiation between the acts of consciousness in respect of the time at which they occur. That is to say, the act occurred at *t1* is different from the same

act occurred at t_2 although they can be directed towards the same intended object. Furthermore, even the type to which these two acts belong is the same, the separation of one act from another is possible. But, what actually is it that differentiates the one act from another, namely, the two tokens of the act of seeing the tree in the garden.? It is simply not the determination of the temporal occurrence of the act but it is the presentation of the object in a respectively different manner. One way of speaking of the individuation of the acts is to be able to suppose a differentiation between them by means of the phenomenological properties characterizing the intentionality of consciousness. I have already assumed some distinction between acts and the types to which they belong. The sensory acts are different from that of non-sensory ones. Within each type of intentional acts it is possible to find several individual differences just as we did before.¹⁰⁷ However, it seems reasonable to conclude that I try to establish a connection of the differences of the acts with the individuation of them. As a third component of such a task I shall take into account the specific determinations of one and the same object. In the characterization of this property of intentions, namely, the individuation problem, there seems to be two components over which

¹⁰⁷ See, ch. 2, 2.1

I have to give an explanation of the above-mentioned problem. These, namely, are the acts and their intended objects. Let us consider the first part of this relation, thus, the intentional acts. So, the first type to which I refer is the discrimination that I assume between the sensory and non-sensory acts.¹⁰⁸ This is the same as saying that the act of seeing the tree in the garden is distinct from the act of thinking of the same tree. This is so because of the fact that the two acts represent two different types to which many other individual acts also belong.

A similar approach can also be applied to the specific determinations¹⁰⁹ of a certain intended object in virtue of which we present it in a particular manner. A similar point has also been made by Smith and McIntyre.¹¹⁰ They claim that the conception-dependent character of intentions gives rise to the multiplicity of the intentions in which one tries to describe the directedness of the consciousness toward one and the same object. But I shall not connect the multiplicity of intentions with the conceptions I have of the intended object. To put it in a similar way, it can be said that in contrast to the suggestion of Smith and McIntyre, I argue that the varied intended objects can be linked with the various other intentional acts. So, this is

¹⁰⁸ *ibid*

¹⁰⁹ See, ch. 4, 5

¹¹⁰ See, *Husserl and Intentionality*, pp. 141-145

to result in the claim that every new presentation or presentative significance of the intended object provides us with an added aspect from which another act originates. Even a further claim follows, that the multiplicity of intentional acts can be associated with one and the same intended object. For example, *the victor at jena* and *the vanquished at waterloo* are two different determinations of one and the same object, namely, the natural individual, Napoleon. Similarly, I can relate numerous intentional acts to Napoleon. In a determinant sense, the thinking, imagining, loving, hating, missing etc., all are directed toward one and the same intended object. Let us return to the relation of the individuality of intentions with the intended object. For this aim I can firstly clarify that the final individuality of the intentions is always accounted for by the contribution of the intended object, namely, the tree in the garden. Because, what is presented in the act is the intended object presented. This is due to the fact that all the determinations of the intended object to which I refer is about the final object, namely, the intended object. In a related sense it can be said that the specific determinations function as a “mode of presentation” of the intended object. The mode of presentation differs from act to act unless its identity with another one phenomenologically is not taken for granted. There is a multiplicity of the acts and their specific

determinations on the one side, however, also we are related to the identical object, namely the tree in the garden. I believe that there must be a way of describing the individual character of intentions by referring to the total phenomenological properties and their constitution. I can formulate this idea by the help of the following separate claims. So,

a). Every intentional act is directed towards an intended object.

b). There can be several acts that are directed towards the same intended object.

c). There can be several acts which are directed towards one and the same intended object with the same specific determination.¹¹¹

d). There can also be numerous specific determinations¹¹² which are related to one and the same intended object.

e). Two identical acts may have a different intended object.

By the following claims, I necessarily reach the conclusion that the individual character of intentions is dependent upon the complete constitution of the phenomenological region from which the intentionality of the acts derives. Specifically, this region is determined by the intentional or noetic¹¹³ significance of the act-

¹¹¹ See, ch. 4, 5

¹¹² *ibid*

¹¹³ See, ch. 4

structure. However, at this point it becomes clear that I can identify the individuality of intentions through the above claims as to which there seems to be three components involved in the constitution of the present property of the intentions. These are the acts, their specific determinations and the intended object. Relatedly, Smith and McIntyre claimed that it is the specific determination by which the individuality of intentions is accomplished. But It should be said that I am not in an agreement with them in respect of that point. My own point is possibly that through the above-mentioned six points I can speak of the individual character of intentions. For, the plurality of the intentions does not only result from the specific determinations I have of the intended object, namely, the tree in the garden. Through the above claims I tried to suppose a way of making a discrimination between the intentions achieved in an act. So, I simply suggest that the best way of supposing a distinction between the intentions is to refer to the three components of the phenomenological region, namely, the act, the specific determination and the intended object. According to this view, suppose I have two acts that are directed toward two different objects. In this case the intentional acts and the intentions achieved in them have to be contemplated as being different in the sense that they present us a different constituent of a certain

ontological domain. With the more concrete examples, let us consider *the act of seeing the tree in the garden* and *the act of imagining Ararat*. To be able to consider a distinction of the former from the latter is entirely dependent upon one of the three components with which I suggested a connection of the individual character of the intentions. This, namely, is *the intended object* towards which I am directed. It is also the case that I simply and primarily directed toward the intended object. In other words, it is the first object of the act of consciousness if such an object exists at all. Although this entity has an distinctive importance for being able to describe the intentionality of consciousness, it is also the same ontological entity which is taken out of consideration by means of the *epoché*. So, in order not to cause an ambiguity as regards the remarks made above, I shall confine myself to the phenomenological analysis which comes before *epoché*. As a consequence, I can state that when the intended objects are different, the intentions achieved in an act is also to become distinct. But, as already noted, this is not to say that some different intentional acts cannot be directed towards one and the same intended object. Here I must also work out that the identity of the object does not change in spite of the multiplicity of the intentional acts in which it is presented with a certain intensity. However, the intentions in which a

certain object is presented might be different even though the same intended object is actually presented. This idea leads us to the fact that what makes an intention different from another is also dependent upon the phenomenological constitution of the intentional act. And the *eidos* of the intentional acts is identical with *a general type* in which many individual acts becomes definable. So, for this second component of the phenomenological constitution of the individual character of intentions I have to be able to describe a further distinction between the intentional acts. The first distinction that I have drawn between the intentional acts is dependent upon the time or moment at which they come about. But for the present argument I need a further way of making a distinction between the individual acts. The primary phenomenological solution to supposing an individuality between acts is to refer to the type or *eidos* to which they pertain. Even before that, as already noted, I accepted a distinction of sensory acts from the non-sensory acts. In addition to that, I shall even go further and suppose that a single act itself can constitute a type to which many other equal acts may belong. In fact, here I shall speak of a limited conception of a type and token relation. Let us consider *the seeing the apple tree in blooming*; I believe that once this act occurred, it will relate us to a type to which many other

distinguishable reappearance of the same act will belong. If I represent the above act as type *A*, there will be a uncountable tokens of this act as token $a_1, a_2, a_3, \dots, a_n$; in similar words, the possibility of the appearance of the distinguishable tokens of acts is endless. A temporality cannot directly be associated with being a certain token of a type. There are some more radical criteria of being a certain act token if I apply to a general type. Furthermore, I can even go so far as to make the claim that every single token of a type can comprise a separate type. The above claim phenomenologically is plausible. Such a type is describable in terms of the phenomenological properties which the act-structure instantiates by being compatible with the characterization that I am directed towards certain phenomenological objects. My strong claim will be that every reappearance of the act can constitute a related type. So, it will also become clear that my definition of type suggests that even in a specific occurrence of the act there seems to be both epistemological and ontological elements that differs from act to act. For the former element I can think of the characterization that intentional acts are directed towards an object of a certain ontological type but not with the same intensity. For the latter I can consider their characterization as *real* things in the sense that they must be taken as *temporal* entities. In addition to that there

are several further *phases* or *components* of the act-structure which is essential for the construction of the phenomenologically active domain.

At this point I can suggest that the formulation of the epistemological characterization can certainly be compatible with the phenomenological acknowledgement that it is the intended object upon which I establish the difference of a certain act from another as long as the objects upon which they are directed are distinct. So, it can be said that there is a close connection of the epistemological characterization of the intentional act with its having an intended object. On this line of reasoning I come to the admission that an act is different from another provided that the intended objects upon which they are directed are certainly different. As to the ontological characterization of the act-structure, one of the ways of distinguishing an act from another is to refer to the specific time at which it occurs. But I must make out that this way of thinking is not applicable to the requirement that I should grasp the phenomenological type of the acts. This, namely, is the region of the essences or *eidos*. So, it can be said that I try to establish a link between the ontological type to which they belong and their being individual acts. Separately, on the basis of being dependent upon a general type I assume a differentiation

between perceptual (sensory) and non-perceptual acts. In order to be able to go even further I need a distinction applicable to the components of the act-structure. I shall principally explain these components in chapter third and fourth. But, for the sake of argument, let us mention them in a presentative way;

<i>A. Noesis</i>	<i>B: Noema</i>
<i>a₁: Noetic Phase</i>	<i>b₁: Sinn</i>
<i>a₂: Noematic Phase</i>	<i>b₂: Noematic Sinn</i>
<i>a₃: Hyle</i>	<i>b₃: Predicate Sinn</i>
<i>a₄: Sensory Content</i>	<i>b₄: Determinable X</i>

The above analysis simply implies that every single constituent of the act-structure may give rise to some differentiation in the phenomenological intentionality of consciousness. Significantly, the phenomenological organisation of all these components of the act-structure determines the final and perfect constitution of the intentional character of consciousness. My ontological reference for the determinate individual character of intentions is dependent upon the above-mentioned components of the act-structure. All these components are applicable to every single act of consciousness and differs from act to act. If the foundation of the act-structure is reducible to the above separate components, then the variation in the essence of the act becomes understandable. The organisation of these components does not only determine the type and nature of the act but

also specifies the intended object upon which the act is directed. The ontology of the act necessarily establish a link between the above-mentioned components and the final intended object. And in the final constitution of the eidetic science I should be able to construct a type (essence) to which other individual experiences belong in a peculiar way. As can be seen, the type is transcendent to the individual acts in the sense that it has a function of assigning a set of properties to the every member of the present type. So, every individual act is definable by the type or *eidōs* in which it is involved and the act-structure which determines its internal organisation. And an act is always represented by a specific act-structure by which it becomes distinguishable from other related acts. Consequently, the intentional acts are firstly distinguished by the type and successively by the special structures in which they are presented.

CHAPTER IV

A MAIN DEMARCATION BETWEEN THE THEORIES OF INTENTIONALITY

4.1. Brentano's Thesis

Having discussed at length the nature and structure of the intentional act and intentions, I shall now focus on a few distinguishable theory of intentionality for determining the central role that Husserl's theory of intentionality plays. Brentano develops one of the most significant theories of intentionality in a book called *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874). In that book, Brentano tries to distinguish the mental phenomena from the physical phenomena by means of the several characteristics. So,

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.

This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴ See, Brentano, F. *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, pp. 88-89

According to his theory, only the mental phenomena are intentional. And the physical phenomena do not display such a characteristic at all. For Brentano the mental phenomena are intentional in the sense that there is always an object upon which the intentional act is directed. The formulation of the directedness of the mental phenomena is represented by the expressions such as “direction toward an object”, “every act includes something as object within itself”, “intentional *inexistence* of an object”, “immanency of an object in a mental phenomenon”. All these phrases suggest that it is the case that there is an inclusion of the object as presented in a mental phenomenon. As is well known, “Franz Brentano’s thesis that the mental is characterised by a peculiar directedness towards an object or by intentionality, has been recognised, in contemporary philosophy, by a large body of philosophers of widely differing persuasions.”¹¹⁵ The type of the mental phenomenon does not change that an object is presented in the intentional act. Let us make some separate remarks regarding the mental phenomena and the object presented in it.

Brentano uses the terms “consciousness” and “mental act” interchangeably throughout his writings. For Brentano, “every

mental act is either a presentation or is founded on a presentation”. And in the phenomenological constitution of the act the “mode of presentation” differs from act to act. The presentation is always the presentation of something presented. Or something is always presented within an intentional phenomena. By the above acknowledgement I come to the establishment of the connection between the subject and the object part of consciousness. To say more about the object part, I can specify that the object is *intentionally inexistent* in the act. Or it is *immanent* to consciousness. So the object’s being mental is closely connected with its being present in the intentional act. In similar words, the confines of the object is determinable within consciousness even if it constitutes an object part of an intentional relation. “...in his early writings Brentano simply said that the directedness is characterized by there being some object which is always there, which the act is directed toward.”¹¹⁶

Let us be more accurate as regards the object of the intentional act; so, in Brentano’s theory of knowledge one can distinguish between the *primary* and *secondary* consciousness. In primary consciousness the object is a sensory content such as sound,

¹¹⁵ See, Mohanty, J N (1986) “Levels of Understanding ‘Intentionality’”, *Monist*, 69, p. 505

¹¹⁶ See, Føllesdal, D(1984) “Brentano and Husserl on Intentional Objects and Perception” in Hubert L. Dreyfus with Harrison Hall (ed.), *Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, p. 31

heat, taste etc., And this primary object is not identical with the intentional act directing upon it. Although these primary objects are non-identical with the intentional phenomena, they still inexist or are immanent to consciousness. However,

Thus, there is no temptation to say that physical objects are “part of” or “contained” our perception of them. To this extent Brentano may be said to hold some form of “idealism,” though certainly not a subjectivist Berkelean kind.¹¹⁷

Brentano even goes further and claim that there are objects of an act character; in other words the presentative act can be directed towards another accompanying presentation or “itself”. Brentano puts this point by saying that I may have either an awareness of a primary object, or an awareness of the act itself. This second type of awareness largely constitutes the secondary consciousness in which I become aware of the present act itself. The former relation is taken as basis of the awareness type, namely, outer perception when the latter refers to the relation of inner perception. However, the core idea in Brentano’s notion of intentionality is the intentional presence of the object in a mental phenomenon. But it must be specified that the immanency of the object is not problematic due to the fact that the intentional act can always be associated with a sensory content which is an incomplete

¹¹⁷ See, Morrison, James C (1970) “Husserl and Brentano on Intentionality”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 31, p. 31

representation of the physical forces or concrete objects. So, even though Brentano eliminates the physical objects from his phenomenology, there is always a ground on which one may speak of the intimate connection of the intentional act side with the sensory world. Actually, Brentano seems to be holding that I know the world by appealing to a “representative theory of perception” as to which I firstly apprehend the mediators of the perceptual knowledge, then the world itself. These mediators are sense-data and images which represent the world at a level of perceptual knowledge. It can conversely be said that Brentano is not “naive realist” who believes that the world itself, as it is, is represented by the perceptual knowledge. Because, according to Brentano I am incapable of having an “actual relation” between the consciousness and the objective world. Instead of this, the only relation describable between them is the intentional relation which provides us with the directedness of the intentional act towards the phenomenal or the sensory world in *the strict sense of the word*. To put it in a similar way, I can say that the ontological status of the external world is entirely taken away from the consideration of the directedness of the intentional acts. In order to strengthen this view, I can identify that for example, the “idea” is a physical phenomenon in Brentano when the act of ideating is one of

the mode of presentation in general. The traditional philosophy explicitly takes the “idea” as mental entity or subjective occurrences with which we can usually associate an object. Clearly, in the phenomenology of Brentano the notions “physical” and “mental” have a distinguishing characterization which is not in agreement with that of traditional philosophy, as noted above. The active acts such as thinking, imagining, remembering are what is mental for Brentano. On the other hand the static contents such as sound, heat, thought, idea, conception are physical phenomena in general. So the classical ontology is conversed into a new form for which there is an entirely different organization of the constituents of the relation of consciousness. Within the ontology of the Brentanian phenomenology, we are able to make the distinction between mental and physical even if it has a radical change compared to that of earlier philosophers.

After exposing the philosophical determination in the phenomenology of Brentano, now I can reveal the relation of his main claims to the above analysis. Brentano claims that the act is intentionally directed towards an intentional object if there is such an object at all. More efficiently, the main thing about the objects of intentional acts is that there is not an act which has no an object, or

conversely there is not an object which is not presented. The characterization of the intentionality of consciousness can be reformulated in such a way that every mental phenomenon is directed toward an object which is either a sensory object or another accompanying presentation. For Brentano the consciousness and object simultaneously require one another. To say briefly, the consciousness is intentional and the object is always present to this consciousness. One of the main differences between Husserl and Brentano is that for Husserl not every mental act is intentional. For example, the sensations and moods are non-intentional. So this leads us to Husserl's denial of the Brentanian argument that only and every mental act is intentional in the sense that it is directed towards an object. Also, most of the arguments that Brentano made with respect to the intentionality of the acts or consciousness seems to have centered around the ontological status of the objects towards which we are directed. Føllesdal puts some light on the difference between Brentano and Husserl by saying that

The Second weakness Husserl found in Brentano was a certain emptiness in his analysis of the directedness of acts. To say, as Brentano did, that each act has an object, is not only false, it is also not very informative. We want to understand how it is that acts are directed towards objects. Husserl's notion of the noema is supposed to do this. Indeed, we could define the noema as all those features of the act in virtue of which it has the object it has.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ See, Føllesdal, Dagfinn (1990) "Noema and Meaning in Husserl", *Philosophy and Phenomenological research*, pp. 263-271

Being decisive about the thesis of Brentano is dependent upon making a distinction between two separate periods of his philosophy, namely, *early* and *later* Brentano. The most significant characteristic of his early period is the claim that the object upon which I am directed is immanent to the act in the sense that it is a part of the act. So, the object becomes a mental entity or mind-dependent entity if I cannot speak of a corresponding extra-mental entity. And in fact Brentano maintains that the relation between the act and the object is a *quasi-relation* instead of being a genuine relation. This idea suggests that one of the terms contained in the relation cannot exist and this term in early Brentano turned out to be the intentional object, if remembered that Brentano begins by saying that the physical object is eliminated from the study of phenomenology. If so, then it becomes clear that the object that Brentano talks about exists in consciousness. So, when the object is not an *actual* or *real* object, it becomes very difficult to find a corresponding actual entity that fulfils the case in question. But in the following period of time Brentano comes to a remarkable change as regards the ontological status of the object. “Brentano’s later development which focussed more on problems of universals, emanating in a radical “reism”- a radical criticism of any acceptance of the existence (reality) of general objects- was less

influential on Husserl's philosophy, indeed even counter to it."¹¹⁹ For example, if I think of centaur, I am thinking of an actual centaur by going beyond the degree of the actuality of the properties of the centaur. Or if I am looking for a honest man, there must be an actual honest man that I am contemplating. This view is a radical change in Brentano's phenomenology. Specifically,

In his letter to Marty, dated 1905, he not only rejects this view but strangely enough contends that he never held it. The immanent object is now said to be the same as the thing itself. When, for example, I think about a horse the object of my thought is the horse itself, not a contemplated horse. Brentano however continues to call this thing, the horse in our example, an "immanent" object, and to hold the view that such a thing need not exist.¹²⁰

This change in his thought has been represented by the view that Brentano has dropped the term "intentional" out of his philosophy. Because the term "intentional inexistence" has already suggested the immanency of the object whenever we speak of the directedness of the consciousness. In similar words, whatever the general status of the object maybe I am always thinking of the directedness of the act toward an actual object. So this claim corresponds with the requirement of a genuine relation which suggests the existence of both terms involved in the relation. According to this new view, the intentional character of consciousness is described on

¹¹⁹ See, Cavallin, J (1997) *Content and Object*, p.22

the basis of the *actuality of the object* toward which I am directed. One possible difference between the Husserlian and Brentanian theory of intentionality seems to be that in Brentano the mental act is supposed as being intentional without a requisite investigation on the nature of the act. And what makes an act intentional is the immanency of the object in consciousness. To put in a similar way, I can say that the availability of an object within an act is the condition of the intentional property of the act. Briefly, Brentano accepted that the act is intentional if and only if there is an object to be presented. By doing so, he does not deal with the phenomenological features of the act which naturally makes it intentional just as Husserl did. As it becomes clear, Husserl tries to explicate what makes an act intentional in such a way that he does not seem to have the right to say that the act is intentional before giving out the phenomenological elements that constitutes the internal construction of the intentional character of the act. Mainly, the difference between Husserl and Brentano is the phenomenological *method* by means of which they endeavour to construct the supposition that the act of consciousness is intentional.

But,

¹²⁰ See, Mohanty, J.N (1971) "Husserl's Concept of Intentionality" in Anna Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), *Analecta Husserliana, The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research*, New York, Humanities Press, p.101

Husserl borrows from Brentano the idea that consciousness is essentially *noetic* or intentional. Brentano claimed that mental predicates are distinguished by the fact that they have intentional contents. Thus my thought is not just a thought *simpliciter*, it is and must be a thought *of* this or that;¹²¹

Another important dissimilarity between them is the fact that Husserl contains a phenomenological constituent, namely, *noema*¹²² in virtue of which the act becomes intentional as exposed in *ideas*. So, for Husserl, there seems to be a noematic structure where I can speak of the directedness of the phenomenological act. For Husserl the noematic structure provides us with the “ofness” of the phenomenological act and this “ofness” relation is present in the act alone. But, for Brentano, the “ofness” structure is actualized in the world of immanent objects. In other words, the intentionality of the act can be characterized as the containment of the object in an act as well as the presentative character of the act itself. Briefly, the intentionality of consciousness mainly depends on the object side for which an inclusion of it within an act becomes understandable. This character of intentional acts is mentioned by David Bell. So, he states that “Brentano did in a sense wish to endorse the claim that the object of a mental act exists ‘objectively’. What he means is utterly different from what ‘modern-day thinkers’ would mean by it. For Brentano, the

¹²¹ See, Gillet, Grant (1997) “Husserl, Wittgenstein and the Snark: Intentionality and Social

object of a mental act is never ‘something actually existing outside the mind’, it is ‘not to be understood as a reality’, but is rather something ‘in-existing’, ‘immanent’, ‘inherent’ or ‘contained’ within a mental act.”¹²³ Consequently, Husserl does not place the “ofness” character within the field of the object and prefers to speak of it as pertaining to the noematic structure. Actually a separate argument can be connected with the above analysis in such a way that the final differentiation between Brentano and Husserl that we described above has also been offered by Smith and McIntyre as the representatives of the object and the content approach to intentionality.¹²⁴

Naturalism”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 57 (2), pp. 331-349

¹²² See, ch. 4, 5

¹²³ Bell, David (1994) “Reference, Experience, and Intentionality” in Haaparanta, Leila (ed.), *Mind, Meaning and Mathematics*, p.188

¹²⁴ See, *Husserl and Intentionality*, pp. 40-57

4.2. Meinong's Theory of Intentionality; Meinongian Approach to the Ontological Status of the Objects of Acts.

Meinong, as a student of Franz Brentano, has attempted to take further the searches on the ontological status of the intentional object to which Brentano has already given a start. Indeed, the main contribution made by Meinong seems to have been concerned with the ontological status of the object. It is also true to say that Meinong himself supposed a distinction between the "content" and the object intended. So, an immanency is attributed to the content when an external sense of the object attaches to the general type of the object intended. Brentano and Husserl has been in an effort to distinguish the proper object of the intention from others.¹²⁵ Actually, Brentano has spent long time on the denial of the claim that the object is in the act or is a part of it. For Meinong there is no need to make a differentiation between the intentional objects (intended objects), because we can be directed towards all objects of any sort. This is to say that a proposition, a judgment, a fact, an abstract individual, a physical object such as tree can become the object of the intention. Furthermore Meinong comes to the conclusion that the objects of the intention do not need to exist in actuality. There are further

implications of these claims on which I shall also put some light soon. The most fundamental ontological characterization of the objects intended can be stated by saying that the objects of intention are “beyond being”. It seems that I can draw two separate conclusions from this maintenance. So, firstly, the objects of intention can be any and every sort and secondly, they do not need to exist when accepted that there are certainly objects which do not exist. But I must point out that by being compatible with the above view Meinong denies that every object must exist in actuality. Indeed this leads us to the admission of Meinongian claim that there are two modes of “being”, namely *existence* and *subsistence*.

According to this theory, only the physical objects such as trees, mountains and cars can exist in the sense that the mode of “being” that they share is the *ordinary existence*. The other ontological category of objects is called “objectives” which may only *subsist*. The objects which subsist are *ideal objects* such as abstract entities, propositions and relations of any type. However, Meinong also points out that there are objects which have neither existence nor subsistence and one can equally be directed towards these objects as well. Consequently, whatever subsists is objectives, which are

¹²⁵ See, ch. 3, 3.1

accepted as ideal objects. They are not the real parts of the reality but they subsist between realities.

According to Meinong, the cognitive acts such as assuming, judging, knowing possess a special sort of object called “objectives. To give an example, consider the *assumption* that the knife is on the table, now there is a cognitive content contained in this assumption, namely, *that the knife is on the table* which is the object of the act of assuming. However, in the establishment of the entity, namely, objective as an ontological category there is an explicit contribution of the objects that actually exist, namely *the knife* and *the table*. These two objects are sensorily perceived. And indeed their existence is described on the basis of the intuitive or perceptual presence of them. When the judged cognitive content only subsists, the table and knife possess an actual existence. As Findlay points out¹²⁶, the objects of cognitive acts have a dependence on objecta. In similar words, it can be said that the objective must be about something else, which possibly turns out to be the actual object itself. The other characterization of objectives is their actualization in the

¹²⁶ See, *Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values*, p. 71

sense that if “what is judged is true, then the objective of the judgment subsists”.¹²⁷ Let us turn to Meinong's own words; so,

If I say, “It is true that the antipodes exist,” truth is ascribed not to the antipodes, but to the Objective, “that the antipodes exist.” But this existence of the antipodes is a fact (*Tatsache*) which, as everyone sees immediately, can very well have a subsistent status, but cannot be still another existent entity in its own term, as it were. This holds, likewise, for all other objectives, so that every cognitive act which has an Objective as its Object represents thereby a case of knowing something which does not exist.¹²⁸

In similar way “the Object of knowledge, (that is, objective) need not to exist at all.”¹²⁹ In fact Meinong even goes further and claim that “wherever existence is absent, it not only can be but must be replaced by subsistence.”¹³⁰ But this last claim causes some problem in relation to the ontological status of the object towards which I can be directed. Namely that let us consider pegasus as an example, so it seems that for Meinong if it does not exist, then it must have subsistence. But I accept that it cannot have subsistence unless I prove its status of being an ideal object type. In fact Meinong does not try to describe a third kind of “being” beside “existence and “subsistence”, but his main argument seems to create such an ontological realm for which there is no a restriction to “being” itself.

¹²⁷ See, Linsky, Leonard(1980) “Meinong's Theory of Objects” in Robert C. Solomon (ed.), *Phenomenology and Existentialism*, p. 190

¹²⁸ See, Meinong, A. “The Theory of Objects” in R.M. Chisholm (ed.), *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology*, p. 80

¹²⁹ *ibid.*, 81

¹³⁰ *ibid.*,81

Because, for Meinong, even the non-being is an ontological property for which there is a describable ontological realm for entities. That is to say that even the “being” or “non-being” of the object can subsist. So, this leads us to the acceptance that “ The Object is by nature indifferent to being (*ausserseiend*), although at least one of its two Objectives of being, the Object’s being or non-being, subsists.”¹³¹ From these claims I come to the admission of the fact that to be an object does not depend upon its having being or non-being. Furthermore even when the object fails to exist or subsist, there certainly are a related characterization of the object as an ontological entity. Namely, the being or non-being is not applicable to the concept of object in the sense that I am not directly speaking of the being or non-being of the object, but only in the sense in which I specify the individuation of one of the characteristics that it has. Accordingly the ontological realm of a specific object does not necessitate its final constitution as being or non-being.

On the basis of the argument that the objects are *indifferent* to being, Meinong simultaneously comes to the admission that there are rather unusual sort of entities that may be contemplated as objects. One of these objects is *Meinong’s incomplete objects*; let

¹³¹ *ibid.*, 86

us to take an example such as my act of thinking of a silver tree. Now in this example the tree is a complete object. There is one more property, namely, of being silver which I assign to the Object in question. And Meinong claims that one knows the complete objects such as trees and mountains by the help of incomplete objects. What the incomplete objects achieve is the presentation of the related non-considered properties which an object may have. A reconsideration of the above example may produce another incomplete object such as a silver tree with golden leaves. Indeed the multiplication of the properties which the incomplete object has is possible. A complete object has a number of properties for each of which there is a typical construction of an incomplete object. There can be more than one incomplete object in virtue of which I indirectly contemplate a complete object. According to Meinong, the incomplete objects are “embedded in” complete objects that actually exist. For each determination of the complete object via an incomplete object seems to be referring to a different property of it. For Meinong I know the complete objects indirectly and by the intermediation of the incomplete objects. Because the properties of the incomplete objects is “embedded in” complete objects insofar as we admit that the complete objects have more than one property. The presentation of a new

incomplete object is possible provided that the instantiation of a new property of a complete object is the case. Each incomplete object represents the complete object in an indeterminate way. The internal connection between the incomplete objects is the shareability of their properties by the complete objects. But this is not to say that the ontological status of an incomplete object depends on that of the complete object. Even though it seems that the existence of an incomplete object is derived from that of the complete object, its existential status is proven by a unique metaphysical application. This means that in spite of the existence of the complete object, the being or non-being of the incomplete object indicates that the incomplete object at least subsists.

At the beginning of our discussion I suggested that the arguments that Meinong made were largely related to the ontological status¹³² of the object towards which I am directed. It seems that Meinong constructs such a significant ontological realm that it becomes redundant to speak of the existence of the object. Meinong's theory of intentionality seems to focus on the object of the intention. And what makes possible the directedness of the act is the independency of the object from the existence. Both Husserl and

Brentano has attempted to give an account of the case in which the object does not exist at all, but Meinong puts this question out of action by the claim that the *object is indifferent to being*. In Meinong's ontology everything can become an object as long as it is different from the conscious act. My characterization of Husserl's theory of intentionality is mainly based on the fact that the intentionality of the conscious act is derived from the act-structure of which there are numerous components.¹³³ To simplify the above view, I can say that the act, for Husserl, is intentional due to the act-structure. But, for Meinong, the central claim becomes that there is an object for every sort of act. For a comparative purpose, unlike Meinong, Husserl was trying to set out the reasons why the intentionality of the act that has no an existing object should be possible. In certain terms Husserl's theory does not presuppose a direct intended object before the significant establishment of the act- structure where the intentionality of consciousness is finally constituted. If I compare the Meinongian ontology with the Husserlian one, then it seems that although I am confined to a larger realm of objects, Husserl's theory is more complicated. This is owing to the fact that there is a structure of the

¹³² See, ch. 2, 2.2

¹³³ See, ch. 4, 5

act which gives rise to the intentionality of consciousness. And also Husserl refers to some separate arguments in respect to both the intentional act and the object. Husserl's main argument in the establishment of the intentionality of consciousness seems to overcome the difficulties arising from the non-existence of the object. The method Husserl used differs from the Meinongian approach on the basis of the fact that when the intended object does not exist, I put into action the act-structure via which I am able to describe the directedness of the act towards an object. So, it can be said that the act-structure creates a possible constitution of the object. For the sake of clarity I can specify the phenomenological role of *intentional content*¹³⁴ in the general sense of the word. The difference between Husserl and Meinong seems to be that unlike Meinong, Husserl attempts to clarify the intentionality of the act *in spite of* the non-existence of the intended object. In Meinongian ontology there is no much difference between the existence and the non-existence of the intended object insofar as the object is indifferent to being.

¹³⁴ *ibid*

4.3. Twardowski's main claims as regards the Intentionality of the Act

The main tendency of people has always been to establish a certain relationship between Husserl's theory of intentionality and the fundamental assertions of Twardowski's philosophy. Relatedly, what is supposed to be new in Twardowski's philosophy is the conception of the "content". To put it in a similar way, I can say that Twardowski uses a mediation of the concept of the "content" in order to explain the relation or directedness of consciousness to the object. So, the intentionality of consciousness is established between the act and object by the mediation of the concept of the "content". In fact the concept of "content" has also appeared in the phenomenology of Brentano.¹³⁵ But the main thing about this usage is that Brentano's concept of content has almost been used synonymously with the object upon which the act is directed. There seems to be an inexact correspondence between Brentano's and Twardowski's term of the content. However, from the point of an exact correspondence it can be said that both seems to be meaning the object in consciousness rather than the object which exists independently of us. The only difference

between Brentano and Twardowski seems to be that the conception of the “content” in Twardowski is too psychological, but Brentano’s term is rather philosophical and phenomenological. Brentano seems to have meant the immanent object by the term “content” and used this object as the intended object upon which we are directed.

But Twardowski denies that the “content” is the object towards which we are directed. Because, according to Twardowski, there is a three-fold distinction between act, content and object. And He specifies that the content is not the same as the object upon which we are directed. Additionally, Twardowski’s theory of intentionality can be called “a content-dependent theory” due to the fact that the final intended object is presented *through* the content of the intentional act. Now, I shall shed some light on the each component of the three-fold distinction between act, content and object respectively. First of all, I need to distinguish the act from the content and the intended object. At first Twardowski points to the possibility of confusing the content of the act with the act itself in which a content is intentionally presented. In this respect it can be said that, for Twardowski, the term “presentation” refers to both “the act of presenting” and the “content” of presentation. Twardowski says,

¹³⁵ See, ch. 3, 3.1

When one talks about “presentations”, one can understand by this expression sometimes the act of presenting; sometimes, however, one can mean by it what is presented, the content of presentation. And hence it has become customary to use instead of the expression ‘presentation’ one of the two expressions ‘act of presenting’ and ‘content of presentation’ whenever the smallest possibility of a misunderstanding exists.¹³⁶

From the above passage I infer that the “act of presentation” is in a close relationship to the content of the presentation. This relation can also be characterized by saying that the content is presented in the presentation in the sense of being “an act of presenting”. So this leads us to the circumstance that there are two separate use of the expression “presentation”, namely, the act of presentation and the content of presentation. However there are two componenets presented in a presentation, these namely are the content and the object of the presentation. To be more accurate about this separation I can refer to Twardowski’s own words, so he says

:The words ‘thing’ and ‘object’ are used in two senses: on the one hand for that *independently existing* entity... at which our presentation and judgment aim, as it were; on the other hand, for the mental, more or less approximate, “picture” of that real entity which *exists “in” us*. This quasi-picture (more accurate:sign) is identical with the content mentioned under (I). In distinction to the thing or object, which is assumed to be independent of thinking, one also calls the content of a presentation and judgment (similarly: of a feeling and willing) the “*immanent or intentional object*” of these mental phenomena.¹³⁷

In order to grasp and understand the correct pattern of the thinking in Twardowski, one has to refer to the exact meaning of the

¹³⁶ Twardowski, K. *OCOP*, p.1

¹³⁷ *ibid.*, 2

terms used throughout the text. According to this view, I can point out that both expressions “the presented” and “presentation” are ambiguous, due to the fact that they both designate the content which is presented in an act of presentation, and the expression “the presented” alone means both the content and the object which finally is presented by the mediation of the “content” itself. To exemplify the distinction between the content of presentation and the presented, I can refer to Twardowski’s own words. So he says,

In comparing the act of presenting with painting, the content with the picture, and the object with the subject matter which is put on canvas—for example, a landscape— we have also more or less approximated the relationship between the act on the one hand and the content and the object of the presentation on the other. For the painter, the picture is the means by which to depict the landscape; he wants to picture, paint, a real or merely imagined landscape, and he does so in painting a picture. He paints a landscape in making, painting, a picture of this landscape. The landscape is the “primary” object of this painting activity; the picture is the “secondary” object. analogously for presentations. A person presents to himself some object, for example, a horse. In doing so, however, he presents to himself a mental content. The content is the copy of the horse in a sense similar to that in which the picture is the copy of the landscape. In presenting to himself an object, a person presents to himself at the same time a content which is related to this object. The presented object, that is, the object at which the presenting activity, the act of presentation, aims, is the primary object of the presenting. The content through which the object is presented is the secondary object of the presenting activity.¹³⁸

For the clarity of the point that I have been making since the beginning of this section, it can be said that Twardowski accepts two separate relations between the three components of the intentionality of consciousness. Namely that the first type of relation is between the act and the content and the second is the relation

between the content and the object as it is presented by the help of the act of presenting. One of the ways of establishing the above mentioned relation between content and the presentation as the act is to stick to Zimmerman's view that,

“ We shall say of the content that it is thought, presented *in* the presentation; we shall say of the object that it is presented *through* the content of the presentation (or through the presentation.) What is presented in a presentation is its content; what is presented *through* a presentation is its object.”

When one says that something is presented, one merely has to add whether it is presented *in* the presentation or *through* the presentation. In the first case, the presented means the content of the presentation; in the second, the object of the presentation.¹³⁹

I can insist on the specification that the fundamental distinction that Twardowski makes between the content and the object of the presentation supposes the mediation of the “content” of the presentation. This is to say that the object is presented *through* the content of the presentation. And similarly the content is presented by means of the mediation of the act of presentation as well as the presentation of the object through the content of the presentation. By such a relation we come to hold that the “content” is mental or psychological. That is, it is the mental picture of the object in spite of the fact that the content is not the same as the real object outside of us. In fact Twardowski does not clearly account for the nature of the

¹³⁸ *ibid.*, 15-16

content even though he claims that there is a mediation of the content in the presentation of the final object. Such a mediation of the content of presentation is necessary for forming the directedness of the act of presentation to the object presented. Let us remember the mental character of the content in connection with the further acknowledgment that the “content” of the presentation will also be taken as a subjective component of the relation of the intentionality. This is to say that the same object is presented by the mediation of the differing contents. This claim is in an agreement with the Husserlian view that one and the same object is presented with the varying contents insofar as one can establish a philosophical link between the content and the object presented.

In fact there seems to be a further case for which I can specify the close relationship between the content and the object; remember that the content is presented *in* the act of presentation, the object is presented *through* the content of the presentation. Indeed, according to Twardowski, the expression “the presented” designates both the content and the object of the presentation. One of the ways of making a distinction between these two usage is to refer to the explanations of Twardowski himself. So Twardowski makes a

¹³⁹ *ibid.*, 16

distinction between *attributive* or *determining* adjectives and *modifying* adjectives. These adjectives implies a difference in meaning when put before a proper noun. Twardowski says,

A determination is called attributive or determining if it completes, enlarges- be it in a positive or in a negative direction- the meaning of the expression to which it is attached. A determination is modifying if it completely changes the original meaning of the name to which it is attached. Thus in 'good man' the determination 'good' is a truly attributive one; if one says 'dead man', one uses a modifying adjective, since a dead man is not a man. Likewise, by adding the adjective 'false' to a name, the original meaning of this name is replaced by another; for a false friend is no friend and a false diamond is no diamond. There is the possibility that the same word is used sometimes modifying, at other times in a truly attributive manner.¹⁴⁰

On the basis of the above paragraph I can evaluate the exemplification to which Twardowski has referred earlier on. According to that paragraph, I have to draw a distinction between the painted landscape and the real existing landscape. According to the above paragraph the adjective, 'painted' is a modifying one as to which the original meaning of the term has underwent a total change in meaning. In this case the modifying adjective 'painted' seems to have set up a connection of this new form of the object with being the content of the act of presentation. In similar terms it can be said that the lanscape as painted is presented in a way which differs from its presentation as an object in the natural world. This is to say that even if the picture is a picture of a landscape, the landscape painted in the

picture will not be the same thing as the real landscape out there. The painted lanscape designates two things; one is the presentation of a new component, namely, the content of the presentation. The other is the presentation of the final intended object presented *through* the content of the presentation. This mediation can be linked with the content being a mental picture of the real entity presented. Additionally it is the case that this content is in us. Indeed one may even go so far as to assume a photographic resemblance between content and object insofar as I hold the belief that the content is a mental picture of the object presented. In fact this final claim seems to be compatible with the mediation of the content of the presentation. To compare this with the Husserlian view is a later task, but for the sake of argument I can suggest that Twardowski develops a “content-dependent theory” of intentionality. Accordingly, Meinong has been focusing on the ontological status¹⁴¹ of the object for which there has been several ways to be present to the mind. But Twardowski impose a significant importance on the content via which I present an object to my mind. As a consequence, I can state that Twardowski takes away the importance of the object from the theory of intentionality

¹⁴⁰ *ibid.*, 11

¹⁴¹ See, ch. 3, 3.2

and instead speaks of a superiority of the content over the object and its ontological status.

4.4. A Primary Consideration of Husserl's Theory of Intentionality

So far we have been trying to describe the directedness of consciousness in terms of the relation between the intentional acts and their objects upon which we are directed. And it seems that this present relation sharply differs from the other relation types upon which we have already shed some light. It is the *intentional relation* for which a new ontology is required for the characterization of the directedness of the act toward the object as well. For Husserl the directedness of consciousness stems from the act and its intentional structure. We have already defined this act-structure as the cause of the directedness of consciousness insofar as we admit that there is an object towards which one can be directed. In fact we encounter a further characterization of the directedness of the intentional act in the words of R Sokolowski. So, he claims that "For Husserl, it is not necessary to find a mediating entity that bestows intentionality upon awareness, because consciousness is intentional by its very nature: consciousness is "always already" intentional, never in need of

something to make it so.”¹⁴² Husserl’s theory of intentionality does not contain questions as regards the ontological status of the intended object. This is due to that every act is associated with an object unless we contemplate a non-existent object. Husserl believes that the talk of non-existent objects is unnecessary as long as they are identified with an actually existing object. From a possible point of view it seems understandable that the presentation of an object, namely, the intended object, is simultaneous with the presence of an intentional act. To put this in a similar way, we can say that there is at least an object for which one can describe the intentionality of the intentional act. Simply, we are related to the object without searching the ontological properties of it. In fact, a similar point is also made by Chisholm. So, he says that “a person can think of, direct his thoughts upon, or refer to both things which exist and things which do not exist.”¹⁴³ Relatedly, Meinong seems to differ from Husserl in that Meinong tried to establish an ontological ground where one cannot raise a question with respect to the existence of the object to be presented. Because the category of being is so broad that there will not remain an object type

¹⁴² See, Sokolowski, R(1992) “Review Essay: Husserl and Analytic Philosophy and Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, p. 729

¹⁴³ See, Rosenkrantz, G (1990) “Reference, Intentionality and Nonexistent Entities”, *Philosophical Studies*, 58(1-2), p. 167

for which we may be incapable of describing the existential status of the object. Similarly, the property of being can be associated with every type of object insofar as the concept of object is broader than that of being. In the name of Meinong we can come to the conclusion that there seems to be a denial of the talk of the non-existent objects.¹⁴⁴ That is to say that every intentional act has an object to which a specific determination of existence applies. Within the framework of Husserl's theory of intentionality one can make the related point that the directedness of consciousness does not assume a direct relation between the act and the object. According to the Husserlian approach, a true consideration of the intentionality of consciousness necessitates the inclusion of the intentional content¹⁴⁵ within the phenomenological region of the act in virtue of which one can associate the act with the intended object. As we shall remember, the intentionality of consciousness, for Husserl, is because of the act and its intentional structure. One of the most significant component of this structure is the intentional content or ideal unity by virtue of which we relate the act to an intended object. As an early announcement, it can be said that the directedness of the act towards

¹⁴⁴ *ibid*

¹⁴⁵ See, ch. 4, 5

the intended object is set up by the participation of the ideal or intentional content which phenomenologically assigns an object for the act of presenting, namely, the act. According to David Woodruff Smith, the intentionality theory of Bolzano, Twardowski, Meinong, Husserl and Frege can be called *internalist*. “It holds that the object of an intentional experience is that which is prescribed by, or satisfies, the *content*, or internal structure, of the experience”.¹⁴⁶ As we shall see, the Husserlian approach to intentionality can be called “content-dependent theory” of intentionality. Actually, before Husserl, we have already seen the philosophical role of the content in both Brentano and Twardowski.¹⁴⁷ It seems that the content in Husserl is similar to the content in Twardowski in the sense that the role of *mediation* is clearly stated within the theory they develop. But the nature of the content is not the same in both due to the ontology of which they become a component. For Husserl the intentional act claims an “aboutness” or “ofness” of something. But we know that the ofness of the act is established by the contribution that the intentional content makes. The phenomenological structure of the content seems to suggest us an intentional relation between the act and the intended

¹⁴⁶ See, Smith, David Woodruff:(1984) “Content and Context of Perception”, *Synthese*, 61, p. 63

¹⁴⁷ See, ch. 3, 3.1 and ch. 3, 3.3

object. The same structure does not say anything as regards the existential status of the object. For Husserl the object toward which we are directed is the tree in the garden. It is not a mental picture of the object intended in an intention. The tree is independent of us and does not have a mode of existence such as “immanence”. Accordingly, it can be said that the relation of intention always assumes an object *simpliciter* in the sense that we are not directed toward the mental tree or a pink tree, but intention always claims an actuality of the intended object in spite of the fact that the object intended may not exist at all. However, this should not be taken as the indication of the fact that one can be directed towards the non-existent objects if we remember that Husserl escapes from making arguments regarding the ontological status¹⁴⁸ of the non-existent objects, even though a great deal of argument has been provided by Meinong. From the philosophical remarks Husserl makes we come to the conclusion that the object *simpliciter* is independent of the act and its intentional structure. When I perceive the tree I perceive the tree in the garden as standing before our sense capacity. At this point we have to draw a distinction between the sensory and non-sensory acts for being able to show the adequacy of taking the natural concrete individuals as the

¹⁴⁸ See, ch. 2, 2.2

objects of the intention. Husserl seems to think that the intended objects of the sensory acts is always natural objects such as a car, a mountain, a tree, a door etc. In fact the same objects can also be presented by the non-sensory acts such as thinking, remembering, judging, loving, hating, imagining etc. Furthermore the object of the act of imagining is a real natural object, for Husserl, as set out before. But, according to Husserl's theory of intentionality, the relation between the act and the intended object is not a real relation just as I can think of a relation of my body to the car that I drive. For Husserl the object that we perceive is an actual and a transcendent object in the sense that it can exist independently of us. As we have already pointed out, the transcendent object is not given wholly and entirely¹⁴⁹, Instead we perceive it each time from a certain perspective. Aspectual character of the perception of the transcendent object leads us to the establishment of the fact that intention achieved in an act always supposes a specific determination of the intended object. If the intentionality of the act is accomplished by the conscious subject's determination of the object, then it becomes clear that we cannot know directly the intended object. Indeed, for Husserl the object of the intention can be contemplated in two different ways; firstly from the

¹⁴⁹ See, ch. 2, 2.1

some of the remarks that Husserl makes we can conclude that the object upon which we are directed is the mountain Ararat. But from another point of view Husserl seems to be involved in the assumption that we always know the object according to the specific determination by which it is thought from a certain perspective such as the consideration of Ararat as the mountain on which I walked. This view seems to be compatible with the admission that the intentional relation of consciousness is not related to the empirical or contingent facts about the intended object. Although the arguments that Husserl makes in *Ideas* phenomenologically assumes the existence of the ordinary objects, it seems that the main structure of the phenomenology of experience is the reconstruction of the noematic description in which the characterization of the intended object changes totally. This can be taken as meaning that the ideal unity of the act is such a comprehensive character by which we relate ourselves to an object phenomenologically. The main task in Husserl's phenomenology is to explain how the act becomes intentional in spite of the questions that one may raise as regards the ontological status of the object. However, the legitimate part of phenomenology is mainly concerned with the ontological exposition of the act-structure in which we relate an act to an intended object. According to the early period of

Husserl, the traditional argument is concerned with the presentation of the intended object and denies a comprehensive analysis of the ontological status of the object. An inquiry of this type mainly tries to clear up the ground where an intended object may not exist. But we must also say that due to the phenomenological structure of the act, we always assume the existence of an object upon which we are directed. In similar terms the intentionality of the act is not due to that there exists an object upon which we are directed. Instead, we are led to the conclusion that there are further components in virtue of which the act becomes noetic along with the contribution which the ideal structure of the act makes in some way. Also from a possible point of view it is the case that the questions as regards the existence or non-existence of the intended object are taken away from the phenomenological framework into which the epoché has already slipped. Actually, early Husserl seems to have put forward some ontological remarks with respect to the natural world and its objects. Even so, as soon as epoché is put into action, the ontological questions regarding the intended object are abandoned. Thus, the constitution of an object-realm is totally left to the act-structure and its phenomenological experiences. In other words we become capable of speaking of the natural world and its objects through the noetic phase

of the act. But this should not lead us to the questions concerning the actuality of the natural world. On this ground we must insist on the fact that Husserl seems to have accepted that the natural world is conveyed to the realm of consciousness where there is a different way of establishment of the world of objects.

CHAPTER V

THE CONSTRUCTION OF HUSSERL'S THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY

5.1. An Analysis of the idea of Content in *Logical Investigations*

So far we have already been involved in some arguments through which we have referred to the determination of the ingredient that Husserl takes as the *intentional content* of the act. In the fifth of Husserl's *Logical Investigations* one can find the details of arguments made in this connection. The overall understanding of the Husserlian theory can be associated with an ontology which aims at the explanation of the intentional structure of the act. Furthermore, we can say that if one analyses the act-structure and its further components, then the determination of the intentional content becomes inevitable. From the earlier remarks we are aware of the fact that the content is not the object of the act upon which we are directed. In *Logical Investigations* Husserl suggests a distinction between the *real* and the *intentional content* of an act. Husserl says,

By the *real phenomenological content* (my italic) of an act we mean the sum total of its concrete or abstract parts, in other words, the sum total of the partial experiences that really constitute it.¹⁵⁰

It can certainly be said that there seems to be a phenomenological relation between the act and the *real content* in the sense that they both designate the noetic or intentional character of the presentative act. The *real content*, for Husserl, is the subject matter of empirical science, namely, the empirical psychology.¹⁵¹ It is a *real (reel) phase* in respect of that it is a *temporal moment* of the act. The real content is part of the act which makes it noetic. The intentional act is such a comprehensive structure that one can identify some further partial acts as a part of the main act. What makes an act noetic is the phenomenological domain in which there are accompanying parts describing the intentionality of consciousness. We can simply say that one can identify the complete act with the partial acts which constitute the real content. Similarly, it can be said that the intentional act represents the real content which introduces the accompanying presentations along with the present act. From this we can point out that though the real content is separate from the main presentative act,

¹⁵⁰ See, *LI*, §16, p. 576

¹⁵¹ See, *LI*, §16, p. 577

they both belong to the same phenomenological essence in the sense that they function as a unique single act of consciousness. We shall also speak of the real content as a *dependent-part* or *dependent-moment* of the noetic act which is directed upon an object. We must say that the real content as the distinguishable moment of the act is not the object towards which we are directed. In spite of the plurality of the partial acts, there is only one phenomenological act which represents the directedness of consciousness. Similarly, these partial acts are unified into a single act by which a certain object is presented. From a possible point of view, it can be said that the object of partial acts is the same as the object of the main act. That is to say that we are involved in the main intentional character of consciousness as to which one single act is directed upon a certain intended object. From the definition Husserl gave above we need to ask; are the partial experiences independent of the main presentative act? The intended object is the object of the main phenomenological act beside the partial acts that constitute it. To say that the partial acts are independent parts is compatible with saying that those partial acts also have a separate object. Also, the function of the partial acts is not the establishment of the intentionality of the noetic act, but is the constitution of the final structure of the intentional act. Real content

holds certain relations to the act just as the individuals or tokens holds to the spatio temporal world. If the *real content* is an empirical aspect of a real and psychological act, then these relations have to be the real empirical relations holding between the real content and the act which is also a temporal entity. For such an entity, we should be able to describe an ontological type on the basis of which one can distinguish a certain act from another one. The first definition which refers to the general type of intentional acts is provided by the ontological structure of the act. Real content introduces an act model which purifies the act character of the consciousness. This purification does not exclude the intentional or noetic character of consciousness. However, we must say that the act and its real content is not enough to make the act intentional. This is due to that there is another component of the act by means of which the act becomes directed towards the intended object. Additionally, we can say that there is not a direct relation between the real content and the intended object. Even so, we have already stated that the partial acts are also directed to the same intended object. The “offness” of the act is constructed by the ideal part of the act and its intentional structure. To put it in a similar way, the intentional relation between the act and the intentional object results from the

other component of the act-structure, namely, the ideal unity of the *intentional content*.

Before we deal with this second component of the content I want to draw some attention to another distinction within the realm of the content itself. This distinction suggests the presentation of the components, namely, the *quality* and *matter* of an act. In this connection, Husserl says,

Quality and matter were distinguished by us as two ‘moments’, two inner constituents of all acts.....If, e.g., we call an experience one of ‘judgement’, there must be some inner determination, not some mere outwardly attached mark, that distinguishes it as a judgement from wishes, hopes and other sorts of acts.¹⁵²

This inner determination has been taken by Husserl as the *quality* of the act which defines it as belonging to *a certain kind*. In similar terms “The quality of an act is the way in which the act is intentionally directed towards its object”¹⁵³ This component defines and differentiates the phenomenological act according to kind as to which certain type of mental acts are defined as being distinguished from the other types. For example, the act of seeing the tree in the garden and the act of seeing the mountain Ararat define a certain type of act, namely, “seeing” for which there is a possible instantianiation by the different tokens of this type. This is to say, the “seeing” as a

¹⁵² See, *LI*, V, §22, p. 597

type of the act seems to assume a big number of the individual occurrences of this present type. One can even attempt to make a possible differentiation between the individual acts as to the subjects to which they belong as a property. This is due to that one can characterize an act as belonging to *subject A* and claim the distinctiveness of it from the other acts which possibly belongs to *subject B*. However, we can even go further and claim that the individual acts that separately belong to the same subject are different even though they share the same quality-component of the act. Content's quality-component concerns the mode of presentation of the object on the part of the phenomenological act. So, the quality-component phenomenologically qualifies the act as a member of a certain act-type by which it is defined.

From the earlier arguments it becomes clear that we have already referred to a distinction between the perceptual and intellectual or non-perceptual acts in terms of the "presentation type". This presentation type can be specified by saying that the subject of the act suggests a subject attitude which we should hold towards the object presented phenomenologically. For example, in the act of

¹⁵³ See, Smith, B (1987) "Husserl, Language, and the Ontology of the Act" in D. Buzetti and M. Ferriani (ed.), *Speculative Grammar, and Philosophical Analysis of Language*, p. 6

seeing the tree in the garden, we get a sensory sight of the tree from a certain perspective by the presentative character of the act. Similarly, by the act of loving the ice cream we get a sensation of being pleased with having the ice cream, etc. From this we can conclude that the presentative character is accomplished within the region of the act or, *noesis*. As a point of demarcation, we can point out that the presentative character or type is definable for perceptual acts in five manner; namely, these are the occurrences which have been in correlation with the five sense organs. To arrive at such a sharp demarcation between the act-types is not equally workable for the intellectual or non-perceptual acts. However, we can assume the existence of some philosophical device by which we can distinguish a hope from a judgement insofar as one is not reducible to another. If looked carefully, it can be seen that we have avoided from the talks which take the acts as the accomplishment of an intention. Content's quality-component of the act, namely, the quality, does not hold a direct relation to the intended object. In other words, it is rather difficult to construct a phenomenological relation between the act's presentation type and the intended object presented. But the quality-component of the act is concerned with the act of presenting by means of which an object is presented. Content's quality-component points to

the manner in which something is presented as an object. This is to say that the occurrence of an intentional act is always correlated with a subject attitude by which the object is presented in a specific manner. This manner or presentation type is not enough to designate the intentional character of consciousness. Or the accomplishment of an intentional relation between an act and an object does not rely on the quality- component of the act. This is to say that what makes an act intentional is largely dependent upon the accompaniment of the content-component, namely, *matter*. In contrast to the quality-component of the act, Content's matter-component seems to present a connection between the act and the intended object. So, the matter of the act becomes definable provided that one can speak of the object part of the intentional relation. We can actually refer to the matter-component in order to distinguish an act from another on the basis of the fact that they are directed towards the varying objects. Namely that the acts with different matter can vary in their intentionality in the sense that a different object is presented by the presentative character of the act. To give an example, consider the acts with different quality but with the same matter. So, the assertion that 'There are intelligent beings on Mars' differs from the question that 'Are there intelligent beings on Mars!' in act-quality in spite of the fact that they both share

the same matter. Similarly, the acts with the same quality may differ in matter in the sense that they are possibly directed towards the different objects. According to Husserl, what determines the phenomenological nature of the intention is the matter-component of the act. Even if the matter is an act component, it seems that Husserl connects this item with the object part of the intention. In *Logical Investigations* Husserl seems to have used the term “matter” and the “content” synonymously. The question arises, how can the matter as a component of the act determine the presentation of the intended object? The adequate answer seems to be that the “matter” is an object aspect of the act. For we have already clarified that the object that Husserl speaks of seems to have been represented by the phenomenological significance of the consciousness. But this claim should not lead us to the acknowledgment that the object of the relation of intending is mental. Furthermore, the phenomenological organisation of the object of the intention is not independent of the act-structure if we accept the phenomenological efficacy of the epoché. For the epoché opens up a new ontological realm in which the objects are organised to have a phenomenological actuality. This actuality is represented by the ideal realm of consciousness if we also admit that the intended object is not independent of the act and its

intentional structure. The intended object is describable with the same properties as those which are suggested by the presentation of the epoché. The bracketing the natural standpoint does not entirely take us away from the natural object for which now Husserl suggests a new way of determining the physical presence of the object. This character of the object is always mentioned by the role of perception in virtue of which we are directed towards an actual physical object. When we claim that the matter-component of the act represents the object part of the intention, we, however, do not specify the type of the object toward which we are directed. The philosophical implication of the matter-component is identical with the assertion that the intentional act provides an aspect in which we are provided an object. It seems that the matter-component is not independent of the acts of which it is an abstract aspect. An aspect in virtue of which we are directed towards a certain object. Actually, this directedness of the intentional act is accomplished by the object-component or object-aspect of the act and its intentional structure. This aspect of the act is identified within the realm of the conscious experience. The phenomenological significance of the matter-component is to establish a connection of the intentional experience with the object part of the same experience.

It can be said that the *real content* possesses a *real quality* and a *real matter* which determines the type and the object of the intentional act respectively. So, it can certainly be decided that the relation of intending is describable by remaining within the realm of conscious experience as well as the object aspect of the intention. Additionally, the partial acts that constitute the intentional act also share the same quality and matter. On the basis of the above remarks we can conclude that it is the matter that determines the objective reference. Husserl claims that the identical matters never give rise to the distinct intentional relations. We must also point to the fact that the object of the act can be conceived in a specific manner. This has already been emphasized by saying that we intend the intended object by means of the specific determination which we have of it. For Husserl, such a determination is equivalent to saying that we know the object in virtue of a phenomenological determination which represents the object in a specific manner. Husserl puts the issue as follows,

The matter, therefore, must be *that element in an act which first gives it reference to an object, and reference so wholly definite that it not merely fixes the object meant in a general way, but also the precise way in which it is meant*. The matter-to carry clearness a little further- is that peculiar side of an act's phenomenological content that not only determines *that* it grasps the object but also *as what* it grasps it, the properties, relations, categorial forms, that it itself attributes to it.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁴ See, *LI*, V, §20, p. 589

When the real quality determines the type of the act, the real matter establishes a ground on which we can not only determine the object but also the specific way in which it is presented. The real matter relates us to the object in a way in which the object of intention is intended “as”. This suggests that the object is presented as having certain properties. And the specific determination mediates the relation between the act and the final intended object. Such a mediation of the matter-component will later be evaluated as the main content of the act which determines the character of the directedness of consciousness. Consequently, Husserl calls the union of these two content components, namely, the quality and matter the *intentional essence* of an act.

Accordingly, the constitution of the act-structure, for Husserl, differs from act to act. Especially, the content components of the perceptual acts are dissimilar with those of intellectual presentations. This is due to that the perceptual acts contain a sensory content beside the quality and matter components of the act. For Husserl the sensory content does not play a role in the intentionality of the act if we remember that the sensation is not intentional.

In correlation with the real content and its further components, Husserl also affirms the phenomenological significance of the ideal unity of the act, namely, the intentional content. The characterization of the intentional content changes from the period to period although it preserves its ideal character. In contrast to the real content, the intentional content is an ideal entity or an abstract structure. The words of Husserl is as follows;

We must exclude all empirical interpretations and existential affirmations, we must take what is inwardly experienced or otherwise inwardly intuited (e.g. in pure fancy) as pure experiences, as our exemplary basis for acts of *Ideation*. We must *ideate universal essences and essential connections in such experiences- ideal Species of experiencing of differing levels of generality, and ideally valid truths of essence* (my italic) which apply a priori, and with unlimited generality, to possible experiences of these species.¹⁵⁵

From the above passage we can infer that the acts of the same type constitute an abstract or ideal structure by which the occurrences of some individual acts becomes possible. In more simple terms, the intentional content designates an ideal type or essences. Namely that they are independently existing universals of which there are a large number of individual occurrences. Though the real acts are temporal entities, the ideal essence or structure is atemporal entity such as the Platonic ideas or forms. As can be seen, we have already come to the conclusion that this ideal structure can be instantiated in virtue of the real temporal act-occurrences. This view seems to be compatible with

the assertion that there must be some fundamental types to which a large number of tokens belong. The act-types cannot be exhausted by the individual act-occurrences which differ from one another. In addition, the intentional content exists independently of the act and its real content. However, it can also be said that each act can constitute a general type of which there may be a number of individual occurrences as we have already pointed out. Such a type or essence of the act is definable by the different occurrences of one and the same act insofar as we never accept a numerical identity between them. This ideal unity seems to suggest that the sum total of the acts of different character are always contained within the same phenomenological domain which we can identify with a specific type or act-essence. And the act- essence does not exclude the differentiation that we find between the individual acts. In similar terms, the participation in the same type or act-essence should not be identified with a sameness of the individual acts just as the ideal unity of the act suggests. Indeed, this is a sort of unity by means of which different individual acts shares. This ideal structure is also independent of the real content in the sense that it does not occur as a part of the real temporal entity, namely, the act. If this independent entity is a type or essence, then it

¹⁵⁵ See, *LI*, V, §16, p. 577

is possible to conclude that there are numerous acts which belong to it. Another significant remark seems to be that Husserl tries to explicate the directedness of the act in virtue of the intentional content. Even though the type of the intentional content kept being of an ideal character, some of the modifications that Husserl made led him to a different characterization of this entity. One of the most significant characterizations of the content in *Logical Investigations* is its being a *linguistic(intensional) entity*.¹⁵⁶ This entity is the same entity as that of Frege's *sense* of which we shall give a broad explanation in one of the following sections.

¹⁵⁶ See, *LI*, I, §14, §30; V, §20, §21

5.2. An Analysis of the idea of Content in *Ideas* ; Noesis and Noema

The conception of content has undergone a radical change in Husserl's book called *Ideas*. Namely that noesis and noema are introduced by Husserl in connection with the argument of phenomenological content. The terms "real content" and "intentional content" has been replaced by these terms, namely, noesis and noema respectively. A comprehensive elaboration of the development of the concept of content is in §85-94 and §124-128 in *Ideas*. Noesis and noema makes some contributions to the ontology of the intentional experience in virtue of which the directedness of the act is phenomenologically defined.

In *Ideas* Husserl seems to be identifying the "real content" of *Logical Investigations* with the "noesis" and the "intentional content" with "noema" respectively. Noesis and noema are the *intentional phases* of the act of consciousness. Unlike the sensory *hyle*, they are components of the intentional act which establishes the directedness of the act of consciousness. What makes an act intentional is the phenomenological "correlation" of noesis with noema as suggested in *Ideas*. As an intentional phase of the act, noesis does not preserve the character of being real any more. This view can be

connected with the acknowledgment that the presentation of epoché opens up a new ontological view according to which the consciousness cannot be explained in natural words. Because the view of natural standpoint seems to claim that the consciousness can be taken as a “psychological ego” by means of which there are a number of instantiation of the individual acts. In similar terms, if epoché suggests a new ontology for the intentional act, then the adequacy of the view, that one is to get involved in the phenomenological study of the intentional acts, becomes clear. Namely, this study has to be accomplished within the transcendental phenomenology in which I have to avoid taking the noesis as a real psychological component. So, under the significance of the epoché, the noesis becomes an atemporal transcendental item for which I cannot make up some empirical statements. In *Ideas* Husserl speaks of the intentional act or noesis as the accompanying components of the transcendental ego. The characterization of the real content in *Logical Investigations* is accompanied with the real and temporal character of the acts. But the transcendental phenomenology modifies the intentional act or noesis into a transcendental component of which there may be a phenomenological (transcendental) study.

There is, for Husserl, another aspect from which I can stress the “sense giving” character of the noesis. The noesis gives an “interpretive sense” to the act in virtue of which the object is presented. Husserl expresses,

At the same time it is not an unwelcome feature that the word “Nous” in one of its outstanding meanings recalls the word (“meaning” or) “sense” (sinn), although the “bestowal of sense” which takes place in the noetic phases includes a variety of things, and only as its basis a “sense-bestowal” as adjunct to the pregnant concept of sense (Sinn).¹⁵⁷

Now, the correspondent term in *Ideas* which Husserl suggested for the intentional content of the act is “noema”. The intentional content in *Logical Investigations* was an act-type, or the ideal unity to which all related acts belong. *Ideas* still suggests the “ideality” of the intentional content as well as the abstract character of it. Within the framework of this elaboration, I can say that the notion of noema seems to be presented in connection with the phenomenological characterization of the perception. So,

Perception, for instance, has its noema, and at the base of this its perceptual meaning, that is, the *perceived as such*. Similarly, the recollection, when it occurs, has as its own its *remembered as such* precisely as it is “meant” and “consciously known” in it; so again judging has as its own the *judged as such*, pleasure the pleasing as such, and so forth.¹⁵⁸

Husserl seems to be offering a new strategy for the understanding of the intentional content as introduced in *Ideas*.

¹⁵⁷ See, *Ideas*, §85, p. 249

According to this view, it seems that the noema of the act of consciousness can be associated with an “*ideal apprehension*” which reflects back upon the whole act. The development of such an ideal structure can be connected with the final aim of transcendental phenomenology as explored in *Ideas*. So, on the basis of the above paragraph I can see that the noema of the act should be taken as a “Sinn” or “sense” which accordingly suggests not only the ideal character of it but also the linguistic structure by which it can be defined as a certain type of entity. In fact this “Sinn” component is another constituent of the noema of which we shall give a brief characterization later on. Along with this way of characterization of the noema of the act I can also point out that the act is not directed towards the noema at all. So, this is to say that the noema is not an object upon which I can be directed. It is rather an ideal structure by means of which I can be directed towards the intended object. The emphasis of the ideal character of the noema also reveals that I am going through an ideal structure in which it is rather difficult to find a real constituent part of an objective relation. This ideal structure is suggested by the significance of the epoché according to which we have to live the object-pole of the relation of intending within the

¹⁵⁸ See, *Ideas*, §88, p. 258

phenomenological domain of consciousness. It seems that the noema in fact points to the fact that a more efficient study of the acts are needed for revealing the importance of the ideal structure of the phenomenological content. The best description of such a structure can be provided by the “*noematic description*” which Husserl thinks it is necessary. According to this description, when I put the act in quotation marks I refer to the described ideal structure or the noema (Sinn) by virtue of which a certain object is presented. Ahmet İnam explores this point by saying that,

The quotation marks in the examples such as “natural thing” and “plant” indicates the changeable character of the meaning. So the “tree” as a noema turns out to be a meaning. The tree in the natural world can burn but the reduced term “tree” never burns (my translation).¹⁵⁹

Noematic structure is a ground where I cannot refer to the natural or real constituents; for, I have already pointed out that the noema functions as a device by means of which the intended object is presented. Now, how can one establish a real relation between the presented or intended object and the ideal structure? The answer has already been given by saying that after the suspension of the natural standpoint, the object-pole of the relation of intending has been represented in the limits of consciousness. Also other components of

¹⁵⁹ See, İnam, A. (1995) *Edmund Husserl Felsefesinde Mantık*, p. 38

the noema establishes a connection of the act with the object without confronting with the object as existing in the natural world. This view is in relation to the fact that the same object can be presented by the mediation of the different noemata if the acts differ from one another. The intended object has to be presented by referring to a “specific determination” of the object. In this connection, it can be said that the physical thing as a transcendent object is always known from a certain perspective in the sense that I either refer to a certain specific determination of the intended object or I know it from a certain perspective, that is, we know it partly but not wholly, remember the arguments that I made before, in the earlier sections. This view that we know the object from a certain perspective can partly be linked with the phenomenological assertion that the noema of the act introduces the object as having a certain determination just as already explored in *Logical Investigations*. So, the “matter-component” of the content in *Logical Investigations* has correspondent to the “Sinn” component of the noema. The noema along with the Sinn-component has always determined the object as presented in a certain manner.

For a better understanding of the point I can refer to a comparative explanation provided by Richard Aquila. So, according to him, in the *investigations* Husserl tried to distinguish between the

intended object and the meaning as involved in the linguistic expressions. But in *Ideas* Husserl makes a Fregean turn by claiming that

Husserl there distinguishes, for example, between an ordinary object of which one may be perceptually conscious on an occasion and the “perceptual *meaning*” of that consciousness. The latter is provided by the act’s “noema,” which Husserl identifies with the “perceived as such” .¹⁶⁰

Even further than this, the two identical presentations can only be provided by the acceptance that not only the same objects are presented but also they are presented as exactly in the same manner in the sense that the noemata of these two acts suggests the the same specific determination of the object. Here I can mention a similar approach developed by E. Parl Welch who also claims that,

The tree is a tree, even though it is “perceived” inadequately, partially; the tree is perceived in certain of its aspects only. The “other side” of the tree is not “seen” in one and the same act.¹⁶¹

In order to strengthen this view, I can remember that Husserl has introduced the philosophical conception of noema of an act in connection with the ideal characterization of the perceptual acts. The noema of an act of perception presents the transcendent object from a certain perspective along with the characterization that the intended object is presented by the specific determination which presents an

¹⁶⁰ See, Aquila, R (1982) “On Intensionalizing Husserl Intentions”, *Nous*, 16, pp. 209-211

object as having certain characterization. But I need to make a distinction with regard to the objects of perceptual acts. According to this view, firstly, the perceived object can be known or given from a certain perspective. Secondly, I can know an object via a specific determination such as the tree in the corner or the tree that I planted in my garden. On this ground, however I can interpret Husserl as saying that the intended object is always the final object of the act in which it is presented. As a Meinongian approach, I apprehend the objects as having certain properties which are instantiated by the specific acts. This characterization can also be found in *Logical Investigations* where Husserl claims that the matter of the act not only decides which object is presented but also how the object is intended in the act. This “how” can be associated with the presentative force of the noema of an act. As a consequence, the presentation of the noema as an atemporal and irreal or ideal entity is in a “correlation” with the noesis as explained in *Ideas*. Such a correlation necessitates the inseparability of one another in the sense that there is not an act that has no a noema insofar as the act shares the presentative character of consciousness. Here it is adequate to say that each noesis identifies a related noema or ideal structure through which an object with a certain determination is

¹⁶¹ See, Welch, E. P. *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl*, p. 171

presented. The whole noema is such a structure by which a “mode of presentation” is suggested. By the “mode of presentation” I do not mean the quality-component of the act, instead I am concerned with the presentative character of the noema of an act. And such a character can specify the composition of the quality and matter components which determine the intentional character of the act. At this point I can work out that the noema of an act consists in the temporal and atemporal phases that constitute the ideal character of consciousness. Such an ideal character seems to exclude the object-component of the relation of intending. The characterization of the object of intention as a certain type of entity will be discussed in the following section.

5.3. The Phenomenological Components of Act's Noema; "Sinn" and "Thetic" Aspects

The matter-component of the content as suggested in *Logical Investigations* turns out to be the "Sinn" component of the noema in *Ideas*. Also Husserl suggests that each noema has another component or phase that sets up the phenomenological relation between the act and the object-component of this relation. Let us remember that the matter-component not only describes the object part of this relation but also the specific manner in which it is presented. The "Sinn" component of the noema is represented by the names, "*the intended as such*", "*the perceived as such*" and "*the noematic Sinn*". The "Sinn" component of the noema does not share the property of being real and empirical unlike the noesis of the act. In order to reinforce this claim, let us refer to Husserl's own words, so

The *tree plain and simple*, the thing in nature, is as different as it can be from this *perceived tree as such*, which as perceptual meaning belongs to the perception, and that inseparably. The tree plain and simple can burn away, resolve itself into its chemical elements, and so forth. But the meaning—the meaning of *this* perception, something that belongs necessarily to its essence—cannot burn away; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties.¹⁶²

From these remarks I can come to the conclusion that the Sinn component of the noetic phases is in a correlation with the Sinn

component in the noema. On this ground, It can be said that the noema seems to be explicated by an act of ideal apprehension. For, this ideal reflection or apprehension has to be an act of transcendental consciousness. An analysis of the phenomenological noema leads us to the determination of the some correlative component, namely, the “*thetic*” phases of the act. Also the intentional character of the act is defined by the Sinn component of the act. However, the Sinn in the noesis holds some similarity to the Sinn-component in the whole noema. The relatedness to one another is explained in the following way by Husserl;

In the example we took and analysed, that which stood out as its “meaning” or “sense”, does not of course exhaust the full noema; correspondingly the noetic side of intentional experience does not consist exclusively of the strict “sense-giving” phase to which “sense” or “meaning” specifically belongs as correlate. We shall presently show that the full noema consists in a nexus of noematic phases, and that the specific sense-phase supplies only a kind of necessary *nucleic layer* in which further phases are essentially grounded, which for that reason, no doubt, though with an enlargement of the term’s meaning, we should designate sense-phases.¹⁶³

The noematic Sinn does not only determine the specific object but also identify the specific manner in which the object is presented. So, it can be said that the Sinn holds a relation to the object part of the intention. The Sinn takes over the role of matter-component of the content introduced in *Logical Investigations*. If I remember the phenomenological significancy of the matter, then I can clarify that

¹⁶² See, *Ideas*, §89, pp. 260-261

the Sinn-component presents an object in a specific manner in which it is presented as having certain properties. The accomplishment of the presentation of an object is dependent upon the Sinn which one identifies in the noema. If the Sinn of the noema decides which object part is to be intended in the act, then I have to be able to contemplate the object as having certain properties. For each property of the same intended object I can speak of a related different intention. Their noemata will differ from each other. Similarly, one and the same object can be presented by two distinct acts which have different noemata and Sinne. Accordingly, the structure of the act is detected by that “ *A unique kind of reflexion* may on every occasion detect this meaning, as it is immanent in perception, and it is only to that which is apprehended in it that the phenomenological judgment has to adjust itself and give faithful expression.”¹⁶⁴ Noematic Sinn presents the object not in a complete way but as having certain determinations in the sense that though the object remains the unchanged, the properties which I consider the object as having changes from noema to noema or more strictly, noematic Sinn. Here the noematic Sinn is identified, by Husserl, with the meaning or sense which the linguistic expressions

¹⁶³ See, *Ideas*, §90, p. 262

¹⁶⁴ See, *Ideas*, §89, p. 261

espress. By depending upon the correspondency of Husserl with Frege I can say that they both mean “the mode of presentation” by the “Sinn” or sense. Consequently, it can be said that the Sinn or “sense giving phase” of the noesis is in a correlation with the noematic Sinn in the noema.

The other component that constitute the structure of the act is the “thetic” or “way of givennes” character of the noema as suggested by Smith and McIntyre.¹⁶⁵ Some people have claimed that this thetic character belongs to the noema of the act. But as far as I can say, the “thetic” character entirely belongs to the conscious part of the relation of intending. In similar terms it can be said that this component is present in the act of consciousness which is directed towards an object. So the thetic (positional) character is correlated with the “generic” kind of the act. To give an example, consider my act of seeing the tree in the garden. In this act the thetic character describes the “seeing” as belonging to a certain type by which it becomes definable. The thetic component is contained in the conscious structure of the act where we become aware of the object in a certain mode of consciousness. Also I have to make a distinction between the modes of consciousness in which I become conscious of the object.

The thetic character impose a certain subject attitude on the act in which I become aware of the intended object. This subject attitude is identifiable within the conscious structure of the act in which I start to define a certain type of which there is numerous related tokens. For the sake of clarity I can say that the subject attitude of the perceptual acts differ from the non-perceptual acts. That is to say that the thetic character of perceptual acts is in a correlation with the sensory kind of the noesis. Additionally, the characterization of the thetic character of the perceptual act is accompanied with the effect of the sensory organs. So, I cannot speak of an entire theoretical composition of the acts. To see an object is different from the hearing a song as well as they are also different from the believing that the cat is on the mat. An object is always given by the accompaniment of the type of the act with a certain subject attitude. To make a distinction between two acts is possible by the generic kind to which they phenomenologically belong. Furthermore, I can also assume a distinction between the tokens of a certain type of the act or noesis. This difference is set up by the other accompanying components of the act, namely, the Sinn or noema. In addition to that, the thetic character is real when we speak of the noetic character of the perceptual acts. In contrast to the

¹⁶⁵ See, *Husserl and Intentionality*, pp. 125-135 ₁₆₁

perceptual acts, the non-sensory acts are such a type for which I cannot mention the real character of the conscious part of the relation of intending.

The “*way of givenness*” or “*doxic character*” of the act specifies the conscious structure by which I become aware of the object in a certain manner. Accordingly, the question is that it is rather difficult to establish a connection of the thetic character with the object upon which we are directed. It may also be the case that the presentation of the intended object is accompanied by a certain subject attitude. In addition to that, the natural object is put in bracket for the phenomenological description. The phenomenological description is descriptive in the sense that in spite of the epoché, Husserl always wants to set up the actuality of the natural objects. When I cannot speak of the presence of a perceived object, I should not assume a non-existent object. It is even the case that the actuality of the natural world is represented by the act-character of the conscious part of the relation of intending.

What has been called the quality component of the act in *Logical Investigations* becomes the “thetic” character of the act in *Ideas*. As a detail, one and the same object is presented by the acts which have a different thetic character. In each act I become aware of

an object with a different thetic character insofar as I assume a distinction between the intentional acts.

5.4. Acts of Perception and Its Content: Noesis and

Hyle

I have already assumed some general distinction between the sensory and the non-sensory intentional mental acts. Here I am concerned with the sensory acts of every kind such as seeing, hearing, smelling etc. The act of seeing a tree involves some definable sensory contents or sensory materials. For a further remark,

The color of an object, its shape, and various other of its features are objects of our acts, and are experienced in the way we experience physical objects. They are objective entities, experienceable by various subjects from various perspectives..... Shapes, colors, sounds, etc. Are perspected variables, Husserl says, as opposed to the perspective variations through which we are aware of them”.¹⁶⁶

Husserl argues that sensory contents are not intentional but they contribute to the intentionality of perceptual acts as explicated before. As every other act the perceptual acts have a noetic phase which excludes all material contents from the nature of the act but distinguishably they have a sensory phase which characterizes the act as sensory. Sensory phase of an act is part of act's content component. In other words the involvement of a sensory content within the content component of an act cannot change the noetic phase of the same act

¹⁶⁶ See, Føllesdal, D (1984) “Husserl's Theory of Perception” in Hubert L. Dreyfus with Harrison Hall (ed.), *Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, pp. 93-94

(perceptual). Sensory phase or content is what “ gives the act its sensory character”.¹⁶⁷ Actually, within the framework of Husserl’s theory of intentionality it is this sensory phase which is called *hyle* or *hyletic data*. Thus,

According to Husserl, when we perceive an external object, a red barn, e.g., the transcendent reference is established through the animation of sensory “contents” immanent to consciousness by an appropriate “apprehension”.¹⁶⁸

It is conceivable to suppose an interconnected relation between the *noetic phase*, *sensory phase* and *noema*. Let us construct a ground on which we can explicate such a connection; the acts of perception goes on at our sensory surfaces as when we see a red car our sensory organ, the eyes are affected in a certain way. The noetic phase determines a certain noema or Sinn for ascertaining the red-car sensation which we get through the experience. Now the red-car sensation is not directed towards something as hyletic data but by means of the noetic phase I conceive its noema of a certain kind with which the red-car sensation is in a agreement in terms of defining the whole experience. As long as I can make a distinction between the red-car sensation and the green-car sensation it is possible to conclude that the noema which the noetic phase determines for the perceiving a

¹⁶⁷ See, *Husserl and Intentionality*, p. 137

¹⁶⁸ See, Brough, John B. (1977) “The Emergence of an absolute Consciousness in Husserl’s Early Writings on Time-Consciousness” in Frederick A. Elliston and Peter MC Cormick (ed.), *Husserl, Expositions and Appraisals*, p. 86

red car will restrict us to just one. However a change of noema which the noetic phase determines remaining within one and the same experience is always possible. This is due to the fact that outer perception is always fallible. For, an unexpected change in the conditions of perception can lead us to a different organisation of a noema as in the case of wearing a black glasses. As soon as I become conscious that there is a change in the related noema this will also mean that the sensory contents which I am gaining from the experience has changed.

At this point it is adequate to say that if the change of hyletic data implies the change of a related noema, then it is certain that there is a further characterization of this dependency. In brief, the noema of perceptual acts is filled (fulfilled) by the hyletic data. In this connection,

The perceptual noema is the intentional correlate of perceptual consciousness: it is neither a physical object, nor a momentary state of consciousness, but rather a meaning, an ideal entity correlated with every act of perception, whether the object intended in that act exists or not.¹⁶⁹

Remember the example I gave above. So, when I experience a red car there will be some appropriate anticipations and expectations which point to the further possible experiences of one

and the same object, namely, the red car in question. Because I have several previous experiences of both the red and the car which become related to the experience of the red car that I am perceiving now. If what I perceive now is in agreement with the past and present hyletic data, then the noema component of content is said to be filled.

According to Husserl, the noema of a perceptual experience is accompanied by what he calls perceptual “fülle” or “fullness”. What appears to mean here is the perspectival “look” or contextually conditioned “appearance” of an object.¹⁷⁰

In fact it can be discussed that there might be a correlation of a different noema with every step of the perceiving on the basis of the fact that there is a limitless way of presenting the intended object, namely, the red car. As can be known, the perception of external objects is deceptive in spite of the fact that as a matter of degree the certainty of the outer perception can be increased by the descriptive character of the intended object. Accordingly, insofar as I confine myself to the acts of a perceptual character, then the related noema of the act, say the seeing the red car must be in agreement with what the sensory experience presents to us. The perceptual act’s noema is an entity which I constitute as soon as our sensory organs are

¹⁶⁹ See, Dreyfus, Hubert L. (1984) “Husserl’s Perceptual Noema” in Hubert L. Dreyfus with Harrison Hall (ed.), *Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, p. 97

¹⁷⁰ See, Christensen, Carleton B. (1993) “Sense, Subject and Horizon”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 53 (4), p. 759

effected by the external stimuli. During the constitution of a related noema of a perceptual act it is also the case that I eliminate a number of other resembling conceptions of the act, namely, the seeing a red car. This results from the fact that one can distinguish the sensory experience of the red car from that of the green car, when compared to the remembering and the imagining the same or different car. Such an advantage of the sensory experiences seems to be resulted from the fact that the noema of these experiences certainly involve some sensory data or namely hyle. The hyle involved in the experience decides that the noema must be of a certain type. This leads to the conclusion that the noema of the seeing the red car is much more definite than that of remembering the same object. This is owing to the fact that in perceptual acts I have a direct access to the object presented. A paragraph which is to support the above view is introduced by D W. Smith. According to his view,

There is a long tradition in philosophy that defines “intuition” as direct awareness of something. The paradigm of such awareness, I believe, is perception of a physical object immediately before one.¹⁷¹

So if the way in which the intended object is presented may change the nature of the noema, then I may not only point to the differences of the noema of the same type mental acts such as hearing,

seeing and touching etc., but also to the differences of the noema which we form in every individual act of the same type say, the seeing itself. To put it in a similar way one may even claim a possible difference between each single act of the same type. Namely, consider two tokens of one and the same act such as seeing a red car and another distinguishable act of seeing a red car. Then the noema of both acts is supposed to be the same. But it is rather difficult to accept a numerical identity between these two acts of seeing the red car as long as we agree that one is not phenomenologically the same as another. If I admit that an individual act is of a unique kind, then it would not be right to suppose an identity between the intentional acts in question. For, the noema is particularly specified in accordance with the distinguishable character of individual acts. Such a specification should not focus on the general type distinctions between intentional acts. When I speak of the perceptual acts what allows to avoid the similarities we can find between the noemata of individual acts is the inner constituents of the mental life which differs from person to person. On the other hand it is the hyletic data which brings us to an agreement on the noema of two individual acts of the same type. They might be considered to be identical because of the fact that

¹⁷¹ See, Smith, D W. (1982) "The Realism in Perception", *Nous*, 16, p. 43

people commonly agree that sensory contents are shareable. Although Husserl assumes a shareability of the noema on the part of the sensory act, he does not say more than that it can be the same from act to act. On the other hand he accepts that if I remain within the field of the intending act and consider the “real content” of the act it is true that the real content of the act differs from act to act even though what he calls a noema is not the same as the real content.

If the identity of two individual acts of the same type is questionable, then it is conceivable that the noemata they may have will also be distinctive. Conceivable that the theoretical construction of the noemata is to a large extent dependent upon the *Sinn* which the *noetic phase* determines for the act, then one must search the grounds where the noemata of certain acts are characterized as belonging to an act which is not the same as the other. As can be known, there are also a wide variety of intentional acts such as imagining, remembering, thinking, dreaming etc. The identity conditions of these acts is even more complex compared to the earlier intentional acts (perceptual). For I have suggested that the noemata of perceptual acts have to fit in with the sensory contents which the experience presents to us. In addition, the involvement of the hyletic data in the perceptual acts alternatively may bring us to an agreement on the nature of the noema.

Now consider the act of imagining or remembering, these acts deny the existence of any hyletic data with which presumably they could have been in an agreement. Such a characterization indispensably eliminates some related noemata which I could have associated with the act, say the imagining. In this respect it can be said that the noema of the act of imagining can be of any kind of which there may be no a sensory characterization. But it can be argued that insofar as I imagine a worldly object, say, a tree, then it seems that there might be a way of describing the involvement of the hyletic data in some way. Because it is certain that even the imagining is not independent of the hyletic data, what is imagined, namely, the object can be tied with the hyletic data in the way that what we call “tree” is what we have imagined after seeing it in the garden with some distinguishing properties. So, our past and present experiences of the tree will be in a close connection with the certain expectations and anticipations which describes the tree as belonging to a certain category.

CHAPTER VI

AN EVALUATION OF NOEMA AND ITS CONSTITUENTS

6.1. Phenomenological Significance of the Noematic Sinn as Content

There is a common argument between philosophers with respect to the phenomenological significance of the content in general. At first the content has been contemplated as the internal structure of the intentional act. But further analysis seems to have led to the acknowledgment that it also refers to the object-component of the act. One can bestow a philosophical meaning upon the intentional content or noema by means of a noematic description in which it is represented as an ideal correlate. In *Ideas* the noema is contemplated as an *intensional* or *linguistic* entity to which I have referred as the “Sinn” or sense of the presentation by being in an agreement with a Fregean usage of the same term. Throughout the history of the term “content”, it is emphasized that it is the content in virtue of which I am directed towards an object. So, one can interpret this as claiming that the phenomenological content establish a link between the

intentional act and the intended object, namely, the perceived tree. The content in *Logical Investigations* has become the intentional essence which is instantiated by the single acts of consciousness. In *Ideas* this content has developed into an abstract linguistic entity, namely, the “Sinn”. As can be remembered, I have already pointed out that a philosophical relation can be established between the noematic Sinn and the object-part of the relation of intending. As a remark, it can be said that not only in *Ideas* but also in *Logical Investigations*, the content-analysis has always been understood as the analysis of the act-structure and its further components. The noematic Sinn also belongs to this same act-structure as an ideal correlate of the intentional act, namely, noesis. Certainly, the noema was an ideal structure of which there are also specified or non-specified other components. One of these components, namely, is the noematic Sinn which determines the intended object in correlation with the noesis and its “interpretive sense” which I bestow upon the intentional act when an object is phenomenologically presented. “Sinn-giving phase” of the noesis and noema intend to determine the specific manner in which the object is intended. The noematic Sinn decides which object we are directed upon in the general sense of the word. But the phenomenological

significance of the object is also expressed by the additional view that the noematic Sinn also decides that

By virtue of the Sinn, a particular object is intended as having certain properties, or determinations; a different Sinn would prescribe a different object or prescribe the same object with different properties.¹⁷²

Husserl's own words are as follows;

The object, is consciously grasped as self-same and yet in a noematically different way: the characteristic nucleus shifting, and the "object", the pure subject of predicates remaining self-same.¹⁷³

For example, I can refer to Atatürk himself as the founder of Turkey as well as the first president of Turkey. As it can be seen, Atatürk, the self-same natural object is presented in a different manner in each act. These two acts differ from one another in terms of having a different noema or noematic Sinn. This shows that the modes of presentation can be multiplied by the occurrences of the separate acts which refers to one and the same object. Husserl says in FTL that,

One and the same object can, a priori, be intended to in very different modes of consciousness (certain essential types: perception, recollection, empty consciousness. Among them the "experiencing" mode, the original mode of consciousness of the object in question, has a precedence; to it all others are related as intentional modifications.¹⁷⁴

On the basis of the above remarks I can say that Husserl seems to be claiming that the noematic Sinn does not relate us to the

¹⁷² See, *Husserl and Intentionality*, p. 133

¹⁷³ See, *Ideas*, §131, p.366

intended object directly. In place of this, it seems to be connected with the specific manner in which the object is presented. In a sharp term, this is to say that the noematic Sinn determines the properties of the object by which I am directed upon an object. In similar terms, by using a certain determination or aspect-property instance of the object, I am involved in a relation of intending. However, I must clarify that the noematic Sinn is not the object upon which I am directed. Instead it comprises the object-aspect of the intentional content. But one can also point to the fact that in virtue of the object-aspect of the act, a certain property is instantiated in relation to the intended object upon which I am directed. This view is strictly held by Dagfinn Føllesdal.¹⁷⁵ He additionally claims that the noematic Sinn is a meaning-entity which mediates the relation between the intentional act and the intended object. I shall evaluate his related claims in a comprehensive way in the section 4.3 of this chapter.

Additionally, the noema or noematic Sinn is an abstract and ideal entity which differs from the Platonic forms when I accept them to be the types of which there are worldly instances existing in this

¹⁷⁴ See, Husserl, E (1978) *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, translated by Dorion Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, p. 314

¹⁷⁵ See, Føllesdal, D. (1984) "Husserl's Notion of *Noema*" in Hubert L. Dreyfus with Harrison Hall (ed.) *Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, London, Cambridge: The MIT Press, pp. 73-80

natural world. The noema or noematic Sinn is part of the act-structure where one finds the intentional components of the act directed upon an object. So, the directedness of the act of consciousness is constructed again by the other component of the act-structure which contains in itself the character of being intentional. Consequently, it is the noema or noematic Sinn which makes the act directed upon an object. The view that I can be directed upon the noema as an object is maintained by Aron Gurwitsch, of which I shall try to give an account in this chapter.

6.2. The Components of Noematic *Sinn*: the “determinable X” and the “Predicate-Senses”

I have already clarified that there is a phenomenological relation between the noematic *Sinn* and the object-part of the relation of intending. The “determinable X”, for Husserl, seems to be identical with the object *simpliciter* that bears in itself the properties which the object is intended as having. The “determinable X” is identified by the internal structure of the noematic description via which the directedness of the intentional act or noesis becomes definite. The “determinable X” is independent ingredient of the act-structure. But one may raise the question, with the significance of the epoché, how can it be possible to speak of the presence of an object in the general sense of the word? As an answer, it can be said that by epoché I do not remove the external reality from the phenomenological considerations. Instead, within a new ontology it gains a different characterization. Beside that, it must again be comprehended that the “determinable X” is the object *simpliciter* of which I have a number of differing specific determinations. The “determinable X” on its own represents the intended object to be presented “in abstraction from all predicates”.¹⁷⁶ On this basis, I can point out that the noematic *Sinn* primarily

determines the properties but not the object *simpliciter* directly. This view leads us to the acknowledgment that there is another correlative component of the Sinn which we call predicate-sense or “determining content”. Husserl says;

But the predicates are predicates of “*something*”, and this “something” belongs together with the predicates, and clearly inseparably, to the nucleus in question: it is the central point of unification which we referred to above. It is the nodal point of connexion for the predicates, their “bearer”, but in no wise their unity in the sense in which any system or connexion of predicates might be called a unity. It must be distinguished from these, although it should not be set alongside them and should not be separated from them, as inversely they themselves are *its* predicates: inconceivable without it and yet distinguishable from it. We say that in the continuous or synthetic process of consciousness we are persistently aware of the intentional object, but that in this experience the object is ever “presenting itself differently”; it may be “*the same*”, only given with other predicates, with another determining content; “it” may display itself only in different aspects whereby the predicates left indeterminate have become more closely determined; or “the” object may have remained unchanged throughout this stretch of givenness, but now “it”, the selfsame, changes and through this change becomes more beautiful or forfeits some of its utility-value, and so forth.¹⁷⁷

Husserl seems to be conceiving that it is possible to identify a unique object for each act of consciousness if I accept that every act is directed towards a certain object in a distinguishing way. I can also call this “X”, namely, the “final object” for the directedness of the acts of consciousness. And this “X” is the bearer of the properties assigned by the predicate-Sinn in the sense that one always refers to the “X” as having certain determinations. By disagreeing with Husserl I can support the view that as Meinong¹⁷⁸ claims, it is rather difficult to

¹⁷⁶ See, *Ideas*, § 131, p. 364

¹⁷⁷ See, *Ideas*, §131, p. 365

¹⁷⁸ See, ch. 3, 3.2

have access to the intended object or object simpliciter due to the fact that the noematic description always suggests a certain determination of the object as already explicated. So, when the noematic Sinn determines the object towards which I am directed, this object is independent of the properties assigned by the predicate-Sinne. The intended object is intended as having certain determinations via which I describe and refer to the existence of a final object. In spite of this specific determinations, according to Husserl, the “determinable X” can be identified independently of the properties assigned to it. Interestingly, the “determinable X” seems to be pertaining to the act-structure in which I am capable of speaking of an object-part of the relation of intending. But it is reasonable to say that Husserl consistently signifies the existence of an external reality even though he eliminates it from the phenomenological considerations. Furthermore, Husserl seems to be holding that the external reality is represented within the confines of consciousness. Or the world of consciousness is represented by the irreal and atemporal act-structure. It is also possible to find Husserl as speaking of the external object as the indispensable correlate of consciousness. Husserl even goes so far as to say that even in the cases where the object does not exist at all I am directed upon an object, or I am presenting an object which does

not exist. But Husserl insists that I am not assuming the existence of the non-existent object upon which one may be directed. Husserl even tries to set up a ground on which I can understand the phenomenological actuality of the objects that do not exist. The “determinable X” as the object simpliciter always preserves the self-same character in spite of the changes or shifts of the properties which are assigned to it. But, according to Husserl, even though the object preserves its own identity, I always need a mediation of the mode of presentation of the object, namely, the specific determination. In other words, the determining content presents the object as having certain determinations which refers to one and the same object. Accordingly, the number of the specific determination can increase by the occurrence of the related properties which refers to one and the same object. On this basis, it can be said that one intention differs from another due to the fact that the specific determination to which I refer differs from act to act. In addition to this, I can also point to the fact that the properties assigned to the “determinable X” can be taken as an instantiation of a phenomenological essence. Presumably, this phenomenological essence implies and refers to the specific properties by means of which an intended object is presented as having a certain determination. In fact, the presentation of an object

relies on the inseparability of the “determinable X” from the predicate-Sinn. And it is possible to interpret Husserl as claiming that I have no a direct access to the final phenomenological object. In place of this, I need the mediation of the “determining content” in virtue of which I present the object in a manner in which it is to refer to a specific determination of the object. The properties of the intended object is represented by the specific determinations which lead us to one and the same object. The multiplicity of the determinations can be associated with the additional ways of presentation of the intended object. Every act intends to provide us a different characterization of the object intended in an act.

One of the types of the intentional act is *perceiving* a certain object. I have already pointed out that the object of perception is transcendent to the act in the sense that the perceived object is independent of the perceiving. Let us also remember that the object of perception is not given *wholly* and *entirely*. This is to say that it is given from a certain perspective, or there are also some additional acts by which the object is presented from the other empirical locations. This leads us to the view that a number of specific determinations or Sinn refers to one and the same object. Predicate-Sinn seems to assign a different determination by means of the help of the senses

which pertain to the related object. In this respect, I can say that the object of the intention is left indeterminate due to the fact that each intention refers to the certain determination of it by the properties of which I have an instantiation achieved in an act. I can accept that each property corresponds to a specific determination which mediates the presentation of the intended object. To say that the object can be presented in different manners is to say that each time a different Sinn is contemplated even though the object presented is the same. Additionally, it is possible to say that the same Sinn in the two different acts may relate us two different objects.

6.3. The Phenomenological Characterization of the “Object as Intended”

The correct understanding of the “object as intended” depends on the noematic description in which it gains a different meaning. The noematic description suggests the ideal structure of the intentional act in which I gain a comprehensive understanding of the noema or the “Sinn”. The “object as intended” is represented by the *perceived as such* in the phenomenological structure of the act. The *perceived as such* is suggested by Husserl as the noematic correlate of the noesis or the intentional act. In spite of this correlation between them, Husserl tries to separate the noema (intentional content) from the intended object in the *Logical Investigations*. The passage where Husserl tries to explicate this point is as follows; so,

We must distinguish, in relation to the intentional content taken as object of the act, between *the object as it is intended*, and the *object* (period) *which* is intended. In each act an object is presented as determined in this or that manner, and as such it may be the target of varying intentions, judgemental, emotional, desiderative etc. Known connections, actual or possible, entirely external to the reality of the act, may be so cemented with it in intentional unity as to be held to attribute objective properties to the same presented object, properties not in the scope of the intention in question.¹⁷⁹

Here Husserl distinguishes the “object as intended” from the intended object. A simple and short reading of Husserl can lead us to the admission that the intentional content of the act is also the object

of the relation of intending. And Husserl seems to be using the “object as intended” synonymously with the *perceived as such*. As it can be seen, this approach introduces the conception of the noema or noematic Sinn of which there is a different account suggested by Aron Gurwitsch.¹⁸⁰ According to Gurwitsch, I can read the quoted passage as suggesting that the “object as intended” is also the object of the relation of intending. For an exact understanding of the point made above, I can suggest some separate claims which sum up the Gurwitsch’s view. So,

- Every act of consciousness has a distinctive noema
- In spite of the varying acts, the noema preserves its own identity
- To one and the same object several noemata may refer
- The noema or noematic Sinn is sensorily *perceived* in an act of consciousness
- The noema is an abstract meaning-entity
- The noema (the *perceived as such*) is the part of the intended object.

¹⁷⁹ See, *LI*, V, §17, p. 578

¹⁸⁰ See, Gurwitsch, A. (1970) “Towards a Theory of Intentionality”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 30, pp. 354-367

- We are also directed towards the noema as an incomplete object.

It is possible to say that Gurwitsch, in contrast to many other interpreters, claims that the noema is a part or constituent of the object. According to Gurwitsch, the noema is associated with the object-part of the relation of intending. In fact, Gurwitsch even goes so far as to say that I am also directed towards the noema. Gurwitsch says that “Quite in general, to every act of consciousness- also denoted as *noesis*- corresponds a noema, namely an object as intended and *presenting* (my italic) itself under a certain aspect”¹⁸¹ According to this view, the noema is also presented as the object of the intending act. To put it in a similar way it can be said that the noema shares the characteristic of being an object even though it has a different characterization in the philosophy of Husserl. Accordingly, I shall agree with Gurwitsch as regards the object character of the noema although I will deny the *directedness* of the noetic act upon it. For, Husserl believes that the directedness of the noetic act is constructed by the phenomenological significance of the noema. Firstly, if I can be directed towards the noema, then I shall have to explicate this relation

¹⁸¹ See, Gurwitsch, A. (1970) “Towards a Theory of Intentionality”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 30, pp. 354-367

of intending by the contribution of a third ingredient which it is difficult to identify within the scope of Husserl's philosophy. So, to say that I am directed towards the noema seems to be contradicting with Husserlian idea that I am always directed upon a concrete and final object. Secondly, I accept that the noema is the object of the intending act or noesis in a different way. According to this view, I can suggest that the noema is the object of a higher order act of consciousness or namely, the *whole* noesis. The partial acts constituting the whole noesis also have separate objects when the act is directed towards one and the same object. In contrast to the ordinary acts, the whole noesis, under the phenomenological significance of the *epoché*, can be directed towards the "object as intended", namely the noema itself. This view seems to differ from Gurwitschian idea that I am directed towards the "object as intended" which is a *part* or constituent of the intended object. It can be seen that we agree with Gurwitsch as regards the claim that the noema is the object of an act of a different type, namely the whole or complete noesis which one identifies in the transcendental attitude. But if I accept that I am directed towards the noema by an ordinary act, then I can conclude that one and the same act will have two separate objects, namely the noema and the complete intended object. In fact, it is known that the

noema as an object gains a different phenomenological characterization which is not consistent with the claims of the noematic description in which we identify the noema as a Sinn. However it is possible to say that the noema is related to the object-part of the relation. So, instead of describing a directedness of the act towards the noema, I shall accept that there is two separate relations between the act, noema and the intended object. First relation is the directedness of the act towards the intended object. The second relation is the relation of the complete noesis to the noema. As it can be seen, I am partly in agreement with the Gurwitschian view except that the noema is the part of the intended object. For, it is possible to read Husserl on this point as suggesting that the noema as a conceptual entity is independent of both the act and the intended object in order to show the ideal apprehension of the noema.

Let us return to a deeper analysis of the noema. In this respect I will refer to the Gurwitschian formulation that the noema is transcendent to both the act and the intended object in the sense that it is independent of both. In addition to such an ontological characterization of the noema, I also find Gurwitsch as holding that the noema is an abstract or conceptual entity which is comprehended by a meaning-apprehension act. When I admit that the noema is a

meaning-entity, this will contradict with saying that it is sensorily *perceived*. So, it can be seen that Gurwitsch interestingly accepts that the noema is a conceptual meaning-entity but he simultaneously denies the mediation of it. Another additional confusion can be found in Gurwitsch's claim that the noema is sensorily perceived. For, it is questionable that how can something be a conceptual meaning-entity and be perceived sensorily. This contradiction leads us to the belief that Gurwitsch's claim that the noema is an object of the act seems to have been supported with the idea that it is sensorily perceived. But if one comes to the description of the object character of the noema as a meaning-entity, then he should not claim that it is also sensorily perceived. But Gurwitsch may have wanted to support the object character of the noema by the claim that it is perceived. As a remarkable point, I can conveniently support the view that one might be directed towards an ideal structure like the ideal objects of geometry insofar as I put in bracket the apprehension of such objects by an act of perception. Since it is rather difficult to understand such an intentional relation (the relation of perceiving) when the objects (noemata) are "devoid of both spatiality and temporality".¹⁸² For a

¹⁸² *ibid.*, p.363

further formulation of the ideal character of the noema, let us refer to Husserl's own words, so

The tree plain and simple can burn away, resolve itself into its chemical elements, and so forth. But the meaning—the meaning of *this* perception, something that belongs necessarily to its essence—cannot burn away; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties.¹⁸³

Another related difficulty in Gurwitschian explanations is that Gurwitsch claims the ideal or abstract character of the noema but he accepts the availability of the noema as a kind of appearance. So the appearance which is gained from a certain perspective becomes the second object of the act of consciousness. But this appearance seems to be differing from the traditional notion of the appearance. This is because of the fact that Gurwitsch's notion of appearance is not strictly confined to the domain of consciousness in which it represents a natural object. Furthermore, Gurwitsch's appearance shares the same characters with the intended object of which it is a constituent.

There is another related argument developed by Dagfinn Føllesdal.¹⁸⁴ According to Føllesdal, I cannot be directed towards the noema as an object. Føllesdal agrees with Gurwitsch with respect to the point that the noema is an abstract meaning-entity. The only difference between Gurwitsch and Føllesdal seems to be that Føllesdal

¹⁸³ See, *Ideas*, §89, pp. 260-261

does not accept the object character of the noema. By this claim Føllesdal also denies any possible directedness of the act towards the noema as an object. I shall put some light upon the identification of the noema with meaning in the following chapter.

¹⁸⁴ See, Føllesdal, D. "Husserl's Notion of *Noema*", in Hubert L. Dreyfus with Harrison Hall (ed.), *Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, pp. 73-80, London, Cambridge: The MIT Press

6.4. Ontological Properties applicable to the Noema of the act

In this section I shall consider the arguments made in connection with the ontological characteristics of the noema of the act of consciousness. For this aim, I will rely on the arguments of Gurwitsch, Føllesdal, C. Solomon and Cunningham. I have already paid special attention to the noema's structure in Gurwitsch. The crucial point of Gurwitsch's theory of the noema is the misleading idea that I can generalize the perceptual noema as the appearance of the object from a certain perspective to the all acts of the phenomenological domain. So, Gurwitsch have referred to the perception in order to characterize the notion of noema which Husserl introduced in *Ideas*. The noema as being an appearance of a perceptual (perceived object) object from a certain perspective will exclude the claim that the noemata are ideal or abstract entities. Because, abstract entities neither can be perceived through the senses nor they can be perceived from a certain perspective unlike physical objects. In the reference to the abstractness of the noema, as I have already noted, Gurwitsch is inconsistent when remembered that his noema is also the object of the act. Because the noema, according to this view, becomes a sensory object. Husserl explicitly clarifies that there is no a reality of

the noema apart from being an unreal and atemporal entity. In support of the point that we have been making for a while, I can also mention the strict claim of Føllesdal theory that the noema itself is not perceived through the senses because of the fact that the noema is an abstract meaning-entity. Let us first concentrate on the abstractness of the noemata to which I refer in a comprehensive framework of the noematic description. Føllesdal claims that the eighth thesis follows the first thesis that “The noema is an intensional entity (intensional with an ‘s’), a generalization of the notion of meaning.”¹⁸⁵ Føllesdal and many others have always referred to the following words of Husserl in support of the abstractness of the noema: so,

The tree plain and simple can burn away, resolve itself into its chemical elements, and so forth. But the meaning—the meaning of *this* perception, something that belongs necessarily to its essence—cannot burn away; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no *real properties* (my italic).¹⁸⁶

There is a weakness in these words of Husserl. This, namely, is equal to saying that Husserl refers to the noema of the perception even though he claims the non-perceptual character of the noem. However, I am not saying that Husserl means the perceptual or sensory character of the “perceived as such”. But under the influence of so many interpreters if I decide for a while that the “perceived as such” is also

¹⁸⁵ *ibid.*, 74

perceived just like those people, then how can I explain away the non-perceptual character of the “perceived as such”. Even though by depending upon such a general supposition case one may be taken as if he clarified the non-perceptual character of the noema, I am heavily left with the accusation that I am confusing an abstract entity with a sensory object. But also this general accusation has to explicate the misleading Husserlian conception of the noema as the “perceived as such”. In this respect it is also necessary to say that if the characterization of the noema of the remembering, judging, and all the other modifications of the act is of the type, namely the *remembered as such* and *judged as such*, then I have to be able to make compatible these occurrences of the noema with the distinguishable noema of the perception, namely, the “perceived as such. Following a logical line of reasoning, it can be said that the compatibility of the noema of the former acts with that of perception has necessitated the need to distinguish between the acts of perception and the judgmental ones whose noema are the same as the *remembering* and *judging*. This view is held by Robert C. Solomon¹⁸⁷ who believes that one can overcome the present difficulty by the differentiation between the “context of

¹⁸⁶ See, *Ideas*, §89, pp. 260-261

perception and the context of mathematical or logical judgments”.¹⁸⁸

Additionally, according to Solomon, I can perceive the noema of the perception unlike the noema of the logical or judgmental propositions. So, Solomon is of the same opinion as Gurwitsch but differs from Føllesdal who asserts that even the noema of the perception is not perceivable. This claim of Føllesdal is defended by the idea that even the noema of perception is an abstract entity. In fact, Husserl in both *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas* seems to be holding that the noema as exemplified in *Ideas* is an ideal structure in which I achieve the phenomenological presentation of the intended object. Føllesdal identifies the noema of the perception with the broader notion of the Frege’s Sinn. And this Sinn, for Føllesdal, determines an object if the act has one.

¹⁸⁷ See, Solomon, R.C., “Husserl’s Concept of the Noema” in Elliston, F.A. and MC Cormick, P. (ed.), *Husserl, Expositions and Appraisals*, pp. 168-181, Notre Dame, London: University of Notre Dame Press.

¹⁸⁸ See, Cunningham, S., (1985) “Perceptual Meaning and Husserl”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 45, pp. 553-566

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

In this thesis I mainly tried to establish a logical ground on which I attempted to construct the structure of Husserl's theory of intentionality. I argued that Husserl's theory constitutes an alternative to those which claim that each act has an object upon which I am directed. In contrast to Meinong, Husserl's theory of intentionality is not concerned with the ontological status of the intended object. Husserl tries to explain the framework in which an act can be taken as intentional. I discussed that Husserl explained the internal structure of the act in which I determined some other components making the act intentional. Husserl assumes that the internal structure of the act, namely the content always determines an object upon which I am directed. Like most of the commentators, I share the view that the content component has a mediation between the intentional act and the intended object. I am also of the opinion that the content component

can be connected with the object part of the relation of intending. This can be put as saying that as soon as the act determines the content, I am directed upon a certain object. Also, it can be said that I am not directed upon the content itself. This view is also supported by Føllesdal who claims the mediation between the act and the intended object. However, Gurwitsch differs from us in the sense that he not only claims the object character of the content but also he believes the directedness of the act upon the intentional content.

We also believe that the directedness of the act can be characterized as to the epoché. Thus, before epoche, the directedness of consciousness is between a psychological entity and the natural individual object. Such a relation is the instantiation of the general type of the act. But, later, this relation turns into the one which is between the reduced experience and the tree in the garden. I offered that the relation of intending can always be formulated as a relation between the intentional act and the tree in the garden. According to Husserl, the talk of the non-existent objects is useless. As an additional remark, I can say that in Husserl even the objects which do not exist have “a sort of actuality” *in the general sense of the word*. From a related point of view, it can be said that for Husserl, the original mode of consciousness by which he introduces the content

component is the perceptual awareness or namely, perception. As can be known, perception assumes the physical presence of the object, that is the tree in the garden, before us when our sense organs are affected by external stimuli.

We argued that the objects of perception are known from a certain perspective. Thus, the tree in the garden is a complete object of which I have a specific determination. Such a specific determination can be linked with the instantiation of a certain property which the object has as a complete object. I am of the opinion that the specific determination of the intended object is again related to the object upon which I am directed. It is also true to say that I claimed the individuality of the *specific determination* of the intended object. It is not an idea about the intended object but it is the *ideal determination* of the intended object in a certain manner in which it is presented as having certain properties.

The content component is an ideal unity which has been reinforced by Husserl in both *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas*.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Primary Sources

Husserl, E. (1973) *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, translated by Dorion Cairns, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, E. (1931) *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, translated by W.R. Boyce Gibson, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. New York: Humanities Press Inc.

Husserl, E. (1970) *Logical Investigations*, vol. 1 and vol. 2, translated by J. N. Findlay, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, New York: The Humanities Press.

Husserl, E. (1978) *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, translated by Dorion Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague.

Brentano, F. (1973) *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, ed. By L. L. Mc Alister, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Meinong, A. (1960) "The Theory of Objects" in R. M. Chisholm (ed.), *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology*, Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe.

Twardowski, K. (1977) *On the Content and Object of Presentations*, translated by R. Grossmann, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Frege, Gottlob. (1982) "On Sinn and Bedeutung" in M. Beaney(ed.), *The Frege Reader*, Blackwell Publishers.

II. Secondary Sources

Aquila, R. (1982) “ On Intensionalizing Husserl Intentions”, *Nous*, 16, pp. 209-211

Bell, D. (1994) “Reference, Experience, and Intentionality” in Haaparanta, Leila (ed.), *Mind, Meaning and Mathematics*, Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Brough, J. (1977) “ The Emergence of an absolute Consciousness in Husserl’s Early Writings on Time-Consciousness” in Frederick A. Elliston and Peter MC. Cormick (ed.), *Husserl, Expositions and Appraisals*, Notre Dame, London: University of Notre Dame Press.

Casey, E. S. (1977) “Imagination and Phenomenological Method” in Elliston, Frederick A and MC Cormick, P. (ed.), *Husserl, Expositions and Appraisals*, Notre Dame, London: University of Notre Dame Press.

Cavallin, J. (1997) *Content and Object*, Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Christensen, Carleton B. (1993) “Sense, Subject and Horizon”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 53 (4), 759

Cunningham, S. (1985) “Perceptual Meaning and Husserl”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 45, pp. 553-566

Dreyfus, H. L. (1984) “Husserl’s Perceptual Noema” in Hubert L. Dreyfus with Harrison Hall (ed.), *Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

Drummond, John J. (1990) *Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism: Noema and Object*, Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Findlay, J. N. (1963) *Meinong’s Theory of Objects and Values*, Oxford: at the Clarendon Press.

Føllesdal, D. (1984) "Brentano and Husserl on Intentional Objects and Perception" in Hubert L. Dreyfus with Harrison Hall (ed.), *Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

Føllesdal, D. (1990) "Noema and Meaning in Husserl", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, pp. 263-271

Føllesdal, D. (1984) "Husserl's Theory of Perception" in Hubert L. Dreyfus with Harrison Hall (ed.), *Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

Føllesdal, D. (1984) "Husserl's Notion of Noema" in Hubert L. Dreyfus with Harrison Hall (ed.), *Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, London, Cambridge: The MIT Press.

George, A and Heck, R. (1998) "Sense and Reference", *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, P. 4

Gillet, G. (1997) "Husserl, Wittgenstein and the Snark: Intentionality and Social Naturalism", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 57 (2), pp. 331-349

Gurwitsch, A. (1967) "Husserl's Theory of the Intentionality of Consciousness in Historical Perspective" in Edward N. Lee and M. Mandelbaum (ed.), *Phenomenology and Existentialism*, Baltimore: John Hopkins.

Gurwitsch, A. (1984) "Husserl's Theory of the Intentionality of Consciousness" in Hubert L. Dreyfus with Harrison Hall (ed.) *Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: The MIT Press.

Gurwitsch, A. (1970) "Towards a Theory of Intentionality", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 30, pp. 354-367

İnam, A. (1995) Edmund Husserl Felsefesinde Mantık, Vadi Yayınları

Kern, I. (1977) "The Three ways to the Transcendental Phenomenological Reduction in the Philosophy of Edmund Husserl" in Elliston, F. A. And MC Cormick, P. (ed.), *Husserl, Expositions and Appraisals*, Notre Dame, London: University of Notre Dame Press.

Kockelmans, Joseph J. (1977) "Husserl and Kant on the Pure Ego" in Frederich A. Elliston and Peter MC Cormick (ed.), *Husserl, Expositions and Appraisals*, Notre Dame, London: University of Notre Dame Press.

Küng, G. (1977) "The Phenomenological Reduction as Epoche and Explication in Elliston, F. A and MC Cormick, P (ed.), *Husserl, Expositions and Appraisals*, Notre Dame, London: University of Notre Dame Press.

Linsky, L. (1980) "Meinong's Theory of Objects" in Robert C. Solomon (ed.), *Phenomenology and Existentialism*, Littlefield Adams Quality Paperbacks.

McIntyre, R. (1982) "Husserl's Phenomenological Conception of Intentionality and its difficulties", *Philosophia*, vol. 11, pp. 223-247

Mohanty, J. N. (1971) "Husserl's Concept of Intentionality" in Anna Teresa Tymeniece (ed.), *Analecta Husserliana, The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research*, New York, Humanities Press.

Mohanty, J. N. (1986) "Levels of Understanding 'Intentionality'", *Monist*, 69, p. 505

Morrison, James C. (1970) "Husserl and Brentano on Intentionality", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 31, p. 31

Mulligan, K. (1995) "Perception" in Barry Smith and D. W. Smith (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*, Cambridge University Press.

Olafson, Frederick A. (1977) "Husserl's Theory of Intentionality in Contemporary Perspective" in Elliston, F. A and MC

Cormick, P. (ed.), *Husserl, Expositions and Appraisals*, Notre Dame, London: University of Notre Dame Press.

Rollinger, Robin D. (1999) *Husserl's Position in the School of Brentano*, Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Rosenkrantz, G. (1990) "Reference, Intentionality and Nonexistent Entities", *Philosophical Studies*, 58 (1-2), p. 167

Skolowski, R. (1992) "Review Essay: Husserl and Analytic Philosophy and Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 52(3), p.729

Smith, B and Smith, D. (1995) "Introduction" in Barry Smith and David Woodruff Smith (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*, Cambridge University Press.

Smith, B. (1987) "Husserl, Language, and the Ontology of the Act" in D. Buzetti and M. Ferriani (ed.), *Speculative Grammar, and Philosophical Analysis of Language*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Smith, B. (1994) "Husserl's Theory of Meaning and Reference" in Leila Haaparanta (ed.), *Mind, Meaning and Mathematics*, Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Smith, David W. (1984) "Content and Context of Perception", *Synthese*, 61, p. 63

Smith, D. W and McIntyre, R. (1982) *Husserl and Intentionality: A study of Mind, Meaning and Language*, Dordrecht: Holland, Boston: U.S.A, London: England, D. Reidel Publishing Company.

Smith, D. W. (1982) "The Realism in Perception", *Nous*, 16, p. 43

Solomon, R. C. (1977) "Husserl's Concept of the Noema" in Elliston, F. A. And MC Cormick, P. (ed.), *Husserl*,

Expositions and Appraisals, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

T. C. (1995) "Intentionality" in T. Honderich (ed.) *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 412-413

Victor Valerde-Mayol. (2000) *On Husserl*, Wadsworth: Thomson Learning.

Welch, E. P. (1941) *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl*, New York: Morningside Heights, Columbia University Press.

APPENDICES

FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE CONTENTS OF THE ACTS

APPENDIX A

HUSSERL'S THEORY OF LINGUISTIC REFERENCE AND MEANING

In *Logical Investigations* Husserl devotes a whole investigation to the theory of meaning and reference. Husserl aims to show the similarity between the Fregean *Sinn* and the linguistic meaning indirectly. Husserl tries to distinguish the psychological entities from the ideal or abstract contents of the acts. Namely, according to Husserl, the content of the act is a linguistic entity just like the meaning of linguistic expressions. The linguistic meaning is dissimilar to the subjective occurrences and ideas which are temporal entities occurring in the temporal order of consciousness. According to Husserl, what introduces us the meaning is the reflexive apprehension of the noematic structure in which the expression gains a new

meaning. In fact, the contribution of the epoché can be understood as the elimination of the objective relation between the consciousness and the relation of intending. The domain of pure consciousness calls such entities that the meaning becomes the means by which the presentation of an object becomes possible. In this connection Husserl says that,

In meaning, a relation to an object is constituted. To use an expression significantly, and to refer expressively to an object (to form a presentation of it, are one and the same. It makes no difference whether the object exists or is fictitious or even impossible. But if one gives a very rigorous interpretation to the proposition that an expression, in so far as it has meaning, relates to an object, i.e. in a sense which involves the existence of the object, then an expression has *meaning* when an object corresponding to it exists, and it is *meaningless* when no such object exists. Meanings are often spoken of as signifying the *objects* meant, a usage that can scarcely be maintained consistently, as it springs from a confusion with the genuine concept of meaning.¹⁸⁹

From the above passage I can draw the conclusion that it is the linguistic meaning which establishes the intentional connection between the phenomenological act and the intended object. In other words, by the mediation of the meaning an act is directed towards the intended object. As a part of the act-structure, the entity, meaning has developed into a different form such as the act-types in *Logical Investigations*. But in *Ideas* this has experienced a total change in order to set up the directedness of the noesis. Husserl's commentators are willing to construct a philosophical relation between the linguistic

meaning and the Fregean “sense”. This becomes explicit in *Ideas* as I have already pointed out. Following a Fregean line of reasoning, I can say that there is a close relation between the “sense” and the presentation of the intended object. In this connection, let us refer to Husserl’s own words, so

Each expression not merely says something, but says it *of* something: it not only has a meaning, but refers to certain *objects*. This relation sometimes holds in the plural for one and the same expression. But the object never coincides with the meaning.¹⁹⁰

Husserl tries to emphasize the presentative function of the meaning in the sense that every sense or meaning determines an object for the expression in question. And this object is never the same as the sense or meaning which the expression expresses. Another characteristic of the following formulation of the linguistic reference is as follows; so,

...(I)several expressions may have the same meaning but different objects, and (II)again that they may have different meanings but the same object. There is of course also the possibility of their differing in both respects and agreeing in both.¹⁹¹

For the second claim, the exemplification to which Husserl refers is the naming activity. According to this method, “the victor at Jena” and “the vanquished at Waterloo” names one and the same

¹⁸⁹ See, *LI*, I, §15, p. 293

¹⁹⁰ See, *LI*, I, §12, p. 287

person, namely, the Napoleon even though the meanings or senses which the names express are different. Accordingly, Husserl uses the example of the term “horse”. The usage of the term “horse” in different occasions may result in a difference in the sense-giving presentation in the sense that one and the same object can be presented in two different manners that identifies the specific determination of the object upon which I am directed. In fact, it can be said that throughout this thesis I have used the term “intentional content” or “ideal content” interchangeably with the “sense”, “meaning”, “intensional entity”, “noema” and “noematic Sinn”. I have already clarified that the intimate connection between the noesis and the intended object is established with the contribution of the noematic Sinn. In spite of the fact that I have no a direct presentation of the intended object, it can be presented by the mediation of the noematic Sinn. This Sinn provides a specific determination in virtue of which the intended object is presented. This view is shared by D.W.Smith and McIntyre, and also Føllesdal. Even Gurwitsch is of the opinion that the noematic Sinn is a linguistic meaning-entity. I have agreed with these people on this claim, but I have also denied the directedness of the noesis towards the noema in spite of admitting the

¹⁹¹ ibid

object character of the noematic Sinn. My view results from the fundamental belief that I can possibly apprehend the ideal or abstract objects such as the objects of geometry. Perhaps the object character of the noematic Sinn is different from the natural objects such as trees and mountains. This is to say that I can make judgments about ideal objects even though I cannot have them as the objects of relation of intending. In fact, one may argue that the specific determination of an intended object can be taken as an object of the relation of intending. But such an enterprise should not lead us to the exclusion of the real object from the relation of intending. For, each specific determination belongs to a unique kind of object. In a similar way, it can be said that every single specific determination is of an intended object towards which different acts are directed.

APPENDIX B

FREGE'S NOTION OF SENSE AND REFERENCE

I have already seen that Husserl's characterization of the noema can be connected with Frege's notion of "sense" in such a way that the sense is associated with the presentation of the intended object. Frege differs from Husserl in that Frege uses the *Bedeutung* for the object of the expression while Husserl identifies the same term with the sense or meaning of the expression.

According to Frege, every expression has a sense and referent. But I should sharply distinguish the sense from the referent by supposing that while the referent is the object to which the expression refers, the sense is the mode of presentation of the object. As a connected remark, "The realm of thoughts and senses is, as Frege conceives it, the realm of *modes of being given* (my italic) of entities of different sorts"¹⁹² Or the sense is what the expression expresses as an ideal correlate of the act of presenting. Frege, like Husserl, claims that

¹⁹² See, Smith, B (1994) "Husserl's Theory of Meaning and Reference" in Leila Haaparanta (ed.), *Mind, Meaning and Mathematics*, p. 167

the sense of a singular term has to be distinct from the *Bedeutung*. In this connection, “So the sense of an expression—that which must be known in order for a speaker to understand it—cannot be identified with its reference”¹⁹³ But it is also the case that the connection between the sense and the referent is established by the mediation of the sense again. For Frege, every sense *determines* an object beside being the mode of presentation. At this point I need to refer to a distinction by which I can reach at the exact notion of the sense. According to this view, I have to take attention to the fact that the sense of the expression is not mental or psychological events occurring in the mind of the person. And I must suppose a differentiation of such events from the sense of the objects. In addition to that, Frege seems to have been involved in an attempt to distinguish namely, the sense from the idea which I have of a particular object. In this connection, Frege says,

The *Bedeutung* and sense of a sign are to be distinguished from the associated idea (*Vorstellung*). If the *Bedeutung* of a sign is an object perceivable by the senses, my idea of it is an internal image, arising from memories of sense impressions which I have had and acts, both internal and external, which I have performed. Such an idea is often imbued with feeling; The same sense is not always connected, even in the same man, with the same idea. The idea is subjective: one man’s idea is not that of another. There result, as a matter of course, a variety of differences in the ideas associated with the same sense. A painter, a horseman and a zoologist will probably connect different ideas with the name “Bucephalus”. This constitutes an essential distinction between the idea and the sign’s sense, which may be the common property of many people, and so is not a part or a mode of the individual mind. For one can hardly deny that mankind

¹⁹³ See, George, A and Heck, R (1998) “Sense and Reference”, *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, p. 4

has a common store of thoughts which is transmitted from one generation to another.¹⁹⁴

In contrast to the subjective ideas, the sense or meaning of a singular term is an objective and mind-independent entity. That is to say, it does not differ from one person to another, and it is intersubjective. As a special ontological category, senses cannot be the objects of the cognitive acts. The sense of an expression is not a temporal entity unlike the psychological processes. A further characterization of the sense of the expression is formulated as follows;

The *Bedeutung* of a proper name is the object itself which we designate by using it; the idea which we have in that case is wholly subjective; in between lies the sense, which is indeed no longer subjective like the idea, but is yet not the object itself. The following analogy will perhaps clarify these relationships. Somebody observes the Moon through a telescope. I compare the Moon itself to the *Bedeutung*; it is the object of the observation, mediated by the real image projected by the object glass in the interior of the telescope, and by the retinal image of the observer. The former I compare to the sense, the latter is like the idea or intuition. The optical image in the telescope is indeed one sided and dependent upon the standpoint of observation; but it is still objective, inasmuch as it can be used by several observers.¹⁹⁵

However, there is a related ontological argument with respect to the ontological status of the object to which a name refers. According to this argument, even if the object or referent does not exist, there still may be a certain sense which the word or name expresses. Husserl also shares the above view with the distinction that I should

¹⁹⁴ See, Frege, Gottlob. (1892) “ On Sinn and Bedeutung” in M. Beaney (ed.), *The Frege Reader*, p. 154, Blackwell Publishers

never suppose a non-existent object as the referent of the related expression. An expression either has an object or not. It is not convenient to constitute a kind of object for the expression of which there is no an actual object. So, I come to the Fregean conclusion that an expression can have a sense even if it has no an actual object to which it would refer. Frege's own formulation of this view is as follows; so,

It may perhaps be granted that every grammatically well-formed expression figuring as a proper name always has a sense. But this is not to say that to the sense there also corresponds a *Bedeutung*. The words 'celestial body most distant from the Earth' have a sense, but it is very doubtful if they also have a *Bedeutung*.¹⁹⁶

In addition to the above characterization of the *Bedeutung*, Frege also claims that one cannot grasp the *Bedeutung* wholly and entirely by a single act of apprehension. The *Bedeutung* is given to us by the mediation of the sense which presents the object in a particular way. In fact this can be linked with the view that I know the *Bedeutung* from a certain aspect from which I attain a specific determination of the *Bedeutung*. So, Frege says "but this serves to illuminate only a single aspect of the *Bedeutung*, supposing it to have one. Comprehensive knowledge of the *Bedeutung* would require us to

¹⁹⁵ *ibid.*, 155

¹⁹⁶ *ibid.*, 153

be able to say immediately whether any given sense attaches to it. To such knowledge we never attain”.¹⁹⁷ This namely is to say that I know a single aspect of the *Bedeutung* to which a certain sense or Sinn refers.

¹⁹⁷ *ibid.*, 153

APPENDIX C

TURKISH SUMMARY

HUSSERL'İN YÖNELMİŞLİK KAVRAMI

NOESİS VE NOEMA KAVRAMLARININ FENOMENOLOJİK ÇÖZÜMLEMESİ

I. Giriş

Bu çalışmanın en başta gelen amacı, Husserl'in yönelmişlik teorisini fenomenolojik yönden irdeleyip yeniden inşasını başarmaktır. Söylemeden edemeyeceğim şey de bu çalışmanın amacı, Husserl Fenomenolojisi üzerine betimlemeseli bir çözümleme olmadığıdır. Çünkü yönelmişlik kavramı Husserl fenomenolojisinde specific bir kavram olup açılımının da genel Husserl felsefesinden bağımsız olduğunu söylemek durumundayım. Ayrıca, bu çalışma ile biz kendimizi Husserl'in ilk dönem yönelmişlik teorisi ile sınırladık.

“Yönelmişlik” ya da “niyetlilik” kavramı arapça “makul” ve “mana” sözcüklerinin Latince’ye “intendo-dere” olarak çevrilmesinden gelmektedir. Bu kavram Aristo sonrası Ortaçağ filozofları tarafından sıkça çalışılmıştır. Bu süreci izleyen zamanlarda ilk olarak bu kavrama eğilen isim Brentano’dur.

Brentano fenomenolojisinde yönelmişlik kavramı şöyle bir anlam ve çerçeve çizmiştir; Brentano’ya göre bütün bilinç yaşantıları ya da mental edimler bir nesneye yönelmişlerdir. Nesnesiz hiçbir bilinç yaşantısı yoktur. Hemen söylemek gerekirse Husserl aynı fikirde değildir; Husserl’e göre özel ruh halleri, duygular ve duyu deneyimleri bir nesneye sahip değildirler. Ek olarak, Brentano bilincin kendisine yöneldiği nesnenin bilinç yaşantısı içinde olduğunu ve bu nesnenin maddi bir şey olmadığını iddia eder. Fakat son dönemlerinde Brentano nesnenin gerçek, hakiki ya da somut bir şey olduğu fikrine sahip çıkar. Brentano, yönelmişlik kavramını bilincin nesnesine başvurarak açıklamaya çalışır. Oysa, Husserl fenomenolojik anlamın aracılığını zorunlu gösterir. Husserl yönelmişliği bilinç yaşantıları çerçevesinde açıklamaya çalışır. Husserl’in yönelmişlik kavramı paranteze alma (epoché) kavramının etkisi altında farklı ve çok yönlü gelişmeler göstermiştir. Bu etki aşkın bilinç ve psikolojik ya da deneysel olarak belirlenebilir bilinç ayrımına yol açmış olup bilinç

yaşantılarının kendisine ait olduğu ego ya da öz bilincin anlaşılması bakımından önemlidir.

II. Yönelmişlik Kavramının Açılımı Üzerine

Bilincin yönelimine en önemli katkıda bulunan öğelerden biri de bilinç yaşantıları ya da yönelimsel edimlerdir. Bilinç yaşantıları adından da anlaşılacağı üzere yönelmişliğin gerçekleşmesi için özne ya da bilinç tarafının katkısını gerektirmektedir. Husserl'in tanımladığı yönelmişlik ilişkileri sadece özne tarafının katkısı ile gerçekleşmeyip aynı zamanda eksik bir nesne tarafının da faaliyette olması ile somutlaşabilir. Fakat şu açıktır ki Husserl her zaman bilincin nesnesinin bahçemizde gördüğümüz ağaç ile aynı olduğunu ileri sürmüştür. Buna rağmen öyle bilinç yaşantıları vardır ki bunların somut bir objesi yoktur. Bu durumlarda bile Husserl'e göre bizler yine de bilincimizin gösterdiği bir objeye yönelmekteyiz. Husserl'e göre bilincimizin nesnesini belirleyen fenomenolojik anlamdır. Ona göre bizler her zaman belirli bir objeye yönelen bilinç ilişkilerini gözönüne almalıyız. Husserl varolmayan nesnelere yönelen bilinç yaşantılarını gözardı etmektedir. Husserl'in yönelmişlik teorisi Brentano'nunkinden farklıdır. Aralarındaki temel fark, Husserl'in bilincin yönelmişliğini nesnesiyle değil de fenomenolojik anlam ve

bilinç-yapıları ile açıklamaya çalışmasıdır. Ayrıca Brentano nesnenin ontolojik olarak varolma koşullarını açıklamaya çalışırken Husserl nesnenin ontolojik durumunu hiç tartışmaz. Hatta varolmayan nesnelere konusundaki konuşmanın dahi anlamsız olduğunu söyler eğer biz her zaman bir nesneye yöneliyor olmamız gerekiyor ise. Aslında bu görüş Meinong'un görüşüyle çelişmektedir. Çünkü Meinong yönelmişliği nesnenin kendisine kazandırdığı derin sınırlarla açıklamaktadır. Meinong'a göre bilinç her türlü nesneye bir yönelimsel ilişki içinde olabilir. Bilincin nesnesi varolmak zorunda değildir. Objeye varlığa ve hiçliğe kayıtsızdır. Objeye varolmanın ötesinde bir çerçeveye işaret etmektedir. Bir objeye ya vardır ya da bir varlık formuna (subsistence) sahiptir. Fiziksel nesnelere vardır fakat soyut nesnelere yukarıda bahsettiğimiz varlık formuna sahiptirler. Bu nesnelere Meinong "Objectives" diye adlandırır. Yukarıda söylediklerimizden de anlaşılacağı üzere Meinong'un yönelmişlik teorisinde nesne kavramı çok önemli bir yer tutmaktadır. Görüldüğü üzere, Meinong'un görüşlerinde ontolojik tartışmaların diğer tartışmalara ve görüşlere bir üstünlüğü vardır. Buradan da şöyle bir görüş ileri sürülebilir; Meinong yönelmişlik teorisini nesne ve nesnenin varolma koşullarına kazandırdığı özel anlam ve boyutla açıklamaya çalışmıştır. Husserl ile Meinong arasındaki temel fark

Husserl'in yönelimsel ilişkileri fenomenolojik anlama dayandırırken Meinong'un bunu nesnenin varolma koşullarına başvurarak açıklamaya çalışmasıdır.

Yönelmişlik teorisinde kendisine başvurduğumuz bir diğer isim ise polonyalı filozof Twardowski'dir. Twardowski yönelmişlik teorisini Husserl gibi fenomenolojik anlam aracılığı ile açıklamaktadır. Twardowski'ye göre bilinç yaşantısı nesnesine felsefi anlam aracılığı ile yönelmektedir. Bu felsefi anlam ise bilincin sunumu sırasında elde edilen bir şeydir. Twardowski'ye göre bilinç, anlam ve nesne arasında bir ayırım kabul edilip bunları birbiriyle karıştırmamak gerekmektedir. Anlam ile yönelinen nesne arasındaki fark, anlamın bilinçsel sunumda nesnenin ise bu anlam aracılığı ile elde edilmesidir. Twardowski'nin en temel katkısının felsefi anlam kavramı ve onun yönelimsel ilişkilerdeki fonksiyonudur. Çünkü Husserl'in başvurduğu fenomenolojik anlam kavramı ile Twardowski'nin felsefi anlam kavramları ve fonksiyonları arasında büyük bir benzerlik bulunmaktadır. Ben Twardowski'nin bahsi edilen kavramının Husserl'in yönelmişlik üzerine olan çalışmalarına büyük bir etkisi olduğu kanısındayım. Çünkü her ikisinin de görüşleri anlam kavramı çerçevesinde şekillenmektedir.

Husserl'in fenomenolojik anlam kavramını irdelerken aslında bu kavramın nesnenin özel belirlenimi (specific determination) olarak anlaşılabilceđi düşüncesine sıkı sıkıya sarıldım. Nesnenin özel belirlenimi ile şunu iddia ediyorum; bilinç yaşantıları nesnelere bu özel belirlenim aracılığı ile yönelmektedir. Bu iddia ile nesnenin belirli bir perspektivden bilinebileceđi görüşüne ulaşıyoruz. Özellikle algı nesnelere ve bu nesnelere yönelen algı temelli bilinç yaşantıları nesnesini belirli bir açıdan bize sunmaktadır. İşte nesnenin özel belirlenimi kavramı da bu görüşten doğmaktadır. Bu çalışmada algısal bilinç yaşantıları ile düşünsel bilinç yaşantıları arasında bir ayırımı gözetmekteyiz ve bu ayırım temeli üzerinde kalarak fenomenolojik anlam kavramı aracılığı ile yönelimsel ilişkileri açıklamaya çalışıyoruz. Bununla beraber, algısal bilinç yaşantıları ile düşünsel bilinç yaşantıları için fenomenolojik anlam ya da nesnenin özel belirlenimi farklı bir şekilde biçimlendirilmektedir. Örneđin, algısal bilinç yaşantıları için fenomenolojik anlam, Gurwitsch'e göre, belirli bir perspektivden elde edilen görüngülerdir. Bu görüngüler somut, algılanabilir nesne kısımlarıdır. Yani bu görüngülere yönelen belirli algısal bilinç yaşantıları vardır. Biz fenomenolojik anlama böyle bir yönelimin mümkün olmadığını düşünüp savunduk. Fakat aynı zamanda fenomenolojik anlamın yönelimsel ilişkinin nesne kısmıyla

yakından ilişkisi olduđu düşüncesindeyim. Buna ilaveten, düşünsel bilinç yaşantıları için de yukarıda bahsi edilen nesnenin özel belirlenimi durumu şu şekilde açıklanabilir; Düşünce bize nesneyi belirli bir açılıma bağlı kalarak sunar. Düşünce nesneyle birebir bir uyum içerisinde olmayabilir. Bu durumlarda düşünce nesneyi bize belirli bir belirlenimi ya da özelliği ile sunar. Bu itibarla düşünsel bilinç yaşantıları için de yönelinen nesne belirli bir açıdan bilince sunulmaktadır. Aslında yukarıda tartıştığımız görüş, Husserl'in aşkın nesnelerin (transcendental objects) bütünsel olarak bilinemeyeceği görüşüne dayanmaktadır.

Maddi nesnelere ve onlar hakkındaki varoluşsal yargılar, bilineceği üzere, Husserl'in fenomenolojisinden dışlanmışlardır. Paranteze alma işlemi ile maddi dünya, bilinç dünyasından alıkonulmuş fakat tamamen koparılmamıştır. Çünkü Husserl dış dünyanın varlığını yadsımamıştır. Bunun yerine yeni bir fenomenolojik tavır belirlemiştir. Bu tavırla dış dünya ile bilinç arasında köprü olabilecek yeni bir bilinç durumu yaratmaya çalışmıştır. Buna göre, bu yeni fenomenolojik tavır ile bilinç yaşantıları ve onun gelişmiş biçimleri derinlemesine irdelenebilir bir duruma gelmiştir. Böylece, aşkın bilinç ve onun yaşantıları için yönelinen nesne farklı bir anlam kazanmaktadır. Bu yeni

fenomenolojik tavır ile Husserl nesnenin gerçekliği konusunda yeni bir niteleme yöntemi geliştirmiştir. Bizim vardığımız sonuca göre, Husserl, nesne gerçekten varolmasa da ya da absürd olsa bile bu tür varlıklara fenomenolojik bir tavır çerçevesi içerisinde değiştirilmiş bir gerçeklik nosyonu iliştilirilmiştir. Bir başka deyişle, düşündüğümüz her nesne bilincin kendisine belirli ve fenomenolojik bir gerçekliğe sahip olarak sunulmaktadır. Nesnenin sahip olduğu bu yeni fenomenolojik gerçeklik ile Husserl nesnenin bilincin tamamı içerisinde yeni baştan belirlenip oluşturulduğunu anlar.

Paranteze alma işlemi genelde çok radikal olduğu ve dış dünyanın bilinçten tamamen koparıldığı görüşünün yanlışlığı nesnenin yine bilinçte oluşturulduğu görüşü ile ortaya çıkar. Epoché fenomenolojik yöntem) aslında bize yeni bir ontolojik alan açar ve bu alanda Husserl bilinç yaşantılarının doğasını araştırarak bir nesneye bilincin nasıl yöneldiğini betimlemeye çalışmıştır. Husserl nasıl oluyor da paranteze alma işlemine rağmen bilincin bir nesneye yönelimini açıklayabilmektedir. Bu sorunun cevabı aslında fenomenolojik anlam kavramı ve onun fenomenolojik fonksiyonları çerçevesinde anlaşılabilir.

III. Fenomenolojik Anlam

Daha önce de söylediğimiz üzere fenomenolojik anlam (Ideal Content or Noema) aracılığı ile bilinç nesnesine yönelmektedir. Yani fenomenolojik anlam nesneyi belirlemekte ve belirli bir biçimde betimlemekte olup bilinç de bu nesneye yönelmektedir. Bu fenomenolojik anlam dediğimiz kavramın Frege'nin "sense" ve "reference" kavramlarıyla yakın bir benzerliğini Husserl'de kabul eder.

Husserl Mantıksal Soruşturmalar (Logical Investigations) adlı iki ciltlik çalışmasında Fenomenolojik anlam kavramına ulaşmadan önce bir de *somut anlam* diye bir diğer faktörü de belirler. Deneysel ya da empirik olarak belirlenebilen bu öge bilinç yaşantılarının yeni fenomenolojik tavır olan paranteze alınma işleminden önceki haline işaret etmektedir. Somut anlam (Real Content) bilinç yaşantılarını oluşturan kısmi mental yaşantılarıdır. Bunlar psikoloji biliminin araştırma konusu içerisine girmektedir. Fakat şunu da söylemek gerekir ki indirgenmiş bilinç yaşantılarında bu somut anlam soyut bir evre haline dönüşüp bilinç yaşantılarının yönelimine katkıda bulunur. Bu dönüşüm paranteze alma işleminden sonra aşkın bilincin elde edilmesi ile gerçekleşir. Aşkın bilinç ve onun soyut bilinçsel evresi artık empirik olarak belirlenemeyip aşkın felsefenin ve ona ait özlerin bir konusu haline gelir. Bu bahsini ettiğimiz değişim *Ideas*'da

gerçekleşir. Somut bilinçsel anlam ya da evre *Ideas*'da soyut ya da düşünsel bir anlam haline dönüşüp bilincin yönelmişliğine katkıda bulunur. Bunun yanında soyut anlam ya da fenomenolojik anlam erken dönem Husserl'de bir genel tür ya da cins iken sonraki evrelerde bu kavram genel olarak kendisine başvurduğumuz soyut anlam şeklinde anlaşılmıştır. Bilincin nesnesine yönelebilmesi için soyut bilinçsel evre ile fenomenolojik anlam arasında eşgüdümlü bir korelasyon bulunmaktadır. Soyut bilinçsel evre nesnesine yönelirken yönelimsel edime belirli bir anlam kazandırır. Bu anlam da bilinç yaşantısının nesnesini belirler. Bilinç yaşantıları karmaşık ve kompleks yapılar olup bu yapıları oluşturan farklı öğeler bulunmaktadır. Bunlardan biri de duysal anlamdır ki biz bunlara algısal bilinç yaşantılarında raslamaktayız. Bu yaşantıların kendileri yönelimsel olmayıp nesnesine yönelen bilinç edimlerine belirli bir ölçüde katkıda bulunurlar. Bu duysal anlam soyut anlamın gerçekleşmesine ve dolayısıyla bilinç yaşantısı nesnesinin belirlenmesinde hayati bir rol oynar. Duysal anlamdaki en ufak bir değişiklik fenomenolojik anlamın belirlenmesinde de etkin bir değişikliğe neden olur. O yüzden duysal anlam ile fenomenolojik anlamın bir uyum içerisinde bulunması gerekmektedir. Duysal anlamın kaynağı duyu organları ile dış dünya arasındaki etkileşimdir.

Yukarıda söylenilenlere ilaveten bir diğer fenomenolojik anlam anlam ögesi de öznel tavır ile anlamın “Sinn” ögesidir. Birincisi, genellikle öznenin nesnesine yönelirken sahip olduğu öznel tavırı işaret eder. Örneğin, biz bir ağacı görürken ağacın görsel anlamda bir izlemine ediniriz. İkinci “Sinn” ögesi ise fenomenolojik anlamın sadece bilince yüklenen kısmıdır, bilinç nesnesine yönelirken. Buna ilaveten, bir diğer önemli ve oldukça spesifikleştirilmiş anlam ögesi de merkezi anlam (Noematic Sinn) diyebileceğimiz bir kavramdır. Bu öge temel olarak yönelimsel ilişkinin obje kısmıyla ilişkilidir. Genel olarak yönelimsel edimin objesini belirler ve ona özel ve farklı bir anlam yükler. Örnek verecek olursak, ağırı dağıcı farklı şekillerde obje durumuna getirebiliriz; arkadaşımın gösterdiği kartpostalda gördüğüm dağ ya da üzerine tırmandığım dağ ya da televizyonda hayran kaldığım karlı dağ şeklinde ağırı dağıcı farklı anlama biçimlerine başvurarak fenomenolojik olarak nesneleştirebiliriz. Bu bağlamda şunu da söylemek gerekir ki Husserl fenomenolojik anlam ile bu anlamın belirlediği nesneyi birbirinden kesin çizgilerle ayırmıştır. Sonuç olarak, Husserl’in yönelmişlik teorisi anlam bağımlı bir yaklaşım olup nesneden çok bilinç edimlerinin katılımını zorunlu kılar.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Place and Date of Birth: Bitlis, 15. 09.1965

Ankara University, Department of Philosophy, Turkey, B. A. In philosophy, 1983-1987

Middle East Technical University, Department of Philosophy, Turkey, MSc. In philosophy

Middle East Technical University, Department of Philosophy, Turkey, Ph. D. In philosophy

Position Held:

Research Assistant at Muğla University, Department of Philosophy (1997) and Middle East Technical University (1997-2003)

Publications:

Article:

“Felsefe’nin Bireysel Sorunlara Uygulanışı Üzerine”, *Felsefe Dünyası* (2001), pp. 69-76.

Presentations:

“Referential Relation in Wittgenstein’s Theory of Language (Tractatus, Philosophical Investigations)” 25th *International Wittgenstein Symposium*, Kircberg am Wechsel, Austria, 11-17 August 2002.

“Stoacılar da Erdem Ögesi ve Ampirik Denemeler”, *I. Ulusal Uygulamalı Etik Kongresi*, Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi, Felsefe Bölümü, 12-13 Kasım, 2001.

“Wittgenstein’da Dil Oyunu”, *Türk Felsefe Derneği Kongresi*, 4 Kasım 2000.