

GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY (1949-2000)

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis aims to analyse the change and continuity issue in German Foreign Policy. In this study, the basic aim is to identify the basic parameters of the West German foreign policy during the Cold War and identify the implications of the reunification on foreign policy of Germany. Actually, after the reunification, the economically giant Germany has started to pursue a more self-reliant foreign policy course but there is not a radical shift from the basic parameters and the core values. The concept of ‘civilian power’ and the international climate within which the foreign policy is formulated, will be given priority. It is argued that from the Gulf War in 1990-1991 to the Kosovo War of 1999, German contribution to military operations has increased. However, Germany has done this within a multilateral context and the aim has been to keep the values of respect for democracy and human rights. Thus, continuity dominates over change in German foreign policy, with regard to its policy record during the 1990s.

Keywords: German Foreign Policy, Change and Continuity, Civilian Power Concept, Multilateralism.

ÖZ

ALMAN DIŞ POLİTİKASI: DEĞİŞİM VE DEVAMLILIK

Gül, Murat

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tez, Alman Dış Politikasında değişim ve devamlılık konusunu incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışmanın temel hedefi Soğuk Savaş sırasındaki Batı Alman Dış Politikasının temel parametrelerini belirlemek ve birleşmenin Alman Dış Politikası üzerine etkilerini incelemektir. Esas olarak, birleşmeden sonra, ekonomik olarak çok güçlü olan Almanya daha cesur bir dış politika izlemeye başlamasına rağmen, temel parametreler ve değerlerden radikal bir sapma olmamıştır. Çalışmanın hedefleri doğrultusunda, ‘sivil güç’ konseptine ve dış politikanın oluşumunu etkileyen uluslararası sistem ve gelişmelere birincil önem verilecektir. Bu çalışmada, 1990-1991 Körfez Savaşı’ndan 1999 Kosova Savaşı’na kadar olan süreçte Almanya’nın askeri operasyonlara katkısının arttığı iddia edilmektedir. Fakat, Almanya bu katkıyı çok taraflı bir çerçevede ve insan hakları ve demokrasiyi koruma değerleri çerçevesinde yapmıştır. Bu nedenle, Almanya’nın 1990’lardaki dış politikası ele alındığında, devamlılığın değişime göre daha baskın olduğu söylenebilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Alman Dış Politikası, Değişim ve Devamlılık, Sivil Güç Konsepti, Çok Taraflılık

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INTRODUCTION

The reunification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar international structure has created uncertainties in the international system. After the reunification, economically giant Germany started to pursue a more independent foreign policy which destructed the image of 'political pigmy' that lived under the security umbrella of the western alliance. The former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in the very first years of the reunification, underlined the re-emergence of Germany as an equal and effective member of the international community. The 1990s have been a transformation period for the international community within which the core principles have become continuity, community and limitation. However, the physical and psychological affects of the reunification, on German people and administrations, and their practical implications on German foreign policy, have been an issue of special attention.

The central geographical orientation of Germany, in Europe, has vested new responsibilities to the country, for the future development of the continent. Moreover, Germany as the most powerful state in the middle of Europe, has started to play a crucial role (with other big powers of the world) in the execution and reconstruction of the international politics. The construction of the 'United States of Europe' within which Germany 'should' play the leading role and realize 'Europeanization of Germany' have been supported by the German foreign policy-makers. In addition to this intra-integration in the Western Europe, integration of the Eastern and Western Europe has been a primary foreign policy objective for the German administrations. With this objective, responsibility and her huge economic and political capabilities, Germany has been considered as one of the 'engines' of the European integration, probably the most important one.

Both German people and German administrations regained self-reliance after the reunification. Today, Germans are (and feel themselves as) the citizens of a democratic and modern state, like the other peoples of the western countries. The new generation of Germans has gained a mentality of European integration and tries to cut its ties with the victims of the Second World War. Thus, the formulation of a European foreign and security policy and the extension of this integration concept to the Eastern Europe is crucial for Germany. Germany wants to play the leading role in determination of the principles of common foreign and security policy, and has the capability to do so. Such an assertiveness has put Germany under the spotlights and Germany's roles,

responsibilities and foreign policy practices have begun to be discussed by the international relations academicians.

Several questions have been asked since the reunification of the country: Will Germany still be a 'civilian power' or will it become militarized? Will Germany keep its objectives of European integration and the extension of 'European values' to the Eastern Europe or will it shift from this multilateral context and pursue a 'go it alone' policy? Will Germany still rely on Atlantic alliance for its self-defence or will it go nuclear and develop its own security agenda?... In sum, the key question to be asked is: 'Will Europe and the wider international community face a new "German Question" or has this question been resolved in a peaceful and democratic way?'

In this study, I will try to find answers to these questions which have been clarified throughout the time since reunification, and, try to indicate the ambiguous questions which are still on the agenda. In the first part of the study, I will give a brief historical background of Germany, in order to have a better understanding of the evolution of German foreign policy, with regard to the new roles, responsibilities and objectives. This part mainly deals with the adaptation of West Germany into the western community and alliance. Germany's role in European integration, as well as the 'path' to the country's reunification, will be specified.

The second part deals with the basic intellectual trends and their theories about the orientation and the course of German foreign policy. Also, in this part, I will deal with

the practical implications of German foreign policy. The continuity-change issue, 'civilian power' role of Germany, Germany's basic foreign policy orientations and the problems which German policy-makers confront in implementing foreign policy, will be studied. Germans' expectations and internal discussions on foreign policy, as well as the changing international environment within which the foreign policy is formulated, will be given priority.

The third part deals with Germany's security policy and Germany's role in the development of a common foreign and security policy in Europe. Also, bilateral security relations with France and Britain and the problems in the formation of a common foreign and security policy, will be identified.

In the fourth part, the issue of 'Germany and the use of military force' will be studied. The issue will be held within a historical context and the evolution of the 'out-of-area' debate will be dealt with, through reference to specific involvements in the use of force.

The fifth part is on the foreign and security policy dilemmas of Germany. The problems Germany confronts as member of NATO, ESDI and the OSCE and difficulty of keeping balance in Washington, Paris and Moscow axis will be discussed.

Finally, in the conclusion part, I will try to make an overall evaluation and set forth prospects for the future course of German foreign policy.

CHAPTER 1

THE GERMAN QUESTION IN THE PRE-UNIFICATION PERIOD

Germany's position between 1945 and 1949 was, to a certain extent, also the inexorable consequence of its geographical situation in the center of Europe – torn between the West and East Europe. The West, represented by Britain and France, had been industrializing since the Industrial Revolution in Britain and democratizing since the political revolution in France. On the other side, autocratic Tsarist Russia had represented the East. However, although the Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917 had dramatically changed the ideological colors of the East from autocratic Tsarism on the extreme right to totalitarian Soviet communism on the extreme left, the Revolution had not changed the basic dilemma (for Germany) because Germany wedged in between the liberal West and the left-wing totalitarian East, with the strongest communist party outside Soviet Russia.

The world structural divide in 1945, and division in Europe, was now between ‘the Free West’ led by the US and ‘the Communist East’ led by the SU.

Actually, after 18 January 1871, by uniting into one national state under Otto von Bismarck, Germany had become too strong for any balance of power within the European system, which had been defined since Utrecht 1713. Actually the late unification of Germany as a ‘nation state’ was the beginning of the – so called - ‘German Question’ to become a continuous problem in the international fora. There are three main reasons behind the emergence of a ‘German Question’: First one is the German unification in terms of Germany’s territorial and national unity; second one is Germany’s unification in terms of Constitutional unity; and third as a problem of international status, Germany’s unification within the framework of the treaties conducted to provide the stability of the European states system¹. The ‘German Question’ is defined by Timothy G. Ash as the fears of Germany’s neighbours to keep such a dynamic, over-populated and geographically central-oriented country with its huge economic capabilities, under control and not to let it again destabilize the political order on the continent².

After the surrender of Germany on 8 May 1945, the future of Germany was the most important of all European questions. Anglo-Soviet interests during the World War II had been defined as the need to contain Germany and to devise the best means of preventing the revival of a strong and aggressive Germany. However, the note sent by the

¹ Bağcı, Hüseyin, *Almanya: Yeni Bir Dünya Gücü?*, Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 1992, pp. 2-3

² Ash, Timothy G., *In Europe’s Name*, New York: Random House, 1993, p.23

British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin to British Prime Minister Clement Attlee on 10 April 1946 was stating that: 'The Russians have decided upon an aggressive policy based upon militant communism and Russian chauvinism'. This statement had a great impact on the British government's policy in the sense that, up to that time the British had thought of the German problem solely in terms of Germany itself and had aimed to prevent the revival of 'the German war machine'. However, Bevin was writing in a top secret Cabinet paper on 3 May 1946 that: 'The worst situation of all would be a revived Germany in league with or dominated by Russia'³. From January 1947, an economic unit, with the name of 'Bizonia', was created. However, its creation was more than just the economic fusion of the British and American (occupied) zones. *Bizonia* was a turning point in post-war Germany: it marked the end of four-power (US, SU, Britain and France) cooperation and the beginning of Anglo-American collaboration in Germany. Thus, Bizonia was the beginning of the end of German unity. Even before the founding of the Federal Republic, basic decisions had set the course for West Germany: the fusion of the three western occupation zones (of the US, Britain and France) in 1947 and 1948 foreshadowed the future Federal Republic. A Six-Power Conference (by the US, Britain, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg – the last three so-called Benelux countries) was held in London between February and June 1948 and the formal decision was to set up a West German State⁴.

³ Steininger, Rolf, 'The German Question, 1945-95' in Larres, Klaus, ed., *Germany Since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1998, p.9

⁴ Ibid., pp.10-12

1.1. Konrad Adenauer Era

The first federal elections of West Germany, held on 14 August 1949, enabled Konrad Adenauer's Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) to form a coalition with the Free Democrats (FDP) and the Deutsche Partei (DP). Since then, the 73-years old new West German Chancellor became the key personality for the reconciliation process between the West and West Germany. Thus, analyzing Adenauer era and his political role is crucial for understanding the West German politics after 1945 because he left his stamp on the foreign policy of the Federal Republic. Adenauer was so determined that the future of West Germany lied in integration with the West and adoption of West Germany into the Western institutional structures, through completely breaking the legacy of the *Third Reich*. Adenauer and his supporters, within the CDU/CSU, sought a European political order that would irrevocably tie West German state and society to the political and cultural system (and values) of Western Europe. This was to be achieved by making West Germany an equal and respected partner of the Western powers and by forging a fundamental reconciliation between West Germany and France. The strategy and policies of Adenauer emanated from the perception of a credible threat from the SU. Adenauer's solution for the communist challenge was the creation of a 'united Western Europe'. In addition to this, there were other reasons for Adenauer's strong insistence on West European integration: The emotional controversy about how to define Germany's national identity and which priorities were to triumph – European or German unification – was continuing. Adenauer's policy was to join the West, making the West and West Germany so strong that one day the Soviet Union would give way and grant German

reunification in its own interest. Thus, it can be argued that Adenauer assessed reunification as a further step that would come after West Germany consolidated its power, and reunification could be imposed on the East, while the latter was weakening. Some scholars formulate this policy as:

Adenauer found the connection between the concepts of Western integration and German reunification in the belief that a consolidation in the West would automatically lead to the collapse of the Soviet dominance in the Eastern zone, what was termed as the “magnetic concept”⁵.

Adenauer’s ‘west-oriented’ foreign policy was called as *Westpolitik* and its main goals were defined as: Cooperation with West and making West Germany member of Western organizations; restore confidence for the country through making West Germany a reliable partner; give priority for improving relations with France and realize European integration through which West Germany could achieve its foreign, security and economic policy goals. Actually, the main facets of *Westpolitik* can be summarized by two concepts: the supranationalization and westernization of West Germany’s foreign policy.

Supranationalization implied a basic abandonment of the (extreme) nationalist thinking of the former German foreign policy course. The new West German state became a leading champion of the schemes for Atlantic and European integration processes. The interplay of national and supranational perspectives became a central theme in West Germany’s post-Second World War foreign policy culture.

⁵ Pfetsch, P. Frank, *West Germany: Internal Structures and External Relations*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988, p.184

Westernization aimed at basic reconciliation of the historical (political) alienation between the West and West Germany. The pro-western civilization tendency (*Abendland*) that was stressing the political, philosophical and ideological values that West Germany was sharing with its western allies, was shaped by the CDU/CSU administration, under Adenauer's leadership.

In accordance with the above-mentioned facets, Adenauer's foreign policy-making, mainly, rested on three components that aimed to restore both political and economic sovereignty for West Germany: First of all, after recognizing the strong reputation and continuing mistrust for West Germany abroad, Bonn acted in a way through which it would achieve its foreign policy goals within a multilateral framework. One, and the first, aspect of this multilateral framework was that the civilian representatives of Washington, Paris and London (in West Germany) did the final work on the West Germany's external relations and on certain domestic questions (like; armament). Since the very beginning of his term in office, Adenauer had to (and preferred to) walk in a line of cooperation with his three western allies, for the defense of the West German interests. The second component of his foreign policy was that through entering into multilateral commitments of ECSC and EEC, Adenauer was willing to confront the legacy of the pre-Second World War German policy implications and to implement confidence-building measures (for West Germany), in order to counter the effects of history. Finally, a major component of Adenauer's western strategy of recognition and reconciliation was his emphasis on, what was called in the 1950s, 'the

memory of the hopeful but abortive rapprochement between Paris and Berlin in the 1920s⁶.

The motives that fostered Germany's initial orientation of European integration can be, easily, found in Adenauer's own words: “ It was important to establish close ties with those peoples that ‘by their nature’ held concurrent views on government, human rights, freedom and property”⁷. By this, Adenauer expressed that he held the European culture and values as the basis of European integration. Adenauer perceived Russia as an imminent threat toward the west and he used this perception to justify his policy of European integration in the minds of West Germans. In accordance with this line of thinking, Adenauer continuously tried to improve relations with Western states, primarily with France. According to him, hostility between Germany and France would be like a “decaying body in the middle of Europe” –as Churchill had put it- and would be “just as detrimental for Europe as a victorious Nazi Germany.”⁸

Soviet attempts to prevent rapprochement between the West and West Germany and prevent possible West German membership in NATO, could not alter Adenauer's pro-Western policy orientation and objectives. With his famous note of 10 March 1952, Stalin tried to torpedo the integration of West Germany into the Western Europe and prevent West German rearmament. Stalin offered a united Germany, including a small

⁶ Geiss, Imanuel, ‘The Federal Republic of Germany in International Politics Before and After Unification’ in Larres, Klaus and Panayi, Panikos, eds., *The Federal Republic of Germany Since 1949*, New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996, pp.140-142

⁷ Pfetsch, P. Frank, *West Germany: Internal Structures and External Relations*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988, p.181

national army for its self-defense, with the only precondition that the unified Germany should not become a member of any kind of military alliance that involved the USA. On 16 March Chancellor Adenauer responded and said that there was nothing new in Stalin's offer and it was intended to isolate West Germany through neutralizing the country and preventing its integration with the West⁹.

All steps made in the field of foreign policy basically also affected the status of the West Germany and Germany as a whole. The first bone of contention was how best to regain sovereignty, and as mentioned above, Adenauer sought it by an arrangement with the Western powers. The Korean War at the end of June 1950 raised the specter of a communist military advance in Europe. Pressures from America to provide some contribution to the defense of Western Europe and Adenauer's offer to supply a West German military contingent, sparked off bitter controversies about the rearmament of West Germany. Adenauer wanted to use West German divisions as a lever to regain sovereignty for West Germany.

The basic problem was finding some way to appease French and British apprehensions about the potential threat to their security from a powerful West German military existence. The result was the European Defense Community (EDC), into which West German troops were to be integrated from the level of divisions. However, the EDC foundered in the French National Assembly in August 1954. Despite the bitter resistance from the West German opposition parties, West Germany's 'military contribution' was made in the form of the Federal Republic became an ally of the Western powers, who now left their troops stationed in West Germany, to protect the West Germany and Western Europe against the threat of a Soviet

⁹ Ibid., p.181

attack. The three Western powers (the US, Britain and France) reserved for themselves only the final decisions over the status of West Berlin and of German unification as a whole.

The membership of West Germany was termed as ‘quasi-sovereignty’ or ‘near-sovereignty’ (which continued up until the reunification of Germany in 1990), that implied the rearmament of the West German state had been accepted, but this would be in a limited scale and would be done within a multilateral context (NATO). The consequences of quasi-sovereignty were far-reaching: since the Federal Republic claimed to be the only truly legitimate German state, it tried to isolate the communist East Germany by the Hallstein Doctrine (the Doctrine which was first implemented by the Adenauer Administration up until the Chancellorship of Willy Brandt in 1969). According to this doctrine, all states that recognised the GDR would be punished by breaking off diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic. Adenauer administration had to make an exception with the Soviet Union, because Moscow held the key to any possible German unification. Thus, Bonn resumed diplomatic relations with Moscow and achieved the release of the last 10.000 German prisoners of war (in the SU), who had been held back as ‘war criminals’ (since the World War II), during Adenauer’s visit to Moscow in September 1955. As mentioned above, Chancellor Adenauer’s 9 September 1955 visit to Moscow was the first and implied the opening of diplomatic relations between West Germany and the SU. On 10 September 1980, Christian Democrat expert on foreign policy, Alois Mertes, called this as ‘German Ostpolitik began’¹⁰. The discussion over the nuclear weapons was another aspect of the issue. The Bundestag

⁹ Steininger, Rolf, ‘The German Question, 1945-95’ in Larres, Klaus, ed., *Germany Since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1998, p.12

adopted a resolution which demanded 'equality' for the Federal Republic in the domain of nuclear weapons. However, in fact, nothing ever came of it, certainly because West Germany's Western allies, including US, were just as wary of nuclear weapons in German hands, as was the Soviet Union. In addition to this external opposition, the highly emotional movement of 1958 against atomic weapons for West Germany, organized by the SPD (Social Democratic Party), trade unions and pacifist groups, were important part of the discussion. Another far-reaching consequence of the quasi-sovereignty was that the GDR achieved a comparable status within the communist Eastern Bloc: It became a member of the Warsaw Pact in January 1955. In spite of its internal weaknesses, the GDR rose to become the second strongest political, economic and military factor within the Soviet Bloc.

After the Schuman Plan for a measure of coordination between the French and German coal and steel industries in 1950 and foundation of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, the principle of controlling West German economic power through European integration was institutionalized and widened by the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. The EEC broadened the original Franco-German arrangement to include Italy and Benelux countries. Economic gains for West Germany, from the European Common Market were great and contributed to the 'German economic miracle' that was going on.

Actually, Adenauer's rejection of Stalin's note of 10 March 1952, the uprising of 17 June 1953 in East Berlin and East Germany (East Germans demanding more freedom,

¹⁰ Ash, Timothy G., *In Europe's Name*, New York: Random House, 1993, p.35

improvement in humane conditions and economic situation), which was the first of comparable turmoils shattering the SU, had destroyed all chances for early German unification. The next crisis, over Berlin, came out in 1958. Refugees from the GDR had kept slipping over to West Berlin through the borders of East Berlin . Krushev's Berlin Ultimatum of 1958 to West Germany (to stop influx of refugees) could not solve the problem. When the number of refugees to West Germany rose to unprecedented heights, the East German Communist Party Leader Walter Ulbricht wanted to eliminate West Berlin by a military coup, but was deflected from this attempt by the compromise solution of Krushev: sealing off the intra-Berlin boundaries between West and East Berlin. This brought about the building of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961.

The year 1963 marked a milestone in West Germany-France relations. Chancellor Adenauer made a move with the Elysée Treaty of 1963, with which he hoped to forge unbreakable links between West Germany and France. It was important within the European context and the logic of Franco-West German relations since 1950, because both countries had become the nucleus for any meaningful integration of Europe. However, French President de Gaulle had drifted into his own peculiar brand of nationalism: he had vetoed Britain's entrance into the EEC in 1963 and 1967, pulled out of NATO in 1966, cultivated his own nuclear force and followed a course of almost headlong collision with the US. The Elysée Treaty thus, provoked the controversy between the 'Atlanticists' and the 'Gaullists'. The West German policy-makers had to find an uneasy balance between the superpower beyond the Atlantic and their closest and greatest immediate neighbor on the continent. Thus, commitment to the 'West' was no

longer so easy to define and practice, if the West itself was divided and the interests were conflicting. However, the controversy between ‘Atlanticists’ and ‘Gaulists’ became irrelevant due to another consequence of the US global policy: After the height of Cold War confrontation between the US and the SU in the Cuban Missile Crisis of autumn 1962, the two superpowers opened a phase of de-escalation and relations with the Eastern Bloc gained importance. NATO’s 1967 Harmel Report can be reflected as a milestone in NATO’s strategy towards the Warsaw Pact. Also, West Germans cited Harmel Report as the bible of East-West relations because the report put German division to the centre of Western concerns and defined defense and détente variously, in a comprehensive manner.

1. 2. Willy Brandt Era

In 1969 elections, the SPD received 43% of the votes, whereas the FDP and CDU/CSU received 6% and 46% of the votes, respectively¹¹. As the FDP preferred to form a coalition with the SPD, Willy Brandt, who had served as foreign minister and vice-chancellor between 1966 and 1969, became the new chancellor of West Germany and served until 1974. The new government brought the impetus, with it, for improving the relations with the Eastern Bloc. However, although there was a relaxation in tensions between NATO and Warsaw Pact members, in conformity with the process of détente and although a leftist-led coalition government was in power in West Germany, the perception of threat coming from the Soviet Union did not disappear.

Brandt and his Social Democratic Party realized that the establishment of closer contacts, between the Federal Republic and German Democratic Republic, required an improvement of relations with Eastern Europe and Bonn's territorial recognition of the status quo of Europe's post-Second World War borders. For Chancellor Brandt, 'small steps were better than none' and 'small steps were better than big words'. Brandt's foreign policy was called as *Ostpolitik* that implied 'two states in one nation', through which the GDR would preserve its identity. As mentioned above, Ostpolitik aimed at improving relations with the Eastern Bloc. Walter Scheel, who became the President of West Germany on 15 May 1974, stated : 'Ostpolitik is an expression of the identity of our interests with the interest of Europe'¹². Government Declaration of October 1969 recognized the existence of 'two states in Germany' and the Ministry for All-German Questions was renamed as the Ministry for Intra-German Relations. However, it should be noted that Ostpolitik was not, completely, an alternative to Adenauer's Westpolitik. The alliance with the West, still, kept its importance and the new foreign policy course was tried to be kept in a compatible manner with the principles and parameters of Westpolitik.

Egon Bahr, Willy Brandt's chief adviser, had suggested a strategy of 'change through rapprochement', in 1963¹³. According to Bahr, West German strategy should be pursued within the context of 'the policy of transformation' through which East Germany should be transformed with agreement of the SU and this was supported by Chancellor

¹¹ Siekmeier, Mathias and Larres, Klaus, 'Domestic Political Developments II: 1969-90' in Larres, Klaus and Panayi, Panikos, eds., *The Federal Republic of Germany Since 1949*, New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996, p.100

¹² Ash, Timothy G., *In Europe's Name*, New York: Random House, 1993, p.19

Brandt who thought that German question could only be solved with the SU, not against it. J. Joffe termed this as 'relaxation through reassurance' between West and East Germany in particular, East and West in general through which détente between states in East and West should lead to détente between state and society in East¹⁴. This was facilitated by a global détente process: After the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the SU and the US had recognized the necessity of defusing tensions between the two blocs, which later led to the signing of the SALT I, in 1972. Thus, the relaxation of tensions encouraged the Brandt administration in improving relations with Eastern Europe and implementing Ostpolitik. Ostpolitik contributed to the signing of a host of bilateral treaties between West Germany and the East European countries: Negotiations between Bonn and Moscow culminated in the signing of Moscow Treaty on 12 August 1970. This accord stipulated the mutual renunciation of force, the acceptance by West Germany of the Oder-Neisse line, the border between Poland and East Germany, and the existing border between the Federal Republic and German Democratic Republic - all on the condition that a permanent settlement of the border questions was reserved for an eventual peace treaty for the whole of Germany. In December 1970, Bonn signed a treaty with Poland which restated West Germany's pledge to recognize the post-Second World War between Poland and Germany¹⁵. Both countries, also, agreed to establish diplomatic relations and renounced the use of force. Chancellor Brandt, in his visit to Poland to sign

¹³ Larres, Klaus, 'Germany in 1989: the Development of a Revolution' in Larres, Klaus, ed., *Germany Since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1998, pp.36-37

¹⁴ Ash, Timothy G., *In Europe's Name*, New York: Random House, 1993, p.177

¹⁵ McNeill, Terry, 'The Soviet Union's Policy Towards West Germany, 1945-90' in Larres, Klaus and Panayi, Panikos, eds., *The Federal Republic of Germany Since 1949*, New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996, p.263

this treaty, recognized 'Germany's terrible crime against humanity during World War II' and received worldwide attention¹⁶.

In September 1971, the four former allied powers (the US, SU, Britain and France) signed the quadripartite agreement, which guaranteed unimpeded access between West Germany and West Berlin. Whereas the western allies reaffirmed West Berlin's special status, the SU permitted West Berlin to maintain its ties with West Germany. Subsequent agreements, between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, were referring to the regulation of the transit traffic of persons and goods, telephone services, as well as cultural and commercial cooperation between the two states. Brandt and his East German counterpart Willi Stoph met twice in 1970 (in Erfurt and Kassel), but progress towards an understanding between the two German governments could not be made unless Bonn recognized the GDR as a sovereign state. The negotiations resulted in the signing of the Basic Treaty in December 1972, according to which West Germany agreed to recognize the GDR de facto and accept the exchange of permanent representatives (though not ambassadors) between the two states¹⁷. Within the context of the Basic Treaty, there became internal discussions on the issue of recognition of the GDR: Christian Democrats argued that the diplomatic recognition would lead to more substantive recognition of the repressive regime and this would be morally unacceptable for people suffering under this regime. On the other hand, Social and Free Democrats replied that the purely diplomatic recognition did not imply political

¹⁶ Steininger, Rolf, 'The German Question, 1945-95' in Larres, Klaus, ed., *Germany Since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1998, p.17

¹⁷ Ibid., p.18

and moral recognition of the system. On the contrary, the recognition, they argued, was the only practicable way to begin alleviating the hardships imposed by the system.

Chancellor Brandt's major objective in opening relations with Eastern Europe was to pursue Deutschlandpolitik. This was Bonn's attempt to improve relations with East Germany through which Brandt hoped to enhance the number of the East Germans (to have positive approach towards West Germany) who had been cut off from the West, since the construction of the Berlin Wall. In order to increase the number of East Germans, visiting West Germany, 'welcome money' was paid to every East German visitor by the West German governments with a total of DM 2 billion from 1970 to 1989. In addition to this, West German credits to GDR increased for: compulsory exchange for pensioners and children, minefields along 'German-German frontier', relaxation of border controls for West German travellers, and increase in numbers of East Germans allowed to travel West. The CDU, as the opposition party in West Germany, adamantly denounced the signing of the treaties with the SU and Poland, as well as Brandt's recognition of the GDR. According to the CDU, those treaties violated the commitment to unification as had been stated in the Basic Law, the West German constitution. However, in 1972 the CDU's attempt to unseat the Brandt coalition government failed, and since then, up until reunification, Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik became an integral part of the foreign policy programme of all West German political parties.

At the Moscow Summit of May 1972, the US and the SU, under the leadership of President R.Nixon and L.Brezhnev, signed accords in order to limit strategic weapons

and anti-ballistic missile systems (SALT I). The same year, President Brezhnev visited West Germany and emphasized the importance of sustaining long-term Soviet-German economic cooperation and necessity of relaxation on disputable issues. In 1973, NATO members accepted the Soviet proposal for convening a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), in order to establish goals and standards in four fields: security, disarmament, economic cooperation and human rights. All these attempts, together with Bonn's détente policy (with Eastern Europe) and the Basic Treaty (between the FRG and GDR), led to the signing of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. It was signed by the heads of states and governments of 33 European nations and those of the US and Canada. It recognized the post-Second World War status quo in Europe, and thus the division of Europe and Germany. Also, by this Act, all the participant states agreed on organizing conferences (on above-mentioned fields), improving relations and deciding on the future activities of this structure¹⁸. H. Kissinger, advisor to the Nixon administration in the US, was acting in the old European Realpolitik spirit of Metternich. However, his attitude changed through Helsinki. Following the US defeat in Vietnam and increasing domestic criticism on the US administration, Kissinger tried to secure Soviet acceptance of improving human contacts, information flows and cultural exchange (although he earlier thought human rights was not an appropriate issue for discussions between states). With regard to the Soviet perception of Helsinki; healing Europe's economic division while sealing its political division, and providing recognition of Yalta frontiers, permanence of Soviet domination and Soviet-type regimes were the basic objectives of Moscow. For West Germany Helsinki process as Chancellor Schmidt described it, was 'an attempt to cover West German actions multilaterally' in his confidential Marbella

¹⁸ Ibid., p.17

paper of 1977. In the negotiation process, Kissinger negotiated on West Germany's behalf the crucial sentence allowing for the possibility of 'a peaceful change of frontiers'.

As Foreign Minister Genscher observed in 1975:

No one can have a greater interest than us Germans in the Conference achieving its goal, namely to improve the contacts between the states and people in Europe...I believe that no one would neglect their national duty more than us, were he to hesitate to use even the smallest chance for a development that could eventually ease the lot of the divided nation¹⁹.

The Federal Republic and the GDR became members of the United Nations in 1973²⁰. The establishment of the CSCE and the Helsinki-institutionalized détente in Europe, had eroding effects on the communist systems after the conclusion of the Helsinki Charter, when the Communist Bloc had to barter human rights against economic aid from the West.

Parallel to the external developments and the international atmosphere, within which the foreign policy was/is formulated, the SPD-led coalition government's foreign policy course gave priority to the process of détente. However, this did not change the NATO-oriented consensus due to the security dependence on the western allies and recognition of the validity of simultaneous pursuit of defense/deterrence and détente. Deterrence and forward defense, still, were the two principal pillars of Western alliance strategy, which remained at the core of West German foreign and security policy orientation. Deterrence implied that potential enemy was to be dissuaded from aggression by a NATO posture and forward defense implied that if deterrence crumbled, the

¹⁹ Ash, Timothy G., *In Europe's Name*, New York: Random House, 1993, pp.266-267

enemy's attacking armies were to be met and contained as far to the east on NATO territory as possible. From this point, rather than being a total challenge to Adenauer's Westpolitik, Brandt's Ostpolitik should be evaluated as the West Germany's opening window to the east. Instead of maintaining the illusion of unification, the SPD-led coalition government intended to improve the human contacts between the people in both parts of Germany. This, they thought, could be achieved by recognizing the GDR as a sovereign state and seeking cooperation with the East German administration on practical matters. The Brandt administration was at least partially successful because in the 1970s, the GDR government relaxed its stringent policies and permitted a limited number of its citizens to visit West Germany in case of a family emergency. Brandt and his Ostpolitik left its stamp on the foreign policy of West Germany, but in 1974 W.Brandt resigned as a result of the scandal that his personal adviser was working for the GDR as a spy²¹.

1.3. Helmut Schmidt Era

Following the resignation of Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt (from the SPD) became the new Chancellor of West Germany. Schmidt tried to continue Ostpolitik, but he tried to do so in a more compatible manner with Westpolitik. For the new Chancellor, the key word in the conduct of inter-state relations (and East-West relations in particular) was: stability, stability of the overall diplomatic system of Ostpolitik with its dual imperative of vertical and horizontal synchronization. Like Kissinger, Schmidt regarded

²⁰ Geiss, Imanuel, 'The Federal Republic of Germany in International Politics Before and After Unification' in Larres, Klaus and Panayi, Panikos, eds., *The Federal Republic of Germany Since 1949*, New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996, p.154

the balance of power as the key to preserving peace in Europe, and international order more generally; and he regarded détente between superpowers as the necessary condition to reduce division of Berlin and Germany. In pursuing these twin goals, he gave priority to two classical instruments, arms and money. West German-Soviet trade in 1979 was 6 times of 1969 level. Bismarck had described Germany's role as that of an 'honest broker' between great powers to East and West, whereas Schmidt described West Germany's role as 'honest interpreters' but honest interpreters 'of Western policy', with 'and of German interests'. Perhaps also; 'in Europe's name'²². The new chancellor reiterated Europe's and West Germany's close partnership with Washington. According to Schmidt, there could not be security without an approximate balance of military power. He thought that a stable east-west balance of power (in the military sphere) was the precondition for any successful détente policy. By the early 1980s, the SU had deployed nearly 1500 nuclear warheads on missiles, having a range of 600 to 3400 miles, called as Soviet SS-20 rockets²³. Thus, Schmidt became determined to strengthen the security of Atlantic partnership by demanding the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles (IRMs) in West Europe, in order to offset this Soviet missile build-up in East Europe.

As mentioned above, Schmidt promoted improving West Germany's relations with its western allies. However, this was not a shift from Ostpolitik orientation. Actually, the statement of the US President J. Carter in 1977 had reminded, to the West

²¹ Siekmeier, Mathias and Larres, Klaus, 'Domestic Political Developments II: 1969-90' in Larres, Klaus and Panayi, Panikos, eds., *The Federal Republic of Germany Since 1949*, New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996, p.111

²² Ash, Timothy G., *In Europe's Name*, New York: Random House, 1993, p.96

German administration, the necessity of reducing tensions with the SU and, if possible, improving relations. In 1977, Carter had stated that the defense of Western Europe might start at the Weser-Lech rivers. However, it was unacceptable for the FRG due to the fact that one third of the West German territory would have been lost without doing any defensive action. The closeness of the Soviet threat and the statistical forecasting about the extent of nuclear destruction increased the anxiety of West Germany. The mood of détente atmosphere was broken with the Afghanistan invasion of the SU in December 1979. Although the US imposed economic sanctions on the SU and wanted its allies to do so, Schmidt administration continued growing commercial relations (with the SU). With the aim of reducing the tensions between the two superpowers, Schmidt visited Moscow in 1980. This attempt was evaluated as the West German administration's desire to pursue both Westpolitik and Ostpolitik in the sense that: West Germany was acting within the framework of its NATO alliance and reflecting western anxiety of Afghanistan invasion and meanwhile, was trying to keep relations with the SU and not to antagonize Moscow.

1.4. Helmut Kohl Era

The disagreements within the SPD and between the coalition parties, the SPD and the FDP, were increasing. Schmidt's party, the Social Democrats, eventually opposed their own chancellor on the INF deployment issue. Also, differences on economic issues

²³ Siekmeier, Mathias and Larres, Klaus, 'Domestic Political Developments II: 1969-90' in Larres, Klaus and Panayi, Panikos, eds., *The Federal Republic of Germany Since 1949*, New York: Addison Wesley

between coalition partners caused the collapse of the center-left government in 1982 that had been in power since 1969 and resulted in a *Wende*, a change of government in Bonn. The Christian Democrats formed a coalition with the FDP under Helmut Kohl as the Chancellor, on 1 October 1982. In transition from social-liberal to conservative-liberal government, new Chancellor brought a blunt neo-Adenauerian reaffirmation of the absolute priority of Western integration on the one hand, and of the long-term commitment to reunification on the other. In October 1982 government declaration: First of all, the central importance of the relationship with the US and West Germany's full commitment to NATO alliance was reaffirmed. Second, it reaffirmed West Germany's commitment to move towards what it called 'European Union' inside the existing European Community. Finally, it roundly reasserted the Federal Republic's commitment to the goal of German unity²⁴. Although a shift from centre-left to centre-right coalition took place in 1982, Hans-Dietrich Genscher (the foreign minister since 1974) remained in post and pursued with vigour the Ostpolitik. It was Genscher who asked the western allies to take Gorbachev and his reforms seriously and who called for stronger economic and technological cooperation between the East and the West Europe. Genscher remained at the centre of the German foreign policy up until 1992 and he is accepted as the architect of Germany's multidimensional policy. As a result of his attempts, France and Germany led to the re-activation of the WEU and the formation of Franco-German Security Council in 1988. Kohl and his CDU occasionally reiterated their wish to see Germany united again. In 1987, the Kohl government hosted East German Party Chief Erich Honecker and thus elevated the international status of the GDR, providing it a

Longman, 1996, p.100

²⁴ Ash, Timothy G., *In Europe's Name*, New York: Random House, 1993, p.100

greater degree of legitimacy. With the active European policy of the Kohl government, Germany's weight in NATO increased and in 1988 Manfred Wörner was the first German to become NATO Secretary General²⁵.

Deutschlandpolitik, initiated by Brandt administration, was continued by Schmidt and Kohl governments. Actually, there has to be made a distinction between *Deutschlandpolitik* and *Ostpolitik*; whereas the first one implied the policy towards East Germany, the latter implied policy towards Eastern Europe and the SU and whereas the first was pursued within the context of internal politics, the latter was pursued within the context of foreign policy. Although the rapprochement continued, in 1987 unification of the two Germanys seemed to be as remote as ever. Not too long before the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Honecker even predicted that the Wall would still exist in fifty or a hundred years. Also, the West German Social Democrats and Greens viewed the division of Germany as permanent²⁶. However, reforms in the SU, initiated by the Soviet President M.Gorbachev (who came to power in 1985), contributed to demands for political and economic changes in Eastern Europe, including the GDR citizens. The GDR celebrated its fortieth anniversary on 7 October 1989. Gorbachev, in his speech commemorating the anniversary, alluded to the vulnerability of the GDR's communist regime when he cautioned the GDR leaders that 'life punishes those who come too late'²⁷. This created large-scale demonstrations among the East German citizens, requesting major political

²⁵ Nigel,Thomas, 'Modern Germany, Politics, Society and Culture', edited by Peter James, Routledge, 1998, pp.10-12

²⁶ Steininger,Rolf, 'The German Qestion, 1945-95' in Larres, Klaus, ed., *Germany Since Unification:The Domestic and External Consequences*, London:Macmillan Press LTD, 1998, p.18

²⁷ Moens,Alexander, 'American Diplomacy and German Unification', *Survival*,Vol.33 No.6, November/December 1991,p.532

reforms. The opening of the Hungarian border to Austria on 2 May 1989 triggered the collapse of the Berlin Wall. The Berlin Wall, unexpectedly collapsed on 9 November 1989. Less than three weeks after the collapse, Chancellor Kohl presented a ten-point proposal to the Bundestag, suggesting the creation of 'confederate structures' with the goal of creating a 'federal state order', which would end the division of Germany²⁸. The possibility of German reunification raised the question of the creation of a 'Fourth Reich'. Initially, the SU rejected reunification and British and French politicians and officials expressed their reservations. Germany's closest ally, the US, strongly supported German reunification and strong cooperation between President George Bush and Chancellor Kohl, as well as between the Foreign Ministers James Baker and Genscher, was important in reunification process. Soviet President Gorbachev agreed to reunification, in principle, in January 1990.

In May 1990, the East and West German governments signed a treaty on the economic and social union between the two countries which came into effect on 2 July 1990. The treaty permitted the East Germans to exchange their valueless East German *Ostmark* for West German Deutsche-Marks on the basis of a one-to-one rate. The aim of East Germans to participate in the prosperity of the western world brought about their desire for immediate reunification. During Kohl's visit to the SU in July 1990, the Chancellor proposed to limit the German armed forces to 370.000. In turn, President Gorbachev granted reunified Germany full sovereignty and permitted Germany to sustain its membership in NATO. In 1989 and 1990, Bonn was Moscow's single most important

partner in the West and what Bonn wanted in return was progress in Deutschlandpolitik. The FRG and the SU reached agreements in September 1990, for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany by the of 1994. Chancellor Kohl promised to finance (totaling to 8 billion dollars) the gradual removal of troops²⁹. Also, in order to remove France's fears of a strong Germany in the middle of Europe, Kohl reassured the French President Mitterand that unified Germany would be bound to the European Community, the ideal of the European integration and Franco-German cooperation. The 'Two-Plus-Four' powers' treaty (two Germanys, the US, SU France and Britain), signed in Moscow on 12 September 1990, granted full sovereignty to reunified Germany and was a prerequisite for the actual reunification.

In West Germany, the year 1945 was often referred to as *Stunde Null* ('hour zero'). That's why Ostpolitik was considered as *Erste Stunde* ('hour one'). The beginning of the Cold War had partitioned Germany and the Germans became the principal beneficiaries of its demise. The long process of diplomacy resulted with the reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990.

1. 5. Parameters of West German Foreign Policy in the pre-Unification Period

West Germany made a remarkable transition from war, defeat and occupation to the establishment and stabilization of a reliable political system and acceptance as an

²⁸ Larres, Klaus, 'Germany in 1989: the Development of a Revolution' in Larres, Klaus, ed., *Germany Since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1998, p.52

²⁹ Steininger, Rolf, 'The German Question, 1945-95' in Larres, Klaus, ed., *Germany Since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1998, pp.24-25

equal partner in the international community. The transition process included the problems of rebuilding a destroyed country, restructuring a shattered economy, launching a workable governmental system, which met both the needs of the German people and “the Western allies”. In addition to them, terminating the occupation, regaining for West Germany a place in the society of nations as a welcome participant and ally and to do so through joining the international organizations were the primary objectives of the West Germany foreign and security policy.

The process of transition can be divided into three main phases: The first commenced with the Nazi surrender and was characterized by Allied occupation, the destruction of Germany’s military might and the marshalling of a concerted program to keep it demilitarized. It should be underlined that although the occupying powers failed to agree in advance to new European political arrangement to stabilize continental relations, they were unanimous in their decision to deny Germany the facility and opportunity of challenging the peace and threatening the security of its neighbors. Then it was no surprise that when the Basic Law of the West Germany was drafted in 1949, it denied a defense function to the new Federal Government. During immediate post-surrender years, German security was of little concern to the occupying powers and foreign relations were handled by the Allies. However, with the commencement of the Cold War and the birth of the West and East German governments, the Western allies assumed responsibility for West German security. Parallel to this, the SU incorporated East Germany into its orbit.

The second phase was a major policy shift in which the negotiations of a controlled West German military contribution to Western defense and the beginning of the integration of West Germany into an emerging European community, was epitomized. This phase consisted of four major interrelated developments. The first one was the issue of management of the West German steel industry. West Germany was admitted as a partner in the International Authority for the Ruhr (which controlled German steel production) in 1949. Two years later, this was superseded by the European Coal and Steel Community that marked the first major step for European integration. The keystone of this phase was the negotiation of the European Defense Community and European Political Community treaties those were signed in 1952 and 1953. These provided, respectively, for a fully integrated European military establishment, functioning as a supranational force under a unified command, to which West Germany would consign manpower and resources (without creating a national army), and for a West European federation with limited, though genuine, authority of governance. However, the French Chamber of Deputies rejected the Defense Community Treaty in 1954 and the Political Community Treaty went to governments for approval, but failed to reemerge.

Related to the plan to incorporate West German troops into a European defense force, the issue became the matter of affiliating West Germany with the North Atlantic Alliance³⁰. Simultaneously with the negotiation of the Defense Community Treaty, the western allies agreed in 1952 to invite West Germany to become an associate member under the North Atlantic Treaty and signed a protocol to this effect at Paris. However, when the French government defaulted on the approval of the Defense Community

Treaty, agreement on the process of West German affiliation with the North Atlantic alliance was deferred. The final aspect of the second phase was the internal West German constitutional maneuver to empower the Federal Republic to exercise the defense function. Although the West German Parliament had debated and approved the Defense Community Treaty for ratification, the legality of this action had been challenged in the Federal Constitutional Court. With the amendment of the Basic Law in 1954, the West German government was granted exclusive authority over the national defense of West Germany.

As mentioned above, French rejection of the Defense Community Treaty obliged the western allies to turn from integrating West German troops into an amalgamated European force to creating a separate national West German military establishment. 1954 London and Paris negotiations introduced the third phase of the West German security development. The principal components of the solution were the creation of the *Bundeswehr* (the West German Military Force), the framing of a formula for its international control that was accomplished by incorporating it within the combined North Atlantic Treaty forces, and fabrication of a European political institution for maintaining restrictions on certain West German military functions. The last of these was the Western European Union, created by amending The Brussels Treaty in 1954 to admit West Germany and Italy into membership and prescribe certain controls on West German arms manufacture³¹. Actually, in the third phase, the Atlantic Allies agreed to empower West Germany to create its own national, but not independent, military establishment and

³⁰ Kissinger, Henry, *Diplomacy*, New York: Touchstone, 1994, p.515

to accept it as a full partner in the North Atlantic Alliance. This afforded West Germany a new and better position, respecting its national defense and European security and achieving foreign policy objectives.

At this point, to analyze the West German ‘national purpose/basic objectives/foreign policy system’ will be meaningful in order to identify the parameters and understand the evolution of the foreign policy. In terms of national purpose, that of West Germany can be stated as the restoration of German unity in freedom and peace-or, more fully, as the revival by peaceful procedures of a reunified, respected, and respectable Germany in control of its own internal affairs and fulfilling its proper role in international relations. With regard to the country’s fundamental goals; achieving and sustaining national identity, preserving national security, maintaining the peace and enhancing the general welfare can be stated as the country’s basic objectives. The third layer, namely the foreign policy system, emphasizes the public policies designed to achieve the above-mentioned fundamental goals³².

In terms of national identity and international status: achieve acknowledgement as honorable member of family of nations; acquire sovereign status and acceptance as an equal partner in international community; obtain diplomatic recognition by, and establish diplomatic relations with, as many foreign governments as possible (with reservation concerning governments recognizing East Germany – up until the early 1970s); and gain acceptance into membership of international organizations, were the main objectives of

³¹ Plischke, Elmer, *Contemporary Governments of Germany*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969, p.249

the West German administrations. West Germany, in terms of national security, aimed to: forestall aggression against integrity of the FRG; provide for own security to extent feasible; affiliate with other countries to establish guarantees of collective security; create West German military establishment – though not necessarily an independent military force (that is to say, to create within a multilateral framework); avoid development of such powerful, independent military force as to produce forceful counteraction; support mutual disarmament (between the two blocs), but not neutralization of West Germany; and buttress national security by affiliating with defensive alliances (like NATO and WEU).

With regard to the issue of Berlin (and the status of Berlin): West Germany tried to maintain freedom from Communist aggression and tried to prevent control or incorporation of West Berlin into East Germany; integrate West Berlin into Federal Republic as constituent Land (state) – full integration, or as complete as possible while preserving four-power commitments regarding all of Berlin; prevent establishment of ‘free city’ in West Berlin, or even for all Berlin – reject ‘third Germany’ concept. In addition to this, the basic parameters of West Germany’s reunification policy can be cited as follows: achieve reunification by self-determination of entire German people; negotiate by peaceful means; acquire by democratic process – through popular elections, constitutional assembly, ratification referendum, and then establishment of government of unified state and election of officials, and reject Communist obverse order; hold division of Germany to be unnatural and intolerable; oppose ‘two Germanies’ policy; and regard reunification as internal, not international, matter so far as German policy and

³² Ibid., p.250

action are concerned. For the West German elite, West German administrations and political parties, the German Question and the European Question were closely related. For most of Germans, as Timothy G. Ash called it as the ‘Yalta Order’, ‘the division of Germany was the division of European continent’ and ‘to overcome division of Germany is simultaneously to overcome the division of Europe’. As Chancellor Schmidt wrote in his memoirs:

... there was hardly a government in Europe which genuinely regretted the partition of Germany. That was more the case in Washington or distant Peking....The world thus seemed to be quite content with the division of Germany; illogically it was much less content with the division of Europe³³.

The other parameters (and priorities) of West German foreign policy can be stated as follows: integrate the European Communities – by supranational “federalism”: unite West and Central Europe – by limited “confederation”³⁴; end division of Europe into two opposing, uncooperating axes; achieve European political and power stabilization; develop influence in international affairs commensurate with realities of West German power status; play significant, recognized and respected role in international political affairs; and join international organizations for collective purposes.

Within the context of the formulation and implementation of foreign and security policies, West German administrations repeatedly stated that the “will to preserve peace and to promote international understanding is...the first and the primary concern of the West German foreign policy”³⁵. Parallel to this, they renounced the use or threat of force

³³ Ash, Timothy G., *In Europe's Name*, New York: Random House, 1993, p.19

³⁴ Plischke, Elmer, *Contemporary Governments of Germany*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969, p.253

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.258

for the attainment of its political aims, they claimed that their policies and objectives were not intended as a threat to any country, and that they seek 'change' only by peaceful negotiation.

In the 1950s Chancellor Adenauer enunciated West Germany's trio of vital interests as: (1) the security of West Germany; (2) the maintenance of the (existing) political, legal and economic ties between Berlin and West Germany; and (3) the achievement of reunification, together with non-recognition of the East German regime and settlement of frontier questions in a peace treaty with an all-German government. The Adenauer Government also laid down most of the basic objectives of West Germany as follows; principles of national identity and respectability, European integration, international cooperation, trade development, Franco-German rapprochement and self-determination (in order to reflect Berlin and reunification issues as internal problems)³⁶. Thus, it can be argued that in the 1950s, the West German government tended to conceive of West German policy from the focal point of the 'national security/reunification/Berlin' relationship, and, tried to do so through aligning itself with the Western powers. However, in the 1960s, the focus shifted so that the policy complex was more accurately depictable as a 'national security/German reunification/European unity/power-prestige/détente' configuration.

In addition to the above-mentioned foreign policy objectives, in terms of general principles, in defining security policy, the West German administrations insisted West German independence and territorial integrity (together with that of West Berlin) had to

be inviolable. West Germany based its security largely on two principles, namely, alliance with the North Atlantic powers and balanced East-West arms limitation. Fundamentally, West German alliance policy consisted of acquiring and contributing to credible and guaranteed collective deterrent vis-à-vis potential aggressors and possessing reliable nuclear protection without becoming a nuclear power. From this point, defense by means of a western coalition, with the crucial participation of the US, was the most preferred option of West Germany because, it appeared to be the least expensive and trustworthy arrangement for effective security assurance and military deterrence. Thus, the NATO Alliance and the enthusiastic participation of the US (for European security against the Soviet expansionism) were the main pillars of the West German security policy.

West Germany, emerging from occupation in 1949, had more restrictions on its course of foreign and defense policy development that would normally be the case. It, therefore, began with less freedom of choice. However, in order to take full advantage of policy flexibility, West German foreign and security policy-makers tried to project all potential policy options and establish both the optimal and the minimally acceptable priorities respecting their desirability and feasibility. Thus, to turn the foreign and security policy formulation process into a process of widening alternatives became the prior objective of the West German policy-makers. In order to achieve this objective, West Germany signed treaties with its Western allies in the early 1950s and with its Eastern neighbours in the early 1970s. Whereas the first enabled West Germany to operate as an 'independent' state in the West, latter enabled it to operate as an

³⁶ Ibid., p.262

‘independent’ state in the East. West Germany wanted its Western neighbours and allies to be as concerned as possible about the European question, while at the same time building the German question into the centre of the European one. However, it should be mentioned that although the 1970 treaties were the elements of *modus vivendi*, they were in no sense part of any final, legally binding peace settlement for Germany.

During the Cold War, West German administrations were confronted with East-West antagonism as the dominating conflict in Europe. The Soviet Union was regarded as the main challenger. However, although West Germany was still a front-state, even under the conditions of strategic parity economic leverage was increasing in value. In addition to this, following the mid-1980s, another view evolved among the government parties: security was begun to be seen as a ‘broad term’. This is to say, the traditional understanding of threat as consisting of clearly defined antagonists with hostile intentions and a capacity for attack was slowly giving way to a risk assessment based on emerging challenges and instabilities in the Euro-Atlantic region and the global architecture. Thus, traditional worst case thinking was replaced by scenarios of the worst *probable* cases and following the disintegration of the communist bloc, security turned into an ‘wholistic approach of protecting and shaping’. As the former Defense Minister V. Rühle reached the conclusion, in his defense guidelines, that a broad concept of security had to incorporate aspects of domestic stability as well as transnational dimensions³⁷.

³⁷ Gutjahr, Lothar, ‘Stability, Integration and Global Responsibility: Germany’s Changing Perspectives on National Interests’, Review of International Studies, Vol.21, No.3 (July 1995), p.313

As, later, foreseen at the 1994 White Paper of the Federal Ministry of Defense, it was stated that changed circumstances necessitate a broader understanding of security³⁸. Thus, although the Warsaw Treaty Organization became defunct and a part of history by 1992, Germany remained (and still remains) a front-state in one sense: it was/is still on the border of a region, in which ethnic, national and religious strife was/is continuing. Economic difficulties and social dislocation with its particular symptoms such as migration to the West replaced Germany's former enemy perception. Due to the (and further increasing) masses of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe, on 2 October 1992 the former Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel stated that "Our domestic stability is beginning to rock"³⁹. This made Germany pursue a foreign and security policy strategy, that's political and military aim was called 'neighborhood stability' and the strategic concerns focused on 'security in and for Europe'. Thus, openness towards Central and Eastern Europe became a central issue for German foreign and security policy-makers. That is why since the mid-1980s the Kohl government began to act as an advocate for Eastern Europe in international fora and since then Germany began to provide the bulk of financial aid to post-Communist Eastern European countries, as Chancellor Kohl stated that "A preventive security policy...includes economic and social stability"⁴⁰.

³⁸ Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter and Kaiser, Karl, 'Academic Research and Foreign Policy-Making' in Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter and Kaiser, Karl, eds., *Germany's New Foreign Policy*, New York: Palgrave, 2001, p.8

³⁹ Gutjahr, Lothar, 'Stability, Integration and Global Responsibility: Germany's Changing Perspectives on National Interests', *Review of International Studies*, Vol.21, No.3 (July 1995), p.314

CHAPTER 2

THE POST-UNIFICATION PERIOD

Following the end of the Cold War, traditional issues may not have disappeared but increasingly concerned problems requiring cooperation between state and non-state actors and approaches which go far beyond the confines of nation state. Nuclear and energy security, preventive crisis management, sustainable economic growth, protection of environment, fight against international terrorism-crime-illegal migration, and prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (wmd) have become critical issues in the conduct of inter-state relations. Although the central task of foreign relations is that of maintaining peace by preventing political instability and military conflicts, the post-Cold War international structure and the international developments necessitated the concept of security to be understood in a much broader sense⁴¹.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp.314-315

On the other hand, in 1990, John Mearsheimer, a well-known academician on security issues and international politics, predicted all kinds of things that would happen in world politics after the demise of the bipolar Cold War system: the dis-integration of NATO, the dismemberment of EU and a powerful and assertive Germany that might go nuclear⁴². Also, neo-realist school predicted repositioning of the Great Powers – through which Germany liberated from chains of divided Europe would reassume its role as a ‘Great Power’. However, this prognosis has been replaced by empirical analysis, in particular, continuity dominates change in Germany’s foreign policy. Germany has been a key player in the process of deepening and widening EU and NATO. It has promoted major regulation in the fields of arms control, non-proliferation (signing of the NPT), international criminal law (CFE Treaty), and the creation of the International Criminal Court. Germany has pushed for deregulation in agriculture within the context of the WTO. Thus, Germany has come close to resembling a civilian power: a state that is willing to take the initiative and influence of international politics through strategies that include the monopolization of force within collective security system, the non-violent resolution of disputes and the strengthening of the rule of law⁴³. It should not be assumed that power or interests have been absent from Germany’s post-Cold War foreign policy. Instead, it is argued that these factors were perceived through the distinct set of norms and values, embodied in the civilian power role. The basic orientations of German foreign policy can be cited as follows:

⁴¹ Von Ploetz, Hans-Friedrich, ‘New Challenges for the Foreign Service’ in Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter and Kaiser, Karl, eds., *Germany’s New Foreign Policy*, New York: Palgrave, 2001, p.70

⁴² Mearsheimer, John J., ‘Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part III: Realism and the Realities of European Security’, *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/1991), pp. 219-222

⁴³ Maull, Hans, ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69 No. 5 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 91-106

1. Fundamental support for European integration as a basic policy objective. This support is channelled through the Community system and therefore implies support for the European institutions. As Henning Tewes, Deputy Director of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Poland since 1998, argues that Germany's support for deepening and widening EU and NATO enlargement policy, fits the ideal type civilian power. The former German Defence Minister Volker Rühe launched the enlargement debate in a speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, initially reluctant, also came round to pushing for NATO expansion just before the NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994. In a speech to the diplomatic corps in Bonn on December 1994, Kohl emphasized:

The Atlantic Alliance is the guarantor of security and stability not only for its own members, but also for all Europe. An important foundation of it remains the close connection with North America and the permanent stationing of American soldiers in Europe...A gradual enlargement of NATO has to be seen in close relationship with the enlargement of the European Union and the WEU as part of a pan-European strategy. Such a strategy must be developed in close contact with Russia. Russia rightfully expects a place that corresponds to its status and dignity. The accession of new members to NATO must therefore be complemented by broad cooperation above all with Russia and Ukraine.⁴⁴

2. Support for economic and monetary union (within the EU) is a major policy objective of Germany. The appearance of EMU in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty was adopted by Germany and Chancellor Kohl clearly staked his political career on its success. Germany had to expect advantages from the EMU to accept it, that is, to agree to give up its monetary independence and the Deutsche Mark. Several devices were designed to

establish EMU following the German model. Since Germany was the essential pivot of the mechanism, the German government retained a veto power over the whole venture and could thus impose its blueprint on its partners. Germany played a crucial role in shaping the rules of EMU, like low inflation and stable currency. Also, the creation of the European Central Bank (ECB) on the Deutsche Bundesbank model and location of the European Monetary Institute, the forerunner of the ECB, in Frankfurt am Main (a city which there is, also, the seat of the Deutsche Bank), is evaluated as the success of the German policy-makers⁴⁵.

3. Free trade is another dynamic of the Germany's economic and foreign policy. Germany has been traditionally on the liberal side of the permanent international community debate on foreign trade issues. Actually, since the beginning of the Cold War, it had been thought in Bonn and Washington that the economic power of the West would be a major, perhaps the major, instrument of achieving Western political goals in the East – 'change through trade'. That is why the US President Nixon worked on trade liberalization and economic inducements to the SU and Carter administration attempted 'economic diplomacy of leverage and linkage'⁴⁶. The reunification has not changed this aspect, for instance in the end-game of the Uruguay Round in the autumn of 1993, Germany strongly supported implementation of liberal trade policies

⁴⁴ Kranz, Jerzy, 'Germany, Quo Vadis? A view from Poland', *German Politics*, Vol.10 No.1 (April 2001), p.152

⁴⁵ Smith, Eric Owen, 'The German Model and European Integration' in Larres, Klaus, ed., *Germany Since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1998, p.153

⁴⁶ Ash, Timothy G., *In Europe's Name*, New York: Random House, 1993, p.249

4. Firm accent on the Franco-German relationship without alienating smaller countries, is also crucial for Germany. As a former representative of a small country in the European negotiating process for a number of years, Germany has been the most sensitive to the preoccupations and complexes of smaller member states, and especially its neighbours. Recent examples of this could be found in the Amsterdam negotiations of 1997, where there was some tension between big and small countries. Franco-German rapprochement has been considered as the 'motor' of European integration. German initiatives in EU have tended to be developed in concert with the French. The Franco-German relationship is at the heart of the view of EU as a community of values and peace. The relation has been highly institutionalized that there were 115 meetings between the German Chancellor and the French President between 1982 and 1992⁴⁷.

5. Conciliatory attitudes in cases of tension or conflicting views with the United States is another dimension of German foreign policy. This policy, which has deep and obvious roots in the Cold War period, seems to have been constantly maintained, even after the demise of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the Berlin Wall. It is an integral part of German European policy.

6. Openness towards Central and Eastern Europe is crucial for German foreign policy. Germany played an important role in the decision taken by successive European Councils, starting in Copenhagen in 1993, to open negotiations with a dozen Eastern and Central European countries. The basic objective that the eastern borders of Germany

⁴⁷ Boyer, Yves, 'France and Britain' in Heurlin, Bertel, ed., *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1996, p.243

should no longer be the European Union's borders, remains nonetheless. As a high-ranking German diplomat stated: 'Germany wants Western countries on its Eastern border'. Former Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel in his speech on 12 November 1996 stated:

The enlargement is our enlightened self-interest, it means peace and stability for the whole of Europe. We will also profit from it economically, for only as a big pan-European community will have a chance in the global competition tomorrow... For German business, Central and Eastern Europe has become one of the most important growing markets worldwide. Roughly a half of the entire EU's trade with the Central and East European reform states is conducted by Germany... The Central and Eastern European countries' share of our foreign trade now exceeds 9 per cent and has thus overtaken our trade with the USA... Almost one tenth of German foreign direct investments go today to Central and Eastern Europe. Germany is the biggest foreign investor in the region. The fear that every Deutsche Mark invested in Central and Eastern Europe will ultimately endanger jobs at home is groundless. Our companies' investment activities are motivated by the goal of capturing new and potential markets. The German Institute for Economic Research has proven unequivocally in a study that the opening of Eastern Europe creates more jobs for us too and this necessitates a structural change.⁴⁸

7. The budgetary problem is not new in the internal debate in Germany. Already in the middle of the 1970s, German press was defining Germany as Europe's 'milking cow' (*Milchkuh Europas*). However, the demand for a reduction in Germany's EU budget (by 1997 EU's budget totalled ECU 74.5 billion, 28.4 per cent -gross- was contributed by Germany)⁴⁹ has recently become more insistent and general and has been taken up by prominent political figures. The issue played a significant (negative) role in the discussions on Agenda 2000.

⁴⁸ Kranz, Jerzy, 'Germany, Quo Vadis? A view from Poland', German Politics, Vol.10 No.1 (April 2001), p.152

8. The free circulation of persons, including political asylum and immigration, has become a major issue as a result of a massive influx of refugees, including several hundred thousands from former Yugoslavia (up to 500.000 Croatian and Slovenian workers in Germany)⁵⁰, combined with a high level of unemployment.

Reconciling these priorities is not easy and in implementing such a foreign policy agenda, Germany confronts with some problems and challenges, like:

- Being able to cooperate with Washington, Paris and Moscow on issues where there is a big distance between the three powers (without nonetheless becoming ‘every body’s darling’, an expression used at the time of unification by Willy Brandt) is a difficult task to achieve.
- The economic difficulties of Moscow and the fragile political order is an issue of special attention for the German policy-makers. Germany has been the major foreign investor of Russian economy. Paradoxically, according to one view, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact brought insecurity to the region because NATO has begun to be discussed in the sense of its undefined tasks and responsibilities (after the Cold War). Moscow has stated that NATO’s eastern enlargement has been considered as hostile and could not be tolerated. Germany follows a role of mediator between its western allies and Moscow, both geographically and politically: On the one hand it supports NATO enlargement, on

⁴⁹ Smith, EricOwen, ‘The German Model and European Integration’ in Larres, Klaus, ed., *Germany Since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1998, p.155

⁵⁰ Bağcı, Hüseyin, ‘Balkanlar (1991-1993)’, Dış Politika Enstitüsü, Ankara, 1994, s.56

the other hand does not want to underestimate Russia's sensitivity. In a speech to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on 19 April 1995, Klaus Kinkel said:

We cannot show less understanding and patience towards the democratic forces in Moscow than we showed in former times to the Communist apparatchiks. As long as Russia says "yes" to a partnership with Europe and the USA, we have to say "yes" to a partnership with Russia [in his speech to the International Bertelsman Forum at Petersburg on 20 January 1996, Kinkel went further] The enlargement of EU, not to mention that of NATO, cannot be achieved with our backs to Russia! The potential candidates for accession must also know this. Against this background, I have welcomed President Kwasniewski's emphasis on an active Polish *Ostpolitik*... I say today to Russia: we have faith in the reform forces in Russia and reckon with the reforms' success... The creation of a community of interest between Russia and EU is also the high road (*Königsweg*) to common security in Europe. I am convinced therefore that, from the perspective of our Polish or Hungarian friends, the priority must be accession to EU, not that to NATO.⁵¹

- Some anxieties relating to the issue of a European defence identity: the aim of reconciling the US military presence in Europe with the European identity, including some possible divergences between Germany and the US concerning the role of instrument of economic pressure, is another difficulty for German foreign policy-makers.

Difficulties in coordinating policies between Germany and France in relation to the military wing of NATO, deepening the EU and the operation of the monetary union, also, creates problems for Germany.

Although, there was/is not a radical shift in Germany's foreign policy since the reunification of the country, the region or the international system within which the foreign policy process is shaped has changed. For the first time in history, Germany is not

faced with perceivable external threat and does not have enemies around it. The bipolar structure of international politics was eliminated and with socialization (in international community), Germany found its place as a civilian power. German policy was guided by two somewhat contradictory principles: On the one hand, deepening and widening European and Transatlantic institutions and the principle of extending democracy towards its Eastern neighbours has been a primary objective; on the other hand the principle of peaceful and close relations with Russia has been a special issue of attention. Both principles simultaneously led to intensified cooperation with Russia, bilaterally and multilaterally. Germany's leading role as an initiator of the NATO-Russia Founding Act (on 27 May 1997) and the institutionalization of the CSCE is explained by its contradictory role which called for both, peace with Russia and democracy in East and Central Europe. Also, NATO's self-conception began to change from being a community of destiny and a community of purpose to a community of values. Germany's policy in two EU treaty negotiations, Maastricht 1990/91 and Amsterdam 1996/97 reflects that Germany's foreign policy role indeed shaped the evolution of Germany's pro-integrationist stance⁵². A role conflict between deepening European integration in the political area (CFSP) and Germany's basic predisposition in European affairs to side with France when push comes to shove can be identified as being at the core of German foreign policy. Germany was one of the key supporters of the institutionalization of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) even after the Kohl government had secured the acceptance of German unification at the CSCE summit in Paris (in November 1990). From 1991 to 1993 Bonn pushed for both the broadening

⁵¹ Kranz, Jerzy, 'Germany, Quo Vadis? A view from Poland', German Politics, Vol.10 No.1 (April 2001), p.152

(geography and issue areas) and deepening of the OSCE (limitation of veto-power through consensus)⁵³, despite the scepticism of its main European and transatlantic partners.

As another aspect of Germany's foreign policy, Germany's non-proliferation policy in the 1990s is evaluated with the expectation that a reunified Germany will and should reassess its non-nuclear weapon state status in order to maximize its autonomy vis-a-vis its nuclear armed allies. It is argued that Germany's nuclear weapons policy is solely interest-based and that Germany will remain a non-nuclear state as long as it 'enjoys' the nuclear protection of the US, France and the UK. Germany abandoned a major non-proliferation initiative in 1993 after receiving hefty criticism from its nuclear allies. It supported the positions of friendly nuclear-armed states in 1996, in the context of a ruling of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons and in 1998, when the US attacked presumed terrorist targets in Sudan and Afghanistan. In defiance of its multilateralist inclinations, the German government still insists on the use of highly enriched uranium in nuclear research reactor in Garching (Bavaria). In a similar move, the Kohl government showed reluctance to support more intrusive nuclear verification regime, when the IAEA launched the '93+2' reform of the IAEA safeguards system. The Schröder government has committed itself to the eventual termination of the commercial use of nuclear energy. In addition, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer acted upon the coalition agreement's provision that the first use

⁵² Harnisch, Sebastian, 'Change and Continuity in Post-Unification German Foreign Policy', German Politics, Vol.10 No.1 (April 2001), p.39

⁵³ Ibid., p.39

of nuclear weapons be renounced, in a NATO debate⁵⁴. There is a very similar analysis on German human rights policies, which clearly reflects the importance of norms and values as factors shaping German foreign policy behaviors. Germany's performance and important role as an initiator and facilitator in the process of establishing the International Criminal Court, is a good example.

2. 1. Domestic Interest Formation and Foreign Policy Formulation

The domestic interest formation of the country has played an important role in the characterization of the country's foreign policy. It is argued that the larger continuity of German foreign policy was in fact only assured by the discontinuity in domestic politics. From one point and according to one view, within the context of the daily activities of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), reunification has had little perceptible impact on the European policy of Germany: No members of the diplomatic service of the GDR were introduced in the German foreign service; the foreign policy advisers of the Chancellor are the same as they were a decade ago; and the upper reaches of the Ministry of Finance have not changed meaningfully in the last few years⁵⁵. Thus, the basic triangle (head of government, head of foreign affairs and the Finance Ministry) has gone through the reunification process without experimenting any substantial change. The main advisers of the government are drawn from a bureaucracy whose members

⁵⁴ Harnisch, Sebastian 'Change and Continuity in Post-Unification German Foreign Policy', German Politics, Vol.10 No.1 (April 2001), pp.40-41

⁵⁵ De Schoutheete, Philippe, 'Germany, Quo Vadis? A View From the Diplomatic World', German Politics, Vol.10 No.1 (April 2001), p.135

have spent their administrative career in a culture of European integration. On the other hand, reunification has incorporated the new Eastern Lander into the German political landscape. The public in former East Germany was not involved in the European integration process in the 40 years between 1950 and 1990. Knowledge and understanding of what the Community is, how it works, what it can and cannot do, how and why it came into being is limited and even, practically non-existent in other part of Europe to which the GDR once belonged. Also, the Lander have acquired a greater weight in European affairs as a result of constitutional changes agreed during the Maastricht Treaty ratification process in Germany. Their attitude on European issues is frequently defensive. Their ministers and officials (unlike federal politicians and civil servants) are not directly exposed to the socialization affect of repetitive contacts, ministerial meetings and European Councils. On the contrary, they fear the consequences of these meetings for their own powers of decision. From legal point of the issue, the Basic Law not only binds German foreign policy to certain fundamental values and opens the state to supranational integration, it also establishes a constitutional environment for a strong civil society against the state in the form of basic rights. With the introduction of the new article 23 of the Basic Law, the Lander not only hold a veto power on important issues of Germany's European policy-making, but that they also sometimes oppose foreign policy choices of the federal government. As an example; in June 1997, during the Amsterdam EU Treaty (re)negotiations, the Kohl government blocked further integration in the field of Home and Justice Affairs (HJA) due to pressure by German Lander which feared losing the 'national veto' in asylum policies⁵⁶.

⁵⁶ Harnisch, Sebastian 'Change and Continuity in Post-Unification German Foreign Policy', German Politics, Vol.10 No.1 (April 2001), pp.46-47

To make a brief analysis of the process of the formulation of foreign policy, structural change in foreign policy has to be analyzed: a_ In terms of structural change, changes in international framework takes the first place. It is a fact that there are more actors and more policy areas interrelated with the formulation of foreign policy.

b_ Changes in national structures, in other words, the internationalization of domestic policy, has become a critical issue. With the growing interdependence and interconnectedness, today German interests abroad are being pursued by many actors both within and outside the Federal Government. In addition to this, government policy has become subject to extreme pressure and greater requirement for justification of policies and actions. With the structural reforms of 1998: 250 comparable units have been created, concerned with foreign and European policy matters; 68 operative units have been created for specific countries and subjects; for the year 2000, DM 11.18 billion was allocated to foreign affairs and the Foreign Office received only one third; also, as mentioned above, with Article 23 of the Basic Law, 16 Lander have become more directly involved in European integration process; each Land has office in Brussels with a total of 137 staff in summer 1999, of whom 87 were senior staff and Germany's Permanent Representation to EU comprised of 65 senior staff⁵⁷. Outside the directly responsible ministries, the Federal College for Security Policy Studies (founded in 1992) aims: to increase dialogue between new and old politicians and all institutions; provide support to German companies in the international arena; create international competence – awareness of long-term national interests, which requires an awareness of history and

⁵⁷ Von Ploetz, Hans-Friedrich, 'New Challenges for the Foreign Service' in Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter and Kaiser, Karl, eds., *Germany's New Foreign Policy*, New York: Palgrave, 2001, pp.70-73

development in international environment. In terms of international competence, the Foreign Service and the Ministry of Defense have systematic approach, whereas the other ministries and actors are more specialized and cannot read the whole system – no specialized training for work with an international dimension. In addition the Federal College, one of the five teaching groups of the Federal Academy of Public Administration, at the Federal Ministry of Interior, is advanced in international and supranational cooperation. Also, the Post-Graduate School of Administrative Sciences, in Speyer, offers a specialized European integration programme⁵⁸.

c_ The third aspect of the structural change in foreign policy concerns the respective roles of various actors.

With regard to the changing tasks of the Foreign Service:

- Presentation of Germany's European policies in partner countries through the means of public diplomacy
- With regard to the Maastricht Treaty, a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (agreed in the Treaty of Amsterdam) for efficiency in decision-making and unity of action
- Work for national and EU support for the eastward enlargement of EU, can be stated as the most critical aspects of the process of change.

At this point, to analyze the role of the parliament and the interaction between the government and the parliament will enable us to have a broader understanding of the process of the formulation of foreign policy and impact of domestic discussions on the foreign policy:

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp.73-74

To start with, the Federal Government is obliged to brief the *Bundestag* and give it the opportunity to give opinions on European policy issues. With Article 45, Bundestag has created a Committee on Affairs of EU Contacts between EU Committee, Foreign Office, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Economics. Under certain conditions, the Committee represents Bundestag and presents opinions to the Federal Government. The procedure works in this way: Government makes available to the Bundestag relevant documents with an outline of German position. The EU Committee, also, receives reports. Issues are clarified by the Government representatives before the Committee. Committee forwards its opinions to the Government and Government takes them into account in negotiations with other member states for stronger position. Government is required to present basic opinions of Bundestag at the IGC, to ensure parliamentary consent in ratification proceedings. Any Bundestag committee is able to invite Member of European Parliament (MEPs), of Council and Commission to its sessions concerned with European policy issues. German MEPs are entitled to attend EU Committee sessions and some of them, appointed by the President of Bundestag, are authorized to participate as Committee members.

In relation with *Bundestrat*, Lander participate in EU affairs through Bundestrat. Each Land government has a minister responsible for European issues. Bundestrat has the right to be briefed but its participation depends on issue-base. The Article 23(5) of the Basic Law brings two clauses: a_ The Federal Government shall take into account the opinion of Bundestrat where Lander are affected by the decision. On other issues

Government includes opinions but these are not binding. b_ Substantial consideration to be given to the opinions of Bundestrat when their authority or functioning affected. Prior to the decision, the Federal Government and Bundestrat must agree, but if they cannot, Bundestrat may overrule the Federal Government through a majority of two-thirds.

Lander are involved in European policy in various ways: The Federal Government includes Lander representatives (appointed by Bundestrat) in its internal consultations. If legislative powers of Lander are affected, the Federal Government takes Lander representatives to EU-level negotiations (below the Council-level) and representatives can make statements with the consent of the Federal Government. Leadership of German negotiating team is to be transferred by the Federal Government to representatives of Lander when exclusive legislative jurisdiction of Lander is affected. This even applies to Council meetings. With the Federation-Lander Law on Co-operation in the Affairs of EU, Lander are able to maintain their own direct contacts to EU institutions and so Lander have their own Information Offices in Brussels (but this does not affect the authority of the Republic's Permanent Representation). The Observer of EU Affairs for Lander work independent of Offices in Brussels, but in close contact, briefs to Bundestrat on activities of various bodies in Brussels and ensures that the rights of Bundestrat are respected. In addition to these, by the Maastricht Treaty, Representatives in the Committee of the Regions (CoR) at EU level was established⁵⁹.

⁵⁹ Hoyer, Werner, 'National Decision-Making Structures for German European Policy' in Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter and Kaiser, Karl, eds., *Germany's New Foreign Policy*, New York: Palgrave, 2001, pp.95-99

With regard to the functioning of the *Executive*: Chancellor determines the policy guidelines, he is the supreme commander of armed forces in 'state of defense', responsible for external security and national defense, takes final political decisions and coordinates ministries (mainly through the Federal Security Council – Bundessicherheitsrat: BSR). In the 1980s the positions of the chancellor, foreign and ministers seemed to be more balanced. However, during the 1990s Chancellor became dominant and the case is so in the Schröder Cabinet. Under Chancellor's leadership, BSR acts as a cabinet committee for security affairs. It takes decisions for the Federal Government or makes suggestions to cabinet. BSR is responsible for external and internal security. Participants of BSR are: Chancellor, foreign minister, minister of interior, justice, finance, economics, economic cooperation and development, defense and chief of staff of Bundeswehr. Chancellor decides on the agenda and when it should convene. Ministries can, also, request a BSR meeting but whether BSR would convene or not depends on the weight of minister. It is argued that BSR was a crucial institution during the Cold War but its importance decreased since the end of the East-West conflict. However, this is not the case: Coalition agreement of Schröder Government envisages increasing political significance of BSR⁶⁰.

To sum up, the Federal Government shares responsibility, for foreign and security policy, jointly with the Bundestag. In 1993 rulings on Maastricht Treaty and during the out-of-area debate of 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court enabled, in certain circumstances and on certain issues, the participation of Bundestrat and Lander in the

⁶⁰ Rühl, Lothar, 'Security Policy: National Structures and Multilateral Integration' in Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter and Kaiser, Karl, eds., *Germany's New Foreign Policy*, New York: Palgrave, 2001, pp.104-107

formulation process of foreign policy. In addition to these, the Federal Government requires co-operation of parliament when the Government wants to engage in military activity and Bundestag sets up committees of inquiry in area of security.

There are different views on the effects of reunification on the German foreign policy. According to one view, Germany's policy record in the 1990s can be described as one of 'modified continuity'. The continuity thesis argues that post-unification Germany stuck to its treasured policy of active integration and broad international cooperation. Through the successful closure of the German Question, however the mix of the constituting ego-and alter-part of Germany's role conception changed. Alter expectation still played an important part of Germany's role perception. First, the family of western democracies continued to figure prominently as the normative focal point of the German nation in the official rhetoric. Second, as German decision-makers were never tired to pointing out, after the Gulf War, that the reunified Germany was facing 'larger responsibilities' in Europe and beyond. The US President George Bush's call to Germany, in May 1989, for 'partnership in leadership', was preparing the ground for fulfilling responsibilities and pursuing a more active foreign policy⁶¹. In a similar vein, the ego-part of Germany's foreign policy role concept underwent a significant change after reunification in the sense that: they are based on 'a sense of achievement and confirmation', because never before in history had Germany been at peace with its neighbours, unified, democratic and free. So that, several key players (politicians and international relations academicians) pointed out that Germany had found its place in

Europe. The liberal and institutionalist views stress that the globalization and the growing interdependence among states (with spread of commerce) have made it impossible for states to pursue independent policies. In sum, they identify three mechanisms to explain continuity in Germany's foreign policy role conception in the 1990s: First, the sense of achievement among Germany's elites to be able to close 'the German question' through a democratic, peaceful and satisfied republic that is deeply embedded in an integrated Europe; second, through the successful export of the German model of an independent central bank to the European level; and third, through the strong altered expectations of its partners, especially the Central and East European countries. As Germany's European policy is concerned, the former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Belgium, Pierre Harmel, argued that:

Germany, like every other European power knows very well that political stage has become global. She knows that she cannot, alone, manage a world policy... If Germany is today reunified, as we have always wished, it is because she has been, in every instance, faithful to her European and Atlantic commitments.⁶²

Within the boundaries of the German European policy, some commentators have alluded to a so-called 'Britishization' of German European policy, implying that in future this policy will be less committed to integration, more sceptical towards new integration proposals, more doubtful about common policies and less supportive of common institutions, that is to say, closer to the views formulated in London up to 1997. State Secretary von Ploetz, from the Bonn Foreign Office, stated openly the view that German European policy had become 'more British':

⁶¹ Haftendorn, Helga, 'Gulliver in the Centre of Europe: International Involvement and National Capabilities for Action' in Heurlin, Bertel, ed., *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1996, p.108

The Germans asked themselves increasingly what benefits forfeiting sovereignty in (European) integration issue area would bring and whether it would not be better to stick to loose cooperation... I'm not pro-integrationist [added Kohl's European policy adviser Joachim Bitterhich thus making clear what Kohl had suggested on earlier occasions, for the federal government, and continued] The expansion of EU competences (*Vergemeinschaftung*) is no longer an article of faith and if better results can be achieved by the normal method of loose cooperation outside of the rules of EU, then there is no reason to go further along the course of integration...⁶³.

It is clear therefore that the Germans are asking more than ever about the costs and benefits of European integration process.

2. 2. A New Assertiveness?

Germany's power became the focus of numerous studies and the description of Germany has been problematic: Germany as a *Zentralmacht* ('central power'), as a *Weltmacht wider Willen* ('world power against its will') or as a *Zivilmacht* ('civilian power'). Chancellor Schröder himself did not shy away from referring to Germany as an important power, a *Grosse Macht* ('big power') but he avoided the word *Grossmacht* ('great power'), a word laden with past history⁶⁴. Germans themselves speak of being more *selbstbewusst*, a term that is difficult to translate, but implies an assertive self-confidence based on self-awareness. Germans often describe Germany as a 'motor' of European integration. However, they are sensitive about the notion of 'leadership' which is translated into *Führer*, in German. George Bush's May 1989 call for a 'partnership in

⁶² De Schoutheete, Philippe, 'Germany, Quo Vadis? A View From the Diplomatic World', *German Politics*, Vol.10 No.1 (April 2001), pp.139-140

⁶³ Kranz, Jerzy, 'Germany, Quo Vadis? A view from Poland', *German Politics*, Vol.10 No.1 (April 2001), p.153

⁶⁴ Le Gloannec, Anne-Marie, 'Germany's Power and the Weakening of States in a Globalised World: Deconstructing a Paradox', *German Politics*, Vol.10 No.1 (April 2001), p.117

leadership' between Germany and America left Bonn awkward and Bonn's European partners wary. Still, it signalled a pronounced American desire to see Germany assuming a larger role in Europe. The US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, speaking in Bonn shortly before the Kosovo War, echoed this objective, stating: "We recognize and welcome the role of the Federal Republic at the epicentre of these processes-expansion and integration, broadening and deepening."⁶⁵ Thus, it has become entirely legitimate for Germany to seek greater influence, in return for contributions (economic and logistics contributions to its allies within the institutional structures - EU and NATO, and in their military operations like in the Gulf War, IFOR and SFOR; as will be studied in the following parts).

Prof. Dr. H. Bağcı, a well-known academician on German foreign policy, has underlined three important shifts in German foreign policy motives, brought about by the reunification: The first aspect is that reunification started a re-Germanization process in foreign policy. Whereas Germany was determining its foreign policy orientation and objectives within the institutional framework (through NATO and Community principles) in the pre-unification period, the 'universal leadership' aim began to come to surface. The second point to be underlined is that Germany did not give up its policy and objective of European integration but it wants to be the determinant of foreign and security policies as the greatest economy of the Union (and major contributor of the Union budget). Thirdly, Germany's domestic political expectations and problems began to have a priority

⁶⁵ Denison, Andrew, 'German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations Since Unification', German Politics, Vol.10 No.1(April2001),p.160

on foreign policy formulation and this gave way to interest-based policy⁶⁶. Germany's new assertiveness has often been discussed with regard to Germany's early insistence on recognizing Croatia and Slovenia in 1991, when most of the European powers (France and Britain) wanted to slow down the process. This issue became the test case in which Germany tried its new role, in which German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher played an active role. Although his colleagues in Brussels (the EC members and the US) stated that recognition would make the situation worse, Genscher said (on 27 November 1991) that his country would announce recognition of Croatia and Slovenia on 19 December 1991. Due to strong pressure from Germany, the EC members stated that they would recognize the former Yugoslav Republics on January 15th, under conditions of respect for democracy and minority rights and acceptance of UN-EC peace efforts. The member states stated the necessity of waiting the final decision of an expert panel working on the issue, the Badinter Commission (sent by the EC to the region under the presidency of French jurist Robert Badinter). However, Germany rejected this proposal, and announced recognition of Slovenia and Croatia on 23 December 1991⁶⁷. Moreover, although the report consisted of negative aspects of recognition, other EU members followed 'the German path' and recognized former Yugoslav Republics. All the same, from EMU to NATO and EU enlargement, from the G8 plan to the stability pacts, German leaders have demonstrated their belief that 'German models and concepts for order can contribute to European solutions'. They have also sought a greater role in other international institutions, whether a seat at the UN Security Council or their man (a German) at the head of the International Monetary Fund. Germans are thinking harder

⁶⁶ Bağcı, Hüseyin, 'Balkanlar (1991-1993)', Dış Politika Enstitüsü, Ankara, 1994, s.51-52

⁶⁷ Maull, Hanns W., 'Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis', *Survival*, Vol.37 No.4, Winter 1995-96, pp.100-105

about ways to shape their environment, in order to protect the common interests. Thus, 'international civil-military relations' are becoming the key to foreign policy, according to the Bosnian trouble-shooter and former minister in Kohl's government, Christian Schwarz-Schilling⁶⁸. In sum, Germany has become more assertive, but it has largely done so within the framework of multilateral institutions, the so-called, 'assertive multilateralism'. As this is the case, many studies come to the conclusion that Germany still fits the 'civilian power' model.

⁶⁸ Denison, Andrew, 'German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations Since Unification', German Politics, Vol.10 No.1(April2001),p.161

CHAPTER 3

GERMAN SECURITY POLICY

A more active role of the European powers in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and EU's capacity to act in the sphere of these fields, has made rapid advances in the late 1990s. The United States' growing reluctance to carry the main burden for security provision for its European allies means that Europe can no longer afford not to act as one in its security requirements. The stationing of Allied troops on German soil and, more importantly, the extension of American guarantees to provide a nuclear shield against the Soviet Union's nuclear threat were important and the Washington Treaty, signed in 1949, had laid down the commitment of the Allied powers to safeguard the security of Western Europe. However, the replacement of the Europe-first foreign policy of the US by an Asia-first policy, made the US to demand greater West European involvement in European regional security.

3. 1. Germany and the Development of European Security Policy

Stanley Hoffmann, a well-known international relations academician, contends that Germany has not departed from its reliance on multilateralism, but this reliance is now funded on a more assertive Germany, less inhibited by its past and the international environment. This shift has had a major impact on the development of EU security structures in which Germany seeks to play a leading role. There are three main reasons for German policy-makers to consider the development of a European foreign policy to be in the best interests of Germany: First, Germany's support for the European Political Cooperation (EPC) and CFSP process was a means to counteract the deficiencies in German foreign policy. Second, the confrontational aspect of the Cold War during the late 1970s and early 1980s necessitated the development of a distinctive European voice in the international system. Subsequently, the post-Cold War European system has seen 'a collapse of illusions' regarding the future role and interests of the US in European regional security concerns. Finally, Germany has viewed the extension of cooperation in foreign and security policy among EU member states as furtherance of the integration process. CFSP can be viewed as an area of the European integration process where Germany continues to play the role of *Musterknabe* ('the best pupil in the class')⁶⁹. Whereas the function of NATO, with regard to the area of foreign and security policy, was limited in the field of diplomacy, EPC provided an invaluable opportunity for the pursuit of Germany's foreign policy objectives. Membership of EPC provided an outlet for German diplomacy through multilateralizing the foreign policy, in order to prevent

⁶⁹ Miskimmon, Alister J., 'Recasting the Security Bargains: Germany, European Security Policy and Transatlantic Relationship', German Politics, Vol.10 No.1(April2001),p.85

any suspicions of a German *Sonderweg* arising. Germany actively pursued the process of European integration, most notably in the Genscher-Colombo proposals of 12 November 1981, to deepen integration and bring EPC into the EC process, with the aim of developing a common defence. EPC provided West Germany with an important ‘alibi function’ which served as a ‘means of deflecting external pressure, and cover for shifts in national policy’⁷⁰. NATO could not be used as a forum for expressing Germany’s singular foreign policy interests because of the sensitive nature of the Cold War and the intention not to upset the close transatlantic relationship. On the other hand, Germany scored a number of diplomatic successes through the CSCE and Chancellor Schmidt’s successful efforts to include INFs negotiations into the NATO agenda in the late 1970s. Chancellor Kohl pushed for foreign and security policy integration at Maastricht very much as a way of deepening Germany’s commitment to the European integration process. However, German attempts to move forward foreign and security policy integration were not considered to be an open challenge to American involvement, in Europe, as the common defense was considered a (very) long-term process.

The inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks, agreed by the WEU in June 1992, into the Treaty of Amsterdam, marked an important step forward in European security policy. The inclusion of Article J. 7(2) to include ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’ was a bold step which clarified to some extent the relationship between the WEU and EU, without suggesting a fusion⁷¹. However, this has also placed much greater demands and

⁷⁰ Ibid., p.85

⁷¹ Ibid., p.87

expectations on CFSP. Hence, the Bremen Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers that took place on 10 and 11 May 1999, expressed the willingness of the European nations to strengthen European operational capabilities, as had been determined by the Petersberg Tasks. This was based on appropriate decision-making bodies and effective military means, within NATO or national and multinational means, outside the NATO framework. The inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks into the CFSP presents Germany, France and the UK with major commitments spanning a wide range of military operations. The decisions made at the Cologne Summit in June 1999 and at Helsinki in December 1999 represent positive strides to meet these commitments⁷². For Germany, in particular, the inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks demands a more interventionist German style within the CFSP and means that Germany is no longer able to shirk responsibility in military operations.

Germany has aimed for Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to be partially extended to questions concerning the CFSP. Opportunities for the use of QMV procedures were stated in the Treaty of Amsterdam, in an attempt to facilitate CFSP decisions and to create the option of ‘coalitions of the willing’, conducting missions under EU auspices and leaving room for ‘constructive abstention’. Germany, also, pressed for the appointment of a High Representative for CFSP, at Amsterdam, to give EU a more visible face and point of contact in world affairs. It is argued that ‘the internalization of a European dimension of foreign policy is the most advanced and

⁷² Bağcı,Hüseyin, ‘Türkiye ve AGSK:Beklentiler, Endişeler’, in Bal, İdris,ed., *21.Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul:Alfa Basım, 2001, s.602

explicit in Germany, where it forms part of the overall strategy of reflexive multilateralism⁷³.

3. 2. Bilateral Security Relations

3. 2. 1. Franco-German Security Relations

The Elysee Treaty of 22 January 1963 was a culmination of efforts, since 1945, to construct close Franco-German ties. The Treaty committed to strengthen bilateral ties through cooperation on defense issues and also cooperation within the fledgling European Community structures. The Franco-German Treaty of 1988 further elaborated on the Elysee Treaty by establishing the Franco-German Defense and Security Council⁷⁴. Franco-German security consultation takes an institutionalized form based on two underlying aims: First, to prevent the return of military aggression between the two states and, second, to establish a dominant partnership as the 'engine of European integration', based on the desire to control Germany within the EC. The relationship with France established a settled German preference for strategic partnership based on a long-term commitment to a strategic project rather than growing out of agreement on a range of technical interests. The highly institutionalized bilateral relationship between France and Germany has been described by Thomas Pederson, an academician studying on EU

⁷³ Miskimmon, Alister J., 'Recasting the Security Bargains: Germany, European Security Policy and Transatlantic Relationship', *German Politics*, Vol.10 No.1(April2001),p.87

⁷⁴ Boyer, Yves, 'France and Britain' in Heurlin, Bertel, ed., *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1996, pp.241-243

integration, as one of 'cooperative hegemony' in which the two countries have been able to secure policy preferences in tandem through a process of close cooperation and through the use of 'side payments' to other member states.

3. 2. 2. British-German Security Relations

The British-German relationship, in security dimension, has been positive due to their close functional interdependence within NATO. Britain has been able to exert considerable influence and prise open the almost exclusive Franco-German 'hard-core' in the area of CFSP. Britain's experience and practical expertise in military intervention is likely to ensure it a central role in any EU military forces. Britain has adopted a generally guarded stance towards the Franco-German-led Eurocorps. However, at the Anglo-French Summit before the Helsinki European Council meeting, Britain showed signs of adopting a more positive attitude toward the Eurocorps⁷⁵.

3.3. Current Issues Facing German Policy-Makers in CFSP

The Kosovo conflict, in 1999, provided an important impetus for greater European cooperation in CFSP. This commitment was emphasised by Chancellor Schröder, during the conflict, in order to secure public support for German involvement in the bombing of Serbia:

⁷⁵ Miskimmon, Alister J., 'Recasting the Security Bargains: Germany, European Security Policy and Transatlantic Relationship', German Politics, Vol.10 No.1(April2001), pp.89-90

The integration of Germany into the Western community of states is part of the *German Staatsrason*. We do not want a *German Sonderweg*. [However, the new German government's stance has changed subtly. According to Schröder] the new German foreign policy will not be unhistorical. But I believe we have shown in the past 50 years that there is no reason to tie down the Germans, out of fear of the *furum teutonicus*...My generation and those following are Europeans because we want to be not because we must be. That makes us freer in dealing with others.⁷⁶

The development of the CESDP, since the Cologne European Council Summit in June 1999, leaves German policy-makers with two important choices: The first relates to the direction in which Germany wants EU's foreign policy to develop and the extent of the constraints on this policy. Second, Germany must decide what the EU's future role should be. Germany has been described as a *zivilmacht*, relying on military means only as a last resort. Germany appears reluctant to commit to further military involvement in multilateral task forces, while at the same time remaining very aware of its responsibilities as a NATO and EU member. The uneasiness that remains within Germany concerning the deployment of the Bundeswehr for anything other than peace-keeping operations may result in Germany's efforts to convince its main EU partners of the merits of a minimalist foreign and security policy in terms of the use of military force. Foreign Minister Fischer has been vocal in expressing his continuing view of EU as a *zivilmacht*. For Fischer, the development of a European security and defence capability is not about a militarization of EU, rather EU must be made an effective and decisive peaceful power which is able, as was the case in Kosovo, to bolster the rule of law and renounce violence and thereby to consign war as a political tool in Europe. Within the same context, Angelika Beer, the defence spokesperson for Alliance 90/Greens, claimed

⁷⁶ Miskimmon, Alister J., 'Recasting the Security Bargains: Germany, European Security Policy and Transatlantic Relationship', *German Politics*, Vol. 10 No. 1 (April 2001), p. 92

that the civilian power character of EU should not be lost⁷⁷. In formulating the security policy, the German foreign and security policy-makers face a dilemma: While Germany is committed to the development of the CESDP and to react to American calls to take more responsibility in its own ‘backyard’, the transatlantic link will continue to exert an important gravitational pull. However, a reluctance to develop the CESDP to a further level may lead to frustrations on the part of France and Britain, which feel more comfortable in resorting to armed force. Another problematic issue has been the US missile shield: Europeans have been very critical of plans for a US missile shield. This issue is relevant for Germany and its security needs because of the non-nuclear character of German defence. ‘Germany’s reliance on the US for a nuclear shield’, according to Fischer, ‘was always based on our trust that the US would protect our interests, and the US as the leading nuclear power, would guarantee some sort of order’⁷⁸.

3. 4. *Bundeswehr* Reform

The importance of the international expectations from Germany and the issue of *Bundeswehr* reform are also problematic for German administration. Following the declaration of NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative and the EU’s Headline Goal, the former German Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping invited the US Secretary of Defence, William Cohen, to speak to a *Bundeswehr* audience in Hamburg on the need for German military modernization. Scharping has secured the Schröder government’s tentative approval for embarking on such a reform, winning initial support from the Federal

⁷⁷ Ibid., p.93

⁷⁸ Ibid., p.94

Cabinet for his 'Cornerstones of Fundamental Renewal' on 14 June 2000⁷⁹. However, due to the high priority given to reducing public spending in Germany, likely, means little funding will be forthcoming for such a project. The Ministry of Defence proposes big changes in Germany's armed forces: to cut total *Bundeswehr* strength by a third to 255.000; to increase rapid reaction forces by two-thirds to 150.000; to make serving as a 'citizen in uniform' a profession fit for a high-tech economy, with commensurate compensation and training; to open 'all careers' to women; to streamline procurement and services by adopting modern business practices and by drawing industry into a 'strategic partnership' with the *Bundeswehr*; and, above all, to give Germany the military capabilities it needs to promote 'inclusive security' for itself, its allies and for the other regions⁸⁰.

The objectives of *Bundeswehr* reform are thus clear. The question, unresolved yet, is that of how to finance this reform project. Without Germany, EU's largest and richest country, Europe's headline-grabbing goals will amount to little. The solution of the problem is due to the solution of internal discussions in Germany on budgetary problems (economic difficulties in Germany) and the German citizens' perceptions of Germany's new responsibilities and roles.

⁷⁹ Denison, Andrew, 'German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations Since Unification', German Politics, Vol.10 No.1(April2001),p.164

CHAPTER 4

GERMANY AND THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Where the Nazis were declaring ‘total war’ to the world, West German Genscherists were declaring total peace at the time of reunification. While Germans were still almost totally absent from the scene of military action during the Gulf War of 1991, they found themselves centre-stage only eight years later in NATO’s war in Kosovo. There are three perspectives on German participation in military interventions:

The first one is the ‘culture of restraint’ view. According to this view, a stable anti-militarist political culture has evolved in Germany (culture of restraint) after Germany’s loss of the Second World War and the breakdown of the Third Reich (which had enormous impact on Germany)⁸¹. Public attitudes and the political discourse in Germany, on participation in military interventions, reflect Germany’s political culture

⁸⁰ Ibid., p.164

and shape the room for manoeuvre for political decision-makers. It is argued that with regard to the role of a civilian power, there is comparatively little change to be identified for the last decade as well as expected for the future. While Germany may be pressed by its partners to give up its exceptionalism on the use of force, Germany's domestic social structures slow down or even prevent substantial changes of the German position. Thus, the undeniable change of German policy from remaining absent in the Gulf War to fully participating to the Kosovo War, is to be seen as a reluctant adaptation to a changing international environment, and there is little danger of making reservations (of Germany), about the use of force, in the foreseeable future.

The second view is 'the salami tactics' or the socializing effects of political action. According to this view, Germany's policy, with regard to the use of military force, has changed as a central element of a remilitarization of German foreign policy. They reflect the evolving German readiness to participate in military interventions as the result of a deliberate strategy of German decision-makers who wanted the use of force to become an accepted means of German foreign policy. German decision-makers expanded the scope of Germany's contributions to out-of-area operations step by step, utilising what can be called 'salami tactics'⁸². So that, the pressure of Germany's western partners is to be seen less as causes of German policy changes, but more as to welcome opportunities for the proponents of re-militarization to legitimize their course.

⁸¹ Baumann, Rainer and Hellmann, Gunther, 'Germany and the Use of Military Force: 'Total War', the 'Culture of Restraint' and the Quest for Normality', German Politics, Vol.10 No.1 (April 2001), pp.62-63

⁸² Ibid., pp.63-64

The third view is the gradual change and the quest for normality view. They argue that structural as well as actional factors shape each other. This is to say, Germany is in the process of ‘coming of age’, becoming more ‘self-confident’ and assertive, feeling less inhibited by her pre-Second World War legacy. In the eyes of the abnormalization critics, in contrast, Germany is again ‘militarizing’ its foreign policy, thereby returning to the dubious past of ‘power politics’ (*Machtpolitik*) and ‘a security policy of reconfrontation’⁸³.

The above-mentioned theoretical views posit different approaches on the use of force (by Germany), and aim to question whether the German military participation in international fora is a process of remilitarization or the way it uses fits the civilian power role. The following part analyzes Germany’s participation in military operations with concrete examples.

4. 1. The German Position Before Unification

The defining concepts in Germany’s foreign policy vocabulary before the reunification were: multilateralism (‘never again go it alone’); European integration with an emphasis on regaining recognition, trust and economic wealth; and anti-militarism with regard to culture of restraint and civilian power role. Use of force, even in concert with the allies, was not perceived to be an acceptable instrument of foreign policy for Germany. The problem of out-of-area operations was discussed in NATO and the question of deploying troops attracted only limited attention in West Germany. In 1982,

⁸³ Ibid., pp.64-66

the West German government's Security Council (*Bundessicherheitsrat*) stressed that the Basic Law (of Germany) prohibited any deployments of *Bundeswehr* troops out-of-area⁸⁴. In 1987, some politicians began to question the issue. US forces engaged in a number of skirmishes with Iran, in order to secure the passage of Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. In July 1987, the US called upon its European allies to provide military assistance in this conflict. The US administration asked the German government to send ships to the Persian Gulf. In turn, Germans pointed to their constitutional restrictions and limited their support to sending a few ships to the Mediterranean. However, the German Ministry of Defense took a position that deviated from the decision of 1982. It maintained that it was constitutional to deploy Bundeswehr forces to protect German merchant ships in the high seas⁸⁵.

4.2. Germany in the Gulf War

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War of 1991 became a challenge to the German insistence on military restraint. During that time, the political rhetoric was filled with 'Genscherist' terminology: On the one hand, multilateralism and European integration continued to be guiding concepts. On the other hand, the reunified Germany carried significantly more European and global responsibility and the conduct of 'a policy of the good example' or 'a policy of responsibility' were imperative under the new conditions. In August 1990 the US administration had asked the Kohl government

⁸⁴ Kreile, Michael, 'Will Germany Assume a Leadership Role in the European Union?', in Heurlin, Bertel, ed., *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1996, p.128

⁸⁵ Baumann, Rainer and Hellmann, Gunther, 'Germany and the Use of Military Force: 'Total War', the 'Culture of Restraint' and the Quest for Normality', *German Politics*, Vol.10 No.1 (April 2001), p.69

whether Germany could send troops to the Gulf. However, without domestic support and a time when the 'Two-plus-Four Treaty' (requiring the Soviet approval) had not yet been ratified, it would be unwise to make such a departure. Also, the German constitution would not allow for a deployment of Bundeswehr soldiers. The only difference this time was that Christian Democrats portrayed constitutional limit as an obstacle to be overcome rather than a fundamental constraint to be dealt with. As a reaction to this, "Germany must not lag behind anybody in its efforts for peace" Brandt said because war, in his view, was 'the ultima ratio of politics'⁸⁶. Meanwhile, Germany supported its allies with substantial financial contributions amounting to DM 18 billion. Also, with NATO's Defense Planning Committee decision in January 1991, Allied Mobile Force's air component were sent to bases in south-eastern Turkey, with 200 *Bundeswehr* soldiers and 18 German fighter jets. Thus, Genscher's hopes for 'a new culture of international co-existence' with Germany as 'a policy of the good example' was likely to be realized⁸⁷.

4.3. German Military Deployments in the Early 1990s and the Out-of-Area Debate

In the early years of reunified Germany, representatives of the Kohl administration argued that Germany was expected, by its partners, to take over more responsibility by contributing to international military operations. In the following period, there became a clear rise in the scope of the German contributions to these operations:

⁸⁶ Joffe, Josef, 'Once More: the German Question', *Survival*, Vol.32 No.2, March/April 1990, p.136

⁸⁷ Haftendorn, Helga, 'Gulliver in the Centre of Europe: International Involvement and National Capabilities for Action' in Heurlin, Bertel, ed., *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1996, pp.112-115

From medical troops to the UN peace-keeping operation ,UNAMIC, in Cambodia (in 1991/92) and to the naval forces of the WEU's Operation Sharp Guard monitoring the embargo against Yugoslavia in the Adriatic (from 1992 to 1996), as well as to the dispatch of supply and transport units of the *Bundeswehr* to Somalia (in 1993/94) as part of UNOSOM II⁸⁸.

Although not covered by the Basic Law and at a time when the debate on the issue of out-of-area operations had not been resolved, the former Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel approved the Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) deployment in the Mediterranean, after the NATO decision of monitoring the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina on 12 April 1993. In the course of the next year, NATO deployed its AWACS to the Mediterranean. In February 1994, NATO fighter jets shot down four Serbian fighters after repeated Serbian intrusions into the no-fly zone and in April 1994 NATO planes even attacked Serbian ground forces in order to stop the onslaught on the UN-protected area of Goradze. While Germany did not take part in NATO's airstrikes, German air force personnel participated in the surveillance and monitoring operations of AWACS⁸⁹.

Actually, the out-of-area debate should not, solely, be evaluated on legal terms: The heart of the problem was never juridical but historical and political. Historically, it should not come as a surprise that a nation which failed disastrously in two world wars and thereafter succeeded brilliantly in peace should remain chained to the habits of a

⁸⁸ Baumann, Rainer and Hellmann, Gunther, 'Germany and the Use of Military Force: 'Total War', the 'Culture of Restraint' and the Quest for Normality', German Politics, Vol.10 No.1 (April 2001), p.72

‘civilian power’. Although Article 24 of the Basic Law explicitly authorized participation in systems of collective security (let the FRG to become NATO and WEU member) and by becoming UN member in 1973 the FRG had accepted all obligations under the charter, the German administrations regarded the out-of-area ban as ‘holy constitutional writ’. This was the outcome of a historical burden. However, with the end of the Cold War and changing international environment, the new responsibilities and roles of Germany in the international community, was began to be discussed. The political actors in Germany could not solve the problem and left the solution of out-of-area question to the Federal Constitutional Court. On 12 July 1994, the Court decided the issue in the affirmative: the *Bundeswehr* may take part in an out-of-area operation if the *Bundestag* gives its authorization and if this operation is conducted within the framework of a system of collective security. Also, the Constitutional Court supported the contention that NATO could/can be seen as a system of collective security⁹⁰.

The Constitutional Court’s decision was not only the solution of juridical question. It signalled and defined the new role of the reunified Germany in the international politics. 30 June 1995 became a watershed date in post-war Germany, on which the Germans broke through the 40-year-old cocoon and the *Bundestag* authorized the government to project force out-of-area into the former Yugoslavia⁹¹.

⁸⁹ Meiers, Franz-Josef, ‘Germany:the Reluctant Power’, *Survival*, Vol.37 No.3, Autumn 1995, pp.83-92

⁹⁰ Joffe,Josef, ‘No Threats,No Temptations:German Grand Strategy After the Cold War’, in Heurlin, Bertel,ed., *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, London: Macmillan Press LTD,1996, p.261

⁹¹ Ibid., p.259

4.4. German Troops in the Balkans: Participation in IFOR and SFOR

In the light of Srebrenica, the German political elite accepted that the legacy of German history should not only be to call for ‘No more Wars!’ (*‘Nie wieder Krieg!’*) but also for ‘No more Auschwitz!’. NATO request in February 1995, for sending a large NATO force to the Balkans to secure the retreat of the unsuccessful UNPROFOR, made the former argument more visible. The operation was not materialized but Bonn responded positively to NATO’s request and declared its readiness to contribute a contingent of 1,800 soldiers. In December 1995, the Balkans Contact Group managed to broker the Dayton Peace Accord. The German government had already indicated in October that it would contribute several *Bundeswehr* soldiers, mainly from logistics and transport units to the NATO-led force, that was to police the agreement. When the Dayton Accord was signed, the Bundestag authorized the German participation in IFOR, by which, the 3.000 German troops mainly provided medical and logistical assistance to French soldiers. SFOR took over the functions of IFOR in 1996 and Germany’s SFOR contingent included combat forces and the *Bundeswehr* troops were regularly stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina⁹².

4. 5. German Participation in Kosovo War

Schröder and Fischer, who were in Washington in 1998 as members of a government-elect, were urged by the White House not to veto any NATO action. After turning back to Bonn, they were confronted with a revised White House request which

asked them; to raise the pressure on Milosevic by having the Germans to commit to full *Bundeswehr* participation in the operation, at least in NATO staffs, on NATO's AWACS and in other indirect forms of combat. With the deployment of the OSCE observers in Kosovo, the coalition was given a limited time. In March 1999, Schröder, Fischer, and Scharping had to rise to the challenge of keeping the German people behind the participation in NATO's air war. They succeeded winning praise in both internal and external domain. On 24 March 1999, four German ECR-Tornados took off from their base in Piacenza to participate in NATO's operation, for bombing of targets in the former Yugoslav Federation⁹³. For the first time since 1945, German forces took part in offensive combat mission against a sovereign state. The most striking part was that it took place under a Red-Green coalition (who were anti-militarist) and without a UN mandate. German participation in Operation Deliberate Force raised a number of questions about this large and influential country's future role in Europe, its self-perception as a civilian power and in addition, the Kosovo tragedy erupted mid-way through the German presidency of the EU and the WEU, and its chairmanship of the G8.

During a prominent transatlantic conference in Munich, in February 1999, Schröder himself was at pains to emphasise in all clarity that Germany would 'remain a reliable partner'. Moreover, in contrast to past attitudes according to which Germany's historical legacy prohibited any deployment of German troops out-of-area, the Chancellor emphasized that Germany's historical responsibility made it imperative 'to prevent mass-murder with all the necessary means'. In his view, Germany had come of age as a full

⁹² Meiers, Franz-Josef, 'Germany: the Reluctant Power', *Survival*, Vol.37 No.3, Autumn 1995, p.91

member of NATO, now being ready 'without any reservations' to assume responsibility as a normal ally⁹⁴. Also, after the war started on March 24, the key figures of the German government were constantly referring to unacceptable Serbian terror against the Albanian people, describing the overarching goal of the use of military means to be a halt to continuing serious and systematic violations of human rights as well as the prevention of a humanitarian catastrophe. The leading Green 'Realo', Fischer, played a pivotal role in changing attitudes on the German Left, declaring in 1995 after a visit to Bosnia that military force was morally justified in order to stop genocide, and that German troops should participate in such humanitarian intervention⁹⁵.

German motivations for participating in the bombing campaign were three-fold: First, a strong sense of responsibility towards its NATO allies was a key motive. In the case of Kosovo, not to have participated in the NATO operation would have fatally undermined the international position of the new German government. Second, a strong sense of moral and political responsibility towards the humanitarian suffering in Kosovo, was important. The construction of post-war German identity around a rejection of its totalitarian past (against the legacy of Hitlerism and Holocaust) motivated the German policy-makers in the decision of participation in military intervention. A third important factor was a worry about a new wave of asylum-seekers and refugees. Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo threatened to precipitate large-scale migration into Western Europe, which the German government wished to prevent.

⁹³ Hyde-Price, Adrian, 'Germany and the Kosovo War: Still a Civilian Power?' , German Politics, Vol.10 No.1 (April 2001), p.19

⁹⁴ Baumann, Rainer and Hellmann, Gunther, 'Germany and the Use of Military Force: 'Total War', the 'Culture of Restraint' and the Quest for Normality', German Politics, Vol.10 No.1 (April 2001), p.76

Given its presidency of EU, Germany played a pivotal role in negotiations to end the war and to bring peace to the region. In early April, Foreign Minister Fischer announced a peace plan. The German EU presidency also took the initiative in developing a 'Stability Pact for Southeast Europe', along with more focused economic and financial aid for Albania and Macedonia. Throughout the bombing campaign, a key concern of German diplomacy was to involve both the UN and the Russians in the search to end the war. In his capacity as the President of the European Council, Chancellor Schröder invited the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to attend the informal EU Summit in Brussels on 14 April. The future role of EU in a peace settlement for the Balkans was also discussed during Annan's three-day visit to Germany. The Germans did not want the Kosovo War to undermine a cooperative security relationship with Moscow and so, they tried to 'bring the Russians back in the boat'. In April and May, many German diplomats and political leaders travelled to Moscow to encourage the Russian administration to play a positive role in the conflict. The German government also encouraged the Americans to intensify their dialogue with Moscow. Finally, the G8 was used as a forum for building a political agreement with Russia. The success of this strategy was evident from the positive outcome of the G8 Summit in Bonn on 5 May, at which a set of 'principles' were agreed on, to end the conflict⁹⁶.

The Kosovo tragedy has forced Germany to confront two distinct but closely inter-linked questions: The first concerns the role and utility of military force. The second

⁹⁵ Hyde-Price, Adrian, 'Germany and the Kosovo War: Still a Civilian Power?', German Politics, Vol.10 No.1 (April 2001), p.21

is whether European order can continue to rest on the traditional principles of the Westphalian states system, namely the sovereignty and the non-intervention into states' domestic affairs. With regard to the Germany's role in the Kosovo War, has Germany remained a 'civilian power' or has it pursued a 'go it alone policy' question is still discussed. In his speech to the opening session in the *Reichstag* building in Berlin on 19 April 1999, Chancellor Schröder quoted the Albanian writer Ismail Kandare:

With its intervention in the Balkans, atlantic Europe has opened a new page in world history. It is not about material interests, but about principles: the defense of legality and of the poorest people on the continent. This is a founding act.⁹⁷

The concept of 'civilian power' is somewhat vague and loosely defined. However, it is not equated with a pacifist renunciation of the use of military force under any circumstances. From this point of view, many international relations academicians argue that Germany remains a 'civilian power' because of the German attempts to stop human suffering, building and running refugee camps in Macedonia and Albania, its efforts to reach a negotiated settlement and the use of force as a last resort, within a multilateral framework (NATO alliance).

⁹⁶ Ibid., p.28

CHAPTER 5

GERMANY'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DILEMMAS

Since unification, Germany's changing role in the European security system has been an issue of special attention. However, Germany's security policy cannot be understood in terms of clear-cut choices and distinct strategies, but rather as a series of policy dilemmas revolving around NATO, ESDI and the OSCE, and Washington, Paris and Moscow axis. The task facing Germany in the 1990s is to manage its security policy in ways which contribute to the consolidation of the European integration process and lessening of tensions and conflicts in Europe. In short, it is expected to lay the foundations for a Europe 'whole and free'.

The ground for the existing multidimensional foreign policy was prepared during the Cold War period. Post-war West German security policy was built on three key planks: First, a transatlantic alliance with Washington and integration into NATO was the

⁹⁷ Ibid., p.30

primary objective. The FRG joined NATO in 1955 and since then the alliance has provided the bedrock of German security. Second one was a West European alliance with Paris and integration into the European Economic Community (EEC) and the WEU. The Franco-German axis was institutionalized with the 1963 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and these two states have coordinated their *Europapolitik* in order to further their commitment of European integration. Third one was the detente policy towards the East Europe. This policy became the most pronounced one with the adoption of *Ostpolitik* and was pursued in a coordinated manner with the CSCE. The aim of the German security policy was/is to prevent rather than fight a war. Peter Stratman, an academician studying on Germany, has argued:

The Federal Republic can expect to be secure only if war is entirely prevented. Confronted with the conventional and nuclear offensive and destructive potential of the SU, it would be meaningless for this tiny, densely populated and highly-industrialized country, which might be the potential battlefield, to seek security in the capability for successful defence...⁹⁸.

This amilitary strategic culture, which contrdicts with pre-1945 aggressive strategy, reflects far-reaching changes in German politics and continues to exert a profound influence on contemporary German security-thinking. In short, amilitary strategic culture colours Germany's approach to the post-Cold War security agenda in Europe and the wider international system.

The emergence of a 'pluralist security community' as Karl Deutsch, a well-known academician on international politics, has claimed, embracing the North Americans and

⁹⁸ Hyde-Price, Adrian, 'Germany's Security Policy Dilemmas: NATO, the WEU and the OSCE', in Larres, Klaus, ed., *Germany Since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1998, p.208

the West Europeans, determined the evolution of German security policy. An international society has developed within the transatlantic states system in which cooperation and sociability between states has largely superseded traditional *Realpolitik* instincts. This has tremendous significance for Germany's place in the post-Cold War Europe. During the pre-1945 period, the issue of how to incorporate a country as large and dynamic as Germany into the established European states system ('the German problem') was an insoluble problem for European security. The power of Germany had been fatally destabilizing the European balance of power. The end of Cold War bipolarity and the reunification of Germany brought about the rebirth of these questions and fears. However, the high level of complex interdependence, economic globalization, institutionalized multilateral cooperation and the consolidation of stable liberal democracies have transformed the nature of classical state power. This has affected the nature of German power in four significant ways: First of all, the power of reunified Germany will not be concentrated in the hands of a centralized government. The substantial state functions and responsibilities have been devolved to the Lander and local government level. Secondly, the membership of Germany in EU and NATO reflects that some power has been devolved upwards, through the institutional framework. Thirdly, the rise of transnational corporations, strategic corporate alliances and cross-border economic activities have broken the state monopoly on economic interactions. Finally, the political culture and social structure of contemporary Germany is fundamentally different from what it was before 1945, with democratic and liberal ethos⁹⁹.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p.211

The fundamental change has not solely been in the German policy-making process. The post-war transformation has also changed the geographical context within which German security policy is formulated. Germany's traditional geopolitical dilemmas arose from its central geographical location within a European balance of power between the great powers of the continent. However, today the dilemmas of Germany's *Sicherheitspolitik* derive from the country's position on the eastern edge of the transatlantic security community: Germany is an integral member of this community, but with borders on the zone of incipient conflict and instability in the east. It is the new geopolitical land-scape which has produced the current foreign and security dilemmas of the German administration. Thus, although Germany is no longer confronted by any identifiable enemies or direct security threats, it nonetheless has to address a security agenda constituted by a series of diffuse and multifaceted security 'risks' and 'challenges':

The first of these comes from the residual military arsenal of the former Soviet Union. The Russian Federation itself remains a major military superpower with substantial conventional and military assets. This coupled with the continuing political instability of many post-Soviet republics and the dangers of nuclear proliferation. The second risk comes with the problems generated by the resurgence of ethno-national conflicts in much of the East Europe and the Balkans. The collapse of Communism and the socio-economic costs created in transforming authoritarian communist systems into democratic market structures, created animosities and new patterns of ethnic, religious and national conflict. The third category of risks arises from developments in the wider

international system. Germany is a major trading country and concerned about potential threats to supplies of vital raw materials, markets and maritime trade routes. With technological developments, the spread of ballistic missiles, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons; problems of international terrorism; immigration from North Africa, the East Mediterranean and the instability generated by the appalling levels of poverty and underdevelopment in many countries, are other risks affecting German foreign and security policy formulation.

As Germany continues to work out its response to the new threats, demands and responsibilities, it is doing so within a firmly multilateral framework. This post-Cold War *Sicherheitspolitik* is being pursued within a dense institutional structure consisting of a series of regional, European and international organizations. This approach was summed up by Chancellor Kohl when he declared on 31 May 1991: “In the security field I am against ‘all or nothing’, I am in favour of ‘but also!’”¹⁰⁰.

The speech of German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in the year 2000 reflects the fact that the German foreign and security policy strategy aims to keep options open, rather than making strict choices:

Last year marked the tenth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall that precipitated the end of the Cold War. The North Atlantic alliance linking the United States and Canada with the democracies of Western Europe was, from its inception, distinctively shaped by the historical constellation of the Cold War. The most succinct and apt definition of the Alliance in those days was provided by Lord Ismay, its first Secretary-General, who described NATO’s mission as: “To keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.” Since that time,

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., pp.216-217

however, the strategic environment in Europe has changed dramatically. The Russian empire in the form of the Soviet Union and its satellite states no longer exists. Germany, now a successful democracy, has with the consent of all its neighbors and the major powers—especially with the steadfast support of the United States—been reunited in peace and freedom. It is integrated in manifold ways into the Euroatlantic and other international structures. In Lord Ismay's terms, only the first of the three NATO objectives is left, that of providing an indispensable security link between North America and Europe.

In the *Washington Post*, Henry Kissinger recently raised the question of whether the Kosovo crisis heralded the end of NATO as we have known it. The background to his concern, and to those of many other American partners, was the commitment made by European Union leaders at last year's Cologne summit to establish a specific European security and defense identity.

To that concern my immediate response is: It is unfounded. The Alliance is still the guarantor of collective defense and security in the North Atlantic area and will keep this role in the twenty-first century. For Germany in particular, transatlantic partnership and the U.S. political and military presence in Europe remain the key to peace and security on our continent. Four times in this century the United States has intervened militarily in Europe, most recently in Kosovo, because we Europeans believed ourselves incapable of acting on our own. That is a lesson we must heed for the future, too. And given its geopolitical position, even a Europe that is one day united will still need transatlantic safeguards.

The United States is vital to Europe's security, whether internal or external. In this age of globalization and increasingly shared interests and challenges, however, one thing is also more obvious than ever: Europe is crucial to America's security. This nexus is reinforced by the new challenges that both the United States and Europe face, ranging from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to terrorism and organized crime, to environmental threats. In a globalized world, there can be no security and prosperity on either side of the Atlantic unless that security and prosperity are shared. After all the blood spilled in what the British historian Eric Hobsbawm has aptly called an "age of extremes," this is a lesson hopefully both the United States and Europe will never forget. The two components of this transatlantic bridge—Europe's importance to America's security and America's role in European security—together constitute the strong and solid foundation of shared interests on which we have to build a transatlantic security partnership adapted to the new environment.

The crisis in Kosovo confronted NATO with a severe test. It passed the test with flying colors, demonstrating extraordinary cohesion and the capacity to act. The Alliance proved it had successfully realigned itself, as agreed at the Washington summit, to respond to the new strategic environment in Europe and assume an important role in conflict prevention and management. As in Bosnia, NATO placed its military capabilities at the service of the international community,

aiding the search for a political solution to restore peace and respect for human rights. NATO's intervention halted rampant nationalism, violence, and expulsion in Kosovo, paving the way for the long-term stabilization of Southeastern Europe.

Another remarkable outcome of the war in Kosovo was the way the Europeans demonstrated a will to assume unprecedented political and military responsibility within the Alliance—not only in terms of their military contributions, but also through the political initiatives of the German EU Presidency and the final breakthrough achieved by the EU intermediary, Finnish President Ahtisaari, and Russian special envoy Victor Chernomyrdin. The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe also highlights the fact that Europeans are now more willing than ever to shoulder political responsibility and its consequences.

It was at the Washington NATO Summit that the common challenge was first outlined: to enhance the vitality of the transatlantic bond by developing a balanced partnership in the field of security and defense policy. A self-confident, emancipated Europe can no longer assume that the United States is going to become involved in European crises at all times and under any circumstance. We have come to realize that the end of the East–West conflict not only opened up exciting prospects for building a comprehensive order for peace in Europe, but also introduced new risks to security and stability on our continent. Bosnia and Kosovo underscored the need for Europe to improve both its political and its military effectiveness. Precisely because we cannot always call on our North American partners for help, the European Union must develop its own military management capabilities so that it has the ability to act whenever such action is judged necessary.

That, however, means the Europeans must first learn to speak with one voice. In that respect Europe has made considerable headway with the appointment of Javier Solana as High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. Clearly, a true common foreign and security policy is still a long way off, but it is essential that we stay the course and develop political and military instruments that will give us the capacity to act on our own in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management.

Galvanized by the war in Kosovo, Europe has already made significant progress in this area. In their Joint Declaration in St. Malo, France and Great Britain laid the groundwork for the creation of a European security and defense union. During its dual EU and WEU Presidency, Germany made the most of this new dynamism, paving the way for groundbreaking decisions at the 1999 Cologne European Council on the establishment of permanent political–military structures. In concrete terms, it is envisaged that the European Union should be able to plan, politically endorse, and carry out international crisis response operations, with the necessary institutional framework in place by the end of the year 2000.

EU member states have committed themselves to further developing their military assets and capabilities for deployment in European-led operations. That includes transport and reconnaissance capabilities as well as improved command and information systems. The Eurocorps is to become a European crisis response force available for deployment in NATO and EU operations. Another important aspect is enhanced cooperation within the European defense industry and closer coordination in planning and procurement of defense equipment.

At the same time, however, one thing is certain: In relations with United States, “hegemony” in the field of foreign or security policy or a duplication of efforts is not our goal. Quite the contrary, we remain committed to the closest possible cooperation within NATO, and particularly with the United States. A self-confident Europe is not a denial of the transatlantic partnership. Obviously, a new form of burden-sharing within the Alliance, with the Europeans making a bigger contribution, is also in the American interest, for even the United States as the sole remaining superpower is neither willing nor able to take care of all crises in all parts of the world—especially not when they happen on Europe’s doorstep.

A Europe that is able to act effectively can, together with the United States, make a notable contribution to global stability. The world of the twenty-first century needs multilateral institutions and shared rules. The UN was a magnificent and historic idea of one of America’s greatest presidents, Franklin D. Roosevelt. We need a global platform for common action in order to be able to meet effectively the challenges of the future. Moreover, history shows that unilateral action by major powers invites the imitation or even the formation of opposing powers, and thus ultimately has a destabilizing effect. There is a lesson here for both sides: Europe must develop in order to be a valuable partner and to remain credible, while the United States must be wise enough—as it has been so often before—to choose the arduous process of transatlantic coordination over the tempting but dangerous option “go it alone.”

Combating the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be an area of particular concern. Here, an important task awaits both Americans and Europeans in the years ahead. In this light, the rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the U.S. Senate was perceived as a major setback for worldwide efforts to promote nuclear disarmament. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is an important cornerstone of global efforts in this field, and without it the whole system of cooperative disarmament and arms control could be jeopardized. This matter depends particularly on the stance of the United States, the world’s largest nuclear power. If we embark upon the course in the wrong way, a new, highly dangerous nuclear arms race could begin in crisis regions. Even the U.S. could not control such a development, the result of which could instead be nuclear anarchy. It is vital, therefore, that the Senate’s rejection of the treaty last November not be the last word on the subject. We must not place at risk all of the painstaking progress accomplished made in recent decades in the field of disarmament and

arms control. The same goes for the ABM Treaty, a crucial pillar of the arms control regime.

A strong Europe will also make for stronger transatlantic relations across the board—in the political, economic, and military domains. In a globalized world, only a European Union that can act effectively—not just on economic and financial issues, but also in the area of foreign and security policy—will be able to safeguard peace in Europe and rise to the global challenges on today’s agenda. It is clearly true that the United States is the “indispensable nation” in that its contribution is essential to resolving international issues. It is up to Europe to develop and become the “indispensable partner” to the United States, while it is up to the United States to accept and support this process. This is the challenge—but also the transatlantic opportunity—of a European security and defense policy.¹⁰¹

The following part of this study deals with Germany’s commitment to and its role in NATO, ESDP and the OSCE.

5.1. Germany in NATO

After the World War II and the partition of Germany, the threat of Soviet expansionism made the FRG to rely on the transatlantic alliance for its security and territorial integrity. After becoming a NATO member in 1955, the *Bundesrepublik* played an important role in the alliance both as a base for forward-deployed NATO forces and as a major contributor to the conventional military strength of the organization. Although Germany cooperates with France on the development of ESDI and has been keen to see a more cooperative OSCE, Germany’s commitment to NATO has not yet resulted in any significant weakening. The NATO alliance remains the bedrock of German security policy. There are four main reasons behind this strong commitment: Firstly, NATO provides an invaluable security guarantee against a resurgent and revanchist Russia. It

also provides an insurance policy in the event of instability in the former Soviet Union. Secondly, German participation in NATO's integrated military command provides a very visible demonstration of its continuing *Westintegration* and its commitment to multilateral defence cooperation. Thirdly, the German government enjoys a close relationship with the US within the context of 'partnership in leadership'¹⁰². Also, the German administration remains convinced that a strong US military commitment to Europe is crucial for the continent's peace and security. Finally, NATO is perceived as a tested alliance based on democratic principles and makes vital contribution to peace and stability in Europe.

The significance of NATO has not declined for Germany, but (since reunification) in Germany and other members of the alliance, there is broad consensus that NATO must reform its structure and functions, parallel to changing security environment. The belief that the Europeans need to assume a greater responsibility for their own security, is widely held on both sides of the Atlantic. Also, the idea of making NATO a more European organization and strengthening 'European pillar', finds great support in Germany. However, a more cohesive European pillar risks undermining America's leadership within NATO. NATO's relations with the countries of the former Warsaw Pact is the second set of changes championed by Germany. The Bonn government was a prime mover behind NATO's London Declaration of July 1990 which offered to extend the hand of friendship to its former enemies. Also, in October 1991, Foreign Minister

¹⁰¹ Fischer, Joshchka, 'The Indispensable Partner', *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.1, No.1 (Winter/Spring 2000) [in <http://www.internationalaffairs.com>]

¹⁰² Asmus, Ronald D., 'Germany and America: partners in leadership?', *Survival*, Vol.33 No.6, November/December 1991, p.546

Genscher and his American counterpart James Baker proposed the creation of an institutionalized forum for regular high level consultation and discussion between NATO, the USSR, the three Baltic states, and the countries of East Europe. The Genscher-Baker initiative was formally endorsed by the NATO's Rome Summit in November 1991, which agreed to establish a 'North Atlantic Cooperation Council.' NATO's military strategy and force structure have been the third set of changes, sought by Germany. Germany played an important role in shaping NATO's far-reaching 'strategic review' which was adopted at the November 1991 Rome Summit¹⁰³. This advocated a greater reliance or reinforcements in the event of war and smaller, more mobile stationed forces configured in multinational corps.

In sum, although Germany has sought reform in structure and functions of NATO, the alliance has remained the bedrock of German security. Alliance with the US has primary importance for Germany, both for its security in particular and European security in general. Thus, the end of the Cold War and the removal of the threat of Soviet expansionism have not brought about lessening of Germany's commitment to NATO.

5. 2. Germany in ESDP

The development of a multilateral approach to foreign and security issues, and the gradual development of an operational European military capability, have been primary

¹⁰³ Kamp, Karl-Heinz, 'NATO Entrapped: Debating the Next Enlargement Round', Survival, Vol. 40 No. 3, Autumn 1998, p. 173

policy objectives for EU members. This was reflected in the Maastricht Treaty which announced the formation of a 'common foreign and security policy' (CFSP). The Treaty also recognized the WEU as an integral part of the development of the EU, which could ask the WEU 'to elaborate and implement the Union's decisions which had defence implications'. A declaration on the WEU was attached to the Treaty which noted the member states' intention 'to build up the WEU in stages as the defence component of the Union'. Also, Germany, in tandem with France, became the driving force behind the Eurocorps which is a multinational force (by 35.000 soldiers) and became operational in 1995¹⁰⁴.

The 'europeanist' initiatives have caused unease in Washington, London and other 'pro-atlanticist' capitals. Chancellor Kohl regularly stated that the Eurocorps is not a threat for or rival to NATO and he believed that Atlanticist-Europeanist tensions could be finessed through the medium of the WEU, which he envisaged as the bridge between NATO and the EU. For this reason, Germans welcomed the NATO decision of January 1994, to create 'combined joint task forces' (CJTF). These forces are command and control structures within NATO's integrated military command structure which are 'separable but not separate'. It was planned to place CJTF under a WEU operational command in order to allow the WEU to conduct humanitarian and peace-keeping operations, in accordance with the principles of the Petersberg Tasks defined by the June 1992 WEU Petersberg Declaration.

¹⁰⁴ Menon, Anand, Forster, Anthony and Wallace William, 'A common European Defence?', Survival, Vol.34 No.3, Autumn 1992, pp.110-122

NATO Foreign Ministers decided to create the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), within the alliance, in 1996 Berlin Summit. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty took the development of security one step further. The inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks into the Treaty and the implementation of them in May 1999, improved the defense capacity of the alliance. The 1998 St.Malo Declaration of Britain and France underlined the importance of making the alliance that can hold autonomous tasks. Also, the Declaration left open door for European tasks without using NATO capabilities (in out of Atlantic alliance issues). At June 2000 Santa Maria da Feira Meeting of the European Council, European heads of states and governments decided that the right of decision will belong to EU on the issues of crisis management, humanitarian aid, peace-keeping operations and deciding on using the NATO capabilities. It was decided to set up four EU working groups, to provide cooperation with NATO. At November 2000 WEU Ministers Summit in Marseilles, WEU was abolished and its power, authority and capabilities were transferred to ESDI. The Presidential Declaration of the Nice Summit on 9 December 2000 claimed that ESDI would be autonomous on the issues and operations where NATO was not involved. This Declaration increased the tension between the NATO's European Union and non-European Union members¹⁰⁵.

The problems of ESDI's roles and functions and its relations with NATO's functions and capabilities, have not been solved yet. Germany is pursuing a balance policy and does not want to be in a situation within which it will have to make a choice between Washington and Paris. German politicians do not (want to) see the case as a

¹⁰⁵ Bağcı,Hüseyin, 'Türkiye ve AGSK: Beklentiler, Endişeler', in Bal, İdris,ed., *21.Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul:Alfa Basım, 2001, ss.599-604

‘zero-sum game’, rather Germany wants a solution between Atlanticism and Europeanism. Thus, Germany wants a European pillar without alienating Washington’s and NATO’s other non-EU members’ interests.

5.3. Germany in the OSCE

The CSCE mechanism was initiated in 1975. Since its formation in Helsinki Summit at a time of detente in Europe, the *Bundesrepublik* has been one of the staunchest supporters of this process. For Bonn, the CSCE provided an ideal pan-European framework for regulating the east-west conflict and provided a multilateral forum for pursuing *Ostpolitik*. Genscher was a strong advocate of the CSCE and strongly believed that the CSCE could provide a framework for integrating the communist states into a new and more cooperative security structure. Genscher also saw the CSCE as a provider of stability for the dynamic and sometimes revolutionary developments in East Europe and the Soviet Union. Thus, after the end of the Cold War, Genscher played an important role in providing the institutionalization of the CSCE. At the Paris Summit of November 1990, the CSCE heads of states and governments declared ‘Paris charter for a new Europe’ and codified a series of principles for the conduct of interstate relations and human rights issues. The CSCE Summit of Helsinki, in the summer of 1992, issued a document called ‘the challenges of change’. Since then, the CSCE has focused primarily on early warning, preventive diplomacy and crisis management. At the Budapest Summit,

in December 1994, the CSCE was institutionalized and became the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)¹⁰⁶.

For Germany, the OSCE offers an institutional framework for addressing the legitimate security concerns of Russia and provides a forum for developing new forms of cooperative security. However, Germany is unwilling to realize the Russian plans for establishing a collective security regime which would subject NATO and ESDI to the OSCE decisions. From German point of view, the OSCE fulfils five key functions: First, it provides a forum for promoting and codifying common standards, values and norms, especially in the fields of human rights and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Second, it offers mechanisms for the monitoring of human rights violations of individuals and national minorities. Third, it acts as a forum for promoting military transparency, arms control, confidence- and security-building measures and so, reducing dangers of armed conflict and misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension. Fourth, it provides a framework for pan-European multilateral diplomacy on a range of issues. Finally, it is developing instruments for preventive diplomacy, conflict avoidance and crisis management¹⁰⁷.

The transformation of the OSCE has been called as the transformation into a regional equivalent of the United Nations, with a European 'security council'. Thus, the OSCE has played an important role in discussing the security issues of Europe. With

¹⁰⁶ Haftendorn, Helga, 'Gulliver in the Centre of Europe: International Involvement and National Capabilities for Action' in Heurlin, Bertel, ed., *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1996, p.101

regard to the objective of Germany to improve relations with the former communist countries, the OSCE is a key forum for Germany. However, Germany (unlike Russia) does not want the OSCE to become a security regime and to be superior to NATO and ESDI.

¹⁰⁷ Hyde-Price, Adrian, 'Germany's Security Policy Dilemmas: NATO, the WEU and the OSCE', in Larres, Klaus, ed., *Germany Since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences*, London: Macmillan

CONCLUSION

The Second World War and the defeat of the country totally shifted Germany's foreign and security posture. The new foreign and security logic was built on cooperation instead of competition, on the pursuit of wealth rather than power, on a quest for integration through transfer of sovereignty instead of a vain search for autonomy. Germany rested on the foundations of a democratic polity and projected the rules of this system onto relations among states, in Europe and Atlantic alliance and internationally. In the process of the evolution of West German foreign policy, the most important point was the rejection of past German *Sonderweg* (its anti-Western orientation, its tendency towards totalitarianism and its military inclinations) and shift towards a pro-Western and pro-democratic orientation. Thus, pacifism, democracy and respect for human rights emerged as powerful core political values in West Germany's foreign-policy role concept. The pacifist impulse implied a strong preference for political solutions and a profound scepticism vis-à-vis the use of force¹⁰⁸. While this attitude reflected Germany's past, it also pointed out the peculiar security position of West Germany during the Cold

Press LTD, 1998, pp.223-224

War because any major war between the two blocs was to devastate (whole) Germany, whatever the eventual outcome of that war would be.

With the reunification of Germany and the end of the East-West confrontation, in theory, Germany was free to return to the role of one of Europe's Great Powers. However, the reunited country showed no desire to depart (fundamentally) from its post-war foreign policy orientation. It strongly insisted on continuity in its integration policy into the Western Alliance system and stuck to the civilian power role concept.

In his book *Risiko Deutschland*, published in 1995, Joschka Fischer argued that it was certainly not in Germany's national interest to give up the dominant civilian power character of its politics and adopt a more assertive foreign policy¹⁰⁹. Today, however, Joschka Fischer is the Foreign Minister in a coalition government that has deployed German military forces in combat missions abroad (as in Kosovo without UN Mandate).

The evolution of German foreign policy in the 1990s and its policy in this period can be identified as one of 'modified continuity'. The starting point of the continuity thesis is the empirical finding that the post-unification German governments' foreign policy rhetoric continued to stress central themes of the civilian power ideal-type. It is underlined that reunified Germany stuck to its treasured 'policy of active integration and broad international cooperation'. Germany's willingness to further integrate into EU and

¹⁰⁸ Maull, Hanns W., 'Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?', *Survival*, Vol.42, No.2 (Summer 2000), pp.65-66

NATO, its aim to seize autonomy through the renunciation of nuclear weapons and the limitation on the troop strength of the German Armed Forces, reflect the reunified Germany's motives and objectives.

The civilian power concept, to which West German foreign policy was settled after the Second World War, implied a foreign policy identity which promoted multilateralism, institution-building and supranational integration, and tried to constrain the use of force in international relations through national and international norms. This foreign policy orientation was shaped by Germany's traumatic past. This is to say, the lessons derived from history led to aversion against the use of military power and Germany never again wants to threaten stability in Europe and the international system. With the collapse of the SU, the threat emanating from the Communist Bloc has disappeared but, ethno-nationalist conflicts have erupted on Europe's periphery. Inevitably, Germany has shifted to a new security posture to overcome the new threats. However, this new security posture does not constitute a fundamental departure from Germany's post-war foreign policy identity as a civilian power and manages to reconcile most core values of Germany's post-war foreign policy role.

Germany's changing position on out-of-area missions of the *Bundeswehr* can be grounded on two main reasons: First one is, the change in attitudes towards the utility and legitimacy of military action is due to pressure from Germany's partners, to make Germany take more responsibilities in the international fora. Second, the change is

¹⁰⁹ Fischer, Joschka, 'Risiko Deutschland: Krise und Zukunft der Deutschen Politik', (Köln: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1995), pp. 228-229 [from abstract of the book, in English version, in

conceptualized as a product of societal socialization. Facing the dilemma that non-military means had not been sufficient to deter Serb forces from slaughtering civilians in the UN-protected areas, Fischer argued that Germany's traditional pacifism could not mean that Germans would stand by idly when genocide happened. In his speech to the Bundestag, in late 1995, he argued:

We are in a real conflict between basic values. On the one hand, there is the renunciation of force as a vision of a world in which conflicts are resolved rationally, through recourse to laws and majority decisions, through the constitutional process and no longer through brute force; a world in which military means are rejected, and in which the aim is to create structures to replace them and make them redundant. On the other hand, there is the bloody dilemma that human beings may be able to survive only with the use of military force. Between solidarity for survival and our commitment to non-violence – that is our dilemma¹¹⁰.

Following the end of the Cold War, discussions on the future role of NATO and EU started. The idea to turn these two organizations from 'community of prosperity' into 'community of values' gained weight. In addition to this, with the Helsinki process, beginning in 1975, the concepts of democracy and human rights and respect for these values have become important issues in the conduct of inter-state relations. Germany's sensitivity for the non-violation of human rights is a key fact, laden with its traumatic history. Thus, Germany's involvement in use of force (with the precondition of multilateral involvement) to prevent human suffering and to prevent 'genocide' is no surprise. In other words, Germany's involvement in use of force, to keep these values, is

<http://www.internationalaffairs.com>]

¹¹⁰ Maull, Hanns W., 'Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?', *Survival*, Vol.42, No.2 (Summer 2000), p.63

to be regarded as a process of adopting international community and acting within the context of the 'policy of responsibility'.

Germany is a member of NATO, EU and the OSCE. To keep cooperative relations with Washington, Paris and Moscow is the primary objective for German foreign policy-makers. However, it is obvious that these options do not add up to a coherent whole and to harmonize political objectives of these organizations is not an easy task: The French connection does not fit with the Atlantic one, and the Central European option clashes with the Russian relationship, as well as with the necessity of keeping EU homogeneous for the purpose of deepening. However, Germany has pursued a policy of diversification, balance and compensation. Thus, German grand strategy will maximize options and minimize hard and fast commitments. It will want to retain a paid-up insurance policy underwritten by the US. It will try to keep its special friendship with France, without forsaking Britain. Germany will seek to bring East and Central European countries into NATO and EU. However, it will pursue a 'Greater Central European Sphere' with prudence, taking care not to alienate Russia or to stimulate Western suspicions¹¹¹.

Within the context of the aim of this study, with regard to the questions asked at the beginning, and through the foreign and security policy record of Germany since the reunification, although the 'German Question' has not been totally resolved, it is likely to be less traumatic. It is no surprise that German foreign and security policies have evolved

¹¹¹ Joffe, Josef, 'No Threats, No Temptations: German Grand Strategy After the Cold War', in Heurlin, Bertel, ed., *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1996, pp. 270-271

parallel to the international developments and have adopted to the international structure and 'atmosphere' within which these policies are formulated. However, this is not a radical shift from the parameters and orientation of the West German foreign and security policies, settled during the Cold War. Thus, it can be argued that continuity dominates over change in German foreign policy during the 1990s. Germany has stuck to its role of 'civilian power'. Although it has become more assertive, it has stayed bound to its multilateral commitments. Germany's primary goal is to keep its status as an equal and respected member of the international community and this depends on the successful, peaceful and democratic closure of the 'German Question', which has been so during the 1990s.

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