THE PROBLEM OF MULTICULTURALISM IN TURKEY
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

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ABSTRACT

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Starting from the 1970's, as a result of influx of immigration and of rise of ethno-cultural conflicts the issue of multiculturalism has come to become one of the significant themes of contemporary politics. In this respect, new policies have been developed in order to manage this increasing ethnic and cultural diversity. In this study it is aimed to get a critical perspective for the analysis of the question of multiculturalism in Turkey with reference to Turkey-EU relationships. As is widely accepted, the issue of multiculturalism is a conjunctural historical phenomenon emerging within the objective conditions of Western liberal democracies. When this issue is put within Turkey's political framework, Turkey with its own historical and political conditions constitute a distinct context in the sense that this question is taken into account with respect to broader problems including democratization or the extension of human rights. On this basis, it will be argued that, the politics of multiculturalism and normative premises associated with it have no taken for granted progressive meaning or role rather to what extent the relevant multicultural policy measures contribute to the solution of various ethnic or cultural conflicts is itself an empirical and political matter, and also part of changing power relations.

Keywords: Multiculturalism, Turkey, Integration to EU

ÖZ

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ İLE BÜTÜNLEŞME BAĞLAMINDA TÜRKİYE'DE ÇOK-KÜLTÜRLÜLÜK SORUNU

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1970'li yıllardan başlayarak, artan göç hareketleri ve yükselen etnik-kültürel çatışmaların sonucu çok-kültürlülük günümüz siyasetinin önemli konularından biri haline geldi. Buna paralel olarak artan etnik ve kültürel çeşitlilikle başa çıkabilmek için yeni politikalar geliştirildi. Bu çalışma kapsamında amaçlanan Türkiye'nin çok-kültürlülük sorununu Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği ilişkileri bağlamında eleştirel bir bakış açısıyla değerlendirmektir. Kabul gördüğü üzere, genel anlamıyla çok kültürlülük sorunu batılı liberal demokrasilerin özgül, nesnel koşullarının ürünüdür ve bu yönüyle tarihsel ve konjonktürel bir olgudur. Türkiye ise kendi tarihsel ve siyasi koşulları ile birlikte çok-kültürlülük sorunu için ayrı bir siyasi bağlam olarak görülmelidir. Bu çerçevede Türkiye'de bu konu demokratikleşme veya insan hakları gibi daha genel sorunlar bağlamında tartışılmaktadır. Bu çalışmada çok-kültürlülük siyaseti ve bu kavramla birlikte anılan normatif önermelerin verili bir ilerici rolü ve anlamı olmadığı vurgulanarak bu doğrultuda geliştirilen politikaların ne ölçüde etnik ve kültürel çatışmaların çözümünün bir parçası olacağının siyasi bir konu olduğu ve değişen güç ilişkilerinden ayrı düşünülemeyeceği savunulacaktır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Çok-kültürlülük, Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği ile bütünleşme.

To

My Dear Mother

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Problematic of the Study

From the early 1970's onwards, Europe has witnessed highly politicized conflicts over ethnic and racial relations that have been faced in the process of integration of the immigrants and minorities following the pattern of immigration and settlement in the years after the WW II. In the 1980's and 1990's the issue has become more problematic in the sense that it has constituted one of the central debates within the European politics. On the one hand, ethnic, racial, religious and other similar positions have been used as a ground for claiming social, cultural, and political rights; on the other, because of their undeniably political character these changing forms of the demands have provoked reactions. When it has become impossible to ignore the impact of these relations the European societies have searched ways of dealing with these challenges concerning the recognition of the rights of the minorities and cultural groups. Thus, they tried to respond the challenge through the formation of the policies of integration, which have taken different forms in different countries and generally defined under the general heading of multiculturalism. Although there is no agreed, fixed definition of the concept within the dominant literature the conceptual distinction made by Bhikhu Parekh may be helpful in grasping the implication of the concept. He distinguishes multicultural societies from the multiculturalist societies in that the former denotes an objective fact and the latter to an ideal situation that can be achieved through deliberate attempts (Parekh, 2000: 6-7). According to this distinction, any society in which there exists culturally, ethnically, racially different groups or communities is a

multicultural society. On the other hand, as Parekh underlines the definition of a society as multiculturalist necessitates much more than a factual situation since in such a society the claims of the groups for recognition of their distinct beings and cultural identities, and for representation are responded affirmatively and met by the state. Further their coexistence on the basis of toleration and interaction is guaranteed by means of specific measures replacing those of assimilative policies.

The politics in Turkey is not immune to these debates originating from the Western European societies, and so the conception of multiculturalism has recently been subject to the discussions in Turkey. On this basis, the problematic of this study is to anlayse how the notion of multiculturalism is perceived in the context of Turkey. By way of dealing with this problem it will be argued that in Turkish politics, the debates mostly turn around the demands of the minorities and ethnic groups for enjoyment of the cultural rights in the form of the recognition of their distinct cultural identities, the right to use their mother tongues in the educational sphere, in teaching, and the right to establish radio and TV broadcasts. In addition to them, it will also be shown that the point stated above is connected to the discussions related to the realisation of the fundamental rights and freedoms, to the problem of political liberalisation of the country, and even to the Kurdish question. It is hoped that the analysis of this problem will help to grasp the dynamics behind such a rising emphasis on the cultural rights and identity concerns in Turkey, and the most significantly to understand how the politics of multiculturalism is perceived by the various actors as a progressive and transformative mechanism in confronting many problems disturbing the democratic functioning of the order, and as a challenge to the existing status-quo.

In explaining the context of the arguments concerning the question of multiculturalism the relationships between Turkey and EU will be the main reference point. However it is important to note that the aim is not to anlayse the evolution of these relationships, instead the requirements of the Union necessary for the membership will be regarded as an external factor, and the extent of the influence of this dynamic will be discussed. In this sense, some other questions will also be raised in this study, that is, how the process of European integration becomes influential upon the discussions of multiculturalism? Can there be any correspondence between the interactions with EU and the rising demands for cultural rights? Lastly in which

ways do various groups, organizations attribute importance to Turkey-EU relationships in terms of their aspirations for a multiculturalist society? In the light of these questions how this process shaped the nature of the existing concerns on multiculturalism is going to be explained. Moreover how the political commitments given for the membership are seen as an opportunity to realise cultural rights is going to be stressed.

These questions will be dealt with in four sections. In the first part the comprehension of the concept of multiculturalism and the evolution of the politics of multiculturalism will be explained in the context of Western Europe. It will be shown that the debates on the notion in Europe go along with the problems of the integration of the immigrants, the representation of the ethnic, cultural and racial identities of various communities in the public sphere, the extent of citizenship rights, and the question of identity. In this section the critiques against the politics of multiculturalism under the themes of culturalism, essentialism and new racism will also be mentioned.

The recent political and legal attempts within the international community in order to form specific norms and the rules with respect to the rights of the minorities and particularly to the cultural rights will constitute the subject of the second part. The reason standing behind these attempts will be connected to the inefficiency of the universal human rights standards. For that reason, the relevant conventions, treaties, documents and political texts developed within the framework of the UN, OSCE, and the Council of Europe will be the basic references of this section. Then, as an introduction to the analysis of the problem of this study, the laws and legal regulations within the Turkish legal system directly or indirectly related to the enjoyment of the cultural rights will be explained briefly. This will be followed by the description of the recent legal reforms and amendments as they are defined in the National Programme and the 6th Harmonisation Package, which are adopted for accession to the EU. The evaluation of this last point will be made with the objective to answer the question of whether it will be satisfactory to make legal changes, revisions within the Constitution and the other legislation, and as a result to grant the cultural rights to the ethnic and cultural communities for the political liberalisation of the country but most importantly for the solution of the problem of multiculturalism.

In the third section, the perception of the notion of multiculturalism will be expressed in the form of the case study and with reference to the perspectives of the mainstream political parties, human rights organisations and the groups raising demands for the cultural rights. While conducting interviews with these actors it will be assumed that the views of the political parties would explain the positions of those having the experience of government on the one hand, and the responses of the other two groups of actors would reflect the perspectives of the civil society organisations vis a vis the question of multiculturalism in Turkey, on the other hand. Such a distinction may be helpful in comprehending how the candidates of political authority and civil society organisations evaluate the problem from the different points of view.

In the last section, it will be aimed at making a critical assessment of the concept of multiculturalism in a general sense in the light of the implications reached in the other sections. Through this evaluation, the limits of the politics of multiculturalism in the realisation of the political and social change will be argued. Especially in this section it is asked whether it is a viable project to engage in politics in the form of the identity politics, and through the discourses of cultural identity and the right to be different in the formulation of their social and political activities.

Actually when we evaluate the dominant understanding and the general description of the politics of multiculturalism it is seen that its implications highlight significant issues within the political and intellectual landscape. However under this general understanding within the liberal democracies in the name of the integration of the differences to the system the problematic of the politics is almost reduced to the recognition of the differences, the elimination of the identity problems etc. In this study it is argued that, in any context, there is nothing problematic about the general definition of the multiculturalism and its normative premises instead the question is related to how these premises and implications would be carried out and reflected in the practice. To put it simply, it is basically a political and practical matter. In this respect the prevalent trend in the political and theoretical debates and also in the political practices is the confinement of all troubles defined under the heading of the concept of the multiculturalism like assimilation, homogenization and discrimination to the political and cultural spheres. For that reason, the solutions of these issues are searched within these realms through political and legal regulations. In this respect

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the question is easily presented as if it was about the lack of democracy. Therefore the material context and socio- economic conditions paving way for the problem stated above are given less attention, and by doing so this dominant trend separates the material basis from the cultural realm.

In this study, the prevalent definition of the concept of multiculturalism and its basic premises are accepted in this respect. Therefore there is no attempt to formulate an alternative understanding, to develop new dimensions for the concept or to redefine the notion on a new basis. It is merely aimed to concentrate on the limits of the politics of multiculturalism and to question the general tendency which attributes an over significance to the politics of multiculturalism beyond its scope and capabilities.

1.2. Theoretical Framework

In any context, the mere existence of culturally distinct and different groups makes us to give attention to the concepts of multiculturalism and multicultural society. This was the case firstly in the Western societies facing the problem of accommodation and settlement of the immigrants and the refugees. As a result of immigration, multiculturalism firstly emerged as an official government policy and then has become a political project formulated in order to manage increasing ethnic and cultural diversity. While stemming from such objective conditions the debates on multiculturalism have gained prominence in the successive years in that with reference or in relation to the concept the theoretical and political concerns have been expressed, many themes have been problematised involving the dichotomy between universal and particular or difference, the concept of citizenship, its content and the nature of the rights and obligations derived from it. In a sense, this is related to the fact that the content and the scope of the politics have enlarged together with the emergence of new political actors. In fact today's theoretical, intellectual and political concerns have a bit changed compared to those observed three decades ago. Actually in choosing the question of multiculturalism as the subject of this study especially such developments and new and more complex dimensions of the politics have been taken into consideration.

Multiculturalism as a concept and as a discourse are associated with some assumptions and normative premises including the necessity of the recognition of different cultural identities, respect to their values, which are almost accepted in almost all contexts. However while these and other premises are widely accepted there is no theory of multiculturalism or the general policies of multiculturalism since the politics of multiculturalism has a context dependent nature therefore the relevant policies are basically related with empirical issues.

The empirical character of the politics of multiculturalism reveals itself within the Western European societies where the post-war immigration waves constituted the historical background of multicultural policy measures. In other words it was the specific, political and socio- economic conditions of these societies that paved the way for the rise of debates upon the issue. In this respect distinct political cultures and political histories have produced particular multicultural policies in each country. But in all the cases the respected societies due to the challenge of the rising claims of the politicised ethnic, racial or religious groups and the immigrants came to revise their existing notions of nationality and citizenship. In the crises conditions of the 1970's and the following decades these measures have enabled the communities to raise their voices for the expression and promotion of their identities, and the participation to the society on the basis of their identities. On the other hand in such conjuncture through multiculturalism and relevant policies the governments have been able to find an opportunity to manage the diversity and tackle with the integration of these people, who were disadvantaged and had marginalised positions in all senses under the economic crisis.

Actually the main criticisms directed against the governments have been their tendency to ignore the demands of the culturally distinct groups for the public appearance, and their attempts aiming at homogenising the society through an assimilatory logic. On this basis at discursive level the multiculturalism seems to be a critique of the universalistic tenets of liberalism. Therefore it is replaced by the emphasis on particularity and difference. Such dichotomies established between the notions of universal and particular, and also between the ideal of equality and difference best find their reflections in the debates upon the concept of citizenship. Over the years defining the boundaries of the citizen rights has produced problems since it is about the question of how one can enjoy these rights and freedoms while

having a different identity from the majority culture. In liberal understanding, as the dominant paradigm in these debates the status of citizenship transcends particularity and difference since it is defined in a general sense and rights and obligations derived from it are applied to every individual equally and in the same way.

However it is argued that rather than ensuring fair terms of inclusion and equal participation such conception of citizenship leads to exclusion and homogenisation, i.e., a situation which forces the excluded groups to assimilate themselves to the majority culture in order to benefit from the citizenship rights. Because in this understanding the state and the law should implement its rules in general terms abstracted from the particularities of individual and group difference. Against this it is claimed that the rights and rules that are universally formulated and blind to differences perpetuate rather than prevent oppression. This is associated by a related criticism that though the laws, public institutions are assumed to stand neutral vis a vis group differences they are shaped by the norms and values of dominant culture so it is not the case that state situates itself outside culture, ethnicity and nationality. It is because of this consideration that group-specific measures are developed and tolerated on the condition that they do not undermine the individual rights and liberties and the common values of the society. The several group specific rights are designed in order for the incorporation of the communities and to accommodate their cultural differences.

Nevertheless even such regulations do not eliminate disputes within the general literature, everyday practices and policy measures because whether they are developed at group or individual level and the boundaries within which they can be enjoyed are still subject to controversies. On one side there are those who while acknowledging the necessity of the protection of the members of the minorities and other groups against discrimination and promotion of their cultural identities, require these measures to be confined to the private realm. This perspective comprehends the rights in terms of the interests of the individual because these specific rights are granted not to the groups as collective rights but to the individuals as the members of various communities. On the other side, there is the view, which regards the group, as the bearer of the rights therefore requires the recognition and promotion of the distinct identities in both private and public realms. This approach criticizes the universalistic notion of citizenship that sacrifices the group difference in the name of

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abstract ideal of equality. The states by taking the individual as the main subject of these regulations design their policies in this line; on the other hand the identity groups wage their struggle in order for their cultural rights.

Because of such implications multiculturalism may be regarded as a branch of the identity politics. In the politics of multiculturalism the members of the ethnic, religious or racial groups resist discrimination, structural inequalities, marginalization and oppression through situating their cultural identities at the center of their politics. In this sense the concept of culture which should be understood as a specific way of life that each group possesses turns into a site of resistance, claims-making and politics.

However these assumptions themselves are criticized as describing to an essentialist conception of multiculturalism. In the essentialist conception of culture identities are assumed to be closed to change and stable over time and the groups or the communities are assessed as homogenous and unified wholes. Because internal differences are neglected, possibility of both conflicting interests within the group and interaction among the communities are not taken into account. When it is accompanied with an overemphasis on difference this essentialist tendency of the politics of multiculturalism reflects itself within the everyday life in the form cultural racism. In fact, the prevalence of racist discourse within the Western European societies constitutes one of the drawbacks of the multicultural policies.

As is also underlined in the successive discussions by focusing on both positive and negative implications it is crucial to have a critical standing vis a vis the concept of multiculturalism rather than attributing it normative values. As has been pointed out, even though the multicultural policies have been formulated by the Western societies as strategic political projects in order to tackle with diversity, at the end it has been through these policies that the various groups and the minorities have been able to promote their concerns and make the society to be aware of their existences. And today the assimilation to the majority culture is no longer the case for the integration to the society instead the boundaries of the notion of the citizenship has been questioned in favour of more comprehensive conception sensitive to the group differences. After all people have been entitled to the linguistic rights or given the opportunity of the representation in the public institutions.

It has been almost three decades that multicultural policies have been formulated and implemented within the Western societies yet over the years it has been understood that the reflections of the politics of multiculturalism cannot be restricted to those measures within the nation-states. International community has also demonstrated its responsiveness to the various demands of the minorities, the immigrants through developing new legal and political instruments dealing with the cultural rights. Specific policies developed at national level like educational and linguistic rights of the minorities have been incorporated into the international legal and political documents. These efforts in a sense display the inadequacy of the existing universal human rights standards so it is argued that cultural rights of the minorities and other groups may be a part of the human rights. At this stage the dichotomy between the universal and that of particular is transcended because the particularities of the different groups including their languages, identities, cultures are reflected under the universal human rights discourse. For instance, in the new instruments recognition of linguistic rights of the minorities or preservation of their cultural identities are regarded as indispensable for the promotion of peace and stability. Therefore the states are put under positive obligations to commit themselves to these principles. However what requires attention is that in conformity with the liberal tradition while all these specific measures are situated within the universal framework they are still designed as individual rights and assumed to be enjoyed by the individuals as the members of the particular ethnic groups. On the other hand flexible practices of the states in implementing the provisions integrated into these texts led to the problems in establishing general standards. And as a member of the international community the issues stated above are meaningful within the Turkish context, too.

In Turkey, the rise of the politics of multiculturalism or more generally identity politics has been witnessed in the 1990's when the politicized Kurdish dynamic and moderate political Islam have come to pursue their concerns through giving reference to the main discourses of the multiculturalism. In fact the 1990's indicate an important conjuncture for the Turkish political establishment in the sense that similar to the conditions within Europe in the early 1970's there was a crisis situation in almost every sphere of the social formation. Specifically mainstream political parties of the center were far from accommodating these adversarial social

actors within the system. It was when the establishment tried to restore order on its previous basis, to establish the stability and the representative capabilities of the liberal democratic order that the religious and ethnic communities have raised their criticism by using the discourse of the politics of multiculturalism.

An essential aspect of the issue of multiculturalism in Turkey is the EU integration process and this is also an important part of the question of this study. In other words, in Western Europe the politics of multiculturalism and the relevant matters have grown within the internal political and economic conditions and then become political forces in the development of many policies, legal changes, and political practices. However though there are internal dynamics behind Turkey's own question of multiculturalism it has been only through the impact of an external factor that the politics of multiculturalism has made itself felt at political and legal levels. Hence the identity groups have made use of both these domestic conditions and the EU mechanism in their own way of the politics of multiculturalism. The discourses of democracy, human rights, minority rights, freedom of religion and belief have constituted the basis of such politics. It is because of this fact that the descriptions of the related articles within the constitution and other legislations and of the recent legal and political amendments made in the process of the accession to the EU are included within the study.

The claims in the name of the multiculturalism and other identity issues have had their reflections in the debates of some liberal intellectuals and writers. Although the question of multiculturalism is not their concern it constitutes an indispensable part of their criticisms against the authoritarian and undemocratic state structure, its assimilatory logic, and the political role of the army. More specifically in Turkey under the official ideology and its basic premises the existing notions of the nation and citizenship are conceived as defined on ethnic basis. In this respect a similarity may be established with those critiques within the European context in that related to the debates on the idea of citizenship it is asserted that it is not possible to talk about state neutrality or impartiality of public institutions vis-à-vis different cultural identities since these institutions are conditioned by the values of majority or dominant culture. In Turkey, too, it is claimed that all the political practices and the public institutions are designed in terms of Turkish identity defined in ethnic terms and that the state does not preserve an equal standing or distance to the other ethnic,

cultural and religious identities. In a sense it is due to such assumption that, for instance, the Kurds want to enjoy linguistic and educational rights as a distinct group right, demand political recognition of their identities.

In addition to the question of the prevalence of culturalist understanding starting from the establishment of the Turkish Republic the state elites, civil and military bureaucracy have assumed the role of the transformation of the society in the light of the universal goals of secularization, modernization and westernization. These ideals have been underlined as essential in order to eliminate the "backward" and "traditional" forms of the social relations so the state has presented itself as the pioneer of progress and development. Therefore the official ideology of the state, Kemalism, is defined by the intellectuals and Islamic writers as one characterized by both cultural homogenization and the laicist sense of secularism. As is explained in the successive sections, for those liberal and Islamic intellectual circles these authoritarian tendencies damage the plural and multicultural structure of the society and prevent the formation of a democratic political structure and consciousness. At the end the European liberal democracies are presented as ideal models in which the state exists as a neutral arbiter and technical agent for the preservation of the democratic multicultural society.

Under these historical and political circumstances we can evaluate the main implications of the politics of multiculturalism in Turkey. As was implied before, the recognition of distinct identities and ways of life, enjoyment of the cultural rights, a more integrative understanding of the idea of citizenship constitute the general themes around which the issue of multiculturalism is taken into account. It can be argued that the wish for integration without assimilation lies behind all these claims in order to ensure equal terms of joining the larger society. If we take the political structure of Turkey into account it seems that there is almost little chance for the groups in question to raise their voices other than the identity politics which is pursued with reference to the universalistic values of human rights and to the democracy. Given this situation the conceptual distinction between the universalism and particularism is meaningful within the Turkish context too, but on a different ground. In other words in the discourses of the identity groups the universalism and particularism are not mutually exclusive categories instead they are interdependent in the sense that the groups in question raise their particular claims and stress their

particularities in terms of the universal principles and in the name of the equal terms of standing within the society. Therefore, as will be accepted, in order to find a common ground with the rest of the society the communities have to avoid overemphasis on their particularities, which may be self-defeating. So rather than the existence of a dichotomy between universalism and particularism we can say that particularity is meaningful only within a universalistic framework. In addition to this, each community may have its own version of universalistic understanding.

However that kind of universalistic discourse focusing on the human rights has some implications in the non-European contexts like Turkey. Even though the claim for the cultural rights, recognition, promotion and preservation of distinct cultural identities and ways of life are located within the general framework of the human rights and freedom of religion, these demands are not about the rights and freedoms of the individual as an ontological universal category but about a particular conception of the individual belonging to a specific community or culture. In other words, the claims in question are asserted not as the rights enjoyed as an individual instead they are raised on the basis of collective characteristics like religion, ethnicity, language, culture that differentiate one community from the other. Therefore it can be suggested that freedom to use mother languages in educational sphere and in broadcasting and to wear "turban" are the group right claims of the social identity groups for whom the enjoyment of these freedoms makes sense only within the public realm.

On the other hand, these debates on the rights and the basis of these rights give way to another theme in the issue of multiculturalism that is the question of the citizenship and its scope since the social claims for the group rights which rest on the group difference are declared with respect to the citizenship rights. As has been noted before, the notion of citizenship as a membership status to the society has become an instrument of exclusion and closure in Turkey because of the culturalist understanding of the nation. In order to overcome this deficiency the notion of the constitutional citizenship (Aydın, 2000: 97, Keyder, 1997:46 and Mahçupyan, 1997) has been introduced by the identity groups, the intellectuals, the human right organizations in order to integrate those excluded and oppressed ethnic and religious communities without denying their distinct cultures, languages, and identities. Under this conception it is assumed that the citizenship rights and freedoms will be

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preserved and put into practice both at individual and group level. In other words, as one writer asserts this definition of citizenship is based upon political liberalism and genuine secularism and it can be realized by means of a legal and administrative order and of a public sphere in which cultural, religious or ethnic identities can be expressed (Keyder, 1997:48).

Turkey as a developing country and with an ambiguous position within the process of European integration constitutes a specific context for the politics of multiculturalism with its own political, historical and economic dynamics. In such a context the modernity has been mainly identified with westernization, economic development, progress and the state has acted as the pioneer in order to carry out political and social transformation necessary for the capitalist development without a corresponding incentive or dynamic coming from the social forces. For that reason, even after the 1980's when the liberalism was accepted as one of the principles of the government the notion was taken in isolation from its normative, philosophical premises and equated to the market mechanism and economic liberalization. As a result when in the 1990's new social actors including ethnic and religious identity groups emerged as forces questioning the state ideology and the regime they have been attributed an important role for the realization of the social change. The politicization of the groups on the basis of the identity concerns, their struggle for the consolidation of multicultural values has been evaluated by the various actors, who have criticized the anti-liberal and anti-democratic political structure as the potential basis of the development of civil society-led democratization and formation of a plural society. Even it has been claimed that dynamics of change and transformation have shifted from state to society or that the state- led modernization has been replaced by the society based change (Göle, 2000: 433). It is because of these factors that in Turkey the politics of multiculturalism is almost identified with democratization and development of civil society therefore use of the discourses of the democracy, human rights, plurality by the Kurds and the moderate political Islam as the main framework of their politics is quite meaningful.

In Turkey, the main actors of the politics of multiculturalism and identity politics are neither the minorities nor the immigrants but these people who were already integrated to the society and regarded as the member of the political community as citizens on a basis as has been determined by the state and the official

ideology. In this sense it is a different context. In spite of such divergence these social actors ask for a new basis of integration under which they will be able to preserve their ways of life and cultures without assimilation to the dominant culture. In a sense they use the basic premises of the multiculturalism as the minorities and immigrants in Europe do. If we take the state's strict policies employed for the suppression of the cultural and ethnic identities and the state's official ideology shaped by this assimilatory logic into consideration the politics of multiculturalism and demands declared around such politics should be attached a positive meaning. From a normative point of view the expression of one's cultural identity through use of her/his mother tongue or another way is quite humanistic and it is even not meaningful to make any discussions about them yet in Turkey people belonging to distinct cultures, ethnic origins have been long denied the enjoyment of these freedoms. Further, the recognition of cultural rights may function as a progressive dynamic for the enhancement of democratic rights and freedoms only if they are properly enforced.

On the other hand, the evaluation of multiculturalism only with reference to its positive implications and to attach it a progressive role as the force of the social change may be a bit problematic. The problem is not related to the normative premises of the multiculturalism but to how the multiculturalism or identity politics is situated within the politics and power relations since the mere identification of the claims in the name of multiculturalism with democratization may be illusionary. Thereupon it may be helpful to take them into account in relation to the political dynamics affecting the political and social structure. After all, being the pioneer of the social change or transformation requires the political power or ability to organize the society around the demand that you formulate and this can be accomplished if a political actor is able to respond the needs of the masses and to socialize its politics. However irrespective of the discourses of the democracy and human rights that the groups use, they fight for their own political interests and concerns not for the general interests of the society. This is a general weakness of the identity politics and has its own reflections in Turkey, too. In addition to this, even if the multicultural politics of the Kurdish movement presents a holistic project around, let's say, the democratization of the country or the promotion of the plural structure the movement

would face serious impediments in carrying out these objectives without the influence of an external pressure like EU.

Moreover, in Turkey there is no such a case for the systematic formulation and enforcement of the policies of multiculturalism so we can only analyse the possible implications of the politics of multiculturalism with respect to the discussions developed at discursive level. If we take the politics of multiculturalism into account not only in terms of its normative premises both also of the conjuncture which has given way to the identity concerns in Turkey more serious political consequences can be mentioned. As was noted, the politics of multiculturalism and identity politics have come into political agenda by the mid-1990's when the state agents under the political leadership of the military were motivated to overcome the crises within the political establishment. These were also accompanied with the failure to represent the adversarial social forces and actors within the system. Therefore a strategic step in this crises management has been the revision and the restoration of the main institutions of the system, i.e., to increase the representational capacity of the liberal democracy in order for the integration of the groups in question. In this respect it might be argued that similar to the situation in Europe the multiculturalism debates follow the crises conditions of the bourgeois democracy yet unlike the European experiences the Turkish state has not advocated the multicultural policies instead it initially preferred to suppress these forces harshly. In France or in Britain the minorities and the immigrants have fought for the recognition of their cultural identities for equal and just terms of integration to society, the representation of their interests within the political realm, end of the assimilatory measures, equal job opportunities and better living standards. At the end they questioned the limits and the representation capacity of the liberal democracies. This challenge has also displayed its influence among many theorists and intellectuals some of whom have adopted more critical perspective regarding the liberal individualism or liberal understanding of citizenship. In Turkey the economy has been designed according to the logic of the market and for the interests of the capital yet the political establishment is not democratic enough in the liberal sense though this has also for a long time served to the interests of the capital. For that reason, the main concern of the intellectuals, the civil society associations, who speak in favour of a multicultural and plural society within which the different ethnic groups and the social identities

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coexist on the basis of harmonious relationship, is to make the structure more democratic. And in their thinking this can be accomplished by ensuring the incorporation and the representation of these different communities within the system without repressing their identities and forcing them to assimilate to the dominant culture. The same tendency prevails also among the identity groups in the sense that they establish an organic connection between the multiculturalism and the question of democratization, that is, the most vulnerable problem of the establishment in the process of the accession to the European Union.

Nevertheless, the debates on multiculturalism are part of the politics so if we perceive the politics not just in terms of its conflict resolution capacity but of its transformative functions it may be asked to what extent the politics of multiculturalism can be successful. From the beginning it may be suggested that the meaning attached to the politics is confined to its former function, which is the crisis management, achievement of stability, prevention of the conflicts through consensus and all those require the elimination of the oppositional and adversarial dynamics from the system. Because the state draws the boundaries of the politics on the basis of such understanding from this perspective the politics of multiculturalism can be successful through moderating the voices of the identity groups in question and accomplishing their representation within and integration to the system. So long as the boundaries of the politics of multiculturalism are determined and its influence is controlled the state agents and the political parties may also give reference to the relevant discourses and even manipulate them. Such possibility by no means comes to mean the neglect of the positive outcome of the multicultural politics as a means for the ethnic groups and religious communities to express and improve their cultures, to enjoy cultural rights and freedoms while avoiding the culturalist and relativist tendencies. This will without doubt enhance the democratization and the human rights standards in Turkey.

Both in Turkey and in Europe these debates have gone hand in hand with the decrease in the influence of the class politics, which has the potential of the use of the politics as a means of social and economic transformation and the capture of the political power. The politics of multiculturalism in its nature cannot lead transformation or social change but might contribute to such project. Yet in this conjuncture the rhetoric on plurality and multiculturalism serves both

homogenization and illusionary divisions within the society and the supervision of every possible radical voice. In the name of stability and harmonious coexistence the identity groups in particular and whole society is almost forced to enter a dialogue, avoid extreme claims and to find a common ground and consensus. Furthermore, those waging struggle for the cultural rights and cultural justice ignore the fact that it is the economic and social rights that constitute the material basis of civil, political, and cultural rights, and that they are to a great extent prevented from enjoying the benefits of these material rights.

Today, for the proponents of the politics of multiculturalism the European context presents the ideal standards of the related policies and measures that Turkey has to adapt itself. As has been briefly mentioned, compared to Turkey European liberal societies have a better functioning democratic orders within which the multicultural policies are implemented, the immigrants and the minorities make use of several benefits and are able to maintain and promote their cultural rights. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the political and economic conditions and dynamics that produced the multiculturalism are specific to the European context. On the other hand, what is called, European democratic framework is not immune to the serious criticisms because in such an environment the racist thinking and discriminatory practices can find mass support base within the society. And over the years it has been stated that policies of multiculturalism has gradually confined the communities and the immigrants to the cultural sphere where they are assisted to enjoy freedoms and rights. But they are the victims of the unemployment, they work in severe conditions with lower wages and their living standards are also low compared to the rest of the population. On this basis it might be restated that without necessary material basis the mere cultural justice does not make sense. Rather this perpetuates the culturalist tendency for the single cultures by closing themselves to interaction and change and they adopt self-defensive attitudes. However it is obvious that the self-defensive position against discrimination, economic marginalisation only leads to ethnic nationalism and fundamentalism. From this point of view, in Europe multiculturalism serves two purposes, i.e., it has protected the cultural groups from the threat of assimilation by means of the formulation of specific measures and the relevant discourses have created the danger of homogenizing the communities due to the overstress on the differences and divisions among them.

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Such dual role that the politics of multiculturalism play both in Europe and Turkey requires us to preserve a critical perspective about the relevant debates in the sense that though the concept has no progressive force in itself this should not result in the abandonment of it altogether. In other words, the politics of multiculturalism would have no taken for granted political, social, economic or ideological objectives and projects. It may well serve to a racist project as it may serve to an emancipatory struggle. So the critical point is about how it is situated within the general politics and the power relations and also the meaning that the social and political actors attribute to it in their struggles.

1.3. Methodology

This study is going to be carried out the by means of both theoretical explanations of a certain literature and of an empirical analysis. First of all, in order to evaluate the debates on the notion of multiculturalism and the related concerns associated with it like those on citizenship, the politics of identity or the politics of recognition and difference, it is of great necessity to see how they are given notice both theoretically and politically in the academic studies developed especially with reference to the Western liberal democracies. This would also enable one to determine the differences and similarities in the perception of the concept, and to observe the different levels of the experiences in Turkey and abroad. In accordance with this point a critical examination of the prevalent literature upon the notion will be useful in demonstrating the limits and drawbacks of the politics of multiculturalism, and to reach conclusions that may contribute to the evaluation of the issue in Turkey.

On the other hand, the problem of this study will be examined on the basis of the case study i.e. in-depth interviews with the actors concerned with the question of multiculturalism. This is because the existing literature in Turkey is so limited that it is almost impossible to derive explanatory insights about the problem. Further the politics of multiculturalism itself is an empirical subject requiring analysis according to the different contexts and to the changing circumstances. In this study the chosen type of the interview is the qualitative interviewing. The objective of this thesis is to reach explanatory information about a problem, which has been insufficiently tackled

with so far hence; the qualitative interviewing may offer an opportunity for further analysis, and to uncover unknown dimensions of the subject in that this kind of survey is quite flexible, iterative and continuous. The interview can be made in the form of conversation, and it can continue smoothly and naturally. Moreover, though there are particular questions directed to the respondents, there is a general framework of the interview aiming at revealing notes on a specific problem. The boundaries of both the questions and the direction of the interview are not strictly drawn. Indeed, in the course of the interview new questions may emerge, the interviewer may face the new aspects about the subject on the basis of the responses of the respondents. Therefore the qualitative interviewing does not proceed mechanically, namely, through asking questions and recording the answers instead it necessitates the ability to interpret the answers and to raise the new questions in the light of the replies (Babbie, 2000: 291-292).

In this respect, as was noted before, the responses in the interview will be assumed to reflect the perspectives of candidates and holders of the political authority and the civil society organisations. There are six particular questions in the interview but they are not strictly defined and open to further revision according to the answers of the participants. Moreover, there is one particular problematic which will be examined together with its pre determined aspects yet it is probable that in the course of the survey new dimensions may be underlined by the respondents, and without doubt this will further contribute to the understanding of the problematic.

In addition to the critical analysis of the relevant literature and qualitative interviewing, the study will also be conducted through the description of the political and legal norms, regulations and the articles directly or indirectly related to the cultural rights. This will include the descriptive survey of the international and regional conventions, documents, and recent legal amendments, regulations in the Turkish Constitution and the other legislation. Because the endeavors of making the cultural rights as part of universal rights and freedoms may serve the emergence of binding norms and rules, this survey may expose the significance of these attempts. The same point can also be extended to those legal reforms in Turkey in that they are attached a considerable importance in confronting the problem of multiculturalism in Turkey, and that the smooth proceeding of this legal and political reform process constitutes one of the most vital elements for the future of Turkey-EU relationships.

Therefore the description of this trend in Turkey would help us to determine the progress that Turkey has made in revising its human rights practices in conformity with the international standards.

CHAPTER II

THE RISE OF MULTICULTURALISM

2.1 The Appeal of Multiculturalism in Western Liberal Democracies

Within the Western societies from the 1970's onwards, with respect to the debates concerning the legal, political and social positions of minorities, ethnic and religious groups, migrants, the significance of cultural differences, diversity, national identity, racism etc. the notion of multiculturalism has been the main reference point. In fact, the concept has been attributed a very inclusive meaning in that, every issue related to the functioning of the liberal democracies has been discussed under the label of or in connection with the concept of multiculturalism both in academic discourses and in everyday politics.

In this regard, it is almost impossible to talk about an agreed definition of the concept. Within the liberal camp, some scholars take the concept as the main reference point in describing an ideal model in which the coexistence of culturally distinct groups are guaranteed through specific measures, that is, a multiculturalist model of society. This normative model is assumed to enhance the functioning of the liberal state, but for some this understanding of multiculturalism which aims at perpetuating and emphasizing differences (ethnic, religious or cultural) may undermine some of the main tenets of liberal state, that is, universalism, emphasis on distinct nationhood or the concept of citizenship. Those taking more critical attitude have connected the debates to the political or economic context or dynamics, and underlined different and contrasting aspects of the notion. Indeed over the years not only discussions have been intense but also depending on the changing context and shifting dynamics the concept has gained new forms, which may even be regressive and reactionary. This is because issues discussed within the framework of the

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concept cannot be confined to the realm of normative theory in the sense that the issues like ethnic relations, the social and political activities of the minorities, and almost every kind of mobilization shaped by emphasizes on differences have already been part of the political power relations, hence together with the shifts in these relations the issues noted above may be accompanied with new dimensions.

However ambivalent character of the concept as observed within the existing political and theoretical debates and studies should not lead us to conclude that everything is imprecise. In contrast new migration movements, increasing waves of asylum seekers and refugees, new forms of racism, xenophobia and politicization of ethnic relations, rising demands for the cultural, political, civil rights are quite concrete realities which are evaluated by some as a challenge within the liberal societies against classical understanding of citizenship, nationhood and rights in the 1990's and in the new century. As has been implied above, all these issues have almost constituted central subject of the studies in academic realm as is seen in the rise of more systematic, cross-national empirical comparative researches and of philosophical and theoretical studies.

While underlying the controversial nature of the notion of the multiculturalism Christian Joppke states the three dimensions of the phenomenon as:

> Multiculturalism as a challenge to the premier cultural community of the modern world; second, multiculturalism as a quest for recognition and compensatory treatment of the historically disadvantaged and discriminated groups in society; and third multiculturalism as a generalized form of anti-colonial discourse and struggle (Joppke, 1996: 450).

According to Joppke, nation state can no longer control and homogenize "its" population since multiple cultures coexist within a state bounded territory. Furthermore multiculturalism is taken mostly in connection with the minority groups (national, migration-based or non-homeland minorities like American blacks) who are historically disadvantaged or oppressed and who raise demand in the name of a distinct group.

Such an understanding of multiculturalism fits in to the political and economic conditions following the 1980's and 1990's which have been characterized by globalization of the capital, financial liberalization, deregulation, the rhetoric on minimal state as a regulator of social interests, deindustrialisation and discourse on

separation of nation from the state. Such economic and political shifts have been mostly seen as success of capital, i.e., a success that has been achieved with high costs and destructive effects and produced uncertainties in political and economic realms, and a feeling of insecurity in social sphere. Therefore some scholars assert that these conditions are accompanied with a kind of crises of identity and culture in which people come to believe that their culture and identities have been threatened as result of the destabilization of homogenous national cultures (Castles, 2000).

However, today what is called multicultural practices, policies and strategies have emerged in particular historical environment and objective conditions which were different from the context stated above. This was the period after the World War II (WW II) in which strong economies employed the immigrants as workforce and in which welfare state and associated political, economic and social stability constituted the social basis of much of the western multiculturalism aiming at coping with the increasing ethnic and racial diversity in the 1970's. This initial perception of the concept was much more strategic as a kind of tool or model for the containment of the immigrants. Furthermore, as long as there was economic prosperity contributing to the well-being of all within a particular state and main cleavages within these capitalist societies were defined in terms of capital-labour conflict, quite positive and progressive meanings were attached to the notion.

Now it is too difficult to evaluate the multiculturalism with respect to the normative values of bad and good due to context dependent nature of the notion. In accordance with the adoption of neo-liberal policies in today's capitalist states there have been parallel shifts in the discourses about main divisions within these societies along with the ethnic, religious, cultural, racial and gender relations which have been added to those of class-based divisions and differences. In contemporary political and academic tendencies class is no longer perceived as a system of economic power and domination but one of the identities stated above. And all these identities and differences, which are blurred and intermingled with each other, now come to be dealt with under the heading of the identity politics and the politics of difference.

However in order to understand controversial and continuous debates on multiculturalism it is necessary to look at the conditions of post-war period that produced the roots of today's discourses.

2.2. Post-War Immigration and the Welfare State

It is widely accepted that the pattern of migration and settlement has been a crucial factor in the economic, political and cultural transformation in the developed world (Western Europe, North America and Australia) and contributed to the revision of their main policies and institutional structures   since the WWII. Even for some countries, from the time of the beginning of nation-state building in the 18th century, immigrants have been one of the components of this project. It is the driving force of the immigrants, who have become influential political actors pursuing interests within the framework of national politics that many of the issues related to the multiculturalism, citizenship, sovereignty and nation-state have been connected to the socio-economic and political realities of immigration process under the area of study of immigration politics.

Currently, almost all developed countries have large immigrant population and increasing levels of ethno-cultural diversity, making up 5 percent, even much more of the whole population. Furthermore, the direction of the migration movement process has changed too, in the sense that there is no longer one-way transcontinental migration since new labour reserve areas have emerged. The countries previously known as the emigration states which were the main source for migrant labour in the 1960's such as Italy, Portugal are now subject to illegal population movements from the Middle East and African continent. Moreover after the dissolution of the socialist regimes in the Eastern Europe, a shift to market economy has brought about economic difficulties that were   severely decreased the quality of living standards in these societies. Consequently, together with the rapid increase in international population mobility, millions of people immigrate across national borders, many only temporarily. And this gives way to the formation of distinct ethnic communities. Moreover this resulted in important socio-economic changes.

All these discussions gradually started with the rapid growth of international migration after 1945. This was the beginning of emergence of welfare states in the Western societies that were characterised by relative economic prosperity in terms of economic growth, low level of unemployment, a general financial stability under Keynesian model and the Bretton Woods monetary system.

Actually the lack of the serious competition from the rest of the world and financial and technological dominance made such a situation possible. However, after the war in the face of shortages of the labour for large scale production necessary for continuous economic growth and expansion the recruitment of labour from the less developed regions seemed an easy solution for industrial economies (Castles, 2000: 6-7). This was followed by the formation of open immigration policies and mass immigration programs that continued until the early 1970's. Within this process historical conditions of the countries determined the form of labour recruitment and the immigration policies. Those countries which have colonial history, such as Britain, France and The Netherlands turned to former colonies and less-developed places including Ireland, Caribbean, Indian Sub continent, East Africa, Mediterranean, Portugal, Maghreb, distant overseas departments in Africa, Indonesia, Surinam, Antilles, Morocco. For countries, which have no such a past like Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium migrants from Mediterranean region, the Southern Europe and Turkey secured necessary work force (Rex, 1996: 117). Unlike the first group of the countries which, through former political and colonial links, were able to import unskilled labour easily without any special regime, the later group of states developed recruitment regimes that allowed immigration on some conditions related to the time period of the stay (Castles, 2000: 8). These foreign workers mostly worked in heavy industry and manufacturing, and concentrated in few urban regions. On the other hand for the founding nations of the New World (Australia, Canada, New Zealand), which also developed large-scale immigration programs, immigrants or migrant labour not only contributed to the growing industries but also were seen as settlers (especially in Australia) in order to increase the population size. **(1)**

As is known in the post-war years it was so vital to secure the loyalty of the working class conflict that many welfare state policies were enacted, i.e., policies introducing welfare benefits like free health and educational services, housing opportunities, income support, wide mechanisms of redistribution etc. In other words, maintaining political legitimacy and reproduction of labour power together with the values of solidarity and compassion became significant motivational forces. Emphasising the logic behind all of these policies Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson state that;

Social rights became an essential part of citizenship in the social Keynesian model that was so successful in the boom period of the capitalism from 1945 to the mid 1970's. Full employment in an expanding national economy was linked to a welfare state, which provided a safety net for those temporarily or permanently unable to work. Marshall's principle of the need for a minimum economic social standard to secure political participation was an expression of this model.... right to work, equality of opportunity (in education, in labour market) (Castles and Davidson, 2000: 110).

Clearly it cannot imply complete equality in a capitalist society, where inequality of wealth and income is seen necessary for economic efficiency. But it should be noted that despite the principle of the equality of opportunity, foreign workers were in a disadvantaged position in the sense that they occupied lower levels in labour markets, which is in some senses determined by ethnic origins. They enjoyed poor quality of housing, social facilities, educational services connected to the process of spatial segregation within the society (Castles and Davidson, 2000: 112).

As a result of the short sighted perspective that saw these people as temporary residents who would have returned in case of recession, these countries developed strategies specific to the immigrant groups. For instance in Germany under the guest worker system foreign workers were supported through special agencies financed by government funding. Under the policy of Funds d'Action Sociale, French government also aimed at answering special needs of foreign workers (Castles and Davidson, 2000: 113). But rather than ensuring equal opportunity these special regimes merely reinforced the distinct status of the groups and were far from preventing the differential and partial inclusion of these people to the social citizenship.

The demand for labour ceased with the economic crises and following recession that began in the early 1970's. **(2)** However by this time there had been 12 million immigrants including their families who joined to them. The issue of family reunions and emergence of the second generation showed the possibility of permanent settlement which was not expected by the governments and this went hand in hand with the enactments of laws in order to prevent further immigration. On the other hand the immigrants also felt the impact of the economic crises like the rest of the population. They had already been employed in lower skilled or semi-skilled

jobs, and their occupation in manufacturing industry declined. Further they had been gradually underrepresented in the industrial and service sectors. Because of this labour market segmentation (partial and differential inclusion to the labour market), their enjoyments of the benefits of social citizenship were restricted in comparison to the natives. **(3)** As is known, economic crises are always accompanied with a social crisis and the respected countries confronted the problem of coping with such huge amount of ethnically, culturally and racially diverse people outside the social institutions. It was these historical and objective circumstances that resulted in the policies or politics called multiculturalism, that is, a politics under which the governments of the western societies have attempted to respond to the demands of the groups in question by means of a number of political, social and cultural regulations within the system.

To sum up, starting from the post-war years the migrants played a considerable role in restructuring the economies of Western societies as a source of cheap labour. But the pragmatic evaluation of the immigration movement (as a temporary labour recruitment process) that ignored the real dynamics of the process itself caused the formation of new ethnic minorities and multi ethnic societies. But migration is a social fact and cannot be reduced to a mere economic variable. In this sense the emergence of the politics of multiculturalism and of the multicultural policies does not reflect the good intention of the Western governments, yet should be understood as a necessary strategy for the liberal states. **(4)**

2.3. Different Integration Strategies and the Debates on the Policies of Multiculturalism within the Western Europe

As is indicated, the welfare state was the social basis of much of the Western multiculturalism although the welfare state has already reached its limits, and understanding of the multiculturalism has gained new and complex dimensions. Initially, when the ethnic relations have started to be politicised in the 1970's in the face of the demands raised by immigrants (as new minorities) the main issue under the label of multiculturalism was the conflict between the logic of inclusion and exclusion, namely, the boundaries of the citizenship. And since the welfare state, as the social face of national state, was able to reduce its exclusionary logic due to

economic prosperity, there was a balance in the previous period. However when the first multicultural policies were developed in Britain in the form of regulations and political projects at both national and local level for the settlement of immigrants and refugees from its former colonies this trend was followed by other countries (USA, Canada and Australia) and by the rest of Western Europe in order to achieve political, social and cultural integration of the immigrants to the respective nation states (Koopmans and Statham, 2000a: 13). In other words the multiculturalism was to provide a framework within which immigrants would be able to participate in the national society.

As is known, in the period after the WWII the extent of the citizenship was extended in different ways, and the social rights (in the form of the social citizenship) were formulated in addition to the existing civil and political rights. The immigrants were also entitled to these rights, at least formally, and they enjoyed from these rights to a limited degree since they partially made use of political rights, (rights required to participate actively in democratic process of government, right to vote, right to be represented at various levels of government, freedom of assembly etc.) civil rights (the freedom of expression, freedom of religion, protection from unlawful acts by the state, equality before law, the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of gender, sexuality, race ,language, or belief) and social rights. This dialectic between exclusion and inclusion and more specifically concerns about the enjoyment of full citizenship both formally and in practical life are still important questions of multiculturalism. Vertovec stresses this point as follows;

> In the name of multiculturalism, Western societies have witnessed since the 1980's a proliferation of discourses concerning the general place of minorities, programs designed to foster equality, institutional structures created to provide better social services, and resources extended to ethnic minority organizations (Vertovec, 1996: 49).

Moreover, there is a parallel reflection in Joppke's argument;

> Multiculturalism, the seeking of equal rights and recognition for ethnic, racial, religious or sexually defined groups is one of the most pervasive and controversial intellectual and political movements in contemporary Western societies (Joppke, 1996: 449).

So far the notion of multiculturalism and the matters related to the immigration till the 1970's have been mentioned in a very general sense, yet as was noted before the dynamics behind these subjects are so complex and change according to circumstances and places that it is too difficult to reach general and fixed explanations. In this respect, what require attention are the variations in the ways that the Western societies responded to the immigration process as revealed in their different strategies of integration (incorporation) of the immigrant groups, ethnic and religious minorities.

There is a general agreement among the scholars and academics that various forms of integration strategies have been shaped by different historical circumstances, political and national/local cultures and by their pre-existing cultural foundations (Modoo, 1997: 5-7, Schiffauer, 1997: 147, 258, Kooopmans and Statham, 2000b: 195-196, Rex, 1996: 51, Joppke, 1996: 454). Indeed it is often indicated that the societies subject to similar process of immigration may adopt different policy approaches with respect to the immigrants. Further, these countries have defined the political status of these groups differently and enforced diverse multicultural policies at local and national level to regulate cultural and ethnic diversity. As Pnina Werbner underlines "multiculturalism is ultimately not a matter of theory, even cultural theory, but real politics, there are as many as multiculturalisms as there are political areas for collective action" (Werbner, 1997: 264). Such awareness is also revealed in the rise of the empirical historical and comparative case studies, which produce important data in grasping the contemporary debates.

In this respect the scholars use some typologies taking into consideration the dynamics within the incorporation process. First of all, how the countries label the migrants or perceive immigration process may be a crucial factor; that is; they may be regarded as immigrants, as foreigners or as ethnic and racial minorities. Secondly, the criterion of formal access to citizenship is also important in this sense. There are two types of criteria implying the well-known distinction between "jus soli" type of citizenship, where acquisition is a territorial birth right and "jus sanguinis" one, where access is conditioned by ethnic-cultural descent or relation of blood. **(5)** According to the former, all within a particular territory have the same

rights automatically or through naturalisation without any requirement. These types may also be called civic territorial and ethno cultural forms for attributing full citizenship (Entzinger, 2000: 101). There is another typology focusing mostly on cultural dimension of integration strategies. There are some distinctions under this typology made by various academics. For example Koopmans and Statham's approach includes ethno cultural exclusive, civic assimilationist and multicultural pluralist variations (Koopmans and Statham, 2000b: 196). Stephen Castles also makes a similar distinction among differential exclusion, assimilation and pluralism as basic models (Castles, 2000: 135). These typologies show the conditions under which the immigrants and minorities are granted full citizenship, and they are merely ideal models because the countries, which will be mentioned below, may develop policies that are mixture of these ideal types. But one point should be highlighted that is the multidimensional character of incorporation process and multicultural policies in general, which involve socio-economic, legal- political and the cultural fields. **(6)**

Within the Western Europe the multiculturalism experiences of France, Germany and Britain are given as proper examples of typologies stated above. In the European context assimilationist model is best represented by France that should be evaluated as part of its revolutionary and Republican political culture and tradition. As Brubaker states this tradition also shapes understanding of nationhood and citizenship, which are formed through political and cultural unity giving way to the cultural assimilation of minorities and immigrants (Brubaker, 1992: 1). A political culture characterised by a strong centralised state together with the ideal of great homogenous nation has refused the recognition of separate existence of ethnic and cultural identities of the immigrants in the public sphere and expected assimilation to French polity. This understanding continued during the colonial period and its colonial domination over the overseas departments rested on the centralised and uniform structures and resembled metropolitan France's own polity (Koopmans and Statham, 2000a: 25). So when the immigration wave started after the WWII, these people coming from ex-colonies were recognised as immigrants and were given the status of citizenship easily and granted all the rights enjoyed by the natives. In French case under jus soli model the immigrants have been seen as merely individuals therefore a kind of individual relationship between the citizens and the state without any intermediary has dominated. In accordance with this, socialisation

into the polity through educational policies has been rationalised in order to achieve the equality of opportunity (Melotti, 1997: 82). As is known, in 1989, the Muslim girls were forbidden to wear head carves since these materials were seen as symbols of religion which should be strictly confined to the private sphere. However over the years, both as a result of the arrival of new immigrants and of politicisation of existing ethno-cultural minorities, and together with the criticism of jus soli criteria of citizenship by the extreme right in favour of jus sanguinis one, the legitimacy of assimilationist model has been gradually undermined. **(7)**

While having shared a colonial past with France, British case represents a different integration experience shaped by distinctive historical conditions and political culture, which are the legacy of empire and Britain's devolution from multiracial empire to ethnic nation state (Joppke, 1996: 476). **(8)** Unlike France a system of indirect rule by way of the intermediary formations, autonomy, a flexible decentralised structure, reliance on local administration have characterised British tradition. Until the Commonwealth Immigration Control Act of 1962 Britain's ex-colonial subjects, mostly the non-white immigrants, were granted citizenship status with legal and political rights and they were also able to create their own communities **(9).** However together with the economic problems and the rising levels of immigration, place of birth and British ancestry gradually determined the right to citizenship. Then the shift from The Commonwealth subject ship to national citizenship was reinforced by British National Act of 1981 (Joppke, 1996: 477). Moreover British model like that of French one recognises immigrants as member of the society but not according to the individually defined citizenship category rather on the basis of their ethnic or national origins. In this sense differences among them have been tolerated and even the immigrants have been assisted to preserve their traditions. But such a regulation determining the conditions for membership to the community by making references to the ethnic and racial categories (Britain's ex colonies like Caribbean included mostly non-white habitants and there were Asian Indians) have worsened the positions of immigrants by overemphasising the differences. Indeed one of the outcomes of this policy is rise in the trend of racial discrimination within the British society.

Today within the European context Germany is the country with the highest number of the foreign migrants from former Yugoslavia, Turkey, Italy,

Greece, and Poland constituting 8.8 percent of total population (Koopmans and Statham, 2000b: 198). However despite all the attempts of the left and the Green Party these people still face serious trouble in the matters involving easy access to citizenship parallel to the jus soli criteria, double citizenship, right to participate in communal elections despite the fact that some moderate regulations have been designed in the 1990's with regard to the right to residence and family reunion, and that through an amendment in its legislation in 2000 the ethnic conception of nationhood was liberalised.

Having a distinct history of nation state formation, in Germany belonging to the nation was always considered in terms of ethno cultural terms linked to the descent and blood. Due to this historical reality, Germany is given an ideal example of jus sanguinis criteria of citizenship, which has been restrictive against the non-Germans. This criterion was quite favorable since descent created a more substantial community than the accidental fact of birthplace (Brubaker, 1992: 119-128). **(10)** Adopting the ethno cultural model Germany after WWII welcomed the immigrants who were needed in order to sustain economic expansion and postwar economic reconstruction but the government did not recognise them as immigrants but as foreigners (auslander) who were expected to return their homelands. In this sense under the model of guest worker the new comers were denied political rights as citizens and politically excluded. On the other hand they were part of the labour market yet the system did not attempt to integrate them through naturalisation at permanent basis instead they were supported financially. Even in the primary education they were supported to preserve their cultures, languages, and to retain their links with their homelands. (Switzerland and Austria have had similar policies with respect to the ethnic groups). In successive years Germany tried to take measures to restrict the entry of the new comers because permanent nature of the immigration became obvious. Furthermore the arrival of the illegal immigrants, the wave of the refugees from Eastern Europe in the 1980's, German unification and the flow of ethnic immigrants (aussiedle) from Russia worsened the situation. Not only have these factors contributed to the further social marginalisation of the groups but also exposed them to the racist attacks.

To summarise, initially seen as a cheap source of labour force for economic expansion, the existence of the immigrants then has turned into an

unanticipated social problem, which has had considerable consequences for the future of the European politics. The experiences of three countries stated briefly above demonstrate the dynamic nature of the integration process and the logic of the policies associated with it is called as multicultural policies in general. There are differences among the countries in terms of their understanding of the notions of nationhood, citizenship in the sense that their distinct histories and political cultures determine the evaluation of the matter and the nature of the policies, and this explains the variations in the formulation of the policies. This is one determinant of the incorporation strategies and the other dynamics are the economic, social and political circumstances and context within which immigration takes place. As seen at a time of economic prosperity and expansion the governments were usually receptive towards the immigrants   and tolerated them even though the political authorities have never enabled them to make use of the full economic and political rights. Yet during the recession periods they tend to adopt restrictive immigration legislations and hesitant attitudes against the groups.

In addition to these, multicultural policies have multidimensional character as reflected in socio-economic, legal-political and cultural domains. In other words countries may prefer to integrate the non- natives through any one of the dimension. Each   policy preference has its own benefits and disadvantages with respect to the groups. As a result of the political and legal integration (granting political and formal citizenship) the minorities may gain formal rights and entitlements yet this does not ensure the social and economic equality and prevent their informal exclusion from the mainstream as the British and French cases demonstrate. Bare social, economic and cultural integration strategies may potentially cause exclusion in the absence of political rights. The German case shows how the denial of the political rights obscures the political participation of the ethno-cultural minorities in pursuing their causes. For that reason it is widely argued that an ideal liberal –democratic and multiculturalist society should both be able to recognise cultural diversity and develop the conditions of equality. Otherwise exclusion because of lack of formal political and civil rights and of unemployment, poverty or racism will persist (Castles and Davidson, 2000: 127, Rex, 2000: 59-60).

On this basis, it can be said that understanding of multiculturalism differs across the Western societies. **(11)** For instance, British government from the

beginning has treated the immigrants as racial and cultural minorities without any policy of assimilation. Establishment of the migrant organisations and political participation has been facilitated. Provision of social services and public education has been extended to the use of the minorities. What is interesting in Britain's context is that the first multicultural policies were formed to deal with relations between the races. They were officially aimed at reducing racial discrimination and achieving equal opportunity for ethnic minorities. **(12)** Then, starting from the year of 1965 eighty Race Relations Act were enforced until 1991 and this trend is called as race relations industry (Joppke, 1996: 480-481). These policies have affected the demands and the claims of the groups too. With respect to the black population, race and culture have meant a particular category for the claim making. However such an overemphasis on racial ethnic and religious differences and conceiving the individuals firstly as members of particular groups under the rhetoric that Britain is multiracial and culturally diverse society only result with exclusion, and may justify inferior treatment, manipulation and inequality (Rex, 1996: 120). In other words there is the danger of the reproduction of the differences. Like Britain, Germany has recognised the ethno cultural differences of the minorities. On the other hand due to the narrowly defined conception of German citizenship and of exclusionary logic behind it, the issue of multiculturalism in Germany is about national identity and the meaning of the Germanness. In French case or in assimilationist model in general, the question of multiculturalism results from the denial of recognition of ethnic and cultural identities within the public domain while underlying the political rights of all individuals in the name of the equal citizenship.

Of course all these national strategies should be considered together with the demands for multicultural rights. Initially emergence of large numbers of the politicized immigrants and minorities opened the way for the claims for the rights. Then the respective policy responses of the countries ranging from naturalisation policies, the revision of the citizenship criteria to the development of the social benefits or residence laws, have conditioned the nature of the group mobilization. Today in the light of their relations with the political system these groups try to manipulate all the political opportunities. In French context due to the non-recognition of the existences of the different identities, demands are concentrated on equality and anti racism concerns. In Britain the groups while defining themselves as

racial, ethnic and religious communities have risen demands for fair terms of integration, equal opportunity, civil and social rights (the blacks mostly lay emphasis on these rights) claims for group specific cultural rights, and the Muslim community insisted on enhancement of religious equality which is claimed to be absent in Britain's context. In Germany until recently the claims regarding acknowledgment of the cultural identities and special group rights have been limited since the communities mainly have been interested in the homeland issues. However in successive years they increasingly have taken account of the troubles that they face and of their problematic status in Germany so the question of political rights has become one of the central issues (Koopmans and Statham, 2000b: 222).

After all, it can be concluded that regardless of the policy variations across the societies the multicultural policies have produced similar negative results with respect to the social positions of the minorities because there is a gap between the objectives set and their actualisation. This, in some sense, means that the countries are not able to respond to the needs of the groups adequately and properly. Due to this inability, the problems of the position of the immigrants and minorities, and ethnic relations in general have been disputed matters of the European politics. Today most of the scholars regard these matters as challenge to the classical understanding of the nation state, the citizenship. So both in everyday politics and theoretical and philosophical debates the nature and the limits of the liberal democratic state have been put under scrutiny with reference to the problems of distinction between individual and group rights, the perception of the notion of the citizenship and in the light of the meanings attributed to the ideal of multiculturalist society.

2.4. The Politics of Multiculturalism

It goes without saying that all the debates made in the name of multiculturalism are carried out in terms of the limits, values and the norms of the liberal constitutional state. As is known the liberal constitutional state is characterised by its adherence to the universalism, moral superiority attached to the individual over community, the notion of unified and undifferentiated citizenship, impartial standing vis a vis different, conflicting interests (public neutrality). Thus, at

normative level, many questions are dealt with respect to the individual; namely, the communities or the groups matter to the extent of their contribution to the individual life since "they are merely the associations of individuals" (Kukathas, 1995: 233-236). Universal character of the public sphere indicates the necessity of separation between the political standing of the individual and their distinctive identities towards which liberal state stands neutral. This universality becomes concrete in a homogenous nation state reflecting the coincidence between the nation and state. This model as evolved over centuries has been shaped through the development of common political culture, common language and an idea of citizenship in which the members of the political community share the belief of the communality of their fate and recognition of equal liberties and put their commitments to this idea over the various distinct interests. Therefore the members are assumed to have equal political rights in the political sphere (Offe, 1998: 4). Because of this, the liberal state has to be neutral and even indifferent to communal interests by standing above them.

However, as has been repeated several times in this study, those who underline the disability of the liberal state to confront the cultural heterogeneity and to meet the desires of the minorities and immigrants for justice and equality have questioned these assumptions. Therein the critics of the liberal theory purport that universalistic rhetoric reflects the Euro centric, rational and instrumentalist thinking, which tends to neglect all the cultural differences and want the members of the communities to assimilate themselves to the majority culture. Moreover they argue that the lack of respect represses and harms the survival of distinct cultures as experienced in imperialism and colonialism, which are part of the universalistic rhetoric too (Joppke and Lukes, 1999: 6). **(13)**

For a long time liberal academics and scholars have drawn their attention to the claims of the minorities within the boundaries of the concept of justice and of the realisation of the human rights. Any argument around the notion of justice, in their view, necessitates a difference- blind state towards racial and ethnic differences, and it will be the intervention to the community matters that would create injustice by undermining the principles of equal treatment and of enjoyment of the political rights and indiscriminate access to educational and economic opportunities by equal individuals as members of the political community.

Another trouble in intervening the private affairs of the groups within the framework of the public sphere and the formation of the policies accordingly may have a disturbing effect that may undermine, for instance, the collective memory or cause secession or weaken both the unifying values that hold political community together and civic republican loyalties and commitments (Offe, 1998: 14).

Whereas, now, most of these critics have come to accept the challenge of the political and cultural rights requests of the minorities and the other groups. For example, after the WWII there was a belief that the framework of international human rights would have been so extensive that it is possible to tackle with the minority claims through guaranteeing fundamental civil, social, economic and political rights to all individuals without any reference to the group membership. This idea also regarded the differences (cultural, ethnic) as private matter therefore any direct attempt to protect minorities by the means of granting special rights to these groups were avoided. However in the light of the injustices that groups face in the political process, working conditions, job opportunities, the limits of these formal international human rights standards would be obvious. Given this fact, according to some scholars, preservation and recognition of the minority cultures and their achievements enrich and strengthen democracy in that they may be value in themselves, they may be value to whole society, their preservation will be a moral and emotional support since the individuals need solidarity and a sense of belonging (Rex, 2000: 61 and 1996: 57). Similarly it may be asserted that community or group membership offers its members meaningful choices and feeling of collective identity, which may be vital for their well being. Otherwise a feeling of alienation and exclusion seems to be the case.

On the other hand at more practical and political level the scholars have attempted to answer several questions like how the minority claims affect the tenets of the liberal state and can be accommodated within the liberal democracies, or how far states should go in their recognition and support of cultural pluralism, or how to balance particular identities with universal requirements of citizenship. And the themes of individual versus group or collective rights and of the boundary of democratic citizenship are at the core of these questions upon which there is no solution reached in consensus among the liberals.

The group or the collective rights can be distinguished from individual rights since these demands are raised by individuals as members of the group or by means of the group membership. These rights are various including demands for exemption from certain laws (for instance, the Muslims are exempted from the British marriage laws), claims for some special cultural rights in the realm of education, language, demands related to the resident programs, incorporation of distinct cultural practices to the legal system, political representation at both national and local level. These rights may also be divided as self -government, poly -ethnic and special representation rights, and they should be distinguished from the existing political and social rights guaranteed under constitutional democracy (Kymlicka, 1995b: 31). **(14)** In fact for many of the ethno-cultural groups within the Western Europe, preservation of their language and culture is seen vital for the cohesion of the group and has a symbolic value reflecting a cultural heritage transmitted over the generations. These demands can be actualised by establishing cultural organizations, acceptance of official bilingualism, as is the case in some countries and permission for education in mother tongue. Bilingualism is the official policy of the government of Canada. Switzerland and Austria have also programs in different languages. In the Netherlands ethnic and religious groups have been given the right of TV broadcasting in their native languages. Of course there are countries like Britain and France where monolingualism prevails (Castles and Davidson, 2000: 125-126). However these rights are different in their nature, and can be meaningful and effective only if they are regarded as complementary to the political and social rights. **(15)**

There is a well known theoretical debate between the liberals and the communitarians with respect to the questions of whether the moral value should be attached to the individual or group and which of these units deserves ontological primacy. In a very general sense, the liberals attribute moral value to the individual over the community and the other side insists on the irreducible nature of the interests of the community to those of individual one. In order to make a connection to our discussions the question can be asked whether the individuals are defined in terms of their membership to various groups (gender, religious, racial, ethnic) or their positions are defined only as individuals standing as equal citizens within the political community. From this we may conclude that the communitarian view will

support both the enhancement of the cultural and the group rights and institutionalisation of cultural differences in the public domain through special arrangements and regulations that necessitate active state intervention in order to preserve distinct cultures, prevent discrimination and to contribute to their reproduction (in both public and private domains). **(16)** Whereas, as has been pointed out before, the liberal idea is intolerant to declaration of the ethnic and cultural identities in the public sphere and regards group specific rights as useless and meaningless in addition to the constitutionally defined individual rights.

This simple distinction can be extended to the discussions within the liberal theory too. Among the liberal theorists, Will Kymlicka argues that the liberal theories of justice should take into account the themes of recognition, identity and cultural membership. In his several studies he tries to show that diverse cultural groups can be tolerated within the liberal state (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000: 5) and that multiculturalism is compatible with liberal individualism. According to him, liberal theorists are wrong in their views that a generalised principle of non-discrimination is enough for justice in ethno-cultural relations and that collective rights demands of the groups would undermine the essence of individual rights is baseless (Kymlicka, 2001: 50 and 1995b: 34). In this regard the exercise of individual rights and liberties depends on full and unimpeded membership in a respected cultural group. Thereby   the formation of theory of the minority rights is crucial and should be seen as a matter of justice and equality. For that reason in his view, liberal multiculturalism or liberal state while guaranteeing tolerance and non discrimination should engage in an attempt to accommodate the recognition and representation of differences within the public sphere. This is called liberal culturalism in which public measures to enable the individuals as members of minority groups to promote their cultures are regarded crucial (Kymlicka, 2001: 41-42). Moreover Kymlicka prefers using the notion of group differentiated rights rather than group/collective rights because for him, a line should be drawn between the demands of external protection against larger society which are needed to protect the groups from injustices and claims for internal restrictions which are raised by the group against its own members in the name of maintaining of its traditions and of prevention of internal dissent. As a liberal theorist, Kymlicka openly refuses the practice of the demand for internal restrictions within the liberal culturalism, which

aims at the enhancement of the political and civil rights of the members of the groups (Kymlicka, 1995a: 9, 1995b: 35, 2001: 22-41). Amy Gutmann from a similar perspective asks whether citizens with diverse identities can be represented as equals without any recognition of their particular identities but only their basic and universally granted political and civil rights and claims that;

> Our lack of identification with institutions that serve public purposes, the impersonality of public institutions is the price that citizens should be willing to pay for living in a society that treats us equals, regardless of our particular ethnic, racial or sexual identities (Gutmann, 1994: 4).

So she states the importance of public acknowledgement of cultural particularities by developing policies, which are non-repressive, non-discriminatory and deliberative, and adds that the liberal democracies are characterised by their ability to balance protection of universal rights with public recognition of diverse cultures (Gutmann, 1994: 12).

On the other hand there are liberals who are still suspicious of the idea of the group- specific rights. Jurgen Habermas argues that individuals are the bearer of rights to cultural membership. Therefore, according to him, under the guarantee of democracy and constitutional state, and equal rights for the distinct groups, thereby, any kind of collective rights or any policy measures to promote these life forms are unnecessary and questionable. And most importantly existing system of rights is not blind to unequal social conditions and cultural variations in that cultural and social context are very significant for the formation of individual identities. But Habermas gives primacy to common political culture (different from distinct cultures) as a necessary factor in the political integration of the citizens and expects loyalty from them regardless of the particularities (Habermas, 1994). John Rex focuses on the similar point by drawing a line between the public and the private domains and claims that this distinction is essential for the multiculturalist societies. Within the public domain involving laws, politics and economics and education services, individuals possessing equal rights have equal treatment and opportunities under a single culture, whereas it is the private domain where the cultural diversity is actualised through many folk cultures (Rex, 1996: 18-25). **(17)**

Other liberal academics while sharing these normative commitments give attention to the nature of the groups and group rights. In their views, moral claims of cultures, the groups or communities can be accepted only if they contribute to the lives of the individuals. The groups are not homogenous associations but characterised by internal differences, and they are subject to change. In this regard any further legal regulations or establishment of institutions cannot be acceptable (Kukathas, 1995: 231-235). There is a related criticism against demands for group rights according to which these rights will confine the individuals to group membership because it is the group that raises the claims for rights. The outcome may be the internal restriction against the members as Kymlicka marks. Indeed it is no less possibility that group representatives may obscure the individuals from making use of the fundamental rights and liberties by restricting individual freedom.Thus it can be said that though there are no agreed norms about the accommodation of minority rights within liberal democracies, most theorists are aware of the implications of these rights and they almost see no contradiction between the minority rights, their needs and the values of the liberal state. It is because of this that they lay emphasis on the equal opportunities that liberal societies offer to the individuals and ethno-cultural groups together.

Starting from the 18th century the formulation of the human rights which have been incorporated into various international documents and conventions have been shaped by liberal understanding that have put the political and civil rights at the center of the human rights and taken the individual as the bearer of these rights. Actually the liberal understanding of the rights have emerged in places where the nation state building was completed and then such priority given to the political and civil rights assumed to be granted to the autonomous individual as an ontological being has been the main tool of the bourgeoisie class (Pollis, 1999:107).

Nevertheless it has taken years for many marginalized groups including the women, the blacks, the workers, the minorities and other ethnic groups to have a formal access to these rights though they have not been able to enjoy the freedoms and benefits derived from civil and political rights on an equal and adequate basis. This is related to the fact that liberal approach has isolated the rights from their socio-economic, political and cultural contexts and paid little attention to the social framework within which such political and civil rights can be enjoyed. In this sense

the successive steps to develop complementary economic, social and cultural rights and to incorporate them to the liberal theory can be seen as efforts to eliminate such deficiency. Regarding these attempts the important point is whether the liberal theory of the universal human rights have been successful in integrating to and justifying the rights stated above within the liberal understanding. Even though it is out of the scope of this study it can be said that with respect to the economic and social rights liberal theory has been able to reconcile these rights with the premises of the liberalism in addition to those political and civil rights as was observed in the welfare state policies. However the situation of the cultural rights or more specifically the minority rights is a bit problematic and disputable. In fact, the main debates about the cultural rights are about the question of to what extent the specific cultural rights can be part of the universal human rights and there is no consensus due to some dichotomies associated with this question, i.e., universalism versus relativism and individual versus group rights (Pollis, 1999: 101).

The former duality results from the fact that both in the universal human rights texts and also in the other international and regional documents dealing with the minority rights it is the universal conception of the individual that is subject to these rights and freedoms. However from the perspectives of those requiring equal respect to their cultures, cultural identities in the name of human rights it is not and cannot be the universalistic idea of the individual but a particular conception of the individual belonging to a particular culture that is the subject of the cultural rights (Kaygı, 1999: 75). Furthermore such duality also finds its reflection within the debates on the individual and group rights. As was stated before, liberalism on the basis of the principle of individualism takes the individual as the bearer of the rights and international and regional documents and conventions are also designed according to this view. Liberal theory, does not neglect the community as the idea of the social contract reveals but the rights, freedoms and obligations are defined on individual not the community level as different from the communitarianism. On the other hand the specific cultural rights and the minority rights in their nature are emphasized not with reference to the individual rights but to some collective traits that a particular community or group possesses. Because of this, the liberal doctrine on the human rights has faced difficulties of confronting the rising demands for the group rights and this has created an incentive for some liberal scholars to develop a

liberal understanding of the minority rights or group specific rights. This is different from the communitarian conception of the group rights in the sense that it is still the autonomous individual as a member of a particular community who enjoys the rights. As has been noted, the international documents also justify the minority rights on this individualistic ground and the main logic behind such formulation of group specific rights is the idea of the autonomous individual who has the capacity to choose the cultural practices of the group she/he belongs according to her/his needs (Pollis, 1999: 104). Nonetheless the liberal theory and the liberal scholars may face problems in integrating the group-specific minority rights into the universal human rights standards from such individual-based perspective because, as was stated, the main danger that these scholars underline in dealing with the minority rights is the internal dissent and restrictions within the groups and this problem is so prevalent that so many individuals belonging to distinct ethnic or religious groups do not have the autonomy and capacity to choose as the liberal theory assumes. Moreover, as is known, according to the liberal doctrine the political and civil rights are regarded as public concerns so subject to public regulation yet with respect to the minority rights or specific cultural rights there is no generally agreed acceptance or practice. This results from the fact that the theoretical efforts to justify the minority rights within the liberal approach under the heading of the group-specific rights, as Will Kymlicka tries to do, are perceived as baseless by other scholars.

In short, the liberal theory, at normative and philosophical levels, shows little success in reconciling the specific cultural rights and the universal human rights for the former is claimed with respect to some particular cultural characteristics, culture or identity that differentiate one community from another. In this respect the relativist discourse may be assumed to formulate more acceptable idea of the minority rights. However since the relativist standing in its justification of the cultural rights rests on a particular idea of the individual in order not to impede individual rights and freedoms it is necessary to make the content of such rights precise. From a humanistic perspective the basic measure of whether a specific cultural right is incorporated to the universal human rights is related to the contribution of such a right to the individual's freedom, development of her personality and ontological existence. Representing such a position one scholar says that;

It is not possible to achieve the universal rights from a cultural, religious or metaphysical approach determined by specific values or ethical codes. Rather in the absence of precise systematic citizenship rights protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms it will be difficult to benefit from the ethical and legal opportunities necessary for the groups in order to live according to their own way of life and this displays the asymmetrical relationship between the universal and particular approaches to the human rights (Guarigla, 1999: 39).

2.4.1. Citizenship in the Liberal Societies

As noted before, the problem of determining and defining the boundaries of citizen rights have been of great importance for the multiculturalist societies. Even though citizenship as an abstract, formal legal category has been ascribed a universal character under which members are granted a set of rights it is agreed that it may be both an instrument and object of closure. Because the notion of citizenship not only provide certain rights but also limit them through the closure of identities. And citizenship as a form of membership within the nation state and as a cultural indicator of nationhood may exclude non-citizens from the territories of a particular state or from having certain rights and benefits. Further an overstress on identity dimension; namely, that of the nationhood, non-citizens may symbolically be prevented from joining the larger society (Brubaker, 1992: 23-34).

In recent years many theorists have claimed that apart from the inability of this national citizenship model in responding the needs of the minorities, this understanding has even created obstacles for the full incorporation of the minorities. This has been followed by the assertion that the position of nation state as a major unit of social organization has been gradually weakened and it cannot be taken as the source of legitimacy for the individual rights. In other words as a result of growing tension between the citizenship and the nation hood the dynamics of membership and belonging can not be comprehended with reference to national citizenship (Soysal, 1996: 21).

Then the discourses on post national and multicultural citizenship have replaced that of national citizenship. According to the proponents of the first model, internationalisation of labour markets, the growing trend of transnational migration,

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emergence of new states after the decolonisation, increasing role of the supranational entities like the EU which have complicated the issue of the nation state sovereignty, the greater focus on human rights as incorporated in international conventions as a new reference point and recent regulations about the positions and rights of the immigrants at international level have made national citizenship less relevant within the multicultural debates and contributed to the development of supra national levels of political identity . This model differs from the old model in four terms: territorial dimension of the citizenship, the rights and the privileges, basis and legitimation of the membership and the organisation of membership (Soysal, 1996: 22-24, 1994: 140-143). **(18)** On this basis even if the immigrants do not have political rights of full citizenship they enjoy social and other rights by means of universal human rights principles and practices codified within the international codes regardless of their nationality.

On the other hand, those giving attention to the emergence of multicultural citizenship basically deal with the limits of the notion of citizenship and with the nature of the existing civil, political and social rights. Briefly for them the boundaries of citizenship regimes should be extended so that new set of rights like those of the cultural and gender rights can be incorporated to them. The proponents define the multicultural citizenship model "as a system of rights and obligations which protects the integrity of the individual while recognizing that the individuality is formed in a variety of social and cultural contexts" (Castles, 2000: 134). They also share the assumption that the classical understanding has difficulties in coping with the new waves of migration and ethno-cultural diversity. **(19)** Castles while stating the principles of the multicultural citizenship adds that individuals have to be evaluated not only as citizens with equal rights but also as members of groups sharing specific traits together with various needs and wants. This fact, to him, makes the development of mechanisms for group representation and participation vital so as to enable them to be part of the decision-making process (Castles, 2000: 144). **(20)** His contribution to the ongoing debates is especially important as is seen in his concern with socio-economic equality dimension of the concept of the ideal of citizenship. He notices that the end of the welfare state is followed by the rapid decline in the social role of the state and public social policies that eroded social part of the citizenship rights. Moreover the formal equality in the enjoyment of the rights do not guarantee

the equality of respect, access to labour markets on an equal footing or making use of the welfare measures like free health and education services. In this sense the problem should be understood broadly by taking into consideration the social and informal discrimination (unemployment, low levels of wages poverty, sexism and racism) besides the denial of public recognition of cultural rights and political exclusion. The combination of all these factors, as Castles argues, marginalises the minorities and blocks the formation of extensive and inclusive concept of citizenship (Castles and Davidson, 2000: 127-128).

At practical level, though not exactly fitting to the models above, Western European societies have made considerable revisions in their citizenship regimes. In recent years for example, ethnically oriented citizenship idea has started to be defined more in terms of civic –territorial understanding due to the problem of the integration of second and third generation of the foreigners. Even the issue of double citizenship has come into the agenda in the 1990's though it has been formally rejected. Excluding Greece, Luxemburg and Austria second-generation immigrants are granted the right of citizenship on the basis of either birth or naturalisation. In line with the new nationality convention of the Council of Europe (1997), which attaches great significance to the policy of dual citizenship (previously the idea of multiple nationality was not desirable) most of the members of the Union take the issue into consideration now (Joppke, 1999). **(21)**

On the other hand, these policy measures do not mean that these countries eliminated old citizenship understanding and replaced it with multicultural strategy or that citizenship lost its connection with the nation-state. Immigrants may benefit many informal provisions provided by the state without being a formal member of the political community. Or in case of the violations of their fundamental rights and liberties they may appeal to supranational courts under the rights codified in international conventions yet the operation of the international standards is not systematic and limited to the very few cases. Today, it seems that requirement of the assimilation to the majority culture is no longer the case and there are no less examples that the governments support financially and politically the groups to maintain their cultures, the ways of life, traditions, and exempt them from some of the measures applied to the natives. Even demand for the exercise of group specific rights does not face harsh opposition. In spite of these changes, most of these

governments apply strict immigration controls in their borders and the laws regulating the conditions of the entry of the immigrants are quite restrictive. Given these facts, it is stated that nation state continues to provide the context within which the identities, the claims of ethnic minorities are articulated. It is still the national governments as the main actors that can respond the needs and wishes of the groups (Koopmans and Statham, 2000b: 218-219). **(22)**

2.4.2. The Understanding of Multiculturalism as Identity Politics

So far it has been tried to display how the existence and requests of the immigrants, ethno cultural minorities, racial and religious groups have initiated intense debates upon the subjects like the citizenship, nationality. So the notion of multiculturalism and the questions associated with it are intended to be located within and reconciled with the liberal theory. As has been denoted before, the multiculturalist claims are raised not merely for material interests but also for the recognition of cultural differences and authentic identities of the respected groups. In a sense   both of them reinforce each other.

The concern for the recognition of identity is not confined to the assertions of ethno- cultural groups or to the multiculturalism alone. The issue is at the heart of today's what is called the politics of identity. As one of the prevalent discourses of the contemporary politics, the identity politics shifts our attention to the problematic presence of the distinct identities, which are defined against and in relation to the other. It also gives attention to the matter of recognition of these identities absence of which (misrecognition of otherness), as Taylor asserts, may damage the personality of an individual or group who will feel the misrecognition as a form of oppression. "Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people it is a vital human need" (Taylor, 1994: 25-26). Axel Honneth shares the ideas of Taylor and underlines the importance of the establishment of relations of mutual recognition which is presented as crucial for self- realisation in that any contact with the others would contribute to the being of the identity that gives one a sense of belonging and personal location. Honneth even describes the condition in which the above relations are absent, as deficient society having injustices. In this regard, for him, emancipatory struggles of various social movements while affecting political landscape also display how the

disrespect and misrecognition can be a cultural basis of resistance. In his normative ideal of society, the social struggles for recognition are given a significant role in achieving this ideal (Honneth, 1995).

Although these philosophical discussions are very beyond of this study, such examples may be useful in showing how the studies (philosophical and theoretical) on the matters of identity and recognition have been expanded in the name of providing voices to those who have been oppressed, excluded, biased including women, blacks, gays, lesbians, ethnic minorities. Apart from the normative values attached to identity, contention for recognition finds its reflection in political life by means of the politics of identity. The term refers to a political arena in which various social groups engage in a struggle within liberal societies, each seeking recognition for the special interests of a special group. Put differently, identity politics concerns the interests or emancipation of a specific part within the larger society so as to empower these groups, who are marginalised due to their nationality, ethnic origin, racial and sexual identity, to reclaim their distinctiveness, their respective voices and experiences (Solomos and Schuster, 2000: 85). Political struggles around the subject of identity and difference can historically be traced back to the 1960's witnessing the civil rights movements of the blacks, the movements of the gays, Asian, Indian, African American people in the USA. National Liberation movements may also be added to them (Calhoun, 1994: 21, Hobsbawm, 1996: 39). Initially aiming at defending common interests of the masses these social movements came to advocate their particularities. According to this logic, one's identity as woman, indigenous, black, lesbian exposes one to violence, exploitation and marginalisation. As a result struggle is waged not just for authentic difference but also against various institutional practices, values and experiences. The case of the feminism exemplifies how this movement evaluates the source of inequality and injustice in the existing gender -specific relations embedded in accepted norms and practices. This is accompanied, as the movement claims, with repression, denial of equal rights more exploitation in labour markets and so on, so attempts are directed towards the elimination of the existing gender relations. The same can be generalised to the sexuality-oriented movements of gays and lesbians complaining the oppression under the relations of heterosexuality and disrespect of their identities.

Today even those disabled people suffering from AIDS, smoking, being obese are included within the marginal groups. Of course it is quite hard to determine the framework of the identity politics and this is not the concern of this study, yet one point is worth noting. Even though it has nothing to do with the identity concerns or the problem of recognition, social class is also regarded as being one of the components of the identity politics, namely, class struggle is perceived to be a fight of people who see their collective identity as worker. If we take into account the fact that rise of these movements has almost matched the decline of the class politics the logic behind this rhetoric can be understood. This shift in the emphasis goes hand in hand with the change in the target of the struggle from the state and its institutions to the achievement of recognition and respect.

For the sake of clearness, the main themes of the identity politics are better to be summarised. As has been implied above, the groups engaging in the politics of identity devote their energies to prevent discrimination and violence through finding a voice in the public sphere in which they may articulate their identities. But as Claus Offe argues not all groups can engage in identity politics. The group in question has to be structural minority (relative to the entire population or relative to segments of population) members of whom share characteristics perceived by the mainstream as symbols for exclusion, oppression and by the members as vital for collective identity. Thereby, though some essential characteristics of the groups are pre given by birth, the collective identities are socially constructed through inter-subjective relations (Offe, 1998: 8). Within the society   the manipulation of these features like being black or Indian as marker of inferiority or superiority, exclusion or inclusion etc. by the rest results in the emergence of the identities. Because of this process, identities and several claims related to them are defined negatively, against other identity claims and the prevalent social, norms, practices and values (Calhoun, 1994: 24) (for instance African identity is formed with respect to the racial discrimination and white supremacy or the identity of being Muslim can be a means for claim making against dominant majority culture). For that reason related demands from the society take shape under the influence of these identities. The particular and limited objectives are pursued only for the sake of the respected group and this standing separates them from the movements oriented towards universal aims.

Most importantly identity politics is pursued and has been institutionalised within the liberal societies but at the same time it questions the ability of the liberal democracies to overcome the marginalisation of various groups. Being defined just as equal individuals and as members of political community having formal rights, entitlements would not be sufficient from the point of view of the advocators of the identity politics. Therefore they criticise the confinement of self-realization of and respect for their identities to the community domain, and seek the means to articulate her/his identity as a woman, a Caribbean or a black gay in the public sphere. Because of the obstacles in the way of the realisation of this demand, the well known slogan of the woman movement that personal is the political has intended to bring the politics and political strategy to the realm of interpersonal relations in order to exhibit the role of the politics and power relations in the private realm and to question the distinction between the public and private realms. From this point, it is easy to reach the conclusion that one's identity necessarily defines one's politics and there is no politics without a claim to identity.

The politics of multiculturalism is a branch of the identity politics in that it is a specific version in which the ethnicity, race, religion and culture become the marker of the collective identities. Of course the oppression suffered, nature of identity formations and the source of claim making may change in each case. The multiculturalism takes the form of a political movement for cultural empowerment thereby culture becomes ground for identity formation, political mobilisation and resistance by way of the claims for collective cultural rights.

The politics of identity has such prevalence in the concerns of the academics, theorists because it reflects new forms of social consciousness and of social relations. So long as struggles around the identity politics enable many marginalized groups to overcome the injustices responsible for the marginalisation by means of various devices and discourses the term may be attached a positive and even progressive value. However, as critiques underline the discourses of the identity politics have results, which have quite negative and dangerous implications for the members of the collectivities and are far from extending the causes of the groups.

The identity politics is basically charged of being essentialist. Essentialism assumes that an object or thing has a specific (fixed) essence or quality by virtue of which the object becomes what it is. In the case of identity politics, the term implies

a view that the collective identities have ahistorical, unchanging, homogeneous, pre-given natural core qualities resting on a fixed essence, which are shared by all the members of a particular group (Calhoun, 1994: 13). The extension of this view is the belief of possibility of construction of stable, frozen collective identities. Such an understanding draws clear-cut boundaries among the collective identities as if being a gay, for instance, were entirely separable from being a Palestinian, or vice versa.

Multicultural version of the politics of identity is vulnerable to such a critique, too; and the whole debate turns around the concept of culture and cultural differences, which are at the hearth of ethnic, racial and religious identities. In its essentialist understanding culture is described in plural forms and as a totality closed to change, interaction and shifts. This perception has its roots in the idea of Herder and then in classical anthropology. Within Romantic debates on culture Herder was known with his opposition to rationalism and universalism of Enlightenment. He regarded culture as the means through which human beings reproduced and understood themselves, so culture implied diversity of specific life forms with their own laws of evolution and not unilinear narrative of universal humanity (Eagleton, 2000: 12). As seen, Herder's perspective denotes historicism and underlines peculiarities of each culture that can be understood only with its own terms. This approach also regards culture as having fixed, unchanging essences which cannot be perceived without historical sympathy (Larrain, 1994:26). While underlying cultural diversity Herder states that all cultures are equally valid indicating the view that there are no such things as universally prevalent values, which can be used in comprehending other cultures. The pluralist conception of culture turns any culture to a value in itself and according to this, the plurality of cultures are more important than their inner content, and criteria of choosing among different contents of culture is also culture dependent (relativist standing) (Eagleton, 2000: 15). Culture as a closed totality with its own distinct norms, values, practices, forms of behavior, social relations denoting fixed, ahistorical, collective qualities between generations, plays a considerable role in multiculturalist discourse in the form of reducing ethnic or racial identities to the differences among these totalities. On the one hand each particular ethnic identity is matched with a set of cultural differences causing ethnicisation and racialisation of cultural differences in which these identities as possessors of the cultures become the symbols of cultural differences. On the other

hand this furthers the reification of identities whose distinctiveness can be grasped in terms of only their differences without any reference to the context, external influence, interaction with other identities, objective circumstances etc. (Modoo, 1997: 10, Wicker, 1997: 32, Çaglar, 1997: 174-179, Samad, 1997: 245, Yuval Navis, 1997: 200). This gives way, at the end, to a kind of multicultural society constituted by distinct supposedly homogenous collective identities. The boundaries within such a society are determined according to specific set of transhistorical cultural differences existing beyond time and space.

There are considerable implications of that kind of thinking. Cultural essentialism of multiculturalism or culturalism uses the discourses of authenticity, stresses continuity of identities over generations, so naturalised and dehistoricised cultural differences are presented as a means for resistance as if the struggle of cultural liberation could be enough for emancipation. Further, the presentation of communities as unique, coherent, unitary entities ignores the possibility of internal power conflicts and the existence of diverse interests. Indeed it is assumed that the qualities of the community shape the thinking, feeling and being of the members. However this way of thinking ignores social conditions and external influence and to the differences along the lines of gender, sexuality or class positions therefore generalizations are made, the existence of multiple identities is neglected and suppressed by imposing the community values upon the members. There is also inherent cultural relativism in culturalist thinking as seen in a known statement that "we all recognise the equal value of different cultures" (Taylor, 1994: 64). That each culture has the equal value means cultures cannot be compared with each other because values and norms are specific to particular cultures, in this respect no general standards of cultures exist outside the cultures (Blum, 1998: 82). **(23)** Such an idea bears the danger that the members of the particular communities are prevented to reach a common ground or shared interests to act together.

As has been pointed above the culturalist view within the multiculturalism has a detrimental effect upon the members of a given community. Such an overemphasis on cultural differences, after a while, becomes the sole source of raising claims for the collective rights. Liberal individualists are also suspicious of group rights on the ground that groups are not homogenous, instead they are constituted by the individuals with diverse interests and that acceptance of the

collective cultural rights may enable powerful group representatives to restrict individual. Yet the problem is not limited to the liberals' worries for individual autonomy.

One of the outcomes of the culturalism is the institutionalisation of the collective cultural rights, for the politics of multiculturalism is ascribed a target, beyond the recognition of the differences, to develop strategies for the protection of the communal identities (Çaglar, 1997: 179, Entzinger, 2000: 110, Castles, 2000: 143).The realization of this benign ideal without falling into the risk of the reification and homogenization of the identities   is really a difficult task. The reasons are obvious. This, on the one hand may neglect the changes within the collectivities and cultures in general. On the other there is the danger of manipulation of group members by the group itself and by the political authority through affirmative action programs. As is implied, many people rather than submitting loyalty to a common way of life, sharing unitary thinking and feeling may not even have any emotional bond with the group. Whereas the assumption of frozen membership will empower the elites to speak in the name of   the community, to oppress members to prevent assimilation and to maintain the cultural cohesiveness of the group. In case formal authorities accept such hierarchical relations within the community, the elites may potentially use these relations to extract more concessions (Offe, 1998: 9-12). The problem of cultural relativism is added to this list, the group will justify and legitimise many practices, traditions, values and norms which damage the personalities of the members (especially women) and would regard any intervention to the community affairs unjust. **(24)**

As is noted, the advocators of multiculturalism ask for an active state acting to eliminate discrimination and bring about equal opportunities to protect the minority cultures, to take measures for the reproduction of their cultures. Under the label of affirmative action programs such as setting quotas for representation, design of public policies specific to minorities, measures in the spheres of education and labour market, the governments, in many Western societies, have formulated several policies. But though not denying their benefits many critics state that these differential treatment programs have both isolated minority groups from the society by presenting them as disabled people needing assistance all the time, and reinforced the conditions of socio-economic dependency. **(25)** Related to this issue, Vertovec

underlines the risk of manipulation in the form of structural pluralism, i.e., a concept denoting the restricted and differentiated access to the public domain. At the end the state may easily deceive the minority groups through exclusion from meaningful parts of the public domain and confining them to the private realm. This policy results in nothing more than the reinforcement of essentialist and culturalist perception and reproduction of the status quo by creating culturally defined spaces (Vertovec, 1996: 59-60). **(26)**

Taking into account the possible consequences of essentialist thinking, the scholars wishing to accommodate a healthier multiculturalism within the liberal societies stress the necessity of the adoption of anti-essentialist standing**. (27)** First of all, cultures and the identities (ethnic, racial etc.) are not pre given, natural, frozen eternal totalities instead they are subject to continuous change due to the external circumstances, historical conditions, interaction with and borrowings from other cultures and identities. Though cultures and identities shape human beings, this does not exclude the fact that every identity grows out of interaction, in other words, cultural and other identities evolve together with new experiences and practices. Therefore unitary categories like German culture, black people should be rejected since not only they themselves are historical but also they involve many complex dimensions along the lines of gender, class. As has been noted, all cultural and ethnic identities area socially and politically constructed. **(28)** In other words they are defined in relation to the other identities through the process of inclusion and exclusion of the selected values, memories and traditions from the past, which are then transmitted to the present for reproduction of the respected identities and their practices. In this selective process some values or norms may be excluded, yet historical and political struggles over their meanings continue. This means that the formation of the identities, at the same time, embraces discursive practices (Larrain, 1994: 162-166, Solomos and Schuster, 2000: 78-85).

Moreover, culturalist tendency tends to equate culture to ethnic or racial identities, and this creates indeterminacy and vagueness over the meaning of the notions. So critics say that ethnicity and racial categories should be distinguished from objective cultural practices and differences. It is not the cultural differences or cultures themselves that construct ethnic and racial identities, the formation of these collectivities are more than essentialised cultural qualities. It is an active and

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continuous process shaped by the interactions, the power relations. To put it in another way, as Hans Rudolf Wicker expresses;

> Culture has no proper force of its own, no independent proprieties. It neither resists nor adapts and assimilates. There is no cultural being…. Culture only provides the means for social interaction and for the generation of inter subjective but it is not responsible for the results of these processes such as the emerging social and political collectivities or more or less binding symbolic worlds (Wicker, 1997: 39).

On the basis of these criticisms, alternative explanations in comprehending the nature of the identities in question and the notion of multiculturalism have been put into the agenda. The most known and pervasive of these alternatives is the concept of hybrid identities. The new identity descriptions like hybridism, hyphenated identities, Creole cultures are beyond the scope of this study but the debates about these concepts display the attempts of the academics to go beyond essentialist thought. According to the studies celebrating hybridity as a challenge to fixed identities, rapid increase in migration process, movements of capital, labour, goods across national boundaries, development in communication and technology have contributed to the emergence of hybrid identities that are fluid, multiple and come into the existence as a result of mixture of more than one identity and of qualities of many identities. However this ideal has also been questioned over the years due to its implicit essentialist perspective. Critics state that this approach assumes ontologically different, homogenous identities in order to mix their elements (Çağlar, 1997: 165). **(29)**

2.4.3. **Essentialism and Cultural Racism**

One of the scholars, studying multiculturalism states that the notion, which was initially attached progressive meaning now have been seen as a conservative idea. Because to him, multiculturalism was the antidote against essentialist, monist definitions of nationality and national cultures yet together with rhetoric turning around the notions like distinct identities and different cultures multiculturalism has come to embrace essentialist features (Modoo, 2000: 15). Such a danger reveals its ugly face in today's cultural or new racism. This phenomenon shows that essentialist

thinking does not remain at discursive level but has quite real effects upon the lives of many immigrants and the ethno-cultural groups.

Although the term racism was firstly used in the 1930's during the Nazi period the implicit experiences of racism and discrimination among races have been part of the European history that can be traced back to the colonial practices of the 15th and 16th centuries in which the non European people were harshly discriminated, inferiorised, exterminated and exploited both materially and emotionally. This thought entered the writings of the philosophers like Herder, Schelling, Bartolome de Las Casas who justified the racial attitudes (Larrain, 1994: 28-31). These practices continued over the centuries and came to the point in which discrimination, exclusion, expulsion on the basis of biological and physical characteristics of individuals became the defining feature of racism as fascism of the 1930s demonstrated. Though not totally eliminated from the 1970's onwards biological racism has been replaced by cultural racism, which over the years intensified its influence.

Racism, and racial identities are such identities that take new forms and expression according to the changing social, economic, political objective circumstances yet regardless of new rhetoric of exclusion accompanied with it, racism is always deterministic. The dynamics, which gave way to the rise of the fascism in the 1920's and 1930's, have both similarities with and divergences from contemporary racist movements. Many of the historians and theorists who try to explain the historical rise of fascism, in some sense, relate it to the destructive effects of the war upon the masses resulting from the great depression which undermined the living standards of the middle classes and petty bourgeoisie and marginalised many members of the lower classes beyond the classical employer/employee distinction. Today it may be said that the neo-liberal policies through producing crises in the national economies have produced similar destructive consequences affecting the natives, the immigrants, and the minorities together. As has been explained before, even though the immigrants were initially welcomed as cheap labour force from the beginning they have been subject to the formal and informal exclusionary policies of the host societies. Therefore they have always been subject to discrimination, exclusion and exploitation within the political community. However relative to the rest of the population what aggravates the living conditions of the non- natives have

not only been the worst and disadvantageous circumstances in the labour markets after the recession of the 1970's but also the reaction of the marginalized population against them in the form xenophobia and violence. Indeed economic crises brought with it a feeling of insecurity, instability and indeterminacy for which the immigrants from Caribbean, Suriname, India, Turkey, Africa and existing minorities have been blamed as if they were responsible for the increasing poverty, unemployment, housing shortages, deficiencies in social services. This may be seen as an illusion, which masks the main reasons of the economic difficulties inherent and embedded in capitalist societies (Stolcke, 1999: 25-26). As has been seen, the new minorities replaced the Russians, the Jews and the Gypsies who suffered during the Nazi period. This by no means denotes that racism is the mere reaction of the lower class population since due to the motive of maintaining the high profit rates necessary for the competition it has always been urgent to have a labour force in order to keep the wages at a lower level. These exclusionary discourses have been accompanied with the fear of recession in the national and moral values, and deterioration of national culture and identity because of the contact with the inferior cultures of the immigrants. Aware of the fact that it is very easy to manipulate this fragile issue today's new right activists highlight the deep differences among cultures. According to them "cultures" cannot and should not mix and be kept distinct in their pure forms.

The extension of this view is that those groups who are excluded or marginalized are the victims of their own culture. In fact from the 1970's onwards with the permanent settlement of the immigrants it was no longer easy for the racist groups to justify exclusion on naturalized biological traits. The growing sensibility to cultural differences has become the new device of the cultural racism that intends to manipulate the ethnicity, culture, values and traditions as new markers of exclusion and inferiority. By means of naturalizing the ethnic identities and the cultural traits new racism has insisted on the incommensurability of the cultures. This is necessary, as followers of these movements assert, to preserve both national identity and the identities of the foreigners in order to enable them to return their homes (Stolcke, 1999: 27).

As one of the scholars also stresses, cultural racism while using new rhetoric required for the defense of cultural identities raises new arguments by making reference to the difference. And the main concern behind all these statements is

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immigrants (Taguieff, 1999: 209). The new racism of Europe makes use of all the implications of essentialism and of cultural relativism. Parallel to essentialist standing, it refers to the cultural qualities in order to fix and naturalise identities, and describes the negative other in terms of irreducible differences. Currently these statements have found their reflection in the rise of the New Right in Europe. For instance, Le Pen says that "we have not only the right but also the duty to defend our national personality as also our right to be different" (Taguieff, 1999: 211). Similarly one of the followers of the New Right, Alain de Benoist defends the notion of the ethno-pluralism and states that interaction among the cultures will result in the loss of identities both of majority society and minority cultures (Koopmans and Statham, 2000a: 23).

As is seen, all these do not remain at discursive level rather they are objectified in the everyday relations. The Western European   societies have already adopted restrictive policy measures against immigrants such as strict immigration controls (as in Britain), population controls, even total close of the borders against the new comers. Then this has been accompanied with the racialisation and ethnicisation of social relations as observed in the problems of the availability of job opportunities, differentiation of residence areas (Castles and Davidson, 2000: 63). As a result of the culturalisation of the racism many theorists use the term of the racism without any reference to the race (Castles, 2000: 184).

According to the many scholars writing on racism, prevalence of the racist discourse should be connected to the crises and weakness of the anti- racist movement and the left together (Taguieff, 1999, Lloyd, 1999, Wicker, 1997, Solomos and Black, 1999). In those countries where racism has gained prominence in everyday politics, the principle of the right of being different and the right of distinct cultures to declare their authenticity have been the main instruments of the anti racists, mostly from the left, to fight against the racism. As has been shown, over the years, the rightwing groups have used the praise of difference. This makes the old strategy of the anti racism inadequate and incapable to accuse the racists of being fascists for the reason that they both use the same rhetoric. So it is widely shared that the objective of undermining the power of the racism can be achieved through more effective new instruments. One more issue can be mentioned about the problem. As is known in the 1930's a strong communist movement responded the racism. Today

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what is absent is an influential left-wing politics, which has gradually lost its power. Perhaps empowerment of the left politics may produce the clues to develop effective, universally oriented, non-reductionist (avoiding the reduction of the race issue to the problem of recognizing differences) strategies. Especially formation of the economically viable policies confronting unemployment and poverty is especially important if it is remembered that New Right politics succeeds to justify exclusion and xenophobia by relating these practices to economic troubles and material problems. In fact there is almost a fragile line between the defense of cultural differences in the name of pluralism and of supporting the racist discourse stressing the urgency of keeping the cultural distinctiveness together with an emphasis on maintaining the purity.

To summarise, all the discussions made around the racism mark that the phenomenon does not grow out of human nature but derives its sources from the historical, political and socio-economic circumstances. And race as a category of identity and the racial identities that are politically and socially constructed by the racism are referred by the new- right activists and those possessing racial identities. Dominant groups create the negative other and impose inferior features upon the marginalized groups and in doing so manipulate several symbols and norms to strengthen the boundaries dividing them and the others and to justify exclusionary treatment. Such a politics creates race as a category (this may be ethnicity too) and racial identities by ascribing inferior meanings to them. For the dominated groups all these values, norms attached by the new right provide ground for political mobilization and resistance against the dominant discourses. Castles and Davidson argue that;

> [R]acialisation greatly reinforces cultural difference and gives it a much greater significance and durability for the groups concerned. Cultural difference becomes a label for exclusion and racialisation but it is also a vital part of process of community formation through which minorities construct themselves as social and political actors (Castles and Davidson, 2000: 80).

For that reason it should be reemphasised that the categories like race and ethnicity and related identities are conditioned by the relations of power and reproduced within the political, social and cultural realms under the constant

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processes of struggle and negotiation (Solomos and Schuster, 2000: 78 and Yuval Navis, 1997: 193).

To conclude, contemporary concerns about multiculturalism are the outcome of the ethnic and cultural polarization of European countries. The debates on the question, as were tried to be explained, mostly develop around the objective factors and dynamics affecting the politics of multiculturalism, its definition or description, general problems, deficiencies and danger of the use of the culturalist discourse within the practices of that kind of politics, its relation with other versions of identity politics etc. At the end, the problem is to develop a multiculturalist thinking and to design a multiculturalist society by taking into consideration all the issues stated above.

In the way of the realisation of this ideal, one problem to be overcome is the dichotomy between old perception of the civic equality and centrality of the public representation of the various differences. Some critiques assert that the ideal of civil equality inevitably necessitates assimilation and homogenisation therefore a democratic and extensive notion of multiculturalism together with inclusive understanding of membership to a society should be developed so that minorities can pursue their interests. However, this does not mean a benign multiculturalism as if all the struggles were waged for the preservation and empowerment of the ethnic identities and their distinct cultures. As has been indicated before, there is the danger of the prevalence or persistence of essentialist and culturalist views, which may potentially serve to the rhetoric of the New Right. Instead, a critical multiculturalism, when combined with democratic ideal can prevent the manipulation of cultural symbols, norms, values, traits, ethnic identities, even languages as a ground for exclusion, violence, social and economic discrimination and a matter of inferiority.

Furthermore, there is a dramatic trend within the Western Europe characterised by economic polarization and social exclusion with respect to both lower class natives and the immigrants and the minorities. In this regard, many writers insist that any politics made on behalf of minorities while recognising ethnic and cultural diversity and giving way to the policies to assist the groups in question, should not neglect the principle of equality and equality of opportunity that can be actualised in an egalitarian multiculturalist society. The realization of the last point according to some academics requires the reconciliation of the struggles of the particular groups and universal human emancipation. Because at the end, any group engaging in identity politics takes only the

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specific interests and experiences of the members of the group into account even if the struggle in question may indirectly produce consequences for the democratic ideal.

Nira Yuval Navis, on the basis of this consideration, recommends an alternative strategy of identity politics, which is called transversal politics. Yuval Navis describes it as a project based on dialogue of different groups and identities, each preserving its particularity but open to exchanges with other positions and subject to ongoing change. This strategy is more than a coalition of the groups, since not only the members of the particular identities have equal political, cultural and social standing, but also the differences within the groups itself (class, race, ethnicity, sexuality) and their values and actual political concerns are attributed priority (Yuval Navis, 1997: 204-205). Of course, many writers under different names support this strategy yet this is an ideal, and it is based completely on normative principles. And so long as the politics of identity and difference remain the part of the political struggle and the power relations, the good intentions of the parties and many subjects will play quite little role in shaping and determining the relevant policies, thereby, it will not be easy to actualise the above ideals in practical life.

In this chapter, the main theoretical and political concerns around the concept of multiculturalism have been reviewed within the context of Western Europe. In the successive part, in order to demonstrate how these concerns have found reflections and been confronted within the international community at both legal and political levels a general description of the regulations within the international covenants and political documents regarding the political, economic and cultural rights of the minorities is going to be stated. Through this, it would be possible to grasp the impact of the rise of multiculturalism in Western liberal democracies upon Turkey. Therefore the next chapter also includes the description of laws and regulations within the Turkish legal system and of the recent constitutional amendments related to the use of the cultural rights, and basic human rights and freedoms. Such a descriptive analysis may enable us to understand to what extend the challenge of multiculturalism is confronted at legal level in Turkey.

As had been underlined before, Turkey-EU relations are one of the basic channels through which the rise of multiculturalism in Western democracies has been influential on the Turkish political and legal structure. For that reason, most of the

reforms carried out by the government contributing to the extension of human rights and cultural rights are related with the process of accession of Turkey to the EU.

CHAPTER III

THE PROBLEM OF MULTICULTURALISM WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND POLITICAL DOCUMENTS

3.1. The Question of Cultural Rights

In a very simple sense, the notion of multiculturalism indicates the existence of different and diverse groups and minorities in terms of their religion, mother tongue, ethnicity or race. And as was tried to be explained in the previous section, the declared aim of multicultural policies is the formation of a more inclusive society which would enable all to enjoy benefits of formal citizenship equally under conditions of the mutual respect and tolerance, and to preserve and promote distinctive identities in all domains of society without any discrimination. Therefore, it can be concluded, on the basis of this ideal, that a practically effective multicultural politics should protect the various groups and minorities against all kinds of exclusion, discrimination being economic, social or political, and violence through proper policies. However, as is widely discussed, different kinds of positive intervention should only be complementary to those rights, benefits and duties enjoyed as equal citizens within the society.

As was discussed in the first part, those societies including different ethnic, cultural groups have responded to the issue differently. Although there are few states denying the existence of ethnic or linguistic minorities within their own societies, on the basis of the assumption that all individuals within the society are equal, this should not give way to the conclusion that the minorities and other groups make use of all the rights necessary for the promotion and the preservation of their identity without discrimination. At the end, states have discretion to behave in a flexible way depending on the situation or the demands of these groups. Further in the light of the

ethnic conflicts, racial violence against migrants, increasing demands on the side of the groups in question for representation and participation within the political and public life on the basis of their distinct identities, and the response of the international community to these demands by means of the attempts to develop a new and more effective instruments clearly demonstrate that the issue of multiculturalism, as it finds its reflection in the problem of the political, economic, social and legal positions of the ethnic, religious, cultural groups and minorities, will continue to be one of the main subjects of the international politics.

As is known the notion of citizenship indicates a series of rights and duties that formally define the legal standing of a person and on this basis an individual is granted certain political and socio-economic rights. On the other hand, it is widely accepted that with regard to the minorities, migrants, ethnic and other groups that kind of legal status is not enough and can give way to cultural homogenisation and assimilation as it ignores cultural differences. On this ground on the side of the groups in question the invention of cultural rights that can be enjoyed either individually or at the group level seems to be a kind of solution in everyday politics.

It is not easy to define the framework and content of cultural rights, and there is no consensus about the matter. This is because firstly, the perception of the concept of the culture may change and its definition is far from being precise so it is difficult to determine those belonging to a particular culture (Tacar, 1996:11, Aral, 1998: 417-418). Secondly, it is necessary to determine the individuals who would enjoy these rights. In other words, whether these rights are granted to a particular ethnic or religious minority or to a group as collective rights or to the individuals belonging to such groups is very important question, since in everyday life this matter has significant consequences both for the states and the groups claiming such rights. Moreover, as Bryan Turner underlines it is not clear if there is a corresponding cultural obligation when one declares the need for cultural rights. According to him, rights necessitate obligations yet in case of cultural rights determination of a fitting obligation is quite problematic (Turner, 2001:13).

In a very general sense two kinds of cultural rights can be mentioned. General or universal cultural rights include the right to free education, freedom of expression and freedom of conscience, right to participation in the life of the community, right

to enjoyment of sufficient social and cultural development, right to take part in cultural life, freedom for scientific research and creative activity without restriction etc. (Tacar, 1996:11). This list can be broadened yet what requires attention in this first category is that these rights or freedoms are mostly regarded as a part of the universal human rights and included in political and legal conventions as inalienable rights requiring non-discrimination and non-intervention on the side of the states. These basic human rights are also part of the international legal documents and the most specific document regulating these rights is International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) adopted in 1966 within the framework of the United Nations. Although it does not mention any specific cultural right, Article 2 (2) of the Convention guarantees the exercise of the rights stated in the Covenant without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, rational or social origin, property or other status. Articles 13, 14, and 15 of the document deal with more specific issues. Article 13 and Article 14 recognize the right of everyone to education through stating that "… education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups…" (Art 13/1). Moreover it is followed that;

> The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose for their children schools, other than those established by the public authorities which conform to such minimum educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the state and to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions (Art 13/3).

And Article 15 states that the right of everyone to take part in cultural life, to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications (Art 15 /1). As is noticed, these articles stipulate regulations about general human rights standards. **(30)**

However, the recent discussions and political and legal regulations with regard to the cultural rights are about more specific or special cultural rights claimed by ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural minorities and groups. In a general sense when these rights are taken into consideration, recognition of different identities is emphasized, for instance right to preservation and promotion of cultural identities of

the groups in question by means of engaging in their own cultural activities. More specifically, for those individuals or groups raising these demands, the rights and freedoms to express, preserve, develop their identities, mainly, right to use their own languages or mother tongues in public and private spheres, to preserve and engage their religion freely, to enjoy educational rights in or through minority languages, to use their personal names in their own language, to have an access to the media or radio and TV broadcasting facilities in mother tongue and to have place names in their own languages etc. are among the most basic cultural rights. And as is seen they are more particularistic and specific, so they are different in their nature and in terms of their consequences from general cultural rights.

3.1.1. Regulations of Special Cultural Rights within the International Community

Like general cultural rights having universal character, those cultural rights that are subject to the claims of minorities and various groups, and parallel to the increasing debates in order to develop new instruments to maintain and promote the rights, there have been attempts to incorporate these rights in question into legal and political documents which are expected to serve the emergence of new international standards on this issue besides universal human rights standards.

However, before stating these attempts some points are better to be made clear. Even though the initial documents like ICESCR make reference to cultural rights in the areas of, for example, education, science and culture, these more general cultural rights are evaluated as a part of the civil, political and universal human rights, which are different in their nature from specific cultural rights as they are mentioned in the new documents. Because these treaties are about the protection of civil and political rights of all individuals without discrimination so they are clear on these rights and necessary obligations of the states. Further these rights are legally secured through a judicial process; therefore the states are legally obliged to maintain these rights. On the other hand, in the newly developed international or regional instruments giving reference to the specific cultural rights the main idea is that the protection of the rights of ethnic groups should be part of the traditional human rights

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standards since the existing treaties are less clear on this issue. On the basis of this idea, it is assumed that there is a direct relationship between the maintenance of cultural rights of minorities and various groups, and achievement of peace, security and stability. For instance, in some OSCE documents dealing with national minorities it is often stated that stability and security are best served by ensuring that persons belonging to national minorities can effectively enjoy their rights or that "… the participating states further reaffirm that respect for the rights of persons belonging to national minorities as part of universally recognised human rights is an essential factor for peace, justice, stability and democracy…". (Copenhagen Document, Art 12)[1] Other instruments developed within the framework of the UN and the European Council also establish a positive correlation between the two factors. It is recognised that since promotion of ethnic, cultural or religious identities of the minority groups have positive implications it is no longer enough to tolerate minority cultures or to respect non-discrimination principle in state policies. In other words, it is essential to assume more active role in protection, and promotion of these identities through granting more specific rights. In short, the states are expected to approach the question of cultural rights in more proactive manner, even to form special measures in the fields of education, language policy etc. In the case of the civil and political human rights, which have negative status, states are obliged to refrain from interference to the enjoyment of these rights. But it is widely recognised in the international community that without a positive intervention it is quite difficult to achieve economic, social and cultural equality; so in order for the minorities to gain at least formal equal rights states should adopt an active policy otherwise these cultures tend to assimilate into majority cultures. "States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity" (UN Declaration, Art 1).

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[1]Copenhagen Document was prepared within the context of Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) by the representatives of the participating states in the meeting of the Second Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE between June 5 – July 29in 1990. The Copenhagen Meeting is important since in this meeting, the participating states accepted their responsibility to take every measure for the full realization of their commitments related to the human dimension. They also reaffirmed their duty to behave in conformity with all provisions of Helsinki Final Act and with the other CSCE documents which stipulate the need to strengthen respect for and enjoyment of human rights, and fundamental freedoms (Copenhagen Document, 1990).

As has been noted recently a number of new political and legal documents and texts have come to deal with the linguistic, educational and other cultural and political rights of the ethnic, cultural, religious communities. Within the framework of the UN besides ICESCR and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966), Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic and Linguistic Minorities (UN Declaration)(1992) was adopted by General Assembly in 1992. The attempts of European Council to develop long-lasting norms on cultural rights that are incorporated in Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995) and European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992) should also be stressed. Although on a different basis, the active contribution of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to the issue in question should be noted.

By giving explicit attention to the rights of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, ICCPR is one of the most important international treaty and source of inspiration for later documents and texts. Article 27 of the Covenant guarantees that;

> In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist; persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.

Later Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic and Linguistic Minorities can be regarded as a significant document in terms of the rights of various minorities and groups. Although it does not constitute an international norm reference and is not legally binding for the states like ICCPR, it is expected that states will take it into account in their national regulations.

For instance, while Article 2 (1) regulates the right of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities "to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion and to use their own language, in private and in public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination", Article 2 (2) stipulates "… the right to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and public life." And Article 4 of the text states specific measures

expected from the states to enable the persons belonging minorities to enjoy these rights by means of creating favorable conditions.

Though attempts within the framework of the Council of Europe have remained at more regional level, they have been prepared to gain international norm status and so to be enforced legally even by the states who are not the member of the Council. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) and successive amendments and protocols following the main text have already regulated the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression, right to education and enjoyment of these rights without discrimination and in this sense constituted one of the main texts having enforcement mechanism on general cultural rights as part of civil and political rights. Giving the fact that Europe, as a result of increasing number of migrants and minorities, has become a multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic and multi-racial region the concern of Council of Europe to achieve an enforceable standard on the right of minorities is worth noting as it is clearly and explicitly reflected in European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages and Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. In the first convention, there are several provisions defining the meaning of minority language, determining the necessary framework for the preservation and promotion of regional or minority languages and dealing with the use of these languages in several spheres including education, media, cultural activities, judiciary, administrative sphere and in general economic and social life. Framework Convention also mentions about the necessity of the respect for the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of the minorities by defining responsibilities of the states**. (31)** For instance, in Article 5 (1), the parties are required "to undertake the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language traditions and cultural heritage" and Article 5 (2) "to refrain from policies or practices aimed at assimilation of persons belonging to national minorities against their will and shall protect these persons from any action aimed at such assimilation." These documents rather than creating personal rights define cultural rights on the basis of the obligations of the states.

From the time of its establishment in 1975 CSCE (Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe) with Helsinki Final Act, CSCE and then OSCE has issued several documents related to the rights of minority groups and which have political significance for the participating states. **(32)** First, in Helsinki Final Act and then in Charter of Paris for a New Europe participating states, while accepting those fundamental rights and the freedom as the birth right of human beings like freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, religion or belief without distinction, stated their commitments to respect ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities and their rights freely to express, preserve and develop that identity without any discrimination and full equality before the law. States party to CSCE also committed to confront all forms of racial and ethnic hatred, anti-Semitism, xenophobia and discrimination. (Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the principle stated under the section of Human Dimension) In these documents, states are also required to ensure equal rights of the migrants especially in the fields of employment, living conditions, housing, health services, and enable them to reserve supplementary education in their own language, national culture and history. (Helsinki Final Act, Principle 7 and Charter of Paris for a New Europe, under the sub-heading of Migrant Workers)

The representatives of the participatory states of CSCE in 1990 explicitly affirmed their commitments to respect economic, social, political and cultural rights of national minorities and to promote these rights by taking effective measures in the Copenhagen Document. Principles 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, and 40 in section IV of the Document are quite clear on both these rights and responsibilities of the states. For example, Principle 33 requires the participating states "… to protect the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities on their territory and create conditions for the promotion of that identity". Another considerable attempt within this framework is the establishment of the post of High Commissioner on National Minorities (1992) whose main function is to identify and seek early resolution of ethnic tensions that might endanger peace, stability within OSCE region. **(33)** In this respect, under the authority of the Commissioner Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities (1996), The Oslo Recommendations Regarding the linguistic Rights of National Minorities (1998) and Lund Recommendation for the Effective Participation of National

Minorities in Public Life (1999) and a Report on the Linguistic Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities in the OSCE Area (OSCE Report) (1999) have been published. All these texts developed by OSCE do not create any legal obligation for the participating states but produce political responsibilities for the parties. States may not obey these principles but it can be said that as being parties the states are assumed to have moral commitment to develop a political behavior to make proper legal regulations in their national laws in accordance with the principles of the documents indicated above. In other words, the Documents establish a set of standards, which would have important political and moral impact and contribute to the creation of legal obligations.

All these international and regional texts have detailed explanatory notes on the cultural rights of minorities yet among these rights the most relevant to the question of this study are about the use of the minority language and mother tongue in various fields the question of the content of education and free access to the media facilities.

What is common in the new instruments is the view that a language is not only a medium of expression, but also a form of expression in itself. The right to use a regional or minority language in private and public life is regarded as an inalienable human right. (Charter for Minority Languages, Preamble) Apart from such a significance, language is described as a personal matter; i.e., one of the most central aspects of the identity or symbol of ethnicity. Even it is argued that as a means of self-identification, the existence of the separate identity and enjoyment and preservation of a distinct minority culture depends on the survival of the mother tongue, which is vital for the transmission of customs and traditions.

Basic aspects of linguistic rights (in both public and private) are about the formal or official status of these traditional languages, the extent of their use in judicial and administrative processes, use of particular languages in having personal names and place names, enjoyment of the linguistic rights in the sphere of education (opportunity to learn minority languages in educational curriculum or receiving education in mother tongue), the opportunity to access media facilities (public or private) in minority languages.

As was noted before, traditional human rights treaties state the freedom of expression in their various articles but there is no clear reference to the specific linguistic rights within European Convention, ICESCR and ICCPR. Article 27 of ICCPR may be noted as an exception. On the other hand, new instruments explicitly guarantee linguistic rights of the minorities in both public and private. Article 2 (1) of UN Declaration proclaims the right of persons belonging to national minorities to use their own languages in private and in public freely and without interference or any forms of discrimination. Article 10 (1) of Framework Convention also focuses on similar points. Within OSCE process, the Oslo Recommendations is designed to provide a useful reference for the development of the state policies and laws which will contribute to an effective implementation of the language rights of persons belonging to national minorities, especially in public sphere. Article 7 of the Charter for Minority Languages while recognising the regional or minority languages as an expression of cultural wealth, requires the participating states to facilitate and encourage the use of regional or minority languages in speech and writing, in public and private life. With respect to the use of minority language in judicial and administrative process, related texts agree on the rights of persons belonging to national minorities to be informed in a language they understand, to acquire civil documents in both official language and traditional one. In the case of the trials, they should be able to defend themselves in their mother tongues and even to get the assistance of interpreters. Article 9 and 10 of Charter for Minority Languages regulates the responsibilities of the parties on these issues. Article 10 (3) of Framework Convention also guarantees the linguistic rights in judiciary. The same Framework in Article 11 (1) guarantees the right to use personal surname and first names in minority language and the right to official recognition of them and Article 11 (2) states the right to display traditional local names, street names and other topographical indications intended for the public also in the minority languages.

Enjoyment of cultural rights in the sphere of media is one of the most problematic issues in the sense that it has taken a long time for the states to develop progressive policies in this area. In principle, it is obvious in these instruments that having right to access to media facilities (TV and radio broadcasting, newspapers, journals) in mother tongues and languages on non-discriminatory basis is not only part of right to freedom of expression as one of the fundamental human rights and

but also quite vital for the minorities to receive and transmit information, to communicate and effectively participate in cultural, religious, social, economic and public life in an effective way. Article 19 of ICCPR and Article 10 of European Convention regulate the right of everyone to freedom of expression. Article 11 of Charter for Minority Languages, while underlining that radio and TV carry out a public service mission gives a detailed description of the right to access to media and adds that "no restrictions will be placed on the freedom of expression and free circulation of information in the written press in a language used in identical or similar form to a regional or minority language" (Article 11/2). Framework Convention in Article 9 (2) provides "… right to licensing, without discrimination and based on objective criteria of sound radio and television broadcasting, or cinema enterprises" and 9 (4) requires states to adopt adequate measures to facilitate these rights.

The first principle of Hague Recommendations emphasises the significance of acquiring proper knowledge of mother tongue during the educational process belonging to national minorities for the preservation of their identity. In this respect, they have right to establish and manage their own educational institutions in conformity with domestic law so in the light of the principles of equality and non-discrimination states have responsibilities to develop special measures to implement minority language education rights (in the form of the financial assistance or assistance for the access to textbooks, training of teachers and etc.) Similarly Copenhagen Document in 32 (2) mentions the rights of persons belonging to national minorities to establish and maintain their own educational, cultural and religious institutions and in 34 to have adequate opportunities for instruction of their mother tongue or in their mother tongue. Article 13 (1) of Framework Convention also stipulates "Within the framework of their education systems, the Parties shall recognise that persons belonging to a national minority have the right to set up and to manage their own private educational and training establishments." Furthermore, while Article 14 (1) states the right to learn minority language, 14 (2) underlines the right to have adequate opportunities for being taught the minority language or receiving instruction in this language. Article 4 (3) of UN Declaration also deals with the same point.

Part of the educational rights of the minority groups is related to the content of educational curriculum. In this sense, states are expected to make arrangements to incorporate and teach the culture, history, religion and belief of various ethnic, linguistic or religious groups in general curriculum and to prepare a proper program. If we take into consideration the fact that formal education is one of the most influential socialisation means, its impact within the larger society can be better understood. State educational policies may easily create negative image of various groups but also may spread the values of tolerance and cultural pluralism and mutual respect among the various groups. On this basis Article 4 (4) of UN Declaration necessitates proper measures in order to encourage knowledge of the history, traditions, language and cultures of the minorities and Copenhagen Document in the preparation of school curriculum, wants states to incorporate the extensive information about the history and culture of national minorities. Article 12 of Framework Convention and Article 8 of Charter for Minority Languages focuses on the same matter in the field of education.

There are, of course, many other cultural rights like the right to establish and maintain associations and institutions, use of mother tongue in religious practices which may be regarded as one of the important components of identity, or practice of cultural activities, festivals, having libraries, cultural centers, academics, theatres, spread of literary work or cinemas etc. which understandably contribute to the participation of various groups in everyday life on equal footing. However, details of these rights are very beyond the scope of this study.

To summarize, the positive contribution of the new instruments to establishment norms in the field of cultural rights gradually have become part of general human rights standards and the provision of these rights have been seen essential for the peace, security and stability and for a democratic order based on rule of law. In this respect, the states having ethnic groups or minorities are now, under their political and legal obligations, expected to take positive steps not only for toleration but also for the preservation and promotion of many cultural rights. Moreover, there is an increasing awareness that the civil and political rights on the one hand, and socio-economic and cultural rights on the other, should be complementary. **(34)**

However, there are also serious limits to the effective practice of these rights. First of all, while new instruments create positive obligation for the participating states in the field of cultural rights they possess weak enforcement mechanism limiting themselves to the establishment of advisory committees or supervisory bodies, so states is enabled to behave in a flexible way in interpretation and practice of these rights. Secondly, rights recognised in these documents are defined on individual basis not group one. All these documents use the phrase of "the right of persons belonging to national minorities" and not "rights of minorities". Further, although there is no definite definition of the term minority, it may be defined as a particular group possessing common national, cultural, religious or linguistic identity. These documents mention about the national minorities, but there are various ethnic, linguistic or religious groups who raise claim for cultural rights yet do not have formal minority status granted by the states. Of course, these communities also enjoy several relevant rights however; this situation may also enable states to act in flexible ways and to interpret cultural rights in a restrictive manner. These problems demonstrate that more efforts are needed to produce legally binding rules and norms, and an effective enforcement mechanism in this field.

3.2. The Problem of Multiculturalism in Turkey

In the context of the problematic of this study, the issues of the status of the minorities, their rights and the positions of other groups are important aspects of the understanding of issues of multiculturalism in Turkey. As a member of international community and of some international organizations, it can be expected that the provisions, principles and norms regarding the rights of the minorities, which are defined in international and regional instruments should have a binding factor in the functioning of the domestic legislative process, and should be part of the legislation and regulations. However when we look at the existing trend it is observed that these norms and principles are taken into the consideration in very restrictive senses due to the unwillingness of the state to apply and ratify them.

Turkish state is party to some basic international treaties including European Convention on Human rights, European Social Charter, UN Convention on the

Rights of the Child and International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (signed, not ratified). Apart from these legal obligations Turkey has also moral and political commitments within the international community. Turkey from the time of its establishment in 1975 has participated first in CSCE and then OSCE process, accepted the principles and provisions of Helsinki Final Act Document, Charter of Paris for a New Europe and Copenhagen Document by putting its signature. Hence, at least in principle and at moral level all the recommendations issued by OSCE having human dimension, especially those related to the minority rights should be binding for Turkey. No enforcement mechanism can force the state to obey these principles but incompatibility with the provisions of these documents may decrease the credibility of Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey is also expected to sign and ratify and to be bound by other agreements, and also to withdraw its reservations. The main treaties that Turkey has not ratified are ICCPR together with its optional protocols and ICESCR established within the context of the UN. Turkey, as one of the founding members of the Council of Europe, is also required to be party to the documents of European Charter on Minority Languages and Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.

On the basis of a survey carried out in 51 states OSCE issued the Report on the Linguistic Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities in the OSCE Area, which aimed at demonstrating the enjoyment of linguistic rights with various aspects. **(35)** The Report, firstly, emphasises that the number of persons belonging to national minorities, the number of minority groups, and their geographic concentration may shape state policies. In this sense, some states have broad linguistic groups having minority status or in some states they are not regarded as such. Furthermore, as is indicated in the text, though Report does not intend to examine the compatibility of each state's domestic law and practice with international standards, it is noted that states may be under different obligations depending on the treaties to which they are party (OSCE Report, 1999). In this respect, the Report concludes regarding the linguistic rights of the minorities that, due to the some factors like demographic facts, level of the economic prosperity which is significant in determining the amount of resources used for minority rights, the degree of incorporation of the values of the democracy and human rights, there are differences in the practices of the states. Secondly, it is suggested that the lawmakers in the states should be better informed

about the implications of the international instruments about the issue. In accordance with these, the states should develop policies through more official and legal methods in their legislation. Even though such a legal regulation on minority rights does not guarantee the full enjoyment of these rights, this at least, will be an important attempt to prevent arbitrary interference with minority rights and for full implementation of international standards. Then a close interaction and communication between the states and the minorities are vital for the determination of the needs of these groups

Then the Report articulates a number of recommendations; i.e., states should give a kind of status or recognition to non-official languages, provide access to administrative and judicial authorities in minority languages, become sensitive in the teaching of and in minority languages and also in teaching about minority cultures in the educational curriculum and enable the groups for easy access to the media by means of broadcasting in their own language and preparing programmes in minority languages etc (OSCE Report, 1999).

Turkey was among these 51 states answering the questions of the survey in 1997. For some questions, for instance, Turkey answered that general curriculum includes teaching of languages of national minorities and also a program of teaching about its own national minorities. Further Turkey stated that it has one official language without granting special status for others and that national minorities have the right to establish private schools together with public funding. For the question of access to media facilities Turkey noted that there are eight newspapers or magazines in Armenian without any permission to a minority group to establish its own private TV and radio stations. Though officially recognised minorities were taken into account in answering these questions, there is a consensus that apart from these formal minorities there are many cultural, linguistic, ethnic, religious groups within Turkey although it took quite long time to recognise their existences at state level (Tacar, 1998:14).

In fact, as will be discussed in successive sections, the general debates on multiculturalism in Turkey mostly turn around the problem of recognition of the distinct identities of sub-cultures of various ethnic, linguistic and religious groups such as Laz, Alevis, Roma, Kurds and Assyrians. And the main issues about this

problem are right to freedom of expression and then the problem of minority (official and non-official) rights embracing right to use language and mother tongue in various spheres like in education and media. As is known, they are also incorporated in international and regional instruments, which deal with the question as a vital component of human rights and democratic standards and also as a necessary step in the achievement of peace, stability and security within the states. In this respect, as was noted before it is assumed that proper arrangements in this field will also enhance the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of the states. Thereby, it can be concluded from the beginning, the question of multiculturalism in Turkey is closely related to the settlement of democratic values and universal human rights standards within the society. On the other hand, for those holding political authority the issue has been evaluated with respect to the interests of the state. Unity and territorial integrity and the indivisibility of the borders have been main consideration for many matters. To put it another way, for instance, for long time diversity has been seen as a danger to a national unity, i.e., an understanding which has given way to the suppression of cultural differences by means of structural and legal restrictions and rejection of existence of different identities like those of the Kurds. On this basis, demands for any cultural right have been linked to the terror and are perceived as a source of secession, which would damage the integrity, and unitary structure of the state (HRA, 2000: 101 and Tacar, 1996: 138-140). **(36)**

Such a perception has found its best reflection in the legal and political arrangements and regulations. As is known, on the basis of its international obligations Turkey is one of the states granting linguistic rights and educational rights to its minorities. The statuses of the minorities (non-Muslim community) were determined by Treaty of Lausanne and Turkish-Bulgarian Friendship Treaty (Tacar, 1996: 81 and HRA, 2000: 16). **(37)** For that reason the existence of other cultural, ethnic or religious identities and groups other than Jewish, Greek and Armenian have been denied and this has been tried to be justified by the argument that Turkey is the unitary state and Turkish ness or Turkish citizenship as a legal bond embrace all the citizens of the state and enable them to enjoy equal rights and obligations. Article 66 of the Constitution also supports this argument which states that "everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk" (HRA, 2000: 13). Moreover this description is called constitutional citizenship within the Constitution.

However it is argued that though in principle the concept may have integrative force for all regardless of ethnic, cultural origins it may, at the same time, be manipulated to assimilate those who are not of Turkish origin.

However, as is written down in one of the texts published by the Human Rights Association, the restrictive measures within the Turkish legal system are not limited to the problem of narrow definition of official minorities. Some basic laws like the Association Law, Law on Radio and Television and Television Establishment and Broadcasting, Political Parties Law, Population Law, Law on Provincial Administration, Law of Foreign Language Education include many provisions that both establish limitation for the right to freedom of expression, and impose quite serious obstacles in the way of recognition and representation of cultures, languages, ethnic origins of many groups. Furthermore they also restrict the participation of these communities in the everyday life on the basis general human rights. For that reason, it has been argued that Turkish political and legal system is characterized by the underestimation of pluralist (ethnic, cultural) structure of the society and of democratic values (HRA, 2000: 103). **(38)**

Even though the detailed description of the codes stated above is not the subject of this study, some examples may be illustrative in demonstrating the general situation. According to the Article 3 of Turkish Constitution "Turkish state, with its territory and nation is an indivisible entity. Language is Turkish." Such an emphasis is also embedded in various articles of the constitution (KHRP, 1997: 7). Most related to our problem, some articles specify the conditions before the freedom of use of language, education and freedom of expression. As is noted in a publication of Kurdish Human Rights Project, according to Article 26 in the expression and diffusion of opinions no language banned by law could be used and similarly to Article 28 which while guaranteeing the freedom of press banned the use of any language in press not officially recognised. The provisions of these articles are based on the Law No: 2932, which specified Turkish as the native language of Turkish citizens and prohibited any language other than the first official languages of countries recognized by the Turkish Republic. The repeal of this law and so the articles 26 and 28 in 1991 has been seen as a considerable step for the reform in the field of linguistic rights. Moreover, in the field of education Turkish is determined as

the medium of education in all Turkish schools. Article 42 explicitly states "No language other than Turkish may be taught to Turkish citizens as a mother language in education and teaching institutions. Foreign language to be taught in institutions of training and education and the rules to be followed by schools conducting training and education in a foreign language shall be determined by law. The provisions of international treaties are reserved." According to this Law of Foreign Language Education Council of Ministers together with the opinion of the National Security Council will determine the foreign languages to be taught in Turkey (KHRP, 1997: 32 and HRA, 2000: 79). It is also this law that regulates the right of opening the private minority schools by the non-Muslim minorities. Regarding the content of education, the Basic Law on National Education specifies the main objective of Turkish national education system as training of the Turkish Nation and in this respect it requires an "education in the quality of protecting, developing, promoting and appropriating national cultural values" (HRA, 2000: 24). **(39)**

On the other hand, from the beginning of the 1990's some positive reforms have been put into practice. Abolishment of law 2932 banning the use of language in expression, speech and press not officially recognized has already been mentioned. Such an attempt has imprecise implications yet it is said that this amendment has opened the way of use of other mother languages, especially Kurdish, in non-political communication. Following this legal change the spread of song, music and literature in Kurdish language has been observed. Besides several newspapers and magazines have been published, for a short time some radio stations using Kurdish were opened. However, this regulation has not embraced the use of other mother languages in education or in broadcast media, public or private (KHRP, 1997: 26-31 and Tacar, 1996: 95). Indeed, the 1994 Law on the Television and Radio Organisation and their Broadcasts necessitates the exclusive use of the Turkish in certain circumstances. So licenses are not being issued for TV or radio channels to broadcasts in other mother languages. **(40)**

At this instance, an important issue should be briefly mentioned. As was implied before, the problem of multiculturalism is seen, as part of the problem of democratization and settlement of human rights values within the state and rights of people from Kurdish origin is vital component of this question though the whole

issue of multiculturalism should not and cannot be reduced to this reality. However, although not explicitly stated (in the successive sections it will be tried to show that) the discussions on minority rights are matched to the cultural rights of especially the Kurds who do not have minority status but de facto accepted as minority. Besides when the different cultural, ethnic identities of different groups have been recognised at the state level, as has been observed in the public speeches of politicians, the Kurds have been the main subject of this recognition (Tacar, 1996). **(41)**

3.3. The Impact of the European Integration Process upon the Multiculturalism Question in Turkey

Democratisation and development of human rights values based on the rule of law can be seen as a process conditioned by both external and internal dynamics. How internal dynamics or democratic forces can provide an impetus for this process depends on many factors including the political culture, historical conditions, economic development level, nature of class relations i.e. factors which may shape, for instance, the nature of the relationships between the state and its citizens. It will not be wrong to generalize that from the time of the foundation of the Republic, internal dynamics have played limited role in the settlement of democratic values, freedom and equality within the society and the weakness is the result of many factors analysis of which is very beyond the scope of this section. In fact, Turkey is one of the countries in which practice of reforms, adoption of democratic measures to a great extent depends on the external dynamics.

In Turkey the important aspects of the understanding of multiculturalism are narrowly defined and, thus rights and freedoms of those belonging to different ethnic, cultural groups and having distinct languages are formally denied. On the other hand, Turkish state recently has recognised the existence of these groups and even made limited political and legal arrangements in order to enable those people to make use of specific rights like the use of their language in everyday life and press without granting them any minority status. However, these policy changes should not be linked directly to the good intention of the political authority for the reason that the protection of basic human rights and democratic values in general and the

acknowledgement of minority rights have been of great significance and importance in the improvement of Turkey-EU relationships. As is known according to Copenhagen Criteria membership to the Union requires the candidate states to meet the political conditions, which include stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. As one of the countries wishing to become a member of the EU, Turkey is also required both to adopt these principles and also to put them into practice in everyday life. Otherwise it is stipulated that the actual negotiations for membership will not begin.

At its summit in Helsinki in December, the EU recognised Turkey as a candidate for membership. Then in the light of the priorities set in the first Accession Partnership in March 2001 and then revised Accession Partnership in April 2003 Turkey now has to carry out necessary regulations and reforms which should be specified in a National Programme in order for full adoption and implementation of Copenhagen political criteria and so for membership to the Union. As it is explained in Accession Partnership Document, such a stage will enable candidate states to adjust their administrative structures, to incorporate the acquis into legislation and to achieve its actual operation. The priority areas in the Partnership Document according to the ability of each candidate to implement its obligations are set out in short and medium term. On this basis the candidates are demanded to prepare a National Programme for accession that reflects Accession Partnership. The National Programme is necessary both for the adoption of acquis and also determining the timetable needed for the implementation and enforcement of proper measures within this process. Then the process will be supervised by means of the Regular Reports from the European Commission on the progress towards accession.

As has just been articulated, the first Accession Partnership with Turkey was prepared in March 2001. In the political criteria section of the document short-term priorities are specified as;

> Strengthening legal and constitutional guarantees for the right to freedom of expression in line with Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights, right to freedom of associations and peaceful assembly and encourage development of civil society, strengthening opportunities for legal redress

against all violations of human rights, removing any legal provisions forbidding the use by Turkish citizens of their mother tongues in TV/radio broadcasting.

Medium term requirements necessitate the guarantee of full enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all individuals and without any discrimination, ratification of ICCPR and its optional protocol and of ICESCR, achievement of cultural diversity and guarantee of cultural rights for all citizens irrespective of their origin and repeal of any legal provision preventing the enjoyment of these rights including those in the educational field.

In the light of the provisions listed in the Partnership Document, Turkey adopted a National Programme on March 19, 2001. Since even the political criteria section is prepared with many details, only some of the points related to the discussions can be noted. In a general sense within the text, Turkish government articulates its commitments to adopt the acquis for accession and in this sense the government is supposed to spread up its efforts and work on political, administrative reforms. Within this framework on the basis of EU standards and international obligations, the aim is to establish and settle a more participatory democracy, balance the powers among the state organs in the light of the principle of the rule of the law. Within this reform process the question of democracy and human rights will take priority and the Constitution will be revised. The constitutional amendments will determine the framework of regulations in legislation. The National Programme Document specifies many reforms in both short and medium term matching the principles within the Accession Partnership involving those reforms on freedom of thought and expression, freedom of association, right to peaceful assembly and civil society, prevention of torture, strengthening of the possibilities of the corrections of human rights violations, training of civil servants on human rights issues, functions of judiciary including the State Security Courts, elimination of death penalty, reforms on cultural rights and individual freedom, abolition of imbalances among the regions in terms of economic, social and cultural opportunities, enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by all people without discrimination and right to freedom of religion and conscience, the status of National Security Council, improvement the conditions of the prisons and elimination of state of emergency law.

In 2.1.1 Article on freedom of thought and expression the government articulates that the related provisions in the Constitution and other legislation will be revised within the context of the Article 10 of European Human Rights Convention and on the basis of unitary structure and maintenance of national unity of the state. In the light of this general aim, for instance, the revision of Article 7 and 9 of Anti-Terror Law, Article 312 of Turkish Penal Code and other legislation on fundamental rights and freedoms are stipulated. According to 2.1.9 Section on Cultural Life and Individual Rights, the official language and formal education language of Turkish Republic is Turkish. But this does not prevent the citizens to use their different languages, dialects and tongues in their daily life and this freedom cannot be abused for the purposes of separation and division. **(42)**

The year of 2003 has witnessed many reforms within Turkish legislation. After the European Commission's Regular Report 2002, the revised Accession Partnership of Turkey was prepared in April 2003 on the basis of short term priorities which are expected to be completed in 2003/2004 and those medium term requirements under the heading of Enhanced Dialogue and Political Criteria which should be carried out during the years of 2003/2004. Turkey is required to ratify ICCPR and its optional protocol, ICESRR, Protocol No: 6 of European Convention on Human Rights together with the compliance with European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In addition to other political regulations, for example, for the prevention of torture, Turkey, as was indicated in the first Partnership Document and National Programme, is demanded to take measures for the guarantee of enjoyment of all basic human rights and freedoms by all individuals without discrimination including those measures for the freedom of expression, freedom of press, association, peaceful assembly in conformity with its obligations under relevant international and regional treaties. The Document more specifically necessitates reforms related to the exercise of freedom of thought, conscience and religion by all individuals and religious communities and requires Turkey

> [T]o establish conditions for the functioning of these communities, in line with the practice of EU member states. This includes legal and judicial protection of the communities, their members and their assets, teaching,

appointing and training of clergy and enjoyment of property rights in line with Protocol No: 1 of ECHR (2003 Revised Accession Partnership Document).

The revised Accession Partnership also states that Turkey is under the responsibility to carry out appropriate legal regulations in order to achieve cultural diversity and to enable all the citizens irrespective of their origins to enjoy their cultural rights. In order to ensure free access to radio and TV broadcasting and educational facilities in languages other than Turkish, the Turkish government should eliminate the existing structural and legal restrictions. **(43)**

As an important stage within this process Turkish government is working to prepare a revised National Programme by taking into account those recommendations within the revised Accession Partnership and this will most probably be accepted in the Parliament. However, before this, a new law on the Amendment of some laws, which is presented to the public and media under the name of 6th Harmonisation Package, has been recently adopted by the Parliament on 19 June 2003. The Package involves amendments related to the problem of this study like enhancement of freedom of thought and expression, for the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms by all individuals without discrimination. **(44)** Through amendments in the Law on Radio and Television Establishment and Broadcasting in the Article of 4 regulated in Article 14 of the package it is specified that both public and private radio and television stations can undertake broadcasting in different languages, tongues and dialects used by Turkish citizens in their daily life. In the Article 5 of the package, 16 (4) of Registration Law (Law on Census or Population Law) No: 1587 regarding the names of children the statement of "those names inappropriate to our national culture, our customs and traditions might not be given" is removed. Furthermore, as a result of amendment in the Article 2 of the Construction Law it is stated that by taking into account the physical conditions of the region and needs of worship by different religions and faiths; necessary places of worship may be founded. (Article 6 of the Package) This change is interpreted as a contribution to the improvement of freedom of religion. Related to the rights of the communities, through the amendment to the Article 1 of the Foundation Law the registration for application period allowed for community foundations to acquire real

estate under their possession is extended from 6 months to 18 months (Article 2 of the Package).

Because it is not aimed at explaining all the legal regulations and their results together with the process of integration to the EU, only some symbolic reform attempts have been stated briefly. However, what is worth nothing, as such a general description of this process displays, is the implications of these legal reforms. Since Turkey was declared as candidate country for membership the necessary steps within the reform process has been completed very rapidly and it seems it will continue in the same line. As a result the democratic values and human rights standards, which are specified within Copenhagen political criteria, would be incorporated to both Constitution and legal system. Of course, it goes without saying that this also necessitates full compliance to the related international and regional legal and political instruments, their incorporation to the domestic legislation and also taking measures for the realisation and implementation of the principles within these documents in everyday life.

Perhaps most importantly, all reform attempts clearly demonstrate how the European Union as an external factor has functioned as one of the main dynamics, in the democratisation and political liberalization process and the settlement of human rights standards and rule of law within the country. To put it another way, the dynamics of accession to the European Union and of Copenhagen Criteria defining the requirements for membership have played such a role that it has become the source of many political improvement. This opened the discussion of many issues like the rights of minorities, status of many different ethnic, religious and cultural groups and their rights. First of all, the recent political and legal reforms and whole positive trend stimulated by the EU process, and the impact of the international and regional instruments to which Turkey is party or expected to be party may have a great potential in the formation of a political culture and a kind of society oriented to and shaped by multicultural values. Secondly, Turkey at least, has had to confront the reality that Turkish society has a multicultural structure including many ethnic, religious, linguistic groups, minorities, and that under its international legal and political obligation, Turkey should take essential measures to maintain and promote the multicultural structure of the society. In this sense, the problem of

multiculturalism has gradually been an influential dynamic in the solution of not only cultural rights but also general democratization question of the country. **(45)**

In this section, through making a descriptive explanation of the principles, provisions and articles developed within the international instruments regarding the cultural rights the suggestion may be that by going beyond its normative premises, the question of multiculturalism may be one of the issues that challenges the European politics. In the sub-section about Turkey the influence of the process of the accession to the EU in making the challenge of multiculturalism as one of the dynamics within the political system has been mentioned on the basis of the legal reforms that the government has carried out recently. In the next chapter, firstly the question of multiculturalism in Turkey will be examined within a historical and political framework and then with reference to the perspectives of the political parties and the civil society organizations. As the main problematic of the study while analysing how they perceive the issue the relevance of the process of EU integration to the debates on the problem of multiculturalism will be explained.

CHAPTER IV

THE PERCEPTION OF AND THE RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION OF MULTICULTURALISM IN TURKEY: INTERVIEWS WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS

4.1. The Ideological Constraints of the Republican Nation-State

The previous section on Turkey has dealt with the problem of multiculturalism at formal level as is reflected in legislation and legal arrangements. However as will be accepted, on the basis of the formal or official implications of the legal arrangements it will be quite problematic to reach into the specific and clear conclusions about the comprehension of the notion of multiculturalism in Turkey. For those reasons in this section, a brief description of the political context and of specific circumstances within which the issue of multiculturalism and identity concerns have come into agenda of Turkish politics will be made. This will be followed by the assessment of the in-depth interviews with the political and social actors, who in one sense or another have concerns about these matters.

As has been explained in the previous parts, it was the economic and political conditions of the 1970's that paved the way for the rise of multiculturalism as a new type of politics and discourse within the Western European countries. Turkey has faced a similar situation in the 1990's but within different circumstances. In Turkey it has been mainly the Islamic and Kurdish movements that have raised claims on the basis of their identities, and these politicized groups have criticized state policies within a different framework. In a very general sense the official understanding of secularization and ethnicist definition of the nation, which are accompanied by assimilationist and discriminative tendencies, have been criticized

and the roots of these issues can be traced back to the process of the nation- building and modernization experienced in Turkey.

Adamantia Pollis points out that modernization and nation-building experiences of the non-Western countries differentiate from those observed in Europe in important senses. These countries after gaining their national independence aimed at achievement of military and economic development, and enacted legislative reforms in conformity with the ideal of westernization. And it was not the bourgeoisie that directed the process, which was the case in Europe but the state that had led and strictly controlled all the changes until the emergence of local bourgeoisie. Furthermore newly adopted state structures and legal/political reforms did not replace the old structures instead they were established on the existing structures. In other words, political system, social, economic and cultural structures were subject to a serious intervention however what was produced was the mixture of tradition and externally forced modern structures without necessary ideological and social integration. In this sense, democratic values (in liberal sense), participation of the masses were not the concern of those state elites directing modernization therefore the individual was conceived only as part of the community together with her/his obligations within the hierarchy. Actually, one of the main targets in this non-western experience of modernization was to achieve state- led economic development through using the modern state structures, and the use of force was the prevalent instrument in the hands of the state elites. Adoption of the state capitalism was the pre condition of development of capitalism in Turkey and indeed state functioned as an instrument in the transition to the industrial capitalism (Pollis, 1999).

As many historians and scholars emphasise Turkey's experience of modernization has followed a similar path. As an example of how the western ideal of modernity is internalized locally, in Turkish case, modernization was equated to westernization, and was directed from above during the process of establishing a nation-state (Keyder, 1997:37-42). While this selective experience lacked key elements of modernization like a bourgeois class, the state agents in their project of the state led modernization imported and used the universalistic claims of the western model, and these values were used by the leaders of the new Republic in order to promote their particular goals (Kasaba, 1997: 27). In their views the ideal of

progress was identified with the achievement of Western civilization in terms of economic and technological development and parallel to this it was claimed that the main purpose of all reforms in the transition from a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Empire to a republican nation state is to reach the level of contemporary Western civilization (Gülalp, 1997:58 and Göle, 1997: 85).

Furthermore the adopted reforms both served to establish a modernized state structure and achieve economic development, and also a social transformation. Indeed, Sungur Savran says that as soon as the political revolution was completed, the Kemalist leadership attempted to eliminate traditional obstacles in order for a rapid development of capitalism. This was followed by the total transformation of legal sphere through abolition of religious influences (Savran, 2002: 8). Part of this project was the social control necessary for the ideal of classless, unprivileged and harmonious society. Thus the official policies of secularization and nationalism have been perceived as the means of ensuring order, stability and social control so the behaviours and daily customs of the people were supervised under a new secular, modern and cultural model characterized by the ideological use of the notions of positivism and scientific rationality. The policies stated above are significant in displaying how the Kemalist leadership in their consciousness and thinking were far from adapting to the liberal ideology because the state elites in enacting reforms were suspicious of civil rights and democratic participation. Hence any kind of social, cultural and political differentiation was equated to instability and threat to unity and progress (Göle: 1997, 83). It is because of this authoritarian perspective that many scholars give attention to the gap between the modernizing state agents and the rest of the society.

The relation between state and religion has constituted one of the most important questions of the Turkish politics since the foundation of the Republic. As is known, Islam and Islamic principles constituted the basis of the Ottoman Empire as a source of belonging. The founders of the Republic in their target for cultural transformation intended to replace the Islamic values with enlightened reasoning through the ideal of secularization since these norms were perceived in contradiction to everything related to progress and civilization (Heper, 2000: 64). For the state elites secularization did not mean the separation of state and religion or the neutrality of the state vis a vis the religious affairs. Subordination and supervision of religious

practices was achieved through the establishment of the institution of Directorate General of Religious Affairs having the official right of interpretation of religion. (Buğra, 2002: 107). This was followed by the intense socialization in conformity with the consolidation of the secular values in the sphere of education, enactment of laws about wearing of religious symbols and clothing in the public institutions (White, 2002: 34). In this sense the Kemalist leadership held the religious expression of Islam and religious affairs as private matter related to the question of the individual belief and consciousness hence religion was kept out of public field. However in adopting state-centered secularization, they consciously neglected the role of the religion as a historical cultural and social dynamic within the worldly social life (Atay, 1998: 100-101). However the control of the religion for the interests of the state has continued in different forms within the politics yet in the 1990's this policy has produced contrary outcomes giving way to the rise of the Islamic movement as an influential political force and to the questioning of state's official definition of secularization.

On the other hand, in creation of a secular identity, nationalism emerged as a new unifying principle replacing the religion. The official nationalism can be described, as a policy concerned with building and consolidating the power of the nation state on the basis of the cultural project of westernisation and secularization and then it became one of the founding principles of the Republic. At the time of the establishment of the republic there was a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society and there was no integrated or unitary polity corresponding to the notion of the nation-state. Therefore those carrying out the political revolution highlighted the civic basis of Turkish identity and civic notion of nationalism. In this respect Turk was defined as those people living within the boundaries of the state and accepting its basic principles, and Turkish nationalism was presented on the basis of the "idea of living together within the same boundaries under the same laws and sharing the same morality and language" (Aydın, 2002: 90). However because the aim was to produce a culturally homogeneous population of the nation state and to consolidate the idea of Turkishness and nationhood it was expected that ethnic and linguistic differences would eventually disappear when the individuals suppress their own identities. In Turkish case it was after the foundation of the nation state that the state attempted to determine the content of Turkishness therefore in practice ethnic-cultural dimensions

of nationhood emphasizing the ethnic singularity of Turk, common history and unity in language, culture and purpose have coexisted with and even prevailed over the civil understanding, which assumes the equal membership of all living within the boundaries irrespective of their ethnic origins (Aydın, 2002: 90). Both ethnic and civil components of the nationhood have contributed to the formation of Turkish national and secular identity yet their coexistence has always been the source of tension.

Moreover, Ahmet Yıldız underlines that Kemalist nationalism at the last instance, distinguished the membership to the nation from membership to the state as citizen but in practice in order to use the citizenship rights it has been necessary to have the objective and subjective preconditions of being Turk (Yıldız, 2001: 214). In this respect, it can be suggested that Turkish nation has been defined in terms of Turkish ethnicity far from becoming a common identity embracing whole population and functioning as an integrative force, and that comprehension of the notion of citizenship does not rest on a social contract or membership to a political community yet is connected to the belonging to national ethnic culture. This indicates a holistic and communitarian sense of citizenship. In this understanding, all the members are assumed to share a common good and idea of belonging to a cultural community therefore social cohesion is achieved not through participation but solidarity (Üstel, 2001: 280-282). Furthermore under this project state policies in the fields of language and education have reinforced the ethnicist dimension of the membership to the community. In this project Turkish language has been granted the role of both creating a common identity and an idea of "us". In the process of the cultural and social transformation of the society language policies have been regarded as significant instruments in intervening the cultural sphere in the formation of a common national culture.

This understanding and the relevant measures have constituted the rational basis of assimilationist policies of the state   especially in its relations with the non-Muslim and Kurdish population. In fact because the public sphere, which has been defined as neutral and harmonious sphere and politics in general were closed to all religious or ethnic differences and class-based demands. The existences of such cases were regarded as threat to national unity and spirit so their public appearances were prohibited (Yıldız, 2001: 215). For instance, with respect to the non- Muslim

communities the state elites adopted the measures of Turkification through a series of language policies like the campaign of "speak Turkish". In this campaign Jewish community had been targeted. This was also perceived as the precondition of benefiting the citizenship rights therefore those sections of society were deprived of enjoying full citizenship status and the number of these communities has decreased dramatically[2] (Bali, 1998:175-176).

As the significant elements of the nation-state building project the principles of secularism and nationalism have also contributed to the formation of both the official ideology of the state, that is, Kemalism and of the new state structure. Indeed Atatürk has always remained as an image and a powerful symbol of the main principles to the extent that he and the rest of the elites built the republic on the basis of these principles. Mesut Yeğen says that Kemalism was the product of the Turkish experience of modernization and westernization and he identifies it with both a radical secularism against Islam and tradition, and a sense of nationalism aiming at achieving cultural homogeneity under totalizing, repressive and authoritarian state structure (Yeğen, 2001a: 56-58). Within this structure bureaucracy and the military officers have always been powerful components of the ruling elite. In the early years of the republic Kemalism as the official ideology adopted a defensive and repressive position in order to accommodate and strengthen the regime and was characterized by its anti-liberal standing. However in the course of time especially together with the transition to multi-party regime the official ideology has turned into an instrument of both regulating the power relations within the system and of gaining political power (Şen, 1998: 138). One of the important outcomes of this situation has been the distinction and sometimes conflicitual relationships between the state elites (bureaucracy and military officers) as the guardian of Republican values of secularism and cultural nationalism, and the political elites, which have been

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[2] This campaign was organised by the Student Community of Faculty of Law of Istanbul University (Dar-ul- funun Hukuk Fakültesi Talebe Cemiyeti) on 13th of January 1928 in order to force the minorities to speak Turkish. According to Rıfat N. Bali this was a new step in the process of the Turkification of the minorities. Through this the advocators of the campaign attempted to prevent the use of the languages other than Turkish within the public sphere. This campaign was carried out in places where there was a huge population of the minorities like İstanbul, İzmir and Edirne. During the campaign the resistance of the minorities was observed and even there were cases of the use of violence and clashes. However the campaign of "Citizen! Speak Turkish" had lost its impetus in April. Though it disturbed the positions of the minorities the campaign did not produce a viable outcome regarding the use of Turkish among the minorities. For more information about this event see R. F. Bali (Bali, 2000).

assumed to represent the particular interests of the people and to place narrow political interests over the general interests of the state (Heper, 2000: 73). In a sense such a distinction has also constituted one of the legitimate grounds of the intervention of the army to the political life holding political power in confronting political and economic crises undermining the functioning of the system.

As is known, Turkey's Constitution defines the country as an indivisible entity constituted and governed by the lines developed by Atatürk, and the military is charged with the role of protecting the state from both external and internal threats. The military has also seen it as its duty to defend the secular republic against a variety of internal threats and to establish the authority of the state under the Kemalist principles. This self-claimed role of the military has been enhanced by the ambiguous concept of national security and national unity since it is these notions that have enabled the armed forces to use the rhetoric that Turkey is under constant threat from internal and external enemies. In these senses there is a close relationship between the official ideology and the Turkish military in that the military acts and defines its role on a legitimate basis determined by the Kemalist ideology. It has been through such an assumed legitimacy that the military adopts the role of the guardian of the state as neutral entity above the daily politics. Secondly it has also contributed to the reproduction of the official ideology through spreading and integrating it to the whole system, to the practices of the political actors and every individual (Şen, 1998: 139 and Cizre, 2001:156). On the basis of these two functions, it has possessed a strategic position in directing the politics in the name of official ideology and as the agent of westernisation and modernisation of the Republic.

In this respect there has emerged a tendency for the extensive supervision of civil political life, i.e., a tendency gradually consolidated by three military interventions until the 1990's. And in each case the army took control of political process and social life, and determined the conditions of transition to the democracy. However as Ümit Cizre underlines the political influence of the military, its ability to direct the political process through the military interventions cannot be explained with reference to the assumption that it wants to maintain its institutional and political autonomy vis a vis other political actors. Instead it is the economic and political dynamics and the military's position within the social conflicts that enables it to have this influence (Cizre, 2001: 174-175). For instance displaying the gap

between the state elites and political parties which have been perceived as sectarian and incompetent in 1960 the military intervened in the intra-class struggle (Savran, 2002:11). on the basis of the assertion that Democrat Party (DP) would undermine the republican reforms, and this period was resulted with the establishment of National Security Council. Through this institution the military gained equal representation with civil politicians in the political life (Heper, 2000:73). On the other hand, 1971 and 1980 military interventions were the result of increasing politicisation, polarisation and radicalism along the ideological lines. In this occasion "the military viewed itself as the only uncorrupted and cohesive actor" (Dagi, 2001: 52) against the rising social conflicts in order to suppress the working class struggle and the socialist movement. In such intensified crises the military has also gained greater autonomy from both social and political forces. The 12 September 1980 intervention differed from the previous interventions in that not only state authority was consolidated but also the period witnessed the reconstruction of political and economic system. Actually 12 September was an anti-crisis intervention and the ruling class aimed to impose its ideology to the society with the backing of the military. The military dominated the political system during the years between 1980 and 1983 but it continued to influence government policy in the issues that they consider critical for the internal and external security of the country through the constitutional mechanism of NCS. Under 1982 Constitution the power of NSC was extended to express opinions and advice governments on the issues related to the national security. The Council of Ministers is required to give due attention to the recommendations made by NSC (Cizre, 2001: 170 and Heper, 2001:14). Thus the military can legally declare its concerns therefore it can be suggested that the army possesses much of its effectiveness from the fact that it works within the framework of institutions and ideas that underpin the established order. Another important dimension of the post 1980 period has been the manipulation of religion and nationalism against the leftist and Kurdish movements. Just before the transition to the civilian rule in 1983 the military through the law No: 2932 prohibited the use of any language other than the first official language of each country in the name of ensuring national unity. This was accompanied with the idea of Turkish-Islam synthesis, which served, to the control of the working class and separatist- minded Kurds.

Duygu Köksal says that;

> The TIS in its widest sense includes all nationalist perspectives that build upon a combination of the Islamic and Islamic cultures of the Turks. Its particular and systematic formulation was realised by a group of the intellectuals known as Aydınlar Ocağı. This synthesis dwells on a particularly authoritarian and militaristic notion of Turkish identity built around a strong state as an end itself. It has served to legitimate the authoritarian practices of the 1980 military intervention and the culturally conservative ideologies of the post-1980 era. The TIS has actually replaced Republican nationalism and become the official nationalism paradigm...TIS ideology, which glorifies the central state, and a homogeneous Ottoman-Turkish identity concentrates solely on Turkic-Islamic elements (Köksal, 2001: 64-65).

Supporting this, for instance, religious instruction was made mandatory, the number of the religious high schools and faculties increased and religious foundations of Sunni sect were permitted to function within the political and public spheres thus Sunni Islam has come to be the official religion of the state. At the end the principles of Kemalist ideology, i.e., secularism and nationalism have been attached new functions according to the requirements and for the reproduction of the system. On the one hand secularist policies have become the means of the control of the religious affairs through which the military has justified its existence in the political life as the guardian of secular Republic and enabled the ruling elites to interpret religion in the interests and for the well being of the established order (Laçiner, 1998: 5). On the other hand after each intervention ethnicist understanding of Turkish nation has been reinforced and consolidated. Especially because of the rise of the armed struggle of the Kurdish movement the ideal of the creation of an integrated society under the civil Turkish identity was no longer the case.

However, what requires attention is that although the official ideology tried to supervise the religion starting from the multi party period, the influence of religion and ethnicist perception of national identity has always been in the agenda of political life mainly by means of the policies of the parties on the right. This once again proves that the consolidation of capitalism in Turkey did not necessarily require the elimination of regressive and traditional components of the society since in the course of time modernist direction came to an agreement with this traditional structure. In Turkey the capitalist ideology structurally has never excluded the

religious and traditional forces though in the first period of the Republic there was an apparent distance between them. As will be mentioned, the religious movement in Turkey has showed resistance not against capitalism but Kemalist modernism. Starting with DP conservative, center-right parties in one way or another have satisfied the demands of the voters who have had religious and nationalist orientation. For instance, DP presented itself as the sole representative of the Turkish nation who were claimed to possess religious and conservative sensitivity and the religious values were integrated to the definition of the nation (Seufert, 2001: 29). Indeed DP increased its political popularity by resting on religious, conservative reactions thus developed a conservative understanding of secularism in order to reconcile religion and state (Mert, 2001b: 207). The party both used the discourse of freedom of religion and consciousness and emphasised that religion was an indispensable component of national identity. In doing so, the party tried to nationalise the religion and attempted to soften the understanding of secular, westernised national identity (Mert, 2001a: 61). Together with DP government capitalism was no longer an imposed system for the westernized character of capitalism was localized and the party opened the way for the development of religious ideology and organizations. The successive right-wing political parties also gave reference to the alternative meanings of the national identity and secularism and these attempts sometimes produced tension between the state elites and other political actors because depending on the conjuncture the official interpretation of secularism has tried to keep the religion out of the public sphere yet in another time has not hesitated to manipulate the religious sensitivities of the masses (Cizre, 2000:163).

As has been noted above, 1980 intervention also aimed the reconstruction of the economy. After the rapid industrialisation under the import substitution policies the post-1980 years marked the beginning of export based economic growth, economic liberalisation and neo liberal policies through January 24 Decisions. Through these policies the position of the domestic capital was reinforced at the expense of the detorioration of the living conditions of the masses due to decrease in the wages depriving the working class of the gains possessed in the previous decades (Öngen, 2002: 65). All these measures were carried out under a conservative, repressive and authoritarian political environment in order to create a socially

disciplined and depoliticised society. When we look at the general characteristics of the political environment in the post-1980 years it can be said that religion and religious symbols were never confined to the private life of the individuals as claimed by the bearers of the official ideology instead especially after 1980 coup it has been clearly revealed that Turkish state has an official religion and sect, which is the Sunni Islam and that the formulation of the principles of the secularism and nationalism have never been neutral. Because apart from the support of the Sunni religious practices in the religious high schools and through the compulsory religious courses the state has not recognised the other sects like the Alevis. Secondly, it can be argued that following this period the rhetoric that the Turkish nation as an identity comprises all regardless of their origins can no longer be the case. This shows that on each occasion the state has been less tolerant to those who are from the non-Turkish ethnic origin and do not belong to Sunni Islam sect.

This has also been possible through the sectarian policies of conservative and right wing political parties as was exemplified in the policies of Motherland Party (ANAP) in the immediate post intervention period. In a very brief sense, the party made the synthesis of liberal economic thinking with the rhetoric of the social and national unity based on conservative, nationalist, religious moral values, and used the discourse that Turkish and Muslim identities were indispensable components of the national identity (Rubin and Heper: 143 and Mert, 2001a: 69). In other words as Ayşe Kalaycıoğlu indicates "Turgut Özal stood for opening up to Turkish markets to the challenge of free trade and force competition, privatization and decentralization of state services" (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 46) but due to the existence of religious, nationalist and conservative cliques constituting the party, ANAP focused both on Islamic-cultural conservatism and industrial growth in a market economy (Toprak, 1993: 240).

In fact, under the harsh economic and political measures 12 September regime was able to suppress the rising socialist movement and weaken working class struggle thus their political influence was undermined as they lost their organizational capacity (Savran, 2002). On the other hand, from the 1990's onwards there emerged new sources of discontent and political instability because of the rise of the political Islam and intensity of the armed struggle of the Kurdish movement. This was the sign of the crisis situation for both the system and official ideology. At

that time there was already an increasing social discontent among the masses due to the neo-liberal economic policies impoverishing them and when this has been accompanied with the challenge of these groups it has been revealed that Turkish society is not an unprivileged, classless and harmonious entity as the Kemalist ideology claims. In this period the working class or socialist movement was not among the crises dynamics since from the 1980's onwards the leftist politics has tried to restructure itself. As a result it was far from mobilizing the society around its own ideology against the established order. On the other hand this decade witnessed the upsurge of the urban poor who may have been expected to be more responsive to the leftist politics because their living standards have been very low and they have been very alienated from the system. This has been related to the non-realization of their expectations in that the ruling class ideology could not establish its hegemony over this section of the society due to its inability to carry out its promises like enrichment, upward mobility. Such gap could be filled by the socialist ideology but the working class politics could not embrace them. Most problematically the political Islam has been quite successful in embracing those sections of the society by manipulating their discontent (Güler, 1999: 70-72). All these have damaged and undermined the representational abilities of the political parties on the center, which have been assumed to preserve and promote the interests of the ruling class, as there emerged "a situation where the basis of support for the state was considerably narrowed down."(Öngen, 2002: 69). In a very general sense, it can be said that in Turkey the political parties have not pursued a rational and viable politics as the military asserts since they have been quite fragmented and lacked a clear sense of identity. For instance, there is a tendency among the parties to identify themselves with their leaders. However given Turkey's imprecise and unstable political and economic dynamics and their inability in tackling with the economic problems a kind of representation crisis has seemed to be probable. In addition to this over the years they have been less differentiated in terms of their ideologies and the policies, which are very "short-sighted and fluid" (Cooper, 2002:119).

The reasons of both the politicization of the Kurdish dynamic and the rise of the political Islam should be sought within the basic premises of the official ideology, i.e., nationalism and secularism. As was explained before, the official understanding of nationalism determined its target as creation of a homogenous

nation state given shape by the Turkish ethnic identity. Hence this paved the way for the denial of the existence of the other sub-ethnic and cultural groups including the Kurds. Then starting from the 1930's the ideals of single culture, single language have become the main components of the centralized state and constituted the ground of the policy of the assimilation of the Kurdish population to the dominant ethnic identity. But before the national independence the ethnic identities and the rights of the Kurds had been recognized under Amasya Protocol (Yeğen, 2001b: 884). In the successive decades on every occasion that Kurdish discontent emerged the state approached the problem from different perspectives, that is, at the beginning it was seen as the resistance of the uncivilized people to the westernization and modernization then after the 1950's the problem was perceived in terms of the question of economic integration between the regions yet in every case the state adopted harsh measures and reacted by using its security forces (Yeğen, 2001b: 885-888). Starting from the 1960's the question was taken into consideration together with the rising leftist movement and the logic behind the state measures remained unchanged. And when the Kurdish dynamic started to pursue its interests with reference to the gaining independence through an armed struggle they were suppressed under 12 September regime. As is seen, until the official recognition of the Kurdish identity in the mid-1990's, the state had mainly adopted military-based policy to what is known or called the Kurdish question and insisted on attributing the reason of upsurge not to any genuine or legitimate cause but to provocation and manipulation of external forces. As was noted before, apart from the prohibition of use of Kurdish language under the Law No: 2932, the military regime also manipulated religion in order to carry out an ideological assault against the communist and Kurdish threat. Although, in a sense, it has been the state nationalism and the relevant policies that have caused the revival of Kurdish identity and the nationalist feeling Mesut Yeğen adds that Turkish nationalism has not perceived the Kurdish issue merely from the perspective of nationalism but made reference to the notions of westernization, populism, development in its evaluation of the matter, and that Kurdish issue has been taken into account in connection to the other problems like the rise of the working class movement (Yeğen, 2001b: 891). At the end the Kurds have been given no option other than assimilation to the Turkish identity.

Even though the political Islam like the Kurdish movement has been perceived as an internal threat to the secular state, the nature of its relation with the official ideology, military and other political actors have been quite different. As was indicated before religion has always been part of the official ideology of the state and the political parties on the right to a great extent have contributed to this. The conservative right wing parties following DP produced populist policies by manipulating religious symbols and values, and to control them within a certain framework. Moreover the masses that reacted to the secular and westernized features of the Republican values were also responsive to these measures. Conservatism was a significant tool in their hands because through this they tried to turkify the Islam and create an alternative national identity. The manipulation of nationalism and religious conservatism continued during the 1980's and 1990's. ANAP policies in the 1980's led to the emergence of new business elite organizations in the conservative regions of central Anatolia. In fact ANAP while using Islam as a means of containing social discontent made legislative changes that enabled Islamic financial institutions to enter into the banking sector. As a result on the one hand a new group of enriched businessmen emerged on the other this has constituted a ground upon which Islam has become a network of sharing resources (Buğra, 2002: 119). Thus when we come to the 1990's political Islam has grown as a response to social, economic and political discontent including the unrest due to the increasing income inequalities, "loss of identity and ideology experienced by the political parties" (Öngen, 2002: 74). Moreover, there were troubles with the state-centered projects of secularization and modernization, which led to the contention in search for new forms of identity as a common basis of trust and solidarity. Political Islam first demonstrated its influence in the municipal elections in 1994, and then Welfare Party (RP) became a coalition partner of the government with True Path Party (DYP) in 1996. The party, in the absence of a strong socialist movement managed to comprise social discontent of economically and politically marginalised masses and also became the political voice of small and medium businessmen who have gradually increased their economic power from the 1980's onwards (Buğra, 2002:125). In this respect the political Islam has been perceived as a threat because it has presented itself as an alternative actor within the political establishment, secondly political Islam by representing a new group of businessmen has created

problem for the western oriented financial bourgeoisie by producing intra-class divisions (Savran, 2002: 17). Within the functioning of the capitalist order the competition is the rule yet the capitalist competition is not a process that gives way to uncompromising polarization within the economy, politics, ideology or every day life and what the rise of political Islam has produced has been such polarization and the division of the ruling class (Güler, 1999: 182). The Islamic religious ideology has already been part of the order and because of its use for the containment of the revolutionary dynamics it has further enlarged its sphere of influence but this was not expected. Because the ruling class wanted to create a depoliticised stable and harmonious society as those established in the advanced capitalist countries it was assumed that Islam without damaging the political equilibrium would have been located within the center.

It is within such a conjuncture that the state attempted to confront ideological, economic and political crises of the system. Parallel to the depoliticisation and ineffectiveness of the system-oriented political parties and institutions the counter-revolutionary extreme forces were welcomed to the political life for the containment of mainly the Kurdish dynamic and the discontent of the urban masses and the poor (Güler, 1999: 75). It seems that when the counter guerilla forces were given role to coerce adversarial dynamics starting from the years of 1992-1993 the state together with its main agents did not see it necessary to preserve the political authority within a legitimate mechanism as is normally assumed to be filled by the political parties (Güler, 1999:98). Although at that time a kind of fascist movement and politicized counter guerilla forces were granted a significant function this does not necessarily indicate the adoption of a fascist political structure since at the end the main consideration has always been the priority of the politics for the sake and stability of the order. In this period the perception of internal threat changed in that this time the Kurdish dynamic and political Islam have been accused of undermining the secular republic by the military. In this instance the military indirectly intervened in the politics through the means of NSC in February 1997. In the meeting of NSC through a number of recommendations the coalition government was required or obliged to take measures against political Islam. This was followed by the non-voluntary resignation of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan under political pressures and banning of RP in 1998. Basically, such a non-armed intervention of the military

served to the restoration of the political order and the reestablishment of Kemalist ideology on a legitimate ground. Furthermore in doing so, the military successfully mobilised the civil society associations, judiciary, universities, media, trade unions and other secular forces in order to remain in a legal framework (Savran, 2002: 18). This has been accompanied by widespread Kemalist counteraction, which has revealed itself by symbolic behaviours like displaying the portrait of Atatürk and posters with Kemalist themes (White, 2002: 55). As Gunter Seufert underlines, the civil society organisations by taking side within the ambiguous polarisation between the secular and religious camps on the side of the military have contributed to the restoration of both political order and official ideology. He further says that in the name of restoring secular order against reactionary Islamic movement trade unions cooperated with the employer organisations hence under this cooperation other political and social conflicts have been left aside (Seufert, 2001: 34). Other civil society associations including Neo-Kemalist organisations or civil Kemalists have provided a civil assistance to the repressive Kemalist restoration by using the discourses of Atatürk nationalism, secularism and modernisation (Erdoğan, 2001: 585 and 2002: 197). On the other hand in this period regarding the Kurdish conflict the state had already carried out violent military campaign, which caused the displacement of many Kurds from their homelands. The centrifugal forces of extreme nationalist wave also supported the military campaign directed against the Kurdish dynamic.

It goes without saying that all these measures taken for the restoration have produced important consequences. First of all, the political autonomy of the military forces vis a vis the other political actors mainly the political parties and the rest of the society have increased. Even it easily forced a popularly elected government to carry out its dictates, and this has been achieved not through control- centered strategy yet through obtaining the consent of the masses since from the point of the military political parties were no longer viable ally in restoring the system against the crises dynamics (Cizre, 2001: 172). The 28 February process has turned the parliament into an ineffective mechanism because parties on the center right have lost their functions and they have been excluded from the political field (DYP and ANAP) so the space for the bourgeois politics has been narrowed down (Öngen, 2002: 75). In a general sense the principles of the restoration can be summarized as

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follows: first it has been carried out under the leadership of the military in order to undermine the legitimacy of the authority of the political Islam. Actually under the restored order the boundaries of the legitimacy has been redrawn and even the possibility of the rise of the counter- revolutionary forces as an alternative power center has been excluded though their mere existence has been tolerated (Güler, 1999: 176). Secondly the Kurdish dynamic has been weakened in its political influence. There has also emerged a need for new political cadres who would be powerful enough for the government and representation and eliminate the question of the loss of the ideological differentiation among the political parties. This is a serious problematic for the reason that a bourgeois democratic system needs political parties, organizations and movements having different ideological standings in order to achieve the representation and the control of various social dynamics within the system. On this basis it can be argued that the problem for the regime resulted from the fact that the 1990's witnessed the politicization of the society in different directions yet there was no mechanism of representation matching this politicization. It has been within such an environment that the military has functioned not merely as an influential component of the political system but like as the only effective political party acting for the enhancement of the interests of the ruling class (Güler, 1999: 176-179).

At the end, a kind of consensus has been achieved around a common purpose, i.e., the preservation of the secular character of the Republic, national unity, integrity through suppressing all adversarial forces and voices. This means a depoliticised political environment devoid of all political conflicts, antagonisms, in other words, while the center-right, conservative political parties have been put out of the politics toward the end of the 1990's nationalism or more properly Kemalist nationalism has been presented as the sole basis of making politics.

4.1.1. The Dynamics of EU

The 1990's have been significant for the political actors in another sense for the reason that they have come to think that Turkey's closer integration with the European Union is a crucial step for the restructuration of Turkish economy and

stabilization of political life. In fact this integration has been a natural but a vital step because starting with the economic liberalisation policies in the post-1980 period the ruling class in Turkey has determined the deeper integration with the capitalist economy as one of its targets, and it was because of this that a new accumulation regime was accepted in these years. The successive step for the realisation of this target in the 1990's and 2000's is at least the preservation of Turkey's position within the imperialist-capitalist system to which Turkey has an irreversible economic dependency.

Having this political concern, Turkey has taken both political and economic steps in order to develop its standards to the level of the EU. These steps in the field of the politics including the reforms for democratisation or the extension of the human rights standards have demonstrated that the EU is, in fact, one of the influential external determinant and restraint on the decisions and the practices of Turkish governments therefore created the impression within the society and among the intellectuals that the political and economic accountability to the EU for membership would pave the way for the domestic reforms, democratisation and political harmonisation (Rumford, 2001: 97). However there is a complex relationship between Turkey and EU in that even after 1999 in various reports issued by the European Commission, apart from the deficiencies in fulfilling the economic requirements, Turkey has been criticised for shortcomings in terms of the level of democratisation, human rights and the protection of the minorities, and, as was explained in the previous section, required to carry out reforms in order to ensure the respect for freedom of thought and expression, grant cultural rights of all Turkish citizens, decrease the influence of the military (Hicks, 2001: 83). Moreover, as is known, one of the obstacles for the membership to the EU is related to the solution of the Kurdish issue. On this matter, in the mid-1990's the distinct identity of the Kurds have been recognised and even towards the end of this decade the governments declared the necessity of the extension of the cultural rights of the Kurds in the field of language and broadcasting (Rumford, 2001: 100).

Despite these initiatives and successive legal reforms in the early 2000's (as was noted before) in this field, leaving aside the other problematic elements of the democratisation and political liberalisation, the state agents for a long time have denied the existence of Kurdish issue and perceived it with reference to the terrorist

activities or underdevelopment. On the one hand they declare their full commitment to the EU norms and standards on the other hand there is an obvious non-willingness for the implementation of the legislative changes that the governments have made. Even the criticisms of the EU related to the anti-democratic measures in tackling with the issue in question has been seen as the interference of the internal affairs (Rumford, 2001: 100). The reason of this incompatibility between the political commitments and practice or lack of the willingness to develop the enforcement mechanism for the legislative changes may be sought in the ineffectiveness of the governments to control and achieve the accountability of the state agents including police, military, and the civil bureaucrats who most of the times act independently in their practices. Actually, if we take into account the political responsibilities of Turkey for the EU membership involving the matters related to the functions and the influence of the NSC, the need for the parliamentary control over the security and defense issues, and the human rights violations the reason behind the military's close attention and the supervision of this process can be understood. Ümit Cizre says that "because of such concerns the military evaluates the accession process in a positive sense so long as this process is controlled therefore the integration process which necessitates many reforms in various spheres is not perceived in its entirety" (Cizre, 2001: 176).

Given such a political context, one important consequence of the EU integration process in the 1990's has been the widespread use of the discourses of democracy and human rights by different actors. As a result a general consensus for supporting the membership to the EU has emerged. Even it is not a rare case that Turkish politicians have stated that human rights and democratisation reform are something that Turkish people are entitled to. Most significantly these discourses have provided a context within which the various groups including the Kurds and Islamic movement have raised claims with reference to their identities. In other words, in Turkey the debates on multiculturalism, cultural rights of ethnic groups and the freedom of religion and consciousness have been made within the general framework of the democratisation and human rights.

4.1.2. The Rise of Identity Politics in Turkey and Discourses of Multiculturalism

In Turkey, identity-based politics or the claims in the name of the cultural rights under the notion of the multiculturalism is a recent issue of the 1990's. As was noted before, in conformity with the official principle of nationalism the state for a long time denied the recognition of the existence of the Kurds as a separate ethnic group and the Kurdish issue has been evaluated within the parameters of the security, national unity and indivisibility. Parallel to this the Kurdish dynamic waged struggle in various forms. Almost until the 1970's they acted mostly within the Turkish left. In this stage, it was thought that the problems in the Kurdish region were connected to the question of underdevelopment. In this sense, the dominant understanding was that these problems could only be solved through a socialist revolution (Kılıç, 1998: 103 and Aydın, 2002: 94). From the 1970's onwards for the movement the issue was no longer underdevelopment but the question of separation for due to the violent policies carried out by the state they have started an armed struggle under the leadership of PKK defining itself as a Marxist- Leninist organization. But then the movement has passed through some tactical changes. Parallel to the political pressures of the European Parliament for the acknowledgement of the political and cultural rights of the Kurds, which almost has made the Kurdish issue a political precondition for the EU membership, this movement has moderated its demands in order to gain a sort of legitimacy and recognition in its activities (Kılıç, 1998: 107). Demands for independence were replaced by that of autonomy, and then after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of PKK, in 1999 separation were no longer the concern of the movement. Instead under the statement of "the democratic republic of the Kurds and the Turks" the Kurdish political movement has come to raise their voice for the cultural rights in the field of language and education and integration to the political community on equal conditions (Aydın, 2002: 99). Moreover, to day the multicultural claims for the cultural rights have been presented as component of the universal human rights and democratization, and such connection is in conformity with the commitments that Turkey has made for accession to EU. What should be noted regarding the Kurdish movement is that the movement has risen as an adversarial dynamic when the left has not been strong enough so starting from the 1990's the class nature of the movement has remained

ambiguous. The Kurdish dynamic may be a strong political and ideological force yet in order to achieve this the movement has always needed the assistance of an external ideological source. This source may be the leftist politics and also the religious ideology. However in the 1990's it has had to rest on its own force. This is the ethnicity through which the idea of Kurdish identity has been developed and mobilized the Kurdish masses. In fact in the absence of a strong socialist movement and as a result of the rise of the moderate political Islam the ethnic and cultural identities have been seen by the movement as the sole cement uniting them. The Kurdish movement, for a long time, has been characterized by its leftist standing but in this decade the political Islam because of the weakness of the left-wing politics has been able to embrace the discontent of the masses in the cities within which the Kurds constitute an important section of the population. As is known, Islam or religious orientation has been no less influential among the Kurds in the Southeastern region. Furthermore, the religious oriented parties like RP; FP had an undeniable electoral base within the Kurdish regions. For that reason, such conflicting directions within the Kurdish dynamic have been reconciled under the general notion of the Kurdish identity (Güler, 1999: 141). Such a tendency may have given way to the neglect of the significance of the ideology but ideology itself is an important force in transforming the structure hence in the absence of any definite ideological standing the gap has been filled by other preferences. In conformity with this, the movement in the 1990's, made politics in various directions, in other words, it has manipulated the relationship with Europe, used the discourse of the human rights and emphasis on ethnicity has been reinforced to the extent that every problem related to the domestic problems of the country has been reduced to the Kurdish question thus the relationship with the intellectuals and left-wing movements have been reconstituted from such a point of view. This may be seen as a shift to the right or liberal-democratic line. Of course, these different directions should be evaluated, as a normal tendency within any movement nevertheless to what extend the dominance of this standing will contribute to the causes of the Kurds is an open question.

The rise of political Islam has been accompanied by a social project in which religion has become the basis of political, social and economic life. In that Islam has functioned as a network resource and Islamic identity is regarded as the main reference of trust and solidarity (Buğra, 2002: 108, 132). Such project also finds

reflection at intellectual level as well. Islamic criticism is essentially against the totalizing nature and universalistic claims of modernization, which in Kemalist project are identified with westernization, positivism and progress under which the various lifestyles and identities have been homogenized. Regarding this dichotomy Reşat Kasaba points out how the Islamists perceive the goals of Kemalist modernity as being against the essential qualities of Muslim culture (Kasaba, 1997: 17). Thus an opposition between the West and Islam is established (Gülalp, 1997: 97 and Göle, 1997: 81). Furthermore secularization and equality as significant values of Western modernity are regarded as an attack to the private realms and social relations (Göle, 1997: 90). In order to avoid the assimilatory logic of Western modernity, its rationalism, universalistic ideals and its homogenizing nature, the rediscovery of Islamic religion is presented as the basis of the new identity (Göle, 1997: 91). On the other hand what this criticism offers is to "capture the purity of the faith and a total submission to Islam as they existed in the Golden Age of Prophet Mohammed" (Toprak, 1993: 246). For instance, one of the Islamic writers, Ali Bulaç, represents these criticisms against both modernism and Kemalist project of secularization. According to him European culture and modernity have turned the individuals into passive objects by homogenizing them and Turkish republic was established on an anti- liberal basis since it assumed the positivism and Enlightenment despotism of the modernity (Bulaç, 1995: 64, 75, 111). He further asserts that secularism in the Turkish Republic has been defined not as the separation of religion and state affairs but as a total exclusion of the religion from all social practices and everyday life, and secularism has been attributed an anti religious nature under the influence of positivism (Bulaç, 1995: 113). Then he argues that in Islam there is no dichotomy between religion and state for Islam rejects the existence of two autonomous fields in favour of the unity of purposes in these fields.

At a more practical level, the issue that is central to the moderate Islamic movement is the problem of wearing of the headscarf in the public institutions and the universities. This issue has over the years been the symbol of the identity-based concerns of the movement in the sense that just like the challenge against the Kemalist project of creating national unity in the form of cultural homogenization the Islamic movement questions the universalistic and homogenizing logic of the official definition of secularism and highlights the Muslim identity.   Basically, this

movement while criticizing the prohibition of wearing turban as an expression of oppression against individuals who have distinct belonging as a member of a particular community challenges the state' s attempt to confine the religious practices or beliefs to the individual consciousness and to the private affairs of the individuals. By doing so, it has tried to attract attention to the relation between the religion and the public order or the position of religion within the public sphere, i.e., a realm that is closed to all ethnic and religious affiliations. Although the debates on the public sphere are very beyond the scope of this thesis it can briefly be said that the problem of turban is basically about the status of a religious identity within the public realm, which is, in Turkey, defined so broadly and mostly equated to the state sphere (Bacık, 2003: 26). For that reason the demands in this line are perceived as undermining the basic values of the secular republic.

Although at normative level universalism and modernity are questioned the rights are claimed around the notions of freedom of religion and consciousness, and even respect for the minority rights, i.e., notions, which are part of universalistic discourse. More specifically, Islamic women's discourses have gradually concentrated on the ideas about civil society, the emancipation of women and women's human rights, individual freedom of the expression for justifying actions and underlining group-specific claims can also be observed in the discourses of the Islamic parties. Indeed both the political Islam and RP before their perception as internal threat to the secular republic used the notion of the rights deriving from the community membership on the basis of the belief that under Umma (the community of the faithful) and Quran Islam sees the individual as the member of one community (White, 2001: 17). But after the 27th of February the rhetoric on democracy and pluralism provided an opportunity for the Virtue Party (FP) as successor of the RP to declare religious oriented political concerns in connection with human rights, civil liberties, freedom of consciousness and cultural plurality. In addition to these, the FP with reference to the party's five principles involving democracy, freedom, development, rule of law and human rights used the statements like the necessity of the preservation of the cultural plurality of society, respect of the political sphere to the private one. The party also supported the acceptance of the European standards in every sense including the premises of the market economy and privatisation (Groc, 2001: 98,107). As will be recalled, Justice and Development Party (AKP) avoids

using religious symbols in politics and mostly concentrates on the matters like social equity, justice, equality of opportunity, fight against poverty and integration with the EU. In the 1990's the perception of the EU by the political Islam has also changed in the sense that after a long lasting opposition to the EU and western values they now hope that within the framework of the basic values of the EU like the protection of the human rights, freedom of belies and religion they can pursue their interests.

As is seen, in the 1990's mainly through the political influence of the EU the politics of multiculturalism or the discourse of the politics of the identity have become one of the disputed subjects of the Turkish politics as is exemplified in the struggles of the Kurdish dynamic and the moderate political Islam. The Kurds have made use of the politics of multiculturalism in the form of demands for the recognition of their cultural identities and of enjoyment of their cultural rights. In this respect it may be suggested that benefit from the cultural and political rights on the basis of group membership necessitates (in their thinking) the reformulation of the membership to the political community on a new basis. This new ground should be more inclusive and integrative and it can be realised by a revision of the meaning of the notion of citizenship. It is on this basis that it can be suggested that the main issue for the Kurdish movement mentioning the politics of multiculturalism is not the Turkish ethnic identity itself but the official project of assimilation and cultural homogenisation which forces every individual to accept the dominant ethnic identity.

The moderate political Islam opposes the official measures taken in order to restrict the religion, religious symbols and practices to the individual belief as private affairs. But the movement in question wants recognition on the basis of Islamic identity and to practice the freedoms derived from such an identity within the public sphere. In other words, what is required is the acknowledgment of the public appearance since in their thought practices; symbols of a particular identity (Islamic way of life) become meaningful as freedom within the public sphere. In this sense they question any distinction between public and private realms as the proponents of the politics of identity and multiculturalism do. Moreover, in carrying out their politics they define themselves against the Kemalist ideal of secular, modern identity. As a result an opposition between the discourses of the Kemalists and Islamic movement has emerged.

As has been indicated, the flexibility of the universalistic conception of human rights and democracy provide a space for identity-based opposition and the claims. In fact, the movements look for international support for their specific causes and, as is known, the Kurdish question has always been on the agenda of the EU in its relations with Turkey. Although the Islamic movement is also quite warm to the EU integration process it is not clear whether the EU perceives the struggle of this movement as one which is waged against the anti-democratic and repressive measures to an identity group. Even when EU gives attention to the freedom of belief and conscience as human rights within Turkey the main concern is the restrictions that communities face in enjoying their rights.

On the other hand, the adoption of the discourse of multiculturalism and the identity politics can be evaluated within the context of the Turkish politics in the 1990's. From the perspective of the state agents and the military the politicization of these movements in question have constituted an internal threat so it may be asked whether such a moderate position may soften the perception of the threat of the military. It seems that the Islamic movement and religious-oriented parties are far from challenging the political order since although there are some small clashes between the military and these political parties these problems are not about the functioning of the system. In fact, they want integration with the system so they contribute to the restoration of the regime.

Regarding the Kurdish movement, it is not easy to reach such a conclusion. It is true that in the recent years they have put a distance to class-based politics in favor of the politics of multiculturalism and for the cultural rights. Now they have come to stress the more inclusive notion of citizenship that would be sensitive to their ethnic identities without assimilation to dominant culture. These demands can be considered as legitimate. Today we see in the public, among the politicians and the officials some moderate arguments, that is; it is necessary to distinguish the rights of the Kurds from "PKK terrorism" while maintaining its unitary state structure and preserve Turkish as the sole official language of the state but these general arguments also add that the reforms which would provide private school instruction in minority languages would enable the Kurds to retain their identity while integrating with society. The same discussion can be generalized to issue of radio and TV broadcasting in Kurdish. However it seems that the logic behind such a perspective is

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not a genuine belief in order to enable an ethnic group to realize its cultural rights but increase the ability of the state to influence this population in the direction that it determines. This does not mean that this movement serves such an aim but the multicultural discourse of the integration without assimilation may contribute to the reproduction of this rhetoric. On the other hand, the Kurdish movement has always had close connection with the left-wing political struggle and this is the most problematic aspect for the state in confronting the Kurdish issue, i.e., to suppress the working-class movement. In this sense, the more the Kurds isolate themselves from the class-based politics in favor of the cultural concerns the more they serve the purpose of the establishment, which is the restoration of the order through depolitization.

Furthermore it is not just the politicized Kurdish movement and the political Islam that give reference to the conception of democracy, human rights or integration of the Turkish state rather their concerns and causes have found a variety of support among both liberal and Islamic-oriented intellectuals, and the human rights advocates who in a very general sense have sought the problem in the non-existence of a democratic and pluralist political and social structure within which the civil society can be politically effective, and the identity groups can express and develop their ethnic and religious identities without restriction on the basis of interaction or harmony. According to this criticism, the idea that the Kemalist project of modernization is the bearer of democracy, rights, and justice should be questioned. Moreover, the Kemalist model of national development, which is "authoritarian and paternalistic", is far from ensuring democracy and individual rights and freedoms. This project is evaluated with suspicions since it is regarded as top-down anti-democratic imposition from above that has denied the historical and cultural experience of the people in Turkey (Kasaba and Bozdoğan, 1997: 4).

For that reason the increasing voices of the adversarial movements and minorities in the last decade is connected with the development of civil society through which the Turkish democracy can be more stable and inclusive. As is observed in their writings, their understanding of the notion of civil society is very similar to a definition of the term articulated by Chris Rumford in his analysis of the democratization problem of Turkey.

It is the liberal democratic version of the idea of civil society that has been taken up, much as it was in Eastern Europe: civil society as the realm of possibility for political change. On this model, there is a strong association to an existing regime and democratization … as a realm of freedom outside the scope of state intervention. Similarly civil society is posited as the realm where conflict between particularisms and the state can be resolved, diffused and accommodated (Rumford, 2002: 273).

As has been stated above these general concerns have been shared by a variety of group of people and the one of the most specific among them has been those advocators of the "2nd Republic" who attempted to develop "a neo-liberal project of democracy" by means of ensuring the smooth functioning market economy (Erdoğan and Üstüner, 2002: 197). As one of the proponents of these discussions Mehmet Altan argues that the Kemalist republic ("the first Republic"), by making a distinction between the democracy and the republic, could not have been a democratic republic due to the strong position of the military, the dominance of the bureaucracy and the state-oriented economy. Altan further claims that from the time of its establishment in 1923 this militaristic and monist nature of the state structure together with its exclusionary ideology has prevented people's sovereignty and constituted an anti-liberal environment (Altan, 1992). Following these arguments Altan asserts that because the official ideology of the state is not neutral, and is against the development of the civil society, this forces the society to deny its genuine identity. In other words, there are Kurds, and the problem of being Muslim influences all of us yet the Kemalist ideology ignores them. However these problems cannot be solved through repressive measures but through the transformation of the state structure (Altan, 1992). For instance to him the different identities have potential of creating the dynamism for the creation of a more democratic society. However, first of all, it is of great necessity to put an end to the domination of the economy by state in favor of market economy since through this it would be possible to transform the state from a political to a liberal state. Indeed, according to Altan the "first republic" has been established as a political state and its social basis remained an agricultural society, which have prevented the development of the civil society and the pluralist environment. He criticizes the Kemalist comprehension of secularism and both authoritarian and totalitarian state consciousness therefore sees it essential to formulate a democratic vision of secularism, and to recognize the

Kurdish identity. In connection to this criticism what Altan offers is the revision of the conception of the citizenship as a legal bond between the state and the individual in order to make it as inclusive as possible. (Altan, 1992)

To summarize, through these discussions the proponents of the "2nd republic" claim to create a new way of life through a cultural democratization which would result in the coexistence of all ethnic, cultural, religious identities as components of a mosaic world on the basis of peaceful and harmonious relations without denying their languages and religion. At the end a democratic and pluralist society characterized by individualism would be constituted. Secondly, through eliminating the state's role within the economy, i.e., through a minimal state a productive economic structure will emerge. (Sezer, 1993) On the other hand Mehmet Altan is right when he evaluates Turgut Özal as pioneer of the social transformation since following the 12 February intervention Turgut Özal introduced the neo-liberal policies in the name of realizing "economic freedoms and democracy" but they led to the gradual disappearance of the principle of the social state in Turkey. Because of this it is argued that "… as part of the quest for Özalist hegemony, the project of the 2nd republic attempted to fix the meaning of democracy by reducing it to a means of the free functioning of capital" (Erdoğan and Üstüner, 2002: 200).

The attacks against the authoritarian Kemalist ideology, its suppression of different identities through the official definition of the secularism and nationalism, the political role of the military-civil bureaucracy are not limited to the criticisms of the proponents of the 2nd republic. The criticisms of so-called post-liberal discourse[3] should be added to these arguments that have been developed within the context of the discourse of democracy. According to this discourse, the political program prevailing in Turkey called Kemalism is based on an authoritarian thinking and state understanding since the process of Turkish modernization has not proceeded through a relativist democratic understanding as was evolved in the West in a natural process (Mahçupyan, 1997: 19, 56). What emerged is an authoritarian and patriarchal political consciousness and statist thinking "determined by the positivism". Thus under such an experience of modernization it was attempted to transform the

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[3] Erdoğan and Üstüner use this specific classification between the 2nd Republican discussions and the post- liberal discourse in their critical evaluation of the use of the discourse of democracy in the 1990's (Erdoğan and Üstüner, 2002).

decentralized, heterogeneous social structure to a centralized, homogenous one under the   principles of secularism and nationalism. As a result the process of the nation building was equated to the homogenization of all population (Mahçupyan, 1998: 45, 48, 76). From this point of view two components of the official ideology have given way to the transition from a multicultural society to a structure dominated by a single culture, i.e. secular Turkish identity. In other words the Jacobin secularism in Turkey has meant the state control of the religion, and even been an anti-religious ideology through which the state has created an authoritarian public sphere (Mahçupyan. 1997: 43, 1998:300 and Bayramoğlu, 2001: 80). By broadening the boundaries of the public sphere this ideology has tried to reduce the religion to a private affair of the individuals and imposed the way of life that it designed. The idea of nationalism has also functioned in a similar way under which the Kurds and the non-Muslims have been regarded as danger and forced to assimilate them. According to this discourse the civil and military bureaucracy as highly autonomous entities have presented itself as the main guarantor of the established order and increased its political influence (Mahçupyan, 1998: 201). Furthermore, within this structure the military has not only affected the political process but also made politics by preserving itself as an autonomous political center.

However, the advocators of this discourse say that such an establishment has faced both a representation and legitimacy crises in the 1990's due to, on the one hand, the rise of the identity-based claims of the Kurds and Islamic movement and the dissolution and the inability of the representation of the center-right politics (Mahçupyan, 1997: 87 and Bayramoğlu, 2001: 16-17, 24). As they argue, while in a world shaped by democratic thinking, the free flow of capital, democracy, human rights new social movements and new demands have emerged Turkey experiences a problem of adaptation to these conditions (Bayramoğlu, 2001: 24 and Mahçupyan, 1997: 46). What is observed is a weakening of social bonds holding society together because there is a situation of social conflict between the state and the new identity groups and also among these groups. Therefore each defines it as against both the other and the state without trying to understand each other. Moreover because the state rather than acting as a neutral actor in order to solve these conflicts itself involve within these conflicts by taking side. Hence in Turkey existing identity and the notion of citizenship are far from being inclusive and integrative to the extent of

embracing the Kurds. From such a perspective what makes the situation worst is the cultural totalitization that the identity groups in question adopt since each community closes itself to the social interaction, cooperation therefore a binary opposition is created between, for example, the Kurd-Turk and Islamist-Secularist (Mahçupyan, 1997: 15, 41 and Bayramoğlu, 2001: 28). To put it differently, the state from a fundamentalist perspective harshly suppresses these communities like the Islamic movement yet this also reinforces the social polarization and tension between these identities and the official ideology. It is because of this Mahçupyan asserts that within Turkish context the politics is characterized by divisions, conflicts and tension (Mahçupyan, 1997: 253) and that there is a differentiation between the social and political spheres.

While stating such commonly accepted critiques against the Turkish state structure, the solutions and the project proposed by the proponents of this discourse do not go beyond some general normative recommendations far from producing the real political, social and cultural changes they require. After all what is seen as essential is the establishment of a democratic order and society (Mahçupyan, 1997 47 and Bayramoğlu, 2001: 103) under which a consensus is constituted among the differences and the different identities can coexist without excluding and repressing the other (Bayramoğlu, 2001: 312). In this sense, democracy is defined as a means (not as end) to establish a multicultural society and a heterogeneous social structure. However this should not be an authoritarian understanding of multiculturalism, in which the individual is confined to and individualized within the communities but a democratic sense of multiculturalism. This ideal can be accomplished only if the state and the communities concerned are ready for interaction, dialogue and recognition of the other. In this respect the state should prepare a common base in order to hold society together, i.e., it should act as arbiter among the social conflicts (Mahçupyan, 1998: 47). Other steps essential for the creation of a democratic multicultural society involve the redefinition of the state, a new social contract and the reformulation of the public sphere according to a democratic consciousness since every individual has a meaningful existence only within the public sphere. Each group or community should be granted an opportunity to express and promote their identities within this sphere (Mahçupyan, 1997: 302). Furthermore in this thinking multiculturalism is given attention not only for its potential of creating a pluralist

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society but also for the fact that these identity groups are regarded as the basis of the development of the civil society (for the first time in the Turkish history). Not surprisingly Europe is presented as an ideal where the diverse and distinct identities would coexist within the civil society on a non-hierarchical basis, the universal human rights standards would be adopted without any challenge, and within such a democratic political and cultural context differences would appear without any restriction within the public sphere legitimately in association with the pluralist values (Mahçupyan, 1997: 221).

As was noted before, the Islamist movement and those writers having as Islamic orientation have already adopted a critical attitude vis-à-vis the Kemalist ideology, its authoritarian secularism through questioning Turkish top-down modernization experience. On this basis, in the 1990's, they have formulated an Islamic political project inspired by the Medina Contract, which was signed among the Jewish, the Muslim and pagan communities under the leadership of Prophet Mohammad (Bulaç, 1995: 155). When it is adapted to today's conditions as some Islamic writers like Ali Bulaç has done, in a very general sense this model corresponds to the idea of multiple legal orders, that is, the freedom of individuals to live under the legal orders proper to their religions and beliefs.

As was implied, the main and perhaps sole concern of the proponents of this model is the official project of secularism restricting the religious practices and beliefs to the individual consciousness by distinguishing the public and private spheres and extending the borders of the former at the expense of the later. It is because of this; the state policies and the official ideology are criticized as being highly centralized and totalitarian (Bulaç, 1995: 170). As Ali Bulaç claims this is related to the modernity itself in that modernity defines itself against its opposite so the modern state has been a totalitarian and it has an irresistible tendency to intervene to every sphere of life (Bulaç, 1995: 164). So what should be made is to provide the freedom of the individual against, for instance, one-sided and even anti-religious sense of secularism.

To sum up, in Turkey the identity-based concerns have gained prominence in the 1990's. On the one hand, mainly the highly politicized Kurds and Islamic movement have gradually adopted the discourses of multiculturalism and the politics of identity. These themes have also displayed their implications among the

intellectual circles ranging from the neo-liberals to the Islamic writers in various degrees. For the Turkish politics the 1990's indicate an important political conjuncture in the sense that this period has witnessed general crises influencing ideological, political and economic realms within the system. There was an increasing criticism directed against the official ideology of the state, Kemalism, and its fundamental premises. This problem while undermining its legitimacy was accompanied with the rise of the Kurdish movement and the political Islam. The ineffectiveness of the political parties and the governments to contain the adversarial activities of these groups because of the loss of their representational capacities have further strengthened the political position and influence of the military which over the years had become a politically autonomous entity. As was noted before, it was not the rise of the socialist movement that resulted in the crises dynamics nonetheless at the last instance the main logic behind the restoration attempt has been to accomplish the continuity of the establishment through eliminating the anti-systemic tendencies. Their existence may contribute to the power of the working class movement and its ideology. In the 1990's the trade unions, which can be significant means in order to meet the working class with, the leftist politics have been main supporters of the restoration program and the Kemalist ideology and even allied with the military against the political Islam thus almost lost their functions (Güler, 1999: 123). In spite of the coercive measures determined by the military in tackling with oppositional politics and of the fact that these measures have also found support within the society this period witnesses the rising international political pressure over Turkey in order for the realization of democratization and the universal human rights standards. In the way of the integration with the capitalist world economy the relations with the EU have always been very significant for Turkey yet such a process has also forced the state to accept some minimum standards, i.e. Copenhagen Criteria essential for the membership. Regarding the problem of multiculturalism this process has considerable importance for it has been through the backing of the political pressures of the EU that the groups in question have declared their causes and in this sense the discourse they use is very similar to that of EU which are the democracy, human rights, the protection of the minority rights etc. In other words, the discourses on democracy, human rights, and the development of civil society have constituted the main framework of the question of the multiculturalism in

Turkish context. Thus it is through them that the Kurds have claimed the recognition of their distinct identity, their cultural rights and the Islamic movement has raised its voice for standing within the public sphere according to its own belief and the way of life. As has been noted the intellectual circles have also problems with the official ideology, the centralized state structure, the policies for the homogenization of the society in the name of the national unity and integrity, the role of the military within the politics, increasing social and cultural conflicts, the distance and differentiation between state and society, in short, the problems with democratisation and strengthening of democratic consciousness within the society. They question the political establishment at macro level. Nevertheless the focus on the coexistence of distinct and diverse ethnic groups, religious and cultural identities on a harmonious or non-conflictual basis constitutes an indispensable component of their democratic multicultural projects. In fact, from their perception the emergence of such identity-based concerns and the discourses of the politics of multiculturalism are regarded as undeniable political forces for the development of the civil society autonomous from the state interference and for the establishment of a plural society integrating all regardless of their difference on an equal ground. And like the groups and the communities in question these intellectual circles also rest on the political influence and pressures of the EU in justifying and proposing their arguments.

After such a brief explanation, it can be argued that in Turkey with reference to a dichotomy between democracy and the political role of the military an implied definition of democracy is made by many writers and in this definition the military is excluded from the sphere of the politics. However, even in the European democracies the military has a role within political decision making process and especially in the issues related to the security the military is part of the formulations of the policies (Cizre, 2001: 177). As will be accepted, this is very part of the politics. Any correlation between democracy and exclusion of the military from the politics may be illusionary in the sense that it only serves to the idealization of the bourgeois democracies. Furthermore the explanation of democracy on the basis of a kind of equilibrium between the main institutions and the actors of the establishment, plurality of the society or preserving the ethnic, religious diversity of the society is also problematic situation because this confines the democracy to the maintenance of the stability of the bourgeoisie domination which is presented and idealised as an

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unchanged order as the writers using the discourse of democracy aim to do. But we know that even within the boundaries of the liberal democracies it is essential to take the level of the political participation, organization, and also the form of the political struggles of the marginalized section of the society including the working class and ethnic groups and the minorities into consideration in defining a democratic multicultural society (Güler, 1999: 169).

In Turkey, the identity politics or the debates on the notion of multiculturalism has risen, in a sense, on the basis of the criticism of the modernization experience of the country. It is legitimately argued that this process has proceeded in order to create a homogenous, classless and unprivileged society. However this purpose has been pursued at the expense of the homogenization of the society, the suppression of the differences and adversarial political and social forces. For that reason the concerns on multiculturalism has gone hand in hand with the more general discourses about the democratization of the country or the extension of the civil rights and liberties. Although having a legitimate ground such criticism in some instances has been accompanied with the denial of modernity and modernization and this is the case in Turkey. One possible consequence of this situation is the rise of fundamentalism and nationalism, and also further confinement of the groups, communities to their own world and cultures. In this respect, the danger of essentialism and cultural relativism are also observed in the standing of the identity groups. For instance, when the moderate political Islam underlines its identity concerns in the form of the demand for the respect to the different ways of life that should be understood as Islamic way of life and respect to the Islamic identity. Because the movement questions the Kemalist modernity project an alternative social and political model has been presented, in this model

> By refusing to assimilate Western modernity and by rediscovering religion and a memory repressed by nationalism and universalism, the Islamic subject elaborates and redefines herself. Islam as a lifestyle provides a new anchor for the self thus creates an imagined political community" (Göle, 1997: 91).

As has been noted, the main reference of this model is the universal values of the human rights yet it takes a particular conception of the individual as its subject, who is the member of the Islamic community.

Within the society, the end point of such ideas is observed in the form of an artificial polarization between essentialist and mutually exclusive identities like the opposition between the Kemalists and Islamists. Each of them defines itself with respect to the other. Even the existence of that opposition and division of the society along this line prevents the possibility of any communication and common ground since each position evaluates the other from its universalistic point of view and its own understanding of truth. Related to this, Reşat Kasaba claims that social identities including the Kemalists, Islamists and the Kurds are intolerant to each other so there is an antagonistic relationship among them (Kasaba, 1997: 18). The question of essentialism and cultural relativism has another consequence in that if a group or community expects respect for its own lifestyle, traditions, values and practices it is legitimate to ask to what extent these demands in question contribute to the enhancement of individual rights and freedoms and to the improvement of people's personalities as human being. It is legitimate because it is no rare case that the community prevails over the individual therefore in the name of the rights of the community the individual freedoms can be sacrificed, as is the case expressed by the internal restrictions imposed by the Islamic practices.

Furthermore, even though the concerns on the unity and integrity of the society on the basis of harmonious and peaceful coexistence of diverse identities, the groups within a multicultural and plural social structure this has not gone beyond mere rhetoric in the sense that discrimination, exclusion, marginalisation of different cultural and ethnic groups have continued at different levels and in political practices. Actually the politics of multiculturalism and the relevant discourses may contribute to the formation of relatively more moderate and liberal political environment. But now that as one scholar argues newly established power relations are far from ensuring social change, eliminating the feeling of indeterminacy, insecurity resulted from both political and identity conflicts and compensating the, problem of unemployment and poverty since the authority and the establishment require an unconditional and non-consensual consent to the capitalism and modernization (Cizre, 2001: 173).

4.2. The Framework of the Survey

In this part in-depth interviews with the representatives of human rights associations, political parties and other organisations interested in the question of this study have been carried out in order to delineate how the problem of multiculturalism is perceived in Turkish politics. These interviews can provide an opportunity to observe the debates on the related legal changes made in the written documents such as the Constitution and also their possible reflections within the public. Moreover the meaning that these representatives attribute to this process may also be revealed through the results of this interview. On the other hand, it is obvious that the implications of this survey are far from being conclusive because at the end it can only reflect the thoughts and responses of the particular actors so generalizations about the perception of the concept of multiculturalism can only be made in a limited degree.

Six questions have been posed within the interview. They can be listed as follows: 1.How do you perceive and define the notion of multiculturalism? 2. Do you know about the debates in Western Europe on multiculturalism? How would you evaluate Turkey's conditions in this context? 3 What are the terms of reference in which multiculturalism is debated in Turkey? 4. What may be the possible implications and repercussions of these debates? 5. How does the process of European integration affect or shape the question of multiculturalism in Turkey? Do you attribute any importance to this process regarding the problem of multiculturalism? 6. Is the politics of multiculturalism necessary in Turkey? May it have long-lasting and viable effects? What are your recommendations with respect to the future of the politics of multiculturalism in Turkey? Through these questions it is aimed at reaching information on three aspects of the question of multiculturalism, which are general perception of the concept, the framework within which the discussions are made and the main themes around which the debates on the multiculturalism are going on, and lastly the extent of the impact of the process of integration to the European Union upon the debates on the notion of multiculturalism, and particularly upon legal reforms paving the way for the possibility of multiculturalism.

The interviews started in the first half of May and were completed in the first week of July 2003.The interviews was made with three different groups of actors. The first group includes human rights organisations involving the Human Right Association, (IHD-HRA), the Turkish Human Rights Foundation (TIHV-THRF), and the Association of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed Peoples (Mazlum-Der), second group responding the survey is the political parties including the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Republican Peoples Party (CHP), the Motherland Party (ANAP), the True Way Party (DYP); the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) did not respond the questions but provided such documents and materials. The representatives of this party expressed that these documents and materials reflect the standing of the party with respect to the questions. Other parties also provided relevant documents and their content will also be expressed. However in the interview some parties are excluded like those left wing parties and smaller parties for the reason that parties chosen for the interview have had experience of the government. In other words, some of those parties held the political authority in the past; one of them is now in power. Because their measures determined or are determining the policies of the government, they decide, for example, the extent of reforms and the application of these reforms. For that reason, the responses of these parties will be assumed to be reflecting the perceptions of the political parties having the experience of governmental authority. The last group was chosen among those organisations making claims for cultural rights involving Kurdish Institute, Mesopotamia Culture Center and an Armenian newspaper named Agos. It is without doubt that there are other groups raising similar claims but due to the time limit only the thoughts of these groups can be presented. Most probably some of the responses of each group would overlap yet there would be differences too, and even the logic behind the wording of similar responses may change; therefore this survey may provide an opportunity to see those divergences. In this sense results of the interview will be stated according to the responses of each group separately, and then all perspectives will be evaluated in a comparative way.

4.3. Human Rights Organisations

At the very beginning, it can be generalised that human rights organisations comprehend the problem of multiculturalism from a similar perspective. It can be suggested that the basic reason lying behind their existence rests on the same logic in the sense that they accept their responsibility to intervene all human rights violations resulting from the lack of commitments to the values of democracy and human rights standards in all contexts without any discrimination, and through legitimate means. As will be demonstrated they conceive the question of multiculturalism as part of the democratization problem of the country, and evaluate the issue through such sensitivity. In Turkey, the proponents of the human rights in their struggles while underlining contemporary democratic norms and standards in human rights have mainly fought against the state policies. Therefore they questioned both official ideology and the regime. In this respect they have always been subject to political pressures and suppression by the state agents. Despite the existence of such common concerns, the differences in the ideological outlook of the main human rights organizations should be noted. Although today such a differentiation is not revealed apparently, their ideological standing is still influential in shaping different policies on some specific issues like the question of the secularism.

Mazlum-Der and HRA were established within distinct and opposing cultural and political framework; therefore they initially struggled for the rights of the particular section of the society. At the beginning HRA dealt with the human rights violations affecting the left-wing groups from a Marxist-Leninist point of view but then it has broadened the horizon to the extent that the Kurdish issue and solidarity with the political prisoners have constituted its other concerns. In contrast, the older head of Ülkü Ocakları founded Mazlum- Der together with the sympathizers of the Islamic organisations in 1991 and the association determined its initial mission as preserving the right- wing activists who had been claimed to be subject to unjust measures of the state despite their assistance to the state in repressing the left-wing groups (Seufer, 2001: 42). Then Mazlum- Der mainly has given priority to the interests of the Islam oriented activities and spent its efforts to attract attention to the question of wearing turban. Furthermore, at normative level, the association has claimed that the human rights are very part of Islamic teaching and tried to formulate

an Islamic understanding of human rights (Plageman, 2001: 391). However towards the end of the 1990's Mazlum-Der has aimed to assume more independent position due to the requirements of everyday struggles for human rights, influence of EU and the close links with a variety of international human right organizations. 27 February process may have also been effective in adopting more independent position (Plagemann, 2001).

Today it may be suggested that there is a minimum consensus between HRA and Mazlum- Der concerning their sensitivity to the Kurdish issue, human rights violations in the Southeastern region of the country, prevention of torture, freedom of thought and expression, and more specifically to the cultural rights of the ethnic groups and minorities, nevertheless as has just been indicated, regarding the question of secularism they still differ in their perspective. On this matter, HRA's recommendations can be listed as follows:

> The state should avoid interfering into the sphere of freedom of religion and belief and should not take side in supporting any religion or sect. The Institution of the Directorate of Religious Affairs should be eliminated. Freedom of religion and belief should be defended unconditionally (Öndül, 1997: 108).

HRA also criticizes the compulsory religious education or state's engagement with religious education and defends the necessity of ensuring equal and fair conditions for Alevi population in their worship and cultural practices (Plagemann, 2001: 389).

On the other hand, Mazlum-Der's perception of secularism is basically in conformity with that of the Islamic political parties. For instance, in one of his writings Yılmaz Ensaroğlu (Ensaroğlu, 2001) criticizes the Jacobean understanding in secularism policies concerning the decrease in the number of high schools providing religious education, restriction to the wearing of turban in the universities and other public institutions. Leaving aside these, Ensaroğlu also questions the passive standing of both the EU and leftist intellectuals in that he claims that neither EU nor the leftist intellectuals show enough sensitivity to the problem of turban as they do with respect to the cultural rights of the Kurds. To him, when the EU mentions the question of freedom religion and consciousness in Turkey the main concern of the Union is the religious rights of the minorities so other violations in the use of these rights are ignored. In this sense EU though indirectly comes to approve

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the official understandings. According to Ensaroğlu the reason behind such ignorance is unclear but he asserts that this is related to the ethno-centrist perspective which EU possesses as a prejudice vis a vis Islam (Ensaroğlu, 2001: 399-402).

Ensaroğlu questions the standing of the intellectuals since they adopt a negative attitude with respect to the religion so they perceive secularism as a means of transforming and enlightening the society in the direction of reason and science rather than as a means of providing a social peace. In fact Ensaroğlu asserts that they are under the influence of anti-democratic and Jakobenist perception of secularism (Ensaroğlu, 2001: 403). However though he highlights that the human rights violations should be evaluated as the problem of all the silence and very passive attitude of Mazlum-Der after the Sivas events display that the association is still dependent on the Islamic circles and does not have a neutral and independent position in every human right question (Plagemann, 2001: 392).

The position of THRF is a bit different in the sense that 33 human rights advocators and HRA founded it. Over the years this association has been specialized on the question of torture and ill treatment and on both physical and psychological rehabilitation. THRF systematically publishes human rights reports in its documentation center therefore daily concerns for the human rights violations locate relatively smaller place in the struggle of THRF and it has close links with international organizations (Plagemann, 2001: 374). Nonetheless it can be said that the foundation has a very similar position to that of THRF on many human rights questions.

Before focusing on their answers with respect to their perception of the multiculturalism in general sense, both Hüsnü Öndül (Head of HRA) and Sedat Aslantas (General Secretary of THRF) articulate their understanding of the concept of culture. As was explained in the previous sections, the meaning attached to the concept of culture affects the way one describes the notion of multiculturalism. Culture can be seen from a universalistic perspective as the common heritage of humanity crossing the differences among distinct nations or sub-groups. As Berdal Aral explains the concept may also imply the process of scientific or artistic contribution indicating a kind of intellectual and creative activity in arts, science, literature etc. (Aral, 1998: 418). Comprehensions of both Öndül and Aslantaş match the anthropological sense of the term culture invoking cultures in plural. This

conception of culture evolved from the 19th century onwards. This third sense of culture may be seen as a way of life that a particular group possesses; i.e.; sum of the material products, symbols, values, traditions etc. Most importantly it is these characteristics embedded within a particular culture that distinguish one group from others by revealing differences among several cultures. Following this, as was explained in multiculturalism debate, culture defines what one is and even can be an instrument of expression of one's identity and means of struggle. Parallel to this, Sedat Aslantaş describes culture as all the habits and abilities that a particular nation, people or an individual possesses, i.e.: a way of life. Supporting this view, Öndül argues that culture exists with individuals but individuals sharing similar habits in their traditions, folklores, values constitute a different community, which should be accepted as richness to the whole humanity. This is also the basis of Öndül's perspective of multiculturalism.

In general the perception of these organisations regarding the notion of multiculturalism is so similar to those perceptions in European context that they mostly emphasise normative principles and requirements. For instance, Yılmaz Ensaroğlu (Head of Mazlum-Der) explains that;

> Multiculturalism is the existence of communities having different cultural identities. Political or social coexistence of culturally distinct groups without falling in to the dilemma of being majority/minority is only possible through the existence of the conditions of the multicultural model of society. Within a multicultural society first of all, those groups having different identities acknowledge their distinct needs and demands reciprocally. Secondly each group is aware of the fact that preservation and promotion of the languages and identities of every group are of vital importance. Within a given society adopting multiculturalism or multicultural values it is strongly recognized that people belonging to different identity groups have an undeniable right to equal participation to all social, economic and political processes and institutions. So such a society excludes the possibility of ignorance or denial of the existence of culturally different groups.

Sedat Aslantaş prefers to present his response by describing a monist or a mono-cultural society, which is the result of an attempt of social engineering. For Aslantaş within a context of multi-linguistic, multi-religious and multi-ethnic geography, i.e., Turkey, those possessing political power have over the years tried to establish a mono-cultural, mono-ethnic and mono-linguistic society. Such a point

stressed by him underlines the results of the assimilatory policies of the states, which have been criticized and questioned for a long time within the countries having minorities and immigrants. He argues that this is not the problem of today, yet of yesterday and future. Therefore as long as the states continue to produce policies for the formation of monist societies humanity will continue to discuss the multiculturalism. Relevant to this point, one of the scholars associates the citizenship with the emergence of the nation-state as a unified political system. And he adds that communal solidarity was achieved through the cultural and ethnic homogeneity by the state on the basis of the many political methods like language policies, compulsory education, and possession of dominant language. However the solidarity of political community has created scarcities and exclusion through the maintenance of cultural boundaries and borderlines. Many cultural groups and minorities, and women have tried to challenge these policies and sought the ways of inclusion (Turner, 2001: 13).

Representatives of human rights organisations were asked whether they are aware of the similar arguments within Europe .Of course, this is not a very critical question since the goal is to enable those people to make a comparison between European and Turkish contexts and to get information on the second dimension of the problem of multiculturalism in Turkey, namely, the framework and the main themes of the debates concerning the multiculturalism within Turkey. Yılmaz Ensaroğlu and Sedat Aslantaş said that they had had no extensive knowledge about European context and so did not answer. According to Hüsnü Öndül in Europe the issue is dealt with around the position and definition of the state, European citizenship, and relationship between the state and citizenship. He argues that Turkey is out of these discussions and that we cannot add anything positive to the debates in Europe at intellectual level. In order to show the different levels of discussions in both contexts he gives the example of Turkish Law on Citizenship[4]. And to Öndül this article does not describe citizenship but the conditions of being Turk, i.e., a

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[4] Article 66 of the Constitution makes the definition of citizenship under the heading of Turkish citizenship. The Article stipulates that "Everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk. The child of Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk. The citizenship of a child of a foreign father and a Turkish mother shall be defined by law. Citizenship may be acquired under the conditions stipulated by law, and shall be deprived of citizenship unless he/she commits an act incompatible with loyalty to the motherland. Recourse to the courts against the decisions and proceedings related to the deprivation of citizenship shall be denied" (HRA, 2000: 13-14).

regulation forcing everyone to be Turk by making a racial and ethic definition of citizenship. Hüsnü Öndül finds the reason in the economic and financial superiority of Europe. Such superiority is accompanied with a democratic maturity at all levels, which should not surprise us. Europe in terms of development of capitalism and relations of production is very beyond those societies in the East and it has defined the framework and meaning of the concepts of democracy, universal human rights, cultural and minority rights yet this should not prevent the rest of the world to adopt similar standards. While Hüsnü Öndül gives an anthropological conception of the culture it seems that he adopts a universalistic standing in terms of his conception of multiculturalism.

As was explained in the first section of the study, the perception of multiculturalism within a particular context is strongly conditioned by specific historical and objective conditions and political culture etc. In Europe the existence of immigrants who can potentially become minorities, refugees, already existing minority groups and today's asylum seekers have led to the formation of multicultural policies. The answers of the representatives of human rights organisations to the question of around which issue or themes the multiculturalism problem is taken into account reveal, though implicitly, how and to what extent the main debates around multiculturalism are shaped by the particular historical and political conditions specific to Turkey. Especially with respect to this question they give so detailed explanations that these views present information about almost every human right problem in Turkey.

According to Sedat Aslantaş, religious, ethnic and linguistic differences constitute the main references of the multiculturalism in Turkey. He argues that in Turkey, though it is asserted that every individual enjoys equal rights and freedoms and that there is no discrimination among communities, groups/ peoples on their different religions, cultures and ethnic origins, this is only rhetoric. From his perspective, the idea about the different other is negative. Especially when the different subjects declare their intentions to expose their differences, to live according to their distinctiveness, and to wage struggle for this, they have always been subject to pressures, violence, including being put into prisons, being subject to counter-guerrilla suppression etc. He expresses the logic as follows:

The creation of the symbol of a common enemy according to real-politics of the period and for the maintenance of the unitary, unquestionable structure of the state has always been part of Turkish political culture. The formation of a mono-cultural society has been one of the main means of this policy.

For Aslantaş within such an environment it is very meaningless to talk about tolerance since the concept necessitates a tolerant on one side and tolerated on the other but this does not define a relationship among the equals. As is seen, the state's assimilatory policies are the main object of his criticism. Yılmaz Ensaroğlu, although not in a detailed framework but very explicitly states that multiculturalism in Turkey is conceived of around the Kurdish question in particular, and the reality of the existence of the minorities whose being are ignored or denied from time to time in general. Such a focus on Kurdish question can be observed in the statements of Sedat Aslantaş too. He does not mention the Kurds or the Kurdish question but it is obvious that it is the Kurds who have, to a great extent, faced suppressive policies of the state.

In one of the texts published by HRA, democratisation, political liberalisation and realisation of human rights standards are evaluated as the fundamental problems of Turkey and Kurdish question is stated to be a significant element of this problem (HRA, 2000: 103). For that reason, both Aslantaş's and Ensaroğlu's concerns upon the Kurdish question linked to the issue of multiculturalism may be perceived as their sensibility to the democratisation and human rights question in Turkey. In conformity with this position, with respect to the possible consequences and reflections of the related debates, Sedat Aslantaş and Yılmaz Ensaroğlu agree that these and successive arguments may contribute to the solution of the human rights problem, democratization, but more specifically of the Kurdish question. On the other hand they are not very optimist with regard to the extent of the ongoing arguments, which are still far from producing effective solutions and reflections due to the legal and structural hindrances.

On this dimension Hüsnü Öndül draws a more comprehensive framework, which is worth noting here. When he describes Turkish case, Öndül gives attention to a dilemma that Turkish society, in reality, has a pluralist; multicultural, multi-linguistic structure but Republic of Turkey with its Constitution and legal system has a monist structure shaped by an ideology which denies this pluralist environment

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through describing everybody within the country as a Turk. This is the basic source of all the tension within the multiculturalism problem in Turkey. To him, the issue of multiculturalism in Turkey is the problem of the Constituon and of all system. In this sense, he notes that;

> The multiculturalism has been conceived in connection with the Kurdish problem; this is the real situation yet at normative level this is not a true position. Because there are 4 million Cherkez and 5 million Laz live in this country, 26 different languages are spoken and there are millions of people having different beliefs, religious sects including Alevis and Assyrians.

Öndül specifically gives the example of the positions of the Alevis and criticizes that;

> The right to freedom of belief and religion should be held as a part of the cultural rights, however in Turkey while cultural and ethnic rights have been linked to the terror and secession; namely, to the sphere of politics in general, people belonging to different sects other than Sunni have not only been ignored but also prevented to enjoy their beliefs equally and freely. Therefore Turkish Republic is not a secular state for it has both a formal religion, i.e., Sunni Islam and it is an ethnic state resting on Turkish-Islam synthesis which has determined the structure and nature of the system after 12 September 1980 coup'sdetat together with all restrictive legal regulations.

From the thoughts of Hüsnü Öndül, it can be derived that he regards Kurdish question as one of the components of problem of multiculturalism in Turkey and then links these two realities to the general human rights and democratisation problem of the country as Sedat Aslantaş and Yılmaz Ensaroğlu do. However in comparison to them Öndül's additional contribution is worth mentioning. For instance, he looks for the reason of the establishment of close connection between Kurdish question and multiculturalism in the armed and political struggle waged for political (secession and political autonomy) and cultural (expressions of their identities) rights in the Southeastern region. Therefore similar struggles by other groups may have given way to similar results. His comment takes again our attention to the fact that there may be a blurred line between the demands for political and cultural rights depending on the nature of the policies of a state and of the intentions of any group or community in question. Furthermore he evaluates the reflections of the ongoing

debates from the perspective of both the groups and of political authority. First of all, Hüsnü Öndül is against the engagement with the politics on the ethnic and religious basis; because both ethnic and religious politics are open to the manipulation. He argues that in Turkey political groups, for a long time, have not been mature in their position, they have made their discussions from the perspective of getting the political power. In other words, they have seen ethnic, cultural and identity differences as taken for granted and put them into the center of their political struggle i.e. a position that should be questioned**. (46)** On the other hand, as Öndül articulates, the political authority has attempted to manipulate and direct the existing debates for the reproduction of its formal ideology by means of Turkification or nationalisation of every symbol, folklore, tradition, clothes even colours such as the official efforts to nationalise or turkify the Newroz and the colours of this tradition. All these attempts serve nothing other than the politicisation of the groups concerned. As has just been noted, Öndül does not characterise the debates as mature yet he claims that especially after the decrease of the impetus of the armed struggle and violence in the Southeast, citizens belonging to different ethnic, cultural origins have started to raise their demands for the use of their language in songs, in broadcasting etc. more freely. And intellectuals, who had no courage in the period when concepts of division and terror were interpreted in a very broad sense, have gradually adopted more critical position by emphasizing the need for cultural rights and freedoms. Öndül, like Aslantaş and Ensaroğlu, believes that this critical perspective may open the way for the democratic solutions of many problems including those of human rights and multiculturalism.

How the process of integration to the EU has affected the legal and political reforms and regulation was explained with reference to the constitutional and other legislative amendments that have gained impetus after 1999. However it seems that both the integration process and these legal changes, though their practical implications have not been revealed yet, have increased the expectations regarding the realisation of political liberalisation within the country. Ideas of human rights organisations reflect such a situation. Indeed in the interview they were asked if the process of integration to the EU affects or shapes the discussions on the multiculturalism and the claims made in the name of multiculturalism and whether they attribute any importance to the membership to the EU. For both questions all

gave affirmative answers. Yılmaz Ensaroğlu attaches a value to the process in terms of its contribution to the solution of the problem and adds that this process has a significant influence both on the intensification of the debates and the expressions of many demands for cultural rights. As he argues that;

> Though politicians assert that the Turkish citizens are worth every improvement in democratic and human rights standards, enjoyment of rights and freedom, we know that the main incentive behind all these constitutional and legal arrangements is the requirements of EU for accession. However irrespective of Turkey's accession to EU, even this process will have important implications for democratisation, which should be the main concern of all.

Very similar to this position, according to Sedat Aslantaş, EU process, plays such a vital role that many subjects including the right to education in and through mother tongue, use of different mother languages in radio and TV broadcasting, elimination of legal restrictions for the possession of real estates by minority foundations, provision of legal permission for the reopening of religious school in Heybeliada have been put into agenda, even though such demands for cultural rights have been evaluated with suspicion by the political authority. To Aslantaş recognition of multicultural values necessitates a democratic consciousness requiring an understanding of respect for the rights and freedoms of the others and non-intervention to these rights. Then it is through the acceptance of the values of European Union that such a consciousness can be adopted at the national level. Even he asserts that multiculturalism depends on the further development of the integration process. In other words, negative outcomes that would stem from the negotiations for accession may easily impede the continuation of many reforms and liberalization.

It is by no means necessary to repeat the reasons that Hüsnü Öndül attaches to the importance of EU process. However some of the points he underlines can be noted. First of all, he reemphasizes a statement written in one of the publication of the HRA that;

> The EU-Turkey relations will create a positive effect upon the enhancement of the human rights and development of democratic standards as long as it is developed in a way that they do not sacrifice human rights, vis-à-vis economic, financial and military interests (HRA, 2000: 19).

Since, to him, dynamics within the relationship with EU act as a transformative mechanism. He is also aware of the fact that majority of the people within the society including Islamic groups and the Kurds, excluding radical left, support the membership to the EU because they notice the positive effects that membership would generate by means of expanding the borders of the rights and freedoms. However he criticise the standing of the political authority as Ensaroğlu does. While describing the main logic behind all the constitutional reforms as the achievement of conformity to the EU standards, he connects the reason to the unable, immature positions of politicians who are far from adopting democratic merits and consciousness, and have used these values as the tools in the foreign politics. On the other hand, Öndül worries about the inefficiency and weakness of the internal dynamics in the democratisation of Turkey. In spite of this fact, he strongly stresses that;

> In order for the settlement of democratic values, multiculturalism, and for the enjoyment of cultural rights it is of vital necessity to adopt Copenhagen political criteria within its entirety   because Europe has already succeeded to create an environment where many cultures coexist on the basis of tolerance.

Five questions of this interview address the understanding of multiculturalism in Turkey with its several dimensions as three representatives of human rights organisations pointed it out. Lastly, they were also requested to explain their concrete projects and recommendations that may serve to the solution of the problem of multiculturalism and to the improvement of the opportunities for politics of multiculturalism. Strongly supporting the necessity of a multicultural politics, within the objective conditions of Turkey's political environment it appears that their suggestions do not go beyond some normative expectations and that the criticism against the policies of the state in this area constitutes the basis of their responses. Sedat Aslantaş formulates this as the necessity of having a revolution in the consciousness and the ways of thinking. What it means, as he explains, is firstly the abolitions of all legal and structural impediments for the use of freedom of expression, which necessitates the end of the attempt for social engineering. A comprehensive transformative project should then eliminate the ideas of dominated

culture, language, religion of the state, which undeniably will enable different cultures to express their identities and enjoy their cultural rights including freedom to use their language in broadcasting, in education, freedom of thought and religion etc. According to him, States should not have cultural policies. With respect to the same issue, Yılmaz Esaroğlu's responses support those of Sedat Aslantaş. To Ensaroğlu, even though there exists no mature politics of multiculturalism in Turkey because of the restrictive policies of the state blaming everyone engaging with such politics for damaging the unitary structure of the state, but for Ensaroğlu non-existence of multicultural politics may potentially be substituted by suppressive, discriminatory, assimilatory state policies aiming at eliminating cultural diversity, even ethnic cleaning. The redefinition and adoption of the concept of the constitutional citizenship is presented by Ensaroğlu as an important step in the way of solutions of many problems involving those of Kurdish question and multiculturalism. He argues that by incorporating this concept in their constitutions many countries, while preserving their unitary structure, acknowledge their responsibilities for the maintenance and promotion of cultures, identities, languages of individuals belonging to several ethnic groups who will, through a social contract, both preserve their diverse identities while accepting their commitments to the state as citizens.

Hüsnü Öndül, too, attributes a great importance to the notion of constitutional citizenship, which should be seen merely as a legal issue. Therefore the state should be neutral in its relation with the citizens within the borders. However this is not the case in Turkey in which the state has an active role in the promotion of Turkish ethnic identity in all spheres like education, music, literature, so-called scientific researches etc. Indeed Öndül's concern about the position of the state draws our attention to another practical problem within the debates on multiculturalism, that is; the limits of the state's role in the preservation and promotion of ethnic, religious identities of the minorities and communities .In the interview, Sedat Aslantaş argues that;

> Irrespective of whether they are granted at individual or group level, the groups in question should be given their cultural rights. On the other hand, state may fulfill an active role yet if the state has no such a measure, at least, it should ensure a legal protection and not intervene in the affairs of these groups.

Hüsnü Öndül adds that the focus on the need for an impartial state should not be comprehended as the nonexistence of the role of the state with respect to the maintenance and development of pluralist and the multicultural structure of the society. On the contrary, state should assume very active and positive role, while preserving an equal distance to all the groups (especially to the majority), for instance, in providing financial assistance in protection of some languages or traditions, which are almost forgotten. Öndül, like Aslantaş, underlines the significance of radical transformation of the consciousness that may solve the tension between the relationship between state and its citizens and between the several peoples within the society. Hüsnü Öndül regards the change of education policies in a direction that will revise educational curriculum in order to reflect cultural richness, multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, multi-religious structure of Turkish society. Moreover, children from the level of primary education should be taught on the basis of pluralist values and of the realities of Turkey's culturally rich geography. As is observed, Öndül's expectations absolutely reflect the necessity of providing relevant legal and political instruments for the educational rights of the minorities.

To summarize, the responses of the human rights organisations within the interview present considerable information in comprehending the problem of multiculturalism with respect to three dimensions of the issue within Turkey i.e. perception of the concept, the main themes and framework of ongoing discussions and the influence of integration process to the EU upon the understanding of concept and the existing debates .As was noted before, the reasons laying behind the existence of these organisations enable us to make some generalisations about their perspectives.

First of all, regarding the first dimension they all conceive of the term of the multiculturalism in connection to the recognition of the identities of different ethnic, cultural and linguistic groups and their understanding of the notion describes a society where distinct communities can coexist on the basis of mutual respect and tolerance. Although they said that they do not follow related debates in the Western Europe, their perception of the term is in conformity with the general comprehension abroad where the recognition of distinct identities of minorities and migrants

constitute one of the concerns of those studying on politics of multiculturalism as was tried to be explained in the first part of the study.

With respect to the second dimension, their responses reflect the specific conditions of Turkey. From the general framework of the interview, it may be derived that, in their points of view, the right to enjoy several cultural rights by the minorities and other cultural, ethnic and religious groups and communities constitutes part of the problem of multiculturalism in Turkey. These cultural rights are mainly about the use of mother tongues in educational sphere, and in both printed and broadcasting medias, the rights of other religious sects like Alevis, the creation of opportunities for the formal minorities to make use of their existing rights and then elimination of all legal and structural obstacles for the use of these and other freedoms. Furthermore they put the Kurdish question within the general problem of multiculturalism in Turkey. Thus all these issues are defined within the framework of the question of democratisation within the country. It is because of this perspective that they argue that the politics of multiculturalism has a strategic importance for the solutions of the Kurdish question, which at the end will contribute to the endeavors for the democrasation of Turkey.

Further, their approaches regarding the question show a similarity with the explanation of the problem in the international legal and political documents under the heading of minority right or the linguistic rights of minorities. As will be remembered, in a very general sense, in these documents, the issue of protection of minority rights or linguistic rights is assessed as a means for the realisation and settlement of democratic values and human rights criteria. Furthermore it appears that they are aware of the differences in the level of discussions in Turkish and European contexts. Europe is presented as a geography where the minimum standards of human rights, democratisation and political liberalisation of the liberal state that Turkey endeavors to adopt have already been achieved. It is because of this acknowledgement that Hüsnü Öndül explicitly argues that Turkey should assume the political values of Europe in general and Copenhagen political criteria without any reservation.

From this we can look at the third dimension of the concern of multiculturalism in Turkey. They clearly express their support to the process of integration to the EU due to the assumption that it is this process not the good

intention of the political authority that has given way to the important legal and constitutional amendments and political commitments (National Programme) related to the general human rights like freedom of expression, non-discrimination and more specific cultural rights. Therefore the continuation of this process and the membership to the EU play a strategic role for the relevant successive reforms and experience of these reforms and improvements in daily life.

Lastly the evaluation of their recommendations regarding the solution of the issue on the basis of their projects may be pointed out. The main concern of these representatives is the assimilatory, suppressive and restrictive policies of the state which should be replaced by an inclusive policy through which those people belonging to various ethnic, religious or linguistic groups preserve and express their distinct identities in their participation to the society while accepting their rights and obligations as citizens. As was expressed, such an ideal is the main concern of all engaging in politics of multiculturalism. This shows that the policies of the state play the key role in the problem of multiculturalism within any society possessing minorities, immigrants, though depending on the context the degree and nature of these policies may vary. For instance, the participants of this survey assert that Turkish Republic tries to Turkify everything including culture, language, symbols, traditions, even colours through attempts to create a dominant culture, dominant language and dominant religion (Sunni Islam) and suppressive policies denying the existence of the "different other" (Aslantaş's concept).

At more concrete level, they list a series of regulations and reforms, which are required from Turkey to fulfill under its international legal and political commitments. Apart from basic cultural rights stated above they underline the state's responsibility to assume an active and positive position such as public funding of the private schools. The redesign of educational curriculum in the light of the needs of these groups, by means of incorporation of information about the cultures of the minorities and other groups, which will serve, in Öndül's thinking, to the development of dialogue within the society, is another recommendation. But beyond these and normative expectations they do not state detailed recommendations as is defined in international instruments and in European context since indeed the recent legal reform have not been practiced yet. In other words, people have not faced the possible outcomes of these arrangements, which are merely attached value at

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normative level. In addition it appears that their opportunities to present more viable and detailed policies depend on their ability to contribute to the formation of relevant state policies, which is not the case in Turkey. **(47)**

4.4. Political Parties

At the beginning it should be noted that the responses of the political parties to the interview questions are not as precise as those of the human rights organisations. Even the representatives of some political parties present no clear-cut answers so their perspectives regarding the three aspects of the problem of multiculturalism problem in Turkey are mostly derived implicitly. However, it seems that this situation does not result from their lack of knowledge.

Two representatives of AKP stated their ideas: Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat and Şaban Dişli but Dişli preferred to answer the questions in written form without providing any opportunity of making discussions upon his explanations so his ideas bear a more intellectual dimension in comparison to the other answers. Mehmet Fırat expresses his perception of the notion with reference to the political, military conflicts of the era as was faced in Yugoslavia, in the former Soviet Bloc and says that it is the cultural conflicts that have caused such an outcome. In this sense, to him multicultural values can act as an antidote to these problems by means of decreasing the trend of these conflicts and of achieving the coexistence of several communities possessing distinct religions, races, ethnic groups and sects together. There have already been legal, political efforts to take precautions, and to prevent these conflicts but the main prerequisite is the development of democratic framework within which people both can use their rights and freedoms and express their various identities. According to Fırat, the EU has succeeded this ideal by ensuring the conditions through which people both as individuals and as members of the communities can preserve, and promote their cultural differences. Fırat seems to understand the concept as a model for the prevention of existing cultural conflicts. Parallel to these thoughts, Şaban Dişli conceives of politics of multiculturalism as a popular issue in countries having ethnically, culturally, racially diverse communities and in the future more and more countries will adopt such a politics together with the interaction with other countries and with the development of the communication.

Demonstrating Dişli's awareness of the relevant debates in Europe, he lists the main concerns of the politics of multiculturalism in Europe as follows; the problem nationalism, the means of the integration of many groups into the society in order to eliminate conflicts, the development of specific policies for the preservation and promotion of identities of the ethnic groups like the right to broadcast, opportunities for private education and communication facilities, provision of public services in conformity with different languages and cultures etc. Dişli supports the necessity of these measures taken in the European context; since he argues that the provision of such social resources will prevent the political tendencies for political autonomy and secession, and contribute to the social unity. He describes his own model as one, which enable all to enjoy all rights ascertaining to the citizenship without denying their ethnic and religious identities. Regarding both Fırat's and Dişli's comprehension of the concept (irrespective of their attribution of such a strategic significance to the concept), the argument of one of the scholar can be reemphasised as was noted in the first section (Offe, 1996). The liberal democracies have many means and instruments to defend themselves against those demands of different natures, which can damage its functioning, and formulation of many rights under the name of multiculturalism may be seen as one of those instruments of the liberal democracies.

The evaluation of the representatives of the other parties does not so much differ from the perspectives above. Representative of CHP, İnal Batu connects the concept to the idea of the recognition of the distinct identities of the ethnic, racial, cultural minorities and groups. Nesrin Nas presenting the perspective of ANAP and Nevzat Ercan that of DYP regard the concept of multiculturalism as an undeniable component of fundamental human rights and freedoms. In this respect, Nesrin Nas criticizes those who take the issue on the basis of the minorities or ethnicity, and claims that the problem can no longer be analysed within the borders of the nation-state. Although Nas stands against the reduction of the meaning of the concept to the ethnic conflicts rather than assessing the notion as a vital part of the democratic societies, it is obvious that the growing interest on the concept has been in a sense a result of the determination of statuses of the groups and minorities in democratic societies.

Interestingly their assessments of the main themes of multiculturalism in Turkey are similar in the sense that in one way or another all of them give reference to the question of the cultural, linguistic, educational and religious rights of the minorities and groups, especially those of the Kurds. Although Nevzat Ercan expresses his thoughts through so general statements, it is understood what he wants to mean.

> Article 66 of our Constitution defines the citizenship on the basis of feeling of belonging not with reference to ethnicity or race. People belonging to different groups founded Turkish Republic but they have united under the ideas of Turkish citizenship. Although the cultures, languages of many groups should be seen as the source of richness, both external enemies and the terrorism have tried to damage the social peace and unity by manipulating culturally and ethnically diverse structure of Turkish society. Some manipulate ethnic groups; others try to create the conflicts between the Alevis and Sunnis. However, regardless of our ethnic and religious origins all of us should adopt universal values of fundamental rights and freedoms.

Such as implicit attention to the Kurdish question and general fears about the unity, integrity and indivisibility of the state is emphasised by the other representatives. Nesrin Nas argues that compared to the debates within Europe, Turkey has recently started to discuss the multiculturalism and the necessity of cultural rights (enjoyment of linguistic rights in educational sphere, broadcasting) within the framework of the democracy and universal human rights and freedoms. However, for a very long time the issue has been connected to the Kurdish identity and assessed as a danger to the unity and integrity of the state. Though slowly, Turkey has gone beyond these fears, and understood that it is the destruction of the relationship between the citizens and the state that damage the unity and that differences only enrich the society. Sharing the arguments of Nas, Mehmet Fırat and Şaban Dişli explain the logic behind such a direct connection as the violence and terror (in their words) that Turkey suffered from till the late 1990's. According to Şaban Dişli, this has resulted in the problem of integration of citizens of Kurdish origin to the system but Turkey endeavors to overcome these deficiencies.

In addition to this, İnal Batu argues that the narrow-mindedness of the governors and politicians caused quite unhealthy, immature and inhuman approaches concerning the cultural rights. As he points out that;

> Together with the decrease of the impetus of the terror firstly, we have witnessed the use of several mother languages in printed media and everyday life (increase in the number of the cassettes in Kurdish etc.). Now we make many legal amendments to broaden the extent of these rights to the fields of the broadcasting media and education. However, these are natural rights and should not have created any problem or trouble.

As Batu notes, the content of the cultural rights and necessary regulations have always been a source of the trouble and tension in Turkey. However, today almost all political parties including the one in the power, as their representatives state, regard the existence of different groups as richness, strongly emphasise the right to freedom of thought and expression of these differences, freedom of religion of different sects, and incorporate these views into their program. For instance, regarding the fundamental rights and freedoms some of the statements within the program of AKP there is an emphasis on the ideal of democratisation emphasis in almost every statement. In the program it is also stated that the party rejects discrimination on any ground, acknowledges its commitments to develop the consciousness of the citizenship on the basis of a social contract, and to take further measures in the areas of freedom of thought, expression, freedom of religion (through policies to enable those belonging to different religions and beliefs to carry out their worships freely) (AKP Programı: 2002). The party's respect for the rights and the freedoms of the minorities is also stressed. Following this, assessing the cultural differences as richness it is pointed out that "use of different languages other than Turkish in cultural activities involving broadcasting underpins the unity and integrity of state and should not be seen as a damaging factor on the condition that official language and language of instruction is Turkish" (AKP Programı, 2002: 28-29). In the light of these principles, Şaban Dişli puts the issue of the multiculturalism in Turkey into the context of human rights but he argues that the notion implies more than this; since though the aim is to grant rights to individuals or groups, this will serve to the social unity and harmony. For that reason, every issue subject to

multiculturalism binds Turkey too, including cultural rights. In this respect the first step for the practice of politics of multiculturalism is to recognise differences and to ensure the right of representation of different groups but he does not explain how to achieve all these. He characterises the broadcasting rights and right to education in mother languages as concrete projects and says that in the future these may be followed by more comprehensive projects like the establishment of private educational systems, provision of communication systems for the ethnic groups within the limits of financial resources.

Mehmet Fırat's main reference to the cultural rights is the 6th Harmonisation Package prepared by his own party. He says that the relevant provisions within the package were designed to respond the needs of the multicultural structure of the society, to improve the standards of democracy, human rights and freedoms (In the interview he listed these provisions and gave examples). He characterises the package as the extension of legal reforms enacted in the period of previous government and sees it urgent to make successive amendments.

> This process will develop step by step and, society will soon understand that the granted broadcasting rights will not damage the national unity and territorial integrity. And I am sure that there will even be no broadcasting in mother languages since such an activity requires financial resources without which it is impossible to continue such activity. Further, if our citizens of Kurdish and Assyrian origins claim to be taught in their own languages, they should be free to use that right. Restrictions of this right are against our conceptualisation of the citizenship. In Turkey secularism should also be reformulated because though the Alevis and Assyrians assert that they are hindered to express themselves freely, our Sunni citizens also suffer from many impediments in practicing their right to live according to their own beliefs. Of course, all these rights should be made use of within the context of internal legislation and international standards.

In general, Fırat's perspective does not diverge from the politics of his party and from the general tendency. However, two points may be questioned in his explanations. First of all, as it has been pointed out several times the provision of funding the minorities and the groups in terms of their access to the media and educational sphere is necessitated by the relevant international regulations that the party in the power explicitly declare its commitment, then it is difficult to explain

how Fırat excludes the funding from the responsibilities of the government. Regarding the rights of the citizens many objections can be noted. After all, it is known that the Department of the Religious Affairs was founded in order to design services proper to Islam religion, in its activities and procedures it serves the needs of Sunni Hanefi sect (HRA, 2000: 17).

According to Nas, ANAP by formulating the First National Programme and the harmonisation packages has acted as a pioneer in the democratisation of Turkey (she gives the example of the abolition of the death penalty) and has already displayed that ANAP has had no reservation regarding the cultural rights of many groups. Nesrin Nas, seeing the multiculturalism as a reality that Turkey cannot ignore, stresses that the direction of the world is towards the adoption of multicultural values. This means Turkey's historical and objective conditions no longer make sense.

The significance of the state policies for the practice of cultural rights and multicultural ideals has already been noted. In the light of the responses, it can be concluded that all the political parties besides the role of making further legal reforms in this area, attribute the role of the regulation with respect to the practice of cultural rights to the state. Since once these rights were entitled it is up to the groups to use them in the media or educational sphere within the limits and regulations set by the law. Nevzat Ercan describes these limits as some technical requirements observed in every state (he gives the example of the duration of the programs), and the preservation of the national unity and territorial integrity.

For instance, for Mehmet Fırat direct interference by the state into the religious or other cultural affairs of the groups and minorities may result in discrimination. Since if the state directly contributes to the establishment of an Armenian school or a mosque this will violate the rights of the others. The state cannot respond to all these demands. Supporting this position, İnal Batu sees it necessary to limit the role of the state with the removal of the legal restraints. However, for Batu, this does not exclude the responsibility of the states to protect and promote the cultural richness of the society. The reason of the attachment of a regulative role to the state is explained in "CHP Demokratikleşme Raporu". Mentioning many points related to the democratisation problem of Turkey, the

Report points out that a democratic state may neither have a formal religion nor rest on a particular ethnic or racial identity. In other words, the state should respect the values of diverse religions and cultures of sub-groups by preserving its equal distance to all the communities. Further, like other parties do, the society is described as a multicultural and multi-linguistic one which is the basis of richness and internal peace, so all ethnic sensibilities and relevant claims should be dealt with within the limits of pluralist democracy and national integrity. (CHP Demokratikleşme Raporu, 2001). Under the heading of the Principles of Democratic Solutions of Ethnic Sensibilities, CHP's model is described as follows:

> Our understanding of democracy rests on a policy recognising the identities of all the sub-groups but aiming at integrating these identities to the society under the general idea of Turkish citizenship… Turkish Republic was not founded on ethnic or racial basis, and the common political identity of all members is Turkish citizenship and the existence of other sub-identities cannot contradict this reality. On the basis of this understanding, in democracies neither state can ignore cultural identities nor can any cultural community develop another political culture…. Our citizens of Kurdish origin constitute an inseparable part of our national unity (CHP Demokratikleşme Raporu, 2001: 74-75).

As is seen, this model is quite similar to the positions of the other parties like DYP and ANAP. Furthermore, in the report the practice of mother languages is evaluated as matter of the cultural field, and official language is regarded as a means of political unity in the public sphere. On this basis, CHP recognises the necessity to create opportunities for the sub-groups to learn, promote their languages, cultures, and traditions and, express themselves without any restraints. The state will repeal all legal and structural impediments. On this basis, the groups, if they want, under the control of the state and within the framework of the laws can establish private schools, research institutes in the universities out of the public educational sphere and also private broadcasting and printed media (CHP Demokratikleşme Raporu, 2001: 76-78). **(48)** In general, the political parties are not clear in determining the limits of state intervention in these affairs. All agree in that the rights noted above are private affairs of the groups, yet it is not clear what the responsibilities of the state are in provision of opportunities and what these opportunities are. This is, in a sense, a technical and practical problem and will be more precise together with the emergence of consequences of the practice of the rights in the successive years.

It goes without saying that the process of accession to the EU is attributed a great significance by all the political parties. And as is known each party has more or less contributed to this process through legal and political amendments. For example, Nevzat Ercan and Nesrin Nas, in the interview, characterise the process as unavoidable and irreversible. According to Ercan, Turkey from 1950's onwards has made its preference for being part of the EU in order to achieve the democratic and economic standards of the Union. This point is also emphasised in the Democratisation Report of CHP defining the membership to the EU as the project of social transformation.

Not surprisingly representatives of all parties accepted the positive impact of the membership process, which has already been a national goal of the foreign policy, upon the concerns of multiculturalism. However, İnal Batu explains this impact from a critical perspective. According to Batu, because of the weakness of the internal dynamics in Turkey, all the legal changes or the reforms made in the name of multiculturalism have been the result of the political pressure of the EU. To him, this is a forced process. Turkey has been forced to make these reforms, and it is no longer possible to escape the obligations that EU determines for the membership. Batu does not deny the positive political changes that will be the outcome of the membership, yet to him it is a shame for Turkish democracy, because the reforms should have been enacted in order to respond the expectation of people for the settlement of democratic values, human rights principles and etc. On the other hand, the critical perspective of İnal Batu is not adopted by CHP that defines its political claim as improvement of the level of political and economic standards of the society by means of realisation of economic and political criteria of the European Union (CHP Demokratikleşme Raporu, 2001). Indeed, there is a difference between the position of İnal Batu and the perspective of CHP with respect to the extent of the outcome of the enjoyment of the cultural rights. İnal Batu sees it unnecessary and meaningless to make discussion about this matter yet CHP, as has been indicated above, evaluate the issue of cultural rights in a more restrictive manner, and in the light of the concerns on national and unity of the country. The party describes the issue as private affair of the communities, and expects the groups in question to display their loyalty to the political identity of Turkish citizenship.

Like Batu, both Ercan and Nas underlines the ineffective role of the internal dynamics in the transformation of society due to the strength of the existing political structure, and Nas traces this situation back to the time of the Ottoman Empire. Nas says that the EU as the external dynamic has speeded up the trend of the reforms and considerable changes will follow with the impact of this external factor, but to her the Turkey had to pass from these stages even if such a dynamic did not exist though more slowly. Nevzat Ercan, too, states his worries about the slow trend of the democratisation process before 1999 and emphasises that Turkish people, long before, have deserved such rights.

The representatives of AKP, Mehmet Fırat and Şaban Dişli presented affirmative answers regarding the impact of the EU process. Dişli believes that the discussions on multiculturalism will be reduced to a minimum provided that Turkey will continue to carry out harmonisation reforms. On the other hand, Fırat accuses of previous governments making legal amendments as a response to the requirements for EU membership. However, he claims that his party whether or not membership will be achieved has enacted these reforms and will continue in this way. To Fırat, Copenhagen criteria merely represent the minimum requirements and the aim of AKP is to go beyond these minimum standards in order to increase the living standards of the Turkish citizens. He adds that the EU process only stimulates and speeds up this trend. However, a contribution is observed in the arguments of Fırat and AKP in general. While stating above ideas, in another statement Fırat says that;

> 2003 Regular Report of the Commission for Progress is about the legal regulations Turkey has made. In other words, it is related to the amendments that Turkey has been required to carry out, and we will also has declared our commitments in the National Programme, if we can not complete all these regulations, negotiations for membership cannot be engaged at the end of the year of 2004. We also should bear in our mind that economic liberalism without political liberalism gives way to brutal capitalism.

Moreover, in its programme AKP needs to overemphasise that "all the steps taken for the realisation of fundamental rights and freedoms should be irrespective of the demands of the international institutions" (AKP Programı, 2002: 13). Some of the representatives also explained their ideas about the application of the recent legal amendments and the practice of recently granted rights, although their thoughts were

same of each other, and so general that were far from presenting any concrete recommendation. For instance, Nesrin Nas underlines the difficulty of adaptation to and integration of the effects of the change by the society since it takes two or more generations to accept it. However, to Nas once, the positive results of the change are conceived the rest of the process can be managed more easily (like the case of the elimination of the death penalty). For the future, Mehmet Fırat says that Turkey will carry on fulfilling all its commitments included in the National Pragramme. With respect to the practice he emphasises the evolutionary nature of the change, which will require time. Because it is not easy to persuade the larger society, you should prepare them for the consequences of the change step by step and change the main conceptualisation of the perceptions of the integrity, unity, and danger. In order to support his arguments he mentions the recent changes on the prevention of torture, right to freedom of thought and expression, the effects of which will soon be felt by all. Like Fırat, Nevzat Ercan, too, focuses on the necessity of the change of general understanding and consciousness of every individual, especially those individuals working in the public institutions. In his thinking, together with the improvement in communication facilities individuals in Turkey have understood the importance of the values like freedom, democracy. In the past, however, due to the existence of terror the society was too sensitive to many issues like death penalty, and political parties including his own party had to take into account these sensitivities because of their concerns about the elections. However today, people know that membership to EU will increase the standards of democracy and human rights therefore they will be more responsive to the legal changes compared to the previous years. As has been noted above, these recommendations do not indicate definite solutions. The need for the change of the perceptions and understanding of the society is an undeniable reality yet the problem lies in how this change can be achieved. For instance, the general statement of the representatives do not provide answers for the problems of how a new consciousness will be created, through which ways the society will be prepared for successive reforms, how the sensitivities of the society over many questions can be overcome etc. It appears that the political parties expect the accommodation of these matters over time in a gradual process.

Lastly the relevant perspective of MHP will briefly be mentioned here. As was noted before there was no chance of making interview with the representatives

of MHP so on the basis of some texts and documents published by MHP the related ideas of the party are to be revealed. Even though these texts are not prepared specifically to analyse the problem of multiculturalism in Turkey the arguments within them reveal the perspective of the party regarding the question of cultural rights and the general effects of the EU process upon the related debates.

In general the party while stating its commitments to democratic values, universality of human rights, and recognising the culturally rich structure of Turkish society and regional differences as part of Turkish culture, MHP is quite sensitive to many themes and demands that are conceived by other parties as legitimate and necessary for Turkish democracy. And the causes of such sensitivity are mostly explained with reference to the significance of the preservation of Turkish national culture (national interests, national values), internal peace and maintenance of national unity and integrity. Because they are the main determinants of the politics of MHP, the party approaches the arguments on use of mother tongue in different spheres and the rights of minorities with suspicion as will demonstrated below.

According to the party, the main trouble with the existing arguments is their reduction of the democratisation process to the recognition of the rights of the minorities, and its equation to the acceptance of the ethnic and religious differences in the public sphere, i.e., a position that will threaten the internal peace and the democratic order of the country (Bahçeli, 2000: 54). In the same document it is argued that democratic politics should not function to deepen these differences and, legitimate the subversive and separatists activities through enabling them to represent these differences in the field of politics. In general, the party characterises the general trend of the world (called globalisation) as one in which sub-identities damage national structures by becoming more politicised. In Turkey such a problem is tried to be created through the claims for ethnic separation under the masks of participatory democracy, constitutional citizenship or multiculturalism (MHP Ar-Ge Merkezi, 2002: 32-34).

Instead the party argues that Turkish Republic has a unitary structure, and the concept of Turkish nation has a meaning beyond all ethnic, religious and linguistic differences and acts as a cement, so does the concept of Turkish citizenship, under which regardless of ethnic origins and cultural features all individuals are recognised

as equal members of the society (Bahçeli, 2002: 61). Then these ideas are defined as the basis of Turkish nationalism. In this sense, by making reference to the ongoing debates, MHP very explicitly rejects the formation of special and specific arrangements regarding broadcasting rights and education in mother languages under the name of cultural rights for the citizens possessing different cultural traits on regional or ethnic basis. It should be noted that the party, in these various documents including the party programme avoids using the terms of ethnic, cultural group or ethnic and religious identity instead this undeniable reality is defined through the statements of regional and traditional differences or distinct cultural characteristics etc. (MHP Programı, 2000: 13). Then the rejection of the provision of cultural rights is justified by the assertion that they will immediately be followed by further claims for integrating mother languages as elective courses to the educational curriculum, the establishment of the private schools through the financial support of the state and even incorporating these schools to Turkish education system which will necessitate the acknowledgement of the equality of the schools teaching in Kurdish to those schools having education in Turkish. The other political claims and the manipulation of these differences within the political sphere as would inevitably lead to political and social conflicts. In other words, the legal recognition of any regional dialect or mother tongue rather than responding to the needs of the citizens will give damage to the social structure. MHP regards all these claims as useless attempts to create an ethnic group and even a distinct nation, that is, attempts that will give no result (Bahçeli, 2002: 61-64). From the point of view of MHP, the Turkish citizens of Muslim origin have already spoken dialects and tongues other than Turkish in their daily life without any legal restraints as articulated in the National Programme, which includes no commitment to the EU for any regulation in matters of linguistic rights in education and broadcasting (MHP defines these issues as part of the public sphere). Furthermore, it is also practically impossible to make broadcast in every regional dialect and tongue spoken in Turkey (Bahçeli, 2002: 77-80).

From this we come to the standing of MHP with respect to the EU process. MHP, too, characterises the process as an irreversible one and sees the goal of accession to the Union as a state policy (MHP Ar-Ge, 2002: 99). However, unlike the positions of other political parties MHP severely questions the double standards applied by the EU in its relations with Turkey. MHP sees it necessary to revise

Turkey's contact with EU in every stage. Because the party asserts that the Union has never took Turkey's national sensitiveness into consideration in that it forces Turkey to carry out some reforms for accession like solution of Cyprus problem granting privileges to minority foundations, elimination of death penalty, broadcasting and education in mother tongues. For instance, MHP criticises the policies of the government of AKP expanding the privileges of the minority foundations. According to MHP this increased their numbers to 160 and may also lead to a rise in missioner activities (MHP, 2003: 24-27). Moreover, the party claims that in its relations with Turkey, the Union attributes to Copenhagen political criteria some extra meanings specific to Turkey's problems, and links it to the Southeastern question: i.e.: an approach which intends to form a Kurdish minority through the rhetoric of cultural rights. More interestingly MHP finds a similarity between the requirements of EU for membership, namely, Copenhagen political criteria and political purposes of PKK-Kadek organization. Indeed, as is stated "the right to broadcast in Kurdish and the extension of this right on an institutional basis is assessed by PKK-Kadek organization as one of the democratic means for the realisation of the political unity of the Kurds" (Bahçeli, 2002: 79).

It is very beyond the scope of this study to explain the relevant discussions of MHP in a detailed manner. The arguments stated above clearly reveal the standing of MHP with respect to the problematic of this study. First of all, party regards the concepts of pluralism, multiculturalism and others as masks of the ongoing concerns on linguistic rights of the ethnic and cultural groups in Turkey, so attaches a negative meaning to these notions. Parallel to this, the party does not recognise the existence of many ethnic and religious groups and their distinct identities such as Assyrians, Kurds and Alevis and justifies this thinking on an argument that they have no officially granted minority status and cannot have and that such a situation will endanger our national values and territorial integrity. As would be remembered other political parties are in a consensus to emphasise to the necessity of eliminating our fears about the unity and integrity of Turkey and to see the culturally diverse and rich structure of the society as a strengthening dynamic of the national unity. Shaped by such a nationalist thinking MHP easily links the claims raised for cultural rights with separatist purposes of PKK-Kadek. Parallel to this, the impact of the integration process upon the democratisation of Turkey and other related reforms is attached a

negative meaning and heavily criticised by means of displaying a conformity between the principles of Copenhagen political criteria and the political aims of PKK-Kadek. As is known, the First National Programme was prepared by the 57th coalition government in which MHP was a partner and MHP declared its commitment to the provisions under the heading of political criteria designed in the light of the requirement of the Accession Partnership, by putting its signature. On the contrary, today MHP tries to challenge the regulations made to fulfill the provisions of the Programme and Accession Partnership, like the abolition of death penalty, the freedom of thought, religion, freedom of expression and others. This is a contradictory point the party's politics. Lastly, it seems too difficult to improve the extent of multiculturalism discussions in Turkey and to reach a viable solution on the basis of the general policies of MHP.

To sum up this section, it will not be wrong to conclude that the views of the political parties with regard to the three dimension of the multiculturalism problem of Turkey do not so much differ from each other. After all, all agree, except MHP, that the concepts or the politics of multiculturalism is related to the recognition of differences and distinct identities of the various cultural, ethnic groups and to the formation of the policies for the expression of these identities without any restraints. Some characterise it as an ideal model for the solutions of ethnic conflicts (Fırat and Dişli) but at the end all of them connect the notion to the democratic values as an inseperable part of the universal and fundamental rights and freedoms (again except MHP). As has just been noted, they overemphasise their normative commitments in order to remove all the legal and structural impediments preventing the groups concerned with the enjoyment of these rights.

Such a similarity of the ideas is observed with respect to the second dimension of the problem; that is; main actors of the multiculturalism in Turkey. Culturally, ethically, linguistically and religiously diverse structure of Turkish society is seen as richness, contributing to the unity of the state. According to the representatives the political parties the concerns on the cultural rights of both minorities and other groups stand at the center of multiculturalism question of Turkey and they notice that the prevalence of these matters is in a sense resulted from the relevant legal and constitutional reforms which have gained impetus

together with the intensification of the relations with the EU after 1999. Then they criticise the mentality, which reduces these concerns to the Kurdish question in general and the rights of the Kurds in particular on the ground that many distinct communities exist in Turkey other than the Kurds. According to them such an assumed connection established has been the consequences of the negative effects of the "terror" Turkey suffered from for a long time. Leaving behind this trouble, all the political parties acknowledge the enjoyment of the cultural rights within the boundaries of legal regulations and internal standards.

Moreover, the political parties give affirmative answers related to the consequences of the EU process in terms of their effect on the relevant constitutional amendments however, İnal Batu and MHP criticise this situation (from different points of view) and Nesrin Nas and Nevzat Ercan argue that this should not have been like this. On the other hand the representatives of the party in power, AKP, assert that non-existence of such an external factor will not prevent their party from enacting these reforms.

There is nothing to say about the political parties' perception of the term of multiculturalism since at the end; it is a generally accepted definition. Yet when Turkey's context comes into the agenda some points can be mentioned. From the outside (in the light of their definition of the concept), it seems that the political authority is more tolerant to the demands and claims for democratisation of the country and specifically to the cultural rights. And indeed this can be observed in their political commitments in many important documents and already enacted constitutional amendments, which will appear to continue in the successive years. But they exist only in written form, and it is not clear how the structural restraints will be removed since the parties offer no viable recommendation for the practice of the granted rights. For that reason, this gives an impression that the commitments of the political authority do not go beyond some rhetoric. On the basis of the responses to the interview questions, it cannot be denied that all the political parties (the representatives of the political authority) necessitate the reformulations of the concepts of the national unity, integrity, indivisibility and in fact they seem to revise their conceptualisations upon the fears about secession and division of the state. But these represent barely normative intensions, in other words, whether or not their sensitiveness to the themes pointed out above is revised can only be understood in

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the practices in daily life. In the light of their responses it seems that the political parties in Turkey ranging from the right – wing to social democrats are in consensus in their perspectives about the question of multiculturalism. This is in parallel with the hegemonic discourses of the 1990's, which emphasise democracy, plurality and human rights. The political parties in question, in a very general sense, locates this question within the framework of democracy, preservation of the plural structure of the society and improvement the level of the human rights standards. For different reasons and in different times these parties have always used the rhetoric of democracy, today not just for their own pragmatic interests but also as a part of a dominant tendency in the process of the integration to the EU, they see it necessary to share these general discourses.

However when we take into account their past experiences in the government and policies, the main logic and dynamics behind the functioning of the Turkish political system and the political parties and role of the military within this system it seems to be necessary to keep a suspicious standing vis a vis the responses. of the political parties. First of all though the existing political parties agree on a general perspective they would present and design such a perspective for the particular interests of a base they represent and due to the existing power relations they may in any time ignore the rhetoric of democracy, plurality respect for the cultural rights. Yet they may take them into consideration as pragmatic instruments in pursuing their policies. Because at the end they are product and very part of the existing political and economic establishment and continue to exist so long as they reproduce the establishment and represent the interests of those sections who can survive only if the main institutions and rules of the established order are preserved (Laçiner, 1998: 8). Furthermore, they function within the centralised political context within which their political weight and influence in determining and shaping the main policies of the state are limited since there is no equilibrium in military – civilian power relationship. This situation especially has become more apparent in the post 1980 period that has been charecterised by the decrease in the representational capacity of the parties at the center due to the weakening of the official ideology of the state as a result of which the military has assumed the role of maintaining ideological and political character of the system (Öngen, 2002: 59). Therefore it may be suggested that these political parties have to be in agreement with the military in preserving the

status quo although there have always been some clashes which are not related to the essence of the establishment (Cizre, 2001: 185).

As is known, for a long time center-right politics has constituted civil wing of the political system. Today they also at least at a discursive level underline the importance of basic democratic tenets, development of the civil society, promotion of multicultural values of tolerance and respect to distinct identities to which they had almost no contribution apart from legislative changes and reforms that have not been enforced in a proper manner. Instead to a great extent, it has been the center-right tradition, to which ANAP and DYP also belong that has always made reference to nationalist religious and conservative values in getting the support of the masses who have not adapted to the Western, secular identity. As was noted before, in doing so they have attempted to create an alternative national identity shaped by religious traits, traditions and local culture in order to establish the link between the state and society, i.e., a link which could not be established by the official understanding of nationalism. When in the post-1980 period ANAP has emerged as the main representative of this tradition it adopted the conservative, Sunni Islam, nationalism and economic liberalism as the party's main principles. Even in the 1990's ANAP has moved more towards right wing parties parallel to isolation of the voters from the moderate left-wing ideas (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 49). Especially together with the rise of the political Islam conservatism has been one of the significant principles of the party in that Mesut Yılmaz in his various statements stresses the identity of Turkish Muslim, which could not be sacrificed in any sense (Mert, 2001a: 70) In addition to nationalist interpretation of Islam, which was made possible by means of the conservative rhetoric, the party mentioned about the development of the civil society and democracy but this was directly linked to the strengthening of the nation and the state from a nationalist outlook (Mert, 2001a: 59) Furthermore, for a long time, the party focused on the liberalisation of the religious life as distinct from official secularism but after 27th of February process ANAP allied with the military in establishing the status quo against the political Islam (Mert, 2001a: 70). From the end of the 1990's onwards ANAP has stood as the party in a more moderate position using the notions of liberalism, nationalism, unity, political and economic stability, integrity and been the main supporter of EU integration.

The political standing of DYP is not very distinct from that of ANAP but it had a statist not liberal tradition inherited from the Justice party (AP). Therefore when DYP entered into the political life in 1987, it faced difficulties in adapting itself to the discourse of democracy but carried out its election campaign on this basis. But it is important to note that DYP is one of the parties, which has manipulated this discourse very pragmatically and strategically. In the initial years of Tansu Çiller's period starting from 1993 the party underlined the rule of law, expansion of political participation, reorganisation of civil-military relation and criticised the role of the military in the political life. Then she assumed quite anti-liberal, conservative position concerning the democratization, individual rights and freedoms and focused on Turkish nationalism, religion and national culture (Cizre, 2002: 89). Çiller was at the same time supporter of economic liberalism, privatization and deregulation and integration with EU yet it was in her period that the most coercive measures were taken in dealing with the Kurdish issue. Though when she first become the leader of party she seemed to be tolerant to the Kurdish cultural rights like broadcast in Kurdish on the state radio, putting Kurdish language as elective course in the high schools, and she even talked about civilian or political solution to the Kurdish question. However within short time due to pragmatic consideration including achieving a political victory and increasing the power of the party Tansu Çiller preferred the military solution and acted in cooperation with military. She even formed a civil security force within the ministry of internal affairs. In this sense her uncompromising, harsh policies on this issue had a negative effect on the solution of the Kurdish issue (Cizre, 2002: 92). Not surprisingly after the 28 February process, DYP again questioned the military and anti-democratic character of the regime, stressed democracy, individual rights and freedoms against state intervention. This indicated a contradiction between the stress on democratic values and the party's conservative and authoritarian policies (Mert, 2001a: 57 and Cizre, 2002: 98).

In the light of these pragmatic shifts of these two parties, it can be suggested that the parties of the center right have used liberal democratic and conservative, nationalist even authoritarian discourses together. They have equated democracy to the representation of the national will and perceived the civil society as the monopolization of many values, identities and cultures under a single entity like

Turkish ness or the state (Mert, 2001a: 78). Concerning DYP's contradictory position during Çiller's period Ümit Cizre asks whether it is related to the ideological crisis in the country or in the party or both and add that " there has been a decline in the ideological functions of the parties and alteration in their social base" (Cizre, 2002: 90). In reality ANAP and DYP in the late 1990's have been less differentiated from each other in their ideologies and they have faced difficulties in adapting to the changing cultural, political and social condition of the country due to their pragmatic and populist outlook (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 58 and Cizre, 2002: 98). For that reason, their moderate perspective vis a vis the cultural rights of the minorities, the recognition and the promotion of their cultural identities, improving the multicultural values within the society is not convincing even at discursive level. Their past policies very clearly reveal the fact that the politics of the center right more than any politics has reinforced the establishment even though in current situation the parties of the center right are not regarded as viable political actors by this establishment.

Compared to the center right parties CHP has possessed a more moderate and relatively democratic standing in its relations with the ethnic and religious groups and minorities in Turkey. Over the years the party has almost isolated itself form its leftist ideology, and even lost its reason of existence as a social democratic party in that the party has started to deal more with democratisation, basic rights and liberties than socio-economic inequalities within the society. Its economic program basically has focused on the issues of development, growth, progress, profitability, productivity so has moved more towards the right by linking the issue of distribution to the economic growth (Ayata, 2002: 112). Apart from this, the party in the 1990's has been criticized due to lack of clarity in ideological outlook and the non-existence of a detailed program concerning the secularisation, the nature of state-society relations, and the rights of the minorities. Regarding the relationship between the state- religious affairs relations CHP defines itself as the supporter of secularism, underlines the freedom of belief and consciousness and the necessity of neutrality of the state vis a vis different beliefs and religions and mentions the transfer of the affairs related to the belief and religion to the sphere of the civil society (CHP, 2001: 73). In its 1993 revised party program there is an implied statement about the elimination of Directorate of Religious Affairs. It is because of such a perspective that the Alevis who have suffered from the non-recognition of their distinct identities

have constituted the support base of the party. Indeed the Alevis for a long time have been regarded both as loyal allies of the secular republic, Kemalist nationalism, and the supporter of the social democratic parties of CHP and SHP till the year of 1993 when 37 Alevis were burnt in Sivas events, and at that time SHP was in government (Ayata, 2002: 107). As a party of advocator of freedom of belief and religion, respect for religious identities and practices CHP has not been politically effective in promoting Alevi identity. Instead the social democrat tradition in Turkey has been always in agreement with the military in establishing the state control over religion and in conformity with the official secularist understanding. Therefore the party could not go beyond the manipulation of the marginalized status of the Alevis.

Moreover, with regard to both state-society relations and the cultural rights of the minorities and groups CHP takes them into consideration within the context of democratization, extension of the scope of the human rights and the principle of plurality. Concerning the state-society relationship the party sees it necessary to limit the influence of the political authority and to check the use of the political power through participation and development of the civil society (CHP, 2001: 15). Actually CHP has always had close contact with women organizations and civil society associations that have a secular outlook.

As was noted before, the similar democratic sensitivity can be observed in CHP's perspective in regard to the rights of the ethnic groups mainly the Kurds. It is true that the social democrats (SHP/ CHP) in one way or another have always been responsive to the cultural rights claims of the Kurds and throughout the 1990's both in power and in opposition have given attention to the claims of the Kurds. They also have stressed the political solution to the Kurdish issue and with this consideration before 1991 elections the social democrats allied with the People's Work Party (HEP) through which the Kurdish identity was politically represented within the parliament (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 141 and Ayata, 2002: 114). During the period of SHP-DYP coalition Murat Karayalçın, the leader of SHP, mentioned education in Kurdish language and after 1995 (the time of the union of SHP with CHP) the social democrats have kept their concerns regarding the identity-based demands of the Kurds. However they could not have represented the interests of this group in a viable manner in that they did nothing in order to prevent the closing down of the parties of HEP, ÖZDEP (The Freedom and Democracy Party), DEP (The

Democracy Party) which were regarded as the representatives of the Kurds. For the time being under the leadership of Deniz Baykal CHP has close cooperation with identity groups like ethnic communities, the Alevis and even the feminists yet like other political parties on the center right it has lost its representation capacity due to the lack of a clear ideological outlook. Hence it is unable to articulate the interests of these groups and the masses so it has been getting more marginalized (Ayata, 2002: 120). It has seemed that the rhetoric on secularism against the Islamic fundamentalism that the party uses in association with some civil society associations and the military is no longer a viable and useful tool for pursing politics.

It has already been mentioned how pragmatically the political Islam and religious oriented political parties have used the notions of democracy, plurality and civil society in securing their position vis a vis the military. The adoption of a moderate rhetoric after 28 February process has been accompanied with a kind of democratic campaign for the enhancement of the human rights, preservation of civil rights and liberties and rule of law. Then these parties have started to represent the religious sensitivity of its base within the framework of freedom of religion and conscience. Especially the Virtue Party spent great effort not to provoke the state agents mainly the military and persuade them that it is the part of the political establishment like the other system oriented political parties. However at the same time, in order to be responsive to the Islamic movement the party mentioned cultural plurality, coexistence of different identities, protection of individual rights, recognition of identities and distinct ways of life.

Whether the political Islam in Turkey may keep its sensitivity to cultural plurality, multicultural values of recognition regarding the cultural rights of the groups other than those, who demand public appearance of their religious symbols, practices and beliefs and to live proper to these beliefs is an open question. The Welfare Party in its election campaigns in the Kurdish geography promoted the discourse of the just solution to the Kurdish issue and presented itself as the supporter of cultural rights including education and broadcast in Kurdish. These campaigns were carried out all these campaigns by using the rhetoric of the brotherhood of the Kurds and Turks under Islamic Umma. Actually, the manipulation of religious sensitiveness of the Kurds has always been one of the main tools of the political Islam and it has been successful in its task with the assistance of

its broad organizational capacity (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 151). However when in 1994 the Kurdish members of the parliament were blamed for supporting separatist activities the members of RP did not hesitate to use affirmative vote for lifting their parliamentary immunity (White, 2001: 18). The same situation can be generalized to the rights of the non-Muslim minorities and to those people belonging to different sects other than Sunni Islam like the Alevis since the Islamic tolerance, ideal of multi-legal and multi-religious order as exemplified in the Medina Contract have remained only at discursive level. This has been far from embracing the concerns of the non-Muslim population as is observed how the minority foundations are subject to restrictive measures (Bali, 1998: 174). It is also known that it has been mostly the religious and extreme nationalist thinking that have assumed discriminatory and intolerant attitude vis a vis the non-Muslim who are still regarded as foreigners. Then it may be further asked what AKP and its predecessors as proponents of the freedom of belief have done for the rights of the Alevis, who for a long time been prevented to live according to their beliefs and cultures and even to express their identities. Instead one member of RP did not feel trouble in defending those people blamed for the Sivas events. In the programme of AKP it is stated that "…religion is one of the most important institutions of the humanity, and secularism is both prerequisite of democracy and the guarantor of the freedom of religion and conscience. The party is against the interpretation of secularism as an anti-religious attitude. In principle the notion of secularism enables those belonging to different religions and beliefs to carry out their religious practices and to express their beliefs accordingly" (AKP, 2002: 15). On the other hand compared to other political parties the Islamic parties of Turkey have more organizational capacity in adapting to changing political circumstances and they have already been part of the political and economic establishment. At current situation their role within the political life is considerable in that over time they have assumed less confrontational and more reform-oriented position as is observed in the political steps and economic policies of AKP.

Then despite the denials of Mehmet Fırat, other parties notice that it is the requirements for membership that stand behind all the reforms. Though some criticise or state their worries, these parties have taken similar steps in this process in the name of democratisation and settlement of fundamental rights and freedoms. Even it can be argued that the political authority in Turkey, irrespective of its

intention has to pass these forced stages step by step for membership, and that although it has removed and will remove many constitutional obstacles in the related fields the existence of practical limitations in daily life can be interpreted as resistance of the political authority to this forced but irreversible trend**. (49)** Therefore it may take quite long time for the political authority to abolish its fears and sensitiveness for the national unity and then adopt the principles of the more or less smoothly functioning of a liberal democracy like that idealized in the member countries of the EU.

4.5. Some Non-Governmental Organisations Concerned with Multiculturalism

In the last part of this section the views of Mesopotamia Culture Center, İstanbul Kurdish Institute (İstanbul Kürt Enstitüsü) and Agos will be reflected. Although these three actors were chosen randomly the various efforts they have spent for the groups they represent have close connection with the issue of multiculturalism in Turkey. For instance, Agos is a well known Armenian newspaper, İstanbul Kurdish Institute makes studies in order to improve Kurdish language by means of printing dictionaries, other books in Kurdish, giving private courses to teach Kurdish and also educate people to teach Kurdish etc., and Mesopotamia Culture Center (MCC) designs activities to promote Kurdish culture and the Center possesses a theater, various music group and provides other similar facilities. In this respect, they may especially be expected to adopt the discourse of multiculturalism and to say much more things about the problem because their endeavors to achieve cultural rights match the ongoing concerns on multiculturalism, particularly on cultural rights.

Hrant Dink from Agos explains his ideas on multiculturalism by reference to the notion of culture. For Dink, culture is not today's concept in the sense that it is a historical word and should have a continuation by means of transference from one generation to another because it is the part of a historical process in which people have become more civilised. On this basis, to Dink, multiculturalism indicates the coexistence of the several cultures and preservation of their existences, so this should not necessarily be on ethnic or religious basis. According to Hrant Dink throughout

the history almost every geography has such a multicultural environment in which the cultures have lived together, but it has recently been accepted that multiculturalism requires more than this; since it is vital to recognize these different beings and specific rights derived from such an existence. Indeed it is what the politics of multiculturalism tries to achieve so in this respect it is different from the concepts of pluralism and difference, which have no historical dimension and can emerge at any time. Applying all these to the European context, Dink argues that European countries try to settle such multiculturalism within the context of EU and to develop policies. This is a trend from monistic structure of the nation state to the diverse but unitary structure of multicultural societies i.e. from mono-culturalism to multiculturalism.

Like Hrant Dink, Şefik Beyaz, head of the Kurdish Institute, understands multiculturalism in terms of recognition of the different identities and existences of the diverse nations, ethnic and religious groups, and to make them live together on the basis of tolerance and democratic values. And indeed, within a framework of democracy differences are conceived as a source of richness and most importantly of unity not of separation or fear of division. To Beyaz the growth of such a consciousness in the world should be related to the challenge of multiculturalism against the monistic cultures of the nation states in which minority cultures are forced to adopt the values of the culture of the majority. However with this challenge it has been gradually understood that the suppression of minority nationalism and pressures upon the national minorities to assimilate themselves to the dominant nation have counter results. Because despite all these pressures and discriminatory policies, national minorities have been able to preserve both their identities and keep their wishes to gain national autonomy. Then, as Beyaz continues, the liberal democracies have noticed that the result is the increasing danger of separation, which may threaten stability of both political and economic structures. Following this, today it has been increasingly acknowledged that in multicultural and multi-ethnic societies individuals should be able to make use of the universal rights and also, as members of the minorities, should be granted special status.

Giving reference to the experiences of the liberal democracies including those of Canada, USA, Belgium, Switzerland and Spain, Beyaz argues that these countries provide the minorities, immigrants, and guest workers within their boundaries, with

many linguistic and cultural rights in the spheres of education, administration and judiciary. Since, there is a widespread acceptance that the preservation and promotion of cultural differences necessitate more than the general citizenship rights. With respect to such arguments, Beyaz talks about three kinds of specific or special rights which are designed (he gives reference to the European case) to decrease the marginal conditions of the communities: that is; self-government rights which requires the transference of political power to the smaller units. Through these rights national minorities may determine their policies about education, use of language, and control of resources, and protect themselves against arbitrary decisions of the majority. The other two rights are multi ethnic rights serving to the protection of special linguistic, cultural practices, which are marginalised due to legal or structural restraints, and special rights for the representation within the political institutions of the larger society. From the point of view of Şefik Beyaz, these rights exist in many European countries and, national minorities, other ethnic groups have been entitled to such opportunities while maintaining their identities or national ethnic consciousness. Further, to a great extent, they have successfully been integrated to the society, and possessed a strong commitment and feeling of belonging to the political system.

The representative of MCC, Yakup Soylu, too, started his discussion by expressing his understanding of the term of culture. For Soylu, the history of humanity has made us understand the fact that any tendency in this process (history of the humanity) towards one colour, one trend or monoculture has only revealed fanatic and excessive thoughts. In this sense, throughout the centuries in the Western World especially in Europe the cultures have been forced to crash and conflict with each other, and this has been the result of these fanatic and racist tendencies. However any culture should not necessarily destroy the other one and this has not been possible. Instead throughout the history, he argues, we witness the continuous interaction among the cultures; that is; a reality which is both unavoidable and vital. (He gives the example of the emergence of four monotheist religions as an evidence of differences among cultures in terms of their beliefs, values) Following this, Yakup Soylu describes the notion of multiculturalism as a reality;

[I]n which the colours, identity, and social, political, economic and moral interests of the individual are represented, democratic values are accompanied with the ideals of freedom and equality, the regulative role of the state is narrowed, restricted to the some fields and within such a reality the individual can exist with its own mythological, religious, scientific, artistic, cultural, natural and moral features. This reality does not necessarily emerge in the superior western civilization; rather the region of Mesopotamia has played an important role in the emergence of such situation.

As is seen Soylu explains his ideas on multiculturalism through complex statements, yet he says that his emphasis is on the necessity of the recognition of different cultures and identities and on enabling them to promote their beings within a democratic environment.

It can be easily said that there is no contradiction among these representatives in their perception of the multiculturalism but a point can be highlighted that their conception of the culture indicates the pluralist and relativist comprehension of the term i.e. a thinking according to which there are many diverse cultures with many different traits, and because they are equal (in Şefik Beyaz's statements) they cannot be suppressed or damaged but should be recognized. Then, a multicultural society creates an environment for the co-existence of the cultures on the basis of respect and tolerance. As was noted, Dink and Beyaz define the European context, as a good example of the realisation of this ideal, by giving various examples. But Yakup Soylu rightly adopts more critical positioning in that, to him, Europe represents the most developed level of western civilisation, therefore the ongoing relevant debates in Europe are of considerable significance and quite meaningful yet this should not prevent us to see the dark side of the same geography. Through this, Soylu stresses the racist, pragmatist tendencies of many thinkers and writers (by the term of racism he means cultural racism).

When we come to the main concerns about multiculturalism in Turkey, Hrant Dink, Şefik Beyaz and Yakup Soylu not surprisingly stress on the multicultural, multi linguistic and multi ethnic structure of Turkish society. To Şefik Beyaz, though multiculturalism necessities the recognition of this diverse structure of the society, in Turkey the political authority for a long time has aimed at assimilating these identities in the name of the preservation of the unity. Due to such assimilatory state policies, the problem of multiculturalism is taken into account in connection to the

solutions of ethnic and religious questions especially that of Kurdish question. Beyaz asserts that rather than developing and expanding the extent of the group rights for different ethnic, national and cultural groups, the state, from the time of the establishment of the Republic intended to Turkify the Kurds and other groups, but the Kurds have resisted to this policy by overemphasizing their identities, language and cultures, and claiming their citizenship rights as equal participants founding the Republic. In this respect for Beyaz the problem of multiculturalism should be seen as the democratisation and citizenship problem of the country. Although Beyaz establishes such a connection between these problems, throughout the interview he discussed all the questions with specific reference to the rights of the Kurds without mentioning any other groups and minorities. He even says that the liberal democrat intellectuals of the country started to discuss the problem only in the 1990's, but they still cannot relieve themselves from the chauvinist and nationalist feelings. On the other hand for Beyaz, even such limited arguments may improve and consolidate the peaceful and interactive relationship among different groups through creating the consciousness of coexistence. Furthermore, if the political authority acknowledges and takes measures in this line this will not only strengthen the integrity but also deepen the feeling of belonging to the system and relationships between the citizens; therefore the state will be founded on a more viable basis.

Compared to Beyaz's perspective, Hrant Dink puts a broader picture of the problem multiculturalism in Turkey. He too stresses the multicultural nature of the larger society with specific reference to the Ottoman Empire. To him, from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire to the foundation of Republic we see shift in the policies from multiculturalism to mono culturalism. As is known, the multi-ethnic and multi-religious structure of the Ottoman Empire is mostly emphasized to show how the Empire was tolerant to these diverse groups and also how it reflected the ideal of multiculturalism. However those making such arguments including Dink are wrong in not seeing the fact that the multiculturalism requires much more than the mere existences of the diverse groups or non-intervention of the state in their internal affairs. Apart from this, he says that though the problem is linked to the Kurdish question as a reality, multiculturalism should not be evaluated from such a position since in Turkey the issue has a very close relation with the democratization and the hindrances preventing the full enjoyment of the of basic human rights and freedom.

Drawing such a framework, from the point of view of Dink the state, the political authority have always perceived the matter in terms of the problem of security at the expense of our freedoms. The extension of such a thinking giving priority to the security is the denial of the existence of the other for a long time like Kurds or seeing the minorities as second-class citizens. According to Dink, if everything is evaluated from such a security-based perspective any Kurdish song, clothes, traditions or colours may be a source of danger, which should be suppressed at all costs. He adds that only recently advocates of democracy have started to address the matter within the conceptions of civilisation, democracy, necessity of respecting and recognizing the other instead of the conceptions of security. On the other hand, Yakup Soylu underlines, like Dink and Beyaz do, how the multiculturalism is conceived at a backward level and focuses on the double sides of the issue in Turkey and unviable policies of the state.

> Similar to European context in which while meaningful arguments are carried out in the name of multiculturalism, racism and exclusionary policies stand at the center, in Turkey the debates on the question can be seen as the extension of the old tendencies based on the denial, ignorance and suppression.

Soylu for instance, assesses the 6th Harmonisation Package within such a framework. Not denying the implications of the Package in such a system closed to many cultures, mainly to the Kurds and seeing this as an important step in the democratisation of the country, he asserts that both the political system and larger society are still far from absorbing and comprehending the reforms. Because the state hinders, through various means, the enjoyment of linguistic and cultural and broadcasting rights, the use of Kurdish as a means of expression in all fields freely, mainly in education and teaching. To Soylu, the state continues to resist all unavoidable changes since the system, from the time of its foundation, has been characterised by the policy of denial, and this reality conditions today's debates in a negative way. Adding to this parallel to Beyaz, Soylu finds the intellectuals as responsible for such a backward framework, characterises them as narrow-minded, and even accuses them of supporting these policies of denial through keeping their silence.

As is understood, when they expresses their views with respect to Turkey, the main target of these groups are the restrictive and assimilatory policies of the state conditioned by the logic of ignorance, denial and suppression. On the other hand, the representatives of two Kurdish institutions criticise the positions of the intellectuals. It seems that it is related to the subjective conditions of the Kurds in general, in other words, Beyaz and Soylu question the silence and ineffectiveness of the intellectuals or "liberal democrats" with respect not to the multiculturalism or cultural rights but to the Kurdish question.

With respect to the relationship with the EU, Hrant Dink and Şefik Beyaz support the EU membership on the ground that it should be the standards of the EU that Turkey has to achieve. Yakup Soylu prefers to use the word of inevitability in his description of the EU process. For Soylu, in its contact with EU, Turkey faces a dilemma because while wishing to keep the policy of denial Turkey wants to be part of Europe but its imprecise position between these two options creates troubles in the integration and harmonisation process to the EU. Furthermore because the state is aware of the necessity of accession to the Union due to mainly economic interests all the constitutional and legal reforms recently made are forced upon Turkey, they have nothing to do with the good intentions of the political authority.

While not ignoring such a reality, according to Şefik Beyaz, even though the contribution of the internal dynamics to the democratisation of the country cannot be underemphasised, their role in affecting and shaping the legal and constitutional improvements is too limited. Due to this fact, Beyaz argues that, historically, all the reforms have been adopted through the pressures of the West. Yet this is not a negative situation because from the time of its establishment, Turkish Republic has turned towards the West. As a result, since Western democracies are shaped by the multicultural values we should attribute importance to Turkey's recent policies to develop its democratic standards. In this respect Beyaz criticizes those conservative clicks opposing the membership to the EU, and so resisting the democratisation of the country. Even in one of its publications, İstanbul Kurdish Institute (İstanbul Kürt Enstitüsü) points out that;

> Europe has to renounce its policy of making Turkey to abide by EU's norms through ready or religious factors. Europe has to make the integration of Turkey to EU easier, has to take an encouraging policy and has to accept its

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membership, should declare that it is going to see this process as the integration to the European merits…We want to clarify that EU should sensitively pay regard to Turkish people's tendency of living democratic merits (İstanbul Kurdish Institute, 1999: 10).

Interestingly Beyaz accepts the existence of exploitative relations and inequalities in Europe since the capitalist relations of production prevail yet as Beyaz continues even if such inequalities exist, the pressures, anti-democratic practices in Turkey cannot be compared to the circumstances in Europe.

Hrant Dink's views about the impact of EU process are not different in their nature from Şefik Beyaz's thoughts. He recommends adopting the feeling of Kuvay-i Milliye in the membership process; even this feeling should be transformed into the Kuvay-i Avrupa movement (Dink also demonstrates his sympathy and support to the EU membership in one of his articles in Agos under the name of "Kuvay-i Avrupa Hareketi", Agos, May 30, 2003). Because, to Dink, "the philosophy of EU" is formed to serve to improve the quality of living standards of the people and ensure the coexistence of many cultures in peaceful relationships. He even asserts that;

I am a socialist and our conception of internationalism or communist utopia, that is, the idea   of to each according to his/her ability and needs, is practiced and succeeded in European Union where the main concern is to broaden rights and freedoms of all. EU also represents the ideal of multiculturalism by bringing various nations together so Turkey should be part of this democratic environment.

Dink, like Beyaz, supports the recent legal reforms included in both National Programme and 6th Harmonisation Package, and says that without the requirements of the accession to the EU, the political authority would not make these reforms within such a short time. Similarly Şefik Beyaz also appreciates how the recent amendments have opened the way for the discussions of many issues.

In the interview, they were also asked to evaluate the future of multiculturalism in Turkey on the basis of specific solutions or plans they may formulate. All of them without any reservation agree that the state should recognize the identities, language, culture and equal citizenship rights of all the minorities, ethnic and religious groups. Most specifically Hrant Dink sees it urgent to adopt the politics of multiculturalism and revision of the   content of the conception of security.

For instance, if security is perceived in terms of the health or educational needs of the citizens we will no longer discuss the political status of National Security Council since it will be constituted by the representatives of non-governmental organisations dealing with health or educational problems rather than the members of the army. Secondly, Dink notices that it is still a problematic matter how the reforms will find their reflections in the society since they have not been operationalised yet.

From his point of view, change of consciousness is needed. In other words, both the state and the larger society have to learn to live with the others within a unity. He says it is meaningless and makes no sense to discuss the natural rights of the individuals such as linguistic rights. Such a change should start initially in the field of education by means of revising the content of the curriculum of the public education. "We should be able to see names like Agop, Delal, Vasili, Mehmet together in our course books." Furthermore, Dink gives attention to the responsibilities of the state by stressing the positive role of the state to provide all material, financial assistance for the promotion of the cultures of minorities and various groups. He says that "it is not easy for us, the Armenians, to finance our private schools, but we also pay our taxes as citizens so state should assist us financially without intervening our private affairs."

Sharing some points in Dink's responses, Şefik Beyaz adds that as part of the democratisation of Turkey, every group within its own conditions should enjoy freedom and law should guarantee this. The legal regulations are important since they remind the people their rights against the state as free and equal individuals, as observed in European countries. However, these and successive progressions should be supported in daily life. His much more specific suggestions; however, are basically related to the rights of the Kurds. Şefik Beyaz emphasises the well-known argument that in democratic societies the mother tongue is an inseparable part of the individual identity, and education or teaching in mother tongue is one of the fundamental rights and freedoms. Turkish state also acknowledges this reality by becoming party to various legal and political treaties and political organisations like OSCE. Bearing this fact in mind, Beyaz then differentiates the position of the Kurds from the other groups on the ground that the Kurds, despite all the oppressive and assimilatory policies, have resisted and preserved their national identity and unity in their social life, in their language and culture. Giving such a reason, Beyaz lists the

obligations of the state under the international regulations and instruments as follows:

> State should recognise the identity, linguistic and cultural rights of the Kurds, take measures for Kurdish children to be taught and educated in their own language and for the promotion of Kurdish culture and by taking into consideration the historical and regional conditions, the state should constitute autonomous self government regions for the Kurds in places densely populated by Kurds.

From his point of view, the right to found the private language institutions makes no sense for Kurds, for the reason that the existence of a particular language can be preserved by creating a need for its use in the public sphere, that is, in public education, in the fields of administration, judiciary and public broadcasting. For instance, public TV and radio channels may prepare programmes about Kurdish culture and history, besides private broadcasting institutions (financially supported by the state).

Moreover, Beyaz asserts that under its international legal and political obligations, (he gives reference to the Copenhagen Document and the Treaty of Lausanne) Turkey has to either entitle the Kurds with a minority status or recognise them as equal founders of the republic. Every right enjoyed by Turks should be available for Kurds; therefore, if two equal peoples constitute Turkey, two official languages should be used in every sphere of life. Otherwise, the state should be neutral toward every group, since to Beyaz, the state cannot be characterised or defined on an ethnic or religious basis according to the concept of constitutional citizenship.

Two problems exist in the responses of Beyaz. First of all, his perception of multiculturalism only in terms of the status and rights of the Kurds seems as discriminatory as the general understanding they want to challenge. Because the various ethnic and religious groups in Turkey face the policies of discrimination and denial though not as suppressive as those to which Kurds have been subject. It is true, the level of politicisation among the Kurds is higher than other groups, yet this does not justify the one sided evaluation of the matter. Secondly, it is obvious that the acknowledgement of these rights, as specified by Şefik Beyaz, at state level and

provision of guarantees under the Constitution and other legislation are almost impossible for the time being.

To assess the responses briefly, leaving no need for further comment the notion of multiculturalism is presented by Hırant Dink, Şefik Beyaz and Yakup Soylu as the recognition of the different identities of distinct minorities, ethnic, religious and cultural groups. Then the politics of multiculturalism would enable the groups concerned to coexist and express themselves freely. When we come to the understanding of the question of multiculturalism in Turkey, the common concerns of the representatives are the suppressive, assimilatory policies of the state and its tendency to deny and ignore ethnically, culturally rich structure of the society and different identities of the groups. Furthermore, while Dink seeks the reason in the security concerns of the political authority, the representatives of two Kurdish organisations explicitly link the question to the Kurdish question and the rights of the Kurds. However, in a general sense, they accept that, be it the Kurdish question or security concerns, the issue of multiculturalism goes hand in hand with the democratisation of the country and enjoyment of the basic human rights and freedoms.

They also notice and highlight how influential the integration process to the EU has been in debating many topics like cultural rights, recognition of differences, linguistic rights under the heading of multiculturalism and in forcing the state to make necessary constitutional amendments in this line. For that reason, they, to a great extent, support the membership with the expectation that together with accession to the Union, the democratic standards, rights and freedoms will be improved to the level of European countries. Thereby, although they know the logic behind the recent legal reforms has nothing to do with the state's wish to settle democratic merits within the country, they regard these reforms as the first steps of successive reforms and regulations.

4.6. A Critical Evaluation of the Interviews

In conclusion, there are three dimensions of the problem of multiculturalism in Turkey, which are the general comprehension of the concept of multiculturalism, secondly the context within which the question of multiculturalism is taken into

account and the main themes of the question, and lastly the extent of the influence of the process of the membership to the EU upon the ongoing concerns on the problem of multiculturalism in Turkey. Hence on the basis of the contributions of civil society organisations and mainstream political parties these three aspects can be explained as follows: first of all, with respect to the perception of the notion of multiculturalism, it can be said that, there is an awareness about how the existence of the ethnically, culturally, and racially distinct groups as minorities within the borders of any state can potentially be source of conflict or trouble. Therefore, the participants to the interview agree with the view that, the first step for the solution of these conflicts is the recognition of the beings and identities of these groups, and formation of special policies in this line by the state in the form of cultural rights besides universal human rights. Then cultural rights are understood as those rights necessary for the preservation, promotion of distinct cultures (as plural) and the expression of the cultural identities.

Regarding the other two dimensions, we cannot talk about such an agreement among the participants of the interview. The results of the responses to the interview questions suggest that, there are not only common points, but also differences between the perspectives of the political parties and the standing of the civil society organizations (both human rights organisations and representatives of some groups like the Armenians and the Kurds). The differences may be traced to their distinct positions. In other words, the political parties as the candidates of the political authority[5] basically make their evaluation in the light of the basic interests of the state like the preservation of the integrity and unity of the state, security concerns, long-run economic interests etc., yet the other actors try to expand the field of the rights and freedoms against those basic concerns of the state. The existence of common points may be due to some objective facts, which may not be denied or ignored in any condition even by the political authority.

The second aspect of the question is about the main themes around which the debates on the problem are carried out. Without any exception, all the participants

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[5] In this study, while bearing in the mind the fact that it is not easy to demarcate the boundaries of the notions of state and political authority, the concept of the state is perceived as a more historical and structural entity as different from the government, which indicates a conjectural institution. On the other hand, the term political authority is perceived to embrace both state and government.

need to highlight the multicultural nature or structure of Turkish society. That there are different groups and minorities and their identities should be respected and tolerated is accepted. It is also underlined that compared to the previous decades, debates on multiculturalism in general and cultural rights of the groups concerned in the form of freedom of expression, linguistic rights, preservation of their distinct traditions, values in particular are made within relatively more free and democratic framework. The reason is explained as the decrease in the trend of violence, armed conflicts or terror in the Southeastern region because it is known that under the violence, because of the tendency to hinder democratic rights and freedoms, and the increase in sensitivity in larger society, it is almost impossible to raise the issues noted above.

Again as a common point related to the factor above, all responses in one way or another, establish connection or correlation between the problem of multiculturalism and Kurdish question. However, divergences among the representatives of civil society organisations and political parties in explaining this relationship or connection should be noted. Especially, the human rights organisations stress that Kurdish question in general, and the rights of the Kurds are the reality of Turkey and part of the multiculturalism problem; however they suggest that multiculturalism is more than this and may not be reduced to this question since other ethnic, religious communities have problems in expressing themselves and participating to the larger society. In general, the approaches of the political parties are similar to this position; that is, there is a Kurdish question, but there is no direct relationship between the two matters. On the other hand, the views of especially İstanbul Kurdish Institute and MCC imply that these institutions have been founded in order to pursue and defend the interests of the Kurds and that they have an explicit tendency in equalizing Kurdish question and cultural rights of the Kurds to the multiculturalism in Turkey. This suggests that their perspectives consciously or not, are not as broad as those of the human rights organisations.

In addition of these common concerns, it seems that in Turkey the issue is perceived as a component of a general problem of democratisation and improvement of fundamental rights and freedoms. Because of this, the participants note that every step for the development of democratic merits and human rights standards would have a direct and positive effect upon the problem of multiculturalism and Kurdish

question, too. On the other hand, the evaluation of the general democratisation problem of Turkey constitutes the basis of different points of view with respect to the second dimension.

From the perspective of civil society organisations, it is the anti democratic, oppressive, repressive and assimilatory policies of the state characterised by denial that stand at the center of restrictions of enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms and of the question of multiculturalism. In their view, the state, for a long time, has tried to achieve one language, one religion; one people through assimilation and these anti-democratic policies have found their reflection in the Constitution and other legal regulations. The extension of these regulations has been the demand of distinct ethnic and religious identities of Alevis, Assyrians or the Kurds who have been regarded as a danger to the security, unity, integrity and indivisibility of the state and nation. These organisations also question the state's tendency to exclude the democratic advocates from the process of the formation of many political reforms, legal regulations which are crucial for the rights and freedoms of the people. The political authority is not willing to communicate with or cooperate to civil society organizations, participation of whom will serve to political liberalization of the country, they say.

Against this, as the results of the responses suggest, the representatives of the political parties adopt a common rhetoric or discourse that we should eliminate our old fears regarding the integrity or security of the state and change the content of our conceptualisations and so on. It is without doubt, as the civil society organisations emphasise, the acknowledgement of the rights of the groups concerned at least at legal level is an important step, yet the discourse of overcoming of old fears is only a normative commitment and far from answering the criticisms of the advocates of democracy.

The dimension of the problem of multiculturalism is about the extent of the influence of the European integration process upon the relevant debates in Turkey. The general character of the replies in the interview with respect to this aspect suggests how Turkey still faces difficulties in improving and integrating minimum standards of democratic merits and human rights values through its own internal dynamics. To put it another way, the results may reveal continuous ineffectiveness and weaknesses of the internal dynamics for change and display that it is mostly the

existence of external dynamics contributing to the incorporation of liberal democratic principles, realisation of political liberalisation and adoption of legal and political reforms in this line. This point is emphasised by the entire participant without any exception.

Both political parties and civil society organisations attribute a great importance to the integration and accept the positive impact of the process upon the relevant discussions. However, the main logic behind almost unconditional support for the membership to EU is not precise but appears to change according to the specific concerns of the participants. The representatives of the human rights organisations seem to support the process due to mainly the ineffective role of internal dynamics for democratisation, and civil society organisations resulting from the restrictive policies of the state. Their responses give an impression that they attach significance to the recent legal amendments, mentioned before, and that without the EU process such changes would not occur. Furthermore, although the representatives of the Armenian and the Kurdish communities idealise Europe as a model for Turkey on the ground that the members of the Union have achieved the ideal of multiculturalism by means of providing conditions for the coexistence of many cultures, ethnic or religious groups, immigrants together and of enabling all the citizens to enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms and cultural rights they also stress how the existing structural and legal constraints prevent advocates of politics of multiculturalism in playing a role in the formation of basic policies and influencing the legal changes. For those reasons, the civil society organisations perceive the process as vital for the successive reforms, their practical implications and unavoidable for the solution of the multiculturalism question. On the other side, political parties evaluate the accession to EU as an irreversible state policy and use the well-known discourse that from the time of the foundation, Turkey has turned its face to the West; that is, to democratic merits etc.

In spite of such a consensus described above, differences in perspectives emerge in relation to some specific matters in Turkey-EU relationships, i.e., the recent constitutional and legal amendments and political commitment regarding some cultural rights and removal of some articles hindering the use of rights and freedoms as was mentioned before. Again the replies in the interviews suggest that in the absence of such an external dynamic, the process of reform making would be

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quite limited. Civil society organisations especially give attention to this problematical reality and criticise the narrow mindedness of the politicians and the state authorities. But in spite of their awareness of this fact, they still see it necessary to support all the stages of the EU process. It can be suggested that political parties have different standing in that they recognize the positive impact of the requirements for membership, and claim that even if Turkey is not accepted as member, these regulations would be made for the sake of Turkish democracy and improvement of the living standards of the citizens. In their views, membership process only speeds up the prevailing trend. Even though among them some political parties question this situation, there is no evidence that they would not follow the same path as their previous policies have revealed.

Another common idea shared by all participants is about the necessity of the politics of multiculturalism in Turkey's objective conditions. Furthermore, it is generally stressed that both for the application and practice of relevant legal regulations, and for the integration of multicultural values, change in the conscience and general perceptions is of vital necessity. Apart from this general and imprecise expectation or recommendation, they offer no viable solution or project to meet the challenge of multiculturalism in Turkey. At most, the civil society organisations ask the political authority put an end to its anti-democratic policies regarding the rights and freedoms of the groups concerned and to take every available measure to make operational the recent legal reforms in the fields of education, broadcasting and other regulations, details of which have already been mentioned.

In the light of these general conclusions, some specific and problematic points may be articulated. First of all, it is seen that the understanding of the notion of multiculturalism does not differ from the perception accepted in European context. However, when we look at the issue in Turkey, it may be suggested that the more intense and proactive communication and relationships between the agents of the political authority and NGO's would, to a great extent, serve to the solution of the problem in Turkey. It is only through such responsiveness on the side of the state that the main concerns and needs of the groups raising claims in the name of multiculturalism can be determined. In fact in the relevant international legal and political documents it is clearly underlined that a considerable work is done by intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations in protecting minorities and

protecting the rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities (UN Declaration, 1992). ICCPR, though implicitly, also highlights crucial role that these organizations and associations play for the maintenance and development of fundamental rights and freedoms in the Articles of 21 and 22. Therefore it can be said that participation and contribution of the civil society organisations to the settlement and achievement of democratic standards have a strategic importance.

Secondly, the concerns on the impact of the EU process are also problematic and may give way to some negative and unexpected results for the whole society. Since, it seems that an instrumental perspective is adopted both by civil society organisations and political parties. The first group evaluates the EU process merely with its political dimension: which is the realisation of the minimum standards of democracy; that is, the Copenhagen political criteria while excluding economic and social aspects of the membership. This may not be the result of ignorance or lack of knowledge, but of the fact that they want political liberalisation, at all costs. However, it may be argued that economic and social factors should be taken into account in the settlement of a stable and well-functioning liberal democratic order. On the other hand, the instrumental perspectives of the political parties appear to be related to the simple fact that a properly functioning market economy needs stable democratic institutions characterised by the principles of liberal democracy. As Mehmet Fırat states that economic liberalism without political liberalism gives way to brutal capitalism. Such an overlap in the positions of two groups regarding the EU process is quite problematic; though the logic behind these arguments is different from each other.

As a third point, in Turkey, the subjects interested in multiculturalism have difficulty in producing solutions and specific projects. Unfortunately these responses highlight the inability of many actors in going beyond some normative necessities and expectations. The reasons may be various. For instance, the debates on multiculturalism, the positions of various groups and their specific rights have recently come into the agenda, so in successive years we may expect more mature debates in the way of presenting more viable outcomes. Furthermore, together with the practical implication of the reforms and with the more proactive role of the civil society organisations, we may also observe more influential endeavors. However,

this requires the removal of existing legal and structural limitations and state's awareness that it should carry out all its obligations without showing any further resistance, in enabling the groups to enjoy their already guaranteed rights under the law.

Some concrete projects presented by Kurdish Institute have been noted before; yet, it is arguable how realistic they are in Turkey's circumstances and to what extent they may contribute to the solution. Because these projects are aimed at promoting the group (collective) rights of the Kurds excluding the troubles faced by the other communities. The reason can be traced to the fact that the Institute comprehends multiculturalism in Turkey in terms of the Kurdish question. Following this, a further question is whether there is a precise and agreed definition of the problem of multiculturalism. If we define it as Kurdish question, may we conclude that everything depends on the elimination of this question? Or will we overcome the issue by granting the right to use mother languages in broadcasting, in education and even in public institutions of the administration and judiciary? The transformation of conscience and general perceptions of the mainstream may be of strategic importance as the participants suggest or it may be argued that the whole society should be mobilised and organised to reach long-lasting solutions. Yet, how it will be succeeded is still an open question.

In this section, the understanding of the problem of multiculturalism in Turkey has been discussed on the basis of the responses of the various actors who are interested in the problem in one way or another. In addition to the expressions of the differences in the level and nature of the relevant arguments between the contexts of Europe and Turkey, it has also been aimed to display that the impact of the process of EU integration in making the challenge of multiculturalism a significant dynamic within Turkish political system is not limited to the legal level. This challenge has also a potential to transform the political practices, the ways of thought and general understanding within the society, which may contribute to the formation of a multiculturalist society in the future. In the previous chapters, the arguments on the issue of multiculturalism and their possible implications have been indicated theoretically and politically in both Western Europe and Turkey. In the next section, the objective is to make a critical evaluation of these debates in the light of the conclusions reached in each part.

CHAPTER V

A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

From the 1970's onwards, the multicultural policies and politics of multiculturalism have been developed as a response to the challenge of the increasing ethnic, cultural, religious or racial diversity, especially in the Western Europe, North America and Australia i.e. regions subject to immigration movements. As was the subject of the first part of the study, given the economic boom after the WWII, there emerged the problem of labour shortage as result of the demands of various industries. This was followed by the policies of opening the borders to the immigrants coming from several regions temporarily. This policy was in conformity with the requirements of the industrial capitalism which needs, on the one hand, availability of low-cost labour like the immigrants especially in the secondary sectors in times of boom, and requires, on the other hand, the easy disposal of them when they are no longer needed. Indeed, the immigrants provided the source of cheap labour-force in the secondary sectors however by the time of the recession of the 1970's the expectation of their temporary or short-term residence had no longer been the case, instead they were even joined by their families. This created problem not only for the capitalist economy having difficulties to accommodate such huge work-force in secondary sectors but also for the liberal democratic state which faced political crises due to the lack of means to tackle with the problem of the integration of these culturally different people.

In a very simple and brief sense, the politics of multiculturalism has evolved within such economic and political conditions in industrial liberal democracies. Empirically, when we look at those societies having cultural, ethnic, religious or racial groups, these societies may be called multicultural, however what is important is not the existence of such reality but how to confront or face with this reality (Parekh, 2000: 6-8).

As has just been indicated above, the liberal democracies have had to deal with the practical issue of the incorporation of diversity while keeping the existing system in smooth operation. Two alternatives have been available: incorporation through assimilation or integration to the society on the basis of the policies of multiculturalism. These countries, for a considerable time, denied the existence of distinct cultural identities of the group, minorities and immigrants and forced them to assimilate into the larger society. However, this led to the contrary results, that is, rather than achieving healthy integration, assimilatory policies contributed to the politicisation of the groups in question, and so caused harm to the stability and public order. Indeed, although the logic behind these policies assumed the equal access to all the rights, at the end minority communities, migrant workers have been denied their basic social and economic rights. They worked in the worst conditions and in low-paid sectors, and their housing opportunities were severe.

On the other hand, multiculturalist policies have offered a more viable and long-lasting solutions to the liberal democracies. Under multiculturalism, the states, while recognizing the unavoidable reality of the distinct and different identities of the immigrants and other groups in question, have developed many appropriate policies and means, which have served both to the incorporation to the society without assimilation and hence to the protection and preservation of the diverse cultural identities. These policies and instruments have ranged from the establishment of specific institutions or the adoption of affirmative action policies to the formation of various cultural rights for the groups in question.

Such a process, very simply and generally stated above, has had considerable implications for the liberal democracies. First of all, before the adoption of the official multicultural policies, the questions like how immigration can be absorbed without changing the existing society and culture or what policies are most proper to the assimilation were widespread. Then a new discourse has emerged and been adopted in all spheres. This discourse can be summarized through the statement of unity in diversity: that is, diversity of cultural groups. Parekh says that this notion of unity in diversity has challenged the assumption of the societies that they have single homogenous national cultures since the immigrants and the other groups concerned have not easily been assimilated to the dominant culture (Parekh, 2000: 4-5). Thus it has been recognised that since these groups, due to some constraints, have

difficulties in equal participation in economic, social and political life; the state has had to eliminate these limitations. At more normative and moral level, this new multicultural discourse has characterised the cultural diversity as a cultural enrichment, which should be preserved and promoted because taking measures in order for the integration of those people without losing their cultural identity, would strengthen the unity of the nation and the society.

Secondly, related to such normative arguments, the existing conception of citizenship has been criticised through a question of how an individual can enjoy all the rights of the citizenship while keeping his/her culturally different or distinct identity. As is known, citizenship in liberal tradition indicates a formal membership status providing equal rights and obligations for all within the political community. Thus it has been increasingly asserted that ethnically, racially and culturally diverse structure of the society has been sacrificed or ignored in the name of the achievements of the ideal of formal equality or uniformity.

Furthermore, apart from the problem of exclusionary logic of the notion citizenship, it has been argued that there are already some constraints in the enjoyment of the rights due to the, for instance, racism, patriarchal system, majority nationalism, class-system etc. For that reason, the solution of the dilemma of both remaining culturally different and enjoying full membership right depends on the broadening the extent of the concept of citizenship and extension of the context of the citizenship rights in order to make it more inclusive. This dilemma between the ideal of equality and difference has been dealt with through the innovation of the cultural rights marking the claims for unhindered representation, recognition without marginalisation, integration without assimilation. Hence in this sense cultural rights, besides demands for political representation, civil justice, social equality, are about the maintenance of cultural identity, distinctiveness in the spheres ranging from media to the judiciary (Stevenson, 2001: 2-3).

From this we may mention another implication of the debates of multiculturalism related to the issues of culture and identity. As has just been noted, liberal notion of citizenship has been questioned for its universalising tendency of oppressing minorities and the other groups through denial of the right to be different. This point has been emphasised by many scholars who argue that the situation of oppression cannot be restricted to the political and economic aspects because non-

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recognition of the distinct identities and specific cultures of the individuals is as oppressive as those harms resulted from social and economic inequalities caused by unfair distribution of resources due to the end of the welfare state policies. Especially from the point of view of the minorities, immigrants or the other groups their identities and cultures have turned into a means for their struggles waged for acquiring their rights against the restrictive policies of the respected states.

In fact, as was implied in the first section of the study, the notions of identity and culture have been attributed meanings that make them the main objective of the politics. In other words, the discourse of multiculturalism, culture or cultural difference and ethnic, religious or racial identities are assumed to offer opportunities for the people to defend their various emotional or material interests against discrimination, assimilation or exploitation. To put it another way, through them marginalized groups and individuals may express their demands for new rights in the political sphere. In the light of all these functions, culture is assumed to generate several group identities by overemphasising on difference. Due to all these attributes of the concept of culture, at discursive level at least, multiculturalism may be regarded as a branch of the identity politics in the sense that cultural, ethnic or racial differences are manipulated for the achievement of any political goal. In this respect these tendencies that may be called culturalism has been part of the general discourse of the politics of identity which asserts to be the voice of not only immigrants or minorities but also of those marginalized groups of women, gays, lesbians, disabled peoples. Furthermore, this aspect of multiculturalism is worth noting in the sense that within the liberal tradition identity politics has been attached a role for challenging the universalistic ideal of the Enlightenment in the name of celebrating the difference and the particular, and thus opened the way for successive discussions of how to reconcile the universalistic ideal of human liberation and particularistic struggles.

At a more practical level, debates on multiculturalism have presented its implications within the international community. It has been generally accepted that the prevalent human rights discourses and the principles of democracy have been far from confronting the demands of the minorities and other groups because of the fact that the provisions both in national legislation, and within the international and regional legal or political documents have not been applied or experienced appropriately; even they have been ignored all together. In the light of such a

deficiency, new norms have been formed regarding the economic, social, political and cultural rights of the minorities, immigrants, and these norms were incorporated into the new legal and political instruments. In this respect, this has broadened the extent of the human rights in general since both the recognition of the various cultural rights of the groups in question; the states have been gradually regarded as an indispensable component of universal human rights and assumed to contribute to the general peace and stability of the international community. Of course, it is still up to the states to adopt and apply these provisions yet the acknowledgement of these rights at international level will serve the emergence of long-standing viable norms. In short, it seems that with all its implications the politics of multiculturalism while questioning the some values of the liberal democracies has been a strategic instrument of crises management for the vulnerabilities of the system. As has been shown, it has been through multicultural policies that the states have tried to tackle with the disturbing affects of the increasing ethnic, religious, cultural or racial diversity caused by the immigration movement.

However such consequences of the multiculturalism should not give way to a conclusion that the politics of multiculturalism has played the expected role perfectly and smoothly. Instead, there are both limitations to such politics and problems with its implications. The first problem is about the extent of the rights derived from the politics of multiculturalism as is discussed and stated by the liberal scholars. Although there is a consensus on the necessity of the recognition of distinct cultures and various cultural rights that enable those people belonging to diverse communication to express and to live their identities, the states and some liberal academies see it essential to restrict the enjoyment of these rights to the private sphere and want those groups in question to show their commitment to the political community. In this respect all those specific rights are still defined as individual rights not at group level in conformity with the liberal tradition. However it is obvious that many politicised ethnic, racial or religious groups wage their struggle to gain a voice in the political sphere by means of group- specific political rights. This is still a problem within the multicultural policies.

On the other hand, there are more serious troubles related to the limits and logic of the politics of multiculturalism. As was noted, such politics have been designed to be the instrument against political crisis through managing the potential

problems of a culturally divided society within the western world. At more practical level scholars highlight the fact that despite the existences of laws, policies and agencies developed for the purposes of prevention of discrimination, marginalisation there are several instances of how the immigrants, native people, ethnic, radical and religious groups are still subject to discrimination, exploitation, racism, prejudice and even violence. This discrimination is not limited to the daily life but widespread and pervasive in social practises, institutions, work places, popular ideas and even political discourse. The most dramatically, this is accompanied with the riots of the various communities together with rising aggression and rates of the crimes i.e. a situation which is manipulated by the governments in justifying their harsh measures against these cases (Castles and Vasta, 1999:307-309, Kundnani, 1997:68). Indeed not only these people still work in worst conditions, have limited housing facilities and live under the conditions of poverty, but also they are accused of being responsible for all these inhumane circumstances and they are regarded as dangerous. This crisis of the multiculturalist settlement reveals that the problem with the politics of multiculturalism is not related to the normative principles or the ideas, but to the reality of the societies and political practises. Because as Castles and Vasta argue after all the assimilation and denial policies in the previous decades, the multicultural discourses of tolerance, diversity, respect are of considerable significance yet these discourses should be matched or accompanied with a genuine commitment to change in institutions, attitudes, practises and ways of thinking which still do not emerge. Due to such a contradictory situation they characterise contemporary Western societies (their main reference case is Australia) as both multicultural and multi racist (Castles and Vasta, 1999). Other scholars in order to show how the official multicultural policies have failed go further and connect it to the state racism (Kundnani, 1997:69, Zizek, 1997:44). For instance, Zizek argues that together with the rhetoric of respect and tolerance multiculturalist state adopts racism but this is not a direct racism since it recognises the identity of the other while asserting the superiority of its own culture and national identity.

Apart from the implicit discriminatory state policies, the reasons of such failures of multiculturalism can be sought within the culturalist standing of both the state and the communities in question or within the tendency of overemphasising the culture. As was stated before, replacing the homogenising logic of assimilation, the

politics of multiculturalism has been asserted to be the voice of many politicised different cultures and identities, which then have functioned as a means of specifying the borders among several groups. It is true that it was the negative interaction between the state and these communities which have given way to the politicisation and the construction of ethnic, religious or racial identities, and that in this process culture and differences act as cement. However this process, on the one hand, institutionalise the identities because the political authority develop many specific policies in the forms of affirmative action or positive intervention which rather than serving the full interaction of the groups intensify their isolated positions from the mainstream. On the other hand, overstress on differences indeed, prevents the interaction or dialogue among the groups, which may be manipulated by the state to keep the system in operation. This is because, through religious, ethnic or racial features the groups both form their group-identities and positions themselves in relation to the other community.

In addition to all these, there is the problem of cultural essentialism. Multiculturalist discourse may be voice of the marginalised ethnic, racial minorities or cultures by means of focus on identity, and of representation and expression of these identities but this may give the impression that identities or cultures are ahistorical, holistic, frozen or fixed closed to any transformation or change. But today it is argued that ethnic, religious identities are subject to change and should be open to interaction, and even a particular identity is not homogenous since there are distinct positions, aspirations, divisions within it though in their political struggles these identities aims at demonstrating their unity and homogeneity for strategical reasons. By taking into consideration all these problematic situations, it may be suggested that difference is not value in itself rather too much stress on difference may be the cause of, for instance, over-Islamisation of the Muslims, over-Asiaisation of Hindus or Pakistani in France, in Britain and even fundamentalism thus of rejection of the achievement of the ideal of equality. This also marks the dual strategy of the capitalist liberal democracies in that capitalism in search for new markets focuses on those at localities like cultures, traditions and then commodifies or reifies them. Thus cultural features are commercialised and become part of the market. The other side of the strategy is the politicisation of the cultures i.e. a process in which liberal democracies invent instruments like multiculturalism in tackling

with diversity yet do not hesitate to manipulate them in order to mask the inequalities, exploitation within the system by constituting the groups among which there are clear-cut boundaries.

There is another trouble within the politics of multiculturalism. There may be problematic consequences of situating ethnic or racial identity at the centre of the politics. First of all, such politics pursued on the basis of religious or ethnic consciousness cannot be regarded progressive even though these identities have already been the site of resistance, since these struggles are narrowly defined. In other words, they pursue the interests of a particular group not all those who are marginalised, exploited, discriminated. Although they may support the causes of each other, their coalitions under a viable and stable goal is too difficult in that they do not aim at universal human liberation (Hobsbawm, 1996:42-44). For instance we may observe that within a politicised Hindu community women rights may easily be ignored or different sexual orientations of its members may severely be suppressed. In such a case, it is not possible to mention about a progressive politics. Therefore their contribution to social change will be too limited though whether they aim at waging such a struggle is another question.

In short, with its both positive and negative implications, multiculturalism is still the most pervasive strategy for the incorporation of several religious, ethnic, linguistic, racial groups and the minorities to the system. Indeed the best way in managing the diversity is to ensure their integration without neglecting their distinct cultural identities, and the politics of multiculturalism in spite of the deficiencies in its functioning plays such a role. Moreover various groups engage in the politics of multiculturalism in order to express their identities in the public sphere, and to achieve political representation. They want to raise their voices in the fields of the education, administration or judiciary. In addition to these concerns, against the danger of the discourse of the new-racism and discriminatory practices within the larger society the groups in question make use of such politics as an instrument to form their own identities and to pursue their struggles on the basis of these politically constructed identities. On the other hand, when we focus on the elaboration of the question in Turkey it is observed that there are no such complex relations and highly developed theoretical debates. As the outcomes of the interviews reveal, in Turkey, the question evolves along the democratisation of the country. These differences in

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the level of the discussions should not make us to conclude that the current concerns in Turkey develop independently from those in the European context instead over the years, together with the close interactions with the EU general rhetoric of multiculturalism has gradually been adopted by several actors ranging from the politicians to the individuals working in various NGO's. And today the impact of European integration process upon the arguments on the challenge of multiculturalism   finds its best reflection in the legal amendments and the reforms that the government has carried out.

Turkish society, with its multicultural structure is composed of minorities, several ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, and thus faces the challenge of the politics of multiculturalism, as is the case within the Western Europe. Given the context-dependent nature of the notion Turkey has its own specific problem of multiculturalism defined, mainly, in terms of the recognition of the identities and rights of the Kurdish population as interview results suggest.   Parallel to the process in Europe, Turkey has also passed the stages of the policies of assimilation or denial of the existence of the distinct identities of the various groups as different from Turkish identity and then taken the debates upon multiculturalism into its agenda especially as a result of intensification of its relationships with the EU. Though at this moment, it is not possible to determine whether the political authority in Turkey will abolish all the assimilatory or denial policies at political level, and in legislation or whether multiculturalist values of tolerance, dialogue or respect will pervade the society and be reflected in daily life and social practises it is obvious that the politics of multiculturalism has such a significance in Turkey's context in that it gives way to many debates about the problems of the democratisation of the country, settlement of universal human rights values and the principle of rule of laws. Since the provision of cultural rights of Armenian community or the Kurds and the acknowledgement of their diverse cultural identities are situated within the wider framework of general human rights question of the country. Although under the direct influence of the requirements of the accession to the EU, Turkey, within a short time, has removed many legal constraints before the enjoyment of basic rights and freedoms, and some cultural rights have been granted, it is still up to the state to take measures for the full application of these positive amendments. Even more progressive steps may follow these changes. As many participants to the interviews argue there is a need of change

in the attitudes, ways of thinking, and consciousness that is necessary for the transformation of the society and the adoption of multiculturalist values. Perhaps the recent and successive legal amendments may open the way for such a transformation at least through demonstrating the people that change is possible.

However so far, we have witnessed that change is possible only at legal level for the reason that the state at both national and local level are not so willing to remove the practical constraints and the state authorities even constitute additional limitations in public institutions and political practises. We may hope that this tendency will be given up yet for the time being it constitutes a serious problem, which is still far from to be overcome through the efforts of the internal dynamics because all these legal changes are assessed by the state, from a pragmatic perspective, as one of the useful instruments of the foreign policy.

Apart from these problems, when we focus on the specific issues under the heading of multiculturalism in Turkey, demands for the recognition of the cultural identities, freedom of their expression in the fields of education and media through cultural rights stand at the centre of the arguments. There is nothing problematic about these claims yet as the interview results reveal the groups stressing on these matters do not intend to go beyond their specific interests. For example the representatives of Kurdish institutions, under the problem of multiculturalism, only mention about the troubles they face and their rights like the promotion of Kurdish language and removal of the existing limitations before the use of the linguistic rights of the Kurds. This may be generalised to the Armenian community too because every group puts its cause at the centre of the politics of multiculturalism and also of the politics in general. In fact, similar to the European context, for the groups and communities the concerns on cultural justice for themselves prevail over other social and economic unjust policies, regulations and inequalities. For that reason, it may be argued that it is because of such concerns that they demonstrate almost unconditional support for the membership to the EU. Moreover, it appears that the political authority is also aware of how the formation of cultural rights (for the time being at legal level) may be a strategic instrument for the management of diverse claims of the minorities and the ethnic groups, mainly those of the Kurds, and for prevention of relatively more radical political claims.

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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

It seems, in the future, that these debates on multiculturalism will be intensified and gain new dimensions together with the changing political and socio-economic circumstances. For instance, the last few years have witnessed the increase in the numbers of the illegal immigrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, and the countries subject to such movements while seeking ways to accommodate these people have gradually attempted to prevent their entry through stricter laws and border controls. However, for the time being, the politics of multiculturalism is still the prevalent strategy in managing and confronting the cultural diversity in the Western Europe.

In this study, the aim was to demonstrate how the question of multiculturalism is grasped in Turkey and to what extent it can be a challenge for the solution of the basic political problems of the country. In discussing these questions the relationships with the EU were taken into consideration as a significant factor. Because, in Turkey there is no mature literature about the question and the current theoretical studies and academic interests provide too limited insights about the issue. Therefore such problems were analysed on the basis of the interviews with the various actors concerned with multiculturalism.

Before dealing with themes in the context of Turkey, in the first part of the study those discussions and academic studies on the notion of multiculturalism were given attention since it is in the Western Europe that the most complex and developed political and theoretical debates are carried out. Moreover, as has been repeated several times, there is no general theory of multiculturalism, in other words, apart from some normative premises that are agreed on; the issue of multiculturalism is basically an empirical and political question. For that reason, it is essential to talk about not one type of multiculturalism yet several multicultural strategies shaped by

the distinct historical, socio-economic, political conditions and the political cultures. And in studying multiculturalism, particular power relations should always been noted. In this respect, as was displayed in the first part, the relevant concerns and arguments in the European context may offer information in grasping how the problem is dealt with in Turkey from a distinct perspective. Of course the purpose is not to make a holistic and comprehensive comparison yet the European context provides clues to understand the differences.

The conclusions reached in the first part suggest how the concerns on the notion of multiculturalism change according to the political and socio-economic circumstances. When the question was focused on in the period after the WWII, due to the problem of the accommodation of the immigrants, multiculturalism was attributed a progressive meaning. Because after all the policies, attitudes and political practices neglecting the rights of the minorities and various groups, the politics of multiculturalism was assumed to offer an opportunity for these groups to raise their voices in order to express their identities and to achieve representation in the political sphere. Further, the related academic studies stressed the progressive dimension of the concept and analysed how such strategy could promote the unity and solidarity within the society while maintaining the cultural diversity. However with successive years some premises of the concept have been questioned. This has been mainly the result of the shortcomings and even failures of the multicultural policies. In this sense the extent of the multicultural policies have remained limited in ensuring the representation and participation of the groups on equal footing, and in preventing discrimination and racism. This has been accompanied with the emergence of another strand criticising some assumptions of the politics of multiculturalism. This critical perspective while trying to overcome the deficiencies through inventing new notions like hybridity reveals that the concept has no value in itself, progressive or regressive, since the meaning it will assume depends on how the actors of the power relations want to pursue the politics of multiculturalism.

The cases in the study demonstrate that it may easily be the instrument of the manipulation in the hands of the states. Moreover the groups, through setting their cultural, ethnic or racial identities at the center of their politics may have been manipulated. This does not mean that it cannot be a progressive strategy but there are quite serious limitations. Perhaps, first of all, the arbitrary distinctions and

dichotomies between the terms of equality and difference or universal and particular should be eliminated since they are not mutually exclusive concepts in their nature instead the alternative ways can be sought to reconcile them. In fact, the rising racism and chauvinism in Europe denotes that it is not the lack of the cultural rights or non-recognition of the identities that gives way to such troubles because there are more serious structural causes laying behind them including economic problems, the increasing rate of unemployment, segregation in the residence and work places, and the discriminatory policies of the states. Therefore any politics ignoring these factors and engaging merely in the politics of the identity would be doomed to failure.

The second section included more descriptive explanations. In this part, it was tried to describe the recent attempts within the international community in developing long-lasting viable, binding rules and norms in the area of the minority rights. The endeavors, which are mostly legal in their nature within the framework of the UN, the Council of Europe and OSCE, mark the ineffectiveness of already accepted universal human rights standards in protecting the political, economic and cultural rights of the minorities and the other groups. In this sense, these organisations spend their efforts to broaden the extent of the human rights by means of incorporating the rights of minorities and of the immigrants into them. This growing consciousness in the evaluation of the cultural rights as part of the universal human rights, in a sense, is related to the ethnic and religious conflicts in Europe and to the many difficulties that the immigrants face in the respected societies. In spite of this progress in the rights of the minorities at legal level their mere existence does not make sense because for their effectiveness they should be part of the domestic laws and national legislation, and possess a binding influence. However as long as the states, as the main actors in enforcing these norms, continue to behave in a flexible way in interpreting them it will take a longer time to reach long-standing principles in the area.

In the third part, the main question of the study was analysed. In this section the problem of multiculturalism in Turkey has been evaluated in the light of the interviews with the political parties and civil society organisations. The responses to the interview questions enable us to suggest important conclusions with regard to the question of this study. Multiculturalism have recently been put into the agenda of Turkish politics in close connection with the matters of the cultural rights of various

communities, mainly those of the Kurdish population, and even equated with the Kurdish question. However, for a long time, the state authorities have conceived of any debate upon them as a danger to the unity and integrity of the nation, and denied the existences of the communities belonging to the different ethnic origins other than the officially recognised minorities. The representatives of the civil society organisations especially highlighted this reality.

When we give our attention to the current situation, the state authorities not only recognise the culturally and ethnically diverse structure of the society but also develop new policies, which may enhance the enjoyment of the cultural rights, remove the restrictive measures by making appropriate amendments at legal level (as was denoted in the second section), and adopt relatively more responsive attitudes to the demands for the cultural rights. The replies in the interview suggest that the comprehension of the problem of the multiculturalism in Turkey is different from that in the European context in that in Turkey it is situated within the framework of the general concerns on democratisation and human rights. In a general sense, the concept is attributed a progressive meaning since it is expected that the ongoing arguments and the relevant reforms would give way to the successive steps for the democratisation of the country. For that reason, it can be concluded that the political reform process goes hand in hand with the challenge of the multiculturalism, and stimulates each other. Furthermore, together with this trend some prevalent ways of thinking, political practices, and attitudes with regard to the conceptions of security, national unity and integrity, the prevailing form of citizenship have been gradually questioned, and more and more claims have been raised for the extension of the fundamental rights and freedoms. For instance, the political authority notices that assimilation can no longer be the case in its relations with the groups belonging to different ethnic origins. On this ground, the politics of multiculturalism may contribute to the solution of some questions like the Kurdish problem and be an important dynamic for the future political reforms.

As has been noted several times in this study, the challenge of multiculturalism in Turkey can only be grasped in the light of the impact of the process of accession to the EU. Responses in the survey also support this reality in that answers of the respondents reveal the fact that without this process both the current debates and the extent of the reforms and legal amendments would have

remained limited and that the trend of political liberalisation would have proceeded more slowly. Therefore, membership to the Union is regarded as an irreversible and vital necessity. Especially the respondents from the civil society organisations see it urgent to adopt and settle the Copenhagen political criterion as integral part of the political system.

On the other hand, the influence of the accession process exposes one of the deficiencies of the political structure, that is, without an external factor like the EU the change and the transformation within the system are difficult to achieve. This has been best observed in the recent reform attempts, which have been speeded up after 1999 though the political authority asserts that the amendments have been made for the well being of the citizens. For this reason, it may be argued that it is not the politics of multiculturalism in itself that functions as a challenge and has a progressive role but the impact of the necessary political steps required for the membership that has made it an effective dynamic for the positive changes within the political structure. In other words, it is the EU process that stands behind the reform process.

In spite of this, many actors talk about the challenge of the politics of multiculturalism as a transformative dynamic and their main concerns are to make it dominant in the attitudes of the individuals, the political practices, the ways of thought, and to establish a society shaped by the multicultural values of tolerance, dialogue and recognition of the differences. It is no doubt that these ideals necessitate a series of pre conditions. After all, the state authorities should be open to dialogue with all the parties concerned with the question including human rights organisations, the representatives of the minorities and the groups claiming cultural rights. They should also be willing to be in close cooperation and interaction with the above actors in forming and planning the relevant policies, in other words, the political authority should behave in a flexible way. It is only through these conditions that the state can understand the genuine needs of the groups and find appropriate solutions. Secondly, the political authorities in both national and local level should take all essential measures for the enforcement of the reforms. Because, as was pointed out before, even though legal constraints were eliminated there are practical restrictions before the enjoyment these freedoms. Perhaps, the realisation of these two conditions may contribute to the achievement of the one of the ideals of any

liberal democracy, that is, to ensure the loyalty and commitment to the political community by all the citizens without denying or neglecting the cultural, ethnic and religious differences that the members of the political community possess. This ideal can be formulated in another way; as long as the political authorities acknowledge the culturally diverse structure of the society, adopt a responsive standing to the demands for recognition of and respect to cultural, ethnic differences, and design appropriate policies to meet their claims, in other words, if the policies of denial and assimilation are eliminated, wish of the various actors for the transformation of Turkish society from a multicultural society to a multiculturalist one is not difficult to achieve.

With respect to the general perception of the notion of multiculturalism, it seems that both in Europe and Turkey the political, theoretical debates on the concept of citizenship, and the focus on the legal and political measures should be taken into account with the consideration that liberal democracies are not integrative enough. In other words, irrespective of the normative critiques against some premises of the liberalism at the end the main consideration of both liberal scholars and of those who have more critical standing vis a vis this paradigm is to enlarge the representational capabilities of the liberal democracies through creating a place for almost every sense of difference within the "toleration limits" of the liberal democratic regime. It is because of this reason that a comprehensive notion of citizenship is regarded essential. Such a notion, at least, is expected to ensure a kind of legal and political equality of the opportunities for everyone. This consideration is in conformity with the prevalent understanding of multiculturalism as integration without assimilation or unity in diversity.

However such meaning attached to the politics of multiculturalism has its own limits. First of all the ideal of equality is confined to the legal and political spheres under the concept of citizenship, namely, the reasons of inequality, discrimination, homogenization, marginalisation, racism (in Europe) are searched in the cultural and political realms, and isolated from their material basis and socio-economic conditions. In this respect, the ethnic and cultural groups while using the politics of multiculturalism in the above sense consciously or unconsciously ignore the real or material sources of their disadvantaged positions. For that reason, if we

perceive and define the politics of multiculturalism from such a perspective we should expect that some basic legal and political reforms and regulations would compensate the incapability of the liberal societies in incorporating different groups. But as is argued throughout the study this is not the case.

In some political contexts like Turkey because of the highly centralized political structure that tries to supervise the society and the oppositional forces at every expense the concept of multiculturalism is attached an over importance for social change and in fact the politics of multiculturalism may create moderation within the political structure. Yet any further meaning or force for social transformation may be illusionary because the politics of multiculturalism in itself has no progressive or regressive meaning and should be taken into account in connection with the objective political, social and economic conditions within which the concerns about the notion are stated.

END NOTES

1. Although the experiences of Australia and N. America (Canada and USA) have important consequences as regards to the debates on multiculturalism, since in these societies, the politics of multiculturalism emerged from unique historical circumstances. However, this study will try to focus on the discussions within the West European context. The neglect of the former cases is related to the subject of this thesis that aims at understanding the position of Turkey with respect to the debates in Western Europe.

2. Until the 1960's, investment was made in main industrial countries accompanied with the economic expansion, the rising wages and high living standards for many. But from the 1970's onwards, economic policies were designed to make investment in low wage countries. Rising levels of unemployment as a result of which even those qualified workers faced the risk of losing their jobs followed this.

3. After the crisis, such an environment of insecurity affected all including the native workers. For instance, in the labour markets, two types of skill profile have emerged, i.e., highly skilled specialists and low skilled routine workers. Moreover, not only have real wages, job opportunities declined drastically, but also informal types of employment like out work and subcontracting have been put in to agenda.

4. Some writers argue that multiculturalism is more than a pragmatic strategy, instead it should be evaluated within the political context of power struggles, collective negotiations and controversies about cultural, ethnic and racial differences, so multiculturalisms are multiple and continuously revised (Werbner and Modoo, 1997: Preface).

5. In reality, jus soli and jus sanginis types of citizenship do not indicate a naturalisation process according to which individuals voluntarily gain these positions, but are granted by the state itself unilaterally (Brubaker, 1992: 119).

6. Koopmans argues that even though typology approach to citizenship and integration strategies may provide a general idea about the process it tends to obscure both the dynamic aspect of the migrant integration and important differences within the states. In order to overcome this deficit, he underlines the role of political institutions and institutional arrangement influencing the preferences and strategies of political actors and determining the context within which policies are formulated and conducted. In this regard, a kind of theoretical link is necessary among political institutions, public discourse and ethnic relations politics in order to display the impact of institutional design upon the different national patterns of migration. His alternative is affected by the views of Charles Tilly who also gives attention to specific structure of political institutions and power relations at each national level in explaining popular mobilisation and revolutions (Koopmans and Statham, 2000a: 20-30).

7. According to Melotti, in France, the problem of immigration is still discussed in terms of integration process that is perceived similarly to the old project of assimilation though social rather than cultural dimension is now focused on. On the other hand, this strategy still perceives the immigrants as those ready to enter to the French society by leaving aside their own histories and cultures. Over the years, immigrants' reactions to this important assimilation strategy has come to question already existing socialisation agencies most of which are still far from facing the reality of growing diversity. In this respect, Melotti recommends an intercultural approach developed not just for the ideal of cultural pluralism but also for mutual enrichment among the cultures (Melotti, 1997: 77-78).

8. In reality, British immigration policy originated from ad hoc adjustments and was not the result of a systematic predetermined policy. It has been characterised by the lack of the consideration of economic and labour market needs, i.e., a situation resulted from the decline and uncertainty about Britain's place in the

world economy and by the strict immigration controls against the black population (Joppke, 1996: 479).

9. In Britain, since the early 1960's, many measures have been taken at local level having a highly decentralised structure. In order to integrate minority groups by means of the formations of special councils and committees under the control of local authorities. For instance, initially Voluntary Liaison Committees, then Community Relations Councils (also Councils for Racial Equality, Committees for Community Relations) were established to assist migrants and coordinated by the Commission for Racial Equality. These bodies were given the duty to act as social welfare advisers, legal watching and policy advocators on behalf of migrant minorities (Vertovec, 1996: 53).

10. For more information, see Brubaker (Brubaker, 1992).

11. As stated, multiculturalism experiences of the USA, Australia and Canada are beyond the scope of this study, but it's better to mention them very briefly. These three are classical immigrant countries and ethnic, racial and cultural plurality has been, from the beginning, part of their histories and they have designed many policies proper to their circumstances. In the USA, multiculturalism is dominantly related to inherent race problems and in this sense it should not be seen as a great challenge to the existing civic concept of nationhood, which is the case in European context (Joppke, 1996: 454). Canadian government, while adopting an official multiculturalism, has intended to deal firstly with the problem of Anglo-French bilingualism and biculturalism and then with immigrants. Australia, as part of the new world for a longtime, has tried to tackle with both existing Aboriginal population (question of their political and social situation within the society relative to the white population) and newly entering Asian and non-European immigrants, who, at the beginning, were encouraged to settle in the country, but then have been perceived as part of the problem, by means of multicultural strategies. In this sense, Australian multiculturalism has been attributed a role to ensure political and socio-economic participation of the immigrants and Aboriginal people (Castles, 2000: 138-139).

12.In Britain, from the time of the declaration of White Paper in 1965, which declared that Britain was a multicultural and multi-racial society, the successive policies for integrating immigrants to a great extent have contributed to the emergence of race relations regime. Although in British multiculturalism, there was a delicate balance between citizenship universalism and racial group particularism, in time, the latter superseded the former and the outcome was the granting of special group rights to immigrants (Joppke, 1999: 8).

13.In some approaches, the critique of universalism is combined with the acceptance of the ontological existence of social groups and with epistemological relativism. According to the later view, it is impossible to have objective knowledge about the other so the other (marginalised ethnic groups, oppressed races, and women) should be enabled to raise its point of view. Parallel to this idea in recent studies there has been a shift of attention from the investigated object to the investigating subject. However this view is by no means capable of undermining the universalistic thought since in epistemological relativism, too, the idea of reducibility of meaning and truth to their social and cultural contexts is raised by means of context transcending universal claims (Joppke and Lukes, 1999: 6).

14. Offe argues that it is only within the multinational societies that the right to self government can be asserted, but its realisation is limited to rare cases since their application requires a territorially concentrated group like regional majorities in distinctive sub-territories. Polyethnic rights indicate special legal entitlement and policy programmes such as public funding, promotion of minority languages, public support for particular cultural practices, representation of minority cultures in the plans of public schools, the funding of libraries, research projects. On the other hand, special representation rights indirectly assist the promotion of group identity (Offe, 1998: 7).

15. Indeed, according to Offe, facing the discourse of politics of difference as an outcome of identity conflicts, liberal democrasies are not defenseless because

under the democratic legislative process, the provision of rights and resources act as an antidote to the conflicts destructive of the democratic order. As a consequence, the system preserves the foundations of a liberal political community, achieves the loyalty of the members to the principles of the system (Offe, 1998: 6).

16. These communitarian ideas are best exemplified in the writings of Charles Taylor, in which he makes a contrast between the notion of equal dignity of individuals derived from the possession of equal rights and entitlements and the politics of difference which requires the recognition of distinct individual and group identities and in this regard, the provision of special rights proper to these identities (Taylor, 1994).

17.According to John Rex, the institutions of public domain, including the institutions of the market, public bureaucracy, the political system, besides law, education etc. are based upon the promotion of the equality of opportunity for all individuals. For that reason, not only the natives, but the immigrants, minorities have to accept these institutions as part of the society in which they live. For instance, they are expected to learn national language, commit themselves to the shared political norms and the legal system. But some writers oppose such a public/private distinction on several grounds. They are also aware of the necessity of some conditions in order to adapt to share political culture like the political, civic rights and entitlements. However, an ideal of society, like that of Rex, may be achieved by way of contact and sharing a feeling of commonality among different people. In this sense, there exists interdependency between the two domains; even they continuously shape each other. For instance, various groups ask from the state an active assistance for the reproduction of community values and norms. These minorities who are given chances to preserve their cultures, traditions, languages within the public domain will show greater loyalty to the system (Modoo, 1997: 18-19).

18. For more information about the details of the terms on which the post-national citizenship is distinguished from the national citizenship model, see Soysal (Soysal, 1996: 22-24 and 1994: 139-143).

19. As stated in individual versus group rights discussions, Will Kymlicka advocates the view that having equal rights as citizens is not enough to culturally integrate distinct groups. Identities are important, so the goals of citizenship and the means of strengthening it can only go hand in hand with the promotion of the level and form of ethnic and religious pluralism (Kymlicka, 1995a).

20. Having connection to the debates on group specific rights, the concepts of differentiated citizenship and differential minority rights (granted on the basis of cultural membership) are seen complementary to equal citizenship rights. Kymlicka uses these concepts in order to differentiate internal restriction and external protection rights demands. Stephen Castles points out the impossibility of the incorporation of minorities as mere individuals (they ask for the preservation of their languages and cultures) but he is suspicious of the concepts on the grounds that differentiated citizenship may lead to a new type of fixation and homogenisation of identities (Castles, 2000: 144). From a similar perspective, Vertovec mentions about the risks of system differentiated incorporation in which differential distribution of civil and political rights and the economic, social and other opportunities may cause unwanted inequalities and subordination (Vertovec, 1996: 58).

21. There are more details in the article of Joppke. In this article, Joppke makes a comparison among Germany, USA and Britain with respect to the evolution of citizenship policies in the 1990's by giving references to theoretical discussions accomplished by Yasemin Soysal, John Brubaker and Will Kymlicka and he tries to understand how these theoretical debates fit the actual practices in these countries.

22. In spite of her defense of post-national citizenship, Soysal acknowledges that while the basis, legitimation and codification of membership rights have crossed

the national borders, it is still the national-states responsible for the actualisation and implementation of these rights. Not only are post-national rights are organised at the national level but also the nation-state remains to be the main actor for public social function and regulation of social distribution though the nature of these practices are determined within the global context (Soysal, 1994: 157).

23. Against Charles Taylor's implicit cultural relativism in his politics of difference (all cultures have equal value), Lawrance Blum explains that three entities deserve recognition, that is, individuals, cultural groups and cultures. Recognition of the individuals and cultural groups denotes the acknowledgement of someone in their cultural distinctiveness. However, this does not bring a conclusion that the culture of a particular group or the identity of an individual has a kind of distinct value or worth. Since recognition of one's cultural identity is one thing and to ascribe a taken for granted value is another. As Blum argues, even if we accept this assumption (we can not), this cannot be used as a ground to raise ethnical demands for recognition or respect. We can only say that every culture has valuable things for both members sharing it and for humanity (Blum, 1998).

24. There are some dramatic examples related to instances where the ethnic and religious communities may strictly impose their traditions, values and norms upon their members. For instance, cases of cliterectomy or compulsory arranged marriages, assault on women by their husbands are sometimes tried to be justified as being part of the group's customs. Or the groups may demand exemption for their children from public education (the Amish Community in USA and the Hutteriters in Canada are exempted from the laws regarding compulsory education) (Kymlicka, 1995b: 40-41). Moreover, Steven Vertovec argues that the powerful positions of the elites to direct the activities of the community may create patronage and nepotism as he gives the examples of the manipulation of social networks within Pakistani community in Britain. When this problem is combined with the culturalist thinking, there exist the cases that representatives

compete for controlling the resources provided by the political authority (Vertovec, 1996: 53-57).

25. Affirmative action in the form of quotas, special social regimes or training programmes may be significant in order to overcome the disadvantaged positions of the immigrants and minorities in multi-ethnic societies. However, these policies may be self-defeating and produce adverse outcomes. Because on the one hand, it is argued that ethnic, racial, religious or other identities of groups should not be used as markers of inferiority and exclusion or marginalisation, on the other hand, group-specific policies are attributed an importance to combat discrimination and social deprivation the communities face and to enable them to get shares in economic and social resources. However, this dilemma while causing the perception of these groups as incapable and unable to stand without state assistance, requiring tolerance and respect; reproduces the conditions of dependency by making continuous reference to the racial, ethnic and other identities as disadvantageous categories. This is a case, for instance, in Britain and the Netherlands where the minorities are supported at a higher level and in these societies, ethnic, racial segregation in the school system is still dominant and level of unemployment among the immigrants is growing (Koopmans and Statham, 2000a: 27).

26. Facing the question of the demands of French speaking community and of the later immigrants in the 1970's, the government declared that Canada was a multicultural society within the framework of bilingualism. This formal rhetoric neither helped the later migrants nor provided the ground for the shared control of the political system because the recognition of cultural and linguistic diversity was in practice confined to private sphere. In other words, cultural diversity was tolerated at non-political level, without any possibility of threat to the political system (Rex, 1996: 128-130).

27. Anti-essentialism truly emphasises the changing nature of cultures and identities through a continuous and dynamic process, but Tarıq Modoo states that this should not be concluded with the rejection of a coherent unity of a self and

identity as deconstructive anti-essentialism does. In fact, under the developments like mass migration, globalisation of economies and consumption, there is no longer a single, unified identity or cultural totality that individuals and groups possess, instead, together with interaction with other individuals and cultures, groups come to have multiple identities, practices which are still subject to change. However, according to Modoo, under the deconstructionist anti-essentialism;

> [T]he self is no more connected to one location, or society and state... There is no politics, no   society, not even a coherent self. What promised to be emancipatory progressive movement seems to make all political mobilisations, with its deconstruction of the unity of collective agency rest on myths and dishonest unities (Modoo, 2000: 194).

In reality, this is what post-modernist anti- essentialist critics wish to do, i.e., to deconstruct, undermine, and even negate the coherence of an identity (Modoo, 2000: 178).

28. Within the essentialism versus anti-essentialism debate, there is an intermediary concept called strategic essentialism. This is a strategic position since the minorities, different identity groups for the sake of their emancipatory struggle and political mobilisation act as if they had fixed, durable identities, traditions or norms; yet, they still adopt a critical perspective as regards the reified, essentialist understanding of the identities (Bonneth, 1999: 212).

29. For more information about the criticisms of the notion of hybridity, see Jonathan Friedman (Friedman, 1997: 70-89).

30. In the preamble of ICCPR it is specified that "... the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights". In the same Covenant Article 2 stipulates that;

Each state party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationalm or social origin.

Regarding freedom of religion, Article 18(1) states that "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion..." In the section I of European Human Rights Convention Article 9 regulates the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, Article 10 makes reference to the freedom of expression and Article 14 prohibits the discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms. Part V of European Social Charter in the Article E also guarantees the principle of non-discrimination.

31. In the Framework Convention protection of national minorities is regarded as essential to stability, democratic security and peace. Because the text underlines that a pluralist and genuinely democratic society should not only respect to the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of each person belonging to a national minority, but also create appropriate conditions enabling them to express, preserve and develop this identity. This is clearly pointed out in the Article 1 that stipulates "the protection of national minorities and of rights and freedom of persons belonging to those minorities forms as integral part of the international protection of human rights".

32. In all basic OSCE documents and recommendations having reference to the minority rights like Helsinki Final Act, Copenhagen Document and Charter of Paris for a New Europe, that rights of persons belonging to national minorities should be protected and respected as part of universal human rights is explicitly specified.

33. Unlike the other international and regional instruments, OSCE engages only those human rights issues having security dimension. As it is written down in Organisation's publications, the various instruments developed by OSCE serve conflict prevention, early warning and action; since OSCE defines its mission as preventive diplomacy. In this respect, the duty of High Commissioner on

National Minorities is not to deal with all minority rights problems but "to seek early resolution of ethnic tensions that might endanger peace, stability or friendly relations between the participating states of the OSCE. His mandate describes him as an instrument of conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage" (Document on High Commissioner on Minorities, 2002).

34. Bryan Turner argues that apart from the problem that cultural rights are discussed within the rights discourse based on the tradition of individual liberalism, which underemphasises the obligation dimension in favour of the ideal of freedom, within the international and legal instruments the cultural dimension of democracy are mostly taken into account with respect to the rights of ethnic minorities including right to cultural autonomy, preservation of cultural heritage, right to respect cultural identity, right of people to their own artistic, historical and cultural and cultural wealth.(He gives reference to the UN instruments). However according to him, there may be contradictions due to the existence of two kinds of the cultural rights i.e. minority and universal rights. He says that;

> Cultural citizenship may help to control cultural imperialism, but it may also articulate conflicts between local or particular rights, and the right to enjoy the universalistic legacy of humanity. The right to maintain one's historical culture may well contradict other universalistic claims about economic and social rights (Turner, 2001: 21-22).

35. For details, see the Report.

36. In reality, such a consideration is not baseless. And as several cases demonstrate, due to the restrictive policies of the state it is a very short step to move from the demands for cultural rights to more politicised claims such as political autonomy, secession, political representation. In this sense every component of the culture like music, literature, and ceremonies may be both expressions of cultural identity, and means or symbols of political authority. In other words, many cultural expressions may have politicised character.

37. Article 39 of Lausanne Treaty articulates that;

No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of a language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in the publications of any kind or at public meeting. Now standing the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own languages before the courts.

In one of the brochures of the Kurdish Institute, this provision is interpreted as the recognition of the cultural social and ethnic rights of the Kurds without naming that (Istanbul Kurdish Institute, 1999: 12).

38.What is worth noting is that Turkish Constitution contains many articles and provisions guaranteeing the equal rights and opportunities for all without discrimination, prohibiting the discrimination before the law on the basis of language, race, sex, and religion. Freedoms of expression, press, association are also guaranteed, but there are more effective other provisions determining the limits of these rights in order to safeguard the unity and integrity of the state.

39. There are other arrangements within Turkish legal system having similar implications like Article 43 of Political Parties Law banning the use of any language and writing other than Turkish in their propaganda activities, Article 6 of Association Law forbidding the use of languages prohibited by law in their regulations and publications, public meetings. Article 16 of Population Law prohibits the names not compatible with national culture, custom and usage (HRA, 2000: 105-106). Among these codes under 6th Harmonisation Package, the statements of national culture, custom and usage have been removed from the Article 16 of Population Law. Though the repeal of Article 43 of the Political Parties Law was mentioned in the draft of the Package, This was not accepted; therefore there is no any provision in the final document regarding the removal of this article.

40. However, there is a general dilemma of the political system requiring a brief mentioning. As a result of the legal amendments some restrictions have been removed, but then instead of banning directly the use of Kurdish language in the

media, the government has hindered the enjoyment of this right in the printed media with reference to the Article 8 of Anti-Terror Law which prohibits the engagement of written and oral propaganda aimed at endangering with its territory and nation, and Article 312 of Turkish Penal Code providing that "it is a crime to provoke differences among people based on class, religion, race, religious sect, and regional differences"(HRA, 2000: 86-87).

41. Pulat Tacar says that Süleyman Demirel, when he was the president, acceped freedom of preservation and promotion of any cultural or ethnic identity as a legitimate right, and underlined the importance of the recognition of them by the state with the exception that these differences could not but used as a means of political separation. Mesut Yılmaz, too, as a prime minister, declared that there was no legal prohibition for the use of Kurdish language in daily life and broadcasting, but existing political restrictions had to be removed (Tacar, 1996: 138, 149).

42. There are other important articles specifying the other political commitments of the political authority. For instance, 2.1.11 is about the enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all individuals without any discrimination and irrespective of their languages, race, colour, sex, political thought, religion, and about freedom of thought, consciousness and religion. In this article, Turkey bears a commitment to ratify the International Convention on Prevention of All Kinds of Racial Discrimination. In the Article 2.1.12 it is specified that "Turkish government, in the short term, will revise the Constitution in the light of European Convention of Human Rights and in the middle term will commit to make necessary legal amendments". Article 2.1.13 is related to the ratification of the ICCPR and ICESCR. For details, see the National Programme.

43. Accession Partnership is quite extensive document and involves other provisions on human rights, economic policies analysis of which is not the concern of this study. For more information, see the document.

44. The package also includes amendments to the Zoning and Construction Law, Law on cinema, video and music pieces.

45. Under a joint declaration, the Human Rights Association, Turkish Human Rights Foundation, The Association of Human Rights and the Solidarity for Oppressed Peoples stated that;

> It becomes unclear who sponsored and who carried out these works in line with the harmonisation process to the EU. The Turkish public and its non-governmental organisations alienated from this process. Human rights associations can learn about these important implementations closely related to our democratic life from the press. This process should be transparent, and the contribution of public should be maintained.

According to these organisations, the package absolutely excludes the contribution of non-governmental organisations. Furthermore, they add that the package while lifting Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law puts in the Turkish Penal Code a new article authoritasing the judiciary to sentence those who are convicted under this article to higher penalties (Turkish Daily News, May 28 2003).

46. One of the texts published by the Kurdish Human Rights Project based in London states that;

> It should be noted that the suppression or devaluation of minority cultural rights has implications not only for a minority' s language and culture but also for the social and political life of the group. In fact, in many ways cultural and political rights are complementary… it is difficult to distinguish cultural and political rights and many expressions of Kurdish culture and identity have become increasingly politicized in the past decade. This makes it difficult to talk about cultural and political speech if they were two entirely different types of expression. The most popular theme of the Kurdish music is the Kurdish struggle against oppression, wearing traditional Kurdish clothes is an expression of Kurdish cultural identity, but is also a political statement. Even dancing has become more and more a political statement; to dance Kurdish is the break the local oppressive rules and asserts the group's identity (KHRP, 1997: 2, 4).

47. In the interview Hüsnü Öndül stated that they were called to participate a meeting prepared for the formation of the Revised National Programme by the

government, yet on the same day the police forces took away all the computers and documents from the main building they work.

48. In their parliament speeches on Harmonization Package on May 19 2003, the two MP's of CHP, Algan Hacaloglu and Şükrü Elekdağ questioned the use of mother languages in public broadcasting. Because, they argued that education and broadcasting in mother languages are private affairs and part of the private sphere: i.e.: the sphere of individual freedoms. But, public sphere should be under control, and in this sphere the individuals exist as equal citizens to whom the state should stand impartial. This means that state may recognize different cultures but should avoid supporting and promoting their identity by using public institutions.

49. Şefik Beyaz mentions about a case related to the foundation of private language institutions. Although, there has been quite long time that this right was granted this right have not been enjoyed yet, due to arbitrary hindrances at local level. He said that they asked for the legal permission from the local government of Şanlıurfa for the establishment of Kurdish language courses but the local authorities replied that there was no such language as Kurdish.

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APPENDIX A

QUESTIONS OF THE INTERVIEW

1. How do you perceive and define the notion of multiculturalism?

2. Do you know about the debates in Western Europe on multiculturalism? How would you evaluate Turkey's conditions in this context?

3. What are the terms of reference in which multiculturalism is debated in Turkey?

4. What may be the possible implications and repercussions of these debates?

5. How does the process of European integration affect or shape the question of multiculturalism in Turkey? Do you attribute any importance to this process regarding the problem of multiculturalism?

6. Is the politics of multiculturalism necessary in Turkey? May it have long-lasting and viable effects? What are your recommendations with respect to the future of the politics of multiculturalism in Turkey?