TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL THROUGH THE LENS OF
NEOCLASSICAL REALISM, 1949-2010

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submitted by ANDREW JAMES EMMERT in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in International Relations, Middle East Technical University by,

Prof. Dr. Yaşar KONDAKÇI
Dean.
Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Oktay TANRISEVER
Head of Department
Department of International Relations

Prof. Dr. Özlem TÜR
Supervisor
Department of International Relations

Examinaing Committee Members:

Prof. Dr. Meliha ALTUNIŞIK (Head of the Examining Committee)
Middle East Technical University
Department of International Relations

Prof. Dr. Özlem TÜR (Supervisor)
Middle East Technical University
Department of International Relations

Prof. Dr. Ayşegül SEVER
Marmara University
Department of International Relations
I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Andrew James Emmert
Signature:
ABSTRACT

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL THROUGH THE LENS OF NEOCLASSICAL ISRAEL, 1949-2010

Emmert, Andrew James
M.Sc., Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Özlem Tür
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This thesis analyzes Turkish foreign policy toward Israel through the lens of Neoclassical Realist theory from 1949-2010. It specifically attempts to discern the various international, regional, and domestic factors that have contributed to Ankara’s foreign policy toward the Jewish state by examining the eras of bipolar (1949-1989), unipolar (1990-2001), and multipolar (2002-2010) international structures. By doing such the author believes that a fresh interpretation of nearly the entire course of Turkish-Israeli relations will be provided.

Keywords: Turkey, Israel, International relations, Neoclassical realism
ÖZ

NEOKLASİK REALİZM PERSPEKTİFİNDEN İSRAİL'E YÖNELİK TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASI, 1949-2010

Emmert, Andrew James
Y. Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Özlem Tür
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Anahtar kelimeler: Türkiye, İsrail, Uluslararası ilişkiler, Neoklasik realism, Orta Doğu
To my family...
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Forward

Out of all the bilateral relationships that the Turkish Republic has enjoyed throughout its history, perhaps the most tempestuous is the one that it has held with Israel over the past 71 years. Ever since Turkey recognized Israel in 1949, it has both strategically cooperated and distanced itself from the Jewish state; it has signed large-scale military contracts with it, yet also downgraded relations on four different occasions. As students of International Relations, such a tumultuous relationship should naturally capture our attention and implore us to start asking questions: how, for instance, can such a relatively young relationship be marked by such disparity in its peaks and troughs? What factors have led and contributed to such disparity? What kind of international environments have the leaders of these respective countries faced while making key decisions? What domestic factors, if any, have contributed to Turkey’s decision making? How do the relevant international and domestic factors correlate with one another? What theory is most adequate for interpreting developments in this relationship?

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Answering such questions of course is anything but an easy task, and as non-policy makers outside the halls of power we can never be guaranteed access to all of the information available on such a topic, let alone be completely certain that any answers which we may conclude are faultlessly accurate. Nevertheless, this work will attempt to help answer such questions to the best of this author’s ability by broadly analyzing Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel from 1949-2010 through the lens of Neoclassical Realist theory. The use of this theory to explore Turkish foreign policy over the aforementioned time frame provides us with two key benefits: first, it allows us to fill a gap within the existing literature concerning Turkish-Israeli relations. Countless pieces of literature attempting to describe or understand the Turkish-Israeli relationship exist; Ofra Bengio in her classic *The Turkish-Israeli Relationship: Changing Ties of Middle Eastern Outsiders*, for instance, attempts to historically explain the relationship from its inception in the late 1940s to the early 2000s, with particular emphasis on the Cold War and 1990s; Gökhan Bacık, on the other hand, attempted in his 2009 essay, “Turkish-Israeli Relations after Davos: A View from Turkey,” to understand the significant downturn in the relationship during the 2000s from the previous decade, and ultimately concluded that the democratization process in Turkey during the first decade of the twenty-first century unleashed certain social forces from the Turkish side, namely the public’s sympathy for the Palestinian people, which weakened what was already in Bacık’s mind a weak, bureaucratic-dependent, relationship; in a somewhat similar fashion Ali Balcı and Tuncay Kardaş attempt to answer the same question as Bacık and conclude through their use of the Copenhagen School’s “securitization theory” that the “desecuritization” of Turkish politics in the 2000s, i.e., the loosening grip of the military on Turkish politics, delegitimized the idea of strong relationship with Israel within Turkish society, as the former was no longer seen as essential for the survival of the state as it had been in the 1990s; taking a different approach to the matter is İlker Aytürk, who in the process of empirically

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trying to understand the causes behind the paradigmatic shift mentioned above, concluded that Israeli neglect over the Palestinian issue along with faulty attempts at troubleshooting from both sides, including a new Islamic government in Turkey, severely damaged the relationship; a different approach is taken by Tarik Oğuzlu, who analyzes the same shift in relations from a Structural Realist perspective and concludes that many of the threats present for Turkey in the 1990s were no longer there in the 2000s and that Turkey’s shift to the Middle East for security reasons lessened the need for a strong relationship with Israel. While all of these works certainly have their place in the literature of Turkish-Israeli relations, this work, while not necessarily disagreeing with many of the listed work’s conclusions, will attempt to contribute to the literature by broadly examining the entirety of the Turkish-Israeli relationship from the perspective of Turkey’s foreign policy and through the lens of Neoclassical Realism. While works examining Turkish foreign policy through the lens of Neoclassical Realism do indeed exist, to the knowledge of this author no work exists specifically covering the AKP government’s foreign policy toward Israel through the lens of Neoclassical Realism while also examining the near entirety of Turkey’s relationship with Israel.

The second benefit of examining Turkish foreign policy toward Israeli through Neoclassical Realism over nearly the entire course of Turkish-Israeli relations is that the model provided by this theory allows us to examine both international and domestic factors relevant to the subject. Unlike Neorealism which would only allow us to consider the structural variables of the international structure, and the various forms of Liberalism which would conversely allow us to examine domestic factors at the expense of the international variables, Neoclassical Realism will allow us to examine both domestic and international factors. The benefit of such an approach will become apparent as we attempt to understand Turkey’s position in the

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international structure as a member of NATO, its placement in the Middle East as a non-Arab entity, as well as a Muslim country with distinct political blocs and a conservative political base not particularly inclined toward a strong relationship with Israel.¹²

With all of this in mind, by the end of this work, the author believes that several arguments will have been adequately demonstrated. First and foremost, this thesis will attempt to demonstrate that Neoclassical Realism is a relatively useful theory for analyzing Turkish foreign policy toward Israel. In the realm of International Relations theory, the usefulness of one theory is essentially determined by the amount of relevant and accurate knowledge that can fit within the model provided by that theory. If, for instance, we assume that states are the most relevant players in international politics as various forms of realism do, we would have a difficult time explaining the politics of the European Union as many of the political decisions made within it are made in multilateral institutions, and therefore outside the plane of states. On the other hand, if we made an effort to evaluate the Cold War through the lens of Neoliberalism, we may also find ourselves lacking in relevant knowledge considering that there would be few examples of the Soviet Union and the United States cooperating through the multilateral or economic institutions that Neoliberal theory emphasizes.¹³ In the case of this work’s subject, this author will attempt to demonstrate that the model provided by Neoclassical Realism is an adequate one, if for no other reason than the sheer volume of information that it allows us to process and the accuracy it provides.

Of course, no theory is completely flawless in its usage. By their very nature theories both permit and prohibit certain information from being taken under consideration for any given subject and by doing so they binarily create their own strengths and weaknesses,¹⁴ and Neoclassical Realism is of course no exception. Moreover, to assert that the Neoclassical Realism is the ‘best’ or ‘most adequate’ theory for describing Turkish foreign policy toward Israel from 1949-2010 would be

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¹² For more on conservatism within Turkey, see Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalayacioğlu, *The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). For more on that conservatism and how it has related to Turkish-Israeli relations, see Bengio, *The Turkish-Israeli Relationship*, 46 and 50-51.


¹⁴ Ibid.
highly fallacious in light of the fact that this will not be a truly theoretical comparative study. The only effective means to accurately determining which theory is truly the best would be the conduction of an exhaustive study covering our topic in the same time frame from the vantage point all of the various theories followed by a comparison of the findings. Such a study is of course well beyond the scope of this work. Nonetheless, the author of this work believes that the information found in the following pages allows us to accurately identify Neoclassical Realism as an adequate theory for examining Turkish foreign policy toward Israel from 1949-2010.

The second argument that this work will demonstrate is that throughout the years covered by this study, a range of international and regional political factors contributed to Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel. The historical periods of this work will be divided into three different periods according to the international political structure: the bipolar world of the Cold War Years (1949-1989); the post-Cold War years of unipolarity (1990-2002); and the onset of the multipolar world (2003-2010). In all three of these periods a combination of the world political structure and regional political factors played tremendous roles in the shaping of Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel. The demonstration of such in turn indicates that while evaluating Turkey’s Israel policy we cannot, and should not, become preoccupied solely with the issue of identity as Constructivists and some other scholars might be wont to do. In other words, throughout the years there have indeed been strong material factors that have clearly shaped Turkish foreign policy toward Israel, and should not search for answers alone in Turkey’s identity.

Somewhat corollary to this, another dynamic which we will see by the end of this work is that outside of the Foreign Policy Executive (FPE) variable, domestic variables were not the main determinants of Turkish foreign policy towards Israel in the years covered in this work. In other words, outside of the interpretation of the international environment provided by Neoclassical Realist model, the domestic factors of Turkish politics relevant to the formulation of Turkey’s foreign policy

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15 For more on Constructivism, see ibid., 155-168.
17 To be elaborated upon in the following chapter.
18 Steven E. Lobell, “Threat assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 42-74.
toward Israel, such as public opinion and the views of oppositional parties, were not decisive in formulating that policy. That said, however, such domestic variables did in fact help reinforce Turkish officials’ decided foreign policy toward the Jewish state, particularly during the years of the Cold War and the years of encroaching international multipolarity.¹⁹

The final argument of this work will be that in comparison to the Cold War and post-Cold War years, the period of multipolarity was marked by an extremely different foreign policy outlook of the officials in power and that as a result, the FPE variable had a greater impact on the formulation of the Turkish government’s foreign policy toward Israel. In his dissertation covering Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East from 2002-2013 through the lens of Neoclassical Realism, Zenonas Tziarras effectively proved that the ideology of the ruling AKP played the greatest role of any of the domestic variables in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy toward Israel.²⁰ Such an assertion of course naturally begs the question as to how the time period covered by Tziarras compares to earlier ones. Like Tziarras, this author also concludes that the foreign policy views of the AKP played an immensely significant role in the formulation of the government’s policy toward Israel. Unlike Tziarras and his superb thesis, however, this work will provide us with the advantage of comparing the AKP-led FPE to others and will ultimately show that the former played a larger role in shaping Turkish foreign policy toward Israel through its ideology than its predecessors.

1.2. Methodology

As previously mentioned, this thesis will be divided according to the three periods of international structure found in the world from 1949-2010, with one chapter being allotted to each. Due to Neoclassical Realism’s emphasis on international and, where applicable, regional, structures,²¹ each chapter will begin with an analysis of those structures and Turkey’s place within them. Particular importance will be paid to

¹⁹ On the influence of public opinion in Turkish foreign policy during the early years of the relationship for instance, see Bengio, The Turkish-Israeli Relationship, 46. For public opinion toward Israel in the aftermath of Cast Lead in 2009, see Banu Eligür, “Crisis in Turkish-Israeli Relations (December 2008-June 2011): From Partnership to Enmity,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.48, no.3 (May 2012): 437-442.

²⁰ Tziarras, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East under the AKP (2002-2013),” 226.

²¹ See Lobell, “Threat assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” 46-54.
Turkey’s relationship with the US given its position as Ankara’s main international patron, as well as Turkey’s relationships with its adjacent Middle Eastern neighbors, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Each chapter will also examine the composition and ideational makeup of the relevant FPE’s so that we may develop an understanding as to how those executives viewed the world and reacted accordingly. Regarding domestic affairs, each chapter will vary according to the domestic variables relevant to the given historical period due to the fact that Neoclassical Realism acknowledges that each state’s FPE faces its own unique set of domestic variables according to historical circumstances. In other words, what may be an important domestic variable for one FPE may very well be completely irrelevant to another; what may have been a relevant domestic factor in 1965, may be dismissible in 2005. The end result for our discussion is that every chapter will be the same in the sense that they will call cover the FPE’s and the international, regional, and domestic factors relevant to our topic, yet different in the domestic variables that it addresses.

It should also be noted that given the flexibility awarded to us by the Neoclassical Realist model, this work will attempt to take a very comprehensive approach to its subject matter and cover a broad range of subjects relevant to the Turkish-Israeli dynamic. Significant detail will be given to matters such as Turkey’s bilateral relationships with its neighbors and the political ideologies and positions of the relevant political parties. The purpose of such an approach is not to engage in petty pedantry of course, but rather to provide the broadest framework as possible for understanding the determinants of Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel. A great deal of excellent literature exists of course on the nature of Turkish-Israeli bilateral relations and this author hopes that he can help contribute to that literature by not just examining the bilateral relationship itself, but by taking a broad and comprehensive approach to that relationship so that we may better understand the plethora of factors relevant to Turkey’s decision-making process as it concerns Israel. Of course, whether or not is successful in that endeavor will be decided by decided by its readers, but the author hopes that at the very least it will an informative work.

Regarding source material, this work relies on a wide range of books, journal and news articles. The vast majority of these sources are in English, but a few in fact are in Turkish and when quoted directly, the author has relied on his own translation.

22 See ibid., 56-61.
It should therefore be noted that when quoting a Turkish source in English, the author places emphasis on syntactical, as opposed to literal meaning. Anyone familiar enough with both languages understands that certain phrases, words, and expressions found in the Turkish language simply do not directly compute well into English. Therefore, the author of this work has placed emphasis on the syntactical meaning in English in the hopes of providing a clear and accurate translation in that language.

It should also be noted that Turkish political parties and institutions shall be addressed by their original Turkish names in order to place emphasis on their official title. More often than not, the translated names of Turkish political parties indicate very little, if any, about their political philosophy. The Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP), for instance, is no more opposed “justice” and “development” than the translated version of the AKP—the Justice and Development Party—would suggest. Moreover, in this author’s experience the English abbreviations of Turkish political parties are often confusing to both Turks and non-Turks alike. Therefore, in an effort to avoid confusion and provide proper reference to Turkish political parties, the names of those parties shall remain in their proper Turkish.

Lastly, it should also be noted that like all other academic pieces this work also has its own methodological weaknesses. The most obvious of course is that by focusing solely on Turkish foreign policy toward Israel, it does not cover the latter’s approach to Turkey. Like any other state, Israel has its own say in its bilateral relationships and we would obviously be in error if we presumed that somehow the Turkish-Israeli relationship was a simple one-way street. The so-called “lower chair crisis” of 2010, for instance, was a prime example of the internal dynamics of Israeli politics creating an incident which helped sour relations with Turkey via the public humiliation of its foreign minister. Nevertheless, this will not be covered extensively here due to the nature of this work.

1.3. Identity, History, and Geography: A Brief Survey of Turkish Foreign Policy

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In order to better understand the developments in Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel over the course of roughly six decades, it behooves us to briefly review Turkish foreign policy in the years leading up to Ankara’s recognition of the Jewish state so that we may place any events covered after 1949 in their proper context. Corollary to this, we must also attempt to develop an understanding of the factors that have helped determine Turkish foreign policy over this same period. Every country of course, no matter how large or small, or where it is located, has its own unique set of historical, geographical, and ideational factors which help determine its foreign policy over the long term. Turkey is no exception to this rule and as Mustafa Aydün has demonstrated in his essay on the determinants of Turkish foreign policy, in order to understand its foreign policy we must understand the history of the late Ottoman Empire and the early republic, its unique placement between the Middle East and Europe, and finally, the ideological foundations of the republic as envisioned by its founder and first president, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.24

Geographically speaking, Turkey’s location at the crossroads between Europe and Asia and between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea have made it one of the most coveted pieces of land in the world.25 Additionally, Turkey’s position in the Middle East as a non-Arab state surrounded by historical rivals has added to the country’s insecurity and isolation.26 The end result of both of these geographical features is that Turkish leaders, like their Ottoman ancestors before them, have often sought the outside protection of one of the world’s great powers in order to ensure its protection. In the mid-twentieth century that power became the US after Turkey joined NATO following Soviet threats in the aftermath of WWII.27 The relevance of this to our discussion is that at times Turkey has sought to reinsure its relationship with the US, and thus its protection, by gravitating toward America’s other main ally in the

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25 Ibid., 157 and Yasemin Çelik, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy (West Port, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 1-2.
26 Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, 47-64.
27 Feroz Ahmad, “The Historical Background of Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” in The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, ed. Lenore G. Martin and Demitris Keridis (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 2004), 10-32.
region, Israel.\textsuperscript{28} It has also meant that Turkey has also chosen at times to sought to develop a relationship with Israel in order to break its regional isolation.\textsuperscript{29}

Reinforcing these geographical influences on Turkish foreign policy toward Israel has also been Turkey’s history. Formed from the rubble of the Ottoman Empire and its collapse in the wake of WWI, the newly-founded Turkish Republic under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk opted to pursue a prudent foreign policy marked by non-confrontation,\textsuperscript{30} non-interference, and non-alignment, especially as it pertained to the Middle East.\textsuperscript{31} Much of the reasoning for such a foreign policy stemmed from the new republic’s mental and economic exhaustion from nearly a decade of war,\textsuperscript{32} as well as the disastrous results of WWI for the Ottoman Empire, which Atatürk and his associates interpreted as a lesson that prudence, not reckless conquest, was the best course of action.\textsuperscript{33}

One major exception to these general principles of foreign policy was Turkey’s annexation of Hatay in 1939 after pressuring France to cede the territory from its Syrian mandate the year before.\textsuperscript{34} This move sowed the seeds of discord between Turkey and Syria and turned the latter into what has probably managed to be Ankara’s greatest historic rival\textsuperscript{35} and a key determinant in Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel. Turkish-Israeli relations have in fact often been strongest when Turkish-Syrian relations are at their lowest, demonstrating to us just how essential of a role Syria can play in shaping Turkey’s outlook toward Israel.\textsuperscript{36}


\textsuperscript{29} Inbar, “The Strategic Glue in the Israeli-Turkish Alignment,” 165 and Bolukbasi, “Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View,” 30.

\textsuperscript{30} Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs,” 156.

\textsuperscript{31} Ahmad, “The Historical Background of Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” 19-21.

\textsuperscript{32} Soner Çağaptay, Erdoğan’s Empire (London: I.B. Taurus, 2020), 11 and 68.

\textsuperscript{33} Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs,” 156.

\textsuperscript{34} Andrew Mango, Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey (New York: The Overlook Press, 2002), 507-509.

\textsuperscript{35} Çağaptay, Erdoğan’s Empire, 111-115.

\textsuperscript{36} Moran Stern and Dennis Ross, “The Role of Syria in Turkish-Israeli Relations,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, vol. 14, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 2013): 115-128.
Regarding identity, Atatürk’s drive to create a secular, westernized republic\textsuperscript{37} meant that he also attempted to align Turkey with the West in his foreign policy as much as possible. In practical terms this meant that more diplomatic efforts were spent on improving ties with European countries as opposed to Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors.\textsuperscript{38} For the purposes of our discussion, this identification with the West and Turkey’s desire to be a part of it has at times reinforced Turkey’s desire to seek better relations with Israel in order to affirm its western credentials.\textsuperscript{39}

1.4. Millets and Mandates: Turkey, Jews, and Ankara’s Foreign Policy toward the Jewish Agency

Fitting into the historical context of Turkish foreign policy was of course the country’s relations with the Jewish Agency, the pre-state government of the Yishuv in Palestine.\textsuperscript{40} The Jewish community had constituted one of the significant millets within the empire\textsuperscript{41} ever since over 100,000 Sephardic Jews had been welcomed there by Sultan Bayezid II following their expulsion from Spain in 1492.\textsuperscript{42} At various points throughout Ottoman history the Jewish millet would rise to the intellectual and economic forefront of the empire despite the occasional pogrom.\textsuperscript{43} This prowess and the precedent set by Bayezid II seems to have generate a kind of respect for the Jewish people within the upper echelons of the Ottoman state that largely carried over into the leadership of the republic, where in 1926 the Jews were granted equal citizenship under the new legal code. In the following decades the Turkish government and its diplomats abroad were instrumental in providing safe havens to Jews fleeing the persecution of Nazi Germany. Beyond those noble ventures, however, during these years Turkey also


\textsuperscript{38} Ahmad, “The Historical Background of Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” 18-22.

\textsuperscript{39} Yavuz, “Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate,” 22-37.

\textsuperscript{40} Patten, Israel and the Cold War, 15-16.

\textsuperscript{41} Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic (London: Hurst and Company, 1997), 53-54.


\textsuperscript{43} Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, 53-54.
developed a cordial relationship with the Jewish Agency, exchanging several cultural
delegations for events such as the Levant Fair of 1936 and the International Fairs held
in Turkey in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The relationship also began to blossom in
matters of commerce with the opening of the Foreign Trade Institute by the Jewish
Agency as well the establishment of a Turkish branch of the Palestinian
Manufacturer’s Association. In 1938 Turkish Prime Minister Celal Bayar even hosted
a delegation led by the president of the Jewish Agency and world Zionist figure, Chaim
Weizmann, to discuss trade relations.  

The cordiality of this relationship was in stark contrast with the contentious
feelings of many in the Arab world, where animosity towards the Zionist project had
been gradually building over the course of the British Mandate. From Ankara’s
viewpoint, however, such animosity meant little on the level of sentiment. Not only
had Turks and Jews enjoyed relatively decent relations over the centuries compared to
the brewing antipathy in the Arab world, but the lack of love loss between the Arabs
and Turks in the aftermath of WWI meant that the government in Ankara was hardly
going to shed any tears for the former’s plight. Nevertheless, on the political level
Turkey was cognizant of the fact that supporting the establishment of Jewish state in
Palestine could sow further animosity between itself and the Arab world, and thus
opted to vote against the UN partition plan of 1947. Far from being a one-time move,
the Turkish government’s decision to support an Arab cause a the expense of Israel
despite its lack of animosity toward the former set a precedent that would become
highly relevant for Turkish-Israeli relations, especially during the Cold War. As we
shall see in greater detail later, at several crucial point over the course of that conflict
Turkey had little desire of its own to damage its ties with Israel, but would do so for
the sake of the Arab world.

1.5. Prime Ministers and Presidents: The Turkish Domestic Scene, 1950-2010

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44 For a synopsis of Turkey’s relations with the Jewish Agency, see Patten, *Israel and the Cold War*, 14-18.
45 See Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
46 Patten, *Israel and the Cold War*, 16.
47 Ibid., 18-19.
48 For more on Turkey’s decision making during the Suez Crisis, see ibid., 81-82. For more on Turkey’s
decision to cut ties with Israel in the mid-1960s, see Bengio, *The Turkish-Israeli Relationship*, 54-56.
Another subject which will require our attention before diving further into the main subject of this work is the nature of the Turkish government and politics, particularly as it relates to foreign policy decision making. Following the victory of the Demokrat Parti in the 1950 general election, Turkey’s political system began to transform into a more orthodox parliamentary system, with the prime minister taking charge of both domestic and foreign affairs as head of government, and the president acting in a much more ceromonal role as head of state.\(^{49}\) With notable exceptions,\(^{50}\) this system of governance largely maintained itself throughout the time period covered in this work and therefore prime ministers and the governments that they headed, not presidents, will be the focus of our attention in the domestic political scene.\(^{51}\)

In the years after 1950 Turkey’s parliamentary politics also evolved along the lines of a typical parliamentary system of government, with multiple parties all vying the largest number of parliamentary seats as possible to either form a government of their own or have has much leverage within one as they could muster. At times one party was able to win a majority of seats in parliament and thus form a government on its own, whereas at others parties were forced to form a coalition government. In the 1950s, 1960s and 1980s the former was generally the case with center-right parties dominating the electoral landscape. In the 1970s and 1990s, however, coalition governments became the norm amongst the chaotic nature of Turkish politics and society in those decades.\(^{52}\) Following the AKP’s landslide victory in the 2002 elections, however, single-party governments once again became the norm, with the former governing the country on its own from 2002-2010.\(^{53}\)


\(^{52}\) Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 221-337.

Ideologically speaking, since the mid-1960s Turkey has generally been divided between the most been the center-left and the center-right. The former has generally had its base amongst secular, educated, urbanized, and progressive voters and has more often than not been the closest ideological inheritor of the Kemalist tradition, standing for secularism, progressivism, social democracy, and more state involvement in the economy.\textsuperscript{54} The center-right on the other hand, has often been strongest among businessmen as well as more rural and conservative voters, and while not outright rejecting Kemalism or secularism per se, has often taken a more liberal approach to both the economy and religion in the public sphere.\textsuperscript{55}

Foreign policy wise, two events of the early 1960s put a significant strain on US-Turkish relations opened a wedge between the center-left CHP and the center-right \textit{Adalet Partisi} (AP) over foreign policy. Genuinely incensed by US behavior and sensing an opportunity to gain votes for the upcoming general election of 1965, CHP chairman İnönü positioned his party as more anti-American compared to the AP, which for its part still wanted to carry on the relationship with the US in order to thwart off communism. As the decade progressed the CHP and the left’s stance at large continued to become even more anti-American as socialist ideology grew in appeal amongst students and intellectuals. In time, this socialist ideology was synthesized with Kemalism, and the US came to be seen as a capitalistic imperial power and Turkey a country which, in the tradition of Atatürk, needed to be liberated from the yoke of imperialism once again.\textsuperscript{56} This line of thinking, as we shall see in greater detail


\textsuperscript{56} The events referred to here are the US’s withdrawing of Jupiter Missiles from Turkey in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the ‘Johnson Letter’ of 1965, the last of which will be dealt with in more
in the pages that follow, eventually led to the Turkish left becoming more anti-Israel in time, whereas the non-Islamist right would become more anti-Palestinian due the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO) links to leftist militants in Turkey.\textsuperscript{57}

Political transformation during this time period was not solely the property of the center-left and center-right, however. In the late 1960s and early 1970s developments also took place on the right side of the spectrum that would influence other factors necessary for us to examine over the course of this work. These developments were the rise of the Islamist and Nationalist/Pan-Turkist right, signified by the founding of the \textit{Milli Nizam Partisi} (MNP) and \textit{Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi} (MHP) in 1970 and 1969, respectively.\textsuperscript{58} While the far-left has traditionally enjoyed little electoral success in Turkey,\textsuperscript{59} the Islamist and Nationalist/Pan-Turkist right were two movements with deep roots in Turkish history which emerged to have a lasting impact on Turkish politics,\textsuperscript{60} often acting as power brokers in right-wing governments.

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\textsuperscript{58} Zürcher, \textit{Turkey: A Modern History}, 257.

\textsuperscript{59} Even during the heyday of Turkish leftist

\textsuperscript{60} Over the course of his career, Erbakan lead three different political parties, the aforementioned MNP (1970-71), the MSP (1971-1980), and following his return to politics after the overturning of a law which banned pre-1980 coup political leaders from participating in politics in 1987, the Refah Partisi. For the history and origins of the Islamist and nationalist/pan-Turkist right, see Poulton, \textit{Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent}, 130-206.
The MHP in fact is still a prominent player in Turkish politics today, while the Islamist movement forms much of the ideological basis for the ruling AKP.

Concerning ideology, the Islamist movement within Turkey traces its origins back to intellectuals and tarikat leaders of the 1950s who rejected the westernization program and secular reforms of Atatürk. Instead, they believed that what Turkey needed was a return to traditional Islamic values, a pivot toward the Islamic world, and the reinsertion of şeriat law. Regarding the Israeli issue, Erbakan and his movement were anything but pro-Israel, as it held highly negative views of the Jewish state and the Jewish people at large, who in there view were conspiring on a world-wide level to maintain Israel’s occupation of Jerusalem and the Palestinian people. As we shall see in more detail later, such views have ultimately had a tremendous impact on Turkish-Israeli relations given the various positions of power that the Islamists have been in through the years.

Coming from an entirely different intellectual pedigree, the ethnic Nationalist/Pan-Turkic right has its roots in the Turkish nationalism and Pan-Turkist ideology that had been growing in popularity in the latter years of the Ottoman Empire. From the party’s founding to the 1990s the MHP’s relationship with Islam

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61 Both the MHP and the successor party to the MNP, the Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP), were prominent members of both of the so-called Milliyetiçi Cephe Hükümetleri of the 1970s, while the MHP is currently in a “People’s Alliance” with the ruling AKP. For information on the Milliyetiçi Hükümetleri, see “Milliyetiçi Cephe Nedir? Kısaca Milliyetiçi Cephe Hükümetleri Dönemi,” Tarihbilgisi.org, accessed May 25, 2020, https://tarihbilgisi.org/milliyetici-cephe/. For more on the “People’s Alliance,” see for instance, Ayşe Sayın, “Yerel Seçim: AKP ve MHP Neden İttifakı Genişletti, Akşener’in Yorumu Ne Oldu?,” BBCNews Türkçe, February 14, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-47230847.

62 For more on the AKP, see Waldman and Caliskan, The New Turkey and Its Discontents, 49-82.

63 For more on one of these prominent thinkers, see Çağaptay, Erdoğan’s Empire, 34-35.

64 Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, 176-177.

65 Çağaptay, Erdoğan’s Empire, 31-35.

66 While it was rarely explicitly mentioned, it was widely believed by the public that Erbakan and his supporters wished to see a return to Islamic law. For more on the thinking of Turkey’s Islamists, see Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, 175-206.


68 For more on the origins of Turkish nationalism and Pan-Turkism, see Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation (London: Hurst and Company, 1995), 29-56.
was therefore primarily thematic as the party always remained devoted to a secular state.

As a secular party of Turkish nationalism, the MHP therefore seems to have had relatively little, if any, interest in the Palestinian issue during the Cold War, as the party’s Islamic themes did not transgress Turkey’s borders and translate into an open affinity with the Palestinian Arabs. Add to that the aforementioned connections between the PLO and Turkish leftists during the 1970s and there seems to have been little sympathy for the Palestinians within the MHP at the time. As we shall later, this gap between the MHP and the Palestinians allowed room for more pro-Israeli feelings to develop later on in the 1990s, helping smooth the way for relations to develop in that decade. When that gap began to close later on, however, the domestic dynamics of Turkish foreign policy toward Israel, as we shall also see, began to change, making it easier for the AKP to carry out its desired policy toward Israel.

1.6. Guardians of the Republic: The Role of the Turkish Military in Politics

With a basic understanding of Turkish domestic politics from 1949-2010 now in place, we can begin to examine the role of the military within Turkish society, the understanding of which will become critical when we dissect the nature of foreign policy decision making toward Israel and its domestic legitimation in the years immediately after the end of the Cold War. The events of that time period and the military’s significance in influencing them will be detailed in the chapter covering the time period from 1990-2002 and thus will not need to be completely outlined here, what we will need to understand at this point, however, is how the military’s historical role within the republic prepared it to have such influence in foreign policy decision making.

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71 Muradoğlu, “İzdüşüm-19.2.2006.”
72 Bengio, *The Turkish-Israeli Relationship*, 77 and 203.
Given the military’s critical role in saving the country during the Turkish War of Independence the officer corps of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) began to see itself as the guardian of the country and the Kemalist tradition given Atatürk’s heroic efforts during that conflict as an officer himself. Just what exactly the ideology of Atatürk, or Kemalism, is or means in the contemporary world is of course subject to debate, but in the case of the Turkish officer corps it generally meant the protection of secularism and the Atatürk’s westernization project.

Following the coup d’état of 1960 and the toppling of the Menderes government, the military established a body, the Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (MGK), through which the general staff of the armed forces could nominally advise the prime minister and his cabinet on matters of national security, but which in reality could be used to pressure the civilian government into adopting policies that it saw fit. In following years the military went about it pressuring the government to enact laws ensuring its political, legal, and financial autonomy, making it in effect an autonomous institution overseeing the civilian government. On two occasions after 1960 the military was able to utilize this institutional power to pressure a government to resign (1971 and 1997), where on another it seized control of the state outright (1980). The only one of these coups that shall directly concern us in the course of this work will be the “post-modern coup” of 1997, as this event coincided with the military’s push toward establishing a significant relationship with Israel in the second half of the 1990s. And the understanding of this coup would next to incomprehensible without the understanding of the military’s sense of mission, ideological disposition, and accumulated power described above.

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74 For more on the mentality of the officer corps, see Gareth Jenkins, “Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), vol. 83, no.2 (March 2007): 340-341.
75 For more on the Turkish officer corps and its outlook on Kemalism, see Mehmet Ali Birand, Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces (London: I.B. Taurus, 1991), 52-67.
77 Quoted in Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 301.
78 Yavuz, “Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate,” 22-37.
On that note, it needs to be acknowledged that the events surrounding the 1997 coup and the military’s role in formulating a relationship with Israel at the time represents probably the one weakness that Neoclassical Realism exhibits while being utilized to examine Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel. As we shall be described in more detail in the following chapter, Neoclassical Realism perceives the FPE as a “unified central decision maker (author’s emphasis).” That is to say that it is not a divisible body, and since foreign policy is ultimately decided through that node, foreign policy decision making itself is indivisible. The problem in our case arises when we consider that much of the Turkish-Israeli relationship in the second half of the 1990s was being directed from the Turkish end by the TAF, which was negotiating military agreements with the Israelis and then coercing the civilian government to sign them despite its ideological opposition. The reality therefore was that two different entities within the Turkish state were attempting to conduct foreign policy, but since such a situation is theoretically impermissible in Neoclassical Realism we are forced to choose either the military or the civilian government. With that in mind, the author of this work will address the foreign policy of that time period as being decided by the military. While in the real, non-theoretical world such a decision would fairly be labeled absurd, perhaps even schizophrenic, in the context of Neoclassical Realism the author came to this decision based on the fact that civilian government ultimately acquiesced to the military’s demands and was eventually pushed from power, showing us that more ‘power,’ however it be defined, rested within the hands of the military and that logically in a world of two choices it, not the civilian government, was the better choice for being placed at the center of Turkish foreign policy decision making. Once again, the author of this work realizes the weakness that this displays for Neoclassical Realism as it relates to our topic. Nevertheless, as the work below attempts to show, Neoclassical Realism is on the whole an adequate theory for examining Turkish foreign policy toward Israel.

With an understanding of the importance of a work covering Turkish foreign toward Israel throughout nearly the entirety of the relationship through the lens of

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79 Lobell, “Threat assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” 56.
80 Yavuz, “Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate,” 28-30.
81 Ibid., 29-32.
Neoclassical Realism, as well as a brief understanding of the relevant historical, geographical, and identity factors, we can now begin to cover the topic of this work more extensively. This chapter will be followed by four other others: the first will provide a more detailed overview of Neoclassical Realism and its usefulness for examining the topic of this work; the second will cover Turkish foreign policy toward Israel during the Cold War from the time of Turkey’s recognition of Israel in 1949 to the fall of the Eastern Bloc in 1989; the following chapter will examine the era of unipolarity from 1990-2002, with a particular emphasis on the late 1990s when Turkish-Israeli relations are widely believed to have been at their apex; the third chapter will cover the rise of multipolarity in the international realm, as well as of the AKP in the Turkish domestic scene from 2003-2010; the final chapter will be the conclusion where a synopsis of our topic and the conclusions that this author has reached will be provided.

CHAPTER 2

UNDERSTANDING NEOCLASSICAL REALISM

Before we begin our analysis of Turkish foreign policy toward Israel we must of course begin to understand what exactly Neoclassical Realism is and what it entails. In order to do that, however, we need to comprehend its theoretical predecessors, Classical and Neorealism, both of which have had a profound influence on Neo classical Realism and have essentially been synthesized with one another by the Neoclassical Realists in order to develop a theory addressing their respective shortcomings. Classical Realism of course is not so much an actual theory as it is a general philosophical outlook on international relations which posits that human nature is immutably self-centered and that in the absence of any form of world government individuals must form collective units in order to maintain order and fulfill their interests in a world of material scarcity. In the modern world these collective units have of course been known as Westphalian states, and continue, from the realist point of view at least, to be the main actors with the international arena. Such a tradition has obviously developed a wide following including, but not limited to, philosophers and academics such as Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Thucydides, Hans Morgenthau, and Henry Kissinger.\(^3\)

Despite such a pedigree, however, Classical Realism has its epistemological shortcomings according to the modern-day social scientist, as it provides no truly testable model from which political scientists can verify their claims.\(^4\) If one were to read Henry Kissinger’s *Diplomacy* or *A World Restored*, for instance, they would not

\(^{3}\) Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman, “Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy,” in *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 14-16.

\(^{4}\) Ibid., 4.

\(^{5}\) Ibid., 14.
find works concerned with pseudo-scientific inquiry attempting to reduce human nature to a set of verifiable equations, but rather ones attempting to inductively identify broad axioms of international relations and foreign policy through historical analysis.  

The answer to these shortcomings came in 1979 with Kenneth Waltz’s groundbreaking work, *Theory of International Politics*. In this work, Walt outlined the principles of what would become known as Neo or Structural Realism. As these labels suggest, this new theory of international relations took several of Classical Realism’s principles, namely its pessimistic view of human nature and its emphasis on the state as the main actor in an anarchical international society, and incorporated them into a structuralist approach to international politics whereby deductive logic would enable the theory to be tested. To be more specific, Waltz and his fellow Neorealists developed a deductive theory centered around two main principles: first, in the absence of any world-wide government, the international realm is inherently anarchical; second, in such an anarchical realm, states can only rely upon themselves for their own security. In such a world, Neorealists argue, the structure invariably conditions and shapes the behavior of states to the degree that the latter becomes nearly universal with little, if any, variation from one state to another. The only real variable in this system, is the structure of power itself and the number of powers within the system, i.e., is the international system, unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar? In a fashion somewhat similar to their Classical predecessors, Neorealists at the end of the day conclude that states ultimately adapt to the system by forming a balance of power amongst themselves, as there is no other sure way of guaranteeing their security in an anarchical system.

Despite being the predominant Realist theory for a number of years, Neorealism and its parsimonious

s and reductive approach, naturally began to generate its fair share of critics in the world of Realism. By “blackboxing” states, and reducing them to mindless,

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87 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 144.


89 This is the term often used to describe Neorealism’s treatment of every state in the same light and failure to take domestic issues into account when considering a state’s foreign policy. See Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman, “Introduction,” 16-18.
senseless, units floating in the sea that is international anarchy, Neorealists, according to their detractors, were neglecting a key variable in the international system. How, for instance, could Neorealists explain variations in a particular state’s foreign policy over the course of time in the absence of any structural changes? How could different states choose to react differently to the same structural scenario if the structure is ultimately what shapes and determines a state’s behavior? To use a contemporary example, how could we explain the difference in US foreign policy toward Iran between the Trump and Obama administrations if the degree of threat emanating from the latter has not changed? Did the international structure change so drastically between the night of January 19 and the afternoon of January 20, 2017 when President Trump took his oath of office that the attempts of his predecessor at some form of rapprochement had to be completely supplanted by a more hostile policy?

Questions such as these, some scholars argued, could only be answered if the severe structural approach was dropped and the individual behavior of states and their particularities were considered once again as they had been under the Classical Realism. At the same, however, these same scholars who had been advocating an alteration to Structural Realism also held on to the belief that Realism needed to maintain the latter’s adherence to a ‘scientific’ approach to explaining International Relations. In time, the scholars pushing for such change developed what is in essence a synthesis between Classical and Neorealism, and thus what we call “Neoclassical Realism.”

Like their Neorealist counterparts, Neoclassical Realists take a so-called “top-down” approach to the international system whereby a state’s “relative material power” (my emphasis) within the international structure is seen as the main independent variable within the foreign policy equation. The reason for this, in the

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90 Ibid., 21.
91 For more on the difference between the administrations’ different approaches to the Iran issue, see Ilan Goldenberg and Kaleigh Thomas, “Trump’s Iran Policy is a Failure: Blame U.S. Blunders for the Worsening Crisis in the Region,” Foreign Policy, September 25, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/25/trumps-iran-policy-is-a-failure/.
93 Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman, “Introduction,” 19 and Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 144-146.
words of Gideon Rose—the scholar to coin the term “Neoclassical Realism”—is that “over the long a state’s foreign policy cannot transcend the limits and opportunities thrown up by the international environment.” That is to say that a state is constrained by the material world at hand in relation to the international structure. This distinction is key, as it clearly places Neoclassical Realism in the Realist camp with its emphasis on material power, yet also demonstrates its proximity to Neorealism due to the importance of the international structure.\(^95\)

On that note, however, Neoclassical Realism differs sharply with Neorealism due to its acknowledgement of several “intervening variables” at the domestic or the state level. These shall be examined in further detail below, but in the big scheme of things, these revolve around any particular state’s perception of the international system, as well as its ability to muster the requisite resources of the nation at large in order to respond to the structural issues at hand,\(^96\) which often involves, in typical Realist thought, the need to balance a potential adversary.\(^97\) In this regard, Neoclassical Realists retain a certain similarity with their Classical predecessors, who also concerned themselves with the state and its internal factors.\(^98\)

Sitting at the critical juncture of the structural and the domestic is what the Neoclassical Realist Steven E. Lobell calls the FPE.\(^99\) This unit is not only responsible for assessing the international structure and its state’s position within it, but also for forming and maintaining a social coalition at the domestic level among any relevant or significantly interested social actor, including, but not necessarily limited to things like governmental bureaucracy, military and security forces, economic segments such as industry, agriculture, finance, and finally, interest groups. The FPE, in other words, is the element of the state that is responsible for gauging its position within the realm of international politics, calculating the best response and managing any element within society that may be relevant for carrying out that foreign policy behavior.\(^100\)

On a theoretical level, the presence of the FPE within Neoclassical Realism has two significant implications. First and foremost, by acknowledging an actor that is

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\(^95\) Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 150-151.

\(^96\) Ibid., 157-162.

\(^97\) Lobell, “Threat assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” 62-73.

\(^98\) Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman, “Introduction,” 19.

\(^99\) Lobell, “Threat assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” 43.

\(^100\) Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman, “Introduction,” 33.
responsibility for assessing the structure and responding accordingly, Neorealism allows for the presence of perception, or how the world may seem to be appear from the standpoint of any given FPE. This is obviously critical for allowing us to understand not only a state’s foreign policy behavior, but also any variation within it in the absence of any significant structural changes. This of course also marks a huge leap forward from Neorealism, which holds that the relationship between the international structure and the units within it is determined by what Robert O. Keohane has labelled the “rationality assumption,” or the belief that states will naturally respond in a rational manner to the matters at hand within the structure. This, Keohane continues, allows Neorealists to hold a circularity in logic as it “permits one to attribute variations in state behavior to various characteristics of the international system.” But by allowing room for the consideration of a FPE’s perception of the structure, Neoclassical Realism allows us to do away with the aforementioned ‘black box’ of Neorealism and help us better understand the ways in which states decide their foreign policy.101 This will be, as we shall see later, particularly relevant for our assessment of Turkish foreign policy toward Israel.

The second implication is that by placing the FPE as the center of foreign policy decision making, Neoclassical Realism is distinguishing itself from Innenpolitik theories of International Relations, which not only fail to adequately take the international system into full account,102 but actually believe a country’s relationship with the outside world can take place outside of the realm of the state, such as in most international commerce. They might argue, for instance, that many of the previously-mentioned non-governmental segments of society such as industry, agriculture, and domestic interest groups may well have substantial international relationships of their own, and are thus determining their state’s relationship with the rest of the world. Neoclassical Realists reject this position, however, and argue that the FPE of any state, despite needing to take domestic factors into account and even compromise with various components at times, is ultimately the final arbiter, decider, and executor of foreign policy. By making such an argument, Neoclassical Realists are ultimately sealing the ring that is the state around the realm of foreign policy.

101 Quoted in Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 158. All other information about the role of perception in Neoclassical Realism also taken from Rose., 157-158.

102 Ibid., 151.
2.1. Neoclassical Realism: The Foreign Policy Executive and Domestic Factors

By taking the FPE and various domestic factors into consideration for an analysis of a state’s foreign policy, Neoclassical Realists are effectively prying open the black box that Neorealists prefer to keep shut. While this of course allows us to more carefully analyze just how states perceive the international structure and ultimately decide how to react to it, it does raise questions as to just what exactly are these domestic variables and how they can effect a state’s behavior in the world. Before we go any further then, a more thorough analysis of the state and nation through the lens of Neoclassical Realism is in order.

Let us begin then with the FPE, which as previously mentioned, lays at the juncture between the international structure and a state’s domestic politics and is, moreover, according to Neoclassical Realists, usually one and the same with a state’s domestic executive. As such an arbiter of power within the state that acts, in the words of Steven E. Lobell, as a “unified central decision-maker…posses[ing] private information and a monopoly on intelligence about foreign countries,” Neoclassical Realists generally “assume the FPE is primarily committed to advancing the security or power of the entire nation.” Corollary to this, the FPE, is the body ultimately responsible for assessing the international structure, devising a grand strategy to secure its state’s safety within it, and mustering the necessary resources from the nation at large to operationalize that strategy as best as possible. While the ideal course of action may not always be feasible to due the autonomy of various domestic actors and their unwillingness to throw their weight behind a foreign policy initiative, it is nonetheless the responsibility of the FPE to do its utter best in forming a domestic coalition at home to seek security in the world.103

Because of this responsibility of this position, as well as the power that accompanies it given its positioning between the international and domestic realms, it is important to keep in mind, as Lobell shows, that the FPE can make foreign policy decisions for domestic purposes or vice versa.104 A prime example of this in the context of Turkish-Israeli relations would be Turkish chief of staff Ismail Karadayi’s visit to

103 Lobell, “Threat assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” 56-73.
104 Ibid., 43-44.
Israel for three days in February 1997. The visit, which had not been previously announced or cleared with the prime minister’s office, was largely interpreted at the time as a signal from the military to prime minister Necmettin Erbakan’s government that that the military would continue to conduct foreign policy as it saw fit, and that the civilian authorities would be powerless to stop it.\textsuperscript{105} On the inverse side of that slope, however, we can probably assume that at least on some level Karadayı and the military were also trying to send the message to the Israeli government that they were not going anywhere, and that the latter could continue to trust Turkey despite the presence of an Islamist government in Çankaya.

Of course, if the FPE in the Neoclassical Realist model is indeed responding to the threats of the international system, forming domestic coalitions to help counter them, and potentially acting in both the domestic and international realms, we have to ask ourselves just what kind of threats states face in the Neoclassical Realist model? In other words, what are they, and where do they come from, and how are they defined? Like their Neorealist cousins, Neoclassical Realists first and foremost look to the international structure and hold that states face their most dire threats from other states. As a result, they must react accordingly and decide to balance against a state whose power threatens the hegemony of all other states, bandwagon with it, or find some other course of action in order to ensure their own survival.

Below the main structural level, however, states may face threats from what Lobell labels the “subsystemic,” or regional level. This of course only relevant to states considerably a part of a region, such as the Middle East, with its own internal international dynamics and issues. Still, below that, Neorealists assert, states can even face existential threats on the domestic level. Since there is no logical demand that these threats must come about one at a time, a state can therefore face existential threats on three levels at once and determine the best response accordingly.\textsuperscript{106}

Turkey once again provides us with an excellent example of a state facing threats in the structural, regional, and domestic levels. During the Cold War and the bipolar structure situated around the US and Soviet Union, Turkey was forced to align itself with the Western camp in order to counterbalance the threat emanating from Moscow and its allies in the Eastern Bloc. Had it not done so, the logic of the time

\textsuperscript{105} Yavuz, “Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate,” 30.

\textsuperscript{106} Lobell, “Threat assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” 47-54.
argued, Ankara would have faced a grave threat from its militarily-powerful eastern neighbor as it had ever since the eighteenth century. At the same time, however, as a member of NATO and ally of the US Turkey was often at odds with Soviet allies in the region, namely Syria, but also Egypt and Iraq. Much of this was due to the Cold War of course, but at the same too, however, the heavy presence of Arab nationalism in the 1950s was far from a welcomed development given Turkey’s presence in the region as a non-Arab state. Finally, on the domestic level, beginning in the late 1960s and lasting up until the 1980 military intervention, Turkey was nearly torn apart by street fighting between the far-right and radical leftist groups. The situation was so severe that there was genuine fear that the country would descend into civil war and ultimately led to military interventions in both 1971 and 1980.

All of this begs the question, however, as to what exactly constitutes a threat, or at the very least, what is a FPE of any state likely to consider a threat outside of states that clearly pose a material threat to the balance of power or domestic-level actors that threaten to overthrow the government? According to Lobell, when assessing the international or regional systems, a state may “define threats based on specific components of a foreign state’s power.” These “components,” he argues, “might include shifts in territory, population, ideology, industry, land-based military, or naval and air power.” In other words, a state does not necessarily have to consider another state’s “aggregate power” alone, but specific elements of that power. An example of this, he claims, was Britain’s distinguishing of Imperial Germany’s land and naval forces in the years leading up to WWI. The former, he asserts, was seen by London as the real problem given its ability to threaten the balance of power on the continent, while the latter was seen as more of a nuisance to its empire than an existential threat.

Whatever one might think of this particular example, there can be no doubt that by taking into consideration elements of a state’s power as opposed to simply its total power, Neoclassical Realism moves behind the rigid limitations of Neorealism and provides us with a greater degree of flexibility in interpreting a state’s foreign policy and thus understanding any variation and change which may occur in a state’s

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107 Çağaptay, Erdoğan’s Empire, 137-139.
108 Pelt, Military Intervention and a Crisis of Democracy in Turkey, 113-149.
international behavior.\textsuperscript{110} How, for instance, could we explain the almost overnight shift in American foreign policy toward Iran following the revolution of 1979 if we did not take account the fact that the latter brought a government into power which was nothing if not ideologically opposed to the US?\textsuperscript{111} How could we understand fear in Washington over North Korea, whose economy continues to be one of the worst in the world and has seemingly accumulated little, if any, additional aggregate power in the past decade outside of its nuclear program?\textsuperscript{112} Examples such as these prove just how essential the consideration of the individual elements of a state’s power truly is for understanding its foreign policy and how other states may perceive it as a threat.

Once an FPE identifies a threat a new chapter begins in the mind of Neoclassical Realists as the former must often discover a way to mobilize the necessary domestic resources in order to pursue the proper course of action. Such mobilization is of course essential as no course of foreign policy action is worth more than the material and moral resources behind it.\textsuperscript{113} A classic example of this would of course be the US’s mobilization of its extensive industrial capacity, manpower resources, and public opinion in its effort to defeat Germany and Japan in the Second World War. Had any of these three components of US power been absent, it is of course highly unlikely that it would have been able to enter the war in the first place, let alone actually win it.\textsuperscript{114}

Of course, as theorists predominately concerned with foreign policy, Neoclassical realists naturally acknowledge that states vary in their ability to mobilize such domestic resources as each state is inherently unique and must deal with its own particular sets of domestic issues in calculating and executing its foreign policy.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{110} Lobell, “Threat assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” 54-56.


\textsuperscript{113} Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman, “Introduction,” 7. For more on this concept of resource extraction see Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Neoclassical Realism and Resource Extraction: State building for Future War,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 226.

\textsuperscript{114} Author’s personal assessment.

\textsuperscript{115} See for instance, Mark R. Brawley, “Neoclassical Realism and Strategic Calculations: Explaining Divergent British, French, and Soviet Strategies toward Germany between the World Wars (1919-1939) in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 75-98.
naturally follows then that some states will be more effective than others at mobilizing the requisite domestic resources for its foreign policy. Japan and China, for instance, differed from one another in their ability to consolidate themselves domestically in order to face the growing threat of Western Imperialism, thus explaining while the former was ultimately more successful than the latter despite its smaller size and population.¹¹⁶

Due to this variation, Neoclassical Realists admit that the domestic side of a state’s foreign policy and the study thereof are in essence “imperfect transmission belt[s]” incapable of being reduced to a truly set model. On a theoretical level, what this ultimately means is that each state has to be looked at individually in order to identify the relevant domestic factors and calculate their impact.¹¹⁷ That said, however, Neoclassical Realists seem to agree that on a broad level domestic institutions such as industry, the military, state bureaucracy, and any group, ethnicity, or institution that may be affected by a foreign policy decision.¹¹⁸ Moreover, there also seems to be consensus that on some level public opinion is indeed relevant.¹¹⁹ This is particularly the case, as Jeffrey W. Taliferro and Randall L. Schweller have shown, when state leaders are able to rally their citizens around a common cause whether it be nationalism, Fascism or some other ideology.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ Benjamin O. Fordham, “The Limits of Neoclassical Realism: Additive and Interactive Approaches to Explaining Foreign Policy Preferences,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 251.
¹²⁰ While Taliferro briefly identifies several occasions throughout history, such as the famous levee en masse during the war of the First Coalition or Soviet ideology during the reign of Stalin, Schweller specifically goes in depth with National Socialism/Fascism in Germany in the 1930s and 1940s. For more on their respective approaches see Taliferro, “Neoclassical Realism and Resource Extraction: State Building for Future War,” 219-222 and Schweller, “Neoclassical realism and state mobilization: expansionist ideology in the age of mass politics, 227-250.
2.2. The Value of Neoclassical Realism in the Examination of Turkish Foreign Policy toward Israel

When we take all of this into consideration, we can readily understand just how useful Neoclassical Realism is for examining Turkish foreign policy toward Israel. First and foremost, by taking the structural level into account in the same way that Neorealism does, Neoclassical Realism allows us to consider just exactly how the international structure has affected Ankara’s foreign policy toward Israel. As we shall see in greater detail below, since Turkey’s recognition of Israel in March 1949\(^{121}\) the world has witnessed what most scholars would agree to as three different international structures. For roughly the first forty years of Turkish-Israeli relations, the international structure was of course marked by the bipolarity of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the US.\(^{122}\) As two allies of the latter, Turkey and Israel were bound to have a positive, or at least not openly hostile relationship. As a country trying to ingratiate itself with the Arab world, however, Turkey was forced to maintain a distant relationship with Israel for much of the Cold War.\(^{123}\)

The end of the Cold War in 1991, however, marked the development of unipolar world dominated by the United States and was something which, as well shall see in greater detail below, was also bound to have an effect on Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel. As two regional outsiders with common enemies uncertain of their future relationship with the US in the absence of the Soviet threat, Turkey and Israel developed a strategic partnership.\(^{124}\)

Finally, the last fifteen years or so have increasingly seen the development of a more multipolar world with the rise of countries such as China and Russia.\(^{125}\) From

\(^{121}\) Patten, *Israel and the Cold War*, 20.


a Turkish foreign policy perspective this has meant that Ankara’s old US ally is no longer the only player in town and that it can just as easily pursue positive relationships with China and Russia when need be. To zero in even further on Turkish foreign policy toward Israel, this has meant that Ankara no longer had a single superpower ally encouraging it to pursue a positive relationship with Israel as it did for much of the 1990s and 2000s. On the contrary, it rather seemed that it had three world-power allies, two of which—Russia and China—seem to have little, if any, interest in pushing Turkey to further develop relations with Israel.

Such structural shifts developments and the changes that they have brought to Turkish-Israeli relations obviously demonstrate just how essential the consideration of the international structure and its influence on the region are, and therefore further indicate the advantage of using Neoclassical Realism to asses the relationship, especially when compared to an Innenpolitik theory such as Neoliberalism. The structure has simply had too much influence on Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel that to set it aside and ignore it would be highly erroneous.

On that same note, however, during its 70-year history with Israel, Turkey has experienced several significant domestic changes that have had at least some influence on its policy toward Israel. The most notable of these of course has been the rise of the Islamist-rooted AKP and the replacement of the secular, Kemalist, and westernphilic military as the chief foreign policy decision-maker with civilian officials largely affiliated with the AKP. Many scholars have of course seen this as a paradigmatic shift given the fact that the latter’s Islamist ideology are nearly, at least on paper, the complete opposite to that of the Kemalist military establishment. And while this viewpoint can be indeed be overstated given the AKP’s, pragmatic, anti-revolutionary

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126 For more detail on Turkey’s growing relationship with China, see Vali Nasr, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat (New York: Anchor Books, 2013), 222-227.


128 Shlomo Brom, “The Israeli-Turkish Relationship,” in Troubled Alliance: The United States, Turkey, and Israel in the New Middle East, ed. William B. Quandt (Charlottesville, VA: Center for International Studies, University of Virginia, 2011), 61.

approach to both domestic and foreign policy,\textsuperscript{130} as Tziarras has shown in his assessment of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP, ideology is by no means irrelevant and dismissable to the discussion of Turkish foreign policy toward Israel.\textsuperscript{131}

With that in mind, it readily becomes apparent that we also have to take domestic factors into consideration while assessing Turkish foreign policy toward Israel. This, once again, demonstrates the usefulness of Neoclassical Realism in doing so, as it not only allows us to examine the international, but also the domestic. Thus, we are ultimately able to ascertain a better understanding of our subject.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 49-62.

\textsuperscript{131} Tziarras, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East under the AKP (2002-2013),” 226.
CHAPTER 3


3.1. Introduction

The Cold War years were undoubtedly a time of numerous positives and negatives in Turkish-Israeli relations. Despite starting off the relationship in a positive fashion by being the first predominately-Muslim country to recognize the Jewish state in March 1949, Turkey began a pattern of behavior that could range from the lukewarm to the frosty. During the best years of its relationship with Israel from roughly 1958-1966, Turkey engaged in bilateral economic projects, as well as intelligence sharing and military cooperation with the Jewish state. The other side of that coin, however, saw Turkey downgrade its diplomatic relations with Israel twice, the first time being in 1956 in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, and the second coming after the latter’s annexation of East Jerusalem in 1980. Moreover, it was during these years that Turkey permitted Israel’s archnemesis, the PLO, to open a delegation in Ankara, and took further steps to support the Arab world in its struggles with Israel, such as the decision to join the Arab states in calling for Israel to withdraw to the pre-war lines in the wake of the Six-Day War, as well its refusal to allow the US to use its military bases on Turkish soil in the effort to resupply Israel during the Yom Kippur War. To add insult to injury, what cooperation Turkey did engage in with Israel, especially from 1958 onward, was done mostly in secret largely to avoid having itself

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133 Bengio, The Turkish-Israeli Relationship, 42-64.
134 Efron, “The Future of Israeli-Turkish Relations,” 5-6. For greater detail on Turkish relations with the PLO and the Arab world during this period, see Mahmut Bali Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 25, no.1 (February 1993): 91-110.
condemned within the Arab world, which it was connected to via the Baghdad Pact, a loose anti-Soviet alliance situated on the ‘Northern Tier’ of the Middle East with Turkey and Iraq at its core. In order to understand exactly why all of this was the case and whether domestic factors played a factor in determining Turkish foreign policy toward Israel, we can examine these circumstances in greater depth via a Neoclassical Realist prism and understand what, if any, domestic factors played a role in the decision-making process of Turkey’s FPE.

3.2. The International Structure and Regional Subsystem

Let us begin then with the Cold War, its bipolar structure, Turkey’s place within it, and how exactly it may have affected its foreign policy toward Israel. The Cold War was of course the geopolitical, ideological, and economic struggle between the US and Soviet Union that developed in the aftermath of World War II and which came to divide nearly the entire world into two camps. Turkey was of course no exception in this regard. Shortly after the defeat of the Third Reich, Soviet diplomats began notifying their Turkish counterparts that any renewal of their Treaty of Friendship would be contingent upon the acquisition of the provinces of Kars and Ardahan in Turkey’s east, as well as the development of a new system for the management of the Bosporus and Dardanelle Straits that would include Soviet military base rights. Such demands naturally alarmed policymakers in both Washington and Ankara and with a common adversary and a mutual interest in precluding Soviet expansionism, the US and Turkey formed a tacit alliance in 1947 and formalized just five years later and after Turkey’s considerable contribution of manpower Turkey was admitted into NATO. Over the next forty years, Turkey, despite some fluctuation in its Cold War foreign policy and various points of contention in its relationship with

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139 Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 36-37.
the US, would remain a member of NATO and a dedicated American ally in its struggle against the Soviet Union.140

In terms of its immediate, direct impact on Turkish foreign policy toward Israel, the relationship between Ankara and Washington in a bipolar world seems to have made its mark in the initial years of Turkish-Israeli relations. If nothing else, Turkey’s decision to recognize Israel despite of fierce Arab opposition was almost certainly related to Turkey’s desire to curry favor with the US in the early years of the Cold War.141 Ironically enough, Ankara’s initial refusal to recognize Israel stemmed from the belief that the socialist government of the Jewish state would ultimately lead it to fall into the Soviet orbit,142 indicating just how much its anti-Soviet perspective dominated its thinking.

Even more important than the Cold War’s direct impact on Turkish policy toward Israel, however, was the indirect impact it had via the international politics of the Middle East. This oil-rich region was of course no exception in the world in terms of being sucked into the Cold War and the bipolar international structure that it created, and Turkey as a member of the Western alliance was to play an extremely significant role in the early years of the conflict as America’s main ally in the region. Few countries, if any, approached its role as ally of the US with more alacrity than did Turkey from the early years of the Cold War until 1964. During these years Turkey became America’s most stalwart ally in attempting to prevent the Soviet Union from penetrating the region any further than it already had through its alliances with the Arab nationalist regimes in Egypt and Syria.

It was in this role that Turkey nearly went to war with Syria in 1957 when it was believed that the latter may have become communist and fallen too much under the persuasion of Moscow.143 It was also in this role that it seems to have considered taking military action against Iraq in the aftermath of the July 14, 1958 coup that toppled the pro-western monarchy and installed an Arab-nationalist and Soviet-

140 Ibid., 46-73.
141 Ibid., 42-43 and Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, 75.
142 Bolukbasi, “Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View,” 22.
143 For an excellent in-depth summary of Turkey’s foreign policy and its role as the US’s main ally in the region during this period, see Pelt, Military Intervention and a Crisis of Democracy in Turkey, 113-159.
friendly regime in its stead. Most importantly, however, it was in this role that Turkey under the leadership of Adnan Menderes took exceptional pains in establishing the Baghdad Pact along with Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Great Britain in 1955 to act as an anti-Soviet bulwark in the region and hopefully function as the region’s version of NATO.

Like all things in life, however, this role as the American vanguard of the region came at a cost, and in this case that fee was Turkey’s open relations with Israel. As a non-Arab country attempting to garner legitimacy amongst Arab countries and effectively rally them to the anti-Soviet cause, the Turkish foreign policy establishment came to realize that it would have to keep Israel at a distance so as not to offend Arab sensibilities toward the Jewish state, which of course at this time were marked by an inveterate hatred.

It was for this reason that Turkey began to voice more support for the Arab states regarding their conflict with Israel at the United Nations, the most significant and symbolic instance probably being its vote of approval as an elected member of the Security Council in 1955 for UNSC Resolution 106, which condemned Jerusalem for the February 28 raid on Gaza that resulted in the death of nearly 40 Egyptian military personnel. Even more significant than this, however, was Ankara’s decision to recall its ambassador to Tel Aviv and ultimately downgrade relations from the ambassadorial level to that of charge d’affaires in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis in 1956. During the course of that event Nasser was extremely critical of the Baghdad Pact states, particularly Iraq and Turkey, accusing them of being allied with the French, British, and Israelis in their attack on Egypt due to Ankara’s relations with Israel. In an effort therefore to shield itself and other fellow members of the Baghdad Pact from further criticism in the Arab world, Turkey made the decision to withdrawal its ambassador from Israel and downgrade relations overall despite pleas from the

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144 Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East*, 26-27.
145 For more on Turkey’s efforts in the formation of the Baghdad Pact, see Sanjian, “The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact,” 226-266.
146 Patten, *Israel and the Cold War*, 26.
147 Ibid., 11.
148 Ibid., 82.
150 Patten, *Israel and the Cold War*, 82.
Israelis not to do so.\textsuperscript{151} Not helping matters of course was Washington’s vehement condemnation of Britain, France, and Israel in light of its attack on Egypt, something of which seems to have spurred Turkey that much more into taking the action that it did.\textsuperscript{152}

But if Arab nationalism was pushing Turkey and Israel farther apart, it was also, quite ironically, also bringing them together. As two non-Arab states within the Middle East, Turkey and Israel both had an interest in containing Arab nationalism and its Soviet backers. While inviting Israel to ascend to the Baghdad Pact was obviously out of the question, in August 1958 Turkish Menderes decided to pursue a covert alliance with the Jewish state following the coup in Iraq in July of that year and the death of his co-architect of the Baghdad Pact, Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Said. In al-Said’s place came a regime that seemed to have Arab nationalist inclinations and at the very least was questionable in its commitment toward the pact in the eyes of Turkey. Adding further fuel to fire of course had been the union of Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic just five months before, bringing Nasser’s footprint right up to Turkey’s doorstep in the south. Taken together, these two developments seemed to have convinced Menderes to accept an offer from David Ben-Gurion to establish a secret “Peripheral Pact” aimed at the containment of Nasser and the forces of Arab nationalism.

While the specific tenets of the pact are murky due to the classification of the documents pertaining to it in both in Turkey and Israel, what definitely seems certain is that the two countries agreed to share intelligence pertaining to the Arab states and the Soviet Union. Moreover, according to several sources interviewed by one of the top scholars on Turkish-Israeli relations, Ofra Bengio, the two sides also opted to launch a military relationship which included, among other things, further intelligence sharing, the selling of military equipment from Israel to Turkey, the training of Turkish soldiers in areas where Israelis were deemed to be more advanced, the ability for Israeli pilots to train in Turkish airspace, and most importantly, a contingency plan for joint military action against Syria should war break out. This latter element seems to have been planned quite extensively, with roles pre-planned for the army, air, and even naval forces. In addition to all of this, it also seems that part of this agreement called

\textsuperscript{151} Almog and Sever, “Hide and seek? Israeli-Turkish relations and the Baghdad Pact,” 618.
\textsuperscript{152} Patten, \textit{Israel and the Cold War}, 83.
for Turkey to further develop its economic relationship with Israel, namely in receiving assistance in the development of its agriculture sector and water systems, fields of which the Israelis were known to be particularly advanced in. By engaging in such an agreement with Israel, Turkey was effectively circling the strategic square that it was facing in the region; by cooperating with Israel on the intelligence and military fronts, Turkey was gaining a valuable ally in the struggle against communism and Arab nationalism; but by keeping it secret and out of the public eye, Turkey was obviously shielding itself from the vitriol of pro-Nasser and Soviet Arab states. Like a convergent plate boundary whereby the oceanic crust collides with that of the continental and slides underneath it, Turkey came together with Israel, it just had to slide underneath the surface to do so.

Unfortunately for Israel, however, the bond that developed between the latter two countries was not bound to last. In 1964 a watershed moment in Turkish foreign policy took place. In June of that year, American President Lyndon Johnson wrote a damming letter to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü explaining that NATO would not be obligated to come to Turkey’s aid in the event that it was attacked by the Soviet Union for taking unilateral action in order to protect the Turkish Cypriot population, which was under threat from its Greek neighbors. To say that this so-called “Johnson Letter” piqued the Turkish people’s pride would be a severe understatement. The letter, in the words of İnönü in his response to Johnson, “in both wording in content, [had] been disappointing for an ally like Turkey who has always been giving the most serious attention to its relationship with the United States,” and sparked deep outrage amongst the Turkish public, even sparking a ten-thousand strong protest at Istanbul University. Even more importantly, the Johnson Letter prompted the Turkish government to reevaluate its relationship with the United States in light of the widespread feeling that it was no longer a reliable ally.

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154 Bengio, *The Turkish-Israeli Relationship*, 54-56.

155 For a full text of the “Johnson Letter” and the Turkish Prime Minister’s response, see Lyndon B. Johnson and İsmet İnönü, “President Johnson and Prime Minister İnönü: Correspondence between President Johnson and Prime Minister İnönü, June 1964, as Released by the White House, January 15, 1966,” *Middle East Journal*, vol. 20, no. 3 (Summer 1966): 388.

After some brief reflection, the Turkish government ultimately decided that it would pursue a new course in its relations toward the United States and the Middle East. This new policy was officially announced by a high-ranking official in the Ministry of Foreign affairs in a 1965 issue of the ministry’s news organ. In the article the author, Hamit Batu, explained that while Turkey still considered the Soviet Union to be a threat and would thus not neglect its commitments to NATO, it would ultimately pursue a different course in the Middle East whereby it would step back from the hostilities of the Cold War and attempt to develop better relations with the Arab states. In other words, Ankara would no longer be the arm of the US within the region and would refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of its southern neighbors and from taking sides in regional disputes. Instead, it would seek to engage the Arab states on a bilateral level and avoid any entanglement in regional disputes as much as possible. Turkey would in effect become a Non-Aligned member in the Middle East all while remaining apart of the Western alliance in the Cold War.

Naturally, this friendly pivot to the Arab World left Israel out in the cold as Ankara could not very well pursue an entirely meaningful relationship with both. In 1966, two years after Turkey’s critical pivot, the former terminated its covert military and intelligence relationship with Jerusalem, and over the next 25 years Turkey kept Israel at arm’s length and began to publicly support Arab causes on an even greater level than it had before. This especially became the case after the 1973 oil embargo, which severely hurt the Turkish economy and prompted Ankara to develop even better relations in the hope that it would be able to purchase oil from the Gulf states at a reduced price. Evidence of all this came with Turkey’s aforementioned policies

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157 Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s,” 94.
158 Ibid., 108.
159 Ibid., 94-95.
160 Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, 65-66.
161 Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 94-95.
162 Bengio, The Turkish-Israeli Relationship, 64.
163 Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 95-102 and Patten, Israel and the Cold War, 91-110.
164 Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 97 and Patten, Israel and the Cold War, 98-99.
during the 1967\textsuperscript{165} and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars,\textsuperscript{166} its support for UNGA Resolution 3379 in 1975,\textsuperscript{167} which “condemned Zionism as a threat to world peace and security” and labeled it “a form of racism and racial discrimination,”\textsuperscript{168} and its decision to open a PLO delegation the level of \textit{charge d’affaires} in 1979.\textsuperscript{169}

Probably the best example of Turkey keeping Israel at a distance so that it could ingratiate itself with the Arab world, however, came in late 1980 when it announced its intention to downgrade its relations with the Jewish state following the adoption of the “Jerusalem Law” in August of that year.\textsuperscript{170} The purpose of the law was to underscore Israel’s hold on East Jerusalem\textsuperscript{171} by declaring it the “complete and united…capital of Israel.”\textsuperscript{172} By doing that, however, Israel stirred outrage in the Arab world, and Turkey was happy to chime in with Demirel and Turkish representatives at the UN unequivocally censuring Jerusalem. While some of the harsh responses may have come from a genuine sympathy for the Palestinians, much of the Turkish thinking indubitably came from the dire economic situation that the country found itself in as a result of high petroleum prices. By 1980 Turkey’s expenditures on petroleum imports outstripped its total earnings from its exports by over $1billion. Ankara’s strategy therefore was to increase its exports to the Middle East and further close the daylight between itself and the Arab world. One way of achieving that was to align itself with the Arabs on the Jerusalem issue and send an emphatic message that it was opposed to Israel’s recent legislation.\textsuperscript{173} In the same month of its passage Demirel announced that Turkey was to going close its Jerusalem consulate,\textsuperscript{174} and the following December the military junta used its place at the Islamic Conference in Saudi Arabia that it would

\textsuperscript{165} Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 95.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., 98.
\textsuperscript{167} Patten, \textit{Israel and the Cold War}, 101.
\textsuperscript{169} Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 99-100.
\textsuperscript{170} Patten, \textit{Israel and the Cold War}, 104.
\textsuperscript{171} Tessler, \textit{A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict}, 521.
\textsuperscript{173} Patten, \textit{Israel and the Cold War}, 104-108.
\textsuperscript{174} Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 101.
also be downgrading its relations with Israel\textsuperscript{175} to the level of second secretary.\textsuperscript{176} The decision to make the announcement at such a venue in an oil-producing Arab country should not be lost on us, and apparently the decision paid off, as the Turkish government reportedly made the decision to downgrade relations on the same day that its foreign minister returned home with a $250 million check from the Saudi government.\textsuperscript{177}

Despite all of this, there were in fact limits to Ankara’s support of Arab causes and its condemnation of Israel during this time period. It was always careful, for instance, to avoid supporting any kind of resolution or declaration that ran contrary to Resolution 242, as well expressing support for any declaration that seemed to question Israel’s right to exist. A prime example of the latter point was Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil’s refusal to sign the final communique of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1969 which called for “the full support to the Palestinian people for the restoration of their despoiled rights and in their fight for national liberation.”\textsuperscript{178} Moreover, at that same conference Turkey did not break relations with Israel as it was under pressure to do,\textsuperscript{179} nor did it do so at all during this time period.\textsuperscript{180} In fact, in 1975—the same year that it supported the anti-Zionist resolution in the UN—Turkey even went so far as to discreetly purchase some small arms, anti-tank shells, and air-to-air missile from the Jewish state, indicating that Ankara was in many ways playing a double game by publicly condemning it and then utilizing the relationship at the same time.\textsuperscript{181}

By the mid-1980s Turkey’s relationship with Israel was even beginning to look like it might be on the upswing. At that time, Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal was beginning to see his country as potential powerhouse in the region given its sizable population and rapidly developing economy. Part of being a regional power, he argued, meant being able to play a role as a potential peace broker between Israel and the PLO given its relations with both Western and Middle Eastern countries. In order to do that,

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\textsuperscript{175} Patten, \textit{Israel and the Cold War}, 104.\\
\textsuperscript{176} Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 101.\\
\textsuperscript{177} Patten, \textit{Israel and the Cold War}, 108.\\
\textsuperscript{178} Quoted in Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 95-96.\\
\textsuperscript{179} Patten, \textit{Israel and the Cold War}, 95.\\
\textsuperscript{180} Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 101.\\
\textsuperscript{181} Patten, \textit{Israel and the Cold War}, 101.
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however, he maintained that it was essential to maintain relations with Israel “as a window…on future events.”\textsuperscript{182} To that end, in 1986 Özal appointed Ekrem Güvendiren,\textsuperscript{183} a diplomat of ambassadorial rank, as \textit{charge d’affaires} in Israel, thus signifying that Ankara was willing to turn the page and begin a new chapter in its relationship with Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{184}

3.3. The Domestic Factors and the FPE

Now that we have an understanding of the international factors and the various foreign policy actions that the Turkish FPE took toward Israel during the Cold War, we may begin to examine the domestic factors that went into such policies as well as the makeup of the FPE itself. Regarding the former, we will consider the role of public opinion as it concerns the heavy increase of the role of Islam in Turkish public life during the course of this time period and how it affected various governments attitudes and policy decisions concerning Israel. Regarding the FPE, we will examine several of the governments and the political parties that were responsible for key decisions in Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel. More specifically, we will focus on the Menderes government of the 1950s due to the fact that it was responsible for many of the early policy decisions and the establishment of much the relationship with Israel; Süleyman Demirel and the AP-led governments of the 1960s and 1970s which made several important decisions regarding Israel during their years in power, such as the decisions to discontinue the secret military relationship with Israel,\textsuperscript{185} support the “Zionism is racism,” proposal in the UN,\textsuperscript{186} and the recognition of the PLO in 1976,\textsuperscript{187} respectively; and finally, the third government of Bülent Ecevit and its establishment of a PLO delegation in 1979.\textsuperscript{188}

\textsuperscript{182} Quoted in Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 103.
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., 104.
\textsuperscript{184} Bolukbasi, “Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View,” 30.
\textsuperscript{185} Bengio, \textit{The Turkish Israeli-Relationship}, 64.
\textsuperscript{186} The vote for the resolution took place in November 1975, seven months after Demirel formed the first Milliyetçi Cephe government. For more details on the UN resolution, see Patten, \textit{Israel and the Cold War}, 101. For the timeframe of the Demirel government, see “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetleri.”
\textsuperscript{187} Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 98.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., 99-100.
3.4. The FPE: The Menderes Government

Let us begin then with Menderes and the five governments that he held from his Demokrat Parti’s (DP) victory in the elections of May 1950 to his downfall at the hands of the 1960 military coup almost exactly ten years later.\(^{189}\) During this time period three policy platforms could adequately summarize Menderes and his party’s approach to power: anti-communism,\(^ {190}\) an emphasis on economic growth via more laissez faire policies as compared to the CHP regime,\(^ {191}\) and a greater emphasis on Turkey’s Islamic heritage alongside a liberalization of Atatürk’s laicist policies.\(^ {192}\) All of these platforms, as well shall see, ultimately acted as further incentives for Menderes to develop relations with Israel in the way that he did. The third policy platform, that of religious liberalization, was to have a long-term effect on both Turkish society and Turkish-Israeli relations and will thus be dealt with in a separate section. For the time being then we will focus on Menderes’ anti-communist and economic policies so far as they relate to his government’s decision making toward Israel.

The son of a prominent family in the western province of Aydın and a graduate of the American College of Izmir,\(^ {193}\) Menderes could be labeled nothing if not anti-communist.\(^ {194}\) Anti-communism had of course been on the rise in Turkey ever since the Straits Crisis at the end of WWII, and by the 1950s it had begun to reach a peak as fears of the permeation of atheistic Marxism into Turkish society continued to grow.\(^ {195}\) Menderes himself was undoubtedly both apart of and a driver of this phenomenon. As we have seen of course, this anti-communist sentiment on the part of Menderes was one of, if not the main, reason for his desire to seek a closer relationship with the US and become a member of the Atlantic alliance. It was also the reason of course that he feared the rise of Arab nationalism and attempted to contain it to the best of his

\(^{189}\) “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetleri.”

\(^{190}\) For more on the coup of 1960, see Pelt, Military Intervention and a Crisis of Democracy in Turkey, 187-209.

\(^{191}\) Ibid., 15-16.

\(^{192}\) Ibid., 46-55.

\(^{193}\) Ibid., 12.

\(^{194}\) See for instance his anti-Communist foreign policy in ibid., 113-134.

\(^{195}\) Ibid., 46-53.
country’s abilities. To those ends of course came, as we have seen, Menderes’ decision to openly develop relations with Israel in the early part of the decade\textsuperscript{196} and then pursue a covert relationship from 1958 onward.\textsuperscript{197}

Beyond this anti-communist incentive, Menderes also seems to have had motivation to develop relations with Israel due to his desire to see a more economically-developed Turkey. After assuming the premiership, Menderes set his government on a course to develop the Turkish economy with the help of Marshall Aid funds and more \textit{laissez faire} economic policies.\textsuperscript{198} Much of the focus of this economic development was on the underdeveloped countryside, where roads were paved connecting villages to their urban centers, dams constructed, electrical grids expanded to provide electricity to the villages, and some 40,000 tractors purchased with Marshall Aid funds.\textsuperscript{199} The results were initially impressive: from 1948 to 1956 the number of cultivated hectares of land increased by eight million and the country at large saw its economy grow on an annual average of 11-13 percent.\textsuperscript{200} The success of this economic expansion was also demonstrated by the fact that during the Korean War from 1950-1953 Turkey was ranked fourth in the world in terms of wheat exportation\textsuperscript{201} and that the country benefited significantly from cotton exports during the war.\textsuperscript{202}

Helping in this goal of making Turkey, in the words of President Celal Bayar, “a little America,”\textsuperscript{203} was in fact Israel, who had sent a significant number of agricultural and irrigation experts to the country in order to provide aid in those endeavors. According to one contemporary Israeli official at the time, Israel had in fact technicians in almost all of the provinces of rural Turkey and played a significant part in developing the cotton fields of Adana, a province which saw its cotton yields

\textsuperscript{196} Patten, \textit{Israel and the Cold War}, 21 and Almog and Sever, “Hide and seek? Israeli-Turkish relations and the Baghdad Pact,” 610.


\textsuperscript{198} Zürcher, \textit{Turkey: A Modern History}, 224-226.

\textsuperscript{199} Pelt, \textit{Military Intervention and a Crisis of Democracy in Turkey}, 15-16.

\textsuperscript{200} Zürcher, \textit{Turkey: A Modern History}, 224.

\textsuperscript{201} Pelt, \textit{Military Intervention and a Crisis of Democracy in Turkey}, 16.

\textsuperscript{202} Zürcher, \textit{Turkey: A Modern History}, 228.

and which marked a particularly shining success story of the Menderes era. It should also be added that bilateral trade between Israel and Turkey increased significantly over these years, so much so that by 1965 it had reached 30 million.

The ultimate point of course is that in his goal of bringing economic development to Turkey, Menderes was evidently more than happy to collaborate with the Jewish state despite its being a regional pariah. The only requirement that he seems to have tacitly put forth is that the economic relationship, just like the military and strategic one, remain low key so as not to bring any unwanted heat from Turkey’s Arab neighbors. And when we consider that, as we have already seen, the military and strategic relationship operated on the same plane of secrecy, we see how both Menderes’ anti-communism and desire to see a more economically robust Turkey only served to reinforce the parameters established by the international and regional levels.

If any internal disagreements developed during the time it seems to have been between the foreign ministry and any bureaucratic agency, including the military, which stood to benefit from greater ties with Israel. The former was naturally more sensitive to Arab opinion and Turkey’s standing within the region. According to one Israeli official at the time, Turkish foreign minister Rüştü Zorlu would even go so far as to prevent Menderes from meeting with Israeli officials and was the prime reason Turkey did not upgrade its relationship with Israel in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis despite Israeli pleas that it do so.

Whatever the case regarding these internal disagreements within the Turkish FPE regarding Israel, we in many ways see them as yet another reflection of the greater dilemma that Turkey was already facing at the time from the international and regional structures; Turkey clearly wanted to have a positive and productive relationship with Israel in many domains for various reasons, yet was ultimately prevented from doing so do to fear that it would alienate the Arab world.

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204 Bengio, *The Turkish-Israeli Relationship*, 50-51.
206 Bengio, *The Turkish-Israeli Relationship*, 50.
207 Ibid., 61.
208 Ibid., 48.
209 Ibid., 61-68.
3.5. The FPE: Süleyman Demirel and his Governments

The next figure that we will take under consideration is Süleyman Demirel, who headed six governments between 1965 and 1980 and was ultimately prime minister from 1965-1971, then again from 1975-1977, for a short period from the summer of 1977 to the spring of 1978, then finally from the fall of 1979 to the September 12 coup of 1980. This of course meant that he was in the prime minister’s chair during several critical moments of the relationship between Turkey and Israel. While many of those events and the decisions surrounding mark several low points in Turkish-Israeli relations, these years were also, as we have already seen, defined by the balancing act performed by Turkey between Israel and the Arab world. As we shall see in greater detail below, we can thus say that Demirel’s premierships in many ways defined this era of balancing in Turkey’s decisionmaking toward Israel.

Like Menderes, Demirel was pro-American, pragmatic, staunchly anti-communist, and desirous of seeing Turkey join the ranks of the developed industrialized nations of the West. To those ends Demirel was, as much Menderes it seems, perfectly comfortable with having a harmonious relationship with Israel. While working in the Water Works Administration, Demirel admonished the Turkish people at a lecture in 1959 “to take to the Israeli people—the perfect people in every respect…as a model and to make the Israeli achievement as [sic] a goal [for Turkey].” In other words, Demirel, like Menderes before him, believed that Turkey had a good deal to benefit from the Jewish state and in a perfect world there would be no barriers to an openly-productive relationship.

210 “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetleri.”
211 Patten, *Israel and the Cold War*, 101, Bengio, *The Turkish-Israeli Relationship*, 64, and Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 95-96, and 98.
214 For Demirel’s anti-Communist stances, see Emre, *The Emergence of Social Democracy in Turkey*, 75-78.
217 Ibid.
The world as we all know, however, is far from perfect and less than a year after being elected prime minister in 1965, Demirel’s government made the decision to call an end to its relationship with Israel due to the country’s tilt toward the Arab world in the aftermath of the Johnson Letter.\textsuperscript{218} Just three years later in 1969 of course came the second Demirel government’s decision to attend the first\textsuperscript{219} Organization of the Islamic Conference in Rabat, Morocco in September of that year,\textsuperscript{220} which had been called in the aftermath of an arson attack against the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem the previous month.\textsuperscript{221} There, as we recall, Turkey joined the Arab states in criticizing Israel for its ongoing occupation of East Jerusalem\textsuperscript{222} and echoed their calls for the Jewish state to withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 lines.\textsuperscript{223} One thing that should be noted here is that the Demirel government responsible for these policy platforms consisted solely of his AP due to his winning of 240 out of 450 parliamentary seats in the 1965 general elections.\textsuperscript{224} What this tells us of course is that at least in terms of the government itself, Demirel would have been in the best position possible to determine foreign policy as he saw fit as he would have had no need to kowtow to any coalition partners unwilling to play along with the prime minister’s decisions in these cases.

Despite these and other negative decisions that Demirel took toward Israel during his time as prime minister, it is important to keep in mind that he often found ways to maintain a balance between the policies that he took. As a pro-American, anti-communist politician, Demirel was not about to jeopardize his country’s relationship with the US by completely severing ties with Israel or by pushing things too hard against Jerusalem. Like Menderes before him, Demirel saw the international and regional structures and realized that as the two were at odds with one another, he would have to create a fair balance between the two. This was reflected of course at Rabat in 1969 when, as noted above, Turkey refused to support the final communique proclaiming support for the Palestinians in their struggle against Israel,\textsuperscript{225}  

\textsuperscript{218} Ibid., 64. For the October 1965 election results see Emre, \textit{The Emergence of Social Democracy in Turkey}, 74.
\textsuperscript{219} Patten, \textit{Israel and the Cold War}, 94.
\textsuperscript{220} Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 95.
\textsuperscript{221} Patten, \textit{Israel and the Cold War}, 50.
\textsuperscript{222} Ibid., 94.
\textsuperscript{223} Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 95.

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and once again in the late 1970s regarding the opening of a PLO delegation in Ankara. In the case of the latter, Demirel gave a verbal agreement via his foreign minister at the Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers to open a PLO delegation within the Turkish capital, yet ultimately dragged his feet on the matter and did not see to its opening.\footnote{Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 95-98.}

The domestic political climate of the day would have in many ways only contributed to Demirel’s apprehension about tilting too far to one side of the conflict. Much of this would have had to do with the Palestinian issue and its place in Turkish politics at the time. As mentioned in the introduction, with the exception of the Islamists,\footnote{See Uzer, “Turkey’s Islamist Movement and the Palestinian Cause: the 1980 ‘Liberation of Jerusalem’ Demonstration and the 1997 ‘Jerusalem Night’ as case studies,” 22-39.} at that time in history the Turkish right had little sympathy for the Palestinian cause, which was seen primarily as an issue of the left. Certainly not helping matters were the connections that Fatah and other Palestinian militant groups had with those of the radical Turkish left.\footnote{Muradoğlu, “İzdüşüm-19.2.2006.”} As a member of the right himself, Demirel would have had little incentive to alienate both Israel and those politicians to the right of him, many of whom he came to be dependent on in the 1970s for the formation of his governments.\footnote{“Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetleri.”} This sensitivity to the right may have acted as somewhat of a domestic incentive in his exercising caution at Rabat in 1969, as too much support for the Palestinian cause might have alienated some right-wing votes prior to the elections scheduled for the following October.\footnote{“Seçim 1969 Genel Seçimi Darbenin ucundan Döndü: 1969 Genel Seçimleri,” Yenisafak.com, last accessed June 7, 2020, \url{https://www.yenisafak.com/secim-1969}.} As Aykan argues this would have been even more so in the case of his foot dragging regarding the opening of a PLO delegation in Ankara.\footnote{Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 98-99.} At that time, Demirel was head of the first \textit{Milliyetçi Cephe Hükümeti}, a right-wing, anti-left coalition government consisting of his own AP, the center-right \textit{Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi} (ÇGP), Erbakan’s \textit{Milli Selamet Partisi} (MSP), and the MHP.\footnote{“Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetleri.”} Two of these three coalition partners, were hardly sympathetic to the Palestinian liberation movement and would have strongly disapproved of any action considered overly sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, such as the opening of the PLO delegation in Ankara.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{225} Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 95-98.} 
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{227} Muradoğlu, “İzdüşüm-19.2.2006.”} 
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{228} “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetleri.”} 
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{230} Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 98-99.} 
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{231} “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetleri.”}
delegation in the Turkish capital, something of which they were to vocalize their opposition to under the government of Ecevit three years later.\textsuperscript{232}

The MSP, on the other hand, would have given its wholesale support to such a move by Demirel given its Islamist origins.\textsuperscript{233} This issue, as well the growing religiosity that was taking place in Turkish society at the time, will be treated with greater detail in the section below. Suffice to say for now, however, the MSP would have provided motivation for Demirel to act in a more pro-Palestinian faction, and thus act as somewhat of a counterweight to the other two parties. Thus, when we take all of these political and domestic factors into account along with Demirel’s personal outlook on the international structure, we see how they in many ways only acted as further solidifiers and incentives for the latter to provide a balanced policy in regards to Israel. The international structure, as we have seen, had already created the need already for a balanced policy vis-à-vis Israel, and Demirel, with his worldview and the domestic situation that he had inherited would have only had further incentive to continue with such a balanced approached.

3.6. The FPE: The Third Ecevit Government

Whereas Demirel seems to have mostly fallen into the same mold as Menderes in that he mainly allowed foreign policy factors to determine his decision making, while his archrival and leader of the CHP, Bülent Ecevit, seems to have been guided by more ideological motivations. If God sought to create a near-total-opposite of Demirel, he probably could not have done a more thorough job than he did with Ecevit. A journalist and poet by trade, Ecevit was in many ways the social and political antithesis of Demirel.\textsuperscript{234} Whereas the latter personified himself as the rural villager cum prime minister and the ultimate testimony of the possibility for social advancement the former,\textsuperscript{235} as a son of doctor and painter, not to mention graduate of the elite Robert’s College in Istanbul, seemed to embody the urbaneness,

\textsuperscript{232} Muradoğlu, “İzdüşüm-19.2.2006.”
\textsuperscript{235} Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 250.
intellectualism, and sophistication of the republican elite. Underneath these personal disparities lay sharp political differences as well. While Demirel was the unofficial spokesmen for the center-right, pro-free market, anti-communist, pragmatic and generally more American-friendly segment of the political spectrum Ecevit represented the “ortannın solu,” democratic socialist, more ideological and generally the much less pro-American part of the country.

These differences naturally manifested themselves in the two politicians’ foreign policy perceptions and positions toward Israel. This is especially noticeable when we compare the disparity of their policies toward the opening of a PLO delegation in Ankara. While Demirel took the middle ground over the issue, Ecevit seems to have taken the left side of the road for more ideological reasons. Since 1967, Turkish leftists began sympathizing with the Palestinian people as, in the words of one prominent Marxist of the day, “victims of American might, since Israel was seen as a mere extension of American power in the Middle East.” In practice, this of course not only meant the vehement denunciation of the Jewish state and its policies, but also the taking up of arms by numerous leftists “with the Palestinian fedayeen in the fight against imperialism and its regional appendage, Zionism.”

Much of this ideology was undoubtedly imbibed by Ecevit and many of his cabinet members of his government lasting from January 1978 to November 1979, something of which was put on display in the summer of 1979. In July of that year, four Palestinian militants took over the Egyptian embassy in Ankara, taking 20 people hostage and killing two Turkish security guards in the process. At the request of the Ecevit government, four PLO representatives were flown to Ankara in order to help negotiate a peaceful end to the crisis, something of which they were successful in doing on July 15, a couple days after the takeover of the embassy.

236 “Bülent Ecevit kimdir? İşte Karaoğlan’ın Hayat Hikayesi…”
237 For more on the rise of Bülent Ecevit and the transformation of the CHP to a “left of center” position, see Emre, The Emergence of Social Democracy in Turkey, 82-119. For an excellent example of the two men’s contrasting personalities, see Birand, The Generals’ Coup in Turkey, 150-157.
238 For the anti-Americanism of the Turkish left, see ibid., 180-199.
240 Quote from ibid., 73.
242 “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetleri.”
Following the conclusion of the event, interior minister Hasan Fehmi Güneş sparked controversy when he met with the four Palestinian militants and openly embraced them, even going so far as to give each of them a friendly kiss on the cheek. This action led to severe condemnation from many of the right-wing opposition parties: Demirel castigated the government for its display of sympathy with the militants and demanded that it resign; the deputy head of the MHP excoriated it for “not [being] able to show the courage to condemn the bloody attack.” Even Turhan Feyzioğlu, head of the center-right CGP and former deputy prime minister within Ecevit’s government, levelled criticism at the government for taking action that “had proven costly for Turkey in the past.” The different standpoint of the right-wing parties even extended to the label that they used for the Palestinian militants, as they referred to them as “terrorists” as opposed to the more romantic “guerillas” used by Ecevit and the members of his cabinet. Nonetheless, none of this seemed to phase Ecevit, who, in an effort to thank the PLO for its help during the crisis, decided to make good on Demirel’s promise to open a PLO delegation in Ankara, something which finally took place later that fall. To mark the occasion Ecevit hosted Arafat in Ankara and gave him the honor of officially opening the delegation. During the course of the whole occasion Ecevit took a moment to state that his country “supported the Palestinian people’s right to establish their own state and their struggle to win their legitimate rights.”

The fact that all of this took place in spite of significant criticism from both the U.S and Israel as well condemnation from the Turkish right, indicates that Ecevit’s decision to go forward with the decision to open a PLO delegation in Ankara was one that contained little political benefit. Internationally the decision only served to alienate Turkey’s American and Israeli allies, while domestically it merely managed to cause a ruckus amongst the non-Islamist right. At most, it would have helped Ecevit prove his leftist credentials to his supporters. Such a benefit, however, would have carried little weight in light of the other incentives not to do so. We can therefore conclude that Ecevit’s decision was one that primarily rested on his ideological

243 Quoted in Muradoğlu, “İzdüşüm-19.2.2006.”
244 Ibid.
245 Birand, The Generals’ Coup in Turkey, 40.
246 All quotes and information from Muradoğlu, “İzdüşüm-19.2.2006.”
bearings and not a true analysis derived from realpolitik. Demirel had proven before that it was possible to maintain a balance between the Palestinians and his western allies, but Ecevit clearly chose to side with the former, telling us that he was almost certainly acting out of ideological inclinations and providing a rare example in Turkish-Israeli relations during this time period where the ideological trumped the practical.

3.8. The Domestic Variables: The Growth of Religiousity within Turkish Society

The next variable that we have to take into consideration is that of Turkish public opinion during the Cold War. Given the fact, however, that little information seems to exist concerning the Turkish public’s opinions of Israel and its government’s policy toward it at the time, we will look at one of the greatest developments within Turkish society during the Cold War: increasing religiosity and the involvement of Islam in politics. While this may be far from a perfect substitute for historical documents from this time period detailing public opinion, we can indeed infer a good deal from the aforementioned phenomenon and gain insight as to what effect, if any, it had on Ankara’s relations with Jerusalem.

Near the end of its long reign of one-party rule, the CHP under İsmet İnönü, began a process of gradually easing much of the laicist policies of Atatürk. The various reasons for this shift in policy are not relevant here, what is, however, is that we understand that İnönü opened the door for more open expression of religion in Turkish society.247 This policy of religious liberalization was only intensified during the DP period. Formally, the adhan was once again permitted to be read in Arabic, restrictions against the tarikats lifted, religious education made requisite if the parents chose not to opt out,248 religious broadcasting allowed to take place on the radio,249 and finally, the building of a plethora of new mosques. Informally, public expressions of religiosity

247 While noting the changes initiated by President İnönü as they related to laicism in Turkey, the author realizes that overgeneralization is possible and would like to note that the changes mentioned here were in many ways mere door openers for much of the religious changes that were took place later, and not entirely reflective of the president’s entire legacy toward laicism in Turkey. For the changes mentioned above, see Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 233. For more on the reasons for the president’s shift, see Pelt, Military Intervention and a Crisis of Democracy in Turkey, 47-49.

248 Pelt, Military Intervention and a Crisis of Democracy in Turkey, 49.

became a greater part of everyday life and religious rhetoric and invocation began to become a greater part of political discourse with Menderes himself leading the charge. The full extent of the DP’s religious policy and Menderes’ use of religious rhetoric as a political tool are of course not relevant here, what is, however, is to understand that during the decade of his rule religiosity was being expressed more and more while religion itself was becoming more relevant to the political atmosphere.250

With that in mind, we must ask ourselves the question as to how, if at all, this growing religiosity and greater presence of religion in the public sphere might have affected the government’s policy toward Israel. To that end, we can see how certain examples of religio-political rhetoric pointed toward an anti-Israeli stance. One such example took place when a speaker at a local DP congress in Erzurum remarked that his opponents in the CHP were “equal to Zionism and Freemasonry.”251 In another similar incident, a writer in the biweekly Hür Adam, which was widely known to be the unofficial mouthpiece for the Nurcu tarikat, accused İsmet İnönü of playing “the role of Turkey’s personal devil” and of “join[ing] Hellenism, Zionism, and Communism as enemies of the nation.”252 Taken together, we do not need a pedantic poststructuralist exegesis in order to understand that Zionism, and implicitly the state of Israel, were not looked favorably upon in conservative religious circles.

At the same too, however, the religious sentiments that would have inclined many Turks to be anti-Israeli, was also vehemently anti-communist and thus tacitly supportive of any anti-Soviet initiative that Menderes undertook during his premiership.253 One prime example of this came from the Islamic philosopher and leader of the Nurcu movement, Said Nursi.254 A staunch Menderes supporter and anti-communist, Nursi whole-heartedly supported the US and its anti-Soviet crusade as well as the decision to send Turkish troops to Korea in order to support that cause. When the signing of the Baghdad Pact was announced, Nursi also unequivocally supported it by personally writing a letter to Menderes and President Celal Bayar. In it, he not only applauded the pact for its anti-communist purposes, but for also for

251 Quoted in ibid., 55.
252 Quoted in ibid., 58.
253 Ibid., 129-130.
254 Ibid., 25.
linking Turkey once again to the Muslim world and creating an organization that would unite “400 million Muslims.”

Taken together, this anti-Israel thinking would have only acted as a domestic incentive for Menderes to pursue the course with Israel that he did in 1958. On the one hand, as Bengio points out, the anti-Israeli sentiment amongst the Turkish population would have been further cause for Menderes to tread lightly in his relationship with Israel so as not to antagonize much of his domestic support. This would have especially been the case around the time of the formation of the Peripheral Pact in 1958 given that in the aftermath of the 1957 elections, which saw support for the DP decline, Menderes and the pro-government press resorted to more religiously-bent attacks on the CHP. On the other hand, however, the anti-communist ideology inherent in the religious mentality of many of his supporters would have more than likely indirectly encouraged Menderes to seek an ally against the Soviet-backed Arab states. If to be anti-communist was to be anti-Arab nationalism, then, quite ironically, it also meant to be pro-Israel.

The religious conservatism and expression that worked its way into society and the political sphere at this time only began to increase as time went on. The MGK established after the 1960 coup understood the importance of Islam to its society and despite reaffirming the secular character of the constitution and maintaining a ban on the use of religion for political purposes, opted not to rollback many of Menderes’ reforms. The number of religious primary and secondary schools, the İmam-Hatipler, was allowed to increase as was the number of state-build mosques.

As the 1960s progressed the more opportunities for political organization granted by the liberal 1961 constitution, as well as the growth of left-wing ideology produced a desire for many politically-inclined religious conservatives to become more politically organized and outspoken. The new development was undoubtedly best signified by the creation the MNP in 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan. A former engineering professor, head of the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and member of the AP, Erbakan had become disillusioned with Demirel’s party for what he saw as its abandonment of Islam and cowering to big capital (which in his

255 Ibid., 129-130.
256 Bengio, The Turkish-Israeli Relationship, 46.
eyes was controlled by Zionists and Freemasons) and decided to form his own party which would maintain an Islamic character and pursue social justice according to the principles of Islam.\textsuperscript{258} Domestically, Erbakan’s new party was explicitly opposed to Marxism, Free Masonry and Zionism and for a more openly-Islamic society. In terms of foreign policy, the party was generally anti-Western and openly opposed to Turkey’s relationship with the European Economic Community, seeing it as a mere Jewish and Zionist-controlled clique of Christian states.\textsuperscript{259} Instead of Turkey being a member of Western-backed institutions such NATO or the UN, Turkey, according to Erbakan, should form Islamic equivalents along with an “Islamic Common Market.”\textsuperscript{260} Unsurprisingly, Erbakan also held a special place in hell for Israel itself, referring to it as a “cancer in the heart of the Arab and Muslim world,”\textsuperscript{261} that wanted to extend itself “between the Nile and Euphrates” and “rule the 28 countries from Morocco to Indonesia” all while “destroy[ing]…the Al-Aqsa Mosque [in Jerusalem] and in its place build[ing] Solomon’s Temple.” Moreover, Zionists and Jews themselves were mere “bacteria” that “organize[d] the Crusades,” created “the Capitalist order of today,” forced the Ottoman Empire into signing the Treaty of Sevres, and that held the world “in the palms of their hands” through the control of financial markets and manipulation of the Christian world.\textsuperscript{262}

Regardless of how we may feel about these viewpoints, they did undoubtedly gain traction within the Turkish electorate. In 1973, Erbakan’s MSP\textsuperscript{263} gained 48 seats in the general election with 11.8% of the vote, making it the fourth largest party in parliament.\textsuperscript{264} The following election in 1977 saw the party win the third largest amount of seats in parliament all while its number of seats drop by half with 8.6% of

\textsuperscript{258} Zürcher, Turkey, 257.
\textsuperscript{259} Poulton, The Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, 176.
\textsuperscript{260} Quoted in ibid., 188 and Çelik, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy, 83.
\textsuperscript{263} As we recall from the first chapter, the MNP was shut down by the military following the 1971 military coup and reformed as the MSP. See Poulton, The Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, 176-177.
\textsuperscript{264} For the 1973 election results, see “1973 Genel Seçimi Sonuçları.”
the vote. With increasing electoral power came greater political leverage, and in the 1970s Erbakan and his party joined several governments, specifically the coalition government led by Ecevit’s CHP through most of 1974, as well as Demirel’s first and second Milliyetçi Cephe coalitions from 1974 to mid-1977 and the end of 1977, respectively. Additionally, the MSP also became the unofficial kingmaker for Demirel’s short-lived minority government of 1979. These periods of government, as we recall, coincided with many of the low points in Turkish-Israeli relations, including Turkey’s support at the UN for the resolution condemning Zionism as a form of racism in 1975, as well as Israel’s decision to annex East Jerusalem in 1979.

Although there seems to be little information regarding the inter-cabinet politics surrounding the first instance, given what we know about Erbakan, as well as the fact that he was generally perceived to be one of the reasons for Ankara’s stance toward Israel at this time, we can readily assume that he was supportive of Demirel’s decision to back the resolution.

In regards to Israel’s annexing of East Jerusalem in July 1980, we know that Erbakan exerted a tremendous amount of pressure on Demirel’s government to entirely break off relations with Israel, even going so far as to proposing a motion to do just that as well one to formally remove the foreign minister, Hayrettin Erkman, from his position as if Israel’s decision was somehow all his fault. To cap it all off, Erbakan held a rally in Konya the following September in order to protest the Jerusalem Law. There, he once again called for the Turkish government to sever ties with Israel and demanded the liberation of Jerusalem from Israeli administration. Just to make sure that the message of the rally, which was held specifically in protest against Israel’s annexation of Jerusalem, was clear, a number of demonstrators in the crowd began burning American and Israeli flags and calling for the reinstitution of şeriat.

Though it is a complete and utter myth that this rally is what finally led to

265 For the 1977 election results, see “1977 Genel Seçimi Sonuçları.”
266 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 261-262.
267 Birand, The Generals’ Coup in Turkey, 144.
268 Patten, Israel and the Cold War, 101.
269 Ibid., 104.
271 Patten, Israel and the Cold War, 107.
the coup of September 12, 1980, it might have further convinced General Evren that it would be prudent to downgrade relations with Israel, an action which he took the following November.

Helping pave the way for the further growth of religion in public and political life in following the coup of September 12 was General Evren himself. The politics of Turkey in the 1970s had been a rough affair, both inside and outside the halls of parliament. In parliament Ecevit and Demirel had been at each other’s throats, whereas on the outside continuous street warfare between leftist and rightist organizations had been taking place. What the Turkish people needed therefore, according to Evren, was a little bit of discipline and ideological steering. To the latter point, he saw, much in the same way that İnönü and the MGK before him, that an institutionalized Islam was the answer. A strict religious education incorporating the values of Kemalism was therefore introduced into the primary and secondary schools, the budget of the Diyanet sizably increased, the number of İmam-Hatip schools expanded, and a plethora of other religious programs founded all in the name of, according to the official educational program of the era, “strengthen[ing]…togetherness and national unity” and—quite ironically—“defend…[the] state’s secular basis…and Atatürkülük.”

Unsurprisingly, much of the staffing for this expansion of state-backed religion came from Islamist circles, including the Aydînlar Ocağı, an Islamist youth organization with ideology similar to that espoused by Erbakan. Not only were Islamists then working their way into positions of authority within the state, but also sowing the seeds of deeper religiosity within the public, which was made evident by the increasing prevalence of women wearing the hijab, attacks by men against

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272 Debunking this is myth is the fact that General Evren and the other members of the general staff had already decided the previous June to launch the takeover it in July, but ultimately postponed it due to issues related to parliament and how it might be perceived in the wake of a failed motion of no confidence in the Demirel government. See Birand, The General’s Coup in Turkey, 142-145.

273 Patten, Israel and the Cold War, 107-108.


276 Poulton, The Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, 184 and 186.

277 Quoted in ibid., 182.

278 Ibid., 184-185.

279 Ibid., 202-204.
secular women,\textsuperscript{280} and the assault of people not fasting during the holy month of Ramadan.\textsuperscript{281}

All of this coincided of course with Turgut Özal’s rise to the premiership as head of the Anavatan Partisi (ANAP).\textsuperscript{282} Despite this, however, as well his membership in the Aydınlar Ocağı as a youth\textsuperscript{283} and the presence of Islamists within his own party,\textsuperscript{284} it does not seem that the public sentiment of the day limited him all that much in regards to his foreign policy decision making toward Israel. Indeed, his strategic vision for Turkey within the region and his desire to maintain it as a link between the East and West motivated him more than anything to make the decisions that he did. Hence, Turkey appointed Güvendiren as \textit{charge d’affaires} in 1986 and refused to upgrade the PLO’s office in Ankara the ambassadorial level in an effort to keep the two entities delegations on an equal plain.\textsuperscript{285} Thus we have another example in Turkey’s behavior toward Israel whereby the demands of the international system outweighed those of the domestic and were not hindered in any way.

\section*{3.9. Conclusion}

After examining Turkish foreign policy toward Israel in the bipolar environment of the Cold War, we can readily come to two conclusions for the period. First and foremost, we can easily observe that the Turkish FPE’s of the time period quite naturally followed the logic demanded by the international and regional subsystems. The former, framed by the epic struggle between the US and Soviet Union cast Ankara into a position whereby it was forced to choose between one of two blocs and ultimately maintain an alliance with it. In choosing the US for that endeavor found itself in the 1950s on the opposing end of Nasser’s Soviet-backed Arab nationalist camp and thus on the same side as the fledgling new Jewish State. In one of life’s little ironies, however, that opposition to Arab nationalism provided the impetus for Ankara to seek allies in the Arab world, something of which it could only do at the expense of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{280} Ibid., 191.  \\
\textsuperscript{281} Ibid., 189.  \\
\textsuperscript{282} Ibid., 192-197.  \\
\textsuperscript{283} Ibid., 180.  \\
\textsuperscript{285} Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 103-104.
\end{flushleft}
its open relationship with Israel. Following the Johnson Letter of 1964 of course Turkey began putting Israel at an even greater distance due to its desire to pursue a better relationship with its Arab neighbors. The key thing that we must remember here though is that despite the decision to do so, Ankara did not, as it also refused to do in the 1950s in the aftermath of the Suez affair, put an end to the relationship completely. Instead, it once again decided to perform a balancing act so as not to completely alienate Israel or the United States.

Such a policy was obviously, as we have seen, generated out of the exigencies of the international structure, and thus cannot be said to have been a mere manifestation of domestic politics. Indeed, our examination of the various FPE’s during the Cold War, with one notable exception of course, demonstrate how the former logically reacted the international climate. On that note, however, we also see how Turkey’s domestic politics of the era, especially the growth of religiosity within society but as well as the composition of coalitions, parties, and the overall foreign policy perceptions of the Menderes, Demirel, and Özal governments added further impetus for Ankara to pursue the relationship with Israel that it did.

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286 Patten, *Israel and the Cold War*, 82-83.

287 Kanat, “Turkish-Israeli Relations during the Cold War: The Myth of a Long ‘Special Relationship,’” 130-149.
CHAPTER 4

TURKISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS IN A UNIPOLAR WORLD, 1990-2002

4.1. Introduction

The end of the Cold War in 1989 marked a new beginning in Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel. The replacement of a bipolar world order with a unipolar one not only meant the removal of the Soviet Union as a player in the Middle East and a situation whereby Turkey could pursue friendly relations with Israel without risking a pushback from the Soviet Union’s Arab client states, but also one in which Ankara would have to prove its strategic value to the United States in the absence of the Soviet threat and effectively seek a “backdoor” to maintain its relationship with Washington via Israel. Encouraging Turkey’s positive relationship with Israel from the other end was the United States itself, who, in pursuit of regional stability sought to further encourage its democratic, secular, and Western-oriented allies in the Middle East to develop a strategic relationship.

On the regional level, the Peace Process between Israel and the Arabs removed a massive barrier for Turkey and allowed it to pursue better relations with the former without having to incur the wrath of the Arab world as it had before. This happened to coincide with a significant loss of importance of Arab opinion for Turkish foreign

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288 Bengio, *The Turkish-Israeli Relationship*, 3-27.
290 Term quoted from Yavuz, “Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate,” 27.
policy in light of Ankara’s decreasing economic dependence on the Arab world due to an economic shift toward Europe and other market factors. Moreover, Turkey’s own issues with Iraq, Syria, and Iran—all sworn enemies of Israel—created a situation whereby it could balance its enemies alongside the Jewish state.

Finally, certain domestic factors such as the ongoing terrorist PKK insurgency and the Turkish military’s desire to acquire new weaponry in light of an arms embargo from its American and European allies only served to grease the wheels for the national security establishment to proceed with its relationship with Israel, as the latter was able to not only provide intelligence on the PKK and provide new arms to Turkey, but also as an incomparable symbol in Ankara’s desire to remain a part of the West and prove its secular credentials on the domestic and international fronts. On the other hand, however, other events such as the election of Erbakan as prime minister in 1995 and the continued growth of religious conservatism in Turkish society signified a large portion of the public’s opposition to their government’s burgeoning ties with Israel. In that sense, this era was therefore markedly different from the Cold War, as the domestic divisions at home were not a reflection of the course in which Turkey was taking its relationship with Israel.

The combination of all these positive factors on the structural, regional, and domestic levels led to Turkey pursuing a strategic relationship with Israel that encompassed numerous environmental, trade, and defense agreements from the time the former upgraded relations to the ambassadorial level in December 1991 to the early 2000s. By the late 1990s this relationship had become so strong and formidable that many scholars, journalists, and politicians began to feel that “a new axis” had been formed that, in the words of one Turkish journalist, “altered the strategic power

293 Bolukbasi, “Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View,” 30-31 and Yavuz, “Turkish-Israeli Relations,” 27.
294 Inbar, “The Strategic Glue in the Israeli-Turkish Alignment,” 165 and Bolukbasi, “Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View,” 30.
295 Yavuz, “Turkish-Israeli Relations,” 22-37.
296 Bolukbasi, “Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View,” 30-33 and Robins, Suits and Uniforms, 248-269.
297 Bengio, The Turkish-Israeli Relationship, 114-126.
299 Ibid., 31.
balance in the oil-rich Mideast”\textsuperscript{300} and sparked protest from numerous states in the region, including those directly hostile to Turkey and the west—Iraq, Iran, and Syria—as well as American allies such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt.\textsuperscript{301}

\section*{4.2. Enter the Unipolar World: The Structural and Regional Factors behind Turkey’s Turn toward Israel}

With the downfall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, the world witnessed the development of a new “unipolar” order centered around American hegemonic power. While there was certainly hope and enthusiasm that the new era would be marked by peace and prosperity for all nations, there was also anxiety on behalf of America’s Cold War allies as to what extent it would remain an ally and uphold security in the absence of the Soviet threat and competition of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{302} Turkey was of course no exception in this regard. While the removal of the Soviet Union as a threat on its eastern and northern borders must have certainly provided it with some relief, Ankara was concerned that it had lost its strategic value in the eyes of Washington and that it would thus lose the support of its international patron. After all, what strategic value was an ally on an old enemy’s border if the enemy himself was no longer a threat? The Gulf War of 1991 in many ways only seemed to bring these issues into deeper focus and highlight just how much the world and the region had changed. Not only did the war effectively see the Soviet Union sidelined on the world and regional stage in a way that it had not been since the end of WWII, but it unequivocally, proved that the United States held all the cards in the region and would so for the foreseeable future. This of course only became more certain with the final collapse of the Soviet Union itself later that year, as Moscow’s two client states within the region, Syria, and Iraq, officially lost a patron once and for all.

Faced with such a situation Turkey naturally decided that it would prove its strategic value to the US and its European allies so as not to lose their patronage. This was of course much of Turkish president Turgut Özal’s reasoning during the Gulf

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{300} These were the words of Sami Kohen, quoted in ibid., 37.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{301} Ibid., 38.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{302} America’s European allies, for instance, were concerned if the US would come to their aid if a united Germany emerged as a threat. See Michael Cox, “From the End of the Cold War to a New Global Era,” 67.}
Crisis when he not only opted to cut off commercial ties with Iraq, including the shutting of the oil pipelines running from the latter through Turkey (something of which came at a considerable economic cost for Ankara), but also deploy around 100,000 troops on its southern border and allow coalition forces to use the İncirlik airbase for coalition bombing raids against Saddam Hussein’s regime.

But while this action ultimately proved effective in demonstrating Turkey’s value to the US and its European allies, there were other factors in Turkey’s relationship with its NATO allies that were cause for concern in Ankara’s foreign policy establishment. First was the European Union’s rejection of Turkey’s application for full membership in 1989.303 This of course took place at a time shortly before the EU began rapidly admitting new members from the states of the former Eastern Bloc and developing its own security and military schemes absent of Turkey and the US.304 Beyond that was the arms embargo that Ankara found himself under from its NATO allies as a result of the what the latter believed to be human rights violations in Turkey’s conflict with the terrorist PKK organization. Finally, there was the list of more minor tensions that Turkey had with the US over issues such as the desire of some American congressmen to label the Ottoman Empire’s actions towards its Armenia population during WWI as genocide. Taken all together, these issues not only proved that there were undoubtedly kinks in Turkey’s relationship with the West, but even more importantly, seemed to signify that Turkey was in many ways considered outside the Western club of states, and that its future as it related to them was anything but certain. Conversely, it raised the question that if Turkey were to retain its relationship with the US in a unipolar world, what else could it do if its actions during Desert Storm were not enough?

This question only seemed to become more relevant as the decade progressed and Turkey’s security situation became even more precarious. To the southeast lay the heavily-armed, nuclear and chemical-weapons seeking regime of Saddam Hussein, who had already proven himself to be aggressive when he invaded Kuwait. Within his borders of course was a growing power vacuum in the country’s northeast which threatened to provide sanctuary to the terrorist PKK organization. To Turkey’s east lay


the anti-Western, nuclear-aspiring, quasi-theocratic government in Iran. And to the south of course was Turkey’s historical rival of Syria.\textsuperscript{305} Finally, with the breakdown of Yugoslavia and the ensuing conflicts in the Balkans, as well as Russia’s war with Chechenyan separatists, Turkey seemed to be surrounded by instability and hostile regimes.

One way of achieving this, many in the foreign policy establishment reasoned, was to open a so-called “backdoor” to the US via Israel. By developing a relationship with the Jewish state, Turkey could not only hope to utilize the Israeli lobby in Washington to effectively lobby on its behalf, but also prove its credentials as a friend of the US.\textsuperscript{306}

Pushing for this relationship from the other end was of course Washington itself. Under president Bill Clinton the US formulated a strategy which aimed in part to promote democracy in the region. When that turned out be to a wholly quixotic notion, by the middle of the decade Washington shifted from the promotion of democracy to the promotion of relations between its two democratic allies in the region, Turkey and Israel.\textsuperscript{307} The US had been impressed by Turkey’s support during the Gulf Crisis and once again began to realize its strategic value.\textsuperscript{308} And when this strategic value was taken into consideration alongside the fact that the Soviet Union could no longer help rally the Arab states behind an anti-Israeli cause, and that Desert Storm had effectively proved that Arab unity was little more than a myth, it became only natural for the United States to support Turkey’s growing ties with Israel.\textsuperscript{309} Indeed, a State Department spokesman admitted as much when he stated that

\begin{quote}
It has been a strategic objective of the United States that Turkey and Israel ought to enhance their military cooperation and their political relations. Israel is a very close friend of the United States, a close ally of the United States. Turkey is a close friend and ally and it seems to us natural and positive that Israel and Turkey would walk together…The United States is very pleased to participate in that cooperation.\textsuperscript{310}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{305} Bengio, \textit{The Turkish-Israeli Relationship}, 19-26.

\textsuperscript{306} Ibid., 88 and Yavuz, “Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate,” 27.

\textsuperscript{307} Bengio, \textit{The Turkish-Israeli Relationship}, 10-12.

\textsuperscript{308} Ibid., 22-25.

\textsuperscript{309} Ibid., 98-101.

\textsuperscript{310} Quoted in ibid., 98.
To this strategic end, the United States not only openly encouraged the further strengthening of ties between its two main allies in the region as the above quotation shows us, but also took part in trilateral military exercises with Israel and Turkey, such as the joint naval search-and-rescue exercise known as “Reliant Mermaid”\textsuperscript{311} in 1998, and the joint air force exercise codenamed “Anatolian Eagle.”\textsuperscript{312} The US also encouraged arms deals between the two countries, such as the 1996 agreement\textsuperscript{313} which saw Turkey’s fleet of 54 F-4 Phantoms updated by Israel at a cost of $632.5 million\textsuperscript{314}—something of which could not have taken place without Washington’s approval given the plane’s American origins. With such incentives at hand, Ankara had every reason to further pursue a tighter relationship with Israel. Not only was it able to get closer to Washington, but it was also able to procure much-wanted military hardware and participate in military drills that would have sent a message of deterrence to its adversaries in the region.\textsuperscript{315}

4.3. The Regional Factors

The incentives for Turkey to draw closer to Israel were not only coming from the new world order, however, as many were also being generated on the regional level. The most important of these were arguably the start of the Peace Process between Israel and the Arab States, as well as the Gulf War’s demonstration of the myth of Arab unity. As we saw earlier, Arab opinion toward Turkey as it concerned Israel was the main hindrance of the former’s ability to develop close relations with the latter in previous decades. With the start of the Peace Process in 1991, however, the taboo of having a relationship with Israel was by and large removed. After all, if the Arab states were on the path to a potential peace agreement with Israel, why should Turkey refrain


\textsuperscript{312} Anshel Pfeffer, “Growing Ties Between Turkey, China, Iran Worry Israel and US,” \textit{Haaretz}, October 7, 2002, \url{https://www.haaretz.com/1.5121945}.

\textsuperscript{313} Inbar, “The Strategic Glue in the Israeli-Turkish Alignment,” 158.

\textsuperscript{314} Pipes, “A New Axis: The Emerging Turkish Israel Entente,” 34.

\textsuperscript{315} Bengio, \textit{The Turkish-Israeli Relationship}, 99. Ibid., 98-110.
from having relations with it as well.\textsuperscript{316} It was no coincidence therefore that Turkey’s move to once again return relations to the ambassadorial level in December 1991 came a matter of weeks after the start of the Madrid Conference.\textsuperscript{317} The Oslo Accords of 1993 between Israel and the Palestinian Authority only served to further hasten a rapprochement with Israel, as the all-sensitive Palestinian issue seemed to be heading for a permanent resolution,\textsuperscript{318} and was thus removed as another obstacle for the potential development of relations. Evidence of this can be seen with Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin’s visit to Israel a couple months after the signing of the Oslo Accords.\textsuperscript{319}

Complimentary to this was the Gulf War’s revelation that Arab unity was little more than a myth. The fact that the crisis began with the invasion of one Arab country by another and saw Arab states side both with and against Saddam Hussein demonstrated that the notion of a unified Arab bloc was a complete fable. In turn, this meant that any diplomatic initiative Ankara understood with Jerusalem would by no means necessarily be condemned by a single Arab voice and thus face isolation in the region.\textsuperscript{320}

Even more fortunate for Turkey was its decreasing economic dependence on its Arab neighbors. The 1980s not only saw a sharp decline in oil prices, but also a series of economic reforms captained by prime minister Turgut Özal which shifted the bulk of Turkey’s economic activity from the Middle East to Europe\textsuperscript{321} to the extent that by 1994 the Middle East market accounted for a mere 12% of Turkish exports—a 35% drop from 1982.\textsuperscript{322} Turkey, in other words, had the shackles of dependence on the Arab world removed, which combined with the onset of the Peace Process and the destruction of the myth of Arab unity, meant that it could pursue better bilateral relations with Israel.\textsuperscript{323}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[317] Ibid., 248 and Bir and Sherman, “Formula for Stability: Turkey Plus Israel,” 25.
\item[319] Ibid., 25 and Robins, \textit{Suits and Uniforms}, 250-251.
\item[320] Bengio, \textit{The Turkish-Israeli Relationship}, 14-26.
\item[321] Bolukbasi, “Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View,” 30.
\item[322] Yavuz, “Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate,” 27.
\item[323] Bolukbasi, “Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View,” 30-31.
\end{footnotes}
And pursuing a better relationship with Israel made perfect sense considering the difficulties that Turkey was experiencing with its neighbors in the 1990s. The most problematic of these neighbors was Syria. The animosity felt by Syria toward Turkey over its annexation of Hatay in 1939 had never gone away, but then in the 1980s came further tension over Ankara’s plan for the Güney Anadolu Projesi (GAP), a massive irrigation and dam project which caused considerable unease in Syria, who worried that its share of the Tigris and Euphrates would be significantly reduced in both quantity and quality. From Syria’s end, however, came its deplorable support for the terrorist Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and PKK organizations, as well as a list of radical Turkish leftist groups. While its support for ASALA and the leftist groups had largely dissipated by the 1990s, Syria’s support the terrorist PKK only continued, allowing much of the organization’s leadership, including its head Abdullah Öcalan, to reside, raise funds, and organize guerilla activities within its borders. If this support for terrorism and the historical animosity was not enough to put Turkish leaders on edge, by the middle of the 1990s it appeared that Syria had begun developing military ties with Turkey’s other main historical rival, Greece.

Further increasing Ankara’s anxiety, albeit to a lesser extent, was its relationship with Baghdad. While the two capitals generally enjoyed better ties with one another due to their mutual struggles with Kurdish separatists, as well as their heavy volume of trade and shared oil pipelines, there were indeed tensions between the two sides. First came the issue of the GAP, which although projected not to be quite as detrimental to Iraq’s water supply, still irked Iraq’s leadership and gave Turkey’s leadership cause for concern in the bilateral relationship. Even more cause for concern, however, was Iraq’s significant military capabilities and its desire to develop nuclear and chemical weapons that if launched toward Turkey would have

324 Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East*, 50.
325 Ibid., 23-27.
326 Ibid., 87-99.
327 Ibid., 51.
328 Çağaptay, *Erdoğan’s Empire*, 84.
329 Stern and Rossi, “The Role of Syria in Israeli-Turkish Relations,” 116.
330 Inbar, “The Strategic Glue in the Israeli-Turkish Alignment,” 155-156 and 165.
obviously resulted in a massive humanitarian disaster.\textsuperscript{331} Moreover, we can assume that Turkey’s support for the coalition that expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait did not exactly endear Saddam toward his northern neighbor. Saddam was accused of much during his lifetime but being inclined toward forgiving and forgetting was never one of them.

Within Iraq’s borders there were also other concerns for Ankara. The conclusion of the Gulf Crisis saw the US, Britain and France establish a no-fly zone over the Kurdish regions of northeast Iraq. This in combination with the growing conflict between the two Kurdish factions there opened up a power vacuum which provided refuge for the terrorist PKK to launch cross-border attacks into Turkey and then retreat back into Iraq.\textsuperscript{332} This, incidentally enough, seems to have been one of the main reasons for Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller’s visit to Israel in November 1994, which marked the first time a Turkish premier visited Israel.\textsuperscript{333} During the course of this visit, it seems that Çiller either signed\textsuperscript{334} or followed up on\textsuperscript{335} a secret security agreement which, among other things, saw the two sides agree to share intelligence regarding the terrorist PKK.\textsuperscript{336}

Finally, there was the Iranian factor.\textsuperscript{337} Although Turkey had generally handled its bilateral relations with Iran dexterously following the 1979 revolution so as to avoid any serious conflict, there had been moments of tension. These mainly had to do with the fact that Turkey was an avowed secular state and Iran as a semi-theocratic one openly dedicated to the spreading of an Islamic revolution throughout the region. This disparity in thinking generally manifested itself by open Iranian support for Turkish Islamists and their declared causes, such as their opposition to a court case banning the wearing of the hijab at Turkish universities.\textsuperscript{338} More ominously, however, Turkish officials firmly believed that Iran was covertly supporting the terrorist PKK.

\textsuperscript{331} Robins, \textit{Turkey and the Middle East}, 58-64.
\textsuperscript{333} Robins, \textit{Suits and Uniforms}, 251.
\textsuperscript{334} Bolukbasi, “Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View,” 31.
\textsuperscript{335} Bengio, \textit{The Turkish-Israeli Relationship}, 108.
\textsuperscript{336} Bolukbasi, “Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View,” 31.
\textsuperscript{337} Inbar, “The Strategic Glue in the Israeli-Turkish Alignment,” 155-156 and 165.
\textsuperscript{338} Robins, \textit{Turkey and the Middle East}, 53-55.
organization and *Hezbollah*—an Islamist Kurdish separatist group which had also been seeking the independence of Turkey’s Kurds through terroristic means.\(^{339}\) Then of course there was Iran’s potential desire to develop nuclear weapons, something of which generally has a tendency to unsettle the neighbors next door.\(^{340}\)

Yet if all these issues with the neighbors were cause for anxiety for the Turkish foreign policy establishment, there was another member of the neighborhood who shared those countries as an enemy: Israel. And from these common concerns came unprecedented military cooperation between Turkey and Israel: a February 1996 agreement that called for military personnel exchanges, the training of Turkish pilots in the latest electronic systems, and Israeli pilots conducting exercise over Turkish soil, something of which would have proven useful for the Israeli Air Force in the event that it was ordered to conduct an air strike on Iranian nuclear facilities given the similar terrain between Turkey and Iran;\(^{341}\) the aforementioned agreement surrounding the F-4 Phantoms and the purchasing of Popeye I and II air-to-surface missiles;\(^{342}\) an agreement which saw Israel update Turkey’s fleet of F-5’s;\(^{343}\) another deal which saw Israel update Turkey’s American-made M60 Patton tanks.\(^{344}\) There were of course other potential plans as well, such as Turkey’s consideration of buying the Galil assault rifle Merkava main battle tanks.\(^{345}\)

In addition to allowing the Turkish military to new weaponry and update its arsenal, these agreements also sent a message to its adversaries that it was by no means isolated.\(^{346}\) While both countries were emphatic that their new relationship was not directed toward any specific party,\(^{347}\) the entente between the two countries sent strong messages throughout the region, eliciting protests from Syria, Iraq, Iran, Greece and


\(^{340}\) Inbar, “The Strategic Glue in the Israeli-Turkish Alignment,” 156.

\(^{341}\) Pipes, “A New Axis: The Emerging Turkish Israel Entente,” 34.

\(^{342}\) Inbar, “The Strategic Glue in the Israeli-Turkish Alignment,” 158-159.

\(^{343}\) Amikam Nachmani, *Turkey: Facing a New Millennium: Coping with Intertwined Conflicts (Europe in Change)* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 222.


\(^{345}\) Pipes, “A New Axis: The Emerging Turkish Israel Entente,” 34.

\(^{346}\) Ibid., 37-38.

\(^{347}\) Ibid., 35.
even American allies such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.\(^{348}\) Syrian vice president Abd al-Halim even went so far as to label the alliance between Ankara and Jerusalem as “the greatest threat to the Arabs since 1948,”\(^{349}\) while other observers, such as Turkish journalist Sami Kohen, saw the “budding alliance” as something that “has altered the strategic power balance” of the region.\(^{350}\)

With such benefits at hand in light of the regional circumstances that Turkey was facing at the time, we can hardly be surprised that it made the choices that it did concerning Israel. By acquiring state of the art military hardware, military training, intelligence, and an unofficial alliance with the region’s preeminent military power, Turkey was strengthening its security in a neighborhood filled with potential adversaries. Thus, we can easily comprehend from a structural perspective as to why it ultimately choice to seek the relationship with Israel that it did.

### 4.4. Domestic Factors and the Foreign Policy Executive

With all of this in mind, we can now begin to analyze the FPE of Turkey at this time, its perceptions of the situation at hand, as well as the domestic factors that helped drive its foreign policy decision making. More specifically, we will examine the role of the Turkish Armed Forces and its thought process toward all of the aforementioned structural factors, as well as the actions that it took in order to ensure compliance at home while it was executing what it believed to be the optimal foreign policy toward Israel in light of the international and regional factors at hand.\(^{351}\)

As we saw in the introduction of this work, the officers of the TAF had come to see themselves as the guardians of Kemalism and the country’s sovereignty,\(^{352}\) and both of these principles would have acted as their own motivating factors for the military establishment to seek a closer relationship with Israel after the end of the Cold War. The most immediate and obvious of these would have of course been the uncompromised upholding of Turkey’s territorial integrity in light of the ongoing

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\(^{348}\) Ibid., 38.

\(^{349}\) Quoted in Bir and Sherman, “Formula for Stability: Turkey Plus Israel,” 37.


\(^{351}\) Pipes, “A New Axis: The Emerging Turkish Israel Entente,” 33-34.

struggle against the terrorist PKK. The Turkish state had of course been fighting the organization since 1984, but in the early 1990s the conflict took on a new intensity as the embargo against Iraq during the Gulf Crisis took a significant economic toll on the southeast of Turkey and thus fueled discontent and motivation for separatism among certain Kurds. Between the end of the Gulf War and 1999, therefore, some 30,000 people lost their lives. Israel, on the other hand, had had connections with Kurdish political factions in Iraq for decades and would have more than likely have had excellent intelligence on the terrorist PKK which it could provide to Turkish intelligence agencies.

In addition to this conflict, the Turkish military also had another national security incentive to cooperate with Israel. In the 1990s the Turkish military found itself in a *de facto* arms embargo from its NATO allies as a result of perceived humanitarian violations in the war against the terrorist PKK. Making the matter all the more frustrating was the fact that the military was attempting to carry out a significant modernization program, which among other things called for substantial arms purchases and reffitting of much of its dated hardware. As the arms agreements previously mentioned show, Israel, unlike Turkey’s Western allies, had absolutely no qualms about making arms deals with Ankara, and in fact sincerely welcomed the economic dividends that they brought.

Concerning the factor of Kemalism, the Turkish military’s firm belief that its country should pursue the path laid by Atatürk to tie its itself to the West did it seems, as Hakan Yavuz argued in his article about Turkish-Israeli relations during this time, encourage it to seek tighter relations with Israel in order to help create another tie to the US and prove its Western identity. This is of course a very reasonable assumption considering the different approach that Erbakan was ready to take when he became prime minister in June 1995. While the pursuit of his agenda was ultimately cut short due to pressure from the military and his eventual resignation a mere year after taking office, Erbakan’s ideology and policy choices and the military’s resistance to them

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356 Ibid., 258 and Inbar, “The Strategic Glue in the Israeli-Turkish Alignment,” 161.
357 For more Turkish-Israeli agreements concerning military hardware, see Nachmani, *Turkey: Facing a New Millennium*, 223-226.
demonstrate that Turkey’s identity was an issue at the time. And in the struggle between Turkey’s Islamists and the military establishment over that identity, the latter as Yavuz argues, could use the country’s burgeoning ties with Israel as a vehicle for further proving its Turkey’s Western identity.  

On that account, however, it would be rash to assume that this struggle over identity was the sole reason for Turkey taking the road that it did during this time period as Yavuz seems to imply. As we have seen, and as Ofra Bengio Süha Bölükbaşi, and others have demonstrated, Turkey had plenty of strategic and tactical reasons for pursuing a positive relationship with Israel at the time given the emerging international structure and regional dynamics of the era. This point is further proven when we consider what would have been the logical results of Erbakan’s foreign policy had it been carried out: a tilt to the Muslim world at the expense of the West in the way that he imagined would by no means have necessarily guaranteed security or strategic success for Turkey given the environment it was in and the problems it was facing.

To be sure, an anti-Western foreign policy would have been pleasing for the governments of Iraq, Syria, and Iran given their anti-Western stances and opposition to American policies within the region. Furthermore, Turkey’s withdrawal from Operations Provide Comfort and Northern Watch, the military operations enforcing the no-fly zones over the Kurdish regions of Iraq, may have very well allowed Saddam to reassert his authority in the northeast and help suppress the terrorist PKK as many in the Turkish political establishment desired. Yet, at the same time, such advantages would not have necessarily eliminated the sources of tension between Turkey and its neighbors. Saddam had already proven himself to be too mercurial to be fully trusted when he invaded Kuwait, and we can probably be rest assured that he was not going to give up his regional ambitions—or his military hardware for that

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358 Yavuz, “Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate,” 22-37.
359 Ibid., 32-34.
360 Bengio, The Turkish-Israeli Relationship, 71-126.
361 Bolukbasi, “Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View,” 21-35.
364 Ibid., 45.
matter—simply to please Ankara. Moreover, a sharp turn to Islamism may not exactly have settled well with Saddam or Hafez al-Assad in Syria given their regimes secular character and own difficulties with Islamist politics. If nothing else, it would not in itself have provided a solution to the tension with both countries surrounding the GAP project, and Erbakan could have very well have found himself in a position where he would have to choose between appeasing his neighbors or his domestic standing given the project’s projected economic benefits. Finally, an abandonment of a positive relationship with Israel and the West at large would have been no sure way to secure procurement of the military hardware that the armed forces so desperately wanted in light of the arms embargo. Such a policy would have only ensured Turkey’s continued deprivation of arms and of the potential for buying arms from Israel, leaving it with perhaps no other secure source of arms. In the big picture then, Turkey could have either maintained is relationship with the West and used Israel to that end as it did or abandon both entirely and further risk isolation in the region. It therefore cannot be said then that the identity factor was the main determinant of Turkey’s rapprochement with Israel at this time but could be said to have acted as a further incentive for the FPE to pursue such a course.

Another element which seems to have acted as a further common denominator between Israel and the Turkish military establishment at this time was the issue of secularism. As a state whose foreign policy was largely being determined by a military devoted to the upholding of secularism in its own country, Turkey seems to have found common cause with Israel over its own secular credentials and opposition to political Islam. Indeed, in a 2002 article with Martin Sherman Turkish deputy chief of staff and one of the main architects of Turkey’s military relationship with Israel, Çevik Bir, put heavy emphasis on Turkey and Israel’s common secular qualities and shared

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366 Robbins, Turkey and the Middle East, 89-90.


369 For more on Bir’s role, see Robins, Suits and Uniforms, 259-261 and 266.
“danger of Islamic radicalism.”³⁷⁰ In fact, Bir argued, one of the main objectives for the growing partnership between the two countries was to act “as a counterweight to the menace of radical forces,” and if given adequate support by the two countries’ American and European allies, he continued, the Turkish-Israeli partnership “could well develop as the pillar of a wider security architecture for the Middle East…with the objective of keeping theocratic extremism…in check.”³⁷¹

That said, however, the idea of secularism as a driving force behind Turkey’s desire to seek closer relations with Israel during this period can easily be overstated. For one, as we have seen there were simply too many other incentives for Turkey at this time to seek the relationship that it did. Additionally, Turkey’s strengthening of ties with Israel coincided of course with the rise of the Refah Partisi and the social tension and divisions surrounding secularism and Islamism that accompanied it, leading many scholars at the time to become overly emphatic about the importance of those issues to the Turkish-Israeli relationship.³⁷² Furthermore, when considering Bir’s article with Martin Sherman, we need to accept it with a grain salt considering that the article was clearly exhorting the United States to further support the Ankara-Jerusalem axis³⁷³ in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks,³⁷⁴ a time when the United States was obviously preoccupied with its own problems with radical Islamism and thus more susceptible to any argument framed in the context of those problems. Finally, we do have to consider that even though the secularism factor may have very well acted as another common trait between the two sides,³⁷⁵ secularism itself is not an actual foreign policy and cannot tell us exactly how states will specifically interact with one another surrounding it. After all, Israel was by no means the only secular state in the region at that time,³⁷⁶ let alone the world, and yet Turkey did not pursue the same sort of relationship that it did with Jerusalem with say Iraq, Syria, China, or Russia.

³⁷¹ Ibid., 30.
³⁷² Bengio, The Turkish-Israeli Relationship, 88-89.
³⁷⁴ Ibid., 23.
³⁷⁶ As mentioned in the footnote above, both Iraq and Syria were ruled the Baath party, the ideological foundations of which were secular. See Shanahan, “Shi'a Political Development in Iraq: The Case of the Islamic Da'wa Party,” 943-945 and Phillips, “Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria,” 357-366.
Whatever the influence of these factors on the Turkish military’s decision making toward Israel, however, one thing that we can be certain of is that such decisions ultimately came to face a good deal of resistance at home. The rise of social conservatism and Islamism that had been taking place for decades seemed to reach new heights in the 1990s, as a poor economy and the discrediting of the mainstream center-right parties, created an opening for the Refah Partisi to slide into, which it did in the December 1995 elections when it became the largest party in parliament. After some six months of political haggling and a failed coalition between ANAP and the DYP, the Refah Partisi finally emerged as the senior partner of a coalition government with the latter, allowing Erbakan to become the first openly-declared Islamist prime minister in Turkey.

After several foreign policy initiatives undertaken by prime minister Erbakan signaled that the new order for Turkey could very well extend to the realm of foreign policy, another event in early 1997 indicated that if Erbakan and his party were have it their way then Turkey’s relationship with Israel would also change. On January 31 of that year, a so-called “Kudüs Gecesi” was organized by the local mayor of the Ankara suburb of Sincan to protest the Israeli control of Jerusalem and commemorate the city’s Islamic heritage. There, a tent resembling the al-Aqsa Mosque was erected complete with pro-Hamas and Hezbollah banners hung inside. To top it all off the Iranian ambassador in Ankara was invited to speak at the event and voice own invective toward Israel.

This event ultimately proved to be too much for the military and its allies within the secular establishment, and a few days later on February 4 tanks and other armored vehicles were dispatched to Sincan in order to send the message that the former were watching the events with concern and only going to permit so much challenge to the Kemalist order. Beyond this, however, we can almost certainly assume that while certainly not the primary reason for the military’s decision to do so, the army’s show

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377 For more on the rise of social conservatism and Islamism at this time, see Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey, 1-22.
378 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 298-299.
379 Yavuz, “Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate,” 27.
381 Yavuz, “Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate,” 22.
of force in Sincan had the effect of reassuring the Israeli government that the armed forces were in charge in Turkey and that its newfound ally was not going anywhere.

Whatever the perception of these actions by the Israelis, however, the events in Sincan would prove to be the opening salvo\textsuperscript{382} in what would come to be known as the “28 Şubat”\textsuperscript{383} process. Over the next several months the military, through various means of pressure and coercion, toppled the democratically government and forced the resignation of Erbakan. Part of this process it should be noted, was the previously mentioned visit by chief of staff Karadayı to Israel from February 24-28. This visit, which was not cleared by the prime minister’s office, was generally seen as a message by the chief of staff to the government that the former would continue to carry out its relationship with Israel as it saw fit, and that Erbakan was powerless to stop them. Adding further gravity to the visit was the fact that upon his return to Turkey General Karadayı and the MGK presented the Refah Partisi government with a list of eighteen demands aimed at hindering the influence of Islamists within the state and society at large. What this ultimately indicates of course is just how symbolic Turkey’s growing ties with Israel had become for the domestic issues facing the country at the time.\textsuperscript{384}

With such domestic tension at hand over issues which included matters such as Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel, we must ask ourselves from the viewpoint of Neoclassical Realism as to how the military-led FPE, was able to form a coalition and ultimately assert its authority in driving Turkish foreign policy toward Israel? Corollary to that, we must attempt to understand how the military was even able to dictate foreign policy in the way that it did in a system where it was nominally under the control of the prime minister. In order to answer these questions then, we must recount a brief history of the Turkish military’s institutional authority in the aftermath of the 1960 coup.

As we recall, the 1961 constitution and the system of government that it created gave the military considerable amount of influence through the MGK, a body designed to act as oversight committee for national security. This was probably best signified by the structure of the MGK itself, which was dominated by the armed forces whose active and retired member controlled the Undersecretariat, which was responsible for

\textsuperscript{382} Ibid., 30.

\textsuperscript{383} Name from Birand and Yıldız, \textit{Son Darbe}.

\textsuperscript{384} Yavuz, “Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate,” 30.
the preparation of documents and briefing reports. This meant that the military was effectively able to determine the committee’s agenda. The agenda and the ensuing statements issued by the committee after every meeting were nothing to be dismissed out of hand, as the latter were not be taken as mere recommendations. This particularly became the case after the adoption of the 1982 constitution, which under Article 118 stated that the official statements and expressions of the MGK were to be “give[n] priority consideration” by the cabinet.

Such consideration was made even more relevant by the fact that the chief of staff’s office had considerable influence, if not complete control, over the formulation of the National Security Policy Document, an annually-updated document that officially listed national security threats and outlined the proper courses of action in dealing with them. What this meant of course was that the military officially determined what was and what was not a threat to national security and how the government was to deal with it. This was demonstrated in April 1997 when the military explicitly named labeled Islamist movements along with Kurdish separatism as the prime threat to the Turkish state, something of which was clearly meant as a message to Erbakan’s government.

As if all of this was not enough, Law No. 2945 of the MGK (1983) gave the Undersecretariat unlimited and unfettered access to any civilian bureaucracy it saw fit in order to ensure that the will of the military was being carried out. The foreign ministry was of course included under this umbrella, meaning that foreign policy could veritably be controlled by the military.

All of this institutional authority was supplemented by a kind of informal power that the military held within Turkish society. It was far from rare, for instance, for the military to have informal contacts with members of the government and civil

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389 Yavuz, “Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate,” 30.
servants, the media,\textsuperscript{390} members of various political parties,\textsuperscript{391} various NGO’s, the business community, including the powerful Turkish Industrialists and Businessman’s Association, or Tüsiad,\textsuperscript{392} as well the judiciary and prosecutor’s offices.\textsuperscript{393} This informal power only increased in the 1990s during the conflict with the terrorist PKK, as security issues came to the forefront and gave the military more legitimacy in the eyes of the conflict-weary public who had come to lose faith in their elected officials to bring about stability.\textsuperscript{394}

All of this formal and informal power was of course brought down upon Erbakan’s government. Not only did the chief of staff utilize the MGK with its eighteen-point plan of February 28 and the alteration of the National Security Document to include Islamist political activities as one of the main threats to national security, but it also held press conferences detailing the alleged connection between Islamist groups and Kurdish separatists and blacklisted numerous corporations, newspapers, magazines, television stations, and student groups that it believed were promoting Islamist activities.\textsuperscript{395} Finally, the military even utilized its common cause with many in the judiciary to have the Refah Partisi closed down and Erbakan banned from politics for a five-year period roughly six months after his resignation in June 1997.\textsuperscript{396} In regards to Turkey’s relationship with Israel, this pressure was utilized to force Erbakan, despite his personal opposition, to ratify the August 1996 military agreement concerning Turkey’s F-4 Phantoms and a free-trade agreement in December 1996 and April 1997, respectively.\textsuperscript{397}

Although we must obviously be careful and not misinterpret all of this maneuvering by the military merely as means to obtaining the relationship with Israel that it desired as Erbakan and his supporters believed,\textsuperscript{398} we can indeed understand and

\textsuperscript{390} Jenkins “Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey,” 344.
\textsuperscript{391} Ibid., 346.
\textsuperscript{392} Dorronsoro and Gourisse, “The Turkish Army in Politics: Institutional Autonomy, the Formation of Social Coalitions, and the Production of Crises,” 82.
\textsuperscript{393} Ibid., 84.
\textsuperscript{394} Jenkins “Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey,” 345.
\textsuperscript{395} Yavuz, “Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate,” 30-31.
\textsuperscript{396} Jenkins “Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey,” 344.
\textsuperscript{397} Yavuz, “Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate,” 28-29.
\textsuperscript{398} Ibid., 31.
deduce several things from the so-called “post-modern coup” in regards to the military’s ability to carry out its desired course with Israel in the face of domestic opposition. First and foremost, we can understand the sheer power, both formal and informal, that the military held within Turkish society at the time. Such power of course was not something that could have been taken lightly by anyone, politician or otherwise, who would have considered voicing their opposition to the military’s policy toward Israel. This would have especially been the case considering that the army had on two previous occasions—1971 and 1980—more than adequately demonstrated its willingness to detain, torture, and even execute those it deemed to be a threat to society.\(^{399}\) Second, given the intense polarization between the secular and pro-Islamist elements of Turkish society during the late 1990s and the military’s decision to ultimately curb the latter both politically and socially,\(^{400}\) we can assume that sections of society that were supportive of the military’s decision were, at least for a little while, more than willing to remain mute over the Israeli factor considering that the military was carrying out a domestic agenda that they agreed with. Finally, we can also assume that any business unaffected by the military’s blacklisting of businesses in early 1997,\(^{401}\) as well as those set to benefit from the expanding trade relationship with Israel,\(^{402}\) were more than happy to support, or at least silently acquiesce toward the armed forces drive toward stronger ties with Jerusalem.

With all of this in mind, however, we must note that the military’s domestic coalition for pursuing better ties with Israel during this time period was not merely built by intimidation and acquiescence. Indeed, we must not forget that there were plenty of politicians and political parties who were not only supportive of closer ties with Israel, but were also instrumental themselves in forming those ties. First among these of course was Demirel, who as we recall, had been relatively pro-Israeli since the 1950s during his time in the DP.\(^{403}\) It had also been him of course who as prime


\(^{400}\) Yavuz, “Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate,” 29-34.

\(^{401}\) Ibid., 30.

\(^{402}\) By 1999, bilateral trade between Turkey and Israel reached a reported $1 billion, a sharp increase from the mere $54 million in 1987. See Stern and Ross, “The Role of Syria in Israeli-Turkish Relations,” 118.

\(^{403}\) Bengio, *The Turkish-Israeli Relationship*, 50.
minister elected to upgrade Israel’s representation in Ankara to the ambassadorial level in 1991. Moreover, it had also been his government which signed the Tourism Cooperation Agreement with Israel in June 1992.  

Following his ascendancy to the presidency after Özal’s sudden death in April 1993, Demirel continued to oversee the expansion of ties with Israel with his successor as prime minister and DYP leader, Tansu Çiller. In the middle and later years of the decade, Demirel even went so far as to make two official visits to Israel in March 1996 and July 1999, respectively. During the course of the first visit Demirel signed four separate agreements concerning trade and economic ties, including the one concerning free trade that Erbakan was forced to ratify in April 1997 under pressure from the military. Taking such policies into consideration, we can readily conclude that Demirel, and along with him the office of the presidency, was unequivocally behind the military in regards to Israel.

Given this support from Demirel, we can also assume that many within his DYP were also supportive of Turkey having better relations with Israel. After all, it is hard to imagine that prior to his ascendancy to the presidency that Demirel would have made foreign policy decisions completely out of step with his own party. This especially makes sense when we consider the support for stronger ties with Israel that Çiller herself showed as prime minister. Her visit in 1994, for instance, not only witnessed the previously-mentioned anti-terrorist agreement, but as mentioned before, also marked the first visit to Israel by a Turkish prime minister. While there,

404 Robins, Suits and Uniforms, 250.
405 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 294.
410 Bolukbasi, “Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View,” 31.
411 Yavuz, “Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate,” 28.
412 Bolukbasi, “Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View,” 31.
413 Robins, Suits and Uniforms, 251.
she also referred to her country’s relationship with Israel as “strategic” and took time to applaud Zionism and reap praise on David Ben Gurion by comparing him to Atatürk.

Coming from another part of the political spectrum was Türkeş and the MHP. As we recall from the introduction, despite holding a conservative Anatolian base and utilizing Islamic themes and symbols, at its core the MHP was not an Islamist party, nor was its founder sympathetic to Arab world’s treatment of Israel. In a 1975 book on Turkish foreign policy, Türkeş acknowledged Israel as “a reality that has found a place in the Middle East,” and argued that the Arab states were “wrong to continually enter into bloody wars” with Israel and should instead work toward finding “solutions for a peaceful settlement with Israel.” By the early 1990s the MHP leader became convinced that a positive relationship with the Jewish state would be beneficial for Turkey’s foreign policy, particularly in countering the Armenian and Greek lobbies in Washington. To promote such a relationship, he attended a shabbat service at a synagogue in Istanbul’s Balat district in 1992 and held a talk on the benefits of improving relations with Israel where he acknowledged meeting with Israeli statesman Shimon Peres and President Ezer Weizmann. By doing such, Türkeş may have very well been going against the wishes of some in his party and the nationalist right, which since the 1980s had been becoming more and more Islamist in their outlook. Nevertheless, by advocating deeper relations with Israel, Türkeş was obviously providing a degree of domestic legitimacy to the strengthening of ties between Turkey and Israel, something of which would have been valuable to the military when it was eager to do just that.

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414 Quoted in Bolukbasi, “Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View,” 31.
415 Yavuz, “Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate,” 28.
419 Although the details of the forum which he held the talk and the way in which he met Peres and Weizmann were unclear, the video of his talk can be found under the heading of “Alparslan Türkeş: İsrail bir çok Devletten birisidir, Türkiye'nin Menfaati Önce Gelir,” at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4XOLhUznB5M.
421 Bengio, *The Turkish-Israeli Relationship*, 77-78.
This support for a positive relationship with Israel was not only forthcoming from the right, however. During his premiership from 1999-2002, Bülent Ecevit even seems to have become somewhat of a convert to the military’s way of thinking. In 2002 his government signed two separate agreements with Israel concerning the outfitting of 300 of the TAF’s helicopters with new electronic combat systems for the price of $110 million and the aforementioned upgrading of 170 of the army’s American-made M60 tanks in exchange for the $668 million. While Ecevit reportedly had his reservations about these agreements, he was ultimately convinced by the chief of staff to sign the agreements and defended this policy despite some opposition in parliament.422

What makes this support by Ecevit and his government so remarkable is threefold. First of course was the Prime Minister’s sympathy for the Palestinians which had clearly been put on display during the events described in the previous chapter. Second, is the fact that the agreement was signed in the midst of the Second Intifada and the Turkish public’s sympathy for the Palestinian cause.423 Finally, the coalition government that Ecevit was sitting on consisted his own center-left Demokratik Sol Partisi, ANAP, and the MHP—a group of parties that obviously comprised a large swath of the political spectrum.424 Taken together, these two facts tell us at least one of two things: that the political establishment and a good deal of the political spectrum were, as Bengio asserts, largely behind the military’s desire to seek better relations with Israel,425 or, at the very least, that the military had that much power in pressuring civilian officials to go along with such policy and neutralizing any opposition.

4.5. Conclusion

When we take all of the international and domestic factors that Turkey had to face in the post-Cold War world into consideration from a Neoclassical Realist lens, we can come to two basic conclusions: first and foremost, we clearly see how the international structure and regional dynamics provided Israel with enough incentive

422 Ibid., 114-116.
423 Ibid.
425 Bengio, The Turkish-Israeli Relationship, 74-89.
for the Turkish FPE to seek the relationship that it did, as the threats emanating from Turkey’s neighbors and the uncertainly of the unipolar world forced Ankara into a position where it had to hedge its bets with the US and its other main ally in the region. This policy fit in line perfectly with the perceptions of the military establishment, which sought to keep Turkey within the West due to its Kemalist ideology. That said, however, we cannot, as we have seen, view Turkey’s rapprochement with Israel as a mere reflection of its domestic policy, as the international incentives were obviously already there.  

Second, when we compare this period with the previous one, we notice a stark difference in terms of the domestic factors and the role that they played in facilitating Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel. In the Cold War era, we realized that by and large Turkey’s domestic scene merely reinforced the logical policies that Menderes and other prime minister’s pursued toward Israel. In the post-Cold War era, however, the domestic scene in many ways acted both against and for the policy of alignment that the military pursued, as rising Islamism and anti-Israeli sentiments collided with the military’s desire to remain a part of the Western alliance. At the end of the day though, the latter’s domestic leverage combined with enough of the political establishment’s desire, or at least willingness, to overcome such opposition.

426 Ibid., 72-126.
CHAPTER 5

TAking Another Turn for the Worse: Turkish Foreign Policy Toward Israel in a Multipolar World, 2003-2010

5.1. Introduction

By the start of the new millennium, Turkey’s relationship with Israel was heading to what was seemingly a harmonious apex. Not only was Ankara in the process of honoring its contractual obligations regarding military affairs and hardware outlined in the previous chapter, but it was also conducting biannual naval\(^{427}\) and near-annual aerial training exercises,\(^ {428}\) as well engaging in intelligence cooperation and high-level security meetings with the Jewish state. The relationship seemed so strong that Ankara even appeared to be gaining dividends from it via its old rivalry with Syria when it coerced Hafez al-Assad into ending his relationship with the terrorist PKK organization and deporting its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, from Syrian soil—something of which may have very well not taken place had it not been for the threat of war for Syrian on both its Turkish and Israeli fronts.\(^ {429}\) All told, the relationship seemed to be, in the words of General Bir, “serv[ing] as a beacon of optimism” for Turkey.\(^ {430}\)

By the end of the decade, however, this “beacon”\(^ {431}\) would come crashing down with the events of 2010. In May of that year, a flotilla predominately organized

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\(^{427}\) Babaoğlu, “Reliant Mermaid Naval Exercise: Increasing the Peacetime Role of Navies.”

\(^{428}\) From 2001-2005, Israel participated with Turkey in the “Anatolian Eagle” aerial training exercise every year except 2002. For a complete list of the participants in the exercise on a year by year basis, see “History,” Anadolukartal.tsk.tr.com, last modified September 26, 2019, https://www.anadolukartali.tsk.tr/Custom/AnadoluKartaliEN/124.


\(^{430}\) Quoted in ibid., 9.

\(^{431}\) Ibid.
by the İnsan Yardım Vakfı (IHH), a pro-Palestinian, Islamic organization with ties to the Turkish government, set sail from Turkey toward the Gaza Strip in an attempt to run the Israeli blockade and deliver humanitarian aid to the impoverished Palestinians of the area. Despite negotiations between Turkey and Israel aimed at finding an alternative solution and avoiding a confrontation between Israeli forces and the participants of the flotilla, the latter set sail with tacit approval from officials in Ankara and by late May reached the international waters off the coast of Gaza. It was there on May 31 where Israeli commandos boarded the largest of the six vessels in the flotilla, the Mavi Marmara. While details regarding how the violence started were murky, what was clear at the end of the day was that ten Turkish citizens, one of whom also held citizenship in the US, lay dead.

The Turkish response to the incident was one of fury: Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan referred to it as a “bloody massacre.” His foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, argued that “the time has come for Israel to pay for its stance that sees itself as above international laws and disregards human conscience,” while also adding that “the first and foremost result is that Israel is going to be devoid of Turkey’s friendship.” Even President Abdullah Gül chimed in, stating that “Turkey’s relations with Israel will never be the same again.” The Turkish government’s response was not just a verbal one, however. Following the incident Ankara took the step of withdrawing its ambassador in Tel Aviv, and demanded that Israel do the same.

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436 Quoted in ibid.

437 Özcan, “From Strategic Partnership to Successive Crises: Turkish-Israeli Relations in the 2000s,” 42.

438 Ibid.

year and froze some sixteen different military contracts estimated to be at a value of $56 billion. Eventually, Ankara also downgraded relations with Jerusalem to the level of second secretary. All of this took place despite the best efforts of the US to reconcile the former allies, which the superpower was ultimately unable to do as a result of Turkey’s insistence that Israel not only apologize for the incident and compensate the families of the Mavi Marmara victims, but also put an end to the blockade of Gaza—terms of which Israel was unwilling to agree to. Both countries, therefore, found themselves at an unfavorable impasse with one another—a dramatic change from just several years earlier.

Of course, rarely in history does a single event determine the entire course of a relationship between two countries, and in this case Turkey’s relationship with Israel from 2003-2010 was no exception. Indeed, the two countries experienced numerous difficulties and points of contention in those seven years, such as their disagreements over the Second Intifada, the Turkish government’s embracing of Hamas following its election victory in 2006, the so-called “lower chair” incident when the Turkish ambassador to Israel was publicly humiliated by the Israeli foreign ministry by childishly being forced to sit in a shorter chair than the Israeli officials present at the press conference, and of course, the start of Operation Cast Lead in late 2008, which brought the Turkish government’s noble efforts to bring peace between Syria and Israel to an ignominious end, and which was capped off by prime minister Erdoğan’s famous walk out at a summit meeting of world leaders in Davos. Compared to the comradery of the 1990s, these events defined a tumultuous decade between Ankara and Jerusalem which saw their relationship, in the words of scholar Mesut Özcan, go “from strategic partnership to successive crises.”

Assuming that this dramatic shift was not merely the result of unfortunate luck, we naturally have to ask ourselves as to how relations between Turkey and Israel

440 Özcan, “From Strategic Partnership to Successive Crises: Turkish-Israeli Relations in the 2000s,” 42.
443 For two excellent summaries of events between Israel and Turkey during these years, see Özlem Tür, “Turkey and Israel in the 2000s—From Cooperation to Conflict,” Israel Studies, vol. 17, no. 3 (Fall 2012): 31-51.
444 Özcan, “ From Strategic Partnership to Successive Crises: Turkish-Israeli Relations in the 2000s,” 45.
declined in the fashion that they did? As we will see in greater detail below, when we examine that relationship from 2003-2010 through the lens of Neoclassical Realism we find that a combination of international, regional and domestic factors had an effect on Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel during that time period.\footnote{Tür, “Turkey and Israel in the 2000s—From Cooperation to Conflict,” 31-51.} On the international level, the shift in the international system from a unipolar world to a multipolar one created a scenario for Turkey in which it was no longer as dependent on the US as it had been in previous years.\footnote{Brom, “The Israeli-Turkish Relationship,” 61.} This situation was aggravated by numerous points of strain between the old allies that predominately revolved around the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.\footnote{Soli Ozel, “Indispensable Even when Unreliable: An Anatomy of Turkish-American relations,” *International Journal*, vol. 67, no. 1 (Winter 2011-2012): 53-64.} With such strains between Washington and Ankara present, the latter no longer saw a strong bond with Israel as as beneficial as it had a mere decade earlier given that it no longer needed the US as strongly as it once did.\footnote{Tür, “Turkey and Israel in the 2000s—From Cooperation to Conflict,” 60-61.}

On the regional level, Turkey’s relationship with its Middle Eastern neighbors improved significantly during this time period, meaning that a strong, military-based relationship with Israel was no longer as essential as it had been when Turkey saw itself surrounded by potential adversaries.\footnote{Soli Özel, “Reshuffling the Cards: Turkey, Israel, and the United States in the Middle East,” in *Troubled Alliance: The United States, Turkey, and Israel in the New Middle East*, ed. William B. Quandt (Charlottesville, VA: Center for International Studies, University of Virginia, 2011), 51.} Additionally, the start of the Second Intifada and the breakdown of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process forced Turkey to distance itself from Israel.\footnote{Ibid., 47.} There was also the serious disagreement between the two countries over Israel’s alleged support for Kurdish militants in northern Iraq in the aftermath of the US invasion there, something of which deeply irritated Turkish officials and helped further erode Israel’s image in their eyes.\footnote{Tür, “Turkey and Israel in the 2000s—From Cooperation to Conflict,” 57-59.}

Finally, on the domestic level the rise of the AKP and the sidelining of the military\footnote{Waldman and Caliskan, *The New Turkey*, 15-48.} from the foreign policy making-decision process not only completely disengaged the strongest proponent for strong relations with Israel from the realm of...
Turkish foreign policy making, but also paved the road for a party with very different foreign policy ideals to take the helm.\textsuperscript{453} Helping the government in those pursuits was a public which largely sympathized with the Palestinian people and held, at least on some level, anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic views.\textsuperscript{454} Add to that a political opposition which also largely sympathized with the Palestinians and understood that the public did as well, and we understand that the government was largely given a free hand in pursuing the policy that it did toward Israel.

5.2. The International Factors: The Coming of the Multipolar World

The factor that we must examine before all else of course is the international structure that existed at the time. In this case that means understanding the gradual evolution of the unipolar international structure to a multipolar one. In 2002, the United States stood above and beyond as the world’s most-preeminent power. Its economy was not only the world’s largest,\textsuperscript{455} but also accounted for nearly a third of the world’s total GDP.\textsuperscript{456} Militarily the US also belonged in a column all to itself, accounting for 43% of the world’s total military expenditures—more than the combination of the next top twenty military spenders.\textsuperscript{457}

Like anything else in history, however, it was not to last and by the end of the decade American hegemony was beginning to show its share of cracks, as countries like China, Russia, India, and others enjoyed substantial economic growth and began to assert themselves on the world’s stage.\textsuperscript{458} While still maintaining its position at the top, by 2010 the American economy would see its share of the world economy drop to

\textsuperscript{453} Özel, “Reshuffling the Cards: Turkey, Israel, and the United States in the Middle East,”\textsuperscript{51-52.}
\textsuperscript{454} Eligür, “Crisis in Turkish-Israeli Relations (December 2008-June 2011): From Partnership to Enmity,” \textsuperscript{437-439.}
\textsuperscript{458} Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment Revisited,” \textsuperscript{7.}
22.9%, while China would see its share from 2002-2010 rise from 4.3% to 9.3%. By 2010, China in fact would have the world’s largest manufacturing economy, a title of which had been held by the US since the early twentieth century. Parallel to these developments, those two countries, along with Russia, would increase their defense spending and begin to account for greater shares of the world’s total military expenditures. Put simply, the US was still at the top of the world’s power structure, but it was no longer as alone as it had been the previous decade.

This new dynamic of course was also playing itself out in the Middle East. While little argument could be made that the US was still not the preeminent outside power in the region, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 severely damaged American credibility in the region and the world at large and tied it down to no end while sapping its blood and treasure. It also opened up a whole slew of other problems, such as the unchecked rise of Iran through its Shia proxies in Iraq, and an increase in anti-American radicalism. To make matters even more complicated for the US, China and Russia were both making inroads with Iran while at the same timing leveraging concessions from Washington in exchange for their support of sanctions in the U.N. Security Council over Iran’s nuclear program. Boosting China’s position in the region of course was its own expanding trade ties in there, which in monetary terms were expanding exponentially in countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran and which eventually made it the world’s largest exporter in the area. In short, the US was no longer the only power in town.

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460 “USA: Percent of world GDP.”
462 Layne, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the “Pax Americana,”” 205.
468 Ibid., 220-221.
469 Haass, “The New Middle East.”
If Washington was struggling to maintain a grip on the region at the time, however, its Turkish allies were faring quite well. Between 2002 and 2010, Turkey’s GDP expanded from 521 billion to 771 billion, making it the world’s eighteenth-largest economy by 2008. Such economic success naturally gave Ankara more clout in the region and placed it in a position whereby it was no longer as dependent on the US for its security. To be sure, Turkey would not completely abandon its long-held alliance with the US during this time period, its decision to allow a NATO radar system to be placed on its soil as a part of anti-Iranian missile-defense system being a prime example. It was, however, inclined to act more independently than it had in the 1990s when it clung tightly to its NATO ally. A perfect example of this was Turkey’s blooming military relationship with China found at the end of the decade which saw joint technology ventures and air force drills at the Anatolian Eagle exercise of 2010—an annual exercise which had initially been developed as joint Turkish-American-Israeli one.

This trend was only helped along by the points of tension that existed between Washington and Ankara at the time, namely over Iraq following the invasion of 2003. Disagreements over Iraq had been present between the two allies since the 1991 Gulf War when Turkish statesmen began to voice their complaints over the US’s lenient policy towards the Kurds in northern Iraq, which they felt merely created a safe-haven for Kurdish separatists launching attacks on Turkish soil. It was with this reasoning that many Turkish politicians opposed the American invasion, as they felt the collapse of the central government in Baghdad would only make their government more susceptible to terrorist attacks. This opposition of course manifested itself in the Turkish parliament’s rejection of a bill in March 2003 that would have given


472 Ozel, “Indispensable even when unreliable: An Anatomy of Turkish-American relations,” 53-64.


474 Pfeffer, “Growing Ties Between Turkey, China, Iran Worry Israel and U.S.”

Washington permission to launch a front from Turkish soil—an event which significantly irritated the latter.

While the Turkish government attempted to make amends for its half-hearted attempt to pass the initiative by allowing the US access to its airspace for the invasion, the strain between the two allies only increased as Turkey’s fears were realized and the number of terrorist PKK attacks on its soil rose. Ankara felt at this time of course that much of the problem stemmed from Washington’s inability to take its concerns over the issue seriously. This point of contention along with the evolving world order put distance between Ankara and Washington, and encouraged the former to pursue a more independent foreign policy than it did in the 1990s, when the US was not only the strongest player at the table, but for all intents and purposes, the owner of the casino. And given the strong link between Turkey’s close relationship with the US and Israel at the time, relations with the latter were bound to take a hit on some level as the Turkish-American axis began to come under strain. If in the eyes of Ankara the road to Washington lay through Jerusalem, then that road was inevitably going to lose some degree of importance once the Turks decided they no longer wanted to frequent the American capital for coffee on the Potomac as much. An excellent example of this was the cancellation of the 2009 Anatolian Eagle exercises, which were set to take place between the US, Turkey, Israel, and Italy that autumn, but were called off after the US and Italy opted not to come after Israel was disinvited—something that would have been nearly unthinkable just ten years before. Instead, Turkey cut a link to the US by cutting another one with Israel, demonstrating the drop of importance of those allies for Turkey. From a structural perspective, we should also not fail to consider the fact that merely a year after the cancellation of the Anatolian Eagle exercises, Turkey would hold joint air force drills with China, as it

476 Çağaptay, Erdoğan’s Empire, 90-92.
478 Tür, “Turkey and Israel in the 2000s—From Cooperation to Conflict,” 60-61.
480 Pfeffer, “Growing Ties Between Turkey, China, Iran Worry Israel and U.S.”
demonstrates the rise of the latter and the opportunity for Turkey to develop alternative relationships.\footnote{Eli\,gûr, “Crisis in Turkish-Israeli Relations (December 2008-June 2011): From Partnership to Enmity,” 448.}

\section*{5.3. The Regional Factors}

Perhaps even more influential than the changes on the international level during this time period were the shifts in regional dynamics. As shall be discussed in more detail below, the threats emanating from Turkey’s three immediate neighbors in the region—Syria, Iraq, and Iran—were either ameliorated in some capacity or ceased to exist, helping diminish Turkey’s need for a robust military alliance with Israel.\footnote{"Özel, “Reshuffling the Cards: Turkey, Israel, and the United States in the Middle East,” 51.} Syria\footnote{Meliha Benli Altun\’sk and Özlem Tür, “From Distant Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations,” \textit{Security Dialogue}, vol. 37, no. 2 (June 2006): 239-245.} and Iran\footnote{Cağaptay, \textit{Erdoğan’s Empire}, 157-159.} would in fact come to be allies of Turkey’s in their own right, while the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq not only removed a common enemy of Turkey and Israel,\footnote{Arbell, “The U.S.-Turkey-Israel Triangle,” 10.} but would even prove to form a serious point of contention between the two sides, as Ankara became wary of Israel’s reported contacts with Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq.\footnote{Tür, “Turkey and Israel in the 2000s—From Cooperation to Conflict,” 57-58.} In addition to these factors, severe setbacks in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process once again made Turkey’s relationship with Israel something of a liability for Ankara and its budding relationship with the Arab world.\footnote{Ibid., 52-55 and Soli\,Özel, “Reshuffling the Cards: Turkey, Israel, and the United States in the Middle East,” 47.} Taken all together, these different factors further lowered Israel’s stock in the eyes of Turkish officials from its all-time high in the 1990s, and even made it a liability in certain regards.\footnote{Tür, “Turkey and Israel in the 2000s—From Cooperation to Conflict,” 52-58 and 57-58.}

Out of all these factors, the one that had probably evolved the most from the late 1990s to the early 2000s was Turkey’s relationship with Syria. As we saw in the previous section, Turkish-Syrian relations in the mid to latter part of 1990s were at a historical low, with the two sides nearly going to war with one another in 1998 over...
the Assad regime’s harboring of the terrorist PKK organization. While military conflict was averted in the end, the tension between Ankara and Damascus had helped pushed the former into the arms of Israel probably more than any other factor at the time. By 1999 this tension had begun to soothe over, however, as the two sides sought to peacefully reconcile their differences with one another. Under the threat of war from the Turkey, Hafez al-Assad agreed to expel the terrorist PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and agree to the Adana Accords of October 1998, which required his regime to halt his support for the terrorist PKK organization and close down its camps on Syrian soil. Less than six months later Öcalan was arrested by Turkish intelligence officials in Kenya and the two sides embarked on the road to reconciliation, establishing a telephone hotline between their respective capitals and appointing various officials and committees to ensure that Damascus was complying with the agreement. The sudden improvement in relations between the two sides was signified by Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s attending of Hafez al-Assad’s funeral in 2000, something of which would have been almost unimaginable just a few years before.

To sweeten it all, the two countries also began to develop a friendly economic relationship. By mutual agreement the two countries delinked the issue over the GAP dam project from other economic issues and set about improving their trade ties, signing a free-trade agreement in 2004 and agreeing to other measures to help facilitate trade across the border, such as the granting of visa-free travel for Syrians coming to Turkey. The burgeoning new relationship was even marked by a visit from Hafez’s

489 Altunışık and Tür, “From Distant Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations,” 236-238.
491 Altunışık and Tür, “From Distant Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations,” 238.
494 Çağaptay, *Erdoğan’s Empire*, 115.
son and heir, Bashar al-Assad, to Ankara in 2004, as well the mutual vacationing of the Erdoğan and Assad families four years later.

While not quite as cozy as the Syrian front, Turkey’s relationship with Iran during this time period was also beginning to improve as both sides began seeking a better relationship with one another. The capture of the terrorist Öcalan and the subsequent ceasefire with his terrorist organization, along with the military defeat of Hezbollah had assuaged much of Turkey’s animosity toward Iran, while the latter’s reformist president, Muhammed Khatami, was eager to bring an end to much of his country’s isolation within the region. As a result, both sides set aside their ideological differences and began working toward building a more cooperative relationship. Trade agreements were signed and commercial ventures approved, such as a 25-year agreement for Turkey to purchase over $20 billion-worth of natural gas. The blossoming new relationship was even marked by an official visit to the Islamic republic by President Sezer in June 2002, a significant feat considering the president’s staunch secular values.

With the seeds for a new commercial relationship planted, the tree only continued to grow throughout the first decade of the millennium, with bilateral trade reaching the $10 billion mark in 201—a nearly $9 billion increase from 2001. As of that same year, Turkey had also increased its oil and natural gas imports from Iran to the point that it was then receiving roughly a quarter of its imports of those respective commodities from its eastern neighbor. Even tourism was on the incline, with the number of Iranian tourists visiting Turkey leaping from 330,000 to 1.8 billion between 2001 and 2010.

To be sure, Turkish-Iranians during this period were far from conflict free, as both sides were vying for influence in Iraq in the wake of the power vacuum left by

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496 Çağaptay, Erdoğan’s Empire, 115.
497 Ibid., 72.
498 Aaron Stein and Phillip C. Bleek, “Turkish-Iranian Relations: From “Friends to Benefits” to “It’s Complicated,”” Insight Turkey, vol.14, no.4 (Fall 2012): 137-138. For more on Turkish-Iranian relations following the revolution, see Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, 53-58.
500 Çağaptay, Erdoğan’s Empire, 157.
501 Sinkaya, “Rationalization of Turkey-Iran Relations: Prospects and Limits,” 141-143.
the invasion and Tehran could not fully reconcile its revolutionary identity with Turkey’s alliance with the US. Nevertheless, the relationship between the two had clearly improved compared to the headier days of the 1990s and happened at a time when tensions between Israel and Iran were starting to simmer once again. This, in combination with the nearly-180 degree turn in Turkish-Syrian relations meant that Ankara’s need for a robust military relationship with Israel had been greatly diminished. After all, much of the impetus for Turkey’s alignment with Israel in the 1990s was a result of the potential threats it was facing at the regional level, particularly those emanating from its three Middle Eastern neighbors. With two of those of three now having been transformed into friendships, Israel’s stock had greatly diminished in the Turkish capital.

Not helping matters any further for Israel in the Ankara stock exchange was the situation in northern Iraq, where Turkish and Israeli officials were at direct odds with one another over the latter’s alleged support for various Kurdish factions within Iraq’s borders. The idea for such support from the Israeli’s perspective was that with the occupation of Iraq having gone awry, Israel could use its ties with the Kurds of northern Iraq to help fund, arm, and train various peshmerga units to act as a counterbalance against radical Sunni cells and Shia militias receiving support from Iran operating within the country. While Israel had of course provided support for peshmerga units within Iraq before, this time the threat was even more grave to Turkey considering the power vacuum in Iraq and the possibility that the Kurds there may make the leap and declare their independence from Baghdad. From the standpoint of Turkey then, Israel’s actions in Iraq were not capable of being overlooked.

As if things could not become any more difficult between Turkey and Israel on the structural level, the outbreak of the Second Intifada in late 2000 helped bring relations between the two countries to another low. Over the next five years, Israel

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503 Sinkaya, “Rationalization of Turkey-Iran Relations: Prospects and Limits,” 148-149.

504 Tür, “Turkey and Israel in the 2000s—From Cooperation to Conflict,” 49-52.

505 Ibid., 57-59. For more detail on Israel’s support for the peshmerga in northern Iraq, see Seymour M. Hersch, “Plan B,” The New Yorker, June 28, 2004, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/06/28/plan-b-2. For more on Israel’s earlier relationship with the Kurds, see Alpher, Periphery, 51-60.

506 Özcan, “From Strategic Partnership to Successive Crises: Turkish-Israeli Relations in the 2000s,” 37.
and the occupied territories would burn as Palestinians carried out numerous attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians alike, while the IDF exorbitantly retaliated using scorched-earth tactics. The bloodshed witnessed during these years not only brought about the ignominious end of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, but also severely tarnished the image of Israel in much of the world’s eyes, who witnessed the horrific aftermath of IDF attacks on Palestinian refugee camps on their television screens.

Realizing the pressure that the Intifada placed their country under for its relationship with Israel, the governments of both Bülent Ecevit and his successor, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, excoriated Israel for its actions, and in their own way, sent the message that their governments could only continue to hold a relationship with it for so long under the circumstances. From a political view, both prime ministers were wholly correct in their assessment of such. As made evident during the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy toward Israel as it related to the Arab world was paramount to walking along an axis between two poles: the closer it got to one the more distant it got from the other. The Peace Process, however, altered this dynamic and shielded Turkey from criticism in the Arab world, allowing it to pursue a closer relationship with Israel absent a zero-sum function. With that process mired in blood, however, Turkey no longer had the leeway it once did and Israel yet again became a liability for it in its own backyard.

When we consider all of these factors then, it should come as little surprise that Turkey’s relationship with Israel from 2003-2010 was not the same as it had been in the 1990s. Having mended its relationship with Syria and Iran, Turkey simply no longer needed Israel in the same way it had over the course of the previous decade. When this change was combined with the conflicting interests over northern Iraq and the end of the Peace Process, it becomes readily apparent how Turkey and Israel suffered a significant decline in their relationship. No Turkish government, Kemalist, Islamist or otherwise, would have had the incentive, much less the leeway, to maintain the relationship that was born out of the previous regional structure.

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508 Tür, “Turkey and Israel in the 2000s—From Cooperation to Conflict,” 52-56 and Özcan, “From Strategic Partnership to Successive Crises,” 37.

509 Ibid.

510 Tür, “Turkey and Israel in the 2000s—From Cooperation to Conflict,” 52-59 and Özcan, “From Strategic Partnership to Successive Crises,” 35-37.
5.4 The Domestic Factors: Introduction

While we have clearly seen how the international and regional factors of the day had a hand in forging Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel in the first decade of the twenty-first century, we have to ask ourselves as to whether these structural elements can entirely explain Turkey’s hand in allowing the relationship to sink to such a low point? In other words, would any Turkish FPE under any leadership, regardless of political persuasion or domestic factors that may have come into play, have made the same decisions that were made at that time? Would a government under Süleyman Demirel, for instance, have made the decision to support the Mavi Marmara flotilla in the same way that the government at the time did? Would a military-led FPE have launched a scathing propaganda campaign against Israel in the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead? Would any other government have foresworn the traditional balance between Israel and the Palestinians so strongly in favor of the latter?

Given what we know about these figures and the history of Turkish foreign policy toward Israel, it would be difficult to answer any of these questions in the affirmative with complete certitude. For that reason we have to go beyond the international and regional and examine the domestic as well. More specifically, we have to consider the composition of the FPE and the framework from which its leaders saw the world. We also have to take into consideration public opinion and the potential ramifications that it may have had on Turkish foreign policy toward Israel.

5.5. The FPE: The Rise of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi

The first domestic issue that we must take into consideration is the FPE itself so that we can understand how the region and the world at large were being viewed by members of the FPE, as well how any other domestic factors may have influenced the FPE’s decision-making process. In addition to all of the changes that took place during this time period on the international level, the Turkish state and the FPE along with it

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511 See Karmon and Barak, “Erdoğan’s Turkey and the Palestinian Issue,” 77.
513 For more on Turkey’s support for Palestinian causes, see Karmon and Barak, “Erdoğan’s Turkey and the Palestinian Issue,” 74-85.
were undergoing tremendous changes that certainly played their own part in Ankara’s shift in policy toward Israel. Put briefly, this was the rise and consolidation of power by the AKP under the leadership of prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and its civilianization (sivillesme) of the foreign policy decision-making process, a development of which allowed for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic an Islamist-rooted party to pursue its own foreign policy goals unfettered by the military establishment. As we shall see shortly, such developments were to prove highly consequential in the long run for Turkish-Israeli relations.

The seminal moment for all of these changes almost undoubtedly came in 2001 with the formation of the AKP by Erdoğan and two of his close associates, Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arınç. All three men had been dedicated members of Erbakan’s Islamist movement for decades, but following the ousting from government and the subsequent closure of the Refah Partisi in 1998, however, the three began to lead a reform movement within the latter’s successor party, the Fazilet Partisi. According to them, the Islamist movement in Turkey would have to adopt a more moderate, less religiously-avowed policy if it were to achieve greater electoral success and avoid proscription by the secular military establishment.

Following the closure of the Fazilet Partisi in 2001 by the Constitutional Court for violating secular principles, Erdoğan, Gül, Arınç and other reformers formed the AKP. The main underlining principle of this new reformist party was that while Islam should undoubtedly form the basis of Turkey’s social and moral core, the country should remain a secular state efficiently governed in a democratic fashion; polls, not imams (or generals for that matter) should determine the country’s course; secular constitutions amenable to democratic processes, not sharia, should form the country’s legal base; pragmatic, thoughtful governance should be pursued, not quixotic Islamic ideals.

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This shift from Islamism to “social conservatism” resonated with many in the Turkish electorate and allowed the new party to straddle the ground between the center and Islamist right and ultimately capture most of the voters from both. When the Turkish people went to the poles in November 2002, this reach combined with the severe disenchantment and contempt that many voters held for the traditional parties in the aftermath of the financial crisis and the chaotic 1990s, and the AKP achieved a resounding victory with 34.28% of the vote and a majority of seats in parliament. The only other party to pass the electoral threshold was the CHP with roughly 20% of the vote, making the AKP, in Erdoğan’s words, “the undisputable single force of the center-right in Turkey,” and indeed, at least at the time, the sole party of the right.

Such legitimacy in the polls gave the AKP a free reign in the pursuit of its two main domestic goals at the time: economic liberation and the harmonization of Turkey’s laws and institutions with the standards of the EU. The former was considered critical by the AKP in order to ensure economic growth and the nurturing of its own conservative economic base, while the continuation of the EU process, on the other hand, was viewed as naturally augmentative to the party’s economic goals given that it would stabilize the economy and help the “Anatolian Tigers” expand into the European market. Perhaps most importantly, however, the party also wanted to utilize the EU reform process to bring the military establishment to heal and excise it from the political domain.

519 Ibid., 60-62 and Öktem, Angry Nation, 122-123.
520 Waldman and Caliskan, The New Turkey, 49.
521 Öktem, Angry Nation, 123.
522 Quoted in Waldman and Caliskan, The New Turkey, 60.
524 Öktem, Angry Nation, 126-130.
525 Ibid., 123.
527 The Anatolian Tigers was the name given to smaller, more conservative businesses of inner Anatolia who were largely seen as being loyal to the AKP. See Waldman and Caliskan, The New Turkey, 66-67.
528 Ibid., 22-24.
In order to achieve all of these ends, the AKP effectively passed several EU harmonization packages in its first term of office from 2002-2007, including four in its first eight months in office alone.\textsuperscript{529} The results were undoubtedly positive for the AKP and the country at large. Not only did the European Council conclude that Turkey had adequately fullfilled enough of the necessary criteria for joining the EU and agree to begin accession talks,\textsuperscript{530} but the Turkish economy began to grow at a staggering rate. From 2002-2007, the Turkish economy grew at average rate of 7\% per annum, putting it on a course which would come to see its GDP nearly quadruple by 2014.\textsuperscript{531} Moreover, by 2008 Turkey had become the world’s eighteenth largest economy and had seen its total sum of exports rise to $132 million—a roughly 360\% increase from 2008.\textsuperscript{532} To cap off all of this success, the AKP achieved a lopsided victory in the August 2007 elections, capturing 46.6\% of the vote and forming its second consecutive single-party government.\textsuperscript{533}

5.6. Bringing the Military to Heel: European Union Harmonization and the Civilinization of the FPE

While perhaps seemingly tangential to the realm of Turkish-Israeli relations, the success of the AKP in passing reform legislation tied to the so-called “Copenhagen Criteria,” or the list of reforms that Turkey needed to pursue in order to enter into direct negotiations with the EU for its ascent to the organization, is indeed highly pertinent to our discussion and should not be overlooked.\textsuperscript{534} As we saw in the previous chapter, by the 1990s the military had become the inveterate enemy of Turkey’s Islamists and had used its considerable influence within government and society to force them out of office in 1997 and subsequently ban the Refah and Fazilet parties. In order to ensure their own political survival and keep the military at bay, leaders of the AKP realized that they would have to curb its insitutional authority.\textsuperscript{535} In many ways, the EU

\textsuperscript{529} Öktem, \textit{Angry Nation}, 135.  
\textsuperscript{530} Ibid., 125.  
\textsuperscript{531} Waldman and Caliskan, \textit{The New Turkey}, 68.  
\textsuperscript{532} Kemal Kirişçi and Kaptanoğlu, “The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy,” 707-708.  
\textsuperscript{533} Waldman and Caliskan, \textit{The New Turkey}, 30.  
\textsuperscript{534} Ibid., 22-24.  
\textsuperscript{535} Ibid., 21.
harmonization process could not have provided a more effective way of doing so; one of the key demands of the Copenhagen Criteria was that Turkey civilianize (sivillesme) its politics so as to ensure the upholding of democracy and the rule of law.\textsuperscript{536} This, coupled with the fact that many officers themselves supported Turkey’s joining of the EU because it would have fulfilled the Kemalist aspiration of the country’s becoming a member of the West, meant that the AKP government could pass legislation curbing the military’s influence while holding it bay from launching an intervention.\textsuperscript{537}

The AKP therefore included in many of its EU harmonization packages numerous pieces of legislation that efficaciously defanged the military establishment. The most notable and relevant of these perhaps was the July 2003 resolution that removed the chief of staff’s authority to appoint the secretary general of the MGK and placed it in the hands of the prime minister, effectively ensuring that the position would be filled by a civilian loyal to the civilian authorities themselves. Apart from this was another piece of legislation that regulated MGK meetings to take place on a bimonthly, as opposed to the previously practiced monthly basis. Other pieces of legislation were also passed that brought the military budget under greater civilian authority and which hindered the legal authority of the military to try civilians in military courts yet allowed civilian courts to bring military officers to trial. Finally, the military also lost its place on the Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu, as well as the Supreme Communication Board, eliminating its authority to influence education and media, respectively.\textsuperscript{538}

To top all of this off, in late 2007 the AKP-led government uncovered an alleged “deep state” ring of military officers, journalists, civil servants and other political activists who were actively seeking to overthrow the government through subversion and domestic terrorism. The modus operandi of the group, known as “Ergenekon,” was to carry out a series of assassinations, terrorist attacks, and other actions that would discredit the government in the eyes of the public and justify a military intervention. By the conclusion of the trial in 2013, some 275 people, including one former chief of staff, had been convicted and sentenced for their alleged roles in the organization. The conclusion of this trial came on the heels of the discovery

\textsuperscript{536} Ibid., 22-23 and Öktem, \textit{Angry Nation}, 124.

\textsuperscript{537} Waldman and Caliskan, \textit{The New Turkey}, 24.

\textsuperscript{538} Ibid., 22-23.
of another alleged coup plot known as “Balyoz.” As opposed to the Ergenekon operation which was to be carried about by a number of civilians and soldiers alike, Balyoz was to be a direct coup attempt from within the army itself. As a result, roughly 330 military officers arrested and put on trial. Due to sloppy investigative work and numerous discrepancies between the allegations and the evidence at hand, the defendants in both of cases were eventually acquitted in the Turkish legal system. Yet, the damage to the military and the demonstration of civilian authority had already taken place by the time of the cases’ conclusions. They in effect marked the final denouement of the military’s influence over politics and signified the beginning of a new era devoid of military control over the civilian government.539

The effect of this civilianization (sivilleşme) process in the Turkish domestic scene inevitably trickled down to the realm of Turkish-Israeli relations540 and had two interrelated effects: first and foremost, the removal of the military from the FPE meant that those most likely to favor a robust relationship with Israel, i.e. the military officers, were no longer in charge of deciding foreign policy. Military officers, as we all well know, have a penchant for viewing foreign policy through the prism of security and military strength. It therefore naturally follows that when a state whose foreign policy is controlled by military officers is under threat in some capacity those officers seek to bolster their state’s military power and seek alliances that may help in achieving security. As we saw earlier, Turkey in the 1990s was an archetypal example of a state in such a situation: the country’s officers recognized the numerous threats facing the state and sought to ensure its security by emphatically remaining a US ally and by forming an alliance with Israel. The removal of the FPE from underneath the thumb of those officers, however, meant that civilians who were more inclined to use a foreign policy noted for its soft power were in charge.541

The second effect of the civilianization (sivilleşme) process was the fact that it for the first time in the history of the republic a party with Islamist roots was allowed to carry out a foreign policy by its own design unfettered by the military. We saw in the previous section the inanity of the Refah Partisi’s attempts to chart a different course for the republic’s foreign policy when the true power of the FPE was in hands

539 Ibid., 31-37.
540 Özel, “Reshuffling the Cards: Turkey, Israel, and the United States in the Middle East,” 51.
541 Ibid.
of the military chiefs; having sidelined the military during the course of the EU harmonization process, however, the AKP set itself up in a position where it could set Turkey on a new path and go about its relationship with Israel as it saw fit, unhindered by military memorandums or any other form of pressure. The new party in other words, not only civilianized the FPE, but replaced its secular-minded Kemalist authorities with itself, something of which would prove to be highly important for Turkey’s approach to Israel, as the AKP would bring a revision of the Milli Görüş movement’s foreign policy outlook to power.⁵⁴²

Of course, it would be erroneous to assert that the AKP was sole agent in the civilianization (sivilleşme) of political authority or in the attempt to reconcile Turkey’s laws with those of the EU After all, Turkey’s candidacy for joining the union had officially begun in 1999 with the findings of the Helsinki summit⁵⁴³—a full three years before the AKP’s election to office. Turkey’s foreign minister at that time, Ismail Cem, had therefore begun negotiating with European leaders and steering Turkish foreign policy toward the use of more ‘soft power’ and to having better relations with other Middle Eastern states.⁵⁴⁴ Alongside that had also come the same kind of legislation aimed at curbing the military’s influence that the AKP would pursue full throttle soon after. In other words, the EU harmonization process and the contingent reforms surrounding the military had been far from new by the time the AKP came to office.⁵⁴⁵

It would be hard in fact to even imagine the AKP taking any other route at that time considering the high public support amongst the Turkish electorate for joining the EU in the first half of the decade. A poll taken in 2004, for instance, indicated that 73% of voters favored Turkish membership in the organization. Two years later, another poll found that rate to have dropped around 20% due to numerous setbacks in the relationship between Turkey and the EU, but nonetheless still indicated that there was widespread support in Turkish society for becoming a part of

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⁵⁴³ Waldman and Caliskan, The New Turkey, 22.

⁵⁴⁴ Tür, “Turkey and Israel in the 2000s—From Cooperation to Conflict,” 50 and Öktem, Angry Nation, 170-182.

⁵⁴⁵ Waldman and Caliskan, The New Turkey, 22.
Europe. Such support of course would have provided an any party which had won the 2002 elections with incentive to pursue membership in the EU, let alone the AKP, which in part also saw the Europeanization process as chance to shed its Milli Görüş heritage and prove its moderate credentials as a party of the center-right.

Another factor that we must not neglect to consider is the “de-securitization” process of Turkish politics that followed the signing of the Adana Accords with Syria in 1999 and the subsequent capture of the terrorist Abdullah Öcalan later that year. These events not only altered the regional landscape for Turkey in the 2000s, as we saw earlier, but also helped in the process of curbing the military’s authority by decreasing the legitimacy for its continuation in the dominance of the FPE.

With all of this in mind, however, we do still have to give the lionshare of the credit for the civilianization (sivilleşme) of Turkish politics to the AKP by acknowledging its unique position within the the Turkish political system at the time. As progenitor’s of the Turkish Islamist movement, members of the AKP would have had extra incentive to pursue such a course given the military’s suspicion of their party and their vulnerability to being removed from office in a military coup. Had any of the traditional secular parties won the election, they too would have more than likely sought to civilianize polities via the EU harmonization process to a certain degree given the popularity of the union at the time and the fact they would have wanted to have more control of their own. The difference between those parties and the AKP, however, is that the former were not under the watchful gaze of the military for being considered an existential threat to the Kemalist order, and would have perhaps let up on the civilianization (sivilleşme) process and even sided with the military if they believed that that order was under threat by the Islamists, as they essentially had done in 1997. For the AKP, on the other hand, curbing the military’s authority was in

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547 Waldman and Caliskan, The New Turkey, 74.
548 Tür, “Turkey and Israel in the 2000s—From Cooperation to Conflict,” 50.
549 During and after the 1997 coup, certain politicians, civil servants and members of the press expressed support in one way or another for the military’s upholding of the Kemalist order. Press conferences held by the military outlining the Islamist threat to the secular order were met with standing ovations, and one state prosecutor filed a petition in the Constitutional Court to have the Refah shut down for attempting to put an end to secularism. While not directly related to the military’s overthrow of the Refah government, a couple of years after Erbakan’s resignation, prime minister Bülent Ecevit blatantly disparaged a female MP from the Fazilet Partisi who was attempting to be sworn in the parliamentary chamber while wearing her hijab by proclaiming the words “Burası devlete meydan okunacak bir yer değildir.” Even during the heady days of 2006 when tension between the military and AKP was at its peak, many citizens opposed to the government seemed to be openly advocating a coup by the military,
essence a matter of life or death with no middle road to take. They therefore pursued it with a vigor that would have been unmatched by any other party and thus brought about a significant domestic change which was to have a massive effect on Turkish-Israeli relations.

5.7. Creating Strategic Depth: Davutoğlu and the New Look of Islamist Foreign Policy Ideals

When the AKP came to power in November 2002, it was not just bringing a revised Islamist domestic platform, but a new foreign policy outlook as well. Just as they had learned that they would have to amend their domestic agenda if they were to achieve any success with the electorate in the face of the military’s hostility, the founders of the AKP realized that they would have to set aside the quixotic foreign policy notions of Erbakan and the Milli Görüş movement. They not only realized that policy notions such as an “Islamic Common Market” and “Great Islamic Federation” were anything but tenable, but that the military and bureaucracy would readily resist such agendas, as they had during the Refah Partisi’s short tenure in office. The result at the end of the day was the unofficial adoption of future foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “Stratejik Derinlik,” or ‘strategic depth’ doctrine, which would essentially remain in place until 2016 with latter’s removal as prime minister.

At the heart of Stratejik Derinlik lays the premise that the contemporary Middle East is a spurious creation of “maps that were artificially drawn” by Britain and the West at the end of WWI in their attempts to dismember the Ottoman Empire. Prior to this ignominious partition, Davutoğlu asserted, the Middle East had been united at its core by “[Ottoman] civilization…which had been formed as the result of an

while many journalists silenced their criticism of it, presumably out of fear of retribution if it did indeed take power or out support for it doing so. For more on the 28 Şubat process and the relationship between the military and the AKP, see Jenkins, “Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey,” 345-346-353. For more on Ecevit and the affair in parliament, see Birand and Yıldız, Son Darbe, 292-297.


Ozkan, “Turkey, Davutoğlu and the Idea of Pan Islamism,” 120-121.

For more on Davutoğlu’s resignation, see Waldman and Caliskan, The New Turkey, 92.

Quoted from a speech by Davutoğlu from Ozkan, “Turkey, Davutoğlu and the Idea of Pan Islamism,” 121.

Ibid., 121.
intensive and centuries-long struggle against the prevailing [Western] civilization” and which ultimately “established an original and long-lasting political order” unique to the world because of its Islamic principles of government. The Treaty of Sevres, however, created a false sense of nationalism and identity among the peoples of the region which only served to perpetuate their unnatural division from one another.

Turkey, according to Davutoğlu, was far from innocent in this abomination. Drawing on the pseudo-scientific work of David Laing, Davutoğlu argued that the founders of the Turkish Republic, despite being at “the center of Ottoman civilization,” lost their true “inner identity” as result of historical factors present in the late Ottoman Empire, and developed an artificial one which they associated with European and Western civilization. As a result, they retreated within the artificial borders created by the Sevres treaty and made the republic “an element of the periphery under the security umbrella of the prevailing Western civilization, rather than being the weak centre of its own civilization.” In other words, rather than embracing their Ottoman heritage and extracting from it the inexhaustable power that it could have carried among the Muslim states of the Middle East, Atatürk and the other founders of the Turkish Republic opted to make Turkey a feckless pawn within Western civilization and thus isolate their country within its own region. Such isolation was only exacerbated, Davutoğlu argued, by successive Kemalist leaders who adhered to the precedent of Atatürk and decided to adopt pro-Western policies, such as the recognition of Israel and support for France during the Algerian conflict. Thus, for most of the republic’s history, Turkey remained relatively peripheral to the West during the Cold War, as well as weak and isolated amongst its Muslim neighbors.

Fortunately, however, at least according to Davutoğlu, there was hope for Turkey in the aftermath of the Cold War if it decided to change course. What was needed, he argued, was a return to its Ottoman heritage and an embrace of Islam which

555 Quoted from Davutoğlu’s Stratejik Derinlik in ibid., 123.
556 Ibid., 123-31.
558 Quoted in Ozkan, “Turkey, Davutoğlu and the Idea of Pan Islamism,” 123.
559 Quoted in “The Turkish-Israeli Relations Under the Davutoğlu Doctrine in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 4.
560 Quoted in Ozkan, “Turkey, Davutoğlu and the Idea of Pan Islamism,” 129.
would allow it to reestablish the bond between itself and the Muslims of the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. Through such a policy Turkey could almost magically restore the diplomatic clout held by the Ottoman Empire and establish what Davutoğlu termed as “hayat alanı,” or ‘living space’ in order to ensure its security. Here, Davutoğlu was borrowing the late nineteenth and early twentieth century German strategic concept of “Lebensraum” (of which ‘living space and “hayat alanı” are direct translations of), which emphasized that Germany should expand its influence eastward so as to provide itself a security buffer. Just as imperial German strategists believed that Lebensraum was not only favorable, but vital for Germany’s security, so too did Davutoğlu believe that it was essential for Turkey, which was surrounded by hostile states intent on getting revenge for the Ottoman Empire’s past misdeeds. Putting it simply, Turkey could either establish itself once again “as an apolitical centre that [would] fill the power vacuum which emerged after the liquidation of the Ottoman Empire,” or collapse under the weight of its adversaries.  

Implicit in this argument of course, is the notion that if Turkey could indeed avoid such a collapse and obtain the strategic depth so desired by Davutoğlu, it would become what the scholar Soner Çağaptay has labelled “a stand alone power” in the region and the world at large; it would achieve, in other words, a position in the world as a kind of neo-Ottoman Empire which would draw much of its strength from the love, admiration, and economic clout of the Muslim world. Such a new Turkey would of course not only be able to pursue a foreign policy independent of the West, but also reobtain the respect and admiration that the Ottoman Empire once held.  

Unsurprisingly, one of the responsibilities that Davutoğlu and other Islamists believed would come with this new role as leader of the Muslim world was the patronization of the Palestinian people and their cause for an independent homeland. Like their predecessors in the Milli Görüş movement, Davutoğlu and other members of the AKP held a strong sense of solidarity with their fellow Muslims in Palestine and were whole-heartedly supportive of an independent Palestinian state. President Erdoğan partially summarized the importance of this issue to his party when he declared in a speech in New York that “the Palestinian issue is an important issue that has an impact not just on the Palestinians, but on all the Muslims and everyone who

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561 Ibid., 119-131.

562 Çağaptay, Erdoğan’s Empire, 18-21 and 44-58.
has a conscience in the world. And in fact, the Palestinian issue lies in the heart of many of the issues in the region.” He also underscored the sense of his party’s solidarity with the Palestinians and his position on their having an independent state when he used his platform at the U.N. General Assembly to “call on the international community to support our Palestinian brothers and sisters in Eastern Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza in their struggle for an independent and geographically unified Palestinian State.”

It therefore followed that a strong relationship with Israel was not high on the agenda for Davutoğlu and his fellow party members. Not only did much of the anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli sentiment of Erkaban’s movement trickle its way down into the ranks of the AKP leadership, but as presumed leaders of the Muslim world they could find little ideological room to incorporate the oft-despised Jewish state into the framework of a new Ottoman Empire. Davutoğlu himself has been said to refer to Israel as a “geopolitical tumour…politically foreign to that geography” of the Middle East—a statement with none too sympathetic overtones. Then of course was the belief that a close relationship with Israel would only serve to isolate Turkey from the region in the long run as it had in the past. Ideally gone therefore, would be the days of close military cooperation, intelligence exchanges, extensive military hardware contracts, and an overall close diplomatic relationship. In their place would be an era of Turkish-led Islamic harmony in the Middle East void of any of the previous harmony between Ankara and Jerusalem.

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563 Quoted in Karmon and Barak, “Erdoğan’s Turkey and the Palestinian Issue,” 75.
565 Kasapoğlu, “The Turkish-Israeli Relations under the Davutoğlu Doctrine in Turkish Foreign Policy, 4-5.
566 Quoted in Ozkan, “Turkey, Davutoğlu and the Idea of Pan Islamism,” 128-129.
567 Kasapoğlu, “The Turkish-Israeli Relations under the Davutoğlu Doctrine in Turkish Foreign Policy, 4-5.
5.8. The Rubber Hits the Road: Stratejik Derinlik and the AKP’s Foreign Policy Ideology in Practice

Despite holding such lofty foreign policy ideals, the leadership of the AKP was realistic enough to understand that such goals could not be achieved overnight. Just as they realized that their Islamist ideals would have to be tempered if their party were to succeed domestically, the leaders of the AKP recognized that their vision of a grand, new Turkey claiming the region as its domain would require time, and that they would ultimately have to steer the country in that direction while navigating through the international environment at hand. In regards to the Neoclassical Realist framework, this of course meant that instead of setting out on an ideological crusade regardless of the international and regional structures, Turkey’s foreign policy leadership under prime minister Erdoğan, foreign minister and later president Abdullah Gül, and Davutoğlu in his capacity as Erdoğan’s foreign policy advisor and then foreign minister, would realistically interpret those structures and react accordingly.\(^{568}\)

On the international level, this meant that the AKP-led FPE would not wholly abandon its alliance with the US despite wanting to carve out a larger piece of the pie for itself.\(^{569}\) This was especially the case prior to 2007 when the party’s was much less sure of itself domestically and internationally.\(^{570}\) According to one scholar, the AKP would in fact not only avoid calling off the relationship all together, but even attempt to bolster its expanding power and aspirations within the framework of Turkey’s alliance with the US and supplant Israel as Washington’s primary ally in the region.\(^{571}\) Such thinking on the part of the AKP helps explain its desire to act as a mediator in the region, especially concerning Israel’s conflicts with Hamas\(^{572}\) and Syria, and thus helps us understand the slight warming of relations in 2008 after the more tumultuous previous few years.\(^{573}\)


\(^{569}\) Ozel, “Indispensable even when unreliable: An Anatomy of Turkish-American relations,” 53-64.


\(^{571}\) See Ozel, “Indispensable even when unreliable: An Anatomy of Turkish-American relations,” 61 and Özel, “Reshuffling the Cards: Turkey, Israel and the United States in the Middle East,” 51.

\(^{572}\) Karmon and Barak, “Erdoğan’s Turkey and the Palestinian Issue,” 76.

\(^{573}\) Tür, “Turkey and Israel in the 2000s—From Cooperation to Conflict,” 55-56.
On the regional level, the AKP’s own peculiar mix of idealism and realism manifested itself in two interrelated diplomatic and economic platforms. The diplomatic side of the coin was the so-called “Zero Problems with Neighbors Policy,” which as the name implied, indicated that Turkey would seek to have cordial relations with all of its neighbors by way of striving for, in the words of Davutoğlu himself, “complementation rather than confrontation.” This of course helps explain Ankara’s attempts to mend relations with Syria and Iran outlined above and prime minister’s Erdoğan’s efforts toward establishing positive personal ties with his neighbors, particularly Assad in Damascus and Ahmadinejad in Tehran.

The economic side of the AKP’s foreign policy strategy, on the other hand, was the desire of the party to have Turkey significantly expand its trade relations as much as possible, but particularly with its Muslim neighbors. While economics does not seem to have initially played a significant role in Davutoğlu’s foreign policy thinking, the aforementioned desire of the AKP to develop its own economic and the practical need to operationalize the party’s goals of becoming a regional Muslim power seemed to have naturally steered the government toward seeking stronger economic ties with its neighbors. This especially seems to have been the case since the mid-2000s when Turkey’s accession process to the EU began to stall. To that end, Ankara began significantly easing visa restrictions with its neighbors and encouraging private investment in those countries. Even Turkish Airlines trebled its number of destinations in the Middle East and became a significant airline choice for Muslims visiting the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

The common denominator between these diplomatic and economic approaches to foreign policy was of course a reliance on what scholars of international relations refer to as ‘soft power,’ which one scholars defines “as a country’s ability to instill

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574 Cağaptay, Erdoğan’s Empire, 46.
575 Quoted in Waldman and Caliskan, The New Turkey, 204.
576 For more on the use of soft power in Turkish diplomacy during this time, see ibid., 61-72.
577 Ibid., 158.
578 Kirişçi and Kaptanoğlu, “The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy,” 711.
579 Ibid., 715.
580 Ibid., 706.
581 Ibid., 708-709.
582 Cağaptay, Erdoğan’s Empire, 65.
their beliefs and values in a designated country in a way that influences that country’s behavior." In the AKP’s Turkey, that soft power was clearly aimed toward creating a neo-Ottoman Empire through the country’s economic, diplomatic, and cultural weight. On some level, it was undoubtedly successful in this goal, particularly as it pertained to the economic sphere. Not only did Turkish television series displaying Turkey and its Ottoman heritage as ideal models of Islamic piety enjoy substantial popularity in parts of the Middle East, but from 2002-2008 Turkey’s combined trade with Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Iran shot from 2.4 billion to 19.6 billion US dollars. This expansion in trade relations with Turkey’s fellow Middle Eastern countries was so successful that it began to account for a larger share of Turkey’s overall trade at the expense of the EU, which accounted for roughly 52% of Turkey’s of foreign trade in 2002, but 41% in 2008. Turkey, in other words, was shifting not just culturally, but economically toward the Middle East.

Some of course may try to argue that such policies on behalf of the AKP-led foreign policy executive amount to little in terms of defining a unique foreign policy for that party. It was after all Ismail Cem who initiated much of the rapprochement with Turkey’s neighbors and decided to pursue a policy centered on good neighborliness, an idea of which was in ways very similar to Özal’s philosophy of foreign policy. The AKP, therefore, could just be said to have been carrying the precedent set by its predecessors. To take the logic of this argument one step further, it could even be said that the foreign policy of both the AKP and its predecessors would have been carried out by any Turkish government given the inherent logic of the regional structure.

Such an argument, while perhaps appealing, would be erroneous, however, as it not only ignores much of the effort that the AKP put into portraying Turkey as an Islamic power in the region, but also fails to take into account traditional Turkish

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583 This is the definition provide by Soner Çağaptay in ibid., 61.
584 Ibid., 62-67.
585 This number may have been even higher had there existed statistics for Turkish-Iraqi bilateral trade in 2002. See Kirişçi and Neslihan Kaptanoğlu, “The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy,” 708.
586 Ibid.
587 Ibid., 707.
588 Ibid., 711 and Meliha Benli Altunışık, “Worldviews and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” New Perspectives on Turkey, no. 40 (Spring 2009): 179-185.

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approaches to foreign policy. To the first point, when we analyze the AKP’s foreign policy, we cannot neglect to understand the desire of its leadership to not only turn Turkey into a regional power, but one based on its Islamic cultural heritage. To that end, the AKP had extra incentive to pursue closer regional ties with its neighbors at the expense of Israel, as it wanted to expand Turkey’s influence and reclaim a sort of neo-Ottoman Empire amongst those very Muslim neighbors. Much of the rhetoric and personal touch that was used toward developing relations with those neighbors at the time are indicative of this enough. In 2008, for instance, prime minister Erdoğan publicly prayed with Iranian President Ahmadinejad at the Sultanahmet Mosque for Friday prayers—a highly symbolic act clearly laced with religion. In another display of Islamic solidarity, Erdoğan declared in a 2008 visit to Iraq that he was “neither a Shiite nor a Sunni; I’m a Muslim,” the implication being that as Muslims, Shias and Sunnis had more in common than they had differences. The fact, moreover, that it was said by a Turkish president in Iraq, clearly points to Islamist overtones, as the two sects of Islam could come together under Turkish leadership.

From a historical perspective, the argument that any Turkish government would have pursued the same foreign policy toward the Middle East that held significant ramifications for Turkish-Israeli relations as the AKP did also fails to hold itself up. Not only would other Turkish governments not have pursued a regional foreign policy based on a common Islamic identity (Erbakan being notable exception of course) due to the Turkish state’s secular identity at the time, but as we saw earlier, traditional Turkish foreign policy in the years after independence was always geared to maintaining a level of distance between Turkey and the other states of the

589 Ibid., 11-21.
590 Kasapoğlu, “The Turkish-Israeli Relations under the Davutoğlu Doctrine in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 2-5.
591 Quoted in Çağaptay, Erdoğan’s Empire, 158.
592 Quoted in Karmon and Barak, “Erdoğan’s Turkey and the Palestinian Issue,” 75.
593 Kasapoğlu, “The Turkish-Israeli Relations under the Davutoğlu Doctrine in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 2-8.
594 As we recall, a classic example of a politician prudently ensuring that he was not in violation of the country’s secular constitution in his foreign policy was Süleyman Demirel, who only sent a delegate to the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1969 after he had been ensured by the foreign ministry that such an action would not violate the Turkish constitution. For more on this event, see Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s,” 95-96.
Middle East,\textsuperscript{595} with the Menderes period marking an exception of course.\textsuperscript{596} Even after the crisis in US-Turkish relations in the mid-1960s and the pivot toward the Arab world, Ankara sought to have positive relations with its regional neighbors while also refraining from interfering in their internal affairs or regional affairs that might place it at the ire of several Arab states.\textsuperscript{597} By seeking to turn Turkey into an Islamic regional power, however, the leadership of the AKP was effectively bucking that trend and setting their country on a new course, one that would not hold the US or its Israeli allies quite as dear.\textsuperscript{598} With that in mind, we have to understand that as opposed to being a mindless piece of plankton bobbing around the ocean surface that is the international arena, the AKP-led FPE has not only interpreted Turkey’s interests in the international and region structure at hand as Zenonas Tziarras proved in his marvelous dissertation on the AKP’s foreign policy,\textsuperscript{599} but also defined and formulated those interests. We cannot just say therefore, that Turkish foreign policy toward Israel from 2003-2010 was the mere result of the AKP-led FPE following a completely objective path pre-determined by the international and regional structure that favored the Arab world at the expense of Israel. On the contrary, in their attempts to fashion themselves as the leaders of the Muslim Middle East, the AKP-leadership pursued a path that necessitated setting Israel aside in some capacity given that they could hardly be the leaders of that world given the animosity toward Israel within it.\textsuperscript{600}

### 5.9. The AKP and the Palestinian Issue

Further supporting this line of argument is the AKP-led FPE’s decision making and approach toward the Palestinian issue during this period. As the self-proclaimed leaders of the Muslim world, the AKP leadership not only felt a good deal of genuine sympathy for the Palestinian people, but also sought to become the unofficial

\begin{footnotes}
\item[595] Kasapoğlu, “The Turkish-Israeli Relations under the Davutoğlu Doctrine in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 4.
\item[596] See Pelt, \textit{Military Intervention and a Crisis of Democracy in Turkey}, 113-159.
\item[597] See Robins, \textit{Turkey and the Middle East}, 65-67.
\item[598] Kasapoğlu, “The Turkish-Israeli Relations under the Davutoğlu Doctrine in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 2-8.
\item[599] Tziarras, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East under the AKP (2002-2013),” 226.
\item[600] Kasapoğlu, “The Turkish-Israeli Relations under the Davutoğlu Doctrine in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 2-8.
\end{footnotes}
vaisgards of the Palestinian cause as holding such a position would confer endless legitimacy in the eyes of the Muslims of the world.\textsuperscript{601}

Prior to Hamas’ victory in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections\textsuperscript{602} when it was much less sure of itself domestically,\textsuperscript{603} the leadership of the AKP predominately attempted to gain such legitimacy by levelling the vitriolic criticism at Israel that it during the Second Intifada, the most notable example probably being Erdoğan’s “state terrorism” remark following the assassination of Sheikh Yassin in 2004.\textsuperscript{604} The election of Hamas marked a watershed moment for Turkey’s approach to the Palestinian issue, however. Not too long after the election, the Turkish government hosted a Hamas delegation in Ankara led by none other than the leader of the organization himself, Khaled Mashaal.\textsuperscript{605} The visit not only ruffled feathers in Jerusalem given the organization’s refusal to lay down its arms and renounce violence,\textsuperscript{606} but also unsettled officials in Washington who were trying to isolate Hamas following its electoral victory.\textsuperscript{607} Ostensibly the meeting was meant merely to be an attempt by the AKP to welcome Hamas into the democratic fold and convince it to renounce violence, recognize Israel, and continue the struggle for a Palestinian state in a peaceful fashion. Many in the Turkish media, however, were convinced that it was the mutual ideological affinity between Hamas and the AKP that acted as the prime motivator for the invitation.\textsuperscript{608} Hamas was founded of course as a Palestinian offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood\textsuperscript{609} and thus shared a similar ideology with many in the AKP.\textsuperscript{610}

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\textsuperscript{601} Karmon and Barak, “Erdoğan’s Turkey and the Palestinian Issue,” 75.
\textsuperscript{602} Tür, “Turkey and Israel in the 2000s—from Cooperation to Conflict,” 55.
\textsuperscript{603} Eligür, “Crisis in Turkish-Israeli Relations (December 2008-June 2011): From Partnership to Enmity,” 432-433.
\textsuperscript{604} Tür, “Turkey and Israel in the 2000s— from Cooperation to Conflict,” 45 and 52-55.
\textsuperscript{605} Çağaptay, Erdoğan’s Empire, 95-96.
\textsuperscript{606} Tür, “Turkey and Israel in the 2000s— from Cooperation to Conflict,” 55.
\textsuperscript{607} “Turkish Media: Washington No Longer Trusts AKP Government,” Turkey Special Dispatch no. 1145, The Middle East Research Institute, April 24, 2006, \url{https://www.memri.org/reports/turkish-media-washington-no-longer-trusts-akp-government}.
\textsuperscript{608} Karmon and Barak, “Erdoğan’s Turkey and the Palestinian Issue,” 76.
\textsuperscript{610} Karmon and Barak, “Erdoğan’s Turkey and the Palestinian Issue,” 75-76.
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This shared ideology was put on display the following summer after Israel began its “Summer Rain” operation in response to the kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. The operation saw a steady stream of bombardments and several land incursions into the Gaza Strip by the Israeli Defense Forces which resulted in the deaths of over 200 Palestinians and over a billion dollars-worth of property damage. This prompted the AKP-led FPE to launch a propaganda campaign against the Israeli’s treatment of the Palestinians by posting billboards depicting a burnt child’s shoe under the heading of ‘Humanity has been slaughtered in Palestine’ and over the words of ‘thou shall not kill’ and ‘you cannot be the children of Moses’ in Istanbul’s Muslim-Jewish neighborhood of Nisantaşı. The implications of these billboards rang of anti-semitism and were followed by the distribution of flyers by private citizens advocating the boycotting of Jewish-owned businesses in the neighborhood.

All of this though was a mere appetizer of things to come in the wake of Israel’s “Operation Cast Lead” in 2008-2009. As mentioned before, this military operation infuriated the AKP leadership and yet also provided it with an excellent opportunity to demonstrate its leadership in the Muslim world by becoming the most outspoken critic of the Israeli operation. AKP officials blasted the operation as “a crime against humanity” and accused Israel of being “the biggest provocateur of global terrorism in the world.” They also took great pains in framing Cast Lead as an attack against innocent civilians in a territory governed by a democratically-elected, yet internationally ostracized political entity. In an interview with the Washington Post in January 2009, Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that there “was no justice” in the West’s handling of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and criticized the international community for “not respect[ing] the political will of the Palestinian people” and argued

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611 Çağaptay, Erdoğan’s Empire, 93.
613 Çağaptay, Erdoğan’s Empire, 93.
615 Quoted in ibid., 437.
616 Quoted in “Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Remarks on Relations with Israel, the Gaza Situation, and Turkey’s Mediating Role, Washington Post, 31 January 2009 (excerpts),” Journal of Palestinian Studies, vol. 38, no.3 (Spring 2009): 350.
that if it had Gaza might not have become the “open-air prison” that it did.\textsuperscript{617} To help carry this message and assemble support for Hamas, Erdoğan went on a tour of the region that included visits to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria.\textsuperscript{618} The Prime Minister and AKP leader also utilized domestic venues to do the same. At a speech in Antalya, for instance, he declared that Israel would “be cursed for the children and the defenceless women who died under bombs.” At another venue, he charged the Israeli leadership with “putting a stain on humanity.”\textsuperscript{619}

The most famous incident, however, came at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. There, after a heated debate with Israeli President Shimon Peres, the prime minister interrupted the moderator to demand that he be given more time to speak because the latter had granted Peres more such time during the course of the debate. After having been granted that permission, the prime minister railed against Peres, saying that “you are killing people” in Gaza\textsuperscript{620} and that “when it comes to killing, you know well how to kill.”\textsuperscript{621} When the moderator intervened and attempted to bring the diatribe to an end, Erdoğan became frustrated and walked off the stage and stated that he would not be returning to Davos.\textsuperscript{622}

This display of anger along with the AKP’s general approach toward the conflict in Gaza won praise from numerous public figures in the region\textsuperscript{623} as well from private citizens in the Arab world.\textsuperscript{624} In Gaza, a public rally in celebration of Erdoğan’s approach to the issue was organized, while in Iran he was praised by numerous officials, with one Ayatollah even arguing that he should receive the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in supporting the Palestinians and making Israel a regional pariah; the municipal authorities of Tehran took it one step further and made the Turkish prime

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{617} Quoted in ibid., 349.
\item \textsuperscript{618} Eligür, “Crisis in Turkish-Israeli Relations (December 2008-June 2011): From Partnership to Enmity,” 436.
\item \textsuperscript{619} Quoted in ibid., 437.
\item \textsuperscript{620} Quoted in “‘You are Killing People,’ Erdogan tells Peres,” \textit{Haaretz}, January 30, 2009, https://www.haaretz.com/1.5069405.
\item \textsuperscript{621} Quoted in Tür, “Turkey and Israel in the 2000s—From Cooperation to Conflict,” 56.
\item \textsuperscript{622} “‘You are Killing People,’ Erdogan tells Peres.”
\item \textsuperscript{623} Eligür, “Crisis in Turkish-Israeli Relations (December 2008-June 2011): From Partnership to Enmity,” 439-440.
\end{itemize}
minister an “honorary fellow” of the Iranian capital. Members of the Arab press even chimed in, contrasting his passion for the Gazan issue with what they saw as the relatively subdued reactions of their leaders. One Lebanese journalist, for instance, wrote that the prime minister’s behavior at Davos “proved once again that he is more Arab and human than most Arab rulers.” In short, if the AKP’s goal was to achieve legitimacy in the Middle East via the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it was enjoying great success.

Beyond all of this, however, Cast Lead also lead to a whole slew of anti-Israeli/Semitic propaganda alongside government-encouraged protests. In Istanbul, for instance, an exhibit was set up in the metro station of Taksim Square which displayed political cartoons condemning Israel for its actions in Gaza. One such cartoon displayed a devilish Israeli soldier rinsing his hands with the blood running from a sink faucet marked as ‘The United States.’ Protests were organized by the AKP and Islamist associations in numerous cities, with the demonstrators waving Palestinian and Hamas flags and carrying banners that read such slogans as “Damn Israel,” “Israel is a cancer in a Muslim’s body,” “Jews are cursed,” “a free Jerusalem, a world without Israel,” and other vitriolic messages. The situation became so heated that private citizens began posting signs upon Jewish-owned stores warning others not to shop there and even went so far as to make physical threats against Jews themselves. In Eskişehir one cultural organization displayed a banner outside of its building reading “From this door Jews and Armenians cannot enter, but dogs can.” Even schoolchildren were brought into the fray, with the minister of education announcing an essay and art contest for students titled “Humanitarian tragedy in Palestine.” To cap it all off with a little stage drama, later that year a television series titled “Ayrılık: Aşkta ve Savaştı Filistin” which depicted IDF soldiers wantonly killing innocent

626 Quoted in “Arabic press praises Erdogan.”
627 Karmon and Barak, “Erdoğan’s Turkey and the Palestinian Issue,” 75.
629 Çağaptay, Erdoğan’s Empire, 93.
babies, children, and other innocent civilians in Gaza was aired on a state-controlled channel.  

Amidst international and domestic protests of anti-Semitism and expressions of concern by Turkish Jews for their own safety, the government defended itself by claiming that it had limited control over things like the demonstrations and that its true mission was humanitarian in nature. Huseyn Çelik, for instance, the minister of Education and the organizer of the drawing and essay contest in the school system, defended his initiatives against claims of anti-Semitism by stating that “If one day Israeli children face such a treatment [as the children of Gaza], [then] I can observe minutes silence for the Israeli children as well.” The problem with this defense, however, is that it does not uphold itself in light of the government’s continual defense of Sudan’s President, Omar al-Bashir, who was convicted in absentee by the International Criminal Court of crimes against humanity for his role in the genocide that took place in Darfur. Not helping its cause either was the fact that the Turkish government failed to condemn Hamas for any of the actions that it took leading up to the Israeli response, namely the renunciation of the ceasefire that had been in place prior to the violence as well as the substantial number of rockets that had been fired into Israel, the former of which was even condemned by the president of the Palestinian Authority (PA), Mahmoud Abbas.  

Another matter that we should take into consideration is that during this time Turkey’s relationship with Hamas’ counterpart in the West Bank, the PA, were not particularly warm. From the AKP’s perspective, Abbas was little more than, in the words of one party official, the “head of an illegitimate government,” while the PA for its part was uncomfortable with the close ties between the former and Hamas. These ties were especially strengthened after the Mavi Marmara incident, as Hamas operatives were given permission to recruit and develop financial networks on Turkish soil. From one such network developed a militant cell in the West Bank that was allegedly aiming to overthrow Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian authority in

631 Ibid., 442.
632 Ibid., 439.
633 Quoted in 438-439.
634 Ibid., 434-436.
635 Karmon and Barak, “Erdoğan’s Turkey and the Palestinian Issue,” 79.
636 Quoted in ibid., 76.
Ramallah via a coup d’état. While this cell was eventually discovered and dismantled by Israeli security services in 2014, its mere existence, connection with Turkey, and alleged goal undoubtedly indicate to us that there is at least some preference for Hamas over the PA by the Turkish government. In turn, that logic tells us that despite presuming to be the leaders of the entire Palestinian cause, the AKP-led FPE nevertheless holds a preference for one faction over another, which in this case happens to mean that it favors a Palestinian group with the same ideological roots as itself over one which does not.

When considered all together, the AKP’s attempts to act as the vanguard for the Palestinians in Gaza, its heavy anti-Israeli propaganda at home, and its preference for Hamas over the PA, unequivocally tell us that the AKP was redefining its country’s interests as it related to region, and was thus taking it on another path determined by its Islamist principles. As we saw in the section on the Cold War, in the absence of a peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, Turkey traditionally decided to pursue a balance between the two. This time, however, Turkey was clearly siding with one of the Palestinian factions at the expense of the Israeli due to its ideology.

It comes as little wonder then that the AKP-led FPE chose to allow the Mavi Marmara flotilla to organize and set sail from Turkey despite knowing that there could be consequences. Such an action would have been almost inconceivable in previous Turkish governments and would be practically inexplicable without an understanding of the FPE at the time. Looking at things from the perspective of that executive position at the time, supporting the flotilla could hardly have seemed likely to gain anything for Turkey with its American allies or with any other international power at the time. Nor would it have appeared logical if Ankara had been attempting to maintain a more neutral stance in the region between Israel and the other states, as it would have merely irritated the former. Instead, it only appears logical if the intent of the action was to

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637 Ibid., 78-79.
638 Ibid., 75-76.
640 See Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s,” 91-110.
642 For more details on the event, see Özcan, “From Strategic Partnership to Successive Crises,” 42.
gain favor with the Muslim states of the region vis a vis the Palestinian issue. In the Turkish historical context, such regional ambitions can only be understood if we understand the thinking of the AKP-led FPE at the time.643

5.10. The Domestic Factors: Public Opinion

Helping accommodate such thinking at the time and allowing the AKP to pursue such a foreign policy toward Israel was public opinion.644 As the head of a one-party government, the AKP had the luxury of making unilateral decisions without needing to take the opinions of coalition partners into account. Like all governments and political parties though, it naturally had to be mindful of public opinion. Fortunately for the AKP, however, most of the Turkish public’s opinion seems to have been in line with the party’s foreign policy goals. A Pew survey from 2008, for instance, revealed that between that year and 2004, anti-Jewish and anti-Christian attitudes significantly increased: in 2004, 49% and 52% of respondents asserted that they held negative views of Jews and Christians, respectively; four years later, those numbers rose to 76% and 74%, respectively.645 Another poll in 2009 conducted by the Frekans Research Company in Istanbul revealed that 57% and 47% of respondents did not want a Christian or Jew, respectively, for a neighbor.646 Together these polls clearly indicate that if nothing else, within Turkish society at the time there undoubtedly was a significant segment of the population that was xenophobic and thus predisposed to supporting an anti-Western and Israeli foreign policy.647 This of course becomes apparent when we consider the receptivity and reciprocity of much the anti-Israeli/Semitic propaganda initiated by the AKP during Operation Cast Lead.648

The weight of such thinking and action becomes apparent when we consider some of the reasons for their development. The main reason of course was more than likely the growing religiosity and conservatism that began in the 1980s and carried

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643 Tziarras, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East under the AKP (2002-2013),” 3.
645 Ibid., 438.
646 Ibid., 443.
647 Ibid., 438 and 443.
648 Ibid., 437-438.
over into the 1990s. In that decade, several domestic and international events such as the violent disintegration of the old Yugoslavia, which witnessed Bosnian Muslims get massacred at the hands of Serbs, the reignition of the Kurdish issue in Turkey’s southeast, and a string of economic crises combined with the rising religiosity of the era to create an even greater wave of Islamic conservatism that washed over into the following decade.\textsuperscript{649} While such a wave of religious conservatism in and of itself does not necessarily correlate to anti-Western or anti-Israeli attitudes,\textsuperscript{650} sociologically, religiosity seems to create a sense of belonging and comfort with fellow coreligionists and a binary sense of unbelonging and discomfort toward those of another religion.\textsuperscript{651} In this case, this would naturally mean that a devout Muslim would feel a bond with their fellow Muslims, including those in Palestine, and a sense of antipathy toward the Jews that are seen as occupying their land. When we take this into consideration with what we already know about the Turkish Islamist movement,\textsuperscript{652} along with the fact that many of its adherents were utilized by the military junta of the 1980s to help propagate its version of Islam,\textsuperscript{653} we can readily surmise that there was more than a hint of anti-Israeli sentiment included in the wave.

A second reason for such anti-Western thinking in the first decade of the twentieth century may very well have been the breakdown of Turkey’s attempts to join the EU during that time. As we saw above, the Turkish public was initially supportive of the idea that their country should join the EU After the gradual breakdown of Turkey’s membership process due to mainly to hesitation on the part of the Europeans themselves, anti-EU sentiment began to grow considerably, particularly around 2007. Given the EU’s central position in the West, this understandable anti-EU sentiment in Turkey can be considered a form of anti-Westernism.\textsuperscript{654} This anti-Westernism in turn could have easily translated, at least to some extent, into anti-Israeli or even anti-Semitic attitudes within Turkey given Israel’s general association with the West.

The final reason may be the rise of anti-Americanism during this decade predominately as a result of the invasion of Iraq. The public anger over that military

\textsuperscript{649} See Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, \textit{The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey}, 7-16.

\textsuperscript{650} Ibid., 136.

\textsuperscript{651} Ibid., 118.

\textsuperscript{652} See Chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{653} Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, \textit{The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey}, 8-9.

\textsuperscript{654} For more on Turkey’s EU process and the role of conservatism, see ibid., 122-129.
action combined with previous feelings of anti-Americanism to create a new wave of that phenomenon laced with antipathy and anxiety during the decade.\textsuperscript{655} Pew Research Polls taken in 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009 revealed that the percentage of Turkish respondents who felt that the US was a potential military threat to their country was 71\%, 65\%, 76\%, and 54\%, respectively.\textsuperscript{656} Accordingly, other Pew Research Polls taken from 2000 to 2006 show that the percentage of Turkish respondents who held favorable views of the US was 52\% (2000), 30\% (2002), 15\% (2003), 30\% (2004), 23\% (2005), and 12\% (2006)—numbers of which clearly demonstrate a sharp drop in the lead up to and the aftermath of the Iraq War and overall low-level of popularity for the US in Turkey.\textsuperscript{657} Much of this was of course related to the terrorist PKK issue in northern Iraq, which struck a nerve with a vast majority of the population. Some of it, however, was related to perception that the true agenda of the US’s war on terror and invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan was to wage war against Muslims throughout the region. This notion of course was particularly relevant for Islamists themselves, but also for many in a country in which religious conservatism had been on the rise. Given such attitudes, it is hardly surprising that the Jewish people and Israel as a staunch ally of the US and its history of difficulties with Muslims, became targets of anger and vitriol of many within the Turkish public.\textsuperscript{658} And with such attitudes in place, the AKP would have little to worry about in regards to its foreign policy toward Israel and public opinion.\textsuperscript{659}

With all of this in mind, the question that we must ask ourselves becomes whether or not the general views and opinions of the Turkish public toward Israel and the West became the main impetus for the AKP-led FPE to take the actions toward Israel that it did during this time? In other words, were the AKP officials in charge of the FPE

\textsuperscript{655} Ibid., 130-139.


\textsuperscript{658} Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, \textit{The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey}, 131-138.

\textsuperscript{659} Yaprak Gürsoy, “Turkey’s Relations with the United States and Israel under the Justice and Development Party Government,” in \textit{Troubled Alliance: The United States, Turkey, and Israel in the New Middle East}, ed. William B. Quandt (Charlottesville, VA: Center for International Studies, University of Virginia, 2011), 113-117.
making decisions toward Israel in order to satisfy public opinion in some capacity? Making a case for an affirmative answer prior to the AKP’s reelection in 2007 would certainly seem to rest on weak ground, as not only did Turkey’s relationship with Israel not suffer a clear and true break, but the AKP’s domestic position at home lends itself to two different roads of thinking that essentially cancel each other out. Prior to its reelection that year, the AKP viewed its position at home in much more precarious terms than it did after. One could therefore argue that by the taking the action that it did toward Israel, the AKP was trying to legitimize itself and shore up its domestic support at home. At the same time too, however, one could just as easily make the argument that the party would not have wanted to take any unnecessary risks and put itself in a position where it would be seen merely as an Islamist party carrying out an ideological crusade against Israel. Thus, any argument that would hold the AKP to be merely acting out of domestic interests toward Israel prior to 2007 would be somewhat tenuous.

If there was a point from 2003 through the Mavi Marmara incident where the AKP truly utilized the Israeli issue to its advantage domestically, it seems to have been in the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead in the lead up to the local elections of March 2009, when the AKP ostensibly believed that anti-Israeli-Semitic propaganda would resonate with its conservative, religious base and help its candidates gain votes. Some of the evidence of course points in that direction: according to one poll conducted by a company in Ankara, the AKP’s standing in the polls shot up by ten percentage points following Erdoğan’s walkout at Davos. Moreover, both Deniz Baykal and Devlet Bahçeli, leaders of the oppositional CHP and MHP, respectively, accused the prime minister of playing to the domestic crowd at the summit even while they expressed a certain degree of sympathy for his actions there.

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660 Tür, “Turkey and Israel in the 2000s—From Cooperation to Conflict,” 49-55.
663 At a party forum Baykal noted that even though he considered the prime minister’s response to be “natural” given the “open wrong that had been done” to him by the panel, he still argued that “there was no need to bring up domestic affairs” at the forum. For more on Baykal’s address to his party regarding this issue, see “Baykal: Başbakana Davos'ta Haksızlık Yapıldı,” Haberler.com, accessed May 1, 2020, https://www.haberler.com/baykal-basbakana-davos-ta-haksizlik-yapildi-haberi/. Addressing his fellow party members at a parliamentary MHP meeting, Bahçeli took a somewhat similar tone, arguing that while “the response was rightful, legitimate and called for,” it was done by a party leader “who of course
With such evidence it becomes difficult to deny that the AKP was not acting in its own domestic interests via the Israeli crisis. But even with that being the case, the question becomes whether or not it was taking action solely for domestic reasons? In other words, was Erdoğan’s walkout at Davos, the statements that he and other AKP officials made regarding Israel, and the slew of anti-Israeli/Semitic propaganda merely just done to rally the party’s base for the local elections that year? Given what we know about the party’s ideology, its regional ambitions for Turkey, along with its feelings toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it would seem far-fetched to answer in the affirmative. Additionally, it seems that prime minister Erdoğan took the behavior by his Israeli counterpart personally and was greatly angered by what he saw as a betrayal by Olmert. If nothing else, this tells us that there truly was a reactive element to Israel’s behavior at the time; it was in other words, far from being a concoction meant to woo voters, and that the AKP’s behavior after the start of Cast Lead was genuinely a reaction to the operation. The reality therefore, is more than likely that the AKP was reacting in a genuine fashion to the Israeli operation, but then also using that operation as propaganda for its own domestic advantage. To put it another way, the motivation generated from potential domestic gains was a facilitator and amplifier of the AKP’s behavior during the crisis, but not the creator of it; the AKP would have reacted the way that it did to some degree even without domestic motivation, but then took that behavior to an even higher one with that motivation. It was unlikely for instance, that so much anti-Israeli/Semitic propaganda would have been carried out at home. At the same time, too, however, things like Davos and the vitriolic statements made by AKP officials for international purposes would have taken place regardless.


664 Tür, “Turkey and Israel in the 2000s—Cooperation to Conflict,” 56.
5.11. The Domestic Factors: The Opposition Parties in Parliament and the Islamization of the Turkish Right

One other domestic factor that we should briefly examine is the role of the opposition political parties in Turkey’s parliament as it relates to the government’s policy toward Israel. Given that from 2003 to 2010 only two parties other than the AKP were able to pass the 10% electoral threshold to make it into parliament, this will entail a brief look at the CHP and MHP during this period.\textsuperscript{665} What we will come to find is that neither party seemed to offer much resistance against the government in its policy toward Israel, and thus helped pave the way for the former to pursue a policy of its choosing toward the Jewish state. In order to understand why exactly that was the case, we have to briefly examine the rebirth and reformation of the CHP and MHP in the late 1990s. By doing so, we can understand how the parties in their contemporary form came to be relatively anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian, as well as the true weight of them becoming so.

As discussed in the introduction, since the 1970s, the political spectrum of Turkish parliamentary politics can roughly be divided into four distinct blocs: the center-left, and center-, Islamist, and Nationalist/Pan-Turkic right.\textsuperscript{666} During the Cold War only two of these blocks—the center-left and the Islamist-right—could be said to have been pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli, as the AP and MHP had little interest in the Palestinian cause and distrusted many of the militant groups supporting it because of their ties to Turkey’s radical leftists.\textsuperscript{667} Functionally, this meant that when right-wing parties formed a coalition with one another as they did from 1975-1977 and then again from mid-1978 to mid-1979,\textsuperscript{668} two of the three had little interest in pursuing a more pro-Palestinian foreign policy. In the 1990s and early 2000s, however, the orientation of the right-wing blocs began to realign. The downfall of ANAP and the DYP,\textsuperscript{669}


\textsuperscript{666} For a survey of Turkish politics from the late 1960s through the early 2000s, see Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 252-306.

\textsuperscript{667} Muradoglu, “İzdüşüm-19.2.2006.”

\textsuperscript{668} “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetleri.”

\textsuperscript{669} Öktem, Angry Nation, 123.
created a vacuum in the center-right that was filled by the AKP,\textsuperscript{670} which for the purposes of our discussion, meant that the center-right was essentially placed under the roof of Islamists who had no love for Israel.

The far right, on the other hand, was also going through changes of its own. By the late 1980s and 1990s the Islamic component of the MHP’s Turk-Islam duality was becoming more prominent, mainly as a result of the growing tide of Islamic conservatism sweeping the rest of the country,\textsuperscript{671} but also due to a political realignment which saw the convergence of the MHP and \textit{Refah Partisi} bases.\textsuperscript{672} The result was a nationalist Turkish right that was utilizing Islamic themes\textsuperscript{673} and appealing to Islamic sentiment even more than it had in the past. After the breakup of Yugoslavia and the start of the ethnic conflicts there,\textsuperscript{674} for instance, the MHP’s successor party after the 1980 coup, the \textit{Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi} (MÇP),\textsuperscript{675} began collecting donations in the mosques to help save people who they saw as their “fellow Muslim-Turkish-Ottoman brethren” in the Balkans. To some extent this obviously indicated a religious affinity between members of the MÇP and Balkan Muslims.\textsuperscript{676} Beyond that, however, in the runup to the 1991 general elections the MÇP formed an alliance with the \textit{Refah Partisi} which saw all of its candidates run under the latter’s banner, demonstrating that there was at least something of a shared ideological and political ground.\textsuperscript{677} Finally, and what is perhaps the best example of the blurring lines between the Islamist and nationalist right, there was the formation of the \textit{Büyük Birlik Partisi} (BBP) in 1993 by Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, a former MHP/MÇP member who lead a breakaway group of other Islamist members in part because they felt that their old party was not emphasizing Islamic identity enough.\textsuperscript{678} For the purposes of our discussion, the end result of these developments was a nationalist right-wing bloc that was increasingly turning toward

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[670]{Waldman and Caliskan, \textit{The New Turkey}, 60.}
\footnotetext[671]{Poulton, \textit{Top Hat, Grey Wolf, and Crescent}, 157-158.}
\footnotetext[673]{Poulton, \textit{Top Hat, Grey Wolf, and Crescent}, 157-158.}
\footnotetext[674]{Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, \textit{The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey}, 12.}
\footnotetext[675]{Following the coup of 1980, the MHP had been banned like other pre-1980 political parties but was later reorganized by Turkeş as the MÇP. See ibid., 2.}
\footnotetext[676]{Quoted in ibid., 12.}
\footnotetext[677]{Ibid., 2-3.}
\footnotetext[678]{Narlı, “The Ultra-Nationalist Movement: Its Past and Future,” 120.}
\end{footnotes}
Islamism, which in turn meant that nearly the whole Turkish political spectrum was turning toward a more pro-Palestinian outlook. As we saw earlier, during the 1990s the presence of the Peace Process was enough to keep the hard right in check and supportive of better relations with Israel. By the time of the AKP’s rise, however, the absence of the Peace Process seems to have brought out the Islamic element of the nationalist right’s identity even more.

Evidence for this can be found in some of the statements from the MHP. At a party meeting in 2008, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli criticized Israel for its recent rocket fire into the Gaza strip and chastised the Jewish state for the “human tragedy” it was carrying out against the Hamas-controlled territory. The recent rocket fire, he noted, caused “more than 100 of our Palestinian brothers to lose their lives,” while the blockade itself was forcing “1.5 million refugees to live under siege and scramble for their lives.” By adopting such an “aggressive manner,” he continued, “Israel [was] not only carrying out humanitarian crimes against children, adults [and] innocent civilians, but dynamiting the efforts for peace in the Middle East.”

The use of the term “brothers” in these statements is extremely telling, for it demonstrates how the MHP had come to see Islam as a common bond between the Turks and Palestinians, something quite unique for a party that had traditionally espoused an ethnic Turkish nationalism.

In another party meeting, this time at one taking place in the near aftermath of Cast Lead, Bahçeli even went so far as to criticize what he saw as the government’s “hypocrisy,” saying that “on one hand it winks at Hamas, yet on the other it wants to carry on its relationship with Israel as if nothing happened. On the one hand, it visits our wounded Palestinian guests in tears, while on the other it fails to see its training of Israel’s planes that drop bombs [on Gaza].” The sincerity of this criticism cannot be verified of course, but the sympathy expressed toward Hamas and the argument that the government was not genuine in its efforts to support the organization and the people of Gaza demonstrate that the MHP clearly thought that there might be votes to

679 Bengio, The Turkish-Israeli Relationship, 83.
be gained at the expense of the AKP by supporting the Palestinian cause, and thus also how much the right had been Islamized since the 1990s.

From the other side of the aisle responses were also coming from Baykal and the CHP. As a center-left party still in many ways tied to the ideals of social democracy that it had adopted under Ecevit a couple of decades earlier, the CHP was internally immune from the growing Islamization taking place on the right and would eventually became the bastion of secularism in a political climate gradually being redefined along secular-Islamist lines. Following the 2002 election and the CHP’s entering of parliament as the only opposition party, the party of Atatürk became the sole inheritor of the Kemalist tradition and engaged in a bitter struggle with the AKP government over the country’s future, particularly as it pertained to secularism.

While such developments were ostensibly positive for the CHP in the sense that it did not have to compete with other parties of similar ideological orientation, they did indeed help lead to an internal party struggle between a liberal, social democratic, left wing, and a more nationalistic, puritanical Kemalist right one. From a foreign policy perspective, this split, along with ideological inconsistencies within Kemalism led to a somewhat awkward position where the party struggled to find unifying positions to foreign policy issues. A classic example of this was the party’s confusion of many of its supporters in regard to the EU issue: on the hand were party supporters who, true to Atatürk’s vision for his country as a member of Western civilization, supported Turkey’s accession to the EU; on the other, however, were party voters who, also true to the Kemalist emphasis on an independent, indivisible Turkey, came out against such accession, as they believed that the EU would merely try to curb the country’s independence and attempt to weaken it by playing on its internal divisions. In regards to Israel and Turkey’s foreign policy toward it, we in many ways can assume that such divisions within the CHP also created difficulty for the party in finding a message that truly spanned the spectrum of its members and supporters; on one side of the aisle would have been party supporters who, in line with

684 Ibid., 252-253.
Atatürk’s pro-western thinking, would have wished to see Turkey have positive relations with the Jewish state given its association with the West; on the other side, however, would have been social democrats and more left-wing party supporters who, much like Ecevit in the 1970s, would have had little desire to see their country pursue such positive relations with Israel because of those very same associations with what they consider to be an imperialistic West.  

Some of this internal ambivalence can perhaps be deduced from Baykal’s statements at the party meeting that took place after the start of Cast Lead. At that meeting, the CHP leader seemed keen to criticize Erdoğan’s behavior at Davos while also avoiding the appearance of being completely unsympathetic, saying that while the Prime Minister’s “use of foreign policy for domestic affairs was harmful” to Turkish foreign policy and that it would “reduce [Turkey’s] role and influence within the Middle East,” his behavior was “natural” considering that an “open wrong was done” to him by the moderator for allowing Peres more time to speak than the Turkish prime minister. Such ambivalent remarks demonstrate a certain uneasiness on the part of Baykal. By not taking a firm position on the prime minister’s behavior, the CHP leader indicated that while he was perhaps uncomfortable with any damage that may have been done to Turkish-Israeli relations, he was still cognizant that some of his party members—and a good deal of voters—were more sympathetic to the Palestinians than Israel.

Several months after these statements, Baykal once again discussed the Israeli issue with journalists following a meeting. This time, however, the CHP leader showed less tact and excoriated the government for what he saw as its duplicity toward Israel and the Palestinian issue, arguing that Turkish foreign policy was being driven by public opinion. On the one hand, he argued, the government was taking a pro-Palestinian stance while on the other it was continuing its relationship with Israel as if nothing had changed, stating “you’re buying weapons, you’re selling weapons, you’re getting intelligence, you’re giving intelligence. You’re [still] partaking in [military] maneuvers together, we still have an alliance [together].” He then exhorted the government to “do what is necessary” if “the alliance with Israel was objectionable,”

688 For more on the viewpoints of Turkish leftists on Israel, see Candar, “A Turk in the Palestinian Resistance,” 68-82.

as such a duplicitous approach to foreign policy was “seriously damaging the country’s consistency, ability to be taken seriously, and credibility.” In making such an argument and emphasizing the government’s continued relationship with Israel, Baykal was clearly trying to appeal on some level to the Turkish public’s sentiment on the Palestinian issue in the aftermath of Cast Lead. At the same time, however, we should take note of the fact that he did not call for the government to cut ties with Israel. Instead, it seems that he was attempting to walk a fine line between criticizing the government’s foreign policy with the Jewish state, while not actually advocating for the abandonment of the relationship with a Western ally.

This middle of the road approach would have exposed a weakness to the AKP-led FPE, as Baykal would have been revealing the CHP’s sensitivity to the Palestinian issue whether it be from an internal split within the party over the matter, or from the realization that public opinion was behind the government. In other words, the government would have realized that the CHP could not mount a strong, unequivocal defense of Turkey’s relationship with Israel without jeopardizing its own political footing. In turn, the AKP would have had little incentive to change course over its foreign policy toward Israel.

When this logic is considered alongside the Islamization of the Turkish right that we explored above, we realize that nearly all of the Turkish political spectrum and the parliamentary opposition from 2003-2010 was more sympathetic to the Palestinians than the Israelis. With the center-right and Islamist blocs effectively amalgamated with one another, the Nationalist right Islamized to one degree or another, and the center-left more or less paralyzed over the issue, three of the four, if not three and a half, of the four traditional blocs of the Turkish political spectrum were more pro-Palestinian than pro-Israeli. For the AKP-led FPE, this meant of course that in terms of the opposition and the political spectrum, it had all but a free pass to pursue its desired foreign policy toward Israel. As in the case of public opinion, this free pass does not seem to have actually motivated the FPE to take greater action against the Jewish state, but we should not underestimate the significance of the situation for

691 Ibid.
692 Özcan,”From Strategic Partnership to Successive Crises,” 42.
the AKP government, as it essentially gave the party another green light in its desire to define its policy toward the region and Israel according to its own vision.

5.12 Conclusion

After taking all of this under consideration, we clearly see how Turkish foreign policy from 2003-2010 was shaped by a range of international, regional, and domestic factors. We also see just how important the AKP’s vision for Turkey and its understanding of the region were in shaping the latter’s foreign policy toward Israel, and that ultimately without those viewpoints the relationship between the two countries could have, to one degree or another, been significantly different. Finally, we also understand just how little resistance the AKP-led FPE encountered on the domestic front in regards to its foreign policy toward Israel, as both the public and the opposition parties within parliament ultimately sympathized with the government’s policy, and thus gave the government a firm green light to continue with that policy.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

With the body of this work now complete, we can now turn toward the arguments and conclusions put forward here by this author. In order to fully understand those conclusions, a brief review of this work’s chapters is in order. As we saw in the chapter concerning the Cold War, Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel was one in which Ankara tried to keep Israel at arm’s length without fully terminating its relationship with the Jewish state. The reasons for this came from the international and regional politics of the era. From 1949-1964, Turkey’s alliance with the US in the Cold War and its determination to act as America’s most fervent ally in the Middle East against the encroachment of communism and Arab nationalism convinced Ankara to take several positive steps toward the Jewish state. The first such step was, as Yasemin Çelik and Philip Robins point out in their respective works on Turkish foreign policy, the recognition of Israel itself in 1949 in an effort to ingratiate itself with the US, which had recognized Israel less than one year earlier. After that of course came the economic, intelligence, and military cooperation outlined in significant detail by Bengio following the toppling of Nuri al-Said’s pro-Western regime in Iraq in the summer of 1958. As we recall, this cooperation was geared mainly toward the containment of pro-Soviet, Arab nationalist regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.

At the same time, however, the same regional politics that were causing Turkey to gravitate toward Israel were also causing it to distance itself from it. As we saw earlier, during the 1950s Turkey was avidly attempting to establish an anti-Soviet regional pact. Doing so, however, required Turkey to ingratiate itself with the Arab world, something of which its relationship with Israel could only act as a detriment to. It was for this reason that Menderes and his successors sought to keep their government’s cooperation with Israel secret and off record.
This discretion only morphed into aloofness after the Johnson Letter of 1964 opened a rift between Ankara and Washington and the former decided to pursue a more-independent foreign policy within the Middle East marked by friendly relations with its Arab neighbors. Turkey therefore effectively shelved its relationship with Israel and began shunning it in the international arena. This especially became the case after the economic shock of the 1973-1974 Arab Oil Embargo forced Turkey to further cozy itself up with the Arab world in an effort to secure cheap oil. In the pursuit of even better relations with the Arabs, Turkey therefore took its share of hostile action toward Israel, such as its support for the “Zionism is Racism” proposal at the U.N. in 1975 and most famously, its downgrading of relations in 1980 following Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem.

On the domestic front, the social and religious developments that were taking place in Turkey during the Cold War would have only acted as a natural reinforcement for the general policy course toward Israel pursued by the numerous FPE’s of the era. More specifically, we saw how the gradual rolling back of many of Atatürk’s secular reforms unleashed a religious conservatism that was to have a major impact on Turkish politics in the years to come. On the one hand, such conservatism, as Bengio pointed out, would have acted as an incentive for the FPE’s of the era to publicly distance their country from Israel as the pro-Islamic, anti-Zionist tenets of that conservatism demanded such. On the other hand, the anti-communist faucets of that same conservatism would have demanded an anti-Soviet foreign policy track, and thus theoretically (and paradoxically) more gravitation toward Israel as anti-Soviet partner, especially during the 1950s.

Of course, at the center of the foreign policy decision-making process were the numerous FPE’s of the era. The most important of these in regards to our discussion were undoubtedly those of prime ministers Adnan Menderes, Süleyman Demirel, and Bülent Ecevit. As we saw earlier, with the exception of Ecevit, all of these men were center-right, anti-communist politicians who desired a close relationship with the US. At the same time too, all were cognizant of the international, regional, and domestic environments at hand, and realized that despite whatever personal affinity they may have had toward Israel, they could not possibly pursue too close of a relationship with it. In the case of Menderes, this meant that a strategic, yet clandestine relationship with the Jewish state was pursued; in the case of Demirel, the break with the US in 1964 and the subsequent shift in Turkey’s foreign policy meant that, as Bengio informs us,
he had to terminate Turkey’s clandestine relations with Israel and pursue more pro-
Arab policies, such as the decision to prevent the US from using its bases on Turkish
soil for the resupply of Israel during the Yom Kippur War and the one to support the
“Zionism is Racism” clause at the U.N.

Both Menders and Demirel clearly tried to pursue a foreign policy course
toward Israel in logical step with the international and regional climates of the era and
their foreign policy goals. Differing from them, however, was Ecevit who, as a
democratic socialist was inclined toward more anti-Western, pro-Palestinian policies
and more ideological thinking. As we saw earlier, this was made readily apparent by
his government’s embrace of the PLO and the opening of its delegation in Ankara in
the aftermath of the takeover of the Egyptian embassy in the Turkish capital by
Palestinian militants in 1979. This decision abandoned the balanced policy of Demirel
who verbally promised to open a PLO delegation in Ankara a few years prior, yet
ultimately prevaricated on the matter. Moreover, Ecevit’s decision also bucked much
of the political opposition, including Demirel’s AD, Feyzioğlu’s CGP, and Türkeş’s
MHP who saw the PLO as little more than a left-wing terrorist organization. If a logical
foreign policy decision and domestic acclamation is what Ecevit was aiming for with
his decision to open a PLO delegation in Ankara, he was clearly at a loss. Instead, the
only way we can really square his decision with any sort of logic is if we understand
it in the context of his anti-American and anti-Israeli ideology.

Of course, when reviewing this period we must remain cognizant of the fact
that the Cold War was hardly a monotonous conflict void of any variation throughout
its existence. Like all conflicts of longevity there were numerous twists and turns,
points of tension and rapprochement that prevent a truly historical study from making
generalized conclusions. Nonetheless, when we examine this period through the lens
of Neoclassical Realism what we can conclude about this era is that when Turkish
foreign policy toward Israel during the Cold War that the former was by and large
shaped by the international and regional factors of the time, and not domestic factors.
If the latter did indeed play a role at all, they would have only acted as a reinforcement
for the tight rope foreign policy that Turkey was already pursuing toward Israel as a
result of the international and regional factors.

The era of international unipolarity from 1990-2002 witnessed a similar
phenomenon in that the international and regional factors of the post-Cold War world
were clearly the main framers of Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel. What was
different, however, is that the domestic factors of the day did not reinforce that policy in the same way that they did during the Cold War. As we recall, the end of the bipolar world order created a good deal of anxiety for foreign policy officials in Ankara who worried that with the threat of the Soviet Union no longer in existence Turkey’s strategic value for the US may very well dissipate, leaving it isolated in an increasingly-volatile neighborhood. And as several scholars cited in this work demonstrated, Turkey attempted to counter such developments by aligning itself with the US’s other main ally in the region, Israel, and prove its strategic worth to Washington. In a similar logic, Turkey also hoped that the Israeli lobby within the American capital would prove valuable and help win over supporters in congress.

On the regional level, Turkey also had other incentives for gravitating toward the Jewish state. Turkey’s relations with Syria and Iraq were reaching lows over the GAP dam project. Furthermore, Syria’s support for the terrorist PKK and Iraq’s desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction understandably had Turkish officials vexed and nervous. Then of course there was Iran, which like Syria had also been supporting Kurdish separatist movements on Turkish soil and had a desire of its own to acquire nuclear weapons. In such a regional climate, Turkey was more than happy to have a friend in Israel, who also shared Iraq, Iran, and Syria as rivals. A robust military relationship was therefore pursued by Turkey with Israel, with several training and hardware agreements being signed over the course of the late 1990s.

Not everyone in Turkey was happy about these developments, however. As we saw earlier, the religious conservatism of previous decades had carried over into the 1990s and in 1996 the Refah Partisi under its long-time anti-Israel/Semitic leader, Necmettin Erbakan, came to power. Despite taking several steps that seemed to challenge Turkey’s traditional pro-Western foreign policy, Erbakan’s efforts were nullified by the military, who also ensured that relations with Israel continued unabated. Eventually, the military even forced Erbakan’s resignation and his party’s exit from the governing coalition. As Hakan Yavuz adamantly argued in his work on the subject, these developments between the military and the Refah Partisi were reflections of the general tension between the Islamists and the secular political establishment of the day. While there is undoubtedly an element of truth in this assertion, for the purposes of our discussion we must understand that unlike the Cold War era where a dilemma to have a positive relationship with Israel was seen at both the international and domestic levels, in the case of the unipolar era the domestic split
over the Turkish government’s gravitation toward Israel was not a reflection of the Turkish-Israeli relationship itself, which was charging full speed ahead at the insistence of the military-led Turkish FPE.

Things changed once again, however, with the rise of the AKP and the onset of the multipolar era from 2003-2010. Just as in our examination of the Cold War, when must approach this era with the caveat that this era was also not entirely monotonous in its developments. Just as the Cold War contained its own variations and points of nuance, so did the era of multipolarity. Turkish foreign policy toward Israel during this period, in other words, was not set on a strict lineal track of declination, but rather subjected to several ups and downs, especially in the first five years of the AKP’s rule. Nevertheless, when we broadly examine Turkish foreign policy toward Israel during those years we do notice that several significant changes took place on the international, regional, and domestic levels that held significant ramifications for Turkey’s Israeli policy. The first of course was the gradual replacement of the unipolar world order with the multipolar one. The decline of the US as the world’s sole superpower and the rise of countries such as China and Russia, meant that Turkey was no longer as beholden to the US as it had been in the 1990s. In that decade, the US’s preeminent position in the Middle East and the world at large had motivated Turkey to reassert its commitment to the West by gravitating toward Israel. With the US no longer the sole player in town, however, Turkey’s commitment to the US vis a vis Israel also saw a decline, as the latter could potentially turn toward other powers to meet its needs. This of course coincided with Turkey’s own economic growth and increased political power, which naturally motivated it to pursue a more independent foreign policy. On the regional level, the strained relations that Turkey had with its neighbors in the 1990s began to improve, with Ankara developing better ties with both Syria and Iran. Turkey’s stance toward Iraq as it related to Israel also changed, as the power vacuum that developed in the aftermath of the US invasion in 2003 created concern in Ankara that the terrorist PKK would use northern Iraq as a springboard for attacks on Turkish soil. In the 1990s the Kurdish issue had provided Turkey with yet another impetus to strengthen ties with Israel, as the Jewish state was reportedly willing to share intelligence with Ankara regarding the terrorist PKK. Following the US invasion, however, Israel reportedly began developing ties with the terrorist PKK once again in order to counter the rise of Sunni and Shia extremist groups in the country. This quite naturally enraged Ankara and its relations with Jerusalem.
became severely strained. With the regional threats that pushed Turkey toward Israel now gone, and one issue even becoming a source of tension, the relationship with Israel suddenly lost much of its appeal.

Matters were made only worse with the complete collapse of the Peace Process and the Turkish-mediated Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations. In the case of the former, the ignominious end of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process in the face of the Second Intifada had removed the political shield that had been given to Turkey in the 1990s. In that decade, the Peace Process had removed the stigma that had come with developing close relations with Israel and thus shielded Turkey from the vitriol of the Arab world that it had attracted in earlier years. With the Peace Process in shambles, Turkey once again began to see its relationship with Israel as more of an onus than a benefit. In the case of the Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations of 2008-2009, Erdoğan was said to have been greatly infuriated by what he saw as Israeli duplicity and seems to have lost whatever personal desire he had left to have a positive relationship with it. Matters came to a head of course in the early summer of 2010 with Mavi Marmara incident. In the wake of that event, the relationship collapsed and attempts to amend matters were stuck at an impasse.

Beyond the international and regional, however, Turkey’s domestic politics were also undergoing significant changes. The first such change was the gradual sidelining of the military from the foreign policy decision-making progress that began with the ANAP and DSP governments of the late 1990s and early 2000s and that was eventually finalized by the AKP. As pointed out by numerous scholars such as Özlem Tür, the civilianization of the Turkish political process helped de-securitize the thinking of the political establishment and removed what was perhaps Israel’s most stalwart ally—the military establishment—from the foreign policy-making process. And with that ally formally removed, Israel’s stock in the eyes of the Turkish government dropped significantly.

Accompanying these developments was of course the rise of the AKP itself, which won landslide victories in the general elections of 2002 and 2007. As a scions of Erbakan’s Milli Görüş movement, the AKP brought a set of foreign ideals to the table that were quite different from those of the traditional political establishment. These ideas were perhaps best articulated by academic, and later foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, in his book Stratejik Derinlik. The essence of Stratejik Derinlik, as we have seen, was the argument that under the Kemalist establishment Turkey was an
isolated country in its own backyard because of its embrace of a foreign Western identity. If, therefore, Turkey embraced its traditional Islamic identity and Ottoman past, it could reestablish itself as the leader of the Middle East and the Muslim world at large. Corrollarily, would become what Soner Çağaptay labelled a “stand alone power” independent of the US and the rest of the West.

Operationally, this pivot to the Islamic world entailed a shift from hard to soft power in Turkey’s diplomatic *modus operandi*. Instead of utilizing diplomatic pressure in its dealings with the Middle East, Turkey under the AKP would embrace its economic and cultural power to establish positive relations with its neighbors. This was much of the reasoning behind Turkey’s rapprochment and expanding economic ties with Syria, Iraq, and Iran—the three countries which had provided much of the impetus for the Turkish-Israeli rapprochment of the 1990s. With a strategy centered on soft power thus in place and cooperative relationships replacing confrontational ones, Turkey’s need for a robust military relationship with Israel began to drop precipitously.

In addition to this, however, Davutoğlu and the AKP’s Islamist-rooted foreign policy ideology left little room for positive relations with Israel. Not only was the ideology anti-Zionist and pro-Palestinian at heart, but AKP officials also realized that to be the leaders of the Islamic Middle East meant being the leaders of the Palestinian issue; and to be the leaders of the Palestinian issue meant being at the vanguard of the anti-Israeli movement. The AKP’s realization of this became abundantly clear with the start of Operation Cast Lead in late 2008, when the government not only took the lead in condemning Israel for its behavior toward the people of Gaza, but also propagated numerous anti-Israeli/Semitic messages amongst the Turkish population.

Support for the AKP came not only from citizens of other Muslim countries such as Iran, but also from the Turkish public itself, who began to vehemently echo the government’s tune of anti-Israeli/Semitism. This of course paved the way for the AKP to pursue a policy toward Israel of its choice. Nevertheless, as previously discussed, despite the anti-Israeli/Semitic discourse apparently reaping benefits for the AKP in the 2009 local elections, the shock, anger, and ideological foundations of the AKP suggest that such discourse was not pursued merely for domestic reasons, but was actually genuine at its core. This especially becomes apparent when we consider the Turkish government’s granting of permission to the *Mavi Marmara* flotilla to set sail from Turkey and embark on its voyage to the Gaza Strip in an effort to break the
Israeli blockade there. Such a policy would have contained little benefit for Turkey if not understood in the context of the country’s efforts to gain further credibility in the Islamic world by helping wage the struggle against Israel.

Also help paving the way for the AKP to pursue its desired foreign policy toward Israel were the domestic shifts in Turkish politics, specifically the Islamization of the Turkish right and the split nature of the center-left CHP. As we saw in the chapter on the Cold War, during that era the four main political blocks of Turkey—the center-left, center-right, Islamist, and Pan-Turkist/Nationalist right—were evenly divided along pro and anti-Israeli lines, with the social democratic CHP and the Islamist MSP taking anti-Israeli stances, and the AP and MHP taking relatively pro-Israeli, or at least anti-PLO positions. By the 2000s, however, this alignment of the political blocs as it related to Israel had shifted dramatically, as the AKP’s takeover of the center-right after the downfall of the traditional center-right parties and the shift of the MHP toward more pro-Islamic policies meant that virtually the entirety of the Turkish right was more inclined toward anti-Israeli policies. On the other side of the political spectrum, the CHP’s makeup of both Kemalists and social democrats seems to have created a situation where the party was split between those who in the tradition of the Cold War, advocated a more anti-West/Israeli foreign policy, and those who advocated the opposite. At the end of the day, this division, along with the sensitivity of the party’s leadership toward the electorate’s more anti-Israeli inclinations, seems to have prevented the CHP from taking a pro-Israeli stance—something of which would have only further paved the way for the AKP for its ideal policy toward the Jewish state.

As seen in the chapter covering of the era of multipolarity, what we thus see is a scenario whereby Turkish foreign policy toward Israel and the domestic factors at home were, like that of the Cold War before it, were pointing in the same direction (negative foreign policy toward Israel abroad, negative feelings toward Israel at home). We also see, once again, a situation whereby Turkish foreign policy toward Israel was shaped by international and regional factors and reinforced by domestic factors at home. The one significant difference between this period and the Cold War, however, is that the former witnessed a situation whereby the ideology of the FPE of the era, i.e. the AKP, defined Turkey’s international and regional interests in a radically different fashion compared to the FPE’s of the Cold War. Thus, while we cannot say that domestic factors per se defined Turkish foreign policy toward Israel in an innenpolitik
fashion, we can say that the FPE variable had an indelible impact on that foreign policy.

When we thus review the entirety of Turkish foreign policy toward Israel through the lens of Neoclassical Realism, we can conclude several things. First of course is that on the whole, Neoclassical Realism is a useful theory for examining Turkish-Israeli relations. As elaborated upon in the introduction to this work, the usefulness of one theory over another is often determined by the volume of relevant information that can be fitted within the model provided by that theory. In the case of this work, the amount of relevant information concerning our topic that has been able to adequately fit within the Neoclassical Realist model is considerable. If nothing else, the model has allowed us to examine the web of complex reasons behind Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel that may very well not have been examinable in other theoretical models. If, for instance, we would have examined our topic through the lens of Neoliberalism, we would have more than likely been prevented from taking the multitude of international and regional factors that helped shape Turkey’s relationship toward Israel into consideration, as this theory places emphasis on international trade and domestic factors that shape foreign policy. On the other hand, had we examined our topic through the lens of Neorealism, we would have been prevented from not only understanding the relationship between Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel and the domestic politics of the era, but ultimately from ascertaining the influence of the AKP’s foreign policy ideology and its influence on its outlook toward Israel given Neoclassical Realism’s shunning of all domestic issues and emphasis on the universal nature of states. Every state no matter how large or small or its geographical position in the world, has its own unique set of qualities, including those of the domestic realm. While some of those domestic qualities may or may not directly influence a state’s foreign policy, they are always present whether noticed or not. And while some scholars of international relations may very well find most domestic factors of any given state to irrelevant to the formulation of its foreign policy, the author of this work has attempted to establish a wide understanding of Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel and the domestic currents present throughout the course of the history of that relationship so that we may better understand the relationship between the international and domestic. It has been, in other words, an attempt to develop the most comprehensive understanding of Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel as possible. And none of this would have been possible without the use of Neoclassical Realism,
which as mentioned above, granted us the theoretical flexibility to look at both the international and domestic factors at hand. Finally, if we had examined our topic through the lens of Constructivism, we would have largely been limited to the role of identity in the formation of Turkish foreign policy toward Israel. And while such an approach may have had value in understanding the AKP and its redefining of Turkish foreign policy goals as it related to the party’s Islamic identity, we would have had a difficult time understanding the nuances of Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel during the Cold War, when the country’s pro-Western identity would have demanded that Turkey take a much more pro-Israeli course than it did. With Neoclassical Realism, however, we were able to obtain the best of all worlds, and we can thus safely conclude that the theory is useful for the examination of our topic.

From a directly observational perspective, another matter that we can conclude from our examination of Turkish foreign policy toward Israel through the lens of Neoclassical Realism is that a combination of international and regional factors contributed to the formulation Turkey’s Israel policy in all three of the periods examined in this work. While perhaps seemingly uninteresting, this observation not only reinforces Neoclassical Realism’s utility in examining our topic, but it also helps demonstrate how viewing Turkish foreign policy toward Israel through the lens of identity would be an exercise that would only lead to overly-simplistic answers. As someone born and raised in the US, this author can speak to the overly-simplistic approach taken to Turkey’s domestic and foreign politics in America. Often times, we in the US have a proclivity for reducing the reasoning behind every political decision made in Ankara to Turkey’s identity as either a Kemalist, secular, pro-Western country or as an Islamist, pro-Middle Eastern one. In other words, Ankara’s position toward Israel at any given time must innately be tied to either Turkey’s desire to be a part of the West or absent from it; its desire to either be a secular state capable of embracing the non-Islamic world, or an Islamic one incapable of such. What this study has shown us, however, is that there a plethora of external factors that have contributed to Turkey’s nuanced policy toward Israel over the decades. Turkey, like every other state on earth, has had to shape its foreign policy according to its interests and the world around it, and it not just a country obsessed with joining one international club or another; and this work, at least it pertains to Israel, demonstrates such.

Corollary to this, what we have seen over the course of this work is that in none of the periods examined were domestic factors ever the sole and decisive motivations
for determining Turkish foreign policy toward Israel. Instead, what we saw were several different scenarios in which the relevant domestic factors either mimicked the international and regional realms (the Cold and the multipolar era) or did not (the unipolar era). In other words, during the Cold War and the multipolar era, domestic factors essentially reinforced those of the international and regional realm, but ultimately did not frame it. During the era of international unipolarity, on the other hand, what we saw was a situation whereby the international and domestic currents helped shaped Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel, but that that policy was highly intensified by the AKP-led FPE. In other words, any FPE of the era was bound to have a less positive relationship with Israel as compared to the 1990s because of the international and regional factors of the era; at the same time, however, the full negativity that came to be found in the relationship from 2003-2010 would not merely have been of the same intensity without the AKP and its ideology. Such observations obviously hold value of their own from a purely historical angle, but they also hold ramifications for Neoliberal interpretations of Turkish-Israeli relations in the sense that we can rightly question any argument that attempts to claim that domestic actors have, or ever were, the main influencers of Turkish foreign policy toward Israel.

The final argument or observation that we can conclude is that in comparison to the eras of bipolarity and unipolarity, the era of multipolarity saw a greater influence of the Turkish FPE’s ideological positioning on Turkey’s foreign policy toward Israel. As we saw in the chapter covering the era of multipolarity and as many scholars have seemed to imply, the international and regional factors of the era alone were enough to cause a shift in Ankara’s outlook toward Jerusalem. At the same time, however, the AKP’s Islamist-rooted ideology and desire to see Turkey become the leader of the Middle East, reinforced the policy courses set in motion by its predecessors and also redefined Turkey’s relationship with the Middle East. Indeed, as demonstrated above, it would be virtually impossible to understand Turkey’s foreign policy toward the Middle East during the period without understanding the AKP and its foreign policy goals. With the exception of the example of Bülent Ecevit’s granting of permission to the PLO to open a delegation in Ankara in 1979, the decisions of other FPE’s as they related to Israel seem to have been less ideologically motivated and perhaps more in tune with an objective outlook on the international and regional outlooks of the era.
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A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET


Bu dönemleri inceleneden önce, giriş bölümünü müteakiben Neoklasik Realist teorinin özetini sunulacaktır (İkinci Bölüm). Burada Klasik Realizm ve Neorealizm teorilerinin bir sentezi olarak Neoklasik Realizm’in şeceresi değerlendirilmiş ve teorinin uluslararası ve yerel faktörlerle ilişkin ikili kabulü açıklanmıştır. Bu bölümde ayrıca dış politika karar alıcılarının rolü de incelenmiştir. Özünde dış politika karar alıcıları, tüm devletlerde yerel ve uluslararası düzlemlerin kesişim noktasında bulunan yürütme organıdır. Neoklasik Realizm, dış politika karar alıcılarının farklı ideolojik geçmişlere ve dış politikaya dair farklı yaklaşımlara sahip farklı gruplardan oluşabileceğini kabul ettiği için ayrıntılı olarak incelenmesi gereken bir değişken olarak ele alınmaktadır.


İç cephede, Soğuk Savaş esnasında Türkiye’dede meydana gelen sosyal ve dini gelişmeler, dönemin sahipsiz dış politika karar alıcılarının izlediği İsrail’e yönelik genel politika tutumuna takviye oldu. Daha belirgin olarak, Atatürk’ün şekiller reformlarının çoğunu kademeli olarak geri çekilmesinin ilerleyen yıllarda Türk siyaseti üzerinde büyük etkisi olacak bir dini muhafazakarlığı nasıl ortaya çıkardığını gördük. Bir yandan, böyle bir muhafazakarlık, dönemin dış politika karar alıcılarının, muhafazakarlığın talep ettiği İslâm yanlısı, Siyonizm karşıtı ilkelerin ülkelerini İsrail’den alenen uzaklaştırmaları için bir teşvik görevi görebilirdi. Öte yandan, aynı muhafazakarlığın anti-komünist bataryaları, Sovyet karşıtı bir dış politika dizini ve dolayısıyla teorik olarak (ve paradoksal olarak) özellikle 1950’lerde Sovyet karşıtı ortak olarak İsrail’e daha fazla çekilmeyle talep ederlerdi.


Bölgesel düzeyde, Türkiye’nin Yahu Devleti’ne yönelmek için başka nedenleri de vardı. Türkiye’nin Suriye ve İrak ile ilişkileri GAP barajı projesi yüzünden bozuluyordu. Ayrıca, Suriye’nin terörist PKK’ya verdiği destek ve İrak’ın kitle imha silahları edinme arzusu Türk yetkilileri anlaştılar bir şekilde kınırdı ve tedirgin etti. Bir de tabii ki Suriye gibi Türkiye topraklarında Kürt ayrılıkçı hareketlerini destekleyen ve nükleer silah edinme arzusunun hızlanmasına bir önlem olarak İsrail ile ilişkilerin hız kesmeden devam etmesi Tablet. Bu nedenle Türkiye, İsrail ile ilişkilerini güçlendirme ve donanım antlaşması imzaladı.

olumlu bir ilişkiye sahip olma ikileminin hem uluslararası hem de yerel düzeyde var olduğu Soğuk Savaş döneminin aksine tek kutuplu düzende Türk hükümetinin İsrail’e çekilmesindeki farklılıkların Türk-İsrail ilişkisini yansımadığını, ordunun önderliğindeki Türk dış politika karar alıcılarının ısrarı ile ilerlediğini anlamak durumundayız.

bulunmaktadır. Yumuşakleştirme odaklanan bir strateji ve çatışmacı ilişkilerin yerine iş birliğine dayanan ilişkiler ile Türkiye'nin İsrail ile sağlam bir askeri ilişkiye olan ihtiyacı kaybolmaya başlamıştır.

Buna ek olarak, Davutoğlu ve AKP’nin İslamcı kökenli dış politika ideolojisi İsrail ile olumlu ilişkilere çok yer bırakmadı. AKP yetkililerinin kalbinde sadece Siyonizm karşıtı ve Filistin yanlısı ideoloji yoktu, AKP yetkilileri aynı zamanda Filistin meselesinin lideri olmanın Orta Doğu'nun liderleri olmanın anlamına geldiğini de anlamışlardı ve Filistin sorununun lideri olmak, İsrail karşıtı hareketin öncesi olmak anlamına geliyordu. AKP’nin bu farklılığı 2008 yılında Dökme Kurşun Operasyonu ile açıklığa kavuştu; hükümet yalnızca İsrail'i Gazze halkına karşı davranışlarından ötürü kınamıyor, aynı zamanda Türk halkı arasında çok sayıda İsrail karşıtı/anti-Semitik iletiler de yayılıyordu.


Türk siyasetindeki iç değişimler, Türk sağının İslamlaşması ve merkez-sol CHP’nin bölünmesi başta olmak üzere AKP’nin İsrail’e karşı arzu ettiği dış politikayı sürdürmesinin önüne geçti. Soğuk Savaş ile ilgili olan bölümde gördüğümüz üzere, o dönemde Türkiye’nin dört ana siyasi bloğu – merkez sol, merkez sağ, İslamic ve Pan-Türkist/Milliyetçi sağ – sosyal demokrat CHP ve İslamic MSP İsrail karşıtı, AP ve MHP İsrail yanlısı – ya da en azından FKÖ karşıtı olmak üzere – eşit bir şekilde bölündü. 2000’lere gelindiğinde ise siyasi blokların İsrail ile bağlantılı olarak bu hizalanması, AKP’nin geleneksel merkez sağ partilerin düşüşünden hemen sonra merkezi ele geçirmesi ve MHP’nin daha İslamic politikaları yanlısı taraflara kaymasınıyla çarpıcı bir şekildeдеся. Türk sağının neredeyse tamamı İsrail karşıtı

Çok kutupluluk dönemini kapsayan dönemde görüldüğü gibi, burada gördüğümüz, İsrail’e yönelik Türk dış politikasının ve evdeki iç faktörlerin olduğu, siyaset anlayışının Soğuk Savaş döneminindeki gibi şekillendiği (yurt dışında İsrail’e karşı olumsuz bir dış politika, yurt içinde İsrail’e yönelik olumsuz duygular) bir senaryodur. Aynı zamanda, İsrail’e yönelik Türk dış politikasının uluslararası ve bölgesel faktörlerle yoğurulduğu ve yurt içinde iç faktörlerle pekiştirildiğine bir kez daha tanıklık ediyoruz. Bunun yanı sıra, bu dönem ile Soğuk Savaş arasındaki önemli bir fark, eski dönemin dış politika karar alıcıları ideolojisinin, yani AKP’nin, Türkiye’nin uluslararası ve bölgesel çizgileri Soğuk Savaş döneminin dış politika karar alıcılarına kıyaslarsa kökten farklı bir şekilde tanımladığı bir duruma tanık olmasıdır. Dolayısıyla, iç faktörlerin Türk dış politikasını kendi balına İsrail’e yönelik “innenpolitik” bir tarzda tanımladığı kendi balına İsrail’e yönelik “innenpolitik” bir tarzda tanımladığı söyleyebiliriz.


Doğrudan gözlemsel bir bakış açısından, bu çalışmada İsrail’e yönelik Türk dış politikasını Neoklasik Realizm merceğinden incelememizden çıkarabileceğimiz bir başka konu da uluslararası ve bölgesel faktörlerin bir kombinasyonunun incelenen her üç dönemde de Türkiye’nin İsrail politikasının formüle olması katkıda bulunduğudır. Çekici görünmese de bu gözlem, Neoklasik Realizm’in konumuzu
incelemektede faydasını pekiştirmekle kalmıyor; aynı zamanda Türk dış politikasının İsrail’e yönelik kimlik merceğinden bakılmamasının yalnızca fazlasıyla basite indirgenmiş cevaplara yol açacak bir etkinlik olduğunu da göstermeye yardımcı oluyor. Zira bu çalışma bize Türkiye’nin İsrail’e yönelik incelikli dış politikasına katkıda bulunan çok sayıda dış faktörün varlığını göstermektedir. Türkiye, dünyadaki her devlet gibi, dış politikasını kendi çıkarlarına ve çevresine göre şekillendirmek zorunda kalmıştır ve bunu herhangi bir uluslararası çalışma katılmaya takıntılı olarak yapmamıştır; bu tez, en azından İsrail ile ilişkili olarak bunu yansıtmaktadır.


Sonuç olarak değerlendirilebileceğimiz son argüman ya da gözlem, tek kutupluluk ve iki kutupluluk dönemleri ile kıyaslandığı zaman, çok kutupluluk döneminin Türkiye’nin İsrail’e yönelik dış politikası üzerinde Türkiye dış politika karar alıcılarının ideolojik konumunun daha büyük bir etkisi olduğunu. Çok kutupluluk döneminde olduğumuz ve birçok akademisyenin de ima ettiği üzere, dönemin uluslararası ve bölgesel faktörleri Ankara’nın Kudüs’e bakışında bir değişikliğe neden olmak için tek başına yeterliydi. Ancak aynı zamanda, AKP’nin İslamcı kökenli ideolojisi ve Türkiye’yi Orta Doğu’nun lideri olarak görme arzusu, seleflerinin
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Adı / Name : Andrew James
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