INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE WAVERING GLOBAL ARMS TRADE (1950 – 2019)

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ABSTRACT

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE WAWERING GLOBAL ARMS TRADE (1950-2019)

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The volume of international arms trade fluctuates in time due to various reasons. The legal international arms trade remarkably increased in the last two decades of the Cold War. After a considerable decline in the 1990s, the volume of the global arms trade has incrementally risen particularly since 2003. Hereby, this thesis explores the causes of the upward trend in the international arms trade. First, it paints the picture of the historical development of the international arms trade with all its economic, political, and military dimensions. Second, it investigates the dynamics of the recent increase in international arms transfers. This is taken up within the framework of a systemic analysis of the international arms trade. Hence, the correlation between the international arms transfers and the international order is shown. It is put forward that the increase in the international arms trade from 2003 onwards reflects the rising intra-systemic competition within the global capitalism. Given the fact that international arms control mechanisms, which are examined in the thesis, are far from being effective instruments to prevent the arms competition it may be contemplated that its pace may sustain in short and medium terms. It appears that despite the decline of the
US hegemony in general, it is not yet possible to discern a replacement of the US hegemony with China or Russia regarding the international arms trade.

**Keywords:** International Relations, Political Economy, Arms Trade, History of Arms Trade, Imperialism
ÖZ

ULUSLARARASI SİYASET VE KÜRESEL SİLAH TİCARETİNDE DALGALANMA (1950-2019)

SOYKAN, Arda

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş

Eylül 2020, 210 Sayfa

uluslararası silah ticareti konusunda Çin veya Rusya ile yer değiştirmesini tespit etmek henüz mümkün görünmemektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Uluslararası İlişkiler, Siyasi İktisat, Silah Ticareti, Silah Ticareti Tarihi, Emperyalizm
To a world where weapons are not bought and sold
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDA</td>
<td>United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency</td>
</tr>
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<td>ACME</td>
<td>Arms Control in the Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASD</td>
<td>Aerospace and Defence Industry Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATT</td>
<td>Arms Trade Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMECON</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Communist Party of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIB</td>
<td>Defence-industrial Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDAP</td>
<td>European Defence Action Plan</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Defence Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LoI</td>
<td>Letter of Intent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCCAR</td>
<td>Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASR</td>
<td>Preparatory Action for Security Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PESCO</td>
<td>Permanent Structured Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THAAD</td>
<td>Terminal High Altitude Area Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIV</td>
<td>Trend Indicator Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNROCA</td>
<td>United Nations Register of Conventional Arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>Warsaw Treaty Organization</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Almost 30 years after the end of the Cold War, the world has been witnessing growing tensions, antagonisms, politico-economic antinomies and even blatant wars, which means nothing but the existing international order is replete with even greater problems.

In the beginning of the post-Cold War era, there was a great expectation that there would be a sustainable decrease in the global arms trade. Notwithstanding this expectation, in the post-Cold War era the international arms trade competition continued.

The Figure 1.1 illustrates the trend of international arms transfers from 1950 to 2018.¹

As a broader analysis of the global arms transfers from 1950 until now, it may be stated that during the Cold War era the competition was characterized as being inter-systemic between the socialist and capitalist socio-economic systems while in the post-Cold War era such competition has been intra-systemic. The Figure 1.1 clearly shows that there have been fluctuations in both inter-systemic and intra-systemic periods.

1.1 Research Question and Argument

This thesis basically seeks to explore why had the economic volume of international arms transfers initially declined in the post-Cold War era until 2002 but then started to rise up in the last sixteen years?

International arms trade is one of the junctions at which economic, military and political domains intertwine. Firstly, given the global level of the capitalist mode of production, neither the production nor the trade of arms can be analysed autonomously from the profit logic of capitalism. Furthermore, the amount and rates of profit that the arms-industrial bourgeoisie has been making is not
negligible and renders this economic sector very appealing. Secondly, once weapons are designed, produced and traded as commodities, they become a crucial part of the military-strategical calculations. The rapid and unceasing development of modern military technology obliges the strategic assumptions of states to be continuously revised. Third, international transfers of arms are undeniably political. The political—sometimes ideological—decisions of political actors explicitly affect the international circulation of arms in various ways such as steering the domestic production, marketing the product, negotiating the contract, implementing embargoes and so on. In sum, international arms trade is the confluence of these three domains (economic, military, political) and presents a complex, but at the same time, dynamic and illuminating subject of study. In the light of this observation, such a complex and dynamic social phenomenon can be analysed benefitting from the insight given by the Theories of Imperialism.

After mentioning its complex and dynamic structure, the arms phenomenon needs to be analytically categorized. Arms as a subject of inquiry within social sciences comprise of different subtopics such as the production, technology, transfer and trade of arms. This thesis falls into the areas of international arms trade and transfers. International arms trade refers to the legal purchase or sale of major conventional weapons by states in return for economic gains or losses. On the other hand, international arms transfers amount to the international legal deliveries of weapon systems regardless of any economic compensation, e.g. military aids. In short, while arms transfers are driven by political and strategic motivations, arms trade has an economic dimension additionally. In the rest of the thesis, the distinction between the trade and transfer of military equipment would

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3 For a skillfully elaborated version of these ideas, see Keith Krause, *Arms and the State: The Patterns of Military Production and Trade* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 12-18.
be taken into consideration although these two terms are interchangeably used in the literature frequently.

A second point that should be clarified pertains to the types of transferred weapons. In this regard, the related literature commonly, though not sharply, divides international arms trade into (1) trade of major weapons (conventional weapons or weapon systems), (2) trade of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and (3) trade of ‘dual-use’ items. According to United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), major weapons comprise of the battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre systems, combat aircraft/vehicles, helicopters, warships and missiles. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database fundamentally produces data about this type of military hardware but its scope is a little larger, consisting of aircraft, air defence systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armoured vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sensors, reconnaissance satellites, ships and some other niche military equipment like turrets or air refuelling systems. On the other hand, while there is no exact definition of SALW, UNODA classifies heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems, and mortars of calibres less than 75 mm together under SALW. Similarly, there is no consensus on the definition of dual-use equipment. For example, some sources confine the definition of dual-use...

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use items by the condition of ‘primarily having a military mission’; whereas, some holds the scope wider by discarding ‘military-use-first’ principle, which leads to the inclusion of materials that can be used even for chemical and nuclear weapons or satellites providing data for military goals. Since the international trade of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons is strictly prohibited, inhibited or concealed, these types of weapons are out of the scope of this thesis. The research subject of this thesis is the first category which is the major conventional weapons. Therefore, the concepts of international arms trade or transfer would be used to imply international legal trade or transfer of major conventional weapons in the rest of the thesis.

Lastly, this thesis rejects the mainstream narratives which defines the Cold War either “as the bipolar (superpower) relationship based on strategic competition, which was a consequence of the geopolitical arrangements brought about by the Second World War” or again as a bipolar (superpower) relationship but based on different “domestic political ideas, values and ideology”. Instead, the Cold War would be admitted as a global social-systemic conflict, which lasted until the collapse of ‘real socialism’ in 1991.

The thesis investigates the relation between the increasing arms transfers and intra-systemic rivalries which becomes more concrete after the end of the Cold War. It seeks to detect the cause of the increase in the transfer of weapon systems which has a complex nature involving economic, military and political aspects. Hence, a major objective of the thesis is to form a holistic and consistent

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7 Paul Holtom and Mark Bromley, “The International Arms Trade: Difficult to Define, Measure and Control,” *Arms Control Today* 40, no. 6 (July/August 2010): 9.

8 Hartung, “The International Arms Trade,” 346.


10 Ibid., 9. In order to comprehend the Cold War as a global social-systemic conflict, see also: Tolgahan Akdan, *Soğuk Savaş ve Türkiye’nin Batı’ya Yönelişi* (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2020).
framework to make sense of the fact that one of the political, economic and military considerations might prevail over the others in different periods of arms trade. While forming such a conceptual framework, I benefitted from the insights given by Marxist theories of imperialism as they enable us to interpret the three aspects of arms trade (military, economic, political) in a combined way.

The 11 September 2001 Terrorist Attacks (9/11) and the “War on Terror”, the natural recovery of conventional arms market after the end of the Cold War, rising authoritarian and militarist regimes around the world have been listed as a bunch of causes of the rise of arms transfers. Admitting the partial impact of the above noted factors, this thesis primarily takes the competition within the existing international order into consideration to fully comprehend the dynamism in the 2000s’ arms trade. It discusses whether there is a correlation between the volume of international arms transfers and the level of rivalries within the global hierarchy. Hereby, the thesis brings two significant inferences into question: 1) The changing volume of arms trade –though not alone- is a signifier of the level of the intra-systemic struggle 2) The multidimensional transformation of the international arms trade provides many clues about the new characteristics of Post-Cold War international relations. In the light of a historical analysis, these findings, inferences as well as further assessments would be thoroughly synthesized in the conclusion chapter.

1.2 Literature Review

The volume of the academic and informative publications on international defence industry and arms trade cannot be underestimated. Some works written after the end of the Cold War on this subject have inspired the author of this thesis beyond ordinary influencing. It is safe to say that the totality of the works in this field have clarified many subtopics such as technological innovations in defence industry, historical development of arms trade, economics of arms business and arms as tools in diplomacy. Yet, there are less studied and less developed areas in the related literature. First, international arms trade has been
often -but unintentionally- treated as if it was an independent research object per se. In other words, the mainstream literature analyses international arms trade by isolating it from the socio-economic system in which it exists. This is probably because of the fact that international arms trade is a legitimate economic sector and a diplomatic channel within the capitalist international system. However, if the system in which arms trade occurs is also studied as a variable, humanity might get closer to solve the problems spurring from the arms trade. Second, the arms trade literature encompasses many ‘ir’ dimensions, but it generally lacks an IR perspective. In other words, economics of arms trade, its place in foreign policy making, its role in military comparisons are often studied but it is very rare to see an overt application of a particular IR Theory to the studies of international arms trade. Third, the number of the Marxist contributions to the literature of the global arms transfers is not satisfactory even though they may help to the interpretation of the imperialistic-hegemonic world order. Contemporary Marxism seems to neglect this field of study, but its theoretical tools can be useful to detect the weaknesses of both mainstream and critical assessments. Hence, this thesis takes into account of the above-mentioned gaps in the literature.

This kind of statement leads us to form some academic categories within the literature of the conventional arms trade. In this thesis, the criterion to be used while categorizing the literature is based on the Coxian dichotomy of “problem-solving theory vs. critical theory”. The first category in this thesis is called the “mainstream position” which clearly carries the traces of problem-solving approach. The mainstream arms trade literature does not question the prevailing social structures in which arms trade takes place; does not analyse arms trade by

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focusing on the contradictions or breakdowns of those structures and relations; rather, it seeks a way to fix the problems emanating from international arms transfers under the given social circumstances. The mainstream position predominantly confines itself with descriptive analysis. The academic works of the Defence Economics field quite often fit in this framework. Notwithstanding, it should be noted that there might exist reformist views within the mainstream literature, basically adopting a problem-solving approach. Indeed, there are much of them in the arms trade literature. This ‘problem-solving critiques’ tacitly take the established power relations and social structures into account but finalize their analysis without significant reference to those relations and structures. Rather, normative claims about the arms transfers are put forward. It is possible to see the examples of both realist and liberal views that produce problem-solving criticisms. On the other hand, apart from all the variants of the mainstream arguments, there stands a critical approach towards the arms trade phenomena, which argues for the necessity to question the socio-economic and politico-military structures along with the internal features of the arms transfers. In this regard, although it is academically not so developed and widespread, the critical position represents the Coxian critical approach. Hereby, it can be argued that the examples of the critical position include the premises of systemic investigations that suggest an emancipatory thinking.

1.3 Framework of Analysis, Sources and Methodology

This thesis is a qualitative research based on a peer-review quantitative analysis. Since the reasons behind the rising international arms trade are interrogated, the thesis has an explanatory scientific purpose.

Another methodological subject is the historical periodization of the global arms deliveries. The changing trends of international arms transfers, for example, necessitate a distinctive Cold War periodization. To illustrate, Fred Halliday’s seminal work divides the Cold War into certain time periods.\(^\text{13}\) His Cold War

periodization is mainly based on the tone of the USA-USSR relations. While evaluating this relation, one of the parameters Halliday paid attention is military expenditures which include the costs of nuclear and conventional armament. However, arms transfers and armament are different things having different repercussions. For instance, the years between 1969 and 1979 are called the Détente years by Halliday, when the two systemic leaderships had gone through a relatively low and acceptable armament trend. In contrast, the Détente period corresponds to an episode of tremendous growth in global arms trade and transfers. In consequence, periodization attempts relying on cornerstone events in global high-politics may not necessarily overlap with the periods of arms transfer trends. Therefore, the analysis of international arms transfers between 1950 and 2019 has been divided into peculiar periods in accordance with the SIPRI data.

The qualitative and quantitative sufficiency of sources presenting data on international arms transfers in another important issue. Due to the highly politico-military nature of the topic, the data sources in the literature are not perfect in terms of transparency and accuracy. The official data about arms trade of individual states are usually confidential or quite limited. Putting the published national reports aside, it is difficult to mention a hundred per cent reliable source. That is why most of the evaluations on international arms trade are actually based on estimates and multiple calculations—though some estimates are professionally elaborated and highly accurate as in the case of SIPRI. In addition to the national reports that are arbitrarily announced, the most common sources providing data


15 Ibid., 10.

16 The USA can be called the most transparent state in this realm. It is on the one end of the spectrum. Nevertheless, many non-governmental organizations are increasingly demanding more transparency from US. On the opposite edge of the transparency spectrum, China is salient as a non-transparent state, declaring almost no data to general public. Besides, some states announce the quantity and the model of the traded arms without their financial value, while some other states, like Russia and big European countries, directly report the total value of the military goods, mentioning no more detail.
are SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme, US Congressional Research Service (CRS), Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT), UN Panels of Experts and exceptional reports of intelligence agencies. Each has weaknesses, making the following proposition principally agreeable: “the quality of financial data on the international arms trade is extremely poor”.17

SIPRI uses its own method to measure the volume of international transfers of major conventional weapons.18 This method is called trend-indicator value (TIV) which determines the value of delivered arms and components through a set of calculations mainly based on the known unit production cost and performance of certain military commodities. TIV does not provide direct financial value of international arms transfers; rather, it is useful to observe the trends and percentage changes in global major weapons deliveries. Since the main question of the thesis is trend-oriented, the SIPRI data on arms transfers would constitute the core statistical source.

1.4 Organization of the Chapters

This thesis is composed of five main chapters. The introduction chapter defines the problematic, formulates the question of the thesis, determines the framework of analysis and hints the theoretical positioning. The second chapter starts the historical analysis of international arms trade in order to look into the nature of competition between the two opposing systems. Therefore, the question of the second chapter is how the international arms trade was shaped under a different international order than today’s, namely the Cold War. In other words, this chapter dwells on the trade of weapon systems and its impetus during the Cold


18 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database: Sources and Methods.”
War (1945-1990). This sort of endeavour is expected to demonstrate the evolution of global arms trade to the reader.

The third chapter discusses the remarkable decline in the volume of international arms transfers which had continued during the 1990s. The effects of the radical change from the Cold War to the post-Cold War international order on the defence industries and arms transfers would be interrogated in this chapter. Also, the relevant issues like the neoliberalism, the global military spending, the new arms control mechanisms, the internationalization of the defence business, the corruption in the sector, innovations in the military technology, the internal and foreign policy practises of the prominent exporter and importer countries would be studied.

The fourth chapter of the thesis has a particular importance because it addresses the current trend and recent debates in the arms trade phenomena. It tries to interpret the data showing the rise of major weapon transfers. The economic and political-strategic conditions of the major arms exporters and importers are examined. The impact of the 9/11 and other factors on this rise is elaborated. Particular regions in which arms transfers have intensified in the post-2002 period is also scrutinized. Furthermore, it focuses on how the 2008 global financial crisis affected the international arms trade.

The conclusion chapter, on the other hand, highlights the important dimensions of the international arms trade. Moreover, it mentions the contribution and shortcomings of the mainstream and critical positions in the literature. Furthermore, the historical periods of the international arms trade are compared. All in all, it attempts to show the correlation between the intensifying intra-systemic rivalries and the trend of the international arms trade.
CHAPTER 2


2.1 Introduction

This chapter attempts to look into the way in which international arms trade evolved during the Cold War (1945-1991). Furthermore, this chapter overviews the approximate decadal trends and turning points in the given period as well as the positions of prominent actors or group of actors within the global arms transfer network. Effects of the various historical developments, the established structures and main drivers behind the arms trade decisions would also be examined. In sum, this chapter scrutinizes the chronological evolution of modern international arms trade until the end of the Cold War. Such an endeavour helps the researchers understand the continuity and change in the arms transfer during the Cold War years, which may provide a base to compare and contrast the contemporary upward trend in international arms supplies.

2.2 The Evolution of International Arms Transfers: 1950-1991

Arms transfers between different polities and its economic, political, and strategic repercussions have always been a subject of the historiography of IR since the initial examples in the literature. Beginning with the ancient Peloponnesian War\(^\text{19}\), the intellectuals of the time had occasionally mentioned the importance of

\(^{19}\) Krause, *Arms and the State*, 34; Stohl and Grillot, *The International Arms Trade*, 11.
arms production and transfers on the interstate affairs throughout the pre-modern era. Nevertheless, two facts have made the arms phenomena more salient in modern times as a topic of analysis: (1) the explicit commodification of arms due to the large scale production and sophistication under the capitalist mode of production and (2) the ascendant decisiveness of arms technology on the results of battles. Especially in the second half of the 19th century, the formation of national arms monopolies which feeds up national armies in the West marks the dawn of contemporary arms trade. The leading country in the privatization of arms industry was Prussia where Krupp became the national champion.20 The profits Krupp made from arms business drew the attention of the bourgeoisie in other core capitalist countries and new arms merchants emerged in a short period of time particularly in Britain and the USA. On the turn of the century, arms-industrial British bourgeoisie had acquired the legal basis securing their right to export arms without any constraints except war-time.21 Before 1914, there had already been a considerable number of giant arms-producing companies which prioritized arms exports, creating an international arms transfer network.22 In fact, this network was so big that arms monopolies were accused of inciting the World War I which led them to be remembered as the ‘merchants of death’ and ‘warmongers’.23 For instance, while Krupp had allocated less than half of its production capacity for German weapons inventory, it had sold arms to more than fifty countries by 1912.24 In short, modern arms trade is a result of capitalistic competition.


21 Ibid., 30.

22 Ron Smith, Military Economics: The Interaction of Power and Money (UK: Palgrave Macmillian, 2009), 145.

The reaction of masses against the horrible violence between 1914 and 1918 as well as the exhaustion of industrial bases in every country except the USA caused a radical decline in arms trade after the Great War. Despite the several significant transfers in the 1920s, economic inabilities, protectionism and the Great Depression had held the international arms trade at low levels until the early 1930s when Japan, the USSR and Hitler’s Germany started to import high-tech military equipment which provides them new arms technologies. Besides, non-regulatory state behaviour on arms trade continued until the mid-1930s and later efforts were hardly effective. On the contrary, state intervention in arms business was even supportive in some manners. Governments started to assign advisory personnel and devote publications to arms manufacturers; also, they funded research and development (R&D) projects in arms technology for the first time in the modern period. Furthermore, some European small powers relatively managed to establish a military-industrial base in this period, producing basic military equipment. In addition to the lack of effective control mechanisms and direct state support, the absence of a polarized international system -as in the case of Cold War- enabled an unconstrained multinational arms transfer network. All these amount to two circumstances: (1) low dependence on a certain supplier for importing states and (2) wide range of clients for the exporters. Hence, states


25 Ibid., 32.


27 Smith, Military Economics, 145; Stohl and Grillot, The International Arms Trade, 15.

28 Stohl and Grillot, The International Arms Trade, 16.


30 Ibid., 19.
from all around the world in this period could purchase arms from both liberal capitalist and fascist capitalist powers simultaneously, though seeming contradictory to world politics of the time.\textsuperscript{31} This fact manifests that economic motivations for arms sales were dominant over strategic and political rationale in the interwar period with few exceptions.\textsuperscript{32}

Due to the peculiarities mentioned above, some scholars even regard the interwar arms trade as one of the main historical phases of the phenomena.\textsuperscript{33} Nonetheless, international arms trade as a research agenda has gained its actual prominence after the Second World War. The war had caused a massive destruction in almost all parts of the world. Yet, it left a huge investment in armament and a breakthrough in weapons technology as a legacy.\textsuperscript{34} In fact, there were few undamaged arms industries in the late 1940s. For example, all arms industries in Europe, except Britain and Sweden, had been destroyed during the war.\textsuperscript{35} The USSR was the most damaged country overall but its arms industry was very active because of its leading and victorious role at the end of the war. The defence-industrial base (DIB) of the USA, on the other hand, was the most developed and productive one. The fact that the USA has imported only one completed major weapons system since the World War I until the end of the Cold War displays how its DIB is powerful – and protectionist at the same time.\textsuperscript{36}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 18.
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\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 17-18. The author indicates that arms transfers between Japan and Siam as well as between Germany and Spain in the late 1930s were more politically oriented.
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\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 13.
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\textsuperscript{34} Moravcsik, “Arms and Autarky,” 32.
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\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 32; Krause, Arms and the State, 82, 128.
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Intra-state regulations related to arms transfers started to be improved since the early 1940s. In this period, military technology and production capacity concentrated in a few states. States having advanced weapons technology and industrial base were cautious to save this strategic advantage; moreover, the clarification of different post-war fictions of socialist USSR and capitalist West pushed war-time allies to be more careful about arms transfers. Governments and arms companies had been explicit collaborators since the late interwar period; however, states have imposed regulatory authority over arms exporters and have become the ultimate decision maker by the beginning of the Cold War.

On the other hand, the outset of the Cold War rendered the national arms control mechanisms inadequate. Systemic split and competition between socialism and capitalism entailed the foundation of international institutions. International Monetary Foundation (IMF), World Bank (WB), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were representing the capitalist camp whereas Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), The Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties (COMINFORM) and The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (Warsaw Pact - WTO) became the international organizations of the socialist bloc. Meanwhile, the more the Cold War was institutionalized, the more the international arms trade was instrumentalized in diplomatic affairs. None of the institutions in the capitalist camp was able to handle this complex situation; therefore, Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls


38 Stohl and Grillot, The International Arms Trade, 17.


40 Use of arms transfers as diplomacy tools in the post-war era have started with some occasions like the transfer of American military equipment under Truman Doctrine to Turkey and Greece in the form of aid to be used against local communist movement. See: Hartung, “The International Arms Trade,” 348.
(COCOM) was established in 1949 by all the founding member states of NATO except Iceland and Japan in order to control the leakage of strategic commodities (mostly military equipment and technology) to socialist bloc.\textsuperscript{41} Also, NATO established a Science Committee in 1957 to facilitate the development of Western military technology within the capitalist alliance.\textsuperscript{42} In the same year, the Treaty of Rome was signed, establishing the European Economic Community. Although the Article 223 of the treaty clearly forbade the member states from any attempt to duplicate the authority of NATO and COCOM in defence-technological and arms transfer issues, the reviving European capitalism started to invest in collective military R&D.\textsuperscript{43} On the other hand, arms transfers and military technology sharing in the socialist world were largely conducted under the tutelage of the USSR until the initiation of COMECON in 1949 and then under COMECON until the creation of Warsaw Pact in 1955.\textsuperscript{44} After 1955, Warsaw Pact and COMECON have cooperated to control the arms exports of Warsaw Pact countries. In sum, the post-war systemic split revealed itself in international arms trade, beginning with the establishment of COCOM (together with NATO) and COMECON (together with Warsaw Pact). The future international prominent arms suppliers such as France, Italy, Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia would have recovered their DIBs mostly thanks to these development aids of the respective organizations of the two competing systems.\textsuperscript{45}


\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 287.

In 1950, the total volume of international major weapons transfers was around $8 billion in SIPRI TIV.\textsuperscript{46} However, it reached $22 billion in TIV only three years later\textsuperscript{47} due to several reasons such as the embodiment of Cold War in Europe, the consolidation of communist rule in China and the Korean War. Until the decline in the early 1960s, the annual volume of global arms trade stayed at this level. According to SIPRI, the total trend indicator value of the arms transfers in this decade -not exactly the real financial value- was approximately $195 billion of which the USA, the USSR, the UK, Czechoslovakia and France respectively realized $68, $66, $41, $6 and $4 billion.\textsuperscript{48} Such a picture depicts the UK as a declining -but still an eminent- actor whereas the USA and the USSR stand there as the systemic leaders.

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\textsuperscript{45} Krause, \textit{Arms and the State}, 128.


\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
Moreover, the list of top ten arms importing countries in the 1950s is correlated with the international politics of the decade. The excessive flow of Soviet major weapons to China during and following the Korean War (figure 1.2) has made it the largest arms recipient by a wide margin. Given the vast arms stocks of the USSR and the meagre economy of China, it is not difficult to estimate that these transfers have been in the form of military aids as a tool of solidarity for the systemic conflict. Also, the fact that the USA ranks second among the arms importers gives some hints for the period. First, more than ninety per cent of the US arms imports have been supplied by the UK. It indicates that the UK military technology is the only one that can buttress the DIB of the USA in realistic terms. Second, the US arms imports have intensified in the mid-1950s, which indicates that the Korean War has compelled the USA to enlarge its weapon inventory and to embark on a military modernization move. Furthermore, the rest of the countries in the top ten, except Canada, are the continental

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49 Ibid.
European countries from both sides. This demonstrates that the geographical focus of the Cold War in addition to the Far East has been Europe in the 1950s.

An overall post-war reconstruction of the capitalist bloc had already begun under the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s; nevertheless, the actual attempts to reincorporate defence industries into a wider capitalist market started in the 1950s. The US Department of Defence initiated generous military assistance programs which would provide international grants and loans amounting to $128 billion throughout the Cold War. Moreover, the USA offered contracts based on purchasing guarantee for made-in-Europe defence products in addition to the weapons technology transfer. This sort of foreign aids was necessary to revive the European DIBs which would undertake a crucial role in the struggle against communism. In other words, the new hegemon of the liberal world, the USA, did

Figure 2.2 The Top 10 Arms Importers, 1950-1959 (in SIPRI TIV, $ billions)
Source: Author’s Own Drawing (The data are taken from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database)

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51 Krause, Arms and the State, 128; Keller, Arm in Arm, 100.
what it had to. Besides, the USA took advantage of the huge defence budgets in
the 1950s by investing more and more in R&D projects, enabling it to overtake
the European arms technologies. Eventually, all these efforts served the purpose
and European states gradually started to look for export markets after supplying a
certain portion to the national armies since the late 1950s. At the end of the
decade, the USA was the sole dominant global arms supplier within the capitalist
c bloc while the British arms exports showing decline and French sales indicating
modest advancement.

The Suez Canal Crisis in 1956 paved the way for further developments. The Free
Officers Movement having secular, nationalist, anti-imperialist and pro-Soviet
tendencies had organized a revolution in Egypt and abolished the pro-Western
monarchy in 1952. Hence, the Cold War was brought to the Middle East under
the Gamal Abdel Nasser’s leadership followed by the Ba’athist Iraq and Syria.
Nasser’s move to nationalize the Suez Canal in 1956 as a response to unsolved
Arab-Israeli disputes transformed the regional crisis into one in which the USA,
the USSR, the UK, France interfered. This key development entailed more arms
transfers from both capitalist and socialist world to the Middle East.

On the socialist front, it was the USSR that would lead the establishment,
recovery, expansion and protection of the system. Its intra-bloc hegemonic
position revealed itself in the arms production and exports as well, not only in the
1950s but throughout the Cold War period. In early 1950s, the USSR didn’t


53 Krause, Arms and the State, 84.

54 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”; Krause, Arms and the State, 132.

Continuity and Change in World Politics, ed. George Lawson, Chris Armbruster and Michael Cox
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 189-190.

supply military equipment to countries except COMECON members, China, North Korea and Mongolia because Stalin’s ‘two camp thesis’ had argued that the non-socialist developing states were serving to the reactionary relations of production in the final analysis. Yet, it should be noted that when Stalin died, what were later to be called the Third World countries had been either newly independent or in struggle of independence or still pro-Western monarchies. All in all, the USSR experienced a major policy change in the aftermath of the death of Stalin, which would also have significant repercussions on the arms industries of socialist Eastern European countries. Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization politics replaced the Stalinist goal of self-sufficiency in the international arena with the understanding of socialist division of labour. This new political orientation increased the intra-socialist bloc arms transfers despite several critiques and objections. Also, defence-economic actions and projects were more frequently negotiated after Stalin within COMECON instead of the directions of the USSR’s foreign military advisers. Another outcome of the Khrushchev’s leadership was that COMECON countries started to export weapon systems to non-socialist countries in the mid-1950s. For instance, the substantial arms agreement signed between the USSR and Nasser’s Egypt in 1955 has symbolically elevated the Soviet Union to the status of global arms supplier. This deal and many of its subsequent counterparts have been largely subsidized by the WTO members through soft loans, barter contracts, grants and payment in national currency until


the mid-1970s. Notwithstanding, the technology of arms transferred to the Third World was old or sometimes barely new.

The post-war reconstruction and advancement of socialist Eastern European DIBs were managed through the aids of the USSR to a large extent. The overall recovery of these defence industries would have taken a little longer; nonetheless, one of the historical peaks of Eastern European arms exports occurred in the 1950s on account of the cutting-edge military technology provided by the Soviet Union. Inevitably, the arms technology licences given by the USSR at that time entailed dependency to itself as the intra-bloc hegemon, very similar to the case of intra-NATO relations. Even the two most prominent DIBs in Eastern Europe, those of Poland and Czechoslovakia, had been planned to produce high in quantity but (relatively) less in sophistication. The patronage of the USSR persisted not only in arms production but also in transfers to outside of the WTO. On several occasions like Egypt in 1955, Syria in 1956 and Indonesia between 1956 and 1959, the USSR used Poland and Czechoslovakia as surrogates in tensed diplomatic atmospheres.

It is difficult to mention a third tier of arms producing and selling countries in the 1950s because of their focus on domestic issues like colonial heritage and development instead of establishing a DIB. However, People’s Republic of


64 Krause, Arms and the State, 128.


66 Krause, Arms and the State, 130.

China, as a socialist state outside the WTO, draws the attention not with its production and marketing capacity but with its enormous amount of arms imports. In the 1950s, China, the decadal champion of conventional arms imports, had imported at least $27 billion worth of military equipment—all of it from the USSR. Just to compare, the second and third largest arms importers of the decade, respectively the USA and France, had imported $12 and $10 billion worth of arms in SIPRI TIV.69 This fact also shows that the territorial foci of the Cold War in 1950s were Far East and Europe. In addition to direct arms imports, China also received arms production licences from the USSR throughout the 1950s70 and adopted the Soviet type defence industry organization except continuous investment in innovation.71

Despite the decrease in the first years of the 1960s, international transfer of conventional weapons rose again in the middle of the decade by virtue of the heightened tension along with the construction of Berlin Wall, the Cuban Revolution and following Missile Crisis and Vietnam War. On the other hand, the Sino-Soviet Split in 1961 had a reducing impact on the value of global arms trade since it almost ended the Chinese arms imports from the USSR. After the leap from $19.9 to $26.3 billion in 1964, the total trend indicator value of the

68 The categorization of arms exporting countries as ‘first tier’, ‘second tier’ and ‘third tier’ belong to the terminology of Keith Krause who elaborated this scheme in his seminal work. See: Krause, Arms and the State, 27-32. Krause melts the arms production and arms exports into one pot. In his three-layer scheme, countries are classified according to a combination of their arms production and transfer capabilities. The subject of this thesis, however, is the arms trade per se. Therefore, the three-layer model would regard the arms transfers only. The main criterion for grouping the arms-exporting states would be the proximity of the SIPRI TIV of their arms transfers. Seventeen years after Krause’s work, Stohl and Grillot, in their co-authored book, asserted that Krause’s three-tier pattern have maintained its validity even in the post-Cold War era. See: Stohl and Grillot, The International Arms Trade, 78.

69 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”


conventional weapons transfers remained stable around $26 billion annually until the dramatic increase in the early 1970s.  

Between 1960 and 1969, the top two arms suppliers were the USSR and the USA, each exporting $88 and $86 billion worth of weapons, respectively. The third largest exporter in this decade was again the UK but the TIV of its exports receded into approximately $15 billion which proves the fact that it lost its global hegemonic power once it had had. France became the fourth country in foreign arms transfers in the 1960s with its $12.7 billion worth of arms exports as a consequence of ambitious Gaullist policies. The fifth largest exporter of the military equipment was Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) which achieved $4 billion. What was important about the FRG in this decade is not its position in global arms sales but its position in arms purchases. FRG became the most arms importing country in the 1960s with $23.6 billion value which was followed by Egypt’s and India’s imports amounting to $10 billion separately. Poland and German Democratic Republic (GDR) ranked fourth and the fifth on the list as a result of their foreign arms purchases worth of $9.6 and $8.6 billion. This kind of alignment among arms importing countries might be interpreted in a way that the Cold War’s centre of gravity was still Europe while the Non-Aligned countries started to become prominent customers. The vitality of Trans-Atlantic relations within the capitalist bloc in these years can be understood when the intra-NATO collaboration on armament affairs is analysed. For instance, NATO Industrial Advisory Group in which some six hundred industrialists from European and North American member states come together has taken the role to enhance the defence-industrial cooperation since 1968.  

72 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”

73 Ibid.

74 Fiott, “EU-NATO Cooperation,” 283-284.
The two leaderships of the contested systems reiterated their status in the 1960s both in global politics and in arms exports. Yet, the flow of history was not smooth even for them. To begin with the capitalist camp, the domestic politics of the USA in early 1960s has witnessed two shocking incidents: President Eisenhower’s final public speech revealing the existence of potent military-industrial complex (MIC) and the assassination of President Kennedy. In his farewell address to the nation in 1961, President Eisenhower drew the attention of the public opinion to the intangible and dangerously growing alliance among the military, arms-industrial bourgeoisie and senators, culminating in the decomposition of so-called national interest. Whether these two events were determinant on the US arms transfer policy is speculative and beyond the scope of this thesis; nonetheless, both the tripartite complex and the President Kennedy were also the actors of arms trade business. After all, the financial volume of US arms exports began to increase in 1963 and hit $12 billion next year, a new record.

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in US arms transfers since 1950. Since arms build-ups and their transfers usually require some duration around one or two years, the rise in US arms exports in the mid-1960s can be largely ascribable to the Berlin Wall Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. In addition, the USA experienced a series of change related to its customer network in this decade. In Europe, it saturated the FRG’s arms need almost by itself, supplying $16 billion worth of military equipment. However, the fact that France and the UK improved their DIBs in the 1960s led to a reduction in demand to US weapons systems. On the other hand, the USA increased the number of its arms recipients, provided arms production licences to intra-bloc staunch allies like Japan and continued to dominate the world market along with the USSR. Besides, the arms transfers of the USA displayed a qualitative transformation in the 1960s. From this decade on, the USA would increasingly prefer to sell arms to other states instead of giving them as military aids. At the end of the decade, the Nixon Doctrine which aimed to prevent the human loss in the Vietnam War became another factor fostering the US arms exports. According to the president’s doctrine, the USA should provide material and technical assistance to its allies in their regional ‘Cold Wars’ rather than sending American troops. Moreover, the Nixon Doctrine corroborated the perception that arms transfers are safe and useful tools

76 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 Keller, Arm in Arm, 100.

80 Krause, Arms and the State, 101.

to persuade and reinforce friendly governments.\textsuperscript{82} This sort of policy bolstered the US arms exports rapidly, though its actual impact became observable during the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{83}

The other prominent arms exporting countries in the Western hemisphere were France, the UK and the FRG. Especially France under de Gaulle’s leadership\textsuperscript{84} and the UK had the motivation to sustain a well-functioning DIB in order to remain independent in military technology and arms production. Nevertheless, they had a far smaller domestic market for conventional major weapons than that of the USA and the USSR; therefore, they adopted an export-oriented arms production policy in order to maintain national arms industries in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{85} France led this path by exporting aircraft worth at $7 billion and the British naval defence industry sold $5 billion worth of ships between 1960 and 1969.\textsuperscript{86} On the other hand, the market share of the UK in global arms transfers declined comparing with the 1950s due to the ambitious new comers and the size of two systemic hegemons.\textsuperscript{87} The third biggest arms exporting country in Western Europe, the FRG, experienced a fragile international situation in the early 1960s which compelled it to implement some new restrictive legislation for arms exports in 1961.\textsuperscript{88} However, its huge defence budget deficit in terms of arms

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{83} Krause, \textit{Arms and the State}, 102.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, “Building Franco-German Consensus on Arms Exports,” \textit{Survival} 61, no. 4 (2019): 85.
\item \textsuperscript{85} Moravcsik, “Arms and Autarky,” 34.
\item \textsuperscript{86} “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”
\item \textsuperscript{87} Krause, \textit{Arms and the State}, 132.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
trade and the need to legitimate its international status through foreign military aids should be the reasons behind its incrementally risen arms export.

![Figure 2.4 Percentage Distribution of International Arms Supplies, 1960-1969](image)

Source: Author’s Own Drawing (The data are taken from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database)

The arms transfer policy of the USSR in the first half of the 1960s has been conducted under the Khrushchev Doctrine. Namely the peaceful coexistence doctrine rejects two classical Marxist-Leninist assertions: (1) the competition between capitalist states in the imperialist system will inevitably cause a war and (2) all the bourgeois states are inherently inimical to the USSR. The corollary of this revisionist discourse was the assumption of a warless international system in which capitalist and socialist states peacefully coexist. According to this doctrine, the nuclear weapons would be the assurance of peaceful coexistence as

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a deterrence mechanism. Hence, the need for major conventional weapons decreased under Khrushchev’s revisionism, indirectly undermining the arms exports.\(^\text{90}\) Another factor slowing down the Soviet arms exports in the 1960s was the Sino-Soviet Split. Not only military-industrial but also socio-economic cooperation between the USSR and China ended in 1961 when the revisionist policies of Khrushchev were labelled apostasy by the Communist Party of China under Mao’s leadership. In consequence, the USSR simultaneously lost a comrade state and a loyal customer which had been the prime importer of Soviet arms by far during the previous decade. For instance, Chinese imports of Soviet weapons systems declined from $2.4 billion in 1960 to $130 million in 1967.\(^\text{91}\) Ironically, the irreversible split between the two giant socialist states turned into a competition over the Third World. Both state used arms transfers as political incentives to make new allies from the left-leaning non-aligned governments, generating an increase in arms exports.\(^\text{92}\) The fact that Chinese were actually using the Soviet military technology to export arms had rendered this competition very bizarre which made the USSR more cautious for the future arms production licence deals.\(^\text{93}\) On the other hand, there were several factors counterbalancing the tendency of Soviet arms transfers to fall in the 1960s. The decolonization of Western European powers had formed new export markets where the USSR can easily access with its political discourse and transportation capabilities.\(^\text{94}\) In addition, the regional crises such as the Arab-Israeli and Indo-Pakistani wars in the second half of the 1960s created new willing buyers. Also, the Third World arms imports from the USSR in the 1960s had symbolized an anti-Western stance.


\(^{91}\) “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”


which would disappear in the following decades.\textsuperscript{95} The abandonment of Khrushchev’s nuclear deterrence policy after 1964 made another accelerating impact on arms transfers. Brezhnev’s leadership re-boosted the production of conventional weapons and promoted the modernization of the WTO arms industries.\textsuperscript{96} Apart from its politico-economic benefits, arms trade was an obligation for the USSR since arms transfers had been one of the rare strong diplomatic tools that prevent the penetration of capitalism into Soviet-friendly Third World countries.\textsuperscript{97} Despite the obsolescence of supplied technology, arms transfers were more practical and fruitful than technical assistance programmes in the short-term.\textsuperscript{98} Notwithstanding, the overall volume of Soviet arms transfers to the non-aligned countries can hardly be claimed plentiful in the 1960s, though its moderate increase vis-à-vis the previous decade.

The non-Soviet Eastern Bloc countries have been relatively successful in arms transfers between 1960 and 1969. Actually, their share in the volume of global arms exports has marked another historical peak in the 1960s as a result of continuous investment in national defence technology.\textsuperscript{99} Czechoslovakia and Poland ranked sixth and tenth respectively in this period on SIPRI’s top arms suppliers list\textsuperscript{100}; nonetheless, Romania and the GDR would be their intra-bloc challengers henceforth. The GDR began to augment its arms transfers to the Third World so that it could gain legitimacy and international recognition as a

\textsuperscript{95}Cutler, Després and Karp, “The Political Economy,” 275.


\textsuperscript{97}Kramer, “Soviet Arms Transfers,” 52.

\textsuperscript{98}Ibid., 53, 56.


\textsuperscript{100}“SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”

sovereign state\textsuperscript{101} whilst the patriotist vanguard cadre of Romania leaned on indigenous defence industry and maverick arms exports to sustain its Stalinist development model.\textsuperscript{102}

The Sino-Soviet Split of 1961 dramatically affected the Chinese arms transfers for the following years. After this fraction between the two giant socialist states, China assumed itself the real defender of communism by defaming the USSR and the USA simultaneously as the two domination-seeking oppressive powers.\textsuperscript{103} Accordingly, the above-mentioned radical reduction in the Chinese imports of Soviet arms occurred. However, rather than seeking utterly new import markets, China continued to buy weapon systems from the USSR at low levels and focused on developing a self-sufficient national DIB throughout the 1960s. Reverse engineering –be it legal or not- was highly applied to the imported Soviet arms in order to achieve up-to-date military technology.\textsuperscript{104} In terms of supply, China followed Mao’s principle that is not to be an international arms dealer like imperialist powers and donated arms to the Third World in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{105}

The third tier global arms suppliers such as Israel, Brazil, South Africa and India –most of them are also non-aligned countries- engaged in new attempts at arms production and exports especially in the late 1960s.\textsuperscript{106} Their efforts were based on two intertwined developmental strategies: defence-led industrialization and

\textsuperscript{101} Cutler, Després and Karp, “The Political Economy,” 284.

\textsuperscript{102} Crampton, Eastern Europe, 311-314.


\textsuperscript{104} Bitzinger and Boutin, “China’s Defence Industries,” 127; Krause, Arms and the State, 154.

\textsuperscript{105} Luo, “Intrastate Dynamics,” 43.

\textsuperscript{106} Krause, Arms and the State, 154.
export promotion. The underlying idea was to use military industry as a leading sector that would stop brain drain and provide technological spin-offs. This process would be initially conducted under an import-substitution planning which would hopefully give a way to an export capacity in the future.\textsuperscript{107} The tangible results of these policies would come in sight in the 1970s and 1980s.

The 1970s in IR have been defined by many scholars as the détente period even though there are some differences regarding the exact end-year of the period.\textsuperscript{108} The characteristic of the détente was the lessening of international tension – especially on Europe- between the hegemons of the two antagonistic systems. Nonetheless, the inter-hegemon rapprochement policies of the 1970s, including arms control talks, did not mitigate the escalation of global arms transfers. In contrast, ironically, the volumetric increase was so high that this decade has been even called the “take-off” years in terms of international arms trade.\textsuperscript{109} On the supply side, the main reason for this sharp rise is the fact that the main front of the Cold War has shifted from continental Europe to the Third World- mainly Middle East. The Cold War order had been settled in Europe by the late 1960s but the competition to articulate the Third World countries into capitalism or socialism that manifests itself through indigenous power struggles has been dynamic until the late 1970s\textsuperscript{110}, paving the way for booming arms exports.


\textsuperscript{109} Hartung, “The International Arms Trade,” 348.

The two hegemonic powers were again the leaders of international arms transfers between 1970 and 1979; but, the number and capacity of assertive exporters mounted up, which alleviated the situation of dependence to a single arms supplier. Both states extended the pool of arms production licences under Nixon and Brezhnev doctrines although the USSR generally seemed more reluctant than the USA about license sharing. In this period, the Soviet export of military equipment has exceeded $135 billion while the US exports were at around $125 billion. Falling far behind the two systemic leaderships, France, the UK and the FRG as the West European second tier arms suppliers transferred respectively $24 billion, $20 billion and $13 billion worth of arms to foreign markets. China and Czechoslovakia were consecutively the sixth and seventh with their approximately $7 billion worth of arms shipment in this decade, indicating the fact that they were not part of the second tier elite group anymore but they led the third tier category.


113 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”
There was a boom on the demand side for the major weapon transfers, too. In addition to the OPEC crisis and the following Yom Kippur War in 1973, the end of Vietnam War in 1975 both enabled and compelled Third World recipients to refresh their empty arsenals.  

After 1975, events leading to the upheavals in Iran and Afghanistan have augmented the flow of arms to the Middle East in particular. Indeed, the fact that military expenditure of the Third World quadrupled between 1960 and 1980 proves that the 1970s are part of a longer trend.  

As cited in Michael Klare’s article, the now-defunct US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) asserted that the total financial value of arms imports to the OPEC members had escalated from $370 million in 1970 to $10.3 billion in 1979.  

Moreover, given the zeitgeist of the Détente, the Third World

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115 Stohl and Grillot, The International Arms Trade, 22.

managed to import more sophisticated major conventional weapons from both blocs, thus acquired a tool to play off one systemic vanguard against the other.\textsuperscript{117}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure2_6.png}
\caption{The Top 10 Arms Importers, 1970-1979 (in SIPRI TIV, $ billions)}
\textbf{Source:} Author’s Own Drawing (The data are taken from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database)
\end{figure}

The US arms export policy of the early-mid 1970s was primarily shaped by the Nixon Doctrine. The doctrine was based on providing material support to the US allies in conflict zones instead of directly sending US contingents. Thus, as if the consequences of arms transfers were easily predictable, the USA did not hesitate to send military hardware to a wide range of recipients while incorporating new developing states like the Republic of Korea (ROK) into weapon technology programmes.\textsuperscript{118} This policy changed during President Carter’s incumbency. Carter was an advocate of arms trade restraints, but his anti-arm sales stance remained in rhetoric\textsuperscript{119} during his first years in office. In 1977 and 1978, the


\textsuperscript{118}Hartung, “U.S. Conventional Arms Transfers,” 9; Keller, Arm in Arm, 100.
massive arms exports to Iran that was the top importer of US weapons throughout the 1970s continued to be the important element of US back up to the Shah who was dethroned in 1979. However, in addition to the FRG’s sharply declining arms demand in the late 1970s, the fact that US weapons pointed towards the USA itself in Iran after the revolution enabled Carter administration to pursue their idealist plans; hence, US arms transfers could be reduced 25 per cent between 1977 and 1980. In short, with the aim of expanding the zone of capitalist order in which the US capital has been predominant, the USA marked new annual arms transfer records by targeting the Third World in the 1970s-a common case for many other countries.

The efforts of European capitalism in defence industry and arms exports are visible in 1970s but they did not produce a great leap especially in terms of global share in international arms supplies. For example, in 1976, several Western European arms-exporting states initiated the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) to advance the armaments cooperation in Europe. Yet, when the Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 are compared, it can be seen that the second tier arms exporters which is consisted of France, the UK and the FRG displayed only a modest increase with regard to their shares in global arms market in the 1970s. France, of which the two thirds of its arms exports had been towards the prominent capitalist countries until the 1970, held the third place in the market by supplying more and more major conventional weapons to the Third World between 1970 and 1979. Its arms exports to (oil-exporting) developing countries have comprised roughly the 80 per cent of its total arms sales in this decade.


120 Hartung, “The International Arms Trade,” 350; “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”

121 Krause, Arms and the State, 102.

122 Fiott, “EU-NATO Cooperation,” 287.
The UK, on the other hand, gained a momentum in arms exports not by altering its customer profile but by offering state-of-the-art military equipment to the clients - a new tendency if compared with previous times.\textsuperscript{124} An interesting commonality between these two states which allegedly represents the universal liberal democratic values is that the growth of their arms exports in the 1970s became possible with their sales to illiberal and autocratic customers.\textsuperscript{125} Just like the 1960s, the FRG has taken new measures to restrain its arms sales in the beginning of the decade but ironically augmented its arms transfers, giving it a clear fifth position among the top arms exporters in this period.\textsuperscript{126}

The arms transfers of the leading socialist country, namely the USSR, showed a radically upward trend in the 1970s as well. This trend occurred as a result of factors related to both Soviet supply and foreign demand in qualitative and quantitative manners. On one hand, the international events and the condition of the global market were in favour of the Soviet Union. The Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the subsequent rise of oil prices making the OPEC members potentially rich clients, the Vietnam syndrome in the USA and the arms-restraint policies along with the imperatives during Carter’s presidency created globally convenient opportunities. Regionally, the poor performance of obsolescent Soviet weapons in the 1973 War led the Middle Eastern buyers to demand more advanced military hardware from the USSR, surely in return for higher prices.\textsuperscript{127} On the other hand, there were internal factors contributing to the rise of Soviet arms transfers. The USSR’s deteriorating balance of trade in the 1970s and its

\textsuperscript{123} Krause, \textit{Arms and the State}, 132.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 134.


\textsuperscript{126} Krause, \textit{Arms and the State}, 134.

\textsuperscript{127} Kramer, “Soviet Arms Transfers,” 54, 56.
desire to keep economy of scale in arms production required more hard currency gains from arms exports by using its comparative advantage with developing states. Moreover, the fact that the USSR has sent a bulk of military advisors and technicians along with weapon systems was associated with espionage and manipulation duties by the mainstream literature and was mentioned as an important reason for the willingness to maximize arms deliveries. In addition to these imperatives and motivations, the USSR has had some peculiar advantages in arms trade. For example, durability and easy maintenance of its equipment, its large stocks of surplus weapons and quickness in legal procedures have rendered the USSR a favourite supplier for many countries. Furthermore, the Soviet state has facilitated the financial issues of arms trade as well. Especially until the late 1970s, the USSR has used many types of subsidization including soft loans, postponement in payments, counter trade and barter agreements. However, in the end, the commercial budget deficit emerging in the Détente years induced Soviet policy makers to growingly adopt hard currency in arms trade transactions. The ratio of Soviet arms transfers which is conducted with hard currency has increased from nearly 40 per cent to 70 per cent until 1980. Nevertheless, the USSR was claimed to spend 88 per cent of its revenue coming from arms sales again on importing commodities from its Third World arms clients, explaining why the Soviet weapons were so demanded by the developing states.

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128 Ibid., 62; Cutler, Després and Karp, “The Political Economy,” 293.


130 Ibid., 63-64.

The financial growth of the arms exports and increasing usage of hard currency has caused a split in the literature on the question of what drives the USSR’s arms transfer policy. For instance, Kramer has argued that the economic motivations started to dominate the rationale of the USSR’s arms transfers in the mid-1970s. This view was objected by Krause in a way that the Soviet economy has certainly benefited from the lucrative terms of arms trade but the international political aims have still ranked in priority for the ultimate transfer decisions. This is actually an unfruitful dichotomy and can be overcome through a more holistic approach. Firstly, Krause’s emphasis is valid in the sense that the USSR, as a hegemonic power, has given up greater profits in order to subsidize the sale agreements with developing recipient countries. This choice is economically irrational; therefore, the political motivations seem still at the forefront for the 1970’s Soviet arms export policy. Secondly, on the other hand, Harpal Brar’s denunciation of Soviet revisionism underpins Kramer’s conclusion. Brar asserts that the post-Stalin economic reforms incrementally introduced the profit motive, commodification of civil products and marketization of planned economy. This general reformist logic of the CPSU, in addition to the foreign trade deficit, might have affected the arms transfer policy in a way that hard-currency gains were prioritized in arms deliveries. Thirdly, Richard Saull’s inter-systemic analysis makes a valuable contribution to the discussion. According to Saull, the Cold War confrontation between capitalism and socialism started to dissolve in the 1970s in the Middle East. For the USSR, it meant that the possibility of new

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134 Krause, Arms and the State, 124.

real socialisms to emerge in the Middle East has withered away. Therefore, pure economic drives might shelve political calculations in the short-term, leading the USSR to sell as many weapons as possible to the developing states. Nevertheless, the USSR’s arms trade network including the Third World states stopped the expansion of capitalist system and reproduced the hegemonic relationship between the USSR and developing pro-Soviet countries. To sum up, different motivations can become prominent case by case in terms of arms sale decisions; however, the historical and geographical context revealed by Saull, the agential influence of the revisionist CPSU depicted by Brar and Krause’s analysis of Soviet arms transfers as an hegemonic actor behaviour in the international arena constitutes the holistic explanation for the Soviet arms transfer policy in the 1970s.

Even though Czechoslovakia and Poland remained on the list of top ten arms exporting countries, Eastern Europe’s share in world arms trade market decreased in the 1970s in comparison with the previous decade. With regard to the production capacity and range of product, Eastern European DIBs have still fit into the group of second tier arms producers in the 1970s – as defined in Krause’s work. However, the financial volume of their arms exports as well as the technological level of the exported equipment has placed them among third tier arms exporters. Indeed, the non-Soviet WTO members were using the obsolete military technology of the 1950s, which lessens their competitiveness. Given the insufficiency of technological support by the USSR in the 1970s, Eastern European countries either tried to push the USSR for stronger ‘solidarity’ or seek


137 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”

138 Krause, Arms and the State, 130.

to boost innovation through technology sharing among themselves.\textsuperscript{140} Hereby, the WTO and the COMECON homed to contentious bargains in this decade.\textsuperscript{141} Yet, bargains were not limited only with the distribution of arms production licences. The ultimate arms export decisions were also discussed, in general bilaterally between the USSR and other members. That is why the literature on the relations within the socialist international organizations mainly splits into two as hierarchical and bargaining model. Whereas the hierarchical model depicts the WTO as a structure dominated by the USSR, the bargaining model regards it as an organization in which sovereign states bargain for the sake of their national interest.\textsuperscript{142} From this aspect, neither the bargaining model nor the hierarchical model accurately describes the Eastern European arms export policy.\textsuperscript{143} Rather, an approach synthesized by the World Systems Theory and International Political Economy has been presented to the literature. According to this, the USSR and Eastern European countries has so deeply entered to the world capitalist arms market that their transfer policies have been impelled by the needs of the market.\textsuperscript{144} Although this explication utterly neglects the distinction between the capitalist and socialist organization of defence industry and export policy, it offers an important framework especially for the 1980s. Hence, in the 1970s, Eastern Europe could do no more than saving its small niche in the global arms market due to the relative technological backwardness and the dynamics of the world market.

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 291.

\textsuperscript{141} Checinski, “Warsaw Pact/CEMA,” 18, 25.

\textsuperscript{142} Cutler, Després and Karp, “The Political Economy,” 274.

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., 274.

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 292-295.
China was in a superior position within the category of third tier arms suppliers in the 1970s. It has enlarged its client network in which Albania, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Pakistan and Vietnam became its remarkably loyal recipients.\textsuperscript{145} As a result of Mao's long-term arms transfer policy, most of the military equipment was delivered as gifts to gain the consent of the oppressed Third World countries and to compete with the USSR for the leadership of international socialism.\textsuperscript{146} Even, it is argued that China did not engage in official arms sales until 1979.\textsuperscript{147} Yet, according to some other sources, China could sell some spare parts of commonly-used Soviet military hardware, e.g. to Egypt, though not made-in-China complete weapon systems.\textsuperscript{148} Several Third World countries like Brazil and small members of the capitalist camp such as Canada, Sweden, Netherlands and Israel also focused on the promotion of arms exports, realizing that the national DIBs could no longer survive otherwise.\textsuperscript{149} Japan has solidified its anti-arms export policy under the 1967 and 1976 legislative prohibitions but it imported foreign defence technology if necessary.\textsuperscript{150} Surely, given the ongoing arms sales from the USA to Japan, to what extent these bans were instilled by the USA is another question.

The statistical and factual analysis of the next period, the 1980s, would also cover the years of 1990 and 1991 in order to constitute a historically meaningful whole. This twelve-year-long episode is a period of big developments and

\textsuperscript{145}“SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”

\textsuperscript{146} Luo, “Intrastate Dynamics,” 38.

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 43.


\textsuperscript{149} Krause, Arms and the State, 159.

transformations in the field of global arms transfers. First, it marks the Cold War’s final period when the real socialisms began to dissolve after an initially escalated inter-bloc competition. Second, the defining events of the past decade such as China’s restructuring in 1978, the Iranian Revolution and the USSR’s intervention to Afghanistan in 1979 tardily created a catalytic impact in this period. Because of a similar situation, the Gulf War and its effect on international arms trade would be analysed in the next chapter. Third, the neoliberal regime of capitalism emerged under Reagan and Thatcher rules, entailing radical reforms for the defence-industrial business. Fourth, the long-lastend Iran-Iraqi War (1980-1988) became an assistive factor for the increasing global arms demand. As an integrated consequence of all these, the financial volume of global arms transfers reached the all-time peak in 1982 with a minimum $45.6 billion worth.\textsuperscript{151} Although a long-term downward trend started aftermath of this year, the average financial value of arms trade became annually $38.8 billion in this period—the highest annual average during the Cold War. Besides, the hierarchy of arms exporting countries did not change much if compared with the previous decade. The top eight arms exporters of the 1970s lined up with the same order in this episode as well. The USSR led the list with $162.2 billion despite having hard times. The USA followed it with an immense total value, $145.3 billion. The core capitalist countries of Western Europe could also preserve their positions between 1980 and 1991. French arms exports reached $34 billion. The total value of the UK’s arms transfers was around $28.6 billion whereas that of the FRG surpassed $20.6 billion. The ambitious sixth exporter, China, narrowed the gap with the top five by selling weapon systems worth $17.2 billion. Czechoslovakia and Italy, as respectively the seventh and eighth suppliers, did not mark any leap forward but gained $11.7 and $10 billion from this sector. One notable detail in this period is that the aggregate share of second tier and third tier arms exporters constituted the thirty-four per cent of the world market as seen below.

\textsuperscript{151} “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”
Figure 2.7 Percentage Distribution of International Arms Supplies, 1980-1991

Source: Author’s Own Drawing (The data are taken from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database)

The list of top ten arms importing countries invites various assessments. For instance, India and Iraq have obviously undertaken enormous armament programmes through arms imports, leaving other importers far behind. Moreover, the increase in Japanese imports is salient. Given the Republic of Korea’s ninth place in addition to India and Japan, it can be argued that the current inter-state competition in the East and South Asia has its origins in this period. Furthermore, the FRG has remarkably reduced arms imports between 1980 and 1991, indicating the dissolution of Cold War tension in the continental Europe. Also, the arms import champion of the past decade, Iran, has fallen to the twenty-fifth position due to the US arms embargo. In contrast, Saudi Arabia has adopted a fierce armament policy as a late comer, roughly quadrupling its arms purchases in the same period.
The escalating systemic competition vis-à-vis the real socialism has shaped the US arms export policy between 1980 and 1991 via two interrelated elements: the neoliberal transformation of the defence industry and the anti-communist aggressiveness of the Reagan administration. This tripartite structure has initially brought a momentum to the arms transfers in spite of losing the arms import champion of the last decade- Iran. Unlike Carter’s belated export promotion, Ronald Reagan has quickly removed the restrictive arrangements and has urged the domestic arms industry to increase foreign sales since the beginning of his incumbency. Moreover, the rise of US arms exports (visible in SIPRI’s data) has occurred despite the growing purchases of Pentagon. Reagan’s determination to exacerbate the arms race with the USSR has made the domestic arms manufacturers work for meeting the demand of the US Army instead of an

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152 Hartung, “The International Arms Trade,” 350; Krause, Arms and the State, 102.

export-oriented arms production. Nonetheless, Reagan was also willing to use arms transfers in foreign policy bargains. Therefore, arms deliveries in the form of military aid or subsidized sales were put into practice again after the Carter period.\textsuperscript{154} Another significant support to national DIB by Reagan came up with the Competitiveness Act of 1988 which provides commercial protection especially against the European arms exporters.\textsuperscript{155} All these have helped US arms exports remain in high levels. However, Reagan’s idea to benefit from arms exports as a diplomatic tool has already been proved wrong. For example, Iran could import military hardware worth $21 billion from the USA throughout the 1970s. Those imported US weapon systems was used by the Islamic Republic of Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. Because the USA has feared Iran to prevail in the war, it has turned a blind eye on or covertly encouraged the massive arms supplies to Iraq.\textsuperscript{156} Not long after this process, Saddam Hussein’s huge military build-up would cause trouble directly to the USA.

The total share of France, the UK and the FRG in the world arms export market almost remained the same, comparing with the 1970s. Nevertheless, their aggregate market share in arms sales to the Third World and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) increased in this dozen-year period. Unlike the two global hegemons, these capitalist second tier arms exporters made concessions such as selling production licences and cutting-edge equipment, which made them favourable suppliers for the recipient states.\textsuperscript{157} On the other hand, the 1979 oil crisis and the growing indebtedness of Third World countries have shrunk the main export market of Western Europeans. Selling advanced weapon systems to the Third World clients were crucial to the capitalist Europe because it was one of

\textsuperscript{154} Krause, \textit{Arms and the State}, 103.

\textsuperscript{155} Kaija Schilde, \textit{The Political Economy of European Security} (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 142.


the rare ways of regaining the petrodollars from the OPEC members and conducting successful diplomatic bargains with them.\textsuperscript{158} Moreover, R&D projects of fast-developing technologies such as electronics and missile systems were getting unsustainably expensive. For instance, Dassault, the military aircraft producer of France, had to export sixty or seventy per cent of its commodities during the 1980s in order to afford the fixed costs.\textsuperscript{159} The three European core-capitalist states were experiencing what Moravcsik called “the autarky-efficiency dilemma” – the contradiction between the desire to have an independent defence industry and the economic rationality of international division of labour.\textsuperscript{160} Under these tough conditions, Western European DIBs were exposed to structural adjustment reforms in harmony with the general logic of neoliberalism. The autarky-efficiency dilemma made governments take the middle course. Some state-owned defence firms began to be privatized and internationalised but states, especially France, mostly became the controlling shareholder. In the private sector, international mergers, acquisitions, co-development projects and co-production lines started to occur.\textsuperscript{161} In Marxian terms, what has been happening is the internationalization and monopolization of arms-industrial capital along with the expansion of the free market.

Among the three eminent West European powers, the most significant state intervention to arms industry was in France. Delegation Generale pour l’Armement was the official armament agency of France, serving as a bridge between the state and the industry. Furthermore, majority of the defence companies were still state-owned in the 1980s. This partial unity between the political authority and arms industry conceded an export-oriented arms

\textsuperscript{158} Keller and Nolan, “The Arms Trade,” 114.

\textsuperscript{159} Moravcsik, “The European Armaments,” 68.

\textsuperscript{160} Moravcsik, “Arms and Autarky,” 35.

\textsuperscript{161} Moravcsik, “The European Armaments,” 68.
production pattern even when it sometimes contradicted the requirements of the French army and foreign policy priorities. Yet, export revenues were at stake for France that had the second largest arms client group in the world, ahead of the UK, the FRG and the USSR. By the end of the period of 1980-1991, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has imported weapon systems from France at a rate between 50-80 of total French arms sales. However, this region has been struggling with severe debt crises now. Therefore, the arms embargoes imposed on China, Taiwan and South Africa was renegotiated in the French Parliament at the end of the decade, with a result in favour of exports as visible in SIPRI data. Unlike the declining trend of French arms exports towards 1991, the UK’s arms exports were more stable except the 1990 and 1991 when global arms trade significantly diminished due to the end of the Cold War. The neoliberal reforms of Thatcher administration rendered the national arms industry almost an ordinary private sector that receives few state interventions. Moreover, the government promoted medium-scale arms firms to consolidate into giant defence corporations. All these were done in order to increase arms exports which seems the only way to retain military-technological development. Eventually, the Thatcher government achieved a remarkable success with the Al-Yamamah arms deal which would bring tens of billions of British pounds from Saudi Arabia since the mid-1980s. Although scandalous corruption allegations about the agreement were revealed, the project continued until mid-2000s under


163 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”

164 Whereas Krause asserts that MENA’s arms imports from France is equal to 80 per cent of the late-1980s aggregate French arms sales, SIPRI data shows a roughly fifty per cent share for the same issue. Krause, Arms and the State, 132; “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”


different names.\textsuperscript{167} The FRG had the fourth highest number of arms recipients in this period, having passed the USSR. Moreover, the geographic location of its prominent importers was multifarious and against the \textit{zeitgeist}. For example, the FRG’s top five arms clients were respectively Turkey, Argentina, Netherlands, Switzerland and Greece, being none of them oil exporting Third World countries.\textsuperscript{168} Besides, not its arms transfers but its supply of critical weapons technology to the fragile security regions such as the Middle East and the Sub-Saharan Africa during the late 1980s and early 1990s drew sharp criticisms.\textsuperscript{169}

The financial value of Soviet arms transfers has gradually diminished until 1991. In other words, it followed a similar downward trend along with that of the USA, France and the FRG since the early-mid 1980s.\textsuperscript{170} This situation was inversely proportional to the USSR’s increasing need of hard currency due to the foreign trade deficit. Therefore, the Soviet state was not an easy-going partner in terms of arms deals anymore and mostly stipulated hard currency as the primary method of payment in this period.\textsuperscript{171} Among the reasons leading to the decline of Soviet arms exports, the deteriorating economic power of the recipient countries comes first. Many MENA states were spending petrodollars to pay the international loans back, not to buy state-of-the-art Soviet arms. Moreover, the majority of the national arsenals in the region have already been replete with excessive amount of major conventional weapons. Furthermore, the rising third tier exporters such

\textsuperscript{167} Smith, \textit{Military Economics}, 107.

\textsuperscript{168} “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”


\textsuperscript{170} Martínez-Zarzoso and Johannsen, “The Gravity,” 12.

as Brazil and Israel have narrowed down the market share of the USSR.\textsuperscript{172} In addition, the internal economic problems of the Soviet Union as well as the revisionist policies of Gorbachev shifted some branches of the arms industry to the civilian production.\textsuperscript{173} Despite all, the traditional ties of the USSR with the non-aligned big buyers such as India, Syria, Libya and the Iran-Iraq War which lasted eight years were the two elements that alleviated the downward tendency of the Soviet arms exports. After an initially wary attitude, the flow of the Soviet weapon systems into the war accelerated. While Iraq enjoyed direct arms deliveries by the USSR, Iran could import Soviet arms through intermediaries.\textsuperscript{174} Indeed, SIPRI data shows that the Gorbachev administration has directly armed the both sides of the war.\textsuperscript{175} Gorbachev’s steps towards the liberalization of state control led to various allegations about the illicit sales of conventional weapons in the late 1980s.\textsuperscript{176} The articulation process of the USSR into the global arms market has come to such a point in the late 1980s that the arms transfer decisions of the USSR has been predominantly driven not by a socialist international grand strategy but by the proliferating export opportunities in the market. The hints of such a tendency were hidden in the several speeches of Gorbachev. His Prague speech in 1987\textsuperscript{177}, his UN speech in 1988\textsuperscript{178} and his “Common European Home”


\textsuperscript{173} Davis, “The Exceptional Soviet Case,” 124; Brar, Perestroika, 59-61.

\textsuperscript{174} Kramer, “Soviet Arms Transfers,” 58.

\textsuperscript{175} “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”

\textsuperscript{176} Anna Stavrianakis, Taking Aim at the Arms Trade: NGOs, Global Civil Society and the World Military Order (London: Zed Books, 2010), 46.

\textsuperscript{177} David S. Mason, “Glasnost, Perestroika and Eastern Europe,” International Affairs 64, no. 3 (1988): 436.
speech in the Council of Europe\(^\text{179}\) signalled the loosening and rupture of the ties within the Eastern Bloc, including solidarity and cooperation in armament via intra-bloc arms transfers. Indeed, the financial value of Soviet major weapon transfers to the Eastern Bloc countries significantly diminished in the second half of the 1980s while arms transfers to India and Afghanistan -both in the form of aid and sales- rose up in the same period.\(^\text{180}\)

Among the non-Soviet Eastern bloc countries, Czechoslovakia and Poland has stayed in the category of the third tier arms exporters in this historical episode while the transfers of the rest seem negligible. By means of remarkable transfers to the USSR, Czechoslovakia even became a net exporter and held on to its seventh place in the world ranking. On the other hand, Poland’s arms sales declined in real terms vis-à-vis the last decade. Actually, if Czechoslovakia is excluded, it is obvious that the socialist Eastern European countries have already been out of the game. The primary reason of this situation is the technological backwardness of the hardware they offered.\(^\text{181}\) Yet, the first half of the twelve-year period was not so dark with regards to the arms exports. Non-Soviet WTO members could sell considerable amount of military equipment to Iraq and some other Third World customers in the early 1980s before the USSR returned to the main supplier position.\(^\text{182}\) However, each socialist bloc country began to experience worse economic conditions in the second half of the 1980s.


\(^{180}\) “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”


\(^{182}\) Ibid., 284; Krause, *Arms and the State*, 135.
culminating in the collapse of national DIBs. The ill-performances of COMECON’s Military-Industrial Commission and WTO’s Military Scientific and Technical Council could provide no remedy. As the two socialist international organizations were disbanded, the arms sales of the Eastern European countries came to a standstill.\textsuperscript{183}

Even though China lacked sophisticated home-grown military technology, it has entered to the group of second tier arms exporters between 1980 and 1991. Deng Xiaoping’s reforms that started in 1978 entailed an export-led development model and overtly incorporated China into the world market. The products of national military industry were not exempt from the integration to international capitalism. In 1979, as a part of Deng reforms, the State Council and the Central Military Commission eventually introduced the legal exports of arms with new ‘Instructions on Foreign Military Aid in the Future’.\textsuperscript{184} A perfect opportunity accelerating the process came up with the Iran-Iraq War. China sold major conventional weapons and spare parts as well as dual-use items to both sides of the war. Pakistan, Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Egypt were other prominent importers of the Chinese arms.\textsuperscript{185} By virtue of the increasing export revenues, constant investments in the heavy defence industry became possible. Hence, the economy of scale which enables lower costs per unit in arms production was achieved. Also, arms imports were stabilized at the minimum level, making China an unfaltering net exporter. To sum up, the market-driven restructuring of the arms production and the international demand stemming from the Iran-Iraq War elevated the Chinese arms transfers to the upper level.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{183} Davis, “The Exceptional Soviet Case,” 125.

\textsuperscript{184} Luo, “Intrastate Dynamics,” 48.

\textsuperscript{185} “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”

When compared to previous decades, the third tier arms exporters have grabbed a bigger percentage share in the world arms supplier market in the last twelve years of the Cold War. Whereas the European small-scale capitalist arms exporters such as Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden have acquired a higher status within the third tier category, the Third World countries like Brazil, Yugoslavia and the DPRK have constituted the bottom part of the same group. Unlike the upper strata of the third tier arms suppliers, the LDCs have been struggling with the energy and debt crises throughout the 1980s. Therefore, at least some of them had to revise their arms production pattern. Arms sales were not one of the ordinary export items for the non-aligned developing states. Rather, they were part of a wider strategy that combines the targets of military-led industrialization and material independence against arms embargoes. For instance, Israel became successful in reducing its dependence on arms imports by augmenting industrial promotions and defence-related R&D. By the late 1980s, more than eighty per cent of the weapons used by Israeli military have been supplied by the national defence industry with comparison to the only two per cent in 1967. However, in the 1980s, the examples of Turkey, the Republic of Korea and Brazil have shown that the overall industrial development via military-technological spin-offs had tangible limitations. Indeed, the countries like Brazil could have found only niche positions in the arms export market by the end of the period. Eventually, these positions were seriously damaged by the dissolution of Cold War politics and the diminished Middle Eastern arms demand.

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190 Ibid., 110-111.

191 Ibid., 114.
At the end of the day, the mainstream literature on international arms trade frequently asserts that the trade of major conventional weapons, throughout the Cold War, has been an international practise which the two superpowers have directed in order to reiterate and extend their influence on other states. In other words, the mainstream narrative tends to reduce the role of arms transfers to the bipolar power struggle and acknowledges the Cold War as a monolithic time period. However, the systemic approach which focuses on the antinomy between the capitalism and socialism reveals the shortcomings of these two assertions.

The social-systemic conflict as a distinctive feature of the Cold War had emanated from three elements. Firstly, each system had its own class structure - bourgeois society vs. proletariat dictatorship - that arises from the two opposite social principle: public ownership vs. private ownership of the means of production. Different class structures entail different class interests. Secondly, the two social organizations had separate ideologies that envisage different institutions and ideals which the whole world should follow. Third, various developments in different parts of the world, especially in the non-aligned countries, had drawn the USA and the USSR into hostile involvements, entailing different social interests of both system. The most significant impact of these three elements on international arms transfers during the Cold War becomes apparent with the type of transfers. The Soviet arms transfers during the Cold War had been conducted to a large extent under the military cooperation, technical assistance and aid programmes instead of direct cash sales which have been the primary method in the capitalist world. Two different ruling class

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194 Michael Brzoska, “The Economics of Arms Imports After the End of the Cold War,” Defence and Peace Economics 15, no. 2 (2004): 112; Hartung, “The International Arms Trade,” 349; Siemon Wezeman argues that arms deliveries were also practised largely in
interests, two contrasting scenarios for the future of the world and the motivation to incorporate the Third World into capitalism or socialism led to a system-based distinction in the types of major weapon transfers. In this respect, the systemic analysis of the Cold War arms transfers can be seen as a reflection of Cox’s Critical Theory approach since it scrutinizes the arms transfers by placing it to the peculiar material and social conditions of the Cold War.

2.3 Conclusion

In the light of the systemic analysis, the international arms transfers during the Cold War can be split into two main historical periods according to the motives and functions of the arms transfers. The first period of the Cold War arms transfers had lasted until the mid-1970s. The international arms deliveries had two fundamental functions during this period: first, conventional arms were transferred within the capitalist or socialist bloc in order to consolidate the intra bloc ties; second, weapon systems were supplied to the Third World so that each system could hinder the expansion of the rival camp and could spread its own set of social relations to these areas. Until the beginning of the 1970s, the bulk of the international arms trade has been realized within the blocs. Therefore, during the pre-1970s Cold War, a big proportion of major conventional weapons have flown to Europe where the blocs have been concretely neighbours to each other. Hereby, it can be inferred that the focus of the Cold War competition had been over Europe for these years. The arms recipients of the Third World, on the other hand, have gone through the decolonization era and the post-decolonization development in this period. In parallel with their turbulent internal and regional politics, they have been financially incapable but at the same time very willing to

the form of military aid within the capitalist camp through the agency of NATO; but, he adds that this fact was real only until mid-1970s and limited with Europe and Asia, excluding the Middle East. If compared to inter-socialist country arms transfers during the Cold War overall, it would be seen that major conventional weapons were sold and bought among the capitalist countries rather than aids. See: Siemon T. Wezeman, “Arms Transfers as Military Aid,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2017: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 380.
import military equipment from only one of the blocs in order to take a side between the two disparate social orders.

The second period has continued since the mid-1970s until the end of the Cold War. The nature of international arms transfer has been exposed to a slow but substantial transformation in this period. Two notable factors have been determinant on the transformation of the arms transfer regime. The first factor is the Détente period itself. During the Détente years, the logic of “capitalism vs. communism” has blurred due to the CPSU’s acceptance of peaceful coexistence with capitalism and due to the emergence of new political currents- e.g. Islamism in the Middle East. Hence, in this episode, the essential contradiction of the Cold War had weakened, which led major weapons to be less political but more commodified objects. The second factor is the multiplied oil revenues of the MENA countries after 1973. This case has facilitated the expansion of the global arms trade. The arms demand of the Third World states has mounted up proportionally with their petrodollars. This situation has whetted the appetite of the eminent suppliers, whether they are capitalist or socialist. Consequently, the international arms transfers slowly started to transform into a globalizing arms market where the prominent exporters have sought for new clients as well as prolonged commercial relations. It should be kept in mind that there has always been a systemic difference upon the international arms supplies throughout the Cold War, but this difference has started to evaporate slowly since the mid-1970s.

In the 1980s, the two extra factors got involved in the changing nature of international arms trade. The first has been the intensifying economic problems of the Eastern Bloc in a time coinciding with the escalating US belligerence. Such a situation compelled the socialist countries, especially the USSR, to sell weapons systems as many as possible in the world market. The second extra factor of the 1980s has been the emergence of neoliberalism in the West. The neoliberal restructuring started to make the production and marketing of major weapons an overtly private economic sector in the capitalist camp where the state intervention to economy has been defamed. Taking all these into account, it is not surprising
that the financial volume of global arms trade has indicated a drastic rise since the mid-1970s and has marked a historical peak in the early 1980s. Also, the most arms importing regions have become the Middle East and the East-South Asia after the early 1970s. This geographic change might lead to the interpretation that the focus of the Cold War competition has shifted to these regions.

In consequence, the systemic analysis of the international arms trade during the Cold War clarifies two important points. First, the international arms transfers have been something beyond the clash of superpowers. Rather, they had two particular functions: to provide the intra-systemic harmony and to compete with the rival system in military, economic and political domains. Second, the motivations and functions of the arms deliveries between 1945 and 1991 do not indicate a monolithic time frame. In chronological order, the politics of peaceful coexistence, the increasing demand of the oil-rich countries, the deteriorating trade deficit of the socialist bloc and the nascent neoliberal practises have incrementally formed a new regime of international arms transfers. In the new regime, major conventional weapons have been more commodified and increasingly exported to a larger number of recipients.
CHAPTER 3


3.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to analyse the decline of international arms transfers between 1992 and 2002. In fact, the international arms transfers had started to decline after the global peak year of 1982. However, despite the downward trend, the total financial volume of weapon system transfers had remained very high until the last few years of the Cold War. Following 1991, on the other hand, the downward trend became drastic and the decline became concrete. In short, the total value of global arms transfers has incrementally decreased until 2002 when it became equal to the pre-1963 levels.\(^{195}\)

\(^{195}\)“SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”, See also: Figure 1.1.
The aforementioned eleven-year episode would be examined from different aspects. First, the new systemic characteristic of the post-1991 international order would be discussed. Second, the overall trend and fluctuations of arms transfers in this period would be investigated by focusing on the global political developments. Third, the main arms suppliers and recipients would be assessed with attributions to their peculiar regional or domestic conditions as well as to their political, economic and security agendas. Hence, this chapter scrutinizes the accumulation of the elements that would eventually lead a gradual increase in international arms transfers in the post-2002 years.

3.2 The Decline of Arms Transfers in the Early Post-Cold War Years

1991 was a cornerstone in terms of both world politics and international arms transfers. The year started with the Gulf War between the US-led international coalition and Iraq under Saddam Hussein rule, which would create a substantial effect on the arms flows. Yet, the event at the end of the year was bigger and would re-write ‘the rules of the game’. On 8 December 1991, the USSR
dissolved, the real socialism collapsed, and the Cold War ended. The end of the Cold War directly affected the international arms transfers since it extinguished the *raison d'être* of enormous military budgets\textsuperscript{196}, though temporarily. Total world military expenditure dropped 8 per cent suddenly in 1991.\textsuperscript{197} In the same year, there was a sharp fall in the financial volume of arms trade agreements - from a record high $71 billion in 1985 to $32 billion in 1991 - which concerns the upcoming years.\textsuperscript{198} As a result of the downward trend in the global arms trade since the late 1980s, the proportion of it within the total world trade fell from 2.2 per cent in 1981 to 0.7 per cent in 1991.\textsuperscript{199} In broader terms, the world aggregate defence budgets fell by 35 per cent while the size of global armed forces declined by approximately 25 per cent from 1989 to 1999.\textsuperscript{200} The volume of the military aid in the form of conventional arms also started to fall down beginning by the mid-1990s.\textsuperscript{201}

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\textsuperscript{198} Ibid., 2.

\textsuperscript{199} Ibid., 27.


\textsuperscript{201} Wezeman, “Arms Transfers as Military Aid,” 380, 389.
Between 1992 and 2002, there was an extra loss of demand particularly in major conventional weapons because of two reasons. First, countries often preferred to upgrade weapons in their inventories instead of buying new ones which have rapidly rising costs due to new expensive technologies. Second, a potential threat of occupation in which conventional weapons could be used by a rival camp, namely the WTO, has no longer existed. Moreover, the ultimate end of USSR’s already-low military aid to the Third World, the barely continuance of the advantageous arms sales by the subsequent Russian Federation, and the debt spiral of the Third World inherited by the 1980s decreased both the international demand and supply of major lethal weapons. Among the Third World, the Asian fast-growing countries could keep the demand for combat systems alive.


204 This term became meaningless after the coalescence of the first ‘two worlds’ into one globalized capitalist world with end of the Cold War.
until the late 1990s; but, the 1997 Asian financial crisis clearly damaged this trend.

The cuts in military expenditure decreased the subsidies allocated to the R&D for an advance defence technology; so, this fact created an indirect negative impact on arms supply in the long term. Under these conditions, some mainstream sources of the literature anticipated a decrease in defence expenditure in the core of capitalism, an increase in military spending in the periphery of capitalism, the expansion of the role of the UN and the rise of effectiveness of the international law. Although some of these estimates partially came true in the short term, almost none of them could survive after 2002.

The shrinking world military spending meant nothing but a crisis for the defence companies whether they are state-owned or private enterprises. The diminishing demand for military equipment was resulting in inefficiencies and bankruptcies, which is alarming especially for imperialist powers that are willing to sustain their independent DIBs. Correspondingly, several necessary qualitative transformations have occurred in this field throughout the 1990s. The transformations are, in the broadest sense, the prominence of economic motives in the making of international arms transfers and the internationalization of supplier-recipient networks.

This issue was frequently argued in the related literature as well. The arms production and transfers have been de-nationalized and de-politicized in the post-

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Cold War era. In other words, in the post-1991 period, the economic interests would replace the ideological, diplomatic and strategical motives during the decision-making of a globalizing arms transfer. Even, the arms deliveries of the 1990s were compared and likened to that of the interwar and pre-World War I periods when the world has not been polarized yet. In short, the new economic orientation and the internationalization of the arms industry and transfers were the outcome of the survival efforts of the large defence industries in the scarce demand years.

To begin with the prevalence of economic considerations, this process started with the stark rationalization of arms industries in adaptation to the new conditions. The rationalization has been composed of five micro-economic strategies. The first one is the conversion from military to civilian production. The historical examples prove that conversion is a very difficult move for an arms-industrial firm because it is very costly- not only in terms of fixed costs (i.e. machinery) but also in terms of business operations which are much more competitive in the civilian market than the monopsonistic and usually oligopolistic military market.

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209 Ibid., 27-28.


The second option was the diversification of commercial activities. Private defence firms invested in the projects of civilian products in addition to their defence business, so that they could get rid of their dependence to the military sector.\textsuperscript{216} Moreover, the ‘electronification’ of conventional weapon platforms, which has started in the 1980s, facilitated the diversification strategy. Indeed, the usability and utility of command, control, communication and computer technologies in the possible intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions have gained a remarkable pace.\textsuperscript{217} Until the 1990s, the defence industry has had a technological superiority compared to its civilian counterpart and has provided technological spin-offs to the civilian economy. However, from 1990s on, the civilian sector has taken the lead in certain innovations and the DIBs have begun to receive technological ‘spin-ins’.\textsuperscript{218} Hence, the angle between defence technology and civilian innovations decreased\textsuperscript{219}, culminating in the vitality of dual-use technologies for the arms industries under economic difficulties\textsuperscript{220}. Furthermore, military innovations like the unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) drew the attention of the military authorities as a future member of the conventional weapons category.\textsuperscript{221} When all these extensive and rapid defence-technological developments were interpreted together with the new military and security


\textsuperscript{216} Ibid., 64; Hayward, “The Globalisation,” 122.

\textsuperscript{217} Bitzinger, “Introduction,” 6-7.


\textsuperscript{219} Keller, \textit{Arm in Arm}, 31.

\textsuperscript{220} Ikegami, “The End,” 439.

\textsuperscript{221} ACDA, “World Military Expenditures,” 30.
doctrines of the post-Cold War era, the 1990s was argued to witness a ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) in the related literature. The RMA highlights the new network-centric organization of warfare and the asymmetric nature of armed conflicts in the absence of a massive rival camp like the WTO.\textsuperscript{222} The RMA in the 1990s has accelerated some trends which would have significant repercussions to the international arms transfers. Firstly, the number of components in major weapon platforms has risen to incredible levels, which can increase the post-transfer dependencies between the supplier and recipient countries. Secondly, the improvement of the various dual-use technologies has transformed major weapons into the “systems of systems”. This fact rendered arms sales huge trade packages in a way that if one part is missing, then the system of systems may not work properly. Thirdly, modern military platforms became extraordinarily sophisticated, entailing the increased complexity of possible technical problems.\textsuperscript{223} This can be another factor in reproducing the dependency relation between the exporting and importing parties. In short, the diversification strategy was followed by many firms. However, it should be noted that this was not a one-way path. Some traditionally civilian firms could get contracts in the defence-industrial market as well, even if they did not have any military background.\textsuperscript{224}

A third way in the agenda of the defence corporations was to divest their defence-related holdings, given the deteriorating market conditions. The policy to divest itself of military production might easily lead to the exit from the defence market if the company is a profit-oriented private enterprise. However, such a situation might be a politico-military loss for the state in which the company operates. At

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\textsuperscript{224} Kiss, Arms Industry Transformation, 21.
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that point, whether or not the state has the authority to interfere in under neoliberal restructuring was an important question. One thing is certain that these sort of hypothetical cases frequently came true in the 1990s when the ambivalent relation between the liberalisation movement and the protectionist nature of arms industry has collided. 225 Briefly, some defence firms submitted to market rules and sold out at least some of their military-industrial assets.

Cooperation among the big, medium and small firms was the fourth reflex of the arms-industrial capital in the 1990s. Actually, co-development and co-production in the arms industry were not new, but they started to occur more often in this period. In a capitalist market, corporations ideally compete with each other in order to undertake the whole work, in return for, of course, whole income. The more corporations share the workload, the less they earn income. Therefore, industrial cooperation can only be a ‘second-best’ remedy. 226 Nevertheless, many corporations had to consent to this type of making business rather than winning zero contracts in the 1990s. Hereby, the stratification of arms industry increased in this decade. Not only the trend of imperative collaboration but also the widening technological network due to the emergence of crucial dual-use items has forged the contemporary supplier chain linking small civil subcontractors to the high-tech prime contractors. 227 The globalization-related dimension of this division of labour would be analysed separately in the following pages.

The last micro-economic response of the defence firms to the reality of the 1990s was to expand their businesses by buying other ‘sinking ships’. Some already-large defence companies sought to grow more by turning the crisis into an opportunity. They simply bought out other defence firms including small

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225 Ibid., 20; Stavrianakis, Taking Aim at the Arms Trade, 5.


227 Kiss, Arms Industry Transformation, 18.
subcontractors or bigger prime contractors. In the literature, this process was analysed through different concepts such as acquisition, merger, consolidation and concentration. In a dictionary of political economy, these concepts may indicate minor differences; however, with regard to the arms-industrial restructuring of the 1990s, they all point out the materialization of the monopolisation tendency of the capital. To illustrate, while the arms sales of the top five largest defence firms in the world constituted the 23 per cent of world total at the end of the Cold War, the same ratio escalated to the 45 per cent by 1998. Unsurprisingly, the finance capital of the core capitalist countries had a special role in facilitating and promoting this sectoral restructuring. Moreover, given the lack of a Cold War pressure, the lobbying between the state and the arms capital turned to be a vital activity in this period. Consequently, the concentration of defence industries all around the world would have a long-term impact on the international arms transfers which would be elaborated in the next chapter.

In the 1990s, the second main result of the crisis in the defence industry and arms trade is the further internationalization of this network. The shrinkage of military budgets, the ongoing problem of overcapacity since the late 1980s and the exponentially rising R&D costs have rendered the national arms markets unsustainable for both private and state enterprises. The domestic demand

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228 Hayward, “The Globalisation,” 120.


231 Dunne and The SIPRI Staff, “Development,” 29.

contraction was so severe particularly in Europe and North America that many states privatized their national arms companies. The privatized companies immediately began to seek for their profits\textsuperscript{234} and, thus, engaged in a rationalization (concentration) process within the national borders, which is mentioned before. However, when the domestic restructuring was not sufficient, the arms-industrial capital headed towards the new markets abroad.\textsuperscript{235} In addition, the post-Cold War relaxation in the world politics defused the national security orientation to a big extent, though temporarily. The legitimate reason which once made states restrain the profit-oriented integrations of different national arms industries seemed lost. Hence, international collaboration in the forms of mergers, acquisitions, corporate alliances, subcontracting chains, co-development projects and licenced production began to spread especially among the North American, Asian and European DIBs.\textsuperscript{236} As a result, most of the traditionally national defence industries were gradually multinationalized by the foreign investors.\textsuperscript{237} International comparative advantage began to dominate the future of the arms companies in a globalizing conventional arms market.\textsuperscript{238}

States, particularly the core-capitalist ones, did not leave their defence entrepreneurs alone in the international arena and started to sign bilateral weapons cooperation agreements with the governments of the other trading partners in order to secure the long-term projects. Although these agreements were part of a systemic alliance within the capitalist bloc already in the 1980s,

\textsuperscript{233} Keller, \textit{Arm in Arm}, 9-10; Stohl and Grillot, \textit{The International Arms Trade}, 37.

\textsuperscript{234} Hartley, \textit{The Economics of Arms}, 62.

\textsuperscript{235} Keller and Nolan, \textquotedblright The Arms Trade\textquotedblright, 116.

\textsuperscript{236} Ibid., 114; Keller, \textit{Arm in Arm}, 29; Hartley, \textit{The Economics of Arms}, 111.

\textsuperscript{237} Bitzinger, \textquoteleft Introduction\textquoteright, 6.

\textsuperscript{238} Moravcsik, \textquoteleft The European Armaments\textquoteright, 81; Keller, \textit{Arm in Arm}, 127.
they became more common and more global in the post-1991 era. Yet, until the new millennium, the bilateral weapons cooperation agreements clustered on a several central nodes such as the USA, France, Russia and Turkey. A version of these agreements is the arms trade offsets. The logic of offsets in arms trade is to compensate the commercial loss of the arms importer through additional concessions. There are two types of offsets: direct and indirect. By the direct offsets, the arms exporting state loads a certain share of the work to the importing state. Hereby, the importing state can create employment opportunities, decrease the cost by producing some components at home, receive foreign direct investment (FDI), or transfer the related technology. These are also the most common types of offsets. Indirect offsets, on the other hand, generate a different commercial channel with the importing state, ranging from barter trade in civilian commodities to co-development of other military equipment. In other words, direct offsets have a link with the primary commercial activity whereas indirect offsets are ways of compensation irrelevant to the primary commercial activity.

The duality of ‘weak demand at home’ and ‘more freedom abroad’ impelled the defence firms to find new clients for their commodities, namely arms. Therefore, in many arms supplier countries except the USA which had still constant domestic demand, defence companies shifted to an export-oriented arms

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240 Ibid., 363.


production, harmoniously with neoliberalism. Thus, a true global market of major conventional weapons, in which the profit logic balanced or even surpassed the politico-ideological factors, incrementally emerged. The buyer states obtained a greater bargaining power with comparison to the Cold War period and could receive arms, in some cases, from the USA, former socialist states and the European suppliers simultaneously. On the other hand, particularly the victorious side of the Cold War -the liberal-capitalist states- achieved a greater arms client list than before, at least until the recovery of Russian defence industry. The reformist view in the literature criticized this situation by asking a legitimate question: “Did the West defeat the USSR only to make the world safe for American and European weapons?” However, the reformist view also argues that the globalization of defence industries materialized just because the major arms supplier countries permitted it. In other words, allegedly, the globalization of the defence industries was an avertable fault of the liberal industrial powers. It is furthermore elaborated in a way that the developed democratic governments have failed to understand how dangerous the arms trade was becoming. This naive perspective perfectly summarizes the problem-


247 Keller, Arm in Arm, 12.

248 Ibid., 11.

249 Ibid., 73.
solving reformist position towards the arms trade. While it criticizes the arms business, it blames the arms trade only on the actors, without any systemic investigation.

The internationalization of the arms industry and transfers has been questioned through different conceptualizations in the literature. One of them is transnationalization. The transnationalization argument on defence sector argues that what was happening in the defence sector in the 1990s is different from a plausible internationalization movement. Internationalization is accepted as a relatively independent operation of arms production facilities in multiple countries. On the other hand, transnationalization is described as an interdependent operation of the arms production within different national borders. In the transnationalization era, military equipment has not been entirely developed and manufactured in one country; rather, only its components are assembled in a single state. It was advocated that such a process paves the way for a rise in the trade of weapon components instead of complete major weapons. Hence, it is even asserted that the international arms trade has increasingly become an ambiguous complexity. Indeed, just as the transnationalists have argued, a conventional major weapon can be designed in one country; its components can be produced in another; those components can be assembled in a new one; and the final product can be sold to a variety of countries in a (almost) Smithian free market, including the co-producing states. Also, it is true that this sort of complexity has created vast problems for the strict control on the diffusion of critical technology and proliferation of lethal weapons.

However, all these did not change the essence of the matter. A finished weapon - or a component- which has use or exchange value has already a surplus value

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embedded in itself. That surplus value is realized when the weapon is sold. It means that when the weapon is sold, the surplus value is captured by a single or a group of defence corporations. In the final analysis, these corporations are still bound to their nation states which provide coercive and controlling means.\(^{253}\) Moreover, even if the number of defence firms which have a multinational character has increased since the 1990s, their composition of capital has been still and mostly dominated by a national bourgeoisie.\(^{254}\) Therefore, instead of a transnationalist approach, the concentration and internationalization of the arms-industrial capital in the 1990s can be explained through the increased international subcontracting activities in the defence sector. Rather than the transnationalist or supranationalist accounts that propose a messy and intangible set of relations, international subcontracting in the defence sector defines a tangible and hierarchical capitalist-imperialist system. What is important in this system is where the surplus value burst out of the arms business flow. And the hubs of such flow are clearly the developed capitalist countries.

Moreover, there are military-practical factors slowing down what is called ‘the transnationalization of the defence economy’. For example, the RMA has increasingly made weapon platforms functional only if they are operated together with certain supplementary systems (e.g. the interconnectedness of air defence systems thanks to the electronification). Therefore, it is very difficult to talk about a global free market of weapon components or spare parts that can be arbitrarily bought from ordinary producers. Furthermore, the ‘rational’ collaboration in defence industry is not exempt from the political calculations. The *juste retour* principal is a good example of it. According to this principal, states and firms that


engage in a joint work demand fair economic and political returns proportionally with their investments.\textsuperscript{255} This seems quite logical at first but causes tough problems especially for long-term joint R&D projects in which the ‘political just return’ is difficult to calculate.

All in all, the Political Economy Discipline interprets the transformation of international arms industry and transfers during the 1990s on the basis of concentration and globalization. On the other hand, the military-focused studies make a contribution through the concept of RMA. In addition to the concentration, globalization and the RMA, certain events and processes in the international politics of the 1990s have a significant impact on the international arms trade. The first of these events is the Gulf War.

The war started with the invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi forces in August 1990 and ended with the Operation Desert Storm organized by the US-led international coalition that averts the Iraqi forces from Kuwait in February 1991. The Saddam Hussein’s army had a wide range of conventional weapons, though technologically backward. Such a vast arms inventory had been aggregated via arms imports from the USSR, the UK, France, Italy; and via a national defence industry that purchased even certain US military technology and equipment components.\textsuperscript{256} Briefly, all the major international arms suppliers had contributed to this military build-up especially since the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War.\textsuperscript{257} Moreover, these prominent suppliers benefitted from the exacerbated demand for armament in the Middle East during the war. New arms contracts signed by the Middle Eastern states reached up to 17 billion US dollar in 1991, compared to $13 billion in 1989.\textsuperscript{258} The biggest share among the arms sale agreements

\textsuperscript{255} Hartley, \textit{The Economics of Arms}, 115.

\textsuperscript{256} Hartung, “The International Arms Trade,” 352.

\textsuperscript{257} Stohl and Grillot, \textit{The International Arms Trade}, 32.
belonged to the USA; but, this share would get even bigger after the war.\textsuperscript{259} The war was an open theatre where the USA could display its superiority in the military technology.\textsuperscript{260} The so-called RMA was practiced by the USA in the battlefield for the first time. The new lethal technologies emanating from the RMA was practically successful but very expensive at the same time. Only the use of cruise missiles and laser-guided bombs costed more than $2 billion during the war.\textsuperscript{261} Yet, the USA compensated its military equipment expenditures particularly through the post-war arms exports to its allies in the region such as Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.\textsuperscript{262}

Arms export revenues were important for the major international suppliers in a period of declining demand; however, it was also too risky to allow an over-accumulation of lethal weapons in a tense region which requires some stability for the sake of oil prices.\textsuperscript{263} Moreover, the disclosure of pre-Gulf War arms sales and technology transfers to Iraq caused harsh criticisms towards the liberal Western governments. Therefore, the Bush administration proposed an initiative called ‘Arms Control in the Middle East’ (ACME) in May 1991. The aim of the initiative was to create a harmony among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) on restraining the arms sales to the Middle East. Although it received some support from the USSR which was on the brink of dissolution, the initiative proved a stillborn attempt very quickly. The USA went


\textsuperscript{260} Keller, Arm in Arm, 52.

\textsuperscript{261} John A. Alic, Trillions for Military Technology: How the Pentagon Innovates and Why It Costs So Much (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2007), 159.

\textsuperscript{262} “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”; Klare, “The Arms Trade in 1990s,” 862.

\textsuperscript{263} Keller, Arm in Arm, 73.
on exporting high-tech weapons systems to Taiwan despite the criticisms; in return, China rejected the initiative and the ACME process stopped.\textsuperscript{264}

The Gulf War created two significant effects on the international armament: increased arms exports to the Middle East and the new efforts for arms control mechanisms.\textsuperscript{265} However, the surveillance and regulation of the arms trade has been becoming more difficult in the 1990s because of several reasons such as the increasing number of arms supplier countries, lesser segregation in the supplier-client relation, the commercialization of arms transfers and the problematic of dual-use technologies.\textsuperscript{266} The establishment of an international arms control organization has been seen as a challenge by the Realist IR Theory in particular, due to the inter-state competition.\textsuperscript{267} Indeed, the first attempt related to the international arms control, ACME, has failed miserably. Nevertheless, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) decided to undertake a more institutional, inclusive and determined endeavour. Hence, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) was created just one day after the dissolution of the Soviet Socialist Republics in December 1991.\textsuperscript{268} The register was put into practice in 1 January 1992 and the first reports started to be submitted in 1993.\textsuperscript{269}


\textsuperscript{265} Stohl and Grillot, \textit{The International Arms Trade}, 31.


\textsuperscript{267} Keller, \textit{Arm in Arm}, 15.


\textsuperscript{269} Edward J. Laurance, Hendrik Wagenmakers and Herbert Wulf, “Managing the Global Problems Created by the Conventional Arms Trade: An Assessment of the United Nations
functioning of the register is based on the voluntary submissions of annual arms trade reports by the UN member states. In this way, the enhancement of transparency and confidence building in armament through international information sharing has been targeted. According to the founding logic of the UNROCA, if a dangerous move for armament is detected, the UN members can act together against that military build-up.

The register can be evaluated as, at most, relatively successful for the 1990s. It has managed to build a sort of norm that many states shared detailed reports of conventional arms exports and imports. Hence, it is alleged that the majority of states felt the pressure to review the national arms trade policy and control mechanisms. On the other hand, the register has failed in some issues. Taking the end of the Cold War and the scope of the UN into account, it was plausible to expect a breakthrough in international disarmament and arms control; however, the register could not produce such a result. To elaborate, its voluntary-based functioning could never ensure full or near-to-full participation by the member states. Moreover, since the reports present data about the arms trade activities of the previous year, the preventive mechanism becomes active only after a certain amount of arms are transferred. Furthermore, although the UNROCA data is the only official data about the arms trade of many states, its reliability is


270 Hartung, “The International Arms Trade,” 352.


273 Ibid., 237.

questionable since the reciprocal import and export reports of the two trade partners do not match sometimes.\textsuperscript{275} In short, the relative success story of the register has been exposed to more criticism year by year because there has been no significant progress in terms of data content and structure.\textsuperscript{276}

There were some additional developments in the international arms control between 1992 and 2002. The institutions of the old world order would not be convenient for the new circumstances. The WTO and the COMECON, the organizations of planning and supervision in arms transfers within the socialist bloc, ceased to exist in 1991. The COCOM –the organization of the capitalist camp dealing with the transfer of weapons and critical technology along with NATO, was also abandoned in 1994. The systemic change had required new structures to monitor and restrain the arms flows; therefore, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies was established in 1995 with the thirty three participating states among which former socialist states like Russia also takes place.\textsuperscript{277} The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) began to action next year with the goal of increasing the transparency and responsibility in the transfer of military goods and technologies.\textsuperscript{278} Despite its important mission, the shortcomings of the WA are quite salient. First, it is just a “supplier’s club” which disregards the demand dimension of the international arms trade.\textsuperscript{279} However, cutting down the demand


for arms through peace settlements in conflictual regions is elaborately emphasized in the academic literature. Second, since it is not codified as a treaty, it is not legally binding. Therefore, these two shortcomings have led to criticisms—particularly until the acceptance of the Arms Trade Treaty in 2013—in a way that the WA is nothing but an intergovernmental forum of information sharing on military know-how and equipment.

Apart from the UNROCA and the WA, the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports of 1998 symbolizes a different type of institutional arms control attempt. Being a non-binding agreement that has a regional scale, the code of conduct started to be practised in 1999. Its mission was to determine high standards for public transparency and management of conventional major weapon flows within the European Union (EU). Due to its non-binding characteristic, it should be considered as a guideline for a coherent practise in outward or inward arms transfers of the EU members. Yet, there are also studies arguing that the code of conduct produced a positive impact on constraining the ‘sell-to-any-buyer’ policies.


281 Hartley, The Economics of Arms, 123.


Besides, the creation of the EU Code has been regarded as one of the first achievements of the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) which gradually raised their campaigns against the arms trade activities in the post-Cold War years.\textsuperscript{286} The increasing visibility and effectiveness of the anti-arms NGOs can be explained through the ongoing arms exports of the liberal-capitalist states to countries with low human rights records. The human rights discourse occupies a wide place in the international politics during the 1990s; but, whether the practices of the liberal West in the arms trade comply with that discourse or not is very controversial. This fact has been studied in several empirical researches. Some concludes that the compatibility in the political regimes is an important factor affecting the decision-making of the arms deal and adds that the less democratic arms producers are more inclined to overseas arms deliveries.\textsuperscript{287} On the other hand, different sources assert that the correspondence between the political regimes has lost its decisiveness after the Cold War and emphasizes that the liberal democracies have not been as altruistic or ethical in arms transfers as they have declared.\textsuperscript{288} Another academic work, which covers the years between 1975 and 2004, propounds that only five of the top twenty arms producers in the world have experienced an autocratic system in the past; moreover, it highlights that approximately the two-third of the arms deliveries were actualized by the liberal regimes in the given time period.\textsuperscript{289}

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\textsuperscript{286} Stavrianakis, \textit{Taking Aim at the Arms Trade}, 8.

\textsuperscript{287} Martínez-Zarzoso and Johannsen, “The Gravity,” 23.

\textsuperscript{288} Akerman and Seim, “The Global Arms Trade,” 548.

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Up until this paragraph, a general framework has been drawn about the transformation of the arms-related phenomena, which is caused by the global systemic change. Such an elaboration was needed since the developments of this decade had set the basis for the post-2002 international arms trade regime. From this point on, it is plausible to scrutinize the situation of the prominent states and regions in terms of the arms trade between 1992 and 2002.

The USA, by far, has the largest share in the international arms exports in this eleven-year period. Its vast arms production capacity, large client network and technological supremacy makes it the sole first tier arms exporter. The dissolution of the USSR and the following defence industry crisis of Russia along with the limits of the European suppliers and the then-underdevelopment of the Chinese DIB have left the USA alone at the top. Therefore, the literature has frequently described the international arms market of the 1990s as unipolar, referring to the US dominance.\footnote{Harkavy, “The Changing International System,” 25; Stohl and Grillot, The International Arms Trade, 26.} Statistics also confirm this reality that the USA has broken its all-time arms export record at the end of the decade, accounting for almost the two-third of the all global major weapons trade.\footnote{U.S. Department of State Bureau of Verification and Compliance, “World Military Expenditures,” 13. While the record year is 1998 according to the SIPRI data, the proportional claim points out the year 1999 and belongs to the State Bureau. For the SIPRI data, see: “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”} However, even if the USA was the hegemon of the victorious system aftermath of the Cold War, the new world order would create problems for its defence industry and arms sales. For example, the production capacity of the domestic DIB had been arranged according to the high demand conditions of the early 1980s; but, the shrunk budget of the Pentagon was no more sufficient for the profit-seeking defence firms.\footnote{Anthony, “The Global Arms,” 7.} The reports published by the US State were sharing the future prospects for the arms industry but not in an optimistic way at all.\footnote{81} Thus, just as it happened globally,
an imperative process of concentration and internationalization of the US arms-
industrial capital started in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{294}

To begin with the concentration, the US statesmen conveyed the urgent necessity
of a radical restructuring in the arms industry to the representatives of the arms-
industrial capital in a gathering known as the “last supper” in 1993.\textsuperscript{295} Hence, a
series of mergers, joint ventures and acquisitions took place in the domestic DIB
between 1993 and 1997, culminating in the emergence of four or five giant prime
contractors and some more intermediary firms.\textsuperscript{296} If the consolidation process
was not stopped by the US Department of Defence, a further monopolization was
likely to occur.\textsuperscript{297} In terms of internationalization, the US defence companies
engaged in joint R&D and production activities with countries like Turkey, the
Republic of Korea and Taiwan in order to reduce the costs.\textsuperscript{298} Surely, some of
these cooperative investments are simply export of surplus capital rather than cost
distribution efforts.

In addition to the overseas collaboration, the client network of the US defence
corporations had to be expanded for two reasons. The first is the traditional state-
capital relations prioritizing the profits of the arms-industrial bourgeoisie. The
second, on the other hand, is the foreign policy strategy of the US decision-
makers, which stipulates the US military-technological superiority (e.g. the RMA

\textsuperscript{293} ACDA, “World Military Expenditures,” 29.

\textsuperscript{294} Hayward, “The Globalisation,” 117.

\textsuperscript{295} Hartley, \textit{The Economics of Arms}, 60.

\textsuperscript{296} Aude Fleurant et al., “The SIPRI Top 100 Arms-producing and Military Services Companies,

\textsuperscript{297} Dunne and The SIPRI Staff, “Development,” 17.

programmes) for the maintenance of the US global hegemony -if any. Increased arms exports would serve to re-finance the extremely expensive military R&D projects. Hereby, the US administrations did their best to protect and promote the interests of the domestic defence corporations in the international arms market. The Foreign Military Sales program which is conducted by the US Defence Security Assistance Agency facilitated and sponsored the arms exports of the US corporations. The defence attaché groups consisting of arms business people and the US state officials have been at the forefront. Hence, the Bush administration, benefitting also from the Gulf War effect, signed $83 billion worth of arms sale agreements, more than double of the former presidency period, during his incumbency. His successor, Bill Clinton, was more cautious about the arms trade in discourse due to his Democratic Party identity; but, his practises were not so different from the Republican President G. W. Bush. Even, Clinton has officially and explicitly articulated for the first time that the arms export licenses given by the state should take the interests of the defence industry into consideration. The question of what happens if a friendly government which imports plenty of US weapons turns into an US adversary as in the case of 1970s’ Iran is actually a simple but also a tough critique of Clinton’s arms export policies. In consequence, the USA had an international comparative advantage in the arms production and long-standing dependency

299 Dombrowski and Gholz, Buying Military Transformation, 3-4.

300 Keller, Arm in Arm, 52-53.


relations with its arms customers; thus, it could relatively sustained its high levels of arms exports during the 1990s despite the decreasing global demand.\textsuperscript{305}

![Figure 3.3 Percentage Distribution of International Arms Supplies, 1992-2002](image)

*Source: Author’s Own Drawing (The data are taken from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database)*

After the liberal counter revolution in the late 1991, the USSR broke up into Newly Independent States. The DIB of the USSR had been located mostly on today’s Russian and Ukrainian lands. Therefore, particularly Russia inherited the biggest share of the military industry of the Soviet Union. This fact has made it the globally second largest arms supplier between 1992 and 2002. However, it was also the one that fell into the most severe crisis due to the very important role of the arms industry and sales in the national economy.\textsuperscript{306} The inherited Soviet defence technology had already started to lag behind the West in the final phase of the Cold War; so, the Western RMA of the 1990s has even widened the

\textsuperscript{305} Hartley, *The Economics of Arms*, 108.

defence-technological gap between the core capitalist countries and Russia. In order to fill this gap, the Russian defence industry policy verged towards export-centrism and Russian major conventional weapons became more commodified in compliance with the global trend of the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the financial volume of the Russian arms exports doubled the volume of domestic procurement in the late 1990s. The plan was to acquire as much as possible hard currency through the exports and to re-invest that money in R&D; nonetheless, the traditional arms clients, especially the once-Soviet-friendly Middle Eastern customers, were insisting on the Soviet-style soft financing (e.g. barter trade). At this point, the Chinese and Indian demand for the Soviet weapons inventory, which these two countries are quite familiar, kept alive and revived the Russian arms industry. Being aware of the fact that there were strict arms embargoes on China subsequent to the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989, the Yeltsin administration particularly focused on to exploit the Chinese defence market. Yet, the profit-oriented and uncontrolled arms transfers to China were subject to some criticisms since China might apply a reverse engineering to the imported goods in order to acquire the Russian (Soviet)

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military technology. To sum up, despite all the reinvigoration efforts during the 1990s, Russia relegated to the second tier arms suppliers club, having a superior position within the group. In a transition process from socialism to capitalism, the total arms exports of Russia and other former socialist bloc countries were dramatically low compared to that of the USSR in the past decade. This fact directly led to a short-term but sharp decrease in the overall international arms deliveries in the period of 1992-2002.

The European continent was very dynamic with regard to the defence sector in the decade following the end of the Cold War. An obvious example of the monopolization and internationalization process took place in the European arms industries. The spirit of the Maastricht Treaty encouraged a pan-European defence-industrial integration in the early 1990s; nevertheless, such a scenario was not quickly exercised because of the UK’s worries about a negative US response. The IEPG was incorporated into the Western European Union (WEU) in 1991 and the Western European Armaments Group was established by the WEU. Yet, for more, an infrastructural transformation took place. In this regard, the European giant arms-industrial firms formed an EU-wide social force via mergers and acquisitions. In parallel, the institutional attempts accelerated. In 1996, the Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO) having a special task on military R&D was created. Two years later, the famous St.

313 Connolly and Sendstad, “Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter,” 14.

314 Keller, Arm in Arm, p. 61.


Malo Declaration was done during the discussions of a new European defence and security organization which is separable but not separate from the NATO. Just to remind, the European defence-industrial bourgeoisie would probably prefer a separable and also separate European defence, considering its competition with the US defence sector capital. In the same year with the St. Malo Declaration, the prominent six arms-producing countries of Europe - France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK published a letter of intent (LoI) aiming defence-industrial reforms for a more competitive European defence market. In 2000, the LoI initiative was codified into the Farnborough Framework Agreement. The arms exports of these six states have constituted approximately the 90 per cent of the EU total and the 25 per cent of the world total between 1998 and 2002. Furthermore, the need for a common arms procurement body produced the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), which began to operate in 2001. Even though these attempts of Europeanization and institutionalization of the European armament have not

317 Fiott, “EU-NATO Cooperation,” 287.


319 Stavrianakis, Taking Aim at the Arms Trade, 108; Béraud-Sudreau, “Building Franco-German Consensus,” 81.

320 Hagelin et al., “International Arms Transfers,” 443.


marked a leap forward, they are still important because they denote the articulated interests of the (core imperialist) European defence industries.

In addition to the internal dynamics, there are also external factors that affect the European arms exports. The EU arms embargo on China that has lasted since the Tiananmen Square incident of June 1989 is one of them. As the time passed, the embargo was not cancelled, but its flexible rules were exposed to different interpretations by the European suppliers. Hence, in the mid-1990s, the financial value of European arms exports—overwhelmingly dual use items—to China even surpassed the pre-Tiananmen sales although the embargo kept the exports very low levels in absolute terms.323 On the other hand, different interpretations of arms export licences are not peculiar only to the embargo on China. For example, it is argued that some European countries such as France, the UK and Italy have adopted a more permissive arms sale policy after the Cold War, others like Germany and Sweden have pursued a more restrictive pattern.324 There are differences in the customer profiles of the leading European arms exporters, as well. For instance, more than the four-fifth of the arms transfers of France and the UK was received by the developing nations by the late 1990s whereas nearly the four-fifth of the German foreign arms supplies were absorbed by mainly European developed countries including Turkey.325

Among the European major weapon exporters, France, Germany and the UK, which were also the traditional second tier arms suppliers of the Cold War, have maintained their position in the global arms exporter hierarchy within the 1992-2002 period. However, some official state predictions made in the early 1990s were not so optimistic about the arms sales prospect of these three arms


324 Béraud-Sudreau, “Building Franco-German Consensus,” 79.

suppliers.\textsuperscript{326} The arms embargo implemented on Iraq meant the loss of a loyal customer of French weapons. In fact, except the Taiwanese demand surge in 1997 and 1998 which succeeds the Taiwan Straits Crisis with China, France could not export military equipment at a desired level in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{327} The UK was argued to have the potential to sustain its arms export volume of the 1980s. The arms export revenues were indispensable for the privatized defence industry which uses a “revolving door” with the British governments in order to dictate its interests.\textsuperscript{328} Yet, the over-reliance on the imports of Saudi Arabia was problematic for an assertive British arms export policy in the 1990s. Germany, on the other hand, had a different customer profile consisted of mainly developed and European countries. Thereby, despite not high, German arms exports stayed relatively stable in this period. Even, the deliveries of naval platforms to Turkey, Greece and the Republic of Korea increased Germany’s percentage share in the global arms transfers.\textsuperscript{329}

International arms sales of China declined in both absolute and comparative terms in this period. This fact relegated China to the third tier suppliers group, despite its semi-second tier features. The primary reason for this regression is the end of the Iran-Iraq War in the late 1980s, which obliterated a lucrative arms market for China.\textsuperscript{330} However, the Chinese DIB had structural problems, as well. The Communist Party of China (CPC) embarked on a comprehensive struggle

\textsuperscript{326} ACDA, “World Military Expenditures,” 33.


\textsuperscript{328} Stavrianakis, Taking Aim at the Arms Trade, 86-87.

\textsuperscript{329} “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”; See also: Figure 2.7 and Figure 3.3.

against corruption within the DIB, leading to some troubles in productive manners. Also, despite a relative improvement in the arms-industrial production capacity in the 1980s, the military technology of China was obsolete, comparing with that of the core capitalist countries. The technological backwardness of Chinese major weapons hampered the emergence of new export opportunities. Therefore, China sought to import not only ready-to-use weapon systems but also arms-industrial know-how. Nonetheless, the technology transfer from foreign sources could not be managed easily. The arms embargo which started to be implemented on China in 1989 hindered the acquisition of the Western military technology. Hence, given the impossibility of a direct access to advanced weapon technology, China adopted a strategy that aims a military modernization through dual-use technologies.

The domestic development and import of these technologies were feasible for China indeed. According to the strategy, both the revenues of continuing arms exports and certain civilian investments would finance the development of dual-use technologies; in return, the improved dual-use know-how would be applied on the military modernization. In addition to the update in national military hardware, the enhanced dual-use technologies were thought to contribute to the arms exports (e.g. sales of missiles to the developing countries). Nevertheless,

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331 Luo, “Intrastate Dynamics,” 49.

332 Shichor, “Israel’s Military Transfers,” 68; Bitzinger and Boutin, “China’s Defence Industries,” 129.


335 Luo, “Intrastate Dynamics,” 38.
this strategy was intercepted by some factors as well. First, the transfer of dual-use technology to China had been also restricted, though not as strict as the military one. Moreover, in the 1990s, the implementation of illicit ways of acquiring new technologies like reverse engineering was extremely difficult due to the increasing use of software.\footnote{337} Second, the 1997 Asian financial crisis retarded the R&D projects. Therefore, it can be said that the modernization of Chinese military technology gained pace only after the economic crisis was overcome.\footnote{338} In brief, structural problems such as inadequate skilled labour and lack of technological infrastructure prevented the materialization of a Chinese RMA in the 1990s, despite the signals of a progress towards 2002.\footnote{339} On the other hand, the years between 1992 and 2002 should rather be seen as an investment period that China would get the results in the post-2002 period.

Whereas the arms exports of the third tier suppliers decreased in real terms like any other group, their percentage share in the world arms transfers continued to grow between 1992 and 2002 as well.\footnote{340} The group of third tier suppliers is the most crowded and uneven group in which some countries hold upper positions while some others are part of a lower-third tier class. Being sixth on the list of world arms exporters, China has led this group by far in the 1990s. Behind it, countries such as Netherlands, Ukraine, Italy, Israel and Sweden formed the upper-third tier suppliers. The medium ranks of the third tier group were consisted of Switzerland, Spain, Canada, Belarus and Czechia. On the other hand,

\footnote{336} Thomas Mahnken, “Armaments Developments Since the Cold War,” in Arms Races in International Politics: From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century, ed. Thomas Mahnken, Joseph Maiolo, and David Stevenson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 281.

\footnote{337} Shichor, “Israel’s Military Transfers,” 82.


\footnote{339} Hayward, “The Globalisation,” 125.

\footnote{340} See: Figure 2.7 and Figure 3.3.
the countries that occasionally exported military equipment in very small amounts in these years can be called the emerging arms suppliers. In this regard, the DPRK, Japan and Poland were at the bottom. Among these three, Japan has an extremely big potential to be a global arms supplier due to its pioneer role in dual use technologies but it has overwhelmingly refused to be an arms exporter. Yet, in compliance with zeitgeist of the post-Cold War era, even Japan has contemplated on some revisions related to the restrictive arms export policy.

Being deprived of cutting-edge military technology, many third tier arms exporters regarded arms imports as a way of access to new technologies. They tried to benefit from the post-Cold War internationalization of the defence-industrial capital by suggesting offset agreements. Some of them became relatively successful with this plan at least for several weapon categories and moved up within the third tier supplier group. On the other hand, some countries such as India, Egypt and South Africa set unrealistic targets in terms of defence-industrial development and enrichment. Even the figures of global peace like Vaclav Havel and Nelson Mandela could not simply abandon the arms exports but there were much more ambitious national arms export policies. The predicament for the lower-third tier and emerging suppliers was that their small-

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341 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”

342 Hughes, “Japan's Emerging Arms,” 428.


345 Ibid., 102-105.
scale DIBs have traditionally designed and produced weapons for only national procurement, which would be probably not suitable for different armies.\textsuperscript{346}

To understand the impact of the systemic change on the third tier arms suppliers, the cases of Sweden, Israel and former socialist East-Central European countries give some useful clues. To begin with the Swedish DIB, the globalization of capitalism entailed two interrelated process. First, the state-owned defence enterprises were rapidly privatized. A large national defence industry was labelled as unnecessary in the absence of real socialism and the 1992 Swedish financial crisis was the excuse to trigger the neoliberal restructuring.\textsuperscript{347} In parallel, a capitalist ‘rationalization’ started in a way that the newly privatized defence firms engaged in mergers and acquisitions both inside and outside of the domestic market.\textsuperscript{348} Eventually, the once independent Swedish defence industry turned into a largely-Swedish, multinational and interdependent defence industry having an increased arms import dependency.\textsuperscript{349} The new privatized defence corporations focused on arms exports and marketed particularly military naval platforms to East Asia.\textsuperscript{350}

Although the date presented by SIPRI indicates negligible amounts, arms sales of Israel to China between 1992 and 2002 were elaborately discussed in the literature.\textsuperscript{351} The end of the Cold War had reduced the military expenditure of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{347} Ikekami, “The End,” 437.
\item \textsuperscript{348} Ibid., 442.
\item \textsuperscript{349} Hall, Markowski and Wylie, “Government Policy,” 165.
\item \textsuperscript{350} ACDA, “World Military Expenditures,” 34.
\item \textsuperscript{351} “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”
\end{itemize}
Israel just like many other countries, putting the national defence industry under tough conditions. The national procurement was already insufficient and was decreasing even more; therefore, the scale of production was shrinking, and thus, the unit cost of weapons was increasing. Nonetheless, its long-standing regional rivalry with Iran and Saudi Arabia at the same time prevented a laissez-faire opening related to the national DIB. Instead, Israel resorted to arms exports in order to compensate the deteriorating defence-industrial efficiency.\footnote{Shichor, “Israel’s Military Transfers,” 68, 87.} Hence, it was argued that China emerged as a good opportunity that is free of competition with the core capitalist states due to the arms embargoes. Yet, Israel could not exploit the Chinese market at all since China preferred the Russian conventional arms and the USA put some pressure on Israel about arms transfers to China.\footnote{Ibid., 74, 79; Hayward, “The Globalisation,” 124.}

East-Central European countries experienced the systemic change directly on their own lands. The first years of the transition can be summarized as total crisis in terms of the defence industry. The military technology of East-Central Europe had already been obsolete, depicting a dark future for the domestic arms industries.\footnote{ACDA, “World Military Expenditures,” 34.} However, when the Cold War ended, the arms exports of these countries decreased almost 90 per cent compared to the 1980s.\footnote{Yudit Kiss, “Defence Industry Consolidation in East-Central Europe in the 1990s,” Europe-Asia Studies 53, no. 4 (2001): 596; Klare, “The Arms Trade in 1990s,” 863.} Until the mid-1990s the arms exports had been defamed as immoral by the East-Central European governments; nevertheless, they very soon started to be seen as economically rational.\footnote{Yudit Kiss, The Defence Industry in East-Central Europe – Restructuring and Conversion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 38.} In 1997, the NATO invited Poland, Czechia and
Hungary to join the alliance. Henceforth, in the name of inter-operability between the armed forces of the alliance, the East-Central European states had to get rid of the arms inventory remaining from the WTO and purchase the convenient Western conventional weapons.

After depicting the panorama of the international arms exports between 1992 and 2002, the import dimension of the issue also needs to be looked into. The fact that the end of the systemic competition in 1991 reversed the growth of national military budgets, which led to a low demand in armament, was mentioned in the previous pages. Notwithstanding, the changes in the prominent actors, geographies and transfer types should be elaborated since they might shed light on the post-2002 configuration of the international arms trade. First of all, the top ten largest arms importers of this period were also the developing countries, except Japan (seventh rank) and the UK (tenth rank). Moreover, seven countries in the top ten had been a member of neither NATO nor WTO during the Cold War although some of them had been the close allies of the systemic hegemons (e.g. the USA-the ROK). India, Egypt and Saudi Arabia which are the important arms recipients of the 1990s were part of the Non-Aligned Movement.

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357 Hunter, “Maximizing NATO,” 190.

358 Stohl and Grillot, The International Arms Trade, 48.
Figure 3.4 The Top 10 Arms Importers, 1992-2002 (in SIPRI TIV, $ billions)
Source: Author's Own Drawing (The data are taken from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database)

The graphic above shows that a set of regional rivalries has absorbed the transfer of major conventional weapons between the given years. At first glance, Turkey draws the attention as a surprising champion. However, considering its domestic struggle against the terrorist activities and the long-lasting instability created by the Gulf War, the increase in Turkish arms imports can be explained. Arms imports of Turkey could have been even bigger if the USA had not stipulated some progress in human rights records related to the Kurdish community for further arms sales.  

Moreover, the end of the Cold War has seemingly alleviated the overpressure of the inter-systemic struggle on certain regional competitions. An exemplary case is the escalated rivalry between the two sides of the Aegean Sea. As a result of this competition, Greece, having a very high military burden on its economy, entered the top arms importers list despite its relatively small

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360 Hagelin et al., “International Arms Transfers,” 452.
military power. On the other hand, almost 25 per cent of the arms imports of Turkey were composed of naval-related military equipment including warships, which is a high proportion for many countries.

The dominance of the Middle East in world arms imports declined in the 1990s. The post-Gulf War arms embargo on Iraq as well as the heavy debt burdens of Syria and Libya has left Saudi Arabia and Egypt as the only Middle Eastern countries among the top arms importers. Yet, some other Middle Eastern countries such as Israel, Iran, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) could sustain arms purchases, even having a higher bargaining power in the arms trade due to the diversification of the arms exporters. Indeed, particularly the West-friendly buyers in the region benefitted from the post-Cold War erosion of the Atlantic consensus on how to share the Middle Eastern market.

The most arms-receiving geography between 1992 and 2002 is Asia. The five of the top seven arms importer in this period are either the East or the South Asian countries. This rapid over-accumulation of major weapons systems in the region during the 1990s can be interpreted in a way that the East-South Asia would likely be a hub of the post-Cold War imperialist competition. Almost all the prominent Asian arms importers have had historical or geographic disputes or newly-emerging capitalist-imperialist competitions among themselves. These multidimensional disputes and rivalries have also a multilateral characteristic. For example, the respectively second and third rank of Taiwan and China in the top


362 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”


ten arms importers list can be probably explicated by the historical tensions between the two countries, which remarkably escalated in 1995-1996. However, the seventh place of Japan, given the absence of a Soviet socialist ‘threat’, can be unlikely explained without any reference to China’s fast economic-political rise in the 1990s. In parallel, it might be naïve to think that the Republic of Korea has purchased very high-quality weapon systems only to deter the DPRK by ignoring the regional influence of China at all. In other words, the East-Asian arms imports in this decade reflect a complex set of competitive relations rather than only bilateral disputes.\textsuperscript{365} This complicated regional order has been rendered much more complex by the imperialist calculations of the eminent arms exporters to the region – e.g. the USA.\textsuperscript{366} Moreover, Australia, which has heavily invested in the expansion of its naval force, has become a part of the East-South Asian adversarial dynamics by the 1990s.\textsuperscript{367}

The mainstream and the critical positions within the literature have emphasized different points about the post-Cold War transformation of the international arms transfers. For instance, a realist version of the mainstream assessments draws the attention to the increasing influence of the defence-industrial corporations in the arms trade activities. Without interrogating the role of the systemic change, the reformist view which is limited with the problem-solving approach simply advocates that states must re-establish their authority in the decision-making of the arms transfers.\textsuperscript{368} On the other hand, an important Marxist study that primarily analyses the relation between the NGOs and the international arms control underlines the imperialist-hierarchical structure of the post-Cold War

\textsuperscript{365} Klare, “The Arms Trade in 1990s,” 865.

\textsuperscript{366} Hagelin et al., “International Arms Transfers,” 446.

\textsuperscript{367} ACDA, “World Military Expenditures,” 30; “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”

\textsuperscript{368} Keller, Arm in Arm, 89-90.
arms trade. According to the study, the arms-supplying states at the top of the capitalist-imperialist hierarchy have contributed to the creation of demand for arms through various ways. Ironically, the practical knowledge shared by a mainstream work which is an example of descriptive defence economics studies also supports the imperialism-centric critical analysis above. As a result of long-term comparisons between the arms-trading partners, it is revealed that two countries tend to engage in arms trade more if they have reciprocal colonial relations in the past.

3.3 Conclusion

Throughout the Cold War, humanity had experienced the dichotomy between the capitalist and socialist systems, but this dichotomy came to an end in December 1991. Capitalism became a truly global social system with few exceptions such as Cuba and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Moreover, not only the real socialism collapsed as a social organization but also its historically hegemonic vanguard state, the USSR, dissolved into smaller pieces that would face socio-political and economic crises by the 1990s. Inevitably, these created a radical change in the international arms transfers. Indeed, some precursors of this change such as the commodification of the conventional arms and the expansion of the transfer networks have been observed since the mid-1970s. However, the end of the Cold War brought these slow developments into a qualitative transformation.

The changeover from the inter-systemic confrontation to the globalizing capitalism and the unrivalled position of the USA within the traditional imperialist hierarchy have reduced the world military expenditures in the 1990s. As a result of this, many defence industries, including the former socialist ones,

369 Stavrianakis, Taking Aim at the Arms Trade, 43.

370 Ibid., 48.

fell into a structural crisis. The neoliberal prescription for them was privatization and concentration. Thus, private or semi-state-owned arms-industrial monopolies and oligopolies proliferated across the globe. Being for-profit enterprises, they sought for international proprietary and collaborative actions in the name of capitalist rationalization. On the other hand, these giant arms firms have still needed the subsidies or protective support of their own nation states. Hence, as a perfect example of the uneven and combined development, an international -not transnational- subcontracting network with imperialistic characteristics began to form between 1992 and 2002. Therefore, this period should be regarded as the national and international restructuring years of the defence-industrial capital.

To conclude, the financial volume of the international arms supply has dramatically declined in line with the falling military spending by the 1990s. Although some regional rivalries and conflicts heated up the arms trade activities occasionally, the end of a comprehensive inter-systemic struggle as well as the lack of a significant intra-systemic competition under the domination of the USA decreased the importance of the international arms deliveries in this period. Besides, the commercialization and geographic expansion of the arms transfers reached up a different level following the end of the Cold War. Even, due to the sharp decline in military aids, the term ‘international arms transfers’ largely lost its conceptual validity and came to be replaced by the ‘international arms trade’.
CHAPTER 4


4.1 Introduction

The international arms transfers, which had entered a downward trend in the mid-1980s, continued to decline until 2002. Despite some ebbs and flows in the late 1990s, the nadir of the last forty years in terms of the global arms deliveries occurred in 2002. However, from that year on, a fluctuating upward trend has proceeded up until 2019.

Figure 4.1 Annual Change in International Arms Transfer, 2002-2019 (in SIPRI TIV, $ billions)
Source: Author’s Own Drawing (The data are taken from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database)
This chapter dwells on the factors that have an impact on the incremental increase in the international arms trade, starting with 2003. These factors can be analysed in micro and macro levels. At the micro level, the national arms trade policies that are co-shaped by the defence-industrial bourgeoisie and national governments, the developments in weapons technology, and the new international arms control mechanisms take place. On the other hand, the macro factors include the intra-systemic imperialistic competition, cornerstone events in the world economy and politics, regional military confrontations as well as the international interventions. Since the 2008 Global Economic Crisis significantly affected both the micro and macro factors, the period of 2003-2019 would be studied in two sub-periods which are divided according to the impact of the economic crisis. Briefly, by examining the micro and macro factors in a chronological and holistic manner, this chapter attempts to find out the underlying reason why the international arms trade has gradually risen up after a break between the mid-1980s and 2002.


The persistence of an upward trend in the international arms trade was detected in the literature before, despite lacking causal and theoretical investigations. Some pieces within the mainstream approach had even predicted this sort of increase at the beginning of the new period. However, these predictions did not discern the changing macro factors that affect the trade in major weapons -e.g. the emergence or resurgence of new rivalries within the capitalist-imperialist world system. On the other hand, the literature started to discuss the rising arms trade in detail towards the late-2000s. Almost all the studies have reached a

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consensus on the fact that the 11 September 2001 (9/11) Terrorist Attacks to the USA was a turning point in the course of the global arms transfers.\footnote{Hartung, “The International Arms Trade,” 352-353; Gilby, The No-Nonsense Guide, 25; Martínez-Zarzoso and Johannsen, “The Gravity,” 24; Thurner et al., “Network Interdependencies,” 1761.} This is a very reasonable assertion. The USA’s call of a global “war on terror” following the terrorist attacks and the corresponding rise in the military budgets of the core capitalist countries might foster the inter-state arms transfers. The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 by the USA was also legitimized through the antiterrorism discourse and these wars might bring a further momentum to the arms trade. For example, in order to re-arm the reorganized Iraqi army, the arms embargo that has been implemented on Iraq since the Gulf War was lifted by the USA and the EU approximately one year after the US intervention.\footnote{Wezeman and Bromley, “International Arms Transfers,” 436.} Moreover, even the volume of the international military aid, which declined precipitously in the post-Cold War era, increased again particularly in the first years of the anti-terror campaign.\footnote{Wezeman, “Arms Transfers as Military Aid,” 389; Stavrianakis, Taking Aim at the Arms Trade, 40.}

Notwithstanding, there is a problem with explaining the growth of arms trade by merely focusing on ‘the war on terror’ because a majority of conventional arms do not serve the purpose of counterterrorism. In other words, most of the complex weapon systems that has been traded since 2002 would not be used in anti-terrorist operations.\footnote{Hagelin et al., “International Arms Transfers,” 455; Hartley, The Economics of Arms, 182.} Rather, both the export and import of lethal military equipment were justified through the argument of global war on terror in many examples.\footnote{Hagelin et al., “International Arms Transfers,” 456-457, 465; Stohl and Grillot, The International Arms Trade, 51.} To be fair, some mainstream studies added either the recovery of
Russia or the rise of China as complementary elements to the ‘war on terror’ argument in explaining the arms trade trend. Nevertheless, these explication attempts are qualitatively inadequate; therefore, a deeper and wider analysis of the post-9/11 arms transfers would be presented in the rest of the chapter.

The post-9/11 upswing of the international arms trade was interrupted by the 2008 Global Economic Crisis. The annual growth rate of the world economy declined to 1.8% and -1.6% respectively in 2008 and 2009 whereas it was 4.3% in 2007. Nonetheless, the world military expenditure continued to increase - though not fast - until 2012 because especially the prominent imperialist countries set their military budgets through medium and long-term planning. The high military expenditures in 2008-2011 had already been decided almost in the mid-2000s. Surely, there could have been rapidly-arranged cuts in the military spending; however, the imperialistic aims and activities of the core capitalist countries led to the relative maintenance of ‘defence budgets’ during the crisis years. Instead of quick reductions, these countries considered a slow and gradual decrease in their military expenditures. Therefore, the regression and stagnation of the world military expenditure have occurred in the early and mid-2010s. Yet, whether rapid or cautious, the cuts in defence spending would


381 See: Figure 3.2.


ultimately cause problems even among allies as in the case of the free-riding discussions within the NATO.\textsuperscript{384}

Normally, an economic crisis affects the arms transfers at least several years after the beginning of the crisis because the delivery of an order requires time.\textsuperscript{385} For example, the impact of the 9/11 on the trend of weapon system deliveries was felt starting from barely 2003. However, the 2008 crisis was so severe that the international arms trade rapidly entered into a recession between 2008 and 2010. If calculated in three-year periods, the growth of arms transfers from 2005-2007 to 2008-2010 could only be 1.5%. The same ratio was 15.1% between 2008-2010 and 2011-2013.\textsuperscript{386}

Undoubtedly, certain domestic DIBs were economically damaged by the crisis more harshly due to the uneven and combined development. To illustrate, China sustained its economic growth during the global recession; moreover, its arms sales increased 195\% between the 2004-2008 and 2009-2013 periods.\textsuperscript{387} In contrast to China, Spain, for example, was one of the countries that the crisis hit most severely. With respect to the relationship between the arms trade and the national economic downturn, the Spanish Secretary of State for Defence, Constantino Méndez Martínez, confessed in 2010 that “We should not have acquired systems that we are not going to use, for conflict scenarios that do not exist and, what is worse, with funds that we did not have then and we do not have now.”\textsuperscript{388} In spite of seeming as an administrative self-criticism, these tough

\textsuperscript{384} Ibid., 178-180.

\textsuperscript{385} Thurner et al., “Network Interdependencies,” 1754.

\textsuperscript{386} “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”

words are open to speculation. For instance, they can be read as directed against Germany because the 58% of the Spanish arms imports between 2005 and 2010 have been supplied by Germany.\textsuperscript{389} If so, this statement might be considered as a critique of the hierarchical (arms-industrial and military) order within the EU.

Apart from the macro factors such as the 9/11 attacks, Iraqi War and the 2008 economic crisis, there are developments in the micro factors that alter the practices of arms production and transfers. These developments between 2003 and 2010 were tightly linked to the transformations which took place in the 1992-2002 period. For example, the already-important dual-use technologies and network-centric military systems have become indispensable for the national armed forces in their asymmetric struggle with terrorism.\textsuperscript{390} In consequence, new defence-technological investments have been made in this field. According to the estimation of the US Department of Defence, 40% of the USA’s military R&D in 2003 was exercised in the software technologies.\textsuperscript{391}

The concentration in the defence sector, which is an important element of the post-Cold War arms-industrial transformation, was very high at the beginning of the 2003-2010 period. The eminent arms monopolies had purchased smaller firms that cannot stay alive in the shrinking arms demand of the 1990s. Notwithstanding, the escalating demand aftermath of the 9/11 entailed some new entrants to the market, which has lowered the total share of the five largest


\textsuperscript{389} “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”

\textsuperscript{390} Stohl and Grillot, \textit{The International Arms Trade}, 38; Kiss, \textit{Arms Industry Transformation}, 13.

\textsuperscript{391} Alic, \textit{Trillions for Military Technology}, 134.
defence firms of the world from 44% by 2003 to 35% in 2011.\textsuperscript{392} On the other hand, even the 2011 level of the defence-industrial consolidation in the world was much higher than that of the early 1990s.

The internationalization of the arms production and the expansion of the arms trade networks have also continued after the 9/11. However, in line with the increasing practices of international collaboration, the problems related to the arms-industrial division of labour became more apparent. It is true that national weapon systems projects are too costly in the twenty-first century. Therefore, many private and state firms have often engaged in international cooperation. Indeed, the weapons cooperation agreements between states are an important micro factor that revives the post-9/11 arms trade.\textsuperscript{393} Nevertheless, the profitability of these agreements that satisfies the arms corporations do not solve other problems. To illustrate, some studies put forward that a joint project conducted by two countries might take a 25\% longer time than the national production of the same output. A four-partnered project for the same equipment might delay even 60\% longer.\textsuperscript{394}

The marketing dimension of the arms trade has been relatively smooth and less problematic for the exporter states and their companies. The dynamism of the international arms fairs in the post-9/11 years is a good example. The number of non-European participating defence firms in the French arms fair have risen from 2 in 1992 to 290 in 2008.\textsuperscript{395} However, intensive marketing efforts seems to be in favour of only the prominent arms-supplier states. Most of the arms trade

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{392} Smith, “The Defence Industry,” 18.
\textsuperscript{393} Kinne, “Agreeing to Arm,” 375.
\textsuperscript{394} Hartley, \textit{The Economics of Arms}, 116.
\end{flushright}
transactions has been still unidirectional and the majority of recipient countries have still bought arms from only one or several arms producers in the 2000s.\textsuperscript{396} Although the big defence corporations acquired new business opportunities during the post-9/11 expansion of the arms trade, the state subsidies to these firms did not end. Governments sustained direct and indirect subsidies such as marketing of weapons, advisory support in bargains, supply of credits to the buyer country which guarantees the purchasing and R&D promotions.\textsuperscript{397} In this regard, the arms capital has benefitted from both the free market and the state back-up.\textsuperscript{398} A century-old ‘revolving door’ between the arms-industrial bourgeoisie and the high bureaucrats stayed open in the 2000s as well.\textsuperscript{399} Such a structural relationship continued to produce bribery and other forms of corruption while eroding the rule of law, global peace and human rights.\textsuperscript{400} The prevalence of profits over human rights has been tested by recent quantitative studies as well. One of them concludes that the human rights violations in an arms-demanding state do not usually affect its arms trade with liberal democratic suppliers.\textsuperscript{401} In addition to this, the findings of a similar research propounds that the right-wing ruling parties of the developed democratic countries are inclined to export conventional arms more than the left-wing governments.\textsuperscript{402} Even though the parameters separating the ‘right-wing’ and the ‘left-wing’ are disputable, the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}

\bibitem{396} Thurner et al., “Network Interdependencies,” 1741, 1743.
\bibitem{397} Gilby, \textit{The No-Nonsense Guide}, 81-86.
\bibitem{398} Ibid., 29-30.
\bibitem{399} Ibid., 75-76.
\bibitem{400} Stavrianakis, \textit{Taking Aim at the Arms Trade}, 2; Smith, “The Defence Industry,” 19.
\bibitem{401} Johnson and Willardson, “Human Rights,” 462.
\bibitem{402} Comola, “Democracies,” 161.
\end{thebibliography}
study presents a general correlation between the arms export policies and ideological-political orientation of the governments.

In response to all these, the anti-armament civil society activism also gained a momentum in the post-9/11 period. In 2003, Control Arms Campaign was initiated by the common efforts of Oxfam, the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) and Amnesty International in order to raise public awareness about the trans-border arms transfers.403 These NGOs and some other like Saferworld do not question the systemic infrastructure of the arms trade and do not confront the representatives of the “state”-“arms-capital” nexus. Rather, they try to persuade the decision-makers to tighten the arms control measures and to increase the transparency by cooperating and compromising with the governments.404 Therefore, these organizations can be called as reformists. On the other hand, the NGOs like Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) have a radical and transformative stance based on a confrontational strategy against the political-economic essence of the arms trade.405

It should be admitted that the NGO activism has effectively drawn the public attention to the arms trade by the 2000s. However, particularly the reformist group has done it by attributing the crux of the problem solely to the conflicts and irresponsible regimes in the underdeveloped countries. Hence, the NGO activism has also contributed to the naturalization and reproduction of the Western imperialist supremacy.406 Hereby, a Marxism-based study on the interaction


405 Ibid., 33-34.

406 Ibid., 11, 176.
between the arms control and civil society accurately suggests a ‘critical sympathy’ to the NGO activism, with their good intent but negative results.\textsuperscript{407}

In the international arms control mechanisms, there was a neither great progress nor a total stagnancy between 2003 and 2010. Whereas the national reports submitted to the UNROCA have been consistently satisfactory in the first half of the 2000s, the number of them started to significantly decline in the second half.\textsuperscript{408} Moreover, the Wassenaar Arrangement was not so fruitful in terms of restricting the proliferation of sensitive military technology due to its structure that cannot overcome the inter-imperialist competition.\textsuperscript{409} On the other hand, as a significant development, the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports which was a non-binding agreement has been turned into a legally binding EU Common Position by the end of 2008.\textsuperscript{410} To sum up, the arms control efforts could not generate a major effect against the post-9/11 increase in the arms trade probably because of the fact that all the norm-creating endeavours had to comply with the liberal socio-economic system.\textsuperscript{411}

There are significant changes in the percentage distribution of the international arms supplies in the post-9/11 years. First, the share of the USA, which had amounted to nearly half of the inter-state arms deliveries in the 1992-2002 period, have decreased to 30\% of the total deliveries between 2003 and 2010. Despite this dramatic decline, the USA has sustained to be the most arms-exporting country. Secondly, the Russian arms exports seem to have recovered from the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[Ibid., 12-13.]
\item[409] Ikegami, “The End,” 448.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
crisis that emerged as a result of the dissolution of the USSR. Thirdly, the total share of the third tier arms exporters except China, which is labelled as the “other’s total” in the Figure 4.2, radically increased from 14% to 21% in the post-9/11 period. Lastly, Germany has remarkably extended its share while the UK has seen its nadir ever.

![Figure 4.2 Percentage Distribution of International Arms Supplies, 2003-2010](image)

Source: Author’s Own Drawing (The data are taken from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database)

To begin with the USA, its massive DIB and R&D facilities should be initially emphasized. In a period when many states were in trouble with enormous R&D expenses\(^\text{412}\), the USA has gradually increased its spending on defence research, development, test and evaluation from $59.1 billion in 2001 to $94.8 billion in 2010 in constant 2020 dollars.\(^\text{413}\) Moreover, by virtue of a vast domestic military

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\(^{412}\) Smith, *Military Economics*, 142.

industry, it has enjoyed relatively low costs per unit and short durations per unit in arms production.\textsuperscript{414} This is an important factor for both national procurement and export-oriented manufacture. In fact, overseas exports have constituted the one-tenth of the annual income of the US arms monopolies on average, which is a very low proportion.\textsuperscript{415} In other words, the US defence firms are not dependent to international export revenues as much as its global rivals. This fact brings the US state a flexibility that it can block the export of cutting-edge military equipment without damaging the balance sheets of the firms.\textsuperscript{416} Pentagon would sooner or later compensate any missing export opportunity. Therefore, the US policy makers working on the arms trade have been relatively free from the economic pressures regarding the defence industry. Such a freedom has two tangible results. First, the USA could prevent the diffusion of its military technology through strict controls on the foreign sale of high-tech weapons.\textsuperscript{417} To sustain the military-technological superiority has been crucial to the USA’s national security milieu that perceives the rise of China and international proliferation of weapons technology as threats to US hegemony.\textsuperscript{418} Second, the post-9/11 arms transfers of the USA could be organized according to the long-term politico-military interests of the US imperialism rather than the short-term economic gains.

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\item[415] Bitzinger, “A New Arms Race?” 34.
\item[417] Stavrianakis, Taking Aim at the Arms Trade, 44.
\item[418] Dombrowski and Gholz, Buying Military Transformation, 137.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Having already the strongest DIB and military on earth, the shocking 9/11 terrorist attacks generated a catalytic impact on the US military spending. The federal outlay of the USA on national defence has risen 84% from 2002 to 2012.419 As a component of the military expenditure, military foreign aid programs were advocated as a part of the anti-terror struggle and then reactivated under the title of “Building Partner Capacity” after a break in the 1990s.420 In short, the conditions of military aid were eased by the Bush administration. However, this policy was frequently studied in the literature and criticized many times because some countries receiving the US military aid have been undemocratic regimes accused by human rights violations while some others have been unpredictable and instable states.421 Since the anti-arms NGOs in the USA have been very less powerful than the arms lobby, they could not create a solid public reaction to such policies.422

Beside the military aid, the overseas arms sales of the USA have also increased between 2003 and 2010. The 9/11 triggered the increase, but “the global war on terror” was never the sole reason behind rising arms sales. It can be understood from the type of some exported conventional weapon systems like the fighter and anti-submarine aircraft sold to Pakistan in this period.423 The US arms exports were part of a wider military diplomacy and had different functions in the


422 Stavrianakis, Taking Aim at the Arms Trade, 174.

423 Wezeman and Bromley, “International Arms Transfers,” 427.
international politics. Rearming Afghanistan and Iraq, containing Iran and the DPRK, consolidating the relations with the new allies in the Eastern Europe are the motivations that is mentioned in the mainstream literature. On the other hand, given the intra-systemic competition of the global capitalism, to confront and deter any regional military challenge that might be posed by China, Russia and even the core EU countries should also be considered.

Lastly about the USA, not only it implemented its own arms transfer strategy but also tried to spoil the arms trade of its rivals. For example, the USA firmly objected to the tendency of some European countries to ease the terms and conditions of the arms embargo on China because the military technology flow to its potential challenger could be very risky. Consequently, the defence technology transfer from the EU to China via arms exports were held at minimum. Moreover, the USA attempted to break the re-emerging Russian-Chinese partnership in the arms trade. For instance, the USA allowed and even encouraged a possible arms sale deal between Taiwan and Russia, knowing that any Russian arms export to Taiwan would cause rigid problems with China. However, that arms deal never materialized according to SIPRI.

The second largest arms exporter between 2003 and 2010 was Russia. Although its military technology and arms production capacity lag behind the USA, it can be counted as a first tier arms supplier due to its remarkably increased volume of


426 Bräuner, “Beyond the Arms Embargo,” 462; Wezeman and Bromley, “International Arms Transfers,” 441.

427 Wezeman and Bromley, “International Arms Transfers,” 432.

428 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”
arms exports, comparing with the 1992-2002 period. Having adjusted its DIB to the capitalist world market by the late 1990s, the Russian arms sales experienced a take-off in this period. The 9/11 attacks generated an indirect impact on the Russian arms exports. The blacklisted countries by the USA and its allies due to the accusations like support for terrorism or human rights abuses turned to the Russian arms inventory.\footnote{Stohl and Grillot, \textit{The International Arms Trade}, 51.} Moreover, according to some expert views, the improved Soviet designs were still technologically less developed than the Western weapon systems, but they were quite competitive in the world market in terms of price and performance.\footnote{Wezeman and Bromley, “International Arms Transfers,” 418.} Furthermore, the export revenues were vital for the survival of the Russian DIB. Because the 80\% of the total sales of the Russian defence industry were to abroad in the pre-2010 years, Russia followed a supportive state policy which culminated in the rise of arms exports.\footnote{Bitzinger, “Introduction,” 5.} Hence, the client list for the Russian major conventional weapons has broadened since the early 2000s.\footnote{Connolly and Sendstad, “Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter,” 10.}

However, the increase in the Russian arms production and trade was not exempt from problems. First, the share of investments allocated to the military R&D was extremely low with comparison to the USA, leading to negative predictions about the future of the Russian arms exports.\footnote{Neuman, “Power,” 75.} The lack of R&D activities in the crisis years of the 1990s must have been compensated also. Therefore, Russia approved the export licences for brand new conventional arms especially in its trade with China in order to collect the needed funds for the military R&D.\footnote{Stohl and Grillot, \textit{The International Arms Trade}, 51.} Second, the
increased number of arms customers did not directly amount to a stable increase in the Russian arms export revenues because some of the new importers had fragile economies. For example, a decline in the oil prices in the mid-2000s led Venezuela to reduce its arms imports from Russia a few years later.\textsuperscript{435} Third, it is asserted that the Russian defence industry was still fragmented in the early-2000s, in a similar way to the situation of the US defence industry of the 1990s. Therefore, Russia had to spend time and resources on the modernization and concentration of its domestic DIB in the second half of the 2000s so that it could sustain its competitiveness in the global market.\textsuperscript{436}

The largest importer of the Russian weapon platforms in this period is China. This outcome is an intersection of multiple reasons. These reasons are the strategic partnership between the two countries since 1996, the export dependence of the Russian DIB, Russia’s immunity against US-led Western pressures and the compatibility of Russian weapons profile with the military goals of China.\textsuperscript{437} However, the volume of arms trade between the two countries have gradually dropped by the end of the 2000s. In the literature, the reason of such a contraction is attributed to Russia’s restriction due to the fear or complaints about the technology theft conducted by China.\textsuperscript{438} Reversely, China might become reluctant to export more military equipment from Russia since it had sufficiently acquired Russian military technology by means of reverse


\textsuperscript{435} Connolly and Sendstad, “Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter,” 20.


\textsuperscript{437} Meijer et al., “Arming China,” 870-871; Menon, “The Limits,” 113.

engineering. Actually, regardless of the technology theft, Russia might gradually give up selling state-of-the-art major weapons to China in return of money, as the Russian DIB and its customer base have grown. The stop of the export of expensive high-tech weapons might decrease the volume of arms trade between China and Russia. In addition, China’s cautious economic planning around the 2008 financial crisis might cause such a decline.

The second biggest client of the Russian military equipment between 2003 and 2010 is India. Being a historically prominent recipient, India has exported a very high amount of Russian conventional arms in this period as well. However, the Indian market have come under risk for the Russian defence firms since India started to establish good relations with the USA and diversify its own inventory with European and Israeli arms in the post-9/11 years.

The rest of the Russian arms exports have been shared by the MENA countries and Venezuela. Particularly the MENA arms market has been again a focus of Russia by the second half of the 2000s. Besides, the recapture of the small but traditional Syrian arms market by the late 2000s might indicate the direction of the newly-emerging Russian imperialism.

The second tier arms exporters between the 9/11 attacks and the repercussions of the 2008 global economic crisis were consisted of Germany, France and the UK.

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439 Wezeman and Bromley, “International Arms Transfers,” 423.


441 Wezeman and Bromley, “International Arms Transfers,” 426-427.


If the arms sales of these countries are scrutinized singularly, their influence on the global market do not seem crucial. However, these big three European arms producers, especially France and Germany, have led noteworthy attempts of cooperation and integration in armament across the continent since the end of the Cold War. Therefore, rather than the individual cases, the EU-wide projects that indirectly affect the European arms exports draw attention in the post-9/11 years. Moreover, the accession of the East-Central European countries to the EU in 2004, which involve several third tier arms suppliers such as Poland and then-Czech Republic, have expanded the European DIB, though not creating a radical impact. Furthermore, even the candidacy negotiations between the EU and Turkey dispatched the latter to be more willing to import made-in-Europe weapon systems especially in the early and mid-2000s. It seems likely that Turkey might consider the arms trade as a tool to ease the membership process.444

Beginning from the 1970s that correspond to the Détente period of the Cold War, the European defence industries have incrementally become export-oriented. The end of the Cold War accelerated this process and the European DIBs had to rely on export revenues still between 2003 and 2010. The eminent European defence firms of the time such as BAE Systems, Thales, Dassault and Saab have earned more than the 70% of their income by arms exports.445 A part of the European arms sales emanated from huge joint projects like the Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft. These examples of defence collaboration also contributed to the consolidation of the intra-EU relations.446 On the other hand, national projects such as the French and Swedish combat aircrafts, respectively Rafale and Gripen, received a certain interest in the international market.447 However, neither the

444 Wezeman and Bromley, “International Arms Transfers,” 433.


447 Hartley, The Economics of Arms, 95.
palliative multinational ventures nor the ambitious national projects were profitable enough for the arms monopolies. In order to raise their own voice, the European arms-industrial capital embarked on an institutional integration process. Eventually, the European defence industry associations merged under the umbrella of Aerospace and Defence Industry Association (ASD) in 2004.448

From a strategic aspect, it was almost impossible to generate the adequate financial resources for considerable R&D investments through export revenues. The political decision-makers of the EU were aware of the fact that the European DIBs would lose their already-weak competitiveness unless an improvement was managed in the R&D field. Moreover, 2003 and 2004 were the years when the relations between the USA and the EU got tense. A Transatlantic political crisis started with the reluctance of France and Germany to involve in the coalition forces of the Iraqi War. Thereupon, the USA labelled the French-German togetherness as the ‘old Europe’ in the beginning of 2003. The dispute rapidly escalated when the various European countries declared a joint statement supporting the upcoming US-led assault on Iraq. The French-German axis was contending with the US hegemony in forming a European-wide authority.449 This sort of tension was a good opportunity for the European arms industrialists to raise their demands. The idea of “separate and separable European politics” advocated by the French-German axis has overlapped with “separate and separable European defence market” desired by European arms industry. In other words, the interests of the defence-industrial capital and the prominent European nation states was intersecting. Hence, the institutionalization of the European defence that gained pace in the 1990s marked a leap forward following the Iraqi War. Having started its operations in 2001, the OCCAR was enlarged with the memberships of Belgium and Spain respectively in 2003 and 2005 as well as the


participation of Turkey, Netherlands and Luxembourg without being member. However, the most important steps were the foundation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) by the Council of the EU and the initiation of the Preparatory Action for Security Research (PASR) by the European Commission in 2004.

Being an intergovernmental agency within the EU, EDA’s founding mission comprises

- supporting the development of defence capabilities and military cooperation among the European Union Member States;
- stimulating defence Research and Technology and strengthening the European defence industry;
- acting as a military interface to EU policies.

Obviously, these tasks are directly or indirectly linked to the promotion of the arms exports both within and outside of the EU. Moreover, ASD has been officially recognized by the EDA’s “Agency Establishment Team” as a consultative actor since the mid-2004. Thus, it can be said that EDA was created by the governments that are pushed by the arms corporations.

One of the first actions of the EDA was to prepare a report called “Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs” that warns the European arms-producing states about the lack of R&D funds. According to the report, the total defence R&D budget of the EU members was only the one-sixth of the defence R&D spending of the USA. The data pertaining to the


452 Stavrianakis, Taking Aim at the Arms Trade, 41; Ikegami, “The End,” 441.


subsequent years was not positive also. In terms of defence-related research, the EU went on falling behind its global rivals such as the USA, Russia and even China. Briefly, since the foundation of the EDA, the low-budget problem has been at the forefront.

The European Commission (EC), as the supranational administrative body of the EU, also attempted to contribute to the R&D activities by initiating the PASR between 2004 and 2006. On the other hand, unlike the EDA, the PASR was not an institution and would operate in the “security” realm rather than the “defence”. In fact, the PASR was only a framework programme that provides research funds. Nor it had a noteworthy budget. However, it is very important since it was the first step taken by the EC in funding the R&D activities that have no civilian purpose. Also, it has symbolised the first official cooperation between the European defence sector and the European Commission, though very limited in the beginning.

In the 2000s, another issue that has occupied the defence-industrial agenda of the EU was the arms embargo which has been imposed on China since 1989. The

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459 Ibid., 185, 201.

460 Ibid., 191, 192, 202.
German-Franco axis and the global supremacy of the USA confronted once again by mid-2000s. The core-European capitalism was in favour of lifting the arms embargo while the USA was insisting on the maintenance of the embargo.\footnote{Bräuner, “Beyond the Arms Embargo,” 462; Wezeman and Bromley, “International Arms Transfers,” 438.} Actually, the different perspectives of the USA and the EU on China has stemmed from their different positions in the imperialist hierarchy. The scope and capabilities of the EU imperialism were limited with the near periphery of the continental Europe. Moreover, the DIBs of the second tier European arms suppliers were export-dependent, constantly seeking for new export markets. On the other hand, the USA had imperialistic interests reaching up to the Far East, unlike the EU. Furthermore, its arms monopolies would not earn much if the arms embargo on China was cancelled. As a result of the clashing imperialistic goals, the USA prevailed over the European demands and the embargo was sustained. Yet, notwithstanding the US pressures, especially France and the UK relatively relaxed the control on dual-use technology and equipment with their trade in China in order to benefit from the vast Chinese defence market.\footnote{Ibid., 475-476.}

Germany has become the largest arms exporter among the EU members, making it also the third largest arms supplier country in the world between 2003 and 2010. It seems that the German defence industry benefitted from the post-9/11 international security ambiance and was not rapidly harmed by the 2008 global economic crisis. The German arms sales increased 37\% between the 2007 and 2011 years with comparison to the former 5-year period.\footnote{Holtom et al., “Development in Arms Transfers,” 267.} On the other hand, the rise in the German arms exports could not pass the ethical criteria. Studies
reported that Germany did not behave responsibly in international arms deliveries, neglecting the human rights abuses of illiberal governments.464

The second largest European arms exporter - and the fourth in the world - was France. The graphic of the French arms exports had a fluctuating profile throughout the 2000s. The global economic crisis obviously affected the DIB of France but the duration of the impact seems to be limited only with the year 2010, thanks to the imports by the UAE and the Asian customers.465 Among the Asian importers, China could have had a more distinct role but the US pressures enabled France to export only dual-use items in small amounts.466

Constituting the fifth largest share of the international arms supply market, the arms exports of the UK showed some similarities with the deliveries of France and Germany. As in the case of France, the big potential of a China-UK arms trade partnership was hampered by the USA.467 Also, similar to the German export policy of the time, notorious allegations were found worthy to be mentioned by the prominent studies in the literature.468 Besides, the UK could hold its arms export level merely stable under the economic crisis conditions by targeting the Middle Eastern buyers.469 Lastly, the divergence of the geographies that receive European weapons systems is interesting. While Germany’s clients


466 Meijer et al., “Arming China,” 866-867.

467 Ibid., 862.

468 Stohl and Grillot, The International Arms Trade, 64-65; Stavrianakis, Taking Aim at the Arms Trade, 3.

were from Europe and its near periphery, the target region of France was primarily Asia and that of the UK was the Middle East.

As it was in the 1992-2002 period, the third tier arms exporters have been led by China after the 9/11 attacks stimulated the global arms transfers. Having the second highest military expenditures since 2001,\textsuperscript{470} China has also become the second largest economy in the world since 2010.\textsuperscript{471} The high economic growth rates and the determined will to reinforce the PLA inevitably started to reflect on the Chinese DIB and arms exports. Due to the post-1989 Western arms embargoes, the Chinese defence-industrial development strategy has relied on the acquisition and then militarization of the dual-use technologies in the 1990s. This strategy was maintained in the 2000s as well. The CPC effectively supported -to some extent pushed for- the civil-military industrial cooperation so that the economic and military benefits of the dual-use technologies could be maximized.\textsuperscript{472} Moreover, the CPC insistently tried to induce the EU to lift the arms embargo but it did not happen, giving way to limited technology transfer from the West.\textsuperscript{473} The emerging Chinese large capital also started to show interest in the defence sector and make investments in the dual-use technologies, though not directly military projects yet.\textsuperscript{474} Hence, certain sectors like the missile production and shipbuilding have become highly profitable; simultaneously, the modernization of the PLA was expedited.\textsuperscript{475} In the light of these developments, a


\textsuperscript{472} Bitzinger and Boutin, “China’s Defence Industries,” 135.

\textsuperscript{473} Bräuner, “Beyond the Arms Embargo,” 462.

\textsuperscript{474} Bitzinger and Boutin, “China’s Defence Industries,” 140-141.
sort of anticipation that China was on the verge of a RMA occurred. Nevertheless, no Chinese RMA materialized at least in the 2000s and the Chinese defence technology could be relatively improved. Despite the reverse engineering efforts and consistent FDI flow to dual-use projects, the Chinese defence industry were still technologically underdeveloped in some critical major conventional weapons like jet fighters. China needed more time to acquire the tangible results of the defence-related domestic investments.

Accompanying the general economic and military advancement, the Chinese arms exports took on a certain character in the post-9/11 years. Just because it is controversial that China has become a normal capitalist country due to the ongoing free-market reforms, whether the Chinese arms sales serve to an imperialistic strategy is not crystal clear, at least for the 2000s. Yet, the signs of a more assertive Chinese foreign policy encompassing wider geographies have been visible in this period. In parallel, beside the Asian arms market, China has exported weapon systems to the Middle East and Africa, though not in high volumes. However, the rich energy and raw material resources of these regions can give a hint about the future motivation behind the Chinese arms sales.

The third tier arms exporters other than China significantly increased their share in the global market. While Netherlands, Israel and Italy were part of the upper-third tier group with considerable export volumes, countries like Sweden, Ukraine and Spain constituted the medium strata. On the other hand, Switzerland,

475 Ibid., 138-139.

476 Dombrowski and Gholz, Buying Military Transformation, 6.


Canada and the Republic of Korea can only be called as emerging arms suppliers with their lesser amount of arms sales. The case of Sweden is a typical example to illustrate the general situation of the European third tier arms exporters. The concentration and internationalization process of the already-privatized Swedish defence firms continued by the mid-2000s. Hence, a semi-Swedish multinational arms capital took place. These companies benefited from the labels of “European” and “Swedish” that evoke high quality and political neutrality. Thus, an impetus to foster the arms exports was successfully created.

Israeli arms exports represent another exemplary framework. Actually, small countries are basically disadvantageous in international arms sales because they may not prove the abilities of their weapon systems. To clarify, neither they can undertake large domestic procurement programmes due to the small size of their national armies, nor they can frequently exhibit their weapons in overseas military operations. Therefore, the buyer countries often prefer the weapons catalogue of the big imperialist countries. For instance, despite not being small in terms of territory and population, even the arms industries of Brazil and Argentine could not survive the overall contraction of the world arms market in the 1990s because they could not create adequate export opportunities. Concentration of the domestic DIB could not be a remedy and these countries became explicitly import-dependent in defence equipment. At this point, Israel stands as one of the few exceptions. The Israeli arms exports can be regarded as

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480 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”

481 Ikegami, “The End,” 443, 446.

482 Markowski, Hall and Wylie, “Introduction,” 5.

very high for a small country. In fact, Israel has shown how deadly its conventional arms are in many assaults on the lands of Palestine for a long time. This is really important about the marketing of weapon systems, but the essential factor that promotes the Israeli arms sales is the effective guidance and subsidies of the national governments. What is more is that various governments of Israel enjoyed political, financial and technological support given by the consecutive US administrations in the last decades.

The post-9/11 rise of international arms trade that can be better explained if the picture of the global arms imports is taken into consideration. The most salient element regarding the graph below is the domination of the Asian and Oceanian arms recipients. The Indian Ocean and the Asian coasts of the Pacific Ocean has witnessed a significant expansion of naval forces and military air fleets between 2003 and 2010.

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Being third in the previous period (1992-2002), China has become the locomotive of the arms imports in the 2000s. However, the volume of the Chinese arms purchases from abroad -almost all of them from Russia- do not indicate an annual consistency. China has spent much more money to buy major weapon platforms in the early and mid-2000s than the late-2000s. Towards the end of the decade, China has increasingly preferred to import high-tech components of weapon platforms instead of buying ready-to-use finished weapon systems.\textsuperscript{487} This fact can be attributed to the goal of developing a national DIB.\textsuperscript{488} The second largest arms importer of the relevant period, India, has also desired to build up an independent domestic defence industry. However, India had no military-technological infrastructure as in the case of China. Therefore, unlike China, India has turned to extensive defence-industrial collaboration with Russia in the


\textsuperscript{488} Wezeman and Bromley, “International Arms Transfers,” 423; Holtom et al., “Development in Arms Transfers,” 271.
2000s in order to diminish its arms import dependence.\textsuperscript{489} The relative regression of the Middle Eastern countries on the list of top ten largest arms importers is another interesting point. However, the studies of the time have accurately seen this fact as a volatile trend due to the regional presence or/and increasing assertiveness of Iran.\textsuperscript{490}


The immediate effect of the 2008 global economic crisis has been felt on the domestic defence industries during the 2008-2010 years. The international arms transfers have stagnated within these three years and the medium and long-term impacts of the crisis have taken place in the 2010s, especially in the first half of the decade. For example, the world military expenditure has made almost no progress in 2011 and constantly decreased between 2012 and 2015.\textsuperscript{491} However, the military spending of some regions or countries showed an opposite trend in these years. For instance, most of the large Asian countries continued to expand their defence budgets in contrast to the falling European and US military expenditures.\textsuperscript{492} This fact was an important opportunity particularly for China in its intra-systemic rivalry with the Western core-capitalist countries.\textsuperscript{493}

The global military spending began to re-increase in 2016 and has grown constantly since then until 2019. Hitting up to $1917 billion, the world military

\textsuperscript{489} Wezeman and Bromley, “International Arms Transfers,” 425.

\textsuperscript{490} Stohl and Grillot,\textit{ The International Arms Trade}, 48.

\textsuperscript{491} See: Figure 3.2.

\textsuperscript{492} Thurner et al., “Network Interdependencies,” 1737.

\textsuperscript{493} Perlo-Freeman, “Europe and the Impact,” 178.
expenditure in 2019 marked the highest point in the post-Cold War era.\textsuperscript{494} The military budgets of the six NATO members—namely the USA, France, Germany, the UK, Italy and Canada—were among the top fifteen largest military budgets, aggregately constituting the 48\% of the world military expenditure in 2019.\textsuperscript{495} To compare, the share of the Asia and Oceania region was 27\% in the same year.\textsuperscript{496} It is interesting to note that the US military spending in 2019 was 15\% lower than its 2010 level. As opposed to the USA, the Chinese military expenditure in 2019 was 85\% higher than its 2010 level.\textsuperscript{497} This is a very big proportional imbalance. Yet, for realistic inferences, the last statistics should be interpreted together with the fact that the US military expenditure, with its $732 billion value in 2019, is still higher than the total military expenditures of the next nine biggest spenders.\textsuperscript{498}

In keeping with the rising military expenditures, the arms sales of the defence companies rose up worldwide. These sales include categorically both the arms export and national procurement. In 2016, the total arms sales of the biggest 100 defence firms in the world—excluding Chinese companies—became $374 billion. This was 38\% higher than the 2002 level.\textsuperscript{499} In 2018, this rate of increase reached up 47\% as a result of the $420 billion worth of arms sales by the worldwide arms-producing and military service companies.\textsuperscript{500} The economic magnitude of the


\textsuperscript{495} Ibid., 4.

\textsuperscript{496} Ibid., 7.

\textsuperscript{497} Ibid., 3.

\textsuperscript{498} Ibid., 3.

arms industry might seem very big with its value over four hundred billion dollar, but it is small in comparison to the civilian manufacturing. To illustrate, the total sale of the largest fifteen firms that operate in the civilian industry such as Volkswagen Group, Samsung Electronics, Toyota Group etc. was $2453 billion while the top fifteen defence-industrial companies in the world carried out $245 billion worth of weapon sales. Yet, unlike the civilian industry, the global defence sector has become very stable since the early 2000s. A very big majority of the firms that had taken place among the largest 60 or 70 arms-producing corporations in 2002 were still inside the top 100 in 2015.

A certain portion of the top 100 defence companies in the world has been still state-owned in the 2010s. DIBs of China, Russia, Italy, India and Israel are some of the significant examples that are dominated by the state capital in varying terms. Nevertheless, considering the size of the DIBs of the USA, the UK, Germany and Sweden, it is safe to say that a bigger portion of the largest 100 arms-producing companies in the world are private enterprises. In fact, the distinction between the public and private ownership of the large defence firms has been less important in the post-Cold War era because both forms of ownership have been operating within the same capitalist supply chain for several decades. Given the further expansion of the domestic and international subcontracting networks in the last decade, the prime-contractors, whether state-owned or not, are just the tip of the iceberg.


501 Ibid., 8.


503 Hartley, The Economics of Arms, 73.

504 Ibid., 29.
Moreover, the “tip of the iceberg” has tended to get smaller. In other words, the large defence corporations inclined to undertake mergers and acquisitions in the 2010s. The concentration of the large arms capital was a characteristic of the 1990s, but it was reversed in the 2000s by dint of rising exports and national procurements. However, it re-emerged in the 2010s because the total arms sales of the 100 largest defence companies in the world has shown sharply negative growth rates -or only moderate growth rates- until very recently, due to the long-term repercussions of the 2008 economic crisis.  

On the other hand, unlike the 1990s, the consolidation of the defence-industrial capital was not supported by the national governments this time. In contrast, particularly the European governments decisively prevented some mergers and acquisition within the defence sector, e.g. in 2012.  

In the 2010s, another feature of the arms production is that the already-rising costs of major weapons has reached a very high level. The defence economics literature has clearly admitted and emphasized the existence of a defence-specific inflation. What is worse is that there is no rapid solution for this kind of inflation. For example, to temporarily stop and restart an arms production facility is not a remedy because it is an extremely expensive move. A recent study has mentioned that the USA must have spent at least $10 billion in 2017 if it wants to restart the production of F-22 combat aircraft of which production was ceased in 2011. The costs of high-tech major weapons have increased recently so much  

505 “SIPRI Arms Industry Database.”  


507 Hartley, The Economics of Arms, 43, 102.  

that even some optimistic mainstream views implied the probability of a worldwide disarmament due to the economically “irrational” costs.\textsuperscript{509}

It may be noted that the various forms of corruption in the 2010s occurred.\textsuperscript{510} Although the arms production and trade is not the most corrupted economic sector in the world, the examples of illicit non-price competition is very common inside the sector, even among the giant arms monopolies having an international corporate identity.\textsuperscript{511} In short, corrupted practises continue to be a structural problem of the organic relations between the states and arms capital.\textsuperscript{512} Nonetheless, corruption is just one of the harmful effects of the arms business to the society. For example, human rights abuses in an arms-purchasing country have been still disregarded. As recent academic researches put forward, unlike the common liberal discourse, there is no truly responsible arms exporting country that prioritizes the human rights issues, including the developed Western democracies.\textsuperscript{513}

In response to the above-mentioned harmful effects of the international arms trade, the existing international system has developed arms control mechanisms for a long time. Voluntary self-restraint, arms embargoes and international regulatory agreements are the basic ways of controlling the international arms transfers.\textsuperscript{514} Set aside the self-restraint and embargoes, even the international

\textsuperscript{509} Hartley, The Economics of Arms, 45.

\textsuperscript{510} Ibid., 103.

\textsuperscript{511} Ibid., 85.


treaties and agreements on arms trade have certain deficiencies, despite their contributions. The first deficiency that comes to mind is that it is almost impossible to create an arms trade treaty on which every state can compromise. Second, being a general problem of the international law most of the time, the arms trade regulations usually lack a legal enforcement capacity.\(^{515}\)

The most well-known arms control mechanisms prior to 2013 were the UNROCA, the WA and the EU Common Position on Arms Exports. These mechanisms have continued to exist up until today, but their presence was overshadowed by the adoption of the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in April 2013. The ATT is the first legally binding and the most comprehensive international agreement on the transfer of major weapons and small arms.\(^{516}\) The treaty was opened to signature for the UN members in June 2013 and entered into force in December 2014. Many core capitalist countries such as Japan, Australia, Switzerland and the EU member states have signed and ratified the ATT within several months or years.\(^{517}\) The USA, Turkey, the UAE and some other countries signed the treaty in the UN but did not ratify it domestically because they did not want to be legally bound by the treaty. Indeed, since the emergence of the ATT, no one has expected the USA -the motherland of the military-industrial complex- to ratify the treaty.\(^{518}\) Moreover, in July 2019, the Trump administration officially declared its intention not to become a party to the treaty, rejecting all its

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\(^{514}\) Hartley, *The Economics of Arms*, 122-123.

\(^{515}\) Ibid., 124.


obligations arising from the Obama administration’s signature in 2013.\textsuperscript{519} Even worse, many prominent arms exporter or importer such as Russia, China, India and Saudi Arabia has not even signed the treaty yet. As of June 2020, the number of signatory states is 130 while 106 of them have ratified the treaty.\textsuperscript{520}

According to the ATT, the state parties have to take into consideration the arms embargoes in force, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, transnational crimes, general peace and security, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, terrorism and gender-based violence while engaging in arms trade activities.\textsuperscript{521} Because \textit{pacta sunt servanda}, the liberal approach asserts that the ATT would be more effective than the previous international arms control attempts which takes belated actions upon the completed arms deliveries. Therefore, the ATT started to be considered as a proactive and preventive mechanism.\textsuperscript{522} Yet, the mainstream liberal view was aware that the ATT was not a fully mature mechanism, therefore the civil society was attributed a special role to check and improve the implementation of the agreement.\textsuperscript{523}

Unlike the mainstream interpretation, the critical literature puts the ATT into a systemic context and does not approach to it so positively. The ATT is part of a legal regime which is not exempt from imperialist hierarchy.\textsuperscript{524} For example, the intra-Western arms trade, no matter how big it is, does not pose a problem to the ATT since the reference points of the treaty such as genocide, crime against

\textsuperscript{519} “Arms Trade Treaty.”

\textsuperscript{520} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{521} Stavrianakis, “Legitimising Liberal Militarism,” 840.

\textsuperscript{522} Wood and Abdul-Rahim, “The Birth,” 20.

\textsuperscript{523} Ibid., 25.

\textsuperscript{524} Stavrianakis, “Legitimising Liberal Militarism,” 846.
humanity and human rights abuses is not mostly practised on the Western lands. Therefore, the ATT is just a trade regulation rather than a disarmament treaty. In other words, because the ATT does not question the legitimacy of the arms trade as a whole, it is limited with a regulatory role. To sum up, the ATT might bring partial improvements; but at the same time, it consolidated the liberal militarism, thus legitimating the essence of the problem.

Among the other arms control mechanisms, the UNROCA seems to have lost its significance by the 2010s. In fact, the UNROCA has a distinctive feature: It is the sole global transparency instrument for international arms deliveries. However, the number of national arms transfer reports that are annually submitted to the UNROCA has decreased to the lowest levels over the past decade. Approximately, only the one-fourth of the UN member states have sent their reports in recent years. Moreover, countries from the key regions of the international arms trade such as the MENA submitted hardly any reports in the late 2010s. Furthermore, the quality of the reports has diminished either. For example, it is frequent that the reports of two arms trade partners did not match with each other although one of them is the seller and the other is the buyer. The common standards in reporting has also vanished. For instance, the USA has not reported the transfer of military equipment that is loaned to another country.

523 Ibid., 850-851.
526 Ibid., 842.
527 Ibid., 845, 855.
531 Ibid., 8.
while the receiving countries of the loaned equipment has usually informed the UNROCA on this sort of deliveries.\textsuperscript{532} Set aside the less developed countries, the examples of poor reporting can be multiplied by looking at the reports of prominent arms exporters such as the USA, Russia, China and Sweden.\textsuperscript{533} On the other hand, the argument that the poor reporting is a result of the negligent and arbitrary attitude of states is questionable. To accuse states of laziness does not seem realistic. Alternatively, it can be argued that the initiation of the legally binding ATT might expedite the attenuation of the UNROCA resting upon a voluntary basis.\textsuperscript{534} However, from another perspective, the poor reporting might be a deliberate action. In other words, the decreasing information sharing on a strategic arms transfers might be a symptom of distrust that stems from the rising inter-imperialist competition.

To thoroughly assess the weaknesses and strengths of the international arms control efforts is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, whether or not the recent efforts like the ATT created an impact on the volume of international arms transfers is a critical question. Although more years are required to answer this question comprehensively, it can be argued that the ATT, together with other control mechanisms, has not significantly affected the international arms trade so far. For example, the financial value of the global arms trade in 2015 was estimated to be at a minimum of $91.3 billion.\textsuperscript{535} Nonetheless, this value has

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{532} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{533} Ibid., 9-11.
\end{flushleft}
increased to roughly $100 billion according to the most recent estimates. Moreover, no decline has been seen in the SIPRI TIV of the arms transfers since 2014. Furthermore, while there were fifty-eight arms exporting states between 2011 and 2015, the number of arms exporting countries between 2015 and 2019 reached up sixty-eight.

The findings of some recent quantitative studies in the arms trade literature indicated that the international arms deliveries have more determining variables than the arms control. An eminent variable, for instance, is the oil prices. The change in the oil prices was shown to have a clear impact on both the supply and demand of the major weapon platforms. The reason of such an interaction is a little complex but at the same time quite logical. The global oil market is economically crucial to the leading arms exporters which are also the mainly developed industrial countries. Therefore, the arms exporters have a tendency to supply conventional arms to the oil exporters not only to collect the arms export revenues but also to provide the oil exporters with the defensive means for the sake of the stability of the oil markets. In other words, under the conditions of inter-imperialist competition, the prominent arms suppliers are inclined to deliver military equipment to the countries having energy resources so that the circulation of the affordable energy would not be interrupted.


537 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”


540 Ibid., 278, 291.
As it can be seen on the figure below, the USA and Russia, have held the largest shares in the world market. Considering the common criteria such as the arms production capacity, military technology and the volume of arms exports, these two countries are explicitly at the top, being the first tier arms exporters of the world. On the other hand, while Russia’s share remained almost the same with the 2003-2010 period, the USA has increased its own share during the last nine years, amounting to the one-third of the global arms supplies. China has nearly doubled its arms exports in this period, and clearly became a member of the second tier group. Other second tier exporters are consisted of the European “big three”, namely France, Germany and the UK. Whereas the UK and France maintained their positions comparing with the 2000s, Germany could not sustain its arms exports, and lost almost half of its share in the global market. There is no change in the share of the third tier arms exporters in this period, as well. The international arms supply largely continued to be practised through direct cash sales rather than military aid, as it has been in the post-Cold War era. Although the military aid programmes were relatively revived by the USA following the 9/11 attacks, they were incrementally abandoned later. For example, only the two per cent of the global arms transfers between 2007 and 2016 have been conducted in the form of military aid. Yet, a moderate increase in the volume of military aid has been predicted since it is more practical than the sales, and the practicality is important to the states competing within the capitalist imperialism.

541 Wezeman, “Arms Transfers as Military Aid,” 380-381.

542 Ibid., 389.
The USA was one of the countries of which economy suffered most from the 2008 global financial crisis. In order to overcome the damage of the crisis, the US Congress adopted the Budget Control Act of 2011, which scheduled a ten-year-long cut in the public spending. Hence, the defence budget of the USA inevitably started to be reduced.543 In 2020 constant dollars, while the USA’s expenditure on the national procurement of military material was $201 billion in 2008 and $161 billion in 2010, it diminished to $112 billion in 2014, and could re-increase barely to $151 billion in 2019.544 Moreover, the military R&D spending of the USA could return to the level of the late-2000s hardly in 2018 and 2019.545 Thus,


545 Ibid., 85-86.
the revenues of the US defence corporations have dropped especially in the early and mid-2010s due to the repercussions of the 2008 economic crisis.\textsuperscript{546}

In contrast to the national procurement, the US arms exports rose up in the 2011-2019 period. There are basically one micro and one macro factors behind this rise. In micro terms, the Obama government has promoted the arms exports in order to compensate the losses of the domestic arms companies during the early and mid-2010s. During the incumbency of Trump, although Pentagon’s arms procurement in large amounts has lessened the importance of arms exports for the US companies, the high levels of arms exports have been still maintained. In macro terms, the US imperialism, with Obama and Trump administrations being the two faces of the same coin, has increasingly used the arms deliveries to train and equip its regional collaborators against China and Russia throughout the 2010s.\textsuperscript{547} The continuation of military aid programmes also supports this assertion. The USA has allocated an average of $5-6 billion annually for foreign military aid until Trump's election.\textsuperscript{548}

The Obama’s arms export policy, which was officialised at the beginning of 2014, initially seemed to advance the self-restraint in foreign arms sales. However, the same policy text also included an explicit support for the “legitimate” arms exports.\textsuperscript{549} Yet, the US efforts for arms exports were not fruitful everywhere. For example, the US arms deliveries to Asia have decreased in the first half of the decade.\textsuperscript{550} The strict conditions the USA imposed on its


\textsuperscript{548} Wezeman, “Arms Transfers as Military Aid,” 381.

\textsuperscript{549} Stohl, “Promoting Restraint,” 15-16.

\textsuperscript{550} Caverly and Kapstein, “Who’s Arming,” 170.
arms exports such as inadequate technology sharing and the impossibility of the re-transfers of the US weapons might be what dissuaded the Asian importers.\textsuperscript{551} On the other hand, it should also be remembered that Russia and China has also strived for keeping the USA out of the Asian defence market, meaning that to enter the Asian defence market was not an easy job. Notwithstanding, even the limited arms sales to Asia was a very profitable business. While the share of the USA in the Asian arms market contracted in the early 2010s, it actually earned the largest amount of money it has ever earned from that market.\textsuperscript{552} In addition, every contract signed with the Asian importers has potentially decreased the arms exports of the US rivals that are more export-dependent than the USA. In other words, the efforts of the USA to export more weapons to Asia should also be read as an attempt to reduce the market share of its rivals.\textsuperscript{553} Some moves of the Obama administration would contribute to this strategy and generally ameliorate the situation of the US arms exports to Asia. The embracement of India as a strategic partner, the traditionally eminent arms client of Russia, was the most salient of them.\textsuperscript{554} Furthermore, the military aid programmes have been another tool for the USA to interfere in the inter-state affairs in Asia. For instance, the Philippines has constantly received US military aid especially until the Duterte government was elected. The military aid as equipment grant was also offered to Vietnam in the mid-2010 for the first time, though the scope of the requested aid is just symbolic.\textsuperscript{555}

\textsuperscript{551} Ibid., 171-172.

\textsuperscript{552} Ibid., 177.

\textsuperscript{553} Ibid., 180.

\textsuperscript{554} Holtom et al., “Development in Arms Transfers,” 262-263.

\textsuperscript{555} Wezeman, “Arms Transfers as Military Aid,” 383.
In other parts of the world, the USA could sell its lethal weapon platforms more easily. For example, the Middle Eastern arms market has been dominated by the USA. The first export order for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system came from a Middle Eastern buyer in 2011, namely the UAE.\textsuperscript{556} However, the major client of the USA in this region was Saudi Arabia. The arms exports of the USA to Saudi Arabia increased nearly 450% from the 2008-2012 period to the 2013-2017.\textsuperscript{557} Another recipient of the US conventional arms in the Middle East was Israel. Israel has been importing much less weapon systems through cash payment from the USA since it developed its domestic DIB after the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, it has also continued to benefit from the US military aid programmes. While Israel received almost $30 billion worth of US military aid between 2007 and 2016, it would receive an extra $33 billion worth military equipment between 2019 and 2028 according to a military aid agreement signed in 2016 between the two countries.\textsuperscript{558} The Northern and Eastern European arms markets were also under the hegemony of the USA. Due to the escalation of the Putin’s imperialistic practices, the USA did not have a difficulty in selling expensive military equipment to countries such as Sweden, Poland and Norway in the mid-2010s.\textsuperscript{559}

The cuts in the US military spending in the early and mid-2010s entailed a concentration in the US arms capital, though not radical. Yet, the Trump administration’s vast military modernization programme carried the concentration forward since huge projects needed huge investments.\textsuperscript{560} As a

\textsuperscript{556} Holtom et al., “Development in Arms Transfers,” 263.


\textsuperscript{558} Wezeman, “Arms Transfers as Military Aid,” 382.

\textsuperscript{559} Ibid., 10.

\textsuperscript{560} Fleurant et al., “The SIPRI Top 100, 2018,” 4.
result of these, in 2018, the five largest arms producing firms in the USA also constituted the top five of the world for the first time since SIPRI initiated its Arms Industry Database in 2002. Whereas Lockheed Martin became the “world champion” by realizing the 11% of the global total arms sales (combined total of national procurement and exports), the five US giant arms producers together accounted for more than the one-third of the global total.561

As it was indicated above, the Trump administration not only fostered the domestic demand for conventional arms but also facilitated the arms exports. In the second year of his presidency, Trump revised the US Arms Transfer Policy in order to officially promote the arms exports.562 The economic dimension of the arms exports was found very important by Trump. The foreign arms sales could create an extra demand for the defence firms, which would result in higher employment across the country; moreover, the additional export revenues could contribute to the R&D budgets of the arms companies.563 Hereby, Trump has attempted to persuade particularly the key customers in the regions where inter-imperialist competition has intensified to buy more US weapon systems. The most successful example of this policy was Saudi Arabia. The 25% of the US total arms deliveries between 2015 and 2019 were made to this country.564 Although a considerable portion of these exports was linked to the contracts signed by the Obama administration, it has seemed so far that Trump’s policy would exceed even the previous arms export volume to Saudi Arabia. Besides, Trump’s pressure about the military-economic burden sharing would probably

561 Ibid., 1-2.


563 Ibid., 45, 50.

drive especially the Asian US allies, e.g. Japan, to import more major conventional weapons from the USA.\textsuperscript{565}

The other first tier arms exporting country of the 2011-2019 period is Russia. The Russian military technology cannot challenge the USA in many categories of the major weapon systems, but the arms production capacity of the Russian DIB and Russia’s current share in the global arms trade market have made Russia the only direct rival of the USA in this field.\textsuperscript{566} There are ten Russian arms companies in the SIPRI’s list of top hundred defence firms in 2018. All of the ten are state-owned enterprises. The SIPRI’s list excludes the Chinese defence firms due to the lack of reliable data. However, even if the Chinese defence firms were included, the ten Russian defence companies would still remain in the top hundred because none of them has a rank lower than sixty-seven.\textsuperscript{567} The total arms sales of these ten defence firms were $36 billion in 2018, which corresponded to the nearly 9% of the global arms sales in that year. A considerable portion of these sales were realized through arms exports, e.g. the s-400 air defence systems. Yet, Russia has embarked on a comprehensive military modernization throughout the 2010s, so the share of the national procurement in the arms sales of Russian defence industry has become larger than before.\textsuperscript{568} In other words, the export dependence of the Russian DIB has significantly declined for the last decade in comparison with the 1992-2002 period.\textsuperscript{569} However, in absolute terms, the arms export revenues continue to be still very important not only for the DIB but for the whole national economy. For example, in 2015, the financial value of the Russian

\textsuperscript{565} Hughes, “Japan's Emerging Arms,” 436.

\textsuperscript{566} Connolly and Sendstad, “Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter,” 26.

\textsuperscript{567} “SIPRI Arms Industry Database.”

\textsuperscript{568} Fleurant et al., “The SIPRI Top 100, 2018,” 5-6.

\textsuperscript{569} Meijer et al., “Arming China,” 871.
arms exports was around $14 billion whereas Russia’s total export of manufactured product (civilian and military) brought in $25 billion.\textsuperscript{570}

In sum, the arms export revenues have still a crucial place in the Russian economy. Not to forget, the Russian economy has shrunk almost 8% in 2009 due to the global crisis although the negative growth rate was rapidly reversed in 2010.\textsuperscript{571} On the other hand, that cruciality has been reduced since the mid-2000s. This fact has led to the paradox of whether the glass is half-empty or it is half-full. In other words, there is a discussion on what is the primary motivation of Russian arms exports in the arms trade literature. While one side of the discussion argues that the Russian arms exports have been primarily driven by the politico-military thinking for years,\textsuperscript{572} the other side asserts that the economic factors are still more determinant on the overseas arms sales of Russia. According to the first view, there has been certain strategic and diplomatic motives impelling the Russian arms exports especially after the economic recovery of Russia under Putin’s presidency. These non-economic motives are mainly consisted of underpinning the national prestige, expanding the influence on key geopolitical and geo-economic regions, maintaining an independent foreign policy channel, and establishing or consolidating military ties the importers.\textsuperscript{573}

In response to this argumentation, the view that argues for the predominance of economic motives highlights the fragility of the Russian DIB and national economy as well as the international events that made this fragility explicit. For example, Russia has had significant market shares in some particular military

\textsuperscript{570} Connolly and Sendstad, “Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter,” 22.


\textsuperscript{573} Ibid., 64.
export items which are quite lucrative. It has exported approximately the 40% of the air defence systems, 25% of the missiles and the 24% of the military aircraft in the world arms export market between 2010 and 2016. However, these remarkable shares have had a declining trend recently. Moreover, the Russian DIB has certain structural problems. The ageing of military-industrial facilities and the weakening of R&D workforce are some of them. Furthermore, the post-Crimea Crisis (2014) economic sanctions implemented by the Western countries on Russia, the burden of Russian military presence in Syria and the recent drops in oil prices have altogether put the Russian economy and DIB into trouble. The Covid-19 pandemic is also likely to create extra pressures on the Russian economy and arms export revenues. Therefore, it is true that Russia might need the arms exports revenues much more under these circumstances. In consequence, both the politics-based and economy-oriented explanations of the Russian arms exports are partially correct. Rather than opting for the one over the other, both views can be combined in the light of historical and material developments. In this regard, it is vital to comprehend the role of Russia and its arms transfers in the capitalist-imperialist international order. Such a perspective can synthesise the duality of political and economic argumentations.

The most important market for the Russian arms exports in the 2010s is Asia. While the MENA region has received 20-25% of Russia’s foreign arms sales between 2013 and 2017, the share of Asia and Oceania region has been the two-

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574 Connolly and Sendstad, “Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter,” 7.

575 Ibid., 8.

576 Ibid., 2.


578 Connolly and Sendstad, “Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter,” 11.
third of the total.⁵⁷⁹ In the 2000s, while the number one customer of the Russian major weapons were China, India was the second. Nevertheless, India has replaced China in the 2010s, accounting for the 25% of Russia’s total arms exports between 2015 and 2019.⁵⁸⁰ However, the Russian arms exports to India have decreased almost 50% in the second half of the 2010s compared to the first half, indicating that the predominance of the Russian conventional arms in the Indian market has been clearly challenged.⁵⁸¹

In comparison with India, China’s arms purchases from Russia has been far lower in the 2010s. However, considering the position of China in the inter-imperialist competition, the Chinese arms imports from Russia draws the attention with its strategic characteristics. Besides, to sell military equipment to China has some peculiar benefits and positive spill-over effects for Russia. First of all, isolated by the Western capitalism aftermath of the Crimea Crisis, Russia has felt the negative impact of the recently falling oil prices more severely. Therefore, Russia has offered expensive high-tech major weapon platforms to China especially in the early and mid-2010s.⁵⁸² In short, Russia has sought to alleviate the economic hardships by exporting weapon systems to China.⁵⁸³ Moreover, the fact that the Russian arms are demanded by the PLA is a good marketing campaign for the Russian DIB.⁵⁸⁴ In addition, the arms trade between the two countries have contributed to cooperation in industrial and military issues. For example, in


⁵⁸¹ Ibid., 4.


recent years, Russia and China has engaged in the collaboration on dual-use technologies -a field that the Russian civilian and military industry can benefit a lot.\textsuperscript{585} Also, the fact that Russia has established some maintenance facilities in China in the 2011-2019 period would probably expand and prolong the defence-industrial cooperation between the countries.\textsuperscript{586} Furthermore, it can be asserted that even though China is also a rival of Russia in the imperialistic sharing competition, Russia’s main rival in Asia and the Middle East still seems to be the USA and its close allies. Therefore, by arming China, Russia might be supporting the lesser evil.\textsuperscript{587} On the other hand, Russia’s arms exports to China have also given an explicit strategic advantage to Russia in estimating the military capabilities of the PLA and its inventory.\textsuperscript{588} At the end of the day, as it was said above, both countries are the prominent actors of the inter-imperialist competition. In this respect, it is impossible to say that the arms trade between the two states is free of problems. To illustrate, the doubts about the Chinese reverse engineering still exist. Moreover, Russia’s arms exports to the regional adversaries of China, e.g. Vietnam and India, might create problems in the future.\textsuperscript{589}

The second largest arms export market of the Russian defence industry in the 2010s is the MENA region. Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Azerbaijan are the salient arms clients of Russia. Algeria has become the third largest arms importer

\textsuperscript{585} Ibid., 49; Connolly and Sendstad, “Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter,” 15.


\textsuperscript{587} Ibid., 48.

\textsuperscript{588} Blank and Levitzky, “Geostrategic Aims of the Russian Arms Trade,” 68.

\textsuperscript{589} Weitz, “Sino-Russian Defense Cooperation,” 52.
of the Russian weapon platforms in this period. The arms sales to Syria probably deserves more attention. In fact, the data sources in arms trade could not present a clear data about Russia’s arms transfers to Syria particularly since the Russian armed forces positioned in Syria. Yet, there are observable results of those potential and actually existing transfers. For example, the Russian energy companies have acquired the right to explore and produce oil in Syria in return for arms deliveries by 2014. Russia has implemented the same policy in Algeria as well. The military presence of Russia in Syria since 2015 has also an indirect effect on the total Russian arms exports. The successful joint military operations conducted by the Russian and Syrian armed forces against the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) has proved the effectiveness of the Russian conventional arms, drawing the attention of potential arms importers. The tense inter-state affairs between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been another peculiar market for the Russian arms companies. The volume of Russia’s arms exports to these contending neighbours is not very high indeed. However, it is important with regard to the fact that Russia’s simultaneous arms exports to these countries indicate a traditional cold-blooded imperialistic practice. To conclude, countries like Algeria, Iraq and Syria had been the traditional arms importers of the USSR, and Russia has managed to re-establish arms export links with them to some extent in the 2011-2019 period. Notwithstanding, the MENA arms market has been dominated by the USA for a long time, and Russia seems

590 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”

591 Azizi, “Russian Arms Trade Approach,” 90.


593 Connolly and Sendstad, “Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter,” 27.

to face with strong barriers to overcome. In this regard, Egypt and Turkey can be taken as successful exceptions. While Russia has delivered several types of combat aircraft to Egypt as part of a multibillion dollar arms export agreement signed in 2014, Turkey has ordered the long-debated S-400 air defence system in 2017 and received the missile system in 2019. As of July 2020, the S-400 system has yet to be activated by Turkey.

The second tier arms exporters have been the classical big three of Europe - France, Germany and the UK- and China between the 2011-2019. To begin with Europe, the negative effect of the 2008 economic crisis might be an accurate point of departure. The total military expenditure of Europe stagnated or moderately decreased in the early 2010s due to the crisis but it started to slowly increase in the middle of the decade probably because of the annexation of Crimea by Russia. As of 2019, Europe aggregately spent $356 billion as defence expenditure, which is equal to the almost 20% of the global military spending. On the other hand, the economic crisis reflected on the arms exports of the European big three in different degrees. For example, while Germany could not yet achieve the volume of foreign arms sales it had in the 2006-2010, France and the UK surpassed their pre-2010 arms exports in the mid-2010s.

As might be expected, the international arms supply of the EU member states has constituted the overwhelming portion of the European arms transfers. The EU members also have a significant share in the world arms export market. The

595 Azizi, “Russian Arms Trade Approach,” 90.


597 “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.”


599 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”
aggregate cross-border arms deliveries of the EU members amounted to 27% of the global total between 2013 and 2017.\textsuperscript{600} The same proportion was 26% in the 2015-2019 period.\textsuperscript{601} According to the list of the SIPRI top 100 arms-producing and military services companies in the world, twenty-seven European-based defence firms took place among the largest one-hundred in 2018, by undertaking nearly the 24% of the global arms sales which covers both national procurement and exports.\textsuperscript{602} While eight of these twenty-seven companies are based in the UK, six of them are in France and four of them are in Germany. Lastly, it should be noted that if the Chinese arms companies included in the top 100, a few European defence corporations can be left out of the largest one-hundred list.

The European defence industries have faced both decades-old and new problems in the 2011-2019 period. First of all, the European defence market has remained fragmented in the 2010s despite the promising efforts from the previous decade, e.g. the establishment of the EDA. Different national policies on defence industry and arms exports have continued to duplicate the costs and hamper the benefits of a potential economies of scale in production.\textsuperscript{603} In fact, many European states rightly struggle to protect their national sovereignty on defence-industrial issues against the foreign monopoly capital. Their military-industrial capital also demands the protection of the nation state against the arms monopolies. However, unless they cooperate with the large foreign capital, the DIBs of small European countries come to be crushed by the economic difficulties such as the redundant duplication of costs and inefficiency of small-scale production. This fact actually indicates an important contradiction with regard to the state-capital relations in the defence sector. In the age of imperialism, while the arms-industrial capital

\textsuperscript{600} Wezeman et al., “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2017,” 5.


\textsuperscript{602} Fleurant et al., “The SIPRI Top 100, 2018,” 4.

\textsuperscript{603} Hartley, “The Economics of European Defense,” 77; Béraud-Sudreau, “Building Franco-German Consensus,” 79.
needs to be protected by the state apparatus, it is also forced to be internationalized through export dependencies, mergers and acquisitions.\footnote{Iraklis Oikonomou, “The EDA-European Commission Connection in EU Military R&D: Not Seeing the Forest for the Trees,” in \textit{The Emergence of EU Defense Research Policy: From Innovation to Militarization}, ed. Nikolaos Karampekios, Iraklis Oikonomou and Elias G. Carayannis (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing AG, 2018), 263.}

Across Europe, nationally fragmented investments in military R&D are one of the significant examples of the duplication of costs. Set aside the non-EU member European states, the inadequacy of defence R&D activities conducted by the EU members seems crystal clear when they are compared with the international rivals. For example, whereas the sum of defence research expenditure of all the EDA members were approximately €8.8 billion in 2014, the US has spent more than €50 billion on military R&D in the mid-2010s. China is also believed to have allocated roughly €20 billion to the defence R&D in those years. Even Russia by itself has spent €3-4 billion on annual average for innovation in military technology around 2014.\footnote{Frédéric Mauro, “Toward an Authentic European Defence Research Strategy: Legal Aspects,” in \textit{The Emergence of EU Defense Research Policy: From Innovation to Militarization}, ed. Nikolaos Karampekios, Iraklis Oikonomou and Elias G. Carayannis (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing AG, 2018), 311-313.} The huge gap between the USA and EU on defence R&D was not a new phenomenon indeed.\footnote{Fiott, “EU-NATO Cooperation,” 282.} Nevertheless, it is an alarming situation that the prominent arms exporters within the EU have recently started to lag behind the other rivals in the imperialist hierarchy in terms of defence research spending. If the current low level of the European defence R&D is persisted fifteen years, the once-desired dream of “separate and separable Europe” will end up with a “dependent and subcontracted Europe” at least in the defence-technological manner.\footnote{Mauro, “Toward an Authentic European Defence Research,” 324-325.}
The EU and especially its core capitalist countries have been aware of the above-mentioned trend. The fragmentation of the European DIB had to be reversed before it is too late. Also, the past reform attempts in this field like OCCAR have not apparently improved the conditions of the EU’s defence sector by the mid-2010s.608 Therefore, a new series of EU-wide plans and actions were prepared in the 2011-2019 period although they have not created a comprehensive change so far. Unlike the previous decades, the EU Commission, the supra-governmental body of the EU, has taken a more assertive role. The process that started with the PASR in 2004 was sustained by the Commission and led to the initiation of the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) in 2016.609 The most salient outcome of the EDAP was the establishment of European Defence Fund (EDF) in 2017, which would allegedly allow the EU budget to directly fund the defence R&D and procurement.610 The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which was activated in 2017 although it was already written in the Lisbon Treaty (2009), has been also believed to promote the intra-EU defence cooperation.611 Moreover, the preparatory action plan was just a precursor for the Commission’s long-term designs. The main goal of the Commission -with contributions by the EDA- was to create an extensive European Defence Research policy (EDRP) which would take place between 2021 and 2027.612


611 Béraud-Sudreau, “Building Franco-German Consensus,” 81.

612 Oikonomou, “The EDA-European Commission Connection,” 266.
The second important problem that the European DIB has faced in the 2011-2019 period is the Brexit. By the 2010s, the UK has been one of the five EU members that comprises the 80% of the EU’s military procurement expenditure. In addition, the UK’s spending on the defence R&D was the highest among the EU members in 2016, accounting for the 43% of the EU total. France’s share was 41% in the same year. On one hand these statistics indicate how hierarchical the EU is in terms of military expenditures; on the other, they highlight the pivotal role of the UK in that hierarchy. Hence, it is likely that the Brexit would hit a major blow to the efforts of creating a large defence market and efficient cost sharing in R&D within the EU.

Among the European second tier arms exporters, France took the lead, accounting for the 7% of the international arms supplies in the 2010s. This is not a surprise since France historically has one of the most export-oriented DIBs in the world. Especially if compared with Germany, France traditionally represents the more permissive arms export culture within the EU. On the other hand, rather than a permissive attitude, France has adopted an aggressive arms export policy by the mid-2010s during the presidency of François Hollande. During the incumbency of the social democratic leader, various major weapon systems that were produced for the national procurement were also put on the arms trade market, and exports to the Middle East was promoted. Hence, France could boost its foreign arms sales by 27% in 2013-2017 period vis-à-vis the former five-year period. The high level of French arms exports continued in Macron’s tenure.

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616 Béraud-Sudreau, “Building Franco-German Consensus,” 89.

either. Thus, France has marked the most successful five years between 2015 and 2019 in terms of arms exports since the end of the Cold War.618

Germany had had a considerable market share in the international arms exports between 2003 and 2010, but it lost half of its market share in the 2011-2019 period. This was the greatest proportional fall among the top six arms exporters of the world and probably caused by the long-term impact of the 2008 economic crisis. The fall was quite significant particularly in the first half of the 2010s. Besides, the regions receiving the German conventional weapons have indicated a change in recent years. For example, between 2013 and 2017, Germany has delivered most of its arms exports to the other European importers while the Middle East has been its second largest arms export market and Asia has been the third.619 However, Asia and Oceania region has taken the lead in the 2015-2019 period, receiving 30% of the exported German arms.620 This trend deserves to be followed for the coming years, since it may point out whether or not a shift in Germany’s imperialistic policies in the Far East.

Although the UK has constantly subsidised its arms exports,621 it could become only the sixth largest arms exporter in the world in the 2011-2019 period. The decrease in its arms sales to its traditional customers such as Saudi Arabia, India and the USA might be the primary reason behind the UK’s shrinking share in the international arms export market.622 One thing should also be noted that these old arms clients of the UK have not reduce their arms imports, meaning that the UK

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621 Hartley, The Economics of Arms, 121.

has been losing the competition in the international market. This fact might
deteriorate following the Brexit, but it is too early to comment on the effect of the
Brexit on the UK’s arms exports.

China’s share in the international market of arms exports nearly doubled in the
2010s, making it the fifth largest arms supplier of the last decade. There are two
main reasons that enable this rise. First, China’s efforts to advance its own
defence-industrial capabilities have boosted its arms exports in the course of time.
The vast and long-term domestic military modernization programmes have
improved the arms technology of China and expanded its DIB since the
beginning of the century.\textsuperscript{623} The military technology transfers from Russia -legal
or through reverse engineering- contributed to this process as well. The
acquisition of dual-use technology from the Western markets can also be said to
promote the development of the Chinese defence industry. Russia has supplied
almost the 80% of the total arms imports of China in the entire post-Cold War
era.\textsuperscript{624} Indeed, the Sino-Russian partnership in the defence sector can be defined
as an efficient symbiotic relationship in which both country gained economically
and strategically.\textsuperscript{625} Without any doubt, there is an obvious possibility that the
increasing assertiveness of both country in the global political economy might
transform into an imperialistic rivalry in the future. Besides, in micro dimension,
the fast development of the Chinese DIB would probably start to challenge
Russia in different ways soon. The enhanced defence-industrial capabilities of
China would firstly decrease the Chinese arms purchases from Russia, and then,
compete with Russian arms companies for the export markets.\textsuperscript{626} However, this
scenario -especially its second phase- needs more time to come true. Russia

\textsuperscript{623} Tian and Su, “Estimating the Arms Sales,” 1.

\textsuperscript{624} “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”

\textsuperscript{625} Weitz, “Sino-Russian Defense Cooperation,” 53; Blank and Levitzky, “Geostrategic Aims of
the Russian Arms Trade,” 66.

\textsuperscript{626} Weitz, “Sino-Russian Defense Cooperation,” 46.
estimates that the defence-technological gap between the two countries would not disappear quickly, particularly in key areas like the jet engines.627

The apparent Chinese investment in national defence is enormous indeed, but the experts think that it might be even 50% larger than it seems on the official data.628 Besides, the recent estimations about the scale of the largest Chinese defence companies which are completely state-owned have shown how big the Chinese arms production capacity is. For example, if the top four Chinese arms firms were included in the SIPRI’s top 100 list in 2018, they all would rank among the top twenty, while three of them would take place in the top ten. Moreover, AVIC, the largest Chinese arms-producing firm, would be the sixth in the list.629 In fact, it can be briefly said that China is only second to the USA among the countries that produce major weapon systems.630 Furthermore, Chinese DIB has advanced to the level that it can produce even the most complex weapon platforms. For instance, China started the building of its first domestic aircraft carrier in 2014.631

Set aside the symbolic and military-strategic meaning of a nationally developed aircraft carrier within the context of imperialism, this sort of huge projects effectively promotes the military-technological learning and industrial expansion, leading to higher arms exports. Another military-industrial factor that indirectly increases China’s arms exports in the 2011-2019 period is the replacement of the old military equipment in the inventory of the PLA with the new ones. Due to the rising domestic arms production and the ongoing military modernization, a

627 Ibid., 47.

628 Tai Ming Cheung, “Racing from Behind: China and the Dynamics of Arms Chases and Races in East Asia in the Twenty-First Century,” in Arms Races in International Politics: From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century, ed. Thomas Mahnken, Joseph Maiolo and David Stevenson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 265-266.


630 Ibid., 11.

considerable amount of outdated conventional arms became useless. Therefore, those weapons began to be increasingly sold in cheap prices, particularly in the Southeast Asian arms market.\footnote{Weitz, “Sino–Russian Defense Cooperation,” 53.}

It is true that the Chinese defence industry and its innovation capacity has been developing fast, but the development process is not exempt from contradictions, faults and inadequacies. According to a liberal-economist mainstream view, the problems of the Chinese DIB are many -e.g. corruption, lack of competition due to public ownership, microeconomic problems like delays in production, inadequacy of quality standards and others.\footnote{Michael S. Chase et al., \textit{China’s Incomplete Military Transformation} (Santa Monica: RAND, 2015), 125.} A Realist version of the mainstream approach, on the other hand, emphasize the current and potential obstacles on the path of China’s defence-technological progress. The argument of the Realist study is that the imitation of the cutting-edge military technology through reverse-engineering or cyber theft is getting harder day by day, even for China which is famously experienced in these endeavours.\footnote{Gilli and Gilli, “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet,” 142, 188.} It is no longer possible for China to level its military technology with the USA only by copying the US technology since it is extremely complex.\footnote{Ibid., 189.} Allegedly, if China wants to challenge the military supremacy of the USA, it has to invent its own military technology by itself, and it would simply take much time.

The second underlying reason of the rising arms exports of China in the 2011-2019 period is the instrumentalization of the arms supplies within the wider foreign policy of China. Arms transfers had been effectively used as diplomatic tools by China much before; however, they gained a clearer character in the post-2010 years. “The Belt and Road Initiative”, which was first announced in 2013,
became a cornerstone not only for the Chinese arms exports but also for the whole world politics to a certain extent. The target regions of the initiative were South Asia, Central Asia and Africa. China’s arms export to the countries in these regions would underpin the inter-regional development strategy. Whether or not the Belt and Road Initiative is an imperialistic project based on the export of capital is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is evident that the Chinese arms supplies to the relevant regions have served to China’s seek for energy and raw material resources as well as new trade markets. In consequence, arms exports of China rose 38% from the 2008-2012 period to 2013-2017. While Asia and Oceania region received the 72% of the aggregate Chinese arms exports, Africa imported the 21%. During the 2013-2017 period, Chinese major weapon deliveries to Africa increased more than fifty per cent. In the years following the Belt and Road Initiative, China also augmented its arms supplies which are in the form of military aid. Though not very high, African, Asian and even South American countries received or were officially offered to get China’s military aid since the mid-2010s. The number of China’s arms clients has also increased in recent years. Whereas Russia has transferred major weapon systems to forty-seven countries between 2015 and 2019, China’s customers were fifty-three in the same period. Lastly, to present a comparison between China’s arms trade volumes in the early and recent years within the 21st century can explicitly display its sectoral and global ascent. From the 1999-2003 period to the 2014-

637 Ibid., 54.
639 Ibid., 7.
2018, arms exports of China have increased 208% whereas its arms imports have dropped 50%. Consequently, the developing DIB of China and the “Belt and Road” effect have bolstered China’s arms exports; in return, arms exports dialectically promoted these developments as well.

The third tier arms exporting countries have supplied the 21% of the international arms supplies between 2011 and 2019 -the same portion with the 2003-2010 period. Despite solid political-economic barriers, some states newly entered the world arms trade market, and some other consolidated their place in the market. Considerable military R&D activities conducted by the less-experienced arms exporters such as Australia, Japan, the ROK, Canada and Turkey indicates that the market share of the third tier category is unlikely to shrink soon.

With higher volumes of arms exports, Spain, Italy and Israel formed the upper class within the third tier category. On the other hand, Netherlands, Ukraine and the Republic of Korea took place in the medium strata of the third tier group whereas Sweden, Switzerland, Canada and Turkey can be called as the smallest or emerging arms exporters of the 2010s. Among all the third tier states, the growth rates of the arms exports of the three countries draw attention. The first of them is Spain. Spain was the eleventh largest arms exporter in the 2003-2010 period, but it managed to be seventh largest exporter in the post-2010 years. Because Spain was one of the countries of which economy was severely affected by the 2008 economic crisis, its rise in the list of top arms suppliers has been extra remarkable. In fact, Spain’s increasing arms exports might be a result of the

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643 Hartley, The Economics of Arms, 38.

644 Ibid., 34.

645 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”
post-2008 efforts to decrease the defence spending. In other words, Spain might reduce the budget for military procurement; therefore, the domestic defence industry might focus on foreign arms sales.

The other fast-rising arms exporters are Turkey and the Republic of Korea. In 2018, the ROK had three and Turkey had two defence firms in the top 100 arms-producing and military service companies in the world.\textsuperscript{646} While the ROK started to supply military equipment to the European market in the mid-2010s, Turkey began to deliver weapon platforms to the Middle Eastern customers in those years.\textsuperscript{647} Hence, the volume of ROK’s arms exports became 143\% higher in the second half of the 2010s than the first half.\textsuperscript{648} Turkey, on the other hand, augmented its foreign arms sales 170\% in the 2014-2018 period with comparison to the former five years.\textsuperscript{649} Although it is difficult for Turkey to sustain high growth rate in the long-run, the arms sale contracts recently signed with Pakistan can maintain Turkey’s rise in arms exports in the short term.\textsuperscript{650} Moreover, just like the Israeli weapon systems did in Palestine, the potential “success” of Turkish conventional arms in the military operations on the lands of Syria and Libya can bring a new momentum to the marketing of the Turkish weapons. Another interesting point regarding the Turkish defence industry is the salient increase in the military expenditure of Turkey. Turkey’s military spending has increased more than eighty-five per cent since 2010.\textsuperscript{651} Hereby, it is not difficult

\textsuperscript{646} Fleurant et al., “The SIPRI Top 100, 2018,” 7.

\textsuperscript{647} Wezeman et al., “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2017,” 5.

\textsuperscript{648} Wezeman et al., “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2019,” 5.


\textsuperscript{650} Ibid., 9.

\textsuperscript{651} Tian et al., “Trends in World Military,” 11.
to estimate that Turkey has fostered military R&D in line with the general growth of its military budget, which would eventually attract potential arms importers.

Despite not being even among the third tier arms exporters, some countries have a big potential to be a substantial actor in international arms sales. Japan is the best example to these countries. As of late 2010s, Japan has exported almost no major weapon systems because of the domestic socio-political and economic pressures.652 However, the national arms export ban, which is a voluntary self-restraint mechanism, was abandoned in 2014.653 Although new principles were adopted to restrict the arms exports, they ultimately created more permissive conditions. Moreover, though in small amounts, Japan has initiated arms transfers in the form of military aid to the Southeast Asian states by the mid-2010s, with the aim of overcoming the Chinese influence in the region.654 Besides, India, Australia and some ASEAN states are informally candidate countries to receive Japanese conventional arms as part of wider cooperation in the near future.655 In consequence, given the intensifying imperialistic competition in the East Asia, Japan is likely to start the export of lethal military equipment by the 2020s.


653 Ibid., 433; Arms Production and Military Services,” 409.

654 Wezeman, “Arms Transfers as Military Aid,” 388.

Figure 4.5 The Top 10 Arms Importers, 2011-2019 (in SIPRI TIV, $ billions)

Source: Author’s Own Drawing (The data are taken from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database)

As it can be seen in the Figure 4.5, all the top ten arms importers are either from Asia and Oceania or from the Middle East and North Africa between 2011 and 2019. To begin with Asia and Oceania region, the coastline from Pakistan to Japan is like a belt of top arms-importing states. On this belt, no matter how much populated or geographically big, India’s arms import volume is extraordinarily high. India is the largest arms importing country not only in the 2011-2019 period. Indeed, India is the leading arms recipient country in the entire post-Cold War era. India’s major arms supplier has been historically Russia, but this fact may change in the long run due to the post-2010 strategic partnership between the USA and India. The USA’s arms exports to India increased 557% in the 2013-2017 period with comparison to the former five years. In the last decade, France and Israel have also emerged as arms suppliers to India. Hence, Russia’s arms exports constituted the 56% of the India’s total arms imports in the

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656 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”

2015-2019 period, while the same ratio was 72% between 2010 and 2014.\textsuperscript{658} The rising US arms deliveries to India following the strategic partnership talks can be read as the USA’s imperialistic efforts to diminish the export revenues and political influence of Russia in the region, and to militarily strengthen India against China.

The second largest Asian arms importer after the global economic crisis has been China. Because China has successfully developed its domestic DIB to a certain level since the early-2000s, it has deliberately reduced foreign arms purchases throughout the 2010s.\textsuperscript{659} Rather than buying expensive complete weapon systems, China has often preferred to purchase the key components of the military equipment, e.g. the aircraft engines.\textsuperscript{660} In this sense, China is still dependent on arms imports for some particular defence technologies.\textsuperscript{661} Given the rapid escalation of inter-imperialist rivalries in the post 9/11 era, China may not wait to domestically develop those key technologies, thus sustain its considerable amount of arms imports.

In addition to those Asian countries that are seen in the figure above, Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore and Japan are also among the twenty largest arms purchasers in the world.\textsuperscript{662} The arms imports of these four countries cannot be ignored from the aspect of inter-imperialist rivalry. For example, Vietnam’s acquisition of modern naval major weapons from abroad has brought it the capability to interfere with the lucrative navigation activities of other states in the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{658} Wezeman et al., “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2019,” 8.
\item \textsuperscript{660} Weitz, “Sino-Russian Defense Cooperation,” 47.
\item \textsuperscript{661} Wezeman et al., “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2018,” 10.
\item \textsuperscript{662} “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.”
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\end{footnotesize}
Besides, the volumes of some traditionally prominent arms importers have recently shown an increasing trend. For instance, Japan’s foreign arms purchases has increased more than 70% in the second half of the 2010s vis-à-vis the first half.\textsuperscript{664} Japan has built a strong domestic DIB since the beginning of the century, thus it has significantly lowered its reliance on foreign military equipment. Notwithstanding, it has risen its arms imports up as an extra effort. This fact might give a hint about the intensification of the inter-imperialist competition in the East Asia.

Beside Asia and Oceania, the MENA was the second region to which weapon systems were transferred most in the 2010s. The uneven development of capitalism and the imperialistic plans in the region have weakened the national authorities, paving the way for the rise of the radical Islamist terrorist organizations like the ISIS. Not only ISIS but also other religious-extremist groups acquired certain major weapons somehow. For instance, some sort of conventional arms produced by the Central European countries were detected in the hands of illegal armed forces during the Syrian Civil War. The route of the major weapons from the Central Europe to Syria was probably passing through Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{665} Yet, it is a well-known fact that the Central European arms are not the only Western military equipment that is obtained by the terrorist groups in the MENA.

In addition to the proliferation of terrorist organizations that can conduct large scale armed operations like the ISIS, the inter-state rivalries in the MENA, especially in the Mashreq, have also triggered the arms transfers to the region. The arms exports to the region has doubled from the 2008-2012 period to the 2013-2017. Between the same periods, due to its assault on Yemen and sub-

\textsuperscript{663} Caverly and Kapstein, “Who’s Arming,” 178.


\textsuperscript{665} Wezeman, “International Arms Flows,” 17.
imperialist regional competition with Iran, Saudi Arabia’s arms purchases increased 225%, corresponding to the nearly one-third of the regional total. Iran, on the other hand, accounted for only the one per cent of the Mashreq’s arms imports. Other prominent arms recipients in the Middle East are Egypt, the UAE, Iraq, Qatar and Turkey. Among these, Turkey has been developing a relatively strong domestic DIB in the 2010s. Otherwise, the Turkish arms purchases would have been much higher, given the Turkish cross-border military operations in Syria and Libya. Moreover, Turkey’s import of S-400 air defence systems from Russia in 2019 led the USA to block the sale of F-35 combat aircrafts to Turkey which is one of the joint producers of the F-35 jets. Thus, the Turkish arms imports are unlikely to rise in the short term.

Unlike the 1990s and 2000s, there has been no European and North American countries among the top ten arms importers in the 2011-2019 period. In fact, the USA is historically the only North American country that has a possibility to enter the top ten list. Even the eminent imperialist powers sometimes buy conventional weapons from their regional collaborators in order to set or consolidate political ties with them. Moreover, the scope and sophistication of the domestic DIB may also impel the core-capitalist states to import certain types of weapon platforms. Hence, the USA might have purchased weapon systems to a degree that it would enter the top ten, as it did in the former decades. However, due to the long-term effects of the 2008 economic crisis, the USA had to reduce the spending on military procurement at least during the incumbency of Obama. This fact led to a decrease in the profits of the domestic arms


667 Ibid., 11.


monopolies. Under these circumstances, the Obama administration could not import more weapon systems.

The 2008 global financial crisis affected the European arms imports in the long run, as well. The delivery of major weapons to Europe diminished 13% between the five-year periods of 2009-2013 and 2014-2018.\textsuperscript{670} Actually, the annexation of Crimea by Russia prompted many European states to buy aggregately almost four-hundred fighter jets which would be delivered in the next decade by the USA.\textsuperscript{671} These massive aircraft orders also indicate that the big majority of the EU members would likely remain loyal arms customers of the USA in the near future, despite the efforts of the core-EU countries to form an intra-Union common defence market.\textsuperscript{672} Indeed, while the share of the USA in the arms transfers to Europe between 2015 and 2019 was approximately 40%, Germany’s share -the second biggest portion- was only 14%.\textsuperscript{673}

4.4 Conclusion

The volume of the international arms trade has gradually increased since 2003, though at times there were reverse cases. There are both micro and macro factors that gave way to this rise. In terms of micro factors, the needs of the defence capital and the conditions of the national DIBs set the basis of the increasing arms trade. After a process of concentration (monopolization) due to the diminishing demand in major conventional weapons in the 1990s, particularly the large Western defence capital entered the 2000s with a search for new markets. The national procurement expenditures were not sufficient for those arms monopolies and the export revenues were a good option to tolerate the losses emerging in the


\textsuperscript{672} Wezeman et al., “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2018,” 10.

national market. Moreover, the international cooperation between defence companies intensified in the 2000s and 2010s as a result of corporate efforts to decrease the production costs. The nation states also encouraged these defence-industrial collaborations with mostly political-strategic considerations. Hence, the defence capital started to internationalize even more and led to an international diffusion of defence-technological and manufacturing capabilities. This fact resulted in a significant growth of the share of the third tier arms exporters in the world market. The state-owned DIBs like those of Russia and China contributed to the increase in the arms trade as well. The export revenues helped the Russian defence industry recover from the post-Soviet defence-industrial crisis; in return, the re-developing Russian DIB boosted arms exports. Thus, Russia’s arms exports took off in the 2000s and remained stably high in the 2010s. The Chinese defence industry embarked on a long-term modernization and marked a progress in the arms production capacity as well as dual-use technologies in the 2000s. These efforts reflected on the Chinese arms deliveries in the following decade, making China one of the fastest-growing arms exporters.

Certain macro factors have also bolstered the global arms trade after 2002. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA and the subsequent US military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq in the name of “Global War on Terror” can be taken as the most prominent macro factors. Indeed, these events triggered a rapid increase in the international arms transfers under the USA’s leadership in the early 2000s. However, these events cannot explain the all the upward trend in global arms trade. As discussed in the Chapter IV, neither the types of traded weapons nor the profile of the major arms importers is usually compatible with the anti-terrorism campaign. Furthermore, the world military expenditures have already started to increase before the 9/11 attacks and other US interventions. Rather than the “War on Terror”, these indicators point to the exacerbating global and regional imperialist competition. The decline of the US hegemony, the massive economic growth of China, the rising military assertiveness of Russia, the severe political-economic dissidence within the EU and a salient increase in the need of energy
resources, raw materials and new markets of the developing countries have taken place almost simultaneously throughout the last twenty years. Under these circumstances, the economic, political and strategical importance of the arms trade multiplied. Besides, the potentially restraining factors did not reduce the volume of the international arms trade effectively. Even the impact of a devastating global economic crisis of 2008 did not totally prevent the rise of it. While the financial crisis decelerated the arms trade in the late 2000s and early 2010s, an upward trend started to be observed in the mid-2010s again. Apparently, the long-awaited ATT did not create a notable change for the recent growth trend at all.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The trade of major conventional weapons between states is a multidimensional, multi-agential, geographical and historical practice. It is multidimensional because economic, political and military considerations are always at the forefront in the making of international arms trade. The economic dimension of the arms trade covers both micro-economic and macro-economic elements. The potential technological spin-offs and lower production costs per unit by virtue of the additional demand created by arms exports are good examples of microeconomic effects of the arms trade. Arms trade activities may also affect employment in the defence industry and national balance of trade which are macroeconomic elements. The political dimension of the arms trade is mainly consisted of domestic and foreign policy domains. In terms of domestic politics, while the arms imports can be used in the rhetoric of national security, arms exports can be a subject of political bargain between the arms lobbies and governments. On the other hand, probably the most highlighted aspect of the arms transfers is their use as diplomatic tools in international affairs. International arms trade practises can pave the way for or consolidate alliances and partnerships; in contrast, they can trigger or intensify the adversarial relations. The military dimension of the global arms trade is equally important with other dimensions. By delivering or receiving high-tech lethal weapon platforms, states may enhance deterrence or power projection capacities, thus may alter the strategic conditions in different regions of the world.
The international arms trade has also a multi-agential feature. The mainstream literature -particularly the branch which adopts the Realist IR Theory- tends to describe the international arms trade as a merely inter-governmental activity since it takes the nation state as a unique and unitary actor in international affairs. However, evident class interests -e.g. that of the arms-industrial bourgeoisie- are embedded in the decision making of the arms transfers. In fact, given the post-Cold War escalation of the rivalries within the capitalist-imperialist hierarchy, the eminent defence companies are mostly considered as “too strategic to fail” by their respective national political-military bureaucracies. Therefore, it can be argued that the class dimension of the international arms trade became even more important in the post-Cold War globalized capitalism.

The international arms trade has a significant geographical dimension. Thanks to the rapid advancement of transportation technologies in the 20th century, intercontinental transfers of major weapons have become possible. This fact has facilitated the leading imperialist countries to interfere in distant parts of the world through arms exports. Moreover, various dynamics of the international arms trade cause an uneven distribution of lethal weapon systems across the globe, making certain regions the centres of over armament. For instance, the South and East Asia and the MENA has been the epicentres of both international arms imports and inter-imperialist rivalries.

Lastly, the global arms trade is a set of historical practises. International arms trade activities gain different characteristics in different time periods. The international arms transfers in the entire post-World War II era can be studied in two distinct historical episodes as the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. As it was done in this thesis, these two broad periods can also be subdivided in compliance with the changing nature of the international arms deliveries in time. Because the historical conditions of these periods are substantially different from each other, it is possible to detect essential economic, political, strategic, geographic and agential discrepancies among those periods. Also, the duration
that passes between the order and delivery of international weapons transfers, which may last up to ten years, is another temporal feature of the arms trade.

The international arms transfers were one of the key practices of the Cold War. From the beginning to the end of the Cold War, the two leaderships of the socialist and capitalist social systems, respectively the USSR and the USA, had been the leading arms suppliers of their own blocs. Yet, it is important to note that the Cold War international arms transfers cannot be reduced to a field of competition between only the USA and the USSR. The separate intra-bloc organizations that control both intra-bloc and extra-bloc arms transfers indicate an institutional rupture between the rival social systems. Moreover, rather than merely serving to the national interests of the USA and the USSR, the international arms transfers during the Cold War underpinned the efforts to consolidate the intra-bloc ties, to block the expansion of the rival system towards the Third World, and to incorporate the Third World countries into one of the systems. Another point that should be emphasized related to the international arms transfers in the Cold War is the slow but significant transformation of the arms deliveries from the form of military aid to arms trade. The softening of the inter-systemic rivalry during the Détente period and the seek for armament in the oil-exporting countries have paved the way for an increase in the foreign arms sales since the mid-1970s. In addition, the ailing socialist economies which are governed by the revisionist administrations and the aggressive neoliberal restructuring in the capitalist world by the 1980s have entailed a further commercialization in the international arms transfers. After 1991, the inter-systemic character of the international arms transfers melted into air and the major weapons became much more quickly commodified as a result of the new intra-systemic rules of the global capitalism. Hence, it can be argued that the concept of international arms transfers became largely synonymous with international arms trade in the post-Cold War era.

A sharp fall in the volume of the global arms trade followed the end of the Cold War. The national military expenditures were dramatically dropping in the 1990s.
Furthermore, the predominance of the US hegemony was repressing the hazardous inter-capitalist rivalries. Hence, despite a few years of increase in the late 1990s, the international arms trade had had an overwhelming downward trend until 2002. Both the contraction of the domestic procurement and the international trade of conventional major weapons generated a structural crisis for the domestic defence industries which are organized according to the high demand conditions of the Cold War. In order to overcome the crisis, a process of privatization started in many national DIBs under neoliberal restructuring—especially in the DIBs of the core-capitalist countries. Those already-private and newly-privatized defence companies sought to minimize the costs and maximize the profits. While some of them quit the defence market or shrank their arms business, some of them grew even larger through merger and acquisitions. This process can be called the concentration of the defence capital. The concentration process was implemented also in some defence industries which are based on public or public-private joint ownership, e.g. respectively Russia and France. As a result, giant arms monopolies started to occur within the global capitalism in the 1990s. Nevertheless, the national procurement budgets and the arms trade market was still insufficient for these monopolies. In order for more efficient operations, they resorted to international mergers and acquisitions as well as joint arms production projects. Hence, starting from the 1990s, the production and trade of weapon systems exceeded the national borders and the pre-1991 blocs. However, this fact has been mistakenly interpreted to a large extent by the mainstream literature in a way that the defence sector has gained a transnational character. The defence capital still enjoys the economic subsidies and political back-up of the state in the international market. Moreover, the post-Cold War cross-border joint projects and the proprietary transactions in the arms business reflects nothing but a widely-spread international subcontracting network in which prime contractors still rely on their nation states. Therefore, it may be more accurate to describe the increasing arms-industrial cooperation in the global market as an extending subcontracting network which exist within imperialistic competition. All in all, the international arms trade was exposed to a rooted structural
transformation in the 1990s and gradually declined until 2002. Actually, the fall in the international arms trade was expected to continue in the 2000s since the full-scale inter-systemic competition had been terminated. Notwithstanding, these expectations proved wrong since they disregarded two key elements: the needs of the internationalized large arms-industrial capital and the return of the intra-systemic international competition.

The world has experienced an incremental rise of international arms trade since 2003 up until today. The reasons behind this rise have not been directly and elaborately studied in the relevant literature so far. Yet, the global war on terror which followed the 9/11 attacks is the most prominent argument that the mainstream literature mentioned to explain the upward trend. According to this argument, the USA and its allies have bolstered arms transfers to the countries that cooperate in anti-terrorism campaign. Besides, the mainstream literature has occasionally emphasized different factors that promote or allow to increase the arms trade. In the broadest terms, these are the globalization of the defence industry and military technology, the weaknesses of the international arms control mechanisms, the effect of the widespread corruption in the arms business and the oppressive-militarist regimes in the less developed countries. However, the mainstream explanation of the rising arms trade has certain shortcomings. For example, some types of delivered weapons and some important arms recipient states have nothing to do with the struggle against terrorism. In fact, the 9/11 attacks only gave a legitimate excuse for the ready-to-jump arms transfers. Moreover, the “war on terror” argument neglects the role of Russia and China in the increasing arms trade. Furthermore, the other implied factors, i.e. the mismanagement problems in the production and circulation of arms, are not new to the international arms market; therefore, they cannot effectively explain the post-2002 rise of inter-state arms transfers.

It is also difficult to speak of an established critical literature that examine the increase in the international arms trade. However, there are remarkable critical studies that focuses on the political economy of defence industry, military
expenditures, and arms control efforts. These studies present a more comprehensive framework by scrutinizing the class dimension and the imperialistic nature of the defence-related economic and political structures. Unlike the mainstream literature that mainly adopts a problem-solving approach, the critical literature is conducive to a social systemic analysis of the international arms trade. Largely inspired by the critical literature, the underlying reasons of the incremental rise in the arms transfers can be separated into two main sections as the micro and macro factors. The micro factors comprise the conditions and developments in the defence sector. In micro terms, the large arms-industrial bourgeoisie sought to increase their revenues through foreign arms sales after the market concentration of the 1990s. In macro terms, the recovery of Russia from the dissolution crisis of the USSR and the fast economic-political rise of China started to exacerbate the intra-systemic competition. In this regard, both micro and macro factors revived the international arms trade after 2002. Subsequently, the 2008 economic crisis severely damaged the world economy in general and the defence industries in particular, thus the global arms trade mostly stagnated during the late 2000s and early 2010s. Later on, the volume of the global arms trade began to re-increase in the mid-2010s and held on to a high annual average.

Consequently, it can be concluded that the gradual rise of the international arms trade after 2002 is driven by the systemic features of the post-Cold War global capitalism. The intra-systemic arms control attempts like the ATT are far from being effective in restraining and reducing the international arms trade. Rather, such limited problem-solving attempts have served to the legitimation of the arms trade between the liberal states, thus indirectly to the legitimation of the established hierarchical military order in the world. Given the growth of the defence-industrial capital and the intensifying intra-systemic competition, the volume of the global arms trade tends to increase in the long run, although the Covid-19 pandemic may trigger an economic crisis culminating in the shrinkage of the world military spending in the early 2020s. Yet, it is also possible that the
potential economic crisis may deepen the intra-systemic competition further, which can entail a rapid escalation of the imperialistic arms trade practises.

The modest contributions of this thesis to the academic research on the international arms trade is as follows. First, this thesis historicizes the period from 1950 to 2019 the international transfers of conventional major weapons and offers a trend-based historical periodization as the Cold War international arms transfers (1950-1991) within which the last two decades are characterized with rise of arms transfers that fallowed by the decline of arms transfers in the early post-Cold War years (1992-2002), and the final period as the rise of arms trade from 2003 to 2019. Second, by indicating the peculiarities of both inter-systemic and intra-systemic practises of international arms transfers, this thesis presents hints about the differences between the Cold War international relations and the post-Cold War international relations. Lastly, by scrutinizing the rise of the global arms trade, this thesis points out that the intra-systemic competition is increasing, which may lead the world peace to face great dangers in the coming period.
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APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET


Uluslararası silah ticareti, ekonomik, askeri ve siyasi alanların kesiştiği kavşaklardan biridir. İlk olarak, kapitalist üretim tarzının küresel seviyesi gözönüne alındığında silahların ne üretimi ne de ticareti kapitalizmin kâr mantığından bağımsız olarak analiz edilemez. Nitekim, silah-sanayi burjuvazisinin elde ettiği kârlar bugün azımsanamayacak seviyededir ve bu durum silah sektörünü cazip bir ekonomik sektör haline getirmektedir. İkincisi, silahlar bir meta olarak tasarlandıktan, üretildikten ve satıldktan sonra devletlerarası düzlemde askeri-stratejik planların önemli bir parçası haline gelirler. Modern silah teknolojisinin durmadan gelişmesi devletlerin stratejik hesaplarının sürekli gözden geçirilmesini zorunlu kılmaktadır. Üçüncüüsü, uluslararası silah transferleri yadınnamaz şekilde politiktir. Siyasi aktörlerin ideolojiden bağımsız olmayan politik kararları, silah transferlerini yerli üretimini yönlendirmek, ürünü pazarlamak, sözleşmeyi müzakere etmek, belli bir.aliçya ambargo uygulamak gibi çeşitli şekillerde açıkça etkiler. Özetle, uluslararası silah ticareti bu üç alanın (ekonomik, askeri, politik) kesişim noktalarından biridir ve
aynı zamanda karmaşık fakat dinamik ve aydınlatıcı bir çalışma konusudur. Bu saptamanın ışığında, böylece karmaşık ve dinamik bir sosyal fenomen Emperyalizm Teorilerinin sunduğu açıklama bütünselliği ve gücünden yararlanılarak analiz edilebilir.


Açıklığa kavuşturulması gereken ikinci bir nokta, transferi yapılan silahların türleri ile ilgilidir. Bu bağlamda, ilgili literatür keskin bir şekilde olmaksızın uluslararası silah ticareti (1) büyük silah ticareti (geleneksel silahlar veya silah sistemleri), (2) küçük ve haif silah ticareti ve (3) “ikili-kullanımı” (askeri ve sivil) donanımları olarak ücretsiz olmaktadır. Birleşmiş Milletler Silahsızlanma İşleri Ofisi'nin göre, büyük silahlar muharebe tankları, zırhlı savaş araçları, büyük kalibreli sistemler, savaş uçakları, helikopterler, savaş gemileri ve füzelerden oluşmaktadır. SIPRI Silah Transferleri Veri Tabanı temel olarak bu tür askeri donanım hakkında veri üretir, ancak kapsamlı askeri uçaklar, hava savunma sistemleri, anti-denizaltı savaş silahları, zırhlı araçlar, toplar, motorlar, füzeler, sensörler, keşif uyduları, askeri gemiler, taretler veya hava yakıt ikmal sistemleri.


bir Uİ perspektifinden yoksundur. Başka bir deyişle, silah ticaretinin ekonomik etkileri, dış politikadaki yeri, askeri karşilaştırmalardaki rolü sıklıkla incelenmektedir, ancak uluslararası silah ticareti çalışmalarında belirli bir Uİ Teorisi’nin açıkl bir şekilde uygulanması çok nadir olarak görülebilmektedir. Üçüncüsü, küresel silah transferleri literatürüne yapılan Marksist katkıların sayısı tatmin edici değildir. Çağdaş Marksizm bu çalışma alanı ihmal ediyor gibi görünse de Marksizm’in kavram seti hem ana akım hem de eleştirel değerlendirmelerin zayıf yönlerini tespit etmek için yararlı olabilir. Dolayısıyla, bu tez literatürdeki yukarıda belirtilen boşlukları dikkate almaktadır.

bağlamda, akademik olarak gelişmiş ve yaygın olmasa da eleştirel pozisyon Cox’un Eleştirel Teori yakla什ınınu temsil etmektedir. Silah ticareti konusundaki eleştirel duruş örneklerinin insanlığa özgürlügeci bir düşüncelî öneren sistem sorgulayıcı çalışmaların nüvelerini barındırduğu da söylenebilir.


kullanmaktadır. Bu yönteme göre, belirli askeri metallerin bilinen birim üretim maliyetlerine ve performanslarına dayalı bir dizi hesaplama yoluyla teslimatı yapılan silahların ve silah bileşenlerinin tahmini parasal değeri belirlenir ve bu değere eğilim gösterge değeri (trend belirten değer) denir. Bu değer uluslararası silah transferlerinin doğrudan mali değerini göstermez; bunun yerine uluslararası büyük silah teslimatlarındaki dönemsel eğilimleri ve oransal değişiklikleri gözlemlemede kolaylık sağlar. Tezın ana sorusu trend odaklı olduğu için, silah transferlerine ilişkin SIPRI verileri temel istatistik kaynağını oluştururduktadır.


sektörünün uluslararasılaşması, sektördeki yolsuzluklar, askeri teknolojideki yenilikler, önde gelen ihracatçı ve ithalatçı ülkelerin iç ve dış politika pratikleri gibi ilgili konular da incelenmiştir.


Son olarak, küresel silah ticareti bir dizi tarihsel pratik bütünüdür. Uluslararası silah ticareti faaliyetleri, farklı zaman dilimlerinde farklı özellikler kazanır. İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası tümünde uluslararası silah transferleri Soğuk Savaş ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemler olarak iki ana tarihsel bölümde incelenebilir. Bu tezde yaptığı gibi, bu iki geniş dönem de uluslararası silah sevkiyatlarının zaman içinde değişen doğasına uygun olarak alt bölümlere ayrılarak, alt dönemler arasında temel ekonomik, siyasi, stratejik, coğrafi ve aktörel farklılıklar tespit edildi. Bu dönemler arasında geçen süre de silah ticaretinin bir diğer zamansal özelliğidir.


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APPENDIX B

TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics
Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics
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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE WAVERING GLOBAL ARMS TRADE (1950 – 2019)

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: Yüksek Lisans / Master Doktora / PhD

1. Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır. / Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide.

2. Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır. / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of two years. *

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