

THE IMPACT OF FAR-RIGHT POLITICAL PARTIES' POLITICIZATION OF  
MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF IMMIGRANTS  
FROM TURKEY IN THE NETHERLANDS

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OF MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF  
IMMIGRANTS FROM TURKEY IN THE NETHERLANDS**

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE IMPACT OF FAR-RIGHT POLITICAL PARTIES' POLITICIZATION OF MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF IMMIGRANTS FROM TURKEY IN THE NETHERLANDS**

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Immigrant-related societal security concerns, based on ethnicity, race, culture, and above all, religion, have been increasing enormously in Europe, as observed in Muslim immigrants. Far-right political parties have played a significant role in this process by politicizing Muslim immigrants within the transition from multiculturalism to assimilation in terms of immigrant integration and migration policies. Although there are too many academic studies on the politicization of migration or immigrant integration and the role of far-right political parties in the literature, there is not yet a study analyzing the impact of this politicization process on Muslim immigrants and their counter-reactions. By focusing on the Turkish-Dutch immigrants in the Netherlands, this thesis argues that the politicization of Muslim immigrants has paved the way for collective identity formation through the development of identity politics within the immigrant community by motivating their political participation, which

provides further political integration of Turkish-Dutch immigrants with the Dutch society.

**Keywords:** Politicization, Far-right Political Parties, Turkish-Dutch Immigrants, Identity Politics, Political Participation

## ÖZ

### AŞIRI-SAĞ SİYASİ PARTİLERİN MÜSLÜMAN GÖÇMENLERİ SİYASALLAŞTIRMASININ HOLLANDA'DAKİ TÜRKİYELİ GÖÇMENLERİN SİYASAL KATILIMINA ETKİSİ

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Göçmenlerle ilgili etnik köken, ırk, kültür ve hepsinden önemlisi dine dayanan toplumsal güvenlik kaygıları, Müslüman göçmenler örneğinde gözlemlendiği gibi Avrupa'da büyük ölçüde artmaktadır. Aşırı sağcı partiler, göçmen entegrasyonu ve göç politikaları açısından çok kültürlülüğten asimilasyona geçiş sürecinde Müslüman göçmenleri siyasallaştırarak bu süreçte önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Literatürde, göç veya göçmen entegrasyonunun siyasallaştırılması ve aşırı sağ siyasi partilerin rolü hakkında çok fazla akademik çalışma olmasına rağmen, bu siyasallaştırma sürecinin Müslüman göçmenler ve onların karşı tepkileri üzerindeki etkisini analiz eden bir çalışma henüz yoktur. Hollanda'daki Türk-Hollandalı göçmenlere odaklanan bu tez Müslüman göçmenlerin siyasallaştırılmasının, göçmen toplumunun kimlik siyaseti geliştirilmesi yoluyla kolektif kimlik oluşumunu sağladığını ve bunun da siyasi katılımı motive ederek daha fazla siyasal entegrasyona yol açtığını savunmaktadır.



**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Siyasallařtırma, Ařırđ Saę Siyasi Partiler, Trk-Hollandalđ Gçmenler, Kimlik Siyaseti, Siyasal Katılım

*To My Beloved Family*

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party
EU	European Union
CD	Centre Democrats
CDA	Christian Democratic Appeal
CHU	Christian Historical Union
CP	Centre Party
CU	Christian Union
D66	Democrats 66
FvD	Forum for Democracy
GL	Green Left
GPV	Reformed Political League
HTIB	Turkish Workers' Union in the Netherlands
KVP	Catholic People's Party
LPF	List Pim Fortuyn
MENA	Middle East and Northern Affrica
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSD	Institute of Multicultural Development (Forum)
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PvdA	Labor Party
PVV	Party for Freedom
RPF	Reformatory Political Federation
SGP	Reformed Political Party
TICF	Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation
UETD	Union of European Turkish Democrats
UID	Union of International Democrats
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations

USA

United States of America

VVD

People's Party for Freedom and Democracy

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Scope and Objective**

It has already been 19 years since September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States of America (USA). The attacks have left many lasting impacts on the USA in terms of ongoing counter-terrorism initiatives and stricter internal precautions and increasing concerns regarding homeland security, but more importantly of growing religious bias against immigrants, particularly the Muslim ones. Such bias and subsequent changing attitudes towards immigrants in general, and Muslim immigrants in particular, sound very curial because its repercussions have not stayed in the USA only, but have spread like wildfire in all over the world, especially in Europe has most of the leading immigrant-receiving countries of the world from Muslim countries in between 2005 and 2019 (“United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division,” n.d.).

In general, Europe and Western European countries, in particular, have been receiving immigrants, especially from the Muslim countries since the 1960s, especially as the manual workers, which had been stimulated by the rapid post-war growth in Europe. Therefore, some of the European countries like Germany or the Netherlands were not inexperienced regarding the Muslim immigrants and their religion, way of life, culture, or identity depending on their ethnicity, let alone their integration with the society since those years, during which multiculturalist integration models were getting popular. However, with the adverse impact of the 9/11 and subsequent terrorist attacks in Europe such as 2004 Madrid or 2005 London bombings, or murder of the Dutch film director Theo van Gogh in 2004 in the Netherlands by a Muslim fundamentalist,

triggered the heated debates about Muslim immigrant-related security concerns in all over Europe at the beginning of the 2000s. As emphasized by Kaya (2013, 64) when migration and Muslim immigrants have begun to be decupled with terrorism, violence, crime and insecurity, this cause “the birth of a popular Islamophobic discourse and the culturalisation of what is social, economic and political in the everyday life of migrant-origin individuals in a way that invalidates the multiculturalist policies of integration in the west”. As expected, immigration and immigrant related issues have become one of the most crucial discussion topics of the political parties in these countries (Vliegenhart, 2007; Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015). In these countries, “(c)onflicts over immigration have become salient in national elections; they played a major role in some national referenda (most consequentially in the ‘Brexit’ campaign); and they have had a significant impact on the political agendas of governments” since those years (Grande, Schwarzbözl, & Fatke, 2018, 1445).

Thus with the 2000s, issues like immigrant integration vs. assimilation, national and ethnic identity of the immigrants, social or cultural degradation in hosting societies, have come into prominence and have begun to discuss by both mainstream and fringe parties, been simultaneously politicized, and influenced almost all of the societies within the European countries. Different than the discussions of the 1980s and 1990s on economic integration or prosperity of the European countries related to the immigrant integration; in the 2000s socio-cultural, national, ethnic or religious unity and diversity, as well as identity have become the main agenda of the political parties, mostly the far-right, when “the immigrant multiculturalism has run into difficulties where it is perceived as carrying high risks with regard to the national, societal and cultural security of the majority society” (Kaya, 2013, 65). The important thing is the criticisms have been diverted not only to the currently arriving Muslim immigrant groups within this period but also towards the Muslim immigrant communities already settled in these countries since the 1960s. “Ethno-cultural and religious relations have become securitized under these conditions” (Kaya, 2013, 64).

German Chancellor Angela Merkel pointed out the migration and asylum as the main agenda of Europe in those years and stated that it was so important “much, much more than the issue of Greece and the stability of the Euro” as the major concern following

the 2007-2008 global financial crisis (Blake, 2019). Hooghe (2019) identifies these new phenomena as Europe's new politics in which policies on economic relations, subsequent crises, increasing migration, and so on have become more interrelated with ethnic, national, cultural and religious identity, nationalism, social and cultural mingling, and integration. Hooghe (2019) acknowledges this as transnationalism vs. the nation, which creates new cleavages within the politics like traditional, authoritarian and nationalist ones are on the one side, and green, alternative, libertarian ones are on the other side. This division goes beyond the classical political left-right cleavage, according to Hooghe (2019), this is why it is difficult to argue that the traditional, authoritarian, or nationalist perspectives are reflected only by far-right.

Nevertheless, the increasing salience of far-right political parties has still played a major role in that process. These parties have politicized these issues by using the abovementioned arguments in their daily rhetoric, party propaganda, or election campaigns since the beginning of the 2000s, as observed in the Netherlands by the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), Party for Freedom (PVV), and just lately Forum for Democracy (FvD) (Lucardie & Voerman, 2013). Within this context, a growing perception of threat towards the European countries' security, sovereignty, and national identity has become one of the main topics in domestic political debates, in which "migration and Islam have been securitized and stigmatized" (Kaya, 2013, 69).

Hobolt and de Vries (2016) determine national political parties as one of the most important cues shaping public attitudes, and they acknowledge that far-right political parties get support for their opposition by "highlighting national identity considerations and feelings of cultural threats," which have been frequently observed in their rhetoric related to immigrants. As long as the issues related to national values, identity, and cultural integrity are used in far-right political parties' discourse, the political conflicts have intensified at the domestic level, which has further increased the public reactions towards similar issues (Grande et al., 2018; Van der Brug, et al., 2015).

In these discussions, societal and cultural security has been politicized by either making the immigrant-related issues like ethnicity, culture or religion salient (being on the political agenda), or by producing polarization (creating a polarization especially

among political parties in terms of opinions on an issue coming to the main agenda) (van der Brug, D'Amato, Berkhout, & Ruedin, 2015b). Kaya (2013) points out the identity as the key principle of societal and cultural security, which has brought about the emergence of identity politics as a counter-reaction of these immigrant communities in issue in the meantime of politicization. Theoretically, through identity politics, members of certain social groups develop a political activity or at least theorize this activity via the shared experiences of injustice, which can be stemmed from their race, ethnicity, religion, or culture ("Identity Politics," 2016).

There is no doubt that the impact of the politicization of Muslim immigrants has different consequences for different members, groups, and layers of the society, in terms of unity, solidarity, and integration. It has influence within the native population's apolitical preferences, which is observed in the increasing election success of the far-right anti-immigrant parties such as in the Netherlands, as well as changing attitudes of some of them towards immigrants (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014).

As for the immigrant communities, considering the political participation as the practice of identity politics, this research examines the relationship between the politicization of Muslim immigrants by far-right political parties and political participation of these immigrants in the forms of actively taking part in politics through a political party membership or civil society organization that is serving for the awareness-raising of immigrant populations regarding their identity politics.

This relationship will be problematized based on field research made in the Netherlands in this Ph.D. thesis. The Netherlands can be seen as a specific example of a broader European pattern in terms of both as a country attracting large numbers of Muslim immigrants since the end of the 1960s, but also as a country who has anti-immigrant parties overly politicizing immigrants since the beginning of the 2000s and having electoral success (Berkhout, et al., 2015). "Issues of religious fundamentalism, particularly with reference to Islam, have become very salient in recent years in the Netherlands, as they have been politicized by the populist right-wing (parties)" (Hobolt, Brug, de Vreese, Boomgaarden, & Hinrichsen, 2011, 364).



As very clearly stated by Sloomman (2018, 2-3) in her book titled “Ethnic Identity, Social Mobility and the Role of Soulmates,” “the case of the Netherlands is specifically interesting because of the sharp about-face from being a country renowned for its so-called tolerance of ethnic diversity to a country where an Islamophobic political party (the Freedom Party, or PVV, headed by Geert Wilders) has been very successful and where essentialist language has come to dominate the political realm”. France, Italy, or Germany also have a large number of Muslim immigrants; however, they do not have such anti-immigrant parties showing a salient electoral success parallel to the efforts of politicizing the issues related to immigrants (Berkhout, Ruedin, et al., 2015). Additionally, as a result of these phenomena in the Netherlands, since the end of the 1990s, there has been a growing resistance against the presence of Muslims in public opinion (Phalet, Baysu, & Verkuyten, 2010). For instance in 2005, “51% of the Dutch participants had unfavorable opinions about Muslims (and) (t)his was the highest percentage of all the countries examined” (Velasco González et al., 2008, 667), which is also believed to have some negative impacts on the daily lives of immigrant communities.

The biggest immigrant community in the Netherlands have the Turkish origin (“Turkish” here refers to those immigrants from Turkey regardless of their ethnic background). Despite some scholarly research on Muslim community’s (regardless of their sects) political participation in the Netherlands (Verkuyten & Yıldız, 2007; Velasco González et al., 2008; Phalet, Baysu, & Verkuyten, 2010; Scheffer, 2011; Berkhout, Sudulich, & van der Brug, 2015; Kranendonk, Vermeulen, & van Heelsum, 2018), Turkish-Dutch immigrant community has not been studied adequately yet particularly in connecting with the politicization of immigrants by far-right parties. By focusing on a case, therefore, it is expected that the study will lead to a better understanding of the relationship between politicization and political participation of immigrants. “Islam is presented as incompatible with civic norms and values and as a barrier to socio-cultural integration in Dutch society” (Phalet et al., 2010, 760). In this context, the study will also try to analyze the state of political integration of these immigrants with the hosting society as a result of these phenomena.

## 1.2 Research Question

Hooghe et al. (2002, 976) argue that the issues of national identity, immigration, and multiculturalism are the most discussed topics by reflecting a cleavage within the European societies not only between native and immigrant communities but also within the native communities. On the one side of the native community, there is the libertarian group that does not reflect any opposition towards immigrants, and on the other side, there is the traditional and nationalistic group that supports the traditional values, opposes immigration, and defends the national community.

Especially when immigrants come from a different religion or ethnic background with an identity that is different from the one in the receiving country, the immigrants are reflected as a challenge to the values of the native community by the traditional and nationalistic group. In this context, especially far-right parties' anti-immigrant attitudes have arisen from the purpose of protection of the nation and national identity that it is at stake, besides economic cost-benefit calculations (McLaren, 2002). According to Hix (1999, 133), "political preferences often derive from deep historical or cultural identities such as nationality, religion or language." Thus, these preferences at diversifying degrees identify party-based and subsequently public based attitudes towards the integration of immigrants in particular. The rhetoric chose by elites, political parties, or media usually diverts the attention to correlating current socio-cultural degeneration, threat on exclusive national identity, and religion with the immigrant communities, which provokes identity politics of immigrant populations and expectedly pave the way for taking political actions in different forms.

Martiniello (2005, 2-3) argues that immigrants' political integration realizes through three forms, which are political participation, mobilization, and representation. According to Martiniello (2005), political participation has a direct and active relationship with citizenship, and it refers to voting, running for election, protests, demonstrations, sit-ins, hunger strikes, boycotts, membership to civil society organizations, etc. They are separated as conventional as in the forms of voting or running for election, or less conventional as in the forms of protests, or demonstrations; and in the later, there is a collective social movement of immigrants depending on the

collective identity formation (Martiniello, 2005). Thus, this form refers to political mobilization.

On the contrary of the individuality of political participation, political mobilization “refers to the process of building collective actors and collective identity,” which increases the strength of the group taking the political action as a group of people (Martiniello, 2005, 3). People constitute the mobilization “for the collective political actors who represent them in the political decision process,” therefore “mobilization is equivalent to the pooling of individual resources in the hands of a collective actor” (Kriesi, 2008, 150).

Political representation, on the other hand, refers to the representation or government of a group of people who are mandated by immigrants to govern on their behalf (Martiniello, 2005).

When the anti-immigrant attitudes and rhetoric of far-right political parties targeting Muslim immigrants are concerned, the immigrants’ political participation come into prominence with collective impacts despite its individual characteristic. This is why Turkish-Dutch immigrants’ political participation motivated by identity politics is analyzed in this Ph.D. research. The study’s focus is limited to legal and conventional political participation only and excludes illegal forms like political violence or unconventional forms like protests. Moreover, among the conventional legal forms of participation, it only involves political party membership/running for election and membership to a civil society organization following awareness-raising initiatives in terms of political rights and identity politics. Voting behavior is not involved, either, depending on its nature closer to the political representation and uncertainty in providing affiliation between identity politics and itself, which might be another research subject in this sense.

With this insight, the key research question that will be addressed in this study is: “What is the impact of increasing politicization of Muslim immigrants by far-right political parties on political participation of Turkish-Dutch immigrants in the Netherlands?”. Within this context, the following supportive questions will also be answered in the study: “What are the influences of the anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim

rhetoric of far-right political parties on Turkish-Dutch immigrants?” “How do Turkish-Dutch immigrants experience and feel this politicization in their daily lives?”

### **1.3 Literature Review**

Within the scholarly debates that are focusing on immigration, migrants, their ethnic, national, cultural, or religious identities, and on top of that their integration with the hosting societies, a beginning of a new Europe has been mentioned since the end of the 1990s and an unprecedented attitude regarding the national sovereignty and territoriality, a new understanding of security transcending the military based security (van Ham & Grudzinski, 1999). There is no doubt the globalization is playing a major role in this change of perception. Another significant impact of this perception is the migration waves from out of Europe, mostly from the Muslim countries. As summarized by Lahav (2004, 1) “the introduction of culturally, religiously, and ethnically diverse groups into European society has had an impact in the public, and political arenas” and “(t)his has been marked by electoral campaigns and party contestation, the emergence and consolidation of extreme-right parties, and increasing public support for xenophobic political forces”.

These new European politics (L. Hooghe, 2019) possess more nationalist approaches in terms of politics focusing on exclusive identity and socio-cultural security, as mentioned in the study’s scope and objective, besides integrating the different communities within the hosting society. This situation paves the way for more polarized European people in economics, security, identity, ethnicity, and culture.

In this atmosphere, a growing number of scholars have begun to mention identity, ethnicity, and culture-based cleavages between the majority and minority, or with other words hosting and immigrant communities (Deleon & Naff, 2003), which brought about the identity politics discussions into the table. McLaren, (2002, 554) stresses the identity politics as one of the most important reasons of such a division, and he defends the view that “people see the nation-state as the appropriate point of

reference for identity and the EU, as undermining the integrity of the nation-state”, which is as also emphasized by Taggart (1998). Owing to this fact, the perceptions like losing national identity, deteriorating economic conditions within the country, and cultural degeneration as the direct or indirect repercussions of migration and immigrants have currently become the most well-known and common arguments used by the political parties and media especially after the 2000s, which caused politicization of immigration and immigrants according to the scholars (Buonfino, 2004; Fleischmann, Phalet, & Klein, 2011; Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015; Green-Pedersen & Otjes, 2017; Castelli Gattinara & Morales, 2017).

The term politicization has been mostly used by the IR scholars for the analysis of the European Union (EU) level issues and processes such as European integration (Buonfino, 2004; de Wilde, 2011; Adam & Maier, 2011; Green-Pedersen, 2012; de Wilde & Zurn, 2012; Statham & Trenz, 2012; Schimmelfennig et al., 2015; Hoeglenger, 2016; Hutter et al., 2016; Kroger & Bellamy, 2016). However, following the increasing number of immigrants or refugees in Europe especially from the Middle East and Northern Affrica (MENA) after the Arab Spring in 2011, the term politicization has begun to be used in the more focused research fields such as immigrants and these immigrants’ integration with the European societies, perception of threats against their identity and socio-cultural structures, or the impacts of political parties on these processes at the national level (Lahav, 2004; Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009; Simon & Grabow, 2010; Fleischmann et al., 2011; Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015; Castelli Gattinara & Morales, 2017; Grande et al., 2018; Zürn, 2019).

“Arguments focusing on immigration patterns assume that politicization is a response to an increase in the migrant population and of its composition” (Grande et al., 2018, 1447). Therefore, as Green-Pedersen and Otjes (2017) argued, there is a close connection between party’s political attention to the issue of immigration and the increasing number of immigrant populations. According to the research of Grande et al. (2018, 1454) “(e)lections after 2010 are often characterized by a sharp increase in the politicization of immigration (in Europe)” and the Dutch election in 2012 and the German election in 2017 are the ones that have highest values in terms of politicization of migration.

As stated before, the Netherlands is one of the best cases to study the abovementioned phenomena. It is why it has been the subject to many studies in the literature (de Hart, 2004; van Heelsum, 2005; Velasco González et al., 2008; Duyvendak & Scholten, 2012; Van Heerden, de Lange, van der Brug, & Fennema, 2014; Oostindie, 2012; Berkhout, Sudulich, & Van der Brug, 2015; Aydemir & Vliegthart, 2016; Mattei & Broeks, 2016; Castanho Silva, 2017; van der Zwan, Lubbers, & Eisinga, 2019). Additionally, it has the most controversial anti-immigrant and anti-Islam political parties of Europe that are coming to the attention of so many studies regarding the politicization of immigration (de Koning & Meijer, 2010; Fleischmann et al., 2011; Castanho Silva, 2017; Damhuis, 2019). Specifically, “public debate around immigration and multiculturalism tends to be concentrated on non-Western migrants, especially those of Turkish and Moroccan origin—due in part to the fact that these groups largely account for the growth of Islam within an increasingly secularized society” in the Netherlands (Damhuis, 2019, 2).

Berkhout et al. (2015, 102) analyses the Netherlands between 1995 and 2009 through “the political salience of the issues of integration and immigration in terms of number of claims made by relevant actors in national newspapers”. They find out that in 2002 and 2004, the political attention dedicated to the issues mentioned earlier made a peak. They explained these peaks in 2002 with the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA and the assassination of Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands and his Party’s electoral success following his assassination. As for the one in 2004, they point out the new restrictive regulations on migration proposed by Rita Verdonk, who was the Minister of Immigration between 2003 and 2006 from VVD (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy), and also the murder of the Dutch film director Theo van Gogh by a Moroccan Muslim extremist. The scholars explain these peaks as the salience phase or element of polarization. In terms of the polarization, on the other hand, the analysis presents the peaks in 2002, 2006, and 2009. The 2002 peak is associated with the election campaign of Lijst Pim Fortuyn, the 2006 peak is associated with the immigrants’ citizenship issues of the VVD government of Rita Verdonk, and subsequent government fall depending on these conflicts between the coalition partners D66 (Democrats 66), CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal) and VVD (Berkhout et al., 2015). They argue that the polarization peak in 2009 has not any

specific connection with a specific event directly; however, they acknowledge that it might be associated with the unexpected electoral success of far-right and anti-immigrant PVV (Party for Freedom) in 2006 and its rising polls heading to 2010 elections (Berkhout et al., 2015). The arguments used within this period regarding the immigration change over the years from instrumental arguments to the collective identity arguments covering cultural and religious traditions and norms, besides national and political values; and this transition makes its peak at the end of the 2000s, according to Berkhout et al. (2015). Despite such in detail analyses of politicization of immigration and integration in different periods by scholars, there are not many studies in the literature focusing on immigrants' politicization instead of immigration, and its impacts on Muslim immigrants.

The research of Phalet et al. (2010) is one of the unique ones that are slightly closer to the research interests of this study concentrating on the Muslim Dutch immigrants regarding the issues mentioned above. The study focuses on the impact of religious identity salience on the political mobilization of Muslim immigrants and questions whether the Muslim immigrants behave collectively when the religious identity has become salient. If so, they prefer which goal framing as the collective action, either defending Islam, helping their homeland in the context of ethnicity, or protecting human rights. Additionally, the research focuses on the impact of religious identity salience on Muslim immigrants' willingness to take normative or non-normative political actions such as signing a petition, donating money, taking part in demonstrations, using street violence, and damaging property. In this study, they look for the political mobilization of Moroccan Dutch and Turkish Dutch communities comparatively only through these preferences and with the above-mentioned specific purposes.

Tillman (2013) explains the connection of opposition against immigrants with the term authoritarianism. He states that “(a)uthoritarianism describes an individual predisposition characterized by a high need for order, presumably as a means of coping with the uncertainty and anxiety of social life” (Tillman, 2013). Within this context, the authoritarians are expected to stress the distinctions between members of in-groups and out-groups. This situation creates many socio-cultural, economic, or identity-

related challenges for immigrants in terms of cohesion and solidarity. “Cultural struggles, manifested in mother tongue classes or in setting up faith or complementary (ethnic) schools can (...) often faces particular social challenges, including racism and lack of mobilizable cultural capital” (Anthias, 2013, 325). Such situations, most likely divert immigrants toward producing identity politics (Bernstein, 2005) and struggling with such challenges differently. Political participation is one of these different ways, which has not been elaborated in detail by scholars yet from this perspective, particularly for the Muslim immigrants in Europe.

As seen in the brief literature review above, there are many studies, particularly in the IR or Sociology disciplines, focusing both on politicization of immigrants and/or immigration and immigrants’ political participation. However, there is not yet such a comprehensive study focusing on the correlation between the two phenomena politicizing Muslim immigrants and these immigrants’ political participation as a counter-reaction. Martiniello (2005, 12) explains the upcoming process with the following words; “(i)n order to promote and defend political interests and to exert some pressure on the political system; immigrant groups can operate as collective actors along ethnic, racial or religious lines”.

Despite these and some other scholars’ general evaluations regarding this issue and also the roles of ethnicity, religion or culture for instance on the identity politics of immigrants (DeLeon & Naff, 2003; Oostindie, 2012; Koyuncu-Lorasdağı, 2013; Kranendonk et al., 2018; Bahçeli, 2018; Petsinis, 2019), there is still a gap in the literature that is deeply analyzing the counter-reactions of immigrant populations against such a politicization process via the emergence of identity politics. This research aims to fill this gap in the literature.

#### **1.4 Argument of the Thesis**

The issues of migration and integration have just become part of the political agenda for the last couple of decades with their multidimensional impacts on European



societies (Berkhout et al., 2015). Jimenez (2011, 4) states that the “integration is a culmination of everyday interactions between and among immigrant newcomers and host communities. These interactions produce measurable economic, political, and social patterns that indicate the degree to which integration is taking place”. According to him, language, economic integration, residential integration, political integration, and social integration are the main indicators of integration of immigrants within the societies. Governments and the private sector and civil society organizations play an important role at diversifying degrees. In such an important research field, the factors sparking off the immigrant populations to actively participate in politics under the influence of their identity politics make them familiar with the hosting societies in terms of political integration, becoming even more important.

Considering the gap, as mentioned earlier in the literature, and with the awareness of the significance of the issue, this thesis congregates the issues of politicization of immigrants and these immigrants’ counter-reactions within single research. These reactions can be realized in political participation, like being a member of a political party or civil society organization. This process is expectedly ended up with the political integration in the hosting society.

In this context, it argues that elaborating the relationship between counter-reactions of immigrants against the politicization of immigrants provides a useful analysis of the relationship between the politicization of immigrant-related issues and its impact on the process and degree of the political integration of immigrants with the same hosting society. In line with the case study, it further argues that the politicization of Muslim immigrants by far-right political parties triggers the identity politics of immigrant communities. It creates the feelings of isolation, assimilation, or discrimination within the society by negatively influencing the Dutch community’s attitudes towards immigrants that necessitates taking a political action through not only religion but also ethnicity/race and culture, which affects the political integration of immigrants positively.

## **1.5 Research Design and Methodology**

This research analyses the above-mentioned intrinsic web of relations in the Netherlands since the beginning of the 2000s between the politicization of Muslim immigrants by far-right political parties and political participation of these immigrants with identity politics's motivation through the thematic content analysis. The research is conducted as both theory and data-driven.

It aims to understand whether all these processes end up in the political integration of immigrant nations into the hosting societies or are influenced negatively. The research does not aim to measure the extent of the political influence of the immigrant people who are politically mobilized neither in political parties nor in civil society organizations. It tries to analyze the relationship between the politicization of immigrants and the political participation of immigrants. Therefore, the research design of the thesis is two-phased. Within the first one, the politicization of Muslim immigrants is deeply analyzed both as a concept and as a phenomenon in the Netherlands' case. As for in the second phase, immigrants' political participation is examined through the concept of identity politics and a reactionary move of immigrants from Turkey in the Netherlands (from now on Turkish-Dutch immigrants) by following a field analysis.

Different theoretical perceptions and approaches are integrated into these two phases, which are explained in detail in the next Chapter. While addressing the research problem at the beginning of the study, for the first phase of the research, which is elaborating the politicization of immigrants, the Copenhagen School's Societal Security Perception was adopted by arguing that this theory could best explain the transition in the Dutch integration policy from multiculturalism to assimilation. It symbolizes the defense of a community's identity against a perceived threat (Waever, 2008). However, following the research, it has revealed that the anti-immigrant and anti-Islam attitudes and rhetoric of far-right political parties within this transition require further and more in-depth theoretical explanation, particularly when its influence on public attitude is concerned. In this context, Realistic and Symbolic Group Conflict Theories have been used as supportive approaches to explain, predict,

and understand the phenomenon. As for the second phase, which is elaborating the political participation of immigrants with identity politics, similarly, at the beginning of the study, the theory of Constructivism was adopted, which focuses on the normative and material structures besides identity in the process of political action (Reus-Smit, 2005; Barnett, 2014). However, Constructivism could not provide enough explanation for the driving forces behind the identity politics of immigrants within the process of political participation of immigrants as a counter-reaction. In this framework, Reactive Ethnicity was also used as a supportive approach to the phenomenon.

In the analysis of the causal relationship of the phases, semi-structured interviews were done with Turkish-Dutch immigrants living in the Netherlands. The participants were the members of either a political party or a civil society organization that provides information on politics for the immigrant community -into particularly Turkish ones, but also Moroccans- and mobilize public opinion of the immigrant community. The semi-structured interview was chosen as the research technique in studying the impacts of ideas, norms and identities in shaping immigrants' politically mobilized reactions against the politicization of immigrants, in which "informants (are asked) a series of predetermined but open-ended questions" to which "there is no fixed range of responses" (Ayres, 2008, 810).

Depending on this selection, an interview guide was prepared beforehand covering the following topics: being an immigrant in the Netherlands, ethnic and national identity, far-right political parties' policies and rhetoric, their political participation forms as Turkish-Dutch citizens. The questions were carefully designed to elicit the participants' ideas and opinions on the topics mentioned above.

Tape-record was used during the interviews because conducting the interview and jotting notes at the same time might cause missing some information and distractibility on both the participants and researcher.

In such phenomenological or narrative studies focusing on specific human experiences, between 10 and 20 interviews are evaluated as sufficient (Dukes, 1984; Creswell, 2007; Slootman, 2018), because "phenomenological methodology differs

from traditional methodologies both in purpose and procedure” (Dukes, 1984, 197). In this context, this Ph.D. research is based on 18 semi-structured interviews.

The participants were carefully selected to represent both Turkish and Kurdish groups, right and left-wing, conservatives, and liberals, without making any separation in terms of religious sects. The political parties to which the participants of this research belong to are DENK, NIDA, Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), Green Left (GL) and Labor Party (PvdA). As for the civil society organizations, it can be said that in the Netherlands, there are more than 120 civil society organizations like federations or unions founded by immigrants from Turkey or having the majority of members who are Turkish-Dutch immigrants. Only a few of them close to politics and sensitive about the anti-immigrant attitudes in the Netherlands (Mügge, 2013). The ones whose representatives accepted to attend the research and interviews within this context are Milli Görüş (National Vision) Netherlands, Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation (De Turks Islamitische Culturele Federatie -TICF) as the body of Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (hereafter Diyanet), The Turkish Workers’ Union in the Netherlands (HTIB), Union of International Democrats (UID / Union of European Turkish Democrats – UETD with its previous name), and NCB/Forum (Institute of Multicultural Development).

There are secondary resources analyzed in the study, such as the academic studies focusing on speeches, strategy documents, and position papers of the parties’ ideologies and rhetoric on the politicization of immigrants and partly immigration, as well as media. Public opinion polls from Eurobarometer and some other sources were also used to get some statistical data, particularly regarding the demographic information and public opinion and preferences of both native Dutch and Turkish-Dutch community in the case study.

There is no academic source or empirical study yet focusing on specifically immigrants’ counter-reactions towards the politicization of Muslim immigrants by far-right political parties from the perspective of identity politics, as explained under the literature review section, thus the research might be one of the first in this field. Indeed, this can be both an advantage and a limitation. It is a limitation because there are not enough academic sources to support the study’s theoretical part, neither in the other

European countries nor in Turkey. Nevertheless, it is also an advantage because it could contribute to the academic literature by being the first in the field and being a model for some similar studies that will be conducted in other European countries. In researching Turkish-Dutch immigrants and their identity politics, being a Turkish and, of course, speaking the Turkish language were also advantages for facilitating the field analysis and interviews.

## **1.6 Organization of the Thesis**

This research aims to understand the impact of Muslim immigrants' politicization by far-right political parties on the political participation of them with the motivation of identity politics by the following framework.

The thesis is comprised of six chapters. In Chapter 2, politicization and identity politics are studied as interrelated concepts and deeply explained to form a sound basis for the study's theoretical framework. Different definitions and typologies of politicization in this context are provided in this Chapter. The Chapter draws the framework of the immigrants' political participation from different perspectives. Thus, the theoretical framework of the study is established on different approaches and perspectives in order to figure out the abovementioned correlation. In this Chapter, the theories and approaches are shared through a historical perspective of the issues that are experienced in Europe in general and in the Netherlands in particular by reflecting transitions experienced since the beginning of the 2000s. In this framework, while elaborating on the transition in Europe and the Netherlands' integration and immigration policies from multiculturalism towards assimilation, the Societal Security Perception of the Copenhagen School is examined. As for the driving forces behind the far-right populist parties' anti-immigrant stances, as well as their impact on the public opinion, Realistic and Symbolic Group Conflict Theories are benefitted. Finally, in order to elaborate on the immigrant reactions as political participation against this politicization and subsequent negative attitudes within the society,

Constructivism is used as the main theory. As for explaining the identity politics developed in this process, the Reactive Ethnicity approach is used.

In Chapter 3, the subject of politicization has been examined through discussions on integration and diversity, which are taking place on top of the governments' political agenda for the last couple of decades in Europe. In this context, first of all, the situation in Europe after the 2000s is elaborated to get the general idea of the reasons and pushing effects behind the anti-immigrant perceptions and attitudes towards immigrants today. In this context, the Dutch migration history and immigration and immigrant integration policies are also analyzed to build a relationship with the practical reality with the theoretical background submitted in Chapter 2 from multiculturalism to assimilation. The role of far-right political parties, as the main actors, is also evaluated in this Chapter from the perspective of politicization.

In Chapter 4, the political participation of immigrants with identity politics as a result of the politicization of immigrants is studied. Like the previous Chapter, the issues are elaborated through a historical perspective in Europe and the Netherlands. To provide a better understanding of identity politics, the meaning(s) of identity has been explained in detail, and its relation with the citizenship has been put forward in this Chapter. Especially the perceptions on identity in Europe and in the Netherlands are studied on the way of developing identity politics. In this context, the role of ethnicity, religion, and culture is analyzed to seek the impact of immigrants' politicization on identity politics. Similar to the previous one, at the end of this Chapter, the case of this study, the Netherlands has been analyzed in the framework of identity politics of both immigrant communities. As a result of this analysis, the relationship between identity politics, political participation, and the political integration of immigrants is evaluated as an expected result of immigrants' politicization.

In Chapter 5, as the case of this thesis, the Netherlands has been scrutinized via the results derived from the field research on Turkish-Dutch immigrants living in the Netherlands. The study's originality lies in the exploration of a linkage between politicization and the selected Turkish community representatives' counter-reactions to these dynamics through political participation. The driving factors of their reactions by playing an active role in political parties or civil society organizations like NGOs,

federations or consultancies to guide the Turkish-Dutch community about their rights and duties as Dutch citizens against the perception of discrimination in the fields of ethnicity/race, religion, and culture have been deeply analyzed. In this Chapter, the participants' daily life experiences in accordance with the politicization process and their points of view in terms of the sense of belonging to the Dutch society and political integration are shared through direct quotations from the participants.

In the last Chapter, a general conclusion is presented from the perspectives of field analysis' findings and their comparative analysis with previous researches conducted in the Netherlands. In this context, the possible consequences of the increasing politicization of immigrants and subsequent political participation of Turkish-Dutch immigrants in the Netherlands are analyzed through the research's conceptual and theoretical frameworks. Additionally, the Chapter forecasts for various future projects and research related to the thesis's subject field that might be conducted in other European countries besides the Netherlands.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

Since the beginning of the 2000s, immigrants and their ethnicity, culture, religion (Islam), and many other issues related to them have become the real issues getting exceptional attention of both governments and political parties, as well as public in Europe, which has been dividing the societies further in terms of diversifying or converging attitudes towards the immigrants (Hoeglinger, 2016). Besides, this phenomenon has been causing some changes in the policies of integration of European countries that have quite a large amount of immigrants (Givens, 2007; Scholten & Van Nispen, 2008). In fact, following the financial turbulences in the 1980s and 1990s, the integration policies had already begun to be reassessed in all over Europe by "revisiting policies identified as "multiculturalism" and re-emphasizing "assimilation" (Givens, 2007, 67). The difference in the 2000s is the different rhetoric of political parties, particularly the far-right, towards the immigrants mostly based on ethnicity, identity, culture or religion, in addition to the transformation in integration policies or approaches, which has escalated further discussions on the typologies of integration policies and success of them. In this atmosphere, far-right populist parties have played a crucial role, as being the main actors of the politicization of Muslim immigrants besides integration policy amendments (Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015; Rem & Gasper, 2018) in influencing both the hosting communities' attitudes towards immigrants and the immigrant communities in terms of their political participation via identity politics.



As acknowledged by Givens (2007, 75) "(t)he radical right is seen as a manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment, and not only changes in immigration policy but also new measures impeding naturalization of immigrants (particularly Muslims) are considered the result of the influence of radical right parties." As an expected result, identity-based discussions and identity politics among the immigrant communities, too, come to the fore as another popular discussion topic in Europe, especially after the Arab Spring, with the triggering impact of the far-right populist parties' initiatives. In brief, all these processes are formulated around two main concepts in this study, which are politicization and identity politics. The theoretical approaches from the disciplines of IR, sociology, and partly psychology help determine the relationship between these concepts and immigrants' counter-reactions as political participation.

In this context, in this Chapter, first studying the politicization of immigrants and identity politics as interrelated concepts will be deeply analyzed to form a basis for the theoretical framework of the study. Following that, the study's theoretical framework will be established on this basis through different approaches and perspectives to figure out the relationship, as mentioned earlier. The theories and approaches will be shared within the chain of events that are constructing the basis of this research through a historical perspective for Europe in general and the Netherlands in particular to draw the general picture of the study.

## **2.2 Studying Politicization as a Concept**

Michael Zürn (2014, 50) defines politicization as "making collectively binding decisions a matter or an object of public discussion." Therefore, politicization turns the issues that are previously unpolitical into the political. On the other hand, De Wilde (2011, 560) defines politicization as "an increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of policy formulation within the EU." All these identifications are valid for the politicization of immigration within the European countries out of the EU framework.

Zürn (2014, 50) mentions three indicators making the politicization practical: 'awareness,' 'mobilization,' and 'contestation.' "Awareness points to a greater interest in and concern about political institutions on the side of citizens, (while) mobilization refers to an increase over time in the amount of resources spent influencing negotiations about and decision making in political institutions, (and) (c)ontestation refers to conflicting views of the common good and opposing demands put to political institutions" (Zürn, 2014, 50-51). These indicators gain strength and activated by some elements at the domestic level like media, party politics, and national narratives regarding the issue on the agenda (de Wilde, 2011; Zürn, 2014). As long as the mass media makes room for immigration-related issues at the domestic level, for instance, and political parties use these issues in their party politics and rhetoric, the issue keeps going to be politicized at the national level.

While studying the politicization, Van der Brug, D'Amato, Berkhout, and Ruedin (2015) develop the conceptual framework on two dimensions: polarization and increased salience. In the first dimension, which is polarization, mostly the studies point out party competitions and different party positions on the same specific issues. In the dimension of increased salience, they mention the importance of agenda-setting that makes a common problem the matter of the public's attention. In this dimension, as expected, news media through party politics play a significant role. It is why the 'parliaments, public spheres, and public opinion' are accepted as the central political settings of politicization (De Wilde et al., 2016). In this dimension, the agenda-setting of the governments or political parties can be improved either as public policy-oriented or as claims-making. Depending on their study's findings, Van der Brug et al. (2015) state that politicization is not a spontaneous reaction to grievances, which means it is either on this or that way requires a political organization. They develop this conceptual framework on four different typologies like politicization as a "structurally bottom-up process," "agency based bottom-up process," "agency based top-down process," and "structurally top-down process."

Structurally bottom-up typology refers to societal developments. In this type, a conflict usually arises within the society regarding a discontent of a specific group and triggers the political action, including "joining interest groups, participating in social

movement activities or voting for a new party." The action may be driven by a political party or any other related organization as propaganda. Overall, the issue must have a substantial impact on society or citizens' daily lives to be politicized.

Agency based bottom-up typology refers to the actions of specific groups in society. In this type, a specific group in society triggers politicization, such as immigrants' group themselves, in which the actions are independent of the structural changes. Similarly, anti-immigrant groups can improve an anti-immigrant reaction, depending on the feelings of native citizens regarding the economic and cultural situation or perception of threat towards these phenomena. These counter-reactions also trigger the politicization of the issue.

Agency based top-down typology refers to the initiatives by the authorities. In this type, the political actors or political parties specifically present a reaction against other politicians' already initiated policies. When political parties' power in agenda setting is considered, the importance of their initiatives and their consequences within the society can be well understood. For instance, the country policies regarding immigration and the settlement of immigrants, or their integration into society, directly affect both immigrant and native communities within the societies, which is why quite eligible for being politicized by the other political organizations.

Structurally top-down typology refers to the political opportunity structure. In this type, a group of political actors choose a new issue and tries to bring this issue to the country's main agenda to get political success and opportunities, which requires internal consensus within the political organization itself and an external coalition to get further support.

In terms of immigrants and immigration, similar to the agency-based top-down typology, Ivarsflaten (2005) argues that the most potent explanation behind the identity concerns is the elite actors' role, who convince the public that there is a strong connection between their fears and immigration for instance. Elite actors, actually the political parties, usually use the agenda-setting device to turn the tones of immigration debates towards either the security of the national community or the national identity. "Cultural threats articulate around the crucial dimension of identity politics, namely

the "us/them" distinction based on perceived ethnic, cultural and religious differences between the receiving society and the immigrant communities" (Castelli Gattinara & Morales, 2017, 275).

In most of the discussions and researches about immigrants and their integration with the hosting society, for instance, it has been argued that the politicization and immigrant numbers have a positive correlation as mentioned above (Givens, 2007; Scholten & Van Nispen, 2008; Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015; Hoeglinger, 2016; Rem & Gasper, 2018). However, Van der Brug, Ruedin, Berkhout, and Cunningham (2015, 193) argue that "whether the issue of immigration becomes politicized does not depend directly on the number of migrants, the perception of immigrant numbers, or the number of people who are discontented, but to a large degree on the actions of the elite who have the resources to politicize the issue."

Zürn (2019, 978), on the other hand, argues via a different perspective that "(i)n most political systems, a collective choice about an issue is based on a prior process of putting the issue on the agenda, some deliberation about the right decision, and the interaction of different positions regarding the choice." He adds that "(t)he more salient the issue, the more actors and people participate in the debate, the more positions are polarized, and the more politicized a decision or institution is" (Zürn, 2019, 978).

Mass media is one of the most practical objects of the politicization process, and so political parties take advantage of this object quite frequently, as observed in the Netherlands, France, and Austria at the domestic and European Parliament elections in 2009 and 2014. "(T)he mass media is crucial because it is where the general public can gain access to information about executive decision-making, and the stances of political actors who challenge decisions" (Statham & Trenz, 2012, 3).

As mentioned before, while explaining the European new politics in the previous Chapter, since the beginning of the 2000s, globalization has more observable impacts on nation-states, especially in the European countries because of the EU's additional supranational influences realized by transferring more and more national political authorities to the EU and receiving more and more foreigners to the member countries' territories with the free movement. It might put "the national language, predominant

religious practices, habits, and traditions (...) under threat", according to Ivarsflaten (2005, 24). Either real or symbolic, this perception of threat brings about identity concerns when the norms, values, ethnicity, culture, religion, or language are concerned.

As argued by Castelli Gattinara and Morales (2017) and Van der Brug et al., (2015), there are different variations of addressing or politicizing immigration and immigrant-related issues across countries by the political actors and public opinions in Europe. They can be related to economic or cultural logics, or identity and religious concerns (Castelli Gattinara & Morales, 2017). The politicization of immigrants therefore mostly depends on how public opinion evaluates and reacts the state of immigrants, and besides what kind of fear and threat public perceives stemmed from immigrants (Castelli Gattinara & Morales, 2017), because primarily since the beginning of the 2000s, the issue of immigration and mainly Muslim immigrants are addressed in connection with security and criminality, too in all over the world (Kaya, 2013). As Van der Brug et al. (2015) argued, especially since the second half of the 1990s, the politicization of immigration has increased, and the focus of the related debates has shifted from claims made on immigration to the integration of immigrants in Western European countries. Since then, the critical discourse of the political parties strongly articulates the notions of 'national interest,' which usually means 'socio-economic interests,' 'identity,' and 'cultural flows' (Harmsen & Spiering, 2004, 30). The issues like enlargement, democratic legitimacy, or identity have become the main discussion subjects during those years (Hurrelmann et al., 2012). Within the same period, the issue of migration became a socio-cultural issue, by which all the public and political party attention have begun to focus on immigrants' -particularly the Muslim immigrants'- cultural habits, and their adaptation to liberal Western values (Van der Brug et al., 2015) as observed in the Netherlands.

## 2.3 Studying Identity Politics as a Concept

With a very general kind of expression, it can be said that the term "identity politics" was first used to defend disabled people's rights at the end of the 1970s, and then to describe the role of ethnicity and culture in politics in the 1980s, and since the 1990s to explain more about ethnic conflicts and nationalism (Bernstein, 2005). It is widely used in the social sciences and the humanities, as the term "identity" itself, to describe multiculturalism, civil rights, lesbian and gay movements, separatist movements in different countries, and violent ethnic and nationalist conflicts in different continents, and so on (Bernstein, 2005). It is described by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary ("Identity Politics" n.d.) as the "politics in which groups of people having a particular racial, religious, ethnic, social, or cultural identity tend to promote their own specific interests or concerns without regard to the interests or concerns of any larger political group." In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, it is identified as "a wide range of political activity and theorizing founded in the shared experiences of injustice of members of certain social groups," and this injustice can be stemmed from race, ethnicity, religion or culture ("Identity Politics," 2016).

Social identification plays a vital role in identity politics and political participation of individuals, because "(i)ndividuals attach emotional significance to perceived membership in the social groups in which they self-categorize and with which they self-identify" (Kranendonk et al., 2018, 45). According to van Heelsum and Koomen (2016, 279), there are many social identities, and ethnic and religious identities are only two of them "that people use to define themselves in relation to others." Gibson and Gouws (1998 as cited in Huddy, 2001) argue that strong racial and ethnic identities increase the need for group solidarity and cause for a kind of negative perception toward out-groups. Therefore, in general, subjective group membership and social groups play an essential role in shaping political attitudes (Conover, 1988; Huddy, 2001).

Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg (2008) mention five factors affecting immigrants' participation in collective political action within the issue of

identity politics, which are 'grievances, efficacy, identity, emotions and social embeddedness or involvement in civil society organizations'. Depending on their research, these factors are explained briefly below (Klandermans et al., 2008, 993-996).

Grievances refer to the negative perception that people have, depending on the authorities' treatment, which direct these people to be engaged in collective action as a response.

Efficacy refers to the beliefs of people on the effectiveness of collective action. It argues that grievances cannot answer why some aggrieved people become mobilized, while others do not.

Identity here is used more as a dual identity and accordingly refers to the suggestions that "integration or holding a dual identity, rather than separation, assimilation, or marginalization, stimulates subgroup mobilization," which means some degree of identification with the nation is needed to mobilize in political action or political participation.

Emotions refer to the orientations of avoidance or approach, such as fear or anger, which can lead people to participate or not participate in protests, for instance.

Social embeddedness or involvement in civil society organizations refers to the positive impact of civil society networks (ethnic or cross-ethnic) on political participation such as voting, standing in elections, or attending meetings.

All these factors have become somehow connected; however, civil society organizations' grievances and social embeddedness come to prominence, especially when the Muslim immigrants' political participation is concerned. As stressed by Simon (1998 as cited in Klandermans et al., 2008, 994), "people do not participate in social movements for instrumental reasons only, but also to fulfill identity needs." On the other hand, social embeddedness helps to "foster conventional political participation among immigrants" because, in this way, immigrants learn the way of working in the political institutions (Klandermans et al., 2008, 996).

## 2.4 Theoretical Framework and Related Approaches

While explaining Europe's new politics Hooghe (2019) states that "(t)he prolonged rise in transnationalism since the 1990s has laid bare the cultural as well as economic consequences of the information revolution", and this process "brought to the fore issues related to the nation, self-rule, and multiculturalism". As Hooghe (2019) also touches upon, this revelation has brought about the theoretical and rhetorical cleavages between the opponents of open societies and cultural diversity, who elaborate them as a threat to their national community, identity, or culture, and the supporters of them. With the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA, this cleavage has further increased, because the issues related to immigrants have begun to be securitized and politicized by establishing a connection of these issues with security, terrorism, or radical Islam (Waever, 2008) not only in the USA but also in all over Europe. Of course, it has repercussions on immigrant communities' sense of belonging to the country of reception, its identity, its language, its culture, and at the top of that their integration with society. Moreover, it affects the integration policies of European countries from multiculturalism towards assimilation (Scholten, 2011). With the words of Givens (2007, 67-68), "(t)his has meant an increase in emphasis on policies related to language acquisition and on courses designed to teach the civic values and culture of the country of settlement and a decrease in emphasis on accommodation of difference."

The politicization of Muslim immigrants in most European countries depending on the increasing number of immigrants in this context has required to improve the policies on integration of immigrants with different types, structures, and impacts (Givens, 2007) because this has influenced the attitudes of hosting communities towards not only newly arriving but also already residing immigrant communities. Simultaneously, the immigrants, particularly the Muslim immigrants and Islam in general, have begun to be the subject of political parties, mostly the far-right, politicizing these issues. Although this rhetoric has been mostly used by the far-right political parties and has influenced the hosting communities, implicit or explicit change of rhetoric in the mainstream political parties or change of immigration policies in the governments has also begun to be observed. The Netherlands is one of the good examples of this



phenomenon in Europe, too. Although the Netherlands has always been considered “an almost ideal-typical example of multiculturalist policies” (Scholten, 2013, 97) and “internationally known for its multicultural approach to immigrant integration” (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2010, 39) since the 2000s this reputation has slightly changed, and today it has been criticized with its assimilationist integration policies (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2011). Scholten (2011, 183) pays attention in 2002 specifically in this turn in which “immigrant integration was to become the central issue in one of the most dramatic episodes in Dutch post-war political history, involving the rise and subsequent murder of the populist politician Fortuyn.”

Such an inclusive phenomenon, without a doubt, requires multidimensional analyses of the scholars of the social sciences. In this framework, it is believed to be useful to elaborate the abovementioned issues and subsequent issues of politicization of Muslim immigrants by political parties, its impacts on overall Dutch society’s attitudes towards the immigrants, as well as its probable results on immigrants’ political participation, the emergence of identity politics and integration dilemma with the Dutch society from different perspectives and theories. Of course, there are many different theories and approaches to elaborating on these issues. The important thing is to choose conceptually and normatively clear and convincing approaches in such a broad subject (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2011), especially when more actors are involved like political parties, the immigrant community, and hosting society.

Until the end of the 1980s, the mainstream theories, such as realism/ liberalism or neo-realism/ neo-liberalism had built their arguments on rationalist explanations. Within this framework, human beings were identified as “atomistic, self-interested, strategic actors,” having a kind of standard instrumental rationality across all political actors, and additionally, in the analyses of these theories, social dimensions of living were not taken into consideration (Reus-Smit, 2005, 206). In this rationalist perspective, as the actors, individuals’ interests are assumed to be formed independently, therefore “social interaction is not considered an important determinant of interests” (Reus-Smit, 2005, 192).

In the 1990s, such a rationalistic approach started to be criticized by feminism and postmodernism to find alternative ways (Steans et al., 2010). In the following

rationalism/ positivism and relativism/ post-positivism debate, which is mostly called forth debate, the power of ideas, values, and norms has come into prominence, contrary to the neo-neo debate. In this context, postmodern theorists criticize the traditional way of thinking about identity, and they argue that identity is an unsteady, contingent, and socially constructed concept, which makes liberal humanistic thinking outdated (Huddy, 2001).

In the 1990s' debates, cultural diversity and the importance of the relationship between individuals and communities come to the fore parallel to the tendency observed in many countries towards multiculturalism and liberal individualism (Parvin, 2009). As for the realist perception, speaking of mainstream theories, Kratochwil (2008, 87) mentions their embracement of "one true description of how things are" without using the terms like 'essence' in explaining things. Therefore, to figure out the connection between the politicization of immigrant communities and immigrant communities' political participation, we need to understand the background of transition in the Dutch policies on immigrants from multiculturalism as an approach towards skepticism and assimilation.

This perspective also provides a sound basis for the discussion of immigrant integration, which is somehow problematic because even the European countries as the members of the same EU family have different implementations and understandings in terms of immigrant integration. "Whereas the French have adopted an assimilative approach, the Germans have stressed social-economic participation and the British have followed their national form of multiculturalism" in the framework of immigrant integration, which points out different meanings like emancipation, integration with retention of identity, adaptation, participation or segregation (Scholten, 2011, 18). The Dutch case seems a historical combination of these different meanings for the different periods like the 1980s, 1990s, and the 2000s. Kolbaşı Muyan (2019) identifies this combination as a transition from liberalism to neoliberalism, or a transition from the group focused approach to an individual-focused approach mainly from a political economy perspective.

As for in this study, taking into account the current identity, culture, and religion-based discussions assuming the immigrants as a threat in the Netherlands, rather than seeing

them as threats in terms of financial issues, the integration policies and approaches towards immigrants are evaluated through a historical perspective from multiculturalism towards assimilation with the Copenhagen School's Societal Security Concept (Wæver, 1995; 2008) depending on "the level of acceptance from the majority population" (Herda, 2018, 374). Huysmans (2002, 43) acknowledges that "security writings participate in a political field where social questions are already contested in terms of crisis, threats, and dangers."

At this point, immigrant-related issues become salient and are brought about to the public attention via politicization as one of the main discussion topics of far-right political parties and local and national election campaigns. These behaviors are believed to be triggered by Realistic or Symbolic Threat Perceptions to their identities, culture, and religion of both the far-right political parties particularly, and of a visible amount of the hosting communities resulting from that.

Socio-cultural, economic, or identity-related challenges in the daily lives create integration problems for the immigrants in terms of cohesion and solidarity, as expected, and most likely divert immigrants toward struggling with such challenges in different ways, such as political participation or mobilization. To answer the questions at this point like "why and how?", the identity politics developed by the in-group vs. out-group contests come to the fore, which brings about explanations via norms and ideas in shaping interests of actors as social constructions.

In this context, Constructivism is used as the theoretical basis of the connection between politicization and political participation of immigrants via identity politics by focusing on the importance of normative and material structures besides identity on the way of shaping political identity, and by making empirical analysis, moreover by employing interpretive, discursive and historical modes of analysis as the techniques for empirical exploration (Reus-Smit, 2005). It makes a comprehensive and coherent elaboration of identity politics possible.

Although the second phase of the study is elaborated from Constructivism's perspective, the immigrant community's identity politics as a counter-reaction against the politicization process can also be evaluated through the Societal Security Concept.

However, the immigrant community's collective identity formation and subsequent identity politics formation must analyze this reactionary process within the social interactions of the different groups in society. Institutionalized norms and structures and interest-based behaviors within the framework of identity play a significant role in these interactions, necessitates using the theory of Constructivism.

Besides Constructivism, Reactive Ethnicity stands out as a supportive approach to deeply analyze and interpret the immigrant communities' behaviors. This approach argues that "when ethnic minority populations (particularly members of the immigrant second generation) are faced with an adversarial mainstream, they often develop defensive or reactive identities and solidarities" (Herda, 2018). In this framework, a fuller understanding of such miscellaneous and increasingly essential issues raised by an increasing number of immigrants, their politicization, their identity politics, their political participation, and their political integration with the hosting society requires supplementary theories consistent with each other.

#### **2.4.1 Societal Security Perception from Multiculturalism to Assimilation**

Societal security is defined "as the cultural, linguistic and identitive survival of a particular social group," and in this context, it is "the logical extension of state security" (Theiler, 2003, 250). In this framework, when multiculturalism vs. assimilation discussions are concerned as part of the state's security, the abovementioned culture and identity-related issues come to prominence. When the increasing number of immigrants and their political integration within the society is concerned, Verkuyten (2006, 149) brings the attention on multiculturalism which "offers a positive view of cultural and identity maintenance for ethnic minority groups and, as such, a concomitant need to accommodate diversity in an equitable way," because it refers to positive attitudes toward immigrants and cultural diversity in the society. Lutz (2017, 4) emphasizes that "(m)ulticulturalism is based on the recognition

of ethnic and cultural minorities and aims to enable these migrant communities to participate in society the same way as the majority population."

It is challenging to identify multiculturalism with a unique definition or view, "as an ideology, a lay theory, a set of normative beliefs, a framework for policies, and a guideline for education and educational activities," as argued by Verkuyten (2006, 149). At first view, it means a positive coexistence of different ethnic, national, or religious groups within the same territory under the same state. However, it may also have a negative side by causing distinctions and divergences among the groups and out-group feelings or jeopardize social unity and cohesion (Verkuyten, 2006).

According to the Bloemraad (2007, 331), if there is multiculturalism in society, it provides "formal recognition of diverse cultures and active support for cultural groups" and mitigates political conflicts. In this system, the majority group embraces that "minorities have legitimate standing in society," and the minority group does not produce potentially explosive reactive ethnicity in this context (Bloemraad, 2007, 331). Such a point of view coincides with the theoretical explanations of this study on counter-reactions of immigrants that will be mentioned in the upcoming pages.

Multiculturalism, as a term, is used in a meaning of a policy approach towards the migrants' claims for "group-specific rights, recognition, and exemptions from duties with respect to the cultural requirements of citizenship in their societies of settlement" (Koopmans et al., 2005, 147). It was first used in Canada to describe the policies rejecting cultural assimilation of immigrants who got a citizenship and "expected to give up their original ethnic identity in favor of the adoption of a new identity" (Arends-Toth & van de Vijver, 2003, 252). In the multicultural societies, "immigrant groups remain distinct from the majority population," and can keep their way of life without giving up their traditions on integration (Lutz, 2017).

A research conducted in the Netherlands by Velasco González et al. (2008, 680) shows that multiculturalism "provide(s) a general ideological view about the importance of cultural diversity that not only reduces a sense of group threat but also emphasizes that people should be recognized and valued in their group identity and that there should be social equality and equal opportunities." Making cultural pluralism institutional to

provide cultural emancipation of immigrants to integrate them into Dutch society has been one of the main ideas behind multiculturalism in the Netherlands since the 1920s (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2011). The Netherlands has long been pointed out as an excellent example of multiculturalist policies regarding immigrants it has as a colonial empire that was receiving immigrants since the 18th and 19th centuries. However, is it so? In the country, multiculturalism has been used as a policy model for long, because it was believed that "the recognition and institutionalization of cultural pluralism (was) an important condition for the emancipation and integration of immigrant groups into Dutch society" (Scholten, 2013, 97) back then. As explained in the Chapter 3 and 4 in detail, this multicultural understanding was rooted in Dutch historical "pillarization" system (P. Scholten, 2011), in which different religious or social-cultural groups in the society live together in equal status without any segregation, despite "a particular division of society into four groups (...): orthodox Protestants, Roman Catholics, social democrats and the group that considered itself neutral or general and in practice were politically usually liberals" (Blom, 2016, 183). Although this system was fictionalized on equality among the pillars, in the practicality, it was not working like that. It depended on the pillar groups' compromises, and the neutral-liberals were the dominant ones over the others.

This general perception belonged to a couple of decades before the 2000s in the Netherlands. Since the beginning of the 2000s, sharp criticisms have emerged about the wrong policies conducted by the Dutch governments regarding multiculturalism, as if it was used as a well-functioning integration policy. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA and following restrictive and skeptical policies of immigrant-receiving countries towards primarily Muslim immigrants had, for sure, the most significant impact on decreasing toleration towards immigrants in all over the world, particularly in Europe. However, according to Vink (2007), the crucial challenges to multiculturalism in the Netherlands have begun in the 1990s with the rhetoric of Frits Bolkestein, then leader of the liberal party VVD, on the compatibility between Islamic and Western values. As for after the 2000s, such issues come to the surface more powerfully via mainstream political discourse (Vink, 2007). Multiculturalism has not only criticized by far-right parties or scholars but also left-wing "with the claim that multiculturalism has become a neo-liberal and neo-colonial form of governmentality,

imprisoning ethno-cultural and religious minorities, migrants and their children in their own ghettos" (Kaya, 2013, 67).

"To what extent this multicultural model or historical pillarization system encourage integration" is one of the current issues of scholarly debates (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2011, 2012). Some scholars criticized the pillarization system as an obstacle in front of immigrants' integration within society. Pillarized Dutch institutions sponsored by the government, like religious education institutions, broadcasting systems, or health systems have been given as examples (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2011). Indeed, such pluralist implementations were not related to integration policies of the Dutch governments at all, despite the political parties' related rhetoric about that seems on the other way around.

In the 1980s, the Ethnic Minorities Policy was introduced to reformulate participation and sociocultural emancipation of immigrants within the society, by which immigrants have begun to be called as 'minorities.' The government's aim back then was to guarantee equal access for minorities with native Dutch majority in terms of housing, jobs, and education. However, subsequent discussions about whether the immigrant communities would be able to become equals or not caused more significant cleavage between the ethnic minorities and the rest of Dutch society. The discussions within this process focused on the differences between Dutch and immigrant culture (Janssens, 2015).

In the 1990s, the Integration Policy was introduced, focusing on immigrants' socio-economic participation, with a more neo-liberal approach, in which categorization of migrants based on foreign descent instead of ethnocultural traits (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2012). In this new policy, instead of the term "ethnic minorities," in this framework, the following terms have begun to be used; "allochtoon" to refer to a person with at least one parent born abroad and "autochthon" for Dutch people (Janssens, 2015).

By taking advantage of negative connotation emerged after the use of the term "allochtoon" in the society, in the 2000s, the discussions on the integration of immigrants was brought back to the table once again by far-right parties this time via

socio-cultural integration agenda pointing out the issues like national identity, ethnicity, religion or culture as the threats towards their societal security.

According to Theiler (2003), societal security has two different dimensions: objective and subjective. The subjective dimension refers to the "preservation of group markers such as language and customs," and the objective dimension refers to "the community's survival as a locus of identification for its members" (Theiler, 2003, 251).

Waever (1995, 392) argues that integration is related to security and identity at the same time, and "(a)lthough security and identity are the primary obstacles to integration, integration has the potential to transform them," therefore in order to understand the issue of integration "one must study the triangle of security-identity-integration." As mentioned several times before, integration discussions are closely interrelated with the increasing number of immigrants all over Europe. Security is interpreted as a social construction in this context (Huysmans, 2002).

Castelli Gattinara and Morales (2017, 274-275) argue that immigration and insecurity are associated terms that at the societal level they refer to the perceived threats to "the economic well-being and cultural, identity and religious values of native majorities, (...) social order, political stability, criminality, and personal safety" of the society or group of people in society.

Societal security is argued to be related to political security by Waever (1995, 405), and it is "about ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a social group." It is presented as the defense of an identity or a community against a perceived threat (Waever, 2008, 153). It is observed at both native and immigrant populations within the societies, as observed in many European countries mentioned in the first Chapter, particularly in the Netherlands. According to the theory, if the state perceives a threat to its identity within society, it makes sense to improve new language policies, reforms in the education system, or give more effort on cultural issues. Similarly, the actors playing the significant role for the financial issues in the state, may also perceive a threat towards the economic resources and financial stability, and take repercussions in order to clear away the threat. While the state itself, the actors taking place in it, or society more particularly are feeling under a security threat depending on different



reasons related to their identities; the immigrant or minority groups may also have the similar security threat against their identity (mostly ethnic identity, or religious identity) from the other way around (Waever, 2008). While state security sees sovereignty as its ultimate criterion, societal security attributes this meaning to the identity, and both mean survival (Waever, 1995; 1996).

Such a perception directs the policies in some cases to the assimilationist approaches, which depends on the expectation that "immigrants should adapt to the new culture and abandon their own traditions and habits in a way that the receiving society remains relatively unchanged by immigration" (Lutz, 2017, 3). Immigrants are expected to acculturate by the hosting society to become similar to natives in social and cultural terms as much as possible, and the principle of descent is the main criterion for citizenship, as acknowledged by Lutz (2017). In this framework, integration policies do not discard old policies regarding immigrants but rather supplement them with new civic integration programs, which is implemented in Germany, Denmark, Austria, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (UK) stricter than the other European countries that have a big amount of immigrant population (Koopmans, 2013).

As seen, the integration policies or approaches in the Netherlands have been transformed from a group focused version, first towards socio-economics focused version in the 1990s, and later towards socio-culture and ethnicity-based version in the 2000s which brought about the perception of threat stemming from ethnic and religious identities of immigrant communities, basically being Turkish and Muslim. Thus, almost de facto, it can be said that immigration and integration policies in the Netherlands have been changed several times over the past decades. Instead of multiculturalist approach, there is more a tendency towards integrating immigrants as Dutch citizens who are adapting more to Dutch norms and values (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2007) and who are expected to take the whole responsibility as individuals to integrate with the Dutch society (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2007).

While the policies on integration of immigrants have passed through a transformation from multiculturalism to assimilation all over Europe, but especially in the countries who have a higher number of immigrant populations like the UK, France, Germany or the Netherlands via different kind of policies and implementations, right-wing political

parties have made these issues point of order, and used in their rhetoric and party propaganda during the elections. They have politicized these issues with the perception of threat to their ethnicity, culture, or religion-based identity. This process has influenced the hosting societies attitudes towards immigrants, too, with the same concerns, which needs further and more in-depth elaboration through supportive theoretical approaches, because societies are not independent reified social agents and the meaning of social security does matter for individuals on the contrary of societal security concept (Theiler, 2003). At this point, Realistic and Symbolic Group Conflict Theories come to the fore.

#### **2.4.2 Realistic and Symbolic Group Conflict Theories as the Driving Forces of Negative Attitudes towards Immigrants**

In the 1990s, there was a "moral panic in Europe about immigration and ethnic diversity," because of a perception of threat to European security, economic system or social cohesion, according to Vasta (2007, 713), when the temporary workers were realized to settle permanently. This situation was pushed further together with the salience of far-right political parties and their negative discourse about immigrants. Vasta (2007, 714) acknowledges that mainstream parties and more importantly governments lost control within this process, because the far-right parties, as observed in the Netherlands via Lijst Pim Fortuyn in the following years, built their arguments on the issue of integration and argued that immigrants did not fulfill 'their responsibility to integrate.' It has been brought to the agenda that the integration policies in the Netherlands have shifted from multiculturalism to assimilation in the following years (Van Oers et al., 2013).

As acknowledged by Sidanius and Pratto (1999, 3), "the social science literature on the interrelated topics of stereotyping, prejudice, intergroup relations, gender, race, and class discrimination" has increased enormously depending on the related incidents

observed all over the world. Parallel to this increase, the theories that are trying to interpret such topics have also been diversified.

Realistic Group Conflict Theory is one of them focusing on intergroup relations, which is one of the most comprehensive ones that may explain the politicization initiatives of the political parties, particularly the right-wing ones, when the hosting communities' employment opportunities, economic conditions, and briefly limited resources are in issue. According to the theory, the intergroup discrimination and prejudice occur once the parties in society, for instance, feel locked in a competition over valuable and limited material resources (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; McLaren, 2003; Brief et al., 2005; Grande et al., 2019).

However, the studies conducted in the Netherlands show that the political parties' negative rhetoric does not usually focus on struggling for limited material resources between majority and minority groups, or with other words native Dutch and immigrant Dutch groups. Both the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) data and some statistical analyses made in the Netherlands show that most societal tensions in the country are felt and experienced between different ethnic nationalities (Kremer, 2013), which means despite the existence of economic problems depending on immigrant-based unemployment, for instance, ethnicity, race, identity-based issues come to prominence. Brief et al. (2005) mention some out-group distinctions as the reason for the majority's reactions towards immigrants in this context and give the example of the race made salient by this majority group. Many similar studies show that citizens react to third-country nationals in their countries because of the perception that immigration poses a threat to the identity and safety first, and later on their economic development. However, in any case, this situation causes a perception of threat and competition.

As for the symbolic group conflict theory, groups perceive differences in values, norms, and beliefs, which is expected to be a threat to the in-group's cultural identity and way of life (McLaren, 2003). When Europe is concerned, it is evident that the immigrants coming out of Europe are culturally different from the dominant nationalities, and they have different religions such as Islam. "Many of these differences are quite visible in terms of attire, with fairly large groups of immigrants

in many countries clearly indicating religious affiliation and cultural ties through their clothing" (McLaren, 2003, 917).

Velasco González et al. (2008) conducts a specific study about realistic threats, symbolic threats and stereotyping (it is not mainly related to the perception of threat, thus not elaborated in this study) in the Netherlands, which proves that in-group identification is associated positively only with symbolic threat and not with realistic threat and stereotypes stemming from Muslims. Velasco González et al. (2008) mention a prejudice towards specifically Muslims in the Netherlands, depending on fear and perceptions of an economic, physical, or political threat and a threat towards norms and values within the Dutch society, particularly after 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA. In their analysis, "(o)ne out of two participants was found to have negative feelings towards Muslims. (...) (I)t was found that stereotypes and symbolic threats, but not realistic threats, predicted prejudice towards Muslims" (Velasco González et al., 2008, 667). Similarly, in the research of Azrout and Wojcieszak (2017), anti-immigrant sentiments are studied in order to make a comparative analysis with Dutch attitudes toward two distinct immigrant groups, Muslims and Poles, about two different EU policies, the strengthening of EU integration and also EU enlargement by Turkey's membership. According to that, "attitudes toward Poles have a stronger impact on support for EU strengthening through utilitarian considerations, compared to the impact through identity-related considerations", however, "attitudes toward Muslims predict individual support for Turkey's membership through identity, rather than utilitarian considerations," which means Poles present realistic threats and Muslims present symbolic threats (Azrout & Wojcieszak, 2017, 66-67).

In a nutshell, as a theoretical approach, it is also embraced in this Ph.D. study that symbolic threats are "equally expected to engender opposition to immigration and immigrants" (Castelli Gattinara & Morales, 2017, 275), which in the long run used by the political parties to bring the public attention on immigrants via politicization and manipulate the native Dutch community's attitudes towards Turkish-Dutch immigrants.

### **2.4.3 Political Participation of Immigrants through Constructivism and Reactive Ethnicity**

In explaining the political participation of immigrants as a counter-reaction of politicization of the issues related to them such as ethnicity, race, religion, or culture constructivism is one of the theories best fits with the issue, by arguing that "social identities, including ethnicity, as being continuously created through people's actions" (Slootman, 2018, 21).

For the realists or liberals, domestic politics, including political culture, part of which is the identity politics of immigrants and their political participation, do not count for very much, with the words of Wiarda (2014). However, domestic politics, as well as political culture, play an integral part within the society. Constructivism fills this gap according to him, and it does not only focus on beliefs and values, but also more domestic political factors such as religion, identity, values, ideology, belief systems, behavioral orientation, and of course culture (Wiarda, 2014).

Constructivism emphasizes the importance of normative and material structures besides identity in political action, and it points out the constitutive relationship between agents and structures (Reus-Smit, 2005; Barnett, 2014). The theory argues that norms and ideas are crucial to understanding state and non-state actors' behaviors and figuring out the interests and correlation of these interests with identity (Barnett, 2014). Normative and ideational structures form the social identities of political actors, according to the constructivists, thus institutionalized norms of a state, for example, shape the identity of its citizens (Reus-Smit, 2005). Wiarda (2014, 148) identifies identity politics as a "status-seeking that is based around categories like gender, class, ethnicity, (...), or political identification." The political arguments in identity politics emanate from "the self-interested perspectives of self-identified societal interest groups (...), in ways that people's politics are shaped by these narrower (non-national) aspects of their identity" (Wiarda, 2014, 148). It coincides with the constructivist perspectives. Similarly, Slootman (2018, 21-22) argues that in the constructivist perspective "ethnic identities are seen as emerging from boundaries that are

constructed between (imagined) social groups" and "(t)hese constructed boundaries make people see themselves as members of groups and are recognized as such by others," which explains the logic behind gathering the immigrant communities around of ethnic, religious or cultural identities in the process of developing identity politics.

While most of the theories focus on the distribution of material power, constructivists argue that the most critical aspect of relations is social, not material, and this exists with the intersubjective awareness of people constituted by ideas, thoughts, and norms (Jackson & Sorensen, 2006). Kratochwil (2008) states that agencies are not material or ideal throughputs of structures; they matter in social life. Interests and ideas, or notions in other words that the actors or agents have about their actions, also matter (Kratochwil, 2008). Similarly, Wendt (1987, 337-338) argues that human agents and structures are theoretically interdependent and this interdependent relationship depends on two truisms about social life: "human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live," "society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors."

Hopf (1998, 174), as one of the leading constructivists, particularly stresses the importance of identity in domestic society "to ensure at least some minimal level of predictability and order" in terms of the actors' behaviors. "In telling you who you are, identities strongly imply a particular set of interests or preferences with respect to the choices of action in particular domains, and with respect to particular actors" (Hopf, 1998, 175), which come into prominence in terms of developing identity politics, too. Wendt (1992, 398), as the person also comes to the mind when social constructivism is at the table, acknowledges that 'identities are the basis of interests.' As expected, these interests may be reformed or altered when the identities are at risk, as observed in the case of identity politics produced both by the hosting and immigrant communities. "Constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world" (Adler, 1997, 322).

Following these arguments, "(b)y emphasizing that the interests of actors cannot be treated as exogenously given or inferred from a given material structure" and being

aware of the influence of "political culture, discourse and the social construction of interests and identities" on preference formation (Risse, 2009, 146), the constructivist theory is used in this Ph.D. research. It is believed that constructivism can offer a suitable method for analyzing immigrants' political participation, especially after the 2000s, since then only a few immigrants from all ethnic groups in the Netherlands were interested in Dutch political issues or in being a politician (Janssens, 2015).

Rationalists believe that agents' behaviors are governed not by a logic of appropriateness but a logic of consequences, which means that states, for example, have interests shaped exogenously (Phillips, 2007). However, for the constructivists, agents' behaviours and identities "are governed by the normative and ideological structures that they inhabit" (Phillips, 2007, 62). Following these general principles, constructivists give special effort to figure out the meaning of an actor's attempt or attitude, and it argues that meaning derived from culture contrary to the rationalists, who believe that culture constraints action (Barnett, 2014).

Studying the politicization of immigration and its impact on immigrants through identity politics makes a thorough human perception and understanding necessary, in which "personal experience, intuition, and skepticism work alongside each other to help refine the theories and experiments" in the research (Stake, 2010, 11). As argued by Hopf (1998), constructivism falls short of explaining the origins of identity, at this point, which makes developing identity politics more understandable. He argues that constructivism "as a theory of process, does not specify the existence, let alone the precise nature or value, of its main causal/constitutive elements: identities, norms, practices, and social structures," instead of that it "specifies how these elements are theoretically situated vis-a-vis each other, providing an understanding of a process and an outcome, but no a priori prediction per se" (Hopf, 1998, 197).

Considering the emergence of strong social and political identities and subsequent studies of political psychologists and IR scholars regarding these identities, supportive theories or approaches come into prominence. The Social Identity Theory is one of them as a "sub-field of social psychology that is concerned with group behavior" (Theiler, 2003, 258). It addresses the "intergroup conflicts, conformity to group norms, the effects of low group status and the conditions under which it generates collective

action, and the factors that promote the categorization of oneself and others into groups" (Huddy, 2001, 128).

According to the theory, social groups, Turkish-Dutch Muslim immigrants, for instance, as in our case, are important sources to feel pride and self-esteem, and they provide a sense of belonging to the related social world (Taifel & Turner, 1979). Deaux et al. (1995, 288) argue that "we would expect predictions from social identity theory to be (the) most applicable to ethnic, religious, political" identities. As for the reactive counter-responses of the related immigrant communities to the identity-based concerns and related attitudes of far-right political parties, the Reactive Ethnicity approach comes to the forefront.

According to the social identity theory, individuals "need to maintain a positive self-image," which is linked to their self-esteem formed in social comparison (Theiler, 2003, 258). In this framework, "people distinguish their in-groups from out-groups in ways that they perceive favorably to reflect upon the in-group (and thus upon themselves) and, by extension, negatively upon the out-group" (Theiler, 2003, 258, 261). In this process, social identity has been developed, and, once it is developed, it is preserved by the group members. Therefore, when there is a threat to the group's status or existence, it is perceived as if it is directed towards the individual members of the group (Theiler, 2003).

Sometimes political parties, mostly the right-wing populist ones, follow some divisive campaigns towards minority groups within the society, especially by media channels, either because of canvassing directly, especially during the election campaigns, or because of realistic and symbolic threat perception. Such campaigns may accentuate "group differences, heightening group consciousness of those differences, hardening ethnic identity boundaries between 'us' and 'them'" (Rumbaut, 2008, 110), too, which is called as Reactive Ethnicity.

Similarly, Herda (2018, 373) argues that when a minority group experiences discrimination in a society by the majority groups, it reacts by "either crystallizing their minority identity, rejecting identification with the majority, or by sometimes



developing unique cultural features, which do not necessarily resemble the host society or the origin culture," which is ethnic identity formation.

In the formation of reactive ethnicity social similarities or dissimilarities in between the majority and minority groups play the crucial role, because they affect their daily life experiences especially when the “socially visible and categorized markers as gender, phenotype, accent, language, name, and nationality” (Rumbaut, 2008, 110). Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) point out ethnicity and religion as the essential social markers in terms of group identity. In this context, when the Muslim minority groups’ visible markers like headscarves of women, the shape of the beard and clothing of men, or their names are concerned, compared to the European counterparts, this type of reactive ethnicity formation becomes highly possible in Europe.


## **2.5 Conclusion**

Concisely, the research points out that the far-right political parties take advantage of the changing atmosphere in the Netherlands in terms of integration and migration policies from multiculturalism towards assimilation after the 1990s that is constructed through societal security concerns of the Dutch governments back then. Far-right political parties formulate their arguments and negative rhetoric towards immigrants in this atmosphere by using identity-based security concerns, which find meaning with symbolic group conflict theory, and influence the native Dutch community’s attitudes towards immigrants in a negative manner, too.

The identity based normative structures and the politicization of Muslim immigrants cause the counter-reactions of immigrants following the social interaction, as argued by constructivism. In the form of political participation, the behaviors of immigrants are shaped with the norms and ideas that produce interests depending on identity. Thus, the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community, in return, reacts to the negative politicization process, as well as to the repercussions of this politicization process on their daily lives because of changing attitudes of native Dutch people, by developing

identity politics realized by reactive ethnicity formation, which points out to the status-seeking of immigrants based on their race, ethnicity, religion, and culture.

Depending on the two-phased structure of the research design, the study analyzes the impact of politicization on political participation motivated by identity politics and tries to correlate this process with further political integration of immigrants via the abovementioned multidimensional theoretical approaches in the next chapters through the following conceptual framework.



**Figure 1** *Conceptual Framework*

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **POLITICIZATION OF IMMIGRANTS**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

European countries, particularly the Western European ones, have become the most attractive destinations for immigrants with the labor demand since the 1960s. International migration rates have been increasing since those years, especially from the Middle Eastern and African countries. "In absolute numbers, Europe's Muslim population is projected to grow from 44.1 million in 2010 to 58.2 million in 2030" (Pew Research Center, 2011). According to the data provided by the United Nations (UN) (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2019), the number of international migrants worldwide in 2019 was nearly 272 million, and 82 million of them lived in Europe.

Castles and Miller (2009, 20) identify migration as "a collective action, arising out of social change and affecting the whole society in both sending and receiving areas." For either native communities or immigrant communities themselves, the impacts of it are multidimensional, like economic, social, cultural, or sociological. Thus, the issue of immigration has been pointed out as one of the most controversial issues of the governments and ordinary citizens' political agenda in the 21st century, especially within the European countries (Favell, 2009).

In the 1960s and 1970s, cheap labor from particularly eastern and Muslim countries into Europe realized in small proportions. Therefore, neither hosting communities nor political actors paid sufficient attention to this phenomenon. Indeed, labor migration

was regarded as a temporary need of the Western European countries back then. However, when it was realized that the immigrants had begun to permanently settle and become part of the society, via family unification or some other ways, then uneasiness has begun to get off the ground within the societies based on the concerns about unemployment, economic problems, as well as integration issues, and finally the issues on cultural degeneration, or national degradation. These concerns have begun to be reflected via media, protests of the local people, or far-right/extremist political parties' rhetoric (Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998; Lahav, 2004; Green-Pedersen & Otjes, 2017). The reasons behind this phenomenon were multidimensional, but the most salient ones were the economic and socio-cultural differences among the members of these hosting and incoming communities, respectively, in years. The socio-cultural differences stemmed from different ethnicities, cultures, religions, and identities. The idea spread in waves was, with the words of Just et al. (2014, 127), "(i)nternational migration ha(d) altered the social makeup of Western democracies."

In the last couple of decades, traditionally tolerant and pro-immigrant European countries "are enacting stricter immigration policies for the new wave of immigrants, referred to as third-country nationals," (Tom, 2006, 451), with the reasons of economic and security problems, or racism and xenophobia; despite they theoretically support multiculturalism and unity in diversity as in the Netherlands. Such strict immigration policies and new implementations towards immigrants residing in the European countries are eventuating in some countries with different reactions among immigrant populations and further diversification and disintegration in societies like in the Netherlands. Tom (2006, 452) argues, "many of these new exclusionary immigration policies, such as those in the Netherlands, are effectuating discontent and exacerbating Islamic fundamentalism in Europe."

In this framework, within this Chapter first, the immigrants' main controversial discussion topics will be explained, which are diversity and integration. Following this explanation, the Chapter will deeply analyze the Dutch case based on these discussion topics in terms of the Dutch history of immigration, immigrant integration policies, and the role of far-right political parties on the politicization process of these issues in Dutch politics.

### **3.2 Main Issues Triggering the Politicization of Immigrants: Diversity and Integration**

While studying the notions of integration and diversity, Anthias (2013, 324) refers to the "concepts of the nature of society (that to which one should be integrating into) and concepts of the parameters of identity and difference (that from which one is diverse)." She attracts attention to the commonalities and structural contexts of integration and diversity and culture, as a frequently pointed out excuse in terms of differentiation within a society. In this sense, Brubaker (2002) stresses the changing characters of cultural groups and states that they cannot be treated as given; therefore, to understand group-making and their practices, not only culture but also overall societal framing should be taken into consideration. Thus, ethnic culture should be evaluated together with ideas and interests linked to nationalism, economy, and the racialization of the 'other' (Anthias, 2013).

Zetter et al. (2006, 5) identify "inclusivity" and "assimilation" as the instruments of social cohesion within the integration process. Nevertheless, unfortunately, this is not a two-sided process, because in this case, mostly the immigrant group, without even having full citizenship, turns into a law-abiding subject in social life. Thus, integration usually gives way to assimilation (Anthias, 2013). Just because of this reason, according to Anthias (2013, 335), integration and diversity "suffer from a focus on the cultural and identificational, construct rigid boundaries of self and others, and hold assumptions about good and bad difference."

The discussion on integration and diversity has impacts on nation-building directly. The sense of belonging issue plays a crucial role in nation-building. It is why the nationalist tendencies are mostly observed in the discussions of immigrants' social cohesion, their integration, and diversity within society. Such discussions bring about civic versus ethnic bases of citizenship dichotomy, which creates different notions of belonging among immigrants in terms of legal status, rights, and participation (Bloemraad et al., 2008). On the other hand, Bosniak (2017, 240) argues the

denationalization of citizenships, parallel to the argument that nation-state is becoming decentered.

As observed in Germany before the 2000s, ethnic nationalism excludes the migrants, because it means, "belonging to a nation rooted in descent," while civic nationalism includes migrants by meaning "belonging to rights and a universalist, voluntary political membership" as observed in France (Bloemraad et al., 2008, 158). Western European countries are diversifying in their civic orientation. For instance, France's civic republican universalism is different from the civic multiculturalism of the Netherlands in the 1970s and 1980s. Such a difference leads to different membership claims of immigrants (Bloemraad et al., 2008). According to a multicultural logic, immigrants' integration is successful when a "different-but-equal-to-us" logic is being followed, which is different from the integration model interpreting assimilation (Molles, 2013).

On the other hand, some analyses show that attitudes towards immigrants within society vary according to different immigrant groups. For instance, "migrants from regions with stronger economic, cultural, and political links to Britain are generally preferred to regions without such links" (Ford, 2011). Thus, there is clear discrimination towards and heterogeneous perception of immigration that European societies present towards immigrants, which is far beyond being black or white, but having a different religion, culture, or social heritage.

Within this context, Yavçan (2013, 174-175) argues in her study that "Magrebi immigrants in France, Pakistani immigrants in the UK, or Turkish, and Bosnian immigrants in Austria may not be perceived similarly to other immigrants, and as a result may exert a more powerful influence on people's political preferences, such as voting for extreme right-wing parties, opposing immigration politics, or developing Eurosceptic attitudes."

### **3.3 Integration Policies in Dutch History since the 1970s**

After the Second World War, the Netherlands found itself in a labor shortage, as had also experienced in Germany. Back then, the national governments had solved the shortage by recruiting unskilled labor from abroad, which had changed “the cultural map of Dutch society,” according to Shadid (2006, 10). In the 1960s, some recruitment agreements were signed between the Dutch governments and the government of countries sending unskilled labor to the Netherlands. Turkey was one of these countries. There were four major minority groups in the Netherlands in those years: Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, and the Dutch Antilleans. Turks and Moroccans were called guest worker minorities for long since they were expected to leave the country once the Dutch economy recovered. However, this departure was never realized as planned.

Since the 19th century until the end of the 1970s, the main feature of the Dutch migration policy was "pillarization," "as a means of allowing tolerance for groups who maintained different religious beliefs, especially Catholics and Protestants, by allowing them to create their own institutions," during the modern ages "letting various societal sub-groups to have their own state-sponsored and semi-autonomous institutions for health care, social welfare, education, etc." (Vasta, 2007, 716).

Since the 1970s and early 1980s, the immigrant population grew fast in the Netherlands. This trend continued with family unification as well. The Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) in the Netherlands published an Ethnic Minorities report in 1979 and put forward the fact that most of the immigrants would stay permanently and called the government to prepare a policy providing equal participation of minorities in Dutch society (Van Oers et al., 2013, 12).

At the end of the 1970s, the immigration surplus crucially increased. Therefore, the Dutch government needed to take some measures to stop this trend, like tight visa requirements or limits on family reunion. In the meantime, the Dutch government

started to focus on the settled immigrants' legal position to diminish the differences between Dutch citizens and immigrants via naturalization (Van Oers et al., 2013, 12).

In the Netherlands, "the oil crises of the 1970s that brought labor recruitment to a halt; the decolonization of Surinam in 1975 that caused large immigration flows; ethnic riots in Rotterdam and Schiedeman in 1972 and 1976; and a series of terrorist acts carried out during the 1970s by Moluccan migrants" (Scholten, 2013, 100) required to take some political precautions at the beginning of the 1980s.

The Dutch government back then adopted a policy of multiculturalism when it was realized that the Surinamese, the Moluccans, the Antilleans, and Turkish and Moroccan workers would not go back to their countries as planned and the number of immigration from these countries continued to increase.

Until the 1980s, there was no civic integration policy in the Netherlands for immigrants (Berkhout, et al., 2015). There was a disproportionate level of unemployment in those years, and the minorities were getting more and more dependent on the welfare state financially, which caused making multiculturalism a scapegoat (Bahçeli, 2018). In those years, anti-immigration attitudes were first revealed in politics by Hans Janmaat, who called for the abolition of multiculturalism (Damhuis, 2019). This policy was formed on the historical pillarization within the Netherlands (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2010, 41), which goes back to the 1960s. During those years, there was a cleavage within the society depending on religion (Protestant, Catholic) and class (Lijphart, 1975), and afterward, socio-cultural cleavages were also added to this pillarization together with the increasing number of immigrants (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2010). By the policy, the immigrant groups had some "local voting rights for non-nationals and public funding of Islamic schools" in the 1980s (Verkuyten, 2006).

According to the critics, the multiculturalism pursued in the Netherlands before the 2000s paved the way for ignoring integration problems "such as urban segregation, criminality, radicalization, and alienation of significant groups within Dutch society" (Scholten, 2013, 97). In those years, the recognition of cultural groups was accused of being the reason for ethnocultural cleavages in the society and alienating these groups from the society (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy, 2005).



**Table 1***Problem perceptions of immigration and policy perspectives*

	<b>Perception of the presence of immigrants</b>	<b>Perception of immigration</b>	<b>Policy perspective</b>
<b>Two-tracks policy (&lt;1980s)</b>	Temporary presence, eventual return to home countries	Immigration is temporary; the Netherlands is not a country of immigration	No integration, preservation of own cultural identity so as to facilitate return migration
<b>Minorities Policy (1980s)</b>	Specific immigrant groups are recognized as permanent minorities	Immigration is temporary, the arrival of minorities was a historically unique event	Integration, but with preservation of the own identity in the Dutch multicultural society
<b>Integration Policy (1990s)</b>	Immigrant presence is permanent	Immigration is a permanent phenomenon; the Netherlands is an immigration country	Good citizenship, social-economic participation (housing, labor, education)
<b>Integration Policy 'New Style' (&gt;2003)</b>	Immigrant presence is permanent; the origin of immigrants is diversified	Immigration needs to be halted; the Netherlands should not be a country of immigration	Common citizenship, cultural adaptation (language, norms and values)

*Note.* Reprinted from “Building bridges across frames? A Meta-Evaluation of Dutch Integration Policy,” by P. W. A. Scholten and F. K. M. Van Nispen, 2008, *Journal of Public Policy*, 28(2), p. 189.

The integration policies in the 1980s focused on the preservation of immigrants' cultures (Berkhout, Sudulich, et al., 2015). They provided equality before the law between people, which was underlined by the Dutch constitution in 1983 by stating that "(a)ll persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in all circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted" (Vink, 2007, 341).

With the 1983 Ethnic Minorities Policy, the Dutch government back then realized the urgent need for the equivalence and equal opportunities of all residents in the Netherlands. Thus it developed a "number of general provisions that related specifically to the legal status of immigrants, most notably concerning political participation and citizenship status", which introduced "local voting rights for non-national immigrants after five years of residence" (Vink, 2007, 340).

The policy was identified as a welfare policy and somehow the continuation of the pillarization for the immigrant groups, because it "funded new ethnic and religious minority communities for their own places of worship and media, and certain types of the educational provision on the same basis as pre-existing parallel institutional arrangements" in order to control integration of immigrants (Vasta, 2007, 716).

After 1985, Dutch language tests began to be used in immigrants' nationalization processes to see whether an immigrant fulfilled the integration requirement (Van Oers et al., 2013, 24). As part of the integration policies and 1986 Nationality Act, dual citizenship was accepted by the Dutch authorities between 1992 and 1997 (Vink, 2007).

In the 1990s more egalitarian approach was acquired providing equal opportunities to migrants within the society (Berkhout, Sudulich, et al., 2015), nevertheless within the same period, particularly "Christian Democrats, Conservative Liberals, and the small Christian parties insisted on a stricter integration requirement" (de Hart, 2004, 28). In order to catalyze the integration of individual immigrants into the Dutch society within those years, a new approach was developed by the government, which brought "about a shift from a 'minorities' policy' to an 'integration policy'" by fuller participation of immigrants (Van Oers et al., 2013, 12). For instance, with the 1998 Act on the Civic

Integration of Newcomers, newcomer programs were introduced, which "required individual immigrants to take obligatory language and societal knowledge courses (Van Oers et al., 2013, 12).

The new policy focused on "the social-economic participation of immigrants as citizens, or allochthonous (... Dutch term to refer to first and second-generation immigrants), rather than the emancipation of minorities", which targeted to have immigrants economically independent participants of the Dutch society by living up their civic rights (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2010, 43).

In 1994, Equal Treatment Act was prepared, through which an Equal Treatment Commission (ETC) was established, and this body started to work on the "cases of direct and indirect discrimination, mainly in employment and education" within the society towards ethnic minorities (Vink, 2007, 341). Until the end of the 1990s, unemployment was comparatively very high among immigrants and native Dutch population, which was decreased by the booming Dutch economy at the end of the 1990s, however, the difference between especially people with the non-western origin and native Dutch stayed around two to three times (Vasta, 2007, 719).

Scholars mention clear segregation in the Netherlands in education (Kremer, 2013). From 1985 to 2000, the number of primary education schools with almost 70% immigrant students increase from 15% to 35%, which are called as "black" schools, compared to "white" schools (in which almost only native Dutch students get an education) (Vasta, 2007; Kremer, 2013). Even though it improved slightly among Turks and Moroccans over time comparatively between first and second-generation immigrant groups, it was still low at the beginning of the 2000s, according to Vasta (2007, 720). According to Doornik (1998, 14), "ethnic segregation is a phenomenon endemic to almost all larger West European cities." Apparently, in the "black schools," almost wholly immigrant children were studying.

In 1998 several new compulsory programs were developed to provide immigrants' integration into Dutch society and culture (Vasta, 2007). On the other hand, some sanctions were introduced for those who could not achieve the expected civic and

language grades in these programs, such as being deprived of some welfare benefits in failing to take the classes (Vasta, 2007, 718).

When the 2000s arrived, and the populist far-right party politicians like Pin Fortuyn brought up the issue to the agenda, and the Dutch government reframed its policies towards immigrants once again under the quite a bit of similar name; "Integration Policy 'New S.'le'." The new policy favored 'common citizenship' instead of 'active citizenship' supported in the previous policy version. It became assimilationist, which meant "the unity of society must be found in what members have in common... that is that people speak Dutch and that one abides by basic Dutch norms" (TK 2003-2004, 29203, nr. 1:8. as cited in Duyvendak & Scholten, 2010, 43). Thus, in the end, "(t)he views of the Netherlands as a multi-ethnic or multicultural society now moved into the background," because the issue was not the active part of public policy any longer for the Dutch governments. (Scholten, 2013, 103).

In those years, Muslim origin immigrants begin to be associated with radical Islam depending on some local or international events mentioned earlier, in Chapter 1, which cause a widespread skepticism towards multiculturalism, according to Kaya (2012), and pave the way for pressure on the Dutch government to tightening its immigration and integration measures. According to Duyvendak and Scholten (2011), Dutch integration policy turns into an assimilationist one with the 2000s. After these years, the Dutch immigration policy requires the prospective residents, let alone citizens, to pass a Dutch language and culture test before arriving at the country. However, such regulation is implemented only after the arrival in many other European countries (Tom, 2006, 461). Another difficulty for immigrants is the high residence permit fees, requiring prospective residents to prove a certain amount of income upon arrival (Tom, 2006). Under the 2000 Aliens Act, in order to limit marital migration and family reunification in the Netherlands, some measures were taken by the Dutch government and these measures became stricter in 2003, for instance, Dutch residents had to be above the age of 18 (after 2003 above 21), to be the residents of the Netherlands for a certain number of years, and to have a certain amount of money to have the Dutch citizenship (Snel, Boom, & Engbersen, 2004).

In the same year, the Parliamentary Committee on Integration Policy was established in the Netherlands and launched to work on immigrants' integration into the society and Dutch way of life. According to Meeteren et al. (2013, 164), "after the 2002 elections (...) integration policies focused more on assimilation, while immigration policies became increasingly selective". Rita Verdonk was the Minister of Immigration in the Netherlands between 2003 and 2006. She introduced "stricter migration laws and new policies to educate/integrate citizens with an immigration background" (Berkhout et al., 2015), which intensified the country's discussions regarding the immigration and integration. During her Ministry, "a new cultural integration exam" was introduced with the same purpose mentioned above (Berkhout et al., 2015).

In 2007 the Integration Act (IA) came into force and instead of an integration test, a naturalization test was begun to be used, according to which, minorities to apply for the citizenship "had to pass the 'naturalization test' in which they had to prove sufficient knowledge of Dutch society and to be able to speak, understand, read and write Dutch" (Van Oers et al., 2013, 25). Therefore, in the integration test, basic knowledge of both the Dutch language and Dutch society had been required before that change (Meeteren et al., 2013). According to Van Oers et al. (2013, 25), "(i)ntegration was no longer to be stimulated but was a requirement."

Since 2013, the Dutch system has new policies related to immigrants requiring them to take some examinations on Dutch language and society, which were passed in the parliament with the support of Party for Freedom (PVV) under the center-right coalition government period from 2010 to 2012 (World Politics Review, 2018). While in the previous system, the government was paying the preparatory integration courses and the required examinations in Dutch language and society for immigrants, in the new one, immigrants make their payment for integration (World Politics Review, 2018).

In a nutshell, "(w)hereas ethnic-minority group formation was previously tolerated in order to facilitate their expected return, and for emancipatory purposes, group formation was increasingly regarded as undesirable as it supposedly hampered integration and social cohesion" by native Dutch after the 2000s (Koopmans et al., 2005); Slootman, 2018, 65).

There is now a culture and identity-based integration policy in the Netherlands, in which newcomers' integration is expected to be realized by embracing existing Dutch cultural values and actively participating in society through 'civic integration programs' and the "participation declaration" prepared in 2014 (Slootman, 2018). Participation declaration is a document prepared to bind new immigrants morally to the Dutch society, make them embrace existing Dutch cultural values, and make them self-sustaining by affirming their intention (Slootman, 2018).

The current coalition government in the Netherlands, consisting of People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), Democrats 66 (D66), and the Christian Union (CU), proposes a less strict policy slightly for 2020 compared to the current one, but in terms of integration of immigrants, strict language, history, and society requirements will most probably continue to exist.

### **3.4 Muslim Immigrants as the Subject of Integration**

Shadid (2006, 12) categorizes the Dutch migration history in terms of attitudes towards Muslim population and Islam in three periods as follow: the 1960s -1970s is the period of negligence; the 1980s is the period of awareness and ethnicization of Islam, and the 1990s is the period of stigmatization and exclusion.

During the negligence period, immigrants from Turkey and Morocco were represented as guest workers, who were expected to reside temporarily in the Netherlands. "Most of these immigrants came from rural areas and had low levels of formal education," and most of them "remained in the lower socioeconomic strata" (Slootman, 2018, 70). In the 1970s, the Dutch government pursued a two-folded policy regarding these immigrant groups, "aiming both at the integration and the return of immigrants to their home countries" and the motto of this policy was "integration with preservation of cultural identity" (Van Oers et al., 2013, 12). Until the late 1970s, beyond their nationality, immigrants' religion did not attract that much attention within the inclusive migration policy of the Dutch government (Sunier & Van Kuijeren, 2002 as cited in

Koyuncu-Lorasdağı, 2013), because the primary attention was paid to create a multicultural society.

However, this policy, predicting to create multiculturalism, could not prevent the tensions in society, because the immigrants "brought with them their native languages, cultural norms, values, and social customs to local Dutch neighborhoods" and this process paved the way for general "contemporary debates over Islam" in the Netherlands (Shadid, 2006, 11).

In the 1980s, during the period of growing awareness towards Muslim immigrants and ethnicization of Islam, Turks and Moroccans have been identified by Islam (Shadid, 2006, 14). "Ethnicization of Islam" is defined by Koyuncu-Lorasdağı (2013, 60) as a 'process in which truly practiced Islam has become the determining ethnic marker in the identity formation of headscarved Dutch students of Turkish origin', even if they do not identify themselves with Islam. Thus, the ethnic designation of Turks and Moroccans, as the largest immigrant group in Dutch society, was linked to the Muslim religion in public representation and media coverage (Shadid, 2006).

After the 1990s, as mentioned earlier, stricter migration policies, comparatively to the 1970s and 1980s, were started to be implemented to encourage integration, although some scholars criticize it as a way of assimilation (Janssens, 2015). Shadid (2016) defines this period as stigmatization and exclusion towards Muslim immigrants. Some Muslim media outlets were shut down in that process (Tom, 2006), which was galvanized by the far-right political parties and their propaganda against immigration and Islam. Nevertheless, Tom (2006) still describes Dutch migration policy as tolerant and open before the 2000s by referring to the significant number of Muslim immigrants. In the 2000s, he mentions an exclusionary Dutch migration policy as a reflection of global policy change in the EU (European migration management) toward the issue in question depending on security issues, difficulties in social cohesion, economic problems, and so on. Especially with the strengthening of right-wing Eurosceptic parties in the Netherlands and in many other EU member countries, the issue of immigrants has become more salient in national and supranational discussions.

These parties in the Netherlands, like Pim Fortuyn List, Party for Freedom, or just currently Forum for Democracy have discursively politicized the issue of Muslim immigrants and migration from Muslim countries to increase their electoral success by arguing that these immigrants threaten national identity, degenerate social and cultural structures of the society, and cause economic problems for the overall Dutch community. Within this atmosphere, let alone integrating the immigrant groups into the society, the largest immigrant groups in the country (Turks and Moroccans) have been called "allochthones," which means they are originating from outside the country (Shadid, 2006, 11).

Regarding immigrants' education, it has been argued that the segregation is continuing along class and ethnic lines. For instance, "(c)hildren can sometimes be refused entry to schools on the basis of their religion or ethnicity," or "complaints have been made to the Equal Treatment Commission that ethnic minority students were put on a waiting list for placement into a particular denominational school" (Vasta, 2007, 722). According to the latest statistical data, "(a)round 5% (4.5%) of the 16.7 million Dutch citizens are Moroccan-Dutch and Turkish-Dutch (636,000 and 696,000, respectively), of which roughly half belong to the second generation" (CBS, 2012 as cited in Sloomman, 2018, 69). Although the first generation immigrants stayed with a lower level of education, the second-generation Turkish Dutch immigrants are moving upwards, at least in terms of higher education. "In 2011, nearly four out of ten young adult Moroccan- Dutch and Turkish-Dutch men and nearly five out of ten women entered higher education (HBO or university). Only eight years earlier, in 2003/2004, this was still roughly three out of ten men and women" (CBS 2012, p. 85 as cited in Sloomman, 2018, 73). These percentages are still lagging behind the native Dutch citizens, but as Sloomman (2018) stresses that it should not be ignored while assessing the 'integration' effort of immigrants themselves.

Employment statistics are also challenging regarding Muslim immigrants. "Around 10% of the Moroccan-Dutch and Turkish-Dutch with an HBO or university diploma are unemployed, versus 5% of the higher-educated ethnic Dutch. Among the lower educated, the difference is even greater. Unemployment among the lower-educated



Moroccan-Dutch and Turkish-Dutch is over 20 and 15%, respectively, while only over 5% of the lower-educated ethnic Dutch are unemployed" (Slootman, 2018, 74).

### **3.5 Anti-Immigrant and Anti-Islam Attitudes of Far-Right Political Parties**

In the 2000s, opposition to further immigration has become observable within Party and electoral politics in the Netherlands. At the beginning of the 2000s, populist party leader Pim Fortuyn explicitly stated that the Netherlands was full (Snel, Boom, & Engbersen, 2004, 1). Far-right political parties usually adopt a strict immigration policy by thinking that it is a promising electoral issue (Mudde, 2007; 2013). According to that, immigration and integration issues played the most significant role in the elections for the first time in Dutch political history in the 2000s (Snel, Boom, & Engbersen, 2004, 1). This situation affected the general public opinion as well, and in 2002 elections almost two-thirds of the Dutch population felt that there were too many immigrants in the country (SCP 2003, 370 as cited in Snel et al., 2004).

These parties point out the immigrant communities mostly as the reason for cultural and social degeneration in the hosting society, the threat against exclusive national identity, and one of the factors causing economic problems in the country like unemployment. When the far-right political parties have become powerful or at least politically visible enough in the country, and when there are financial difficulties in that country, moreover unemployment and so on, then their arguments and policies will most likely become more salient among the peoples via discursive politicization of these issues by creating a dissociation between in-group and out-group within the same society.

According to Jackman (1977 as cited in Hobolt et al., 2011, 32), "the concept of intolerance is (...) closely connected to the notion of prejudice; that is, stereotyped and negative beliefs about a group". Prejudices and stereotypes are studied via "social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner, 1999), group conflict theory (Blumer, 1958; McLaren, 2006; Quillian, 1995) and integrated threat theory (Stephan and

Stephan, 1993, 1996)", in which it has been argued that "negative out-group evaluations are related to a strong in-group identity, and thus a positive sense of 'social self'" (Hobolt et al., 2011, 362). According to this argument, out-groups' prejudiced evaluations can stem from realistic threats to in-group interests, symbolic threats to values, norms and beliefs, negative stereotyping of an out-group, or intergroup anxiety caused by feeling threatened by members of the out-group (Hobolt et al., 2011).

Within the European countries, this uneasiness attributed to immigrants have come into prominence by the party policies and propaganda of far-right political parties especially in the last couple of decades, like Party for Freedom (PVV) and Forum for Democracy (FvD) from the Netherlands, the Front National (FN) from France, The League (La Lega) from Italy, or Alternative for Germany (AfD) from Germany. These far-right political parties have combined their anti-EU attitude, which has been the underlying Eurosceptic sentiment within them, with the issue of migration, exclusive national identity, and the issue of socio-cultural degeneration in their society stemming from immigrant communities' different ethnicities, culture, religion, and identity - both domestic and non-EU.

Different than before, in around the last twenty years, the anti-immigrant statements have suddenly become one of the most used discourses of these far-right parties. For instance, in 2016, one of his speeches, right-wing Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orban, "has described the arrival of asylum seekers in Europe as a poison" by stating that Hungary did not want even one single migrant (The Guardian, 2016).

The Netherlands is slightly separated from other European countries with its very well known far-right political Party: Party for Freedom (PVV). This Party's difference is its leader, Geert Wilders's anti-immigrant attitude focusing specifically on the immigrants who are coming from the Islamic countries, despite thousands of Muslim people living in the Dutch territory. Imposing a ban on all Islamic symbols, mosques and the Koran in the country, preventing immigration from Islamic countries, forbidding women from wearing a headscarf or imposing fine on headscarf are only some of its party policies. He touches upon the issue of migration and Islam as the main problem of Europe today in his speeches that he has given in several different cities and countries from Malmö to Copenhagen, from Rome to New York, from Berlin to Bonn, and his tone of

criticism has never been observed in the other far-right political party cases from different European countries. He points out the issues of migration and Islam together as a growing threat toward the Western world in his words. Some examples of these statements of Wilders are quoted below:

I travel the world to tell people what Europe has become. I wish I could take you all on a visit to my country and show you what Europe has become. It has changed beyond recognition as a result of mass immigration. And not just any mass immigration, but mass immigration driven by the dangerous force of (I)slam. (...) We are not going to allow (I)slam to steal our country from us. (...) (W)e must stop the (I)slamization of our countries. More (I)slam means less freedom. There is enough (I)slam in the West already. We must stop immigration from non-Western countries, which are mostly (I)slamic countries. (...) We must forbid the construction of new hate palaces called mosques (Wilders, 2011a).

There is enough Islam in Europe already. Immigrants must assimilate and adapt to our values: When in Rome, do as the Romans do (Wilders, 2011b).

(C)ultural relativists deny that immigrants should assimilate, since that would champion European culture over the immigrants' native cultures. They tell the Islamic newcomers who settle in our cities and villages: you are free to violate our norms and values, since your culture is just as good as ours. This is a lie; this is not true. Cultures are not equal. Our culture, based on Humanism, Christianity and Judaism, is far better than the barbaric Islamic culture (Wilders, 2012a).

During the past three decades, Europe made a fatal mistake. It allowed millions of people from Islamic countries to immigrate into Europe. So many people rooted in a culture entirely different from our own Judeo-Christian and humanist tradition have entered Europe that our heritage, our freedoms, our prosperity and our culture are in danger (Wilders, 2012b).

(W)e must stop the Islamisation of our countries. More Islam means less freedom. Ladies and Gentlemen, there is already enough Islam in Europe. Immigrants ought to assimilate and accept our values (Wilders, 2013a).

Today, Europe, too, is confronted with millions of immigrants. Unfortunately, many of these immigrants are not strengthening nor enriching our societies, because many of them refuse to assimilate and they create a parallel society within our nations. A very large number of these immigrants have moved to Europe from Islamic countries. Europe is in the middle of an Islamization process, driven by immigration from North Africa, Turkey, the Middle East and other parts of the Islamic world, such as Somalia (Wilders, 2013b).

The EU project has failed. The euro has failed. We have paid billions for the South. We are no longer in control over own money, our national borders, our budget, our laws and immigration. (...) I say: no more Islam, no more sharia, no

more mosques, no more imams, no more immigration from Islamic countries (Wilders, 2013c).

Our mission is to stop all immigration from Islamic countries, to stimulate voluntary remigration of Islamic people, and to expel criminals and jihadists (Wilders, 2014a).

Recognize that Islam is the problem. Start the de-Islamisation of the Netherlands. Less Islam. Close our borders to immigrants from Islamic countries. Immediately border controls. Stop this "cultural enrichment (Wilders, 2014b).

We want to stop all immigration from Islamic countries. We want to stimulate voluntary re-emigration to Islamic countries. (...) We want to de-(I)sলামize our nation (Wilders, 2014c).

In one of his latest speeches in 2017, Wilders connects Islam and terrorism and points out immigration as the main reason for this combination. He even puts the so-called impacts of immigration from Islamic countries on Dutch culture, society, and identity, and economy aside after realizing that such rhetoric is no longer a useful tool in the process of canvassing, thus, mentions terrorism mostly in his current speeches. He states that "(t)he problems Europe faces today are existential. Not economics but (I)sলামisation, terrorism, and mass-immigration are our main problems" (Wilders, 2017).

Since 2016, there is also Forum for Democracy (FvD), with its young leader Thierry Baudet, in the Dutch political party family. FvD had gotten two seats in the March 2017 national elections for the Dutch lower house of parliament, whereas in the last Dutch provincial elections on March 20, 2019, it has secured almost 15% of the votes and got 12 seats, which makes it the second party after VVD within the elections for Senate. It follows campaigns against the EU, Muslim immigrants, Islamic face veils, and other face coverings, as PVV. FvD's leader Thierry Baudet has a more elitist style compared to Wilders, and he makes less provocative criticism on Islam; however, it does not mean he "never denounces Islam-related phenomena, such as radical imams, Islam-inspired terrorist attacks or big ostentatious mosques" (Damhuis, 2019, 12).

Bahçeli (2018, 75-78) argues that Turkish-Dutch citizens "and their identity (as being the biggest Muslim community in the Netherlands) have been increasingly problematized against a rightward shift in the Dutch integration debate over the last two decades," because "the Turkish diaspora has felt increasingly alienated from Dutch

society, disengaged from traditional parties" being confronted by an increased level of discrimination.

Of course, such anti-immigrant stances are not only realized via the far-right political parties. As observed during the refugee crisis and mass migration from the MENA region toward Europe after the Arab Spring, national governments' migration policies and subsequent financial problems put the issue in the middle of the main agendas of states as in Germany, France or Italy which are the leading countries in accepting comparatively more refugees than the other European countries and in which the issue has been politicized. Nevertheless, it is still the far-right parties who are more focusing on immigrants' issues in the party manifestos, keeping it always on the agenda and politicizing it (Vieten & Poynting, 2016).

### **3.6 How to explain the phenomenon of politicization in the Dutch Case through the far-right political parties?**

As acknowledged by van der Brug, D'Amato, Berkhout, and Ruedin (2015), and mentioned in Chapter 2, there are different typologies of politicization as "structurally top-down process," "agency based top-down process," "structurally bottom-up process," and "agency based bottom-up process."

In the top-down, policy-based typology, some groups' reactions against policies regarding immigrants cause the politicization, as explained before. In this context, some policy references are used for the analysis, such as political participation, access to nationality, or anti-discrimination; however, it is realized that the legislation on these fields does not change substantially from 1995 to 2009 (Berkhout et al., 2015). According to Berkhout et al. (2015), this means that, despite the lack of specific and observable policy changes regarding these policy references, the immigration and integration are still the subjects of increasing political debate during this period. Nevertheless, the specific stricter regulations that are taken into action regarding immigrants' family reunions, difficult integration exams for immigrants or new visa

procedures may explain the salience peaks in 2004 or 2007, although in absolute terms the general legislation about immigrants relatively favorable towards immigrants during these years (Berkhout et al., 2015).

Another top-down process, actions of specific groups, is the other type of politicization, like far-right political parties. According to the study, this typology does not provide sufficient explanation for the politicization phenomenon in the Netherlands either, because actors playing an active role in this process change over time from only some of the political parties and organizations representing minorities to the political parties and governmental bodies. The political parties and governmental bodies do not match the general perception that the politicization of the issue fueled by the anti-immigrant parties only. Nevertheless, still, in terms of claims, Rita Verdonk (VVD), Job Cohen (PvdA), and Geert Wilders (PVV) take the first seats during the period that is analyzed in terms of claims-making (Berkhout et al., 2015).

In case of the Netherlands, it is difficult to explain politicization of immigration with societal developments as a bottom-up process only, according to Berkhout et al. (2015), because the studies they follow did not give this expected result when patterns of immigration, cultural differences of immigrants and economic developments experienced within these years were considered as the main factors playing a particular role in politicization. First of all, the number of immigrants and the issue's politicization do not increase evenly in the Netherlands between 1995 and 2009. In those years, the non-Western migration rates decrease on the contrary. Furthermore, the increase in the number of immigrants stems from second-generation migrants who have grown up in Dutch culture, social structures, and education system directly.

"So, there is no evidence that a direct relationship exists between demographic developments and politicization" or no clear link between economic growth and politicization (Berkhout et al., 2015, 112). Because during the years, in which the politicization of immigrants makes a peak, the Dutch economy shows a high growth and low unemployment.

Finally, the last typology is the political opportunity structure as another top-down process of politicization. Although regarding the political opportunity structure, the

general situation remained stable in the Netherlands during these 15 years, "(t)he changes in the party system, and the post-2002 government coalitions (...) provided opportunities for the politicization of migration and integration" (Berkhout et al., 2015, 117). In this case, the parties opposing anti-immigration or restrictive regulations about migration come together and united. The civic integration issue was used by the opposition parties to divide the government coalition in those years (Berkhout et al., 2015).

As an end result, the politicization of immigration and subsequently, immigrant-related issues in the Netherlands can only be explained through a common understanding of these four abovementioned typologies, which are the combination of party system characteristics, events, and political leadership according to Berkhout et al. (2015). Nevertheless, as many other studies conducted in the Netherlands, which are elaborated in the following pages, show that in many cases, agency based top-down processes outweigh when the far-right populist parties' stances and reactions against immigrants and related government policies are taken into consideration. On the process of politicization, neither the mainstream parties nor the governmental bodies nor the fringe parties are the only players having full control in agenda-setting, but indeed, they both take advantage of using immigration as one of their election campaign propagandas when required.

### **3.7 Historical Landscape of Politicization of Immigrants and Immigrant Integration in the Netherlands since 1970s**

As Ruedin (2017) expressed, when there are more claims about a specific group on the political agenda, this group is more politicized. There are, of course, different pushing affects in the country for making an issue more politicized. In the case of the immigrants, Ruedin (2017, 9) mentions three indicators that might directly impact politicization: the size and visibility of immigrants, the possibility to participate in debates themselves, and immigration policy citizenship regimes of the country in the

issue. Depending on the research that he followed in the Netherlands and some other European countries (Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Spain, Switzerland, the UK) comparatively, he states that larger groups are not more politicized than smaller groups. Thus, size is not the main driving force behind. The study also shows that immigrant groups unlikely to fend for themselves, which means this does not turn out politicization. "Civil-society organizations and left-wing parties tend to make positive claims (...), but this is a reflection of their generally more positive stance on immigration" (Ruedin, 2017, 14). In the third indicator, the study shows that different forms of politicization can be expected depending on the different citizenship regimes, such as more ethnic or civic, or more pluralistic or monistic. For instance, in a more civic regime, there are more instrumental frames in contexts, while in a more ethnic regime, there are more identity frames in contexts.

As argued by Hoeglenger (2016), until the 1970s, the issue of migration or immigrants were not that salient in domestic or European level discussions. However, in the upcoming decades, their salience has increased, particularly among the populist radical right. Many scholars analyze the different periods from the perspective of the politicization of immigration and in conjunction with immigrants' politicization.

Fermin (1997) analyses and summarizes 1977-1995 in the Dutch political parties' documents on multi-ethnic society and integration policy. In this context, she studies the conservative-liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), the radical-liberal Democrats 66 (D66), the social-democratic Labor Party (PvdA), the left-wing Green Left (GL), the Christian Democrats (CDA), the conservative Protestant parties (SGP, GPV, RPF) and the extreme right-wing or anti-immigrant parties (the Centre Party (CP) and the Centre Democrats (CD).

She puts forward that "their viewpoints shifted during the study's time frame, from a preference for strategies combining individual and collective integration of minorities in the eighties to a preference for more obligatory and more limited forms of socio-economic and individual integration in the nineties, with a heavy accent on labor market participation" (Fermin, 1997, 288-289).



Vliegenthart and Boomgaarden (2007) elaborate the period of 1991-2002 Dutch newspapers in terms of politicization of immigration and immigrant integration in connection with social or political real-world developments such as 9/11 terrorist attacks, and key events such as parliamentary elections, political party leaders' speeches and their criticism on Islam for instance. The analysis put forward that some real-world events like 9/11 effect the politicization of migration and immigrant integration directly, and its impact declines very slowly in the process. Additionally, the success of politicization of migration and immigrant integration in the field of political party leaders' speeches –mostly the far-right-, depends on the charismatic performance of the person in issue as observed in the cases of VVD leader Frits Bolkestein and Pim Fortuyn, the leader of LPF. However, in any case, these developments or events influence politicization in the Dutch case.

Another study focuses on the period of 1995-2004 in terms of politicization of immigration and integration on parliament and media in the Netherlands. It shows that Dutch parliament's attention to these issues gradually increases throughout the whole period, but the attention in the media, which is used by the far-right political party List Pim Fortuyn in these years quite frequently and affectively, to these issues rises enormously since 2001 by focusing on Islam (Roggeband & Vliegenthart, 2007). In this period, Islam is reflected "as a threat to Dutch culture and values and a principal obstacle to the integration of Muslim migrants" (Roggeband & Vliegenthart, 2007, 543).


The Table 2 and Figure 2 show the use of different frames asked in parliament questions between 1995 and 2004 and yearly use of each frame in newspaper articles, respectively.

**Table 2***Percentage use of each frame in parliament between 1995 and 2004*


	<b>Left</b> <b>(SP, GL, PvdA)</b>	<b>Centre</b> <b>(CDA, D66)</b>	<b>Right</b> <b>(VVD,CU,SGP, LPF)</b>
Emancipation	.47	.33	.22
Multiculturalism	.17	.13	.03
Restriction	.15	.21	.02
Victimization	.05	.10	.06
Islam-as-threat	.16	.23	.67
Total number of questions (units)	126	67	90

*Note.* Reprinted from "Divergent framing: The public debate on migration in the Dutch parliament and media, 1995-2004" by C. Roggeband and R. A. Vliegthart, 2007, *West European Politics*, 30(3), p. 535.

As seen in Figure 2, the media follows the same framing with the political arena and frame the issues of integration and migration as issues concerning Islam and Muslim migrants almost above all other issues, except slight decreases against multiculturalism in 2000. Nevertheless, overall study and analysis show that the parliaments' attention to the issues of migration and integration is more stable throughout this period compared to media (newspapers) and slightly increases after 9/11; however, the media's attention to these issues rises enormously since then, which means the politicization of immigrant-related issues increases as well.




**Figure 2** *Yearly use of each frame in newspaper articles* Reprinted from "Divergent framing: The public debate on migration in the Dutch parliament and media, 1995-2004" by C. Roggeband and R. A. Vliegenthart, 2007, *West European Politics*, 30(3), p. 536.



**Figure 3** *Issue Salience in the Netherlands per year* Reprinted from "Just a shadow? The role of radical right parties in the politicization of immigration, 1995–2009" by S. Meyer and S. Rosenberger, 2015, *Politics and Governance*, 3(2), p. 12.

For the period of 1995-2009, Meyer and Rosenberger (2015) follow a study in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK regarding the politicization of immigration. They find out in their study that the party actors are key players in the politicization of immigration in these countries, although other non-party actors like civil society organizations or the media also dominate the politicization of immigration. The interesting finding in this study is that contrary to the general perception, “mainstream parties from both the left and the right (i.e., social democrats, liberals, and conservatives) outperform radical right parties in claims-making on immigration” (Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015, 8).


However, in terms of negative politicization, the radical-right parties stand out, except the UK, “where radical right parties are neither represented in parliament nor contribute significantly to the politicization of immigration through claims in the media (Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015, 9).



**Figure 4** *Issue salience as the average number of claims 1995–2009* Reprinted from "Just a shadow? The role of radical right parties in the politicization of immigration, 1995–2009" by S. Meyer and S. Rosenberger, 2015, *Politics and Governance*, 3(2), p. 9.

As seen in Figure 3, the Netherlands takes the first seat in terms of total salience of the issue of immigration. In terms of the radical-right salience, it takes the third seat. The issue salience raises and falls during the studied period depending on the important incidents happening in the country such as the assassination of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 or the murder of the Dutch film director Theo van Gogh by a Moroccan Muslim extremist in 2004, which is reflected in Figure 4.

As also emphasized by Hoeglinger (2016, 93), in the 2000s, “(t)he issue emphasis of immigration by the Populist Radical Right shows a continuing upward trend, whereas the issue emphasis of European integration declined,” and “the Liberals and the Christian Democrats and Conservatives, also relied comparatively more strongly on immigration than on European integration.” Hoeglinger (2016) represents the issue with Figure 5, which shows the emphasis of Europe and immigration in election campaigns over time, depending on the party families by including at least one election for each country studied (Austria, the UK, Germany, France, Netherlands, and Switzerland).



**Figure 5** *Issue emphasis of Europe and immigration in election campaigns* Reprinted from " Politicizing European Integration: Struggling with the Awakening Giant" by D. Hoeglinger, (p.93), 2016 London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Similarly, Berkhout et al. (2015, 102) analyze the Netherlands between 1995 and 2009 through “the political salience of the issues of integration and immigration in terms of the number of claims made by relevant actors in national newspapers.” They find out that in 2002 and 2004, the political attention dedicated to these issues make a peak. They explain the one in 2002 with the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA and the assassination of Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands and his party’s electoral success following his assassination. In 2004, they pointed out the new restrictive regulations on migration proposed by Rita Verdonk, who was the Minister of Immigration between 2003 and 2006 from VVD (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy), and also the murder of Theo van Gogh. The scholars explain these peaks as the salience phase or element of politicization.

Berkhout et al. (2015) study almost the same period for the polarization in politics within the as the element of politicization. The analysis presents the peaks in 2002, 2006, and 2009. The 2002 peak regarding the polarization is associated with the election campaign of Lijst Pim Fortuyn, while the 2006 peak is associated with the citizenship issues of the VVD government of Rita Verdonk, and subsequent government fall depending on these conflicts between the coalition partners D66, CDA and VVD (Berkhout et al., 2015). They argue that the polarization peak in 2009 has not any specific connection with a specific event directly; however, they acknowledge that it might be associated with the unexpected electoral success of far-right and anti-immigrant PVV in 2006 and its upcoming polls heading to 2010 elections (Berkhout et al., 2015).

Another critical aspect of the politicization process is the actors of it. Again the same study shows that while in the 1990s, political party actors and non-party actors (such as migrant NGOs) have a similar range of strength and role in politicization, the party actors’ role visibly increases between 2003 and 2009 (Berkhout et al., 2015). It is explained by the election periods in general terms and the claims made by the government authorities. Only 2002 is presented as an exception, in which party actors or governmental bodies make comparatively fewer claims than non-party actors.

Berkhout et al. (2015) stress that during whole these years from 1995 to 2009, the politicization of immigration and hence immigrant-related issues are kept on the

agenda and continued by PvdA, VVD, and CDA, who are the most significant and most potent parties of the country, and the leader of them is the PvdA. In the overall analysis, leftist parties make positive claims regarding the immigrants, from the 1990s to the 2000s; however, the general atmosphere begins to change with 2002. When the discussions increase their electoral turnovers depending on the rising concerns on immigration and integration, the far-right political actors begin to play an active role.

Vliegenhart (2007) examines the period 1997-2007 with the same perspective through very well known newspapers in the Netherlands, which are NRC Handelsblad, Algemeen, Dagblad, Volkskrant, De Telegraaf, and Trouw. The analysis shows that from 1997 onwards, a left-right divide becomes visible on the issues mentioned above. The liberal coalition partner, VVD, promotes a more restrictive immigrant and integration policy, the other coalition partners, the Social Democrats, and the Democrats 66 opt for a less stringent policy in those years. According to the written media (mainly newspaper articles published during those years), left-wing parties mostly use the terms “emancipation and multiculturalism”; however, the right-wing parties use the frame of “Islam as a threat” in their rhetoric.

The arguments that were used within this period regarding the immigration have changed over the years from instrumental arguments to the collective identity arguments covering cultural and religious traditions and norms, besides national and political values; and this transition makes its peak at the end of the 2000s (Berkhout et al., 2015; Ruedin, 2017), which cause emerging identity politics among the immigrant groups as the subject of this politicization processes.

### **3.8 Conclusion**

In this Chapter, the politicization processes towards migration, immigrants and immigrant integration are discussed in the case of the Netherlands from the historical perspective. Understanding the growing opposition in the politics against the

immigrants and changing immigrant policies are essential to figuring out the integration diversity dilemma of immigrants at the national level.

The Chapter elucidates the transition in Dutch policies towards immigrants and their integration from a multiculturalist approach towards an economics-based integration after the 1980s, and after the 1990s towards identity, culture, and nationality-based integration approach as criticized being assimilationist. The reasons for reactions towards Muslim immigrants by far-right political parties were mostly supported by the economic problems like unemployment of local people because of cheap immigrant labor in the 1970-1980s. After the 1990s, these reactions have begun to be based on nationality and identity-related issues as well. Within this process, different ethnic, cultural, and religious identities overlapped arguably by threatening Dutch identity, culture, religion, and overall social life.

Of course, the dramatic events taking place in all over Europe in the last couple of decades such as terrorist attacks in European cities or murders of some European citizens who were criticizing migration, non-EU immigrants or particularly Islam have pushed further reactions against immigrants, parallel to the far-right parties' discursive politicization of immigrants. It was a general opposition against migration at the beginning, however within the process, it has turned into a reaction specifically towards Muslim people as a form of identity, and it has brought about an unprecedented Islamophobia in Western countries.

In such an atmosphere, "Islamic communities in the diaspora have responded to the less friendly environment with a stronger identification with (...) an increased political voice and organization. Indeed, there has been an increase in political protest by immigrant groups, along with an increase in other more conventional forms of political participation" (Klandermans, Toorn, & Stekelenburg, 2008, 992).

At this point, the issue of immigrants' identity, or identity itself, comes to prominence in studying the impact of identity on immigrants' political behaviors and, indeed, political participation, which will be deeply analyzed in the next Chapter.



## **CHAPTER 4**

### **IDENTITY POLITICS OF IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

For long, immigrant groups' political participation was not considered as important in the European countries in the 1970s or 1980s because most of these immigrants had arrived at these European countries as temporary manual workers. It was not expected that they would stay permanent and become the citizens of hosting countries one day (Martiniello, 2005). However, since the beginning of the 1990s, these manual workers have become permanently settled, particularly in the western European countries like the Netherlands or Germany, who were requesting manual workers in those years. These temporary annual workers have begun to get citizenship of the hosting country in the upcoming years, which has brought about the issues of integration problems, and national and ethnic identity dilemma into the table of politics as both an administrative and election issue for canvassing in election periods.

When the immigrants and their identity-related matters have been considered, a growing Euroscepticism has also emerged in almost all over Europe in the last couple of decades in the discussions of EU's widening and deepening perspectives. Legal and illegal migration waves from the Middle East and Northern Africa into Europe have triggered the dose of the criticism of these discussions, as mentioned in the previous chapters on the bases of more ethnicity, culture, and religion. The factors explaining these criticisms, in the meantime, have expanded from utilitarian and economic aspects, 'hard factors', to the identity and culture-driven, most of the time immigration-

related aspects, 'soft factors' (McLaren, 2002; de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005; van Klingeren et al., 2013).

In the meantime, 'identity' has become one of the most discussed topics of European peoples. It has been realized that these discussions have so many sub-branches such as exclusive national identity versus European identity (Hooghe & Marks, 2007), or the priority of ethnic identity or national identity (McLaren, 2004). This process has created an atmosphere suitable to develop identity politics for both the political parties of hosting communities and for the immigrant communities who have been already settled in the European countries since the 1960s or long before.

Some sociologists and social psychologists argue that people participate in social movements or groups to fulfill identity needs (Klandermans et al., 2008), which is so crucial for the discussions above. Similarly, Simon and Klandermans (2001, 320) argue that "salient group memberships direct people's attention to their collective (or social) as opposed to their individual (or personal) identities, which then regulate their social behavior."

Today, politics is defined by identity-related issues, according to Fukuyama (2018). "(T)he left focuses less on creating broad economic equality and more on promoting the interests of a wide variety of marginalized groups, such as ethnic minorities, immigrants and refugees, women, and LGBT people" and "(t)he right, meanwhile, has redefined its core mission as the patriotic protection of traditional national identity, which is often explicitly connected to race, ethnicity, or religion" (Fukuyama, 2018, 91). Therefore, while hosting communities are perceiving a kind of threat against their national, ethnic, cultural or religion-based identities against the immigrant communities, particularly by the influence of far-right political parties' negative rhetoric and identity politics against immigrants; it is highly possible to expect a counter-reaction from immigrant communities like developing an identity politics based political participation against such attitudes.

In the light of these discussions mentioned earlier, in this Chapter, the role of identity politics on immigrants' political participation will be analyzed within the process of politicization of immigrants from the perspective of immigrants in Europe in general

and Turkish-Dutch immigrants in the Netherlands in particular. Therefore, it will be beneficial to read about the definitions of identity first and dive into the perceptions of identity in Europe and the Netherlands afterward.

#### **4.2 Definition(s) and Typologies of Identity**

The Cambridge Online Dictionary ("Identity," n.d.) identifies "identity" as the "reputation, characteristics, etc. of a person or organization that makes the public think about them in a particular way" and "who a person is, or the qualities of a person or group that make them different from others." Oxford English Dictionary ("Identity," 2010), on the other hand, identifies it as follows "(t)he sameness of a person or thing at all times or in all circumstances; the condition of being a single individual; the fact that a person or thing is itself and not something else; individuality, personality" with more personal and individual perception.

Identity has two central dimensions, which are individual and collective. "We use the word identity to describe both a person's self-image as well as her assigned categories," such as being a man or woman (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000, 718). According to Johnston et al. (1994, 13), "personal identity emerges through the mirror of social interaction, that is, by playing different roles and by interpreting how others see us." Akerlof and Kranton (2000) argue that identity is bound to social categories. Similarly, Tilly (2003, 608) identifies identities as "social arrangements," providing opportunities for people to shape common and shared stories about themselves, their connection, and so on, which consists of relations and boundaries between "them" and "us," which leads "us" to the collective identities.

Collective identity emerges through the group interaction, "which is strengthened by group solidarity and boundary maintenance activities and shaped by public images of the group via interaction with nonmembers" (Johnston et al., 1994, 28). Collective identity is identified by Simon and Klandermans (2001, 320) as a "place in the social world" depending on gender, age, ethnicity, etc. "The concept of collective identity

refers to the agreed-upon definition of membership, boundaries, and activities for the group" (Johnston et al., 1994, 15). Depending on the interactions, negotiations, and conflicts regarding the situations and the definitions of these situations, members construct the collective identity (Johnston et al., 1994). Opposite to individual identities, collective identities are structural, consisting of shared beliefs about a group naturally institutionalized in symbols, communities, politics, etc. (Valocchi, 2001).

There are different manifestations of collective identities, such as being part of ethnic, political, cultural, or national identity, all relevant and essential for this study. Because, in all over Europe most of the political parties have begun to espouse "an ethnic conception of the nation, explicitly opposed to the immigrants and minorities and their claims to belonging," which makes the identity politics more salient (Nandi & Platt, 2018) on the bases of ethnicity, culture, and religion.

Parallel to that, the growing discussions on the integration of immigrants, far-right political parties' anti-immigrant rhetoric, as well as anti-Islam attitude, media effect, etc. on the politicization of immigrants have a crucial impact on the perceptions of social identities, as well as the counter-reactions of these different identity groups within these societies.

Phalet et al. (2010) acknowledge that "social identities depend crucially on acceptance and acknowledgment by relevant others" because the social identities come into existence within interactions among groups, which makes others' perceptions or related expectations crucial. When the ethnic identities are in issue, such perceptions and expectations between in-groups and out-groups may even lead to discrimination (Noels et al., 2010, 751). Similarly, when the religious identity is in issue, like being a Muslim, again strong in-group and out-group differences and related adverse treatments come to the table. For instance, regarding the Dutch Muslims, "the Dutch majority represents a powerful "other" (Phalet et al., 2010, 761).

Sıcakkan and Lithman (2005) assume the nationalist modes of belonging, significant historical events, wars, collective histories, and memories based on identity. National identity, accordingly, is defined in general terms as "an affective state of belonging to a social group (Luedtke, 2005, 87) or as "a cultural norm that reflects emotional or

affective orientations of individuals toward their nation and national political system" (Tsygankov, 2001, 15), as being different from the ethnic identity.

Van Heelsum and Koomen (2016, 277-280) study the identity formation process of Moroccan immigrants in Western Europe, and they focus on "how external factors foster identification with ethnic, religious and national-group categories" within their research. They specifically concentrate on public discourse (the negative one) on immigrant and religion-related issues, and they find out that these discourses cause "diminished feelings of acceptance amongst immigrants, thereby reinforcing their identification as a separate (ethnic) group" (van Heelsum & Koomen, 2016, 280). They put forward in their research that "ethnic (Moroccan) and the Muslim identity tend to merge among Muslims in Western Europe, whereas factors more easily influence national identity in the receiving society" and "ethnic and religious identities are expressed in a parallel manner" (van Heelsum & Koomen, 2016, 288). Additionally, "(a)scription has the strongest effect on national identification" and thus "(b)oth the public discourse and perceived acceptance influence national identification" (van Heelsum & Koomen, 2016, 288).

Culture "is a deeply rooted set of values, beliefs, and ways of behaving," according to Wiarda (2014, 151), and this is why it "provides a group or a country with its identity." At this point, Xiaomei and Shimin (2014) point out the connection between culture and identity in the foundation of political identity. They argue, "the politics of community, with its appeal to common interests and its ethical orientation, complements the national interpretation of cultural identity. It is because political extensions based on judicial services, administration, and national will are not always satisfying. A national consciousness with a high level of intellectual connection and strong emotional bonds must appeal to historical and present-day cultural ties and expressions of value" (Xiaomei & Shimin, 2014, 165).

Nandi and Platt (2018, 4) argue, "minority identities are associated with forms of political engagement or behaviors." Within this context, political identity is defined as "the salience of politics to an individual's sense of self" (Nandi & Platt, 2018, 2).

Smith (2004, 302) acknowledges that "a political identity can be conceived as the collective label for a set of characteristics by which persons are recognized by political actors as members of a political group." Thus, party affiliation, economic status, regionalism, language, gender, race, ethnicity, or nationhood can be identified as the different forms of political identity (Smith, 2004; Lluch, 2018).

The increasing salience of discussions regarding the statuses of immigrant populations in European countries and the growing power of populist nationalism against them make the interconnectedness of ethnic, cultural, and/or religious identities of a country's minority and majority populations very crucial. Nandi and Platt (2018) point out the political party support within these discussions and argue that it is linked to greater political identity. They acknowledge that "right-wing political affiliation (...) will be associated with stronger ethnic identity among the majority; and more left-wing political affiliation associated with stronger ethnic identity among minorities, given the ways in which left-wing parties tend to more explicitly espouse issues of diversity and minority rights" (Nandi & Platt, 2018, 6). Additionally, Just et al. (2014) emphasize that religious affiliations are associated with greater political identity among minorities, which is mostly observed among second-generation immigrant groups.

#### **4.3 Perceptions on Identity in Europe and Developing Identity Politics**

It is crucial to understand the perception of European identity formation to have a general overview of this issue in Europe, in which the Netherlands is one of the actors. In this context, before focusing on the cleavages between Dutch and Turkish-Dutch identities and the role of religion on the way to developing identity politics, the European identity perception will be discussed, which has an important impact on national identities of the European countries.

There is no doubt; the EU has an essential role in European societies' identity discussions today. In the Treaty on European Union Article 6, which entered into force

in 2007, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, the respect of human dignity and human rights are mentioned as the shared values of European peoples. These values are expected to bring about "pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and equality between men and women" into European societies (Chopin, 2018, 2). Chopin (2018) stresses that these values "comprise the base of a joint political identity," but points out that the specific nature of this identity depends on the country's political and national culture, for which he gives the examples of secularity and religious freedom.

According to Saurugger and Thatcher (2019, 463), the "identity is constructed through action and the development of social categories." At the EU level, the group of collective elite actors who are members of the EU decision-making mechanism constructs political identity accordingly. The issue is so crucial for the EU itself since it is closely related to the Union's legitimacy in all over Europe.

The issue of European identity has become politicized, especially since the EU constitutional crisis in 2005. Checkel and Katzenstein (2009) argue that this politicization process has brought about two different European identity projects: cosmopolitan European identity project, and national-populist European identity project. While "(c)osmopolitan conceptions focus on political citizenship and rights," "(p)opulist conceptions center on issues of social citizenship and cultural authenticity" which is more nationalistic in terms of cultural threats stemming from immigrants (EU and non-EU), Islam, or headscarves (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009, 11-12). National-populist European identity project is more related to this Ph.D. research in terms of its direct impact on the politicization of immigrants and related anti-immigrant attitudes, which creates the cleavages between the majority and minority groups in the hosting European countries who have different ethnic, cultural and religious identities. Because, "(t)he political and social integration of ethnic and cultural minorities is a task that populist conceptions of European identities regard as a threat" (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009, 12). This identity project, either this or that way, influences the national level populist tendencies and initiatives, mainly through the political parties and media, as observed in France, Germany, or the Netherlands since the beginning of the 2000s. As expected, the immigrants, such as Turkish-Dutch Muslim immigrants in

the Netherlands, react to these tendencies when these tendencies begin to affect their communities, daily lives, and citizenship statuses, which will be discussed in the following Chapter.

Hooghe and Marks (2004) make a distinction between exclusive and inclusive national identity at this point. They argue that "citizens who conceive of their national identity as exclusive of other territorial identities are likely to be considerably more Eurosceptical than those who conceive of their national identity in inclusive terms" (Hooghe & Marks, 2004, 416). "(T)he fear of losing one's national identity as a consequence of progressing European integration was found to directly affect ethnic threat and Euroscepticism" (Hooghe & Marks 2005, van Klingeren et al., 2013, 691). Immigrants' ethnic, cultural, and religious existence has expectedly presented the same repercussions at the national level.

#### **4.4 Dutch Perceptions on Immigrants and their Identity Formations**

Triandafyllidou (2001) mentions the immigrants' feelings, such as inclusion and exclusion within the society, by being identified as "others" in the framework of identity politics, where local identity variations determine how the migrant identity characteristics will be considered. For instance, "(r)ight-wing Dutch populist discourse utilizes the binary between 'autochthones' (of 'Dutch descent') and 'allochthones' (of 'foreign descent') that was introduced by mainstream political parties in the late-twentieth-century" (Jones, 2016, 613).

Slootman (2018) identifies the tolerance towards different cultures, ethnicities, or religions under the multicultural ideology in the Netherlands until the late 1980s as pragmatism, as the pillarization system's legacy. This system goes back to the period of the 1920s-1960s, in which the society was segmented into sacred, secular, and socio-cultural pillars, as well as subcultures (Lijphart, 1968; Schrover, 2010). Within this structure "there was a particular division of society into four groups, manifesting itself in varying gradations, in all kinds of ways and in many areas of society: orthodox



Protestants, Roman Catholics, social democrats and the group that considered itself neutral or general and in practice were politically usually liberals," and additionally there were some smaller groups which did not fit into any of these categories (Blom, 2016, 183). There was an invisible hand somehow arranging the proper functioning of the society despite different religious or ideological groups, and this situation "made politics in particular not only often dull and soporific, but also unpopular" and almost none of the problems within the society could be deal with effectively, according to Blom (2016, 184). Schrover (2010, 330) acknowledges that the "unintended cumulative effect of state interference with immigrant organizing during pillarization, and later multiculturalism, has led to (...) 'cultural freezing': the enforcement of essentialist ideas about both the culture of migrants and Dutch culture". Schrover (2010) adds that when the cultures are frozen, then the integration and adaptation are impossible within society. In this system, the pillars had their political parties; PvdA, VVD, the Catholic People's Party (KVP), and the two conservative Protestant parties, the Christian Historical Union (CHU) and the Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP).

After the 1960s, this structure started to change slightly via more compromise and more consultation because since the beginning of this period, new parties have emerged who were clearly against the pillarization system, and the most well-known one of those was the progressive-liberal D66. In the meantime, immigration flows (guest workers) were observed from other European countries into the Netherlands, which begun to pose some concerns within the society in terms of religion, for instance, the Catholic immigrants were not allowed to have their churches, which might cause them to lose their faith in the end (Schrover, 2010). Thus, the leave of pillarization was both related to new political parties and ideas within society and religious concerns.

In the meantime, some other guest workers arrived in the Netherlands, too, from the countries out of Europe, such as Morocco and Turkey. Once it was realized that the temporary workers from Morocco or Turkey would permanently settle, in the early 1980s, major immigrant groups were decided to be publicly recognized as ethnic minorities. In those years, "(c)ombating discrimination and inequality was seen as the mutual responsibility of both the minority and the majority; the mutual adaptation was

emphasized, and combating discrimination was one of the policy aims" (Slootman, 2018, 60). CDA, VVD, and D66 were the main political coalition members during those years after the collapse of pillarization.

In those years, the implementations of the governments and politicians were seen as pragmatist because they both aimed at facilitating the return of these minorities back to their countries and their socioeconomic integration -if they would stay longer (Slootman, 2018). In this context, special provisions and institutional arrangements were established for the ethnic minorities, such as permitting the publicly funded Islamic schools (Phalet et al., 2010).

In the 2000s, the situations have begun to change in terms of attitudes towards immigrants. The issue of national/exclusive identity has become politicized in those years, which has been frequently used by the political parties, particularly by the far-right parties. As mentioned in detail within the previous chapters, Pim Fortuyn, the assassinated far-right extremist party leader, had called Islam "a backward culture" at the beginning of the 2000s and probably for the first time brought up the discontent within the society regarding multiculturalism and migration to the agenda that clear. Since then, identity has become such a political issue (Kremer, 2013).

In 2004, the center-right Dutch government, consisted of Conservatives (VVD) and Christian Democrats (CDA) and supported by the Eurosceptic far-right (PVV), prepared and announced an integration bill, which was reflecting an abandoning of multiculturalism, more demands from and stricter approach towards immigrants (Kern, 2011; Kremer, 2013). Kremer (2013, 1) argues that the politicization of identity within the Dutch society "has marked a turn away from multiculturalism and a turn toward "culturalized citizenship" — the idea that being Dutch means adhering to a certain set of cultural and social norms and practices," which means that "(i)migrants now have to "become Dutch," not only through language acquisition, but also in a cultural and moral sense."

In one of his controversial essay, "The Multicultural Drama," Paul Scheffer (2000 as cited in Kremer, 2013, 9) argues that the "Dutch should develop a greater sense of national consciousness and become less indifferent to their own society. Doing so

would also benefit immigrants (...) because if "we" became better at defining and propagating "our" language, history, and culture, immigrants would know in which country they had to integrate." This period perfectly coincides with the growing political and social discussions and discontent regarding multiculturalism in the Netherlands.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, dual nationality is considered a hindrance to integration in the Netherlands since 2004, opposite to the 1990s, let alone following multicultural policies. Actually, since the 1970s, local governments have tried to prohibit immigrants from claiming their rights as Dutch citizens to set up Muslim schools (Duyvendak, 2011, 87), so multiculturalism has not been there in total as appeared to the outside world. Moreover, even though the tradition of pillarization allowed some Islamic institutions to move independently, "integration policies never straightforwardly promoted immigrants' (own) cultural and/or religious identities" (Duyvendak, 2011, 88).

Native Dutch citizens see the religious way of life of Muslims, as one of the social identity groups in the Netherlands, as noncompliant with Dutch civic norms and values (Phalet et al., 2010) such as equal treatment, non-discrimination, freedom of belief, freedom of speech (Mattei & Broeks, 2016), and this perceived by the Dutch Muslims, from the other way around, as a threat to their own religious identity. "It follows from the primary function of identity consolidation that Muslim citizens should be especially motivated to engage in political action when they experience religious identity threat" (Phalet et al., 2010, 762). Additionally, "personal experiences of unfair and hostile treatment due to religious background significantly increased the degree to which the Turkish and Moroccan second generation identified with their Muslim in-group" (Fleischmann et al., 2011, 643).

## 4.5 Developing Identity Politics

The majority mostly categorizes immigrants according to their origin country, ethnicity, or religion, and the “(i)migrants from predominantly Muslim countries are increasingly defined by their religion” (Kranendonk, Vermeulen, & van Heelsum, 2018, 61). As mentioned in the previous Chapter, religion, in this context, becomes the subject of ethnicization (Shadid, 2006) within the social identification process, which makes it one of the most critical mobilizers in terms of identity politics. Berking (2003), on the other hand, mentions the ethnicization of cultural identities as one of the important ingredients of identity politics as well. He (2003, 256) states that the social groups are kept together via reliable identifications and shared values, and when they are at stake depending on the categorizations like “we” and “others,” it requires to secure identity and cultural difference that is socially constructed. Thus, ethnicization is “the process of the affirmation of difference, a process in which ascriptive features are (re-)essentialized and the reflexive mode of constructing difference or identity is consciously abandoned” (Berking, 2003, 257).

Leach, Brown, and Worden (2009, 759) argue that “identity politics” - mostly used as ethnic identity politics- is an attempt of people who have “little power to affirm their threatened identities and to assert their claims for material resources and political clout.” In this identification, “ethnicity” is used as a combination of different forms of group identity referring to “race, culture, geographic region, language/dialect, religion, and sometimes economic or social position” (Leach et al., 2009, 760). According to Leach et al. (2009), the minority groups like immigrants engage in political movements when they see a disadvantaged situation of them shared by all the members of their group, which is unfair and can be changed by political efforts.

In this framework, when the Muslim immigrants’ sense of discrimination or assimilation increase following a politicization initiative through their ethnicity, culture or above all religion, these immigrants are expected to be in need to change this unfair situation by political effort either by voting and protesting, establishing civil society organizations, or taking an active role in politics as a politician.

When Dutch far-right political parties' anti-immigrant and anti-Islam rhetoric and attitudes in the politicization of Muslim immigrants are concerned, the ethnicity/race, culture, and religion come to the fore in social identification of immigrants, which evokes the Muslim immigrants on the way to developing identity politics.

#### **4.5.1 The Role of Ethnicity/Race in Identity Politics**

Ethnicity refers to "a community of people who share a common language or culture," according to Vick and Ishiyama (2011, 217). Ethnic identity, in this context, "is a measurement of the feeling of belonging to a particular ethnic group," so an immigrant's identification with the receiving country's culture and society can be categorized under the ethnic identity (Epstein & Heizler (Cohen), 2015, 1). As to Chandra (2006, 398), "ethnic identities are a subset of identity categories in which membership eligibility is determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent." Descent-based attributes refer to physical features such as skin color, gender, or eye color; or to the cultural and historical inheritance such as name, language, or origin ancestors (Chandra, 2006, 400).

Immigrants are expected to integrate and even assimilate into hosting national identity and culture despite their ethnic identity, and when they do not, it causes some doubts among the hosting community regarding the immigrants' loyalty (Klandermans, Toorn, et al., 2008). Under such a circumstance, immigrants produce collective political actions (Klandermans et al., 2008). These actions can be created by their frustration and perceived injustice or by resources and opportunities within society and collective identity and emotions in protest behavior (Klandermans et al., 2008). In this way, they create their own political identity, because being identified with a major political party or the adoption of ideology as a term of self-description is one of the main features of political identity (Huddy, 2001). Therefore, through identity politics set off by their ethnicity, they participate in real political activities, either this or that way.

Hagendoorn (1995) mentions a hierarchical structure of ethnicities formed within the multi-ethnic societies, which is closely correlated with the ethnic preferences of the inner groups and the present social distance between the majority and ethnic minorities. He argues, "ethnic groups at the bottom of the ethnic hierarchy are rejected by dominant ethnic groups as well as by other ethnic minorities" (Hagendoorn, 1995, 222). Within this context, ethnic minority groups with cultural and socio-economic similarities with the majority do not face social distance that much and take a higher place in the ethnic hierarchy (Hagendoorn, 1995, 204).

Accordingly, the "ethnic groups from countries with a Muslim majority tend to be the ones placed at the bottom of the ethnic hierarchy" in Western Europe (Teney et al., 2016, 2187). Such a perception causes bigger cleavages within society via racialization. As argued by Jones (2016, 613-614), "(r)acialisation in Dutch political discourse utilizes a variety of signifiers to construct difference, such as appearances (descent/external bodily features, dress), things deemed 'cultural' (such as behavior, religion, sexuality, speech and accent) and class," which refers to a "hierarchical distinction between 'conditional' and 'unconditional' Dutch citizens."

#### **4.5.2 The Role of Culture in Identity Politics**

Wiarda (2014) acknowledges that culture affects groups' perceptions on the way of identifying threats, as identity itself creates the sense of group identity by framing the interests of this group and accordingly structures the demands of this group on the political system. It is why its culture can define the identity of this group. The immigration itself from one culture to another may trigger identity problems for immigrants and the native population. Halloran and Kashima (2006, 137) identify culture as "the sum of what various people share with others within a society with whom they also share common social identities." As mentioned above, in social identities, common social stereotypes, values, norms, attitudes, and sometimes beliefs

come to the table. Thus, Halloran and Kashima (2006) argue that culture and identity have a reciprocal relationship, and to some extent, they create each other.

Cultural identity, on the other hand, points out to "the history and present existence of the common origin and symbiotic relationship between community cultures; stresses the cultural realm of the co-existence and interaction of diversity; and displays established myths, beliefs, symbols and consensuses that are different from those of other groups" (Xiaomei & Shimin, 2014, 165).

Hill and Wilson (2003) suggest the identity politics as a way to understand how culture and identity construct, invent and achieve political ends as a discourse and an action in politics and civil society. According to them, "identity cannot be understood without some recourse to wider theorizing and comparisons of the institutions, practices, and ideologies of national states, governments, political parties" (Hill & Wilson, 2003, 2).

According to Xiaomei and Shimin (2014), cultural identity is always linked to ethnocultural identity, so ethnic group members cannot give it up. It is also an important criterion for identifying national membership (Xiaomei & Shimin, 2014). Identity politics is assumed to be cultural because identity groups struggle to get recognition and respect for their cultural differences emerging from their distinct group identities (Bernstein, 2005).

Prinz (2019, 6) acknowledges that "living in the diaspora may (...) increase the awareness of the own cultural identity" and although the demands of the host country's culture focus on "assimilation, acculturation, and adaptation in the direction of the host country's culture," the immigrant populations may not prefer these options. To protect their own cultural identity, they react in many different alternative ways. Developing identity politics and afterward becoming politically active are only some of them. Therefore, cultural identity, as "the sense of self derived from formal or informal membership in groups that impart knowledge, beliefs, values, attitudes, traditions, and ways of life" (Jameson, 2007, 200) is one of the most important integral parts of the identity politics. It is encouraging that minority groups take some specific actions once they sense a threat against their existence, norms, or values against their culture briefly.

#### **4.5.3 The Role of Religion (Islam) in Identity Politics**

Religion is one of the most significant social and political forces in the formation of politics within society. The increasing salience of religious divides between Christians and Muslims in European politics is given as an example to that by Boomgaarden and Freire (2009, 1240).

"Since securing an institutional and cultural environment in which Muslims can properly practice their faith should be more important for Muslims who are highly religious, we expect religiosity to interact with Muslim identity. It means that religiosity should increase the positive effect (or at least reduce the negative effect) that belonging to Islam may have on immigrant engagement in politics of their host societies" (Just et al., 2014, 130).

Koyuncu-Lorasdağı (2013, 58) draws attention to the complex relationship between migration and religion since the middle of the 2000s and explains it with identity politics. For example, in the Netherlands, first-generation immigrants define themselves as Turkish Muslims or Moroccan Muslims, whereas second and third-generation identify themselves as only Muslims (Parekh, 2008, 6-8). Prins (1996 as cited in Bahçeli, 2018, 76) evaluates the issue from another perspective and draws attention to the difference between first and second-generation Turkish-Dutch identity. "First-generation Dutch Turks are seen as segregated, meaning that they maintain tight-knit connections within their group of origin and identify little with the Netherlands and the native Dutch. The second generation's identity is more "hybrid," with strong connections to their Turkish roots as well as Dutch society" (Bahçeli, 2018, 76).

From these dimensions, the Muslim identity has also begun to be discussed in terms of its meaning. Samad (2007) argues that because of Western Europe's unsuccessful integration initiatives, new ethnicities emerge, and these ethnicities construct new identities, such as Muslim identity. The Muslim minority groups do not feel affiliated with the culture of origin any longer, nor to the new culture that they experience, so



Islam evolves into an ethnic identity (Shadid, 2006; Koyuncu-Lorasdağı, 2013). At this point, ethnic origin's connection gradually loses its strength, and Islam steadily constructs the cultural and political identity.

Kranendonk et al., (2018) argue that religiosity affects political participation of immigrants on a positive way, since religious groups, such as people who are attending meetings at Mosques or participating in events organized within the Mosques, create secure networks among people and encourage them to involve in civic matters. Just et al. (2014) conduct a research on the connection of Islam, religiosity, and immigrants' political action, and they argue that some Muslim immigrants participate political actions more than others if they are the part of religious organizations; and this is mostly observed in the second generation Muslim immigrants in western Europe. They also argue that "perceptions of unfair treatment and social exclusion may also operate on political participation indirectly, that is, via reactive religious identity" (Just et al., 2014, 130), as mentioned in Chapter 2 under the theoretical framework of this study.

Similarly, Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007, 1449) acknowledge that members of devalued groups, as in the case of Turkish-Dutch Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands, "can cope with identity threats by adopting group-based strategies involving increased in-group identification and a distancing from the majority group" and indeed "(e)thnicity and religion are among the most important markers of group identity." They emphasize the negative association between ethnic and religious identification besides national identification on the other. If the ethnic and religious association is strong, it is difficult for immigrants to identify themselves with the host nation's national category. In the research findings, Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) also accept that "a total ethnic or Muslim identification does not necessarily imply that people would not be interested in developing a sense of commitment to the nation.

Just et al. (2014) argue that "religion has the capacity to mobilize immigrants politically, but the strength of this relationship depends on immigrant generation, religiosity, and the type of religion" (Just et al., 2014, 128). "The feeling of being ostracized by this exclusionist nationalist vision of Europe is thus likely to be perceived by immigrants of Muslim affiliation, regardless of their specific denominations," and this is why "immigrants of Muslim affiliation are less likely to

identify as European than Christian immigrants and immigrants without such religious affiliation" (Teney et al., 2016, 2188).

In theories regarding people's electoral behaviors, Lijphart (1979) argues that there are three determinants of party choice: religion, language, and class. Religion emerges as the key one among them. Similarly, Just et al. (2014) put forward that political parties are the mobilizers of voters through religious lines. Of course, political parties are not the only mobilizers. By helping people to develop their civic skills, political efficacy, and political knowledge, or to have social networks, religious institutions also play an essential role in people's engagement in politics (Campbell, 2013; Just et al., 2014).

#### **4.6 Political Participation of Immigrants via Identity Politics and Political Integration as a Result**

As Huddleston (2017) stated, as long as the number of immigrants increases and constitutes large social groups in hosting societies, being enfranchised and equal for these immigrant groups can only become possible through political participation one form or another. It can be realized either by direct and active participation in the political parties and civil society organizations, voting, protesting, or forming alliances between the political parties and immigrant organizations and immigrant communities themselves. The alliance formation between political parties and immigrant organizations can play an essential role in politicization with different pragmatic or idealistic purposes, as Triviño-Salazar (2018) argued. The gatherings within the framework of mosques and churches by a community or financial resources allocated to a political party or an organization by a community providing representation for them can be given as examples for such alliance formations.

As acknowledged by Adamson (2007), the political participation was associated with individual convictions and motivations before, however currently its motivators have slightly changed and begun to involve the preferences for political beneficiaries of some groups and its members, thus become to be influenced by pressure groups,

lobbies, ethnic minorities, gender and other forms of issue politics. Therefore, it has currently become motivated by the group-based motivators, according to Adamson (2007), as observed in the social identity formation of immigrant communities based on ethnicity, race, culture, or religion.

As Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg (2008, 992) mentioned, "the Western world has become a less hospitable place for immigrants of Islamic descent" since the beginning of the 2000s. There has been negative news regarding the immigrants and migration on newspapers more than ever, which goes hand in hand with the increasing political support for far-right political parties that are playing the leading active role in the politicization of these issues (Vliegenhart, 2007; Klandermans, van der Toorn, et al., 2008).

As expected, different types of reactions can be given as a response to these politicization processes. Heath (2014, 16) states that "exclusion and discrimination might well lead to feelings of being unwanted, which in turn might lead to a reluctance to integrate." In this context, immigrant communities' further self-isolation and drifting apart more from the hosting society come into prominence in this case. In another form, these reactions can be observed as recreating ties with the country of origin by forming transnational social spaces and transnational participation (Goldring, 2001); forging economic ties with the country of origin (Portes, Haller, & Guarnizo, 2002); creating social and cultural ties with the country of origin (Itzigsohn & Giorguli Saucedo, 2002); or even participating in the political life of the country of origin (Itzigsohn & Giorguli-Saucedo, 2005).

Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo (2005, 899) identify three types of transnational participation in this framework: linear transnationalism, resource-dependent transnationalism, and reactive transnationalism. In those types, immigrants either build ethnic institutions in the recipient country to maintain close social relations with the home country or develop business projects and invest in the home country and directly send money to the home country.

Klandermans, van der Toorn, et al. (2008) argue that especially the Islamic communities in the countries in which intense politicization of Muslim immigrants is

observed, react to this kind of negative politicization "with stronger identification with their own culture and with an increased political voice and organization." They present their reaction either through political protests or with more conventional forms of political participation such as being a member of a political party, running for elections, or actively organizing or working in civil society organizations in association with politics, in short with political participation. It is identified as "taking part in or becoming involved in activities related to politics" (van Heelsum, 2007).

Political participation, with a broad general understanding, "is a form of action to express a demand" from the political system and is a form of "pressure on the decision-makers to pay attention to (these) demand(s)" (Hooghe, 2011, 205). As expected, this demand can be expressed by both the majority and minority populations in the community. In case of the minority groups such as immigrants, social identity does matter in shaping the political behaviors of immigrants besides ethnic and national identity (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Simon & Grabow, 2010), because "identification with social groups activates political participation under the conditions of perception of shared grievances and connectedness to a superordinate group" (Kranendonk et al., 2018, 44). Schäfer (2014, 375) acknowledges that "(i)dentify politics based on ethnic or religious identification, cultural habits or nationality are becoming increasingly important when it comes to the mobilization of movements."

As mentioned in detail in Chapter 2, the political participation of immigrant groups gets their motivation within the social groups via social interactions such as gatherings under the roof of a political party or in a civil society organization, or regular meetings at Mosques in case of the Muslim immigrants depending on identity politics. Because in politics, actors give special efforts to have a dominant position to dominate society through political means, according to Schäfer (2014). "In order to participate in the political game, it is necessary to become politically mobilized and exert an effect on other political actors" (Schäfer, 2014, 387).

As described before, immigrant groups' political participation, with the encouraging impact of identity politics, gets its roots from the "idea that members of such social groups are oppressed precisely because of their membership in those social groups" (Fatima, 2011, 339). Thus, identity politics produces the action of political

participation with two claims: "identity is tied to interests" and "politics is interest-based" (Fatima, 2011, 339). It means political participation provides advocacy for interests, and these interests are determined by social group membership, according to Fatima (2011).

Tillie (2004, 532) argues that political participation can be possible in various ways, for instance "(o)ne can contact a municipal councilor, demonstrate for or against a certain issue, vote in local or national elections, visit a local neighborhood meeting where local issues are addressed or become an active member of a political party or a protest organization." Unlike the categorization of Martiniello (2005), which is explained in Chapter 1, Vermeulen (2011) categorizes political participation as formal and informal participation. In the case of formal participation, he mentions elected office, while as for the informal participation, he mentions civic participation in civil society organizations (Vermeulen, 2011). Within the informal political participation of immigrants, cultural, religious, social or interest groups play an important role, because immigrants search for a familiar environment to be the part of it, in which specific organizational demands are formulated such as religious ones as in the case of mosques (Vermeulen, 2011). Vermeulen (2011) mentions the building of a neighborhood mosque, a neighborhood playground or a community center as the examples of political participation of immigrants, for which the related organizations interact with local or national authorities, or even become involved in local and national advisory councils with more access to the political system.

In both cases, "identification influences action mobilization" (Klandermans, 2014, 6). In the case of civil society organizations, "organizations and organizers try to mobilize the people affected," and in this way, "they make people aware of the identity they share" (Klandermans, 2014, 12). Therefore, while this type of political participation contributes to raising awareness of immigrant communities about the interests that they have depending on their collective social identity, how to protect it through political-legal ways, and how to eliminate inequalities about it, it also contributes directly political integration of these immigrants with the hosting society within this process. Integration in the broadest sense means "the elimination of inequalities," and "the acquisition of competences" (Jan Niessen & Schibel, 2007). Additionally, "(t)he

political participation of immigrants is one dimension of the integration process: the greater the political participation, the greater the integration in the democratic domain" (Ahokas, 2010).

The relationship between identity and citizenship is also vital to understand the possible impacts of immigrants' political participation on political integration, like running for election as a member of a political party or being a member of civil society organization. In general, without being a citizen of a related country, immigrants do not participate in any political activity except taking place in civil society organizations related to politics or establish a new one. In almost all Western European countries, immigrants can get citizenship after a permanent residence by completing a specific period to stay in the hosting country, and most of those countries do not permit dual citizenship. Thus, most of the time, until having the citizenship, those immigrants reside in that country without having a sense of belonging and an actual identity identified with this country (Sıcakkan & Lithman, 2005).

In the case of the Netherlands, the political participation of immigrants depends on Dutch citizenship, too. For instance, immigrants with Dutch citizenship can vote at both local and national elections; however, immigrants who have not Dutch citizenship but reside in the country for more than five years can vote only at municipal elections (van Heelsum, 2005). Duyvendak (2011) mentions a "culturalization of citizenship" in the Netherlands parallel to the rise of authoritarianism, in which norms, values, and traditions, including religion, play a crucial role. Culturalization of citizenship is reflected as an expected result of increasing immigration and growing threat perception towards the Dutch socio-cultural structure and identity, which trigger immigrant community to get closer their own Turkish cultural identity and push forward the formation of identity politics. Nevertheless, this does not prevent them from integrating politically with Dutch society.

Tillie (2004, 530) categorizes political integration in three different types, which are "political trust (citizens trusting the democratic political institutions)," "adherence to democratic values like freedom of speech or the distinction between Government and Church," and "political participation."

According to the first type, if public servants or representative institutions like municipal councils are not trusted by the citizens, by immigrants in this case, then it means there is a legitimacy problem of these institutions. In this situation, citizens or immigrants prefer not to integrate into the political system. They may prefer to change the democratic institutions depending on this distrust sometimes, through which actually, they politically integrate, but they show this integration via demonstrations, or sometimes via anti-democratic actions.

In the second type, Tillie (2004) argues that when there is no support of or believe in democracy's fundamental values, political integration cannot be possible.

In the last type, which is the political participation, participation in politics within the democratic framework is accepted enough for political integration, even if there is no trust in democratic institutions or adherence to democratic values (Tillie, 2004). Depending on the research that he conducted in Amsterdam among Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, and Antillean immigrants, Tillie (2004, 534) argues that if people increase their membership to the ethnic voluntary associations their social trust increases, and this trust "spills over into political trust," and this brings about higher levels of political participation, and hence further political integration. Similarly, depending on Euro-Turks' research, Kaya (2012) acknowledges that there is a positive correlation between political participation and ethnocultural memberships. Kaya (2012) also confirms that when a particular ethnic group's network of associations increases and becomes denser, this produces more political trust among these ethnic group members, and these group members increase their political participation.

Briefly, immigrants' participation in political processes provides for immigrants more representation and more equality within the society they migrate to, which contributes to the constitution of larger social groups within the hosting country and their political integration into their new society (de Rooij, 2012).

## 4.7 Conclusion

Collective political action such as establishing a political party or being a member of a political party or a civil society organization is an identity management strategy that disadvantaged or devalued groups may adopt to achieve a positive social identity according to the evaluations and contributions of the social groups that belong to (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Positive social identity means “favorable comparisons that can be made between the in-group and some relevant out-groups: the in-group must be perceived as positively differentiated or distinct from the relevant out-groups” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 40). It is a well-known fact that “(d)efining identity in rigid, exclusionary terms - premised on things such as shared heritage that cannot be easily acquired by the foreign-born - can lead to the marginalization of one part of the population, and will not bring comfort to those who feel loss” (Kremer, 2013, 1). Standard universal civic norms and values within the society should be encouraged to provide real and effective integration. “For these to work, there needs to be a two-way process: immigrants need to adapt to existing norms, but they also need to see their culture and norms reflected in public arenas” (Kremer, 2013, 1).

As mentioned in this Chapter, several studies conducted in Europe present that perception of unfair treatment and social exclusion in Europe have revitalized Muslim identity among immigrants (Fleischmann et al., 2011; Just et al., 2014). This treatment paves the way for political participation and engagement of immigrants into domestic politics to defend Islamic values in most cases (Fleischmann, Phalet, & Klein, 2011, 641), which has become their new ethnic identity. This participation expectedly provides for further political integration. The current situation of Turkish-Dutch immigrants in the Netherlands who have already been politically active will be analyzed within the next Chapter through the field analyses conducted in the Netherlands to understand this phenomenon.



## **CHAPTER 5**

### **THE CASE OF TURKISH-DUTCH IMMIGRANTS' POLITICAL PARTICIPATION**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

Since the early 1990s, the integration of immigrant communities into Dutch society has been one of the most discussed Dutch public discourse items. Without any ideological difference, political parties have been somehow part of this discussion either negatively or positively. Since the beginning of the 2000s, minority groups such as Turkish-Dutch immigrants are struggling to be part of this discussion process directly or indirectly because the politicization of Muslim immigrants and immigration has been increasing since then in the Netherlands.

As written in the Introduction Chapter of this research, the key research question addressed in this study is: "What is the impact of increasing politicization of Muslim immigrants by far-right political parties on political participation of Turkish-Dutch immigrants in the Netherlands?" Within this context, the following supportive questions also seek an answer in the study: "What are the influences of the anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric of far-right political parties on Turkish-Dutch immigrants?" and "How do Turkish-Dutch immigrants experience and feel this politicization in their daily lives?"

By answering these questions, the study aims to find out the interaction of immigrants' politicization and the political integration of immigrants within the hosting society from the perspective of the political participation of immigrants.

As mentioned in the previous chapters, integration discourses and segregationist implementations pave the way for different kinds of reactions among the immigrants, especially when the issues related to them have been politicized, particularly in a negative manner. Mostly they are expected to become more self-isolated or drift themselves apart more from the hosting society, for instance. However, it has also been argued that minorities may develop a 'reactive ethnicity' in such situations, such as feeling prejudice, discrimination, and exclusion from mainstream society (Heath, 2014). However, what about those who represent their reaction by being politically active such as establishing or being a member of a political party or a civil society organization in such circumstances? Does this politicization process mobilize immigrants in terms of political participation, and make them politically integrated with society?

Depending on this research question, this chapter builds upon the findings from a series of qualitative semi-structured interviews to see whether this thesis's argument is in line with informant responses. All the perspectives and dimensions of the politicization process have to be taken into consideration to test the impact of Muslim immigrants' politicization on the political participation of Turkish-Dutch immigrants in the Netherlands. This process includes the role of identity politics gaining acceleration simultaneously depending on the far-right parties' attitudes and rhetoric. The impacts of this politicization process on the ordinary Dutch people and overall Dutch society via media have also been evaluated through participants' responses since they frequently mention their related daily life experiences. Indeed, it is not easy to analyze the degree of public based impacts. Nevertheless, they still influence the sense of belonging of the immigrant community to the hosting country and the development of identity politics.

The sources of data analyzed in this Chapter are transcriptions from face-to-face interviews (including one skype meeting). The transcribed data were analyzed within a comparative perspective with the immigrants' political participation since the beginning of the 2000s and the studies conducted in the Netherlands particularly on the politicization of Muslim immigrants by far-right political parties such as Fermin (1997), Vliegenghart and Boomgaarden (2007), Vliegenghart (2007), Roggeband and

Vliegenthart (2007), Meyer and Rosenberger (2015)'s researches that were deeply discussed in Chapter 3.

## **5.2 Procedure of the Interviews**

The interviews were formed in semi-structured; thus, the questions were prepared before the face-to-face meetings. The questions were established within an open-ended style. The participants were informed before the meetings about the general framework of the issues discussed during the interviews. There was no fixed range of responses to the questions, which was why the order of the questions was improvised depending on the participants' responses.

In total, 22 questions were asked (in Turkish) to the participants in around 45 minutes each. All respondents have given their answers in Turkish, except for one participant who preferred to use Turkish and English while answering the interview questions.

The interview questionnaires were composed of six different sets of questions submitted in detail in the appendices. In the first set of questions, the participants were questioned regarding their socio-demographic information (like gender, marital status, age, or level of education) and their immigration status and national identity. In the second set of questions, they were questioned regarding their decisions on entry into politics or political participation in general. After this set, the participants were asked some questions about the general situation in Europe in terms of far-right political parties and their critical attitudes and rhetoric, mainly its reasons and impacts on the Netherlands; and the daily lives of immigrants. In the following sets, the participants were questioned about the Dutch immigration policies (in the past, now and in the future); these policies' influence on politics and immigrants' daily lives. In the last sets of questions, the meaning of identity as an immigrant and the future expectations were discussed.

Seventeen interviews were conducted in the Dutch cities of Amsterdam, Den Haag, Rotterdam, Delft, and Schiedam, and one interview was done via Skype meeting with an interviewee from Deventer. The participants voluntarily attended the interviews. The interviews were conducted by the researcher in face-to-face with the participants.

The interviews were audio-recorded after having the participants' written consent at the beginning of the interviews. All of these interviews have been transcribed.

### **5.3 Participants of the Study**

Participants were required to have an origin of Turkey and hold the Netherlands' citizenship to be eligible for the study. In this context, 18 politically active participants were selected carefully by taking into account their different ideological/political stances and roles within the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community and their visibility in the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community. This way, it could be possible to reflect different types of perceptions regarding the politicization of Muslim immigrants and their impacts on their political participation.

The participants were either politically active in a political party, or inactive, but still had connections with the politics. Some of them were the active members of the leading civil society organizations established by Turkish-Dutch immigrants, whose direct attendance to the politics was possible once they were political party members. However, they played an active role in raising the Turkish community's awareness in terms of Dutch laws, rules and regulations, rights and duties as Dutch citizens, and raising awareness on domestic politics.

Some of the participants, who were the members of these political parties or civil society organizations, also worked as specialists or consultants for the Dutch governments regarding the immigrants. Thus, contrary to the political parties, they had an indirect engagement in governing issues, particularly at the municipal level.

Nevertheless, it is not easy to draw a clear conclusion for the role of civil society organizations in the Netherlands in influencing the decision-making processes of the government in general or municipalities in particular. Their impact is rather observed on the establishment of Turkish-Dutch immigrants' identity politics against the negative attitudes they face within Dutch society and politics.

To sum up the profile of the whole participants, it can be said that;

- Four of the participants were women,
- Seven of them were 2nd, and 11 of them were 1st generation immigrants,
- Eight of them were above 50 years old, five of them were in the 40s, three were in the 30s, and two were in the 20s.

Detailed profile of the participants is listed in Table 3.

**Table 3**

*Participants' profile*

No	Gender	Age	Education	Generation	Party/Civil Society Membership	Citizenship Ethnicity
1	Female	≥40	B.A.	2 <sup>nd</sup>	DENK	TR-Dutch
2	Male	50	M.A.	1 <sup>st</sup>	Milli Görüş	TR-Dutch
3	Male	37	B.A.	1 <sup>st</sup>	DENK	TR-Dutch
4	Male	26	M.A.	2 <sup>nd</sup>	DENK	TR-Dutch
5	Female	40	Vocational School	2 <sup>nd</sup>	CDA Milli Görüş	TR-Dutch

**Table 3 (continued)**

<b>6</b>	Male	28	B.A.	2 <sup>nd</sup>	Milli Görüş	TR-Dutch
<b>7</b>	Male	45	B.A.	1 <sup>st</sup>	Milli Görüş	TR-Dutch
<b>8</b>	Male	38	B.A.	2 <sup>nd</sup>	GL	TR-Dutch
<b>9</b>	Male	56	Ph.D.	1 <sup>st</sup>	PvdA	TR-Dutch
<b>10</b>	Male	34	M.A.	2 <sup>nd</sup>	NIDA	TR-Dutch
<b>11</b>	Female	44	B.A.	2 <sup>nd</sup>	PvdA / GL (inactive)	TR-Dutch
<b>12</b>	Male	46	Vocational School	1 <sup>st</sup>	UETT/UID	TR-Dutch
<b>13</b>	Female	53	B.A.	1 <sup>st</sup>	PvdA	TR-Dutch
<b>14</b>	Male	54	Vocational School	1 <sup>st</sup>	PvdA	TR-Dutch
<b>15</b>	Male	58	Vocational School	1 <sup>st</sup>	TICF/Diyanet	TR-Dutch
<b>16</b>	Male	67	Social Academy	1 <sup>st</sup>	HTIB PvdA	TR-Dutch
<b>17</b>	Male	58	B.A.	1 <sup>st</sup>	NCB/Forum (abolished)	TR-Dutch
<b>18</b>	Male	51	Post-doc	1 <sup>st</sup>	PvdA	TR-Dutch

## 5.4 Method of Analysis

The interviews of this research were made and transcribed within the framework of the issues believed to have a triggering impact on Turkish-Dutch immigrants regarding the political participation following the party-based politicization process. Each transcript is about 15 pages long, and in total, there are about 300 pages of transcribed data.

The analysis method used in this case study is the thematic content analysis based on manual coding, as mentioned in the Introduction Chapter. In this way, the research themes were analyzed in the transcribed data and supported by the examples of those themes (Burnard et al., 2008). The analysis was conducted in interdependent stages setting up the draft analytical categories for the analysis and accordingly preparing an analytical coding guide, which was used for coding all the interviews, and in this way, producing case overviews (Schmidt, 2004). Here, "(c)oding (...) means relating particular passages in the text of an interview to one category, in the version that best fits these textual passages" (Schmidt, 2004, 255).

For setting up the analytical categories the text passages in the interviews were carefully read several times, page by page and line by line in order to derive the structure of the analysis, by which the ideas of the participants were generalized in a conceptual abstraction by underlying uniformities and diversities (Glaser & Strauss, 2017). In this way, all transcribed interviews were fully passed through an intensive and repeated reading process, which was quite necessary to ensure the required degree of accuracy of the analytical categorization (Schmidt, 2004).

While doing the intensive reading, the individual aspects of participants regarding the same coded issues were especially taken into account, and the similarities and differences were noted to clarify the analysis' next steps, which was also necessary for discovering recurrent themes in the interviews (Burnard et al., 2008).

In this framework, all the details in the interviews related to the research and supportive questions were categorized under main themes manually, sub-themes, and

codes or reflections on the immigrant community's daily life. Three themes of the identity politics were identified that were widely utilized in the interviews by the participants, all of which created the feeling of "isolation, assimilation, or discrimination" among the immigrant people, and encouraged them to take some political steps as a reaction. They were "ethnicity/race, culture, and religion." In this way, main themes (ethnicity/race, culture, religion) and sub-themes or impacts (social, political, educational, administrative impacts) were reached for immigrants' political participation from the perspective of identity politics of immigrant community and their codes as discussed below.

According to Schmidt (2004), it is vital to reduce the quantity of information faced at this stage of the analysis in order to be able to compare the cases concerning dominant tendencies. It is why only these three themes have come into prominence. "This involves accepting a loss of information, but this is correspondingly less the more differentiated the analytical categories and their content features" (Schmidt, 2004, 256). All the themes, their sub-themes, and their codes are presented in the forms of tables below. Direct quotations from the participants' responses were used to analyze the aggregate data, and these quotations were evaluated according to the codes mentioned above.

#### **5.4.1 The theme of ethnicity/race and its impacts on Turkish-Dutch immigrants**

According to the common perceptions of participants, ethnicity, and race, which are interchangeably used by people, is probably the most critical component of identity politics, politicized in the Netherlands.

The general point of view of the 18 participants shows that the theme of ethnicity/race is related to three sub-themes, causing impacts on or emerging codes of the Turkish-Dutch immigrants, which are social, political, and educational. These impacts cause eleven visible codes in the daily life of the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community, as listed in Table 4.



**Table 4***Theme of Ethnicity/Race, its impacts and reflections*

<b>Main theme</b>	<b>Sub-themes (impacts)</b>	<b>Reflections (codes)</b>
<b>Ethnicity/Race</b>	Social impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- the feeling of discrimination through negative rhetoric</li> <li>- the feeling of marginalization between minority and majority</li> <li>- a potential criminalization tool</li> <li>- motivation for alliance formation as a community</li> </ul>
	Political impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- a popular (or populist) agenda for electoral campaigns</li> <li>- linkage with politics in Turkey</li> <li>- motivation for alliance formation against racist rhetoric of political parties</li> </ul>
	Educational impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- an open cleavage for the type of schools (white schools / black schools)</li> <li>- inequality on the way of higher education</li> <li>- a discriminative tool for the economic well-being in terms employment</li> <li>- a pushing effect for being well educated</li> </ul>

**5.4.1.1 Social impact**

The social impact, which causes the feelings of discrimination against the immigrant community within the Dutch society, has a reflection on the formation of “we” and

“others” cleavage via discriminative rhetoric of politicians and marginalization. It brings to the fore potential criminals from within the immigrant community as a negative reflection.

Here, the first question that you are asked is, “where are you from?” It is always asked Turkish people here. There is an intention here. They try to stress that you are not a “Dutch.” Since my appearance is not like any other Dutch here. When this is the first question here, I deliberately say that I am from Amsterdam. I say, “I am Dutch.” They keep going to ask, “but where are you from?” Of course, I have an immigrant background. However, in the end, I was born and raised here. I am like you. I have rights, as I do have responsibilities. They say: “okay, but where is your father or mother from?” (The interviewee number one)

The rhetoric of Thierry Baudette (*leader of FvD*) is not only Eurosceptic but also inhuman. The following day of the elections, this party leader used the term “boreal” which was discussed a lot in all over Dutch media for the following days. He said that they wanted to create the boreal Netherlands. It means the Netherlands consists of white people only (*by referring to Northern Europe and its ethnic groups, culture, and languages*). This term has a historical meaning. It is related to fascism, which refers to the period of Hitler’s Germany. (The interviewee number eight)

If you use the social sensitivities of a community, especially those on identity, you can easily make politics. You do not need to think about it that much. You marginalize them. (The interviewee number seventeen)

Although rules and regulations, the law in general, protect every person's rights in the Netherlands, and equality is the main rule of the Dutch law, in daily life, there is visible discrimination depending on ethnicity or race, according to the participants.

In the Netherlands, everybody has the same rights. We have an amazing constitution here. However, we do not have the same opportunities. (The interviewee number four)

They even argue that police forces treat people differently depending on their skin color or other physical distinguishing features. They think that it is happening easier than before -they mean after the 2000s- because the far-right political parties are normalizing ethnic racism or discrimination within the society by using it as party propaganda and on media. The following quotation summarizes this perception:

If you are black or have a beard, police ask you to stop for any reason more frequently than others. (The interviewee number three)

Ethnicity is one of the most crucial reasons for the highest decline rates of Turkish-Dutch immigrants' job applications as well, and as a result of that, one of the most powerful pushing effects behind these people's political participation, with their own words.

Although it is not stated directly and frankly, my appearance and race offended their eye when I apply for a position. (The interviewee number one)

Far-right parties give the signal to the immigrant community that 'you are not from here, you do not belong here, you will never be from here, you are Turkish, so if possible, go back to your country.' We were thinking that these discourses de-motivate our supporters (*referring to the electorates of DENK from Turkish-Dutch immigrants*). However, later on, we have realized that these words were only irritating and had positive impacts on our supporters. Our political parties (*referring to the ones established by immigrants*) create a feeling of trust for the immigrant community for the opposite. We have realized the importance of political participation for that. (The interviewee number four)

The participants argue that if the discrimination continues based on ethnicity, the Netherlands might face some critical problems in the future. Since these attitudes have not demobilized the Turkish-Dutch community, on the contrary, they bunch up more strongly than ever before to take some political actions together and form an alliance as they do through the gatherings of Mosque meetings or some other civil society organizations against such discriminative attitudes despite ideological differences among themselves. Within this participation process, they do not isolate or disintegrate themselves from the Dutch system, according to the participants; instead, they are eager to integrate, especially with the structural system and administrative bodies, by believing that although they hail from Turkey, in terms of nationality, they are Dutch, too.

#### **5.4.1.2 Political Impact**

According to the general perception of participants, ethnicity is one of the most popular frames used by the Dutch political parties, mostly by far-right. The rhetoric of these

parties is identified as “racist” in related cases, by almost all of the participants of the study. Following quotation of one of the interviewees elaborates on this issue:

Europeans’ philosophy has been built upon race during history. (...) Every different race argues that it is superior to others. (The interviewee number two)

Nevertheless, the racist discourses of far-right political parties are seen as only a vote-seeking effort by the immigrants in the Netherlands, especially before the elections, because they argue that it is impossible to be a racist in the Netherlands, depending on the Dutch law.

In order to gain power in politics, politicians must find something to play politics. For sure, you have to use this thing to get more votes, most productively. For some of them, this is related to economics, which means they try to get more electoral support by politicizing salary increase. For some others, this works with bringing the environment and nature-related issues into the agenda. As for another group, they try to get these votes and support them by racist rhetoric. (The interviewee number two)

However, mainstream parties also bring about some rhetoric, which might negatively affect immigrant communities from time to time with the same vote-seeking purposes.

To gain over the supporters of far-right political parties, the mainstream parties change and harshen their rhetoric. For example, last year, the Christian Democrats wanted to begin the new academic year by singing the Dutch national anthem with an old fashion chauvinist approach. Of course, it was not accepted. Nevertheless, they increased their votes with this rhetoric. (Interviewee number two)

The far-right political parties’ negative rhetoric towards the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community plays an essential role in alliance formation among Turkish-Dutch immigrants through small groups as the first step by social gatherings at weekend schools, for instance, or meetings at mosques, and finally coming together in civil society organizations.

In the last couple of decades, the PVV has gained a serious strength and widened its impact area, and it still does. As the PVV, other mainstream parties also have changed their rhetoric against us by seeing the electoral potential behind this. It has paved the way for an apparent political instability for the immigrant community. In order to fix this situation, we have established DENK. (The interviewee number three)

Without a doubt, Turkey plays a vital role in shaping behaviors or attitudes towards Turkish-Dutch immigrants in the Netherlands. The political impact is used as one of the main agendas of political parties to create a reflection among the Dutch society against the immigrants and takes Turkey as its core at so many times to remind ethnic differences.

According to the participants, almost all the political parties from both left, center, and right use Turkey-related issues in their daily discourses and party propagandas.

When we look at the national elections here in the Netherlands, or the European Parliament elections, we see that the Netherlands always look for an enemy with a populist strategy in these elections periods, and selects Turkey as the enemy. There are almost half a million people with Turkey's origin who is living here, and these people are incredibly affected by this populist strategy. (The interviewee number three)

In general, the participants have serious concerns about this situation, since it has been believed that both the Dutch and Turkish governments and political parties, in general, misuse them for the sake of political victory. They refer to the parties VVD and AKP (Justice and Development Party) depending on the diplomatic crisis following AKP's efforts to hold political rallies in the Netherlands for the 2017 constitutional referendum. Especially the rhetoric used by Turkish politicians as well as Dutch ones is evaluated as unacceptable by them. They stress that; Turkish-Dutch immigrants are the ones who are affected most negatively from these campaigns as the residents of the Netherlands.

Particularly the second generation, but in the overall picture almost all the participants are seriously critical about the issues observed in Rotterdam in 2017. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu's plane was banned from landing, and Turkish Minister of Family and Social Policies, Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya was expelled from the Netherlands in 2017 in order to prevent them from speaking in the rallies before the referendum in Turkey.

Turkish politics have always depended on religion and nationalism. It is also implemented by Dutch politicians here in the Netherlands. (The interviewee number sixteen)

They believe that such incidents have worse impacts on themselves regarding discrimination and isolation from society since it brings about the immigrants' integration discussions back to the table. They, indeed, put the blame on Turkey and Turkish politicians on that. They acknowledge that both of the parties, Turkey and Dutch mainstream and far-right, at that time took advantage of this in their upcoming elections.

#### **5.4.1.3 Educational Impact**

In the country, the attitude towards Turkish-Dutch immigrants was different until the 2000s in education, as acknowledged by the participants. For instance, Turkish language lessons were included in the curriculum of students in the schools, and even Turkish national holidays were celebrated in the immigrant schools. However, after the 2000s, first, these language courses were removed from the curriculum. In 2004 mother tongue education was banned entirely in the immigrant schools, and today the weekend schools that are teaching Turkish language, history, and culture to the Turkish immigrant children are not permitted to function. Especially education in the mother tongue is being evaluated as one of the most important aspects of general education for immigrants, which has been pointed out by most of the participants. The government policies regarding forbidding the education of the mother tongue have been openly criticized in this context. The participants believe that increasing the politicization of immigrant-related issues causes such changes within the Dutch education system. One respondent expands on the issue:

We do not come together any longer, even at schools. We do not accommodate in the same districts. Everybody has a different district. We have our schools, our sanctuary, our supermarket, separate than the native Dutch community has. It means there is a steady disintegration in society. It is not a class-based disintegration, but ethnic and religious. Besides, the issue of language follows them. When you submit these three issues as a threat to the native community, this community begins to absorb it and use it daily. It is what the far-right parties have done. (Interviewee number seventeen)

The most critical situation in the field of education that is mentioned as discrimination and racism during the interviews is the current separation among the schools as "black schools" and "white schools," to which immigrant children and only Dutch children are going respectively, which is activating the immigrant community to find out a solution about. Participants state their perceptions with the following words:

Students have begun to be separated in between white and black schools. Some of the regions have more foreign residents than others. There are all blackheads in these schools in these regions, in which native Dutch people are quite a few. In these schools, they (*referring to Dutch people*) have been lowered down education and scores. They (*referring to Dutch people*) have discredited the Islamic schools by arguing that these schools' scores and education are not good. (The interviewee number twelve)

In the Netherlands, immigrant students are consciously misguided by the school counselors at the end of secondary education to prevent them from having higher education, according to the participants. Thus, most immigrant children have to go to the vocational school or waste a couple of years before starting at the University.

The native Dutch society's discriminative practices, such as dissociating immigrant and native children during primary or secondary education, have been identified as class-based as well. It means that if a native Dutch child is coming from a family with lower income, less education, and whether the class difference would be visible between the pupils, similar discrimination or isolation is observed between the Dutch children.

However, in terms of finding a company to fulfill the schools' traineeship requirement, native Dutch and Turkish-Dutch children have different treatments, even if they study at or graduate from the same school. Participants have argued that the percentages to be accepted by a company as an immigrant are very low compared to a native Dutch applicant. Although this is an unacceptable situation, it is believed to have positive returns for immigrants. Such negative attitudes and situations mostly instigate the younger generation to study more and struggle more to be heard, according to the participants, as an essential step forward on the way of protecting their identity and defend their interests within the Dutch system.

Job opportunities and possibilities have been formalized according to immigrants' education and academic background in the Netherlands.

Particularly in the governmental agencies and institutions, almost 70% of the cleaning staff are immigrants, while only about 2% of the high-level managerial positions belong to immigrants, although about 16% of the university students in the Netherlands are immigrants. It represents blatant discrimination towards immigrants. (Interviewee number seventeen)

In the field of defending their rights as Dutch citizens besides being Turkish citizens, the participants believe in the importance of education, which leads them on the way of being politically active to get better positions within society and to guide the other Turkish-Dutch immigrant community members.

The issue of education is also believed to be impacted by the political parties' propagandas. The crucial thing about this is that whenever political parties politicize these issues related to Turkish-Dutch immigrants via media, it has been discussed in the schools, which negatively impacts immigrant children.

Additionally, Turkey related issues are part of the education in the schools in the Netherlands in a negative manner, according to the participants. They state that whenever a negative issue occurs about Turkey, this issue is somehow politicized by political parties, particularly by the far-right, and this issue is taught almost as a lesson in the schools, which effects the Turkish-Dutch immigrant children who are going to the Dutch schools.

In education, some of the participants, on the other hand, argue that both Dutch and immigrant communities have the same rights depending on the Dutch rules and regulations. Therefore, it is not possible to mention clear-cut discrimination between the majority and minority groups stemming from the governmental policies or implementations. Some of the participants accuse the Turkish-Dutch immigrants, particularly the first-generation immigrants, with not continuing their education or paying sufficient effort to have higher education.

I do not believe that there is discrimination in the Dutch governmental policies regarding the educational opportunities provided for the majority and minority groups. If people improve themselves with education, then they accomplish everything. The Dutch do not tell you, "you cannot do this." On the other hand,



they problematize the instability between majority and minority in terms of education because if you do not educate yourself, you cannot adapt. If you are not well educated, nobody offers you a ministerial or managerial high-level position. Yes, there is racism in the field of education in our daily lives, but this is not a government policy. (The interviewee number nine)

Slootman (2018, 10) argues about the Moroccan and Turkish-Dutch immigrants' ethnic identification that "there is not some static, uniform, and predictable ethnic identification" because it is "influenced by social others in certain ways" and "affected by the process of social mobility and develop over time."

With identity politics despite differences in ethnic roots, political ideology, generation, age, or gender, the immigrant populations are expected to develop their collective identifications against the perceptions of discrimination, racism, and unfair implementations towards their own social identity.

#### **5.4.2 The theme of culture and its impacts on Turkish-Dutch immigrants**

According to the common perceptions of participants, culture is another politicized category related to Turkish-Dutch immigrants, as one of the main themes of identity politics, too. The category of culture has three sub-themes or impacts on Turkish-Dutch immigrants. Again, two of these impact fields are similar to the first category: social and political impacts. However, one impact field is unique for this category, which is policy impact. These impacts cause seven visible reflections or outcomes for the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community, as listed in Table 5.

**Table 5***Theme of Culture, its impacts and reflections*

<b>Main theme</b>	<b>Sub-themes (impacts)</b>	<b>Reflections (codes)</b>
<b>Culture</b>	Social impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- dissociative role of media within the Dutch society</li> <li>- dissociative role within the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community itself</li> <li>- reason of identity dilemma</li> <li>- an obstacle for socio-cultural integration</li> </ul>
	Political impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- negative political party discourse</li> <li>- a popular (or populist) agenda for electoral campaigns</li> </ul>
	Policy impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- a governmental policy tool</li> </ul>

**5.4.2.1 Social Impact**

The social impact of culture generates a dissociation within general Dutch society for the immigrant and native communities because of their differences and divergences. A similar dissociation is also observed among the Turkish-Dutch immigrants themselves, too, interestingly, since they show mixed reactions when they are subject to culturally discriminative attitudes on the one hand and begin to feature their culturally different patterns more than ever, on the other. In such a circumstance, they find themselves in an identity dilemma most of the time. Especially the youngest generation has

difficulties in identifying itself culturally on an identity basis. In the end, the social impact of culture and its reflections do not act so positively to integrate immigrants further within Dutch society.

I can neither identify myself as pure Dutch, nor as pure Turkish. I believe that most of the problems stem from this. We speak neither Turkish nor Dutch fluently. We know neither Turkish culture nor the Dutch one that well. We deal with one identity, but another day we leave or put that identity aside. We cannot find ourselves. (The interviewee number six)

The Turkish-Dutch immigrants feel a negative perception from the native Dutch people in cultural terms. The participants state that some of the native Dutch people argue that the Dutch culture and the Dutch identity are disappearing because of the immigrants and their disintegration with Dutch society. The Dutch media plays a significant role in this negative type of heightened awareness. Within this context, the participants state that the foreigners are demoralized, marginalized, and otherized by media. It can be said that culture is used as a tool for building a barrier between communities in the Netherlands. The participants argue that they have been pushed to claim their rights in a country of which they have official citizenship.

The Prime Minister mentions about being a ‘normal Dutch,’ what does it mean? (The interviewee number one)

Within this struggle, immigrants produce identity politics either consciously or unconsciously, too, to respond to such attitudes, and they call native Dutch people as “white Dutch.” They reflect this perception towards the EU as well, and about the EU membership process of Turkey. One of the interviewees elaborates this situation as follows:

If I became the Prime Minister of Turkey or the President, I would not engage in this (*referring to the EU*). In the worst scenario, I would cooperate with countries with similar cultures and religions with Turkey, such as Azerbaijan, Iraq, or even Syria. (The interviewee number two)

However, some of the participants from the left ideology touch upon the internal discrimination and racism among the Turkish-Dutch community itself, not only about political ideologies but also about many other different issues.

For instance, we are researching homosexuality among the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community here, and we find unbelievable problems because the vast majority of our community does not accept homosexuality. There are leftists and rightists, Alevi and Sunnis, believers, and non-believers among this group who do not accept homosexuality. If you do not accept the differences within your community if you do not even think about it once, how can you dare to ask Dutch people to accept you with your beard, language, or religion? We (*referring to the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community*) discriminate our differences, marginalize each other, and even spy on these issues. Nevertheless, you expect the Dutch people to see you as an equal. It is one of the most significant deficiencies of the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community here. If we can provide our internal solidarity, we will not need extra support from any other group abroad. (The interviewee number seventeen)

Briefly, these participants argue that all these cultural and social otherness, discrimination, and even Islamophobia felt by the immigrant community from the Dutch society also stem from the Turkish community itself because this community still has problems integrating into itself fully.

#### **5.4.2.2 Political impact**

The political impact of culture has the same reflections with the previous theme (ethnicity/race) on Turkish-Dutch immigrants. It is used as one of the main popular topics by political parties to create negative repercussions on Dutch people towards immigrants and used as party propaganda.

Even a Minister from VVD could openly argue that “our (*referring to Dutch*) culture is more superior to other cultures, especially the Islamic cultures. From Forum for Democracy, he (*referring to Thierry Baudet*) said, “Europe has to stay dominant wide.” How can you say that? He said their culture; their blood is being thinned out, because of all the migrants coming here. (The interviewee number ten)

The participants mention negative repercussions of being a bi-cultural citizen, like having both Turkish and Dutch cultures at the same time. It is evaluated by political parties, particularly by far-right, as an obstacle in front of full integration of immigrants with Dutch society, culture and norms, and of feeling Dutch.

This attitude is felt by the Turkish-Dutch immigrants within their daily lives as well. It is because the Europeans, in general, and Dutch people, in particular, have been only recently learning to live together with different cultures in harmony, according to the participants.

Following the discussions of integration vs. assimilation, it has been expected by the Dutch political parties, particularly by the far-right, to have pure Dutch culture in the Netherlands, according to the participants.

There must be one culture. It is one of the discussion topics here. The general idea is that you cannot integrate if you pay more attention to your own culture. (The interviewee number one)

Moreover, some of the participants argue that the Dutch rules and regulations that were reorganized after the 1990s almost forced newcomers to adopt Dutch culture via a new type of exam. These exams are getting more difficult to pass, as also mentioned in the previous chapters. Without a doubt, this causes isolation and withdrawal from Dutch society for the immigrant community.

#### **5.4.2.3 Policy impact**

The policy impact of the theme of culture shows itself on the way of governmental policies and policy tools. Multiculturalism is one of the good examples of this. Multiculturalism is no longer a public policy in the Netherlands, as mentioned before. Almost all the participants agree that the Netherlands was a multicultural country once upon a time. It meant that everybody had the right to live his/her culture without any discrimination or negative attitude.

Since the late 1990s and with the increase of far-right political party's negative rhetoric and overall political parties' anxiety regarding their statuses and vote expectations, multiculturalism has not been leaving as it was before, according to the participants, although not disappeared totally.

Depending on participants' responses within the interviews, it is possible to mention two realities of multiculturalism today in the Netherlands. One of which is still surviving successful multiculturalism within the overall Dutch society's daily life, as in Amsterdam or Rotterdam.

The second of which is the end of multiculturalism in Dutch party politics, including those parties established by the immigrant communities. Because multiculturalism means equal treatment and acceptance of every different culture within the society, and as such, it is basically against the integration of different ethnic, religious, and cultural groups in the society, according to the Dutch far-right political parties, as argued by the participants.

Language is one of the most crucial matters in culture. Since the beginning of the 2000s, especially with the political parties' efforts, even speaking Turkish or Arabic on the streets is not tolerated, according to some participants, let alone in the governmental offices.

Multilingualism is necessary for multiculturalism, for some participants, which is not supported by the government any longer, too, for some immigrant communities like Turkish-Dutch.

### **5.4.3 The theme of religion and its impacts on Turkish-Dutch immigrants**

Religion is the most critical component of identity politics for Turkish-Dutch immigrants. It is also one of the most politicized discussion topics related to immigrants in the Netherlands. It is why it has been selected as the most crucial category in this analysis. The participants' general perception puts forward that the theme of religion is related to the same three sub-themes with the first theme (ethnicity/race), causing impacts on the Turkish-Dutch immigrants. These impacts pave the way for six visible reflections or outcomes for the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community, as listed in Table 6.

**Table 6***Theme of Religion, its impacts and reflections*

<b>Main theme</b>	<b>Sub-themes (impacts)</b>	<b>Reflections (codes)</b>
<b>Religion</b>	Social impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- discrimination initiator within the society</li> <li>- association with terrorist activities</li> <li>- binding role in community formation</li> </ul>
	Political impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- negative political party discourse</li> <li>- a popular (or populist) agenda for electoral campaigns</li> </ul>
	Educational impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- cause of opportunity inequality in education</li> </ul>

**5.4.3.1 Social Impact**

The social impact of the theme of religion reflects similar outcomes on the immigrant community with the first theme (ethnicity/race), which is a feeling of discrimination rooted in Dutch society. It causes unfair implementations between native and immigrant communities in the field of education, too. As also observed in the criminalization reflection of the first theme's social impact, the theme of religion's social impact paves the way for associating Islam with terrorism. Overall, still, these negative impacts have a positive outcome, as in the first theme, which is community formation and further connectedness among the immigrant people.

According to the general perception of participants, the Netherlands' governmental policies on immigrant communities regarding the religion are not discriminative or isolationist. Thus, separatism through religion is not visible at the governmental level in the Netherlands.

Even though they mention some transitions from the 1970s up to today in their daily practices regarding the religion, there is not clear-cut discrimination, or isolation stemmed from the Dutch governments towards Turkish-Dutch Muslim immigrants on religious grounds.

Probably the only exception to this perception is the decrease in the amount of financial support or subsidy for the Muslim community's publishing rights, despite continuing support for other religious groups such as Hindus, Protestants, or Catholics. Indeed, Vermeulen's (2005, 83) research that is focusing on the Turkish immigrants' organizing processes in Amsterdam and Berlin shows that the number of subsidies Turkish organizations received yearly from the local Amsterdam authorities increase in the early 1980s and eventually decrease by the end of the 1990s.

In the last five years, the right to publish of Muslim community has been disintitiled. Additionally, in the last couple of years, some changes have been made in the Dutch constitution regarding establishing Islamic schools, depending on the rapid increase in Muslim people. There are different attitudes towards Muslim immigrants and Catholic immigrants, for instance. Dutch people/governments think that they can take Catholic Polish immigrants under control even if they have a different culture because they are similar in many different ways, like religion. However, about Muslims, they say that Muslim people are culturally, genetically, and religiously different from Dutch people, so they cannot be changed or taken under control. (The interviewee number seven)

The most visible religion-based discrimination felt by the participants stems from the attitudes of native Dutch people during the daily life, which is affected by the far-right political parties increasing effort to frame Muslim immigrants as a scapegoat for degeneration and degradation in Dutch identity, religion, culture, and norms. Indeed, according to the general opinion of participants, the discrimination and isolation that is experienced by the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community in terms of their religious beliefs, behaviors or even physical appearance as a visible sign (particularly in the case



of women wearing a headscarf) have increased within Dutch society daily following the critical rhetoric of far-right political parties on media.

Being a Muslim is an obstacle for me within the society to live like an ordinary person, mainly because of representing my belief and my religion with my clothing. It is why, for long, I could not have a job. (The interviewee number one)

If you do not wear headscarves, do not fast, or attend events with your neighbors, they (*referring to native Dutch people*) are pleased and say that "you are different." (The interviewee number eleven)

Religion is used as one of the populist agenda tools to make politics about immigrants next to violence and terrorism. According to the participants, the way of the opposition of far-right populist parties like PVV or its well-known leader Wilders reflects an excellent example of this. His words are not towards Muslim people, but directly towards Islam, as mentioned in the previous chapters while quoting his several speeches made in all over Europe. Islam has been reflected as the primary and real criminal within the society, so they combine Islam and violence in their rhetoric and party propaganda.

This attitude creates a visible impact on native Dutch people's attitudes towards Islamic communities by leveling their distrust to them, especially towards Moroccans, mostly after the terrorist incidents involving Moroccan-Dutch immigrants. For instance, the participants believe that the general attitude towards the Muslim community in the Netherlands has incredibly changed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA.

The attack on Twin Towers in New York was a decisive moment for Europe. Following that day, all our lives have changed. We have begun to walk on the streets by watching out our backs. Even though the incident has happened 7.000 km away from here, we have become potential criminals in the eyes of people from now on. (The interviewee number fourteen)

Finally, religion is a binding force among the immigrant community in the Netherlands. According to the participants, Islam has a binding role for the Turkish-Dutch immigrants, thanks to its societal goal, which is filling the gap between social classes within society. Especially mosques are believed to have particular importance among most Turkish-Dutch people because mosques are not seen as places only for

praying, but for gathering the Muslim community together, providing an atmosphere for social interaction and social identity formation the meetings organized in them. Owing to this fact, the number of mosques is increasing in the Netherlands.

The Turkish-Dutch immigrant community, especially the younger generation, evaluates this issue from the perspective of identity. They think that as long as they become organized via mosques and some other ways, and feel that they are from the Netherlands at the same time, the first step can be taken in the framework of identity, both Turkish and Dutch identities.

Mosques are a sort of barrier in front of assimilation in the society because there are not only Koran courses in mosques, but also courses in the field of history, particularly Turkish history with a good quality of education for immigrants from Turkey. (The interviewee number four)

In this framework, especially for the members of Milli Görüş, the mosques in the Netherlands are crucial in their functioning as a center where the immigrant community comes together.

#### **5.4.3.2 Political Impact**

The political impact of religion is similarly used as one of the main agendas of political parties to influence native Dutch society's general attitude against the immigrants. Additionally, this issue is used as party propaganda for the elections. There has been negative rhetoric of political parties against immigrants' religion, Islam, since the 1990s, as mentioned in the studies related to politicization in Chapter 3.

Most of the participants feel that the main pushing effect behind the negative attitudes of native Dutch people come from the far-right populist parties like PVV or FvD. Their anti-Islam rhetoric about immigrants and particularly about Islam, such as calls for closing down the Islamic schools, closing down the mosques, isolating Muslim people from the society, or imposing a ban on Koran have negative impacts on native Dutch

people alongside the Muslim community. These parties have point out Islam as a threat to Dutch values, traditions, culture, and Christianity.

There is an alienation within the Dutch society depending on being a Muslim, and politics are instigating this. Therefore, we are making these people (*referring to Muslim people*) heard and voiced their common interests. (The interviewee number three)

According to the participants, religion is the most accessible tool used by the political parties to manipulate people, especially when there is a problem waiting for a solution within the society.

It is always easy to land a problem upon foreigners, especially when their religion is not similar to yours. Particularly, if it potentially provides you vote. (The interviewee number fourteen)

The religion has begun to be used within the party rhetoric of mainstream parties recently because of that. Slightly and steadily anti-Islam and even Islamophobia has become an agenda of political parties, media, and native Dutch community, respectively in the Netherlands.

Islamophobia, which has gained prominence in the last two decades, is one of the main reasons behind establishing our political party in the Netherlands (DENK). (The interviewee number three)

Nevertheless, one of the participants, who is number six, reflects a different perspective in terms of political parties and their attitudes towards Islam. The participant does not separate the parties as mainstream and fringe while mentioning their attitudes towards Islam. Broadly, he differentiates the parties as anti-immigrant ones from others, who are totally against Muslims simultaneously. He explains his membership to CDA with this perspective, which is believed as not anti-immigrant.

Another critical point is that religion is used as an election campaign by the political parties. According to the general point of view, the anti-Islam rhetoric and attitudes have been used as an electoral tool by the parties, particularly by the populist far-right parties, especially during the election periods in the Netherlands. When the nation, culture, identity, and values are believed to be at stake, religion is the easiest way to attract communities' attention to almost any issue.

The far-right populist and extremist parties, who first came into prominence with the party Lijst Pim Fortuyn at the beginning of the 2000s in the Netherlands, argue that Islam is an obstacle in front of the integration of Muslim people with and within the Dutch society, culture and social life, which is believed to endanger cultural atmosphere of the Netherlands by pointing out the Muslims and their religion Islam.

Without our religious rhetoric or mosques, we do not come to anybody's attention within society. (The interviewee number two)

However, participant number eighteen mentions Islam as an abstract identity re-created in the 1990s as a reaction to the integration discussions in the Netherlands. According to the participant, these discussions were based on radicalization and the terrorization of religion. He states that racists in Europe formed this abstract identity, and unfortunately, Turkish people with a lack of education and experience of living in Europe those years, did appeal to an Islamic identity. Moreover, today it is difficult to change the image of this identity. Participant number seven also mentions an "Islamic identity" to surpass the ethnic dimension of the issue shortly. Repeatedly, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA, there has been a policy to redesign Islam, in western countries, according to the participants.

#### **5.4.3.3 Educational Impact**

Religion influences the field and level of education of immigrants in the Netherlands, as well. Some Muslim people face discrimination in terms of guidance and references in education, which is why they are usually led towards vocational schools instead of higher education institutions.

Budget cuts are also mentioned in terms of Islamic schools in the Netherlands currently. It is correlated with the anti-Islam and anti-Muslim attitudes of political parties, according to the participants.

It was possible to establish Islamic schools with parents' approval and signature in the 1990s. It was possible for all religious communities (*referring sects*).

However, once the number of these schools increased, they have changed the laws. Today, even if you get a hundred thousand signatures, you cannot establish an Islamic school. The real hidden purpose behind this is to prevent the rise and possible success of these schools. (The interviewee number seven)

Religion-based discrimination experienced by the participants is seen as a motivator for politically and educationally mobilize. To take any action, they stress the necessity of educating people further and raising the level of awareness farther. They suggest that only in this way, it becomes possible to take place within the political arena and act over there to struggle with their explanation. In this regard, the participants point out the criticism they faced concerning their religion as one of the main driving factors behind their political participation.

Of course, these far-right parties lay down that they do not want us. They do not want Muslims. They want to close down Islamic schools and mosques. They especially want to disintegrate Muslims from society. They have even made very foolish suggestions like the ban on Koran. In terms of conception, this is racism and discrimination. What we should do at this point is to educate people and raise the level of their awareness, not to withdraw from the political arena, and to give effort for participating in politics. (The interviewee number two)

As discussed earlier, today the far-right redefine “its core mission as the patriotic protection of traditional national identity, which is often explicitly connected to race, ethnicity, or religion” (Fukuyama, 2018, 91), which makes religion one of the critical integral parts of identity politics for both hosting community and immigrant communities. Especially for the participants from the right-wing participants from Milli Görüş, religion is one of the essential features of Turkish-Dutch immigrants’ identity.

In this context, the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community, especially the second generation, begin to identify themselves as Muslims, because the negative attitudes and discourses in the society towards their religion lead to a feeling of unacceptance within the general Dutch society, and in the end as theoretically argued by van Heelsum and Koomen (2016) this reinforce their self-identification as a separate (ethnic) group. It also coincides with the arguments of Just et al. (2014), mentioned in Chapter 4, that the more significant religious affiliations associated with political identity are mostly observed among the second generation immigrant groups.

## **5.5 Some insights for the political participation of Turkish-Dutch immigrants**

Under this study, the experiences of immigrants show that the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community feels and experiences an increasing politicization of Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands since the beginning of the 2000s.

With the negative impact of rhetoric and attitudes of politicians as well as their targeting strategies, even the native Dutch people who have positive impressions about immigrants, or who do not have either positive or negative feelings about them, have slightly altered their point of view towards immigrants in a negative manner, according to the general perception of participants. For instance, the increasing number of Muslim immigrants is considered by the native Dutch community to influence the socio-cultural structure of the Netherlands and economic well-being. Because this increase is frequently used by the far-right political parties in their daily rhetoric and on media to impact the ordinary Dutch people's approaches towards the Muslim immigrant community. This situation finds its reflections in criminalization, too as stated by van der Leun and van der Woude (2011, 444) that "(o)ver the past decades the Netherlands has developed into a culture of control in which criminals and immigrants are mainly seen as 'dangerous others.'

While these processes continue, usually far-right parties take advantage of this situation in political elections. They prepare their party propaganda and manifesto accordingly, and their rhetoric entirely focuses on the negative impacts of the immigrant community on economy, culture, norms, religion, and nation in general, but exclusively on Dutch identity. It is clearly stated by Berkhout, Sudulich, and van der Brug (2015) in their study conducted in the Netherlands between 1995 and 2009. The study puts forward that party actors' role increased between 2003 and 2009 by the election periods in general terms, notably when the discussions on immigrants increased the electoral turnovers in municipal and national elections in the Netherlands.

Such a political maneuver brings about isolationist, separatist, even racist attitudes towards immigrants, which pave the way for immigrants' different reactions, as mentioned in Chapter 4. It may cause the withdrawal of immigrant groups from society and some more isolation or further integration with society. However, more struggle is required to keep their ethnic, cultural, and religious identity against assimilation in both cases. When the immigrant populations prefer to pursue the second path, they realize it through identity politics and political participation.

A political party is the collective reaction of a community. Because once the community improves itself, it cannot content itself only with voting; it institutionalizes and establishes a political party in the end. (The interviewee number seven)

In this context, the Turkish-Dutch immigrants' political participation can be explained through their activated identity politics because of the politicization of issues related to Muslim immigrants. The interviews expose that immigrants' identity politics take their roots from different themes, as mentioned above. Of course, it is possible to increase or further differentiate these themes, which produce identity politics. For instance, identity politics encourage social integration among socialist Turkish-Dutch immigrants and Dutch gays seeking for equality and non-discrimination as mentioned by the interviewee number sixteen.

However, the social integration problems among different religious and political groups within the Turkish-Dutch community itself continue to exist stemming from different ideologies, religious sects, or ethnic origin, according to the participants belong to the left ideology. The participants belong to the left ideology complain about some Turkish-Dutch immigrant community members' lack of support from the rightest ideology. They argue that Turkish-Dutch immigrants who have different ideologies than them do not participate in political or social events that they organize, or do not support them in their legal struggle against the Dutch far-right, and resist to ally within the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community. Therefore, it can be said that there are two types of social integration issues here; the first one is that of the Turkish-Dutch immigrants with the host society, and the second one is within the community itself.

On behalf of HTIB, I made a plea against Wilders, the leader of PVV. The Moroccan-Dutch immigrant community also joined us in this process. I almost

begged them (*referring Milli Görüş and Diyanet*) to join us. I said, "even if you do not want to become a party to it, come to the court and be with us." They did not even do that. (The interviewee number sixteen)

"Mutual trust" comes to the fore in the interviews as one of the most critical issues. It refers to the trust between immigrant and host communities and trust within the immigrant community itself. While Turkish-Dutch immigrants fully trust in the Dutch political system and the political parties and civil society organizations that they belong to, some members of the different ideological, sectarian, and ethnic groups within the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community itself do not wholly trust in each other.

As a self-criticism, some of the participants, particularly those belonging to the first generation and over 40s, argue that both the Turkish-Dutch community and the Moroccan-Dutch community have not been so successful in building up the trust of native Dutch people.

If our children still call Dutch people an infidel and if our Imams still advise our children not to swim in the same swimming pool with Dutch people by arguing that they are four-footed pigs, you have to discuss yourself first. As a result, of course, we have besieged with Islamophobia. (The interviewee number sixteen)

Some of the participants even argue that the most significant percentage of the Netherlands' statistical data indicates Moroccans and Turks between the ages of 15-25 as the primary criminals. Thus for those participants who belong to the first generation and mostly adhere to the left ideology, the Dutch peoples' concerns regarding these courses of events are quite understandable. However, there is not yet a reliable ethnic profiling criminal system in the Netherlands, and there are critical studies on the ethnic bias of Dutch police officers who have "stereotyped ethnic groups as the "criminal other," particularly Moroccans" (Unnever, 2019, 191). Ethnic profiling is 'the use by police, security, immigration or customs officials of generalizations based on race, ethnicity, religion or national origin -rather than individual behavior or objective evidence- as the basis for suspicion in directing discretionary law enforcement actions" (van der Leun & van der Woude, 2011, 450).

It is why the rapidly increasing popularity of xenophobia or Islamophobia pushes the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community to take a step in politics to prevent these



segregationist initiatives and assist the immigrant community in defending their rights as also being Dutch citizens. In the meantime, the issue of ethnicity, next to religion and religious identity, still matters a lot for all participants.

Without making any separation among the participants, it can be argued that the economics, unemployment, and subsistence issues are always assumed as intrinsic to the issue of immigrants in the Dutch society, even if it is not always stated explicitly by politicians or media. Immigrants are aware that identity, ethnicity, or religion-related problems could gain more significance with the influence of economic problems.

This finding seems compatible with the theoretical background of this research. As mentioned earlier, even though the reasons behind the general politicized attitudes regarding the immigrants and immigration have slightly shifted from economic issues toward identity and ethnicity, economics has always retained its priority in people's daily lives.

The question here is who benefits from reference to economic issues. The Dutch elections at both municipal and national levels since the beginning of the 2000s show that mostly the far-right political parties use the economic issues to increase electoral support besides identity-related issues.

There are parties from the right-wing who foster the arguments like "since the immigrants have arrived in the Netherlands, we have problems; they have stolen our jobs and homes." At the municipal level, we feel the reflections of these arguments in our daily lives in people's attitudes. (The interviewee number thirteen)

Nevertheless, especially the first-generation immigrants view these arguments and rhetoric as a motivation to have better education, take place in Dutch politics, and collectively mobilize and integrate.

The general perception shows that the immigrants in general usually electorally supported the Dutch leftist political parties before, because it was assumed that leftist parties like PvdA or GL advocated their rights much better than the other political parties did. These parties, according to the participants, did not make them felt as "other", although ideologically, the biggest majority of the Turkish-Dutch immigrant

community take place on the conservative right wing. Indeed, in the 1980s and 1990s “(t)he small left-wing parties, the Labor Party and the Democrats 66, advocated a further strengthening of the legal status of resident foreigners. These parties supported a simplification of the naturalization procedures, especially by recognizing dual citizenship” (Fermin, 1997, 290), as mentioned previously. This situation matches with the arguments of Nandi and Platt (2018, 6) that are mentioned in Chapter 4 that “more left-wing political affiliation associated with stronger ethnic identity among minorities, given the ways in which left-wing parties tend to more explicitly espouse issues of diversity and minority rights”.

According to the participants, since the beginning of the 2000s, the leftist parties' voters have increasingly questioned the connection and closeness of their parties to the immigrant communities parallel to the increasing politicization of immigration and immigrants. Consequently, the leftist parties have also slightly altered their attitudes towards immigrants and have begun to remain distant. Some participants explain this change of attitude with a shift from Left to Right, which made it necessary for Turkish-Dutch immigrants to establish their own political parties, NGOs, or federations following their increased awareness of immigrants' legal rights and duties. It is also one of the driving forces of the political participation of Turkish-Dutch immigrants.

Unfortunately, currently, these left-wing parties have begun to realize that these immigrant groups supporting them are not egalitarian or do not defend libertarian policies when they go back to Turkey. If they continue to stay by immigrants, they may distance themselves from their supporters. They say, "These immigrants do not have an ideological tie with us. Why should I defend them?" From this point of view, immigrants will establish a new strategy according to themselves. They establish their political parties and groups. There is a big question mark here for politicians and scholars because this is a significant ideological disengagement, which will further trigger clashes within society in the long run. (The interviewee number seventeen)

Additionally, the participants repeated many times that the negative rhetoric and attitudes of the far-right parties have not led to isolation on their side. Instead, they believe in the importance and strength of collaboration, mobilization, and participation to defend their rights and identities. While doing so, they also advocate party diversity: instead of playing active roles in specific parties like the Labor Party, which is much

closer to the immigrants in terms of its policies, they try to participate in political parties with different ideologies, including the far-right.

There must be an immigrant (referring to Turkish-Dutch immigrants) in every different Dutch political party representing us. Today, all Turks in only one party, which is DENK. It is segregation. They (referring to native Dutch people) are doing this segregation, but we are also doing the same thing. (The interviewee number six)

As stated above, the interviews do reveal that there is an apparent cleavage within the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community itself regarding the ethnicities, religious beliefs, mother tongues, or gender, as argued by leftist participants mostly in consequence of the different ideologies, sects or ethnic origin. It has been pointed out that without providing a real mutual trust and belief in each other as Turks and Kurds, or Sunni and Alevi for instance; and without reflecting an acceptance of differences within the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community itself; it is almost impossible to develop feelings of mutual trust from the native Dutch community in terms of integration and respect for multiculturalism.

Kranendonk et al. (2018) argue that identification with the destination country, national identification with other words, positively encourage immigrants to participate in the host country's social, economic, and political systems. However, identification with the origin country, Turkey, in this case, ethnic identification with other words, makes a negative impact on the participation of immigrants in those fields, especially politics. In general, the participants mention the negative impact of such ethnic identification made by the native Dutch community that they experience. Therefore, the participants mention this attitude of native Dutch people as discriminative and segregationist.

Especially about DENK, they (the far-right parties) say that it is a Turkish party. They always mention Erdogan when they talk about DENK. We are always under this pressure. (The interviewee number five)

Despite the apparent role of Turkey as being a popular populist agenda topic in far-right political parties' negative rhetoric towards Turkish-Dutch immigrants and some daily life experiences of immigrant community accordingly, the participants do not mention the transnational ties that are existing between Turkey and some civil society organizations established in the Netherlands. These ties provide cross-border political

networks throughout Europe and influence politics in the hosting countries (Mügge, 2013). Some of these organizations were established in the Netherlands directly by Turkish governments in the related periods, while immigrants from Turkey established some of those arrived at the Netherlands via political asylum. Milli Görüş, Diyanet, or UID/UETD are among these organizations. The interviewee number five mentions the critics directed towards DENK in this context. According to her, the critics argue that DENK is a political party established by Turkey and thus associates it with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, although there is no clear evidence about such arguments.

Finally, to elaborate on the Turkish-Dutch immigrants' sense of further belonging to and integration with the Dutch society against the negative politicization of their Muslim identity by far-right political parties, the interviewees' self-identification as Turkish or Dutch was explored. By the semi-structured interviews, the participants were asked whether they identify themselves with one nationality. It was found out that the members of each political party, NGO, federation, or civil society organization in general, no matter if he/she is rightest, leftist or conservative, has felt Dutch in terms of national identity just as well as Turkish. In turn, it is attributable to two different factors. The first one is the governmental policies and Dutch laws towards immigrants and immigrant integration, which provide equal opportunities for all immigrants with native Dutch communities, despite the opposite implementations experienced in daily life, especially in education. Therefore, this first factor influences the Turkish-Dutch immigrants positively and makes them feel as Dutch. The second one is the isolationist and separatist discourses of politicians, particularly the far-right, which pushes forward to drift apart from Dutch nationality and identity and culture and norms. Nevertheless, all of the participants gave similar responses to this question and considered themselves both Turkish and Dutch, as stated before. The Turkish-Dutch immigrants grow up with Turkish traditions, culture, and norms, but when they become adults, they realize that they have already integrated with the Dutch way of life, especially in the working environment.

I cannot identify myself Dutch, but not Turkish, either. After all, we were born and raised here. My cousin just left the Netherlands to settle in Turkey, but he had many difficulties in adopting in Turkey. That is to say, "you have a Dutch identity." We do not know either Turkish or Dutch very well. Neither Turkish nor

Dutch culture we know. It is why we cannot find ourselves. (The interviewee number six)

However, most participants stated that they would not be able to leave the Netherlands and begin to live in Turkey after getting used to the Dutch system for that long, despite the abovementioned identity dilemma in their answers. They point out that they are now part of the Dutch society in civic terms and are getting politically more integrated with the country.

I believe that we are permanent settlers here. We are part of this Dutch society. Not too far, in a maximum of 15-20 years' period, we will be at public administration. It means the Netherlands will have to accept us as its native Dutch citizens. Otherwise, there will be problems. (The interviewee number seven)

Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, and Moffitt (2007, 140) argue that people prefer to identify themselves more strongly with the distinctive and clearly structured groups associated with clearer prototypes when they feel uncertain about themselves. In some cases, this can cause stronger self-identification with religion. In the Netherlands, some Turkish-Dutch immigrant groups' stricter Muslim identity formation can be explained with this approach, as observed in the members of Milli Görüş and Diyanet, which may explain the interruptions in socio-cultural integration with the Dutch society.

## **5.6 Discussion**

Almost all the participants associate their engagement with politics with their parents and grandparents' experiences who arrived at the country as temporary immigrant workers in the 1960s-1970s. For the next decades and especially for the 2000s, they mention their own political participation experiences before they were asked questions for linking such acts to differences or alterations in Dutch governmental policies. While explaining six decades-old histories, they touch to open the politicization of their statuses, their existence, their integration, their identity, their ethnicity, and some other related matters through political parties in general.

At this point, it is necessary to match the participants' comments with research outcomes of the same years to have a general understanding of the impact of politicization on their political participation.

Fermin (1997) focuses on the period of 1977-1995 in the Dutch political party documents on multi-ethnic society and integration policy and he argues that the political parties' viewpoints shift from individual and collective integration of minorities in the 1980s to an obligatory and more limited form of socio-economic and individual integration in the 1990s. This shift towards the socio-economic integration of the immigrant communities was explicitly mentioned by participants older than the age of 50. The politicization of immigrant-related issues by political parties, particularly the center, and left, were more or less definite and constitutive in the 1980s "in terms of realization of equal social rights, especially by making public facilities equally accessible for minorities" (Fermin, 1997, 289). However, in the 1990s, this atmosphere slightly began to change with neo-liberal policies like "labor participation among minorities, by means of an education policy directed to upgrading the level of their qualifications and through legislation on employment equity equity" (Fermin, 1997, 289). Nevertheless, compared to the 2000s, these years are mentioned as moderately good years in the memories of the participants older than the age of 50.

In the 1980s, the first Foreigners Policy was established. Although the Netherlands was recessive about minorities, many investments were made in the fields of language, education, culture, and economics in a short time. In the political arena, NGOs were begun to be supported by these investments. However, from the 1990s, these policies have slightly changed, especially at the end of the 1990s. Even one of the Social Democrats, Klaus Herbert, openly announced that the multicultural society is over. (The interviewee number eighteen)

Concisely, since the 1990s, the general attitude towards Turkish-Dutch immigrants has begun to change as reflected by the participants.

From the 1970s to the 2000s, both political parties and NGOs (referring to Dutch NGOs) were taking our side. They included Christian Democrats and Liberals. You could go to them and discuss everything with them. You could convince them when you argued that you were right. However, after 2001-2002 all the relations have broken down with both the political parties and NGOs". (The interviewee number sixteen)

This awareness's main reason is the changes and inequality of opportunities in their daily life experiences and a sense of isolation in many different fields of life, from economics (such as traineeship opportunities and employability) to education.

Vliegenthart and Boomgaarden (2007) focus their attention on the impact of real-world indicators on the politicization of immigration and integration on Dutch newspapers for 1991-2002. The research questions, "whether issue prominence in news reporting largely reflects real-world developments, such as the level of immigration and the number of asylum applicants, or whether it is dependent on social or political key events, like 9/11 or parliamentary elections" (Vliegenthart & Boomgaarden, 2007, 294). They make a computer-assisted content analysis of the five most popular Dutch national newspapers NRC Handelsblad (1991–2002), Algemeen Dagblad (1992–2002), De Volkskrant (1995–2002), Trouw (1992–2002) and De Telegraaf (1998–2002) for 157,968 articles in total. In their analysis, they distinguish three types of critical events that potentially determine the prominence of reporting about immigration and integration of minorities: institutional events (such as national and general elections and election campaigns), unpremeditated events (such as 9/11 terrorist attacks), and deliberative events (such as former VVD leader Frits Bolkestein's criticism on multicultural society in the 1990s, or Paul Scheffer's newspaper article on the 'multicultural fiasco' in 2000, or Pim Fortuyn's criticism on the Islamic culture in 2002) (Vliegenthart & Boomgaarden, 2007, 302). The participants explicitly mention these events while talking about the transition in general Dutch attitudes towards immigrants depending on these events.

After the incidents on 9/11, a preconception towards foreigners in the Netherlands, especially towards Muslims, has emerged. It was always there, a little. I know it from my childhood. However, it was not acted out. After these incidents, a political leader showed up, Pim Fortuyn. He could courageously use or say that Islam was not a good religion. He said that Islam was an obstacle in front of Muslims' full integration here in the Netherlands. (Interviewee number eleven)

Roggeband and Vliegenthart (2007) elaborate the period of 1995-2004 in terms of politicization of immigration and integration on parliament and media, and they find out that the parliament's attention to the issues as mentioned earlier gradually increased throughout the whole period, however, the media attention rose enormously

since 2001 and focused more on immigrants' religious culture or Islam. At the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s, VVD leader Frits Bolkestein and Pim Fortuyn, the leader of Lijst Pim Fortuyn, actively used media to express their discontent with the Dutch multicultural policy model and they mostly pointed out Islam's incompatibility with the values of the Western Enlightenment (Roggeband & Vliegenthart, 2007; de Koning & Meijer, 2010). Just et al. (2014, 127) argue that increasing the number of immigrants and their visible status within the societies with distinct religious beliefs has made it difficult for "governments to contend with the practicalities of accepting and integrating immigrants."

In the study of Roggeband and Vliegenthart (2007), Islam-as-threat is the dominant frame in the political arena, especially for the far-right for that period, whereas multiculturalism has the lowest percentage. Media follows the same framing with the political arena in which Islam and integration of Muslim immigrants gain priority after 9/11 enormously, and in this way, it reaches ordinary Dutch citizens. This framing is one of the most voiced issues by the participants too.

In the analysis of Meyer and Rosenberger (2015) for the period of 1995-2009, political parties play a key role in the politicization process, both mainstream from left and right and fringe parties, but the radical-right parties stand out in negative politicization. In this study, the assassination of Pim Fortuyn or Theo van Gogh in 2002 and 2004 respectively come to prominence as the incidents triggering politicization in those years, as also pointed out by Berkhout, Sudulich, and van der Brug (2015). The participants frequently refer to these incidents, too, during the interviews.

After the end of the 1990s, the policies have begun to change slowly. It was said in those years, "we invested a lot to these people (referring to immigrants), but none of them have integrated. None of them has become equal. They still live in their parallel system and order. So what shall we do? We should change them". The clashes about Pim Fortuyn exactly coincide with this period. Besides, after September 11, these clashes switched more into the Islamic ones. (Interviewee number eighteen)

As for the differences between the left-wing and right-wing political parties regarding immigrants' politicization and their integration with the hosting society, Vliegenthart (2007) focuses on the most famous Dutch newspapers between 1997-2007. According



to the study, after the end of the 1990s, the left-wing focused more on immigrants' emancipation and multiculturalism in their rhetoric and supported the softening of integration policies. On the other hand, the right-wing promoted more restrictive immigrant and integration policies and used Islam as a threat in its rhetoric. It paved the way for feeling a political sympathy towards the left-wing political parties among Turkish-Dutch immigrants, as found out in the interviews.

Most of the immigrants coming from Turkey are ideologically rightest. However, regarding the fundamental rights, self-defense, and protection, they always favor the left-wing, although they do not bound up with the left ideology. (The interviewee number seventeen)

When these analyses are compared with the participants' responses, especially at the age of 50s and 60s, the politicization of immigration and immigrant-related issues come into prominence in their daily-life experiences. They referred to politicians' changing attitudes and subsequently of the native Dutch community towards immigrants and particularly Islam, parallel to the changing political rhetoric. For the participants, those older than the 40s, all these periods, especially the 1990s, reflect a transition in some of the political parties' (basically anti-immigrant ones') rhetoric on culture and identity of minorities.

As mentioned before, ethnic and religious identities, as social identities, are used to define people in relation to others (van Heelsum & Koomen, 2016). Strong racial, ethnic, and religious identities increase the negative perception toward out-groups, such as towards the majority in the society from the side of immigrants (Huddy, 2001) and play an essential role in shaping political attitudes (Conover, 1988; Huddy, 2001). Identity politics strengthens the in-group solidarity of the Turkish-Dutch Muslim immigrants while decreasing the out-group's reliability during the years studied above. Nevertheless, still, some of the interviewees from the left ideology, although a small percentage, consider that the disunity of the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community in terms of ideologies, left-right divisions, and ethnic cleavages, represents the major obstacle to increase their political representation and participation in the Netherlands.

Campbell (2013, 39) acknowledges that people are usually involved in politics when they receive a request, and this request becomes more productive through face-to-face

contact as in the social networks of immigrants. For instance, Campbell (2013) gives the importance of Church friends in the political participation process of people, for which Muslim peoples' regular Mosque visits or attendance to the mosques' meetings can also be taken as an example. In the case of Turkish-Dutch immigrants who already play an active role in politics, politicization and ethnicization of Muslim identity are the driving forces of their political participation. The participants, belonging to the right-wing ideology, usually take the required strength for political participation from the meetings at the Mosques, as its importance pointed out by Campbell (2013). Above all, all the participants with different political attainment of higher education matter for further socio-cultural and political integration.

As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 4 within the theoretical framework of this research, as long as in-group solidarity increases by eliminating the differences among the group members, the immigrants' emerging reactive ethnicity paves the way for more substantial representation on behalf of the immigrant community. The participants believe that this could be possible via educating themselves further, which provides better opportunities at the administrative positions that they want to be in the future.

Simon and Klandermans (2001) stress the politicized collective identity parallel to the political mobilization process and mention "group members' explicit motivations to engage in (... a) power struggle" within the society. They give the following example in order to show the differences of political repercussions of collective identity and politicized collective identity proper: "(A) religious group that 'simply' wants its children to be taught in its own schools. It is not difficult to imagine that this acting out of a specific collective identity may have wider political repercussions in that it may challenge the educational system of society at large and, more generally, the power relations between church and state", although the religious group did not intend such challenges in the first place (Simon & Klandermans, 2001, 323). Therefore, in the politicized collective identity, group members can intentionally take a step further and choose to be the part of a political party or a civil society organization to fulfill their demands via reaching different authorities for this purpose or only making themselves heard within the same society.

As mentioned before, identification with a major political party or the adoption of ideology as a term of self-description is one of the main features of political identity (Huddy, 2001). Thus, as long as the political parties politicize the issues related to their ethnicity, culture, or religion, immigrants set off their identity politics. In practice, they represent it by participating in real political activities seen as the only possible way to struggle against discrimination or isolation. So, the periods of the increasing power of far-right or anti-immigrant parties, and widening isolation and discrimination among the Dutch society against the immigrant community overlap with the periods of increasing awareness among the Turkish-Dutch immigrants on politics.

According to Chopin (2018), the revival of negative attitudes towards immigrants is a signal for the identity crisis affecting most European countries. National elections held in these countries prove the strength of populist right-wing parties and present their identity-oriented rhetoric besides economy and culture (Chopin, 2018). Different kinds of crises enhance support to the far-right, whether political, economic, or cultural (Mudde, 2004; Jupskås, 2015). As Taggart (2004, 275) acknowledges, "populism tends to emerge when there is a strong sense of crisis and populists use that sense to inject an urgency and an importance to their message". Vetik, Nimmerfelft, and Taru (2006, 1085) argue that in such an atmosphere reactive identity "emerges in situations of imbalance between the processes of differentiation from and identification with the 'other' (... and) this type of identity is a situational phenomenon that emerges in a hostile environment to reinforce the collective worth of 'us'". Therefore, when far-right political parties ground their arguments on national differences and exclusive identity discussions, this triggers a growing counter-reaction on the immigrant community's side. Accordingly, immigrants have taken more active positions in different political parties and civil society organizations since the beginning of the 2000s, and for the last few years, they have established their political parties in the Netherlands. The members of the most prominent ones have participated in the research, as discussed below.

The first immigrant organizations in general established by the immigrants from Turkey in Europe, mostly in Western Europe, were founded at the beginning of the 1970s, and they were mainly formed based on the "leftist and rightist political workers' organization's that were strongly focused on Turkey and on each other" (Vermeulen,

2005, 69). According to the study of Vermeulen (2005, 91), only in Amsterdam, "(t)he number of available Turkish organizations increases from 0.96 in 1980 to 2.57 in 1986"; (it) becomes stable for a few years until 1990 when the number starts to increase again, to 3.5 in 1993 and 3.9 in 1996", and keep going to increase during the 2000s.

Voting rights for immigrants in local elections were granted in 1985 in the Netherlands depending on the concerns of "the lack of integration of ethnic minorities and hoped that political integration would spill over into other forms of integration" (Jacobs, 1998 as cited in Fennema & Tillie, 2001, 27). In the upcoming years, political parties began to focus on immigrants' votes and their official formal participation in their parties. In 1998, with some other immigrant communities, immigrants from Turkey began to be represented in the municipal councils of the Netherlands' most prominent cities. Turkish-Dutch immigrants' political participation was mostly based on the governments' integration policies in the 1980s and the early 1990s. Since the beginning of the 2000s, this participation's driving force has changed with the politicization of Muslim immigrants by far-right political parties mainly through "we" and "others" cleavages.

DENK is one of the most popular political initiatives of Turkish-Dutch immigrants as a counter-reaction to this cleavage. It was founded in 2016 by two Turkish-Dutch immigrants Tunahan Kuzu and Selçuk Öztürk. They were expelled from PvdA in 2014 "when they opposed a government proposal to monitor several Turkish religious organizations for obstructing the integration of Dutch Turks in Dutch society" (Bahçeli, 2018, 80). It is the first party by citizens with a migration background who won three seats in the Dutch general election in 2017. The party's main aim is to provide solidarity against racism, and it "seeks to offer immigrant voters protection in response to the anti-immigrant mobilization of the populist right" (Otjes & Krouwel, 2019, 1150). DENK had three deputies in the Dutch Parliament and 33 local representatives in municipalities in 2019 (Daily Sabah, 2019).

The establishment of DENK is elaborated as a kind of emancipation by some scholars. It means the emergence of awareness among the immigrant community as an electorate who was not included in the democratic process before (Sfregola, 2018).

NIDA is another immigrant political party founded by Moroccan-Dutch immigrants in 2014. The party has many Turkish-Dutch members as well. One of its main aims is countering cultural and religious discrimination, including racism and Islamophobia ("NIDA" n.d.). It is active in struggling with inequality within the educational system, within the labor market, and on topics like racial profiling by the police, anti-black and anti-Muslim racism, or Islamophobia, with the words of participants from this party. It won two seats in Rotterdam city council in 2014 (Otjes & Krouwel, 2019, 1163).

Alternatively, Turkish-Dutch immigrants are actively participating in civil society organizations founded or run by Turkish-Dutch immigrants. The Netherlands branch of the Union of International Democrats (UID / Union of European Turkish Democrats – UETD with this previous name) is one of them that was founded in Köln, Germany in 2004 to support the political, social and cultural development of Turkish people living in Europe (Mügge, 2013). The UETD has soon become widespread in many European countries, including the Netherlands, where it has become one of the leading civil society organizations conducted by Turkish-Dutch immigrants. Its vision is to provide equal rights for every person in all spheres of social life irrespective of their different cultures or religions, and this is why it conducts studies for Turkish people all over Europe to assist their process of integration and adaptation to European society ("UID," n.d.). According to the interviewee number twelve from UID, the organization had prioritized the lobbying initiatives from 2004 to 2008. According to him, after 2008, UID has begun to conduct face-to-face relationships with the immigrant community members to solve their problems with the new vision. After 2013, the membership system has brought it in, and in a short period, the number of members has increased rapidly. Unfortunately, there is not any archived data of members to evaluate the increasing number of members within the years; however, currently, only in Amsterdam branch, there are 650 members of UID according to the information provided by the participant.

Milli Görüş Netherlands is another very active and well-known civil society organization in the Netherlands founded by Turkish-Dutch immigrants in the 1970s. It is defined as "a socio-religious movement that focuses on the integration and emancipation of (mainly Turkish) Muslims in Dutch society," focusing on youth and

women ("Milli Görüş Nederland," n.d.). It was established in Europe in those years as a kind of extension of the National Salvation Party of Necmettin Erbakan (Mügge, 2013), and today it organizes awareness-raising activities for the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community in terms of their political rights and responsibilities within the society, as well as training activities in Turkish language, culture, and history for immigrant children.

Another popular and older organization in the Netherlands founded by Turkish-Dutch immigrants is the "Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation (TICF)," which was established in 1979 by the associations linked to the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) in the Netherlands. It has taken responsibilities in the fields of integration, equal right and citizenships of Turkish-Dutch immigrants, as being the leading NGO struggled for foreigners' right to elect and be elected in 1986 in the Netherlands ("Hollanda Türk İslam Kültür Dernekleri Federasyonu Yeni Yerine Kavuştu," n.d.).

The Turkish Workers' Union in the Netherlands (HTIB) is another well-known, actively working civil society organization established by Turkish-Dutch immigrants in the Netherlands in 1974 and stayed active until today. Its primary purpose is the strengthening of the interests of immigrants and their social positions within Dutch society.

In the field of migration policies and immigrant integration in a multicultural society Forum / NCB (Institute for Multicultural Development) was one of the most well-known non-governmental organizations following researches on immigrant-related issues in the Netherlands, which had been established at the end of 1990s as an initiative of the Dutch Ministry of Public Health back then (Bilion & Boumaza, 2005). It was working in the field of immigrant integration problems and following initiatives to raise the awareness of immigrant communities in terms of rights and duties, politics, and so on; however, it was abolished in January 2015.

In the Netherlands, most civil society organizations or initiatives of immigrants do not have an archive system keeping the statistical data regarding their members or supporters from the immigrant community. Therefore, it is difficult to come up with a comparative result in terms of the increasing interest of Turkish-Dutch immigrants

towards such initiatives, contrary to direct political participation. In terms of the formal political participation, Turkish-Dutch immigrants have attended the local and national level elections in the Netherlands as the political candidates for the last couple of decades, and parallel to that, the number of Turkish-Dutch immigrant councilors at the local level and Turkish-Dutch immigrant representatives at the national level have increased gradually since then (van Heelsum, 2007).

According to the participants, mainly from Milli Görüş and Diyanet, Islam, as the religion of immigrants, is one of the most politicized issues in the Netherlands, which has been the leading factor for the political participation of Turkish-Dutch immigrants. Their comments on the binding role of religion for community formation reflect the positive impact of politicization on their political participation.

As expressed by the participants, the relationship between politics and religion within the immigrant community is also acknowledged by Boomgaarden and Freire (2009). Particularly far-right political parties' anti-Islam rhetoric and criticism intensify cleavages within society via racialization, which sets off some Turkish-Dutch immigrants' political reactions in the Netherlands. However, this situation influences the far-right and conservative participants more than the left-wing ones. This finding also corresponds with the study of Just et al. (2014), which states that religiosity increases immigrant engagement in host societies' politics. According to Phalet et al. (2010, 764) "the specific contents of group goals are a crucial moderator of the connection between group identity and political action" which is observed in the political behaviors of Turkish-Dutch Muslim immigrants under the roof of Milli Görüş, Diyanet or some other similar religious civil society organizations. Therefore, it can be argued that religion's politicization encourages them to engage in politics, directly or indirectly. In other words, the politicization of religion is also one of the motivations of politically active and mobilized Turkish-Dutch immigrants. This finding also coincides with the politicized discussions on migration and immigrants after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA. The focal point of these attacks was religion and particularly Islam, which once again leads us towards the reactive ethnicity formation within this process.

In the Dutch case, in brief, the end of multiculturalism, growing influence of far-right parties within the society, on media, or even on mainstream parties have led the Turkish-Dutch immigrants to improve and vigorously defend a socio-political identity to have a voice and ensure that their culture and religion-related norms are respected in the Netherlands. That is why they participate in political parties or religious and cultural civil society organizations.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, aggrieved immigrants participate in collective action, provided that they displayed a dual identity. If they are cynical about politics, they do not participate in collective action unless aggrieved. Similarly, immigrants who feel efficacious are more likely to participate in collective action if they are embedded in ethnic, social networks. If they feel discriminated against because of their ethnic background, they display anger when they are politically efficacious. Moreover, immigrants who feel angry are more likely to participate in collective action (Klandermans et al., 2008, 1007). In brief, Klandermans et al. (2008, 1009) suggest that "integration into civil society (...) reinforces action participation", and this "integration creates the preconditions for immigrants to turn discontent into action."



## **CHAPTER 6**

### **CONCLUSIONS**

This Chapter concludes the thesis by drawing together the study's findings and integrating them with the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of the analysis shared in Chapter 2. The study has focused on the impact of Muslim immigrants' politicization by far-right political parties on Turkish-Dutch immigrants' political participation in the Netherlands. In this context, the study examined Turkish-Dutch first and second-generation immigrants in the Netherlands who were politically active in political parties or civil society organizations. Within this examination, the influences of the anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric of far-right political parties on Turkish-Dutch immigrants, and feelings and daily life experiences of immigrants accordingly were evaluated carefully, within the framework of the primary and supportive research questions of the study.

It was argued in the thesis that the far-right political parties' politicization of Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands had been shaped by the societal security concerns referring to the Dutch ethnic, religious, and cultural identity at stake.

When the far-right political parties politicized such concerns by using them in their rhetoric, election propaganda, and policies in general based on symbolic threats mentioned above, like "Dutch identity, norms, and culture were about to be dissolved and degraded by Islam," they had some negative repercussions in the daily lives of the immigrant communities. These impacts were stemmed from the changing native Dutch attitudes towards the immigrants in a negative manner. In such an atmosphere, feelings like isolation, marginalization, and from time to time, assimilation had steadily grown up among the immigrant community members and paved the way for the development of identity politics. The development of identity politics brought about different types

of reactional behaviors of the immigrant community, as mentioned earlier in Chapter 1. For the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community members, who were attending the analysis, taking political action in the form of political participation was the primary reactional behavior that came into prominence. In this case, the immigrants' political participation was expected to cease perceived exclusion by being identified as "other," to find status in society through their interests and concerns and to find a solution for shared experiences of injustice within Dutch society. It was also argued that this chain of the relationship between politicization and political participation contributed to the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community's political integration within Dutch society.

The qualitative data gathered by the semi-structured interviews were used for the analysis, besides other secondary resources. It has been conducted as both data-driven and theory-driven, as stated in the first and second Chapters. This integrated approach of the analysis provides an original conceptual framework for the study.

The analysis method was the thematic content analysis to discover patterns of participants' reactional behaviors and feelings and experiences triggering these behaviors. Since the data was small (about 300 pages-long), instead of a computer-assisted analysis, manual qualitative analysis was preferred, which was useful for understanding and interpreting the data.

The analysis was conducted in different stages with deductive reasoning. In the first stage, the developing themes within the politicization process were evaluated from a very general perspective like identity-based concerns, pushing factors of societal security, or motivators of development of identity politics. Afterward, the draft analytical categories were set up for the analysis, and accordingly, an analytical guide was prepared to code all the interviews. By doing this, all transcribed interviews with the participants were abstracted, and uniformities and diversities of the responses were conceptually generalized. In this second stage, the initial codes were determined by identifying where and how the patterns, as mentioned above, occur. At this stage, the main themes were revived as "ethnicity/race, religion, and culture," coinciding with the analysis's theoretical and conceptual framework. In the following stage of the analysis, the themes were collated into the sub-themes or impacts, such as social, cultural, political, and policy impacts, and the codes by considering the daily life

effects of these sub-themes. In the final stage of analysis, the contributions of these themes, sub-themes, and codes were deeply elaborated to understand the data in a general perspective and build its relationship with the research's theoretical framework.

The field analysis has revealed an increasing anti-immigrant and anti-Islam treatment, and politicization regarding the immigrants in the Netherlands since the beginning of the 2000s. The research put forward that since the end of the 1990s, the issues related to ethnicity, culture, and above all, religion had become prominent among the rhetoric of far-right political parties in the Netherlands. This process went hand in hand with "the interpretation of the socio-cultural dimension of integration shifted from support for a certain pluralistic strategy in the eighties to a more strictly color blind and sometimes assimilationist strategy in the first half of the nineties" (Fermin, 1997, 290). The politicization in this process was used mainly by the negative rhetoric towards Muslim immigrants and Islam based on religious, ethnic, and cultural diversity, which caused discrimination in the society and marginalization of Turkish-Dutch immigrants by creating the "we" and "others" cleavage in the Dutch society.

Although the far-right political parties were the main actors of the politicization process both in the literature and in the field analysis, mainstream political parties (from center and right) also came into prominence within the participants' responses. The participants criticized them because of their negative rhetoric towards immigrants, especially from Muslim countries since the beginning of the 2000s. The interviews also put forward that there was even a slight shift in attitudes of left-wing political parties towards Turkish-Dutch immigrants recently. It was argued that these parties had begun to keep a distance from the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community, depending on the ideological differences and the criticisms of their native Dutch supporters directed to them.

Despite this general anti-immigrant stance that the immigrants felt, the participants argued that the anti-Islam or anti-immigrant attitudes of political parties were just a populist strategy. Indeed, even Turkey (by referring AKP) used that strategy as populist election propaganda when needed. They referred to the diplomatic crisis that occurred in 2017 between the Netherlands and Turkey. The AKP had wanted to hold

political rallies in the Netherlands to seek support in Turkey's constitutional referendum back then, and the Dutch government had not allowed. Within the crisis, the Dutch government had restricted Turkish Ministers' travel seeking to promote their campaign, and afterward, the Turkish-Dutch immigrants had protested the Dutch government.

According to the field analysis, the increasing politicization had social, political, and economic impacts in general on Turkish-Dutch immigrants' daily lives via ethnicity, culture, and religion. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Velasco González et al. (2008) conducted a study in the Netherlands on immigrants from Poland and Turkey about realistic threats, symbolic threats, and stereotyping. They argued that during the 1980s, the attitudes towards Muslim immigrants were shaped by the realistic threats like unemployment in economics; however, they began to be shaped by stereotypes and symbolic threats related to identity, culture, and religion after the 1990s. However, the field analysis of the thesis revealed that, contrary to the previous literature, there were still economic concerns against the Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands that had repercussions in Turkish-Dutch immigrants' daily lives, especially in employment and housing opportunities available to them.

The most negative impacts of the politicization process for Turkish-Dutch immigrants were observed in education and employment in the field analysis. This situation was evaluated as a pushing factor for especially younger generations to have higher education and get better jobs, but more importantly, to take political action to voice these negative impacts to the whole Dutch society.

The analysis put forward that Turkish-Dutch immigrants' feelings and perceptions towards the politicization of the issues related to themselves revealed a sense of contestation about the common good within Dutch society, too. In this process, the immigrants also began to question whether the cultural, material, or institutional norms within the Dutch society provided an equal and fair structure for their interests in common, which caused a societal polarization from the immigrants' side too besides the political polarization. The emergence of contestation created a dynamic among Turkish-Dutch immigrants for developing identity politics. It activated the emergence of collective identity formation strengthened by group solidarity and boundary

maintenance shaped by nonmembers within a social interaction (Johnston et al., 1994). The contestation afterward encouraged the immigrant community members to form solidarity and alliance against the discriminative and isolationist attitudes and rhetoric of far-right political parties and native Dutch people. Within these improvements and interactions, identity politics encouraged immigrants' political participation attending the analysis and motivated for further political action within the society.

However, the field analysis also revealed social integration problems within the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community itself in the politicization process due to different ideologies, religious sects, or ethnic origins that prevent them from speaking and acting with a single voice representing the whole community. According to participants' responses, these social integration problems caused a cleavage in terms of collective identity formation and developing identity politics accordingly. According to that perception, Turkish-Dutch immigrants' collective identity from the center and center-right ideology were shaped mainly by the theme of religion. The most salient impacts were stressed as the social and political impacts, according to these participants. Besides, the discriminative role between majority and minority, linkage with politics in Turkey, and a decisive role in binding the community came into prominence as the primary reflections of these impacts playing a crucial role in the development of identity politics. As for the Turkish-Dutch immigrants from the left ideology, the collective identity was shaped based on the theme of ethnicity/race and culture, more than religion; and by their social, political and educational impacts, and mostly their reflections as marginalization between minority and majority, criminalization of immigrants within the society, a robust populist propaganda tool, and a motivator to have higher and better education degrees and employment.

Therefore, the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community's identity politics could only be formed within the different ideological, ethnic, or sectarian groups by developing collective identity in smaller groups. According to the participants, who belong to the left ideology, these social integration problems within the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community were identified as one of the most critical obstacles to forming group solidarity. As long as the group-solidarity increases by reducing the group members' differences, the immigrants' emerging reactive ethnicity provides for a stronger and

more reliable political participation on behalf of their community against the Dutch society.

In this framework, the research put forward that the politicization of Muslim immigrants made the "we" and "others" cleavage more explicit and observable, and paved the way for collective identity formation as "immigrants from Turkey" within the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community. However, Muslim immigrants' politicization motivated their political participation only within smaller sub-groups diverging from each other in terms of ideology, religious sects, or ethnic origin. Thus, the thesis's limitation came out over here: the identity politics developed through reactive ethnicity cannot be realized in a unique and all-inclusive form in the Turkish-Dutch immigrants' case as a reaction to the politicization process. The possible reasons for accounting for this might be a motivation for future studies.

Despite such in-group obstacles for a unique identity politics formulation, the participants emphasized the importance of political participation and political integration with the Dutch political system and society in general. At this point, the issue of "trust" as one of the essential components of political integration (Tillie, 2004) came into prominence. It refers to the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community's trust in the Dutch political system and to the political parties and civil society organizations that they belong to. As mentioned in Chapter 4, if people do not sufficiently trust the political system and its institutions like political parties, they do not politically integrate. It means they do not play an active role in political parties; they do not vote in the host country elections or establish civil society organizations functioning in politics. Depending on the participants' answers, it could be said that the respondents fully trust in the Dutch political system. They also trust political parties and civil society organizations that they were taking place. Therefore, they actively integrated into Dutch politics within the politicization process, which also brought about social integration with Dutch society. As for the native Dutch community's feeling of trust towards the immigrants in general from Muslim countries, the participants' responses pointed to a negative situation.

Politicization, identity politics, and political participation of immigrants are relevant issues with integration in the countries that have diverse demographic compositions

(Ginieniewicz, 2010). The Netherlands, with its large Muslim immigrant population and diverging political attitudes towards these immigrants marginalizing them, can be categorized in this group. Because, when people begin to feel distinct from the society depending on their identity or when they feel uncertain about their identity depending on the attitudes of a specific group within the society, as in the case of immigrants, they begin to identify themselves stronger with the group that they have more social interaction and common fate (Hogg et al., 2007). According to Ginieniewicz (2010, 273), “it might be argued that higher representational levels of migrants in the electoral bodies of the receiving societies promote the integration of diverse groups into these societies.”

It is because of the fact that such participation in the field of politics provides to raise the issues that concern immigrants, who know and experience these issues at first hand, bring these issues to the public attention, and ensure possible solutions to these issues. In this context, the Turkish-Dutch Muslim immigrants have become more integrated politically via political participation process following the politicization. Therefore, it can be said that the research outcome was consistent with the conceptual and theoretical framework of the thesis concerning the relationship between the politicization of Muslim immigrants and the political participation of Turkish-Dutch immigrants, and their political integration in the Netherlands.

The study contributes to the literature regarding the polarization impact of the politicization on both political parties and the immigrant community, as acknowledged by Zürn (2014) and van der Brug et al. (2015), mentioned in Chapter 2. The participants' responses and their daily experiences showed that somehow contrary to the related literature, politicization does not always reveal its impact through polarization between political parties or social groups and an increase of salience. As observed in the far-right political parties' rhetoric and related policy formulations, its homogenizing effort within the society to hold a unique identity, culture, religion, and so on may have two different repercussions.

Instead of polarization, it may cause a mobilization impact, as observed in the Turkish-Dutch immigrants' self-identification through group membership and subsequent political participation, despite existing social integration problems within the

community itself. Such an impact provides further political integration of the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community into Dutch society. Moreover, instead of polarization among the political parties, it may cause a rapprochement impact for the parties, depending on the issues of concern observed in the shift of left-wing political parties towards the right. Additionally, its homogenizing effort affects the rapprochement of the different and divergent rhetoric of mainstream and fringe parties accordingly in terms of immigrant integration and migration policies.

The thesis was formed of six Chapters, and the analysis was conducted in two phases. In Chapters, 1 and 2, immigrants' politicization and identity politics were analyzed as interrelated concepts. The different typologies of politicization and identity politics formation were discussed with the literature's supportive theoretical approaches and concepts. In Chapter 2, the theories and approaches were used within a historical perspective to reflect upon the transition in the Dutch immigrant integration and migration policies from multiculturalism towards assimilation during the 2000s.

Therefore, in the first phase of the study, Muslim immigrants' politicization was analyzed within the period of transition from multiculturalism to assimilation in migration and immigrant integration policies in the Netherlands, as studied in detail in Chapter 3. For this phase, the Societal Security Concept was employed. In this approach, it was argued that when there was a perception of threat towards the Dutch identity based on ethnicity, culture, race, religion, and so on, this community would react to this threat defensively to protect its identity. The theory was useful in this phase to evaluate the politicization of Muslim immigrants from a comprehensive perspective within the transition of migration and immigrant integration policies from multiculturalism to assimilation within the triangle of security, identity, and integration (Waeber, 1995). In this context, this approach helped to explain the political concerns behind the changing Dutch integration and immigration policies during the period when negative repercussions of multiculturalism on Dutch identity, culture, and societal security, in general, were increasingly questioned.

As for the rise of far-right political parties, their growing anti-immigrant and anti-Islam rhetoric and also the part of the Dutch community supporting this negative attitude towards immigrants, the analysis focused on the meaning of societal security concerns



within the Societal Security Concept and included in the Symbolic Group Conflict Theory to the research, which was missing in the Concept (Theiler, 2003). Because, according to the Symbolic Group Conflict theory, different groups within the society perceive differences in terms of values, norms, and beliefs, and these differences are elaborated as a threat to the cultural identity and way of life of each group (McLaren, 2003). When the native Dutch and Turkish-Dutch immigrant communities are concerned from this perspective, particularly cultural and religious differences quickly came to the surface by pointed out in the interviews that had conflictual repercussions on these communities' daily lives.

In Chapter 4, which forms the second phase of the study, the identity politics developed as a reaction of the politicization process and subsequent political participation of immigrants were analyzed from a historical perspective. Different typologies and identifications of the concept of identity were discussed in this Chapter, alongside the relationship between identity politics and political participation to provide a clear understanding of the relationship between these phenomena. Religion, ethnicity, and culture were particularly elaborated in this Chapter with their crucial role in forming identity politics. At the end of the Chapter, immigrants' political participation as a counter-reaction to the politicization was formalized through these factors.

The second phase of the thesis was formulated via the Constructivist theory serving to explain both immigrants' political participation and the emergence of identity politics as the driving force of this participation by focusing on identity and normative structures such as ethnicity, culture and religion-based behaviors and attitudes produced by the Turkish-Dutch immigrants against the politicization.

The Constructivist theory put forward with the field analysis's findings that the institutionalized norms of the Dutch society shaped the identity of its citizens, as the immigrant community's institutionalized norms, that were arguably diversified from the Dutch norms within the politicization process in terms of ethnicity, religion, and culture shaped their identity politics (Reus-Smit, 2005; Barnett, 2014).

Similarly, in this phase, the research needed further theoretical evaluation and explanation for the immigrants' collective identity formation and the development of

identity politics, and above all, their subsequent political participation. As explained in detail in Chapter 2 and 4, the immigrants form their identity politics through norms depending on ethnicity, culture or religion, because in the identity politics people need status seeking within the society who belong to the same social interest groups such as race, class, cultural preferences, or religion. This need is shaped by political arguments, preferences, and perceptions stemming from their interests (Wiarda, 2014). The Reactive Ethnicity Approach came into prominence, at this point, to explain the reactive identity politics formulation through in-group and out-group differences, and these differences' ethnic, religious, and cultural identifications. In this approach, the differences between the social groups were heightened by one group (or as in this case by a political party) within the society, which paved the way for hardening ethnic identity boundaries between them. This situation was mostly observed between majority and minority groups (Herda, 2018). In such circumstances, the minority group, the Turkish-Dutch immigrants, in this case, began to further relieve its identity. They even developed unique cultural or behavioral features different from both of these groups, as found in the field analysis, which was identified as a kind of reactive ethnic identity formation. This process brought about the alliance formation within the minority group with a sense of discrimination, marginalization, and isolation. It was required for a social change in Dutch society, according to the participants. As stated by one of the participants during the field analysis, social change could be imaginable through politics or could begin with political action.

In Chapter 5, the field analysis conducted in the Netherlands was presented with the findings, as summarized at the beginning of this Chapter. In that Chapter, the thesis's main argument was confirmed by data gathered through these interviews. A comparison with the relevant research on politicization in the Netherlands between 1977-2009 and the participants' responses also put forward a consistency between the period of the increasing power of far-right and anti-immigrant political parties and widening isolation and discrimination among the Dutch society against immigrants influenced by these parties. Moreover, this period overlapped with the increasing awareness and developing identity politics among the Turkish-Dutch immigrants on these issues.

Although the studies in similar research areas have deeply analyzed the politicization of migration and immigrant-related issues, or immigrants' political participation and political integration, this research filled out the existing gap in the literature by combining different analyses to explore the dynamics of relationships between the two phenomena.

Moreover, the research went beyond the other related studies by involving immigrant communities' identity politics into the analysis as the main crucial driving force of their political participation and subsequent political integration.

The research has revealed some further literature gaps that may become the source of inspiration for future studies in this context. As mentioned earlier, the social integration problems within the Turkish-Dutch immigrant community itself and its repercussions on the immigrant community's social and political integration require further in-depth analysis. It is believed to provide valuable insights for the social and political integration issues of immigrants with the hosting society, which may proceed with comparative researches between different European countries that also have immigrants from Turkey and the Netherlands to seek for possible similarities and differences in the collective identity formation and development of identity politics. Additionally, the role of Turkey as a critical actor in emergence and functioning of the civil society organizations in Europe, which are established by immigrants from Turkey either with direct influence and support or as a reaction to the political developments in Turkey, can also form some further questions in future researches to elaborate on the impact of Turkey not only on social integration problems of the Turkish immigrant community itself but also on the integration problems occurring with the hosting societies in Europe.

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## APPENDICES

### A. APPROVAL OF THE METU HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE

UYGULAMALI ETİK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ  
APPLIED ETHICS RESEARCH CENTER



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03 OCAK 2019

Konu: Değerlendirme Sonucu

Gönderen: ODTÜ İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu (İAEK)

İlgili: İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu

Sayın Doç.Dr. Sevilay KAHRAMAN

Danışmanlığını yaptığınız Elçin KARANA'nın "Understanding The Impact of Party-Based Euroscepticism on Political Mobilization of Immigrants 'The Case of Turks in the Netherlands'" başlıklı araştırması İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu tarafından uygun görülerek gerekli onay 2018-SOS-245 protokol numarası ile araştırma yapması onaylanmıştır.

Saygılarımla bilgilerinizi sunarım.

  
Prof. Dr. Tülin GENÇÖZ

Başkan

  
Prof. Dr. Ayhan SOL

Üye

Prof. Dr. Ayhan Gürbüz DEMİR

Üye

  
Prof. Dr. Yaşar KONDAKÇI (4.)

Üye

  
Doç. Dr. Emre SELÇUK

Üye

  
Doç. Dr. Pınar KAYGAN

Üye

  
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Ali Emre TURGUT

Üye

## **B.INTERVIEW QUESTIONS**

### **The first set of questions: Socio-demographic information**

1. Gender
2. Age
3. Marital status
4. Number of children (if any)
5. City of residence
6. Occupation
7. Level of education / field
8. Duration of residence in the Netherlands
9. Citizenship status (Dutch, Turkish, Dual citizenship)

### **The second set of questions: Decision of political participation and historical background of it**

10. Could you please tell me your story; how did you decide on playing an active role in politics (in a political party or a civil society organization)?
11. What were the reasons that were motivating you in making such a decision? (both positive and negative)

### **The third set of questions: The Dutch policies towards immigrants (yesterday, today, and tomorrow)**

12. What is your elaboration about the Dutch policies and attitudes towards immigrants?
13. Are there any specific changes between the past and today? If so, how could you identify this change? How do you experience or feel it?
14. What is the real motivator of current immigrant-related policies, the Dutch government, or far-right political parties?

#### **The fourth set of questions: Far-right political parties, policies, and rhetoric**

15. Far-right political parties like Lijst Pim Fortuyn, Forum for Democracy, or Party for Freedom has some negative rhetoric towards Muslim immigrants and Islam in general, which is easily observable on media. What do you think about this rhetoric? Do you take any initiatives about this?
16. What are the impacts of this growing strength of far-right political parties on other mainstream parties (both left and right)?
17. What is the role of Turkey in all these processes?

#### **The fifth set of questions: Identity and citizenship**

18. How do you evaluate the multicultural social structure of the Netherlands?
19. What does the far-right political parties' politicization of Muslim immigrants or Islam make you feel about your relationship with the Dutch society as Turkish-Dutch citizens in your daily lives? What is your opinion on ethnic and national identity in this context?
20. What are the differences and/or similarities between a Turkish-Dutch citizen and a native Dutch citizen?

#### **The sixth set of questions: Future expectations**

21. What do you predict about the far-right political parties regarding their policies and rhetoric about Muslim immigrants, their identity, religion, culture, etc.?
22. Are you planning to take any specific steps regarding these predictions?



## C.CURRICULUM VITAE

### PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Karana, Elçin Sabahat  
Nationality: Turkish (TC)  
Date and Place of Birth: 23 October 1981, Ankara  
Marital Status: Single  
Phone: +90 541 344 35 55  
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### EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	Charles University, Prague European Studies	2013
BS	Ankara University International Relations	2003
High School	Aydınlıkevler High School, Ankara	1999

### WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2016- Present	TED University, International Programs Office	Director
2014-2016	METU, International Students' Office	Specialist (International Students' Advisor)
2010-2011	Ondokuz Mayıs University	Senior Government Official / Incoming Erasmus Students' Coordinator / EVS Coordinator
2005-2009	Ministry of National Defense of Turkish Republic	Senior Government Official / Expert in Political Affairs
2004-2005	Channel B	News presenter

### FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English

### PUBLICATIONS

1. Karana, E., Kahraman, S. (2018). The Reformation of Dutch Attitudes towards European Integration and the Accession of Turkey. In C. MacMillan (Ed.), *Contemporary Perspectives on Turkey's EU Accession Process: A Reluctant European?* (pp. 37-61). Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
2. Kahraman, S., Karana, E. (2015, November). *Reformation of Attitudes towards the European Integration*. Paper presented at Fourth International Euroacademia Conference - The European Union and the Politicization of Europe, Prague, Czech Republic.

## D.TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

ABD’de 11 Eyll 2001 tarihinde gerekleřtirilen terrist saldırıların etkisi, 2000’li yılların bařından buyana sadece ABD’yi deęil tm Dnyayı, zellikle de gmen nfusu yksek olan Avrupa lkelerini yakından etkilemiřtir. Saldırılarının en byk etkisi, zellikle Mslman gmenlere ynelik tutum ve davranıřlarda gzlenmiřtir. Bu durum, Avrupa’nın yeni politik tartıřmalarında kimlięe dayalı gvenlik algılarının geliřtirilmesine ve Mslman gmenlerin Avrupa deęerlerine, kimlięine, sosyo-kltrel yapısına tehdit oluřturduęu ve uyum sorunlarını derinleřtirdięine ynelik sylemleri siyasallařtıran ařırı-saę partilerin ykseliřine doęrudan etki etmiřtir. zellikle ařırı-saę partilerin gmen ve İslam karřıtı tutum ve davranıřlarının ykseliřinde, tehdit altında olduęu dřnlen milletin ve milli kimlięin korunması ve finansal maliyet fayda analizleri gereke olarak gsterilmektedir (McLaren, 2002).

Anılan ařırı-saęa dayalı siyasallařtırma sreci, zellikle Mslman gmen nfusu yksek olan Avrupa lkelerinde, 2000’lerden buyana toplumsal boyutta ok-kltrllk, asimilasyon ve uyum tartıřmalarını n plana ıkarmıřtır. 2000’li yılların bařında Madrid ve Londra’da yařanan terr saldırıları ya da Hollandalı film yapımcısı Theo van Gogh’un bir ařırı İslamcı tarafından ldrlmesi gibi olaylar, bu tartıřmaları gvenlik boyutunda daha da derinleřtirmiřtir.

Hollanda, Mslman gmen nfusun toplam nfus ierisinde yoęunluęu en yksek olan Avrupa lkelerinden biri olarak bu arařtırmanın sahasını oluřturmaktadır. Ayrıca 2000’lerden buyana zellikle Mslman gmenleri olumsuz řekilde siyasallařtıran ve pek ok tartıřmanın da bu anlamda odak noktası olmayı bařararak oy potansiyelini de her ge gn artıran ařırı-saę partileriyle de Hollanda dięer Avrupa lkelerinden ayrıřmaktadır (Berkhout ve dięerleri, 2015). Bu erevede, kktendincilik ve zellikle İslam konuları, Hollanda’da ařırı-saę partiler tarafından son yıllarda en fazla siyasallařtırılan konular olmuřtur (Hobolt ve dięerleri, 2011). Sloomman (2018, 2-3) tarafından da ifade edildięi gibi etnik eřitlilięe gsterdięi hořgr ile tanınan bir lkeden İslam fobisi olan bir partinin (PVV) bu kadar bařarılı olduęu ve sylemlerinin

genel siyasi ortama egemen olmaya başladığı bir ülkeye dönüşmesi anlamında da Hollanda, Avrupa içerisinde özel bir çalışma alanı oluşturmaktadır. Hollanda içerisinde de çalışma, en büyük Müslüman göçmen toplumu oluşturan Türk-Hollandalı göçmenlerle gerçekleştirilmiştir. Burada Türk kavramı herhangi bir etnik, ideolojik ya da mezhepsel ayrım gözetmeksizin Türkiyeli tüm göçmenleri ifade etmektedir.

Söz konusu siyasallaşma sürecinin aşırı-sağ partilerin oy potansiyelini artırma çabalarının önemli bir ayağını teşkil ettiği ve mevcut parti seçim propagandaları aracılığıyla Hollanda toplumunun büyük bir kesimini de göçmenlere yönelik olumsuz tutum ve davranışlar geliştirme konusunda yönlendirdiği değerlendirilmektedir. 1990'ların sonundan bu yana ülke içerisindeki Müslüman nüfusun varlığına yönelik bu anlamda artan bir toplumsal direniş söz konusudur ve bu durum 2000'li yılların başında tüm Avrupa genelinde yapılan kamuoyu yoklamalarında Hollanda'yı açık ara ilk sıraya getirmektedir (Phalet et al., 2010). Bu durumun da, 1960'lardan buyana Hollanda'da yerleşik Türk göçmenler üzerinde kimlik siyaseti geliştirilmesi anlamında etkilerinin olduğu değerlendirilmektedir.

Bu kapsamda, bu tezin temel amacı, aşırı-sağ siyasi partilerin Müslüman göçmenleri siyasallaştırmasının, göçmenleri siyasal olarak harekete geçirme konusundaki rolünü incelemektir. Söz konusu araştırma ile özellikle Müslüman göçmenlerin Avrupa toplumlarıyla entegrasyonu konusunda süregelen tartışmaların da hangi yönde etkilendiği hususuna açıklık getirilmesi hedeflenmiştir. Çalışma, Hollanda'da yerleşik Türk-Hollandalı birinci ve ikinci kuşak göçmenleri incelemektedir. Bu göçmenler arasından da gerek bir siyasal parti üyeliği gerekse bir sivil toplum örgütü üyeliği gibi siyasal anlamda aktif katılım gerçekleştirmekte olan bireyler araştırmaya katılımcı olarak seçilmiştir.

Tezde, aşırı sağ siyasi partilerin Hollanda'daki Müslüman göçmenleri siyasallaştırmasının, Hollanda etnik, dini ve kültürel kimliğine dayalı toplumsal güvenlik kaygılarıyla şekillendirildiği ileri sürülmektedir. Aşırı sağ siyasi partiler bu kaygıları söylemlerinde ve seçim propagandalarında siyasallaştırırken, bu siyasallaşmanın, göçmen toplulukların günlük yaşamlarında olumsuz yansımalarla yol açtığı değerlendirilmektedir. Bu yansımaların temel nedeni ise, Hollandalıların göçmenlere yönelik tutumlarında gözlenen değişimdir. Bu ortamın, göçmenler

arasında artan oranda ötekileştirme ve zaman zaman da asimilasyon algısına yol açtığı ve bu kapsamda da kimlik siyasetinin gelişimine zemin hazırladığı savunulmaktadır.

Martiniello (2005) göçmenlerin siyasi entegrasyonunu üç farklı yöntemle açıklar, bunlar siyasal katılım (political participation), siyasal mobilizasyon/seferberlik (political mobilization) ve temsildir (representation). Siyasal katılım vatandaşlıkla yakından ilişkilidir ve daha çok oy kullanma, parti üyeliği, protesto, boykot, sivil toplum organizasyonlarına katılım gibi bireysel doğrudan katılımı ifade ederken; siyasal olarak mobilize olma kolektif kimlik ve aktörler geliştirerek kimlik siyaseti anlamında birlikte grup bilinciyle hareket etmeye yönelik adımlar atılmasını ifade etmektedir (Martiniello, 2005). Martiniello (2005) siyasal katılım formlarını kendi içinde konvansiyonel/geleneksel ve daha az konvansiyonel/geleneksel olarak ayırmaktadır. Bu kapsamda oy kullanma ya da siyasi parti üyeliği gibi daha bireysel içerikli faaliyetler geleneksel grupta, eylem ve protesto gibi kolektif faaliyetler ise diğer grupta kategorilendirilmektedir. İkinci kategoriye giren eylemleri, grup bilinciyle hareket edilmesi nedeniyle Martiniello (2005) mobilizasyon kategorisine dâhil etmektedir. Siyasal temsil ise göçmenlerin kendilerini temsil edecek bir grup ya da hükümet temsilcisine vekâlet vermesini ifade etmektedir.

Aşırı-sağın Müslüman göçmenleri siyasallaştıran göçmen karşıtı tutumları düşünüldüğünde, göçmenlerin bireysel özelliğine rağmen kolektif etkileri olduğu düşünülen siyasal katılımı (political participation) ön plana çıkmaktadır. Bu anlamda tez çalışmasının analiz alanı kimlik siyaseti ile gelişen Türk-Hollandalı göçmenlerin siyasal katılımıdır. Siyasal katılımın, göçmenler arasında aşırı sağın siyasallaştırması ile doğan toplumsal “ötekileştirme” ve dışlanma algısını ortadan kaldırdığı ve Hollanda toplumu içerisinde göçmenlerin ortak çıkarları ve kaygıları temelinde yaşadıkları bir takım adaletsizlikleri giderecek bir statü kazandıracağı değerlendirilmektedir. Çalışma yalnızca legal ve konvansiyonel siyasal katılıma odaklanmakta, siyasal şiddet gibi legal olmayan ya da protesto gibi konvansiyonel olmayan formlar çalışma alanı dışında bırakılmaktadır. Ayrıca konvansiyonel formlar arasında da yalnızca siyasal parti üyeliği ya da seçimlere katılma ve göçmenlerin siyasal toplum bilincini geliştirmeye yönelik faaliyetler yürüten sivil toplum organizasyonlarına üyelik alanlarına odaklanılmaktadır. Oy kullanma faaliyeti ise

gerek siyasal temsile doğası gereği yakınlığı gerekse oy kullanma eylemi ile kimlik siyaseti arasındaki sonuç ilişkisinin kurulmasındaki belirsizlik nedeniyle bu araştırma alanının dışında bırakılmıştır.

Avrupa genelinde ve Hollanda özelinde özellikle 2000’li yılların başından buyana alevlenen ve göçmenleri hedef alan sağcı söylemlerde sosyal ve kültürel güvenlik, ya göçmenlerle ilgili etnik köken, kültür ya da din gibi konuları daha görünür kılarak (siyaset gündemine taşıyarak) ya da özellikle siyasi partiler arasında genel olarak da toplum yapısı içerisinde kutuplaşma yaratarak siyasallaştırılmaktadır (van der Brug, D’Amato, et al., 2015a). Kaya (2013) kimliğin sosyal ve kültürel güvenlik alanında temel prensip olduğunu savunmakta ve bu kapsamda kimliği göçmenlerin söz konusu siyasallaştırılma sürecinde karşıt bir reaksiyon olarak geliştirdikleri kimlik siyasetinin temel unsuru olarak görmektedir. Burada kimlik siyaseti, göçmenlerin kimliklerine yönelik tehdit algılamalarını yönlendirmekte ve gerek sosyo-kültürel gerekse ekonomik çıkarlarını şekillendiren kolektif grup kimliğini oluşturarak siyasal sistem içerisinde bu taleplerini şekillendirmelerini sağlamaktadır (Wiarda, 2014). Göçmenler özelinde bu çıkar ve taleplere, yerli toplumla eşit şartlarda ve imkânlarda eğitim olanağı ya da işe alımlarda ayırım gözetmeyen standart bir yapılanma örnek olarak gösterilebilir. Parti üyeliği, ekonomik statü, dil, cinsiyet, ırk, etnik köken, milliyet gibi pek çok farklı unsur bu anlamda siyasal kimliğin farklı formlarını oluşturmaktadır (Smith, 2004; Lluch, 2018). Müslüman göçmenlerin siyasallaştırılması sürecinde ağırlıklı olarak bu sosyal ve siyasal kimlik, etnik köken üzerinden oluşturulabileceği gibi kültür üzerinden ya da din üzerinden de oluşturulabilmektedir.

Kimlik siyaseti kapsamında belli bir sosyal gruba üye olan kişiler siyasal içerikli eylemler gerçekleştirmek ya da ırk, etnisite, din ve kültür temelli ayrımcılığa dayanan ortak deneyimleri aracılığıyla bu tür eylemleri tasarlamaktadır (“Identity Politics,” 2016). Klandermans, van der Toorn ve van Stekelenburg (2008) göçmenlerin kimlik siyaseti kapsamında kolektif siyasi faaliyetlere katılımlarını beş faktörle açıklamaktadır. Bunlar: toplum içerisinde otoritelerin tutum ve davranışlarına yönelik negatif algıdan kaynaklanan bir yakınma (grievances) olması; kolektif eylemin etkisinin daha büyük olacağına yönelik bir algı oluşması (efficacy); özellikle çifte kimliğe sahip olmanın ve entegrasyonun, ayrımcılık ya da asimilasyona oranla, alt

grup mobilizasyonunda daha etkili olduğuna yönelik bir anlayışın gelişmesi (identity); korku ya da öfke gibi duyguların gelişmesi (emotions); ve sosyal katılım ya da sivil toplum ağlarının (etnik ya da etnisiteler arası) seçimlerde oy kullanma, aday olma ya da ilgili siyasi toplantılara katılma gibi siyasal katılım alanlarında olumlu etkilerinin olacağına inanılması (social embeddedness or involvement in civil society organizations)'dır. Kimlik siyasetinde itici rol oynayan bu davranışsal bakış açıları değişen formlarda siyasal katılımı beraberinde getirmektedir. Bunlar oy kullanmadan, siyasi parti üyeliğine, protestodan, siyasi faaliyet yürüten organizasyonlara üyeliğe kadar pek çok farklı alanı ifade etmektedir. Dolayısıyla kimlik siyaseti, genel hatlarıyla göçmenlerin, siyasallaştırılma sürecinde siyasi hareketliliğini açıklayan bir kavram olarak kullanılmaktadır (Massoumi, 2015).

Bu kapsamda, bu tez aşırı-sağ siyasi partilerin Müslüman göçmenleri siyasallaştırması süreci ve aynı süreçte göç ve entegrasyon politikalarındaki değişimin itici güç etkisi ile Türk-Hollandalı göçmenlerin siyasal katılımı arasında nasıl bir ilişki olduğu sorusuna yanıt aramaktadır. Bu soruyu yanıtlarken araştırma ayrıca aşırı-sağ partilerin göçmen ve Müslüman karşıtı söylemlerinin Türk-Hollandalı göçmenleri nasıl etkilediği ve Türk-Hollandalı göçmenlerin siyasallaşma sürecini günlük hayatlarında nasıl deneyimledikleri sorularına da yanıtlar bulmaya çalışmaktadır. Siyasal katılım gerçekleştiren göçmenlerin siyasi partilerdeki ya da sivil toplum örgütlerindeki siyasi etkisi ya da gücünün ölçülmesi ise bu tezin araştırma alanına girmemektedir.

Tez araştırması iki aşamalı olarak kurgulanmıştır. İlk aşamada göçmenlerin siyasallaştırılması olgusu Hollanda özelinde değişen göç politikaları ve parti siyaseti bağlamında tarihsel bir perspektifle detaylıca incelenirken, ikinci aşamada göçmenlerin siyasal katılımı güçlenen kimlik siyaseti üzerinden Türk-Hollandalı göçmenler özelinde değerlendirilmektedir. Bu iki aşamadan ilki olan Müslüman göçmenlerin aşırı-sağ partiler tarafından siyasallaştırılması olgusunda teorik olarak Kopenhag Okulunun Toplumsal Güvenlik Yaklaşımı'ndan yola çıkılmıştır. Bu yaklaşımda bir toplumun kimliğine yönelik olarak tehdit algılandığında savunma mekanizması geliştirilmesi anlatılmaktadır (Waever, 2008). Fakat yapılan literatür taramalarında ve araştırmanın ilerleyen aşamalarında sürece tarihsel açıdan yaklaşırken aşırı-sağın göçmen ve İslam karşıtı yaklaşım ve söylemlerinin

Hollanda'nın çok kültürlülükten asimilasyona evirilen entegrasyon politikaları özelinde göçmenlere yönelik gelişen parti söylemleri ve takip eden Hollanda toplumunda göçmenlere karşı gelişen negatif tutumun arkasında yatan sosyolojik ve hatta psikolojik nedenlerin daha detaylı açıklamalara ihtiyaç doğurduğu gözlenmiştir. Bu kapsamda Realist ve Sembolik Grup Çatışması yaklaşımlarının da araştırmaya dâhil edilmesinin bu olguyu açıklama ve içselleştirme aşamasında faydalı olduğu değerlendirilmiştir. Zira, Toplumsal Güvenlik Yaklaşımı, Hollanda'nın 1970'lerden buyana sürdürdüğü çok kültürlülükten asimilasyona evirilen politikalarını güvenlik, kimlik ve entegrasyon bağlamında açıklamada etkili bir yaklaşımken (Waever, 1995), bu süreç içerisinde aşırı-sağ partilerin ve buna dayalı olarak toplumun belirli kesimlerinin göçmenlere yönelik geliştirdikleri negatif algının ve tutumun derinlemesine analiz edilmesi hususunda yetersiz kalabilmektedir. Ayrıca bu yaklaşımda toplumlar bağımsız birimler olarak maddeleştirilmekte ve bu süreçte toplumsal güvenliğin bireyler için ne anlam ifade ettiği üzerine yoğunlaşmamaktadır (Theiler, 2003).

İkinci aşamada ise, göçmenlerin siyasi katılımını açıklamada siyasi eylem sürecinde kimliğin yanı sıra normatif yapılanmalara ya da standartlara odaklanan inşacı teoriden faydalanılmıştır ve bu kapsamda örneğin bir devletin kurumsallaşmış normları vatandaşların kimliğini şekillendirmektedir (Reus-Smit, 2005; Barnett, 2014). İnşacı kuram kapsamında göçmenlerin etnik kökene, kültüre ya da dine dayalı normlar üzerinden bir kimlik ve kimlik siyaseti geliştirmesi söz konusu olmaktadır, zira kimlik siyasetinde ırk, sınıf, kültürel yönelim, din, cinsiyet gibi daha pek çok alanda aynı sosyal çıkar grubuna mensup bireylerin, Müslüman göçmenler örneğinde olduğu gibi, bir statü arayışı söz konusu olmakta ve bu arayışta da bu grupların siyasal argümanları kendi çıkarları ile ilgili olarak bahsi geçen kimliğe ilişkin özelliklerle şekillenen daha dar kapsamlı bir siyaset anlayışından doğmaktadır (Wiarda, 2014).

Fakat bu aşamada da göçmenlerin kimlik siyaseti geliştirmelerinin ardında yatan temel süreçleri açıklamada bireylerin ve grupların geliştirdikleri davranışsal modelleri açıklamada inşacı teorinin yanı sıra Reaktif Etnisite gibi daha sosyoloji ve psikoloji temelli yaklaşımların analize dâhil edilmesi açıklamaları detaylandırmak ve daha anlamlı kılmak açısından gerekli görülmüştür. İnşacı kuramın önde gelen

akademisyenlerinden Hopf (1998) bu noktada inşacı kuramın kimliğin özünü açıklamada yetersiz kaldığını belirtmektedir ki kimlik siyaseti geliştirilmesi alanında kimliği oluşturan çıkış noktaları büyük önem taşımaktadır. Hopf'a (1998, 197) göre inşacı kuram kimlik, norm, uygulama ya da sosyal yapılar gibi temel kurucu unsurların varlığını özgüleştirmemektedir, bunun yerine bu unsurların teorik olarak birbirleri ile karşılıklı ilişki durumlarına odaklanmaktadır. Bu da kimliğin ya da kimlik siyasetinin oluşumu aşamasında herhangi bir öngörude bulunmayı ya da bu süreci anlamlandırmayı olanaksız kılmaktadır. Bu aşamada, grup içi ve grup dışı özelliklerin farklılıklarına odaklanan ve bu farklılıkları kolektif grup davranışı ile etnik, dini ve siyasi kimlik üzerinden kurgulayan Sosyal Kimlik Teorisi, ki bu teoride grup üyeleri dışarıdan bir tehdit algısı olmaksızın grup üyelerinin ortak özellikleri ile ortak bir kimlik etrafında bir araya gelmelerini ifade etmektedir ve Reaktif Etnisite yaklaşımı ön plana çıkmaktadır. Bu yaklaşımda gruplar arası farklılıklar etnik kimliğin gruplar arasındaki sınırları belirginleştirmesi ve bunun reaktif ya da sembolik tehdit algıları üzerinden yapılması ile ortaya çıkmaktadır. Burada Reaktif Etnisite grup içerisinde kendiliğinden oluşmamakta, toplum içerisinde diğer gruplardan kaynaklanan bir ayrımcılık söz konusu olduğunda oluşturulmaktadır.

Yukarıda anılan değişkenler arasında ilişki ağını analiz etmek amacıyla, birincil bilgi kaynağı olarak Hollanda'da yerleşik bir siyasi parti ya da politika ile ilintili faaliyetler yürüten sivil toplum örgütlerinde aktif Türk-Hollandalı göçmenlerle açık uçlu mülakatlar gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu tekniğin tercih edilmesindeki amaç göçmenlerin geliştirdiği politika temelli tepkileri şekillendiren değer, norm ve kimlik gibi algılar incelenirken görüşme öncesi belirlenen ancak açık uçlu bırakılan sorulardan oluşması ve bu sorulara sabit yanıtların ötesinde daha detaylı ve farklı bakış açılarını yansıtan yanıtlar verilmesine olanak sağlamasıdır (Ayres, 2008). Bu kapsamda 18 görüşme yapılmış, bu görüşmelerin 17'si Hollanda'da, 1'i ise internet aracılığıyla Skype programı üzerinden gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Mülakatlarda yer alan katılımcıların üyesi olduğu siyasi parti ve sivil toplum oluşumları şöyledir: DENK, NIDA, Hristiyan Demokratlar (Christian Democratic Appeal-CDA), Yeşil Sol (Green Left-GL), İşçi Partisi (Labor Party-PvdA), Milli



Görüş, Türk İslam Kültür Dernekleri Federasyonu (TICF), Hollanda Türkiyeli İşçiler Birliği (HTIB), Uluslararası Demokratlar Birliği (UID) ve Forum (NSD).

İkincil bilgi kaynağı olarak aşırı-sağ parti liderlerinin konuşmaları, parti propagandaları ve medya içeriklerine yönelik yürütülen akademik çalışmalar kullanılmıştır. Ayrıca Hollanda özelinde göçmenlere yönelik bazı verilerin analizinde istatistiki veri sağlayan kaynaklara da başvurulmuştur.

Tez, göçmenlerin siyasallaştırılması ile yine aynı göçmenlerin karşıt bir reaksiyon olarak geliştirdikleri siyasi katılımı arasındaki ilişkiyi incelerken, göçmenlerle ilgili din, dil, kültür, etnik köken vb. konuların siyasallaştırılmasının, göçmenlerin siyasi entegrasyonuna nasıl etki ettiği konusunda çıkarımlarda bulunmaktadır. Dolayısıyla çalışma aşırı-sağ partilerin Müslüman göçmenleri siyasallaştırmasının, göçmenler arasında toplumdaki soyutlanma, asimile edilme ya da ayrımcılığa uğrama gibi algılar yaratması ve bu algıların da günlük hayata yansıyan etkilerinin göçmenler arasında kolektif ve çok temelli (dini, etnik/ırksal ve kültürel) kimlik siyasetinin gelişimine yol açtığını savunmaktadır. Bu durumun da göçmen toplulukları arasında bir partiye üye olmak, ya da parti kurmak, benzer şekilde siyasi alanda göçmenleri bilinçlendirme faaliyetleri yürüten sivil toplum örgütleri kurmak ya da bu örgütlere üye olmak gibi, siyasi hayata daha aktif dâhil olma yönünde itici bir güç yarattığı, dolayısıyla siyasal katılımı tetiklediği ileri sürülmektedir. Bu anlamda da, siyasallaştırma sürecinin toplumda göçmenlere karşı yarattığı negatif algıya rağmen, göçmenler arasında ev sahibi toplum ile daha fazla siyasal entegrasyona olumlu katkı sağladığı savunulmaktadır.

Özetle, göçmen toplulukları siyasallaşmaya tepki olarak, önce kimlik siyaseti geliştirmekte ve buna bağlı olarak siyasal katılıma yönelmektedir. Bu sürece dâhil olan göçmenlerin, mevcut aşırı-sağ söylemler temelli bir ayrımcılık ya da ırkçılık günlük hayata yansıyor olsa da, siyasi olarak bilinçlenme ve kimlik siyaseti geliştirme ile aktif siyasal katılım aşamasında kendilerini Hollanda toplumunun bir parçası hissetme konusunda daha fazla aidiyet duygusu geliştirmelerini sağlamaktadır. Özellikle, Vermeulen (2011)'nin formel ve enformel siyasal katılım ayrımında gözlemlendiği gibi göçmenlerin sivil toplum örgütlerine üyelik şeklindeki enformel katılımında kültürel, dini ya da sosyal gruplar önemli rol oynamakta, çünkü göçmenler

kendilerini yakın hissedebilecekleri ve taleplerini rahatça dile getirebilecekleri bu tür ortamlara ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Vermeulen (2011) mahalle camii inşa edilmesi için göçmenlerin yerel ya da milli otoritelerle bu tür sivil toplum örgütleri aracılığıyla temasa geçmesini hatta bu tür otoriteler kapsamında danışma kurullarına girmesine ve siyasete dâhil olmasını bu tür enformel siyasal katılımlara bir örnek olarak vermektedir. Sürece dâhil olan göçmen gruplar eş zamanlı olarak ait oldukları kolektif kimlik grubu ile ilgili farkındalığını artırmanın yanı sıra bu grup tarafından geliştirilen kimlik siyaseti ile siyasal katılım gerçekleştirirken yaşadığı ülkenin siyasal yapısı ile de takip ettiği yasal süreçler vb. aracılığıyla entegre olmaktadır.

Tez altı bölümden oluşmaktadır. Giriş bölümünde tez çalışmasının genel çerçevesi çizilmekte, tezin argümanı, araştırma sorusu ve literatür taraması sunulmaktadır. Takip eden ikinci bölümde göçmenlerin siyasallaştırılması ve kimlik siyaseti, bağıntılı kavramlar olarak detaylı şekilde incelenmektedir. İlgili bölüm içerisinde siyasallaştırmanın farklı türlerine ve tanımlarına detaylı şekilde yer verilmekte ve akademik çalışmalardan örnekler sunulmaktadır. Bu temel kavram analizleri üzerine farklı yaklaşımlardan yola çıkılarak tezin teorik çerçevesi bu bölüm içerisinde oluşturulmaktadır. Çalışmanın genel çerçevesinin daha anlaşılır kılınması açısından bu bölümde teori ve yaklaşımlar özellikle 2000’li yılların başındaki değişimi yansıtabilmek açısından Avrupa geneli ve Hollanda özelinde tarihsel gelişmeler göz önünde tutularak sunulmaktadır. Bölüm içerisinde, iki aşamalı olarak yürütülen çalışmanın teorik ve kavramsal çerçevesi şematik olarak oluşturulmakta ve takip eden bölümler öncesinde çalışmanın genel yapısı kurgulanmaktadır.

Üçüncü bölüm, çalışmanın iki aşamalı yapısının ilk ayağını oluşturmaktadır. Bu bölümde, Avrupa siyasetinin ana gündem maddelerinden biri olan göçmenlerin siyasallaştırılması konusunda göçmenlerin entegrasyonu ve ev sahibi toplumla farklılıkları konularındaki temel tartışma alanları incelenmekte; bu kapsamda özellikle 2000’li yılların başından buyana gelişmeye başlayan, ya da yükselişe geçen göçmen karşıtı yaklaşımların arkasında yatan temel nedenler incelenmeye çalışılmaktadır. Bu çerçevede 1970’lerden buyana sürdürülen ve yıllar içerisinde değiştirilen Hollanda göçmen ve entegrasyon politikaları incelenmekte ve bu politikadaki çok kültürlülükten asimilasyona geçiş tartışmalarına uzanan değişim ya da dönüşümün

ikinci bölümde sunulan teorik yaklaşımlar ve aşırı-sağ partilerin Müslüman göçmenleri siyasallaştırma süreci ile ilişkisi değerlendirilmektedir. Bu kapsamda, değerlendirme içerisinde göçmenlerin siyasallaştırılmasında ana rolü oynayan aşırı-sağ partiler de detaylı şekilde incelenmektedir.

Dördüncü bölümde göçmenlerin siyasallaştırılması neticesinde gelişen kimlik siyaseti ve buna bağlı olarak ortaya çıkan siyasal katılım süreci incelenmektedir. Önceki bölüme benzer şekilde, bu bölümde de Avrupa genelinde ve Hollanda özelinde gelişmeler tarihsel bir bakış açısıyla ele alınmaktadır. Kimlik siyasetinin daha iyi anlaşılmasını sağlayabilmek adına kimlik kavramının değişik tanımlamaları üzerinde durulmakta ve göçmenler açısından kimlik ve vatandaşlık kavramlarının ilişkisi değerlendirilmektedir. Bu kapsamda, literatür taramalarında da öne çıktığı şekliyle etnik yapının, dinin ve kültürün, kimlik siyaseti geliştirilmesindeki rolü ele alınmakta ve göçmenlerin siyasi tepki olarak geliştirdikleri katılım bu kavramlar üzerinden kurgulanmaya çalışılmaktadır.

Analiz bölümü olan beşinci bölümde Hollanda'da yerleşik Türk-Hollandalı göçmenlerden aktif siyasal katılım gerçekleştirenlerle gerçekleştirilen saha analizi sunulmaktadır. Bu bölümde katılımcıların açık-uçlu mülakatlar kapsamında paylaştıkları günlük hayat deneyimleri ve siyasallaştırılma sürecinde sosyal aidiyet ve entegrasyon konularındaki görüşleri doğrudan alıntılarla paylaşılmaktadır. Bu bölüm içerisinde katılımcıların mülakat sorularına verdikleri yanıtlar ve kimlik siyaseti üzerine yapılan literatür taramalarındaki verilerle örtüşecek çıkarımlar göz önünde bulundurularak araştırmaya ışık tutacak temalar (etnik köken/ırk, kültür ve din) ve bu temaların göçmen toplulukları üzerindeki sosyal, siyasal, eğitim ya da yönetim temelli etkileri tartışılmaktadır. Bu tartışmalar ışığında da analiz sonuçları toplulukların siyasal katılımı ve siyasal entegrasyonu anlamında genel olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Bu aşamada, kavramsal çerçeve ve argümanlar ile saha çalışması neticesinde elde edilen veriler arasında uyumlu bir sonuç ortaya çıktığı görülmüştür.

Tezin altıncı bölümü sonuç bölümüdür. Bu bölümde ise yarı-yapılandırılmış görüşmeler neticesinde elde edilen veriler ışığında tezin genel argümanı ve araştırma sorularının geçerliliği tartışılmaktadır. Müslüman göçmenlerin aşırı sağ partiler tarafından 2000'lerin başından buyana artan oranlarda siyasallaştırılmasının ve buna

bağlı olarak göçmenler arasında geliştirilen kimlik siyaseti ve bu siyasetin neticesinde atılan siyasal katılım temelli adımların göçmenlerin siyasal entegrasyon süreci açısından toplumsal sonuçları sunulmakta ve çalışmanın genel bir değerlendirmesi yapılmaktadır. Nitel araştırma süreci, tematik içerik analizi ile gerçekleştirilmiştir. Analiz kapsamında gerçekleştirilen yarı-yapılandırılmış görüşme kayıtları deşifre edilerek yaklaşık 300 sayfalık veri elde edilmiştir. Veri herhangi bir bilgisayar programı kullanılmadan manuel olarak analiz edilmiş ve böylece katılımcıların yanıtlarının derinlemesine ve aşamalı analiz sağlıklı şekilde yürütülmüştür. Analiz, birbirini izleyen aşamalarda gerçekleştirilmiştir. İlk aşamada, göçmenlerin siyasallaştırılması sürecindeki, kimlik temelli endişeler, toplumsal güvenlik kaygılarını tetikleyen unsurlar, ya da kimlik siyaseti geliştirilmesindeki etmenler gibi genel perspektifler ele alınarak temalar belirlenmiştir (etnisite/ırk, kültür, din), ki bu temalar, özellikle dördüncü bölümde ele alınan kimlik siyaseti geliştirilmesindeki temel unsurlarla ve dolayısıyla çalışmanın kavramsal çerçevesiyle örtüşmüştür. Bu aşamada, tüm analiz verileri analitik kategorilere ayrılarak, alt temalar ve sonrasında da kodlar, dolayısıyla katılımcıların günlük hayatlarında ilk aşamada kategorilendirilen temalara dayanan deneyimleri belirlenmiştir.

Yapılan incelemeler ve saha analizi, Hollanda'da aşırı-sağ partilerin Müslüman göçmenleri gerek seçim kampanyaları ve parti propagandaları, gerekse günlük söylemleri ile hem parlamento gündemine taşıyarak siyasi düzeyde hem de basın aracılığıyla toplum genelinde siyasallaştırmasının sonuçlarının araştırmanın kavramsal ve teorik çerçevesi ile örtüştüğünü göstermektedir. Bu bağlamda, 1960'lardan buyana işçi göçü ile Hollanda'ya yerleşen ve ilerleyen yıllarda aile birleşimi ya da benzer kanallarla sayıları hızla artan Türkiyeli birinci ve ikinci kuşak göçmenler, 2000'li yılların başından bu yana Hollanda'da süregelen aşırı-sağın yükselişini gerek ana akım partilerin söylemlerindeki sağa kayış, gerek sol tandanslı partilerin göçmen nüfustan yavaş da olsa kendini uzaklaştırmasına yönelik sinyaller, gerekse tüm bu süreçlerin özellikle eğitim ve iş olanakları konusunda Hollandalı toplumun bir kesimine günlük hayat içerisinde nüfuz etmesi anlamında açıkça deneyimlemektedir. Bu kapsamda, Hollanda'nın Avrupa ülkeleri arasında özellikle koloni ve göçmen tarihi açısından ayırıcı özelliklerinden biri olan çok kültürlülüğünün Amsterdam ya da Rotterdam gibi göçmen nüfusun yoğun olduğu şehirlerde halen

yaşatıldığını ileri sürseler de, Türk-Hollandalı göçmenlerin ülke genelinde aşırı-sağ söylemlerle tetiklenen ve gerek politikalarla gerekse günlük hayat deneyimleriyle asimilasyona yönelik bir dönüşüm algısı içerisinde oldukları gözlenmektedir. Bu algı, Türk-Hollandalı göçmenler arasında etnisite, ideoloji, mezhep ya da cinsiyet ayrımı gözetmeksizin tüm katılımcılar tarafından dile getirilen kolektif toplum bilinci oluşturma ihtiyacını tetiklemekte, bu anlamda kimlik siyaseti geliştirme ve bu yönde mücadele etme ihtiyacını da 2000’li yıllar sonrasında ciddi oranda artırmaktadır. Bu süreç içerisinde ana akım partilerin söylemlerindeki sağa kayışın yanı sıra sol tandanslı partilerin de Türkiyeli göçmenlere yönelik tutumlarında değişimler gözlenmektedir.

Bu çerçevede, Türk-Hollandalı göçmenlerden aktif olarak siyasi parti üyeliği yürüten, parti kuran ya da sivil toplum örgütleri aracılığıyla göçmen toplumunun siyasal hak ve yükümlülükler hususunda bilinçlendirilmesine yönelik faaliyetler yürütenlerin, bu eylemlerinin arkasındaki temel itici güç Müslüman göçmenlerin ve genel olarak İslam’ın siyasallaştırılmasıdır. Literatürde de değinildiği üzere İslam bu süreç içerisinde aşırı-sağ tarafından etnikleştirilmekte (Koyuncu-Lorasdağı, 2013) ve bu bağlamda Müslüman göçmenler tarafından geliştirilen kimlik siyasetinin temel unsurlarından biri haline gelmektedir. Benzer şekilde din, kültür üzerinden de Müslüman göçmenlerin sosyal kimlik oluşumunun ana unsurlarından bir haline dönüştürülmektedir.

Her ne kadar, aşırı-sağ partiler Müslüman göçmenlerin siyasallaştırılması sürecinin ana aktörleri olarak görülse de merkez ve merkez sağ partilerin de özellikle seçim dönemlerinde göçmenlere yönelik olumsuz söylemlerde bulunduğu araştırmanın katılımcıları tarafından sıklıkla dile getirilmiştir. Dahası, sol partiler dahi 2000’li yılların başından buyana Müslüman göçmenlerle aralarına bir mesafe koymakta ve bu tavır ilgili partilerin Hollandalı tabanından gelen tepkiler neticesinde gözlenmektedir. Ancak yine de katılımcılar, siyasal partilerin göçmenlere yönelik tutum ve söylemlerinin popülist bir stratejinin ürünü olduğunu, hatta zaman zaman Türkiye’nin de (AKP’ye atıfta bulunularak) benzer bir stratejiyle, 2017 yılındaki referanduma “evet” kampanyasının Hollanda’da da sürdürülmesi talebi nedeniyle Hollanda ile Türkiye arasında yaşanan diplomatik krizde gözlemlendiği gibi, göçmenlerin bu durumundan faydalandığı ifade edilmektedir.

Velasco González ve diğerlerinin (2008) çalışmasında gözlemlendiği gibi literatürde bazı çalışmalarda aksi iddia ediliyor olsa da, çalışma bulguları Müslüman göçmenlerin siyasallaştırılmasında ekonomi temelli kaygıların ve söylemlerin halen aktif olarak kullanıldığını ve bunun toplumdaki temel ayrışmalarda önemli rol oynadığını göstermektedir.

Yapılan saha görüşmelerinde, siyasallaştırma sürecinin, göçmenlerin günlük hayatına en olumsuz etkilerinin eğitim ve istihdam alanlarında olduğu ifade edilmiştir. Ancak analiz temaları ve bu temaların oluşturduğu kodlar dikkate alınarak toplumsal düzeyde bu etkilerin yansımalarının olumsuzun aksine olumlu olduğu, göçmenleri eğitim anlamında daha aktif ve istekli olmaya yönelttiği ve siyasal katılımın da bu süreçlerde önemli bir araç olarak algılandığı görülmüştür.

Ancak, yukarıda bahsedilen ortak bilinç ve kolektif kimlik oluşturma ihtiyacı hemen her bir katılımcı tarafından dile getirilmiş olsa da, özellikle sol ideolojiye mensup katılımcılar tarafından Türk-Hollandalı göçmenler arasında halen siyasi ideolojiye, etnik kökene ve mezhepsel farklılıklara dayalı ayrışmanın devam ettiği ve bu durumun da kimlik siyasetinin oluşturulması ve siyasi katılım aşamalarında güçlü ve tek bir kolektif kimlik ile hareket edilmesini güçleştirdiği inancıdır. Bu bulgu, reaktif etnisite yaklaşımı ile şekillendirilen kimlik siyasetinin Hollanda'daki Türkiyeli göçmenlerin siyasal katılımı sürecinde ancak göçmen toplumunun içerisinde farklı ideolojik, etnik ve mezhepsel oluşumları ya da girişimleri açıklarken, Türkiyeli göçmenlerin tamamını kapsayıcı ve kolektif grup bilinciyle tek bir vücut olarak hareket edilmesi noktasında yetersiz kalmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, Müslüman göçmenlerin siyasallaştırılması, Türk-Hollandalı göçmen toplumunda “biz” ve “diğerleri” algısını derinleştirip bu ayrımı daha belirgin kılarken; kolektif kimlik oluşumunu “Türkiyeli göçmenler” olarak şekillendirmektedir. Bu noktada, geliştirilen kimlik siyaseti ise, siyasal katılımı ancak etnik kökene, mezhebe ve siyasal ideolojiye göre ayrışan daha küçük alt gruplar seviyesinde mümkün kılmaktadır.

Tezin bu noktada, özellikle Zürn (2014) ile van der Brug ve diğerleri (2015) tarafından dile getirilen siyasallaştırmanın kutuplaştırma etkisi üzerine iki önemli katkısı bulunmaktadır. Katılımcıların saha çalışması kapsamında verdiği yanıtlar göz önünde bulundurularak, literatürdeki bahsi geçen çalışmaların aksine, siyasallaştırma her

zaman kutuplaştırma etkisi yaratmamakta, Türk-Hollandalı göçmenler örneğinde olduğu gibi homojenleştirme etkisiyle mobilizasyon etkisi yaratabilmektedir. Bu etki kendisini, kimliğin grupla şekillendirmesi ile göstermektedir ki bu da siyasal katılımı ve dolayısıyla siyasal entegrasyonu beraberinde getirmektedir.

Diğer yandan, siyasallaştırma, siyasal partiler arasında kutuplaştırma yerine, Hollanda sol tandanslı partilerinin sağa kayışında gözleendiği şekliyle farklı alanlarda bir yakınlaşma yaratabilmektedir. Ayrıca aşır-sağ partilerin Müslüman göçmenleri siyasallaştırma çabasındaki tek din, tek millet, tek kültür oluşturmaya yönelik homojenleştirme çağrısının ana akım ve ana akım olmayan partiler arasında söylemsel anlamda da bir yakınlaşmayı ya da benzeşmeyi beraberinde getirdiği gözlenmiştir. Bu durum, merkez ve merkez sağ partilerin özellikle seçim dönemi göçmenleri hedef alan söylemlerinde açıkça gözlenmektedir.

Tüm bu siyasallaştırma ve kimlik siyaseti oluşumu ile siyasal katılım tartışmaları içerisinde “karşılıklı güven” konusu katılımcılar tarafından özellikle ön plana çıkarılmaktadır. Karşılıklı güvenle anlatılmak istenen sadece göçmen ve ev sahibi toplumlar arasındaki güven değil, göçmenlerin mevcut siyasal sisteme ve kendi göçmen toplumları içerisinde birbirlerine duydukları güvendir. Siyasal anlamda geliştirilen güven duygusu siyasal entegrasyonun en önemli unsurlarından biridir (Tillie, 2004), çünkü sisteme ve siyasal yapısına yönelik güven duygusu gelişmediğinde siyasal sistemle entegrasyon mümkün olamamaktadır. Görüşme sonuçları Türkiyeli göçmen toplumunun Hollanda siyasal sistemine ve üyesi oldukları siyasal parti ya da sivil toplum girişimlerinin siyasal gücüne olan inancı ve güveninin tam olduğunu göstermekle birlikte, Hollanda toplumunun göçmenlere yönelik güven duygusu ile göçmen toplumunun kendi içindeki güven inşasının tam olarak sağlanamadığını göstermektedir.

Yine de özellikle seçim süreçlerinde aktif olarak yer alınmasının toplum içerisindeki farklı grupların entegrasyonu açısından önemli olduğu ve bu anlamda göçmenlerin de siyasal süreçlerde yüksek oranda temsilinin bu sürece katkı sağlayacağı değerlendirilmektedir (Ginieniewicz, 2010, 273). Zira siyasal doğrudan katılımı göçmenlerin toplumsal boyutta ve günlük hayatta deneyimledikleri olumsuz gelişmeleri ya da uyum problemlerini kamuoyunun gündemine taşıma olanağı

doğmakta ve böylece bu sorunlara çözüm yolu arama olanağı doğmaktadır. Bu süreçte, Türk-Hollandalı göçmenler örneğinde olduğu gibi göçmen toplumunun ev sahibi ülke toplumu ile uyumu siyasal süreçlere katılımı ile başlamakta ve sosyal entegrasyonla da devam etmektedir. Bu anlamda, araştırma bulgularının tezin kavramsal ve teorik çerçevesi ile bir kez daha örtüştüğü görülmektedir.

Her ne kadar, Avrupa’da ve özellikle Hollanda’da aşırı-sağın yükselişi, göçmenlerin siyasallaştırılması ya da Müslüman göçmenlerin entegrasyonuna yönelik ayrı ayrı çalışmalar yürütülmüş olsa da bu iki olguyu kimlik siyaseti temelinde ilişkilendiren bir çalışma henüz akademide yeterince detaylı yer bulamamıştır. Bu anlamda, tezin literatürdeki bu boşluğu dolduracağına inanılmaktadır. Ayrıca, çalışma mevcut diğer çalışmaların ötesine geçerek göçmenler tarafından geliştirilen kimlik siyasetini, göçmenlerin siyasallaştırılması, siyasal katılım ve siyasal entegrasyon ilişkisine dahil etmektedir.

Çalışma, literatürde çalışılması fayda sağlayacak başka konularda da bir takım eksiklikler olduğunu ortaya koymakta ve bu anlamda da gelecekte yürütülecek yeni çalışmalara da ışık tutmaktadır. Yukarıda detaylı şekilde bahsedildiği gibi, Türk-Hollandalı göçmen toplumunun içerisinde var olan etnik kökene, mezhebe ya da siyasal ideolojilere dayanan sosyal entegrasyon problemleri ve bu problemlerin göçmen toplumunun ötesinde ev sahibi toplumla sosyal ve siyasal uyum sürecine etkileri daha detaylı ve derinlemesine bir araştırmayı gerekli kılmaktadır. Bu alanda yürütülebilecek karşılaştırmalı saha çalışmalarının, Avrupa ülkeleri özelinde ya da dünya genelinde Müslüman göçmen nüfusu yüksek ülkeler açısından göçmenlerin uyum sürecine ilişkin önemli bulgular sağlayacaktır.

Ayrıca, Avrupa’daki sivil toplum örgütlerinin oluşumunda ve işleyişinde Türkiye’nin rolü üzerine farklı çalışmalar yapılmış olmasına rağmen, bu çalışmalarda Türkiye’nin söz konusu oluşumlarda yer alan göçmen toplumlarının gerek göçmen toplumunun kendi içerisindeki gerekse ev sahibi toplumla olan entegrasyon sorunlarındaki rolü üzerine detaylı ve kapsayıcı bir çalışmanın henüz yapılmadığı gözlenmiştir. Söz konusu çalışma ile yukarıda bahsi geçen kolektif kimlik oluşumu ve bu kimlik üzerinden kurgulanan kimlik siyasetinin anılan uyum sorunları yaşanmadan yaratacağı



siyasal katılım ve etkileri daha farklı bir perspektiften değeriendirilebilme olanağı bulacaktır.

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