

EFFECTS OF CHANGING BOUNDARIES OF MUNICIPALITIES ON MUNICIPAL
SERVICE PROVISION: WATER AND SEWAGE SERVICES IN HATAY

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ABSTRACT

EFFECTS OF CHANGING BOUNDARIES OF MUNICIPALITIES ON MUNICIPAL SERVICE PROVISION: WATER AND SEWAGE SERVICES IN HATAY

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In Turkey, inefficiencies in municipal service provision have been always attributed to the size of municipalities. Particularly since the 2000s, the boundaries of the municipalities have been changed through successive legal arrangements with the aim of increasing municipal service provision. The final and most important amendment about rescaling municipalities was enacted through the Law No 6360 in 2012 which established 14 new metropolitan municipalities in Turkey. Also with this law, boundaries of the metropolitan municipalities were expanded to correspond to provincial boundaries, the small scale municipalities and villages were abolished and certain municipal services were delegated to the metropolitan municipalities. The major assertion of the Law No 6360 was that changing municipal boundaries would result in increasing efficient service provision through using less resource, decreasing cost of the services and improving quality of the service. The major aim of this dissertation is to determine the effects of changing municipal boundaries on municipal services. The research area is Hatay Metropolitan Municipality which was established by the Law No 6360. This dissertation focuses on water and sewage services of Hatay which was delegated to metropolitan municipality by the law. The research questions are about relation between scale and service provision and the sub-questions are about positive and negative effects of the boundary changes on water and wastewater services in Hatay. At the end, this dissertation finds out if the Law No 6360 has achieved its goals in Hatay and reveals real aims and objectives of the law.

Keywords: Municipal boundaries, scale, service provision, efficiency, water and sewage services

ÖZ

BELEDİYELERİN SINIRLARININ DEĞİŞTİRİLMESİNİN BELEDİYELERİN HİZMET SUNUMU ÜZERİNE ETKİLERİ: HATAY’DA SU VE KANALİZASYON HİZMETLERİ

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Türkiye’de, belediyelerin hizmet sunumundaki yetersizliklerin nedeni olarak belediyelerin büyüklüğü gösterilmektedir. Özellikle 2000li yıllardan bu yana, belediyelerde hizmet sunumunu artırma amacıyla bir dizi yasal düzenlemeyle belediyelerin sınırları değiştirilmektedir. Belediyeleri yeniden ölçeklendiren en son ve en önemli düzenleme 2012 yılında çıkarılan ve Türkiye’de 14 yeni büyükşehir belediyesi kuran 6360 sayılı yasa olmuştur. Bu yasayla birlikte ayrıca, büyükşehir belediyelerinin sınırlarını il sınırlarına kadar genişletilmiş, belde belediyelerinin ve köylerin tüzel kişiliğine son verilmiş ve bazı belediye hizmetleri büyükşehir belediyelerine devredilmiştir. 6360 sayılı yasanın en önemli gerekçesi, belediyelerin sınırlarının değiştirilmesiyle, daha az kaynak kullanma, hizmetlerin maliyetlerini düşürme ve hizmetlerin kalitesini artırma yoluyla belediyelerin hizmet sunumunda verimlilik artışı sağlanacağıdır. Bu tezin temel amacı, belediyelerin sınırlarının değiştirilmesinin hizmet sunumu üzerindeki etkilerini ortaya çıkarmaktır. Tezin araştırma sahası 6360 sayılı yasayla kurulan Hatay Büyükşehir Belediyesidir. Tez Hatay’da, yasayla birlikte büyükşehir belediyelerine devredilen su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerini incelemektedir. Tezin araştırma soruları ölçek ve hizmet sunumu arasındaki ilişki ve alt soruları belediyelerin sınırlarının değiştirilmesinin Hatay’da su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri üzerine olumlu ve olumsuz etkileri üzerindedir. Çalışmanın sonunda, 6360 sayılı yasanın hedeflerinin Hatay’da gerçekleşip gerçekleşmediği ve yasanın asıl amaç ve hedeflerinin neler olduğu ortaya koyulacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Belediye sınırları, ölçek, hizmet sunumu, verimlilik, su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri

To My Son Ayhan Tan

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party (in Turkish, <i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i>)
CHP	Republican People's Party (in Turkish, <i>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</i>)
DP	Democrat Party (in Turkish, <i>Demokrat Parti</i>)
DSP	Democrat Left Party (in Turkish, <i>Demokrat Sol Parti</i>)
HATSU	Hatay Water and Sewage Administration General Directorate
HMM	Hatay Metropolitan Municipality
IMF	International Money Fund
LGU	Local Government Unit
MHP	Nationalist Movement Party (in Turkish, <i>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</i>)
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ÖDP	Freedom and Solidarity Party (In Turkish, <i>Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi</i>)
SPA	Special Provincial Administration
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
TÜİK	Turkish Statistical Institute (in Turkish, <i>Türkiye İstatistik kurumu</i>)
UK	United Kingdom
UPSV	Union for Providing Services for Villages
US	United States
USA	United States of America
WB	World Bank

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

One of the most important tools that measure local service provision in Turkey is finding the most suitable city size calculated over the population of municipality. Therefore, changing the population and the number of the municipalities through annexation, amalgamation and consolidation practices are frequently included in public authorities' agenda. The regulations about local governments in Turkey determine the service scale of municipalities by using population as the sole criteria. Hence, they disregard the fact that municipalities significantly differ in terms of their geographical location, socio-economic level, cultural and political dimensions. Since the foundation of Turkish Republic, the most important and unchangeable characteristic of the local government system in Turkey has been that municipalities are regarded as uniform administrative units with no differences between them (Çınar, Duru & Çiner, 2013). Thus, the legal arrangements enforce a single model for all local governments.

One of the main goals of the rescaling policies in Turkey is proposed as more efficient municipal service provision. Public authorities have always attributed inefficiencies in municipal service provision to the size of municipalities. Therefore, the solutions were sought in changing the boundaries through amalgamations, or dissolution of small-scale municipalities. Particularly since the 2000s, the boundaries of the municipalities have been altered through successive legal arrangements referring the public administration reforms. However, there is neither a single model nor a single scale for the efficient delivery of municipal services. Each municipal service has different requirements and need different assessment criteria, necessitating various models to be put into practice.

In Turkey, several recently enacted laws regulate changing municipal boundaries: Law No 5216 on Metropolitan Municipalities in 2004, the Law No 5393 on Municipalities in 2005, the Law No 5747¹ in 2008 and the Law No 6360² in 2012. The final and most important amendment about the boundaries was enacted through the Law No 6360. This law is about establishing new metropolitan municipality in which the provincial population is over

¹The Law No 5747 in Turkish is “*Büyükşehir Belediyesi Sınırları İçerisinde İlçe Kurulması ve Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun*”

²The Law No 6360 in Turkish is “*On Dört İlde Büyükşehir Belediyesi ve Yirmi Yedi İlçe Kurulması İle Bazı Kanun ve Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun*”

750.000. Also with this legislation, boundaries of the metropolitan municipalities were expanded to correspond to provincial boundaries, the small scale municipalities were dissolved and certain municipal services were delegated to the metropolitan municipalities. This development sparked the scale debates in Turkey once more. One argument is that scale of the municipalities affects the municipal services. Major aim of these regulations was increase the efficiency of local service provision through expanding the municipal boundaries.

Provision of urban services in an efficient way has been a remarkable and worldwide subject that has long been studied by several fields, such as public administration, politics, economics and economic geography. Several research questions have focused on different aspects of the most efficient urban service delivery: whether the service area should be larger or smaller; whether the services should be delivered by the central administrative units or by the local units; and whether the service delivery should be carried out by public or private sectors. The most favoured response to these questions is the economics of scale which measures optimum size for the most efficient service provision. The economics of scale, which determine the optimum scale for the most efficient service provision, has also become very popular in Turkey in recent years. Simply, two criteria are the sufficient to calculate the optimum scale: population and cost. However, there are numerous and various factors influencing municipal service provision. This dissertation will firstly discuss the various factors that affect the provision of municipal services. Then, it will specifically focus on the scale aspect of the service provision.

1.1. Research Questions and Initial Hypotheses

The Law No 6360 established 14 metropolitan municipalities in Turkey. As mentioned before, boundaries of all the metropolitan municipalities have extended to correspond to the boundaries of provincial boundaries. The law also changed the boundaries of the district municipalities located within the metropolitan municipalities. 1,591 small scale municipalities and 16,082 villages were dissolved (Akilli & Akilli, 2014). What is more, some municipal services were delegated to the metropolitan municipalities. The major assertion of the law is that changing scales and enlarging the boundaries of the municipalities would result in many positive developments in their capacity for service provision. For example, efficiency in the service provision will increase through using less resource, decreasing cost of the services and improving quality of the service.

In brief, the Law No 6360 changed the municipal boundaries and delegated certain municipal services to the metropolitan municipalities. It is clear that this shift has influenced service

provision of the municipalities. Hence the major research problem is on how changing boundaries of the municipalities influences municipal service provision. The research questions are:

- 1) What are the factors that affect service provision?
- 2) What kind of relationship do municipal scale and municipal service provision have?
How does the municipal scale affect efficiency of municipal service provision?
- 3) What are the positive and negative effects of changing municipal boundaries on service provision?

First of all, various factors affecting service provision should be investigated. Then, among these factors, how scale concerns with service provision should be studied. Empirical academic surveys demonstrate that there is a relation between scale and service provision and they mainly focus on the positive or negative effects of changing the municipal boundaries. Thus the main topic of this dissertation is determined as impacts of the municipal scale on the municipal service provision. One argument is that changing municipal boundaries impinges negatively on service provision of the municipalities. It is asserted that extending boundaries results in disruption and prolongation of service provision, decline in service quality, waste of resources, rise in costs, uncertainty in authorities, increase in complaints and dissatisfactions of the citizens (Zengin, 2014, p. 102). On the other hand, it is maintained that enlarging municipal boundaries provides optimum scale economies, more efficient service provision with less sources and less costs. In Turkey, the amendments enlarging the scales of municipalities have been enacted on the grounds of these positive claims.

As mentioned before, the major research problem for this dissertation was formulated as how the changes of the municipal boundaries impact the municipal service provision. This general problem should be narrowed to a specific local area and a specific municipal service. Hence, the research area for this dissertation has been determined as Hatay Metropolitan Municipality and its district municipalities. Hatay gained the status of metropolitan municipality through the Law No 6360 in 2012. Its boundaries were extended to the boundaries of the province of Hatay. The small scale municipalities were abolished and three new district municipalities were established. Certain local services, which were provided by district municipalities before, were delegated to the metropolitan municipality. Among these services, water and sewage services have been selected for this study, for they are common, essential, continuous local services and available data. Therefore, the sub-questions of the case study formulated are as follow:

- a) How did the water and sewage service provision in Hatay before the Law No 6360?
- b) How has the water and sewage service provision changed in Hatay after the Law No 6360? What are the positive and negative impacts on water and sewage service provision in terms of efficiency?
- c) Did the Law No 6360 achieve its goals of ‘enlarging municipal boundaries to ensure optimum scale economies, more effective service provision with less resource use, less costs and more quality’ in Hatay?
- d) What are the real aims and objectives of changing municipal boundaries and establishing metropolitan municipalities?

Finally, some initial hypotheses of the dissertation can be proposed from a critical realist perspective. It should be mentioned that these hypotheses are tentative answers of the major research questions and sub-questions.

Initial Hypothesis 1: There is an inverse relation between municipal scale and service provision. As the scale grows, service delivery is adversely affected.

Initial Hypothesis 2: Water and sewage services in Hatay that are compatible with the claims of the Law No 6360 could not be achieved.

Initial Hypothesis 3: The real aims and objectives of changing municipal boundaries and establishing metropolitan municipalities are very different from the goals of the Law No 6360. Municipal boundary changes are political processes rather than technical or administrative concerns.

The first initial hypothesis is derived from the review of existing literature of the dissertation. The second initial hypothesis is proposed after a preview of the research field. The third initial hypothesis is based on the literature review conducted, along with examination of municipal context in Turkey and a preview of the research field. These hypotheses provide the theoretical framework for the study. At the end of the dissertation, these hypotheses will be verified or falsified by employing the methodology of critical realism.

1.2. Aim and Scope of the Study

With the latest regulations, municipal boundaries have been expanded, small municipalities have been abolished and new metropolitan municipalities have been established in Turkey. These practices are primarily based on the criteria of population and area with the main goal of improving service delivery. It is asserted that there is a relation between municipal scale and municipal service provision. Thus the major aim of this dissertation is to determine the

effects of changing municipal boundaries on municipal services. At the local level referring the Hatay case, it aims to reveal the impacts of these amendments on the water and sewer services of the municipalities. It also seeks to find out real aims and subjects of these legal regulations. The study will apply the most convenient method in terms of the availability of local data. This will require some quantitative and qualitative analysis in order to answer the questions posed by the dissertation.

This dissertation consists of six chapters. The introduction chapter presents the initial hypothesis, research questions, selection of the case study, research method of the study, and methodology of the study. In the second chapter, a comprehensive literature review is provided. After the nature of public service is discussed, the factors that influence service provision are critically reviewed. Impacts of decentralization processes, privatization, internal factors and external factors on the public service are evaluated. Then, the rescaling policies are critically examined. The different practices of the changing boundaries, such as annexation, amalgamation and consolidation of municipalities are evaluated. The issue of optimum scale for municipalities is evaluated in detail. At the end of this chapter, some country cases about changing boundaries and numbers of the municipalities are scrutinized.

The third chapter lays out the national level of the study examining the municipal context of Turkey. The legal regulations about district municipalities including shifts of boundaries and numbers of the municipalities are evaluated. This is followed by elaborating the legal regulations about metropolitan municipalities which bring about important changes in the local service provision. At the end of the chapter, case studies on changing municipal boundaries and finding optimum scales in Turkey are provided.

Following chapters focus on the local level of the study. The fourth chapter is about Hatay Metropolitan Municipality and its district municipalities. After giving a brief urban history of the Hatay, this chapter elaborates its district municipalities in terms of their demographic structures. Then, the effects of the Law No 6360 on Hatay Metropolitan Municipality are examined. Finally, the water and sewer services in Hatay are briefly put forth. After Hatay Water and Sewage Administration General Directorate (HATSU) is briefly introduced, quantitative analysis of water and sewage services in Hatay is conducted. The fifth chapter presents an analytical and critical study of Hatay Metropolitan Municipality and the water and sewage service provision of HATSU. This chapter is the comprehensive empirical evidence for the dissertation. All of the outputs are revealed and analysed together so as to construct empirical base for the dissertation.

The conclusion chapter involves an overall summary of the chapters, the literature review, and the findings of the case study. A critical realist approach is developed on the basis of the results of the study. Then certain policy recommendations are proposed to the policy makers and local authorities in order to improve the tools of the service provision of the municipalities.

1.3. Selection of the Case Study

As a latest regulation on metropolitan municipalities, the Law No 6360 has brought about the most comprehensive changes to municipalities in Turkey. It established fourteen new metropolitan municipalities and assigned certain municipal services to metropolitan municipalities. The law also abolished small-scale municipalities and created new district municipalities through changing the boundaries. Moreover the borders of all metropolitan municipalities in Turkey expanded to correspond to the provincial borders. One of the recently established metropolitan municipalities is Hatay. There are several reasons for selecting Hatay as the case study for this dissertation. First of all, it was declared as a metropolitan municipality according to the Law No 6360 in 2012. It has been exposed to the boundary changes through abolishing the small scale municipalities and creation of new district municipalities. Second, Hatay provides a good example of a fragmented urban area in terms of geography and socio-economic development. Geographically the city is divided into two by mountains. The coastal part of the city is located in the west of the mountain and is more developed with an industrial economy. Whereas, the other part, located in the east of the mountain and borders with Syria, is less developed with small scale agricultural activities. Finally, Hatay is the Turkey's gateway to the Middle East and the transit point between global production and consumption centres.

1.4. Research Method of the Study

Research method of a study is defined as “techniques that are used, within a particular approach, to generate and analyse data to describe or explain characteristics, patterns and processes in social life” (Blaikie, 2007, p. 5). Naturally, research methods need research questions at the first place. The main question of this dissertation is whether there is a relation between scale and service provision. If the answer is yes, what is the nature of the relationship between them? In other words, how does the scale affect the service provision in terms of efficiency? Is there a direct proportion or reverse proportion between them? In other words, when the scale becomes larger or smaller, does the service provision change positively or negatively in response? On the contrary, there may not be any relation between scale and service provision. If this is so, what is the justification of this assertion?




Figure 1 Design of the research questions

The factors influencing service provision will be investigated in the literature review chapter. One of these factors is presumed to be scale. It is commonly postulated that there is a relation between scale and service provision (Keating, 1995; Swianiewicz, 2002; Arıkboğa, 2007; Okçu *et al*, 2017). Specifically, changing municipal boundaries is claimed to have an effect on the service provision of the municipalities. This dissertation mainly asks: what is the relation between municipal scale and municipal service provision? After that, the pros and cons of changing boundaries will be scrutinized and the results will be elaborated. In Turkey, municipal boundaries have been enlarged, small municipalities have been abolished and new metropolitan municipalities have been established. How these practices influenced the water and sewer service provision in Hatay is the other question to be answered at the local level. In Figure 1, design of the research questions for the case study is provided.

In order to answer all of the research questions, a specific research method should be developed. The tools and strategies employed during research determine the method of the study. The nature of the data determines the kind of analysis. These are quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis. Outcomes of the case study turn into more solid and consolidated

ones through performing quantitative analysis. Also comparing between data obtained different sources become easier. Thus, basic deductions of the relevant field are accentuated. Besides, qualitative analysis is absolutely necessary in order to attain meaningful deductions. While quantitative analysis tests a population or a group and determines the variables, qualitative method unveils the mechanisms and dynamics hidden behind the structures (Öztürk, 2013, p. 8). This dissertation employed both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Which ways and strategies used to answer research questions determines the research strategies of the study. The deductive, inductive, retroductive and abductive strategies are four different research strategies (Blaikie, 2007, p. 8). For this dissertation, deductive and inductive research strategies were employed to answer the research questions. Deductive research strategy is required for testing the theories given in the literature review. Inductive research strategies are needed to evaluate the field data and to develop a new hypothesis.

In order to design the research method of this dissertation, deductive and inductive research strategies and quantitative and qualitative research analyses were used. First of all, practices, politics and results of the changing municipal boundaries on the service provision were examined by focusing on different countries provided in the literature review chapter. Then, the issue was studied within the municipal context in Turkey. A comparison with Turkey and the countries is presented with an emphasis on the specific characteristics of the countries, such as their historical, political, geographical and administrative structures. Moreover, quantitative data were gathered from the official statistics institute and the local government offices. This data was analysed systematically and evaluated critically. These strategies provide crucial deductive tools for the dissertation.

The field research provides a significant part of the information. The study was conducted in the province of Hatay. It lasted nine months in Hatay. The qualitative and quantitative data were analysed attentively. As a part of the field research, semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted in local government offices. The questions of interviews were structured to derive specific information that would help with answering the research questions. In addition, activity reports, strategic plans, newspapers and brochures were acquired from the municipal offices. The data collected from the field were compared with the data received from the organizations. Moreover, comprehensive internet searches about the local agenda, such as local press, institutions, and events provided important data for the dissertation. Furthermore, observations and conversations with the local people supplied more notable information. All these strategies provide inductive data for the dissertation. They also constitute the empirical method of the study. More inductive data will be gained from the critical analysis of both

theoretical frames and the case study. Yet the critical analysis requires a specific research methodology to be developed. This part will be presented in the methodology of the study.




Figure 2 Design of the research method

Texts in the boxes are adapted from Blaike (2007, p. 8) and Penpecioglu (2012, p. 17).

The research method of the dissertation ultimately combines deductive and inductive research strategies and quantitative and qualitative analyses in order to investigate the effects of changing boundaries on the service provision of the municipalities. Figure 2 outlines design of research method of the dissertation.

1.5. Methodology of the Study

While method includes specific techniques, strategies and instrument for research, such as public surveys and in-depth interviews; methodology comprises the whole process of research

with a philosophical basis, such as positivism and interpretivism (Yeung, 2003, p. 443). A research method should be approached with a more extensive theoretical framework. This refers methodology of a study and consists of two distinctive assumptions. These are ontological and epistemological assumptions. As a branch of philosophy, ontological assumptions are about the nature of social reality. On the other hand, epistemological assumptions are concerned with the ways in which knowledge of the social reality is gained (Blaikie, 2007, pp. 12-13). The ontological assumptions are divided into two main theories: idealist and realist theories. While idealist theory claims that the external world is a reflection of the human's thoughts; realist theory assumes that the social reality exists independently of the human's thoughts, and observers. The realist theories are also divided into many categories. This dissertation will adopt a realist ontology in order to understand the nature of social reality. Besides, the epistemological assumptions include a wide variety of theories³. Each of them endeavours to describe the social reality in different ways.

Akbulut (2007) divides the epistemologies into three major categories: nomothetic epistemology, ideographic epistemology and historical materialism. The nomothetic epistemology constructs social reality within the scope of human-nature, ideographic epistemology constructs it within the context of human-society. On the other hand, historical materialism constructs the social reality within the dialectic interaction of human-nature-society. While positivist core of the nomothetic epistemology reshaped the social sciences, interpretive approach of the ideographic epistemology reshaped the cultural sciences. On the contrary, Marxism developed alternative approaches within the frame of the historical materialism (Akbulut, 2007, p. 5). This dissertation will determine its epistemological base through analysing the data historically and critically. Also, it will evaluate the social reality as a dependent variable of capitalist relations.

As a social science, public administration is analysed within the context of positivism with regard to measures of natural sciences. The criticisms of these positivist approaches are brought by the classical or conventional public administration through textual analysis and narrative inquires (Akbulut, 2007, p. 6). The nomothetic context of the public administration claims that social reality has certain regularities and it can be explained by the general laws. That requires the interfering and regulating the social reality. The empiric reality is portrayed and it produces abstract principles via inductive strategies. In this context, nomothetic

³ For detailed explanations about the ontological and epistemological assumptions, see "Approaches to Social Inquiry" of Norman Blaikie (2007) and "Social Theory of Science" Russell Keat and John Urry (1975).

epistemology has three main features: inference, interference and measuring. Therefore, public administration produce knowledge on behalf of these features (Akbulut, 2007, p. 11). Nonetheless, as Akbulut proposes, it is a possible solution that the reality of public administration can be examined in the realm of capitalist social reality and through examining the historical and social foundations of the rules of operation of this reality (2007, p. 27). In this context, an ontological and epistemological proposal can be critical realism⁴. This dissertation cannot adopt Marxism as a science, but can make certain contributions to the methods of Marxism under favour of critical realism.

Joseph (2001) presents benefits and contributions of the critical realism to Marxism. First of all, critical realism provides a philosophical basis to Marxism. On one hand, Marxism produces first level knowledge regarding the society. On the other hand, philosophy is the second level knowledge because it is the knowledge of the first level knowledge. As the second level knowledge, critical realism comments and criticizes the outputs, claims, theories and methods of Marxism. Also looking outside of Marxism, critical realism provides a real critical evaluation of it. Hence critical realism presents a methodological frame to the Marxist science. The ontological approach of critical realism asks: How the world itself should be, so that its knowledge becomes possible? On the other hand, critical realism makes an explanation about the structure, actor and transformative social activity based on a stratified and emergent social perception. (Joseph, 2001, pp. 150-151). It criticizes both praxis and orthodox Marxism. The praxis Marxism ignores the social structure and focuses on the activities of actor instead. The orthodox Marxism adopts the mechanic, positivist and deterministic side of dialectic materialism. Critical realism brings structure and actor together in the model of transformative social activity (Joseph, 2001, pp. 156-158).

As the founder of critical realism, Bhaskar (1975) defines critical realism as the cluster of ontological realism, epistemological relativism and judgmental rationality. He is anti-positivist but defends the possibility of naturalism; and he criticizes Hegel but embraces dialectical materialism. He establishes his critical realist philosophy on four major principles. These are critical naturalism, transcendental realism, descriptive critics and dialectic (as cited in Türk, 2012, pp. 190-191). Bhaskar (1975) asserts that knowledge has two dimensions ontologically. The transitive dimension of the knowledge is human-centric and produced socially, while intransitive dimension of the knowledge is independent from human and embraces generative

⁴ The term of critical realism was derived from critical naturalism (positivism) and transcendental realism. The meaning of transcendental is metaphysical, abstract or beyond experiment. Critical realism has some common features with critical theory; but it differs from naïve realism (empiricism) or classical realism. It mostly refers scientific realism (Pratt, 1994, p. 112).

mechanisms and structures. Epistemologically, he indicates three different levels of reality: the empiric, actual and real levels. The empiric level is based on experiment and observable objects. The actual level is based on experiment and events. Including both empirical and actual ones, the real level based on experiment, observable objects, structures and generative mechanisms. Hence, Bhaskar (1975) criticizes both empiricism and transcendental idealism. For him, reality is structured, differentiated, relativistic and constantly changing. Furthermore, Bhaskar (1998) criticizes the efforts to seek cause and effect relations between events. Yet, he does not reject the causality rules totally. Instead he defines ‘tendencies’ as generative mechanisms. (as cited in Türk, 2012, pp. 194-196). The Marxist science tries to develop an analysis about different processes and mechanisms in this structured and stratified world. This analysis comprises of an abstraction method that reveals the causative mechanisms. It starts from the concrete, moves to the abstract one and again turns to concrete (Joseph, 2001, p. 160). According to Bhaskar (1998), scientific activity should make the generative mechanisms research objects and try to discover and reveal these mechanisms. Eventually, he attempts to open a place for the possibility of social science between the polarization of ‘hyper-naturalist’ (positivist) and ‘anti-naturalist’ (hermeneutic) epistemologies. He believes that same analysis methods can be adapted to both natural and social sciences (as cited in Türk, 2012, pp. 197, 199).

Pratt clarifies the practical meaning of extensive method and intensive method as quantitative method, qualitative method, respectively (2014, p. 384). The extensive (quantitative) method uses all the collected data of a whole population and provides ‘generalized outcomes’, particularly with questionnaires. The intensive (qualitative) method uses a sample data of the population and analyzes ‘causal processes’, particularly with structured in-depth interviews (Pratt, 2009, p. 390). While some critical realists advocate a mixed method of both qualitative and quantitative method, the others avoid from making a qualitative and quantitative division. It depends on the research topics, contexts and processes (Yeung, 1997, pp. 56-57).

Qualitative and quantitative methods are explained by Yeung as following (1997, p. 57):

More generally, qualitative methods such as interactive interviews and ethnography are necessary to abstract the causal mechanisms of which quantitative/statistical methods are oblivious. It should not be expected that these abstract causal mechanisms can explain events directly without any need for empirical research into the contingency of the concrete. To do so is to commit the error of ‘pseudo-concrete research’ that is common in radical structuralism such as Marxism (Sayer, 1992). Quantitative methods, on the other hand, are particularly useful to establish the empirical regularities between objects. Although these concrete regularities are not causal relations, they can inform the abstraction of causal mechanisms. Quantitative methods are also useful in drawing attention to the external and contingent relations between objects.

Table 1 Critical and transcendental realism

	Critical Realism	Transcendental Realism
Discipline Origin	<i>Social Science</i> 1) Rejection of positivist account of science: methodological individualism 2) Rejection of empiricism, positivism, structuralism and hermeneutics	<i>Natural science</i> 1) Rejection of Human empiricism and Comtean positivism 2) A synthesis of the Copernican revolution
Ontology	1) Pre-existence of social structures: transformed and reproduced by social actors 2) Human agency with intentions: reasons as real causes 3) Continuous process of structuration between structures and agency 4) Open systems: no regular conjunctions of social events and outcomes	1) Things and materials possess causal powers independent of human agency: their realization is contingent 2) Intransitive dimension of science: stratification of the world into different levels of 'ontological depth' 3) The existence of natural necessity: secretion of causal powers through generative mechanisms and enduring tendencies 4) Open systems. No regular conjunctions of social events and outcomes
Epistemology	1) The possibility of naturalism 2) Subject-matter: internal (necessary) and external (contingent) relations between objects and events 3) A material perspective of knowledge 4) Practice: immanent critique and emancipation of actors	1) Science is an ongoing process 2) Transitive dimension of science: social (re)production of knowledge 3) Search for causal laws in science: explanation but not prediction
Methodology	1) Process of abstraction and retroduction 2) Impossibility of experimentation 3) Possibility of direct awareness of structures and mechanisms 4) Theoretical (abstract) and empirical (concrete) research	1) Process of retroduction: a posteriori reasoning 2) Possibility of experimentation 3) Use of postulated entities and analogies 4) Practice: theoretical and empirical research

Source: Received from Yeung, (1997, p. 53)

Critical discourse analysis is also required during resolving of the interviews, conservations and observations in the research field. Critical discourse analysis sorts out the structures and mechanisms keeping in communication. It also clarifies “how other social structures are maintained and transformed in and through various forms of languages and discourses” (Jones, 2004, p. 43). The researchers who adopt critical realism “translate the subject’s everyday language about causes into a critical realist understanding of structures and mechanisms, but also that the researcher reflect on how, why and to what effect, that everyday event (in this case discourse) operates” (Jones, 2004, p. 44).

On the other hand, Pratt (1994) puts forward practical applications of critical realism. It has gained popularity in social sciences and geography since the 1980s. This is an important development as critical realism can be used in a practical level to reveal social reality. However, it has some problematic points. Its research methodology is not understood completely nor is developed sufficiently. Nonetheless, Pratt refers to certain scholars giving proposals about how a critical realist research can be conducted (1994, p. 115). The first scholar is Andrew Sayer who adapted Bhaskar's studies to social sciences, especially to economic geography, in the methodological sense in 1984. Sayer evaluates "space as a product of processes, not as a thing" in the view of nominalism (Pratt, 2013, p. 27).

As a basic level of critical realism, Outhwarite (1987) proposes a retroduction model, which means explanation through applying mechanisms. It includes defining a possible mechanism, collecting pro and con evidences and eliminating possible options (as cited in Pratt, 1994, p. 118). Another research conducted by Allen and McDowell (1989) provides a good example of critical realism. The research is about property ownership and rental housing in London. There are four points of critical realist methodology. They took care about abstraction and conceptualization. Also they emphasized collecting the data intensively and extensively. Moreover a retroduction model for analysis is applied and reconceptualization is developed. Finally, such a retroduction model might demonstrate that the results cannot be presented initially within a comprehensible logic (as cited in Pratt, 1994, pp. 118-119).

Morgan and Sayer's research about electrical industry in Galler (1985) is another important application of critical realism. They used both intensive and extensive research methods by conducting questionnaires and in-depth interviews. According to the scholars, while the intensive research highlights knowledge about the patterns, the extensive research prioritizes the knowledge about the processes. Massey and Meegan (1985) and Massey and Quintas (1992) also used critical realism in their works on the reconstruction of industry. The most notable aspect of their analysis is the interpretation, which points to the importance of conceptualization and reconceptualization (as cited in Pratt, 1994, pp. 118-120).




Figure 3 Simplified steps of a critical research practice

Source: Yeung (1997, p. 66).

In locality studies, critical realism came to the fore in the late 1980s. Harvey (1987), Cooke (1986, 1987, 1989), Smith (1987), Urry (1981, 1988) and Duncan and Goodwin (1989) and Duncan and Savage (1989) participated an urban research program coordinated by Cooke. These scholars focus on use of field research, definition of locality and spatiality of social relations are some of the topics (as cited in Pratt, 1994, pp. 118-120). Ultimately, Pratt wishes both historical materialism and critical realism to “be strengthened, and in this case, geographical explanation too, through engagement” (2013, p. 29).

Yeung proposes three methodological paths of critical realism. They are ‘iterative abstraction’, ‘the grounded theory method’ and ‘triangulation’. Iterative abstraction is the practical (empirical) section, the grounded theory method is the theoretical construction and triangulation is the justification part of the critical realist methodology (1997, p. 57). In Table 2, definitions, goals and methods of these avenues are provided.

Table 2 Three avenues of the critical realist methodology

Methodological Avenues	Description	Goal	Method
Iterative Abstraction	1) Abstraction: A double movement from the concrete to the abstract and from the abstract to the concrete. 2) Iterative: The abstraction continues until the goal is achieved. 3) Retrodution: Movement from a description of some phenomenon to a description of something which produces it or is a condition for it.	1) To discover and to conceptualize generative mechanisms and causal structures. 2) To conceptualize and to theorize the real essence, power and mechanism of an object 3) To distinguish external/incidental/necessary relations between objects and events	1) Practical (Empirical) 2) Deductive 3) Extensive
The Grounded Theory Method	1) An analysis for generating and testing theory 2) A qualitative research method that uses a systematic set of procedures to develop an inductively derived grounded theory about a phenomenon	1) To form a mediation between theory and practice 2) A pay complement to iterative abstraction by grounding abstract causal mechanisms in empirical data. 3) To harmonize deductive abstraction and inductive grounding of generative mechanisms	1) Theoretical 2) Inductive 3) Intensive
Triangulation	1) A multimethod in social scientific research 2) Based on a conviction that there is no clash between the purposes and capacities of quantitative and qualitative methods and data	1) To improve the validity and reliability of data collected 2) To compare and contrast different sources of findings if they are addressing the same phenomenon.	The most appropriate combination of methods

Source: Yeung (1997, pp: 58-65)

Naess puts forward three opportunities that critical realism can offer for urban planning studies: “The possibility of interdisciplinary integration, the possibility of investigating causal relationships between societal conditions, spatial urban structures and the actions of agents, the possibilities of generalization and prediction” (2015, p. 1229). First of all, urban development and planning are the subjects of different disciplines which many factors, such as economic, social, cultural, physical and psychological have an impact on. As “a meta-theoretical platform accommodating and encouraging interdisciplinarity to a particularly great extent”, critical realism can provide advantages for urban studies (Naess, 2015, p. 1230). Second, critical realism draw structure-agency dialectics to urban studies’ attention. According

to critical realism the structures are not only things, they are socially constructed. Agents create social structures which have emergent powers and features different from and beyond the total amount of these agential powers. Third, the planning domain requires prediction of social phenomena and generalization of the results avoiding from the positivist approaches (Naess, 2015, pp. 1230-1237). Naess summarizes from the viewpoint of planning: “A critical realist approach would emphasize a context-dependent process and the combination of different planning methods” (2015, p. 1240).

The methodology and empirical results of this dissertation will be argued in the light of critical realism. This dissertation asked whether there is a (causal) relationship between municipal scale and service provision. Then it will explore critical realism as a mediator between theory and practice. Thus, critical realism will be profitable for research into the relationship between scale and service provision. Early empirical studies demonstrate that there is a relationship between scale and service provision. They are divided into two opposing parts in terms of the relation type: positive or negative relation. However, these empirical studies do not evaluate political dimensions and do not establish whether a ‘causal’ relationship exists between scale and service provision (Naess & Jensen, 2002, pp. 295-296). Therefore, this dissertation will carry out both ontological and epistemological approaches of critical realism. After literature review, causal mechanisms will be explored. Then empirical practices will be conducted through using quantitative and qualitative research methods. Iterative abstraction will be adopted in order to make reconceptualization. Hence theory construction will be attempted in order to reveal causal mechanisms which are underlying in the social structures. Interaction between social structures and agencies will be also investigated in this context. This step requires critical discourse analysis. Through criticizing theories, improving validity and reliability of data and verifying the theory, triangulation method will be deployed.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Both public authorities and scholars seek solutions to the problems of the local services and try to determine the most appropriate method for efficient service delivery. Their questions focus on different aspects of efficient service delivery: whether the service area or population should be large or small, whether the services should be delivered from a central or local governmental units and whether the service should be provided by public or private sector. These questions refer to various factors affecting local service provision, such as scale, (de)centralization and privatization, while the other factors are internal factors (leadership style of the mayor, structure of the municipal council, organizational culture and ethical values of the municipalities) and external factors (economic, political, social and cultural structure of the city and legal regulations). All these factors influence service delivery to a certain extent, either positively or negatively.

The most common research issue in the local service provision is the question of scale. The studies about scale include a wide range of approaches. One of these approaches is economies of scale. Its research method is based on empirical data such as population, area, and cost. Economies of scale seek to determine an optimum municipal size for the most efficient service delivery by focusing on the costs of local services and their consequences. Economies of scale have also been regarded as rescaling of the urban management in respond to neo-liberal economy (Keating 1991, 1995; Brenner, 2003; Blatter, 2006).

The second factor effecting local service delivery is (de)centralization. The relation between central and local government has a significant impact on local services. Thus, debates on centralization versus decentralization have been always been relevant to the study of local governments. The major question of these debates is whether the authority should be in the central government or local government for the most efficient service delivery. To answer this question, studies focus on jurisdiction, subsidiarity, and participation dynamics. Also described as an alternative method in the service provision, the third factor is privatization. Who should provide services for the most efficient service provision: private sector or public authorities? It is widely accepted that private sector is more advantageous than public sector in delivery of service. On the other hand, there are serious criticisms against privatization of the public assets and services. The fourth research issue focuses on the organizational structure of the local institutions that might have a notable impact on service delivery. This topic will

be evaluated as ‘internal factors’, such as policies, attitudes and preferences of the mayors, council members and employees. Finally, there are factors outside the local institutions such as, the economic, social, political and cultural structures of the city. These will be evaluated as ‘external factors’ influencing service provision (Lankina *et al*, 2008; Andrews & Boyne, 2008; Ashworth *et al*, 2010).

First of all, this chapter will examine the nature of public service in order to understand the historical development, characteristics and principles of the public administration. Next, de(centralization), privatization, internal and external factors will be reviewed. This dissertation mainly focuses on the scale effects on the service provision. Therefore, this chapter will examine the scale and its politics in detail. Finally, a critical analysis of the relationship between scale and service provision will be provided.

2.1. Nature and History of Public Service

A simple definition of public service is service provided by government to people who live within its jurisdiction. For example, health, safety, education, planning and environment are public services. They can be provided by central government or local government. If local government provides public services, they are defined as local public services. If municipalities, as a kind of local government, provide local public services, these services can be described as municipal services.

First of all, the definition of public should be provided. What is the meaning of public? Numerous scholars give different meanings of the public. According to Bayırbağ and Göksel (2012), following questions should be answered to define public clearly. When and how does a public-private dichotomy arise? Where does the private end and the public start? What is the difference between public services and private services? What are the policies that determine ultimate goals and solutions of the service provision? By whom and how are these policies determined? By whom and how are these policies put into practice? (Bayırbağ & Göksel, 2012, p. 154)

A study on public services requires an analysis of the nature and characteristics of services, as well as historical development of the public administration. Public service delivery cannot be considered solely as a technical issue, it has also a political dimension. The issues of social justice and public interest should be taken into consideration. The evaluation of public service delivery should be based on use value rather than exchange value. Also public service consumers should be recognized as citizens, rather than customers. Therefore, public services

can be defined as “services that concern the whole society and which can seriously harm the welfare of individuals when they are interrupted or inaccessible” (Bayırbağ & Göksel, 2012, p. 155). Public service delivery has certain characteristics differing from the private service delivery:

- 1) Public service delivery requires a wide range of expertise,
- 2) Large amounts of material resources and manpower needed,
- 3) Public administration is based upon the principle of rationality and
- 4) Public administration is established as a bureaucratic organization (Bayırbağ & Göksel, 2012, p. 157).

It is clear that public service delivery has some difficulties. The organizations that provide public services do not resemble companies operating within the market. They are organized as a part of the state structure. Most of the public services cannot be priced and their benefits cannot be measured by exchange value and money. In other words, public services cannot be satisfactorily delivered through a profit or loss framework. Every public service should be delivered equally to whole society, and ought to be regular, accessible, continuous, non-rivalrous, and non-excludable. In this regard, private sector is not able to provide all these services to all citizens living in a country (Bayırbağ & Göksel, 2012, pp. 154-155).

On the other hand, it is important to review transformations in the public administration system. Throughout the history of the capitalist state, form of public service delivery has changed along with the transformations in public policies. These changes can be divided into certain periods. The first wave of changes began after World War II and continued throughout the welfare state period. Another state of transformation in public policies came with the change of capitalist economic system towards the end of the twentieth century. Nowadays, public policies have reached a completely different form. Although this dissertation cannot give a detailed research about transformation of the public policies, they will be handled with broad strokes.

Classical theory of public administration prevailed in United State and Western Europe between industrial revolution and World War II. Woodrow Wilson, Fredrick Taylor, and Max Weber were the pioneers of this approach. Based upon rationality and efficiency principle, application of classical theory resulted in a dichotomy of politics and bureaucracy. During this

era, public services were provided by the welfare states and bureaucracy was enhanced⁵. However after the Second World War, the welfare state model made the classical theory of public administration non-functional. Hence the dichotomy of politics and bureaucracy disappeared until the 1980s. Meanwhile, the new public administration approach emerged as a reaction against the classical theory in the 1960s. Opposing the mechanization of the bureaucracy, social psychological and cultural factors were included into the administration approach. The ideas of anti-hierarchic, anti-technical in the administration process, social equity, participation of the service consumers in the decision-making processes, and closer relations with the consumers were promoted (Bayırbağ & Göksel, 2012, pp. 156-163).

As Bayırbağ and Göksel point out (2012, p. 164), the new public administration approach formed a basis for the new public management theory. The new economic model proposed the cooperation of state-market and civil society. The transformation was quite significant resulting in many public services being left in the hands of the free market economy. Hence definition and form of the public services were restructured in accordance with the neo-liberal policies of the states. Key factors in the transformation in the service provision can be summarized as following: Service providers were partly delegated from public to private sector. Public properties were also partly transferred from state to private sector (privatization). Definition of the service consumer changed from citizen to customer. The term public interest was replaced with the term individual interest. Likewise, public benefit for whole society was replaced with individual profit. Ultimately, service distribution principles were changed. Most of the notions used during the welfare state period (i.e. democracy, participation, efficiency, etc.) were redefined in accordance with the neo-liberal policies. Also new terms, and concepts –such as governance, competitiveness, entrepreneurship, customer orientation, transparency etc...- were adapted from the private management domain to the public administration domain, as the name of ‘new public management’ implies. Also the efforts to improve productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness of the services became prominent in the context of total quality management and performance analysis. This brought about public administration reforms all around the world. At this point, changing the scales of the local governments was pushed forward in accordance with the goals of the neo-liberal economy. For example,

⁵ The bureaucrats who provides public services professionally (i.e., teachers, polices and health officers) locates at the lowest level of the hierarchy. Also called as ‘street level bureaucrats’, they have technical knowledge and speciality about the public services. They are the closest employee to the citizens and they have great effects on the service delivery. They have capacity of changing political agenda (Bayırbağ & Göksel, 2012, p. 162).

economies of scale which were acquired from the management theories were applied in local public services. This topic will be discussed in detail at the end of this chapter.

2.2. Impacts of (De)centralization on the Public Service

Discussions on the question of who should have the authority of service delivery have been going on for a long time. However, it is difficult to make a clear distinction as to whether services should be provided by central or local public authorities. This section will examine the debates around centralization versus decentralization; because degree of the relationship between central state and local governments influences public service provision. It will also deal with the discussions on recentralization and centralization at the local level, which sparked after the final regulations on metropolitan municipalities. The major questions of the centralization debates can be summarized as the following:

- 1) Which public authority provides better services: central or local?
- 2) Which local authority provides better services, metropolitan municipality or district municipality?

First of all, it is important to define the terms about public authority. While centralization and decentralization refer process of the states about authority transfer, delegation and devolution refer to the authority transfer to which unit.

1) Centralization refers to a top-down administration form that concentrates decisions, planning and activities of the state on a specific territory. Authority of some duties and responsibilities belongs exclusively to the state and its branches. Public services for the whole county are delivered from a central organization. For example, education and health services are provided according to the centralization principle in Turkey.

2) Decentralization means transferring the state's authority, duties, and responsibilities to local governments⁶, who can exercise this power independently. For example, fire departments and funerary services are provided according to decentralization principle in Turkey.

⁶ There are different meanings and types of decentralization. For example, the World Bank declares four types of decentralization: 'political, administrative, fiscal, and market decentralization' (WB, 2001).

3) Delegation⁷ refers to central state giving mandate to its field organizations, which are located away from the centre, to exercising power its behalf. For example, ministries and their regional and provincial organizations in Turkey use power according to the delegation principle (Keleş, 2012, p. 21).

4) Devolution⁸ means central state giving mandate to local governments for exercising power on its behalf. Local governments exercise this power independently. They have legal, financial and political autonomy about their duties and responsibilities (Keleş, Yerinden Yönetim ve Siyaset, 2012, p. 21).

According to Keleş (2012, p. 25), centralization and decentralization are two opposing processes but they balance the inadequacies of each other. Both have advantages and disadvantages. In the service provision, while centralization allows for uniformity and regularity, decentralization supplies promptness and easiness. Centralization enables to use resources rationally and to distribute them all over the country equally. While achieving economics of scale, centralization results in an effective, compatible and integrated process in service delivery. However, the shortcomings of centralization are that it causes delay in the activities and cannot meet requirements and demands of the local people (Keleş, 2012, pp. 26-27). On the contrary, it is argued that decentralization can provide services more effectively and efficiently. For a rational resource use, decentralization meets the local requirements according to subsidiarity principle (Tekel, 2006, p. 72). De Vries provides a detailed set of advantages of the decentralization process.

The expected consequences can be found in numerous publications, and have been summarized, among others, by De Vries (2000) and Treisman (2007). They point to expectations about the possibilities to satisfy citizens' demands, the increased honesty, efficiency and responsiveness, better performance, increased possibilities for citizen participation, improved checks and balances, cooperation and policy stability, more policy experimentation and innovation as a consequence of decentralization (Treisman 2007, 13-15). Decentralization would also increase the possibilities of tailor-made policies, to cut through red tape, to increase officials' knowledge of and sensitivity to local problems; it may result in better penetration of national policies to remote local communities, greater representation for various religious, ethnic and tribal groups in the policy process, and greater administrative capability at the local level (de Vries, 2014, p. 77).

However, De Vries admits that the achievements of the decentralization process depend on various circumstances. He also points out disadvantageous sides of decentralization. After decentralization under the pressure of EU directions, local institutions had weak

⁷ Delegation means in Turkish '*yetki genişliği*', '*yetki göçerimi*'

⁸ Devolution means in Turkish '*yetki devri*'

administrative, financial and technical capacity in developing countries (2014, p. 78). Aside from discussing the pros and cons of centralization and decentralization, one should evaluate each process “as a tool not as the definite goal”. Their consequences change with regards to “concrete time and environment” (Nemec & Matejova, 2014, p. 97). Bayraktar develops another approach to the centralization versus decentralization debate. Power relations between central state and local governments are determined “by multiple factors beyond the simple distribution of competencies and resources” (2014, p. 322). This relation emerges “in different power configurations based on where, by whom and for what power is exercised” (Bayraktar, 2014, p. 322).




Figure 4 Discussions for and against decentralization

Source: Received from Nemec & Matejova (2014, p. 116)

Some scholars tried to address the problem of who should provide the services (the issue of centralization/decentralization) by devising some objective criteria. One of the criterion is the scale of the administrative unit. While centralization indicates a consolidated structure and larger scale local units, decentralization implies a fragmented structure and small scale local units. At this point, the issue of economies of scale arises again (Nemec & Matejova, 2014, pp. 100-102). Emre Koyuncu and Selçuk Sertesin (2012, p. 5) indicate economies of scale as the main reason of authority sharing between central and local governments. According to

economies of scale, while the scale of a service centralizes (or grows), the unit cost of the service decreases. Therefore, it becomes more sensible to provide services from a central unit where the administrative authority and area of responsibility is larger. However, economies of scale approach also consider that beyond an optimum point centralization will raise the costs due to diseconomies. These negative effects (diseconomies) can be distance, difficulties in raw material procurement, and issues with human resources, etc. Therefore, achieving optimum scale becomes crucial. Also, it is difficult to find a common optimum scale for every service of municipalities, because the optimum scale differs depending on the kind of service. Therefore, authorities should not insist on providing a service from a central unit just because they benefit from economies of scale. On the other hand, spillover effect of the service is the other factor to consider when deciding centralization or decentralization. Spillover effect refers to positive or negative effects (externalities) of a public service delivered by an administration within its jurisdiction area according to another person, group, region, service and sector and spreads out of the administration's duties and responsibilities (Koyuncu & Serteser, 2012, pp. 5-6).




Figure 5 Relation between centralization and cost

Source: Received from Koyuncu and Serteser, 2012, p. 6

The other criteria to determine who should provide public services are efficiency, geographical proximity (subsidiarity), political responsibility, local requirements and demands. These are also establishment goals of the local governments gained through devolution. On the other hand, if the delegation of the central state is extended, its local units can provide public services (Koyuncu & Serteser, 2012, p. 6). Around the world, historical, economic, social, political and administrative structures of the states determine the division of public services between central and local governments. In general, while electricity and natural gas services are provided by central states, water and solid waste services are provided by local governments.

Meanwhile, another discussion topic revolves around division of the public services between local government levels. Which local government level should provide the local services? In Turkey, the sides of this debate are divided along the lines of metropolitan municipality or district municipality. As in the case of centralization-decentralization debates, democratic participation, administrative and technical efficiency, economics of scale, effective resource and personnel use are the criteria used in this debate. Division of public services in some countries is provided in the table of Appendix A. This table was taken from the collected work of Yıldırım (2014). The table shows service division between metropolitan municipality and local municipality in Amsterdam (Holland), Barcelona (Spain), Frankfurt (Germany), London (United Kingdom), Roma (Italy), Paris (France) and İstanbul (Turkey).

In Turkey, establishing metropolitan municipalities, abolishing small scale municipalities, and transferring their duties and responsibilities to the metropolitan municipalities are usually praised by the public authorities and scholars. As a result, the phenomenon of ‘centralization at the local level’ emerges in the metropolitan municipalities. As Bayraktar remarks, centralization process “has been also reproduced at the municipal level” through reforms on local governments (2014, p. 339). Also recentralization has become the most recent trend both in Turkey and the European countries. The confusing point here is while decentralization is convoked on one hand, central administration is empowered on the other hand (Keyman, 2014). Some of the reasons behind recentralization are the last financial crisis and its repercussion on local governments, desirable for rent emerging from urban areas and expropriating on local common properties in a rapid, easy and large scaled ways. These issues will be discussed in detail under the topic of municipal context in Turkey.

2.3. Effects of Privatization on Public Services

In accordance with the neoliberal policies, privatization of the public services has become a favourite method all around the world. Privatization can be simply described as transfer of state’s goods and services to private owners. The main purpose of the privatization is to increase efficiency (Britannica, 2010). It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to analyse the pure economic and technical dimensions of privatization processes. Yet, the effects of privatization on the municipal services can be reviewed within the framework of critical analysis.

Privatization is commonly evaluated as one of the most important instruments of the neoliberal policies adopted by most countries since the 1980s. With privatization of the state owned assets, it is assumed to reduce the state’s dominant role in the capitalist market. This

economic perspective describes “the economic efficiencies as the major inducement for privatization” (Balkan-Şahin, 2010, p. 484). Under neoliberal economic conditions, privatization turns into a panacea for dealing with economic inefficiency, lack of innovation in the public sector, increase in the public expenditure, etc. Neo-classic economists formulate the ultimate aim of the privatization as “to improve the productivity and efficiency of public enterprises by transferring them to the private sector, to reduce the excessive public deficit by reducing the amount of transfers to the state owned assets from the treasury, to promote competition, to improve the quality of goods and services and to attract foreign capital to accelerate the growth rate of industrialization” (Karataş & Ercan, 2008, p. 348).

Along with a wide range of analysis within a purely economic and technical framework, privatization has recently been examined as a political process by certain scholars. Evaluating it as class alliance or interest conflict, Angın (2010) defines privatization as “a highly political process”, shaped by intertwined class- and identity-based interests in different countries. From a neo-Gramscian perspective, Balkan-Şahin (2010) evaluates privatization process as a hegemony/consent establishment between actors such as external and domestic social forces, big capital groups and counter-hegemonic social groups. Öniş analyses privatization processes in terms of the changing power and discourse of ‘pro-coalition and ‘anti-coalition’ as well as legal and institutional changes. He also describes certain sets of forces facilitating large-scale privatization (2011). Criticizing these studies because of their more emphasis on the constitutive role of privatization process, Bedirhanoglu and Angın evaluate privatization “as a political and ideological moment within which a particular perception of social reality is reproduced in opposition to others” (2012, p. 142). Privatization is a fundamental analytical tool since it is one of the major dimensions of the economic liberalization. Based upon the structure-agency dialectic, Yalman defines the privatization processes as (2011, p. 1):

[P]rivatization emphasized a new division of labor between public and private sectors in terms of functions and responsibilities regarding the production of goods and provision of public services. This usually took the form of ownership transfer by selling state-owned industries to private sector for the sake of increasing their efficiency through competition. At the same time it signalled a reassessment of the role of the market in conditioning social relations. In that sense, privatization was more than an ownership change: it was a change in mentality regarding the relationship between state, market and society.

The privatization practices of state can also be observed within the context of municipalities. The main goal is to improve efficiency in the municipal service provision. Municipalities carry out various privatization methods for their goods, services, lands and enterprises. Contracting out (outsourcing), franchising (concession), build-operate-transfer model, selling method, renting method, pricing method, association between other public institutions, incorporation,

and joint venture are some of the privatization methods in Turkey. Table 3 shows privatization methods with their definition and municipal services which privatization methods are applied to.

Table 3 Privatization methods of municipalities

Privatization Method	Definition	Municipal Service
Contracting out	Delivery of a public service by a private sector under a contract	Garbage collection, street sweeping, park and green areas care
Franchising	Assigning management and finance of a public service to a private sector completely or partly	Natural monopoly services: Water, wastewater, electricity and natural gas
Build-operate-transfer	Investing, producing and providing a public service by a private sector that bears the expenses of investment and management and then gains the right to operate over a predetermined period and tariff.	-Services requiring great capital and high technology: Construction of highways, subway, rail system, bridges, airports, power stations and trade centres -Building of office building, bus terminal, cafeteria, hotels and entertainment centres
Selling method	Privatization of public savings through direct selling, shares selling, public offering, block selling to national or foreign capital, institutional supply to the international markets	Land and buildings of municipalities, municipal economic enterprises and all kinds of municipal assets can be sold with direct selling or selling through shares models.
Renting method	While the municipalities undertake capital investment and construction of facilities for the execution of the service, the private sectors take over management and operation of those facilities for a certain time period.	The facilities that the municipalities cannot manage are assigned to the private sectors.
Association between public institutions	When the municipality cannot provide some services, it can reach an agreement with another municipality or public institution and can sell, make or jointly provide these services.	Every kind of services that the municipality cannot execute.
Incorporation and joint venture	Municipalities can establish company and participate in existing companies.	Security, transportation, housing, water, food, etc.
Pricing method	Commercialising, pricing and providing of public services to local citizens.	Garbage collection and filling, water and wastewater treatment, natural gas, transportation, preventive health services and primary education.

Source: Acartürk (2001); Dayar (2015)

The outsourcing (contracting out) method is usually preferred for the services that does not require qualified personnel and can be provided by private sector can provide more effectively. For example, these services can be garbage collection, street sweeping, maintenance of parks and green areas. If these services provided by private sectors, it is not supposed to minimize public interest. Likewise, if they are provided by municipalities, it is not supposed to maximize public interest. It is also alleged that provision of the private sector decreases the costs of service prices and increases both quality and quantity of services as well as competition (Acartürk, 2001, p. 47). As some municipal services do not need qualified employees but require numerous employees, labour problem is thought to be solved through outsourcing. However, this indicates much work but cheap labour. Acartürk points out some other possible downsides to outsourcing method: corruption and patronage relations between municipality and private sector are likely to damage service process and remove all the counted positive returns of the contracting out (2001, p. 47).

The most notable difference between franchising and outsourcing is the nature of service. Franchising method is applied for natural monopoly services, such as natural gas, water and wastewater services. Also there is no competition in the franchising system as the private sector has monopoly in that service. The consumers of the services directly pay the prices of the services to the private sector. Franchising is criticized for creating monopolism and preventing competition. The private sector can decrease production of goods and services, increases the cost of the service and ultimately acquires unearned gain from the process. The fact that the cost of the service is paid by consumers directly can create financial difficulties especially for low-income users (Acartürk, 2001, p. 48).

The build-operate-transfer model is for the public services that require large amounts of financing. When municipalities cannot afford a large-scale project, such as construction of railways, highways, and various other infrastructures, they often prefer this model. Taking over the capital and risks of the service, national, international or joint entrepreneurs establish and operate the facility. After a certain period of time, the facility is transferred to the municipality unconditionally without any charge. This model is praised for providing high technology, quality and productivity (Acartürk, 2001, p. 50). On the other hand, the build-operate-transfer model is one of the most criticized methods of privatization. These projects are usually carried out by consortia of national and international entrepreneurs, turning cities into a commodity of the foreign capital.

One of the favourite methods of privatization is incorporation and joint ventures. Acartürk indicates four targets of municipalities with incorporation: delivery of municipal services in a competitive arena with private sectors, more effective service provision, reducing of local taxes, and working with fewer employees (2001, p. 54). Indeed, many municipalities have to prefer privatization methods due to lack of resource, technology and qualified employee, excessive and unqualified employment, failure in administration and inability to meet increasing demands of local people. Although they have many duties and responsibilities under legal regulations, they usually suffer from financial and administrative incapability, scarcity of equipment and professional personnel. Insomuch that privatization of the local services is demonstrated to bring about positive results as “local administrations are overburdened with the provision of legally mandated services in which the central authorities play a marginal role” (Lankina *et al*, 2008, p. 15).

An important issue of privatization is the pricing method. Public authorities do not demand money from the citizens for the benefit of some public goods and services. They procure those funds through tax revenues. Yet, it is legally possible for municipalities to market and price certain local goods and services. In this case, local people contribute to the financing of public goods and services to the extent that they benefit from services, but not according to their abilities to pay. Water, wastewater solid waste and natural gas services, transportation and preventive health services are subject to pricing. At this point, determining the pricing of goods and services is very crucial. As a matter of principle of public administration, pricing should be determined according to ability of citizens to pay. There are two methods widely used in determining pricing. Pricing can be determined based on a cost and benefit analysis or upon market mechanism. The benefit method is criticized to create unfairness in the society. It is too hard to examine total benefit of a good or service. Also ignoring the principle of ability to pay, the benefit is only distributed among the beneficiaries. The other method examines pricing of a service according to market mechanism. That service has a price in the market economy determined under the supply and demand conditions, and this price is accepted by the municipalities. Yet, this price can be expensive for the local people and the municipalities can decrease it (Acartürk, 2001, pp. 56-57).

Privatization should not be defined solely as transferring public goods and services to the private sector. As mentioned before, it indicates a new division of labour between state, market and civil society (Yalman, 2011, p. 1). Arguing from a critical viewpoint, Harvey describes privatization as an important component of neoliberalism. He also regards the privatization process as “accumulation by dispossession” that means redistribution of the sources from

whole society to preferential groups (2007, pp. 33-35). According to neoliberal approaches, such as monetarism, agency theory and public choice theory, privatization should be utilized by governments for the sake of effective service provision and increased competition. Hence, they deepen the division of state, market and civil society (Angin, 2010, pp. 5-7). The real mechanisms of the privatization should be revealed out throughout the perspective of critical realism. The major reasons behind the privatization methods of the municipalities are new public management approach under the neo-liberal policies. Minimizing the role of state in the economy, resigning the public assets and services to the both national and international markets and gaining rents for the specific groups through ignoring the public interest are some other underlying factors of the privatization.

2.4. Internal Factors Affecting Municipal Service Provision

Under the new public management approach, there are a great number of studies focusing on leadership, partnership, organizational culture, human resources management, strategic management, total quality management, innovation, equity etc. all of which influence the public service provision. As intrinsic to public organization itself, they can be defined as internal factors. The purpose of this chapter is not to examine each factor in detail, but to review some of them briefly. Therefore, following sections will only deal with the impacts of leadership style of the mayor, structure of the municipal council, organizational culture and ethical principles of the municipalities on the service provision.

2.4.1. Leadership of the Municipal Mayor

Recently it has become very popular to study the “potential effect of charismatic and transformational leadership” on public service provision (Boyne, 2003, p. 371). In the municipal administration, mayors are supposed to have leadership characteristics according to the new public management approach. These characteristics can be counted as “strong, entrepreneurial, fixer, flexible and adaptable mayor” (Köse, 2016). This section will investigate the effects of mayors and other municipal authorities on service provision in terms of their personalities, desires, goals, decisions and performances.

First of all, it is important to define leadership. Leadership can be identified “as the process (act) of influencing the activities of an organized group in its efforts toward goal-setting and goal achievement” (Stogdill, 1974 as cited in Petrovsky, 2010, p. 79). However, this definition cannot be directly applied to public authorities, as it belongs to private management domain. In contrast to private leadership, there are notable restrictions and challenges for public

leadership. As elected politicians, municipal mayors have a responsibility towards all local people in terms of democratic accountability. Since they have multiple and complicated goals, it is more difficult to achieve these goals for mayors in a limited time period. As mayors are restricted by legal regulations, they cannot always do whatever they want (Petrovsky, 2010, pp. 80-82).

There are various theoretical arguments regarding the relation between leadership and service provision. Petrovsky (2010) refers to three theories on this issue. One theory is concerned with different capacities of the mayors. More clearly, “motives, means, and opportunities” of the mayors influence service provision (Petrovsky, 2010, p. 83). The other theory is related to two different type of leadership affecting service delivery, “transactional versus transformational leadership” (Petrovsky, 2010, p. 84). While transactional leader aims at creating a narrow change in the organization, transformational leader targets more extensive and comprehensive shifts both in the organization and public domain. The final theory focuses on the “interactions between political and managerial leaders” (Petrovsky, 2010, p. 84). A public service agreement between political leaders in a locality might have a positive impact on the municipal service provision (Petrovsky, 2010, p. 85). Köse also examines leadership theories through dividing into four categories chronologically: Trait theory, behavioural theory, situational theory and managerial theory. The first theory (1940s) focuses on personalities of leaders. The second theory (1940s-1960s) concentrates on behaviours of leaders. The third theory (1960s-1980s) bases contingency of leader’s behaviour based on the changes of new era. The final theory is about transactional and transformational leadership (2016, p. 12).

There are also numerous empirical studies about the effects of leadership on public service delivery according with the theoretical arguments above. Petrovsky mentions four dimensions that the empirical researches evaluate as “(a) the overall strength and visibility of leadership, (b) the people in formal leadership positions and the characteristics of these people, (c) specific aspects of leadership behaviour, and (d) the interaction of political and managerial leaders” (2010, p. 85). On the other side, it is important to reveal potential contingencies of the impacts of leadership on service delivery which particularly consist of external factors (Petrovsky, 2010, p. 92).

2.4.2. Structure of the Municipal Council

Municipalities consist of two main bodies: executive body and decision-making body. As the decision making body, members of the municipal council are elected by local elections in democratic systems. Municipal councils have considerable influence over the service

provision since they have an important role in the policy-making processes. They determine the local problems, needs and demands, make programmes, choose public services, look for financial resources and regulate the organization according to rules and legislation (Köse, 2016, p. 19).

In municipalities, the leadership role is likely to be shared between the council members, and the mayors. Therefore, the decisions, desires, strategies, and actions of the council members affect the service provision process. Also, their relations with each other, with the mayor, with other authorities and employees, and with local actors may affect the service provision. Political parties, personal tendencies, compliances, and interests are the substantial variables determining these relations. Moreover local government forms of the countries are important. They are strong mayor-council, weak mayor-council, council-manager and commission forms and each of them has different impact on the service provision (Köse, 2016, p. 21).

2.4.3. Organizational Culture

As the public service reforms consider cultural change as a basic tool, organizational culture of the municipalities has attracted the attention of scholars (Ashworth, 2010, p. 98) According to the new public management approach; public organizations adopted the organizational culture from the private sector. Municipalities are supposed to develop a flexible, highly motivated, deliberative, competitive, and successful organizational structure. Just as leadership is expected from the mayor and the members of council, a good organizational culture is expected from the employees. However, this section will only focus on the relation between organizational culture and service provision and describe the possible impacts of organizational culture on improvement service provision.

It is very difficult to find a clear definition of organizational culture; because its definitions in the academic literature are so complicated and contested. Yet, Ashworth proposes three elements of a simple definition of organizational culture. They are symbols, practices and values (Ashworth, 2010, p. 99). While symbols are visible signs, practices are observed and less visible. Values are accepted abstract ideas and developed in a long term. Then we can argue that organizational culture consists of behavioural patterns, ideologies, beliefs, symbols, values, physical structures, and languages leading all processes in the organization. Organizational culture also includes the relations between its environment and other organizations (Gezici, 2012, p. 13).

Studies on the relation between organizational culture and service provision are mostly related to private sector. This relation is attributed to “the important role that culture is perceived to play in securing increased competitive advantage, and it is argued that it achieves this by making employee behaviour and responses increasingly stable and predictable, thereby facilitating and shaping individual interactions within organizations” (Ashworth, 2010, p. 100). The arguments of these studies can be generalized as “those with strong mission-oriented cultures are likely to perform better than those that do not” (Ashworth, 2010, p. 105). However, it should be known that other variables in the public organization, such as leadership and communication might affect the organizational culture. More importantly, there is a unique culture of each organization that also influences those it interacts with.

2.4.4. Ethical Principles of the Municipality

One of the most noteworthy tools which guide public service provision is ethical values. Legality, righteousness, reliability, justice, equity, and competence are the some ethical values municipalities can adopt for service provision. In this way, confidence-building mechanisms are developed between the public and service providers, while unethical practices in service provision such as bribery, corruption and clientelism are prevented (Çelik & Bilbay, 2017, p. 443).

Derived from the word ‘ethos’ in Greek, ethic means "character, behaviour and customs". It is a branch of science that examines the moral values in philosophy. As an external factor, legislations are the rules to be obeyed by municipalities in the service provision. Also, as internal factors, ethical values are rules to be obeyed by municipalities in the service provision. Fundamentally, the municipal services are supposed to produce appropriate services in line with the expectations of the local people and distribute municipal services on an equal and need basis. Ethical values are required not only for the local authorities, but also for the employee working in the both organization and field. Their relations between consumers are very important in the service provision. Satisfaction level of the consumers with the services is mostly determined by this relation. Acts of municipalities according to the ethical values make the works of service providers easier and increase reliability of consumers (Çelik & Bilbay, 2017, pp. 444-446).

On the other hand, there are unethical behaviours and practices in the public administration that influence service provision negatively. Bribery, corruption, clientelism, degeneration and discrimination are the most widespread and challenging unethical values. Other unethical behaviours are acquiring unfair goods, collusive tendering, embezzlement, extortion,

misfeasance, abuse of power, flattery, gossip, and blowing off (Çelik & Bilbay, 2017, p. 447). Nonetheless, taking precautions against and attenuation of these unethical values are mostly depended upon municipalities themselves.

To be fair and egalitarian in the provision of services can be counted among the ethical principles of municipalities. This issue is also closely related to discrimination. In the context of municipal services, egalitarianism refers equal service delivery to everyone living in its jurisdiction area. On the other hand, fairness indicates giving priority to disadvantaged people for the service provision. If municipalities give primacy to the hegemonic groups in terms of their colour, language, religious, race, gender, etc., it would be discrimination. While equal service provision is a norm or legal obligation, fair service provision is an optional value for municipalities. There are numerous studies investigating the relation between these values and service provision. According to Bagihole (1993, p. 163), labour-axis municipalities in England care about fairness and desire to decrease social inequalities as well as “class and economic divisions”. Their target group consists of people who are excluded from the mainstream of social and political life, such as disabled people, women and black people. It can be clearly observed that they create notable shifts in the service provision (Bagihole, 1993).

2.5. External Factors Effecting Public Service

As argued in the previous section, there are internal factors, which are particular to the public organization itself, influencing the service provision to a great extent. On the other hand, there are also external factors, which deserve special attention with regard to the service provision. External factors are called as “organizational environments” by Andrews and Boyne (2008) and as “locality-specific structural endowments” by Lankina, Hudalla and Wollmann (2008, p. 3). These factors develop outside the organization but have notable effects on the service provision. This section will examine the external factors under five categories: economic structure of the city, socio-cultural structure of the city, political structure of the city, geographical structure of the city, and regulations on local governments.

2.5.1. Economic Structure of the City

An important external factor that has substantial impact on the municipal services is the economic structure of the city. Local revenues of the municipalities are directly related to the local economy. Quantity, type, frequency, and regularity of the local municipal income influence service provision. Andrews (2010, p. 17) and Andrews and Boyne (2008, p. 789) define this factor as environmental munificence (capacity), which is “the scarcity or abundance

of critical resources” of a local unit. While municipalities of wealthy cities are able to provide more and higher quality services, municipalities of poor cities have financial incapability of meeting the needs and demands of their citizens. Even though national funding for local governments are distributed equally all around the country, they are not sufficient for municipalities to provide all the services. Municipalities are affected “by the relative prosperity of service users” (Andrews, 2010, p. 19). Moreover, neighbourhoods with different economic structures in the same city also create discrepancies in service delivery. If municipalities provide services irrespective of these economic structures of different areas, it might bring about negative results in poor neighbourhoods. (Andrews, 2010, p. 19). Furthermore, as needs and demands of these economically different areas are varied, the quantity and type of municipal services become diversified. Andrews adds an external economic factor that may influence the service provision (2010, p. 20):

Public organizations require the support of a wide range of external stakeholders, including central government, citizens, and service users (Hirschman 1970). (...) High levels of social capital amongst the users of public service users may also lead to improved organizational performance by enabling them to overcome collective action problems associated with influencing policy-makers (Putnam 2000). Indeed, the presence of a strong civic culture within an area may dictate agenda-setting or constrain the range of alternatives available to public organizations (Elkins and Simeon 1979).

Lankina *et al* point out commercial resources, tourism facilities and “the degree of economic concentration and constellation of industries” of a local unit as factors that influence municipal service provision (2008, p. 3). According to the authors, cooperation of local enterprises with the local authorities has a positive impact on service provision. On the other hand, “dispersed and conflictual constellation of industrial versus agricultural players” may cause negative outputs for service provision (Lankina *et al*, 2008, p. 3). Moreover, existence of strong and abundant economic resources in a city provides additional local income and opportunities to municipalities. In return, municipalities are likely to invest more in the large-scale services, such as infrastructure, transportation and planning activities.

2.5.2. Political Structure of the City

It is commonly argued that the level of political engagement of the society has a positive impact on the local service provision (Putnam, 2002; Dagger, 1996; Oldfield 1990; Putnam, 1993; Elkins and Simeon, 1979; Verba 1963; as cited in Andrews, 2007, p. 845-846). In accordance with the new public administration approach, municipalities in European countries try to establish closer relations with local people to improve service provision. They encourage

local people to participate in the decision making processes of the municipalities to improve service provision (Andrews, 2007, p. 846).

When local population actively participates in the decision-making processes of the municipalities, they get an opportunity to express their wishes, demands, and complaints about urban and daily life. The municipalities decide to provide services in response to these political pressures. As the mayor and the municipal council are elected by the local elections, they have to take these pressures into consideration. Elected authorities want to make voters satisfied with their performance “(as this increases their likelihood of re-election) and that voters recognize and punish underperformance” (Coffé & Geys, 2005, p. 487). Such a reciprocal relation inevitably improves local service provision.

Andrews (2007, pp. 846-847) particularly refers to Putnam’s works on political engagement to public organizations. Putnam (1993) emphasizes that there is a close link between public service provision and citizen participation. He asserts that a democratic culture makes public service provision better. He defines four dimensions, in which democratic culture affects public service: civic engagement; political equality; solidarity, trust and tolerance; and social structures of co-operation. For Putnam, civic engagement indicates active participation of citizens in the decision making processes of local governments. Civic engagement helps local authorities in defining and solving local problems. For the author, political equality is a result of extended civic engagement. Solidarity, trust, and tolerance are three major factors that hold a society together, when they develop between local people and authorities, policies, programmes, and projects will be affected. Also these factors naturally generate co-operation among local people. Organized citizens have more opportunities to convey their messages to the authorities, and authorities become more effective in meeting their needs and demands (Putnam 1993; as cited in Andrews, 2007, p. 847). In the later works of Putnam, these factors are redefined as social capital, which he regards as a typical feature of any community (Coffé & Geys, 2005, p. 486).

2.5.3. Socio-Cultural Structure of the City

Municipal service provision is also influenced by the social and cultural structures of the city. Social and cultural differences determine the type and quantity of municipal service provision. These locality-specific factors might be a result of demographic, ethnic, religious, historical, traditional and residential variations. Municipalities should consider these external factors when they designate their services. Andrews (2010, p. 20) and Andrews and Boyne (2008, p. 789) call these socio-cultural factors as “environmental complexity”. The authors associate

environmental complexity with demographic characteristics of the service consumers. The degree of ethnic heterogeneity of the society influences municipal service provision. If the service consumers are homogeneous, the municipalities “provide a standardized service that addresses their needs” (Andrews, 2010, p. 20). On the contrary, if the service consumers are heterogeneous, the municipalities should make a great effort “to identify their divergent preferences, and it may be necessary to provide a wider range of services to meet their requirements” (Andrews, 2010, p. 20). Municipalities should spend more time and money for heterogeneous societies. Therefore, quantity and quality of their services become diversified (Andrews, 2010, p. 20). Distinction of rural versus urban areas is also another important factor affecting service provision. Requirements and demands of the people living in rural areas are different from those who live in urban areas. While cultural amenities (theatre, cinema, concerts, etc.) are mostly demanded in urban areas, funeral and cemetery services in rural areas might be more in demand.

2.5.4. Geographical Structure of the City

A significant factor affecting municipal service provision is geographical structure of a city. The term geographical should not be evaluated only with its physical character, but also with its social, economic and political dimensions. Lankina *et al* (2008, p. 4) redefine impacts of the structures of the areas on public service provision as ‘ecology factors’. The authors state that ecology factors consist of important part of the socio-economic structure of the localities. They give ‘east-west effect’ as an example for ecology factor. In their research field, uneven development was observed in the local units, which divides the region as east and west. While western residences have more commercial and industrial areas, eastern residences were deprived of economic facilities. As wealthier and more democratic structures, western residences have positive effect on local service provision (Lankina *et al*, 2008, p. 4). Besides, the authors indicate the theory of geographic diffusion, also called as ‘flows’. According to the theory, “flows refer to exchanges of information, ideas, technologies, trade and commerce through human interaction and facilitated by the geographic proximity or contiguity of one country to another” (Lankina *et al*, 2008, p. 5). Local units also may experience such a geographic diffusion which deepens geographical division between eastern and western residences. Ultimately, this also results in distinctness in local service provision (Lankina *et al*, 2008, p. 5).

2.5.5. Regulations on Local Governments

As an external factor, regulations have an impact on municipal service provision to a certain extent. Laws and legislation on local governments are the most common forms of the regulations that municipalities must follow. These regulations also set rules, standards, and methods regarding the municipal services. In certain cases, municipalities do not have a chance to choose their strategies and activities, and they might have some restrictions imposed on them by the central government (Boyne, 2003, p. 369). Regulations also control service outputs and service quality, and check the standards that municipalities should meet at a minimum level (Martin, 2010, p. 38). Municipalities can determine, change or reorganize their programmes on service provision according to these legal regulations.

Boyne (2003, p. 369) argues that legal regulations can identify and control spending of the municipalities in accordance with the accountability principle. However, he does not establish a direct relation between regulation and service provision. For the author, regulators determine this relation through monitoring and inspecting. As he clarifies in the following:

If regulators know better than local agencies how to improve services, then the impact of regulation is likely to be positive. In contrast, if local expertise is superior, then regulation is likely to be counterproductive. It is therefore difficult to specify an a priori proposition on the relationship between regulation and public service improvement (Boyne G. A., 2003, p. 369).

On the other hand, there are comprehensive laws which can directly and radically effect the local governments. These might result from public administration reforms. Financial, administrative, institutional or political structures of the municipalities can be transformed through enforcing such laws. Hence, the processes about service provision of the municipalities can be changed, removed or renewed. As Martin indicates, “scale, scope, and extent of regulation” are the distinctive factors on determining the degree of relation with service provision (2010, p. 36). The author also points out three theories which establish relationships between regulation and public service provision. The first theory has a traditional view which considers regulation of public services for assurance. The second theory evaluates regulation of public services as a tool for competition. The third one handles regulation of public services as an instrument of improvement (Martin, 2010, p. 39). Moreover, Martin adds two other perspectives about the link between regulation and service provision. These assert that regulation “may in fact have no significant impact, or have a negative impact on performance.” (2010, p. 43). He admits that methodological challenges make it difficult to analyse the effects of regulation on service provision. Referring the internal factors, such as “leadership and managerial capacity, and prior performance” of the public institution, the

author puts forward that the positive impact of the regulation on service provision hinges upon the institution's capability to meet the obligations (Martin, 2010, p. 53).

2.6. The Effects of Rescaling Policies on the Municipal Service Provision

This section will present a detailed research about scale, and rescaling policies. Thus, a critical analysis of the relationship between scale and service provision will be provided. First, history of the scale policies developed in line with administrative reforms will be reviewed. Then various approaches to the scale issue (public choice school, consolidationist, and critical approaches) will be examined. The critical realist perspective for the scale issue will be developed in accordance with its epistemological and methodological basics. At the end, the relation between scale and municipal service provision from that perspective will be proposed.

2.6.1. Rescaling of Local Governments

The big city phenomenon emerged parallel to the changes in the social and economic structure which left their mark on the twentieth century. A great migration from rural areas to cities began following the industrial revolution in European countries. Due to emergence of big cities, governing, controlling and planning these cities became a major problem. In order to address these problems, both public authorities and scholars attempted to seek solutions within different methods and models (Çınar, Çiner & O. Zengin, 2009, pp. 14-15). One of the simplest and most common solutions proposed was changing the scales of the municipalities.

In European countries, interventions to the numbers, area size, and boundaries of municipalities were carried out especially after the Second World War. The policies – also called rescaling⁹ policies – usually materialized along the lines of local government reforms. There were two important motives behind the local government reforms implemented in European countries. The first was extending the jurisdiction of local services while the second was increasing local service efficiency. Rescaling of local governments' boundaries became the most widespread practice to realize these motives. Yet, the real purpose of these reforms was to minimize the role of the state on the economy. As Boyne, Entwistle and Ashworth put

⁹ Keating uses the term rescaling to imply 'migration of economic, social, and political systems of action and of regulation to new spatial levels, above, below, and across the nation-state' (2014:1). Neil Brenner uses the concept 'politics of rescaling' which proposes that 'geographical scales such as the urban, the regional, the national and the global are not pre-given but are socially constructed and politically contested' (2002: 4).

forward, it was “the move from ‘government’ to ‘governance’” and “used to chart the ‘hollowing out’ of the state” (2010, p. 1).

The history of rescaling policies should be evaluated as two different waves. The first wave began at the end of World War II and continued until the 1980s. The reforms of the first wave were implemented within the frame of welfare state model and aimed at creating larger scale local units. The second wave began after the 1980s, and reforms of this era were put into practice within the frame of regulatory state model and neo-liberal policies (Çınar *et al*, 2013, p.49). The second wave of the reforms can be divided into two different periods. The first period started with advocating fragmented local units. The second period started with the supporting consolidated local units, conversely (Keating, 1995; Brenner, 2003). All these reforms intended to increase efficiency of service provision and achieve economies of scale (Keating, 1995). They were directed at changing the boundaries of the municipalities based on population and area criteria. Regarding local government reforms, Brenner (2003, p. 297) explains two different periods as following:

In contrast to the forms of metropolitan governance that prevailed during the Fordist-Keynesian period – which emphasized administrative modernization, interterritorial equalization and the efficient delivery of public services – the newest wave of metropolitan governance reform is focused upon economic priorities such as territorial competitiveness and attracting external capital investment in the context of geoeconomic and European integration.

In fact, during late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, large scale urban agglomerations in the US and European countries raised the issue of consolidated metropolitan areas. However, metropolitan political institutions were widely discussed in the late 1960s (Keating, 1995, p. 115). Along with the spread over of the Fordist-Keynesian policies, debates on the large scale units mainly focused on local service provision, spatial redistribution, regional planning and administrative efficiency (Brenner, 2003, p. 300). Therefore, local government reforms were implemented simply through reducing the number of municipalities and increasing their size. Nonetheless, following the crisis of the Fordist-Keynesian development model in the 1970s, a new economic model was imposed and new governmental reforms were planned accordingly. This time around, large-scale local units were blamed as the cause of administrative problems. Therefore, the political and intellectual wave was to return to the philosophy of “small is beautiful” (Keating, 1995, p. 120). Referring to public choice theory, however, this stream could continue its domination until the 1980s. A new administrative crisis was raised by intellectual and political groups and they again looked for new solutions. The goal was creating larger and consolidated units but this time in more competitive and entrepreneurial forms. Brenner (2003, p. 302) summarizes this transition in the following:

In short, across the western European urban and regional system, the managerial forms of metropolitan political organization that predominated during the era of high Fordism have been superseded by entrepreneurial, competitiveness-oriented approaches to metropolitan governance that privilege developmentalist priorities such as economic growth, labour market flexibility and territorial competitiveness.

During all these local government reforms, the question of municipal scale was always discussed both at the theoretical level and at the application level in different countries. Debates on the rescaling of the municipalities have traditionally and normatively been conducted around two mainstream approaches: The public choice school versus the consolidationist¹⁰ perspective (Baldersheim & Rose, 2010). While the public choice school advocates small scales and fragmented units, consolidationist perspectives insists on larger scales and consolidated units. The question is simply whether the small scale municipality is beautiful or the big scale municipality is good. Doubtlessly, there are also alternative and critical approaches to these two mainstreams approaches. In this section, various discussions on the scale issue will be scrutinized in order to develop a critical realist perspective for the scale and its impacts on the service provision.

2.6.2. Public Choice Theory

Public choice theory can be briefly described as an “extension of the neo-classical model of the market into political life” (Keating, 1991, p. 108). It interprets the decisions and practices that come out the political process according to the means, methods, and assumptions used by the science of economics (Kızılboğa, 2012, p. 91). According to this theory political decision making processes are substitute to market processes; while political actors, bureaucrats, politicians and pressure groups take the place of market actors (Odabaş, 2001).

Actually, the roots of public choice theory go back to the works of economists from continental Europe of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Kızılboğa, 2012, p. 91). The works of Wicksell, Sax, Mazzola, Panteleoni and De Marco are the first instances of this theory. After the World War II, public choice theory caught the attention of American economists and remarkable works were published in the 1970s (Odabaş, 2001). Public choice theory progressed into modern era, through the works of Duncan Black, James M. Buchanan, Kenneth Arrow, Anthony Downs, Mancur Olson and Gordon Tullock (Kızılboğa, 2012, p. 92). Buchanan (2003) categorizes the basic principles and assumptions of the public choice

¹⁰ The term ‘consolidationist’ (in Turkish means *bütünleştirici*, *bütünleştirmeyi savunan*) refers to a person or a view which advocates consolidation and it is literally used by several scholars, such as Keating (1991; 1995), Feiock, Park, & Kang (2006), Rankin (2007), Savitch & Vogel (2000) and Baldersheim & Rose (2010).

theory as methodological individualism, *homo economicus* and political exchange. The notions of hollowing of the state, privatization and deregulation, which were also the policies of Thatcher's era in England, were adopted within the framework of the theory of public choice (Odabaş, 2001).

The public choice theory adapted its approach to urban policies, especially about the metropolitan areas. The scholars who advocate smaller and fragmented units in a metropolitan area base their arguments on the principles of public choice theory. Based on market principles; these scholars assume that fragmented structures would result in a lower cost, efficient and responsive local administrative structure as they provide competitiveness (Efe & Gül, 2017, p. 168). They also claim fragmented units are important to sustain local democracy in the cities and competition between governmental units. The roots of this idea go back to the British Economist called E. F. Schumacher's theory: Small is beautiful (1973).

Within the field of local government studies, Charles M. Tiebout, Vincent Ostrom, and Robert Warren are the prominent members of the public choice school. During the 1960s, these scholars evaluated the problems of metropolitan areas and service provision from a market-oriented view and argued for fragmented and numerous local units within a metropolitan area as a solution (Çınar *et al*, 2009, p. 16).

According to the public choice theory, rational individuals make choices in accordance to the market conditions. Hence, citizens turn into customers. Individuals interact with public policy in terms of their utility performances and these performances form the basis of the public interest concept (Keating, 1991, pp. 108-109). It is clear that this approach mainly derives from Tiebout's thesis of "vote with their feet" (Tiebout, 1956 as cited in Mouritzen, 1989, p. 663). Swianiewich explains this thesis: "people migrate to local governments in which the ratio of taxes verses services is closest to their personal preferences" (2002, p. 10). Çınar *et al* also clarify this thesis: location selection decisions can be determined regarding cost and quality of public services. There might be different choices and conditions in terms of cost and quality. The citizens, who are defined as customers, make their choices and decide a residential area most suitable to them. These citizens are willing to pay more for urban services such as higher education, public transport and recreation and prefer lower tax rates to a settlement that offers high quality services despite high costs (2009, p. 17).

The scholars of the public choice school argue that a single government within a consolidated metropolitan area cannot meet the diverse needs of citizens by determining services and taxes in different levels. Therefore, they assume that customer (citizen) satisfaction increases with

numerous location selections with different government levels available to the citizens who live in different communities within a metropolitan market. In other words, these scholars advocate for a fragmented government structure which includes hundreds of local government units in a metropolitan area (Çınar *et al*, 2009, p.17).

In the public choice theory, relation between service provision and scale is established according to the principles market competition. The scholars of the theory maintain that a fragmented government structure would encourage competition among the numerous local government units within this structure and the competition among them would increase service efficiency. They suppose that just as the private sector, local governments which locate in a metropolitan area should compete with each other for the production of goods and services. Thus, these local units look for providing services in a more efficient way as a result of competition. What is more, creating such a competitive and innovative platform will align the service method of local governments with the market. Hence, more appropriate administrative tools will be provided for the application of alternative methods in a fragmented metropolitan area, such as privatization in service provision (Çınar *et al*, 2009, pp. 17-18).

In the 1980s, the public choice approach received a significance support by the US scholars who are called ‘local public economy school’. Their views are mainly based upon Tiebout’s thesis. They criticize the consolidation approaches and defend fragmented units in the US metropolitan areas. More importantly, they refute the presence of economies of scale (Keating, 1991, p. 111). In the words of Keating:

In fact, they reject two propositions of the consolidation school, that larger jurisdictions are needed for efficient service delivery and that fragmentation presents problems of coordination. The findings of public choice researchers on the efficiency of various types of delivery unit tend to be inconclusive as those of the consolidationists and for the same reason, the difficulty of measuring outputs and in controlling for variations among units other than size (1991, p. 111).

The earlier advocates of the public choice school insisted on only polycentric city regions for improving service provision. In the 1980s, members of the local public economy school started to emphasize different optimal scales for the production of different public properties (Çınar *et al*, 2009, p.18). They distinguished production of public services from provision of public services. While local services can be produced by units of various sizes, they can be best provided by small units. If the services are provided by the small municipalities, local choices can be easily reflected. Members of the local public economy school maintained that a single set of local governments could not supply fiscal equivalence, as the local interests diversify according to the service. Therefore, production of services can be handled by the units of

various sizes (such as metropolitan municipality, intergovernmental unit, another department of the local government or private sector), and then productions can be contracted to the small scales for provision (Keating, 1991, p. 111). Thus, competition among these units would be encouraged in a liberal way. As Keating argues, metropolitan areas were featured by “local public economies in which public entrepreneurs and citizens seek out the best ways of providing services in a climate of cooperation and competition within a set of understood rules” (1991, p. 112).

Ultimately, abandoning the idea of numerous small-scale local governments, the public choice school began to advocate multi-scale governments and limited their functions. Spatial consequences of this approach are functional specialization and governments serving a single purpose. Although there are some differences between the previous and following members of public choice school, all of them have adopted the market logic within their theoretical framework (Çınar *et al*, 2009, p.18).

The public choice theory has been criticized severely by several scholars. Yoloğlu (2011a, p. 12) refers to Tkacheva who criticizes the Tiebout’s argument on the residents of newly established municipalities. As in the words of Yoloğlu:

Tkacheva (2008:156) argues that since it is assumed that municipal services are paid for by users, in Tiebout’s arguments it is important that efficient provision of public services can be accomplished by communities’ preferences for tax-services packages. However, Tkacheva (2008:167) argues that new municipalities are established to shift the cost of financing municipal services to nonresidents. Wealthier people form new municipalities because they want to consume more municipal services, but at the same time they also want to pay less for this desire. Although income and property taxes are paid by residents of new municipalities, taxes of retail sales can be exported to shoppers who live in other municipalities. Therefore, such an attitude distorts the basic assumption that he who consumes the services pays the cost (2011a, p. 13).

Tkacheva (2008) concludes that the main thesis of Tiebout “that all residents pay for public goods and services according to their preferences of goods and services is not a valid one” (as cited in Yoloğlu, 2011, p. 13). Moreover, Cox and Nartowicz (1980) criticize the theories of public economy on competitiveness. In contrast to the arguments of the theory, they draw attention on the weak relations between suppliers and consumers. According to these scholars, as the local governments become monopolistic suppliers of public goods and services, they are not obliged to meet the demands of these citizens (as cited in Yoloğlu, 2011, p. 13).

2.6.3. The Consolidationist Perspectives

After the World War II, local government reforms consolidate fragmented units in the metropolitan regions (Keating, 1991, p. 101). As the population of cities increased, demands

of the citizens and municipal services grew and diversified. However, small scale municipalities, which also formed a fragmented structure, remained incapable of meeting these requirements. Their income resources, technological advances, and qualified staff were inadequate. More importantly, they had to adopt the new worldwide economic model. Thus, local government reforms started with changing municipal boundaries and consolidating the fragmented local units. Keating states that municipalities with larger scales were formed through annexations for the sake of improving efficiency and achieving economies of scale. As larger units benefit from the advantages of scale economies, they could operate more efficiently (1995, p. 117). As a result, their administrative capacity and troubleshooting ability would be increased. They would employ more qualified personnel and could use high-cost technology for the effective service provision (Keating, 1991, p. 103).

As explained before, consolidation practices were divided into two main different periods: The Fordist-Keynesian period between 1960 and 1980, and the neo-liberal period after the 1990s. Hence, consolidationist approaches are divided into various perspectives. The metropolitan governance, the new regionalism and the city region perspectives are the most prominent ones among consolidationist approaches. The most common proposal of these perspectives is the city and region scale with the aim of establishing consolidated units. Although they are inherently similar with each other, there are fundamental differences between them. While the new regionalism approach evaluates the space at the region scale as an integrated form, the city-region approach studies with the purpose of removing differences between city and region (Çınar *et al*, 2009, p.19). On the other side, the metropolitan governance paradigm was firstly developed during the 1950s within the frame of welfare state model. The earliest consolidation approach is called metropolitan government model or reform theory (Swianiewicz & Łukomska, 2017, p. 2). After the 1990s, this approach evolved in accordance with the new economic model and was called metropolitan governance approach. Despite their differences, these consolidationist approaches influence and support each other.

2.6.3.1. The Metropolitan Government Model (Reform Theory)

The metropolitan government model, which emerged in the 1950s, is the earliest and the most primitive form of the consolidationist approaches. Supporters of this model identified the problems of fragmented units in a certain area and offered merging them under a larger government model through a comprehensive local government reform. This is simply called metropolitan government model.

A worldwide problem identified by the consolidationist approaches is the fragmentation of the local units. Yoloğlu (2016, p. 81) indicates that political fragmentation in big cities was also a notable problem in Turkey before enactment of the Law No 6360. Fragmentation is described as the increase in the number of government units in a specific region (Dolan, 1990, as cited in Yoloğlu, 2011, p. 16). There are several reasons for fragmentation. The first and foremost reason is uncontrolled urban growth. The following can be counted among other causes of fragmentation: Extension of the settlement areas towards the borders of the metropolitan area, urban sprawl and the scattering of local units in an irregular way (Savitch & Vogel, 2012). These units generally forms incorporated structures. Then, the living costs (especially for housing) are quite low in the sub-urbans (Yoloğlu, 2016, p. 82).

Schiltz and Moffitt (1971:89) note that widespread agreement on local values, strong personnel involvement encompassing the entire community, well organized community leaders with adequate resources, a variety of social organizations which provide a communications network, and an effective campaign for incorporation are among the causes of fragmentation. They also found that upper-class suburbs are more likely to incorporate, whereas, lower-class suburbs prefer to be annexed to the central city. Additionally they emphasize that the threats to community values, a demand for services, or the presence of some problem can provide the initial impetus for incorporation (as cited in Yoloğlu, 2011a, p. 18).

There are some inevitable results of fragmentation mentioned by numerous scholars. Savitch and Vogel state that excessive fragmentation of municipalities in a region are usually blamed for “inefficient and ineffective public services, poor planning, inadequate infrastructure, and inequality in the financing and delivery of public services to residents” (2012, p. 1). Dolan (1990) also points out the effects of fragmentation as following:

Confusion in responsibility for service provision, reductions in political scrutiny and control, political unresponsiveness, duplication of effort, inefficiencies in service provision, higher per unit costs, larger government expenditures, units of government concerned only about their own problems, fragmented and unstable metropolitan government structure in policy making to manage money and implement programs effectively (as cited in Yoloğlu, 2011a, p. 19).

On the other hand, there is a great deal of attempts to mitigate the results of fragmentation. The first and most common solution against fragmentation was consolidation of the fragmented units. Hence the earliest consolidationist approach emerged under the name of metropolitan government model (reform theory). According to this theory, “bigger government could exploit economies of scale and give citizens cheaper, more effective government” (Savitch & Vogel, 2000a, p. 162). Later on, metropolitan government model had proven to be an inadequate solution for the fragmented units and their problems. Thus, the metropolitan governance approach, the new regionalism approach and the city-region approach were developed as a response.

2.6.3.2. The Metropolitan Governance Approach

Towards the 1990s, for the proponents of the consolidation, there were several metropolitan areas in which municipalities were still quite dispersed and disconnected from their boundary units. The ‘old’ metropolitan government model seemed not to be a permanent solution and therefore a new approach to these fragmented structures, which would also be compatible with the new era of globalization, was needed. As a result, the metropolitan government model has transformed into the metropolitan governance model. The metropolitan scales were evaluated by the proponents of new regionalism as “new state spaces” to plan, develop and compete to meet the requirements of the global economy (Savitch & Vogel, 2012, p. 1).

Meanwhile, the main purpose of the region scale policies has changed over the years. Transition from the welfare state to the liberal state induced changes in regional policies. To create a globally competitive territory in a global economy became the main goal of region policies in the 1990s. The concept of ‘government’ was transformed into to ‘governance’ with this approach. Likewise, the nature and characteristic of the relations between central and local governments were changed. As a consequence, the metropolitan governance paradigm became a substantial tool of the region scale policies (Çınar *et al*, 2009, pp. 23-24). As Blatter states, debates on the metropolitan governance were carried out by two opposing sides in the 1990s: “Centralization / consolidation and decentralization / fragmentation”. However, within the focus has shifted from “rescaling of the government into rescaling of the governance”¹¹ in accordance with the new management paradigm (2006, pp. 121-122).

The metropolitan governance model has been propounded for various local government reforms in several countries. Although these reforms differ from one country to another, their ultimate goals are the same: Consolidation of local units in metropolitan areas to create efficiency in distribution resources, increase in accountability, and decrease in cost through controlling urban sprawl.

¹¹ Blatter (2006, p. 132) clarifies the term ‘governance’ as “upward movement of political decision making (assignments of competencies to higher levels of government or stronger collaboration among local units) or both upward and downward movements”. It includes non-governmental actors to the decision making processes and a transition from hierarchical and vertical structures to horizontal and voluntary bodies (Blatter, 2006:121).

2.6.3.3. The New Regionalism Approach

The new regionalism¹² approach reviews transformation of economic and social structure and understands this transformation through many different perspectives. Some issues that the new regionalism approach focus on are restructuring of the local governments, establishing regional governments as a new tier in the local governments, weakening of the nation state, sharing the power of sovereignty with supra-national organizations and construction of a new elite and identity in the local area (Cole and Palmer, 2008 as cited in Çınar *et al*, 2009, p. 20).

In contrast with the approaches of public choice school and conventional metropolitan government school, the new regionalism refuses the notion of “a single right model” for the metropolitan areas (Özgül, 2017, p. 24). Each metropolitan region has unique economic, political and social features. Moreover, there are different relations between local governments, central administration and local actors in each local unit (Özgül, 2017, p. 24). On the other hand, the new regionalist perspective promotes an understanding of the concept of region, where local forces and institutions become prominent, instead of a state-led development process. The region is regarded as the most effective unit of post-fordist economic development. Also establishment of new institutional mechanisms are proposed for regional development. In this context, new regionalism suggests a new spatial scaling, which leads to enlarging the spatial scale for competition at the national level and expansion of different markets such as goods, services, capital. Briefly, new regionalism emphasizes scale economies to provide regional development in a competitive way (Çınar *et al*, 2009, p. 20).

The new regionalism approach evaluates the scale issue within the context of service provision and delivery mechanisms. Annexation processes in the metropolitan areas are presented as important tools to solve the issues of low growth and reduced incomes. It is argued that the mechanisms of economies of scale achieved through the annexation of the municipalities would provide benefits to local service delivery (Çınar *et al*, 2009, p. 21).

In the study of Carey *et al* (1996), it is assumed that governments exercising authority at larger scales are able to provide services at a lower cost per capita. In order to provide lower cost with larger scales, numerous factors should be taken into consideration. Some of these factors are capital intensity (in solid waste removal, water and wastewater services), inseparability of production factors, cost and availability of scale-sensitive technologies, distribution area and

¹² The term ‘new regionalism’ is translated to Turkish in different forms, such as ‘*yeni bölgecilik*’, ‘*yeni bölgeselcilik*’ or ‘*yeni bölgeselleşme*’. Özgül (2017, p. 24) prefers the term *yeni bölgeselcilik*, since it requires analyzing the issue from the point of administrative and planning dimensions.

cost of service. In addition, cost reduction in large-scale purchases, incidental nature of the demand for some services such as fire and municipal police services should also be taken account. It is also frequently mentioned that the local governments which are small-scale and serving in a certain area on their own are not able to benefit from scale economies in providing various local services. According to the scholars, these small units should be merged or consolidated with other local governments that can provide services at the larger scales (Carey *et al*, 1996 cited as in Çınar *et al*, 2009, p. 21).

2.6.3.4. The City-Regions Approach

The other perspective within the consolidationist stream is the city-regions approach. According to this approach, changing of the borders in metropolitan area and reorganizing of the local governments brings along transfer of rural lands to urban uses (Çınar *et al*, 2009, p. 22). It is supposed that if central city and its periphery were amalgamated, distribution of services and taxes would be more equitable (Keating, 1995, p. 120).

The city-region approach has generally adopted in the US cities. In this context, Rusk (1995) states that distinction between rural and urban would take place through the application of annexation method. Hence, the city-regions involving urban rural and suburban areas together would be established. Rusk also suggests that these areas should be consolidated under a single government referring to the overbound city model (Rusk, 1995 as cited Çınar *et al*, 2009, p. 22).

Meligrana (2004) explains the difference between notions of the overbound and underbound cities used in border reforms arguments. The overbound city means that local government in the city has total authority over the rural areas. Whereas, the underbound city indicates that local governments in the cities have authority over urban settlements, but not over the rural areas (Meligrana, 2004 as cited in Çınar *et al*, 2009, p. 22). As also Çınar *et al* put forward, all these arguments about giving powers to the metropolitan governments have the common underlying purpose of drawing attention of the global capital to these areas (2009, p. 22).

2.6.4. Evaluation of the Opposing Approaches within a Critical Realist Perspective

Rescaling reforms usually seek to achieve optimum scale for the municipalities. In other words, the major question is what the most appropriate size of the municipalities should be for the most efficient service provision. There are numerous and various responses to this question. Two prominent responses to this question are the public choice theory and the

consolidationist views, as previously discussed. Baldersheim and Rose states: “The advantages and disadvantages of larger or smaller scale units of local government, and what is the proper size of local authorities are issues that have occupied a prominent position within the theory and practice of public administration” (2010, p. 1). Consequently, a critical evaluation of these approaches is inevitably required. After examining the issues of optimum scale and efficiency, this section will compare these competing approaches within the frame of the critical realist approach.

2.6.4.1. Optimum Scale of the Municipalities

Throughout the urban history, a major question has always been the same: What is the optimum size of a city? This question can be found in the works of many philosophers from the first ages to the nineteenth century. As Swianiewicz indicates (2002, p. 6):

Plato, in his Republic and Laws, suggested that the ideal city should have a size sufficient for delivery of all important functions but small enough to protect the unity of the city. He came to the conclusion that the ideal number of citizens would be $7!$, i.e. 5,0401. In the 19th century, the recommendation to organize society into localities attracted the attention of utopians. Fourier (1829) suggested the organization into falansters (communes) consisting of 1,620 or, even better, 2,000 persons (inhabitants).

During that period, the question of scale was about establishing local governments. It was associated with the organization of the state on a subnational level (Swianiewicz, 2002, p. 6). However, the primary focus of the question of scale has gradually changed since the beginning of the twentieth century. In its current form the question now asks: What is the optimum size of a municipality for efficient service provision? Thus, it has become an instrument of local government reform. Changing the borders and sizes of the municipalities, establishing new sub-levels, merging or dividing municipalities are all about the question of scale. Its premise has been associated with the idea of the economies of scale, which originated within the discipline of management.

Within the framework of economies of scale, the term ‘optimum size’ is defined as the scale where service delivery costs per capita decrease due to the increasing population. Yoloğlu (2011b, p. 48) clarifies the meaning of optimum city size by providing the relation between scale and marginal cost. The cost of each unit produced in excessive amounts decreases until a specific point, which depends on the increase in scale. Yet, the unit cost starts to increase beyond the specific point. This exact point is defined as optimum scale in terms of production. While this explanation is valid for the producer, its effect is reversed for the consumers. They

can buy more of a product which was produced at the optimum scale with the same amount of money. Yet, they can buy less of the same product or service after this scale is outpaced.

As illustrated in Figure 6, “the normal average cost curve is U-shaped” (Blom-Hansen, Houlberg & Serritzlew, 2014, p. 791). There is a U-shape relation between cost and population. After the optimum scale, cost starts to increase in tandem with increase in population. The negative effects of the economies of scale, which are defined as diseconomies, begin due to population increase. There are also externalities, also called as spillover effects, which cause cost increase. Therefore, it is very important not to exceed the optimum scale. As Boyne explains diseconomies of scale: “After a certain level of production is reached, diseconomies of scale may begin to emerge and unit costs rise” (1995, p. 225). This means that “marginal costs are larger than average cost” (Houlberg, 2010, p. 313). According to Blom-Hansen *et al* (2014, p. 791), troubles of “communication and coordination” cause diseconomies in the larger units. In their words:

However, after a certain level of production is reached, decreasing returns to scale may begin to emerge and unit costs to rise. The main source of this effect is problems of communication and coordination. As production grows, problems of transmitting accurate information through increasing layers of management become more and more serious. Controlling the decisions that are put into effect also becomes more difficult as scale increases. In short, large production processes suffer from increasing management costs. (Blom-Hansen *et al*, 2014, p. 791).

Economies of scale were thought to be found “not only in industrial production but also in services delivered by local governments” (Swianiewicz & Łukomska, 2017, p. 3). Thus, the idea was also applied in determination of the optimum size of the municipalities.




Figure 6 Relation between scale and marginal cost

Source: Received from Yoloğlu (2011b, p. 49)

Figure 6 shows the U-shape relation between scale and marginal cost. Actually, economy of scale is a subject of private management. As Boyne also indicates, “the concept of scale effects is derived from economic theories of production in the private sector” (1995, p. 225). Historically, it was adapted to the public administration by the new public management approach.

In measuring optimum scale of municipalities, one dependent variable (cost) and two independent variables (population number and/or surface area) are widely used. The most popular and easiest criterion is population size. Surface area is generally used in the cases of transportation and communication. The claim is that costs change depending on the size of the population. Cost is the primary and the most important criterion for the consumers (population size) with regards to certain services. Yet, it sometimes can be dependent on the service distribution area (Swianiewicz, 2002). Houlberg (2010, p. 312) explains the economies of scale for municipalities more theoretically:

The municipalities have to be large enough to minimize average costs and there must be forces working to ensure efficient exploitation of these factors. In more theoretical terms, one might say that economies of scale are when the average cost is larger than the marginal costs of production (Houlberg 1995), and the optimal size for local authorities is where marginal benefits equal marginal costs (Martins 1994: 456).

Economies of scale are particularly employed by the consolidationist approaches as a main reason for the consolidation of the municipalities. Once the optimum size is determined, small scale municipalities are merged and transferred to larger ones. Hence, municipalities begin to serve larger areas and populations. Here the optimum size for municipalities is defined as the scale where costs of municipal service provision per capita start to decrease in tandem with increase in population size (Slack and Bird, 2013 as cited in Kızılboga-Özaslan, 2015a, p. 152)

As noted above, however, there is a U-shape relation between cost and population/area. Beyond the optimum scale, costs start to increase. More importantly, this theoretical relation is only true under very specific conditions where all other factors are constant, which can be also defined as ‘laboratory conditions’. The cost and population/area valuables require to be “extracted from the impact of other intervening variables” (Swianiewicz & Łukomska, 2017, p. 5).

There is a great deal of necessary conditions for achieving economy of scale. For example, it is mainly related with production processes and become evident in certain service types and able to play a role in the situations where high costs come together with constant or low costs

(Dollery and Crase, 2004 as cited in Kızılboğa-Özaslan, 2015, p. 152). Moreover, as Swianiewicz and Łukomska (2017, pp. 3-4) indicates:

Several authors (e.g., Kortt, Dollery, and Drew 2015; Sancton 2000) suggest that economy of scale may be seen in some local public services, but not in others. The scale effect is more visible in services in which constant costs play a more important role, and, therefore, changes in the scope of local government services may change the optimal point of the U-shaped curve (Bikker and Van der Linde 2016; Hirsch 1968).

It can be concluded that each service of each municipality has unique optimum scale because one optimum scale is determined for only one service. On the other hand, optimum scale might be useful for private sectors, but for not public services. Municipal services “cannot be produced in factories and distributed to people” and require “geographical proximity between service units and people; therefore this naturally inhibits the concentration of services at a few points” (Dearlove, 1979 as cited in Yoloğlu, 2011a, p. 7).

Table 4 Academic works on optimum scale

Author	Research area	Research object	Optimum Scale, N: Population
Sharpe, 1995	24 European countries	Expenditures on municipal administrative services	- Italy, Norway, Denmark N= 5,000 - Holland, Sweden N=8,000
Mouritzen, 1991	Denmark	Expenditures on municipal administrative services	N < 15,000 more efficient 30,000 < N < 50,000 less efficient
IMI, 1986	Italy	Expenditures on solid waste services	N = 5,000
Found, 2012	Canada	Expenditures on fire and police services	20,000 < N < 40,000
Denters <i>et al</i> , 1991	Netherlands	Political democracy	N < 30,000

Source: Martins, 1995

2.6.4.2. Efficiency in Local Service Provision

The other concept which is frequently utilized by economies of scale is efficiency. It is supposed that at the optimum scale, while costs of the service distribution decreases, efficiency in the service provision increases. Yoloğlu indicates that debates on achieving the optimum scale coincide with the principle of efficiency local governments (2011b, p. 49). Also as Swianiewicz states, “it is generally accepted that the efficiency function in relation to the size is U-shaped, with the lowest point representing the effect of economy of scale.” (2002, p. 16).




Figure 7 Efficiency, productivity and effectiveness

Source: Received from <http://www.opentextbooks.org.hk>

Similar to economies of scale, the concept of efficiency also originates from the private management discipline. Main indicators of technical performance of a management are efficiency, productivity, and effectiveness. Yet, these terms might sometimes create confusion (Yükçü & Atağan, 2009, p. 1). Productivity means providing optimum output from available resources. Here optimum output refers to production of a certain output with the least cost. Productivity can be found through dividing the output by the input. Efficiency means the use of resources for the intended purpose with minimum waste. Efficiency is about inputs of a management. It can be calculated through dividing standard (reference) quantity by the used (actual) quantity in terms of input. Effectiveness means achieving the best possible results by making the best use of resources. Effectiveness is about the outputs of a management. It can be calculated by dividing the materialized (actual) output by the planned (reference) output. While efficiency refers to “doing the right things”, effectiveness refers to “doing the things right” (Drucker, 1990 as cited in Kutlar, Yüksel, & Bakırcı, 2011, p. 20). Efficiency is increased by producing goods and services at minimum possible cost and maximum possible quality. Effectiveness is doing the best not only for the management but also for the consumers (Research Gate, 2014). As measured by profit, productivity is used particularly by private management. The term efficiency is preferred for the public administration, since the social benefit is taken into account instead of simple profit (Özer, 2017). In order to prevent confusion in meanings, this dissertation will use the term efficiency.

Efficiency is an evaluation criterion that measures how sufficient the labour, raw materials, materials and other inputs are utilized for the purposes determined by the enterprise (Yükçü & Atağan, 2009, p. 3). As mentioned before, efficiency is calculated through dividing the

reference input by the actual input. If the efficiency value of a performance becomes smaller than 1, the performance is not very efficient. For example, if the standard time of a work is 3 hours, but it is finished in 5 hours; then the efficiency value will be calculated through dividing 3 hours by 5 hours. The result is 0.6. The work is not very efficient, because the value of 0.6 smaller than 1. If the efficiency value of a performance is bigger than 1, the performance is considered as efficient. Businesses cannot always achieve the efficiency value as bigger than 1. Yet, they try to make the efficiency value closer to 1.

Once the term efficiency was adapted to the public administration domain, one of the major targets of the public organizations became increasing efficiency in service provision. The indicator of efficiency is also used in the debates of scale and economies of scale. Efficiency in public administration corresponds to the rational use of the resources to meet social needs on an optimal scale (Özer B. , 2017). Efficiency of the municipalities depends on many variables, such as new resources, better use of existing resources, product and service diversification and development, application of modern and innovative management approaches, managerial knowledge and experience background. The methods of efficiency measurement are mainly divided into two categories as parametric and non-parametric methods. Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Random Distribution Analysis and Deterministic Frontier Analysis are the parametric methods. Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic Envelopment Analysis are the non-parametric methods (Kutlar, Yüksel, & Bakırcı, 2011, pp. 17-21).

There are numerous studies on measurement of the efficiency in municipal services in Turkey and other countries. Data Envelopment Analysis, Malmquist Index and Free Disposal Hall are the most commonly used methods. This dissertation will not provide a detailed review of these methods. Yet, advocates of the municipal consolidation and economies of scale believe that merging municipalities make the municipal service provision more efficient (Gustely, 1977, p. 349). There are also many empirical researches analysing the link between efficiency and scale. Yet whether or not a more efficient service delivery can be achieved by merging the municipalities is a challenging issue. (Yoloğlu, 2011b, p. 52). There are various and indefinite results. As in the words of Swianiewicz (2002, p. 16):

Still, there is a basic methodological problem with such analysis. It is extremely difficult to measure the output of certain services and there is certainly no objective method to measure the benefits arising from them. In practice, many researchers adopt a simplified method measuring only the cost-side, following a silent assumption that the level of service provision is invariant.

Swianiewicz refers to the methodological problem of the efficiency in the municipal services. Measuring the outputs and benefits of some services is very difficult. A simple cost-side analysis discards the variety in service provision (2002, p. 16).

2.6.4.3. Those Who Advocate Merging Municipalities

The issues of the optimum scale and efficiency was discussed above. The two competing approaches, the consolidationist view and the public school theory will be critically examined as those who advocate merging municipalities and those who advocate fragmented (small scale) municipalities, respectively.

Western countries which advocate merging the municipalities claim that municipalities should become larger in terms of both population and service area for the most efficient service delivery and they start to merge small municipalities. They believe that as a result of merging, service quality, accountability and citizen participation would increase and the service provision would become fair and unbiased (Fox & Gurley, 2006, p. 1). Moreover, larger municipalities are evaluated as the optimal choice for having various financial and technical competences, such as adequate qualified personnel and technologic equipment. The idea of merging the municipalities is attributed to economic motivations rather than democratic reasons. Therefore, the central argument behind this idea is the economies of scale (Slack and Bird, 2013, as cited in Kızılboga-Özaslan, 2015a, p. 152)

The scholars who advocate consolidation of municipalities with their arguments are provided as following. According to Tanguay and Wihry (2008), enlarging the municipal scales through consolidation of the small municipalities has lots of advantages. First, the unit cost decreases due to the economies of scale. Second, benefit spillovers are internalized. Finally, costs of administration and decision making processes are divided by a large population. They assert that service costs per capita decreases as a result (as cited in Yoloğlu, 2011b, 49). Brazer (1962) and Hirsh *et al* (1964) state that fragmentation in the service areas causes cost and benefit spillovers. For Rothenberg (1970) as a result of cost and benefit spillovers, local authorities make wrong decisions. Consequently, these scholars suggest that small municipalities should be merged into larger ones for achieving economies of scale and internalizing spillover effects. Since large municipalities can internalize the spillover effects, they provide cost saving. In addition, for Brazer (1962) large scale municipalities benefit most from the advantages of scale economies, particularly about management and cost control issues (as cited in Gustely, 1977, p. 350-354).

Major thesis of the scholars advocating consolidation of the municipalities can also be summarized as following:

1) Economies of Scale: There are positive effects of the economies of scale on comprehensive local services, such as water and sewage services. Moreover, marginal costs decrease while the service area enlarges. (Fox & Gurley, 2006)

2) Service Quality: The municipalities that serve in larger areas with dense population can enhance service quality without increasing cost (Kushner and Siegel, 2005, as cited in Swianiewicz, 2002, p. 8)

3) Service Capacity: Large municipalities can make regional plans and have the capacity to implement them. They can influence national policy makers (Fox & Gurley, 2006). In addition, they have more capability to resolve major urban problems, such as transportation and discrimination problems (Spicer, 2012, as cited in Swianiewicz, 2002, p. 8).

4) Local Development: Large municipalities promote local development and provide stimulus for economic improvement (Swianiewicz, 2002, p. 10).

5) Eliminating Spillovers: In small scale municipalities there are free riders and they cause extra costs. Yet large municipalities can eliminate such spillover effects (Blazek, 1994, as cited in Swianiewicz, 2002, p. 9).

6) Participation: Since large municipalities provide many services, citizen interest grows and they start to participate to decision making process (Fox & Gurley, 2006).

7) Accountability: Accountability, subsidiarity and transparency can be only provided by large municipalities (Spicer, 2012, as cited in Swianiewicz, 2002, p. 9).

8) Pluralism: Pluralist societies emerge in large municipalities. There are more powerful non-governmental organizations. Large municipalities provide large fields for various interest groups (Goldsmith and Rose, 2000, as cited in Swianiewicz, 2002, p. 9).

In his work, Mouritzen (1989) compares two competing views: reform theory (consolidationist view) and political economy (public choice) school. First, he provides the arguments of the consolidationist view. It is true that some specific services require large populations and areas since citizen demands should reach a threshold before provision of local services. Also, there might be economy of scale in the large units. The author defines economies of scale as “the larger the community, the more effective the production of services

because the unit cost of production is negatively related to the amount produced.” (Mouritzen, 1989, p. 661). These facilities of the larger units provide more efficiency in service provision. Citizens pay less tax and have more opportunity to get involved in the policy making processes. Hence, their satisfaction increases. As large municipalities are more heterogeneous, minorities can also participate in public affairs, creating strong democratic units (Mouritzen, 1989, pp. 662-663).

Gustely (1977) provides the outcomes of municipal consolidation. Since larger municipalities decrease differences in the tax-bases of different settlements, they enhance equity between them. Decrease in average costs results in a decrease in total costs of public services. Therefore, services can be delivered in an efficient way. Achieving economy of scale is the most significant results of the municipal consolidation; because small municipalities cannot have the advantages of the economy of scale, such as technological improvement (Gustely, 1977, pp. 361-363).

Yoloğlu (2016) states that political consolidation is one of the most important solutions to the negative impacts of political fragmentation. He summarizes the proposed reasons for consolidation: acquiring a professional perspective in administration, increasing the capability of the local authorities, involving disadvantaged groups into the system, becoming closer to political representatives, overcoming operational difficulties, decreasing the tax burdens of the citizens, eliminating cost differences between local units, removing diseconomies, providing an effective planning service, resolving malfunctions in service provision, enhancing service quality and efficiency (Yoloğlu, 2016, p. 89).

2.6.4.4. Those Who Advocate Fragmented (Small Scale) Municipalities

Public choice school and other advocates of the small local units are critical of the consolidalist views. Their major criticism is questioning the validity of the idea of economies of scale. Also, observing the consolidated municipalities, they draw some negative conclusions. Yoloğlu (2016, p. 89) provides the negative outcomes of the consolidation of municipalities. It is asserted that there is no decrease in costs; in somuch that spending increases due to increase in expectation from central government. It is also highlighted that moving away from economies of scale in particularly labour intensive services and efficiency decrease depending upon bureaucracy would be observed in large municipalities. Furthermore, Mouritzen (1989, p. 663) indicates that while economies of scale might be appropriate for certain capital intensive programmes, such as water systems, waste disposal and sewage; it is not valid for labour intensive operations. Besides, large municipalities create large

bureaucracy due to the increasing variation and heterogeneity of the population. Efficiency begins to decline since transformation process of the inputs to productions will be prolonged (Hutcheson & Prather, 1979 as cited in Yoloğlu, 2011b, p. 50)

Main arguments of the public choice school and supporters of the small municipalities are provided in the following:

- 1) Proximity: A close relation between municipal authorities and citizens is only possible in small units (Swianiewicz, 2002, p. 10).
- 2) Accountability: Municipal authorities become more accountable in the small municipalities since their responsiveness to citizens is increased (Swianiewicz, 2002, p. 11).
- 3) Social trust: In small communities, social trust is established along with strong personal ties which results in increasing political trust (Denters, 2002 as cited in Swianiewicz, 2002, p. 10).
- 4) Tiebout's Model: Citizens can 'vote with their feet' in small municipalities, which means that they can make a choice between local taxes or service provision. As a result, these small municipalities become more homogenous (Swianiewicz, 2002, p. 10).
- 5) Participation: Small units provide citizens with more reasons to get interested in local affairs and citizens start to participate in local public issues (Denters, 2002 as cited in Swianiewicz, 2002, p. 10).
- 6) Economies of scale: The argument of economies of scale is 'irrelevant'. It is not valid for every function of the municipalities. Some services can be contracted out or totally privatized. On the other hand, larger municipalities can be more bureaucratic and there might create coordination and management problems. Therefore economies of scale cannot give the desired and planned outputs. What is more, merging municipalities might result in increase of costs and decrease of service quality (Swianiewicz, 2002, p. 11).
- 7) Competition: Small units in a metropolitan region can compete with each other in order to attract capital for their functions (Swianiewicz, 2002, p. 11).
- 8) Experiment: Small units in a metropolitan region can learn from various experiences and from each other, this way they acquire political experience (Swianiewicz, 2002, p. 11).

Table 5 Comparasion of the opposing approaches

Those who advocate large municipalities		Those who advocate small municipalities	
Grounded Theory	-Consolidationist Perspectives	Grounded Theory	-Public Choice School
Economies of Scale	-Positive effects at optimum scales -Costs decrease with large area -Tax burdens decrease -Eliminating spill-over	Economies of Scale	-Not valid for every services -Large units coordination and management problems
Efficiency	-Efficiency increases in large area -Production efficiency -People get more for less	Efficiency	-Efficiency increases in small area -Allocation efficiency - People get what they want
Quality	-Quality increases with low costs	Competition	-Easy to compete of small municipalities
Service Capacity	-More capacity to plan and solve urban problems	Proximity and Social Trust	- A close relation between authorities and citizens -Easy to establish strong ties
Development	-Local economy improved by large municipalities	Tiebout's Model	- Vote with their feet' - Choice between local taxes or service provision
Accountability	-Accountability, subsidiarity and transparency with large municipalities	Accountability	-Responsiveness of municipal authorities increase
Participation	-More services result in participation -Citizen satisfaction increases	Participation	-More reasons to get interested -Citizen satisfaction increases
Pluralism	-Democracy in large municipalities -Various interest groups -Powerful NGOs	Homogeneity	-Democracy in small units -Easy service provision to homogeneous society

Mouritzen (1989) also provides the claims of the advocates of small municipalities. It is argued that small municipalities make citizens more satisfied as they are more homogeneous and democratic. It is also asserted that “citizens in small jurisdictions hold more favourable attitudes towards participation and democracy, and the smaller units are more homogeneous and more efficient in the provision of services” (Mouritzen, 1989, p. 661). In small units, closer relationship between elected officials and citizens can be established. “The policy-makers are in direct contact with the constituency and are not forced to rely solely on (filtered and biased) information coming from the bureaucracy.” (Mouritzen, 1989, p. 664). Preferences of citizens can simply influence local policies. Moreover, small municipalities are likely to become “ideal place for education to democracy” and there “citizens are more responsible, the opportunities

for participation are enhanced and feelings of efficacy are fostered” (Sharpe, 1970 as cited in Mouritzen, 1989, p. 664). Thus efficiency, which mainly refers allocation efficiency, can be realized under these circumstances.

It should be noted that there are differences in the meaning of some concepts which are used by the two competing approaches. Mouritzen (1989) draws attention to some of these differences, i.e. the term participation and the term efficiency, respectively. These terms have different meanings according to these two views. With participation, the consolidationist views mean “collective or organizational channels of participation”. However, the public choice school refers to “individual participation” (Mouritzen, 1989, p. 665). For the consolidationist views, efficiency mainly refers to the production process: “people get more for less” (Mouritzen, 1989, p. 666). Yet, for the public choice school, efficiency is defined as the ability of the public authorities to deliver services depending on the preferences of citizens: “people get what they want” (Mouritzen, 1989, p. 666).

2.6.4.5. Certain Critiques to the Opposing Approaches

There is a question which always draws attention in the field of public administration: What is the most appropriate (optimum) size for municipalities? As mentioned before, this question was initially posed regarding the organization of sub-national units of government (Rydergård, 2012, p. 1). There are various answers for the question of optimum size of the municipalities in terms of population number (i.e. ranging from 5.000 to 1.000.000). Therefore, this question divides the responders into two camps: Advocates of smaller municipalities versus advocates of larger municipalities. Within the context of local government reforms, these responders are also referred to as “localists” or “regionalist” in the sense of “fragmentation/ decentralization” or “consolidation/ centralization” of the local units, respectively (Blatter, 2006, p. 121). Despite their sharp differences, these opposing approaches share a common goal: “Rescaling of government” in accordance to the new global economy (Blatter, 2006, p. 121).

Thus, municipalities have been rescaled (merged or fragmented) to create the most suitable areas for competition. These areas were designed as basic units in creating private entrepreneurial policies, in raising the competitiveness-based elements of local and regional development and in creating spaces suitable for flexible production modes (Çınar *et al*, 2013, p. 17). As a result, debates on “rescaling of government” were turned to debates about “rescaling of governance” in the last decades (Blatter, 2006, pp. 121-122). As pointed out by Blatter:

[W]e are witnessing new discourses beyond the traditional dispute between localists and regionalists. New dichotomies emerge, for example, “jumping of scale” versus “relativization of scales”; “deterritorialization” versus “reterritorialization”; “spaces of place” versus “space of flows.” These dichotomies can be interpreted as different proposals and/or diagnoses in respect to the geographic scale and functional scope of emerging institutions of metropolitan governance. Here, the dominant positive question is whether “rescaling” means that political regulation and governance are moving toward larger scales/higher levels or whether “rescaling” means both centralizing and decentralizing tendencies at the same time. In sum, positive and normative discussions about the architecture of metropolitan governance are shifting from small-versus large scale government toward few versus many scales of governance. The newer cleavage is also a question of broad versus narrow functional scope of governance institutions (2006, p. 121).

In fact, as numerous scholars emphasize, both the question above and its answers are under fire of criticism. There is no answer to this question which is universally accepted (Keating, 1991, 1995; Razin, 1996; Baldersheim & Rose, 2010; Houlberg, 2010; Rydergård, 2012; Swianiewicz, 2017). For Keating, the answers proposed are ‘speculative’. For Baldersheim and Rose (2010, p. 1), the question possesses “an inherent phoenix-like character: as soon as an answer is provided in one time and place, the question arises anew in another time or place”. According to these authors, “it is apparent that there is no “golden egg” (Columbus egg) that provides a solution to the question” (Baldersheim & Rose, 2010, p. 7). For Swianiewicz, outputs of these efforts “are still far from conclusive” (2017, p. 1). Houlberg asserts that empirical results “do not give a clear answer” since they “are scattered, ambiguous, and inconsistent” (2010, p. 309). For Eran Razin, “there is no clear-cut optimal structure for local government in metropolitan areas” (1996, p. 42).

In fact, more than forty years ago, Dahl and Tufte (1973) reached the conclusion that “no single type or size of unit is optimal” (as cited in Houlberg, 2010, p. 311). “We can conclude with confidence that, under certain not well understood circumstances, it may, or may not, be more, or less, economical to have larger, or smaller, local authorities” (Newton 1978, as cited in Houlberg, 2010: 315). As it can be observed, the common argument is that there is no definite answer since the sizes obtained from empirical studies differ. But why is it so? According to Houlberg, the reason is “the complexity of the production of particular municipal services and/or simultaneous production of more services and tasks”. (2010, p. 313). He adds that optimal scale differs due to the service and the type of authority in a multipurpose municipality. There is no definite result “as to whether differences in expenditure levels are due to differences in productivity or differences in service levels”, because the total production in the municipalities cannot be calculated (Houlberg, 2010, p. 313).

By scrutinizing the nature of question regarding the optimum size, one can easily conclude that there is no definite answer. However, as stated before, there have been always attempts to

answer this question and these answers have mainly divided the responders into two sides: Advocates of the larger scales and advocates of the smaller scales. The historical development, arguments, reasons and inferences of these contesting approaches have been examined above. In the following, some critiques will be provided within the perspectives of certain scholars.

Keating (1991, 1995) criticizes both public choice school and consolidationist views. His first critique is against the public choice school and its theory of ‘vote with their feet’. Keating argues that individuals cannot always prefer rationally, instead their preferences culturally and structurally conditioned. He adds that the market can provide distorted signals which lead the individuals to wrong decisions (1991, p. 109). Keating also criticizes the consolidationist views and their arguments about scale of the local units. First, he focuses on the scale issue in terms of its academic research method. He asserts that “the right size for a municipal government is a matter of the local circumstances and the value judgements of the observer”. He also adds “matters of ideology and of interest” having relevance to the issue of municipal scale (Keating, 1995, p. 117). Therefore, rescaling of the local units cannot be understood simply as an intellectual endeavour (Keating, 1991, p. 117).

Keating continues his criticisms by offering certain keywords in order to clarify the problem. According to him, there are four major dimensions of the scale issue that are predominantly addressed by the consolidationist approach: Efficiency, democracy, distribution and development (Keating, 1995, p. 117). They try to determine an optimal scale where municipalities produce most service with least cost (efficiency); where citizens can have control over municipalities (democracy); where services and the related tax burdens are well balanced (distribution); and where local economic growth can be achieved as a result of best equipped municipalities (development). However for Keating, these concepts are highly value-laden to reach a consensus for their definition (1995, p. 117).

According to Keating, empirical results analysing relation between size and efficiency have been disproved, since the description of efficiency is itself conflicted. Moreover, “deductive arguments as the Tiebout’s model and its derivatives could not adequately address this relation” (Keating, 1991, p. 117). In the words of Keating:

It is very difficult to demonstrate that a particular size of unit is more efficient, given the absence of adequate measures of output in public services. It may be possible to show that units of a certain size have lower costs than others, but unless the quality of service is as good we cannot call them more efficient. Nor can we say that a unit is inefficient because its costs are high; it may be delivering a better product, be more responsive to the needs of clients or be paying higher wages as a recognition of employee interests. So exercises in measuring economies of scale in local government services have invariably proved inconclusive (1991, p. 103).

Moreover, Keating underlines a major problem with the studies on the economies of scale. As they look for only the best size of local units through a single factor, the outputs are discovered in an isolated way. He briefly puts forward that technical studies about municipal scales and efficiency do not provide any definitive conclusion. The technical results become highly speculative when trying to determine an optimum scale for local units. For Keating, efficiency can be evaluated only with regards to “what local government ought to do” (1991, pp. 117-118). Keating (1995) adds other important factors that affect the issue of municipal scale: The importance of historical context, and local interests and power. For the author, all of these factors affecting municipal scale are in fact political issues. “The political nature of the issue is further emphasized by the implications which government structures have for the balance of power among social and political interests and for substantive public policies” (Keating, 1991, p. 117).

Baldersheim and Rose (2010) also express significant criticisms against the contesting views. As stated before, for the authors there is “no universally accepted answer” (2010, p. 5) for an appropriate size of the municipalities despite numerous empirical works on the issue. In their words: “Demographic size alone, however, tells only part of the story. Also important is just what local authorities do – both what they are *expected* to do and what they in addition may do *on a voluntary* basis.” (Baldersheim & Rose, 2010, p. 5). They conceptualize the scale issue as a political process that they call “politics of territorial reform” (Baldersheim & Rose, 2010, p. 9). The authors argue that all efforts on reorganization of the local governments are “an outcome of political processes – i.e. patterns of policy making, debate and conflict – in large part occur at the national level” (Baldersheim & Rose, 2010, p. 9). According to the authors, the scale issue should be evaluated as an important part of local government reforms. Reformers suggest that there is a deep incompatibility “between territorial jurisdictions and the functions and responsibilities of local government” (Baldersheim & Rose, 2010, p. 1). They conclude that all the “wicked problems, such as degraded environments, traffic congestion, urban sprawl, inadequate water supply and decaying inner cities” of the municipalities result from fragmentation (Baldersheim & Rose, 2010, p. 1). Thus they look for a better fit between scale and the problems faced by municipalities. As in the words of Baldersheim and Rose: “Such a fit, however, can never be a permanent one; societies change and so do the extent and nature of challenges confronting governments” (2010, p. 1). At the end, the authors turn the scale questions into a more complicated and intricate ones:

What powers and responsibilities are to be assigned to different units of sub-national government, how are the activities of these units to be financed and how many and how large

(or small) should the units of sub-national government be? Further complicating the matter is what set of principles and rules should be adopted for how decisions are to be made and carried out at the sub-national level (Baldersheim & Rose, 2010, p. 1).

Baldersheim and Rose suggest to the contributors of their book that their research should focus on the questions above, not solely on the “advantages or disadvantages of the larger or smaller scale of local government units” (2010, p. 2). Hence, the authors prepare an analytical roadmap for researchers to analyse reform within the frame of political process¹³.

Blatter (2006) criticizes the opposing approaches from the perspective of rescaling politics. He clarifies that enlarging the municipal scales is a result of “the scalar expansion of markets (continental and global free trade agreements)” so that the municipalities can enhance their ability of competition (Blatter, 2006, p. 123). According to the author, the debates on the size of municipalities have been left behind. The question should be “whether ‘rescaling’ means that political regulation and governance are moving toward larger scales/higher levels or whether ‘rescaling’ means both centralizing and decentralizing tendencies at the same time” (Blatter, 2006, p. 122). Blatter draws attention to the new form of the rescaling as following (Blatter, 2006, p. 124).

Finally, beyond parallel and overlapping tendencies toward larger and smaller scales, researchers acknowledge that the classic entities of governance do not disappear. The city and the nation-state do not dissolve but are only being complemented by further scales of regulation and governance. In consequence, scholars have come to diagnose a “relativation of scales” which means the proliferation of governing capacities across a variety of spatial scales—neighborhood, municipality, metropolitan, regional, national, supranational, continental, and global (Brenner, 1999a, p. 33; 2002, p. 10; Collinge, 1996, p. 1).

Furthermore, Mouritzen (1989) points out excessive studies on the scale of economy to find a relation between the cost of services and the size of municipalities. Nonetheless, according to author, “the results are ambiguous” since optimum scale is “a relative phenomenon” (1989, p. 674). Optimum scale differs depending upon forms, levels and services of the municipalities. “Also, it varies across countries because the distribution of functional responsibilities between levels of governments varies across countries” (Mouritzen, 1989, p. 674). Mouritzen concludes that both public choice and consolidationist theories can be “only partial theories” since they investigate only one dimension of the scale phenomenon (1989, p. 680).

Sancton (2000) elaborates the statement that there is not any valid optimum scale for the municipalities; because each service has unique optimum size. Since the municipalities produce many various services, there is no single administrative size that can procure every

¹³ For further details about the roadmap, look their edited book “Territorial Choice: The Politics of Boundaries and Borders”, 2010.

service and have them produced at the minimum cost (as cited in Kızılboğa-Özaslan 2015a, p. 152).

Dearlove (1979) provides a remarkable expression about the limits of economy of scale. It is very clear that market logic cannot be adapted to municipalities. The author asserts that services delivered to the citizens by municipalities are not produced in the factories. These services require geographical proximity between service units and the citizens. This prevents services from being concentrated in specific points. In addition, municipalities provide many labour intensive services. They are produced under fixed cost conditions. It is impossible for their production to be cheaper when the quantity increases. For such services machines or automation cannot replace employees' labour (Dearlove, 1979 as cited in Yoloğlu, 2011b, p. 51). Dearlove refers to local governments as following (1979):

They are area monopolist; they are not attempting to, and neither could they, maximize profits; and they lack unambiguous indicators of standards of performance. Some of the goods produced by local authorities are public goods where each individual's consumption leads to no subtractions from any other individual's consumption. In this sort of situation pricing is next to impossible. Since an efficient allocation of resources occurs when price is equal to marginal cost, it is clear that the production of non-priced goods at an efficient level can only occur by chance (Brown, 1974). Moreover, if you are serious about trying to estimate cost functions then you have to hold constant the quality of the product. This problem can, in principle, be coped with when we are dealing with the products of private manufacture, but is impossible to hold constant, or measure, the differences in quality when we are dealing with the services provided by local authorities (Thompson, 1965; Hirsch, 1970). For single-product plants the economies of scale are the potential reductions in average unit costs of production associated with higher levels of production capacity. For multi-product plants scale is a multi-dimensional concept and may be changed not only by altering the overall capacity but also in other ways. Local government is a provider of many services and so dealing with the issue of economies of scale is a very tricky exercise (as cited in Yoloğlu, 2011a, p. 8)

Dearlove asserts that pricing of public goods is almost unfeasible. Therefore, efficiency in the service provision depends on random factors. If one insists on analysing the cost functions for public goods, qualification and quality of the product should be held at a constant level. However, this is impossible for public goods. He concludes that trying to achieve economies of scale is very thorny.

Rydergård (2012) tries to put an end to debates about both optimum scale and efficiency by pointing out that the empirical findings supporting larger or smaller municipalities cannot reach clear-cut results. There are evidence supporting and invalidating for the arguments of each view. Indeed, the outcomes demonstrate that there are other factors influencing efficiency and therefore determining municipal size is not a decisive and universal science. Optimum scale depends on the variety and context of the municipal duties. Because the boundaries have

not only administrative functions but also historical, social and political functions; drawing boundaries requires considering these factors as well (Rydergård, 2012, p. 14).

Feiock, Park & Kang (2006) have an actor-based evaluation of changing sizes of the local governments. They analyse cases of the city-county consolidations in the US. According to the authors, consolidation processes are not based on economic reasons, as claimed by their proponents. These processes have in fact a political basis. There is no a clear evident for economic benefits of consolidation (i.e. efficiency, economy of scales and development) offered by the actors (Feiock *et al*, 2006, p. 1). Moreover, the presumed benefits are only a part of the reforms. They argue that “reform is also a means for these same advocates to pursue more narrow, or selective, benefits for themselves and their allies” (Feiock *et al*, 2006, p. 10). In fact, both the advocates and the opponents structure the reforms according to their selective incentives. Hence, interest groups and their gains always become the focus of these reforms. “Business interests, civic organizations, local officials, academic elites, and the local media”, all of them receive “private or selective benefits” from these reforms (Feiock *et al*, 2006, p. 10).

Feiock *et al* apply “theories of public entrepreneurship and local government reorganization” to understand the “selective costs and benefits to these actors of pursuing opportunities to change existing boundaries” (2006, p. 9). The authors explain the entrepreneurs and gainers of these reforms with their so-called and real motives. Those can be public officials, private business interests and resident interests.

Supporters and opponents use heresthetical strategies to exploit latent attitudes in the community as they struggle over this issue. The claims they make often have little to do with the actual effects of the proposed reorganization, but this is largely irrelevant. City-county consolidation is not about efficiency, racial division, or even economic development. It is fundamentally about political losers trying to be winners and the current winners trying to prevent this turn of events (Feiock *et al*, 2006, p.23).

According to Feiock *et al*, the reformers “deal with the devil”, because the reforms never result in the conclusionsthey promise (2006, p. 24). On the other hand, Savitch and Vogel (2012) define changing boundaries of local government units with their institutional arrangements as territorial rescaling. They critically analyse cases of city-county consolidation and find out that the public authorities cannot achieve the pre-assumed development. At the end, in the consolidated units, segregation and urban sprawl are still the major problem and spillover effects cannot be prevented (Savitch & Vogel, 2012, p. 4).

Similarly, Çınar *et al* (2013) claim that determining a universal optimum population size for municipalities will be an inconclusive effort. According to the authors, both practices of making smaller or larger the municipalities are important policies. The common point is the promotion of local markets through commercializing local specificities and diversities. Likewise rescaling is based on creating attractive spaces for the international market (Çınar *et al*, 2013, p. 17). Those who examine the scale issue from a critical perspective regard rescaling as a tool of capital accumulation. While producing complicated spaces, neoliberal world economy rescales economic, political, and social spaces with a governance model. At the same time, metropolitan areas are transformed into key points of financial competition. This transformation is affirmed by both of the opposing views. They praise the shift from a traditional metropolitan planning model to a neoliberal competitive planning model through developing a paradigm of entrepreneur cities. In other words, transition from a metropolitan planning under the leadership of state to a strategic planning is praised. Consequently effective metropolitan governance and planning gain importance in order to attract the global market (Çınar *et al*, 2009, pp. 24-25)

2.7. Municipal Rescaling Practices in Certain Countries

Since the beginning of twentieth century, one of the worldwide problems has been managing, monitoring and planning the big cities that have proliferated. Various methods and models have been proposed to solve this problem, such as changing the number and the scale of the municipalities (Çınar *et al*, 2009, pp. 14-15). Rescaling policies in the European countries were put on the agenda along with local government reforms. These policies were put into practice in two different periods. The first period started after the World War II and merging of municipalities left its mark on this period. The second period started after the 1980s and can be divided into two phases. Fragmented local units were advocated during the first phase. Then, consolidated local units gained support during the second wave.

After the World War II, the welfare state delegated some responsibilities and services to the local governments as a consequence of increasing public demands. However, the local governments remained incapable of meeting the administrative, financial and personnel requirements of these responsibilities. As a result, local governments were consolidated on the grounds of increasing efficiency of the service provision. The first period lasted until the crisis of welfare state. The second period began with the proposal of small units in the 1980s. However, merging municipalities as a tool of promoting local development gained importance again in the 1990s. The goals of merging practices during this period –promoted by the new

public management approach- were very different from those of the earlier welfare state era. A typical example for the policies of this period comes from New Zealand. Practices of rescaling, privatization, deregulation and localization as the tools of local government reforms in New Zealand became a model for other countries. The number of municipalities reduced to 74 from 249 and a new sub-level of administration between central and local government was established (Çınar *et al*, 2013, p.51).

Nature of local government reforms and rescaling policies vary from country to country, because each country has a unique institutional structure and actor process based on its economic and political background. Furthermore, each country has a different relationship between central and local governments (Kızılboga-Özaslan, 2015a). The goal of this section is to put forward the reasons of the municipal rescaling policies of the selected countries and analyse the consequences of these policies on the municipal service provision. In this context, theoretical and empirical studies on rescaling practices in the countries will be critically reviewed. The ultimate aim of this section is to contribute the municipal rescaling policies of Turkey and its impacts on the municipal service provision through comparing the country cases.

2.7.1. Methods of Merging Municipalities

First of all, it is better to provide information on various give several methods of merging municipalities employed applied by other the countries. Çınar *et al* (2013) examined the methods of merging municipalities under three sections: different topics. These methods are annexation, amalgamation, and consolidation.¹⁴

1) Annexation: As one of the methods of expanding the municipal boundaries, annexation¹⁵ was initially used in the US and then spread to European countries. Annexation refers to the incorporation of new territories into the boundaries of an existing municipality. A municipality that wants to expand annexes the large rural areas around it. These surrounding areas do not have a legal status and therefore a referendum is not required for annexation. Slightly different from annexation is the pactice of merging,¹⁶ where two territories with legal status are united.

¹⁴ This dissertation will use the words consolidation, merging, amalgamation and annexation interchangeably.

¹⁵ Annexation means *katma* in Turkish.

¹⁶ Merging means *katılma / birleşme* in Turkish.

These territories request merging with a city and a referendum is required for this method. In Turkey, since there is no territory that doesn't have a legal status, annexation is not implemented. Nonetheless, the merging practice resembles two practices in Turkey. The first practice is merging small municipalities or villages with a big municipality through a referendum. The Article No 8 of the Law No 5393 refers to this merging practice. The second practice is incorporating small municipalities and villages into the boundaries of a big municipality without a referendum. This practice is referred in the Article No 11 of the Law No 5393 (Çınar *et al*, 2013, pp. 45-46)

2) Amalgamation: As a more comprehensive method, amalgamation¹⁷ is employed in the US and European countries. It refers to the creation of a new local unit by incorporating municipalities and villages into the closest municipality. The incorporated municipalities and villages have legal status previously. Also, the newly formed local unit gets a new legal status. The major aim of amalgamation is decreasing the number of municipalities and to establish new and larger municipalities. Amalgamation is a more democratic practice because the local people are asked whether or not they desire amalgamation. On the contrary, as annexation is a top-down practice, and it is usually criticized for it (Çınar *et al*, 2013, p. 47).

3) Consolidation: As the final method of extension of local units, consolidation¹⁸ was first used in the US and then spread to the European countries. When a city and a county with a legal status merge through consolidation, this practice is called as city county consolidation. It indicates a single tier administrative system. On the contrary, annexation and amalgamation mostly refer to two tier administrative systems. The major aim of consolidation is to remove small local units (counties) located in the centre and to establish a single tier administrative system. These counties lose their status after consolidation (Çınar *et al*, 2013, p. 48).

2.7.2. An Overview of Rescaling Practices of the Selected Countries

Even though an optimum size for a municipality is theoretically found in the European countries, sizes of the municipalities highly vary in practice. For example, England, Holland, Poland, Bulgaria, and the Nordic countries have larger municipalities, while Hungary, Slovakia and Czech Republic have smaller ones. It is interesting that France has thousands of very small municipalities (Swianiewicz, 2002, p. 6). While the optimal population size is 2,000

¹⁷ Amalgamation means *bütünleştirme* in Turkish.

¹⁸ Consolidation means *birleştirme* in Turkish.

in Bayern, it is 6,500 – 8,000 in Sweden (Rydergård, 2012, p. 7). Variations in the sizes of the municipalities among countries are explained by Swianiewicz as following:

This provides a good opportunity to observe a variation of political, social and economic processes amongst a variety of territorial organization settings. Differences between countries may only be explained by history (tradition) and inertia of the spatial organization to some extent. The territorial organization of some states' municipal government is, indeed, deeply rooted in historical tradition and any change would probably be strongly resisted (Swianiewicz, 2002, p. 6).

Along with the local government reforms between 1950 and 1990, municipalities in the European countries were merged and the number of municipalities was drastically reduced. The total number of the municipalities in nineteen European countries – United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Holland, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, Luxemburg, Finland, Bulgaria and Greece – decreased by 38,933 (Rydergård, 2012, p. 7). However, the merging policy lost its primacy in the political agenda by the end of the twentieth century. Particularly the socialist countries in the Eastern Europe led this new trend of deemphasizing merging, as their municipalities were forcibly consolidated under the Communist regime (Swianiewicz, 2010, p. 1). Warning of Martins is noteworthy to make a critical comment on these reducing practices of the countries:

It is apparent from the data that the reduction in the total number of municipalities cannot be easily explained by using population density, surface area, or even the average population size of municipalities as criteria. Rather, it is necessary to bear in mind national peculiarities and the socioeconomic and ideological context, and to consider the alternatives to amalgamation (1995, p. 447).

Despite the abundant empirical studies on the optimal size of municipalities, there is a lack of works on the effects and results of the rescaling practices of various countries. The existing studies mostly indicate failure of the sampled merging practices. For example, very few of the projects of merging local units in the USA have been put into practice since 1805 and majority of them failed. Likewise, expected results from municipal consolidations have not been achieved in Canada for 20 years. Efforts to merge communes and to decrease their numbers in France have not brought about achievable conclusions (Çınar *et al*, 2009).

Table 6 shows the general characteristics of municipalities in selected 26 countries. Average municipal area, average municipal population, number of municipalities, municipalities with lower than 5,000 population and municipal expenses as per cent of gross national product (GNP). Baldersheim and Rose (2010, p. 4) divide the countries in the table into three different groups in terms of municipal population. Group 1 includes the countries with the smallest

municipalities. Their average municipal population is lower than 10,000. This group also includes the countries, where over half of the municipalities have lower than 5,000 population. France is “the most extreme sample” (Baldersheim and Rose, 2010, p. 4). It has 1,720 average municipal population and 95% of its municipalities with lower than 5,000 population. Also the average municipal area in France is 17 kilometer square, which is a very small area. Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxemburg, Slovak Republic, Spain and Switzerland are also included Group 1. Hungary, Slovakia, France and Czech Republic have 54, 68, 77 and 80 percent of their municipalities under 1,000 population, respectively (Swianiewicz, 2002, p. 7). In addition Germany and Italy are also placed in this group. Estonia and Latvia can be also included in this group, but their average municipal area is over 100 kilometer square. Indeed, this means that they have the lowest population density.

Table 6 Characteristics of municipalities in selected countries

Countries	Average municipal area (km ²)	Average municipal population (2007)	Number of municipalities (2007)	Percent municipalities under 5,000 population	Municipal expenses as per cent of GNP (2007)
Austria	40	3,510	2,537	91	7.5
Belgium	51.2	17,910	589	14	6.7
Bulgaria	432	29,090	264	11	7.2
Czech Rep.	12.6	1,640	6,249	96	11.2
Denmark	440	55,480	98	3	32.2
Estonia	178	5,930	227	80	9.8
Finland	706	12,660	416	52	19.3
France	17	1,720	36,683	95	11.2
Germany	28.94	6,690	12,312	77	7.2
Greece	21	10,775	1,034	53	2.5
Hungary	30	3,170	3,175	91	11.6
Ireland	120	37,310	114	37	7.2
Italy	37	7,270	8,101	71	15.1
Latvia	115	4,340	527	91	10.8
Lithuania	1,088	56,570	60	2	8.4
Luxemburg	22	4,080	116	81	4.7
Netherlands	157	36,890	443	2	15.3
Norway	751	11,010	431	55	13.3
Poland	127	15,390	2,478	25	13.4
Portugal	319	34,380	308	20	6.1
Romania	81	6,800	3,173	35	9.6
Slovak Rep	17	1,870	2,891	95	6.1
Slovenia	106	9,560	210	48	8.4
Spain	62.5	5,430	8,111	85	6.4
Sweden	1,437	31,310	290	4	24.5
Switzerland	14	2,700	2,758	89	7.7
UK	504	139,480	437	0	12.8
Turkey	328	23,340	2,950	69	-

Sources: Çınar et al (2013, p. 54), Baldersheim & Rose (2010, p. 3), Swianiewicz (2002, p. 7), Martins (1995, pp. 444-445)

Group 2 includes the countries with the largest municipalities. Their average municipal population is greater than 35,000. This group also includes the countries, where municipalities with a population smaller than 5,000 represent a very small percentage of all municipalities. United Kingdom (UK), Denmark, Lithuania, Ireland and Netherlands are in this group. The average municipal population in the UK is 139,480. It has no municipality with a population smaller than 5,000. Also the average municipal area of UK is 504 kilometer square, which refers a very large area. The countries in Group 3 have medium sized municipalities. The average municipal population is between 25,000 and 35,000. They have “relatively few municipalities” with populations smaller than 5,000. Bulgaria, Portugal, and Sweden are examples of this group (Baldersheim & Rose, 2010, p. 4).

Apart from Group 1 and 3, the other countries which have municipalities with a population of 10,000-25,000 can be added to a group called small sized municipalities. Hence Group 4 has Belgium, Finland, Greece, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Turkey. The example of Turkey is very interesting when compared to the current data. The data in this table is from the year 2007. The data for Turkey after 2014 is different than the data in 2007. This issue will be discussed on the following chapter.

Table 7 Dividing of the selected countries into groups

Group 1	Countries with the smallest municipalities	France, Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxemburg, Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland, Germany, Italy, Estonia and Latvia
Group 2	Countries with the largest municipalities	UK, Denmark, Lithuania, Ireland and Netherlands
Group 3	Countries with medium sized municipalities	Bulgaria, Portugal and Sweden
Group 4	Countries with small sized municipalities	Belgium, Finland, Greece, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey.

As it can be clearly observed in Table 7, there are different municipal sizes among the countries. Swianiewicz expresses the variation in the size of the municipalities as following (2002, p. 6):

Differences between countries may only be explained by history (tradition) and inertia of the spatial organization to some extent. The territorial organization of some states' municipal government is, indeed, deeply rooted in historical tradition and any change would probably be strongly resisted (France provides a classic example of such a situation). Still, we can also indicate countries in which the size of municipal government has only recently been re-shaped. For example, the history of the large British district is just over 20 years old.

On the other hand, Baldersheim and Rose (2010, p. 4) emphasize that population size alone cannot provide comprehensive information about the countries. There should be other characteristics to compare countries. For example, the average municipal population and municipal expenses as a percent of the GNP can provide more information about the countries. The authors compare 11 selected countries over these data. They find out that there is a relation between municipal size and municipal expenditures. “The smaller the municipalities (and the more who have under 5,000 inhabitants), the fewer the tasks that are commonly assigned to the municipalities and, as a consequence, the smaller are local expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP)” (Baldersheim & Rose, 2010, p. 4). However, the authors warn that “increased size is no guarantee for increased activity” (Baldersheim & Rose, 2010, p. 4). They compare some countries that justify their argument. They conclude that “there is no universally accepted answer to the question of what may constitute an appropriate organization of subnational government – is both striking and convincing” (Baldersheim & Rose, 2010, pp. 4-5).

Table 8 Percent change of number of municipalities in countries for 1950, 1990 and 2007

Countries	Number of municipalities 1950	Number of municipalities 1990	Percent Change 1950-1990	Number of municipalities 2007	Percent Change 1990-2007	Total Percent Change 1950-2007
Belgium	2,669	589	-78	589	0	-77.9
Czech Rep.	11,459	6,196	-46	6,249	+1	-45.5
Denmark	1,391	275	-80.2	98	-64.4	-93.0
Finland	547	455	-16.8	416	-8.6	-23.9
France	38,000	31,424	-17.3	36,683	+16.7	-3.5
Germany	24,156	16,061	-33.5	12,312	-23.3	-49.0
Greece	5,959	5,922	-1	1,034	-82.5	-82.6
Italy	7,781	8,101	+4.1	8,101	0	+4.1
Netherlands	1,015	647	-36.3	443	-31.5	-56.4
Norway	744	439	-41	431	-2	-42.1
Spain	9,214	8,086	-12.2	8,111	+1	-12.0
Sweden	2,281	286	-87.5	290	+1.4	-87.3
UK	2,061	484	-76.5	433	-10.5	-79.0
Turkey	628	2061	+228.1	2810	+36.3	+347.4

Sources: Çınar *et al* (2013, p. 54), Baldersheim & Rose (2010, p. 3), Swianiewicz (2002, p. 7), Martins (1995, pp. 444-445)

As mentioned before, numerous municipalities in the European countries were merged and the number of municipalities was drastically reduced between the years 1950 and 1990. While some countries reduced the number of municipalities significantly, others reduced the number of municipalities only slightly. A few countries even increased the number of municipalities

and completely give up on this policy. Table 8 and Figure 8 show percent change of number of municipalities in selected 13 countries. Percent changes are divided into three periods. The first period is between 1950 and 1990. The second period is between 1990 and 2007. The third period refers total percent change between 1950 and 2007.

It can be clearly observed in Table 8 and Figure 8 that most of the countries reduced the number of municipalities between 1950 and 1990. Sweden, Denmark, Belgium and UK dramatically reduced the number of municipalities. Czech Republic, Germany and Netherlands decreased the number of municipalities moderately. Only Italy increased the number of municipalities. There is a little change in the total number of municipalities between 1990 and 2007. Only Greece could begin to merging practices between 1950 and 2007 and dramatically reduced the number of municipalities. Denmark, Netherlands and UK continue the merging practices during this period. On the other side, France increased the number of municipalities during this period. France and Spain have the least total percent change in terms of merging municipalities. Among these European countries, Italy is the unique country that increased the number of municipalities. The issue of Turkey will be discussed in the municipal context of Turkey chapter.




Figure 8 Percent change of number of municipalities in selected countries for 1950, 1990 and 2007

Sources: Çınar et al (2013, p. 54), Baldersheim & Rose (2010, p. 3), Swianiewicz (2002, p. 7), Martins (1995, pp. 444-445)

Among these countries, Greece has a similar case with Turkey in terms of rescaling practices. As an Eastern European country, Greece has a rooted tradition of local administrative system. The soul of ancient Greek commune is claimed to have persisted even under the sovereignty of foreign states. However, the Ottoman local administrative system had an important impact on the formation of contemporary municipalities (Krispis, 2016; Hlepas, 2015). Greece has a unitary state structure and its administrative system is parliamentary democracy. The fragmented structure of the local governments was the most notable problem in Greece. Also, a centralist, populist, and clientelist administration system prevailed in the country for a long period of time. In the contemporary history of Greece, two important laws on local governments were enacted: the Kapodistrias Plan in 1997 and the Kallikratis Reform in 2010. These legislations reduced the number of municipalities and implemented decentralization processes. Yet, there are certain failures of these reforms (Hlepas, 2015).

In Greece, efforts to empower the local governments started in 1986. A law enacted in 1987 divided the country into 13 regions (in Greek *Peripheria*). In 1994, a series of legislation finalized the second level of local administration and established prefectures (districts, in Greek *Nomoi*). In 1997, the Kapodistrias Plan merged municipalities and communes and finalized the structure of the first level local administration. Hence, current urban municipalities (in Greek *Dimoi*) and rural municipalities (communes, in Greek *Koinites*) were established (Tunç, 2017; Gündüzöz, 2011b). As it can be seen in Table 8, the Kapodistrias Plan reduced the number of municipalities from 5,922 to 1,034, an 82.5% change. The number of urban municipalities was 900 and the number of communes was 134. The Kallikratis Reform determined the final form of local governments in 2010. The reform established new deconcentrated administrative authorities (in Greek *Apokentromeni Diikesi*). At present, the local governments consist of 7 deconcentrated administration units, 13 regions, and 325 municipalities. The reform decreased the number of municipalities from 1,034 to 325 with 68.5 percent of change (Krispis, 2016, pp. 1-2; Hlepas, 2015, pp. 6-7). Table 9 shows administrative division of Greek according to the Kapodistrias Plan and the Kallikratis Reform.

Table 9 Administrative division of Greek

Kapodistrias Plan (1997)	Type of Administration	Kallikratis Reform (2010)	Type of Administration
-	-	7 non-elected deconcentrated administrations	State Adm.
13 non-elected regional administrations	3.Tier Local Government	13 elected regional authorities	2. Tier Local Government
54 elected prefectures	2. Tier Local Government	-	-
1,034 municipalities	1. Tier Local Government	325 municipalities	1. Tier Local Government

The main goals of the Kapodistrias and Kallikratis reforms were to achieve economies of scale, to improve efficiency and quality in local services, and to develop human and financial resources (Hlepas, 2012, p. 6; Podimata & Yannopoulos, 2012, p. 3). These reforms also sought to implement the principles of new public management such as subsidiarity, transparency, accountability, good governance, and coordination in the municipal sector. However, the outcomes of the reforms did not exactly match the objectives (Hlepas, 2014, p. 189). Greece practiced decentralization reforms under the pressures of EU policies which imposed “the market and competitive principles and rules” to the local governments (Tsekos & Hlepas, 2019, p. 68). The financial crisis in Greece also resulted in the local governments in over-debt, restricted resources and staffs (Tsekos & Hlepas, 2019, p. 68). The duties and revenues of the municipalities do not coincide. Moreover, the decision making processes are still functioning at the central level. This means the centralist approach continues in Greece, counter to assertion of decentralization claims (Hlepas, 2012). Furthermore, decentralization reforms in Greece did not improve the municipal services, including water and sewage services. They did not result in economies of scale in the water and sewage services. Also, the reforms induced lack of coordination among institutions on water services. They do not collaborate each other in an efficient way. It is clearly seen that, all of the causes and effects of Kapodistrias Plan and Kallikratis Reform in Greece are very similar with the local government reforms in Turkey. Particular attention should be paid to bringing public administration reforms to the agenda after the 2001 crisis in Turkey (Balaban, 2004, p. 6).

2.7.3. Academic Surveys on the Effects of Rescaling Practices

Despite abundant empirical studies on the optimum size of the municipalities, there is a lack of similar works on the effects of rescaling practices in various countries. The existing studies mostly point to the failing of merging practices. For example, few project on merging local

units in the USA have been carried out since 1805 and most of them failed. There is no evidence for consolidation practices resulting in an increase in efficiency and accountability. Likewise, the results expected from municipal consolidations have not realized in Canada for 20 years. Efforts to merge communes and to decrease their numbers in France have not brought about achievable conclusions (Çınar *et al*, 2009). Swianiewicz (2010) also points out some failed attempts of municipal amalgamations in Norway, Albania, Ukraine, and Estonia. Moreover some countries, such as France, Spain, Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Hungary, have regarded the rescaling practices “as politically impossible” (Swianiewicz, 2010).

Table 10 shows a summary of academic surveys on the effects of municipal rescaling practices in several countries. Blom-Hansen *et al* (2014; 2016) refer to some academic surveys on the amalgamation practices and argue that the general implication of these academic surveys “is that there is no consistent evidence of economies of scale in local government” (Blom-Hansen *et al*, 2016, p. 5). Moreover, the authors claim that amalgamation of municipalities has “no general effects” in terms of efficiency. “In short, the most plausible hypothesis is a null one” (Blom-Hansen *et al*, 2016, p. 5).

Table 10 Academic surveys on the effects of rescaling practices

Academic surveys	Results of the surveys	Scholars
13 US studies	No association between size and costs	Ostrom (1972)
Dutch amalgamation studies	No economic gains from amalgamations	Derksen (1988)
17 UK studies	Diseconomies of scale (unit costs rise with scale)	Boyne (1995)
European studies	Mixed results; no conclusive evidence on scale effects	Martins (1995)
US and Canadian studies	80% of municipal activities do not possess economies of scale beyond relatively small municipalities	Bish (2001)
32 UK, US and Australian studies	Mixed results; no conclusive evidence on scale effects	Byrnes and Dollery (2002)
65 studies from several countries	Little evidence for a relationship between size and efficiency	Holzer <i>et al</i> (2009)
490 conducted studies from US, Europe and other continents	A non-linear relationship between size and costs of service delivery	Walker & Andrews (2013)
95 Danish studies on amalgamated and not amalgamated municipalities	No general relationship between size and public service spending	Blom-Hansen <i>et al</i> (2014, 2016)
6 Polish municipalities	No clear effect on costs of service delivery	Swianiewicz & Łukomska, 2017

Sources: Blom-Hansen *et al* (2014, p. 793), Blom-Hansen *et al* (2016) and Swianiewicz & Łukomska (2017)

Blom-Hansen *et al* (2014; 2016) studied Danish local government reform to reveal the scale effects of the municipal amalgamation practices. The central government of Denmark merged 239 municipalities in 2007. The authors investigate both the amalgamated municipalities and the municipalities that were not amalgamated, through conducting quantitative observations between 2005 and 2011. They measure the scale effects “as administrative costs per inhabitant” by using statistical methods (Blom-Hansen *et al*, 2014, p. 801). They find out a 10% administrative cost reduction in the amalgamated municipalities (Blom-Hansen *et al*, 2014, p. 801). Yet, they cannot establish a general relationship between size and municipal service spending. The authors also observe “administrative efficiency gains” in the merged municipalities but they conclude that “the evidence is inconclusive” (Blom-Hansen *et al*, 2016, p. 5).

Suziki developed a different approach to study effects of municipal consolidation. According to Suziki, academic works on this issue cannot reach “conclusive results”, because they do not account for “contextual factors” (2016, p. 4). He states that “composition of merger partners, organizational culture, and mayor’s leadership and capabilities should be included when one examines the effects of municipal consolidations on service provision and their fiscal outcomes” (Suziki, 2016, p. 6). If a municipality selects a financially weak municipality to merge with, it might remove the positive effects of consolidation. In addition, Suziki (2016, p. 4) indicates that municipal consolidation might change the organizational culture:

Local officials in the merged municipalities may not fully understand or accept the necessity of mergers. They may have anxieties or uncertainty about the changes and potential personnel loss that consolidation brings. Municipal managers in new municipalities need to manage resistance from local officials and successfully lead significant organizational change (Denhardt *et al*. 2015). Organizational merger is like a marriage. Compatibility of organizational cultures such as patterns of work behavior, beliefs and values, risk orientation, and achievement orientation are important (Denhardt *et al*. 2015).

Suziki (2016, p. 4) also emphasizes “the degree of homogeneity in the organizational cultures of consolidated municipalities” as a factor effecting the performance of the new municipality. Furthermore, the author draws attention on the impacts that mayor’s leadership and capabilities on the consolidation have results (2016, p. 5):

A mayor’s qualities such as education, expertise, age, and experience can affect municipal performance (Avellaneda 2009). And so the consolidation effects might be contingent on the mayor’s capabilities. A mayor with relevant expertise and experience may mitigate negative impacts. In addition, a mayor with the appropriate qualities may accelerate positive merger impacts. Thus, the mayor’s leadership might condition the merger effects on municipal performance.

Moreover, Suzuki argues that “municipal consolidation may not uniformly affect all consolidated jurisdictions” (2016, p. 4). Some municipalities may gain advantages of consolidation in terms of efficiency, local democracy, and local development, while others may not (2016, p. 4). Consequently, scholars from various countries should consider all the factors that influence the outcomes of the rescaling practices and keep in mind that the degree of impact might change according to space and time. As Mark Callanan (2011) underlines:

In any comparative review, one must consider the distinctive nature of each country’s institutional environment. Local government in different countries have different structures, population sizes, decision-making structures, provide a different range of services, and operate under distinctive financing systems. Nevertheless, parallels and comparisons can be drawn, and appropriate lessons can be learned from the experience abroad.

Despite lack of similar works on the effects of rescaling practices in various countries, there are some outputs to compare with the case of Turkey. First, law-makers should consider all the geographical, social, political, administrative and economic factors affecting service provision while regulating municipal boundaries. There is no single model for every country to implement rescaling policies. Second, it should be known that there is no persistent evidence of economies of scale in municipalities. Third, amalgamation of municipalities has ‘no general effects’ in terms of efficiency; its effects change according to municipal service type.

2.7.4. Effects of Rescaling Practices on Water and Wastewater Services

In Turkey, new legislations on metropolitan municipalities have delegated certain local services, which were provided by district municipalities before, to the metropolitan municipality. Among these services, water and sewerage services were selected for this study, for they are common, essential, and continuous local services with available data. This section will analyse the effects of rescaling practices on water and wastewater services in select countries. Thus, the comparison of the country cases in terms of water and wastewater services will contribute the case study of the dissertation.

Swyngedouw, Kaika & Castro (2002) present the long history of transformation of water and wastewater services by dividing it into four periods. During the first period, which consists of the nineteenth century, water services were provided by the private sector only to a part of the city with primitive supply systems. The second period witnessed municipalisation of the water and wastewater services. Supply and treatment systems were developed and almost every part of the city benefited from these services. The third period began after World War II and lasted throughout the welfare state era. National policies regulated and controlled water and wastewater services. Large scale water and wastewater investments, such as dams, canals and

networks left their mark on this period. The final period started after the 1970s alongside the introduction of neoliberal policies (Swyngedouw *et al*, 2002, pp. 126-127). Privatization of the water and wastewater services spread all around the world. In the 1990s, World Bank (WB) and International Money Fund (IMF) endeavoured to completely take water management away from public administrations on the ground of efficiency. They forced municipalities to transfer their water services to multinational water companies or provide these services with a profit inducement as if they were private actors. All stages of the water process, such as drawing, treating and distributing of water, and wastewater collection and treatment was targeted by privatization policies. Thus, water turned into a commodity to be sold for a profit (Yüce, 2012, pp. 12-13). However, this global trend has recently been reversed in many places and remunicipalisation of the water and wastewater services has proliferated in many countries, such as USA, France, Germany, Spain and Latin American countries (Kishimoto, Lobina & Petitjean, 2014).

On the other hand, costs of water supply in metropolitan municipalities rose due to increasing urban population, farther away water resources, and lack of water supply. Furthermore neoliberal water policies deepen this cost increase and prevent fair cost allocation. They also limit conditions of access to healthy water, which conflicts with water rights of the citizens (Karakaş-Ulusoy, 2009, p. 125). Thus, water management in metropolitan areas has become a crucial issue that the municipalities have to tackle. They are directed to provide water and wastewater services in an efficient way with scarce resources and in a cost effective manner. They are expected to achieve economies of scale through changing municipal boundaries.

Some scholars argue that economies of scale can be best achieved in water and wastewater services. One of the reasons behind this argument can be explained by dividing production process into two: capital-intensive and labour-intensive. Water and wastewater services are examples of capital-intensive production and because of this they usually ensure economies of scale. As Houlberg (2010, p. 314) clarifies:

Economies of scale are most likely to be found in capital-intensive production and not so often in personal-intensive areas (Houlberg 2000: 10), as the fixed costs are higher in more capital-intensive production. The expectation is, therefore, that economies of scale are most likely in the more technical areas municipal services like roads, refuse disposal, sewage disposal, domestic water supply, etc.

Hirsch (1968) presents another reason by dividing the municipal services into three different categories. These are vertically integrated services, horizontally integrated services, and circularly integrated services. Water and wastewater services are vertically integrated services and they provide economies of scale. Whereas, fire protection and garbage collection are

horizontally integrated services and they are no suitable for achieving economies of scale. Circularly integrated services, such as school administration rarely achieve economies of scale (Hirsch, 1968 as cited in Gustely, 1977, pp. 352-353).

Those who advocate for consolidation of municipalities argue that water and wastewater services are provided more efficiently in larger municipalities. For example, if municipalities which are close each other build a common water treatment plant, unit cost will be lower and operation of the plant will be easier. On the contrary, if each municipality build its own water treatment plant, unit cost will be higher and operation of the plant will be more difficult (Koyuncu & Serteser, 2012, p. 6).

On the other hand, proponents of the public choice theory argue that water and wastewater services should be provided by small-scale municipalities. Since these services related to the locality, they should be provided by a local unit, which is closest to people. Besides, there are many negative factors beyond the optimum point, such as human resources, distance and raw material supply. Cost of treatment plant construction might be high for a municipality, but so is the cost of collecting all the waste in one point, then treating them. Consequently, it would be more efficient if a few municipalities established service unions that provide water and wastewater services (Gündüzöz, 2011a).

Table 11 Comparing large and small municipalities in water and sewage services

Those who advocate large municipalities in water & sewage services	Those who advocate small municipalities in water & sewage services
Consolidationist Perspectives	Public choice school
Achieving economies of scale	Proximity and subsidiarity in service delivery
Capital-intensive services	Diseconomies in large municipalities (human and financial resources, troubles in coordination)
Vertically integrated services	Higher unit cost in large scale treatment plants
Lower unit cost in establishing big and common treatment plants	Establishing service unions by several municipalities
Cost and resource saving	Every citizens are not willing to participate in pollution
Increase in citizen satisfaction	Increase in citizen satisfaction
Environmet protection in large scales	Environmental problems are peculiar to local

Greece can be a good sample to observe changes in water and sewage services after merging practices of municipalities. In Greece, municipalities are responsible for the local services. Currently, there are 325 municipalities. Small municipalities face some problems in certain

areas, such as, healthcare, communication, and transportation. They also lack qualified human resources. On the other hand, municipalities with large areas face problems of unity and supervision (Krispis, 2016, p. 17). Water supply, sewerage and wastewater services are among the responsibilities of municipalities. In small municipalities, they are provided directly by municipalities. In municipalities with a population larger than 10,000, these services are provided by the Public Water Supply and Sewerage Companies, called DEYAs. Moreover, two companies provide a large part of these services in Greece. One of them is in Athens, called EYDAP. The other one is in Thessaloniki, called EYATH. While EYDAP is a private company, EYATH is a public company (OECD, 2009). DEYAs serve 40% of the total population in Greece, while EYDAP and EYATH serve an additional 53% of the total population. The number of DEYAs is 228 in 2009. After Kallikratis reform, this number was decreased to 180 in 2014. The current number of DEYAs was 127 in 2018. On the other hand, only 7% of the total population receive water, sewerage and wastewater services directly from municipalities (Tsekos & Triantafyllopoulou, 2014, p. 12).

Central government agencies provided water and wastewater services until the 1980s in Greece. With the implementation of decentralization practices, such as Kapodistrias Plan and Kallikratis reforms, many competencies and responsibilities were delegated to the regional and local levels (Podimata & Yannopoulos, 2012, p. 2). Water and wastewater services are regulated under the topic of environmental protection regarding division of powers in Greece. Central government, regional level and municipal level are responsible for different aspects of environmental protection. The Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change is responsible for general environmental protection. Regional level administration is responsible for control, audit and coordination of these services. Municipal level is responsible for local water supply, irrigation, sewerage systems, and water and wastewater treatment (Greece - CoR, 2009).

According to an OECD published report on water, sewerage and wastewater treatment systems in Greece “an estimated 98% of the population connected to a water supply system and the current infrastructure meets demand” (OECD, 2009, p. 80). However, there are “old and decaying distribution networks need to be replaced” (OECD, 2009, p. 80). In 2007, Greece experienced a water crisis that affected the whole country. Many people were left with no access to water, and tourism and industry slowed down (Atay, 2012). Besides, many Greek islands have problems of water scarcity in summers and they can meet the water demand by tankers. Although there are some problems, such as salt-water intrusion, high nitrate pollution

and chromium contamination, the quality of raw, tap and drinking water are in acceptable levels (OECD, 2009, p. 80).

In urban settlements, nearly 90% of population connected to a sewerage network and nearly 91% of population had access to a wastewater treatment plant. In rural areas, there are individual systems, such as septic tanks and cesspools. OECD reported that “Greek water and wastewater enterprises are responsible for the operational performance of treatment systems, but not all facilities are functioning optimally, either to save on running costs or because of poor management” (2009, p. 87).

In Greece, each municipality determines its pricing scheme for water users. Therefore, there may be great variations of prices among municipalities. It is also interesting that residential customers pay more for water than commercial users in Greece. Fortunately, “large families and consumers in isolated rural areas take advantage of a maximum cap on their water bill” (OECD, 2009, p. 82). On the other side, the water bill also includes charges for various services.

There are a few studies analysing the impact of municipal consolidation practices on water and wastewater services in Greece. Farmaki and Tranoulidis (2018) explore the problems and delays in water and wastewater services.

Regarding municipal water pricing policies, we concluded that DEYAs do not follow a unified and structured pricing scheme. Furthermore, several companies do not discriminate between data costs either per service (water supply, sewerage) or per use (water supply, irrigation, etc.). Finally, it is evident that none of them has yet adopted the relevant provisions set by the European directive for full cost recovery and water pricing reflecting financial, environmental and water resources cost (Farmaki & Tranoulidis, 2018, p. 111).

Farmaki and Tranoulidis (2018) also find out that there is no homogeneous structure among water services and providers in terms of their operating practices.

The findings of the study also revealed that water services and water providers do not operate in a homogeneous manner in a national context, and in some cases Municipal Enterprises for Water Supply and Sewage follow a unified and organized pricing system, others do not discriminate neither between costs or service (water, sewerage), nor use (water supply, irrigation, etc.) and when the Municipality does not have an enterprise but is operating water supply services itself, many elements of the financial cost are not calculated or these are confused with other services it provides (Farmaki & Tranoulidis, 2018, p. 111).

Botetzagias (2008) points out that the capacity of water and wastewater providers are not strong due to “lack financial resources and qualified personnel” (as cited in Koutalakis, 2015, p. 183). Charalampos Koutalakis (2015, p. 191) adds that municipalities cannot “effectively

apply, monitor and enforce environmental regulations” since the central state did not give sufficient fiscal autonomy to the municipalities.

Patterns of multilevel coordination between central government and local authorities are characterised by weak institutionalisation, legalism and discontinuity with detrimental effects on the homogeneous and synchronic application of law. More important, considerable problems with corruption and clientelism have generated mistrust and scepticism to central governments to delegate further competencies to local and regional authorities. Political unwillingness and administrative incapacity of local and regional authorities to effectively apply, monitor and enforce environmental regulations creates an unfavourable institutional environment for local authority involvement in the policy area (Koutalakis, 2015, p. 191)

Podimata and Yannopoulos (2012) investigate the results of Kallikratis reform on water government in Greece, questioning whether there was an increase in efficiency. They selected Alfeios River Basin as their field for research. As a trans-regional basin, its control is divided between two local authorities. Podimata and Yannopoulos argue that Kallikratis decentralization reform caused “the problem of lack of coordination among institutions with joint competence for water resources management.” (2012, p. 1). According to the authors, local institutions could not “cooperate with each other efficiently” (Podimata & Yannopoulos, 2012, p. 6). After the reform, “the emergence of new institutions, municipal enterprises, leaders and other players have created a much more complex environment that increased fragmentation” (Podimata & Yannopoulos, 2012, p. 6). The authors give an account of failure due to decentralization:

Although, several administrative tasks have been transferred to local authorities, the truth is that regional authorities have little experience in self-governance and have not succeeded to become fully operational and autonomous. The transfer of new competencies was not accompanied with fiscal and administrative capacities (Podimata & Yannopoulos, 2012, p. 5).

It can be clearly seen that decentralization reforms in Greece did not improve the municipal services, including water and sewage services. On the other hand, the duties and revenues of the municipalities do not coincide. If we consider the arguments above, we can easily maintain that amalgamation practices in Greece did not result in economies of scale in the water and sewage services. There is not any study in the relevant literature that points out a positive improvement of water and sewage services of the municipalities in recent years.

2.7.5. Optimum Scale of Water and Wastewater Services in Selected Countries

The literature on economies of scale in the water and wastewater services in many countries is quite “scarce and inconclusive” (Marques & De Witte, 2011, p. 1016). Most of services were sold to private sector or public companies. Therefore, making a precise comparison

between these countries and Turkey is very difficult. Nonetheless, this section will provide an overview of works on optimum scale

Marques and De Witte (2011) measure economies of scale for Portuguese water and wastewater utilities. In Portugal, municipalities have the responsibility of water and wastewater services. Yet, they are free to transfer this responsibility by various methods such as “concession contracts, municipal companies which can encompass or not a (minority) private shareholder, semi-autonomous organizations (with some kind of autonomy) and the direct supply by the municipalities” (Marques & De Witte, 2011, p. 9). In Portugal, 109 water utilities serve a population of 10,000 or smaller. Only 6 water utilities serve more than a population of 200,000 and 18 water utilities serve more than a population of 100,000. The density of customers differentiates between 223 and 14 customers per km with an average of 29 (Marques & De Witte, 2011, p. 1015). The authors measure the optimum scale of 66 water utilities. They use non-parametric model to measure performance. Consequently, they determine the optimum population size for the utilities to be between 160,000 and 180,000. At the end, they suggest reducing the number of water utilities from 300 to 60. (Marques & De Witte, 2011).

Nauges and Berg (2008) measure economies of scale in pipe water and sewerage services in four countries: Moldova, Romania, Vietnam and Brazil. Their sample set consists of 38 utilities in Moldova, 26 utilities in Brazil, 23 utilities in Romania and 47 utilities in Vietnam. In order to measure economies of scale they use variations in “the volume of water produced, the volume of wastewater treated, the number of connections to be served, and the network length” (Nauges & Berg, 2008, p. 159). Their results show evidence of economies of scale in Moldova, Romania and Vietnam. However, they found “null hypothesis of constant returns to scale” in Brazil (Nauges & Berg, 2008, p. 159). Nauges and Berg conclude that “the cost structure of water and sewerage utilities varies significantly within and between countries and over time” (2008, p. 144).

Berg and Marques (2011) present a literature review of empirical studies on water and wastewater utilities. They review a total of 47 studies on economies of scale in water and wastewater utilities. According to authors, “the determination of the existence of economies of scale, and particularly the optimum size of water utilities, is a classic problem in the water sector”, because the outcomes are complicated and based on “the average size of the water utilities in the sample” (Berg & Marques, 2011, p. 15). Tsagarakis refers to some studies on economies of scale in water and wastewater services (2013, p. 1552) :

Torres and Morrison Paul (2006) reported that consolidation of small utilities in USA might generate cost efficiencies, depending on the concurrent expansion of the network. In another study, significant economies of scale were reported for French water utilities from merging into water districts (Garcia and Thomas 2001). Mizutani and Urakami (2001) reported an optimal size of a water supply organization in Japan to be approximately 766,000 serving people. Fraquelli and Giandrone (2003) reported a minimum efficient size of 100,000 serving population wastewater treatment facilities in Italy. Tsagarakis et al. (2003) reported lower total annual economic costs in larger facilities for different wastewater treatment systems in Greece.

According to Tsagarakis, when water utilities in a region are consolidated into a single large-scale utility, economies of scale can be successfully achieved. Yet, the author admits that “there is not a universal size for a water utility”. Therefore, an optimal size for a water or wastewater utility should be determined “for specific geographical areas” (2013, p. 1552). Tsagarakis also measures optimal scale of water utilities in Brazil, Norway, Russia, Albania and Poland. Optimal scales that the author can exactly determine are more than 50,000 for Albania, more than 100,000 for Poland, and more than 1,000,000 for Russia. Tsagarakis also points out that consolidating “water utilities bear financial costs which vary according to the number of utilities that are merged, the area served, the topography, and other factors” (2013, p. 1560).

On the other side, there are several studies which support decentralized and small water and wastewater facilities “for low-density communities and varying site conditions” Massoud, Tarhin & Nasr, 2009, p. 652). Comparing with centralized ones, decentralized water and wastewater systems are claimed to be more cost effective and reliable particularly in developing countries. Indeed, wastewater treatment plants require “high capital cost in addition to operation and maintenance cost” (Massoud *et al*, 2009, p. 652). According to Massoud *et al*, decentralized systems should be preferred for their advantages of lower costs:

Collection, treatment and disposal are three basic components of any wastewater management system of which collection is the least important for treatment and disposal of wastewater. Nonetheless, collection costs more than 60 percent of the total budget for wastewater management in a centralized system, particularly in small communities with low population densities (Hoover, 1999). Decentralized systems keep the collection component of the wastewater management system as minimal as possible and focus mainly on necessary treatment and disposal of wastewater (2009, p. 652).

Libralato, Ghirardini, & Avezzù suggest that decentralized small wastewater treatment plants became more favourable and preferable in the water management than centralized large plants. In addition, the number of the small plants and the treated volume of wastewater in small treatment plants are greater compared to centralized large treatment plants. For example, more than nine thousands wastewater treatment plants provide services for an average of less than two thousand citizens in Italy (2012, pp. 61-62).

Table 12 Studies about optimum scale for water and sewage services

Author	Research Area	Research Object	Result
Marques & De Witte (2011)	Portugal	Water utilities	Optimum Population: 160,000-180,000
Nauges & Berg (2008)	Moldova, Romania, Vietnam, Brazil	Water and wastewater utilities	Null hypothesis
Berg & Marques (2011)	47 studies	Water and wastewater utilities	Complicated outcomes
Tsagarakis (2013)	Brazil, Norway, Russia, Albania and Poland	Water utilities	Optimum Population differs: 50,000 for Albania, more than 100.000 for Poland, and more than 1,000,000 for Russia.

It can be reliably concluded from the results of academic surveys provided above that there is not a universal optimal scale for water and wastewater services. Therefore, looking at a country sample and taking its optimal scale for water and wastewater services would be scientifically unsound.

CHAPTER 3

MUNICIPAL CONTEXT IN TURKEY

Determining the optimum size for municipalities is one of the most important mechanisms that affects local service provision. Therefore, public authorities often raise the issue of changing the population and the number of municipalities through annexation, amalgamation or consolidation practices. The regulations on local governments in Turkey calculate the service scale of municipalities by using population size as the sole criteria. They disregard the fact that municipalities significantly differ in terms of their geographical location, socio-economic level, and in terms of their cultural and political features. Therefore, the regulations enforce a single model for all local governments.

The boundaries of municipalities in Turkey have frequently been changed to achieve more efficient service provision. Public authorities have always attributed inefficiencies in municipal service provision to the size of municipalities. Therefore, the solutions to these inefficiencies were sought in changing the boundaries through amalgamations, or dissolution of small-scale municipalities. These practices have become more prevalent since the early 2000s and the boundaries of numerous municipalities have been altered through legal arrangements. However, there is neither a single model nor a single scale for the efficient delivery of municipal services. Each municipal service has different requirements and need different assessment criteria, necessitating various models to be put into practice. This chapter mainly provides an overview of the laws that regulate changing municipal boundaries in Turkey. In this context, municipalities will be examined with regard to scale changes. This will be followed by an examination of the developments regarding specific kinds of municipalities such as district municipalities and metropolitan municipalities.

3.1. Kinds of Municipalities in Turkey

The Constitution of Turkey identifies three types of local government: municipality, special provincial administration, and village. The first legislation about municipalities (Law No 1580) was enacted in 1930, which had been in force for 74 years. According to this law, there were three kinds of municipality: municipalities, small scale municipalities (*belde belediyeleri*, in Turkish) and municipal offices (*belediye şubeleri*, in Turkish). If the population of a settlement reaches 2,000, a municipality could be established in that settlement, which would include of one or more villages. If the population of a municipality reached 80,000, then municipal offices could be established. As it is clearly seen, there was only one criterion for

establishing municipalities. On the other hand, the municipality at the centre of a province was named provincial municipality (*il belediyesi*, in Turkish). There is no separate legislation for provincial municipalities, and they are subject to the Municipality Law.

The second constitution of Turkey, which was enacted in 1982, defined a new type of municipality: Special forms of government can be introduced for large settlements. This new form of municipality was called metropolitan municipality and the Law on Metropolitan Municipality (Law No 3030) was enacted in 1984. The first metropolitan municipality was established in İstanbul. Also seven metropolitan municipalities were established between 1986 and 1988. These are Ankara, İzmir, Adana, Bursa, Gaziantep, Konya and Kayseri. These metropolitan municipalities had ‘district municipalities’ within their boundaries. The boundaries of metropolitan municipality did not comprise the whole province. Between 1993 and 2000, eight metropolitan municipalities were established. These are Antalya, Diyarbakır, Eskişehir, Erzurum, Mersin, Kocaeli, Samsun and Sakarya. These metropolitan municipalities had ‘low tier municipalities’. It was not required to establish district for low tier municipality. Hence, two kinds of municipality were formed in the metropolitan municipalities: district municipality and low tier municipality. In 2004, a new law on metropolitan municipalities (Law No 5216) was enacted. The Law No 5216 extended the boundaries of metropolitan municipalities to the certain degrees. On the other side, the boundaries of İstanbul and Kocaeli metropolitan municipalities expanded to their provincial boundaries. The Law No 5216 also redefined municipalities of metropolitan municipalities as ‘first tier municipalities’. In 2008, the Law No 5747 dissolved all the first tier municipalities. There would be only ‘district municipalities’ to be established within the metropolitan municipalities. The final amendment about the boundaries was enacted through the Law No 6360 in 2012. With this law, boundaries of the all metropolitan municipalities were expanded to correspond to provincial boundaries.

Table 13 Kinds of municipality in Turkey

Period	Kinds of Municipality	Related Regulation
1923-1984	Municipalities	Law No 1580
1984-1993	Metropolitan Municipalities + District Municipalities	Law No 3030
1993-2004	Metropolitan Municipalities + District Municipalities + Low Tier Municipalities	Decree Law No 504
2004-2008	Metropolitan Municipalities + First Tier Municipalities	Law No 5216
2008- ...	Metropolitan Municipalities + District Municipalities	Law No 5747

At present, there is a system of two tier municipality in metropolitan cities: metropolitan municipality and district municipality. Table 13 provides the kinds of municipalities in Turkey since 1923. Detailed demonstration of the kinds of the municipalities by their regulations is given in Table 14. In this table, the names of the metropolitan municipalities and their municipalities according to their establishment laws are provided.

Table 14 Kinds of municipality in Turkey according to the laws

Metropolitan Municipality	According to the Law No 3030		According to the Law No 5216		After the Law No 5747	
	Kind of Mun.	Number of Mun.	Kind of Mun.	Number of Mun.	Kind of Mun.	Number of Mun.
Adana	District	2	District	3	District	5
	Low-tier	0	First-tier	17		
Ankara	District	8	District	15	District	16
	Low-tier	0	First-tier	21		
Antalya	District	0	District	0	District	5
	Low-tier	3	First-tier	14		
Bursa	District	3	District	7	District	7
	Low-tier	0	First-tier	18		
Diyarbakır	District	0	District	0	District	4
	Low-tier	3	First-tier	6		
Erzurum	District	0	District	1	District	3
	Low-tier	3	First-tier	6		
Eskişehir	District	0	District	0	District	2
	Low-tier	3	First-tier	5		
Gaziantep	District	2	District	3	District	3
	Low-tier	0	First-tier	5		
Istanbul	District	27	District	32	District	39
	Low-tier	0	First-tier	41		
Izmir	District	9	District	19	District	21
	Low-tier	0	First-tier	38		
Kayseri	District	2	District	5	District	5
	Low-tier	0	First-tier	19		
Kocaeli	District	0	District	6	District	12
	Low-tier	3	First-tier	38		
Konya	District	3	District	3	District	3
	Low-tier	0	First-tier	4		
Mersin	District	0	District	0	District	4
	Low-tier	3	First-tier	22		
Sakarya	District	2	District	6	District	10
	Low-tier	10	First-tier	15		
Samsun	District	0	District	1	District	4
	Low-tier	3	First-tier	14		
Total	District	58	District	101	District	143
	Low-tier	31	First-tier	283		

Note: Mun. is the abbreviation of Municipality

Source: Akıllı (2010, p. 23)

Table 15 provides distribution of municipalities according to their types in 2005, 2009 and 2014. These years mark important developments in the changing the types of municipalities after the 2000s. As it can be seen from the table, the number of small scale municipalities and district municipalities were drastically decreased in 2014 after the Law No 6360 was enacted. At present, there are 30 metropolitan municipalities with 519 district municipalities. Also there are 51 provincial, 400 district and 396 small scale municipalities.

Table 15 Distribution of municipalities by their types

Types of Municipality	2005	2009	2014
Metropolitan Municipality	16	16	30
District Municipality of Metropolitan Municipality	101	143	519
First Tier Municipality of Metropolitan Municipality	283	-	-
Provincial Municipality	65	65	51
District Municipality	749	749	400
Small Scale (<i>Belde</i>) Municipality	2011	1978	396
Total	3225	2951	1396

Source: MİGM (2018)

3.2. Regulations about Changing Municipal Boundaries in Turkey

In Turkey, number of municipalities has been increased frequently until the 2000s. On the contrary, number of municipalities has gradually been decreased since 2005. These two different periods should be analysed within a historical and critical context. Causes and effects of the regulations on changing district municipalities should be critically examined.

The first regulation on municipalities in Turkey is the Law No 1580 which was enacted in 1930. According to this law, the criterion of establishing a municipality was population criterion. Villages with minimum a population of 2,000 can be turned into municipalities. Moreover, there was no condition for abolishing legal entity of municipalities. Therefore, over time the number of municipalities increased dramatically, particularly after the 1950s. Since it was not foreseen that the cities would grow, the boundaries were forced to expand. In order to address the problem, municipal boundaries were revised and new municipalities were established. Over time it became clear that it was not enough to include the surrounding area within the municipal boundaries. As a result, with the Law No 6785 enacted in 1956, municipalities were authorized to make decisions and inspections in the ‘adjacent areas’ to control the speculative development around the cities. However, the adjacent area did not constitute a clear administrative boundary and this caused many problems. The adjacent area practice neither prevented the establishment of new municipalities nor it enabled the managing

the fragmentation of the settlements. New municipalities continued to be established. By the 1980s, the squatter areas at the periphery of the large cities turned into instruments of land speculation furthered by the growing numbers of cooperatives and property developers. Adjacent areas continued to be included in the city through construction and contractors (Köroğlu, 2012, pp. 37-38).

However, an attempt to intervene in the growing number of large cities was made after the military coup in 1980. The Decision No 34 of National Security Council stated that “Municipalities which was established in the vicinity of our large cities as a result of rapid population growth and migration from villages in our country should be dissolved; since public services such as electricity, water, sewerage and transportation cannot be provided sufficiently and control of these services failed” (Canpolat, 2010, p. 91). After implementation of this decision, the number of municipalities was decreased from 2580 to 1700 in 1981. Also, legal entities of 150 villages were abolished (Canpolat, 2010, pp. 91-92). As Çınar *et al* argues, due to security worries of the military, small municipalities in the vicinity of large municipalities were dissolved (2013, p. 85). Table 16 shows number of municipalities and percentage increase between 1923 and 2000.

Table 16 Number of municipalities (1923-2000)

Year	Number of Municipalities	Percentage increase (%)
1923	421	-
1950	628	49.1
1960	995	58.4
1970	1303	30.9
1980	1727	32.5
1990	2061	19.3
1997	2810	36.3
2000	3215	14.4

Sources: MİGM, 2018, p. 8; Çınar et al, 2013, p. 84

As it can be seen in Table 16, the number of municipalities increased significantly between 1950 and 1970. This increase continued until the end of the 1990s. The number of municipalities, which was 421 when the Republic was established, reached 2810 by 1997. In the section where country samples are examined, it is seen how high these rates are compared to other countries (see Table 8). Increase in the number of municipalities has been always considered to be an important problem by the governments of the period. There were various reasons for increase in the number of municipalities. First of all, according to the Law No

1580, the criterion for establishing municipality was having a minimum population of 2000, the number of municipalities smoothly increased (Çınar *et al*, 2013, p. 85). The other reason for the rise in the number of municipalities is the increasing population of Turkey. On the other hand, large cities experienced enormous waves of migration after the 1950s. When new settlements in the cities exceeded population of 2000, they gained municipal status and their numbers mushroomed in time. Moreover, demands of the people who live in rural areas and desire to receive shares from government revenues can be mentioned as other reasons (Aktel, Altan & Kerman, 2009, pp. 48-49).

At this point, the question to be asked is why the population criterion was not changed or why the establishment condition of a municipality was not altered. The answer can be found in the political background of Turkey. According to some scholars, one reason is electoral concerns of political parties (Akdede & Acartürk, 2005; Aktel *et al*, 2009; Canpolat, 2010; Çınar *et al*, 2013). During the years of political stability, the number of municipalities did not increase. However, during pre-election periods and there were political conflicts, the number of municipalities increased. Also, political parties were banned from organizing in villages but free to organize within municipalities. Moreover, during the coalition periods when the balance of power between political parties was close to each other, the number of municipalities increased. On the other side, the answer also has some economic basis as establishing municipalities in the rural areas results in improving relations of capitalist production and capital accumulation (Çınar *et al*, 2013, p. 86-87). Also Beyhan clarifies the reason of increase as following (2014, p. 2):

Especially, the promises by the politicians during election campaign were one of the factors for this dramatic increase in the number of local governments in Turkey. The fact that for a long time period the population threshold required to establish a municipality in Turkey was very low (only 2000) also facilitated the proliferation of the small municipalities particularly within the metropolitan areas and along the coastal areas of the country where the speculations for urban land is very high owing to rent expectations.

In 2002, Justice and Development Party (AKP, *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) came to power by receiving a significant portion of the votes in the 2002 elections. AKP has been in power for 17 years and made important changes in public administration system of Turkey. During this period, there are four regulations that changed the boundaries of district municipalities: the Law No 5216 on Metropolitan Municipalities in 2004, the Law No 5393 on Municipalities in 2005, the Law No 5747 in 2008 and the Law No 6360 in 2012.

These laws on municipalities in the early 2000s were part of the public administration reforms. One of the goals of this reform is expanding the boundaries of provincial, district and

metropolitan municipalities through including the small municipalities. As a result, authorities and the duties of district and metropolitan municipalities were increased. Moreover, the minimum population criterion for gaining a legal entity of municipality was increased from 2,000 to 5,000. The municipalities with populations under than 2,000 lost their legal entity and are turned into village or neighbourhood. The major reasons of these amendments were supporting the cities which have been facing problems with zoning and plan integration, urban sprawl, and efficient use of the financial and human resources (Çınar *et al*, 2013, pp. 146-147).

3.2.1. The Law No 5216

The first law on metropolitan municipalities is the Law on Metropolitan Municipality (Law No 3030) enacted in 1984. This law had been in force for 30 years. The second law regarding metropolitan municipalities was enacted in 2004, called the Law on Metropolitan Municipality (Law No 5216). This law is very notable for any study on rescaling practices for consolidation of small local units in metropolitan areas by expanding the boundaries of metropolitan municipalities. As Çınar *et al* argue, this law resulted in a new division of labour between metropolitan municipalities and other municipalities within the metropolitan area. With this division of labour, the politicization of space gained a new dimension (2009, pp. 9-10). The Law No 5216 introduced significant changes to the regulation of boundaries of metropolitan municipalities and their lower level municipalities. In fact, the first attempts to change the boundaries had already begun. Between 2003 and 2004 several law proposals were put forward, but they did not pass due to the various disagreements in the council. Finally the Law No 5216 was enacted despite some objections.¹⁹

The Article 3 of the Law No 5216 defined metropolitan municipality as a public legal entity that includes minimum three districts and the first tier municipalities. This article also identified district and the first tier municipalities. The first tier municipality is defined as a municipality which was established without establishing a district within the boundaries of the metropolitan municipality and has the same authority, privilege and responsibilities as district municipalities. The Article 4 determines criteria of population and distance for establishing metropolitan municipality. “Provincial municipalities with a total population of more than 750,000 based on the last census of the settlements within the municipality boundaries and at a maximum distance of 10,000 meters away from these boundaries can be turned into metropolitan municipalities by taking into consideration the physical settlement conditions

¹⁹ For a detailed information about law proposals and the process of the Law No 5216, see the work of Çınar *et al*, 2009, pp. 55-73.

and economic development levels” (Mevzuat, 2004). “Population” and “distant between settlements” are the first criteria for establishing metropolitan municipalities in Turkey (Özdemir & Meşhur, 2011, p. 174).

The Provisional Article 2 determined the boundaries of metropolitan municipalities and the municipalities to be merged with metropolitan municipalities:

The boundaries of İstanbul and İzmir metropolitan municipalities are the boundaries of their provinces. In other metropolitan municipalities, provided that the existing governorship building is considered to be the centre and within the provincial property boundaries, the boundary is twenty kilometres with population up to one million, thirty kilometres in metropolitan cities with population up to two million, and thirty kilometres in metropolitan cities with population bigger than two million (Mevzuat, 2004).

In the preamble of the Law No 5216, the major reason for the expanding the boundaries of metropolitan municipalities is described as concentration of the population in cities that increases the demand for services and costs (TBMM Mevzuat, 2004). According to Çınar *et al* the actual reason is economic factors. The metropolitan municipalities are presented as the centres of capital attraction and accumulation (2009, p. 74).

The other reason provided for the expanding the boundaries of metropolitan municipalities are lack of administration in the metropolitan areas. The term scale efficiency is used many times in the preamble.

Population growth, industrialization, transportation, environmental problems and developments in technology increased the scope and scale of public services. (...) The capacity to produce services and insufficient financial resources make the solution impossible. It eliminates efficiency and productivity in government. Planning and coordination, and scale efficiency are eliminated due to the large number of units authorized to carry out the services required to be carried out at the metropolitan level and it causes waste of resources (TBMM Mevzuat, 2004)

The final statement of the preamble is that when the law is enacted, the problems faced by the metropolitan municipalities will be resolved more rapidly and the services will be provided more effectively and efficiently. However, there are certain criticisms of the Provisional Article No 2 of this law which is also known as ‘compass’ (in Turkish, *pergel*) regulation.

Table 17 Boundaries of metropolitan municipalities in the Law No 5216

	Metropolitan Municipalities	Establishment Date	Population in 2000	Service Area (the radius)	Ratio*
1	İstanbul	1984	8,831,805	Whole province	100
2	Ankara	1984	3,203,362	50 km	64
3	İzmir	1984	2,250,149	50 km	70
4	Adana	1986	1,133,028	30 km	33.3
5	Bursa	1987	1,184,144	30 km	41.1
6	Gaziantep	1987	862,033	20 km	33.3
7	Konya	1988	761,145	20 km	9.6
8	Kayseri	1993	524,818	20 km	31.2
9	Antalya	1993	606,447	20 km	26.3
10	Diyarbakır	1993	551,046	20 km	23.5
11	Erzurum.	1993	366,962	20 km	15
12	Eskişehir	1993	482,318	20 km	14.2
13	Kocaeli	1993	1,195,193	Whole province	100
14	Mersin	1993	544,046	20 km	30.7
15	Samsun	1993	362,756	20 km	23.5
16	Adapazarı	1993	294,398	20 km	62.5

*Ratio of number of municipalities in metropolitan municipality to municipalities in province

Source: TUIK, 2019; Çınar *et al*, 2009.

The most significant criticism about the law is the fact that the boundaries of metropolitan municipalities are drawn as in the direction of circles with a certain radius. Such a practice is not based on any technical or rational basis. In line with these circles (compass), there are municipalities within the boundaries of the districts that are ‘included’ and ‘not included’ in the metropolitan municipality. Municipalities which are not included in these boundaries can only be included upon the request of the metropolitan authority and by the approval of the Ministry of Interior after the request from the municipal council. However, this is a long bureaucratic process.

All in all, this compass regulation did not consider being a metropolitan municipality in an integrated area. Also, it did not consider macroforms of the metropolitan cities. Moreover, boundaries of the compass in some metropolitan cities such as Antalya, Mersin and İzmir extended over the sea. Hence, the compass rule did not create appropriate boundaries for all cities. This rule, which is established by trial and error without any discussion, supervision or examination, had a negative effect on the spatial planning practices of metropolitan municipalities. Beyond technical justifications, it is based on a number of political reasons regarding transformation of the economic structure (Soydal & Türk, 2012, p. 63). On the other hand, Çınar *et al* underline, the included municipalities should be synchronized with the boundaries of the metropolitan area; which was not realized (2009, p.89).

The other criticism is about the criteria for establishing metropolitan municipalities. The criteria of ‘population’ and ‘distance between settlements’ are not sufficient to determine the boundaries of metropolitan municipality. Besides, social and economic relations between settlements were not considered. It is also argued that administrative boundaries defined by the law for metropolitan areas in the law would not reflect the characteristics of a metropolitan region; and these criteria determining the impact areas of the city would be insufficient (Özdemir & Meşhur, 2011, pp. 174-176).

3.2.2. The Law No 5393

A new period for municipalities in Turkey began in 2005 with the enactment of the Law on Municipalities No 5393. The instruments of this era are the regulations on annexation and merging of the municipalities (Çınar *et al*, 2013, p. 147). Article 8 and 11 of the Municipal Law No 5393 are about changing district municipalities. The Article 8 is titled “Annexation and Merging” (TBMM Mevzuat, 2005a). According to the Article 8, the small scale municipalities and villages which are at minimum 5,000 meters away from a larger municipality can merge into a neighbourhood municipality. If more than half of the voters living in that small scale municipality or village petition to join the larger municipality, council of the larger municipality can decide on the merger. If these municipalities are in a metropolitan municipality, council of the larger municipality must send the merging proposal to approval by council of the metropolitan municipality. The Article 11 is titled “Dissolution of Legal Entity” (TBMM Mevzuat, 2005a). Legal entity of the merged municipality is abolished by the ministry of interior based on the opinion of council of state. Then the merged municipality is turned into a neighbourhood of the larger municipality. The Article 11 also regulates the conditions of dissolution of the legal entity of a municipality. The population criterion was increased from 2,000 to 5,000 in 2005 with the new Municipality Law No 5393. Also, if population of a municipality decreases goes below 2,000, this municipality would be turned into a village (TBMM Mevzuat, 2005a). A total of 147 municipalities and 176 villages were abolished through the implementation of the Article 8 and 11. These municipalities and villages were located in Adana, Adıyaman, Antalya, Bolu, Bursa, Elazığ, Erzincan, Erzurum, Eskişehir, Gaziantep, Hatay, İçel, İstanbul, İzmir, Kars, Kayseri, Kocaeli, Konya, Malatya, Manisa, Kahramanmaraş, Muğla, Nevşehir, Niğde, Sakarya, Samsun and Trabzon (Çınar *et al*, 2013, p. 147). Between 2005 and 2009, the number of municipalities decreased from 3225 to 2949 (see Table 18).

Table 18 Number of municipalities (2000-2014)

Year	Number of Municipalities	Percentage change (%)
2000	3215	14.4
2005	3225	0.3
2009	2949	-8.5
2014	1396	-52.6
2018	1398	-

Source: MİGM (2016; 2018)

In the preamble to the Law No 5393, following arguments about scale are stated (TBMM Mevzuat, 2005b):

There has been a constant increase in the number of municipalities in Turkey, unlike western countries. The main inducement of this increase is the inadequacy of the 2000 population limit, which was envisaged for the establishment of a municipality by the Municipal Law of 1930, against the rapid population growth. With the newly established municipalities, the average population size of the municipalities is decreasing. (...) This raises a serious scale problem, especially in small municipalities. While preventing the efficient and proper use of resources in small municipalities, the scale problem results in a crisis due to the inability to meet the excessive demand for services in large cities with high concentration of population.

In the preamble to the law, the approach of new public management was emphasized and small scale municipalities were charged with obstruction of the local government reform. Therefore, it was suggested that these municipalities are to be dissolved. Inadequacies of small municipalities were explained as follows:

In terms of scale, it is seen that the management capacity of small municipalities is not developed, they use a significant portion of their income in current expenses and they cannot make the investments necessary by the services and they cannot allocate sufficient resources even for basic services. These municipalities face significant difficulties in employing qualified and trained personnel.

In the preamble to the Article 11, this issue is explained as follows (TBMM Mevzuat, 2005b):

Law No. 1580, which has been in force since 1930, did not provide any regulation on the dissolution of the legal entity of the municipalities. Therefore, there are many municipalities in existence, although their population has dropped below 2000. As a result, resources have been used inefficiently and these municipalities could not do their duties. Although the municipalities with population below 2000 can be dissolved by reverse procedure in accordance with the procedure in the establishment procedures due to the principle of parallelism in the procedure, the governments did not. As in the case of provinces of Hatay and Denizli, many municipalities are separated by streets; there was confusion in the carrying out use of duties and exercising powers, and in the provision of services; the citizens were confused, because they do not know which municipality to apply for the problems; and the construction control and the struggle against illegal development could not be carried out sufficiently.

3.2.3. The Law No 5747

The other legislation on changing the municipal boundaries is the Law No 5747, titled “Law on Establishment of Districts within the Boundaries of Metropolitan Municipality and Amendment of Some Laws” (TBMM Mevzuat, 2008a). With this law, first level municipalities were abolished and new municipalities were established at the district level. Thus, the metropolitan municipality layout was redefined at the level of municipalities that are the size of the district.

The Law No 5393 failed in merging municipalities due to a wide range of common decisions. The Law No 5747 was enacted to facilitate implementation of the Article No 11 of the Law No 5393 (Çınar *et al*, 2013). Hence, small municipalities were abolished in less time through shortening the procedures. Furthermore, the problems that emerged from local levels would be tried to solve by central state. This actually means that decision making processes of the local people and local units about merging practices were totally ignored (Aktel *et al*, 2009, p. 64-65).

As mentioned before, the Law No 5747 also abolished the first tier municipalities of the metropolitan municipalities. First tier municipalities had been formed without establishing a district within their boundaries. The Law No 5747 enforced establishing district in the municipalities of metropolitan municipalities. Therefore, Article 1 of the Law No 5747 orders districts to be established. These settlements were first tier municipality of the metropolitan municipalities before. This article abolishes the legal entity of the first tier municipalities and determines the villages and neighbourhoods which would be consolidated to these newly established districts. Article 2 of the Law No 5747 is about merging, consolidation, and exclusion from the boundaries. It remarks the first tier municipalities within the metropolitan municipalities, which would be dissolved and consolidated to district municipalities as neighbourhood (TBMM Mevzuat, 2008a). The Law No 5747 sought to abolish 862 municipalities with populations below 2,000 and turn them into villages; and abolish the 240 first tier municipalities and turn them into neighbourhoods. However, the main opposition party of that period appealed to the Constitutional Court arguing against the abolition of municipalities with population below 2,000. Also, several municipalities filed for an annulment. Ultimately, the legal entity of 836 municipalities remained the same (O. Zengin, 2014, p. 101). Hence, the number of municipalities was decreased from 2949 to 1396 (with a 52.6 percent decrease) after the Law No 5747 (see Table 18).

In the preamble to the Law No 5747, the following reasons were provided (TBMM Mevzuat, 2008b):

Since municipalities do not have the capacity to generate local resources in small settlements, which are mainly in rural areas, these small municipalities were dependent on the funds transferred from general budget tax revenues. Since the share allocated to local administrations is distributed according to the population of the municipalities, small municipalities have more resource shortages. (...) In the municipalities with less population, the financial structure is deteriorated due to shortage of resources and their debts are gradually increasing. (...) Due to the insufficient administrative and technical capacity in these municipalities, other municipal services, especially zoning and license applications, cannot be provided in sufficient quality and in accordance with the legislation.

It is also asserted that disorganization and inadequacy of the small municipalities impeded local government reform. Therefore, small municipalities are suggested to be dissolved. Due to the abolition of the legal entities of these municipalities, significant savings would be made in administrative costs, and it would be possible to provide local government services efficiently by collecting these resources at a higher level of local government (TBMM Mevzuat, 2008b). However, as Tunga Köroğlu argues, the Law No 5747 was only about the population limit except for metropolitan cities. He adds that this law remained an inadequate solution to the problems of cities and municipal boundaries rather than improving the administrative regulation of the space (Köroğlu, 2012, p. 38)

3.2.4. The Law No 6360

The final amendment that changes the boundaries and numbers of the district municipalities is Law No 6360. On one hand, this law is an end product of the AKP's efforts on the changing boundaries of municipalities. On the other hand, this law might be an introduction of the implementing this metropolitan municipality model for all 81 provinces in Turkey. The law established metropolitan municipalities in 14 provinces with population larger than 750,000 (see Table 19). Also, boundaries of the metropolitan municipalities were expanded to provincial boundaries.

The third paragraph of Article 1 abolished small municipalities which were in the newly established metropolitan municipalities. These municipalities were turned into neighbourhoods. Also, boundaries of district municipalities were expanded to their district boundaries (TBMM Mevzuat, 2012a).

Table 19 Metropolitan municipalities established by the Law No 6360

	Population in 2012	Establishment Date	Service Area	Regulation
Aydın	1,041,979	2014	Whole province	Law No 6360
Balıkesir	1,189,057	2014	Whole province	Law No 6360
Denizli	987,700	2014	Whole province	Law No 6360
Hatay	1,519,836	2014	Whole province	Law No 6360
Malatya	669,544	2014	Whole province	Law No 6360
Manisa	1,367,905	2014	Whole province	Law No 6360
Kahramanmaraş	1,089,038	2014	Whole province	Law No 6360
Mardin	788,996	2014	Whole province	Law No 6360
Muğla	894,506	2014	Whole province	Law No 6360
Tekirdağ	906,702	2014	Whole province	Law No 6360
Trabzon	766,782	2014	Whole province	Law No 6360
Şanlıurfa	1,845,667	2014	Whole province	Law No 6360
Van	1,085,542	2014	Whole province	Law No 6360
Ordu	724,268	2014	Whole province	Law No 6360

Source: TÜİK (2019)

Legal entity of 1,358 small municipalities and 16,567 villages were dissolved by the law. Hence 17,925 local units were transformed into neighbourhood. In addition, the law abolished 277 small municipalities which were not in the metropolitan municipalities and had a population under 2,000. In total, legal entity of 1,635 small municipalities were dissolved. On the other side, the law established 25 districts (Adıgüzel & Tek, 2014, p. 80). Table 20 and Table 21 show the changes in the numbers of local government after the Law No 6360.

Table 20 Local government units before and after the Law No 6360

Local Government Units (LGU)	Number of LGU before the Law 6360	Newly Established	Newly Abolished	Number of LGU after the Law 6360
Villages	34395		16561	17834
Special Provincial Administration	81		30	51
Metropolitan municipality	16	14		30
District municipality of metropolitan municipality	143	25		519
Provincial municipality	65		14	51
District municipality	749	2	349	416
Small municipality	1977		1635	342
Total municipality	2951	41	1998	1358

Source: Adıgüzel & Tek, 2014, p. 81

Table 21 Effects of the Law No 6360 on the government units

	Local government units turned into neighbourhood			Number of districts			Number of neighbourhoods	
	Number of abolished villages	Number of abolished municipalities	Total	Before the Law 6360	New	Total	Before the Law 6360	After the Law 6360
Adana	468	40	508	15		15	405	913
Ankara	684	42	726	25		25	805	1531
Antalya	539	84	623	19		19	525	1148
Aydın	491	37	528	16	1	17	266	794
Balıkesir	892	34	926	18	2	20	289	1215
Bursa	659	38	697	17		17	443	1140
Denizli	361	81	442	18	1	19	349	791
Diyarbakır	789	15	804	17		17	247	1051
Erzurum	3-968	20	988	20		20	332	1320
Eskişehir	371	18	389	14		14	521	910
Gaziantep	448	19	467	9		9	368	835
Hatay	368	64	432	11	4	15	149	593
İstanbul	152	38	190	39		39	794	984
İzmir	595	61	656	30		30	750	1406
K. Maraş	474	54	528	9	2	11	358	886
Kayseri	397	52	449	16		16	433	882
Kocaeli	243	34	277	12		12	240	517
Konya	585	175	760	31		31	933	1693
Malatya	495	40	535	13		13	352	887
Manisa	782	68	850	15	2	17	413	1263
Mardin	586	21	607	9	1	10	154	761
Mersin	508	57	565	13		13	411	976
Muğla	396	49	445	11	2	13	232	677
Ordu	483	53	536	18	1	19	478	1104
Sakarya	425	24	449	16		16	323	772
Samsun	943	34	977	17		17	356	1333
Şanlıurfa	1153	15	1168	10	3	13	225	1393
Tekirdağ	257	24	281	8	3	11	121	402
Trabzon	477	59	536	17	1	18	384	920
Van	578	8	586	11	2	13	118	704
Total	16567	1358	17925	494	25	519	11794	29699

Source: Adıgüzel & Tek (2014, p. 79)

Table 22 shows population ranges of the municipalities 11% of municipalities have population less 2,000 and 62% of the municipalities have population less than 5,000. In 2008, 31% of municipalities have population less than 2,000 and 69% of the municipalities have population less than 5000. However, in 2018, 7.4% of the municipalities have population below 2,000 and 38.1% of the municipalities have population below 5,000.

Table 22 Population ranges of the municipalities

Population Ranges	Number of Municipalities and Their Percentages					
	2000	%	2008	%	2018	%
0-2000	354	11.0	915	31.0	104	7.4
2001-5000	1657	51.6	1122	38.0	429	30.7
5001-10000	557	17.3	350	11.9	184	13.2
10001-20000	274	8.5	229	7.8	141	10.1
20001-50000	181	5.6	94	3.2	199	14.2
50001-100000	83	2.6	93	3.2	103	7.4
100000-1000000	106	3.3	101	3.4	206	14.7
1000001-5000000	-	-	7	0.2	22	1.6
Total	3212	100	2951	100	1398	100

Source: TUIK, 2019; MiGM, 2018

The Law No 6360 also amended the revenue distribution in municipalities. “The portion of taxes collected within their territories by the central authority that is remitted to the metropolitan municipalities has been increased from 5 to 6% (60% of which goes directly to the metropolitan municipality, the remaining 40% is pooled). The portion of national tax revenue allocated to lower tier (district) municipalities was increased from 2.85 to 4.5% (a certain percentage of which is transferred to the metropolitan municipality)” (Elicin, 2018, p. 300).

In the preamble to the law, requirements of the new public management are indicated (TBMM Mevzuat, 2012b):

Today, with globalization, the management paradigm is changing and this change brings about new values. An efficient, effective, citizen-oriented, accountable, participatory, transparent and as much local government approach has come to the fore as the basic principles and values for public administration reforms in many developed countries. (...) According to this new understanding, public administration has to meet efficiency, productivity and increasing service expectations of the citizens.

The preamble emphasizes the existence of too many small municipalities, and their administrative and financial incapability.

In a certain geographical area, there are many local administrations that resulted in waste of resources due to insufficient planning and coordination and economies of scale. (...) This prevents effective and correct use of resources and leads to serious management problems in small settlements as well as in metropolitan cities (TBMM Mevzuat, 2012b).

Thus, economies of scale are offered as the solution of these problems (TBMM Mevzuat, 2012b) :

Within this framework, there is need for strong local government structures that can provide services at optimal scale, with the municipal boundary being the local boundary in terms of management, planning and coordination. Efficiency, coordination and quality of services will be

increased thanks to the economies of scale that will emerge from the one centre execution of the services provided in the metropolitan area, and it will be possible to provide more and better quality services with less resources. The services which were provided from more than one centre will be supplied by a larger and ideally sized centre. This will also reduce unit costs and public expenditure per capita.

According to the preamble, a metropolitan municipality model that is valid for the whole province will reveal the following positive developments (TBMM Mevzuat, 2012b):

Local government units that produce services at a larger scale will be equipped with advanced technologies. In these local government units, qualified technical personnel can be employed and productivity will be increased as labor force will become specialized. Such a local government system will ensure the efficient use of resources to be distributed from the center. A more fair structure may emerge among local government units integrated within the provincial boundaries in terms of the use of resources and the opportunities to be owned. Within the framework of the regulatory zoning plans will be put into practice harmoniously throughout the province.

Therefore, Kocaeli and İstanbul metropolitan municipalities are referred as a model since their boundaries were expanded to overlap with the provincial boundaries by the Law No 5216 in 2004. It is also asserted that with this law, in some provinces where there is no possibility of effective and efficient provision of local public services with the existing local government structure, the municipalities would be equipped with capability to meet the increasing expectations of citizens. Briefly, according to the preamble, public services would be provided by municipalities at an ideal scale and in a more efficient way (TBMM Mevzuat, 2012b).

It can be seen that the terms optimum scale and efficient service provision were frequently used in the preamble to the Law No 6360 as with the previous laws. In the report of AKP about the Law No 6360, similar statements regarding scale changes are used.

In this context, the aim of expanding the municipal boundary to the local boundary in terms of government, planning and coordination, is creating a strong structure that produces services on the widest scale. Efficiency, coordination and quality of services will be increased thanks to economies of scale resulting from the single center execution of services provided in the metropolitan area, and it will be possible to provide more and better quality services with less resources (AKP Raporu, 2012, p. 9).

According to the report, The Law No 6360 would increase efficiency, quality and coordination in the service provision as a result of economies of scale. More services would be provided by using less resources. Also, the law commits consolidation in service provision for the whole metropolitan area (AKP Raporu, 2012, p. 13).

3.3. Criticisms of the Law No 6360

In response to the claims of the Law No 6360, criticisms in the literature will be provided in this section. These criticisms will be examined under following topics: arguments on the real

aim and scope of the Law No 6360, criticisms on economies of scale, criticisms on efficient service provision and criticism on decentralization.

1) Arguments on The Real Aim and Scope of the Law No 6360: For O. Zengin (2014), the real aim of the Law No 6360 is changing electoral district and increasing possibility of urban rent. In the preamble to the law, cities are considered as a big market, trade centre and the engine of the national economy within the global economy. All the reasons stated in the preamble are abstract, lack of scientific research and analysis, and are based on unsubstantiated assumptions (O. Zengin, 2014, pp. 96, 102).

Alkan (2015) argues that the preparation of the law, the way it was brought to parliament and presented to the public was neither transparent nor participatory. All democratic procedures, consultation and negotiation principles were overlooked. The law was enacted with a single stroke without discussions in the assembly and without sharing details with academics, experts, professional organizations, NGOs, and relevant municipalities and villages (Alkan, 2015).

Önez Çetin refers the structural changes brought by the Law No 6360 in the following (2015a, p. 11):

In this regard, the new metropolitan system leads to structural changes in terms of administrative, financial, zoning and planning order. By the new Law, critical amendments were made at administrative structure (the removal of public legal personalities, the establishment of new public legal personalities, the amendment at administrative commitment, the changes at borders and division of powers), financial system (redetermination of the shares of local governments and new distributional relations), political geography (the change at the dimension of representation and participation with the change at election zones), personnel structure, the provision of services/ service delivery (the expansion of the service area with the expansion of the municipal borders to provincial borders) and development and planning order (İzci and Turan, 2013: 119). This restructuring process alters the power-responsibility and service fields of the local governments. The structure of the local units provided local services also regulated with the redetermination of the spatial field.

According to Bayraktar (2016), one of the major aims of the Law No 6360 is to facilitate centralization at the local level. At the core of this expansion, there is a risk of creating networks of sharing and widening unjust rent (Bayraktar, 2016, p. 8).

For Genç, the major problem of municipalities in Turkey is its municipality system. There are numerous small municipalities around the central district municipalities which result in administrative and political fragmentation (2016, p. 415). The Law No 6360 indicates this problem, too. However, as Beyhan claims, “Law No 6360 could not solve the problems associated with administration and planning of the middle sized cities or urban conurbations” (2014, p. 12).

Şahin and Bostancı clarify the major reasons of the boundary regulations as “removal of barriers to investments in the metropolitan areas that are spreading, differentiating and changing in order to solve the problems of the constricted and constantly crisis-threatened markets; and failure to achieve the expected success with neo-liberal policies” (2012, p. 115). There are both vertical and horizontal transfers of authorities. On the one hand, in the spatial hierarchy of the state, the powers are redistributed between the central government, local administrations and the levels of the state, while at the same time the possibility to transfer powers at all levels of the state can be non-state levels was opened. The horizontal transfer of authority behind the administrative restructuring is often referred to as efficiency, productivity and savings.

Koyuncu and Serteser argues that the claim on ensuring the efficiency of service delivery on the basis of the Law No 6360 has been left aside, and the main focus has been large investments and marketing of cities as a competitive element (2012, p. 7). For Şengül, Kavuncu and Kocatürk (2016, p. 84), establishing metropolitan municipalities refers to concentration of capital on the urban spaces. Also as a political process, the Law No 6360 aimed to create a hegemonic central and local power block and look for new politics (Şengül, Kavuncu & Kocatürk, 2016, p. 88). Kavuncu identifies the Law No 6360 as consolidation of the local governments (2017, p. 160). For the author, merging municipalities caused reproduction and reconstruction of political power and authority at the local level and between central and local administration (Kavuncu, 2017, p. 166).

2) Criticisms on Economies of Scale: Both the preamble to the Law No 6360 and report of AKP frequently emphasize the economies of scale. Bayraktar (2016, p. 5) states that the use of the term economies of scale to refer efficient and rapid service provision was borrowed from the new management approach. Brenner (2006) argues that scale is now considered as a dynamic phenomenon which is tested and changed within socio-spatial practices rather than a given objective ground (cited in Bayraktar, 2016, p. 3). For Bayraktar, this socio-spatial dynamism in the construction of the scale can easily be seen in the light of the preferences and demands of the political power behind the Law No 6360. Thus, this law regards scale as a phenomenon which is defined in the light of political and social variables as opposed to a technical concept (Bayraktar, 2016, p. 3).

Bayraktar refers to studies on the economies of scale that suggest it has not always yielded as favourable results as claimed by the proponents, especially in the long run. Moreover, it is clear that the scale designed by the Law No 6360 will cause serious problems in the provision

of service. According to the author, economies of scale cannot be applied to municipalities due to the diversity and special nature of the municipal services (Bayraktar, 2016).

Genç (2016) refers to the serious critiques of the Law No 6360. One of them is about scale. The reasons for optimal scale offered by the law “are abstract, devoid of any scientific analysis and consisted of opinion”. Though the provincial borders suitable for İstanbul and İzmit, it is not suitable for the other metropolitan municipalities. For, optimum scale varies from municipality to municipality (Genç, Law Number 6360 and Transformation in Metropolitan Municipalities, 2016, p. 430). Genç also points out the critiques about providing service to rural areas. There are “non-optimal results because of geographical conditions, distance, etc” (Genç, 2016, p. 435). Many villages turned into neighbourhoods are far from the city centres and there are geographical barriers between them. They cannot be reached for efficient provision of services. Moreover, there are metropolitan municipalities with very scattered districts. They are divided by mountains, rivers or plains that would make the service provision very difficult (Genç, 2016, p. 435).

Özer (2013) also indicates the difficulties in service provision due to the provincial boundaries. Moreover, this implementation goes against the subsidiarity principle which orders that the public should receive service from the nearest local administrative unit. The fact that people travel miles and demand services from the metropolitan area does not satisfy this criterion. What is more, rural people will be adversely affected by the reflection of service costs on the whole province. This is especially valid for water prices, the environment and other taxes (Özer, 2013, pp. 118-119).

For G. Zengin, the provinces were converted into metropolitan municipalities without any scientific studies, regulatory impact analysis or developed country samples in order to determine the optimal scale (2013, p. 20).

Kaypak and Yılmaz (2015) present consequences of the Law No 6360. For the authors, since the municipalities within the metropolitan municipalities carry out their management activities only by taking their area of responsibility into account, a fragmented management approach has emerged. As the problems related to the general metropolitan area cannot be managed from a center, there is a lack of coordination among the district municipalities and a waste of resources because economies of scale cannot be implemented (Kaypak & Yılmaz, 2015, p. 1331).

3) Criticisms about Efficient Service Provision: One of the major claims for changing municipal boundaries is increasing efficiency of service provision. O. Zengin (2014, p. 112)

argues that the Law No 6360 “might lead to service inefficiencies (decline in service quality, disruption of services, prolongation of service delivery, reduced citizen satisfaction, etc.) and waste of resources” (Zengin O., 2014, p. 112). Also, he claims that “no analysis, model, measurement or feasibility study of service efficiency and productivity has been conducted” (Zengin O., 2014, p. 112).

Alkan (2015) evaluates the Law No 6360 as a new form of restructuring local governments of “authoritarian urbanization”. For the author, the claims of efficiency, effectiveness, better service provision stated in the law are the product of cyclical economic and political climate (Alkan, 2015).

Although the rationale of Law No 6360 refers to the expected benefits such as effectiveness, coordination, quality increase in service provision and decrease in public service delivery costs, this conjuncture can be read as a macro intervention in the spatial-managerial structure in order to widen the geography of land rent production – as well as other political and electoral benefits (Alkan, 2015).

According to Alkan (2015), in many cases where small units are weakened or abolished, the goal of effectiveness in the provision of services and infrastructure precludes the aspirations of local democracy, citizen participation and autonomy. Particularly in rural settlements, the efficiency objective can turn into a ‘fiasco’ by reducing ability to access local governments and resulting in emergence of service gaps.

Arikboğa (2013) indicates another aspect of scale discussion. If the service efficiency in question, as stated in the preamble to the Law No 6360, not only the economies of scale, but also “the area where the benefit of the service is spread” is an important criterion to be considered (Arikboğa, 2013, p. 84). The benefits of each service are spread across different areas. The benefits of some services can be spread to significantly larger areas, while the benefits of some services have to remain at narrower scales. With the implementing of the law, decisions on these services would result in the failure to account for the differentiating preferences of people living in different regions, the provision of services in a uniform fashion, and thus loss of efficiency (Arikboğa, 2013, p. 84).

If the jurisdiction of the metropolitan municipalities is expanded to the whole province, then the area where the benefit of the service is spread and the economies of scale will start to produce opposite results in most cases. More specifically, in this case, for example, water and sewage, public transport, fire and so on, it cannot be said that the benefits of services are distributed equally or uniformly across all provincial areas. Rather, the benefits of these and similar services are independent and clustered on the basis of certain regions within the province. Therefore, the provision of such services by metropolitan municipalities will not increase efficiency, but will reduce it. Again, the impact of economies of scale on these services will be limited, whereas participation and sensitivity to local characteristics will be more dominant (Arikboğa, 2013, p. 86).

Kara (2016) postulates that small-scale urban units mean waste of resources. However, increasing the scale too much will lead to inefficiencies. When the urban population increases too much, the cost of urban infrastructure such as water and sewerage and social infrastructure will increase. Especially in urban areas spread over a large area and clustered in a scattered area, providing services to the farthest districts of the city will be costly and required large investments (Kara, 2016, pp. 259-260).

According to Gözler, municipal services might not be provided in an efficient and effective way in the metropolitan municipalities. He states that it is very expensive and time-consuming to make plans remotely and then carry them out with staff and vehicles commuting from miles away (Gözler, 2013, p. 23). Likewise for Keleş (2013), it would be difficult to perform services such as public services, infrastructure and zoning inspections efficiently and effectively in metropolitan municipalities. Metropolitan municipalities providing services to remote settlements may result in an increase in service costs of services (Keleş, 2013). Moreover, Çalcalı (2014) indicates increase in costs as a result by Law No 6360. The fact that metropolitan municipalities provide services to very large area would result in high costs. Although the revenues of metropolitan municipalities have been increased, this revenue increase would be insufficient for services to be provided to large rural areas, which lack of infrastructure and other services. Planning and implementing services for villages converted into neighbourhoods would be very difficult for metropolitan municipalities (Çalcalı, 2014, p. 65).

Turan and Duru (2014) point to the relationship between district and metropolitan municipalities. The main attention was paid to the metropolitan municipalities due to the concerns of providing efficient and effective services while district municipalities were ignored. As a result, metropolitan municipalities overshadowed district municipalities with their financial, political and administrative powers. Hence, district municipalities became the branches of the metropolitan municipalities with limited powers and authorities (Turan & Duru, 2014, p. 284).

For G. Zengin, it is not possible for metropolitan municipalities to provide all services to the whole province effectively and efficiently with their current financial liabilities and limited capacity to generate their own income (2013, p. 19). Likewise, Görmez (2014) points out inefficient service provision in geographically large metropolitan municipalities. Although it would be a positive development for villages in narrow metropolitan municipalities to receive services, it would be difficult in large ones, such as Konya, Mersin and Muğla. Moreover, it would be impossible to provide services to the whole province in such cities. There would be

problems in fire, solid waste, environmental, agricultural and husbandary services. According to the author, the Law No 6360 is not appropriate for efficient service provision. For him, the primary service area should be at the district level (Görmez, 2014).

Önez Çetin (2015a, p. 15) also voices her doubts about the service provision in the whole province. Despite increases in the revenues, personnel and the equipments of metropolitan municipalities, efficient service may not be provided throughout whole province including the rural areas. In her words:

It is a wonder that how the rural services that had been provided for years outside the municipality borders (water, drainage, solid waste and supporting the forest villages), and the services within and outside the municipal borders (agriculture, housing, land conservation, construction, maintenance and repair affairs made by central government) can be met by metropolitan municipalities (Önez Çetin, 2015a, p. 15).

Kavuncu argues that emphasis on more efficient service delivery in municipalities through changing municipal boundaries ignores power relations and struggles in the political vein. She also adds that before consolidation of municipalities, the unique factors within socio-spatial context were not analysed carefully (Kavuncu, 2017, p. 41)

4. Criticisms on Decentralization: Both the general preamble to the Law No 6360 and AKP's report occasionally emphasize decentralization. In fact, the Law No 5216 on Metropolitan Municipalities transfers many important services, responsibilities and duties from municipalities to the metropolitan municipalities. As Önez Çetin (2015a, p. 14) indicates:

Metropolitan Municipality Law No. 5216 makes the allocation of responsibilities, and powers between the metropolitan municipalities and metropolitan district municipalities and even in some respects the decisions of the metropolitan district municipalities' subject to the approval the metropolitan municipality. Some services of old district municipalities are now conducted by metropolitan municipality, and the decision-making authority is passed to the metropolitan municipality at some issues.

The Law No 6360 abolished the special provincial administrations, small municipalities and villages in the metropolitan municipalities. Hence, most of their services, responsibilities and duties were transferred to the metropolitan municipalities. Therefore, metropolitan municipalities gained all the authorities in the local level. For Arıkboğa (2013), this is a "centralist decentralization". Contrary to its claim, the law is very centralist, totalitarian, and do not care about the specific features of the localities. The author also points to the distribution of financial resources in a metropolitan municipality. Revenues previously used by many units in a province are now collected by a single unit. Hence, metropolitan municipalities could implement large scale projects, just like private entrepreneurs (Arıkboğa, 2013, pp. 72-73). For Kerimoğlu, a new conception of governance model has been introduced that centralizes

and reinforces the bureaucratic and authoritarian structure of the state (2014, p. 3). On the other hand, the Law No 6360 established Investment, Monitoring and Coordination Directorates to replace the abolished special provincial administrations in the metropolitan municipalities. As a local unit of the central government, these directorates have “supervision authority” and “administrative tutelage” within the localities (Önez Çetin, 2015b, p. 138). This suggests that large areas of the metropolitan municipalities are managed with a strong executive, giving the impression that the central state moved to the local area and a strong structure emerged. A strong metropolitan municipality was created in the form of central government, and a new custody was established in the image of district municipalities (Belli & Aydın, 2017, p. 401; Önez Çetin, 2015a; Gözler, 2013, p. 39). As Elicin (2018, p. 299) states, the Law No 6360 “gave way to rescaling of urban service delivery schemes producing a recentralisation at metropolitan level as well as reassignment of some rural services under the responsibility of metropolitan municipalities”.

According to Bayraktar, the Law No 6360 resulted in the “centralization of the locality” and an increase in the influence of the national centre (2016, p. 3). Then, the author proposes “a tri-dimensional matrix based on different aspects of power” to explain the Turkish politics: Decentralisation, poly-centralisation and re-centralisation. For the author, the Law No 6360 “clearly represents a re-centralisation trend”. He also adds that it is likely to see the mayors of the metropolitan municipalities “as the urban fortunes” since “the geographic area under their control has been very notably enlarged” (Bayraktar, 2014, p. 339). Bayraktar also points out that the Law No 6360 induced centralization about development plans, through increasing the power of metropolitan municipalities over district municipalities. As Ersoy also argues, the municipalities, which had the authority to make development plans in 1985 and thus gained great power, were exposed to the dynamics of centralization with the establishment of metropolitan municipalities (2014, p. 31).

[F]or an objection to a subdivision plan, how will the citizens reach to a municipality 150 km away and tell their troubles to their elected delegates? In the past, even at the municipal level, this problem was sometimes experienced. Especially after the transfer of this authority to district and metropolitan municipalities, it will be more difficult and the legitimacy of the administrations in the public eye will be reduced (Ersoy, 2014, pp. 31-32).

For Ersoy, such an implementation will result in authorization and communication problems at the local levels (2014).

3.4. Case Studies on Changing Municipal Boundaries in Turkey

There are numerous academic studies on the Law No 6360. Most scholars present a literature review, historical background and anticipated impacts of the Law No 6360. There are also

authors who conducted field studies to observe and evaluate impacts of the law. Some of these scholars preferred to conduct public surveys and use the SPSS²⁰ program for data analysis using empirical methodology. Others preferred to make interviews and applied descriptive analysis using qualitative method. In the following section, several case studies on the impacts of the Law No 6360 on the service provision are presented. The studies were intended to test the claims of the law in practice. Their research objects are mainly boundary changes, abolished local units, efficiency, effectiveness and centralization processes.

Kızılboğa Özaslan, Akıllı and Özaslan (2014) investigated how the local people responded to the Law No 6360 that abolished the Gümüşlük municipality. The Law No 6360 established a metropolitan municipality in Muğla, abolished the Gümüşlük small municipality and turned it into a neighbourhood of Bodrum district municipality. The authors conducted surveys with local people and analyzed the data with SPSS program. They found that the participants thought that they should have been consulted for the decision to abolish and they did not agree with the abolition decision. Also, they did not see the abolition of the municipalities as a valid reason because they could not provide effective and efficient services and did not have sufficient financial resources. Moreover, they thought that they would have problems especially in environmental cleaning, garbage collection, sewage, drinking water, zoning, fire and transportation services after the municipality was abolished (Kızılboğa Özaslan, Akıllı & Özaslan, 2014).

Hergüner (2015) investigated the impact of the Law No 6360 on the service quality in Trabzon. The Law No 6360 established a metropolitan municipality in Trabzon, abolished its small municipalities and turned them into neighbourhoods. The author analyzed the change in service quality in those small municipalities through conducting semi-structured interviews with local people. He processed the data utilizing descriptive analysis. He found that most people believe that the transfer of the powers of the municipalities to the metropolitan municipality adversely affects local democracy, despite partial progress in efficiency. Hence, this study testifies centralization at local level caused by the Law No 6360 (Hergüner, 2015).

Kaypak and Yılmaz (2015) measured effectiveness of the Law No 6360 in Malatya. The Law No 6360 established metropolitan municipality in Malatya. The authors conducted surveys with local people and analyzed the data using SPSS program. Their findings suggest that with the expansion of the responsibility area of the metropolitan municipality, environmental and

²⁰ SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) is a computer program for statistical analysis of the data in a quick and easy way.

landscape arrangements, road, water and sewerage services are inadequate. Also, there was increase in real estate, environmental and garbage taxes, construction license taxes. Furthermore, water bills, housing rents, housing and land prices and transportation fees were also increased. Kaypak and Yılmaz (2017) also measures effectiveness of the Law No 6360 in Van metropolitan municipality. They conduct surveys with local people. Their findings suggest an improvement in transportation, environment, landscape, solid waste, water and sewage services. Road, maintenance and repair practices increased. However, real estate, environmental and garbage taxes, construction license taxes, water bills, housing rents, housing and land prices and transportation fees increased (Kaypak & Yılmaz, 2015).

Biricikoğlu and Demirel Duyar (2015) examined the concepts of economies of scale, and service efficiency and effectiveness all of which are emphasized in the general preamble to the Law No. 6360. The authors conducted a field study in Sakarya Metropolitan Municipality. They had semi-structured interviews with the heads of departments in the metropolitan municipality. They utilized descriptive analysis methods to interpret the data. Their primary question was about the impacts of changing municipal boundaries introduced by Law 6360 on service delivery. It was not the question whether optimum size for the service area of the metropolitan municipality in the Sakarya was the provincial boundary or not. They asked how the practitioners evaluated the effects of this change on the service provision. There are both positive and negative perspectives towards the Law No 6360. The heads of the departments stated that expansion of the service boundaries to the provincial boundaries would contribute positively to the efficient and effective delivery of services. They mentioned that the law would create a more equitable and fair structure in terms of benefiting from the service. However, they stated that the law had some problems in terms of efficient and effective delivery of services. The capacity to provide service remained insufficient. There is lack of staff and financial resources. Also, they stated that there are cost increases in different services (Biricikoğlu & Demirel Duyar, 6360 Sayılı Yasa'nın Genişleyen Büyükşehir Belediyesi Hizmet Sınırının Etkinlik Ve Verimliliğe Etkisi Bağlamında Değerlendirmesi: Sakarya Büyükşehir Belediyesi Örneği Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi, 2015).

Candan and Maltaş (2015) examined the claims of the Law No 6360 on efficiency, economies of scale, subsidiarity, political participation and allocation of service. They sent questionnaire forms to headmen in Hatay Metropolitan Municipality. The authors measured headmen's degree of satisfaction with municipal services before the law and after the law using the Servqual Model. They analysed 138 questionnaire forms with SPSS program. Headmen's degree of satisfaction with services both before and after Law was moderate. After the law,

headmen thought there was an increase in service quality in terms of the financial aspect. However, according to the headmen, service quality declined in terms of trust, responsibility, equality, cleanliness, supervision and communication dimensions; while there was positive development in physical, zoning, transportation and cultural services. (Candan & Maltaş, 2015).

Göküş and Alptürker (2016) aimed to measure service efficiency in Mersin Metropolitan Municipality. The authors studied Silifke's villages which were abolished and turned into neighbourhoods after the Law No 6360 was enacted. They conducted semi-structured interviews with the headmans of the neighbourhoods. Interviews were recorded transcribed and interpreted within the framework of qualitative research techniques,. The authors concluded that some headmen were dissatisfied with the transformation practices of the Law No 6360 while others were not. Some headmen stated that services were provided efficiently. Yet, other headmens pointed out that they had problems of communication with the municipal administrations; their service requests were not met on time or were met by private relations; and partisan attitude was exhibited. The reasons cited for the lack of effective services are neighborhoods being far from the city centers, the large size of the municipal service area, the novelty of the law and the administrative organization of the municipalities not being fully realized. For the authors, the major finding of this study is that the Law No 6360 was not fully implemented.

Belli and Aydın (2016) examined the issue of efficiency and productivity in service provision, and representation in the Önsen-Kahramanmaraş. The Law No 6360 established metropolitan municipality in Kahramanmaraş, abolished the Önsen municipality and turned it into a neighbourhood of the Onikişubat district municipality. The authors conducted surveys with local people and used the SPSS program for data analysis. They concluded that the abolition of the municipality of the municipality was an appropriate decision in terms of efficiency and productivity in service. The Onikişubat district municipality provides more efficient services than the Önsen municipality. However, there was an important problem about domestic water failure. Also, they revealed that there are no major differences between small municipality and district municipality in terms of representation (Belli & Aydın, 2016).

Genç and Korkın (2017) analyzed local people's perception of the Law No 6360's practices in Atça. The Law No 6360 established a metropolitan municipality in Aydın, abolished Atça small municipality and turned it into a neighbourhood of Sultanhisar district. The authors conducted surveys with local people and analyzed the data with SPSS program. The local people's opinion of the law, which abolished Atça municipality, was negative. Most of the

participants thought that the law caused negative outcomes in their settlement. Likewise, most of the participants did not agree that the law decreased waste of resources and increased quality and efficiency of the service provision. They stated that Atça municipality was more efficient before the law (Genç & Korkın, 2017).

Okçu, Özgür, Nergiz, Savaş Yavuzçehre, Kılınç, Akman, Akman and Aydın (2017) claim that scale changes would seriously affect the municipal service provision. They conducted field studies in seven metropolitan municipalities (Kocaeli, Samsun, Antalya, İzmir, Ankara, Diyarbakır, Erzurum) based upon public surveys. They asked for transformation, efficiency and effectiveness in service provision; perception of the local people on the service division between district and metropolitan municipalities; satisfaction of the local people by the services to provide within provincial borders; and the perspectives of the local people about improvement of the service provision. The authors used the SPSS program for data analysis. Most of the respondents thought that the law was positive in terms of service efficiency. However, it was found that optimum scale for efficient service delivery varied on the basis of service. They also share the idea that water services, solid waste, construction and maintenance of main streets and public transportation services should be carried out by the metropolitan administration. There are also respondents with negative opinions about the law. They thought that taxes would increase and service provision within provincial borders would be insufficient (Okçu, Özgür & Nergiz, 2017).

Sadioğlu, Dede and Yüceyılmaz (2017) investigated the problems of the abolished municipalities. This study is based on the example of Değirmendere Municipality and deals with the abolishing of municipalities in terms of locality, representation, participation and indirectly effectiveness. As a small municipality of Kocaeli Metropolitan Municipality, Değirmendere Municipality was abolished by the Law No 5747 in 2008. Değirmendere provided a long-term experience on the subject and the fact that Kocaeli Metropolitan Municipality was presented as a model under the Law No 6360 makes this study more salient. The authors conducted interviews with the local authorities and they interpreted the data utilizing descriptive analysis method. The results show that the abolition decisions provided efficiency in service provision but caused problems in local democracy and participation mechanisms. For the authors, when making abolition decisions the emphasis should not be solely on efficiency and effectiveness, but rather on the agenda in line with the specific characteristics of local politics and local government (Sadioğlu, Dede & Yüceyılmaz, 2017).

Elicin (2018) assessed the effectiveness of the outcomes of the Law No 6360 in Kahramanmaraş Metropolitan Municipality. The author conducted semi-structured interviews

with local officials and explores legislation, reports and statistics. The field study concentrates on public transportation, fire service and urban planning, in which effective service delivery is expected to be performed by the public authority. According to Elicin, efficiency in public transportation was not achieved. “The lack of efficiency seems to be a major obstacle for integrated urban transportation at provincial level.” (Elicin, 2018, p. 306). Although there were considerable improvements, the author conclude that fire service was not satisfactory. Finally, the author was in doubt about a holistic urban planning (Elicin, 2018).

Eren and Yılmaz (2018) searched the issue of efficiency and productivity in the decision making processes in Hatay Metropolitan Municipality. The authors conducted face-to-face surveys with local people and analyzed the data with the SPSS program. The authors measured efficiency and productivity by testing the perception of local people on the involvement in decision-making processes of Hatay metropolitan municipality. They found out that there is a weak participation to the decision making processes. Therefore, efficiency and productivity in decision making processes were not constructed by the metropolitan municipality (Eren & Yılmaz, 2018).

Koç (2019) investigated the perception of the headmen to the efficiency and productivity in service provision. The research area of the author was the villages in Muğla which were transformed to the neighbourhood by the Law No 6360. The Law No 6360 established metropolitan municipality in Muğla and abolished the villages in 2014. The author conducted public surveys with the headmen and analyzed the data with the help of Excell program. He measured the efficiency and productivity in service provision after the Law No 6360 by asking following questions. Difficulties in service provision due to the increase in the service area, service provision in time, efficient service provision without resource wastage, and rapid and powerful service provision. At the end of the study, the author found that the expectations of the headmen have not satisfied yet. Their perceptions to the law were both positive and negative (Koç, 2019).

Table 23 gives a summary of these case studies about the the influences of the Law No 6360 on the municipal service provision. In the table, there are names of authors, their research municipalities, objects, methods and results. As it can be seen in the table, there are both positive and negative outcomes.

Table 23 Case Studies on the Law No 6360

Authors	Research Municipalities	Research Objects	Research Methods	Research Results
Kızılböğü Özaslan <i>et al</i> , 2014	Gümüşlük- Muğla	- Decision of the abolition of the municipality -Effects of the Law No 6360	-Public surveys -The SPSS program	- Incorrect abolition decision - Problems in environmental cleaning, garbage collection, sewage, drinking water, zoning, fire and transportation services
Hergüner, 2015	Trabzon	Service quality in abolished small municipalities	-Semi-structured interviews -Descriptive analysis	-Partial progress in efficiency -Negative impact on local democracy
Kaypak & Yılmaz, 2015	Malatya	Effectiveness of the Law No 6360	-Public surveys -The SPSS program	-Inadequate environmental and landscape arrangements, road, water and sewerage services -Increase in rents, sales taxes and bills
Biricikoğlu & Demirol Düyar, 2015	Sakarya	Efficiency in service provision	-Semi-structured interviews -Descriptive analysis	-Both positive and negative perspectives -Efficient and effective delivery of services -A more equitable and fair structure -Insufficient capacity to provide service remained -Lack of staff and financial resources -Cost increases in different services
Candan & Maltaş, 2015	Hatay	-Efficiency, economies of scale, subsidiarity, political participation and allocation of service -Satisfaction degrees of the headmen	-Public surveys -The SPSS program	-A positive increase in service quality for the financial dimension -Decline in service quality in terms of trust, responsibility, equality, cleanliness, supervision and communication dimensions; -A positive development in physical, zoning, cultural and transportation services

Table 23 (continued)

Authors	Research Municipalities	Research Objects	Research Methods	Research Results
Göküş & Alptürker, 2016	Silifke-Mersin	Efficiency in service provision	-Semi-structured interviews -Qualitative methods	-Some headmens were satisfied with the law, but others were not. -Inefficient service provision and several reasons (time, distance, clientalism, obliviousness, etc) for it.
Belli & Aydın, 2016	Önsen-K.Maraş	Efficiency and productivity in service provision, and representation	-Public surveys -The SPSS program	-Correct abolition decision -More efficient service by distirict municipilty -Problems in potable water -No major changes in representation
Kaypak & Yılmaz, 2017	Van	Effectiveness of the Law No 6360	-Public surveys -SPSS program	- Improvement in landscape, transportation, environment, solid waste, water and sewage services -Increase in maintenance-repair and road works - Increase in rents, sales taxes and bills
Genç & Korkın, 2017	Atça-Aydın	Perception of the local people towards practices of the Law No 6360	-Public surveys -The SPSS program	- Negative perception towards the law - Decrease in efficiency and quality
Okçu <i>et al</i> , 2017	Seven metropolitan municipalities	Efficiency in service provision, perception of the local people on the scale hanges and their satisfaction on municipal services	-Public surveys -The SPSS program	-Both positive and negative perceptions -Efficient service provision with scale changes -Insufficient service provision in the borders
Sadioğlu <i>et al</i> 2017	Değirmendere-Kocaeli	Efficiency, democracy and particiaption	-Semi-structured interviews -Descriptive analysis	-Efficiency in the service provision but problems in democracy and participation mechanisms

Table 23 (continued)

Authors	Research Municipalities	Research Objects	Research Methods	Research Results
Elicin, 2018	K. Maraş	Effectiveness of the Law No 6360	-Semi-structured interviews -Critical analysis	-Problems in transportation, fire service and urban planning
Eren & Yılmaz, 2018	Hatay	Efficiency and productivity in the decision making processes	-Public surveys -The SPSS program	-A weak participation -Not constructed efficiency and productivity
Koç, 2019	Muğla	Efficiency and productivity in service provision	-Public surveys with headmen -The Excell program	-Both positive and negative results -Unsatisfied expectations

3.5. Case Studies about Optimum Scale

There are also a few case studies with the goal of finding optimum scale of the municipalities for efficient service provision. It should be noted that these studies based upon empirical methods as the U shaped cost function lines were used to determine optimum size.

For the optimum scale of metropolitan municipalities, the work of Ceritli (2002) can be pointed out. The author investigated optimum scale for efficient provision of the municipal services (water, sewage, garbage collection and public transportation). The author conducted his study in the cities with populations between 50,000-1,000,000. He sent questionnaire forms to the municipalities and asked some questions for measuring efficiency. For water services the parameters were vehicle efficiency (amount of water/vehicle), personnel efficiency (amount of water/personnel), annual water supply per capita and network failure repair (failure/personnel and failure/vehicle). For wastewater services the parameters was network failure repair (failure/personnel and failure/vehicle). For garbage collection services the parameters were vehicle efficiency (amount of collected garbage/vehicle) and personnel efficiency (amount of collected garbage/personnel). For public transportation services the parameters were vehicle efficiency (amount of passenger/vehicle) and personnel efficiency (amount of passenger/personnel). At the end, Ceritli found out that optimum populations were 150-250 thousands for water services, 200-250 thousands and 500-623 thousands for sewage services, 150-200 thousands for garbage collection services, 200-250 and 500-623 thousands for public transportation services. The author concluded that a 150-250 thousands of population reflects optimum scale regarding four municipal services (Ceritli, 2002).

Another work on measuring the optimum size belongs to Gündüzöz's study (2011b). The author examined data from 49 small municipalities in the province of Tokat. The goal of

Gündüzöz is questioning the new population criterion (minimum 5,000) of the Law No 5216 for establishment of a municipality. The major aim of the author is find out optimum municipal size over the service costs per capita. The parameters were population in 2000 and expenditures on final accounts of municipalities in 2002. In the study, the U-shaped cost function was assumed for municipalities. This cost function, in which per capita municipal expenditures are considered as dependent and the population as an independent variable, is used to calculate the population size that minimizes the service cost per capita of each municipality. Thus, the other variables affecting costs are considered constant and the relationship between population size and service costs of municipalities is revealed (Gündüzöz, 2011b, p. 191). As a result of the analysis, the author identifies optimum municipal size as the population of 5,433. Since 92.30% of the municipalities in Tokat were below 5,000 in population, Gündüzöz proposed the municipalities that should be consolidated (2011b).

Topal (2011) investigated small municipalities in Trabzon to determine optimum size for municipalities. The motivation of Topal is the new population criterion (minimum 5,000) of the Law No 5216 for establishing a municipality. In the study, a population scale that minimizes the per capita costs of the municipalities was calculated with the help of an econometric model. The population sizes of the 64 municipalities in Trabzon and per capita costs of the municipalities were minimized by the U shepe cost function. At the end of the study, the author identified the optimum population size that minimized per capita costs of the municipalities as 4,625. For Topal, this result supported the decision of new population criterion for establishing municipalities. However, the author added that this criterion was far from resolving the problem of small scale in the Turkish municipal system (Topal, 2011, p. 379).

Yoloğlu (2011b) conducted an empirical analysis on the optimum size of the municipalities in terms of efficiency in service provision. The author examined 43.9% of the municipalities in Turkey. He selected water, solid waste and development services for the analysis. The author utilized an inductive method for evaluating data. For the optimum scale analysis of development services, the efficiency parameters were the size of the planned development area per technical and administrative personnel, and the total number of construction permits issued within a year. For the optimum scale analysis of solid waste services, the parameters are the annual amount of solid waste collected by each personnel working in solid waste works and the method of solid waste disposal. For the optimum scale analysis of water services, the parameters were population per personnel, water loss rate in the network and price of water. As a result of his analysis, Yoloğlu reaches to the following conclusions. Optimum scale for

development and solid waste is between 10 and 20 thousands of people. However, it is not possible to determine any optimum scale for municipalities in terms of water services. Hence, between 10 and 20 thousands of population in each municipality was “a critical point” (Yoloğlu, 2011b, p. 47). At the end, Yoloğlu proposed research ways for measuring optimum scale of municipalities. First, researchers should utilize not only quantitative analysis, but also qualitative analysis to evaluate efficiency in municipal service provision.

To give an example, annual or daily amount of solid waste per personnel is important in solid waste works. However, it is also important whether the solid waste is collected by horse carriage or garbage truck. Or the water loss rate in the water network is important, but the quality of the water supplied is just as important. In addition, it should be assessed whether all services provided by municipalities can be subjected to such scale analysis. In other words, it should also be considered whether it is desirable to produce too much service by a staff member. For example, given the construction permits carried out by municipalities, it should not be overlooked that as the number of permits issued by a staff increases, the quality of the work will decrease and this may cost people lives in case of natural disasters (Yoloğlu, 2011b, p. 67).

As it can be clearly seen from the studies summarized above, there is no single optimum scale for municipalities. In addition, there is no single scale for the water and sewage services. If there was a universally accepted scale for the most efficient service provision, it would never be the population of 750,000 which was offered by the Law No 6360. Doubtlessly, there is a relation between scale and service provision in the municipalities. However, there are other factors affecting the delivery of the most efficient service at any scale. These other factors will be further investigated in the case study section of the dissertation.

Table 24 gives the academic works which try to determine an optimum scale for municipalities in Turkey. The optimum scales range from approximately 4,5 thousands to 250 thousands.

Table 24 Studies on determining optimum scale for municipalities

Author	Research area	Research object	Optimum population sizes for services	Optimum population sizes for municipalities
Ceritli, 2002	Municipalities (50,000-1,000,000)	Water services	200-250 thousands	150-250 thousands
		Sewage services	500-623 thousands	
		Garbage collection	150-200 thousands	
Gündüzöz, 2011	49 small municipalities in Tokat	Population by expenditures on final accounts of municipalities	-	5,433
Topal, 2011	Municipalities in Trabzon	Population by expenditures on final accounts of municipalities	-	4,625
Yoloğlu, 2011	Municipalities (43,9%)	Development	10-20 thousands	10-20 thousands
		Solid waste	10-20 thousands	
		Water	Not measured	

CHAPTER 4

THE PROVINCE OF HATAY

Hatay Metropolitan Municipality and its district municipalities have been selected as the research field for this dissertation. Water and sewerage services have been chosen as the municipal services to focus on. First, the Law No 6360 established a metropolitan municipality in the province of Hatay in 2014. The Law also abolished small scale municipalities and created new district municipalities through changing the boundaries in Hatay. The boundaries of the metropolitan municipality were expanded to correspond to the boundaries of Hatay. Second, Hatay provides a good example of a fragmented urban area in terms of its geography and socio-economic development. Geographically the city is divided into two by mountains. The coastal part of the city is located to the west of the mountain range and is more developed with an industrial economy. Whereas, the other part, located to the east of the mountain and bordering Syria, is less developed with only small scale agricultural activities. Finally, Hatay is Turkey's gateway to the Middle East and a transit point between global production and consumption centres.

The Metropolitan Law No 5216 reassigns certain municipal services from district municipalities to metropolitan municipalities; water and sewage services are among these. After Hatay gained metropolitan municipality status, metropolitan municipalities took over the responsibility of water and sewage service provision. For the provision of this service HATSU (Hatay Water and Sewage Administration General Directorate) and were established in 2014. Water and sewage services were selected for this dissertation since they are common, essential, and continuous local services with available data.

This chapter will first provide a brief historical background of Hatay. It will also elaborate demographic and geographical structure of the province of Hatay. Moreover, municipalities of Hatay, changes in the municipal boundaries, political representation, division of municipal services, and water and sewage services in Hatay will be examined. Finally, a quantitative analysis of water and sewage services in Hatay will be carried out.

4.1. History of the Province of Hatay

The province of Hatay²¹ is located in Southern Turkey, on the eastern shores of Gulf of Iskenderun. It is surrounded by the Mediterranean Sea to west, Syria to south and east, Adana to northwest, Osmaniye to north and Gaziantep to northeast. Throughout its history, Hatay has always been an important trade centre and a port settlement due to its location in the Mediterranean region. Hatay was an important settlement in ancient times, throughout Hellenistic and Roman periods, accommodating Hittites, Phoenicians, Nineveh, Chaldeans, Persians, Greeks and Macedonians. The Republic of Hatay was established by the Hatay Assembly on 2 September 1938. The Republic lasted for one year under joint French and Turkish military supervision. The Hatay Assembly was brought under control of Turkey in 1939 and the republic joined Turkey as a province through a popular referendum. The district of Hassa of Gaziantep and the district of Dörtyol of Adana were then incorporated to the province in order to increase the proportion of Turkish population in the new province. Going through both vitality and stagnation in terms of economic and social life, Hatay has occasionally faced migration and urbanization problems. Nonetheless, Hatay has become a significant city with cultural diversity, natural riches, geographical advantages, and a strategic location (investinHatay, 2014).

4.2. Demographic Structure of Hatay

With an average population of 1.5 million, Hatay is the 13th most populous province of ranking of Turkey (TÜİK, 2014, p. XV). Its surface area is 5,524 kilometer square (HGM, 2014). Hatay's population has been growing consistently especially after 1970s, the most recent recorded annual growth rate of Hatay's population is 11.1%. According to the most recent data the province's net migration rate is -4.3%. The unemployment rate is 12.2. The socio-economic development index declined from 20 to 22 between 2010 and 2012 (TÜİK, 2014, p. XVI).

The population censuses for Hatay Province are provided in Table 25 and Figure 10. The periods when population growth rate was the slowest were between 1940 to 1945 and between 1990 to 2000. On the other hand, the periods when the population growth rate was the highest were between 1950 and 1965, 1975 to 1980 and 2000 to 2010. During the 1950s Hatay experienced waves of migration and the urban population increased dramatically. Intensification of industrial plants and increases in services provided by the city resulted in

²¹The administrative capital of the province in Turkey is usually called as the name of the province. Although the administrative capital of the province is Antakya, the formal name of the province is called Hatay.

population growth in the urban settlements within the province. There was a slight decline between 2010 and 2011. After 2012, the population did not increase much. When Hatay gained metropolitan municipality status in 2014, its population was 1,519,836. As of 2018 the population of Hatay is 1,609,856.

Table 25 Population censuses in the province of Hatay (1940-2018)

Years	Population		Years	Population
1940	246138		2010	1480571
1950	296799		2011	1424223
1960	441209		2012	1483674
1965	506154		2013	1503066
1970	591064		2014	1519836
1980	856271		2015	1533507
1990	1109754		2016	1555165
2000	1253726		2017	1575226
2007	1386224		2018	1609856

Source: TÜİK, 2019




Figure 9 Population censuses in the province of Hatay (1940-2018)

Source: TÜİK (2019)

Population density, annual population growth rate and annual rate of net migration for Hatay between the years 1940 and 2017 are provided in Table 26. It is noteworthy that the highest annual net migration was recorded in 2013 despite Syrian refugees were being accommodated in Hatay at the same time, which means that the province have experienced significant out-migration.

Table 26 Population density, annual population growth rate and annual net migration rate of Hatay (1940-2017)

Years	Population density. (person/km ²)	Annual population growth rate (‰)	Annual net migration rate (‰)
2007	238	-	-
2008	242	19.33	-2.24
2009	249	24.55	-2.58
2010	254	21.96	-2.68
2011	253	-4.30	-5.18
2012	255	6.39	-5.30
2013	258	12.99	-6.79
2014	273	11.10	-4.27
2015	276	8.99	-5.63
2016	279	14.12	-2.2
2017	283	12.89	-4.36

Source: TUIK (2019)

Before gaining status of metropolitan municipality, Hatay had a considerable rural population. It is quite interesting that Hatay had the second largest rural (small municipalities and villages) population among Turkey's provinces. In terms of the ratio of rural population to total population, Hatay is ranked 8th with a figure of 49.94%. Since Hatay has a rural population that is more than the average metropolitan municipality, it becomes a characteristic feature that should be evaluated carefully in terms of both its causes and consequences (Adıgüzel & Tek, 2014, p. 82).

Table 27 Population of the districts in Hatay

Districts	2012	2013	2018
Altınözü	59169	61882	61106
Antakya	470833	347974	377793
Arsuz	-	79782	90456
Belen	29496	30061	33540
Defne	-	134570	151017
Dörtyol	151837	115251	123891
Erzin	40776	41297	41368
Hassa	54104	54231	56409
İskenderun	318780	245083	248335
Kırıkhan	106452	107049	115196
Kumlu	13065	13241	14233
Payas	-	38959	41409
Reyhanlı	470833	347974	98534
Samandağ	128303	116151	121109
Yayladağı	21766	28610	35460

Source: TUIK (2019)

Before the Law No 6360, the province of Hatay had 12 districts. Ranked by their population, the districts were Antakya, İskenderun, Samandağ, Dörtyol, Kırıkhan, Reyhanlı, Altınözü, Hassa, Erzin, Belen, Yayladağı, and Kumlu. The Law No 6360 established 3 districts in Hatay: Defne, Arsuz, and Payas. Populations of the districts of Hatay in 2012, 2013 and 2018 are provided in Table 27. Hence, changes in population before and after the Law No 6360 can be followed from this table.

The Law No 6360 established the districts of Arsuz, Defne and Payas in 2012. The region of Arsuz included several villages and small municipalities that were part of İskenderun previously. After the enactment of the law, the population of İskenderun decreased in 2013. Payas was also a small municipality of the district of Dörtyol before the law. The area of Defne included several small municipalities and villages that were part of Antakya and Samandağ previously. After the enactment of the law, the population of Antakya and Samandağ also decreased.

4.3. Geography of Hatay

Adıgüzel summarizes the physical, demographic and economic structure of the province of Hatay in the following (2014, p. 56):

Amanos Mountains divide Hatay from north to south. Amanos Mountains have also been an important factor affecting the distribution of agriculture, industry and trade in the province. Amik Plain, which covers a large area with large agricultural lands, is located to the east of the Amanos Mountains and to the west of the industrial zone on the İskenderun-Payas axis. In general, agriculture and trade in the province are concentrated in the eastern part of the province and industry is mainly concentrated in the western part. When the demographic distribution of the province is analysed, it is seen that the population is concentrated in agricultural, trade and industrial centres. For example, there are approximately 470.000 people in Antakya and its vicinity, known as the trade centre of the province, 470.000 in İskenderun, Payas, Dörtyol and its vicinity, and around 200.000 people in Kırıkhan-Reyhanlı and its vicinity, which benefit from the agricultural potential of Amik Plain.

Adıgüzel emphasizes importance and impact of the Amanos Mountains on the province of Hatay. This geographic feature also affects service provision in the province of Hatay. Urban population of the province is mainly concentrated around the districts of Antakya, İskenderun, Samandağ and Dörtyol. Antakya and İskenderun are the more prominent of these centers. Antakya is the central district of the province, and İskenderun is the most developed district with strategic importance and industrial activities.




Figure 10 Physical and administrative map of Hatay

Source: Çetin (2010, p. 235; [http:// www.mmsrn.com/hatayin-ilcelerinin-isimleri-ve-haritasi/](http://www.mmsrn.com/hatayin-ilcelerinin-isimleri-ve-haritasi/))

İskenderun is a coastal city of Hatay and located at the south of Anatolia and east of Mediterranean. The settlement of İskenderun was on the spice road and located very close to the city of Antakya which has been a major centre throughout the history. The importance of İskenderun is based upon its geographical location. The city extends along the coast of İskenderun Gulf with a port (İskenderun Port) and a railway. Kimyon (2013: 82-83) indicates the importance of the city as following:

Today, İskenderun still maintains its importance in such a way that the natural gas and petrol pipe-line of the Middle East passes through there. Besides, it is a junction point in transportation network of the region. The city has one of Turkey's largest ports on Mediterranean. Its economy is based upon the commerce due to the intensive port facilities and industrial facilities, especially the iron and steel industry.

Furthermore, Çakır (2010:164) points out that “all of the development process in the region is the result of 1) the development of İskenderun Port and its environs, 2) combination of different types of transportation lines, and 3) the establishment of Iron and Steel Factory. These three factors have made the development and expansion of the settlement easier for years; in terms of economic development, sectoral variation, urban expansion, and population increase” Also, there have several attempts by the local actors to turn İskenderun into province. İskenderun satisfies all economic, social, and geographic conditions to be a province as laid out by the constitution. Turning İskenderun into a province has been a popular election promise that has not yet been realized by any political actor.

Table 28 Total areas of the districts and their distances to Antakya

		Total area before the Law No 6360 (km ²)	Total area after the Law No 6360 (km ²)	Distance to Central District (Antakya) (km)
1	Antakya	889	703	0
2	Arsuz	-	462	90
3	İskenderun	759	247	63
4	Erzin	298	258	111
5	Dört Yol	580	342	91
6	Payas	-	157	87
7	Belen	197	184	47
8	Hassa	495	520	93
9	Defne	-	155	10
10	Altınözü	357	392	32
11	Kumlu	186	193	52
12	Kırıkhan	588	715	54
13	Reyhanlı	406	367	42
14	Samandağ	446	384	24
15	Yayladağı	466	445	45

Source: HGM (2014)




Figure 11 Distances between districts and Antakya (Centre of Hatay)

Source: HGM (2014)

As a central district of the province of Hatay, Antakya has become a scattered, fragmented and unplanned settlement area (Adıgüzel, 2014, p. 57).

When the city of Antakya is approached from the north, there is a pattern of construction that starts 25 km before the Antakya district centre and continues uninterruptedly. This structure presents an unplanned, fragmented, disorganized, aesthetically problematic and distorted situation which lacks a certain totality. It is very difficult for an observer to look at this structure, which is distributed in the form of “fishbone”, to cut the city centre and to estimate the boundaries of the settlements. (Adıgüzel & Tek, 2011, p. 83)

There were 21 small municipalities and 70 villages in the Antakya central district. Law No 6360 abolished the biggest number of small municipalities in Hatay there. This caused an “unmanageable issue” for the Antakya urban region. These small municipalities were established through irrational decisions during 1990s, which resulted in the problem of small municipalities. These municipalities hindered the efficient service provision of Antakya Municipality. Moreover, these municipalities tried to lead urban development through acquiring urban rent. A similar problem of small municipalities was also the case in İskenderun-Dörtyol axis (Adıgüzel, 2014, pp. 58-59).

4.4. Municipalities in the Province of Hatay

Hatay (Antakya) Municipality was established in 1939 (Tek, 2009). It is the same time when Hatay joined Turkey. Before the Law No 6360 was enacted in 2014, Hatay Municipality maintained its urban services as the central municipality of the province of Hatay. In those years, the other district municipalities of the province of Hatay were İskenderun, Dörtyol, Erzin, Samandağ, Yayladağ, Reyhanlı, Hassa, Altınözü and Kumlu, which were also the districts of Hatay with the same names. In total, there were 12 district municipalities and 64 small municipalities in the province of Hatay.

There were a few boundary changes in Hatay that took place before Law No 6360. Article 7 of the Law No 1580, amended by Law No 7469, expanded boundaries of some local government units. These were: inclusion of Çaylı and Ocaklı villages of the district of Dörtyol in 1988, inclusion of Çetillik village of district of İskenderun within the boundaries of Gözcüler Municipality on in 1995, inclusion of Çay part of Hancı village in the district of Samandağ within the borders of Tavla municipality in 2004, and Müftüler and Karapelit villages of Belen district within Belen Municipality in 2004 (Çınar *et al*, 2013, pp. 133-137).

There were significant increases in the number of municipalities in Hatay before the 1989, 1994 and 1999 local elections. While the number of municipalities was 14 in 1963, it rose to 21 in the 1980s. The number of municipalities was 28 before 1989 local elections. The biggest increase in number of municipalities occurred before 1994 elections and increased to 60 with the establishment of 32 municipalities. In 2012, there were 64 small municipalities and 12 district municipalities in Hatay. Table 29 shows the number of municipalities by districts

before the Law No 6360. The table also provides number of villages, sub-districts (*bucak*) and neighbourhoods.

Table 29 Administrative units in Hatay before the Law No 6360

Districts	Small Municipalities	Sub-districts	Villages	Neighbourhoods
Altınözü	3	3	70	43
Antakya	21	5	42	2
Belen	-	-	11	6
Dörtyol	6	2	6	7
Erzin	-	-	10	10
Hassa	5	2	28	6
İskenderun	13	2	37	28
Kırıkhan	1	2	56	16
Kumlu	-	-	13	3
Reyhanlı	-	-	31	16
Samandağ	12	2	31	9
Yayladağı	3	3	33	3
Total	64	21	368	149

Source: Adıgüzel, 2014, p.58

With 21 municipalities, Antakya is the district with the highest number of municipalities. After that İskenderun and Samandağ have 13 and 12 small municipalities, respectively. This indicates a fragmented structure around large cities.

4.5. Changes in the Municipal Boundaries in Hatay

‘Law on the Establishment of Fourteen Provinces of the Metropolitan Municipality and the Twenty Seven Provinces and the Amendment of Certain Laws and Decree Laws’ (the Law No 6360) was enacted on November 12, 2012 and got into force after the 2014 local elections. The Law No 6360 established metropolitan municipality in Hatay in 2014. The law also coincided the borders of the metropolitan municipality to the provincial administrative borders. Furthermore, the law abolished the legal entities of 21 sub-districts, 64 small municipalities and 368 villages in Hatay, and turned them into neighbourhoods. Some of small municipalities were fragmented into two or three neighbourhoods. Hence the number of neighbourhoods increased from 149 to 589. Table 30 presents the number of municipalities, sub-districts, villages and neighbourhoods before and after Law No 6360.

Table 30 Administrative units in Hatay before and after the Law No 6360

Districts	Before the Law No 6360				After the Law No 6360
	Small Municipalities	Sub-districts	Villages	Neighbourhoods	Neighbourhoods
Altınözü	3	3	41	2	48
Antakya	21	5	42	43	95
Arsuz	-	-	-	-	38
Belen	-	0	11	6	18
Defne	-	-	-	-	37
Dörtyol	6	2	6	7	15
Erzin	0	0	10	10	20
Hassa	5	2	28	6	39
İskenderun	13	2	37	28	45
Kırıkhan	1	2	56	16	73
Kumlu	0	0	13	3	16
Payas	-	-	-	-	12
Reyhanlı	0	0	31	16	47
Samandağ	12	2	31	9	42
Yayladağı	3	3	33	3	47
Total	64	21	368	149	593

Source: Hatay Valiliği, 2014

The Law No 6360 abolished 64 small municipalities in Hatay and affiliated them to the district municipalities as neighbourhood. Before the Law No 6360, 21 of them were within the boundaries of Antakya, 13 of them were within the boundaries of İskenderun, 12 of them were within the boundaries of Samandağ, 6 of them were within the boundaries of Dörtyol, 5 of them were within the boundaries of Hassa, 3 of them were within the boundaries of Altınözü, 3 of them were within the boundaries of Yayladağı, one of them was within the borders of Kırıkhan. Likewise, the Law No 6360 abolished 368 villages within the boundaries of Hatay and merged them to their district municipalities as neighbourhood. 70 villages in Antakya, 56 villages in Kırıkhan, 42 villages in Altınözü, 37 villages in İskenderun, 33 villages in Yayladağı, 31 villages in Samandağ, 31 villages in Kırıkhan, 28 villages in Hassa, 13 villages in Kumlu district, 11 villages in Belen, 10 villages in Erzin and 6 villages in Dörtyol were transformed into neighbourhood.




Figure 12 The Province of Hatay before and after the Law No 6360

Source: <https://www.uyduharita.org/hatay-haritasi-resimleri/hatay-2/>;

http://cografyaharita.com/turkiye_mulki_idare_haritalari3.html

On the other hand, the law established the districts of Antakya²², Arsuz, Defne and Payas and the number of the district municipalities rose to 15 in the province of Hatay. The Article No 2 of the Law No 6360 is about foundation of the districts and determination of the borders. The sub-articles of the Article No 2 (6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11) are about the new districts (Antakya, Defne, Arsuz and Payas) of the province of Hatay. These sub-articles also mention abolished villages and small municipalities and established neighbourhoods and districts.

The sub-articles numbered 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Law No 6360 are provided in the following (TBMM Mevzuat, 2012a):

(6) In the province of Hatay, the Antakya district and the district municipality with the same name have been established. The Appendix List No 5 of the Law gives the neighbourhoods, villages and municipalities which have been merged into the district of Antakya as neighbourhood.

(7) In the province of Hatay, the Defne district and the district municipality with the same name have been established. The neighbourhoods, villages and the municipalities which have been merged into the Defne district as neighbourhood are provided in the Appendix List No 6 of the Law.

²² Before the Law No 6360 the central district of the Hatay province was not called as Antakya, instead called as the Central district. The law established the district with the name of Antakya.

(8) In the province of Hatay, the Sofular and Hanyolu villages, which were before merged into the central district, have been merged into the district of Altınözü.

(9) In the province of Hatay, the villages and municipalities which are provided in the Appendix List No 7 of the Law have been merged into the district of Yayladağı.

(10) In the province of Hatay, the Arsuz district and the district municipality with the same name have been established. The neighbourhoods, villages and the municipalities which have been merged into the Arsuz district as neighbourhood are provided in the Appendix List No 8 of the Law.

(11) In the province of Hatay, the Payas district and the district municipality with the same name have been established. The Payas district was formed with the Sincan, Kozludere and Çağlalık villages which were before merged into the district of Dörtöy.

All the neighbourhoods of the province of Hatay are provided in the Appendix B. The appendix also shows the municipalities which were villages, small municipalities and sub-districts before the Law No 6360.

4.6. Political Representation in the District Municipalities

After the Law No 6360 was enacted in 2012, the first local elections in Turkey were held in 2014. The law also affected the political balance of power within the province of Hatay. These effects were observed at the two scales (Adıgüzel & Tek, 2014, p. 88). The first one was at the local scale. The boundaries of the district municipalities were coincided with the district borders. Political representation in the municipal council has changed as the rural areas were also represented. Also O. Zengin (2014, p. 111) states that as a result of the abolition of the small municipalities, the councils in which the residents of the municipality decided on local policies for themselves were removed. The second effect was at the metropolitan scale. The borders of the metropolitan municipality were expanded to correspond to the provincial boundaries. The council of metropolitan municipality include the members from all the districts according to the representation procedure. More importantly, as the law created new districts through separating or merging local units, its impacts on the local politics are more challenging. Adıgüzel and Tek (2014, pp. 90-91) comments on the local elections:

Moreover, the scope of the Law No 6360 while establishing a new district in the province of Hatay, for the determination of the boundaries of this district, Hatay local that the emergence of different reactions, on the other hand, the civil war is taking place in Syria due to the geographical position of the reflection of Turkey in Hatay much different It should be emphasized that these developments may also affect local elections in Hatay.

According to Adıgüzel and Tek the governing party (AKP) determined that strategic voting tendencies increase as municipalities become smaller, and that the impact of national politics on local elections diminishes as they descend from metropolitan municipalities to small

municipalities (2011, p. 91). Hence, one of the important reasons to enlarge municipal boundaries was fear of losing in local elections of 2014.

Table 31 Local elections in Hatay in 2009

District		Municipality	Party		District		Municipality	Party
Altınözü	1	Altınkaya	MHP		İskenderun	40	Akçalı	CHP
	2	Altınözü	AKP			41	Arsuz	CHP
	3	Hacıpaşa	DP			42	Azganlık	AKP
	4	Karbeyaz	CHP			43	Bekbele	AKP
Dörtyol	5	Altınçağ	AKP			4	Denizciler	AKP
	6	Dörtyol	MHP			45	Gökmeydan	DP
	7	Karakese	MHP			46	Gözcüler	CHP
	8	Kuzuculu	MHP			47	İskenderun	CHP
	9	Payas	MHP			48	Karaağaç	CHP
	10	Yeniyurt	DP			49	Karayılan	MHP
	11	Yeşilköy	AKP			50	Madenli	CHP
	12	Akbez	AKP			51	Nardüzü	CHP
Hassa	13	Aktepe	AKP			52	Sarıseki	ANAP
	14	Ardıçlı	MHP			53	Üçgüllük	CHP
	15	Hassa	MHP			54	Kırıkhan	MHP
	16	Küreci	AKP			55	Kurtuluşoğusku	MHP
	17	Söğüt	MHP		Reyhanlı	56	Reyhanlı	AKP
	18	Avsuyu	AKP			57	Aknehir	ÖDP
	19	Çekmece	DSP			58	Değirmenbaşı	CHP
	20	Dursunlu	CHP			59	Koyunoğlu	CHP
Antakya	21	Ekinci	CHP		Samandağ	60	Kuşalanı	CHP
	22	Gümüştöze	CHP			61	Mağaracık	CHP
	23	Güzelburç	CHP			62	Mızraklı	CHP
	24	Harbiye	CHP			63	Samandağ	ÖDP
	25	Antakya	AKP			64	Sutaşı	CHP
	26	Karaali	DSP			65	Tavla	CHP
	27	Karlısu	CHP			66	Tekebaşı	AKP
	28	Kuzeytepe	DSP			67	Tomruksuyu	CHP
	29	Küçükalyan	ANAP			68	Uzunbağ	CHP
	30	Maşuklu	CHP			69	Yaylıca	DSP
	31	Narlıca	AKP			70	Karaköse	MHP
	32	Odabaşı	DSP			71	Kışlak	AKP
	33	Ovakent	MHP			72	Yayladağı	MHP
	34	Serinyol	DSP			73	Yeditepe	AKP
	35	Subaşı	CHP			74	Erzin	AKP
	36	Şenköy	AKP			75	Belen	MHP
	37	Toygarlı	CHP		Kumlu	76	Kumlu	MHP
	38	Turunçlu	CHP					
	39	Yeşilpınar	CHP					

AKP: Justice and Development Party CHP: Republican People's Party, MHP: Nationalist Movement Party, ÖDP: Freedom and Solidarity Party, DSP: Democrat Left Party, DP: Democrat Party

Source: TUIK, 2019

Besides in Turkey, rural areas (villages and small municipalities) mostly vote for AKP in general elections. Thus, AKP would gain the votes through merging villages and small municipalities. Table 31 provides the 2009 local elections by district and small municipalities in Hatay before the Law No 6360. Also, Table 32 gives results of the last three local elections in Hatay held in 2009, 2014 and 2019. The change in the votes before and after the Law No 6360 can be easily observed in Table 32.

Table 32 Local elections in Hatay in 2009, 2014 and 2019

District Municipalities	Before the Law No 6360	After the Law No 6360	
	2009	2014	2019
Altınözü	AKP	AKP	AKP
Antakya	AKP	AKP	AKP
Arsuz	CHP	CHP	CHP
Belen	MHP	AKP	MHP
Defne	-	CHP	CHP
Dörtyol	MHP	MHP	MHP
Erzin	AKP	AKP	CHP
Hassa	MHP	AKP	AKP
İskenderun	AKP	AKP	AKP
Kırıkhan	MHP	AKP	AKP
Kumlu	MHP	AKP	MHP
Payas	MHP	AKP	AKP
Reyhanlı	AKP	AKP	AKP
Samandağ	ÖDP	CHP	CHP
Yayladağı	MHP	AKP	AKP
Metropolitan	-	CHP	CHP

AKP: Justice and Development Party CHP: Republican People's Party, MHP: Nationalist Movement Party, ÖDP: Freedom and Solidarity Party

Source: TUIK, 2019

AKP realized its goal by abolishing small municipalities and villages and merging them into one district municipality. Thus, AKP votes from rural areas are cast in district municipalities in Hatay after law No 6360. Deveci evaluates this manoeuvre of the government as “demographic operation to win the local elections” (2013, p. 38). Moreover, political parties which were not represented in the parliament due to national election barriers were prevented from winning even a few small municipalities in the 2014 local elections. This was also one of the goals AKP sought to achieve by abolishing small municipalities.

The success of CHP in winning Hatay Metropolitan Municipality should be interpreted carefully. The mayor Lütfü Savaş was mayor of Antakya municipality from AKP during the period of 2009-2014, and he was actually a supporter of MHP. Adıgüzel (2014, p. 68) explains the success of Lütfü Savaş as following:

One of the most important reasons of CHP's success, and perhaps the most important, is its attitude to the nomination process. CHP, reading the effects of the developments in Syria had on Hatay correctly, nominated the former Mayor of Antakya Lütfü Savaş. CHP thought that he would reduce the sectarian tensions in the province and would embrace a wider base. CHP calculated that Lütfü Savaş could get votes from the right as well as from the left, and this assumption was correct.

Since Lütfü Savaş is preferred by all parties, especially MHP voters in Hatay, he was able to get elected in last two elections as CHP's candidate. Nonetheless, AKP gained positive results from Law No 6360 across the country in 2014 local elections. Adıgüzel comments on the success of AKP as following (2014, p. 68):

Due to the new metropolitan municipality system, AKP has gained a strong position in Hatay as it did in other metropolitan municipalities. In addition, while the new districts are established and new electoral circles are made, the border shifts and plans are made in order to make AKP more advantageous than the other political parties. Considering this situation, AKP was successful in the province of Hatay, increased the vote rates according to the 2009 local elections, increased the number of mayors from 4 to 11, but lost the election for mayor of Hatay Metropolitan Municipality to the CHP by a neck. One of the most important reasons of AKP's success is the new metropolitan municipality system is the division of Antakya and Iskenderun districts and the establishment of new districts with controversial boundaries within these districts. This has contributed to the AKP's gaining of these two major districts more easily.

The fact that the nature of municipal council has changed after the Law No 6360 influenced the municipal service provision. Each political party tries to influence decision making process in the council in line with its local interests. As O. Zengin argues, rural residents who live far from the city centre will determine the formation and representation of decision-making bodies of the metropolitan city (2014, p. 111). In Hatay, there are also different parties' representations in the council of metropolitan municipality. While the metropolitan municipality is from CHP, most of the district municipalities are controlled by AKP. CHP could win the elections only in the newly created small district (Defne and Arsuz) and Samandağ municipalities. This would probably result in disagreement in decision making processes. As also Adıgüzel argues, the Law No 6360 brought about a troubled council form in Hatay Metropolitan Municipality.

[W]hile the winning party AKP received 37.7% of the vote and the runner-up CHP received 36% of the vote, there are 50 members from AKP, 25 from CHP, 11 from MHP and 1 from SP in Hatay Metropolitan Municipality Council. The fact that mayor of the metropolitan municipality is from CHP and the majority of the members of the council are from AKP could have opened a door for political reconciliation, tolerance, and a new culture of cohabitation. However, the tone of the first council meeting makes it hard to believe that these expectations are going to be realized.

Table 33 gives numbers of council member by parties in Hatay Metropolitan Municipality in the last two sessions. Despite the success of AKP in 2014 local elections, CHP gained a significant achievement in the 2019 elections. Considering the electoral alliances between

AKP and MHP, and between CHP and İyi Parti (Good Party), CHP gained 11 members in the council of metropolitan municipality. This indicates that the initial success of the new metropolitan municipality system is not permanent. However, since this dissertation comprises the period of 2014 and 2019, further analysis on this issue is beyond its scope.

Table 33 Numbers of council member by parties in Hatay Metropolitan Municipality

	2014 - 2019				2019 -				
	AKP	CHP	MHP	Others	AKP	CHP	MHP	İyi Parti	Others
Altınözü	6	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	1
Antakya	6	2	0	0	5	3	0	0	0
Arsuz	0	6	0	0	1	5	0	0	0
Belen	3	0	1	0	0	0	3	1	0
Defne	0	7	0	0	0	7	0	0	0
Dörtyol	3	0	4	0	0	0	5	2	0
Erzin	3	0	1	0	1	3	0	0	0
Hassa	5	0	1	0	5	0	0	1	0
İskenderun	4	2	1	0	5	2	0	0	0
Kırıkhan	6	0	1	0	5	0	0	2	0
Kumlu	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
Payas	3	0	0	1	3	1	0	0	0
Reyhanlı	5	0	1	0	5	1	0	0	0
Samandağ	0	7	0	0	0	7	0	0	0
Yayladağı	3	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	1
Total	50	25	11	1	38	30	11	6	2

Source: HBB, 2019

4.7. Division of Municipal Services in Hatay

Although all district municipalities in Turkey are under the purview of Municipality Law No 5393, district municipalities of the metropolitan municipalities have become different than other district municipalities. Other district municipalities provide all the local services within their jurisdiction. However, district municipalities of the metropolitan municipalities cannot provide all the local services. Metropolitan Law No 5216 divides municipal services between district municipalities and metropolitan municipalities and leaves a few services to be shared by both. Also, some services of the district municipalities must be approved or audited by the metropolitan municipality and a portion of their income is required to be transferred to the metropolitan municipality (O. Zengin, 2014, p. 106). Table 34 shows the division and sharing of local services between district municipalities and metropolitan municipalities. It should be noted that this table does not list the all of the municipal services listed in the Law No 5216.

According to the Law No 5216, district municipalities are responsible for the following services. Collecting and transporting solid waste to transfer stations, building car parks, sports, recreational and entertainment places and parks; providing social and cultural services for old

people, disabled people, women, youth and children; offering vocational training and skills courses; construction, maintenance and repair of sanctuaries and health, education, cultural facilities and buildings, and preservation of cultural and natural assets and historic fabric; providing services related to the development of spaces and functions that are important in terms of urban history, providing burial services, and evacuating and demolishing buildings that pose a risk of disaster or pose a danger to life and property safety. The Law No 6360 transferred the final duty of the district municipalities and transferred it to the metropolitan municipality. Also, the revenues of car parks are to be transferred to the metropolitan municipalities. Moreover, metropolitan municipality is authorized to supervise the zoning practices of the district municipalities. This indicates a kind of tutelage relationship. Furthermore, the district municipalities are restricted in terms of their budgeting (O. Zengin, 2014, pp. 106-107).

According to the Law No 5216, certain services are shared between metropolitan municipality and district municipalities. These are services related to road maintenance, cleaning, and municipal police services. Also some of these services can be completely assigned to the district municipalities by the metropolitan municipalities or they can be provided jointly at metropolitan municipality council's discretion. These are constructing passenger and cargo terminals, car parks, carrying out cemetery and burial related services, establishing wholesalers and slaughterhouses, cleaning services, and address and numbering services (O. Zengin, 2014, p. 107). None of these services was assigned to the district municipalities in Hatay.

The Law No 5216 assigned some services to the metropolitan municipalities. These are water and sewage services, treatment and removal of solid waste, transportation services, fire services, cemetery and burial services, building and managing passenger and cargo terminals, veterinary services and agricultural services. According to the Article No 7 (r) of the Law No 5216, the duty of the Metropolitan Municipality is to carry out water and sewerage services; to establish and operate the dams and other facilities required for this purpose; breeding streams; marketing of spring water or water produced at the end of treatment.

Table 34 Division of municipal services between district and metropolitan municipalities

Services provided by only DM ¹	Services provided by only MM ²	Services provided by both DM and MM		Services which can be assigned to the DM by MM
Collecting and transporting solid wastes to transfer stations	Treatment and removal of solid waste	Planning, development and regulatory services	Car parks, sports, recreation, and parks	Passenger and cargo terminals
		Municipal police services	Road services	Cemetery and burial
Burial services	Evacuating and demolishing buildings under risk	Social, cultural and historical services	Cleaning services	Wholesalers and slaughterhouses
		Health and education services	Vocational training and skills courses	Address and numbering services

1 DM: District municipality

2 MM: Metropolitan municipality

This dissertation focuses on water and sewage services for the case study of Hatay Metropolitan Municipality. The following section will provide a brief information about water and sewage services in Hatay. There are several reasons for choosing these services for this study. First, they are essential and continuous local common services. Second, they were provided by the district municipalities before the Law No 6360. Therefore, these services have been provided by metropolitan municipalities since 2014. Third is the availability of data on these services.

4.8. Water and Sewage Services in Hatay

Before the Law No 6360 entered into force, water and sewage services in the province of Hatay were provided by 12 districts and 64 small municipalities. As water resources, there were deep wells in the province. In most municipalities, there were sewerage networks established by the method of collective work, and wastewater was discharged to the closest stream without treatment. Only Antakya and İskenderun each had one wastewater treatment plant.

4.8.1 Hatay Water and Sewage Administration General Directorate (HATSU)

In metropolitan municipalities, water and sewage services are provided by Water and Sewage Administration General Directorate. Affiliated with the metropolitan municipality, this directorate is a public institution with a legal entity and independent budget. Although it has a separate organizational structure outside the organization of metropolitan municipality, its

decision making body is the council of metropolitan municipality and its chairman is the mayor of metropolitan municipality.

Water and sewage services in Turkey as well as in many countries of the world are provided by public institutions. After the 1980s, privatization and deregulation of these services in Turkey began alongside with various neo-liberal policies. During this period, the search for new models for water services became a part of the political agenda. A French model was chosen for municipal water and sewage management in İstanbul (Çelik, 2009, p. 101). Thus, İstanbul Water and Sewage Administration General Directorate (İSKİ) was founded in 1981. After the first metropolitan municipalities were established between 1984 and 1986, the İSKİ model was widened in other metropolitan municipalities. Hence, “the era of İSKİ model water management” started (Çınar, 2006, p. 73).

Within the frame of the Law No 6360, Council of Ministers decision (No. 2014/6072) published in the Official Gazette in 2014, and water and sewage administrations were established in the new metropolitan municipalities. Thus, HATSU general directorate was established in Hatay for water and sewage services. Authorities and responsibilities of HATSU were regulated by the İSKİ Law No 2560. Major duties of HATSU are to provide potable water, collect, treat and remove wastewater, and protect watersheds (HATSU, 2018).

HATSU divided its service area, which include 15 district municipalities of the province of Hatay, into 2 regions (regional directorates). The first region includes the districts of Antakya, Defne, Kırıkhan, Kumlu, Reyhanlı, Hassa, Altınözü, Belen, Yayladağı and Samandağ. The second region includes the districts of Erzin, Dörtyol, Payas, İskenderun, and Arsuz (HATSU, 2018). These regions divide the province of Hatay along with the Amonos Mountain. The first region is to the east of the mountain, the second region is to the east of the mountain. The major division on the service provision was launched with these regional divisions. There are also sub-units within these regions: Antakya, Kırıkhan, Kumlu, Reyhanlı, Hassa, Yayladağı and Samandağ, Erzin, Dörtyol, İskenderun, Belen and Arsuz (HATSU, 2018). There are no sub-units in Defne, Payas and Altınözü.

Departments of HATSU are as following: Sewage Department, Planning Department, Sustenance Services Department, Projects Department, Operation Department, Potable Water Department, Strategy Development Department, Information Technologies Department, Human Resources Department and Subscription Department. There are also branch offices of these departments. Administration of HATSU is comprised of 4 main bodies: General Board, Administrative Board, Auditors and General Directorate. General Board is the council of

Hatay Metropolitan Municipality. Administrative Board includes the mayor of Hatay Metropolitan Municipality, General Director of HATSU, one of the assistants of the General Director and assigned two members (HATSU, 2018). The General Director of HATSU is appointed by the Minister of Interior upon the proposal of the mayor of Hatay Metropolitan Municipality. Assistants of the General Director General Managers are appointed by the proposal of the General Manager with the approval of the Mayor of Hatay Metropolitan Municipality (HATSU, 2019, p. 24). Being the mayor of Hatay Metropolitan Municipality, Lütfü Savaş is also the head of HATSU.

HATSU built wastewater treatment plants in Erzin, Serinyol (Antakya), Samandağ, Kırıkhan and Reyhanlı and Küçükalyan-Narlıca (Antakya). Construction of Altınözü waste water treatment plant still continues. Hence, HATSU has finished the construction of 6 wastewater treatment plants since 2014. HATSU also took over 7 wastewater treatment plants in İskenderun, Antakya, Payas, Dörtyol, Karayılan (İskenderun), Denizciler (İskenderun), and Belen (package plant) which were built and have been operated before the Law No 6360. Also, HATSU took over the water treatment plants in Yayladağı, Sebenoba (Yayladağı) and Mızraklı. Construction of İskenderun water treatment plant continues. At present, there are 13 wastewater treatment plants and 3 water treatment plants in Hatay. In addition, there are 691 boreholes, 603 water tanks and service buildings in Hatay as a part of their operation (HATSU, 2019, pp. 12-15). Table 35 provides number of facilities of water and wastewater services.

Table 35 Number of facilities of water and wastewater services

Facilities	Before the Law No 6360	After the Law No 6360 (HATSU)			
		2015	2016	2017	2018
Wastewater Treatment Plant	7	9	9	13	13
Water Treatment Plant	3	3	3	3	3
Water Tank	-	562	580	580	603
Borehole	-	509	591	640	691
Service Building	-	18	19	20	20
Collection Branch	-	15	16	17	17

Source HATSU (2018; 2019)

According to the activity report of HATSU, total area of service of HATSU is 5,867 km square²³. It serves a population of 1,609,806. HATSU added Syrian population of 447,887 living in Hatay to its service population. With the Syrian population, total population that HATSU serves becomes 2.057.740 (HATSU, 2019, p. 8).

²³ According to the General Directorate of Mapping, surface area of Hatay is 5,524 kilometre square.

In 2018, number of registered vehicle and working machine was 168, and the number of rental vehicles was 145. In total, HATSU has 313 vehicles (HATSU, 2019, pp. 20-21). As of 2018, HATSU carries out its business and operations with a total of 371 personnel including 162 civil servants and 177 workers, a total of 339 permanent staff, and 32 contracts. In addition, 1,623 carry out their duties in HATSU (HATSU, 2019, p. 32). Expense budget of HATSU was 453.753.928 TL in 2018. Revenue budget of HATSU was 299.727.391 TL (HATSU, 2019, pp. 53-55).

In 2018, number of total subscriber was 564,083, volume of used water is 72,737,581 metre square, and water collection of revenues was 169,830,789 TL. HATSU classifies subscribers according to the consumer groups, such as households, offices, administration buildings, constructions, village settlements, veterans and their families, garden water and disabled-dependant people. Table 36 provides number of subscriber, volume of used water and revenues of water collection in 2018. The table also calculates subscribing ratio (number of subscribing/number of population), volume of used water per subscriber and revenues of water collection per subscriber in each district.

Table 36 Number of subscriber, volume of used water and water revenues of districts in 2018

	Districts	Number of population (A)	Number of subscriber (B)	(B/A) *	Volume of used water (m ³ /year) (C)	(C/B) **	Revenues of water collection (TL/year) (D)	(D/B) ***
1	Altınözü	61106	19409	31.8	2697694	139.0	3048691	157.1
2	Antakya	377793	137940	36.5	17772365	128.8	46432015	336.6
3	Arsuz	90456	35785	39.6	4719907	131.9	9712387	271.4
4	Belen	33540	18369	54.8	1964367	106.9	4517813	245.9
5	Defne	151017	54942	36.4	5573424	101.4	14049037	255.7
6	Dört Yol	123891	42099	34.0	5648338	134.2	12129384	288.1
7	Erzin	41368	14255	34.5	2116280	148.5	3925322	275.4
8	Hassa	56409	17779	31.5	2727922	153.4	4945915	278.2
9	İskenderun	248335	90337	36.4	11931027	132.1	36158017	400.3
10	Kırıkhan	115196	41276	35.8	6175117	149.6	11213604	271.7
11	Kumlu	14233	3728	26.2	690245	185.2	755029	202.5
12	Payas	41409	15052	36.3	1973415	131.1	4653914	309.2
13	Reyhanlı	377793	26855	7.1	4033121	150.2	8677458	323.1
14	Samandağ	121109	34259	28.3	3145936	91.8	6816577	199.0
15	Yayladağ	35460	11998	33.8	1568423	130.7	2795620	233.0
	Total	1609806	564083	35.0	72737581	128.9	169830789	301.1

*B/A: Subscribing ratio of each district

**C/B: Volume of used water per subscriber

***D/B: Revenues of water collection per subscriber

Source: HATSU, 2019

It is possible to draw some conclusions from the Table 36. While Reyhanlı had minimum subscribing ratio, Belen had maximum subscribing ratio. Kumlu used the most water per subscriber, while Samandağ used the less amount of water per subscriber. While İskenderun paid highest water price per subscriber, Altınözü paid the lowest water price per subscriber. In total, subscribing ratio was 35%, volume of used water per subscriber was 128.9 m³ and water collection of revenues per subscriber was 301.1 TL in 2018.

4.9. Quantitative Analysis of Water and Sewage Services in Hatay

This subsection provides a quantitative analysis of water and sewage services in Hatay by comparing the data before and after the Law No 6360. Some statistical data were obtained from activity reports of metropolitan municipality, district municipalities and HATSU. Others were acquired from internet database of Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). However, this part of the analysis cannot produce precise results for the dissertation since the data is inadequate for a comprehensive comparison. This is only a preliminary consideration for the case study.

4.9.1. Data Obtained From Activity Reports

Table 37 compares major parameters before and after the Law No 6360. The parameters are population served, number of water subscribers, amount of water used, revenues of collection, unit water price, wastewater price, cleaning tax, number of wastewater treatment plant, number of water treatment plants between 2012 and 2018.

The population and number of subscribers increased every year from 2012 to 2018. More important at this point is subscribing ratio, which is the ratio of subscribers to the whole population. Subscribing ratio increased after the Law No 6360, which is a positive outcome of the boundary expansion. There is a sharp rise in subscribing ratio between 2014 and 2015. This ratio slowly increased after 2015. On the other hand, used water per subscriber has also increased after 2015. This refers to a negative outcome of boundary expansion. The curve of collection revenue per subscriber does not show a uniform distribution. Therefore, making a comparison is difficult. Figure 14 shows subscribing ratios in Hatay between 2012 and 2018 and Figure 15 shows used water per subscriber in hatay between 2012 and 2018.

To compare unit water price, the household service group was taken into consideration. Before the Law No 6360, the unit water price in municipalities of Hatay was quite low. The price of 0.80 TL/m³ was the highest value in Hatay. After the Law No 6360, the unit water price increased. Furthermore, in 2015 and 2016, HATSU implement an incremental pricing model

for subscribers. The rates were 2 TL for the first 0-20 m³ of water used; 3 TL for 20-35 m³ of water used and 4TL for more than 35 m³ of water used. After 2017, following complaints and reactions the implementation of incremental pricing ended.

Table 37 Major parameters on water and wastewater services before and after the Law No 6360

Parameters	Before the Law No 6360		After the Law No 6360				
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Number of served population (10 ³)	1,483	1,503	1,519	1,533	1,555	1,575	1,609
Number of subscribers	354,867	370,355	405,103	511,206	542,110	561,135	564,083
Subscribing ratio (%)	23.9	24.6	26.7	33.3	34.9	35.6	35.0
Used water (10 ³ m ³)	33,935	36,064	28,531	59,918	62,457	69,805	72,737
Used water per subscriber (m ³)	9.6	9.7	7.0	11.7	11.5	12.4	12.9
Collection revenue (10 ³ TL)	45,485	48,554	35,631	191,940	188,516	161,472	169,830
Collection revenue per subscriber (TL)	128.2	131.1	88.0	375.5	347.7	287.8	301.1
Unit water price (TL/m ³)	0.80	0.80	1.00	2.00-3.00 - 4.00*	2.00-3.00 - 4.00*	2.30	2.76
Wastewater price (TL/m ³)	0	0	0.30	0.75	0.75	0.45	0.54
Cleaning tax (TL/m ³)	0.18	0.19	0.24	0.26	0.27	0.28	0.32
N# Wastewater treatment plant	7	7	7	9	9	11	13
N# Water treatment plant	3	3	3	3	3	3	3

*A gradual tariff for water price was applied in 2015 and 2016. For 0-20 m³ used water, 2 TL; for 20-35 m³ used water, 3 TL; and more than 35 m³ used water 4 TL were collected from the subscribers.

Source: HATSU (2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019)




Figure 13 Subscribing ratios in Hatay between 2012 and 2018

Source: HATSU (2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019)




Figure 14 Used water per subscriber in Hatay between 2012 and 2018

Source: HATSU (2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019)

Table 38 gives comparison of rate of inflation and rate of increase in water price in Hatay. These values are for household subscriber using 1 m³ municipal water in a month. The table also gives wastewater price and cleaning tax which are added to the water bills. Before the Law No 6360, as municipalities did not charge for wastewater price, the values of 2012 and 2013 are zero. As it can be observed in the table, the rates of increase in water prices and total prices were very high in 2014 and 2015 when they are compared with rates of inflation in those years. This table is evidence that water prices increased after the Law No 6360.

Table 38 Comparison of rate of inflation and rate of increase in water price in Hatay between 2012 and 2018

Years	Unit water price (TL/1m ³)	Wastewater price (TL/1m ³)	Cleaning tax (TL/1m ³)	Total water price (TL/1m ³)	Rate of increase in water price (%)	Rate of increase in total water price (%)	Rate of Inflation * (%)
2012	0.8	0	0.18	0.98	-	-	-
2013	0.8	0	0.19	0.99	0	1.02	7.4
2014	1	0.3	0.24	1.54	25	56.1	8.7
2015	2	0.75	0.26	3.01	100	95.5	8.8
2016	2	0.75	0.27	3.02	0	0	8.5
2017	2.3	0.45	0.28	3.03	15	0	11.9
2018	2.76	0.54	0.32	3.62	20	19.5	20.3

*Annual consumer price index changes

Source: HATSU (2018; 2019); (TCMB, 2020)

The Article No 23 of the İSKİ Law No 2560 provides pricing scheme principles (TBMM Mevzuat, 1981):

Separate pricing scheme are made for water sales, removal of wastewater in the settlements with sewerage facilities and discharge of septic tanks. The determination of these prices is based on the management, operating expenses and amortization expenses directly charged with renewal, reclamation and extension costs and a profit rate. Procedures and principles regarding the determination of prices and revenues of collection are further determined by a regulation.

In Turkey, each metropolitan municipality has its own regulation about water and wastewater prices. Therefore, water bills include various taxes in addition to the unit water price. Hatay Metropolitan Municipality collects a cleaning tax from all the neighbourhoods and wastewater price from the neighbourhoods which have sewerage facilities. Also, it charges for discharge of septic tanks apart from the water bills. In Turkey, every municipality collect cleaning tax but only metropolitan municipalities collect wastewater price. Hence, before the Law No 6360, district municipalities in Hatay did not charge for wastewater price; but charged for cleaning tax. As it can be seen in Table 38, cleaning tax increased after the Law No 6360. Wastewater charges were first begun after the Law No 6360 and gradually increased until 2019. These are negative outcomes of boundary expansion. According to activity reports of HATSU, number of wastewater treatment plants rose after the Law No 6360. Nonetheless, number of water treatment plants did not change between 2014 and 2019.

The ratio of expense budget can be another parameter for comparison. This dissertation briefly defined “ratio of expenses” as the ratio of expenses spent for water and sewage services to expenses spent for other services of the municipality Before the Law No 6360 İskenderun

Municipality had a water sewage department. Ratios of expenses spent by the water sewage department to expenses spent by İskenderun Municipality were 23.9% in 2012 and 38.1% in 2013. When Hatay gained metropolitan municipality statue, the water sewage department of the municipalities were abolished and services were assigned to HATSU. Ratios of expenses of HATSU to expenses of Hatay Metropolitan Municipality were 69.6% in 2014, 52.9% in 2015, 48.1% in 2016, 61.2% in 2017 and. As it can be observed, ratios of expenses increased after the Law No 6360 (Table 39). It is surprising that the revenues and expenses of HATSU are almost two thirds of the revenues of the metropolitan municipality. All these are negative outcomes of the boundary expansion.

Table 39 Ratio of Expenses and Revenues in Hatay between 2012 and 2018

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Expense Budget of HATSU (10 ³ TL)	-	-	63,419	253,290	365,231	502,257	453,753
Revenue Budget of HATSU (10 ³ TL)	-	-	123,712	212,255	290,787	306,448	299,727
Expense Budget of HBB (10 ³ TL)	-	-	123,712	478,809	759,500	820,767	974,740
Revenue Budget of HBB (10 ³ TL)	-	-	224,812	503,461	551,139	703,679	929,019
Ratio of Expenses (%)	23.9 ¹	38.1 ¹	69.6 ²	52.9 ²	48.1 ²	61.2 ²	46.5 ²
Ratio of Revenues (%)	-	-	55.0 ³	42.2 ³	52.8 ³	43.5 ³	32.3 ³

1 Ratio of expenses of water and sewage services to expenses of İskenderun Municipality in 2012 and 2013.

2 Ratio of expenses of HATSU to expenses of Hatay Metropolitan Municipality between 2014 and 2018.

3 Ratio of revenues of HATSU to revenues of Hatay Metropolitan Municipality between 2014 and 2018.

Source: HATSU (2018; 2019), İB (2013; 2014)

In summary, according to the analysis of the activity reports' data, the positive outcomes of Law No 6360 in Hatay are rise in subscribing ratio and the number of wastewater treatment plants. On the contrary, rise in water use per subscriber, unit water price, wastewater price, cleaning tax, increased ratio of expenses are the negative outcomes. As mentioned before, these positive and negative outputs which were derived from activity reports of HATSU, district municipalities and Hatay Metropolitan Municipality cannot provide a comprehensive evaluation; they are used as an overview on the consequences of Law No 6360.




Figure 15 Outcomes of the activity reports' data

4.9.2. Database of Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK)

This part of analysis uses database of the Turkish Statistics Institute's official website that publishes data every two years as 'Municipal Drinking Water Statistics' and 'Municipal Wastewater Statistics'. Since 1994, the Turkish Statistics Institute have collected data on the current status of drinking and potable water services, sewerage networks and treatment plants in all municipalities within the scope of environmental statistics. Data for sewerage networks and treatment plants have been published since 2001. Data of drinking and potable water services have been published since 2004. On the other hand, these data are provided only at the province level. There is no separate data for individual municipalities within a province. Moreover, the data is consistent due to the fact that municipalities do not collect meticulously collected data. Most importantly, data from Turkish Statistics Institute and data from activity reports do not match each other. As seen from Table 40, subscribing ratios of activity reports and TÜİK are not the same. For all these reasons, it is not possible to make an accurate comparison before and after the Law No 6360. Nonetheless, a few quantitative analyses will be carried out to give a rough idea about water and wastewater services in Hatay.

Table 40 A sample for comparison of the data of municipalities' activity reports and TÜİK

	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Subscribing ratio of the activity reports (%)	-	23.9	24.6	26.7	34.9	35.0
Subscribing ratio of the TÜİK (%)	21.9	22.3	23.8	33.6	32.0	31.8

The parameters of ‘Municipal Drinking Water Statistics’ that the Turkish Statistics Institute collects from municipalities are: Daily water amount per person (litres/person-day), total amount of water drained for drinking and potable water network (thousand m³/year), amount of water distributed (m³/year), number of subscribers of distributed water, water revenues (TL), total number of municipalities, number of municipalities served with drinking and potable water treatment plant, number of drinking and potable water treatment plants, ratio of municipal population served with drinking and potable water treatment plant to total municipal population (%), ratio of municipal population served with drinking and potable water treatment plant to total population (%), number of municipalities served with drinking and potable water network, municipal population served with drinking and potable water network, ratio of municipal population served by drinking and potable water network to total municipal population (%), ratio of municipal population served by drinking and potable water network to total population (%), and number of municipalities responsible for water distributed by drinking and potable water network (TUIK, 2015a). These parameters were collected from the municipalities and published every two years between 2004 and 2016. Appendix C gives all the data of ‘Municipal Drinking Water Statistics’ for the province of Hatay.

The parameters of ‘Municipal Wastewater Statistics’ that the Turkish Statistics Institute collects from municipalities: Total number of municipalities, number of municipalities served by sewerage network, municipal population served by sewerage network, ratio of municipal population served by sewerage network to total municipal population (%), ratio of municipal population served by sewerage network to total population (%), number of wastewater treatment plants, number of municipalities served with wastewater treatment plant, municipal population served with wastewater treatment plant, ratio of municipal population served with wastewater treatment plant to total municipal population (%), ratio of municipal population served with wastewater treatment plant to total population (%), amount of wastewater treated in wastewater treatment plants (thousand m³/year), amount of wastewater discharged from the network according to the receiving water body (thousand m³/year), and daily amount of wastewater discharged per person in municipalities (litres/person-day) (TUIK, 2015b). These parameters were collected from the municipalities and published between 2001 and 2016. Appendix D gives all the data of ‘Municipal Wastewater Statistics’ for the province of Hatay.

Table 41 Data of Municipal Drinking Water Statistics for the province of Hatay

	Before the Law No 6360			After the Law No 6360		
Parameters	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Total Population of Hatay	1413287	1480571	1483674	1519836	1555165	1609806
Total amount of water drained for drinking and potable water network (10 ³ m ³ /year)	71710	78937	94558	141220	100696	104365
Amount of water distributed (10 ³ m ³ /year)	40415	41233	46940	112832	64445	72645
Difference between drained and distributed water-Loss percentage (%)	56.4	52.2	49.6	79.9	64.0	69.6
Number of water subscribers	310004	330163	352839	510485	497532	511669
Subscribing ratio (%)	21.9	22.3	23.8	33.6	32.0	31.8
Municipal population served with drinking and potable water network	1067892	1118743	1143619	1459043	1508510	1593757
Ratio of municipal population served by drinking and potable water network to total population (%)	75.6	75.6	77.1	96.0	97.0	99.0
Municipal population served with water treatment plant	678	-	10487	16547	17006	17335
Ratio of municipal population served with drinking and potable water treatment plant to total population (%)	0	-	1	1	1	1

Source: TUIK (2019a)

Table 41 gives some important data on ‘Municipal Water Statistics’ to make a comparison for the province of Hatay. TUIK (2019a) provides total amount of water drained for drinking and potable water network and the amount of water distributed between 2008 and 2018. Therefore, difference between water drained for drinking and potable water network and amount of water distributed (water loss percentage) can be calculated. Before the Law No 6360 in 2008, 2010 and 2012, the percentages are 56.4, 52.2, and 49.6, respectively. After the Law No 6360 in 2014, 2016 and 2018, the percentages are 79.9, 64.0, and 69.6, respectively (see Figure 17). The water loss has increased after the Law No 6360. This is a negative outcome of the boundary expansion.




Figure 16 Difference between drained and distributed water

As TUIK provided number of water subscribers, subscribing ratio within whole population can also be calculated. Subscribing ratios before Law No 6360 are 21.9, 22.3, 23.8 and 33.6, 32.0 and 31.8 between 2008 and 2018 after the Law No 6360. Subscribing ratios have increased. This is a positive outcome of the boundary expansion. Although the values are different than those provided in from activity reports, both sets of data point to the same conclusion.

TUIK (2019a) also provides ratios of municipal population served with drinking and potable water treatment plant to total population, and ratios of municipal population served by drinking and potable water network to total population. As the number of water treatment plant has remained same (3) after the Law No 6360, the percentage has not changed. On the other hand, ratios of municipal population served by drinking and potable water network to total population have increased from 75.6% in 2008 to %99 in 2018. This is a positive output for the boundary expansion.




Figure 17 Ratios of municipal population served by drinking and potable water network to total population

These water statistics demonstrate that there are positive developments in increasing subscribing ratio and building water network after the Law No 6360. Service efficiency increased to a specific point (optimum scale). However, boundary expansion after this point might cause diseconomies and result in decrease in efficiency. The fact that the values of water loss increased might be an evidence for this.

Table 42 provides important data on ‘Municipal Wastewater Statistics’ for the province of Hatay between 2008 and 2016. Ratios of municipal population served by the sewerage network to total population over the years are given by TUIK (2019b). The ratios were 44.1% in 2008, 53.6% in 2010 and 58.4% in 2012 before the Law No 6360. They have increased after the Law No 6360; 80% in 2014 and 75% in 2016. This is a positive outcome of the boundary expansion.

Table 42 Data of Municipal Wastewater Statistics for the province of Hatay

Parameters	Before the Law No 6360			After the Law No 6360		
	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018*
Total Population of Hatay	1413287	1480571	1483674	1519836	1555165	1609806
Municipal population served by sewerage network	622816	793707	865735	1215869	1166374	-
Ratio of municipal population served by sewerage network to total population (%)	44.1	53.6	58.4	80.0	75.0	-
Municipal population served with wastewater treatment plant	378331	430113	377587	520508	488288	-
Ratio of municipal population served with wastewater treatment plant to total population (%)	26.8	29.1	25.4	34.2	31.4	-

*There is no data available for 2018.

Source: TUIK, 2019b

TUIK (2019b) also gives ratios of municipal population served with wastewater treatment plant to total population. These ratios were 26.8% in 2008, 29.1% in 2010 and 25.4% in 2012 before the Law No 6360. They have increased after the Law No 6360; 34.2% in 2014 and 31.4% in 2016. This is also a positive output with regards to boundary expansion. HATSU increased sewage system construction and the number of treatment plants. However, these are not adequate data to make an exact evaluation and reach absolute result.




Figure 18 Ratios of municipal population served by sewerage network to total population




Figure 19 Ratios of municipal population served with wastewater treatment plant to total population

In conclusion, TÜİK's data suggests that some positive outputs of the Law No 6360 in Hatay are an increase subscribing ratios, ratios of municipal population served by drinking and potable water network to total municipal population, ratios of municipal population served by sewerage network to total municipal population, and ratios of municipal population served with wastewater treatment plant to total municipal population. The negative outcome of the Law No 6360 in Hatay is increase in difference between water drained for drinking and potable water network, and the amount of water distributed (water loss).




Figure 20 Outcomes of TUİK's data

4.9.3. Conclusion of the Quantitative Analysis

By comparing the data before and after the Law No 6360, the quantitative analysis of the dissertation provides an overview about water and sewage services in Hatay. Some statistical data were obtained from activity reports of metropolitan municipality, district municipalities and HATSU. Others were acquired from internet database of Turkish Statistical Institute (TUİK). This part of analysis did not produce comprehensive results for the dissertation as the data gained from statistical resource was inadequate for comparison.

According to analysis of activity reports, positive outcomes of the Law No 6360 in Hatay are increase in subscribing ratio and number of wastewater treatment plants. On the contrary, increase in used water per subscriber, unit water price, wastewater price, cleaning tax, ratio of expenses are negative outcomes. According to the analysis of TUİK's data, positive outcomes of the Law No 6360 in Hatay are increase in subscribing ratios, ratios of municipal population served by drinking and potable water network to total municipal population, ratios of municipal population served by sewerage network to total municipal population, and ratios of municipal population served with wastewater treatment plant to total municipal population. The negative outcome of the Law No 6360 in Hatay is increase in difference between water drained for drinking and potable water network and amount of water distributed. There is a water loss in the pipes. It can be concluded that service efficiency increased to a specific point (optimum scale). However, boundary expansion after this point might cause diseconomies and decrease in efficiency. The fact that water loss have increased might be an evidence for it.

CHAPTER 5

IMPACT OF CHANGING MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES ON WATER AND WASTEWATER SERVICES: THE CASE OF HATAY

This section of the study provides answers to the research questions of the dissertation. As mentioned before, the Law No 6360 changed the municipal boundaries and assigned certain municipal services to the metropolitan municipalities. The main goal of the law is increasing efficiency in the service provision by using fewer resources, decreasing service costs and improving service quality. This dissertation examines how changing boundaries of municipalities affect municipal service provision. The research questions are:

- 1) What are the factors that affect service provision?
- 2) What kind of relationship do municipal scale and municipal service provision have?
How does the municipal scale affect efficiency, cost and quality of municipal service provision?
- 3) What are the positive and negative effects of changing municipal boundaries have on service provision?

The factors that affect service provision were discussed in the second chapter: Impact of decentralization processes on service provision, effects of privatization on service provision, internal (leadership style of the mayor, structure of the municipal council, organizational culture, ethical principles of the municipality) and external (economic, political, socio-cultural, and geographical structure of the city, and legal regulations) factors that affect service provision. Effects of rescaling policies were exclusively and particularly elaborated since the major basis of the Law No 6360 is changing municipal boundaries. Certainly, there are other impacts of the Law No 6360 that are presented above. This dissertation mainly focuses on the effects of the rescaling policies of the Law No 6360 on service delivery.

The research area of the dissertation is Hatay Metropolitan Municipality and its district municipalities. Water and sewerage services have been selected for this study. Sub-questions for the research area are formulated as follow:

- a) How did the water and sewer service provision function in Hatay before the Law No 6360?

- b) How has the water and sewer service provision changed in Hatay after the implementation of Law No 6360? What are the positive or negative impacts on the efficiency of water and sewer service provision?
- c) Did the Law No 6360 achieve its goals of ‘enlarging municipal boundaries ensures optimum scale economies, more effective service provision with less source usage, less costs and more quality’ in Hatay?
- d) What are the real aims and objectives of changing municipal boundaries and establishing metropolitan municipalities?

There are three initial arguments of the dissertation from a critical realist perspective. At the end of the analysis of the field study, these arguments will be verified or falsified.

5.1. Aim and Scope of the Case Study

This dissertation mainly aims to reveal the impacts of municipal rescaling practices on the water and sewer services of the municipalities by focusing on the case of Hatay. It also seeks to find out real aims and objectives of the municipal rescaling regulations.

This study will not utilize an empirical method to calculate parameters of economies of scale, such as population, population density, area measurement, and unit cost. It will not seek to discover optimum scale of the municipalities for the most efficient service provision. It will not analyse the variations in efficiency or productivity that result from changing boundaries and extending the service area throughout the province. As Çınar *et al* states, there are challenges in determining which scales are more appropriate for efficient service provision in Turkey. For example, calculating one scale for water services or fire services will not yield the same result for other services. Likewise, calculating different scales for each service will not provide administrative integration. On the other hand, there are some obstacles to collect data and to measure efficiency-productivity due to the fact that structure of local governments in Turkey. Most importantly, there are shortcomings of the Turkish administrative structure in producing measurable, comparable data and reports. (2013, pp. 21-23).

This study will analyze effects of boundary changes on service provision with regards to efficiency. However, the term efficiency will be redefined and analysed within the framework of critical realist methodology. Efficiency will be defined as delivering a service in accordance with public expectations and within the predefined goals of the authorities. Other terms, such as quality, equity, promptness and coordination will be variables to measure efficiency. The equipment, the staff with the knowledge and experience to perform a technical service, service buildings, and income sources of the metropolitan municipality will refer to quality. Equal

distribution of services in all neighbourhoods, and no political, economic, ethnical discrimination between neighbourhoods, streets and actors will indicate equity. Promptness will refer to providing services in a timely and a speedy manner. As Biricikoğlu and Demiroğlu Duyar argues, the efficiency and productivity of metropolitan municipalities in local service delivery can be too complex to be solely reduced to scale and cost calculations (2015, p. 377).

5.2. Method of the Case Study

In the previous chapter, the quantitative data obtained from the activity reports of the municipalities and TÜİK's database were analysed and some conclusions were drawn. The case study involves both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with municipal authorities and headmen. The interview questions were structured to gain specific information that would help with answering the research questions. In addition, activity reports, strategic plans, newspapers, and brochures were acquired from the municipal offices. Moreover, comprehensive internet searches about the local agenda, such as local news, organizations, and events provided important data. Furthermore, observations and conversations with local people also provided valuable data. In order to carry out a comparison, it is important to obtain data from two periods: before and after the Law No 6360. All of these strategies provide inductive data for the dissertation. Many inductive data were collected in order to develop a critical realist perspective at the end of the case study.

5.3. Limitations of the Case Study

There are difficulties in determining which scales are more appropriate to provide efficient service provision in Turkey. There are also some restrictions to collect data and to measure efficiency-productivity due to the structure of the local governments in Turkey. In order to calculate which scale and distance can be used more effectively and efficiently, it is necessary to know when, at what scale and with how much financial resources a service is provided. Municipalities in Turkey do not have a database with this information (Çınar *et al*, 2013, pp. 21-23).

Another problem is the ability to measure efficiency and apply the obtained scale. For the efficiency of any service, data such as quality of equipment, technology usage, time cost, inflation in the country need to be evaluated. These include different costs for each unit. For example, a road to a local government with a mountainous area and a road to a flat plain will not have a lifetime. Studies on finding the most appropriate scale will only provide more objective data when it comes to similar places and services (Zengin, 2014, p. 342).

As the authors point out, this field study encountered similar limitations in finding quantitative data. Relevant institutions either do not have required database at all or they have

discontinuous data, even if the database exists. Particularly, there is no sufficient data from the period before the Law No 6360. Therefore, it is not possible to compare before and after the municipal boundaries change and. As Suziki indicates (2016, p. 5):

One important factor in the inadequacy of the research focusing on the gap in benefits within merged municipalities is the absence of sufficient data in the pre-merger unit. After municipal mergers, most cities do not continue to collect data in the pre-merger unit. The data collection unit tends to be the post-merger unit rather than the pre-merger one. Most existing studies assessing merger impacts tend to rely on only post-merger unit data, which consists of aggregated data from merged municipalities. Therefore, it is difficult to analyze how, for example, economic growth or levels of democratic participation have changed in the same area before and after municipal mergers. We still do not know the empirical results of the issue of the unequal distribution of advantages and disadvantages among merged units

As mentioned in the previous chapter, quantitative data obtained from the institutions is inadequate to make a scientific and critical analysis. Therefore, this dissertation mainly focuses on the quantitative and qualitative data collected from the field study by interviews with public authorities, conversation with local people and on-site observations.

5.4. The Semi-Structured In-Depth Interviews

The semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted in Hatay can be divided into two parts. In the first part, public authorities in the municipalities were interviewed. In the second part, neighbourhood headmen attended interviews. Each set of interview had different questionnaires with different motives.

5.4.1. First Set of Interviewees and Questionnaires (Municipalities and HATSU)

The first part of the field study in Hatay was conducted between August and September in 2018. Officials in Hatay Metropolitan Municipality, Hatay Water and Sewage Administration General Directorate (HATSU), Antakya Municipality, and Erzin Municipality were interviewed face-to-face. These interviewees with their institutions, departments and interview dates are provided in Table 43.

The first group of semi-structured in-depth interviews of the first part consists of two different questionnaire sets. The first questionnaire set is for the metropolitan and district municipalities, and the second for HATSU. The questionnaire sets for metropolitan and district municipalities were provided in Appendix E, and the questionnaire sets for HATSU were provided Appendix F.

Table 43 Interviewees of the first part of the field study

	Institution of interviewee	Department of interviewee	Interviewee	Interview Date
1	HATSU	Sewage Head of Department	Y. A.	09/08/2018
2	HATSU	Management Department	F. Ö. D	09/08/2018
3	HATSU	Watershed Department Chef	Ş. S.	09/08/2018
4	HATSU	Legal Advisor	M. Y.	31/08/2018
5	Metropolitan Municipality	Environment Protection Department Chef	M. Ç.	09/08/2018
6	Antakya Municipality	Vice Mayor	İ. S.	31/08/2018
7	Arsuz Municipality	Vice Mayor	A. Y.	05/09/20018
8	Erzin Municipality	Civil Works Department in Erzin Municipality (2009-2014) and Metropolitan Municipality (2014-2019)	R. K.	10/09/2018
9	Erzin HATSU	District Authority	İ. Ö.	14/09/2018
10	İskenderun Municipality	Member of Municipal Council (2009-2014)	E. K.	11/09/2018

The first set includes three main sections: personal information of the interviewee, preliminary information and general questions about the study. The preliminary information briefly provides goals of and the changes brought by the Law No 6360 in Hatay. It also expresses aim and scope of the study. The major question of the interview is on the impact of the Law No 6360 on water and sewage services in Hatay. Thus, the goal of the interview is an objective and comprehensive analysis of the rescaling policies, which caused significant changes in municipalities. The final section includes six general questions:

- 1) Do you think the entry into force of Law No 6360 is the right decision for the province of Hatay? Can you evaluate the effect of this process on both managers and citizens?
- 2) How do you evaluate the Law No 6360 that expanded the boundaries of metropolitan municipality to the provincial boundaries? How did this practice affect municipal service provision in Hatay?
- 3) The Law No. 6360 transferred water and sewerage services from district municipalities to metropolitan municipalities. Do you think it is the right decision for Hatay? How do you think the service provision was affected after the Law No 6360?
- 4) In the general preamble of the Law No6360, following objectives have been put forward. Which of these targets have or have not been realized for water and sewage services in Hatay? Explain the reasons together. a) Achieving economies of scale b) Efficiency in service provision c) Service provision with more resource, less cost and higher quality

- 5) What are the advantages and disadvantages of large-scale municipalities over small-scale municipalities in terms of provision of water and sewerage services? Which are more effective in providing water and sewage services: district municipalities or metropolitan municipalities?
- 6) Would you have any suggestions for the water and sewage services in Hatay?

The second questionnaire set for HATSU consists of six sections. After personal information of the interviewee, preliminary information and general questions about the study, there are also questions for departments, and water and sewage services of HATSU. In the fourth section, there are questions about number of personnel, number of vehicle and quantity of budget of the departments. Then general questions about water and sewage services are asked: Which institutions offer services of water supply, water treatment, sewage, wastewater treatment, storm drainage and agricultural irrigation more efficiently? What are the challenges before and after the Law No 6360? What are your proposals about the Law No 6360 in terms of water and wastewater services?

In the fifth section, there are questions about water services of HATSU. Before the Law No 6360, how were water services provided? Do you think that this service is effectively and equally provided to every neighbourhood? What are the problems in this field (legislation, management, personnel, financial resources, local conditions, etc.)? Could you evaluate the provision of this service from the viewpoint of the citizen? Do you think they are satisfied with the service? Do they have any complaints? Are these complaints responded? Can you find solutions to the problems?

In the final section, there are questions about sewage and wastewater services of HATSU. Before the Law No 6360, how were sewage and wastewater services provided? Do you think that this service is effectively and equally provided to every neighbourhood? What are the problems in this field (legislation, management, personnel, financial resources, local conditions, etc.)? Could you evaluate the provision of this service from the viewpoint of the citizen? Do you think they are satisfied with the service? Do they have any complaints? Are these complaints responded? Can you find solutions to the problems?

5.4.2. Second Set of Interviewees and Questionnaires (Neighbourhood Headmen)

The second part of the field study in Hatay was conducted between September, 2018 and March, 2019. 180 neighbourhood headmen from district municipalities were interviewed face-to-face. Snowball sampling method was employed in the field. Also some criteria were

considered in the selection of headmen. There are 15 district municipalities in Hatay and at minimum 4 headmen from each district municipality were interviewed. In addition, attention was paid to the status of the neighbourhood before the Law No 6360 to make comparison between past and present. At least 1 neighbourhood which was village before, at least 1 neighbourhood which was small municipality before, and at least 1 neighbourhood which was in district municipality were selected. The interviewed headmen with information about their neighbourhoods, district municipalities and statues before the Law No 6360 are given in Appendix H.

The questionnaire sets for the headmen were divided into 3 groups. The first group includes the neighbourhoods which were villages before the Law No 6360. The second group consists of the neighbourhoods which were small municipalities before the Law No 6360. The third group involves the neighbourhoods which were neighbourhoods of the municipalities before the Law No 6360. In fact, almost all questions are the same, except for a few differences. The questions sets for the headmen are given in Appendix G.

The questionnaire sets are divided into questions regarding two periods: before and after the Law No 6360:

- 1) How was/is drinking water supplied?
- 2) How was/is drinking water delivered?
- 3) Was/Is there a sewer network in your village/ small municipality/ neighbourhood?
- 4) How was/is wastewater removed in your village/ municipality /neighbourhood?
- 5) How was/is rain water removed in your village/ municipality /neighbourhood?
- 6) How many households/ subscriber were/are there in your village/ municipality /neighbourhood?
- 7) Did/Do you have any problems with the water supply? Were/Are these problems solved?
- 8) Were/Are there any water shortages? What was the reason? How was it solved?
- 9) Were/Are there any problems with the infrastructure? What was the reason? How was it solved?
- 10) Was/Is your water quality? Was/Is there any disease, risk from water? If so, was it solved?
- 11) Was/Is your wastewater drainage a threat to the environment and human health?
- 12) Were/Are the residents satisfied with this service? Did/Do they have any complaints about the service provision? What were/are they?

- 13) Could/Can every people in the village / small municipality / neighbourhood benefit from this service equally? Were/Are there any discrimination in service provision? What kind of discrimination? Do you think that other neighbourhoods got better services than yours?
- 14) Are there any problems with installing the meter? Are there any complaints about it?
- 15) Were/Are there any complaints about water bills? Was/Is it expensive?
- 16) How were/are water and wastewater services in your village / small municipality / neighbourhood? What did the responsible authority do in your neighbourhood? What kind of troubles do you have about these services?
- 17) How was/is the attitude of the staff of these services towards the people?
- 18) How do you communicate with HATSU? Can you easily reach to HATSU?
- 19) Which is the best institution in providing water and sewage services? a) District/Small Municipality b) Metropolitan Municipality (HATSU) c) Provincial Special Administration d) Central State
- 20) Was the Law No 6360 establishing a metropolitan municipality in Hatay a good decision?
- 21) In the justification of Law No 6360, the following objectives have been put forward. Which of these goals has been realized for this service? a) Achievement of scale of economies b) Administration, planning and coordination of services at an optimal scale c) Lower cost and better quality service with less resources d) Efficiency-effectiveness in service provision

5.5. Qualitative Analysis of First Set (Municipalities and HATSU)

This part of the qualitative analysis will be conducted on the interviewee basis. The second part will be analysed on the basis of both interviewee and issue. One of the major questions is about the general opinions of the interviewees on the Law No 6360, this is in order to determine how much they know about the subject. Consequently, the first question is whether the Law No 6360 is a right decision for the province of Hatay in terms of the changes it brought administrative, political and social areas. The other major question is about HATSU and the changes in water and sewage services in Hatay. Table 44 gives the general opinions of the interviewees about the Law No 6360 and HATSU.

The Sewage Head of Department in HATSU evaluates the Law No 6360 as being positive for Hatay. Small municipalities gained more advantages in having access to large scale infrastructure projects, qualified personnel, and control mechanisms. Since the municipalities in Turkey get a share of the income according to their population, the small municipalities

cannot afford to build drinking water, sewage network or rain water drainage. Since Hatay gained metropolitan municipality status, revenues and funds were combined. Hence, municipalities which demanded more services but had fewer resources gained the opportunity of having large-scale projects. Moreover, there are more qualified personnel and control mechanisms for planning large scale projects in the small municipalities. For him, gathering revenues in a single centre and conducting projects from a single source made the services better quality. Thus, the service provision is more efficient, of higher quality, and equal. He states that, for transporting services over long distances, Hatay was divided into 2 main regions²⁴ with regards to water and wastewater services. According to him, in order to make these services faster and better quality within their geographical area, the control mechanism has been centralized (metropolitan unit), while the management has regionalized (local unit). He adds that these regional directorates with their sub-units in the districts have sufficient personnel and equipment, which increases efficiency and productivity in service provision. Villages and small municipalities including those furthest and were deprived of service before the Law No 6360 receive services with the help of these regional directorates at present. To report problems with service, HATSU established an emergency line with the phone number 112. Thus, the personnel can reach to the borders of the province in maximum 30 minutes. According to him, water bills are not high now, and they were cheaper before the Law No 6360. Mayors priced the water lower than its cost due to the fear of not being reelected in the local elections. He explains why the water bills increased after Hatay became metropolitan Municipality:

Before Hatay became a metropolitan municipality, the mayors gave it [water] to the citizens much lower than the cost of water! Do you know what he did? Instead of using the funds more efficiently, prospectively, they gave the citizen less cost. Why did they do that? Fear of not being elected again. Especially in small towns everyone knows the mayor. He gave it to the citizen to a quarter of its cost. He does not know how to take forward measures.²⁵

According to the vice mayor in Antakya Municipality, the current situation is better than before the Law No 6360. He has knowledge about the water and sewage services because he was in

²⁴ As mentioned before, HATSU divided its service area into 2 regions (regional directorates) which include 15 district municipalities of the Hatay province. The first region is to the east of the Amanos Mountain, the second region is to the west of it. There are also sub-units of the regional directorates in the some districts.

²⁵ 'Büyükşehir olmadan önce belde ve belediye başkanları suyun maliyetinin çok çok altında vatandaşa vermişler! Ne yapmış biliyor musunuz? Gelen ödeneği daha verimli, ileriye dönük kullanmak yerine vatandaşa daha az maliyetle vermişler. Bunu da niye yapmışlar? Bir daha seçilmeme korkusu. Hele ki küçük beldelerde herkes başkanı tanıyor. Şimdi ama maliyetinin daha altında çok çok altında ama dörtte biri kadar altında vatandaşa vermiş.'

charge of Antakya municipality's civil works before the Law No 6360. For him, there were disruptions in the service provision before. The metropolitan model is good for abolishing small municipalities and collecting resources in one hand. On the other side, he criticizes the Law No 6360 due to its uncertainties. The relations between municipalities are uncoordinated and problems with the division of duties arise. He also indicates water sourcing problems faced by the small municipalities. When small municipalities could not find water source before, they had to solicit other municipalities which had water resource; but this caused a big problem. As services were provided from a single centre in a coordinated way after the Law No 6360, that problem was resolved. There were small municipalities which had no infrastructure before. The small municipalities in Antakya tried to incorporate in order to build one wastewater treatment plant with funds from the central administration; but they could not achieve. For him, abolishing the legal entity of small municipalities was a good practice for Antakya. He also indicates to importance of HATSU's regional directorates for efficient and equal service provision to every neighbourhood. Moreover, he states that on the one hand, the water bills increased and on the other hand the costs of the water and wastewater decreased. That is a contradictory comment. He refers to the local people making complaints about water bills. Furthermore, he mentions about troubles of the transition period. Antakya Municipality established a directorate of water and sewage works in the first year, despite existence of HATSU. Local people continued to reach out district municipalities for water and sewage services. For him, transition period should be longer. He emphasizes that abolishing numerous small municipalities in Antakya that were lacking resources, personnel and equipment before the Law No 6360 was a good practice.

The vice mayor of Arsuz Municipality addresses the major problem of small municipalities around Arsuz that were lack of infrastructure. According to him, abolishing small municipalities was a right decision for Arsuz. However, after the Law No 6360 HATSU have not built sewage system, water and wastewater treatment plants in Arsuz yet. Since Arsuz is a touristic city, population doubles or triples during summers. Septic tanks are not sufficient and most of the wastewater is discharged to the sea without treatment. HATSU prepared plans for an infrastructure project for Arsuz and started in Karaağaç, but it will take long time to complete the project. While HATSU was planning the project, the Mayor of Metropolitan Municipality wanted to apply for a loan. However, it took a long time to get authorization from the council of Metropolitan Municipality since the AKP members tried to put a spanner in the works. What is more, he states that there are some problems with the installation of water meters in the Arsuz villages. The villagers moan: 'We extracted the water, why should we give

money to you HATSU?’ According to him, the transition period is very troublesome. Local people continue to bring complaints about water and sewage services to district municipality.

During the first period after 6360, there were a lot of problems. HATSU has just been created. We [district municipality] provided water and sewage services. They have just been transferred [to HATSU]. Now the citizen does not know HATSU. I voted for you, he says, you will handle my issue. He says that the water prices are too high. My water bill, he says, blah blah... HATSU is a very troubled institution in my opinion, due to the fact that it has newly established.²⁶

In Hatay, most of the villagers have similar objections to the installation of water meters. They think that the water belongs to them because they have found and extracted the water as a result of long lasting efforts before the Law No 6360. They are angry with HATSU, because it sells villager’s water back to the villagers.

The delegate of the Hatay Metropolitan Municipality in Erzin explains the local problems of Erzin that resulted from being a metropolitan municipality. As Erzin is one of the farthest cities from Antakya, most local people did not want to be a district municipality of the metropolitan municipality. On top of the distance between Erzin and Antakya, there are also cultural and social differences between them. He talked about the infrastructure projects which were launched by Erzin municipality before the Law No 6360. HATSU completed water and sewage drainage system and built wastewater treatment plant in Erzin. However, local people were not satisfied with these services. There were numerous troubles during the construction and there were breakdowns after the system was in use.

The former member of council of İskenderun Municipality claims that wastewater treatment plants are not frequently controlled. The security guards are in charge of both security and chlorination of the tanks. Wastewater is usually discharged to the receiving water bodies without treatment. He also points out a remarkable determination. ‘Large scale municipality means large scale urban projects, which in turn means large scale rents.’ He mentions about privatization of the water and wastewater services and corruptions in metropolitan municipalities.

²⁶ ‘6360 sonrası ilk dönemde çok sıkıntı oldu. HATSU yeni oluştu. Su ve kanal işlerini biz yürütüyorduk. Daha yeni devredildi zaten. Şimdi vatandaş bilmez HATSU filan. Bilenin de işine gelmiyor. Ben sana verdim oyumu, sen yapacaksın benim işimi diyor. Su fiyatları çok yüksek diyor. Su faturam şöyle şöyle diyor. HATSU da çok sıkıntılı bir kurum bana göre, yeni oluşumundan kaynaklı.’

Table 44 General opinions of the interviewees in municipalities and HATSU

Interviewee	Institution	Law No 6360		Water and Sewage Services	
Y. A.	HATSU	(+)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Abolishing small municipalities Resources in one hand 	(+)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Providing services to the settlements which were deprived of services before More efficient, quality, equal More qualified personnel & equipment Less costly Reaching to everywhere even it is in the borderline
İ. S.	Antakya Municipality	(+)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Abolishing small municipalities Resources in one hand 	(+)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Providing services settlements which were deprived of services before
		(-)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bad decision of being a metropolitan city Incoordination, vagueness, gap 	(-)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Troubles during transition period
A. Y.	Arsuz Municipality	(-)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bad decision of being a metropolitan city Political concerns Population criterion is insufficient 	(-)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Troubles during transition period Lack of infrastructure
		(+)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Abolishing small municipalities 	(+)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The mayor tried to do projects but was hindered
R. K.	Erzin (HMM)	(-)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bad decision of being a metropolitan city Long distance from centre Cultural & social differences 	(-)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Problems in building and using infrastructure
M. Ç.	HMM	(-)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not efficient and not rentable Political decision 	(-)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Uncertainty in irrigation
E. K.	İskenderun	(-)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bad decision of being a metropolitan city 	(-)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increasing water bills Great corruptions in large projects Lack of inspection in projects Security guard in the run of treatment plants

As it can be seen in Table 44, only officials of HATSU and Antakya municipality (which is the central district) support the Law No 6360, enlarging municipal boundaries and assigning water and wastewater services to HATSU. According to them, establishing metropolitan

municipality in Hatay was a good decision. Abolishing small municipalities and concentrating resources at one point (recentralization) were the best practices of the Law No 6360. For them, water and sewage services in Hatay were improved after the Law No 6360. HATSU provide services to the settlements (particularly villages and small municipalities) which were deprived of services before. HATSU provide more efficient, quality and fair services. There are more qualified personnel and equipment in HATSU. Its services are less costly, and it can reach every neighbourhood even if they are at the border of the province. These comments are aligned with the consolidationist views that advocate larger local units for the efficient service provision.

Other interviewees in the municipalities think that establishing metropolitan municipality in Hatay was not a good decision. Uncoordination, political concerns, rent oriented, very large area, cultural and social differences are problematic aspects of the Law No 6360. They also criticize assigning water and sewage services to HATSU. Increasing water bills, corruption in large projects, lack of inspection in projects, problems in building and using infrastructure, and troubles during the transition period are some of the criticisms. These interviewees defend decentralization and more fragmented local units for efficient service provision.

5.6. Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of the Second Set (Neighbourhood Headmen)

The second part of the field study in Hatay was conducted in neighbourhoods through interviewing neighbourhood headmen of district municipalities. Before the Law No 6360, there were 368 villages, 64 small municipalities, and 149 neighbourhoods in Hatay. There are now 594 neighbourhoods. Among these, 100 villages, 30 small municipalities and 50 neighbourhoods were selected for face-to-face interviews with their headmen (see Table 45). It should be noted that although all of these local units are neighbourhoods at present, this dissertation use their old statuses (villages, small municipalities and neighbourhoods) to avoid confusion.

Table 45 Numbers of interviewed headmen by local units

Districts	Villages	Small Municipalities	Neighbourhoods	Total
Altınözü	3	1	1	5
Antakya	8	3	2	13
Arsuz	19	6	2	27
Belen	9	-	10	19
Defne	7	4	1	12
Dörtyol	3	5	5	13
Erzin	10	-	9	19
Hassa	3	1	1	5
İskenderun	11	5	7	23
Kırıkhan	4	1	2	7
Kumlu	4	-	1	5
Payas	3	-	9	12
Reyhanlı	6	-	3	9
Samandağ	6	2	2	10
Yayladağı	5	2	1	8
Total	100	30	50	180

Note: There was no small municipality in Belen, Erzin, Kumlu, Payas and Reyhanlı before the Law No 6360.

In order to make a quantitative analysis of the interviews, one of the programs of Windows operating systems, Microsoft Excel was used. Responses to each question were compiled under headings and these headings yield same outputs. When these outputs were divided by the numbers of headmen, general results for the conclusion were produced. To give an example, there are positive and negative opinions of the headmen about an issue. If the sum of positive opinions is 60, this number is divided by the total number of headmen (180), a percentage is obtained (33.3%). This percentage yields an overall evaluation about that issue. However, it should be noted that these percentage calculations cannot provide exact results; they only give quantitative outcomes about the interviews. On the other hand, positive and negative results were derived from the answers of headmen within the context of the qualitative analysis.

5.6.1. Opinions of the Headmen on Hatay Metropolitan Municipality and HATSU

This part of the quantitative and qualitative analysis will be conducted on the basis of both interviewee and issue. One of the main questions is the general opinions of the interviewees on Hatay Metropolitan Municipality. The other main question is about HATSU and the water and sewage services it provides in Hatay. Table 46 gives general opinions of the headmen on

Hatay Metropolitan Municipality (HMM) as positive or negative, and Table 47 gives general perspectives of the headmen on HATSU as positive or negative.

Table 46 General opinions of the headmen on Hatay Metropolitan Municipality

Opinions HMM	Villages	Small Municipalities	Neighbourhoods	Total
Positive (+)	60	15	23	98
%	60	50	46	54.4
Negative (-)	40	15	27	82
%	40	50	54	45.6
Total	100	30	50	180

According to Table 46, positive and negative opinions on Hatay Metropolitan Municipality account for 54.4% and 45.6% of all responses, respectively. More than half of the headmen are satisfied with the Hatay Metropolitan Municipality. 60% of villages, 50% of small municipalities and 46% of neighbourhoods are also satisfied with metropolitan municipality. On the contrary, 40% of villages, 50% of small municipalities and 54% of neighbourhoods are not satisfied with metropolitan municipality. Headmen of neighbourhoods are more dissatisfied with metropolitan municipality than headmen of villages and small municipalities.

Table 47 General opinions of the headmen on HATSU

Opinions on HATSU	Villages	Small Municipalities	Neighbourhood	Total
Positive (+)	44	10	18	72
Percentage (%)	44.0	33.3	36.0	40.0
Negative (-)	56	20	32	108
Percentage (%)	56.0	66.7	64.0	60.0
Total	100	30	50	180

According to Table 47, percentages of positive and negative opinions on HATSU are 40 and 60, respectively. More than half of the headmen are not satisfied with the HATSU. 56% of villages, 66.7% of small municipalities and 64% of neighbourhood headmen have negative opinions. Headmen of small municipalities are more dissatisfied than headmen of neighbourhoods and villages. Besides, there are several headmen who are satisfied with Hatay Metropolitan Municipality, but not satisfied with HATSU. Most of the headmen approve Mayor Lütfü Savaş, even if they are not satisfied with the metropolitan municipality.

Table 48 Results of the perspectives on HMM and HATSU on the basis of districts

		HMM	%	HATSU	%
Antakya	Positive	9	69,2	8	61,5
	Negative	4	30,8	5	38,5
	Total	13		13	
Arsuz	Positive	14	51,9	7	25,9
	Negative	13	48,1	18	66,7
	Total	27		27	
İskenderun	Positive	15	65,2	10	41,7
	Negative	8	34,8	14	58,3
	Total	23		24	
Erzin	Positive	5	26,3	2	10,5
	Negative	14	73,7	17	89,5
	Total	19		19	
Dörtyol	Positive	3	23,1	1	7,7
	Negative	10	76,9	12	92,3
	Total	13		13	
Payas	Positive	2	16,7	1	8,3
	Negative	10	83,3	11	91,7
	Total	12		12	
Belen	Positive	10	83,3	10	83,3
	Negative	2	16,7	2	16,7
	Total	12		12	
Hassa	Positive	3	60,0	3	60,0
	Negative	2	40,0	2	40,0
	Total	5		5	
Defne	Positive	11	91,7	7	58,3
	Negative	1	8,3	5	41,7
	Total	12		12	
Altınözü	Positive	3	60,0	3	60,0
	Negative	2	40,0	2	40,0
	Total	5		5	
Kumlu	Positive	4	80,0	3	60,0
	Negative	1	20,0	2	40,0
	Total	5		5	
Kırıkhan	Positive	2	28,6	1	14,3
	Negative	5	71,4	6	85,7
	Total	7		7	
Reyhanlı	Positive	5	55,6	5	55,6
	Negative	4	44,4	4	44,4
	Total	9		9	
Samandağ	Positive	7	70,0	6	60,0
	Negative	3	30,0	4	40,0
	Total	10		10	
Yayladağı	Positive	5	62,5	5	71,4
	Negative	3	37,5	3	42,9
	Total	8		7	

Table 48 provides the headmen's opinions about Hatay Metropolitan Municipality (HMM) and HATSU on the basis of districts. It should be noted that percentage of headmen who are

dissatisfied (negative percentages) will be taken into consideration. Negative percentages of the district municipalities for Hatay Metropolitan Municipality are 83.3 for Payas, 76.9 for Dörtyol, 71.4 for Kırıkhan, 73.7 for Erzin, 40.0 for Hassa, 40.0 for Altınözü, 44.4 for Reyhanlı, 48.1 for Arsuz, 37.5 for Yayladağı, 34.8 for İskenderun, 30.0 for Samandağ, 30.8 for Antakya, 16.7 for Belen, and 8.3 for Defne. The results are sorted in descending order of value. The headmen who expressed most dissatisfaction with HMM are in Payas. On the other side, the headmen who expressed most satisfaction with HMM are in Defne.

According to Table 48, negative percentages of the district municipalities for HATSU are 92.3 for Dörtyol, 91.7 for Payas, 85.7 for Erzin, 71.4 for Kırıkhan, 66.7 for Arsuz, 58.3 for İskenderun, 44.4 for Reyhanlı, 42.9 for Yayladağı, 41.7 for Defne. 40.0 for Hassa, 40.0 for Altınözü, 40.0 for Kumlu, 40.0 for Samandağ, 38.5 for Antakya, and 16.7 for Belen. The results are sorted in descending order of value. The headmen who expressed most dissatisfaction with HATSU are in Dörtyol. On the other side, the headmen who expressed most satisfaction with HATSU are in Belen.

As this dissertation mainly focuses on the water and sewage services, the analysis will be continued over the findings of HATSU. The headmen who expressed most dissatisfaction are in Dörtyol. Except Kırıkhan, the headmen who expressed most dissatisfaction are from the second region of HATSU, Payas, Erzin, Arsuz and İskenderun. It can be observed that there is discrimination among regions in terms of service provision. The rumour of ‘the other part of the mountain’ can be real. Table 49 and Figure 22 show the relation between satisfaction values and distances to Antakya.

Table 49 Relation between distances to the centre and dissatisfaction values

HATSU Regions	Districts	Distances to the centre (km)	Dissatisfaction Values (%)
1. Region	Antakya	0	38.5
1. Region	Defne	10	41.7
1. Region	Samandağ	24	40.0
1. Region	Altınözü	32	40.0
1. Region	Reyhanlı	42	44.4
1. Region	Yayladağ	45	42.9
1. Region	Belen	47	16.7
1. Region	Kumlu	52	40.0
1. Region	Kırıkhan	54	85.7
2. Region	İskenderun	63	58.3
2. Region	Payas	87	91.7
2. Region	Arsuz	90	66.7
2. Region	Dörtyol	91	92.3
1. Region	Hassa	93	40.0
2. Region	Erzin	111	89.5

Except Hassa, all the negative outcomes are in the second region. The further away from the centre, more negative the outcomes are. It can be clearly seen that there is a relation between distance and service provision. The headmen who expressed most satisfaction with HATSU are in Belen and Antakya.




Figure 21 Relation between distances to the centre and dissatisfaction values

Considering whether there is a relation between political parties and dissatisfaction values, I compared negative outputs of districts about Hatay Metropolitan Municipality and HATSU and political parties that hold the district municipalities. As it can be seen in Table 50, there is no meaningful relationship between the party affiliation of the municipality and dissatisfaction values.

Table 50 Relation between political parties and dissatisfaction values

District	Dissatisfaction values of HMM	Party		District	Dissatisfaction values of HATSU	Party
Payas	83,3	AKP		Dörtöy	92,3	MHP
Dörtöy	76,9	MHP		Payas	91,7	AKP
Erzin	73,7	AKP		Erzin	89,5	AKP
Kırıkhan	71,4	AKP		Kırıkhan	85,7	AKP
Arsuz	48,1	CHP		Arsuz	66,7	CHP
Reyhanlı	44,4	AKP		İskenderun	58,3	AKP
Altınözü	40	AKP		Reyhanlı	44,4	AKP
Hassa	40	AKP		Yayladağı	42,9	AKP
Yayladağı	37,5	AKP		Defne	41,7	CHP
İskenderun	34,8	AKP		Altınözü	40,0	AKP
Antakya	30,8	AKP		Hassa	40,0	AKP
Samandağ	30	CHP		Kumlu	40,0	AKP
Kumlu	20	AKP		Samandağ	40,0	CHP
Belen	16,7	AKP		Antakya	38,5	AKP
Defne	8,3	CHP		Belen	16,7	AKP

Relationship between population and satisfaction, and development level and satisfaction were also examined. However, no meaningful relationship between them was found. Table 51 provides the results of opinions on metropolitan municipality on the basis of local units.

Table 51 Headmen's opinions about HMM on the basis of local units

	District	Result	Village	Small Municipality	Neighbourhood	Total
1	Antakya	Positive	5	2	2	9
		Negative	3	1	0	4
		Total	8	3	2	13
2	Arsuz	Positive	8	4	2	14
		Negative	11	2	0	13
		Total	19	6	2	27
3	İskenderun	Positive	7	2	6	15
		Negative	4	3	1	8
		Total	11	5	7	23
4	Erzin	Positive	3	0	2	5
		Negative	7	0	7	14
		Total	10	0	9	19
5	Dörtyol	Positive	0	0	3	3
		Negative	3	5	2	10
		Total	3	5	5	13
6	Payas	Positive	1	0	1	2
		Negative	2	0	8	10
		Total	3	0	9	12
7	Belen	Positive	7	0	3	10
		Negative	1	0	1	2
		Total	8	0	4	12
8	Hassa	Positive	2	0	1	3
		Negative	1	1	0	2
		Total	3	1	1	5
9	Defne	Positive	7	3	1	11
		Negative	0	1	0	1
		Total	7	4	1	12
10	Altınözü	Positive	2	1	0	3
		Negative	1	0	1	2
		Total	3	1	1	5
11	Kumlu	Positive	4	0	0	4
		Negative	0	0	1	1
		Total	4	0	1	5
12	Kırıkhan	Positive	2	0	0	2
		Negative	2	1	2	5
		Total	4	1	2	7
13	Reyhanlı	Positive	4	0	1	5
		Negative	2	0	2	4
		Total	6	0	3	9
14	Samandağ	Positive	4	2	1	7
		Negative	2	0	1	3
		Total	6	2	2	10
15	Yayladağı	Positive	4	1	0	5
		Negative	1	1	1	3
		Total	5	2	1	8

Table 52 provides the results of the opinions of the headmen about HATSU on the basis of local units.

Table 52 Headmen's opinions about HATSU on the basis of local units

			Village	Small Municipality	Neighbourhood	Total
1	Antakya	Positive	5	1	2	8
		Negative	3	2	0	5
		Total	8	3	2	13
2	Arsuz	Positive	5	1	1	7
		Negative	14	5	1	18
		Total	19	6	2	27
3	İskenderun	Positive	3	2	5	10
		Negative	8	4	2	14
		Total	11	6	7	24
4	Erzin	Positive	1	0	1	2
		Negative	9	0	8	17
		Total	10	0	9	19
5	Dörtyol	Positive	0	0	1	1
		Negative	3	5	4	12
		Total	3	5	5	13
6	Payas	Positive	0	0	1	1
		Negative	3	0	8	11
		Total	3	0	9	12
7	Belen	Positive	7	0	3	10
		Negative	1	0	1	2
		Total	8	0	4	12
8	Hassa	Positive	2	0	1	3
		Negative	1	1	0	2
		Total	3	1	1	5
9	Defne	Positive	4	2	1	7
		Negative	3	2	0	5
		Total	7	4	1	12
10	Altınözü	Positive	2	1	0	3
		Negative	1	0	1	2
		Total	3	1	1	5
11	Kumlu	Positive	3	0	0	3
		Negative	1	0	1	2
		Total	4	0	1	5
12	Kırıkhan	Positive	1	0	0	1
		Negative	3	1	2	6
		Total	4	1	2	7
13	Reyhanlı	Positive	4	0	1	5
		Negative	2	0	2	4
		Total	6	0	3	9
14	Samandağ	Positive	3	2	1	6
		Negative	3	0	1	4
		Total	6	2	2	10
15	Yayladağı	Positive	4	1	0	5
		Negative	1	1	1	3
		Total	5	2	1	7

According to Table 52, the negative percentages of HATSU in villages are 100.0 for Dörtiyol and Payas, 90.0 for Erzin, 75.0 for Kırıkhan, 73.7 for Arsuz, 72.7 for İskenderun, 50.0 for Samandağ, 42.9 for Defne, 37.5 for Antakya, 33.3 for Hassa, Reyhanlı and Altınözü, 25 for Kumlu, 20 for Yayladağı, and 12.5 for Belen. The village's headmen who expressed most dissatisfaction with HATSU are in Dörtiyol, Payas and Erzin. The small municipality's headmen who expressed most dissatisfaction with HATSU are in Dörtiyol (100%) and Arsuz (83.3%). The neighbourhood's headmen who expressed most dissatisfaction with HATSU are in Payas (88.9%) and Erzin (77.8%). All headmen's opinions about Hatay Metropolitan Municipality and HATSU are provided in Appendix H.

5.6.2. The First Statements of the Headmen

During interviews with the headmen, I first presented preliminary information about my study. Then I mentioned major aim of the thesis: I tried to find out how were the water and sewage services in Hatay before and after the Law No 6360. The initial statements of the headmen are quite remarkable. Some of the statements are complaints, demands or requirements, some are the first things that they always want to say, some are summaries of their perspectives, etc. Moreover, these initial statements provide important clues about their general perspectives about HATSU and metropolitan municipality.

Most of the village headmen in İskenderun state that they were more satisfied before the Law No 6360. For example, headman of Akçay states:

It's too bad, too bad. It wasn't good that Hatay was turned into metropolitan municipality. We were much better during the Special Administration period. In other words, we [our village] should have continued as village. This [abolishing the villages] was the worst aspect of the metropolitan law [Law No 6360].²⁷

Headmen of villages in Erzin complain about HATSU and the metropolitan municipality status. Headman of Yoncadüzü first talks about their problems:

We couldn't get service. They [HATSU] took our ready-made water, they're selling it to us right now. We didn't have enough water. They added drilling water. They also sold this water to us. They said we will get the water ready. Water well is ready, it was drilled. They have not brought us water for four years.²⁸

²⁷ 'Çok kötü oldu, çok kötü. Büyükşehir olması hiç iyi olmadı. Özel İdare dönemi çok daha iyiydik biz. Köy olarak kalmalıydık yani. Büyükşehir yasasının en kötü yönü de bu oldu.'

²⁸ 'Biz hizmet alamadık. Bizim hazır suyumuzu aldılar elimizden, parayla şu an satıyorlar bize. Suyumuz yetmedi. Sondaj suyundan kattılar. Onun da suyunu bize sattılar. Suyu hazır getireceğiz dediler. Kuyu hazır, vurulmuş. Dört senede bir suyu depoya çekip getiremediler bize.'

One of the most complained issues is installation of water meters in the villages. The villagers discovered the water source and brought water to their village years ago. After the Law No 6360, HATSU installed water meters and collected the water fees.

Headman of Çatköy in Dört Yol states: ‘No service! We are [our village is] a mountain village. They [HATSU] couldn’t leave the city so they could arrive at the village’²⁹. Likewise, headman of Gazeluşağı in Hassa says:

If you ask our own personal opinion now, we would like our village to gain legal status again. However, there is no return from the metropolitan laws issued by the state. The institution HATSU cannot reach enough. It reaches to some extent.³⁰

Headmen of Eriklikuyu in Samandağ initially talks about the advantages of villages and the disadvantages of metropolitan municipality and HATSU.

Now imagine that you were giving your own decision before, you (your village) had your own legal personality. So you're saying I can do what my neighbourhood need in my own neighbourhood. (...) You collect the water fee yourself. Therefore, when you apply to the District Governor and the Special Provincial Administration, they give you cash for the project. For example, a water pipe has fractured, you can repair it for 50 TL. At that time, you could intervene and get it done instantly. However, you should report to HATSU now. HATSU comes with a ladle, two men, one turntable. The cost of the failure is actually 50 TL. The cost of the team to HATSU is 1500 TL.³¹

In fact, he explains how cost of service provision in the villages increased after Hatay became a metropolitan municipality. He also talks about that they could take their own decisions, find the budget immediately and meet their needs before the Law No 6360.

Headman of Üçtepe in Reyhanlı talks about the difficulties of being far away from centre (Antakya):

²⁹ ‘Yok ne hizmeti! Dağ köyüyüz biz. Şehirden çıkamadılar ki köye varsınlar.’

³⁰ ‘Şimdi bizim kendi şahsi fikrimizi sorarsanız, biz köy tüzel kişiliğimizin geri dönmesini isteriz. Lakin bu Büyükşehir yasalarında, devletin çıkardığı yasalarda artık bu işin dönüşü yok. HATSU dediğimiz kurum da yeteri kadar ulaşmıyor. Bir yere kadar ulaşıyor.’

³¹ ‘Şimdi düşünün kendi kararınızı kendiniz veriyordunuz önceden, kendi tüzel kişiliğiniz var. Yani diyorsunuz ki ben kendi mahallemde Yani diyorsunuz ki ben kendi mahallemde ihtiyaç olanları yapabilirim. Su parasını kendiniz topluyorsunuz. (...) Dolayısıyla kaymakamlığa da, il özel idaresine de siz müracaat ettiğinizde size proje karşılığı nakit para veriyor. Bunları verince örnek veriyorum bir su patladı, çok örnek veriyorum belki, bir iki yevmiyesinin yarısı, yani 50 liraya yaptıracağınız bir patlak var. O zamanlar anında müdahale edip yaptırabiliyordunuz. Ama şu anda HATSU’ya haber ediyorsunuz. HATSU k epçeyle geliyor, 2 tane adam, 1 tane pikap. Yani arızanın maliyeti 50 lira. Gelen ekibin maliyeti HATSU’ya 1500 lira.’

Of course, [when it was] village, the period of Provincial Special Administration was better. It is hard to find response [from HATSU] at present. I mean, we must go to the centre Antakya for getting a service.³²

On the contrary, headman of Seferli in Altınözü initially explains how he was relieved after the villages were abolished. As headman of a village, he had to take care of all the works in the villages before the Law No 6360. At present, HATSU took over all the responsibilities of headmen about water and sewage services. While some headmen complain, others are pleased.

I'll speak for myself. I was relieved after HATSU. I speak personally, but I don't know other friends. But I was relieved. Why was I relieved? When there is a problem, they [HATSU] come and take care of it on the same day.³³

Headmen of neighbourhoods generally approve Hatay becoming a metropolitan municipality. Yet, some headmen have significant criticisms about HATSU. For example, headman of Dumlupınar in İskenderun states:

HATSU serves, nevertheless, as it is new, we can't get efficiency. It may have made good investments, but we can't get what we want.³⁴

He points out that when Hatay became a metropolitan municipality, the needs and demands of the local people increased. Yet, HATSU has not been capable of meeting these yet. Also, headman of Güzelçay says:

Before HATSU, our works were done by a single [political party] municipality, İskenderun Municipality in our neighbourhood, Güzelçay. Now, when there are different parties in the metropolitan municipality, there are problems and conflicts.³⁵

He points out the various parties in the council of metropolitan municipality. Since the members from different parties do not get along well, the services are disrupted. Likewise, headman of Yenişehir in Altınözü firstly draws attention to this issue:

It was much better before, make sure it was much better. I know well because I've been a headman in this neighbourhood for a long time. I mean, I have so much experience. Hence [becoming] metropolitan municipality certainly was not useful for Altınözü. It might be caused

³² 'Tabi eski köy İÖİ dönemi daha iyi. Şu anda muhatap bulmak zor oluyor. Yani hizmet için Antakya merkeze gitmek zorunda kalıyoruz, herhangi bir hizmet almak için.'

³³ 'Ben kendi adıma söyleyeyim. Ben rahatladım vallahi HATSU olduktan sonra. Şahsi olarak söylüyorum. Ama diğer arkadaşları bilmiyorum. Ama rahatladım ben. Niye rahatladım? Bir sorun olduğu zaman aynı gün içerisinde gelip hallediyorlar.'

³⁴ 'HATSU hizmet veriyor vermesine de, şimdi şöyle, yeni olduğu için randıman alamıyoruz. Güzel yatırımlar yapmış olabilir ama biz istenileni alamıyoruz.'

³⁵ 'HATSU'dan evvel, tek belediyeden, İskenderun belediyesinden işlerimiz yapılıyordu, bizim merkez mahallesiydi, Güzelçay mahallesinde. Şimdi büyükşehirde değişik partiler olunca, sorunlar oluyor, çekişmeler oluyor.'

by different parties: Altınözü [municipality] is from AKP, metropolitan municipality is from CHP.³⁶

On the other hand, headman of Elektirik in Antakya talks about positive developments after being metropolitan municipality:

Of course, services became different after becoming metropolitan municipality. There was unproductive work here before, it wasn't enough. This [unproductive work] was not enough to the neighbourhoods in Antakya. But after becoming a metropolitan municipality, of course, there are more tools, more staff, more machines, and so on. In other words, we are more relieved now.

³⁷

Before the Law No 6360, the major problem of Antakya was the existence of numerous small municipalities around the provincial municipality. Therefore, distribution of the resources was too dispersed and as the headmen indicate, there were inefficient service provision in these small municipalities. Most people living in Antakya think that abolishing these small municipalities was a positive outcome of the Law No 6360.

In the following part, the analysis of the interviews with headmen will be conducted under three main sections: evaluation of the water and sewage services on the basis of local units (villages, small municipalities and municipalities), on the basis of districts (Erzin, Dörtöyl, Payas, İskenderun, Arsuz, Belen, Antakya, Defne, Samandağ and other districts) and on the basis of issues.

5.6.3. Evaluation of the Water and Sewage Services on the Basis of Local Units

By evaluating observations and interviews with headmen, this part of the dissertation will analyse water and sewage services on the basis of local units: villages, small municipalities and neighbourhoods in Hatay.

³⁶ *Önceden çok daha iyiydi, emin olun çok daha iyiydi. Ben bu mahallede çok uzun dönemdir muhtar olduğum için iyi biliyorum. Yani o kadar tecrübem var bu konuda. O yüzden kesinlikle BŞB bizim Altınözü'nün işine yaramadı. Belki de şeyden olmuştur. Altınözü belediyesi başka AKP'den, BŞB de CHP'den, ondan kaynaklı.*

³⁷ *Tabi şimdi hizmetler büyükşehir olduktan sonra daha farklı oldu. Burada önceden kısır bir çalışma vardı, yeterli değildi. Bu kadar mahalleye yeterli değildi Antakya olarak. Ama büyükşehir olduktan sonra tabi daha fazla araç gereç, daha fazla personel, daha fazla iş makinaları filan derken yani çok daha rahatız şimdi.*




Figure 22 Evaluation of the water and sewage services in Hatay

5.6.3.1. Water and Sewage Services in Villages

In villages, drinking water is supplied either from the mountains as spring water or from underground water through wells. Water from the mountain is carried by gravity drainage or by electric pumps. The well water is extracted by electric pumps. The water pipes were built before the Law No 6360. Their financial resources were provided by Special Provincial Administration (SPA) or Union for Providing Services for Villages. Some villagers used their own resources. As the pipes are very old, they are unhealthy and water loss is very high. HATSU only renewed the pipes or added new pipes to the existing system.

On the other hand, there are several villages that have water scarcity problem. HATSU tries to find them surface or underground water sources. For some villages, HATSU drilled wells and built water pipes. However, these services are not enough to solve the scarcity problem. Moreover, water tanks in the villages are not clean as they are very old and have not been maintained. HATSU began to chlorinate these tanks regularly. Also, it cleaned the water tanks in a few villages.

The biggest problem in villages is installation of water meters to houses. Most of the villages had no water meters before the Law No 6360 since they were not subject to any municipal law. On the other hand, there are villages where water meters were installed by the headmen before. As electric pipes are used in these villages, headmen had to collect small water fees to cover electricity bills. Also some headmen collected water fees in order to meet the expenses of maintenance and repair services. Villages without water meters had to install water meter

after the Law No 6360. The villagers have complaints about this implementation. In fact, the problem is not about water meters. They do want to the installation of water meters by HATSU, since the villagers found the water source, brought the water reached to their villages, and built the water pipes. According to villagers, HATSU did nothing about water and sewage services in their villages, but installed the water meters, started to collect water fees, and sold the water of villagers to the villagers. Fortunately, the law allows that ‘the fee for drinking and potable water in villages is determined not to exceed 25% of the lowest rate for five years.’ (TBMM Mevzuat, 2012a). Therefore, the villagers have not paid high bills to HATSU during five years.

There is no sewage system in most of the villages. HATSU has not developed sewage or wastewater treatment projects for villages yet. It only added some pipes to remove wastewater from the villages. Also, it completed sewage projects in a few villages which were launched before the Law No 6360.

Almost all the villagers were against the abolishing villages. Most of them are more satisfied with the services of Special Provincial Administration or Union for Providing Services for Villages. Some headmen are pleased that HATSU took over all the responsibilities from their shoulders. Yet, most of the headmen thought that although HATSU took over the responsibilities, the headmen again had to engage in all services in the villages.

Almost all the headmen are satisfied with the teams of HATSU that come to repair and provide maintenance services to the villages during the day. However, they do not repair roads that HATSU teams cut for repairing the pipes. Therefore, the roads seem very bad. All the villagers complain about this problem. There is an uncoordinated relation between HATSU and the metropolitan municipality which is responsible with repairing the roads.

5.6.3.2. Water and Sewage Services in Small Municipalities

In small municipalities, drinking water is supplied either from surface water or from underground water through wells. Water from the mountain is carried by gravity drainage or by electric pumps. The well water is extracted by electric pumps. Most of the water pipes were built before the Law No 6360. Their financial resources were provided by small municipalities or General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works. As the water pipes are very old, they are unhealthy and contain asbestos. Moreover, water loss in the pipes is very high. HATSU renewed the pipes or added new pipes to the existing network. In a few small municipalities, it built new water networks.

There are small municipalities that have no sewage network and wastewater treatment plant. Before the Law No 6360, some municipalities did not build either sewage network or wastewater treatment plant. On the other hand, small municipalities with sewage system have no wastewater treatment plant. Wastewater is discharged to the receiving water body (river or sea) without any treatment. Also, the sewage pipes were very old. All these cause diseases and environmental deterioration. Nonetheless, most of the headmen were pleased with the services of small municipalities before the Law No 6360. They criticized abolishing the small municipalities. Before the Law No 6360, they could reach and convey their demands, requirements and complaints to the municipalities more easily. The relations between municipalities and local people were closer. In addition, the municipalities had better information about local problems.

The issue they widely complain about is the increased water bills. The price of unit ton of water rose from 0.50-0.60 TL to 2 TL in the second year of HATSU. Also, the graded water scheme resulted in too high bills. Moreover, high subscription fines were imposed on people. All of these created a reaction towards HATSU.

5.6.3.3. Water and Sewage Services in Neighbourhoods

In neighbourhoods, drinking water is supplied either from surface water or from underground water through wells. Water from the mountain is carried by gravity drainage or by electric pumps. The well water is extracted by electric pumps. Most of the water pipes were built before the Law No 6360. Their financial resources were provided by municipalities or General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works. As the pipes are very old, they are unhealthy and contain asbestos. Moreover, water loss in the pipes is very high. HATSU renewed the pipes or added new pipes to the existing network. In some neighbourhoods, it built new water networks (see Table 35).

Most of the neighbourhoods have a sewer network. A few of them have a wastewater treatment plant. Yet, the sewage pipes are very old. On the other side, there are also some neighbourhoods without sewage system and wastewater treatment plant. Wastewater is discharged to the receiving water body (river or sea) without treatment. All of these cause diseases and environmental deterioration. HATSU built sewage networks in few neighbourhoods. It also completed or entirely built wastewater treatment plants for few districts. While some headmen are pleased with HATSU, some are not. Before the Law No 6360, they could reach and convey their demands, requirements and complaints to the municipalities more easily. The relations between municipalities and local people were closer.

The headmen mostly complain about increased water bills. The price of one ton of water rose from 0.80-1 TL to 2 TL in the second year of HATSU. Moreover, the graded water scheme resulted in too high bills. Furthermore, high subscription fines were imposed to the people. All these create a reaction towards HATSU.

The other issue they complain about is the problem of rain water drainage. When it rains heavily, all roads in the neighbourhoods of Hatay flood. According to the Law No 2560 (the İSKİ Law), construction or operation of facilities related to the removal of rain water shall be carried out by İSKİ provided that the necessary expenditures are met by the relevant municipalities. Expenses related to the construction or operation of these facilities cannot be included in the prices (TBMM Mevzuat, 1981). Since most of the district municipalities are not inclined to pay the relevant expenditures and they cannot include these expenditures in the water bills, HATSU does nothing about rain water drainage in district municipalities. Therefore, in case of heavy rainfall, all the streets and avenues are flooded rain water.

5.6.4. Evaluation of the Water and Sewage Service on the Basis of Districts

Through evaluating observations and interviews with headmen, this part of the dissertation will analyse the water and sewage services on the basis of districts. Hence, the problems peculiar to the districts can be uncovered. In the first place, projects of HATSU which were extracted from the reports of HATSU and the existing facilities about water and sewage services will be provided in the Table 53.

Table 53 Facilities on Water and Sewage Services in Districts before and after the Law No 6360

	Water Treatment Plant		Wastewater Treatment Plant		Sewage Network		Water Network	
	Before 6360	HATSU	Before 6360	HATSU	Before 6360	HATSU	Before 6360	HATSU
Antakya	0	0	1	2	1	1	1	1
Arsuz	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
İskenderun	0	0	3	0	1	0	1	0
Erzin	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1
Dörtyol	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0
Payas	0	0	2	0	1	0	1	0
Belen	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Hassa	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Defne	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Altınözü	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Kumlu	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Kırıkhan	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
Reyhanlı	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0
Samandağ	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
Yayladağı	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	1

Source: HATSU, 2019

HATSU built wastewater treatment plants in Erzin, Serinyol (Antakya), Samandağ, Kırıkhan and Reyhanlı and Küçükalyan-Narlıca (Antakya). Building of Altınözü waste water treatment plant still continues. Thus, HATSU has finished 6 wastewater treatment plants since 2014. Before the Law No 6360, there were 7 wastewater treatment plants in İskenderun, Antakya, Payas, Dörtöy, Karayılan (İskenderun), Denizciler (İskenderun). In Belen, there was a package treatment plant that belonged to a building complex. HATSU took over these existing plants and started to operate them. Also, HATSU took over water treatment plants in Yayladağı, Sebenoba (Yayladağı) and Mızraklı. The Sebenoba and Mızraklı water treatment plants were package plants. Construction of İskenderun water treatment plant still continues. At present, there are 13 wastewater treatment plants and 3 water treatment plants in Hatay (HATSU, 2019, pp. 12-15). Also, HATSU built sewage networks in Antakya, Erzin, Dörtöy, Belen, Hassa, Altınözü, and Kırıkhan. It built water network in Antakya, Belen, Hassa, Altınözü, Kırıkhan, Smandağ, and Yayladağı. HATSU has not developed any project for Defne and Kumlu yet.

5.6.4.1. Water and Sewage Services in the District of Erzin

As the farthest district from Antakya, Erzin is located in the second region of HATSU. Erzin is an interesting case; because in spite of the fact that HATSU completed building of infrastructure and wastewater treatment plant of Erzin, local people are not satisfied with HATSU. Even though most headmen in Erzin are from CHP, they are not pleased with the metropolitan municipality. For example, the first words of a headman are: ‘No, no, there is no service of metropolitan municipality in Erzin I mean, you see while coming here. Above all, there is no service of it in our Mahmutlu neighbourhood. No, no, no!’³⁸ Nonetheless, HATSU has provided services in Erzin.

The construction of water network in the centre of Erzin was launched by Erzin Municipality before the Law No 6360. HATSU completed the water network in 2018. It added new water pipes to the old ones; and extracted water from the wells. According to the headmen in Erzin, local people in Erzin are not content with the well water. They had used only natural spring water before this construction. At present, both natural and well water is mixed in old and new water pipes. People do not like the taste of the well water and believe that what they consume

³⁸ ‘Yok, yok. Erzin’e hiçbir hizmet yapmıyor büyükşehir. Yani sen görüyorsundur buraya gelip giderken. Şu kadar bir hizmeti yok. Hele bizim Mahmutlu mahallesine yok yani. Hiç yok, hiç yok, hiç yok!’

is not healthy water. Also, the headmen claim that HATSU built infrastructure carelessly and negligently. These are some reasons for negative opinions about HATSU.

The construction of sewage network in the centre of Erzin was also launched by Erzin Municipality before the Law No 6360 and HATSU completed it in 2015. According to the headman of Hürriyet neighbourhood, 50% of the subscribers in Erzin are connected to the sewage network. 50% of them still use septic tanks. These subscribers do not want to pay connection fees. The problem is that HATSU initially collected wastewater fee from all subscribers. It should not collect it from subscribers who did not connect to sewage network. On the other hand, the pipes with small diameter frequently get congested and cause unpleasant odours and overflows. Also, when it rains heavily, flood becomes a big problem. Moreover, while the roads were building, the roadside runnels were covered with concrete. Therefore, rain water floods over the roads. The troubled sewage network and rain water drainage negatively effect headmen's opinions about HATSU.

The main reason of dissatisfaction with HATSU is the unrepaired roads in Erzin. After HATSU finished construction of infrastructure, metropolitan municipality has not yet repaired the broken roads. All the headmen point out this problem. As in the words of headman of the Bahçelievler neighbourhood:

In any case, each pain has a pleasure. We were in pain and looking forward to pleasure but all the pains felt here are all about roads. Of course, HATSU had to break the roads. Sewage network was built, water network was built. In somewhere, electrical wires were installed under the ground. There are lots of project put into practice over the roads. At that time, Erzin was transformed into construction site. In each neighbourhood, there was a work. These are good works. However, if metropolitan municipality repaired the roads broken by HATSU after the works step by step, we would not be facing this problem. It has not started to repair the roads yet. Why did this happen? It happened due to first period of metropolitan municipality and its inexperience to a degree. However, if metropolitan municipality worked, if it finished the roads, nobody would complain.³⁹

The construction of wastewater treatment plant in Erzin was launched by Provincial Bank before the Law No 6360 and HATSU completed it in 2017. According to headmen, site selection of the plant was not rational. Because it is very close to the settlement areas, local people are disturbed with its offensive odours. Moreover, some headmen think that the

³⁹ 'Yani illaki her cefanın bir sefası vardır. Biz cefayı çektik, sefasını bekliyoruz ama burada çekilen cefalar aslında hep yolla alakalı. BŞB eğer ki HATSU'nun bozduğu yolları, haklı olarak da bozmak zorunda. Kanalizasyon geçti, içme suyu şebekesi geçti. Bir kısım yerlerde elektrik yerin altına alındı. Üst üste bir kaç proje geçirdi. O zaman Erzin şantiye alanına dönmüştü. Her mahallede bir çalışma vardı. Bunlar güzel şeyler fakat bu çalışmalar bittikten sonra peyderpey arkadan yavaş yavaş yolları devam etmiş olsalardı bu problem yaşanmazdı. Yollara hiç el değdirmediler. Peki bu neden oldu? Biraz da büyükşehir belediyesinin ilk dönemi olduğundan, deneyimsizliğinden geldi. Ama işte BŞB çalışsa, yolları bitirmiş olsalardı, kimse hiçbir şey demezdi.'

wastewater treatment plant was not operated regularly. This negatively affects headmen's opinions about HATSU. The headman of Hürriyet neighbourhood states:

Rain water flows to the [wastewater] treatment plant. This time, the plant is overloaded. They shut down the plant for 3 months in case it disrupts the treatment and leave it to the neighbourhood. Those living in this neighbourhood, the owners of the garden and the citizens sitting in the garden remain in the filth. There's such a problem here.⁴⁰

Some headmen are not pleased with the personnel of HATSU since they do not work efficiently. There are numerous personnel, but they are not qualified. The headmen cannot find respondent in HATSU in order to convey their demands, requirements or complaints. For the repairs, the HATSU teams come from İskenderun. For the large scale repairs, the teams come from Antakya. Since İskenderun and Antakya are far from Erzin, the headmen think that this is not an efficient practice. Long distances cause waste of resource and time. Although they come from Antakya in the morning and return in the evening, the team can work in Erzin only 3-4 hours in a day. As in the expressions of the headman of Cumhuriyet neighbourhood:

It is irrational to provide service in such a large area. Now consider a breakdown here. The [HATSU] teams and vehicles come from Antakya. In the morning, these teams will leave from Antakya at 8 o'clock, they will be here by 11 o'clock. They will give a break for lunch after 1 hour. They will return back [to Antakya] by 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The [expenditures of] road and teams are more expensive. This is more costly. (...) They cannot finish the work in the same day. They have to go and come back again. So that's why I say it's irrational.⁴¹

According to the headmen, local people in Erzin did not want Hatay to become a metropolitan municipality due to the long distance and cultural differences between Erzin and Antakya. They want Erzin to be attached to the province of Osmaniye, as it is closer than Antakya. The headman of Hürriyet explains why they do not want to metropolitan municipality:

No, Hatay is not ready for being a metropolitan municipality. We have not wanted to Hatay become a metropolitan municipality all along. The first [reason] is its infrastructure has not been set up yet. The second [reason] is Erzin is far away [from the centre]. The distance is 110 kilometres. There is no communication with each other. If there is, it will be hard to go there and come back here. As headmen we wanted to Erzin to be a district of Osmaniye. At least, Osmaniye is 10 km away from here. We could have completed our institutional works more easily. However, it did not happen. Perhaps it was best that İskenderun was a province. We would get

⁴⁰ 'Yağmur suyu direk arıtmaya giriyor. Bu sefer de arıtmaya fazla yük. Arıtmayı da bozar diye 3 ay kapatıyorlar tesisi, aşağıya mahalleye bırakıyorlar. O mahallede oturanlar, bahçe sahipleri ve bahçede oturan vatandaşlar pisliğin içinde kalıyorlar. Burada böyle bir sorun var.'

⁴¹ 'Böyle büyük bir alanda hizmet yapmak mantık dışı zaten. Şimdi düşünün bir arıza oldu burada. Ekipler ve araçlar Antakya'dan gelecek. Sabah bu ekipler, Antakya'dan 8'de çıksalar, 11'e doğru ancak burada olurlar. 1 saat sonra bunlar öğle arası verecek. Ha şöyle, ha böyle derken de öğleden sonra 3 olmadan kalkıp gidecekler. Böyle olunca, bir yol mazot parası daha pahalı. Bunların yolluk yevmiyesi, şuyu buyu derken çok daha maliyetli oluyor. (...) Aynen, aynı gün işi bitiremedikleri çok oluyor. Tekrar git gel yapmaları gerekiyor. Yani bundan dolayı mantık dışı diyorum ben.'

rid of this problem totally. (...) The culture of Erzin and the culture of districts after Belen don't match each other. We are different in terms of social, economic and cultural aspects.⁴²

They also think that there is discrimination between 'this side and other side of mountain' in the service provision. They claim that metropolitan municipality and HATSU provides more and effective services to the first region. They suppose that they are the 'stepchild' of metropolitan municipality. The reason is mostly thought to be long distances and inability to integrate physically and culturally. On the other hand, several headmen in Erzin do not like the existing mayor of Erzin Municipality who is from AKP. They think that he is a passive mayor and could not get in contact with metropolitan municipality and work with them in a coordinated way.

Although they are not pleased with the mayors of the Erzin Municipality, most of the headmen in Erzin prefer the district municipality to provide water and sewage services rather than HATSU. They want these services to be provided by the closest authority. As in the words of the headman of the Yeni neighbourhood:

If the district municipality provided [water and sewage services], it would be wonderful. It would be much better, if it [authority] was here. We've already had our works done by the district municipality as a favour. Even if it they are not authorized, we say that let's pass gravel, they pass it; we say that let's pave asphalt, they pave it. I wish all these services were assigned to the district municipalities, these services would be better with a local municipality. Oh, if there is such authority...⁴³

In two villages (Turunçlu and Yeşiltepe), HATSU changed their water resources. In three villages (Turunçlu, Başlamış ve Kızlarçayı) HATSU completed sewage networks which were launched before the Law No 6360. Although most of the houses have not been connected to the networks, HATSU collected wastewater fees from all the houses. As the diameter of sewage pipes are too small, they frequently get congested. These negatively affect headmen's opinions about HATSU.

⁴² 'Yok değildi. Biz zaten en başından beri Hatay'ın BŞB olmasını istemedik. [Nedenleri] Birincisi altyapı olarak hazır değildi henüz. İkincisi biz Erzin olarak çok uzak kalıyoruz mesela. Olmaz yani. 110 km yol. Hiçbir iletişimimiz olmuyor. Olsa da çok zorlanıyoruz gidip gelmeye. Biz vaktinde muhtarlar olarak da Erzin'in Osmaniye'ye bağlanmasını istemiştik. En azından 10 km'lik yol, kurumsal işlerimizi daha rahat hallederiz diye ama o da kaldı. Belki de en iyisi İskenderun'un il olmasıydı. Toptan kurtulurduk bu meseleden. (...). Şimdi bu tarafın kültürü ve Belen'den sonrasının kültürü bize uymuyor. Ama bu bölgenin insanı olsun ekonomisi kültürü olsun biz daha farklıyız.'

⁴³ 'Vallahi ilçe belediyesi verseydi 10 numara 5 yıldız olurdu. Burada olsaydı, çok daha iyi olurdu. Biz zaten çoğu işimizi belediyeye burada rica minnet yaptırıyoruz. Kendilerinin işi olmasa bile, diyoruz ki şuraya biraz kum dökelim, döküyorlar, asfalt dökelim, döküyorlar. Bu işleri komple Erzin ilçe belediyesine verseler, yerel belediye ile bu işler daha iyi olur. Öyle bir yetki olsa ah...'

5.6.4.2. Water and Sewage Services in the District of Payas

The district of Payas was established after the Law No 6360 by including the villages of Dörtöl. It is very close to the industrial regions. Headmen in Payas are not pleased with HATSU. There was an old and unhealthy water network in Payas. The water loss in the pipes is very high. Also, the pipes frequently burst that result in water cut. Furthermore, all the sewage networks in Payas, including two villages (Kozludere and Sincan) were built before the Law No 6360. The pipes of old sewage network are insufficient to meet the needs of the increasing population in Payas. As the diameter of the pipes are very small, overflows from the pipes cause problems.

The major trouble in Payas is that the mayor of Payas Municipality (AKP) and the mayor of metropolitan municipality (CHP) do not get along with each other. This is a personal problem as much as a political one. According to headmen, the mayor of metropolitan municipality Lütfü Savaş and HATSU do not provide service in Payas. This negatively affects headmen's opinions about HATSU. As the headman of the Karacami neighbourhood expresses:

Of course, we cannot not receive services due to political reasons and conflicts of the mayor of Payas and the mayor of metropolitan municipality. We go to [the district or metropolitan municipality] and say let's do this. They ask: 'Are we authorized?' The others say: 'We are not authorized.' We are piggy in the middle. I mean, we are torn between these two municipalities. Then we come up against citizen here.⁴⁴

The headman of the Karşı Neighbourhood also points to same problem in Payas:

Nothing was done at Payas. There's a duality in Payas. The mayor of Payas and the mayor of metropolitan municipality don't get along well with each other. In the middle, we get the beating. One says, 'If you're there, I won't make you do anything here'. Other says, 'I won't make you do anything there'. Neither our roads, nor our water, we don't receive our service. We speak for the citizen.⁴⁵

The major problem in Payas is that water is cut off frequently. The headman of the Kürtül neighbourhood mentions this problem: 'HATSU has made our mother cry! [We've suffered a lot] Our ready-made water, which was not cut even once a week, at present it is cut every day.

⁴⁴ 'Tabi ki siyasi nedenler; buranın belediye başkanı ile büyükşehir başkanı ikisinin uyuşmazlığından dolayı buraya yeterince hizmet alamıyoruz biz. Gidiyoruz diyoruz ki şunu yapalım. O diyor ki bize mi ait? Bu diyor ki bize değil. Biz ikisinin arasında kaldık şimdi. Yani iki belediyenin arasında kaldık. Biz de vatandaşla burada karşı karşıya kalıyoruz.'

⁴⁵ 'Payas'ta hiçbir şey yapılmadı. Payas'ta bir ikililik var. Payas belediye başkanı BŞB başkanı ile anlaşamıyor. Arada dayığı biz yiyoruz. O diyor madem sen oradasın, ben sana bir şey yaptırmam. O buraya aynı şekilde. Ne yollarımız, ne suyumuz, ne hizmeti görmüyoruz. Vatandaş adına konuşuyoruz biz.'

HATSU has made our mother cry!’ Some headmen think that the water is cut, when the mayors fight each other. Intentionally HATSU cut water or the team do not repair the punctures in pipes. Also, the headmen in Payas blame the coordinator of HATSU who is responsible for Payas, Dört Yol and Erzin. They state that he does not work carefully and efficiently. For the headmen, the employees of HATSU do not know the local characteristics and the old system of water and sewage services. The headman of the Cumhuriyet Neighbourhood mention about the inefficient works of HATSU:

They [the HATSU teams] don't know here. For example, there is a [pipe] puncture in somewhere. They can't even target where to dig. If you don't know how to target, if you don't know the valve, where are you going to blow up; where are you going to fix? You're going to cut off that water and work. They work without cutting the water. They can't provide water for a week. No water coming from the dynamos. What happens when you don't flood the dynamos? It causes water cut for three days. For example, somewhere in my neighbourhood, the water [pipe] was broke out. There was no repair. It was covered up although it was not repaired. The water was given to the canal. They're looking for a solution. Since they can't give water for a week, the water is wasted. There is no such an understanding! There is no such a solution! Let's not call them politics, but this is something real.⁴⁶

The headman adds that the previous teams of the municipality were better than HATSU team. Most of the headmen in Payas are not satisfied with HATSU. They think that water and wastewater services should be handled by the district municipality.

5.6.4.3. Water and Sewage Services in the District of Dört Yol

In the centre of Dört Yol, there were water network, sewage network and treatment plant built before the Law No 6360. There are water networks in the small municipalities of Dört Yol, but only a few of them have sewage network. The small municipalities and villages do not benefit from the wastewater treatment plant. Most of the headmen in Dört Yol are not satisfied with HATSU. The rain water drainage is the major problem in Dört Yol. The pipes of both water and sewage networks are very old and unhealthy. Also some headmen from small municipalities complain that the rain water flows into drinking water.

The villages of Dört Yol (Çat, Kağılı and Konaklı) are mountain villages and a terrorism ban has been imposed to them, which means except from summers, only a few villagers stay in the

⁴⁶ ‘Burayı bilmedikleri gibi bir yerde mesela patlak oluyor. Nereyi kazacaklarını bile hedefleyemiyorlar. Hedeflemeyi bilmezsen, vanayı bilmezsen, nereyi patlatacağın, nereyi onaracağın? O suyu kesip çalışma yapacağın mesela. Suyu kesmeden çalışma yapıyorlar. Bir hafta su veremiyorlar. Dinamolardan su gelmiyor. Dinamolardan su basmayınca ne olacak? 3 gün su kesimine sebep oluyor. Mesela benim mahallemde bir yerde oranın suyu patlak. Oranın tamirati yapılmadı. Yapılmadığı gibi üstü kapandı. Kanala verildi. Çözüm noktasını arıyorlar. Bir hafta su veremeyiz diye, o su boşa gidiyor. Yani böyle bir anlayış olmaz! Böyle bir çözüm olmaz! Biz kendilerine tamam kesinlikle siyaset manasında demeyelim ama gerçek olan bir şey bu.’

villages. Therefore, HATSU does not provide services there. The headmen of villages complain about HATSU. The headman of the Kapılı village states:

[The metropolitan municipality] provide services to the highlands of Dörtol. They pave asphalt on the roads of highlands, although they are highland. We're saying "Here is a village. The Çat and Kapılı villages were established in 1923. Why isn't the service provided to these villages? They answered as 'If you were us, would you serve to the place with three people, or serve to the place with thousands of people?'⁴⁷

The headman of Çatköy summarizes the issue well: 'No service! We are mountain village. They [HATSU] couldn't leave city to get to the village.'⁴⁸

None of the headmen of the small municipalities in Dörtol are satisfied with metropolitan municipality. They think that small municipalities were better in providing services and establishing closer relations. Most of the headmen in Dörtol are not pleased with HATSU. According to these headmen, water and wastewater services should be delivered by district municipality.

5.6.4.4. Water and Sewage Services the District of İskenderun

In the centre of İskenderun, there were water network, sewage network and treatment plant before the Law No 6360. The major problem in the centre of İskenderun is the drainage of rain water. Although it doesn't taste very good, many people drink tap water. Dispenser size water is widely used in İskenderun. Nonetheless, the headmen of neighbourhoods are satisfied with HATSU. The headman of Dumlupınar neighbourhood evaluates HATSU hopefully: 'Perhaps it [HATSU] will be very good going forward. Of course, there might be troubles now as it has just been established. However, I'm sure that it will be good in the future.'⁴⁹ This positively affects headmen's opinions about HATSU.

The neighbourhoods located on the hills of İskenderun are not serviced by the sewage network or the wastewater treatment plant. These neighbourhoods are squatter areas and mostly accommodate immigrant population. Nonetheless, most of them are satisfied with HATSU.

⁴⁷ 'Dörtol'a bağlı yaylalıklar. Buralara hizmet gidiyor. Sıcak asfalt gidiyor. Normal hizmet gidiyor, buralar yaylalık olmasına rağmen. Diyoruz ki arkadaş burası köy, 1923'de kurulmuş, Çat, Kapılı köyleri. Niçin buraya hizmet gelmiyor? Dedikleri sadece şu: Ya siz olsanız, 3 kişilik yere mi hizmet edersiniz, bin kişilik yere mi hizmet edersiniz? Aldığımız cevap bu.

⁴⁸ 'Yok ne hizmeti. Dağ köyüyüz biz. Şehirden çıkamadılar ki köye varsınlar.'

⁴⁹ 'Belki ileriye dönük çok iyi olacak. Ama şimdilik yeni kurulduğu için tabi ki aksilikler olacak ama ileri tarihte iyi olacağına eminim.'

On the other hand, most of the headmen in villages are not pleased with HATSU. They do not approve abolishing the villages. They prefer Special Provincial Administration for providing water and sewage services. The headman of the Akçay village explains why he does not want metropolitan municipality:

It was too bad, too bad. It wasn't good that Hatay became a metropolitan municipality. We were much better during the Special Provincial Administration period. I mean, our village should have remained as a village. This was the worst aspect of the metropolitan municipality law. In my village, people are still labouring in animal husbandry. But the law says 'No, animal husbandry is over'. What are these people going to do? You say, on the one hand, I encourage animal husbandry, on the other hand you say you cannot labour in animal husbandry. It's not known who gets the little money that you give? Likewise, it's not known who is in charge for irrigation. You go to the metropolitan municipality, they say, 'No we aren't'. You go to State Hydraulic Work, they say, 'No we aren't'. We also didn't understand, who, what, not in that, not in this. All services are entangled like this. They left no jurisdiction in the council of district municipality. When we want to make our road built, even that becomes a problem. It wasn't like that before! We knew what was what during the Special Provincial Administration period.⁵⁰

The small municipalities of İskenderun had no financial and technical difficulties before the Law No 6360. These small municipalities are near the industrial region. Most of them had their infrastructure construction before. There are wastewater treatment plants in Denizciler and Karayılan. Most of the headmen of them prefer the small municipalities to provide water and sewage services.

5.6.4.5. Water and Sewage Services in the District of Arsuz

Although Arsuz is located very close to Antakya geographically, the driving distance between these two cities is quite long. The district of Arsuz was established after the Law No 6360 by merging small municipalities of İskenderun. As a coastal city, Arsuz is one of the prominent touristic cities of Hatay. As it also accommodates summer house vacationists during summers, the population of Arsuz doubles or triples in size. There are both negative and positive opinions about HATSU in Arsuz. The satisfied headmen are mostly from the coastline neighbourhoods. The degree of satisfaction decreases as one moves towards the mountain side. The headmen in the mountain side think that HATSU provide more services to the coastline neighbourhoods. There is also an ethnic and political difference between coast and mountain

⁵⁰ 'Çok kötü oldu, çok kötü. BŞB olması hiç iyi olmadı. Özel İdare dönemi çok daha iyiydik biz. Köy olarak kalmalıydık yani. büyükşehir yasasının en kötü yönü de bu oldu. Daha benim köyümde insanlar hayvancılıkla uğraşıyor. Ama yasa diyor ki hayır, hayvancılık bitti. Ne yapacak bu insanlar peki? Sen bir yandan hayvancılığa teşvik veriyorum diyorsun, diğer yandan hayvancılık yapamazsın diyorsun. Verdiğin birkaç kuruş acaba kimin eline geçiyor, belli değil. Aynı şekilde, sulama kimin elinde bilinmiyor. Büyükşehir gidiyorsun, hayır bende değil diyor, DSİ'ye gidiyorsun, hayır bende değil diyor. Biz de anlamadık vallahi, ne kimde, onda değil, bunda değil. Bütün hizmetler böyle karışmış durumda ablam. İlçe belediyesinde hiçbir yetki bırakmamışlar. Bir yolumuzu yaptıracağız, onda bile sorun oluyor. Önceden böyle bu kadar değildi yahu! Özel İdare'deyken neyin ne olduğunu bilirdik.'

sides. In the coastline, the population is composed mostly of Alevi people who support CHP. The headmen in the mountain side probably point out to this difference as a reason for discrimination in service provision.

There are water networks in Arsuz and in the small municipalities. However, there is no sewage network and wastewater treatment plant in Arsuz. Only some summer housing estates have their own package wastewater treatment plants. There are septic tanks near the houses. The HATSU teams come to withdraw wastewater when it is full and they charge a fee in return. HATSU have started to build the sewage network in Arsuz and completed some parts of it in the Karaağaç neighbourhood. The major problem in Arsuz is the lack of sewage network resulting in the possibility of wastewater leaking to drinking water. The headman of the Pirinçlik village expresses:

You sentenced people to well water, to well water. Then you have to remove the septic tank as infrastructure. The soil drains it [wastewater] but you can't convince people that groundwater is clean without solving the septic problem. Either you need protection, or you can't hit the bore and drink clean water while I have septic tank. This is soil, it will absorb the wastewater.⁵¹

Likewise, the headman of the Hüyük village refers to the same problem:

It's okay, HATSU comes here and empties it [sewage] with vacuum truck. Yet, what about the sewage leaking into the soil? It will eventually flow into drinking water. For example, it inevitably flows into artesian well. There is no problem here since drinking water comes from mountain. There are other villages [whose water is drawn from well] where the sewage absolutely leaks to the soil. We wish the sewage network was built, but we might wait for it.⁵²

Most of the villagers in Arsuz complain about the installation of water meters. The villagers do not want to pay for their water. The headman of Hüyük explains this issue well: 'Suppose that you grow a fruit tree. I sow, I grow; somebody else eats its fruit.'⁵³ This negatively affects headmen's opinions about HATSU.

⁵¹ 'Kuyu suyuna mahkum etmişsiniz insanları, kuyu sularına. O zaman altyapı dediğimiz fosseptik olayını ortadan kaldırmanız gerekiyor. Toprak süzer ama fosseptik olayını çözmeden yeraltı sularının temiz olduğuna ikna edemezsiniz insanları. Ya koruman lazım ya da benim fosseptiğim varken sen aşağıda sondaj vurup temiz su içemezsin. Toprak bu emecek suyu.'

⁵² 'Tamam HATSU gelip vidanjörle çekiyor ama toprağa verilen şey ne olacak? Eninde sonunda içme suyuna karışacak. Artezyene mesela geçiyor, ister istemez geçiyor. Burada içme suyu dağdan geldiği için bir sıkıntı yok ama bu su bir tek burada durmuyor ki, diğer köyler var, sızıyor mutlaka. Keşke kanalizasyon da yapılırsa ama onu biraz daha bekleyeceğiz galiba.'

⁵³ Sen farz et ki bir meyve ağacını yetiştiriyorsun. Ben ekiyorum, yetiştiriyorum, meyvesini başkası yiyor.

The headman of Konacık states that he was stuck in a difficult situation after the installation of water meters.

[The water meters] were installed and a promise was given to us. We said, ‘Ok, we will get the water meters to install. Let’s drink that water. Subscribe us. They said, we will provide services to you in a best way. But what a pity, what a pity! They’ve recently called us. I said, ‘I wish I hadn’t got to install.’ I said to my people, ‘It was better if we got punished.’⁵⁴

The villagers expected that HATSU will provide better services if water meters are installed. However, they were disappointed since HATSU did not provide the service they hoped for. This also negatively affects headmen’s opinions about HATSU.

5.6.4.6. Water and Sewage Services in the District of Belen

As a mountain settlement, Belen is a big gateway connecting two regions of HATSU. In Belen’s neighbourhoods, there are water networks but there was no a sewage network before. HATSU began the renewal of the water network in the Sarımazı neighbourhood in 2014. However, the contractor aborted the work and it remains uncompleted.⁵⁵ The sewage network was made a contracted out before the Law No 6360 and HATSU assigned the work. However, it has not been completed yet. These negatively affect headmen’s opinions about HATSU.

Nonetheless, the headmen in Belen are very satisfied with HATSU and the metropolitan municipality. Particularly, the headmen of villages in Belen become more comfortable about water and sewage services after the Law No 6360. The headman of the Atik village expresses his pleasure with the HATSU team: ‘At present, I am more satisfied. Technology is better now, the employees are more qualified’⁵⁶. Likewise, the headman of the Kıcı village explains why the HATSU team is better: ‘Of course, it was better for headmen. At least they [the HATSU teams] come with all kinds of crews, vehicles, employees and they repair the

⁵⁴ ‘Takıldı ve bize söz verildi. Biz dedik tamam saatleri taktıracağız. Saatli bir su içelim dedik. Aboneliğinizi yapın. Aboneliğiniz yapıldıktan sonra size en güzel şekilde hizmetleri vereceğiz dediler. Ama maalesef, maalesef. Geçen de aradılar. Ben dedim ki keşke taktırmasaydım. Ceza yesek daha iyiydi dedim halkıma.’

⁵⁵ A local news referred to this case: ‘The drinking water network started by the Hatay Metropolitan Municipality in the Sarımazı neighbourhood was awarded to the tenderer of the company, who was awarded the tender for drinking water network works, while the work was tendered to another company, but when the firm carried out the works at a fast pace, Sarımazı residents became rebellious. Source: <http://www.iskenderun.org/haber/belen-sarimazida-yol-dereye-dondu-h36237.html>

⁵⁶ ‘Vallahi yok, ben şimdi daha memnunum. Teknoloji şimdi daha iyi, çalışanlar daha yetkili.’

breakdown. We don't have to deal with these.'⁵⁷ In a similar vein, the headman of the Derebahçe neighbourhood states: 'The HATSU teams are young, they're working. They have three or four vehicles. You call the sewer department and they'll come and take care of [the problem]. They're trying to do whatever they can.'⁵⁸ These are positive remarks for HATSU. Yet, it should be noted that these teams are subcontractors working for HATSU. It is widely claimed in Hatay that as they get paid per work, they do their job well.

The headman of Benlidere compares HATSU with the previous authorities. He concludes that HATSU is better than the previous ones:

We couldn't receive any services before the Law No 6360. We could have received, only if the district governors have wanted or Special Provincial Administration has projected the proposals. However, it is not so now. Since politics comes forward, since it [HATSU] will want to come and ask for votes after 5 years, it has to do. Service becomes quality. There's no competition in the previous [authorities], and you would have been grateful if they have done. Yet, this is not so now. It [HATSU] will have to account for it 5 years later.⁵⁹

For the headman, since the local authorities are elected, they consider the next local election; as a result local authorities do their jobs more carefully.

5.6.4.7. Water and Sewage Services in the District of Antakya

As the administration of metropolitan municipality and HATSU are in Antakya, there should not be a problem about water and sewage services in the city centre. The headmen in Antakya's neighbourhoods are satisfied with HATSU. The headman of the Akeveler neighbourhood speaks highly of the works of Lütfü Savaş:

The services provided for the infrastructures are the most invisible works of the mayors. This man [Lütfü Savaş] did his best. I mean, he is living end. (...) If he bribed, it would be very different. And this man has such a problem. AKP, for example, has 50 members in the council [of metropolitan municipality]. CHP has 25 members in the council. The man makes a motion,

⁵⁷ 'Muhtarlar açısından tabi ki daha iyi oldu. En azından gelip onlar her türlü ekibiyle, aracıyla, elemanıyla gelip arızayı yapıp gidiyorlar. Bizim bunlarla uğraşmamıza gerek kalmadı.'

⁵⁸ 'Ama HATSU'nun ekipleri genç, çalışıyorlar. Üç dört tane arabaları var. Kanalizasyonu ara hemen gelip bakıyorlar. Ellerinden ne geliyorsa yapmaya çalışıyorlar.'

⁵⁹ 'Büyükşehirden önce hiç hizmet alamıyorduk. Kaymakamlar isterse ya da İÖİ Antakya'da programı projeyi öne sürer de projelendirirse oluyordu. Ama şimdi öyle değil. Siyaset öne çıktığı için, 5 sene sonra gelip oy isteyeceği için yapmak zorunda. Hizmette kalite oluyor. En azından ötekinde rekabet olmuyor, yapıtıysa şükrediyorsun. Ama bunda öyle olmuyor. 5 sene sonra vatandaşın hepsine hesabını verecek.'

for example he says, ‘Let’s decrease the price of water’. That 50 members do not decrease it. Then they go out and say, ‘Hah, they didn’t decrease [the price of water]’.⁶⁰

Likewise, according to the headman of the Esentepe neighbourhood, HATSU has achieved an extremely difficult goal.

There's a 50% increase in the population. Of course drinking water, sewage network will not be enough to this population. Now, if you look at HATSU, it is not easy for it to take care for this population at once. Even bringing it to these levels is not really easy. I mean it's not really easy to achieve this.⁶¹

In the centre of Antakya, HATSU installed new water, sewage and rain water pipes. It built a wastewater treatment plant in Serinyol. Also, it continues the construction of a wastewater treatment plant in Küçükdalyan-Narlıca. These were small municipalities before. These are positive remarks for HATSU. However, some headmen in the small municipalities and villages are not satisfied with HATSU. The headman of Serinyol prefers the small municipality in water and sewage services.

Of course, our small municipality was better. When there was a failure in the sewage network, our bucket was ready. But today if you call HATSU, it will come tomorrow. Of course it was better when our municipality was in charge. (...) Personally I would prefer our local municipality. Relationships were more comfortable. Our problems belonged only to us and were intervened immediately. Now if you go to the metropolitan municipality, who will you find and whom will you talk about your trouble? It's more difficult for us.⁶²

The headman of the Maraşboğazı village claims that the village budget was used more effectively. The expenditures of HATSU are much higher and irrational.

There were [water meters] before. The headman employed a guard and paid the guard a monthly salary of five hundred lira, approximately. Let’s say that he collected three thousand lira through calculating the water use. The headman met both the salary of guard and the costs of repair the breakdowns, burst, etc. [in the pipes]. And a budget is formed [from that collected money]. All

⁶⁰ ‘Belediye başkanlarının en yapılmayan, en gözle görülmeyen şeyler yer altına yapılan hizmetler gözüküyor. Bu adam elinden geleni yaptı ablacım. Çok dört dörtlük bir insan yani. (...) Çünkü hanımefendi yemiş olsaydı, çok başka olurdu. Bir de şöyle bir durumu var bu adamın. AKP'nin burada mesela 50 tane meclis üyesi var. CHP'nin 25 tane meclis üyesi var. Adam önerge veriyor mesela, su indirilsin diyor. O 50 tanesi indirmiyor. Ondan sonra dışarı çıkıp diyorlar ki, hah indirmedim ki diyorlar.’

⁶¹ ‘Nüfusta %50 artış var. Bu nüfusa tabi ki içme suyu, kanalizasyon yetmeyecek. Şimdi HATSU'ya da bakacak olursanız, bir anda bu kadar nüfusa bakıyor olması kolay değil. Bunu bu seviyelere bile getirmek gerçekten kolay bir şey değil. Yani bunu başarmak gerçekten kolay bir şey değil.’

⁶² ‘Tabi ki bizim belediye olduğunda daha iyiydi. Kanalizasyon arızası olduğu zaman kepçemiz yanıımızdaydı. Ama bugün HATSU'ya telefon açacaksın yarın gelecek ancak. Tabi ki bizim belediye olduğunda daha iyiydi. (...) Şahsen ben bizim yerel belediyeyi tercih ederdim. İlişkiler daha rahattı. Sorunlarımız sadece bize aitti ve hemen müdahale ediliyordu. Şimdi büyükşehre gitsen kimi bulacaksın, derdini anlatacaksın? Daha zor oldu bizim için.’

the expenses for the village were taken from that budget. This was more simple and cost free. At present, in case a burst, [the HATSU team] comes to Maraşboğazı from Antakya 20-25 km away. It burns such much diesel to install a piece for example. 3-4 employees come, install and turn back. I mean cost of this is higher. It is irrational.⁶³

On the other hand, the neighbourhoods whose wastewater is not connected to a treatment plant have a wastewater removal problem. Since the rivers are used as the wastewater receiving water body, there are risks for the environment and human health. These are negative scores for HATSU.

5.6.4.8. Water and Sewage Services in the District of Defne

The Defne district was established after the Law No 6360 through including a few neighbourhoods of Antakya, and the small municipalities and villages of Samandağ. There are old and unhealthy water and sewage networks in Defne. The infrastructure is inadequate to meet the needs of the increasing population. The headman of the Tavla neighbourhood mentions an issue peculiar to Defne.

Our problem in Defne is different. Defne has just been established. Hatay metropolitan municipality has just been established. Defne was established along with it. They created a pseudo-district. Of course, the services of this district will be hindered.⁶⁴

In Defne, there are headmen both pleased and displeased with HATSU. Since there is no wastewater treatment plant, wastewater is given to the rivers. This causes risks for the environment and human health. The headman of Güneysöğüt states: ‘There are septic tanks. They cause overflows everywhere. Sewage flows through the village. There might be also serious illnesses.’⁶⁵ Also, the headman of Harbiye talks about the leakage of sewage and wastewater of stone quarry to drinking water. He emphasizes that HATSU has not find a solution to the drinking water pollution.

⁶³ ‘Var ablam var. Daha önce de vardı. Muhtarlık bir bekçi tutardı. Beş yüz milyon, atıyorum, o zaman bir aylık verirdi. Üç bin lira para toplanırdı diyelim. Bunun sayaçları yazıp toplayan bekçi vardı. Hem onun maaşı çıkardı. Hem patlakları, çatlakları, kepçe çağırır yaptırırdı. Ve bir bütçe de oluşurdu. Köye artık ne gerekirse, yenilir, içilir, misafir şu, bu gibi harcamalar da oradan yapılırdı. Ve daha basit, daha masrafsız. Şimdi bir patlak oluyor. Maraşboğazı’na 20-25 km’de Antakya’dan gelinir. Oradan bir kamyon, bir kepçe, bir tane dayarmofon takacak mesela, bu kadar mazot yarıyor. Geliyor 3-4 tane işçi, Onu takip gidiyor. Yani bunun maliyeti daha fazla. Mantıksız yani.’

⁶⁴ ‘Şimdi bizim sıkıntımız ayrı, Defneli olarak. Şimdi Defne yeni kuruldu. Hatay BŞB yeni kuruldu. Defne onunla birlikte kuruldu, havadan bir ilçe yarattılar. Bunun hizmeti elbette aksayacak.’

⁶⁵ ‘Fosseptik çukurlar var. Her tarafa taşma yapıyor. Lağım suları köyde akıyor. Ciddi hastalıklar da olabilir.’

Believe me, sewage water is mixed into Harbiye water. The septic tanks are full and causing overflows. In fact we drink sewage water as if it is - Harbiye water. Next to [Harbiye water], there is a stone quarry. They're extracting stones with dynamite. This destroys the water very much. I've been fighting against this for four years. Everyone in Harbiye neighbourhood complain about this situation. We didn't get any results.⁶⁶

One of the drinking water sources in Antakya and Defne are the Harbiye water. The headman of Harbiye adds that:

Of course, the water networks are old. However, our real trouble is that our water is distributed and it contaminates too much. Think that there is water cut two or three times in a week in a place like Harbiye where water springs from everywhere. That's to say, what happened so that our water has become like this for two or three years?⁶⁷

It is a negative mark for HATSU that an important water source is contaminated and the problem is left unsolved. On the other hand, some neighbourhoods of Defne and some neighbourhoods of Samandağ in Karaçay region, have a water scarcity problem. Their water sources have dried up due to climate change. HATSU has not developed an effective project to solve water scarcity problem of these neighbourhoods. This negatively affects the headmen's opinion about HATSU.

5.6.4.9. Water and Sewage Services in the District of Samandağ

There are old and unhealthy water and sewage networks in Samandağ. HATSU has just finished construction of the wastewater treatment plant. In Samandağ, there are headmen both satisfied and unsatisfied with HATSU. The headman of Vakıflı is pleased with HATSU and the mayor of metropolitan municipality. For him, however, the opponent members in the council try to hinder the mayor's effort to provide services.

I mean, it [HATSU] will be better. Besides, there is a haplessness of the mayor [of the metropolitan municipality]. You ask why? The mayor is from a party, the others [council members] are from other parties. The opponents [AKP] predominated in the council. They could not reach a decision. For example, a sewage network would be built here. The mayor of the

⁶⁶ 'İnanır mısınız, Harbiye suyuna kanalizasyon suyu karışıyor. Fosseptikler dolmuş taşıyor. Harbiye suyu diye aslında kanalizasyon suyu içiyoruz. Yani başında taş ocağı var. Dinamitle taş çıkartıyorlar. Suyu bu da çok mahvediyor. Ben 4 senedir bu işe karşı mücadele verdim. Harbiye mahallesi olarak herkes şikayetçi bu durumdan. Hiç bir sonuç alamadık.'

⁶⁷ 'Eski tabi şebekeler ama asıl sorun suyumuzun dağıtılması ve suyumuzun çok kirlenmesi. Bir düşünün Harbiye gibi bir yerde, böyle her yerden suların çıktığı bir yerde sürekli su kesintisi yaşıyor. Haftada en az iki üç kez. Yani ne oldu da bu suyumuz iki üç yılda bu hale geldi?'

metropolitan municipality asked for applying for credit. Yet, they did not approve. So, construction of sewage network was left hanging.⁶⁸

This indicates that the council of metropolitan municipality do not work in a coordinated way. On the other hand, the major problem of Samandağ is that there are villages that have water scarcity problem. The headman of Mızraklı points out the water scarcity problem.

Of course, we have a lot of problem with the water scarcity. My neighbourhood has a population of 10 thousand. We have a distribution network which distributes the water for one hour every 5 days. We give the water for one hour, half hour. I change water tank in some days. We contend with that water since the water from tank does not come in time.⁶⁹

People wait for the water treatment plant of the Karaçay Dam. The headman of Mızraklı replies the question of whether they have applied to HATSU for this problem.

We've applied to HATSU for many times. Nothing we can do about it. We were dated. It is said that water will be supplied from another resource. And that water was given to another neighbourhood. After that, our turn didn't come. We're waiting for that dam water. Water is the most important thing. We content with road, but nothing is like water. We can't contend with water and we don't know how clean and healthy this water is right now. Of course, 40% -50% of citizens are carriers of Hepatitis-B. You know, we reported this to HATSU many times. Yet unfortunately we suffer meanwhile. You know we pity our fate. We have troubles. There is nothing to do. Let's hope for the best.⁷⁰

As in city Defne, HATSU has not developed an effective project to solve water scarcity problem of these neighbourhoods of Samandağ. This is a negative score for HATSU.

⁶⁸ 'Yani, daha güzel olacak. Bir de gelen başkanın şansızlığı var. Niye diyeceksiniz? Başkan bir partiden, diğerleri başka bir partiden. Muhalif mecliste daha çok yoğunlukta. Hiç bir kararı çıkartmadılar. Mesela benim geçen yıl kanalizasyonum olacaktı. Mali borçlanma istemiş büyükşehir başkanı. Ama onlar kabul etmemiş. Benim kaldı yani kanalizasyon işim.'

⁶⁹ 'Tabi çok, çok. Benim mahallemde benim 10 bin nüfusluk bir mahallem var. 5 günde bir birer saatlik bir dağıtım şebekemiz var. Birer saatlik, yarım saatlik veriyoruz. Bazı zamanlarda tanker değiştiriyorum. O da zamanında gelmediği için bir şekilde idare ediyoruz.'

⁷⁰ 'Çok, çok bulunduk. Yapacak bir şey yok. Bize tarih verildi. Başka yerden su temin edilecek dendi. Ve o su şu anda bir mahalleye verildi. Ondan sonra sıra gelmedi bize, olduğu gibi duruyor. O baraj suyunu bekliyoruz işte. Su konusu en önemli şey. Yol idare ediyoruz ama suda böyle bir şey olmuyor. İdare edemiyoruz ve şu anda bu su ne kadar temiz ne kadar sağlıklı bilmiyoruz. Tabi ki vatandaşların %40-%50'si Hepatit-B taşıyıcısı. Yani bunu defalarca HATSU'ya söylüyoruz. Ama ne yazık ki bu dönemde böyle bir sıkıntı çekmemiz, gerçekten içler acısı bir durumdayız yani. Sıkıntılıyız. Yapacak bir şey yok. Hayırlısı Allah'tan artık.'

5.6.4.10. Water and Sewage Services in the Other Districts

As I conducted fewer interviews with the headmen in Reyhanlı, Altınözü, Kırıkhan, Kumlu, Hassa and Yayladağı, I gained less information on these districts. Therefore, I can only evaluate their major problems about water and sewage services

The major problem of Reyhanlı is that the mayor of metropolitan municipality and district municipality do not get on well with each other. Therefore, some headmen claim, HATSU provides limited service to Reyhanlı. They think that there is discrimination in service provision on the basis of political affiliation. The headman of the Bağlar neighbourhood states:

Mayors do not get along well with each other. A meeting again was held before. We asked the mayor [Lütfü Savaş] a question. We said, ‘Our mayor, we do not receive service. You provide services to some places, you don’t provide services to some places. He said, ‘Life is the first, love is the second. Whoever supported [voted] me, I would support them first. Then if anything remains, I will do it for you.’⁷¹

Likewise, the headman of Kuşaklı claims that Lütfü Savaş discriminates politically in providing services.

Of course, he [Lütfü Savaş] got a bit more votes from my next village. He turned it [the village] Paris. Most of the polls in our village voted for the AKP. He said that they do not vote for me. Hence, he does not provide service to us.⁷²

Infrastructure and rain water drainage are also problems in the city centre. Since the population increased with the arrival of Syrian immigrants, the infrastructure was inadequate. The headman of the Yeni neighbourhood mentions this issue:

In fact, our population has doubled, with the Syrians settling here. The infrastructure [project] was planned according to the population of Reyhanlı. What happened now? When the population is doubled, we have difficulties. The electricity, water, sewage, all of them are inadequate.⁷³

⁷¹ ‘Belediye başkanları anlaşıyorlar. Daha önce yine toplantı yapıldı. Başkana bir soru sorduk. Dedik, “Başkanım hizmet gelmiyor”. Dedik, “Kimi yerlere hizmet yapıyorsunuz, kimi yerlere yapmıyorsunuz”. O da “Önce can, sonra canan” dedi. “Bana kim destek veriyse, önce onlara destek yaparım ben” dedi. Sonra bir şey kalırsa, size yaparım dedi.’

⁷² ‘Tabi, hemen yan köyüm biraz daha fazla oy aldı. Paris’e çevirdi. Benim mahallemde AKP’ye çıktığı için dedi bu zaten bana vermiyor, o yüzden hizmet yapmıyor.’

⁷³ ‘Aslında bizim nüfusumuz ikiye katlandı, Suriyelerin buraya yerleşmesiyle birlikte. Altyapı Reyhanlı’nın nüfusuna göre ayarlanmıştı. Şimdi ne oldu? Nüfus iki katına çıkınca mecburen sıkıntılar yaşıyoruz. Kaldırıyor elektrik, su, kanalizasyon bunları.’

The major problem of Altınözü is the lack of wastewater treatment plant. The wastewater is given to the rivers without treatment. Most of the headmen in villages are satisfied with HATSU. This is a positive remark for HATSU:

Now the services have of course become easier. In the past, the headmen were making their own efforts. They were collecting money from the public when the pump burned. Or the collected money might have not been enough. But now they're a little more relaxed. Why? When the pump burned, HATSU immediately comes, repairs. I mean there's no trouble.⁷⁴

The major problem of Kırıkhan is the HATSU team. The headmen in villages assert that the team do not come for repairs in time. Only these headmen complain about the HATSU team. The headman of Bektaşlı moans that 'If you call [the HATSU team] twenty times, they come once'⁷⁵. The reason might be the existence of too many (55) villages in Kırıkhan. The most unsatisfied headmen with the metropolitan municipality and HATSU in the first region are in Kırıkhan.

The major problem of Hassa is the lack of a wastewater treatment plant. Also, there are neighbourhoods which have no sewage network. HATSU has not developed a project for Hassa yet. The headman of the Aktepe small municipality explains these problems:

I don't want to scribble them [metropolitan municipality and HATSU]. Since 2015, they have said that the infrastructure would be built in the Aktepe neighbourhood in 2016. This was on big posters. I read them. I also talk to the mayor of the metropolitan municipality. I explained this. I said, 'My mayor, the Aktepe [small municipality] was founded in 1972. So far, the mayors [of the Aktepe municipality] didn't build [the infrastructure]. They said, 'It happened like that, like this, we'll do it' But they did not. Then metropolitan municipality was established. I said, 'This is up to you, my mayor. It hasn't been done since 1972.' Yet, during the period of Selahhattin Çolak who was the mayor [of the small municipality] 10 years ago, they changed one third [of the water network], two thirds left. They had to do it, since there were outbreaks too much. Even when I visited [Lütfü Savaş], there were 4-5 outbreaks. I reported it to HATSU. They [repaired] for one day, didn't repair for three days. Even if they repair, they don't fix the places they broke. The mayor said, 'Okay, we'll do it.' I gathered the people. By the way, I'm officially corresponding with him. It is now 2018. They say, 'We will complete the project'. Yet they didn't. It still remains.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ 'Şimdi hizmetler tabi ki şimdi daha kolaylaştı. Eskiden muhtarlar kendi çabalarıyla yapıyordu. Şimdi onlar, icabında pompa yandığı zaman halktan para topluyordu. Veya topladığı para karşılayamayabilirdi. Ama şimdi bu konularda biraz daha rahatlar. Çünkü niye? Pompa yandı, hemen HATSU geliyor, yapıyor. Sıkıntı olmuyor yani.'

⁷⁵ 'Yirmi sefer arasan, bir sefer geliyor.'

⁷⁶ 'Ben bunları karalamak istemiyorum. Bu büyükşehir 2015 yılından beri hatta altyapı konusunda 2016 yılında sıra Aktepe mahallesine gelecek dediler. Büyük afişlere de asıldı. Ben bunları da okudum. Ben BŞB belediye başkanıyla da görüşüyorum. Bu durumu anlattım. Sayın başkanım dedim. Aktepe 1972 yılında kuruldu. Şimdiye kadar buranın belediye başkanları yapmadılar. Şöyle oldu. Böyle oldu. Yapacağız, edeceğiz dediler, yapmadılar. İşte büyükşehir oldu. Bu iş size düştü başkanım dedim.'

The headman of the Gazeluşağı village, which is the farthest settlement in the north, criticizes the Law No 6360:

If you ask me my own opinion, we want our village to regain its legal entity. However, there is no way back now in the metropolitan municipality laws, in the laws enacted by the state. HATSU cannot reach everywhere adequately. It reaches to a certain place. You know Hatay is a too dispersed a city. Its rural area is also too dispersed. Particularly, Hassa is dispersed, too dispersed. Its neighbourhoods, villages are too dispersed. You see, sewage network hasn't been planned yet. [HATSU] cannot help with the water and irrigation services. We have no sewage network, this is a problem. Let's not talk about irrigation. Hatay has been just become a metropolitan municipality. This is also a problem.⁷⁷

The headman of the Yeniyapan village argues that 'However, if you ask me what is the bleeding wound of Hatay Metropolitan Municipality, I say HATSU'⁷⁸. This argument summarizes HATSU well.

The major problem of Kumlu is water scarcity in the villages. Their water networks are very old and unsatisfactory. There is no wastewater treatment plant and most of the neighbourhoods had no sewage network. HATSU has not developed a project for Kumlu yet. The headman of the Cumhuriyet neighbourhood points out the water scarcity problem:

During summers, we suffer from a lack of groundwater. In order to meet the water needs of some of our neighbourhoods, such as Akpınar neighbourhood, HATSU drilled wells. Underground wells were opened. Then the waters were not distributed to the neighbourhoods because HATSU had no allowances or approval from the council.⁷⁹

1972'den beri yapılmadı fakat bundan 10 sene önce dedim Selahattin Çolak başkandı burada. Üçte birini değiştirdiler, o zaman. O da mecburiyetten. Patlak filan çok oluyordu. Fakat üçte ikisi kaldı. O gün kendini ziyaret ettiğim gün bile 4-5 tane patlak var. Dedim ki şu anda 5 tane patlak var. Ben HATSU'ya bildirdim. 1 gün yapıyorlar, 3 gün yapmıyorlar. Yapsalar da bozdukları yeri düzeltmiyorlar. Eline sağlık dedim. Dedi muhtar, tamam yapacağız dedi. Halkı da topladım. Bu arada resmîyetten ben yazıyorum. Velhasıl kelim, 2018 oldu, yapacağız, edeceğiz dediler. Projeyi tamamladık dediler. Yapılmadı. Hala öyle kaldı.'

⁷⁷ 'Şimdi bizim kendi şahsi fikrimizi sorarsanız, bir köy tüzel kişiliğimizin geri dönmesini isteriz. Lakin bu BŞB yasalarında devletin çıkardığı yasalarda artık bu işin dönüşü yok. HATSU dediğimiz kurum da yeteri kadar ulaşmıyor. Bir yere kadar ulaşıyor. Hatay biliyorsunuz çok dağınık bir yer. Kırsal olarak da çok dağınık. Özellikle bizim Hassa merkez kadar dağınıklığı var. Çok dağınık. Çok mahallesi, köyü çok dağınık. Yani kanalizasyon işlerine girmedik. İçme ve sulama suyu işlerinde yeteri kadar yardımcı olamıyorlar. Kanalizasyonumuz yok, bu bir sıkıntı. Sulama suyunu da söylemeyelim. Çünkü Hatay daha yeni büyükşehir oldu. Onun da sıkıntısı var.'

⁷⁸ 'Ama Hatay Büyükşehir Belediyesinin kanayan yarası nesidir diye sorsanız, HATSU derim ben.'

⁷⁹ 'Yaz aylarında biraz yeraltı sularının yetersizliğinden dolayı sıkıntı çekiyoruz. HATSU bizim bazı mahallelerin su ihtiyacını karşılayabilmek için mesela Akpınar mahallesi var, oraya vurdu. Yeraltı kuyuları açıldı. Sonra HATSU'da ödenek olmadığı için veya meclisten onay verilmediği için sular daha mahallelere dağıtılmadı.'

There is no wastewater treatment plant in Yayladağı. The headman of the Tutulubahçe neighbourhood explains that why it was better before the Law No 6360:

Relations with the local municipality were better, more comfortable. You could reach the municipal authorities at any time. But now, it is not like that. Now, you know that the political dynamics are very different in Hatay. When there are different parties, they get stuck when solving local problems. As long as there is [a conflict], no service is done, nothing else is done. [If they were from the same party], it wouldn't be fully solved, but I think they would do a little more coordinated work.⁸⁰

5.6.5. Evaluation of the Water and Sewage Service on the Basis of Issues

This part of the dissertation will analyse the water and sewage services on the basis of answers of the headmen to the questions in the semi-structured in-depth interviews. These answers were divided into subsections along the lines of specific issues. The sub-sections are water services, sewage and wastewater services, working system of HATSU, reasons of service disruptions in HATSU, which institution is the best in providing water and sewage services, abolishing villages and small municipalities, establishing metropolitan municipality in Hatay, testing the claims of the Law No 6360. The method of this part will include both qualitative and quantitative analysis conducted by calculating percentile scores.

5.6.5.1. Water Services According to Headmen

1. Drinking and Potable Water: When I asked the headmen whether there is a problem with drinking and potable water in your neighbourhood, the answers were grouped into two as ‘problem’ or ‘not problem’. If they have water shortage; if their drinking and potable networks are very old and unhealthy; and if there are troubles in water delivery, I noted them as problem.

Table 54 Drinking and potable Water

	Village	Small Municipality	Neighbourhood	Total
Problem	39	12	23	86
Percent	39%	40%	46%	47.7%
Not Problem	61	18	27	94
Percent	61%	60%	54%	52.3%
Total	100	30	50	180

As it can be seen in Table 54, 47.7% of the headmen answered the question as ‘problem’; 52.3% of the headmen answered as ‘not problem’. Almost half of the neighbourhoods have

⁸⁰ ‘Yerel belediye ile ilişkiler daha iyiydi, daha rahattı. İstedığınız zaman ulaşabiliyordunuz belediye yetkililerine. Ama şimdi öyle değil. Şimdi biliyorsunuz siyasi olarak dengeler çok farklı Hatay'da. Farklı partiler olunca yerelde sorunların çözümü noktasında tıkanıyorlar. [Anlaşmazlık] olduğu müddetçe hizmet de yapılmaz, başka bir şey de yapılmaz. [Aynı partiden olsalardı], çok çözülmezdi ama bir nebze daha koordineli iş yaparlardı diye düşünüyorum.’

problems with drinking and potable water. Percentage of those with problems is higher in small municipalities than in villages and neighbourhoods.

The most troubled villages in terms of drinking and potable water are in Kumlu. They have water shortage and their water networks are very old and unsanitary. In addition, the villages of Defne and Samandağ (the Karaçay region) also have water scarcity. There are villages where drinking and potable water delivered only two or three days a week. For example, in Düğünyardu, which is a village of İskenderun, there is almost no drinking and potable water. The headman of Düğünyardu complains:

We have no water, no water! I'm exhausted, really exhausted. Every day – not every day, but once a month – I meet and quarrel with the mayor of the metropolitan municipality; we are like this [fighting tooth and nail] with each other.⁸¹

The headman of the Çağlalık village in Payas tells about their water problem after the Law No 6360.

The problem is that when [Çağlalık] is village, our water [network] was broken down, let's say at night. We were repairing it on our own. Right now, there's no water coming to my village from those two sources [of mountain]. [Their pipes] have been broken down. [The HATSU teams] don't go there. They say that since there's terrorism, they don't go there. We're drinking irrigation water right now. HATSU has given irrigation water flowing from the river; we're drinking it.⁸²

Most of the small municipalities and neighbourhoods have very old, unsanitary and hazardous (including asbestos) pipes. The small municipalities of Antakya and Defne have water shortages and their water is very unhealthy. Particularly small municipalities of Arsuz have such a problem. The neighbourhoods with the most problems in terms of drinking and potable water are in Erzin and Belen, since their water networks have just renewed by HATSU. The most troubled neighbourhoods in terms of drinking and potable water are in Dörtöl, Payas and Reyhanlı. Their water networks are very old and unsanitary. For example, wastewater into drinking water in the Mızraklı Neighbourhood of Samandağ and therefore cancer incidents are widespread.

⁸¹ 'Suyumuz yok, suyumuz! Vallahi ben var ya bitkinim, bitkinim. Her gün büyükşehir başkanıyla, her gün değil de, ayda yılda bir sefer denk geliyoruz, birbirimizle böyle oluyoruz.'

⁸² 'Sorun şu: Biz köyken bizim suyumuz arıza yapıyordu, mesela gece vakti. Biz gündüz kendi imkanlarımızla gidip yapıyorduk. Şu an benim köyüme o iki kaynaktan da su gelmiyor. Arıza yaptı. Gitmiyorlar. Terör var diyorlar gitmiyorlar. Şu an biz sulama suyunu içiyoruz. Dereden akan sulama suyunu verdiler, onu içiyoruz.'

2. Water Meters: I asked the headmen in villages if there were water meters in their houses before the Law No 6360. I did not ask headmen in small municipalities and neighbourhoods because they had water meters before the Law No 6360.

Table 55 Water meters in villages

Water Meter	Village	Total
With water meter	56	136
Percent	56%	75.6%
Without water meter	44	44
Percent	44%	24.4%
Total	100	180

Before the Law No 6360, there was no water meter in villages where use and potable water reached with gravity pipes since electricity or costly equipment are not required. Also, water fees were not regularly collected by the headmen. In some villages, headmen regularly collected water fees in order to meet repair costs or salaries of the water guard. Before the Law No 6360, some village headmen employed a worker to look after the water and wastewater services. The worker was called water guard. The headmen collected the money for the salary of the worker from the villagers as water bill. Some headmen did not employ water guard and they looked after these services with the help of villagers or they rented workers periodically. After the Law No 6360, all these practices were abolished since HATSU took over this position. Before the Law No 6360, the villages where the water meters were not used were in Belen, Dörtüyl, İskenderun and Arsuz. These villagers mostly complain about the installation of water meters to their houses. The headman of the Sincan village in Payas states:

I mean the [central] state built this [network], HATSU collects its fee. I mean we have worked, done it so far. People say [to HATSU] that ‘Our ancestors brought this water, why do you want to water fee?’ They say, ‘We pay money for the water that our ancestors brought’.⁸³

This negatively affects the headmen’s opinion about HATSU. On the other hand, there are some headmen who approve the installation of water meters. As in the words of the headman of the Nergizlik village in Arsuz:

Surely, it [installation of water meters] is good now. Before, in our village there was a 200 ton water tank. I filled it, it wasn’t sufficient. The man was throwing his hose into the garden. Therefore, water wasn’t sufficient. After that, he bawled that he has no water. First, fill your

⁸³ ‘Yani şimdi bunu devlet döşedi, HATSU parasını alıyor. Yani biz çalıştık yaptık şimdiye kadar. İnsanlar diyor ki bizim dedelerimiz getirdi bu suyu, siz ne su parası istiyorsunuz? Dedelerimizin getirdiği suya para ödüyünüz şimdi dedi.’

water store, then irrigate your garden. So if I gave you your water, use it as drinking water first. Irrigate your garden with the excess water.⁸⁴

These headmen think that installation of water meters prevents wasting water. Otherwise, people use plenty of water without considering whether it will be enough or not. For them, this is a positive aspect of the Law No 6360. In addition, in the villages where drinking and potable water was pumped, water meters were used in the houses before the Law No 6360. Water fees were regularly collected by headmen to meet the costs of electricity and repair of the pump. Yet, these fees were just 5-10 TL per month. Nevertheless, these villages did not complain about installation of the water meters by HATSU.

3. Water Bills: I asked headmen whether there are any complaints about the water bills increasing after the Law No 6360 in your neighbourhood. I grouped their answers as ‘water bills increased’; and ‘water bills did not increase’. It should be noted that two village headmen answered that water bills were decreased and three headmen of villages answered that their water bills have not reached them yet. 56% of the headman state that water bills increased. This is a negative remark for HATSU.

Table 56 Water bills

	Village	Small Municipality	Neighbourhood	Total
Water bills increased	39	22	37	98
Percent	39%	73.3%	74%	56%
Water bills did not increase	61	8	13	79
Percent	61%	26.7%	26%	44%
Total	100	30	50	175

After the Law No 6360, the fees villagers pay for water has increased. Since the Law No 6360 obliges the water price rates for villages to be capped at 25% of the city rates for the first 5 years, most villagers have not complained about the water bills yet. On the other hand, more than 70% of headmen from small municipalities and neighbourhoods stated that there are complaints about the high water bills after the Law. There is no complaint in the neighbourhoods of Belen Kumlu, Yayladağı and Defne. The most complaints about water bills are in the neighbourhoods of İskenderun, Arsuz, Erzin, Dört Yol, Payas, Samandağ, Kırıkhan

⁸⁴ ‘Muhakkak ki [iyi oldu] şimdi. Biz önceden bende 200 tonluk havuz vardı, doldururdum, yetmezdi. Adam tutuyor hortumunu bahçesine atıyordu. Onun için su yetmiyordu. Ondan sonra bas bas bağıryordu, benim suyum yok diye. Yahu önce deponu doldur. Sonra bahçeni sula. Yani ben sana suyunu verdiğem önce içme suyu olarak kullan. Fazlasıyla git bahçeni sula.’

and Reyhanlı. The headman of the Şükrüpaşa neighbourhood in Erzin grumbles about the water bills.

How long will the citizen cry out? There was a poor-fellow here, he owed money, his water was cut off. Everyone's in debt. In order to survive, a man requires air, sun, water. If the water which is 1 TL increases to 4-5 TL, this really becomes trouble. There's no trouble for the rich; but for the poor-fellow, there's a lot of trouble. The man is an employee, commuting to work every day. He has to take shower every day for cleaning. The poor uses [the water] as well as rich.⁸⁵

The headman of the Kuzuculu small municipality criticizes the water fee which is the same for every neighbourhood.

Of course, everybody complains. When the water bills increase and the service you receive in return, complaints increase. For example, my water comes through gravity drainage system. While it [the price per cubic meter of water] was 0.1 TL previously, now it is 1 TL. Why would I pay for this? Injustice is here: A water pipe is broken. As the headman, I go and repair it with my own tools, with my own facilities. HATSU does not pay any expense for this water to come here. It doesn't burn electricity, doesn't use a machine, and doesn't withdraw water under the soil. At least in such places the water fee should be collected low. For example, if the water is supplied by pumps in Iskenderun and if it is 5 TL there, it must be 1 TL here. You see injustice is here.⁸⁶

The cost of water is higher in the neighbourhoods where the water is supplied and distributed by using electricity (pumps). It is also higher if the water is treated at the treatment plant. Yet, it is less when the water is supplied by using gravity drainage system. The fact that the price per cubic meter of water is the same for every neighbourhood becomes unfair.

5.6.5.2. Sewage and Wastewater Services According to Headmen

1. Sewage Services: I asked the headmen whether or not there is sewage network in their neighbourhood. I grouped the answers as 'with sewage network' and 'without sewage network'. In total, 40.5% of the neighbourhoods have sewage network and 59.5% of the neighbourhoods do not have a sewage network (see Table 57).

⁸⁵ 'Vatandaş nereye kadar bağırarak. Bir gariban varmış burada, borcu varmış, suyu kesilmiş. Herkesin borcu var. Bir adamın hava, su, güneş, yaşaması için, bunları yapmak zorunda. 1 liralık su 4-5 liraya çıkarsa gerçekten sıkıntı ablacım. Zenginler için bir sıkıntı yok ama garibanlar için sıkıntı çok. Adam işçi, her gün işe gidip geliyor. Temizlik için her gün duş almak zorunda. Zengin kadar da fakir fukara kullanır.'

⁸⁶ 'Herkes şikayetçi tabi. Su faturaları artınca ve karşılığında aldığın hizmet böyle olunca şikayetler artıyor. Mesela benim suyum kendi cazibesıyla geliyor. Eskiden 10 kuruştan içerken şimdi 1 liraya çıktı. Bunun parasını ben niye ödeyeyim ki? Adaletsizlik şu burada: Bir su borusu patlıyor. Ben muhtarlık olarak ben kendi araçlarımla, kendi imkanlarımla gidip tamir ediyorum ben bu suyu. HATSU bu suyun gelmesi için hiçbir masraf etmiyor yani. Elektrik yakmıyor, bir makine kullanmıyor, toprağın altından çekmiyor. En azından böyle yerlerde su parasının düşük alınması lazım. Iskenderun pompayla çekiyorsa atıyorum, orada 5 lira ise, benim burada 1 lira olması gerekiyor. Haksızlık burada yani.'

Table 57 Sewage networks

	Village	Small Municipality	Neighbourhood	Total
With sewage network	23	7	43	73
Percentage (%)	23%	23.3%	86%	40.5%
Without sewage network	77	23	7	107
Percentage (%)	77%	76.7%	14%	59.5%
Total	100	30	50	180

Since they have been affiliated with a district municipality for years, it is not surprising that 86% of the neighbourhoods had sewage network. Also, it is not surprising that only 23% of the villages had sewage network. What is amazing that only 23.3% of the small municipalities had sewage network. The fact that villages and small municipalities are in the same situation with respect to sewage services is certainly not ideal. There is no sewage network in the small municipalities of Arsuz and Dört Yol. Some of small municipalities of İskenderun, Defne, Samandağ, Hassa and Yayladağı have sewage network. Some neighbourhoods of Kırıkhan, Samandağ and Arsuz do not have sewage network. In Belen, the sewage network is under construction; and it has neighbourhoods where the construction has not been completed yet.

As mentioned before, HATSU completed the construction of sewage network in Erzin but the headmen are not pleased with this work. They assert that the works of HATSU are perfunctory and lack any oversight. The headman of the İsalı neighbourhood in Erzin states:

I think [offensive odour coming from the sewage network] is a result of lack of inspection and control. [HATSU] doesn't care about how it's been done. They've installed these sewer pipes with very small diameters. Therefore, they clog up very quickly and this causes offensive odour.⁸⁷

The headman of the Mahmutlu neighbourhood argues that HATSU does not work efficiently.

The sewage network has been built, but it doesn't work efficiently. There is too much offensive odour. We usually pump water in order to remove clog. Above all, there is a place under our Mahmutlu neighbourhood. They built a store. Everything that comes out of the sewage gathered there. They overflow there. Mahmutlu is stuck with odour and infested with flies.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ '[Kanalizasyondan koku gelmesi] bence denetimsizlikten ve kontrolsüzlükten kaynaklı. Bakılmıyor nasıl yapılıp edildiğine. Çok küçük çaplı döşediler bu kanalizasyon borularını hep. Bundan dolayı çok çabuk tıkanıyor, koku yapıyor.'

⁸⁸ 'Kanalizasyon yapıldı ama randımanlı çalışmıyor. Kokulardan durulmuyor. Arada bir su veriyoruz buna bir tazyikli. Tıkanıklık geçsin diye. Hele bizim Mahmutlu'nun altında bir yer var. Ya bu çağda depo yapmışlar. Buradan kanalizasyondan giden her şey orada toplanıyor. Orada taşıyor. Devamlı kokudan, sinekten Mahmutlu perişan yani.'

This negatively affects the headmen's opinion about HATSU. As stated before, HATSU initially collected wastewater fee from every subscribers. However, ideally it should not collect fees from the subscribers who do not benefit from sewage network. The headman of the Kışlalar neighbourhood in Dörtöy refers to this issue:

For example, HATSU increased the water fee too much. Then, there is no sewage network, it collects wastewater fee. For example, I have no sewage network. I pay the wastewater fee. Why would I pay?⁸⁹

This is an unfair policy of HATSU. Some subscribers submitted a petition for the correction of this practice and HATSU stopped collecting wastewater fee from those subscribers. Nonetheless, this is a negative score for HATSU.

2. Wastewater Treatment Plants: I asked the headmen whether or not there is a wastewater treatment in their neighbourhood. I grouped the answers as 'with wastewater treatment plant' and 'without wastewater treatment plant'. In total, 26.2% of the neighbourhoods have a wastewater treatment plant; and 73.8% of the neighbourhoods do not have a wastewater treatment plant (see Table 58).

Table 58 Wastewater Treatment Plant

	Village	Small Municipality	Neighbourhood	Total
With wastewater treatment plant	8	7	32	47
Percentage (%)	8%	23.3%	64%	26.2%
Without wastewater treatment plant	92	23	18	133
Percentage (%)	92%	76.7%	36%	73.8%
Total	100	30	50	180

According to Table 58, 8% of villages, 23.3% of small municipalities and 64% of neighbourhoods have a wastewater treatment plant. Approximately 6% of neighbourhoods have a sewage network but do not have a wastewater treatment plant. As their sewage network does not connect to a treatment plant, wastewater is discharged into a receiving water body (river or sea) without treatment.

Some headmen claim that the wastewater treatment plant in their districts does not work regularly. The headman of Üçtepe village in Reyhanlı puts forward:

No, [the wastewater treatment plant] is not in full operation. For example, there is Afrin canal next to the plant. The Afrin canal releases bad odours into my village. We suffer most from the

⁸⁹ 'Mesela ilk başta suya çok zam koydu. Sonra mesela kanalizasyon yok, atıksu parası alıyor. Mesela benim kanalizasyonum yok. Ben atıksu parasını ödüyorum. Niye ödeyeceğim?'

treatment plant. The treatment plant is in my neighbourhood. The Reyhanlı industry region is also in my neighbourhood. Since my village is the closest village to Reyhanlı and it is at a central place, factories and the wastewater treatment plant were built here. You see it's not fully operational. So all the dirt and the smell of the canals come to us.⁹⁰

Likewise, the headmen in Erzin complain about the irregular working of the wastewater treatment plant. Due to the offensive odours, they think that the plant does not work and the wastewater is discharged to the receiving water body without treatment.

3. Rain Water Drainage: There are 33 (19.4% of) neighbourhoods that experience problems with rain water drainage. The most troubled neighbourhoods are Kırıkhan, Altınözü, Reyhanlı, Payas, Dörtöyl, Erzin and İskenderun. HATSU does not anything unless the district municipalities require services for rain water drainage. Since most of the district municipalities are not disposed to pay the relevant expenses and they cannot include these costs in the water bills, HATSU does nothing about rain water drainage in the district municipalities. Therefore, in case of heavy rainfall, all the streets and avenues are flooded with rain water. This is a negative development for the water and wastewater services in Hatay. The headman of the Kürtöl neighbourhood in Payas talks about the rain water issue.

Let me tell you this: There were irrigation water channels in Payas before. In all the streets, on the both sides of the garden, there were irrigation water canals. These irrigation water canals also carried the rainwater to the Tütenbaca River. As the district municipality was established in Payas, metropolitan municipality did not leave these canals. It covered these canals on the ground that there is no garden anymore. So what happened? Rain water cannot flow into these canals. There is a lot of trouble in the streets when it rains; because they close and cancel our canals without evacuating any of the rain water.⁹¹

⁹⁰ Yok, tam faaliyette değil o. Misal o arıtma çalışmadığı için onun yanından geçen Afrin kanalı var. Afrin kanalı ciddi biçimde benim köyüme koku veriyor. Onun en büyük sıkıntısını ben çekiyorum. Arıtma tesisi benim mahalleimde. Reyhanlı sanayisi de benim mahalleimde. Reyhanlı'ya en yakın köy ve orta yerde olduğum için genelde sanayi, AAT buraya yapıldı. Yani tam anlamıyla faaliyette değil. Yani kanalların bütün pisliği, kokusu bize geliyor.

⁹¹ 'Ben sana şunu söyleyeyim kızım: Payas'ta eskiden sulama suyu kanalları vardı. Bütün sokaklarda, cadde aralarında, bahçe kenarlarında iki taraflı sulama suyu kanalları vardı. Bu sulama suyu kanalları da bizim yağmur sularını filan hepsini taşır, ta o Tütenbaca denilen, oradaki dereye taşırdı akan suları. Şimdi biz ilçe olduğumuzdan dolayı BŞB bu kanalları bırakmadı. Burada işte bahçe kalmadı, şu bu kalmadı diye bu kanalların üzerini kapattı bir kısmını, merkezdeki. Öyle olunca ne oldu? Yağmur suları bu kanallara akıyor. Çok zaman da caddelerde sıkıntı yaşıyor. Yağmur sularının hiçbirinin tahliyesini yapmadan kanallarımızı kapatıp iptal ettikleri için akılları sıra.'

Likewise, the headman of the Fatih neighbourhood in Payas states: ‘There's no rain drainage in this neighbourhood. When new asphalt is built, they do not build rain drainage. Everywhere is too bad when it rains.’⁹²

5.6.5.3. Working System of HATSU According to Headmen

This subsection will evaluate the works of HATSU in the neighbourhoods, the HATSU teams, complaints about HATSU, and comparison between HATSU and the previous public authorities.

1. Works of HATSU in the Neighbourhoods: When I asked the headmen, what HATSU did in your neighbourhood about water and wastewater services, I received a variety of answers. I grouped these answers as ‘no service’ and ‘at least one service’. 60% of the headmen say that HATSU has not done anything in their neighbourhood (no service). Most of them say HATSU did nothing other than collecting water bills. On the other hand, 40% of the headmen mention at least one service that HATSU provided in their neighbourhood. The answers of the headmen are outlined as follows. HATSU completed, built or renewed water network; HATSU completed, built or renewed sewage network; HATSU completed, built or renewed wastewater treatment plant; HATSU built or renewed rain water drainage; HATSU built or cleaned the water tanks; HATSU added new water pipes; HATSU found or changed water resource; HATSU drilled a well; HATSU repaired the breakdowns. Nonetheless, since 60% of the headmen said that HATSU have never done anything in their neighbourhoods, this is recorded as a negative implication against HATSU.

Some headmen claim that there is no oversight in the works of HATSU. As in the words of the headman of the Orhangazi village in İskenderun: ‘The most important problem in HATSU is oversight. There is no supervision’.⁹³ Also, the headman of the Zülüflühan village in Antakya claims that HATSU has no plan for future works:

HATSU has no plan, no program. For example, we are now in November [2018]. HATSU officials cannot come and tell me that we have a plan and a program for 2019. They have no

⁹² ‘Bu mahallede ablacım hiçbir yerde yağmur gideri yok. Yerlere yeni asfalt yapıldığında yağmur giderleri yapmıyorlar. Bir yağmur yağdığı zaman çok kötü oluyor her yer.’

⁹³ ‘HATSU’da en önemli sorun denetim. Denetim hiç yok.’

plans, no projects. Everything is going on with daily solutions. If you're not in a program, it won't work. I think like this.⁹⁴

He adds that HATSU could have developed many more projects for the whole province by now. 'If I could build a natural treatment plant as a village headman within 5 years, it would not have been so much that HATSU built two wastewater treatment plants in Hatay.'⁹⁵ These negatively affect the headmen's opinion about HATSU.

On the other side, there are positive evaluations of HATSU. For the headman of Tomruksuyu in Samandağ, it was better that some services such as water and wastewater services were transferred to the metropolitan municipality.

Of course, it is better that the metropolitan municipality is the central unit and that it provides equal service to every neighbourhood. It would be better to have a treatment plant instead of treating wastewater of so many neighbourhoods one by one. (...) Metropolitan municipality was definitely better. *Big bucket is much better than a small bucket.* (...) It would be better to assign [water and sewerage services] to a separate institution. It's healthier. Otherwise, even collecting garbage is troublesome. They should even centralize this garbage. They should even give all the environmental services to the ministry, called as Environmental Control Services. Because these services are a burden on municipalities.⁹⁶

This headman is a proponent of centralization in provision of local services. Another headman from Piriçlik village in Arsuz criticizes the Law No 6360 but sets apart Hatay Metropolitan Municipality and HATSU.

For me, the best working unit among the local governments is HATSU. The other units, how can I say, like autumn leaves. The district municipalities have already turned into local branch offices. There is no service there. There is no authority there. The major missing point of this municipality law, metropolitan law enacted by the government is that there is no foundation. It also grabbed the method of providing service in a shortest way. *The system has been centralized.* The population of Hatay is crowded, incomes are plentiful. It is very easy to provide service here. It is a place to be served. They [municipalities] have good income. Among the adjacent municipalities, I personally think that Hatay metropolitan municipality provides the best service

⁹⁴ 'HATSU'nun bir planı, programı yok. Mesela şu anda biz Kasım ayındayız. HATSU yetkilileri şu an çıkıp bana 2019'da bizim şöyle bir planımız, programımız var diyemez. Hiç öyle bir planları, projeleri yok. Her şey günlük çözümlerle ilerliyor. Bir program çerçevesinde olmazsanız, bu işler olmaz. Ben böyle düşünüyorum.'

⁹⁵ 'Ben 5 yıl içerisinde bir köy muhtarı olarak bir tane doğal arıtma tesisi yapmışsam, HATSU'nun Hatay'da iki tane atıksu arıtma tesisi yapmış olması çok fazla değil açıkçası.'

⁹⁶ 'Tabi ki büyükşehir belediyesinin merkezi bir birim olması, her mahalleye eşit hizmet veriyor olması daha iyi. Bir de bu kadar mahallenin tek tek ayrı arıtması olacağına bir arıtma tesisi daha iyi olur. (...) Kesinlikle büyükşehir daha iyi oldu. Büyük kepçe, küçük kepçeden çok daha iyidir. (...) [Su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerinin] ayrı bir kuruma verilmesi daha iyi oldu. Daha sağlıklı oluyor böyle. Öbür türlü beldelerin çöp toplaması bile sıkıntılı oluyor. Hatta bu çöpü de merkezileştirseler daha iyi olur. Hatta çevreyle ilgili bütün hizmetleri bakanlığa verseler daha iyi olur, Çevre Kontrol Hizmetleri diye verilebilir. Belediyelerin üstünde bir kambur çünkü bu hizmetler.'

to the citizens. I look at other municipalities. For example, the municipality of Gaziantep has been always puff up. It is a pro-government municipality. However, I went to its a few districts where there is still no network, unfortunately.⁹⁷

Most of the headmen from CHP criticize the Law No 6360 and the new metropolitan municipality model on one hand; while taking a bright view of Hatay Metropolitan Municipality and HATSU on the other hand.

2. The HATSU Teams: I asked the headmen whether the HATSU teams arrive immediately when water and sewage services break down in your neighbourhood. I grouped the answers as ‘immediately’, ‘not immediately’ and ‘never respond’. According to the 70.5% of the headmen, the HATSU teams respond immediately. According to the 28.2% of the headmen, the HATSU teams do not respond immediately. For the two headmen, they never come to their neighbourhood. According to headmen in Altınözü, HATSU team do not reach to their neighbourhoods immediately. Especially some villages have problems with this. Overall, the fact that the HATSU team mostly reach to the neighbourhoods as soon as possible in case of breakdown is a positive development for the water and wastewater services in Hatay.

In order to compare, I also asked the headmen how were the maintenance and repair services about water and wastewater before the Law No 6360. In the villages, the headmen were responsible for the breakdowns. They hired a repairman and paid for the expenses by collecting money from the villagers or from the village budget including water fees. In the small municipalities and neighbourhoods, the municipal administration was the responsible for the maintenance and repair services

The headman of Aşağıkepirce village in Arsuz asserts that the situation was better before the Law No 6360.

I mean it was better than before [the Law No 6360 in the village]. Why was it better? You can’t find anyone in the municipality at 5 o’clock. If there is a burst pipe here, who takes care of it? Again we turn a hand to it. We go and shut the valve. There are also weekends. I mean we used

⁹⁷ ‘Yani belediyelerin sistem olarak en iyi çalışan birimi şu anda bana göre HATSU. Diğer birimler nasıl diyeyim sana sonbahar yaprağı gibi. Zaten ilçe belediyeleri mahalli şubelerine dönüştü. Bunlar da hizmet diye bir şey yok. Yetki diye de bir şey yok. Zaten bu belediyeler yasının, hükümetin çıkardığı BŞB yasının en büyük eksiği alt yapısının olmaması, vatandaşı da hizmet babında en kısa yoldan hizmet etme yöntemini elinden aldı. Merkezileşti sistem. Hatay nüfus kalabalık, gelir çok. Hizmet açısından çok kolay; hizmet edilmesi gereken bir yer. Gelirleri de iyi. Ben şahsen çevre belediyeler içinde büyükşehir olarak Hatay’ın vatandaşa en iyi hizmet verdiğini düşünüyorum. Öbür belediyeleri de görüyorum. Mesela Gaziantep belediyesi öve öve yere yurda koymadılar. Hükümet yanlısı bir belediye ama maalesef ben birkaç ilçesine gittim, halen şebeke suyu yok.’

to work day-and-night. Even it was night, we immediately called the repairman and had it repaired in order that the villager's water wasn't cut off.⁹⁸

Some headmen in villages state that they responded to the breakdowns faster and cheaper before the Law No 6360. This negatively affects the headmen's opinion about HATSU. Likewise, the headman of the Bekbele small municipality in İskenderun states that: 'While we kept the equipment by one here, it has moved away from here now. So what we would have responded in fifteen minutes, [the HATSU team] can respond in one day.'⁹⁹

On the other hand, some headmen claim that the HATSU team is better. As stated by the headman of Piringlik village in Arsuz:

Positive side [of HATSU] is that it's better in terms of breakdowns; maintenance and repair of breakdowns. How is it good? They have teams. They work more professionally. We had to work as subordinate to the citizen. Collective work is a working system that obliges headmen to citizens. However, this system is more professional.¹⁰⁰

The headman of the Nergizlik village in Arsuz expresses that response to the breakdowns was not good before the Law No 6360.

You see HATSU is better because during the period of Special Administration headmen [in villages] shouldered this work [repairing the breakdowns]. You couldn't get anything [money] from the villagers. We were always left holding the bag.¹⁰¹

The two headmen in villages refer to the difficulties of collecting money from the villagers in order to meet the repair costs before the Law No 6360. The headman of Tokaçlı village in Altınözü also points out this issue:

Now the services have of course become easier. In the past, headmen were making their own efforts. They were collecting money from the villagers when the pump burned. Or the money

⁹⁸ 'Yani o zaman [köyken] daha iyiydi. Niye daha iyiydi? Saat 5'te bir Allah'ın kulunu belediyeden bulamıyorsun şimdi. Şurada patlak olsa, kim şey yapacak? Yine biz el atıyoruz. Vanayı gidip biz kapatıyoruz. Bir de hafta sonu da var. Yani bizim gecemiz gündüzümüz yoktu. Köylü susuz kalmasın diye gece de olsa hemen bir arızacıyı çağırıp yaptırıyorduk.'

⁹⁹ 'Şurada araç gerecin elinin altındayken şimdi ta uzaklara taşındı. Yani biz onbeş dakikada müdahale edeceğimiz şeylere bir günde ancak müdahale ediliyor.'

¹⁰⁰ 'Artısı şu: Arıza açısından; arızaların bakım onarımı açısından daha iyi oldu. Nasıl iyi oldu? Ekipleri var. Daha profesyonel çalışıyorlar. Ha biz vatandaşa bağımlı çalışmak zorundaydık. İmece muhtarları vatandaşa mahkum eden bir çalışma sistemi. Ama bu sistem daha profesyonelce.'

¹⁰¹ 'Yani bir yerden bakarsanız HATSU olması daha iyi oldu çünkü Özel İdare döneminde muhtarlar bu işi yükleniyordu. Köylüden bir şey de alamıyordun. Sıkıntı hep bizlere pathıyordu yani.'

that he collected might not be able to afford [the repair expenses]. But now they're a little more relaxed. Why? The pump burned, immediately HATSU comes, repairs it. So there's no trouble.¹⁰²

These are positive effects of HATSU as it took the load off headmen's shoulders in terms of repair and maintenance. Also, for some headmen it was difficult to collect the fees from the villagers. On the contrary, some headmen claim that they still repair breakdowns since the team cannot come to the village instantly. Although they have no authority after the Law No 6360, the headmen often have to deal with the troubles in the village.

3. Complaints about HATSU: I also asked if there was a subject that local people complained about HATSU. Some headmen stated that there was no subject that local people complained about HATSU. On the other hand, some headmen mentioned the complaints about HATSU. These are about the installation of water meters, high water prices, being a metropolitan municipality, the asphalts remaining broken after they were cut for repairs pipes, employees of HATSU, paying wastewater fees despite not having sewage network, water scarcity particularly in summers, water cuts, lack of sewage network, lack of well drilling, lack of healthy drinking water, bans on garden irrigation, and lack of rain water drainage system.

The headman of the Çağlalık village in Payas complains about HATSU as the asphalts, which were cut for repairs to the pipes, are not filled. '[The HATSU teams] come to [repair the breakdowns], but excuse me, *they do more harm than good*. They dig my asphalt, but they left here [unfilled]. They did 4 years ago, but left here'.¹⁰³ The asphalt is still unfilled. The metropolitan municipality should fill the asphalt.

4. Comparing HATSU with Previous Public Authorities: An important question was whether it was good to transfer water and sewage services to HATSU. Headmen's answers to this question were the same with the overall opinions of the headmen about HATSU (see Table 50). 40% of the headmen agreed that it was good to transfer water and sewage services to HATSU. I grouped them as 'good'. 60% of the headmen replied that it was not good to transfer water and sewage services to HATSU. I grouped them as 'not good'. Table 59 gives the results on the basis of local unit.

¹⁰² 'Şimdi hizmetler tabi ki şimdi daha kolaylaştı. Eskiden muhtarlar kendi çabalarıyla yapıyordu. Şimdi onlar, icabında pompa yandığı zaman halktan para topluyordu. Veya topladığı para karşılayamayabilirdi. Ama şimdi bu konularda biraz daha rahatlar. Çünkü niye? Pompa yandı, hemen HATSU geliyor, yapıyor. Sıkıntı olmuyor yani.'

¹⁰³ '[HATSU ekipleri] Buraya [arızalara] geliyor ama af edersin, yaptığı iş ürküttüğü kurbağa değmiyor. Şu asfaltımı kazıyor. Ama burayı bırakıyor. 4 yıl önce yapmış, burayı bırakıyor.'

Table 59 Transfer of the water and sewage services to HATSU

	Villages	Small Municipalities	Neighbourhood	Total
Good	44	10	18	72
Percentage (%)	44.0	33.3	36.0	40.0
Not Good	56	20	32	108
Percentage (%)	56.0	66.7	64.0	60.0
Total	100	30	50	180

According to these outcomes, transfer of water and sewage services to HATSU in Hatay can be considered as a negative development.

In order to compare the period before and after the Law No 6360, I also asked headmen whether they considered public authorities that provided water and sewage services in your local unit previously as better than HATSU. I grouped the answers as ‘the former ones were better’ and ‘the former ones were not better’.

Table 60 Previous Public Authorities

	Village	Small Municipality	Neighbourhood	Total
The former ones were better	71	22	34	127
Percent	71%	73.3%	68%	70.5%
The formers ones were not better	28	8	16	53
Percent	28%	26.7%	32%	29.5%
Total	100	30	50	180

As presented in Table 60, 70.5% of the headmen think that previous public authorities were better than HATSU in providing water and sewage services. 29.5% of the headmen think that previous public authorities were not better than HATSU in providing water and sewage services. 73.3% of the headmen of small municipalities stated that the previous public authority was better than HATSU. For them, water and sewage services in abolished small municipalities were more efficient, rapid and inexpensive. 71% of headmen of villages thought that abolished Special Provincial Administration and Union for Providing Services for Villages¹⁰⁴ were better than HATSU. As in the words of the headman of the Aşağıokçular village in Defne:

I was the headman during the period of the Village Services as well. Of course, it was better during the period of Village Services, when [our neighbourhood] was under tvillage status. There

¹⁰⁴ The headmen in Hatay call Union for Providing Services for Villages shortly as Village Services.

is no rent, no bribery, no politics. But now, you know, all the municipalities have become richer than me.¹⁰⁵

Smilarly the headman of Yeniyapan village compares the authorities in terms of providing services.

May I say something to you? There are three layers. The first layer is Special Provincial Administration. Before it, there was Village Services. The final is metropolitan municipality. Among these, we received the best service, the greatest service from Village Services. Special Provincial Administration also wasn't too bad. However, this final metropolitan municipality has become *Union of Separating Villages*. There was politics also under Special Provincial Administration. What a pity that we can't provide people oriented services. We provide politics oriented services.¹⁰⁶

The headman of the Konaklı village in Dörtöy explains why he thinks Special Provincial Administration was better than HATSU.

No, it [establishing a metropolitan municipality in Hatay] wasn't a right decision. It would have been much better if we remained in our previous status, the period of Special Provincial Administration. (...) It would have been better if Special Provincial Administration still provided services. At least, we could find the people and get what we wanted. Now it's hard for us to go to the centre [Antakya]. It's also hard for us to reach them [HATSU]. If we go, we'll never find anyone in his office again. They can't come here because there's terrorism. At least, we were a remedy for ourselves.¹⁰⁷

According to 68% of the headmen of the neighbourhood, water and sewage services in district municipalities were better than HATSU. These outputs indicate that HATSU is regarded as a negative development.

5.6.5.4. Reasons of Service Disruptions in HATSU

It can be clearly seen that there are some disruptions in HATSU's services. I investigated the reasons of the service disruptions and asked some questions. Then I categorized the various

¹⁰⁵ 'Şimdi ben köy hizmetleri döneminde muhtarlık yaptım. Tabi ki köy hizmetleri zamanında, köy statüsündeyken daha iyiydi. Çünkü rant yok, rüşvet yok, siyaset yok. Ama şimdi biliyorsunuz belediyelerin tümü Maşallah, benden zengin oldular.'

¹⁰⁶ 'Vallahi size bir şey söyleyeyim mi? Üç kademe var: Birincisi İl Özel İdaresi. Ondan önce ikincisi Köy Hizmetleri. Sonra da Büyükşehir Belediyesi. Bunların içinde en güzel hizmeti, en iyi hizmeti Köy Hizmetlerinden almıştık. İl Özel İdaresi de fena değildi. Ama bu en son Büyükşehir Belediyesi, Köyleri Bölme Birliği oldu yani. İl Özel İdaresinde de siyaset dönüyordu. İnsan odaklı hizmet yapmıyoruz maalesef. Siyaset odaklı hizmet yapıyoruz.'

¹⁰⁷ 'Hayır, hiç doğru bir karar değildi. Eski konumuzda, Özel İdare'de olsaydık bundan çok daha iyiydi. (...) Özel İdare verseydi daha iyiydi. Hiç olmazsa o zaman biz kişileri bulup yaptırıyorduk ne istiyorsak. Şimdi bizim buradan merkeze gitmemiz de zor oluyor. Onlara ulaşmamız da zor oluyor. Gütsek kimseyi bir daha yerinde bulamıyoruz. Terör var diye buralara da gelemiyorlar. Hiç olmazsa biz o zaman kendimiz kendimize çare oluyorduk.'

answers into the following groups. Discrimination in service provision (political discrimination, ethnical discrimination, geographical - two sides of mountain discrimination); distance to the centre (Antakya); political factors, and other factors (not finding the relevant personnel in HATSU or lack of relevant personnel, the Law No 6360; difference in political parties, factors based on actors and administration, equivocation tactics, issues with the transition period, financial difficulties, large service area, authority confusion, and the HATSU team.)

1. Discrimination in Service Provision: I asked headmen whether there is any discrimination in service provision of HATSU. 35.5% of the headmen think that there is discrimination in service provision of HATSU. These headmen are particularly in Dörtüol, Payas and Kırıkhan. 64.5% of the headmen think that there is no discrimination in service provision of HATSU (see Table 61).

Table 61 Discrimination in service provision of HATSU

	Village	Small Municipality	Neighbourhood	Total
Discrimination in service provision	36	15	19	64
Percent	36%	50%	38%	35.5%
No discrimination in service provision	64	15	31	106
Percent	64%	50%	62%	64.5%
Total	100	30	50	180

64% of the headmen in villages, 50% of the headmen in small municipalities and 62% of the headmen in neighbourhoods think that there is no discrimination in service provision of HATSU. These affect the headmen's opinions positively. The headman of Seferli village in Altınözü states that there is no discrimination in service provision of HATSU.

I don't think there's any discrimination [in service provision]. Other friends - I've heard such rumours - but I do not give much possibility. Cause' there is no discrimination [in our village]. Let me tell clearly, there is no need to lie. I don't think that it's realistic.¹⁰⁸

On the other hand, headmen who state that there is discrimination in service provision explain the various types of the discrimination in service provision of HATSU. 90 headmen talk about the political discrimination in service provision. 44 of them (48.8%) state that there is discrimination on the basis of a politics. They assert that service is not provided to the

¹⁰⁸ 'Bence [hizmette ayırım] olmadı. Diğer arkadaşlar, böyle dedikodular duydum ama ben çok ihtimal vermiyorum. Çünkü bende böyle bir şey olmadı. Açık söyleyeyim, yalana gerek yok. Bence ayırım filan bunlar çok gerçekçi değil.'

neighbourhood where AKP voters live. Headmen mostly in Kırıkhan and Reyhanlı state that there is political discrimination in service delivery. In the words of the headman of Camuzkışlası in Kırıkhan:

Yes, they [HATSU] don't care about us. We go there, they write to notebook. [HATSU] say, 'Your village didn't vote [for CHP]. There is no service to you'. They don't work since we support AKP.¹⁰⁹

The headman of Yenişehir in Altınözü states: 'That's to say: Altınözü doesn't vote for CHP. Why? For, this is a rural area. The metropolitan municipality punishes us since Altınözü don't vote for CHP'.¹¹⁰ Likewise the headman of Akarca in İskenderun points out political discrimination in service provision of HATSU.

No, no, it's done consciously. For example, I support AKP. Since I support AKP, the man [mayor of the metropolitan municipality] tells me: 'I have no business with people who support AKP'. If AKP comes to power in the metropolitan municipality tomorrow, will the other man [the mayor is from AKP] says that I have no business with the people who support CHP? Should the mayor be like this? Everyone has their own opinion. Don't you think so?¹¹¹

The headman of Sebenoba in Yayladağı provides the best explanation: 'Is there politics without political discrimination?'¹¹² On the other hand, 46 of the headmen (51.2%) think that there is no political discrimination. This is a positive development for HATSU. The headman of Aşağıokçular in Defne objects to the claims of political discrimination: 'No, no. If so, the service would not be provided to my neighbourhood. The people in our neighbourhood vote for all parties. Praise be, our mayor [of metropolitan municipality] does not discriminate.'¹¹³ The headman of Ballıöz in Defne explains why he think that there is no political discrimination.

¹⁰⁹ 'Evet dikkate almıyorlar. Oraya gidiyoruz, deftere yazıyorlar. Sizin köye diyor, oy çıkmamış, hizmet yok diyor. Biz AKP'liyiz diye, iş yapmıyorlar.'

¹¹⁰ 'Şimdi şöyle: Bizim Altınözü'nden CHP'ye oy çıkmaz. Niye? Çünkü burası kırsal yer. Buradan oy çıkmadığı için Büyükşehir bizi bu konuda cezalandırıyor.'

¹¹¹ 'Hayır, hayır, bilinçli yapılıyor bize. Ben AKP'liyim mesela. Ben AKP'li olduğum için adam bana diyor ki benim AKP'lilerle işim yok diyor. Yarın AKP'li gelir, o zaman öbür adam der mi benim CHP'li ile işim yok diye. Bu şans var mı başkanın? Herkesin kendine göre bir görüşü vardır. Öyle değil mi?'

¹¹² 'Şimdi siyasette ayırım olmadan siyaset olur mu?'

¹¹³ 'Hayır, hayır. Öyle olsa benim mahalleme hizmet gelmezdi. Bizde herkese oy veren var. Maşallah bizim başkanımız hiç bir ayırım yapmıyor.'

It's impossible to discriminate. Let me give you an example of this man [Lütfü Savaş]. He worked for AKP and worked for MHP. This man was once a Hatay lover. Let's disregard the parties. Even he is from another party, these people vote this man for his personality. This man was working for AKP. They came to the man from CHP and said, 'Come here, your place is here'. This man is far above the partisanship. Once, they won't let this man work peaceful.¹¹⁴

The headman of Yeşilköy in Samandağ cites an interesting anecdote:

I said in all honesty: 'Mr. Mayor, Samandağ is the castle of CHP, give us some attention'. I said him to discriminate. He said, 'No. CHP, AKP, MHP are the same for me. I'm starting to love him much more after he said that.'¹¹⁵

When I asked the headmen whether there is a political discrimination in service provision of HATSU, the headmen replied by referring to Lütfü Savaş.

A total of 37 headmen mentioned discrimination in service provision on the basis of geographic location. 26 of them (70.3%) state that there is discrimination based on 'this side versus the other side of the mountain'. These headmen are mostly in Erzin, Dörtöy and Payas, which are located in the 'other side of the mountain' from the centre (Antakya) and located at the very edges of the second region of HATSU. They think that HATSU provides services particularly to the first region. The Amanos Mountains are a big barrier in providing services. The mountain range creates not only long distances but also social, economic and cultural differences. This is a negative remark for HATSU. The headman of Kuyuluk in Erzin points out geographical discrimination in Hatay.

It is better if these services are assigned to the district municipalities. In Hatay, there is a [discrimination] as this side and other side of the mountain. There is a different perspective beyond Belen. There is a different viewpoint before Belen. Dörtöy, Erzin, particularly Erzin is the farthest district.¹¹⁶

He also mentions social and cultural differences between these two sides. Headman of Çağlalık village in Payas claims that service provision is better at 'the other side of the mountain': 'No,

¹¹⁴ 'Ayrım olması zaten mümkün değil. Bu adamdan [Lütfü Savaş] örnek vereyim size. AKP'de çalışmış, MHP'de çalışmış. Bu adam bir defa Hatay sevdalı bir adam. Partileri geçelim. Başka bir partiden de olsa bu insanlar bu adama şahsı için veriyorlar. Bu adam AKP'de çalışıyordu. CHP'den gelip adama dediler ki, gel senin yerin burası. Bu adam parti şeyini geçecek bir defa. Bu adamın rahat çalışmasına izin vermiyorlar bir defa.'

¹¹⁵ 'Ben dedim açık açık. Sayın başkanım dedim, Samandağ CHP'nin kalesi, biraz bize önem verin. Ayrımcılık yapın dedim. Dedi ki, 'Yok CHP, AKP, MHP benim için tek' dedi. Ben vallahi de billahi bu sözü söylemesiyle bana, fazlasıyla sevmeye başladım.'

¹¹⁶ 'Vallahi bu hizmetler şimdi ilçe belediyelerine verilirse daha iyi olur. Şimdi bizim bu Hatay dağın öte yüzü, beri yüzü denilen bir şey var. Şimdi Belen'den öbür tarafa ayrı bir bakış var. Belen'den bu tarafa ayrı bir bakış var. Dörtöy, Erzin, hele Erzin en uzak ilçesi...'

there is a tradition here: This side and other side of the mountain. It is said that if [any service] remains from other side of the mountain only then, it is sent to this side.’¹¹⁷ The headman of Tatarlı in Arsuz is very angry with HATSU as he thinks that the services are provided better at ‘the other side’.

Now, Tatarlı, Isikli, Konacık, Kale, Haymeseki cannot benefit [from the services]. Why? There is not much service provision to this side of the mountain, to the sea side. But if it is remained or you insist too much, if you bribe - these are done – asphalt, odds and needs will be made. But now, one road was cut [in order to repair the breakdown by HATSU], okay? I've been telling them for a long time. They came, they cut it; they said okay, they left. A road near the mosque. [They say] ‘No allowance’, talk the talk ... walk the walk... There is an allowance for elsewhere [the other side], but why not for here? I don't understand why.’¹¹⁸

On the other hand, a few headmen ‘on the other side of the mountain’ reject this claim:

It is said in our side that the service is provided better at the other side. You go to the other side; they say that the service is provided better at the other side. I don't believe this. These are gossips.’¹¹⁹

Furthermore, I asked the headman of Muhlisali in Belen whether the geographical structure influences the service provision. He replied: ‘Of course, the physical structure is disrupting it. For example, a railway will be built, but we cannot create a route to cover all districts. Because there is no consolidation, the metropolitan municipality will have difficulty in providing these services.’¹²⁰ This answer is a perfect description of the lack of consolidation in Hatay in terms of service provision.

Moreover, some headmen indicate another form of discrimination based upon geographical structure. They put forward that there is discrimination in service provision of HATSU

¹¹⁷ ‘Yok, burada bir gelenek var: Dağın bu yüzü, öbür yüzü. Derler ki bizim burada, dağın öbür yüzünden artarsa, bizim bu yüze hizmet gönderir.’

¹¹⁸ ‘Şimdi buralarda yani Tatarlı, Işıklı, Konacık, Kale, Haymeseki faydalansak faydalansak faydalanamıyoruz. Niye desen? Dağın bu tarafına deniz tarafına fazla bir hizmet yok. Ancak artarsa veya çok bastırırsan, yedirirsen, içirirsen - bunlar yapılıyor- ufak tefek asfalt filan yapılıyor. Ama şimdi, bir tane yol yarıldı, tamam mı? Kaç zamandır beri söylüyorum. Geldiler, biçtiler, tamam dediler, gittiler. Caminin yanında bir yol. Yok, ödenek yok, yok şu yok, bu yok... Başka yere ödenek var da buraya niye ödenek yok? Bunun nedeni nedir ya, ben anlamıyorum ya.’

¹¹⁹ ‘Şimdi bizim bu çevre diyor ki, öbür tarafa hizmet yapılıyor. Öbür tarafa gidiyorsun, onlar diyor öbür tarafa yapılıyor diyorlar. Ben ona pek inanmıyorum. Bunlar hep dedikodu.’

¹²⁰ ‘Şimdi tabi ki fiziki yapı bunu bozuyor. Mesela bir tren yolu yapılacak ama tüm ilçeleri kapsayacak bir güzergah oluşturamıyoruz. İşte bir bütünlük olmadığı için BŞB bu hizmetlerde zorlanacaktır haliyle.’

between the sea side and mountain side. I ask ‘Why do you think that you do not receive HATSU services? The headman of Harlısu village in Arsuz replies: ‘I don’t know that, probably because we are mountain village. I know, the services are provided in the settlements which are at the seaside’. ¹²¹

2. Distance to Central District of Hatay (Antakya): 65 headmen mention about the distance to centre as a factor affecting service provision of HATSU. 47 of them (72.3%) emphasize that distance to centre negatively affected the service provision of HATSU. These headmen are mostly in Arsuz, Erzin and Dörtöy. These district municipalities are in the second region of HATSU. Long distance to centre negatively affects the headmen’s opinion about HATSU.

The headman of Işıklı in Arsuz explains the problems of being far away from the centre. He claims that service was provided depending upon the distance.

We do not reach the metropolitan municipality. Since we were in the further corner, we couldn't get the services. We have difficulty in conveying our problems. We have to go to Antakya to express our particular problems. Sometimes we talk to the heads of departments, the managers. Are [our demands] met? Only 20% of them are met; 80% of them are not met. ¹²²

Similarly, the headman of Kale village in Arsuz talks about the costs of communication with the central administration of HATSU which is located in Antakya.

Exactly the same, I have to go to Antakya. Here you know our situation. There is no direct route to here. I move around the Arsuz-İskenderun road. I mean every commute costs me 100 TL of fuel. Fuel is 100 TL. When you eat lunch, it costs 150 TL. If I solve this issue by commuting 3 times a month, my budget must be minimum 500-600 TL each month. We take after it with our possibilities. When we submit [to HATSU] with a petition, it should be automatically evaluated. Yet, we have to go to thousand times in order to learn what happened to our petition, what has HATSU done? However, there is still no result. ¹²³

¹²¹ ‘Onu bilemeyeceğim, biz dağ köyü olduğumuz için herhalde. Denizin kenarında olan yerlere hep gidiyor hizmet, biliyorum.’

¹²² ‘Biz büyükşehir belediyesine pek ulaşamıyoruz. Ücra köşede olduğumuz için, hizmetleri alamadık. Sorunlarımızı iletmede çok zorluk çekiyoruz. Özel sorunlarımızı dile getirmek için Antakya’ya kadar gitmek zorunda kalıyoruz. Bazen daire başkanlarıyla, müdürlerle konuşuyoruz. Karşılıyor mu peki? %20’si ancak karşılanıyor. %80’i zor.’

¹²³ ‘Aynen Antakya’ya gidip gelmek zorunda kalıyorum. İşte bizim konumunu da biliyorsunuz. Buradan doğrudan gidilecek yol yok. Arsuz-İskenderun yolu üzerinden dolanıyorum. Yani her gidiş gelişim bana 100 lira yakıta mal oluyor. Yakıtım 100 lira oluyor. Bir yemek yiyeceksin 150 lira oluyor. Ben bu konuyu ayda 3 defa gidip gelerek halletsem, zaten ayda 500-600 lira sırf buna gidiyor. Bizim imkanlarımızla biz kendimiz yani peşine düşüyoruz. Biz dilekçe verdiğimiz zaman o otomatik olarak kendiliğinden düşmesi gerekiyor. Ama biz ne oldu dilekçemize, ne yaptınız diye bin defa gidiyoruz. Ama yine de netice yok.’

The headman of Aşağıburnaz in Erzin mentions the problems with HATSU based upon distance to centre and the difficulty of communicating with HATSU.

This could be a problem in the metropolitan municipality: The distance to the centre is a little problem as it is far away. We can reach the friends [the teams] here easily, but we cannot find a respondent for another issues. You apply to each unit step by step until you reach to the centre. [HATSU] is a little far away for these issues. There are many steps to reach the centre.¹²⁴

On the other hand, there are also neighbourhoods far away from the centre in the first region of HATSU. However, headmen of these neighbourhoods stated that distance was not a serious problem in service provision.

3. Political Factors: 83 of the headmen (%46.1) refer to political factors as a reason for disruption of HATSU's service provision. Some of them state that council members from AKP try to hinder the projects and services mayor of metropolitan municipality suggests in the council. In the words of the headman of Yeniyurt in Dörtöyl: 'When we call heads of departments, they say 'You talk about this but we can't do works here. There is obstruction [by the council members] from AKP. They obstruct our works. They don't sign.'¹²⁵ The headman of Eriklikuyu in Samandağ explains these political factors in detail.

When Hatay became metropolitan municipality, an unfortunate situation occurred. The mayor of the metropolitan municipality is from CHP and the most of the council members are from AKP. Now people don't get along well with each other here. Hence the citizen suffers from this. We go to the metropolitan municipality and tell them about [our problems or demands]. [The mayor] says, 'They [council members from AKP] don't let me use the credit. I can't make this investment with this money'. They say, 'We give [approval] for him to use credit, but he doesn't use the credit properly.' What a pity that everyone has found a pretext, and live in a certain way.

¹²⁶

¹²⁴ 'Büyükşehirdeki sıkıntılar şu olabilir. Mesafe uzak olduğu için merkeze biraz sıkıntı oluyor. Şimdi buradaki arkadaşlara bir patlak filan olduğu zaman daha çabuk ulaşabiliyoruz ama daha başka konular için muhatap için kimseyi bulamıyoruz. Aşama aşama her birime başvuruyorsunuz, merkeze gidinceye kadar. Bu konularda biraz uzak oluyor. Merdiven basamağı çok ulaşmak için.'

¹²⁵ 'Daire başkanlarını aradığımızda, muhtarım işte siz bunu diyorsunuz ama biz burada iş yapamıyoruz, AKP'nin engellemeleri çok. Bizim yapacağımız işi engelliyorlar, imzalamıyorlar, diyorlar.'

¹²⁶ 'Hatay'ın büyükşehir olurken şöyle bir şanssızlığı da oldu. Büyükşehir belediye başkanı CHP'nin, meclis üyelerinin çoğunluğu AKP. Şimdi insanlar bir şekilde burada anlaşıyorlar. Anlaşamayınca mağduriyet vatandaşa oluyor. Şimdi büyükşehir gidiyoruz. Diyoruz ki, 'Arkadaş böyle böyle bir durum'. Diyor ki, 'Bana kredi kullandırmıyorlar. Ben bu parayla bu yatırımı yapamam'. Onlar da diyor ki, 'Biz bu adama krediyi veriyoruz. Ama bu adam bu krediyi doğru kullanamıyor.' Herkes maalesef kendine göre bir bahane, bir yol tutmuş.'

The headman of Muhlisali in Belen explains the conflicts between the council members and the mayor.

Here they [AKP and CHP] get rent from each other. People who are from AKP do not want CHP to work there. They [AKP] strive to ensure that their candidate will become mayor of this city in the future, if they [CHP] are in trouble. It stems from that. What happened first about water [price]? The members of the council approved the high price. The mayor's authority was not enough to stop it, they approved. Then they came back and they said that the Mayor Lütfü makes you drink expensive water. They spread rumors. After that they took him to court. You know, things like that happen in politics.¹²⁷

However, the headman of Çağlalık in Payas explains why the council members from AKP refuse to authorize Mayor Lütfü Savaş to take loans.

Look, I have just gone to their council meetings. At the meeting, mayor of the metropolitan municipality says, 'I want the authority to take loans. Authorize a loan of 250 million TL, I'll become indebted'. They ask, 'What do you think you will do?' 'I will build roads. The other side, men from AKP say, 'My brother, you have never touched these roads for 5 years. You say that you will finish these roads before the election. You have your own resources, why haven't you done it step by step?' As far as we can see, Hatay Metropolitan Municipality spends a lot of money on social activities. I think the money needs to be spent on infrastructure. For me, what changes if Hatay BSB basketball team in the 1st league, what happens, if not? Yet, for me the roads are important, water is important, sewage is important.¹²⁸

The headman points out an important point about for what and for whom the mayor of the metropolitan municipality uses the loan. On the other hand, according to a few headmen, council members from CHP are doing something behind mayor's back. The headman of Derekuyu in Arsuz says: 'I'm really pleased with Lütfü Savaş. He is very good but those around him discriminate on a political basis.'¹²⁹ The headman of Maraşboğazı in Antakya also asserts:

¹²⁷ 'İşte bunlar birbirlerinden rant sağlıyorlar. Şimdi AKP'liler tutup da orada CHP'lilerin iş yapmasını istemez. Onlar zor durumda kalsın ki gelecekte bizim adayımız bu şehrin belediye başkanlığını alsın diye çaba gösteriyorlar. Ondan kaynaklanıyor. Su konusunda ilk önce ne oldu? Meclis üyeleri yüksek fiyata onay verdiler. Başkanın yetkisi yetmedi, onayladılar. Ondan sonra geri döndüler dediler ki Lütfü başkan size pahalı su içiriyor. Onun dedikodusunu yaptılar. Arkasından tuttular, onu mahkemeye verdiler. Bu gibi şeyler siyasette oluyor yani.'

¹²⁸ 'Bak, ben şimdi gittim meclis toplantılarına. Toplantıda diyor ki, borçlanma yetkisi istiyorum BSB başkanı. Bana 250 milyon yetki verin, ben borçlanacağım. Ne yapacaksın diyorlar? İşte ben yolları yapacağım. Diyor ki karşı taraf AKP'nin adamları, kardeşim sen bu 5 yıl bu yolları hiç ellememişsin. Seçime kadar sen bu yolları bitireceğim diyorsun. Niye, öz kaynakların var, yavaş yavaş yapmadın bu işi? Şimdi bizim gördüğümüz kadarıyla Hatay BSB sosyal faaliyetlere çok para harcıyor. Bence alt yapıya harcanması lazım. Net. Şimdi benim için Hatay BSB'nin basket takımı 1. ligde olsa ne olur, olmasa ne olur? Ama benim için yol önemli, su önemli, kanalizasyon önemli.'

¹²⁹ Ben ama Lütfü Savaş'tan memnunum, yalan yok. Adam çok iyi. Ama çevresindekiler bunu [siyasi ayrımı] yapan.

Yes, yes, HATSU has failed the class. Yet, Lütfü Savaş doesn't hear about some things. In fact, the directors under the command of him take side against us. I mean Mr Lütfü doesn't know about most of them.¹³⁰

Moreover, most headmen state that the mayor of the district municipality and the mayor of metropolitan municipality do not get along with each other. Mayors' disagreement might be political or personal. These political factors influence service provision negatively. This issue was discussed in the previous subsections. On the other hand, most of the interviewees think that if the mayor of Hatay Metropolitan Municipality was from the ruling party AKP, it would be better in terms of service provision.

4. Other Factors: 46 of the headmen mention the personnel who work in the HATSU's buildings as a factor affecting service provision of HATSU. 41 (89.1%) of these headmen state that they cannot find the relevant personnel or there is no relevant personnel in HATSU when they want to inform a need, request or complaint about water and sewage services. The headman of Harlısu in Arsuz claims: 'Sure, the service is not provided. We can't commute to Antakya easily. When we can go, we can't find anyone to respond. The petitions that we submit go to waste.'¹³¹

12 headmen believe that if the same party held the district municipalities and metropolitan municipalities, there would be no disruption in service provision. As in the words of the headman of Kale in Arsuz, 'In my opinion, [the troubles in service provision] would be overcome. I think, if there are 100 problems [now], 90 of 100 would not be a problem any more'.¹³² Also the headman of Güzelçay in İskenderun states, 'Absolutely, the service would be better. I mean, if [the mayor of metropolitan municipality] was from the ruling party, it would be better. The ruling party is the ruler'.¹³³

¹³⁰ 'Evet, evet, HATSU olarak sınıfta kaldı. Bazı şeylerden de Lütfü Savaş'ın haberi olmuyor. Onun altındaki müdürler filan esas taraflılığı onlar yapıyor ablam. Yani çoğundan haberi olmuyor Lütfü beyin.'

¹³¹ 'Hizmet gelmiyor tabi. Şimdi biz buradan kalkıp Antakya merkeze kolay gidip gelemiyoruz. Gitsek muhatap bulamıyoruz. Verdiğimiz dilekçeler hep boşa gidiyor.'

¹³² 'Bence giderilirdi. Yani en azından bu sorunların 100 tanesinde yaşıyorsa, 90'ında sıkıntı çıkmazdı, diye düşünüyorum.'

¹³³ 'Kesinlikle, hizmet daha iyi olurdu. Yani hükümetin partisinden olsaydı, iktidar partisinden olsaydı daha da iyi olurdu tabi. İktidar partisi her zaman için iktidardır.'

15 headmen allege that service provision totally depends on the authorities and the administration. As the headman of Piriçlik in Arsuz explains:

Between the ruler and the ruled, that is, between the roof and the base, there must be a love, respect and harmony, a consensus. Yet, this does not exist. I don't trust the municipality; I call the municipality a thief. The municipality never trusts me, says, 'Does he vote for me?' This is bad.¹³⁴

The headman of Yeniyapan in Hassa also refers to the effect of administration on the service provision.

No, it's not about distance, or proximity. It's all about incompetence and improvidence of people. Consider a metropolitan municipality. Eight secretaries have changed. Eight secretaries. Everything changed until you got people to do something.¹³⁵

17 headmen mention the evasion tactics of HATSU. The headman of Sinanlı in Defne argues that although they listen and promise to meet the demands, they never deliver later on.

Communication is very easy. We often go and come back. Everyone welcomes us well. 'Welcome, my headman. Goodbye, my headman. You tell them about your problems as much as you want. 'Okay, with great pleasure.' There are unanswered petitions. 'Unfortunately, there is no funds, no money. That's how they pass.'¹³⁶

The excuse of HATSU is lack of money. The headman of Kaledibi in İskenderun explains the evasion tactics of HATSU by comparing it to Special Provincial Administration:

They [HATSU] say okay, then nothing. Previously, we would go to the Special Administration and apply. At least they told whether or not it would be put into practice. HATSU say, 'All right, all right.' They're evading us. They say, 'We will do it when there is money'.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ 'İdare edenle, idare edilenler arasında, yani tavanla taban arasında bir sevgi saygı bir uyum olmalı, bir fikir birlikteliği olmalı. E bu yok. Ben belediyeye güvenmiyorum, belediyeye hırsız diyorum. Belediye bana hiç güvenmiyor, zaten bana oy mu veriyor diye. Olmadı bu.'

¹³⁵ 'Hayır, uzaklık, yakınlık durumuyla alakalı değil. Tamamen kişilerin beceriksizliği, basiretsizliği ile alakalı. Bir büyük düşünün. Sekiz tane genel sekreteri değişmiş yani. Sekiz tane. İnsanlara bir şeyi yaptırana kadar her şey bakmışsınız değişmiş.'

¹³⁶ 'İletişim çok rahat. Gidip gidip geliyoruz. Herkes bizi güzel karşılıyor. 'Hoş geldiniz muhtarım. Hadi güle güle muhtarım.' Siz istediğiniz kadar anlatın derdinizi. 'Tamam başım gözüm üstüne.' Birikmiş dilekçeler var. 'Maalesef işte ödenek yok, para yok.' Öyle geçiştiriyorlar işte.'

¹³⁷ 'Tamam diyorlar, sonra tık yok. Önceden Özel İdare'ye gidip başvuru yapılırdı. En azından yapıp yapılmayacağını söylerlerdi. Şimdi o yok. Tamam, tamam, deyip bizi oyalıyorlar. Bütçe olduğunda yapacağız diyorlar.'

13 headmen point out the confusion between metropolitan municipality and district municipalities regarding authority, which causes service disruption. As the headman of Aşkarbeyli in İskenderun mentions:

There are good sides and bad sides [of HATSU]. Its negative side: We demand service. We go to district municipality; they say ‘Go to the metropolitan municipality.’ We go to the metropolitan municipality, they say, ‘Go to the district municipality.’ Sometimes there are situations where we are in such a contradiction.¹³⁸

Furthermore, 21 headmen express that the teams of HATSU do not work efficiently, carefully or respectfully. For some, there are fewer HATSU teams responsible for responding to the breakdowns. For some, vehicles and equipment of HATSU are inadequate for providing service. According to the headman of Yeşilköy in Samandağ:

To give an example, HATSU has one or two teams in Samandağ that repair breakdowns. We went [to HATSU] when we met with the general manager of HATSU, he says, ‘No money to us’. They [HATSU] gave two breakdown teams and one excavator to all 42 neighbourhoods [of Samandağ]. My brother, can you take care of these [neighbourhoods] with a excavator? HATSU should give at least one or two more excavators to Samandağ. It also gives us 10-15 more employees. Sometimes when there's a breakdown, they can't go and repair. There are sometimes 50-60 breakdowns per day. When it rains, maybe 100 [breakdowns per day]¹³⁹

According to some headmen, coordinators of HATSU in the regions are not good at their work. For others, employees responsible for reading the water meters do not behave well and respectfully towards the subscribers. For some, officers working in HATSU's buildings were not professionals in their job. The headman of Mustafalı in Erzin claims:

Then there's a problem with the management. There were 120 people working for the metropolitan municipality in Erzin. There were also 70 staffs in Erzin municipalities. Now I'm thinking what do these staffs do? I went and asked one of them: ‘What are you doing here? Give me a document of your work.’ Nothing!¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ ‘Şimdi iyi tarafı, artı tarafı da var. Eksi tarafı: Biz hizmet istiyoruz. Küçük şehre gidiyoruz. O diyor ki büyükşehre gidin. Büyükşehre gidiyoruz. O diyor ki küçük şehre. Bazen böyle çelişkide kaldığımız durumlar oluyor.’

¹³⁹ ‘HATSU'nun bizim Samandağ'da bir iki ekip var örneğin arızaya bakan. Gittik, HATSU genel müdürü ile görüştüğümüzde bize para yok diyorlar. Şimdi bütün 42 mahalleye iki tane arıza ekibi vermişler, bir tane kepçe vermişler. Kardeşim sen bir kepçeyle bunları yetiştirebilir misin? Örnek söylüyorum HATSU Samandağ için en azından bir iki kepçe daha vermesi lazım. Bir de 10-15 kişi daha vermesi lazım. Bazen arıza olduğu zaman işte adamlar yetiştiremiyor. 50-60 tane arıza bazen günde oluyor. Yağmur yağdığı zaman belki 100.’

¹⁴⁰ ‘O zaman yönetimde bir sıkıntı var. Erzin'de büyükşehir adına çalışan 120 kişiymiş. 120 personel varmış, 70 tane de Erzin belediyesinin varmış. Şimdi düşünüyorum bu kadar personel ne iş yapıyor? Ben gittim sordum birini yakalayıp. Sen ne yapıyorsun burada, yaptığın işlerin bir dökümanını ver bakalım bana dedim. Maalesef.’

On the other hand, some headmen argue that the problems in service provision are not completely HATSU's responsibility. There are a few external factors that affect its working conditions. For example, 42 headmen state that it is the transition period that disrupts the service provision of HATSU. According to these headmen, the metropolitan municipality has recently been established and everyone is trying to adapt the new system. Therefore, it is hard for HATSU to provide service efficiently as soon as possible. The headman of Atik in Belen draws an analogy for the transition period.

So let's think: Now a child is born. The elders are trying to make it walk by holding its hands. I mean our metropolitan municipality is in the same situation now. It is like a new-born. I don't think it's going to bad in the future. Everything's going to be all right.¹⁴¹

They hope that HATSU would improve in the future. Moreover, 11 headmen claimed that HATSU had no sufficient revenues or funding. For this reason, HATSU has difficulties in providing service efficiently. If HATSU had sufficient financial resources, the service would become better. As in the words of the headman of Hamam in Kumlu:

No, no. There is no discrimination. As there is no allowance, [services] are tardy. Anyway, I state only for the water services. Otherwise, other services were provided. Our water wells, roads, all of them were built.¹⁴²

Furthermore, 23 of the headmen expressed that since the service area of HATSU was very large, it could not deliver services to every neighbourhood in time. As the headman of Karacami in Payas claims:

They can't reach, they can't reach. Area is wide. They can't reach because the area is large. Indeed, they are right. Approximately there are 600 neighbourhoods. It is difficult from Erzin to Yayladağ. It is not easy to serve such a large area. But they haven't adapted the new system yet.¹⁴³

Also, 12 the headmen claimed that the reason for the disruption in service provision is the Law No 6360 itself. As in the words of Gökgöl in Erzin:

¹⁴¹ 'Yani şöyle düşünelim: Şimdi bir çocuk doğuyor. Bunu büyükler elinden tutup yürütmeye çalışıyor. Yani bizim BŞB şu an aynı durumda. Yeni doğmuş bebek gibi. Bu ileriki zamanlarda kötü olacağını zannetmiyorum. Her yer düzelecek.'

¹⁴² 'Yok, yok, ayırım yok. Ödenek olmadığı için gecikiyor. Yani ben sadece su için söylüyorum hem. Yoksa diğer hizmetler yapıldı hep. Kuyularımız, yollarımız, hepsi yapıldı.'

¹⁴³ 'Yetişemiyorlar, yetişemiyorlar. Alan geniş. Alan geniş olduğundan dolayı yetişemiyorlar. Şimdi onlar da haklı. Tahminen 600 tane mahallesi var. Ta Erzin'den Yayladağı'na kadar zor. Bu kadar büyük bir alana hizmet etmek de kolay değil. Ama oturtamadılar daha yeni sistemi.'

Since the very beginning, I've been saying that also at meetings. Whoever made the Metropolitan Law [Law No 6360], they made it very wrong. (...) Why? For example, here I am in a village 110 km away [Antakya]. You cannot reach the central administration [in Antakya], even if you do your best.¹⁴⁴

The headman of Pirinçlik village in Arsuz criticizes the Law No 6360. He asserts that although the government enacted the law under the pretence of public interest, there are other political reasons of the law.

Yes, headmen have already experienced the biggest problem. The metropolitan law [Law No 6360] places a huge obligation on us. When the law was enacted, the government - I don't suppose that it had the best of intentions - might have thought that it would be more beneficial, municipal revenues would be spread to the public, but unfortunately they could not reach beyond their political ideology. In other words, just as the government managed the Special Provincial Administration like its own backyard, the municipalities couldn't avoid doing the same thing: dividing the people between those who vote for them and those who don't vote¹⁴⁵

These arguments of the headman of Pirinçlik contribute to verification of this dissertation's hypothesis.

5.6.5.5 Which Institution is the Most Ideal in Providing Water and Sewage Services?

I asked the headmen which institution would be the most ideal in providing water and sewage services. 99 of the headmen (43.8%) think that HATSU should continue to provide water and sewage services. On the other hand, 56.2% of the headmen refer to institutions other than HATSU as the ideal service provider. The institutions mentioned are Special Provincial Administration, central state and district municipalities. 36 headmen state that Special Provincial Administration was the best in providing water and sewage services. All of these headmen are in the villages. As in the words of the headman of Tatarlı in Arsuz:

If you relay these issues to someone in charge, the state had an institution, called Village Services. It was much better. It was not necessary to transform from the villages into neighbourhoods. These villagers rebel a lot. You see these villagers can't handle this.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ 'Ben bunu baştan beri, toplantılarda da söylüyorum. BŞB Kanunu kim yaptıysa çok hatalı yapmış. ... Neden peki dersin işte burada ben mesela 110 km ötede bir köyüm. Merkezi yönetim yani ne kadar ulaşabilirim desen de ulaşamazsın.'

¹⁴⁵ 'Evet zaten en büyük sıkıntıyı muhtarlar yaşıyor. Büyükşehir yasasının bize çok büyük yükümlülükleri var. Yasa çıkartıldığında belki hükümet -ben çok iyi niyetli olduğunu da düşünmüyorum ama- daha faydalı olur, belediye gelirleri halka, tabana yayılır diye düşünmüş olabilir ama maalesef siyasi çizgiden dışarı çıkamadılar. Yani nasıl hükümet Özel İdareleri kendi arka bahçesi gibi yönettiyse belediyeler de bana oy veren vermeyen şeklinde bu çizgiden dışarı çıkamadılar.'

¹⁴⁶ 'Eğer yetkili birine ileteceksen bu konuları, devletin KHGB diye kurumu vardı. O çok daha iyiydi. Köyden mahalleye aktarmamak gerekiyordu bir anda. Bu millet çok isyan ediyor. Yani bu millet çekemiyor bu işi.'

According to 16 headmen, district or small municipalities should provide water and sewage services. The headman of Kıyığören in Altınözü claims:

That's to say: It will be more wonderful, beautiful, better, if the district municipality provides this service. Now, [the authority] is with the metropolitan municipality. Until we go to the metropolitan municipality, they always find an excuse, so we can't reach them. All these problems arise because they do not assign these services to the district municipalities.¹⁴⁷

For 5 headmen, central government should deliver these services. As a result, these point to a negative outlook towards HATSU.

5.6.5.6. Abolishing villages and small municipalities

I asked headmen of villages if they thought the Law No 6360 abolishing the legal entity of villages was a good decision. I also asked the headmen of small municipalities if they thought the Law No 6360 abolishing the legal entity of small municipalities was a good decision. I did not ask this question to the headmen of neighbourhoods. 33 (67%) village headmen express that abolishing villages was not a good decision. The headman of Bektaşlı in Kırıkhan shortly states, 'The villagers said that if the metropolitan municipality wasn't established, it would have been better. Because are they willing to pay water fee?'¹⁴⁸ The headman of Aşağıkepirce in Arsuz explains why it was not a good decision to abolish the villages.

That was not true at all. The people here still live like in the village, but the law is regulated according to the metropolitan municipality. There's an imbalance here. They are still engaged in vineyard gardening, they are still engaged in animal husbandry. Tomorrow, what about the water fee? You can't just say that, give up these works? It is impossible. These are their means of living.¹⁴⁹

13 (53.4%) headmen of small municipalities stated that abolishing villages was not a good decision. According to the headman of Aktepe in Hassa: 'No, it was not good to abolish [small municipalities]. If this authority and budget were given to the municipalities, we would have

¹⁴⁷ 'Şimdi şöyle: Her ilçenin kendisi belediyesi bu hizmeti verirse daha harika olur, daha güzel olur, daha iyi olur. Şimdi büyükşehirde olduğu için şimdi biz büyükşehir yetişene kadar yok bu böyle, yok şu şöyle onlara da ulaşamıyoruz. Bütün bu sıkıntıların hepsi bu hizmetleri ilçelerin belediyelerine vermedikleri için çıkıyor.'

¹⁴⁸ '[Köylünün] hepsi diyor, [BŞB] olmasaydık iyiydi diyorlar. Çünkü adam su parası vermeye mi hevesli?'

¹⁴⁹ 'O da hiç doğru değildi. Buradaki insanlar hala köydeki gibi yaşamını sürdürüyor ama yasalar büyükşehir göre ayarlanmış. Burada bir dengesizlik var. Hala bağ bahçe işleriyle uğraşıyorlar, hala hayvancılıkla uğraşıyorlar. Yarın bir gün bunların su parası ne olacak? Bunlara diyemezsin ki hadi bu işleri bırak. Mümkün değil. Geçim kaynakları bu insanların.'

no troubles.’¹⁵⁰ The headman of Gökmeydan in Arsuz points, ‘The small municipalities were actually better. They are closer [to us]. It is different for a metropolitan municipality to govern 15 districts, whereas it is different for a small municipality to govern 10-15 neighbourhoods’.¹⁵¹ These outputs show that abolishing villages and small municipalities was not a good practice.

5.6.5.7. Establishing Metropolitan Municipality in Hatay

I asked all headmen if they thought Hatay was ready for being metropolitan municipality. With this question I intended to learn whether the Law No 6360 establishing a metropolitan municipality in Hatay is considered as a good decision. 74.1% of the headmen argued that becoming a metropolitan municipality was not a good decision for Hatay.

Table 62 Becoming a Metropolitan Municipality

	Village	Small Municipality	Neighbourhood	Total
Good decision	25	10	11	46
Percent	25.5%	33.3%	22.4%	25.9%
Bad decision	73	20	48	131
Percent	74.5%	66.7%	77.6%	74.1%
Total	98	30	49	180

Note: 3 headmen did not give answer to this question.

According to Table 62, 74.5% of the headmen in villages, 66.7% of the headmen in small municipalities and 77.6% of the headmen in the neighbourhoods stated that Hatay was not ready for being metropolitan municipality. The headman of the Işıklı village in Arsuz explains why establishing metropolitan municipality in Hatay was not a good decision.

Being metropolitan municipality of Hatay was a mistake in itself. We weren't ready. There was no foundation for it. There was no necessary staff blah blah... Second, we had more authority to make decisions, because we were providing our services ourselves, we were doing our works with the unions rather than the metropolitan municipality. You were authorized to collect fees from the citizens. There were lots of advantages for us to live in a village. It [Hatay] could be metropolitan municipality, but there was no point in abolishing villages. (...) The Village

¹⁵⁰ ‘Hayır, [beldelerin kapatılması] hiç doğru olmadı. Bu kadar yetki, ödenek beldelere verilseydi zaten hiçbir sorunumuz olmazdı.’

¹⁵¹ ‘Belde belediyeleri daha iyi aslında. Daha yakın aslında. Büyükşehir olunca 15 ilçeyi yönetmek farklı, ama bir beldede 15-20 mahalleyi yönetmek farklı.’

Services was great. We could attend to everybody's problems. The citizens always did [their works] by themselves.¹⁵²

The headman of the Muhlisali neighbourhood in Belen clarifies why Hatay was not ready for being metropolitan municipality.

[Establishing metropolitan municipality in Hatay] was not a right decision. You know it was too early. Maybe being metropolitan municipality is a good thing in terms of savings, it is a good system in terms of cost; but Hatay is not ready for it. For example, our villages are very scattered. The closest village is 10-15 km away. The metropolitan municipality will build road to it. In addition, there is no order in the villages, all of them is scattered. How will [HATSU] build their sewage networks and drinking water system? The most important problem is that the water in the villages is completely connected to the metropolitan municipality. In past, the villager found his spring, built his pipe, and brought water for himself. There is fear among all the villagers that the metropolitan municipality will also take this water. The villager has a problem with such water. When the villages become modernized, the water become very cheap, the villages become well maintained, the metropolitan will be able to serve.¹⁵³

According to these responds, the fact that the Law No 6360 established a metropolitan municipality in Hatay was not a good decision.

5.6.5.8. Testing the Claims of the Law No 6360

I asked the headmen if they think following claims of the Law No 6360 materialized in Hatay: achieving economies of scale; administration, planning and coordination at optimal scale; and more quality service with less resources and low costs. 26 (14.4%) headmen asserted that these claims of the Law No 6360 were realized in Hatay. These headmen were mostly in Defne, Belen and Antakya. However, 144 (75%) headmen alleged that these claims of the Law No 6360 were not materialized in Hatay. 10 headmen did not answered this question.

The headman of İsalı neighbourhood in Erzin explains why the claims of the Law No 6360 have not been achieved in Hatay.

¹⁵² ‘Hatay’ın BŞB olması başlı başına bir hataydı. Biz hazır değildik. Altyapısı yoktu. Bilmem neyi yoktu. İkincisi BŞB’den daha ziyade biz kendi hizmetimizi kendimiz yaptığımız için, birliklerle yaptığımız için daha rahat daha karar alma yetkin vardı. Vatandaşa salma kesme yetkin vardı. Köylü kalmanın yani bizim için çok büyük avantajları vardı. BŞB olabilir ama köyleri kapatmanın anlamı yoktu. (...) [Köy Hizmetleri] harikaydı. Herkesin her işine koşabiliyorduk. Vatandaş hep kendisi, köylü yapıyordu.’

¹⁵³ [Hatay’ın BŞB olması] Doğru bir karar değildi. Erkendi yani. Belki büyükşehir olmak güzel bir şey ama tasarruf anlamında, maliyet anlamında iyi bir sistem ama Hatay buna hazır değil. Mesela köylerimiz çok dağınık bizim. En yakın köy 10-15 km. Bunun yoluna hizmet verecek büyükşehir. Artı köylerde hiçbir şekilde düzen yok, herkes dağınık. Bunun kanalizasyonunu nasıl yapacak, içme suyunu nasıl yapacak? En önemli sorun köylerde suların tamamen büyükşehir bağlanmış olması. Köylünün kendisi pınarını bulmuş, borusunu döşemiş, kendi şahsına su getirmiş. BŞB istese bu suyu da alır korkusu tüm köylüde var. Böyle bir suyla alakalı köylünün sorunu var. Şimdi köyler modernize olur, suyu çok ucuz yaparsınız, köyler bakımlı olur, o zaman BŞB hizmet verebilir.’

No, [the claims of the law] have not come true. First, we are very far from the centre Antakya. I mean it is impossible to provide a service cheaper here. It is not efficient, either. How much time is wasted for a team to commute [between Antakya and Erzin] it is waste. If you say it is quality, Look at the sewage network, its situation is obvious. Think about it.¹⁵⁴

The headman of Eriklikuyu in Samandağ states: ‘No, no. Nothing like that happened about [the claims of the Law No 6360]. The local municipalities used to respond to problems faster and more precisely’.¹⁵⁵ Most headmen suggesting that the goals of Law No 6360 have not been realized is a negative outcome. Furthermore, some headmen allege that the services have been more costly after the Law No 6360. In the words of the headman of Müftüler in Belen:

Of course, Hatay did not qualify for being a metropolitan municipality. When [Hatay] is a metropolitan municipality, there will be very big tax burden for the public. The public doesn't know it, but I do. I told them one by one before the establishment of the metropolitan municipality. Look, you're going to pay these taxes. They say really. When [Hatay] became metropolitan municipality and the taxes increased, they realized it. After that, they called me, ‘My headman, you were right.’ I'm right, but what good is it now?¹⁵⁶

The headman of Çaylı in Dörtöyol insists that if the services are provided by the district municipalities, the cost of the services will be lower.

No, no, [the claim of the Law No 6360] didn't materialized. Being metropolitan municipality is a burden; a burden on the whole country. If Dörtöyol municipality did the same job, [it would be better]. Now the metropolitan municipality does same job, it employs staff, etc.... The district municipality did the same thing. In other words, it is better that local governments should be decentralized.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴ ‘Hayır, [yasanın iddiası] gerçekleşmedi. Mesafe olarak bir Antakya merkeze çok uzağız. Yani mümkün değil bir hizmeti ucuz yapacaksın burada. Verimli desen o da olmuyor. Bir ekipler gitsin gelsin ne kadar zaman harcanıyor boş. Kaliteli desen bak yolların kanalizasyonun hali ortada. Sen düşün artık.’

¹⁵⁵ ‘Yok, yok abla. [Yasanın iddiası] Böyle bir şey olmadı. Yereldeki belediyeler sorunlara daha hızlı, daha keskin yaklaşır.’

¹⁵⁶ ‘Tabi Hatay büyükşehir olma özelliğine sahip değil. Büyükşehir olduğu zaman halka çok büyük külfet, vergi geliyor. Bunu halk bilmiyor ama ben biliyorum. Büyükşehir olmadan önce tek tek anlattım. Bakın bu bu vergileri ödeyeceksiniz diye. Olur mu, dediler filan? Ne zaman büyükşehir oldu, vergiler artınca anladılar. Ondan sonra beni aradılar, muhtarım haklıymışsın. Haklıyım ama neye yaradı?’

¹⁵⁷ ‘[Yasanın iddiası] Yok, yok olmadı. Büyükşehir olması külfet yani ülkenin üzerine külfet. Aynı işi Dörtöyol belediyesi yapsa... Aynı işi şimdi BŞB geldi, eleman aldı, bilmem ne yaptı. E aynı işi o adam da yapıyordu. Yani yerel yönetimlerin kendi şeyinden (yerinden) yönetilmesi daha iyi.’

Likewise, the headman of Numuneevler in Dörtöy states that ‘Being metropolitan municipality is more burdensome for citizen. It's not good for them.’¹⁵⁸

5.7. Conclusion of the Case Study

The research area of this dissertation was Hatay Metropolitan Municipality and its district municipalities. Water and sewerage services were selected for this study. In order to answer the sub-questions of the dissertation, a field study in Hatay was conducted. The semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with HATSU officials, municipal authorities and neighbourhood headmen. While, interviews with HATSU officials and municipal authorities were the first set, interviews with the neighbourhood headmen were the second set of the field study. There are 10 interviewees in the first set and 180 (100 villages, 30 small municipalities, and 50 neighbourhoods) headmen in the second set of the field study.

5.7.1. Outcomes of the Interviews

There are some outcomes from the first set of the field study conducted with HATSU and municipal officials. According to the interviewees in HATSU and Antakya municipality, establishing metropolitan municipality in Hatay and enlarging municipal boundaries were good practices. Abolishing small municipalities and concentrating resources at one point (re-centralization) were the best implementations of the Law No 6360. For them, water and sewage services in Hatay were improved after the Law No 6360. HATSU provide services to the settlements (particularly villages and small municipalities) which were deprived of services before. HATSU provide more efficient, quality and fair services. There are more qualified personnel and equipment in HATSU. Its services are less costly, and it can reach every neighbourhood even if they are in border of the province. These comments refer to consolidationist views that advocate larger local units for the efficient service provision. The other interviewees in the municipalities think that establishing metropolitan municipality in Hatay was not a good decision. Uncoordination, political concerns, rent oriented, very large area, cultural and social differences are some of the problematic aspects of the Law No 6360. They also criticize assigning water and sewage services to HATSU. Increasing water bills, corruptions in large projects, lack of inspection in projects, problems in building and using infrastructure, and troubles during the transition period are some of the criticisms. These interviewees support decentralization and more fragmented local units for the efficient service provision.

¹⁵⁸ *Vatandaş açısından daha külfetli oldu büyükşehir olması. Onlar açısından hiç iyi olmadı.*

There are many outcomes from the second set of the field study conducted with the neighbourhood headmen in Hatay. 180 interviewees were chosen from 15 districts of Hatay. They are 100 village headmen, 30 small municipality headmen and 50 neighbourhood headmen. The main questions were general opinions of the interviewees on Hatay Metropolitan Municipality and HATSU's water and sewage services. More than half of the headmen (54.4%) are satisfied with the Hatay Metropolitan Municipality. On the other hand, more than half of the headmen (60.0%) are not satisfied with the HATSU. The headmen who express most dissatisfaction are in the small municipalities. Also, while some headman is satisfied with Hatay Metropolitan Municipality, they are dissatisfied with HATSU. Most of the headmen approve Mayor Lütfü Savaş, even if they are not satisfied with the metropolitan municipality.

The headmen who express most dissatisfaction with HMM are in Payas. The headmen who explain most dissatisfaction with HATSU are in Dörtöy. Except Kırıkhan, these headmen are in the second region of HATSU, Payas, Erzin, Arsuz and İskenderun. The village headmen who express most dissatisfaction with HATSU are in Dörtöy, Payas and Erzin. The small municipality headmen who point out most dissatisfaction with HATSU are in Dörtöy and Arsuz. The neighbourhood headmen who explain most dissatisfaction with HATSU are Payas and Erzin. It can be clearly observed that there is discrimination in service provision of HATSU on the basis of region. The relation between distances to centre (Antakya) and satisfaction values was also explored. Except Hassa, all the negative outcomes are from the second region. The further away from the centre, more negative the outcomes are. It can be clearly seen that there is a relation between distance and service provision.

The analysis of the interviews with headmen was conducted under three main subsections: evaluation of the water and sewage services on the basis of local units (villages, small municipalities and municipalities), on the basis of districts (Erzin, Dörtöy, Payas, İskenderun, Arsuz, Belen, Antakya, Defne, Samandağ and other districts), and on the basis of issues (responds of the headmen). Such a division helps to clarify discrimination in service provision.

The first evaluation of the water and sewage services is on the basis of local units. The problems of the villages are old and unsanitary water pipes, water scarcity, dirty water tanks, installation water meters, and lack of sewage system and wastewater treatment plant. Most of the villagers complain about abolishing villages and being part of metropolitan municipality. HATSU has not developed sewage or wastewater treatment projects for villages yet. Almost all the headmen are satisfied with the teams of HATSU that come to repair and to provide maintenance services in the villages. However, the asphalts remain broken after the HATSU

teams cut for repairs to the pipes. There is an uncoordinated relation between HATSU and the metropolitan municipality in terms of repairing to roads.

In the small municipalities, the water pipes are very old and unsanitary, and they include asbestos. There are small municipalities without sewage network and wastewater treatment plants. Wastewater is discharged to the receiving water body (river or sea) without treatment. All of these cause disease and environmental deterioration. Most of the headmen think that it was not a good practice to abolish small municipalities. Previous municipalities were closer to people and had a grasp of local problems. Most of the headmen in small municipalities complain about increased water bills.

The most untroubled local units are neighbourhoods. Nonetheless, the water pipes are very old and unsanitary, and they contain asbestos. There are some neighbourhoods without sewage system and wastewater treatment plant. Wastewater is discharged to the receiving water body (river or sea) without treatment, which cause disease and environmental harm. HATSU finished construction of sewage networks, water networks and wastewater treatment plants in some neighbourhoods. Most of the headmen in the neighbourhoods complain about increased water bills. Also, there are some neighbourhoods which face to problem of rain water drainage.

The second evaluation of the water and sewage services is on the basis of districts. HATSU built wastewater treatment plants in Erzin, Serinyol (Antakya), Samandağ, Kırıkhan and Reyhanlı and Küçükalyan-Narlıca (Antakya). HATSU has not completed any water treatment plant yet. Also, HATSU built sewage networks in Antakya, Erzin, Dörtöy, Belen, Hassa, Altınözü, and Kırıkhan. It built water network in Antakya, Belen, Hassa, Altınözü, Kırıkhan, Samandağ, and Yayladağı. HATSU has not developed any project for Defne and Kumlu yet.

As the farthest district from Antakya, Erzin has many problems about the services of HATSU. Although HATSU completed construction of infrastructure and wastewater treatment plant of Erzin, local people are not satisfied with HATSU. They think that HATSU built the infrastructure carelessly and negligently. HATSU initially collected wastewater fee from all subscribers earlier. The troubled sewage network and rain water drainage also negatively affect the headmen's opinion about HATSU. According to the headmen, location of the wastewater treatment plant was not good and the plant is not operated regularly. They suppose that they are the 'stepchild' of metropolitan municipality. The reason is mostly thought to be long distances and inability to integrate physically and culturally. In the villages, diameter of

sewage pipes is too small, and they frequently get congested. These also negatively affect the headmen's opinion about HATSU.

As water network is old and unsanitary in Payas, the water loss in the pipes is very high. Also the pipes frequently burst resulting in water cuts. Also, the pipes of the old sewage network are insufficient to respond to the needs of the increased population in Payas. As the diameter of the pipes is very small, overflows cause problems. According to the headmen, the main problem in Payas is that the mayor of Payas Municipality (AKP) and the mayor of metropolitan municipality (CHP) do not get along with each other. Therefore, the mayor of metropolitan municipality Lütfü Savaş and HATSU do not provide efficient service in Payas. The rain water drainage is the major problem in Dört Yol. The pipes of both water and sewage networks are very old and unsanitary. Most of the neighbourhood headmen in İskenderun are satisfied with HATSU. The major problem is with the rain water drainage. Most of the village headmen are not pleased with HATSU. The main problem of Arsuz is lack of sewage network and wastewater treatment plant. Therefore, wastewater might leak into drinking water. Most of the villagers in Arsuz complain about the installation of water meters. The villagers do not want to pay for their water. The villagers expected that HATSU will provide better services once water meters are installed. However, they got disappointed since HATSU did not provide the quality of service they had hoped for.

The headmen who are satisfied with HATSU mostly live in the coastline neighbourhoods. The degree of satisfaction decreases towards the mountain side. The headmen living in the mountain side think that HATSU provide more services to the coastline neighbourhoods. There is also an ethnic and political discrimination between coast and mountain sides. In the coastline, the population is composed mostly of Alevi people who support CHP. The headmen living in the mountain side probably point to these differences as a reason for discrimination in service provision.

The major problem in Belen is unfinished infrastructure that was launched by HATSU. Almost all the headmen are pleased with HATSU in Belen. There is no significant problem about water and sewage services in the centre of Antakya. However, some headmen in the small municipalities and villages are not satisfied with HATSU. The neighbourhoods whose wastewater was not connected to a treatment plant have a wastewater removal problem. Since rivers are used as the wastewater receiving water body, there are risks for the environment and human health. There are old and unsanitary water and sewage networks in Defne. The infrastructure is inadequate for meeting the needs of the increasing population. Since there is no wastewater treatment plant, wastewater is discharged to the rivers. This causes risks for the

environment and human health. It is a negative remark for HATSU that an important water resource is contaminated and the problem is left unsolved. On the other hand, some neighbourhoods of Defne (the Karaçay region) have a water scarcity problem. Similarly, the major problem of Samandağ is that there are villages that experience water scarcity. There are old and unsanitary water and sewage networks. HATSU has not developed an effective project to solve water scarcity problem of these neighbourhoods. The major problem of Reyhanlı is that the mayor of metropolitan municipality and district municipality do not get on well with each other. Therefore, some headmen claim that HATSU provides limited services to Reyhanlı. They think that there is political discrimination in service provision. Infrastructure and rain water drainage are also problems in the centre of the city. Since the population has increased with the arrival of Syrian immigrants, the infrastructure is inadequate to meet the needs. The major problem of Altınözü is the lack of a wastewater treatment plant. The major problem of Kırıkhan is about the HATSU team. The major problem of Hassa is lack of wastewater treatment plant. There is no wastewater treatment plant in Yayladağı. The major problem of Kumlu is water scarcity in the villages. Their water networks are very old and unsanitary. There is no wastewater treatment plant and most of the neighbourhoods had no sewage network.

The third evaluation of the water and sewage services is on the basis of issues. The issues were categorized based on the answers of the headmen. The categories are water services, sewage and wastewater services, working system of HATSU, reasons of service disruptions in HATSU, which institution is the best in providing water and sewage services, abolishing villages and small municipalities, establishing metropolitan municipality in Hatay, testing the claims of the Law No 6360.

Nearly half of the neighbourhoods have problems with drinking and potable water. Small municipalities have more problems about drinking water than villages and neighbourhoods. The villages which have most problems about drinking water are in Kumlu, Defne and Samandağ. Most of the small municipalities and neighbourhoods have very old, unsanitary and hazardous (including asbestos) pipes. Before the Law No 6360, the villages where the water meters were not used are in Belen, Dört Yol, İskenderun and Arsuz. These villagers complain about the installation of water meters. The most complaints about water bills are in the neighbourhoods of İskenderun, Arsuz, Erzin, Dört Yol, Payas, Samandağ, Kırıkhan and Reyhanlı.

Most neighbourhoods have old sewage networks. There are also neighbourhoods with sewage network but they have not any treatment plants. Their wastewater is discharged to the receiving

water bodies without treatment. There are no wastewater treatment plants in Arsuz, Kumlu, Hassa, Belen, Altınözü, Yayladağı and Defne. The new sewage networks are claimed to work inefficiently as the pipes are too small. Moreover, there are neighbourhoods which have problems about rain water drainage. These are in Kırıkhan, Altınözü, Reyhanlı, Payas, Dörtyol, Erzin and İskenderun.

60% of the headmen said that HATSU has not done anything in their neighbourhoods. Some headmen claim that there is no audit of HATSU's works. On the other hand, 70.5% of the headman state that the HATSU teams arrive immediately when a breakdown of water and sewage services occur in their neighbourhood. This positively affects the headmen's opinion HATSU. On the other hand, there are complaints about HATSU. The complaints are about installation of water meters, high water bills, being a part of metropolitan municipality, not repairing the asphalts that were cut for repairing the pipes, employees of HATSU, paying wastewater prices despite lack of sewage network, water scarcity particularly in summers, water cuts, lack of sewage network, lack of drilling well, lack of healthy drinking water, bans on garden irrigation, and lack of rain water drainage system. 60% of the headmen assert that it was not good to transfer water and sewage services to HATSU, and 70.5% of the headmen think that previous public authorities were better than HATSU in providing water and sewage services.

It can be clearly seen that there are certain problems of HATSU's service. These are discrimination in service provision (political discrimination, ethnical discrimination, geographical discrimination); distance to centre (Antakya); political factors, and other factors (not finding the relevant personnel in HATSU or inexistent of relevant personnel, the Law No 6360 itself; differences among political parties, factors based on actors and administration, evasion tactics, transition period, financial difficulties, large service area, authority confusion, and the HATSU team.) Only 35.5% of the headmen thought that there is discrimination in HATSU's service provision. This is a positive remark for HATSU. On the other hand, headmen who think that there is discrimination in the services of HATSU are mostly in Dörtyol, Payas and Kırıkhan. The types of discrimination are political, ethnic, and geographical. Some headmen allege that service is not provided in the neighbourhoods where AKP voters live particularly in Reyhanlı and Kırıkhan. Some headmen state that there is discrimination on the basis of 'this side or other side of the mountain'. These headmen are mostly in Erzin, Dörtyol and Payas which are on the 'other side of the mountain' according to the centre (Antakya) and located at the outskirts of the second region of HATSU. They think that HATSU provides services specifically to the first region. The Amanos Mountain range is

a big barrier in providing services. The mountain does not increase the distances but also creates social, economic, and cultural divides. There are other geographical factors influencing service provision of HATSU. There is discrimination between sea side and mountain side regions. Certain headmen claim that distance to centre negatively affects the service provision of HATSU.

Some headmen refer to political factors that disrupted service provision. Some of them state that council members from AKP try to hinder projects and services that the mayor of metropolitan municipality offers in the council. On the other side, according to a few headmen, council members from CHP play trick on the mayor Lütfü Savaş. Also, most of the headmen state that mayor of the district municipality and mayor of metropolitan municipality do not get along with each other. The causes of the mayors' disagreement might be political or personal. These political factors influence service provision negatively. A few headmen mention the staffs who work in HATSU's buildings might affect service provision. They cannot find the relevant personnel or there is no relevant personnel when they wanted to inform a need, request or complaint about water and sewage services. Several headmen assert that if the district municipalities and metropolitan municipalities were controlled by the same party, there would be no disruption in service provision. Besides, some headmen allege that service provision is totally based on authorities and administration. There are also equivocation tactics of HATSU. According to some headmen even if personnel from HATSU listen and give promise to meet the demands, the response never materializes later on. The excuse of HATSU is lack of funds. A few headmen point to confusion among metropolitan municipality and district municipalities, which causes service disruption. Some headmen point out that the teams of HATSU do not work efficiently, carefully, or politely. For some, there are fewer HATSU teams responding to the breakdowns. For some, coordinators of HATSU in the regions do not do a good job. For some, the employees responsible for reading the water meters do not behave well and respond to the subscribers politely. For some, officers working in the HATSU's offices do not do their jobs professionally. On the other side, some headmen argue that the problems in service provision are not totally caused by HATSU itself. There are a few external factors that affect its working conditions: transition period, the large service area, and Law No 6360 itself.

According to 56.2% of the headmen, institutions apart from HATSU should provide water and wastewater services. These institutions are Special Provincial Administration, central state and district municipalities. Also, most of the headmen in villages (67%) and in small municipalities (53.4%) think that abolishing their local units was not a good decision. Moreover, 74.1% of

the headmen argue that being a metropolitan municipality was not a good decision for Hatay. Furthermore, 75% of the headmen state that the claims of the Law No 6360 (achieving economies of scale; administration, planning and coordination at optimal scale; and more quality service with less resources and low costs) were not materialized in Hatay.

5.7.2. Answers of the Sub-questions

At the end of the field study, the sub-questions of the dissertation can be easily answered. The first sub-question is about how the water and sewer service provision in Hatay before the Law No 6360. Indeed, the answers of this question have argued in detail so far. Nonetheless, a brief summary can be provided as following. According to interviewees from HATSU and Antakya Municipality, the water and sewer service provision in Hatay was not good before. There were many small municipalities which were lack of financial resources, staffs and technical capability. Also, there were numerous villages without infrastructure and lack of healthy water. On the other side, for the most headmen (nearly 60%) that I interviewed think that the water and sewer service provision in Hatay was better before. The headmen in villages claim that Special Provincial Administration and Union for Providing Services for Villages (Village Services) were better in water and wastewater services. The headmen in small municipalities and neighbourhood assert that municipalities were better in water and wastewater services. However, the fact that the previous period is better does not mean that everything is very good about water and sewage services. The interviewees simply compared previous and existence situations.

The second question on how the water and sewer service provision has changed in Hatay after the Law No 6360 and what are the positive or negative impacts on the water and sewer service provision in terms of efficiency. Answers of these questions were also argued in detail before. There are both positive and negative impacts of the Law No 6360. Nonetheless, there are little positive scores for HATSU. The negative outputs for HATSU are the majority.

According to some headmen, building wastewater treatment plants, building water and sewage networks, increase in subscribing ratio due to installation of water meters in the houses of villagers and illegal users, increase in water revenues, installing water meters in villages to prevent water wastage, 25% discount of the water price for villagers, reaching of the HATSU teams to the failure scenes in time, chlorination of water tanks in the villages, no discrimination in service provision, and more qualified personnel are the factors of HATSU that affect service provision positively. On the contrary, according to some headmen, transfer of water and sewage services to HATSU, preferring previous authorities in water and sewage services, no

work of HATSU in their neighbourhoods, installing water meters in villages, high prices of water bills, same price tariff for every neighbourhoods, not repairing unbroken roads after works of the HATSU teams, using well water instead of natural water, water scarcity in some villages, frequent water cuts, building small radius and unqualified pipes, bypass of wastewater treatment plants, collecting wastewater fees in the neighbourhoods without sewage network, no rainwater drainage, no sewage network in some crowded neighbourhoods, no drilling well in some villages, no treatment plant of some sewage networks, no definite plan and program, lack of audience, control and coordination, long distances for citizens, long distances and high costs for the HATSU teams, villages with water scarcity problem, discrimination in service provision (this side versus other side of the mountain, urban settlement versus and rural settlement, seaside versus mountain side, and political discrimination), disagreement of the mayors, disagreement of the council members, personnel not familiar with local conditions, attitudes of the personnel, not finding the relevant personnel, evasion tactics, authority confusion among metropolitan municipality and district municipalities, transition period, no sufficient revenues and allowances, inability to integrate socially and culturally, very large service area, and criticisms to the Law No 6360 are the factors affecting the service provision negatively. These negative factors decrease efficiency (decrease quality, equity, promptness, and increase resource use and service costs) in service provision. Positive factors listed above do not have a significant impact on efficiency as negative factors do.

The third question of the dissertation is whether the Law No 6360 achieved its goals of ‘enlarging municipal boundaries ensures optimum scale economies, more effective service provision with less source usage, less costs and more quality’ in Hatay. As mentioned before, 75% of the headmen state that the claims of the Law No 6360 were not materialized in Hatay. What are the real aim and objects of changing municipal boundaries and establishing metropolitan municipalities is the final question of the dissertation. In order to answer this question, the case should be analysed in a critical realist framework; and hence an overall result can be handled. The data collected from the field, organizations, activity reports, strategic plans, newspapers, brochures and internet searches should be analysed all together. Furthermore, observations and conversations with the local people should be considered. With the help of the literature review, the outputs of the case study will develop a critical realist perspective.

The Law No 6360 puts forward that the major aim is achieving economies of scale; administration, planning and coordination at optimal scale; and more quality service with less

resources and low costs. It is clearly seen from the case study that the claims of the Law No 6360 have not materialized in Hatay. There are several academic works, which are given in the chapter of Turkish Municipal Context, contribute to this result. It is also understood from the literature review and case study that there are other aims of the Law No 6360, which are underlying reasons that should be revealed.

As Zengin asserts, the real aim of the Law No 6360 is increasing urban rent. The law considers the cities as a big market, trade centre and the engine of the national economy in the global economy (2014, pp. 96, 102). Also, for Koyuncu and Serteser the focus of the law is large investments and marketing of cities as a competitive element (2012, p.7). As the empirical evidence of the dissertation indicates, the goal is not economies of scale; it is 'economies of rent'. Changing municipal boundaries paves a way for profit-oriented and rent-seeking implementation in the cities. The law also claims that the service provision would be more efficient. However, the water and wastewater services have not become efficient yet. As one of the headman points out, the HATSU has gone through a painful period because of the transition phase of the Law No 6360.

The law envisaged that an integrated and coordinated structure would be established in the whole province. This refers metropolitan consolidation. However, the metropolitan consolidation did not actualize. Instead, metropolitan fragmentation occurred in the province. A variety of discrimination in service provision emerged in Hatay that resulted in fragmented service areas. Geographical (this side and other side of the mountain; sea side and mountain side; remoteness and closeness) administrative (central neighbourhoods and periphery neighbourhoods –villages) and political (party discrimination and disagreement of mayors and incoordination of council members) factors are the main types of discrimination in the service provision of HATSU.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The conclusion chapter of the dissertation summarizes the previous chapters, reviews findings of the case study, and reconsiders the theoretical background on impacts of changing municipal boundaries on the service provision within the context of these findings. This chapter is comprised of three sections: summary and findings of the case study, reconsideration of theoretical perspectives, and policy recommendations and further remarks. First, a brief summary of previous chapters and the findings of the Hatay case study will be provided. Second, literature review of the dissertation will be revisited and a critical realist perspective will be developed in light of the findings of the case study. Finally, some policy recommendations and further remarks will be proposed in order to contribute to future works about the impacts of municipal boundary changes on the municipal service provision.

The major research problem of this dissertation is on how changing boundaries of the municipalities affects municipal service provision. Within the context of this chapter, answers to research questions and sub-questions which were posed in the introduction chapter will be provided. The research area of the dissertation is Hatay Metropolitan Municipality and its district municipalities. It focuses on water and sewerage services in Hatay which were reassigned to metropolitan municipalities after the Law No 6360. There are also initial hypotheses which were proposed within a critical realist perspective. These hypotheses also provide theoretical framework for the dissertation.

6.1. Summary and Findings of the Case Study

This section will provide a summary of the previous chapters and the findings of the case study, which are discussed with reference to sub-questions of the thesis. This dissertation consists of six chapters. Following the introduction chapter, the second chapter provides a comprehensive literature review. The research method of the dissertation involves deductive and inductive strategies with quantitative and qualitative analyses in order to examine the effects of changing boundaries on service provision of the municipalities. As methodology of the study, critical realism is adopted which establishes an ontological and epistemological basis for the dissertation. For this dissertation, I first ask whether there is a (causal) relationship between municipal scale and service provision. If there is, what kind of relation do they have? Then I employ critical realism as a mediator between theory and practice. Earlier empirical

studies suggests that there is a relationship between scale and service provision but they disagree on the nature of the relationship, some proposing a direct relation while others argued for a reverse relation. However, these empirical studies do not evaluate historical and political dimensions of the scale issue. After reviewing historical context of municipalities and rescaling practices, the empirical study is conducted by utilizing quantitative and qualitative research methods.

In the literature review chapter, the nature of public service and the factors that influence service provision are critically reviewed. Impacts of (de)centralization processes, privatization, internal factors and external factors on the public service are evaluated. This is followed by a critical examination of the rescaling policies as well as an evaluation of different practices of changing municipal boundaries, such as annexation, amalgamation, and consolidation. The issue of optimum scale for municipalities is evaluated in detail. At the end of this chapter, some cases of changing boundaries and numbers of the municipalities from several countries are scrutinized. The third chapter of the dissertation lays out the national level of the study examining the municipal context of Turkey. The legal regulations on district municipalities including shifts of boundaries and numbers of the municipalities are evaluated. This is followed by exploring the legal regulations on metropolitan municipalities which brought about important changes in local service provision. At the end of the third chapter, case studies on changing municipal boundaries and finding optimum scales in Turkey are provided. The fourth chapter of the dissertation focuses on Hatay Metropolitan Municipality and its district municipalities. After providing a brief urban history of Hatay, this chapter examines its district municipalities in terms of their demographic structures. Then, the effects of the Law No 6360 on Hatay Metropolitan Municipality are analyzed. Finally, the water and sewer services in Hatay are discussed. After HATSU is briefly introduced, quantitative analysis of water and sewage services in Hatay was conducted. The fifth chapter provided an analytical and critical case study of HATSU and Hatay Metropolitan Municipality.

1) What are the factors that affect service provision?

The literature review chapter begins with answering the first research question. There are various factors affecting municipal service provision: (de)centralization processes, privatization of the services, internal factors and external factors. The relationship between each of these factors and service provision is demonstrated by various studies.

The first factor affecting municipal service provision is (de)centralization processes. The relation between central and local government has a significant impact on local services. The

major question is whether the authority should be held by the central government or the local government for the most efficient service delivery. To answer this question, studies focus on jurisdiction, subsidiarity, and participation dynamics. The second factor that affects service provision is privatization. It is widely accepted that private sector is more advantageous than public sector in terms of service delivery. However, there are serious criticisms of privatization of the public assets and services. Finally there are also internal and external factors that have notable impacts on service delivery. The internal factors are leadership style of the mayor, structure of the municipal council, organizational culture, and ethical values of the municipalities. The external factors are economic, political, social and cultural structures of the city and legal regulations.

- 2) *What kind of relationship do municipal scale and municipal service provision have? How does the municipal scale affect efficiency, cost and quality of municipal service provision?*

The relevant literature demonstrates the existence of a relationship between scale and service provision. Therefore, I start to conduct the field study with presupposing this relation. As Figure 1 illustrates, I follow the flow chart referring to a relation between scale and service provision. Therefore, the question follows with the nature of the relationship between scale and service provision. There are two mainstream approaches to this question: public choice theory and consolidationist perspectives (the metropolitan government theory, the metropolitan governance model, the new regionalism approach and the city-region approach). While public choice school advocates smaller scale and fragmented local units, consolidationist perspectives advocates larger scales and consolidated local units. Municipalities with larger scales were formed through annexation, amalgamation or consolidation for the purpose of achieving economies of scale. Despite their differences, these two approaches are the result of local government reforms and they are both influenced by the new public management model. They also have the same ultimate goal: rescaling of municipalities in accordance with the demands of the new global economy.

The terms of optimum scale for the municipalities and efficiency (cost, quality, proximity, equity, coordination, etc.) in service provision were elaborated in order to better understand how changing municipal boundaries affect service provision. For this purpose, studies on optimum scale and efficiency in service provision were presented. There were numerous optimum scales (population sizes ranging from 5.000 to 1.000.000) for the municipalities. It can be clearly concluded that each service of each municipality has its unique optimum scale, because optimum scale can only be calculated for a single service. On the other hand, optimal

scales might be a useful instrument for private sectors, but for not public services. Whether a more efficient service delivery can be achieved by changing the municipalities is a challenging question, as the relevant literature provides various and indefinite results. Furthermore, measuring the efficiency in terms of outputs and benefits of some municipal services is very difficult.

3) *What are the positive and negative effects of changing municipal boundaries on the service provision?*

Changing municipal boundaries have both positive and negative effects on service provision. In order to understand the positive and negative impacts, the advocates and arguments of public choice theory and consolidationist perspectives were examined critically. Consolidationist perspectives argue for large municipalities due to the fact that merging municipalities provides economies of scale, increases efficiency, quality, service capacity, local development, accountability, participation, pluralism, and citizen satisfaction. On the contrary, public choice theory asserts that economies of scale are not valid for every municipal service and diseconomies cause troubles in large municipalities. They also suggest that efficiency, competition, proximity, social trust, accountability, participation, homogeneity and citizen satisfaction increase in small municipalities. Besides theoretical perspectives, examples from several countries are investigated in order to reveal effects of rescaling municipalities on the service provision. The historical background and policies of the rescaling practices in these countries are provided. Their sizes and numbers of municipalities, merging practices and effects on service provision were examined. Also, impacts of rescaling municipalities on water and sewage services in selected countries were scrutinized.

The chapter of municipal context of Turkey consists of historical background, regulations, and case studies about changing municipal boundaries in Turkey. This chapter plays an important role to overview rescaling policies of Turkey. The regulations on local governments in Turkey determine the scale of municipalities by using population size as the only criteria. They disregard the fact that municipalities significantly differ in terms of their geographical location, socio-economic level, and their cultural and political features. Therefore the regulations enforce a single model for all municipalities. The boundaries of municipalities in Turkey have frequently been changed in order to achieve more efficient service provision. Public authorities have always attributed inefficiencies in municipal service provision to the size of municipalities. Therefore, the solutions to these inefficiencies were sought in changing the boundaries through amalgamations, or dissolution of small-scale municipalities. These practices have become more prevalent since the early 2000s and the boundaries of numerous

municipalities have been altered through legal arrangements. However, as discussed previously, there is neither a single model nor a single scale for efficient delivery of municipal services. Each municipal service has different requirements and need different assessment criteria, necessitating various models to be put into practice.

In Turkey, the number of municipalities was increased at high rates until the 2000s. In the section where country samples are examined, it can be seen how high these rates are compared to those of other countries. In contrast, number of municipalities has been gradually decreased since 2005. These two different periods are analysed in a historical and critical context. Causes and effects of the regulations on changing district municipalities are elaborated critically. Since AKP came to power in 2002, four important regulations that change the boundaries of district municipalities have been enacted: the Law No 5216 on Metropolitan Municipalities in 2004, the Law No 5393 on Municipalities in 2005, the Law No 5747 in 2008 and the Law No 6360 in 2012. These laws on municipalities in the early 2000s were associated with the public administration reform. One of the goals of this reform is enlarging boundaries of provincial, district and metropolitan municipalities through absorbing the small municipalities. The authorities and duties of district and metropolitan municipalities would be increased. Moreover, the population criterion about acquiring the legal entity of municipality was increased from 2,000 to 5,000. The municipalities which have populations lower than 2,000 lost their legal entity of municipality and were transformed into village or neighbourhood. The major reasons behind these amendments were supporting the cities which have problems about zoning and plan integration, urban sprawl, and efficient use of the financial and human resources.

The most substantial regulation on changing boundaries is the Law No 6360. The law established metropolitan municipalities in 14 provinces whose population exceeds 750,000. Boundaries of the metropolitan municipalities were expanded to correspond to the provincial boundaries. The law also dissolved small municipalities which were located within the boundaries of newly established metropolitan municipalities. These municipalities were turned into neighbourhoods. Moreover, boundaries of district municipalities were enhanced to their district boundaries. In total, legal entity of 1,358 small municipalities and 16,567 villages were dissolved. Hence 17,925 local units were transformed into neighbourhoods. In addition, the law abolished 277 small municipalities which were not in the metropolitan municipalities and had population under 2,000. In total, legal entity of 1,635 small municipalities were dissolved. On the other hand, the law established 25 districts. In the preamble of the law, requirements of the new public management were indicated. According to the law, the problem

was the existence of too many small municipalities, and their administrative and financial incapability. Economies of scale are offered as the solution to these problems. Thus, efficiency, coordination and quality of service provision would be increased. It can be clearly seen that the terms economies of scale and efficient service provision were frequently referred to in the preamble of the Law No 6360. Likewise, according to the AKP's report, the Law No 6360 would increase efficiency, quality and coordination in service provision as a result of economies of scale. More services would be provided by using fewer resources. In addition, the law pursues consolidation of service provision for the whole metropolitan area. Critiques of the claims of the Law No 6360 are provided. Also, some case studies about optimal scale and effects of changing municipal boundaries in Turkey were examined. While some scholars preferred to conduct public surveys and use SPSS program for data analysis within the framework of empirical methodology, others preferred to conduct interviews and utilized descriptive analysis relying on qualitative methods. These studies were intended to test the claims of the Law No 6360 in practice. Their research objects were mainly boundary changes, abolished local units, efficiency, effectiveness and centralization processes. While there are a few positive results, negative results are more.

Before presenting the case study, the fourth chapter focuses on the province of Hatay. After providing historical background, this chapter also elaborates on the demographic and geographical structure of Hatay. Moreover, municipalities of Hatay, changes in the municipal borders, political representation, division of municipal services, and water and sewage services in Hatay are examined. Finally, a quantitative analysis of water and sewage services in Hatay is provided. The Law No 6360 established a metropolitan municipality in Hatay in 2014. Before the law, the province of Hatay had 12 districts: Hatay (centre), İskenderun, Samandağ, Dörtyol, Kırıkhan, Reyhanlı, Altınözü, Hassa, Erzin, Belen, Yayladağı, and Kumlu. The law established 4 districts in Hatay: Antakya, Defne, Arsuz, and Payas. The law also expanded the borders of the metropolitan municipality to the provincial administrative borders. Furthermore, the law abolished the legal entities of 21 sub-districts, 64 small municipalities, and 368 villages in Hatay, and turned them into neighbourhoods. Some of the small municipalities were fragmented into two or three neighbourhoods. Ultimately, the number of neighbourhood was increased from 149 to 589. The mayor of Hatay Metropolitan Municipality, Lütfü Savaş is from CHP. However, most of the mayors of district municipalities are from AKP, the council is under the control of AKP. The fact that the structure of municipal council has changed after the Law No 6360 influenced the municipal service provision. Each political party try to influence the decision-making process of the council in line with its local interests.

This dissertation chose to study water and wastewater services. In Hatay, HATSU was established for water and sewage services in 2014. HATSU divided its service area into 2 regions (regional directorates) which include 15 district municipalities of Hatay. The first region includes the Antakya, Defne, Kırıkhan, Kumlu, Reyhanlı, Hassa, Altınözü, Yayladağı and Samandağ municipalities. The second region includes Erzin, Dörtyol, Payas, İskenderun, Belen and Arsuz. These regions divided the province of Hatay along with the Amanos Mountain. The first region is to the east of the mountain, the second region is to the west of the mountain. The major division on the service provision was launched with these regional divisions. According to the activity report of HATSU, total area of service of HATSU is 5,867 km square. It serves a population of 1,609,806. Yet, HATSU added Syrian population of 447,887 living in Hatay to its service population. With the Syrian population, total population that HATSU serves becomes 2,057,740. HATSU built wastewater treatment plants in Erzin, Serinyol (Antakya), Samandağ, Kırıkhan, Reyhanlı, and Küçükdalyan-Narlıca (Antakya). Construction of Altınözü waste water treatment plant still continues. Hence, HATSU has finished 6 wastewater treatment plants since 2014. HATSU took over 7 wastewater treatment plants in İskenderun, Antakya, Payas, Dörtyol, Karayılan (İskenderun), Denizciler (İskenderun), and Belen (package plant) which were built and have been operated before the Law No 6360. Also, HATSU took over the water treatment plants in Yayladağı, Sebenoba (Yayladağı) and Mızraklı. Construction of İskenderun water treatment plant continues. At present, there are 13 wastewater treatment plants and 3 water treatment plants in Hatay. In addition, there are 691 boreholes, 603 water tanks and service buildings in Hatay as a part of their operation.

In order to conduct a quantitative analysis some statistical data were gathered. The data were obtained from activity reports of metropolitan municipality, district municipalities, HATSU, and internet database of Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). However, the data gained from statistical resources is inadequate to make a comparison of water and sewage services in Hatay before and after the Law No 6360. Municipalities and HATSU do not have a data base. TÜİK's data has some problems as it provides data only for whole provinces. There is no separate data for municipalities within a province. Moreover, the data is inconsistent. This is due to the fact that municipalities do not provide meticulously collected data. Most importantly, TÜİK's data of activity reports of municipalities and HATSU do not match each other. For all these reasons, it is not possible to make an accurate comparison before and after the Law No 6360. Nonetheless, a short quantitative analysis was carried out in order to have a preliminary consideration. According to data analysis of activity reports, some positive outputs of the Law No 6360 in Hatay are an increase in subscribing ratio and number of wastewater treatment

plants. However, increase in used water per subscriber, unit water price, wastewater price, cleaning tax, and ratio of expenses are all negative outputs. According to TUIK's data analysis, positive outcomes of the Law No 6360 in Hatay are an increase in subscribing ratios, ratios of municipal population served by drinking and potable water network to total municipal population, ratios of municipal population served by sewerage network to total municipal population, and ratios of municipal population served with wastewater treatment plant to total municipal population. Negative output of the Law No 6360 in Hatay is increase in difference between water drained for drinking and potable water network, and amount of water distributed. There is a water loss in the pipes. It can be concluded that service efficiency increased up to a specific point (optimal scale). However, boundary expansion after this point might have caused diseconomies and resulted in decrease in efficiency. The fact that water loss have increased might be an evidence for it.

In order to answer the sub-questions, a field study in Hatay was conducted. Semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with HATSU officials, municipal authorities and neighbourhood headmen. Interviews with HATSU and municipal authorities are the first part, and interviews with the headmen are the second part of the field study. 10 interviews in total were conducted for the first part, and 180 interviews (100 villages, 30 small municipalities and 50 neighbourhoods chosen from 15 districts of Hatay) were conducted for the second part. Snowball method was applied during the field study. The second part (interviews with headmen) constitutes the major analytical basis of the case study. While public officials gave more superficial and affirmative answers, the headmen provided more detailed and practical information. Analysis of the case study consists of both quantitative and qualitative analysis. For quantitative analysis, Microsoft Excel was used. The answers of the headmen were grouped as different headings and outputs were drawn through calculating percentiles. Also, positive and negative outputs were derived from their answers within the context of qualitative analysis.

The main questions were about the general opinions of the headmen regarding Hatay Metropolitan Municipality and HATSU with its water and sewage services. More than half of the headmen (54.4%) are satisfied with the Hatay Metropolitan Municipality. On the other hand, more than half of the headmen (60.0%) are not satisfied with the HATSU. Headmen of small municipalities and villages are more dissatisfied than headmen of neighbourhoods. This refers to discrimination in service provision on the basis of local units. According to headmen, there are less and inefficient service provision in villages and small municipalities compared

to neighbourhoods. It can be concluded that the further away from the city center, the less satisfaction is.

The headmen who expressed most dissatisfaction with the metropolitan municipality are in Payas and those who are most dissatisfied with HATSU are in Dörtyol. Except Kırıkhan, dissatisfied headmen are in the second region of HATSU, Payas, Erzin, Arsuz and İskenderun. It is clearly seen that there is a degree of discrimination among regions in service provision. The relation between distances to Antakya (centre of the province) and satisfaction values can be also examined. Except Hassa, all the negative values are in the second region. The further away a district is from the centre, the more negative are the results. It can be clearly observed that there is a reverse correlation between distance and service provision.

a) How did the water and sewer service provision in Hatay before the Law No 6360?

According to interviewees from HATSU and Antakya Municipality, the water and sewer service provision in Hatay was not good before. There were a great deal of small municipalities which lacked of financial resources, staff and technical capability. Also, there were numerous villages without infrastructure and lacked access to clean water. On the other side, for the most headmen (nearly 60%) think that the water and sewer service provision in Hatay was better before. The headmen in villages claim that Special Provincial Administration and Union for Providing Services for Villages (Village Services) worked better in water and wastewater services. The headmen in small municipalities and neighbourhoods assert that municipalities were better in water and wastewater services. Most of the headmen think that it was not a good practice to abolish villages and small municipalities. Previous authorities were closer to people and had a grasp of local problems.

b) How has the water and sewer service provision changed in Hatay after the Law No 6360? What are the positive or negative impacts on the efficiency of water and sewer service provision?

In order to answer these questions, the interviews with headmen are analysed under three main headings: evaluation of the water and sewage services on the basis of local units (villages, small municipalities and neighbourhoods), on the basis of districts (Erzin, Dörtyol, Payas, İskenderun, Arsuz, Belen, Antakya, Defne, Samandağ and other districts), and on the basis of issues (responds of the headmen). This categorization helps to clarify discrimination in service provision.

The first heading is evaluation of the water and sewage services is on the basis of local units. The problems that the villages face are old and unsanitary water pipes, water scarcity, dirty water tanks, installation of water meters, and lack of sewage system and wastewater treatment plant. In most of the small municipalities and neighbourhoods, the water pipes are very old, unsanitary and have asbestos. There are still some small municipalities and neighbourhoods without sewage network, rain water drainage and wastewater treatment plant. Also, most of the headmen complain about the increased water bills. Also as it was mentioned before, there is discrimination in service provision on the basis of local units. There is less and inefficient service provision in villages and small municipalities compared to neighbourhoods.

The second heading is evaluation of the water and sewage services is on the basis of district. Districts with the most troubles about water and wastewater services are Erzin, Payas and Dörtöyl. These districts are in the second region and far away from the centre of Hatay. Most of the headmen do not want a part of metropolitan municipality due to the long distances and inability to integrate physically and culturally. On the other hand, the mayors of the district municipalities and metropolitan municipality do not get along with each other. This also affects service provision. In Arsuz, headmen in the mountain side think that HATSU provide more services to the coastline neighbourhoods. There is also cultural and political discrimination between coast and mountain sides. In the first region, Defne and Samandağ have major problems due to water scarcity and lack of treatment plant. The major problem of the other districts of the first region is the lack of infrastructure. As these districts accommodate Syrian immigrants, the infrastructure is inadequate for meeting the needs of the increasing population.

The third evaluation of the water and sewage services is on the basis of issues. The issues were categorized based on the answers of the headmen. The categories are water services, sewage and wastewater services, working system of HATSU, reasons of service disruptions in HATSU, which institution is the best in providing water and sewage services, abolishing villages and small municipalities, establishing metropolitan municipality in Hatay, testing the claims of the Law No 6360.

According to some headmen, building wastewater treatment plants, building water and sewage networks, increase in subscribing ratio due to installation of water meters in the houses of villagers and illegal users, increase in water revenues, installing water meters in villages to prevent water waste, 25% discount of the water price for villagers, HATSU teams responding to problems in time, chlorination of water tanks in the villages, service provision without discrimination, and qualified personnel are the factors that affect service provision of HATSU

positively. Table 63 provides the positive outcomes of the Law No 6360 in water and sewage services. All of the positive outcomes (increase in quality, fairness, promptness, service provision and revenues) refer to an increase in efficiency in water and sewage services.

Table 63 Factors and positive outcomes of the Law No 6360 in water and sewage services in Hatay

Water and Sewage Services	Factors	Positive Outputs
Building water and sewage networks	Recentralization	Increase in service provision
Building wastewater treatment plants	Recentralization	Increase in service provision
Installing water meters in villages to prevent water wastage	Privatization	Increase in revenues
Increase in subscribing ratio	Privatization	Increase in revenues
Reaching of the HATSU teams to the failure scenes in time	Privatization	Increase in promptness
Chlorination of water tanks	Privatization	Increase in quality
25% discount of the water price for villagers	External factor (Legal regulation)	Increase in fairness
More qualified personnel	Internal factor (Organizational culture)	Increase in efficiency
No discrimination in service provision	Internal factor (Ethical principle)	Increase in fairness

Table 63 also gives factors that affect water and sewage service provision in Hatay after the Law No 6360. Building water and sewage networks and wastewater treatment refers to recentralization in service provision. Since metropolitan municipalities gather financial resources in one hand, they have capacity to build large scale facilities. Increase in subscribing ratio due to installation of water meters in the houses of villagers and illegal users, increase in water revenues, and installing water meters refer to privatization in water and sewage services. Also, services provided by the HATSU teams refer to privatization as the HATSU teams are subcontracted labours. The other positive outcomes indicate internal and external factors.

On the contrary, there are too many negative outcomes of the Law No 6360 in terms of water and sewage services in Hatay. According to some headmen, transfer of water and sewage services to HATSU, not having any work of HATSU in their neighbourhoods, installation of water meters in villages, high water bills, same pricing scheme for all neighbourhoods, not repairing broken roads after HATSU teams, using well water instead of natural water, water scarcity in some villages, frequent water cuts, building pipes with small diameter, bypass of wastewater treatment plants, collection of wastewater fees in the neighbourhoods without sewage network, not having rainwater drainage, not having sewage network in some crowded neighbourhoods, no drilling well in villages in need, no treatment plant of some sewage

networks are some factors that affect service provision negatively. Also, not having definite plan and program, lack of audience, care and coordination, long distances for citizens, long distances and high costs for the HATSU teams, discrimination in service provision (this side and other side of the mountain, urban and rural discrimination, seaside and mountain side discrimination, and political discrimination), disagreement of the mayors, disagreement of the council members, personnel not familiar with local conditions, rough attitudes of the personnel, not finding the relevant personnel, equivocation tactics, authority confusion among metropolitan municipality and district municipalities, transition period, no sufficient revenues and allowances, inability to integrate socially and culturally, very large service area, and criticisms to the Law No 6360 are the other factors affecting the service provision negatively. Positive factors listed above do not have a significant impact on efficiency as negative factors do.

Table 64 provides the negative outcomes of the Law No 6360 in water and sewage services. All of the negative outcomes (decrease in quality, fairness, promptness, service provision and coordination, and increase in costs and resource wastage) refer to decrease in efficiency in water and sewage services. On the other side, according to 56.2% of the headmen, institutions other than HATSU should be the ones providing water and wastewater services. These institutions are Special Provincial Administration, central state and district municipalities. Also, most of the headmen in villages (67%) and in small municipalities (53.4%) think that abolishing their local units was not a good decision. Moreover, 74.1% of the headmen argue that being a metropolitan municipality was not a good decision for Hatay.

Table 64 also gives factors that affect water and sewage service provision in Hatay after the Law No 6360. For example, transfer of water and sewage services to HATSU indicates recentralization. Installing water meters in villages and high prices of water bills refer to privatization. Evasion tactics, and lack of audience, care and coordination in service provision point out internal factors. Authority confusion among metropolitan and district municipalities and transition period refer to external factors. Long distances for citizens and discrimination in service provision indicate scale factors. All of these factors are negative outputs of rescaling policies.

Table 64 Factors and negative outcomes of the Law No 6360 in water and sewage services in Hatay

Water and Sewage Services	Factors	Negative Outcomes
Transfer of water and sewage services to HATSU	Recentralization	Decrease in efficiency
Preferring previous authorities	Recentralization	Decrease in efficiency
No work of HATSU in neighbourhoods	Scale	Decrease in efficiency
Installing water meters in villages	Privatization	Decrease in fairness
High prices of water bills	Privatization	Increase in service costs
Same price tariff in every neighbourhoods	Privatization	Decrease in fairness
Not repairing unbroken roads after works of the HATSU teams	Privatization	Decrease in coordination
Using well water instead of natural water	Privatization	Decrease in quality
Water scarcity in certain villages	Privatization	Decrease in efficiency
Frequent water cuts	Privatization	Decrease in efficiency
Collecting wastewater fees in the neighbourhoods without sewage network	Privatization	Decrease in fairness
No drilling well in some villages	Privatization	Decrease in service provision
Building small radius and unqualified pipes	Internal factor	Decrease in quality
Bypass of wastewater in treatment plants	Internal factor	Decrease in quality
No rainwater drainage	Recentralization	Decrease in service provision
No sewage network in some crowded neighbourhoods	Recentralization	Decrease in service provision
No treatment plant of some sewage networks	Recentralization	Decrease in service provision
No definite plan and program	Internal factor (Organizational culture	Decrease in efficiency
Lack of audience, care and coordination	Internal factor (Organizational culture	Decrease in quality
Long distances for citizens	Scale	Decrease in efficiency
Long distances and high costs for the HATSU teams	Scale	Increase in costs and resource wastage
Discrimination in service provision (geographical, administrative and political discrimination)	Scale	Decrease in fairness
Disagreement of the mayors	External (political) & Internal factors	Decrease in service provision
Disagreement of the council members	Internal (structure of council) factor	Decrease in service provision
Personnel not familiar with local conditions	Internal factor (Organizational culture)	Decrease in efficiency
Rough attitudes of the personnel to the citizens	Internal factor (Organizational culture)	Decrease in efficiency
Not finding relevant personnel (communication problems)	Internal factor (Organizational culture)	Decrease in efficiency
Evasion tactics	Internal factor (Organizational culture)	Decrease in service provision
Authority confusion among metropolitan and district municipalities	External factor (legal regularity)	Decrease in efficiency
Transition period	External factor (regularity)	Decrease in efficiency
No sufficient revenues and allowances	External factor (regularity)	Decrease in efficiency

Table 64 (continued)

Water and Sewage Services	Factors	Negative Outcomes
Inability to integrate socially and culturally	External factor (social-cultural structure)	Decrease in efficiency
Very large service area	Scale	Decrease in efficiency
Criticisms to the Law No 6360	External factor (regularity)	Decrease in efficiency

c) Did the Law No 6360 achieve its goals of ‘enlarging municipal boundaries ensures optimum scale economies, more effective service provision with less resource use, less costs and more quality’ in Hatay?

According to 75% of the headmen, water and sewage services in Hatay that are compatible with the claims of the Law No 6360 have not been achieved. According to the preamble of the law, metropolitan municipalities would produce services at optimal scale since efficiency, coordination and quality of services would be increased by achieving economies of scale. Moreover, unit costs and public expenditure per capita would be reduced. As municipalities that provide services at a larger scale will be equipped with advanced technologies and staffed with qualified technical personnel, productivity would increase. The law also claims that “a more fair structure may emerge among local government units integrated within the provincial boundaries in terms of the use of resources” (TBMM Mevzuat, 2012b). Water and sewage services, which were provided by municipalities before, were assigned to metropolitan municipalities after the Law No 6360. Whether or not the claims of the law were realized was tested in terms of water and sewage services in Hatay. Most of the interviewees argue that in Hatay the Law No 6360 failed to achieve its goals regarding scale economies, efficiency, and quality in service provision with less resource usage and costs. There is lack of coordination and integration among district municipalities and the metropolitan municipality. The interviewees criticize the high cost of services provided by HATSU. First, it is not cost-effective to provide service in a large area. Diseconomies have emerged in the metropolitan municipality due to the fact that costs of transportation, communication, and construction have increased. Second, HATSU’s expenses are very high compared to the previous periods. HATSU’s revenue is also very high, whereas its services are regarded as inadequate by the citizens. Third and the most importantly, the price of unit water per cubic metre increased significantly. The major sources of complaint for the citizens in Hatay are high water bills and installation of water meters in villages. Therefore, it can be concluded that privatization in water and wastewater services is one of the most important consequences of the municipal boundary expansions.

6.2. Reconsidering Literature Review and Developing a Critical Realist Perspective

Review of the literature made some important contributions to this dissertation. The first pre-supposition derived from the literature review is that there is a relation between municipal scale and service provision (Keating, 1995; Swianiewicz, 2002; Arıkboğa, 2007; Okçu et al, 2017). It is a very controversial issue whether there is a direct or inverse correlation between them. There are two mainstream approaches with regards to relationship between scale and service provision: public choice theory and consolidationist perspectives (the metropolitan government theory, the metropolitan governance model, the new regionalism approach, and the city-region approach). While the public choice school advocates smaller scales and fragmented units, consolidationist perspectives advocates larger scales and consolidated units. Municipalities with larger scales were formed through annexation, amalgamation or consolidation practices in order to achieve economies of scale. This dissertation does not prefer any of these perspectives and does not conclude that smaller or larger scales of municipalities would be the best for improving efficiency in service provision. This dissertation also does not intend to find an optimal size for the municipalities and does not attempt to calculate efficiency in service provision through using quantitative data. I tried to analyse the impacts of municipal boundary changes on municipal services in terms of efficiency within the framework of a critical realist perspective. I put forward positive and negative effects and draw a conclusion that enlarging municipal boundaries has significantly more negative effects on water and sewage services in Hatay and it decreases efficiency in service provision.

As it was stated before, both public choice theory and consolidationist perspectives are the products of local government reforms and informed by the new public management model. Also, they have the same goal: rescaling of municipalities in accordance with the demands of the new global economy. There are alternative arguments that are critical of these two approaches that help me develop a critical realist perspective. The mainstream approaches try to find an optimum size for municipalities, which is a subject of economies of scale. However, there are various optimum sizes and no universal recipe (Keating, 1991, 1995; Razin, 1996; Baldersheim & Rose, 2010; Houlberg, 2010; Rydbergård, 2012; Swianiewicz, 2017). The second pre-assumption of this dissertation is that each service of each municipality has unique optimum scale because an optimum scale is determined for one service (Houlberg, 2010, p. 313). On the other hand, optimum scale might be a useful instrument for private sector, but for not public services. As Dearlove (1979) argues, municipal services “cannot be produced in factories and distributed to people” (cited in Yoloğlu, 2011a, p. 7). Moreover, optimum scale is calculated in order to improve efficiency in service provision, because it corresponds to the

rational use of the resources to meet social needs on an optimal scale (Özer, 2017). Yet, whether or not a more efficient service delivery can be achieved by changing municipal boundaries is another challenging issue (Yoloğlu, 2011b, p. 52). There are various and inconclusive results since measuring the outputs and benefits of municipal services are very difficult (Swianiewicz, 2002, p.16). On the other hand, the concept of efficiency is also “derived from economic theories of production in the private sector” (Boyne, 1995, p. 225). For Keating, efficiency can be evaluated only with regards to “what local government ought to do” (1991, pp. 117-118). Also, Biricikoğlu and Demirel-Duyar, assert that efficiency of metropolitan municipalities in local service delivery can be too complex to be reduced to scale cost calculations alone (2015, p. 377). They do not evaluate efficiency as a technical issue only and they redefine it by adding some variables to measure efficiency, such as quality, participation, subsidiarity. Therefore, the third pre-assumption is efficiency can be redefined and other variables can be included in its measurement. This dissertation redefines efficiency as providing services in accordance with public expectations and within the predefined goals of the authorities.

Several scholars, such as Brenner, Keating, Blatter, Baldersheim and Rose, Savitch and Vogel, Feiock, Rydergård, Bayraktar and Çınar *et al* conceptualize the scale issue as a political process. Keating emphasizes the political nature of the scale issue and adds some factors affecting service provision: “historical context, local interests and local power” (1991, 1995). Baldersheim and Rose (2010) call the scale issue as “politics of territorial reform”. For these authors, all efforts of reorganizing the local governments, i.e. local government reforms are a product of political processes. According to Blatter (2006), enlarging the municipal scales is a result of “the scalar expansion of markets”, enabling the municipalities to compete easily. For Çınar *et al* (2013), making municipal boundaries smaller or larger are important policies that promote local markets by commercializing local specificities and diversities; creating attractive spaces for the international market. The scholars analyse rescaling policies within a critical perspective and evaluate them as a tool of capital accumulation. While producing complicated spaces, neoliberal world economy rescales economic, political, and social spaces with a governance model. Furthermore, metropolitan areas are transformed into focal points of financial competition (Çınar, et al, 2013). Referring to Brenner, Bayraktar claims that the Law No 6360 turns the scale into a phenomenon which is defined in the light of political and social variables rather than a technical concept (2016). The argument that changing municipal boundaries is a political process is verified by the case study of this dissertation.

d) What are the real aim and object of changing municipal boundaries and establishing metropolitan municipalities?

As Feiock *et al* (2006) points out, law-makers do not offer any clear evidence for economic benefits of the changing boundaries. Except for the reasons that the Law No 6360 puts forward (i.e. efficiency, economy of scales, less cost with less resource, etc.), there must be other motives to enlarge the municipal scales and establish metropolitan municipalities. These motives are a part of the generative mechanisms that a critical realist analysis seeks to unveil. In European countries, rescaling practices, deregulation, privatization and localization became tools of local government reforms and they were promoted by the new public management approach. Municipalities were rescaled (merged or fragmented) to create the most suitable areas for competition (Çınar *et al*, 2013). As Blatter (2006) argues, “rescaling of the government” transformed into “rescaling of the governance” in accordance with the new public management approach.

In Turkey, there have been some arguments about the real motives behind the Law No 6360. The real aim of the Law No 6360 is to increase urban rent. The law considers the cities as a large market, trade centre, and the engine of the national economy within the global economy (Zengin, 2014, pp. 96, 102). In addition, focus of the law is large investments and marketing of cities as a competitive element (Koyuncu and Serteser, 2012, p. 7). The other aim of the Law No 6360 might be gerrymandering of election districts by the AKP government (Bayraktar, 2016, p. 3). AKP determined that strategic voting tendencies increases while municipalities becomes small, and that the impact of national politics on local elections diminishes as the level descends from metropolitan municipalities to small municipalities (Adıgüzel & Tek, 2011, p. 91). One of the important reasons to enlarge municipal boundaries was fear of losing the local elections of 2014. On the other hand, rural areas (villages and small municipalities) mostly vote for AKP in general elections. Thus, AKP desired gain more votes by merging villages and small municipalities. The Law No 6360 established the districts of Defne, Arsuz and Payas, by changing the boundaries. It is clear that establishing new districts in Hatay was gerrymandering by AKP in order to gain more votes. More importantly, AKP estimated that it would win all the metropolitan municipalities in Turkey and easily cooperate with mayors of the metropolitan municipalities from AKP. However, AKP could not win in Hatay. Most of the interviewees think that if Hatay Metropolitan Municipality was controlled by AKP, service provision would have been better. In fact, AKP has emphasized a powerful mayor model for years. The Law No 6360 turns the mayors of metropolitan municipalities into bosses of the cities. On the other side, if the candidates who are from opposition parties win

the election in the metropolitan municipalities, the service provision might be hindered through resource cuts, lack of supervision, and promotion (Bayraktar, 2016, pp. 11-12).

The empirical evidence of the dissertation points out to some conclusions. First, the goal of the Law No 6360 is not economies of scale. The real aim is 'economies of rent'. As one of the interviewees points out, 'large scale municipality means large scale urban projects, which in turn means large scale rents.' The Law No 6360 also causes privatization of water and wastewater services. Moreover, the law claims that the service provision would be more efficient. However, water and wastewater services have not been provided efficiently yet. One of the headmen points out: 'HATSU has gone through a painful period because of the transition phase of the Law No 6360'. Therefore, service provision is not efficient, it is painful. The law envisaged that an integrated and coordinated structure would be established covering the whole province. However, this metropolitan consolidation did not materialize. Instead, 'metropolitan fragmentation in service provision' has occurred. Discrimination in service provision based on a variety of factors has emerged in Hatay resulting in fragmented service areas. Geographical (this side and other side of the mountain; sea side and mountain side; remoteness and closeness) administrative (central neighbourhoods and periphery neighbourhoods –villages) and political (party discrimination and disagreement of mayors and incoordination of council members) factors are the main types of discrimination in the service provision of HATSU.

Concluding Hypothesis 1: There is an inverse relation between municipal scale and service provision. As the scale grows, service delivery is adversely affected. Findings of the case study and reconsideration of the literature verifies this argument. The municipal boundaries are enlarged in order to achieve economies of scale and increase efficiency in service provision. However, economies of scale cannot be applied to public services as it is an instrument of private management. In addition, it is very difficult to calculate an optimal scale for all municipal services due to their special nature and diversity. Also, it would not be valid for all municipalities due to their different historical, social, cultural, and economic structures. Moreover, as scale grows, diseconomies and problems in service provision emerge. In Turkey, the Law No 6360 is the latest regulation that enlarged municipal boundaries for the sake of efficient service provision in an optimum scale. It determined the minimum population for metropolitan municipalities as 750,000, abolished villages and small scale municipalities in metropolitan municipalities and abolished municipalities under the population of 2,000 in other provinces. The law imposed a single model on all municipalities. However, the population criteria of the law are inadequate, abstract, and lack any scientific analysis. Also,

the boundaries of the metropolitan municipalities were expanded to correspond to the provincial boundaries and the boundaries of district municipalities were enhanced to their district boundaries. In the light of theoretical and historical background, findings of the case study demonstrated that municipal service provision was adversely affected after the Law No 6360.

Concluding Hypothesis 2: Water and sewage services in Hatay that are compatible with the goals of Law No 6360 could not be achieved. The law claims that enlarging municipal boundaries ensures optimal scale economies, more efficient service provision with less resource use, less costs, and better quality. However, the case study in Hatay demonstrates that water and sewage services have not been provided efficiently with less resource use, less costs, and better quality. Therefore, scale economies were not achieved after municipal boundaries were expanded to the provincial boundaries. Also coordination, integration and consolidation in service provision, which are also targeted by the Law No 6360, were not observed in the water and sewage services. Moreover, diseconomies emerged and the service costs increased.

Concluding Hypothesis 3: The real aim and object of changing municipal boundaries and establishing metropolitan municipalities are very different from the goals put forward in the legal regulations. It is understood that changing municipal boundaries is a political process. There are other mechanisms beyond the claims of legal regulations on rescaling practices. Increasing urban rent, profiting from large scale projects, marketing of cities as a competitive agent, gaining more votes and collaborating with the mayors of the metropolitan municipalities more easily are the other motives of the law-makers.

6.3. Policy Recommendations and Further Remarks

The question of what is the optimal size for municipalities seems to have remained on the agenda of politicians and scholars for a long time. However, it is proven that there is no universally accepted optimum size for municipalities. The other challenging issue is increasing efficiency in municipal service provision by achieving economies of scale. Yet, measuring efficiency is very difficult for municipal services due to the nature of public services. More importantly, these concepts belong to the field of private management but have been tried to be adapted to public administration in accordance with the requirements of neoliberal economy and new public management approach.

Within a critical realist perspective, this dissertation evaluates the Law No 6360 as the latest amendment that changed the municipal boundaries in Turkey. It analyses the impacts of changing municipal boundaries on the water and sewage services in Hatay and put forth the

negative and positive marks of the service provision. It concludes that services are negatively affected as the municipal scale grew. It also tests the claims of the law (achieving economies of scale, and increasing efficiency, quality, coordination in service provision) and demonstrates that its outcomes are the opposite of its claims. This dissertation does not calculate an optimal size for municipalities, nor will it suggest an optimal size. It also does not measure efficiency by using statistical data, but redefines efficiency and analyses it through conducting in-depth interviews with public authorities and neighbourhood headmen. This dissertation does not advocate public choice theory or consolidationist approaches. It put forward their positive and negative arguments and derives conclusion from them through a critical realist analysis of the case study. It underlines that rescaling practices have not an administrative or a technical basis, they are completely political processes concerned with profiting and acquiring rent from urban areas.

While preparing regulations about rescaling practices, the law-makers should consider the following recommendations. First, they should carry out scientific and technical analyses. The examples of other countries should be investigated. They should bear in mind that each country has unique historical, social, political and economic structures. As Rydergård points out, the boundaries have not only administrative functions but also historical, social, and political functions; drawing boundaries requires considering these factors as well (2012, p.14). The regulation should not determine a single optimum size and model for all municipalities and for all municipal services. It should not stipulate population or area as the only criterion. Each province has unique historical, social, political, and economic structures. Each municipal service has different requirements and needs different assessment criteria, necessitating various models to be put into practice. In addition, democratic procedures, consultation and negotiation principles should be observed. The regulation drafts should be shared with academics, experts, professional organizations, NGOs, and relevant municipalities. The aim of the regulation should not be economies of scale, efficient service provision, i.e. or profit-oriented and rent-seeking; it should pay attention to public interest and fairness.

The most important shortcoming of this study is not comparing Hatay with other municipalities. Another metropolitan municipality and a provincial municipality can also be chosen for comparasion. For example, Mersin Metropolitan Municipality is a good sample because it has a longer rescaling history starting from 1994. As a provincial municipality, Osmaniye can be other sample for comparasion. Water and sewage services are provided by district municipalities in Osmaniye. Therefore, Osmaniye gives information on how water and sewage services are provided by district municipalities. Moreover, it would be better, if water

and sewage services were compared with other municipal services, such as public transportation and solid waste services. Furthermore, in-depth interviews could be conducted with local people in order to obtain more reliable data. Furthermore, more data from the previous periods could be collected in order to make a comparison between before and after the Law No 6360. More importantly, it will be better, if a scientific study about the outcomes of the Law No 6360 is carried out 10 years after the enactment of the law. These recommendations are likely to contribute future works on similar issues.

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APPENDICES

A: DIVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES BETWEEN METROPOLITAN AND LOCAL MUNICIPALITIES IN SOME COUNTRIES

Services		Amsterdam	Barcelona	Frankfurt	London	Roma	Paris	İstan- bul
1	Environment health	L	M-L	M	L	M	M	M-L
	Solid waste removal	M	M	M-L	M	M	M	M
	Solid waste collection	M	L	L	L	M	M	L
	Street cleaning	L	L	L	L	M	M	L
2	Water treatment & distribution	M	M	M-L	M-L	M	M	M
	Local distribution	M	L	M-L	L	M	M	M
	Drainage	M	M	M	M-L	M	M	M
	Sewage network	M	M	M-L	L	M	M	M
3	Main road construction& maintenance	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
	Snow Removal	M				M	M	M-L
	Bridges, undergrounds	M					M	M
	Local road construction & maintenance				L		M	L
4	Airports							
	Terminals	M			M		M	M
	Taxi-Minibus	M-L	L	L	M	M	M	M
	Public transportation	M		M	M	M	M	M
5	Education				M-L	M-L		
	Primary education	L					M	
	Vocational education	M-L	M-L	M-L	M-L	M-L	M	M-L
	School Build				L		M	
	Adult education	M-L	M-L	M-L	M-L	M-L	M	M-L
6	Urban Plan	M-L	M-L	M-L	M-L	M	M	M-L
	Cartography	M-L	M-L		M-L	M	M	M-L
	Development	M-L	L	L	L	M-L	M	M
	Strategic Plan	M	M	M	M	M	M	M

A (continued)

Services		Amsterdam	Barcelona	Frankfurt	London	Roma	Paris	İstan- bul
		M	M	M	M	M	M	M
	Fire station	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
7	Municipal police	M-L	M-L	L	M	M	M	M-L
8	Donation / Credit				M		M	
	Housing allotment	M			L	L		
	Housing construction	M-L	L	L	L		M	L

M: Metropolitan Municipality L: Local Municipality

1: Environment 2: Water and Sewage 3. Road Construction & Maintenance 4. Transportation 5. Education 6. Planning & Development 7. Fire 8. Security 9. Housing

Source: Yildirim (2014)

B: LOCAL UNITS BEFORE AND AFTER THE LAW NO 6360 IN HATAY

District		After the Law No 6360	Before the Law No 6360		
1. ANTAKYA		Statue	Statue	District	Sub-district
1	AÇIKDERE	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Centre
2	AKASYA	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
3	AKCURUN	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Centre
4	AKÇAOVA	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Centre
5	AKEVLER	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
6	AKHİSAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Serinyol
7	AKSARAY	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
8	ALAATTİN	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Centre
9	ALAHAN	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Serinyol
10	ALAZI	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Serinyol
11	ALTINÇAY	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
12	ANAYAZI	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Serinyol
13	APAYDIN	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Centre
14	ARPAHAN	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Serinyol
15	AŞAĞIOBA	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Serinyol
16	AVSUYU	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Antakya	Centre
17	AYDINLIKEVLER	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
18	BAĞRIYANIK	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
19	BARBAROS	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
20	BİNİCİLER	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
21	BİTİREN	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Centre
22	BOŞİN	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Centre
23	BOZHÜYÜK	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Centre
24	BÜYÜKDALYAN	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Hıdırbey
25	CEBRAİL	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
26	CUMHURİYET	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
27	DEMİRKÖPRÜ	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Centre
28	DERİNCE	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Serinyol
29	DİKMECE	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Serinyol
30	DOĞANKÖY	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Hıdırbey
31	DUTDİBİ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
32	EKİNCİ	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Antakya	Hıdırbey
33	EMEK	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
34	ESENLİK	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
35	ESENTEPE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
36	FEVZİÇAKMAK	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
37	GAZİ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
38	GAZİPAŞA	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
39	G. Ş. KANATLI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
40	GÖKÇEGÖZ	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Centre
41	GÜLDEREN	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Serinyol
42	GÜLLÜBAHÇE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
43	GÜNYAZI	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Hıdırbey
44	GÜZELBURÇ	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Antakya	Hıdırbey
45	HABİB-İ NECCAR	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
46	H. Ö. ALPAGOT	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre

B (continued)

District		After the Law No 6360	Before the Law No 6360		
1. ANTAKYA (CENTRE)		Statue	Statue	District	Sub-district
47	HARAPARASI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
48	HASANLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Centre
49	HAVUZLAR	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
50	İPLİK PAZARI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
51	KANTARA	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
52	KARAALİ	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Antakya	Serinyol
53	KARAALİBÖLÜĞÜ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
54	KARDEŞLER	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
55	KARLISU	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Antakya	Hıdırbey
56	KIŞLASARAY	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
57	KİSECİK	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Hıdırbey
58	KOCAABDİ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
59	KURUYER	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Centre
60	KUYULU	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
61	KUZEYTEPE	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Antakya	Hıdırbey
62	KÜÇÜKDALYAN	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Antakya	Centre
63	MADENBOYU	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Centre
64	MANSURLU	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Centre
65	MARAŞBOĞAZI	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Serinyol
66	MAŞUKLU	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Antakya	Centre
67	MELEKLİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Centre
68	MEYDAN	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
69	NARLICA	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Antakya	Centre
70	ODABAŞI	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Antakya	Hıdırbey
71	OĞLAKÖREN	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Serinyol
72	ORHANLI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
73	OVAKENT	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Antakya	Serinyol
74	PAŞAKÖY	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Serinyol
75	SAÇAKLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Centre
76	SARAYCIK	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Hıdırbey
77	SARAYKENT	Neighbourhood	Mahalle	Antakya	Merkez
78	SERİNYOL	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Antakya	Serinyol
79	SOFULAR	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
80	SUVATLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Centre
81	ŞEHİTLER	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
82	ŞEYHALİ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
83	ŞİRİNCE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
84	TAHTAKÖPRÜ	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Serinyol
85	TANIŞMA	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Centre
86	ULUCAMI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
87	UZUNALIÇ	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Serinyol
88	ÜÇGEDİK	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Serinyol
89	ÜRGENPAŞA	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
90	ÜZÜMDALI	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Centre
91	YAYLACIK	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Hıdırbey
92	YENİCAMİ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
93	YEŞİLOVA	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Centre
94	ZENGİNLER	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Antakya	Centre
95	ZÜLÜFLÜHAN	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Serinyol

B (continued)

District		After the Law No 6360	Before the Law No 6360		
2. ARSUZ		Statue	Statue	District	Sub- district
1	AKÇALI	Neighbourhood	Municipality	İskenderun	Uluçınar
2	ARPADERESİ	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Centre
3	ARPAGEDİK	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Uluçınar
4	AŞAĞI KEPİRCE	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Uluçınar
5	AVCILARSUYU	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Uluçınar
6	BEYKÖYÜ	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Uluçınar
7	ÇETİLLİK	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Uluçınar
8	DEREKUYU	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Uluçınar
9	GÖKMEYDAN	Neighbourhood	Municipality	İskenderun	Uluçınar
10	GÖZCÜLER	Neighbourhood	Municipality	İskenderun	Uluçınar
11	GÜLCİHAN	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Uluçınar
12	HACIAHMETLİ	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Uluçınar
13	HARLISU	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Centre
14	HAYMASEKİ	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Uluçınar
15	HELVALI	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Centre
16	HÜYÜK	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Uluçınar
17	IŞIKLI	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Uluçınar
18	KALE	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Uluçınar
19	K. CUMHURİYET	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Karaağaç
20	K. KONARLI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Karaağaç
21	K.ÖVÜNDÜK	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Karaağaç
22	K. ŞARKKONAK	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Karaağaç
23	KARAGÖZ	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Uluçınar
24	KARAHÜSEYİNLİ	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Centre
25	KIŞLA	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Centre
26	KONACIK	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Uluçınar
27	KOZAKLI	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Centre
28	KURTBAĞI	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Uluçınar
29	MADENLİ	Neighbourhood	Municipality	İskenderun	Uluçınar
30	NARDÜZÜ	Neighbourhood	Municipality	İskenderun	Centre
31	NERGİZLİK	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Centre
32	PİRİNÇLİK	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Centre
33	TATARLI	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Uluçınar
34	TÜLEK	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Uluçınar
35	ULUÇINAR	Neighbourhood	Sub-district	İskenderun	Uluçınar
36	ÜÇGÜLLÜK	Neighbourhood	Municipality	İskenderun	Uluçınar
37	YUKARIKEPİRCE	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Uluçınar

B (continued)

District		After the Law No 6360	Before the Law No 6360		
3. ERZİN		Statue	Statue	District	Sub- distrcit
1	AŞAĞIBURNAZ	Neighbourhood	Village	Erzin	Centre
2	BAHÇELİEVLER	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Erzin	Centre
3	BAŞLAMIŞ	Neighbourhood	Village	Erzin	Centre
4	CUMHURİYET	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Erzin	Centre
5	GÖKDERE	Neighbourhood	Village	Erzin	Centre
6	GÖKGÖL	Neighbourhood	Village	Erzin	Centre
7	HÜRRİYET	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Erzin	Centre
8	İSALI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Erzin	Centre
9	İSTİKLAL	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Erzin	Centre
10	KARAMUSTAFALI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Erzin	Centre
11	KIZLARÇAYI	Neighbourhood	Village	Erzin	Centre
12	KUYULUK	Neighbourhood	Village	Erzin	Centre
13	MAHMUTLU	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Erzin	Centre
14	MUSTAFALI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Erzin	Centre
15	ŞÜKRÜ PAŞA	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Erzin	Centre
16	TURUNÇLU	Neighbourhood	Village	Erzin	Centre
17	YENİ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Erzin	Centre
18	YEŞİLTEPE	Neighbourhood	Village	Erzin	Centre
19	YONCADÜZÜ	Neighbourhood	Village	Erzin	Centre
20	YUKARIBURNAZ	Neighbourhood	Village	Erzin	Centre
District		After the Law No 6360	Before the Law No 6360		
4. DÖRTYOL		Statue	Statue	District	Sub- distrcit
1	ALTINÇAĞ	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Dört Yol	Centre
2	ÇATKÖY	Neighbourhood	Village	Dört Yol	Centre
3	ÇAYLI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Dört Yol	Centre
4	KAPILI	Neighbourhood	Village	Dört Yol	Centre
5	KARAKESE	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Dört Yol	Centre
6	KIŞLALAR	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Dört Yol	Centre
7	KONAKLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Dört Yol	Centre
8	KUZUCULU	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Dört Yol	Centre
9	NUMUNE EVLER	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Dört Yol	Centre
10	OCAKLI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Dört Yol	Centre
11	ÖZERLİ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Dört Yol	Centre
12	SANAYİ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Dört Yol	Centre
13	YENİYURT	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Dört Yol	Centre
14	YEŞİL	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Dört Yol	Centre
15	YEŞİLKÖY	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Dört Yol	Centre

B (continued)

District		After the Law No 6360	Before the Law No 6360		
5. İSKENDERUN		Statue	Statue	District	Sub- distrcit
1	AKARCA	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Centre
2	AKÇAY	Neighbourhood	Municipality	İskenderun	Centre
3	AŞKARBEYLİ	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Centre
4	AZGANLIK	Neighbourhood	Municipality	İskenderun	Centre
5	BARBAROS	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
6	BARIŞTEPE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
7	BEKBELE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
8	BİTİŞİK	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Centre
9	BULUTTEPE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
10	BÜYÜKDERE	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Centre
11	CIRTIMAN	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Centre
12	CUMHURİYET	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
13	ÇAY	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
14	ÇINARLI	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Centre
15	DENİZCİLER	Neighbourhood	Municipality	İskenderun	Centre
16	DUMLUPINAR	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
17	DÜĞÜNYURDU	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Centre
18	ESENTEPE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
19	FATİHSULTAN	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
20	GÜLTEPE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
21	GÜRSEL	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
22	GÜZELÇAY	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Centre
23	HÜRRİYET	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
24	İSMET İNÖNÜ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
25	KALEDİBİ	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Centre
26	KARAYILAN	Neighbourhood	Municipality	İskenderun	Centre
27	KAVAKLIOLUK	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Centre
28	KOCATEPE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
29	KURTULUŞ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
30	MEYDAN	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
31	MODERNEVLER	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
32	MURADİYE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
33	M. KEMAL	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
34	NUMUNE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
35	ORHANGAZİ	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Centre
36	PINARBAŞI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
37	PİRİREİS	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
38	SAKARYA	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
39	SARISEKİ	Neighbourhood	Municipality	İskenderun	Centre
40	SAVAŞ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
41	SUÇIKAĞI	Neighbourhood	Village	İskenderun	Centre
42	SÜLEYMANİYE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
43	YENİŞEHİR	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
44	YILDIRIMTEPE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre
45	YUNUSEMRE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	İskenderun	Centre

B (continued)

District		After the Law No 6360	Before the Law No 6360		
6. BELEN		Statue	Statue	District	Sub- district
1	ATİK	Neighbourhood	Village	Belen	Centre
2	BAKRAS	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Belen	Centre
3	BENLİDERE	Neighbourhood	Village	Belen	Centre
4	ÇAKALLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Belen	Centre
5	ÇERÇİKAYA	Neighbourhood	Village	Belen	Centre
6	DEREBAHÇE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Belen	Centre
7	FATİH	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Belen	Centre
8	HALİLBEY	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Belen	Centre
9	İSSUME	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Belen	Centre
10	KARAPELİT	Neighbourhood	Village	Belen	Centre
11	KICI	Neighbourhood	Village	Belen	Centre
12	KÖMÜRÇUKURU	Neighbourhood	Village	Belen	Centre
13	MUHLİSALİ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Belen	Centre
14	MÜFTÜLER	Neighbourhood	Village	Belen	Centre
15	ÖTENÇAY	Neighbourhood	Village	Belen	Centre
16	SARIMAZI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Belen	Centre
17	SOĞUKOLUK	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Belen	Centre
18	ŞENBÜK	Neighbourhood	Village	Belen	Centre
District		After the Law No 6360	Before the Law No 6360		
7. KUMLU		Statue	Statue	District	Sub- district
1	AKKERPİÇ	Neighbourhood	Village	Kumlu	Centre
2	AKKUYU	Neighbourhood	Village	Kumlu	Centre
3	AKPINAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Kumlu	Centre
4	AKTAŞ	Neighbourhood	Village	Kumlu	Centre
5	BATIAYRANCI	Neighbourhood	Village	Kumlu	Centre
6	CUMHURİYET	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Kumlu	Centre
7	DOĞUAYRANCI	Neighbourhood	Village	Kumlu	Centre
8	FEVZİÇAKMAK	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Kumlu	Centre
9	GÖKÇEOĞLU	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Kumlu	Centre
10	GÜLOVA	Neighbourhood	Village	Kumlu	Centre
11	HAMAM	Neighbourhood	Village	Kumlu	Centre
12	HATAYHAMAMI	Neighbourhood	Village	Kumlu	Centre
13	KALETEPE	Neighbourhood	Village	Kumlu	Centre
14	KELLİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Kumlu	Centre
15	KIRCAOĞLU	Neighbourhood	Village	Kumlu	Centre
16	MUHARREM	Neighbourhood	Village	Kumlu	Centre

B (continued)

District		After the Law No 6360	Before the Law No 6360		
8. DEFNE		Statue	Statue	District	Sub- district
1	AKDENİZ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Merkez	Centre
2	AKNEHİR	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Samandağ	Centre
3	ARMUTLU	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Merkez	Centre
4	AŞAĞIOKÇULAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Merkez	Centre
5	BAHÇEKÖY	Neighbourhood	Village	Merkez	Harbiye
6	BALIKLIDERE	Neighbourhood	Village	Merkez	Harbiye
7	BALLIÖZ	Neighbourhood	Village	Merkez	Hıdırbey
8	BOSTANCIK	Neighbourhood	Village	Merkez	Harbiye
9	BÜYÜKÇAT	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Karaçay
10	ÇARDAKLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Merkez	Harbiye
11	ÇEKMECE	Neighbourhood	Municipality	merkez	Hıdırbey
12	ÇINARLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Karaçay
13	ÇÖKEK	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Karaçay
14	DEĞİRMENYOLU	Neighbourhood	Village	Merkez	Harbiye
15	DÖVER	Neighbourhood	Village	Merkez	Harbiye
16	DURUNLU	Neighbourhood	Belediye	Merkez	Centre
17	ELEKTRİK	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Merkez	Centre
18	GÜMÜŞGÖZE	Neighbourhood	Belediye	Merkez	Harbiye
19	GÜNEYSÖĞÜT	Neighbourhood	Village	Merkez	Hıdırbey
20	HANCAĞIZ	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Karaçay
21	HARBİYE	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Merkez	Centre
22	HÜSEYİNLİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Karaçay
23	KARŞIYAKA	Neighbourhood	Village	Merkez	Şenköy
24	KOÇÖREN	Neighbourhood	Village	Merkez	Hıdırbey
25	MEYDANCIK	Neighbourhood	Village	Merkez	Hıdırbey
26	ORHANLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Merkez	Hıdırbey
27	ÖZBEK	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Karaçay
28	SAMANKAYA	Neighbourhood	Village	Merkez	Harbiye
29	SİNANLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Merkez	Harbiye
30	SUBAŞI	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Merkez	Hıdırbey
31	SÜMERLER	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Merkez	Centre
32	TAVLA	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Samandağ	Karaçay
33	TOYGARLI	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Merkez	Hıdırbey
34	TURUNÇLU	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Merkez	Hıdırbey
35	ÜZENĞİLİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Karaçay
36	YENİÇAĞ	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Karaçay
37	YEŞİLPINAR	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Merkez	Harbiye

B (continued)

District		After the Law No 6360	Before the Law No 6360		
9. HASSA		Statue	Statue	District	Sub- distrcit
1	AKBEZ	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Hassa	Centre
2	AKKÜLEK	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Aktepe
3	AKTEPE	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Hassa	Centre
4	ARDIÇLI	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Hassa	Centre
5	ARPALIUŞAĞI	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Centre
6	A.KARAFAKILI	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Centre
7	BADEMLİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Aktepe
8	BİNTAŞ	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Centre
9	BUHARA	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Aktepe
10	ÇAY	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Hassa	Centre
11	ÇINARBAŞI	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Centre
12	DEDEMLİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Centre
13	DEMREK	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Aktepe
14	DERVİŞPAŞA	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Hassa	Centre
15	EĞRİBUCAK	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Aktepe
16	GAZELUŞAĞI	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Centre
17	GİRNE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Hassa	Centre
18	GÜLKENT	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Aktepe
19	GÜLPINAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Aktepe
20	GÜVENÇ	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Aktepe
21	HACILAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Centre
22	HAYDARLAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Centre
23	KATRANLIK	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Aktepe
24	KORU HÖYÜK	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Centre
25	KÜRECİ	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Hassa	Centre
26	MAZMANLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Aktepe
27	ONBEŞKASIM	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Hassa	Centre
28	SAPANÖZÜ	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Centre
29	SÖĞÜT	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Hassa	Centre
30	SUGEDİĞİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Centre
31	TEPEBAŞI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Hassa	Centre
32	TİYEK	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Centre
33	YENİ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Hassa	Centre
34	YENİYAPAN	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Centre
35	YOLUKLAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Centre
36	YUKARIBUCAK	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Centre
37	Y.KARAFAKILI	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Centre
38	YUVALI	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Aktepe
39	ZEYTİNOBA	Neighbourhood	Village	Hassa	Aktepe

B (continued)

District		After the Law No 6360	Before the Law No 6360		
10. KIRIKHAN		Statue	Statue	District	Sub- distrcit
1	408 EVLER	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Kırıkhan	Centre
2	ABALAKLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
3	ADALAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
4	AKTUTAN	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
5	ALAYBEYLİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
6	ALİBEYÇAĞILLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
7	ALPARSLAN	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Kırıkhan	Centre
8	ALSANCAK	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Kırıkhan	Centre
9	ARKITÇA	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
10	AYDINLI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Kırıkhan	Centre
11	AYGIRGÖLÜ	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Yalangoz
12	BAHÇELİEVLER	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Kırıkhan	Centre
13	BALARMUDU	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
14	BALDIRAN	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
15	BARBAROS	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Kırıkhan	Centre
16	BAŞPINAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
17	BEKTAŞLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
18	CAMUZKIŞLASI	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Yalangoz
19	CEYLANLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
20	CUMHURİYET	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Kırıkhan	Centre
21	ÇAMSARI	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Yalangoz
22	ÇAMSEKİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
23	ÇANKAYA	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Kırıkhan	Centre
24	ÇATALTEPE	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
25	ÇİLOĞLANHÜYÜ	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
26	DANAAHMETLİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
27	DEDEÇINAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
28	DELİBEKİRLİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
29	DEMİRKONAK	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Yalangoz
30	FATİH	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Kırıkhan	Centre
31	GAZİ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Kırıkhan	Centre
32	GÖLBAŞI	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
33	GÜLTEPE	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Yalangoz
34	GÜNDÜZ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Kırıkhan	Centre
35	GÜVENTAŞI	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
36	GÜZELCE	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
37	ILIKPINAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
38	İÇADA	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
39	İNCİRLİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Yalangoz
40	KALETEPE	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Yalangoz
41	KAMBERLİKAYA	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
42	KAMIŞLAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
43	KANGALLAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
44	KARAÇAĞIL	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
45	KARADURMUŞLU	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
46	KARAEMLASLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
47	KARAMAĞARA	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
48	KARAMANKAŞI	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre
49	KARATAŞ	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkhan	Centre

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District		After the Law No 6360	Before the Law No 6360		
10. KIRIKHAN		Statue	Statue	District	Sub- district
50	KAZKELİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkkhan	Centre
51	KIZILKAYA	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Kırıkkhan	Centre
52	KODALLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkkhan	Centre
53	KURLUSARIMAZI	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkkhan	Centre
54	KURLUSOĞUKSU	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Kırıkkhan	Centre
55	KURTULUŞ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Kırıkkhan	Centre
56	MAHMUTLU	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkkhan	Centre
57	MENDERES	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Kırıkkhan	Centre
58	MİMARŞİNAN	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Kırıkkhan	Centre
59	MURATPAŞA	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkkhan	Centre
60	NARLIHOPUR	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkkhan	Centre
61	ÖZKIZILKAYA	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkkhan	Centre
62	ÖZSOĞUKSU	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkkhan	Centre
63	ÖZYÖRÜK	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Kırıkkhan	Centre
64	REŞATLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkkhan	Centre
65	SAYLAK	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkkhan	Centre
66	SÖĞÜTLÜÖZ	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkkhan	Centre
67	SUCUKÖY	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkkhan	Centre
68	TAŞOLUK	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkkhan	Centre
69	TOPBOĞAZI	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkkhan	Centre
70	TORUN	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkkhan	Centre
71	YILANLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkkhan	Centre
72	YALANGOZ	Neighbourhood	Sub-district	Kırıkkhan	Centre
73	YENİ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Kırıkkhan	Centre
74	YILANLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Kırıkkhan	Yalangoz

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District		After the Law No 6360	Before the Law No 6360		
11. REYHANLI		Statue	Statue	District	Sub- distrcit
1	ADABUCAĞI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Reyhanlı	Centre
2	AHMETBEYLİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
3	AKYAYLA	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
4	ALAKUZU	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
5	BAĞLAR	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Reyhanlı	Centre
6	BAHÇELİEVLER	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Reyhanlı	Centre
7	BAYIR	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Reyhanlı	Centre
8	BEŞASLAN	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
9	BÜKÜLMEZ	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
10	CİLVEGÖZÜ	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
11	CUMHURİYET	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
12	CÜDEYDE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Reyhanlı	Centre
13	ÇAKIRYİĞİT	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
14	D.PAŞAHÜYÜĞÜ	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
15	DEĞİRMENKAŞI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Reyhanlı	Centre
16	ESENTEPE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Reyhanlı	Centre
17	FEVZİPAŞA	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
18	FİDANLIK	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Reyhanlı	Centre
19	G.MÜRSELTEPESİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
20	GÖKTEPE	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
21	GÜLTEPE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Reyhanlı	Centre
22	HARRAN	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Reyhanlı	Centre
23	KARACANLIK	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
24	KARAHÜYÜK	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
25	K.SÜLEYMANLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
26	KONUK	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
27	KULETEPE	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
28	KUMTEPE	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
29	KURTULUŞ	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
30	KUŞAKLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
31	MEHMETBEYLİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
32	MUSTAFA KEMAL	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Reyhanlı	Centre
33	NERGİZLİ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Reyhanlı	Centre
34	OĞULPINAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
35	ÖZ KURTULUŞ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Reyhanlı	Centre
36	PAŞAHÖYÜK	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
37	PAŞAKÖY	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
38	PINARBAŞI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Reyhanlı	Centre
39	SULUKÖY	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
40	TAYFUR SÖKMEN	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
41	TERZİHÜYÜK	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
42	UZUNKAVAK	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
43	ÜÇTEPE	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
44	VARIŞLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Reyhanlı	Centre
45	YENİ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Reyhanlı	Centre
46	YENİŞEHİR	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Reyhanlı	Centre
47	YEŞİLOVA	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Reyhanlı	Centre

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District		After the Law No 6360	Before the Law No 6360		
12. SAMANDAĞ		Statue	Statue	District	Sub- district
1	ATAKÖY	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Karaçay
2	ATATÜRK	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Samandağ	Centre
3	AVCILAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Karaçay
4	BATIAYAZ	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Centre
5	BÜYÜKOBA	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Karaçay
6	CEMALGÜRSEL	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Samandağ	Centre
7	CEYLANDERE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Samandağ	Centre
8	CUMHURİYET	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Samandağ	Centre
9	ÇAMLIYAYLA	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Karaçay
10	ÇANAKOLUK	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Karaçay
11	ÇİĞDEDE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Samandağ	Centre
12	ÇÖĞÜRLÜ	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Centre
13	ÇUBUKLU	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Karaçay
14	DEĞİRMENBAŞI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Samandağ	Centre
15	DENİZ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Samandağ	Centre
16	ERİKLİKUYU	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Centre
17	FİDANLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Karaçay
18	GÖZENE	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Centre
19	HIDIRBEY	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Centre
20	HUZURLU	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Karaçay
21	KAPISUYU	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Centre
22	KARAÇAY	Neighbourhood	Sub-district	Samandağ	Karaçay
23	KOYUNOĞLU	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Samandağ	Centre
24	KURTDERESİ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Samandağ	Centre
25	KUŞALANI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Samandağ	Centre
26	MAĞARACIK	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Samandağ	Centre
27	MEYDAN	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Centre
28	MIZRAKLI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Samandağ	Centre
29	SELDİREN	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Karaçay
30	SUTAŞI	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Samandağ	Centre
31	Ş.KANATLI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Samandağ	Centre
32	TEKEBAŞI	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Samandağ	Centre
33	TOMRUKSUYU	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Samandağ	Centre
34	UZUNBAĞ	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Samandağ	Centre
35	VAKIFLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Centre
36	YAYLICA	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Samandağ	Centre
37	YENİ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Samandağ	Centre
38	YENİKÖY	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Karaçay
39	YEŞİLADA	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Centre
40	YEŞİLKÖY	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Centre
41	YEŞİLYAZI	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Centre
42	YOĞUNOLUK	Neighbourhood	Village	Samandağ	Centre

B (continued)

District		After the Law No 6360	Before the Law No 6360		
13. YAYLADAĞI		Statue	Statue	District	Sub- district
1	ARSLANYAZI	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Kışlak
2	AŞAĞIPULLUYAZI	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Centre
3	AYDINBAHÇE	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Yeditepe
4	AYIŞIĞI	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Kışlak
5	BEZGE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Yayladağı	Centre
6	BOZLU	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Şenköy
7	ÇABALA	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Centre
8	ÇAKIKÖY	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Yayladağı	Centre
9	ÇAKSINA	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Yeditepe
10	ÇAMALTI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Yayladağı	Centre
11	ÇANDIR	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Centre
12	ÇATBAŞI	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Şenköy
13	ÇAYIR	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Şenköy
14	DENİZGÖREN	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Yeditepe
15	DUSDURU	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Yayladağı	Centre
16	EĞERCİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Centre
17	GÖRENTAŞ	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Kışlak
18	GÖZLÜCE	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Yeditepe
19	GÜRIŞIK	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Centre
20	GÜVEÇÇİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Kışlak
21	GÜZELYURT	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Centre
22	HİSARCIK	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Kışlak
23	KARACURUN	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Yeditepe
24	KARAKÖSE	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Yayladağı	Centre
25	KIŞLAK	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Yayladağı	Centre
26	KIZILÇAT	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Centre
27	KÖSRELİK	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Centre
28	KULAÇ	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Centre
29	KURTULUŞ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Yayladağı	Centre
30	LEYLEKLİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Centre
31	OLGUNLAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Centre
32	SEBENOBA	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Yeditepe
33	SUNGUR	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Kışlak
34	SÜRÜTME	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Kışlak
35	ŞAKŞAK	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Centre
36	ŞENKÖY	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Yayladağı	Şenköy
37	TURFANDA	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Şenköy
38	TUTLUBAHÇE	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Yayladağı	Centre
39	ULUYOL	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Kışlak
40	ÜÇIRMAK	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Kışlak
41	YALAZ	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Centre
42	YAYIKDAMLAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Yeditepe
43	YENİCEKÖY	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Centre
44	YEŞİLTEPE	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Yeditepe
45	YONCAKAYA	Neighbourhood	Village	Merkez	Şenköy
46	YUKARIOKÇULAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Merkez	Şenköy
47	Y.PULLUYAZI	Neighbourhood	Village	Yayladağı	Centre

B (continued)

District		After the Law No 6360	Before the Law No 6360		
14. ALTINÖZÜ		Statue	Statue	District	Sub-district
1	AKAMBER	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Centre
2	AKDARI	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Centre
3	ALAKENT	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Centre
4	ALTINKAYA	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Altınözü	Centre
5	ATAYURDU	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Centre
6	AVUTTEPE	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Centre
7	BABATORUN	Neighbourhood	Sub-district	Altınözü	Babatorun
8	BOYNUYOĞUN	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Centre
9	BÜYÜKBURÇ	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Centre
10	ÇETENLİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Babatorun
11	DOKUZDAL	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Yiğityol
12	ENEK	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Centre
13	ERBAŞI	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Yiğityol
14	FATİKLİ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Altınözü	Centre
15	GÖZECİK	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Yiğityol
16	GÜNVURAN	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Yiğityol
17	HACİPAŞA	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Altınözü	Centre
18	HANYOLU	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Şenköy
19	KAMBERLİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Centre
20	KANSU	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Babatorun
21	KARBETAZ	Neighbourhood	Municipality	Altınözü	Centre
22	KARSU	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Centre
23	KAZANCIK	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Centre
24	KESKİNCİK	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Babatorun
25	KILIÇTUTAN	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Yiğityol
26	KIYIGÖREN	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Altınözü	Centre
27	KOLCULAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Yiğityol
28	KOZKALESİ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Altınözü	Centre
29	KURTMEZRAASI	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Centre
30	MAYADALI	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Babatorun
31	OYMAKLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Babatorun
32	SARIBÜK	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Yiğityol
33	SARILAR	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Altınözü	Centre
34	SEFERLİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Yiğityol
35	SİVRİKAVAK	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Yiğityol
36	SOFULAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Antakya	Şenköy
37	TEPEHAN	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Centre
38	TOKAÇLI	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Centre
39	TOKDEMİR	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Centre
40	TOPRAKHİSAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Centre
41	T.MEZRAASI	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Babatorun
42	YANIKPINAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Yiğityol
43	YARSELİ	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Centre
44	YENİHİSAR	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Centre
45	YENİŞEHİR	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Altınözü	Centre
46	YOLAĞZI	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Babatorun
47	YUNUSHANI	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Centre
48	ZİYARET	Neighbourhood	Village	Altınözü	Centre

B (continued)

After the Law No 6360			Before the Law No 6360		
15. PAYAS		Statue	Statue	District	Sub-district
1	CUMHURİYET	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Dört Yol	Centre
2	ÇAĞLALIK	Neighbourhood	Village	Dört Yol	Yakacık
3	FATİH	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Dört Yol	Centre
4	İSTİKLAL	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Dört Yol	Centre
5	KARACAMI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Dört Yol	Centre
6	KARBEYAZ	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Dört Yol	Centre
7	KARŞI	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Dört Yol	Centre
8	KOZLUDERE	Neighbourhood	Village	Dört Yol	Yakacık
9	KÜRTÜL	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Dört Yol	Centre
10	SİNCAN	Neighbourhood	Village	Dört Yol	Yakacık
11	YENİŞEHİR	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Dört Yol	Centre
12	Y.BEYAZIT	Neighbourhood	Neighbourhood	Dört Yol	Centre

C: MUNICIPAL DRINKING WATER STATISTICS FOR HATAY

	Before the Law No 6360			After the Law No 6360		
	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Total amount of water drained for drinking and potable water network (thousand m ³ /year)	71710	78937	94558	141220	100696	104365
Drained daily water amount per person (litres/per-day)	184	193	227	265	183	179
Amount of water distributed (10 m ³ /year)	40415	41233	46940	112832	64445	72645
Number of water subscribers	310004	330163	352839	510485	497532	511669
Number of municipalities	76	76	76	16	16	16
Number of drinking and potable water treatment plants	1	1	2	2	4	4
Number of municipalities served with drinking and potable water treatment plant	1	4	5	3	3	3
Municipal population served with drinking and potable water treatment plant	678	-	10487	16547	17006	17335
Ratio of municipal population served with drinking and potable water treatment plant to total municipal population (%)	0	-	1	1	1	1
Ratio of municipal population served with drinking and potable water treatment plant to total population (%)	0	-	1	1	1	1
Municipal population served with drinking and potable water network	1067892	1118743	1143619	1459043	1508510	1593757
Number of municipalities served with drinking and potable water network	74	75	75	16	16	16
Ratio of municipal population served by drinking and potable water network to municipal population (%)	98	96	98	96	97	99
Ratio of municipal population served by drinking potable water network to total population (%)	76	76	77	96	97	99
Number of municipalities replied to the questions	73	74	74	1	1	1

Source: TUIK, 2019a

D: MUNICIPAL AND WASTEWATER STATISTICS FOR HATAY

	Before the Law No 6360			After the Law No 6360		
	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Number of municipalities served by sewerage network	33	39	42	16	16	16
Municipal population served by sewerage network	622816	793707	865735	1215869	1166374	-
Ratio of municipal population served by sewerage network to total municipal population (%)	57	68	74	80	75	70
Number of wastewater treatment plants	5	6	5	6	8	12
Number of municipalities served with wastewater treatment plant	5	8	9	6	8	12
Municipal population served with wastewater treatment plant	378331	430113	377587	520508	488288	-
Ratio of municipal population served with wastewater treatment plant to total municipal population (%)	34,6	36,9	32,4	34,2	31,4	42,5
Amount of wastewater treated in wastewater treatment plants (thousand m ³ /year)	22885	25436	25302	26199	34421	51620
Amount of wastewater discharged from the network according to the receiving water body (thousand m ³ /year)	32565	39797	51263	61199	82221	85079
Daily amount of wastewater discharged per person in municipalities (litres/person-day)	143	137	162	138	193	207

Source: TUIK, 2019b

E: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR MUNICIPALITIES

BELEDİYELER İÇİN DERİNLEMESİNE MÜLAKAT SORULARI

Görüşmenin Yapıldığı Belediyenin	Adı	HATSU
	Başkanı	
	Hizmet Alanı Büyüklüğü	
	Hizmet Verilen Nüfus	
Görüşmenin Yapıldığı Belediye Birimi	Birim Adı	
	<i>Birim Yetkilisinin:</i>	
	Adı Soyadı	
	Mezuniyet Bilgisi	
	Mesleği	
	Birimdeki Görevi	
	Birimde Çalıştığı Süre	
	Belediyede Çalıştığı Süre	
	İletişim Bilgisi	

Ön Bilgi: Bu çalışmanın amacı belediyelerin sınırlarının değiştirilmesinin belediyelerin hizmet sunumuna olan etkisini araştırmaktır. Alan araştırması olarak Hatay ili seçilmiştir. Hatay ilinde belediyelerin hizmet alanıyla ilgili yapılan en önemli değişiklik 6360 sayılı yasa doğrultusunda gerçekleşmiştir. 6360 sayılı yasa ile 2014 yılında Hatay ilinde sınırları il mülki sınırları olan büyükşehir belediyesi kurulmuştur.

Büyükşehir Belediyesinin il sınırını kapsaması, birçok belde belediyesinin kapanması ve kırsal alanların belediye sınırlarına dâhil edilmesi ile birlikte Hatay Büyükşehir Belediyesinin görev, yetki ve sorumluluklarını oldukça geniş bir coğrafyaya yayılmıştır. Daha önce 12 ilçe belediyesi olan Hatay'da yasayla birlikte 3 ilçe belediyesi daha kurulmuştur. Şu anda Hatay Büyükşehir Belediyesinin toplam 15 ilçe belediyesi ve 149 mahallesi bulunmaktadır. Bu görüşmenin amacı, 6360 sayılı yasanın belediyelerin başta su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri olmak üzere hizmet alanında yarattığı olumlu ve olumsuz etkilerini Hatay BŞB örneği üzerinden araştırmaktır. Böylece belediyelerde önemli değişikliklerine neden olan bu kanun ve uygulamalarına yöneltilen değerlendirmelerin objektif ve kapsamlı bir şekilde analiz edilmesi hedeflenmiştir.

GENEL SORULAR:

1. 6360 sayılı Kanunun yürürlüğe girmesi Hatay ili açısından sizce doğru bir karar mı? Bu süreci hem yöneticiler hem de vatandaşlar açısından değerlendirebilir misiniz?

2. 6360 sayılı Kanun ile Büyükşehir Belediye sınırlarının il mülki sınırları ile çakıştırılmasını genel olarak nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz? Sizce Hatay ilinde hizmet sunumu bu pratikten nasıl etkilenmiştir?
3. Daha önce ilçe belediyeleri tarafından sunulan su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri 6360 sayılı yasayla birlikte büyükşehir belediyelerine bağlı ilgili birim tarafından yürütülmeye başlamıştır. Bu görevin büyükşehirlere verilmesi sizce doğru bir karar mı? Sizce 6360 sayılı yasa sonrası bu hizmet sunumu nasıl etkilenmiştir?
4. 6360 sayılı Kanunun gerekçesinde aşağıdaki **hedefler** öne sürülmüştür. Bu hedeflerden hangileri Hatay'da su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri için gerçekleşmiş ya da gerçekleşmemiştir? Nedenleri ile birlikte açıklayınız.
 - a. Ölçek ekonomisini yakalama
 - b. Hizmetlerde etkinlik-verimlik
 - c. Daha düşük maliyet ve daha az kaynakla daha kaliteli hizmet
5. Su ve kanalizasyon **hizmetlerinin sunumu** açısından büyük ölçekli belediyelerin küçük ölçekli belediyeler karşısında **avantajları** ve **dezavantajları** nelerdir? Su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerinin sunumunda ilçe belediyeleri mi yoksa büyükşehir belediyeleri mi daha etkili olur?
6. 6360 Sayılı Kanunun su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri açısından önerileriniz var mı?

F: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR HATSU

HATSU İÇİN DERİNLEMESİNE MÜLAKAT SORULARI

Görüşmenin Yapıldığı HATSU Birimi	Birim Adı	
	<i>Birim Yetkilisinin:</i>	
	Adı Soyadı	
	Mezuniyet Bilgisi	
	Mesleği	
	Birimdeki Görevi	
	Birimde Çalıştığı Süre	
	İletişim Bilgisi	

Ön Bilgi: Bu çalışmanın amacı belediyelerin sınırlarının değiştirilmesinin belediyelerin hizmet sunumuna olan etkisini araştırmaktır. Alan araştırması olarak Hatay ili seçilmiştir. Hatay ilinde belediyelerin hizmet alanıyla ilgili yapılan en önemli değişiklik 6360 sayılı yasa doğrultusunda gerçekleşmiştir. 6360 sayılı yasa ile 2014 yılında Hatay ilinde sınırları il mülki sınırları olan büyükşehir belediyesi kurulmuştur.

Büyükşehir Belediyesinin il sınırını kapsaması, birçok belde belediyesinin kapanması ve kırsal alanların belediye sınırlarına dâhil edilmesi ile birlikte Hatay Büyükşehir Belediyesinin görev, yetki ve sorumluluklarını oldukça geniş bir coğrafyaya yayılmıştır. Daha önce 12 ilçe belediyesi olan Hatay’da yasayla birlikte 3 ilçe belediyesi daha kurulmuştur. Şu anda Hatay Büyükşehir Belediyesinin toplam 15 ilçe belediyesi ve 149 mahallesi bulunmaktadır. Bu görüşmenin amacı, 6360 sayılı yasanın su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri alanında yarattığı olumlu ve olumsuz etkilerini Hatay Büyükşehir Belediyesi (HATSU) örneği üzerinden araştırmaktır. Böylece bu hizmetlerde önemli değişikliklerine neden olan bu kanun ve uygulamalarına yöneltilecek değerlendirmelerin objektif ve kapsamlı bir şekilde analiz edilmesi hedeflenmiştir.

GENEL SORULAR:

1. 6360 sayılı Kanunun yürürlüğe girmesi Hatay ili açısından sizce doğru bir karar mı? Bu süreci hem yöneticiler hem de vatandaşlar açısından değerlendirebilir misiniz?
2. 6360 sayılı Kanun ile Büyükşehir Belediye sınırlarının il mülki sınırları ile çakıştırılmasını genel olarak nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz? Sizce Hatay ilinde hizmet sunumu bu pratikten nasıl etkilenmiştir?
3. Daha önce ilçe belediyeleri tarafından sunulan su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri 6360 sayılı yasayla birlikte büyükşehir belediyelerine bağlı ilgili birim tarafından yürütülmeye

başlamıştır. Bu görevin büyükşehirlere verilmesi sizce doğru bir karar mı? Sizce 6360 sayılı yasa sonrası bu hizmet sunumu nasıl etkilenmiştir?

4. 6360 sayılı Kanunun gerekçesinde aşağıdaki **hedefler** öne sürülmüştür. Bu hedeflerden hangileri Hatay’da su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri için gerçekleşmiş ya da gerçekleşmemiştir? Nedenleri ile birlikte açıklayınız.

- a. Ölçek ekonomisini yakalama
- b. Hizmetlerde etkinlik-verimlik
- c. Daha düşük maliyet ve daha az kaynakla daha kaliteli hizmet

5. Su ve kanalizasyon **hizmetlerinin sunumu** açısından büyük ölçekli belediyelerin küçük ölçekli belediyeler karşısında **avantajları** ve **dezavantajları** nelerdir? Su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerinin sunumunda ilçe belediyeleri mi yoksa büyükşehir belediyeleri mi daha etkili olur?

BİRİME DAİR SORULAR

1. Biriminizde kaç adet personel çalışmaktadır?

	Şube Adı	Memur	İşçi	Sözleşmeli personel	Hizmet alımı	Diğer kurumlardan görevlendirme
a.						
b.						
c.						
d.						

2. Biriminizde kaç adet araç kullanılmaktadır? Türleri ile belirtiniz.

	Şube Adı	Kayıtlı Araç	İş Makinesi	Kiralık Araç
a.				
b.				
c.				
d.				
e.				

3. Hizmetleriniz için ayrılan bütçe nedir?

	Şube Adı	Gelir Miktarı	Gider Miktarı
a.			
b.			
c.			
d.			
e.			

4. Sizce aşağıda belirtilen hizmetler hangi kurum/kuruluşlar tarafından daha etkin ve verimli bir şekilde yürütülebilir? Birden fazla seçenek işaretlenebilir.

Hizmetler	Su Temini	Su Arıtma	Kanalizasyon	Atıksu Arıtma	Yağmur Suyu Drenajı	Tarımsal Sulama
Bakanlık						
Valilik/İl Müd.						
YİKOB						
BŞB						
İlçe Belediyesi						
Özel Sektör						
Diğer belirtiniz						

5. 6360 Sayılı Kanun öncesi ve sonrasında karşılaştığınız **sorunlar** nelerdir?

Sorun Alanı		Sorunlar	6360 Öncesi	6360 Sonrası
1.Kurumsal yapıya dair	1a	Personelin sayıca yetersizliği		
	1b	Personelin nitelik açısından yetersizliği		
	1c	Finansman yetersizliği		
	1d	Kurumsal yapıdaki yetersizliklerden kaynaklanan sorunlar		
	1e	Mevzuat eksikliği		
	1f	Büyükşehir ve ilçe belediyeleri arasında koordinasyon sorunları		
	1g	Yetki karmaşasının yaşanması		
2.Su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerine yönelik	2a	Hizmet alanının çok büyümesi		
	2b	Hizmet verilen nüfusun çok artması		
	2c	Hizmet kalitesinin düşmesi		
	2d	Hizmet verimliliğin azalması		
	2e	Hizmet sunumunda hızın düşmesi		
	2f	Hizmet üretim/dağıtım maliyetinin artması		
	2g	Şebekelerdeki su kaybının artması		
	2h	Altyapı sorunlarının yaşanması		
	2i	Arıtma tesislerinde sorunların yaşanması		
3.Vatandaş açısından	3a	Vatandaş memnuniyetinin azalması		
	3b	Hizmette adalet/eşitlik ilkesinin zayıflaması		
	3c	Hizmet tüketim maliyetinin artması - Suyun birim metreküp fiyatını artması - Faturaya eklenen vergi, bedel vb. ek maliyetlerin artması		
	3d	Kaçak kullanım sayısının artması		
	3e	Kırsal alanda sayaç takılmasına yönelik artan tepkiler		
	3f	Kırsal alanda fatura ödeme konusunda yaşanan sıkıntılar		
Diğer (Lütfen Belirtiniz)				

6. 6360 Sayılı Kanunun su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri açısından önerileriniz var mı?

İÇME SUYU HİZMETİNE YÖNELİK SORULAR

1. HATSU’da yıllara göre içme suyu hizmeti hakkında bilgi veriniz.

Yıllar	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014
Arıtılan/ Çekilen içme suyu miktarı					
İletilen içme suyu miktarı					
Hane başına tüketilen su miktarı					
Su şebekesinden yararlanan belediye sayısı					
Su şebekesinden yararlanan mahalle sayısı					
Toplam Abone sayısı					
Suyun birim m ³ fiyatı, TL/m ³					
KSUB, TL/m ³					
ÇTV, TL/m ³					
Şebekelerdeki Su Kayıp Oranı					
Kaçak kullanım sayısı					

2. HATSU’da daha önceki yıllarda bu hizmet nasıl sunuluyordu? (Arıtma, kaynağından alım yöntemi, iletim yöntemi, pompa, cazibe, vs)
3. Bu hizmetin her mahalleye etkin bir şekilde sunulduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Bu alanda karşılaştığınız sorunlar nelerdir? (Mevzuat, yönetim, personel, mali kaynak, yerel koşullar vb. açısından)
4. Bu hizmetin sunumunu vatandaş açısından değerlendirir misiniz? Sizce verilen hizmetten memnunlar mı? Her hangi bir şikayetleri oluyor mu? Bu şikayetlere geri dönüş sağlıyor musunuz? Sorunlara yönelik çözüm üretebiliyor musunuz?

ATIKSU-KANALİZASYON HİZMETİNE YÖNELİK SORULAR

1. HATSU’da yıllara göre kanalizasyon ve atıksu arıtma tesisi hakkında bilgi veriniz.

Yıllar	Kanalizasyon şebekesinden yararlanan belediye sayısı	Kanalizasyon şebekesinden yararlanan nüfus sayısı	Atıksu arıtma tesisinden yararlanan belediye sayısı	Atıksu arıtma tesisinden yararlanan nüfus sayısı
2018				
2017				
2016				
2015				
2014				

2. HATSU’da yıllara göre atıksu hizmeti hakkında bilgi veriniz.

Yıllar	Hane başına üretilen atıksu miktarı	İletilen atıksu miktarı	Arıtılan atıksu miktarı	Hizmetin birim maliyeti	Hizmetin birim fiyatı
2018					
2017					
2016					
2015					
2014					

3. Daha önceki yıllarda bu hizmetler ilçe belediyesindeyken nasıl sunuluyordu?

4. Bu hizmetin her mahalleye etkin bir şekilde sunulduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Bu alanda karşılaştığınız sorunlar nelerdir? (Mevzuat, yönetim, personel, mali kaynak, yerel koşullar vb. açısından)

5. Bu hizmetin sunumunu vatandaş açısından değerlendirir misiniz? Sizce verilen hizmetten memnunlar mı? Herhangi bir şikayetleri oluyor mu? Bu şikayetlere geri dönüş sağlıyor musunuz? Sorunlara yönelik çözüm üretebiliyor musunuz?

G: IN-DEPTH QUESTIONS FOR NEIGHBOURHOOD HEADMEN

MAHALLE MUHTARLARI İÇİN MÜLAKAT SORULARI

Görüşmenin Yapıldığı Muhtarlık	İlçe adı	
	Mahalle adı	
	Muhtarın Adı Soyadı	
	Muhtarın Mezuniyet Bilgisi	
	Muhtarın Mesleği	
	Muhtarın Çalıştığı Süre	
	Muhtarın İletişim Bilgisi	

	A. 6360 sayılı yasa öncesi sorular	
1	İçme ve kullanma suyu nasıl temin ediliyordu?	
2	İçme ve kullanma suyu nasıl iletiliyordu?	
3	Köyünüzde/beldenizde/mahallenizde kanalizasyon şebekesi var mıydı?	
4	Köyünüzde/beldenizde/mahallenizde atık sular nasıl uzaklaştırılıyordu?	
5	Köyünüzde yağmur suları nasıl uzaklaştırılıyordu?	
6	Köyünüzde/beldenizde/mahallenizde kaç tane hane/abone vardı?	
7	Su temini ile ilgili sıkıntılarınız var mıydı? Bu sıkıntılar çözülmüş müydü?	
8	Su kesintileri yaşıyor muydu? Neden? Nasıl çözülmüyordu?	
9	Alt yapı ile sorunlar yaşıyor muydu? Nasıl çözülmüyordu?	
10	Suyunuz içilebilir nitelikte miydi? Sudan kaynaklı herhangi bir hastalık, risk var mıydı? Varsa çözülmüş müydü?	
11	Atık sularınız çevre ve insan sağlığı açısından bir tehdit oluşturuyor muydu?	
11	Köylüler bu hizmetten memnun muydu? Şikayetleri oluyor muydu? Hangi konularda şikayetleri oluyordu?	
12	Köydeki herkes bu hizmetten eşit ve aynı şekilde yararlanabiliyor muydu? Hizmette ayrımcılık var mıydı? Varsa, nasıl bir ayrımcılık vardı? Sizden daha iyi hizmet alan mahalleler var mıydı?	
13	Su faturaları ile ilgili bir şikayetleri var mıydı?	
14	Su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri köyünüzde genel olarak nasıldı? Hangi birimler ilgileniyordu? Köyünüzde hangi hizmetler yapıldı? Memnun muydunuz?	
15	Bu hizmetlerde çalışan personellerin tutumu nasıldı?	

	B. 6360 sayılı yasa sonrası sorular	
1	İçme ve kullanma suyu nasıl temin ediliyor?	
2	İçme ve kullanma suyu nasıl iletiliyor	
3	Mahallenizde kanalizasyon şebekesi var mı?	
4	Mahallenizde atık sular nasıl uzaklaştırılıyor?	
5	Mahallenizde yağmur suları nasıl uzaklaştırılıyordu?	
6	Mahallenizde kaç abone var?	
7	Su temini ile ilgili sıkıntılarınız var mı? Bu sıkıntılar çözüldü mü?	
8	Su kesintileri yaşıyor mu? Neden? Nasıl çözülüyor?	
9	Alt yapı ile sorunlar yaşıyor mu? Neden? Nasıl çözülüyor?	
10	Suyunuz içilebilir nitelikte mi? Sudan kaynaklı herhangi bir hastalık, risk var mı? Varsa çözüm için ne yapıyor?	
11	Atık sularınız çevre ve insan sağlığı açısından bir tehdit oluşturuyor mu?	
12	Mahalle sakinleri bu hizmetten memnun mu? Şikayetleri oluyor mu? Şikayetlerine çözüm üretebiliyor mu?	
13	Mahallenizdeki herkes bu hizmetten eşit ve aynı şekilde yararlanabiliyor mu? Hizmette herhangi bir ayrımcılık var mı? Varsa, nasıl bir ayrımcılık var? Sizden daha iyi hizmet alan mahalleler var mı?	
14	Sayaç takılması ile ilgili sıkıntılar yaşıyor mu?	
15	Su faturaları ile ilgili şikayet var mı?	
16	Su ve atık su hizmetleri mahallenizde genel olarak nasıl? HATSU şimdiye kadar mahallenizde hangi hizmetleri yaptı? Hizmet alma konusunda ne tür sıkıntılar yaşıyorsunuz?	
17	HATSU personellerinin tutumu nasıl?	
18	HATSU ile iletişime geçmek istediğinizde nasıl iletişime geçiyorsunuz? İlgililere kolayca ulaşabiliyor musunuz? İsteklerinize cevap veriliyor mu? Uzaklık sorunuz var mı?	
19	6360 sayılı Kanunun gerekçesinde aşağıdaki hedefler öne sürülmüştür. Bu hedeflerden hangileri bu hizmet için gerçekleşmiştir? a. Ölçek ekonomisini yakalama b. Hizmetlerde optimal ölçekte yönetim, planlama ve koordinasyon c. Hizmetlerde etkinlik-verimlik d. Daha düşük maliyet ve daha az kaynakla daha kaliteli hizmet	
17	Sizce bu hizmet hangi kurum tarafından sunulursa daha iyi olur? a. İlçe belediyeleri tarafından b. Büyükşehir Bld (HATSU) tarafından c. Köylerde eski yöntemle d. Merkezi yönetim tarafından	

**H: THE HEADMEN INTERVIEWED AND THEIR GENERAL OPINIONS ABOUT
HATAY METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY AND HATSU**

			HMM	HATSU
	İSKENDERUN			
	Villages (12-11)	Headmen		
1	Akarca	Erdoğan Sert	Negative	Negative
2	Akçay	İbrahim Dingil	Negative	Negative
3	Aşkarbeyli	Alatdin Pişgin	Positive	Positive
4	Bitişik	Efendi Dönmez	Negative	Positive
5	Büyükdere	Hüseyin Cirdi	Negative	Positive
6	Cırtıman	Ali Kılınç	Positive	Positive
7	Çınarlı	Necati Bahriyeli	Positive	Positive
8	Düğünürdu	Bestami Kaya	Negative	Negative
9	Kaledibi	Bestami Demirci	Negative	Negative
10	Orhangazi	Osman Güllü	Negative	Negative
11	Suçıkağı	Mehmet Kurtar	Negative	Negative
	Small Municipalities (5-5)	Headmen		
1	Azganlık	Murat Sarraç	Positive	Positive
2	Bekbele	Yakup Yardımcı	Negative	Positive
3	Denizciler	Ali Rıza Kekeç	Negative	Negative
4	Karayılan	Osman Baltacı	Positive	Negative
5	Sarıseki	Esabil Müdük	Negative	Negative
	Neighbourhoods (28-7)	Headmen		
1	Dumlupınar	Alaattin Karadal	Positive	Positive
2	Gültepe	Mehmet Çalık	Negative	Positive
3	Güzelçay	Davut Zabun	Positive	Positive
4	Modernevler	Ramazan Güneş	Positive	Positive
5	Yunusemre	Ahmet Mücahitoglu	Positive	Positive
6	Sakarya	Mustafa Tuzluoglu	Positive	Positive
7	Esentepe	Mehmet Çalık	Negative	Negative
	ARSUZ			
	Villages (27-20)	Headmen		
1	Aşağıkepirce	İrfan Candemir	Negative	Negative
2	Avcıarsuyu	Mehmet Dereboğaz	Positive	Positive
3	Beyköyü	Yusuf Tartar	Negative	Negative
4	Derekuyu	Saffet Avcı	Negative	Negative
5	Gülcihan	Mehmet Sert	Positive	Positive
6	Harlisu	Ahmet Uğraş	Negative	Negative
7	Helvali	Ali Yılmaz	Negative	Negative
8	Hüyük	Rıdvan Dural	Negative	Positive
9	İşikli	Mehmet Sürer	Negative	Positive
10	Kale	Mehmet Gebeş	Positive	Positive
11	Karagöz	Ali Çetinkaya	Negative	Negative
12	Kışla	Mehmet Ateş	Negative	Negative
13	Konacık	Ersoy Aslan	Negative	Positive
14	Kurtbağı	Mehmet Uludağ	Negative	Negative
15	Nergizlik	Hüseyin Yasin	Positive	Positive
16	Pirinçlik	Kasım Uğur	Positive	Positive
17	Suvatlı	Ali Durgun	Positive	Positive
18	Tatarlı	Ali Yiğit	Negative	Negative
19	Tülek	İsa Başegmez	Negative	Negative
20	Yukarıkepirce	Mehmet Çakmak	Negative	Negative

H (continued)

	Small Municipalities (6-6)	Headmen		
1	Akçalı	Mehmet Ali Duran	Negative	Positive
2	Gökmeydan	Necati Diker	Negative	Positive
3	Gözcüler	Mehmet Karataş	Negative	Positive
4	Madenli	Zekeria Tilki	Negative	Negative
5	Nardüzü	Mehmet Şanlı	Negative	Negative
6	Üçgüllük	Naim Güngör	Positive	Positive
	Neighbourhoods (7-2)	Headmen		
1	Uluçınar	Yakup Duran:	Positive	Positive
2	Arpaçiftlik	Şükrü Özdemir	Negative	Positive
	ERZİN			
	Villages (10-10)	Headmen		
1	Aşağıburnaz	Halil Ekren	Negative	Positive
2	Başlamiş	İbrahim Kurt	Negative	Negative
3	Gökdere	Salih Börklü	Negative	Negative
4	Gökgöl	Mehmet Özgüven	Negative	Olumlu
5	Kızlarçayı	Nevcet Öz	Negative	Negative
6	Kuyuluk	Hüseyin Uyanık	Negative	Negative
7	Turunçlu	Mehmet Genç	Positive	Positive
8	Yeşiltepe	Bayram Ali Kaya	Negative	Negative
9	Yoncadüzü	Yaşar Açıkgöz	Negative	Negative
10	Yukarıburnaz	Musa Gözleyici	Negative	Negative
	Neighbourhoods (10-9)	Headmen		
1	Bahçelievler	Abdullah Demir	Positive	Negative
2	Cumhuriyet	Şeref Vural	Negative	Negative
3	Hürriyet	Kadir Kürtül	Negative	Negative
4	İsali	Mehmet Arıkoğlu	Negative	Negative
5	Karamustafalı	Celal Karakurt	Negative	Positive
6	Mahmutlu	Miklat Karaçal	Negative	Negative
7	Mustafalı	Celal Esen	Negative	Positive
8	Şükrü paşa	Vedat Özkara	Negative	Negative
9	Yeni	Muharrem Vural	Negative	Negative
	DÖRTYOL			
	Villages (3-3)	Headmen		
1	Çatköy	Sıtkı Karaca	Negative	Negative
2	Kapılı	Baytekin Koca	Negative	Negative
3	Konaklı	Halil İbrahim Duran	Negative	Negative
	Small Municipalities (5-5)	Headmen		
1	Altınçağ	Adnan Memili	Negative	Negative
2	Karakese	Osman Çalışkan	Negative	Negative
3	Kuzuculu	Adnan Gültekin	Negative	Negative
4	Yeniyurt	Muhittin Sade	Negative	Negative
5	Yeşilköy	Ferhat Aydın	Negative	Negative
	Neighbourhoods (7-5)	Headmen		
1	Çaylı	İlhami Taşar	Negative	Positive
2	Kışlalar	Sebiha Koyuncu	Negative	Positive
3	Numune evler	Fahrettin Arı	Negative	Negative
4	Özerli	Muhlis Arslan	Negative	Negative
5	Sanayi	Hasan Akkuş Akdeniz	Positive	Positive
	PAYAS			
	Villages (3-3)	Headmen		
1	Çağlalık	Yusuf Erdem	Negative	Negative
2	Kozludere	H.Mehmet Okur	Negative	Positive
3	Sincan	İyanet Koca	Negative	Negative

H (continued)

	Neighbourhoods (9-7)	Headmen		
1	Cumhuriyet	Ali Kara	Negative	Negative
2	Fatih	Ali Çelen	Negative	Negative
3	İstiklal	Bahri Özdemir		
4	Karacami	Ayhan Selçuk	Negative	Positive
5	Karbeyaz	Cemal Keskin	Positive	Positive
6	Karşı	Ünal Aray	Negative	Negative
7	Kürtül	Necati Çunkur	Negative	Negative
8	Yenişehir	Mehmet Çetinel	Negative	Negative
9	Yıldırım beyazıt	Ali Koç	Negative	Negative
	BELEN			
	Villages (9-8)	Headmen		
1	Atık	İsmail Kurtulan	Positive	Positive
2	Benlidere	Mehmet Berberci	Positive	Positive
3	Çakalli	Salahittin Vural	Negative	Positive
4	Kici	Ahmet Soysal	Positive	Positive
5	Kömürçukuru	Mehmet Doğru	Positive	Positive
6	Müftüler	Tahsin Saydam	Positive	Positive
7	Sogukoluk	İsmail Gülpınar	Positive	Positive
8	Şenbük	Talip Vurucu	Positive	Negative
	Neighbourhoods (10-4)	Headmen		
1	Bakras	Ali Şirin	Negative	Negative
2	Derebahçe	Nureddin Kelleci	Positive	Positive
3	Muhlisali	Faruk Ekim	Positive	Positive
4	Sarımazi	Sabahattin Ünal	Positive	Positive
	HASSA			
	Villages (26-3)	Headmen		
1	Gazeluşağı	Mehmet Topçu	Positive	Positive
2	Tiyek	Miklat Soylu	Positive	Positive
3	Yeniyapan	Mehmet Teke	Negative	Negative
	Small Municipalities (5-1)	Headmen		
1	Aktepe	Mehmet Demirci	Negative	Negative
	Neighbourhoods (8-1)	Headmen		
1	Girne	Ali Çil	Positive	Positive
	ANTAKYA			
	Villages (42-7)	Headmen		
1	Maraşboğazi	Mustafa Bilgin	Negative	Negative
2	Saçaklı	Murhiç Yıldırım	Positive	Positive
3	Paşaköy	Hasan Şeker	Positive	Positive
4	Suvatlı	Ali Durgun	Positive	Positive
5	Uzunaliç	İsmail Balcı	Positive	Positive
6	Yaylacık	Dursun Keleş	Negative	Negative
7	Yeşilova	Cahit Hatunoğlu	Positive	Positive
8	Zülüflühan	Semir Taşkın	Negative	Negative
	Small Municipalities (11-2)	Headmen		
1	Karlısu	Mehmet Doğru	Negative	Positive
2	Küçükdalıyan	Ali Gazaloğlu	Positive	Positive
3	Serinyol	Sabahattin Güzel	Negative	Negative
	Neighbourhoods (42-2)	Headmen		
1	Akevler	Ali Polat	Positive	Positive
2	Esentepe	Tuncay Yıldız	Positive	Positive

H (continued)

	DEFNE			
	Villages (23-7)	Headmen		
1	Aşağıokçular	Hüsamettin Uzun	Positive	Positive
2	Sinanli	İbrahim Bozhaydar	Negative	Positive
3	Balliöz	Necdet Eraslan	Negative	Positive
4	Güneysöğüt	Metin Yıldırım	Positive	Positive
5	Koçören	Sürrayya Çalıcı	Positive	Positive
6	Hancağiz	Feyruz Çiçek	Negative	Positive
7	Yeniçağ	Mehmet Ali Yeşilçay	Positive	Positive
	Small Municipalities (10-4)	Headmen		
1	Çekmece	Fikret Çolakoğlu	Positive	Positive
2	Harbiye	İbrahim Öztürk	Negative	Negative
3	Tavla	Semih Gözel	Negative	Positive
4	Yeşilpınar	Erkan Mansuroğlu	Positive	Positive
	Neighbourhoods (4-1)	Headmen		
1	Elektrik	Nihat Derviş	Positive	Positive
	SAMANDAĞ			
	Villages (22-6)	Headmen		
1	Çanakoluk	Tevfik Nar	Negative	Positive
2	Çöğürlü	Mehmet Doğru	Negative	Negative
3	Karaçay	Nedim Yılmaz	Positive	Positive
4	Eriklikuyu	Hamit Akdaş	Negative	Negative
5	Vakifli	Berç Kartun	Positive	Positive
6	Yeşilköy	İmadeddin Ergin	Positive	Positive
	Small Municipalities (5-2)	Headmen		
1	Tomruksuyu	Alaattin Aslan	Positive	Positive
2	Yaylica	Ali Aslan	Positive	Positive
	Neighbourhoods (15-2)	Headmen		
1	Çiğdede	Tahsin Kaplan	Positive	Positive
2	Mizrakli	Semih Bal	Negative	Negative
	YAYLADAĞI			
	Villages (38-5)	Headmen		
1	Ayişiği	Durmuş Aslan	Positive	Positive
2	Bozlu	Ali Doğruöz	Positive	Positive
3	Sebenoba	Mustafa Yılmaz	Negative	Negative
4	Yeşiltepe	Abdulkadir Parlak	Positive	Positive
5	Yukariokçular	İbrahim Türkmen	Positive	Positive
	Small Municipalities (3-1)	Headmen		
1	Karaköse	Osman Erdoğan	Negative	Negative
2	Şenköy	Abdullah Burakçın	Negative	Negative
	Neighbourhoods (6-1)	Headmen		
1	Tutlubahçe	Emek Çakılı	Negative	Negative
	REYHANLI			
	Villages (30-6)	Headmen		
1	Bükülmez	Hasan Dolgun	Positive	Positive
2	Cilvegözü	Mahmut İri	Positive	Positive
3	Cumhuriyet	Yahya Bahadırılı	Positive	Positive
4	Kuşaklı	Hüseyin Cemiloğlu	Negative	Negative
5	Oğulpınar	Hasan Şanverdi	Negative	Negative
6	Üçtepe	Mahmut Kılıç	Positive	Positive
	Neighbourhoods (17-3)	Headmen		
1	Bağlar	Hüseyin Yumuşak	Negative	Negative
2	Yeni	Mustafa Sever	Negative	Negative
3	Yeşilova	Ahmet Benli	Positive	Positive

H (continued)

	ALTINÖZÜ			
	Villages (41-3)	Headmen		
1	Kiyigören	Sabahattin Bayır	Negative	Negative
2	Seferli	Mehmet Karagön	Positive	Positive
3	Tokaçlı	İbrahim Çilingir	Positive	Positive
	Small Municipalities (3-1)			
1	Karbeyaz	Bekir Güler	Positive	Positive
	Neighbourhoods (4-1)	Headmen		
1	Yenişehir	Feyruz Beyoğlu	Negative	Negative
	KUMLU			
	Villages (13-4)	Headmen		
1	Akpınar	Recep Demiri	Negative	Positive
2	Hamam	Şevket Yaman	Positive	Positive
3	Hatayhamami	Ali Dinçer	Positive	Positive
4	Kircaoğlu	Ali Alacan	Positive	Positive
	Neighbourhoods (3-1)	Headmen		
1	Cumhuriyet	Bülent Aydın	Negative	Negative
	KIRIKHAN			
	Villages (55-4)	Headmen		
1	Camuzkışlası	Hüseyin Gök	Negative	Negative
2	Bektaşlı	Enver Çağlı	Negative	Positive
3	Kangallar	Hüseyin Işık	Positive	Positive
4	Saylak	Haydar Önk	Negative	Negative
	Small Municipalities (1-0)	Headmen		
1	Kurtlusoguksu	Mail Arık	Negative	Negative
	Neighbourhoods (17-2)	Headmen		
1	Bahçelievler	M. Hilal Taşlıtarla	Negative	Negative
2	Gündüz	Uğur Sarıfakioğulları	Negative	Negative

I: APPROVAL OF THE METU HUMAN SUBJECT ETHICS COMMITTEE

UYGULAMALI ETİK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
APPLIED ETHICS RESEARCH CENTER



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15 ARALIK 2017

Konu: Değerlendirme Sonucu

Gönderen: ODTÜ İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu (IAEK)

İlgi: İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu

Sayın Prof. Dr. Melih ERSOY ;

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PUBLICATIONS

1. Pehlivanoğlu Mantaş, E., Okutman Taş, D., İnsel, G., Aydın, E., Öztürk, D. C., Ölmez, T., Görgün, E., Ubay Çokgör, E., and Orhon, D. *Evaluation of Municipal and Industrial Wastewater Treatment Sludge Stabilization for Environmental Hazards in Istanbul*, Clean: Soil, Air, Water Article, 2007, 35(6), 558-564.
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Swimming, running, painting, camping

K: TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

Trkiye’de, belediyelerin hizmet sunumundaki yetersizliklerin nedeni olarak belediyelerin byklg gsterilmektedir. zellikle 2000li yıllardan bu yana, belediyelerde hizmet sunumunu artırma amacıyla bir dizi yasal dzenlemeyle belediyelerin sınırları deęiştirilmektedir. Bu yasal dzenlemeler, belediyelerin hizmet leęini hesaplarken sadece nfus ltn temel almaktadır. Belediyelerin coęrafı zelliklerini, ekonomik, sosyal, kltrel ve siyasal yapılarını gz ardı ederek tek bir lt zerinden tek bir modeli uygulamaya alıřmaktadır. 2004 yılında ıkarılan 5216 sayılı Bykřehir Yasası, 2005 yılında ıkarılan 5393 sayılı Belediye Yasası ve 2008 yılında ıkarılan 5747 sayılı yasa belediyelerin sınırlarında nemli deęiřikler yapmıřtır. Belediyelerin sınırlarını deęiřtiren en son ve en kapsamlı dzenleme 2012 yılında ıkarılan ve Trkiye’de 14 yeni bykřehir belediyesi kuran 6360 sayılı yasa olmuřtur. Bu yasayla birlikte ayrıca, bykřehir belediyelerinin sınırlarını il sınırlarına kadar geniřletilmiř, belde belediyelerinin ve kylerin tzel kiřilięine son verilmiř ve bazı belediye hizmetleri bykřehir belediyelerine devredilmiřtir. 6360 sayılı yasanın en nemli gerekesi, belediyelerin sınırlarının deęiřtirilmesiyle, daha az kaynak kullanma, hizmetlerin maliyetlerini dřrme ve hizmetlerin kalitesini artırma yoluyla belediyelerin hizmet sunumunda verimlilik artıřı saęlanacaęıdır. Bu tezin temel amacı, belediyelerin sınırlarının deęiřtirilmesinin hizmet sunumu zerindeki etkilerini ortaya ıkarmaktır. Tезin arařtırma sahası 6360 sayılı yasayla kurulan Hatay Bykřehir Belediyesidir. Tез Hatay’da, yasayla birlikte bykřehir belediyelerine devredilen su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerini incelemektedir. Tезin arařtırma soruları lek ve hizmet sunumu arasındaki iliřki ve alt soruları belediyelerin sınırlarının deęiřtirilmesinin Hatay’da su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri zerine olumlu ve olumsuz etkileri zerindedir. alıřmanın sonunda, 6360 sayılı yasanın hedeflerinin Hatay’da gerekleřip gerekleřmedięi ve yasanın asıl ama ve hedeflerinin neler olduęu ortaya koyulacaktır.

Tезin temel arařtırma sorusu, belediye sınırlarının deęiřtirilmesi belediyelerin hizmet sunumunu nasıl etkiledięi zerinedir. Dięer arařtırma soruları ise ařaęıda verilmiřtir:

- 1) Hizmet sunumunu etkileyen faktrler nelerdir?
- 2) Belediye hizmetleri ile belediye leęi arasında nasıl bir iliřki vardır? Belediye leęi, belediye hizmetlerinin etkinlięini, maliyetini ve kalitesini nasıl etkilemektedir?
- 3) Belediye sınırlarının deęiřtirilmesinin olumlu ve olumsuz etkileri nelerdir?

Alan alıřmasının soruları ise řu řekilde belirlenmiřtir:

- a) 6360 sayılı yasa öncesinde Hatay’da su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri sunumu nasıldı?
- b) 6360 sayılı yasa sonrasında Hatay’da bu hizmetlerin sunumu nasıl değişti? Hizmet etkinliği açısından su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri üzerindeki olumlu ve olumsuz etkileri nelerdir?
- c) Yasanın ‘ölçek ekonomilerini sağlama, daha çok kaynakla, daha ucuz ve daha kaliteli hizmetle etkinliği artırma iddiası Hatay’da gerçekleşti mi?
- d) Belediye sınırlarının değiştirilmesi ve büyükşehir belediyelerinin kurulmasının asıl amaç ve hedefleri nelerdir?

Ayrıca tezin aşağıda verilen 3 adet hipotezi vardır. Tezin sonunda, bu hipotezlerin doğruluğu veya yanlışlığı eleştirel gerçekçi bir bakış açısıyla test edilecektir.

Hipotez 1: Belediye ölçeği ile hizmet sunumu arasında ters bir ilişki vardır. Ölçek artıkça, hizmet sunumu olumsuz etkilenmektedir.

Hipotez 2: Hatay’daki su ve kanalizasyon hizmet sunumu 6360 sayılı yasanın iddia ettiği gibi gerçekleşmemiştir.

Hipotez 3: Belediye sınırlarının değiştirilmesi ve büyükşehir belediyelerinin kurulmasının gerçek amaç ve hedefleri, yasaların iddialarından oldukça farklıdır. Bunların teknik ve idari olmasından ziyade siyasi süreçler olduğu açıktır.

Bu tez 6 bölümden oluşmaktadır. Giriş bölümünden sonra, ikinci bölümde kapsamlı bir yazın taraması yapılmıştır. Belediye sınırlarının değiştirilmesinin belediye hizmetleri üzerindeki etkilerini inceleme yöntemi olan tezin araştırma metodu tümdengelim ve tümevarım araştırma stratejileriyle niceliksel ve niteliksel analizlerden oluşmaktadır. Tümdengelim araştırma stratejisi, yazın taramasında verilen teoriler için uygulanmıştır. Saha verilerini değerlendirmek ve hipotezler geliştirmek için tümevarım araştırma stratejisine başvurulmuştur. Niceliksel ve niteliksel analizler de istatistik veriler ve saha verileri için kullanılmıştır. Eleştirel söylev analizi ise araştırmanın bütün aşamalarını kapsamakta ve teorik çerçeve ve alan çalışmasının çıktıları bir arada inceler. Çalışma metodolojisi olarak teze ontolojik ve epistemolojik temel sağlayan ve teori ile pratik arasında bir aracı görevi üstlenen eleştirel gerçekçilik benimsenmiştir.

Yazın taraması bölümünde kamu hizmetlerinin doğası ve kamu hizmetleri üzerinde etki eden faktörler eleştirel olarak irdelenmiştir. Kamu hizmetleri üzerinde merkezileşme/yerelleşme süreçlerinin, özelleştirmenin, içsel faktörlerin ve dışsal faktörlerin etkileri ele alınmıştır. Daha sonra, yeniden ölçeklendirme politikaları irdelenmiştir. Katma/katılma, birleştirme ve

bütünleştirme gibi belediye sınırlarını değiştiren farklı pratikler incelenmiştir. Belediyeler için optimum ölçek tartışmalarına ayrıntılı olarak yer verilmiştir. Bölümün sonunda, belediye sınırlarının ve sayılarının değişikliği ile ilgili bazı ülke örnekleri verilmiştir. Tezin üçüncü bölümü, Türkiye’de belediye bağlamını inceleyen ulusal düzeyi ele almıştır. Belediyelerin sınırlarını ve sayılarını değiştiren yasal düzenlemeler incelenmiştir. Yerel hizmet sunumunda önemli değişiklikler yaratan büyükşehir belediyeleri ile ilgili yasal düzenlemeler de ele alınmıştır. Bölümün sonunda, Türkiye’de belediye sınırlarının değiştirilmesi ve optimum ölçek arayışları ile ilgili yapılan çalışmalar verilmiştir. Tezin dördüncü bölümü Hatay Büyükşehir Belediyesi ve onun ilçe belediyeleri üzerinedir. Hatay ilinin kısa bir kentsel tarihi verildikten sonra, demografik yapıları açısından ilçe belediyeleri incelenmiştir. Sonrasında 6360 sayılı yasanın Hatay ili üzerindeki etkilerine bakılmıştır. Son olarak, Hatay’daki su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri incelenmiştir. Tezin beşinci bölümünde, HATSU ve Hatay Büyükşehir Belediyesinin eleştirel ve analitik alan alışmasına yer verilmiştir.

Hizmet sunumunu etkileyen faktörler nelerdir?

Yazın taraması, bu ilk soruyu yanıtlayarak başlamıştır. Belediye hizmet sunumunu etkileyen birçok faktör bulunmaktadır: merkezileşme/yerelleşme süreçleri, hizmetlerin özelleştirmesi, içsel faktörler ve dışsal faktörler. Her bir faktörle hizmet sunumu arasında ilişki çeşitli çalışmalarla kanıtlanmıştır. Hizmet sunumunu etkileyen ilk faktör merkezileşme/yerelleşme süreçleridir. Merkezi yönetim ile yerel yönetimler arasındaki ilişki yerel hizmet sunumu üzerinde önemli bir etkiye sahiptir. Temel soru, etkili bir hizmet sunumu için yetkinin merkezde mi yerelde mi olması gerekir. Bu sorunun yanıtları hizmet alanı, yerindenlik ve katılım dinamikleri etrafında şekillenir. İkinci faktör, alternatif yöntemler olarak da adlandırılın özelleştirme konusudur. Genel olarak hizmet sunumunda özel sektörün kamu yönetiminden daha avantajlı olduğu kabulü vardır. Ancak kamu mal ve hizmetlerinin özelleştirmesine yönelik ciddi eleştiriler de vardır. Öte yandan hizmet sunumunda etkili olan içsel ve dışsal faktörler de vardır. İçsel faktörler başkanın liderlik vasfı, belediye meclisinin yapısı, kurumsal kültür ve belediyelerin sahip oldukları etik değerler olarak sıralanabilir. Dışsal faktörler ise kentin ekonomik, sosyal ve kültürel yapısı ile yasal düzenlemelerdir. Sayılan bu faktörlerin hepsi ayrıntılı bir şekilde yazın taraması bölümünde ele alınmıştır.

Belediye hizmetleri ile belediye ölçeği arasında nasıl bir ilişki vardır? Belediye ölçeği, belediye hizmetlerinin etkinliğini, maliyetini ve kalitesini nasıl etkilemektedir?

Ölçekle hizmet sunumu arasında kanıtlanmış bir ilişki ilgili yazında vardır. Bundan dolayı, saha çalışmasına bu ilişkiyi varsayarak başladım. Şekil 1’e dönülecek olursa, ölçekle hizmet

sunumu arasında ilişkiyi kabul eden akış çizgisini izledim. Dolayısıyla, bir sonraki soru ölçekle hizmet sunumu arasında nasıl bir ilişki olduğu üzerinedir. Bununla ilgili iki anaakım yaklaşım vardır: kamu seçimi teorisi ve bütünlükçü yaklaşımlar (metropoliten yönetim-reform teori, metropoliten yönetim modeli, yeni bölgecilik yaklaşımı ve kent-bölge yaklaşımı). Kamu seçimi teorisi daha küçük ölçekli ve parçalı yerel birimleri savunurken, bütünlükçü yaklaşımlar daha büyük ölçekli ve bütünlükçü yerel birimleri savunur. Daha büyük ölçekli belediyeleri, ölçek ekonomilerini sağlayabilme adına katma/katılma, bütünlleştirme ve birleştirme gibi pratiklerle oluşturulmaktadır. Tüm farklılıklarına rağmen, her iki yaklaşım da yerel yönetimler reformlarının bir ürünüdür ve yeni kamu işletmeciliği modeli etkisinde kalmaktadır. Ayrıca her iki yaklaşımında ortak hedefi vardır: belediyeleri yeni küresel ekonomiye uygun olarak yeniden ölçeklendirme.

Belediye sınırlarının değiştirilmesinin hizmet sunumunda nasıl bir etkiye sahip olduğunu bulmak için, belediyeler için optimum ölçek ve hizmet sunumunda etkinlik (maliyet, kalite, yakınlık, eşitlik, koordinasyon vb.) kavramları irdelenmiştir. Optimum ölçek ve hizmet sunumunda etkinlikle ilgili akademik çalışmalar sunulmuştur. Belediyeler için belirlenmiş birçok optimum ölçek (nüfus olarak genelde 5.000 ve 1.000.000 arasında değişen nüfus büyüklükleri) vardır. Açıkça şu sonuca varılabilir: her bir belediyenin her bir hizmeti için bir optimum ölçek vardır, çünkü sadece bir hizmet için optimum ölçek belirlenebilir. Öte yandan, optimum ölçek özel sektör için faydalı olabilir, fakat kamu hizmetleri için değil. Ayrıca, belediyelerin sınırlarının değiştirilmesiyle daha etkili hizmet sunumu olup olmayacağı da tartışmalı bir konudur. Çünkü ilgili yazında çok çeşitli ve kesin olmayan sonuçlar vardır. Zira çoğu belediye hizmetinde çıktı ve yararlar açısından etkinlik ölçümü oldukça zordur.

Belediye sınırlarının değiştirilmesinin olumlu ve olumsuz etkileri nelerdir?

Belediye sınırlarının değiştirilmesinin belediye hizmetleri üzerinde hem olumlu hem de olumsuz etkileri olabilir. Bu etkileri ortaya çıkarabilmek için kamu seçimi teorisi ve bütünlleştirici yaklaşımların argümanları eleştirel bir şekilde incelenmiştir. Bütünlleştirici yaklaşımlar büyük ölçekli belediyeleri savunurlar; çünkü onlara göre belediyeleri birleştirme ölçek ekonomileri sağlar ve hizmet sunumunda etkinliği, kaliteyi, hizmet kapasitesini, yerel kalkınmayı, hesap verilebilirliği, katılımı, çoğulculuğu ve vatandaş memnuniyetini artırır. Kamu seçimi teorisyenleri ise ölçek ekonomilerinin her belediye hizmeti için geçerli olmadığını ve büyük belediyelerde dışsal ekonomiler yarattığını iddia ederler. Onlara göre, verimlilik, rekabet, yakınlık, toplumsal güven, hesap verilebilirlik, katılım, homojenlik ve vatandaş memnuniyeti küçük ölçekli belediyelerde sağlanır.

Teorik yaklaşımların yanı sıra, ülke örnekleri belediye sınırlarının değiştirilmesinin hizmet sunumu üzerindeki etkileri açısından ele alınmıştır. Bu ülkelerin yeniden ölçeklendirme ile ilgili tarihsel altyapıları, izledikleri politikalar ve değiştirdikleri belediye büyüklükleri ile sayıları verilmiştir. Su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri üzerindeki etkileri de bazı ülke örnekleri açısından incelenmiştir. Bu konuda da hem küçük ölçekli belediyeleri hem de büyük ölçekli belediyeleri savunan çalışmalar vardır. Türkiye ile karşılaştırmak üzere Yunanistan örneği üzerinde durulmuştur. Türkiye'nin yakın komşularından biri olan Yunanistan ile ortak bir tarihi, bazı benzer gelenekleri ve kültürel özellikleri vardır. Yunanistan'da yerel yönetimlerle ilgili iki önemli yasa çıkarılmıştır: 1997 yılındaki Capodistrias Planı ve 2010 yılındaki Kallikratis Reformu. Bu düzenlemeler ile belediye sayıları oldukça düşürülmüş ve belediyeler ademi merkezileştirme süreçlerine tabi tutulmuştur. Fakat bu reformların bazı önemli sorunları olmuştur. Belediye birleştirmeleri sonunda beklenen ölçek ekonomileri su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri açısından sağlanamamıştır. Bunların yanı sıra, su hizmetleri konusunda kurumlar arası koordinasyon sorunu artmış ve birbirleriyle etkin bir şekilde işbirliği gerçekleştirememişlerdir. Açıkça görülüyor ki, Yunanistan'daki bu reformların tüm sebep ve sonuçları Türkiye'deki ile çok benzerdir.

Türkiye'de belediyeler konusunu içeren tezin üçüncü bölümünde, Türkiye'deki belediyelerin sınırlarının değiştirilmesiyle ilgili tarihçe, yasal düzenlemeler ve alan çalışmaları yer almaktadır. Yerel yönetimlerle ilgili düzenlemeler belediyelerin ölçeğini yalnızca nüfus ölçütü (ve bazen alan) üzerinden hesaplamıştır. Bu düzenlemeler belediyelerin sosyo-ekonomik düzeylerini, coğrafi, kültürel ve politik karakterlerini göz önünde bulundurmamıştır. Dolayısıyla düzenlemeler bütün belediyeler için tek tip bir model önemektedir. Belediyelerin sınırları daha etkili hizmet sunumu adına sürekli değiştirilmiştir. Kamu otoriteleri belediyelerin hizmet sunumundaki verimsizliği daima belediyelerin büyüklüğüne bağlamıştır. Dolayısıyla, özellikle 2000li yılların başından beri çareyi, çıkardıkları yasalarla küçük belediyeleri kapatıp belediyeleri birleştirmekte bulmuşlardır. Ancak bütün belediyeler ve onların etkili hizmet sunumları için tek bir model ve tek bir ölçek yoktur. Her bir belediye hizmetinin farklı gereklilikleri ve ölçünleri olduğu için farklı modellere ihtiyaç duyarlar.

Türkiye'de 2000li yıllara kadar belediye sayılarında çok ciddi artışlar olmuştur. Ülke örneklerinin incelendiği bölümde bu oranların diğer ülkelere göre ne kadar yüksek olduğu da görülür. Ne var ki, Türkiye'de belediye sayıları 2005 yılından beri düşüşe geçmiştir. Bu iki farklı dönem tarihsel ve eleştirel kapsamda incelenmiştir. Bu düzenlemelerin nedenleri ve belediyeler üzerindeki etkileri eleştirel olarak ortaya konmuştur. AKP'nin 2002 yılında iktidara gelmesinden bu yana, belediyelerin sınırlarıyla ilgili 4 önemli yasa çıkarılmıştır: 2004

yılında 5216 sayılı Büyükşehir Belediye Yasası, 2005 yılında 5393 sayılı Belediye Yasası, 2008 yılında 5747 sayılı yasa ve son olarak 2012 yılında 6360 sayılı yasa. Bu yasalar 2000li yılların başında gündeme getirilen kamu yönetimi reformunun birer ürünüdür. Bu reformun hedeflerinden biri il, ilçe ve büyükşehir belediyelerinin sınırlarını, küçük belediyeleri de sınırlarına dâhil ederek genişletmektir. Böylece, ilçe belediyelerinin ve büyükşehir belediyelerinin görev ve yetkileri artırılmıştır. Ayrıca belediye kurulma şartı olan 2000 nüfus eşiği de 5000'e çıkarılmıştır. Nüfusu 2000'in altında olan belediyelerin tüzel kişilikleri sona ermiş ve köy veya mahalleye dönüştürülmüştür. Bu düzenlemelerin en önemli nedeni imar ve planlama açısından sorun yaşayan, kent saçaklanması görülen, finansal ve insan kaynaklarının verimsiz kullanan belediyelere sahip olan kentlere destek vermek olarak gösterilmiştir.

Belediyelerin sınırlarını değiştiren en önemli yasa 2012 yılında çıkarılan 6360 sayılı yasadır. Yasa, il nüfusu 750.000'i aşan 14 ilde büyükşehir kurulmasını sağlamıştır. Kocaeli ve İstanbul hariç tüm büyükşehir belediyelerinin sınırlarını il sınırlarıyla çakıştırmıştır. Yasa ayrıca büyükşehir sınırları içerisinde yer alan tüm belde belediyelerinin ve köylerin tüzel kişiliğine son vermiş ve bu yerleşimleri mahalleye dönüştürmüştür. İlçe belediyelerinin sınırlarını da ilçe sınırlarıyla çakıştırmıştır. Bu yasayla birlikte, Türkiye'de toplam 1.635 belde ve 16.567 köyün tüzel kişiliğine son verilmiştir. Böylece 17,925 yerel birim mahalleye dönüştürülmüştür. Öte yandan, diğer illerde yer alan ve nüfusu 2.000'in altında kalan 227 adet belediyenin de tüzel kişiliğine son vermiştir. Toplamda 1,635 belediyenin tüzel kişiliğine son verilmiştir. Bu yasa ayrıca, büyükşehir belediyelerinde 25 yeni ilçe kurmuştur. 6360 sayılı yasanın gerekçesinde, yeni kamu yönetimi anlayışının gerekliliklerine işaret edilmiştir. Yasaya göre, problemler çok sayıda belde belediyesinin varlığı ve bu belediyelerin idari ve finansal yetersizlikleridir. Bu problemlere çözüm olarak ölçek ekonomileri önerilmiştir. Böylece, hizmet sunumunda etkinlik, koordinasyon ve kalite artırılabilecektir. Yasanın gerekçesinde süreklilik olarak ölçek ekonomilerine, hizmet sunumunda etkinliğe ve optimum ölçeğe sürekli vurgu yapılmıştır. Aynı şekilde AKP'nin raporunda da, 6360 sayılı yasanın ölçek ekonomileri sayesinde, hizmet sunumunda etkinliği, koordinasyonu ve kaliteyi artıracığı vurgulanmaktadır. Daha az kullanımıyla daha çok hizmet sunumuna da vurgu yapılmaktadır. Yasa aynı zamanda, büyükşehir alanının bütününde hizmet sunumunun bütünleştireceğine iddia etmektedir. 6360 sayılı yasaya karşı eleştiriler de söz konusudur. Bu eleştiriler, yasanın genel amacı, ölçek ekonomileri ve etkinlik başlıkları altında irdelenmiştir. Ayrıca, 6360 sayılı yasa ve optimum ölçek konusunda Türkiye'de yapılan akademik çalışmalara da yer verilmiştir. Bazı araştırmacılar anket çalışmaları yapıp, ampirik metodoloji çerçevesinde veri analizi için SPSS programı kullanmıştır. Bazı araştırmacılar ise derinlemesine mülakatlar yapıp, niteliksel araştırma metodlarıyla betimsel analizler yapmıştır.

Bu çalışmaları amacı 6360 sayılı yasanın iddialarını test etmeye yöneliktir. Araştırma konuları temel olarak, sınır değişiklikleri, kapatılan yerel birimler, etkinlik ve etkililik konularıyla merkezileşme süreçleri üzerinedir. Bu çalışmalarda, az miktarda olumlu sonuç varken, daha fazla olumsuz sonuç olduğu gözlemlenmiştir.

Alan çalışmasına geçmeden önce, tezin dördüncü bölümünde Hatay ile ilgili genel bilgiler verilmektedir. Hatay ilinin kısa bir tarihçesinden sonra, Hatay'ın demografik ve coğrafi yapısına yer verilmiştir. Ayrıca Hatay ilinde belediyeler, belediyelerin sınırlarında değişiklikler, siyasi temsil, belediyelerde hizmet bölüşümü ve Hatay'da su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri irdelenmiştir. Bu bölümün sonunda Hatay'da su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerinin niceliksel analizine de yer verilmiştir. 6360 sayılı yasa Hatay'da 2014 yılında büyükşehir belediyesi kurulmasını öngörmüştür. Yasadan önce Hatay'da Antakya, İskenderun, Samandağ, Dört Yol, Kırıkhan, Reyhanlı, Altınözü, Hassa, Erzin, Belen, Yayladağı ve Kumlu olmak üzere 12 ilçe bulunmaktaydı. 6360 sayılı yasa Hatay'da Antakya, Defne, Arsuz ve Payas olmak üzere 4 ilçe kurmuştur. Yasa ayrıca büyükşehir belediyesinin sınırlarını Hatay il sınırlarına kadar genişletmiştir. 21 bucak, 64 belde belediyesi ve 368 köyün tüzel kişiliğini kaldırılmış ve bu birimleri mahalleye dönüştürmüştür. Mahalle sayısı 149'dan 589'a yükselmiştir. Hatay Büyükşehir Belediyesi başkanı Lütfü Savaş CHP'lidir. Ancak, ilçe belediyelerin çoğunluğu AKP'den olduğu için büyükşehir belediye meclisinde AKP'li meclis üyeleri ağırlıktadır. Belediye meclisin bu yapısı belediye hizmet sunumunu etkilemektedir. Her bir meclis üyesi karar alma süreçlerini kendi partisi ve kendi yerel çıkarları doğrultusunda etkilemeye çalışmaktadır.

Belediyelerden büyükşehir belediyelerine devredilen su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri, Hatay'da 2014 yılından bu yana Hatay Su ve Kanalizasyon Hizmetler Genel Müdürlüğü (HATSU) tarafından sunulmaktadır. HATSU, Hatay Büyükşehir Belediyesine bağlı, kendine ait bütçesi olan kamu tüzel kişiliğine haiz bir kuruluştur. Karar alma süreçleri Hatay Büyükşehir meclisinde işlemektedir. Dolayısıyla, bu kuruluşun da başkanı büyükşehir belediye başkanı Lütfü Savaş'tır. HATSU, hizmet alanını ikiye bölmüştür. 1. bölge Antakya, Defne, Kırıkhan, Kumlu, Reyhanlı, Hassa, Altınözü, Yayladağı ve Samandağ belediyelerinden oluşmaktadır. 2. bölge Erzin, Dört Yol, Payas, İskenderun, Belen ve Arsuz belediyelerinden oluşmaktadır. Bu bölgeler Hatay'ı ikiye ayıran Amanos Dağları boyunca oluşturulmuştur. İlk bölge, dağların doğusunda; ikinci bölge dağların batısında yer almaktadır. Hizmet sunumundaki ilk temel ayırım bu yolla yapılmış olmaktadır. HATSU'nun faaliyet raporuna göre, HATSU'nun toplam hizmet alanı 5.687 km² olup hizmet verdiği nüfus 1.609.806'dır. Ancak, HATSU hizmet verdiği bu nüfusa 447.887 Suriyeli nüfusunu da eklemektedir. Böylece hizmet verdiği toplam

nüfus 2.057.740 olmaktadır. HATSU, Erzin, Serinyol (Antakya), Samandağ, Kırıkhan Reyhanlı ve Küçükdalyan-Narlıca (Antakya)'da atıksu arıtma tesisleri inşa etmiştir. Altınözü'nde atıksu arıtma tesisinin inşaatı devam etmektedir. Böylece HATSU 2014 yılından bu yana 6 adet atıksu arıtma tesisinin inşaatını bitirmiştir. HATSU İskenderun, Antakya, Payas, Dörtyol, Karayılan (İskenderun), Denizciler (İskenderun) ve Belen (paket tesis) ilçelerinde 6360 sayılı yasadan önce tamamlanan 7 adet atıksu arıtma tesisini devralmıştır. HATSU ayrıca Yayladağı, Sebenoba (Yayladağı) ve Mızraklı'da 6360 sayılı yasadan önce tamamlanan 3 adet su arıtma tesisini de devralmıştır. İskenderun için planlanan su arıtma tesisinin inşaatı devam etmektedir. Şu anda Hatay'da toplamda 13 adet atıksu arıtma tesisi ve 3 adet su arıtma tesisi bulunmaktadır. HATSU ayrıca, 691 adet sondaj, 603 adet su deposu ve hizmet binaları da inşa etmiştir.

Su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerine ilişkin niceliksel analiz yapabilmek için bazı istatistiki verilere ihtiyaç duyulmuştur. HATSU'nun, büyükşehir belediyesinin ve ilçe belediyelerinin faaliyet raporlarından ve TUİK'in internet sayfasından bazı veriler elde edilmiştir. Ancak bu veriler, geçmiş yıllarla karşılaştırma yapmak ve kesin bir sonuç çıkarmak için yeterli ve birbiriyle tutarlı değildir. Bu verilerle yapılan niceliksel analizler sadece ön değerlendirme amaçlıdır. HATSU'nun ve belediyelerin faaliyet raporlarından elde edilen verilerin niceliksel analizinden bazı sonuçlara ulaşılmıştır. 6360 sayılı yasadan sonra Hatay'da aboneleşme sayısının artması ve atıksu arıtma tesislerinin artması, belediye sınırlarının genişletilmesinin olumlu sonuçlarıdır. Bu noktada, su ve kanalizasyon şebekeleriyle ilgili geçmiş yıllara ait faaliyet raporlarına ulaşamadığından bu değişkenlerle ilgili bir yorum yapılamadığının belirtmek gerekir. Öte yandan, 6360 sayılı yasadan sonra Hatay'da abone başına kullanılan su miktarı, birim su fiyatı, temizlik vergisi ve su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleriyle ilgili giderlerin oranlarında artışlar olmuştur. Bunlar da belediye sınırlarının genişletilmesinin olumsuz sonuçlarıdır. TUİK'ten elde edilen verilerin niceliksel analizinden de bazı sonuçlara ulaşılmıştır. 6360 sayılı Yasadan sonra Hatay'da aboneleşme oranında artış, içme suyu ve kanalizasyon şebekeleri ile atıksu arıtma tesislerinden yararlanan nüfus oranında artış belediye sınırlarının genişletilmesinin olumlu etkileridir. Olumsuz etki ise, çekilen su miktarı ve dağıtılan su miktarı arasındaki farkın (şebekelerdeki su kayıpları) artması. Bu sonuçlara göre, belirli bir noktaya (optimum ölçek) kadar hizmet sunumunda verimlilik artışının sağlandığı ileri sürülebilir. Ancak sınırların bu noktadan sonra daha da genişletilmesi dışsal ekonomilere neden olmuştur. Şebekelerdeki su kayıplarının artması buna delil olarak sunulabilir.

Tezin alt sorularını yanıtlamak için, Hatay'da saha araştırması yürütülmüştür. HATSU ve belediye yetkilileri ile mahalle muhtarıyla yarı yapılandırılmış derinlemesine görüşmeler

yapılmış ve metot olarak kartopu yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Bu görüşmeler iki kısma ayrılmıştır. HATSU ve belediye yetkilileri ile yapılan görüşmeler birinci kısmı, mahalle muhtarlarıyla yapılan görüşmeler ise ikinci kısımdır. Birinci kısımda 10 görüşmeci ile ikinci kısımda ise 180 görüşmeci (100 köy muhtarı, 30 belde belediyesinden muhtar ve 50 mahalle muhtarı) vardır. Daha çok ikinci kısım alan çalışmasına analitik bir temel sağlamaktadır. (6360 sayılı yasadan sonra bütün köy ve belde belediyeler mahalleye dönüştürüldüğünden, karışıklık olmaması adına tezde bundan sonra bu yerel birimler yasadan önceki statüleri ile anılacaktır.) Kamu yetkilileri genelde yüzeysel ve olumlayıcı cevaplar verirken, muhtarlar daha ayrıntılı, eleştirel ve pratiğe dair bilgiler vermiştir. Saha araştırmasından elde edilen verilerden hem niceliksel hem de niteliksel yöntemler kullanılarak analizler yapılmıştır. Niceliksel analizler için Microsoft Excel programı kullanılmıştır. Muhtarların cevapları farklı başlıklar altında konu bazında gruplandırılmış ve çıktılar yüzdeliklerle ifade edilmiştir. Bu yüzdelikler olumlu ve olumsuz sonuçlar olarak kaydedilmiştir.

Görüşmeler sırasında en temel sorular, muhtarların Hatay Büyükşehir Belediyesi ve HATSU ile ilgili genel görüşleri üzerineydi. Muhtarların yarısından fazlası (%54,4) Hatay Büyükşehir Belediyesinden memnun olduklarını ifade etmiştir. Belde belediyelerinin ve köylerin muhtarları mahalle muhtarlarına göre daha çok memnun olmadıklarını ifade etmiştir. Aslında bu hizmet sunumunda bir ayırma tekabül etmektedir. Merkezdeki mahallelerden çeperdeki ve kırsaldaki yerleşimlere (belde belediyeleri ve köyler) doğru gidildikçe memnuniyetsizlik artmaktadır. Buradaki muhtarlara göre merkez mahallelerden daha az ve daha verimsiz hizmet aldıklarını düşünmektedirler. Dolayısıyla, merkezden uzaklaştıkça hizmet sunumundaki memnuniyetsizliğin arttığını ifade edebiliriz.

Büyükşehir belediyesinden en fazla memnun olmayan muhtarlar Payas'ta, HATSU'dan en fazla memnun olmayan muhtarlar ise Dörtöyl'de yer almaktadır. Kırıkhan dışında, en çok memnun olmayan muhtarlar, Payas, Erzin, Arsuz ve İskenderun olmak üzere HATSU'nun ikinci bölgesinde yer almaktadır. Hizmet sunumunda bölgeler arası bir ayırım olduğu açıktır. Mesafe olarak merkez Antakya'dan uzaklaştıkça hizmet sunumunda memnuniyetsizlik artmaktadır. Hassa haricinde memnuniyetsizliğin en fazla olduğu ilçeler merkez Antakya'ya en uzak olan ilçelerdir. Dolayısıyla, hizmet sunumuyla mesafe arasında ters bir orantıdan bahsetmek mümkündür.

Şunu da ifade etmek gerekir ki, muhtarlar arasında HATSU'dan memnun olmayıp Hatay Büyükşehir Belediyesinden memnun olanların sayısı çoktur. Hatta büyükşehirden memnun olmayıp Lütfü Savaş'tan çok memnun olan muhtarlar da vardır. Muhtarların büyük çoğunluğu Lütfü Savaş'tan çok memnun olduklarını fakat ileri sürdükleri çeşitli gerekçelerle

hizmetlerden memnun olmadıklarını dile getirmektedirler. Hatay’da hizmet sunumunda, içsel faktörlerden liderlik özelliğinin olduğu gözlenmiştir. Başkanın girişimci, esnek ve uyumlu kişiliği hizmet sunumundaki memnuniyeti belli bir dereceye kadar etkilemektedir.

Hatay’da 6360 sayılı yasa öncesinde su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri nasıldı?

HATSU ve Antakya Belediyesindeki görüşmeciler, 6360 sayılı yasadaki Hatay’da su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerinin iyi olmadığını ifade etmişlerdir. Daha önce özellikle Antakya çevresinde finansal kaynakları, personeli ve teknik kapasitesi yetersiz çok sayıda belde belediyesinin olduğunu belirtmişlerdir. Ayrıca altyapısı olmayan ve sağlıklı suya erişimi bulunmayan köylerin olduğunu da ifade etmişlerdir. Öte yandan, muhtarların yaklaşık %60’ı 6360 sayılı yasadaki Hatay’da su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerinin daha iyi olduğunu ifade etmişlerdir. Köydeki muhtarlar konusunda geçmişte İl Özel İdaresinin ve Köylere Hizmet Götürme Birliğinin bu hizmetler konusunda daha iyi çalıştıklarını iddia etmişlerdir. Belde belediyesindeki ve mahalledeki birçok muhtar da daha önceki belediyelerin su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerini daha iyi sağladıkları görüşündeler. Çoğu muhtara göre köy ve belde belediyelerini kapatmak doğru bir uygulama değildir. Onlara göre, bir önceki kurumlar, halka daha yakındılar ve yerel problemlere daha çok hâkimdiler.

6360 sayılı yasa sonrasında Hatay’da bu hizmetlerin sunumu nasıl değişti? Hizmet etkinliği açısından su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri üzerindeki olumlu ve olumsuz etkileri nelerdir?

Bu soruları yanıtlamak için, muhtarlarla yapılan görüşmeler üç başlık altında incelenmiştir. Birinci başlık, su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerinin yerel birimler (köyler, belde belediyeleri ve mahalleler) açısından değerlendirilmesidir. İkinci başlık, su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerinin ilçeler (Erzin, Dörtöy, Payas, İskenderun, Arsuz, Belen, Antakya, Defne, Samandağ ve diğer ilçeler) bazında değerlendirilmesidir. Üçüncü başlık ise su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerinin konu (muhtarların verdiği cevaplar) bazında değerlendirilmesidir.

Birinci başlıkta su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri köyler, belde belediyeleri ve mahalleler açısından değerlendirilmiştir. Köylerin yaşadığı en büyük problemler eski ve sağlıklı su boruları, su kıtlığı, kirli su depoları, su saatlerinin takılması, kanalizasyon şebekelerinin ve atıksu arıtma tesislerinin olmayışıdır. Birçok belde belediyesinde ve mahallede de su boruları çok eski, sağlıklı ve asbest içermektedir. Halen kanalizasyon şebekesi, yağmur drenaj hattı ve atıksu arıtma tesisi olmayan belde belediyeleri ve mahalleler vardır. Ayrıca birçok muhtar artan su faturalarından şikayetçidir. Ayrıca daha önce de belirtildiği üzere, merkez mahallelerden çeperlere ve kırlara gidildikçe daha az ve daha verimsiz hizmet sunumu yapılmaktadır.

İkinci başlık su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerinin ilçeler bazında değerlendirilmesidir. Bu konuda en çok problemli ilçeler ikinci bölgede yer alan Erzin, Payas ve Dört Yol ilçeleridir. Bu ilçeler ikinci bölgede olup, Antakya merkezden çok uzaktadırlar. Buralardaki birçok muhtar, uzak mesafeler ve hem fiziki hem de kültürel olarak diğer bölgeyle uyum sağlayamadıklarını düşündükleri için büyükşehir belediyesi olmaktan memnun değildir. Örneğin Erzin'deki muhtarların arasında Osmaniye iline daha yakın oldukları için Osmaniye'ye bağlanmasını öngörenler var. Hatta Erzin, Dört Yol, Payas ilçelerindeki muhtarlar İskenderun'un büyükşehir yapıp İskenderun'a bağlanma fikrini daha çok benimsemiş durumdadır. Öte yandan, bu ilçelerin (özellikle Payas ilçesinin) belediye başkanları ve büyükşehir belediye başkanı anlaşamamaktadır. Bu durum da ölçek genişletilmesine bağlı olarak hizmet sunumunu etkileyen önemli bir faktördür. Arsuz'daki muhtarlar hizmet sunumunda dağ ayırımı ve deniz ayırımı yapıldığını düşünmektedir. Birinci bölgede ise, Defne ve Samandağ su kıtlığı ve atıksu arıtma konusunda çok sıkıntı yaşamaktadır. Birinci bölgedeki diğer ilçelerin en büyük sorunu altyapıyla ilgilidir. Ayrıca bu bölgede Suriyeli göçmenler de yoğunlukta olduğu için, altyapı bu artan nüfusu kaldırabilecek nitelikte değildir.

Üçüncü başlık su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerinin konu bazında değerlendirilmesidir. Konular muhtarların sorulara cevaplarına dayanılarak kategorize edilmiştir. Kategoriler; su hizmetleri, kanalizasyon ve atıksu hizmetleri, HATSU'nun çalışma sistemi, HATSU'da hizmet aksaklıklarının nedenleri, su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerinde hangi kurumun daha iyi olduğu, köylerin ve belde belediyelerinin kapatılması, Hatay'da büyükşehir belediyesi kurulması, yasanın iddialarının Hatay üzerinden sınanması şeklindedir.

Bazı muhtarlara göre; atıksu arıtma tesislerinin inşa edilmesi, su ve kanalizasyon şebekelerinin yapılması, köylerdeki evlere ve kaçak kullanan evlere su saatlerinin takılmasıyla aboneleşme oranının artması, su gelirlerinin artması, su sayaçlarının takılmasıyla su israfının azalması, köylerden birim su fiyatının %25 indirimli alınması, HATSU ekiplerinin arızalara zamanında yetişmesi, köylerdeki su depolarının temizlenmesi, hizmette ayrımcılık yapılmaması ve daha kalifiyeli personellerin olması belediyelerin sınırlarının genişletilmesinin olumlu sonuçlarıdır. Bu olumlu sonuçlar hizmette verimlilik artışı da sağlamıştır. Su ve kanalizasyon şebekeleri ile atıksu arıtma tesislerinin inşa edilmesi hizmet sunumunda yeniden merkezileşmeye işaret etmektedir. Büyükşehir belediyeleri finansal kaynakları tek bir elde topladıkları için, belediyelere göre daha büyük ölçekli projeleri gerçekleştirme gücüne sahiptirler. Aboneleşme oranında artış, köylere su saatlerinin takılması ve su gelirlerinde artış aslında su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerinde özelleştirmeye neden olmaktadır. Ayrıca, bakım ve onarım

işlerinin taşeron firmalara devredilmesi de özelleştirmeye örnektir. Yukarıda sayılan diğer olumlu sonuçlar ise hizmet sunumunu içsel ve dışsal olarak etkileyen faktörlere örnektir.

Diğer taraftan, 6360 sayılı yasanın Hatay’da su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri açısından çok fazla olumsuz etkisi vardır. Bazı muhtarlara göre, su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerinin HATSU’ya devredilmesi, HATSU’nun mahallelerinde hiçbir hizmet yapmaması, köylerdeki evlere su saatlerinin takılması, su faturalarının yüksek gelmesi, bütün mahalleler için aynı su tarifesini uygulanması, HATSU ekiplerinin bakım-onarım için kazdığı yolların tekrar onarılmaması, doğal su kaynakları yerine kuyu sularının verilmesi, bazı köylerde su kıtlığının yaşanması, su kesintilerinin artması, şebekelerde küçük çaplı su borularının inşa edilmesi, atıksu arıtma tesislerinden atıksuyun arıtılmadan alıcı ortamlara verilmesi, kanalizasyon şebekesi olmayan mahallelerden atıksu bedelinin alınması, yağmur suyu drenaj hatlarının olmaması, bazı büyük mahallelerde kanalizasyon şebekesinin olmaması, bazı köylerde ihtiyaç olduğu halde su kuyularının yapılmaması, bazı büyük mahallelerde kanalizasyon şebekesi olduğu halde atıksu arıtma tesislerinin olmaması ve buralarda atıksuların alıcı ortamlara doğrudan deşarj edilmesi, belediyelerin sınırlarının genişletilmesinin olumsuz etkileridir. Ayrıca, HATSU’nun kesin ve net plan ve programının olmaması, kontrol, denetim ve koordinasyonun olmaması, vatandaşlar açısından Antakya merkeze uzak olmaları, HATSU ekipleri için mesafelerin uzak ve yol maliyetlerin yüksek olması, hizmet sunumunda çeşitli ayırımların ortaya çıkması (dağın bu yüzü-öteki yüzü ayırımı, kent merkezi-kırsal alan ayırımı, deniz kenarı-dağ tarafı ayırımı ve siyasi ayırımlar), başkanların anlaşılamaması, meclis üyelerinin birbirleriyle anlaşılamaması, yerel koşulları bilmeyen personellerin olması, hizmet alıcılarına karşı kaba davranan personellerin olması, ilgili personellere ulaşamama, oyalama taktiklerine başvuran yetkililerin olması, büyükşehir belediyesi ve ilçe belediyeleri arasında yetki karmaşalarının olması, sosyal ve kültürel açıdan entegrasyon sorunlarının olması, çok geniş hizmet alanının olması ve 6360 sayılı yasaya eleştirilerin olması hizmet sunumunu olumsuz etkilenmesine neden olmuştur. Açıkça görülüyor ki, 6360 sayılı yasanın belediye sınırlarını genişletmesinin olumsuz etkileri olumlu etkilerinden çok daha fazladır.

Yasanın ‘ölçek ekonomilerini sağlama, daha çok kaynakla, daha ucuz ve daha kaliteli hizmetle etkinliği artırma iddiası Hatay’da gerçekleşti mi?

Görüşme yapılan muhtarlardan %75’ine göre, yasanın ölçek ekonomilerini sağlama, daha çok kaynakla, daha ucuz ve daha kaliteli hizmetle etkinliği artırma iddiası Hatay’da gerçekleşmemiştir. Yasanın iddiasında, büyükşehir belediyelerinin ölçek ekonomilerin sağlandığı optimal ölçekte hizmet sunumunda etkinliğin artacağı, koordinasyonun sağlanacağı ve daha kaliteli hizmet sunumu yapılacağı belirtilmiştir. Ayrıca hizmet sunumunda birim

maliyetler ve harcamalar azaltılacak, ileri teknoloji ve kalifiyeli elemanlarla daha etkin sunum yapılacaktır. Daha bütünleşik bir yapıda daha adil hizmet sunumu da iddialar arasındadır. Bu iddiaların Hatay’da gerçekleşip gerçekleşmediği görüşmecilere sorulmuştur ve birçoğundan gerçekleşmediği cevabı alınmıştır. Alan çalışmasında, böyle bir geniş alanda daha az maliyetli hizmet sunmanın olanaksız olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Bilakis, dışsal ekonomiler açısından ulaşım, iletişim ve inşaat maliyetlerinin arttığı gözlenmiştir. Ayrıca, bir önceki dönemlerle karşılaştırıldığında HATSU’nun giderlerinin çok olduğu rahatlıkla anlaşılabılır. Gelirlerinin çok olmasına rağmen, hizmet sunumunda yetersizlik gözlemlenmiştir. Ayrıca, köylerde su saatlerin takılması, suyun birim fiyatının çok artması, birçok hizmetin özelleştirme yöntemleriyle sunulması, ölçek genişletilmesinin önemli sonuçlarıdır

Belediye sınırlarının değiştirilmesi ve büyükşehir belediyelerinin kurulmasının asıl amaç ve hedefleri nelerdir?

İlgili yazın taramasında, çeşitli ülkelerde gerçekleştirilen belediyelerin yeniden ölçeklendirme pratiklerinde teknik ve ekonomik (hizmet sunumunda düşük maliyetle verimlilik ve kalite artışı vs.) nedenlerin çok ötesinde nedenlerin olduğuna işaret edilmiştir. Özellikle eleştirel yaklaşımlar bu pratiklerin yeni kamu işletmeciliği bağlamında yerel yönetimlerin yeniden yapılandırılmasının önemli bir ayağı olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Belediyelerin ölçeğini küçültmenin veya büyültmenin her ikisinin de neoliberal koşullar doğrultusunda politik olarak ortak amaca hizmet ettiğini ileri sürmektedirler. Belediyeler rekabetin, rant arayışlarının ve kar elde etmenin odak noktası haline getirilmektedir. Türkiye’de de belediyelerin sınırlarını değiştiren yasal düzenlemelerin benzer amaçları olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Özellikle 6360 sayılı yasanın öne sürdüğü amaçların arka planında bazı politik mekanizmalar vardır. Yasanın kentleri büyük bir piyasa alanı ve ticaret merkezine dönüştürüp küresel ekonomi ve ulusal ekonominin motor gücü haline getirme isteği vardır. Ayrıca AKP hükümetinin seçimlere yönelik bazı beklentilerinin olduğu da açıktır. Köylerin ve belde belediyelerin tüzel kişiliğine son vererek buralardan gelebilecek oylarla büyükşehir belediyelerini hâkimiyeti altına almayı tasarlamıştır. Çünkü AKP aslında yıllardır büyükşehir belediye başkanlarını kentlerin patronu olarak kurgulamıştır.

Hatay’da yürütülen saha araştırmasının 6360 sayılı yasanın asıl amacına yönelik bazı temel bulguları vardır. Birincisi, yasanın hedefi ölçek ekonomileri değil, rant ekonomileridir. Bir görüşmecinin de ifade ettiği gibi, “Büyük ölçekli belediyeler, büyük ölçekli projeler demek; büyük ölçekli projeler de büyük rantlar demektir.” 6360 sayılı yasa aynı zamanda su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerini özelleşmesine de neden olmuştur. Bunlara karşılık, su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerinde verimlilik artışı sağlanamamıştır. Ayrıca yasa, büyükşehirlerde

bütün ili kapsayan bütünleşmiş ve koordinasyonu sağlanmış bir yapının oluşacağını ileri sürmüştür. Ancak, hizmet sunumunda metropoliten bütünleşme gerçekleşmemiş; aksine, metropoliten parçalanma gerçekleşmiştir. Hizmet alanlarının parçalara ayrılmasıyla hizmet sunumunda birçok faktöre bağlı ayrımlar ortaya çıkmıştır. Coğrafi (dağın bu yüzü ve öteki yüzü, deniz tarafı ve dağ tarafı, merkeze uzaklık ve yakınlık gibi), yönetsel (merkezdeki mahalleler ve köy ve belde belediyesi gibi çeperdeki yerleşimler) ve siyasal (farklı partiler, başkanların birbirleriyle anlaşamaması ve meclis üyeleri arasındaki koordinasyonsuzluk) ayrımlar Hatay’da su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerini etkilemektedir.

Hipotez 1: Belediye ölçeği ile hizmet sunumu arasında ters orantılı bir ilişki vardır. Ölçek büyüdükçe, hizmet sunumu olumsuz olarak etkilenmektedir. Alan çalışmasından elde edilen bulgular ve yazın taramasından çıkarılan sonuçlar bu hipotezi doğrulamaktadır. Belediyelerin sınırları ölçek ekonomisini yakalama ve hizmet sunumunda verimliliği artırma amaçlı genişletilmektedir. Ancak, ölçek ekonomileri özel işletmenin konusu olduğu için kamu hizmetlerine uyarlanamamaktadır. Ayrıca, belediye hizmetlerinin kendine özgü doğası ve çeşitliği sebebiyle bütün belediye hizmetleri için tek bir optimum ölçek hesaplamak çok zordur. Bir optimum ölçek bulunsa bile, bu optimum ölçek bütün belediyeler için geçerli olmayacaktır. Çünkü her bir belediyenin kendine özgü coğrafi, toplumsal, kültürel, siyasal ve ekonomik yapısı vardır. Bununla birlikte, ölçek büyüdükçe hizmet sunumunda olumsuz dışsallıklar ve bunlara bağlı problemler ortaya çıkmaktadır. Türkiye’de 6360 sayılı yasa, ölçek ekonomisini yakalama ve hizmetlerde verimliliği artırma gerekçesiyle belediyelerin sınırlarını genişleten son yasal düzenlemedir. İl nüfusu 750.000 ve yukarı olan yerleşimleri büyükşehir belediyesi ilan eden bu yasa, bu illerdeki köylerin ve belde belediyelerin tüzel kişiliğine son vermiş ve bütün büyükşehir belediyeleri için tek bir model getirmiştir. Yasanın bu nüfus ölçütleri yetersiz, soyut ve bilimsel analizden yoksundur. Bu yasayla ayrıca büyükşehir belediyelerin sınırları il sınırlarına ve ilçe belediyeleri de ilçe sınırlarına kadar genişletilmiş. Teorik ve tarihsel incelemelerin ışığında, alan çalışmasından elde edilen bulgular 6360 sayılı yasanın belediyelerin hizmet sunumunu olumsuz etkilediğini göstermiştir.

Hipotez 2: Hatay’da su ve kanalizasyon hizmetleri 6360 sayılı yasanın hedeflerine uygun olarak gerçekleşmemiştir. Yasa, belediyelerin sınırlarının genişletilmesiyle optimum ölçek ekonomilerinin yakalanacağı, daha az kaynakla, daha az maliyetle ve daha yüksek kaliteyle daha etkin hizmet sunumu olacağı iddia edilmişti. Ancak, Hatay’da gerçekleştirilen alan araştırması, Hatay’daki su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerinin daha az kaynakla, daha az maliyetle ve daha yüksek kaliteyle daha etkin sunumunun gerçekleşmediğini kanıtlamıştır. Ölçek ekonomilerinin büyükşehir belediyelerinin sınırlarının il sınırlarına genişletilmesiyle

sağlanamadığı ortaya koyulmuştur. Ayrıca, Hatay’da su ve kanalizasyon hizmetlerinde bütünleşme ve hizmet maliyetlerinde azalma gözlemlenmemiştir.

Hipotez 3: Belediye sınırlarının değiştirilmesi ve büyükşehir belediyelerinin kurulmasının gerçek amaç ve hedefleri, yasaların iddialarından oldukça farklıdır. Bunların teknik ve idari olmasından ziyade siyasi süreçler olduğu açıktır. Yeniden ölçeklendirme pratikleriyle ilgili çıkarılan yasaların ileri sürdüğü gerekçelerin ardında başka mekanizmalar vardır. Kentsel rantın artırılması, büyük ölçekli projelerden büyük kazançlar sağlanması ve kentlerin birer rekabet aracı olarak pazarlanması bu mekanizmalara örnek olarak verilebilir. Ayrıca iktidar partisinin kendi oylarını artırma ve büyükşehir belediye başkanlarıyla daha kolay işbirliği yapma gibi mekanizmalarda vardır.

Bu tez belediyeler için optimum bir büyüklük hesaplaması yapmamıştır ve bir optimal ölçek önermemektedir. İstatistiki bilgiler kullanarak verimlilik hesaplaması da yapmamıştır; fakat verimliliği yeniden tanımlayarak ve derinlemesine görüşmelerden elde edilen verileri analiz ederek verimliliği ölçmüştür. Bu tez ne kamu seçimi teorisini ne de bütünleştirici argümanları savunmuştur. Bu yaklaşımların olumlu ve olumsuz savlarını ortaya koymuş ve eleştirel gerçekçi bir analizle bu yaklaşımlardan sonuçlar çıkarmıştır. Bu tez yeniden ölçeklendirme pratiklerinin idari ve teknik boyutlarından ziyade kentsel alanlardan kazanç ve rant sağlamaya yönelik siyasal süreçler olduğunu ileri sürer.

Yasa yapıcıların, yeniden ölçeklendirme pratikleriyle ilgili düzenlemeleri hazırlarken birkaç hususu göz önünde bulundurmaları gerekir. Bir düzenleme hazırlamadan önce konunun bilimsel ve teknik analizlerinin yapılması şarttır. Konuyla ilgili ülke örneklerinin incelenmesi gerekir. Her bir ülkenin kendine özgü tarihsel, sosyal, politik, ekonomik ve idari boyutlarının olduğu göz önünde bulundurulması gerekir. Düzenleme, yalnızca nüfus ölçütü üzerinden bütün belediyeler ve bütün hizmetleri için tek bir optimum büyüklük ve tek bir model sunmamalıdır. Her bir belediyenin de kendine özgü koşulları ve farklı ihtiyaçları olduğu göz önünde bulundurulmalıdır. Ayrıca düzenlemenin her bir aşamasında demokratik prosedürlerin işletilmesi gerekmektedir. Son olarak düzenlemenin, kamu yararını ve sosyal adaleti ön planda tutan, kentlerin tüm ihtiyaçlarının göz önünde bulunduran, yaşanabilir ve bütünleştirici amaçlarının olması gerekmektedir.

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