THE ROLE OF EDUCATION ON INTEGRATION POLICIES: A COMPARISON OF SWEDEN, GERMANY AND TURKEY AFTER THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
THE MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

NESİBE BURCU ERŞEKERCİ

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES

JANUARY 2020
Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF EDUCATION ON INTEGRATION POLICIES: A COMPARISON OF SWEDEN, GERMANY AND TURKEY AFTER THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS

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January 2020, 143 pages

This study aims to produce a comparative research on integration policies of Sweden, Germany, and Turkey that host remarkable number of Syrians after the crisis in Syria which is considered as the biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time. This study mainly examines main integration areas and tools used by Sweden, Germany and Turkey to deal with unexpected number of Syrian refugees. This study argues that after the Syrian crisis, despite the three countries’ distinct characteristics, and their different traditional integration models, they all have used education as a prominent tool for integration and reproduced their integration models they had been applying prior to the Syrian crisis.

Keywords: Syrian Refugees, Integration, Sweden, Germany, Turkey
ÖZ

ENTEGRASYON POLİTİKALARINDA EĞİTİMİN ROLÜ: SURIYE MÜLTECİ KRİZİ SONRASI İŞVEÇ, ALMANYA TÜRKİYE KARŞILAŞTIRMASI

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Ocak 2020, 143 sayfa

Bu çalışmamızın en büyük insani krizi olarak değerlendirilen Suriye mülteci krizinde kaynağı değer miktarda Suriyeli ev sahibliği yapan İsveç, Almanya ve Türkiye’nin entegrasyon politikaları üzerine karşılaştırmalı bir araştırma yapmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışma, İsveç, Almanya ve Türkiye’nin beklenmedik sayıda Suriyeli mülteciyle başa çıkmak için kullandığı temel entegrasyon alanlarını ve araçlarını incelemektedir. Bu çalışma üç ülkenin farklı özelliklere ve farklı geleneksel entegrasyon modellerine sahip olmalarına rağmen Suriye krizi sonrası üç ülkenin de entegrasyon politikalarında eğitimin ön çarpıtğını ve eğitimin bu süreçte ülkelerin sahip olduğu entegrasyon modellerini yinelemekte olduğunu savunmaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Suriyeli mülteciler, Entegrasyon, İsveç, Almanya, Türkiye
To One and the Most Beloved, to my Guides
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It has been a long and strenuous journey for me to complete this study. During this journey, I was blessed with the guidance and company of my dear advisor Prof. Özlem Tür Küçükkaya. She helped me to overcome all my apprehension and provided me all the support and the courage I needed. I would like to offer my deepest gratitude to her.

I also would like to thank Assist. Prof. Dr. Besim Can Zırh and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Başak Yavçan for their comments and contributions during my thesis defense.

I would like to thank my mother Behiye for her endless patience and understanding. I am also grateful for the continuous support my sister, my brothers and my whole family. Especially Banu, Sena and Erkam; no matter how far away they are, I always feel their love and support. I also would like to express my thanks to my aunt Uğur Yakupoğlu for her sincere prayers and emotional support she offered to me during my studies.

I would like to thank to Tuğba for creating a perfect study environment for me. I am also deeply grateful for support of Kevser and encouragement of Şule. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my all friends for their understanding. Lastly, I want to thank my cat Firuze for being by my side during the nights when I was studying.
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DGMM</td>
<td>Directorate General of Migration Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization of Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFIP</td>
<td>Law on Foreigners and International Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGI</td>
<td>Migration Governance Indicators</td>
</tr>
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<td>MIPEX</td>
<td>Migration Policy Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiGOF</td>
<td>Migration Governance Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoNE</td>
<td>Ministry of National Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>Temporary Accommodation Centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Temporary Education Centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPR</td>
<td>Temporary Protection Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War II</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>Third Country Nationals</td>
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NGO
Non-Governmental Organization

TPR
Temporary Protection Regulation

PIKTES
Project for Promoting the Integration of Syrian Children into the Turkish Education System
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study aims to produce a comparative research on integration policies of Sweden, Germany, and Turkey that host remarkable amounts of Syrians after the refugee crisis in Syria which is “the biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time, a continuing cause of suffering for millions which should be garnering a groundswell of support around the world” (UNHCR, 2016). This study mainly examines prominent integration areas and tools used by Sweden, Germany and Turkey to deal with unexpected number of Syrian refugees. In line with the main question, this research also addresses the following questions:

1. What is migrant integration, what are the areas of integration and which areas come to forefront as a necessity to grant tranquil incorporation of migrants?
2. How do Sweden, Germany and Turkey differ in carrying out migrant integration policies to attain social cohesion in compliance with their historical and national context?
3. Which integration policies have Sweden, Germany and Turkey carried out after the Syrian crisis? At what points their migrant integration policies differ from or resemble with each other? How have the integration models affected their integration policies after the Syrian crisis?

This study argues that after the Syrian crisis, despite the three countries’ distinct characteristics, and their different traditional integration models and diverse national perceptions on foreign people, they all have used education as a prominent tool for
integration by reproducing their integration models they had been applying prior to the Syrian crisis.

In order to answer the above-mentioned questions effectively, the second chapter of the thesis primarily focuses on the concept of integration. Since in the literature, there is not a certain definition for integration, this chapter will define the concept of integration in terms of sociological and current political literature. To prevent any misconception occurring throughout the thesis, the terms integration, refugee and migrant, as well as migrant integration, will be clearly defined in accordance with their current usage in the literature. Then, some traditional integration models will be mentioned to explain how differently the states perceive migrants, immigration and integration in terms of their nationhood concepts. In the following parts, the integration policies of Sweden, Germany and Turkey will be explained. In the same chapter, the agreed areas of measuring, monitoring, developing and comparing the integration policies will be briefly discussed. Although each country’s national model of integration varies, or their scope of integration differs, they need to clearly define their own features on how to incorporate migrants in core social institutions. Here, gathering data is essential to evaluate the solid facts and accurate information on integration and migration and to prevent any misperception in the outcomes of migration and integration policies. For this reason, this thesis refers to the data provided by Migration Policy Index (MIPEX), which has developed indicators in different areas to measure efficiency of policies to integrate migrants in 38 countries, including Sweden, Germany and Turkey. Lastly in the second chapter, the relevance of education with other areas of integration is discussed. Considering the complex feature of integration and also referring to the MIPEX data, this thesis justifies that education and training affect all of other basic integration areas.

The third chapter of the study addresses the question; how do Sweden, Germany and Turkey differ in carrying out migrant integration policies to attain social cohesion in compliance with their historical and national context. In the third chapter of the thesis, the dominant political agenda and background information about migrants and refugees in Sweden, Germany, and Turkey, before the Syrian crisis is mentioned and
a broad characterization of approaches to migration and integration of those three countries is discussed.

Firstly, the thesis gives the historical process of Sweden, Germany and Turkey’s migration and integration policies. Sweden, Germany, and Turkey have quite different migration histories, including vastly different ethnic, religious and cultural identities of migrant groups in the past. Starting from the first migration experiences of Sweden, Germany and Turkey, in the period before the Syrian crisis, important migration flows and their effects on the migration and integration policies of the states are mentioned. As well as the historical process of migration policies, the asylum policies of Sweden, Germany and Turkey are also explained in a historical context. There are several reasons behind the migration of people in another country, while some people are forced to leave their homes with a fear of persecution or as a result of war, other people are motivated by better social and economic conditions to migrate. The number of people as a part of irregular migration including forcibly displaced people, refugees, asylum seekers, stateless people, or human trafficking victims increased globally. Therefore, the responses and the policies of the states towards asylum seekers and refugees have evolved and managed by procedures and frameworks different than immigrant policies. As focal point of this study is policies of Sweden, Germany and Turkey towards Syrians during a refugee crisis, this study prefers to discuss the process of refugee and asylum policies of each state in a separate section rather than presenting an overall policy including both immigrant and refugee policies.

In the third chapter, the education systems and how Sweden, Germany and Turkey adapt foreign students from several origins to their education systems are explained. Not only the school system but also other trainings and courses that states used to foster integration of foreign population into their society are discussed. In the last part of the chapter, this study gives a brief comparison of Sweden, Germany and Turkey’s policies on migration and integration. The patterns of states to integrate the migrants could generally be described according to their "openness" to the new group of people” (Heckmann, 2003, p.47). The comparison shows that the patterns of Sweden, Germany and Turkey has led distinct migration and integration policies of three states at the end of their historical process. This section also proves that the nationhood perception not
only influence migration and integration policies. The education system of each state is directly a reflection of the state’s policies managing the foreign population, openness to foreigners and the traditional integration models.

In the fourth chapter of the thesis, this study tries to answer how Sweden, Germany and Turkey respond during to the Syrian refugee crisis and later asks which integration policies Sweden, Germany and Turkey have carried out after the Syrian crisis. In this chapter, the thesis firstly gives a brief information of the impact of the crisis in each country. The unexpected process of the Syrian crisis led to huge migration flows and demographic changes in each country that are the main destinations of Syrian asylum seekers.

This study argues that the impact of the refugee crisis on Sweden, Germany and Turkey in the first place led to legal adjustments on asylum policies. At the beginning of the crisis Sweden, Germany, and Turkey showed hospitality and carried out ‘open door’ policies to Syrians fleeing from war, persecution, and violence. However, after the massive human flow to Europe, the political bargaining on asylum seekers, border controls and more restrictive measures and asylum procedures took place in the process. Consequently, each country focused on more efficient integration policies for the Syrian refugees after the human flow from Syria.

The last part of this study analyzes what kind of measures are taken to integrate the Syrian population and increase their social cohesion in Sweden, Germany, and Turkey. This study exemplifies a broad range of factors such as the reforms, investments and efforts in each country and shows that each country mainly focused on compulsory education, language courses, vocational training, higher education, and obligatory or voluntary education to support social integration of the refugees in all age and gender groups in these three states. The brief comparison of the three countries at the end of the fourth chapter addresses how education came to the forefront as a main tool to grant integration of Syrians parallel to each states’ traditional integration model. Although the policies of these three countries differs in terms of their national integration framework, these three countries resemble each other in using of education in their integration policies after the Syrian crisis. This study argues that Sweden,
Germany and Turkey reproduced their integration and migration models prominently with education.

The thesis does not attempt to compare the outcomes and reach a judgment about the success of the integration especially in terms of education. Lack of efficient global policies for increasing number of displaced people, lack of capacity and resources in the case of a huge influx seem to remain a widespread problem affecting the success of integration in all states. Comparing the outcomes of integration is considerably complex because the demographic characteristics of the migrant populations such as age, gender, country of birth, education levels, their parent’s education level and motivation to migrate, each have a different impact on the outcomes. As well as the characteristics of the foreign population, the significant characteristics of the host society lead to differences in the outcomes and these characteristics evolve over time. Furthermore, the size of the migrant population being admitted is another significant factor, especially in the case of a host country with limited resources. In this study, the selected countries; Sweden, Germany, and Turkey have different sizes of Syrian population including different rates of gender, age, education level and populations from different geographical parts of Syria. In Turkey, which hosts the largest amount of Syrian refugee population, for example, the migrant population education level is distinctively different from refugees who reside in Sweden and Germany.

The study focuses on comparing Sweden, Germany and Turkey due to the high population rates of Syrians they host. During the Syrian refugee crisis, Turkey has become the final destination of the largest refugee population in the world, Germany has received the highest number of refugees in Europe (Holmes & Castañeda, 2016, p. 4) and Sweden per capita, received the most asylum seekers globally (Skodo, 2018). Syrians became the third major foreign population living in Germany, while in Sweden and Turkey Syrian population ranks first among the foreign population. Therefore, for an analysis of the Syrian case, these three countries are the most proper ones to research.
One of the other reasons that this thesis makes a comparison between Sweden, Germany and Turkey is that these three states’ approaches are most frequently labeled with different traditional integration models. Sweden is one of the most prominent examples of multiculturalism that allows different ethnic, religious and cultural groups to sustain their characteristics in the Swedish society (Castles & Miller, 2009), while Turkey integrates migrants into society through a one-sided adaptation; the people of Turkey regardless of their religion or ethnic identity are expected not to express their distinctive linguistic, cultural or social characteristics and adapt to being Turkish as a comprehensive umbrella identity (Ülker, 2008). Ethnic exclusionism in Germany is related to typical nationhood by descent, migrants are generally included in limited areas in society and are excluded from others (Brubaker, 1992). To observe how do the different models managed the refugee crisis, which points are similar, which points differentiate in their responses, this study picked up states with different models.

Another reason to select Sweden, Germany and Turkey to compare in this thesis is the different rankings of these three countries in MIPEX. Sweden is at the top of the list of the 38 countries while Turkey’s ranking is 38 out of 38 states. Germany’s ranking is 10 out of 38 which is close to a middle ranking. As mentioned before the indicators are useful tools to evaluate the effectiveness of integration. Therefore, the study aimed to enrich the comparative analysis of the integration policies in various levels in terms of evaluations of integration policy effects.

1.1 Literature Review, Methodology and Limitations

This study includes detailed research of various sources to present a comparative analysis of Sweden, Germany and Turkey’s integration policies before and after the Syrian crisis to reach a consistent answer to the research question. A broad scope of literature has been reviewed in order to compare Sweden, Turkey and Germany’s pre-Syrian crisis and post-Syrian crisis integration policies and to discuss the tools used to foster the integration of Syrian refugees in the three countries. The existing literature on migration and refugee policies presents a wide range of research. The literature on citizenship, migration and integration policies of Turkey (Kirişçi, 1996; Çağaptay, 2002; İçduygucu & Aksel, 2013; Abadan-Unat, 1995; İçduygucu, Erder & Gençkaya,
the changes during the EU Accession process (Kale, 2015) and the impact on Syrian crisis (İçduygu & Şimşek 2016; Sağiroğlu, 2016; Erdoğan, 2016) present rich resources. There is also a broad literature on migration and integration policies of Germany (Brubaker, 1994; Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009; Hess & Green, 2016; Bade, 2003; Green, 2013) and Sweden (Brannström, 2015; Dahlström, 2005; Hammar, 1999; Borevi, 2014). As well as specific cases of each state, the literature offers many publications on comparative analysis for states in terms of their different citizenship, migration and integration regulations.

Similar to process of integration and migration policies, the developments and the changing policies after the Syrian crisis are also well covered for Sweden, Germany, and Turkey in the literature. Not only the academic resources but also the institutional online systems of Sweden, Germany and Turkey provide information on the regulations and adjustments of states. This study also applies publications and online data systems such as Directorate General of Migration Management of Turkey, the Federal Office of Migration and Refugees of Germany and Swedish Migration Agency to reach proper data on the policies of each state. As well as each states’ national and institutional information, the EU online and published resources offer a broad literature on both states’ frameworks and the common EU frameworks that bind Sweden and Germany as member states and Turkey as a candidate state. The EU online resources also give access to previous and current EU regulations, strategies and implementations, for instance to devoted specific topics, indicators and statistics, as well as updates and articles related to the field of education.

This study also refers to global and national statistics to analyze the scope of the refugee crisis and also to reach the updated information about refugee populations. Non-governmental organizations such as UNHCR, IOM share information and many reports on the refugees in particular the Syrian refugees in their online databases. Likewise, the EU provides statistics and information in various areas such as the population and conditions of member states, which contributes to our understanding while making a comparison between Germany and Sweden’s demographic data.
Migration is an issue of continuing debate and a shared concept globally, as a result of the massive movement of people evolving with economic, political and environmental reasons. In the era of involuntary migration, the influx of millions of people has political, economic, social, developmental, and humanitarian outcomes that at the international level all actors should consider the best response to managing such movements. Based on integration’s definition, related literature and previous researches on migrant integration identifies elements essential for a ‘successful’ integration. According to Ager and Strang’s (2008) methodology:

Key domains of integration are proposed related to four overall themes: achievement and access across the sectors of employment, housing, education and health; assumptions and practice regarding citizenship and rights; processes of social connection within and between groups within the community; and structural barriers to such connection related to language, culture and the local environment.

Similarly; MIPEX sets eight political areas including education, labor market mobility, health, family reunion, permanent residence, access to nationality, political participation and anti-discrimination. MIPEX developed 167 policy indicators “to create a rich, multi-dimensional picture of migrants’ opportunities to participate in society” (MIPEX, 2015a). MIPEX indicators helps key policy actors to develop efficient integration and policies. In this study MIPEX is referred as a guide to contribute to the evaluation of integration.

The current study has also certain limitations; there is limited literature specific to the refugees. The reports and academic literature use the terms “migrants” or “foreign born citizens” when analyzing the demographic data. For example, data on education outcomes for children of immigrants are available on a national level but the data has no detail about refugee children. In addition, it is important to note that the refugee information of Germany and Sweden is also complex. Because during the Syrian crisis, there was an ongoing refugee flow to Sweden and Germany from Somali, Afghanistan, Eritrea, and Iraq in addition to the Syrian refugees. In general, the international comparisons in the literature often suffer from a lack of reliable data for refugees across countries. Lastly, some statistics and state documents for Germany are based on secondary sources, since the sources are in German; the necessary information at the national level of Germany is hard to attain. Another limitation
regarding the German case is the educational system of Germany. In Germany, 16 individual federal states have their own education departments and policies. Therefore, a general summary of the main stages of the German education system is used but also some exceptional practices were mentioned in the German case of the thesis.

Another limitation about the shortcomings of finding a common basis for studying integration and to define the basic terms. Concepts of integration, migrant, and migration do not have clear-cut definitions. According to the glossary of migration related terms, the definition of UN Convention states migrant should be used in the cases that an individual decides to migrate without any reason force them to migrate and indicates that the definition “does not refer to refugees, displaced or others forced or compelled to leave their homes.” (UNESCO, 2017). On the other hand, the sources of EU define migrant as;

In the global context, a person who is outside the territory of the State of which they are nationals or citizens and who has resided in a foreign country for more than one year irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and the means, regular or irregular, used to migrate. (European Commission, n.d.).

Therefore, this thesis assumes migrant integration policies include immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees or people under different protection status.

It is also useful to define the context of refugee integration. At the international level, the 1951 Refugee Convention is the main document that forms the basis of refugee definition and summarizes the rights of the displaced, as well as the legal responsibilities of states to protect them. A refugee, according to the Convention, “is someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion” (UNHCR, n.d.). All asylum seekers do not qualify as refugees and the states grant other international status for those individuals such as subsidiary protection. Thus, all Syrians in Sweden, Germany, and Turkey do not qualify as refugees. In this study, the refugee term will encompass not only the integration of immigrants but also the asylum seekers, refugees
or people under different protection statuses, in the context of integration of Syrians in Germany, Sweden and Turkey cases.
CHAPTER 2

INTEGRATION

2.1 Defining Integration of Migrants and Refugees

Integration, in general, means the act and process of combining single parts or adding a part into an existing structure to make a unified whole. Thus, integration refers both to the process of the connection of the components itself and the level of the wholeness at the end of the process. In the sociological context, integration is theorized using social integration and system integration terms to explain the transformation. For instance, Lockwood argues that social integration refers to “the orderly or conflictual relationship between the actors” whereas system integration focuses on the relationship between the parts of the social system (Archer, 1996). From the actors’ standpoint, social order is investigated by relying on social cooperation or conflict among agencies whose conception of the social world and acts shape the social order based on their interests. According to the latter view, social order is determined by the interaction among systemic parts, in other words core institutions (Mouzelis, 1997). Esser suggests acculturation, placement, socialization (interaction) and identification to theorize social integrations as the processes creating integration (Heckmann & Boswick, 2006, p.3). Referring to Esser’s acculturation, placement, socialization(interaction) and identification, Heckmann and Schnapper (2016) introduce four dimensions of integration into the literature; structural integration, cultural integration, interactive integration and identificational integration. Structural integration is correlated with Esser’s placement and defines obtaining rights to access and gain status in the core institutions such as education and labor market. Cultural integration occurs following access to core institutions. Individuals actively socialize
with other members of the society, which leads to changes in behaviors and attitudes and this change refers to cultural integration. Interactive integration is the emerging relations between individuals, such as marriage and friendship, and identificational integration is an individual’s identifications based on feeling like a part of that society (Heckmann & Bosswick, 2006, p.9).

In the international political arena and migration research, there are various definitions of integration but often integration is defined as “the two-way process of mutual adaptation between migrants and host societies in which migrants are incorporated into the social, economic, cultural and political life of the receiving community” (IOM, 2016, p.2).

According to European Commission’s (EC) website a migrant is “a person who is outside the territory of the State of which they are nationals or citizens and who has resided in a foreign country for more than one year irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and the means, regular or irregular, used to migrate” (EC, 2019). Therefore, migrant integration policies are inclusive of immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees or people under different protection status. As mentioned, in the literature, general integration plans and policies are carried out under the term migrant, but refugee-specific actions are also necessary in terms of integration. UNHCR’s note on the integration of refugees (2007) underlines that in addition to general integration programs, the states should take into consideration the consequences of the reception of refugees. Refugees are subject to prejudice and discrimination in social, economic and cultural areas, they experience a lack of language skills and problems to access health services, residential areas and the labor market. Refugees are legally enabled to the same rights as nationals in access to the basic structures, however, they encounter more obstacles during their integration process as compared to the immigrants. These obstacles include problems in housing, problems with everyday practices due to unfamiliarity, qualification problems in education and labor market system (UNHCR, 2014, p.2).

As seen in the recent Syria crisis spanning over many years, the refugee flow does not seem to last globally, and the possibility of return is quite low for those that fled away.
Therefore, the integration of refugees could not be excluded from the mainstream policies on migration.

2.2 Integration Models

After WWII the nation-states had to develop policies to manage the process of human flow and determine a way of including the newcomers into their social structure. Migration has been highly intensified with the development of communication channels, easy transportation, the closeness of borders and the increasing regional conflicts. Therefore, individuals and also their cultures have become closer. As the international nature of migration increases, it is observed that issues such as identity, harmony, integration, assimilation, exclusion, cohesion and multiculturalism also come to the fore along. Different perspectives are well-defended in a long-standing debate to assist in integrating large human flows in the host country. The pattern of countries to integrate the migrants are often labeled according to their understanding of the nation-state and how the state perceives migrants and immigration. Heckmann explains that patterns as “a number of conditions on the part of the receiving society which could generally be described as its "openness" to the new group of people” (Heckmann,2003, p.47). There are fundamental approaches to migrant incorporation that emerged in the historical process under the reflection of a nation’s self-understanding of the national, social, political and legal structure. The integration models addressing the presence and integration of migrants and minorities sustain a national legacy and also different actors are involved in the policymaking and the politics of integration process (Bertossi & Duyvendak, 2012, p.237). Although the models presenting the states evolved with the changing migration regime and now are seen as a burden to the integration of immigrants, the national integration models heavily influence the understanding of migrants and integration. Approaches to integration varies in relation to where a State’s integration policy lies between the edges of assimilation and multiculturalism(IOM, 2016, p.3). Therefore, the models will be briefly mentioned in order to make a contribution to the analysis of the history of migration and to the current integration policies of Germany, Sweden and Turkey.
a) **Assimilation:** Castles briefly describes assimilation as “the incorporation of migrants into society through a one-sided process of adaptation, in which they are expected to give up their distinctive linguistic, cultural or social characteristics and become indistinguishable from the majority population” (Castles, 1993, p.1). Although assimilationist approach claim that their goal is to achieve equality, in reality, they express the quest to justify the unchanging character and superiority of the dominant identity and culture. In general, assimilation theories suggest the members of the minority group to adhere to the prevailing values and to renounce their own minority group identity. The cultures of the immigrants they belong before their migration are supposed to be unsuitable or dangerous for the public order. In the assimilationist approach the receiving society must be able to welcome and newcomers must be able to give up previous features. Briefly, assimilation theory, predicts an approach that is dominated by inter-community asymmetry and a certain vertical hierarchy and it positions the minority group at a lower level of the hierarchy.

b) **Exclusion/Segregation:** The exclusionist or segregationist approach directly or indirectly discriminates against migrant populations. In the social order, the structure does not allow the migrants to participate in all areas of society with equal opportunities. The regulations and laws force segregation of facilities and services. In general, migrants are expected to access only to the labor market but are denied in the welfare systems, citizenship and political participation (Castles, 1993, p.2). The exclusion can be remarkably observed in terms of legal structures, as the migrant integration is restricted through laws. The significant difference between the rights of the citizens and foreigners puts the foreign population in a disadvantaged socioeconomic position and excludes them from society. The segregationist model best defines Western European states’ policies in the situation of former guest workers from developing countries migrated to be employed in the mid-20th century.
c) **Multiculturalism:** Multiculturalism has various definitions but in general, multiculturalism is the existence of different ethnic, religious and cultural groups with their own characteristics, that are distinguishable from the other groups. In other words, in the framework of multiculturalism the other is accepted with its differences and granted the right to sustain its differences. According to Castles in a multicultural environment the majority of the group willingly accepts and welcomes the cultural differences, and also changes its social behavior and institutional structures according to the diversity (Castles, 1993, 3). In the multicultural context the community adopts a common shared culture, which is necessary to sustain multiculturalism. Therefore, a minority group can integrate into society and at the same time preserve its cultural and traditional practices. In the theoretical framework; multiculturalism provides equal rights to each religious, ethnic and cultural group in society in legal and political terms.

Most of the research on migration and integration identifies certain countries with certain national models (such as the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK as multicultural, and France as assimilationist). Although the states follow the same national models, the outcomes are not generally the same and vary in respect to value systems, behavioral patterns and historical backgrounds of receiving and migrating populations (Bertossi & Duyvendak, 2012, p. 238). The models also continue to evolve depending on changing global tensions, systems and migration flow. However, the traditional models do exist and contribute to understanding the prevailing attitudes of the policies in a general perspective.

**2.3 Measuring Integration**

The migration of millions of people has humanitarian, political, social and economic consequences. Thus, the global actors, states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are convinced that the migration issue needs to be addressed seriously. The process of migration and the integration of migrated populations require more comprehensive policies to prevent negative results. Since integration has a complicated context and includes widespread issues, guiding indicators are fundamental to determine and conduct the policies efficiently. Although the national
model of integration varies or the scope of the integration changes in different examples, integration policies need clear features on how to adapt migrants in core institutions of the society.

As the integration is defined as “a cross-cutting and multi-sectoral issue that pertains to policy areas that address the economic, social, legal, cultural, and civic spheres and impacts all aspects of migrants’ lives and their communities” (IOM, 2016). Therefore, to analyze the interrelated dynamics between those multi-sectoral parts of migration needs detailed data collection, to observe solid facts and to prevent misperception on migrants and migration’s impact on society. To attain proper data while evaluating integration, proper questions in basic areas are useful to categorize and to compare the integration policies. Currently, there is a broad agreement on the political areas to measure. Many indexes and methodologies are developed to increase transparency and provide reliable results.

At this point, it is useful to address the EU framework on planning and measuring integration to ensure that the integration is beneficial for both sides of the migration. The integration of migrants and the second generation has been on the policy agenda of the EU for a long time. Under the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht, the intergovernmental cooperation with the Geneva Convention of 1951 and the Protocol of 1967 on asylum was brought into the EU’s institutional framework.

The cooperation on the integration of the EU has been evolving since the European Council Summit held in Tampere in October 1999 (Council of European Union, 2016). The Tampere Council called upon the need to develop common policies on asylum and migration to harmonize the system for people who seek entry to the EU states and to manage migration flows. In 2004, the EU Council agreed on common basic principles for immigrant integration policy underlining that integration policy must involve the “local, regional, and national institutions, with which immigrants interact, in both the public and private realms. The development and implementation of integration policy is, therefore, the primary responsibility of individual Member States rather than of the Union as a whole.” (Council of European Union, 2004). Common Basic Principles was indicated for Immigrant Integration Policy contained and they
were: employment, education; access to public and private services for migrants; basic knowledge of the host society's language history, and institutions; frequent interaction between migrants and natives; the practice of diverse cultures and religions; the participation of immigrants in the democratic process and consequently developing clear goals; indicators and evaluation mechanisms to adjust policy. The Common Basic Principles introduced indicators as an essential part of policymaking on integration. In 2010, the European Commission emphasized the necessity of a strategy for smart and sustainable integration to enable migrants to develop their potential and subsequently agreed on the Zaragoza Declaration to focus on the key determinants of integration as a tool to develop integration policies in a comprehensive manner. It identified four policy indicators; education, employment, active citizenship and social inclusion (Huddleston et al., 2013).

In 2011, EC proposed an agenda on third-country nationals (TCNs) integration and on how to understand and better support integration. Common European indicators identified in the Zaragoza Declaration were mentioned in the agenda as relevant to monitor the outcomes on integration and to improve the EU policies. Following the Syrian Refugee crisis, in 2016 EC proposed seven legislative proposals to improve the common EU asylum system and adopted an action plan on the integration of third-country nationals. The Action plan stated that the migration of TCNs is an opportunity for the states and the migrants are well integrated. Currently, Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, produces The EU’s migrant integration data. Eurostat serves the data categorized under Zaragoza Indicators to monitor the foreigner’s integration conditions. Eurostat introduces the European-wide results in the five areas of integration: employment, education, health, social inclusion and active citizenship (Eurostat, 2015).

Additionally, there are many indexes to evaluate and compare states’ integration policies. One of the most preferred one in academic research is MIPEX. Migrant Integration Policy Index is a part of a project initiated for the integration of TCN to use indicators to improve the integration policies and efficiency of the policies. MIPEX is the most widely and intensively used index in quantitative research by politicians, NGO’s and researchers (Bilgili et al., 2015, p.5). MIPEX developed 167
policy indicators in eight different policy areas to reach a multidimensional picture of the migrants’ opportunities to participate in society (MIPEX, 2015a). The eight integration policy indicators basically arise from the EU integration indicators and a different dimension is detailed out for each indicator to compare the differences and trends between the 38 selected countries, to monitor the outcomes of the indicators and to find the most effective policies.

The OECD also presents a set of indicators of migrant integration in the areas of employment, education, social inclusion, civic engagement, and social cohesion. The OECD provides publications on the integration outcomes collaborating with EC, including a detailed comparison of EU, OECD and G20 countries.

IOM developed a methodology to measure how countries manage migration policies; Migration Governance Framework (MiGOF) and the Migration Governance Indicators (MGI) for reliable, measurable indicators to achieve the 2030 Agenda on migration for Sustainable Development of the UN. MGI specifies possible engagements and key elements on integration and social cohesion, which would be useful for both the migrants and the host societies. There are six political indicators revealed as the milestones of a successful integration; anti-discrimination and social cohesion, family reunification, civic and political participation, health, access to education, access to the labor market and financial inclusion (IOM, 2016, 5). IOM states that the six political indicators were based on the MIPEX and integration indicators of OECD/EU integration indicators.

A methodology in the literature was also developed by Ager and Strang. The authors present a conceptual framework and set indicators on refugee integration to contribute for a better understanding. According to Ager and Strang’s (2008) methodology; there are key domains under four titles. Overall, the framework is based ten key domains and within each of the domains indicators are proposed, these ten domains are, education, health, housing, employment, social bonds, social bridges, social links, language and cultural knowledge, safety and stability, and finally rights and citizenship (Ager & Strang, 2008, p.170).
Referring to the mentioned efforts on measuring integration to achieve a successful integration, it is obvious that access to core institutions is indicated as a pathway to success in integration. Access to education, access to the labor market, political and social participation, and healthcare enable migrants to reach and develop their full potential, to protect their human rights, prevent their marginalization and foster social cohesion and harmonious coexistence (UNHCR, 2014).

2.4 MIPEX Indicators

As the basic areas defined are similar in different empirical researches, this thesis referred to the information provided by MIPEX to attain a solid fact to justify which area is central to migrant integration and which area’s effectiveness fosters integration in other specific areas evaluated by indicators. There 167 indicators under eight policy areas and the first policy area of MIPEX is “labor market mobility”. The index seeks the answer to the question of whether immigrants have equal rights and opportunities to access the labor market and develop their skills in compliance with the dimensions; the right to work, widespread support with training or public services, targeted support addressing the migrants, equal conditions and rights for migrants. The results of MIPEX prove that what works for natives are also valid for migrants to find a job. The on-track programs and work focused introduction courses increase employment by supporting previous vocational training and professions of migrants with work experience (Huddleston et. Al, 2015, p.22).

The second policy area is “family reunion”, the index evaluates the policies and regulations of a state referring to the facility of a family reunion based on eligibility, and conditions of the migrants. While twenty-two countries require basic legal income and standard housing conditions for family reunion, some states dictate additional conditions such as language and other kinds of tests for family members. As family reunion requires access to the labor market for the migrants, in general, the policies of the states cause an unequal impact on “the elderly, young adults, women, the less educated” (Huddleston et. Al, 2015, p.29).
The third area is the “education” and it evaluates how efficient the system is to respond to the needs of the migrants. The level of integration of the migrants into education systems is measured by the rate of access to primary, secondary, vocational or higher education programs and the efficiency of these systems to answer to migrants' needs or intercultural approach. According to the outcomes of the data on migrant education “the most significant factors determining the educational attainment of migrant pupils are their parents' educational background, their language skills, the composition of their school and the general structure and quality of the country's education system” (Huddleston et. Al, 2015, p.36).

“Health” is the fourth area of integration and is concerned with the question of whether the migrants have equal and efficient access to the health system in the host countries (Huddleston et. Al, 2015, p. 39). The entitlements to healthcare coverage, the methods to inform the migrants in their native language about the health system, action plans on migrant health are taken into consideration to determine the level of integration. Migrants are out of the health system due to a lack of basic information on how to access the health system as well as the provision of the host state.

The fifth area is “political participation” of migrants. Most of the migrants have almost no say in policies that directly affects them. The political participation comes with naturalization in general but civil rights such as voting rights, founding political associations and funding for the associations are important scales of political participation of the migrants. The security of “permanent residence” is determined as the sixth indicator on the path to better integration outcomes (Huddleston et. Al, 2015, p. 49). Thus, the indicator considers how restrictive are the policies applied in the path to permanent residence and citizenship in countries and which rights are provided associated with the permanent residency. According to MIPEX, the researchers prove newcomers, refugees, women, less educated and economically disadvantaged groups are significantly disadvantageous in terms of permanent residency requirements (Huddleston et. Al, 2015, p.56).
The seventh area is about the naturalization process of the migrants. “Access to nationality” is directly connected with citizenship policies of the states and they are usually discouraging for the migrants (Huddleston et. Al, 2015, p. 58). Similar to the permanent residence states expect a certain life standard, a basic knowledge of the language and harmonization of the migrants with the culture of the host society. The research displays that language courses and a citizenship course of the states encourage the migrants (Huddleston et. Al, 2015, p.60). The last political indicator is “anti-discrimination”. MIPEX searches countries’ precautions against anti-discrimination, which are granted by laws and structures (Huddleston et. Al, 2015, p.64). The protection of migrants from racial/ethnic, religious, and nationalistic discrimination is crucial to achieving integration.

The MIPEX gives guiding information for achieving a successful integration and displays the interconnection between the areas. It is obvious that the outcomes of each area directly or indirectly influence the success of structural, cultural, social and identificational integration.

2.5 Education as a Part of Integration

Considering the multifaceted and complex feature of integration and also referring to MIPEX data, this thesis justifies that all basic integration areas are related with knowledge and training. As Heckmann previously argued; connecting the migrants to the existing structures of the host society and achieving an interconnection entails a process of acquiring access to the core institutions of the host society such as labor market, education, housing. Likewise learning and socialization is necessary for the migrants to join the new society and to get a placement or status (Heckmann & Schapnner, 2016, p.46).

The learning process of migrant children starts in the school system. For more than a century education has been considered as a cornerstone of modernity and has been complicatedly connected to the development of both the nation and the citizen. In this context, Dewey’s arguments on society and education shed light on our understanding of the importance of education for integration. Dewey (2008) argues that in a
democratic society, all of the institutions must have equal power and coordinate to achieve the integrity and objectives of the society by cooperating with education, which in itself is a social institution. The general statement of Dewey is that the school should be at the center of the social environment as an institution that perpetuates social life because it ensures the transfer of the core culture to the younger generations to sustain the existing circumstances and also to reach a better condition in the future for all (Dewey, 2008). The education as a social phenomenon has no function if a kind of society definition is absent in mind. In that sense the access to education in the school system provides migrant children with all the necessary knowledge to participate in the host society. The schools do not only integrate migrants but also the generations into society, in other words, the schools regenerate the society. When it comes to refugee children the schooling and access to the school systems as fast as possible is essential to their integration. Primarily, the children need to escape their old traumas and adapt to secure and social areas (Dryden-Peterson et al, 2019).

In the case of migration, learning cannot be limited with schools and includes every kind of education and training. It is necessary for every gender, age and profession to be a part of the existing society. The EU action plan states that no matter the time of the arrival of a refugee the successful integration into the society will benefit both the refugee and the individuals of the host society; to achieve a successful integration the keys are training and education therefore granting access to these are of the utmost importance. (European Commission, 2016). There are several courses of actions that can be implemented to obtain the goal of integration and some of these include language comprehension lectures both online and in-person, appropriate trainings to build up their skills for labor market in addition to integration into education from an early age.

In an overview of the World Bank (2015) on measuring integration the active participation of migrants in the labor market considered as an access to public and social life as productive and independent members and also essential to strengthen social cohesion. A major challenge for migrants but specifically for refugees on the way to access in the labor market, at first the lack of linguistic skills and followingly the difference of qualifications and vocational models between the states.
The Settling in 2018 report on migrant integration underlines the necessity of knowledge and skills and that the highly educated always has a greater chance of being in work, regardless of nationality (OECD& European Union, 2018). However, the lack of language skills, lower education level of refugees and the qualification differences between the receiving state and origin state in terms of profession and education system decrease the chance of migrant’s incorporation into the labor market.

In a survey on refugee’s qualifications shows that the overall professional structure and qualifications of refugees was quite diverse and varies in each country (Stoewe, 2018, p.3). Therefore, information courses on the basic educational and vocational structures, additional vocational trainings, placement in apprenticeship to assist to develop current skills of the migrants and language courses related to professions work are major education areas that foster integration to economic life of the society. The entrepreneurship programs which provide information on legal and economic structure of the host society and the main process on how to start a business are another tools of integration which have wide range effects. For instance; the outcomes of UNHCR’s business entrepreneurship project which helps refugees by trainings and technical assistance demonstrates that “refugee-led businesses are generating employment for refugees and members of the local population and are combating discrimination and negative perceptions toward refugees” (Sánchez Piñeiro, 2018).

Learning is not limited with school system and vocational trainings for migrants. The learning process of migrants includes every kind of education and training to socialize every gender, every age and every profession to be a part of the existing society. Language learning, knowledge on basic values, culture and institutions of the host society are significant parts of the learning. In EU member countries executing EC immigration law and the EU Framework on Integration, civic integration courses and tests for non-EU migrants have ever more become part of regulations (Carrera & Wisbrock, 2009). The civic integration courses include various courses on the host society’s culture, history, legal and economic institutions, values and customs. The integration programs which also includes language courses in addition to civic
information are generally followed by examinations on the knowledge as a part of naturalization process.

To sum up, enrollment to compulsory education is only a little part of the integration story, but more importantly secondary schools, higher education, vocational trainings, apprenticeship, entrepreneurship educations, courses to increase the participation to cultural and sport activities, language courses, courses and conversation clubs to increase awareness of migrants on social, political, historical structure of the host society and even maternal educations or reproductive health educations are all essential parts of the education process since they influence other areas of the integration process. Poor language skills, lack of knowledge on host society’s structural operations, and useless certifications prevent refugees from benefiting the opportunities of the host society (Holdaway et. al, 2009). Comprehensive education strategies enable refugees to reach and develop their full potential, to prevent their marginalization, and foster social cohesion and harmonious coexistence.
CHAPTER 3

SWEDEN, GERMANY AND TURKEY’S MIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICIES BEFORE THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS

3.1. Sweden’s Migrant Integration Policies Before the Syrian Refugee Crisis

Sweden was an ethnically homogenous country for a long time ago. During 1930’s the direction of the human flow changed, and Sweden became an immigration country rather than an emigration country. In 1970’s Sweden managed migrant’s social and political concerns, focusing on “a promise of multicultural group rights for migrants in addition to social and political rights” 1980’s the policy developments based on individual rights rather than groups and the framework of Swedish institutional structure changed focusing on “internationalization of Sweden and individualization of Swedish society”. (Soininen,1999, p.685).

In the 2000’s family reunion and asylum migration were the main reasons of the migration flows. Recently, Sweden has a more diversified migrant population due to EU expansion, the global refugees and also labor migrants. Sweden has a large migrant population compared to Swedish population; 9.1 percent of the Swedish population are foreign citizens, and in last five years 701,302 people migrated to Sweden, which refers to 6.8 of the Swedish population. (The Statistical Database of Sweden, n.d) 2019).

3.1.1 Historical Process of Sweden’s Migration And Integration Policies

In general, Sweden is commonly characterized in the international literature as representing a multicultural migration policy comprising “a corporatist policy-making
style, but also a social-democratic universal welfare model” (Soininen, 1999, p.685) and that means the government combines its way of understanding and identification of migration with the needs of migrants.

The history of migration started in Sweden with the merchant trading communities in Middle Ages. However, Sweden was a country that mostly emigrated until the end of the 1930s, in 1930s Swedes flow changed its direction and many Swedish Americans returned to their homeland. Since 1930 Sweden is a “net migrant country” (Dahlström, 2007, p.323). Before 1930s Sweden was a homogeneous society both ethnically, culturally, and religiously until the second half of the twentieth century. Sweden was not seen attractive destination for migrants, because it had a low-level economy and industrial development. In addition, Sweden had a negative attitude towards foreigners and based on ‘One nation, One people, One religion’ motto which dominated the establishment and management of Sweden in early years.

Migration in the post-war years has led to changes in the policy of assimilation and triggered changes afterwards. In the 1940s, the influx of refugees escaping World War II (WW II) dramatically increased migration to Sweden. After the war refugees from Germany and Nordic countries returned while the Baltics refugees remained in Sweden. The regular migration to Sweden started in accordance with the increasing need of workforce for industrial production after the WW II. Although Sweden did not have an official guest-worker policy, in the post war years the demand for labor migrants grew with economic growth. In 1947 Sweden had signed agreements with Austria, Italy and Hungary for the acceptance of foreign workers. Amendments facilitating recruitment and accommodation of foreign workers followed by the agreements with Middle and Eastern European countries. (Borevi, 2014, p.714) In 1954 a free movement agreement put into force between the Nordic countries, as a result it was estimated approximately 550,000 Finnish workers migrated to Sweden (Westin, 2006). Contrarily to other Western states, the Swedish government and the Swedish trade union confederation did not allow cheap labor from abroad. Same level wages with Swedes were paid to foreign workers Swedes and equal rights were granted such as unemployment benefits.
The emergence of migrant policy

After the war with dramatically increasing number of refugees and workers migrated to Sweden, the Swedish government started to give attention to migration issues more significantly. It was obvious that the majority of migrants that moved to Sweden were permanent residents, but migrant policies were not on the agenda yet (Dahlström, 2006, p.15). In that period, lack of language, isolation due to socioeconomic conditions, negative attitudes of major population because of cultural differences was challenging newly arrived migrants (Brannström, 2015, p.42). As a result of increasing migrant problems and the growing fear against insulated foreign groups, the criticism against policies arose. At the beginning of the 1960s migrants and local ethnic groups launched protests which led to permanent changes in migration policy. In 1968 for the first time, Swedish government brought migration policy up for discussion. The government declared that migrants must live under the universal welfare system and with the same conditions as the rest of the population (Borevi, 2014, p.710). The new policy referred to the universalist welfare principles. This welfare state system was defined by equality objective that applies comprehensive benefits and welfare services that were universal for the entire population not only for vulnerable groups (Borevi 2014, p.711). The Swedish government put forward to a clearer position by adopting an integration policy that allows migrant access to society with their linguistic, cultural and religious difference and rejected an assimilationist approach.

During 1970s the acceptance of workers from other countries ended with the beginning of global economic crisis, but immigration to Sweden continued because of family reunifications and asylum seekers from non-European countries. The first non-European refugees Sweden accepted were approximately 1,000 Ugandan Asians expelled in 1972 because of Idi Amin’s Africanization policies, afterwards Chilean refugees and also refugees from other South American states arrived Sweden. In 1980s, increasing oppression of the regimes in fled many Syrian, Iraqi, Iranian and Kurdish refugees to Sweden (Westin, 2006)

The new migration flows led to a significant growth in ethnic and cultural diversity in Sweden. The criticisms increased to review migration policy in the public debate
claiming that the migration policies were lack of equal treatment to all cultural and ethnic groups. In 1974 a committee presented guidelines for migration policies which guided the 1975 goals of Sweden's with three main headlines; equality, freedom of choice and partnership (Borevi, 2014, p.710). In 1975 the Swedish Parliament adopted the Migrant and Minority Policy as the first comprehensive integration policy based on three principles. The policy contained multicultural goals; avoiding assimilation and supporting ethnic identities.

First principle of the policy aimed providing equal rights to migrants to sustain their linguistic, cultural and religious traditions just as the majority (Soininen, 1999, p.687). Second principle freedom of choice meant that migrants in Sweden must be able to choose to what extent an individual is to adopt another cultural identity. The last principle, cooperation meant a cooperation was vital to create a solidarity between migrants and the majority population (Dahlström, 2006, p.21).

The new policy introduced new reforms and social and cultural institutions facilitating ethnic identity formation of minorities and migrants. Culturally, opportunities were available for foreigners to cultivate their own identity such as “support for journals produced in immigrant languages, mother tongue instruction in the public-school system and financial support for ethnic organizations” (Borevi, 2014 p. 711). Economically, migrants and Swedish population were equally enjoying social services and insurances. They both assumed to be part of one collective body, producing and getting an equal share of the welfare produced. Politically, the 1975 policy lowered the time limit for naturalization from seven to five years and eliminated the criteria for the applicants to have the ability to support a family. The Parliament also granted foreign nationals residing in Sweden at least for three years, the right to vote and to run for office in municipal elections with the notion of attaching migrants in the political system (Wickström, 2013, p.119). However, after the increasing criticisms in the early 1980s “the government initiated a radical reconsideration of its position which meant that the more ideologically progressive aspects of its earlier approach were abandoned” (Soininen, 1999, p.689).
In 1980s in general people migrated to Sweden for family reunifications and asylum applications. With the growing number of asylum seekers, Sweden become a main destination for Middle Eastern countries like Iran and Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey. Their main motive to migrate was not to adopt the labor market and naturally not to serve the Swedish welfare system contrarily to earlier migrants. The specific examples of cultural differences with non-Western migrants in gender equality and family life, received more attention in the Swedish society. These factors triggered debate especially on freedom of choice and increased racist and anti-immigration tenors on a level not seen in Sweden since the 1930s (Branström, 2015, p.47). Another major concern in the public debate was about the socioeconomic conditions in Sweden. The divergence between unemployment rates of the migrants and natives was expanding, therefore, the government had to attempt to find solutions to labor market related problems. Indeed, the flow to Sweden was not under the control of the government anymore; labor migrants had been replaced by non-familiar refugees and their dependents.

Less than a decade after the 1975, the government once again established committees to investigate the policies. The report of the committee approved that “the decision of 1975 had lacked discussions about the content, limitations and conditions of freedom of choice” (Dahlström, 2006, p.23). The statement of the committee declared that customs that conflict with Swedish law was unacceptable and freedom of choice was not applicable for “entire forms of living, norms, values, customs and practices” (Soininen, 1999, p.690). The government expressed that basic principles of the Swedish society such as democracy, gender equality, and the rights of children was uncompromising in order to abolish concerns about long term results of migration for Sweden. The freedom of choice in what extent he chooses to adopt a different cultural identity belonged to the individual and public measures target only to meet specific needs of individuals not collective entities groups (Borevi, 2012, p.49).

Another reconsidered scope was the status of the migrants and the minorities. In 1975, the parliament combined the concepts of migrant and minority groups under Migration and Minority Policy. In the middle of 1980s, the migrant and minority policy had been dismantled and renamed only as Migration Policy. Migrant and minority definitions
were clarified. The use of minority term was only reserved for “those groups who have lived in the country for a very long time or always” (Branströmm, 2015, p.48). Thus, migrants “do not have a constitutional entitlement to the kind of group-based rights enjoyed by the native Saami (or Lapps) and the Tornedal Finns of northern Sweden” (Soininen, 1999, p.687). Those regulations brought Sweden’s minority policy into line with existing international guidelines on the minority status.

During the 1980s and early 1990s the development of the socioeconomic equality was also on the agenda of the government. After the changing character of immigration from labor migrants to refugees or family members, finding an answer to the question how to ensure the economic contribution of migrants became more essential for the Swedish government. The programs that aimed to increase productivity of the migrants started in 1980’s. a diversified program containing job training language courses, labor market orientation was launch to increase capability of migrants. To avoid discrimination in the labor market in 1986, the parliament introduced a legal ban against ethnic discrimination, however did not attach any sanctions.

1990s and 2000s integration policy

The social, political and economic situation of Sweden in 1990’s resulted in a review of the migrant issues. The basis of Sweden's current integration policy was set in the 1990s inquiries. The racist rhetoric was rising in political scene against the foreigners as a result of a deep economic crisis and growing unemployment rates.

Hammar (1999) argues that Sweden has always carried out an apolitical tradition on migrant issues, the political parties were unanimous on migrant policy. However, in 1991 Nydemokrati in their election manifesto combined a critique of economic conditions and immigration policy in Sweden and took remarkable percent of the votes. It was considered as the end of the apolitical period in Sweden policy, however, the established parties ousted the populist challenges. In 1994 during the elections the immigration issue occupied ten percent of the debates and only about 2 per cent of the material analyzed. In the 1994 election Nydemokrati only got 1.2 per cent of the votes, which meant the end of the party (Dahlström, 2007).
A general questioning about the Swedish welfare system’s framework and efficiency had already started since 1980s when the economic and financial problems unsettled the strong belief in present planning. The government reassessed the position of state, public sector, the market, its actors and the individuals; and followed a more general ideological shift in a neo-liberal direction (Rothstein, 1998, p.25-26). In 1997, the Social Democrat government initiated a review of migration policy and presented the proposition titled as Sweden, Future and Diversity: from Immigrant policy to Integration Policy (Kılıç, 2017, p.96).

The government was concerned with ethnic and cultural divisions between the members of the Swedish society, instead of the expenses of unproductivity of the migrants. The main objective of the new policy was to support migrants to participate in social life as self-sufficient members of the society. A new migrant policy was proposed to promote equal rights, responsibilities and mutual respects in the Swedish society. The government promoted public measures targeting specific needs of individuals and avoided to treat migrants as collective identities. The authorities abstained from using migrant term especially in defining people born in the country, if mentioning their origin was a necessity “new comers” or softer terms were preferred to use (Brannström, 2015, p.50).

The Swedish Integration Board was established to guarantee equal treatment to individuals regardless of ethnic and cultural origin in terms of rights and obligations. The board, currently renamed as Swedish Migration Agency, was formed to prepare and monitor procedures facilitating the social integration of new comers. In 1995 when Sweden became a member of the European Union (EU), the membership allowed the citizens of other EU states to work and live in Sweden. In 2001 Sweden became a party to Schengen Agreement which allows for free movement of people across all Member States. In May 2004, 10 more countries became members of the EU. Sweden agreed to allow the citizens of the eight new member states to work without a work permit.

The Swedish government stressed nondiscrimination to grant social equality and justice. The government claimed to secure equality and justice, initially they must fight
against the mindset and bias of Swedish society, but the criticism for treating Sweden as a racist state failed the attempt of the government for a while. In 1999, the act in 1994 which prohibits the ethnic discrimination in labor market replaced by a new act. The new act was more comprehensive than the narrow understanding of 1994 act, even indirect negative attitudes toward ethnic or racial identities were recognized as discrimination. (Branströmm, 2015, p.52). Employers and entrepreneurs in the market also had an impact on 1999 regulation. After few years, discrimination against disability and sexual orientations was also prohibited by laws and extended to more areas in daily life.

In 2001 the Act on Swedish Citizenship entailed dual citizenship and enabled a person to keep their old citizenship when becoming a Swedish citizen. In 2002 the Confederation of Entrepreneurs published a report that mentions the negative influences of the restrictive migration policy towards third-country citizens on the economy and demanded employers to be included in work permit process (Bucken-Knapp et. al, 2019, p.225). The new regulations against discrimination were also implemented in education. The government also attempted to avoid discrimination in schools. In 2001 the laws reinforced equal treatment of students and in 2003 prohibition of direct and indirect discrimination took effect (Kılıç, 2017, p.95).

Sweden’s integration approach has been commonly defined as a multicultural integration model in the literature (Borevi, 2014; Castles & Miller, 2009). Changing legislations, changing global context and migration influenced the policies and it was assumed as negative influences that led to restrictions and compromises on the values of multiculturalism and diversity approach of Sweden (Wiesbrock, 2011). Although there have been deviations on the generous approach, Sweden has achieved to protect the basic framework. Provision of certain citizenship rights has been considered as a priority that affects integration of migrants to welfare state and social structure.

The comprehensive reform on 2010 introduced changes to the existing integration system. The Fact Sheet on integration declared by the Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality (the Ministry was dissolved in 2014), defined the aim of integration policy of Sweden as “equal rights, obligations and opportunities for all, regardless of
ethnic or cultural background. The policy goals are to be achieved mainly through general measures for the whole population, regardless of country of birth or ethnic background” (Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality, 2009). To attain the main goal, a general roadmap was designed based on significant areas to work on. These areas were defined as faster introduction of migrants, promoting employment and entrepreneurship, equality in education, improving language skills and adult education, effective anti-discrimination measures, common basic values to support diversity, development of urban areas to reduce social exclusion (Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality, 2009).

In 2010 the government nationalized integration at state level and limited the previously decentralized integration policies to the municipalities. Recently, integration in Sweden is worked by different ministries and agencies; each minister and government agency are authorized within its respective area to reach their integration objectives. One of the most prominent institutions in the process of migration is the Ministry of Employment that is responsible for integration in the labor market, and its Swedish Public Employment Service is responsible of individual introduction plans. The municipalities are also in charge to increase the integration of migrants, in terms of education, accommodation and social services.

Sweden was ranked as the first state in the MIPEX (2015bX) ranking between 38 countries. According to the policies and laws offers targeted solutions to better serve a multicultural society. Compared to other European countries, the policies are considered as successful to respond migrants need and in law they have the same rights given to native citizens in economic, social, family and democratic life.

Despite all this effort, the results were obtained that integration was not successful in the manner envisaged. According to Wiesbröck (2011), a deep chasm has formed between migrants and Swedes in business life in Sweden. During the 2013 riots in Sweden started after a migrant shot to death by police that gap was seen as the major motivation. In Sweden most migrants made up a large majority of the unemployed population. Generally, the areas where the migrants live are relatively far from the city
center, therefore isolation of migrants increases while participation into society become limited.

3.1.2 Sweden’s Asylum and Refugee Policy

Swedish policy making on asylum seekers and refugees is one the typical examples structured around the welfare state principle. Sweden deals with refugees with a system including various public structures following a developed program for the reception of refugees. The main purpose of the policy summed as “to contribute as efficiently as possible to efforts aiming at reducing both the conditions creating refugees and the difficulties for those who have been forced to migrate” (Ring, 1995, p.160). At the international level, Sweden considered as one of the active contributors to efforts of the UN and other organizations. Sweden became a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol.

The flow of refugees after the WWII, reinforced Sweden’s status as an immigration country. After the war Sweden had an open policy for refugees from Germany, Nordic and Baltic countries. Many of the refugees returned their homes but most of refugees from Baltic countries stayed in Sweden. In 1940s during the recovery period of economy, the increasing need of workforce for industrial production after the Second World War led an active recruitment of foreign labor. In that period labor not only from Scandinavia but also from Italy, Turkey, Greece and Eastern Europe started to migrate to Sweden. Generally, migration of workers was organized by labor market authorities, but people also found opportunities to arrive Sweden on their own (Swedish Migration Agency, n.d).

At the end of the 1960s Sweden introduced a regulated migration for those who came to Sweden to work. In 1969 the Swedish Immigration Board was found to work on both integration and migrant issues (Swedish Migration Agency, n.d). The Immigration Board and labor market cooperated to manage the assessments; only people who had a permit for both employment and residence could come to Sweden and only if Sweden needed foreign workers the permit would be granted. A regulated labor market assessment for foreigners had an exception for the citizens of Nordic
countries, refugees and the family members of migrants (Ring, 1995, p.162). The Nordic countries’ members already had a right for employment and residence in all Nordic states since 1951 (Swedish Migration Agency, n.d). These regulations decreased the number of non-Nordic workers, but on the other hand increased the immigration of non-Nordic family members. The labor demand decreased in the following years with the global economic crisis and in 1970s labor immigration was stopped. However, the refugees escaping from wars and political crisis started to increase in that period, and most of the admitted refugees joined the labor force and contributed to Swedish market since 1970. Ugandan Asians were the first non-European refugees of Sweden (Westin, 2006).

In 1975 the Migrant and Minority Policy as the first comprehensive integration policy based on three principles, equality, freedom of choice and partnership principles was introduced to migrant policy. The policy assumed the refugees had a permanent right to stay as immigrants (Ring, 1995, p.163).

The number of asylum seekers from Middle East and Africa began to increase all over the European countries, which soon followed by the former Eastern Bloc countries. Therefore, in 1985 new principles and regulations were introduced in Sweden as a response to increasing asylum applications. The process of reception was totally delegated to the Swedish Immigration Board. Each of the municipalities of Sweden had to act in a collaboration with the Immigration Board. It was defined that; the municipalities would be funded in accordance with how many refugees they receive. The municipalities could be refunded for the expenditures of housing, language education and integration of refugees to local communities (Borevi, 2014). The reception system which still continues to welcome the asylum seekers and place them in reception centers and after their permission municipalities are responsible for language education, placement in school, training and helping to find a job.

In the mid-90s main source of the migration issues was the consequences of the collapse of the communist regimes. After the breakdown of Yugoslavia, a human flow fleeing to Sweden had started. Over 100,000 people, mostly Bosnians escaped from ethnic cleansing and the war. In 1992, totally 84,000 people migrated from former
Yugoslavia, sought asylum in Sweden. Sweden also participated in the joint action of the UN to evacuate 3,600 Kosovo Albanians from Macedonia to Sweden and provided a temporary protection (Swedish Migration Agency, 2019). In 1993, the government took a controversial decision that 40,000 Bosnians would be granted a permanent residency in Sweden but initially they had to apply for a visa. The decision led to debates blaming government to accept ethnic cleansing and contradicting to humanitarian principles of the Swedish policy. According to the opposition, the Bosnians could be granted to reside temporarily just to secure their lives. Nevertheless, the government maintained to reduce the possibilities for asylum just like the other European countries taking exclusive measures on asylum seekers.

During 1990’s the only motivation was not persecution but other than humanitarian reasons for the newcomers, people with future concerns and desire of a better life migrated to Sweden. However the financial difficulties of Sweden, in 1990s, resulted in racist rhetoric, activity, and violence raging in the country against the growing population of foreigners. The migrants and refugees were not welcomed anymore because of increasing unemployment and increasing expenses of them, therefore, the rate of rejected applications reached 90 percent (Wilton, 2004, p.7). Between 1991-1994 the center-right coalition government and after 1994 the Social Democratic government made efforts to produce solutions for refugee issues. In 1991 when the non-socialist government took power after the social democrats, initially made a change stressing the individual need for protection to grant asylum and revoked the restrictive conditions implied by the previous Social Democrat government to stay in Sweden. The government in December 1991 decided to grant asylum to applicants who could not stay according to the procedures of 1989. The main aim was to activate and encourage arrived people for the ways of supporting themselves rather than being a burden on the state. Minister of Immigration followed liberal attitude focusing on humanitarian dimensions and introduced reforms to strengthen the incentives of refugees to re-enter the labor market instead of using social benefits (Hammar, 1999).

In 1992 an Appeal Board was established in order to speed up the process in asylum applications and to decrease work load of the government. The appeal of a refused applicant was an ordinary process assessed by the government, and during that period
the appeals had reached to ten thousand. In 1997, reunification of the families was restricted with new provisions. In 1999 the EU declared a common asylum and migration policy for the member states which also binds Sweden as a member of the EU.

There are remarkable legislative, judicial and executive reforms introduced in 2000s. The 2005 Aliens Act (2005:716) issued in September 2005, contained regulations on conditions of entry, work, residence of foreigners. The act provided two main forms of protection; Geneva Convention refugee and subsidiary protection. As defined in 1951 Geneva Convention, refugee status given to individuals fleeing because of fear of persecution on grounds of race, nationality belief and in addition of national provision because of gender, sexual orientation. Person otherwise in need of protection was individual;

1) feels a well-founded fear of suffering the death penalty or being subjected to corporal punishment, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 2) needs protection because of external or internal armed conflict or, because of other severe conflicts in the country of origin, feels a well-founded fear of being subjected to serious abuses or 3) is unable to return to the country of origin because of an environmental disaster. (Aliens Act 2005:716, Chapter 4)

The Aliens Act contained additional forms of protection, known as humanitarian protection for extraordinary circumstances.

In 2005, Swedish Migration Agency started to reassess the cases of almost 30,000 asylum seekers with the refusal of entry but could not leave Sweden, in accordance with provisional act of the Swedish Parliament (Swedish Migration Agency, 2019). In 2006 the Appeal Board replaced by three Migration Courts and one Migration court of appeal to evaluate the appeals of the Migration Agency’s decision. In the same year, the municipalities became also responsible for accommodation of unaccompanied minors. In 2010, the context of the right of asylum seekers to work was expanded.

In Sweden asylum seekers have been enabled to work but they have to obtain a certificate that states they are exempted from the requirement to have a work permit (Swedish Migration Agency, n.d). A refugee who has been granted a temporary
residence permit also have the right to work in Sweden. If the temporary permit expires the refugees can apply for a permanent residence permit. Refugees have been offered an individual introduction plan that includes basic Swedish language training, vocational trainings, access to the labor market services. All asylum seekers receive an invitation to a free and voluntary health assessment after applying for asylum in Sweden. It is guaranteed that the health assessment wouldn’t affect application for asylum. In addition to initial health assessment, all asylum seekers are entitled to get emergency healthcare and dental care (Swedish Migration Agency, 2019).
Figure 1: Sweden’s Migrant Integration Policies Before the Syrian Refugee Crisis
3.1.3 Migrant Education in Sweden

Sweden has a decentralized education system, (EURYDICE, 2019) which means the government is the overall authority while the municipalities are responsible for organizing education (Lundhal, 2019, p.2). Sweden, in addition to EU law that mandates to allow children to attend compulsory school within three months of their arrival, limits that period within one month. The students, as quick as possible transferred to regular classes after a limited period in welcome classes, to prevent exclusion.

The officially declared purpose of the Swedish education system is to provide the same opportunities for migrant children that Swedish children has. Sweden offers a comprehensive system at the aim of the lifelong learning and access to the labor market. The Swedish Education Act, aims “to protect children and students from discrimination and degrading treatment pre-schools, schools and adult education programs are responsible for enforcing prohibitions against discrimination and degrading behavior, and for promoting equal treatment.” (“Education in Sweden”, n.d.)

The education starts 6 in preschool classes or earlier, then followed by the compulsory school between the ages seven and sixteen. The preschools are free and in some cosmopolitan cities preschools specifically target foreign born children to teach Swedish. (Rydin et al, 2012, 196).

At the age of fifteen, students choose or receive recommendations for different programs within secondary education Upper secondary school for three years are optional and include eighteen national programs; students can choose one of the twelve vocational programs or six preparatory programs for higher education at universities or colleges (Society, 2019). After vocational upper schools’ students can enroll to higher vocational education provided by state universities, colleges, municipalities, or independent education providers (EURYDICE, 2019) In other words all programs provide access to higher education, students that continued with vocational programs at the age of fifteen often enter a form of postsecondary vocational education at the age of eighteen. The enrollment rates are quite high for refuges even in secondary
schools. Swedish as Second Language (SSL) is offered in for students up to age 18 to increase language skills of refugee children and head teacher decides which students need to follow SSL (Rydin et al. 2012, p.196). The fact that second language education is also offered in upper-secondary schools. It is particularly important for refugee children who come at age twelve or later.

In Sweden, refugee children have equal educational rights at all levels of education as Swedish children and higher education is tuition free for refugees as Swedish students. Asylum seeking children, however, are not offered for free high education and they are entitled to education in regular schools. Within a month they are placed in elementary or upper secondary schools. In general, for a period (previously maximum three years) new arrivals were placed in introductory classes separated from regular classes at the schools

Contrarily, the reports on migrant education of Sweden continuously has been underlining the shortcomings of the Sweden education system referring foreign born students education. OECD reports strongly warns Sweden government to input necessary precautions to prevent growing ethnic inequalities are probably in education systems (OECD, 2017). The disadvantageous socioeconomic position of migrants certainly assessed as the main reason for inequalities in education system. Nonetheless, in general, “Sweden has a comprehensive support model, provides continuous support to the development of linguistic skills, teaching support and assistance in transferring students to higher levels of education. Intercultural learning is mainstreamed into education”.(EU Publications, 2013)

3.2 Germany’s Migrant Integration Policies Before the Syrian Refugee Crisis

Most of its history Germany officially rejected to be a country of immigration and ignored being a destination for millions of foreigners (Green, 2013). The refusal of being an immigrant country precipitated to a failure of comprehensive policies for migration and integration. German government’s initiatives to produce policies for foreigners and their integration generally had been generally reactive and did not serve permanent solutions for the problems. Uncertain status of resident migrants and their generations sustained for many years, conjointly with the lack of integration policies.
Finally, in 2005 after decades Germany formally internalized the notion of being a country of immigration. In 2018, almost 20.8 million people in Germany had a migrant background, 10.9 million of the population are foreigners (DESTATIS, 2019).

3.2.1. Historical Process of Germany’s Migration And Integration Policies

Germany is one of the most remarkable examples that its political agenda had been strongly shaped by a blood-based type of national self-understanding; its migration regime based on 1913 Nationality Law which belongs to Wilhelmine period (Howard, 2008). German Empire, which had not standardized citizenship laws declared the first national common law related to citizenship called “The Nationality Law of the German Empire and States” in 1913. The law was based on pure jus sanguinis in other words law of blood, in which defines “the citizenry more consistently as a community of descent” (Brubaker, 1992, p.115). The main point of the citizenship law was to create a homogeneous society, as Brubaker argued the laws “marked the nationalization” and contributed to “ethnicization of German citizenship” (Brubaker, 1992, p.114). Correspondingly, the migration policy aimed to prevent the naturalization of non-ethnic Germans and facilitate the immigration and naturalization of ethnic Germans living abroad.

After the collapse of the Weimar Republic and with the rise of national socialism in Germany, Nazis exploited the laws on national belonging to gain power. From the start of their potency, Nazis defined the nation as “a genetic, biological entity, then it is only logical that membership of it may be transferred only via blood, the purity of which may best be maintained through ius sanguinis” (Green 2004, p.29). The separation of ethnic groups and strong emphasize on German blood on one hand victimized its own citizens, on the other hand embraced the Germans living abroad.

Period after WWII

Post war period triggered the historic transition from emigration to immigration for all European states, which had profound effects on the economy politics and cultures of the receiving states, of course on Germany (Bade, 2003, p.217). At the end of the WWII Germany was divided into four zones and in the Western zone the Federal
Republic of Germany (West Germany), in the Eastern Zone the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) were founded. Millions of Germans were officially expelled to East and West leaving their homes behind. Their political, economic and social characteristics were essentially different from the Western Germany’s natives and therefore, Germany had to a striking challenge in integrating the newcomers. This challenge in terms of integration not only shaped the new republic’s citizenship law, but also created the legacy of providing a sanctuary for ethnic Germans from territories which had never belonged to Germany (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009).

Article 116 of the Basic Law clearly recognized full membership of expellees to German state, and assured equality between expellees and German resident. In 1953 the Federal Expellee Law expanded the categories of the persons who were defined as expellee. The Basic Law ensured that all ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe could immigrate to Germany and receive citizenship. Basic Law provided a broad definition of ethnic German that; “someone who acknowledge himself to belong to the German people in so far as this acknowledgement can be confirmed through such specific characteristics as descent, language, upbringing and culture” (Koppenfels, 2002, p.103).

Contrarily to the initial concerns, afterwards the differences did not solidify divisions between the new arrivals and residing Germans. Politically, socially and economically Germany handled a rapid and remarkably successful process of integration of the immigrant groups. From the beginning of the migration, refugees and expellees took advantage of full and equal citizenship. Being part of the society and the citizenship provisions fostered the integration process of newcomers.

**Recruitment Period and Guest Workers**

After the economic recovery of the Federal Republic of Germany, to fulfill the labor shortages the government took actions to recruit foreign workers temporarily. Cheap labor was necessary to sustain the economic recovery and to keep the inflation low. While welcoming the guest workers there was a lack of guide policy towards guest workers and recruitment process because they were considered as temporary guests. In 1955, West Germany signed the first labor recruitment treaty with Italy, which
became a model for later agreements. Later on, guest workers from Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, and the former Yugoslavia arrived due to signed recruitment agreements. The guest workers policy was structured on a temporarily. Workers were expected to stay in Germany to work for a limited period and go back to their homeland. Contrarily, the process did not match the expectations and most guest workers decided to stay in Germany and were joined by their families.

The German government adopted The Act on Foreigners to regulate the entry, residence, work and exits of foreigners in the first place. However, the Act did not specifically address the questions on family reunification or social and political rights of foreigners. The new act used flexible and blurred terms on the issue to guarantee the interests of German government while granting a residence permit for foreign workers (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009, p. 93).

As a result of the economic crisis in 1970’s the federal government enforced a recruitment ban on guest workers in 1973. However, a sharp increase in foreign population occurred because remaining guest workers were joined by their families. Although Germany did not make other adjustments for the admission of the foreigners after the recruitment ban in 1973 other admission paths to access Germany was discovered. Germany had over time, received far more applications for refugee status than any other country in Europe (Hess & Green, 2005, p.318). In addition, Return Assistance Act to encourage guest workers to financially to send them back actually did not work, only a slight drop was observed in total numbers.

The German government’s defensive response to the challenges of increasing foreign population negatively influenced its ability to build a positive attitude. This failure in managing the migration of foreign workers and their families was explained by Bade (2001) as “ethno-national thinking and jus sanguinis tradition had severely retarded the general course of development” (as cited in Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009). The guest worker recruitment resulted in conflicting arguments for Germany; on one hand foreign workers were necessary for the future of Germany, on the other hand Germany was not a land of immigration (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou; 2009, p.98).
At the end of the Recruitment period, West Germany realized the continuing presence of foreigners in the country and started to produce formal methods.

The Act on Foreigners of 1990 assured legal certainty for migrants residing in Germany and restricted migration of non-Europeans. The Act on Foreigners of 1990 also contained positive resolutions on spousal and family reunification and on legal rights and naturalization for second-generation immigrants. The children of foreigners born in Germany obtained a temporary residence permit, naturalization was simplified for immigrants who had been legally residing in Germany for a period of fifteen years as well as for second generation. (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2005, p.114).

**Post-Cold War period**

In the post-Cold War period a massive human flow emerged and approximately, 1.4 million ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union moved to (West) Germany, between 1989 and 1993, in addition 1.2 million asylum applications were lodged between 1990 and 1993, with over 438,000 arriving in 1992 alone to Germany (Hess & Green; 2016, p.321). The situation was an obvious ‘migration crisis’ and a significant turning point in policy priorities. Three foremost flows to Germany after the fall of the Iron Curtain emerged. Firstly, unification of West and East Germany; secondly, immigration of ethnic Germans after the collapse of the Soviet Union and thirdly the increasing asylum applications due to the war in former Yugoslavia led millions of people to move to Germany.

The citizens of East Germany and millions of ethnic Germans previously living in the Soviet Union territories were not perceived as a threat to the national identity because they had always fulfilled German citizenship due to Basic Law. However, Germany was not tolerant to an increase in the foreign population with Yugoslavs fleeing to their country as well as the other refugees and asylum seekers. Since the asylum seekers enjoyed benefits, many of Germans was concerned about exploitation of generous asylum benefits, they thought overwhelming majority were not genuine refugees. This point of view resulted in violence against the asylum seekers (Schuster, 2003).
During 1990s the EU policies also contributed to German migration policy agenda. In November 1993, Maastricht Treaty took effect with increasing institutional relationships and later on, the Amsterdam Treaty reinforced the fundamental normative guidelines governing the EU. The treaty of Amsterdam have marked a more general turning point in the EU’s approach to immigration and asylum (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2005, p.219). The EU process shifted migration policies towards a more liberal point and encouraged harmonization for Germany.

Another remarkable point to be considered for German migration policy in post-Cold War era was the elections in 1998. The new government removed the idea that Germany was not a land of immigration with a new draft of citizenship law. The new government softened the restrictive attitude of Germany with severe reformations. The German Nationality Act put into effect and brought three major changes. Firstly, the reforms added an inclusion of jus soli (law of birth) for the foreigners born in Germany, secondly, offered easier requirements for naturalization for foreigners and thirdly allowed dual citizenship for foreign children (Howard, 2008, p.49). However, the proposal of dual citizenship caused hostile reactions defending the dual citizenship would prevent integration of the foreigners.

Germany is “a country of immigration”

In 2000 a debate on recruitment of high skilled workers concluded with a comprehensive reform of Germany’s migration policy. The lack of skilled workers in IT sector expanded to a legal framework and totally changed Germany’s self-definition. The government called for an independent Commission which lately published its report declaring Germany is an immigration country and serious efforts to foster the integration of foreigners is necessary (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009, p.210). After the negotiations the Migration Act entered into force in 2005. For the first time, the focal point was long-term permanent residency and integration. The principle of integration contained an obligation to learn the German language and to know, and to respect the laws of Germany. In other words, Germany has altered its immigration law by asking every migrant to adapt to German culture before being able to become a German citizen and introduced “Leitkultur” (leading culture) term in
German politic agenda (Orgad, 2010, p.70). Following the debates of incompatibility of Islam and Western -Christian German culture, in 2006, the German Islam Conference initiated the first dialogue between representatives of the government and of Muslims communities in Germany to expand the religious and social involvement of the Muslim population. (Dobbernack, 2017, p.11)

Germany, because of the state’s ethnic centered nation understanding resisted to accept foreigners as a part of the society and include them to social, political and cultural institutions. Therefore, Germany was classified as an exclusionist ethnic nation state and sustained policies excluding foreigners from the German society (Castles, 1993, p.5). Currently, Germany considers the integration of migrants as one of the crucial duties of the home affairs policy and aims to integrate all individuals into the society with necessary rights and duties. The formal perspective of Germany stresses participation of the migrants in social, economic and cultural areas with equal rights and opportunities as the crucial feature of integration. In order to achieve that kind of integration “people who come to Germany intending to stay must learn the German language and acquire basic knowledge of our history and our legal system, in particular the significance of Germany’s free and democratic order, the party system, the federal structure, the welfare system, equal rights, tolerance and religious freedom” (The Federal Ministry of Interior Building and Community, n.d.). Germany officially states that foreigners’ effort to integrate and respect the rules of the host country is essential for the progress. That approach brought Germany also in line with assimilationist approach which adopts a vertical hierarchy dominated by the receiving country and positions the minority group at a lower level of the hierarchy.

According to the MIPEX indicators Germany’s overall score is 61 over 100 and its ranking is 10 among 38 countries which means the rank is above the average of Western European States. Due to indicators Germany “had the right political, economic and social conditions to experiment, evaluate and expand new ambitious integration policies… integration policies have benefited and arguably contributed to its rising employment rates” (MIPEX, 2015c). However, ongoing progress needs improvements made on defined political areas. The effectiveness of Germany’s integration policies is below the success of other European states such in education,
political participation and family reunion. There are also other problematic areas such as naturalization process, dual citizenship and limited access to health services of asylum seekers.

3.2.2 Germany’s Asylum and Refugee Policy

After the Second World War the new German Republic was found as a social state, erected on democratic and liberal values with social provisions supported by a strong but limited state authority. The Basic Law of the Republic aimed to ensure rights not only to German citizens but also to foreigners and stateless persons. In order to become a safe place for all who were politically persecuted, under the Article 16 (2)2 of the Basic Law it was sentenced that “persons persecuted for political reasons enjoy the right of asylum” (Schuster, 2003, p.117). Germany had a wide interpretation of political persecution. However, the ethno-cultural expressions of the German understanding of membership influenced the policy on refugees and asylum seekers. From the beginning of 1970s to the end of 1990s the policies proved that “refugee” term was reserved for ethnic Germans and “non German refugees were designated asylum seekers or most commonly Asylants which has a clearly humiliating meaning” (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009, p.141). Refugees and asylum seekers “were disparaged systematically and polemically through the pejorative and defamatory” (Bade, 2003, p.269). Actually, similar to the German government’s initiatives to produce policies for immigrants, the asylum policies were not strategical and used as a political card by political parties. It is obvious that all legal regulations binding asylum seekers and refugees took effect in close dates to election schedules.

During the post war period, refugee issue was easy to manage, because the newcomers were not foreigners but ethnic Germans. However, the Cold war fled the third-country nationals to Germany and influenced the direction of asylum policy. The first German asylum decree in 1953 based on only the Geneva Convention, not the Basic Law. In 1965 the new Aliens Act referred to Article 16 (2), however the legal practice continued limited by the Geneva Convention's exclusion of refugees. Although asylum seekers were globally increasing, Germany realized that the increasing asylum applications was used an entrance ticket to Germany by migrants after the end of
foreign labor recruitment. In 1977, the first increase of the number of applicants from outside Europeans, doubled in 1978 and peaked in 1980 at 92,000 after the military coup in Turkey (Bosswick 2000, p.46).

In 1978, a law for the acceleration of asylum proceedings to control the numbers of asylum seekers came into effect and restricted the possibilities of appeal. In 1980, during the election campaigns asylum became an important headline. The opposition accused the government, ignoring the abuse of the right to asylum, government pushed a second acceleration which restricted the mobility of rejected asylum seekers to one federal state (Bosswick 2000, p.47). The second acceleration law led a notable decrease in numbers in 1981. In 1982, the new asylum regulations replaced the procedural regulations of the 1965 Aliens Act and the acceleration laws. The procedure aimed reducing the high application numbers through classification; those applications coming from a safe third country could be concluded with deportation.

The early 1990s was the runner of new economic social and political pressures for Germany. Reunification, the collapse of Soviet Union and war in Yugoslavia escalated the foreign population in Germany; the number of asylum seekers was at the peak in 1992. Unfortunately, inefficient management and lack of solutions towards the refugee crisis ended up with violence against foreigners. The reason behind the violence and increasing tension was the discourse in the political area. German far right insisted that people had to take their own action because the government repeated that solution was not possible according to the basic regulations (Schuster, 2003).

The violence and the reaction of the foreigners forced the government to take actions, political parties finally agreed on a regulation, in particular on a compromise amending the Basic Law’s Article 16 (2). First of all, the asylum appeals would not be possible for those from Germany’s neighbor states and from the list of ‘safe states’, if they did not have acceptable reasons. Secondly, immigration of ethnic Germans was limited, naturalization of foreigners facilitated. Thirdly, the refugees from war zones would be under temporary protection status, however, it could not be applied due to financial reasons (Boswick 2000, p.55).
In 1993 the government added a new asylum procedure accompanied the constitutional amendment. In addition to a special procedure at the airports introduced that if applicants did not have valid documents, they would not be allowed to leave the airport. An asylum seeker had to wait for months before the expulsion. According to the statistics between 1993 and 1999, only 17,058 applications were filed at German airports, 14,307 of which went through the regular asylum procedure and only 14 asylum seekers were recognized in the special airport procedure (Bosswick, 2000, p.57). Germany also involved in the EU migration policies from the beginning. In 1992, the Schengen and Dublin agreements regulated asylum issues. The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and following Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 summarized asylum and migration issues on intergovernmental level. German followed three main actions at the EU level, “harmonization of the right to asylum, border control and readmission, and burden sharing within the EU” (Bosswick, 2000, p.54).

In 2005, the Residence Act regulated conditions and requirements of residence in Germany in line with a single permit directive of the EU. Single permit is mandatory for third-country nationals to work and to benefit from equal rights. However, the requirements for a work permit differs for asylum seekers and refugees. An asylum seeker can only seek for a job in 3 months after the entrance to Germany and not allowed to be employed during the stay in reception center. In some cases, the finalization of an asylum application requires 24 months of duration for asylum seekers. After the waiting period in reception center an asylum seeker can apply for a job, if only the job position doesn’t decrease the employment chances of natives (Hamann, 2015)

To sum up, migration is one of the key issues that led to transformation of all Europe; Germany are among the few of instances that had experienced a remarkable demographic and political transformation. The approach of German policies toward the foreigners is between liberal motives in laws and conservative nation state perspective. The regulations on the ‘others’ were the outcomes of the struggle between the bureaucracy and liberal opinion makers on the public discourse. The “leading culture” approach dominates the integration policies of Germany.
Germany’s Migrant Integration Policies Before the Syrian Crisis

Figure 2: Germany’s Migrant Integration Policies Before the Syrian Refugee Crisis
3.2.3 Migrant Education in Germany

Germany has already a dual education system. On one side designs a path through academic learning. On the other side pave a road, that is more wide than the other road, vocational training is offered for all students in Germany. Because of the Federal structure of Germany, in each 16 states the education policies and quality can vary both for natives and migrants. Due to the European regulations a refugee child should enroll to school in three months. In Germany, this period generally takes more time, if the process of status definition is not ended in Germany, children cannot attend to school (Bloch et. al, 2015). During the time in reception centers, refugees attend obligatory German language courses.

In Germany preschool is not compulsory and in each federal state the procedures and costs are changing for preschool education. Some states give importance to attendance of refugee children in preschools to minimize the adoption risk in elementary schools. However, in most of the other federal states children are included in the school system with elementary education (Crul et. al, 2017). Compulsory education is between ages of 6-16 in Germany in general, in some states ends in 15. In Germany foreign children starts the school in a welcome class or international class before the transferring to regular classes. In some schools it takes four years to transfer to a regular class and causes a segregation in the school system. The foreign children could not adapt the regular system and the situation led isolation.

In some Federal states German as a second language classes are provided to support language skills of students. The provision of second language classes also varies in different Federal States of Germany. Therefore, there is no standard curriculum, schedule, materials and efficient instructors for teaching Germany as a second language.

After the primary school at an early age, children choose the type of school for the continuing education. In general teachers make a recommendation on student’s school performance. However, the quality of vocational schools is not standard in Germany. It is considered that low quality schools are more suitable for a for refugees because of their low qualities and lack of language and a small rate of
German natives attend that low-quality schools (Bloch et al. 2015). In the detailed studies about migrant education the most highlighted problem of the German education system is early tracking (Cruz et al. 2017; Bloch et al. 2015; MIPEX, 2015a). At the end of the compulsory education the students are supposed to take up vocational apprenticeship. The mid-level or poor level education of schools that refugees attend, and low language skills put migrants in a disadvantageous position compared to their national peers to be selected for apprenticeship. The apprenticeship and vocational training are significant components of German labor system. The access to the labor market and to be employed in a steady job is possible with apprenticeship and vocational training. For the refugees who arrived to Germany during at the ages of secondary school the situation becomes more complicated as they are uninformed about the system. In other words, the foreign students are “excluded” in low quality vocational trainings ends up with low skilled jobs. But the system needs low skilled workers, and refugees are the best solution in German perception.

In Germany the refugees have right to enroll universities, however, the lack of language skills is the main obstacle for refugees to register at German universities. During the registration of international students, the universities demand a high school diploma equivalent to German education or documentation to prove qualification of their academic skills and an advanced level of German (“University Entrance Qualification”, n.d) The universities as much as possible provides language education for refugees. In addition, most of the federal states in Germany offer vocational training for students who cannot reach required levels of German.

In addition to school system Germany offers integration courses for foreigners. The integration courses are similar to school system. The classes of the course offer German language courses and orientation courses on history, culture and legal system of Germany. Third-country nationals those who intend to stay in Germany enrolls to those courses after an assessment exam. Also, for asylum seekers the accommodation centers offer language courses during the evaluation period of the asylum application.
In brief, Germany represents a compensatory support model. The system offers gives “linguistic support, parental involvement and intercultural education, but these are not as strongly present as in the comprehensive model”. (EU Publications, 2013)

3.3 Turkey’s Migrant Integration Policies Before the Syrian Refugee Crisis

Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, Turkey was an important destination for international migration and had to manage various mass human influxes. Turkey’s political patterns have been transformed related with internal and external the changes. However, Turkey managed these process since the last century with the lack of a basic and comprehensive politics document on migration issues for Turkey (İçduygı, Erder& Gençkaya, 2014, p.11).

3.3.1 Historical Process of Turkey’s Migration and Integration policies

In the first years of the Republic’s foundation, the population renewed with significant emigration as a result of an international population exchange. Many developments, such as the Cold War, globalization and Turkey's accession process to the European Union, have affected the national and international environment and caused significant changes in the profile of migrants and asylum seekers arriving to Turkey. Turkey is not only a country of migration and emigration, but also has become a migration transit country for foreign citizens who wish to migrate to other countries. As a major emigration country, Turkey had to face challenges caused by changes in the global environment and changing profile of migration, and reviewed its migration policies in the 2000’s. The review of the migration policies resulted with a significant transition “from long- established policies, which were mostly formulated through the lens of nationalism, to new liberal ones that have been partly affected by Turkey’s engagement with global dynamics and its involvement in European Union affairs.” (İçduygı & Aksel, 2013, p.170).

Nation Building of the Turkish Republic

Before addressing the migration policies of the Republic of Turkey, it would be useful to look over at the migration and settlement policies of the Ottoman Empire. Although institutional and structural sustainability between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish
Republic was beside the point, it was possible to address the sustainability about ideological and mental basis of the migration policy (Kale, 2015, p.167).

In the late nineteenth century, increasing wars and ethnic conflicts which led to forced migrations and pushed millions of people into Ottoman territories, visibly affected and transformed the Ottoman Empire politically, economically, socially and demographically (Kale, 2015, p.155). Nationalism damaged Ottoman Empire’s cosmopolitan structure and started a transition from a religiously and ethnically diversified nation to a homogenous nation based on Muslim identity. The increasing influence of nationalism became more apparent with the emergence of homogeneous nation states in the Balkans which tries to build their homogeneity based on religion. Various ethnic populations such as Macedonians, Bosnians were considered as Turks and forced to migrate from new nation states such as Serbia and Greece to inner Ottoman territories (Kale, 2015, p.158). The increase of Muslim population firstly nurtured Islamism, with nationalist movements and the dissolutions in the Arabian Peninsula, Turkism took the most effective place in the political arena, especially during the nation state building process and migration policies of the Turkish republic. A state-led migration management started at the last years of Ottoman Empire and continued in the early years of Turkish Republic with a main concern; homogenization of the population. The changes were essentially continued with “(i) the emigration of non-Muslim populations, mainly Armenians and Greeks, from Anatolia, (ii) the immigration of Turkish Muslim populations, especially from the Balkan countries” (İcduygu & Aksel, 2013, p.170).

The efforts for managing the migration and settling migrants continued after the foundation of the new Turkish Republic in 1923. At the emergence of the Turkish Republic migration policy was a principal tool of nation building and national integrity process (Erdoğan, 2015; Çağaptay, 2002). It is clear that all developments and definitions during this period and the regulations took effect about migrants would be effective later in the formation of both Turkey’s international migration policies and civil code of the new state. During the independence process of Turkey, traumatic events such as war, internal and external migrations, and loss of educated and working population interrupted the production potential of the country. Therefore, the priority
of the new state in this period was sustainability of production and the reestablishment of everyday life in the cities. The structure of the cities except Istanbul had changed economically, socially and culturally with the migration flows and “cosmopolitan urban culture” where different ethnic and religious groups live vanished. (İçduygu et. al, 2014).

Two major forced migration practices in the early part of the Republic were agreements of reciprocity in the West and deportation and forced resettlements after the rebellions in the East. The Convention concerning the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations was signed in 1923 during the international peace conference in Lausanne. Turkish-Greek population exchange was one of the most remarkable historical examples in terms of ensuring ethnic separation. After a devastating war era it was evaluated for many researchers and politicians as a logical attempt to separate “different” ethnic origins to homogenize the population in nation state building for both countries (Macar, 2015, p.180).

The Law on Settlement 2510 in 1934 was the first political document including general regulations on immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees of the new Turkish republic. The law on one hand drew the framework of the policy on migration issues and on the other hand it regulated the assimilation process of Turkish citizens who were neither of Turkish descent nor culture as a principal cornerstone in the nation building process (Çağaptay, 2002, p. 221). It was considered that the law set two different statuses by “(i) facilitating the migration and integration of those of “Turkish origin and culture” either as migrants or as refugees and (ii) preventing and impeding the entry of those who did not meet this criterion as migrants or refugees” (İçduygu & Aksel, 2013, p.171). In his article on the reformation of the Turkish nation, Çağaptay (2002) states that at the root of the Kemalist definition of “Turkishness” was the continuation of the “nation” system that had descended from the Ottoman Empire and that the understanding of the acceptance of Muslims as Turks continued. In this context, he examines the different articles of the settlement Law and asserts that this law opens the borders to non-Turk Muslims but aimed to assimilate them by placing them among the “Turks”, and thinks that they can assimilate them because they have a close cultures and common religion (Çağaptay, 2002).
The Law on Settlement 2510 enacted articles which laid the foundation of traditional Turkish migration policy and have sustained its efficacy until recent years. According to the law a person who belong to Turkish culture must be a Muslim individual who spoke no other language but Turkish; Muslims who speak languages other than Turkish and all foreign Christians and Jews were foreigners (Ülker, 2008). They cannot be given nationality declaration documents and immigrant papers. The minister of interior of the period Şükrü Kaya defined the intention of the law to find solutions for issues of population, settlement, nomadism and immigration to create a country speaking the same language, thinking in the same way and sharing the same feelings (Babuş, 2006, p.250).

The Law on Settlement has been continuously amended over the years. In 1947 after regulations introduced in articles of the law, the concept of Muhacir was replaced by the concept of immigrant in the bureaucratic usage but continued only define Muslim descendants as migrants (Baklacıoğlu, 2015, p.196). The main articles of the law, which lived exactly until 2006, determined the basic characteristics of Turkey's foreign migration policy and gave important clues about the scope, meaning and content of citizenship in Turkey.

**The Cold War Period**

After 1946, Turkey's transition to a multi-party period initiated a process that had significant implications for both national and international policies. In this context, during the Cold War decisions such as Turkey's involvement in the Western bloc as a NATO member, deployment of troops to the Korean War and benefiting Marshall Assistance brought many changes. In terms of migration and migration policies, changes in agricultural structure and the start of urbanization process triggered new situations about the settlement and employment of internal and international migrants. Turkey, which closed its borders in the Cold War-era developed its migration policies based on security and maintained the entrenchment of the nation building at the local level (Örselli & Babahanoğlu, 2016, p.2066). In this process, the most notable developments regarding migration and migration policy had been the signing of the
1951 UN Convention and the 1967 Protocol and mass emigration of Turkish people to industrialized countries in terms of the labor migration.

At the international level, Turkey’s integration efforts with global regime and especially the Western bloc steered Turkey to take part in the drafting of the 1951 Geneva Convention which defines the status and the rights of refugees and asylum seekers. However, Turkey put a geographical limit which is still valid under Article 42 of the Convention; only those fleeing from Europe due to human rights violations could apply for a refugee status, those fleeing not from Europe could be accepted in conditional terms by Turkish authorities (İçduyuğ et. al, 2014). In 1950’s migration from Balkans continued especially in the Stalinist period from Yugoslavia. After the exile began in 1953 with the policy of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and Macedonia thousands of people, including Turks, Albanians and Bosnians migrated to Turkey. Although the number Albanians changes in various resources, according to the official figures 151,889 migrants came to Turkey between 1953-1960 and the number continued to increase in following years (Baklacıoğlu, 2015, p.202).

Since the beginning of the 1960s, Turkey has also started to acquire new positions in the international migration system. After the Second World War, with the need for labor force from other countries to reorganize the economic structures of Western countries, Turkey started to export labor to many European countries, especially Germany. This was the first time in the history of modern Turkey that the Turkish and Muslim population has moved out of the country in an intense migration movement (İçduyuğ et. al, 2014, p.211). Turkey's 'labor migration period' began in accordance with Five Year Development Plan which aimed to reduce unemployment, to ensure the balance of payments through the increase of foreign exchange income and to steer investments for social and cultural development of the society" ( Abadan Unat, 2015, p.262). Between 1961 and 1974, approximately 649,000 Turkish citizens went to Germany, 56,000 to France, 37,000 to Austria and 25,000 to the Netherlands as guest workers (İçduyuğ & Aksel, 2013, p.174). The main plan was projected temporary employment, based on rotation that would contribute to skills of Turkish workers and enable them to use these skills to develop Turkish industry (Abadan Unat, 2015, p.263).
On the other side, despite the policies promoting the return of the labor migrants in Europe, during the economic recession, most of the temporary workers preferred to stay permanently. Their families migrated for family reunifications and applied as asylum seekers. Migration from Turkey to Western countries continued also in 1980’s but the basic motivation was ethnic, religious and political reasons after due to military coup in 1982 (Abadan Unat, 2015). Between 1983-1994, 1.2 million Turks left their homeland and %95 of that population migrated to Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, UK and the Scandinavian States (İçduygu &Aksel, 2013).

The 1980s Beginning of New Migration Challenges for Turkey

After 1980, the qualitative change in migration processes of Turkey occurred on the ground of both national and international dynamics. In that period, Turkey was experiencing new trends revealed by neoliberal economic transformation, while the Soviet Union and the socialist systems was collapsing, and the Middle East was facing crisis and wars. The changing migration regime and the first mass immigration of foreigners who were non- Turk and non-Muslim in the history of modern Turkey, compelled the state to take new measures with regards to the management of migrants and asylum seekers (İçduygu &Aksel, 2013, p.174).

The first reason lying behind the migration flow towards Turkey in 1980’s was the general process of globalization which facilitated not only the flow of people but also information, goods and money. On the other hand, the economic, social and political turmoil and instabilities in the regions neighboring to Turkey, transformed Turkey to a bridge that provides access to more prosperous and secure geographies. In the Eastern the humanitarian insecurities emerged in Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq related after the Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf crisis and the Afghan War. Another obvious example was the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. Thousands of opponents of the new Islamic regime ruling after the revolution left their country and entered Turkey. Because of the provisions of the 1934 Resettlement Act and the geographical limitation defined in the Geneva Convention, Turkey applied a flexible visa policy for asylum seekers from Iran, until the 1990s over 1 million passed the borders and just a few of them settled in Turkey (İçduygu, 2005, p.6).
In 1989, 300,000 Bulgarian Turks and Pomaks were forced to migrate from Bulgaria based on assimilationist policies against Turkish ethnicity (Kirişçi & Karaca, 2015, p. 301). Turkey opened its borders and treated forcibly displaced people as their descendants rather than refugees. The government encouraged the acquisition of Turkish citizenship, and at the same time quickly implemented legislations that would provide public assistance for immigrants. By the end of the soviet regime approximately 140,000 people turned back to Bulgaria while almost 240,000 chose to became Turkish citizen (Kirişçi & Karaca, 2015, p.303).

Turkish government had totally changed towards Iraqi Kurds during the mass refugee flow in accordance with policy of Turkey which gained strength after 1980 Coup, because of rejection of Kurdish identity. Between 1988-1991, over 50,000 in 1991, approximately 460,000 Iraqis moved to Turkish borders as a result of the Iraqi army’s attack on the Kurds (Kirişçi & Karaca, 2015, p.304). Despite the liberal steps taken after the 1980 military coup, Turkey followed a policy focused on national security and prevented the access of Kurdish population inside Turkish borders. their homes. However, 1994 regulations about asylum implemented after the crisis brought about heavy criticisms on Turkey’s asylum and refugee policies. In 1994 an Asylum regulation was put into practice to define the conditions to apply for asylum and addressed the topics such as entry, exit and settlements of the aliens. However, Turkey did not retreat from the geographical limitation clause of the Geneva Convention and only maintained to allow a temporary situation for non-European aliens until they migrate to a third country. Turkey considered the geographical limitation as a precaution for migration flows threatening the cultural and ethnic balance of Turkey, and sustained limitation (Kirişçi, 1996).

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist systems in Eastern Europe also triggered thousands of people to migrate to Turkey. The citizens of the Commonwealth of Independent States and migrated to Turkey in the early 1990s especially to cities on the Black Sea coast. CIS citizens came to Turkey, usually for small-scale shuttle trade, housework, babysitting and entertainment industry. In short, the period after 1980’s,
various migration concepts such as asylum, transit migration, and circular migration has introduced into migration literature of Turkey (Kirişci & Karaca, 2015). Furthermore, in 1981, the state allowed dual citizenship and in 1982 included Turkish nationals abroad in the Constitution to ensure their social, cultural and political rights and facilitate the process of returnees (İçduygu & Aksel, 2013, p.177).

2000s of Turkish Migration: Influence of EU negotiations

Compared to earlier periods in 2000’s the migration policy of Turkey has changed fairly depending on internal and external factors. Globalization as a main factor forced Turkey to deal with irregular migration and human trafficking as a migrant transition country. The other remarkable factor effective on Turkey’s migration policies was the European Union membership negotiations. International migration issues have taken place among the most important agenda items in Turkey’s relations with the European Union related on Turkey’s position as a country of asylum, as country of immigration and country of irregular transit migration (Kale et al, 2018, p. 1). In addition, Turkey’s liberal market economy and liberal policies- altering the state’s traditional conceptions of national identity- of Justice and Development Party as the internal factor that shaped Turkey’s immigration policies (İçduygu & Aksel, 2012, p.179).

The number of foreigners residing and transiting to Europe obviously show that Turkey have become a country of immigration in 2000’s. In 2010 the number of foreigners with Turkish residence permit was 182,301 and reached to 462,217 in 2015. In 2018 foreigners with a work permit reached to 84,840 when it was 14,201 in 2010. International students’ number in Turkey has exceeded 79,225. (DGMM,2019). In 2000’s estimated number of transit migrants who aim to reach European countries were more than half a million, mostly from Middle Eastern, Asian and African countries, trying to make their way to Europe. (İçduygu & Aksel, 2012, p.180)

The high percentages of transit migration and irregular migration also shaped the Europeanization process of Turkish migration policy. During the membership process of Turkey which began in 1999, the most important agenda of the process was
migration and the management of migration flows. Within the framework of the European Union alignment process, Turkey has abandoned temporary migration policies and made attempts to develop consistent migration policies and practices. On March 27, 2003, the draft law on work permits for foreigners was adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The law ensured process of foreign people to seek work and to be employed easily by concentrating the management of work permit under a single authority (İçduygū & Aksel, 2012, p.180). The law was an attempt to apply international standards and also EU standards on work permit.

In 2005, the “Turkish National Action Plan” in the area of asylum and migration”, was adopted. It was considered as a cornerstone that brings about various changes in Turkey's policy, implementation and legislation by harmonizing Turkey and EU in areas identified in “Accession Partnership” document (İçduygū & Aksel, 2012: 181). The plan includes the tasks and the timetables for Turkey to adopt EU directives mainly focused on readmission agreements, administrative procedures, transformation of border management and lifting the geographical limitation (Sağıroğlu, 201, p.49). However, the possibility of many problems, especially with lifting the geographical limitations, have discouraged Turkey about the process. Turkey have concerns about becoming a buffer zone to protect the security of Europe.

In 2006, Law on Settlement was put into effect and regulated permanent settlement of immigrants in Turkey. Although it brought some liberal amendments, it continued the traditional Turkishness conception. The law limits formal immigration and grants the right to permanent settlement in Turkey only individuals of Turkish descent and culture (İçduygū & Şimşek, 2016, p. 65). The new Citizenship Law of 2009 was another significant development to eliminate inconsistencies and to harmonize Turkish law with European Convention on nationality.

The most remarkable change that initiated a remarkable phase in migration and asylum issues was Law on Foreigners and International Protection no.6458 (LFIP) which enacted in 2013 after a long preliminary preparation (Sağıroğlu, 2016, p.52). The law had five main parts and regulated three main fields but did not include any provisions
on political participation, citizenship rights and prevention of discrimination of foreigners (Balkır & Kaiser, 2015, p.234).

The first section of the Law submitted purposes, scopes and definitions of the law and for the first time in Turkish regulations made a comprehensive definition migration. Second section of the first part also had statement securing non-refoulement principle as an important part of human rights and international law (LFIP, Article 4). Second part of the law issued articles on entry into and exit from Turkey, visa requirements, visa applications and competent authorities, residence permit and work permit. The work permit put into effect with remarkable amendments such as facilitating integration to job markets of foreigners and foreign students in Turkey (Balkır & Kaiser, 2015, p.235). LFIP contains many significant detailed statements which put into effect for the first time in Turkish legal frameworks. Initially, international protection concept introduced in Turkish law and defined the statuses which provides international protection (Sağıroğlu, 2016, p.54). Definitions of asylum, refugee, subsidiary protection and conditional refugee, in which conditions these statuses would be given, and which are the extent of international protection were stated in a detail for the first time.

LFIP also declared the establishment, duties, mandate and responsibilities of the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) under the Ministry of Interior. Before 2013, there was not any authorized institutional structures in Turkey that perform migration management, set an agenda in this area, identify and implement relevant public policies and carry out the control mechanisms of these policies. Actually, depending on new laws, amendments and institutions it was considered 2000’s Turkey made courageous attempts on transforming migration and asylum policies into a more liberal context and accored with EU standards. However, there have been remaining questions on laws and regulations effectiveness and applicability. Contradictory amendments also aroused suspicion whether Turkey’s migration policies caught up between the politics of the past based on nationalist legacies and the politics of future or not (İçduygu & Aksel, 2012, p.186).
In Turkey it is hard to mention the existence of integration policies. Ongoing migration policies do not offer a constant integration plan for migrants. Turkey recently preferred the term “harmonization” rather than integration and set regulations and policies to harmonize foreign people with Turkish culture. According to the MIPEX indicators Turkey’s overall score is 25 over 100 and rank is 38 among 38 countries which means Turkey has the worst ranking according to integration indicators. (MIPEX, 2015d). Turkey does not offer durable solutions and long-term integrations for refugees and other status owners although access to fundamental rights such as health, education, labor market and social assistance is available people for under Temporary Protection in Turkey. MIPEX’s advice for Turkey is to create national adaptation strategies and to abolish the uncertainty about the conditions for long-term residence.

3.3.2 Turkey’s Asylum and Refugee policy

Along its history, the Turkish Republic has experienced different types of migration including mass refugee flows. In general, Turkish society has been generous and had a hospitable attitude towards migrated people just because considering them as the victims. However, in terms of legislation and enforcement, Turkey did not pursue a consistent asylum and refugee policy and adopted different policies in various crisis (Kirişçi & Karaca, 2015, p.297).

In several records the term refugee had been used before the 1934 Law of Settlement which was the first political document including migration issues, but the content of the term was unclear. Turkey’s Law on Settlement, Law No. 2510, regulated the settlement of foreigners in Turkey, and stated who could enter the country as people of Turkish race or Turkish culture (Çağaptay, 2002, p.225). The law also framed the term refugee as persons who take refuge in Turkey to stay for a certain period of time on account of compelling circumstances without the intention to settle (Baklacioğlu, 2015, p.197). The Law shaped the characteristic of the migration and settlement policies for population movements from the Balkans. As mentioned before, the exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations resulted as the most prominent migration at the early years of the republic. The cross-border population movement from Balkan
continued during the Cold War period. Albanians, Bosnians, Pomaks, and Tatars, who were religiously Muslim but not ethnically Turkish, benefited from the conditions of the law; although they were not ethnically Turkish, they could be integrated into Turkish identity (Kirisçi, 1999, p.112).

In 1951, Turkey has signed the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees (Geneva Convention) and its 1967 Protocol, which became the fundamental basis of the Turkish asylum and refugee policies (Kirişçi, 2002, p.127). However, Turkey signed the 1951 Convention with a geographic limitation. With this geographic limitation, Turkey, as a signatory state would allow granting refugee status only coming from European countries to stay in Turkey (Kale, et. al, 2018, p.3).

The reflection of the geographical limitation occurred a system with two types in asylum policy of Turkey. The conventional refugees; those coming from European countries are allowed to stay in Turkey and non-conventional refugees those coming from non-European states who are not allowed to stay in Turkey. Turkey coordinates that process with the UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) for resettling the second type of refugees to third countries. (Kale et al, 2018, p. 3.) A non-conventional refugee primarily has to apply to the Turkish authorities to obtain a status and then to apply to the Turkey office of the UNHCR to get refugee status; and applying UNHCR is not possible if authorities of Turkey does not approve the application.

In 1989 with its recent migration and asylum regulations, Turkey had to handle the largest mass migration in Europe since the WWII (Kirişçi & Karaca, 2015, p.301). As a result of oppressive, assimilationist policy of Bulgarian government almost 300,000 Bulgarian Turks and Pomaks forced to leave their homeland. During the crisis the victims of the mass migration were not considered as refugees in Turkey but considered as a part of Turkish race and culture as an outcome of 1934 Settlement Law. The government followed a generous and dynamic policy to settle and integrate Bulgarian Turks; therefore, more than 240,000 of the refugees obtained Turkish citizenship (Özgür-Baklacıoğlu, 2006, p.321).
On the contrary to welcoming attitude towards refugees from Bulgaria, in 1988 Kurdish refugees were accepted only after intense pressure of the international community. Between 1988-1991, over 50,000 in 1991, approximately 460,000 Iraqis passed Turkish borders as a result of the Iraqi army's attack on the Kurds (Kirişçi & Karaca, 2015, p.304) Turkey rejected to apply the Geneva Convention’s provisions to Kurdish people, used “guest” term to define them and demanded the Western countries to settle Iraqi refugees in their countries.

In 1994, Turkey took changing and challenging patterns of migration into consideration and prepared The Asylum Regulation reflecting a strong nation-state centered perspective. The Asylum Regulation filled the gap of a procedure on asylum and gave an executive authority to the state alongside with the UNHRC. Turkey retained the geographical limitation, and only provided a temporary asylum to non-European asylum seekers until they resettled in a third country (İçduygu & Aksel, 2012, p.176).

Turkey’s asylum policy significantly shifted with the launch the EU accession process. In 2001, Turkey and EU signed a document introducing “acquis adoption and adaptation while promoting cooperation between actors and institutions in the EU and Turkey at various administrative and governance levels” (Kale et al, 2018, p.3). In the context of the adaptation Turkey had to “adopt the EU’s restrictive immigration tactics, to crack down on the illegal migrants passing through its long and porous borders on their way to Europe… and meet the demands of the European community by adhering to international humanitarian standards with regards to refugee protection” (Biehl, 2008, p.5). The government confirmed with a National Action Plan for Asylum and Migration in 2005 adopting to the EU’s standards concerning immigration and asylum issues. On the other hand, Turkey have sustained a hesitant attitude towards lift of geographical limitation, related to lack of a burden sharing mechanism in EU, with the concern of evolving into a buffer zone. (Kale et al, 2018, p. 3).

The following era brought significant regulations binding migration and asylum policies, as a response to domestic needs as well as global conditions and Europeanization process. In April 2013 the first inclusive document on migration took
effect. The Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) aimed to regulate the protection for those who seek protection from Turkey, and the establishment and responsibilities of the DGMM.

Consequently, in the last era Turkey has achieved significant developments on migration and refugee issues. After 2000’s Turkey has adopted a more liberal context and to establish institutions in respect to EU standards during the membership negotiations. The new legislations established necessary institutions and a legal system for management. Turkey’s liberal market economy and liberal policies of the ruling party in 2000’s encouraged the reforms.
Figure 3: Turkey’s Migrant Integration Policies Before the Syrian Refugee Crisis
3.3.3 Migrant Education in Turkey

Turkey has a centralized education system, led by The Ministry of National Education (MoNE). Actually, Turkey do not offer any opportunity or systematical approach to integrate foreign students to national education system related to its migration policies.

In Turkey the compulsory education starts at the age of 6 and continues until the age of eighteen. There is a 4+4+4 model, consists of four-year compulsory primary schools and four-year compulsory education which allow preference between different programs (Crul et al, 2019). Upper Secondary school follows the secondary school and offer various programs.

Upper Secondary Education covers Anatolian High School, Science High School, School of Fine Arts, Sports High School, School of Social Sciences, the Anatolian Religious High Schools and High Schools conducting vocational and technical programs. Such training is aimed at children aged 14 to 18 years and at those who are above 18 in Vocational Education Centres and it is the responsibility of General Directorate of Secondary Education, the General Directorate of Vocational and Technical Education and General Directorate of Religious Education. (EURYDICE, 2019)

Foreign students can register as international students at universities. There is a special examination to attain higher education for foreign students. Each university determines the quota for international students.

In addition to school system, Turkey does not offer comprehensive trainings and courses for foreigners living in Turkey.

According to EU’s publication (2013) on education of migrants Turkey is defined as non-systematic support model. The system does not have any clearly expressed policy on the national level to support the education of migrants. That model also can have such an existing policy exists but unable to efficiently implement.

3.4 Comparison of the Migration and Integration Policies of Sweden, Germany and Turkey Before the Syrian Refugee Crisis

Sweden, as an ethnically homogeneous country, started to change during the 1930s and evolved into an immigration country with the migration flows of labor migrants.
After long debates on nationhood, migration and the rights of migrant workers in Sweden, the policy of Sweden expressed a promise of multicultural group rights for migrants in addition to social and political rights. Since 1970s Sweden demonstrates one of the most significant examples of multicultural policy and most liberal asylum policy. In this multicultural order, Sweden accepts and welcomes cultural differences, and the institutions of the state welcome and secure diversity by providing equal rights to each religious, ethnic and cultural group in the society. The new policy did not only bring public recognition of different cultures and ethnicities but also allowed the migrants to protect their customs, language, culture, and traditions.

Germany just like Sweden has always been a destination for migrants. However, compared to the beginning of migration flows, Germany experienced a demographic and political transformation as a result of migration in the last decades. The refusal of being an immigrant country precipitated to a failure of a comprehensive policy for migration and integration. After the 1990s the diversified migrant flow of guest workers, asylum seekers and their families and the EU migrants led to the debates on immigration and the integration process started. Germany ignored developing a comprehensive policy for migration and integration because of rejecting being an immigrant country. In the millennium Germany regarded migration as a solution to deal with the socioeconomic consequences of the demographic features of Germany. Germany accepted that the state needs migrants as a source of workforce to sustain economic growth, production and wealth. The nationhood based on pure jus sanguinis changed and Germany liberalized “community of descent” principle (Brubaker 1992. p.115). European integration and the respect for human rights evolved the national system of Germany through a more liberal political approach towards diversity aiming economic success.

The framework of migration is quite different in case of Turkey. Turkey has managed the historical process of migration since the last century with the lack of basic and comprehensive institutions on migration issues. Citizenship only belonged to individuals with Turkish descent and culture. Turkey followed a policy focused on national security and did not allow any political, cultural and social attempt that could threat the monoethnic structure of the state. Turkey adopted the 1951 Geneva
Convention with a geographical limitation and only has granted refugee status to those coming from the West. Since then, this restriction is one of the main characteristics that determine Turkey's asylum policies and practices. In 2000s Turkey has become a country of immigration. After the 2000s Turkey made courageous attempts on transforming migration and asylum policies into a more liberal context and to establish an institutional framework in accordance with the EU standards during the membership negotiations.

The integration policy of Sweden insisted on mutual adaptation, which binds both the migrants and the natives. Sweden believed that the incorporation and socioeconomic inclusion of migrants were based on state-centered efforts. Therefore, citizenship was used as a tool to support migrants to participate in every aspect of society, rather than strengthen national discourses. Sweden considered that a fast introduction to the labor market, education, social and economic services with equal rights would encourage the migrants to become self-sufficient members of society. Citizenship does not stir up vigorous public debate and nationalist emotion in general. The integration model of Sweden promotes multicultural structure of the society.

The integration policies of Germany also evolved during the progress of migration and citizenship. Germany currently carries out the integration policies on "liberal German leading culture" and expects the migrants to respect German values. In the formulated concept of the leading culture learning the German language and the traditions, customs, history, culture, and the legal system of Germany are the key components. Actually, the research proves that Germany on one hand adopts liberal European values and on the other hand carries a soft version of exclusionist to assimilationist model; Migrants are considered as a workforce necessary for economic section of the state and in labor market and they are welcomed if they adopt the German language and culture.

Unlike, Germany and Sweden Turkey recently preferred the term “harmonization” rather than integration and set regulations and policies to harmonize foreign
population. Officially harmonization defined as a voluntary situation based on mutual understanding of foreigners and Turkish society.

The main purpose of the Swedish education system is to provide the same opportunities to migrant children that their national peers have. Sweden provides a full range of educational options, including access to academic tracks and higher education. In addition to school system Sweden offers a lifelong learning for foreigners at all ages. However, the high unemployment rates of migrants -especially well educated- and social segregation has been at the top of the criticism of Sweden since the beginning of 2000s.

The education system of Germany reflects both the national model and integration policies. The strong emphasis on vocational training to support economic growth and development, lead to solid orientation of migrant children and adults towards vocational trainings. The linguistic skills are supported in the school system and integration courses are available where the individuals adapt to German culture and values.

The education system of Turkey grants access to children regardless of their ethnic, religious and cultural background just as Turkish citizens who belong to Turkish identity. The schools are open to all ethnicities and cultures, however cultural, religious, ethnic diversity is not encouraged. The state does not offer other courses like Sweden and Germany.
## Comparison of Migration and Integration Policies of Sweden, Germany and Turkey Before the Syrian Refugee Crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Policy Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Equal Rights obligations and opportunities for all regardless of ethnic or cultural background. Multicultural approach. A comprehensive education system including adult education. The school system promotes multicultural society. A gap between migrants and Swedes in socioeconomic areas, high unemployment rate and isolation of migrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>People who come to Germany intends to stay must learn the German language and acquire basic knowledge of German history and Legal System. Exclusionist to assimilationist approach. Emphasize on occupational training, early tracking disadvantages for foreigners. Integration courses offering language and orientation classes to promote German culture. Necessity of migrants due to aging German population to produce and sustain the economic health.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Harmonization policy for foreigners; integration only migrants of Turkish origin and culture. Geographical limitation. Assimilationist approach, strong emphasis on National Security. Centralized education system, no adjustments for foreign students. Turkey is an immigrant country, a transit migration country; important attempts in accordance with EU Framework.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 4: Comparison of the migration and integration policies of Sweden, Germany and Turkey Before Syrian Refugee Crisis*
CHAPTER 4

SWEDEN, GERMANY AND TURKEY’S MIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICIES AFTER THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS

4.1 Sweden Integration Policies after The Syrian Refugee Crisis

The devastating conflicts in Syria led to a massive influx to European borders. Sweden was one of the final destinations for Syrian refugees due to its liberal immigration and asylum policies. In 2015 the number reached to a peak point, almost 163,000 asylum seekers arrived Sweden and 51,338 of them was originated from Syria (Government Offices of Sweden, 2017). Sweden provided the highest number decisions granting refugee status to Syrian applicants in the European Union per capita.

Before the crisis in Syria, the Syrian refugee population was quite low. The situation started to change in 2012 with the newcomers from Syria escaping from the conflicts. The number of asylum seekers the following years the applications steadily increased. In 2013 Sweden was the first EU country to grant permanent residence permits to asylum seekers from Syria. In 2015 the number of applicants peaked at 51,338, Sweden received the largest number of asylum applications per capita in the EU (Ostrand, 2015). At the end of 2016 Syrians had already became one of the largest immigrant groups in Sweden. In 2016 Syrian population in Sweden was 148,009; which represents 1.48% percent of the total Swedish population. In 2018, overall population of Syrians was 185,991 according to Statistics Sweden data. (The Statistical Database of Sweden, n.d)
Not only the asylum applications but also the resettlement program was a way to enter Sweden for Syrian population. Resettled refugees in Sweden receive a permanent residence. In 2017 Sweden increased its resettlement quota. The Swedish Migration Agency had been implementing a resettlement plan in conjunction with UNHCR for different nationalities (Somali, Afghan, Eritrean, Ethiopian, Sudanese, and Palestinian) and included Syrians since 2014 to provide support to vulnerable individuals and host countries with a large refugee population (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018). Compared to other countries Sweden had already high resettlement rates since 2010 Sweden resettled 1,900 individuals each year.

According to the Statistics of Sweden between 2010-2018 64 % of the Syrian applicants were male, the percentage of the children under age 18 were 32%. Compared to other asylum seekers living in Sweden the Syrian population had a higher education level. 35% of that population had a primary education, 22% had an upper secondary education and 21 % had a post-secondary education, in addition male and female's education levels were so close. (The Statistical Database of Sweden, 2019)

At the beginning of the Syria crisis Sweden followed an open-door policy and sustained its previous liberal attitude towards people fleeing war and persecution. The generous attitude of the government claimed Sweden could welcome Syrian refugees without a limit. However, the unprecedented flow in 2015 challenged the sustainability and the capacity of Sweden’s services. Consequently, Prime Minister and the deputy minister stated a reversal in refugee policy that Sweden was “no longer capable of receiving asylum seekers” and would implement restrictive regulations (The Guardian, 2015). As the other EU member countries did not seem to share the responsibility of the human flow, the Swedish system revert to the EU minimum levels.

Sweden experienced the highest number of applications because of the civil war in Yugoslavia in 1992, however, in 2015 the number of applications for protection doubled the previous record. In addition, more than 20 percent of asylum applications 2015 and 32 percent of the applications between 2010-2017 were filed by unaccompanied minors in 2015 (The Statistical Database of Sweden, 2019). Children younger than 18 had been entitled to special rules and care in Sweden, therefore,
growing numbers of unaccompanied children increased the pressure on the municipalities and other authorities. As the Swedish system faced the enormous challenge, three main problems came to the forefront which should be solved immediately. First of all, while the Swedish asylum and reception systems were well-resourced and designed to be efficient, the Migration Agency was not prepared to handle such a large number of arrivals in such a short time. Accommodation and other services for new arrivals fell short to correspond the growing demand. Secondly, because each asylum claim was evaluated for a final decision individually by a special adjudicator, time and human resource was inefficient to accelerate the process. At the end of 2015 approximately, it took 8 months to finalize an application and at the beginning of 2016 the period past one year, though the Migration Agency had stopped issuing official estimates (Fratzke, 2017, p.7). Thirdly, the significant rate of children under age of 18 arrived at Sweden, challenged the youth services’ capacity and capability.

On 24 November 2015, the government took a broad set of measures to cope with the rising demands focused on two major steps; restricting the border controls and reducing the offered benefits when the EU Member States were unable to share the responsibility of asylum seekers. At the first step Sweden introduced temporary border controls at international borders which had been extended several times and temporary ID checks which requires individuals arriving at the border to present a passport or other travel document (Ministry of Justice, 2018). The decision significantly affected the number of monthly applications, the number of asylum seekers decreased drastically.

As a second step to reduce the flow, in 2016, the government introduced a temporary act to bring Sweden’s asylum and reception systems in line with minimum standards under EU law and applied to all asylum claims submitted after November 2015 (Ministry of Justice, 2018). The Geneva Convention refugee status is given to individuals who fears persecution in their homeland and was granted permanent residency before the 2016. Since government introduced regulations in 2016, individuals can only receive a temporary resident permit for three years and the right to limited family reunification if they apply within three months. The restrictions on
obtaining a residence permit in Sweden were considered necessary from 2016 until 2019 (Ministry of Justice, 2018). The third status given because of humanitarian reasons to people “otherwise in need of protection” would not be granted due to the new regulations. The Swedish government also took measures for the returns of asylum seekers announcing that “it is crucial that people who have received a final and non-appellable refusal-of-entry or expulsion order following a legally certain examination of their grounds for asylum return to their country of origin as quickly as possible” (Ministry of Justice, 2018). If there is final and non-appellable decision on refusing the entry or expulsion for an adult without a child, then the right to accommodation and financial assistance is no longer available.

4.1.1 Sweden’s Investments and Regulations for Integration

In Sweden, providing equal rights, obligations and opportunities for all, regardless of any background in a multicultural approach is the main integration goal. To reach that primary policy goal Sweden strategies intends introduction of newcomers into labor market and social life as soon as possible. Before the 2015 Syrian crisis Sweden had already presented a comprehensive system to accelerate integration process. After the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015 and to foster integration of the mass flow of refugees renewed its integration policies and particularly used education to achieve integration goals.

The Swedish government not only took measures to reduce human flow but also pay attention to the investments to improve the reception and asylum system. The unprecedented migration flow to Sweden exceeded the capacity and efficiency of service and exacerbated the strain on authorities to develop the system. The most significant service fell short to supply newcomers need was accommodation. In the standard process asylum seekers have two housing options in Sweden while their applications are processed; they can accept the housing provided by the government or they can find their own housing. The lack of financial resources and family ties of Syrian asylum applicants to find housing on their own resulted with high rates of demand for the government housing. Since the government housing provided by municipalities with an excess supply of rental housing, asylum seekers were forced to
live in accommodation centers outside of the major cities (Bevelander & Pendakur, 2009). Because of restricting rent regulations and low construction in Sweden housing system had already limitations for refugees. The government firstly changed the previous system that municipalities were able to decide whether or not to participate in the settlement of the newcomers. In 2016 all municipalities were required to participate in a certain share of protection beneficiaries (Fratzke, 2017, p.8). In addition, the government declared a financial grant for the municipalities that received a large rate of refugees, to increase construction of new houses.

Sweden’s integration policies consider self-sufficiency of the refugees as a significant priority for a long time in order to increase employment, to minimize social and economic cost of dependency, and to attain equal rights, opportunities and obligations for all members of the society. Therefore, when an asylum seeker’s application is taken into the process, since 2010, for each individual the Public Employment Service develops an “Introduction Plan” which includes actually an education plan such as language courses, skill trainings, internships or other professional courses. The aim of the plan is the entrance of the individuals into the Swedish labor market within two years after arriving (Emilsson, 2014, 5). After 2015, the services for integration to the labor market faced new challenges because of the rapidly rising demand for services and the low skilled profile of the demanders.

The unprecedented flow of the Syrian newcomers led the Migration Agency to cut reception interviews with the asylum applicants and had no detailed data savings to speed up the registrations (Fratzke, 2017, p.17). However, the interviews were necessary for designing an introduction plan of the individuals to find appropriate work placements according to their background and previous skills. As a result of recent problems restricting the entry of newcomers to the labor market, the Swedish government initiated new introduction and education plans to facilitate the access to the labor market. At the end of 2016 the county administrative boards were assigned for the coordination of interventions which was previously managed by the Migration Agency in the asylum process, in order to take advantage of local capabilities and innovations (Fratzke, 2017, p.18). The county authorities became responsible for management of language and orientation programs funded by the government. In
2016, the government approved a 200 million euros budget to increase foreigner’s early integration. The budget was reserved for the additional costs of labor market programs, interpreters, vocational education courses and language training courses, complementary courses in the universities and employment services (European Web Site on Integration, 2015).

In January 2018, a new regulation changed the context of the Introduction Plan refugees are obliged to apply and undertake necessary education and trainings stated in their introduction Plan, those who do not follow the instructions will not receive an introduction payment for their basic needs (European Web Site on Integration, 2017). Introduction Plans direct the individuals to language courses, vocational trainings and courses related to civic education.

Another initiative taken after 2015, to speed up labor market integration of the refugees was ‘Fast Track” programs. The main purpose was to support refugees with certification, language education and trainings. In March 2015, the government declared that talks had launched on fast tracks focusing on newly arrived immigrants under the introduction system.

The purpose of the talks was to work with the social partners and the Swedish Public Employment Service to identify forms and measures for making the best use of valuable skills possessed by newly arrived immigrants with education or experience in shortage occupations so that they can be matched more quickly with the needs of industries and enterprises. (Ministry of Employment, 2016)

Depth talks with relevant government agencies of health, education, finance and employment followed the initial talks to form fast tracks in their industries. Fast tracks in various professions such as teachers, social workers, construction workers, doctors and chefs directed the refugees towards a relevant language education and vocational training that will lead back into their profession as quickly as possible. The fast track programs were managed in both Arabic and Swedish, in order to respond the demand of Arabic speaking refugees mostly from Syria. Especially, as a response to the shortage of teachers and the urgent need for mother tongue-teachers who could support newly arrived students in their native languages the fast track programs became remarkable tools.
The Swedish government committees also worked on the education of youth and children in related to high proportion of under 18 aged applicants after 2015. In 2015, 163,000 people mainly from Syria arrived to Sweden and 40 percent of them were minors under 18 and almost half of them were unaccompanied. At the end of 2015, in Sweden the rate of refugees and asylum seekers in school students reached 7 percent (Bunar, 2017, p.3). The number of applications for validation of qualifications to apply for higher education increased after 2015. In 2016, the largest proportion of applicants were Syrians according to the statistics retrieved from Swedish Council for Higher Education (2017). The statistics significantly underlined that the education system and its management would be a cornerstone for the success of integrating growing generation of new comers.

In Sweden, refugee children have equal educational rights at all levels of education as Swedish children and higher education is tuition free for refugees as Swedish students. Asylum seeking children, however, are not offered for free higher education and they are entitled to education in regular schools. Within a month they are placed in elementary or upper secondary schools. At the beginning of 2016 the Swedish government adopted some new political changes on the reception of newly arrived students and international schools. According to the new regulations (Prop.2014/15:45) after the arrival of the student, they must be considered as newly arrived up to four years (Bunar, 2017, 5). Within two months in the school, a student’s academic level and previous education must be evaluated by diagnostic and additional tests and within this period the decision must be made whether the students should be offered introductory (separate) or regular class. The new regulations legalized introductory classes and limited the period with two years. It was also recommended that introductory classes should be located as close as possible to regular classes to avoid segregations.

In 2018 preschool classes became compulsory for all children from the year that they turn six. The Government declared the Support for Better Language Development in Preschools underlining that preschool participation is imperative for learning Swedish language for children who do not speak Swedish at home (EURYDICE, 2019). In the same year the government put another legislation for asylum seekers into effect only
from July to September. Even if the previous asylum application has been rejected, an asylum seeker attending upper school studies is enabled to apply for a resident permit and moreover, a temporary residence permit is given to the applicants to find a job after upper school graduation. It becomes also possible for the same individuals who are employed to apply for a permanent residency.

In addition to legal and structural changes the government declared new measures to provide new arrivals a qualified education to accelerate their integration. In January 2017 a long term program with a budget of 2,138 million SEK, under the responsibility of the National Agency for Education was launched to support municipalities’ capacity to develop language learning, study advisors, didactical performance of teachers and required cooperation. (Bunar & Ambrose, 2016, p.37). The National Agency for Education also funded the municipalities to employ a local officer to monitor the performance of teachers in schools with newly arrived students. Another fund was prepared by the government to support the capacity of free schools. The government announced the agreement signed with the Association of Independent Schools about admission quotas equal to 5 percent of the population of the school for newly arrived children to grant them a high qualified education (Bunar, 2017, p.6).

In brief, for decades, Swedish migration and integration policies are based on principles of multiculturalism and diversity. The approach of Sweden’s multiculturalism has a strong emphasis on labor market integration to achieve socioeconomic inclusion and self-sufficiency of the migrants. After the Syria crisis, it is obvious that the capacity and the quality of the ongoing Swedish system were reviewed and required measures to expand integration capacity of the system has taken. The government has shown a tendency towards increasingly obligatory integration measures to minimize the risks. These obligatory developments are related to education of migrants such as compulsory preschool and mandatory Introduction Plans for individuals. Politically, the government promotes labor market participation for integration and after the Syria refugee crisis sustained the same policies and mostly focused on education of refugees to foster labor market mobility. To guarantee the adoption of Syrians into welfare system and to prevent isolation, Sweden improved school system to provide early integration considering high number of children
migrated to Sweden and aimed labor market access of adults through mandatory Introduction plans.

4.2 Germany’s Integration Policies after The Syrian Refugee Crisis

In the crisis of Syria, millions of people poured to European borders. The member states of the European Union had to face the Syrian refugee challenge; institutional shortcomings and divisions between member states of the EU became more visible than ever. From the beginning of the Syrian crisis Germany had initially become the primary country of destination in Europe and played a leading role to convince other European states to produce a common response.

Merkel's government's announcement that it would accept asylum seekers who managed to arrive in Germany by not implementing the Dublin II Convention, which obliges asylum seekers to stay in the EU countries where they first set foot, has made Germany one of the most refugee-welcoming countries. At the beginning of the crisis, Syrian refugees were the concern of Syria's neighbors but with the developments in 2015, they become the challenge of Europe, and Germany in particular. Refugees tried to reach the future they desire in Europe risking their lives. Pressured by the media coverage of the drama the refugees had experienced during their difficult journey to Germany, Chancellor Merkel's much-criticized statement that Germany will welcome Syrian refugees excited Syrians on their journey to Europe. Merkel's “Wir schaffen das (we can do this)” approach is particularly indicative of Germany's policy in this period, with Merkel describing it as a national duty to protect hundreds of thousands of refugees from Syria (Wiederwald, 2016). Germany's previous refugee experience and capacity enabled it to move more confidently in this area. Powerful NGOs, institutions and relative public opinion pressured the government to accept more refugees after the photo of the Syrian baby’s dead body on the shores (Akn, 2017, p.92) The German-owned Wilkommenskültur (Welcome culture) brought forward many institutions, organizations, non-governmental organizations and individuals who worked actively on issues such as refugee accommodation, settlement of basic needs and language learning during the refugee crisis. However, the open-door policy ended at the end of 2015 as the number of refugees soon increased beyond estimates.
Asylum applications in Germany reached a historically record level after 2015. Previously, during the war in former Yugoslavia in 1990s, asylum applications represented similar levels but later on the numbers had declined severely until the war in Syria. After the refugee crisis total population of the asylum seekers escalated to 1.7 million in 2017 (Destatis, 2019). By the end of 2017, approximately 700,000 Syrians were living in Germany (Hindy, 2018). Syrians became the third major population among the foreigners living in Germany after Turkish and Polish people. Although Germany had a positive and responsible attitude related to the refugee problem, a serious amount of the population strongly opposed the policies of the government, that led to the developments of far-right political movements and the success of the AfD (far right party) in the elections (Akın, 2017, p.90)

Compared to the previous refugee flow Germany, in recent Syrian crisis, the German government took rapid measures. Germany launched temporary border-controls with Austria and introduced on Asylum Package I, which suggests major changes and restrictions to asylum law in 2015.

A series of systems to integrate the refugee population started in 2016. On March 2016, Asylum Package II was declared (Gesley, 2015). According to the legislation, there would be no family reunification for refugees with subsidiary protection for two years. Also, a new law took effect that if asylum applicants sentenced to a prison sentence (on probation or not) could be deported more easily; the law was a result of the sexual assaults of immigrant men in New Year’s Eve.

On August 2016, the Integration Act took effect. The main principle of the act was “support and challenge” (Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 2016). The legislation facilitated staying permanently in Germany for refugees who show the potential to integrate and put restriction for the benefits for refugees who refuse to cooperate.

4.2.1 Germany’s Investments and Regulations for Integration

In 2016, as a response to the refugee crisis Germany put into effect Integration Act to support integration process for refugees. The principle of the new act is “support and
challenge” and actually the act highlights education as a main tool to achieve structural, cultural and social integration of the refugees. The act aimed to offer “more integration classes, vocational training, employment and training opportunities, assignments of a place of residence to avoid concentration in select areas, and permanent settlement permits for refugees who show that they are willing to cooperate and take integration classes.” (Library of Congress, 2015).

The primary education that the regulation has enforced, reflects the state’s integration approach; “being able to speak German and knowing how German society works are of key importance when it comes to integration” (Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 2016). Therefore, Germany has designed an education program particularly for non-EU refugees to support them to adopt German society. In 2005, the integration courses were established for third-country nationals before the current crisis, as a part of Immigration Act in 2005. However, the Integration Act of 2016 put a step further and the courses became compulsory for refugees who will reside in Germany. Asylum seekers who do not attend courses lose to access to government benefits which they need to stay in the country legally. The general integration course includes 600 hours language lessons and 100 hours lessons about German history, legal system and culture. (BAMF, 2016). At the end of the course, a certificate is given after language and orientation tests. The certificate is necessary for naturalization process. According to official approach of Germany an individual must how he or she is well integrated with German identity, society, values, laws and language. Thus, the score of the test is the proof.

Since 2015, after the refugee crisis the number of individuals from Arab speaking countries highly increased in integration courses. Syrian nationals was the largest group of new participants. In 2016, approximately half of all new integration course participants (46.9 %) were Syrians, and then Iraqis 8.2%. (BAMF, 2016). Therefore, the participants attending the course had less literacy skills because of the Latin Alphabet. In order to adapt to the rising number of people learning a second alphabet among integration course participants, new classes were added, and total hours of the integration course was increased in February 2017 (BAMF, 2016). The context of the education and trainings that Germany considers as necessary to accelerate Syrian
refugees’ integration is not limited only with linguistic and cultural education but rather comprehensive.

Refugees at the end of their asylum application have access to the labor market and have equal rights with German citizens. Although there are no legal obstacles, the rate of working refugees is quite low particularly among refugees who arrived after the refugee crisis. In 2016, only 9% of refugees who came with the major flow started to work, while the rate was 31% for refugees who passed the border in 2013. Low level of linguistic and professional skills led the employment rates of refugees to remain low (Brücker et al., p.57). The strong emphasis on education to develop language and professional skill is thus considered as the proper attempt for refugees to participate in labor market (OECD, 2017, p.12). Therefore, the Integration Act in 2016, mostly focused on integration courses, workforce and vocational trainings exactly gives the clue about in which direction Germany will use education as a tool to integrate refugees. In other words, in accordance with the motivation to booming German economy, Germany aims to integrate Syrian refugees as skilled workers into German society through apprenticeship tracks and vocational trainings (Crul et al., 2017, p.5). Therefore, Germany took actions based on education to increase labor market integration of the refugees. Germany is in an advanced position because of its history of migration and experience of integrating large numbers of immigrants and refugees into labor market.

In 2016, 100,000 refugees funded by the state to attend job-related language training courses by the government. The purpose is of these courses to equip refugees with more advanced levels of language knowledge which is necessary to graduate vocational trainings. In the federal states In general, an elementary level (B1) language certificate is necessary to work as a health staff, and advanced level is necessary for teachers. According to the OECD, refugees with language skills are recruited more compared to those without language knowledge. An employer survey by the OECD revealed that even for low-skilled jobs, half of all participating employers require at least good German language skills. This amount reaches to 90% percent for medium skill jobs (OECD, 2017, p.12).
The government also enacted 3+2 regulation in 2016 to increase legal certainty for employers and skilled workers. Previously an asylum who participate in a vocational training as an apprentice could be deported, therefore employers lost their education and time investments on an employee. The new regulation allows rejected asylum seekers to complete a training program for three years and adds two years for employment in the same company for two years. (Konle-Seidl, 2017, p.6) The refugees can obtain permanent residency at the end of the 3+2 years even if their asylum claims were rejected.

In addition, various volunteer and nonprofit organizations started new initiatives to help the integration process. So far, 1800 internships, more than 500 training positions and more than 400 full-time positions for refugees have been organized (Hindy, 2018). Volunteers and civil society often offered actions, their support for refugees was stronger and more well-organized. The volunteer actions helped refugees to find housing and jobs, offer programs specifically for refugees.

Additional policies to integrate the current flow of the refugee crisis into labor market is a long-term investment. The courses and trainings to equip refugees with necessary skills to become a member of the industry of Germany. IMF report on German economy underlines the importance of successful labor market integration of refugees and called the German government to “facilitate more flexible forms of vocational training, with a strong on-the-job component and intensive language teaching.” (IMF, 2016). Moreover, the report emphasizes if Germany succeeds integration the economic benefits will be significant, within the next years a positive effect on GDP is possible. It is obvious that vocational trainings, job related language courses and apprenticeship programs for refugees serves as tool to successful labor production and their integration.

Another long-term investment in terms of integration concerns the school aged children or the second generation of the refugees. In the refugee crisis the education of the school aged children has been one the most certain challenges. Hundred thousand of Syrians were under 18 age that arrived Germany during the refugee crisis and that mean a large children population needed access to school. The foreseen cost
in 2015 were billions annually; for effective education of Syrian children additional teachers are required, but, there was the shortage of available teachers (Trines, 2019). Another main obstacle for refugee children who enrolled to the elementary and secondary school was lack of language skills. The literature review to reach efficient resources on refugee children is also limited and problematic. Although there are more areas of improvement because of more obstacles for refugees, attention to refugee children integration is comparatively scarce (Bloch et al., 2015). There is no official data on the actual school attendance of refugee and asylum-seeking children in Germany. It is estimated that most of these children attend school regularly, however, some refugee children could not gain access to school due to the lack of resources for support classes and integrated learning groups. In Germany, due to its strong industry “in need of low and medium skilled labor there is a strong tradition of company-based and school-complemented vocational training, the ‘dual system’. (Crul et al, 2017). Therefore it seems, Germany’s dual system intends to promote vocational training for refugee children and made limited efforts to develop its school system.

In terms of university education Germany also took attempts after the Syrian crisis. Syrian refugees in Germany are well educated compared to other refugees in Germany and also compared to Syrians in other countries. According to the German statistics in 2016 more than 50% had at least secondary degree, and 23% had a tertiary degree, less than 3 percent had no formal schooling (BAMF, 2016). Although all Syrian youth with asylum status are eligible for government-provided schooling, the lack of German language registration to German universities were low (Dryden-Peterson et. al, 2016). Therefore, government prepared a budget to increase refugee enrollment to universities by providing preparatory courses and free applications.

During the registration of international students, the universities demand a high school diploma equivalent to German education or documentation to prove qualification of their academic skills and an advanced level of German. Syrian students are more advantageous as the Syrian Secondary School Education certificate is approved as equivalent and no need to additional courses, if the student has a successful grade. But there were students with lower grades and poor linguistic skills, or without documentation and unable to prove the skills. Most universities, therefore, demand
students to attend in German-language academic courses if they do not have documentation or acceptable criteria. Recently, the government supply financial aid to projects to expand the capacity of such courses. Integra (Integrating Refugees in Degree Programmes) offers language and preparatory courses which helps refugees for access to university. At the end of the course the score of the final test gives right to access to German Universities. Welcome – Students Helping Refugees, is another Project that support refugees at the beginning of their studies by providing services such as academic advising, language support, orientation. Currently 158 universities provide support for refugees through the Welcome project and 160 universities and preparatory colleges in the Integra project (“Support in Every Situation”, n.d.)

In brief, after the Syrian crisis Germany’s primary purpose was to adapt refugees to labor market as fast as possible. The government took actions for more integration classes, promoted vocational trainings, increased employment and training opportunities and offered permanent residence permits for refugees who show that they are willing to adapt German system. The strong emphasize on German language and knowledge on German culture as key components of integration was supported by new regulations on education and courses. In the school system mentioning remarkable reforms seems not possible. The school system of Germany sustains dual system which puts foreign student in a disadvantageous position and at the end enforces indirectly or directly to vocational track. At the end migrant children seems to take part in the society as trained workers for German industry.

4.3 Turkey’s Integration Policies after The Syrian Refugee Crisis

One of the most effective crisis that had a crucial impact on Turkey’s policy was the refugee crisis following the Syrian civil war. The displacement of the Syrian population after the war emerged “the largest mass migration wave in recent history” according to UNHCR; more than 5 million people had to leave their homeland (Erdoğan, 2016, 74). An ever-growing number of Syrians continued to migrate to neighbor states and led to a very challenging process. In other words, the crisis affected Syrians first and then its neighbor countries like Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.
Turkey followed an open door policy in accordance with both humanitarian foreign policy and the new liberal approach which had global goals such as making Turkey a global player. (Kale et al, 2018, p.9). At the national level, the government sustained a strong emphasis on religious fellowship and historical, geographical and ethnic relations shared with the Syrian people. The main discourse of the government also reflected on the description of the Syrians, Syrian refugees was called as guests who were welcomed for a temporary stay (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016, p.60). In 2015 the influx of Syrian refugees from Turkey to Europe peaked. Thousands of Syrian refugees trying to reach Europe and their tragedies had an impact at the international level and realization of the seriousness of the refugee crisis. When in Europe the number of refugees seeking international protection reached almost 500,000, Turkey and the EU started a collaboration to control and reduce the flow. A Joint Action Plan to reduce irregular border crossings was prepared crossings in exchange for lifting visa requirements for Turkish citizens in the Schengen zone which also aimed at reenergizing of Turkey-EU relations by promising to open negotiation chapters that have been previously stopped and also offered a 3 billion Euros fund to Turkey to enhance the conditions of Syrians in Turkey. (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016, p. 62).

In 2012 the conflicts in Syria continued and the refugee crisis increased after the failed attempt of UN for a ceasefire; the number of refugees that fled to Turkey was more than 20,000 monthly and increased in following years (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016, p.61). The flow of Syrian refugees to Turkey reached to millions in 2014 due to increasing violence of radical Islamic groups that started to take control areas in Syria.

As of October 2019, the number of registered Syrians in Turkey increased by 8,529 people compared to the previous month, totaling 3,674,588 people. (Directorate General Of Migration Management, 2019) The rate of registered Syrians under temporary protection to the Turkish population is 4.48% across the country. 1,991,638 of the Syrian population are men and 1,682,950 of the population are women. According to the statistics, the number of Syrian men is 308,688 more than the number of Syrian women. The largest difference between the number of men and women exists between 19-24 age range; with 93,173 people. According to the age statistics published by DGMM recently, the number of Syrians aged between 0-18 increased by 7,716
compared to the previous month. 28.81% of Syrians are under the age of 10. There are 829,664 people identified as young population between 15-24 age range. The rate of the young Syrian population in total number of Syrians is 22.57%, while Turkey's young population is 15.8% (Directorate General Of Migration Management, 2019)

Turkey as a signatory of the 1951 Geneva Convention with a geographical limitation applied only a temporary asylum people from non-European countries until they were settled in a third country after a two-tiered process followed in cooperation with UNHCR. In accordance with this regulation Syrians were not officially given refugee status and only provided with “temporary protection” until they were resettled in a third country as just like the other people from non-European countries.

In the context of Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) the Turkish government considered Syrian refugees under the title of temporary protection and issued the Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR) to define status of the Syrians. The regulation stated that the temporary protection “may be provided to foreigners, who were forced to leave their countries and are unable to return to the countries they left, and arrived at or crossed our borders in masses to seek urgent and temporary protection and whose international protection requests cannot be taken under individual assessment” (Zeldin,2016). In general, the regulation stressed the temporary protection did not provide neither a residence permit nor a possibility to apply for the Turkish citizenship, but the context grounded on the temporality of the situation which would end with the return of the foreigners. Under the temporary protection, Syrians were allowed to stay in Turkey, but not allowed to apply for asylum. As it was expected that Syrians would return home in a short period of time at the beginning Syrians have been considered as guests who need to be welcomed with a humanitarian and religious point of view. Actually “guest” had no legal basis under national or international law, and failed to provide a secure status to refugees (Toğral Koca, 2016, p.59). Contrary to expectations, the flow Syrians increased dramatically.

The Syrian people living in Turkey since 2011 visibly started to be a part of the Turkey’s reality in demographic, financial and social aspects. According to many researchers, even if the war in Syria would end, the possibility of the return of the
Syrians seems quite difficult (Erdoğan, 2016, p.84). Thus the government started to a process in which policies and practices to serve the purpose of improving the conditions of the Syrians. The government adopted new policies in parallel with the changing needs and direction of the crisis. The regulations and investments evolved from emergency conditions to sustainable plans when the possibility of millions Syrians in Turkey will not reside temporarily.

4.3.2 Turkey’s Investments and Regulations for Integration

Actually, the investments and regulations of Turkey on the Syrian case has two stages. In the first phase the policies have been focused on the temporality of Syrian crisis at the beginning. Increasing population of Syrians and the ongoing unsolvable crisis in Syria enforced all related public institutions of Turkey have been eager to solve inefficiencies with a sincere effort over the previous period of the refugee crisis, Turkey has taken a number of steps about legal and social arrangements in the second stage.

The first action of Turkey was to build Temporary Accomodation Centers (TAC) for Syrians in the southern cities such as Hatay, Kilis, Gaziantep, and Şanlıurfa. Operations about the settlement of the Syrian people into those camps was given to Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD in Turkish). Previously Syrians only resided in the TAC’s established in the border provinces. As of December 11, 2017, a serious number of personnel in various categories hired in the services offered at 22 TACs in 11 border cities, where Syrian refugees were located (Alp et. al, 2018, 62). The government established Temporary Education Centers(TEC) in TACs and followingly in the cities which host large numbers of Syrian population to provide urgent education support for Syrian refugees; in August 2017 , the total number TECs reached to 404, 30 of them were in TACs and 374 were outside of TACs (Alp et. al, 2018, p.71). The main intention of the government for TECs to serve only Syrian children was based on impermanence and assumed return to Syria. “Education given in these centers was in the Arabic language and based on a revised version of the Syrian curriculum.” (Alp et. al ,2018, p.71). Followingly, the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) revised the curriculum followed in the TECs and excluded the
parts about the political regime in Syria supposing the post war regime of Syria would be different. In addition to TECs, Private Syrian schools follows the Syrian national curriculum in Arabic. In TECs and private schools the teaching staff were Syrians who migrated to Turkey.

Another prior regulation of the Turkish government was offering health services for Syrian refugees under temporary protection and that regulation took effect when they first entered Turkey in 2011 (Erdoğan, 2015). Syrians under temporary protection started to benefit from “migrant health centers, health service providers of the Ministry of Health and its affiliates, university healthcare practice and research centers, private hospitals, and voluntary health centers” (Alp et al., 2018, p.88).

Turkey preferred to use the term “harmonization” rather than integration and set regulations and policies to harmonize Syrian people with Turkish society in LFIP which took effect in 2013. Harmonization was described as a mutual process aims to equip foreigners and the applicants “with knowledge and skills that will facilitate their self-reliance in all spheres of their social lives without any dependency to third persons in our country, in the resettlement countries or in their home countries when they return” (DGMM, n.d.). The regulations was not based on “rights” of refugees and the “obligation” imposed on the state, but support of the host state based on well-intentioned efforts of the host to the guests - within the bounds of possibility” (Erdoğan, 2017, p.18). The emergence of a National Harmonization Strategy expanded the framework of policies to catch a harmonization with the refugees. After the huge flow started in 2014, Turkey prepared long-term plans especially on school age Syrian refugees.

With drastically increasing refugee numbers after 2014 Turkey realized that many Syrians in Turkey will permanently stay and convinced to take long term measures. The number of Syrians residing in temporary housing centers in 2019 was 63,188 that means 1.71% of Syrians live in camps. As of October 10, 2019, the number of Syrians living in the cities was 3 million 611 thousand 440 people. The number of Syrians living in the cities increased by 8,568 people compared to last month (Mülteciler Derneği, 2019). The increasing number of Syrian refugees involved in city life coming
from rural areas convinced government to take actions to guarantee the adaptation of Syrians as fast as possible. The major attempt of the government invested primarily on the education of Syrian children as a means of integration. The statements of official documents and authorities considered uneducated refugee children as “source of concern for security.” (Alp et al, 2018, p.69). In other words, Turkey’s national security concerns which already has been directing migration and integration policies for years, also caused Turkey to integrate school-aged Syrian refugees into the national education system, to protect the state from unintegrated, radicalized individuals.

The educational background of Syrians considerably different from the refugees in European states. Although according to statistics before the crisis Syria’s level of education was 94%, the current refugees’ education level is quite below Turkey’s national level. 33% of Syrian refugees are illiterate, 13% are literate without school education, 16,5% has elementary school degree, 6,5% has secondary school degree and only 6,5% has high school and university degrees; the remaining 25.6% of did not give information on their educational backgrounds (Erdoğan & Erdoğan, 2018).

The poor education levels of the newcomers in addition the language barrier, differences between the alphabet of Arabic and Turkish put barriers also for adult Syrian refugees and stresses the necessity of education for all Syrian refugees to create a harmonization. The recent population of Syrians in Turkey exceeds 3,6 million, 46,93% of this population is under 18, and 22,55% is between 15-24, which translates to more than one and a half millions of children and youth population (Directorate General Of Migration Management, 2019). Because of millions of Syrians at school age, the Turkish state put effort to produce solutions in order provide access to education in line with the state’s commitment to the “no lost generation” policy (Alp et al, 2018, p.78). The education of Syrian children in TECs in Arabic and an isolated environment were considered as risky in terms of creating parallel societies and lack of dialogue and relation between Turkish and Syrian people (Yavçan & Akalın, 2016).

The Ministry of National Education (MoNE) intensified adopted stronger emergency measures and Syrian students given right to register in public schools by the MoNE
The MoNE’s 2014 Circular regulated the procedures of the educational services provided for all non-citizens in Turkey. The registration in public schools was facilitated through identification documents for refugees. The government decided to gradually close TEC’s within a certain period of time to integrate Syrian refugees into Turkish education system. In 2017, there were 404 TECs, in 20 different cities currently 224 TECs in 19 cities where Syrian citizens and Syrian students concentrated the most. In 224 Temporary Education Centers, 106,845 students, all Syrian, are receiving intensive Turkish education (T.C. MEB Hayat Boyu Öğrenme Genel Müdürlüğü, 2018). The process of closing the Temporary Education centers is ongoing and as of October 2018, 224 TECs are underway. A commission of the MoNE with a circular recommended to direct Syrian students to religious İmam Hatip schools, vocational schools in order to increase schooling rates of refugee children considering the cultural preferences of Syrian refugees.

In 2016, the MoNE founded the Migration and Emergency Education Department (MEED) within the Directorate General for Lifelong Learning (DGLL) “as the key unit responsible for planning, legislation, implementation, and coordination of education and complementary services for “all refugees” residing in Turkey, regardless of duration of stay and residency status” (Cloeters, G , n.d, p.15) In the same year, the government initiated a “ABB” (PIKTES, n.d) to contribute to the access of Syrian citizens to education services in Turkey and to Support the Ministry of National Education in its efforts on integration of Syrian kids . In 2016, the Project for Promoting the Integration of Syrian Children into the Turkish Education System , 300 million euros was funded by the EU for additional courses, training staff, materials , support services, transportation and psychosocial consultation.

Many other financial support projects for vulnerable Syrian refugees also have been initiated as a part of educational strategies. In 2016 Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) program put into practice to provide cash transfer for Syrians (Cloeters, G , n.d, p.16). A collaborative project called “Conditional Cash Transfer for Education” has launched in 2017 to encourage enrollment and improve school attendance of children by financially supporting the families of refugee children to continue sending their children to school (UNICEF Turkey, 2018). The Ministry of Family and Social
Policy, the Ministry of National Education, the Turkish Red Crescent, AFAD, the Directorate General of European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), and UNICEF are involved in the Project and project aims to help 450,000 refugee children to continue their education.

According to the 2018 statistics of the MoNE, A total number of 518,105 students, including 465,171 temporarily protected Syrians and 52,934 Iraqis, who came to Turkey through mass migration, are educated in Turkish curriculum at the Turkish public schools In 224 Temporary Education centers in 19 provinces, 106,845 students, all of them Syrian, receive education with additional intensive Turkish language classes. There are also 16,680 students enrolled in open schools. 316,045 girls (49.26%), and 325,585 boys (50.74%) in total 641,630 students have accessed to education. 585.181 of the students are Syrians. (T.C. MEB Hayat Boyu Öğrenme Genel Müdürlüğü, 2018)

According to the levels of education of the students in public schools and temporary education centers, the schooling rates are 31.63% in pre-school, 96.90% in the primary school, 57.53% in the secondary school and 25.19% in the high school. General enrollment ratio has reached to 63% in 2017/2018 semester while it was 30% in 2014/2015 semester (T.C. MEB Hayat Boyu Öğrenme Genel Müdürlüğü, 2018). It is obvious that Turkey has achieved a great deal of success but the development of crisis management in the form of temporary, left Turkey aside from permanent and long term policies while managing a process that concerns millions of people. In addition to uncertainty of the future policies for education, there are also existing major problems to increase schooling and access to education of Syrians. First of all, Turkey has about 18 million students of basic education age. Of course, there is already a fundamental problem of physical infrastructure, capacity and qualifications in public schools. Secondly, around 400,000 school age Syrian refugees are out of school system. The ratio of student not attending school increases in secondary and high school education. Economic issues have obstructive roles on schooling. It is estimated that most of Syrian children work illegally because of economic concerns. When their parents fail to find a job, children have nothing to do but to work and most of the children work illegally in various jobs (Alp et. al, 2018, p.78). Cultural factors are
another basic reason for unschooled Syrian refugees. Early age marriages disrupt girls’ school life.

In addition to national education system and public schools in Public Education Centers the MoNE provides various courses for Syrian youth and adults, such as hobby, language and vocational courses. As the language problem is a major obstacle for Syrians and other foreigners to be able to adapt to education system and participate in social life. Accordingly, the MoNE offers intensive Turkish language teaching modules in Public Education Centers for foreigners at wide age range (T.C. MEB Hayat Boyu Öğrenme Genel Müdürlüğü, 2018). Between 2014-2018 almost 140,000 Syrians attended language courses, and approximately 350,000 Syrians, mostly females, attended other general courses such as personal development, designing, child development, music and sports. Community centers are other establishments that give Turkish language courses for children and adults. The courses are given especially in the evenings and on weekends for workers.

The government also supports the access of Syrian refugees to higher education institutions. The Council of Higher Education took decisions for students’ recognition who were previously attending undergraduate programs in Syria or Egypt (Erdoğan & Erdoğan, 2018). The regulations allowed Syrians enrollment as international students at universities individually and enabled each university to determine the number for international students. However, a quota was put , to protect the balance of the national students. In the cities where Syrians population is high, the students who cannot present documentation allowed to register as special students. (Erdoğan & Erdoğan, 2018).

Syrians under Temporary Protection was given legal right to work in October 2014. In 2016 principles for foreigners have been revised and regulated by International Labor Law (UIK in Turkish). Working principles for Syrians under Temporary Protection related the law was regulated by Regulation On Work Permits For Foreigners with Temporary Protection in the same year. The regulations on the work permit for Syrians are stated as
Employers who would like to hire the Syrian citizens who fled their country due to domestic conflict can apply to our Ministry for work permits in line with the official procedure and principles that are indicated on our website. The Syrian citizens in the name of whom work permit applications will be made should have at least 6 months of standing residence permit granted by Police Offices. (Erdoğan & Ünver, 2015, p.41)

There is a quota limit Syrians in workplaces, the number of Syrians cannot exceed 10% of the workforce in any workplace. The number of Syrians granted work permits in Turkey is 31,185 people, according to a statement by the Ministry of family, labor and Social Services in 2019 (Mülteciler Derneği, 2019). The number of the registered Syrian workers is notwithstanding the situation of Syrians. It is estimated 800 thousand to 1 million Syrians are part of the work force. (Erdoğan & Ünver, 2015, p.10). Therefore, the main problem in this regard is that Syrians accessed to labor market without registration. Unfortunately, employers exploit the existence of Syrians and take advantage of recruiting low cost labor. A comprehensive study including the World Bank’s and the ILO’s Reports on the impact of Syrian refugees on the Turkish business world, economy and employment identifies the Syrian workers as “unqualified workers who have the potential to supply the demand for labor in agriculture, and livestock as well as manufacturing and industrial sectors, which do not require qualifications” (Erdoğan & Ünver, 2015, p.59). Moreover, the report drew attention that Syrian refugees serves to informal economic activities “which destroy economic stability, increases unlawful profit, negatively affects lawfully run firms and, above all, damages the state that cannot control taxes and insurance” (Erdoğan & Ünver, 2015, p.60).

Considering the need for highly qualified workforce, in 2016, the Council of Higher Education, designed a system Foreign Academician Information System (YABSIS) to create a database of researchers and foreign academicians who were forced to leave their country and migrate to Turkey. The system received 1,637 applications, as of 2017, “14 professors, 14 associate professors, 93 assistant professors, 124 teaching assistants, 4 doctors, 1 research assistant, 79 lecturers and 5 Syrians with the title of expert were already working in vocational colleges, state, and private foundation universities established by Law 4702” (Alp et. al, 2018, p.87).
In addition, Workforce Law No. 6735 in August 2016 introduced the Turquoise Cards that grants foreigners “the right of work permanently in Turkey, and the right of residence to his/her spouse and dependent children. Holders of Turquoise Cards will have the same rights as accorded to Turkish citizens after a transition period”. (“Turkey’s New Law on International Workforce”, n.d) The government grants naturalization for foreigners with professions “to give them the chance to work as citizens like the children of this nation” (Göksel, 2018, p.161). According to the general provisions Syrians under temporary protection have no possibility for naturalization. However, efforts are being carried out to facilitate the exceptional naturalization of some people in Turkey under temporary protection status who have a particular profession or level of education or made serious amount of investment in Turkey.

To sum up, Turkey’s ability to follow clear and consistent integration policies in all areas for the Syrian refugees is entangled by the size of the population of Syrian refugees. The legal status for Syrians defined in accordance with national migration policy approach restricts elbow room for Turkey. It is obviously urgent to determine a comprehensive, long term and sustainable policy for Syrian refugees in Turkey. On the other hand, a significant policy on Syrian children has taken place; the Syrian children started to enroll Turkish national school system. In the long term the Turkey’s aim is to integrate Syrian children into society equipped with language skills and knowledge of Turkish norms, culture, history, and structures to prevent emergence of a parallel population threatens national security. Turkey’s national education system and policies to integrate Syrians in the long term into society reflects the characterization a unified nation building of Turkey on Turkishness. Similar to the early periods of Turkish Republic aimed to assimilate non-Turk Muslims by placing them among the Turks (Çağaptay, 2002), currently Turkey places Syrians in schools.

### 4.4 Comparison of Sweden, Germany and Turkey’s Policies After the Syrian Refugee Crisis.

It is possible to argue that the developments in the aftermath of the Syrian crisis, moved in line with the historical and legal framework of migration policies of Sweden,
Germany, and Turkey, the extent of the crisis and its reflection on the countries led states to take actions to strengthen their previous migration and integration policies or their traditional integration models to foster the integration of remarkable population of refugees.

It is important to underline that Sweden and Germany have already institutionalized migration frameworks and efficient EU level mechanisms to adjust migration and refugee policies before the Syrian refugee crisis. On the other hand, Turkey’s position as a country of immigration and transit migration has put on the political agenda of Turkey with EU negotiations and liberal attempts of the ruling party in 2000s (Kale et al, 2018, p.1). The substantial institutions, documents and authorities to manage migration and related subheadings have just appeared. In other words, Turkey did not only manage the Syrian refugee influx but at the same time, since the beginning of the crisis continued to establish the institutional structure to manage the necessary migration and integration procedures.

On the other hand, while the permanency of an overwhelming majority of Syrian refugees is a reality; permanent solutions in political and legal terms have not mentioned in a sustained manner in Turkey. Turkey as a signatory of the 1951 Geneva Convention with a geographical limitation applies only a temporary asylum people from non-European countries until they were settled in a third country which became the fundamental basis of the Turkish asylum and refugee policies (Kirişçi, 2000). After the Syrian crisis Turkey did not give compromise on the statement allows only those fleeing from Europe due to human rights violations could apply for a refugee status Turkey sticks firmly on previous national security concerns and did not abolish the geographical limitation Syrians were not officially given refugees status and only granted with temporary protection. The context grounded on the temporality of the situation which would end with the return of the foreigners. Under the temporary protection, Syrians were allowed to stay in Turkey, but not allowed to apply for asylum (Erdoğan, 2015).
Meanwhile Germany made an effort in the refugee problem with a long-term planning; considering the effect of migration on economic growth. Already in 2005 Germany accepted that Germany is an immigrant country and needs migrants to sustain the wealth of its strong industrial system. The Migration Act entered into force in 2005 has introduced “Leitkultur” that expects migrants to learn the German language and to know, and to respect the laws of Germany as a condition for long-term permanent residency and integration. In the same year the integration courses were established for third-country nationals to offer language courses and orientation courses. The Syrian policy of Germany due to demographic factors, in an aging Germany, aimed to provide a steadiness on population with the young migrant population which at the same time, affects labor market positively, as the Syrian refugees are young but at the same comparatively well educated (Akın, 2017, p.88).

As a response to the refugee crisis put Germany’s Integration Act in 2016 into effect to facilitate integration process for refugees. The motto of the new act was “support and challenge” and the scope was to ensure integration of refugees who are willing to cooperate by providing more integration classes, vocational trainings, employment and training opportunities. With the integration act the integration courses became compulsory and those asylum seekers who refuse to take courses were not given access to government benefits which they need to stay in the country legally. The curriculum of the integration course includes 600 hours language lessons and 100 hours lessons about German history, legal system and culture to educate refugees under the strong influence of German “Leitkultur” to integrate German society. In other words, Germany rehearsed the basic intentions and scope of the Migration Act of 2005 in 2016 but in a more mandatory manner.

Similarly, Sweden that sustained its previous liberal attitudes towards Syrian refugees claimed Sweden could welcome people fleeing war and persecution without a limit. As Sweden’s integration policy, promises equal rights, obligations and opportunities for all, regardless of any background in a multicultural approach, primary strategy of Sweden has been introduction of newcomers into socioeconomic life as fast as possible. Before the 2015 Syrian crisis Sweden had already presented a comprehensive
system to accelerate integration process but experienced failures especially in employment of migrant population, school success of students with a migration background which resulted in isolation of the migrant population.

After the Syrian crisis, the Swedish government firstly took actions to reduce human flow that exceeded the capacity and efficiency of Sweden. Followingly Sweden headed the ongoing problematic areas contradicts with its liberal and multicultural characteristic that the Syrian crisis brought to the surface one more time. The most significant service fell short to supply newcomers need was accommodation. Because of rent regulations and low construction in Sweden, the accommodation system forced asylum seekers to live in outside of the major cities which decrease the employment options for refugees in the long term. The government firstly changed the previous system that municipalities were able to decide whether or not to participate in the settlement of the newcomers. To prevent physical isolation of asylum seekers and migrants, all municipalities were required to participate in a certain share of protection beneficiaries (Fratzke, 2017, p.8).

Other major problem of migrants was to access to the labor market. Sweden has already an integration approach that aims to support migrants to include the welfare system of Sweden as fast as possible (Soininen, 1999,691). In order to increase employment, to minimize social and economic cost of dependency refugees have been offered an individual introduction plan that includes basic Swedish language training, and vocational trainings prepared after a detailed interview with the asylum seeker (Fratzke, 2017, p.17). After the Syrian refugee crisis, just like Germany, it became mandatory for refugees to follow the prepared plans. The government also initiated fast tracks programs in various professions to introduce the skilled refugees into the labor market after a sufficient language education and vocational training. Therefore, it is possible to argue that education of refugees in vocational areas was used by the Swedish government to support self-sufficiency of the new members to integrate them equal members of the society and decrease unemployment rates. In other words, Sweden strengthen its previous policies on economic integration of migrants enforcing education and trainings.
Germany, also used trainings and courses to prevent the lack of language skills, differences between education levels and the vocational qualifications of Syrians and Germany that decrease the chance of migrants’ access into the labor market. Also Germany increased apprenticeship tracks and vocational trainings to integrate Syrian refugees as skilled workers into German society. Integration Act in 2016 granted a legal certainty to asylum seekers undergoing vocational training. According to 3+2 regulation if an asylum seeker are employed by a firm in a trainee position they will not be deported during their vocational training period for three years. In addition if they success during their training, the asylum application will be reviewed.

Compared to Germany and Sweden it’s hard to mention about a well design strategy to increase access to the labor market for Syrians in Turkey. Most of the Syrian workers are not registered into the work permit system and the majority works in black market with low wages as unqualified workers in agriculture, manufacturing and industrial sectors, which do not require qualifications Vocational trainings and adult educations are provided by the government and also the involvement of various NGOs are increasing however, they are quite limited and non-systematic compared to Sweden and Germany. The effects of education as a key to access to the labor market in skilled jobs only can be observed in future years as an outcome of schooling Syrian children in Turkey’s national education system.

As a matter of principle, education is legally guaranteed for all without any discrimination as a human right. Therefore, access to education has already been guaranteed in Sweden, Germany and Turkey. The EU law binding Germany and Sweden enforces enrollment of asylum seekers to school within three months. In Sweden the duration is one month but in Germany generally registration takes longer periods. In Turkey in 2014, Syrian students were given the right to register into public schools by the MoNE (Syrians in Turkey, p.15). Previously, Syrian children were educated according to the Syrian national curriculum in Arabic in TECs established to provide urgent education support for Syrian refugees. The government aims to abolish all TECs in 2020 and to sustain education only at the national schools in Turkish. The
transfer of the students to the national education system is a remarkable proof of using education as a main tool of integration. To prevent a socially excluded “problematic generation” (Alp et. al, 2018, p.97) that would threaten the security of public order, it was decided to include Syrians into a homogeneous education model. In the long term the Turkey’s aim is to integrate Syrian children into society equipped with language skills and knowledge of Turkish norms, culture, history, and structures to prevent emergence of a population threats national security. Turkey’s national education system and policies to integrate Syrians in the long term into society reflects the characterization of one-sided assimilationist model.

It is possible to argue that also in Sweden and Germany the policies on education system after the Syrian refugee crisis was relevant to their national traditional integration models and sustained to reproduce members for a desired society related to that models. Sweden made serious attempts to prevent inefficiencies in the current school system. Sweden did not compromise on the existing multicultural understanding but took steps to improve the success of foreign students in this multicultural system. The purpose of Sweden’s reforms after the Syrian crisis was to combine the main education of the foreign students with additional support to achieve in mainstream schooling (Ministry of Education and Research Sweden, 2016). For example mandating preschool in 2018 to accelerate language learning reforms is an example of the reforms that aims to prevent inequalities and segregation in the multiculturalist system in the long term. It is possible to argue that Sweden’s reforms on education after the Syria crisis aimed to minimize the performance gap between the native and refugee students which contradicts with equality principle of the Swedish integration approach and negatively affects the social and structural integration of the refugee students.

In Germany, the school system continues to reproduce the segregationist social order of Germany (Koehler & Schneider, 2019). The school system and early tracking in Germany is highly criticized because of enforcing especially newly arrived migrant students into low qualified vocational schools. Although there is no information about the enrollment rate of refugees, it is estimated that after the Syrian crisis the newly arrived refugee children because of the early tracking in the schools are adopted into
the lowest qualifying vocational training in secondary education to be workers in the labor market, just like other children with migration background. The literature does not give remarkable information about the developments in the school system compared to Sweden and Turkey except the investments to increase the language skills of the refugees (additional language classes, German as a second language in some federal states) and improvement of the class and school capacities.

As well as compulsory education, additional courses and non-formal educations make valuable contributions to the integration of migrants. After the Syrian crisis Sweden, Germany and Turkey used language training to integrate refugees, as the acquisition of language skills lead to independence and participation in society of the refugees. In addition to the school system, examples of language courses provided by various agencies and funding of public centers, adult education services and municipalities to expand their capacities highly apparent in these three countries.

To sum up, after the Syrian refugee crisis in Sweden, Germany and Turkey the integration policies mainly focused on education, trainings and courses to grant integration of refugees. The school systems are the main institutions that states create their desired kind of society compatible with national perceptions and citizenship policies. Therefore, pattern of integrating Syrian children that make up the majority of the Syrian refugees has already shaped by each country’s education models. Although the legal status and future strategies on Syrians is still unclear in case of Turkey, enrollment of Syrian children to Turkish schools intended to minimize Turkey’s national security concerns eventually. Sweden and Germany also used education as a primary tool to promote Syrians integration to labor market swiftly; vocational trainings, courses, language supports were offered to newcomers to increase their employment rates. Although the strong emphasize on education and trainings has resembled in these three countries, in the long run each country support and reproduce their distinctive integration models.
Comparison of Sweden, Germany and Turkey’s Changing Policies After the Syrian Refugee Crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A legal status for Syrians; subsidiary protection, resettlement refugees, refugees of convention</td>
<td>A legal status for Syrians; subsidiary protection, resettlement refugees, refugees of convention</td>
<td>Only temporary protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>Obliged Introduction Plans to increase access to labor market with education</td>
<td>Compulsory Integration courses to develop language skills and knowledge on German culture</td>
<td>Access to National School System of Syrian children to prevent marginalization of the next generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reforms in education system to increase success in school system</td>
<td>3+2 regulation to promote vocational training</td>
<td>Promotion of Schooling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments on municipalities for housing system and comprehensive trainings, language courses in addition to school system</td>
<td>Language courses to promote German language skills</td>
<td>Language Courses, Limited vocational and hobby courses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policies in line with fast introduction of refugees into socioeconomic system and to promote equal, multicultural society</td>
<td>Policies in line with ‘Leading German culture’ and German ‘need migrants as workforce’</td>
<td>Policies in line with national security and one sided assimilationist policies, still no constant integration policies and legal status.</td>
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Figure 5: Comparison the migration and integration policies of Sweden, Germany and Turkey After Syrian Refugee Crisis
Sweden, Germany, and Turkey have experienced one of the largest migration influxes since the end of the Cold War. The crisis in Syria led to the fleeing of millions of Syrian refugees and their families inside the borders of Sweden, Germany, and Turkey. Moreover, a drastically high number of children under the age of 18, who were separated from their families, passed the borders of states that have completely unfamiliar cultural, political and social environments compared to the states where they have born. The migration flow of serious numbers of newcomers led to a considerable impact on each state’s political agenda. The intense political agenda of each state set the issue of Syrians through calls for international and national emergency meetings, negotiations and bargaining. Internal and external tensions sustained during the crisis. The process triggered legal and political adjustments and regulations to reduce and manage the migration in each state. Afterwards, Sweden, Germany and Turkey focused on how to integrate the newcomers in the existing cultural, economic and political structures. Sweden, Germany and Turkey reproduced their traditional integration models by using education as a primary tool for the integration of Syrians after the Syrian crisis.

Sweden welcomes cultural differences, allows the migrants to protect their customs, language, culture, and traditions. The institutions of the state welcome and secure public recognition of diverse cultures and ethnicities by providing equal rights to each
religious, ethnic and cultural group in the society (Soininen, 1999). The integration policy of Sweden insists on mutual adaptation, which binds both the migrants and the natives. Nonetheless, Sweden stresses state-centered efforts are essential to increase incorporation and socioeconomic inclusion of migrants. Citizenship is used as a tool to support migrants to participate in every aspect of society, rather than stirring up strong public debates and nationalist emotions. A fast introduction to the labor market, education, social and economic services with equal rights would encourage the migrants to become self-sufficient members of society. Similarly, the main purpose of the Swedish education system is to provide the same opportunities to migrant children that their national peers have. Sweden provides a comprehensive support model including a wide range of educational options (EU Publications, 2013).

Compared to Sweden, Germany experienced a demographic and political transformation as a result of migration in the last decades. The nationhood of Germany based on pure jus sanguinis (Brubaker, 1992) limited the openness to diversity. After the 1990s the diversified migrant flow of guest workers, asylum seekers and their families and the EU migrants led to the debates on policies of Germany. Finally, Germany was convinced to be an immigrant country in the early 2000s and liberalized its community of descent policies. The European Union integration and the respect for human rights evolved the national system of Germany through a more liberal political approach towards diversity. Actually, the research shows that Germany on one hand adopts liberal European values and on the other hand carries a soft version of exclusionist to assimilationist model. Migrants are considered as a workforce necessary for economic section. In the 2000s Germany regarded migration as a solution to deal with the socioeconomic consequences of the demographic features of Germany. Even Germany accepts Germany needs migrants, expects the migrants to respect liberal German leading culture and values if they stay in Germany. In the formulated concept of the leading culture (Leitkultur) learning the German language and the traditions, customs, history, culture, and the legal system of Germany are the key components. The naturalization for third-country nationals is only granted if they score enough at the test examining knowledge of the German language and culture. The education system of Germany reflects both the national model and integration
policies. The strong emphasis on vocational training to support economic growth and development, lead to a solid orientation of migrant children towards vocational trainings. The school system and integration courses are intensively designed to adapt migrants to the German language, culture and norms.

The process to construct an effective framework on migration and integration policy is quite new in the case of Turkey compared to Germany and Sweden. The only legal document of Turkey on migration issues was the Law on Settlement 2510 in 1934 that the law on one hand drew the framework of the policy on migration issues, on the other hand constructed the sense of nationhood in the new republic. Citizenship only belonged to individuals with Turkish descent and culture and the policies on immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees managed based on that vigorous sense of Turkishness (Çağaptay, 2002). Turkey followed a policy focused on national security and did not allow any political, cultural and social attempt that could threaten the monoethnic structure of the state. Considering that security priorities Turkey signed the 1951 Geneva Convention with a geographical limitation and only has granted refugee status to those coming from the West. Since then, Turkey has sustained the geographical limitation. With the rise of economic, social and political turmoil and instabilities in the regions neighboring to Turkey in the 2000s Turkey has become a country of immigration and also transit migration (İçduygu & Aksel, 2013). The 2000s has been the era of courageous attempts for Turkey to transform migration and asylum policies into a more liberal context and to establish an institutional framework in accordance with the EU standards during the membership negotiations. Turkey’s progress continues, even though it is caught up between the past nationalist legacies and more liberal policies. The education system of Turkey is not suitable for plurality. The schools are open to all ethnicities and cultures, however cultural, religious, ethnic diversity is not encouraged.

It is obvious that Sweden sustained its previous liberal attitudes towards Syrian refugees and declared that Sweden could welcome people fleeing war and persecution without a limit. However, the unprecedented number of Syrians led to a temporary restriction of liberal asylum policies. After the 2015 Syrian crisis Sweden maintained its comprehensive system to accelerate the integration process, especially improving
the failed areas such as access to the labor market, housing and education. Sweden’s perception of integration claims state-centered efforts are fundamental as much as migrants’ efforts. to increase incorporation and socioeconomic inclusion of migrants. Education played a key role in the post-Syrian crisis period in state-centered efforts. Sweden mainly applied to education and trainings as a corrective and preventive action on the risks of isolation, unemployment and lack of educational skills. Sweden obliged refugees to follow the introduction plans including language courses or vocational trainings prepared to increase the access to the labor market with enhanced training of the refugees. The government also prepared a budget to offer more opportunities for refugees to develop their skills such as labor market programs, vocational education courses and language training courses. Fast tracks programs supported skilled refugees’ adaptation to labor market via sufficient language education and vocational training.

Sweden also reformed its core institution for the future members of the society. The new regulations on newly arrived students in Swedish schools revised introduction classes to prevent language barriers and adaptation problems. Preschool classes became compulsory for all children from the age of six to accelerate learning Swedish language and socialization for children who cannot practice Swedish at home. Sweden funded municipalities as the responsible authority were to use the budget to support the language learning of refugees, to increase the didactical performance of teachers and schools.

In Germany case, this study proved that with the support and challenge motto in 2016, considering the effect of migration on economic growth in the long term, Germany made an investment on the education of refugees. The Syrian policy of Germany due to demographic factors, in an aging Germany, aimed to provide a steadiness on population with the young migrant population which at the same time, affects labor market positively, as the Syrian refugees are young but at the same comparatively well educated (Akın, 2017, p.88). Asylum Act II and Integration Act of 2016 repeated the strong emphasis on the “Leitkultur” as a priority for integration. Primarily Germany
used education to promote its “Leitkultur”, the integration courses become compulsory and the class hours have increased.

Germany opened its doors to Syrians assuming the potential of refugees as skilled workers. By the Integration Act in 2016, Germany’s intention to support and develop skills refugees to adapt them to the labor market came out apparently. The act’s scope mainly included “more integration classes, vocational training, employment and training opportunities…permanent settlement permits for refugees who show that they are willing to cooperate and take integration classes” (Gesley, 2015). 3+2 statement of the act granted a legal certainty to refugees undergoing vocational training; when they are employed by a firm in a trainee position, they will not be deported during their vocational training period for three years. The government funded refugees to attend job-related language training courses and provided more budget for the formation of job opportunities.

The study showed that there are not remarkable attempts on the school system compared to vocational investments, except investments to increase the language skills of the refugees (additional language classes, German as a second language in some federal states) and improvement of the class and school capacities. After the Syrian crisis the newly arrived refugee children- because of the early tracking in the schools- are assumed to be enrolled into the lowest qualifying vocational training in secondary education to be workers in the labor market, just like other children with migration background. In a sense education system reproduces its future workers in medium or low skilled jobs.

In the Turkish case after the Syrian crisis, Turkey’s migration and integration policies sustained its position on the past based on nationalist legacies. After the Syrian crisis Turkey did not give compromise on the statement that allows only those fleeing from Europe due to human rights violations could apply for a refugee status. Turkey sticks firmly on previous national security concerns and did not abolish the geographical limitation Syrians are not officially given refugees status and only granted with temporary protection. Under the temporary protection, Syrians are allowed to stay in Turkey, but not allowed to for a permanent residency. During the Syrian crisis for the
first time “harmonization” introduced in the political agenda, however, the scope of harmonization does not offer a clear roadmap on the long-term strategies.

The most remarkable long-term policy of Turkey after the Syrian crisis on integration used education to protect its national legacies. The Syrian children are being educated in Arabic-medium Temporary Education Centers (TECs) based on the Syrian national curriculum but adapted according to the national school system of Turkey. All TECs in 2020 will be abolished and the Syrian children will have to attend only the Turkish-medium national schools with their native peers. The transfer of these students into the national education system is a remarkable proof of using education as a main tool for integration. To prevent the emergence of a socially excluded “problematic generation”, that may cause a security threat against the public order, the Turkish Government decided to include Syrians into a homogeneous education model.

The Syrian children who are mostly coming from rural areas of Syria are enrolling in schools giving education in Turkish, following the official Turkish curriculum. With the language skills and knowledge of Turkish norms, culture, history and structures they will attain by means of this education, they are expected to integrate better into the urban conditions and Turkish society. The government launched a broad range of funding projects to financially support the Syrian families and started initiatives to increase the Syrian children’s rate of enrolment in school. Turkey re-interpret the former integration model of the early-republican period and applies it to its current school system. With this method, the non-Turkish Muslims are being assimilated through the placement among the Turks.

Consequently, while the developments in the aftermath of the Syrian crisis have moved in line with the historical and legal framework of migration policies of Sweden, Germany, and Turkey, the extent of the crisis and its impacts on the countries, however, has led to changes in their migration and integration policies. Due to the enormous number of Syrians flooded the country and the temporary legal status granted by the Turkish Government, Turkey is less consistent in creating and following integration policies than Germany and Sweden. Turkey recently prefers to use the term “harmonization” instead of “integration” and sets regulations and policies to
harmonize the Syrian people with Turkish society. The most prominent action of Turkey was granting the Syrian children the access to its national school system with the intention to prevent the rise of any likely security issues, and to adapt the Syrian children a centralized school system closely related to national security. Germany has supported an open but selective migration policy. After the Syrian crisis, Germany has carried out its integration policies under the motto of “support and challenge”, most probably to use the refugee migration as an opportunity for economic growth by providing language education and training for the refugees to help them to develop their skills to become compatible and productive members within the German society. Sweden, on the other hand, despite the challenges posed by the refugee crisis, is still trying to preserve its multicultural and inclusive practices. Although it was over the capacity of the state, in response to the human influx, the government has adopted integration policies to improve job opportunities and conducted effective educational reforms to increase school success. In each of these countries, education has played the leading role in implementing the official integration policies conducted after the Syria crisis. By means of education, Sweden, Germany and Turkey have reproduced and reinforced their prior integration models.
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Bu çalışma, son yılların en büyük insani krizi olarak değerlendirilen Suriye mülteci krizinden sonra, kayda değer miktarda Suriyeliye ev sahipliği yapan İsveç, Almanya ve Türkiye'nin entegrasyon politikaları üzerine karşılaştırmalı bir araştırma yapmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışmada temel araştırma sorusu İsveç, Almanya ve Türkiye'nin yoğun mülteci akını sonrasında, Suriyeli mültecilerle ilgili süreci yönetirken ön çıkan entegrasyon alanlarının, bu alanlarda kullanılan araçlarının ne olduğudur. Bu çalışma farklı entegrasyon modellerine ve göc politikalarına sahip olmalarına rağmen, Suriye krizi sonrası üç ülkenin de en önemli entegrasyon aracı olarak eğitimi kullandıklarını savunmaktadır. Aynı zamanda birçok alanda farklı eğitimler aracılığıyla Suriyeli mültecileri geleneksel entegrasyon modellerine uygun şekilde konumlandirmaya çalışıklarını ve entegrasyon modellerini yinelediklerini ortaya koymaktadır.

Günümüzde göc, ekonomik, politik ve çevresel nedenlerle gelişen kitlesel insan hareketinin bir sonucu olarak, küresel alanda devam eden ortak bir tartışma konusudur. Küresel dünyada düzenli veya düzensiz göç milyonlarca insan anavatanlarını çalışmak, eğitim almak, daha iyi yaşam şartlarına sahip olmak için gönüllü olarak veya çatışma, savaş veya zulüm sonucu istemsiz olarak geride bıraklardır. Bu büyük çaplı göçler devletleri derinden etkilemekte ve devletin kurumlarını öteki ile birlikte yaşamaya yönelik entegrasyon politikaları geliştirmeye zorlamaktadır.

Uluslararası literatürde birbirinden farklı tanımlar yer alsa da entegrasyonun sıkça karşılaşılan genel tanı görülen göçmenlerin ev sahibi toplumun sosyal, ekonomik, kültürel ve siyasal yaşamına dahil edilmesiyle, göç edenler ve ev sahibi toplum arasındaki karşılıklı uyumdan bahsetmektedir. Dolayısıyla büyümeye, hak ve fırsatlar, ayrımcılığı önleme, istihdam, eğitim, sosyal uyum, aidiyet, vatandaşlık, sağlık hizmetleri gibi temel politika alanlarına temas eden çok yönlü ve zorlu bir süreçtir.


Entegrasyon tanımı ve kapsamı ülkeler göre farklılık arz etmekte ve dolayısıyla ülkeler farklı entegrasyon politikaları ortaya koymaktadır. Bu farklılık ev sahibi devletin toplumsal düzeni, uluslararası süreci ve göçe yönelik yaklaşımlarıyla yakından ilgilidir. Genel itibariyle entegrasyon politikaları, devletlerin vatandaşlık kavramı ve ulusal anlayışı doğrultusunda göçmenlerle bütünleşmeyi şekillendirmekte çok kültürlülükten, asimilasyona kadar farklılaşabilmektedir.


Yeni politika, aynı zamanda göçmenlerin farklı kültürlerini korumayı, dillerini, etnik yapılarını korumaları da desteklemektedir. Fakat göçmenlerin sahip olduğu ve benimsediği bu farklılıkların, İsveç’in değerleriyle çelişmemesi gerektiğini vurgulamıştır.

İsveç’in bugünkü çok kültürlü entegrasyon politikası 1990’lı yıllarda tamamen şekillenmiş ve ayrımcılığıla mücadele eden önemli düzenlemeler yapılmıştır. İsveç en liberal göc politikası uygulayan ülkelerden biri olmuştur. İsveç, göçmenlerin bütünleştirilmesi ve sosyoekonomik olarak İsveç refah sisteminine dahil edilmesini devlet merkezli çabalarla dayandığına inanmaktadır. İsveç göçmenlerin iş gücü piyasasına, eğitime, sosyal ve ekonomik hizmetlere toplumda eşit haklara sahip bireyler olarak hızla katılmasıının, göçmenleri toplumun kendi kendine yeten üyesi olmaya teşvik etme politikasını kabul etmiştir. Bu nedenle vatandaşlık, göçmenlerin ulusal söylemle güclendirmek yerine toplumun her alanında katılımını desteklemek için

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bir araç olarak kullanılmıştır. Vatandaşlık kavramının kamuoyunda yaratığı ateşli tartışmaları ve aşırı milliyetçi söylemeler sınırlandırır.

Benzer şekilde, İsveç eğitim sisteminin temel amacı, göçmen çocuklara İsveçli akranlarıyla aynı fırsatları sunmaktadır. İsveç, göçmenlere yüksek akademik başarılar elde etmelerini sağlayacak bir okul sistemi ve ömrü boyu öğrenim de dahil olmak üzere çok çeşitli ve her yaş grubu için kapsayıcı öğrenim seçenekleri sunmaktadır. Ayrıca anadil eğitimi desteklemektedir. Ancak, göçmenlerin yüksek işsizlik oranları, sosyal ayrımcılık, okul sistemindeki aksaklıklar ve göçmenlerin fiziki izolasyonu 2000’li yılların başından beri İsveç’e yönelik eleştirilerin başında yer almaktadır.

Almanya’nın göç ve entegrasyon politikaları ise soy birliğe dayalı bir ulus anlayışı şekillendirilmiş, bu da kademeli ayrımcılığın söz konusu olduğunu bir göçmen rejimine yol açmıştır. Almanya yoğun göçün bir sonucu olarak göç akınlarının başlanıncasına kıyaslada demografik ve siyasi bir dönüşüm yaşasına da halen oldukça seçici ve ayrıtırıcı bir kabul ve entegr etme süreciyle göçmenlere haklar sunmaktadır.

Almanya, siyasi gündemin güçlü bir soya dayalı ulus anlayışını temel alarak şekillenişinin en dikkat çekici örneklerinden biridir. Vatandaşlık yasalarını standartlaştırmayan Alman İmparatorluğu, 1913 yılında vatandaşla ilgili ilk ulusal ortak yasayı ilan etmiştir ve göç rejimini buna da dayandırmıştır. Bu ilk göç politikası, etnik kökeni Alman olsam olanların vatandaşlığa girmesini önlemeyi ve yurtdışında yaşayan etnik Almanların göç ve vatandaşlığa geçişini kolaylaştırmayı amaçlamaktadır.


İlginç bir detay, Almanya'nın göç ve yabancı nüfus politikaları 1900’lerin başlarında kurulduğu ve günümüzde de devam etmektedir. Vatandaşlık yasalarını standartlaştırmayan Alman İmparatorluğu, 1913 yılında vatandaşla ilgili ilk ulusal ortak yasayı ilan etmiştir. Bu ilk göç politikası, etnik kökeni Alman olsam olanların vatandaşlığa girmesini önlemeyi ve yurtdışında yaşayan etnik Almanların göç ve vatandaşlığa geçişini kolaylaştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. 135


Almanya'nın eğitim sistemi göçmenler için yaşam boyu süren ayrımcılığın temel hazırlamakta ve sorunlar oluşturmaktadır. Ekonomik büyüme ve kalkınmayı desteklemek için mesleki eğitime yapılan güçlü vurgu göçmen çocukları için okul eğitiminde, çıraklık öğreniminde ve mesleki nitelik kazanmında kısıtlayıcı ve ayrımcı uygulamalar içermektedir. Okul eğitimi dışında sağlanan öğrenim olanaklarında yine en çok ön çıkan alanlar dil kursları, entegrasyon kursları ve mesleki eğitimlerdir.
Türkiye’de ise kuruluşdan 2000’li yıllara kadar göç konularında temel ve kapsamlı kurumların varlığından söz etmek mümkün değildir. Türkiye temelde ulusal güvenliğe odaklanan bir politika izlemiş ve Türk kimliği üzerine inşa edilen yapısını tehdit edebilecek etnik ve çeşitliliğe karşı katı göç politikaları uygulamıştır.

Cumhuriyetin ilk dönemde Osmanlı döneminin gayrimüslim nüfusunun göç ettirilmesi ve Türk ve Müslüman nüfusun bu nüfusun yerine yerleştirilmesiyle nüfusun millileştirilmesi sağlanmıştır. Türkiye için göçmenler, sığınmacılar ve mültecilerle ilgili genel düzenlemeleri içeren ilk siyasi belge 1934 yılında 2510 sayılı İskan Kanunu’ndur. Bu yasa Türkiye’ye gelme ve buraya yerleşme hakkını Türk soylundan ve Türk kültüründen olanla vererek, bir yandan göç politikasının öte yandan ulus inşa sürecini çerçevesini belirlemiştir.

Türkiye 1951 yılında Mültecilerin Hukuki Statüsüne ilişkin en önemli belgelerin başında gelen Cenevre Konvansiyonu'nu imzalamış fakat bu sözleşmeye coğrafi çekince ile taraf olmuştur. Buna göre Türkiye, Avrupa ülkeleri dışından gelerek iltica etmek isteyen kişilere geçici yalnızca uluslararası koruma sağlamak ve mülteci statüsü vermemektedir. Bu kısıtlama, halen Türkiye'nin sınırı politika ve uygulamalarını belirleyen temeli oluşturumaktadır.


Türkiye'nin eğitim sisteminin yabancılar için bütüncül ve kapsamlı olduğunu söylemek zordur. Türk okullarında etnik, dini ve kültürel geçmişlerine bakılmaksızın,
yabancı öğrencilere Türk vatandaşları gibi erişim hakkı vermektedir. Okullar tüm etnik kökenlere ve kültürlere açıktır, ancak kültürel, dini, etnik çeşitlilik teşvik edilmemekte ve kültürlerarası uygulamalar bulunmamakta veya öne çıkmamaktadır.


İsviç, geleneksel politikasına uygun olarak, mülteci krizi karşısında liberal göç politikasını sürdürse de artan sığınma başvuruları mevcut sistem kalmayacağı bir noktaya ulaşmıştır. AB ülkelerinin bu yükü paylaşmaları nedeniyle, 2016’dan üç yıl geçici olarak sığınmacı politikasını AB politikalarla uyumlu hale getireceğini açıklayan İsviç Hükümeti aynı zamanda mülteci akını önleyecek önlemler almıştır. Göçmen entegrasyon politikalarına bakıldığında ise İsviç’in daha önce yürütüdüğü politikalarda problemli olan alanları iyileştirmeye ve mülteci sayısının yarattığı baskıyı azaltmaya yönelik olduğu görülmektedir. Çok kültürlü bütünleşme modelini oluşturan öncelikler göz önünde bulunduğunda mültecilerin sosyoekonomik alanlara girmeleri, hak ve fırsatlardan eşit şartlarda yararlanmaları için çeşitli yatırımlar ve
düzlemeler gerçekleştirilmiştir. Mültecilerin yerleşim ve sağlık hizmetleri konularında iyileştirmeler ve yatırımlar yapılmıştır.

İsveç sığınma başvurusu süresince mültecilerle gerçekleştirilen mülakatlar sonrası temel İsveççe eğitimi ve mesleki eğitimleri içeren bireysel bir planlama sunmaktadır. Bu planlamalar istihdama engel olan dil yetersizliği, vahşişizlik gibi engelleri azaltmak ve göçmenleri İsveç sistemine bağımsız ve kendine yeten bireyler olarak dahil etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Kriz sonrası İsveç hükümeti mülakatlar için daha çok personel istihdam etmiş, bu planlamayı ve belirlenen eğitimleri almayı mülteciler için zorunlu hale getirmiştir. Hükümet ayrıca, yüksek vahşi belli meslek ve uzmanlık alanındaki mültecilerin işgücü piyasasında tercih edilebilir olması için dil eğitimi ve İsveç sisteminin özgü uygulamaları içeren hızlandırılmış programlar başlatmıştır.

İsveç mevcut okul sisteminde verimsizlikleri önlemek için ciddi girişimlerde bulunmuştur. İsveç mevcut çok kültürlü anlayıştan ödün vermemiş, ancak bu çok kültürlü sisteme yabancı öğrencilerin başarısını artırmak için adımlar atmıştır. İsveç'in Suriye krizinden sonrası reformlarının amacı, yabancı öğrencileri ana akım eğitimde başarılara yardımcı olmak için adımlar atmıştır. Örneğin, anaokulları okul ve dile adaptasyonu artırması için zorunlu hale getirilmiştir. Okulların kapasite, öğretmen istihdamı ve yeterliliğini artırılmasını için belediyelere önemli bütçeler dağıtılmıştır. Okul sistemi dışında belediyeler her yaştakikikiyi yönelik eğitim ve danışmanlık hizmetleri sağlamaktadır.


Ayrıca Almanya, Suriyeli mültecileri pasif işçi olarak Alman toplumuna entegre etmek için çıraklık eğitimlerini ve mesleki eğitimleri arttırılmıştır. Çalışırken mesleki terimleri ve mesleki öğrenmeyi sağlayacak istihdam alanları yaratmıştır. 2016 Yılında Entegrasyon Yasası, mesleki eğitim gören sığınmacılara yasal bir kesinlik tanıması. 3+2 yönetimde göre, bir sığınmacı bir firma tarafından stajyer pozisyonunda çalıştırılrsa, başvurusu reddedilse bile sınır dışı edilmeme garantisi sunmuştur.

Almanya'da okul sistemi, Almanya'nın ayrımcı sosyal düzenini yeniden üretmeye devam etmektedir. Mültecilerin kayıt oranı hakkında herhangi bir bilgi olmamasına rağmen, Suriye krizinden sonra yeni gelen mülteci çocuklarını okullarda alan seçmenin erken olması ve düşük dil bilgisi nedeniyle düşük nitelikli mesleki eğitime kabul edildiği tahmin edilmiştir. Okul sistemine yönelik kayda değer iyileştirmeler yapılmamış birkaç iyi örnek belirli eyaletlerle sınırlı kalmıştır.

Ekim 2019 itibarıyla Türkiye'de kayıtlı Suriyeli sayısı bir önceki aya göre 8 bin 529 kişi artarak 3,6 milyonu aşmıştır. Türkiye dünyada en çok mülteci nüfusunu topraklarında barındıran ülke konumundadır. Suriyeli mültecilerin yaklaşık olarak yarısı Türkiye topraklarında bulunmaktadır.

Öte yandan Suriyeli mültecilerin ezici bir çoğunluğunun ülkede kalıcılığı bir realite iken; Türkiye'de siyasi ve hukuki açıdan kalıcı çözümlerden söz edilmemektedir. 1951 Cenevre Konvansiyonu'na imza atan Türkiye, Suriye krizinden sonra Türkiye bu politikasını sürdürmuş coğrafi çekinceyi kaldırmıştır. Türkiye daha önceki ulusal güvenlik kaygılarına sıkı sıkıya bağlı kalmış ve Suriyelere resmi olarak mülteci statüsü verilmemiş, sadece geçici koruma altında alınan Suriyelilere savaş ve zulümden kaçıran din kardeşi misafirler vurgusuyla kapılar açılmıştır.

Suriye krizi sonrasında Türkiye’nin entegrasyon politikalarını iki evrede incelemek faydali olacaktır. İlk dönemde Türkiye politikalarını durumun geçiciliği üzerine inşa etmiş geçici yaşam merkezleri ve kamplar inşa etmiş, Suriyeli çocuklar için geçici eğitim merkezleri (GEM) kurmuş ve kendi dillerinde, kendi müfredatlarında eğitim almalarına imkân tanıtmıştır. Geçici koruma altında Suriyeliler için sağlık hizmetleri de erişilebilir hale getirilmiştir. Türkiye’nin din kardeşi olan Suriyeli mazlumların Türkiye’de kaldıkları süreçte desteklenmeleri ve uyum içinde yaşamaları öngörülmiştir.

Suriye’de hedeflenen barış, istikrar ve huzurun sağlanamaması ve artan çatışmalar sonucu ülkelerini terk eden mültecilerin artmasıyla Suriyelilerin misafir olmadığı anlamış ve bu evrede entegrasyona dair adımlar atılmıştır. Bunlardan en önemli Suriyeli çocukların Türk okullarına kaydedilmeye başlanması olmuştur. İlk olarak GEM’de müfredata Türkçe dersleri eklenmiş, GEM ile birlikte kayıtlı Suriyeli çocukların devlet okullarına da kaydı başlatılmıştır. Şu an ise GEM sayıları
azaltılmakta devlet okullarına kayıt zorunlu hale getirilmektedir. Hükümet, 2020 yılında tüm GEM’leri lağvetmeyi ve sadece Milli Eğitim bağılı okullarda eğitimi sürdürmeyi hedeflemektedir. Öğrencilerin milli eğitim sistemine aktarılması, eğitimin bir entegrasyon aracı olarak kullanılmasını dikkate değer bir kantı vardır. Kamu düzeninin güvenliğini tehdit edecek sosyal olarak sız đàoumlu bir "sorunlu ve kayıp nesli" önlemek için, Suriyelilerin Türk eğitim modeline dahil edilmesine ve sosyal etkileşimin artırılması amaçlanmaktadır. Suriyelilerin Türk eğitim modeline dahil edilmesi, sosyal güvenliği ve homojen yapıyı koruma amaçlandığından, bir ülke örneklerinde görülen izole ve radikalleşmiş gruplamayı önlemek; Suriyeli çocuklar okul sistemine dahil ederek Türk normları, kültürü, tarihi öğrenerek büyümeyen ve Türkçe bilişin bireyler olarak topluma entegre etmektedir. Türkiye'nin eğitim sisteminin Suriye krizi sonrasında da farklı dil, din ve etnik unsurlara karşı çokçuluktan uzak olduğu görülmektedir.

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