

METU
2020

C. SOYSAL

THE STILLBORN NEO-OTTOMANIST FOREIGN POLICY
ASPIRATION OF THE ÖZAL ERA

COŞKUN SOYSAL

JANUARY 2020

THE STILLBORN NEO-OTTOMANIST FOREIGN POLICY ASPIRATION
OF THE ÖZAL ERA

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

COŞKUN SOYSAL

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

JANUARY 2020

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Yaşar Kondakçı
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Oktay Tanrısever
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Yüksel Akkaya (Hacı Bayram Veli Uni., HİT) _____

Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş (METU, IR) _____

Prof. Dr. Hasibe Şebnem Oğuz (Başkent Uni., SİBU) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. E. Attila Aytekin (METU, ADM) _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Şerif Onur Bahçecik (METU, IR) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name : Coşkun Soysal

Signature :

ABSTRACT

THE STILLBORN NEO-OTTOMANIST FOREIGN POLICY ASPIRATION OF THE ÖZAL ERA

Soysal, Coşkun

Ph.D., Department of International Relations

Supervisor : Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş

January 2020, 421 pages

Turkish foreign policy makers have at times become tempted by aspirations of regional leadership. The political leadership of Turgut Özal, first as prime minister from 1983 to 1989 and later as president from 1989 until his death in 1993, is crucial in this sense, as the “neo-Ottomanist” foreign policy aspiration became a much-contested issue during the period of his rule. This thesis, therefore, seeks to examine how and in what circumstances this aspiration flourished under Özal. This thesis argues that the domestic neoliberal restructuring that took place throughout the 1980s is a key factor that formed the basis on which neo-Ottomanism could be proposed in a way that could be considered a subimperialist hegemonic project in the early 1990s. The transformation in the international order that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s is another key factor thought to have opened up space for aspirant regional powers. However, the neo-Ottomanist foreign policy aspiration of the Özal leadership failed due to the constraints placed upon regional aspirants such as Turkey by the very hierarchical nature of the international order as well as material incapacity on the part of Turkey. This thesis analyses how this aspiration came about, its rise to prominence

and ultimate decline under the political leadership of Özal by looking into his foreign policy practices towards the Balkans, Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus from a neo-Gramscian approach.

Keywords: Turkish Foreign Policy, Neo-Ottomanism, Turgut Özal, Subimperialism, Regional Leadership

ÖZ

ÖZAL DÖNEMİNİN ÖLÜ DOĞAN YENİ OSMANLICI DIŞ POLİTİKA HEVESİ

Soysal, Coşkun
Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi : Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş

Ocak 2020, 421 sayfa

Türk dış politika yapıcıları, zaman zaman bölgesel liderlige dair alt-emperyalist heveslere kapılmışlardır. Turgut Özal'ın 1983'ten 1989'a kadar önce Başbakan, 1989'dan 1993'teki ölümüne kadar Cumhurbaşkanı olarak görev yaptığı dönemde gündeme gelen "Yeni Osmanlıcılık", oldukça önemli fakat tartışmalı bir dış politika meselesidir. Bu yüzden bu tez, Özal döneminde bu hevesin nasıl ve hangi şartlar altında ortaya çıkıp geliştiğini incelemeyi hedeflemektedir. Bu tez, 1980'ler boyunca ülke içinde gerçekleşen neoliberal yeniden yapılanmanın, 1990'ların başında alt-emperyalist bir hegemonya projesi olarak değerlendirilebilecek bir biçimde önerilen Yeni Osmanlılığın temelini oluşturan önemli bir etmen olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Uluslararası düzende 1980'lerin sonu ve 1990'ların başında gerçekleşen dönüşüm, bölgesel güç heveslilerine alan açtığı düşünülen bir diğer önemli etmendir. Bununla birlikte, o dönemde bölgesel liderlige ilişkin Yeni Osmanlıci heves, uluslararası düzenin hiyerarşik yapısının Türkiye gibi bölgesel liderlik heveslisi ülkelerin üzerine getirdiği kısıtlar ve Türkiye'nin maddi kapasitesinin yetersizliği gibi nedenlerle, başarısızlığa uğramıştır. Bu tezde, Özal'ın siyasi liderliği döneminde söz

konusu hevesin nasıl oluştuğu, hangi şartlar altında öne çıkıp nihayetinde iniş geçtiği; Balkanlar, Orta Doğu, Orta Asya ve Kafkasya'ya yönelik dış politika uygulamalarının incelenmesiyle Yeni Gramscici bir yaklaşımla analiz edilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Dış Politikası, Yeni Osmanlıcılık, Turgut Özal, Alt-Emperyalizm, Bölgesel Liderlik

To My Wife Aynur & My Son Hüseyin Yalçın

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis is the product of a very turbulent period in both Turkey's political history and my own life. It is also the final product of my doctoral experience, which took almost a decade as a result of certain developments, mostly negative in character, which I will not delve into here but are well-known by those who are interested in and familiar to Turkey. As this thesis is a product of a long process, the list of people to which I am grateful and indebted has become longer and longer. I am afraid no list would prove adequate enough to include all people to whom I would like to express my gratitude and indebtedness, but better that I attempt it than do nothing, so I will begin.

I would, first of all, like to thank Professor Doctor Mustafa Türkeş—my thesis supervisor, who also became my teacher in all aspects of life during much of my doctoral experience at the Department of International Relations of Middle East Technical University (METU). His guidance, endless support and sustained efforts in leading me to prepare and complete this thesis go beyond any words. Specific to this thesis, I would also like to thank the members of the Thesis Monitoring Committee—Associate Professor Doctor E. Attila Aytekin and Assistant Professor Doctor Şerif Onur Bahçecik. Professor Doctor Yüksel Akkaya and Professor Doctor Hasibe Şebnem Oğuz joined them in the final examining committee. I would like to thank all members of the examining committee for their valuable comments, suggestions and criticism.

As for my academic experience more generally, I feel grateful and indebted to all professors from whom I have taken lessons and guidance in one way or another, both at the undergraduate level at the Dokuz Eylül University in Izmir and at the graduate level at METU in Ankara. Among them, special mention must go to my former supervisors Professor Doctor Ayşegül Kibaroğlu and Professor Doctor Ebru Boyar. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Department of International Relations (IR) of METU as a whole. I enjoyed almost every moment throughout my

graduate experience both as a student and a research assistant there, and for that reason I would also like to thank all members of that department ranging from its former and current chairs to its whole academic and administrative personnel. I must especially express my gratitude to Tolgahan Akdan, Çağdaş Özeniş, Burak Erdinç, Günseli Durmaz, Büşra Barın, Tekin Baykız and Abdullah Öztürk—my dear fellow colleagues, who all served as research assistants in the Department of IR at METU at one point of their careers while I was also there.

Having passed all courses and the comprehensive examination of the doctoral programme, I moved to Gaziantep while I was still writing this thesis in order to begin working at the University of Gaziantep, to which my academic post originally belongs. I am very grateful to the Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences of the University of Gaziantep, and especially to the Department of Global Politics and International Relations and to the Department of Economics, for making that transition phase as smooth as possible and providing a joyful and comfortable working environment. I must specifically mention my dear friends Ebru Vural, Müslüm Kavut and Uğur Ülger, who work as research assistants in the Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences at the University of Gaziantep. Ebru was with me throughout my whole undergraduate and graduate studies, whereas Müslüm was with us throughout our graduate studies. Along with Uğur, they all shared my joys and sorrows. I feel a great gratitude to them. I would also like to thank other fellow research assistants Muhyettin Erdemli, Bengü Kayapalı, Doctor İşil Önay and Asime Yıldız for their friendship and for their helpfulness whenever I needed. I must also specifically mention assistant professor doctors Sinan Tankut Gülhan and Nimet Pınar Özgüner Gülhan from the Faculty of Arts and Humanities, to whom I feel deeply grateful for their valuable help and friendship in my very first experiences in both the city of Gaziantep and the University of Gaziantep. The friendliness and helpfulness of Ali Serdar Kılınç and his wife Belma Kılınç was also very much precious to both me and Aynur, my wife, in our relatively lonely environment at the very beginning of our new life in Gaziantep.

Hüseyin Hayatsever, one of my most precious friends from Dokuz Eylül University and an incorruptible journalist, was among my greatest supporters throughout my all graduate studies and other difficult experiences. He and his wife Ezgi Kaya Hayatsever provided whatever they could and helped as much as they could while we were together in Ankara and after we left Ankara for Gaziantep. They opened up their house to me every time I came to Ankara from Gaziantep and did their best to make me feel comfortable. It is in no way possible to find adequate words that could describe their friendship, help and support. I feel a great gratitude and indebtedness to both of them. I would also like to express my gratitude to my friends from our *Mülkiye* (the historical Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Ankara) group—Özhan Değirmencioğlu, Doctor Emre Demir, Özer Metin, Umutcan Polat and Doctor Halil Burak Sakal. They organised feasts for me, they all stood by me, and whenever I came to Ankara they all welcomed me in one way or another. The discussions we undertook within that close group were always beneficial and enlightening.

I am also very much grateful and indebted to John Angliss, who proofread each chapter of this thesis time and again as both a native English speaker, a professional literary translator and a former graduate student of IR. He also came to my rescue in numerous other cases. I must also express my sincere gratitude to the librarians at both METU and the İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University in Ankara. Among them was İbrahim Kurnaz, with whom I also became friends over the course of time, and who provided materials that would be too difficult to find without his help. I would also like to thank Selin Eker Çalışkan from the Registrar's Office and Serap Dalkılıç from the Graduate School of Social Sciences for their helpfulness and assistance with bureaucratic procedures at METU. I am also grateful and indebted to the architects of the Programme for Training Scholars (*Öğretim Üyesi Yetiştirme Programı*), and among them, I would particularly like to thank Professor Doctor Fatoş Tünay Yarman Vural from METU for her valuable efforts with respect to that programme. Although the programme had many problems, hundreds, or maybe thousands, of young successful scholarship students from relatively non-elite

backgrounds had the opportunity to undertake graduate studies thanks to the research assistant positions and financial support provided within this framework. I would have been unlikely to have had the opportunity to continue with graduate studies following my graduation from the university on my own, taking into consideration the modest financial potential of my parents at that time.

Finally, no surprises, the biggest and most special thanks go to my family. I am sure that I would not have achieved what I have achieved throughout my life without the care and support of my parents. My father, Ahmet Musluk, has a special place in my personal development with his constant emphasis on honesty and responsibility. He held my hand and set me on my feet whenever I fell down in both moral and material respects. The purest, truest and sincerest of all loves is maternal love, and I also feel enormously grateful and indebted to my mother Sultan Musluk for her continuous love and care, which I have always felt. I am also grateful and indebted to my sister, Cansu Gökce, for our joyful and lovely childhood and for her later support throughout our adulthood. I am also genuinely grateful and indebted to my sister-in-law, Yağmur Yılmaz, for her enormous support during our troubled periods. She did a great job for us in taking care of our son, Hüseyin Yalçın, throughout much of his babyhood, and always came to our rescue whenever we badly needed help. I would also thank my mother- and father-in-law, Yıldız and Memet Yılmaz, for their help and support throughout my doctoral studies. The greatest sacrifices, however, belong to my dear wife, Aynur Yılmaz Soysal, and I feel not only grateful and indebted to her for her genuine love and matchless efforts in helping and supporting me, but also guilty about the time that I could not devote to her and to Hüseyin Yalçın. I would like to express my greatest gratitude and indebtedness to her as well as my apologies for times that we would have enjoyed together with Hüseyin Yalçın but that we had to sacrifice for my doctoral studies. I dedicate this thesis to them with the hope that we will all together be able to compensate for our difficult times.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ	vi
DEDICATION.....	viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS	xiii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xvii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.2 The Research Question of the Thesis	2
1.3 The Assumptions of the Thesis	2
1.4 Methodology and Concepts	4
1.4.1 Hegemony, Hegemonic Projects and Historical Bloc	5
1.4.2 Hegemony at the International Level	17
1.4.3 Hegemony and Imperialism.....	27
1.4.4 Passive Revolutions as Chains between the International and the Domestic	33
1.5 Outline of the Thesis.....	39
2. A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON THE NEO-OTTOMANIST FOREIGN POLICY ASPIRATION UNDER ÖZAL.....	42
2.1 Introduction	42
2.2 Review of the Literature	42
2.2.1 Conventional Studies	48
2.2.2 Agency-Based Analyses of Turkish Foreign Policy.....	51
2.2.3 Structure-Based Analyses of Turkish Foreign Policy	56

2.2.4 Identity-Based Analyses of Turkish Foreign Policy	60
2.2.5 Studies Utilising International Political Economy	66
2.3 Contributions of the Thesis	78
2.4 Conclusion.....	80
3. DOMESTIC SPACE REORGANISED ON THE EVE OF NEOLIBERAL RESTRUCTURING	81
3.1 Introduction	81
3.2 Bourgeois Hegemony through Planned Developmentalism and the Acceleration of Class Struggle in the 1960s.....	82
3.3 Towards a Crisis of Hegemony in the 1970s	89
3.4 The Economic Reform Package of 24 January 1980	95
3.5 The 12 September 1980 <i>Coup d'État</i> and Military Rule.....	99
3.6 Conclusion.....	116
4. THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER	118
4.1 Introduction	118
4.2 The International Order Reconfigured: From Inter-Systemic Rivalry to Intra-Systemic Heteronymous Competition.....	118
4.3 The Space Emerged for Regional Aspirants in the Early 1990s	126
4.3.1 Subimperialism: The Unrequited Love of Regional Aspirants .	139
4.4 Conclusion.....	155
5. NEOLIBERALISM AND THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC FRACTION WITHIN THE TURKISH BOURGEOISIE IN THE LATE 1980S AND THE EARLY 1990S.....	157
5.1 Introduction	157
5.2 Neoliberalism and the Rise of the Islamic Fraction within the Turkish Bourgeoisie in the Late 1980s and the Early 1990s.	158
5.3 The Contest between Liberals and Islamists in the Early 1990s	169
5.3.1 Liberal Anti-Statism and Multi-Culturalism: The “Second Republic” Debate	171

5.3.2 Anti-Secularist Cultural Pluralism and Islamic Capitalism: Necmettin Erbakan’s “Just Economic Order” and MÜSİAD’s Demands	178
5.4 Conclusion	188
6. NEO-OTTOMANISM AS PUT FORWARD BY THE ORGANIC INTELLECTUALS OF THE ÖZAL LEADERSHIP IN THE EARLY 1990S.....	190
6.1 Introduction	190
6.2 The Neo-Ottomanist Tendency and the Role of Organic Intellectuals as Reflected in Türkiye Günlüğü	190
6.3 Conclusion	212
7. THE PRACTICE OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER ÖZAL AS A TEST CASE OF THE NEO-OTTOMANIST HEGEMONIC PROJECT: AMBIGUITY AND INCAPACITY	213
7.1 Introduction	213
7.2 Incorporating Turkey into World Markets: Özal’s Foreign Policy in the Early 1980s	214
7.3 Attempts to Substitute Relations with the Middle East for Relations with Europe: The Short-Lived Delusions of the Iran–Iraq War	220
7.4 An Overall Assessment of the Turkish Foreign Policy in the Early Özal Period: Prelude to Neo-Ottomanism?.....	228
7.5 Between Cautiousness and Assertiveness: Late Özal’s Foreign Policy towards the Balkans.....	235
7.5.1 Özal’s Reaction to Bulgaria’s Campaign of Forced Assimilation and Forced Migration towards its Turkish Minority in the Late 1980s: Assertive in Rhetoric but Cautious in Practice	236
7.5.2 Özal and the War in Bosnia: Assertive but Incompetent.....	241

7.6 The First Gulf Crisis and Özal: Assertive but Lacking Material Capacity	255
7.7 Özal's Foreign Policy towards Central Asia and the Caucasus: Ambitious but Incompetent Yet Again	276
7.8 Conclusion.....	287
8. A THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE NEO-OTTOMAN SUBIMPERIALIST ASPIRATION UNDER ÖZAL:	
WHY STILLBORN?.....	289
8.1 Introduction	289
8.2 Defining the Problematic of Neo-Ottomanism under Özal.....	289
8.3 US Imperialism and the Neo-Ottomanist Project under Özal	292
8.4 States within the Pax Ottomana Novum.....	305
8.5 The Position of Big Capital and the Newly Emerging Islamic Bourgeoisie vis-à-vis the Neo-Ottomanist Project.....	315
8.6 Liberals, Nationalists, Islamists and Kurds vis-à-vis the Neo-Ottomanist Project.....	321
8.7 The Decline and the Ultimate Breakup of the Özal Leadership.....	330
8.8 Conclusion.....	333
9. CONCLUSION	335
BIBLIOGRAPHY	346
APPENDICES	
A. CURRICULUM VITAE	400
B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET	402
C. TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM	421

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
ASKON	Businessmen Association of Anatolian Lions
BCP	Bulgarian Communist Party
BSEC	Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
BSP	Bulgarian Socialist Party
BNDES	Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social Development
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India, China
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CE	Common Era
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (of the United States)
CPY	Communist Party of Yugoslavia
DECA	Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement
DGMs	State Security Courts
DİSK	Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Unions
DLP	Democratic Left Party (<i>Demokratik Sol Parti</i>)
DP	Democrat Party (<i>Demokrat Parti</i>)
EC	European Communities
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investments
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
G7	Group of Seven
G8	Group of Eight
G20	Group of Twenty
GAP	Southeastern Anatolia Project
GDP	Gross Domestic Product

HAK-İŞ	Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions
HTK	Council for Free Enterprise (<i>Hür Teşebbüs Konseyi</i>)
IFOR	Implementation Force (in Bosnia)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialisation
İKV	Economic Development Foundation
İSO	Istanbul Chamber of Industry
İŞHAD	Association for Solidarity in Business Life
İTO	Istanbul Chamber of Commerce
JP	Justice Party
JDP	Justice and Development Party (<i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i>)
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party (of Iraq)
KOSGEB	Small and Medium Scaled Industry Development and Support Directorate
MESS	Turkish Employer Association of Metalware Industrialists
MP	Motherland Party (<i>Anavatan Partisi</i>)
MRF	Movement for Rights and Freedom (of Bulgaria)
MÜSİAD	Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association
NAP	Nationalist Action Party (<i>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</i>)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP	Nationalist Democracy Party (<i>Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi</i>)
NSC	National Security Council
NSP	National Salvation Party (<i>Milli Selamet Partisi</i>)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PD	Party of Democracy (<i>Demokrasi Partisi</i>)
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PLP	People's Labour Party (<i>Halkın Emek Partisi</i>)

PP	Populist Party (<i>Halkçı Parti</i>)
PSD	Party of Social Democracy (<i>Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi</i>)
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (of Iraq)
RDF	Rapid Deployment Force
RPNP	Republican Peasants' Nation Party (<i>Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi</i>)
ropp	Republican People's Party (<i>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</i>)
RRP	Republican Reliance Party (<i>Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi</i>)
SEEs	State Economic Enterprises
SFOR	Stabilization Force (in Bosnia)
SMEs	Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
SPO	State Planning Organisation
SPP	Social Democrat Populist Party (<i>Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti</i>)
SSK	Social Insurance Institution
TBMM	Grand National Assembly of Turkey
TESK	Confederation of Turkish Tradesmen and Craftsmen
TİKA	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
TİSK	Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations
TKAE	Institute for Research on Turkish Culture (<i>Türk Kültürünü Araşturma Enstitüsü</i>)
TOBB	Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey
TPP	True Path Party (<i>Doğru Yol Partisi</i>)
TUSKON	Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists
TÜRK-İŞ	Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions
TÜSİAD	Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association
TZOB	Union of Turkish Chambers of Agriculture
U&CD	Uneven and Combined Development
UDF	Union of Democratic Forces (of Bulgaria)
UN	United Nations

UNPROFOR	UN Protection Forces (in Bosnia)
US(A)	United States (of America)
USSR	Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union
WP	Welfare Party (<i>Refah Partisi</i>)
WP (of Brazil)	Workers' Party (of Brazil)
WPT	Workers' Party of Turkey (<i>Türkiye İşçi Partisi</i>)
WTO	World Trade Organization
YÖK	Higher Education Council

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Turkish foreign policy makers have at times become tempted by aspirations of regional leadership. The political leadership of Turgut Özal, first as prime minister from 1983 to 1989 and later as president from 1989 until his death in 1993, is crucial in this sense, as the aspiration that became known as “neo-Ottomanism” was to become a much-contested issue during the period of his rule. In this respect, it also represents a historical precedent for later periods of Turkish foreign policy in which similar aspirations were aired. This thesis, therefore, seeks to examine how and in what circumstances this aspiration came to flourish under Özal. This thesis argues that the domestic neoliberal restructuring that took place throughout the 1980s is a key factor that formed the basis on which neo-Ottomanism could be proposed in the early 1990s in a way that could be considered a subimperialist hegemonic project from a neo-Gramscian approach. The transformation in the international order that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s is another key factor thought to have opened up space for aspirants to regional leadership. This thesis analyses how this aspiration came about, its rise to prominence and ultimate decline under the political leadership of Özal by looking into his foreign policy practices towards the Balkans, Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus from a neo-Gramscian perspective. This introductory chapter is to lay out the research question, the assumptions of the thesis as well as the methodology adopted throughout the thesis. The section on methodology is also to discuss the crucial concepts of “hegemony,” “hegemonic projects,” “historical bloc,” “imperialism” and “passive revolution,” since these are critically relevant concepts for a neo-Gramscian historical materialist analysis of the

subject at hand. Finally, a brief outline of the thesis is to be provided in the last section of this chapter.

1.2 The Research Question of the Thesis

This thesis is to explore how and in what circumstances neo-Ottomanist aspiration for regional leadership in Turkish foreign policy has flourished under Özal. By doing this, the thesis also aims to contribute to the literature through its attempt to identify the social sources of Turkish foreign policy.

The existing literature on Turkish foreign policy already provides some explanations such as the influence of the international system, the policies of imperialist powers towards the regions where Turkey is a part of, and the ideologies of foreign policy makers in the Özal period. However, from these explanations another question arises: what were the distinguishing factors that led to, or provided a space for, this aspiration in that period in particular? How should we understand the changes in the extent to which this aspiration was able to influence actual foreign policies? Are they related to changes in domestic factors such as the adoption of new accumulation strategies or the processes of economic and political restructuring? Or are they related to both domestic and external factors that could be thought as mutually constitutive? Not unconnected with these, is it also possible to explain the more extravagant foreign policy claims of that period through looking at more particular transformations such as the neoliberal economic and political restructuring and the Islamisation of society from above since the 1980 *coup d'état*? This thesis is to revolve around these questions.

1.3 The Assumptions of the Thesis

The central assumption of this thesis is that Turkey is part of the international order that rests upon capitalist social relations on a worldwide scale, and the continuities and changes in Turkish foreign policy cannot be analysed without taking

into consideration the mutually constitutive relationship between the domestic and the international.

At the basic level, this thesis departs from a hypothesis that, after the Cold War, struggles for hegemony within the international order continued to be influential. During the Cold War “a globalised social conflict” or an “inter-systemic conflict” between two rival international blocs that represented two rival social systems drove the main dynamics of international politics.¹ That “inter-systemic conflict” had a huge impact on Turkey’s post-Second World War foreign policy orientations and ultimately it being driven into the Western capitalist bloc.² The influence of Western hegemony over Turkish foreign policy did not cease to exist in the post-Cold War period. The expansion of the world capitalist system to former socialist countries only increased US influence on Turkish foreign policy, as was the case with the First Gulf War. The framework and the limits of Turkey’s post-Cold War foreign policy activism at regional scales have been determined by US-led hegemony at the global scale. Thus, another question arises; to what extent has its post-Cold War aspiration for a neo-Ottoman subimperialist leadership over neighbouring regions proven successful?

This thesis further assumes that this neo-Ottomanist aspiration might be related to changes in domestic material factors such as accumulation strategies adopted and changes in levels of capital accumulation. A cursory glance at basic studies of Turkish economic history shows that the Özal period has some particular economic characteristics. As neoliberalism was the fundamental economic programme of the day, with an “export-oriented” growth strategy, ambitions to

¹ Richard Saull, *The Cold War and After: Capitalism, Revolution and Superpower Politics* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 8–15.

² Tolgahan Akdan, “A Systemic Analysis of the Cold War and Turkey’s Postwar Drive to the West” (master’s thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2014), 11–12, 138–39, 161–81, 185–86. See also Tolgahan Akdan, “An Appraisal of Debates on the Turkish–Soviet Break-Up and Turkey’s Reorientation to the West from a Systemic Perspective,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* (2018): 1–19.

become more open to foreign capital and more integrated with world markets, and steady privatisations and financialisation through regular “structural adjustment reforms” are the key elements of the period in question.³

The final assumption is that it might also be possible to explain the extravagant foreign policy claims of the period with the basis formed by more particular transformations such as the restructuring of the state apparatus and the Islamisation of the society from above since the 1980 *coup d'état*. The vast literature on “authoritarian neoliberalism”⁴ already hints us that there might be such a relationship between neoliberal restructuring and authoritarian forms of state along with more assertive foreign policy claims.

1.4 Methodology and Concepts

It was already stated that this thesis aims to explore how and in what circumstances the neo-Ottomanist aspiration for regional leadership in Turkish foreign policy under Özal has flourished by benefiting from insights provided by the neo-Gramscian approach. It also aims to provide an alternative analytical model to

³ Arslan Başer Kafaoğlu, *Türkiye Ekonomisi: Yakin Tarih*, vol. 2 (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayıncılıarı, 2008), 56–88; Nazif Ekzen, *Türkiye Kısa İktisat Tarihi, 1946'dan 2008'e: İliştirilmiş Ekonomi, IMF–Dünya Bankası Düzeninde 62 Yıl*, 2nd ed. (Ankara: ODTÜ Yayıncılık, 2009), 113–18; Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908–2009*, 15th ed. (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayımları, 2011), 145–69; Mahfi Eğilmez, *Değişim Sürecinde Türkiye: Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Sosyo-Ekonominik Bir Değerlendirme*, 8th ed. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2018), 147–51.

⁴ For a study that examines such a relationship, see Dennis C. Canterbury, *Neoliberal Democratization and New Authoritarianism* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005). The term “authoritarian neoliberalism,” however, was coined by Ian Bruff. Ian Bruff, “The Rise of Authoritarian Neoliberalism,” *Rethinking Marxism* 26:1 (2014): 113–29. Today authoritarian forms of neoliberalism have become an independent research agenda in themselves. See for instance, Cemal Burak Tansel, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism: Towards a New Research Agenda,” in *States of Discipline: Authoritarian Neoliberalism and the Contested Reproduction of Capitalist Order*, ed. Cemal Burak Tansel (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2017), 1–28; Ian Bruff and Cemal Burak Tansel, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism: Trajectories of Knowledge Production and Praxis,” *Globalizations* 16:3 (2019): 233–44.

the conventional state–society dichotomy of the mainstream approaches of IR and foreign policy analysis.

Economic and statistical data that is necessary for a neo-Gramscian version of historical materialist analysis are to be gathered from statistics provided by domestic and international institutions and by secondary economic studies on the period at hand. Primary material such as newspapers and memoirs about the foreign policy of the period are also available to researchers. Finally, how neo-Ottomanism was brought forward by a group of intellectuals and articulated as an alternative foreign policy at the regional level in a way that could be considered a subimperialist hegemonic project is to be examined through their writings and interviews conducted in *Türkiye Günlüğü*—a nationalist–conservative journal which had close contact with the political leadership under Turgut Özal.

Having adopted a historical materialist methodology and a neo-Gramscian approach, the thesis is to revolve around some fundamental concepts developed by the Italian Marxist theoretician Antonio Gramsci such as “hegemony” and “historical blocs” as well as the ones developed by his disciples such as “hegemonic projects.” It would, thus, be beneficial at this point to give out definitions of such fundamental concepts as understood and employed throughout the thesis.

1.4.1 Hegemony, Hegemonic Projects and Historical Bloc

Although the concept of hegemony had long been used since the ancient Greek philosophers by various strands of political thought including Marxists,⁵ Antonio Gramsci gave a new content to the concept in his prison writings in the inter-war period under the Italian fascist regime. Gramsci makes a distinction between what he calls the “two ways,” in which “the supremacy of a social group [i.e. class]

⁵ For a genealogy of the concept of “hegemony,” see Owen Worth, *Rethinking Hegemony* (London: Palgrave, 2015), 19–40 and Richard Saull, “Hegemony and the Global Political Economy,” in *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, ed. Robert A. Denemark and Renée Marlin-Bennett (Oxford: Wiley–Blackwell, 2017).

manifests itself”—“domination” and “intellectual and moral leadership.”⁶ As for the latter, which corresponds to the moment of hegemony, he states that it could, “and indeed must,” be exercised “before winning governmental power.”⁷ Drawing conclusions from the historical experience of the Italian unification process, the *Risorgimento*, he formulates the concept of hegemony as the specific manifestation of class rule in capitalist societies that combines generating *consent* of subordinate classes by intellectually, morally and politically leading them, and using *coercion* against the antagonistic ones in order to dominate them.⁸ Gramsci, thus, not only positions hegemony in contrast with pure domination in order to emphasise the social processes of generating consent, but also uses the term “hegemonic” in opposition to “economic-corporate” in order to depict a particular historical phase in which a class “moves beyond a position of corporate existence and defence of its economic position and aspires to a position of leadership in the political and social arena.”⁹ Accordingly, this thesis is to employ the concept as “*a moment in which the ruling class takes moral and intellectual leadership*,”¹⁰ whereby its “corporate interests, in their present and future development, transcend the corporate limits of the purely economic class, and

⁶ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, trans. and ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, 11th ed. (New York: International Publishers, 1992), 57. Gramsci uses the term “social group” instead of “class,” much like the way he calls Marxism “the philosophy of praxis” in order to deceive the prison censor of the fascist regime. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, “Preface,” in *ibid.*, xiii.

⁷ Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 57.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 57–58.

⁹ Hoare and Smith, “Preface,” in *ibid.*, xiv. For Gramsci’s further elaborations of these two particular phases, see Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 53–54, footnote 4; and see *ibid.*, 173–75, 262–63, 404.

¹⁰ Elif Uzgören, “Consolidation of Neoliberalism through Political Islam and Its Limits: The Case of Turkey,” *METU Studies in Development* 45 (2018): 288. Emphasis added.

can and must become the interests of other subordinate groups too.”¹¹ For Gramsci, this moment is “the most purely political phase, and marks the decisive passage from the structure to the sphere of the complex superstructures.”¹² This also corresponds to a form of class rule in capitalist societies based on combinations of generating consent from and using coercion against different segments of society. Its distinctive feature compared with pure domination is the co-optation of subaltern social strata by the leading social group(s) through obtaining consent of those subaltern groups albeit not without resorting to coercive elements against those from which consent cannot, or is too costly to, be generated. Gramsci also states that the coercive apparatus, “‘legally’ enforces discipline on those groups who do not ‘consent’ either actively or passively,” and that it is, nevertheless, “constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed.”¹³ He also expresses that force and consent “balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent.”¹⁴ Even when force or coercion is exercised, this is done along with an attempt to ensure that it appears “to be based on the consent of the majority, expressed by the so-called organs of public opinion—newspapers and associations—which, therefore, in certain situations, are artificially multiplied.”¹⁵ Gramsci also acknowledges that in “certain situations when it is hard to exercise the hegemonic function, and when the use of force is too risky,” corruption

¹¹ Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 181.

¹² Ibid. For the concepts of “structure” and “superstructure” in the historical materialist tradition, see *infra* footnote 25.

¹³ Ibid., 12.

¹⁴ Ibid., 80, footnote 50.

¹⁵ Ibid.

or fraud could also be resorted to by the leading group(s).¹⁶ He refers to that “dialectical unity of the moments of force and consent in political action” with the notion of “dual perspective.”¹⁷

The concept of hegemony, accordingly, involves “the successful mobilisation and reproduction of the ‘active consent’¹⁸ of dominated groups by the ruling class through their exercise of intellectual, moral, and political leadership.”¹⁹ Such leadership is articulated and “exercised through the development of a national–popular project which specifies a set of policies or goals as being ‘in the national interest’.”²⁰ These policies or goals would “actually serve the long-term interests of capital,” as they would also “advance certain short-term, narrow economic and social

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 169, footnote 70.

¹⁸ Gramsci makes a distinction between “active” and “passive” forms of consent pointing to the contradictory and fragmentary character of human consciousness reminiscent of Friedrich Engels’ and Georg Lukács’ conceptions of false consciousness. Ibid., 333. “Active consent” involves a “conscious realization on the part of subordinate group members of the compromise they have made with the ruling class,” whereas “passive consent” refers rather to the “unquestioned views, assumptions, and beliefs we hold that support the rule of the dominant class,” such as religion and other forms of customary thinking. Ideological submissiveness, on the other hand, is an example of “active consent” like other cases of self-reasoning and judgements. Jacob P. K. Gross, “Education and Hegemony: The Influence of Antonio Gramsci,” in *Beyond Critique: Exploring Critical Social Theories and Education*, Bradley A. U. Levinson et al. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 60.

¹⁹ Bob Jessop, *The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982), 148. The element of political leadership entails “taking systematic account of popular interests and demands, shifting position and making compromises on secondary issues to maintain support and affiances in an inherently unstable and fragile system of political relations (without, however, sacrificing essential interests); and organising this support for the attainment of national goals which serve the fundamental long-run interests of the dominant group,” whereas the element of “intellectual and moral leadership” entails “the constitution and reproduction of a collective will, a ‘national–popular outlook, a common world-view, a shared perception of the world, which is adequate to the needs of social and economic reproduction.” Ibid.

²⁰ Bob Jessop, *State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 181.

interests and demands of subordinate groups.”²¹ It is at this point where Gramsci’s later disciples formulate and employ the concept of hegemonic project. As Bob Jessop argues, it is “the development of a specific ‘hegemonic project’,” which would “resolve the abstract problem of conflicts between particular interests and the general interest.”²² Hence, in line with these elaborations, hegemonic projects are defined in this thesis as *national–popular projects aimed at generating the active consent of subordinate social groups in favour of the leading social group and at socially mobilising those subordinate groups for political purposes through policies or goals declared as being in the national interest.*

Hegemonic projects are rather more visible in superstructural aspects of particular social formations such as politics, ideology and culture. However, it is only those that satisfy certain specific conditions which become “noteworthy for their capacity to cement a ‘historical bloc’ involving an organic relation between base and superstructure.”²³ For Gramsci, what he calls the “moment of hegemony,” indeed, corresponds to a close congruence between the “base” which consists of material relations of production and the “superstructure” which consists of the realm of “human will”²⁴ such as politics and ideology.²⁵ According to him, “the complex,

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid., 208. Emphasis in the original.

²³ Ibid., 214.

²⁴ Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 403.

²⁵ Two quotations would make the point of relationship between the “base” or “economic structure” on the one hand, and the “superstructure” on the other, as understood by the two founders of historical materialism better. “[T]he economic structure of society always furnishes the real basis, starting from which we can alone work out the ultimate explanation of *the whole superstructure of juridical and political institutions as well as of the religious, philosophical, and other ideas of a given historical period.*” Frederick Engels, trans. Emile Burns, “Anti-Dühring: Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science,” in *Collected Works*, vol. 25, *Engels*, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, trans. Emile Burns and Clemens Dutt (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1987), 26. Emphasis added. “*The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of the direct producers determines the relationship of domination and servitude*, as this grows directly out of production itself and reacts back on it in turn

contradictory and discordant *ensemble* of the superstructures is the reflection of the *ensemble* of the social relations of production,”²⁶ and the peculiar formation that emanates from this unity is “historical bloc.” In the conception of “historical bloc,” he further argues, “precisely material forces are the *content* and ideologies are the *form*,”²⁷ but he, nonetheless, reminds that this distinction between *form* and *content* is only of analytical value, since they are not distinct social phenomena at the ontological level, but rather different aspects of the same social formation. The unity that the conception of historical bloc involves is essential, since “the material forces would be inconceivable historically without form and the ideologies would be individual fancies without the material forces.”²⁸ Hence it could be argued that the concept of “historical bloc” refers to “the way in which leading social forces within a specific national context establish a relationship over contending forces.”²⁹ It is not a

as a determinant. *On this is based the entire configuration of the economic community arising from the actual relations of production, and hence also its specific political form.* It is in each case *the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the immediate producers* – a relationship whose particular form naturally corresponds always to a certain level of development of the type and manner of labour, and hence to its social productive power – *in which we find the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social edifice, and hence also the political form of the relationship of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the specific form of state in each case.* This does not prevent the same economic basis – the same in its major conditions – from displaying endless variations and gradations in its appearance, as the result of innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural conditions, racial relations, historical influences acting from outside, etc., and these can only be understood by analysing these empirically given conditions.” Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, trans. David Fernbach (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 927–28. Emphasis added.

²⁶ Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 366. Emphasis in the original.

²⁷ Ibid., 377. Emphasis in the original.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Adam David Morton, “Social Forces in the Struggle over Hegemony: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy,” *Rethinking Marxism* 15:2 (2003): 157; Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, “A Critical Theory Route to Hegemony, World Order and Historical Change: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Relations,” *Capital & Class* 28:1 (2004): 90. The latter article was also reproduced in Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, “A Critical Theory Route to Hegemony, World Order and Historical Change: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International

simple “political alliance between social forces represented by classes or fractions of classes.”³⁰ Gramsci also states that

an appropriate political initiative is always necessary to liberate the economic thrust from the dead weight of traditional policies—i.e. to change the political direction of certain forces which have to be absorbed if a new, homogenous politico-economic historical bloc, without internal contradictions, is to be successfully formed.³¹

As Anne Showstack Sassoon also argues, although “[a] class can in fact organise itself in a State which only barely goes beyond the bounds of an economic–corporative development,” it can represent “a fully developed and maximally extended historical bloc,” only if “this state has developed the area of hegemony that it is an extended or integral State.”³² Thus, she further argues, the historical bloc implies “necessarily the existence of hegemony.”³³ Overall, following Bob Jessop, the concept of “historical bloc” can be defined as “*an historically constituted and socially reproduced correspondence between the economic base and the politico-ideological superstructures of a social formation.*”³⁴

Having provided definitions of “hegemony,” “hegemonic projects,” and “historical bloc,” it would also be beneficial to address the conditions upon which

Relations,” in *Global Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour: Contesting Neo-Gramscian Perspectives*, Andreas Bieler et al. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 9–27.

³⁰ Morton, “Neo-Gramscian Perspectives,” 157; Bieler and Morton, “Neo-Gramscian Perspectives,” 90.

³¹ Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 168.

³² Anne Showstack Sassoon, *Gramsci’s Politics*, 2nd ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1987), 123.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Bob Jessop, “A Neo-Gramscian Approach to the Regulation of Urban Regimes,” in *Reconstructing Urban Regime Theory: Regulating Urban Politics in a Global Economy*, ed. Mickey Lauria (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997), 56. Emphasis added.

hegemonic projects prove to be functional in bringing about moments of hegemony through their capacities to build up historical blocs. First among them is related to the historical and structural characteristic of the social formation within which a particular hegemonic project is brought forward. Some social forces and their interests are structurally privileged in particular social formations including, first and foremost, forms of state. Such privileges are “inscribed” in those social formations “at the expense of other forces and interests.”³⁵ This poses some “objective limits,” but there is, nonetheless, “some scope for short-term variations in hegemony at the level of political practices.”³⁶ However, in the long run, “hegemony will return . . . to the structurally privileged class (or class fraction),” as long as the strategic orientation of that class or class fraction and its relation to the process of capital accumulation “prove adequate.”³⁷ This condition is rather related to the *leadership* aspect of hegemonic projects. Which class or class fraction is to lead over other social forces as envisaged by a particular hegemonic project is of crucial significance. Class rule, however, is exercised, not in a direct, but rather in a mediated way. Hegemonic projects are in general articulated and brought forth by organic intellectuals from a particular social force but are announced or introduced to subordinate groups by the political leadership, and in case of success, again implemented by that leadership. This is the point where Gramsci, adapting Niccolò Machiavelli’s *The Prince*,³⁸ attributes to modern political parties the role of “modern prince” in the sense that

³⁵ Jessop, *State Theory*, 209.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, ed. and trans. Peter Bondanella (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

those would be the principal political agents in struggles towards hegemony.³⁹ The “active politician” in Gramsci’s thinking occupies a crucial position since it is only her/him who is to be “a creator, an initiator,” but she/he “neither creates from nothing nor does [she/he] move in turbid void of [her/his] own desires and dreams.”⁴⁰ The “active politician” resembles Marx’s “men making their own history,” but not “under circumstances chosen by themselves,” but rather “under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past.”⁴¹ Yet, following Marx’s concrete researches, Gramsci also acknowledges that “every fluctuation of politics and ideology” may not be “presented and expounded as an immediate expression of the structure,” and claims to the contrary are nothing but “primitive infantilism.”⁴² On the contrary, “structural tendencies” that find their expressions in politics might not always be realised, and political analysts must leave some room for possible “error[s] of calculation on the part of the leaders [*dirigenti*] of the dominant classes,” as well as for “political acts [which] are due to internal necessities of an organisational

³⁹ See the section “The Modern Prince,” in Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 123–205. “The principle once posed that there are leaders and led, rulers and ruled, it is true that parties have up till now been the most effective way of developing leaders and leadership.” Ibid., 146.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 172.

⁴¹ The full expression is as follows: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle-cries, and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language.” Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” in *Selected Writings*, Karl Marx, ed. David McLellan, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 329.

⁴² Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 407.

character” aimed at giving “coherence to a party, a group, a society.”⁴³ Thus, Bob Jessop, for instance, argues that there is a “non-necessary”⁴⁴ and “contingent correspondence between economic and non-economic relations,” but also that it is only when “hegemonic projects” bring about such correspondence between economic and non-economic relations that they gain a capacity to “cement a ‘historical bloc’,” and “thereby promote capital accumulation.”⁴⁵ A class or class fraction, therefore, may exercise “economic leadership” over other social forces, but this does not automatically bring about “intellectual and moral leadership.” Apart from these general considerations, it must also be stated that the role of the political leadership further increases under conditions of class rule without a solid social basis. This is most obvious in cases of “passive revolution,” which are to be elaborated later.

As also indicated earlier in these definitions, another condition is to link the “realization of certain particular interests of subordinate social forces to the pursuit of a ‘national–popular’ programme which favours the long-term interests of the hegemonic force.”⁴⁶ This is mostly related to the *ideology* aspect of hegemonic projects since it is ideologies that provide conceptions of world with some degree of coherence which are capable of bringing forth concrete national–popular political programmes. The ideology aspect of hegemonic projects is also crucial in the sense that all historical blocs project “a particular world view, grounded in historically

⁴³ Ibid., 408. A similar “openness” is central to Stuart Hall’s understanding of Marxism, which he calls “Marxism without Guarantees.” Stuart Hall, “The Problem of Ideology: Marxism without Guarantees,” *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 10:2 (1986): 28–44.

⁴⁴ Jessop, *State Theory*, 206.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 214.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 209.

specific socio-political conditions and production relations, which lends substance and ideological coherence to [their] social power.”⁴⁷

Finally, although hegemonic projects need not “be directly economic in character or give priority to economic objectives,”⁴⁸ material gains granted to subordinate groups and overall economic productivity would be decisive in their ultimate successes or failures. Successful hegemonic projects are in general the ones that have a close association with “an appropriate accumulation strategy.”⁴⁹ This must not, however, lead to a crude form of economism, of which Gramsci himself is also bitterly critical.⁵⁰ What Gramsci’s arguments over hegemony imply for hegemonic projects is, indeed, that their essential function is “to secure the (integral) economic

⁴⁷ Mark Rupert, *Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 30.

⁴⁸ Jessop, *State Theory*, 210.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ For instance, see his comments on Nikolai Bukharin’s *Theory of Historical Materialism: A Popular Manual of Marxist Sociology* in Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 419–72. Gramsci even objects to the concept of “materialist dialectic,” arguing that Marx himself too never used the concept, but rather used the concept of “rational dialectic.” Ibid., 456–457. Gramsci refers here to Marx’s comments over the Hegelian dialectic: “My dialectical method is, in its foundations, not only different from the Hegelian, but exactly opposite to it. For Hegel, the process of thinking, which he even transforms into an independent subject, under the name of ‘the Idea’, is the creator of the real world, and the real world is only the external appearance of the idea. With me the reverse is true: the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected in the mind of man, and translated into forms of thought. . . . The mystification which the dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general forms of motion in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be inverted, in order to discover the *rational kernel* within the mystical shell. In its mystified form, the dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and glorify what exists. *In its rational form* it is a scandal and an abomination to the bourgeoisie and its doctrinaire spokesmen, because it includes in its positive understanding of what exists a simultaneous recognition of its negation, its inevitable destruction; because it regards every historically developed form as being in a fluid state, in motion, and therefore grasps its transient aspect as well; and because it does not let itself be impressed by anything, being in its very essence critical and revolutionary.” Karl Marx, “Postface to the Second Edition,” in *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, Karl Marx, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), 102–103.

base of the dominant mode of growth,”⁵¹ and they do this through “the direct, active conforming of *all social relations* to the economic (and *extra-economic*) needs of [that dominant mode of growth].”⁵² Gramsci himself also argues that

every State is ethical in as much as one of its most important functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes.⁵³

It is in this wider sense that economy is nothing but “the mainspring of history in the last analysis,”⁵⁴ and hence “all feasible organic hegemonic projects need to respect (or take account of) ‘economic determination in the last instance’.”⁵⁵ As such, Jessop argues that “political forces have a vested interest in securing the productive potential of the economic base which both generates political resources and defines the scope for making material concessions,” since for wealth to be distributed, it “must first be produced.”⁵⁶ Thus, although economic growth may not always be the top political priority, other priorities can only be established as long as “the core conditions for

⁵¹ Jessop, “Neo-Gramscian Approach,” 57.

⁵² Ibid., 58. Emphasis added. Friedrich Engels makes the point well in a letter he wrote to Josef Bloch on 21 September 1890 and to which Gramsci also occasionally refers to: “According to the materialist conception of history the determining moment in history is *ultimately* the production and reproduction of real life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. If therefore somebody twists this into the statement that the economic moment is the only determining one, he transforms it into a meaningless, abstract and absurd phrase.” Quoted in Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 427, footnote 74. Emphasis in the quotation.

⁵³ Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 258.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 162.

⁵⁵ Jessop, “Neo-Gramscian Approach,” 58.

⁵⁶ Ibid. For a similar argument, see Fred Block, *Revising State Theory: Essays in Politics and Postindustrialism* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1987), 51–68.

capital accumulation are not thereby irrevocably undermined.”⁵⁷ Overall, this last condition is related to the *material* aspect of hegemonic projects.

Having elaborated the leadership, ideology and material aspects of hegemonic projects, it is now appropriate to look into how hegemony is projected and exercised beyond the domestic polities and spatialities.

1.4.2 Hegemony at the International Level

The concept of “hegemony,” as also implied by Gramsci’s usage of the concept rather as “the moment”⁵⁸ of hegemony,⁵⁹ is a concept with spatio-temporal limits. There is no debate over its temporal limits at all, since struggles for hegemony are dynamic and open-ended processes, as it is the case with all class struggles throughout the history.⁶⁰ A vigorous debate, however, has raged over the spatial limits of the concept. Initially, Gramsci’s concepts used to suffer from a general “strange case of mutual neglect” between Marxism and International Relations.⁶¹ Beginning

⁵⁷ Jessop, “Neo-Gramscian Approach,” 58.

⁵⁸ Gramsci uses the concept of “moment” [momento] in several meanings—the temporal “moment of time,” or “aspect” or “feature” of a particular phenomenon, or, finally, “motive force” behind a particular social process. Whereas he sometimes means only one meaning of the concept, he also at times uses the concept in a way that combines all of its meanings. Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 388, footnote 17. Cf. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, preface to *Prison Notebooks*, xiv.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 56, footnote 5; 124; 125, footnote 3.

⁶⁰ Bob Jessop succinctly makes the point: “[P]olitical class struggle never ends. Only through its continual renewal can a capitalist power bloc keep its relative unity in the face of rivalry and fractionalism and maintain its hegemony (or, at least, its dominance) over subaltern groups.” Bob Jessop, “Marxist Approaches to Power,” in *The Wiley–Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology*, ed. Edwin Amenta, Kate Nash, and Alan Scott (Chichester: Wiley–Blackwell, 2012), 8.

⁶¹ John Maclean, “Marxism and International Relations: A Strange Case of Mutual Neglect,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 17:2 (1988): 295–319.

from the early 1980s, this “mutual neglect” has been gradually overcome with the publication of Marxian works in the disciplines of International Political Economy⁶² and International Historical Sociology⁶³ in general, and, in particular, with the ambitious neo-Gramscian overture first initiated by Robert Cox with two seminal articles published in 1981⁶⁴ and 1983,⁶⁵ followed by a monograph in 1987.⁶⁶ The school has later on further widened the scope of its understanding of “hegemony”—from the “international” level to a supposedly “transnational” one—with the contributions of scholars such as William Robinson and of the Amsterdam School.⁶⁷ All these modifications of Gramsci’s concepts have sparked bitter debates as to whether it is possible or not to “internationalise” his concepts, since those concepts were claimed to have “receive[d] their meaning and explanatory power primarily from their grounding in national social formations,” for “they were used exclusively by Gramsci in that capacity.”⁶⁸ Overshadowed by such criticisms, the neo-Gramscian school of IR, nonetheless proved resilient, and this was not without firm grounds. This

⁶² Ibid., 310–14.

⁶³ Benno Teschke, “IR Theory, Historical Materialism and the False Promise of International Historical Sociology,” *Spectrum: Journal of Global Studies* 6:1 (2014): 9–10.

⁶⁴ Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10:2 (1981): 126–55.

⁶⁵ Robert W. Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 12:2 (1983): 162–75.

⁶⁶ Robert W. Cox, *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

⁶⁷ For an analysis of the “transnationalist” variant of neo-Gramscianism and a critique of it, see Adrian Budd, “Transnationalist Marxism: A Critique,” *Contemporary Politics* 13:4 (2007): 331–47.

⁶⁸ Randall D. Germain and Michael Kenny, “Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians,” *Review of International Studies* 24:1 (1998): 20.

is the case for at least two reasons. First, as has also been proposed by Peter Ives and Nicola Short,⁶⁹ although the Italian case constitutes Gramsci's main political concern and analytical focus, he has nonetheless a broader perspective placing that particular case within its international context. Second, and indeed related to the first, he also examines cases of hegemonic forces projecting their hegemonies beyond their own domestic contexts. He deals not only with the hegemony of the industrial north over the rest of Italy⁷⁰ and the historical case of Piedmontese hegemony over other Italian city-states,⁷¹ or, say, the acceptance by the rural France of the hegemony of Paris,⁷² but deals also with the Serbian hegemony over parts of Europe and the French hegemony⁷³ over Europe following the French Revolution and the subsequent empire led by Napoléon Bonaparte, as well as American hegemony following the introduction of the Fordist method of mass production.⁷⁴ He also points out that the "European cultured classes" achieved a "world-wide hegemony,"⁷⁵ and the "Western culture" had "hegemony over the whole world culture."⁷⁶ The references made to Gramsci's own work here is not intended for a "canonical or theological

⁶⁹ Peter Ives and Nicola Short, "On Gramsci and the International: A Textual Analysis," *Review of International Studies* 39:3 (2013): 621–42.

⁷⁰ Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 70–71, 94.

⁷¹ Ibid., 66, 98.

⁷² Ibid., 79.

⁷³ Ibid., 84, 115.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 279–318.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 447.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 416–18.

Gramscianism,”⁷⁷ but rather aimed at demonstrating that his understanding of social phenomena is in line with the broader tradition of historical materialist method. For that method “seeks to enable the theorisation of any particular part of social reality in relation to the totality.”⁷⁸ As Mark Rupert also argues,

[w]hile analytical distinctions may be made between the “global” and “domestic”, . . . national and international should be construed as two aspects of an internally related whole, a whole which is in some sense capitalist and alienated.⁷⁹

Having discussed some general metatheoretical and methodological aspects of any possible relationship between Gramsci’s concepts and the international, it is now appropriate to look into how such a relationship is conceived of in his own writings; undoubtedly not without limitations set by the way his conceptualisation is understood and employed in this thesis.

As stated earlier, Gramsci does not neglect the international context even in his analyses of the domestic social phenomena.⁸⁰ Gramsci’s analyses recognise and incorporate the international common trends that emanate from social forces operating beyond the domestic level. This is most evident in his analyses where he discusses the influences of the French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars, and the subsequent “Restoration” era in Europe on the historical experience of the Italian

⁷⁷ William I. Robinson, “Gramsci and Globalisation: From Nation-State to Transnational Hegemony,” *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 8:4 (2005): 14, note 1.

⁷⁸ Maclean, “Marxism and International Relations,” 302.

⁷⁹ Mark Rupert, “Alienation, Capitalism and the Inter-State System: Towards a Marxian/Gramscian Critique,” in *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*, ed. Stephen Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 84.

⁸⁰ It would be apt to state at this point that, throughout this thesis, the term “domestic” is used “in reference to phenomena at the ‘national level’ where using the term ‘national’ may inaccurately imply a connection to a political strategy of constructing the nation.” Ives and Short, “On Gramsci and the International,” 622, footnote 2. The term “international,” on the other hand, is understood and employed as the “dimension of social reality which arises specifically from the coexistence within it of more than one society.” Justin Rosenberg, “Why Is There No International Historical Sociology?,” *European Journal of International Relations* 12:3 (2006): 308.

unification process—the *Risorgimento*.⁸¹ Notwithstanding this international perspective, he also states that “the point of departure is ‘national’,” since any class rule would entail leading a “combination of national forces.”⁸² Even in order to achieve an economy that would follow a world plan, he finds it indispensable for a class to “‘nationalise’ itself,” since it would be “necessary to pass through multiple phases in which the regional combinations (of groups of nations) may be of various kinds.”⁸³ Arguing that the Bolsheviks’ eschewal of “internationalism of every vague and purely ideological (in a pejorative sense) element” gave “a realistic political content” to their struggle, he concludes that “exigencies which are national in character are knotted together” in the concept of hegemony.⁸⁴

One should, therefore, speak of multiple, if any, *hegemonies* rather than a singular one at any stage that goes beyond the domestic level. One should also, in this sense, speak of *crises* rather than *crisis* of hegemony at the international level. However, this must not lead to an outright denial of the fact that there are striking commonalities as well as variegations among various social formations due to the universal-cum-uneven development processes along capitalist lines.⁸⁵ Hence more commonalities emerge among various hegemonic projects in a vast scale of societies.

⁸¹ Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 52–120.

⁸² Ibid., 240.

⁸³ Ibid., 241.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Here it is referred to processes generally described as “uneven and combined development” (U&CD) in much of the recent literature on “historical sociology of international relations.” Derived from Leon Trotsky’s writings about the history of the Bolshevik Revolution, some IR scholars—most notably Justin Rosenberg—argue that the “international” is “marked by an inherent dynamism as more developed societies interact with less developed ones, causing combined development in backward societies, which reinforce rather than straighten out, the unevenness of world-historical development as a whole.” Benno Teschke, “Advances and Impasses in Fred Halliday’s International Historical Sociology: A Critical Appraisal,” *International Affairs* 87:5 (2011): 1101.

This is much more so with regard to the internationalisation of production, with new divisions of labour and growing integration among domestic markets. In addition to these, the uneven character of capitalist development and capital accumulation has transformed an already unequal geopolitical setting into one that has generated “core” and “peripheral” countries.⁸⁶ This, in turn, has allowed particular core countries to pursue imperialist policies at the international level in order to create and maintain conditions favourable to their own class rule at home.⁸⁷ This has further increased commonalities among hegemonic projects of the bourgeoisie in different countries, albeit not without their own spatio-temporal variegations. Thus, it becomes only in this sense possible to speak of particular political projects that are able to achieve *hegemonic* character at the international level. It is also this kind of political projects that go through a *crisis* of hegemony at the international level. It was already stated above that Gramsci himself also acknowledges and examines particular cases of hegemony being projected beyond domestic polities. Citing directly terms such as “great,” “medium,” and “small powers,” he also argues that domestic hegemonic constellations in subordinate economies are more receptive to international developments.⁸⁸ He also points out that “ideologies” could be “disseminated in less developed countries” from “highly developed” ones in a way “impinging on local interplay[s]” in the former ones.⁸⁹ Finally, he also argues that wars may change, or even completely reverse, hegemonic relations within a state.⁹⁰

⁸⁶ Ray Kiely, *Rethinking Imperialism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 119.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 86, 188, 239.

⁸⁸ Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 176–77.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 182.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 264.

Making the point that particular social forces are able to project their hegemonies well beyond their domestic social formations is not without its problems. It is not possible to tackle all the criticisms levelled against this point here, but three interrelated problems must be confronted. These are again related to the three aspects of hegemonic projects—leadership, ideology and material capabilities. As stated earlier, class rule is mediated through political leadership and the state, but at the domestic level, the existence of bourgeois hegemony is more or less discernable. This becomes obscure beyond domestic social formations, since the existence of a bourgeois hegemony across national boundaries is not that easy to discern. This is also evident in neo-Gramscian conceptions such as the “*nébuleuse* personified as the global economy,”⁹¹ or “transnational managerial class”⁹² of Robert Cox or the “transnational capitalist class” of Leslie Sklair⁹³ and William Robinson.⁹⁴ Even if one

⁹¹ Robert W. Cox, “Global Perestroika,” in “Socialist Register 1992: New World Order?,” ed. Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch, *Socialist Register* 28 (London: The Merlin Press, 1992): 27. “There is, in effect, no explicit political or authority structure for the global economy. There is, nevertheless, something that remains to be deciphered, something that could be described by the French word *nébuleuse* or by the notion of ‘governance without government’. There is a transnational process of consensus seeking among the official caretakers of the global economy. It aims towards generating consensual guidelines, underpinned by an ideology of globalization, that are transmitted into the policy-making channels of national governments and big corporations.” Robert W. Cox, *The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections on Power, Morals and Civilization*, with Michael G. Schechter (London: Routledge, 2002), 83.

⁹² “At the apex of an emerging global class structure is the transnational managerial class. Having its own ideology, strategy and institutions of collective action, it is both a class in itself and for itself. Its focal points of organisation, the Trilateral Commission, World Bank, IMF and OECD, develop both a framework of thought and guidelines for policies.” Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders,” 147. See also Ibid., 155, footnote 38.

⁹³ The “transnational capitalist class” is “domiciled in and identified with no particular country but, on the contrary, is identified with the global capitalist system.” Leslie Sklair, *The Transnational Capitalist Class* (Oxford: Wiley–Blackwell, 2001), 10.

⁹⁴ William I. Robinson, *A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2004); Robinson, “Gramsci and Globalisation,” 1–16.

agrees to the argument that such a “transnational class” is in the making,⁹⁵ it is more difficult to substantiate the argument that it exercises a “transnational hegemony.” At the very basic level, the problem lies in the fact that “a single global hegemonic project is untenable” in an “increasing world of globalization.”⁹⁶

As for the aspect of ideology, the ideological hegemony of neoliberalism at the international level which goes back to the early 1980s would well illustrate the point. As Adrian Budd argues, the “tendency towards neo-liberal restructuring, although real, is constrained by countervailing factors.”⁹⁷ This is a limit posed upon world-wide neoliberal restructuring. At the heart of the issue lies the “Janus-faced” character of the contemporary state. It occupies a “historically conditioned mediating position . . . between the international system and domestic social forces,” and

remains concerned not only with global developments but also with national class relations, the health of national economies, and the national reproduction of political and social relations conducive to continued capital accumulation.⁹⁸ Thus, “its hegemonic representation” being “constructed in contrasting ways, often dependent on its spatial form of production,” the hegemonic character of neoliberalism differs “at contrasting levels across global space.”⁹⁹ Hence such concepts as “variegated neoliberalism” emerge.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ For a study that argues such a class in the making, see Kees van der Pijl, *Transnational Classes and International Relations* (London: Routledge, 1998), 98–135.

⁹⁶ Worth, *Rethinking Hegemony*, 148.

⁹⁷ Budd, “Transnationalist Marxism,” 339.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 340.

⁹⁹ Worth, *Rethinking Hegemony*, 78.

¹⁰⁰ Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck, and Nik Theodore, “Variegated Neoliberalization: Geographies, Modalities, Pathways,” *Global Networks: A Journal of Transnational Affairs* 10:2 (2010): 182–222; Bob Jessop, “Rethinking the Diversity of Capitalism: Varieties of Capitalism, Variegated Capitalism, and the World Market,” in *Capitalist Diversity and Diversity within Capitalism*, ed. Geoff Wood and Christel Lane (London: Routledge, 2011), 209–37; Huw Macartney, *Variegated Neoliberalism: EU Varieties of Capitalism and International Political Economy* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 84–95;

The last problem regarding hegemonic projects that go beyond domestic social formations is concerned with their material aspect. The Coxian and transnationalist variants of the neo-Gramscian school of IR “often fail to explain thoroughly how consent is reached with respective national subaltern classes.”¹⁰¹ The analyses made by those variants of neo-Gramscianism also suffer from lack of sufficiently “detailed emphasis given to ways in which the various forms of ideology, common sense, religion, folklore and so on are articulated for hegemonic relationship” between the ruling and subaltern classes.¹⁰² Thus, in those analyses, hegemony is perceived rather as a “process that seems to be quite mechanical and top-down in its working, with emphasis placed on building elite classes rather than on forging class relations.”¹⁰³ That “top-down” depiction of hegemonic relations at the international level is also accused by Philip McMichael, in his piece on William Robinson’s “transnational state” argument, with “suspending the dialectic”¹⁰⁴ in the sense that those analyses have in common a “primarily outside-in approach to state power.”¹⁰⁵ The concepts of *nébuleuse* and “transnational capitalist class” rather

Bob Jessop, “The World Market, Variegated Capitalism and the Crisis of European Integration,” in *Globalisation and European Integration: Critical Approaches to Regional Order and International Relations*, ed. Petros Nousios, Henk Overbeek, Andreas Tsolakis (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 91–111.

¹⁰¹ Worth, *Rethinking Hegemony*, 74.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Philip McMichael, “Revisiting the Question of the Transnational State: A Comment on William Robinson’s ‘Social Theory and Globalization’,” *Theory and Society* 30:2 (2001): 201.

¹⁰⁵ Budd, “Transnationalist Marxism,” 337.

“[conjure] up an image of a cloud in which there is no centre of power.”¹⁰⁶ The approaches that such concepts reflect, according to Adrian Budd, are “unable to capture the significance of the contradictory tendencies at work in the global political economy,” and “the persistence of state power” is at the centre of those contradictory tendencies.¹⁰⁷ Even though “states introject the neo-liberal imperatives of the contemporary world system,” state power also “continues to be projected into the international system.”¹⁰⁸ As such, Peter Burnham, for instance, criticises Cox’s arguments with

[underplaying] the extent to which ‘globalisation’ is authored by states and is regarded by state agents (both liberal market and social democrat) as one of the most efficient means of restructuring labour/capital relations to manage crisis in capitalist society.¹⁰⁹

Apart from the criticism towards the Coxian and transnationalist variants of neo-Gramscianism that they neglect the crucial role fulfilled by the state, another issue at hand is their overemphasis on the consensual aspect of hegemony at the international level. Combined with their neglect of state power, this culminates in an overall neglect of more material factors such as the coercive apparatus of US nuclear imperialism and the economic expansion to which it also contributed as a result of the armament race under conditions of superpower rivalry with the Soviet Union during the Cold War.¹¹⁰ “Imperialism” either does not have any place in those analyses, or

¹⁰⁶ Adrian Budd, “Gramsci’s Marxism and International Relations,” *International Socialism* 114 (2007), accessed 5 February 2019, <http://isj.org.uk/gramscis-marxism-and-international-relations/>.

¹⁰⁷ Budd, “Transnationalist Marxism,” 337.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Peter Burnham, “Globalisation: States, Markets and Class Relations,” *Historical Materialism* 1:1 (1997): 153.

¹¹⁰ Budd, “Gramsci’s Marxism.”

else they strip it of its domestic ruling class component—the US ruling class in the contemporary period.¹¹¹

One should engage with Gramsci's concepts at the international level only after taking into consideration these points and criticisms. It is thus now apposite to lay out how the concepts of hegemony and imperialism at the international level are understood and employed throughout the thesis.

1.4.3 Hegemony and Imperialism

The concept of “hegemony” at the international level, following Richard Saull, is understood and employed throughout the thesis as “a form of international leadership,” centred on a particular social formation, “whereby the reproduction of dominance is realized through the *active involvement*” of other social formations.¹¹² Any such definition must also “integrate the *material and structural logic* of uneven capitalist development” with the concept of “historical bloc” in order to “make sense of the evolution and dynamics” within the hegemonic arrangements at the international level over the last several decades.¹¹³ The “dominance” of one social formation is essential but not sufficient, since that particular social formation must also be “at the center of the dominant mode of (capital) accumulation,” whereas at the same it must also be “able to draw in other states and societies into participating in this mode of accumulation.”¹¹⁴ The subordinate social formations can also “[secure] some socioeconomic and political gains,” but the fundamental issue is that they

¹¹¹ Budd, “Transnationalist Marxism,” 340–43.

¹¹² Richard Saull, “Rethinking Hegemony: Uneven Development, Historical Blocs, and the World Economic Crisis,” *International Studies Quarterly* 56:2 (2012): 324. Emphasis in the original.

¹¹³ Ibid. Emphasis in the original.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 328.

become “integrated into the socioeconomic structure, the political institutions, and cultural milieu associated with the hegemon.”¹¹⁵ The distinctive feature of international hegemony is that it is not totally “imposed by the hegemon but, instead, develops out of the acceptance and internalization” of particular patterns of behaviour on the part of subordinate social formations.¹¹⁶ Hegemony at the international level

operates . . . through multiple channels and connections involving states, international institutions (the Bretton Woods institutions, the WTO [the World Trade Organization], the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and wider civil society forces organized at the domestic and international levels.¹¹⁷

Hegemony as “a form of international order,” then, goes well beyond a particular state’s material capabilities (e.g. its military prowess and economic dynamism) since it rather “rests on a *consensual acceptance* [by subordinate social formations] of socioeconomic and political hierarchy through a network of social, ideational, cultural, and institutional means,” and these are mostly “associated with liberal–democratic forms of governance” in the contemporary period.¹¹⁸ Hegemonic relations at the international level again develops from “historical blocs,” which, as a concept, “encapsulates the relationship between state and society, domestic and international, and dominant and subaltern socioeconomic forces.”¹¹⁹ The concept of “historical bloc” at the international level

refers to the constellation of social, economic, and political connections—organized nationally and internationally—between the administrative and coercive machinery of the state and social groupings within which civil society

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Saull, “Hegemony and the Global Political Economy.”

¹¹⁸ Saull, “Rethinking Hegemony,” 328. Emphasis in the original.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

whereby leading *qua* capitalist social forces establish ascendancy over other social groupings.¹²⁰

“Imperialism,” on the other hand, again following Saull, is understood and employed as rather referring to the coercive aspect of the international leadership exercised by a particular social formation over subordinate ones.¹²¹ “Hegemony” entails the acceptance of “hierarchical relationships that define empire” as “legitimate and beneficial by agents in the periphery,” but when those agents in the periphery attempt to act autonomously from the leading social formation, it becomes “likely to trigger imperial responses exposing the iron fist of empire.”¹²² As Charles Maier also argues, “hegemony seems *potential empire*, leadership where force has not become necessary to maintain control, not just a high-minded renunciation of intervention.”¹²³ Overall, while “hegemony” is an all-encompassing form of class rule that exceeds far beyond particular state apparatuses being exercised at either domestic level or both domestic and international levels, “imperialism” is rather related to a particular state apparatus which has the most efficient coercive instruments being exercised solely at the international level. It could also be argued that “imperialism,” following Haldun Gülpalp, involves the “[creation of] an international division of labour . . . through the extension of the conditions of capitalist accumulation on a world scale”¹²⁴ by employing both the capitalist and territorial logics of power as a coercive capacity.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Richard Saull, “Empire, Imperialism, and Contemporary American Global Power,” *International Studies Perspectives* 9:3 (2008): 312.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Charles S. Maier, *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 63. Emphasis added.

¹²⁴ Haldun Gülpalp, “Debate on Capitalism and Development: The Theories of Samir Amin and Bill Warren,” *Capital & Class* 10:1 (1986): 139.

The contemporary economic form of it more specifically involves “*depriving developing countries of the right to develop protectionist industrial policies and thereby generate dynamic comparative advantage.*”¹²⁵ Hence it is

less what advanced countries *do* to less developed countries, and more a question of what the former increasingly *do not* allow the latter to do, namely carry out industrial policies.¹²⁶

It comes onto the scene with its disciplinary coercive apparatuses including sanctions and military interventions in case of non-obedience on the part of subordinate social formations being designated as “failed” or “rogue” states.

The aforementioned case of “contingent” or “non-necessary” correspondence between the economic base and superstructural elements well applies to the relationship between “hegemony” and “imperialism.” For imperialism also operates at “the intersection of, respectively, capitalist and territorial logics of power and economic and geopolitical competition.”¹²⁷ The relation between “these two distinctive but intertwined logics of power” is far from being “functional or one-sided,” but rather is “problematic and often contradictory (that is, dialectical).”¹²⁸ These two logics cannot be reduced to each other, but they are also closely connected with each other.¹²⁹

If it is to return to the fundamental aspects of hegemony at the international level, this leadership must be exercised by a particular ruling class or class fraction

¹²⁵ Ray Kiely, *Rethinking Imperialism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 188. Emphasis in the original.

¹²⁶ Ibid. Emphasis in the original.

¹²⁷ Alex Callinicos, “Does Capitalism Need the State System?,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 20:4 (2007): 539.

¹²⁸ David Harvey, *The New Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 30.

¹²⁹ Kiely, *Rethinking Imperialism*, 149, 257.

that is hegemonic over a particular domestic social formation. That leadership is mediated primarily through the political leadership of the imperialist state apparatus at hand as well as through international institutions. Ideological hegemony at the international level is constituted in a rather loose fashion culminating in, as indicated earlier, variegations at different spatial levels. The material aspect of hegemony is provided again through the mediation of either the leading imperialist state apparatus or international institutions in the form of economic and military assistance towards subordinate social formations, but incentives such as political recognition or appreciation, accession to or promotion in international institutions may also help in generating consent from those subordinate social formations. Hegemony becomes thinner and dimmer the further it gets from the leading core towards peripheral regions and towards subaltern social groups (i.e. the proletariat and the peasantry) within those regions. Thus, the generation of consent from those subaltern social groups and incorporation of them into the wider international historical bloc is again mediated through domestic social formations in general and domestic state apparatuses in particular. The contemporary forms of consent generation mechanisms involve easily available credits and cheaper consumer goods as well as the promotion of “individualism,” “consumerism,” and sometimes “nationalism.”¹³⁰ Accordingly, “[t]he state is situated as an alien mediator between society as a collection of self-interested individuals, and society as a potentially self-determining political community.”¹³¹ In addition to that mediatory role of the state at the domestic level, it “also mediates between [its own] alienated community and other historically constructed communities.”¹³² Thus, the modern capitalist type of state has a dual mediatory role—one at the domestic and the other at the international level—within

¹³⁰ Saull, “Rethinking Hegemony,” 331.

¹³¹ Rupert, “Alienation, Capitalism and the Inter-State System,” 84.

¹³² Ibid.

wider hegemonic constellations at the international level. Overall, the complex and contradictory relationships between uneven capitalist relations of production on a world-wide scale and the superstructural elements such as the leading imperialist state, international institutions as well as other state apparatuses cement an international historical bloc when these two aspects converge or overlap with each other to a certain extent albeit in a non-necessary and contingent fashion.

It was already stated that hegemony becomes dimmer and thinner the further it gets from the leading core. This is mainly because the international hegemonic projects articulated by the organic intellectuals of the ruling domestic class or class fractions of the leading social formation, mostly through the technocratic cadres of international institutions who have direct links with that particular ruling class or class fraction, have less to offer in material terms the farther such projects are to reach in peripheral regions. Such projects also have the least to offer to the subaltern social groups in those regions, since these are also those subjected to the harshest exploitation of surplus value under capitalist social relations in order to accumulate capital at the international level albeit in an uneven manner. In addition to these material shortcomings of the international hegemonic projects in peripheral regions, one should also take into account the elite-driven, and thus alien, nature of such projects in the eyes of those subaltern social groups in the periphery. Therefore, dissent or counter-hegemonic challenges become likely in such regions of the world economy. If such tendencies become the actual case, imperialism comes onto the scene as stated earlier. It is, however, more often than not the case that the reception or internalisation of internationally articulated hegemonic projects at the domestic level in peripheral regions is rather realised mostly through non-hegemonic strategies such as passive revolutions. Hence, that concept should also be looked into.

1.4.4 Passive Revolutions as Chains between the International and the Domestic

“Passive revolution” is a concept “about the reorganisation and restoration of class power.”¹³³ In the absence of a solid social class basis, class rule tends to be formed rather around a non-consensual form of political leadership. Gramsci deals with the *Risorgimento* from such a viewpoint acknowledging the “absence of an Italian equivalent of the Jacobins” and hence the lack of “intellectual and moral leadership.”¹³⁴ Giuseppe Mazzini and the Action Party could not incorporate the peasantry and the countryside into the process of national unification by subordinating them to the bourgeoisie and the “city” within “an organic relationship” through consensual means as was the case with French Revolution.¹³⁵ Lacking “any popular dimension” or “solid class base,” the result of the *Risorgimento* was not that

a social group which ‘led’ other groups, but a State [the Piedmontese State] which, even though it had limitations as a power, ‘led’ the group which should have been ‘leading’ and was able to put at the latter’s disposal an army and a politico-diplomatic strength.¹³⁶

This was because the Italian bourgeoisie was already in the making and far from having a “homogenous nuclei,” and moreover, “their tendency to unite was extremely problematic.”¹³⁷ Thus, they wanted to “dominate,” rather than to “lead,” and they wanted “their interests to dominate,” and not directly through their own cadres, since

¹³³ Chris Hesketh, “Passive Revolution: A Universal Concept with Geographical Seats,” *Review of International Studies* 43:3 (2017): 401.

¹³⁴ Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 45.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 105.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 104.

it was also not possible.¹³⁸ It is for that very reason that “they wanted a new force, independent of every compromise and condition, to become the arbiter of the Nation.”¹³⁹ As a result, this new force, the Piedmontese state in this case, had a function similar to that of a modern political party, which is considered to involve “the leading personnel of a social group” by Gramsci, but one with additional features such as “an army and a politico-diplomatic strength.”¹⁴⁰

For Gramsci, therefore, “the important thing to analyse” is the “significance” of a distinctive type of function of the political leadership in passive revolutions, that is, “the fact that a State replaces the local social groups in leading a struggle of renewal.”¹⁴¹ Thus, it is “domination” without “leadership” or “dictatorship without hegemony.”¹⁴² One more crucial aspect of passive revolutions is that, in addition to domination through the state apparatus, it involves “hegemony” only in a narrow sense, as

exercised by a part of the social group over the entire group, not by the latter over other forces in order to give power to the movement, radicalise it, etc. on the “Jacobin” model.¹⁴³

Through passive revolutions, “relatively far-reaching modifications are being introduced into the country’s economic structure in order to accentuate the ‘plan of production’ element,” in a way that “socialisation and co-operation in the sphere of

¹³⁸ Ibid., 105.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 105–106.

¹⁴² Ibid., 106.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

production are being increased.”¹⁴⁴ All these take place, however, “without . . . touching (or at least not going beyond the regulation and control of) individual and group appropriation of profit.”¹⁴⁵ Gramsci examines the European Restoration Era following the Napoléonic Wars (1803–1815), the fascist rule in Italy following the First World War and the introduction of the Fordist production method in the United States and the rise of Americanism at the international level as passive revolutions in addition to the Italian *Risorgimento*.¹⁴⁶

Passive revolutions “may serve to disable effective social action on the part of the subaltern groups and hence to reproduce the conditions of capitalist domination.”¹⁴⁷ They indeed involve modifications through “conservatism”¹⁴⁸ by maintaining surplus extraction and capital accumulation (i.e. the very essence of capitalist exploitation). Likewise, the concept refers to “a generalised means of statecraft in the expansion of capitalism,” but with “pacifying reforms (which are themselves a response to subaltern class pressures).”¹⁴⁹ Pointing out that the very concept of *Risorgimento* was used in different ways referring to different beginning points in the history of Italy, with some making it begin as early as the eleventh century whereas others start it later, Gramsci argues that such questions about the origins of the *Risorgimento* stem from the weakness of the Italian economy, its newly emerging capitalist social relations, the lack of a strong and extensive bourgeois

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 120.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 119–20, 277–318.

¹⁴⁷ Rupert, “Alienation, Capitalism and the Inter-State System,” 81.

¹⁴⁸ Hesketh, “Passive Revolution,” 399.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 401.

economic class, “but instead one had numerous intellectuals and petty bourgeois, etc.”¹⁵⁰ Thus, for Italian unification,

[i]t was not so much a question of freeing the advanced economic forces from antiquated legal and political fetters but rather of creating the general conditions that would enable these economic forces to come into existence and *to grow on the model of other countries*.¹⁵¹

It is this last feature of passive revolutions that provides us with the chain between the international and the domestic for it refers to a process that has been, not only “structurally conditioned by the broader global political economy,” but also “contingently articulated in various contexts giving the term its geographical seats.”¹⁵²

Overall, strategies of passive revolution are exclusive to the bourgeoisie, since any reversal or complete transformation of bourgeois class rule cannot be achieved in a piecemeal fashion,¹⁵³ and such strategies are resorted to by bourgeois social forces whenever their hegemony weakens¹⁵⁴ or whenever their “political superstructure in the integral sense (force plus hegemony) cannot cope with the need to expand the forces of production.”¹⁵⁵ They allow the bourgeoisie “to reorganise its dominance

¹⁵⁰ Antonio Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, vol. 3, ed. and trans. Joseph A. Buttigieg (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 60.

¹⁵¹ Ibid. Emphasis added.

¹⁵² Hesketh, “Passive Revolution,” 390.

¹⁵³ Sasso, *Gramsci’s Politics*, 213–14; Rupert, “Alienation, Capitalism and the Inter-State System,” 81.

¹⁵⁴ Sasso, *Gramsci’s Politics*, 207, 210.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 210–11.

politically and economically,”¹⁵⁶ and provide them with “new forms of political domination.”¹⁵⁷ They also maintain “the passivity of subordinate groups and the separation of leaders and led.”¹⁵⁸ One should also point to the transitory nature of passive revolutions which rather serve to “prepare the ground for a new period of hegemony.”¹⁵⁹ At the international level, the post-war settlement based upon the liberal international order following the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions and the later neoliberal restructuring beginning from the late 1970s could be considered as passive revolutions since these were “response[s] by governments to conditions of structural crisis and hegemonic instability where the working class might prove a threat.”¹⁶⁰ Another crucial point regarding passive revolutions is that these are the ways social formations, which lack a solid social basis or which have not undergone profound social and economic transformations on their own, receive the impact of such profound transformations, which occur in core countries and then spill over to other countries, “in a more passive way.”¹⁶¹ This point is highlighted by Gramsci when he argued that the “drive for renewal” in the periphery might be caused by a combination of the domestic “progressive” social forces with “an international situation favourable to their expansion and victory” in his analyses on the relation

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 208.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 211.

¹⁵⁸ Jessop, *Capitalist State*, 150.

¹⁵⁹ Jessop, *State Theory*, 213.

¹⁶⁰ Jonathan Joseph, “Hegemony and the Structure–Agency Problem in International Relations: A Scientific Realist Contribution,” *Review of International Studies* 34:1 (2008): 113, footnote 16.

¹⁶¹ Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations,” 169–70.

between the French Revolution and the late *Risorgimento*.¹⁶² The crucial point here is that, since local economic development is “artificially limited and repressed,” the “impetus of development” is “instead the reflection of international developments.”¹⁶³ Through such international developments as the French Revolution, ideological currents “born on the basis of the productive development of the more advanced countries” are transmitted to the periphery.¹⁶⁴ It is this latter aspect of passive revolutions which matters most in order to understand the constitution and maintenance of hegemony at the international level. As hegemony becomes dimmer and thinner the further it gets from the leading core, passive revolutions emerge as the chains between the processes of capitalist restructuring at international and domestic levels forging hegemony at the international level. Hence it emerges as a key concept in efforts to understand the Turkish case of neoliberal restructuring which has taken place for approximately four decades.¹⁶⁵ Thus, the concept is also to be utilised in a similar manner throughout the thesis with a view to better understanding the complex, albeit contradictory at times, relationship between changes in the economic structure and emergence of different superstructural forms including forms of state and approaches to foreign policy.

¹⁶² Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 116.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 116.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 116–17.

¹⁶⁵ Alev Özkanç, “Türkiye’nin Neo-Liberal Dönüşümü ve Liberal Düşünce,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, vol. 7, *Liberalizm*, ed. Murat Yılmaz (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), 637; Alev Özkanç, *Siyaset Sosyolojisi Yazılıları: Yeni Sağ ve Sonrası* (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2007), 70–71, 85; Galip L. Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism: The Case of Turkey in the 1980s* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2009), 311, 351–52; Elif Uzgören, “Globalisation, the European Union and Turkey: Rethinking the Struggle over Hegemony,” (PhD diss., University of Nottingham, 2012), 153–55; Uzgören, “Consolidation of Neoliberalism,” 291, 302. For world-wide applications of the concept of passive revolution to cases of neoliberal restructuring in various domestic contexts, see the special issue of *Capital & Class* 34:3 (2010).

1.5 Outline of the Thesis

The thesis, as indicated, seeks to examine how and in what circumstances the neo-Ottomanist foreign policy aspiration flourished, its rise and ultimate failure under the political leadership of Turgut Özal from 1983 to 1993 from a neo-Gramscian approach. While doing this, it is to employ a historical materialist methodology, which aims not to miss the fundamental point with respect to the mutually constitutive relationship between the domestic and the international. Thus, the chapters of the thesis were drawn up out of such a concern. The following chapter is to critically engage with the ever-expanding literature on the neo-Ottomanist foreign policy aspiration under the political leadership of Turgut Özal in its first section. It is to introduce the most prominent strands of analysis which dominate the literature on neo-Ottomanism under Özal. While doing this, the chapter also aims at laying out the fundamental points where this thesis differentiate itself from the existing literature. The chapter is also to illustrate its possible contributions to the literature by employing a neo-Gramscian approach in its last section.

Chapter 3, is to examine the domestic and international circumstances that led to a neoliberal restructuring in Turkey beginning from the early 1980s. In order to achieve that purpose, it first examines the experience of planned economic development under the import substitution industrialisation (ISI) model and its subsequent crisis that began as early as the second half of the 1960s. The chapter analyses the search for a response to the deepening crisis of hegemony on the part of the Turkish bourgeoisie in relation to the US-led neoliberal hegemonic project at the international level beginning from the early 1970s. The chapter, then, looks into the neoliberal economic and political restructuring that took place in the early 1980s through the 24 January 1980 economic reform package and the subsequent military rule following the 12 September 1980 *coup d'état* since this period formed the basis over which politics would revolve around for decades.

Following that analysis of the domestic scene, Chapter 4 is to examine the changes and the ultimate transformation in the international order which began with

what some authors call the “Second Cold War” under US President Ronald Reagan and which subsequently ended up with the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Its first section analyses this period with respect to the transition from a period marked with the inter-systemic conflict between the capitalist Western bloc and the socialist Eastern bloc to a period marked rather by heteronymous intra-systemic competition and crises. Its second section, on the other hand, elaborates the new possibilities thought to have been opened up for supposedly “regional powers” such as Turkey in this international political conjuncture in the early post-Cold War years. How such regional aspirants were accommodated into the new international order or, when that could not be accomplished, eliminated entirely is also to be looked into. Here, the chapter aims to better understand why some intellectuals and policy makers in the early 1990s saw great opportunities and a large space opened up for Turkey in its neighbouring regions.

Chapter 5 is to return to the domestic scene in order to examine the reformulation of neo-Ottomanism by a group of intellectuals who had close links to President Turgut Özal in the early 1990s in a way that could be considered a subimperialist hegemonic project. To fulfil that aim, the chapter is to analyse first the social dissent aroused by the neoliberal economic policies pursued under the Motherland Party government led by the then-Prime Minister Özal throughout the 1980s and the subsequent crisis even though it could not bring about a counter-hegemonic challenge to the neoliberal hegemony. That section also points to the simultaneous rise of the Islamic fraction of the Turkish bourgeoisie in the post-1980 period which enabled hegemonic projects with mainly conservative and Islamic motives providing them with a solid social basis. The crisis conjuncture of the late 1980s and the early 1990s was also marked with contending ideological positions among which the most known was the debate around the conception of the “Second Republic.”

The reformulation of neo-Ottomanism in a way that could be considered a subimperialist hegemonic project occurred in such a conjuncture, and its articulation by a group of intellectuals gathered around *Türkiye Günliği*, a nationalist-

conservative journal, which supported, and was also supported by Özal, is to be examined in Chapter 6, whereas Chapter 7 is to analyse the Turkish foreign policy pursued under the political leadership of Özal in order to investigate whether or not the neo-Ottomanist hegemonic project could be transformed into a historical bloc within a full-blown neo-Ottoman hegemony. A distinction is made between Özal's early foreign policy practices throughout the 1980s during which the main motive was the acceleration of the incorporation of the Turkish economy into world markets and his later practices in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Thus, the first section of this chapter is devoted to his early foreign policy practices, whereas the following sections of the chapter are devoted to his later relatively more assertive foreign policy practices towards the three key neighbouring regions—namely, the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia and the Caucasus. The case of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) deserves special attention, as it led Turkish policy makers to think for a while that they could substitute relations with the Middle East for those with Europe, and this is also examined in a separate section. Chapter 8 is to theoretically assess the neo-Ottoman subimperialist aspiration for regional leadership under the political leadership of Turgut Özal using a neo-Gramscian historical materialist approach. As such, this neo-Ottoman subimperialist hegemonic project is to be analysed in terms of its capacity or incapacity to successfully cement a historical bloc out of the social forces it sought to combine and mobilise behind the project. The conclusions drawn in general are to be elaborated in Chapter 9.

CHAPTER 2

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON THE NEO-OTTOMANIST FOREIGN POLICY ASPIRATION UNDER ÖZAL

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is to critically engage with the ever-expanding literature on the neo-Ottomanist foreign policy aspiration under the political leadership of Turgut Özal. The chapter has a number of goals in doing this. Apart from introducing the most prominent strands of analysis which dominate the literature on neo-Ottomanism under Özal, the chapter seeks to lay out the fundamental points where this thesis differentiate itself from the existing literature. Thereby, the chapter also aims at vindicating the neo-Gramscian version of historical materialist methodology adopted in this thesis in analysing the issue at hand through critically elaborating the fundamental shortcomings of the existing literature. As such, the chapter aims to illustrate its possible contributions to the literature by employing a neo-Gramscian approach. Thus, the first section is devoted to a critical review and an elaboration of the existing literature, which is to be done through grouping it under five main categories. A critical assessment and an evaluation of possible contributions are to be made in the last section of the chapter.

2.2 Review of the Literature

There is a vast literature on Turkish foreign policy.¹⁶⁶ Many of these studies devote some space to the Özal period since it is considered to have been an important

¹⁶⁶ Although it is impossible to cite here all studies covering Turkish foreign policy in general, it would be wise to state that the most prominent works among them are as follows: Clement H. Dodd, ed.,

turning point within the overall political history of Turkey if not particularly within that of Turkish foreign policy. Apart from works that cover Turkish foreign policy in general, there are also a lot of monographs and articles that deal with the Turkish foreign policy under the political leadership of Turgut Özal.¹⁶⁷ There are also works

Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1992); Graham E. Fuller et al., *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); Mehmet Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919–1995)*, 9th ed. (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996); Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation, eds., *Turkey between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996); Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı, eds., *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000); Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi, eds., *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2002); Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003); Faruk Sönmezoglu, ed., *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi* (Istanbul: Der Yayıncıları, 2004); İdris Bal, ed., *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era* (Boca Raton, FL: Brown Walker Press, 2004); Nasuh Uslu, *Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2004); Baskın Oran, ed., *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919–2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*, trans. Mustafa Akşin (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2010); Cüneyt Yenigün and Ertan Efegil, ed., *Türkiye'nin Değişen Dış Politikası* (Ankara: Nobel, 2010); Ertan Efegil and Rıdvan Kalaycı, ed., *Dış Politika Teorileri Bağlamında Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi* (Ankara: Nobel, 2012); Faruk Sönmezoglu, Nurcan Özgür Baklacıoğlu and Özlem Terzi, eds., *XXI. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi* (Istanbul: Der Yayıncıları, 2012); Hasret Çomak and Caner Sancaktar, eds., *Türk Dış Politikasında Yeni Yönelimler: İki Kutuplu Sistem Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası* (Istanbul: Beta, 2013); William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 3rd ed. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); Faruk Sönmezoglu, *Soğuk Savaş Döneminde Türk Dış Politikası, 1945–1991* (Istanbul: Der Yayıncıları, 2016); Faruk Sönmezoglu, *Son Onyillarda Türk Dış Politikası, 1991–2015* (Istanbul: Der Yayıncıları, 2016); Adem Çaylak and Seyit Ali Avcu, eds., *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası* (Ankara: Savaş Yayinevi, 2018); Murat Ercan, 21. Yüzyılda Küresel ve Bölgesel Aktörler Bağlamında Türk Dış Politikası (Istanbul: Efe Akademi Yayıncıları, 2018).

¹⁶⁷ The literature on the Turkish foreign policy under Özal is expanding everyday. Far from providing an exhaustive list, the following list contains the prominent works published so far as of the end of 2018: William Hale, “Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis,” *International Affairs* 68:4 (1992): 679–92; Mustafa Aydin, “Foreign Policy Formation and the Interaction between Domestic and International Environments: A Study of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy (1980-1991)” (PhD diss., Lancaster University, 1994); İdris Bal, “Turkey’s Relations with the West and the Turkic Republics of the Former Soviet Union: The Rise of the ‘Turkish Model’ (1991-1992)” (PhD diss., University of Manchester, 1998); İdris Bal, “‘Turkish Model’ and the Turkic Republics,” *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* 3:3 (1998): 105–29; Mahmut Bali Aykan, *Türkiye'nin Kuveyt Krizi (1990–1991) Politikası: 1998 Yılından Geriye Yönelik Bir Yeniden Değerlendirme* (Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 1998); Yasemin Çelik, “Turkish Foreign Policy after the Cold War” (PhD diss., the City University of New York, 1998); Muhittin Ataman, “An Integrated Approach to Foreign Policy Change: Explaining Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1980s” (PhD diss., University of Kentucky, 1999); Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut, *En Uzun Onyıl: Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar*, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Büke Yayıncıları, 2000); İdris Bal, “Uluslararası Politikada Türk Modelinin Yükselişi ve Düşüşü,” *Bilig* 14 (2000): 1–16; İhsan D. Dağı, “Human Rights, Democratization and the European Community in Turkish Politics: The Özal Years, 1983-87,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 37:1 (2001): 17–40; Sedat Laçiner, “From Kemalism to Ozalism: The Ideological

Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy” (PhD diss., King’s College, University of London, 2001); Muhittin Ataman, “Leadership Change: Özal Leadership and Restructuring in Turkish Foreign Policy,” *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 1:1 (2002): 120–53; Muhittin Ataman, “Özalist Dış Politika: Aktif ve Rasyonel Bir Anlayış,” *Bilgi* 7:2 (2003): 49–64; Sedat Laçiner, “Özal Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası,” in *Türkiye'nin Dış, Ekonomik, Sosyal ve İdari Politikaları, 1980–2003*, ed. Turgut Göksu et al. (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2003), 25–48; Sedat Laçiner, “Özalism (Neo-Ottomanism): An Alternative in Turkish Foreign Policy?,” *Yönetim Bilimleri Dergisi* 1:1–2 (2003–2004): 161–202; İlhan Uzgel, *Ulusal Çıkar ve Dış Politika: Türk Dış Politikasının Belirlenmesinde Ulusal Çıkarın Rolü, 1983–1991* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004); Kemal Kirişçi, “Huzur mu Huzursuzluk mu?: Çekiç Güç ve Türk Dış Politikası (1991–1993),” trans. Ahmet K. Han, in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoglu (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004), 311–28; Ramazan Gözen, “Türkiye ve I. Körfez Savaşı: Kriz Ortamında Dış Politika,” in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoglu (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004), 271–309; Şule Kut, “Yugoslavya Bunalımı ve Türkiye'nin Bosna-Hersek ve Makedonya Politikası: 1990–1993,” in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoglu (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004), 585–608; Leyla Kahraman, “Türkiye'de Devlet Adamlığı ve Politikacılık: Demirel, Ecevit ve Özal Örnekleri” (PhD diss., Hacettepe University, 2006); Sibel Kavuncu, “Turgut Özal’ın Başbakanlığı Döneminde Türkiye–ABD İlişkileri” (PhD diss., University of Istanbul, 2006); Nevra Yaraç Laçinok, “Turgut Özal,” in *Türk Dış Politikasında Liderler: Sürekliklik ve Değişim, Söylem ve Eylem*, ed. Ali Faik Demir (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 2007), 537–639; Hande Erol, “Türkiye–Ortadoğu İlişkileri (1983–1993)” (master’s thesis, Dokuz Eylül University, 2008); Mehmet Yıldız, “Avrupa Birliği’ne Tam Üyelik Başvurusuna Giden Süreçte Turgut Özal’ın Yaklaşımları, Çalışmaları ve Politikası” (master’s thesis, Süleyman Demirel University, 2008); Sedat Laçiner, “Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism,” *USAk Yearbook* 2 (2009): 153–205; Abdulkadir Şengül, “Gulf Crisis of 1990–1991: Impact of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy” (master’s thesis, Fatih University, 2010); Eren Gündüz, “Türkiye'de Güçlü Tek Parti İktidarları Döneminde (DP, ANAP, AKP) Türk Dış Politikasının Ana Eğilimleri, Yönelimleri ve Karşılaştırılması” (master’s thesis, University of Kirikkale, 2010); İsa Afacan, “Turkish–American Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, 1990–2005” (PhD diss., Florida International University, 2011); Abdulvahap Kara, *Turgut Özal ve Türk Dünyası: Türkiye–Türk Cumhuriyetleri İlişkileri, 1983–1993* (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2012); Ömer Ak, “Liderlik Profili Analizi ve Dış Politika: Turgut Özal ve Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,” in *Dış Politika Teorileri Bağlamında Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Ertan Efeğil and Ridvan Kalaycı (Ankara: Nobel, 2012), 501–27; Haydar Çakmak, “Turgut Özal’ın Dış Politika Felsefesi ve Uygulamaları,” in *Liderlerin Dış Politika Felsefesi ve Uygulamaları*, ed. Haydar Çakmak (İstanbul: Doğu Kitabevi, 2013), 117–23; Duygu Demirdöven, “Turkish Foreign Policy between 1983 and 1999: Comparison of Turgut Özal and Mesut Yılmaz in the Period of Transition and Transformation of Turkey” (master’s thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2014); Gökçay Dağlıoğlu, “Turgut Özal Döneminde Türkiye’nin Bulgaristan Türkleri Politikası: Konstruktivist Bir İnceleme” (master’s thesis, Turgut Özal University, 2014); Ömer Yılmaz, “A Constructivist Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy in 1980s and 2000s: The Example of Turkey–U.S. Relations” (PhD diss., University of Siegen, 2014); Nazmi Güçlü, “Avrupa Birliği’ne Giden Süreçte Turgut Özal Dönemi Türkiye’nin AET Politikası” (master’s thesis, Gediz University, 2015); Özgür Kaçan, “Turgut Özal’ın Cumhurbaşkanlığı Döneminde (1989–1993) Türk Dış Politikası: Türkiye–Türk Cumhuriyetleri İlişkileri” (master’s thesis, Ahi Evran University, 2015); Şaban H. Çalış, *Hayalibilimi ve Hayali Kimlikler: Neo-Osmanlılık, Özal ve Balkanlar*, 5th ed. (Konya: Çizgi Kitabevi, 2015); Barış Doster, “Turgut Özal ve Dış Politika,” in *Cumhurbaşkanları ve Dış Politika*, ed. Haydar Çakmak (Ankara: Kripto, 2016), 197–216; Berdal Aral, “Özal Döneminde İç ve Dış Siyaset: Sürekliklik mi, Kopuş mu?,” in *Özal’lı Yıllar: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, ed. İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Beta, 2016), 179–201; Erkan Ertosun, “Change and Leadership in Foreign Policy: The Case of Turgut Ozal’s Premiership in Turkey, 1983–1989,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 27:2 (2016): 47–66; Gülistan Gürbey, “Özal’ın Dış Politika Anlayışı,” in *Özal’lı Yıllar: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, ed. İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Beta, 2016), 225–43; Hasan Mor, *Türk Dış Politikasının Eksenleri: Belirleyici Faktörler Ekseninde Özal’ın Dış Politika Konsepti* (Konya: Çizgi Kitabevi, 2016); İhsan Dağı, “Özal’lı Yıllarda Türk Siyaseti: İnsan Hakları, Demokratikleşme ve Avrupa

conducted more in a journalistic style, covering Özal's political legacy in general, and sometimes his legacy with respect to Turkish foreign policy in particular, based upon materials such as journalists' accounts, personal memoirs and interviews.¹⁶⁸ Although it is possible to discern the basic characteristics of the Turkish foreign policy under Özal's leadership from those studies, none of them focuses exclusively on the neo-Ottomanist foreign policy aspiration of the period towards regions surrounding Turkey such as the Balkans, the Middle East and Central Asia and the Caucasus. Yet a literature on such an aspiration in Turkish foreign policy has also begun to

Birliği,” in *Özal’lı Yıllar: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, ed. İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Beta, 2016), 203–23; Lale Dündar, “Özal Dönemi Türk Dış Politikasında Turgut Özal’ın Kişisel Özelliklerinin Rolü,” *Atatürk Yolu* 58 (2016): 1–20; Muhittin Ataman, “Özal ve İslam Dünyası: İnanç ve Pragmatizm,” in *Özal’lı Yıllar: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, ed. İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Beta, 2016), 283–313; Ramazan Gözen, “Turgut Özal ve Dış Politika: Körfez Savaşı Örneğinde İdealler ve Gerçekler,” in *Özal’lı Yıllar: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, ed. İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Beta, 2016), 245–81; Selami Yıldız, “First Gulf Crisis and Turkish Foreign Policy” (master’s thesis, Yeditepe University, 2016); Şaban H. Çalış, “Hayaletler Anaforu: Özal, Osmanlı ve Balkanlar,” in *Özal’lı Yıllar: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, ed. İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Beta, 2016), 315–56; Hikmet Özdemir, “Turgut Özal ve Avrasya,” *Avrasya Dünyası* 2 (2018): 4–15; Kübra Deren Ekici, “Sosyal Konstruktivizme Göre Turgut Özal Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası (1983–1993)” (PhD diss., University of Kocaeli, 2018).

¹⁶⁸ Mehmed Nuroğlu, *Sevgi Şelalesi: Ne Dediler?: Sekizinci Reisicumhur Turgut Özal’ın Vefati Sebebiyle Türk Basınında Çıkan Yazilar* (İstanbul: Sebil Yayınevi, n.d.); M. Hulki Cevizoğlu, *Körfez Savaşı ve Özal Diplomasisi* (İstanbul: Form Yayınları, 1991); Ufuk Güldemir, *Texas–Malatya* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1992); Yavuz Gökmen, *Özal Sendromu*, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Verso Yayıncılık, 1992); Morton I. Abramowitz, “Dateline Ankara: Turkey after Özal,” *Foreign Policy* 91 (1993): 164–81; Mehmet Barlas, *Turgut Özal’ın Anıları* (İstanbul: Sabah Kitapları, 1994); Necip Torumtay, *Org. Torumtay’ın Anıları*, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1994); Osman Özsoy, *Ünlülerin Turgut Özal’la Hâtıraları* (İstanbul: TÜRDAV, 1994); Yavuz Gökmen, *Özal Yaşasaydı* (Ankara: Verso Yayıncılık, 1994); Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Büyüklerle Masallar, Küçüklerle Gerçekler*, vol. 3, *Kriz Doğuran Savaş* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000); Mehmet Akyol, *Beni Çok Ararsınız*, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 2000); Mehmet Ali Birand and Soner Yalcın, *The Özal: Bir Davanın Öyküsü*, 10th ed. (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2007); Cengiz Çandar, “Turgut Özal Twenty Years After: The Man and the Politician,” *Insight Turkey* 15:2 (2013): 27–36; Morton Abramowitz, “Remembering Turgut Ozal: Some Personal Recollections,” *Insight Turkey* 15:2 (2013): 37–46; Cengiz Çandar, *Mezopotamya Eksresi: Bir Tarih Yolculuğu*, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014); Engin Güner, *Özal’lı Yıllarım: Başdanışman Engin Güner Anlatıyor* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2014); Hikmet Özdemir, *Turgut Özal: Biyografi* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2014); Erkan Ertosun, ed., *Yakın Dostlarının Dilinden Turgut Özal’ın Dış Politikasını Anlamak* (Ankara: Turgut Özal Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2015); Cengiz Çandar, “İnsan ve Siyasetçi Olarak Turgut Özal,” in *Özal’lı Yıllar: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, ed. İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Beta, 2016), 1–12; Muharrem Sarıkaya, “Özal ve Gazeteci,” in *Özal’lı Yıllar: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, ed. İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Beta, 2016), 13–24.

accumulate from the 1990s onwards.¹⁶⁹ In the face of such a vast literature, studies on the Turkish foreign policy under Özal and the aspiration for regional leadership in

¹⁶⁹ Ian O. Lesser, *Bridge or Barrier?: Turkey and the West after the Cold War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992); Graham E. Fuller, *Turkey Faces East: New Orientations toward the Middle East and the Old Soviet Union* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992); Paul B. Henze, *Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992); Graham E. Fuller, *From Eastern Europe to Western China: The Growing Role of Turkey in the World and Its Implications for Western Interests* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993); Graham E. Fuller et al., *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); Randolph E. Rosin, "Turkey: Prospects for Regional Hegemony" (master's thesis, Troy State University at Fort Bragg, 1994); Ola Tunander, "A New Ottoman Empire? The Choice for Turkey: Euro-Asian Centre vs National Fortress," *Security Dialogue* 26:4 (1995): 413–26; Stephanos Constantinides, "Turkey, the Emergence of a New Foreign Policy: the Neo-Ottoman Imperial Model," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 24 (1996): 323–34; Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation, eds., *Turkey between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996); Ayşe Gülden Kadioğlu, "Republican Epistemology and Islamic Discourses in Turkey," *The Muslim World* 88:1 (1998): 1–21; M. Hakan Yavuz, "Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: the Rise of Neo-Ottomanism," *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 7:12 (1998): 19–41; Malik Mufti, "Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy," *Middle East Journal* 52:1 (1998): 32–50; Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi, eds., *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2002); Alexander Murinson, "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy," *Middle Eastern Studies* 42:6 (2006): 945–64; Ömer Taşpinar, "Turkey's Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism," (Carnegie Papers 10, Carnegie Middle East Center, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 2008); Joshua W. Walker, "Turkey's Imperial Legacy: Understanding Contemporary Turkey through Its Ottoman Past," *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology* 8 (2009): 494–508; Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Worldviews and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 169–92; Nora Fisher Onar, "Echoes of a Universalism Lost: Rival Representations of the Ottomans in Today's Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45:2 (2009): 229–41; Nora Fisher Onar, "Neo-Ottomanism, Historical Legacies and Turkish Foreign Policy" (EDAM Discussion Paper 2009/03, Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, İstanbul, October 2009); Nuh Uçgan, "Türkiye Siyasetinde Kemalizm'den Post-Kemalist Döneme Geçiş" (master's thesis, İzzet Baysal University of Abant, 2009); Cihan Erkli, "Through the Turkish Looking-Glass: Turkey's Divergent Narratives, National Identity & Foreign Policy" (master's thesis, Georgetown University, 2010); İlhan Uzgel and Volkan Yaramış, "Özal'dan Davutoğlu'na Türkiye'de Yeni Osmanlıci Arayışlar," *Doğudan* 16 (2010): 36–49; Mesut Düzova, "Türkiye'de 1980 Sonrası Muhabazakâr Milliyetçilik ve Modernite Projesi" (master's thesis, University of İstanbul, 2010); Nicolas Panayiotides, "Turkey between Introversion and Regional Hegemony: From Ozal to Davutoglu," *The Cyprus Journal of Sciences* 8 (2010): 23–38; Turan Çavlan, "Yeni Osmanlıcılık: Batıdan Kopuş mu?," *Yakın Doğu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 3:2 (2010): 126–56; Ebru Eren-Webb, "To Which Eurasia Does Turkey Belong? A Comparative Analysis of Turkish Eurasianist Geopolitical Discourses," *Boğaziçi Journal* 25:2 (2011): 59–82; Ebru Eren-Webb, "To Which Eurasia Does Turkey Belong? A Comparative Analysis of Turkish Eurasianist Geopolitical Discourses" (master's thesis, Koç University, 2011); Lerna K. Yanık, "Constructing Turkish 'Exceptionalism': Discourses of Liminality and Hybridity in Post-Cold War Turkish Foreign Policy," *Political Geography* 30 (2011): 80–89; Faruk Yalvaç, "Strategic Depth or Hegemonic Depth?: A Critical Realist Analysis of Turkey's Position in the World System," *International Relations* 26:2 (2012): 165–80; Gökberk Yücel, "Türk Dış Politikasında Kimlik Sorunu: Kemalizm ve Ötekisi Yeni Osmanlıcılık" (master's thesis, University of Bilecik, 2012); Matthew T. Gullo, "Turkish Foreign Policy: Neo-Ottomanism 2.0 and the Future of Turkey's Relations with the West" (master's thesis, Duke University, 2012); Sedef Arat-Koç, "Neo-Empire, Middle Power or Subcontractor for Imperialism?: 'Neo-Ottomanism', Shifts in Geopolitics and Turkey's Foreign Policy," (draft paper presented at the

that period can be roughly classified into five main categories: i) studies that reflect conventional approaches to International Relations (IR) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA); ii) studies that prioritise agency in foreign policy decision-making processes; iii) studies that give priority to external motivators and constraints such as domestic and international structures; iv) studies that focus on “identity” mostly from

BRISMES Annual Conference, London School of Economics, London, March 26–28, 2012); Daniel Andreas Hartmann, “Neo-Ottomanism: The Emergence and Utility of a New Narrative on Politics, Religion, Society, and History in Turkey” (master’s thesis, Central European University, 2013); Göktürk Tüsyüzoğlu, “Milenyum Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası: Yeni Osmanlıcılık ve Türk Avrasyacılığı Ekseninde İnşa Edilen Bir Pragmatizm,” *Alternatif Politika* 5:3 (2013): 295–323; Suat Beylur, “Turkey’s Balkan Policy under AK Party and Claims for Neo-Ottomanism” (master’s thesis, Hacettepe University, 2013); Tristan Karyl Hicks, “Turkey’s New Foreign Policy: Becoming a Regional Power During EU Accession” (master’s thesis, West Virginia University, 2013); Aylin Gürzel, “Turkey’s Role as a Regional and Global Player and Its Power Capacity: Turkey’s Engagement with Other Emerging States,” *Revista de Sociología e Política* 22:50 (2014): 95–105; Berrin Akdeniz, “Sivil Toplum, Neo-Osmanlıcılık ve İHH” (master’s thesis, Abant İzzet Baysal University, 2014); H. Burç Aka, “Paradigm Change in Turkish Foreign Policy after Post-Cold War,” *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 13:3 (2014): 56–73; Rasim Özgür Dönmez, ed., *Türkiye’de Politik Değişim ve Türk Dış Politikası: Neo-Osmanlılığın Sosyo Politiği* (Bursa: Dora, 2014); Yasemin Bilgel, “Regional Power Politics after the Cold War” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2014); Hakan Övünç Ongur, “Identifying Ottomanisms: The Discursive Evolution of Ottoman Pasts in the Turkish Presents,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 51:3 (2015): 416–32; Lisel Hintz, “Fighting for Us, Inside and Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey” (PhD diss., George Washington University, 2015); Özgür Tüfekçi, “Turkish Eurasianism and Its Impact on Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Turkey” (PhD diss., Coventry University, 2015); Clemens Hoffmann and Can Cemgil, “The (Un)Making of the Pax Turca in the Middle East: Understanding the Social–Historical Roots of Foreign Policy,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29:4 (2016): 1279–1302; Lerna K. Yanık, “Bringing the Empire Back In: the Gradual Discovery of the Ottoman Empire in Turkish Foreign Policy,” *Die Welt des Islams* 56:3–4 (2016): 466–88; M. Hakan Yavuz, “Social and Intellectual Origins of Neo-Ottomanism: Searching for a Post-National Vision,” *Die Welt des Islams* 56:3–4 (2016): 438–65; Malik Mufti, “Neo-Ottomanists and Neoconservatives: A Strange Alignment in the 1990s,” *Insight Turkey* 18:1 (2016): 143–64; Mehran Kamrava, ed., *The Great Game in West Asia: Iran, Turkey and the South Caucasus* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Mustafa Türkeş, “Decomposing Neo-Ottoman Hegemony,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 18:3 (2016): 191–216; Sophie Kloos, “The Neo-Ottoman Turn in Turkey’s Refugee Reception Discourse,” *Alternatif Politika* 8:3 (2016): 536–61; Mark Langan, “Virtuous Power Turkey in Sub-Saharan Africa: The ‘Neo-Ottoman’ Challenge to the European Union,” *Third World Quarterly* 38:6 (2017): 1399–1414; Mehmet Gürsan Şenalp, “Yeni-Osmanlılığın Ekonomi Politiğinin Bir Eleştirisi: Ulusötesi Bir Hegemonya Projesinin Yükseliş ve Düşüsü,” *Praksis* 44–45 (2017): 937–70; Muharrem Ekşi, “Regional Hegemony Quests in the Middle East from the Balance of Power System to the Balance of Proxy Wars: Turkey as Balancing Power for the Iran–Saudi Rivalry,” *Gazi Akademik Bakış* 11:21 (2017): 133–56; Seçkin Köstem, “When Can Idea Entrepreneurs Influence Foreign Policy? Explaining the Rise of the ‘Turkic World’ in Turkish Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 13 (2017): 722–40; Mehran Kamrava, “Hierarchy and Instability in the Middle East Regional Order,” *International Studies Journal* 14:4 (2018): 1–35; Mehran Kamrava, “Multipolarity and Instability in the Middle East,” *Orbis* 62:4 (2018): 598–616.

constructivist perspectives; v) and, finally, studies that seek to analyse Turkish foreign policy by employing a political economy framework. This last branch of studies contains two sub-groups that differ sharply from each other: studies that benefit from the insights of classical international political economy, and studies that draw their insights from critical international political economy.

2.2.1 Conventional Studies

These studies range from descriptive histories of Turkish foreign policy to theoretically eclectic analyses of Turkish foreign policy, mostly reproducing realist readings of Turkish foreign policy within international politics. As Faruk Yalvaç also notes, “these analyses adopt an empiricist epistemology based on an *eventist* conception of foreign policy.”¹⁷⁰ Most of the monographs and edited books that cover Turkish foreign policy in general belong to this category, with either merely descriptive styles or with implicitly realist arguments scattered around those texts mostly in an eclectic way.¹⁷¹ Studies of Turkish foreign policy pursued under Turgut Özal’s political leadership and the aspiration for regional leadership in that period are no exceptions to this group of studies.¹⁷² Some studies that combine both domestic and international factors in their analyses can also be considered within this category unless they do this within a theoretical framework which allow for scientific generalisations rather than taking the Turkish case as a peculiar case. Mustafa Aydin’s thesis, for instance, combines both domestic and international factors in order to

¹⁷⁰ Faruk Yalvaç, “Approaches to Turkish Foreign Policy: A Critical Realist Analysis,” *Turkish Studies* 15:1 (2014): 120. Emphasis in the original.

¹⁷¹ For a typical example, see Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*.

¹⁷² Hale, “Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis”; Aykan, *Türkiye’nin Kuveyt Krizi Politikası*; Kavuncu, “Özal’ın Başkanlığı Döneminde Türkiye–ABD İlişkileri”; Erol, “Türkiye–Ortadoğu İlişkileri”; Kara, *Özal ve Türk Dünyası*; Kaçan, “Türkiye–Türk Cumhuriyetleri İlişkileri”; Özdemir, “Turgut Özal ve Avrasya,” 4–15.

analyse the “change” in Turkish foreign policy that took place beginning from the 1980s, but from an exceptionalist, or “non-theoretical,” in his own words, point of view.¹⁷³ It is also worth noting that he takes the domestic and the international as ontologically separate categories that only “interact” with, rather than mutually constitute, each other.¹⁷⁴ In a similar vein, İdris Bal also combines Turkey’s domestic problems and the international perceptions of the supposed “Turkish model” put forward with respect to the newly independent Turkic countries of the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s in order to understand the fall of that “model,” but again in a descriptive format.¹⁷⁵ Hasan Mor’s monograph, which he reproduced from his doctoral thesis, is another study that combines “the external determining factors” such as the international political and military circumstances and “the domestic determining factors” such as the historical, cultural, ideological, material and physical factors, as well as the decision-making mechanism in Turkish foreign policy and the individual decision-makers, first and foremost Özal himself, in order to understand Özal’s approach to foreign policy.¹⁷⁶ Mor argues that those “fundamental determining factors” and the “areas of interaction” such as the “geopolitical factors,” the “security factor” and the “economic and political factors” must all be determined and that “the relationship and interaction among all these must also be demonstrated in a systematic way.”¹⁷⁷ He also argues that Turkey “has common goals, values and interests that it shares with both the West and the East in the midst of them,” and these in turn

¹⁷³ Aydın, “A Study of Change.”

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 8–19.

¹⁷⁵ Bal, “The Rise of the ‘Turkish Model’”; Bal, “‘Turkish Model’ and the Turkic Republics”; Bal, “Türk Modelinin Yükselişi ve Düşüşü.”

¹⁷⁶ Mor, *Özal’ın Dış Politika Konsepti*.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 21.

constitute the “foreign policy inputs” for Turkish foreign policy.¹⁷⁸ Apart from this systemic account, he further argues that Özal was “among the few foreign policy actors, if not the sole one, that recognised to a great extent those determining factors and areas of interaction in their entirety.”¹⁷⁹ He, therefore, combines domestic and international factors with more personal factors—Özal’s personality and leadership in this case—in an effort to apprehend his approach to foreign policy.¹⁸⁰ Aylin Gürzel has also a similar approach that interrogates Turkey’s “power capacity” with respect to both “hard power” and “soft power” aspects within the framework of Kalevi Holsti’s “role theory.”¹⁸¹ Reports written for think tanks and other studies conducted under the auspices of security and intelligence departments can also be considered in this category since they also similarly combine all these factors with a view to bringing forward concrete policy suggestions for US foreign policy decision-makers.¹⁸² There are also other studies that focus on the possible implications of the

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 21–22.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 22.

¹⁸⁰ For a similar approach, see Akdeniz, “Sivil Toplum, Neo-Osmanlıcılık ve İHH,” 69–73.

¹⁸¹ Gürzel, “Turkey’s Role,” 95–105. For a study that only discusses Turkey’s “soft power” capacity in its bid to regional leadership in the South Caucasus and the Middle East, see Meliha Benli Altunışık, “Turkey’s Soft Power in a Comparative Context: The South Caucasus and the Middle East,” in *The Great Game in West Asia: Iran, Turkey and the South Caucasus*, ed. Mehran Kamrava (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 161–82.

¹⁸² Lesser, *Bridge or Barrier?*; Fuller, *Turkey Faces East*; Henze, *Turkey*; Fuller, *From Eastern Europe to Western China*; Fuller et al., *Turkey’s New Geopolitics*; Rosin, “Turkey: Prospects for Regional Hegemony”; Alan Makovsky, “Turkey,” in *The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World*, ed. Robert Chase, Emily Hill (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 88–119; Makovsky and Sayari, eds., *Turkey’s New World*.

supposedly “neo-Ottomanist” turn in Turkish foreign policy for Turkey’s relations with the West in general.¹⁸³

The eclectic nature of these studies renders much of them explaining the issue at hand with a vast variety of factors and indeed being ended up with rather descriptive accounts than theoretical contributions to the field. They also do not take into consideration crucial factors such as capitalist social relations and the role of imperialism within the hierarchical international order. Most of them do not go beyond a classical realist framework which is dominated by an eventist and state-centric reading of international politics.

2.2.2 Agency-Based Analyses of Turkish Foreign Policy

These studies prioritise the role of individual decision-makers and political leaders in Turkish foreign policy formation, and thus take their place on the side of “agency” in the decades-old “agency–structure debate”¹⁸⁴ that has taken place in social sciences in general and more particularly in the IR literature. There are a great number of studies that prioritise the role of the political leadership of Turgut Özal and his ideology while examining the practice of Turkish foreign policy under his leadership.¹⁸⁵ Morton Abramowitz, former US Ambassador to Turkey, for instance,

¹⁸³ For instance, see Gullo, “Neo-Ottomanism 2.0.”

¹⁸⁴ The problem of “ontologically and epistemologically appreciating the relationship between human agency and prevailing social structures” has been on the forefront of social sciences and the IR literature for decades. Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, “The Gordian Knot of Agency–Structure in International Relations: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective,” *European Journal of International Relations* 7:1 (2001): 5–6.

¹⁸⁵ Ataman, “An Integrated Approach”; Ataman, “Leadership Change”; Ataman, “Özalist Dış Politika”; Laçiner, “From Kemalism to Ozalism”; Laçiner, “Özalism (Neo-Ottomanism)”; Laçiner, “Özal Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası”; Laçiner, “Özalism”; Kahraman, “Türkiye’de Devlet Adamlığı,” 306–25; Yaraç Laçinok, “Turgut Özal,” 537–639; Yıldız, “Özal’ın Yaklaşımları, Çalışmaları ve Politikası”; Ak, “Turgut Özal ve Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,” 501–27; Çakmak, “Özal’ın Dış Politika Felsefesi,” 117–23; Demirdöven, “Comparison of Özal and Yılmaz,” 26–43; Güçlü, “Özal Dönemi Türkiye’nin AET Politikası”; Doster, “Özal ve Dış Politika,” 197–216; Ertosun, “Ozal’s Premiership in Turkey,” 47–66; Dündar, “Özal’ın Kişisel Özelliklerinin Rolü,” 1–20; Aral, “Özal Döneminde İç ve

recounts some of his dealings with Turgut Özal, particularly on the First Gulf War, and provides his personal views about the personality and legacy of Özal.¹⁸⁶ An extension of that literature consists of academic studies that focus upon the ideologies of the foreign policy decision-makers. Malik Mufti, for instance, argues that Özal's perception of the Gulf crisis and his attempts at what he and his colleagues called "active foreign policy" during the crisis are in themselves indicative of the difference between two competing paradigms in "Turkish strategic culture"—namely the "İnönü" and "Zorlu doctrines"—with Özal's understanding of foreign policy toward the Middle East supposedly falling within the confines of the "Zorlu doctrine."¹⁸⁷ Mufti termed the traditional Republican approach toward the region as the "İnönü Doctrine" with "reserve," through "pursuing correct relations with all Middle Eastern states and eschewing interference in their domestic affairs;" "neutrality," "maintenance of the status quo," and "compartmentalization," through "avoiding linkage between Turkey's Middle East policies and its relations with the Western powers" being its "four cardinal principles."¹⁸⁸ The supposed "Zorlu Doctrine," by contrast, "diverged from each of the cardinal principles of the İnönü Doctrine" with

Dış Siyaset," 179–201; Gürbey, "Özal'ın Dış Politika Anlayışı," 225–43; Dağı, "Özal'lı Yıllarda Türk Siyaseti," 205–223; Ataman, "Özal ve İslam Dünyası," 283–313.

¹⁸⁶ Morton Abramowitz, "Remembering Turgut Ozal: Some Personal Recollections," *Insight Turkey* 15:2 (2013): 37–46.

¹⁸⁷ Malik Mufti, "From Swamp to Backyard: The Middle East in Turkish Foreign Policy," in *The Middle East Enters the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Robert O. Freedman (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2002), 94; Malik Mufti, *Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 84. Özal himself also drew a parallel between the foreign policy understandings of him and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu—the minister of foreign affairs of the Democratic Party period in the 1950s. Mehmet Barlas, *Turgut Özal'in Anıları* (İstanbul: Sabah Kitapları, 1994), 127–28. Mufti, in an earlier article, presents the case of the Gulf War as illustrative of the tension between "proponents of boldness" or "daring" and those of "caution" regarding Turkish foreign policy. Malik Mufti, "Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy," *Middle East Journal* 52:1 (1998): 48.

¹⁸⁸ Mufti, "From Swamp to Backyard," 82; Mufti, *Daring and Caution*, 31–32.

another set of principles that could be described as “engagement rather than reserve,” through “a willingness to use coercion against and even to intervene in the internal affairs of neighboring countries (such as Syria and Iraq) in order to influence their behavior;” “alignment rather than neutrality,” “flexibility rather than rigid adherence to the status quo,” and finally, “linkage rather than compartmentalization,” meaning, “a conviction that Turkey’s overall strategic interests are inextricably connected with its Middle East policies,” and a “consequent readiness to actively either support or oppose the regional initiatives of great powers.”¹⁸⁹ From this point of view, the attitude of Turgut Özal and the policies he suggested during the Kuwait crisis and the subsequent Gulf War clearly fell within the confines of the supposed “Zorlu Doctrine.” Mufti elsewhere already argues that “Özal stood in marked opposition to the austere Republican dogmas of secularism and unitary nationalism at home, caution and non-intervention abroad.”¹⁹⁰ Likewise, Ömer Taşpinar also draws a contrast between, “Kemalism” as “[t]he official ideology of the Republic,” which supposedly “turned its back on the Islamic world and pursued an exclusively Western path,”¹⁹¹ and “neo-Ottomanism,” which supposedly “embraces a grand, geostrategic vision of Turkey as an effective and engaged regional actor, trying to solve regional and global problems,” through “projecting Turkey’s ‘soft power’—a bridge between East and West, a Muslim nation, a secular state, a democratic political system, and a capitalistic economic force.”¹⁹² Philip Robins also makes a similar point by arguing that up to the time of Özal, the practice of Turkish foreign policy “has steadily

¹⁸⁹ Mufti, “From Swamp to Backyard,” 84–85.

¹⁹⁰ Mufti, “Neo-Ottomanists and Neoconservatives,” 150.

¹⁹¹ Ömer Taşpinar, “Turkey’s Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism,” (*Carnegie Papers 10*, Carnegie Middle East Center, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 2008), 1–2.

¹⁹² Ibid., 3.

developed a series of principles” since the 1950s.¹⁹³ He contends that Özal’s foreign policy initiatives during the Gulf crisis fell out of the foreign policy principles supposedly drawn by the “Kemalist traditionalist elite.”¹⁹⁴ However, he relates, to use his own words, the “modifying pressures on even the most basic principles of foreign policy” to rather the “changing world, especially one which has altered so profoundly on the cusp of the new decade [1990s],” than mere individual or ideological preferences.¹⁹⁵ Meliha Benli Altunışık is another scholar who also points to the differences in “worldviews” of various foreign policy decision-makers, and argues that “Turkey’s Middle East policy has been transformed . . . into a more contentious and pluralistic one” since the late 1980s.¹⁹⁶ She, nevertheless, acknowledges the role of international and regional factors such as “the systemic change in 1989” and the “transformation in the Middle East in the context of the Iraqi crisis” as well as domestic factors such as the “rise of political Islam and Kurdish nationalism” in the evolution of Turkish foreign policy into a “contested arena,” within which “different perspectives began to compete with each other.”¹⁹⁷ Likewise, but from a post-colonialist point of view, Nora Fisher Onar distinguishes the “secularist and Islamist narratives” from each other, albeit with reservations that neither of the two are monolithic and that the Ottoman Empire was never colonised.¹⁹⁸ Yet she draws a

¹⁹³ Philip Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), 65.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 65–73.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 65.

¹⁹⁶ Altunışık, “Worldviews,” 169.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 174.

¹⁹⁸ Onar, “Echoes of a Universalism Lost,” 229–30.

similarity between, on the one hand, the struggle between Euro-centric narratives and the post-colonial particularistic narratives that emerged as reactions to that Euro-centric universalisms, and the struggle between the supposedly “Kemalist particularism” and the “Islamist cosmopolitanism,” on the other hand.¹⁹⁹ “With political liberalization in the 1950s and economic liberalization in the 1980s,” she argues, “cracks began to appear in the Kemalist narrative.”²⁰⁰ It was first Turgut Özal, who was “spurred by liberal advisors to vaunt ‘neo-Ottomanism’ in his domestic and foreign policy,” but Onar also argues that even the supposed “Kemalist vision of Turkey’s role in world affairs” also transformed over time into a “willingness to engage the ‘near abroad’: the Middle East, Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia.”²⁰¹ An interesting contribution that prioritised the role of the Ottoman and Turkish states in the formulation and practice of Turkish foreign policy in terms of their “historically changing strategies of social reproduction . . . in response to changing domestic and international environments” is an article co-authored by Clemens Hoffmann and Can Cemgil.²⁰² Moreover, there are also studies that focus on the role of domestic political parties—of the Motherland Party (MP) in our case.²⁰³ Another group of studies also emphasises the role of other domestic factors such as the evolution of the domestic

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 230.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 233.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Hoffmann and Cemgil, “Pax Turca in the Middle East,” 1280.

²⁰³ For a study which argues that strong single-party rule in Turkey, namely the Democrat Party (DP), the MP and the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government, initiated important changes in politics and economics as well as they do share some common foreign policy understandings, see Gündüz, “Güçlü Tek Parti İktidarları.”

political regime in Turkey and the challenges posed by the Kurdish problem or “the reinforcement of Islamic radical movements.”²⁰⁴

The role of the human agency in all social processes including foreign policy decision-making cannot be overlooked. However, it is always possible to generate questions about the circumstances in which these individual decision-makers find room for such manoeuvres and to what extent they are able to actualise their wishes in the face of constraints posed by the prevailing social relations at both levels of domestic and international order.

2.2.3 Structure-Based Analyses of Turkish Foreign Policy

In contrast with those studies that prioritise the human agency over social structures, this group of studies gives priority to external motivators and constraints that have impacts upon the human agency such as economic and political structures, be they at domestic or international levels. The most typical examples of this category are those studies conducted within a neorealist framework of IR. Apart from neorealists of different varieties, this category would indeed also contain some studies benefiting from a political economy approach. However, many of those studies, especially those with a historical materialist framework such as neo-Gramscians, deserve a separate category, since they reject and try to go beyond the “agency–structure” duality by acknowledging the “mutually constitutive relationship between agency and structure.”²⁰⁵ Accordingly, although these studies also take externalities into consideration in their analyses, they try not to yield to a one-sided structuralism, but rather try to take the human agency as “located in structure, but not determined

²⁰⁴ Constantinides, “Neo-Ottoman Imperial Model,” 323.

²⁰⁵ Bieler and Morton, “Gordian Knot,” 5.

by it.”²⁰⁶ Hence, what is put forward as studies that give priority to structure here refers to studies that prefer to focus on externalities rather than seeing these externalities as being intrinsic to overall social phenomena. Yasemin Çelik’s thesis on Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era well represents the category in point. Although she benefits from an international political economy approach, she focuses on the international as an external factor over Turkey’s foreign policy conduct during and after the Cold War.²⁰⁷ İhsan Dağı, on the other hand, emphasises the leverage of European institutions over the Özal governments of the 1980s regarding human rights issues in the face of Turkish bid to join the European Community from a liberal institutionalist point of view.²⁰⁸ From a neorealist point of view, Ramazan Gözen has also evaluated Özal’s foreign policy during the First Gulf Crisis, focusing on the limits and constraints imposed upon Turkey that emanate from its small power status, despite Özal’s ambitions to posit Turkey as a great power, and thence argues that Turkey “had to get over the most radical foreign policy experience in its history, not in an easy manner, but very much running into difficulties and with new problems.”²⁰⁹ Elsewhere, however, he also asserts that, neither pure realism nor liberalism or other ethical approaches can completely explain Turkey’s attitude during the First Gulf War, but it must be rather analysed taking into consideration the existence of an extraordinarily pressing international crisis.²¹⁰ He argues that such international crises influence the foreign policies of states on which such crises have

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 27.

²⁰⁷ Çelik, “Turkish Foreign Policy after the Cold War,” iv–v.

²⁰⁸ Dağı, “Özal Years,” 17–40.

²⁰⁹ Gözen, “Özal ve Dış Politika,” 281.

²¹⁰ Gözen, “Türkiye ve I. Körfez Savaşı,” 272, 274–275.

direct impacts by posing upon them unexpected outcomes, threats to their “high level national interests,” and finally, “time pressures/limitations.”²¹¹ Likewise, Şule Kut also argues that the problems and crises that emanated from the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s made their own contributions to the constitution of the supposedly “new” Turkish foreign policy in the aftermath of the Cold War.²¹² Isa Afacan, however, points out that “systemic factors primarily prevail in the early years of the post-Cold War Turkish-American relations, as had been the case during the Cold War era,”²¹³ whereas Ola Tunander contends that “[t]he end of the Cold War led to fundamental changes for Turkey.”²¹⁴ In a similar vein, Nicolas Panayiotides argues that the “enormous systemic change that came after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the redistributions of power caused by it”²¹⁵ created a need on the part of Turkey for a “redefinition of its role and interests in the international system.”²¹⁶ “Neo-Ottomanism,” to him, emerged as a result of that need, and the Turkish politicians of the time, he argues, utilised the context of the post-Cold War era with the reasoning that the United States supposedly needed Turkish support “in order to promote its regional interests” in key regions bordering Turkey such as the Middle East.²¹⁷ An

²¹¹ Ibid., 273. For other studies that focuses on the impacts of the First Gulf Crisis upon Turkey, see Şengül, “Gulf Crisis of 1990–1991”; Yıldız, “First Gulf Crisis and Turkish Foreign Policy”.

²¹² Kut, “Türkiye’nin Bosna–Hersek ve Makedonya Politikası,” 585.

²¹³ Afacan, “Turkish–American Relations,” vi.

²¹⁴ Tunander, “New Ottoman Empire?,” 413.

²¹⁵ Panayiotides, “Turkey between Introversion and Regional Hegemony,” 23.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 23–24.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 23, 26, 30, 32–32.

edited collection of chapters²¹⁸ on Turkey in its “post-Cold War environment,”²¹⁹ which is widely referred to, also considers Turkey “a rising regional power.”²²⁰ The breakup of the Soviet Union and the “emergence of newly independent states of Turkic and Islamic heritage” are the key developments that the collection suggests to have “created a new field of interest for Turkish foreign policy and [given] rise to considerable enthusiasm concerning the Turkish mission amongst the ‘lost cousins’ of Turkestan.”²²¹ Another collection,²²² again one that is widely referred to, considers Turkey as “an emerging multiregional power,” focusing rather on its position in “world politics.”²²³ Barry Rubin, the editor of the collection, argues that the end of the Cold War “forced a major reassessment of Turkey’s geostrategic role,” and that “the country has become a far more active international player” since then.²²⁴ As such, he thus argues that “[t]he dramatic changes in Turkey’s foreign policy posture in the 1990s came largely in response to outside developments and pressures.”²²⁵ There are

²¹⁸ Mastny and Nation, eds., *Turkey between East and West*.

²¹⁹ R. Craig Nation, preface to *Turkey between East and West*, ix.

²²⁰ The collection’s subtitle is “New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power.”

²²¹ Nation, preface, ix.

²²² Rubin, ed., *Turkey in World Politics*.

²²³ The full title of this collection is “Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power.”

²²⁴ Barry Rubin, “Turkey: A Transformed International Role,” in *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, ed. Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2002), 3.

²²⁵ Barry Rubin, “Understanding Turkey’s New Foreign Policy,” in *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, ed. Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2002), 329–30.

many other studies that take the systemic change which came with the end of the Cold War as the determining factor behind the supposedly “neo-Ottomanist” shift in Turkish foreign policy.²²⁶

Although these studies successfully identify the systemic dimension of Turkey’s new foreign policy aspiration with the transformation in the international order in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they mostly do not problematise capitalist social relations and the domestic neoliberal restructuring which began in the early 1980s as key factors behind Turkey’s overall transformation. Moreover, they also superficially reduce the systemic factors to their geopolitical forms by neglecting their subtle systemic capitalist content, and they do not take Turkey’s complex relationship with imperialism into consideration.

2.2.4 Identity-Based Analyses of Turkish Foreign Policy

These studies give top place to ideational factors such as “identity” in their quest to make sense of Turkish foreign policy. Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, for instance, argues that “an adequate account of Turkish foreign policy requires an analysis of Turkey’s identity since it is closely linked to the formulation of foreign policy” and that “even when Turkish decision makers thought that only the identification with the West could maximize Turkey’s gains, their definition of those material gains was based on Turkey’s identity.”²²⁷ Ian Lesser also claims that “the question of identity remains critical for Turkey and in Turkey’s relations with Europe and the West,” and

²²⁶ For instance, see Cavlan, “Yeni Osmanlıcılık,” 132; Tüysüzoğlu, “Milenyum Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası,” 295–323; Hicks, “Turkey’s New Foreign Policy”; Aka, “Paradigm Change in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 56–73; Bilgel, “Regional Power Politics,” 112–14.

²²⁷ Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 9.

“to an important extent, remains open within Turkish society and elsewhere.”²²⁸ Following a similar line, Gökçay Dağlıoğlu analyses Özal’s discourse and policies during the forced assimilation campaign of Bulgaria towards its citizens of Turkish descent from a social constructivist perspective.²²⁹ Ömer Yılmaz’s thesis, on the other hand, suggests that the later period of Turkish foreign policy under the political leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is “an extension” of that of the Özal leadership, though the former is “an advanced form based on a serious theoretical and conceptual ground” again from a constructivist perspective.²³⁰ He argues that these two leaders had similar perceptions and paradigms of identity, and accordingly had similar foreign policy understandings and engaged in similar foreign policy practices such as “their common goals to make Turkey first a regional and later a global actor,”²³¹ though there are also differences between the two with respect to their approach to bilateral relations with the United States within the framework of cooperation in the Balkans and the Middle East.²³² Thus, “without an appropriate analysis of identity and its transformation,” Yılmaz concludes, “a comprehensive explanation of the transformation of [Turkish foreign policy] in the last decade would be incomplete.”²³³ Another thesis that examines the Turkish foreign policy pursued under Özal, again

²²⁸ Ian Lesser, “Turkish Society and Foreign Policy in Troubled Times” (Conference Proceedings No: 2, Center for Middle East Public Policy & Geneva Center for Security Policy, Geneva: RAND, 2001), 14.

²²⁹ Dağlıoğlu, “Özal Döneminde Bulgaristan Türkleri Politikası,” 80–86.

²³⁰ Yılmaz, “Turkish Foreign Policy in 1980s and 2000s,” 2.

²³¹ Ibid., 282–83.

²³² Ibid., 2.

²³³ Ibid., 279.

from a social constructivist point of view, belongs to Kübra Deren Ekici.²³⁴ Hakan Yavuz is also among those who posit the neo-Ottomanist aspiration in Turkish foreign policy within larger fluctuations of self-definition and identity in Turkey.²³⁵ Nuh Uçgan's and Cihan Erkli's Master's theses are other cases in point.²³⁶ Seçkin Köstem focuses on the role of supposed "idea entrepreneurs" who influenced Turkish foreign policy in a way that have made the "Turkic World" a key concept.²³⁷ Such "idea entrepreneurs," according to him, "can influence foreign policy," when at the same time, "a critical juncture prompts decision-makers to search for a new foreign policy framework," and "the evolving national identity conceptions of the ruling elite overlap with the general premise of the idea entrepreneurs' proposals."²³⁸ As such, as "a concept initially advocated by idea entrepreneurs" such as nationalist and pan-Turkist nongovernmental actors, "the idea of the 'Turkic World,'" Köstem argues, "became the key organizing concept in the governmental reconstitution of Turkey's national interests after the collapse of the Soviet Union."²³⁹ The idea was adopted at a time "when Turkey's national identity was under fierce contestation" in the 1990s

²³⁴ Ekici, "Özal Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası."

²³⁵ Yavuz, "Rise of Neo-Ottomanism," 19–41; Yavuz, "Origins of Neo-Ottomanism," 438–65. Alexander Murinson also follows Yavuz's line. Murinson, "Strategic Depth Doctrine," 945–64.

²³⁶ Uçgan, "Kemalizm'den Post-Kemalist Döneme," 182–85; Erkli, "Turkey's Divergent Narratives," 28–30, 34–37. Sophie Kloos, on the other hand, claims the "relevance" of "self-understanding" or "self-image" in political decision-making by analysing the "neo-Ottoman turn" in Turkey's refugee reception discourse. Kloos, "Neo-Ottoman Turn," 536–61.

²³⁷ Köstem, "Idea Entrepreneurs and Foreign Policy," 728.

²³⁸ Ibid., 723.

²³⁹ Ibid.

“rapidly” by “ideologically compatible Turkish decision makers.”²⁴⁰ Gökberk Yücel’s Master’s thesis also draws a binary opposition between the supposedly “Kemalist” and “neo-Ottoman” identities, and between their respective implications over Turkish foreign policy.²⁴¹ Mark Langan also argues that Turkey pits its “neo-Ottomanist” foreign policy orientation under the JDP governments towards sub-Saharan Africa as a “challenge” against the “perceived neo-colonialism” of the European Union by declaring it as its “other” in terms of its “normative foreign policy identity” and its supposedly “virtuous power.”²⁴² Şaban Çalış,²⁴³ on the other hand, posits the supposedly neo-Ottoman “spectres” haunting the everyday debates in Turkish politics and the Ottoman identity under the political leadership of Özal in a rather post-structuralist framework benefiting from concepts of Jacques Derrida and Benedict Anderson such as “hauntology”²⁴⁴ and “imagined communities.”²⁴⁵ From a different point of view, Joshua Walker argues that “Turkey is very much shaped by the legacy and identity that the Ottoman Empire left it as a clear imperial successor

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Yücel, “Türk Dış Politikasında Kimlik Sorunu.”

²⁴² Langan, “Virtuous Power Turkey,” 1399–1414.

²⁴³ Şaban H. Çalış, *Hayaletbilimi ve Hayali Kimlikler: Neo-Osmanlılık, Özal ve Balkanlar*, 5th ed. (Konya: Çizgi Kitabevi, 2015), 78–95. For a concise version of the same study, see Şaban H. Çalış, “Hayaletler Anaforu: Özal, Osmanlı ve Balkanlar,” in *Özal’lı Yıllar: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, ed. İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Beta, 2016), 315–56.

²⁴⁴ Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994).

²⁴⁵ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006).

state.”²⁴⁶ Moving from the assumption that “Turkey is not an economic superpower or even a great power by most standards used in the field of international relations,” Walker asks the question as to where Turkey does “derive [the] status and ambition as a regional and global player that goes well beyond the standard international relations explanations.”²⁴⁷ His answer is that

[t]he choices that a former imperial metropolis’ elites make in dealing with its imperial legacy are not only determined by rational self-interest and material capabilities, but also by the particular ideas that are enshrined in the formation of a national identity that might run counter to its own material and international interests.²⁴⁸

Thus, “a newly-assertive Turkey” could promote itself “as the natural leader of the Muslim world largely on the basis of its imperial legacy from the Ottoman Empire” since the end of the Cold War.²⁴⁹ Finally, the writings of the organic intellectuals of the Özal leadership gathered together in *Türkiye Günlüğü* in the early 1990s, foremost among them Cengiz Çandar, could also be considered within this category, but their writings are to be examined in the fifth chapter regarding the articulation of neo-Ottomanism by these intellectuals in a way that could be considered a subimperialist hegemonic project.

A particular sub-group under this category is studies that employ methods of “discourse” or “content analysis.” Ebru Eren Webb, for instance, considers “neo-Ottomanism” as an “Ottomanist” variant of the wider “Eurasianist geopolitical discourses” from the view point of critical geopolitics.²⁵⁰ For such studies,

²⁴⁶ Walker, “Turkey’s Imperial Legacy,” 494.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 495–96.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 496.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 503.

²⁵⁰ Ebru Eren-Webb, “To Which Eurasia Does Turkey Belong? A Comparative Analysis of Turkish Eurasianist Geopolitical Discourses,” *Boğaziçi Journal* 25:2 (2011): 78–79; Ebru Eren-Webb, “To Which Eurasia Does Turkey Belong? A Comparative Analysis of Turkish Eurasianist Geopolitical Discourses” (master’s thesis, Koç University, 2011), 156–57. For another study that takes “neo-

geopolitical as well as historical discourses are crucial elements in the “reciprocal relationship between foreign policymaking and the creation of national identity, neither of which can exist without imaginations of location and past.”²⁵¹ In that sense, Lerna Yanık, for instance, argues that, even when it is not possible to go beyond the mere discursive level to more practical policies, neo-Ottomanist discourses proved useful for Turkey’s foreign policy by providing Turkey with its inclusion in particular groups or regions and by justifying “various external and, at times, internal policies.”²⁵² A similar point is made by Daniel Andreas Hartmann in his Master’s thesis which takes neo-Ottomanism as a “narrative of legitimization” in the sense that it serves legitimising particular policies, and thus has also become a “transformative narrative.”²⁵³ Likewise, Lisel Hintz also argues that “elites choose to take their identity contestation ‘outside’ the foreign policy arena when identity gambits at the domestic level are blocked by those supporting a competing proposal.”²⁵⁴ Hakan Övünç Ongur, on the other hand, examines the evolution of narratives about the Ottoman past in Turkey, and finds out multiple “Ottomanisms” including neo-Ottomanism under Özal that “remained essentially within the confines of foreign policy and did not effectively diffuse into the public sphere.”²⁵⁵

Ottomanism” within the wider framework of Turkish Eurasianism, see Tufekci, “Turkish Eurasianism,” 128–38.

²⁵¹ Yanık, “Constructing Turkish ‘Exceptionalism’,” 81.

²⁵² Yanık, “Bringing the Empire Back In,” 469–70.

²⁵³ Hartmann, “Neo-Ottomanism,” 11, 14–17.

²⁵⁴ Hintz, “Fighting for Us,” viii, 175–215.

²⁵⁵ Ongur, “Identifying Ottomanisms,” 417.

The basic problem with studies that prioritise “identity” as the key factor in explaining Turkish foreign policy is that those studies often eschew the following question: if “identities” are also “socially constructed,”²⁵⁶ then what social and material conditions give rise to these changes in foreign policy in a way that “identities” could so easily cast their own colours over foreign policy preferences? Thus, much of the criticisms levelled at the previous groups of studies is also relevant for this group of studies since they also do not problematise capitalist social relations in their analyses and Turkey’s complex relationship with imperialism within the hierarchical international order.

2.2.5 Studies Utilising International Political Economy

Having split into two contradictory traditions, approaches that utilise political economy in analysing Turkish foreign policy have also developed a similar contrast: a contrast between liberal international political economy analyses and critical international political economy approaches. Just like many other concepts such as “imperialism,” first systematically theorised by John A. Hobson,²⁵⁷ a “social-liberal” in Lenin’s words,²⁵⁸ the neo-Ottomanist aspiration towards regional leadership in Turkish foreign policy has also been analysed by both liberals and their discontents. Whereas the same phenomenon is “hegemony” through “soft power” for liberals,²⁵⁹

²⁵⁶ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46:2 (1992): 391–425.

²⁵⁷ John A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2005 [1902]).

²⁵⁸ Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* [1916] (viewed in HTML), accessed 25 December 2018, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/index.htm>, chapters 7–8.

²⁵⁹ For instance, see Hakan Altinay, “Turkey’s Soft Power: An Unpolished Gem or an Elusive Mirage?,” *Insight Turkey* 10:2 (2008): 55–66.

it might be considered as part of the hegemonic discourse under authoritarian neoliberalism from the viewpoint of critical international political economy.²⁶⁰

For liberal international political economy rests on an assumption that the economic and the political are ontologically separate spheres, they for the most part choose to rely on statistical data on short- and medium-term economic tendencies, and as a result, they also prefer to neglect negative repercussions of the neoliberal model adopted from the 1980s onwards such as more authoritarian forms of state and gradual erosion of formal separation of powers. This is also not limited to the Özal period at hand, since, as late as 2013, they were still pointing out to a “pro-European attitude on global issues”²⁶¹ against claims that a “shift” was taking place in both Turkish politics and Turkish foreign policy.²⁶² In a similar vein, some other liberal academics rather preferred to examine the neoliberalisation process as a case of

²⁶⁰ For such studies, rather focusing on the Justice and Development Party (JDP) years notwithstanding, see Güven Gürkan Öztan, “The Struggle for Hegemony between Turkish Nationalisms in the Neoliberal Era,” in *Turkey Reframed: Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony*, ed. İsmet Akça, Ahmet Bekmen, and Barış Alp Özden (London: Pluto, 2014), 75–91; İsmet Akça, “Hegemonic Projects in Post-1980 Turkey and the Changing Forms of Authoritarianism,” in *Turkey Reframed: Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony*, ed. İsmet Akça, Ahmet Bekmen, and Barış Alp Özden (London: Pluto, 2014), 13–46; Mehmet Sinan Birdal, “The Davutoğlu Doctrine: The Populist Construction of the Strategic Subject,” in *Turkey Reframed: Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony*, ed. İsmet Akça, Ahmet Bekmen, and Barış Alp Özden (London: Pluto, 2014), 92–106; Cihan Tuğal, *The Fall of the Turkish Model: How the Arab Uprisings Brought Down Islamic Liberalism* (London: Verso, 2016).

²⁶¹ Abdullah Yuvacı and Muhittin Kaplan, “Testing the Axis-Shift Claim: An Empirical Analysis of Turkey’s Voting Alignment on Important Resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly during the Years 2000–10,” *Turkish Studies* 14: 2 (2013): 212–28.

²⁶² For instance, see Laura Batalla Adam, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the AKP Era: Has There Been a Shift in the Axis?,” *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 11:3 (2012): 139–48; Özlem Demirtaş Bagdonas, “A Shift of Axis in Turkish Foreign Policy or A Marketing Strategy? Turkey’s Uses of Its ‘Uniqueness’ vis-à-vis the West/Europe,” *Turkish Journal of Politics* 3:2 (2012): 111–32.

“democratisation”²⁶³ and that of a “rising trading state”²⁶⁴ under conditions of increasingly authoritarian frameworks especially towards labour²⁶⁵ and the wider opposition in general.²⁶⁶

The number of studies that try to grasp social relations in Turkey in order to understand the material incentives behind and limits to practices of Turkish foreign policy from a critical international political economy perspective have increased in

²⁶³ Fuat Keyman, “Globalization, Modernity and Democracy: In Search of a Viable Domestic Polity for a Sustainable Turkish Foreign Policy,” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 7–27; Fuat Keyman, “Globalization, Modernity and Democracy: Turkish Foreign Policy 2009 and Beyond,” *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* 15:3–4 (2010): 1–20.

²⁶⁴ Kemal Kirişçi, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State,” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 29–56.

²⁶⁵ Aziz Çelik, “Turkey’s New Labour Regime under the Justice and Development Party in the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century: Authoritarian Flexibilization,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 51:4 (2015): 618–35; Sümercan Bozkurt-Güngen, “Labour and Authoritarian Neoliberalism: Changes and Continuities under the AKP Governments in Turkey,” *South European Society and Politics* 23:2 (2018): 219–38.

²⁶⁶ Ayşegül Kars Kaynar, “Political Trials and the Second Jurisdiction of the State: Normalcy of the Exception,” in *Contemporary Turkey at a Glance*, vol. 2, *Turkey Transformed?: Power, History, Culture*, ed. Meltem Ersoy and Esra Ozyurek (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2017), 25–37; Cemal Burak Tansel, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism and Democratic Backsliding in Turkey: Beyond the Narratives of Progress,” *South European Society and Politics* 23:2 (2018): 197–217.

recent years.²⁶⁷ Haluk Gerger,²⁶⁸ for instance, puts Turkish foreign policy under scrutiny based upon a class-based political economy framework from the post-war period until the present era, and basically reaches the conclusion that there is more or less a continuity throughout the whole post-war Turkish foreign policy in the sense that Turkish foreign policy is largely driven by the interests of the capitalist class in Turkey and by the process of the incorporation of Turkey into world markets.

Ali Murat Özdemir, Ebubekir Aykut, Engin Sune and Göksu Uğurlu,²⁶⁹ and Muhammed Kürşad Özkin²⁷⁰ also share a similar point of view about the nature of Turkish foreign policy, although they tend to locate the post-war conduct of Turkish foreign policy within a broader context of a “collective imperialist” network, so they emphasise the role of the “international” rather than the “domestic.” İlhan Uzgel, on the other hand, tries to link Turkish foreign policy conduct to domestic social factors such as the interests of dominant classes regarding issues such as economics and trade, but also to the national interest perceptions of the national security bureaucracy

²⁶⁷ Yalçın Küçük, *Emperyalist Türkiye* (Ankara: Başak Yayınları, 1992); Yalçın Küçük, *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler, 1908–1998*, vol. 2. (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 2003); Haluk Gerger, *ABD, Ortadoğu, Türkiye* (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2012); Haluk Gerger, *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politiği: “Soğuk Savaş”tan “Yeni Dünya Düzeni”ne* (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2012); Akça, “Hegemonic Projects in Post-1980 Turkey”; Birdal, “Davutoğlu Doctrine”; Muhammed Kürşad Özkin, “Kolektif Emperyal Düzende Türkiye,” in *Kolektif Emperyalizm: Mağribden Maşriķa Dönüşümün Ekonomi Politiği*, ed. Ali Murat Özdemir (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2014), 351–402; Öztan, “Turkish Nationalisms”; Ali Murat Özdemir et al., *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politiği: Büyük Sorulara Küçük Yanıtlar* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2015); Faruk Yalvaç, “A Historical Materialist Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy: Class, State, and Hegemony,” *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 13:52 (2016): 3–22; Galip L. Yalman, “Crises as Driving Forces of Neoliberal ‘Trasformismo’: The Contours of the Turkish Political Economy since the 2000s,” in *The Palgrave Handbook of Critical International Political Economy*, ed. Alan Cafruny, Leila Simona Talani, and Gonzalo Pozo Martin (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 255–60; Tuğal, *Fall of the Turkish Model*; Türkeş, “Decomposing Neo-Ottoman Hegemony”; Şenalp, “Yeni-Osmanlılığın Ekonomi Politiği.”

²⁶⁸ Gerger, *ABD, Ortadoğu, Türkiye*; Gerger, *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politiği*.

²⁶⁹ Özdemir et al., *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politiği*.

²⁷⁰ Özkin, “Kolektif Emperyal Düzende Türkiye.”

at times of crises, insecurity or instability.²⁷¹ He, thus, leaves some space to the “relative autonomy of the state” in defining interests on its own when vital security and defence matters are at stake from a Poulantzasian point of view. Uzgel’s study focuses on the Özal period, and arrives at the conclusion that there emerge different conceptions of “interest” among different actors such as the state and social classes during processes of foreign policy formation.²⁷² In another study²⁷³ he co-authored with Volkan Yaramış, they specifically examine neo-Ottomanist quests in Turkish foreign policy from Turgut Özal to Ahmet Davutoğlu—a professor of IR as well as one of the key architects of the Turkish foreign policy under the JDP governments.²⁷⁴ Uzgel and Yaramış, in that study, state that debates over neo-Ottomanism emerge in periods, during which both regional politics and Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies undergo significant transformations.²⁷⁵ They also point out that neo-Ottomanist proposals, arguments and practices, in general, correspond to a political approach which develops through and is supported by convergence of interests with the West in general and the United States in particular.²⁷⁶ For Mesut Düzova, however, the “neo-Ottomanist project” was brought forward by a group of

²⁷¹ Uzgel, *Ulusal Çıkar*.

²⁷² Ibid., 442–43, 446.

²⁷³ Uzgel and Yaramış, “Yeni Osmanlıçı Arayışlar.”

²⁷⁴ Ahmet Davutoğlu served first as chief advisor in foreign policy to then Prime Minister Abdullah Gül in 2003 and later to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who took over that position in the same year, between 2003 and 2009, and later, as minister of foreign affairs in the JDP governments under the premiership of Erdoğan between 2009 and 2014, and finally as prime minister when Erdoğan was elected president in 2014 until he was forced to resign in May 2016 by then President Erdogan as a result of the growing rift between them.

²⁷⁵ Uzgel and Yaramış, “Yeni Osmanlıçı Arayışlar,” 37.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

nationalist-conservative intellectuals gathered together around the Turkish quarterly journal *Türkiye Günluğunü*, who also had close ties with then President Turgut Özal, as a panacea for the “ideological crisis” within which the Turkish right found itself in the late 1980s following a decade of neoliberal economic restructuring at a time its adverse social effects were being gravely felt.²⁷⁷ Yalçın Küçük also employs a class-based analysis emphasising domestic factors in his study examining Turkish foreign policy conducted in the Second World War and post-war years.²⁷⁸ Küçük, in an earlier study, also employs the concept of “hierarchical imperialism,” within which a multiple range of states (i.e. “imperialist,” “imperialist satellites” and smaller ones) are arrayed according to their capabilities within a framework of international division of labour.²⁷⁹ Turkey was in a desire to assume an imperialist role in a hierarchical order within which the United States was fulfilling the role that of a “upper-imperialist” (*üst emperyalist*) power. However, Küçük rather emphasises the influence of domestic factors on the formation of Turkish foreign policy such as concentration of capital in forms of “monopolies” that took place during the post-1980 period.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁷ Düzova, “Muhafazakâr Milliyetçilik ve Modernite Projesi,” 105–12.

²⁷⁸ Küçük, *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler*, vol. 2.

²⁷⁹ Küçük, *Emperyalist Türkiye*, 49.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., 34.

Mustafa Türkeş also employs the concepts of “sub-imperial power,”²⁸¹ “sub-superpower”²⁸² and “sub-regional super power”²⁸³ interchangeably for the foreign policy aspiration that arose in both the Özal and the later periods. Though not in a way as extensive as his article published in 2016 mentioned before, the arguments put forward in favour of Turkey to become a “sub-super power” or “sub-imperial power” are also elaborated in Türkeş’s earlier studies on Turkish foreign policy. In a chapter on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s priorities and Turkey in the 1990s, he states that these debates rather remained centred on the First Gulf Crisis and the Middle East.²⁸⁴ He also adds that “the projections towards the post-Cold War period” put forward in those debates could not go beyond “an expression of the United States being the single super power and Turkey’s quest for becoming a sub-super power in relation with that [single super] power.”²⁸⁵ Elsewhere, in a study on the relations between the United States and Turkey within the framework of the evolving strategies of the NATO in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, he expresses that such arguments were bound to remain “superficial.”²⁸⁶ In another chapter, he also acknowledges that “some advisors of Özal considered to get indulged in the self-

²⁸¹ Türkeş, “Decomposing Neo-Ottoman Hegemony,” 193, 211.

²⁸² Ibid., 191–92, 200, 211.

²⁸³ Ibid., 211.

²⁸⁴ Mustafa Türkeş, “Doksanlı Yıllarda NATO’nun Öncelikleri ve Türkiye,” in *En Uzun Onyıl: Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar*, ed. Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Büke Yayınları, 2000), 201.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ Mustafa Türkeş, “NATO Bağlamında ABD–Türkiye İlişkilerinde Devamlılık ve Değişim,” in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoglu (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004), 392.

defeating project making Turkey as a sub-super power—meant sub-imperialism,”²⁸⁷ during the First Gulf Crisis. He also argues that those neo-Ottomanist proposals were brought forward as part of an “active foreign policy” in those years, but could yield no results, and even blurred and distorted the concept of “active foreign policy.”²⁸⁸ He further argues that some foreign policy initiatives such as the one towards the Northern Iraq under the presidency of Turgut Özal indeed became nothing but the beginnings of the later “dead ends” of Turkish foreign policy.²⁸⁹ Likewise, Sedef Arat-Koç also argues that the neo-Ottomanist aspiration in Turkish foreign policy could be considered as an aspiration on the part of Turkish politicians to serve as a “sub-imperial ‘sub-contractor’ in the [Middle East] region” under the auspices of US imperialism.²⁹⁰ It would be wise to state at this point that, contrary to their often conflation with each other, the concepts of “subimperial” and “subcontractor” have different meanings, which denote qualitatively different positions and forms of incorporation of states into the hierarchical international order. Whereas the latter one is more related to mere outsourcing of weaker powers in favour of greater ones or outsourcing some state functions from non-state agencies,²⁹¹ the former one points to

²⁸⁷ Mustafa Türkeş, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: Quest for Enduring Stability and Security,” in *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era*, ed. İdris Bal (Boca Raton: BrownWalker Press, 2004), 199.

²⁸⁸ Mustafa Türkeş, “Türkiye’nin Balkan Politikasında Devamlılık ve Değişim,” *Avrasya Dosyası* 14:1 (2008): 12.

²⁸⁹ Mustafa Türkeş, “Türk Dış Politikasında Bölgesel Meseler ve Obama Yönetiminin Olası Politikaları: Açımlar ve Açılımlar,” in *Yeni Dönemde Türk Dış Politikası: Uluslararası IV. Türk Dış Politikası Sempozyumu Tebliğleri*, ed. Osman Bahadır Dinçer, Habibe Özdal and Hacali Necefoğlu (Ankara: USAK Yayıncıları, 2010), 72, 74.

²⁹⁰ Sedef Arat-Koç, “Neo-Empire, Middle Power or Subcontractor for Imperialism?: ‘Neo-Ottomanism’, Shifts in Geopolitics and Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” (draft paper presented at the BRISMES Annual Conference, London School of Economics, London, March 26–28, 2012), 3, 7, 11–12, 22.

²⁹¹ For some examples of usages of the concept of “sub-contractor” in this sense, see Kevan Harris, “The Rise of the Subcontractor State: Politics of Pseudo-Privatization in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 45:1 (2013): 45–70; Abbey Steele and Jacob N. Shapiro,

a complex relationship based on combinations of subservience and autonomy between a subimperialist and imperialist power.²⁹² Focusing on the later period neo-Ottomanist shift in Turkish foreign policy following the Arab uprisings which began in late 2010, Arat-Koç makes the point that “[n]eo-Ottomanism has provided ‘fresh-blood’ for Western imperialism in the Middle East,” as well as that “it has also provided economic opportunities to the Turkish capitalist class, and possibility of self-aggrandizement for others in Turkey.”²⁹³ Another more recent example is Barış Alp Özden’s chapter in an edited book published in 2015, which not only traces the concept’s original theoretical development back to the Latin American Marxist dependency school, but also considers it a “class strategy towards overcoming the contradictions produced by semi-peripheral social formations.”²⁹⁴ In an article published in the same year, Şebnem Oğuz also argues that the “attempts of the Turkish state” under the JDP governments “to assume a sub-imperialist role in the Middle East through ‘neo-Ottomanism’” constitute an example of the fact that “the position of a nation-state within the imperialist chain can change more rapidly than in the past, in line with the rapidly changing patterns of international capital flows.”²⁹⁵ A similar contribution, which focuses on neo-Ottomanism as the “historic ideology of the ruling sectors” in Turkey under the JDP governments in terms of Turkey’s position as a

²⁹² “Subcontracting State-Building,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 28:4–5 (2017): 887–905; Lynette H. Ong, “‘Thugs-for-Hire’: Subcontracting of State Coercion and State Capacity in China,” *Perspectives on Politics* 16:3 (2018): 680–95.

²⁹³ The concept of “subimperialism” is to be dealt with in depth in the fourth chapter of this thesis.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., 22.

²⁹⁵ Barış Alp Özden, “Ustanın Çıraklı Alt-Emperyalistler: Politik Bir Emperyalizm Analizi Denemesi,” in *Emperyalizm: Teori ve Güncel Tartışmalar*, ed. Ahmet Bekmen and Barış Alp Özden (İstanbul: Habitus Yayıncılık, 2015), 116, 121.

²⁹⁶ Şebnem Oğuz, “Rethinking Globalization as Internationalization of Capital: Implications for Understanding State Restructuring,” *Science & Society* 79:3 (2015): 358.

“regional sub-power” within confines of “peripheral neoliberalism,” belongs to Claudio Katz.²⁹⁶

Employing a Critical Realist methodology, Faruk Yalvaç is also among those scholars who benefit from taking into consideration social relations while analysing the aspiration of regional leadership in Turkish foreign policy, and offers the concept of “hegemonic depth” instead of “strategic depth.”²⁹⁷ Although he principally examines the “strategic depth” doctrine proposed by Davutoğlu, which could also be considered an Islamist/civilisationist variant of neo-Ottomanism,²⁹⁸ he states that “the liberalization of the Turkish economy in the 1980s allowed a newly empowered Anatolian bourgeoisie to slowly penetrate and transform state institutions.”²⁹⁹ “However,” he argues,

what initially appeared to be counter-hegemonic policies aimed at the dominant secular Kemalist state structures and policies have gradually been transformed into a policy of compromise with those state structures—a process defined as co-optation or *transformismo [sic]* by Gramsci.³⁰⁰

Although Yalvaç tries to remain loyal to a critical realist methodology which could be considered as an offshoot of historical materialism, this last argument takes the supposedly “Kemalist state structures and policies” as “dominant” structures and policies in an ahistorical manner attributing these supposed “state structures and policies” an unchanging “Kemalist” essence. Elsewhere, in an article published four

²⁹⁶ Claudio Katz, “Capitalist Mutations in Emerging, Intermediate and Peripheral Neoliberalism,” in *BRICS: An Anti-Capitalist Critique*, ed. Patrick Bond and Ana Garcia (London: Pluto Press, 2015), 83–85.

²⁹⁷ Yalvaç, “Strategic Depth or Hegemonic Depth?,” 165–80.

²⁹⁸ Davutoğlu himself and the JDP circles, however, tend to dismiss that concept, apparently in an effort to evade accusations of irredentism. For instance, see “O Tabiri Kullanmadık, Kullanmayacağız,” *Sabah*, 18 March 2010.

²⁹⁹ Yalvaç, “Strategic Depth or Hegemonic Depth?,” 172.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., 172. Emphasis in the original.

years later than the previous one, he leaves aside the concept “Anatolian capital” by arguing that “classes are not spatial categories in the sense that they cannot be defined in terms of their geographic location,” and hence, that “the use of spatial categorisations such as Anatolian capital or Istanbul capital may be misleading.”³⁰¹ Yet he goes on treating the state as a class on its own by arguing that “the dominance of a *state class* in Turkey’s political development was gradually reversed as new classes appeared along with the deepening of capitalist relations of production.”³⁰² The same concept of a “state class” is also present in Mehmet Gürsan Şenalp’s contribution to the topic which also incorporates the role of the supposedly “transnational capitalist relations and practices” in the rise of neo-Ottomanism under the JDP governments by benefiting from the theoretical and conceptual framework of the Amsterdam School in general, and of Kees van der Pijl in particular.³⁰³ However, ideologies, as well as other superstructural elements such as the state apparatus, are *forms*, rather than constituting *essence* or *content* by themselves. The supposedly “Kemalist” ideology, “state structures and policies,” or any other ideology or form of state, for that matter, could only be considered as particular historical forms that accompany particular historical structures and social relations of production. It is, moreover, at least doubtful, if not incorrect at all, that the supposed “Anatolian bourgeoisie” has ever outlined or put forward a “counter-hegemonic project” against the neoliberal hegemonic project which was formulated by the Turkish upper bourgeoisie in the late 1970s. Still, even if it did, the supposed “co-optation” process would be towards the neoliberal historical bloc that was constituted in the 1980s, not towards superstructural elements, since these elements would also be modified

³⁰¹ Faruk Yalvaç, “A Historical Materialist Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy: Class, State, and Hegemony,” *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 13:52 (2016): 7.

³⁰² Ibid., 12. Emphasis in the original.

³⁰³ Şenalp, “Yeni-Osmanlılığın Ekonomi Politiği,” 944, 947–53, 959–62.

instead of being never changing ahistoric forms. This is also what happened with the supposedly “Kemalist state structures and policies” throughout the 1980s and beyond, for they also evolved into new forms with the political restructuring before and after the promulgation of the 1982 constitution by the military rule, and the result was a “Turkish–Islamic Synthesis” which became the dominant form of ideology thereafter.

The liberal political economy approach tends to focus more on forms rather than essence in analysing Turkey’s post-1980 neoliberal turn. This group of studies reproduce the analytical distinction made between the economic and the political as if these were ontologically separate spheres. Thus, most of them evaluates Turkey’s post-1980 experiences from a technical economicistic point of view with drawing conclusions that its economic performance has been either “successful” or not. Elif Uzgören’s criticism towards the institutionalist political economy literature on Turkey that this group of studies fails to “problematise capitalism”³⁰⁴ is relevant for the liberal political economy literature on Turkey in general. Accordingly, they also neglect “social class as a category to approach Turkey’s social formation.”³⁰⁵ Hence their criticisms, if any, are not levelled against the capitalist essence of social relations, but rather against particular forms of divergence from an ideal type of free market, and for the most part, politics becomes the guilty of any divergence or outright social failure in their analyses. Ironically, this group of studies welcomed efforts to consolidate neoliberalism, despite being done under an increasingly authoritarian form of state, in the name of “democratisation” in both the Özal and Erdoğan periods.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁴ Elif Uzgören, “Consolidation of Neoliberalism through Political Islam and Its Limits: The Case of Turkey,” *METU Studies in Development* 45 (2018): 286.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

The critical political economy literature, on the other hand, locates Turkey's post-1980 transformation in general and its new foreign policy aspiration in particular within broader systemic dynamics of capitalist social relations of production. This group of studies also provides us with a historical reading of the case of Turkey by focusing on social classes and struggles among them. Thus, they, again in Uzgören's words, "[unravel] market-oriented nature" of neoliberal policies, and "ultimately [highlight] how socio-economic conditions for labour and lower income groups are deteriorated."³⁰⁷ They also do not neglect the saliency of Turkey's complex relationship with imperialism within the hierarchical international order. This thesis is to benefit from and to be built upon these insights provided by the critical political economy literature on Turkish foreign policy.

2.3 Contributions of the Thesis

As it has been made clear in the previous sections, there is a vast literature on Turkish foreign policy in general and the aspiration for regional leadership in Turkish foreign policy in particular. The existing literature, however, is dominated by analyses that do not problematise capitalism at all and that neglect social class as a category in analysing Turkey's post-1980 neoliberal turn and its overall transformation. The liberal version of the political economy literature on the issue at hand, however, takes the economic structure into consideration, but deals with it rather in a superficial way, with technical economicistic analyses of "performance" and "success," hence overlooking the authoritarian form of state, under which Turkey's "incorporation into world markets" has taken place since the early 1980s. This group of studies also joins the previous groups of studies in neglecting Turkey's complex relationship with imperialism within the hierarchical international order.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., 299.

The critical political economy literature, however, provides us with insights which do not miss the capitalist essence of Turkey's post-1980 transformation as well as its complex relationship with imperialism within the hierarchical international order based upon the world capitalist system. The neo-Gramscian approach, of which its merits were sought to be put forward in the introductory chapter by discussing its main concepts, is especially relevant at this point, since it has "helped enlarge the space for Marxist ideas in international analysis."³⁰⁸ It also "illustrates a consistent appreciation of the interpenetration of the national and international," in which "international forces both provide the context of change and penetrate and transform national political and social relations."³⁰⁹ "[G]rounding state power in class relations," rejecting "a mechanical materialist interpretation of Marx and "recognis[ing] that ideas are themselves part of reality," and finally "its commitment to social change"³¹⁰ are all major strengths of the neo-Gramscian version of historical materialism, which is to be adopted in this thesis. Following Elif Uzgören, one should also add that its conceptualisation of "hegemony" is "decisive to acknowledge that rule of particular class configurations at different historical specificities are always contested."³¹¹ It also "does not treat state and society relations as one of exteriority"³¹² as if the political and the economic were ontologically separate categories.

The neo-Gramscian historical materialist analyses of Turkey's neo-Ottomanist foreign policy aspiration in the post-1980 period focus more on the

³⁰⁸ Adrian Budd, "Gramsci's Marxism and International Relations," *International Socialism* 114 (2007), accessed 5 February 2019, <http://isj.org.uk/gramscis-marxism-and-international-relations/>.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ Uzgören, "Consolidation of Neoliberalism," 288.

³¹² Ibid.

present Recep Tayyip Erdoğan era which began in late 2002.³¹³ The Özal period has little space, if any, in these studies. However, it marks an important precedent for debates over neo-Ottomanism, and served as the basis upon which later transformations in Turkish foreign policy became possible. The literature lacks a broad neo-Gramscian historical materialist reading of the neo-Ottomanist foreign policy aspiration of the Özal period. This thesis aims to make a contribution towards filling this gap in the literature. It also aims to contribute to the literature through its reading of neo-Ottomanism under Özal as a subimperialist hegemonic project fraught with contradictions and limits.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter introduced the most prominent strands of analysis with the ever-expanding literature on the neo-Ottomanist foreign policy aspiration under the political leadership of Turgut Özal. Apart from studies that utilise critical international political economy in their analyses, much of the existing literature do not problematise capitalist social relations in their analyses and Turkey's complex relationship with imperialism within the hierarchical international order. The chapter also sought to lay out the fundamental points where this thesis differentiate itself from the existing literature by critically engaging with that literature. Thereby, it is argued that the neo-Gramscian version of historical materialist methodology adopted in this thesis in analysing the issue at hand is vindicated and has its own merits. As such, the chapter also discussed its possible contributions to the literature in the last section.

³¹³ André Bank and Roy Karadag, “The Political Economy of Regional Power: Turkey under the AKP,” (GIGA Working Papers 204, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Middle East Studies, Hamburg: GIGA, 2012); Kees van der Pijl, “Arab Spring, Turkish ‘Summer’?: The Trajectory of a Pro-Western ‘Moderate Islam’,” (NOREF Report, Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution, Oslo: NOREF, 2012); André Bank and Roy Karadag, “The ‘Ankara Moment’: The Politics of Turkey’s Regional Power in the Middle East, 2007–11,” *Third World Quarterly* 34:2 (2013): 287–304; Birdal, “Davutoğlu Doctrine”; Öztan, “Turkish Nationalisms”; Tuğal, *Fall of the Turkish Model*; Türkeş, “Decomposing Neo-Ottoman Hegemony”; Yalvaç, “Class, State, and Hegemony”; Şenalp, “Yeni-Osmanlıcılıkın Ekonomi Politiği.”

CHAPTER 3

DOMESTIC SPACE REORGANISED ON THE EVE OF NEOLIBERAL RESTRUCTURING

3.1 Introduction

The early 1980s in Turkey marked the beginning of a clear departure from the earlier period during which an import-substituting industrialisation strategy had been put into practice from the early 1960s to 1980. This chapter explores how and in what circumstances domestic economic and political landscape was reorganised in Turkey in the early 1980s. While doing this, domestic neoliberal restructuring initiated by the 24 January 1980 economic reform package is focused on as the key element of the transformation that took place in this period. In order to better understand the whole process that culminated in this restructuring, the first section examines the period opened in the early 1960s, during which developmentalism through planning had been the central element of the bourgeois hegemony, whereas the second section focuses on the 1970s, during which that hegemony became increasingly fragile and hard to sustain. The fourth section analyses the course of change in the accumulation strategy with the 24 January 1980 economic reform package. The fifth section examines the *coup d'état* of 12 September 1980 and the following political restructuring under the military rule until the transition to civilian rule in late 1983. The chapter ends with a concluding section.

3.2 Bourgeois Hegemony through Planned Developmentalism and the Acceleration of Class Struggle in the 1960s

It would be impossible to understand the transformation that Turkish foreign policy has undergone since the 1980s without looking at the more general socioeconomic transformation that Turkey has gone through in the same period. There is an almost unanimous consensus about the underlying neoliberal character of this transformation.³¹⁴ This “qualitative politicoeconomic transformation”³¹⁵ is generally accepted to have begun with the declaration of a new “stabilisation programme” by the Justice Party (JP) government, led by Süleyman Demirel as the prime minister and Turgut Özal being the undersecretary to him, on 24 January 1980.³¹⁶ The programme indicated a transition from the import substitution

³¹⁴ For instance, see Nilgün Önder, “Integrating with the Global Market: The State and the Crisis of Political Representation,” *International Journal of Political Economy* 28:2 (1998): 44–84; Zülküf Aydin, *The Political Economy of Turkey* (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 92; Nilgün Önder, “The Turkish Political Economy: Globalization and Regionalism,” *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology* 6:1–2 (2007): 229–59; Galip L. Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism: The Case of Turkey in the 1980s* (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2009), especially 235–ff; Nazif Ekzen, *Türkiye Kısa İktisat Tarihi, 1946'dan 2008'e: İlişтирilmiş Ekonomi, IMF-Dünya Bankası Düzeninde 62 Yıl*, 2nd ed. (Ankara: ODTÜ Yayıncılık, 2009), 97–118; Pınar Bedirhanoglu and Galip L. Yalman, “State, Class and the Discourse: Reflections on the Neoliberal Transformation in Turkey,” in *Economic Transitions to Neoliberalism in Middle-Income Countries: Policy Dilemmas, Economic Crises, Forms of Resistance*, ed. Alfredo Saad-Filho and Galip L. Yalman (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 107–27; Tevfik Çavdar, *Neoliberalizmin Türkiye Seyir Defteri* (İstanbul: Yazılıma Yayınevi, 2013), 17, 31–38; İsmet Akça, Ahmet Bekmen, and Barış Alp Özden, “Introduction,” in *Turkey Reframed: Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony*, ed. İsmet Akça, Ahmet Bekmen, and Barış Alp Özden (London: Pluto Press, 2014), 5, 8; Cenk Saracoğlu, “Tank Paletiyle Neoliberalizm, 1980–2002,” in *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Siyasal Hayat*, ed. Gökhan Atilgan, Cenk Saracoğlu, and Ateş Uslu (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2015), 750.

³¹⁵ Önder, “Integrating with the Global Market,” 44.

³¹⁶ Mustafa Sönmez, *Türkiye Ekonomisinde Bunalım*, vol. 1, *24 Ocak Kararları ve Sonrası* (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1980), 5; Taner Berksoy, “Türkiye’de İstikrar Arayışları ve IMF,” in *IMF İstikrar Politikaları ve Türkiye*, ed. Cevdet Erdost (Ankara: Savaş Yayınları, 1982), 170–71; Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 1993), 178; Tevfik Çavdar, *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi: 1950'den Günümüze*, 3rd ed. (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004), 258–61; Hikmet Özdemir, “Siyasal Tarih (1960–1980),” in *Türkiye Tarihi*, ed. Sina Akşin, vol. 4, *Çağdaş Türkiye, 1908–1980* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2008), 279; Korkut Boratav, “İktisat Tarihi (1908–1980),” in *Türkiye Tarihi*, ed. Sina Akşin, vol. 4, *Çağdaş Türkiye, 1908–1980* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2008), 370; Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908–2009*, 15th ed. (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi

industrialisation (ISI) model of the pre-1980 period to an export-oriented accumulation strategy based upon neoliberal policies.³¹⁷ Although these policies could also not prevent crises and themselves underwent some modifications in subsequent decades under different governments, their key premises remained unchanged.³¹⁸ Therefore, many analysts argue that the history of post-1980 Turkey is the history of the bourgeois hegemony, which has rested upon neoliberalism.³¹⁹ Problems were managed through partial modifications without touching the neoliberal core of the post-1980 hegemonic projects. It is in this sense Galip Yalman argues that the typical post-1980 crises in Turkey cannot be considered “crises of neoliberalism,” but rather “crises *in* neoliberalism.”³²⁰ Thus, it also became possible

(Yayınları, 2011), 144–58; Ebru Deniz Ozan, “İki Darbe Arasında Kriz Sarmalı,” in *Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat*, ed. Gökhan Atılgan, Cenk Saraçoğlu, and Ateş Uslu (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2015), 666.

³¹⁷ Berksoy, “Türkiye’de İstikrar Arayışları,” 170; Önder, “Integrating with the Global Market,” 44. See also Joachim Becker, “Financialisation, Industry and Dependency in Turkey,” in “Turkey: the Politics of National Conservatism,” ed. İlker Ataç and Joachim Becker, special issue, *Journal für Entwicklungspolitik* XXXII:1/2 (2016): 91–92.

³¹⁸ Önder, “Integrating with the Global Market,” 44.

³¹⁹ Muharrem Tünay, “The Turkish New Right’s Attempt at Hegemony,” in *The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, ed. Atila Eralp, Muharrem Tünay, and Birol Yeşilada (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), 11–30; Alev Özkanç, *Siyaset Sosyolojisi Yazılıları: Yeni Sağ ve Sonrası* (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2007), 57–112; Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 308–9, 350–51; Çağdaş Sümer and Fatih Yaşılı, “Liberal-Muhafazakâr İttifak Üzerine Notlar,” in *Hegemonyadan Diktatoryaya AKP ve Liberal-Muhafazakâr İttifak*, ed. Çağdaş Sümer and Fatih Yaşılı (Ankara: Tan Kitabevi Yayınları, 2010), 15; Alev Özkanç, “Cumhuriyet Döneminde Siyasal Gelişmeler: Tarihsel-Sosyolojik Bir Değerlendirme,” in *1920’den Günümüze Türkiye’de Toplumsal Yapı ve Değişim*, ed. Faruk Alpkaya and Bülent Duru (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2012), 91–125; İsmet Akça, Ahmet Bekmen, and Barış Alp Özden, “Introduction,” in *Turkey Reframed: Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony*, ed. İsmet Akça, Ahmet Bekmen, and Barış Alp Özden (London: Pluto, 2014), 1–9; Saraçoğlu, “Tank Paletiyle Neoliberalizm,” 750; Galip L. Yalman, “Crises as Driving Forces of Neoliberal ‘Trasformismo’: The Contours of the Turkish Political Economy since the 2000s,” in *The Palgrave Handbook of Critical International Political Economy*, ed. Alan Cafruny, Leila Simona Talani, and Gonzalo Pozo Martin (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 255–60.

³²⁰ Yalman, “Crises,” 257. Emphasis in the original. For more on “crisis in neoliberalism,” see Alfredo Saad-Filho, “Crisis *in* Neoliberalism or Crisis *of* Neoliberalism?,” in “Socialist Register 2011: The

to argue that a new historical bloc was cemented insofar as variegations of neoliberalism has been able to prevail as hegemonic projects in Turkey over the last four decades.³²¹

The formation of this historical bloc was far from being a straightforward process. It gradually developed as a reaction and response to the failure of pre-1980 attempts of the Turkish bourgeoisie to overcome an “organic crisis that itself combined crisis of capital accumulation and hegemony that had been gradually deepening from the second half of the 1970s onwards.”³²² Developments that led to a crisis of hegemony on the part of the Turkish bourgeoisie, in fact, can be traced as far back as the 1960s,³²³ during which capitalist development speeded up under the ISI strategy through central economic planning within the institutional framework established after the 27 May 1960 *coup d'état*. It is, therefore, appropriate to take a glance at the 1960s and 1970s.

The 1960s represents a period of bourgeois hegemony which rested upon industrial developmentalism through planning under a democratic form of Keynesian welfare state.³²⁴ The new historical bloc was based on a “compromise among the Kemalist bureaucratic cadres, industrial bourgeoisie, industrial workers and

Crisis This Time,” ed. Leo Panitch, Gregory Albo, and Vivek Chibber, *Socialist Register* 47 (London: The Merlin Press, 2010): 242–59.

³²¹ Yalman, “Crises,” 260.

³²² İsmet Akça, “Hegemonic Projects in Post-1980 Turkey and the Changing Forms of Authoritarianism,” in *Turkey Reframed: Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony*, ed. İsmet Akça, Ahmet Bekmen, and Barış Alp Özden (London: Pluto, 2014), 14.

³²³ Tünay, “New Right’s Attempt,” 17.

³²⁴ Galip L. Yalman, “Tarihsel Bir Perspektiften Türkiye’de Devlet ve Burjuvazi: Rölativist Bir Paradigma mı Hegemonya Stratejisi mi?,” *Praksis* 5 (2002): 16; Galip L. Yalman, “Hegemonya Projeleri Olarak Devletçilik, Kalkınmacılık ve Piyasa,” in *Liberalizm, Devlet, Hegemonya*, ed. E. Fuat Keyman (İstanbul: Everest, 2002), 328; Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 217.

peasantry.”³²⁵ Its material reason consisted of a speedy and lucrative capital accumulation on the part of the industrial bourgeoisie, and a policy of full employment and welfare policies on the part of the working class. As expressed by Nilgün Önder, “[t]he state’s legislating and institutionalizing collective labour rights and a social security system served to incorporate working-class interests,” and also “to expand the domestic market,” and thus, were beneficial to “capital as a whole.”³²⁶ The 1961 constitution, drafted following the 27 May 1960 *coup d'état*, albeit not without its limits, paved the way for a democratic form of statehood for the first time in Turkish history.³²⁷ As it provided a firmer basis for the working class to get organised, it proved more difficult to establish a stable bourgeois hegemony.³²⁸

It is, nonetheless, this same period of Turkish history when the Turkish bourgeoisie was trying to exceed its “economic-corporate level” towards a level of “solidarity of interests” in the sense that it was developing a class consciousness of its own.³²⁹ This is reflected in the fact that the Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations (TİSK) was founded in 1962, the Confederation of Turkish Tradesmen and Craftsmen (TESK) in 1964, and the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TÜSİAD) was founded in 1971 in addition to the Union of Chambers

³²⁵ Elif Uzgören, “Consolidation of Neoliberalism through Political Islam and Its Limits: The Case of Turkey,” *METU Studies in Development* 45 (2018): 290. See also Önder, “Integrating with the Global Market,” 45.

³²⁶ Önder, “Integrating with the Global Market,” 45.

³²⁷ Yalman, “Türkiye’de Devlet ve Burjuvazi,” 14; Yalman, “Hegemony Projeleri,” 325–26; Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 211–12.

³²⁸ Yalman, “Türkiye’de Devlet ve Burjuvazi,” 14; Yalman, “Hegemony Projeleri,” 326; Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 212.

³²⁹ For these levels of class consciousness, see Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, trans. and ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, 11th ed. (New York: International Publishers, 1992), 181–82. See also Robert W. Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 12:2 (1983): 168.

and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), which had already been established in 1950. A similar process of organised class formation was also in the making within the working class. The Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Unions (DİSK) was established in 1967 to provide a more radical alternative to the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (TÜRK-İŞ) that had been established in 1952. These were followed by establishment of the Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions (HAK-İŞ) in 1976, which argued from a conservative and religious basis that the Turkish unionist movement “imitated” the Western model and that class politics was “foreign” to Turkish society.³³⁰ Given the “greater degree of freedom than ever before”³³¹ with more civil rights, greater autonomy for universities, freedom for students to organise their own unions, and the right to strike for workers, this process of class formation would soon acquire a new dimension through an intensified and protracted class struggle.³³² As a result, politics “contrasted sharply from those of the previous decade,”³³³ and it became a real arena of ideological contest to such an extent that a socialist party—the Workers’ Party of Turkey (WPT)—was able to enter parliament for the first time in Turkish political history in the 1965 elections, just four years after its foundation in 1961.³³⁴ Since hegemony requires, in one form or another, the

³³⁰ Elif Uzgören, “Countering Globalization and Regionalization: Is There a United Front within Turkish Labour and Disadvantaged Groups?,” *Globalizations* 15:3 (2018): 352.

³³¹ Ahmad, *Making of Modern Turkey*, 136; cf. Murat Sevinç, “Türkiye’de Anayasal Düzen: 1920–2012,” in *1920’den Günümüze Türkiye’de Toplumsal Yapı ve Değişim*, ed. Faruk Alpkaya and Bülent Duru (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2012), 44–56.

³³² Sungur Savran, *Türkiye’de Sınıf Mücadeleleri*, vol. 1, 1908–1980 (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2010), 173–77.

³³³ Ahmad, *Making of Modern Turkey*, 139.

³³⁴ Gökhan Atılgan, “Sanayi Kapitalizminin Şafağında,” in *Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat*, ed. Gökhan Atılgan, Cenk Saraçoğlu, and Ateş Uslu (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2015), 569–70.

representation of workers' rights,³³⁵ the prospects for a bourgeois hegemony were limited as the Turkish bourgeoisie itself gradually came to perceive the very existence of an organised working class extremely dangerous for its survival.³³⁶ Therefore, planned economic development as the core of the post-1960 hegemonic and non-hegemonic political strategies proved to be counterproductive in the eyes of the bourgeois class in Turkey.³³⁷

Notwithstanding the counter-hegemonic challenges that emerged during the 1960–80 period, the Turkish bourgeoisie did not demand a change in this accumulation strategy until the late 1970s. As early as the introduction of the First Five-Year Development Plan (1963–67) by the State Planning Organisation (SPO) in 1962, the plan was labelled as if it were a “socialist plan.”³³⁸ When it came to legislate some fundamental reforms (i.e. land reform, taxation reform, reforms in the structures of the state economic enterprises [SEEs], family-planning programmes and reform in income-distribution) within the framework of the plan, these were shelved by the government and hence the well-known case of the “resignation of the four first-planners” occurred.³³⁹ Following the curtailment of the First Plan from the very

³³⁵ Quoted from Robert Gray, “Bourgeois Hegemony in Victorian Britain,” in *Class, Hegemony and Party*, ed. Jonathan Bloomfield (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1977), 73–90 in Yalman, “Türkiye’de Devlet ve Burjuvazi,” 15.

³³⁶ Yalman, “Türkiye’de Devlet ve Burjuvazi,” 14–15; Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 213; Ebru Deniz Ozan, *Gülme Sırası Bizde: 12 Eylül'e Giderken Sermaye Sınıfı, Kriz ve Devlet* (İstanbul: Metis Yayımları, 2012), 188.

³³⁷ Yalman, “Türkiye’de Devlet ve Burjuvazi,” 17.

³³⁸ Necat Erder, “1960’larda Türkiye’de Plânlama Deneyimi,” in *Plânlı Kalkınma Serüveni: 1960’larda Türkiye’de Plânlama Deneyimi*, Necat Erder et al. (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayımları, 2003), 11.

³³⁹ The biggest controversy erupted over the land reform. Big capital groups that had agricultural production and even other big capital groups that did not directly deal with agricultural production harshly opposed the reform proposal. Sabancı was an example of the former group, whereas Koç and Eczacıbaşı were examples of the latter one. Some members of the cabinet accused the planning experts with being “communist.” The then prime minister İsmet İnönü later explained that he had not had sufficient power to oppose the shelving of these proposals by the cabinet in the face of economic

beginning, the Second Plan (1968–72) emerged as a totally conservative plan in respect to its socioeconomic proposals, and it mainly served to facilitate capital accumulation for a newly-rich group within the bourgeoisie.³⁴⁰ Again in this period, the SPO came into complete harmony³⁴¹ with the rightist governments in 1967–71 under Undersecretary Turgut Özal. As for the Third Plan (1973–77), it was prepared under the conditions of political repression of the military regime that had taken power after the 12 March 1971 memorandum, and the repression mattered more than the implications of the plan itself. Finally, the Fourth Plan (1979–83), despite its progressive goals, could not be implemented due to the political instability in the late 1970s and the subsequent decision to switch the accumulation strategy for the 24 January 1980 stabilisation programme.³⁴² The crucial point here is that the Turkish bourgeoisie did not oppose economic planning or interventionist economic policies *per se*, but rather were anxious about their potential for creating counter-hegemonic challenges.³⁴³ The top priority of the Turkish bourgeoisie became “creditworthiness”

instability and a possible military intervention such an instability would have provoked. Caught between their loyalty to İnönü and professional self-respect, the four senior planning experts waited until the announcement of the First Five-Year Plan in September 1962 and ultimately presented their petitions for resignation late in the same month. These four planners were the undersecretary Osman Nuri Torun and heads of department Attila Karaosmanoğlu, Necat Erder and Ayhan Çilingiroğlu. Several years later, İnönü, as a sign of his continued amity, offered nomination from his party to these planners before the 1965 parliamentary election. Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni: Dün-Bugün-Yarın*, vol. 2 (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınları, 1984), 776–83; Günal Kansu, *Planlı Yıllar: Anılarla DPT'nin Öyküsü* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2004), 101–24; Erder, “Plânlama Deneyimi,” 71; Ali Somel, *Devletçilik ve Planlama Tartışmalarına Damga Vuran Forum Dergisi* (İstanbul: Yazılıma Yayınevi, 2010), 104–105.

³⁴⁰ Yalçın Küçük, *Planlama, Kalkınma ve Türkiye*, 4th ed. (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınları, 1985), 295–318.

³⁴¹ Gökhan Atılgan, “Sanayi Kapitalizminin Şafağında,” 567.

³⁴² For analyses of the third and fourth five-year development plans, see Küçük, *Planlama, Kalkınma ve Türkiye*, 359–68 and 442–52.

³⁴³ Yalman, “Türkiye’de Devlet ve Burjuvazi,” 17; Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 33–34.

in the eyes of international financial institutions in order to manage the financial bottlenecks that Turkey was experiencing due to its heavily import-dependent manufacturing industry as well as declining rate of profit in the 1970s.³⁴⁴ However, the conditions set forth by the international financial institutions for “creditworthiness” changed following the crisis of the post-war international order in the 1970s. It also turned out to have been very difficult to sustain the bourgeois hegemony through planned industrial developmentalism under a democratic form of state since the organised working class began to pose a crucial challenge to that hegemony as early as the early 1970s.

3.3 Towards a Crisis of Hegemony in the 1970s

It was already stated that the historical bloc which rested upon planned industrial developmentalism under a democratic form of Keynesian welfare state throughout the 1960s was far from being stable in the face of an ever-stronger working class and hence an accelerated class struggle. Thus, already by the early 1970s, it turned out that the bourgeois hegemony had a very fragile basis and was hard to sustain under the existing political, economic and social framework. Various attempts at non-hegemonic strategies³⁴⁵ such as increasingly resorting to coercive instruments could also not yield any result. Even the strictest measures such as the martial law declared after the 12 March 1971 military memorandum were unable to provide a stable equilibrium in the balance of social forces. The martial law caused more violence through repressive exercises such as imprisonment, torture and execution,

³⁴⁴ Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 280–81; Sönmez, *24 Ocak Kararları*, 36–37. “Loss of creditworthiness meant, in the final analysis, the loss of [the Turkish capital groups’] capacity to import, and ipso facto, the contraction of industrial production.” Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 281.

³⁴⁵ For “hegemonic” and “non-hegemonic” political strategies, see Jessop, *State Theory*, 211–13.

but only served to create more violent reactions amidst deepening “structural contradictions intrinsic to the capitalist mode of production.”³⁴⁶

Added to these was the “instability and crisis”³⁴⁷ within the Western capitalist bloc which began to come up to the surface by the end of the 1960s. The post-war boom within the Western capitalist bloc under a Keynesian welfare state form had already reached its limits, and this became more apparent with the 1973 oil crisis.³⁴⁸ Major economic instruments such as nationally and internationally-coordinated governmental policies that had seemed to work in the post-war “Golden Age” stopped working by the early 1970s.³⁴⁹ This situation was further aggravated by international political developments such as the Vietnam War, the Arab–Israeli conflict, the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, all of which rang alarm bells in Western capitals.³⁵⁰ These led to a renewed conflict between the two rival camps in the Cold War, often referred to as the “Second Cold War.”³⁵¹ The general economic recession in the capitalist world was one of the key novelties of this renewed conflict,³⁵² and the response came accordingly. While a Fordist accumulation regime, Keynesian welfare state and ISI strategies combined with

³⁴⁶ Tünay, “New Right’s Attempt,” 17.

³⁴⁷ Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991* (London: Abacus, 1995), 404.

³⁴⁸ Ibid., 244.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., 408–409.

³⁵⁰ Ibid., 244–46.

³⁵¹ Ibid., 452; Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War*, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 1986), 11–19.

³⁵² Halliday, *Second Cold War*, 22.

American strategic power provided the material reason for the post-war hegemonic order within the Western capitalist bloc, it was anti-communism as an ideological glue that provided the ideational dimension of this particular hegemonic order.³⁵³ It is this hegemonic order that went into crisis beginning from the late 1960s, and the crisis could only be overcome by neoliberal restructuring after having effectively displaced organised labour from the historical bloc.³⁵⁴ Represented by the premiership of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom from 1979 and the presidency of Ronald Reagan in the United States from 1980, the response of the capitalist world to the crisis was a neoliberal onslaught against post-war Keynesian welfare state practices and a renewed militancy towards the Soviet Union under New Rightist governments.³⁵⁵ In short, it became possible for the capitalist camp to overcome the crisis of the 1970s with a modification in the economic development model that would be turned into neoliberalism both at domestic and international levels. This was the new orthodoxy that became known as the “Washington Consensus” in the late 1980s and early 1990s.³⁵⁶

This neoliberal turn in international politics made itself evident in the policies suggested by the Turkish bourgeoisie only in the late 1970s. It is worth noting that the TÜSİAD began its activities such as newspaper advertisements and press statements in favour of a new accumulation strategy after the third visit of its members to the United States in October 1978. Whereas the first two visits in 1975 and 1977 were undertaken in order to prevent possible US sanctions against Turkey because of the latter’s military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, the third visit was directly linked

³⁵³ Richard Saull, “Rethinking Hegemony: Uneven Development, Historical Blocs, and the World Economic Crisis,” *International Studies Quarterly* 56:2 (2012): 329.

³⁵⁴ Ibid., 331.

³⁵⁵ Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes*, 409–10; Halliday, *Second Cold War*, 112–18.

³⁵⁶ David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 13.

to the state of the Turkish economy.³⁵⁷ The TÜSİAD delegates had meetings with members of the Jimmy Carter administration and officials from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, Eximbank and Federal Reserve Board in Washington, and with officials from trade banks that had relations with Turkey in New York.³⁵⁸ Following these contacts, in contrast to its first declaration defending a “mixed economy” and “planned development,” which were published in newspapers on 2 August 1971 soon after its establishment,³⁵⁹ TÜSİAD began making an open call for “private enterprise,” a “market economy” and “expansion into foreign markets” in May–June 1979, with four press statements critical of the centre-left Republican People’s Party (RPP) government.³⁶⁰ With carefully chosen words such as “the realist way out” and “national interests” in these statements,³⁶¹ the Turkish bourgeoisie was also manufacturing a conviction to present its class interests as if these were in the general interests of the whole society.

It was not only TÜSİAD that was in search of a way out of the crisis in the late 1970s. The crisis became the primary concern of virtually all segments of the

³⁵⁷ TÜSİAD, *İç ve Dış Basında Duyurular* (Istanbul: TÜSİAD, n.d.), 10, 12, accessed 11 September 2017, <http://tusiad.org/tr/yayinlar/raporlar/item/9059-ic-ve-dis-basinda-duyurular>.

³⁵⁸ Ibid., 12.

³⁵⁹ TÜSİAD, “Amaç ve Görüşlerimiz,” various newspapers, 2 August 1971. Also available in TÜSİAD, *İç ve Dış Basında Duyurular*, 2–3.

³⁶⁰ TÜSİAD, “Gerçekçi Çıkış Yolu,” *Milliyet*, 15 May 1979; TÜSİAD, “Ulus Bekliyor,” *Milliyet*, 22 May 1979; TÜSİAD, “Yokluğu Paylaşmak mı? Bolluğu Sağlamak mı?,” *Milliyet*, 29 May 1979; TÜSİAD, “Refahın ve Hürriyetlerin Düşmanı: Enflasyon,” *Milliyet*, 12 June 1979. These four declarations are also available in TÜSİAD, *İç ve Dış Basında Duyurular*, 14–19.

³⁶¹ TÜSİAD, “Gerçekçi Çıkış Yolu,”; TÜSİAD, “Ulus Bekliyor.” Also available in TÜSİAD, *İç ve Dış Basında Duyurular*, 16–17.

Turkish bourgeoisie in the period 1977–80.³⁶² Although they put the blame on the international circumstances at first, they increasingly began to agree upon the government's and political parties' ineptitude in handling the crisis.³⁶³ The most common problems posed by the crisis for various fractions of the bourgeoisie were inflation and foreign exchange bottlenecks.³⁶⁴ As class consciousness grew within ranks of the bourgeoisie, the proposals it brought forward began to contain not only pure economic solutions to the crisis, but also social elements. For instance, various organisations representing the Turkish bourgeoisie, such as the TİSK, MESS,³⁶⁵ and TOBB, claimed that increases in wages were the principal driving force behind inflation.³⁶⁶ Despite the existence of fault lines that would turn into intra-class conflict within the Turkish bourgeoisie, the severity of the crisis compelled its various segments to unite under a single programme. One of the main indicators of this recognition of the need for unity was the establishment of the Council for Free Enterprise (*Hür Teşebbüs Konseyi*—HTK) in late 1976.³⁶⁷ The Meeting of Turkish Free Enterprise Associations in Istanbul on 28 April 1975 had already laid the

³⁶² Ozan, *12 Eylül'e Giderken*, 69.

³⁶³ Ibid., 70.

³⁶⁴ Ibid., 71.

³⁶⁵ *Madeni Eşya Sanayicileri Sendikası* (the Employer Association of Metalware Industrialists—MESS) was founded by a group of powerful industrialists such as the Koç family and Jak Kamhi in 1959. The members of MESS formed the core of the later TİSK. It was later renamed *Türkiye Metal Sanayicileri Sendikası* (the Turkish Employer Association of Metal Industrialists—MESS). Mustafa Sönmez, *Kirk Haramiler: Türkiye'de Holdingler*, 3rd ed. (Istanbul: Özlem Yayıncılık, 1988), 170.

³⁶⁶ Ozan, *12 Eylül'e Giderken*, 71.

³⁶⁷ Ibid., 134.

foundations for the HTK.³⁶⁸ TİSK and its member associations, TÜSİAD, TESK and the Union of Turkish Chambers of Agriculture (TZOB) all took their places at this initial meeting.³⁶⁹ This is important in the sense that it provided a common platform for very different segments of the Turkish bourgeoisie, ranging from industrialists to craftsmen and agricultural producers, where they could focus on their common demands and withdraw those they could not agree upon.³⁷⁰ Before the official declaration of the change in accumulation strategy by the government on 24 January 1980, the Turkish bourgeoisie had already arrived at a consensus over the need for such a change. The officials of the representative organisations of the bourgeoisie were making statements saying that the survival of the political regime was at stake in the face of “growing anarchy” and the “threat of communism.”³⁷¹ Thus, the bourgeoisie increasingly agreed upon a new programme in such common platforms. Ebru Deniz Ozan summarises the main demands that laid the common ground among the Turkish bourgeoisie in this period as “orientation towards exports,” the “attraction of foreign capital,” and, in connection with this, “participation in the European Common Market and membership in the European Economic Community.”³⁷² It is

³⁶⁸ Ibid.

³⁶⁹ Ibid; Sönmez, *Türkiye 'de Holdingler*, 174.

³⁷⁰ For the details of the development of and debates within the HTK, see Ozan, *12 Eylül'e Giderken*, 134–57.

³⁷¹ Sönmez, *Türkiye 'de Holdingler*, 174–75; Ozan, *12 Eylül'e Giderken*, 139–40.

³⁷² Ibid., 83–92. In her doctoral dissertation examining the positions of various class fractions *vis-à-vis* Turkey’s bid for EU membership, Elif Uzgören also confirms that the pro-membership position had a hegemonic status within the Turkish bourgeoisie despite some reservations by agricultural producers. Nevertheless, Uzgören also states that this fraction was largely marginalised and the processed agricultural production sector was supportive of the membership bid. Elif Uzgören, “Globalisation, the European Union and Turkey: Rethinking the Struggle over Hegemony,” (PhD diss., University of Nottingham, 2012), 196–99.

under these circumstances that the 24 January 1980 economic reform package was announced by the JP government. It is now worth looking into this package.

3.4 The Economic Reform Package of 24 January 1980

The economic reform package declared by the JP government on 24 January 1980 marks a turning point in Turkish economic history. It came after several unsuccessful attempts at economic reform throughout the period 1977–79.³⁷³ Its peculiar characteristic was that it reflected a transition to a new accumulation strategy—an export-oriented growth strategy. It was in this sense different from the previous “economic measures” taken under former governments.³⁷⁴ The package was announced with the intention to prepare the necessary conditions for such a transition. It contained measures such as currency devaluation, the removal of control over prices and subsidies for particular goods, new credit opportunities, debt relief, the promotion of foreign capital and exports, gradual import liberalisation, organisational changes in the economic bureaucracy, the resolution of problems in mass housing, and, finally, the liberalisation of interest rates.³⁷⁵

The reform package, in fact, was far from original. The measures proposed combined elements of the earlier “stabilisation programmes” imposed upon underdeveloped countries by the IMF and the programmes of “structural adjustment”

³⁷³ Utku Utkulu, “The Turkish Economy: Past and Present,” in *Turkey since 1970: Politics, Economics and Society*, ed. Debbie Lovatt (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 20. The 24 January 1980 economic reform package was the fifth of a series of “stabilisation programmes” prepared between the years 1977 and 1980 in Turkey. Emin Çölaşan, *24 Ocak: Bir Dönemin Perde Arkası*, 2nd ed. (n.p.: Milliyet Yayınları, 1983), 7–8.

³⁷⁴ Sönmez, *24 Ocak Kararları*, 50.

³⁷⁵ Ibid., 50–82.

developed by the World Bank in the 1970s.³⁷⁶ This was also reflected in studies of the background preparations for the package. Emin Çölaşan, for instance, recalls that on the same day (3 December 1979) that Turgut Özal came into office as both undersecretary of the prime ministry and acting undersecretary for the SPO, an IMF mission headed by Charles Woodward, the then-IMF mission chief for Turkey, began their previously delayed visit to the country.³⁷⁷ This mission worked closely with the economic bureaucrats of the JP government including Turgut Özal and the Secretary-General of the Treasury Kaya Erdem.³⁷⁸ The negotiations continued with missions from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank in the first weeks of January 1980.³⁷⁹ The package was later expanded towards decreasing investments in line with the new conditions set out by the World Bank during a visit to Washington by a Turkish delegation headed by Turgut Özal in

³⁷⁶ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 148–49.

³⁷⁷ Çölaşan, *24 Ocak*, 54–55.

³⁷⁸ Kaya Erdem (1928–) had been appointed by former JP-led governments to positions such as the director general of the treasury and the director general of the Social Insurance Institution (SSK). He was later appointed by the RPP government as the secretary general of the treasury. Despite this and the fact that his brother, Tarhan Erdem, was a member of parliament for the RPP, he became successful in establishing close relations with the JP government in general and with Turgut Özal in particular. Together with Özal, they decided upon the technical details of the 24 January 1980 economic reform package. Özal and Erdem also went on working closely in the aftermath of the 12 September 1980 *coup d'état*, serving as the deputy prime minister and minister of finance respectively. They resigned together from their positions following the banking scandal in June 1982. He would later serve as the deputy prime minister (1983–89) under the Motherland Party (MP) governments. Ibid., 60. On the other hand, Arslan Başer Kafaoğlu, a former SPO executive and expert on finance and economics, claims that an earlier outline of the 24 January 1980 economic reform package had already been drawn up long before both Turgut Özal came into office and the IMF mission arrived Turkey. According to him, Adnan Başer Kafaoğlu, his elder brother, former chief auditor and then a member of the senate, had suggested virtually the same measures in 1979 to the then-prime minister Süleyman Demirel. Kafaoğlu had been a trusty colleague of Demirel since the former was appointed as the general director of revenues by the latter in 1966. Demirel's trust in him deepened after his successful efforts during the 1970 devaluation. Arslan Başer Kafaoğlu, *Türkiye Ekonomisi: Yakin Tarih*, vol. 2 (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayıncılık, 2008), 12, 29–31.

³⁷⁹ Çölaşan, *24 Ocak*, 107–112.

February 1980.³⁸⁰ Özal complained to other members of this delegation about these conditions, and Çölaşan claims that he said, “This is too much... It seems that these guys are crazy! Anyone that signs this would be hanged!”³⁸¹ The gravity of the financial bottleneck, however, prevailed over the gravity of these conditions, and having consulted Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel over the telephone directly, Özal accepted these conditions in order to obtain a \$300 million credit from the World Bank.³⁸² Nazif Ekzen also emphasises that the real owners of the 24 January 1980 economic reform package were the “core countries,” and they were able to impose it through international financial institutions using mechanisms such as credit conditionality.³⁸³ All these confirm the crucial role of the international financial institutions in disseminating particular hegemonic projects across national boundaries through “the harmonisation of national policies.”³⁸⁴ It is through such harmonisation processes based on credit conditionality that the “internationalisation of the state” takes place.³⁸⁵ As policy regimes get further internationalised, statehood also becomes “denationalised,” whereas a process of “destatisation of polity, politics, and policy” takes place.³⁸⁶ One might put it more bluntly that the US-led neoliberal

³⁸⁰ Ibid., 157–65.

³⁸¹ Ibid., 160.

³⁸² Ibid., 160–61.

³⁸³ Ekzen, *İlistirilmiş Ekonomi*, 118.

³⁸⁴ Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10:2 (1981): 145. See also Saull, “Rethinking Hegemony,” 330.

³⁸⁵ Ibid., 144–46. See also Robert W. Cox, *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 253–65.

³⁸⁶ Bob Jessop, *The State: Past, Present, Future* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 202–205. “National states, in other words, increasingly withdraw from particular public policy fields such as reducing

hegemonic project was indeed appropriated by the Turkish bourgeoisie and adapted to Turkey through the 24 January 1980 economic reform package by the economic bureaucrats of the JP government.

Notwithstanding the appropriation of the US-led neoliberal hegemonic project with the 24 January 1980 economic reform package, Turkey was still far from having undergone a profound social and economic transformation that would enable a particular social class—the Turkish bourgeoisie, in this case—to exert its hegemony over the other segments of the society. As mostly the case in the periphery, the appropriation of the hegemonic project of the leading core was carried out through non-hegemonic strategies. This is also evident from the fact that many measures proposed by the 24 January 1980 package could not be implemented under civilian rule. Some of these could only be implemented under the iron fist of military rule after 1980, and some of them were impossible even under military rule.³⁸⁷ The 1961 constitution, though it had been curbed substantially, was still intact, together with the many rights and liberties it provided—the right of free association being the most important. Therefore, it became necessary first to overcome organised working-class resistance in order to secure the extra-market conditions for a successful appropriation and adaptation of the US-led neoliberal hegemonic project. In Nilgün Önder's words, "the existing political system became an impediment to the restructuring of the Turkish political economy toward a radically different course,"³⁸⁸ and this impediment would be overcome only after the 12 September 1980 *coup d'état*.

poverty in favour of economic policies that do not benefit themselves in order to overcome financial bottlenecks. In the absence of governments in such policy fields, extra-governmental agents—including 'parallel power networks'—fill the vacuum, and they are also promoted by governments to do so". Ibid., 204.

³⁸⁷ For some of these measures, see Sönmez, *24 Ocak Kararları*, 92–105. Among these measures, for instance, the proposed removal of severance pay has still not been passed into law.

³⁸⁸ Önder, "Integrating with the Global Market," 49; Nilgün Önder, *The Economic Transformation of Turkey: Neoliberalism and State Intervention* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016), 19.

3.5 The 12 September 1980 *Coup d'État* and Military Rule

Two different news items on the same day, 11 September 1980, illustrate well the point of the 12 September 1980 *coup d'état*. One of the classic headlines from pre-1980 about street violence—"Terror took 17 lives again yesterday!"—was accompanied by another news item announcing a statement from the ranks of the Turkish bourgeoisie: “Without the establishment of State Security Courts, production will not increase,” TİSK President Halit Narin said.³⁸⁹ The goal of changing course in terms of accumulation strategy had already been adopted as a government policy with the 24 January 1980 economic reform package, but it has almost become a conventional wisdom in the literature that it became possible only after the *coup d'état* to secure the extra-market conditions for such a change.³⁹⁰ In a similar vein, Bülent Ecevit as the leader of the main opposition party, the RPP, had also warned immediately after the announcement of the economic reform package that the measures proposed by the package could not be implemented under a democratic parliamentary regime.³⁹¹ This crude fact was also confessed later by both

³⁸⁹ Bülent Tanör, “Siyasal Tarih (1980–1995),” in *Türkiye Tarihi*, ed. Sina Akşin, vol. 5, *Bugünkü Türkiye, 1980–2003* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2011), 30.

³⁹⁰ For some of the studies that defend this argument, see Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 148; Ahmad, *Making of Modern Turkey*, 178; Kafaoğlu, *Türkiye Ekonomisi*, vol. 2, 41–43; Özkanç, “Tarihsel-Sosyolojik Bir Değerlendirme,” 105; Gökhan Atılgan, “Türkiye’de Toplumsal Sınıflar: 1923–2010,” in *1920’den Günümüze Türkiye’de Toplumsal Yapı ve Değişim*, ed. Faruk Alpkaya and Bülent Duru (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2012), 298; Mehmet Özgüden, “Türkiye’de Seçkinler,” in *1920’den Günümüze Türkiye’de Toplumsal Yapı ve Değişim*, ed. Faruk Alpkaya and Bülent Duru (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2012), 341–42; Henri J. Barkey, *The State and the Industrialization Crisis in Turkey* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 180; Mustafa Sönmez, *Türkiye Ekonomisinde Bunalım*, vol. 2, *1980 Sonbaharından 1982’ye* (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1982), 90–91; Erinç Yeldan, *Küreselleşme Sürecinde Türkiye Ekonomisi: Bölüşüm, Birikim ve Büyüme*, 15th ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011), 44; Ozan, “İki Darbe Arasında,” 665–66; Saracoğlu, “Tank Paletiyle Neoliberalizm,” 749, 751; Ozan, *12 Eylül'e Giderken*, 56–61; Akça, “Hegemonic Projects in Post-1980 Turkey,” 14–15; Ahmet Bekmen, “State and Capital in Turkey During the Neoliberal Era,” in *Turkey Reframed: Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony* (London: Pluto Press, 2014), 50–51.

³⁹¹ Kafaoğlu, *Türkiye Ekonomisi*, vol. 2, 31–32.

Kenan Evren, the leading military chief of staff of the *coup d'état* and the acting president after 1980, and Turgut Özal, the key architect of the 24 January 1980 economic reform package and the vice prime minister in charge of the economy after 1980.³⁹² Prominent members of the Turkish bourgeoisie have also concurred with this assessment. For instance, Rahmi Koç, the son of Ahmet Vehbi Koç, the founding leader of Koç Holding, has extolled the hasty decision-making process and its equally rapid reversibility in case of errors without any need for political legitimisation under military rule.³⁹³ Likewise, İbrahim Bodur, the then-president of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry (İSO), took pride in the “twice-as-successful implementation of the 24 January 1980 economic decisions by the post-12 September military administration.”³⁹⁴ The sharpest eulogy for the *coup d'état*, however, belongs to Halit Narin, the then president of TİSK, who delightedly declared, “For the last two decades, the workers laughed and we cried. Now, it is time for us to laugh at last!”³⁹⁵ The argument here, however, is not that the *coup d'état* was the inevitable result of economic conditions in general and of the accumulation crisis in particular. It is rather that the accumulation crisis was only one part of, but a key negative factor in, the more general crisis of hegemony that ultimately culminated in the 1980 *coup d'état*.³⁹⁶

The Turkish bourgeoisie was right in applauding the armed forces from their class point of view given the still ongoing mass strikes in September 1980. The

³⁹² Mehmet Ali Birand, Hikmet Bila and Rıdvan Akar, *12 Eylül: Türkiye'nin Miladi* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 1999), 140; Sönmez, *1980 Sonbaharından 1982'ye*, 90.

³⁹³ Ibid., 90–91.

³⁹⁴ Ibid., 91.

³⁹⁵ Ozan, *12 Eylül'e Giderken*, 20.

³⁹⁶ Akça, “Hegemonic Projects in Post-1980 Turkey,” 15. For a further discussion over the causes of the *coup d'état*, see Tanel Demirel, “12 Eylül'e Doğru Ordu ve Demokrasi,” *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 56:4 (2001): 43–75.

working class could resist inflationary pressures on their wages under conditions of economic crisis through its powerfully-organised strikes and meetings during the late 1970s. This was the case to such an extent that the share of wages in all added value in the manufacturing sector rose steadily from 36.9 percent in 1977 to 37.7 percent in 1978 and to 38.7 percent in 1979.³⁹⁷ This meant additional increases in costs for the bourgeoisie under conditions of economic crisis. The working class were also able to reverse some of the coercive measures taken after the 12 March 1971 military memorandum, such as the establishment of State Security Courts (DGMs) that mostly targeted the political left and trade union activism.³⁹⁸ Thus, one of the slogans of the magnificent May Day meeting in 1977 was, “We crushed the DGMs, it is time to crush MESS now!”³⁹⁹ This slogan reveals the high level of class and political consciousness among the working class in terms of determining its targets on the eve of the 1980 *coup d'état*, and was sufficient to set alarm bells ringing for the Turkish bourgeoisie.

The political crisis further aggravated the situation. The RPP could not form a single-party government. Its “left-populist strategy”⁴⁰⁰ was also not able to gain the

³⁹⁷ Boratav, “İktisat Tarihi (1908–1980),” 370.

³⁹⁸ State Security Courts, better known as DGMs (its Turkish acronym), were established by an amendment (article 136) made to the 1961 constitution in 1973 under the “technocratic governments” following the 12 March 1971 military memorandum. The amendment was cancelled by the Constitutional Court on 11 October 1975 on the grounds that the amendment violated the principle of judicial unity. The Nationalist Front government led by the JP, nonetheless, wanted to re-open these courts through a new legal amendment following the decision of the Constitutional Court. However, the struggle led by DİSK against the efforts to re-open the DGMs grew with the participation of other professional associations, and evolved into a general strike in 1976. Thus, the efforts of the government to re-open these courts failed. They were re-opened only after the 1980 *coup d'état*. Sevinç, “Türkiye’de Anayasal Düzen,” 57; Ozan, “İki Darbe Arasında,” 669–70; Saracoğlu, “Tank Paletiyle Neoliberalizm,” 785.

³⁹⁹ Çavdar, *Neoliberalizmin Türkiye Seyir Defteri*, 26–27. “MESS” referred to the Employer Association of Metalware Industrialists in this slogan.

⁴⁰⁰ Akça, “Hegemonic Projects in Post-1980 Turkey,” 15.

consent of the Turkish bourgeoisie, whereas it was also unable to embody the more radical fractions of the political left. On the other hand, the “authoritarian populist strategy”⁴⁰¹ of the JP obtained the support of the Turkish bourgeoisie at large, but it could not generate the consent of the subaltern classes to a great extent. Also, as a reaction to the iron fist of the 12 March martial law practices in the early 1970s, the revolutionary and more radical fractions of the political left were also able to mobilise greater numbers in the streets outside the parliament. This led the conservative “Nationalist Front”⁴⁰² governments led by the JP to employ further coercive practices under cover of the discourse of “re-establishing state authority.”⁴⁰³ Governments led by the RPP for short intervals were also unable to bring about political stability, given its hegemonic ineptitude noted above. Developments such as the Tariş resistance of the working class, the massacres of Alevis in Çorum, political assassinations, and finally the Islamist demonstrations led by the NSP against the decision of Israel to

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² The “Nationalist Front” governments were the coalition governments led by the JP formed with other right-wing political parties in the second half of the 1970s. The right-wing political parties in the parliament felt it necessary to act together since none of them had enough deputies in the parliament to form a government alone in the face of mounting working class activism and the rising political left, including the ever-strengthening RPP within the parliament and the revolutionary left outside the parliament. The ideological glue of these governments was anti-communism. The first Nationalist Front government (31 March 1975–21 June 1977) was formed by the JP, the National Salvation Party (NSP), the Republican Reliance Party (RRP) and the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) following a four-month long interim government under the premiership of Sadi Irmak, a member of the Senate, after the collapse of the former RPP–NSP government (26 January 1974–17 November 1974). The second Nationalist Front government (21 July 1977–5 January 1978) was formed as a result of the inability of the RPP to form a single-party government despite its first place in the 1977 elections with 41.38 percent of the votes. The coalition was formed by the JP, NSP and NAP. Although they shared a common anti-communist agenda, the parties formed the Nationalist Front governments differed from each other in many respects. Far from bringing a period of stability, none of these governments was able to last long due to their internal disagreements and tensions. Some commentators also call the single-party government formed by the JP the “third Nationalist Front government” (12 November 1979–12 September 1980). Ozan, “İki Darbe Arasında,” 693–700.

⁴⁰³ Akça, “Hegemonic Projects in Post-1980 Turkey,” 15.

move its capital from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem further aggravated the political crisis.⁴⁰⁴ It was, however, the presidential election that created a real deadlock. Despite more than a hundred rounds of voting from March 1980 to 12 September 1980, the parliament failed to elect a president to replace Fahri Korutürk, whose incumbency had been due to end on 6 April 1980. This deadlock also left the parliament unable to debate other issues, such as the 24 January 1980 economic decisions taken by the government.⁴⁰⁵ The legislative enactment of these decisions, accordingly, had to wait until this deadlock was ultimately resolved by the Turkish Armed Forces on 12 September 1980.

It has already been stated in the introductory chapter that the dissemination of hegemony from core to periphery in the world economy is realised through international financial institutions, and hegemonic projects of the core are mostly appropriated by the peripheral countries in a rather passive way through what Antonio Gramsci calls “passive revolution” at the national level.⁴⁰⁶ It is evident that the Turkish case, at least from the 1960s to the 1980s, has much in common with such a conceptualisation of “passive revolution” as a historical form of class domination.⁴⁰⁷ The prospects for a bourgeois hegemony were limited, as the Turkish bourgeoisie itself gradually perceived the very existence of an organised working class extremely

⁴⁰⁴ Ozan, “İki Darbe Arasında,” 699–700.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., 700.

⁴⁰⁶ Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders,” 145. See also Saull, “Rethinking Hegemony,” 330.

⁴⁰⁷ It is also worth noting here that Turkish political commentators have at times referred to the Turkish Armed Forces as the “army party.” For instance, see Aytekin Yılmaz, “Solun ‘İlerici Ordu Teorisi’nin Açmazları,” *Taraf*, 26 September 2008. Nicos Poulantzas also points out that, “the role of political parties for the bourgeoisie is replaced by that of the military” in “crises of hegemony” as big as those of Portugal, Spain and Greece. Quoted from Nicos Poulantzas, *The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece, Spain*, trans. David Fernbach (London: NLB, 1976), 92, 106 in Cemal Burak Tansel, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism: Towards a New Research Agenda, in *States of Discipline: Authoritarian Neoliberalism and the Contested Reproduction of Capitalist Order*, ed. Cemal Burak Tansel (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 21, footnote 12.

dangerous for its survival.⁴⁰⁸ The periods of martial law beginning from the 12 March 1971 military memorandum and the 24 January 1980 economic reform package can all be seen as attempts at passive revolution through a war of position.⁴⁰⁹ These were all “successful only in the short run,” because “the interests of different groups and classes could not be neutralized except when military regimes subjected the whole society to severe political repression during limited periods.”⁴¹⁰ The “ideological feebleness of the bourgeoisie” made it unable to unite the interests of its different fractions and of subordinate groups around a single “national-popular program.”⁴¹¹ Only through the war of manoeuvre with the 12 September 1980 *coup d'état* did it become possible to create the extra-market conditions for a passive revolution and a change in the accumulation strategy that could constitute bourgeois hegemony in Turkey into the 1980s.⁴¹² As a result, “[a] new power bloc was formed” around following elements: i) “the entire bourgeoisie under the leadership of the dominant segment of big industrial/financial capital,” ii) “the armed forces-turned-state administrators,” iii) and “a group of technocrats who became the embodiment of ‘economic knowledge and expertise’.”⁴¹³

⁴⁰⁸ Yalman, “Türkiye’də Devlet ve Burjuvazi,” 14–15; Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 213; Ozan, *12 Eylül'e Giderken*, 188.

⁴⁰⁹ Tünay, “New Right’s Attempt,” 19.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid., 19.

⁴¹¹ Ibid., 18.

⁴¹² Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 351–52; Özkanç, *Yeni Sağ ve Sonrası*, 70–71, 85; Uzgören, “Globalisation, the European Union and Turkey,” 153–55.

⁴¹³ Önder, “Integrating with the Global Market,” 50; Önder, *Economic Transformation of Turkey*, 18.

Turkish Armed Forces ruled the country through an executive council called the “National Security Council”⁴¹⁴ after they took the power on 12 September 1980. In its first declaration, the National Security Council (NSC) stated that its main goal was “to reclaim the integrity of the country and authority of the state, and to remove the causes that hinder the democratic order from functioning.” The NSC also claimed that “reactionary ideas and perverted ideologies had brought the country to the brink of civil war by penetrating deep into the state institutions, trade unions and political parties.”⁴¹⁵ It was also announced in the same declaration that the parliament and the government had been abolished, the immunity of deputies had been lifted, martial law had been introduced for the whole country, visits abroad had been banned and a curfew had begun.⁴¹⁶ The constitution was also suspended, and this was followed by the closure of all political parties, for the first time including the party founded by Atatürk—the RPP.⁴¹⁷ All strikes and lockouts were postponed, and activities of trade unions except TÜRK-İŞ were suspended.⁴¹⁸ The workers were ordered to go back to work immediately, and their wages were increased by 70 percent at once in order to obtain their consent.⁴¹⁹

⁴¹⁴ The members of the National Security Council were the Chief of General Staff General Kenan Evren, Commander of the Armed Forces General Nurettin Ersin, Commander of the Air Forces General Tahsin Şahinkaya, Commander of the Naval Forces Nejat Tümer and Commander of the Gendarmerie General Sedat Celasun. Its secretary general was General Haydar Saltık. General Evren was authorised as the President of the State as the president of that council.

⁴¹⁵ Tanör, “Siyasal Tarih (1980–1995),” 31.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid., 31.

⁴¹⁷ Ahmad, *Making of Modern Turkey*, 182.

⁴¹⁸ Tanör, “Siyasal Tarih (1980–1995),” 33–34.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid., 34.

In one year alone, more than a hundred thousand people were put under arrest, and there were approximately eighty thousand people in prison with thirty thousand of them awaiting trial by the end of 1982.⁴²⁰ These included not only militants and activists, but also intellectuals, artists and university professors, as well as ordinary citizens.⁴²¹ Nearly 3,600 death sentences were pronounced, and 20 of these were actually carried out within the two years following the *coup d'état*.⁴²² The use of torture was widespread and systematic, with many killed in prisons, the most notorious example being the experiences of prisoners of Kurdish descent in Diyarbakir Prison.⁴²³ These were all practices directed towards the undeclared goal of suppressing political and social dissent in order to “put an end to class-based politics.”⁴²⁴ The distinct feature of the crisis in the 1970s was its rapid evolution into a “crisis in the state form”⁴²⁵ due to the enormous challenge posed by the ever-stronger working class.⁴²⁶ Hence the restructuring of the state in order to put an end

⁴²⁰ Eric J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 3rd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 279.

⁴²¹ Saraçoğlu, “Tank Paletiyle Neoliberalizm,” 780.

⁴²² Zürcher, *Turkey*, 280.

⁴²³ Ahmad, *Making of Modern Turkey*, 185. For a first-hand description of the use of torture in Diyarbakir Prison following the *coup*, see Hasan Cemal, *Kürtler*, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2003), 15–34.

⁴²⁴ Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 308; Yalman, “Crises,” 260; cf. Ozan, *12 Eylül'e Giderken*, 165–66.

⁴²⁵ “A crisis in the state form arises when the working class challenge to the power of capital extends to a challenge to the constitutional authority of the state in its relation to civil society.” Simon Clarke, “The Global Accumulation of Capital and the Periodisation of the Capitalist State Form,” in *Open Marxism*, vol. 1, ed. Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn, and Kosmas Psychopoulos (London: Pluto Press, 1992), 148.

⁴²⁶ Galip Yalman also states that the economic crisis of the 1970s in Turkey was a crisis of balance of payments from the Turkish bourgeoisie’s view point, just like the one in the 1950s. However, according

to class-based politics emerged as the core of a new hegemonic strategy in the early 1980s. This was due to a growing “trepidation that the very existence of the Turkish state was under threat” in addition to “the Turkish bourgeoisie’s chronic anxiety that its survival was at stake.”⁴²⁷ Thus, in spite of the formation of a cabinet under the premiership of Büleld Ulusu, a retired admiral, the NSC rapidly moved towards efforts to institutionalise the political restructuring of the state through a new constitution.

The draft constitution was prepared under the auspices of the NSC by a commission led by Professor Orhan Aldıkaçtı.⁴²⁸ It was specifically designed to put severe limitations on the democratic rights and freedoms that had been granted by the 1961 constitution.⁴²⁹ The executive power of the state would be strengthened in expense of the legislative and judicial branches.⁴³⁰ The mechanism of constitutional oversight through the Constitutional Court was also limited.⁴³¹ It essentially normalised the exceptional limitations imposed on democratic rights and freedoms by inserting a notorious derogation that enabled authorities to limit these rights and freedoms in case of “circumstances too risky to be delayed.”⁴³² It also aimed to limit parliamentary debates by removing the bicameral legislature that consisted of the

to Yalman, the strategy to overcome the crisis in the late 1970s had to differ from the one in the 1970s due to the “labour” problem of the bourgeoisie this time. Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 305.

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

⁴²⁸ Tanör, “Siyasal Tarih (1980–1995),” 43.

⁴²⁹ Ibid., 50–52; Sevinç, “Türkiye’de Anayasal Düzen,” 64–66.

⁴³⁰ Tanör, “Siyasal Tarih (1980–1995),” 47.

⁴³¹ Ibid.

⁴³² Ibid., 52.

Senate of the Republic and the Parliament of the Nation and putting in its stead a unicameral legislature that only consisted of the Grand National Assembly.⁴³³ Public officials were also denied the right to association and collective bargaining.⁴³⁴ Decrees and all other legislative decisions by the NSC were also put under constitutional protection, whereby its members would be granted lifelong legal immunity against any potential judicial proceedings in the future.⁴³⁵ The autonomy of universities was also drastically reduced with the establishment of the Higher Education Council (YÖK) as a supervisory administrative authority.⁴³⁶ To put it in a nutshell, it could be argued that the restructuring of the state in the 1980s, of which the 1982 constitution was the main pillar, represented a transition from a democratic form of the state to an authoritarian one⁴³⁷ through fascistic practices of the 1980 *coup d'état*.⁴³⁸

⁴³³ Sevinç, “Türkiye’de Anayasal Düzen,” 67.

⁴³⁴ Ibid., 65.

⁴³⁵ Tanör, “Siyasal Tarih (1980–1995),” 54.

⁴³⁶ Ibid., 48. It is worth noting here that a purge in universities accompanied these legal changes. Dozens of academics were purged by the YÖK following the legal amendments made in the law (no. 1402) that used to belong to the martial law declared after the 12 March 1971 military memorandum. The public personnel that were purged in this way were not going to be allowed to work in the public sector again. Many more academics resigned on their own either with a fear to get eternally unable to work in the public sector or in protest to the purges. The 1402-victims (*1402’likler*) that were eliminated through purges and resignations in this period were mostly leftist academics. Some of them were also sentenced to imprisonment through criminal investigations into their intellectual activities. Ibid., 48; Ahmad, *Making of Modern Turkey*, 185; Sevinç, “Türkiye’de Anayasal Düzen,” 74; Saracoğlu, “Tank Paletiyle Neoliberalizm,” 788; Zürcher, *Turkey*, 280.

⁴³⁷ Yalman, “Türkiye’de Devlet ve Burjuvazi,” 14; Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 308–309, 332–33, 351–52.

⁴³⁸ It should be noted at this point that an overemphasis on the “authoritarian” character of the post-1980 Turkish state may erroneously make the following “civilian” governments under the political leadership of the MP appear ardent democrats. Unfortunately, fascistic practices of the *coup d'état* sometimes overshadowed the later authoritarian practices of the successive MP governments. As it is to be demonstrated in the following chapters, the MP, in general, did not challenge, but rather sought to benefit from the authoritarian political framework drawn by the *coup d'état* administration to such

A form of ideological and moral indoctrination accompanied the restructuring of the state in the 1980s. This was already evident in the shift in the official ideology of the state. Whereas the 1961 constitution emphasised such themes as “independence,” “libertarianism,” and “rule of law,” the 1982 constitution placed its emphasis on such themes as “territorial integrity,” “national solidarity,” and “defence of the state.”⁴³⁹ Referring to the “historical and moral values of Turkishness,” the latter one brought forward a new interpretation of “Turkishness,” which exceeded the mere bond of citizenship.⁴⁴⁰ The new content injected into the official ideology was not only limited to the legal texts of the state. The military junta sought to reproduce it in every area of social life.⁴⁴¹ Both military rule and subsequent civilian governments “mobilised the ideological apparatuses of the state in such a way that enabled an anti-communist conservatism to gain a hold over society.”⁴⁴² The military rulers sought to construct the hegemonic order that it wanted to constitute and maintain on an ideological basis called the “Turkish–Islamic Synthesis.” This included a mixture of a right-wing interpretation of Kemalism,⁴⁴³ Turkish nationalism

an extent that it even advocated a “no” vote in the referendum on lifting political bans on former politicians in 1987.

⁴³⁹ Cem Eroğlu, *Anatizeye Giriş* (Ankara: İmaj Yayınları, 2007), 317.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid., 317.

⁴⁴¹ Saraçoğlu, “Tank Paletiyle Neoliberalizm,” 786.

⁴⁴² Ibid., 786.

⁴⁴³ The military rulers were careful in distinguishing themselves from the concept of Kemalism, which had earlier been incorporated into discourses of some influential socialist movements of the pre-1980 period such as the Workers’ Party of Turkey and the Yön–Devrim movement. They, therefore, preferred in its stead to use the term *Atatürkçülük*, which literally means Atatürkism, since it was thought to have sounded relatively more apolitical and less ideological. Indeed, left-wing authors had already begun to criticise a superficial reading of Atatürk’s legacy on the part of some politicians, civilian and military bureaucrats as well as some authors as early as the 1960s on the grounds that their *Atatürkçülük* had been formalistic and had only focused on forms such as dress but had neglected the real progressive and anti-imperialist content of Atatürk’s legacy. For such criticisms, see İlhan Selçuk,

and Islamic elements.⁴⁴⁴ The Intellectuals' Hearths (*Aydınlar Ocağı*) and especially its first president Professor İbrahim Kafesoğlu had had an important role in forming “systemic content” for the Turkish–Islamic Synthesis in the pre-1980 period.⁴⁴⁵ The ideological framework offered by them was so influential that the 1982 constitution would include many of the proposals put forward by the Intellectuals' Hearths.⁴⁴⁶ Many positions within the state bureaucracy, especially in universities, were also filled with people from that institution throughout the 1980s.⁴⁴⁷

The NSC put its draft constitution to the vote under repressive conditions in late 1982. It was forbidden to address the public politically in a way that would influence the people's voting behaviour according to decision 71 (article 3) of the

“Gardrop Atatürkçülüğü,” *Yön*, 9 September 1966; Nadir Nadi, *Ben Atatürkçü Değilim*, 12th ed. (İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayıncılar, 1993); Uğur Mumcu, *Bütün Yazıları*, vol. 25, *Sahte Atatürkçülük*, 6th ed. (İstanbul: UM:AG Yayıncılar, 2011).

⁴⁴⁴ Saraçoğlu, “Tank Paletiyle Neoliberalizm,” 786.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid., 787. The Intellectuals' Hearths (*Aydınlar Ocağı*)—one of the key rightist intellectual institutions, whose origins can be traced back to the 1960s—was established in 1970. Its first president, Professor İbrahim Kafesoğlu, was already very active within the Institute for Research on Turkish Culture (*Türk Kültürüni Araşturma Enstitüsü*—TKAE), which had been founded under the auspices of President Cemal Gürsel in 1961, and the publication attached to this institute, *Türk Kültürü*, of which he was the most important author, became instrumental in formulating a new historiography called the “Turkish–Islamic Synthesis,” along with the other activities of the Intellectuals' Hearths throughout the 1970s. Yet all these endeavours fell short of taking intellectual and moral leadership until the 1980s, when the left would be crushed in every respect under military rule. Yüksel Taşkin, *Anti-Komünizmden Kireselleşme Karşılığına Milliyetçi-Muhafazakâr Entelijansıya* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılar, 2015), 245, 139; Etienne Copeaux, *Tarih Ders Kitaplarında Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk–İslam Sentezine (1931–1993)* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayıncılar, 1998), 55–59. Turgut Özal had also close relations with this institution, and attended all its meetings. Mustafa Şen, “Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party,” in *Islamization of Turkey under the AKP Rule*, ed. Birol Yeşilada and Barry Rubin (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 67; Emin Alper and Özgür Sevgi Göral, “Aydınlar Ocağı,” *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, ed. Ahmet Çiğdem, vol. 5, *Muhafazakârlık*, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2006), 587; Tanıl Bora, *Cereyanlar: Türkiye'de Siyasi İdeolojiler* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılar, 2017), 404.

⁴⁴⁶ Taşkin, *Milliyetçi-Muhafazakâr Entelijansıya*, 254–66.

⁴⁴⁷ Alper and Göral, “Aydınlar Ocağı,” 587.

NSC.⁴⁴⁸ It was, nevertheless, free for members of the NSC to make the case in favour of the draft constitution. This disequilibrium was further entrenched by the “Law on Holding a Referendum on the Constitution” (no. 2707, 1982-09-24) enacted by the Constituent Assembly.⁴⁴⁹ It gave permission for people “to explain and introduce the constitution,” while prohibiting any criticism of it (article no. 5/b). Another element of pressure was the merger of the referendum with the presidential election. The first of the provisional articles of the constitution mandated that citizens would vote together on both the constitution and the presidency of Kenan Evren.⁴⁵⁰ There was no other candidate for the presidency. The more important element of pressure, however, was the uncertainty as to whether the NSC would accept a possible rejection of the constitution.⁴⁵¹ There were no clauses or official statements about what would happen in the case of such a rejection.⁴⁵² The NSC was not even satisfied with these limitations, and announced another decision (no. 71) that forbade any criticism of or any oral or written statement against the propaganda speeches of the then-acting head

⁴⁴⁸ Tanör, “Siyasal Tarih (1980–1995),” 44.

⁴⁴⁹ The Constituent Assembly was established on 29 June 1981 by the NSC in order to form the constitutional and legal structure that would carry the country into its new order, to prepare the constitution and fundamental laws and to use legislative power until the formation of a new parliament. It had two main divisions—the NSC and the Advisory Council. These were not equal divisions *inter se*. The members of the Advisory Council were determined by the NSC, and these were in a position of being mere advisors and no more. It was always the NSC that had the final say on the constitution and other legislative activities, and it was also the only power that could place a check on the government. Tanör, “Siyasal Tarih (1980–1995),” 41–42.

⁴⁵⁰ Saraçoğlu, “Tank Paletiyle Neoliberalizm,” 783.

⁴⁵¹ Tanör, “Siyasal Tarih (1980–1995),” 45.

⁴⁵² On the contrary, Professor Orhan Aldıkaçtı, the Head of the Constitutional Committee, made statements including the following: “Our constitution will be accepted. Certainly... Because accepting the constitution means enacting a law on political parties and calling elections... The voters will consider this point, and they will vote in favour of the constitution in order to proceed to a normal order immediately.” *Cumhuriyet*, 26 January 1982.

of state Kenan Evren during his radio and TV interviews, as well as his meetings.⁴⁵³ These all worked, and the constitution was accepted with 91 percent of the vote on 7 November 1982. The elections were held on 6 November 1983. The NSC, nonetheless, kept on taking legal decisions that reorganised Turkey's political space until the formation of the new parliamentary speakers' office (*TBMM Başkanlık Divanı*) on 7 December 1983.⁴⁵⁴

The 6 November 1983 elections were held under the shadow of security checks on candidates conducted by the NSC and a new electoral system that included a 10 percent threshold.⁴⁵⁵ Having rejected some of the political parties that resembled their pre-1980 predecessors and some candidates that had, or were thought to have had, links to those parties, the NSC permitted only three political parties to stand for elections. One of these was the Motherland Party (MP) led by Turgut Özal—the key architect of the 24 January 1980 economic reform package as both the undersecretary of the prime ministry and acting undersecretary of the SPO under the JP government. The other two were the Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP) led by Turgut Sunalp, a retired general, and the Populist Party (PP) led by Necdet Calp, a former bureaucrat. The NSC clearly gave its support to the NDP. This support in favour of the NDP notwithstanding, it was the MP that won the elections with 45.1 percent of the votes. The NDP, on the other hand, emerged as the third party with 23.3 percent, and the PP came second thanks to its relatively leftist discourse with 30.4 percent.

The victorious Turgut Özal was indeed not a stranger to military rule. He served as the deputy prime minister in charge of the economy in the government led by Bülend Ulusu until the banking scandal that erupted in 1982. His previous role as the key architect of the 24 January 1980 economic reform package under the JP

⁴⁵³ Tanör, "Siyasal Tarih (1980–1995)," 45.

⁴⁵⁴ Saraçoğlu, "Tank Paletiyle Neoliberalizm," 785; Tanör, "Siyasal Tarih (1980–1995)," 37.

⁴⁵⁵ Saraçoğlu, "Tank Paletiyle Neoliberalizm," 789.

government has already been noted. His career had ranged from high positions within the bureaucracy to positions in the private sector such as roles in Sabancı Holding and ENKA Holding.⁴⁵⁶ He had also been to various departments of the World Bank as a private consultant in the wake of his departure from the SPO following the 12 March 1971 military intervention.⁴⁵⁷ He himself had also established three firms in the 1970s.⁴⁵⁸ He had served as the president of MESS, the powerful Employers Association of Metalware Industrialists, until 1979.⁴⁵⁹ He was also a member of TÜSİAD.⁴⁶⁰ Thus, he had good relations with both domestic and international capital groups.⁴⁶¹ He also had connections with almost all factions within the Turkish political right. He had wanted to stand as a candidate for Senate membership from the ranks of the Nationalist Action Party in 1975 but to no avail, and two years later he would be nominated by the National Salvation Party as its candidate for Grand National Assembly membership from Izmir but would not get elected.⁴⁶² He had already had good relations with the JP tradition as both an old friend of Süleyman

⁴⁵⁶ Metin İlhan, “Turgut Özal’ın Siyaset Öncesi Yılları (1950–1982),” *Akademik Araşturmalar ve Çalışmalar Dergisi* 66 (2015): 96–102.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid., 101.

⁴⁵⁸ Emin Çölaşan, *Turgut Nereden Koşuyor?*, 44th ed. (Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1989), 101–108.

⁴⁵⁹ İlhan, “Özal’ın Siyaset Öncesi Yılları,” 102.

⁴⁶⁰ Çölaşan, *Turgut Nereden Koşuyor?*, 118.

⁴⁶¹ Ahmet Vehbi Koç (1901–1996), the founder of Koç Holding, submitted a fifteen-point report to General Kenan Evren, the leader of the 1980 *coup d'état*, in their meeting on 12 October 1980—one month after the *coup d'état*. The eleventh point of that report advised the *coup d'état* leaders to keep Turgut Özal in office as the deputy prime minister in charge of the economy despite ongoing rumours about Özal’s Islamist past and that Özal was involved in corruption. *Hürriyet*, 20 October 1987.

⁴⁶² Çölaşan, *Turgut Nereden Koşuyor?*, 90, 94–100.

Demirel and a former high bureaucrat in the governments led by this party. Despite his own pragmatism and his wife, who had a very non-religious lifestyle, he also maintained his connections with the Islamic religious orders and communities.⁴⁶³ He had also been to the United States again and made some political contacts there before he established the MP on 20 May 1983.⁴⁶⁴ Therefore, with this background, Özal turned out to suit very well the post-1980 hegemonic strategy of the Turkish bourgeoisie, which included “putting an end to class-based politics”⁴⁶⁵ at its core under an authoritarian form of state armed with a conservative ideology. Thus, the NSC did not attempt to obstruct him in the aftermath of elections, although the generals in the NSC were rather in favour of a government that would be led by their former colleague Sunalp. Hence the Özal period began in Turkish politics with the approval of the cabinet list by President Kenan Evren on 13 December 1983,⁴⁶⁶ and

⁴⁶³ He had been part of an Islamist circle called the *takunyalılar* (clog-wearers) in the bureaucracy along with his brother Korkut Özal. It is reported that these two brothers were called the *takunyalı biraderler* (clog-wearing brothers). These pious bureaucrats were walking around with clogs on their feet since they performed their ritual ablutions before attending Islamic prayers. Although Korkut Özal was relatively more loyal, both of them were disciples of the İskender Paşa branch of the Nakşibendi order, led first by Mehmed Zahid Kotku and later by Mahmud Esad Coşan. Ibid., 43–44. See also Mehmet Ali Birand and Soner Yalçın, *The Özal: Bir Davanın Öyküsü*, 10th ed. (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2007), 39–40.

⁴⁶⁴ For the contacts made during the preparations for the establishment of the MP between 1982 and 1983, see Birand and Yalçın, *The Özal*, 139–82. Some argue that the US factor became influential in the NSC’s decision not to reject the establishment of the MP and Özal’s candidacy for premiership in the 1983 general elections, but Kenan Evren denies such allegations. Ibid., 151, 159–61. Yalım Eralp, a former senior diplomat, even notes that a *Wall Street Journal* article specifically mentioning Özal in 1983 “in effect said that if Özal were not permitted to run, the U.S. administration would be angry with the military,” and that “[a]t the [US] State Department I was told that the article was inspired by the U.S. administration.” Yalım Eralp, “An Insider’s View of Turkey’s Foreign Policy and Its American Connection,” in *The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need*, ed. Morton Abramowitz (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2003), 113.

⁴⁶⁵ Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 308; Yalman, “Crises,” 260; cf. Ozan, *12 Eylül’ e Giderken*, 165–66.

⁴⁶⁶ Tanör, “Siyasal Tarih (1980–1995),” 62.

it “ensured the continuation of neoliberal restructuring of the Turkish political economy.”⁴⁶⁷

It is also worth noting at this point that the “Turkish–Islamic Synthesis,” upon which the 1980 *coup d'état* was ideologically based, indeed served to deepen cleavages within the Turkish society over identity issues. The oppression and tortures towards the citizens of Kurdish descent following the *coup d'état* were already noted above. The subsequent bans on the articulation and expression of the Kurdish identity as well as the notorious ban on speaking Kurdish in the public sphere further aggravated the already existing Kurdish question to such an extent that an unprecedented number of citizens of Kurdish descent joined the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is officially designated as “terrorist organisation” by the Turkish domestic law and various international organisations, in this period. All these created an irreversible disintegration within the Turkish political left with the gradual but steady estrangement of the citizens and political activists of Kurdish descent from the Turkish left,⁴⁶⁸ whereas previously in the 1960s and 1970s the Kurdish question used to be addressed mostly within the united front of the Turkish left.⁴⁶⁹ Combined with the coercive practices towards the overall Turkish left in general, that disintegration within the Turkish left further paved the way for identity

⁴⁶⁷ Önder, “Integrating with the Global Market,” 51; Önder, *Economic Transformation of Turkey*, 18.

⁴⁶⁸ A history of the relationship between the Turkish left and the Kurds in Turkey is provided in Mesut Yeğen, *Müstakbel Türk’ten Sözde Vatandaşa: Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler*, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), 145–96.

⁴⁶⁹ The “Eastern Meetings” of the socialist Workers’ Party of Turkey (WPT) in the second half of the 1960s and the decisions taken in the fourth congress of the same party in 1970 acknowledging the “existence of the Kurdish people in Turkey and their problems” are the two most known examples. For the “Eastern Meetings,” see İsmail Beşikçi, *Doğu Mitinglerinin Analizi (1967)* (Ankara: Yurt Kitap–Yayın, 1992); Azat Zana Gündoğan, “The Kurdish Political Mobilization in the 1960s: The Case of ‘Eastern Meetings’,” (master’s thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2005). For the full-text of the decisions taken in the fourth congress of the WPT, see “Türkiye İşçi Partisi IV. Büyük Kongre Kararları,” in *Emek: Aylık Sosyalist Dergi* 7 (1970): 1–8.

politics to prevail over class-based politics through Islamisation and Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms.

The neo-Ottomanist aspiration in Turkish foreign policy in the post-1980 period would emerge out of this space for authoritarian conservatism offered by the economic and political restructuring in the early 1980s through a passive revolution. It would also serve as part of the hegemonic discourse in order to generate consent in domestic politics through a nationalistic discourse especially in the late 1980s when social dissent against neoliberal austerity policies began to grow. The reconfiguration of the international order in the same period also provided some new instances and locales in the ex-Ottoman and Turkic regions where the Özal leadership would test whether or not it had the capacity to realise its subimperialist aspiration in the form of neo-Ottomanism. This reconfiguration in the international order is examined in the following chapter.

3.6 Conclusion

The 1960s marks an attempt at bourgeois hegemony based upon industrial developmentalism through planning under a democratic form of Keynesian welfare state. However, it soon turned out that the prospects for such bourgeois hegemony were limited since class struggle began to accelerate as an ever-stronger working class got on the stage. Added to this was the general crisis of the US-led hegemony within the Western capitalist bloc which began as early as the late 1960s. Neoliberalism emerged as a new hegemonic project out of that crisis within the Western capitalist bloc, and it gradually marked the programmes put forward by the Turkish bourgeoisie in the second half of the 1970s following the unsuccessful attempts at sustaining the bourgeois hegemony in the early 1970s. The 24 January 1980 economic reform package declared by the JP government demonstrated the acceptance on the part of the decision-makers of the time of the need to change course in the accumulation strategy and of a new hegemonic project in order to maintain the hegemony of the Turkish bourgeoisie. What this entailed was an overall restructuring by dismantling

the Keynesian welfare state and displacing the organised working class from the historical bloc. Thus, the 1980 economic reform package could be considered as a new hegemonic project on the part of the Turkish bourgeoisie and the JP leadership of the period. Accordingly, the period between the 24th of January and the 12th of September in the year 1980 constituted an attempt at overcoming the crisis of hegemony of the late 1970s with a new hegemonic project and maintaining bourgeois hegemony through a neoliberal restructuring. Only under the iron fist of the military following the 12 September 1980s *coup d'état* did it become possible to create the extra-economic conditions for a passive revolution and a change in the accumulation strategy that could reconstitute bourgeois hegemony and a new neoliberal historical bloc formed around the bourgeoisie under the leadership of big industrial/financial capital, the armed forces later to be joined by the political leadership of the MP, and a group of economic technocrats. On the one hand, the economic aspect of this restructuring made Turkey's incorporation into world markets top priority for successive Turkish governments. The political aspect of this restructuring, on the other, made identity politics prevail under an authoritarian form of state that helped distorting the core of the social problem and diverted the primary political debates from class-based politics to an identity-based one. It is out of this economic and political basis that the subsequent aspiration for greater role for Turkey in its surrounding regions has arisen. Having analysed the reorganised domestic space, it is now apt to discuss the transformation in the international order at the end of the Cold War and the space thence emerged for regional aspirants.

CHAPTER 4

THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

4.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to examine the changes and the ultimate transformation in the international order which began with what some authors call the “Second Cold War” under US President Ronald Reagan and which subsequently ended up with the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Its first section analyses this period in terms of the transition from a period marked by the inter-systemic conflict between the capitalist Western and socialist Eastern blocs to a period marked rather by heteronymous intra-systemic conflicts and competitions. Its second section, on the other hand, elaborates the new possibilities thought to have been opened up for supposedly “regional powers” such as Turkey in this international political conjuncture in the early post-Cold War years. How such regional aspirants were accommodated in the new international order or, when that could not be accomplished, eliminated entirely will also be considered utilising the concept of “subimperialism.” In doing this, the chapter aims to better understand why some intellectuals and policy makers in the early 1990s saw great opportunities and a large space opened up for Turkey in neighbouring regions.

4.2 The International Order Reconfigured: From Inter-Systemic Rivalry to Intra-Systemic Heteronymous Competition

The developments that ultimately led to a transformation in the international order are of crucial importance in understanding Turkish foreign policy throughout

the 1980s and 1990s. The liberal international order led by the United States across the Western capitalist bloc finally found its way to expand into other regions of the world as a result of several key political developments such as the First Gulf War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. These major developments came after the earlier anti-Communist strategies pursued by the United States against the Soviet Union such as containment through the Islamic “Green Belt” in the late 1970s and renewed militancy in the 1980s. These strategies were part of the New Rightist onslaught within the Western capitalist bloc following the crisis of the post-war bourgeois hegemony based upon a Keynesian welfare state form that shook much of the Western countries throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as examined in the previous chapter. Caught between the already Herculean task of leading the establishment of a new bourgeois hegemony that would rest upon neoliberal policies within the Western capitalist bloc and the challenging new task of mastering transitions in those turbulent regions of the ex-Soviet space, the Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Middle East, the United States took regional aspirants such as Turkey into consideration in its projections and activities towards such regions.

By the year 1979, the Jimmy Carter administration had already given up the policy of *détente* towards the Soviet Union in the face of developments such as the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.⁴⁷⁰ The Carter administration adopted a new containment policy towards the Soviet Union known as the “Green Belt” strategy. The “Green Belt” strategy consisted of “[supporting] moderate and controllable Islam and [using]

⁴⁷⁰ Richard Saull, *The Cold War and After: Capitalism, Revolution and Superpower Politics* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 138–39. Perry Anderson dates it back to 1977 when Zbigniew Brzezinski, then at the helm of the National Security Council under the Carter administration, “declared the death of *détente*” following the setbacks of US imperialist possessions *vis-à-vis* the achievements of the Soviet Union and other revolutionary forces in Angola and Ethiopia. Perry Anderson, *American Foreign Policy and Its Thinkers* (London: Verso, 2015), EPUB e-book, chap. 6, pp. 97–98.

it against the USSR [Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics] and Communism.”⁴⁷¹

Another issue at stake in US foreign policy in this period under the Carter administration was the formation of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) that would secure US interests in the Persian Gulf. Under conditions of increased security concerns within the Western capitalist bloc in the face of developments in Iran and Afghanistan, the following Ronald Wilson Reagan administration launched a fierce campaign of renewed militancy against the Soviet Union from 1981 to 1989 within the framework of the “Reagan Doctrine” that ushered in what some authors call the “Second Cold War.”⁴⁷²

That second confrontational phase of the Cold War was marked by an increased military expenditure, which had already begun under the Carter administration but reached a 51 percent increase under the Reagan administration, and a focus on improving strategic missiles rather than conventional forces on the part of the United States.⁴⁷³ Furthermore, the Reagan administration announced the Strategic Defence Initiative in 1983, which was also dubbed “Star Wars” by some authors.⁴⁷⁴ The initiative at first foresaw a defensive shield on land and in space, and sparked off ambitious debates over a renewed competition in space, but proved to have been fraught with ambiguities.⁴⁷⁵ Yet it served to meet the domestic pressure

⁴⁷¹ İlhan Uzgel, “Relations with the USA and NATO,” in *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919–2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*, ed. Baskın Oran and trans. Mustafa Akşin (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2010), 540.

⁴⁷² For instance, see Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War*, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 1986), 11–19, 22, 112–18.

⁴⁷³ Halliday, *Second Cold War*, 235.

⁴⁷⁴ For instance, see E. P. Thompson and Ben Thompson, eds., *Star Wars: Self Destruct Incorporated* (London: The Merlin Press, 1985).

⁴⁷⁵ Halliday, *Second Cold War*, 236–37.

from the US arms industry for “increased military expenditures and contracts running well into the next century,” and it also forced the Soviet Union to deploy more “resources into a new round of the arms race” at the expense of its domestic social promises.⁴⁷⁶ Moreover, it provided the United States with “a convenient means for re-asserting [its] hegemony over the NATO alliance” and gave “a political advantage” in domestic debates over defence and security.⁴⁷⁷ It also provided fresh economic impetus under conditions of deteriorating material reason for the post-war US-led hegemony since the early 1970s. It must not be forgotten that the coercive apparatus of US nuclear imperialism and the economic expansion to which it also contributed as a result of the arms race served as the material reason of the post-war US-led hegemony throughout the Cold War.⁴⁷⁸

Turkey was among the countries that resolved to join this anti-Communist campaign led by the United States in the 1980s—and it did so not only under military rule but also under the subsequent civilian government led by Turgut Özal.⁴⁷⁹ These developments, indeed, represented a precursor to the post-Cold War conflicts which would have relatively more “heteronymous” characteristics, a sharp contrast to Cold War conflicts in which the parties used to be, by and large, obvious.⁴⁸⁰ From 1979 onwards, the United States “confronted a different kind of political and ideological enemy” in the Middle East—an anti-Communist but also anti-Western form of

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid., 237.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid., 238.

⁴⁷⁸ Adrian Budd, “Gramsci’s Marxism and International Relations,” *International Socialism* 114 (2007), accessed 5 February 2019, <http://isj.org.uk/gramscis-marxism-and-international-relations/>.

⁴⁷⁹ Uzgel, “Relations with the USA and NATO,” 548.

⁴⁸⁰ Saull, *Cold War and After*, 145.

Islamism.⁴⁸¹ Confronting, on the one hand, a Shi'ite Islamic challenge in the Middle East, and cultivating Sunni-based Islamist groups through such intermediaries as the Gulf monarchies on the other hand, all these developments created an ambivalence in US foreign policy towards the region.⁴⁸²

The US resort to militarism and confrontation in the 1980s was not only aimed at the Soviet Union and the revolutionary dynamics of the Cold War, but also at “[consolidating] its leadership of the capitalist world” yet again, just “as it had done in the early period after 1945 and as it had been undermined during the 1970s.”⁴⁸³ This time, its leadership would be asserted through a new hegemonic project which could be roughly termed neoliberal globalisation. Although the *détente* made the Soviet rulers believe that they finally achieved “recognition by Washington of political parity as a superpower of equal standing at large”⁴⁸⁴ as a direct result of the supposed strategic nuclear parity between the two superpowers, the late 1970s and early 1980s indeed demonstrated that there were insurmountable limits, not least economic ones, “to what the USSR was able to do in support of international revolution.”⁴⁸⁵ Besides the fact that the Soviet Union was far from being able to fund “another Cuba,” the heteronymous character of revolutionary change, which was most evident in the case of Iran, posed fresh challenges to such prospective Soviet

⁴⁸¹ Ibid., 146.

⁴⁸² Ibid., 146–47.

⁴⁸³ Ibid., 153.

⁴⁸⁴ Anderson, *American Foreign Policy*, chap. 6, p. 101.

⁴⁸⁵ Saull, *Cold War and After*, 153. By the 1980s, “[t]he GNP and per capita income of the USSR were half those of the US, and labour productivity perhaps 40 per cent. Central to that difference was a still larger one, in reverse. In the much richer American economy, military expenditures accounted for an average of some 6–7 per cent of GDP from the sixties onwards; in the Soviet economy, the figure was over double that—15–16 per cent.” Anderson, *American Foreign Policy*, chap. 6, pp. 102–103.

initiatives.⁴⁸⁶ In any case, from 1979 onwards, it took no longer than a decade for the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe to begin to collapse. Ultimately the Soviet Union itself disintegrated in 1991 for reasons that go beyond the scope of this thesis.⁴⁸⁷ These all meant a great transformation in the international order.

⁴⁸⁶ Saull, *Cold War and After*, 153–54.

⁴⁸⁷ Many authors, including those on the left, emphasise the economic competition between the two social systems—namely, capitalism and socialism—and the ultimate Soviet incompetence and defeat in that competition. Eric Hobsbawm and Perry Anderson, to mention but a few, are among these authors who emphasise the economic factors behind the ultimate failure of the Soviet Union. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991* (London: Abacus, 1995), 471–75; Anderson, *American Foreign Policy*, chap. 6, pp. 102–103.

Few others focused on ideological degeneration within the ruling Soviet elite. Yalçın Küçük, a Turkish Sovietologist, for instance, criticises the Soviet elite for turning their backs on pure socialist theory by inserting the peasantry and the oppressed Third World peoples into its revolutionary policies as early as 1920. This was, according to him, the beginning of a gradual moving away from the idea that the working class had a transformative role over the society. The conjunctural emphases on “peace” and “democracy” during the Second World War became complementary to this already ongoing process. In search of a compromise with the capitalist world, the Soviet Union also at times tried to demonstrate that it did not have a revisionist agenda with respect to the Third World. This was imperative according to the Soviet elite in the sense that revolutions *per se* did not resolve crises in those Third World countries, as was the case with Chile and Nicaragua in the absence of an appropriate international economic order. At one point in the heydays of the strategic nuclear “balance of terror,” this Soviet caution found another source of legitimacy. This time it was the threat of nuclear extermination against the whole of human civilisation that deterred the Soviet elite from pursuing revisionist international policies and that further legitimised jettisoning phrases such as “world revolution” from the official lexicon of Soviet Marxism. These all joined in with a fetishisation of work as a result of the industrial catch-up strategies and the lack of an adequate conception of leisure. Hence, Küçük concludes that the Soviet experience resulted in producing what was being produced in capitalist economies, failing to carry on a lasting struggle against capitalist individualism due to the persistence of labour theory of value in production, and finally failing to develop a theory and practice of leisure under socialism. Thus socialism lost its attractiveness as an alternative lifestyle among new generations in the face of consumeering and entertainment of the Western capitalism alongside its faithless ruling elite. Yalçın Küçük, *Sovyetler Birliği’nde Sosyalizmin Çözülmüşü* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1991), 471–590. For a similar point of view, see also Kemal Okuyan, *Sovyetler Birliği'nin Çözülmüşü Üzerine Anti-Tezler*, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: Yazılıma, 2014).

For a survey of approaches to the end of the Cold War in general, and an account of the disintegration of the Soviet Union in particular, see Michael J. Hogan, ed., *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Adam Roberts, “An ‘Incredibly Swift Transition’: Reflections on the End of the Cold War,” in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, vol. III, *Endings*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 513–34; Alex Pravda, “The Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1990–1991,” in *The Cambridge*

As Richard Saull also states, “[t]he socioeconomic and ideological challenge to capitalism and the capitalist great powers that had originated in 1917,” as well as “the geopolitical and strategic arrangements that had emerged after 1945”⁴⁸⁸ finally came to an end. The US leadership became free from any geopolitical checks, and the liberal international order within the Western capitalist bloc gained new spaces to expand into through the Washington Consensus. Thus, the neoliberal hegemony already constituted within the Western capitalist bloc in the early 1980s under the auspices of the US leadership now had an opportunity to operate at the global level. Although it was far from having clear lines and definitions, the debates and rhetoric over a “New World Order” in the early 1990s represented a new global hegemonic project that proposed neoliberal economic globalisation as its material base and a discourse over liberal democracy and human rights as its ideological superstructure. The imposition of neoliberal economic globalisation through the “structural adjustment policies” of the IMF and the World Bank and the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 and the subsequent memberships of former Communist countries such as China and Russia in that organisation (in 2001 and 2012, respectively) suggest that that project was successful, at least in the economic sphere. However, it soon turned out that the neoliberal transition in much of the world was not taking place as straightforwardly as had been imagined.

Indeed, Saull also argues that it would rather be more appropriate to speak of multiple “endings” regarding the Cold War throughout the world, “shifting in time and space, and most importantly, *in form*.⁴⁸⁹ Whereas a number of Communist states

History of the Cold War, vol. III, *Endings*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 356–77.

⁴⁸⁸ Saull, *Cold War and After*, 180.

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid., 181. Emphasis in the original.

in Eastern Europe had transitions to liberal democracy and capitalism through liberal civil society, in other locales, such as the Middle East,

the political challenge from communist and revolutionary forces was defeated not by the triumph of liberal civil society but rather the ascendancy of highly illiberal, reactionary social and political movements.⁴⁹⁰

Thus, these were indeed “paradoxical endings” in the sense that, the victory against the challenges from the left in many locales “rested on the strengthening of political forces” such as radical populists, far-right movements and Islamic fundamentalists.⁴⁹¹ These political forces were “committed to transforming their societies in a direction at odds . . . with existing regimes,” but they were indeed also at odds “with the [United States] and its commitment to promoting the secular universalisms of human rights, liberal democracy and capitalist markets.”⁴⁹² These reactionary forms of resistance and anti-imperialism brought about new forms of conflicts and crises, within which class-based politics could barely find a place and social relations were altered in favour of market forces to such an extent that the neoliberal hegemony could be entrenched. In addition to this contradictory character of the neoliberal hegemony in the post-Cold War era in much of the non-Western world, the strengthening of market forces at the expense of “collective-public authority vested in democratic institutions” in the Western world created widened socioeconomic inequalities that ultimately benefited populist and far-right political movements in the face of fragmented and/or delegitimised leftist movements in the West.⁴⁹³

Overall, the end of the Cold War signifies a transition from a bipolar international order marked with the inter-systemic conflict between two antagonistic

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid., 182.

⁴⁹² Ibid.

⁴⁹³ Ibid., 184.

social systems—capitalism and socialism—to a unipolar one within which neoliberal globalisation became the main hegemonic programme. The neoliberal historical bloc that emerged as a result is led by the United States, and the capitalist social relations of production, accumulation and reproduction on a worldwide scale constitutes its material base, whereas the US state apparatus serves as the imperialist machinery within that historical bloc. However, this process was far from straightforward. The uneven character of capitalist development fuelled divisions and dissent in peripheral regions of the world, whereas the collective public aspect of democratic institutions in core countries became eroded in the face of ever-expanding market forces. In the absence of a formidable progressive alternative, illiberal and reactionary social forces began to gain the upper hand in the periphery, whereas in the core, right-wing populist movements that ranged from xenophobia to outright racism began to gain greater influence by the day. Under conditions of unipolarity in the early post-Cold War years, this led to debates over how to constitute and maintain hegemony at the international level given the highly fragile circumstances created by the uneven character of capitalist development. One key question within those debates was whether or not regionalisation or regional powers could contribute to hegemony at the international level. Therefore, it is now appropriate to discuss the supposed role of regional powers as contributors to hegemony at the international level.

4.3 The Space Emerged for Regional Aspirants in the Early 1990s

With unstable and contradictory features in comparison with the relatively more stable Cold War international politics, the post-Cold War international politics, combined with domestic opposition within the United States that put a strain on its ability to project its power abroad, have in practice, “tended to reduce the ability of the [United States] to direct and determine political outcomes across the world.”⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid., 201.

US budget deficits had long been an issue, but these could have been financed by other capitalist economies such as West Germany and Japan under the peculiar conditions of the Cold War.⁴⁹⁵ However, as early as the 1980s, it became much more apparent that “control of the world order slipped beyond the capacity of any single state and perhaps even any group of states.”⁴⁹⁶ The result was the promotion of political spaces for local and regional actors instead of direct US interventions alongside a process called “regionalisation” in international politics concurrent with “globalisation.”⁴⁹⁷

The post-Cold War international order failed “to address the many acute problems which the global political economy is creating,”⁴⁹⁸ bringing about the danger of a crisis of legitimacy due to the difficulties in generating the active consent of the powerless masses all over the world. Regionalism was in part an answer to this situation as “a number of regional hegemonies” were thought to have the potential to

⁴⁹⁵ Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 328–36.

⁴⁹⁶ Anthony Payne and Andrew Gamble, “Introduction: The Political Economy of Regionalism and World Order,” in *Regionalism and World Order*, ed. Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 15.

⁴⁹⁷ It is worth noting here that “regionalisation” in international politics does not run counter to globalisation. “In practice, regionalism as a set of state projects intersects with globalisation. . . . Many observers see the move towards regionalism at the end of the 1980s and in the 1990s as a step towards globalism rather than as an alternative to it.” Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne, “Conclusion: The New Regionalism,” in *Regionalism and World Order*, ed. Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 250–51. “[M]any of the debates in the recent literature surrounding the emergence of regionalism has suggested that regional arrangement have often been employed, both to regulate the processes of the global economy and to co-ordinate strategic global objectives. . . . Coinciding with the birth of the neoliberal doctrine, new regionalism was to gain greater significance by the end of the Cold War as states looked to forge partnerships in an attempt to regulate the wider processes of globalization that were arising through the rapidly changing global economy.” Owen Worth, *Rethinking Hegemony* (London: Palgrave, 2015), 130–31. See also Andrew Hurrell, “One World? Many Worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of International Society,” *International Affairs* 83:1 (2007): 127–46.

⁴⁹⁸ Gamble and Payne, “New Regionalism,” 261.

be more successful under conditions that “a global hegemony organised around [only] one state [was] no longer possible.”⁴⁹⁹ Regional aspirants would use their economic dominance in their own regions to set new political and security frameworks as well as economic institutions which would supposedly lead to prosperity and development in those regions.⁵⁰⁰ As already noted, this was anything but incompatible with the US-led hegemonic project of neoliberal globalism as long as such regionalist projects embrace open regionalism since, thereby, it would still be possible to pursue policies through such platforms as the Group of Twenty (G20)⁵⁰¹ to manage the global economy.⁵⁰² Although things did not turn out to be as they were supposed to have been, it is certain that the United States increasingly sought to rest upon local and regional actors in its international projections and that these actors, in turn, sought to utilise this new situation by improving their status within the hierarchical order of international politics.

İlhan Uzgel argues that the restructuring of global capitalism which began in the 1990s and the concomitant shift in global geopolitics allowed the emergence of new powers, while at the same time made them “more effective and initiative taking

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁰¹ The G20 was founded in 1999 in order to promote international financial stability. Its current members are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. It has an expanded agenda since 2008, and served as a platform to discuss a range of global issues, but the international financial stability being the main agenda. Top representatives of its members meet annually. It was modelled on the earlier platforms such as the Group of Seven (G7) which consists of the seven leading core economies of the world and which was later transformed into the Group of Eight (G8) with the post-Soviet Russia being fully admitted in 1997. Russia was suspended from the group following its annexation of Crimea in 2014 as a result of the conflict it had with Ukraine, but the non-G7 members of the G20 resisted to maintain Russia within the G20.

⁵⁰² Gamble and Payne, “New Regionalism,” 261. “Open regionalism means that policy is directed towards the elimination of obstacles to trade within a region, while at the same time doing nothing to raise external tariff barriers to the rest of the world.” Ibid., 251.

actors in global politics.”⁵⁰³ Although it was not earlier than the 2000s that those “emerging powers” would enjoy greater autonomy in their own policies and were subsequently termed BRIC or BRICS,⁵⁰⁴ the United States had already begun to “[urge] its regional allies to assume more responsibility, to engage in regional security issues and to deepen their geopolitical cooperation.”⁵⁰⁵ Accordingly, many American scholars also gradually began to conceptualise the changing position of the United States in global politics under a common theme that it “no longer [had] the capacity to shape world affairs alone.”⁵⁰⁶

It was under these conditions that Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy brought forward the idea of “pivotal states” in an article published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1996.⁵⁰⁷ “The challenges [to US security] are more diffuse and numerous,” assert the authors, arguing that “a single overarching framework may be inappropriate for

⁵⁰³ İlhan Uzgel, “Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP Government: The Failed Hegemony of a Pivotal State,” in “Turkey: the Politics of National Conservatism,” ed. İlker Ataç and Joachim Becker, special issue, *Journal für Entwicklungspolitik* XXXII:1/2 (2016): 162.

⁵⁰⁴ “The acronym BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa—has significantly evolved in the last decade from being the most popular buzz word in international politics to that of becoming a significant platform of emerging economies. From just being an acronym coined by Jim O’ Neil [then-chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management] (initially BRIC) in 2001 vested with an economic weight, the idea gradually took shape of a functional mechanism with the potential of a political anchorage. . . . The gravity of the idea lies in its components, as BRICS account for more than 40 percent of the global population, nearly 30 percent of its landmass and a share of world GDP that increased from 16 percent in 2000 to nearly 25 percent in 2010. The crux lies in their emerging economies, which together act as a key pillar of strength against the financial ups and downs. What makes BRICS important is its non-western operational framework and outlook. BRICS has gradually emerged as a significant alternative to the west-dominated Bretton Woods institutions of World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF).” Amrita Jash, “OPINION | BRICS - More Than an ‘Acronym’,” *IndraStra Global* 2:10 (2016): 41, <http://www.indrastra.com/2016/10/OPINION-BRICS-More-than-Acronym-002-10-2016-0041.html>.

⁵⁰⁵ Uzgel, “The Failed Hegemony,” 162.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid., 163.

⁵⁰⁷ Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy, “Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs* 75:1 (1996): 33–51.

understanding today's disorderly and decentralized world.”⁵⁰⁸ Hence the United States must “focus its efforts on a small number of countries whose fate is uncertain and whose future will profoundly affect their surrounding regions.”⁵⁰⁹ These countries that belong to the “developing world” are the “pivotal states.”⁵¹⁰ The United States was the one that had the most to lose in the post-Cold War international order, and being bounded by its limited capacities and domestic political concerns, it would thus be beneficial for it to engage in a burden-sharing with these countries in maintaining security in their surrounding regions.⁵¹¹ It should be noted here that the American theoreticians of the idea of “pivotal states” ranked Turkey among those states that should be supported by the United States in order to sustain the US-led hegemony in the underdeveloped regions of the world.⁵¹² The following countries are considered “pivotal states” by the authors: “Mexico and Brazil; Algeria, Egypt, and South Africa; Turkey; India and Pakistan; and Indonesia.”⁵¹³

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid., 33.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁵¹⁰ “According to which criteria should the pivotal states be selected? A large population and an important geographical location are two requirements. Economic potential is also critical, as recognized by the U.S. Commerce Department’s recent identification of the ‘big emerging markets’ that offer the most promise to American business. Physical size is a necessary but not sufficient condition: Zaire comprises an extensive tract, but its fate is not vital to the United States. What really defines a pivotal states [sic] is its capacity to affect regional and international stability. A pivotal state is so important regionally that its collapse would spell transboundary mayhem: migration, communal violence, pollution, disease, and so on. A pivotal state’s steady economic progress and stability, on the other hand, would bolster its region’s economic vitality and political soundness and benefit American trade and investment.” Ibid., 37.

⁵¹¹ Ibid., 35.

⁵¹² Ibid., 37.

⁵¹³ Ibid.

The authors later in 1999 expanded their “pivotal states” thesis into an edited volume⁵¹⁴ following a series of round tables and panels both in US think tanks as influential as the Council on Foreign Relations and the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, and in key US institutions such as the Department of State and the Congress.⁵¹⁵ The editors acknowledge their search for a “coherent post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy,” and suggest a “strategy of selectivity and setting priorities regarding the developing world.”⁵¹⁶ They set out the reasons of their search as the already existing “wariness” on the part of the American public and the Congress with respect to “overseas commitments” of the United States and the disillusionment caused by the end of the Cold War since it did not bring about “the hoped-for new world order.”⁵¹⁷ For the editors, the United States remains the single super power in the new post-Cold War period, but there are also great powers along with the developing world. The developing world, according to the editors, include three main groups: “client states,” “rogue states” and “emerging states.”⁵¹⁸ To use their own words, they “take it for granted that the U.S. government will always give top priority to its Great-Power relationships with Europe, Russia, Japan, and China.”⁵¹⁹ In a

⁵¹⁴ Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy, eds., *The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999).

⁵¹⁵ Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy, acknowledgments in *The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World*, ed. Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), xiii–xiv.

⁵¹⁶ Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy, introduction to *The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World*, ed. Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 1.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid.

⁵¹⁸ Ibid., 2.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid.

similar vein, the US government will also be “attentive to special client states such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and South Korea,” as well as “a few ‘rogue’ states such as North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Libya, which threaten those special clients.”⁵²⁰ The question, therefore, arises as to what kind of strategy the United States should pursue “toward the remaining 130 or 140 countries of the world.”⁵²¹

Stating that “some of these states are already important players in their regions and have the potential to become Great Powers themselves during the century ahead,” the editors also argue that such states are “more important to U.S. national interests than others, and this importance should earn them the consideration of American strategists.”⁵²² Contrary to expectations that the United States would “police the world,” the editors argue that such expectations would prove false for two reasons: “it hasn’t the political will,” and “(for all its strengths) it lacks the resources.”⁵²³ Therefore, a focus on such “pivotal states” would contribute to “protecting US national interests,” and would also “consider new security issues” such as the environment and international migration since the aforementioned nine “pivotal states” alone constitute “*one-third* of the earth’s population.”⁵²⁴ The editors also warn that their list of “pivotal states,” which consisted of nine states, must not be fixated on, and they acknowledge that “the list could change” in the future.⁵²⁵

⁵²⁰ Ibid.

⁵²¹ Ibid.

⁵²² Ibid.

⁵²³ Ibid., 4.

⁵²⁴ Ibid., 5, 7. Emphasis in the original.

⁵²⁵ Ibid., 8.

Having defined a “pivotal state” as “a key country whose future may not only determine the success or failure of its region but also significantly affect international stability,”⁵²⁶ the editors express the overall possible benefits of such an approach in three respects. “[C]oncentrating limited American foreign-policy attention and resources to their greatest, salutary effect on U.S. interests,” is the first among those, while possible “spillover effects on neighboring states” as a result of a “well-developed policy toward a pivotal state” constitute the second one.⁵²⁷ Finally, such an approach, the editors argue, “might persuade” regional actors to “play constructive roles in international issues,” or “dissuade them from acting as ‘spoilers’ who might block international accords on the environment or intellectual property rights.”⁵²⁸

A similar conceptual toolbox is employed by another American political scientist, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who also served as counselor to President Lyndon B. Johnson from 1966 to 1968 and was President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor from 1977 to 1981.⁵²⁹ Focusing on Eurasia, which he considers “the globe’s most important playing field . . . [on which] a potential rival to America might at some point arise,” he sets out several preconditions in order to formulate an “American geostrategy for the long-term management of America’s Eurasian geopolitical interests.”⁵³⁰ First among them is “to identify the geostrategically dynamic Eurasian

⁵²⁶ Ibid., 9.

⁵²⁷ Ibid., 8.

⁵²⁸ Ibid.

⁵²⁹ Daniel Lewis, “Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to Jimmy Carter, Dies at 89,” *The New York Times*, 26 May 2017, accessed 14 February 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/26/us/zbigniew-brzezinski-dead-national-security-adviser-to-carter.html>.

⁵³⁰ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (London: Basic Books, 1997), 39.

states that have the power to cause a potentially important shift in the international distribution of power,” while another is “to decipher the central external goals of their respective political elites and the likely consequences of their seeking to attain them.”⁵³¹ Related to these, another precondition set out by the author is “to pinpoint the geopolitically critical Eurasian states,” because their “location and/or existence have catalytic effects either on the more active geostrategic players or on regional conditions.”⁵³² He also sums up the “grand imperatives of imperial geostrategy” in three respects: “to prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together.”⁵³³ From such a viewpoint, he employs two key concepts in order to identify the “geostrategically dynamic Eurasian states”: “geostrategic players” and “geopolitical pivots.”⁵³⁴ He defines “geostrategic players” as

the states that have the capacity and the national will to exercise power or influence beyond their borders in order to alter—to a degree that affects America’s interests—the existing geopolitical state of affairs.⁵³⁵

“Geopolitical pivots,” on the other hand, are

the states whose importance is derived not from their power and motivation but rather from their sensitive location and from the consequences of their potentially vulnerable condition for the behavior of geostrategic players.⁵³⁶

For Brzezinski, “geostrategic players” might have aspirations towards “regional domination” or “global standing” that go far beyond their capacities, and

⁵³¹ Ibid.

⁵³² Ibid.

⁵³³ Ibid., 40.

⁵³⁴ Ibid., 40–41.

⁵³⁵ Ibid., 40.

⁵³⁶ Ibid., 41.

their relationships with the United States have an ambivalent character since these states at times collude with it, whereas they might also enter into conflicts with it.⁵³⁷ “Geopolitical pivots,” on the other hand, are most often “determined by their geography, which in some cases gives them a special role either in defining access to important areas or in denying resources to a significant player.”⁵³⁸ It is also the case, “a geopolitical pivot may act as a defensive shield for a vital state or even a region,” while it is also sometimes the case that “the very existence of a geopolitical pivot can be said to have very significant political and cultural consequences for a more active neighboring geostrategic player.”⁵³⁹ As for “geostrategic players,” according to Brzezinski, “France, Germany, Russia, China, and India are major and active players, whereas Great Britain, Japan, and Indonesia, while admittedly very important countries, do not so qualify.”⁵⁴⁰ “Ukraine, Azerbaijan, South Korea, Turkey, and Iran,” on the other hand, “play the role of critically important geopolitical pivots.”⁵⁴¹ However, he also notes that “both Turkey and Iran are to some extent—within their more limited capabilities—also geostrategically active.”⁵⁴²

As it might have been clear, what both Chase, Hill and Kennedy, on the one hand, and Brzezinski on the other, bring forward could be considered an attempt at formulating a compact policy for the United States in the new post-Cold War period with a view to generating and maintaining consent for the US-led international order

⁵³⁷ Ibid., 40–41.

⁵³⁸ Ibid., 41.

⁵³⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁴¹ Ibid.

⁵⁴² Ibid.

by relying upon and supporting a limited number of regional powers called “pivotal states” or “geopolitical pivots.” This is directly related to the fact that “a single global hegemonic project is untenable” in an “increasing world of globalization.”⁵⁴³ Thus, “a number of regional hegemonies”⁵⁴⁴ were thought likely to be more successful than a single global hegemony or trying to rely upon an unlimited number of countries under conditions of heteronymous but *intra-systemic* crises and conflicts (i.e. crises and conflicts that occur *within* capitalism as the new worldwide all-encompassing social relations of production, accumulation and reproduction). Accordingly, from a historical materialist point of view, countries that are conceptualised as “pivotal states” or “geopolitical pivots” could be considered as *surrogate hegemons*⁵⁴⁵ or *subimperialist powers*. They could be considered as surrogate hegemons⁵⁴⁶ in the sense that they are expected to carry out at regional levels the hegemonic leadership

⁵⁴³ Worth, *Rethinking Hegemony*, 148. See also Payne and Gamble, “Political Economy of Regionalism,” 15; Gamble and Payne, “New Regionalism,” 261; Saull, *Cold War and After*, 201.

⁵⁴⁴ Gamble and Payne, “New Regionalism,” 261.

⁵⁴⁵ The concept of a “surrogate hegemon” is also used by Ewa Thompson, but in a completely different manner. She argues that the Western Europe constituted a form of “surrogate hegemon” for the Polish elites through the Western European “intellectual prowess” since, “[e]ven though the Soviets wielded power over Poland, they were not respected there.” Ewa Thompson, “The Surrogate Hegemon in Polish Postcolonial Discourse,” accessed 15 February 2019, <http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~ethomp/The%20Surrogate%20Hegemon.pdf>, 4. See also Ewa Thompson, “Whose Discourse?: Telling the Story in Post-Communist Poland,” *The Other Shore: Slavic and East European Culture—Abroad, Past and Present* 1:1 (2010): 1–15, accessed 15 February 2019, <http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~ethomp/THE%20OTHER%20SHORE,%20vol.1.pdf>.

⁵⁴⁶ Apart from Ewa Thompson, who was referred to in the previous footnote, the term “surrogate” appears in Daniel Zirker’s article on the Brazilian subimperialism in the 1980s in a more relevant manner. He argues that the Brazilian subimperialism “increasingly seemed to imply . . . a limited fluctuation between two contrasting and related impulses or modes—a relative (and relatively mature or developed) autonomy in the direct interests of immediate and long-term Brazilian policy objectives and a closer adherence to something like the *barganha leal* [a bargain with the United States, but a loyal one to it, on the part of Brazil], a mode that I will call the *surrogate*.” Daniel Zirker, “Brazilian Foreign Policy and Subimperialism during the Political Transition of the 1980s: A Review and Reapplication of Marini’s Theory,” *Latin American Perspectives* 21:1 (1994): 121–22. Emphasis in the original.

task of the leading social formation (i.e. the United States in our age). They could also be considered as subimperialist powers in the sense that they are also expected to use coercive instruments, if necessary, along with consensual ones in generating and maintaining consent and stability at regional levels, and thereby, expected to contribute to hegemony at the international level. The same logic could be applied to lower levels of analysis with concepts developed such as “subregionalism” and “microregionalism.”⁵⁴⁷

Overall, even critical neo-Gramscian authors argue that “a palpable reintroduction of a period when regional hegemons have the freedom to manoeuvre” is at stake alongside “a clear shift away from the days of a struggle for global power.”⁵⁴⁸ This “freedom of manoeuvre,” however, is not without constraints, and enjoyed within the confines of hegemony at the international level. Glenn Hook and Ian Kearns, for instance, argue that a series of factors such as “[t]he structural power of internationally mobile capital,” “the ideological ascendancy of neo-liberalism,” and “the demands for structural adjustment made by the Bretton Woods institutions” create “very powerful series of pressures” on states.⁵⁴⁹ The commitment of much of the regionalist and subregionalist projects throughout the world to “an export-led development strategy, open regionalism, and to at least a lip-service commitment to liberal democratic forms of politics” could only be explained with reference to the

⁵⁴⁷ Following Andrew Gamble and Anthony Pane’s neo-Gramscian approach to regionalism and world order, Glen Hook and Ian Kearns use the term “subregionalism” in order to “draw attention to the subregionalist projects promoted by the weaker states in the global political economy which are seeking to strengthen cooperation in a more circumscribed space than at the regional level.” “Microregionalism,” on the other hand, refers to the projects promoted by “national and subnational actors” at an even lower level of analysis. Glenn Hook and Ian Kearns, “Introduction: The Political Economy of Subregionalism and World Order,” in *Subregionalism and World Order*, ed. Glenn Hook and Ian Kearns (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 6. See also Shaun Breslin and Glenn D. Hook, eds., *Microregionalism and World Order* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

⁵⁴⁸ Glenn Hook and Ian Kearns, “Conclusion,” in *Subregionalism and World Order*, ed. Glenn Hook and Ian Kearns (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 254.

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid., 255.

hegemonic project carried out at the international level.⁵⁵⁰ It becomes, therefore, “increasingly difficult to pursue any separate national economic development strategies.”⁵⁵¹ Yet, for domestic elites and decision-makers, such regionalist or subregionalist projects might still look attractive since such projects could also serve to “reinforce their domestic positions given the growing pressures for change which increasingly they are forced to face.”⁵⁵² As such, the very real existence of external constraints also prove to be useful for those domestic elites and decision-makers since they can also “deliberately limit potential domestic opposition” by “exaggerating the extent to which there is no room for manoeuvre” due to those external constraints.⁵⁵³ Hence subimperialist hegemonic projects arise at regional levels aiming at surrogate hegemonies on behalf of the leading imperialist state. However, the exercise of such projects, if possible, is far from straightforward, but is rather full of contradictions manifest in the two “contrasting and related impulses or modes” to subimperialism—“surrogacy” or “subservience” on the one hand, and “relative autonomy” on the other.⁵⁵⁴ Thus, it is now appropriate to look into the concept of subimperialism and its contradictory aspects more closely.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵⁵² Ibid., 256.

⁵⁵³ Ibid., 257.

⁵⁵⁴ Zirker, “Brazilian Foreign Policy,” 122.

4.3.1 Subimperialism: The Unrequited Love of Regional Aspirants

Subimperialism is an undertheorised and highly contested concept. The concept is first employed by Ruy Mauro Marini (1932–1997)—a Brazilian Marxist economist and sociologist as well as a journalist and socialist political activist.⁵⁵⁵ Marini employed the concept first in an article⁵⁵⁶ on the novel form of Brazil's relations with the US imperialism in the 1960s published in *Monthly Review* in 1965—just one year after the *coup d'état* in Brazil. Following the classical Marxist theories of imperialism which emphasise export of capital and the role of finance capital born as a result of the merger between industrial and financial capital,⁵⁵⁷ Marini argues that export of capital is “one of the most characteristic features of contemporary capitalism.”⁵⁵⁸ He also points out the “integrationist tendency of world capitalism,” albeit with acknowledging that “such a tendency [develops] amidst contradictions and conflicts,” following the points made by Vladimir Lenin against Karl Kautsky’s theory of “ultra-imperialism.”⁵⁵⁹ He describes that tendency with the concept of “antagonistic cooperation” developed by Ernst Talheimer, a German Marxist, in the 1920s.⁵⁶⁰ Stating that “the expansion of world capitalism and the

⁵⁵⁵ For his autobiography in Spanish, see Ruy Mauro Marini, “Memoria,” accessed 28 February 2019, http://www.marini-escritos.unam.mx/002_memoria_marini_esp.html.

⁵⁵⁶ Ruy Mauro Marini, “Brazilian ‘Interdependence’ and Imperialist Integration,” *Monthly Review* 17:7 (1965): 10–23, 26–29.

⁵⁵⁷ For classical Marxist theories of imperialism, see Ray Kiely, *Rethinking Imperialism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 55–67.

⁵⁵⁸ Marini, “Brazilian ‘Interdependence’,” 11.

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid., 12.

intensification of the monopolistic process” strengthened that integrationist tendency at an unprecedented level as it is also manifest in “the intensification of the export of capital,” he argues that the tensions which arise among the core countries can no more reach to a level of “open hostilities” as they could have done so in the past, but must rather “remain within the framework of antagonistic cooperation.”⁵⁶¹ According to him, a similar form of “antagonistic cooperation” was discernible in the relationship between the Brazilian capitalist development and its integration with the US imperialism.

Brazilian policy makers often put forward such concepts as “continental interdependence” and “loyal bargain” (*barganha leal*) in order to describe the new role they ascribed to Brazil in the southern hemisphere in general and in the South Atlantic in particular.⁵⁶² Through such concepts, they defended a position within which they would “consciously accept the mission of associating [themselves] with the policy of the United States in the South Atlantic,” whereas the United States would, in turn, recognise that “the quasi-monopoly of rule in that area should be exercised by Brazil exclusively.”⁵⁶³ Marini rejects the arguments that such efforts on the part of Brazilian policy makers were simple examples of Brazilian “submission to Washington” or a “definitive conversion of Brazil into a colony of the United States.”⁵⁶⁴ In their stead, “[w]hat we have,” he argues, “is the evolution of the Brazilian bourgeoisie toward the *conscious acceptance* of its integration with North

⁵⁶¹ Ibid.

⁵⁶² Ibid., 19–20.

⁵⁶³ Ibid., 20.

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid., 21.

American imperialism.”⁵⁶⁵ This evolution, he continues to argue, “result[s] from the very logic of the economic and political dynamics of Brazil.”⁵⁶⁶ Brazilian policy makers of the period had “the intention of becoming the center from which imperialist expansion in Latin America will radiate.”⁵⁶⁷ The novelty here lies in the fact that Brazilian policy makers were not “passively accepting North American power,” but were rather “*collaborating actively* with imperialist expansion, assuming in this expansion the position of a key nation.”⁵⁶⁸ Allied with domestic big landowners called the “latifundists” and integrated with imperialism, the Brazilian bourgeoisie, Marini argues, had “no alternative but to attempt foreign expansion.”⁵⁶⁹ This was “an imperialist expansion on the part of Brazil in Latin America, which amount[ed] to the creation of a sub-imperialism or to the extension of North American imperialism.”⁵⁷⁰

In a later article published in 1972, Marini provides us with a definition of subimperialism as “*the form which dependent capitalism assumes upon reaching the stage of monopolies and finance capital.*”⁵⁷¹ In the case of Brazil, subimperialism developed as a class strategy that could be summed up in two points: 1) “export of manufactured goods, durable as well as non-durable,” and 2) “an increase in state expenditures” in order to develop the infrastructure of transportation and

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid. Emphasis added.

⁵⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid., 22. Emphasis added.

⁵⁶⁹ Ibid., 23.

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid., 26.

⁵⁷¹ Ruy Mauro Marini, “Brazilian Subimperialism,” *Monthly Review* 23:9 (1972): 15. Emphasis in the original.

electrification and also to reequip the armed forces.⁵⁷² Marini concedes at this point that the model he presents resembles the one applied by German Nazism in the 1930s, but he argues that in subimperialism the difference arises from “the role given to foreign capital.”⁵⁷³ This was due to the fact that Brazil had neither the technological base nor the military power to fight for the market by force on its own. Thus, the solution found was to

[offer] partnership to foreign monopolies in the exploitation of the Brazilian worker and in the earnings derived from commercial expansion—that is to say, [to realize] that policy through an unrestricted alliance with foreign capital.⁵⁷⁴

As a result,

[b]ig industry was denationalized; the exploitation of raw materials such as iron was monopolized; the plan to electrify received considerable contributions from the international finance agencies.⁵⁷⁵

Marini later modified his formulation of the concept of subimperialism as implying “two basic components”: 1) “a medium organic composition on the world scale of national productive apparatus,” and, 2) “the exercise of a relatively autonomous expansionist policy” with a “greater integration in the imperialist productive system . . . maintained under the hegemony exercised by imperialism on an international scale.”⁵⁷⁶

⁵⁷² Ibid., 16.

⁵⁷³ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid., 16–17.

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid., 17.

⁵⁷⁶ Quoted in Zirker, “Brazilian Foreign Policy,” 117, from Ruy Mauro Marini, “World Capitalist Accumulation and Sub-Imperialism,” *Two-Thirds: A Journal of Underdevelopment Studies* 1:2 (1978): 34–35. This article of Marini is not available online, but for a Spanish version of it, see Ruy Mauro Marini, “La acumulación capitalista mundial y el subimperialismo,” *Cuadernos Políticos* 12 (1977), accessed 13 January 2019, http://www.marini-escritos.unam.mx/052_acumulacion_subimperialismo.html.

The concept of subimperialism has been revised and applied to other semi-peripheral cases of imperialist integration in addition to Brazil since its initial formulation by Marini. It was mostly applied to Brazil and South Africa along with the other BRICS countries. Although much of these efforts turn out to be highly contested and undertheorised, it seems that the cases of Brazil and South Africa are the closest examples to the analytical ideal type formulated by Marini. Marini himself also thought of the pre-1979 Iran to have fit into his model of subimperialism.⁵⁷⁷ One such revision and reapplication of the concept came from Daniel Zirker who analyses “the civilian political transition of the mid-1980s” that took place in Brazil in the light of Marini’s formulations.⁵⁷⁸ The contribution of Zirker is his emphasis on the “two contrasting dynamics” of subimperialism—“more autonomous and self-interested foreign policies” on the one hand, and on the other hand, “significant limitations to this autonomy,” which emanates from “active collaboration with imperialist expansion.”⁵⁷⁹ It follows that subimperialist powers might have “a high degree of autonomy in areas that are not of immediate concern to the empire or in courses of actions that generally *reinforce* the wider system dynamics.”⁵⁸⁰ However, apart from such areas, there are always strong limitations and constraints imposed upon subimperialist powers by the leading imperialist power. A factor peculiar to the Brazilian case was the existence of strong anti-imperialist challenges throughout

⁵⁷⁷ Quoted in Zirker, “Brazilian Foreign Policy,” 117, from Ruy Mauro Marini, “World Capitalist Accumulation and Sub-Imperialism,” *Two-Thirds: A Journal of Underdevelopment Studies* 1:2 (1978): 35.

⁵⁷⁸ Zirker, “Brazilian Foreign Policy,” 115–31.

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid., 116.

⁵⁸⁰ Zirker, “Brazilian Foreign Policy,” 119. Emphasis in the original.

Latin America, which made the United States more eager to open up space for Brazil at the regional level.⁵⁸¹

Moving from the case of South Africa, another contribution belongs to David Simon, who argues that for a social formation to rise up to the level of a subimperialist power it must have at the same time “*both* the economic *and* political/military power to dominate the surrounding periphery with a degree of autonomy.”⁵⁸² Another author that revisits the concept of subimperialism by looking into the case of South Africa is Patrick Bond.⁵⁸³ Reinterpreting Marini’s works, Bond detects three general criteria for a social formation to become a subimperialist power: 1) “regional economic extraction,” 2) “export of capital,” and finally, 3) “internal corporate monopolisation and financialisation.”⁵⁸⁴ In addition to these three general criteria, he also argues that the contemporary form of subimperialism as arguably reflected in the case of BRICS countries reveals “two additional roles”: 1) “ensuring regional geopolitical ‘stability,’” and 2) “advancing the broader agenda of neoliberalism, so as to legitimate deepened market access.”⁵⁸⁵ Bond also makes the point that, in the face of actual or

⁵⁸¹ Ibid., 119–27.

⁵⁸² Quoted in Melanie Samson, “(Sub)imperial South Africa? Reframing the Debate,” *Review of African Political Economy* 36:119 (2009): 100, from David Simon, “The Ties That Bind: Decolonisation and Neo-Colonialism in Southern Africa,” in *Colonialism and Development in the Contemporary World*, ed. Chris Dixon and Michael Heffernan (London: Mansell Publishing, 1991), 24. Emphasis in the original.

⁵⁸³ Patrick Bond, *Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2000); Patrick Bond, “Bankrupt Africa: Imperialism, Sub-Imperialism and the Politics of Finance,” *Historical Materialism* 12:4 (2004): 145–72; Patrick Bond, “US Empire and South African Subimperialism,” in “Socialist Register 2005: The Empire Reloaded,” ed. Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, *Socialist Register* 41 (London: The Merlin Press, 2004): 218–38; Patrick Bond, *Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation* (London: Zed Books, 2006).

⁵⁸⁴ Patrick Bond, “Sub-Imperialism as Lubricant of Neoliberalism: South African ‘Deputy Sheriff’ Duty within BRICS,” *Third World Quarterly* 34:2 (2013): 266.

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid.

possible domestic opposition or in order to generate active popular consent with respect to both domestic and international public opinion, subimperialist policy makers often prefer a method of “talking left while mainly walking right, indeed sometimes talking left *so as to walk right*.⁵⁸⁶ The governments formed by the African National Congress (ANC) in the post-apartheid South Africa which began with the election of Nelson Mandela, the legendary political figure of the anti-apartheid Black movement in South Africa, as President in 1994 and which has been continued until today with his successors from within the ANC, and the left-wing Workers’ Party (WP) governments under the presidencies of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2011) and Dilma Vana Rousseff (2011–2016) in Brazil were all noted for such a method of “talking left while mainly walking right.”

The contradictions inherent in such regional aspirants to become subimperial powers must not lead us to think that the domestic policy makers in such social formations are simply the surrogates or subservients of the leading imperialist state. They are, indeed, rather aware of the limitations and constraints before their political aspirations. These limitations and constraints might either emanate from their domestic material capabilities or incapabilities, or be imposed upon them by the very dynamics of the world capitalist system or by the leading imperialist social formation. Nevertheless, one should also not miss the point that the contemporary “unique”⁵⁸⁷ form of imperialism is far from an external factor for semi-peripheral and peripheral social formations, but is instead intrinsic to such social formations, because these social formations are continuously “[reconstituted] as integral elements of an informal

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid., 257. Emphasis in the original. See also Patrick Bond, *Talk Left, Walk Right: South Africa's Frustrated Global Reforms*, 2nd ed. (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2006).

⁵⁸⁷ Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, “The Unique American Empire,” in *The War on Terror and the American ‘Empire’ after the Cold War*, ed. Alejandro Colás and Richard Saull (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 24–43.

American empire.”⁵⁸⁸ The “changing nature of international capital flows” is a crucial factor in such processes of reconstitution since the “American capital now exist[s] as a material social force *inside* a good many other social formations” as a result of foreign direct investments (FDI) made by “US multinationals with the full back-up of the US state.”⁵⁸⁹ This process is further deepened through mergers between US and domestic firms or outright acquisitions of domestic firms by US multinationals. An opposite trend in the form of other foreign capitals existing as material social forces inside the US social formation, at least for now, seems unlikely given “the size of the US economy as a whole.”⁵⁹⁰ On the contrary, such other foreign capitals “[seek] to reproduce, not to challenge, the American imperial state,” to the extent that they become “part of the American social formation.”⁵⁹¹ Therefore, it became possible to talk of an “induced reproduction and interiorization of imperialist neoliberal relations”⁵⁹² within contemporary semi-peripheral and peripheral social formations. Such social formations internalise, not only “neoliberal accumulation forms and their crises,” but also “imperialist moments,” and these culminate in “a relation of

⁵⁸⁸ Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, “Global Capitalism and American Empire,” in “Socialist Register 2004: The New Imperial Challenge,” ed. Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, *Socialist Register* 40 (London: The Merlin Press, 2003): 17.

⁵⁸⁹ Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, “Superintending Global Capital,” *New Left Review* 2:35 (2005): 109. Emphasis in the original. Nicos Poulantzas also advances similar arguments regarding the position of American capital within European social formations. Nicos Poulantzas, “Internationalisation of Capitalist Relations and the Nation-State,” trans. Elizabeth Hindess, *Economy and Society* 3:2 (1974): 145–79; Nicos Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, trans. David Fernbach, 2nd ed. (London: NLB, 1976), 43–44, 46–47, 50–57, 70–78.

⁵⁹⁰ Panitch and Gindin, “Superintending Global Capital,” 116.

⁵⁹¹ Ibid., 117.

⁵⁹² Sabah Alnasseri, “Imperialism and the Social Question in (Semi)-Peripheries: The Case for a Neo-National Bourgeoisie,” *Global Discourse* 2:2 (2011): 125. For a similar line of argument, see Vassilis K. Fouskas, “Neo-Liberalism and Ordoliberalism: A Critique of Two Forms of Imperialism and Authoritarianism,” *Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory* 46:3 (2018): 397–99, 419.

dependency of a precarious nature” among such social formations, which Sabah Alnasseri terms “lower order imperialism.”⁵⁹³ This new form of subimperialism strives to become “self-interested,” but “articulates a contradictory relationship to imperialist centres in forms of cooperation and/or conflicts,”⁵⁹⁴ in a way reminiscent of the concept of “antagonistic cooperation” employed by Ernst Talheimer and later by Ruy Mauro Marini.

The contradictory relationship between regional aspirants to become subimperial powers and the leading imperialist state emanates, not only from pure economic relations, but also from non-economic relations such as political and military relations, since all these processes are articulated within the political field and mediated through political leaderships. Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin emphasise the role of networks among the intelligence and security apparatuses of the leading capitalist states that bind them to their counterparts in the United States as well as the role of “new propaganda, intellectual and media networks.”⁵⁹⁵ What all these imply is that even the international limitations and constraints before regional aspirants to become subimperial powers do not have to be imposed upon them from outside, and indeed, it could even be argued that such limitations and constraints in the form of “foreign interventions” are only preferable as last resorts. Such direct foreign interventions come to the fore only if the aspirant social formation has not internalised the dependent social relationship with the imperialist centres to a certain extent economically or politically, or in all respects. This was the case with many Third World countries during the Cold War and with some Middle Eastern countries in the post-Cold War period such as Iraq and Libya.⁵⁹⁶ Indeed, such social formations with

⁵⁹³ Alnasseri, “Imperialism,” 125.

⁵⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁵ Panitch and Gindin, “Global Capitalism,” 15.

⁵⁹⁶ For historical analyses as to why a regional “great power” could not emerge in the Middle East so far in the face of already existing imperialist contexts, see Ian S. Lustick, “The Absence of Middle

weak links with the leading imperialist social formation either do not have the material capabilities to become subimperial powers or have ambitions going beyond the room for manoeuvre allowed for subimperial powers as was the case when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. Thus, it would be more apt to call “subimperial powers” regional aspirants with strong links with the leading imperialist social formation and a high level of internalisation of a dependent social relationship with that imperialist social formation in all respects—be they economic, political or military.⁵⁹⁷ Fred Halliday’s definition of the concept of subimperialism is apt here: “(a) a continuing if partial strategic subordination to US imperialism on the one hand, and (b) an autonomous regional role on the other.”⁵⁹⁸ As for such aspirants, there is a richer variety of instruments in the hands of the leading imperialist social formation to impose limitations and constraints upon them, making it more often than not unnecessary to intervene in challenges posed by such aspirants from outside in a direct manner. The Brazilian case might well illustrate the point.

The more the left-leaning WP governments in Brazil, first under Lula and later under Dilma, tended increasingly to benefit “from the emergence of other powers—China, India, and Russia—at a time when the United States was increasingly distracted by two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,”⁵⁹⁹ the more the contradictory characteristics of subimperialism rose to the surface. Lula and Dilma “sought to revise

Eastern Great Powers: Political ‘Backwardness’ in Historical Perspective,” *International Organization* 51:4 (1997): 653–83; Raymond Hinnebusch, “The Middle East in the World Hierarchy: Imperialism and Resistance,” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 14:2 (2011): 213–46.

⁵⁹⁷ It would, therefore, not be appropriate to think of Russia and China in terms of subimperialism. Mathias Luce, “Sub-Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Dependent Capitalism,” in *BRICS: An Anti-Capitalist Critique*, ed. Patrick Bond and Ana Garcia (London: Pluto Press, 2015), 41.

⁵⁹⁸ Fred Halliday, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development* (New York: Penguin Books, 1979), 283.

⁵⁹⁹ David R. Mares and Harold A. Trinkunas, *Aspirational Power: Brazil on the Long Road to Global Influence* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 67.

the existing institutions,”⁶⁰⁰ albeit without questioning their underlying premises, in order to make more room for their subimperialist hegemonic project at domestic, regional and international levels. In the face of waning global commodities boom following the 2008 global economic crisis, Brazil’s “[economic] growth faltered, and domestic politics came to increasingly occupy”⁶⁰¹ Brazilian policy makers. Both Lula’s and Dilma’s efforts to harness state banks such as the Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) as “networks of capitalist dissemination”⁶⁰² as well as as sources for redistributionary mechanisms at the domestic level in the face of mounting social polarisation increased fracturing within the Brazilian bourgeoisie.

The red line was crossed when President Rousseff “doubled down on strengthening relationships among the BRICS” by establishing “a closer relation with China and Russia even as these emerging powers adopted more confrontational stances toward the liberal international order.”⁶⁰³ Although Brazil was initially not against Western support for the Arab uprisings which began in late 2010, Rousseff later changed course in the face of open regime change plans by NATO in Libya, and “[worked] behind the scenes to prevent a similar proposed intervention in Syria from being approved by the United Nations.”⁶⁰⁴ At the 2014 summit in Fortaleza, Brazil, BRICS leaders also “announced the formation of a new BRICS development bank

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid., 74.

⁶⁰¹ Ibid., 75.

⁶⁰² Alex Moldovan, “Uneven and Combined Development and Sub-Imperialism: The Internationalization of Brazilian Capital,” *Globalizations* 15:3 (2018): 317.

⁶⁰³ Mares and Trinkunas, *Aspirational Power*, 79.

⁶⁰⁴ Ibid.

and a currency reserve arrangement among the member states.”⁶⁰⁵ Relations with the other BRICS countries such as Russia and China improved to such an extent that Brazil preferred to remain silent on such issues as Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its conflicts with Ukraine as opposed to the confrontational stance adopted by the West.⁶⁰⁶ Moreover, Rousseff also sought to “score points with left-wing voters in Brazil by adopting a more critical attitude toward the Obama administration” especially by utilising some conjunctural developments such as the “revelations by U.S. National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden of U.S. espionage targeting Brazil and President Rousseff herself.”⁶⁰⁷ Furthermore, the Brazilian economy, despite the unfavourable international economic conjuncture following the 2008 global economic crisis, began to demonstrate some indications of moving “from a sub-imperial position to a more autonomous position in the world [capitalist] system,” through a “narrowing down of the gap between [Brazilian] outward and inward FDI.”⁶⁰⁸ Thus, Alex Moldovan argues, for instance, “[i]n this way, we can hypothetically see a movement from sub-imperialism to inter-imperialism”⁶⁰⁹ as “[c]onditions of dependency in the Brazilian sub-imperial formation are beginning to wither due to an acceleration of an organic expansion process of local capital.”⁶¹⁰

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid., 80.

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid; Steen Fryba Christensen, “How Prioritized Is the Strategic Partnership between Brazil and China?,” in *Emerging Powers, Emerging Markets, Emerging Societies: Global Responses*, ed. Steen Fryba Christensen and Li Xing (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 104.

⁶⁰⁷ Mares and Trinkunas, *Aspirational Power*, 81.

⁶⁰⁸ Moldovan, “Internationalization of Brazilian Capital,” 324.

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid., 325.

⁶¹⁰ Ibid., 324.

These overall quantitative and qualitative shifts of the Brazilian social formation within the hierarchical international order become more meaningful with the increasing fracturing within the Brazilian bourgeoisie and the subsequent political turmoil which led to, and was also deepened by, the impeachment proceedings against President Rousseff over allegations of corruption at the national oil company Petrobras. Those proceedings which began in December 2015 “landed major politicians and top executives in jail, paralyzing an industry that constituted almost 10 percent of the economy,”⁶¹¹ and ended up with the removal of Rousseff from office in May 2016 and the succession of Michel Miguel Elias Temer Lulia, first as acting president in May 2016 and later as president in August 2016. The impeachment was also striking in the sense that Temer was a highly controversial political figure who had reportedly been an “informant” for the US Embassy in Brazil.⁶¹² His party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement, had worked actively in favour of Rousseff’s impeachment despite Temer’s vice presidency under Rousseff. Following the 2018 elections, Jair Messias Bolsonaro, who did not even hesitate to salute the US flag in public,⁶¹³ succeeded Temer as president beginning from 2019. Against this historical background, suspicions of US involvement behind the impeachment proceedings between 2015 and 2016 have been brought forward.⁶¹⁴ However, the question as to

⁶¹¹ Mares and Trinkunas, *Aspirational Power*, 2.

⁶¹² “Brazil’s Acting President Used to Be Us Intel Informant – Wikileaks,” *Russia Today*, 13 May 2016, accessed 13 January 2019, <https://www.rt.com/news/342933-temer-us-brazil-spying/>.

⁶¹³ Roberto Simon and Brian Winter, “Trumpism Comes to Brazil,” *Foreign Affairs*, 28 October 2018, accessed 13 January 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/brazil/2018-10-28/trumpism-comes-brazil>.

⁶¹⁴ Siphamandla Zondi, “Brazil’s Neo-Liberals Threat to BRICS,” *IOL*, 16 May 2016, accessed 13 January 2019, <https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/opinion/brazils-neo-liberals-threat-to-brics-2022344>; “BLF Conference Calls for Summit against Imperialism,” *Black Opinion*, 16 May 2016, accessed 13 January 2019, <https://blackopinion.co.za/2016/05/16/blf-conference-calls-summit-imperialism/>; Eric Draitser, “BRICS under Attack: The Empire Strikes Back in Brazil,” *MPN News*, 22 March 2016, accessed 13 January 2019, <https://www.mintpressnews.com/brics-attack-empire-strikes-back-brazil/214943/>; Brian Becker, “Brazil: The Very, Very Corrupt Impeach the President for ‘Corruption’?,” *Sputnik*, 14 April 2016, accessed 13 January 2019,

whether or not the United States had direct involvement in that process becomes a less significant point taking into consideration how imperialism is not merely an external, but also an internalised phenomenon in semi-peripheral and peripheral social formations such as Brazil. The crucial point is that subimperialism turns out to be a highly liminal position, almost impossible to sustain in the face of the obvious contradictions between, on the one hand, the expansive characteristics of capital, and, on the other hand, the objective limitations and constraints imposed by domestic and international factors such as domestic material incapabilities, the contradictory trends and dynamics of world capitalism as well as the leading imperialist social formation.

The objective limitations and constraints before any regional aspirant to become a subimperial power are due to the contemporary unique form of imperialism in discussion. These, however, must not overshadow the space and possibilities opened up before such aspirants as a result of the same contemporary unique form of imperialism in the post-Cold War period. If one key factor analysed in classical Marxist theories of imperialism is capital exports or the critical role played by finance capital, the other one has been the problem of territorial control over resources and markets, which is most explicitly discussed in the works of Vladimir Lenin and Nikolai Bukharin.⁶¹⁵ This latter problem constitutes the thorniest and most pressing challenge before the US imperialism in the contemporary international order, given the fact that control of the international order had already “slipped beyond the

https://sputniknews.com/radio_loud_and_clear/201604141037997461-very-corrupt-impeach-president/; Paul Craig Roberts, “Washington Launches Its Attack against BRICS: The Destabilization of Brazil and Argentina,” *Global Research*, 22 April 2016, accessed 13 January 2019, <https://www.globalresearch.ca/washington-launches-its-attack-against-brics-the-destabilization-of-brazil-and-argentina/5521365>; Hugo Turner, “‘Soft’ Coups Threaten Brazil, Venezuela and South Africa,” *Global Research*, 14 May 2016, accessed 13 January 2019, <https://www.globalresearch.ca/soft-coups-threaten-brazil-venezuela-south-africa/5525142>; Shannon Ebrahim, “Obama Sabotages Left-Wing States,” *The Star*, 11 May 2016.

⁶¹⁵ Anthony Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1990), 109–135.

capacity of any single state, and perhaps even any group of states.”⁶¹⁶ This is undoubtedly not unconnected with problems of capitalism in general. Despite the seeming triumph of capitalism with the end of the Cold War, “the political capacities to make its triumph permanent are inadequate,” and much more so with respect to “extend[ing] the benefits of prosperity and economic development to all the states that now seek it.”⁶¹⁷ This creates recurring problems of legitimacy in the face of difficulties encountered in generating the active consent of the subordinate segments of societies. The US imperialism, therefore, was in no way “omnipotent but rather depended, for its rule, on working through other states.”⁶¹⁸ Reminiscent of the agency–structure problematic of the social sciences in general, the relationship between subimperialist social formations and the leading imperialist social formation is a mutually constitutive one. Imperialism could be “properly conceived as the source of both opportunities *and* constraints, as being both enabling *and* binding”⁶¹⁹ for all semi-peripheral and peripheral social formations including subimperialist ones. Subimperialist social formations, in turn, could also be considered both as active agents who could either reproduce or challenge their dependent social relationships with the leading imperialist social formation and as significant components of the whole international order which also functions as the “source of both opportunities

⁶¹⁶ Anthony Payne, “The New Political Economy of Area Studies,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 27:2 (1998): 260; Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne, “The World Order Approach,” in *Theories of New Regionalism: A Palgrave Reader*, ed. Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 48.

⁶¹⁷ Ibid., 59.

⁶¹⁸ Panitch and Gindin, “Global Capitalism,” 20. See also ibid., 23; Panitch and Gindin, “Superintending Global Capital,” 122.

⁶¹⁹ Payne, “New Political Economy of Area Studies,” 266. Emphasis in the original.

and constraints, as being both enabling *and* binding”⁶²⁰ for the leading imperialist social formation itself.

Hence the following question comes to the fore: modifying the question asked by Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne,⁶²¹ if a global hegemony organised around one leading imperialist social formation is no longer possible, might not a number of regional hegemonies organised around subimperialist regional aspirants be more successful in resolving, or at least managing, the recurring legitimacy crisis with which capitalist international accumulation is fraught? The previous sections of this chapter sought to demonstrate that this question has been answered by leading organic foreign policy intellectuals of US imperialism in a positive manner through such conceptualisations as “pivotal states” and “geopolitical pivots.” In addition, and partly due, to this US promotion, subimperialism has emerged as hegemonic projects with varying motivations in some semi-peripheral social formations which have internalised a dependent form of social relationship with the US imperialism. Following Mathias Luce, there are “five determining elements” for such subimperialist hegemonic projects to successfully cement subimperialist historical blocs at regional levels:

[1] a dependent country’s accession . . . to regional sub-centre status in response to global accumulation patterns through its transformation into a sub-centre of heavy industry with a certain domestic level of production and financial capitalist operation, [2] bourgeois unity through displacing internal contradictions, [3] the formulation of a national sub-imperialist plan, [4] formation of national capitalist trusts that tie the dependent economy to imperialism via state intermediation, [and finally,] [5] the dependent economic condition that not only transfers value to imperialist economies but also appropriates the surplus value of weaker nations.⁶²²

⁶²⁰ Ibid. Emphasis in the original.

⁶²¹ The original question asked by these authors is as follows: “If a global hegemony organized around one state is no longer possible, might not a number of regional hegemonies be more successful?” Gamble and Payne, “World Order Approach,” 59.

⁶²² Luce, “Sub-Imperialism,” 33–34.

Turkey under the presidency of Turgut Özal in the early 1990s is a case in point, which is to be examined in the subsequent chapters in terms of whether or not the neo-Ottomanist foreign policy aspiration aired by a group of organic intellectuals of the Özal leadership in a way that could be considered a subimperialist hegemonic project could successfully build a neo-Ottoman subimperialist historical bloc at the domestic and regional levels.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the changes and the ultimate transformation in the international order as discussed in terms of the transition from a period marked by *the inter-systemic conflict and competitions* between the capitalist Western and the socialist Eastern blocs to a period marked rather by *heteronymous intra-systemic conflicts and competitions*. Its second section, on the other hand, elaborated the new possibilities thought to have been opened up for regional aspirants such as Turkey in this new international political conjuncture in the early post-Cold War years. This point was discussed mainly by utilising the concept of subimperialism. The conclusion drawn from that discussion is that since a global hegemony organised around one leading imperialist social formation is no longer possible, a number of regional hegemonies organised around subimperialist regional aspirants have been thought to be more successful in resolving, or at least managing, the recurring legitimacy crisis with which the world capitalist system is fraught through such conceptualisations on the part of leading organic foreign policy intellectuals of US imperialism as “pivotal states” and “geopolitical pivots.” Finally, it was argued that subimperialism has emerged as hegemonic projects in some semi-peripheral social formations which have internalised a dependent form of social relationship with the US imperialism, although it is hard to attain and, if attained, too difficult to sustain due to its highly liminal and unconstant characteristic in between dependency and imperialism. Within such a framework and context, how subimperialism emerged as

a hegemonic project in Turkey under the presidency of Turgut Özal in the early 1990s in the form of neo-Ottomanism is to be examined in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 5

NEOLIBERALISM AND THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC FRACTION WITHIN THE TURKISH BOURGEOISIE IN THE LATE 1980S AND THE EARLY 1990S

5.1 Introduction

The Motherland Party (MP) period from 1983 to 1991 was marked by neoliberalism and its adverse effects, which became clearer from the late 1980s, upon both Turkey's political economy and Turkish society overall. As the MP's neoliberal policies began to have repercussions in the late 1980s, it was the rise of political Islam, as well as the emergence of an Islamic fraction within the Turkish bourgeoisie, which accompanied the growing social dissent rather than a political left alternative, since the latter had already been crushed, whereas the former had ready grassroots organisations built around already-existing networks of religious orders and communities, a direct result of the "Turkish–Islamic Synthesis" imposed from above under military rule with a view to putting an end to class-based politics. As such, the early 1990s saw the emergence of two distinct ideological positions, one brought forward by a group of liberal intellectuals close to President Özal and the other one being put forward by political Islamists, both aiming at overcoming the obvious backsliding of the neoliberal model through the dismantling of the last remnants of the Kemalist republican legacy. Hence, the first section below examines the rise of political Islam in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The second section, on the other hand, focuses on the contest between liberals and political Islamists in their attempts at formulating distinct ideological positions in the early 1990s. Accordingly, the anti-statist and multi-culturalist project of a liberal "Second Republic" on the one hand, and the "Just Economic Order" put forward by the Islamist Welfare Party's leader

Necmettin Erbakan together with other anti-secularist proposals such as the Charter of Medina on the other, are also elaborated in two separate subsections under the second section.

5.2 Neoliberalism and the Rise of the Islamic Fraction within the Turkish Bourgeoisie in the Late 1980s and the Early 1990s

The two strategic goals of the 24 January 1980 economic reform package were liberalisation within the domestic market and also towards foreign capital as well as strengthening of both domestic and foreign capital at the expense of the working class.⁶²³ As Korkut Boratav argues, the package had a “structural adjustment” perspective, which was being marketed by the international financial institutions at that time, besides its “stabilisation programme” epithet.⁶²⁴ Maintaining its main shape while involving new elements over time, this neoliberal package defined the economic policies implemented until late 1988. This period could be termed the “counter-attack of capital”,⁶²⁵ concomitant with a passive revolution in the early 1980s, as illustrated in the third chapter. In this period, there were continuous attempts at managing and rearranging the general contradiction between labour and capital at the expense of labour.⁶²⁶ Moreover, working-class organisations such as trade unions remained paralysed after military rule ended in late 1983.

⁶²³ Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908–2009*, 15th ed. (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2011), 148.

⁶²⁴ Ibid.

⁶²⁵ Ibid., 145–69. For an account of passive revolutions as “counter-attacks of capital,” see Christine Buci-Glucksman, “State, Transition and Passive Revolution,” in *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), 223.

⁶²⁶ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 149–50.

The MP's neoliberal hegemonic project in the 1980s was based upon a power bloc around the political leadership of the MP, civilian and military bureaucrats and the economic leadership of groups representing traditional big capital, such as the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TÜSİAD), under an authoritarian state apparatus. This was supported by "a conservative ideology that unified elements of Turkish right-wing nationalism and Islamism," while the "core of MP ideology" was constituted by "market liberalism" and "competitive individualism."⁶²⁷ Prime Minister Turgut Özal also sought to remedy the grievances on the part of subordinate segments of the society through a distorted version of populism, which rested upon a discourse of a "middle pillar" (*orta direk*).⁶²⁸ Especially after his Motherland Party (MP) gained control of municipalities in most cities in 1984, instruments such as the legalisation of illegal housing through the distribution of deeds for such buildings through zoning amnesties and construction permissions were effectively used in order to gain consent from subordinate segments of the society. Moreover, forms of tax relief on certain expenditures and various public funds, the most famous of which was "Fak-Fuk-Fon" as the abbreviation of the Turkish expression *Fakir Fukara Fonu* (Fund of the Poor),⁶²⁹ were also other

⁶²⁷ Nilgün Önder, *The Economic Transformation of Turkey: Neoliberalism and State Intervention* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016), 167; Nilgün Önder, "Integrating with the Global Market: The State and the Crisis of Political Representation," *International Journal of Political Economy* 28:2 (1998): 66.

⁶²⁸ By employing the term *orta direk*, which has meanings as diverse as "lodgepole," "mainmast," or "middle pillar," Özal and the MP sought to address the demands of the wider middle classes and to gain their support. According to the 1983 election manifesto of the MP, "peasants, workers, civil servants and craftsmen" constituted the "middle pillar." TBMM, *Anavatan Partisi Programı, Anavatan Partisi 6 Kasım 1983 Seçim Beyannamesi, Hükümet Programı* (Ankara: TBMM, 1983), 64, 70–73. Documents pertaining to the MP and other political parties are available online at the website of the Open Access System of the Library of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, accessed 9 February 2018, <http://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr:8080/xmlui/?locale-attribute=en>.

⁶²⁹ This fund later evolved into social assistance and solidarity funds controlled by the Foundations for Social Assistance and Solidarity in each city and town under the auspices of the Prime Ministerial Social Assistance and Solidarity Encouragement Fund in the 2000s. These funds also became the subjects of corruption allegations.

significant instruments of Özal's distorted version of populism. The MP governments also increased public expenditures in election periods, and opened up some indirect and informal channels that would provide some wealth to some segments of the working class.⁶³⁰ Thus, it became possible, at least for some time, to suppress class-based demands, trade union organisations, struggles for wage increases and demands for subsidies for the peasantry through this distorted version of populism.⁶³¹ Özal wished to construct a new social base for his leadership: those who had gained by becoming house owners, aid recipients and consumers, though still in poverty to a large extent.

Added to such distorted populism was a discourse which extolled the market and claimed that there was no alternative. “Free market economy,” “free enterprise,” “the middle pillar,” and “striking it rich” (*köşeyi dönmek*) were all catchphrases of the Özal leadership in that period.⁶³² Moreover, many cliché-ridden propositions accompanied this discourse, such as that “the liberalisation of the import regime would put an end to the black market and thus would ameliorate income distribution by increasing tax revenues of the state,” that “high interest rates would serve in the interests of the people in general since it would increase savings and reward the savers,” that the MP leadership “ended citizens falling into the courts just because they had several dollars in their pockets,” and finally that “the privatisation of the State Economic Enterprises would genuinely make them the people’s property.”⁶³³ This pro-market discourse and its propositions were also disseminated through

⁶³⁰ Cenk Saraçoğlu, “Tank Paletiyle Neoliberalizm, 1980–2002,” in *Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat*, ed. Gökhan Atilgan, Cenk Saraçoğlu, and Ateş Uslu (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2015), 792.

⁶³¹ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 153.

⁶³² Ibid., 156.

⁶³³ Ibid.

professionals and academic circles as well as the press, which was also highly monopolised in the hands of several big capitalists in the same period. The MP’s rhetoric over the so-called “middle pillar” became beneficial in “incorporate[ing] the interests of the major subordinate social classes and groups into the neoliberal economic project.”⁶³⁴ It also “effectively linked neoliberal reforms . . . to the welfare of the subordinate classes and of the people as a whole.”⁶³⁵ Thus, it became possible for the “capitalist class, led by its dominant fraction of big industrial/financial capital,” to “[acquire] the subordinate classes’ consent for continuing neoliberal transformation of the economy.”⁶³⁶ All these went hand in hand with one of the most oppressive periods of Turkish political history.⁶³⁷

Another key development of the period was the emergence of different ideological positions such as the “liberal left,” which emphasised “civil society” as a sphere of freedom. The self-declared *Atatürkçü* cadres within the civilian and military bureaucracy and the role they played as the repressive instruments of the state apparatus also made it easier to distort the core of the social problem by diverting it from the general contradiction between labour and capital towards anti-statist propositions. Thus, whereas, on the one hand, a mixture of a superficial version of *Atatürkçülük* and the Turkish–Islamic Synthesis was being pumped into society through official channels of indoctrinisation and education, a liberal “anti-statist” discourse extolling “civil society” as a sphere of freedom but blaming the state in general and its Kemalist, republican, secularist, pro-public and pro-welfare legacy in particular, was also being propagated by the politicians, academics, journalists and

⁶³⁴ Önder, *Economic Transformation of Turkey*, 165.

⁶³⁵ Ibid., 166.

⁶³⁶ Ibid., 162–63.

⁶³⁷ Nurdan Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak: 1980’lerin Kültürel İklimi*, 8th ed. (İstanbul: Metis Yayımları, 2016), 13–14.

authors of the period. Combined with the promotion and subsequent rise of identity-based politics in order to put an end to class-based politics, such an ideological assault upon the republican legacy as a whole also paved the way for the rise of political Islam and the further exacerbation of the already deteriorated Kurdish problem throughout the 1990s. These all led to an ideological degeneration on the part of subordinate groups within Turkish society, with increased levels of individualism and religiosity. As a result, the workplace and production were gradually replaced by the neighbourhood and family as the new focal points of social life.⁶³⁸

Yet if there had not been steady economic growth, not even all these factors would have been enough to cement together a new historical bloc by effectively displacing the organised working class. The bourgeois hegemony in the 1980s, which rested upon neoliberalism under an authoritarian state with a loosely conservative but pro-market ideology, was sustained by a power bloc composed of the political leadership under MP governments, the civilian and military bureaucracy and groups representing big capital, which evolved in this period into finance capital. An average 4.9 percent annual growth in GDP, excepting the year 1980, contributed to steady capital accumulation in the period between 1980 and 1988.⁶³⁹ Aggregate production was also shifted towards foreign demand through exports, with domestic demand having been reduced as a result of pressures over wages as well as by policies of export promotion through subsidies and incentives. This also became possible with the liberalisation of the import regime, since Turkish exports relied in large part on an infinite array of imported products. All these created a dramatic increase in current account deficits, but the deficits could also be sustained through an increase in the volume of foreign debt stocks. Thus, Turkey's creditworthiness in the eyes of the international financial institutions maintained a critical position as top priority for the decision-makers of the period. Another observation Korkut Boratav makes is that

⁶³⁸ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 158.

⁶³⁹ Ibid., 159.

economic growth in this period did not rest upon increases in productive capacity and that, in addition to declining rates of investments to GDP, the direction of investments made tended to be towards sectors other than industry, especially towards construction.⁶⁴⁰ He therefore argues that the apparent success in rising exports by Turkish industrialists was not the result of increases in productivity or technological advances, but was as a result of devaluationary currency policies and eroding real income levels among the working classes.⁶⁴¹ Despite the rhetoric of *orta direk*, real wages fell by 18 percent compared to consumer prices between 1983 and 1988, the time in which Özal was in power.⁶⁴² Moreover, the share of commercial and financial capital as well as some rentier groups in the share of added value increased at the expense of the share of industrial capital.⁶⁴³

In a nutshell, although the surplus appropriated from subordinate strata of society increased in favour of the Turkish bourgeoisie in general, commercial and financial capital, along with some rentier groups, gradually gained an advantage at the expense of industrial capital in the 1980s. Despite the ideological and cultural onslaught in favour of market and neoliberal policies towards the subordinate strata of the society, by the end of the 1980s there were signs of exhaustion in the field of exports and capital accumulation on the one hand, and signs of increasing social dissent in the field of politics on the other. Özal's star was getting fainter in the face of the glaring inherent contradictions of his neoliberal policies in the second half of the 1980s, and the MP's hegemonic project "began to weaken toward the end of the

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid., 162.

⁶⁴¹ Ibid., 162–63. One should also add more conjunctural phenomena such as the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) to these factors. The implications of the Iran–Iraq War are to be elaborated in the seventh chapter.

⁶⁴² Ibid., 152.

⁶⁴³ Ibid., 168–69.

1980s.”⁶⁴⁴ Politics also began to reflect this backward slip. That one by-election, two referenda, two elections and one presidential election were held in the period between 1986 and 1989 demonstrates clearly the contentious nature of the political atmosphere in this period. Political parties such as the Party of Social Democracy (PSD) and the True Path Party (TPP), which were considered to have been offshoots of the pre-1980 political parties, began to get stronger, and the opposition in the parliament was increasingly influenced by these parties which remained outside parliament until 1987. The PSD, which largely represented elements of the pre-1980 Republican People’s Party (RPP), had already become Turkey’s second party in the 1984 local elections, whereas the TPP, which had a similar relationship with the pre-1980 JP became the third-largest. Votes for the Populist Party (PP) and the Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP), on the other hand, were in sharp decline. Ultimately, the PP transformed itself into the Social Democrat Populist Party (SPP) and agreed to a merger with the rising PSD under the banner of the SPP, while the NDP was dissolved in mid-1986. This trend went on, with a decline in votes for the ruling MP of more than 10 percent in the parliamentary by-elections held in September 1986, with both the TPP and SPP got more than 20 percent of the votes. Although Özal tried to resist demands for removing the political ban on politicians from the pre-1980 period, he was in no position to be able to do so for long, and he finally agreed to make an amendment, albeit to be approved by a referendum, in September 1987. It was approved by a slender margin with 50.16 percent of the votes, but this was a blow to the MP leadership, since it had campaigned in favour of a “no” vote before the referendum, and made Özal rush towards a snap election with a view to preventing a possible meltdown of his electoral support base. The MP won the election held in November 1987 with 36.31 percent of the votes, but the left-leaning opposition saw a threatening rise, with the SPP and the Democratic Left Party (DLP) led by Bülent Ecevit, the former chairperson of the RPP in the pre-1980 period, getting

⁶⁴⁴ Önder, *Economic Transformation of Turkey*, 169; Önder, “Integrating with the Global Market,” 66.

approximately one third of the total votes in total. Having won the snap parliamentary elections, Özal wanted to adapt this same tactic in the approaching local elections, and in order to bypass the constitutional rules, his party made an amendment that would be subjected to another referendum in September 1988. This referendum turned into a vote on the Özal government, and the “yes” votes that the MP campaigned for remained below the vote share the party had got one year previously—35 percent and 36 percent respectively.⁶⁴⁵ It was the first time in Turkish political history that “no” votes had prevailed in a referendum, and this new blow to the MP leadership ushered in a free fall in its votes, making it the third party with 22 percent of the vote in the 26 March 1989 local elections. As a result, Turgut Özal found it more secure to run as candidate for the presidency in late 1989, despite strong protests by the SPP and TPP, since he would get easily elected at least in the third round of the elections that only required an absolute majority vote in the parliament—a parliament of which more than 60 percent of the deputies were members of the MP thanks to its former electoral victory in 1987, but also one that became incongruous with people’s will in 1989.⁶⁴⁶ Added to all this was a new round of working class activity and protests, which began anew in the spring of 1989, after a long interval following the 1980 coup.⁶⁴⁷

The economic response to all these developments under the Özal government was twofold. On the one hand, the MP government carried out a 142 percent increase in the wages of employees in the public sector, and increases in wages of civil servants

⁶⁴⁵ Bülent Tanör, “Siyasal Tarih (1980–1995),” in *Türkiye Tarihi*, ed. Sina Akşin, vol. 5, *Bugünkü Türkiye, 1980–2003* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2011), 80.

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid., 82–83.

⁶⁴⁷ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 173.

that ranged between 55 and 95 percent also followed suit in 1989.⁶⁴⁸ Employees in the private sector were also influenced positively by collective bargaining agreements ending up with substantial increases in wages.⁶⁴⁹ Resources reserved for subsidies in the form of supportive purchases in the agricultural sector were also increased for the first time in the 1980s in 1989, and these went on to increase continuously until 1992.⁶⁵⁰ All these measures were aimed at regaining the lost consent from the subordinate social strata of the society with the aim of giving some material content to Özal's distorted version of populism. On the other hand, the MP government went on to deepen its neoliberal economic restructuring with a decision to carry out current account liberalisation in August 1989. The initial limits of the amount set by the decision would also be lifted completely in the following couple of months, and thus, the IMF recognised the Turkish lira as fully convertible in early 1990.⁶⁵¹ This decision also served to facilitate the entry of short-term foreign capital, thereby providing easier access to foreign loans and credits. In the face of increases in wages and other public expenditures, these all led to dramatic increases in public deficits and foreign debt stock.⁶⁵² The MP leadership sought to benefit politically from such expansionary economic policies, but their influence remained rather limited with politics became diversified yet again from 1988 onwards, and the positive impacts of that period also did not last long with an economic crisis erupted in 1994. In the same year, political

⁶⁴⁸ Ibid., 175; Suavi Aydin and Yüksel Taşkin, *1960'tan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi*, 5th ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2017), 371.

⁶⁴⁹ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 175.

⁶⁵⁰ Korkut Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi (1981–2002)," in *Türkiye Tarihi*, ed. Sina Akşin, vol. 5, *Bugünkü Türkiye, 1980–2003* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2011), 195.

⁶⁵¹ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 178.

⁶⁵² Ibid., 177.

Islam under the leadership of the Welfare Party (WP) would gain the upper hand in local elections by winning municipalities in many cities including the two critical metropolitan municipalites of Istanbul and Ankara. This development was no accident.

The crushing of the political left and the organised working class as well as the promotion of identity-based politics in order to put an end to class-based politics in the 1980s opened up a wide space for religious networks of solidarity among the subordinate segments of the Turkish society. The political left was not only under the direct pressure of the repressive state apparatus, but also under an ideological and discursive onslaught which targeted it as “an archaic ideological remnant of a discredited past.”⁶⁵³ Thus, in contrast to the pre-1980 period, political Islam had the opportunity to benefit from religion in its “attempts to redesign socioeconomic institutions,” and, as Ayşe Buğra and Osman Savaşkan argue, “religious identity became a network resource and appeared as a factor that ultimately informed the newly emerging alliances and conflicts within the business community.”⁶⁵⁴

Another key element in Turkey’s post-1980 accumulation strategy was the increased significance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with flexibility having emerged as one of the main motives of new productive modes under the conditions of economic globalisation.⁶⁵⁵ This led to the emergence of firms in some relatively less developed cities in the Anatolian periphery, which, though small in size, nonetheless became competitive in world markets.⁶⁵⁶ Low wages and relatively

⁶⁵³ Ayşe Buğra and Osman Savaşkan, *New Capitalism in Turkey: The Relationship between Politics, Religion and Business* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014), 53.

⁶⁵⁴ Ibid., 55.

⁶⁵⁵ Berrin Koyuncu, “Küreselleşme ve MÜSİAD: Eklemlenme mi, Çatışma mı?,” in *Liberalizm, Devlet, Hegemonya*, ed. E. Fuat Keyman (İstanbul: Everest, 2002), 360.

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid.

easier practices of unregistered employment as well as easier access to subsidies in such peripheral cities as Kayseri, Konya, Denizli and Gaziantep brought the Anatolian periphery to the forefront.⁶⁵⁷ As such, the Small and Medium Scaled Industry Development and Support Directorate (KOSGEB) was established in order to support such firms in 1990.⁶⁵⁸ The flexibility entailed by new relations of production was in great conformity with the informal ways of doing business dominant in such firms, and Islam served as the social capital in such informal relationships. Moreover, some Islamic claims and prohibitions in the economic sphere “had the potential to open many interesting channels of capital accumulation through network relations” such as the mushrooming of Islamic private financial institutions in Turkey with the help of Gulf capital, and Turgut Özal’s Islamist brother Korkut Özal reportedly held a central role in many such relationships.⁶⁵⁹ This differentiation within productive capital also led to new relations within the Turkish bourgeoisie which involved both opportunities and conflicts.⁶⁶⁰ These developments led to the emergence and rise of an Islamic fraction within the Turkish bourgeoisie, which found its expression in the establishment of Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (MÜSİAD) on 5 May 1990 in Istanbul.⁶⁶¹ This new fraction within the Turkish bourgeoisie began to raise new demands, and also portrayed itself as suffering from

⁶⁵⁷ Saraçoğlu, “Tank Paletiyle Neoliberalizm,” 761, 769–70.

⁶⁵⁸ KOSGEB, “About KOSGEB,” accessed 19 May 2019, <http://en.kosgeb.gov.tr/site/tr/genel/detay/347/about-kosgeb>.

⁶⁵⁹ Buğra and Savaşkan, *New Capitalism in Turkey*, 57.

⁶⁶⁰ Koyuncu, “Küreselleşme ve MÜSİAD,” 360.

⁶⁶¹ “One could, in fact, suggest that the ambiguity around the ‘M’ in the abbreviation MÜSİAD might have played a role in the strategic use of Islamic identity. Although ‘M’ is the initial for *müstakil*, meaning ‘independent,’ in the 1990s it was often interpreted as being an abbreviation for ‘Muslim,’ a confusion that might have contributed to the establishment of relations of trust in economic life.” Buğra and Savaşkan, *New Capitalism in Turkey*, 131.

the allegedly segregationist policies carried out by the secularist establishment towards religious people in general, and towards religious businesspeople in particular.

It was in the face of these developments that a contest between liberals and Islamists took place in the early 1990s when the MP had already begun to lose its grip on power, since these were the two main ideological groups that had gained strength throughout the 1980s, and both of them saw the republican legacy as an obstacle in the path of their own political projects. The political proposals of the former group were coined as the “Second Republic,” whereas the latter sought to bring forward their own proposals under such terms as the “Just Economic Order” and the “Charter of Medina.” It was under such circumstances that a group of organic intellectuals under the political leadership of Turgut Özal gathered around *Türkiye Günlugü* sought to accommodate the political demands of both groups and reformulate them into what could be considered a subimperialist hegemonic project in the form of neo-Ottomanism. It is, therefore, appropriate at this point to look into this contest between liberals and Islamists in the early 1990s.

5.3 The Contest between Liberals and Islamists in the Early 1990s

The organic intellectuals of the Turkish bourgeoisie opened up a new debate over the nature of the political regime in the pages of corporate newspapers such as *Sabah* under President Turgut Özal’s auspices in early 1991. Named after the conceptualisation of Mehmet Altan, who first initiated the discussion, it became known as the “Second Republic” debate. Though it consisted of a loose set of liberal ideas, the arguments put forward by these intellectuals could be considered a new ideological position favouring the Turkish bourgeoisie under conditions of political and economic backsliding in the early 1990s. The debate would also be followed by later liberal initiatives such as the New Democracy Movement, which was led by Cem Boyner, a textile businessman and former president of TÜSİAD, which evolved into a political party in December 1994, the Association for Liberal Thinking led by

academics Atilla Yayla and Mustafa Erdoğan, which was founded legally in April 1994, and the Liberal Democratic Party, which was founded on 26 July 1994. A parallel initiative occurred among the Islamists. Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the WP, published his own proposal of economic order under the title “Just Economic Order” in 1991.⁶⁶² MÜSİAD endorsed and furthered this initiative by proposing an alternative set of moral codes and ways of doing business for “Muslim businessmen” in a detailed report titled “The Islamic Person in Business Life.”⁶⁶³ Thus, while liberal intellectuals were in search of a way out of the political and economic backsliding of the existing social framework, the Islamic fraction within the Turkish bourgeoisie was also on the scene with new demands. The formulation of neo-Ottomanism by a group of organic intellectuals among the Özal leadership in the early 1990s in a way that could be considered a subimperialist hegemonic project took place within this overall picture. It could also be considered an attempt at working out a compromise between the search on the part of Turkey’s big bourgeoisie represented by TÜSİAD for a liberal way out of the existing backsliding and the demands of the newly emerging Islamic fraction of the Turkish bourgeoisie represented by MÜSİAD. Accordingly, the below sections will, first, examine the “Second Republic” debate initiated by a group of liberal intellectuals, and, second, elaborate the Islamic proposals brought forward principally by Erbakan and MÜSİAD in the early 1990s.

⁶⁶² Necmettin Erbakan, *Adil Ekonomik Düzen* (Ankara: n.p., 1991).

⁶⁶³ MÜSİAD, “İş Hayatında İslâm İnsanı (*Homo Islamicus*),” (MÜSİAD Araştırma Raporları 9, İstanbul: MÜSİAD, December 1994).

5.3.1 Liberal Anti-Statism and Multi-Culturalism: The “Second Republic” Debate

The very first step of the liberal initiatives towards formulating a way out of the political and economic backsliding of the early 1990s came with Mehmet Altan’s⁶⁶⁴ late 1991 article entitled “A New Republic...” in his column published in *Sabah*, along with *Hürriyet* one of the two most popular daily newspapers in Turkey in that period.⁶⁶⁵ He used the concepts of a “new republic” and “second republic” interchangeably, and he argued that a new republic would put an end to the “state mentality” supposedly “organised against the people.”⁶⁶⁶ The debate sparked by Altan’s articles later continued with contributions from other authors such as Cengiz Çandar, Hikmet Özdemir, Asaf Savaş Akat and Nur Vergin.⁶⁶⁷ Although not all of them endorsed the concept of a “Second Republic,” these authors had much in common with respect to their political and historical readings of the republican experience in Turkey and its problems. Therefore, the concept of a “Second Republic”

⁶⁶⁴ Mehmet Altan is both a scholar and columnist, and he is also one of the two sons of Çetin Altan—a famous Turkish ex-socialist writer and former member of parliament from the ranks of the Workers’ Party of Turkey in the second half of the 1960s. Çetin Altan’s other son is novelist and columnist Ahmet Altan. Both the father and the sons were renowned for their liberal ideas throughout the 1990s and have come to be known as the Altans for short.

⁶⁶⁵ Mehmet Altan, “Yeni Bir Cumhuriyet...,” *Sabah*, 31 January 1991.

⁶⁶⁶ Deniz Yıldırım and Evren Haspolat, “İkinci Cumhuriyetçilik: ‘Sol’ Özalizm’in Türkiye Tahayyülü,” in *Türkiye’de Yeni Siyasal Akımlar (1980 Sonrası)*, ed. Evren Haspolat and Deniz Yıldırım (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2016), 145–46.

⁶⁶⁷ Eylem Akdeniz adds to these authors Çetin Altan, Mete Tunçay and Nilüfer Göle. Eylem Akdeniz, “The Democrat as a Social Type: The Case of Turkey in the 1990s” (PhD diss., Bilkent University, 2011), 209.

has since been recognised as an “umbrella concept.”⁶⁶⁸ The adherents of the Second Republic argued in general that the economic liberalisation initiated in the early 1980s under military rule and later furthered under civilian governments headed by Özal should be complemented by a programme of political liberalisation.⁶⁶⁹ It must also not be forgotten that the Soviet socialism was collapsing in the same period, and the “end of history” was also being declared by Western liberal authors cheering an alleged final victory on behalf of capitalism and liberal ideology.⁶⁷⁰ Thus, these authors took confidence from the generous tailwinds emanating from the collapse of the only systemic alternative to capitalism—the Soviet Union.

Having defined himself a “Marxist liberal,”⁶⁷¹ by definition a misnomer, Mehmet Altan sought to benefit from Marxist concepts such as the “mode of production” with a view to deriving some additional support from left-leaning citizens. For Altan, and some other adherents of the Second Republic, the main problem was not capitalism, but rather the lack of a genuinely established capitalist mode of production in Turkey.⁶⁷² The space that emanated from the absence of capitalist forces of production was filled by the civilian and military bureaucracy, and a particular tutelary form of the state made up a *status quo* which ultimately hindered productive forces from developing. As such, since “[t]he history of all hitherto

⁶⁶⁸ Doğan Gürpinar, “The Trajectory of Left-Liberalism in Turkey and Its Nemesis: The Great Rupture in the Turkish Left,” *Insight Turkey* 14:1 (2012): 154.

⁶⁶⁹ Yıldırım and Haspolat, “İkinci Cumhuriyetçilik,” 147.

⁶⁷⁰ Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” *The National Interest* 16 (1989): 3–18.

⁶⁷¹ Mehmet Altan, *Marksist Liberal* (İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2002). A correct definition for Altan might be a formerly Marxist-inspired liberal-leaning intellectual.

⁶⁷² Yıldırım and Haspolat, “İkinci Cumhuriyetçilik,” 148.

existing society is the history of class struggles,”⁶⁷³ history was allegedly frozen by the *status quo* in the Turkish case, and since “[t]he bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part,”⁶⁷⁴ it would not be possible to make any progress in transforming these social relations in Turkey in the absence of a genuine bourgeois class in the face of a repressive state. Deniz Yıldırım and Evren Haspolat, accordingly, argue that the Second Republic debate corresponds to “‘left’ Özalism,” since it adopted Özalism and argued that Özalism would also open the way for the left, and hence, that Özalism should be supported by the left.⁶⁷⁵ Thus, the debate sought to vindicate Özal’s pro-market policies and generate legitimacy for these policies from the left at a time when social dissent was on the rise against Özal’s neoliberal legacy. Therefore, it could be argued that the proposals for the Second Republic were formulated as a new ideological position in order to overcome the problems faced by the political leadership of Turgut Özal in deepening his neoliberal programme, which until then had been implemented within an authoritarian form of the state, thereby ensuring the maintenance of bourgeois hegemony. As they were pro-hegemonic as such on the one hand, and pretending to oppose the establishment by positing themselves against the civilian and military bureaucracy on the other, the proposals for the Second Republic provide us with an excellent example of a discourse which

⁶⁷³ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, with an introduction by David Harvey (London: Pluto Press, 2008), 33.

⁶⁷⁴ Ibid., 36. Marx and Engels also went on to emphasise the historically revolutionary role of the bourgeoisie in dismantling the reactionary forms of social relations as follows: “The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. . . . The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilisation.” Ibid., 38, 39. However, once capitalist social relations fully prevails, it is the proletariat that is to have the revolutionary role of transforming the society in its own image. “Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of modern industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product.” Ibid., 48.

⁶⁷⁵ Yıldırım and Haspolat, “İkinci Cumhuriyetçilik,” 148–49.

is seemingly “dissident,” but indeed “hegemonic.”⁶⁷⁶ Politically, this ideological position indeed advocated the destruction of last remnants of the Kemalist legacy within the state apparatus. Its economic policy position, on the other hand, was a continuation of the 24 January 1980 economic reform package, together with an emphasis on liberal democracy. In other words, Altan’s formulation of the Second Republic was a modification of the neoliberal hegemonic project that had been put forward in the early 1980s. Overall, the adherents of the Second Republic do not problematise capitalism and imperialism in their analyses, since they emphasise the lack of genuinely established capitalist social relations in Turkey, and thus posit the main axis of struggle over a supposed “center,” “status quo,” “civilian and military bureaucracy,” or the “tutelage” of that bureaucracy in favour of a supposed “periphery,” which is thought to have been suppressed throughout Turkish political history.⁶⁷⁷ As such, Altan, for instance, sees a continuity between the Ottoman and Republican periods of Turkish political history since, for him,

What they call the First Republic is nothing more than the transfer of the Ottoman palace, the Ottoman structure to the Republic... Nothing changed, moreover, when the sultan fled, the palace bureaucracy replaced him. In any case, the soldiers of the Ottoman [Empire] established the Republic.⁶⁷⁸ Obviously, his analogy of such a continuity is a superficial one, and clearly represents a distortion of Marxist analysis. The Second Republic argument leans on Sencer Divitçioğlu’s historical method of analysis and İdris Küçükömer’s political reading of Turkey, which could also be considered an extension of the former, in extending

⁶⁷⁶ Galip L. Yalman, “Tarihsel Bir Perspektiften Türkiye’de Devlet ve Burjuvazi: Rölativist Bir Paradigma mı Hegemonya Stratejisi mi?,” *Praksis* 5 (2002): 7; Galip L. Yalman, “Hegemonya Projeleri Olarak Devletçilik, Kalkınmacılık ve Piyasa,” in *Liberalizm, Devlet, Hegemonya*, ed. E. Fuat Keyman (İstanbul: Everest, 2002), 315; Galip L. Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism: The Case of Turkey in the 1980s* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2009), 20, 343–44.

⁶⁷⁷ Yıldırım and Haspolat, “İkinci Cumhuriyetçilik,” 150.

⁶⁷⁸ Mehmet Altan, *İkinci Cumhuriyet’in Yol Hikayesi*, interview with Defne Asal Er (İstanbul: Hayykitap, 2008), 164.

the Asian mode of production thesis.⁶⁷⁹ For Altan, Turkey is “a country, within which there is no real capitalist and no real working class and the military–civilian bureaucracy decides everything.”⁶⁸⁰

For the adherents of the Second Republic, the neoliberal programme is the precondition of Turkey’s supposed democratisation and hence a progressive agenda.⁶⁸¹ Only through such a programme, genuine social classes would emerge, they argued, and thus Özal was a “revolutionary,” and the neoliberal restructuring initiated with the 24 January 1980 economic reform package was “an economic revolution,” which would pave the way for the politically liberal state model of the Second Republic.⁶⁸² Likewise, the left must demand more marketisation and privatisation since these would, as the argument goes, ultimately open the way forward for the left itself.

Despite their all emphasis upon the economic factors such as productive forces and economic liberalisation, the supposedly political contradiction between an “oppressive” and “authoritarian” state and a liberal one, between Kemalism and liberalism, or to put it in their terms, between the “First Republic” and the “Second Republic” is the principle contradiction for these scholars.⁶⁸³ According to them, the First Republic was not democratic, but the Second Republic would be; the First

⁶⁷⁹ Yıldırım and Haspolat, “İkinci Cumhuriyetçilik,” 152.

⁶⁸⁰ Mehmet Altan, “Sorun Politik Devletten Liberal Devlete Geçmemektir,” in 2. *Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları: Yeni Arayışlar, Yeni Yönelimler*, ed. Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar (Ankara: Başak Yayıncılık, 1993), 42. This was certainly not correct. At the latest, in the post-war period, if not before, clearly discernible bourgeois and working classes had already emerged. Indeed, Altan neither adopted Divitcioğlu’s method in toto, nor did he solely rely on Küçükömer’s misleading arguments, knowing that such debates would academically hold no water.

⁶⁸¹ Yıldırım and Haspolat, “İkinci Cumhuriyetçilik,” 155.

⁶⁸² Altan, *Yol Hikayesi*, 139.

⁶⁸³ Yıldırım and Haspolat, “İkinci Cumhuriyetçilik,” 157.

Republic was not transparent, but the Second Republic would be; the First Republic was not “civilian,” but the Second Republic would be.⁶⁸⁴ However, despite all their criticisms towards the supposedly “tutelary” guardianship role of the “military–civilian bureaucracy,” these proposals for the Second Republic also represented a “top-down” and “power-centred” perspective.⁶⁸⁵ The adherents of the Second Republic have always gathered around a domestic or foreign centre of power, and had a vision of having the country transformed by the means of such powers—be they Özal or in later periods the European Union. As such, Evren Haspolat and Deniz Yıldırım likens the ideological current of the Second Republic to “a soul searching for others’ bodies to place within them.”⁶⁸⁶

Overall, the proposals for the Second Republic could be considered an ideological position advocating the destruction of the last remnants of the supposedly “strong state” and a political modification of the domestic order established after the 1980 *coup d'état*, while maintaining and furthering the general neoliberal character of the 24 January 1980 package which had been put into practice by Turgut Özal under the military rule in the early 1980s. The proposals for the Second Republic were formulated by a group of intellectuals under the patronage of President Özal in the early 1990s under conditions of increasing social dissent and the emergence of problems such as the rise of political Islam and the deepening of the Kurdish problem.⁶⁸⁷ President Özal sought to overcome these problems and sustain a power bloc consisting of his political leadership, the civilian and military bureaucracy, the

⁶⁸⁴ Ibid., 160.

⁶⁸⁵ Necmi Erdoğan and Fahriye Üstüner, “1990’larda ‘Siyaset Sonrası’ Söylemler ve Demokrasi,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, vol. 7, *Liberalizm*, ed. Murat Yılmaz (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005), 660; Yıldırım and Haspolat, “İkinci Cumhuriyetçilik,” 162.

⁶⁸⁶ Ibid., 164.

⁶⁸⁷ Erdoğan and Üstüner, “Söylemler ve Demokrasi,” 658.

big bourgeoisie represented by TÜSİAD and the newly emerging Islamic fraction within the Turkish bourgeoisie through a new all-encompassing hegemonic project promising a compromise of the “peaceful coexistence of cultural differences” under a supposedly “political liberal” state.⁶⁸⁸ He tried to accomplish this task, not by openly and directly expressing his own views, but by supporting a group of intellectuals and journalists who constituted the organic intellectuals of his political leadership supportive of the Second Republic.⁶⁸⁹ In a nutshell, the ideological position of the Second Republic aimed at hegemonising Özal's neoliberalism by incorporating new “democratic” and “multiculturalist” elements into it in the face of increasing difficulties in sustaining bourgeois hegemony under an authoritarian state.⁶⁹⁰ In any case, as Alev Özkazanç succinctly puts, “any liberal initiative which does not attempt at a radical criticism of the neoliberal transformation would ultimately serve for a transition to a new phase of neoliberalism.”⁶⁹¹ The Second Republic was clearly among such liberal initiatives.

⁶⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁹ Ibid., 658–59. President Özal also joined the panel titled “Politics in a Changing Turkey,” on 16 January 1993, organised by the journal *Türkiye Günluğu* and the Cedit group which had been publishing that journal. The other participants of the panel were the leading proponents of the Second Republic such as Mehmet Altan, Cengiz Çandar, Hikmet Özdemir, Asaf Savaş Akat and Nur Vergin. The panel was also broadcasted by *Kanal 6*, a nation-wide TV channel, of which Ahmet Özal, President Özal's son, was the owner. Ibid., 665, footnote 2. Of these intellectuals, Cengiz Çandar and Hikmet Özdemir was Özal's special advisors.

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid., 660.

⁶⁹¹ Alev Özkazanç, “Türkiye'nin Neo-Liberal Dönüşümü ve Liberal Düşünce,” in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce*, vol. 7, *Liberalizm*, ed. Murat Yılmaz (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005), 641.

5.3.2 Anti-Secularist Cultural Pluralism and Islamic Capitalism: Necmettin Erbakan's "Just Economic Order" and MÜSİAD's Demands

The period between 1991 and 2001, as Haldun Gülpalp argues, was the period in which political Islam rose to prominence and took its place in world history thanks to peculiarly favourable conditions for identity-based ideologies.⁶⁹² Turkey was no exception to this. Political Islam represented by the WP gained a clear victory in the 1994 local elections, gaining by far the greatest number of cities, 28 out of 77 including the two crucial metropolises of Istanbul and Ankara. They were followed by the MP and the TPP, which gained 14 and 11 municipalities respectively, although in terms of vote percentages, the WP came third with 19 percent of the votes behind the TPP and the MP, which gained 21 percent each. One year later, it would become the top party, winning 21 percent of the votes in the 1995 general election, again followed by the TPP and the MP, which gained 19 percent each. Subsequently, the WP became the leading partner in a coalition government formed with the TPP in 1996, but was ultimately forced to leave the government in 1997 under pressure principally from the Turkish Armed Forces, and was finally banned from politics by the Constitutional Court in 1998 on charges that it violated the constitutional principle of secularism. The National Outlook (*Millî Görüş*) ideology, upon which the WP was built, was far from a popular ideology in the pre-1980 period. Necmettin Erbakan, the founder and the leader of the party, had first founded the National Order Party in 1970, and later founded the National Salvation Party in 1972 in its place, since the former was banned under the martial law declared after the 12 March 1971 military memorandum. As the former was short-lived and the latter was only able to become the junior partner in various coalition governments throughout the 1970s – and was itself shut down with all other political parties following the 12 September 1980 *coup d'état*, it was only in the mid-1990s that Erbakan's National Outlook movement had

⁶⁹² Haldun Gülpalp, *Kimlikler Siyaseti: Türkiye'de Siyasal İslam'ın Temelleri*, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2014), 10.

the opportunity to rise very far, due to a combination of global and domestic factors. Modernity in general and the left in particular were in decline throughout the world in the 1980s and 1990s, while poststructuralist epistemological arguments were on the rise, with objectivity and universality declared obsolete while methodological relativism and appraisals of authentic local identities were on the rise.⁶⁹³ Added to this was the imposition of the Turkish–Islamic Synthesis from above⁶⁹⁴ by the iron fist of the military in the early 1980s, which put an end to class-based politics and placed in its stead identity-based politics. The failure of the already weak political left to pose a meaningful counter-hegemonic challenge against bourgeois hegemony and the subsequent acquiescence of the social democratic parties to neoliberal policies,⁶⁹⁵ despite their landslide victory in the 1989 local elections and their principal role as coalition partners in the TPP–SPP/RPP governments between 1991 and 1996,⁶⁹⁶ were also among other significant domestic factors that contributed to the rise of political

⁶⁹³ Ibid., 13–14, 37–38.

⁶⁹⁴ This “from above” characteristic conforms well to the logic of passive revolutions. Stuart Hall, “Popular-Democratic vs Authoritarian Populism: Two Ways of ‘Taking Democracy Seriously’,” in *Marxism and Democracy*, ed. Alan Hunt (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1980), 182; Alex Callinicos, “Bourgeois Revolutions and Historical Materialism,” *International Socialism* 2:43 (1989): 151–59; Perry Anderson, *English Questions* (London: Verso, 1992), 105–18; Neil Davidson, “How Revolutionary Were the Bourgeois Revolutions? (Contd.),” *Historical Materialism* 13:4 (2005): 19; Adam David Morton, *Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 64–65; Adam David Morton, “Waiting for Gramsci: State Formation, Passive Revolution and the International,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 35:3 (2007): 609; Adam David Morton, “The Continuum of Passive Revolution,” *Capital & Class* 34:3 (2010): 318; Alex Callinicos, “The Limits of Passive Revolution,” *Capital & Class* 34:3 (2010): 495; Adam David Morton, “The Limits of ‘Sociological Marxism’?,” *Historical Materialism* 21:1 (2013): 150–51.

⁶⁹⁵ Saraçoğlu, “Tank Paletiyle Neoliberalizm,” 807.

⁶⁹⁶ In 1995, the SPP joined the Republican People’s Party (RPP), which had been shut down following the 1980 *coup d'état* and reopened under the leadership of Deniz Baykal in 1992. Thus, the RPP replaced the SPP in these governments in 1995. This series of coalition governments between the TPP and the SPP/RPP, except for a short interval where a minority government was formed alone by the TPP and lasted only for 25 days in October 1995, came to an end in 1996 following the 1995 general elections.

Islam in Turkey in the mid-1990s. As argued by Halil Karaveli, Turkish political Islamists were “successful because they catered simultaneously to the religiously-conservative Anatolian bourgeoisie and to the working class in the metropolitan areas” by filling “the vacuum that had appeared after the crushing of the left by the fascists and the military.”⁶⁹⁷ Overall, it was only in the 1990s, during which Turkish political Islamists could emerge with influential political proposals.

Necmettin Erbakan, then the leader of the Islamist WP, published a pamphlet titled “Just Economic Order” in 1991 which laid down the fundamentals of his proposals.⁶⁹⁸ Although he describes capitalist social relations in Turkey as “slave order,” which did not emerge on its own, but rather emerged as a result of the “modern colonialism” (*Modern Müstemlekecilik*) exercised in a “conscious, planned and programmed way” by the “forces of imperialism and Zionism” over Turkey through the mediation of “imitator parties,”⁶⁹⁹ what he proposed indeed did not go beyond a petit bourgeois framework which rested upon the newly emerging small and medium-sized enterprises with Islamic leanings.⁷⁰⁰ The 1982 constitution and subsequent laws regarding elections and political parties contributed to that image of “imitator parties” on the one hand and Islamists on the other by depriving political parties of instruments for organising at a grass-roots level.⁷⁰¹ Neoliberal policies that led to the retreat of the public sector from the economy and the deep penetration of foreign capital into the

⁶⁹⁷ Halil Karaveli, *Why Turkey is Authoritarian: From Atatürk to Erdoğan* (London: Pluto, 2018), 194.

⁶⁹⁸ Erbakan, *Adil Ekonomik Düzen*.

⁶⁹⁹ Ibid., 1–3.

⁷⁰⁰ Gülpalp, *Kimlikler Siyaseti*, 52.

⁷⁰¹ Ergin Yıldızoğlu, *AKP, Siyasal İslam ve Restorasyon* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 2015), 45.

country also contributed to the fissure between political parties and the electorate.⁷⁰² Turkish political Islam, however, had a wide-ranging network of socioeconomic relationships through religious organisations and institutions across the country, unlike any other political parties in the post-1980 period.⁷⁰³

Erbakan also drew a contradiction between the interest rate and labour, and criticised economic policies that had been pursued up until that time on the grounds that the share of labour within total incomes was in steady decline, whereas the share of interest expenses was on the rise.⁷⁰⁴ According to him, this also deepened the already-acute problem of income distribution.⁷⁰⁵ Another contradiction he makes, which already exists in Islamic thought, is that between *Hak* (righteousness or “God”) and *Batil* (unrighteousness or deviance), and their respective understandings of the way forward. For him, the Western civilisation follows a *Batil* understanding, since it has its historical origins in the rule of oppressive Egyptian pharaohs, which were inherited by the Ancient Greek civilisation, which were, in turn, inherited by Ancient Rome.⁷⁰⁶ The understanding of right adopted by that civilizational lineage was based upon “force,” the “majority,” “privilege” and “interests,” and for that reason, it created nothing but oppression.⁷⁰⁷ The true understanding of right, however, was based upon “fundamental human rights,” such as “the right to live,” “the right to defend one’s generation and honour,” “the right of property,” “the right to save one’s

⁷⁰² Ibid.

⁷⁰³ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁴ Erbakan, *Adil Ekonomik Düzen*, 4–7.

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid., 7–11.

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid., 14.

⁷⁰⁷ Ibid., 14–15.

mind,” and “the right to save one’s belief.”⁷⁰⁸ Apart from these, it was also supposedly based upon “labour,” “contracts made with mutual consent” and the “rights entailed by justice.”⁷⁰⁹ Thus, whereas the former understanding was supposedly no more than a “mentality that values force the most,” the latter understanding supposedly involved a “mentality that values right the most.”⁷¹⁰ The “just economic order” of Erbakan was supposedly based upon that latter understanding of right, and in economic terms, it had a claim to have the “beneficial aspects of capitalism and communism” such as “profit” and “free market competition” in the case of capitalism and the “absence of (fiscal) interest” in the case of communism, while excluding the “harmful elements” within both of them such as “interest”, “trusts and monopolies” in the case of capitalism and the “opposition to right of property and profit” and “desk-based price determination” in the case of communism.⁷¹¹ As is clear, despite all its claims to constitute a *via media* between capitalism and communism, the “just economic order” of Erbakan indeed falls clearly within the confines of capitalism, since it does not propose an alternative social system which excludes private control over the means of production and the individual appropriation of surplus value in the form of profit. It envisages a society composed of individual entrepreneurs with Islamic sensitivities organised within a totalitarian state under the leadership of the WP within an Islamist ideological framework.⁷¹²

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid., 15.

⁷⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁷¹⁰ Ibid., 16–17.

⁷¹¹ Ibid., 17–18.

⁷¹² Güllalp, *Kimlikler Siyaseti*, 65.

As Ayşe Buğra argues, however, the role attributed to Islam as a “network resource” has always had “the potential to undermine its role as a binding force” across various social classes, since political Islam had to “separate in order to bind” and had to “highlight difference in [Islamists’] demands for equality.”⁷¹³ This posed a problem of incorporating non-Islamist segments of the Turkish society into Islamist proposals, and Turkish political Islamists sought to overcome this problem through culturally pluralistic rhetoric under the name of “the Charter of Medina.”⁷¹⁴ The Charter of Medina is believed to have been among the fundamental founding texts of a supposedly Islamic form of polity based upon the coexistence of different religious groups under the leadership of Muslims with particular limits and sanctions imposed upon non-Muslim groups in exchange for their survival and freedom of faith, albeit with the political leadership of the prophet Muhammad representing the ultimate supreme legal and judicial authority.⁷¹⁵ Apart from the clear inequality imposed by the charter, the Islamic intellectuals bringing it forward as an appropriate social contract for the Turkish society in the 1990s, during which the Kurdish problem deepened and took on a particularly bloody character,⁷¹⁶ either preferred to neglect its

⁷¹³ Ayşe Buğra, “Political Islam in Turkey in Historical Context: Strengths and Weaknesses,” in *The Politics of Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology and State in Turkey*, ed. Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002), 139.

⁷¹⁴ The Charter of Medina is the text that is believed to have been drawn up by the very first Muslims led by the Islamic prophet Muhammad upon his arrival to Medina as a result of his *Hijra* (622 CE) from Mecca, where the Arab idolaters had initially not accepted his prophecy and had expelled him. The charter is believed to have been drawn up in order to accommodate the existence of different social groups in the city inhabited by many Jewish tribes as well as the Medinan and Meccan Muslims and other non-Muslim Arabs. Ali Bulaç, “Medine Vesikası ve Yeni Bir Toplum Projesi: Tarihsel ve Sosyal Çevre,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, vol. 6, *İslâmcılık*, ed. Yasin Aktay, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005), 503–13.

⁷¹⁵ Bulaç, “Medine Vesikası,” 509.

⁷¹⁶ Levent Tezcan, “İslâmcılık ve Toplumun Kurgusu,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, vol. 6, *İslâmcılık*, ed. Yasin Aktay, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005), 519. For a detailed account of Turkish political Islamists’ approach to the Kurdish problem in Turkey, see Serdar Şengül, “İslâmcılık, Kürtler

alleged ultimate historical collapse⁷¹⁷ or blamed the Medinan Jewish tribes due to their so-called “attitudes of treason.”⁷¹⁸ Notwithstanding this inherent shortcoming, it remained the key element of the culturally pluralistic rhetoric of Turkish political Islamists throughout the 1990s.⁷¹⁹

As indicated earlier, another key aspect of the rise of Turkish political Islam in the 1990s was the simultaneous emergence of MÜSİAD with new demands as the key representative of the Islamic fraction within the Turkish bourgeoisie. MÜSİAD, having been established by small and medium-sized entrepreneurs with Islamic leanings, was also “aware of the potential of Islam as a network resource within contemporary capitalism.”⁷²⁰ Its organisational rhetoric was full of references to the allegedly “historical exclusion of Muslim businessmen from the established business community supported by the republican state.”⁷²¹ Thus, in a sense, MÜSİAD was transferring “the language of social disadvantage used by [the WP] in a cultural context . . . to the realm of economic relations.”⁷²² It would be possible, thereby, to legitimise a similar government support on the basis of Islamic identity in the form

ve Kürt Sorunu,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, vol. 6, *İslâmcılık*, ed. Yasin Aktay, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005), 525–43.

⁷¹⁷ Bulaç, “Medine Vesikası,” 503–13.

⁷¹⁸ For instance, see Ahmet Yaman, “Tarihî ve Hukukî Yönüyle Medine Sözleşmesi/Vesikası,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, vol. 6, *İslâmcılık*, ed. Yasin Aktay, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005), 516.

⁷¹⁹ Tezcan, “İslâmcılık ve Toplumun Kurgusu,” 517–24.

⁷²⁰ Buğra, “Political Islam,” 133.

⁷²¹ Ibid.

⁷²² Ibid.

of, not only established practices such as “provid[ing] investment resources or market outlets . . . by using public funds,” but also building “relationships of reciprocity . . . on cultural identities that are defined to exclude the non-religious as well as to include the religious.”⁷²³ While such government support would open up new spaces of capital accumulation for the newly-emerging businesspeople with Islamic leanings, the rhetoric of social disadvantage and the Islamic discourse employed by MÜSİAD would also serve to ease tensions between these businesspeople and their employees through Islamic ethical codes and practices binding them to each other. Unlike their Western counterparts and members of TÜSİAD, members of MÜSİAD did not seek to differentiate themselves, at least in cultural terms, from their employees, and sought to come side by side during Islamic practices such as prayers. In addition to these, they made efforts to justify their wealth in the eyes of their employees through efforts to demonstrate that they worked equally as hard from an Islamic ethical point of view as well as giving personal and informal attention to their employees and their families in contrast with bigger enterprises, all of which helped in easing the conventional contradiction between capital and labour.⁷²⁴ Besides these cultural factors, the active promotion of the Turkish–Islamic Synthesis both by military rule and subsequent MP governments throughout the 1980s as “a panacea for containing the Left,”⁷²⁵ Turkey’s incorporation into world markets with a new export-oriented accumulation strategy beginning from 1980 and further policies of economic liberalisation, transfers of foreign exchange by expatriate Turkish workers from Western Europe, the mushrooming of Islamic private financial institutions under the auspices of Özal

⁷²³ Ibid.

⁷²⁴ Şennur Özdemir, “MÜSİAD ve Hak-İş’i Birlikte Anlamak: Sınıflı Bir ‘İslâmi Ekonomi’ mi?,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, vol. 6, *İslâmcılık*, ed. Yasin Aktay, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005), 856–87.

⁷²⁵ Yıldız Atasoy, “Cosmopolitan Islamists in Turkey: Rethinking the Local in a Global Era,” *Studies in Political Economy* 71/72:1 (2004): 141.

brothers, and finally the local networks of religious communities and orders all contributed to the rise of the Islamic fraction within the Turkish bourgeoisie which became organised under MÜSİAD in 1990.⁷²⁶

Apart from its demands for governmental support within an identity-based framework based upon privileging Islamists at the expense of non-Islamists, MÜSİAD also sought to benefit from the process of neoliberal globalisation through a strategy of regional integration.⁷²⁷ Unlike TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD initially saw the Customs Union with the European Union as a detrimental decision since, according to them, it would destroy Turkish local business and industry due to the lack of competitiveness on the part of Turkish small and medium-sized enterprises.⁷²⁸ Although they saw regionalisation and blocisation as complementary to globalisation,⁷²⁹ the region they considered to be on the rise was East Asia which had remarkable levels of economic growth prior to the 1997 Asian financial crisis.⁷³⁰ This is also evident in usages of the term “Anatolian Tigers”—reminiscent of the term “Asian Tigers” employed in order to describe the economic performance of some East Asian countries—while referring to “the export potential of some smaller enterprises

⁷²⁶ Özdemir, “MÜSİAD ve Hak-İş,” 872–74.

⁷²⁷ Koyuncu, “Küreselleşme ve MÜSİAD,” 364, 372.

⁷²⁸ Ziya Öniş and Umut Türem, “Business, Globalization and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis of Turkish Business Associations,” *Turkish Studies* 2:2 (2001): 101. It would, however, shift towards a pro-EU stance by the end of the 1990s. *Ibid.* This is a trend common to Turkish conservative and Islamist circles. Turgut Özal is also a case in point. He was speaking against the European Community in the early 1980s, whereas he later became the champion of Turkey’s bid for accession into that community in the late 1980s. İlhan Uzgel, *Ulusal Çıkar ve Dış Politika: Türk Dış Politikasının Belirlenmesinde Ulusal Çıkarın Rolü, 1983–1991* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004), 224–47.

⁷²⁹ Koyuncu, “Küreselleşme ve MÜSİAD,” 372.

⁷³⁰ *Ibid.*, 372–73.

located in certain towns of Anatolia.”⁷³¹ Along with the attractive economic performance of East Asian countries, what also certainly mattered was the supposedly non-Western cultural affinity felt by members of MÜSİAD with these countries.⁷³² In addition to East Asian countries and indeed more so, MÜSİAD also advocated an economic blocisation with the Islamic world and the newly independent Central Asian Turkic republics.⁷³³ Thus, in the latter half of the 1990s, it would also support initiatives such as the D-8 aimed at strengthening bilateral economic ties with Muslim countries under the political leadership of the WP.⁷³⁴ As such, it was only in the early 2000s that this particular variant of Turkish political Islam would be replaced by a neoliberal orientation.⁷³⁵ For the most part of its advances from the early 1980s to the late 1990s, it had “a distinct anti-liberal, anti-Western profile (epitomised in the figure of N. Erbakan).”⁷³⁶ This would continue for as long as Erbakan remained at the helm of that movement.⁷³⁷

As a class fraction still in the making in the early 1980s, the emergence of the Islamic fraction within the Turkish bourgeoisie with new demands marked the

⁷³¹ Ayşe Buğra, “Class, Culture, and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business Associations,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 30:4 (1998): 524.

⁷³² Ibid., 531.

⁷³³ Koyuncu, “Küreselleşme ve MÜSİAD,” 373.

⁷³⁴ Ibid.

⁷³⁵ Kees van der Pijl, “Arab Spring, Turkish ‘Summer’? The Trajectory of a Pro-Western ‘Moderate Islam’,” (NOREF Report, Oslo: Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution, November 2012), 7.

⁷³⁶ Ibid.

⁷³⁷ The Justice and Development Party (JDP), which was established in 2001 by splitters from the National Outlook movement, returned to many of the original ideological positions of Turkish political Islam, and in that sense, does not represent a rupture from that movement.

changed political economy in Turkey in the post-1980 period, but the Turkish form of political Islam which rose up with that particular class fraction was far from having a hegemonic character until the 2000s, and although it managed to win many municipalities in metropolises as key as Istanbul and Ankara in 1994, and also came to power, albeit in coalition with the TPP, in 1996, it could not keep its grip on power for long in the face of mounting pressures from the Turkish Armed Forces and non-Islamist segments of Turkish society ranging from TÜSİAD to TÜRK-İŞ and DİSK. Nevertheless, by the early 1990s, it was more than clear that Turkish political Islam and the Islamic fraction within the Turkish bourgeoisie had already turned out to be key elements of the new Turkish political and social formation. It was under such circumstances that neo-Ottomanism was brought forward by the organic intellectuals of the political leadership under Turgut Özal in the early 1990s in a way that could be considered a subimperialist hegemonic project, and one of its key characteristics was its apparent attempt at accommodating Islamists into the liberal proposals known as the “Second Republic.”

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the rise of political Islam and the emergence of an Islamic fraction within the Turkish bourgeoisie in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. While the MP’s neoliberal hegemonic project was slackening and social dissent was growing in the late 1980s, liberals and political Islamists appeared with their own ideological positions aiming at overcoming the debacle of the neoliberal model through dismantling the last remnants of Turkey’s Kemalist republican legacy. Whereas liberals reflected the traditional desire of big capital to sustain bourgeois hegemony within an economically anti-statist and multi-cultural liberal framework termed as the “Second Republic,” political Islamists came up with the “Just Economic Order,” which envisioned an Islamic form of petit bourgeois framework, with complementary anti-secularist and culturally pluralistic proposals such as the “Charter of Medina.” In the meantime, the Islamic fraction within the Turkish

bourgeoisie represented by MÜSİAD also began to emerge with new demands such as governmental support within an identity-based framework based upon privileging Islamic small and medium-sized enterprises at the expense of non-Islamic enterprises as well as developing close economic relations with the Islamic world and the newly independent Central Asian Turkic republics through regional economic blocs. The liberal “Second Republic,” its political patronage being limited to Özal’s leadership, remained ineffective as a political project, while political Islamists were still far from being a hegemonic force until the 2000s. Notwithstanding their failure as a political project in the early 1990s, a group of organic intellectuals of the political leadership of Turgut Özal gathered around *Türkiye Günlüğü* sought to accommodate these ideological positions and reformulate them in the form of neo-Ottomanism in the same period in a way that could be considered a subimperialist hegemonic project from a neo-Gramscian historical materialist approach. Thus, the next chapter will analyse neo-Ottomanism as put forward by these intellectuals as a subimperialist hegemonic project by virtue of its capacity or incapacity to successfully cement a historical bloc.

CHAPTER 6

NEO-OTTOMANISM AS PUT FORWARD BY THE ORGANIC INTELLECTUALS OF THE ÖZAL LEADERSHIP IN THE EARLY 1990S

6.1 Introduction

By the early 1990s, a group of organic intellectuals of the political leadership of Turgut Özal gathered around the nationalist-conservative journal *Türkiye Günlüğü*, along with Özal himself, began to propose a new regional leadership role for Turkey. They based their arguments upon the transformed post-Cold War international order, and argued that a new geopolitical space that ranged from the Balkans to Central Asia and the Caucasus had opened up before Turkey to fulfil such a role with the vacuum created following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Although some among them felt uneasy with US projections with respect to these regions, what they proposed in general was a regional leadership role under the auspices of the United States. Hence, the chapter illustrates how these intellectuals perceived the new international order, and analyses the way they reformulated neo-Ottomanism in *Türkiye Günlüğü* in the early 1990s.

6.2 The Neo-Ottomanist Tendency and the Role of Organic Intellectuals as Reflected in *Türkiye Günlüğü*

By the end of the 1980s, mainly through interviews and articles published in the quarterly journal *Türkiye Günlüğü* [Turkey Diary], a group of nationalist-conservative intellectuals, alongside some formerly leftist liberals such as Cengiz Çandar, began to propose an assertive role for Turkey in surrounding regions, arguing that it was the most appropriate candidate for becoming a regional power thanks to

its imperial legacy in much of these regions. Indeed, as argued above, denoting retrogression for the neoliberal model in many realms, such intellectual endeavours were commonplace in the 1990s. The debate over the conceptualisation of a neo-Ottomanist foreign policy based upon a regional hegemony over territories that range from the Balkans and the Middle East to the Caucasus and Central Asia that would be led by Turkey, on the pages of *Türkiye Günlüğü*, most prominently and vigorously by Cengiz Çandar, the then special advisor to President Turgut Özal, was one of the most well-known cases of these endeavours. What distinguished the proposals made by these nationalist-conservative and liberal intellectuals in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the increasing signs that the political leadership was also on the same page with these intellectuals on foreign policy issues. As the political leader, first as prime minister and after 1989 as president until his death in early 1993, Turgut Özal echoed occasionally similar views about Turkish foreign policy and the proposed role that it would play in Turkey's surrounding regions.

Türkiye Günlüğü began to be published under a contentious domestic political environment in April 1989 principally as a right-wing journal. Similar to the MP, it sought to bring together authors and views from the famous “four political tendencies,” which the MP claimed to have incorporated within itself.⁷³⁸ It, however, gathered together nationalist-conservative authors with close connections with the former ultranationalist *ülküciü* movement⁷³⁹ such as Mustafa Çalık, Ahmet Turan

⁷³⁸ These “four tendencies” were “nationalism,” “conservativism,” “social democracy” and “liberalism.” The claim that the MP had incorporated all these tendencies within itself was formulated in its programme as follows: “We are a nationalist conservative political party advocating social justice and free market economy.” MP, *The Programme of the Motherland Party* (n.p.: MP, 1986), 5.

⁷³⁹ The *ülküciü* movement was set up as a side organisation of the nationalist Republican Peasants’ Nation Party (RPNP), which would subsequently be renamed the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) in 1969, for the young militant cadres of the party in the Associations of Ideal Hearths (*Ülkü Ocakları Derneği*) in 1965. *Ülküciülik*, or “idealism” in its ultranationalist sense is an understanding of social order that was put forth by Alparslan Türkeş—a former colonel and the founder of the NAP. *Ülküciü yol*, or the “idealist way,” was imagined to be a “third way” independent of both capitalism and communism. The young militant cadres of this movement were also pitted against the political left as paramilitary forces during the pre-1980 violent political clashes. Mehmet Ali Ağaogulları, “The

Alkan, Mim Kemal Öke and Mümtaz’er Türköne as well as liberal authors such as Atilla Yayla, Nur Vergin, Osman Cengiz Çandar and Şahin Alpay, of whom the last two had been active in the Maoist *Aydınlık* group led by Doğu Perinçek in the pre-1980 period. Thus, in essence, right-wing intellectuals, be it nationalist-conservative or liberal, constituted its backbone. Nevertheless, the coexistence of these two groups in the journal was not free from tensions sometimes coming to the surface in the form of conflicting statements. This is most apparent in their approaches to the West and Turkey’s relation to it. The nationalist-conservatives, led principally by Mustafa Çalık and Ahmet Turan Alkan, sought to posit their neo-Ottomanist proposals as opposed to the West, whereas the liberals, foremost among them Cengiz Çandar and Nur Vergin, formulated neo-Ottomanism clearly in a way that could be considered a subimperialist project. What united these intellectuals was their organic relations with the political leadership of Turgut Özal. The *Cedit* (New) Group established by Mustafa Çalık, the founder and the editor in chief of the journal, was organising panels and discussions under the direct patronage of Özal himself with Özal being participated in person either in the form of moderator or in the form of speaker. It was already mentioned that Özal also occasionally echoed views similar to ones that were published in this journal, and more to ones expressed by the liberal wing within the journal. Moreover, among the contributors to the journal, there were close fellows of him such as Cengiz Çandar, who became a special advisor to him in 1991 until his death in 1993. Thus, although there were ideological differences among these intellectuals, they were united in a common cause behind the political leadership of Özal. Hence, the journal and the new role that its contributors proposed for Turkey in its surrounding regions in the post-Cold War era deserve attention in order to understand how the political leadership under Turgut Özal perceived and interpreted the unfolding new international order.

Ultranationalist Right,” in *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*, ed. İrvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 194, 198–99.

Beginning from the heydays of the First Gulf War in early 1991, the authors in *Türkiye Günülgü* began to propose a new role for Turkey in its surrounding regions taking into consideration the transformation in international order that took place in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The fact that the authors of the journal began to pay attention to regional politics only after the fourteenth issue published in the spring of 1991 reveals the impact of this transformation in international order upon the thinking of the organic intellectuals of the Turkish new right. This issue was dedicated to the developments in the Middle East with the title “Middle East: ‘Boded Ill’!”⁷⁴⁰ In this issue, Yusuf Yazar, for instance, criticises the “arbitrary and artificial borders” in the Middle East stating that drawing such borders is not different from invasion and annexation from an Islamist point of view.⁷⁴¹ Cengiz Çandar, the special advisor to the President Turgut Özal, on the other hand, describes the central position of the region in world politics with reference to its “geostrategic, geopolitical, economic and cultural dimensions.”⁷⁴² Citing European historians, he describes the centuries-long Ottoman presence in the region as “Turkish domination,” and criticises the republican “Turkish intelligentsia” for trying to “reject its own past” by labelling this presence as “Ottoman.”⁷⁴³ Interestingly, he also tries to vindicate the Arab nationalism against the Ottoman Empire on the grounds that it was “an inevitable reaction to the Turkish

⁷⁴⁰ *Türkiye Günülgü* 14 (1991). The original Turkish title of the issue is “Orta – Doğu: ‘Morarmıştır Faltaş!’” that sought to recall the phrase “morarıyor faltaş” (boding ill) Cemal Süreya (poet and writer, 1931–1990) had used earlier in 1967 alluding to the dreadful state of affairs in the Middle East in his poems “*Ortadoğu I*” and “*Ortadoğu II*”. Cemal Süreya, *Sevda Sözleri: Bütin Şiirleri*, ed. Selahattin Özpalabıyıklar, 36th ed. (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayıncıları, 2009), 103–109.

⁷⁴¹ Yusuf Yazar, “Ortadoğu’ya Müdahale,” *Türkiye Günülgü* 14 (1991): 70.

⁷⁴² Mustafa Çalık, “Orta Doğu Üzerine Cengiz Çandar İle Mülakat,” *Türkiye Günülgü* 14 (1991): 84.

⁷⁴³ Ibid.

domination,”⁷⁴⁴ possibly with a view to targeting the long-held republican narrative that Arabs stabbed their Muslim fellows in the back in the First World War. He even goes further by linking the birth of the modern version of Arab nationalism in the Ottoman Levant and the existence of Christian Arabs in the forefront of this version of Arab nationalism to the particular character of the Ottoman Middle East in the sense that it was the “region that the Western colonising powers wanted to dominate” unlike the Maghreb that they had already dominated.⁷⁴⁵ As to the Gulf War, he openly rejects the arguments that this was a war for oil, and claims instead that this was “an undeclared war between the United States and Europe.”⁷⁴⁶ He argues that through this war did the United States manage to make Europe approve and assign its role as the governor and regulator of the whole world, and that this was a reaction to the developments in Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s towards integration and creating a single market.⁷⁴⁷ Accordingly, some countries like Iran and Turkey “had the opportunity to seem significant actors on the international scene,” and “Turkey suddenly came into prominence as an element to be reckoned with seriously and its friendship needed to be sought.”⁷⁴⁸ Thus, Çandar asserts as follows:

Today we cannot abide by pacifist doctrines of the Cold War period like, “It’s the United States who’s at war, let’s not attract the hostility of the other party.” This war is essentially a war between Europe and the United States. Europe treated Turkey very badly and continues to do so. The desire and goal of the United States to subordinate Europe and become the regulator of the world

⁷⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁵ Ibid., 85.

⁷⁴⁶ Ibid., 89.

⁷⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁸ Ibid.

and our interests at present and at least for the foreseeable future suddenly overlapped.⁷⁴⁹

He claims that Europe felt disturbed by Turkey's increasing role in its regions, but despite this he also argues that Turkey should not dream of a "history without Europe" for itself, and that it would be wise to compel Europe to accept Turkey through "playing the game with the United States and Britain."⁷⁵⁰ His emphasis on a common future with Europe, as a formerly leftist but subsequently liberal author, reveals a salient divergence with nationalist-conservative authors of the journal such as his interviewer Mustafa Çalik. Arguing that Turkey had more to gain not only from the competition between the United States and Europe but also from other areas such as the anticipated economic integration in the Black Sea region and its supposedly indispensable geopolitical and cultural characteristics, Çalik in a sense objects to Çandar by asking him whether Turkey's "compulsion not to envisage a history without Europe" was still not lessening.⁷⁵¹ The latter agrees or feels obliged to agree that such "compulsion" was in decline by stating that this also was an indicator of Turkey's rising importance, and accordingly, he goes on by adding,

I think a juncture at which we can get out of the moral defeat that the dissolution of an empire had put into people's hearts and minds with the republic—a moral defeat which lasted for seventy years—has come. The position and state that Turkey deserved was not the panorama that had been in people's minds and also in our foreign policy as a reflection of it for seventy years. Countries with imperial legacies all act in accordance with an outlook that is appropriate to those legacies. Since we inherited an empire that its dissolution had lasted extremely long and its "sick man [of Europe]" character had become chronic, our people have virtually had a psychology of sickness during time of recovery. . . . We must realise that this period of recovery, which lasted unnecessarily long, came to an end. Turkey has reached the

⁷⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁰ Ibid., 90–91.

⁷⁵¹ Ibid., 91.

condition of the luckiest country of all the Near Asia and Middle East in the coming years. An utterly wide and bright horizon has opened up before it.⁷⁵² Çandar also points to the historical importance of Iraq for Turkey by drawing attention to the “forceful and unjust detachment of Northern Iraq from us without our will,” and adds that this region is “like sort of a homeland for us.”⁷⁵³ He also recalls that “the Iraqi front was the only front which we were not defeated and had to leave without being defeated.”⁷⁵⁴ Although he states that this must not be understood as a reason for political claims over these territories, “Iraq occupies such place in our sentiments and consciousness.”⁷⁵⁵ Moreover, he emphasises that majority of the population in Northern Iraq is still the same by asserting, “They are kin and integral part of us—be it Turkmen or Kurd.”⁷⁵⁶ Here Çandar tends to distance his views from irredentist approaches adopted by ultranationalists who kept advocating that Mosul and Kirkuk belonged to Turkey.

More generally on Turkish foreign policy, “Turkey must become a political power,” he asserts, “which is able to pursue a multidimensional and active foreign policy” with a supposedly “broad perspective” and “which has ‘internalised’ a great power role.”⁷⁵⁷ Accordingly, he does not hesitate to label both the leftist and Islamist opponents of his pro-American “active” foreign policy as “not authentic” and “lacking a consciousness and basis of nationalness that would look for a ‘Turkey first’

⁷⁵² Ibid.

⁷⁵³ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁴ Ibid., 91–92.

⁷⁵⁵ Ibid., 92.

⁷⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁷ Ibid.

[understanding].”⁷⁵⁸ He even goes further by claiming that this opposition camp was trying to conceal their support to Saddam Hussein, the then President of Iraq, under the banner of “anti-imperialism,” adding also that only “French neo-Nazis” joined this opposition camp in the West.⁷⁵⁹

Notwithstanding this assertiveness of Çandar, a translation of a critical article on American foreign policy and the Gulf War was also being published in the same issue of the journal.⁷⁶⁰ Reminiscent of the contradiction between liberal Çandar and nationalist-conservative Çalık about Turkey’s future relationship with Europe, Michael Klare warns the countries that seek to become regional powers about their future relationship with the United States by stating, “it is from now on with regional powers, endowed with modern armaments, that the United States risks colliding,” in that article. “In this sense, the Gulf crisis,” he adds, “appears as the test bed of the wars of tomorrow.”⁷⁶¹ The translation and publication of such critical article in this pro-Özal journal reflects the uneasiness felt by the nationalist-conservative intellectuals gathered together in this journal towards the United States and its policies. The eagerness for interventionist policies towards the Middle East, however, turns out to be predominant despite the discomfort felt with the US policies towards the region. In this vein, the nationalist-conservative authors in the journal also complain about the lack of sufficient instruments for more actively engaging with the region such as regional studies.⁷⁶² They argue that the lack of instruments in many

⁷⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁰ Michael Klare, “Körfez ya da Yarınki Savaşların Deneme Tahtası,” trans. Eriman Topbaş, *Türkiye Günlüğü* 14 (1991): 94–96. For the French original of the article, see Michael Klare, “Le Golfe, banc d’essai des guerres de demain,” *Le Monde diplomatique* (January 1991): 1, 18–19.

⁷⁶¹ Klare, “Le Golfe,” 1, 18–19.

⁷⁶² For instance, see Nabi Avcı, “Türkiye’de Ortadoğu Araştırmaları Neden Bu Kadar Yetersiz?,” *Türkiye Günlüğü* 14 (1991): 97–98. Nabi Avcı served as Minister of National Education between 2013

respects is due to a “problem of mindset”⁷⁶³ by targeting worldviews of the supposed “secular élites” of the Republic.⁷⁶⁴ Socialism also gets its share from this wholesale criticism with being labelled as “élite culture.”⁷⁶⁵

The journal becomes further assertive in the summer of 1992 with its nineteenth issue once more devoted to the issue of Turkish foreign policy and the supposed role for Turkey in its neighbouring regions. The title of this issue is, “Turkey While History and Geopolitics Settling Their Accounts with the Twentieth Century?,” and it was being published at the time of critical international political developments such as the First Gulf War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the breakup of Yugoslavia. These developments seem to have made the organic intellectuals of the Özal leadership more ambitious about the supposed role of Turkey in its neighbouring regions, but at the same time the nationalist-conservative majority of these

and 2016 and as Minister of Culture and Tourism under the Justice and Development Party (JDP) governments.

⁷⁶³ Ibid., 97.

⁷⁶⁴ Mustafa Ömer Satılmaz, “Laik Çevre Aydınlarının Yeni Ekmek Kapısı: İslâm Araştırmaları,” *Türkiye Günüluğu* 14 (1991): 99–102.

⁷⁶⁵ Mümtaz’er Türköne, “Seçkin Kültürü Olarak Sosyalizm,” *Türkiye Günüluğu* 15 (1991): 63–67. Durmuş Hocaoğlu, on the other hand, places the Turkish left within the broader category of “westernism,” which is, according to him, one of the three main groups that composed the Ottoman intelligentsia alongside “Islamism” and “Turkism.” Durmuş Hocaoğlu, “Türk Aydınında Felsefi Zaafiyetin Temelleri,” *Türkiye Günüliği* 15 (1991): 72–73. An accusation of a “defeatist” kind of “westernism” against the Turkish left is common to all articles that were published in the fifteenth issue of the journal that appeared with the title “Socialism and the Turkish Left” at the time of dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Turkish left is also criticised for not undergoing a rupture with Kemalism, and thus it is accused of “disconnection” with pious masses since these authors also claim that the secularist stance of the Turkish left denied freedom of conscience to these masses. Türköne, “Seçkin Kültürü,” 67; Vedat Bilgin, “Türkiye Solunun Toplumsal Özellikleri Üzerine,” *Türkiye Günüliği* 15 (1991): 79; Beşir Ayvazoğlu, “Türkiye’de Solcu Olmak,” *Türkiye Günüliği* 15 (1991): 81–84; Mehmet Ali Ağaoğulları, “Osmanlı Sosyal Demokrat Olsayıdı,” *Türkiye Günüliği* 15 (1991): 89–94; Mustafa Erdoğan, “Sol’dan Görünenler,” *Türkiye Günüliği* 15 (1991): 116–20; Kadir Cangızbay, “Ölen Sosyalizm mi?,” *Türkiye Günüliği* 15 (1991): 124; Mustafa Çalık, “Sosyalizmi Yolcularken Batı, Türk Solu veya ‘Herodian’lığın Mukadder Akibeti Hakkında Bazı Notlar,” *Türkiye Günüliği* 15 (1991): 127–32.

intellectuals became more suspicious towards the so-called “New World Order” led by the United States. The foreword by the editorial council⁷⁶⁶ to that issue dubs it the “delusion of the New World Order” in a way sceptical about the US policies towards the Middle East and the Balkans.⁷⁶⁷ It is easy to realise the ambivalence of the nationalist-conservative editors of the journal that emanate from both the perceived opportunities for Turkey in a new international environment and the uneasiness felt as a result of the domestic Kurdish problem that was further aggravated by heavy casualties in the fight against the PKK:

National conceptions of countries with imperial legacies like Turkey would do no harm to world peace, but scenarios of breakup envisaged by *ethnic imaginations* would rather serve the “new world order” [sic] or the practice of US hegemony in Eurasia. History and geopolitics can neither reject nor deny *national conceptions*. Quite the contrary, *national conceptions* have decisive roles in the formation of history and geopolitics. As regards *ethnic imaginations*, it is not possible to tell the same thing. . . . The “realisation” of these “imaginings” means legitimisation of primitive and late chauvinisms. The right to self-determination of nations cannot be extended to *ethnic imaginations*, nor can it be reduced to them.⁷⁶⁸

In that issue the journal also gave wide coverage to views of President Turgut Özal on Turkish foreign policy with an interview conducted by the editor-in-chief Mustafa Çalık directly with him. For Özal, the West is the clear winner in the post-Cold War period. This is a fortunate development according to him since the victory of the West means the victory of “liberal democracy” and “private enterprise”

⁷⁶⁶ The then editorial council of the journal consists of the following nationalist-conservative intellectuals: Ahmet Turan Alkan, Nabi Avcı, Beşir Ayvazoğlu, Vedat Bilgin, Mustafa Çalık, Öner Kabasakal, Mim Kemal Öke, Mehmet Özden, Ahmet Nezihi Turan and Mümtaz’er Türköne. *Türkiye Günlüğü* 19 (1992): 2.

⁷⁶⁷ The Editorial Council, “Yaz Mektubu,” *Türkiye Günlüğü* 19 (1992): 3.

⁷⁶⁸ Ibid., 4. Emphasis added.

according to him.⁷⁶⁹ While welcoming this new period in general and appraising the opportunities it brought forth, he also draws attention to the negative features of this period. He states that the inter-bloc rivalry and the nuclear threat of the Cold War era were displaced by serious regional controversies, local wars and internal fights.⁷⁷⁰ Nationalist sentiments that had been suppressed for decades and separatist demands emanating from these sentiments gained prominence immediately after the disappearance of the “heavy hand” of the Soviet Union over the Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Caucasus. The risk at that point, according to him, was that none of those newly independent countries had ethnic or religious integrity.⁷⁷¹

As is the case for his special advisor Cengiz Çandar, Turgut Özal also criticises the Turkish foreign policy of the former governments. Appreciating the difficult circumstances during the establishment of the Republic, he avoids using an accusatory rhetoric against the founders of the Republic regarding their cautiousness in foreign policy. He, nonetheless, finds it wrong to maintain this cautiousness in Turkish foreign policy any longer.⁷⁷² He also finds close connection between economic and foreign policies by claiming that the economic restructuring initiated by him formed the basis of his supposedly new foreign policy.⁷⁷³ He makes a contrast between the economic conditions of Turkey in 1980 and in 1992 by stating that whereas he tried hard to get oil with credits from Iraq in 1980 as the then undersecretary of the prime ministry, Turkey in 1992 was granting credits to that same

⁷⁶⁹ Mustafa Çalık, “Özal: ‘Türkiye’nin Önünde Hâcet Kapıları Açılmıştır!’,” *Türkiye Günlüğü* 19 (1992): 6.

⁷⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷⁷² Ibid., 8.

⁷⁷³ Ibid., 8–9.

country.⁷⁷⁴ For him, having such means is a clear indicator of a strong country in all respects. Nevertheless, the economic and political restructuring in Turkey represents only one aspect of its international position in the early post-Cold War years for him. The other and more important aspect is the transformation in international order with major developments in regions that surround Turkey. Using a mystifying language, he claims that “gates of desire”⁷⁷⁵ have opened before Turkey in the face of such regional and international developments:

Today we came to such a point in history that a wide area from the Balkans to Central Asia inhabited by either Muslim or Turkish communities have opened before us. . . . This opportunity is the biggest opportunity that our nation has grasped for four hundred years. Some kind of “gates of desire” have opened before our nation... It is indeed the kind of enormous opportunity and blessing that any nation or country might get once in several centuries. If we do not enter today from these “gates of desire” that have opened before us, we will have missed this historic opportunity; because these gates would not stand open forever, if they close, we would not be able to get again such opportunity, not only for a century or so, but maybe forever and ever.⁷⁷⁶

In his answer to Mustafa Çalık’s question as to whether or not Turkey would assume a “vanguard role” for countries of the geopolitical landscape that ranges from Central Asia to the Balkans, Turgut Özal defines this landscape as, “places inhabited by communities with which we have historical and cultural commonalities, and

⁷⁷⁴ Ibid., 12.

⁷⁷⁵ The original Turkish phrase Turgut Özal uses is *hâcet kapıları* that literally means “gates of need.” It is, however, more appropriate to translate it as “gates of desire” since that idiom connotes an entrance into a place that you would be able to satisfy your desires. Malik Mufti also uses the latter translation instead of the former, whereas Lerna Yanık and Hakan Övünç Ongur prefer to use “gates of wish” and Göktuğ Sönmez prefers “gates of achievement.” Malik Mufti, *Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 76; Lerna Yanık, Constructing Turkish ‘Exceptionalism’,” 84; Hakan Övünç Ongur, “Identifying Ottomanisms: The Discursive Evolution of Ottoman Pasts in the Turkish Presents,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 51:3 (2015): 423; Göktuğ Sönmez, “The Interplay between International and Domestic Factors in Turkey’s Grand Strategy-Making: Activism, Disappointment, and Readjustment” (PhD diss., SOAS, University of London, 2017), 291.

⁷⁷⁶ Çalık, “Özal: ‘Hâcet Kapıları Açılmıştır!’,” 12–13.

thereby constituting *our natural sphere of influence*.⁷⁷⁷ He describes this region with several “intersecting circles.” The first circle contains the ex-Ottoman territories, whereas the second one contains the countries inhabited by Turkic communities. A third circle could also be drawn around territories inhabited by “related communities” such as the Iranian Kurds since these were considered to be “relatives” of Turkey’s own Kurds.⁷⁷⁸ Turkey would be a “guide” for all countries throughout the region in both transforming their economies into free-market economies and restructuring their polities along pro-western and supposedly “democratic” lines. Thus, his answer to the question is positive:

No other country is as close as Turkey to the powerful, pacifist and trustworthy leadership of this region. Because Turkey is the heir to an imperial civilisation that marked the longest period of peace, calm and tranquillity throughout the history in much of this region that intermittently witnesses bloody battles today. . . . Turkey cannot and must not afford to be indifferent to anything that takes place around itself. . . . Increasing the standards of welfare and development in this region primarily depends on resolving disputes and mutual cooperation and solidarity. Accelerating such a positive process, on the other hand, needs the leadership role of Turkey that would assert itself with its strong economy and stable politics.⁷⁷⁹

Ahmet Turan Alkan, on the other hand, does not reflect the same hopeful mood of thought about Turkey’s international position in his article in the same issue. On the contrary, he employs a concerned rhetoric about Turkey’s position and the international and regional political climate at that time. Borrowing the name of the famous epic novel and memories of Halide Edib Adıvar (1884–1964) about the Turkish War of Independence, *Ateşten Gömlek* (The Shirt of Flame, 1922) and *Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihani: İstiklal Savaşı Hatıraları* (Turk’s Ordeal with Fire: War of

⁷⁷⁷ Ibid., 13–14; italics added.

⁷⁷⁸ Ibid., 14. Turgut Özal, therefore, was not interested in affairs related to the Iranian Kurds as much as he was in affairs related to the Iraqi Kurds since the latter ones were direct descendants of people that used to be Ottoman subjects. Ibid., 20–21.

⁷⁷⁹ Ibid., 15–16.

Independence Memories, 1962), “How many times has the Turk had his ‘ordeal with fire’; it is unknown,” he asserts and adds, “History has been watching the dance of the Turk with fire for centuries.”⁷⁸⁰ The reason for such concerned rhetoric is the survival of the Turk in Asia Minor that is supposedly at bay since, “Asia Minor, indeed, is both too beautiful and too precious for Turks,”⁷⁸¹ seemingly in the eyes of the westerners according to Alkan. Reminiscent of the accusations of defeat against the Treaty of Lausanne among the conservative and Islamist political circles, Alkan also claims that Lausanne represented the “real” solution, meaning that it was the realistic way out for the Western powers, whereas the Treaty of Sèvres represented the “optimal” in their “ideal” to weaken and ultimately destroy the Turkish presence in Anatolia.⁷⁸² He also further contends that although that “ideal” seemed to be quite difficult to attain, the “optimal” possibilities still existed.⁷⁸³ Arguing that Turkey was always kept as an “agricultural country” with huge debts owed to the West, he alleges that Turkey’s smallest moves against such limitations were always, and would again be, suppressed with miscellaneous domestic and foreign problems.⁷⁸⁴ Therefore, for him, “Turkey must be ready to see new bills of problems on its table as long as it pronounces words other than the ones found appropriate for it,” since it was settling old scores with its own history at that time.⁷⁸⁵ Unlike optimistic Turgut Özal who urged to discuss even federalism, Alkan puts territorial integrity and unitary state as

⁷⁸⁰ Ahmet Turan Alkan, “Ateşlerde Yürümek,” *Türkiye Günliği* 19 (1992): 24.

⁷⁸¹ Ibid., 24.

⁷⁸² Ibid.

⁷⁸³ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁴ Ibid., 25.

⁷⁸⁵ Ibid.

“incontestable” by also stating, “This idea is our *idée fixe*, taboo.”⁷⁸⁶ He also claims that the Republic of Turkey inherited the Sublime State’s (*Devlet-i Âliyye*) approach to its subjects despite its emphasis on Turkishness, and hence, that the distance between Ottomanism and Turkish nationalism is shorter than assumed.⁷⁸⁷ Thus, he considers quests for going beyond the Turkish character of the republican regime in order to come to terms with the ethnic multiplicity as “signs of malevolence.”⁷⁸⁸ This is, indeed, a direct criticism towards the liberal wing within the Özalian neo-Ottomanist camp, and, in a way, represents the inner contradictions within that short-lived camp. He also criticises the emphases made by proponents of Özalian neo-Ottomanism upon “luck” and the “casual” character of it with reference to the special international and regional political circumstances, since, for him, these were indicators that the neo-Ottomanist role that Turkey would supposedly play in its surrounding regions lacked any solid basis.⁷⁸⁹ Therefore, what Turkey must do in the first place was, according to him, to join the ranks of the first-class states. For him, this would also mean encroaching on the wealth cake that great powers never share with others. Thus, it entailed, “settling old scores with the West and overcoming it in all respects,” while at the same time, “this might also be one of the most meaningful equivalents of the concept ‘jihad’.”⁷⁹⁰ It would be worth noting at this point that what

⁷⁸⁶ Ibid., 26.

⁷⁸⁷ Ibid., 27–28. It is obvious here that Alkan conflates the *millet* system of the Ottomans that was based on religious communities with the later constitutionalist policy of Ottomanism that was based on equal citizenship and representation in the Ottoman parliament. For the *millet* system and the policy of Ottomanism, respectively, see Bilal Eryılmaz, *Osmâni Devleti’nde Millet Sistemi* (İstanbul: Alternatif Üniversite, 1992); Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyâset*, 9th ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayımları, 2019).

⁷⁸⁸ Alkan, “Ateşlerde Yürümek,” 28.

⁷⁸⁹ Ibid., 29.

⁷⁹⁰ Ibid., 30.

Alkan proposes here is not a “delinking” from the capitalist globalisation or the world capitalist system as the political left in general, and Samir Amin in particular, defended for the peripheral Third World countries in order to overcome the exploitative and destructive effects of global capitalism which constantly kept such countries underdeveloped.⁷⁹¹ What Alkan and his nationalist-conservative fellows advocate is instead to remain within the world capitalist system, but to seek to play the capitalist game better, thereby having a greater share from the global cake of wealth. Overall, it could be argued that what is proposed by Alkan is clearly a nationalist initiative that would also utilise Islamic elements, but unlike Turgut Özal and liberal authors, he pits this initiative against the West.

It has already been noted that Cengiz Çandar, the then special advisor to President Turgut Özal, shares the vigour of Özal about the supposed role that Turkey would assume. He goes much further in his assertiveness about this new role in his article published in the summer of 1992. For him, the year 1991 marks a real turning point for “an enormous range [of issues] from the very ontology of the Republic to security doctrines and from its foreign policy to the character of the regime,” given that “three determining developments took place,” in that year—i.e. “the disappearance of the Soviet Union,” “the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the reshaping of the Balkan map,” and, finally, “the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War and the Kurdish question ‘coming out of Pandora’s box’.”⁷⁹² Thus, what he proposes is a “radical change in views and attitudes about the problems lying in front of the country,” since all these developments rendered, “much, if not all, of what had been written until 1991 about the future of the country and perspectives on it, null and

⁷⁹¹ Samir Amin, *Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World* (London: Zed Books, 1990). See also Yong-Hong Zhang, “On Samir Amin’s Strategy of ‘Delinking’ and ‘Socialist Transition’,” *International Journal of Business and Social Research* 3:11 (2013): 101–107.

⁷⁹² Cengiz Çandar, “21. Yüzyıl’a Doğru Türkiye: Tarih ve Jeopolitiğin İntikamı,” *Türkiye Gündüğü* 19 (1992): 31.

void.”⁷⁹³ Stating that the newly independent countries that emerged out of the Soviet Union such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are all Sunni Muslim countries with great Turkic populations,⁷⁹⁴ he regards it “inevitable” that “the state situated on the Western edge of the Turkic World and, be it the Muslim Ottoman or the secular Republic, that constitutes the ‘Sunni centre’ of Asia Minor” would be “the centre of attention of this new formation.”⁷⁹⁵ From this aspect, “Turkey had the chance, not vouchsafed even to the Ottomans before, of extending and expanding its sphere of influence into the trans-Caspian [region],” and this prospect that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union was, “the most invaluable geopolitical gift of history to Turkey.”⁷⁹⁶

Çandar also claims that the year 1991 marked the suspension of the regional order that had been imposed upon the Middle East in the aftermath of the First World War.⁷⁹⁷ The Kurdish problem having already been inflamed in Iraq and Turkey, it brought up “questions as to whether the ‘modern’ Republic of Turkey would continue to exist exclusively as a ‘Turkish Republic’ or a ‘Turkish–Kurdish Republic’.”⁷⁹⁸ He

⁷⁹³ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁴ This view resembles Ziya Gökalp’s earlier Pan-Turanianist views. However, Çandar is wrong about Tajikistan since, though a Central Asian country like others, it is not a Turkic country, and the Tajik language is widely accepted as a dialect of Persian. Moreover, although Sunni Islam predominates across these ex-Soviet Central Asian countries, the secular legacy of the Soviet era is still vivid in all these countries especially at the top administrative levels. For Ziya Gökalp and his views, see Hamit Bozarslan, “M. Ziya Gökalp,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, vol. 1, *Cumhuriyet’e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi*, ed. Mehmet Ö. Alkan, 7th ed. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2006), 314–19.

⁷⁹⁵ Çandar, “21. Yüzyıl’a Doğru,” 32.

⁷⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁸ Ibid., 33.

goes further by claiming that this new formation in the Middle East offered Turkey also a chance of vigilantism (*ihkak-i hak*) towards its national goals that it had not been able to accomplish in Lausanne such as the status of the Mosul province. Moreover, he argues, “the political forces and the local people in the Iraqi Kurdistan have begun to embark on quests for integration with Turkey again.”⁷⁹⁹ These were all “a geopolitical revenge of history on history,” thereby placing Turkey back to its “geopolitical position before the First World War.”⁸⁰⁰ All these amount to an ahistorical presentation of geopolitics and history as if these claims were true at all times and in all places in their own right.

Although he concedes that it is not reasonable to think the empires could again rise in their old forms, he argues that the heirs of those empires would fulfil old imperial functions under new historical conditions. He also rests on the accusations of “defeatism” against the Treaty of Lausanne and attacks especially İsmet İnönü that he and his followers followed a “mediocre” line with respect to Turkish foreign policy, but such a foreign policy would not be the line that Turkey needed to follow in a world that supposedly returned to the “chaos of the First World War.”⁸⁰¹ For him, Lausanne closely resembles Sèvres, with the former being only “a modification” of the latter, and the difference between these two treaties was far from a matter of quality, but rather a matter of quantity.⁸⁰² Thus, a country that would reject the imperial mission open before it and consider itself condemned to a “mentality of

⁷⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁰¹ Ibid.

⁸⁰² Ibid.

Sèvres” and constrained by Lausanne would ultimately shrink and shatter.⁸⁰³ Since, to him, conquests and military expansionism was out of question in the twenty-first century, it would be necessary to “determine accurate ways of enlargement,” because, “imperial mission entails enlarging,” he asserts by also adding, “to stop, to pause is the first stage of shrinking, shattering and melting.”⁸⁰⁴ Those “accurate ways to enlarge,” according to him, would be through “democratic society” and “powerful economy” as part of an “imperial vision.”⁸⁰⁵ “To shrink or to enlarge; history and geopolitics do not seem to be generous enough to give [Turkey] a third option,” thus, he concludes.⁸⁰⁶ This is the point Çandar emphasises the most. This is the clearest expression of the neo-Ottoman subimperialism. For him, the biggest “roadblock” before such “imperial mission” was the one that had been set up by “minds confused by the Republic in accordance with its new role defined by the West with the elimination of the Empire.”⁸⁰⁷ He, therefore, calls for a mass intellectual campaign that would be fought by a wide range of ideologies, “from communism to Islamism, from Islamism to Pan-Turanianism [*Turancılık*],” supposedly alienated by the Republican “mediocrity,” against the “intellectual desert” again supposedly created by the Kemalist Republic in accordance with its “minor role” in international arena given by the West.⁸⁰⁸ Thus, what he offers could be considered as a political alliance

⁸⁰³ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁶ Ibid., 34.

⁸⁰⁷ Ibid., 33–34.

⁸⁰⁸ Ibid., 34.

against the supposedly “mediocre” Republican foreign policy establishment around a neo-Ottomanist foreign policy agenda.

As it is the case with Ahmet Turan Alkan, Durmuş Hocaoğlu, another nationalist-conservative author of the journal, also follows a more cautious line compared to Turgut Özal and Cengiz Çandar. First of all, unlike Özal and Çandar, for Hocaoğlu, the Kurdish question leads to great trouble rather than opening up new opportunities.⁸⁰⁹ Moreover, there were serious limits to what Turkey could accomplish in Central Asia due to several significant factors such as the ongoing Russian presence in and influence over these newly independent Turkic countries and the lack of a common culture and language among much of those countries.⁸¹⁰ Yet he still agrees with Özal and Çandar that historic opportunities emerged before Turkey since it “stood at a point where history was changing course.”⁸¹¹ Like Çandar, he also asserts, “the Ottomans retreated, the Republic of Turkey remained as core, and in my opinion too, the retreat of Turkey and Turks has ended.”⁸¹² Hence it was time for advance, and his proposals for such advance are almost the same as those of Özal and Çandar. It becomes clear once again that the views of these authors do not have significant differences with each other regarding the aim set themselves despite their ideological differences.

Being among the harshest critics of Kemalism despite having an élite Republican family background,⁸¹³ Nur Vergin, a liberal-conservative scholar of

⁸⁰⁹ Durmuş Hocaoğlu, “Tarih Makas Değiştiriyor,” *Türkiye Günluğu* 19 (1992): 39.

⁸¹⁰ Ibid., 39–40.

⁸¹¹ Ibid., 35.

⁸¹² Ibid., 37.

⁸¹³ Nur Vergin’s biological father is Mahmut Conker, a diplomat and son of one of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s comrades in arms and closest friends, Nuri Conker, whereas his foster father is Nureddin Vergin, again a diplomat. “Vergin: ‘AKP 10 yıl daha iktidarda kalır’ dedim diye beni mahvettiler,”

political science, is also one of the most ambitious advocates of the supposed new role for Turkey in its surrounding regions. In an interview with her published in the journal, she mocks the criticisms against the supposed neo-Ottomanist foreign policy agenda of the Özal leadership that that role was provided by the US imperialism by saying, “That this role was provided us by the head stage director, the United States, is among the received information,” but she nonetheless also states, “I think that these information are correct, and believe that the United States is stirring Turkey up to play a more profound and slightly more significant role.”⁸¹⁴ She adds that she does not use the verb “stirring up” in a negative sense because, “Turkey looks as though it needs to be stirred up and encouraged to benefit from its historical richness.”⁸¹⁵ Likening Turkey’s situation to that of the “sleeping beauty” in Charles Perrault’s famous tale, she contends that Turkey was sleeping like the “sleeping beauty” awaiting her prince to wake her up. “The prince,” in this case the United States, “is waiting for her, impatiently, and poking her to make her rise up,” she claims, but also alleges, “Turkey looks as if it hesitates to stand up, to walk and run. . . . Because the princess fears, because Turkey is nervous!”⁸¹⁶ The principal reason for this, according to her, is that Turkey was still under the influence of “prescriptions not to move, given her by owners of a Third Worldist view,” who have, she also argues, “imprisoned Atatürk in their own shallow volumes and, for some reason or other, have called their such

T24, 28 July 2013, accessed 2 May 2018, <http://t24.com.tr/haber/vergin-akp-10-yil-daha-iktidarda-kalir-dedim-diye-beni-mahvettiler,235429>.

⁸¹⁴ “Vergin: ‘Türkiye’nin Kendinden Korkmaması ve Aslına Rüçü Etmesi Lâzım’,” *Türkiye Günlüğü* 19 (1992): 42.

⁸¹⁵ Ibid.

⁸¹⁶ Ibid.

considerations Atatürkism [*Atatürkçülük*.]”⁸¹⁷ For Vergin, however, this was nonsense since Turkey was “a prominent member of the [Western] First World from the political aspect, if not from the economic aspect” for the very reason that it was “nothing more than the successor, albeit with retreated borders, of a state, whose partners were the British and Austro-Hungarian empires.”⁸¹⁸ Thus, for her, Turkey “must not fear from itself,” and “must revert to type” by “adopting a policy appropriate to the logic and nature of its history and geopolitical positioning.”⁸¹⁹ That would not necessarily mean an aggressive or bellicose approach, but would mean “a quest for wielding influence and a competition for prestige.”⁸²⁰ “Turks abroad,” which contained the Turkic populations of the newly independent Central Asian countries, as well as the ex-Ottoman peoples would be the principal agents of that supposed influence. As such, for her, as it was also for Çandar, Turkey had to reckon not only with the “Turks abroad,” but also with the “Kurds abroad,” by which she specifically referred to the Kurdish population that existed in northern Iraq but not excluded the ones in other ex-Ottoman countries such as Syria.⁸²¹ Finally, it is worth noting that she also argues the supposed new role of Turkey had and would have “no aspects to arouse suspicions on the part of the United States.”⁸²² Hence it would be appropriate to argue that Vergin’s neo-Ottomanism, like Çandar’s, was not pitted against the West in general, but was rather supposed to be complementary to their

⁸¹⁷ Ibid.

⁸¹⁸ Ibid.

⁸¹⁹ Ibid.

⁸²⁰ Ibid., 45–46.

⁸²¹ Ibid., 47.

⁸²² Ibid., 44.

policies towards the regions that surround Turkey in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War.

6.3 Conclusion

The organic intellectuals of the political leadership of Turgut Özal gathered around a new right-wing journal *Türkiye Günlüğü* all propose an assertive neo-Ottomanist foreign policy based upon assuming a regional leadership and quitting the supposed Republican “mediocrity” in foreign policy. Although it is apparent that there are inner contradictions between the nationalist-conservative and liberal wings of the Özalian neo-Ottomanist camp in the sense that the former wing are relatively uneasy about the US projections towards regions surrounding Turkey and unsure about Turkey’s real capabilities and the extent of the risks ahead such as the Kurdish problem, there is a general predominant understanding among these intellectuals that the time had already come for a neo-Ottomanist offence and the supposed “retreat of the Turks” had already come to an end. All the major international political developments and the subsequent transformation in the international order were perceived only as evidences of such a new era that was opening before Turkey. To what extent this new subimperialist hegemonic project could be realised under the leadership of Özal and whether or not a corresponding historical bloc could successfully be cemented are the subjects of the following chapters.

CHAPTER 7

THE PRACTICE OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER ÖZAL AS A TEST CASE OF THE NEO-OTTOMANIST HEGEMONIC PROJECT: AMBIGUITY AND INCAPACITY

7.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses the Turkish foreign policy pursued under the political leadership of Turgut Özal between 1983 and 1993 in order to investigate whether or not the neo-Ottomanist aspiration of the period could have any reflections in the realm of foreign policy. The foreign policy practice towards the three neighbouring regions of the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia and the Caucasus of the period in question is rather descriptively historicised in this chapter in order to provide a firm basis for the theoretical discussion that is to ensue in the next chapter. While doing this, it is sought to allow only for taken-for-granted historical phenomena, on which there is more or less a general consensus within the literature. Accordingly, it is also sought to avoid unsubstantiated arguments and claims over the foreign policy of the period. Moreover, a distinction is made between Özal's early foreign policy practices throughout the 1980s during which the main motive was the acceleration of the incorporation of the Turkish economy into world markets and his later practices in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Thus, the first section of this chapter is devoted to his early foreign policy practices until the year 1989. The case of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) deserves special attention, as it led Turkish policy makers to think, at least for a while, that they could substitute relations with the Middle East for those with Europe, and this is also examined in the second section. The remaining three sections of the chapter are devoted to his later relatively more assertive foreign policy

practices towards the three key neighbouring regions—namely, the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia and the Caucasus.

7.2 Incorporating Turkey into World Markets: Özal’s Foreign Policy in the Early 1980s

Turgut Özal, having formed a government in late 1983 following the general elections from which the Motherland Party (MP) led by him emerged victorious, took over the political leadership of the new hegemonic project, of which he had already been one of the key architects and practitioners between 1979 and 1982. While the rhetoric of the old order had concerned “planning” and “industrialisation” until the late 1970s, now the rhetoric of “the free market” became the core of the new hegemonic discourse.⁸²³ Accordingly, again in this period, “integration with the world economy” stood as an “end in itself, at least at the level of discourse,”⁸²⁴ unlike the period until the late 1970s, when it had instead been perceived instrumentally as a means of “creditworthiness”⁸²⁵ in the face of chronic financial bottlenecks. Ayşe Buğra and Osman Savaşkan also confirm this by stating that this integration started

⁸²³ Galip L. Yalman, “Tarihsel Bir Perspektiften Türkiye’de Devlet ve Burjuvazi: Rölativist Bir Paradigma mı Hegemonya Stratejisi mi?,” *Praksis* 5 (2002): 16–17, 20; Galip L. Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism: The Case of Turkey in the 1980s* (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2009), 214–15, 351–52.

⁸²⁴ Quoted from Galip Yalman, “24 Ocak Kararları ve Türkiye’nin ‘Batı ile Bütünleşme’si,” *İktisat Dergisi* (January 1985), in Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 250. See also Yalman, “Türkiye’de Devlet ve Burjuvazi,” 20; Galip L. Yalman, “Crises as Driving Forces of Neoliberal ‘Trasformismo’: The Contours of the Turkish Political Economy since the 2000s,” in *The Palgrave Handbook of Critical International Political Economy*, ed. Alan Cafruny, Leila Simona Talani, and Gonzalo Pozo Martin (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 255.

⁸²⁵ Yalman, *Transition to Neoliberalism*, 262, 280.

with the *coup d'état* of 1980.⁸²⁶ This naturally had direct implications for the Turkish foreign policy pursued in the post-1980 period.

Turkish foreign policy in the early 1980s, under both the military rule and the subsequent MP governments, focused more on maintaining good relations with the West and its institutions. There was already a certain harmony between successive US administrations and military rule in Turkey—a harmony based on the anti-communist strategies followed by these administrations. There was also another profound convergence between the “Green Belt” strategy of the Carter administration and the new ideological superstructure based upon the “Turkish–Islamic Synthesis” in Turkey in the early 1980s. The “Green Belt” strategy and the “Islamisation from above”⁸²⁷ in Turkey under military rule were in complete conformity with each other. Another issue at stake in relations with the United States under the Carter administration was the formation of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) that would secure the US interests in the Persian Gulf. The United States wanted Turkey to open up its military facilities for the RDF, while Turkey hesitated to act in such a hostile way towards Iran and the Soviet Union and sought joint NATO action instead of an arrangement in which Turkey would remain alone.⁸²⁸ Finally, the absence of Greece⁸²⁹ in NATO’s military structure was another issue in relations with the United

⁸²⁶ Ayşe Buğra and Osman Savaşkan, *New Capitalism in Turkey: The Relationship between Politics, Religion and Business* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014), 49.

⁸²⁷ Angel Rabasa and F. Stephen Larrabee, *The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008), 37. cf. Cihan Tuğal, “NATO’s Islamists: Hegemony and Americanization in Turkey,” *New Left Review* 44 (2007): 11–12; Gareth Jenkins, *Political Islam in Turkey: Running West, Heading East?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 141–45; Banu Eligür, *The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 88–118.

⁸²⁸ İlhan Uzgel, “Relations with the USA and NATO,” in *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919–2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*, ed. Baskın Oran and trans. Mustafa Akşin (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2010), 544–45.

⁸²⁹ Greece had left the military wing of NATO in protest of NATO’s unwillingness to stop Turkey following the latter’s second Cyprus operation on 14 August 1974. Ibid., 541.

States in this period. Under conditions of increased security concerns within the Western capitalist bloc in the face of developments in Iran and Afghanistan, NATO's supreme commander Bernard Rogers sought to prevent a possible Turkish veto over the proposed return of Greece to NATO's military structure.⁸³⁰ Both of these issues were resolved in favour of the United States. Turkey agreed to provide storage facilities and installations for the RDF, and it also removed its objections to Greece's return to NATO's military wing under what was later coined the "Rogers Plan." The United States got what it wanted at the end of the day due to the inherent weaknesses of military rulers in Turkey that emanated from its legitimacy deficit and international isolation.⁸³¹ Relations further developed in favour of the United States under the Reagan administration from 1981 to 1989. As noted earlier, the "Reagan Doctrine" exerted a renewed militancy against the Soviet Union that ushered in what some authors call the "Second Cold War."⁸³² Not only military rule but also the subsequent civilian government led by Turgut Özal continued to support this anti-communist campaign led by the United States in the 1980s.⁸³³

The other pillar of Turkey's relations with the West was undoubtedly its relations with the European Economic Community (EEC) and the larger European Communities (EC) that would ultimately be transformed into the present-day European Union (EU) following the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. There were profound economic factors regarding relations with the EC such as financial loans that would be released for Turkey's use and access to the proposed Customs Union. For that

⁸³⁰ Ibid., 542.

⁸³¹ Ibid., 543.

⁸³² Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War*, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 1986), 11–19; Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991* (London: Abacus, 1995), 452.

⁸³³ Uzgel, "Relations with the USA and NATO," 548.

reason, it was also much easier to directly link it with the main task of integration with the world economy, which became a constant item on the agenda of the Turkish bourgeoisie throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, it was also one of the few topics that always took its place on the agenda of TÜSİAD. This can be followed easily in the statements and official reports of this organisation. For instance, as early as 26 January 1980, just two days after the declaration of the 24 January 1980 economic reform package, Hüsnü Özyegin, one of the key big businessmen within this organisation, was stating that it was the membership of the EC that would be “the widest and most comfortable gate for the Turkish economy to expand abroad.”⁸³⁴

There were also political factors behind these sustained efforts to establish good relations with Europe. Accession to European political institutions had always been presented and perceived by some politicians and intellectuals as “a natural and necessary outcome”⁸³⁵ of Turkey’s quest for catching up with the “level of contemporary civilisation,” which had been declared as a national target by the founding father of modern Turkey—Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In addition to this constant theme of modernisation, problems with Greece and the concern of Turkish policy makers not to lag behind Greece in participating in key international institutions and fora also played a key role in Turkey’s efforts to join the European club.⁸³⁶ Turkey was also the only “European NATO member that had been excluded”⁸³⁷ from the EC, since the only other two European non-EC NATO members—Norway and Iceland—had themselves chosen to remain outside the

⁸³⁴ TÜSİAD, *Konuşmalar 1980* (İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1980), 32–33.

⁸³⁵ Çağrı Erhan and Tuğrul Arat, “Relations with the European Communities (ECs),” in *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919–2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*, ed. Baskın Oran and trans. Mustafa Akşin (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2010), 576. cf. William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 3rd ed. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 134.

⁸³⁶ Erhan and Arat, “Relations with the EC,” 576.

⁸³⁷ Ibid., 576–77.

European integration process. One should also add the possible desire of the MP leadership to repair the damage caused by the *coup d'état* to Turkey's political legitimacy in the international arena. These all culminated in Turkey's application to the EC for full membership on 14 April 1987, but got stuck in limbo until late 1999, when Turkey was at last officially granted candidate status for full membership by the EU at the Helsinki Summit.

Apart from relations with the United States and EC, there were ongoing problems in bilateral relations with neighbouring European countries. Problems with Greece over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus continued almost without any improvement.⁸³⁸ Occasional tensions in the Aegean such as unilateral Greek attempts to drill oil, the Turkish military reactions to these attempts, and the failure of negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities over the resolution of the Cyprus problem led relations with Greece only to deteriorate.⁸³⁹ The proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 was among these developments.⁸⁴⁰ On the other hand, although relations with Bulgaria had been relatively more stable despite the different economic and political systems of the two countries, the campaign of forced assimilation and oppression towards the Bulgarian Turkish minority by the regime of Todor Zhivkov, which began in 1984, severely damaged bilateral relations.⁸⁴¹

⁸³⁸ S. Gülden Ayman, "Türk–Yunan İlişkilerinde Güç ve Tehdit," in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoglu (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004), 493.

⁸³⁹ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 122.

⁸⁴⁰ Kivanç Ulusoy and Murat Tüzünkan, "Kıbrıs Sorunu: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Açıması," in *XXI. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoglu, Nurcan Özgür Baklacioğlu and Özlem Terzi (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 2012), 513.

⁸⁴¹ Hüner Tuncer, *Özal'in Dış Politikası, 1983–1989* (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2015), 131–134; Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 123.

Foreign relations between 1983 and 1989 were of course not limited to the relations with the West. Despite growing tensions with the Soviet Union as a result of developments such as the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, the signature of the Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) between Turkey and the United States in March 1980, the Soviet military build-up in the Caucasus and the rearming of Syria by the Soviet Union after the war of 1982 in Lebanon,⁸⁴² bilateral relations began to improve in the second half of the 1980s especially after the succession of Mikhail Gorbachev to Konstantin Chernenko as secretary-general of the Soviet communist party in 1985.⁸⁴³ The volume of bilateral trade more than quadrupled between 1987 and 1990, not least because Russian natural gas began being pumped to Turkey through a pipeline via Bulgaria in 1987, while Turkish contractors began getting important construction contracts in the Soviet Union.⁸⁴⁴

There were ongoing problems with Middle Eastern countries notwithstanding some amelioration in bilateral relations such as those with Israel. Relations with Israel found a firmer basis especially after the Camp David Accords signed between Egypt and Israel in 1978 and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation's acceptance of Israel's existence and a "two-state solution" in Palestine in 1988 following the end of the first *intifada*.⁸⁴⁵ Successive Turkish governments also wanted to utilise the pro-Israeli lobby in Washington by developing a cordial relationship with Israel in its efforts to counter political activities targeting Turkey, especially by the Greek and Armenian

⁸⁴² Erel Tellal, "Relations with the USSR," in *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919–2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*, ed. Baskın Oran and trans. Mustafa Akşin (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2010), 618–19.

⁸⁴³ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 121.

⁸⁴⁴ Tellal, "Relations with the USSR," 619–20; Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 121.

⁸⁴⁵ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 125; Atay Akdevelioğlu and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Relations with Israel," in *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919–2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*, ed. Baskın Oran and trans. Mustafa Akşin (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2010), 612.

lobbies within the US Congress.⁸⁴⁶ There was also Syria, with which bilateral relations were already troubled due to old grievances over the annexation of Hatay by Turkey in 1939 and the support and shelter provided by Syria to the PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan during the 1980s and 1990s.⁸⁴⁷ In addition to this, problems persisted over water since Turkey was beginning its ambitious “Southeastern Anatolia Project” (GAP) that included the construction of giant dams on the Euphrates, which supplied a large proportion of the Syrian population with their drinking water.⁸⁴⁸

7.3 Attempts to Substitute Relations with the Middle East for Relations with Europe: The Short-Lived Delusions of the Iran–Iraq War

One particular aspect of Turkish foreign policy in the 1980s under the MP governments is the growing volume of Turkish exports, and this is particularly true for the relations with the Middle Eastern countries in this period. Relations with these countries were marked by increasing trade volumes—firstly as a result of the rises in oil prices in 1973–74 and again in 1980–81 and Turkey’s growing consumption of imported oil, and secondly, as a result of Turkey’s efforts to increase its exports within the framework of its new accumulation strategy in the 1980s and the simultaneous opportunity that arose following the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–88, which largely destroyed the infrastructure of these two countries and made both of them

⁸⁴⁶ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 125; Gencer Özcan, “Türkiye–İsrail İlişkileri,” in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoglu (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004), 339.

⁸⁴⁷ Melek Fırat and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, “Relations with Arab States,” in *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919–2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*, ed. Baskın Oran and trans. Mustafa Akşin (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2010), 599–601; Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 127.

⁸⁴⁸ Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, “Relations with Arab States,” 607–608; Konuralp Pamukçu, “Su Sorunu Çerçeveinde Türkiye, Suriye ve Irak İlişkileri,” in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoglu (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004), 256.

dependent on Turkey.⁸⁴⁹ The Iran–Iraq War deserves particular attention regarding the aspiration for regional hegemony on the part of the Turkish political leadership. Turkey paid scrupulous attention to remaining neutral during the Iran–Iraq war, just as it tried to adopt an even-handed policy towards the Arab–Israeli conflict.⁸⁵⁰ However, with Turkish exports to both of the warring parties greatly boosted, it was an incident, at least for some time, that the Turkish bourgeoisie and the Özal government thought they were reaping the benefits of the export-oriented accumulation strategy. The numbers also seemed to justify their position.

The Turkish exports during the 1980s rose steadily in general.⁸⁵¹ Halis Akder also points out that Turkish exports were, by and large, concentrated in the regions of Europe and Middle East during the first half of the 1980s.⁸⁵² The exports to Middle Eastern countries reached a peak level of 44 percent of all Turkish exports in 1982, while they also remained above Turkey's exports to the European Economic Community (EEC) throughout the five years between 1980 and 1985.⁸⁵³ Nonetheless, the share of the exports to Middle Eastern countries in Turkey's total exports would decline steadily during the second half of the 1980s compared to that of the EEC

⁸⁴⁹ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 123–27.

⁸⁵⁰ Ibid., 124; Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, “Relations with Arab States,” 599.

⁸⁵¹ It was about \$5 million in 1976, and fell below that point in 1977 to about \$4 million. It lagged around \$6 million in 1978 and 1979, whereas it came close \$8 million in 1980. The next year it rose almost to \$10 million, and in 1990 it was \$35 million. Turkish Statistical Institute, accessed 27 May 2019, <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr>.

⁸⁵² Turkey's exports to the European Economic Community and Middle East countries combined were corresponding to 79.4 percent of its total exports in 1985. Halis Akder, “Turkey's Export Expansion in the Middle East,” *Middle East Journal* 41:4 (1987): 555.

⁸⁵³ The shares of Turkey's exports to the European Economic Community and Middle East countries in Turkey's total exports are, respectively, 42.9 and 21.6 percent in 1980, 31.9 and 40.3 percent in 1981, 30.5 and 44.2 percent in 1982, 35.0 and 42.7 percent in 1983, 38.2 and 38.8 percent in 1984, and 39.4 and 40.0 percent in 1985. Ibid.

countries to such an extent that the latter was about four times greater than the former in amount in 1990.⁸⁵⁴ However, the exports to each country in the Middle East went on to increase throughout the 1980s except for some countries such as Libya, Lebanon and Syria, but the real driving force was the exports to Iraq and Iran in that period. The exports to Iraq rose to its peaks with almost \$1 billion in 1985 and 1988, while those to Iran rose to its peaks with over \$1 billion in 1983 and 1985 from \$113 million and \$11 million in 1979 respectively. The rise of oil prices up to \$37.42 a barrel in 1980 after the 1973 crisis provided a general impetus for exports to the oil-rich Middle East until the mid-1980s when oil prices declined to their lowest point since the 1970s. It was, nonetheless, undoubtedly the Iran–Iraq War from 1980 to 1988 that made the share of the exports to the Middle East within Turkey’s total exports go above that of the EEC countries during that period. 64 percent of Turkey’s exports to the Middle East were destined for the warring parties of that war in 1985.⁸⁵⁵ Not surprisingly, that conjunctural predominance of Middle Eastern countries in Turkish foreign trade made the ex-Islamist Turgut Özal leadership lean towards fostering political relations with this region.⁸⁵⁶ The Özal leadership also sought whether or not such relations with this region would be an alternative to relations with the EEC. Not only the political leadership, but also the Turkish bourgeoisie was content with these improving

⁸⁵⁴ Turkey’s exports to the EEC countries and Middle East countries were \$7 million and \$1.6 million respectively. Turkish Statistical Institute, accessed 27 May 2019, <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr>.

⁸⁵⁵ Turkish Statistical Institute, accessed 27 May 2019, <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr>.

⁸⁵⁶ It is also worth noting that Turgut Özal had preferred to make his first foreign trip as the prime minister to Iran in April 1984. İlhan Uzgel, *Ulusal Çıkar ve Dış Politika: Türk Dış Politikasının Belirlenmesinde Ulusal Çıkarın Rolü, 1983–1991* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004), 181; Atay Akdevelioğlu and Melek Fırat, “Relations with Iran,” in *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919–2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*, ed. Baskın Oran and trans. Mustafa Akşin (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2010), 615.

relations.⁸⁵⁷ Apart from the big capital groups organised within TÜSİAD, a relatively more conservative fraction within the Turkish bourgeoisie was also in the making throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s—a process which was elaborated in the fifth chapter. This emerging “Islamic bourgeoisie”⁸⁵⁸ was also on the same page with the political leadership of Turgut Özal in his quest for fostering political relations with the Muslim Middle East, and if possible, developing these relations as an alternative to Turkey’s western orientation.⁸⁵⁹ It was again in this period that “neo-Ottomanism” began to be pronounced for the first time as one of the prospective avenues Turkey might supposedly pursue.⁸⁶⁰ “[A]s Turkey regains economic strength, it will be increasingly tempted to assert itself in the Middle East as a leader,” David Barchard,

⁸⁵⁷ “It is fortunate that there is such a market [the Middle Eastern market] neighbouring our country,” it was hailed in an article published in *Görüş*, the official magazine of TÜSİAD, in 1985. Quoted from “Orta Doğu’nun Önemi,” *Görüş* 13:3 (1985): 21 in Uzgel, *Ulusal Çıkar*, 165.

⁸⁵⁸ Most of the members of that fraction are far from being “Islamist” in the sense that, unlike “Islamists,” they do not necessarily aim at “Islamising” the social order within which they exist. These “Islamic” capitalists rather have relatively open and ambivalent relations regarding Islam. They, nonetheless, benefit from its symbols as elements of their wider social and ethical status within society. While doing this, they take advantage of opportunities that arise as a result of the contradictions of capitalism and bourgeois form of democracy. For a discussion over terminology with respect to the terms “Muslim,” “Islamic,” and “Islamist,” see Dilek Yankaya, *Yeni İslâmî Burjuvazi: Türk Modeli*, trans. Melike Işık Durmaz, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılığı, 2014), 24–27.

⁸⁵⁹ Uzgel, *Ulusal Çıkar*, 177–78.

⁸⁶⁰ The term “neo-Ottomanism” was first used by the Greek observers of Turkish politics following the Turkish military intervention to the Cyprus crisis in 1974. Stephanos Constantinides, “Turkey, the Emergence of a New Foreign Policy: The Neo-Ottoman Imperial Model,” *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 24 (1996): 332; Kemal H. Karpat, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 524. Its first conceptualisation, however, was brought forward in a Chatham House Report published in 1985. Constantinides, “Neo-Ottoman Imperial Model,” 331, footnote 14; M. Hakan Yavuz, “Social and Intellectual Origins of Neo-Ottomanism: Searching for a Post-National Vision,” *Die Welt des Islams* 56:3–4 (2016): 443. The author of this report, David Barchard, also asserts that it was him that used the term “neo-Ottomanism” for the first time. He also states that Özal also read the report and wanted to talk to him about it, but does not provide any further detail on how his reaction to the report was. Notwithstanding this, he also acknowledges that Özal indeed did not go against the “traditional Kemalist foreign policy” at all. “David Barchard,” in *Yakın Dostlarının Dilinden Turgut Özal’ın Dış Politikasını Anlamak*, ed. Erkan Ertosun (Ankara: Turgut Özal Üniversitesi Yayıncılığı, 2015), 39–40.

the then Ankara correspondent for the *Financial Times*, argued in a Chatham House Report, in the midst of the Iran–Iraq War, in 1985.⁸⁶¹ Noting that Turkey was beginning to play a more influential role at summits of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, he further argued that “the attraction of playing a strong role as a regional leader” was “likely to grow,” and might “prove stronger than that of being a latecomer to Europe.”⁸⁶² He also contended that “regional leadership and the Ottoman/Islamic heritage might well be themes which successive governments would stress” in case of a divorce between Turkey and Europe pointing out that such arguments were already “seriously thought about and argued over by opinion leaders inside Turkey,” even though they were not yet “quite formulated in these terms.”⁸⁶³

Barchard seems right in his claim that proposals for “regional leadership” in the Middle East as an alternative to relations with Europe was, at least for some time, on the table of the political leadership in the early 1980s. It was already stated that the political leadership and the newly emerging “Islamic” fraction of the Turkish bourgeoisie were already ideologically prone to such proposals and that the Turkish bourgeoisie in general welcomed the improving trade relations with the region. It might also be telling at this point that, not only Prime Minister Turgut Özal and the MP governments he led, but also President Kenan Evren, the leading figure in the 1980 *coup d'état* as the Chief of General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, had significant roles with respect to relations with the region.⁸⁶⁴ The Iran–Iraq War seems

⁸⁶¹ David Barchard, “Turkey and the West,” (Chatham House Papers 27, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 91.

⁸⁶² Ibid.

⁸⁶³ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁴ President Evren’s participation in the Fourth Islamic Summit Conference of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) held in Casablanca in October 1984 marks an important turning point in Turkish foreign policy. Although former right-wing governments had always attached importance to relations with the OIC and participating in activities of that organisation, it had not been possible before to attend the summits of that organisation at the presidential level due in part to debates over whether or not such an action would violate the constitutional principle of secularism. Thus, President Evren,

to have reinforced that trend. Henri Barkey suggests that, when Iranian forces carried the war into Iraq in 1982, “a great deal of speculation focused on Turkey’s potential role in a débâcle of Iraqi armies” until 1988, when Iraq reasserted control over its territories.⁸⁶⁵ The speculations were about a possible annexation of the oil-rich northern Mosul province of Iraq by Turkey in order both to “prevent the oil from falling into Iranian or an Iranian-sponsored Iraqi Islamic regime” and to “forestall the creation of a Kurdish state” which had been considered as an existential threat to Turkey’s national unity and territorial integrity in the face of Turkey’s own Kurdish problem.⁸⁶⁶ These speculations were further fuelled when the Turkish military strengthened its troop deployment near the Iraqi border, although it appeared to have been done as a measure against a possible Kurdish insurgency that would emanate from Iraq and spill over into Turkey.⁸⁶⁷ The MP government denied such speculations at that time, but Barkey also notes a survey made then among the MP’s deputies in the parliament suggests that “a significant minority [indicated] that they would be in favour of an incursion into Kirkuk if necessary.”⁸⁶⁸

both as the president who supposed to remain “impartial” and “loyal to the constitutional principles” of the Republic and as a former top general of the Turkish Armed Forces which had long been considered as a secularist bulwark against Islamist reactionary movements, indeed broke with a long-upheld tradition. For sure, this must be considered within the framework of the “Turkish–Islamic Synthesis” which was put into practice throughout the 1980s. Fırat and Kürkçioğlu, “Relations with Arab States,” 597–98; Uzgel, *Ulusal Çıkar*, 178–79; cf. Mahmut Bali Aykan, “Turkey and the OIC: 1984–1992,” *The Turkish Yearbook* 23 (1993): 101–31; Meliha Benli, “Turkey’s Attitude towards the Organization of the Islamic Conference (1964–1984)” (master’s thesis, Middle East Technical University, 1986); Mahmut Bali Aykan, *Turkey’s Role in the Organization of Islamic Conference: 1960–1992* (New York: Vantage Press, 1993); Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, “Türkiye ve İslâm Konferansı Teşkilatı,” *Yeni Türkiye* 1:3 (1995): 388–412.

⁸⁶⁵ Henri J. Barkey, “The Silent Victor: Turkey’s Role in the Gulf War,” in *The Iran–Iraq War: Impact and Implications*, ed. Efraim Karsh (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989), 144–45.

⁸⁶⁶ Ibid., 145.

⁸⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁸ Ibid., 151, footnote 39. Bruce Kuniholm claims that Turkey “notif[ied] the United States and Iran that if Iraq were defeated by Tehran and the state were to disintegrate, it would demand the return of

In any case, it turned out that the fortunes brought by the Iran–Iraq War were anything but lasting, not to mention its costs such as the space opened up for the PKK in Iraq as a result of that country’s loss of control in its northern provinces and the problem of thousands of fleeing Iranians and Iraqi Kurds that sought refuge in Turkey.⁸⁶⁹ As the oil prices declined in the mid-1980s⁸⁷⁰ and the protracted war exhausted the foreign exchange reserves of both Iran and Iraq, the initial export boom to these two countries also began to slacken and ultimately came to an end. Even, as early as 1985, it became clear that the Middle East market cannot be an alternative to the European market for Turkish exports since the structure of Turkish exports to these two markets “exhibited a divergence” instead of a similarity.⁸⁷¹ They were rather specialising in different products, and there was even “interdependence between imports from the EEC and exports to the Middle East,” through joint-ventures and mergers between Turkish and European firms leading to an industrial structure in Turkey what is known as “assembly industry.”⁸⁷² One may argue, in other words, Turkey became “an export channel of the EEC to the Middle East” to a certain extent.⁸⁷³ These structural problems, coupled with declining oil prices and diminishing foreign exchange reserves of Iran and Iraq, forced the political leadership

Mosul and the great northern oil basin of Kirkuk.” Bruce R. Kuniholm, “Turkey and the West,” *Foreign Affairs* 70:2 (1991): 45.

⁸⁶⁹ Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, “Relations with Arab States,” 599–605.

⁸⁷⁰ The crude oil prices in nominal terms fell to \$14.44 in 1986 and could never rise to its 1980 level until 2004. As for real price increases (with inflation adjusted to July 2017), it could not get back to its 1980 level even in the 2000s. Tim McMahon, “Historical Crude Oil Prices,” accessed 5 July 2018, https://inflationdata.com/Inflation/Inflation_Rate/Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.asp.

⁸⁷¹ Akder, “Turkey’s Export Expansion,” 556.

⁸⁷² Ibid., 556–61.

⁸⁷³ Ibid., 564.

to take relations with Europe more seriously than before, and deprived the supposed quests, if any, for substituting these relations with relations with the Muslim countries of the Middle East of any material reason. Hence it is not surprising that Prime Minister Turgut Özal, following his ambivalence towards full-membership in the EEC between 1983 and 1985,⁸⁷⁴ declared in December 1985 that their “explicit aim” was entering the EEC.⁸⁷⁵ The following year the State Ministry in Charge of Relations with the European Community was established, while in April 1987 Turkey officially applied for full-membership to the European Community. It must also be noted at this point that the big capital groups organised in TÜSİAD, as the hegemonic fraction within the Turkish bourgeoisie, had already begun lobbying in order to demonstrate the significance of relations with and the issue of full-membership to the EEC for themselves.⁸⁷⁶ The Economic Development Foundation (İKV), on the other hand, which had been founded by the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (İTO) and the Istanbul Chamber of Industry (İSO) in 1965, became an institution that reflected the attitude of the whole Turkish business world in the 1980s and 1990s with respect to relations with the EEC.⁸⁷⁷ The İKV acted as a significant pressure group in favour of full-membership in the EEC with studies it conducted, statements and lobbying

⁸⁷⁴ Frank Tachau notes that Prime Minister Turgut Özal “indicated in late 1983 that he had second thoughts at least with regard to the priority of the Turkish association with the EEC.” Frank Tachau, *Turkey: The Politics of Authority, Democracy, and Development* (New York: Praeger, 1984), 200.

⁸⁷⁵ Uzgel, *Ulusal Çıkar*, 234. For a similar argument, see Tanıl Bora, “Turgut Özal,” *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, vol. 7, *Liberalizm*, ed. Murat Yılmaz (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005), 591.

⁸⁷⁶ Uzgel, *Ulusal Çıkar*, 241.

⁸⁷⁷ It was being funded by TOBB, TZOB, TİSK, the Turkish Association of Foreign Trade and TÜSİAD, along with its founders İTO and İSO. In spite of this fact, TÜSİAD, İTO and İSO have predominance in the İKV. Ibid., 211; Mustafa Sönmez, *Kırk Haramiler: Türkiye’de Holdingler*, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: Özlem Yayıncılık, 1988), 176.

activities it made on behalf of the Turkish bourgeoisie in this period.⁸⁷⁸ In a sense, the MP government was besieged by the Turkish bourgeoisie, alongside other social forces demanding some form of democratisation, regarding relations with the EEC beginning from the mid-1980s.⁸⁷⁹ Thus the following years were marked by the priority given to relations with Europe as also elaborated above. Relations with the Middle East had to remain largely limited to commercial relations despite the previous efforts of the political leadership to expand them into other spheres as well. As indicated, even the commercial relations began to turn into disillusionment not later than the mid-1980s.

7.4 An Overall Assessment of the Turkish Foreign Policy in the Early Özal Period: Prelude to Neo-Ottomanism?

Notwithstanding the ebb and flow of the Turkish foreign policy in the early Özal period until 1989, the foreign policy agenda of Turkey does not imply a neo-Ottomanist turn until the tail end of the 1980s. Studies on neo-Ottomanism in Turkish foreign policy also in general mark the years 1989 and 1990 as the beginning of the supposed neo-Ottomanist turn. In an article that suggests “[combining] increased pluralism – including local autonomy for the Kurds – with a wider Turkish influence in Europe and Asia,” as a “more relevant” policy for Turkey in the twenty-first century, Ola Tunander considers the end of the Cold War as the beginning of a Turkey that “appears – at least in the early 1990s – as a regional great power with influence in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Black Sea Region, the Balkans and the Middle

⁸⁷⁸ Uzgel, *Ulusal Çıkar*, 241.

⁸⁷⁹ Ibid., 243.

East.”⁸⁸⁰ Stephanos Constantinides agrees with Tunander, suggesting that “Turkey took this [neo-Ottomanist] direction in its foreign policy particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.”⁸⁸¹ Hakan Yavuz also highlights the year 1989, albeit for a different reason, since it was the year that Turkey’s application for full-membership in the EC was rejected by the latter, and the former in turn entered into a “domestic debate of identity” that “[shaped] the perception of the country’s position in the international system.”⁸⁸² Yılmaz Çolak also points to the 1990s by stating that “Ottoman imagination had not yet turned into a political vision” until the late 1980s, although “Ottoman imagination and images continued to exist and even increased in Turkish popular social and political life.”⁸⁸³ Alexander Murinson is also among those who refer to the end of the Cold War as the beginning of the supposed “transformation” in Turkish foreign policy, while he also states that this “transformation hinges upon a growing embrace of the philosophy of

⁸⁸⁰ Ola Tunander, “A New Ottoman Empire? The Choice for Turkey: Euro-Asian Centre vs National Fortress,” *Security Dialogue* 26:4 (1995): 413–414.

⁸⁸¹ Constantinides, “Neo-Ottoman Imperial Model,” 331.

⁸⁸² M. Hakan Yavuz, “Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: the Rise of Neo-Ottomanism,” *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 7:12 (1998): 35.

⁸⁸³ Yılmaz Çolak, “Ottomanism vs. Kemalism: Collective Memory and Cultural Pluralism in 1990s Turkey,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 42:4 (2006): 591.

neo-Ottomanism.”⁸⁸⁴ Joshua W. Walker,⁸⁸⁵ Nora Fisher Onar,⁸⁸⁶ İlhan Uzgel and Volkan Yaramış,⁸⁸⁷ Ahmet Davutoğlu,⁸⁸⁸ Lerna K. Yanık,⁸⁸⁹ Gökberk Yücel,⁸⁹⁰ Latif

⁸⁸⁴ Alexander Murinson, “The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 42:6 (2006): 945.

⁸⁸⁵ Joshua W. Walker, “Turkey’s Imperial Legacy: Understanding Contemporary Turkey through its Ottoman Past,” *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology* 8 (2009): 503–504.

⁸⁸⁶ Nora Fisher Onar, “Neo-Ottomanism, Historical Legacies and Turkish Foreign Policy” (EDAM Discussion Paper 2009/03, Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, Istanbul, October 2009), 10.

⁸⁸⁷ İlhan Uzgel and Volkan Yaramış, “Özal’dan Davutoğlu’na Türkiye’de Yeni Osmanlıçı Arayışlar,” *Doğudan* 16 (March–April 2010): 37–40.

⁸⁸⁸ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, 32nd ed. (İstanbul: Küre Yayıncılığı, 2009), 85–86.

⁸⁸⁹ Lerna K. Yanık, “Constructing Turkish ‘Exceptionalism’: Discourses of Liminality and Hybridity in Post-Cold War Turkish Foreign Policy,” *Political Geography* 30 (2011): 84; Lerna K. Yanık, “Bringing the Empire Back In: the Gradual Discovery of the Ottoman Empire in Turkish Foreign Policy,” *Die Welt des Islams* 56:3–4 (2016): 480.

⁸⁹⁰ Gökberk Yücel, “Türk Dış Politikasında Kimlik Sorunu: Kemalizm ve Ötekisi Yeni Osmanlıcılık” (master’s thesis, University of Bilecik, 2012), 96–97.

Mustafa,⁸⁹¹ Suat Beylur,⁸⁹² Berrin Akdeniz⁸⁹³ and Malik Mufti⁸⁹⁴ are other authors that in one way or another have referred to the same period as the beginning of this transformation in Turkish foreign policy.

It is also not possible to find any mentions to or suggestions towards such a turn in foreign policy in the reports published by TÜSİAD, which represented the dominant fraction of the Turkish bourgeoisie. The main agenda of TÜSİAD in the early and mid-1980s was a change of course in terms of accumulation strategy and reforms that would complement this change such as the reform of the financial system and funding and promotion for exports. For instance, TÜSİAD welcomed the then “ongoing efforts to improve relations with the Middle Eastern and Arab countries and to increase exports to these countries” that “achieved positive results” in its 1983 report on the state of Turkish economy at that time.⁸⁹⁵ It also emphasised regularly the need for a struggle against inflation and public sector deficits,⁸⁹⁶ and it defended

⁸⁹¹ Latif Mustafa, “Medeniyetleşmenin Kesişme Noktasında Balkanlar: Destekçiler ve Muhalifler Arasında Balkanlarda ‘Yeni Osmanlıcılık’” (master’s thesis, the University of Fatih Sultan Mehmet Foundation, 2013), 33.

⁸⁹² Suat Beylur, “Turkey’s Balkan Policy under AK Party and Claims for Neo-Ottomanism” (master’s thesis, Hacettepe University, 2013), 10–11.

⁸⁹³ Berrin Akdeniz, “Sivil Toplum, Neo-Osmanlıcılık ve İHH” (master’s thesis, Abant İzzet Baysal University, 2014), 71.

⁸⁹⁴ Malik Mufti, “Neo-Ottomanists and Neoconservatives: A Strange Alignment in the 1990s,” *Insight Turkey* 18:1 (2016): 151.

⁸⁹⁵ TÜSİAD, *1983 Yılına Girerken Türk Ekonomisi* (Istanbul: TÜSİAD, 1983), ii.

⁸⁹⁶ TÜSİAD, *Türkiye’de Enflasyon ve Enflasyonla Mücadelede Başarı Koşulları* (Istanbul: TÜSİAD, 1986); TÜSİAD, *1987 Yılına Girerken Türk Ekonomisi* (Istanbul: TÜSİAD, 1987), i–vi; TÜSİAD, *1988 Yılına Girerken Türk Ekonomisi* (Istanbul: TÜSİAD, 1987), i; TÜSİAD, *İstikrarlı Kalkınma ve Yeniden Sanayileşme İçin Ekonomik Çözümlər* (Istanbul: TÜSİAD, 1989), i–vi.

the privatisation of SEEs⁸⁹⁷ and the strengthening of local producers and industrialists in the face of the looming customs union with European countries.⁸⁹⁸

The official texts of the governing MP also do not refer to the neo-Ottomanist aspiration regarding foreign policy. The 1983 programme of the MP underlined the need for “disciplined and strong armed forces” due to the geopolitical conditions of Turkey under the title of “national defence.”⁸⁹⁹ As to the title “foreign policy,” it stated that Turkey should play “a more active role . . . in its relations with the Western World with which it has ties of political, military and economic cooperation.”⁹⁰⁰ It also emphasised “historical ties” with “the countries of the Middle East and other Islamic countries” arguing that it was “quite natural for [Turkey] to develop better relations” with these countries.⁹⁰¹ This last point, however, is not peculiar to the MP leadership since the other two political parties that were eligible to compete in the 1983 elections also had similar foreign policy understandings. The left-leaning PP was promising “to strive to make all Muslim countries live in peace and stability” and “to make it clear that [Turkey] was wishing and believing in to find durable resolution

⁸⁹⁷ TÜSİAD, *Özelleştirme: KİT'lerin Halka Satışında Başarı Koşulları* (İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1986), i–iii; TÜSİAD, *Ekonominik Çözümlər*, v; TÜSİAD, *Avrupa Topluluğu ve Türkiye'nin Üyeliği Sorunu: Makro Bir Değerlendirme* (İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1987), vii.

⁸⁹⁸ TÜSİAD, *1986 Yılına Girerken Türk Ekonomisi* (İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1986), v–vi; TÜSİAD, *Döviz Durumu İle İlgili Gelişmeler* (İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1986), 3–16; TÜSİAD, *Diş Ticaret Raporu: İthalat ve İhracatta Sorunlar ve Öneriler* (İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1986); TÜSİAD, *Türkiye'de Süt ve Süt Ürünleri Sanayiinde Durum* (İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1986), 6, 31; TÜSİAD, *Türkiye'de Et ve Et Ürünleri Sanayiinde Durum* (İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1986), 3, 29–30; TÜSİAD, *1987 Yılına Girerken Türk Ekonomisi* (İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1987), v–vi; TÜSİAD, *Avrupa Topluluğu*, iii; TÜSİAD, *İş Dünyasının Sorunları: Öncelikler, Beklentiler ve Çözümlər* (İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1987), ii.

⁸⁹⁹ MP, *The Programme of the Motherland Party* (n.p.: MP, 1986), 41–42.

⁹⁰⁰ Ibid., 45.

⁹⁰¹ Ibid., 45. Almost the same sentences were used regarding foreign policy in the 1983 manifesto of the MP. TBMM, *Anavatan Partisi Programı, Anavatan Partisi 6 Kasım 1983 Seçim Beyannamesi, Hükümet Programı* (n.p., 1983), 141–42.

to the Palestinian issue in the Middle East.”⁹⁰² In a similar vein, the NSC-backed NDP also promised “to foster increased cultural, economic and political relations with Arab and Muslim countries.”⁹⁰³ This similarity in the foreign policy understandings of the three political parties is not surprising given the *trasformismo* that took place as a result of the passive revolution in the early 1980s. It was already noted that *trasformismo* or “transformism” means “[the] formation of an ever-more-extensive ruling class” through, “gradual but continuous absorption” of both the “active elements produced by the allied groups . . . and even those which came from antagonistic groups and seemed irreconcilably hostile.”⁹⁰⁴ Through this process rival ideas and programmes are assimilated into ones that would fit into hegemonic frameworks drawn by the dominant classes or class fractions. One should also not forget that potentially rival political figures and parties had already been eliminated by the NSC through strict security checks before declaring these eligible to compete in the 1983 general elections.

It should also be stated that foreign policy was not among the top priorities of the MP government in its public debate when it came to power in the early 1980s. The top priorities declared in its 1983 government programme were domestic “peace and confidence,” “strengthening of the middle pillar [*orta direk*] made up of farmers, workers, civil servants, shopkeepers and retirees,” “unemployment,” “housing,” “developing the regions prioritised for development especially the east and southeast,” and “bureaucracy.”⁹⁰⁵ When it came to foreign policy, Turgut Özal almost repeated the expressions used in the 1983 programme and manifesto of his party while

⁹⁰² TBMM, *Anavatan, Halkçı ve Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partileri Seçim Beyanname ve Programları* (n.p., 1983), 21.

⁹⁰³ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁴ Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 58, footnote 8. See also ibid., 58–59.

⁹⁰⁵ TBMM, *Anavatan Partisi Programı*, 163.

reading the new MP government's programme before the parliament in 1983.⁹⁰⁶ Foreign relations were in general thought in instrumental terms to facilitate exports, expand markets for Turkish exporters and integrate the Turkish economy into the world market. As such, "the main goals" of Turkish foreign policy was declared as "strengthen[ing] the country's defence and economic development" in the manifesto published by the MP on the eve of the 1987 parliamentary elections.⁹⁰⁷ It could be, nonetheless, argued that the export-oriented accumulation strategy adopted in 1980 and the subsequent rise of Turkish exports to countries in Turkey's surrounding regions formed the material basis over which later period expansionary schemes such as neo-Ottomanism could be formulated. It is this feature of the early Özal period that makes it, in a sense, a prelude to the later period neo-Ottomanist foreign policy aspiration. Apart from this, the practice of Turkish foreign policy in the period in question could in no way be considered neo-Ottomanist.

Moreover, it was already noted above that, by the time the political leadership of Turgut Özal supposedly began to resort to a neo-Ottomanist foreign policy, as argued by most of the studies on the topic, social dissent was again on the rise as a result of the uneven and grave ramifications of the neoliberal policies pursued from early 1980 onwards, and politics began to take on a contentious character. Thus, as elaborated earlier, although his party was in power, he found it more secure to run as candidate for presidency in 1989, when President Evren's term in office came to an end. For this reason, one would have expected Özal to remain outside the area of foreign policy to a great extent as of November 1989, since he would have to remain "impartial" and "above" the party politics according to the constitution. However, his term as president was different from the previous ones in many respects, not least regarding his relations with the MP governments founded by his former political fellows, Yıldırım Akbulut and Mesut Yılmaz, and the initiatives he undertook, more

⁹⁰⁶ TBMM, *Anavatan Partisi Programı*, 213–16.

⁹⁰⁷ MP, *Electoral Manifesto of the Motherland Party* (Ankara: MP, 1987), 59.

often than not independently from the government, in the realm of foreign policy. It is for that reason possible to speak of a “Turkish foreign policy under Özal” concerning the period until the end of the successive MP governments in 1991, and even until 1993, when his presidency ended due to his sudden death, although the political power was no longer in the hands of his fellows between 1991 and 1993.

Overall, the practice of Turkish foreign policy in the early Özal period between 1983 and 1989 was marked by the export-oriented accumulation strategy adopted in 1980 and the subsequent rise in trade volumes with countries in Turkey’s surrounding regions. Turkey’s soaring exports to Middle Eastern countries especially after the Iran–Iraq War that took place between 1980 and 1988 even made the conservative political leadership of the MP, which had Islamic tendencies, consider substituting Turkey’s relations with Muslim countries of the Middle East with Turkey’s relations with Europe. Later developments, however, proved that Turkey’s economic relations with Europe remained intact and much stronger than with any other region, and thus, the quest to substitute Turkey’s relations with Middle Eastern countries with its relations with Europe turned out to have been based upon mere conjunctural phenomena rather than being based upon a solid material basis. Yet it is again this period that formed the material basis over which the later period neo-Ottomanist foreign policy aspiration could be formulated with the rise of Turkish exports to countries in Turkey’s surrounding regions. This period, therefore, constituted, in a sense, a prelude to later period neo-Ottomanism, while at the same time the very first analyses foreseeing that Turkey could somehow pursue a neo-Ottomanist line of foreign policy in the future were also made in this period.

7.5 Between Cautiousness and Assertiveness: Late Özal’s Foreign Policy towards the Balkans

As for the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s, two cases that are relatively more significant deserve particular attention with respect to Turkey’s relations with the Balkans in order to understand whether or not there is really a neo-Ottomanist turn

in Turkish foreign policy. Chronologically, the first one is the campaign of forced assimilation and forced migration towards the Turkish minority in Bulgaria by the regime of Todor Zhivkov, which began in 1984, and the second one is the breakup of the Socialist Republics of Yugoslavia and the subsequent war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995). These two cases occurred in the former Ottoman territories, thereby which Turgut Özal considered to have been in the “first circle” of “Turkey’s natural sphere of influence.”⁹⁰⁸ They also raised questions of identity and provided in this sense the political leadership of Özal opportunities to assert itself with a neo-Ottomanist role of regional leadership. Hence, the following sections examine how Turkey reacted to the forced assimilation and migration campaign against the Turks in Bulgaria by the Zhivkov regime and Turkey’s role and initiatives with respect to the war in Bosnia during the Özal period.

7.5.1 Özal’s Reaction to Bulgaria’s Campaign of Forced Assimilation and Forced Migration towards its Turkish Minority in the Late 1980s: Assertive in Rhetoric but Cautious in Practice

When the Bulgarian government under Zhivkov’s leadership launched its “The Process of Rebirth” campaign to force the Turkish minority to change their names and forcibly adopt Bulgarian names towards the end of 1984, the Özal government was in power. Having taken over power from the military administration that had come with the 1980 *coup d'état*, the first task waiting before the “civilian government” was unsurprisingly to improve the country’s international image. Therefore, the initial attitude of the Özal government regarding the persecutions

⁹⁰⁸ Mustafa Çalık, “Özal: ‘Türkiye’nin Önünde Hâcet Kapıları Açılmıştır!’,” *Türkiye Günlüğü* 19 (1992): 13–14.

towards the Turkish minority in Bulgaria was cautious.⁹⁰⁹ President Kenan Evren sent a message to his counterpart, Zhivkov, in January 1985, “calling for an end to the campaign.”⁹¹⁰ However, the Bulgarian government’s response was to intensify the campaign by also punishing those who spoke Turkish and closing down Turkish publications as well as banning books in Turkish.⁹¹¹ Ultimately, the Turkish government sent a diplomatic note to Bulgaria in March 1985 calling for negotiations with a tacit implication that a migration agreement between the two countries could also be concluded.⁹¹² The Zhivkov regime’s response was that Turkey was “interfering in Bulgaria’s internal affairs.”⁹¹³ In the face of Bulgarian insistence not to change course, Prime Minister Özal stated that “Turkey would be prepared if necessary to receive and resettle all the Turks in Bulgaria in Turkey.”⁹¹⁴ Turkey also engaged in diplomatic efforts in international organisations within which it participated such as the Council of Europe and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in order to draw an international attention to the persecutions towards the Bulgarian Turkish minority. As the question was also a question between two members of the two rival camps of the Cold War, Turkey could also derive US

⁹⁰⁹ İlhan Uzgel, “Relations with the Balkans,” in *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919–2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*, ed. Baskın Oran and trans. Mustafa Akşin (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2010), 630.

⁹¹⁰ Ibid., 629.

⁹¹¹ Ibid.

⁹¹² Ibid., 630.

⁹¹³ Ibid.

⁹¹⁴ Ibid.

support in various United Nations meetings.⁹¹⁵ In addition to the Council of Europe and the OIC, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, what would later transform into the present Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and Western human rights organisations such as Helsinki Watch and Amnesty International also denounced the Bulgarian persecutions towards the Turkish minority. In the summer of 1989, the Bulgarian government forced the Turkish minority to migrate to Turkey in mass. However, the Turkish government began to impose visa requirement upon migrants from Bulgaria and closed the border between two countries when the number of migrants exceeded 300,000 in August of the same year.⁹¹⁶

Zhivkov was forced to resign through a “civilian intervention” that took place within the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), and subsequently a bloodless regime change was carried out by the BCP in late 1989 at a time when the Gorbachev leadership in the Soviet Union was delivering “open and direct messages” which signalled change.⁹¹⁷ The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and the post-Zhivkov Bulgarian administrations sought to dissociate themselves from the anti-Turk campaign by blaming Zhivkov.⁹¹⁸ Relations were further ameliorated after the

⁹¹⁵ Ibid., 630.

⁹¹⁶ Ibid.

⁹¹⁷ Mustafa Türkeş, “Geçiş Sürecinde Dış Politika Öncelikleri: Bulgaristan Örneği,” in *Türkiye'nin Komşuları*, ed. Mustafa Türkeş and İlhan Uzgel (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2002), 185. Zhivkov was first succeeded by a more moderate figure from the BCP, Petar Mladenov, then Foreign Minister, but the pressures for change made the Mladenov leadership announce the BCP would renounce its guaranteed right to rule. The BCP moved in a more moderate direction under Mladenov, and in April 1990 the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) dissociated itself from the BCP and its Marxist–Leninist legacy. Following the elections in 1990, the newly formed National Assembly replaced Mladenov with Zhelyu Zhelev—the leader of the pro-Western Union of Democratic Forces (UDF)—following the resignation of Mladenov. Ibid., 189; Steven Otnoski, *Bulgaria*, 2nd ed. (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2004), 28–29.

⁹¹⁸ Türkeş, “Bulgaristan Örneği,” 185.

establishment of the Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF), which sought to bring together the Bulgarian Turkish minority and defend their rights within the Bulgarian regime, under the leadership of Ahmet Doğan in January 1990 and the electoral victory of the UDF in October 1991.⁹¹⁹ Some of the migrants could also return to Bulgaria in the subsequent years. Although some problems persisted such as the return of the confiscated properties and the legal problems pertaining to dual citizenship, the conditions of the Turkish minority continued to improve, and the MRF could take part in the coalition governments in Bulgaria.⁹²⁰

The literature on the topic seems to agree that the Turkish political leadership stood on a firm line regarding the oppression towards the Turkish minority in Bulgaria.⁹²¹ Şule Kut states that Ankara welcomed the regime change in Bulgaria as well as the BSP's later denunciation of Zhivkov's oppressive policies towards the Turkish minority. These policies were considered by the Turkish government as "Zhivkov's sin" rather than blaming the whole Bulgarian nation.⁹²² Mustafa Türkeş also points to the fact that Turkey eschewed policies that would destabilise Bulgaria

⁹¹⁹ İlhan Uzgel, "Relations with the Balkans," in *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919–2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*, ed. Baskın Oran and trans. Mustafa Akşin (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2010), 818–19.

⁹²⁰ Nurcan Özgür, "1989 Sonrası Türkiye–Bulgaristan İlişkileri," in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoglu (İstanbul: Der Yayımları, 2004), 614–23.

⁹²¹ Some authors even criticise Özal on the grounds that he indeed acted erroneously in this crisis by declaring that his government would accept Turkish migrants from Bulgaria. By doing so, it is argued, he played into Zhivkov's hands. Haydar Çakmak, "Turgut Özal'ın Dış Politika Felsefesi ve Uygulamaları," in *Liderlerin Dış Politika Felsefesi ve Uygulamaları*, ed. Haydar Çakmak (İstanbul: Doğu Kitabevi, 2013), 122.

⁹²² Şule Kut, "Turkish Policy toward the Balkans," in *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, ed. Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayar (Washington: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), 77.

although it could have done so.⁹²³ He also states that Turkish officials emphasised their loyalty to the *status quo* established by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 refusing any kind of territorial revisionism and neo-Ottomanist adventurism during this crisis unlike the later case of the First Gulf War, during which “some advisors of Özal considered to get indulged in the self-defeating project of making Turkey as a sub-super power—meant sub-imperialism.”⁹²⁴ In another article, he reinstates that Turkey’s overall attitude towards Bulgaria had been “constructive” as of the early 1990s.⁹²⁵ One should also take into consideration the fact that there was, rightfully, a fear from a possible Turkish military intervention, similar to the one made in Cyprus in 1974, among the Bulgarians.⁹²⁶ Thus, in the face of such fears, Turkey’s constructive approach to the crisis had a vital importance in gradually overcoming the crisis and improving relations subsequently for the Bulgarian political elite.⁹²⁷ Özal at times did not hesitate to employ a populist rhetoric on the crisis to such an extent that he was also threatening the Bulgarian government with the power of his country referring to its population over fifty million at that time.⁹²⁸ However, his words seem

⁹²³ Türkeş, “Bulgaristan Örneği,” 194–95, 209; Mustafa Türkeş, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: Quest for Enduring Stability and Security,” in *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era*, ed. İdris Bal (Boca Raton: BrownWalker Press, 2004), 199.

⁹²⁴ Ibid.

⁹²⁵ Türkeş, “Bulgaristan Örneği,” 194–95, 209.

⁹²⁶ Özgür, “Türkiye–Bulgaristan İlişkileri,” 614.

⁹²⁷ Mustafa Türkeş, “Türkiye’nin Balkan Politikasında Devamlılık ve Değişim,” *Avrasya Dosyası* 14:1 (2008): 9.

⁹²⁸ Nevra Yaraç Laçinok, “Turgut Özal,” in *Türk Dış Politikasında Liderler: Süreklik ve Değişim, Söylem ve Eylem*, ed. Ali Faik Demir (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 2007), 611–13; Barış Doster, “Turgut Özal ve Dış Politika,” in *Cumhurbaşkanları ve Dış Politika*, ed. Haydar Çakmak (Ankara: Kripto, 2016), 209.

to have been aimed at the domestic audience and did not reflect into his government's practices during the crisis.⁹²⁹ Cenk Saraçoğlu argues that this rhetoric, combined with a powerful media coverage of individual stories of Turkish migrants from Bulgaria such as Naim Süleymanoğlu, Olympic Champion in weightlifting, was useful in sparking out a “nationalist mobilisation” which also contained “anti-communist overtones.”⁹³⁰ The opposition parties such as the SPP and TPP were also quick to join in the resentment towards the Bulgarian regime, and that resentment rose to its peak level with a huge rally in the Taksim square in Istanbul in 1989.⁹³¹ Saraçoğlu, thus, concludes that, through a “nationalist populism,” the issue became, in a way, instrumental to a certain extent in counterbalancing the social dissent that mounted in the late 1980s as a result of the neoliberal economic policies pursued by the MP leadership.⁹³²

7.5.2 Özal and the War in Bosnia: Assertive but Incompetent

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995) began when Turgut Özal had already become president, but also when the MP he had founded had already fallen out of the government. The disintegration process of the Socialist Federal

⁹²⁹ Nüzhet Kandemir, a former senior Turkish diplomat, claims that Özal, despite his harsh rhetoric against the Bulgarian regime, exercised “secret diplomacy” throughout the crisis. Deputy ministers of foreign affairs of the two countries, he states, met secretly in Geneva, Ankara and Sofia, and undertook intense negotiations. He also claims that Naim Süleymanoğlu could be brought to Turkey as a result of the ameliorations these negotiations brought forth. “Nüzhet Kandemir,” in *Yakın Dostlarının Dilinden Turgut Özal’ın Dış Politikasını Anlamak*, ed. Erkan Ertosun (Ankara: Turgut Özal Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2015), 205.

⁹³⁰ Cenk Saraçoğlu, “Tank Paletiyle Neoliberalizm, 1980–2002,” in *Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat*, ed. Gökhan Atılgan, Cenk Saraçoğlu, and Ateş Uslu (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2015), 849.

⁹³¹ Ibid.

⁹³² Ibid., 850.

Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in the aftermath of the Cold War took place with bloody wars including ethnic cleansing and genocide.⁹³³ The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the most violent of these wars. Apart from the brutality the inter-ethnic violence involved, the factor of religion was also aggravating since the conflicting parties were the Orthodox Christian Bosnian Serbs, the Catholic Christian Croats and the Muslim Bosniaks. The most well-known case of this ethnic bloodshed is the murder of thousands of unarmed Bosniaks at Srebrenica in 1995. It was only after this bloodshed before the very eyes of the international community that a US-led multinational coalition intervened to stop the war, and finally, the Dayton Accords were signed between the conflicting parties in the same year.⁹³⁴

⁹³³ The SFRY used to have an “admirable commitment to multinationalism and multiculturalism” that made it an interesting case compared to its other Balkan counterparts. Beginning from 1948, it had also sought to pursue an alternative socialist path—a supposedly “third way” between Western bourgeois democratic and Eastern communist regimes. The post-war Yugoslav state had been founded along lines of the Soviet federal model under the auspices of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) led by Josip Broz, better known as Tito, and had pursued economic policies based on centralist planning between 1945–1963. The break with Stalin in 1948 led to a slow abandonment of the Soviet-style administrative centralism at the theoretical level in the 1950s with such developments as the renaming of the CPY as the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Although that tendency also came to slow down following the death of Stalin in 1953 and the subsequent partial reconciliation with the Soviet Union between 1955 and 1956, the Tito leadership was still sceptical about Stalinism and the notorious Sino-Soviet split (1956–1966) contributed to that scepticism. The so-called “minireform” of March 1961 culminated in an “economic chaos,” whereby a split between centralist unitarists and decentralist reformists within the SFRY leadership also surfaced. Tito himself having been oscillating between the two camps, the course of events ended up with further decentralisation in the economic field in 1963–64, and that trend reached to its climax with the constitution of 1974. Thus, already existing nationalist-inspired tensions grew in the 1970s, but it was after the death of Tito in 1980 that “the last bonds among the peoples disintegrated,” while at the same time economic hardships under austerity programmes of the IMF further devastated the SFRY from within. All these ushered in a process whereby micronationalisms were spurred, and these micronationalisms evolved gradually from competing to warring parties especially with the rise of local nationalist leaders and parties which engaged in identity-based politics to power in all Yugoslav republics in 1990. That process eventually culminated in the disintegration of SFRY. Andrew Baruch Wachtel, *The Balkans in World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 116, 119, 121–23; Iva Banac, “Nationalism in Serbia,” in *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order*, ed. Günay Göksu Özdogan and Kemal Saybaşılı (Istanbul: Eren, 1995), 145–47; Mustafa Türkeş et al., “Kriz Sarmalında Bosna-Hersek: ‘Devlet Krizi’,” (research report DPF 2012-RR 02, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi-TÜSİAD Dış Politika Forumu, İstanbul, 2012), 5–6; Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 10.

⁹³⁴ Wachtel, *Balkans*, 123.

When the Bosnian Serbs, with the support of Federal Yugoslavian army, invaded Bosnia following the declaration of independence by Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), it sparked an outrage among the Turkish people quite naturally for a couple of reasons. The first one was the pain felt as fellow Muslims—Bosniaks in this case—were being massacred once again while the West remained inactive to a certain extent. The second one was the sense of responsibility towards the Balkans in general and the Muslims of that region in particular since the region had been ruled by the Ottoman Empire for centuries. Finally, there were political and religious groups that ranged from nationalist and conservative groups to outright Islamists, which also attributed great political significance to that region and its Muslims from their corresponding ideological points of view. Turkey also did not want instability in the Balkans since this was the bridge region on its way to Europe and half of its foreign trade was being conducted with Europe.⁹³⁵ Likewise, Turkey considered the Bosnian conflict “a cause for long term instability in the region.”⁹³⁶ Apart from these general reasons, the Turkish politicians thought it was possible to draw parallels between the Turkish experience with respect to its quest for full-membership in the EU and the Bosnian one. If Europe did not accept the Bosnians, the argument goes, “it would be difficult to see how Turkey itself could be accepted into Europe.”⁹³⁷

Turgut Özal tried to make use of the Bosnian War and the emotions it provoked among the Turkish society. However, when the war broke out, he was no longer in a position to make foreign policy decisions on his own since he had already ascended to the Çankaya Palace as president. At that time, and until 2017, the Turkish governmental system was based on a parliamentary system of government, and “the

⁹³⁵ Uzgel, “Relations with the Balkans,” 825.

⁹³⁶ Türkeş, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans,” 205.

⁹³⁷ Uzgel, “Relations with the Balkans,” 825.

presidency had often been a marginal force in Turkey's foreign affairs.”⁹³⁸ Although the presidency had significant powers of appointment and discretion, the power of the presidency used to increase “proportionately to the weakness and passivity of the popularly elected government.”⁹³⁹ However, the parliament had just been elected a year ago in 1991, and a coalition led by Süleyman Demirel's right-wing TPP with Erdal İnönü's social democratic SPP was in charge of the government beginning from November 1991. That coalition was formed amidst widespread resentment harboured within a significant portion of the society about the arbitrary practices of governance during the former MP governments and the deeds of President Özal that were thought to have violated the constitutional principle of impartiality.⁹⁴⁰ Thus the new government sought ways to limit the deeds of President Özal that it thought to have gone further beyond the constitutional framework. He also had some problems with the Mesut Yılmaz leadership within the MP, and even tried to make the MP convene an extraordinary congress through manipulating his former colleagues within the party in order to change the party leadership in 1992. When these attempts failed, he began to test the waters whether it was possible or not to succeed in case he would establish a new political party.⁹⁴¹ Accordingly, when the Bosnian War erupted,

⁹³⁸ Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), 70.

⁹³⁹ Alan Makovsky, “Turkey's Presidential Jitters,” (Policywatch 451, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC, 2000), accessed 17 July 2018, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkeys-presidential-jitters>.

⁹⁴⁰ That resentment against the practices of the MP governments and President Özal is well described in the coalition protocol signed between the TPP and SPP: “The institutional structure of our country was pushed into an unprecedented degeneration and corruption in the hands of an administration incompatible with statecraft and the responsibility towards the customs of the Republic.” İrfan Yılmaz and Tuncer Neziroğlu, ed., *Hükümetler, Programları ve Genel Kurul Görüşmeleri*, vol. 8, 9 Kasım 1989–30 Ekim 1995 (Ankara: TBMM Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2013), 6533.

⁹⁴¹ For Özal's troubles with the MP leadership and his subsequent behind-the-scenes efforts in order, first, to change the MP leadership, and latter, to establish a new political party, see Mehmet Ali Birand and Soner Yalçın, *The Özal: Bir Davanın Öyküsü*, 10th ed. (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2007), 488–513.

President Özal was already feeling exasperated with the changed domestic political conjuncture. Yet these could not stop him from actively dealing with the issue. On the contrary, that changed domestic political conjuncture could even be argued to have contributed to his further interest in such critical foreign policy issues.

It was already noted above that the Balkans was particularly important for Özal since it used to be part of the former Ottoman Empire and accordingly it was within the wider region what he called “Turkey’s natural sphere of influence.”⁹⁴² Ideas such as a highway that would connect the region to Istanbul and improving telecommunication systems with the region were previously put forward under his political leadership, but these were interpreted, not least by the Greeks, as “the return of the Ottomans to the Balkans.”⁹⁴³ His statements also sparked controversy about his intentions. One such statement of him was reportedly made in a speech in Australia on 11 May 1991: “We [Turkey] have due weight in the Balkans as we used to have in the past. Turkey is going to be the leader of Muslim groups [there].”⁹⁴⁴ This kind of statements caused concern across the region over Turkey’s real intentions and provided a basis for accusations that Turkey was allegedly indeed in a quest for forming a “Muslim belt” in the region with other Muslim nationalities of the region such as the Bosniaks and Albanians.⁹⁴⁵

⁹⁴² Çalık, “Özal: ‘Hacıet Kapıları Açılmıştır!’,” 13–14.

⁹⁴³ Sedat Laçiner, “Özal Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası,” in *Türkiye’nin Dış, Ekonomik, Sosyal ve İdari Politikaları, 1980–2003*, ed. Turgut Göksu et al. (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2003), 37.

⁹⁴⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, 12 May 1991.

⁹⁴⁵ Türkeş, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans,” 203. Some even went further by drawing a parallel between the historical Ottoman–Habsburg rivalry in the European mainland and the later “special interest” of Germany in Croatia and Slovenia and that of Turkey in BiH and Macedonia in the 1990s. Mehmet Gönlübol and F. Hakan Bingün, “1990–1995 Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası,” in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919–1995)*, Mehmet Gönlübol et al., 9th ed. (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996), 666.

Özal, time and again, called for the world leaders to intervene in the crisis, and when the Serbian forces launched an air bombardment to Sarajevo for the first time on 6 April 1992, he urged the United Nations (UN) and NATO to form a force to intervene immediately to stop the war and declared that Turkey would join this force on the fullest scale.⁹⁴⁶ He also had some proposals such as enforcing a full embargo as was the case with Iraq in the First Gulf War, severing all relations with Serbia by all democratic countries, bringing Serbia to account for the massacres it committed and suspension of Serbia's succession of Yugoslavia in international organisations such as the UN and OSCE.⁹⁴⁷ He also brought the issue to the agenda of the OIC, and proposed a military intervention and military operations against strategic Serbian targets unless the Serbs handed over their arms.⁹⁴⁸ In a conference he attended in the United States on 2 February 1993, he stated that Bosnia must have been exempted from the embargo imposed upon Serbia by the UN and that the Serbian military sites must have been handed over to the UN, and if not possible, that those sites must have been neutralised with air bombardment since the only solution to the crisis, according to him, was to establish an equity between the Serbs and Bosniaks.⁹⁴⁹ He also permitted the “Group in Solidarity with Bosnia and Herzegovina,” which largely consisted of political Islamists that ranged from moderate conservatives to utmost fundamentalists, to organise a meeting on 13 February 1993 in the Taksim square in Istanbul, although the Ministry of Interior of the TPP-SPP coalition

⁹⁴⁶ Yaraç Laçinok, “Turgut Özal,” 608.

⁹⁴⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, 30 May 1992.

⁹⁴⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, 12 January 1993.

⁹⁴⁹ Yaraç Laçinok, “Turgut Özal,” 609.

government had previously refused the request of the group.⁹⁵⁰ He and his neo-Ottomanist fellows did not miss the opportunity to utilise that instance in order to express their neo-Ottomanist aspiration towards the wider geopolitical landscape around Turkey, and Özal became the sole speaker in the meeting. Since the speech he made in that meeting demonstrates amply the main contours of his neo-Ottomanism in general and his stance towards the Balkans in particular, it would be appropriate to look into that speech.⁹⁵¹

Özal made the opening of his speech by stating, “This audience, this incredible and meaningful audience, emphasises the voice of the Turkish people over global problems.”⁹⁵² The message the meeting gave, to him, was, “Count us in!”—a message from Turkey to the world.⁹⁵³ The participants were, “the representatives of the common sense, not only of the Muslim world, but also of the whole humanity.”⁹⁵⁴ In his speech Özal also defined what Turkey represented in his own image. Asserting that Turkey was not “an Oceanian island,” but “a dignified country that could survive resting upon its own power in the Balkans, in the Middle East and Caucasus—in the most painful part of the world,” and that it was also a “free and autonomous country” that had “close contact with the West for more or less a thousand years,” he argued that Turkey came to “a unique and extremely important position in the world scene” which was “in a remaking” thanks to its three characteristics: “secularism,”

⁹⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁵¹ For the full text of that speech, see Turgut Özal, “Bosna–Hersek Mitingi’ndeki Konuşma,” *Türkiye Günlugü* 22 (1993): 8–15.

⁹⁵² Ibid., 8.

⁹⁵³ Ibid.

⁹⁵⁴ Ibid.

“democracy,” and “Islam.”⁹⁵⁵ Turkey was a “symbol of hope” for the Muslim Bosniaks as well as a “model state” for the countries that ranged “from the East Europe to the Far East, from the Caucasus to the Middle East.”⁹⁵⁶ Turkey was “a whole composed of various elements,” but “a national whole,” since “national,” for him, did not entail “an ethnic homogeneity.”⁹⁵⁷ Turkey was “shining like a star among the whole Islamic societies” as well as “before the other Turkic communities.”⁹⁵⁸ As such, “I see the birth of a great regional power,” he contended with vigour.⁹⁵⁹

As for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), he commented that it was the land of “a Muslim and European society” which had always lived “in compliance with humanitarian and civilisational criteria without causing any significant crisis for centuries.”⁹⁶⁰ Apart from this general description of BiH, this time he went on his description by expressing the particular characteristic of it for “them”: “As for *us*, it is an *Andalusia*”⁹⁶¹ which *we* explored as though once again in the last couple of years

⁹⁵⁵ Ibid., 8–9.

⁹⁵⁶ Ibid., 9.

⁹⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁵⁸ Ibid., 10.

⁹⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁶¹ Özal refers here to the historical *Al-Andalus*—a region in the Iberian Peninsula, conquered by the Muslim Umayyad dynasty in the eighth century, hence ruled by Muslims until its total reconquest by Christian armies at the end of the fifteenth century.

of the twentieth century.”⁹⁶² He also claimed that Turkey would “not allow Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fate to be similar to that of Andalusia” despite the loneliness it had been pushed into by the West amidst the atrocities committed by the Serbs.⁹⁶³ He further asserted that the struggle of the Muslim Bosniaks was “heralding the emergence of a new Muslim nation onto the scene of history on the Adriatic’s shores.”⁹⁶⁴ He also expressed his pride that Turkey was “leading and guiding with respect to [the Bosnian issue] within the Islamic world” as was the case, according to him, with every issue.⁹⁶⁵ It is interesting that he gave the example of his recent conversations with the then US President William Jefferson Clinton during his last trip to the United States as to what could be done. He also indicated that he was hopeful about the new Clinton administration by stating that it looked as if the new US administration would first propose a peaceful resolution to the issue, but in case they failed in achieving such an outcome, they would take “effective measures” that would go up to the point of military intervention.⁹⁶⁶ While acknowledging his pledge to the US administration that Turkey was ready for any kind of cooperation and help over the issue, he was also sending messages of warning to the West not to remain passive before the Serbian atrocities reminding that the appeasement policy towards the Nazi Germany of Adolf Hitler had not worked in the past.⁹⁶⁷ What he proposed

⁹⁶² Özal, “Bosna–Hersek Mitingi,” 10. It is not clear here what Özal meant by “we” and “us.” His reference to the Muslim Andalusia leads us to think that he meant Muslims or the Turks as Muslims. In either case, it reveals once again the Islamic component of neo-Ottomanism.

⁹⁶³ Ibid., 11.

⁹⁶⁴ Ibid., 13.

⁹⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁶⁷ Ibid., 13–14.

was to gather under the same roof of the UN in order to find out “a just, humanitarian and lasting resolution in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”⁹⁶⁸ It is interesting that Özal’s proposals for resolving the crisis, by either peaceful or military means, did not involve unilateral actions by Turkey despite all his assertive claims that Turkey would not allow BiH to have the same fate as that of the Muslim Andalusia. His proposals involved nothing but multilateral and/or international action—either through the leadership of the United States or the UN. It is also worth noting that Özal, in taking up the Bosnian cause, also sought to pay lip service to Islamist sensitivities. When he made that speech in the meeting for Bosnia in February 1993, only one year had remained before the local elections that would be held on 27 March 1994, and the general elections would also be held on 24 December 1995. The organisers of the meeting had expected three hundred thousand people to participate in the event, but observers estimate the number of participants as fifteen thousand at best, whereas the number of people who listened to Özal’s speech from the beginning to the end is estimated only around ten thousand.⁹⁶⁹ Even that little participant group booed Özal as he stated that Turkey was a secular country and that he developed good relations with the then US President Clinton.⁹⁷⁰ It must also be noted that the meeting took place under the shadow of famous Kemalist investigative journalist Uğur Mumcu’s assassination on 24 January 1993, and the already existing political polarisation along secularist and Islamist lines was further deepened as a result of that assassination.⁹⁷¹ The participants consisted of Islamists to a large extent, and as discussed in the fifth

⁹⁶⁸ Ibid., 15.

⁹⁶⁹ Ali Gözcü, “Bosna Dayanışma Mitingi: Bir Değerlendirme,” *Haksöz* 23 (February 1993), accessed 18 July 2018, <https://www.haksozhaber.net/okul/bosna-dayanisma-mitingi-bir-degerlendirme-328yy.htm>. For a similar account, which calls the meeting “fiasco,” see Yavuz Gökmen, *Özal Yaşasaydı* (Ankara: Verso Yayıncılık, 1994), 239–42.

⁹⁷⁰ Gözcü, “Bosna Dayanışma Mitingi.”

⁹⁷¹ Gökmen, *Özal Yaşasaydı*, 239, 241.

chapter, Turkish political Islam led by Erbakan's WP was on the rise, and would prove very successful in both elections in 1994 and 1995. As for the Bosnian cause, Erbakan had also direct links with the Bosnian leader Alija Izetbegovic,⁹⁷² who also had an Islamic orientation combined with nationalism.⁹⁷³

Having all these stated, it is still important not to forget that it was no longer President Turgut Özal that was pulling the strings in the realm of foreign policy. The TPP–SPP coalition government led by Süleyman Demirel was already taking initiatives and in a determining position in the Turkish foreign policy of that period from November 1991 to June 1993.⁹⁷⁴ Philip Robins argues that the Turkish political elite "adopted a three-pronged approach" in "developing a political strategy for managing the issue":

First, the Turkish government, supported by the relevant state institutions, vigorously pursued the issue in its foreign policy, with the sole exception of an eight-month period of introspection; the charge of apathy or aloofness could not therefore easily be levelled against it. Second, the government organised a domestic aid effort for Bosnia, thereby showing that it was active in terms of humanitarian assistance, while also providing an avenue through which moderate activists could channel their energies. Third, Ankara also indicated, rhetorically at least, that it would be willing to contemplate active Turkish participation in the use of force in Bosnia, but only in a multilateral

⁹⁷² Abdussamet Karataş, "Erbakan'ın Şahitleri 2: Bilge Kral Aliya İzzet Begoviç," *Millî Gazete*, 9 September 2013.

⁹⁷³ For an elaboration of Izetbegovic's Islamism, see Raymond William Baker, *One Islam, Many Muslim Worlds: Spirituality, Identity, and Resistance across Islamic Lands* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 121–132.

⁹⁷⁴ President Turgut Özal died on 17 April 1993. Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel ran as presidential candidate following Özal's death, and he was elected the 9th president of the Republic of Turkey in May of that year. President Demirel waited for the extraordinary congress of the ruling TPP to convene in order to appoint Tansu Çiller to form the government. Çiller succeeded Demirel as the new leader of the TPP having been elected the president of the TPP in its extraordinary congress in June 1993, and she formed a coalition government again with the SPP in July 1993. Thus she became the first female prime minister of Turkey heading the 50th Republican government. Hikmet Çetin from the SPP served as the minister of foreign affairs in these TPP–SPP coalition governments until he was succeeded by his colleague Mümtaz Soysal again from the SPP on 27 July 1994. Tanör, "Siyasal Tarih (1980–1995)," 94.

context; such a posture thereby helped to parry emotional calls for the immediate commitment of Turkish forces to the conflict zone.⁹⁷⁵

Like President Özal, the government and especially Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet Çetin tried to “utilise every forum” which provided “a public platform at which to raise the issue.”⁹⁷⁶ NATO, OSCE and OIC were the foremost among these international platforms. Accordingly, it could be argued that the government had a clearly multilateral approach towards the Bosnian crisis. Earlier in April 1991, even President Özal had “told the federal head of state that Turkey supported the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia,”⁹⁷⁷ and this was indeed in tandem with Turkey’s decades-long “desire of stability in the Balkans.”⁹⁷⁸ Other Yugoslavian leaders, such as Macedonia’s president Kiro Gligorov, the president of BiH Alija Izetbegovic and the President of the Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milošević, sought support for their particularistic causes in Ankara on the eve of the Bosnian War, but Turkey preferred to remain loyal to its policy of preserving Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity until it became clear that there remained no future for a unitary Yugoslavia.⁹⁷⁹ Following the EU’s recognition of Slovenia and Croatia on 15 January 1992, Turkey also officially recognised on 6 February 1992⁹⁸⁰ these two countries along with Macedonia and BiH

⁹⁷⁵ Robins, *Suits and Uniforms*, 346.

⁹⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷⁷ Uzgel, “Relations with the Balkans,” 822.

⁹⁷⁸ Robins, *Suits and Uniforms*, 350.

⁹⁷⁹ Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, “Turkey in the New Security Environment in the Balkan and Black Sea Region,” in *Turkey between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power*, ed. Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 81–82; Türkeş, “Devamlılık ve Değişim,” 10–11; Uzgel, “Relations with the Balkans,” 822–23.

⁹⁸⁰ “Olaylar Kronolojisi (1990–1996),” in *Dağılan Yugoslavya ve Bosna-Hersek Sorunu: Olaylar–Belgeler, 1990–1996*, ed. İsmail Soysal and Şule Kut (İstanbul: İSİS, 1997), 14.

as it sought to demonstrate an equal distance to all these newly independent ex-Yugoslavian states and also did not want to remain “completely left out” of the issue at hand.⁹⁸¹ However, as the crisis further deepened and the Bosnian War erupted, Turkey sought to engage in an active diplomacy on behalf of the Bosniaks towards whom the Turkish people had an undoubted sympathy. Apart from these diplomatic efforts, Turkey also allegedly supplied weapons to the anti-Serb forces—notably the Bosnian government.⁹⁸²

Nevertheless, despite pressing elements such as President Özal’s harsh rhetoric, criticisms and accusations made by the MP and by various nationalist and Islamist groups, and the already noted sympathy among the Turkish people towards the Muslim Bosniaks, the Turkish government felt it necessary not to go further and acted in restraint for several reasons. First of all, Turkey was extremely cautious not to engage militarily in additional crises since it already had problems due to its security problems and military engagements such as the presence of its troops in Cyprus and its military struggle against the PKK in Southeastern Anatolia and Northern Iraq.⁹⁸³ Another reason was that, given the already existing strong historiographical and nationalistic reactions to the Ottoman legacy throughout the Balkans apart from some exceptions, many Balkan nations were extremely alert to the slightest political manoeuvres of Turkey towards that region.⁹⁸⁴ Thus, Turkey

⁹⁸¹ Uzgel, “Relations with the Balkans,” 823.

⁹⁸² Former Chief of General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces General Doğan Güreş acknowledged that Turkey provided arms to the Bosnian government just three months after his retirement from office. Robins, *Suits and Uniforms*, 348.

⁹⁸³ Uzgel, “Relations with the Balkans,” 824.

⁹⁸⁴ On the Ottoman legacy in the Balkans and attempts at “de-Ottomanisation” in various spheres of social life in many Balkan countries, see Maria Todorova, “The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans,” in *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order*, ed. Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Kemali Saybaşılı (Istanbul: Eren, 1995), 55–74.

would trigger off an almost automatic reaction in the form of accusing Turkey of “attempt[ing] to resuscitate the Ottoman Empire” in case of a unilateral Turkish involvement in the region.⁹⁸⁵ Finally, Turkey did not have the material ability and capacity to unilaterally engage in military adventures in the region. Not only the airspace on Turkey’s way to Bosnia was closed to Turkey, not least by Greece, but also Turkey did not have such military equipment as tanker aircraft, and hence its air force would only be able to fly over the region no longer than several minutes.⁹⁸⁶ Apart from these constraints, it is also important to remind that the TPP–SPP coalition government of the time was already politically against any unilateral action.⁹⁸⁷ Therefore, even when Turkey engaged in military action with respect to the Bosnian War, it did this through multilateral arrangements and tried to remain within the framework of international law.⁹⁸⁸ Turkey did not hesitate to “participate actively in every international military operation [in Bosnia].”⁹⁸⁹ Another example of Turkey’s restraint during the Bosnian War was the policy it pursued towards Serbia that

⁹⁸⁵ Türkeş, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans,” 204; Uzgel, “Relations with the Balkans,” 824.

⁹⁸⁶ Uzgel, “Relations with the Balkans,” 824. This last point was also made open to the public by a report leaked to the press by the Turkish Armed Forces, most probably in order to further prevent possible adventurist policies towards the region. Robins, *Suits and Uniforms*, 349.

⁹⁸⁷ This was also manifest in a statement made by Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet Çetin in August 1992: “Even if hundreds of thousands of Bosniaks seek refuge in Turkey, Turkey is not going to act alone.” Şule Kut, “Yugoslavia Bunalımı ve Türkiye’nin Bosna–Hersek ve Makedonya Politikası: 1990–1993,” in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoglu (İstanbul: Der Yayıncıları, 2004), 597, footnote 50.

⁹⁸⁸ Türkeş, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans,” 203.

⁹⁸⁹ “Turkish frigates and submarines took part in the joint NATO–Western European Union (WEU) Operation Sharp Guard (July 1992 to October 1996) staged in the Adriatic to enforce the UN arms embargo, and eighteen Turkish F-16s joined Operation Deny Flight, which has monitored and enforced a ‘no-fly-zone’ over Bosnia–Herzegovina since 1993. In 1994 Turkey contributed a brigade to the UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) and later maintained its presence in the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR).” Kut, “Turkish Policy toward the Balkans,” 83.

emerged in territories remained in the hands of the Serbs out of the former Yugoslavia. That policy was “specifically designed not to turn Serbia, Greece’s main ally in the Balkans, into Turkey’s enemy.”⁹⁹⁰ As such, relations with that country were not totally cut off, and Turkey’s exports into Europe could resume going their way through former Yugoslavian territories.

7.6 The First Gulf Crisis and Özal: Assertive but Lacking Material Capacity

The case of the first Gulf crisis (2 August 1990–28 February 1991) is particularly important with respect to relations with the Middle East under the political leadership of Özal in the period after 1989—the year that supposedly marked the “neo-Ottomanist” turn in Turkish foreign policy. This case is widely interpreted as an instance of his aspiration for regional leadership supported by the United States.⁹⁹¹ Apart from this apparent departure from the traditional Republican *modus operandi* with respect to Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East, the case of the Gulf War is also important from another aspect, that is, unlike the Bosnian case discussed above, Özal still had considerable power and impact thanks to the existence of the MP on top of the single-party government at that time.⁹⁹² Thus, again unlike the Bosnian case, he was not limited from the very beginning in this case. He, therefore, could emerge as the leading person in many instances during and in the

⁹⁹⁰ Ibid., 80.

⁹⁹¹ For instance, see Mufti, *Daring and Caution*, 84; Uzgel and Yaramış, “Türkiye’de Yeni Osmanlıçı Arayışlar,” 39; Mufti, “Neo-Ottomanists and Neoconservatives,” 151–55; Yavuz, “Social and Intellectual Origins of Neo-Ottomanism,” 456.

⁹⁹² Birol Yeşilada, for instance, states that Özal “single-handedly decided Turkey’s policy” with respect to the Gulf crisis. Birol Yeşilada, “Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Middle East,” in *The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, ed. Atila Eralp, Muharrem Tünay, and Birol Yeşilada (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), 182.

aftermath of that case. Hence his stance regarding that case is beneficial for any study that aims to examine his neo-Ottoman subimperialist aspiration for regional leadership.

When Iraq attacked and ultimately invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990 following its earlier verbal quarrel with that country over its accusations of manipulating the oil prices and some other problems such as border issues and the Iraqi debts, the initial responses from the Turkish government were of a mild kind. The then Minister of Trade and Industry Şükrü Yürür, for instance, stated that he “regretted Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait” and described it as “a threat to the maintenance of friendship in the area” on the day of the invasion.⁹⁹³ Prime Minister Yıldırım Akbulut also expressed “his regret at the invasion” and called “for an early Iraqi withdrawal from the Emirate” two days later.⁹⁹⁴ This was the case despite the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 660 “condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait” and “demanding that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally”⁹⁹⁵ and the already existing problems between Turkey and Iraq.⁹⁹⁶ However, these mild responses gave its way to a harsh rhetoric against Iraq as President Turgut Özal began to seize the initiative regarding the crisis.

⁹⁹³ Philip Robins, “Turkish Policy and the Gulf Crisis: Adventurist or Dynamic?,” in *Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects*, ed. Clement H. Dodd (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1992), 72.

⁹⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁵ UNSC Resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, accessed 9 August 2018, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/10/IMG/NR057510.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁹⁹⁶ Iraq had unilaterally abrogated the November 1989 treaty between the two countries that had used to allow Turkey to conduct cross-border military operations into Northern Iraq in order to support its fight against the PKK with hot-pursuit operations. It was also reluctant to pay its \$1.7 billion debt to Turkey which it had been granted in the face of its financial bottleneck following the Iran–Iraq War. Finally, Iraq was threatening Turkey with mobilising the Arab world in order to impose a complete embargo against Turkey in the face of its construction of the huge Atatürk Dam on the Euphrates River which was one of the major sources of water for Iraq. M. Hakan Yavuz, “İkicilik (Duality): Türk–Arap İlişkileri ve Filistin Sorunu (1947–1994),” in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoglu (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004), 249.

As the crisis got ahead, Turkey reached crucial crossroads. The very first one was a prospective embargo against Iraq. Two of the three pipelines through which the Iraqi oil was being exported to world markets were ending in Turkey.⁹⁹⁷ Thus, Turkey would have a critical position in effectively imposing such an embargo against that country taking into consideration that oil was the primary source of Iraq. However, such an act would draw the hostility of that neighbouring country and even the wider Arab world unless other Arab countries participated. Moreover, it would damage the Turkish foreign trade since Iraq was not only one of the main suppliers of oil, but also both a significant market and a transit way for Turkish exports. It was in such a context when Minister of State Mehmet Keçeciler stated that Turkey would not close the two Iraqi pipelines unless the other one across Saudi Arabia was first cut off⁹⁹⁸ on 6 August 1990—the day the UNSC Resolution 661 mandating a total embargo against that country was declared.⁹⁹⁹ However, pressures on Turkey for imposing embargo against Iraq had already intensified before that resolution. President Özal, in a later phase of the crisis, stated that the then US President George H. W. Bush had begun to raise the issue of pipelines as early as their first telephone conversation over Iraq.¹⁰⁰⁰ Although Turkey could previously manage to fend off such pressures, Resolution 661 placed a tight constraint upon it. If it was to go on trading with Iraq, it would not only confront a problem of international legitimacy, but also have to bear the brunt of possible sanctions as a result of violating that resolution. Fortunately for

⁹⁹⁷ The other one was with Saudi Arabia.

⁹⁹⁸ Philip Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), 69; Robins, “Turkish Policy and the Gulf Crisis,” 72.

⁹⁹⁹ UNSC Resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, accessed 9 August 2018, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/11/IMG/NR057511.pdf?OpenElement>.

¹⁰⁰⁰ “Cumhurbaşkanı Turgut Özal’ın Körfez Krizi Konusunda Basın Mensuplarıyla Yaptıkları Sohbet Toplantısı,” in *Türkiye’nin Kuveyt Krizi (1990–1991) Politikası: 1998 Yılından Geriye Yönelik Bir Yeniden Değerlendirme*, Mahmut Bali Aykan, (Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 1998), 110.

Turkey, that difficult period did not last longer than several days. It was first Iraq that shut down one of the twin pipelines.¹⁰⁰¹ Turkey, later, “closed down the pipeline completely, froze all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in Turkey and pledged to stop trade with Baghdad”¹⁰⁰² on 7 August 1990—one day after the declaration of Resolution 661. Members of the government including Prime Minister Akbulut and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Bozer were caught unawares of that decision taken by Özal and his inner team of advisors.¹⁰⁰³ The government took a meeting headed by Özal again on 7 August 1990 and officially decided to impose embargo against Iraq in accordance with Resolution 661.¹⁰⁰⁴ Özal stated later that he deliberately hastened to act in order to have advantage following the official notification given them by the US Department of State that Secretary of State James Baker would come to Ankara in order to meet with Turkish officials over the Gulf crisis.¹⁰⁰⁵ He also confessed that he wanted to prevent an image like “Baker came and made [Turkey] shut down [the pipelines].”¹⁰⁰⁶ Moreover, he always emphasised Turkey should “get its share of the pie” through a foreign policy he called “active foreign policy” by “taking risks” in

¹⁰⁰¹ “Turkey and the Gulf Crisis: Chronology,” in “Turkey and the Gulf Crisis,” ed. İsmail Soysal, special issue, *Studies on Turkish–Arab Relations* 6 (1991): 161. Philip Robins cites Minister of State Keçeciler’s statement reported by the Anatolian Agency, the Turkish state-owned news agency, and reproduced by the BBC, which claims that Iraq also reduced the flow of the other pipeline by 70 percent Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East*, 70; Robins, “Turkish Policy and the Gulf Crisis,” 73.

¹⁰⁰² “Turkey and the Gulf Crisis: Chronology,” 161.

¹⁰⁰³ Ramazan Gözen, “Türkiye ve I. Körfez Savaşı: Kriz Ortamında Dış Politika,” in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoglu (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004), 290.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Mahmut Bali Aykan, *Türkiye'nin Kuveyt Krizi (1990–1991) Politikası: 1998 Yılından Geriye Yönelik Bir Yeniden Değerlendirme* (Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 1998), 134.

¹⁰⁰⁵ “Özal’ın Basın Mensuplarıyla Toplantısı,” 111.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Ibid.

order to enjoy potential advantages and benefits that would emerge out of the crisis.¹⁰⁰⁷ It seems that he had some fixed predictions about the possible course of events and based his policies upon those predictions. One of those predictions of his was that the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would go in one way or another. The map of the Middle East would also be redrawn, and Turkey would be “at the table” when the map would be redrawn and “the pie” would be “shared out.” The Gulf countries would cover the economic damage upon Turkey caused by the crisis, whereas the United States and Europe would also award Turkey additional aid, extensive credits, and support in its problems with Greece and Armenia and in its bid to access the European Common Market.¹⁰⁰⁸ In a sense, as was the phrase attributed to him, Turkey would “put one and get three [in return].”¹⁰⁰⁹

The two other crossroads were about officially permitting the United States to use Turkish military bases, especially the Incirlik air base, in a possible military operation against Iraq and sending Turkish troops in such operations. Although Özal’s ultimate decision to completely cut off the two oil pipelines with Iraq had also been criticised by Erdal İnönü and Süleyman Demirel, the opposition leaders at that time,

¹⁰⁰⁷ Ibid., 92, 118; Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Büyüklerle Masallar, Küçüklerle Gerçekler*, vol. 3, *Kriz Doğuran Savaş* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000), 28.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Arcayürek, *Kriz Doğuran Savaş*, 27–28.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Indeed, neither Özal himself nor anyone from his team of advisors or from the MP government used that phrase in public. It first appeared in an article by Turkish columnist Ertuğrul Özkök in the daily *Hürriyet*. The article was covering the opinions of Süleyman Demirel, the then leader of the TPP in the opposition, about Özal’s policies toward the crisis. The article was citing Demirel’s claim that Özal said, “This is a good opportunity. We will put one and get three [in return].” Özkök states that Özal told him he never used that phrase but it stuck to him. However, Özkök also argues that the phrase well reflected the point about what Özal had in mind. Gözen, “*Türkiye ve I. Körfez Savaşı*,” 298; Birand and Yalçın, *The Özal*, 442–43. However, Özal himself would later in February 1991 react by stating, “They are writing I said we would put one and get three. I did not say so. Three in return for one is insufficient. I say we will put one and get twenty.” Arcayürek, *Kriz Doğuran Savaş*, 244. Sami Kohen also claims that President Özal frequently said journalists watching his last foreign trip to Central Asian Turkic republics, “In order to become a big power, thinking big is necessary.” Kohen further claims that he utilised the English phrase “calculated risks” in such speeches and that he argued it must not have conflated with “adventurism.” Osman Özsoy, ed., *Ünlülerin Turgut Özal’la Hâtıraları* (İstanbul: Türkiye Kalkınma ve Dayanışma Vakfı, 1994), 237–38.

it had been in general considered to have complied with international law and more specifically with the UNSC Resolution 661. However, this time, the issues of opening Turkish military bases to US military operations against Iraq and sending Turkish troops abroad were not considered as necessities in the absence of any such clear mandate given by the UN. Even when the UNSC authorised, “[m]ember states co-operating with the Government of Kuwait,” “to use all necessary measures to uphold and implement” the previous resolutions regarding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait “unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implement[ed]” those resolutions itself and requested “all States to provide appropriate support” in that direction with its Resolution 678,¹⁰¹⁰ a semantic debate also emerged as to whether Turkey would also “use all necessary means” or would only “provide appropriate support” within the framework of that resolution.¹⁰¹¹ The opposition was in favour of the second proposition that Turkey should only “provide appropriate support” for actions that aimed at upholding and implementing the previous resolutions on the issue—at least until 15 January 1991. Some members of the opposition even claimed that Turkey did not have to do that either since the Resolution only “requested” all states to “provide appropriate support.” Thus, the argument goes, it was not mandatory for Turkey to take any further action apart from complying with the previous resolutions by going on imposing embargo against Iraq and supporting actions of other states to uphold and implement that embargo.¹⁰¹²

President Özal, however, seemed to have been determined to side with the United States against Iraq during the crisis, though he continuously made contradictory remarks on the Turkish stance over the crisis and possible Turkish

¹⁰¹⁰ UNSC Resolution 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, accessed 9 August 2018, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/28/IMG/NR057528.pdf?OpenElement>.

¹⁰¹¹ Arcayürek, *Kriz Doğuran Savaş*, 105.

¹⁰¹² Erdal İnönü, the chairperson of the SPP, was defending this line. Erdal İnönü, *Körfez Krizi ve SHP* (Ankara: Profil Yayıncılık, 1991), 58–59.

actions.¹⁰¹³ Especially, there was a gap between his public statements over the crisis and his personal convictions he made open in his private conversations and confidential talks with other state officials. This was especially the case with his remarks over what Turkey's attitude would be about the future of the Mosul province of Iraq. That being the case, it should be, nonetheless, noted that he made attempts to involve Turkey in the crisis by both permitting the United States to Turkish military bases and sending Turkish troops abroad for operations against Iraq. The very first attempt of his was to request the Turkish parliament to take a decision that would authorise the government to declare war, to send Turkish troops abroad and to allow foreign military forces to be deployed in Turkey following the opposition urged the parliament to convene immediately due to the extraordinary characteristic of the crisis for Turkey.¹⁰¹⁴ Özal tried to seize the initiative with that request, but both the TPP and the SPP used that session held on 12 August 1990 as an opportunity to express their reservations about the confrontational policy pursued by the president and the government toward Iraq and accused President Özal of going beyond his area of competence strictly drawn by the constitution.¹⁰¹⁵ As a result, the government's proposal that reflected Özal's demands was scrapped to a great extent, and the final motion only permitted the government to declare war and to send troops abroad just in case of a first attack against Turkey from outside powers.¹⁰¹⁶ Moreover, it also became apparent that even such a circumscribed motion could not get full support

¹⁰¹³ For such contradictory remarks of his over the crisis, see Ibid., 107–109; Arcayürek, *Kriz Doğuran Savaş*, 105–112.

¹⁰¹⁴ Robins, “Turkish Policy and the Gulf Crisis,” 75–76.

¹⁰¹⁵ Ibid., 76. Turkish press was also full of such criticisms from various columnists. Critiques ranged from accusing Özal of performing a “one-man show” to bringing the country to the brink of “semi-dictatorship.” Ramazan Gözen provides examples of such criticisms from the Turkish press. Gözen, “Türkiye ve I. Körfez Savaşı,” 278.

¹⁰¹⁶ Robins, “Turkish Policy and the Gulf Crisis,” 76; Aykan, *Türkiye ’nin Kuveyt Krizi Politikası*, 20.

from the MP, his former party, let alone full support from the parliament.¹⁰¹⁷ Özal, however, did not give up his attempts.

On 1 September 1990, in his inaugural address to the parliament for its new working year, President Özal once more requested the parliament to authorise the government to send troops abroad and allow foreign military forces to be deployed in Turkey, while the deputies from the opposition parties were absent in protest.¹⁰¹⁸ Ostensibly to prevent further criticism, he limited his request by excluding declaration of war, but the parliament had already granted that authorisation, as noted above, albeit only in case of a first attack against Turkey, on 12 August 1990. Thanks to the MP majority in the parliament, he could get what he wanted by a vote of 246 to 136.¹⁰¹⁹

Özal put forward “the need for watching and analysing developments very closely and taking decisions rapidly” as the reason behind his request with a view to “having a high manoeuvrability to fulfil that need.”¹⁰²⁰ TPP chairperson Süleyman Demirel claimed that Özal was “in search of keeping his unexplained promises,” implying that Özal had made the US President Bush, with whom he had been in frequent contact from the very beginning of the crisis, big promises of Turkish support against Iraq.¹⁰²¹ One problem in Özal’s dealings with foreign leaders was that he often

¹⁰¹⁷ The proposal could only be accepted by a vote of 216 to 151 with 6 abstentions, although the MP had already 275 deputies in the parliament. Robins, “Turkish Policy and the Gulf Crisis,” 76.

¹⁰¹⁸ Arcayürek, *Kriz Doğuran Savaş*, 7.

¹⁰¹⁹ Aykan, *Türkiye ’nin Kuveyt Krizi Politikası*, 20.

¹⁰²⁰ Ibid., 9.

¹⁰²¹ Ibid., 16. The SPP Chairperson Erdal İnönü also had similar opinions. Ibid., 18.

avoided official translators in his conversations.¹⁰²² Even later a crisis erupted between him and the MP government when he excluded the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Bozer from his meeting with the US President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker during his official trip to Washington, DC, on 20 September 1990.¹⁰²³ The crisis led Bozer to resign on 11 October 1990.¹⁰²⁴ The real reason behind his resignation was, however, his growing opposition to Özal's efforts to make Turkey directly involve in a prospective war against Iraq. He was the first minister who reportedly opposed and resisted Özal's theses on the Gulf crisis within the MP government led by Prime Minister Yıldırım Akbulut.¹⁰²⁵ This would be followed by the resignation of the Minister of National Defence Safa Giray on 18 October 1990. Although Giray's resignation came rather as a result of his disagreements with the then Prime Minister and MP Chairperson Yıldırım Akbulut over domestic and intra-party politics,¹⁰²⁶ it also signified the weakness of ties between the presidency and

¹⁰²² Ibid., 18.

¹⁰²³ *Milliyet*, 9 October 1990.

¹⁰²⁴ *Milliyet*, 12 October 1990. Apart from that crisis, Ali Bozer later confessed that he was not on the same page with President Özal over the Gulf crisis in general by stating that he and the then Chief of General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces General Necip Torumtay had argued that Turkey must go neither one step forward nor back from the official UN position, but Özal had always wanted to a more pro-US position against Iraq. *Hürriyet*, 10 January 2000.

¹⁰²⁵ Hikmet Özdemir, *Turgut Özal: Biyografi* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2014), 378.

¹⁰²⁶ *Milliyet*, 19 October 1990; *Milliyet*, 20 October 1990. The intra-party struggles within the MP falls out of the scope of this dissertation, but it should be noted that a struggle for leadership between the Islamic conservative and liberal wings had already begun by the late 1990s. Although Özal first preferred to side with the former wing that primarily included Yıldırım Akbulut and Mehmet Keçeciler, he later began to abstain in favour of the latter wing led by Mesut Yılmaz before the MP convention held on 15 June 1991. It is argued that his wife, Semra Özal, was behind in this later turn of his. Semra Özal did not have an Islamist background unlike his husband and had indeed a very secular lifestyle to such an extent that her outside activities and dinners and parties she attended constituted many headlines in Turkish press during his husband's term of presidency. Özal later became regretful of his choice in favour of Yılmaz as the latter began to distance the government from the presidency. Thus, Özal wanted to change the MP leadership once more in 1992, but the candidate he supported in the 30

government within the executive bloc at a time of such crisis as the Gulf crisis.¹⁰²⁷ It should also be noted, *en passant*, that the resigned ministers were also principal members of the Crisis Committee that was formed in the Çankaya Presidential House following the outbreak of the Gulf crisis.¹⁰²⁸ Thus, the resignations also caused harm on the working of that committee. On the other hand, from a more general point of view, the intra-party clashes within the MP reached such a level that the liberal wing led by Mesut Yılmaz was threatening the party with withdrawing their support for the MP government in the parliament implying that the government would not have enough votes in a future vote of confidence without their votes in the parliament.¹⁰²⁹

The real shock, however, came with the resignation of General Necip Torumtay, the then Chief of General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, on 3 December 1990. Members of the government denied the claims that Torumtay resigned in protest of President Özal's and government's policies over the Gulf crisis at first.¹⁰³⁰ Nevertheless, Torumtay later explained the motivations behind his

November 1992 MP convention, Mehmet Keçeciler, could not win before Mesut Yılmaz leading Yılmaz to further consolidate his power over the party. Birand and Yalçın, *The Özal*, 483, 519–20.

¹⁰²⁷ Derya Sazak, “Özal Mesut Yılmaz'a 'Vize' Verdi mi?,” *Milliyet*, 23 October 1990. Although it is not as open as the case with the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Bozer, there are some reports that Minister of National Defence Safa Giray also did not support President Özal's insistence on getting war powers from the parliament. Same reports also indicate that Özal, for that reason, preferred to appoint his nephew from his hometown Malatya, Hüsnü Doğan, as the new Minister of National Defence. *Milliyet*, 31 October 1990. On the other hand, the then Chief of General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, General Necip Torumtay, who would also resign later in December of the same year, organised a military ceremony in Giray's honour following his resignation. This was the first of its kind, and led to speculations that the Turkish Armed Forces shared a common ground with the resigned minister over issues such as the Gulf crisis. *Milliyet*, 21 October 1990; *Milliyet*, 23 October 1990.

¹⁰²⁸ President Turgut Özal, Prime Minister Yıldırım Akbulut, Chief of General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces General Necip Torumtay, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Bozer and Minister of National Defence Safa Giray were members of that committee.

¹⁰²⁹ *Milliyet*, 19 October 1990.

¹⁰³⁰ For instance, see *Milliyet*, 22 December 1990.

resignation, and those were all related to disagreements over policies that would be pursued with respect to the Gulf crisis.¹⁰³¹ More specifically, it seems that he deeply resented the informal style of President Özal and the way he tried to legalise actions he thought to have been necessary for possible future gains that Turkey would gain as a result of its “active foreign policy”¹⁰³² after it would be able to sit down at the table following the crisis. Özal did not hesitate to bypass the civilian and military bureaucracy, and at times even the government, when he thought that those would preclude the actions he found necessary during the crisis.¹⁰³³ Torumtay refers to the contradictions between President Özal’s statements and actions and those of the government regarding the Gulf crisis in his memories. On the one hand, Özal was even talking about possible military operations against Iraq that Turkey would also join and was stating that Turkey must be ready for any instance implying Turkey’s historical claims over the Iraqi province of Mosul. However, on the other hand, the government did not send a directive that involved a clear governmental policy to the ministries and the Turkish Armed Forces that would be in accordance with Özal’s statements.¹⁰³⁴ For Torumtay, this was what mattered most during the crisis from a

¹⁰³¹ He also wrote two books that reflected his memoirs and ideas about the changing geopolitics of Turkey. Necip Torumtay, *Org. Torumtay’ın Anıları*, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayımları, 1994); Necip Torumtay, *Değişen Stratejilerin Odağında Türkiye* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayımları, 1996).

¹⁰³² For the term “active foreign policy” and an evaluation of Turkey’s foreign policy during the 1990s in general including Özal’s policies towards the Gulf crisis in those terms, see Şule Kut, “Türkiye’nin Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dış Politikasının Anahatları,” in *En Uzun Onyıl: Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar*, ed. Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Büke Yayımları, 2000), 43–61; Şule Kut, “The Contours of Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1990s,” in *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, ed. Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2002), 8–9.

¹⁰³³ Torumtay gives the example of Özal’s decision to shut down the two oil pipelines shared with Iraq without any information coming from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus he reasons that the government might also not be informed of that decision by Özal in advance. Torumtay, *Org. Torumtay’ın Anıları*, 102–103.

¹⁰³⁴ Ibid., 108.

military point of view, since any possible military operation would require, perhaps months-long, careful and thorough preparations—be it a limited one or a large scale incursion into Mosul.¹⁰³⁵ Torumtay does not hide his own personal considerations that Turkey must not be involved in a war against Iraq lest Turkey be not war-weary in the aftermath of the crisis in order to be in an advantageous position in the future.¹⁰³⁶ He, nonetheless, states that disobedience from the ranks of the Turkish Armed Forces to the executive was out of question despite claims of Özal to the contrary.¹⁰³⁷ When a directive was finally prepared by the government following Torumtay's warnings and Özal's order, it came before the Secretary General of the Council of National Security late on 1 December 1990 and was presented to Chief of General Staff Torumtay the following morning only with the signature of the Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry with other spaces for signatures of the members of the cabinet remained blank.¹⁰³⁸ Accordingly, for Torumtay, it became impossible to go on without giving concessions from his “principles and understanding of state” in lack of clearly stated goals, and when stated, only done through legally problematic ways.¹⁰³⁹ Hence, he resigned. The daily *Milliyet* announced his resignation on 4 December 1990 with the headline, “Resignation like warning!”¹⁰⁴⁰ The disagreements

¹⁰³⁵ Ibid., 107–116.

¹⁰³⁶ Ibid., 117. In his later book, he also states that the Gulf crisis caused significant harms over Turkey in economic, social and military terms as a result of its loss of a significant trading partner as well as a source of fossil fuels and the instability and insecurity in Northern Iraq from which also the PKK benefited. Torumtay, *Değişen Stratejilerin Odağında*, 77–78, 244–253.

¹⁰³⁷ Torumtay, *Org. Torumtay'in Anıları*, 112–13.

¹⁰³⁸ Ibid., 122.

¹⁰³⁹ Ibid., 123–30.

¹⁰⁴⁰ The newspaper provided five reasons for the resignation based upon its sources of “Ankara circles in the know”: 1) Özal wanted to send troops to the Persian Gulf, but Torumtay opposed that idea, 2) Özal wanted to allow the American forces to use the Incirlik airbase in their operations against Iraq, but Torumtay argued that that would not comply with the Agreement for Cooperation on Defense and

were also publicly visible. Minister of Defence Hüsnü Doğan, for instance, did not attend the farewell dinner organised in Torumtay's honour, whereas the only attendees were military commanders.¹⁰⁴¹ However, the crack was not only between the civilian and military bureaucracy on the one hand, and the presidency and the government on the other hand; it was felt deeply also within the MP itself. President of the Parliamentary Commission on National Defence Recep Ergun, an MP deputy albeit a retired general, was also stating that the army was "uncomfortable with one-man [rule]." He even criticised his own colleagues within the MP in parliament on the grounds that deputies all had responsibility for those "flaws in governance."¹⁰⁴² Amid wide criticisms from both within the MP and the wider ranks of the opposition parties and various columnists in the Turkish press, the government had to step back, and Minister of National Defence Hüsnü Doğan stated that neither President Özal nor the government wanted war.¹⁰⁴³

Despite such statements and Özal's and his aides' denials at various times of the allegations that Özal indeed had territorial ambitions towards the Iraqi Mosul province, claims to the contrary seems to have a firm ground. General Torumtay reminds that President Özal stated on every possible occasion that the Mosul province had been within the frontiers drawn by the National Pact. He also states that Özal

Economy (DECA) signed between the United States and Turkey in 1980, 3) Torumtay thought that Özal's policies would lead Turkey into a dangerous war, 4) Özal's visit to other force commanders, following his meeting with Torumtay in which they could not reach any compromise, made Torumtay harassed, 5) Torumtay, having been appointed earlier by Özal as the chief of general staff of the Turkish Armed Forces despite the fact that it was indeed General Necdet Öztorun's turn according to established military customs, was already uneasy with his appointment in such a way, and his uneasiness grew further with Özal's "policies supporting [Islamic] reactionaryism" [*irticaa destek veren politikalar*]. *Milliyet*, 4 December 1990.

¹⁰⁴¹ *Milliyet*, 10 December 1990.

¹⁰⁴² *Milliyet*, 6 December 1990.

¹⁰⁴³ *Milliyet*, 18 December 1990.

immediately opened the issue of Mosul and Kirkuk when Torumtay and a group of newly appointed commanders paid an official visit to him following the Supreme Military Council meeting held at the end of August 1990, and read them an article written by “a famous British author” over the “significance of these two places for Turkey.”¹⁰⁴⁴ It seems that President Özal was very enthusiastic about that article since Cengiz Çandar, a prominent journalist who would later become his special advisor, also acknowledges that Özal gave that article to him too in their first meeting in his presidential office in Çankaya, Ankara.¹⁰⁴⁵ It is an article written by a prominent Middle East historian, Professor John Barrett Kelly, published in *National Review*—an American semi-monthly conservative editorial magazine focusing on political, social, and cultural affairs—on 17 September 1990.¹⁰⁴⁶ Discussing possible future scenarios for Iraq and the Kurds following the Gulf crisis, Professor Kelly ends his article as follows:

After Saddam Hussein and his detestable regime have been dealt with, northern Iraq—i.e., the old *vilayet* of Mosul—should be allowed to revert to Turkey, under a United Nations guarantee, if necessary (the Turks can be relied upon to honor it), of a substantial degree of internal autonomy for the Kurds. Those Kurds banished to southern Iraq should be returned to their homelands, and the colonies of Arabs that the government in Baghdad has implanted in the Kurdish homelands be sent packing. [Perhaps the] greatest strategic benefit that would accrue from the reversion of the Mosul *vilayet* to Turkey would be that the oil-bearing areas of Kirkuk and Mosul would come under Turkish trusteeship or sovereignty. Not only would the transfer of ownership bring about a welcome and well-deserved transformation of Turkey’s economy, but it would deprive the truncated Iraqi state of the revenues which up to date have been largely devoted to mischief-making. The Iraqi rump would not be wholly deprived of oil revenue: it would still have a trickle of oil from the Khanaqin Held in the east, and a steadier flow from the North Rumaila field in the south. Together, these should suffice to finance a

¹⁰⁴⁴ Torumtay, *Org. Torumtay’ın Anıları*, 115.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Cengiz Çandar, *Mezopotamya Ekspresi: Bir Tarih Yolculuğu*, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2014), 107.

¹⁰⁴⁶ J. B. Kelly, “Let’s Talk Turkey,” *National Review*, 17 September 1990, 31, 34.

modest program of economic reconstruction, the reintegration into civilian life of Iraq's redundant soldiery, and the payment of reparations to the Kurds on a scale commensurate with their past sufferings.¹⁰⁴⁷

The significance of the above quotation is that later developments also suggest that President Özal might have agreed with all those proposed by Professor Kelly.

Apart from General Torumtay's testimony, there were other witnesses who expressed that Özal indeed had intentions of "opening a second front" against Iraq, alongside the southern one opened by a military coalition led by the United States, in order to have a say in the aftermath of the crisis and, if possible, to put forward claims over oil-rich Mosul. Hüsamettin Cindoruk, a veteran right-wing politician, who became deputy from the ranks of the TPP led by Süleyman Demirel and chairperson of the parliament following the 20 October 1991 parliamentary elections, states that President Özal told him his disillusionment with both the army and the former MP government on many occasions.¹⁰⁴⁸ According to him, for Özal, Turkey had missed an opportunity, but that opportunity was still not missed completely even after the end of the First Gulf War. Özal's plan was to march into Iraq from the 40 km-long borderline between Silopi and Syria and to reach the Persian Gulf from Basra rather swiftly insofar as the Iraqi army had already been war-weary after the air bombardments during the war. Turkey would also get help from the local population and militias of the Kurdish groups led by Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani. On the one hand, the Iraqi people would get rid of Saddam Hussein's despotic rule, and on the other hand, Turkey would seize control over rich oil fields of Iraq. These would not pose a significant problem for Turkey since, unlike its military operation in Cyprus in 1974, all that plan would be implemented under the auspices of the United States. He was even proud of being the "scriptwriter" of the Gulf crisis claiming that the US President Bush had hesitated to act against Saddam Hussein at first since they

¹⁰⁴⁷ Ibid., 34.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Arcayürek, *Kriz Doğuran Savaş*, 137.

used to “exaggerate Saddam’s power,” but he was later “convinced” by Özal that “that issue would be resolved easily.”¹⁰⁴⁹

General Kemal Yavuz, the then Commander of the Second Army of the Turkish Armed Forces, also states that President Özal, in an official visit to the borderline in Silopi following the initiation of the Operation Provide Comfort, of which its second phase known rather as “Hammer Force” in Turkey, preferred to ignore the Turkish civilian and military officials in briefings he got due to his anger with them. General Yavuz further argues that Özal responded to him by rebuking him for not having implemented what he had suggested during the Gulf crisis when the former complained about the possible negative consequences of the Operation Provide Comfort such as the empowerment of the Kurdish autonomy and the creation of a safe haven for the PKK. What Özal reportedly said him amid anger is telling:

I had told you before. If we had entered [Iraq] from the north when the Americans had entered from the south, both these issues would not have been of concern and Mosul and Kirkuk would have been in our hands.¹⁰⁵⁰

Another witness of Özal’s ambitions was Yavuz Gökmen—a journalist who was close to him. Gökmen claims that he talked to President Özal on 19 January 1991 when the air bombardment against Iraq had already begun, and asked what would happen if Iraq fired a missile at Turkey. Özal’s answer to the question was short but succinct: “It can’t fire. If only it could! If it fires, a second front [from north in addition to the one from south] will be opened.”¹⁰⁵¹ Gökmen concludes that if Turkey did not go directly into war with Iraq, this was because Iraq did not attack Turkey.¹⁰⁵² Gökmen, in his book published while President Özal was still alive, also claims that,

¹⁰⁴⁹ Ibid., 138.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Ibid., 145–48.

¹⁰⁵¹ Yavuz Gökmen, *Özal Sendromu*, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Verso Yayıncılık, 1992), 198; Gökmen, *Özal Yaşa Saydı*, 101.

¹⁰⁵² Gökmen, *Özal Sendromu*, 200.

as early as 1981, when oil prices skyrocketed, Özal had been thinking of capturing Mosul and Kirkuk with a view to decreasing Turkey's oil imports, and that he had even raised the issue before the then Acting Head of State Kenan Evren under military rule as well as before Gökmen himself albeit "off-the-record."¹⁰⁵³ Gökmen also quotes other speculations he had heard before that both Özal and his brother Korkut Özal had raised the "Southeastern Question" during their tenure in the State Planning Organisation under İsmet İnönü's coalition government in the early 1960s and that the two brothers had presented the then Prime Minister İnönü a report suggesting the establishment of a regional administration and expending the income appropriated from the region again in the region by providing examples from the US federal model.¹⁰⁵⁴ Former president Kenan Evren and professor Mim Kemal Öke also testify that President Özal had the intention to capture Mosul and Kirkuk.¹⁰⁵⁵ None of these claims were refuted by President Özal himself.

Notwithstanding the rifts and disagreements within the state apparatus over to what extent Turkey should involve in the crisis, President Özal became much more eager to make Turkey act resolutely against Iraq in line with the United States especially after the UNSC Resolution 678 adopted on 29 November 1990. As noted above, that resolution had put 15 January 1991 as the deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and had authorised the member countries of the coalition against Iraq to use force unless Iraq complied with that resolution. By January 1991, the number of Turkish troops deployed to the Iraqi border had allegedly reached 300,000 under the auspices of the Malatya-based Second Army of the Turkish Armed Forces.¹⁰⁵⁶ As to

¹⁰⁵³ Ibid., 36–37.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Ibid., 37–38.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Özdemir, *Özal*, 390–391.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Aykan, *Türkiye'nin Kuveyt Krizi Politikası*, 52.

whether Turkey would involve in a possible military operation against Iraq, both President Özal and members of the government continued to make contradictory and ambivalent statements until the air bombardment was launched on 17 January 1991 by the anti-Iraq coalition led by the United States.¹⁰⁵⁷ When asked about what possible Turkish actions would be in case of a war against Iraq, “The use of the Incirlik airbase by American forces against Iraq is out of question for now,” he answered and went on by stating, “I cannot know what would happen in the future. I mean, we do not have any decisions taken yet,”¹⁰⁵⁸ in early January 1991, following the collapse of the Geneva summit between the then US Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. As for the possibility of a Turkish ground offensive into Northern Iraq, “Ground offensive is out of question,” he responded by also adding following another question posed by journalists,

There are miscellaneous scenarios, but these must not be talked upon at length. In essence, the security of our borders is fundamental; we do not have our eyes on anyone’s territories. I shall state this clearly.¹⁰⁵⁹

From all these statements, it was not discernible what his real plans, if any, were and whether or not if these statements were all made for the sake of political correctness in the face of harsh criticisms from the opposition ranks that he and the MP were dragging the country into war.

According to Mahmut Bali Aykan, a consensus was reached over the use of the Incirlik airbase by American forces against Iraq among President Özal, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Armed Forces.¹⁰⁶⁰ The rift over sending Turkish troops abroad, however, was going on. For Özal, sending troops, at least in

¹⁰⁵⁷ Ibid., 49–53.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Arcayürek, *Kriz Doğuran Savaş*, 199.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Aykan, *Türkiye’nin Kuveyt Krizi Politikası*, 50.

symbolic numbers, to the Gulf region in order to protect Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states from a possible Iraqi attack would serve as an instrument to make Turkey's influence over future developments in the region.¹⁰⁶¹ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Armed Forces, on the other hand, did not want Turkey to involve in a war that would break out inevitably earlier or later and hence were reluctant to send troops abroad.¹⁰⁶² Aykan states that the rift over sending troops abroad or launching a ground offensive into Northern Iraq went on into General Doğan Güreş's period of command in the Turkish Armed Forces as he became the successor of General Necip Torumtay following the latter's resignation on 3 December 1990.¹⁰⁶³ Accordingly, although the MP government got the authority to do so from the parliament and President Özal seemed to have been very eager to make Turkey involve in all actions against Iraq in line with the US-led coalition forces, Turkey did not involve in any military operations against Iraq apart from allowing American war jets to use the Incirlik airbase in such operations beginning from 17 January 1991. On that day, the National Security Council held a meeting under the chairpersonship of President Özal and suggested taking decisions that would enable using both Turkish and foreign forces in Turkey, and the cabinet, again under the chairpersonship of President Özal, took a decision to increase its training, humanitarian and logistic support it had already provided until then to the ally states joining the air operation against Iraq "in order to make that operation come to an end in a rapid fashion" thereby "minimising the human casualties for both sides," "before the crisis got more dangerous dimensions."¹⁰⁶⁴ The cabinet also sent a proposal to the parliament in order to obtain

¹⁰⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶² Ibid., 50–51.

¹⁰⁶³ Ibid., 51.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Ibid., 53–54.

authorisation “to send the Turkish Armed Forces abroad and to have foreign military forces in Turkey, and to use these forces”¹⁰⁶⁵ on the very same day, and the parliament once again authorised the government to take all these actions by a vote of 250 to 148,¹⁰⁶⁶ meaning, again, 25 deputies from the ranks of the MP either voted against the proposal or did not vote at all. It was later understood, however, that the American jet fighters had already begun using the Incirlik airbase in their air bombardment campaign against Iraq as early as the early hours of the same day, but it was acknowledged by the government five days later.¹⁰⁶⁷ The reason for hiding this fact was set out by both President Özal and Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Kurtcebe Alptemoçin as “a measure against a possible missile attack from Iraq in the absence of an adequate air defence system.”¹⁰⁶⁸ The Patriot missiles and air defence systems were launched in the meantime. The opposition, however, linked all that rush on the side of Özal and the MP government to the visit of US Secretary of State James Baker to Ankara on 13 January 1991.¹⁰⁶⁹

The subsequent phases of the crisis including the ground offensive that began on 24 February 1991 did not create much change for Turkey. Although the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs Aziz sent his Turkish counterpart a threatening note in protest of Turkey’s logistic support to the air bombardment against his country in late January 1991, this was not followed suit by any action. On 24 January 1991, in his meeting with prominent journalists, President Özal was once more announcing that

¹⁰⁶⁵ Arcayürek, *Kriz Doğuran Savaş*, 209.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Aykan, *Türkiye’nin Kuveyt Krizi Politikası*, 55.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Arcayürek, *Kriz Doğuran Savaş*, 216.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Ibid., 222–23; Aykan, *Türkiye’nin Kuveyt Krizi Politikası*, 54–55.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Arcayürek, *Kriz Doğuran Savaş*, 202.

Turkey did not have any intentions to open a second front against Iraq unless the following danger arose:

Emergence of steps towards founding a “*Kurdish state*” in a vacuum that would emerge in Iraq... Stepping in of Iran and Syria in order to “*acquire something*” in case of a chaos that would ensue in Iraq... Embarking on a ground offensive against Turkey on the side of Iraq in a moment of “*madness*”...¹⁰⁷⁰

As to whether or not Turkey still had some calculations over Mosul and Kirkuk, “The political power circles *officially* denies such an interest,” Hasan Cemal, a Turkish journalist and columnist, states by also adding that it could also be interpreted as some dangers mentioned above “might push Turkey into certain directions *even though it does not wish to do so.*”¹⁰⁷¹ According to Yavuz Gökmen, President Özal continuously bargained with the US President Bush over Turkey’s role in the prospective war against Iraq, and he put forward the issue of Mosul and Kirkuk before Bush in their meeting in the Oval Office in Washington, DC.¹⁰⁷² For that reason, Gökmen further claims, these conversations were not fully recorded, and the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Bozer was excluded from that meeting despite the presence of his US counterpart James Baker.¹⁰⁷³ Gökmen also argues that Özal demanded too much in return for what Turkey would provide, and therefore, despite Baker’s trip to Ankara two days before air bombardment began, Turkey did not allow the United States to use the Incirlik airbase during these two days on the eve of the

¹⁰⁷⁰ Hasan Cemal, *Cumhuriyet*, 25 January 1991. Emphasis in the original.

¹⁰⁷¹ “Ancak gelişmelerin, . . . Türkiye’yi bazı yönönlere *istemeye istemeye* itebileceği yorumu da yapılabılır.” Ibid. Emphasis in the original.

¹⁰⁷² Gökmen, *Özal Yaşa Saydı*, 100.

¹⁰⁷³ Ibid., 99–100. It is noteworthy that Ali Bozer was also an eminent professor of law, and Gökmen was his student in the Faculty of Law, in University of Ankara. Gökmen, *Özal Sendromu*, 193.

air bombardment.¹⁰⁷⁴ Thus it can be argued that ambivalence was still prevalent among the members of the executive, but the crisis did not create further test cases for Turkey since the military operations against Iraq ended on 27 February 1991 with Bush was declaring that the coalition forces achieved their objectives following the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait and Iraq's announcement that it would comply with the UNSC resolutions. As indicated above, according to some accounts, President Özal did also not lose his aspiration towards the Mosul province even after the Gulf crisis ended. This is most evident in what he allegedly said Hüsamettin Cindoruk in late 1992: "I could not make neither the soldiers nor the government accept this idea [to capture the oil-rich regions of Iraq through a ground offensive] of mine. But even now, this chance has not gone yet."¹⁰⁷⁵ To sum up, Özal's policies during the Gulf crisis and his later initiative on the Kurdish problem were the ones that neared the most to what could be called a neo-Ottoman subimperialism, but even those attempts could not succeed.

7.7 Özal's Foreign Policy towards Central Asia and the Caucasus: Ambitious but Incompetent Yet Again

Turkey's relations during the presidency of Turgut Özal with Central Asia and the Caucasus following the dissolution of the Soviet Union had also limits posed upon Özal due to the government change in late 1992, and, in any case, his impact over these relations came to an end with his subsequent death on 17 April 1993. It was already noted that Turgut Özal perceived the geopolitical landscape that ranged from Central Asia to the Balkans as Turkey's "natural sphere of influence."¹⁰⁷⁶ It was also

¹⁰⁷⁴ Gökmen, *Özal Yaşasaydı*, 100.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Arcayürek, *Kriz Doğuran Savaş*, 137.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Çalık, "Özal: 'Hâcet Kapıları Açılmıştır!'," 13–14.

noted that he described this region with several “intersecting circles.” According to this narrative, Central Asia and the Caucasus constituted the second circle since it contained countries inhabited by Turkic communities—the first and third ones being ex-Ottoman territories and the countries where other “related communities” such as the Iranian Kurds live. As for the relations with those regions under Özal’s presidency, these are examined in two parts: first, a broader view of the relations with the newly independent countries of Central Asia and Caucasus inhabited by Turkic communities is presented, and later, the case of the establishment of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) is analysed.

In order to present a broader view of the relations with the newly independent countries of Central Asia and Caucasus inhabited by Turkic communities, it would be useful to look into how Özal interpreted the emergence of those countries on the eve of the twenty-first century apart from his general approach that those regions were part of Turkey’s “natural spheres of influence.” For that purpose, the speech made by him in the First Congress of Friendship, Fraternity and Cooperation among Turkish States and Communities—also known as the Congress of the Turkish World [*Türk Dünyası Kurultayı*]—held on 22 March 1993 in Antalya, Turkey,¹⁰⁷⁷ might provide some clues to Özal’s understanding of Turkey’s role *vis-à-vis* those countries. Having made an enthusiastic opening with reading a passage from Dündar Taşer, a nationalist Turkish poet, “The star of the Turkish history shines in far heights!” he claimed. For him, “The pendulum of the Turkish history has left behind the lowest point it could have descended into. Thereafter and from now on, the world will watch the rise of

¹⁰⁷⁷ For more on that congress and the full-texts of speeches made in that congress, see Türk Devlet ve Toplulukları Dostluk Kardeşlik ve İşbirliği Kurultayı Düzenleme Komitesi [hereafter, TDKDK], *Türk Devlet ve Toplulukları Dostluk Kardeşlik ve İşbirliği Kurultayı, 21–23 March 1993, Antalya: Konuşma, Bildiri ve Karar Metinleri* [hereafter, *Türk Dünyası Kurultayı*] (Ankara: Levent Ofset, 1993), accessed 23 September 2018, <http://tudevtest.siuweb.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/1-Kur.pdf>. President Özal’s opening speech in that congress was also reproduced in Turgut Özal, “22 Mart 1993 Günü Antalya’daki Türk Dünyası Kurultayında Yaptığı Açış Konuşması,” *Türkiye Günlüğü* 22 (1993): 16–18.

that pendulum of history.”¹⁰⁷⁸ Özal lamented that it was not possible to see an equivalent to the “resilience of standards valid in international economic relations,” in the “political field,” and that “the international political order” had remained “far behind the international order of economic relations.” Hence, he argued that the international political order would be restructured and “the Turkish world” could make “very significant contributions” in that process. Turkey, according to him, had become, “a country, taken as model by all of its neighbours,” with “its political and economic stability,” and “the accumulation of technical knowledge and experience it owned.” Accordingly, Turkey, “as country, society and state,” had, “a desire to share [its] political, economic and cultural experience, first and foremost with [its] sibling Turkish republics and communities.”¹⁰⁷⁹ It is also worth noting that one of Turgut Özal’s much quoted epigrams was his slogan, “The twenty-first century will be a Turkish century!”¹⁰⁸⁰ Taking into consideration Özal’s other statements, not least the ones he made in the interview published in *Türkiye Günlüğü*, it could be argued that “Turkish” definitely included other “sibling” Turkic communities.

It was already noted that, despite President Özal’s enthusiastic rhetoric with respect to relations with Central Asia and the Caucasus as in the case of the Bosnian

¹⁰⁷⁸ TDKDK, *Türk Dünyası Kurultayı*, 29–30; Özal, “Açış Konuşması,” 16.

¹⁰⁷⁹ TDKDK, *Türk Dünyası Kurultayı*, 31; Özal, “Açış Konuşması,” 18.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Özal first used this slogan in the opening speech he made in the Third Izmir Economic Congress, held between 4 and 7 June 1992 under the main theme of “Turkey towards the Twenty-First Century.” His exact statement was as follows: “Unless we make serious mistakes, the twenty-first century will be the Turks’ and Turkey’s century.” For the full-text of that speech, see “Turgut Özal’ın 3. İzmir İktisat Kongresi’ndeki Konuşmaları,” in 2. *Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları*, ed. Metin Sever and Cem Dizzar, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Başak Yayıncılık, 1993), 15–31; “Türkiye’nin Geleceği Nasıl Olacak?: Üçüncü İzmir İktisat Kongresi, Turgut Özal’ın Açılmış Konuşması,” in *Türkiye’ye Yön Veren Konuşmalar: Turgut Özal’ın Mirası*, ed. Hüseyin Yayman (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2018), 167–80. Hasan Celal Güzel, on the other hand, claims that it was he who first coined that phrase in 1987, in a speech he made in the opening ceremony of the Konya branch of the Turkish Hearths, when he was the Minister of State in, and the Spokesperson of, the first MP government. He also inserted that phrase into the programme of the Rebirth Party [*Yeniden Doğuş Partisi*] established by himself in 1992 following his resignation from the MP. Hasan Celal Güzel, “21. Asır Türk Asrı Olacaktır,” *Yeni Türkiye* 3 (1995): 118; 126, footnote 44.

War, even if he had a coherent strategy—and it is at best uncertain if he ever had at all—he would most probably not be able to make it implemented since he was in a weaker position to have an influence over foreign policy decision-making processes due to the change of government in late 1992. There was, however, a negligible, if any, difference between President Özal's and the TPP–SPP coalition government's stance towards the newly independent ex-Soviet Turkic republics in these regions. Like Özal's “The twenty-first century will be a Turkish century!,” Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel also began many of his speeches with the phrase, “the Turkish world from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China,”¹⁰⁸¹ implying that all the territory stretching between those places constituted Turkey's natural object of interest, if not “natural spheres of influence” at all as Özal had asserted. Moreover, it could also be argued that it was natural for Turkey to have preferred to establish close relations with the newly independent countries with which it had historical and cultural ties. Thus, immediately after these states emerged, establishing close relations with those countries and fostering these relations became all but a supra-party issue for Turkey, and successive governments followed almost identical policies towards the Turkic republics, some of them being more interventionist towards the domestic affairs of those countries whereas others tried to follow close but more legalistic policies.¹⁰⁸²

¹⁰⁸¹ Although that phrase is almost identified with Demirel, it does not belong exclusively to him. President Özal also used it quite often. For an analysis of that phrase as part of debates over the supposed “Turkish model” for the newly independent Turkic republics, see Kut, “Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dış Politikasının Anahatları,” 54–55; Kut, “The Contours of Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1990s,” 12–13.

¹⁰⁸² For instance, it is widely accepted that particular groups within the Turkish intelligence gave support to the unsuccessful *coup d'état* attempt in Azerbaijan in March 1995 against President Heydar Aliyev. Particular figures such as Abdullah Çatlı, a nationalist mafia leader who had close links with the Turkish security and intelligence organisations, took part in that putsch. Kemal Kirişçi, “Turkey and the Newly Independent States of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus,” in *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, ed. Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2002), 234. On the other hand, some authors also argue that Turkey, despite the Turkish involvement in the putsch, had also a role in its pre-emption with the then Turkish President Süleyman Demirel having informed his Azerbaijani counterpart Aliyev about that putsch in advance. Hakan Güneş, “Türkiye–Orta Asya İlişkileri,” in *XXI. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoglu, Nurcan Özgür Baklacioglu and Özlem Terzi (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 2012), 721.

Subtle historical and cultural ties, efforts of ideological zealots such as Pan-Turanianists and neo-Ottomanists, and the Western promotion of Turkey as a “model”¹⁰⁸³ all played definitely key roles in Turkey’s post-Cold War relations with Central Asia and the Caucasus. However, there were also more material factors behind the improving relationship of Turkey with these regions such as the presence of significant oil and gas resources in these regions and the potential of these regions as markets for Turkish exports.¹⁰⁸⁴ All these factors have driven Turkey to establish and maintain close relations with the countries of these regions, apart from Armenia, with which it had historical problems such as the Armenian defiance of Turkey’s borders, the historical controversy between the two sides about the Armenian rebellions during the First World War and Armenian accusations of the so-called “genocide,” and finally, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (1988–1994) between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The very first years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 constituted a period of Turkish eagerness towards Central Asia and the Caucasus under conditions of hegemonic vacuum as a result of the relative retreat of the Russian factor over these regions. This period continued until 1993 or so, when Russia adopted a policy of “near abroad” under growing Eurasianist influences in its domestic politics and began its efforts to reassert its leadership in these regions.¹⁰⁸⁵ The last years of President Özal and his efforts towards these regions fall within the confines of this initial period. Several institutions specific to fostering relations with these regions were also created in this period or already existing institutions were either restructured

¹⁰⁸³ For the US promotion of the supposed “Turkish model,” see the next chapter.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Çakmak, “Özal’ın Dış Politika Felsefesi ve Uygulamaları,” 120.

¹⁰⁸⁵ For that policy and its impact over Turkey and its relations with the newly independent republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus, see İdil Tuncer, “Rusya Federasyonu’nun Yeni Güvenlik Doktrini: Yakın Çevre ve Türkiye,” in *En Uzun Onyıl: Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar*, ed. Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Büke Yayınları, 2000), 435–60.

or mobilised in line with this goal. President Özal led the MP government to establish the present day Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) as “Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency” in early 1992 in order to plan and coordinate Turkey’s economic, developmental, cultural and educational aids towards the newly independent Turkic republics in these regions.¹⁰⁸⁶ As indicated, unlike other cases, there was a consensus in general over establishing good relations with the newly independent Turkic republics of these regions within the Turkish political establishment. Thus, competition, rather than conflict, prevailed this time between President Özal and the later TPP–SPP coalition government led by Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel. Accordingly, Demirel also led the establishment of other institutions and platforms designed to foster relations with the Turkic republics. Among these, there were the International Organization of Turkic Culture (TÜRKSOY) established in 1993 and the Presidential Summits of Turkish Speaking Countries which was first convened in 1992.¹⁰⁸⁷ A minister of state in charge of “Turks abroad” was also appointed for the first time in mid-1993.¹⁰⁸⁸ All these efforts yielded positive results in fostering both economic and cultural relations with these countries, but the initial impetus was lost as limits to what Turkey could accomplish in these regions began to get more and more apparent in the course of time. There are

¹⁰⁸⁶ Fatma Zehra Aktaş, “Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Sosyal Hizmetleri: Türk Kızılayı, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı” (master’s thesis, Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University, 2017), 33–34. Later in 2011, the word “development” was changed into “coordination” reportedly with a view to preventing a negative perception of the agency on behalf of the aid taking countries. Ali Çiçek, “Kamu Diplomasisi ve TİKA Örneği” (master’s thesis, Erciyes University, 2015), 110.

¹⁰⁸⁷ The latter summit process was later evolved into the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States (Turkic Council) in 2009. The Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States, “General Information,” accessed 27 September 2018, http://www.turkkon.org/en-US/general_information/299/308.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Akın Öge, “Türkiye’de Resmi Miliyetçiliğin ‘Türklük’ Kavrayışı ‘Dış Türklerden Sorumlu’ Devlet Bakanlığı ve Türk İşbirliği ve Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı (TİKA) İncelemesi” (master’s thesis, Yıldız Technical University, 2009), 53.

a number of factors that ostensibly led to that loss of impetus regarding relations with these countries.

First of all, the “Turkish model” seemed to have lost its attractiveness for a number of reasons. It was understood that the Iranian factor, against which the model was initially pitted, had been overestimated. Iran neither had an economy powerful enough to finance hegemony exercised under its regional leadership nor did it have an influence over or a cultural affinity with these countries at stake. Secondly, although Russia was returning the region, its “near abroad” policy was far from a complete aggression and it was careful not to antagonise the West in its dealings towards that region. It was also unclear to what extent the West was willing a Turkish leadership over that region. Finally, the “Turkish model” was, at best, not performing very well in its own domestic setting. Turkish economy began to fall into chronic crises in the 1990s and deep political problems such as the Kurdish question had already evolved into a more troublesome issue causing many casualties each day.¹⁰⁸⁹

Apart from that seemingly fall of the supposed “Turkish model,” it was also apparent that both these new Turkic republics and Turkey itself tried to avoid a conflict with Russia, and Russia showed in many instances that it was still able to control and direct the course of developments with respect to these newly independent countries. For instance, the Presidential Summits of Turkish Speaking Countries which was first convened in 1992 was planned to convene again in 1993, but it could be convened again only in 1994 due to Russian meddling.¹⁰⁹⁰ Russia was also a key deterrent in much of Turkey’s regional calculations, for instance, when it wanted to rush into Azerbaijan’s help when it was at war with Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Thus, when President Özal said, “What if a few bombs fell into Armenia during a military exercise near the Armenian border?,” it sparked much

¹⁰⁸⁹ Güneş, “Türkiye–Orta Asya İlişkileri,” 723.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Tuncer, “Yakın Çevre ve Türkiye,” 453.

criticism and harsh reactions from the Turkish public opinion with accusations of irresponsibility.¹⁰⁹¹

Despite the convergence with both the MP government and the subsequent TPP–SPP government regarding policies towards the new Turkic republics, President Özal at times criticised the “classical Turkish foreign policy” on the grounds that it would not benefit these Turkic republics and that Turkey should pursue a “more courageous foreign policy” towards these countries.¹⁰⁹² The answer of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet Çetin from the social democratic SPP was that Turkey was “not in search of adventures.”¹⁰⁹³ As was the case during the Bosnian War, the TPP–SPP government stood as a political barrier his assertiveness with respect to Central Asia and the Caucasus from late 1992 until his death on 17 April 1993. Thus, although he made a long chain of official trips to these countries in his last days, they were far from yielding any end results apart from demonstrating cordiality and good will at the top level among Turkey and these countries.¹⁰⁹⁴ Even, in Azerbaijan’s capital, Baku, President Özal responded to the criticism of his Azerbaijani counterpart, Abulfaz Elchibey, that Turkey did not support them in their fight against the Armenian attacks, by stating that Turkey was with Azerbaijan but the war must be won by Azerbaijan itself.¹⁰⁹⁵ It must be noted at this point that the incapacity to foster relations at the expense of other powers was not only on the side

¹⁰⁹¹ Yaraç Laçinok, “Turgut Özal,” 623.

¹⁰⁹² Ibid., 627.

¹⁰⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹⁴ President Özal met with the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan between 4 and 11 April 1993 in their countries. His sudden death six days after that chain of trips led to comments that he expended too much effort during those trips at the expense of his own health.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Ibid., 623.

of Turkey, it was also on the side of the newly independent Turkic republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, evident in their eschewal to officially recognise the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and in their extreme cautiousness in their foreign relations not to instigate a Russian reaction.

As a last point, one should also look into the experience of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in order to better understand the fundamental characteristics of and limits to the neo-Ottomanist aspiration in Turkish foreign policy at regional scales during the Turgut Özal period. BSEC is important as a foreign policy initiative led by Turkey aimed at stability, friendship and economic cooperation in the nearby regions of the Black Sea. These were the regions that contained much of the ex-Ottoman territories as well as the Caucasus within which three ex-Soviet newly independent republics were located—Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. It was already noted that the ex-Ottoman territories constituted the very first circle of what Özal and the organic intellectuals gathered together in *Türkiye Günlüğü* of the period saw as “Turkey’s natural spheres of influence.” As for the Caucasus, Azerbaijan was located in the second circle since it was a Turkic republic, whereas Armenia and Georgia were also perceived to have located within the third circle, supposedly constituted by “related countries,” since their inhabitants were relatives of some of the ethnic groups in Turkey.

The general factors that nurtured the Turkish aspiration towards the ex-Soviet space are also relevant for understanding the Turkish initiative of the BSEC in the early 1990s. First of all, socialism both as an ideology and system had lost its hegemony, while at the same time the Soviet military power appeared to have lost its willingness to intervene in the face of the domestic transformation taking place within the Soviet Union as well as the Soviet republics declaring independence one after one. That was definitely an encouraging factor for the Turkish aspiration towards the ex-Soviet space. The already noted debates over the supposed “Turkish model” led especially by American think tanks were also adding into that factor. The actual and potential conflicts in the ex-Soviet space were also a source of concern that made Turkey seek to build new relations in those regions with a view to preserving stability

in its immediate neighbourhood. The Caucasus in particular and the Black Sea region in general were also located on the transit route between the vast energy resources of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia and the Western countries which were all in need of those resources.¹⁰⁹⁶ There was also an international trend towards economic integration at regional scales.¹⁰⁹⁷ One should also add into these factors the ideological factor of “neo-Ottomanism” that involved an aspiration for regional leadership among President Turgut Özal and his aides.

BSEC as a project was first put forward by Şükrü Elekdağ, a Turkish diplomat, in early 1990.¹⁰⁹⁸ Its main aim was declared as “to create the conditions and to make the institutional arrangements that would improve and diversify economic relations among the Black Sea countries.”¹⁰⁹⁹ In contrast with President Özal’s more assertive discourse, the BSEC indeed aimed at establishing good relations with all countries of the Black Sea region including the Russian Federation, the main heir to the former Soviet Union, which already began to get suspicious about what the real Turkish intentions were towards the regions it declared its “near abroad.” It could also be argued that the BSEC emerged as part of a more “balanced” foreign policy strategy taking into consideration the Turkish efforts not to exclude countries such as Armenia

¹⁰⁹⁶ Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, “The Black Sea Politics and Turkey,” in *Turkey at the Threshold of the 21st Century: Global Encounters and/vs. Regional Alternatives*, ed. Mustafa Aydin (Ankara: International Relations Foundation, 1998), 70.

¹⁰⁹⁷ N. Bülent Gültekin and Ayşe Mumcu, “Black Sea Economic Cooperation,” in *Turkey between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power*, ed. Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996) 180–85.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, “The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project: A Regional Challenge to European Integration,” *International Social Science Journal* 45:4 (1993): 550.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Emel G. Oktay, “Türkiye’nin Avrasya’daki Girişimlerine Bir Örnek: Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü,” *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 3:10 (2006): 156–57.

and Greece, with which it had significant problems.¹¹⁰⁰ It was already noted earlier that the Turkish bourgeoisie was also in search of new markets for its exports based upon the new accumulation strategy of export-oriented growth.¹¹⁰¹ The construction contracts Turkish companies got in the ex-Soviet space were already worth about \$600 million.¹¹⁰² The State Planning Organisation also began to give permissions to foreign companies for foreign investment in Turkey with the condition to make exports to the ex-Soviet markets only through Turkey.¹¹⁰³ Under these circumstances, President Özal was quick to adopt the project first put forward by the Foreign Ministry bureaucrats, and shared it with countries such as Bulgaria, Romania and the former Soviet Union.¹¹⁰⁴ That was followed by a series of summits held in Ankara, Bucharest, Sofia and Moscow throughout late 1990 and 1991. Finally, the declaration for economic cooperation in the Black Sea region was signed by Bulgaria, Romania, the Soviet Union and Turkey, but the Russian Federation as well as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine signed the declaration separately.¹¹⁰⁵ Finally, on 2 February 1992, the main document of the BSEC was signed in Istanbul by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. Later Greece and Albania also joined the organisation as founding members when the Treaty of Black Sea Economic Cooperation was signed on 25 June 1992 in

¹¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 158.

¹¹⁰¹ Uzgel, *Ulusal Çıkar*, 295.

¹¹⁰² Quoted from Şükrü Elekdağ, “Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region Project,” *Turkey Economy* 7 (1991): 33, in Uzgel, *Ulusal Çıkar*, 297.

¹¹⁰³ Murat Yetkin, *Ateş Hattında Aktif Politika* (Istanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1992), 309.

¹¹⁰⁴ Oktay, “Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü,” 159.

¹¹⁰⁵ Uzgel, *Ulusal Çıkar*, 299.

Istanbul.¹¹⁰⁶ The last country that joined the organisation became Serbia and Montenegro in 2004, but after Montenegro became independent in 2006, Serbia remained the member of the organisation.

Although significant steps were taken such as the establishment of the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank in 1992, achievements of the organisation remained rather limited. Political problems among the member states as well as the economic and financial incapacity of the leading countries including Russia and Turkey in financing a region-wide economic development and integration were among principal reasons. More specifically, as for the neo-Ottomanist aspiration of President Özal, it was bound to have limits, since, from October 1992 onwards, there was the TPP–SPP coalition government led by Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel who was in search of limiting the former in its political as well international dealings. That rivalry and rift among President Özal and Prime Minister Demirel demonstrated itself even in the summit in Istanbul during which the Treaty of BSEC was signed when the two went into controversy as to whether it was President Özal or Prime Minister Demirel that was to sign the treaty on behalf of Turkey. President Özal left the summit as a result of that controversy.¹¹⁰⁷ Thus, overall, the case of the BSEC also well demonstrates that the neo-Ottomanist aspiration in Turkish foreign policy under the political leadership of Turgut Özal had its own limits.

7.8 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the practice of Turkish foreign policy under the political leadership of Özal with a view to demonstrating whether or not the neo-Ottomanist foreign policy aspiration of that leadership could have any reflections on the foreign policy pursued under Özal between 1983 and 1993. The transformation in

¹¹⁰⁶ Oktay, “Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü,” 159–60.

¹¹⁰⁷ Yaraç Laçinok, “Turgut Özal,” 625.

international order that took place with the end of the Cold War again seems to be a critical turning point since it is only with that transformation that the neo-Ottomanist foreign policy aspiration began to have been aired. Even if Özal and his colleagues had a neo-Ottomanist aspiration for regional leadership in their minds before that transformation in international order, Özal's relatively mild and cautious reaction to Bulgaria's forced assimilation and forced migration campaign towards its Turkish minority reveals it is only with that international transformation this aspiration could come to the surface with opportunities and space opened up before such regional aspirants. Thus, the post-1989 practice of Özal in the realm of foreign policy, at least at the rhetorical level, rests upon a more assertive discourse, whereas the pre-1989 practice reflects to a great extent the acceleration of Turkey's incorporation into world markets as a result of its course of change in accumulation strategy from import substitution industrialisation to an export-oriented growth model in the early 1980s. As such, the 1980–1989 period was rather marked by efforts to foster bilateral economic relations with neighbouring countries, but it contributed to the later period aspiration for regional leadership with soaring exports in that period appeared to have provided a material reason for such an aspiration. In that sense, even though the neo-Ottomanist aspiration for regional leadership would come to fore in the early 1990s, the 1980–1989 period in Turkish foreign policy could, nevertheless, be considered a prelude to that aspiration. The case of the Iran–Iraq War, however, illustrated that Turkey's export expansion into the Middle Eastern region was rather a conjunctural development, and Turkey's economic relations with Europe proved more resilient. Moreover, even in the post-1989 period, Özal appeared to have been far from a position to assert Turkey as a regional leader. The post-1989 practice of Özal in the realm of foreign policy suggests that the neo-Ottoman subimperialist aspiration could not go beyond rhetoric with the first Gulf crisis having been the sole exception since Özal took the initiative and made various attempts in that direction during that crisis albeit to no avail.

CHAPTER 8

A THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE NEO-OTTOMAN SUBIMPERIALIST ASPIRATION UNDER ÖZAL: WHY STILLBORN?

8.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to theoretically assess the neo-Ottoman subimperialist aspiration for regional leadership under the political leadership of Turgut Özal using a neo-Gramscian historical materialist approach. As such, this neo-Ottoman subimperialist hegemonic project is analysed in terms of its capacity or incapacity to successfully cement a historical bloc out of the social forces it sought to combine and mobilise behind the project.

8.2 Defining the Problematic of Neo-Ottomanism under Özal

Neo-Ottomanism, as formulated by President Turgut Özal and the organic intellectuals of his political leadership in the early post-Cold War years, was counterposed to the pre-existing Kemalist legacy in Turkish foreign policy, which “supported the status quo based on the territorial settlement of 1923, with a strong, unitary nation-state that could act in accordance with the Western-oriented state system based on secular relations.”¹¹⁰⁸ As such, it entails dismantling that legacy and, instead, undertaking an “active foreign policy” towards the three key regions surrounding Turkey, namely the Balkans, the Middle East and Central Asia and the

¹¹⁰⁸ Mustafa Türkeş, “Decomposing Neo-Ottoman Hegemony,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 18:3 (2016): 193.

Caucasus, which Özal saw as Turkey's "natural spheres of influence."¹¹⁰⁹ From a neo-Gramscian historical materialist perspective, this corresponds to establishing a subimperialist hegemony throughout these regions under a global hegemony led by US imperialism based upon neoliberal globalisation within the rubric of the so-called "New World Order." This form of regional leadership was thought to have been vindicated by Turkey's imperial legacy and its historical and cultural ties with these regions.

The neo-Ottomanism of the Özal era was quite short-lived in the sense that the first attempt to implement it within Turkish foreign policy was during the first Gulf crisis (2 August 1990–28 February 1991) and it was formulated systematically as a hegemonic project for the first time in the immediate aftermath of the same crisis, but nonetheless began to fail from the very beginning of that crisis and came to an end, if not before, with the sudden death of Özal on 17 April 1993. Notwithstanding this brevity, the political leadership of Özal and the organic intellectuals under his leadership, gathered around *Türkiye Günlüğü*, sought to combine a variety of external and domestic social forces to form a neo-Ottoman historical bloc in their own image, but to no avail. As already illustrated in earlier chapters, the neo-Ottomanist project of the Özal leadership sought to sustain a bourgeois hegemony in Turkey established through a passive revolution in the early 1980s by incorporating the newly emerging Islamic fraction of the Turkish bourgeoisie into the post-1980 neoliberal historical bloc and expanding this hegemony into the three key regions surrounding Turkey, which were deemed Turkey's "natural spheres of influence," and thereby transforming it into a subimperialist regional hegemony which would be led by Turkey as a surrogate hegemon on behalf of US imperialism in these regions. Accordingly, at the heart of the neo-Ottomanist project lie two core social forces—one being the United States as the leading imperialist state at the global level, and the other being Turkish big capital, represented by the Turkish Industrialists and

¹¹⁰⁹ Mustafa Çalik, "Özal: 'Türkiye'nin Önünde Hâcet Kapıları Açılmıştır!'," *Türkiye Günlüğü* 19 (1992): 13–14.

Businessmen Association (TÜSİAD), as the economically dominant class fraction at the domestic level. As for other significant external forces of the period, the European Community (EC), which would ultimately be transformed into the present-day European Union (EU) following the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, did not have an equivalent important place in the neo-Ottomanist project of the Özal leadership, whereas the newly emerging Russian Federation, like Iran, was perceived as a competitor at best rather than a partner. Therefore, the United States was the primary external force whose support was actively sought for the project. The states in the three regions which were considered Turkey's "natural spheres of influence," though ambiguity remained over their supposed roles and positions, could also be considered external forces in the project. At the domestic level, on the other hand, in addition to Turkish big capital, the Islamic fraction of the Turkish bourgeoisie, conservative and Islamist segments of Turkish society and liberals emerged as other social forces to which the neo-Ottomanist project of the Özal leadership ascribed importance. Finally, at both the domestic and regional levels, Kurdish forces ranging from the PKK to the Iraqi Kurdish groups led by Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani were envisaged as supporting the neo-Ottomanist project given the political overtures initiated by Özal towards these forces. In all these cases, their position vis-à-vis the neo-Ottomanist project was ambivalent at best. Even the United States, the outside actor most sympathetic to the project, changed course as early as the end of the First Gulf War by assenting to Saddam Hussein remaining in power in Iraq despite Özal's ambition to see him overthrown.¹¹¹⁰

¹¹¹⁰ Although President Özal sought to stay on legitimate ground by denying such ambitions to have Saddam overthrown especially during the early stages of the first Gulf crisis, he later made his "Saddam must go!" position public. For one of his early denials, see *Cumhuriyet*, 9 September 1990. Özal especially tried hard to persuade the then US President Bush to topple the entire Saddam regime in Iraq. See *Cumhuriyet*, 12 March 1991; Lally Weymouth, "Turkey Facing the High Costs of Being America's Ally," *The Washington Post*, 19 May 1991; Mehmet Barlas, "'Çöldeki Döngü' Özal Gibi Bush'lari da Vurdu...", *Sabah*, 25 October 2006; A. Mümtaz İdil, "Erdoğan Özal'in Başına Gelenleri Hatırlıyor mu," *Odatv*, 20 October 2014, accessed 23 November 2019, <https://odatv.com/erdogan-ozalin-basina-gelenleri-hatirliyor-mu-2010141200.html>. See also Birand and Yalçın, *The Özal*, 318, 324, 417–18, 428–29.

8.3 US Imperialism and the Neo-Ottomanist Project under Özal

Since the neo-Ottomanist project of the Özal leadership envisaged a new leadership role for Turkey in the Balkans, the Middle East and Central Asia and the Caucasus under the auspices of the US leadership, in a way that could be considered a subimperialist regional hegemony led by Turkey as a surrogate hegemon on behalf of US imperialism from a neo-Gramscian perspective, the United States was considered an indispensable member of the supposed alliance of social forces in that project. Although the conservative nationalist wing of the organic intellectuals of the Özal leadership, principally composed of Mustafa Çalık, Ahmet Turan Alkan and Durmuş Hocaoğlu, were ambivalent toward the so-called “New World Order,” which was on the forefront of US political discourse in the early 1990s under the Bush administration, the liberal wing, among whom Cengiz Çandar and Nur Vergin, as well as President Özal himself, were prominent figures, were praising that conceptualisation, apparently desiring that Turkey take a supposedly advantageous position in this new international order under the auspices of the US leadership by following an “active foreign policy,” which involved taking sides with the United States in key foreign policy issues. Yavuz Gökmen, a journalist who was personally close to Özal, has argued that, for Özal, Turkey was a “circle in the world,” and “the only way to resolve Turkey’s problems in the best way was to win the world leadership around.”¹¹¹¹ Since the United States was the sole and undisputed leader of the world in his eyes, Özal believed that by exerting influence over then-US President Bush, he could make Turkey the world’s “secret leader” through economic and strategic cooperation with the United States.¹¹¹²

Indeed, the United States could also be considered the original owner of many neo-Ottomanist propositions, such as the need for dismantling the Kemalist legacy in

¹¹¹¹ Yavuz Gökmen, *Özal Sendromu*, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Verso Yayıncılık, 1992), 10.

¹¹¹² Ibid., 10–11.

Turkish foreign policy and the appropriateness of Turkey undertaking roles within the framework of post-Cold War US power projections in surrounding regions.¹¹¹³ Thus, the United States could also be considered the most supportive, and perhaps the most consistent, international force behind the neo-Ottomanist project at least until the end of the First Gulf War. Even after the end of the First Gulf War, US support, if not for the neo-Ottomanist project, then at least for providing Turkey with a greater regional role, continued. The underlying material reason for such US supportiveness was its general interest in maintaining a US-led global hegemony resting upon neoliberal globalisation, by upholding stability in key regions of the world so as to prevent any possible counter-hegemonic challenges. As illustrated in the fourth chapter, the United States sought to accomplish this task in the early post-Cold War years through supporting and relying upon a select few regional aspirants which had been conceptualised using such terms as “pivotal states” and “geopolitical pivots” by leading US organic foreign policy intellectuals. The neo-Ottomanist project of the Özal leadership was attractive to the United States inasmuch as it contributed to regional stability in a way supportive of the US-led global hegemony while more or less sharing the burden of that task at the regional level and as it also sought to

¹¹¹³ For instance, Graham Fuller, a former high-ranking CIA official and a RAND expert on Turkey, argues as follows: “Acceptance of a new role in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East has not come easily to Turkey, for it has required virtual abandonment of a revered and deeply rooted foreign policy legacy left in the years after World War I by the father and founder of the modern Turkish state, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.” Graham E. Fuller, *From Eastern Europe to Western China: The Growing Role of Turkey in the World and Its Implications for Western Interests* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), 11. See also Graham E. Fuller, “Conclusions: The Growing Role of Turkey in the World,” in *Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China*, Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser with Paul B. Henze and J. F. Brown (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 168. Fuller also argues elsewhere along with Cengiz Çandar, “Today, after the demise of the Soviet Union, Ataturk’s cautions about interest in external Turkish peoples, sensible in its day, require reinterpretation. And Turkey’s growing status requires it to take a far more activist policy in the troubled areas of the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East.” Cengiz Çandar and Graham E. Fuller, “Grand Geopolitics for a New Turkey,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 12:1 (2001): 23. Other RAND experts on Turkey, Stephen Larrabee and Ian Lesser also argue, “It is increasingly clear that Turkey cannot preserve the traditional prerogatives of the Kemalist state if it wishes to integrate more closely with Europe and participate more actively in a globalized system.” F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 195.

overcome the adverse economic and political effects of neoliberalism at the domestic level by maintaining bourgeois hegemony through outward economic expansion and nationalist rhetoric without touching the neoliberal core of the economic policies being pursued. This US position vis-à-vis Turkey can be evidenced through primary resources such as US National Security Strategy documents as well as secondary resources such as works produced by leading US organic foreign policy intellectuals.

The closing sentences of a book written on Turkey by Dankwart Rustow and published by the prominent US foreign policy think tank The Council on Foreign Relations in 1987 is characteristic of US opinion on Turkey's role in the late 1980s:

In the late twentieth century, Turkish and American interests in the Middle East converge and coincide more closely than ever. Turkey remains a crucial *barrier* to Soviet expansion. Historically and strategically, culturally and commercially, Turkey is the West's *bridge* to a more peaceful Middle East.¹¹¹⁴ Studies conducted within the US military establishment also began to acknowledge "consonance" between the "[Turkish] government's foreign policy objectives" and "United States national security interests"¹¹¹⁵ as early as 1989, albeit with respect to US projections towards the Middle East at that time, and not yet towards Central Asia and the Caucasus, since the Soviet Union was still intact.¹¹¹⁶ Following the end of the

¹¹¹⁴ Dankwart A. Rustow, *Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987), 126. Emphasis added.

¹¹¹⁵ Allen K. McDonald, *Turkey: A Bridge to the Middle East*, Study Project (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 1989), ii.

¹¹¹⁶ The following quotation succinctly makes the point: "As an outsider, the United States is naturally handicapped in its ability to exert a direct influence in regional affairs [in the Middle East]. Turkey is an ideal partner to help bridge this gap. However, Turkey's continued influence is in large measure dependent upon its economic growth and stability. Therefore, the United States should vigorously pursue policies which would directly benefit the Turkish economy. Such action would make Turkey an even more valuable partner, one that is not only fully committed to the United States and the Western alliance, but also enjoying a degree of influence in the most volatile region in the world today." Ibid.

Cold War, however, “the old Soviet Union” was added to the Middle East in this regard.¹¹¹⁷

As early as 1990, the George H. W. Bush administration declared in its National Security Strategy document that the United States sought to “maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance,” and to “establish a more balanced partnership with [its] allies and a greater sharing of global leadership and responsibilities,” and that the United States was “prepared to share more fully with [its] allies and friends the responsibilities of global leadership.”¹¹¹⁸ Similar expressions were again present in the 1991 National Security Strategy document, which also stated, “As the Gulf crisis clearly showed, our strategy is increasingly dependent on the support of regional friends and allies.”¹¹¹⁹ The 1993 document makes the point further clearer:

While the United States emerged from the Cold War as the world’s preeminent power, we have neither the desire nor the ability to be the world’s “policeman.” Regional solutions to regional problems are the most enduring path to peace. We should support those efforts, helping to facilitate the regional process whenever possible. Regional organizations should be utilized to contribute to building a broader consensus behind international endeavors. . . . Our strategy has shifted from a focus on a global threat to one on regional challenges and opportunities, from containment to a new regional defense strategy.¹¹²⁰

The 1994 edition produced by the Bill Clinton administration also continued this trend, stating that “The focus of our planning for major theater conflict is on deterring

¹¹¹⁷ Graham E. Fuller, *Turkey Faces East: New Orientations toward the Middle East and the Old Soviet Union* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992).

¹¹¹⁸ The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, 1990), 2, 3, 15.

¹¹¹⁹ The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, 1991), 28.

¹¹²⁰ The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, 1993), 7, 13.

and, if necessary, fighting and defeating aggression by potentially hostile regional powers.”¹¹²¹

Turkey’s policies towards the newly independent Central Asian Turkic republics as well as the debate over the supposed “Turkish model” seemed to be a good fit with the US-led hegemonic project of neoliberal globalisation, within which the leadership of the United States was envisioned to be backed up by key surrogate countries called “pivotal states” or “geopolitical pivots” taking significant roles in the formation and maintenance of such hegemony in their respective regions.¹¹²² It was also in this period that Turkey was being declared the “star of Islam” by *The Economist*¹¹²³ and that Turkey’s supposedly new regional role was being praised in a series of reports and studies published in the United States by experts in think tanks such as the RAND Corporation which had close links to the US military–industrial complex.¹¹²⁴ According to these RAND Corporation experts, Turkey was “potential

¹¹²¹ The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, 1994), 7.

¹¹²² See the fourth chapter.

¹¹²³ “Star of Islam: A Survey of Turkey,” in *The Economist* 7737 (14–20 December 1991): 145–68. A direct quotation would make the point better: “Most people think the end of the cold war has made Turkey matter even less than they thought it mattered more. . . . This is culturally arrogant and geopolitically blind. Consider the most likely outlook for the next 15 or 20 years, and the problems this sort of world is likely to cause for the democracies of Europe and America; ask what Turkey can do to help with these problems, and what the consequences might be if Turkey cannot, or will not, help; and realise that *Turkey is no longer in the least peripheral. It sits at the centre of the possible next cold war.*” *Ibid.*, 147. Emphasis added.

¹¹²⁴ RAND Corporation was established in the wake of the Second World War in order to “connect military planning with research and development decisions.” In time, it was transformed into an interdisciplinary research and development organisation, and no later than the crisis decades of the 1960s and 1970s, it “extended its focus beyond the United States.” It is among the chief strategy formulators for the US imperialism. For its official history, see RAND, “A Brief History of RAND,” accessed 24 September 2018, <https://www.rand.org/about/history/a-brief-history-of-rand.html>. RAND Corporation also focused on “counterinsurgency strategies” towards vulnerable capitalist societies with a view to preventing possible “upheavals,” or better should be said, social revolutions. Jessica Wang, “Colonial Crossings: Social Science, Social Knowledge, and American Power from the Nineteenth Century to the Cold War,” in *Cold War Science and the Transatlantic Circulation of Knowledge*, ed. Jeroen van Dongen (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 212. Such a study of RAND focusing on the “counterinsurgency measures” taken in Malaya was conducted by Robert William Komer—a former

leader, or at least model, of the five new Turkic states” (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), and “[e]ven for those states that are not Turkic, such as Armenia, Georgia, and Tajikistan,” it was “a key regional player to be reckoned with.” Hence, they argued, “Turkey’s influence and involvement now extend in a nearly unbroken belt from the Turks of the Balkans to the Turks of western China and eastern Siberia.”¹¹²⁵ Turkey was of particularly critical importance for the Caucasus, since, for the RAND experts, there were “[o]nly Turkey and Iran . . . available to play [the role of an external ally]” for Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, each of which was “in search of some external ally,” and it was only Turkey that could “serve as an overland lifeline to the West.”¹¹²⁶ The RAND reports on Turkish foreign policy published in the early 1990s were also among the first studies that pointed to possible neo-Ottomanist ventures in Turkish foreign policy.¹¹²⁷

When these reports discussed Turkey “diversifying” its foreign relations in terms of its implications for US foreign policy, they suggested that the United States “can and should strive to promote the strategic importance of Turkey in Europe as well as in Central Asia and the Middle East,” since Turkey had “potential” as “a

leading member of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States, who later took critical roles in Vietnam during the war against that country and was also appointed as US Ambassador to Turkey. Komer became famous in Turkey when his car was set into fire by the Middle East Technical University students in Ankara, in 1969, in protest of US imperialism. For Komer’s study focusing on the “counterinsurgency measures” taken in Malaya, see Robert W. Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992). The case of Komer well illustrates the integrated structure of the military, intelligence and diplomatic as well as scientific corps within the US state apparatus. RAND was one of the leading symbols, if not the primary one, of that integrated structure serving US imperialism. Hamilton Cravens, “Column Right, March! Nationalism, Scientific Positivism, and the Conservative Turn of the American Social Sciences in the Cold War Era,” in *Cold War Social Science: Knowledge Production, Liberal Democracy, and Human Nature*, ed. Mark Solovey and Hamilton Cravens (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 124–25.

¹¹²⁵ Fuller, *Turkey Faces East*, v.

¹¹²⁶ Ibid., 48.

¹¹²⁷ Ibid., 12–14.

conduit for Western aid to the southern republics of the former Soviet Union,” and it should also “lend active political support to Ankara’s proposals for Black Sea economic cooperation.”¹¹²⁸ From the US point of view, although there would be increasing risks of “divergence” among Turkish and US national interests as Turkey became more assertive in its surrounding regions, “[US] interests in the stable evolution of political and economic systems around the Black Sea and in the Middle East, and in preventing the emergence of regional hegemonies (e.g. Iran)” were “broadly compatible with Turkey’s regional preferences.”¹¹²⁹ Thus, despite the risk of confrontation as had been the case in 1974 due to disagreement over the Cyprus issue, “a new strategic relationship” between the two countries could be “placed in the context of broader Western cooperation,” and only in this way, “the vagaries of domestic politics and regional change” could be resisted.¹¹³⁰ Even as Turkey remained outside European institutions, it would attribute more significance to its relationship with the United States.¹¹³¹ Given such US point of view on Turkey’s

¹¹²⁸ Ian O. Lesser, *Bridge or Barrier?: Turkey and the West after the Cold War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), vii–viii. Another RAND report also touches upon the same point. Paul B. Henze, *Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), v. See also Andrew Mango, “Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role,” (*The Washington Papers* 163, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), xiv, xv, 110, 133.

¹¹²⁹ Lesser, *Bridge or Barrier*, 40.

¹¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹¹³¹ Ibid., 42. Graham Fuller better summarises the US point of view in the last report of that RAND series on Turkish foreign policy published in the early 1990s: “The reality is that conflict is going to exist in the region around Turkey, probably for a long time. Given Turkey’s past track record of identification with and support for a large variety of the values and interests of the West, is it not still desirable for Turkey to play a role in these regions of crisis? . . . Washington is under no obligation to accept the Turkish vision of regional politics, but it must surely cope with it as one of the new realities. Of all the states in the region, Turkey is certainly the most desirable ‘model’ to play such a central role in the affairs of this pivotal region. That is why the U.S. relationship with Turkey, despite massive changes in the region and in the world, should remain strong and positive in the decades of challenge ahead.” Fuller, *Growing Role of Turkey*, 29–30. That RAND series of reports were later expanded and published in a single book. See Fuller and Lesser, *Turkey’s New Geopolitics*.

growing importance in the new post-Cold War period, it is not surprising that the then US President George H. W. Bush also suggested Turkey as “a model that should be followed by Central Asian countries” in early 1992 following a visit to the United States by Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel.¹¹³² Gün Kut also acknowledge that the phrase “from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China” was first used by Henry Kissinger—an American political scientist and diplomat who had also served as US Secretary of State and National Security Advisor.¹¹³³ Leaving aside the debate as to whether the suggestion of a “Turkish model” for the newly independent Turkic republics first came from abroad or from within Turkey, it could be argued that the United States in general was in support of the idea.¹¹³⁴ Turkey would both be a “model” for the newly independent Central Asian Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union and other Muslim countries located in the crucial but unstable Middle East region and “become integrated in the Western political system,” and thereby would “function as a lever for the reversion of the movement towards the conflicts of the type foreseen by Huntington.”¹¹³⁵ For that to be achieved, however, the

¹¹³² Quoted from Ahmad Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism?* (London: Zed Books, 1994), 210 in İdris Bal, “Türk Cumhuriyetleri Politikası,” in *Türkiye'nin Dış, Ekonomik, Sosyal ve İdari Politikalari, 1980–2003*, ed. Turgut Göksu et al. (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2003), 62.

¹¹³³ Kissinger is said to have used that phrase in a speech he made in a meeting on Turkey as part of the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos in 1992. It is also stated that Prime Minister Demirel was present at that meeting. Gün Kut, “Yeni Türk Cumhuriyetleri ve Uluslararası Ortam,” in *Bağımsızlığın İlk Yılları: Azerbaycan, Kazakistan, Kırgızistan, Özbekistan, Türkmenistan*, Büşra E. Behar et al. (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1994), 13, footnote 6.

¹¹³⁴ Hakan Güneş, “Türkiye–Orta Asya İlişkileri,” in *XXI. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoglu, Nurcan Özgür Baklacıoğlu and Özlem Terzi (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2012), 721. For a detailed study on the supposed “Turkish model” for those newly independent Turkic republics, see İdris Bal, *Turkey's Relations with the West and the Turkic Republics: The Rise and Fall of the 'Turkish Model'* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2000).

¹¹³⁵ Chrysostomos Pericleous, *The Cyprus Referendum: A Divided Island and the Challenge of the Annan Plan* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 23. American political scientist Samuel Huntington argued in his famous 1993 *Foreign Affairs* article that cultural conflicts among different civilisations would

“fundamental restructuring and democratization of the authoritarian Kemalist regime as well as the establishment of peaceful relations with its neighbouring countries” were “presupposed.”¹¹³⁶

In line with this supportive US stance vis-à-vis Turkey’s supposed regional role in the new post-Cold War era, Turkey could “[receive] nearly \$8 billion worth of U.S. and German military equipment,” and, as “the third largest recipient after Israel and Egypt of U.S. assistance,” it also became “Washington’s fifth largest client, with arms purchases amounting to \$7.8 billion from 1984 to 1994.”¹¹³⁷ This last point provided the United States with another material reason to position itself in support of Turkey’s supposed regional role in the new post-Cold War era. This US position, which began with the George H. W. Bush administration (1989–1993), also continued in the following Bill Clinton administration (1993–2001), and top diplomats of the Clinton administration declared it by bestowing Turkey with such monikers as “frontline state” and “pivotal state” in official statements in the mid-1990s.¹¹³⁸ As

predominate in the new post-Cold War era. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilisations?,” *Foreign Affairs* 72:3 (1993): 22–49.

¹¹³⁶ Pericleous, *Cyprus Referendum*, 23.

¹¹³⁷ Fawaz A. Gerges, *America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 199.

¹¹³⁸ Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard Holbrooke of the Clinton administration stated on Turkey before the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations on 9 March 1995 as follows: “In Turkey, we seek the further development of a democratic, secular state with a prosperous economy, a supportive approach to Western interests, and high human standards. . . . Turkey stands at the crossroads of almost every issue of importance to the U.S. on the Eurasian continent—including NATO, the Balkans, Cyprus, the Aegean, Iraq Sanctions, Middle East peace, Russian relations in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and transit routes for Caspian oil and gas.” He further stated that “Turkey after the Cold War is equivalent to Germany during the Cold War—a pivotal state, where diverse strategic interests intersect,” and that “human rights, however important, would not be allowed to ‘rupture’ U.S.–Turkish relations.” Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott of the same administration reiterated these views by stating, “Turkey is yet again on the front line of the world’s most important struggles just as it was during the Cold War.” Quotations are, respectively, from Richard C. Holbrooke, “Overview of U.S. Policy in Europe: Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session, 9 March 1995,” (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 44; Henri J. Barkey, preface to *Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey’s Role in the Middle East*, ed. Henri J. Barkey (Washington, DC: United

already illustrated in the fourth chapter, it was also in this period that leading organic foreign policy intellectuals of US imperialism began to conceptualise the concepts of a “pivotal state” and “geopolitical pivot,” and to consider Turkey within this framework.¹¹³⁹ In all these analyses, a final material reason underlying US support was also obvious: to curtail Russian and Iranian influences and Islamic fundamentalism in regions where Turkey could exert some influence with US support.¹¹⁴⁰ Yet the extent of the US support for Turkey’s supposed new role in its

States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), vii; Alan O. Makovsky, “Turkey,” in *The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World*, ed. Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 117; Strobe Talbott, “U.S.–Turkish Leadership in the Post-Cold War World: Address at Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, April 11, 1995,” *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 6:17 (1995): 360.

¹¹³⁹ “A prosperous, democratic, tolerant Turkey is a beacon for the entire region; a Turkey engulfed by civil wars and racial and religious hatreds, or nursing ambitions to interfere abroad, would hurt American interests in innumerable ways and concern everyone from pro-NATO strategists to friends of Israel.” Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy, “Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs* 75:1 (1996): 47–48. “Turkey’s historical, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and religious ties to peoples in the region—reinforced by the ethnic presence of these peoples in the mix of Turkish citizenry—gives Ankara long-term opportunities for special influence in the region, particularly among Muslims of the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. In Central Asia and the Caucasus, Turkey offers a pro-Western diplomatic, economic, and transport alternative to Moscow and Tehran. . . . Turkey . . . could be a beneficiary of Washington’s desire to break Moscow’s monopoly on Central Asian energy routes.” Makovsky, “Turkey,” 95. “Turkey stabilizes the Black Sea region, controls access from it to the Mediterranean Sea, balances Russia in the Caucasus, still offers an antidote to Muslim fundamentalism, and serves as the southern anchor for NATO. A destabilized Turkey would be likely to unleash more violence in the southern Balkans, while facilitating the reimposition of Russian control over the newly independent states of the Caucasus. . . . An independent, Turkic-speaking Azerbaijan, with pipelines running from it to the ethnically related and politically supportive Turkey, would prevent Russia from exercising a monopoly on access to the region and would thus also deprive Russia of decisive political leverage over the policies of the new Central Asian states. . . . Turkey’s evolution and orientation are likely to be especially decisive for the future of the Caucasian states. If Turkey sustains its path to Europe—and if Europe does not close its doors to Turkey—the states of the Caucasus are also likely to gravitate into the European orbit, a prospect they fervently desire. But if Turkey’s Europeanization grinds to a halt, for either internal or external reasons, then Georgia and Armenia will have no choice but to adapt to Russia’s inclinations. . . . Regular consultations with Ankara regarding the future of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia would foster in Turkey a sense of strategic partnership with the United States. America should also strongly support Turkish aspirations to have a pipeline from Baku in Azerbaijan to Ceyhan on the Turkish Mediterranean coast serve as major outlet for the Caspian Sea basin energy sources.” Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (London: Basic Books, 1997), 47, 129, 149–50, 204.

¹¹⁴⁰ For such considerations, see Zalmay Khalilzad, “Why the West Needs Turkey,” *The Wall Street Journal*, 22 December 1997; Strobe Talbott, “U.S.–Turkish Relations in an Age of Interdependence:

surrounding regions was ambiguous at best. Despite President Özal's desire to capture the oil-rich Mosul province of Northern Iraq through a Turkish military incursion into this province together with the US-led coalition against Saddam Hussein or his advisor Cengiz Çandar's proposal to integrate a prospective Kurdish autonomous region in that province into Turkey through economic means, the United States seemed unlikely to allow such Turkish control over the region. For instance, Morton Abramowitz, former US ambassador to Turkey, still argues that both the United States and Turkey "need[ed] to avoid a Turkish seizure of northern Iraq and the uncertain consequences such a development would [have] produce[d] in the area" in his introduction to a book he edited on US–Turkish relations on the eve of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.¹¹⁴¹ Henri Barkey, currently an academic and former RAND expert on Turkey and US State Department personnel, also argues in the same compilation that it was "important to the United States that a Turkish military intervention [into the oil-rich city of Kirkuk]—one that Turks [could] achieve with great ease—[was] avoided."¹¹⁴² Ekavi Athanassopoulou, at this point, brings forward an argument about the apparent US discouragement of Özal over his wish to capture Mosul and Kirkuk on the grounds that "Washington's endorsement [of Özal's such desires] would have run contrary to US objectives at the time," for "Turkey's active involvement" in the region "would certainly cause a reaction by its Kurdish population, whose support against Saddam Hussein the Bush administration was

"Turgut Özal Memorial Lecture," (Washington, DC: Washington Institute on Near East Policy, 14 October 1998).

¹¹⁴¹ Morton Abramowitz, introduction to *The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need*, ed. Morton Abramowitz (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2003), 26.

¹¹⁴² Henri J. Barkey, "The Endless Pursuit: Improving U.S.–Turkish Relations," in *The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need*, ed. Morton Abramowitz (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2003), 245.

seeking.”¹¹⁴³ Yalçın Küçük also argues that it was out of question for the United States to support such Turkish control over the key oil-rich region of the Mosul province, because the United States allegedly had a “project of a Kurdish state” in that region—a project revealed in documents seized from the US Embassy in Tehran during the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979.¹¹⁴⁴ Another disappointment on the part of the Özal leadership was US restraint when Iraq announced that it would retreat from Kuwait.¹¹⁴⁵ The Özal leadership wanted the ouster of Saddam from office by force through a US-led military operation continuing to Baghdad, but the United States hastened to declare victory immediately after the Iraqi retreat from Kuwait.

Such restraint on the part of the United States was, indeed, in line with the US National Security Strategy documents of 1990 and 1991. As quoted before, the United States declared that it sought to “deter any aggression that could threaten its security,” and, when this was not achieved, to “repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests and allies,” to “maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance,” and to “establish a more balanced partnership with [its] allies and a greater sharing of global leadership and responsibilities.”¹¹⁴⁶ “A key objective of our policy in the Gulf is to reduce the chances that another aggressor will emerge who would threaten the independence of existing states,” a National Security Strategy document stated on the

¹¹⁴³ Ekavi Athanassopoulou, *Strategic Relations between the US and Turkey, 1979–2000: Sleeping with a Tiger* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 85.

¹¹⁴⁴ Yalçın Küçük, *Fitne*, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Mızrak Yayınları, 2010), 340. For the documents on the Kurdish question seized from the US Embassy in Tehran, see Yalçın Küçük, *Kürtler Üzerine Tezler* (İstanbul: Dönem Yayıncılık, 1990), 296–344.

¹¹⁴⁵ Mehmet Ali Birand and Soner Yalçın, *The Özal: Bir Davanın Öyküsü*, 10th ed. (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2007), 538.

¹¹⁴⁶ The White House, *National Security Strategy* [1990], 2–3; The White House, *National Security Strategy* [1991], 3–4.

topic at hand in 1994.¹¹⁴⁷ This US position also fits well within the concept of imperialism since, as also discussed theoretically in the introductory chapter, the contemporary form of imperialism is less about “what advanced countries *do* to less developed countries,” but “more a question of what the former increasingly *do not* allow the latter to do.”¹¹⁴⁸ It not only provides opportunities for semi-peripheral and peripheral social formations including subimperialist ones, but also imposes constraints upon them. Thus, it binds and limits as much as it enables, as already discussed in the fourth chapter.

The apparent US opposition to a prospective Turkish incursion into Northern Iraq did not evolve into an open clash with Turkey since the Özal leadership was already very much constrained at the domestic level, as illustrated in the seventh chapter. President Özal tried hard to force the Motherland Party (MP) government and the Turkish Armed Forces to enter Iraq along with the US-led anti-Iraq coalition forces but to no avail. Even if he could have succeeded in persuading them, the United States would probably not have allowed unlimited Turkish control over crucial oil fields. In other words, the Özal leadership was already far from successfully cementing a historical bloc out of the neo-Ottomanist hegemonic project articulated by its organic intellectuals at the domestic level, but even if we assume for a while that it could have succeeded, it was still highly unlikely that it would establish a neo-Ottoman hegemony in its own image at the regional level. Moreover, it would also be misleading to take these analytical levels of analysis as if they were ontologically independent from each other. As such, it would also be misleading to think of all those domestic constraining forces over the Özal leadership as isolated from the international environment.

¹¹⁴⁷ The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, 1994), 26.

¹¹⁴⁸ Ray Kiely, *Rethinking Imperialism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 188. Emphasis in the original.

8.4 States within the *Pax Ottomana Novum*¹¹⁴⁹

Based on a historical glorification of the supposedly *Pax Ottomana* (Ottoman Peace) believed to have reigned for centuries over the vast territories of the Ottoman Empire stretching from North Africa in the west to what is now Iraq in the east, and from the Arabian peninsula in the south to Crimea in the north, what President Turgut Özal and the organic intellectuals of his political leadership proposed was a new regional leadership role for Turkey in former Ottoman territories such as the Balkans and the Middle East as well as new geographies such as Central Asia and the Caucasus in a way that could be considered a neo-Ottoman subimperialism within the framework of the US-led international order in the new post-Cold War era. In other words, they proposed a new Ottoman peace—a *Pax Ottomana Novum*. As is the case with all hegemonic orders, the consent of states in these regions would be obtained either actively or passively. To put it another way, their consent would be obtained by making them either actively and voluntarily collaborate with the subimperial hegemon or at least to passively acquiesce to the regional leadership of that subimperial hegemon. As also is the case with imperialism, the use of coercion against actually or potentially antagonistic states or non-state actors would also be necessary. Both tactics required sufficient and efficient material capabilities in the form of providing the states of these regions with enough material reason to obtain their active consent, at least paying lip service to their needs and desires in order to obtain their

¹¹⁴⁹ The Latin term *Pax Ottomana* (Ottoman Peace), or *Pax Ottomanica* as also employed by some authors, is derived by analogy from the more common Latin terms *Pax Romana* (Roman Peace) and *Pax Britannica* (British Peace) in the discipline of historiography. All these terms refer to the political, economic and social stability attained and maintained for relatively long periods of time in vast territories under the imperial rules of the Roman, Ottoman and British empires. The term *Pax Ottomana Novum* here, which literally means “New Ottoman Peace,” is chosen in order to avoid a conflation with the historical conceptualisation of *Pax Ottomana* employed by scholars of Ottoman studies. For that latter historical usage of the term, see Ezel Shaw, “The Ottoman Aspects of *Pax Ottomanica*: The Political, Practical and Psychological Aspects of *Pax Ottomanica*,” in *Tolerance and Movements of Religious Dissent in Eastern Europe*, ed. Béla Király (Boulder, CO: East European Quarterly, 1975), 165–82; Kemal Çiçek, ed., *Pax Ottomana: Studies in Memoriam Prof. Dr. Nejat Göyüncü* (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2001); İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı Barışı* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayımları, 2004).

passive consent, or in the form of imposing economic sanctions or displaying military might. Moreover, since hegemony involves moral and intellectual leadership, an all-encompassing ideology would also be needed.¹¹⁵⁰

Notwithstanding these theoretical points, it was not clear what the supposed Turkish leadership would offer countries in its surrounding regions in order to gain their active consent and collaboration apart from ambiguous comments and speculation by President Özal and the organic intellectuals of his political leadership regarding a so-called “Turkish model” to be followed by states within the supposed *Pax Ottomana Novum* or Turkey’s so-called “natural spheres of influence.” Turkey was indeed in an economically advantageous position, since all its neighbouring countries except Greece were either in a transition phase from a command economy to a market economy or did not have an adequate or functioning free-market economy at all. Turkey, with a \$180 billion gross domestic product (GDP) in 1993, was also the biggest economy among its neighbours apart from its northern maritime neighbour the Russian Federation, which had a \$435 billion GDP in the same year.¹¹⁵¹ The Turkish economy was also bigger than each of the oil-exporting Arab economies, with the economy of the largest, Saudi Arabia, being worth \$132 billion in the same year. Among Turkey’s adjacent neighbours, Greece was the closest big economy with a \$108 billion GDP in the same year.¹¹⁵² Therefore, by the early 1990s, Turkey was already an important regional economic centre.

¹¹⁵⁰ “[H]egemony does not derive automatically from relations of production but is instead a political process, involving a multitude of actors and the mediation of ideology. Hegemony is sustained through political means, even though economic power is the decisive element of its emergence.” Iraklis Oikonomou, “A Historical Materialist Approach to CSDP,” in *Explaining the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in Action*, ed. Xymena Kurowska and Fabian Breuer (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 165.

¹¹⁵¹ The World Bank, *DataBank*, accessed 27 May 2019, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=1995&locations=TR-RU-GR-SA-EG-AE-QA&start=1978&view=chart>. Data are in current US\$.

¹¹⁵² Ibid.

As for bilateral trade, Turkish exports rose overall throughout both the 1980s and the early 1990s despite conjunctural falls in some years. In the year 1981, Turkey's total exports amounted to approximately \$10 billion, a figure that rose to \$57 billion in 1995.¹¹⁵³ However, its ratio of exports to imports never went beyond the 83 percent it hit in the year 1988—the last year of the Iran–Iraq War, which created opportunities for Turkish exports to the warring countries.¹¹⁵⁴ The closest ratio to that came in 1994 with 79 percent, but that year the Turkish economy was in crisis, with total imports falling dramatically to \$57 billion in that year from \$73 billion in 1993.¹¹⁵⁵ Imports of crude oil and other refined petrochemical products as well as imports of unfinished goods on the part of the Turkish industrial sector made foreign trade deficits a persistent element of the Turkish economy. As for the overall balance of payments and net foreign direct investment, the oldest data Turkish Statistical Institute provides also demonstrate that Turkey was again in deficit.¹¹⁵⁶ Accordingly, chronic problems in foreign trade and current account deficits persisted well into the mid-1990s, creating financial bottlenecks and aggravating Turkey's debt problem. Hence, despite a relatively large economy and soaring exports, Turkey was still far from a capital-exporting country, but rather in a position of capital importer.

It has already been noted in previous chapters that classical theories of imperialism emphasise the role of monopoly and finance capital and that theoreticians of subimperialism also focus on monopolies and trusts. In the case of Turkey, big capital groups organised in the form of holdings began to emerge among industrial

¹¹⁵³ Turkish Statistical Institute, accessed 27 May 2019, <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr>.

¹¹⁵⁴ Calculated by the author by using data from Turkish Statistical Institute.

¹¹⁵⁵ Turkish Statistical Institute, accessed 27 May 2019, <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr>.

¹¹⁵⁶ The Turkish Statistical Institute goes back to 1996 regarding net foreign direct investment. The deficit in that year was \$612 million.

capitalists from the late 1960s.¹¹⁵⁷ As the whole process resulted in the merging of commercial capital with that of industrial capital from the 1950s onwards, it also established connections and partnerships with finance capital, and hence, the formation of finance capital was accelerated from the late 1960s onwards.¹¹⁵⁸ 278 firms with over 20 employees dominated over 64.2 percent of Turkey's total industrial production in 1963, whereas, in 1967, 387 firms dominated over 71.5 percent.¹¹⁵⁹ Again, the ratio of the total sales of the biggest one hundred firms in the manufacturing industry to the gross national product increased by 70 percent, whereas its ratio to total sales in manufacturing increased by more than 40 percent between 1968 and 1976.¹¹⁶⁰

The establishment of TÜSİAD in 1971 only a couple of weeks after the 12 March military memorandum in the face of widespread social activism on behalf of the political left and trade unions may also be regarded as an indication of the soaring power of big capital in Turkey. This was an attempt on the part of the big bourgeoisie in Turkey to “[move] beyond a position of corporate existence and defence of its economic position,” and a sign that it “aspire[d] to a position of leadership in the political and social arena.”¹¹⁶¹ In the second half of the 1970s, 106 new holdings were

¹¹⁵⁷ Özgür Öztürk, *Türkiye'de Büyük Sermaye Grupları: Finans Kapitalin Oluşumu ve Gelişimi*, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Sosyal Araştırmalar Vakfı, 2011), 83.

¹¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 87.

¹¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹¹⁶¹ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, trans. and ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, 11th ed. (New York: International Publishers, 1992), 53–54, footnote 4; and see ibid., 173–75, 262–63, 404.

added to the group.¹¹⁶² Another phenomena, emerging in the 1970s, was holding company-owned banks, and as financial bottlenecks became more severe in the late 1970s, holding companies which owned banks did not face problems accessing capital in the form of money, while other groups without banks were left at a disadvantage within the market.¹¹⁶³ As also discussed in the third chapter, concomitant with the neoliberal turn within the Western capitalist bloc, TÜSİAD also began to advocate a change of course in Turkey's accumulation strategy from import-substitution industrialisation to export-oriented growth in the late 1970s under conditions of mounting economic and political crisis. With the declaration of the 24 January 1980 economic reform package and the subsequent *coup d'état*, that change could take place in the early 1980s. Turkey's incorporation into the world markets accelerated in new phases throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s, first, in the form of soaring foreign trade, and later, following current account liberalisation in 1989, in the form of increased mobility of monetary capital and inflows and outflows of direct investments.¹¹⁶⁴ These all led to the increased domination of monopolies in many economic sectors to such an extent that the share of the biggest ten companies within the manufacturing industry reached over 50 percent by 1995 from 28 percent in 1977 and 41 percent in 1982.¹¹⁶⁵

Notwithstanding this centralisation and concentration of economic domination in the hands of a limited number of big firms in the form of monopolies, Turkey lacked national capitalist trusts such as Petrobras of Brazil that would "tie the

¹¹⁶² Öztürk, *Türkiye'de Büyüük Sermaye*, 92.

¹¹⁶³ Ibid., 118–119.

¹¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 128–29.

¹¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 135.

dependent economy to imperialism via state intermediation.”¹¹⁶⁶ Turkey also did not have, and still does not have, any banks in the global top hundred by assets under administration.¹¹⁶⁷ In other words, the country’s political leadership did not have sufficient finance capital to use it to pursue subimperialist policies. Moreover, the fragility of the Turkish economy also came to the fore in the 1994 crisis once again when the economy shrank about 6.1 percent following sudden foreign capital outflows as a result of attempts to decrease interest rates on domestic debt, although the average growth rate was about 4.3 percent between 1989 and 1997.¹¹⁶⁸

A case worth noting at this point is Özal’s project of “peace water,” which he brought forward for the first time in 1986 while he was prime minister.¹¹⁶⁹ He proposed the project again both in February 1987 during his trip to the United States and in July of the same year during his trip to Syria.¹¹⁷⁰ The project envisaged carrying surplus water from the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers in Turkey to the Arabian peninsula using a pipeline passing through Syria and being divided into two lines—one transiting Jordan and arriving at the coastal Hejaz region of Saudi Arabia on the Red Sea, and the other continuing through Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar

¹¹⁶⁶ Mathias Luce, “Sub-Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Dependent Capitalism,” in *BRICS: An Anti-Capitalist Critique*, ed. Patrick Bond and Ana Garcia (London: Pluto Press, 2015), 34.

¹¹⁶⁷ For instance, see David Sanders, “Biggest Banks in the World 2018,” *Global Finance*, 1 November 2018, accessed 28 May 2019, <https://www.gfmag.com/magazine/november-2018/biggest-banks-world-2018>.

¹¹⁶⁸ Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908–2009*, 15th ed. (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2011), 181.

¹¹⁶⁹ Muzaffer Tepekaya, “Değişen Dünya Konjonktüründe Türkiye’nin Sınır Aşan Suları,” *Türk Dünyası İncelemeleri Dergisi* 1 (1996): 175.

¹¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 175; Ofra Bengio, *The Turkish-Israeli Relationship: Changing Ties of Middle Eastern Outsiders* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 139.

and the United Arab Emirates and ultimately arriving at Oman.¹¹⁷¹ The project could well be considered an attempt at gaining consent from the Arab countries mentioned above to prospective Turkish leadership at the regional level, but it was rejected out of hand by these Arab states, and a second attempt at reviving the project in 1991 also failed. Apart from objections made on technical grounds by these Arab states, what really drove them to reject the project was their shared fear that it would make them dependent upon Turkey in such a key matter, and hence, enhance Turkey's regional weight at their expense.¹¹⁷² The rejection of this Turkish project by its Arab counterparts made Özal shelve the project in despair for an indefinite period.¹¹⁷³

As for Turkey's political power in the 1990s, the picture remained confused. On the one hand, Turkey was an exceptional case of a country inhabited by a Muslim majority with a decades-long experiment in a secular form of parliamentary democracy, whereas, on the other hand, social dissent was on the rise as a result of the neoliberal policies being pursued, and this would almost amount to a crisis of legitimacy by the early 1990s, as political parties were widely seen as inept organisations fraught with corrupt and inappropriate relationships with other societal actors. High inflation rates as well as aggravated social problems such as the Kurdish problem and the rise of political Islam all added to an increased loss of trust in politics. As a result, the "Turkish model," promoted by the organic intellectuals of the US foreign policy establishment as well as by some domestic Turkish circles, no longer appeared so attractive, and lost any pull it may have formerly had. Even for

¹¹⁷¹ Tepekaya, "Türkiye'nin Sınır Aşan Suları," 176. Ofra Bengio argues that the project was first proposed to Özal by Abraham Tamir, the then director general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, "who held a series of discreet talks in Ankara in 1986–88, which included different strategic, economic, and political issues." She also argues that "Arab objections to Israel's participation in the plan led Turkey to exclude it." Bengio, *Turkish–Israeli Relationship*, 139.

¹¹⁷² Tepekaya, "Türkiye'nin Sınır Aşan Suları," 176; Bengio, *Turkish–Israeli Relationship*, 139–40.

¹¹⁷³ Murhaf Jouejati, "Water Politics as High Politics: The Case of Turkey and Syria," in *Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's Role in the Middle East*, ed. Henri J. Barkey (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 143.

Azerbaijan, for which the catchy slogan of “two states but one nation” has always been adopted both by Turkish policy makers and in the Turkish popular press, the ongoing Russian influence over that country and Turkey’s own predicament in cases such as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as well as Azerbaijani political elites’ cautiousness in approaching Turkey made the so-called “Turkish model” irrelevant.

As for Turkey’s military power, the Turkish Armed Forces has long been a source of pride for many Turks due to its historical legacy and privileged position within Turkish society. It is still the second largest army in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) after that of the United States. The biggest military operation it had undertaken abroad took place against Cypriot Greek forces in 1974, and that operation proved successful, but it was entangled in a domestic fight against the PKK in the early 1990s. Moreover, despite a reorganisation and modernisation program that it fully embarked upon beginning from 1981, some authors argue that its supposed unpreparedness in the First Gulf War “had revealed how inflexible their organization was, and how deficient they were in equipment for operational mobility and logistic support.”¹¹⁷⁴ Even the ambitious President Özal himself reportedly declared after the end of the First Gulf War that, as of the morning of 16 January 1991, the day the Gulf crisis turned into war, the Turkish Armed Forces had only enough ammunition for six days in case of war.¹¹⁷⁵ The Turkish Armed Forces also did not have any military bases abroad apart from its presence in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, despite cross-border counter-terrorism operations against the PKK in northern Iraq and its participation in international peacekeeping missions. This situation would not change until 2017 when it opened its first military base

¹¹⁷⁴ Simon V. Mayall, “Turkey: Thwarted Ambition,” (McNair Paper 56, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997), 78. For similar arguments put forward by a Turkish journalist who was close to Özal, see Gökmen, *Özal Sendromu*, 188, 209.

¹¹⁷⁵ Murat Yetkin, *Ateş Hattında Aktif Politika: Balkanlar, Kafkaslar ve Ortadoğu Üçgeninde Türkiye* (İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1992), 233.

abroad in Mogadishu, Somalia.¹¹⁷⁶ Moreover, Turkey never had the option to unilaterally intervene in such cases as the Bosnian War, simply because states in its way such as Greece and Bulgaria had already made it clear that, even if Turkey had decided to intervene unilaterally, they would not allow Turkish warplanes to fly through their airspace to conduct such unilateral military campaigns. Moreover, Turkey did not have certain military equipment such as tanker aircraft, and hence, its warplanes alone would only be able to fly for relatively short periods of time.¹¹⁷⁷ As for cases such as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Turkey shrank from the danger of confronting a more powerful army, the Russian army. Therefore, it was at best doubtful whether the Turkish Armed Forces had the ability or capacity to undertake subimperialist military missions abroad in the early 1990s.

In more material terms, as demonstrated above, its economy was far from having the solid financial capacity to export capital to these countries, let alone give grants and loans. Özal's political leadership was even having difficulties in generating active consent from its own domestic constituency as well as in sustaining bourgeois hegemony and maintaining unity within the Turkish bourgeoisie. Social instability even began to undermine capital accumulation when the economy began shrinking as was the case in 1994. It must not be forgotten that, for wealth to be distributed, it "must first be produced."¹¹⁷⁸ Therefore, it could be argued that the political leadership

¹¹⁷⁶ "Turkey Sets up Largest Overseas Army Base in Somalia," *Al Jazeera*, 1 October 2017, accessed 28 May 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/turkey-sets-largest-overseas-army-base-somalia-171001073820818.html>.

¹¹⁷⁷ İlhan Uzgel, "Relations with the Balkans," in *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919–2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*, ed. Baskın Oran and trans. Mustafa Akşin (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2010), 824. This last point was also made open to the public by a report leaked to the press by the Turkish Armed Forces, most probably in order to further prevent possible adventurist policies towards the region. Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), 349.

¹¹⁷⁸ Bob Jessop, "A Neo-Gramscian Approach to the Regulation of Urban Regimes," in *Reconstructing Urban Regime Theory: Regulating Urban Politics in a Global Economy*, ed. Mickey Lauria (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997), 58.

of Özal was far from providing states within the supposed *Pax Ottomana Novum* with sufficient material reason to fulfil a leadership role at the regional level.

A final noteworthy point regarding states within the supposed *Pax Ottomana Novum* is the difference, to use the least harsh word, between the way the political leadership of Özal in Turkey made of the Ottoman legacy in the former Ottoman territories and the way states located in these territories perceived and reinterpreted that legacy. What President Özal and the organic intellectuals of his political leadership did not seem to recognise was the fact that what they considered a glorious golden age might not be seen as such by the other peoples of these territories. Indeed, in many cases of post-Ottoman nation-building and state-formation, either in the Balkans or in the Middle East, the question was “not only a break with but a rejection of the political past.”¹¹⁷⁹ A process called “de-Ottomanisation” with “zealous efforts” accompanied such cases of post-Ottoman nation-building and state-formation.¹¹⁸⁰ Even in spheres where “a more tangible legacy” has existed, such as the “economic/social sphere,” diverse social outcomes “due to factors extraneous to the Ottoman legacy” have been produced.¹¹⁸¹ The reactionary stance vis-à-vis the Ottoman legacy in much of the Balkans and the Middle East also led to any steps in terms of Turkish activism towards these regions being perceived as an attempt at resuscitating the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 also served to add to such fears, and it has been argued that this created a “Cyprus syndrome” particularly in Greece and Bulgaria.¹¹⁸² Moreover, the Ottoman

¹¹⁷⁹ Maria Todorova, “The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans,” in *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order*, ed. Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Kemali Saybaşılı (İstanbul: Eren, 1995), 57.

¹¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 59.

¹¹⁸¹ Ibid., 61.

¹¹⁸² Sylvie Gangloff, “The Impact of the Ottoman Legacy on Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans (1991–1999),” *Variaturcica* XXXV (2005): 3.

Empire has also been treated as the “quintessential inhibitor” in much of the post-Ottoman “national(ist) historiograph[ies]” among Christian nations of the Balkans and Muslim Arabs of the Middle East alike in the sense that it allegedly inhibited the free development of these nations and, thereby, caused and sustained their socioeconomic backwardness.¹¹⁸³ Furthermore, when Turkish policy makers put forward Islam as a social bond that bound together the Muslim constituencies of the former Ottoman territories, it either fell short of providing such a bond of solidarity among Muslims in the face of diverse interpretations of Islam as was the case with the Middle East, or else deepened conflicts along religious lines with accusations of “building of an ‘Islamic arc’ (or ‘Green transversal’)” levelled against Turkey, as was the case with the Balkans.¹¹⁸⁴ All these negative factors, combined with its economic and political instability in the early 1990s, left Turkey into a position where it was far from capable of undertaking a task of intellectual and moral leadership at the regional level.

8.5 The Position of Big Capital and the Newly Emerging Islamic Bourgeoisie vis-à-vis the Neo-Ottomanist Project

Although the “economic leadership” of a class or class fraction over other social forces does not automatically bring about the “intellectual and moral leadership” of that particular class or class fraction, overall economic productivity can be decisive in the ultimate success or failure of a particular hegemonic project as illustrated in the introductory chapter. As such, the economic leadership of the traditional big capital groups represented by TÜSİAD which was still relevant as of the early 1990s, although it would regress somewhat in the second half of the 1990s due to the emergence and consolidation of the Islamic fraction within the Turkish

¹¹⁸³ Todorova, “Ottoman Legacy,” 73.

¹¹⁸⁴ Gangloff, “Impact of the Ottoman Legacy,” 3.

bourgeoisie which first appeared under the Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (MÜSİAD) in 1990 and was followed by other Islamic business associations such as the Association for Solidarity in Business Life (İŞHAD) under the auspices of the Fethullah Gülen movement in 1993, which would later be expanded to the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON) in 2005, and the Businessmen Association of Anatolian Lions (ASKON) in 1998.¹¹⁸⁵

The neo-Ottoman project brought forward by the organic intellectuals of the Özal leadership in the early 1990s in a way that could be considered a subimperialist hegemonic project seemed to have sought to accommodate the newly emerging Islamic fraction within the Turkish bourgeoisie with traditional big capital groups under a general framework of market expansion through creating spheres of influence in Turkey's neighbouring regions. However, as indicated earlier, although Turkey's incorporation into world markets was deepening and its exports were soaring steadily, the 1994 economic crisis demonstrated the fragility of the Turkish economy in the face of unstable capital flows, and even general conditions of capital accumulation such as economic and political stability were far from met throughout the 1990s.

It is worth noting at this point that the political alienation of Islamic conservatives within centre-right political parties would also contribute to the rise of political Islam as a separate political force under the leadership of the WP in the mid-1990s. Likewise, the Islamic fraction within the Turkish bourgeoisie as represented by MÜSİAD in the early 1990s also began to transfer their loyalty in favour of the WP in the same period, whereas the traditional big capital groups based mainly in Istanbul and organised within TÜSİAD had long been criticising rising inflation and public sector deficits beginning from the second half of the 1980s.¹¹⁸⁶ The Özal

¹¹⁸⁵ Öztürk, *Türkiye'de Büyük Sermaye*, 163; Ayşe Buğra and Osman Savaşkan, *New Capitalism in Turkey: The Relationship between Politics, Religion and Business* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014), 116–27.

¹¹⁸⁶ TÜSİAD, *Türkiye'de Enflasyon ve Enflasyonla Mücadelede Başarı Koşulları* (İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1986); TÜSİAD, *1987 Yılına Girerken Türk Ekonomisi* (İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1987), i–vi; TÜSİAD,

leadership and its organic intellectuals in *Türkiye Günliği* did not appear to have a programme including concrete policies that would ameliorate the grievances of these capital groups in the early 1990s.

It was also unclear how the neo-Ottoman subimperialist project would link “the realization of certain particular interests of subordinate social forces to the pursuit of a ‘national–popular’ programme which favours the long-term interests of the hegemonic force”¹¹⁸⁷ apart from through epic and heroic glorifications based upon the Ottoman past. While subordinate social classes such as the working class and the peasantry were suffering under high rates of inflation, even the general conditions of capital accumulation were also deteriorating to such an extent that an economic crisis that would shrink the economy would erupt in 1994. As also indicated in the first chapter, although economic growth may not always be the top political priority in hegemonic projects, other priorities can only be established as long as “the core conditions for capital accumulation are not thereby irrevocably undermined,”¹¹⁸⁸ and although hegemonic projects need not “be directly economic in character or give priority to economic objectives,”¹¹⁸⁹ the material gains granted to subordinate groups and overall economic productivity would be decisive in their ultimate success or failure. As such, the Özal leadership lacked a national–popular programme in order to overcome these problems. As late as 1991 and 1992, Özal still argued that high inflation was “the cost of transformation” in the 1980s, whereas in the early 1990s, it

¹¹⁸⁸ *Yılina Girerken Türk Ekonomisi* (İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1987), i; TÜSİAD, *İstikrarlı Kalkınma ve Yeniden Sanayileşme İçin Ekonomik Çözümlər* (İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1989), i–vi.

¹¹⁸⁷ Bob Jessop, *State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 209.

¹¹⁸⁸ Jessop, “Neo-Gramscian Approach,” 58.

¹¹⁸⁹ Jessop, *State Theory*, 210.

emanated from a failure in reducing the size of the state in the economy and from bad governance.¹¹⁹⁰

Added to the general economic discontent voiced by TÜSİAD throughout the latter half of the 1980s and the early 1990s was the worry among big capital groups organised within TÜSİAD that Turkey would enter into a hot war in Iraq due to President Özal's eagerness to "stake one and get three" by actively siding with the United States against that country. Relations between TÜSİAD and the Özal leadership were also no longer cordial by the early 1990s, and thus, it was considered no coincidence that a judicial probe was launched against the then-TÜSİAD President Cem Boyner in July 1990, with TPP leader Süleyman Demirel was stating that the probe aimed at putting TÜSİAD under political pressure.¹¹⁹¹ As for the Gulf crisis, TÜSİAD argued that it was "sufficient" for Turkey "to join the embargo" imposed on Iraq and that "Turkey must not enter into war."¹¹⁹² TÜSİAD President Boyner also accused the MP government of "not being able to provide economic and political stability" and the opposition of "not helping [the government] in providing stability" during the crisis.¹¹⁹³ He also expressed that he found arguments that the crisis had no effect upon the Turkish economy strange, arguing to the contrary that "the crisis had very grave effects upon the [Turkish] economy" without mentioning any names but apparently aiming his criticism at President Özal and officials of the MP government

¹¹⁹⁰ Mehmet Barlas, *Turgut Özal'in Anıları* (Istanbul: Sabah Kitapları, 1994), 65–66.

¹¹⁹¹ *Milliyet*, 23 July 1990.

¹¹⁹² *Milliyet*, 15 September 1990.

¹¹⁹³ *Milliyet*, 16 September 1990.

who were claiming quite the opposite during the crisis.¹¹⁹⁴ Harshly criticising the 1991 fiscal budget prepared by the MP government in late 1990, TÜSİAD also declared the year 1991 “a dark year.”¹¹⁹⁵ Notwithstanding these criticisms, representatives of TÜSİAD also held talks with EC officials in Brussels arguing that “Turkey was impatient and had expectations in return for its unconditional pro-Western stance [during the crisis].”¹¹⁹⁶ TÜSİAD’s ambivalence, however, was best exemplified when it stated in the wake of the air bombardment against Iraq that “new areas of investment might emerge after the war,” in a way laying bare its very capitalistic instincts, but also that it would be “a calamity [for Turkey] to enter into war.”¹¹⁹⁷ Meanwhile, President Özal was in a sustained effort to persuade the business community of the relevance of his policies towards the Gulf crisis.¹¹⁹⁸ Yet when the war ended, TÜSİAD went on to criticise the MP government on the grounds that the economy was teetering on the brink of collapse by using the metaphor of a *sirat köprüsü*, adapted from the Arabic phrase *as-sirat al-mustaqeem*, and meaning the

¹¹⁹⁴ *Milliyet*, 17 September 1990. TÜSİAD also devoted an issue of its monthly magazine *Görüş* published in February 1991 to the Gulf crisis, and both the effects of and the burden the crisis brought upon the Turkish economy were extensively covered in that issue. See *Görüş* 19:2 (1991): 13–29.

¹¹⁹⁵ *Milliyet*, 23 November 1990.

¹¹⁹⁶ *Milliyet*, 19 October 1990; *Milliyet*, 24 October 1990.

¹¹⁹⁷ *Milliyet*, 25 January 1991.

¹¹⁹⁸ He delivered a one-and-a-half-hour-long speech in a conference co-organised by TÜSİAD and the Istanbul Chamber of Industry (İSO) under the title “The Gulf War and the Turkish Economy” at the Hilton Convention Center in Istanbul on 14 February 1991, and claimed that he was never mistaken in his predictions about the war and that everything related to the war occurred as predicted by him. He also argued that the war might continue for one or two months more, but in the end, Saddam would be removed from office in one way or another. Yalçın Doğan, a Turkish columnist writing in the daily *Milliyet* at that time, states Saddam announced only one day after Özal’s speech that Iraq would withdraw its forces from Kuwait and comply with the United National Security Council resolutions, and thus argues that these developments invalidated Özal’s arguments in twenty-four hours leaving Saddam in office and Turkey in a position necessitating a *modus vivendi* with Iraq with Saddam remaining at its helm. Yalçın Doğan, “Ankara: Banko Yanılığı,” *Milliyet*, 16 February 1991.

bridge which people must successfully cross to get to Heaven.¹¹⁹⁹ Just days before President Özal's sudden death, it called for early elections, again criticising the government for using the Gulf crisis as a pretext for its own economic mismanagement.¹²⁰⁰

All these developments soured relations between President Özal and TÜSİAD, which had initially been close and harmonious. Özal began to criticise traditional big capital groups on the grounds that they were too dependent on the state,¹²⁰¹ and, when asked about what role TÜSİAD and the larger business community would have in his project of establishing a new political party through the end of his life, he reportedly preferred to use swear-like words, stating that nothing positive would come of them and that a new party should focus instead on “young businessmen” with the impetus coming from Anatolia, by which he meant the newly emerging small and medium-sized entrepreneurs with Islamic leanings throughout the Anatolian periphery.¹²⁰² Yet this new Islamic fraction within the Turkish bourgeoisie was still in the making in the early 1990s as illustrated in the fifth chapter, and although Özal himself, along with his brother Korkut Özal, had contributed to that very making and had close relations with this group of entrepreneurs to such an extent that he invited them onto his own plane during his foreign trips, this new fraction as represented by MÜSİAD in the early 1990s began to transfer their loyalty to the Islamist WP led by Necmettin Erbakan in the same period. Meanwhile, the Islamists harshly criticised Özal's policies towards the Bosnian crisis as insufficient, as illustrated in the seventh chapter, and Erbakan also fiercely attacked the pro-

¹¹⁹⁹ The original Turkish expression used is “Ekonomi Sırat köprüsünde.” *Milliyet*, 3 March 1991.

¹²⁰⁰ *Milliyet*, 14 April 1991.

¹²⁰¹ Alev Özkazanç, *Siyaset Sosyolojisi Yazılıları: Yeni Sağ ve Sonrası* (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2007), 103, footnote 61.

¹²⁰² This narrative belongs to his special advisor Cengiz Çandar. Birand and Yalçın, *The Özal*, 539.

American stance Özal adopted during the Gulf crisis.¹²⁰³ It was, however, still far from certain what the newly emerging Islamic fraction within the Turkish bourgeoisie could have accomplished apart from improving their commercial relations with countries of the Muslim and Turkic worlds or organising fundraising events, as they did for Kurdish asylum-seekers coming from Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf crisis,¹²⁰⁴ even if they had not transferred their loyalty in favour of the Islamist WP. To put it briefly, the political leadership of Özal ended up in a position with its relations with the traditional big capital groups having soured on the one hand, and with the newly emerging Islamic fraction within the Turkish bourgeoisie far from dependable on the other, from a position of having initially having had close and cordial relations with both of them. The neo-Ottomanist project was, therefore, deprived of a solid social base at the domestic level.

8.6 Liberals, Nationalists, Islamists and Kurds vis-à-vis the Neo-Ottomanist Project

The neo-Ottomanist project of the Özal leadership was articulated mainly by the two wings of liberals and conservative nationalists within the organic intellectuals of that leadership, gathered around the journal *Türkiye Günlüğü*, as illustrated in the sixth chapter. Thus, liberals and conservative nationalists constituted the principal ideological constituencies of the neo-Ottomanist project, but these intellectuals as well as President Özal himself also sought to mobilise wider segments of society ideologically against the supposedly Kemalist republican legacy. For instance, as illustrated in the sixth chapter, according to Cengiz Çandar, the biggest “roadblock” before the neo-Ottomanist imperial mission was the one that had been set up by “minds confused by the Republic in accordance with its new role defined by the West

¹²⁰³ *Milliyet*, 8 October 1990.

¹²⁰⁴ *Milliyet*, 10 April 1991.

with the elimination of the Empire.”¹²⁰⁵ Thus, he was calling for a mass intellectual campaign that would be fought by a wide range of ideologies, “from communism to Islamism, from Islamism to Pan-Turanianism [*Turancılık*],” supposedly alienated by the Republican “mediocrity,” against the “intellectual desert” again supposedly created by the Kemalist Republic in accordance with its “minor role” in international arena given by the West.¹²⁰⁶ As the two most important groups challenging the Kemalist republican legacy, with one challenging the secular aspect of the Republic, while the other challenged its unitary nation-state dimension and territorial integrity, Islamists and Kurds were, therefore, regarded as natural ideological supporters of the project. Islamists and Kurds, along with nationalists, were also regarded as springboards that would help in politically reaching the Muslims in the Balkans and the Middle East, the Kurds abroad in Iraq, Syria and Iran, and finally, the Turkic peoples of Central Asia within the framework of the supposed *Pax Ottomana Novum*.

The overall ideology underlying the project, however, was at best expressed in sketchy terms. Among neo-Ottomanist intellectuals, only Cengiz Çandar and Nur Vergin—and to some extent Hikmet Özdemir, since he extolls some aspects of neo-Ottomanism despite his criticism that it was too much outward-oriented—proposed or advocated a definite model or form of state. These intellectuals all praised, in one way or other, the liberal inward-oriented ideological position of the Second Republic developed by Mehmet Altan. Çandar, for instance, has reservations about the terminology since the term “Second Republic” seemed imported from France,¹²⁰⁷ whereas Vergin argued that it implicated a desire for the outright “elimination” of the

¹²⁰⁵ Cengiz Çandar, “21. Yüzyıl'a Doğru Türkiye: Tarih ve Jeopolitiğin İntikamı,” *Türkiye Günülgü* 19 (1992): 33–34.

¹²⁰⁶ Ibid., 34.

¹²⁰⁷ Cengiz Çandar, “Özal’ın Cenaze Töreni Kemalizmin Cenaze Törenine Benziyordu,” in 2. *Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları: Yeni Arayışlar, Yeni Yönetimler*, ed. Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar (Ankara: Başak Yayınları, 1993), 97.

Republic of Turkey, while what was needed, according to her, was instead a “correction.”¹²⁰⁸ Özdemir, on the other hand, advocated a synthesis between the proposals for the Second Republic and neo-Ottomanism that could be found on the grounds that Turkey must “make peace with its history and with Islam as a sub-element of that history,” also “with the Kurdish identity,” and finally, “with the individual.”¹²⁰⁹ All these three liberal neo-Ottomanist intellectuals also advocated some form of presidential system for Turkey, unlike Mehmet Altan, who opposed it on the grounds that it would evolve into a “sultanate” in countries like Turkey.¹²¹⁰ President Özal’s preference for a presidential system along US lines and his vocal support for such system was also quite well-known. In brief, Özal found it necessary to have a strong executive in order to realise large-scale investments and great transformations, while he also argued that parliamentary system was not appropriate for culturally heterogenous countries, for it would end up in clientelist political relations based upon ethnic or sectarian identities.¹²¹¹

¹²⁰⁸ Nur Vergin, “Tasfiye mi, Tashih mi?,” *Türkiye Günülgü* 20 (1992): 8–9.

¹²⁰⁹ Hikmet Özdemir, “Fatih Sultan Mehmet İstanbul’unda Sivil Toplum Olduğunu İddia Ediyorum,” in 2. *Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları: Yeni Arayışlar, Yeni Yönetimler*, ed. Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar (Ankara: Başak Yayıncıları, 1993), 79.

¹²¹⁰ Çandar, “Özal’ın Cenaze Töreni,” 107; Nur Vergin, “Genel Oy Kapsamında Cumhurbaşkanı,” *Türkiye Günülgü* 16 (1991): 129–41; Özdemir, “Fatih Sultan Mehmet,” 88; Mehmet Altan, “Sorun Politik Devletten Liberal Devlete Geçmemektir,” in 2. *Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları: Yeni Arayışlar, Yeni Yönetimler*, ed. Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar (Ankara: Başak Yayıncıları, 1993), 55. Among these intellectuals Vergin argues that semi-presidential system is more appropriate for Turkey. Nur Vergin, “Cumhuriyetin Yönetilebilirliği İçin İktidar Yapısında Değişim: Yarı-Başkanlık Sistemi,” *Türkiye Günülgü* 41 (1996): 5–16; Nur Vergin, “Siyasal Sistem Arayışları ve Yarı-Başkanlık Sistemi,” *Yeni Türkiye* 9:51 (2013): 449–55. She also argues, however, that her preference for semi-presidential system had nothing to do with Özal’s political project and that they even had a hot telephone debate over the issue one night since Özal was a staunch advocate of presidential system along US lines whereas she thought it would be detrimental for Turkey. Ibid., 451–52.

¹²¹¹ Mehmet Barlas, *Turgut Özal’ın Anıları* (İstanbul: Sabah Kitapları, 1994), 141–42, 293–95, 334–36. Zeynep Göğüş, a Turkish journalist, claims that Özal had this perspective in the 1970s while he was in the United States and working in the World Bank after he left the State Planning Organisation. According to her, he discovered the American “melting pot,” whereby ethnically and culturally different people come together and unite under the American identity, and he thought that it would

As illustrated in the fifth and sixth chapters, these liberal neo-Ottomanists also emphasised the need for a resolution to the Kurdish problem through political initiatives, whereas other intellectuals with a conservative form of nationalism within *Türkiye Günlüğü* such as Ahmet Turan Alkan and Durmuş Hocaoğlu remained distanced from such rhetoric. President Özal also seemed to have considered playing the “Kurdish card” as an important political instrument in the absence of a dependable Turkmen population in Mosul province in his aspiration towards that region during the Gulf crisis.¹²¹² What is certain is that he initiated a dialogue process with the Iraqi Kurdish groups led by Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, as well as with the PKK. According to Cengiz Çandar, who acted both as Özal’s special advisor and go-between in his dealings with Kurdish groups including the PKK, President Özal saw the resolution of the Kurdish problem in Turkey as his final duty to his people.¹²¹³ It would fall both into the realm of speculation and outside the scope of this thesis to go into further details of these initiatives. One could, however, argue that such initiatives were anything but incompatible with the neo-Ottomanist projections of Özal and the intellectuals around him, who saw the Iraqi Kurds within the first circle of Turkey’s potential spheres of influence, since Iraq used to be a part of the former Ottoman Empire. The opposition, however, accused him with trying “to lay a table of his own

also work well in a country like Turkey in these years. Osman Özsoy, ed., *Ünlülerin Turgut Özal’la Hâtıraları* (İstanbul: Türkiye Kalkınma ve Dayanışma Vakfı, 1994), 241.

¹²¹² President Özal was asking Cengiz Çandar, not yet his special advisor but only journalist, how large the Turkmen population in Iraq was in their private talk in the Presidential House in Çankaya, Ankara, on 6 February 1991. When he could not get a satisfactory answer from Çandar, he asked more directly, “Would the power of the Turkmens be sufficient for us to expand our influence in Iraq? There is Iran for Shiites, and the Arab world is there for Sunni Arabs. Or vice versa. Would the Turkmen card be sufficient for us, as Turkey, to carry our influence into the very centre in the new structure that is going to emerge after Saddam in Baghdad?” When Çandar’s answer was, “It would not, Sir,” Özal reportedly reiterated, “It would not without Kurds, right?” Cengiz Çandar, *Mezopotamya Ekspresi: Bir Tarih Yolculuğu*, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılığı, 2014), 98–99. See also Ibid., 100–103.

¹²¹³ Ibid., 25.

since he could not find a place at the table of spoils following the Gulf war.”¹²¹⁴ Circles close to him reportedly claimed that he had the following reasoning with respect to the Kurdish problem:

If the establishment of a Kurdish state in North Iraq is inevitable and the US scenario is written in that direction, then, at least, let this happen, not despite Turkey, but under the wings of Turkey.¹²¹⁵

It was thus speculated that he envisioned a Kurdish state in Iraq under Turkish tutelage.¹²¹⁶ Yavuz Gökmen also asserts that the *Misâk-ı Millî* (National Pact) borders were not unchangeable according to Özal, and that he disagreed in this respect with Kemalists.¹²¹⁷ For Özal, Saddam’s rule in Iraq ran counter to Turkey’s interests, and so war must break out, Saddam must be toppled, and Iraq must be divided into federal units.¹²¹⁸ Prospective federal states representing the Kurds and Turkmens in Northern Iraq would be shielded by Turkey. Thus, Turkey should enter into the Gulf War without delay and must capture Mosul and Kirkuk by invading Iraq from the north. In this way, he believed, the “PKK trouble” could have also been prevented.¹²¹⁹ There

¹²¹⁴ This phrase belongs to the Democratic Left Party (DLP) leader Bülent Ecevit. Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Büyüklerle Masallar, Küçüklerle Gerçekler*, vol. 3, *Kriz Doğuran Savaş* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000), 305.

¹²¹⁵ Ibid., 301.

¹²¹⁶ Ibid.

¹²¹⁷ Yavuz Gökmen, *Özal Yaşa Saydı* (Ankara: Verso Yayıncılık, 1994), 93. Gökmen also remarks that Özal did not like the Treaty of Lausanne at all, and entered into polemics over the loss of Mosul and Kirkuk as well as the Dodecanese (*On İki Ada*). Ibid., 98. Kadir Mısıroğlu, a staunch opponent of the Kemalist legacy, who also labels the Lausanne Treaty as a “defeat” for Turkey, claims that President Özal once said him personally, “Now the day of your ideas is coming! Write what you know! Never fear! I’m right behind you! I did not drop your works from my hand even for a moment during the Gulf War. Bravo! You were so farsighted!” Özsoy, *Ünlülerin Özal’la Hâtıraları*, 178.

¹²¹⁸ Gökmen, *Özal Yaşa Saydı*, 95.

¹²¹⁹ Ibid.

are also accounts arguing that he indeed had a different ethnic policy from that of the traditional Kemalist political elites and had in mind a kind of reconfiguration based on a model similar to the United States, even through changing the name of the country to “Anatolia” on the grounds that it did not have any ethnic implications.¹²²⁰

Ostensibly not coincidentally, immediately after the Gulf crisis the MP government took significant steps to ameliorate the Kurdish problem under the auspices of President Özal. Among them were the abolition of the notorious articles, 141, 142 and 163 of the Turkish penal code, which were instrumental in punishing dissident political views, the abolition of law no. 2932, which had been used in practice to prohibit the public usage of the Kurdish language, and an amnesty for those with political convictions. These were undoubtedly dramatic improvements after years under the iron fist of the army in the 1980s, but it was still unclear to what extent Turgut Özal envisioned a change apart from in appraisals of his legacy, as it is also known that he was happy to leave aside basic democratic concerns when his personal political interests were at stake—as it had been the case with the 1987 referendum, during which he had campaigned for vote against the removal of political bans on former politicians. Moreover, despite these ameliorations, at the fundamental level, the authoritarian form of the state that was institutionalised through the neoliberal economic and political restructuring following the 1980 *coup d'état* was still in place, not changed in substantial terms. Arguably, the only achievement, despite all these steps, was the declaration of a one-month ceasefire by the PKK on 16 March 1993, for which President Özal used his special advisor Cengiz Çandar as a go-between. Further dialogue with the Iraqi Kurds, notably Jalal Talabani, as an intermediary only led the PKK to declare in the morning of 17 April 1993 that it would prolong the ceasefire indefinitely without any conditions, but President Özal

¹²²⁰ Muhittin Ataman, “Özal Leadership and Restructuring of Turkish Ethnic Policy in the 1980s,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 38:4 (2002): 129. See also Özsoy, *Ünlülerin Özal’la Hâturaları*, 241.

lost his life on the very same day.¹²²¹ Hence how this initiative undertaken by Özal would end and what results it would yield is bound to remain a mystery and open to speculation. He had declared in public that people must be free to broadcast in Kurdish and teach the Kurdish language. He also argued that even “federation must be discussed,” although he apparently felt it necessary to state that he was against it, but just wanted it to be discussed in order to overcome the anti-democratic climate.¹²²² Based upon the testimony of Yusuf Bozkurt Özal, Özal’s younger brother, Yavuz Gökmen speculates that President Özal also wanted local governors to be elected instead of being appointed by the central government.¹²²³ Relying upon the same testimony, Gökmen further speculates that President Özal was also in favour of autonomy for all local structures including schools aside from the national army that would not amount to a federation, and he was also reportedly in favour of a gradual, stage by stage, general amnesty towards members and leaders of the PKK.¹²²⁴ From all these speculations, Gökmen concludes,

What he wanted was nothing but to have Apo [Abdullah Öcalan] brought to him, to admonish him, and to take the gun from his hand forever and ever. Talking to Apo would not have meant granting him equal status. Özal, as the Sultan, would have granted his rebellious subject an imperial amnesty after smacking him twice.¹²²⁵

¹²²¹ For details of the dialogue process initiated by Özal, see Çandar, *Mezopotamya Ekspresi*, 19–29, 77–184.

¹²²² Gökmen, *Özal Yaşasaydı*, 76–77, 136–38.

¹²²³ Ibid., 149, 288, 291–92.

¹²²⁴ Ibid., 288–92.

¹²²⁵ Ibid., 292. Jalal Talabani (1933–2017), the former leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—one of the two most influential Kurdish political movements, along with Masoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Northern Iraq—and the 8th President of Iraq from 2006 to 2014, has a similar impression of Özal: “He wanted to give an impression to the Kurds of being somewhat of a father of theirs. He wanted to help and serve them, and thereby, to direct their attention towards

Apart from all these speculations, whatever his real intentions were, the reality is that the ceasefire only lasted until 24 May 1993, when the PKK ambushed and killed 33 unarmed soldiers, and thenceforth the situation evolved into all-out warfare well until the late 1990s, with high casualties on both sides including “murders by unknown assailants” (*faili meçhul cinayetler*). Moreover, the Kurdish political movement, organised first under the People’s Labour Party (PLP, or HEP in its Turkish acronym) between 1989 and 1993 and later under the Party of Democracy (PD, or DEP in its Turkish acronym) between 1993 and 1994, sought to posit itself as a separate political force within the Turkish legal framework, and when it sought to align itself with other political parties, this was not the MP but the left-wing social democratic SPP in the early 1990s. Overall, however, Özal’s policies during the Gulf crisis and his later initiative on the Kurdish problem were those that came closest to what could be called a neo-Ottoman subimperialism, but even those attempts did not succeed.

In a nutshell, although a neo-Ottomanist variant of nationalism based upon the glorification of Turkey’s imperial legacy inherited from the Ottoman Empire is a common theme among all of these neo-Ottomanist intellectuals and President Özal himself, they lacked a coherent national–popular programme. The lack of such a programme was apparent even among the liberal wing of these neo-Ottomanist intellectuals and President Özal himself, since, though Özal opened the ground for a debate over a prospective political resolution of the Kurdish problem, neither these liberal intellectuals nor Özal ever appeared with a coherent road map on the issue beyond demanding a ceasefire from the PKK via Çandar as go-between between Özal and Kurdish actors such as the PKK and the Iraqi Kurdish leaders. Having sought to become both liberal and conservative, this was indeed Özal’s political strategy from the very beginning as reflected in the MP’s well-known claim to have brought together four political tendencies of nationalism, conservatism, social democracy and liberalism. This strategy persisted well into Özal’s presidency, and he preferred

Turkey. In other words, he had an Ottoman-like point of view. He thought that Turkey could be a new centre for Middle Eastern people—not least for the Kurds.” Birand and Yalçın, *The Özal*, 538.

to oscillate between the liberal and conservative factions within the MP in the face of competition for the leadership in that party in the legal absence of Özal himself, due to the then-constitutional principle of impartiality for presidents. In the end, Özal both upset conservatives when he appeared close to Mesut Yılmaz's leadership and later upset Yılmaz himself when he appeared complaining about Yılmaz's relatively autonomous stance and re-approaching the conservatives.¹²²⁶ As also noted earlier, the political alienation of Islamic conservatives within centre-right political parties would also contribute to the rise of political Islam as a separate powerful political force under the leadership of the WP in the mid-1990s, and the Islamic fraction within the Turkish bourgeoisie as represented by MÜSİAD in the early 1990s also began to transfer their loyalty to the WP in the same period. Apart from the conservative nationalists among the organic intellectuals of the Özal leadership, the nationalists, organised under the Nationalist Action Party (NAP), also preferred to align themselves with the Islamist WP in the 1991 general elections. As is clear, although the neo-Ottomanist project as articulated by the organic intellectuals of the Özal leadership envisioned a wide spectrum of ideological constituencies that ranged from liberals and nationalists to Islamists and Kurds being mobilised behind and supporting their cause against the last remnants of the Kemalist republican legacy, it turned out that they indeed neither had a coherent national–popular programme around which they could have mobilised these segments of the society nor could they succeed in politically making them supportive of their project apart from a nucleus of liberals and conservative nationalists who were already serving as organic intellectuals of the Özal leadership.

¹²²⁶ Birand and Yalçın, *The Özal*, 483, 519–20.

8.7 The Decline and the Ultimate Breakup of the Özal Leadership

The neoliberal hegemonic project led by the MP from 1983 onwards was based upon the political leadership of Turgut Özal and the MP with a power bloc formed around that political leadership, as well as the civilian and military bureaucracy and the traditional big capital groups represented by TÜSİAD in the remaining part of the 1980s and the early 1990s as illustrated in the third chapter. Although the political leadership of Özal had been in decline since the late 1980s as illustrated in the fifth chapter, the biggest crack in that power bloc appeared with the early general elections held on 20 October 1991, which ended eight consecutive years of the MP rule. Even before that crack, competition for leadership within the post-Özal MP following Özal's election as president in 1989, and the rifts between President Özal, on the one hand, and the MP government and the Chief of General Staff of Turkish Armed Forces, on the other, best epitomised by the case of the First Gulf War, were all indicators that indeed from 1990 onwards President Özal was far from a position to maintain a power bloc under his political leadership. President Özal knew, or at least saw, this well, and thus, in his last years, began to propagate a political system change in favour of presidential system, which was thought to strengthen his political leadership. Thus, the political leadership of Özal and the organic intellectuals of that leadership sought to overcome the apparently impending political and economic crisis of the early 1990s through a new hegemonic project, which envisioned a new regional leadership for Turkey. They envisioned overcoming working class grievances regarding neoliberal policies pursued from 1980 onwards by raising issues over identity-based politics and by addressing the ideological grievances of such anti-Kemalist groups as the Islamists and Kurds. They also foresaw the mobilisation of wider segments of society behind the imperial mission of neo-Ottoman leadership at the regional level by invoking a new wave of nationalism around such an imperial mission. They believed they could obtain the consent of capital groups such as TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD through market expansion and new lucrative areas of investment, whereas US imperialism was envisioned as co-opting

Turkey to serve as a surrogate hegemon on its behalf and to share the burden of maintaining stability at the regional level within the US-led international order. Other states within this supposed *Pax Ottomana Novum* were seen as being willing to comply with Turkey's leadership thanks to Turkey's cultural and historical ties with these states and its imperial legacy, while Turkey was even envisioned as exemplifying a "model" for these states with its pro-Western democracy and free-market economy.

However, both President Özal and the organic intellectuals of his political leadership lacked a coherent national–popular programme, which was crucial for a hegemonic project to successfully cement a historical bloc since all historical blocs project "particular world view[s], grounded in historically specific socio-political conditions and production relations, which [lend] substance and ideological coherence to [their] social power."¹²²⁷ Özal had sought to achieve this during the first years of his political leadership as both the prime minister and the leader of the MP through a distorted version of populism, which rested upon a discourse of a "middle pillar" (*orta direk*), and he had also claimed to have incorporated the famous "four political tendencies" of nationalism, conservatism, social democracy and liberalism within the MP as illustrated in the fifth and sixth chapters. Later developments, however, suggest that such claims had been far from reflecting the political reality of the period. As is clear, Özal's later neo-Ottomanist campaign also failed to incorporate such diverse political groups in the absence of a coherent national–popular programme. It also soon turned out that the political leadership of Özal did not have the ability and capacity to provide all these abovementioned social forces with sufficient material reason to gain their consent, or at least, to coerce them into acquiescing to its leadership.

On the eve of the 1991 early general elections, the Özal leadership had already failed on almost all fronts. Working class activism was once more on the rise with the

¹²²⁷ Mark Rupert, *Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 30.

spring 1989 protests and the great strike of mine workers in Zonguldak that took place in 1990–1991, a long period after the 1980 *coup d'état* when such demonstrations had been banned.¹²²⁸ Relations with TÜSİAD were troublesome, whereas MÜSİAD had already begun to turn its face towards a rising political Islam. The Kurdish political movement also began to emerge as a separate political force, and it had chosen to align itself with another political party, the social democratic SPP, rather than the MP in the 1991 elections. The Islamist WP was on the rise, and the nationalist NAP was also aligning itself with that party in the upcoming 1991 elections. The centre-right electorate, which the MP heavily relied upon, was divided between the MP and the TPP led by the veteran right-wing politician Süleyman Demirel, and was increasingly tilting towards the latter. Meanwhile, President Özal was very much constrained in his efforts to enter the war against Iraq during the Gulf crisis at the domestic level, as illustrated in the seventh chapter, and the United States was also far from being supportive of his aspiration to capture oil-rich regions of Northern Iraq, while neither the Ottoman imperial legacy nor the debates over a so-called “Turkish model” made enough sense to convince states within the supposed *Pax Ottomana Novum* to opt for a neo-Ottoman subimperialist hegemony led by Turkey. President Özal was also very much busy with intra-MP controversies and rivalries between the conservative and liberal factions within the MP. On the eve of the 1991 elections, he came to a position ostensibly supportive of the liberal faction led by Mesut Yılmaz in order to counterbalance the conservative faction, and thus, Yılmaz replaced Yıldırım Akbulut first as the chair of the MP and later as the head of the MP government as prime minister in June 1991.¹²²⁹ Although the relatively younger leader Yılmaz attracted as much as 24 percent of the vote, this did not suffice to keep the MP in power. Demirel’s TPP was victorious with 27 percent of the votes, while the social democratic SPP got

¹²²⁸ Cenk Saraçoğlu, “Tank Paletiyle Neoliberalizm, 1980–2002,” in *Osmanlı ’dan Günümüze Türkiye ’de Siyasal Hayat*, ed. Gökhan Atilgan, Cenk Saraçoğlu, and Ateş Uslu (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2015), 800–805.

¹²²⁹ Ibid., 804–805.

20.8 percent, and these two parties formed a coalition government in the aftermath of the elections. Their criticisms were levelled more against President Özal than against the MP, and thus, having formed the government on 20 November 1991, they sought to constrain his interference in daily politics. Thus, Özal from late 1991 onwards was reduced to a lame duck in political terms. From that time until his sudden death on 17 April 1993, President Özal was no longer pulling the strings in such cases as the Bosnian War and the establishment of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), as illustrated in the seventh chapter. His death was the final blow to the neo-Ottoman subimperialist hegemonic project of the early 1990s, and such a foreign policy aspiration was only aired again in the 2010s under later Justice and Development Party (JDP) governments.

8.8 Conclusion

This chapter sought to theoretically assess the neo-Ottoman subimperialist aspiration for regional leadership under the political leadership of Turgut Özal by benefiting from a neo-Gramscian historical materialist approach. The chapter illustrated that the Özal leadership was far from being in a position to successfully cement a neo-Ottomanist historical bloc in the early 1990s. Thus, the neo-Ottomanist project was, in a sense, stillborn from its very beginning, and could only be kept alive for a relatively short period. Though neo-Ottomanism under Özal was a short-lived project, the Özal leadership and its organic intellectuals gathered around *Türkiye Günlüğü* sought to combine some external and domestic social forces to form a neo-Ottoman historical bloc in their own image. By the end of 1991, it had already become clear that both President Özal and the organic intellectuals of his political leadership lacked a coherent national–popular programme, an element crucial for any hegemonic project to successfully cement a historical bloc, and that the Özal leadership did not have the ability or capacity to provide all these social forces with sufficient material reasons to gain their consent, or at least, to coerce them into acquiescing to its

leadership. As a result, it must be underscored that the Özal leadership could not succeed in consolidating a meaningful relationship between these social forces within the framework of its neo-Ottomanist project.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

Turkish foreign policy makers have at times become tempted by aspirations of regional leadership. Therefore, the main research question of this thesis is how and in what circumstances such an aspiration came to flourish under the political leadership of Turgut Özal throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, since this experience represents a significant historical precedent for later periods of Turkish foreign policy in which similar aspirations were aired. This thesis analyses how this aspiration in the form of neo-Ottomanism under Özal came about, its rise to prominence and ultimate decline by looking into Özal's foreign policy practices towards the Balkans, Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus (i.e. the regions which he saw as Turkey's "natural spheres of influence") from a neo-Gramscian perspective. Since the neo-Ottomanist project of the Özal leadership envisaged a regional hegemony led by Turkey as a surrogate hegemon on behalf of US imperialism in the aforementioned regions, this thesis seeks to examine the aspiration for regional leadership under Özal as a subimperialist hegemonic project. What Özal and his organic intellectuals proposed was a new role of regional leadership in conformity with the US-led international order in the post-Cold War era.

The thesis demonstrates that a course of change in accumulation strategy from import substitution industrialisation to export-oriented growth took place in Turkey in the early 1980s, and the concomitant neoliberal economic and political restructuring and the problems it encountered in the late 1980s led liberal and Islamist intellectuals to come up with new ideological positions that envisaged dismantling the last remnants of Turkey's Kemalist republican legacy in the early 1990s, while the Islamic fraction within the Turkish bourgeoisie was also on the rise with new demands in the same period. The transformation in the international order in the late

1980s and the early 1990s also seemed to have opened up space for regional aspirants such as Turkey. It was under such circumstances that a group of intellectuals gathered around the nationalist-conservative journal *Türkiye Günlüğü* with close connections to the then President Turgut Özal began to formulate a neo-Ottomanism that envisaged a role of regional leadership for Turkey under the auspices of US imperialism. This was indeed far from original, since some organic intellectuals in the US foreign policy establishment had already begun to formulate such a role for Turkey in the early 1990s. Özal himself echoed similar views on Turkish foreign policy, and resorted to enthusiastic rhetoric over Turkey's supposed role of regional leadership in its surrounding regions such as the Balkans, the Middle East and Central Asia and the Caucasus. However, the only example he could give beyond rhetoric was the case of the First Gulf War, but even in that case both the government formed by his own former party, the Motherland Party (MP), and the military bureaucracy were far from being on the same page with Özal. Thus, Özal's eagerness for Turkey to directly enter into the war waged by the US-led coalition against the Saddam regime in Iraq epitomised in the phrase "putting one (in) and getting three (back) in return," which has been attributed to him, proved futile. This thesis argues that this was no accident, and the neo-Ottoman subimperialist aspiration aired in the early 1990s was in a sense stillborn in hindsight.

The central assumption of this thesis is that Turkey is part of the international order that rests upon capitalist social relations on a worldwide scale, and that continuities and changes in Turkish foreign policy cannot be analysed without taking into consideration the mutually constitutive relationship between the domestic and the international. At a basic level, this thesis departs from a hypothesis that, after the Cold War, struggles for hegemony within the international order continued to be influential. The influence of Western hegemony over Turkish foreign policy did not cease to exist in the post-Cold War period. The expansion of the world capitalist system to former socialist countries only increased US influence on Turkish foreign policy, as was the case with the First Gulf War. This framework and the limits of Turkey's post-Cold War foreign policy activism at the regional level were then

determined by US-led hegemony at the international level. A further assumption is that post-Cold War neo-Ottomanist foreign policy aspirations might also be related to domestic material factors such as the accumulation strategies adopted and changes in levels of capital accumulation. The final assumption is that it might also be possible to explain the extravagant foreign policy claims of the period through looking at the context formed by particular transformations such as the restructuring of the state apparatus and the Islamisation of the society from above since the 1980 coup d'état.

Taking into consideration these assumptions, the thesis proposes a number of arguments. This thesis argues that the domestic neoliberal restructuring that took place throughout the 1980s was a key factor that formed the basis by which neo-Ottomanism could be proposed in a way that could be considered a subimperialist hegemonic project in the early 1990s. On the one hand, the economic aspect of this restructuring, marked by a change of course in accumulation strategy from the import substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the pre-1980 period to an export-oriented growth model, made Turkey's incorporation into world markets top priority for successive Turkish governments. This economic aspect also constitutes the distinctive feature of Turkish neoliberalism in the sense that the neoliberal turn in Turkey coincided with a transition from the ISI model that rested upon state-led development plans to an export-oriented growth model unlike many other cases of neoliberal restructuring, which mostly represent mere transitions from Keynesian welfare state models. The political aspect of this restructuring, on the other hand, led identity politics to prevail under an authoritarian form of the state that helped distort the core of social problems and divert many political debates from class-based politics to identity-based ones. It is from this economic and political basis that the subsequent aspiration for a greater role for Turkey in its surrounding regions has arisen.

This thesis further argues that the transformation in the international order that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s is another key factor thought to have opened up space for aspirants to regional leadership. As such, this thesis examines the changes and the ultimate transformation in the international order which subsequently ended up with the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. It analyses this period in

terms of the transition from a period marked by the inter-systemic conflict between the capitalist Western and socialist Eastern blocs to a period marked rather by heteronymous intra-systemic conflicts and competitions within the capitalist-imperialist system, and it also elaborates the new possibilities thought to have been opened up for regional aspirants such as Turkey in this international political conjuncture in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War.

How such regional aspirants were accommodated in the new international order or, when that could not be accomplished, eliminated entirely are all considered using the concept of subimperialism and by looking into the emblematic case of Brazil in order to better illustrate that this phenomenon is not limited to Turkey. The conclusion drawn from the overall discussion is that subimperialism has emerged as hegemonic projects in some semi-peripheral social formations which have internalised a dependent form of social relationship with US imperialism. Yet subimperialism was hard to attain and, if ever attained, was too difficult to sustain due to its highly liminal and unconstant characteristic in-between dependency and imperialism. The exercise of subimperialist hegemonic projects aiming at surrogate hegemonies on behalf of the leading imperialist state at regional levels are full of contradictions manifest in their two contrasting and related impulses or modes of surrogacy or subservience on behalf of the leading imperialist state, on the one hand, and relative autonomy from that imperialist state, on the other. The Brazilian case well illustrates that contradictory character of subimperialism and its limitations. In the case of Turkey, however, these contradictions and limitations are much more obvious and severe.

The thesis also examines the rise of political Islam and the emergence of an Islamic fraction within the Turkish bourgeoisie in the late 1980s and the early 1990s as repercussions of the post-1980 domestic neoliberal restructuring. While the MP's neoliberal hegemonic project was slackening and social dissent was growing in the late 1980s, both liberals and political Islamists appeared with their own ideological positions aiming at overcoming the debacle of the neoliberal model through dismantling the last remnants of Turkey's Kemalist republican legacy. In the

meanwhile, the Islamic fraction within the Turkish bourgeoisie, represented by the Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (MÜSİAD), also began to emerge as a new domestic social force with new demands such as governmental support within an identity-based framework based upon privileging Islamic small and medium-sized enterprises at the expense of non-Islamic enterprises as well as developing close economic relations with the Islamic world and the newly independent Central Asian Turkic republics through regional economic blocs. The liberal "Second Republic," its political patronage being limited to Özal's leadership, remained ineffective as a political project, while political Islamists were still far from being a hegemonic force until the 2000s. Notwithstanding their failure as a political project in the early 1990s, a group of organic intellectuals of the political leadership of Turgut Özal gathered around *Türkiye Günlüğü* sought to bring together all these diverse social forces by accommodating these ideological positions and reformulating them in the form of neo-Ottomanism in the same period.

By the early 1990s, organic intellectuals of the Özal leadership gathered around *Türkiye Günlüğü*, along with Özal himself, began to propose a new regional leadership role for Turkey. They based their arguments upon the transformed post-Cold War international order and argued that a new geopolitical space that ranged from the Balkans to Central Asia and the Caucasus had opened up before Turkey to fulfil such a role due to the vacuum created following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Although there were inner contradictions between the nationalist-conservative and liberal wings of the Özalian neo-Ottomanist camp in the sense that the former wing were relatively uneasy about US power projections into the regions surrounding Turkey and unsure about Turkey's real capabilities and the extent of the risks ahead such as the Kurdish problem, there was a general predominant understanding among these intellectuals that the time had already come for a neo-Ottomanist offensive and that the supposed "retreat of the Turks" had already come to an end. All major international political developments and subsequent transformations in the international order were perceived only as evidence of the new era that was opening before Turkey.

Following these considerations, the thesis, accordingly, analyses the Turkish foreign policy pursued under the political leadership of Turgut Özal between 1983 and 1993 in order to investigate whether or not the neo-Ottomanist aspiration of the period could have any reflections in the realm of foreign policy. While doing this, a distinction is made between Özal's early foreign policy practices throughout the 1980s during which the main motive was the acceleration of the incorporation of the Turkish economy into world markets, and his later practices in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The main reason for such a distinction is that it was only with the transformation in international order that took place with the end of the Cold War that the neo-Ottomanist foreign policy aspiration began to be aired. Even if Özal and his colleagues had such a neo-Ottomanist aspiration for regional leadership in their minds before that transformation in the international order, Özal's relatively mild and cautious reaction to Bulgaria's forced assimilation and forced migration campaign towards its Turkish minority well illustrated the point that it was only with this international transformation that this aspiration could have surfaced with opportunities and space opened up before such regional aspirants. Thus, the post-1989 practice of Özal in the realm of foreign policy, at least at the rhetorical level, rests upon a more assertive discourse, whereas the pre-1989 practice reflects to a great extent the acceleration of Turkey's incorporation into world markets as a result of its change in accumulation strategy from import substitution industrialisation to an export-oriented growth model in the early 1980s. As such, the 1980–1989 period was marked by efforts to foster bilateral economic relations with neighbouring countries. Yet it contributed to the aspiration, which was yet to emerge, for regional leadership with soaring exports in that period appearing to provide a material basis for that aspiration. In that sense, even though the neo-Ottomanist aspiration for regional leadership came to the fore in the early 1990s, the 1980–1989 period in Turkish foreign policy was, nevertheless, considered a prelude to that aspiration. The case of the Iran–Iraq War, however, illustrates that the expansion in Turkey's exports into the Middle Eastern region was rather a conjunctural development, and Turkey's economic relations with Europe proved more resilient. Moreover, even in the post-

1989 period, Özal appeared to have been far from being in any position to bring Turkey to a position of regional leadership. The neo-Ottoman subimperialist aspirations under Özal could not move beyond rhetoric, with the first Gulf crisis being the sole exception since Özal could take the initiative and make various attempts in that direction during that crisis, but even those attempts could not yield any meaningful results in terms of his subimperialist aspiration.

Finally, this thesis theoretically analyses the neo-Ottoman subimperialist hegemonic project under Özal in terms of its capacity or incapacity to successfully cement a historical bloc out of the social forces it sought to combine and mobilise behind the project. Neo-Ottomanism, as articulated by the organic intellectuals of the Özal leadership, was ideologically pitted against the supposedly Kemalist legacy in Turkish foreign policy. This project envisioned dismantling that legacy and conducting a so-called “active foreign policy” towards the regions Özal saw as Turkey’s “natural spheres of influence.” Turkey’s regional leadership throughout this geographical area was also thought to have been vindicated by Turkey’s imperial legacy and its historical and cultural ties with these regions. As already argued, the post-1980 neoliberal economic and political restructuring had provided a basis upon which such a foreign policy aspiration could be aired, but the more crucial factor was the end of the Cold War with the space it was thought to have opened up for regional aspirants such as Turkey. It was revealed, however, that the Özal leadership was far from being in a position to successfully cement a subimperialist neo-Ottoman historical bloc in the early 1990s. Thus, the neo-Ottomanist project was, this thesis argues, in a sense, stillborn from its very beginning, and could only be kept alive for a relatively short period.

Though neo-Ottomanism under Özal was a short-lived project, the Özal leadership and its organic intellectuals gathered around *Türkiye Günlüğü* sought to combine some international and domestic forces to form a neo-Ottoman historical bloc in their own image. The United States and the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TÜSİAD) were at the heart of the neo-Ottomanist project as the two core social forces since the former was the leading imperialist state at the

global level, whereas the latter was the economically dominant class fraction at the domestic level. States within the supposedly “natural spheres of influence” were also other international forces in the project. At the domestic level, on the other hand, in addition to Turkish big capital, the Islamic fraction of the Turkish bourgeoisie along with conservative and Islamist segments of the Turkish society as well as liberals, nationalists and Kurds all emerged as other social forces courted as part of the project. In all these cases, the position of these forces vis-à-vis the neo-Ottomanist project was ambivalent at best. By the end of 1991, it was already clear that both President Özal and the organic intellectuals of his political leadership lacked a coherent national–popular programme, an element crucial for any hegemonic project to successfully cement a historical bloc, and that the Özal leadership did not have the ability or capacity to provide all these aforementioned social forces with sufficient material reasons to gain their consent, or at the very least, to coerce them into acquiescing to its leadership.

Yet the Özal period, in a sense, prepared the ground and paved the way for later right-wing governments by making the necessary structural transformations it carried out through domestic economic and political restructuring. The Özal period, in this sense, could be considered both a significant historical precedent before and a prelude to later experiences of aspirations for regional leadership in Turkish foreign policy. What Özal advocated but could not carry out were large-scale privatisations and a transition to a presidential system, which would be achieved in later periods. The failure of the Özal leadership in actualising these proposals was one of its fundamental shortcomings.

By benefiting from the neo-Gramscian version of historical materialism in its analysis of the neo-Ottoman foreign policy aspirations for regional hegemony under Özal, the thesis also seeks to make a contribution to the existing literature, which is dominated by analyses that do not problematise capitalism at all and that neglect social class as a category in analysing Turkey’s post-1980 neoliberal turn and its overall transformation, though there is a vast literature on Turkish foreign policy in general and the aspiration for regional leadership in Turkish foreign policy in

particular. The approach adopted and employed throughout the thesis seeks to provide insights which do not miss the capitalist essence of Turkey's post-1980 transformation as well as its complex relationship with imperialism within the hierarchical international order based upon the world capitalist system. The main contribution of the neo-Gramscian approach adopted and employed throughout the thesis is that it embeds social classes into the analysis by analysing the relationship among various social forces without reducing the class-based approach to a mere class analysis.

Moreover, the neo-Gramscian historical materialism adopted and employed throughout the thesis seeks to eschew some theoretical problems associated with the Coxian and other transnationalist variants (e.g. of Leslie Sklair, William Robinson, and Kees van der Pijl) of the neo-Gramscian school of international relations. As discussed in detail in the introductory chapter, these transnationalist variants of the neo-Gramscian approach have three main problems in common. First, they obscure the leadership aspect of hegemony with cloudy depictions of agencies that do not have any concrete centre of power. However, since class rule is mediated through political leadership and the state, the existence of bourgeois hegemony is more or less discernable rather at the domestic level in modern capitalist social formations, and all hegemonic projections at the regional and international levels have a domestic social class basis. A second problem associated with these transnationalist variants of the neo-Gramscian approach concerns the ideological aspect of hegemony. These transnationalist variants also exaggerate the extent to which particular ideological currents or economic programmes become hegemonic at the international level. Such currents or programmes, however, are very much constrained at levels that go beyond domestic social formations since the contemporary form of the state occupies a historically conditioned mediating position between the international order and domestic social forces. As such, the contemporary state remains concerned not only with international conditions of capital accumulation, but also with providing domestic economic and extra-economic conditions that would ensure sustained capital accumulation, and thereby, the maintenance of bourgeois hegemony at the

domestic level. The last problem associated with these transnationalist variants of the neo-Gramscian approach is about the material aspect of hegemony. As these variants of the neo-Gramscian approach provide explanations based upon obscure agencies at a so-called “transnational” level and tend to underestimate the mediatory role of state power in articulating and implementing class strategies, they also often fail to explain how consent is generated by the so-called “transnational” agencies from subaltern social classes that are located within different domestic social formations and what sort of material reason these so-called “transnational” agencies provide for these subaltern social classes. Yet they also do not touch upon the failure in generating consent at all. The transnationalist variants of the neo-Gramscian approach suspend the dialectic in the sense that they perceive hegemony as a quite mechanical and top-down process.

The neo-Gramscian variant of historical materialism adopted and employed throughout this thesis, however, seeks to overcome these problems by not losing its sight of the domestic social class basis of hegemony and of the mediatory role of the political leadership and state power. It also seeks not to lose its sight of countervailing factors such as domestic economic and political struggles that constrain the hegemonic influence of ideological currents and economic programmes at the international level. It, finally, seeks to take into consideration the extent to which particular hegemonic projects are capable of providing sufficient material incentives for subaltern social classes in order to achieve their consent at the domestic level. It is through these insights that the thesis demonstrates that the Özal leadership was in no position to form a neo-Ottomanist historical bloc, and the neo-Ottomanist aspiration of the Özal leadership was in that sense stillborn. Four significant factors made the neo-Ottoman subimperialist hegemonic project of the Özal leadership a stillborn project: the limitations placed by the United States as the leading imperialist state on the neo-Ottomanist aspiration of the Özal leadership, the existence of differing positions among different fractions of the bourgeoisie, the lack of unity within the state apparatus in the face of both opposition from the Turkish Armed Forces as reflected by the then-Chief of General Staff General Necip Torumtay's

resignation and reluctance on the part of the MP government as reflected by the resignations of the then ministers of national defence and foreign affairs, and the lack of support for Özal's neo-Ottomanist aspiration among the working classes and wider segments of the Turkish society. Not every hegemonic project succeeds in building a historical bloc, and despite its stillborn character, as already noted, the neo-Ottomanist experience under Özal prepared the ground and paved the way for such later experiences.

It should also be stated at this point that the existing neo-Gramscian historical materialist studies on Turkey's neo-Ottomanist foreign policy aspirations in the post-1980 period focus more on the contemporary period as illustrated in the literature review chapter. However, the Özal period, which marks an important precedent for debates over neo-Ottomanism and which served as the basis upon which later transformations in Turkish foreign policy became possible, is given little space, if any, in these studies. As already noted, the literature lacks a broad neo-Gramscian historical materialist reading of the neo-Ottomanist foreign policy aspiration of the Özal period. For that reason, the thesis has also aimed to make a contribution towards the filling of this gap in the literature. It is believed that analysing this significant historical precedent would contribute to and enhance our understanding of later periods of Turkish foreign policy in which similar aspirations have been aired. This thesis also aimed to contribute to the literature through its reading of neo-Ottomanism under Özal as a subimperialist hegemonic project. It is again hopefully believed that it would trigger, or pave the way for, further research into such topics as the relationship between domestic (e.g. neoliberal) restructurings within particular social formations and the foreign policy behaviours of those social formations and the relationship between the end of the Cold War and the rise of subimperialist aspirations as well as comparative studies on the subimperialist aspirations of different semi-peripheral social formations or comparative studies on earlier and later experiences of subimperialist aspirations within the same social formation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

Black Opinion

Cumhuriyet (The Republic)

Emek: Aylık Sosyalist Dergi (Labour: Monthly Socialist Journal)

Hürriyet (Liberty)

Le Monde diplomatique

Milli Gazete (National Newspaper)

Milliyet (Nationality)

National Review

Russia Today

Sabah (Morning)

Taraf (Party)

The Economist

The New York Times

The Star

The Wall Street Journal

Türkiye Günüğü (Turkey Diary)

Yeni Türkiye (New Turkey)

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS, REPORTS AND WORKING PAPERS

ANAP [MP], *Anavatan Partisi Programı, Anavatan Partisi 6 Kasım 1983 Seçim Beyannamesi, Hükümet Programı*. Ankara: TBMM, 1983.

Arat-Koç, Sedef. “Neo-Empire, Middle Power or Subcontractor for Imperialism?: ‘Neo-Ottomanism’, Shifts in Geopolitics and Turkey’s Foreign Policy.” (draft paper presented at the BRISMES Annual Conference, London School of Economics, London, March 26–28, 2012.

Bank, André and Roy Karadag. “The Political Economy of Regional Power: Turkey under the AKP.” GIGA Working Papers 204, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Middle East Studies, Hamburg: GIGA, 2012.

Barchard, David. “Turkey and the West.” Chatham House Papers 27, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985.

Fuller, Graham E. *From Eastern Europe to Western China: The Growing Role of Turkey in the World and Its Implications for Western Interests*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993.

Fuller, Graham E. *Turkey Faces East: New Orientations toward the Middle East and the Old Soviet Union*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992.

Henze, Paul B. *Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992.

Holbrooke, Richard C. “Overview of U.S. Policy in Europe: Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session, 9 March 1995.” Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995.

Komer, Robert W. *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992.

Larrabee, F. Stephen, and Ian O. Lesser. *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003.

Lesser, Ian O. *Bridge or Barrier?: Turkey and the West after the Cold War*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992.

Lesser, Ian. O. "Turkish Society and Foreign Policy in Troubled Times." Conference Proceedings No: 2, Center for Middle East Public Policy & Geneva Center for Security Policy, Geneva: RAND, 2001.

Makovsky, Alan. "Turkey's Presidential Jitters." Policywatch 451, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC, 2000. Accessed 17 July 2018, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkeys-presidential-jitters>.

Mango, Andrew. "Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role." The Washington Papers 163, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994.

Mayall, Simon V. "Turkey: Thwarted Ambition." McNair Paper 56, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997.

McDonald, Allen K. *Turkey: A Bridge to the Middle East*. Study Project. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 1989.

MP. *Electoral Manifesto of the Motherland Party*. Ankara: MP, 1987.

MP. *The Programme of the Motherland Party*. n.p.: MP, 1986.

MÜSİAD, "İş Hayatında İslâm İnsanı (Homo Islamicus)," MÜSİAD Araştırma Raporları 9, Istanbul: MÜSİAD, 1994.

Onar, Nora Fisher. “Neo-Ottomanism, Historical Legacies and Turkish Foreign Policy.” EDAM Discussion Paper 2009/03, Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, Istanbul, October 2009.

Rabasa, Angel, and F. Stephen Larrabee. *The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey*. Santa Monica: RAND, 2008.

Rennebohm, Max. “Bulgarians Campaign for Democratic Reforms and Multi-Party Rule, 1989-90.” Global Nonviolent Action Database (27 April 2011), accessed 25 May 2019, <https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/bulgarians-campaign-democratic-reforms-and-multi-party-rule-1989-90>.

Talbott, Strobe. “U.S.–Turkish Leadership in the Post-Cold War World: Adress at Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, April 11, 1995.” U.S. Department of State Dispatch 6:17 (1995): 358–62.

Talbott, Strobe. “U.S.–Turkish Relations in an Age of Interdependence: Turgut Özal Memorial Lecture.” Washington, DC: Washington Institute on Near East Policy, 14 October 1998.

Taşpinar, Ömer. “Turkey’s Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism.” Carnegie Papers 10, Carnegie Middle East Center, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 2008.

TBMM. *Anavatan, Halkçı ve Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partileri Seçim Beyanname ve Programları*. n.p., 1983.

The White House. *National Security Strategy of the United States*. Washington, DC: The White House, 1990.

The White House. *National Security Strategy of the United States*. Washington, DC: The White House, 1991.

The White House. *National Security Strategy of the United States*. Washington, DC: The White House, 1993.

The White House. *National Security Strategy of the United States*. Washington, DC: The White House, 1994.

Türkeş, Mustafa, Şadan İnan Rüma, and Sait Akşit. "Kriz Sarmalında Bosna–Hersek: 'Devlet Krizi'." Research report DPF 2012-RR 02, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi–TÜSİAD Dış Politika Forumu, İstanbul, 2012.

TÜSİAD. *İstikrarlı Kalkınma ve Yeniden Sanayileşme İçin Ekonomik Çözümler*. İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1989.

TÜSİAD. *1983 Yılına Girerken Türk Ekonomisi*. İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1983.

TÜSİAD. *1986 Yılına Girerken Türk Ekonomisi*. İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1986.

TÜSİAD. *1987 Yılına Girerken Türk Ekonomisi*. İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1987.

TÜSİAD. *1988 Yılına Girerken Türk Ekonomisi*. İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1987.

TÜSİAD. *Avrupa Topluluğu ve Türkiye'nin Üyeliği Sorunu: Makro Bir Değerlendirme*. İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1987.

TÜSİAD. *Diş Ticaret Raporu: İthalat ve İhracatta Sorunlar ve Öneriler*. İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1986.

TÜSİAD. *Döviz Durumu İle İlgili Gelişmeler*. İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1986.

TÜSİAD. *İş Dünyasının Sorunları: Öncelikler, Beklentiler ve Çözümler*. İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1987.

TÜSİAD. *İstikrarlı Kalkınma ve Yeniden Sanayileşme İçin Ekonomik Çözümler*. İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1989.

TÜSİAD. *Konuşmalar 1980*. İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1980.

TÜSİAD. *Özelleştirme: KİT'lerin Halka Satışında Başarı Koşulları*. İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1986.

TÜSİAD. *Türkiye'de Enflasyon ve Enflasyonla Mücadelede Başarı Koşulları*. İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1986.

TÜSİAD. *Türkiye'de Et ve Et Ürünleri Sanayiinde Durum*. İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1986.

TÜSİAD. *Türkiye'de Süt ve Süt Ürünleri Sanayiinde Durum*. İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1986.

Van der Pijl, Kees. “Arab Spring, Turkish ‘Summer’?: The Trajectory of a Pro-Western ‘Moderate Islam’.” NORDEF Report, Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution, Oslo: NORDEF, 2012.

Yılmaz, İrfan, and Tuncer Neziroğlu, eds. *Hükümetler, Programları ve Genel Kurul Görüşmeleri*. Vol. 8, 9 Kasım 1989–30 Ekim 1995. Ankara: TBMM Başkanlığı Yayıncıları, 2013.

BOOKS

Abramowitz, Morton, ed. *The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need*. New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2003.

Ahmad, Feroz. *The Making of Modern Turkey*. London: Routledge, 1993.

Akça, İsmet, Ahmet Bekmen and Barış Alp Özden, eds. *Turkey Reframed: Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony*. London: Pluto Press, 2014.

Akçura, Yusuf. *Üç Tarz-ı Siyâset*. 9th ed. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayıncılığı, 2019.

Akşin, Sina, ed. *Türkiye Tarihi*. Vol. 4, *Çağdaş Türkiye, 1908–1980*. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2008.

Akşin, Sina, ed. *Türkiye Tarihi*. Vol. 5, *Bugünkü Türkiye, 1980–2003*. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2011.

Akyol, Mehmet. *Beni Çok Ararsınız*. 2nd ed. Ankara: Akçağ Yayıncıları, 2000.

Alpkaya, Faruk and Bülent Duru, eds. *1920'den Günümüze Türkiye'de Toplumsal Yapı ve Değişim*. Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2012.

Altan, Mehmet. *Marksist Liberal*. İstanbul: İthaki Yayıncıları, 2002.

Altan, Mehmet. *İkinci Cumhuriyet'in Yol Hikayesi*. Interview with Defne Asal Er. İstanbul: Hayykitap, 2008.

Amin, Samir. *Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World*. London: Zed Books, 1990.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 2006.

Anderson, Perry. *American Foreign Policy and Its Thinkers*. London: Verso, 2015.

Anderson, Perry. *English Questions*. London: Verso, 1992.

Arcayürek, Cüneyt. *Büyüklerle Masallar, Küçüklerle Gerçekler*. Vol. 3, *Kriz Doğuran Savaş*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000.

Athanassopoulou, Ekavi. *Strategic Relations between the US and Turkey, 1979–2000: Sleeping with a Tiger*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2014.

Atilgan, Gökhan, E. Atilla Aytekin, Ebru Deniz Ozan, Cenk Saraçoğlu, Mustafa Şener, Ateş Uslu and Melih Yeşilbağ. *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Siyasal Hayat*. İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2015.

Avcıoğlu, Doğan. *Türkiye'nin Düzeni: Dün-Bugün-Yarın*. Vol. 2. İstanbul: Tekin Yayıncıları, 1984.

Aydın, Suavi and Yüksel Taşkın. *1960'tan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi*. 5th ed. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncıları, 2017.

Aydın, Zülküf. *The Political Economy of Turkey*. London: Pluto Press, 2005.

Aykan, Mahmut Bali. *Turkey's Role in the Organization of Islamic Conference: 1960-1992*. New York: Vantage Press, 1993.

Aykan, Mahmut Bali. *Türkiye'nin Kuveyt Krizi (1990–1991) Politikası: 1998 Yılından Geriye Yönerek Bir Yeniden Değerlendirme*. Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 1998.

Bal, İdris. *Turkey's Relations with the West and the Turkic Republics: The Rise and Fall of the 'Turkish Model.'* Hampshire: Ashgate, 2000.

Bal, İdris ed., *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era*. Boca Raton, FL: Brown Walker Press, 2004.

Barkey, Henri J. *The State and the Industrialization Crisis in Turkey*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.

Barkey, Henri J., ed. *Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's Role in the Middle East*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996.

Barlas, Mehmet. *Turgut Özal'in Anıları*. İstanbul: Sabah Kitapları, 1994.

Bengio, Ofra. *The Turkish-Israeli Relationship: Changing Ties of Middle Eastern Outsiders*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Beşikçi, İsmail. *Doğu Mitinglerinin Analizi (1967)*. Ankara: Yurt Kitap-Yayın, 1992.

Birand, Mehmet Ali, Hikmet Bila and Rıdvan Akar. *12 Eylül: Türkiye'nin Miladı*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 1999.

Birand, Mehmet Ali and Soner Yalçın. *The Özal: Bir Davanın Öyküsü*. 10th ed. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2007.

Block, Fred. *Revising State Theory: Essays in Politics and Postindustrialism*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1987.

Bloomfield, Jonathan. *Class, Hegemony and Party*. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1977.

Bond, Patrick. *Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa*. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2000.

Bond, Patrick. *Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation*. London: Zed Books, 2006.

Bond, Patrick. *Talk Left, Walk Right: South Africa's Frustrated Global Reforms*. 2nd ed. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2006.

Bonefeld, Werner, Richard Gunn and Kosmas Psychopoulos, eds. *Open Marxism*. Vol. 1. London: Pluto Press, 1992.

Bora, Tanıl. *Cereyanlar: Türkiye'de Siyasi İdeolojiler*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılıarı, 2017.

Boratav, Korkut. *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908–2009*. 15th ed. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayıncılıarı, 2011.

Bozdağlıoğlu, Yücel. *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*. New York: Routledge, 2003.

Breslin, Shaun, and Glenn D. Hook, eds. *Microregionalism and World Order*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

Brewer, Anthony. *Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey*. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 1990.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*. London: Basic Books, 1997.

Bağrıa, Ayşe, and Osman Savaşkan. *New Capitalism in Turkey: The Relationship between Politics, Religion and Business*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014.

Cafruny, Alan, Leila Simona Talani, and Gonzalo Pozo Martin, eds. *The Palgrave Handbook of Critical International Political Economy*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Canterbury, Dennis C. *Neoliberal Democratization and New Authoritarianism*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005.

Cemal, Hasan. *Kürtler*. 3rd ed. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2003.

Cevizoğlu, M. Hulki. *Körfez Savaşı ve Özal Diplomasisi*. İstanbul: Form Yayıncılık, 1991.

Chase, Robert S., Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy, eds. *The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999.

Cleveland, William L. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000.

Copeaux, Etienne. *Tarih Ders Kitaplarında Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine (1931–1993)*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayıncılık, 1998.

Cox, Robert W. *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.

Cox, Robert W. *The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections on Power, Morals and Civilization*. With Michael G. Schechter. London: Routledge, 2002.

Çalış, Şaban H. *Hayaletbilimi ve Hayali Kimlikler: Neo-Osmanlılık, Özal ve Balkanlar*. 5th ed. Konya: Çizgi Kitabevi, 2015.

Çandar, Cengiz. *Mezopotamya Ekspresi: Bir Tarih Yolculuğu*. 3rd ed. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2014.

Çavdar, Tevfik. *Neoliberalizmin Türkiye Seyir Defteri*. İstanbul: Yazılıma Yayınevi, 2013.

Çavdar, Tevfik. *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi: 1950'den Günümüze*. 3rd ed. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004.

Çaylak, Adem, and Seyit Ali Avcu, eds. *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*. Ankara: Savaş Yayınevi, 2018.

Çiçek, Kemal, ed. Pax Ottomana: *Studies in Memoriam Prof. Dr. Nejat Goyünç*. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2001.

Çomak, Hasret, and Caner Sancaktar, eds., *Türk Dış Politikasında Yeni Yönelimler: İki Kutuplu Sistem Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası*. İstanbul: Beta, 2013.

Çölaşan, Emin. *24 Ocak: Bir Dönemin Perde Arkası*. 2nd ed. n.p.: Milliyet Yayınları, 1983.

Çölaşan, Emin. *Turgut Nereden Koşuyor?* 44th ed. İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1989.

Davutoğlu, Ahmet. *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*. 32nd ed. İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2009.

Derrida, Jacques. *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International*. Translated by Peggy Kamuf. New York: Routledge, 1994.

Dodd, Clement H., ed. *Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects*. Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1992.

Dönmez, Rasim Özgür, ed. *Türkiye'de Politik Değişim ve Türk Dış Politikası: Neo-Osmanlılığın Sosyo Politiği*. Bursa: Dora, 2014.

Efegil, Ertan and Rıdvan Kalaycı, eds. *Dış Politika Teorileri Bağlamında Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*. Ankara: Nobel, 2012.

Egilmez, Mahfi. *Değişim Sürecinde Türkiye: Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Sosyo-Ekonominik Bir Değerlendirme*. 8th ed. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2018.

Ekzen, Nazif. *Türkiye Kısa İktisat Tarihi, 1946'dan 2008'e: İlişтирilmiş Ekonomi, IMF-Dünya Bankası Düzeninde 62 Yıl*. 2nd ed. Ankara: ODTÜ Yayıncılık, 2009.

Eligür, Banu. *The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Eralp, Atila, Muharrem Tünay, and Birol Yeşilada, eds. *The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993.

Erbakan, Necmettin. *Adil Ekonomik Düzen*. Ankara: n.p., 1991.

Ercan, Murat. *21. Yüzyılda Küresel ve Bölgesel Aktörler Bağlamında Türk Dış Politikası*. İstanbul: Efe Akademi Yayınları, 2018.

Erder, Necat, Atilla Karaosmanoğlu, Ayhan Çilingiroğlu, and Atilla Sönmez. *Plânlı Kalkınma Serüveni: 1960'larda Türkiye'de Plânlama Deneyimi*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003.

Erdost, Cevdet, ed. *IMF İstikrar Politikaları ve Türkiye*. Ankara: Savaş Yayınları, 1982.

Eroğul, Cem. *Anatizeye Giriş*. Ankara: İmaj Yayınları, 2007.

Ertosun, Erkan ed. *Yakın Dostlarının Dilinden Turgut Özal'in Dış Politikasını Anlamak*. Ankara: Turgut Özal Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2015.

Eryılmaz, Bilal. *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Millet Sistemi*. İstanbul: Alternatif Üniversite, 1992.

Fuller, Graham E., and Ian O. Lesser. *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China*. With Paul B. Henze and J. F. Brown. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.

Gamble, Andrew, and Anthony Payne, eds. *Regionalism and World Order*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996.

Gelvin, James L. *The Modern Middle East: A History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Gerger, Haluk. *ABD, Ortadoğu, Türkiye*. İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2012.

Gerger, Haluk. *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politiği: "Soğuk Savaş"tan "Yeni Dünya Düzeni"ne*. İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2012.

Gerges, Fawaz A. *America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Gilpin, Robert. *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.

Gowan, Peter. *The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for World Dominance*. London: Verso, 1999.

Gökmen, Yavuz. *Özal Sendromu*. 2nd ed. Ankara: Verso Yayıncılık, 1992.

Gökmen, Yavuz. *Özal Yaşa Saydı*. Ankara: Verso Yayıncılık, 1994.

Gönlübol, Mehmet, Cem Sar, Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, Oral Sander, A. Haluk Ülman, A. Suat Bilge, Duygu Sezer, Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, and Hakan Bingün. *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919–1995)*. 9th ed. Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996.

Gramsci, Antonio. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. Translated and Edited by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. 11th ed. New York: International Publishers, 1992.

Gülalp, Haldun. *Kimlikler Siyaseti: Türkiye'de Siyasal İslam'ın Temelleri*. 2nd ed. İstanbul: Metis Yayıncıları, 2014.

Güldemir, Ufuk. *Texas–Malatya*. İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1992.

Güner, Engin. *Özal'lı Yıllarım: Başdanışman Engin Güner Anlatıyor*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2014.

Gürbilek, Nurdan. *Vitrinde Yaşamak: 1980'lerin Kültürel İklimi*. 8th ed. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2016.

Güvenç, Serpil Çelenk. *İkili Anlaşmalardan Kıbrıs'a Solun Merceğinden Dış Politika: TİP Deneyimi, 1960–1970*. İstanbul: Daktylos Yayınevi, 2008.

Hale, William. *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*. 3rd ed. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013.

Hall, Peter A, ed. *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

Hunt, Alan, ed. *Marxism and Democracy*. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1980.

Halliday, Fred. *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*. New York: Penguin Books, 1979.

Halliday, Fred. *The Making of the Second Cold War*. 2nd ed. London: Verso, 1986.

Harvey, David. *The New Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Harvey, David. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Hobsbawm, Eric. *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991*. London: Abacus, 1995.

Hobson, John A. *Imperialism: A Study*. New York: Cosimo Classics, 2005 [1902].

Hogan, Michael J. ed., *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Hourani, Albert. *A History of the Arab Peoples*. With a New Introduction and Afterword by Malise Ruthwen. London: Faber and Faber, 2013.

İnönü, Erdal. *Körfez Krizi ve SHP*. Ankara: Profil Yayıncılık, 1991.

Jenkins, Gareth. *Political Islam in Turkey: Running West, Heading East?* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Jessop, Bob. *State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990.

Jessop, Bob. *The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods*. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982.

Jessop, Bob. *The State: Past, Present, Future*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016.

Kafaoğlu, Arslan Başer. *Türkiye Ekonomisi: Yakın Tarih*. Vol. 2. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayıncıları, 2008.

Kamrava, Mehran ed. *The Great Game in West Asia: Iran, Turkey and the South Caucasus*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Kansu, Günal. *Planlı Yıllar: Anılarla DPT'nin Öyküsü*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayıncıları, 2004.

Kara, Abdulvahap. *Turgut Özal ve Türk Dünyası: Türkiye-Türk Cumhuriyetleri İlişkileri, 1983–1993*. İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2012.

Karaveli, Halil. *Why Turkey is Authoritarian: From Atatürk to Erdoğan*. London: Pluto, 2018.

Karpat, Kemal H. *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays*. Leiden: Brill, 2002.

Kiely, Ray. *Rethinking Imperialism*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Király, Béla, ed. *Tolerance and Movements of Religious Dissent in Eastern Europe*. Boulder, CO: East European Quarterly, 1975.

Kurowska, Xymena, and Fabian Breuer, eds. *Explaining the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in Action*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Küçük, Yalçın. *Emperyalist Türkiye*. Ankara: Başak Yayınları, 1992.

Küçük, Yalçın. *Fitne*. 2nd ed. İstanbul: Mızrak Yayınları, 2010.

Küçük, Yalçın. *Kürtler Üzerine Tezler*. İstanbul: Dönem Yayıncılık, 1990.

Küçük, Yalçın. *Planlama, Kalkınma ve Türkiye*. 4th ed. İstanbul: Tekin Yayınları, 1985.

Küçük, Yalçın. *Sovyetler Birliği'nde Sosyalizmin Çözümlüğü*. İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1991.

Küçük, Yalçın. *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler, 1908–1998*. Vol. 2. İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 2003.

Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*. [1916] Viewed in HTML, accessed 25 December 2018, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/index.htm>.

Lovatt, Debbie, ed. *Turkey since 1970: Politics, Economics and Society*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001.

Machiavelli, Niccolò. *The Prince*. Edited and Translated by Peter Bondanella. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Maier, Charles S. *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.

Makovsky, Alan, and Sabri Sayarı, eds. *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*. Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000.

Mares, David R., and Harold A. Trinkunas. *Aspirational Power: Brazil on the Long Road to Global Influence*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016.

Marx, Karl. *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*. Vol. 1. Translated by Ben Fowkes. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982.

Marx, Karl. *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*. Vol. 3. Translated by David Fernbach. London: Penguin Books, 1991.

Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. *The Communist Manifesto*. With an Introduction by David Harvey. London: Pluto Press, 2008.

Mastny, Vojtech, and R. Craig Nation, eds. *Turkey between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996.

Mor, Hasan. *Türk Dış Politikasının Eksenleri: Belirleyici Faktörler Ekseninde Özal'in Dış Politika Konsepti*. Konya: Çizgi Kitabevi, 2016.

Morton, Adam David. *Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy*. London: Pluto Press, 2007.

Mouffe, Chantal, ed. *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979.

Mufti, Malik. *Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Nuroğlu, Mehmed. *Sevgi Şelalesi: Ne Dediler?: Sekizinci Reisicumhur Turgut Özal'in Vefati Sebebiyle Türk Basınında Çıkan Yazilar*. İstanbul: Sebil Yayınevi, n.d.

Okuyan, Kemal. *Sovyetler Birliği'nin Çözülüşü Üzerine Anti-Tezler*. 3rd ed. İstanbul: Yazılıma, 2014.

Oran, Baskın, ed. *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919–2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*. Translated by Mustafa Akşin. Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2010.

Ortaylı, İlber. *Osmanlı Barıştı*. İstanbul: Timaş Yayıncıları, 2004.

Otfinoski, Steven. *Bulgaria*. 2nd ed. New York: Infobase Publishing, 2004.

Outhwaite, William, ed. *The Blackwell Dictionary of Modern Social Thought*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002.

Overbeek, Henk W., ed. *Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy: The Rise of Transnational Neo-Liberalism in the 1980s*. London: Routledge, 1993.

Ozan, Ebru Deniz. *Gülme Sırası Bizde: 12 Eylül'e Giderken Sermaye Sınıfı, Kriz ve Devlet*. İstanbul: Metis Yayıncıları, 2012.

Önder, Nilgün. *The Economic Transformation of Turkey: Neoliberalism and State Intervention*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2016.

Özcan, Gencer and Şule Kut, eds. *En Uzun Onyıl: Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar*. 2nd ed. İstanbul: Büke Yayıncıları, 2000.

Özdemir, Ali Murat, Ebubekir Aykut, Engin Sune, and Göksu Uğurlu. *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politiği: Büyük Sorulara Küçük Yanıtlar*. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayıncıları, 2015.

Özdemir, Hikmet. *Turgut Özal: Biyografi*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2014.

Özdoğan, Günay Göksu, and Kemâli Saybaşılı, eds. *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order*. İstanbul: Eren, 1995.

Özkazanç, Alev. *Siyaset Sosyolojisi Yazılıları: Yeni Sağ ve Sonrası*. Ankara: Dipnot Yayıncıları, 2007.

Özsoy, Osman. *Ünlülerin Turgut Özal'la Hâtıraları*. İstanbul: TÜRDAV, 1994.

Öztürk, Özgür. *Türkiye'de Büyük Sermaye Grupları: Finans Kapitalin Oluşumu ve Gelişimi*. 2nd ed. İstanbul: Sosyal Araştırmalar Vakfı, 2011.

Pericleous, Chrysostomos. *The Cyprus Referendum: A Divided Island and the Challenge of the Annan Plan*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2009.

Poulantzas, Nicos. *The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece, Spain*. Translated by David Fernbach. London: NLB, 1976.

Poulantzas, Nicos. *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*. Translated by David Fernbach. 2nd ed. London: NLB, 1976.

Ramet, Sabrina P. *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002.

Rashid, Ahmad. *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism?* London: Zed Books, 1994.

Robins, Philip. *Turkey and the Middle East*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991.

Robins, Philip. *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003.

Robinson, William I. *A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2004.

Rubin, Barry and Kemal Kirişçi, eds. *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2002.

Rupert, Mark. *Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Rustow, Dankwart A. *Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987.

Sassoon, Anne Showstack. *Gramsci's Politics*. 2nd ed. London: Hutchinson, 1987.

Saull, Richard. *The Cold War and After: Capitalism, Revolution and Superpower Politics*. London: Pluto Press, 2007.

Savran, Sungur. *Türkiye'de Sınıf Mücadeleleri*. Vol. 1, 1908–1980. İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2010.

Sklair, Leslie. *The Transnational Capitalist Class*. Oxford: Wiley–Blackwell, 2001.

Somel, Ali. *Devletçilik ve Planlama Tartışmalarına Damga Vuran Forum Dergisi*. İstanbul: Yazılıma Yayınevi, 2010.

Soysal, İsmail and Şule Kut, eds. *Dağılan Yugoslavya ve Bosna–Hersek Sorunu: Olaylar–Belgeler, 1990–1996*. İstanbul: İSİS, 1997.

Sönmez, Mustafa. *Türkiye Ekonomisinde Bunalım*. Vol. 1, 24 Ocak Kararları ve Sonrası. İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1980.

Sönmez, Mustafa. *Türkiye Ekonomisinde Bunalım*. Vol. 2, 1980 Sonbaharından 1982'ye. İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1982.

Sönmez, Mustafa. *Kırk Haramiler: Türkiye'de Holdingler*. 3rd ed. İstanbul: Özlem Yayıncılık, 1988.

Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, ed. *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*. İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004.

Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, Nurcan Özgür Baklacioğlu, and Özlem Terzi, eds. *XXI. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*. İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2012.

Sönmezoğlu, Faruk. *Soğuk Savaş Döneminde Türk Dış Politikası, 1945–1991*. İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2016.

Sönmezoğlu, Faruk. *Son Onyillarda Türk Dış Politikası, 1991–2015*. İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2016.

Sümer, Çağdaş and Fatih Yaşlı, eds. *Hegemonyadan Diktatoryaya AKP ve Liberal-Muhafazakâr İttifak*. Ankara: Tan Kitabevi Yayınları, 2010.

Süreya, Cemal. *Sevda Sözleri: Bütün Şiirleri*. Edited by Selahattin Özpalabıyıklar. 36th ed. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2009.

Tachau, Frank. *Turkey: The Politics of Authority, Democracy, and Development*. New York: Praeger, 1984.

Taşkın, Yüksel. *Anti-Komünizmden Kireselleşme Karşılığına Milliyetçi-Muhafazakâr Entelijansiya*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015.

Thompson, E. P., and Ben Thompson, eds. *Star Wars: Self Destruct Incorporated*. London: The Merlin Press, 1985.

Torumtay, Necip. *Org. Torumtay'in Anıları*. 3rd ed. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1994.

Torumtay, Necip. *Değişen Stratejilerin Odağında Türkiye*. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1996.

Tuğal, Cihan. *The Fall of the Turkish Model: How the Arab Uprisings Brought Down Islamic Liberalism*. London: Verso, 2016.

Tuncer, Hüner. *Özal'in Dış Politikası, 1983–1989*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2015.

Uslu, Nasuh. *Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2004.

Uzgel, İlhan. *Ulusal Çıkar ve Dış Politika: Türk Dış Politikasının Belirlenmesinde Ulusal Çıkarın Rolü, 1983–1991*. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004.

Van der Pijl, Kees. *Transnational Classes and International Relations*. London: Routledge, 1998.

Wachtel, Andrew Baruch. *The Balkans in World History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Worth, Owen. *Rethinking Hegemony*. London: Palgrave, 2015.

Yalman, Galip L. *Transition to Neoliberalism: The Case of Turkey in the 1980s*. Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2009.

Yankaya, Dilek. *Yeni İslâmî Burjuvazi: Türk Modeli*. Translated by Melike Işık Durmaz. 2nd ed. Istanbul: İletişim Yayıncıları, 2014.

Yapp, M. E. *The Near East since the First World War: A History to 1995*. 2nd ed. Harlow: Longman, 1996.

Yayman, Hüseyin, ed. *Türkiye'ye Yön Veren Konuşmalar: Turgut Özal'in Mirası*. Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2018.

Yeğen, Mesut. *Müstakbel Türk'ten Sözde Vatandaşa: Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler*. 3rd ed. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncıları, 2009.

Yeldan, Erinç. *Küreselleşme Sürecinde Türkiye Ekonomisi: Bölüşüm, Birikim ve Büyüme*. 15th ed. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncıları, 2011.

Yenigün, Cüneyt, and Ertan Efegil, eds. *Türkiye'nin Değişen Dış Politikası*. Ankara: Nobel, 2010.

Yetkin, Murat. *Ateş Hattında Aktif Politika: Balkanlar, Kafkaslar ve Ortadoğu Üçgeninde Türkiye*. İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1992.

Yıldızoğlu, Ergin. *AKP, Siyasal İslam ve Restorasyon*. İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 2015.

Zürcher, Eric J. *Turkey: A Modern History*. 3rd ed. London: I.B. Tauris, 2004.

CHAPTERS IN BOOKS AND ARTICLES IN JOURNALS

Abramowitz, Morton. Introduction to *The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need*, edited by Morton Abramowitz, 1–30. New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2003.

Abramowitz, Morton I. “Dateline Ankara: Turkey after Özal.” *Foreign Policy* 91 (1993): 164–81.

Abramowitz, Morton I. “Remembering Turgut Ozal: Some Personal Recollections.” *Insight Turkey* 15:2 (2013): 37–46.

Adam, Laura Batalla. “Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the AKP Era: Has There Been a Shift in the Axis?” *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 11:3 (2012): 139–48.

Ağaoğulları, Mehmet Ali. “The Ultranationalist Right.” In *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*, edited by İrvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak, 177–217. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Ak, Ömer. “Liderlik Profili Analizi ve Dış Politika: Turgut Özal ve Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.” In *Dış Politika Teorileri Bağlamında Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, edited by Ertan Efegil and Rıdvan Kalaycı, 501–27. Ankara: Nobel, 2012.

Aka, H. Burç. “Paradigm Change in Turkish Foreign Policy after Post-Cold War.” *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 13:3 (2014): 56–73.

Akça, İsmet. “Hegemonic Projects in Post-1980 Turkey and the Changing Forms of Authoritarianism.” In *Turkey Reframed: Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony*, edited by İsmet Akça, Ahmet Bekmen, and Barış Alp Özden, 13–46. London: Pluto, 2014.

Akdan, Tolgahan. “An Appraisal of Debates on the Turkish–Soviet Break-Up and Turkey’s Reorientation to the West from a Systemic Perspective.” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*. (2018): 1–19.

Akder, Halis. “Turkey’s Export Expansion in the Middle East.” *Middle East Journal* 41:4 (1987): 553–67.

Alnasseri, Sabah. “Imperialism and the Social Question in (Semi)-Peripheries: The Case for a Neo-National Bourgeoisie.” *Global Discourse* 2:2 (2011): 121–44.

Alper, Emin, and Özgür Sevgi Göral. “Aydınlar Ocağı.” In *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*. Vol. 5, *Muhafazakârlık*, edited by Ahmet Çiğdem, 3rd ed., 583–89. İstanbul: İletişim, 2006.

Altan, Mehmet. “Sorun Politik Devletten Liberal Devlete Geçememektir.” In 2. *Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları: Yeni Arayışlar, Yeni Yönetimler*, edited by Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar, 33–59. Ankara: Başak Yayıncıları, 1993.

Altınay, Hakan. “Turkey’s Soft Power: An Unpolished Gem or an Elusive Mirage?” *Insight Turkey* 10:2 (2008): 55–66.

Altunışık, Meliha Benli. “Worldviews and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East.” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 169–92.

Altunışık, Meliha Benli. “Turkey’s Soft Power in a Comparative Context: The South Caucasus and the Middle East.” In *The Great Game in West Asia: Iran, Turkey and the South Caucasus*, edited by Mehran Kamrava, 161–82. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Aral, Berdal. “Özal Döneminde İç ve Dış Siyaset: Süreklik mi, Kopuş mu?” In *Özal’lı Yıllar: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, edited by İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, 2nd ed., 179–201. İstanbul: Beta, 2016.

Ataman, Muhittin. “Leadership Change: Özal Leadership and Restructuring in Turkish Foreign Policy.” *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 1:1 (2002): 120–53.

Ataman, Muhittin. “Özal Leadership and Restructuring of Turkish Ethnic Policy in the 1980s.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 38:4 (2002): 123–42.

Ataman, Muhittin. “Özalist Dış Politika: Aktif ve Rasyonel Bir Anlayış.” *Bilgi* 7:2 (2003): 49–64.

Ataman, Muhittin. “Özal ve İslam Dünyası: İnanç ve Pragmatizm.” In *Özal’lı Yıllar: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, edited by İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, 2nd ed., 283–313. İstanbul: Beta, 2016.

Atasoy, Yıldız. “Cosmopolitan Islamists in Turkey: Rethinking the Local in a Global Era.” *Studies in Political Economy* 71/72:1 (2004): 133–61.

Atılgan, Gökhan. “Türkiye’de Toplumsal Sınıflar: 1923–2010.” In *1920’den Günümüze Türkiye’de Toplumsal Yapı ve Değişim*, edited by Faruk Alpkaya and Bülent Duru, 269–312. Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2012.

Atılgan, Gökhan. “Sanayi Kapitalizminin Şafağında.” In *Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat*, Gökhan Atılgan, E. Atilla Aytekin, Ebru Deniz Ozan, Cenk Saraçoğlu, Mustafa Şener, Ateş Uslu and Melih Yeşilbağ, 515–656. İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2015.

Aykan, Mahmut Bali. “Turkey and the OIC: 1984–1992.” *The Turkish Yearbook* 23 (1993): 101–31.

Bagdonas, Özlem Demirtaş. “A Shift of Axis in Turkish Foreign Policy or A Marketing Strategy? Turkey’s Uses of Its ‘Uniqueness’ vis-à-vis the West/Europe.” *Turkish Journal of Politics* 3:2 (2012): 111–32.

Bal, İdris. “‘Turkish Model’ and the Turkic Republics.” *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* 3:3 (1998): 105–29.

Bal, İdris. “Türk Cumhuriyetleri Politikası.” In *Türkiye’nin Dış, Ekonomik, Sosyal ve İdari Politikaları, 1980–2003*, edited by Turgut Göksu, Hasan Hüseyin Çevik, Abdulkadir Baharçıcek, and Ali Şen, 49–77. Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2003.

Bal, İdris. “Uluslararası Politikada Türk Modelinin Yükselişi ve Düşüşü.” *Bılıg* 14 (2000): 1–15.

Banac, Iva. “Nationalism in Serbia.” In *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order*, edited by Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Kemali Saybaşılı, 133–52. İstanbul: Eren, 1995.

Bank, André, and Roy Karadag. “The ‘Ankara Moment’: The Politics of Turkey’s Regional Power in the Middle East, 2007–11.” *Third World Quarterly* 34:2 (2013): 287–304.

Barkey, Henri J. “The Endless Pursuit: Improving U.S.–Turkish Relations.” In *The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need*, ed. Morton Abramowitz, 207–49. New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2003.

Barkey, Henri J. “The Silent Victor: Turkey’s Role in the Gulf War.” in *The Iran–Iraq War: Impact and Implications*, edited by Efraim Karsh, 133–53. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989.

Becker, Joachim. “Financialisation, Industry and Dependency in Turkey.” *Journal für Entwicklungspolitik* XXXII:1/2 (2016): 84–113.

Bedirhanoglu, Pınar, and Galip L. Yalman. “State, Class and the Discourse: Reflections on the Neoliberal Transformation in Turkey.” In *Economic Transitions to Neoliberalism in Middle-Income Countries: Policy Dilemmas, Economic Crises, Forms of Resistance*, edited by Alfredo Saad-Filho and Galip L. Yalman, 107–27. Abingdon: Routledge, 2010.

Bekmen, Ahmet. “State and Capital in Turkey During the Neoliberal Era.” In *Turkey Reframed: Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony*, edited by İsmet Akça, Ahmet Bekmen, and Barış Alp Özden, 47–74. London: Pluto, 2014.

Berksoy, Taner. “Türkiye’de İstikrar Arayışları ve IMF.” In *IMF İstikrar Politikaları ve Türkiye*, edited by Cevdet Erdost, 147–74. Ankara: Savaş Yayıncılı, 1982.

Bieler, Andreas, and Adam David Morton. “The Gordian Knot of Agency–Structure in International Relations: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective.” *European Journal of International Relations* 7:1 (2001): 5–35.

Birdal, Mehmet Sinan. “The Davutoğlu Doctrine: The Populist Construction of the Strategic Subject.” In *Turkey Reframed: Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony*, edited by İsmet Akça, Ahmet Bekmen, and Barış Alp Özden, 92–106. London: Pluto, 2014.

Bond, Patrick. “Bankrupt Africa: Imperialism, Sub-Imperialism and the Politics of Finance.” *Historical Materialism* 12:4 (2004): 145–72.

Bond, Patrick. “US Empire and South African Subimperialism.” In “Socialist Register 2005: The Empire Reloaded,” edited by Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, *Socialist Register* 41, 218–38. London: The Merlin Press, 2004.

Bond, Patrick. “Sub-Imperialism as Lubricant of Neoliberalism: South African ‘Deputy Sheriff’ Duty within BRICS.” *Third World Quarterly* 34:2 (2013): 251–70.

Boratav, Korkut. “İktisat Tarihi (1908–1980).” In *Türkiye Tarihi*. Vol. 4, *Çağdaş Türkiye, 1908–1980*, edited by Sina Akşin, 295–380. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2008.

Boratav, Korkut. “İktisat Tarihi (1981–2002).” In *Türkiye Tarihi*. Vol. 5, *Bugünkü Türkiye, 1980–2003*, edited by Sina Akşin, 187–245. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2011.

Bozarslan, Hamit. “M. Ziya Gökalp.” In *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, edited by Mehmet Ö. Alkan. Vol. 1, *Cumhuriyet’e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi*, 7th ed., 314–19. İstanbul: İletişim, 2006.

Bozkurt-Güngen, Sümercan. “Labour and Authoritarian Neoliberalism: Changes and Continuities under the AKP Governments in Turkey.” *South European Society and Politics* 23:2 (2018): 219–38.

Brenner, Neil, Jamie Peck, and Nik Theodore. “Variegated Neoliberalization: Geographies, Modalities, Pathways.” *Global Networks: A Journal of Transnational Affairs* 10:2 (2010): 182–222.

Bruff, Ian. “The Rise of Authoritarian Neoliberalism.” *Rethinking Marxism* 26:1 (2014): 113–29.

Bruff, Ian and Cemal Burak Tansel. “Authoritarian Neoliberalism: Trajectories of Knowledge Production and Praxis.” *Globalizations* 16:3 (2019): 233–44.

Buci-Glucksmann, Christine. “State, Transition and Passive Revolution.” In *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*, edited by Chantal Mouffe, 207–36. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979.

Budd, Adrian. “Transnationalist Marxism: A Critique.” *Contemporary Politics* 13:4 (2007): 331–47.

Budd, Adrian. “Gramsci’s Marxism and International Relations.” *International Socialism* 114 (2007), accessed 5 February 2019, <http://isj.org.uk/gramscis-marxism-and-international-relations/>.

Buğra, Ayşe. “Class, Culture, and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business Associations.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 30:4 (1998): 521–39.

Buğra, Ayşe. “Political Islam in Turkey in Historical Context: Strengths and Weaknesses.” In *The Politics of Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology and State in Turkey*, edited by Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran, 107–44. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002.

Bulaç, Ali. “Medine Vesikası ve Yeni Bir Toplum Projesi: Tarihsel ve Sosyal Çevre.” In *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, edited by Yasin Aktay. Vol. 6, *İslâmcılık*, 2nd ed., 501–13. İstanbul: İletişim, 2005.

Burnham, Peter. “Globalisation: States, Markets and Class Relations.” *Historical Materialism* 1:1 (1997): 150–60.

Callinicos, Alex. “Bourgeois Revolutions and Historical Materialism.” *International Socialism* 2:43 (1989): 113–71.

Callinicos, Alex. “Does Capitalism Need the State System?” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 20:4 (2007): 533–49.

Callinicos, Alex. “The Limits of Passive Revolution.” *Capital & Class* 34:3 (2010): 491–507.

Cavlan, Turan. “Yeni Osmanlıcılık: Batıdan Kopuş mu?” *Yakın Doğu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 3:2 (2010): 126–56.

Chase, Robert S., Emily B. Hill and Paul Kennedy. “Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy.” *Foreign Affairs* 75:1 (1996): 33–51.

Christensen, Steen Fryba. “How Prioritized Is the Strategic Partnership between Brazil and China?” In *Emerging Powers, Emerging Markets, Emerging Societies*:

Global Responses, edited by Steen Fryba Christensen and Li Xing, 87–109. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Clarke, Simon. “The Global Accumulation of Capital and the Periodisation of the Capitalist State Form.” In *Open Marxism*, edited by Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn, and Kosmas Psychopoulos. Vol. 1, 133–50. London: Pluto Press, 1992.

Constantinides, Stephanos. “Turkey, the Emergence of a New Foreign Policy: The Neo-Ottoman Imperial Model.” *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 24 (1996): 323–34.

Cox, Robert W. “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10:2 (1981): 126–55.

Cox, Robert W. “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method.” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 12:2. (1983): 162–75.

Cox, Robert W. “Global Perestroika.” in “Socialist Register 1992: New World Order?,” edited by Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch, *Socialist Register* 28, 26–43. London: The Merlin Press, 1992.

Cravens, Hamilton. “Column Right, March! Nationalism, Scientific Positivism, and the Conservative Turn of the American Social Sciences in the Cold War Era.” In *Cold War Social Science: Knowledge Production, Liberal Democracy, and Human Nature*, edited by Mark Solovey and Hamilton Cravens, 117–35. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Çakmak, Haydar. “Turgut Özal’ın Dış Politika Felsefesi ve Uygulamaları.” In *Liderlerin Dış Politika Felsefesi ve Uygulamaları*, edited by Haydar Çakmak, 117–23. İstanbul: Doğu Kitabevi, 2013.

Çalış, Şaban H. “Hayaletler Anaforu: Özal, Osmanlı ve Balkanlar.” In *Özal’lı Yıllar: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, edited by İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, 2nd ed., 315–56. İstanbul: Beta, 2016.

Çandar, Cengiz. “Turgut Özal Twenty Years After: The Man and the Politician.” *Insight Turkey* 15:2 (2013): 27–36.

Çandar, Cengiz. “İnsan ve Siyasetçi Olarak Turgut Özal.” In *Özal’lı Yıllar: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, edited by İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, 2nd ed., 1–12. İstanbul: Beta, 2016.

Çandar, Cengiz, and Graham E. Fuller. “Grand Geopolitics for a New Turkey.” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 12:1 (2001): 22–38.

Çelik, Aziz. “Turkey’s New Labour Regime under the Justice and Development Party in the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century: Authoritarian Flexibilization.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 51:4 (2015): 618–35.

Çolak, Yılmaz. “Ottomanism vs. Kemalism: Collective Memory and Cultural Pluralism in 1990s Turkey.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 42:4 (2006): 587–602.

Dağı, İhsan D. “Human Rights, Democratization and the European Community in Turkish Politics: The Özal Years, 1983–87.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 37:1 (2001): 17–40.

Dağı, İhsan D. “Özal’lı Yıllarda Türk Siyaseti: İnsan Hakları, Demokratikleşme ve Avrupa Birliği.” In *Özal’lı Yıllar: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, edited by İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, 2nd ed., 203–23. İstanbul: Beta, 2016.

Davidson, Neil. “How Revolutionary Were the Bourgeois Revolutions? (Contd.).” *Historical Materialism* 13:4 (2005): 3–54.

Demirel, Tanel. “12 Eylül’e Doğru Ordu ve Demokrasi.” *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 56:4 (2001): 43–75.

Doster, Barış. “Turgut Özal ve Dış Politika.” In *Cumhurbaşkanları ve Dış Politika*, edited by Haydar Çakmak, 197–216. Ankara: Kripto, 2016.

Dündar, Lale. “Özal Dönemi Türk Dış Politikasında Turgut Özal’ın Kişisel Özelliklerinin Rolü.” *Atatürk Yolu* 58 (2016): 1–20.

Ekşi, Muharrem. “Regional Hegemony Quests in the Middle East from the Balance of Power System to the Balance of Proxy Wars: Turkey as Balancing Power for the Iran–Saudi Rivalry.” *Gazi Akademik Bakış* 11:21 (2017): 133–56.

Engels, Frederick. “Anti-Dühring: Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science.” In *Collected Works*, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, vol. 25, *Engels*, translated by Emile Burns and Clemens Dutt, 5–309. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1987.

Eralp, Yalım. “An Insider’s View of Turkey’s Foreign Policy and Its American Connection.” In *The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need*, edited by Morton Abramowitz, 109–43. New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2003.

Erder, Necat. “1960’larda Türkiye’de Plânlama Deneyimi.” In *Plânlı Kalkınma Seriüveni: 1960’larda Türkiye’de Plânlama Deneyimi*, Necat Erder Attila Karaosmanoğlu, Ayhan Çilingiroğlu, and Attila Sönmez, 5–11. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003.

Erdoğan, Necmi, and Fahriye Üstüner. “1990’larda ‘Siyaset Sonrası’ Söylemler ve Demokrasi.” In *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, ed. Murat Yılmaz. Vol. 7, *Liberalizm*, 658–66. İstanbul: İletişim, 2005.

Eren-Webb, Ebru. “To Which Eurasia Does Turkey Belong? A Comparative Analysis of Turkish Eurasianist Geopolitical Discourses.” *Boğaziçi Journal* 25:2 (2011): 59–82.

Ertosun, Erkan. “Change and Leadership in Foreign Policy: The Case of Turgut Ozal’s Premiership in Turkey, 1983–1989.” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 27:2 (2016): 47–66.

Fouskas, Vassilis K. “Neo-Liberalism and Ordoliberalism: A Critique of Two Forms of Imperialism and Authoritarianism.” *Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory* 46:3 (2018): 397–421.

Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History?” *The National Interest* 16 (1989): 3–18.

Fuller, Graham E. “Conclusions: The Growing Role of Turkey in the World.” In *Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China*, Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser. With Paul B. Henze and J. F. Brown, 163–83. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.

Gamble, Andrew and Payne, Anthony. “The World Order Approach.” In *Theories of New Regionalism: A Palgrave Reader*, edited by Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw, 43–62. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

Gangloff, Sylvie. “The Impact of the Ottoman Legacy on Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans (1991–1999).” *Variaturcica XXXV* (2005): 1–19.

Gençkaya, Ömer Faruk. “The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project: A Regional Challenge to European Integration.” *International Social Science Journal* 45:4 (1993): 549–57.

Germain, Randall D., and Michael Kenny. “Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians.” *Review of International Studies* 24:1 (1998): 3–21.

Gözen, Ramazan. “Türkiye ve I. Körfez Savaşı: Kriz Ortamında Dış Politika.” In *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, edited by Faruk Sönmezoglu, 271–309. İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004.

Gözen, Ramazan. “Turgut Özal ve Dış Politika: Körfez Savaşı Örneğinde İdealler ve Gerçekler.” In *Özal’lı Yıllar: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, edited by İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, 2nd ed., 245–81. İstanbul: Beta, 2016.

Gray, Robert. “Bourgeois Hegemony in Victorian Britain.” In *Class, Hegemony and Party*, edited by Jonathan Bloomfield, 73–90. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1977.

Gross, Jacob P. K. “Education and Hegemony: The Influence of Antonio Gramsci.” In *Beyond Critique: Exploring Critical Social Theories and Education*, Bradley A. U. Levinson. With Jacob P. K. Gross, Christopher Hanks, Julia Heimer Dadds, Kafi Kumasi, Joseph Link, 51–79. Abingdon: Routledge, 2016.

Gülalp, Haldun. “Debate on Capitalism and Development: The Theories of Samir Amin and Bill Warren.” *Capital & Class* 10:1 (1986): 139–59.

Gültekin, N. Bülent and Mumcu, Ayşe. “Black Sea Economic Cooperation.” In *Turkey between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power*, edited by Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation, 180–85. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996.

Gürbey, Gülistan. “Özal’ın Dış Politika Anlayışı.” In *Özal’lı Yıllar: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, edited by İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, 2nd ed., 225–43. İstanbul: Beta, 2016.

Gürpınar, Doğan. “The Trajectory of Left-Liberalism in Turkey and Its Nemesis: The Great Rupture in the Turkish Left.” *Insight Turkey* 14:1 (2012): 147–68.

Gürzel, Aylin. “Turkey’s Role as a Regional and Global Player and Its Power Capacity: Turkey’s Engagement with Other Emerging States.” *Revista de Sociología e Política* 22:50 (2014): 95–105.

Hale, William. “Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis.” *International Affairs* 68:4 (1992): 679–92.

Hall, Stuart. “Popular-Democratic vs Authoritarian Populism: Two Ways of ‘Taking Democracy Seriously’.” In *Marxism and Democracy*, edited by Alan Hunt, 157–85. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1980.

Hall, Stuart. “The Problem of Ideology: Marxism without Guarantees.” *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 10:2 (1986): 28–44.

Harris, Kevan. “The Rise of the Subcontractor State: Politics of Pseudo-Privatization in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 45:1 (2013): 45–70.

Harris, Laurence. “Keynesianism.” in *The Blackwell Dictionary of Modern Social Thought*, ed. William Outhwaite. Oxford: Blackwell (2002): accessed May 24, 2017, doi: 10.1111/b.9780631221647.2002.x.

Hesketh, Chris. “Passive Revolution: A Universal Concept with Geographical Seats.” *Review of International Studies* 43:3 (2017): 389–408.

Hinnebusch, Raymond. “The Middle East in the World Hierarchy: Imperialism and Resistance.” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 14:2 (2011): 213–46.

Hoare, Quintin. Introduction to “State and Civil Society.” In *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, Antonio Gramsci. Translated and Edited by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, 11th ed, 206–207. New York: International Publishers, 1992.

Hoffmann, Clemens and Cemgil, Can. “The (Un)Making of the Pax Turca in the Middle East: Understanding the Social–Historical Roots of Foreign Policy.” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29:4 (2016): 1279–1302.

Hook, Glenn and Kearns, Ian. “Introduction: The Political Economy of Subregionalism and World Order.” In *Subregionalism and World Order*, edited by Glenn Hook and Ian Kearns, 1–13. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999.

Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilisations?” *Foreign Affairs* 72:3 (1993): 22–49.

Hurrell, Andrew. “One World? Many Worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of International Society.” *International Affairs* 83:1 (2007): 127–46.

Ives, Peter and Nicola Short. “On Gramsci and the International: A Textual Analysis.” *Review of International Studies* 39:3 (2013): 621–42.

İhsanoğlu, Ekmeleddin. “Türkiye ve İslâm Konferansı Teşkilatı.” *Yeni Türkiye* 1:3 (1995): 388–412.

İlhan, Metin. “Turgut Özal’ın Siyaset Öncesi Yılları (1950–1982).” *Akademik Araştırmalar ve Çalışmalar Dergisi* 66 (2015): 89–110.

Jash, Amrita. “OPINION | BRICS - More Than an ‘Acronym’.” *IndraStra Global* 2:10 (2016): 41, <http://www.indrastra.com/2016/10/OPINION-BRICS-More-than-Acronym-002-10-2016-0041.html>.

Jessop, Bob. “A Neo-Gramscian Approach to the Regulation of Urban Regimes.” In *Reconstructing Urban Regime Theory: Regulating Urban Politics in a Global Economy*, edited by Mickey Lauria, 51–73. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997.

Jessop, Bob. "Marxist Approaches to Power." In *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology*, edited by Edwin Amenta, Kate Nash, and Alan Scott, 3–14. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012.

Jessop, Bob "The World Market, Variegated Capitalism and the Crisis of European Integration." in *Globalisation and European Integration: Critical Approaches to Regional Order and International Relations*, edited by Petros Nousios, Henk Overbeek, Andreas Tsolakis, 91–111. Abingdon: Routledge, 2012.

Joseph, Jonathan. "Hegemony and the Structure-Agency Problem in International Relations: A Scientific Realist Contribution." *Review of International Studies* 34:1 (2008): 109–28.

Jouejati, Murhaf. "Water Politics as High Politics: The Case of Turkey and Syria." In *Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's Role in the Middle East*, edited by Henri J. Barkey, 131–46. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996.

Kadioğlu, Ayşe Gülden. "Republican Epistemology and Islamic Discourses in Turkey." *The Muslim World* 88:1 (1998): 1–21.

Kamrava, Mehran. "Hierarchy and Instability in the Middle East Regional Order." *International Studies Journal* 14:4 (2018): 1–35.

Kamrava, Mehran. "Multipolarity and Instability in the Middle East." *Orbis* 62:4 (2018): 598–616.

Katz, Claudio. "Capitalist Mutations in Emerging, Intermediate and Peripheral Neoliberalism." In *BRICS: An Anti-Capitalist Critique*, edited by Patrick Bond and Ana Garcia, 70–96. London: Pluto Press, 2015.

Kaynar, Ayşegül Kars. "Political Trials and the Second Jurisdiction of the State: Normalcy of the Exception." In *Contemporary Turkey at a Glance. Vol. 2, Turkey Transformed?: Power, History, Culture*, edited by Meltem Ersoy and Esra Özyurek, 25–37. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2017.

Keyman, Fuat. "Globalization, Modernity and Democracy: In Search of a Viable Domestic Polity for a Sustainable Turkish Foreign Policy." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40. (2009): 7–27.

Keyman, Fuat. “Globalization, Modernity and Democracy: Turkish Foreign Policy 2009 and Beyond.” *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* 15:3–4 (2010): 1–20.

Kirişçi, Kemal. “Huzur mu Huzursuzluk mu?: Çekiç Güç ve Türk Dış Politikası (1991–1993),” translated by Ahmet K. Han. In *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, edited by Faruk Sönmezoglu, 311–28. Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004.

Kirişçi, Kemal. “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State.” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 29–56.

Kloos, Sophie. “The Neo-Ottoman Turn in Turkey’s Refugee Reception Discourse.” *Alternatif Politika* 8:3 (2016): 536–61.

Koyuncu, Berrin. “Küreselleşme ve MÜSİAD: Eklenenme mi, Çatışma mı?” In *Liberalizm, Devlet, Hegemonya*, edited by E. Fuat Keyman, 358–76. Istanbul: Everest, 2002.

Köstem, Seçkin. “When Can Idea Entrepreneurs Influence Foreign Policy? Explaining the Rise of the ‘Turkic World’ in Turkish Foreign Policy.” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 13 (2017): 722–40.

Kuniholm, Bruce R. “Turkey and the West.” *Foreign Affairs* 70:2 (1991): 34–48.

Kut, Gün. “Yeni Türk Cumhuriyetleri ve Uluslararası Ortam.” In *Bağımsızlığın İlk Yılları: Azerbaycan, Kazakistan, Kırgızistan, Özbekistan, Türkmenistan*, edited by Büşra Ersanlı Behar, 9–24. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1994.

Kut, Şule. “Turkish Policy toward the Balkans.” In *Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, edited by Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı, 74–91. Washington: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000.

Kut, Şule. “Yugoslavya Bunalımı ve Türkiye’nin Bosna–Hersek ve Makedonya Politikası: 1990–1993.” in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, edited by Faruk Sönmezoglu, 585–608. Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004.

Laçiner, Sedat. “Özal Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası.” In *Türkiye’nin Dış, Ekonomik, Sosyal ve İdari Politikaları, 1980–2003*, edited by Turgut Göksu, Hasan Hüseyin Çevik, Abdulkadir Baharçıcek, and Ali Şen, 25–48. Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2003.

Laçiner, Sedat. “Özalism (Neo-Ottomanism): An Alternative in Turkish Foreign Policy?” *Yönetim Bilimleri Dergisi* 1:1–2 (2003–2004): 161–202.

Laçiner, Sedat. “Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism.” *USAK Yearbook* 2 (2009): 153–205.

Laçinok, Nevra Yaraç. “Turgut Özal.” In *Türk Dış Politikasında Liderler: Süreklik ve Değişim, Söylem ve Eylem*, edited by Ali Faik Demir, 537–639. İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 2007.

Langan, Mark. “Virtuous Power Turkey in Sub-Saharan Africa: The ‘Neo-Ottoman’ Challenge to the European Union.” *Third World Quarterly* 38:6 (2017): 1399–1414.

Luce, Mathias. “Sub-Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Dependent Capitalism.” In *BRICS: An Anti-Capitalist Critique*, edited by Patrick Bond and Ana Garcia, 27–44. London: Pluto Press, 2015.

Lustick, Ian S. “The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political ‘Backwardness’ in Historical Perspective.” *International Organization* 51:4 (1997): 653–83.

Maclean, John. “Marxism and International Relations: A Strange Case of Mutual Neglect.” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 17:2 (1988): 295–319.

Makovsky, Alan O. “Turkey.” In *The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World*, edited by Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy, 88–119. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999.

Marini, Ruy Mauro. “Brazilian ‘Interdependence’ and Imperialist Integration.” *Monthly Review* 17:7 (1965): 10–23, 26–29.

Marini, Ruy Mauro. “Brazilian Subimperialism.” *Monthly Review* 23:9 (1972): 14–24.

Marini, Ruy Mauro. "World Capitalist Accumulation and Sub-Imperialism." *Two-Thirds: A Journal of Underdevelopment Studies* 1:2 (1978): 29–40.

Marx, Karl. "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte." In *Selected Writings*, Karl Marx, edited by David McLellan, 2nd ed., 329–55. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

McMichael, Philip. "Revisiting the Question of the Transnational State: A Comment on William Robinson's 'Social Theory and Globalization'." *Theory and Society* 30:2 (2001): 201–10.

Moldovan, Alex. "Uneven and Combined Development and Sub-Imperialism: The Internationalization of Brazilian Capital." *Globalizations* 15:3 (2018): 314–28.

Morton, Adam David. "Social Forces in the Struggle over Hegemony: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy." *Rethinking Marxism* 15:2 (2003): 153–79.

Morton, Adam David. "The Continuum of Passive Revolution." *Capital & Class* 34:3 (2010): 315–42.

Morton, Adam David. "The Limits of 'Sociological Marxism'?" *Historical Materialism* 21:1 (2013): 129–58.

Morton, Adam David. "Waiting for Gramsci: State Formation, Passive Revolution and the International." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 35:3 (2007): 597–621.

Morton, Adam David and Andreas Bieler. "A Critical Theory Route to Hegemony, World Order and Historical Change: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Relations." In *Global Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour: Contesting Neo-Gramscian Perspectives*, Andreas Bieler, Werner Bonefeld, Peter Burnham, and Adam David Morton, 9–27. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Mufti, Malik. "Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy." *Middle East Journal* 52:1 (1998): 32–50.

Mufti, Malik. “From Swamp to Backyard: The Middle East in Turkish Foreign Policy.” In *The Middle East Enters the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Robert O. Freedman, 80–110. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2002.

Mufti, Malik. “Neo-Ottomanists and Neoconservatives: A Strange Alignment in the 1990s.” *Insight Turkey* 18:1 (2016): 143–64.

Murinson, Alexander. “The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 42:6 (2006): 945–64.

Oğuz, Şebnem. “Rethinking Globalization as Internationalization of Capital: Implications for Understanding State Restructuring.” *Science & Society* 79:3 (2015): 336–62.

Oikonomou, Iraklis. “A Historical Materialist Approach to CSDP.” In *Explaining the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in Action*, edited by Xymena Kurowska and Fabian Breuer, 162–87. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Oktay, Emel G. “Türkiye’nin Avrasya’daki Girişimlerine Bir Örnek: Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü.” *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 3:10 (2006): 149–79.

Onar, Nora Fisher. “Echoes of a Universalism Lost: Rival Representations of the Ottomans in Today’s Turkey.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 45:2 (2009): 229–41.

Ong, Lynette H. “‘Thugs-for-Hire’: Subcontracting of State Coercion and State Capacity in China.” *Perspectives on Politics* 16:3 (2018): 680–95.

Ongur, Hakan Övünç. “Identifying Ottomanisms: The Discursive Evolution of Ottoman Past in the Turkish Presents.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 51:3 (2015): 416–32.

Overbeek, Henk and Kees van der Pijl. “Restructuring Capital and Restructuring Hegemony: Neo-liberalism and the Unmaking of the Post-War Order.” In *Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy: The Rise of Transnational Neo-Liberalism in the 1980s*, edited by Henk Overbeek, 1–27. London: Routledge, 1993.

Ozan, Ebru Deniz. “İki Darbe Arasında Kriz Sarmalı.” In *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Siyasal Hayat*, Gökhan Atılgan, E. Attila Aytekin, Ebru Deniz Ozan, Cenk Saracoğlu, Mustafa Şener, Ateş Uslu and Melih Yeşilbağ, 657–746. İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2015.

Önder, Nilgün. “Integrating with the Global Market: The State and the Crisis of Political Representation.” *International Journal of Political Economy* 28:2 (1998): 44–84.

Önder, Nilgün. “The Turkish Political Economy: Globalization and Regionalism.” *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology* 6:1–2 (2007): 229–59.

Öniş, Ziya and Umut Türem. “Business, Globalization and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis of Turkish Business Associations.” *Turkish Studies* 2:2 (2001): 94–120.

Özdemir, Hikmet. “Siyasal Tarih (1960–1980).” In *Türkiye Tarihi*. Vol. 4, *Çağdaş Türkiye, 1908–1980*, edited by Sina Akşin. 225–93. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2008.

Özdemir, Hikmet. “Turgut Özal ve Avrasya.” *Avrasya Dünyası* 2 (2018): 4–15.

Özdemir, Şennur. “MÜSİAD ve Hak-İş'i Birlikte Anlamak: Sınıflı Bir ‘İslâmi Ekonomi’ mi?” In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyaset Düşünce*. Vol. 6, *İslâmcılık*, edited by Yasin Aktay, 2nd ed., 837–69. İstanbul: İletişim, 2005.

Özden, Barış Alp. “Ustanın Çıraklı Alt-Emperyalistler: Politik Bir Emperyalizm Analizi Denemesi.” In *Emperyalizm: Teori ve Güncel Tartışmalar*, edited by Ahmet Bekmen and Barış Alp Özden, 113–55. İstanbul: Habitus Yayıncılık, 2015.

Özekin, Muhammed Kürşad. “Kolektif Emperyal Düzende Türkiye.” In *Kolektif Emperyalizm: Mağribden Maşrika Dönüşümün Ekonomi Politiği*, edited by Ali Murat Özdemir, 351–402. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayıncıları, 2014.

Özgüden, Mehmet. “Türkiye'de Seçkinler.” In *1920'den Günümüze Türkiye'de Toplumsal Yapı ve Değişim*, edited by Faruk Alpkaya and Bülent Duru, 341–42. Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2012.

Özkazanç, Alev. “Türkiye’nin Neo-Liberal Dönüşümü ve Liberal Düşünce.” In *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*. Vol. 7, *Liberalizm*, edited by Murat Yılmazı, 634–57. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncıları, 2005.

Özkazanç, Alev. “Cumhuriyet Döneminde Siyasal Gelişmeler: Tarihsel–Sosyolojik Bir Değerlendirme.” In *1920’den Günümüze Türkiye’de Toplumsal Yapı ve Değişim*, edited by Faruk Alpkaya and Bülent Duru, 91–126. Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2012.

Öztan, Güven Gürkan. “The Struggle for Hegemony between Turkish Nationalisms in the Neoliberal Era.” In *Turkey Reframed: Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony*, edited by İsmet Akça, Ahmet Bekmen, and Barış Alp Özden, 75–91. London: Pluto, 2014.

Panayiotides, Nicolas. “Turkey between Introversion and Regional Hegemony: From Ozal to Davutoglu.” *The Cyprus Journal of Sciences* 8 (2010): 23–38.

Panitch, Leo and Sam Gindin. “Global Capitalism and American Empire.” In “Socialist Register 2004: The New Imperial Challenge,” *Socialist Register* 40, edited by Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, 1–42. London: The Merlin Press, 2003.

Panitch, Leo and Sam Gindin. “Superintending Global Capital.” *New Left Review* 2:35 (2005): 101–23.

Panitch, Leo and Sam Gindin. “The Unique American Empire.” In *The War on Terror and the American ‘Empire’ after the Cold War*, edited by Alejandro Colás and Richard Saull, 24–43. Abingdon: Routledge, 2006.

Payne, Anthony and Andrew Gamble. “Introduction: The Political Economy of Regionalism and World Order.” In *Regionalism and World Order*, edited by Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne, 1–20. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996.

Payne, Anthony. “The New Political Economy of Area Studies.” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 27:2 (1998): 253–73.

Pravda, Alex. “The Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1990–1991.” In *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*. Vol. III, *Endings*, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, 356–77. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Poulantzas, Nicos. “Internationalisation of Capitalist Relations and the Nation-State.” Translated by Elizabeth Hindess, *Economy and Society* 3:2 (1974): 145–79.

Roberts, Adam. “An ‘Incredibly Swift Transition’: Reflections on the End of the Cold War.” In *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*. Vol. III, *Endings*, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, 513–34. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Robins, Philip. “Turkish Policy and the Gulf Crisis: Adventurist or Dynamic?” In *Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects*, edited by Clement H. Dodd, 70–87. Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1992.

Robinson, William I. “Gramsci and Globalisation: From Nation-State to Transnational Hegemony.” *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 8:4 (2005): 559–74.

Rosenberg, Justin. “Why Is There No International Historical Sociology?” *European Journal of International Relations* 12:3 (2006): 307–40.

Rubin, Barry. “Understanding Turkey’s New Foreign Policy.” In *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, edited by Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi, 329–35. Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2002.

Rupert, Mark. “Alienation, Capitalism and the Inter-State System: Towards a Marxian/Gramscian Critique.” In *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*, edited by Stephen Gill, 67–92. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Saad-Filho, Alfredo. “Crisis in Neoliberalism or Crisis of Neoliberalism?” in “Socialist Register 2011: The Crisis This Time.” *Socialist Register* 47, edited by Leo Panitch, Gregory Albo, and Vivek Chibber, 242–59. London: The Merlin Press, 2010.

Samson, Melanie. “(Sub)imperial South Africa? Reframing the Debate.” *Review of African Political Economy* 36:119 (2009): 93–103.

Saraçoğlu, Cenk. “Tank Paletiyle Neoliberalizm.” In *Osmanlı ’dan Günümüze Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat*, Gökhan Atılgan, E. Attila Aytekin, Ebru Deniz Ozan, Cenk

Saraçoğlu, Mustafa Şener, Ateş Uslu and Melih Yeşilbağ, 747–869. İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2015.

Sarıkaya, Muharrem. “Özal ve Gazeteci.” In *Özal’lı Yıllar: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, edited by İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, 2nd ed., 13–24. İstanbul: Beta, 2016.

Saull, Richard. “Empire, Imperialism, and Contemporary American Global Power.” *International Studies Perspectives* 9:3 (2008): 309–18.

Saull, Richard. “Rethinking Hegemony: Uneven Development, Historical Blocs, and the World Economic Crisis.” *International Studies Quarterly* 56:2 (2012): 323–38.

Saull, Richard. “Hegemony and the Global Political Economy.” In *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, edited by Robert A. Denemark and Renée Marlin-Bennett. Oxford: Wiley–Blackwell, 2017.

Sevinç, Murat. “Türkiye’de Anayasal Düzen: 1920–2012.” In *1920’den Günümüze Türkiye’de Toplumsal Yapı ve Değişim*, edited by Faruk Alpkaya and Bülent Duru, 15–89. Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2012.

Sezer, Duygu Bazoğlu. “Turkey in the New Security Environment in the Balkan and Black Sea Region.” In *Turkey between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power*, edited by Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation, 71–95. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996.

Sezer, Duygu Bazoğlu. “The Black Sea Politics and Turkey.” In *Turkey at the Threshold of the 21st Century: Global Encounters and/vs. Regional Alternatives*, edited by Mustafa Aydin, 69–76. Ankara: International Relations Foundation, 1998.

Shaw, Ezel. “The Ottoman Aspects of Pax Ottomanica: The Political, Practical and Psychological Aspects of Pax Ottomanica.” In *Tolerance and Movements of Religious Dissent in Eastern Europe*, edited by Béla Király, 165–82. Boulder, CO: East European Quarterly, 1975.

Simon, David. “The Ties That Bind: Decolonisation and Neo-Colonialism in Southern Africa.” In *Colonialism and Development in the Contemporary World*, edited by Chris Dixon and Michael Heffernan, 21–45. London: Mansell Publishing, 1991.

Simon, Roberto and Brian Winter. "Trumpism Comes to Brazil." *Foreign Affairs*, 28 October 2018, accessed 13 January 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/brazil/2018-10-28/trumpism-comes-brazil>.

Soysal, İsmail. "Turkey and the Gulf Crisis: Chronology." *Studies on Turkish–Arab Relations* 6 (1991): 161–71.

Steele, Abbey, and Jacob N. Shapiro. "Subcontracting State-Building." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 28:4–5 (2017): 887–905.

Sümer, Çağdaş and Fatih Yaşılı. "Liberal-Muhafazakâr İttifak Üzerine Notlar." In *Hegemonyadan Diktatoryaya AKP ve Liberal-Muhafazakâr İttifak*, edited by Çağdaş Sümer and Fatih Yaşılı, 9–27. Ankara: Tan Kitabevi Yayıncıları, 2010.

Şen, Mustafa. "Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party." In *Islamization of Turkey under the AKP Rule*, edited by Birol Yeşilada and Barry Rubin, 57–82. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011.

Şenalp, Mehmet Gürsan. "Yeni-Osmanlılığın Ekonomi Politiğinin Bir Eleştirisi: Ulusötesi Bir Hegemonya Projesinin Yükseliş ve Düşüşü." *Praksis* 44–45 (2017): 937–70.

Şengül, Serdar. "İslâmcılık, Kürtler ve Kürt Sorunu." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*. Vol. 6, *İslâmcılık*, edited by Yasin Aktay, 2nd ed., 525–43. İstanbul: İletişim, 2005.

Tanör, Bülent. "Siyasal Tarih (1980–1995)." In *Türkiye Tarihi. Vol. 5, Bugünkü Türkiye, 1980–2003*, edited by Sina Akşin, 27–161. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2011.

Tansel, Cemal Burak. "Authoritarian Neoliberalism: Towards a New Research Agenda." In *States of Discipline: Authoritarian Neoliberalism and the Contested Reproduction of Capitalist Order*, edited by Cemal Burak Tansel, 1–28. London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2017.

Tansel, Cemal Burak. "Authoritarian Neoliberalism and Democratic Backsliding in Turkey: Beyond the Narratives of Progress." *South European Society and Politics* 23:2 (2018): 197–217.

Teschke, Benno. “Advances and Impasses in Fred Halliday’s International Historical Sociology: A Critical Appraisal.” *International Affairs* 87:5 (2011): 1087–1106.

Teschke, Benno. “IR Theory, Historical Materialism and the False Promise of International Historical Sociology.” *Spectrum: Journal of Global Studies* 6:1 (2014): 1–66.

Tepekaya, Muzaffer. “Değişen Dünya Konjonktüründe Türkiye’nin Sınır Aşan Suları.” *Türk Dünyası İncelemeleri Dergisi* 1 (1996): 149–84.

Tezcan, Levent. “İslâmcılık ve Toplumun Kurgusu.” In *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*. Vol. 6, *İslâmcılık*, edited by Yasin Aktay, 2nd ed., 517–24. İstanbul: İletişim, 2005.

Thompson, Ewa. “The Surrogate Hegemon in Polish Postcolonial Discourse.” 2007. Accessed 15 February 2019, <http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~ethomp/The%20Surrogate%20Hegemon.pdf>.

Thompson, Ewa. “Whose Discourse?: Telling the Story in Post-Communist Poland.” *The Other Shore: Slavic and East European Culture—Abroad, Past and Present* 1:1 (2010): 1–15.

Todorova, Maria. “The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans.” In *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order*, ed. Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Kemâli Saybaşılı, 55–74. İstanbul: Eren, 1995.

Tuğal, Cihan. “NATO’s Islamists: Hegemony and Americanization in Turkey.” *New Left Review* 44 (2007): 5–34.

Tunander, Ola. “A New Ottoman Empire? The Choice for Turkey: Euro-Asian Centre vs National Fortress.” *Security Dialogue* 26:4 (1995): 413–26.

Tünay, Muharrem. “The Turkish New Right’s Attempt at Hegemony.” In *The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, edited by Atila Eralp, Muharrem Tünay, and Birol Yeşilada, 11–30. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993.

Türkeş, Mustafa. “Doksanlı Yıllarda NATO’nun Öncelikleri ve Türkiye.” In *En Uzun Onyıl: Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar*, edited by Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut, 2nd ed., 193–217. İstanbul: Büke Yayınları, 2000.

Türkeş, Mustafa. “Geçiş Sürecinde Dış Politika Öncelikleri: Bulgaristan Örneği.” In *Türkiye’nin Komşuları*, edited by Mustafa Türkeş and İlhan Uzgel, 171–210. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2002.

Türkeş, Mustafa. “NATO Bağlamında ABD–Türkiye İlişkilerinde Devamlılık ve Değişim.” In *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, edited by Faruk Sönmezoglu, 379–403. İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004.

Türkeş, Mustafa. “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: Quest for Enduring Stability and Security.” In *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era*, edited by İdris Bal, 198–210. Boca Raton: BrownWalker Press, 2004.

Türkeş, Mustafa. “Türkiye’nin Balkan Politikasında Devamlılık ve Değişim.” *Avrasya Dosyası* 14:1 (2008): 253–80.

Türkeş, Mustafa. “Türk Dış Politikasında Bölgesel Meseleler ve Obama Yönetiminin Olası Politikaları: Aşmazlar ve Açılmalar.” In *Yeni Dönemde Türk Dış Politikası: Uluslararası IV. Türk Dış Politikası Sempozyumu Tebliğleri*, edited by Osman Bahadır Dinçer, Habibe Özdal and Hacali Necefoğlu, 67–75. Ankara: USAK Yayınları, 2010.

Türkeş, Mustafa. “Decomposing Neo-Ottoman Hegemony.” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 18:3 (2016): 191–216.

Tüysüzoglu, Göktürk. “Milenyum Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası: Yeni Osmanlıcılık ve Türk Avrasyacılığı Ekseninde İnşa Edilen Bir Pragmatizm.” *Alternatif Politika* 5:3 (2013): 295–323.

Utkulu, Utku. “The Turkish Economy: Past and Present.” In *Turkey since 1970: Politics, Economics and Society*, edited by Debbie Lovatt, 1–40. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001.

Uzgel, İlhan and Volkan Yaramış. “Özal’dan Davutoğlu’na Türkiye’de Yeni Osmanlıcı Arayışlar.” *Doğudan* 16 (2010): 36–49.

Uzgel, İlhan. “Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP Government: The Failed Hegemony of a Pivotal State.” In “Turkey: the Politics of National Conservatism” edited by İlker Ataç and Joachim Becker. Special issue, *Journal für Entwicklungspolitik* XXXII:1/2 (2016): 161–86.

Uzgören, Elif. “Countering Globalization and Regionalization: Is There a United Front within Turkish Labour and Disadvantaged Groups?” *Globalizations* 15:3 (2018): 347–61.

Uzgören, Elif. “Consolidation of Neoliberalism through Political Islam and Its Limits: The Case of Turkey.” *METU Studies in Development* 45 (2018): 285–307.

Walker, Joshua W. “Turkey’s Imperial Legacy: Understanding Contemporary Turkey through Its Ottoman Past.” *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology* 8 (2009): 494–508.

Wang, Jessica. “Colonial Crossings: Social Science, Social Knowledge, and American Power from the Nineteenth Century to the Cold War.” In *Cold War Science and the Transatlantic Circulation of Knowledge*, edited by Jeroen van Dongen, 184–213. Leiden: Brill, 2015.

Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” *International Organization* 46:2 (1992): 391–425.

Yalman, Galip L. “Tarihsel Bir Perspektiften Türkiye’de Devlet ve Burjuvazi: Rölativist Bir Paradigma mı Hegemonya Stratejisi mi?” *Praksis* 5 (2002): 7–23.

Yalman, Galip L. “Hegemony Projeleri Olarak Devletçilik, Kalkınmacılık ve Piyasa.” In *Liberalizm, Devlet, Hegemonya*, edited by E. Fuat Keyman, 315–39. İstanbul: Everest, 2002.

Yalman, Galip L. “Crises as Driving Forces of Neoliberal ‘Trasformismo’: The Contours of the Turkish Political Economy since the 2000s.” In *The Palgrave Handbook of Critical International Political Economy*, edited by Alan Cafruny, Leila

Simona Talani, and Gonzalo Pozo Martin, 239–66. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Yalvaç, Faruk. “Strategic Depth or Hegemonic Depth?: A Critical Realist Analysis of Turkey’s Position in the World System.” *International Relations* 26:2 (2012): 165–80.

Yalvaç, Faruk. “Approaches to Turkish Foreign Policy: A Critical Realist Analysis.” *Turkish Studies* 15:1 (2014): 117–38.

Yalvaç, Faruk. “A Historical Materialist Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy: Class, State, and Hegemony.” *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 13:52 (2016): 3–22.

Yaman, Ahmet. “Tarihî ve Hukukî Yönüyle Medine Sözleşmesi/Vesikası.” In *Modern Türkiye’de Siyaset Düşünce*. Vol. 6, *İslâmcılık*, edited by Yasin Aktay, 2nd ed., 514–16. İstanbul: İletişim, 2005.

Yanık, Lerna K. “Constructing Turkish ‘Exceptionalism’: Discourses of Liminality and Hybridity in Post-Cold War Turkish Foreign Policy.” *Political Geography* 30 (2011): 80–89.

Yanık, Lerna K. “Bringing the Empire Back In: the Gradual Discovery of the Ottoman Empire in Turkish Foreign Policy.” *Die Welt des Islams* 56:3–4 (2016): 466–88.

Yavuz, M. Hakan. “Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: the Rise of Neo-Ottomanism.” *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 7:12 (1998): 19–41.

Yavuz, M. Hakan. “Social and Intellectual Origins of Neo-Ottomanism: Searching for a Post-National Vision.” *Die Welt des Islams* 56:3–4 (2016): 438–65.

Yıldırım, Deniz and Evren Haspolat. “İkinci Cumhuriyetçilik: ‘Sol’ Özalizm’in Türkiye Tahayyülü.” In *Türkiye’de Yeni Siyasal Akımlar (1980 Sonrası)*, edited by Evren Haspolat and Deniz Yıldırım, 143–70. Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2016.

Yuvacı, Abdullah and Kaplan, Muhittin. “Testing the Axis-Shift Claim: An Empirical Analysis of Turkey’s Voting Alignment on Important Resolutions in the United

Nations General Assembly during the Years 2000–10.” *Turkish Studies* 14: 2 (2013): 212–28.

Zhang, Yong-Hong. “On Samir Amin’s Strategy of ‘Delinking’ and ‘Socialist Transition’.” *International Journal of Business and Social Research* 3:11 (2013): 101–107.

Zirker, Daniel. “Brazilian Foreign Policy and Subimperialism during the Political Transition of the 1980s: A Review and Reapplication of Marini’s Theory.” *Latin American Perspectives* 21:1 (1994): 115–31.

THESES AND DISSERTATIONS

Afacan, İsa. “Turkish–American Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, 1990–2005.” PhD diss., Florida International University, 2011.

Akdan, Tolgahan. “A Systemic Analysis of the Cold War and Turkey’s Postwar Drive to the West.” Master’s thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2014.

Akdeniz, Eylem. “The Democrat as a Social Type: The Case of Turkey in the 1990s.” PhD diss., Bilkent University, 2011.

Akdeniz, Berrin. “Sivil Toplum, Neo-Osmanlıcılık ve İHH.” Master’s thesis, Abant İzzet Baysal University, 2014.

Aktaş, Fatma Zehra. “Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Sosyal Hizmetleri: Türk Kızılayı, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı.” Master’s thesis, İstanbul Sabahattin Zaim University, 2017.

Arik, Murat. “Security, Trade and Externalities: Explaining Change in Turkish Foreign Policy Behavior (1977–1997).” PhD Diss., University of Connecticut, 2001.

Ataman, Muhittin. “An Integrated Approach to Foreign Policy Change: Explaining Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1980s.” PhD diss., University of Kentucky, 1999.

Aydın, Mustafa. "Foreign Policy Formation and the Interaction between Domestic and International Environments: A Study of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy (1980-1991)." PhD diss., Lancaster University, 1994.

Bal, İdris. "Turkey's Relations with the West and the Turkic Republics of the Former Soviet Union: The Rise of the 'Turkish Model' (1991-1992)." PhD diss., University of Manchester, 1998.

Benli, Meliha. "Turkey's Attitude towards the Organization of the Islamic Conference (1964-1984)." Master's thesis, Middle East Technical University, 1986.

Beylur, Suat. "Turkey's Balkan Policy under AK Party and Claims for Neo-Ottomanism." Master's thesis, Hacettepe University, 2013.

Bilgel, Yasemin. "Regional Power Politics after the Cold War." PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2014.

Çelik, Yasemin. "Turkish Foreign Policy after the Cold War." PhD diss., the City University of New York, 1998.

Çiçek, Ali. "Kamu Diplomasisi ve TİKA Örneği." Master's thesis, Erciyes University, 2015.

Dağlıoğlu, Gökçay. "Turgut Özal Döneminde Türkiye'nin Bulgaristan Türkleri Politikası: Konstrüktivist Bir İnceleme." Master's thesis, Turgut Özal University, 2014.

Demirdöven, Duygu. "Turkish Foreign Policy between 1983 and 1999: Comparison of Turgut Özal and Mesut Yılmaz in the Period of Transition and Transformation of Turkey." Master's thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2014.

Düzova, Mesut. "Türkiye'de 1980 Sonrası Muhafazakâr Milliyetçilik ve Modernite Projesi." Master's thesis, University of Istanbul, 2010.

Ekici, Kübra Deren. "Sosyal Konstrüktivizme Göre Turgut Özal Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası (1983-1993)." PhD diss., University of Kocaeli, 2018.

Eren-Webb, Ebru. “To Which Eurasia Does Turkey Belong? A Comparative Analysis of Turkish Eurasianist Geopolitical Discourses.” Master’s thesis, Koç University, 2011.

Erkli, Cihan. “Through the Turkish Looking-Glass: Turkey’s Divergent Narratives, National Identity & Foreign Policy.” Master’s thesis, Georgetown University, 2010.

Erol, Hande. “Türkiye-Ortadoğu İlişkileri (1983–1993).” Master’s thesis, Dokuz Eylül University, 2008.

Gullo, Matthew T. “Turkish Foreign Policy: Neo-Ottomanism 2.0 and the Future of Turkey’s Relations with the West.” Master’s thesis, Duke University, 2012.

Güçlü, Nazmi. “Avrupa Birliği’ne Giden Süreçte Turgut Özal Dönemi Türkiye’nin AET Politikası.” Master’s thesis, Gediz University, 2015.

Gündoğan, Azat Zana. “The Kurdish Political Mobilization in the 1960s: The Case of ‘Eastern Meetings’.” Master’s thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2005.

Gündüz, Eren. “Türkiye’de Güçlü Tek Parti İktidarları Döneminde (DP, ANAP, AKP) Türk Dış Politikasının Ana Eğilimleri, Yönelimleri ve Karşılaştırılması.” Master’s thesis, University of Kirikkale, 2010.

Hartmann, Daniel Andreas. “Neo-Ottomanism: The Emergence and Utility of a New Narrative on Politics, Religion, Society, and History in Turkey.” Master’s thesis, Central European University, 2013.

Hicks, Tristan Karyl. “Turkey’s New Foreign Policy: Becoming a Regional Power During EU Accession.” Master’s thesis, West Virginia University, 2013.

Hintz, Lisel. “Fighting for Us, Inside and Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey.” PhD diss., George Washington University, 2015.

Kaçan, Özgür. “Turgut Özal’ın Cumhurbaşkanlığı Döneminde (1989–1993) Türk Dış Politikası: Türkiye-Türk Cumhuriyetleri İlişkileri.” Master’s thesis, Ahi Evran University, 2015.

Kahraman, Leyla. "Türkiye'de Devlet Adamlığı ve Politikacılık: Demirel, Ecevit ve Özal Örnekleri." PhD diss., Hacettepe University, 2006.

Kavuncu, Sibel. "Turgut Özal'ın Başkanlığı Döneminde Türkiye–ABD İlişkileri." PhD diss., University of Istanbul, 2006.

Laçiner, Sedat. "From Kemalism to Ozalism: The Ideological Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy." PhD diss., King's College, University of London, 2001.

Mustafa, Latif. "Medeniyetleşmenin Kesişme Noktasında Balkanlar: Destekçiler ve Muhalifler Arasında Balkanlarda 'Yeni Osmanlıcılık'." Master's thesis, the University of Fatih Sultan Mehmet Foundation, 2013.

Öge, Akın. "Türkiye'de Resmi Miliyetçiliğin 'Türklük' Kavrayışı 'Dış Türklerden Sorumlu' Devlet Bakanlığı ve Türk İşbirliği ve Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı (TİKA) İncelemesi." Master's thesis, Yıldız Technical University, 2009.

Rosin, Randolph E. "Turkey: Prospects for Regional Hegemony." Master's thesis, Troy State University at Fort Bragg, 1994.

Sönmez, Göktuğ. "The Interplay between International and Domestic Factors in Turkey's Grand Strategy-Making: Activism, Disappointment, and Readjustment." PhD diss., SOAS, University of London, 2017.

Şengül, Abdulkadir. "Gulf Crisis of 1990–1991: Impact of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy." Master's thesis, Fatih University, 2010.

Tüfekçi, Özgür. "Turkish Eurasianism and Its Impact on Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Turkey." PhD diss., Coventry University, 2015.

Uçgan, Nuh. "Türkiye Siyasetinde Kemalizm'den Post-Kemalist Döneme Geçiş." Master's thesis, İzzet Baysal University of Abant, 2009.

Uzgören, Elif. "Globalisation, the European Union and Turkey: Rethinking the Struggle over Hegemony." PhD diss., University of Nottingham, 2012.

Yıldız, Mehmet. "Avrupa Birliği'ne Tam Üyelik Başvurusuna Giden Süreçte Turgut Özal'ın Yaklaşımları, Çalışmaları ve Politikası." Master's thesis, Süleyman Demirel University, 2008.

Yıldız, Selami. "First Gulf Crisis and Turkish Foreign Policy." Master's thesis, Yeditepe University, 2016.

Yılmaz, Ömer. "A Constructivist Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy in 1980s and 2000s: The Example of Turkey–U.S. Relations." PhD diss., University of Siegen, 2014.

Yücel, Gökberk. "Türk Dış Politikasında Kimlik Sorunu: Kemalizm ve Ötekisi Yeni Osmanlıcılık." Master's thesis, University of Bilecik, 2012.

WEBSITES

<http://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr>

<https://www.aljazeera.com>

<https://data.worldbank.org>

<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org>

<http://en.kosgeb.gov.tr>

<https://www.gfmag.com>

<https://www.globalresearch.ca>

<https://www.haksozhaber.net>

<https://inflationdata.com>

<https://www.iol.co.za>

<https://www.mintpressnews.com>

<https://odatv.com>

<https://www.rand.org>

<https://sputniknews.com>

<http://t24.com.tr>

<http://tudevtest.siuweb.com>

<http://www.turkkon.org>

<http://www.turkstat.gov.tr>

<http://tusiad.org>

APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Soysal, Coşkun

Nationality: Turkish (TC)

Date and Place of Birth: 25 Kasım 1985, Marmaris/MUĞLA, Turkey

Marital Status: Married

Phone: +90 505 273 76 16

Fax: +90 342 360 14 02

email: csoysal@gantep.edu.tr

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	METU International Relations	2010
BS	Dokuz Eylül Uni., International Relations	2007
High School	Marmaris Halıcı Ahmet Urkay Anatolian High School	2003

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2008-2017	METU Department of International Relations	Research Assistant
2017-(cont.)	University of Gaziantep Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences	Research Assistant

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

English (Advanced), French (Reading)

PUBLICATIONS

1. Musluk [Soysal], Coşkun. “Book Review: *Becoming Turkish: Nationalist Reforms Cultural Negotiations in Early Republican Turkey, 1923–1945*, written by Hale Yılmaz.” *Turkish Historical Review* 6:1 (2015): 106–08.
2. Soysal, Coşkun. “The Issue of Change in International Relations: A Comparison of Neo-Realism, Liberalism and Rationalism.” In *13. KAYSEM Tam Metin Bildiri Kitabı*, edited by Ali Fuat Gökçe, Uğur Ülger, Seda Kulu, Muhammed Aksu, 524–32. Ankara: Nobel, 2019.

HOBBIES

Novels, Movies, Long-Distance Driving

B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

ÖZAL DÖNEMİNİN ÖLÜ DOĞAN YENİ OSMANLICI DIŞ POLİTİKA HEVESİ

Türk dış politikasının bazı dönemlerine bölgesel liderlik hevesleri damga vurmuş ve bu da genellikle Yeni Osmanlıcılık biçiminde ortaya konulmuştur. Turgut Özal’ın, kurucusu olduğu Anavatan Partisi’nin (ANAP) seçimlerden birinci parti olarak çıkış tek başına iktidara geldiği 1983 yılından 1989'a kadar Başbakan ve 1989'dan yaşamını yitirdiği 1993 yılına kadar Cumhurbaşkanı olarak görev yaptığı dönem, Yeni Osmanlıçı dış politika hevesinin açığa çıktığı ve çokça tartışıldığı bir dönem olarak son derece önemlidir. Bu bağlamda, bu dış politika hevesinin 1980'ler boyunca ve 1990'ların başında, Özal’ın siyasi liderliği altında nasıl ve hangi koşullar içerisinde ortaya çıkış geliştığı, bu tezin temel araştırma sorusunu oluşturmaktadır. Tezde, Özal liderliğinde gündeme gelen bu dış politika hevesinin nasıloluştuğu, hangi şartlar altında öne çıkış nihayetinde düşüre geçtiği, Özal tarafından Türkiye'nin doğal nüfuz alanları olarak görülen Balkanlar, Orta Doğu, Orta Asya ve Kafkasya'ya yönelik dış politika pratiği üzerinden, Yeni Gramscici bir yaklaşımla analiz edilmektedir. Bu yapılrken, Özal’ın kendi açıklama ve eylemlerinin yanı sıra, milliyetçi-muhafazakâr bir çizgiye sahip olan *Türkiye Günlüğü* dergisi etrafında bir araya gelmiş bulunan ve Özal liderliğinin organik aydınları olarak değerlendirilebilecek gazeteci ve yazarlara ait yazı ve söyleşilerden de yararlanılmaktadır. Bu dönemde ortaya çıkan Yeni Osmanlıçı dış politika hevesi, Özal liderliği ve organik aydınları tarafından öne sürüldüğü biçimyle, Türkiye'nin, adı geçen bölgelerde, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin (ABD) öncülük ettiği uluslararası düzen çerçevesinde bölgesel liderliğini öngörmektedir. Bu heves, Yeni Gramscici tarihsel materyalist bir yaklaşımından, Amerikan emperyalizmi adına bölgesel düzeyde taşıyıcı ya da vekil bir hegemonya tesis edilmesini öngören alt-

emperyalist bir hegemonya projesi olarak ele alınabilir. Bu yüzden, tezde, Özal dönemi Yeni Osmanlıcılığının, alt-emperyalist bir hegemonya projesi olarak boyutları, niteliği ve tarihsel blok oluşturup oluşturulmadığı araştırılmaktadır.

Tezin temel araştırma sorusu ve varsayımları giriş ünitesinde belirtilmekte ve tezin kuramsal çerçevesi de Yeni Gramscici tarihsel materyalist yazından faydalananarak ortaya konulmaktadır. Yeni Gramscici yaklaşımın, tezde de sıkılıkla kullanılan kavramlarından olan “hegemonya”, “hegemonya projesi” ve “tarihsel blok” gibi kavamlar, tezin kuramsal çerçevesinde önemli birer yer tutmaktadır. Tezde, “hegemonya” kavramı, hâkim sınıfın ahlaki ve entelektüel öncülüğü ele geçirdiği, aynı zamanda, bu sınıfın dar iktisadi çıkarlarının, dar anlamda bu sınıfı aşarak, tabi konumdaki diğer alt sınıfların da çıkarlarıymış gibi sunulabildiği bir moment olarak ele alınmaktadır. Temelde salt iktisadi altyapıya dayanır gibi görünen bu süreç, tabi konumdaki diğer alt sınıflarının rızalarının elde edilmesi ya da gerekiğinde bu sınıflara yönelik olarak zor araçlarına başvurulması bakımından, hem rızanın hem de zorun bir arada bulunduğu bir süreçtir. Dolayısıyla, bu süreçte, iktisadi liderlik tek başına belirleyici olmadığı gibi, ancak siyasal liderlik ile entelektüel ve ahlaki liderlik dolayımıyla sürdürülebilmektedir. Bunu sağlayan en önemli araç ise, farklı toplumsal sınıfların dar çıkarları ile toplumun genel çıkarlarıymışçasına sunulan hâkim sınıf çıkarları arasındaki çatışmadan kaynaklanan soyut sorunu dönüştürerek ötelemeye hizmet eden hegemonya projeleridir. Bu yüzden, hegemonya projeleri de, tabi konumdaki alt toplumsal grupların aktif rızalarının öncü toplumsal grubun lehine olacak biçimde üretilmesini ve ulusal çıkarlar olarak ilan edilen politika ve hedefler üzerinden bu alt grupların belirli siyasal amaçlar etrafında mobilize edilmelerini amaçlayan ulusal–popüler projeler olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Hegemonya projeleri, toplumlarda daha çok siyaset, ideoloji ve kültür gibi üstyapısal boyutlarda ortaya çıkarken; yalnızca belirli koşulları yerine getirebilen hegemonya projeleri, iktisadi üretim ilişkilerine dayalı altyapısal öğelerle üstyapısal öğelerin yakın biçimde örtükleri bir tarihsel blok oluşturabilmektedirler. Bu bakımından, tarihsel blok kavramı da, belirli bir toplumsal formasyonun iktisadi temeli ile siyasal–ideolojik üstyapısı arasında, tarihsel olarak oluşturulmuş ve toplumsal olarak yeniden üretilen

bir uyumluluk ve örtüşmeye denk düşmektedir. Bir toplumsal sınıfın hegemonyası, ancak siyasal liderlik ile entelektüel ve ahlaki liderlik dolayımıyla öne sürülen hegemonya projeleri üzerinden bir tarihsel blok oluşturulabildiği ölçüde tesis edilebilmekte ve sürdürülebilmektedir. Bunun sağlanabilmesi içinse, liderlik, ideoloji ve maddi çıkar gibi unsurlar bakımından kendi içerisinde uyumlu ve tutarlı bir hegemonya projesine ihtiyaç vardır.

Yeni Gramscici yaklaşım, hegemonya ve tarihsel blokun, yalnızca ulusal düzeyde değil, bölgesel ve uluslararası düzeyde de tesis edilebileceğini öne sürer. Tezde, bu argüman, hem Gramsci'nin kendi yapıtlarından hem de izleyicileri konumundaki Yeni Gramscici yazarların yapıtlarından yararlanılarak ileri sürülmektedir. Bu noktada, Yeni Gramscici yazında çokça yer bulamasa da, genel olarak tarihsel materyalist yazında önemli bir yer tutan emperyalizm kavramı devreye girmektedir. Bu çerçevede, emperyalizm, uluslararası düzeyde tesis edilen hegemonyanın rıza-zor bileşkesinde, daha çok zor boyutuna karşılık gelmekte ve belirli bir devlet aygıtının öncülüğüne dayanmaktadır. Emperyalizmin günümüzdeki iktisadi biçimini, gelişmekte olan ülkeleri, bu ülkelerin korumacı endüstriyel politikalar geliştirme ve böylelikle kendileri açısından dinamik bir mukayeseli avantaj elde etme haklarından yoksun bırakmak biçimini almaktadır. Bu bakımından, emperyalizm, az gelişmiş ülkelere ne yapıldığı meselesinden çok, ne yapmalarının engellendiği meselesi biçiminde tezahür etmektedir. Dolayısıyla, emperyalizm, diğer ülkeler üzerinde bağlayıcı ve sınırlandırıcı bir olgu olarak ortaya çıkmakta ve bir kavram olarak, hem kapitalist ve territorial güç mantıklarının hem de iktisadi ve jeopolitik rekabetin kesişim noktasına tekabül etmektedir.

Hegemonya uluslararası düzeyde gelişmiş merkez ülkelerden yarı-çevre ve çevre ülkelere doğru gidildikçe zayıflamakta, bu ülkelerin kendi iktisadi altyapılarına dayanmadığı ölçüde de bu tür ülkelerin seckinleriyle sınırlı düzlemlere hapsolmakta ve geniş toplum kesimlerine yabancılasmış bir içerik sergilemektedir. Bu yüzden, kaynağı gelişmiş merkez ülkeler olan dönüşümler ya da yeniden yapılanmalar, yarı-çevre ve çevre ülkelerde daha çok tepeden ve Yeni Gramscici terminolojiyle pasif devrimler biçiminde gerçekleşmektedir. Pasif devrimler, sınıf temelli iktidarın

yeniden düzenlenmesi ve restore edilmesiyle ilgili olup, güçlü bir toplumsal sınıf temelinin yokluğunda, daha çok rıza üretimine dayalı olmayan biçimlerle gerçekleştirilmektedir. Gramsci'nin, *Risorgimento* olarak bilinen İtalyan ulusal birliğinin sağlanması sürecine dair analizleri, kapitalist toplumlarda geleneksel olarak öncülüğünü burjuvazinin üstlenmesi gerektiği varsayılan dönüşümlerin, böylesi yarıçvre ve çevre ülkelerde daha çok bizzat devlet ve siyasi liderlik tarafından üstlenildiğini göstermektedir. Gramsci, Napoléon Savaşları (1803–1815) sonrası Restorasyon dönemi Avrupa'sındaki dönüşümleri, Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında İtalya'daki faşist yönetimi ve Fordist üretim yönteminin Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde (ABD) yerleşmesinin ardından uluslararası düzeyde yükselen Amerikanizmi pasif devrimler bağlamında ele almaktadır. Yeni Gramscici yazarlar, bu listeye, 1970'lerin ikinci yarısında başlayan ve temelde Keynezyen sosyal refah devleti modelinin terk edilmesine dayanan neoliberal yeniden yapılanma örneklerini de eklemektedirler. Türkiye'deki 1980 sonrası neoliberal yeniden yapılanma da bu bağlamda ele alınmakta ve bu tezde de bu çerçevede değerlendirilmektedir.

Bu kuramsal çerçevede, tez üç temel varsayımdan hareket etmektedir. İlk olarak, Türkiye'nin, dünya ölçüğindeki kapitalist toplumsal ilişkilere dayanan uluslararası düzenin bir parçası olduğu ve bu yüzden, Türk dış politikasındaki devamlılık ve değişim unsurlarının, sürekli biçimde karşılıklı olarak birbirlerini şekillendirmekte olan ulusal ve uluslararası düzeyler arasındaki karmaşık ilişkiden bağımsız olarak değerlendirilemeyeceği varsayılmaktadır. En temel düzeyde, Soğuk Savaş döneminde iki sistem arası çatışmanın ana çatışma ekseni olduğu uluslararası düzenin yerini, Soğuk Savaş'ın ardından emperyalist–kapitalist sistem içi çatışma ve rekabet almıştır. Dolayısıyla, hegemonya mücadeleleri, uluslararası düzen içerisinde Soğuk Savaş sonrasında da etkili olmaya devam etmiştir. Kapitalizmin eski sosyalist ülkeleri de içine alacak biçimde dünya ölçüğünde genişlemesi, Türk dış politikası üzerindeki ABD etkisini arttırmış ve Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde bölgesel düzeydeki dış politika aktivizminin çerçevesi ve sınırları, uluslararası düzeyde ABD öncülüğünde kurulmuş olan neoliberalizme dayalı hegemonya bağlamında belirlenemeliştir. Tezin bir diğer varsayımı, Soğuk Savaş sonrası

dönemde ortaya çıkan Yeni Osmanlıçı dış politika hevesinin, benimsenen birikim stratejileri ve sermaye birikimi süreçleriyle ilgisinin bulunabileceğidir. Son olarak, tezde, söz konusu dönemde ortaya çıkan, kimlik ve kültüre dayalı yeni dış politika söylemlerinin, devlet aygıtında 1980 darbesinden itibaren gerçekleştirilen yeniden yapılanma ve yukarıdan aşağıya doğru teşvik edilen İslamizasyon gibi daha özel dönüşüm süreçleriyle de açıklanmasının mümkün olabileceği varsayılmaktadır.

Bu varsayımlardan hareket eden tezin, birkaç temel argümanı bulunmaktadır. Tezde, ülke içerisinde 1980'ler boyunca gerçekleştirilen neoliberal yeniden yapılanmanın, Yeni Osmanlıcılığın, bir tür alt-emperialist hegemonya projesi olarak değerlendirilebilecek biçimde öne sürülebilmesine zemin teşkil eden, önemli bir etken olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Bir yandan, bu yeniden yapılanmanın, 1980 öncesi ithal ikameci sanayileşme modelinden, ihracata yönelik büyümeye modeline geçişin damgasını vurduğu iktisadi boyutu, Türkiye'nin dış pazarlara eklenmesini, 1980 sonrasında kurulan hükümetler açısından en öncelikli mesele haline getirmiştir. Bu iktisadi boyut, aynı zamanda, Türkiye'deki neoliberal yeniden yapılanmanın özgün tarafına işaret etmektedir, zira diğer neoliberal yeniden yapılanma örneklerinde, ithal ikameci sanayileşmeden ihracata yönelik büyümeye geçişten çok Keynezyen sosyal refah devleti modelinin terk edilmesi söz konusudur. Diğer yandan, bu yeniden yapılanmanın siyasi boyutu ise, toplumsal meselelerin özünün saptırılabilmesine olanak sağlayacak biçimde, kimlik siyasetini, otoriter bir devlet biçimini altında hâkim hale getirmiş ve birincil düzeydeki siyasal tartışmaları sınıf temelli siyasetten koparıp kimlik temelli bir siyasetin konusu haline getirmiştir. Nihayet, Türkiye'ye bölgesel düzeyde daha geniş bir rol verilmesini öngören Yeni Osmanlıçı dış politika hevesi, işte bu iktisadi ve siyasi zemin üzerinde yükselme olanağı bulmuştur.

Tezde, ayrıca, uluslararası düzende, 1980'lerin sonu ve 1990'ların başında meydana gelen ve bölgesel liderlik heveslisi ülkelere alan açtığı düşünülen dönüşümün bir diğer önemli etken olduğu öne sürülmektedir. Bu bakımdan, uluslararası düzende gerçekleşen ve 1990'ların başında Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesiyle sonuçlanan değişiklik ve dönüşümler, iki sistem arası çatışmanın damgasını vurduğu bir dönemden, emperialist–kapitalist sistem içi olsa da karmaşık ve tekdüze

olmayan çatışma ve rekabetlerin damgasını vurduğu bir döneme geçiş bağlamında ele alınmaktadır. Türkiye gibi bölgesel güç heveslisi ülkelerin önünde bu dönemde açıldığı düşünülen yeni olanaklar da Soğuk Savaş'ın hemen ertesindeki bu uluslararası siyasi konjonktür çerçevesinde değerlendirilebilir.

Tezde öne sürülen bu varsayıım ve argümanlardan hareketle, konuya dair yazının eleştirel bir değerlendirmesi de yapılmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, Özal dönemi Yeni Osmanlıci dış politika hevesine dair yazın tanıtılrken, aynı zamanda tezin bu yazından hangi noktalarda farklılığı da ele alınmaktadır. Bu yapılrken, konu hakkındaki yazın, daha çok tarihsel olay anlatısına dayanan geleneksel betimleyici çalışmalar, öznelerin rolüne ağırlık veren çalışmalar, yapısal etkenlere ağırlık veren çalışmalar, kimlik temelli çalışmalar ve son olarak, uluslararası siyasal iktisattan yararlanan çalışmalar olarak sınıflandırılmaktadır. Geleneksel çalışmalar olarak adlandırılan küme içerisinde yer alan çalışmalarda pek çok etken bir arada değerlendirilmekte ve çok zaman, kuramsal açıklamalardan çok, betimleyici anlatılar öne çıkmaktadır. Bu küme içerisinde yer alıp kuramsal bir çerçeveye sahip olan çalışmalar ise daha çok klasik realist çerçevede devlet-merkezli yaklaşımlardan yararlanmaktadır. Özne temelli çalışmalar olarak adlandırılabilen kümeye yer alan çalışmalar ise, dış politika karar vericilerinin rollerine yeterince yer verilmesine rağmen, bu tekil öznelerin aldığı kararları hangi koşullar altında aldığı ya da bunları uygulamada karşı karşıya bulundukları olanakların ya da sınırlılıkların neler olduğu gibi sorulara yeterince açık yanıt verilmemektedir. Diğer yandan, yapı ekseni olarak adlandırılabilen kümeye yer alan çalışmalar ise, dış politika karar vericilerinin karşı karşıya bulunduğu sistemsel öğelere ve uluslararası düzende 1980'lerin sonu ile 1990'ların başında meydana gelen dönüşüme ciddi oranda yer vermektedirler. Ne var ki, bu kümeye çalışmalar da genel olarak kapitalist toplumsal ilişkilerin ve Türkiye özelinde ise 1980 sonrası neoliberal yeniden yapılanmanın rollerini ihmali etmektedirler. Dahası, sistemsel etkenlerin kapitalist özlerinin ihmali edilmesi sonucu daha çok geopolitik biçimlere indirgenmesi ve Türkiye'nin emperyalizmle olan karmaşık ilişkisinin görmezlikten gelinmesi de bu kümeye çalışmaların ortak özellikleri arasında yer almaktadır. Kimlik ekseni

çalışmalarda ise, kimi zaman kimliğin toplumsal olarak inşa edilen bir olgu olduğu da ileri sürülmüşine rağmen, bunun hangi toplumsal ve maddi koşullar altında gerçekleştiği sorusuna yanıt verilmemektedir. Kapitalizm ve emperyalizm gibi etkenler, yine bu kümede de ihmal edilmektedir. Liberal siyasal iktisat yaklaşımından yararlanılan çalışmalarda ise, Türkiye'nin 1980 sonrası neoliberal dönüşümü teknik açıdan iktisadi performans değerlendirmeleriyle ele alınmaktadır. Bu çalışmalarda, iktisadi ve siyasi alanlar arasındaki analitik ayırım sanki ontolojik bir ayırmışçasına birbirlerinden ayrı olarak değerlendirilmektedirler. Bu çalışmalarda kapitalizm bir sorun olarak öne çıkmaz ve eleştirel değerlendirmeler içerdiklerinde bile bunlar daha çok idealize edilen bir serbest piyasa örneğinden varsayılan sapmalara yönelikler. Bu türden sapmalar ya da başkaca başarısızlıklar ise bütünüyle siyasete ya da halka verilen popülist tavizlere bağlanmaktadır. İronik olansa, liberal yaklaşımından yararlanılan bu kümedeki çalışmalarda, neoliberalizmi konsolide etme yönündeki çabaların, gitgide otoriterleşmekte olan bir devlet biçimini altında gerçekleştiriliyormasına rağmen, "demokratikleşme" olarak sunulması ve memnuniyetle karşılanmasıdır. Katkılarından bu tezde de istifade edilen eleştirel siyasal iktisat yazını ise, Türkiye'nin 1980 sonrası dönüşümünü ve ortaya çıkan dış politika hevesini kapitalist toplumsal üretim ilişkilerinin oluşturduğu daha geniş sistemsel dinamikler çerçevesinde ele almaktadır. Bu yazın, neoliberal politikaların piyasa merkezli doğasını ortaya koymakta ve aynı zamanda, Türkiye'nin hiyerarşik uluslararası düzen içerisinde emperyalizmle girdiği karmaşık ilişkileri de dikkate almaktadır. Tezde bu yazının sunduğu katkı ve bakış açılarından yararlanılmaktadır.

Bu kuramsal ve kavramsal çerçeveye uygun olarak, tezde ilk olarak Türkiye'nin 1980 sonrası dönemde yaşadığı dönüşüm ele alınmaktadır. Bu dönüşüm, 1960'larda başlayan planlı kalkınmaya dayalı hegemonya arayışının sınırlılıkları ve nihayet tıkanması bağlamında incelenmektedir. Planlı kalkınma ile birlikte ortaya çıkan sanayileşme süreci, işçi sınıfı oluşumuna ve örgütlenme sürecine hız vermiş, burjuvazi ile işçi sınıfı arasındaki mücadeleyi şiddetlendirmiştir. 1960'ların sonundan itibaren ise Batı kapitalist bloku içerisinde ABD öncülüğündeki hegemonya da sarsıntıya uğramaya başlamıştır. Keynezyen refah devleti modelinin ortadan

kaldırılmasına dayanan neoliberalizm, 1970'li yılların ikinci yarısından itibaren kapitalist blok içerisindeki krizi aşmak adına bir hegemonya projesi olarak öne sürülmüştür. Türkiye'de burjuva hegemonyasının sürdürülebilmesine yönelik 1970'lerin başında gerçekleştirilen çabaların da başarısızlığa uğramasının ardından, burjuva hegemonyasının muhafaza edilmesi maksadına yönelik olan 24 Ocak 1980 iktisadi reform paketi, neoliberalizmin damgasını vurduğu bir hegemonya projesi olarak öne çıkmış, fakat siyasal güçlükler dolayısıyla uygulanma olanağına kavuşamamıştır. Bu paket, 1960'tan 1980'e dek uygulanmış olan ithal ikameci sanayileşme modelinin terk edilerek ihracata yönelik büyümeye modeline geçilmesini öngörmektedir. Bu geçişin gerçekleştirilebilmesi için Keynezyen sosyal refah devleti modelinin tasfiye edilmesi ve örgütlü işçi sınıfının gücünün kırılarak tarihsel bloktan çıkarılması gerekmektedir. Bu ise demokratik yollardan gerçekleştirilememiş ve ancak 12 Eylül 1980 askeri darbesi sonrası kurulan faşizan bir diktatorial rejim altında hayata geçirilmiştir. Tezde bu dönemde gerçekleştirilen neoliberal yeniden yapılanma pasif devrim olarak ele alınmakta ve birikim stratejisinin de değiştirilmesi yoluyla burjuva hegemonyasının yeniden tesis edildiği ve yeni bir tarihsel bloğun oluşturulduğu öne sürülmektedir. Bu yeni tarihsel blok, büyük sanayi sermayesi ve finansal sermayenin öncülüğünde, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri ve sonradan katılacak olan ANAP ile bir grup ekonomik teknokratın katılımıyla oluşturulmuştur. Alt toplumsal sınıflar örgütlü olarak değil, örgütsüz yiğinlar olarak, ya doğrudan zor araçlarına başvurularak ya da tüketim kültürü ve İslamizasyon gibi kimlik merkezli söylem ve politikalarla bu yeni tarihsel bloka eklenmeye çalışılmıştır. Tüm bu yeniden yapılanma süreci, iktisadi bakımdan Türkiye'nin dünya piyasalarına eklenmesini 1980 sonrası kurulan hükümetlerin en öncelikli meselesi haline getirmiştir. Siyasi bakımdan ise, otoriter bir devlet biçimini altında kimlik siyasetini hâkim hale getirmiş ve birincil düzeydeki siyasal tartışmaları sınıf temelli siyasetten koparıp kimlik temelli bir siyasetin konusu haline getirmiştir. Yeni Osmanlıçı dış politika hevesi işte bu yeni iktisadi ve siyasi zemin üzerinde yükselme olanağına kavuşmuştur.

Tezde, Türkiye içerisinde gerçekleşen neoliberal yeniden yapılanma sürecinin incelenmesinin ardından, uluslararası düzende Türkiye gibi bölgesel güç heveslisi

ülkelere alan ve imkân açtığı düşünülen ve 1980'lerin sonu ve 1990'ların başında gerçekleşen dönüşümde odaklanılmaktadır. Bu dönüşüm ile birlikte daha önce kapitalist Batı bloku ile sosyalist Doğu bloku arasındaki iki antagonistik sistem arasındaki çatışmanın ana çatışma ekseni olduğu bir uluslararası düzenden, emperyalist-kapitalist sistem içi karmaşık çatışma ve rekabet ilişkilerinin damgasını vurduğu bir uluslararası düzene geçilmiştir. Tezde, Türkiye gibi ülkelerin bölgesel güç heveslerinin de uluslararası düzende gerçekleşen bu dönüşüm bağlamında ele alınabileceği öne sürülmektedir. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde, uluslararası düzendeki ABD liderliğini sürdürmekte yük paylaşımında bulunabilecek ve bölgesel düzeyde istikrar sağlanması adına katkıda bulunabilecek ülkelere yönelik olarak, Amerikan emperyalizminin dış politika alanındaki organik entelektüellerinin “eksen ülkeler” ve “jeopolitik eksenler” gibi kavramlar etrafında yeni roller önerdikleri görülmektedir. Bu tür bölgesel güç heveslisi ülkelerin uluslararası düzene nasıl eklemelidikleri ya da, bu mümkün olmadığında, nasıl sınırlandırıldıkları, Marksist bağımlılık okuluna mensup Brezilyalı kuramçı Ruy Mauro Marini’nin geliştirdiği alt-emperyalizm kavramından yararlanılarak ele alınmaktadır. Bu yapılrken, bu kavramın simge örneği konumundaki Brezilya deneyiminden yararlanılmakta ve bu tür heveslerin Türkiye ile sınırlı olmadığını gösterilmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Burada yürütülen tartışma göstermektedir ki, alt-emperyalizm, Amerikan emperyalizmi ile bağımlı bir ilişki biçimini benimsemiş olan kimi yarı-çevre ülkelerde hegemonya projeleri biçiminde öne çıkmaktadır. Fakat alt-emperyalist bir ülke konumunu elde edebilmek hayli zor olduğu gibi, böylesi bir konumun sürdürülebilmesi de, bağımlılık ile emperyalizm arasında akışkan ve sabit olmayan, son derece istikrarsız doğası nedeniyle, aşırı düzeyde güç olmaktadır. Öncü emperyalist devlet adına bölgesel düzeylerde vekil ya da taşıyıcı hegemonya tesis etmeyi hedefleyen alt-emperyalist hegemonya projeleri, uygulamada çelişkilerle yüküdürler. Zira taşıyıcılık ya da tabiyet ile görelî özerklik biçimlerindeki, birbirleriyle ilişkili fakat aynı zamanda birbirlerine zıt olan iki ayrı niteliği aynı anda bünyelerinde barındırmaktadırlar. Brezilya örneği, alt-emperyalizmin bu çelişkili

karakteri ve sınırlılıklarına iyi bir örnek teşkil etmektedir. Diğer yandan, Türkiyeörneğinde bu çelişki ve sınırlılıklar çok daha belirgin ve keskindirler.

Uluslararası düzendeki dönüşümün incelenmesi sonrası, tez yeniden Türkiye'ye dönmekte ve 1980'lerin sonu ve 1990'ların başında siyasal İslam'ın yükselişe geçmesi ile Türk burjuvazisi içerisinde İslami bir fraksiyonun ortaya çıkışmasını 1980 sonrası neoliberal yeniden yapılanmanın birer yansımıası olarak ele almaktadır. 1980'lerin sonunda ANAP'ın 24 Ocak 1980 iktisadi reform paketine tam bağlılık içeren neoliberal hegemonya projesi artık sendelemekte ve toplumsal hoşnutsuzluk büyümektedir. Aynı dönemde, hem liberaller hem de siyasal İslamcılar, neoliberal modeldeki tıkanmayı Türkiye'deki Kemalist cumhuriyetçi mirasın son kalıntılarını da ortadan kaldırarak aşmayı amaçlayan kendi ideolojik konumlanışlarıyla ortaya çıkmaktaydılar. Bu arada, Türk burjuvazisi içerisinde, Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (MÜSİAD) tarafından temsil edilen İslami fraksiyon da yeni birtakım taleplerle boy göstermeye başlamıştır. İslami küçük ve orta ölçekli işletmelere, kimlik temelli bir bakış açısıyla, İslami olmayan işletmelerin aleyhine olacak biçimde ayrıcalık tanınmasına dayalı hükümet desteği ve bölgesel ekonomik bloklar oluşturulması yoluyla Müslüman ülkeler ve Orta Asya'da bağımsızlığını yeni ilan etmiş olan Türkî cumhuriyetlerle yakın ekonomik ilişkiler geliştirilmesi gibi talepler, burjuvazi içerisindeki İslami fraksiyonun taleplerinden başlıcalarıdır. Liberallerin öne sürdüğü “İkinci Cumhuriyet”, siyasi patronajı Özal'ın liderliği ile sınırlı kaldığı ölçüde etkisiz bir siyasi proje olarak kalırken, İslamcılar ise 2000'lere dek hegemonik bir güç olma konumuna erişmemişlerdir. Birer ideolojik konumlanış olarak 1990'lı yılların başlarındaki başarısızlıklarını bir yana, *Türkiye Günlüğü* dergisi etrafında bir araya gelmiş bulunan, Turgut Özal'ın siyasi liderliğine bağlı bir grup organik aydın, bu farklı ideolojik konumlanışları yeniden yorumlayıp birbirleriyle bağdaştırarak Yeni Osmanlıçı bir proje etrafında bir araya getirmeye çalışmıştır.

1990'ların başı itibarıyle, Özal liderliğinin, *Türkiye Günlüğü* dergisi etrafında bir araya gelmiş bulunan organik aydınları, o dönem artık Cumhurbaşkanı olan Turgut Özal'ın kendisi de dahil olmak üzere, Türkiye için yeni bir bölgesel liderlik

rolü önermeye başlamışlardır. Özal ve bu organik aydınlar, böylesi bir rolün gerekliliğine dair argümanlarını Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönüşmuş olan uluslararası düzene dayandırmışlardır. Onlara göre, 1990'ların başında Sovyetler Birliği'nin çökmesi ve Yugoslavya Sosyalist Federal Cumhuriyeti'nin dağılması sonucu ortaya çıkan boşlukla birlikte, Balkanlardan Kafkasya'ya ve Orta Asya'ya, Türkiye'nin önünde böylesi bir rolü yerine getirebileceği yeni bir coğrafi alan açığa çıkmıştır. Özal liderliğindeki Yeni Osmanlıcı ekibin milliyetçi-muhafazakâr ve liberal temsilcileri arasında kimi iç çelişkiler de yok değildir. Örneğin, Mustafa Çalık, Durmuş Hocaoğlu ve Ahmet Turan Alkan gibi yazarların dâhil edilebileceği milliyetçi-muhafazakâr kanat, Türkiye'yi çevreleyen bölgelere yönelik Amerikan planları hakkında huzursuzluk duymaktayken, Türkiye'nin kendi kapasitesi ve Kürt sorunu gibi ilerde ortaya çıkabilecek risklerin kazanabileceği yeni boyutlar bakımından endişe duymaktaydı. Diğer yandan, Cengiz Çandar ve Nur Vergin gibi liberal yazarlar ise ABD'nin Türkiye'yi çevreleyen bölgelere yönelik tasarımlarını Türkiye bakımından iyi bir fırsat olarak değerlendirmektediler. Bununla birlikte, Yeni Osmanlıcı bir taarruz için zamanın çoktan geldiği ve Türklerin sözde geri çekilişlerinin artık sona erdiği gibi kavrayış ve değerlendirmeler, Özal liderliğine bağlı bu organik aydınların tümüne hâkim durumdaydı. Uluslararası düzende meydana gelen tüm büyük gelişmeler ve uluslararası düzende nihai dönüşüm, hep Türkiye'nin önünde açılmakta olan böylesine yeni bir dönemin kanıtları olarak değerlendirilmektediler. Bu yüzden, Kemalist cumhuriyetçi mirasla özdeşleştirdikleri ve vasat olarak gördükleri dış politika anlayışının terk edilerek aktif bir dış politika izlenmesi gerektiğini öne sürüyorlardı.

Buradan hareketle, tezde, yukarıda anlatıldığı biçimyle ortaya konulan Yeni Osmanlıcı dış politika hevesinin dış politika alanında herhangi bir yansımاسının bulunup bulunmadığı incelenmektedir. Turgut Özal'ın 1983 ile 1993 yılları arasındaki siyasi liderliği döneminde izlenen dış politika, tezde bu çerçevede analiz edilmektedir. Bu yapılrken, temel motivasyonun Türk ekonomisinin dünya pazarlarıyla bütünlleşme sürecinin hızlandırılması olduğu 1989'a kadar olan erken dönem dış politika pratiği ile 1980'lerin sonu ve 1990'ların başındaki dış politika

pratiği arasında bir ayrima gidilme ihtiyacı hissedilmektedir. Böylesi bir ayrimın en temel nedeni, Yeni Osmanlıçı dış politika hevesinin yalnızca Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesiyle birlikte uluslararası düzende meydana gelen dönüşümün ardından su yüzüne çıkabilmiş olmasıdır. Bulgaristan'ın 1980'lerin ikinci yarısında kendi Türk azınlığına karşı gerçekleştirdiği zorla asimilasyon ve göçe zorlama politikalarına karşı Özal'ın verdiği görelî ilâmlı ve temkinli tepki, Yeni Osmanlıçı dış politika hevesinin ancak Türkiye gibi bölgesel güç heveslisi ülkelerin önünde yeni olanak ve alanlar açan uluslararası düzendeki dönüşümle ortaya konulabildiğini açıkça göstermektedir. Özal liderliğinin 1989 öncesindeki dış politika pratiği, büyük ölçüde, birikim stratejisinde ithal ikameci sanayileşme modelinden ihracata yönelik büyümeye modeline geçişle birlikte Türkiye'nin dış pazarlara eklemelendirilmesi sürecinin hızlandırılması arzusunu yansımaktadır. Özal liderliğinin 1989 sonrasındaki dış politika pratiği ise, en azından retorik düzeyinde, daha iddialı bir söyleme dayanmaktadır. 1980–1989 dönemine, daha ziyade Türkiye'nin yakın coğrafyasındaki ülkelerle ikili ekonomik ilişkilerin geliştirilmesi yönündeki çabalar damgasını vururken, bu dönem aynı zamanda artan ihracat rakamları ile bölgesel liderlik hevesine maddi bir saik kazandırmış olması bakımından, ancak sonraki dönemde dışa vurulabilecek olan Yeni Osmanlıçı dış politika hevesine katkıda bulunmuştur. Bu mânâda, her ne kadar bölgesel liderlik arzusundaki Yeni Osmanlıçı dış politika hevesi ancak 1990'lî yılların başında öne çıkabileceğse de, Türk dış politikasının 1980–1989 dönemi bu dış politika hevesi için bir tür girizgâh olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Ne var ki, 1980 ile 1988 yılları arasında gerçekleşen İran–Irak Savaşı örneği, Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu'ya yönelik ihracat hacmindeki büyümeyenin konjonktürel olduğunu açıkça ortaya koymaktadır. Savaşın ardından bu bölgeye yapılan ihracat düşmüştür, Avrupa'yla olan ekonomik ilişkilerin daha kuvvetli olduğu görülmüştür. Turgut Özal'ın henüz Başbakan olduğu 1987 yılında Avrupa Topluluğu'na Türkiye için yaptığı tam üyelik başvurusu, biraz da böylesi bir hayalkırıklığının ürünü olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Dahası, 1989 sonrası dönemdeki dış politika pratiği bile, Özal liderliğinin Türkiye'yi bölgesel lider olarak öne sürmekten uzak bir konumda olduğunu göstermektedir. Özal dönemi Yeni

Osmanlıcı alt-emperialist dış politika hevesi, bir istisna dışında retorikten öteye gidememiştir. 2 Ağustos 1990 günü Irak'ın Kuveyt'i işgal etmesiyle başlayan ve ABD öncülüğündeki Irak karşıtı koalisyonun düzenlediği askeri harekâtın bittiği 28 Şubat 1991 günü sona eren Birinci Körfez Krizi boyunca, Cumhurbaşkanı Özal inisiyatifi ele almış ve Yeni Osmanlıcı alt-emperialist dış politika hevesi doğrultusunda pek çok girişimde bulunmuştur. Fakat Özal'ın bu dönemdeki çabaları bile bu hevesini gerçekleştirebilmek bakımından anlamlı sonuçlar doğurmamıştır.

Tezde, son olarak, Özal liderliğindeki Yeni Osmanlıcı alt-emperialist hegemonya projesi, bir araya getirerek bu proje etrafında mobilize etmek istediği toplumsal güçlerden Yeni Osmanlıcı bir tarihsel bloku başarıyla oluşturma kapasitesi ya da kapasitesizliği bakımından, kuramsal bir analize tabi tutulmaktadır. Yeni Osmanlıcılık, Özal liderliğinin organik aydınları tarafından öne sürüldüğü haliyle, ideolojik olarak Türk dış politikasındaki Kemalist mirasın karşısında konumlandırılmaktaydı. Bu proje, bu mirasın ortadan kaldırılmasını ve Özal'ın Türkiye'nin tabii nüfuz sahaları olarak gördüğü bölgelere yönelik olarak sözde aktif bir dış politika uygulanmasını öngörmektedir. Türkiye'nin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun ana ardılı olması bakımından sahip olduğu emperial miras ve söz konusu bölgelerde yer alan ülkelerle olan tarihsel ve kültürel bağlarının, Türkiye'nin bölgeleri liderliğini meşrulaştırdığı ve haklı kıldığı savunulmaktadır. Daha önce ileri sürüldüğü üzere, ülke içinde 1980 sonrasında gerçekleşen neoliberal iktisadi ve siyasi yeniden yapılanma böylesi bir dış politika hevesinin gündeme gelebildiği zemini teşkil eden önemli bir etken olmakla birlikte, esasen daha önemli olan etkense Türkiye gibi bölgelerin güçlü ülkeler için alan açtığı düşünülen uluslararası dönüşüm olmuştur. Ne var ki, 1990'lı yılların başlarında, Özal liderliği başarılı biçimde Yeni Osmanlıcı alt-emperialist bir tarihsel blok inşa edebilmekten uzak bir konumdaydı. Tezde, Yeni Osmanlıcı projenin, bu bakımından, aslında başından itibaren ölü doğmuş bir proje olduğu ve bu yüzden de yalnızca kısa bir süreliğine gündemde kalabildiği öne sürülmektedir.

Bu argümanı desteklemek adına, kısa ömürlü bir proje olmuş olmasına rağmen, Özal liderliği ve *Türkiye Günleri* dergisi etrafında bir araya gelmiş olan

organik aydınlarının kendi bakış açılarından oluşturmayı hedefledikleri Yeni Osmanlıci tarihsel blok içerisinde yer almasını öngördükleri uluslararası ve yerel düzeydeki toplumsal güçler, bu projeye ilişkileri bakımından ele alınmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, ABD ve Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSİAD), Yeni Osmanlıci projenin merkezindeki iki ana güç olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Türkiye'nin alt-emperialist bölgesel liderliği, proje bakımından ana uluslararası güç konumunda olan Amerikan emperializminin bu projeye desteği olmaksızın gerçekleştirilemezdi. Diğer yandan, TÜSİAD ise yerel düzeyde iktisaden hâkim sınıf fraksiyonunu temsil eder konumdaydı. Bunlara ilaveten, Türkiye'nin doğal etki alanları olarak değerlendirilen bölgelerde yer alan ülkeler projenin hesaba katması gereken diğer uluslararası güçlerdi. Yine yerel düzeyde, TÜSİAD tarafından temsil edilen Türk büyük sermayesine ek olarak, Türk burjuvazisi içerisindeki İslami fraksiyon ve toplumun muhafazakâr ve İslamçı kesimleri; liberaller, milliyetçiler ve Kürtlerle birlikte, projenin bir araya getirmeyi hedeflediği diğer toplumsal güçleri oluşturuyordu.

Özal liderliği ve organik aydınları, aslında, tez boyunca alt-emperialist bir hegemonya projesi olarak değerlendirilen Yeni Osmanlıcılık üzerinden, 1980 sonrası neoliberal politikaların derinleştirerek şiddetlendirdiği toplumsal eşitsizliğin 1980'lerin ikinci yarısında daha da arttırdığı toplumsal hoşnutsuzluğun da üstesinden gelmek istediler. Neoliberal politikalara yönelik işçi sınıfında meydana gelen hoşnutsuzluğun kimlik temelli siyasete dayalı meselelerin gündeme getirilmesi ve siyasal İslamcılar ya da Kürt milliyetçileri gibi geleneksel olarak Kemalizme karşı toplumsal grupların ideolojik konumlanışlarına hitap edilmesi yoluyla aşılabileceğinin öngörüldüğü anlaşılmaktadır. Bölgesel düzeyde lider olma iddiasındaki Yeni Osmanlıci emperial misyon etrafında yeni bir milliyetçilik dalgası uyandırılarak toplumun daha geniş kesimlerinin siyasi mobilizasyonu da hedeflenmiştir. Yeni pazarlar ve daha kârlı yatırım alanları vaadiyle TÜSİAD ve MÜSİAD gibi sermaye gruplarının rızalarının elde edileceğine de inanılmıştır. ABD'nin ise, Türkiye'nin, söz konusu sorunlu bölgelerde kendisi adına bir tür vekil ya da taşıyıcı hegemon güç olarak işlev görmesinden ve bölgesel düzeyde istikrar

sağlanmasıının yükünü paylaşmasından memnun olacağı ve destek vereceği varsayılmıştır. Bu bölgelerde yer alan diğer ülkelerinse, Türkiye'nin bu ülkelerle olan kültürel ve tarihsel bağları ile Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan devralındığı varsayılan emperyal miras dolayısıyla Türkiye'nin bölgesel düzeyde liderliğini destekleyecekleri öngörülmüştür. Dahası, Türkiye'nin, Batı yanlısı demokrasisi ve serbest piyasa ekonomisiyle, bu ülkelere örnek alacağı bir "model" ülke olduğu varsayılmıştır. Oysa tüm bu güçler, Yeni Osmanlıçı proje karşısında, en iyi ifadeyle, belirsiz bir konumdaydılar.

20 Ekim 1991 günü yapılan erken genel seçimlerin arifesinde, Özal liderliği hemen hemen her alanda başarısız olmuş bir görüntü arz etmekteydi. İşçi sınıfı eylemliliği, grevlerin ve işçi eylemlerinin yasaklandığı 1980 darbesinden bu yana ilk defa yeniden yükseliş geçmişti. 1989 bahar eylemleri ve Zonguldak'taki maden işçilerinin 1990–1991'de düzenledikleri büyük grev ve yürüyüş, bu dönemdeki işçi eylemliliğinin ilk akla gelen örneklerindendir. TÜSİAD ekonomideki olumsuz tablonun faturasını Özal liderliğinin kötü ekonomi yönetimine kesmeye çalışırken, MÜSİAD ise yüzünü çoktan yükseliş geçen siyasal İslam'a dönmeye başlamış durumdaydı. Kürt siyasi hareketi de ayrı bir siyasi güç olarak ortaya çıkmaya başlamış ve bu dönemde başka siyasi güçlerle ittifak ilişkisine girdiğinde bile ANAP yerine merkez solda yer alan Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (SHP) ile ittifaka girmeyi tercih etmiştir. İslamcı Refah Partisi (RP) aynı dönemde yükseliş geçen bir diğer siyasi güç olup milliyetçilerin örgütlediği Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) de bu dönemde ANAP'la ittifak yapmak yerine RP ile seçim ittifakına gitmiştir. ANAP ile tecrübeli siyasetçi ve eski Başkaban olan Süleyman Demirel'in liderlik ettiği Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP) arasında ikiye bölünen merkez sağ seçmen tabanı ise uzun süren ANAP'lı dönemin ardından bu dönemde daha çok DYP'ye yönelmeye başlamıştır. Cumhurbaşkanı Özal'ın Körfez krizi sırasında Irak'a karşı savaşa girmeye olanak tanıyan tezkereyi elde etme yönündeki çabaları da, ülke içinde hem siyasi muhalefet hem de Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri ile ANAP hükümetinin bakanları tarafından ciddi ölçüde sınırlanılmaktaydı. ABD ise, Özal'ın beklediğinin aksine, Türkiye'nin petrol bölgelerini ele geçirmesine olanak tanıyacak herhangi bir adıma ya da Irak

Devlet Başkanı Saddam Hüseyin'in bütünüyle devrilmesine sıcak bakmamıştır. ABD'nin, doğrudan Bağdat'a ilerlemek yerine, Saddam Kuveyt'ten çekileceğini açıklar açıklamaz zafer ilan ederek askeri operasyona son vermesi, Özal'ın Yeni Osmanlıci hevesini boşă düşürmüştür. Cumhurbaşkanı Özal tarafından doğal nüfuz alanları olarak görülen bölgelerdeki ülkelere yönelik örnek teşkil edeceği düşünülen "Türk modeli" tartışmaları da bu ülkelerin Türkiye öncülüğünde tesis edilecek Yeni Osmanlıci bir bölgesel hegemonyaya rıza göstermelerini sağlamaya yetmemiştir. Aynı dönemde, Cumhurbaşkanı Özal ANAP içerisindeki muhafazakâr ve liberal kanatlar arasındaki tartışma ve çekişmelerle ilgilenmek durumunda kalmış ve iki kanadı birbirlerine karşı denelemek isterken her iki kanatla da ilişkilerini kötüleştirmiştir. Daha genç bir lider olan Mesut Yılmaz'ın ANAP'ın başına geçmesi sonrası ANAP, 1991 seçimlerinde oyların yüzde 24'ünü alabilmişse de, sırasıyla yüzde 27 ve yüzde 20,8 oy alan DYP ve SHP'nin seçim sonrasında koalisyon hükümeti kurmalarını engelleyememiştir. Tüm seçim kampanyalarını Cumhurbaşkanı Özal'ı sınırlamak üzerine kuran bu partiler, iktidara geldikten sonra da Özal'ın günlük siyasete müdahaleini engellemek için çalışmışlardır. Özal liderliği 1991 seçimlerinden itibaren, popüler siyasi jargonla belirtilecek olursa, topal ördek konumuna düşmüş ve dış politika meselelerinde önceki dönemlerde sahip olduğu inisiatifi yitirmiştir. Bu durum, Bosna Savaşı ve Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü gibi örneklerde belirgin durumdadır.

Dolayısıyla, 1991 yılının sonuna gelindiğinde, Cumhurbaşkanı Özal'ın ve onun siyasi liderliğine bağlı organik aydınların, başarılı biçimde tarihsel blok oluşturabilmek için kritik öneme sahip tutarlı bir ulusal–popüler programdan yoksun oldukları çoktan açığa çıkmıştı. Dahası, Özal liderliğinin, tüm bu toplumsal güçlerin rızasını elde etmeye ya da en azından bazıları üzerinde zor uygulayarak boyun eğmelerini sağlamaya yetecek düzeyde maddi saikten yoksun olduğu da görülmekteydi.

Yine de, Özal döneminin, ülke içinde uygulamaya koyduğu neoliberal iktisadi ve siyasi yeniden yapılanmayla gerekli yapısal dönüşümleri gerçekleştirerek, sonraki sağ hükümetler için bir bakıma zemin hazırladığı ve yol açtığı öne sürülebilir. Özal

dönemi, bu bakımından, sonraki dönemlerde gündeme gelen Yeni Osmanlıci dış politika heveslerinin önünde, hem önemli bir tarihsel öncül hem de bir tür girizgâh olarak değerlendirilebilir. Özal'ın sıkılıkla savunduğu fakat gerçekleştiremediği büyük çaplı özelleştirmeler ve başkanlık tipi hükümet sisteme geçiş, sonraki dönemlerde gerçekleştirilmiştir. Özal'ın bu tür önerilerini hayatı geçirmedeki başarısızlığını, en temel handikaplarından birisi olmuştur.

Bu tez, Özal döneminde ortaya çıkan Türkiye'nin öncülüğünde bölgesel düzeyde hegemonya kurma hedefine yönelik Yeni Osmanlıci dış politika hevesini analiz ederken Yeni Gramscici tarihsel materyalist yaklaşımından yararlanarak, konu hakkındaki akademik yazına katkıda bulunmayı hedeflemektedir. Genel olarak Türk dış politikası ve daha özelde ise Türk dış politikasındaki bölgesel güç heveslerine dair geniş bir yazın mevcuttur. Fakat bu yazın içerisinde, Türkiye'nin 1980 sonrası neoliberal yönelimine ve genel anlamda yaşadığı dönüşüme bakarken kapitalist toplumsal ilişkileri sorunsallaştırmayan ve bir analitik kategori olarak toplumsal sınıfları görmezlikten gelen analizler hâkim durumdadır. Bu tezde benimsenen yaklaşım, Türkiye'nin 1980 sonrası dönüşümünün kapitalist özünü ve dünya ölçüğinde kapitalizme dayanan hiyerarşik uluslararası düzen içerisinde emperyalizmle girdiği karmaşık ilişkiyi göz önünde bulunduran bakış açıları sağlamaktadır. Tezde benimsenmiş olan Yeni Gramscici yaklaşımın ana katkısı, sınıf temelli bakış açısını salt sınıfa indirmeksizin farklı toplumsal güçler arasındaki ilişkiler üzerinden geliştirdiği analizlerle içeriyor olmasıdır. Tezde, Yeni Gramscici tarihsel materialist yaklaşım tarafından sağlanan bu bakış açılarından yararlanılmaktadır. Tez, bu bakış açılarından hareketle, Özal liderliğinin Yeni Osmanlıci bir tarihsel blok oluşturabilecek konumda olmadığını ve dolayısıyla, söz konusu dönemde ortaya çıkan Yeni Osmanlıci dış politika hevesinin ölü doğmuş bir heves olduğunu göstermektedir. Öncü emperyalist güç konumundaki ABD'nin koyduğu kısıt ve sınırlamalar, sermayenin farklı fraksiyonlarının sergilediği farklı tutumlar, ANAP hükümetinin Milli Savunma Bakanı Safa Giray ve Dışişleri Bakanı Ali Bozer'in yanı sıra Genelkurmay Başkanı Org. Necip Torumtay'ın Birinci Körfez Krizi sırasında istifa etmiş olmalarından da anlaşılabilceği üzere devlet aygıtı

îçerisinde içsel bütünlüğün sağlanamamış olması ve hem emek hem de Türk toplumunun daha geniş kesimlerinde Özal'ın politikalarına destek verilmiyor olması, Özal liderliğinin Yeni Osmanlıcı alt-emperialist hegemonya projesinin daha baştan ölü doğmasına neden olan önemli etkenlerdir. Her hegemonya projesi tarihsel blok oluşturmada başarılı olmak durumunda değildir ve aslında, daha önce de belirtildiği üzere, Özal dönemi Yeni Osmanlıcı dış politika deneyimi sonraki dönemler için bir tür zemin hazırlayıcı ve yol açıcı olmuştur.

Bu noktada belirtilmesi gereken bir diğer husus ise, yazın taraması yapılan üitede gösterildiği üzere, Türkiye'nin 1980 sonrası dönemde ortaya çıkan Yeni Osmanlıcı dış politika heveslerine dair hâlihazırda mevcut olan Yeni Gramscici tarihsel materyalist çalışmaların daha ziyade günümüz tartışmalarına odaklanmış olmalarıdır. Bununla birlikte, Yeni Osmanlıcılık üzerine tartışmalar bakımından önemli bir tarihsel öncül olan ve Türk dış politikasının sonraki dönemlerinde gerçekleşecek olan dönüşümler için bir tür zemin teşkil etmiş bulunan Özal dönemi, bu çalışmalarında oldukça az yer tutmaktadır. Hâlihazırda belirtilmiş olduğu üzere, yazında, Özal döneminde ortaya çıkan Yeni Osmanlıcı dış politika hevesinin, Yeni Gramscici tarihsel materyalist bir yaklaşımla geniş biçimde incelendiği bir çalışma mevcut değildir. Bu nedenle, tez aynı zamanda yazındaki bu boşluğu doldurmayla yönelik bir katkıda bulunmayı hedeflemektedir. Ayrıca, bu önemli tarihsel öncülün analiz edilmesinin, Türk dış politikasında benzer heveslerinin gündeme geldiği sonraki dönemlerin anlaşılmasına da katkıda bulunabileceğine inanılmaktadır. Tezin konuya dair mevcut yazına yapmayı hedeflediği bir diğer önemli katkı da, Özal dönemi Yeni Osmanlıcılığını alt-emperialist bir hegemonya projesi olarak ele almasıdır. Tezde sunulan tüm bu kuramsal ve kavramsal çerçeveyenin, (neoliberal yeniden yapılanma gibi) yerel ölçekte belirli toplumsal formasyonlar içerisinde gerçekleşen yeniden yapılanmalar ile bu toplumsal formasyonlara ait dış politika uygulamaları arasında olabileceği varsayılan ilişkiler gibi konulara yönelik olarak daha ileri düzeyde araştırmalar için bir tür tetikleyici ya da yol açıcı olması da ümit edilmektedir. Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesi ile bölgesel güç heveslisi ülkelerin öne çıkmaları arasındaki ilişkiye dair daha ileri düzeyde çalışmaların yanı sıra, farklı yarı-

çevre ülkelerin farklı alt-emperialist heveslerine ya da tek bir ülkenin farklı dönemlerdeki alt-emperialist deneyimlerine dair karşılaştırmalı çalışmalar bakımından da tezin teşvik edici ve ön açıcı olması umit edilmektedir.

C. TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

- Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences**
- Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences**
- Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics**
- Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics**
- Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Marine Sciences**

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : Soysal
Adı / Name : Coşkun
Bölümü / Department : Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English) :

The Stillborn Neo-Ottomanist Foreign Policy Aspiration of the Özal Era

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: **Yüksek Lisans / Master** **Doktora / PhD**

1. **Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır. / Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide.**
2. **Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır. / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of two years. ***
3. **Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır. / Secure the entire work for period of six months. ***

* Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararının basılı kopyası tezle birlikte kütüphaneye teslim edilecektir.
A copy of the decision of the Institute Administrative Committee will be delivered to the library together with the printed thesis.

Yazarın imzası / Signature

Tarih / Date