

DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY CRISES:
THE ROLE OF STATE INSTITUTIONS DURING SÜLEYMAN DEMİREL
ADMINISTRATIONS

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ABSTRACT

DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY CRISES: THE ROLE OF STATE INSTITUTIONS DURING SÜLEYMAN DEMİREL ADMINISTRATIONS

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This study searches for the role of state institutions on political decision-making mechanism and leadership of Süleyman Demirel in Turkish foreign policy crises. Having been entrusted as the political decision-maker for forty years of Turkish political history, Demirel has been selected as a unique case because he served as prime minister in both Cold War and Post-Cold War periods, both in single-party government and coalition governments and also both as prime minister and president. By utilizing American archival documents, Turkish Grand National Assembly parliamentary minutes, memoirs of retired diplomats and top political and bureaucratic figures that have eye-witnessed the foreign policy crises in Demirel's period, as a result, it is concluded that Demirel adopted his leadership in attaching great importance to policy recommendations of state institutions but at the same time filtering those recommendations within the scope of his own political understanding

by considering the expectations of citizens. Having identified that National Security Council and Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy had great role in Demirel's decision-making process who had been very delicate in conducting foreign policy due to his conformity with traditional foreign policy priorities of Turkey and prioritizing institutions and institutionalisation, this research aims to contribute to the literature by opening up the black-box of Turkish foreign policymaking mechanism thanks to archival documents of the United States and evaluation of witnesses of those crises.

Keywords: Demirel, Foreign policy, Decision making, Black-box

ÖZ

TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASI KRİZLERİNDE KARAR ALMA SÜRECİ: SÜLEYMAN DEMİREL YÖNETİMLERİ BOYUNCA DEVLET KURUMLARININ ROLÜ

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Bu çalışma, Türk dış politikası krizlerinin yönetiminde Süleyman Demirel'in liderlik ve karar alma mekanizması ile devlet kurumlarının bu karar mekanizmasındaki rollerini incelemektedir. Türkiye yakın yüzyıl siyasi tarihinin yaklaşık kırk yılında siyasi karar alıcı olarak görev alan Demirel, hem Soğuk Savaş, hem de Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde görev yapmış olması, hem tek parti hükümeti hem koalisyon hükümetlerinde Başbakan olarak görev yapmış olması, hem Başbakanlık hem Cumhurbaşkanlığı görevlerinde bulunmuş olması sebebiyle özgün bir örnek olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Amerikan arşiv belgeleri, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanakları, emekli diplomatların anıları ve Demirel dönemlerindeki dış politika krizlerinde aktif görev almış siyasetçi ve üst düzey devlet görevlileriyle yüz yüze yapılan görüşmeler sonucunda Demirel'in devlet kurumlarının politika önerilerine önem veren ancak kendi filtreleriyle süzdüğü bu önerileri vatandaşın

beklentilerini de dikkate alarak dengeleyen bir liderlik örneđi sergilediđi görölmektedir. Türkiye'nin geleneksel dıř politika öncelikleriyle uyum içinde olan, kurum ve kurumsallařmaya önem veren ve dıř politikanın yürütölme biçiminde hassas davranan Demirel'in karar mekanizmasında Milli Güvenlik Kurulu'nun ve Dıřıřleri Bakanlıđı bürokrasisinin ciddi rolü olduđunun tespit edildiđi bu çalıřma, olayların canlı tanıklarının tespitleri ve Amerikan devlet belgelerinin ıřıđında Türk dıř politikasının kara kutusunun iřleyiř mekanizmasını inceleyerek literatüre katkı sunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Demirel, Dıř Politika, Karar Alma, Kara kutu

To my family and my friends

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
JP	Justice Party
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMP	Nationalist Movement Party
NSC	National Security Council
NSP	National Salvation Party
OYAK	Turkish Armed Forces Assistance and Pension Fund
RPP	Republican People's Party
SDPP	Social Democratic Populist Party
SPO	State Planning Organization
TBMM	Grand National Assembly of Turkey

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Why is Süleyman Demirel such an important figure to study in order to understand the rationale behind Turkish Foreign Policy? What makes him different from other political leaders? As a former bureaucrat, how he turned to be a political leader and stayed in politics for more than four decades makes him deserved to be given special attention in terms of his leadership and his political experience in order to clearly understand Turkey's foreign policy experience. By focusing on his experiences and personal skills, this thesis aims to investigate the formulation of Turkish foreign policy and its responses to specific cases and crises by giving a special attention to sources of those responses in terms of institutional reflexes arising from institutional cultures and priorities of different state institutions. In order to understand operating principles and functioning of black-box of a state in foreign policy making, it is important to understand how different institutions within that black-box bargain and influence the foreign policy formulation in line with their own priorities.

Different scholars have studied Turkish foreign policy through different focuses however those studies rarely mentioned different primary reflexes of state institutions which take part in policy formulation within Turkish state. Realist tradition, disregarding operational mechanism of state institutions, argues that decision making in foreign policy is sharply distinct from domestic policy and foreign policy operates within a black-box in which all decisions are taken through rational calculations of unitary and value maximizing actors¹. This thesis, however, aims to

¹ For main premises of Realism, see Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948).

bring a broader understanding and a deeper investigation of working principle of the black-box and Turkish foreign policy in terms of interaction between political leaders of the decision making and repeated reflexes of state institutions arising from institutional priorities in specific cases or crises. That is to say, it aims to investigate how different state institutions take active role in directing political leaders and how rational or irrational decisions are taken in specific and certain cases or crises of Turkish foreign policy due to organizational priorities and established routines.

Turkish foreign policy has been studied by scholars in many aspects in terms of decision outcomes in a historical and chronological path. Those studies bring a broad understanding about the historical development of the foreign policy in Turkey. This thesis, however, draws a special attention on relationship between political decision makers and state institutions in terms of formulation and implementation of Turkish foreign policy in order to open the complex and complicated operating principles of the black-box. It is specifically focused on Süleyman Demirel as the political decision maker for three reasons. Firstly, he served for almost forty years both in Cold War and Post-Cold War periods which could be regarded as the main systemic variable that should be considered in order to measure the effect of international system in foreign policy behaviour. Secondly, he served as prime minister and as president which makes it feasible to grasp the effect of changing role of political decision maker in foreign policy decision-making process. Finally, among the Turkish political decision makers, there is greater chance of evaluating Demirel's leadership through primary sources provided by him thanks to his own writings and interviews published about his leadership in his own words.

Research Design

The main hypothesis to test in this dissertation is whether Demirel prioritized those institutional reflexes in his final understanding about national interest in foreign policy or not. By doing this, the dissertation tries to find out the working principle of the bargaining between different institutions in order to influence political decision making. Demirel has been a key actor in Turkish foreign policy history thanks to his charismatic leadership and long-term political experience. Managing seven foreign

policy crises, Demirel ranks first among Turkish political leaders together with İsmet İnönü in terms of number of foreign policy crises that were put up with². Demirel and his leadership in political crises has been studied in many aspects however how he took into consideration the institutional reflexes of state institutions is in need of broader investigation in the literature. In this respect, institutional reflexes to political crises in foreign policy, when Demirel was in power, play an important role in terms of capturing how national interest has been shaped and constructed by different institutions differently.

In order to understand how institutional priorities of the state institutions shape or influence decisions of political leaders, it is important to capture a specific period of Turkish foreign policy in which president and prime minister give enough space for state institutions to take part in the formulation of foreign policy decisions. The main argument here is that institutional reflexes can be understood if only political leaders that are responsible for foreign policy decision making let those institutions buckle down to foreign policy formulation. In this respect, Demirel periods are believed to fit in that proposal. Considering foreign policy making in İnönü period where decision-making process was operated by one single political man or in Menderes period in which MFA ministers Fuat Köprülü and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu came into prominence rather than MFA bureaucracy or Menderes himself; or Turgut Özal period and Justice and Development Party periods in which state institutions have been mostly alienated and non-governmental organizations and private sector have been counted in, Demirel periods are known with his tendency to formulate and operate foreign policy in close cooperation with state institutions³.

This thesis seeks for answer to three main research questions in regard with its proposal and main argument. The first question to be dealt with is what kind of constraints would affect Demirel's foreign policy leadership. In order to understand this, systemic determinants and the international structure, type of the government

² Fuat Aksu, *Türk Dış Politikasında Karar Alma ve Kriz Yönetimi Süreç Analizi*, (İstanbul: Dış Politika ve Kriz İncelemeleri Yay., 2017), 78.

³ İlhan Uzgel, "Türk Dış Politikasının Oluşturulması" in Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 1, 1919-1980*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008), 73-92.

(single party or coalition government) and partners in that government, role of Demirel (whether prime minister or president) in the domestic political structure are put into perspective. Second question in this thesis is whether state institutions have a role of shaping foreign policy understanding of the political leader or how state institutions put their institutional priorities in the foreign policy agenda of that political leader. The final question raised here is how it would be possible to understand the effect of the process in shaping decision making of the political leader. That is to say, the type of the foreign policy crises and strategies pursued in those crises are under investigation in order to capture the role of political leadership where political leaders take more active role in crises than in daily routine functioning of foreign policy⁴.

Dealing with those three issues requires a wide and complex research model which could be quite difficult for a Ph.D. thesis to cover. In order to overcome this problem and bring a comprehensive method, it is utilized a matrix which focuses on measuring the impact of those variables mentioned above on leadership and policy making of Demirel in Turkish foreign policy.

Methodology

This thesis benefits from a qualitative method and interpretative approach by searching archival documents, parliamentary minutes and government programmes, evaluating press release and official declarations of decision makers, making semi-structured interviews with the participants that had eye-witnessed the specific cases to be searched, and analysing the speeches given by Demirel in addition to written academic literature. Here, archives of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Turkish Armed Forces are not accessible due to classification problem, which brings a very serious limitation for the purpose of this thesis. In order to overcome that problem, declassified and released documents of the US Department of State and CIA under “Freedom of Information Act” are benefitted together with the written memoirs of

⁴ Fred I. Greenstein’s argument is cited in Ömer Ak, “Parlamenter Sistemlerde Başbakan-Danışman İlişkisinin Dış Politika Üzerindeki Etkisi: Danışmanlık Sistemleri Yaklaşımı” in Ertan Efeğil and M. Seyfettin Erol (eds.), *Dış Politika Analizinde Teorik Yaklaşımlar: Türk Dış Politikası*, (Ankara: Barış Platin Yayınları, 2012), 157-181, 177.

retired Turkish diplomats and military officers. Moreover, oral interviews are held with former ministers, former top generals, foreign policy advisors and top bureaucrats of the state institutions which had their place in Demirel's decision making process. It is important to note that problem of subjectivity in oral interviews and written memoirs may pose a problem for the research where those participants may tend to make more biased comments about the past events or may put themselves at the centre of all events even though they did not have first-hand experience on specific cases. In order to overcome this problem of subjectivity, all information gathered from interviews and memoirs are double checked with each other and with available official archive documents of US Departments. Still, a chance for searching through Turkish national archives when they are declassified would bring a broader opportunity for scholars who aim to study policy formulation in Turkish foreign policy.

In terms of methodology, Demirel has been selected as the political decision maker because he had the chance for governing Turkey in both Cold War and Post-Cold War periods which could be identified as the first variable for this research. Besides, in order to understand the impact of government type and political role, Demirel serves best for the research because he served in single party government and coalition governments as prime minister and also was selected as president. Therefore, his leadership as the leader of government and National Security Council with his different roles play an important role in evaluating his true effect on foreign policy decision making.

When searching through state institutions, this research limits its scope on National Security Council, Turkish Armed Forces and Ministry of Foreign Affairs as three main actors for foreign policy decision making other than the political leadership. Even though there are many state and non-state actors in foreign policy formulation and implementation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Armed Forces and, at some point, National Intelligence Organization, are taken into consideration in understanding the formulation of institutional reflexes as long as available data is

found⁵. Above all, the National Security Council is given a special attention as being the bargaining board among those state institutions and political leaders. On the other hand, National Assembly, the political party of the leader and coalition partners in the government play significant roles as well; because political decision maker needs to convince these institutions in order to execute his/her foreign policy decisions.

Here, rather than analysing all foreign policy crises that broke out in Demirel periods, this thesis intentionally narrows its focus on one specific crisis for each period in order to make a deeper analysis and compare different periods accordingly. To be clearer, two cases for Cold War period has been selected in which Demirel was prime minister of single party government in one and prime minister under coalition government in the other. For the Post-Cold war period, a case when he was prime minister under coalition government and a case when he was president are selected in order to bring an overall understanding about his leadership. Besides, domestic and outside developments for each specific time period are evaluated in order to form a table of matrix which exhibits the impact of different determinants of Turkish foreign policy on foreign policy leadership of Demirel.

In order to understand the impact of institutional influence of state institutions on political decision maker, each and every concrete steps of decisions are analysed and evaluated through all available sources so that underlying dynamics behind decisions of political leaders and role of institutions could be understood. By doing this, overall tendency for Demirel's decision making on foreign policy and his interaction with state institutions could be revealed in order to open the black-box of Turkish state.

Research Composition

In the following theoretical framework chapter, limitations of grand theories on foreign policy analysis and more promising middle range alternatives are evaluated in order to come up with a hybrid approach which makes it possible to understand the role of actors in formulation, decision making and implementation of

⁵ There have been different state institutions such as 'State Planning Organization' and 'Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade' which found some ground on foreign policy making however they are not evaluated here due to main focus of the thesis and their limited role.

foreign policy. Because this thesis focuses on both the leader and the state institutions, a multidimensional approach is utilized which opens up the black-box of foreign policy decision making by giving special attention to both decision-making process of a political decision maker throughout his/her operational codes and institutional process for state institutions in that foreign policy making.

The third chapter on Süleyman Demirel's leadership and foreign policy understanding first deals with Demirel's early life before politics and his biographical information. Rather than a standard chronological biography, it is aimed to cover how specific milestones in his life shaped his political understanding as a decision maker. Then his leadership is evaluated through an analysis of political psychology, his operational codes and leadership trait analysis shaped by different factors. Finally, his overall foreign policy understanding and his attitude to specific foreign policy issues is examined in order to present the framework for case study chapters in which specific foreign policy cases and Demirel's leadership is evaluated.

The fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh chapters analyse different periods of Demirel's political leadership as a decision maker in foreign policy by focusing on specific foreign policy crises. Even though most of the academic studies prefer to analyse foreign policy by mentioning chronological developments and cases in order to picture an overall tendency, those chapters of the thesis aim to focus on specific foreign policy crises in order to measure the role of political decision maker in accepting and following or reshaping the priorities of state institutions which generate those overall foreign policy tendencies. In those four chapters, historical developments in international, regional and domestic politics are evaluated with their impact on decision makers in terms of providing opportunities and posing restrictions in their decisions.

It is important to keep in mind that structures, organizations and power of institutions also change temporally and especially the structure of National Security Council plays crucial role in terms of the results of bargaining between those institutions. Therefore, the changing role of state institutions and political leaders due to changing dynamics are also assessed in those case study chapters so that it could

be searched whether the political decision maker followed the traditional established lines of foreign policy or he drew his unique way of decision making.

In terms of the foreign policy cases selected, the fourth chapter evaluates poppy cultivation crisis between Turkey and United States of America for Demirel's prime ministry period in Cold War. The fifth chapter examines the crisis of arms sale embargo of the US on Turkey for prime ministry under a coalition government in Cold War. Likewise, the sixth chapter deals with Nakhichevan crisis as a Post-Cold War crisis when Demirel was prime minister of a coalition, and finally the seventh chapter handles the Kardak-Imia crisis for Post-Cold War when Demirel was President. Those four cases are believed to show an overall understanding for changing institutional reflexes and leadership style of Demirel with his changing position in political decision making.

Capturing institutional reflexes in Turkish foreign policy and their role in shaping foreign policy leadership of political leaders is believed to help prospective policy makers to formulate and organize foreign policy in a comprehensive way so that those policy makers can diversify their future practices outside the established routines if necessary. Besides, it aims to contribute to the literature by filling the gap in the research on the role of political leaders for the utilization of governmental institutions in building decisions in foreign policy. Therefore, specific attention is given on to the discussion whether Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy is conducting the pre-formulated foreign policy of the governments or directly formulates the foreign policy independent from the governments. Within this perspective, hidden role of the military in foreign policy agenda setting through utilization of different institutions, such as National Security Council, is also under careful examination. By doing so, this thesis hopes to find an opportunity for building up that process with its findings in decision-making process for opening up the black-box of Turkish foreign policy making.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

Foreign policy is the instrument for preserving and strengthening political, economic and national interest of a state. It is an art of calculating high interests of a country and ability to practise it.

Süleyman Demirel⁶

Is it at all possible to come up with a uniform definition of foreign policy? While Hill⁷ defines foreign policy as the aggregate of the official external relations pursued by independent actors, McGowan⁸ defines it as the states' counteractions with actors beyond their sphere of sovereignty. Modelski⁹ perceives foreign policy as the sum of states' endeavour to harmonize other states' actions with that of the international order through communities' evolved activities. According to Wilkenfield et. al.¹⁰, however, foreign policy is the sum of a state's actions and reactions to influence the order beyond the lines of her sovereignty. Whether

⁶ Cengiz Ergen, *Cumhurbaşkanı Süleyman Demirel'in Söylev ve Demeçleri*, (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2009), 1315.

⁷ Christopher Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 3.

⁸ Patrick McGowan, *The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy*, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973), 12.

⁹ George Modelski, *A Theory of Foreign Policy (Princeton Studies in World Politics)*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 6.

¹⁰ Jonathan Wilkenfield [et. al.], *Foreign Policy Behaviour: The Interstate Behaviour Analysis*, (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1980), 22.

descriptive or explanatory, the many definitions of foreign policy harbour the same elements¹¹. Nevertheless, they all presuppose and encompass the strategic and structured quarrelling of the state, as a subcategory of international relations, with sources through foreign actors that are perceived to be the de-facto and official incumbents of that particular states' foreign policy. However, these actors, that perform to target the ends of foreign policy, follow policies that incorporate the endogenous and exogenous forces as well as the delicacies of the system in which they are operating.

2.1. Theories and Foreign Policy

2.1.1. Grand Theories

Though foreign policy, in terms of boundary, implementation environment and type of politics is significantly different compared to domestic politics, they do influence each other and when formulating foreign policy, foreign, domestic and human factors are taken into account whilst acknowledging the non-hierarchical nexus between the actors. Within this framework, differing theories, that analyse foreign policy, adopt differing mechanisms within differing methodologies. Traditional IR theories strive to approach foreign policy through a prism that draws an analogy between state and human actions¹². However, behavioural theories that have cropped up as a reaction to the former in their calculus include various presumptions when explaining the functioning of foreign politics.

Liberalism, as a subscriber to traditional International Relations (IR) theories, defines both the nature of states and humans as peaceful and thus, capable of averting wars through the restructuring of institutions with high morals and ethics in mind. To the contrary, Realism alludes to the evil nature of both the states and humans in a non-hierarchical and anarchic system where states pursue a conflict-prone foreign policy so to maximize power. Behavioural theorists, by insulating domestic politics,

¹¹ Those four and many other definitions of foreign policy are discussed in M. Fatih Tayfur, "Main Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy: A Review", *METU Studies in Development*, 21:1, (1994), 113-141.

¹² Valerie Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 1, (2005), 1-30, 2.

to focus on the higher politics of foreign policy and confining the state actions to the international order whilst also shunning ethics and morality induced a methodological criticism of realism rather than an attack on its presumptions. Realism sheds light on the states', the presumed sole incumbent of foreign policy, defined as official, external and governmental activity, foreign policy actions rather than its black-box, that appears as a result of a series of mechanisms. For realism, choices among alternatives based on calculations about possible consequences which serve best for the goals and objectives of the state is the core of foreign policymaking¹³ and it focuses on decisions itself rather than giving a comprehensive attention on decision-making process and decision-maker where it pre-assumes the decision-maker as a rational unitary actor. Taking the state as granted but not opening it up in terms of formulation and implementation of foreign policymaking brings a shortcoming for this thesis which aims to understand operating principles of foreign policymaking. Fittingly, behavioural theories, that criticise realism, open up the black-box to some extent in order to focus on the main actors that form the decision-making apparatus and explain the series of decisions pertaining to foreign policy.

Since the focal points of grand IR theories are different, they do not sufficiently analyse the relationship between foreign policy shaping and role of leadership and institutions. For example, the subject matters of realism are "state", "war" and "security"¹⁴, while the subject matters of liberalism are "individual", "peace" and "economics"¹⁵. Even though neo theories such as neo-liberalism focuses on "institutions", they refer to international organizations¹⁶ rather than the domestic state institutions as structures. Similarly, the subject matters of constructivism are

¹³ According to Morgenthau, in realist understanding, foreign policy actions reflect either status quo, imperialism or prestige policy. See Morgenthau in Ghazi A. R. Algosaihi, "The Theory of International Relations: Hans J. Morgenthau and His Critics", *Background*, Vol. 8, No. 4, (1965), 221–256.

¹⁴ J. Donnelly 2009. "Realism" in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (4th ed.), *Theories of International Relations*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 31-56.

¹⁵ T. Dunne "Liberalism" in John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (4th ed.), *The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to international relations*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 110-122.

¹⁶ Michael. N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore "The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations", *International Organization*. 53: 4, (1999), 699-732.

“socially constructed ideas” and “norms” rather than decision-making process itself¹⁷. That is why, due to their lack of a total explanatory power, these theories can be considered as a starting point while assessing the relationship between leadership and institutions in decision making of foreign policy in terms of their attention on international system.

2.1.2. Middle Range Theories

Is Waltzian understanding¹⁸ of “explaining states’ foreign policy behaviour with pre-established set of norms and rules arising from the ‘structure’ of world system and ordering principle of anarchy following power capabilities” comprehensive enough for understanding the dynamics of foreign policy making? Or, to what extent does constructivist criticism to this approach for its ignorance of interaction between states and the structure explain the foreign policy dynamics? By adding up social structures to material capabilities under interrelation of shared knowledge, role identities and practices, Wendt’s constructivist understanding¹⁹ of foreign policy formulation criticizes traditional theories however it still does not open up the black-box in order to understand main operating principles.

Similarly, behavioural theories can add to the pertinent analysis, but they are not enough either, as they ignore the institutional perspective and they overestimate the actual behaviour of the leaders. Behavioural theorists attempt to study the actual behaviour of actors rather than the meanings they assign to this behaviour. Although American behavioural scientists working in the 1950s tried to take all the factors that might have effect on making a decision into account such as influence of the mass media, the personality of decision-makers, institutional features of the policy-making body and socio-psychological factors about threat perception, such a big list of factors

¹⁷ M. Barnett “Social Constructivism” in John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (4th eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 162-173.

¹⁸ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Massachusetts: Addison Wesley Publishing Company, 1979).

¹⁹ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

that focuses on what might be relevant is quite much more difficult to deal with than a list that focuses on which factors will be relevant²⁰.

Furthermore, comparative foreign policy (CFP) analysis, as its name implies, compares and contrasts different country practices. Looking at nearly 200 different states, CFP explores the causes of the behaviours by constructing, testing, and refining theories of foreign policy decision making in comparative perspective²¹. However, CFP, in the view of the author of this study, is not applicable to the subject of this study, namely, the case study of Demirel, as this study does not aim to compare different country practices.

Neo-classical realism, from a different perspective, combines some classical realist arguments about state and neo-realist argument of Waltz about dominance of systemic factors, and comes up with an argument that foreign policy making should consider international systemic forces by filtering them through national and domestic factors of a state in which the decision-maker, the leader plays a crucial role²².

In addition to this neo-classical realist understanding, middle range theories, in the view of this study, can better explain the relationship between leader and institutions in Turkish foreign policy in the case study of Demirel. In fact, middle range theories are the ones that examine one (or more) aspect(s) of a certain phenomenon in detail²³. They examine specific and more restrictive phenomena, like Demirel case in Turkish foreign policy, than meta-theories; give precise interpretations of the noticed regularities and predictions, and are able to give full explanations and to analyse the issue completely²⁴. In other words, while grand theory

²⁰ Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley, *Understanding International Relations*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 70.

²¹ Jeffrey. S. Lantis and Ryan Beasley, *Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis*, (Oxford: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, 2017), 1.

²² Gideon Rose, "Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", *World Politics*, Vol 51, No 1, (Oct. 1998), 144-172.

²³ Craig. C. Pinder and Larry. F. Moore, *Middle Range Theory and the Study of Organizations*, (USA: Springer, 1980), 20.

²⁴ Gerda Jakstaite, "Containment and Engagement as Middle-Range Theories", *Baltic Journal of Law & Politics*, 3: 2, (2010), 165-196, 169.

is a theory explaining international relations, meta-theory is a theory that analyses a particular aspect of international relations. Merton describes middle range theories as theories consisting of limited sets of assumptions from which specific hypotheses are logically derived and confirmed by empirical investigations. These theories do not remain separate but are consolidated into wider networks of theory. By benefitting from human actions as their ground for theoretical framework, they add up the human as the agent in decision making and releases IR theories' fallacy where they try to explain state actions under the systematic rules of natural law-like generalizations²⁵. Besides, they also benefit from beliefs of human agent and bridge the gap of traditional theories by constructing a causal mechanism through agents' beliefs and states' foreign policies²⁶.

Here it is important to note that Rosenau, in order to develop pre-theory of foreign policy, argues that a matrix should be facilitated in which individual (personal characteristics of the decision-maker), role (external behaviour of officials arising from their role on state), governmental (executive and legislative structure of the state system), societal (non-governmental structure of the society) and systemic variables (geographical realities or other challenges that states cannot change) are utilized in order to understand the foreign policy behaviour depending on whether the country is large or small in terms of geography, developed or underdeveloped in terms of economy, and open or closed in terms of polity²⁷.

When analysing and understanding foreign policy the focal point of the theories is both decision output itself and formulation process of decisions with their main determinants. A fraction of theories focuses on the determinants of the decision-makers whilst others tend to funnel their attention on the institutions that form the decisions. Essentially, it is all about determining which approach best explains the

²⁵ Hudson "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations", 4.

²⁶ Mark Schafer and Stephen G. Walker, "Structural International Relations Theories and the Future of Operational Code Analysis", in Mark Schafer and Stephen G. Walker (eds.), *Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics*, (Beverly Hills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 238.

²⁷ James Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", in James Rosenau, *The Study of World Politics: Theoretical and Methodological Challenges, Vol 1*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 171-200.

contents of the black-box. Hence, a hybrid of both perspectives will be used in this research as a theoretical framework in order to capture the relationship between leadership and institutions in the case of Demirel in Turkish foreign policy. When doing so, this chapter needs to assess the fundamental approaches that account for human or institutional factors and weigh their pros and cons to determine viable alternatives that are crisis driven. In the following chapters we will be testing waters with a matrix, formed by case studies to test the viability of these presumptions, whereby we will be determining how best to approach the interaction between leaders and institutions in Turkish foreign policy making in order to reach better outcomes.

2.2. Foreign Policy Crisis and Theories on Decision Making

2.2.1. Crisis and Decision Making

Decision making in foreign policy can be broadly defined as a process of planning and conducting political actions based on short-term, medium-term and long-term strategic interests that are defined and decided by decision-makers for the sake of survival of the state in international system²⁸. Even though these actions are generally the routine daily political actions with no surprising outcome, they may also be the products of pre-established strategic plans which are developed through careful calculations of state interest within long term political experience and traditional priorities. Besides, decision making in foreign policy may also bring sudden and urgent political actions just after an imminent political crisis arising from national or international factors and mainly shaped within the political environment of decision-makers as Mintz and DeReouen argue²⁹. Mintz and DeReouen classify these political actions as single actions of states, consecutive actions of states during the crisis period, consecutive and conversational actions of states based on the actions of the other, and finally the strategic actions of states in order to shape the prospective and

²⁸ Margaret Hermann, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy," *International Studies Review*, Vol.3, No.2, (2001), 47-81, 52.

²⁹ Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4.

probable actions of the other³⁰. No matter a good or bad decision it is, decision-making process includes a body of decision-maker. While some theories on foreign policy decision making focus on the role of human in decision making, some other theories prioritize the role of institutions in decision making.

Different than black-box understanding of classical realism, in neo-classical realist understanding, a foreign policy decision is shaped by domestic factors and leaders who are driven by systemic and regional channelers³¹. Şihmantepe mentions that those systemic channelers are filtered within the state apparatus and turned out to a foreign policy decision³². Middle Range theories, besides, generally focus on decision unit itself and deeply analyse main characteristics and basic operating principles of that unit in order to understand how decisions are taken in those foreign policy crises. Here, it is important for those theories to evaluate what kind of decisions are taken when the unit is a predominant single leader, a single group or a coalition. No matter agent-based (human; leadership) or structure-based (institutions) a theory is, crises periods differ from normal time decision making where those theories need to consider crises' unique characteristics. Here, Aksu notes that a crisis is different than a conflict or a dispute by its own nature where level of conflict is escalated with non-violent military acts³³. If not solved, a crisis leads to a war with violent military acts.

Then what makes the crisis decision making so different than other types of decision making? Under normal conditions, chance for long calculation of all possible consequences, facilitation of possible resources and coordination between all related institutions enable decision-makers take solid and stable policy actions. In crisis time, however, time limit, problem of facilitating the resources, pressure of

³⁰ Ibid., 415-416.

³¹ Richard. C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, "Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics", in Richard. C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin (ed.), *Foreign Policy Decision Making Revisited*, (Palgrave&McMillan, 2002), 53-54.

³² Aydın Şihmantepe, *Türk Dış Politikasında Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel & Dış Politika Kriz Davranışları Üzerine Bir Araştırma*, (İstanbul: Cinus Yayınları, 2019), 37.

³³ Fuat Aksu, "Protracted Conflicts and Foreign Policy Crises in Turkish Foreign Policy" in Kutay Karaca and Fatma Zeynep Özkurt (eds.), *New Concepts and New Conflicts in Global Security Issues*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Gelişim University Press, 2017), 65-98.

domestic political factors and facing an imminent threat brings the issue of an imminent decision which may be the second best or sufficing enough rather than the first best or optimal one unlike rational decision-making theories argue. Indeed, By referring to Holsti's definition of crisis as "A situation of unanticipated threat to important values and restricted decision time" and revisiting Brecher and Wilkenfeld's studies, Houghton mentions the main elements of a crisis time as a non-routine situation outside ordinary circumstances where existential threat to core interests brings high degree of stress and uncertainty due to urgency, time pressure and element of surprise³⁴. While Hermann utters emergence of surprise, high threat and short time in order to define a crisis, Brecher mentions finite time instead of short time and disregards the impact of surprise in order to differ crisis period from a normal period and makes a difference between foreign policy crisis and international crisis where the former is on actor level and the latter on systemic level³⁵. For Houghton, crisis time also brings centralization, decrease in alternatives and options, increased used of analytical shortcuts, increased communication and argumentation, increased pressure to attain rationality even though this rationality might be open to question³⁶. In this respect, in order to bring a broader understanding on crisis decision making, it is more important to fathom how political leaders and institutions in decision-making process are positioned. This thesis, therefore, bases its theoretical background in driving its focus on opening the black-box of foreign policy decision making in understanding how those leaders and institutions operate within that black-box, which rational decision-making theories ignore to analyse.

³⁴ David Houghton, "Crisis Decision Making in Foreign Policy", Online Publication: September, 2017, Available on <https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-403>, Last Accessed 07/03/2019.

³⁵ Charles F. Hermann, "Crisis in Foreign Policy: A Simulation Analysis" and Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfield "A study of Crisis" cited in Fuat Aksu "Türk Dış Politikası Krizlerinde Hükümetler, Cumhurbaşkanları ve Başbakanlar", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Cilt 13, Sayı 59, (2018), 65-87.

³⁶ Houghton, "Crisis Decision Making in Foreign Policy", Available on <https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-403>

What kind of government do we have? A single-party government, a coalition government, a military administration, a supra-party government, a minority government or a temporary coalition government? Which type of crises are we dealing with? An Unexpected, protracted, pre-mediated, indirect, accidental, inadvertent or humanitarian crisis? What kind of an event triggered the crisis? A political, economic, external change, non-violent, internal change to regime, non-violent military, violent or humanitarian one? What is the nature of that event? A protest, threat, accusation, subversive activity, co-operation with adversary, abandoning diplomatic relations, attrition, embargo or breach of agreement? These questions are open to be evaluated in the matrix that will be developed in the following case study chapters in order to understand the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy decision making. Crisis management theories argue that states use negotiation, jurisdiction, arbitration, mediation, non-military or non-violent military pressure, violent pressure, third party support, coercive diplomacy, limited escalation, Tit for tat, test of capacity, drawing line and conveying commitment as some of the crisis management strategies³⁷. Depending on the leadership type and institutions, those strategies may vary in consideration with the type of the crisis.

Do the political decision-makers limit their actions within the boundaries of alternative actions proposed by institutions? Do the institutions propose the most rational action among many pre-established alternatives through careful calculations or do they just advice a sufficing enough action? Foreign policy action could be shaped by environmental background and characteristics of the political leader or by the level effectiveness and traditional codes of the institutions in decision-making process. Bendor and Hammond³⁸ utter that, when to evaluate the typology and output of the political action, it matters whether the decision-maker is completely rational and fully informed or not together with whether there is a single decision-maker, many decision-makers with same goal and many decision-makers with conflicting goals.

³⁷ See the matrix for crisis management strategies in Aksu, *Türk Dış Politikasında Karar Alma ve Kriz Yönetimi Süreç Analizi*, 36-38.

³⁸ Jonathan Bendor and Thomas Hammond, "Rethinking Allison's Model", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 86, No. 2 (Jun., 1992), 301-322, 303.

Depending on the domestic national factors, international factors and interaction level of the leaders with institutions, those foreign policy decisions differentiate into different actions when they are taken by a dominant single leader or a coalition government. Here, type of the decision also affects the eagerness and motivation of the political leaders to take action. That is to say, while routine actions of daily diplomacy and specialized actions that necessitate high technical diplomatic experience do not generally appeal political leaders, crisis time actions are more inviting for them to take active role due to possible and prospective repercussions and ramifications in domestic politics and the chance to improve the position of the leader in international arena. Crises, for Houghton, -somewhat ironically- may be good for leaders, because in the short run they offer the chance to increase power capabilities. In the following part of this chapter, it is aimed to evaluate the theoretical explanations that favour human and theories that favour institutions in decision making for foreign policy crises.

2.2.2. Human Oriented Theories on Decision Making

When we look at the definitions of the foreign policy mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, which are summarized in the form of actions and reactions followed by the states in order to influence other actors outside their own sovereignty, it is unthinkable to isolate the foreign policy from the political leaders who are the decision-makers and the state institutions who are the main actors in taking or implementing these decisions. From this perspective, theories about foreign policy analysis which look beyond grand theories are mainly divided to the ones that are human-based and the ones that are institution-based.

Even though the realist approach considers the foreign policy as a set of decisions in a black-box resulting from rational calculations; both the political decision-makers of foreign policy and the level of rationality of the institutions taking part in these policies effectively are limited with the resources they take into consideration while defining their problems and opportunities, the constraints and the conditions they face. Leader oriented approaches essentially focus on the factors

behind the decisions of the political decision-makers and how they are surrounded by some constraints while they are making decisions.

Hudson³⁹ points out the importance of human-based approach in understanding foreign policy making by arguing that the end of the Cold War revealed that it was not possible to explain or predict system change at the system-level variables alone. Indeed, for her, personalities of Gorbachev, Havel and Walesa were also important variables. Within this perspective, impact of leadership appeared as an important factor in foreign policy making.

The very main question here is how the leaders make decisions in foreign policy. Although a decision-maker, acceded as a result of electoral campaigns and promises, knows that foreign policy making is a fragile, delicate and long process of protecting national interests, and knows that he does not have the capability to isolate this process from the dynamics of domestic policy. Here, Özdamar⁴⁰, by benefiting from formal rational choice theories, posits that as a result of domestic and foreign pressures, the leader calculates benefits, costs and balances between priorities of domestic politics and foreign policy's motives. Keeping his focus on human (leadership), he argues that if the leader does not have a political survival issue, s/he is ready to give up from his/her personal security for the sake of a better foreign policy⁴¹.

Operational Code Analysis and Leadership Trait Analysis

In addition to political survival issue, in an early study, Sprouts⁴² claim that the decision-makers' psychological environments, cultures and ideologies affect the foreign policy making. İşyar notes cognitive level, intelligence, information and

³⁹ Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations", 13.

⁴⁰ Özgür Özdamar, "Dış Politika Karar Alımı Sürecinde Lider Merkezli Yaklaşım: Akıllı Tercih Kuramı ve Türkiye'nin Irak Savaşına Katılmama Kararı" in Ertan Efeğil and Rıdvan Kalaycı (eds.), *Dış Politika Teorileri Bağlamında Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, (Ankara: Nobel Yayınları, 2012), 485.

⁴¹ Ibid., 486.

⁴² Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol 1, No 4, (1957), 309-328.

emotions as four key components that a leader's values are shaped⁴³. Erişen adds another variable of how leaders think about their opponents' intentions and potential strategy in their prediction, which he claims an important determinant shaped within psychological environment of the leaders⁴⁴. As one of the cognitive and psychological studies in foreign policy analysis, Winter and Stewart⁴⁵, in their study, draw attention to the importance of the life experience of leaders in shaping his/her foreign policy action. In the analysis of leadership, here, one should mention about the difference between "survival approach" and "personal attribute approach". In the former approach, leaders' choices of foreign policy can be explained in the light of the assumption that leaders seek power and how, in turn, their survival in power can be explained by their choice in international arena⁴⁶. On the other hand, "the personal attribute approach" tries to explain leaders' choices in terms of their orientation toward the use of force, their psychological traits and beliefs about the world, and their personal characteristics and background experiences, which is broadly handled in operational code analysis⁴⁷. All in all, political psychology has been utilized and operationalized in understanding the dynamics behind decision-making process of a political leader.

Operational Code Analysis

While analysing the importance of human (leadership) in foreign policy making, it is quite crucial to underline the importance of a term, namely, "operational

⁴³ Ömer Göksel İşyar, *Karşılaştırmalı Dış Politikalar: Yöntemler-Modeller-Örnekler ve Karşılaştırmalı Türk Dış Politikası*, (Bursa: Dora Basım Yayın, 2013), 246.

⁴⁴ Cengiz Erişen, "Yanlı Algilama Perspektifinden Türk Dış Politikasının Değerlendirilmesi" in Ertan Efeğil and Rıdvan Kalaycı (eds.), *Dış Politika Teorileri Bağlamında Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi, Cilt 1*, (Ankara: Nobel Yayınları, 2012), 536 and 545.

⁴⁵ Winter and Stewart, "Content Analysis as a Technique for Assessing Political Leaders" cited in Margaret G. Hermann, "Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Mar., 1980), 7-46.

⁴⁶ Jeff Carter and Giacomo Chiozza, "State Leaders and Foreign Policy", in Cameron Thies (ed.), *Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2018).

⁴⁷Ibid.

code”, an idea originated by Leites⁴⁸, and extended by George⁴⁹. Bringing a psychological approach to political belief system of the leaders shaped by social and cultural values of their voters, in order to analyse decision making mechanisms, Operational Code Analysis has been first introduced by Nathan Leites in 1951 where he searched for the political belief system and understanding of Soviet Politburo and Bolshevism for analysing the differences between Western Bloc and Eastern Bloc in Cold War. His study, later developed by Alexander George in 1969 by including five philosophical questions for understanding leaders’ political belief system and their approaches to political universe and to their opponents, and five instrumental questions for understanding instrumental beliefs and methods of leaders for using the power.

In order to understand the political belief system of a leader, asking five philosophical questions on whether the nature of political universe is friendly, mixed or hostile, whether the leader is optimistic or pessimistic in realizing fundamental values, whether predictability of political universe is low or high, whether control over historical developments is low or high and finally whether role of chance is low or high where those answers reveal the nature of political universe that a leader in. When it comes to how the leader understands his political universe, five instrumental questions are asked which seek for answers on whether leader’s direction of strategy is cooperative, mixed or conflictual, whether his intensity on his tactics depend on punishment, threatening, opposing, supporting or rewarding, whether he is risk averse or risk acceptant, whether the level of importance of timing for his actions and diversity of his actions are flexible or not, and finally whether he prefers conflictual tactics or cooperative tactics in terms of utility of means⁵⁰.

⁴⁸ Nathan Leites, *The Operational Code of Politburo*, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1951), and Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism*, (New York: Free Press, 1953).

⁴⁹ Alexander George “The Operational Code: A Neglected Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 13 (2), (1969), 190-220.

⁵⁰ Mark Schafer and Stephen Walker, “Operational Code Analysis at a Distance: The Verbs in Context Analysis of Content Analysis” in Schafer and Walker (eds.), *Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics*, 32-39.

Later on, based on those questions which they label as master beliefs, Holsti⁵¹ in 1977, developed six operational code typologies (A,B,C as harmonious with temporary conflict and D,E,F as conflictual with permanent conflict typologies) about the beliefs of leaders by considering nature and source of conflict in political world, which has been re-corrected and summarized in four operational code typologies (Type A, Type B, Type C, Type DEF) by Walker⁵² in 1990. Defining an operational code involves identifying the core political beliefs of the leader about the inevitability of conflict in the world, the leader's estimation of his/her own power to change events, as well as his/her style of pursuing goals.

Leadership Trait Analysis

When it is about leadership and its role in foreign policy making, the core of Hermann's research about leaders' personal characteristics is needed to be discussed in detail. Hermann⁵³, while analysing the stages of decision making, adds (dominant) leader to the analysis. In the pertinent stage, the leader takes the inputs and transforms them into an output, i.e. a foreign policy action. Depending on a leader's sensitivity to political realm, the output changes. That is, the less sensitive s/he is, the more independent output there occurs. At this point, an example from Turkey can be illustrative. In fact, since Turkish President is less sensitive to political realm, his foreign policy actions (the output) become more independent and thus less mediatory.

In fact, adding content analysis to operational code framework, Hermann compares and contrasts the leaders' beliefs, motivations, decisional styles, and interpersonal styles in which she comes up with "Leadership Trait Analysis". By searching through spontaneous speeches and media interviews of a political leader, she argues that sufficient clue can be obtained in order to make a trait analysis so that it could be understood about his/her decisions in foreign policy. Revisiting crusader

⁵¹ Ole R. Holsti, "The Operational Code as an Approach to the Analysis of Belief System", *Final Report to the National Science Foundation*, Grant SOC 75-15368, Duke University, (1977).

⁵² Stephen Walker "The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis", *Political Psychology*, Vol 11, No 2, (1990), 403-418.

⁵³ Margaret Hermann, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy," *International Studies Review*, Vol.3, No.2, (2001), 47-81.

vs pragmatist distinction of Stoessinger (1979), ideologue vs opportunistic distinction of Ziller (1973), directive vs consultative distinction of Bennis and Nanus (1975), transformational vs transactional distinction of Burns (1978) and task-oriented vs relation-oriented distinction of Byars (1973), she classifies leaders into 2 main groups such as problem focused and relationship focused, and 8 subgroups by benefitting operational code analysis and content analysis together and simultaneously tries to find answers to three questions about the leader, who face the challenge of controlling the policy agenda against the external variables and the difficulty of controlling the policy while transferring its authority; how the leader reacts to the political constraints, how open the leader is to the external information and what are the leader's reasons for seeking his position. Hermann states that trait analysis of the leaders can be generated from the answer for these three questions and that trait analysis reveals the expansionistic, incremental, directive and reactive subgroups of problem focused leaders and evangelistic, charismatic, consultative and accommodative subgroups of relationship focused leaders⁵⁴.

Not only Hermann's framework, but also the studies of Walter Weintraub, Richard Herrmann, and Stephen Walker and Michael Young, have all been using automated Profiler Plus⁵⁵. Today, operational code analysis method is used through a computerized programme called "Verbs in Context System", and this computerized programme, in order to find out statistical answers to those three questions mentioned above, searches through the speech texts and looks for the frequency of some specific verbs delivered by a leader in his speeches. Different than the operational code analysis, statistical scores for a leader is meaningful in leadership trait analysis if only those scores are compared to the average mean of other leaders analysed where Hermann draws a reference point for each score in her study for 122 political leaders and 87 presidents.

Here, it can be asserted that this approach which sheds light on the inner world of the leader takes the spontaneous speeches of the leaders reflecting his own ideas

⁵⁴ Margaret G. Hermann [et. al.] "Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals" *International Studies Association, Blackwell Publishing*, (2001), 84-131.

⁵⁵ For further information about that computerized programme, it is available on <https://profilerplus.org/>

into consideration rather than speeches written by the advisors or prepared before meticulously; and considers the interview responses as units of analysis by focusing on certain words in these speeches.

While approaching to the characteristics of the leader, the answer to the first question represents whether the leader challenges the surrounding constraints or respects those constraints; the answer to the second question represents whether the leader uses incoming information selectively or open to information directing his response. The answer to the third question focuses on whether the leader's desire to remain in the office is driven by internal focus of attention or by relationships that can be formed with salient constituents.

Hermann acknowledges that the leader resisting to the constraints sees these constraints as obstacles to overcome, struggles with the moment's problems abruptly and he is responsive and decisive. Thus, she asserts that the leader's responses to the developments are highly predictable. She also advocates that the leader open to information is more sensitive to his entourage and willing to gain their supports, pays attention to the views of the people surrounding him and he is negotiable. On the other hand, she states that the ones who are less open to information focuses more on convincing the other people and trying to find supporting views of them. The answer to the last question tries to define the philosophical background that the leader fed from. It mainly categorizes the leaders as two groups, the first one being driven by internal focus such as a particular cause, an ideology, a specific set of interests while the second one being driven by environmental motivations such as acceptance, power, support and acclaim.

In the table below, the categorization of characteristics and behaviours of the leaders as a summary of Hermann's studies is presented. In the next chapter of this thesis, these fundamentals are going to be used in order to analyse the operational codes and leadership traits of Süleyman Demirel.

Table 1: Leadership Trait Analysis

TRAITS TO ASSES LEADERSHIP STYLE	CHARACTERISTICS
QUESTION 1: How to understand whether they will challenge or respect constraints	
1-Belief to ability to control events (Focus on verbs and action words)	If high: active in foreign policy, maintain control on decision making, random checks to subordinates and face to face meetings, less likely to delegate authority, less prone to compromise
	If Low: reactive to situations, wait and see before acting, less likely to take initiative, willing to delegate authority.
2- Need for power and influence (Focus on verbal threat/giving advices)	If high: manipulative, Machiavellian, charming but little real regard, test before adhering an action, good in negotiation.
	If low: enable followers to feel strong, ready to sacrifice his own interests for group, team spirit, sense of justice.
If High in 1 and 2: Challenge	They are in charge, know what should happen, skilful in getting what they want directly and indirectly.
If Low in 1 and 2: Respect	Building consensus and achieving compromise.
If Moderate in 1 and 2: Middle	Move from one to other. Other traits will drive him.
If High in 1 and low in 2: Challenge	No ability to manipulate, too direct and open in use of power. Easy to predict.
If low in 1 and high in 2: Challenge	Ability to manipulate, work behind the scene.
QUESTION 2: How to understand how open they will be to contextual information (how open will leaders be to inputs from others and from political environment)	
1-Conceptual Complexity (Focus on words to show different dimensions)	If high: see issues grey than black&white, collect wide info before action.flexibility.
	If low: trust their intuition, action rather than thinking, consistency.
2-Self Confidence (Focus on “me, mine, myself, I am going to...)	If high: more immune to info coming from environment. satisfied with who they are.
	If low: Easily buffeted by contextual winds. Generally inconsistency.
If 1 is higher than 2: Open and Pragmatic	Open to listening, sensitive to situational cues, deal with problems case-by-case, make others do the job.
If 1 is lower than 2: Closed and ideologeous	Knows what will happen, tend to persuade others, insensitive to cues, tend to reinterpret environment, organize decision making hierarchically,
If High on 1 and 2: Open and Strategic	Self Confidence brings patience.
If Low on 1 and 2: Closed	Reflecting views of people around them. Sometimes brings narcissism.

Table 1 (cont'd)

QUESTION 3: How to understand what motivates leaders (why leader sought office and his need to secure his group)	
1-Task Focus (Seeking Office) (Focus on: achievement, plan, position, tactic)	If emphasize problem/task focus: moving group forward to a goal is the purpose. Always push group to work, ask for projects. Task is the focus.
	If maintaining group: establishing loyalty and keeping morale high. Sensitive to what people want, move group to a goal if they want. People in the group is the focus.
	Charismatic leader: stands in the middle.
2- Distrust of others (Focus on nouns and phrases about others: their actions harmful...)	General feeling of doubt, misgiving, suspect to others' actions.
	If high: suspicious about actions of others, nothing they do can be right, loyalty is sine qua non to work with leader. Often shuffle their advisors. hyper-sensitive to criticism.
3-Ingroup bias (Focus on how he mentions his group. With good words?)	His group holds center stage, strong emotional attachment to group.
	If high: maintain the separate identity of group. Perceive only good aspects of group. More isomorphic the leader and group. Anything said to group is said to leader. Tend to find external scapegoats to mobilize group. Look to politics as zero sum game.
Source: Margaret G. Hermann "Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis", <i>Social Science Automation</i> , 2002, 1-49	

Unlike computerized machines with concrete algorithms, humanized sensors grounded on past experience together with psychological determinants of decision-makers make the foreign policy decision-making process more complex. This complexity brings uncertainty to decisions of both decision-makers of the conflicting states in crises times. Alexander George⁵⁶, by evaluating the impact of acute stress of crises times on decision making, develops four arguments. First of all, due to impaired attention and perception, he argues that important aspects of crisis situation may escape scrutiny, conflicting values and interests at stake may be overlooked, range of perceived alternatives is likely to narrow but not necessarily to the best option and finally search for relevant options tends to be dominated by past experience; tendency to fall back on familiar solutions that have worked in the past, whether or not they are appropriate to present situation. Secondly, shortened and

⁵⁶ Alexander L. George, The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Decision Making, Available at: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK219168/> Last Accessed at 29/12/2018.

narrowed perspective causes less attention to side-effects of options and longer-range considerations and consequences of actions. Third, increased cognitive rigidity may cause increased stereotypic thinking, reduced receptivity to information that challenges existing beliefs and Impaired ability to improvise; reduced creativity. Finally, belief that one's own options are quite limited and that opponent has it within his power to prevent an impending disaster, tendency for shifting the burden to the opponent increases.

Here, using the metaphor of a drunk person searching for his keys where there is more light rather than where he dropped them, Jervis argues that decision-makers uses decision shortcuts such as simple models and decision rules, benchmarks, analogies, certainty, common dimensions and readily available information in order to decrease the burden of cognition, however those behavioural codes result in inertia, ignorance of interaction effects (inability to see separate parts of a problem) and making net assessments which may bring miscalculations⁵⁷.

All in all, in understanding the reason of why a country applies a specific foreign policy, the first perception that was analysed above focuses on the features of the leader. Since the decision-makers are human at the end of the day, this perception is understandable but not enough. That is why the second part will focus on the approach that favours institutions in explaining foreign policy choices.

2.2.3. Institutions Oriented Theories on Decision Making

The second theoretical approach is the one that argues that foreign policy choices depend on the institutions. It is important to underline the focal points of this understanding. Are foreign policy decisions products of sudden ideas and views of leaders or are they calculated carefully and filtered through a long bargaining process between different institutions? Institutions-based theories focus on the second part of question and try to understand role of state institutions in decision making which have quite longer life-time and accumulated experience compared to short-term political leaders.

⁵⁷ Robert Jervis "Drunkard's Search" in Robert Jervis, *How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2017), 338-358.

Institutions matter because they determine the way preferences of the actors are aggregated and decisions are made⁵⁸. Party fractionalisation, political instability (meaning that the probability of re-election is low for the existing government) or being a single-party or coalition government are all regarded as various dimensions of institutional perspective. Considering that these institutions affect how the foreign policy decisions are going to be made by the politicians, it is important to analyse this perspective while trying to find why and how the politicians in office implement the existing foreign policies. Kenneth Waltz⁵⁹, who is the father of structural realism, argues that the foreign policy of a country is formed by its political institutions, and tempered by its experiences and traditions. In fact, in this understanding, institutions are crucial for moderating competing policy preferences.

It is evident that in a foreign policy choice, both the leader and the institutional structure in which that leader acts mutually affect each other. In fact, if an institutional structure is in such a way that it does not allow the leader to do what s/he wants, then the leader's emotions, life experience, way of thinking, culture, ideology and way of thinking become ineffective in shaping the foreign policy choice. For example, if a country has democratic institutions, then the leader's choices depend on the institutions such as the parliament. On the other hand, if a country has a non-democratic regime, then the leader's way of thinking, ideology and culture become more effective in shaping the foreign policy choice. From this perspective, it could be argued that non-democratic regimes are more open to foreign policy change, while democratic ones are more open to foreign policy stability.

The importance of institutions was evident in the case of Vietnam. Indeed, in the hands of one man and with the lack of checks and balances from the Congress, the United States had moved too far and too fast in concentrating war-making. This specific case showed that unrestricted presidential power in foreign-policy making

⁵⁸ Douglas C. North, "Institutions", *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol 5, No 1, (1991), 97-112.

⁵⁹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1.

was neither necessary and desirable nor tolerable in a free society⁶⁰. Is it only the congress or the parliament that could be focused as state institutions?

When Allison and Zelikow analysed the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 in order to evaluate the mechanisms for institutions affecting the decisions of foreign policy decision-makers, those scholars have published one of the most referenced and criticized study about crisis decision making in foreign policy, “Essence of Decision”. In their study⁶¹, after briefly defining the rational actor model which takes the decision itself as the unit of analysis and covers decision making as a rational process based on value maximizing decisions taken under perfect knowledge of a unitary actor focused on goals and objectives, Allison and Zelikow mention that model’s fallacies and introduce two of their new middle range theoretical models in which Organizational Behaviour Model takes organizational output as unit of analysis and Bureaucratic Politics Model considers political resultant as unit of analysis.

In Cuban Missile Crisis, it was inapprehensible for US decision-makers why Soviet military officers were so relaxed and away from secrecy with their military camouflage uniforms dressed on when they constructed the missiles in the island in contrast to their complete secrecy in transportation of those missiles to the island because of their awareness of US U-2 spy planes. For explanation of that situation in their Organizational Behaviour Model (OBM), scholars argue that different state institutions with different pre-established routines without capability to change those routines in restricted time are loosely allied within governments, and institution for transporting the missiles to Cuba was a different organization than the military officers constructing those missiles within the island. According to their OBM, different states has different types of institutions and different institutions within a state have different organizational sensors for detecting political crises and pre-established institutional routines for action which pushes them to come up with a sufficing political action in order to decrease risk of failure due to time, information

⁶⁰ Foreign Affairs article is available on <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1978-09-01/foreign-policy-and-democratic-process-making-separation-powers-work>

⁶¹ Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (New York: Longman, 1999).

and resource limitations in crises times. Here, March and Simon⁶² underline the power of institutions by claiming that institutions and bureaucracy restricts the actions of nations and dictates the final outcome. Indeed, Allison and Zelikow also refers to parochial priorities and organizational imperialism in order to mention how institutions control choices of decision-maker by limiting the alternatives through one real alternative⁶³.

Starting with very similar arguments to OBM, Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM) differs by mentioning that role and impact of those different institutions with different organizational priorities mainly depend on power and network of their top leaders and they increase their role in bargaining process for decision making depending on how close networks and influential power their leaders have on top political leader. In Cuban Missile Crisis, although there were many different alternative policy actions, top leader of the Navy convinced the US President that initiating a naval quarantine, Navy's only alternative solution, was the best option. According to Tayfur, this bureaucratic politics deteriorates the rational understanding of unitary decision making where conflicting interests and priorities of institutions bring rivalry, competition, deception and jealousy in bargaining process⁶⁴.

Here, it is important to note that changing leaders and zeitgeist may change institutional priorities in time and influential power of institutions may also depend on the legal role given to them with Constitution and other legal documents. Also, Krasner criticizes OBM model because it somehow underestimates the power of the president, who appoints almost all of the key bureaucrats and key actors in foreign policy making⁶⁵. Here, the structure of administration, centrality of the political leader and external influence of the specific foreign policy on whether the foreign policy case is related to domestic politics and requires normative judgement or not

⁶² James March and Herbert Simon, *Organizations*, (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 1993).

⁶³ Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 90.

⁶⁴ M. Fatih Tayfur, "Dış Politika" in Atilla Eralp (ed.), *Devlet ve Ötesi: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), 86.

⁶⁵ Stephen D. Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important (or Allison Wonderland)", *Foreign Policy*, no. 7, (1972), 159-179.

highly affects the level of bureaucracy in being effective in foreign policy making⁶⁶. Indeed, Allison and Zelikow's study focuses on US administrative system with unique and certain institutional structure which is quite different compared to the rest of the world. Countries such as Turkey, where prime ministers are more influential in appointing the bureaucrats may pose a different situation for OBM. Besides, their study has been criticized by many scholars because it does not include the issue of uncertainty which takes an important place in foreign policy theories. This thesis, therefore, aims to develop a matrix of decision making in the following chapters in order to evaluate whether there is a unique and specific mechanism for bureaucracy in Turkish foreign policy decision making or not different than Allison and Zelikow's approaches.

2.3. A Search for Turkish Foreign Policy Literature

Does Turkish state tradition and political system enable the leaders of institutions to impose power or influence on top political leader as it is argued in Bureaucratic Politics Model? Are political decisions in Turkish foreign policy the products of a bargaining process between actors or a result of single leader's unquestioned calculations? Do state institutions offer their sufficing alternative actions based on their organizational priorities or do they fully operate in accordance with whatever the decision of single top leader or political party group is? Do state institutions have their own single organizational priorities or are there some different groups with different priorities within an institution waiting for different political governments with different ideologies so that they can switch the institutional priorities by gaining influence in their institution thanks to ideological closeness to government as Philip Robins⁶⁷ argue when talking about Turkish diplomacy?

⁶⁶Alen Maulitov, "How to Measure the Impact of Bureaucratic Politics on Foreign Policy-Making?" Available on https://www.academia.edu/10945774/How_to_measure_the_impact_of_bureaucratic_politics_on_foreign_policy-making

⁶⁷ Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War*, (London: Hurst & Company, 2003), XXV.

A search in academic literature on Turkish foreign policy shows that most of the scholars rarely seek for answers for those question where they rather prefer to bring a broad and comprehensive understanding on decision outputs and main policy orientations in a chronological perspective in terms of systemic and external factors' impact on Turkish foreign policy⁶⁸. Looking from theoretical and conceptual perspective, most of the well-known and referenced studies about Turkish foreign policy give their focus on cultural, historical and strategical dimensions and comes up with two basic principles as status-quo and westernization⁶⁹ where they divide the Turkish foreign policy into periods and try to develop broader understanding for each period. For instance, Uzgel divides modern Turkish foreign policy history according to dominance of actors in which leaders dominate the foreign policy between 1919-1950, Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy between 1950-1960, public, opposition and intelligentsia between 1960-1980, top officers of military coup between 1980-1983, Özal and business-world between 1983-1991, military and Turkish Armed Forces General Staff between 1991-2002 and finally Ak Party since 2002⁷⁰. Robins, focusing on the Post-Cold War period, argues that up until 1991 after Cold War, Turkish foreign policy experienced dominant personal approach of Özal where 1991 brought academic and bureaucratic approach and finally left to a weak, divided and competitive approach after 1994⁷¹.

Periodization of the Turkish foreign policy may be seen as a method where prioritizing different actors act as dominant decision-makers which are either political leaders, state institutions or non-state institutions. It is plausible to come up with different periodization for Turkish foreign policy which makes it easier to deal with however this thesis focuses on main structure of international system as the main

⁶⁸ Because this thesis focuses specifically on Süleyman Demirel's decision making and role of institutional priorities of state institutions on those decisions of Demirel in foreign policy, historical readings about Turkish foreign policy are not analysed in detail here. In the following chapters, those studies will be evaluated when they are relevant to the topic.

⁶⁹ Baskın Oran, "Türk Dış Politikasının Teoriği ve Pratiği" in Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 1, 1919-1980*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008), 17-54.

⁷⁰ Uzgel, "Türk Dış Politikasının Oluşturulması", 73-92.

⁷¹ Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War*, 51.

periodization in which type of the government Demirel was operating in gains importance in order to bring a comprehensible understanding for the role of political leadership and institutions in decision making of Turkish foreign policy crises.

In those studies, about Turkish foreign policy, history and geography together with cultural background that creates the values play crucial role in explaining the operating system of Turkish foreign policy. In Oran, cultural dimension is defined as Asian, Middle Eastern and European identity as triple identification of Turkishness, historical dimension as institutional and philosophical continuity with past Ottoman Empire, and strategical dimension as two global axes of west-east and north-south together with five regional axes of Europe, Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East and Mediterranean⁷². Here, status-quo is regarded as keeping itself away from revisionism and irredentism under Atatürk's rational foreign policy for newly established Republic and consubstantiated with his famous quote "*Peace at home, peace in the world*". By referring to Atatürk's own speeches, Palabıyık argues that new Turkish Republic's foreign policy orientation has been seeking for peace and refraining from war as long as an enemy threatens Turkish nation's and state's perpetuity⁷³. Here, indeed, reminding Hatay's inclusion to mainland Turkey after 1939 plebiscite and recalling the pragmatist understanding, Karaosmanoğlu defines the traditional tendency of Turkish foreign policy a cautious revisionism rather than "status quoism"⁷⁴.

Westernization, on the other hand, is regarded as developing peaceful and progressive policies towards western world through membership in West-oriented international and regional institutions in accordance with democratic understanding in which the final destination is seen to be an equal member of Western world⁷⁵. It is

⁷² Oran, "Türk Dış Politikasının Teoriği ve Pratiği", 20-29.

⁷³ M. Serdar Palabıyık, "Türkiye'de Savaş Düşüncesi", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Cilt 4, Sayı 14 (Yaz 2007), 185-215, 210.

⁷⁴ Ali Karaosmanoğlu, "Özal'ın Dış Politika Anlayışında Yaptığı Değişiklik Saymakla Bitmez", in Habibe Özdal, Osman Bahadır Dinçer, and Mehmet Yeğin (ed.), *Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası: Cilt 2*, (Ankara: USAK Yayınları, 2010), 163-183.

⁷⁵ Aknur and Ersoy argues that when Westernism and nationalism clashes in foreign policy, as two main determinants, post 1960 cases such as Cyprus intervention shows that nationalism dominates the foreign policy orientation. Müge Aknur and Rezzan Ersoy, "Siyasi Partiler ve Türk Dış Politikası", in

important here to mention that Sander argues this westernization as a product of security concerns of Turkey arising from geographical location, economic concerns that ties Turkey to Europe, and Atatürk's foreign policy orientation that prioritize western modernization⁷⁶. Bağcı notes that, unlike empires that define vital interests, small and medium size states such as Turkey define national interests in order to guarantee territorial security that is why westernization and building regional pacts in foreign policy are seen as foreign policy efforts for security concerns⁷⁷.

Having discussed the external and domestic variables in policy making process, almost all studies on Turkish foreign policy clearly notes the westernist and status-quoist tradition together with rationalist and pragmatist understanding of Turkish foreign policy making.

Putting traditional paths and tendencies aside, some scholars like Ali Faik Demir and Haydar Çakmak⁷⁸ also bring the specific issue of leadership in Turkish foreign policy making in their edited books where the questions raised in theoretical part still stay out of focus. When it comes to decision-making process and decision units, some studies search for the type of decision unit and its role on foreign policy decision outputs⁷⁹, some focus on legal role of institutions in foreign policy decisions⁸⁰, some search through personality of the political leaders and its role on

Ertan Efegil and M. Seyfettin Erol (eds.) *Dış Politika Analizinde Teorik Yaklaşımlar: Türk Dış Politikası*, (Ankara: Barış Platin Yayınları, 2012), 122.

⁷⁶ Oral Sander "Türk Dış Politikasında Sürekliliğin Nedenleri", *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, Cilt 37, Sayı 3, (1982), 105-106.

⁷⁷ Hüseyin Bağcı, "Türkiye'ye Soğuk Savaşta Biçilen Elbise Artık Dar Gelmektedir". in Habibe Özdal, Osman Bahadır Dinçer, and Mehmet Yeğin (eds.), *Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası: Cilt 4*, (Ankara: USAK Yayınları, 2011), 179. [For a comprehensive analysis of how Turkey became a part of Western Bloc after the World War II within Truman Doctrine and NATO developments, please also see Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, (Ankara: METU Press, 2001), 3-30.]

⁷⁸ Haydar Çakmak (ed.), *Liderlerin Dış Politika Felsefesi ve Uygulamaları*, (İstanbul: Doğu Kitabevi, 2013); Ali Faik Demir (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikasında Liderler*, (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 2007).

⁷⁹ Esra Çuhadar-Gürkaynak and Binnur Özkeçeci-Taner, "Decisionmaking Process Matters: Lessons Learned from Two Turkish Foreign Policy Cases", *Turkish Studies*, Vol 5: No 2, (2004), 43-78.

⁸⁰ Ertan Efegil, "Foreign Policy Making in Turkey, A Legal Perspective", *Turkish Studies*, Vol 2, No 1, (2001), 147-160.

foreign policy orientation⁸¹, some give attention specifically on crisis management and Turkish foreign policy crises⁸², and some scholars deal with operational code analysis and leadership styles of Turkish foreign policy decision-makers⁸³.

Erhan and Embel, for instance, argue that Turkish political decision-makers, who have a dominant role arising from historical and sociological legacies and legal reasons such as the duty of foreign policy making given to executive leaders by Turkish Constitutions, are affected in their foreign policy decisions by some factors such as economic development concern, building a strategic vision, seeking foreign alliance when they are in trouble in domestic politics and finally their need for success in their domestic policy agenda⁸⁴.

Çuhadar-Gürkaynak and Özkeçeci-Taner, in their study on decision-making process for 1974's decision for military intervention to Cyprus and 1999's acceptance of EU's offer for candidacy for full membership, utilizes Hermann's decision unit framework and come up with the conclusions that refutes rational unitary actor understanding of grand theories and supports the role of multiple actors in coalition groups where the crisis itself operates like a catalyser which brings a compromise between multiple actors of coalition groups in Turkish foreign policy⁸⁵. Likewise, Efeğil searches for the functioning of institutions in crises times in accordance with their roles given by legal rules and the Constitution and concludes that the dominance

⁸¹ Çakmak (ed.), *Liderlerin Dış Politika Felsefesi ve Uygulamaları*, and Demir (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikasında Liderler*.

⁸² Aksu, *Türk Dış Politikasında Karar Alma ve Kriz Yönetimi Süreç Analizi*.

⁸³ For operational code analysis and leadership trait analysis of Turkish leaders, See Barış Kesgin, "Leadership Traits of Turkey's Islamist and Secular Prime Ministers" *Turkish Studies*, Vol 14, No 1, (2013),136-157., "Tansu Çiller's Leadership Traits and Foreign Policy", *Perceptions*, Vol XVII, No 3, (Autumn, 2012), 29-50, and "Political Leadership and Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Israel and Turkey", *PhD Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Degree Program in Political Science and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas*, (Jan, 2011)

⁸⁴ Çağrı Erhan and Ersin Embel, "Türk Dış Politikasında Karar Vericileri Yönlendiren Yapısal Faktörler", *Bilig*, S:72, (2015), 145-170.

⁸⁵ Çuhadar-Gürkaynak and Özkeçeci-Taner, "Decision-making process Matters: Lessons Learned from Two Turkish Foreign Policy Cases", 43-78.

of National Security Council, Chief of Military Staff and Ministry of Foreign Affairs is as important as the role of a dominant political leader⁸⁶.

All those studies are useful for this thesis in order to look at the specific foreign policy cases from different perspectives and it is important to benefit from their multi-dimensional settings. Compared to grand theories that do not reach out into inside mechanisms of the black-box of the state, middle range theories seem more promising in understanding operating principles of state in foreign policy making. Those middle range theories, each of which are focusing on either institutions or leaders or processes, bring a greater understanding for foreign policy analysis however their attention in focusing only on one of those decision units fail to cover up those units all told.

Because the main point of this thesis is to understand the relationship between leaders⁸⁷ (specifically Demirel) and institutions on Turkish foreign policy in crises periods, it is necessary to bring a hybrid and holistic approach where the crisis cases, systemic determinants, political leaders, state institutions, legal perspective and external sources are all added into the model separately. That is why bringing a complex and multi-dimensional approach for understanding the relationship between leaders, institutions and processes in foreign policy crises is preferred in this thesis.

In terms of personal characteristics of political leaders and their impact on foreign policy making, specific studies focused on Demirel will be evaluated in detail in the next chapter on Demirel's leadership on foreign policy making. Chapters about case studies on specific Turkish foreign policy crises, on the other hand, by utilizing that hybrid approach, assess and analyse the role of political leader and institutions on those crises by evaluating the decision-making process behind each and every decision made on those crises where international, regional, domestic and organizational developments are taken consideration as variables that drives the decision making. Finally, it is aimed to come up with a matrix table for variables and decisions in order to bring a broader understanding on Turkish foreign policy decision

⁸⁶ Efeğil, "Foreign Policy Making in Turkey, A Legal Perspective", 157-158.

⁸⁷ Aknur and Ersoy notes that political leadership is quite dominant in Turkish foreign policy making where Minister of Foreign Affairs has little to do different than his/her party leader. Aknur and Ersoy, "Siyasi Partiler ve Türk Dış Politikası", 122.

making. Besides, findings about operational code analysis and leadership trait scores of Demirel is also be compared with the real decisions of him so that it could be feasible to test the consistency of the statistical findings and interpretive assumptions about his decision-making process in different times and different crises. By doing so, a more comprehensive understanding about political decision-making and external dynamics that affect this decision-making could be reached.

CHAPTER 3

DEMIREL: FROM BUREAUCRACY TO POLITICS

There is no place for anger in foreign policy. When I was prime minister, in his visit to Turkey in 1967, I asked De Gaulle how he conducted his foreign policy. He replied me that ‘Big states do not conduct their foreign policy on the streets.’

Süleyman Demirel⁸⁸

If bringing prosperity to a country is the final lofty goal of domestic politics, then winning elections with a political party by convincing the voters for being the right political choice is the ultimate means for a political leader. Political leaders have to keep in mind that winning the elections is needed in order to be in power and to be the political decision-maker. Unlike domestic decision-making, the foreign policy front needs a broader calculation by factoring in international dynamics that encompasses many agents and once a wrong decision is taken, it is harder to retract its catastrophic ramifications. Making the right foreign policy decisions may necessitate to unshelve the imminent priorities of voters on the one hand, and to concurrently convince them of their long-term advantages.

What then makes a political decision maker successful and remarkable in foreign policy decision-making? Is it his/her capability to do things right or do the right things? While a bureaucrat proposes a political action propped up by a cost-benefit analysis within the boundaries of his institutional capacity and capability without a clear concern for public voters, a political decision maker has to reshape

⁸⁸ Cited by Mehmet Ali Bayar in interview with him on 23/09/2019 in Istanbul.

that political action within his operational codes matured through his experience under a strict concern for voters' preferences. As mentioned earlier in the previous chapter, the concern for voters' expectations peak if the elections are tight, yet such concerns remain following the elections⁸⁹. In this respect, foreign policy decision-making in Turkish political life became harder after the 1960s due to the existence of multiple actors in politics with diverse ideological backgrounds and endowed capacity to put pressure on political decision makers before the public eye. It was under such circumstances that Süleyman Demirel rose to fame in Turkish political life and became a leading figure for almost forty years; rendering the worthiness of a special attention, in academic literature, to his political life. Turning to politics, having garnered a decade of bureaucratic experience, he won his first election against the "National Chief", namely İsmet İnönü, under the strict pressure of military tutelage of the 1960 coup d'état and went on to rule Turkey for almost twenty years; thirteen of which as prime minister and seven of which as president in Cold War and Post-Cold War periods.

Distinguished Members of the Supreme Assembly!... We deeply supplicate from God in order to be vouchsafed of creating an advanced, prosperous, productive and happy Turkey altogether as the honoured members of this historic Assembly who are full of with patriotism.⁹⁰

While making the closing statements of his first speech at the National Assembly after winning his first election as the leader of the Justice Party, Prime Minister Demirel, or with full name Sami Süleyman Gündoğdu Demirel⁹¹, there was no denying that his reign would be treacherous. His journey from İslamköy (a small village of Atabey town at the province of Isparta where he was born in 1924 and finished primary school) to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey was thorny and

⁸⁹Özdamar, "Dış Politika Karar Alımı Sürecinde Lider Merkezli Yaklaşım: Akıllı Tercih Kuramı ve Türkiye'nin Irak Savaşına Katılmama Kararı", 486.

⁹⁰ Demirel's first speech at the National Assembly declaring government programme on 3rd November 1965. Translated from İrfan Neziroğlu and Tuncer Yılmaz (eds.), *Başbakanlarımız ve Genel Kurul Konuşmaları-Cilt 5*, (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 2014), 133.

⁹¹ Süleyman Sami's first surname "Gündoğdu" was given by his primary school teacher Sadık Doğan. Later in 1934 his family, inspired from his grandfather's occupation, got the surname "Demirel" due to "Surname Act". Hulusi Turgut, *Demirel'in Dünyası*, (İstanbul: ABC Ajansı Yayınları, 1992), 63.

necessitated perseverance. Most of the available written sources about his life and leadership are compiled either from Demirel's own written statements and published books⁹² or from written works of Arat⁹³, Arzık⁹⁴, Donat⁹⁵, Komsuoğlu⁹⁶, Kazdağlı⁹⁷ and Turgut,⁹⁸ some of which are academic studies about his political leadership and the rest are mainly assessments about his political life based on his speeches or interviews done with him⁹⁹. In the following part, this chapter first briefly summarizes Demirel's biography, then analyses his leadership skills and personal characteristics and finally evaluates his approach to main foreign policy issues of Turkey.

3.1. A Summary of Demirel's Biography

As the first Prime Minister of peasantry origins, he was made into a role model and success story for the ordinary citizens whilst carrying the burden of elevating the peasants' standards to that of the urban class. Statements such as “*the cause of village and peasantry is the cause of humanity*¹⁰⁰” hinted at how he would mould his party programme so to convince the voters of being the right choice.

⁹² Süleyman Demirel, *1971 Buhranı ve Aydınlığa Doğru*, (Ankara: Doğu Matbaası, 1973).

⁹³ Yeşim Arat “Süleyman Demirel: National Will and Beyond” in Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), *Political leaders and democracy in Turkey*, (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2002).

⁹⁴ Nimet Arzık, *Demirel'in İçi Dışı*, (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1985).

⁹⁵ Yavuz Donat, *Cumhuriyet'in Karakteri: Süleyman Demirel Anlatıyor*, (İstanbul: Merkez Kitap, 2005).

⁹⁶ Ayşegül Komsuoğlu, *Siyasal Yaşamda Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel*, (İstanbul: Bengi Yayınları, 2008).

⁹⁷ Celal Kazdağlı, *Demirel'in Liderlik Sırları*, (İstanbul: Beyaz Yayınları, 1999).

⁹⁸ Hulusi Turgut, *Demirel'in Dünyası*, (İstanbul: ABC Ajansı Yayınları, 1992); Hulusi Turgut, *Güniz Sokağı*, (İstanbul: ABC Ajansı Yayınları, 1987).

⁹⁹ Also, Murat Arslan's study on Demirel's political life and Aydın Şihmantepe's study on Demirel's decision-making on foreign policy crises would be mentioned as recent academic studies. See Murat Arslan, *Süleyman Demirel*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2019) and Şihmantepe, *Türk Dış Politikasında Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel & Dış Politika Kriz Davranışları Üzerine Bir Araştırma*,

¹⁰⁰ As quoted in Arzık, *Demirel'in İçi Dışı*, 34.

He was born in a small village, bred in traditions and religious rituals, lived in a conservative family where he achieved to be a hafiz of Quran. He was successful enough to combine his traditional peasantry background with liberal values of modern city life following his move to Istanbul where he graduated from High Engineering School, today known as Civil Engineering Faculty of Istanbul Technical University. His public service at the higher echelons of the bureaucracy coupled with his government sponsored training programme, in USA, and his party leadership, which came at a very tender age, elevated Demirel to prominence in the right-wing political life where he became the political hope for the many aspiring prosperity.

Here, one may need to ask three questions: Why did he choose to be a bureaucrat rather than a private sector employee? How was he sent to USA for the training course? Why did he prefer the right wing of politics to the left?

He started university as a mechanical engineering student but then moved onto the civil engineering department. Reminiscing his childhood days where his mother would carry water from afar, he explains the reason for his move between departments:

[M]y main objective was to carry the melted snow from the high mountains of Davraz to our valley. My mum would carry the water from as far as 150 meters away from our house. Women in Anatolia were burdened with carrying water so I decided to be hydraulic engineer.¹⁰¹

He was a grantee during his study in High Engineering School and had to work in public service for reimbursement. At this point, he found the chance to start working at General Directorate of Electrical Power Resources Survey and Development Administration in 1949, which provided him with an opening to make advanced studies in US Reclamation Bureau. Since the project he was working on had an American partnership, he found the opportunity to make friends such as the project manager Charles Travis, who then went on to pave his journey to USA¹⁰². Upon his return, he worked in the capacity of the Head of Department for dams and hydroelectric power plants. Later, following his second study trip to USA with the

¹⁰¹ Turgut, *Demirel'in Dünyası*, 136.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 133.

Eisenhower Foundation Scholarship, he was assigned as the Director General of State Hydraulic Works.

His position at the State Hydraulic Works and his ambitious projects on irrigation, potable water and dam construction meant he was later acquainted with Adnan Menderes, the Prime Minister of his time. Helped by his nationalistic and Islamic political background, nurtured during his high school and bachelor years, he decided enter politics with the newly established right-wing party, Justice Party, which was founded after the 1960 military coup. At the time he specifically mentioned, *“I didn’t go into politics, I was thrown into politics. Thrown as a result of the reality of Turkey.”*¹⁰³ Later, he explained that the exact date in which he decided to enter into politics was on 17 September 1961, the day the state went ahead with Menderes’ execution¹⁰⁴.

Menderes set a high value on Demirel’s quick-wit and smart way of explaining issues related to his job when he was travelling all around Turkey as the Director General of State Hydraulic Works. When Menderes let him make an inaugural speech for opening of Seyhan Dam in April, 1956, that first public speech ranked as a notable memory for Demirel because he reminded that he had a great chance to help public for reaching a civilized level with his projects. Demirel telling even tiny details about irrigation and dam projects thanks to his retentive memory aroused Menderes’s attention where he mentioned, *“That guy put Turkey in his pocket. Take him now and assign as minister. Next time, he may easily be prime minister.”*¹⁰⁵

While he honed his career by being a party leader at a very young age, his experience with American firms such as Morrison Knudsen Inc, would hold him back and induce accusations of freemasonry by his political opponent Sadettin Bilgiç (leader of the conservative group in Justice Party and a rival for the party

¹⁰³ Ibid., 193.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 385.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 132.

leadership)¹⁰⁶. Indeed, when he became the party leader of Justice Party, he had the advantage of being a young but experienced former high level bureaucrat with state experience who was not carrying any baggage of desire for revenge from past experiences of 1960 coup on the one hand but disadvantage of being accused of running away after the party raid of 1962, of being a member of freemasonry and his early photograph taken with US President Johnson, who was known as the owner of famous Johnson Letter¹⁰⁷. Even though Demirel burst into prominence by being the hope of the right-wing voters, he was by and largely challenged by rival right-wing political leaders in the following years of his political life such as Necmettin Erbakan and Turgut Özal, who were also his colleagues from High Engineering School with similar political backgrounds. Unlike Demirel, Erbakan's tendency to quarrel with the state's official ideology and the values of the Republic, for the sake of political Islamism, could have pushed him to the extreme. Özal did not see eye to eye with Demirel either, namely, state institutions and their accumulative experience was of considerably lesser value to Özal. Interestingly, in 1946 just after the Second World War, due to the popular wave of anti-communist ideology of the time, they all took part in the infamous attack at the leftist Tan Newspaper even though Demirel later claimed that he could not remember whether Özal and Erbakan were present on the day. He pointed out that he was just protesting the communist antagonism by Stalin, in line with his own nationalistic political background, and that he did not take part in the acts of vandalism¹⁰⁸.

After the 1980 military coup, Demirel was banned from politics together with his political opponents Bülent Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan and Alparslan Türkeş as a result of the 1982 referendum¹⁰⁹. Nevertheless, he continued to offer his counsellor

¹⁰⁶ Here, Bilgiç in his memoirs, argues that it was 1962 Justice Party Convention when Demirel was accused of being freemason by his opponents and refuses to be part of that group who blamed Demirel in that respect. See Saadettin Bilgiç, *Hatıralarım*, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 2002).

¹⁰⁷ Arslan, *Süleyman Demirel*, 69.

¹⁰⁸ Fikret Bila's interview with Demirel published in 11/09/2005. Available on <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/Tan%20Gazetesi%20Baskini/> Last accessed on 01/06/2019.

¹⁰⁹ In this period of political ban, Demirel read many books about autobiographies of famous state leaders. Interview with Muhsin Demirel on 17/09/2019 in Ankara.

services to active politicians with the nickname “Trainer, Technical Director, A Clued-Up” and finally “The Father” up until the removal of the political ban by the referendum held on 6 September 1987. It was quite vexatious for him that Özal, whom Demirel trusted and was confident enough to assign as the Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry, squabbled with Demirel, before the referendum, with respect to the removal of his political ban.

After winning the race for the leadership of the True Path Party on 24 September 1987, “The Father” revived his active political life by being elected as the Deputy of Isparta, in his first elections on 29 November 1987, two months after the removal of his political ban, thus with no preparation. After winning the elections in 1991, he became the Prime Minister under a coalition government until the death of Özal in 1993 when he became the President of the Republic of Turkey. Upon the end of his presidential tenure, he chose to ditch his political life, in the year 2000, and opt for a life in his apartment at Güniz Sokak of Ankara. His wife, Nazmiye Demirel, gave her full support to Süleyman Demirel through his hardships until her death in 2013. All throughout Nazmiye Demirel preferred to remain low key and set an example of a traditional family.

The former President and the third longest-serving Prime Minister of Turkey, Demirel continued to advice political leaders until the age of 91 before his passing away on 17 June 2015. Throughout his political life he served as prime minister multiple times: under the single party government from 1965 to 1971, under the Nationalist Front Governments from 31 March 1975 to 21 June 1977, and from 21 July 1977 to 5 January 1978. After a brief period of being in opposition, he became Prime Minister again under a single party minority government in November 1979 however, he had to vacate following the 1980 military coup as he had done in 1971 subsequent to the military memorandum. Throughout his early life, he got experience about social and economic realities of Turkey thanks to his job in State Hydraulics Works and he learned how to work with western people thanks to his time spent in the USA and Morrison Knudsen¹¹⁰. He was an experienced decision-maker who was very cognizant of the convincing that had to be done to stay in power thus he remains

¹¹⁰ Turgut, *Demirel'in Dünyası*, 124.

influential in Turkish foreign policy cases where he managed a total of seven foreign policy crises, the highest number for any Turkish prime minister together with İnönü.

3.2. Personal Characteristics and Leadership Analysis of Demirel

3.2.1. Personal Characteristics

What makes Demirel such a unique and successful political leader, i.e. what solidified his role in the Turkish political life, for almost forty years, and how did he end up in winning most of the elections he ran in? In political life, political parties are highly consubstantiated with political leadership where voters identify their political beliefs with a party through its leadership and see the political leader a direct channel to pay the party to account. In this respect, Komsuoğlu argues that it was the first time in Turkish political life with Justice Party where low and middle class started to share rural party administration with local notables and little bourgeoisie¹¹¹. Considering this, it would be right to mention that, even though Demirel's daily lifestyle would be closer to elite society than the peasants after he left rural life¹¹², Demirel put great effort on creating his image on being a pacemaker for ordinary folk as being a member of it where “*Sülü the Shepherd*¹¹³” of small village of Isparta became a prime minister. Demirel, himself, mentioned that many citizens from rural areas were visiting and shaking his hand when he was prime minister in order to be sure whether “one of them” were really sitting in prime ministry office or not¹¹⁴. Thus, according to Feroz Ahmad, the rural population looked up to Demirel as an inspiring model and regarded him as the man who could realize their dreams even

¹¹¹ Komsuoğlu, *Siyasal Yaşamda Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel*, 339.

¹¹² As an example, Demirel mentions that he was going night clubs for entertainment in 1950s which could be labelled as a sign of upper-class life style at that time. (Turgut, *Demirel'in Dünyası*, 147). Likewise, Demirel notes that, after Erim declared to resign his government when Demirel withdrew his support, they celebrated it by drinking “Black Label” whiskey. With his own words in “12 Mart Belgeseli 10. Bölüm | Rövanş | 32.Gün Arşivi”, available on <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kTTYWPNU2SE>. Last accessed on 14/04/2019.

¹¹³ In order to show that he is part of ordinary folk, he was tagged with several nicknames such as “Sülü the Shepherd” See Arslan, *Süleyman Demirel*, 27.

¹¹⁴ Tekin Erer, *Lider Demirel*, (? : Ceylan Matbaası, 1977), 30.

though he was non-military bureaucratic elite¹¹⁵. Under this circumstance, he organised his political leadership in domestic politics based on being the representative of the folk and spokesman of silent crowds against the elitist partnership of military and Republican People's Party¹¹⁶.

His lifelong friend Cindoruk defines Demirel as a rational and prudent liberal democrat who had believed the rule of law throughout his life and even carried the Constitution in his pocket for all life¹¹⁷. Looking on this argument, what kind of personal characteristics could be mentioned for the memorableness of Demirel in political leadership?

Çavuşoğlu utters that his retentive memory, ability to recognize most of the people he only saw once, hardworking, powerful public speeches and appeal to the grassroots of the political constituency make Demirel a unique leader¹¹⁸. When addressing his speech skills, Demirel, once quoted from İsmet İnönü, who said “[...W]atch that guy's speeches like a hawk; he talks very differently.¹¹⁹”. Here, it is important to mention Komsuoğlu's argument that this specific way of speech is a conscious method of Demirel's political leadership and mass communication technique in which he defines himself as the defender of ordinary citizens against the core elite¹²⁰. According to Tuncer, flexibility in adapting to changing dynamics of politics by refraining from any rigid ideology, pragmatism in the face of opportunities

¹¹⁵ Feroz Ahmad, “Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye: 1954-1980” cited in Gökmen Kılıçoğlu, “Süleyman Demirel'in Dış Politika Felsefesi ve Uygulamaları”, in Haydar Çakmak (ed.), *Liderlerin Dış Politika Felsefesi ve Uygulamaları*, (İstanbul: Doğu Kitabevi, 2013), 64.

¹¹⁶ Komsuoğlu, *Siyasal Yaşamda Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel*, 257.

¹¹⁷ Hüsametdin Cindoruk's comments on Demirel is available in the printouts of the panel held by Vakıf 2000 and moderated by A. Kurtcebe Temoçin, “Demirel the Legend: In the Memory of the Ninth President Süleyman Demirel”, *Vakıf 2000*, (23 May 2017), 21-30.

¹¹⁸ Hüseyin Çavuşoğlu, “Süleyman Demirel'in Siyasal Hayatı ve Kişisel Özellikleri”, *The Journal of Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences*, Süleyman Demirel University, C.21, S.3, (2016), 1043-1051.

¹¹⁹ Mehmet Ali Birand, Can Dündar and Bülent Çaplı, *12 Mart: İhtilalin Pençesinde Demokrasi*, (İstanbul: Can Sanat Yayınları, 2016), 136.

¹²⁰ Ayşegül Komsuoğlu, “Türkiye'de Siyasal Liderlik ve Kitle İletişimi: Bir Örnek İnceleme, Süleyman Demirel”, 38. *ICANAS (International Congress of Asian and North African Studies)*, Ankara, Türkiye, 10-15 Ekim 2007, 1933-1950.

thanks to his optimistic and result oriented attitude, capability to melt his traditional background into a modern democratic stance and his selective language, depending on the audience, make Demirel a beacon of Turkish political life¹²¹. In this respect, Kazdağlı quotes from Demirel saying “[...I]f I were dealing with an intellectual group’s platform, I would have talked differently. Now, I am dealing with peasants and I need to talk to them in their vernacular.”¹²²

Pragmatism in political life is mentioned as another characteristic of Demirel where he refrained from strictly attaching himself to any ideological groups even though he stayed close to most of the right-wing groups in his earlier life¹²³. Rather than a romantic who was led by emotional reactions to critical issues, Arat¹²⁴ labels Demirel as a pragmatic and realistic leader by focusing on his famous quote “*Yesterday is yesterday, today is today*”. In this respect, shifts in his political attitude and discourse throughout years fits in his pragmatic understanding to stay in power where Arcayürek mentions that Demirel’s unending desire to stay in politics brought him an unbreakable tenacity¹²⁵. Heper utters that Demirel was man of reason and calculations with his intuitive judgement and innate caution who believed to bridge a respect between civilian government and the military for the sake of democracy¹²⁶.

Through his political life, Demirel’s political discourse changed notably depending on the type of the opponents and circumstances of political atmosphere. In 1960s, he claimed to be the defender of democracy and national will for the sake of ordinary citizens against elitist attitude of İnönü’s Republican People’s Party and military. 1970s’ Demirel, on the other hand, faded out his earlier informative

¹²¹ Nil Tuncer “Süleyman Demirel” in Ali Faik Demir (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikasında Liderler*, (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 2007), 125-234.

¹²² Kazdağlı, *Demirel’in Liderlik Sırları*, 11.

¹²³ Arslan, *Süleyman Demirel*, 33.

¹²⁴ Arat, “Süleyman Demirel: National Will and Beyond”, 91.

¹²⁵ Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Cüneyt Arcayürek Açıklıyor: 5& Demirel Dönemi 12 Mart Darbesi 1965-1971*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1992), 16.

¹²⁶ Metin Heper, “Chapter 13: Conclusion” in Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı (ed.), *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*, (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2002), 221-229.

speeches and shined out with his nationalistic and conservative discourse and accused Ecevit's Republican People's Party of helping to nurture communism where Demirel aimed to take military in his side in fight against communism on the one hand and to consolidate right wing votes in his party where Necmettin Erbakan and Alpaslan Türkeş were rising in the right wing as two major rivals¹²⁷. When it was after 1980s, however, Demirel's political discourse surprisingly shifted to ideas like freedom, justice and democracy and started to have good relations with leftist intellectuals after he was banned from political life due to 1980 military coup.

One can argue that these changes were either results of a learning process of political experience through time or due to a pragmatic understanding for staying in power. Arslan, for example, argues that Demirel's tolerance for student protests and military's attitude was because of his compulsory obedience to 1961 Constitution's liberal structure rather than his sincere belief to liberal values, that is why his discourse changed after those values of the Constitution changed after 1971 military memorandum¹²⁸. Donat, from another perspective, mentions Demirel's pragmatism with a reference to his positive attitude to readmission of political figures in to his party where he said "*Marshalling the resources is important in politics. You need to embrace. It does not matter whether he was with Özal or military. It is important that he is with us now.*"¹²⁹ According to Bayar, on the other hand, Demirel's pragmatism was in a Kantian way rather than a Machiavellian approach¹³⁰.

Another personal characteristic attributed to Demirel's leadership is his patience and timing in political issues where he did not give up in conflictual or challenging situations even in the worst time. Cindoruk notes that Demirel was never

¹²⁷ Komsuoğlu, *Siyasal Yaşamda Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel*, 188.

¹²⁸ Arslan, *Süleyman Demirel*, p 13. [Indeed, Demirel mainly criticized 1961 Constitution for only defining what citizens can do but failing to define what they cannot do, which in return brought lack of necessary sanctions for some actions and that caused increase in activities against the functioning of state regime. For Demirel's discussion about 1961 Constition, See Demirel, *1971 Buhranı ve Aydınlığa Doğru*, 21-22.]

¹²⁹ Donat, *Cumhuriyet'in Karakutusu: Süleyman Demirel Anlatıyor*, 171.

¹³⁰ Bayar means that a long-term rational pragmatism for achieving peace was dominant in Demirel rather than a short term oriented one. Interview with Bayar.

pessimistic in his life and he always looked for a possible solution in times of political turmoil and problems¹³¹. Demirel, himself, mentions his earlier rustic life as the main source of his patience where he was able to wait for months in order to pick the harvest after he planted the seeds. Arzık quotes with his own words that “...*We are peasants. We plant the seeds, wait and pick the harvest. We do not expect to get the results in one day.*”¹³² At this point, Komsuoğlu points out Demirel’s timing skill with regard to his patience that he always waited for the right time to act in order not to step back in his actions or speeches where withdrawing the constitutional change bill for letting Celal Bayar in politics due to potential military intervention threat in May 1969 and bringing it again and ratifying in November 1969 after winning the elections when that threat faded out¹³³. It is noteworthy that Demirel was intensely criticized by Menderes family after this withdrawal¹³⁴.

Demirel has been mostly compared with Özal in political leadership by the right-wing society and unlike Özal, Demirel had been best remembered for his positive attitude towards state institutions and bureaucrats where he carefully got on well with the system without threatening its routine operational structure. When Demirel was defining his family, he interestingly selected the words that “[...*M*]y family neither discomforted the society nor was uncomfortable with the society... We were living a modest life with our natural conservative values”¹³⁵ which could be regarded as his main understanding about getting on well with existing system. As two examples for his careful attitude in order not to violate the system, it could be

¹³¹ Cindoruk’s comments in Vakıf 2000 panel.

¹³² Quoted from Arzık in Kazdağlı, *Demirel’in Liderlik Sırları*, 13.

¹³³ Komsuoğlu, *Siyasal Yaşamda Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel*, p 170. [In official documents of US Secretary of State, this threat of military intervention was reported to US Presidential Office by Embassy in Ankara mentioning that Chief of Joint Forces, Memduh Tağmaç warned the President Sunay with a letter that all forces was ready for a military takeover in 20th May late night if the bill was ratified. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume XXIX Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, eds James E. Miller, Douglas E. Selva and Laurie Van Hook (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 423, Available on <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d423> Last accessed on 03/08/2019

¹³⁴ For newspaper copies of the criticism, See Acar Tuncer, *Belgelerle ve Olaylarla Demirel’in Gerçek Yüzü*, (İzmir: Doğruluk Matbaası, 1987), 73-79.

¹³⁵ Arzık, *Demirel’in İçi Dışı*, 32.

uttered when he first refused to be the Director General of State Hydraulic Works by asserting that there were potential candidates within the bureaucracy of State Hydraulic Works¹³⁶ and when he refused the solution for being selected as a senator instead of a recently resigned one in order to be prime minister by asserting that he would prefer to be elected in elections rather than being selected as a senator¹³⁷.

Looking from this perspective, Demirel was respecting to existing state institutions and trying not to discomfort them. According to Zeybek, Demirel was getting on well with bureaucracy not because he was scared of its power but Demirel worked as a high-level bureaucrat and respected bureaucratic expertise due to accumulated experience and institutional memory which could help him to set political priorities based on that information¹³⁸. With his own words, Demirel mentioned that “*You should run the state with the help of bureaucrats. If you ignore them, you suffocate and get stuck.*”¹³⁹ Likewise, Inel also mentions that Demirel approached state affairs more seriously than Özal did¹⁴⁰. Here Ceyhun, Minister of State for Economic Affairs, for illustrating Demirel’s approach to state affairs for 24 January 1980 decisions and economic measures, reports his speech saying that “*Economic measures are painful but serving for the country is more important than making politics and collective responsibility is needed*”¹⁴¹.

Last but not least, Demirel has been well remembered for his cautious attitude in keeping the balance in varied factors and his tendency for consultation with his group in crucial and critical issues. In terms of his tendency for consultation, Demirel was well known with being a good listener where he had taken notes in all

¹³⁶ Turgut, *Demirel’in Dünyası*, 127.

¹³⁷ Arslan, *Süleyman Demirel*, 39 and 76.

¹³⁸ Interview with Namık Kemal Zeybek on 11/07/2019 in Ankara.

¹³⁹ Donat, *Cumhuriyet’in Karakütüsü: Süleyman Demirel Anlatıyor*, 76.

¹⁴⁰ Hakan İnel “Turgut Özal ve Süleyman Demirel’in Siyasi Liderliklerinin Bürokrasi ile İlişkiler Açısından Karşılaştırılması” *The Journal of Europe-Middle East Social Science Studies*, Volume 2 Issue 2 (April 2016), 181-215, 201.

¹⁴¹ H. Özdemir, *Turgut Özal*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2014) as cited in Arslan, *Süleyman Demirel*, 168

conversations even though he would not need due to his excellent memory¹⁴². Cindoruk adds his calmness to his cautious attitude and notes Demirel's reply in his question about whether he had ever got angry, by saying that "*I sometimes get angry, clench my fist but then put it inside my pocket instead of table thumping*"¹⁴³.

His cautiousness is associated with multiple plans for any cases or unexpected difficulties by Komsuoğlu where she notes that, after Justice Party was closed by military regime, Demirel gave the task of establishing a new party to Necmettin Cevheri and İsmet Sezgin as an alternative plan in case Saadettin Bilgiç and Nahit Menteşe got arrested¹⁴⁴. Çağlayangil, Demirel's long serving Minister of Foreign Affairs, in addition, mentions his cautious attitude and his clear orientation for consultation mechanisms irrespective of the foreign policy type at hand¹⁴⁵. Demirel, making a clear distinction between western and eastern approaches to problems, noted that "[...]*Western societies analyse reasons in order to reach to a result however eastern societies pre-assume the result and search for potential reasons that fit in*"¹⁴⁶". In this respect, Kazdağlı also quotes from Demirel saying that:

I would never act with a pre-convinced opinion. I would never preach with my pre-assumptions. I assess all factors affecting a situation and come up with a result. The point is whether to be rational or emotional.¹⁴⁷

In addition to his cautiousness, his aim to balance multiple power sources is best exemplified with his desire to balance the military arising from bad experiences of 1960 coup. On the one hand, he was keeping a balance between different groups within his party, on the other hand he was trying to deteriorate influence of military

¹⁴² Interviews with Hikmet Çetin, Murat Karayalçın, Onur Öymen and Mehmet Ali Bayar.

¹⁴³ Cindoruk's comments in Vakıf 2000 panel.

¹⁴⁴ Komsuoğlu, *Siyasal Yaşamda Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel*, 229.

¹⁴⁵ Çağlayangil mentions that all hard-core staff would consult to Demirel before a critical decision where Demirel did the same. See Tanju Cılızoğlu, *Çağlayangil'in Anıları-Kader Bizi Una Değil Üne İtti*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2007), 21-22.

¹⁴⁶ Komsuoğlu, *Siyasal Yaşamda Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel*, 108.

¹⁴⁷ Kazdağlı, *Demirel'in Liderlik Sırları*, 46.

in political life while at the same time trying not to annoy the military. Komsuoğlu here notes that Demirel had a tendency to ignore other powers when he felt himself powerful enough¹⁴⁸.

His game of balancing the military by getting on well sometimes but resisting it on some occasions has its clues in many aspects some of which can be summarized as cooperating with the military in selecting Cevdet Sunay as president, withdrawing constitutional change bill in 1969 by saying that “[...R]einstating the political rights is our duty. Isn't it also our duty not to offend the army?”¹⁴⁹ on the one hand but discharging Cemal Tural from Chief of General Staff and also refusing to approve General Faruk Gürler as President by preferring Fahri Korutürk (a retired Admiral)¹⁵⁰ on the other hand. Indeed, Demirel's cooperative attitude towards military was criticized as being a white feather after he was forced to resign due to 1971 military memorandum and as cited in Komsuoğlu, Sakallıoğlu argues that his reconciliatory attitude resulted in an excessive compromise¹⁵¹. Here Zeybek claims that Demirel never showed a sign of white feather against military but he respected the military institution as the primary source of power in foreign policy issues and expected the military to stay within its defined legal institutional role¹⁵². Indeed, Komsuoğlu also notes that Demirel started to act less cooperative and less timorous against military after 1971 memorandum where she gives the example of how Demirel withdrew his support for Erim government which was supported by military¹⁵³. Likewise, Cebeci

¹⁴⁸ Komsuoğlu, *Siyasal Yaşamda Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel*, 156.

¹⁴⁹ Milliyet, 22nd May 1969, as cited in Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç, “İç ve Dış Politikada Çeşitlilik: 1965-1971” in Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç and Cihat Göktepe (eds.), *İç ve Dış Gelişmelerle Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi: 1946-2012*, (İstanbul: Ufuk Yayınları, 2014), 161.

¹⁵⁰ Demirel rejected the offer of military to select General Gürler as president in order not to generate a traditional understanding for Chief of General Staff to see Presidency as the next step. Demirel cooperated with Ecevit secretly and selected Korutürk as the new president. When this secret meeting with Ecevit became apparent after Demirel denied, he said his famous words that “*Yesterday is yesterday, today is today*”. See Kazdağlı, *Demirel'in Liderlik Sırları*, 196.

¹⁵¹ Komsuoğlu, *Siyasal Yaşamda Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel*, 172.

¹⁵² Interview with Zeybek.

¹⁵³ Komsuoğlu, *Siyasal Yaşamda Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel*, 179.

also quotes Demirel's response on TAF-Force Commanders' request for visiting him, saying that *"As a party leader, I do not meet commanders. If they need to say something to me, they should go to prime minister so that he could tell me. I know what state is and how state should operate."*¹⁵⁴

Demirel summarized his understanding of consultation by saying that *"forming a government is like selecting the most fitting from the elected and ambitious batch of deputies without offending the other elected and ambitious ones."*¹⁵⁵ Here, Zeybek mentions that Demirel found it noteworthy to make a distinction between pluralist decision-making and multi-headed decision-making where he listened to all proposals and ideas of each and every counterparts in a case but made his final decision by himself based on those technical information provided¹⁵⁶. A pluralist decision-making, where each member of the group proposes his/her opinions from his/her own perspective in order to nourish the final decision of the group leader that is to be obeyed and operated by the entirety of the group, can be seen as a harmony in decision making. Multi-headed decision-making, on the other hand, generates inconsistency, lack of coordination and chaos where each member of the group follows different paths due to their different views create a problem and this lack of common wisdom paves the way for sharp edges that cannot be sanded off at times.

3.2.2. Leadership Analysis

In theoretical background chapter, operational code analysis of Alexander George has been summarized in which answers to five questions about political belief and answers to five questions about instrumental belief give clues about how a political leader make decisions based on his background. Besides, Hermann's leadership trait analysis also examines a political decision maker in terms of his reactions to the political constraints, his openness to external information and his

¹⁵⁴ Yüksel Cebeci, *Silahların Gölgesinde Demirel*, (? : Latin Matbaası, 1975), 50.

¹⁵⁵ Arcayürek, *Cüneyt Arcayürek Açıklıyor: 5& Demirel Dönemi 12 Mart Darbesi 1965-1971*, 18.

¹⁵⁶ Interview with Zeybek.

reasons for seeking his position. In this respect, Kesgin, in his study about leadership trait analysis of Post-Cold War Turkish prime ministers, finds out that average Turkish prime ministers in Post-Cold War period have a friendly view of political universe, optimistic attitude about realizing political goals, their belief about predictability of political future and control over historical development are low and role of chance is high in terms of political belief. When it comes to instrumental belief, those prime ministers show a cooperative characteristic in direction of strategy and in their intensity of tactics, low to medium level of risk acceptance, medium flexibility between their cooperative and conflictual tactics and between their words and deeds, and “appeal” as the most preferred means of action. According to Kesgin, unlike opportunistic leadership style of Ecevit, Yılmaz and Gül or collegial style of Çiller, Demirel presents a directive leadership style in Post-Cold War period¹⁵⁷.

Demirel’s scores on philosophical questions reveal his friendly nature of political universe but lowest compared to other Post-Cold War Turkish leaders, his low degree of optimism which is quite lower compared to others, his high belief in predictability of future which is the highest among other leaders, his low belief about the ability to control historical events and finally his quite high belief about role of chance. When looking at his scores on instrumental questions, it shows a cooperative understanding in his direction of strategy but lowest among others, friendly attitude in his intensity of tactics, risk averse, diverse approach between cooperative and conflictual tactics, and finally appeal and reward tactics in terms of benefitting from utility of means (Table Two).

¹⁵⁷ Kesgin, “Political Leadership and Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Israel and Turkey”, 137.

Table 2: Operational Code Analysis of Turkish Prime Ministers

Philosophical Beliefs		Turkish PM Av.	Demirel
P-1	Nature of the political universe	0.352	0.299
P-2	Optimism/pessimism	0.15	0.091
P-3	Predictability of political universe	0.169	0.177
P-4	Belief in ability to control historical development	0.306	0.261
P-5	Role of chance	0.948	0.959
Instrumental Beliefs			
I-1	Direction of strategy	0.523	0.466
I-2	Pursuit of goals/intensity of tactics	0.253	0.23
I-3	Risk orientation/diversity of tactics	0.336	0.325
I-4	Timing of action		
I-4a	Cooperative/conflictual tactics	0.443	0.503
I-4b	Word/deed tactics	0.398	0.432
I-5	Utility of means		
I-5a	Reward	0.161	0.197
I-5b	Promise	0.06	0.034
I-5c	Appeal	0.528	0.502
I-5d	Oppose	0.139	0.145
I-5e	Threaten	0.035	0.04
I-5f	Punish	0.076	0.081
Source: In Kesgin, "Political Leadership and Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Israel and Turkey"			

In this respect, as shown in the table below, Demirel’s scores on BACE (Belief to ability control events) and PWR (Need for power) shows his tendency to challenge constraints, his higher score on CC (Conceptual complexity) than his SC (Self-confidence) score reveals his tendency to be open to information, his higher TASK focus score compared to other prime ministers shows his relationship focused attitude rather than problem focused personality, and finally his low DIS (Distrust of others) and high IGB (In group bias) scores points out his perception of the world as a zero-sum game rather than a threatening place.

Table 3: Leadership Trait Analysis of Turkish Prime Ministers

Leadership Trait	Turkish PM Av.	Low	High	Demirel
Belief can control events	Mean=.351	<.319	>.383	0.408
Conceptual complexity	Mean=.564	<.527	>.601	0.591
Distrust of others	Mean=.138	<.097	>.179	0.136
In-group bias	Mean=.142	<.114	>.170	0.152
Need for Power	Mean=.287	<.243	>.331	0.342
Self Confidence	Mean=.400	<.320	>.480	0.312
Task focus	Mean=.637	<.572	>.702	0.572

Source: In Kesgin, "Political Leadership and Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Israel and Turkey"

Looking from this perspective, his tendency to challenge the constraints reveals his ability to stay in power seven times through elections even though he was overthrown by military interventions twice. While he challenged constraints continuously, his leadership lied behind his ability to go on well with the system at the same time by adapting the conditions and status quo. In this respect, reminding Demirel's political change in foreign policy attitude between Cold War period and Post-Cold War period, Kılıçoğlu quotes his saying that "*The real skill is running the system without kicking up a row*¹⁵⁸". Indeed, one can argue that Demirel's political change in foreign policy is highly connected with his concern in domestic politics together with his adaptation to new system change. Cem here gives the example of how Demirel used a discourse of anti-imperialism in late 1960s' Cold War period in order to challenge Turkish Labour Party which gained seat in the Assembly¹⁵⁹. Within the point of view that different roles bring difference in leadership style, Çuhadar et al. mentions in their LTA analysis that president Demirel differs from prime minister Demirel where president Demirel is more relationship focused than problem focused, more closed and insensitive to information, and close to evangelistic type of persuading others about his mission compared to his prime

¹⁵⁸ Kılıçoğlu "Süleyman Demirel'in Dış Politika Felsefesi ve Uygulamaları", 65.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 70.

minister periods even though he is still seen quite stable in his personality in terms of constraint challenging and conceptual complexity¹⁶⁰.

Here, it is important to note that Şihmantepe mentions possible problems about computerized measuring of operational code analysis for Demirel because gathering and analysing the forty years of speeches is almost impossible where Demirel also experienced serious changes in his leadership on the one hand and translating his speeches to English for computerized Profiler Plus programme may create different problems in which wrong translations of specific words or speeches without facial gestures fades out the real meaning on the other¹⁶¹. Within this perspective, Şihmantepe interprets Demirel's speeches manually and notes that, in terms of political belief, Demirel believed that essence of the political universe was conflictual, predictability of the political universe, ability to control the historical developments and role of chance were low, and he was neutral about his expectations to realize basic values. When it comes to instrumental belief, Şihmantepe argues that risk averse Demirel used cooperative tactics in clear consistency with his peaceful strategy¹⁶².

It is important to mention that available resources in academic literature on operational code analysis of Demirel is quite limited with few pieces of the studies referred above however it is noteworthy that findings of interpretative studies about Demirel's characteristics and leadership is considerably consistent with the findings of studies about operational code analysis and leadership trait analysis. Indeed, Demirel was such a political leader that he interpreted his personality in terms of his political belief and decision-making mechanisms and his instrumental belief throughout his leadership ingeniously and this provides an available rich primary source for the scholars.

¹⁶⁰ Esra Çuhadar [et. al.], "Personality or Role? Comparisons of Turkish Leaders Across Different Institutional Positions", *Political Psychology*, Vol 38, No 1, (2017), 39-54, 49.

¹⁶¹ Şihmantepe, *Türk Dış Politikasında Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel & Dış Politika Kriz Davranışları Üzerine Bir Araştırma*, 65.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 199-200.

Then what kind of personality can we address to Demirel in terms of his political leadership towards foreign policy issues? A very characteristic of Demirel lies behind his ability to adapt himself and his political style to different political conditions even though this is sometimes called as inconsistency. According to Demirel, this adaptation was an instinct to survive in changing political dynamics¹⁶³. Post-Cold War period's political atmosphere and the role of being the president led him to a mediator and moderator unlike his confrontational attitude of Cold War times. That is why it is better to evaluate Demirel in consideration with political dynamics throughout time keeping in mind that Demirel was a learning political leader based on past experience.

3.3. His Leadership on Foreign Policy Issues

There are many definitions of leadership and the existing literature is fraught with discussions on the characteristics of leaders however, this thesis specifically focuses on the political leadership and its impact on the foreign policy decision-making processes. In this respect, it is important to first to understand main characteristics of Demirel's understanding of state and foreign policy. According Bayar, being overthrown twice by military interventions, Demirel mainly referred to "Constitutional State" as a term for mentioning the necessity of being democratically elected by citizens and ruling the state within the limits of duties given by legislations in order to gain legitimacy in governing the state¹⁶⁴. He adds up that Demirel's foreign policy decision-making can be summarized as realist, pragmatic, cautious, prudent and non-adventurous. Kılıçoğlu argues that Demirel has been very cautious and balanced in his foreign policy understanding in which he always tried to be imperturbable and away from adventure¹⁶⁵.

¹⁶³ Komsuoğlu, *Siyasal Yaşamda Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel*, 73.

¹⁶⁴ Interview with Bayar. He served as ambassador and foreign policy advisor to Demirel in his Post-Cold War periods and has known Demirel since Cold War years.

¹⁶⁵ Gökmen Kılıçoğlu, "Süleyman Demirel ve Dış Politika" in Haydar Çakmak (ed.), *Cumhurbaşkanları ve Dış Politika*, (Ankara: Kripto Yayınları, 2016), 228. About Demirel's leadership on foreign policy, please also see Kılıçoğlu, "Süleyman Demirel'in Dış Politika Felsefesi ve Uygulamaları"; and Tuncer, "Süleyman Demirel", 125-234

Here, keeping himself away from adventure is a very important aspect for Demirel in consideration for the future of the nation where he notes that:

A democrat never pushes the button whenever it comes to his mind that 'Let's be a hero'. He carefully considers the short and long-term interests of the nation and then looks for peaceful solutions for problems because idea of war fades out in his mind when he thinks about that. But he also needs defence power for solving problems peacefully. If you don't have a defence power backing you, then your words would not be credible. No matter how genius and experienced your diplomats are, they will be suspended.¹⁶⁶

Within this point of view, it is quite understandable why he got on well with bureaucracy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs who has similar understanding for national foreign policy implementation. Şihmantepe interprets Demirel's own speeches about foreign policy issues in order to evaluate his leadership on foreign policy and elucidates that Demirel's persisting leadership skills in foreign policy based on his realistic, rationalistic and pragmatic understanding was basically peaceful where he kept the international balance in mind and depended on international legitimacy, sought for multiple dimension in foreign policy, used simple and clear language without any direct threats to opponents but always kept the military alternatives as a backup plan, was open to information and shared state's common wisdom by respecting to staff of foreign affairs, and also adds that Prime Minister Demirel was more status quotist and preferred to string out solutions for the problems whereas President Demirel was more interventionist when the problem was imminent¹⁶⁷.

There is no wrong in claiming that Demirel pursued a foreign policy away from radical and adventurous decisions. Öymen mentions that Demirel was strictly loyal to traditional principles of Turkish foreign policy along with republican values, was eager to maintain good relations with foreign countries but also stable enough to take a tough stance against foreign pressure, and also had positive attitude and trust

¹⁶⁶ Demirel's speech on 1 September 1993 as cited in Ergen, *Cumhurbaşkanı Süleyman Demirel'in Söylev ve Demeçleri*, 438.

¹⁶⁷ Şihmantepe, *Türk Dış Politikasında Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel & Dış Politika Kriz Davranışları Üzerine Bir Araştırma*, 197.

to Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy¹⁶⁸. Here, Ercüment Yavuzalp, a former Undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs who had chance to see Demirel in action, clearly repeats that “*Demirel’s foreign policy understanding was in line with the traditional Turkish foreign policy and Demirel was brave enough to stand against adventurous foreign policy*”¹⁶⁹.” By alluding to “*the foreign policy path proved to be true*”, Yavuzalp mentions the traditional policy priorities of having good relations with West, keeping the status quo and staying away from unnecessary war, which could be regarded as core principles for a diplomat from the beginning of his career. Indeed, Karayalçın notes that there has been a clear resemblance in foreign policy understanding of Demirel and İsmet İnönü where he believes that Demirel was inspired from İnönü in foreign policy leadership and he consulted to İnönü in many issues¹⁷⁰. This consistency in foreign policy understanding of both leaders, according to him, rooted in very well calculated foreign policy principles of Atatürk that he realized the facts and conditions of the country in order to bring about the most appropriate way of foreign policy formulation, which Yavuzalp calls “*foreign policy path proved to be true*”¹⁷¹.

Yavuzalp, through accounting for the potential difficulties and relative power of the country, defines the traditional Turkish foreign policy as sticking to the “peace at home, peace in the world” principle by being cautious about revisionism and keeping the status quo on the one hand and developing healthy relations with western world on the other¹⁷². In this respect, Demirel clearly mentioned the importance of state tradition by saying that he pursued and operated the state’s foreign policy rather

¹⁶⁸ Onur Öymen’s article about his comments on Süleyman Demirel’s foreign policy. Available at <https://add.org.tr/demirelin-d%C4%B1%C5%9F-politikas%C4%B1yla-ilgili-baz%C4%B1-gozlemler/> Last Accessed on 17/03/2019.

¹⁶⁹ Ercüment Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996), 146.

¹⁷⁰ Karayalçın calls Demirel as “İsmet İnönü without military uniform”. Interview with Murat Karayalçın on 28/08/2019 in Ankara.

¹⁷¹ Karayalçın argues that derailment in foreign policy tradition in history always resulted in failure where he gives the examples of Erbakan’s coalition government’s foreign policy on Libya and Iran on the one hand and Davutoğlu government’s foreign policy on Syria on the other. Interview with Karayalçın.

¹⁷² Ercüment Yavuzalp, *Dış Politikada Oyunun Kuralları*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1998), 219-243.

than his individual foreign policy¹⁷³. Here Bayar mentions two key points for Demirel's understanding about the state tradition the first of which his tendency to select the cabinet ministers from the ones that could operate in harmony with state institutions and the second one for accepting the advisors offered by MFA minister rather than selecting his own foreign policy advisors by himself¹⁷⁴.

When his speeches available about foreign policy are searched, it is seen that Demirel mostly preferred to use the terms “*peaceful foreign policy*”, “*multilateral and multidimensional foreign policy*”, “*continuity in foreign policy*”, “*refraining from adventure in foreign policy*”, “*for the sake of high national interests of the country in order to sustain the security*” and “*keeping in mind the potentials and resources that are determined by history, geography and world conjuncture*” in order to define his foreign policy understanding¹⁷⁵. In addition, he drew attention Turkey's prioritized non-belligerence by saying that:

[...T]here is no active or passive foreign policy but conditions that bring about activity. No country should be dragged onto risky adventures, in order to be labelled as active in foreign policy, without prior knowledge of this fact.¹⁷⁶

Rather than describing this as a cowardly or/and passive form of foreign policy, it should be viewed as a cautious policy that awaits patiently for the perfect opportunity. Within his own perspective, he aimed to transform Turkey into a developed and revered country that followed the “*pacta sunt servanda*” principle. He clearly noted that:

[...M]ultidimensional foreign policy cannot be a policy of being flirtatious with everyone. *Pacta sunt servanda* principle should be the main determinant of multidimensional policy. If you are a part of an agreement,

¹⁷³ Tuncer “Süleyman Demirel”, 147.

¹⁷⁴ Interview with Bayar.

¹⁷⁵ Almost all of his speeches when he was president which are available in “Ergen” and when he was prime minister which are available in “Neziroğlu and Yılmaz” contains at least two or more of those terms above. See Ergen, *Cumhurbaşkanı Süleyman Demirel'in Söylev ve Demeçleri*,; Neziroğlu and Yılmaz (ed.), *Başbakanlarımız ve Genel Kurul Konuşmaları-Cilt 5*,; Neziroğlu and Yılmaz (ed.), *Başbakanlarımız ve Genel Kurul Konuşmaları-Cilt 6*,.

¹⁷⁶ Tuncer “Süleyman Demirel”, 151.

you should obey its own rules and can enjoy the relations with others in spheres which are outside the domain of those rules. Otherwise, no one trusts you and you cannot explain yourself and you become alone.¹⁷⁷

In fact, Demirel proved how active he could be in foreign policy during Post-Cold War, as both the prime minister and president, when the conditions were entailed it. At the time, he underlined the burden caused by unstable governments as the reason for his activeness¹⁷⁸. Even though he handled foreign policy issues very delicately and separated its dynamics from that of domestic policy, he sometimes prioritized domestic concerns, in foreign policy crises, due to their alleged primacy. For example, although he clearly stressed the importance of the double anchor of the NATO membership and the need for good relations with Europe, he was accused of pursuing secret diplomacy and for not applying for the membership to the European Economic Community, for the sake of domestic policy concerns, when his party was in a coalition with the National Salvation Party in Nationalist Front governments¹⁷⁹.

As it is thoroughly evaluated in the theoretical framework chapter, foreign policy decisions of a political decision maker are mainly shaped by his operational codes, which are formed through many different social, cultural, economic and political issues such as his experiences, social network, economic background, his ideological position and the political unit he subscribes to. At this point, it can be observed that state traditions and institutional priorities together with Demirel's own individual experiences come into prominence in Demirel's decision-making process. Indeed, his clear tendency in prioritizing state institutions' insights makes him unique among other prime ministers, which makes him the focus point of this thesis.

How can then Demirel's foreign policy approach be defined? Bayar notes three most frequent sentences used by Demirel in defining his foreign policy approach saying that "*If foreign policy is a function, economic welfare of citizens*

¹⁷⁷ Demirel's speech quoted in Şihmantepe, *Türk Dış Politikasında Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel & Dış Politika Kriz Davranışları Üzerine Bir Araştırma*, 183.

¹⁷⁸ Even though he was active in foreign policy in Post-Cold War period, he was careful enough in respecting the regular functioning of state apparatus based on legally set responsibilities. Kılıçoğlu, "Süleyman Demirel ve Dış Politika", 227.

¹⁷⁹ Tuncer "Süleyman Demirel", 149.

would be its first derivative”, “If you do not know how to make peace, then do not fight”, and “Diplomacy is a science and art which requires specialization for calculating what you would lose if you stay at the table and what you would win if you leave the table”¹⁸⁰. In this respect, Demirel adds the economic welfare to security oriented traditional foreign policy understanding on the one hand and defines the necessity of delicate calculations in conducting foreign policy issues.

When the foreign policy parts of official programmes of seven Demirel governments are scanned, it is seen that they include obvious and continuous reference to Atatürk’s national policies together with Atatürk’s phrase “*Peace at home, peace in the world.*” By emphasizing the improvement of international cooperation, Demirel’s government programmes target close friendship, cooperation and alliance with western countries on the one hand, cooperation and good relations with African, Asian, Latin American and Arab countries on the other. When it is about neighbour countries, especially USSR in Cold War, those government programmes focus on respecting territorial integrity, independence, sovereignty and non-intervention to domestic affairs. Moreover, specific attention is given to Cyprus issue by mentioning to solve the Cyprus issue and relations with Greece by paying regard to Turkish communities’ rights. What is seen in those programmes is the absolute determination about chronic problems in foreign policy such as Cyprus, Aegean Sea continental shelf and Turkish communities abroad together with refraining from adventurous policies.

Even though Demirel was labelled as a pro-American politician by his left wing and conservative right-wing opponents¹⁸¹, and although he resisted the deterioration of the Turkish-American alliance during the Cold War, many of his important political decisions in the foreign policy realm generally worked against the US interests. Here Ünlü Bilgiç argues that Demirel’s anti-American moves in foreign policy may be regarded as a careful calculation for domestic politics in order not to be labelled as pro-American where the time-period would not welcome Americanism

¹⁸⁰ Interview with Bayar.

¹⁸¹ An example for right wing opponents is Acar Tuncer. See Tuncer, *Belgelerle ve Olaylarla Demirel’in Gerçek Yüzü*, 12.

in politics by public¹⁸². Despite labelling Demirel as pro-American the fact that he was overthrown from the prime ministry twice, in 1971 and 1980, as a result of military interventions tells otherwise, since both the leftist and conservatives deem them as pro-American interventions which otherwise did not challenge American policies towards the region¹⁸³.

During his Cold War governments, as an outcome of his foreign policy understanding mentioned above, he preferred to devolve the routine daily functioning of foreign policy to Çağlayangil, his Minister of Foreign Affairs¹⁸⁴. Looking at the government programme of 1965, rather than exactingly following the policies of Western Bloc and NATO, there was a clear tendency for developing good relations with Middle Eastern neighbours within a multidimensional foreign policy by benefitting from cultural and religious ties on the one hand and delivering international commitments under the “*pacta sunt servanda*” principle on the other¹⁸⁵. In Demirel’s own perspective, there was no benefit in bearing hostility to the US, which he labelled as an irreplaceable friend and ally¹⁸⁶. Even though Demirel had to stand against the US in foreign policy crises such as poppy cultivation, military bases and embargo crises, he refrained from rupturing the relations and altering Turkey’s

¹⁸² Ünlü Bilgiç, “İç ve Dış Politikada Çeşitlilik: 1965-1971”, 197.

¹⁸³ Çağlayangil claimed that CIA involved in military interventions in Turkey and the “Economist” magazine declared it. He also mentioned that the US representative threatened him about the consequences of Demirel’s poppy decision. Cılızoğlu, *Çağlayangil’in Anıları-Kader Bizi Una Değil Üne İtti*, 63 and 324. Indeed, it is a big discussion in Turkey whether military interventions were products of CIA plots or were supported by the US in order to secure US interests after the military takeover. Mütercimler argues that it is possible to track CIA and Pentagon fingerprints in military takeovers where those US institutions cooperated with the Turkish generals, civilians and media. Especially for 1971 memorandum, See chapter 7 and 11 in Erol Mütercimler, *Kompla Teorileri 4: İsyandar, İhtilaller, Darbeler*, (Istanbul: Asi Kitap, 2019). Demirel also noted that his peaceful foreign policy towards Soviet Union and decisions about poppy cultivation discomfited the US administration. (In Tuncer, “Süleyman Demirel”, 138). About serving to US interests, a telegram sent from US Embassy in Ankara to Department of State clearly mentions that US interests will be secured and raised in military regime of 12 September Coup. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980 Volume XXI Cyprus; Turkey; Greece, eds David Zierler and Adam M. Howard (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014), Document 154, Available on <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v21/d154>

¹⁸⁴ Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*, 114.

¹⁸⁵ Cılızoğlu, *Çağlayangil’in Anıları-Kader Bizi Una Değil Üne İtti*, 189.

¹⁸⁶ Tuncer, “Süleyman Demirel”, 156.

main axis. At this point, he claimed that the US could not give up Turkey but could search for a more compatible government within Turkey¹⁸⁷. He repeatedly mentioned the importance and necessity of NATO membership, even in turbulent times. After the end of the Cold War, he believed that Turkey and the US would develop a multidimensional alliance in security issues. During the beginning of Post-Cold War years, Demirel stressed the ability to pursue a foreign policy independent from USA and he introduced the Improved Partnership discourse by criticizing Özal's Strategic Cooperation discourse¹⁸⁸.

His approach to Europe was in same vein to the US. He thought that Turkey's story of modernization and development could not be achieved without good relations with Europe. That is why he laid emphasis on relations with Europe and saw Europe as a collection of values rather than a simple geography¹⁸⁹. In this respect, he thought, "[...]*the Common Market is Turkey's spurt for playing a part in world trade*¹⁹⁰", which is a testament to Demirel's vision of Europe as a springboard for Turkey's economic development. Nevertheless, he did not refrain from criticizing European policies when it related to Cyprus or the Kurdish issues. When confronted with such issues he would state that, "*Europe should not bother Turkey's comfort and peace.*¹⁹¹"

Demirel's attitude towards the Soviet Union in the Cold War period had been more complicated and cautious due to the dichotomy of economic and security concerns. On the one hand, he repeatedly mentioned the importance of the NATO alliance while on the other hand striving for economic cooperation with the Soviet Union. At this point, he emphasized that having good relations with communist countries was different to being against communism¹⁹². Hence, he deliberately kept

¹⁸⁷ Kılıçoğlu "Süleyman Demirel'in Dış Politika Felsefesi ve Uygulamaları", 75.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 75.

¹⁸⁹ Tuncer "Süleyman Demirel", 180.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 181.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 180.

¹⁹² Arcayürek tells how Demirel smiled when he quoted this word of having good relations with communists does not mean being communist. Arcayürek, *Cüneyt Arcayürek Açıklıyor: 5& Demirel Dönemi 12 Mart Darbesi 1965-1971*, 128.

Turkey's relations with the communist bloc at economic level and refrained from any kind of cooperation in security matters. That is why he refused Kosigin's proposal to sign a non-aggression treaty while he was entering into agreement on Soviet credits for infrastructural reconstruction of Turkish industry.

It is important here to note that, Demirel was cautious and careful enough in balancing Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union and the US. Even though number of Demirel's visits to Moscow increased when relations with US was tense, secret documents of those meetings shows that Demirel was very careful about drawing the line between security issues and economic issues in negotiations¹⁹³. Nonetheless, Demirel's relations with Moscow had been on a peaceful level up until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Afterwards, together with end of the Cold War and emergence of a new international rivalry on Central Asian energy resources, Demirel and Moscow continuously struggled for geo-strategical dominance on these resources and energy corridors where Demirel's speeches about newly established Turkic states created problems. The popular discourse, "*Turkish world from the Adriatic to the Chinese Wall*" which was appreciated and used by Demirel posed a threat for Russia in the Post-Cold War period, which made Russia more cautious and resulted in its watching over the Turkic States. In this respect, Demirel understood Central Asian Turkic States' treading warily and he called Russia as a bird of prey over those states of Central Asia¹⁹⁴. In his presidency, his eager and positive policy attitude towards Central Asian Turkic States within cultural and economic perspective under the consideration of alternative energy resources was carefully balanced with his cautious position in order to refrain from suffering Russia Federation's whims¹⁹⁵. Here, Robins reports from a foreign advisor to Demirel that special interest of Demirel on Central Asia was due to his desire to gather domestic political support of voters due to high popular interest towards Central Asian Turkic States on the one hand and the lack of pre-established political priorities on the region by Ministry of Foreign Affairs

¹⁹³ Secret documents declassified and released in Ibid., Chapter 2.

¹⁹⁴ In Tuncer "Süleyman Demirel", 194.

¹⁹⁵ Kılıçoğlu, "Süleyman Demirel ve Dış Politika", 229.

on the other¹⁹⁶. Zeybek, oppositely, argues that it has no relation with domestic popular calculations but Demirel's attitude towards Central Asian Turkic States was a product of rational understanding and special ideological interest of Demirel unlike Özal's pure interest maximizing rational understanding¹⁹⁷. Similarly, Yavuzalp also clearly mentions that, except for his decision on not applying for European Community membership, Demirel put clear cut distinction between domestic politics and foreign politics in order not to harm regular functioning of state affairs in foreign relations¹⁹⁸.

It is also worth of mentioning Demirel's approach to the Cyprus issue and his relations with Middle East. Irrespective of the conditions, Demirel never made concessions with regard to the Cyprus issue. He even once said, "*Governments may end however successor resumes from predecessor because Cyprus is an ideal of the whole nation. There is a very rooted state policy in Cyprus.*"¹⁹⁹ Whenever the Cyprus case was discussed in the United Nations, Demirel knew that the number of votes mattered more than being right or just. That is why he focused on having good relations with the Middle Eastern Arab states. However, he needed to keep a balance between relations with Israel and the Arab Countries, which was a challenge. In the use of military bases, for instance, he disallowed the US from using the Turkish bases for an attack on the Middle Eastern Arab states; however, he also refused to label Israel as an aggressor country. Instead he supported the UN decision for Israel to move revert to its pre-war borders²⁰⁰.

¹⁹⁶ Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War*, 69.

¹⁹⁷ Zeybek notes that Özal was not interested in Turkishness of the region and support for Turkish population in the region however Demirel had an ideological tendency for Turkishness since he was writing articles on famous "Turkish Homeland" in 1960s when he was bureaucrat. Interview with Zeybek.

¹⁹⁸ Even though Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy insisted on benefits of application, Demirel refused to apply for European Community membership in 1975 in order not to discomfort his coalition partner, Erbakan. At this time, Greece applied for it and got an advantage over Turkey. See Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*, 145.

¹⁹⁹ Tuncer, "Süleyman Demirel", 198.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 214.

During the Cold War period, without a doubt, oil crises played an important role in developing good relations with oil rich Arab countries; however, the secular regime of Turkey posed a challenge in being active in the Organization of the Islamic Conference. In this respect, Demirel sent his Minister of Foreign Affairs to the conference held at Rabat in 1969 claiming that the conference was a political one rather than a theological²⁰¹. However, reactions were not exclusive to the secular faction of politics. When he sent Çağlayangil to Cairo, Erbakan, as the coalition partner, went against the decision, which then created tension within the Nationalist Front. Therefore, it had always been difficult to keep a balance in the Middle Eastern foreign policy, which in turn deteriorated Demirel's domestic standing.

Beyond that overall political approach of Demirel to those actors and countries, in order to understand reflection of his leadership style and political ideology on his foreign policy decisions, it is here important to evaluate his behavioural codes, which were developed through his life. In this respect, one should ask how Demirel could be defined in terms of his behavioural codes. Çağlayangil's definition might be the best one to summarize Demirel where he said:

Foreign policy doesn't tolerate propitious time and Demirel has always been stable. He never wears one's heart on one's sleeve and never tell his last words at the beginning. He takes his time to decide and never take imminent decisions because he consults to his core staff and calculates all the possible consequences by omitting the unambiguity. At the end of the day, his decisions are always solid.²⁰²

As Demirel repeatedly mentioned the necessity to strongly cooperate with and consult to bureaucracy in foreign policy decisions, he made a clear distinction between his ideological boundaries and necessity of the state. When ideological opposition of his Justice Party peaked in election campaign of 1965 with the mottos of "*Destroy Communism where you find*", "*JP is against communism*", "*There is communism behind the left*²⁰³", it was a reaction of conservative right-wing

²⁰¹ Ibid., 214.

²⁰² Cılızoğlu, *Çağlayangil'in Anıları-Kader Bizi Una Değil Üne İtti*, 24 and 122.

²⁰³ "USAK Yearbook of International Politics and Law 2010", *Usak Yayınları*, Vol. 3, (2010), 213.

ideological position against Soviet antagonism rather than an electoral passion. Indeed, Demirel himself nourished his anti-communist ideological position from his elementary school years due to his teacher's inculcation together with his conservative background. Nonetheless, when it was an issue related to Turkey's interests in foreign policy, he never hesitated to cooperate with Soviet Union limited with economic aspects for the sake of country's interests thanks to his pragmatic attitude.

Here, one may argue that it was concern for security threat from Soviet Union that made Demirel anti-communist rather than a concern for political ideology. Kılıçoğlu argues that Cold War period's main concern for Demirel was economic growth in order to stay in power by attracting voters which shaped his foreign policy orientation through a pro-western look²⁰⁴. At his first meeting with Kosigin, Prime Minister of Soviet Union, Demirel clearly mentioned his anti-communist political ideology as a priority by saying that:

Justice Party is against communism. Because it does not fit in our social structure and traditional lifestyle, we do not welcome materialism. However, being neighbour is something different. You are powerful and our neighbour. You are more than welcome if you like to develop a good neighbourhood.²⁰⁵

Demirel's two long-term visits to the US as a bureaucrat would shape his mind-set as a pro-western politician. His unending desire to ensure Turkey for reaching civilization level of the West made him open for any kind of economic assistance for the sake of infrastructural development no matter that assistance comes from Soviet Union. Yet he needed to mention, "*I couldn't stop thinking about how would our industrial development be if it was Western countries instead of Soviets that provided financial support for our industrial investments.*"²⁰⁶

Here, it is also important to note the change in Demirel's attitude in foreign policy leadership in Post-Cold War period. Having the experience of being

²⁰⁴ Kılıçoğlu, "Süleyman Demirel'in Dış Politika Felsefesi ve Uygulamaları", 72.

²⁰⁵ Cılızoğlu, *Çağlayangil'in Anıları-Kader Bizi Una Değil Üne İtti*, 339.

²⁰⁶ Osman Arolat's newspaper report on 19/06/2017, available on <https://www.dunya.com/kose-yazisi/demirelin-kosiginle-pazarligi-ve-jiinivoskyin-sinir-disi-edilmesi/368444>

overthrown twice from prime ministry and being arrested and banned from politics due to military interventions, Post-Cold War Demirel poses a different approach in his political life where he seems more cooperative with his left-wing opponents and he even formed a coalition government as mentioned earlier. His active position in foreign policy issues due to changing systemic dynamics of the world after collapse of Soviet Union brought him a broader understanding in foreign policy thinking other than security concerns. Perhaps the best summary of how Demirel read the new order, as Tuncer stated in his interview, is his belief in the fact that the growth coming from being integrated into world markets rather than investing in the infrastructure of the 1990s could pay the bill of being a social state and his message that he would turn his party from a county party to a city party and follow neo-liberal policies²⁰⁷. Being aware of the new opportunities other than strict US domination and serious Soviet threat for Turkish foreign policy, Demirel in Post-Cold War presents a more active stand in foreign policy issues where ‘the conditions were suitable for active foreign policy’ as he reminded. For Robins, this activeness of Demirel could be interpreted as an effort for not being lagged behind Özal, his main opponent in Post-Cold War period²⁰⁸. Indeed, Demirel in the Post-Cold War mostly disputed with Özal and Demirel showed a more cautious attitude closer to position of bureaucracy which will be evaluated in detail in following case study chapters.

When it comes to President Demirel, it is seen that his changing role in politics from prime ministry to presidency brought a significant change in Demirel’s political understanding where he played the role of mediation between different units of decision making in both domestic and foreign policy of Turkey. Especially in foreign policy crisis, Şihmantepe notes this change by claiming that Demirel participated more actively in the foreign policy crises which presented imminent threat and limited time for decision making where prime ministers failed to handle properly²⁰⁹.

²⁰⁷ As cited in Tuncer, “Süleyman Demirel”, 134-135.

²⁰⁸ Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*, 147.

²⁰⁹ Şihmantepe, *Türk Dış Politikasında Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel & Dış Politika Kriz Davranışları Üzerine Bir Araştırma*, 170.

Şihmantepe's argument will be discussed and evaluated in the chapter which covers the case study of Kardak-Imia Crisis in Demirel's presidency.

Having an overall understanding about Demirel's foreign policy principles and main orientation together with his pragmatist understanding, one may raise a question on whether he utilized different back channels in his policy practices or not. Had Demirel benefitted from non-institutional or non-bureaucratic channels in conducting foreign policy? Using individual and private networks in international relations has been a well-known way of conducting foreign policy together with utilizing non-institutional channels by political leaders even though it has negative consequences due to inexperience of those non-institutional channels in diplomacy²¹⁰. At this point, Akdoğan claims that Demirel conducted foreign policy directly with him in several cases and crises as a back-door channel where even sometimes MFA Minister Çağlayangil showed unrest²¹¹. Besides he gives Hikmet Çetin as a witness for his works. In contrast to this argument, Çetin argues that Demirel respected to Akdoğan's experience about Middle East however he informed MFA bureaucracy in every move of Akdoğan and asked MFA bureaucracy for assessments about accuracy and applicability of Akdoğan's views and proposals at every step²¹². He also mentions that Demirel utilized his personal network and connection with other state leaders where he was highly respected by them. Similarly, Bayar also notes that Demirel never preferred a non-institutional back channel in his foreign policy making but he used his own weight of influence over other state leaders in foreign policy issues as an interlocuter or as a wise man²¹³.

In sum, it would be argued that Demirel pursued a pragmatic path in his foreign policy orientation through different periods where he prioritized national interests of Turkey and utilized the structural dynamics of the international system in

²¹⁰ Interviews with Uğur Ziyal on 28/09/2019 in Ankara: with Onur Öymen on 26/09/2019 in Istanbul.

²¹¹ Lütfü Akdoğan was a journalist and former Deputy in the parliament. He had several political connections in the Middle East. For his arguments about how he conducted back channel diplomacy, See Lütfü Akdoğan, *Krallar ve Başkanlarla 50 Yıl: Cilt 1-2-3*, (Ankara: Gazeteciler Cemiyeti, 2012).

²¹² Interview with Hikmet Çetin on 02/10/2019 in Ankara.

²¹³ Interview with Bayar.

advance for maximizing national interest and acted in a decisive understanding of representing a sovereign independent country even against superpowers in crisis situations. He refrained from deteriorating institutional and hierarchical practices of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy and preferred to act within legal responsibilities. As mentioned before, different institutional roles bring different leadership styles in different political dynamics. Within this respect, Demirel's political attitude and foreign policy understanding presents some changes in his presidency period compared to his prime ministry. Without making any concessions in his cautious and balanced understanding, he acts more active in foreign policy issues where he seeks for new opportunities for Turkish development in new international system. As he mentioned in an interview to TRT that Turkish foreign policy understanding should be based on protecting national interests by never leaving creditable policy attitude and clearly sticking to the principle of "*Pacta sunt servanda*" on the one hand, preserving the modern values shared with the world and keeping good relations with neighbours without acting against Middle East or Caucasia when being a part of Europe on the other²¹⁴. All in all, Demirel's strategic vision and foreign policy principle are summarized as rationalist, internationalist, multilateralist, multipolarist, geo-strategically pluralist and always in search for peaceful cooperation where he prioritized legality and international legitimacy²¹⁵.

²¹⁴Interview with Süleyman Demirel about foreign policy, available on <http://www.trtarsiv.com/izle/130340/32-gun-suleyman-demirel-den-turkiye-nin-dis-politikasi>

²¹⁵ Interview with Bayar.

CHAPTER 4

PRIME MINISTER IN POWER AND POPPY CRISIS

We are a big and civilized state. We can protect our rights by using all diplomatic means and wisdom in solving our problems.
Süleyman Demirel²¹⁶

Demirel, who was the Prime Minister as well as the leader of the ruling party that had come to power alone thanks to the success in the elections right after he took over the position of party leader of Justice Party, found himself in a hectic environment, and he had to manage a process composed of systemic, regional and domestic dynamics that were different than the processes in the previous periods. “*Finding the problems of the predecessors in his laps*” (in his own saying²¹⁷), Demirel would rule the country as the leader of a party, which was seen as the follow-up of the closed party of a prime minister that was hanged in a domestic environment composed of a military coup resulting in the execution of a prime minister for the first time in Turkish history. In this chapter, in order to fully understand Demirel’s leadership and the institutions’ reflections, the situation that Demirel “found in his laps”, the organizational dynamics of the institutions that are active in foreign policy as well as the pertinent period’s global/systemic, regional and domestic dynamics are analysed; and, within the scope of these dynamics, how the relations between leader and institutions are shaped in the process of decision making in foreign policy crises is addressed. Despite the fact that Demirel’s single party government covers a broader

²¹⁶ Ergen, *Cumhurbaşkanı Süleyman Demirel’in Söylev ve Demeçleri*, 1680.

²¹⁷ His speech available in Neziroğlu and Yılmaz (eds.), *Başbakanlarımız ve Genel Kurul Konuşmaları-Cilt 6*, 272.

date range, since foreign policy crisis and the decision-making mechanisms of the decision makers in that crisis were chosen as the focal point of this thesis, the analysis of periodical developments is limited to the period until the crisis period. From this viewpoint, taking the year of 1968 in which Opium Poppy Cultivation Crisis grew into account as well, the period analysed below has been restricted to the end of Demirel's second and third governments²¹⁸. Similarly, in the following chapters, the periodical developments are assessed in the scope of the period of every crisis.

4.1. Developments of the Period

4.1.1. Developments Before Demirel

Demirel's leadership and his ruling style observed in his first prime ministry cannot be grasped without taking the past developments that shaped domestic dynamics into account. These developments, the internal and external reflections of which are analysed in the following parts, constitute various opportunities and constraints for not only Demirel but also for institutions. Military, economic and political responsibilities, arising from the alliance peaking with the beginning of Cold War against the threat of Soviet Union within the context of alliance with NATO and West (specifically the US), changed dramatically before Demirel; the atmosphere of Cold War showed differences from the previous periods and in this context, regional and systemic dynamics changed. Tuncer, by also mentioning "*having good relations with other blocs*" that appears in government plan, specifies this détente period, with its well-known term, in which the alliance with the US continues in security and regional issues as well as good relations with USSR in economic level without addressing security issues.²¹⁹

Lessons learned from dismantling Jupiter Missiles from Turkey by the US without any prior warning in Cuban Missile Crisis²²⁰ and US President Johnson's

²¹⁸ Demirel's first government was between 27.10.1965-03.11.1969, second one was between 03.11.1969-06.03.1970 and the third one was between 06.03.1970-26.03.1971.

²¹⁹ Hüner Tuncer, *27 Mayıs'tan 12 Mart'a Türk Dış Politikası*, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2014), 27.

²²⁰ After Cuban Missile Crisis, US administration offered polaris nuclear submarines instead of Jupiter missiles under the Multilateral Force (MLF) Project however Turkey refused to be part of MLF in

infamous letter²²¹ to Turkish President İnönü which was forbidding to use the weaponry supported by the US in any operations against Cyprus brought Turkish political decision makers the idea that Turkey should seek for multiple opportunities in foreign policy rather than absolutely leaning on US support which could vanish in any terms.

In addition, Menderes government, which, while being in full coordination with the US in domestic politics, was evaluated as planning to tending towards different preferences, was overthrown by a military coup; his party was closed down; Menderes and ministers of foreign affairs and treasury were executed and after the new Constitution in 1961, the country relapsed into a different domestic atmosphere.

4.1.2. International Developments of the Period

After it was understood that a nuclear threat would confront the world with such a danger arising from the Cuban missile crisis, the détente between USA and Soviet Union restored the cold war period into a new phase and a relaxation of the tension between the blocs began. This period is well known with NATO's change in its Third Strategic Concept of defence, "Massive Retaliation" to Fourth Strategic Concept of Defence, "Flexible Response", which defined three step gradual responses in case of an attack first of which includes direct defence by the country under attack, second one includes deliberate escalation by using tactical nuclear

January 1965 just before Demirel government. See Mehmet Gönlübol and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "1965-1973 Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası" in Mehmet Gönlübol (ed.), *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1995)*, (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2014), 501. [For a critical discussion on MLF, please also see J. W. Boulton, "NATO and the MLF", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol 7, Issue 3, (Apr. 1972), 275-294]

²²¹ US President Johnson sent a letter to Turkish Prime Minister İnönü on 5 June 1964 when Turkey found himself responsible for intervening to Cyprus in order to save the Turks in the island who were murdered and assassinated by Greek extremists. Johnson warned İnönü not to use the weaponry supported by the US in intervention to Cyprus and to keep in mind that NATO would not help Turkey incase a Soviet inclusion in the case of Cyprus. This letter was written in a harsh language and Turkey did not welcome this way of warning coming from a NATO ally. For transcripts of the cables of Johnson Letter, See Jacob M. Landau, "Johnson's 1964 Letter to İnönü and the Greek Lobbying at the White House", *The Turkish Yearbook*, Vol XIV, (1974), 53 and 64. Full version of the letter is also available in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968 Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey*, eds James E. Miller and David S. Patterson (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2000), Document 54, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d54> Last Accessed on 18/08/2019.

weapons and the third one includes a general nuclear response with all strategic nuclear weapons NATO had²²². This change of strategic concept was not welcome by Turkey for putting itself into a problem of imminent security threat however all NATO members signed it in 1967.

In parallel with this détente, France's opposition in NATO in 1966 and Czechoslovakia's opposition in Eastern Bloc in 1968 triggered the leaks into the alliance blocs. In addition to that, the rise of Soviet Union's prestige thanks to the important attrition of the US after Vietnam War, brought about the opportunity of free act for the middle size states in NATO bloc and increase in diversification and sophistication in the countries' foreign policies²²³.

United Nations, other than NATO, also attracts attention for Turkish decision-makers as an international organization due to its important role in foreign policy making at global level. While this organization comes to the forefront as a platform where lots of problems in Turkish foreign policy are addressed, it had some troubles in providing international assistance for solving various problems, particularly Cyprus issue. At this point, it is necessary to point out that, Non-Alignment Movement crystallised in 1955 with Bandung Conference was acting like a third bloc in international organizations especially in the UN and it was constituting a different alternative for the countries in search for a bloc other than two blocs, and that Turkey was trying to benefit from influence sphere of this movement in foreign policy issues for which it could not get enough support in the alliance. Here, it could also be important to note the overall anti-imperialist and anti-American wave in global social aspect rising in all over the world which was triggered by US operations in Vietnam and raised by student and labour movements of 1968's generation. Indeed, Gerger, in his class based analysis in economics and foreign policy, argues that international developments such as independence movements of Africa and revolutionist tendency in Latin America deeply affected Turkish understanding of anti-imperialism in a

²²² Change in strategic concepts and ways to respond the possible attacks are available on https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm

²²³ Öymen argues that Turkey, providing the security of 30 percent of NATO's borders against Soviet Union, enjoyed esteem in NATO at this period. Onur Öymen, *Zor Rota, Gençlik ve Diplomasi Anıları*, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2017), 65.

political situation where decrease in financial aid from west and the US due to decreasing strategic importance of Turkey's location for NATO's security concerns in détente period enabled Turkish policy makers and public question the indispensable Western alliance²²⁴.

In sum, it could be mentioned about the structure of the period that two blocs under ideological constrains were trying to balance each other within a balance of nuclear threat where a non-alignment movement was acting on its behalf outside those two blocs. The main concept for defining this period could be called as relative autonomy for medium power states like Turkey in détente period.

4.1.3. Regional Developments of the Period

When the problems in foreign policy that Turkey tried to solve are analysed, it is seen that they were the problems shaped importantly by regional developments in particular. On the one hand, it was observed that Baghdad Pact not only triggered Israel against the Arab World instead of bringing peace as a regional agreement; but also caused separations in Arab world; on the other hand, it was noticed that Arab countries that could not get the expected support from Western bloc started to get closer to Soviet Union²²⁵. It is observed that Turkey, combined with its excessive Western-oriented position before Demirel, could not get Arab countries' support in both international organizations and region, which constituted an important problem for the solution of regional problems. When Demirel's government policy in this period is assessed, it is noticed that he tried to change the dynamics he found in his laps particularly to provide support for the solution of Cyprus issue in international arena and within this context aimed at developing good relations with Arab countries²²⁶.

²²⁴ Haluk Gerger, *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politikası: Soğuk Savaş'tan 'Yeni Dünya Düzeni'ne*, (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2012), 122.

²²⁵ Melek Fırat and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Ortadoğu ile İlişkiler", in Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular Belgeler Yorumlar. Cilt 1: 1919-1980*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), 639.

²²⁶ For Demirel's government programme of 1965 (30th Government of the Republic), See Neziroğlu and Yılmaz (eds.), *Başbakanlarımız ve Genel Kurul Konuşmaları: Cilt 5*, 103-133.

In regional means, the most critical issues at the agenda were the crisis-triggering problems with Greece regarding ongoing Cyprus issue and other issues related to sovereignty and security problems over the Aegean Sea. The peaceful relations achieved during Atatürk period were disturbed due to the factors such as the endorsement of continental shelf by Greece, and, with Cyprus issue as well as the difficulties Turkish Cypriots faced on the island, this problem became the biggest regional problem when Demirel came to power. Criticizing Israel's position during Arab Israeli War and preventing the US use of military bases to support Israel can be said to be the actions aiming to take the support of Muslim Middle East for regional problems in Turkish foreign policy.

It is here important to mention that NATO itself had some troubles in regional terms where France, under De Gaulle leadership, challenged US domination in political dimension and left the military wing of the NATO in 1966 where France was rising as a new nuclear power. In this respect, other than non-alignment movement, NATO itself started to lose its power of solidarity in European region where its unquestioned dominance was started to challenge.

As a result, in terms of regional dynamics, the West keeping itself apart from Turkey's theses in order to keep Greece in NATO bloc²²⁷ was a serious obstacle for Demirel's foreign policymaking; and at the Middle East, as a reflection of the problems between Israel and Arab countries, it became difficult to pursue the policies in favour of Turkey without disturbing these two sides.

4.1.4. Domestic Developments of the Period

Relatively free environment resulting from new post-coup constitution of 1961 provided a suitable ground for the representation and voicing of different views; and this resulted in the rise of plurivocality at domestic politics²²⁸. The citizens, being fed up with coalition governments and dominance of military in politics and in search of a single-party government, had given the duty of ruling to Demirel, but because of

²²⁷ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Soğuk Savaş Döneminde Türk Dış Politikası: 1945-1991*, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2016), 299.

²²⁸ Especially Articles 11 and 12. For the original version, See <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/10816.pdf>

the new free environment, the new single-party governments, different than the previous ones, would not be able to have an autonomous space and arbitrary understanding. Especially the possibility of rise of the voices of labour and student movements in such an environment led to the inclination of the politicians' ears to the demands of the masses having different views. The economic problems resulting from the decline of economic aids in comparison to the previous periods of Cold War and the rise of the necessity of searching social welfare showed themselves in the form of political protests.

When the reflections of domestic dynamics occurring from political developments to foreign policy are analysed, it can be argued that domestic reactions resulting from the blow of anti-American reactions after Johnson letter that came just after the distrust against the US resulting from the removal of Jupiter missiles during Cuba crisis gave Demirel an opportunity of having good relations with other blocs without damaging the alliance with NATO and West²²⁹. In addition to that, it would not be wrong to state that anti-imperialist ideological discourse of labour and student movements developed in a free environment of new Constitution and after the Vietnam fiasco of the US, combined with anti-American tendencies in favour of independence resulting from the US soldiers' loose way of life in the country, constituted a domestic environment that contributed to the foreign policy relations to be developed with Soviets and other blocs than the West, and provided a resistance towards the actions in favour of alliance with the West. Indeed, it is observed that the increasing voices of Turkish Workers' Party that was able to have seats in the Parliament during the prime ministry of Demirel frequently compelled Demirel in this issue²³⁰. At this point, it should not be forgotten that Demirel was criticised for pursuing policies in favour of the US by left fractions that evaluated Demirel as having a tendency in favour of America with its infamous nickname "Morison

²²⁹ Tuncer, "Süleyman Demirel", 160.

²³⁰ Baskın Oran, "Görelî Özerklik 3: 1960-1980" in Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular Belgeler Yorumlar. Cilt 1: 1919-1980*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), 678.

Süleyman”²³¹. From this perspective, it can be argued that Demirel was luckier than executed Menderes regarding new approaches in terms of balancing policies by looking at alternatives to solve the problems in domestic dynamics while having an ongoing West-axis foreign policy.

When the most significant economic developments of this period are analysed, switching to planned economy with five-year development plans commenced with the establishment of State Planning Organization and in this axis, import substitution industrialization policies; trying to dealing with the problems in balance of payment resulting from the decline of economic aid from the West alliance were placed at the top. In terms of Demirel, the economic welfare of the country, even the hind end of which was travelled by him as the General Director of State Hydraulic Works, was the first priority for both domestic politics and foreign policy. Demirel, well observing the welfare and tranquillity occurring with clean drinking water he brought to the villages, was aware of the fact that domestic and foreign policy that would provide economic recovery would extend his tenure as well.

For Demirel, West alliance meant civilization, a modern life and dynamo of economic development, while good relations with Eastern bloc was a balancing factor that would provide the economic support that West did not provide or hesitated to provide²³². In fact, he was able to increase the gross national product from 8.450 billion US dollar to 20.000 billion US dollar, thanks to the planned growth in his first prime ministry against economic problems, and the welfare resulting from this growth constituted one of the piers of the working of domestic dynamics as supporter in decision making of foreign policy. On one hand the important role of foreign currency workers brought from Germany after 1965 in closing foreign exchange gap; on the other hand heavy industrialization made via long term and affordable credits resulting from economy-based good relations developed with Soviet Union, not only

²³¹ Turgut, *Demirel'in Dünyası*, 233.

²³² Hulusi Turgut “Demirel'in Çok Gizli Dış Politika Arşivi-1” Available on <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/demirelin-cok-gizli-dis-politika-arsivi-1-40492807>

brought about economic growth, but also started a process that would deepen the debt spiral²³³.

Two important specific developments should be reasserted here which played great role in decision-making process of Demirel that raised from domestic political developments. The first one was, without doubt, increasing anti-imperialist ideology of 1968's stream in Turkey that boosted labour and student movements against the dominance of the US in Turkey. Indeed, official CIA documents on this issue also points out that opium crisis would be solved easily if only Erim government after military memorandum could control the student riots against banning the opium harvest which Demirel failed to do²³⁴. Combined with the situation that budget voting in the Assembly in 1970 resulted in overthrow of Demirel administration due to negative votes which also had an important portion within Demirel's party, new Demirel government after that voting was also forced itself to keep itself away from pro-American policies which would draw negative attention of the citizens at that political atmosphere.

4.1.5. Organizational Developments of the Period

It would not be easy to understand the topic of this thesis, namely, the relation between leader and institutions in decision making of foreign policy, without evaluating the decision-making dynamics of the leader and developmental dynamics of the institutions at the same time. The first question to be asked here would be which channels are utilized in foreign policy formulation and foreign policy making. Alpogan, retired Ambassador and former Secretary General for NSC, notes that government programme and National Security Policy Papers are regarded as centre

²³³ The big projects such as Aliğa Petroleum Refinery, Seydişehir Aluminum Factory, Bandırma Sulphuric Acid Factory and İskenderun Iron and Steel Factory were financed via long term credits provided within the context of Economic and Technology Cooperation Agreement with Soviet Union in 1967.

²³⁴ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume XXIX Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, eds James E. Miller, Douglas E. Selva and Laurie Van Hook (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 442, Available on <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d423%20Last%20accessed%20on%2003/frus1969-76v29>

of attraction in foreign policy formulation in terms of written official documents²³⁵. Based on those documents, foreign policy issues are held in the meetings of NSC where the members of the Council handle the specific issues and propose their arguments based on institutional experience and expertise. Within this respect, it would not be wrong to argue that the main institutions for foreign policy process are Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy, top generals of Turkish Armed forces, political leaders of the government and finally the president.

Yalvaç, by mentioning Tinbergen's argument that military bureaucracies in countries such as Turkey, Egypt, Japan and Peru use state's power for nourishing capitalist industrialization, explains foreign policy making with a capital-state nexus relation and comes up with an argument that 1960s' and 1970s' state led capitalism developed a role of fostering good relations with western capitalist world for military, which was a dominant actor of foreign policy in civilian-military coalition that was raised as a result of initial Turkish republican state's weak connection with society²³⁶. Within this context, how the institutions having active role in foreign policy change, and how new institutions change the existing institutions' role in foreign policy become more of an issue.

4.1.5.1. Military and National Security Council

Turkish Armed Forces perceive itself not only as an army protecting the borders of the country, but also as an institution, ensuring the establishment of republic and the continuity of Turkish state tradition and thus feeling the responsibility in domestic and foreign policy without needing to be authorized²³⁷. For this reason, it takes as a responsibility to terminate the civil government's tenure via coup if it thinks that the domestic politics is not in line with national interests or with Atatürk's foreign policy priorities for the sake of country by depending on Article 35

²³⁵ Interview with Yiğit Alpogan on 09/09/2019 in Ankara.

²³⁶ Faruk Yalvaç, "A Historical Materialist Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy: Class, State, and Hegemony", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Volume 13, No. 52, (2016),3-22, 11-12.

²³⁷ George S. Harris, "The Role of Military in Turkey in 1980s: Guardians or Decision-Makers?", in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), *State, Democracy and Military in 1980s*, (Berlin-New York: Walter De Gruyter, 1988), 193.

of its internal law²³⁸. In fact, the expression of Alpaslan Türkeş, who was the spokesman for the military coup of 27 May 1960, as “...*We are loyal to NATO and CENTO*”, was a signal showing that the country would not abandon its close cooperation with the West in its foreign policy. Having seen itself as the leading institution of modernizing Turkey, military had the privilege of double autonomy one of which from the society and the other from politicians and civilian bureaucracy²³⁹. Here it is important to note Komsuoğlu’s argument on Demirel’s thought that military never wanted to be ruled by civilian governments in multi-party nature of National Assembly because military would be open to criticism of opposition parties for the jobs they had fulfilled with the orders of government in the future, that is why they preferred to rank themselves on a position above and beyond civilian governments and political parties²⁴⁰.

Role of the military in Turkish political life has been quite strong which also accelerated after the 1960 military takeover in terms of domestic and foreign policy sphere. Having experienced the demise and collapse of Ottoman Empire, latest Ottoman elites in bureaucracy and army restored the Republic of Turkey under the head of Atatürk which also drew lessons from the collapse of the old empire and had chosen the westernization among the alternatives of Islamism and Turkism that were practiced and failed. That is why the new republic was born out of the ashes of invaded country of old Ottoman legacy and shaped its new policy orientation towards securitization of the state for domestic and foreign threats. This security concern was sharpened with the start of Cold War period where Soviet Union appeared as a threatening neighbour in the north and ongoing rivals on the east, west and south that

²³⁸ Article 35, saying that “The TSK’s duty is to protect and defend the Turkish fatherland and the Turkish Republic as defined by the Constitution”, was amendment of Article 34 when it was first issued just after 1960 coup. Besides Demirel labels those military takeovers as state crises rather than military coups because military did not establish long-term military rule. Both mentions are in Tuba Ünlü, “The European Union and the Turkish Military (1997-2007)”, *PhD Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University*, Washington DC, (November 28, 2007), 79 and 108. Available on <https://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/304871672.html?FMT=AI> Last Accessed on 17/08/2019.

²³⁹ İlhan Uzgöl, “Between Praetorianism and Democracy: The Role of the Military in Turkish Foreign Policy”, *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, Vol XXXIV, (2003), 177-211.

²⁴⁰ Komsuoğlu, *Siyasal Yaşamda Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel*, 299.

were regarded as possible and potential allies of the Soviet Union which brought the unchallenging existence and necessity of a strong army and positioning the military in the core of the state. Indeed, Bilgin also mentions that policy makers of the Republic instrumentalized the concept of secularism in securitization for both domestic and international politics where they aimed to restrict attempts of European states to manipulate the role of caliphate and religious communities by fore-fronting secularism as the main ideological background of the new republic²⁴¹. Bilgin's argument could be interpreted in a way that the role of protecting secularism within the country brought a role and opportunity for military to take responsibility in actively participating foreign policy making. Özcan, in this respect, utters that military used the strategy of securitization of many issues so that it could actively participate in policy issues which also includes the foreign policy dimension²⁴².

Here, Cizre notes that military's role in Turkish politics not only arises from institutional structure but also unseen power of cultural and historical background of Turkish identity²⁴³. According to Ünlü, this traditional source of power is also honed by a positive image on public perception that military had been far away from corruption²⁴⁴. In addition to that argument, the fact that future's prospective prime ministers can only serve as third lieutenant as the highest rank for compulsory national service but this lowest rank of military officers would also create a psychological dominance of military in the minds of civilian policy makers.

Ünlü, by referring to Pion-Berlin's argument about sources of autonomy, also notes that military enjoyed both political autonomy and institutional autonomy through its constitutionally sanctioned independent role in National Security Council, its legally defined relation to president, its control over defence industry and national

²⁴¹ Pınar Bilgin, "Güvenlikten İçeri Uluslararası: Türkiye'de Güvenlik ve Laiklik", *Marmara Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Cilt 23, Sayı 2, (2015), 123-142.

²⁴² Gencer Özcan, "The Changing Role of Turkey's Military in Foreign Policy Making", *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, No 23, ISSN 1696-2206, (May 2010), 31.

²⁴³ For Ümit Cizre's argument, See Uğur Burç Yıldız, "Ordunun Türk Dış Politikasındaki Rolü: Kurumsal Olmayan Mekanizmalar", in Ertan Efeğil and Rıdvan Kalaycı (eds.), *Dış Politika Teorileri Bağlamında Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, (Ankara: Nobel Yayınları, 2012), 364.

²⁴⁴ Ünlü, "The European Union and the Turkish Military (1997-2007)", 68.

intelligence, its autonomy in budgetary issues, promotions of its officers and legal system with military courts, and finally its role in state enterprises²⁴⁵.

In this period of Demirel's single party government, the fact coming to the forefront is that the military trying to control domestic and foreign politics through a legal institution called the National Security Council (NSC) which was established after 1960 takeover and authorized to give recommendations to the Council of Ministers about domestic and foreign security topics in its meetings that are held under the head of the President²⁴⁶. While the traditional impact of Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) was already existing due to its active involvement in the establishment of Republic and due to the fact that the foreign policy problems were on the basis of security issues in general, the military effect on decision makers regarding foreign policy found a legal basis thanks to the establishment of NSC, which was legally authorized for conveying recommendations to the cabinet²⁴⁷. This could be argued to provide a de-facto opportunity for TAF with its members in NSC, which prioritized its security-based institutional reflexes regarding guidance to the decision makers in foreign policy, to expand its authority to give recommendatory decisions. Here Bayülken, former diplomat and Minister of Foreign Affairs, mentions that NSC was protector of the fixed foreign policy understanding that did not change from government to government²⁴⁸. It is important to note that NSC, as the decision-making body, is composed of its military members from TAF and civilian members from the cabinet and is led by the president. General Secretariat for NSC, on the

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 95-108.

²⁴⁶ There are different views considering that this Council was inspired from High Defence Parliament and General Clerkship established in 1933; from National Security High Council of 1949; and from NSC established in the US in 1947. Law number 129 in 1962 established the modern NSC. For the Law number 129 of NSC, See https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc046/kanuntbmmc046/kanuntbmmc04600129.pdf

²⁴⁷ The duty of "conveying opinion to the Ministerial Cabinet" in 1961 NSC was changed after 1971 memorandum and it became "providing policy recommendations". See Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç, "The Military and Europeanization Reforms in Turkey", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 45:5, (2009), 803-824, 804; and, also Bulut Gürpınar "Milli Güvenlik Kurulu ve Dış Politika", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Cilt 10, Sayı 39 (Güz 2013), 73-104.

²⁴⁸ As cited in Ali Balcı, *Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler ve Uygulamalar*, (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2017), 134.

other hand, has been tied to Prime Minister administratively but conducted the official bureaucratic issues of NSC²⁴⁹. NSC was generally regarded and also perceived as a platform where top generals of the military dominate civilian governments even though the role of the Council was limited with giving recommendations to government for consultation and General Secretary was also associated with its military understanding because its Secretary Generals had been selected from the military generals until 2004. As it is argued by Öztürk and Yurteri, 1962 regulation for administrative affairs of General Secretary for NSC was the only declassified regulation of General Secretariat where others were classified as secret²⁵⁰. Kılıçoğlu examines Demirel's view of this council by quoting his own statement that “[...T]he Council of Ministers is a political institution but the NSC is the state.”²⁵¹

Zeybek argues that, in normal and ordinary political conditions, military does not impose any pressure on NSC and top generals have been very respectful to civilian politicians however they may aim to dominate government when civilian authority is weak or political atmosphere is chaotic²⁵². Besides, he also adds that NSC works very active with its bureaucratic organization called General Secretariat of NSC which deals with a wide range of state priorities and prepares the National Security Policy Documents in different policy areas from security to economics by coordinating related state institutions²⁵³. Celasin, former Commander of Turkish Air Forces and former Secretary General for NSC, also holds an argument closer to Zeybek and utters that military does not commit itself to dominate politics and

²⁴⁹ <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/11422.pdf> [It is important to note that Secretary General had no vote in NSC meetings and President had two votes if it was a tie for the votes in a decision. See article 5 of Law no 129]

²⁵⁰ Saygı Öztürk and Kemal Yurteri, *MGK: Dünü ve Bugünüyle Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2011), 24.

²⁵¹ Kılıçoğlu, “Süleyman Demirel ve Dış Politika”, 230.

²⁵² Interview with Zeybek.

²⁵³ Here, Özcan notes that army was utilizing the NSC by preparing action plans against neighbour countries in which preparation of National Security Policy Documents were monopolized by the military up until 2004 when a civilian NSC Secretary General, Yiğit Alpogan was appointed for the first time. Özcan, “The Changing Role of Turkey’s Military in Foreign Policy Making”, 30. [Öymen notes that in MFA, DG of Policy Planning was responsible for contributing to NSPD. In Öymen, *Zor Rota, Gençlik ve Diplomasi Anıları*, 161]

politicians through the power of uniform or NSC in normal conditions where politicians perform in accordance with their responsibilities given by the voters²⁵⁴.

Looking at the policy agendas of NSC meetings held between 1965-1971²⁵⁵, it could be argued that main focus of those meetings was domestic security issues rather than foreign policy where relations with NATO, new foreign policy orientation of the country, Cyprus problem and Turkish-Greek relations were regarded as the topics to be discussed in those agendas in terms of foreign policy.

Here one may raise a question about why and how important the NSC was for Demirel in his decision making. By considering within Demirel's approach to military for making it closer to Justice Party by neutralization of the army, Cizre argues that Demirel aimed to keep military in decision making through NSC where he could notice and control the military reflexes and keep its role limited to "conveying recommendation" in political decision making²⁵⁶. Indeed, there could be argued about a mutual dependency and relationship of interest for military and Demirel over NSC²⁵⁷. As Cizre's argument mentioned above, Demirel could have aimed to control army and its excessive intervention to politics by limiting but also soothing top generals at NSC meetings. For military, on the other hand, this platform of NSC meetings could be seen as a legal body for military to show their initial signals of reluctance so that government could consider military's prospective moves with early signs mentioned at NSC meetings. Besides, having considered that presidents had been former members of TAF until Özal, leadership of NSC could also be utilized by military if there is a problem to be solved.

Last but not least, agenda setting for NSC meetings could also be used as a leverage by military where Secretary General first submits the agenda template to

²⁵⁴ Interview with Ergin Celasin on 13/09/2019 in Ankara.

²⁵⁵ Policy agendas of NSC meetings available in Bülent Şener, *Türk Dış Politikasında Güç Kullanma Seçeneği (1923-2010): Teorik, Tarihsel ve Hukuksal Bir Analiz*, (Ankara: Barış Kitap, 2013), 282-295.

²⁵⁶ Ümit Cizre, *AP Ordu İlişkileri: Bir İkilemin Anatomisi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993), 80.

²⁵⁷ Agah Oktay Güner reports from Cevdet Sunay, President of the time, that some generals raised difficulties in many issues at some of the NSC meetings in order to put Demirel in a difficult position. Güner's comments in Vakıf 2000 panel, 33-38.

chief of general staff's overview then to prime minister and finally to president²⁵⁸. Because chief of general staff was the one to see the agenda template first, it could be argued that he put the initial anchor and his agenda could not be easily cancelled or changed by prime minister where final word about the agenda belonged to president as the head of NSC.

Vahapoğlu, the longest serving bureaucrat as retired Colonel at General Secretariat for NSC, holds counter-arguments against Cizre's points mentioned above and notes that Demirel gave too much importance on institutionalization and respected to state institutions where NSC and General Secretariat had a privileged importance for him because technical information provided by the General Secretariat was immune from any political influence and was purely objective based on true information. In this respect, he argues that it would not be true to attribute such kind of pragmatism to Demirel's understanding about NSC by mentioning an implicit manipulation of military because Demirel would not prefer to deteriorate the functioning of a legal state institution through that kind of short-term calculation²⁵⁹. This argument of Vahapoğlu is also supported by Bayar by mentioning Demirel's overall understanding about state institutions and institutionalization²⁶⁰.

Keeping those arguments about NSC in mind, it is also important to mention for this period that military was influential in another newly established body, Republic Senate, which was composed of the members of National Unity Committee of 1960 coup and some other generals. This Senate was acting as an upper chamber and checking and balancing the parliament in its decisions, and even recommending on domestic and foreign policies²⁶¹. Together with NSC, Senate was an influential institution for military to control foreign policy up until 1980 military coup.

²⁵⁸ This agenda setting for NSC meetings mentioned in Öztürk and Yurteri is also confirmed by Celasin. Interview with Celasin. Also in Öztürk and Yurteri, *MGK: Dünü ve Bugünüyle Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*, 122-123.

²⁵⁹ Interview with Mustafa Hidayet Vahapoğlu on 27/09/2019 in Ankara.

²⁶⁰ Interview with Bayar.

²⁶¹ Balcı, *Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler ve Uygulamalar*, 135.

Starting from this period, other than NSC, Uzgel also notes that the establishing Turkish Armed Forces Assistance and Pension Fund (OYAK) could also be seen as an attempt of military to enter into business world in order to shape public opinion and private sector's perception about the military other than its direct influence on politicians²⁶².

At this period, although the intelligence bureaucracy, which was the other leg of the security bureaucracy, was officially established under the name of National Security Services in 1926 under General Staff. Since it was just established in 1965 under the name of National Intelligence Organization and since its head was a general that was active in armed forces for a long time, it did not show an institutional reflex and priority and thus it was not evaluated separately.

In sum, having considered its traditional prestigious role and legal bodies which could be utilized as a means of influencing foreign policy, military for this period could be regarded to have a strong potential capability for dominating foreign policy issues.

4.1.5.2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Civilian Bureaucracy

In foreign policy making, civilian bureaucracy is mostly associated with the diplomats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Undersecretary of the Ministry is mostly associated with the top institutional decision making which is different than the minister who rules the ministry. There has been a long discussion about the role of the bureaucracy of MFA in foreign policy making. The role of the ministry, under the head of undersecretary, is summarized in official terms as providing alternative policy actions for enlightening the political decision makers in their decisions²⁶³. Even though Gür²⁶⁴ notes that duty of diplomats in MFA is

²⁶² Uzgel, "Between Praetorianism and Democracy: The Role of the Military in Turkish Foreign Policy", 183.

²⁶³ Gün Kut, "Türk Dış Politikasında Çok Yönlülüğün Tarihi: Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Devamlılık ve Değişim", *Boğaziçi University-TÜSİAD Foreign Policy Forum Research Report*, DPF 2010-RR 02, 6

²⁶⁴ Kemal Gür is a retired diplomat. See his argument in Kemal Gür, "Dış Politika Yapımında Dışişleri Bakanlığı", in Ümit Özdağ and Yelda Demirağ (eds.), *Stratejik Derinlikte Savrulan Türk Dış Politikası*, (Ankara: Kripto Yayınları, 2016), 25.

preparing alternative official actions for the foreign policy rather than the whole foreign policy itself, both Tuygan²⁶⁵ and Loğoğlu²⁶⁶ associate more to it and argues that bureaucracy of the ministry not only prepare alternatives but also formulates the foreign policy itself. Considering Bölükbaşı's and Ziyal's arguments that political decision makers make their decisions based on the alternatives prepared by the Ministerial bureaucracy²⁶⁷, it can be argued that role of the bureaucracy goes beyond the application where bureaucrats take an active part in formulation indirectly. Additionally, Alpogan also notes that foreign policy parts of government programmes are also prepared by MFA bureaucracy based on policy papers of the departments within the ministry and then forwarded to governments consideration where almost all of the proposals are accepted by governments, which could be regarded as a strong sign for dealing with the formulation part indirectly²⁶⁸. He, deliberately puts limit on the role of MFA bureaucracy where by adding that MFA bureaucracy could never go beyond a technical proposal where governments pay the price before history and account before the public. Öymen, beyond that discussion, adds that informing NSC, president and prime minister on foreign policy issues and accompanying the president and prime minister in their foreign visits could be mentioned for Undersecretary of MFA's duties²⁶⁹.

Robins emphasizes that the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) works mostly in harmony with MFA that it is confident in its institutionalized structure and patriotism in foreign policy, regardless of the position of politicians²⁷⁰. Elekdağ, mainly due to

²⁶⁵ Ali Tuygan, *Gönüllü Diplomat, Dışişlerinde Kırk Yıl*, (İzmir: Şenocak Yayınları:2012), 28.

²⁶⁶ Faruk Loğoğlu is deputy in the Parliament and former Undescretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who also served as ambassador to Turkey's Washington Embassy. For his argument, See O. Faruk Loğoğlu, "Türk Dış Politikası, Fedakar ve Seçkin İnsanlarla Dolu Dışişleri Bakanlığı'nın Ürünüdür", in Habibe Özdal, Osman B. Dinçer, and Mehmet Yeğin (eds.), *Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası: Cilt 3*, (Ankara: USAK Yayınları, 2010), 260.

²⁶⁷ Interview with Ziyal. Also, in Deniz Bölükbaşı, *Dışişleri İskelesi: Dışişleri'nde 34 yıl*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2011), 542.

²⁶⁸ Interview with Alpogan.

²⁶⁹ Öymen, *Zor Rota, Gençlik ve Diplomasi Anıları*, 336.

²⁷⁰ Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War*, 67.

the fact that foreign policy problems of Turkey were about security, interprets this as “solidarity between military and foreign affairs²⁷¹”. Çalış notes that “solidarity between military and foreign affairs” stems from the sense of trust and solidarity between the Kemalist bureaucracies of these two institutions, which are the protectors of the secular and pro-western approach of the Republic²⁷². This argument of solidarity between military and MFA is also supported by Oran by mentioning their shared origins coming from late Ottoman elites, similarity in their working style where both make inside meetings and brain storming within their own institution repeatedly, similarity between the structure they work in where both work in strict hierarchy and in protocol rules, and similarity in the way their understanding the threats and dangers coming to Turkey²⁷³. Here, Eralp argues that bringing the arguments and claims of hostile or rival state on the table for clearly evaluating all pros and cons in a case has been the working principle of MFA bureaucrats however this way of mentioning rival state’s claims has been criticized by some politicians and military officers for being not patriotic enough²⁷⁴ and that is how the term “mon cher” has been attributed to MFA bureaucrats as a sign of despisal²⁷⁵.

Similar to other bureaucratic institutions, MFA also has its traditions and policy understanding in foreign policy which is either regarded as state policy to be followed or the policy should be followed for the sake of country. Zeybek argues that MFA has a very well trained and educated bureaucracy which draws a foreign policy priority based on careful calculations about circumstances of Turkey and having good

²⁷¹ Şükrü Elekdag “Başbakanlar ve Dış Politika” available at <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/07/14/yazar/elekdag.html>

²⁷² Şaban Çalış, “The Turkish State’s Identity and Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process”, *Mediterranean Quarterly: A Journal of Global Issues*, Vol. 6, No: 2 (1995, 135-155, 150.

²⁷³ Oran, “Türk Dış Politikasının Uygulaması”, 66.

²⁷⁴ Yalım Eralp, *Sefir Olmak, Bir ‘Monşer’den Anekdotlar*, (İstanbul: Adalı Yayınları, 2018), 28. (Please note that Eralp, a retired ambassador, uses quotation mark for the term mon cher, which means ‘my dear, my darling’ in English, in all of his books in order to refer to in a pickwickian sense of despisal.

²⁷⁵ Bölükbaşı, *Dışişleri İskelesi: Dışişleri’nde 34 Yıl*, 39.

relations with USA²⁷⁶, considering the idea of reciprocity in every policy action and refraining from hostility to any other states are traditions and priorities of MFA²⁷⁷. Since the traditional culture of the foreign affairs is based on the status quo, İskit points out that foreign ministry officials act according to the background of the issue, and they find it safer to continue the current practice with pre-established templates instead of turning to new options in the event of a crisis²⁷⁸.

It is generally argued that MFA has a strong memory and institutional identity as the primary institution with its legal authority to carry out foreign policy and with its historical background coming from the Ottoman Empire. This argument of having strong memory could be interpreted as a result of service notes circulating within the ministry which brings a historical chronicle of what previous colleague had done in certain matters²⁷⁹. Learning about what previous colleague had done in certain matters also brings the idea of acting in accordance with pre-established templates which İskit points out. Alpogan clearly considers the historical archives and accumulated technical experience in MFA as its two sources of foreign policymaking²⁸⁰. Oran here notes Çağlayanlı's criticism of the MFA for lacking an institutional memory, where he thinks that reasons are the problems of archive system and resistance of the workers in using new typing programmes for preventing the problem of fading out in papers. Last but not least, Oran also utters that lack of policy planning, lack of proposing policy alternatives and problem of specialization in one specific topic due to human resources management problems could be seen as the structural problems of MFA that create problems for political decision-makers²⁸¹. Here, it could be right to add that it lost its privilege of being the only civil state

²⁷⁶ Oran notes this as westernism rather than limiting to the US. Oran, "Türk Dış Politikasının Uygulaması", 63.

²⁷⁷ Interview with Zeybek

²⁷⁸ Temel İskit, *Diplomasi: Tarihi, Teorisi, Kurumları ve Uygulaması*, (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007).

²⁷⁹ Utility of service notes are mentioned both in Oran and Yavuzalp. Oran, "Türk Dış Politikasının Uygulaması", 60; and Yavuzalp, *Dış Politikada Oyunun Kuralları*, 194.

²⁸⁰ Interview with Alpogan.

²⁸¹ Oran, "Türk Dış Politikasının Uygulaması", 69-72.

institution in foreign policy after the establishment of the State Planning Organization (SPO) and its involvement to the foreign affairs since 1960s, where institutional memory was challenged in several issues where sometimes MFA was not involved in the situation.

Although MFA, known as cautious, restrained, maintaining good relations with the west, avoiding war and maintaining a foreign policy understanding that prioritizes continuity, isolating itself to the domestic political dynamics as much as possible, it had also faced difficulties in diplomatic management of the dilemma over national interests and the Western alliance due to the Johnson letter and other developments before Demirel. Especially the willingness of SPO for increasing its influence in foreign policy formation with its power has exposed MFA bureaucracy to accusations that they are on the side of West and far from fighting for national interests²⁸². For MFA diplomats, Oran notes an institutional reflex as acting passively or resisting to government in only two conditions one of which is a government's tendency to leave the western alliance and the other is when a government tend to disintermediate the foreign affairs bureaucracy in foreign policy making²⁸³. This argument could be true for Cold War period where a strong international system was the leading factor however foreign policy practices of governments after 2009 presents that those institutional reflexes of MFA could no longer exist. Besides, Öymen notes that it is wrong to see MFA bureaucracy as a counter force against politicians where this bureaucracy is legally obliged to provide its service as civil servants²⁸⁴. Additionally, Ziyal adds that the only way of showing a resistance for a top MFA bureaucrat could be submitting resignation so that politicians could have the chance to work with other bureaucrats in line with their policy orientation²⁸⁵.

²⁸² In addition to rise of SPO, Mustafa Aşula, a retired diplomat, reports in his memoirs that temporary law number 13, after the coup, disqualified MFA in economic issues and transferred the authority to Ministry of Finance. Mustafa Aşula, *Dışişleri Albümü*, (Ankara: Nurol Matbaacılık, 2000), 9.

²⁸³ Oran, "Türk Dış Politikasının Uygulaması", 63.

²⁸⁴ Interview with Öymen.

²⁸⁵ Interview with Ziyal.

Compared to former period of İnönü governments which was interpreted as a period in which a small diplomatic elite governed all foreign policy decisions, in this period, a wider bureaucratic structure took part in the formation of foreign policy and domestic political dynamics were more effective in forming foreign policy than before²⁸⁶. Although MFA is mentioned by its characteristics of staying clear of domestic political conflicts of the parties, Sert, by analysing and comparing all memoirs written by retired diplomats of the time, argues that MFA bureaucracy was indeed politicized and faced group identity conflict within itself after the 1960 coup's intense intervention to appointments and assignments in the Ministry, which had a fresh trauma due to execution of its Minister just a couple of years ago²⁸⁷. According to those memoirs which confirm each other in full consistency, Sert mentions that 1960's top bureaucrats of MFA, such as Zeki Kuneralp, Secretary General for MFA in Demirel government, saw westernism as the main source of Turkey's esteemed position in eastern world²⁸⁸. Besides, Yılmaz and Bilgin also assert that MFA diplomats and intellectuals of statecraft in this period regarded this westernism as an identity for Turkey that abalienated any attempt to move closer to eastern identity and this was repeated by diplomats as an official discourse rather than a policy orientation²⁸⁹.

Having an effective power to provide guidance for political decision makers with the support of foreign affairs advisors in president's office and the prime ministry's office, MFA has advantageous position in leading the political policy makers to the path in line with their institutional understanding where it had been told to have the advantage of increasing its influence about its policy priorities while

²⁸⁶ Baskın Oran, "Türk Dış Politikasının Oluşturulması", in Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular Belgeler Yorumlar. Cilt 1: 1919-1980*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), 75.

²⁸⁷ Hüseyin Sert, "İçeriden Gelen Ses: Bir Hatırat Yazarı Olarak Türk Diplomati ve Türk Hariciyesinde 1960-1980 Döneminin Hatıratlar Üzerinden Analizi", *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Hatırat Uluslararası Sempozyumu*, Adnan Menderes Üniversitesi, Aydın, (25-27 Nisan 2018), 21.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁸⁹ Eylem Yılmaz and Pınar Bilgin, "Constructing Turkey's "Western" Identity During the Cold War: Discourses of the Intellectuals of Statecraft", *International Journal*, Vol. 61, No. 1, Turkey: Myths and Realities (Winter, 2005/2006), 39-59, 58.

presenting foreign policy issues directly to Demirel and other policy makers by also noting the reserve points of other institutions²⁹⁰. Under this consideration, it could be argued that MFA bureaucracy utilized the information channels through president and politicians where the source of its institutional power was both stemmed from and supported with ministers appointed to MFA.

Although MFA bureaucracy got it difficult in accepting İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil becoming the MFA Minister as a violation of its institutional tradition during the Demirel periods, his closeness to Demirel could be seen as an advantage in considering institutional reflexes of Foreign Affairs in foreign policy. Indeed, Demirel was very interested in technical knowledge and accumulated memory of bureaucracy however he was very determinate about his own decisions even if bureaucracy shows any resistance²⁹¹. Besides, by saying that “*Ministry of Foreign Affairs is my headquarters and I am the foreign policy prime minister*”, Demirel mentioned how important MFA bureaucracy was for him²⁹².

Last but not least, it is important to note the organizational change of the MFA institutionally in this period where number of Deputy Secretary General increased, Department for Cyprus was enlarged and merged with Department for Greece, new offices for economic development issues were established together with special offices for worker’s remittances and cultural affairs, High Policy Planning Council was established and tied directly to the Minister, and finally Foreign Affairs Academy was established in order to train freshers in diplomatic orientations²⁹³.

4.1.5.3. Political Decision Maker

Having duties and power in foreign policy outside of public institutions, Grand National Assembly of Turkey unchangingly continues its limited role in foreign policy; the Cabinet supports prime minister's decisions mainly depending on

²⁹⁰ Interviews with Çetin and Ziyal.

²⁹¹ Interviews with Çetin, Zeybek and Karayalçın.

²⁹² Interview with Bayar

²⁹³ Ali Rıza Özcoşkun, *Cumhuriyetin Kuruluşundan Bugüne Dışişleri Bakanlığı Teşkilat Yapısı (1920-2018)*, (Ankara: Türk Diplomatik Arşivi Yayınları Dışişleri Bakanlığı Matbaası, 2018), 32-51.

pictures drawn by MFA and the president takes part just in a representative manner into the duties outlined in the Constitution²⁹⁴. When the power granted by the Constitution is evaluated, the main decision-maker regarding foreign policy is seen as the prime minister, and the use of the representative power given to the president is materialized by the prime minister and the Council of Ministers in peace time and by the Chief of General Staff regarding security in the time of war.

Here, Demirel's understanding of diplomacy and how he regarded the role of politicians and diplomats in foreign policy is quite crucial. Karayalçın quotes Demirel's approach to politicians and diplomats saying that "*Diplomats take action at the point where politicians are stuck. Politicians go on a level as much as they can and then leave the ground to diplomats in order to go further.*"²⁹⁵ Then, it is needed to understand what kind of a decision maker Demirel was in that period. As it was noted in the previous chapter, Demirel also changed his leadership in different periods where he also learned from his actions and from political developments within a long-term experience in power. In this period of his prime ministry for the first time, he focused on good and balanced relations in order not to discomfort the military where the memory of 1960 military takeover was fresh. Indeed, it could be said that Demirel attempted to balance military without discomforting it so that he could keep military away from domestic politics and could develop the dominance of civilian authority in politics. When it comes to his relations with MFA, existence of Çağlayangil was comforting point for Demirel where he did not intervene in daily routine functioning of foreign affairs due to his trust to Çağlayangil and well experienced staff of MFA. Bölükbaşı argues that political leaders generally prefer to stay distant to MFA bureaucracy due to their prejudices in their first years of government up until they

²⁹⁴ In the 1961 Constitution, the powers of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, which consists of the National Assembly and the Republican Senate, were defined as endorsing the international agreements with a law, the assignment of the Turkish Armed Forces abroad and the declaration of war. The powers of the President are limited to appointing representatives to foreign states, ratifying and issuing international agreements, accepting foreign state officials, chairing the Council of Ministers when deemed necessary, presiding over the NSC and representing the Commander-in-Chief inextricably from the spiritual existence of the Assembly. Available on <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa61.htm>

²⁹⁵ Interview with Karayalçın. [Bayar also reports Demirel's speech that "*We need diplomacy again when diplomacy ended.*" Interview with Bayar].

realize the importance and effectiveness of MFA staff with their hard working²⁹⁶. Karayalçın notes from his memoirs that Çağlayangil's way of administering the MFA was very welcome by the core staff where he gave much importance on consultation and active participation in critical foreign policy issues²⁹⁷. Indeed, Yavuzalp also mentions that MFA bureaucracy also quickly trusted and got on well with Çağlayangil even though he was not coming from MFA staff²⁹⁸. In this respect, it could be argued that there was a good harmony between MFA bureaucracy and Demirel in his single party governments. Running foreign policy as the prime minister of single party government, Demirel seemed to act more active because he neither needed to balance nor confront another party in foreign policy demands.

Finally, it is important to note the foreign policy goals written in government programmes of the first, second and third governments of Demirel between 1965-1969, 1969-1970 and 1970-1971. In those programmes, keynotes could be mentioned as strict loyalty to international responsibilities arising from international organizations such as NATO and the UN, honing the good relations with west and improving the relations with the rest, especially with Soviet Union and Arab neighbours in economic and social terms, and continuing the ongoing multi-faceted foreign policy under a clear consideration of non-intervention and mutual respect to sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Those programmes specifically point to preserving the interests in Cyprus as a national case, preserving the national interests at all costs, and specific reference to importance of MFA bureaucracy and TAF and improving their capacity in terms of human resources and material equipment in order to sustain the country's independence²⁹⁹.

²⁹⁶ Bölükbaşı, *Dışişleri İskelesi: Dışişleri'nde 34 Yıl*, 57.

²⁹⁷ Interview Karayalçın.

²⁹⁸ Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*, 114.

²⁹⁹ For Demirel's speeches on government programmes, See Neziroğlu and Yılmaz (eds.), *Başbakanlarımız ve Genel Kurul Konuşmaları: Cilt 5*, 103-133 and 771-807; and Neziroğlu and Yılmaz (eds.), *Başbakanlarımız ve Genel Kurul Konuşmaları: Cilt 6*, 3-18.

4.2. Crisis and Crisis Management

4.2.1. Poppy Cultivation Crisis Between Turkey and the US

Has it ever been plausible that prohibition of cultivating a plant may cause a foreign policy crisis between countries under a strong alliance? The answer is yes if it is poppy cultivation³⁰⁰. The US demand for putting a ban on poppy cultivation in Turkey, for the sake of US global fight for ending the use of narcotics by its youth, bred a serious foreign policy crisis between 1968-1974. “*Papaver Somniferum* (opiating poppy)”, which has been cultivated in Anatolian land since ancient times, utilized for medicine, animal feed, some sort of industrial purposes and even industrialized as a pain killer medicine for a time at the beginning of 20th century under the brand name of “Heroin³⁰¹” by Bayer Company, has been strictly controlled and registered in its cultivation because a very dangerous and addicting narcotic called “opium” can be extracted by stiffening its milk obtained from the capsule of its plant. Because its seeds have been used in food industry for their fat-rich ingredient and opium extracted from its capsule has been used for obtaining medicinal morphine, its cultivation and sale was regulated in Turkey since 1928 where the “Law number 1369” legalized its cultivation and domestic trade in raw format but banned its ready-made import and export. Later on, “Law number 2061”, in 1932, authorized the Sale Union as a monopoly for opium sale and obliged the peasants to register their opium cultivating lands in order to create a map for domestic opium production. Then after, Turkey has approved the “1925 Geneva Opium Act³⁰²” in April 1933 and legalized its domestic trade authorized the “Monopoly Board³⁰³” for opium exports

³⁰⁰ Poppy cultivation even triggered a war between Britain and China in the history between 1839-1842 when China wanted to ban opium production in order to keep its population away from poisoning with opium addiction.

³⁰¹ Bayer Company stopped producing its industrialized pain killer medicine made of opium under the brand name of “Heroin” in 1924 when US administration totally prohibited producing and trading heroin. See Nuran Taşlıgil and Güven Şahin, “Tarihsel Süreçte Haşhaş (*Papaver Somniferum* L.) ve Afyon”, *Tarih Okulu Dergisi (TOD): Haziran 2018, Yıl 11, Sayı XXXIV*, 168 and 177.

³⁰² For the full version of the act, See https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-6-a&chapter=6&clang=en

³⁰³ This authorization was given to newly established Turkish Grain Board in 1938. See the detailed report of “Turkish Grain Board Poppy Report of 2016” on Poppy Cultivation and its legislative history.

where Turkey also repealed the Law number 2061 and accepted to limit its poppy cultivation to 13 provinces which increased to 30 in 1945 and 42 in 1960 due to increase in poppy export of Turkey. Then in 1967 when Demirel was in power, cultivating poppy brought a serious foreign policy crisis between Turkey and the US because unexpected consequences of Vietnam War such as military losses and psychological problems of military men that turned back to their country generated a mass domestic problem for the US and US administration started a global fight against narcotics and drug dealers.

That foreign policy crisis started with the US pressure on Demirel administration in order to ban poppy cultivation in Turkey totally where US administration hold Turkey responsible for poisoning US youth by being the source of opium supply which was processed in Marseilles heroin laboratories and transferred to US territory. In this respect, Demirel administration put a Cabinet Decree on law in 1968 which restricted the 42.000-hectare cultivation area of 1960s to 13.000-hectare cultivation area and limited the cultivation to 11 provinces. However, Nixon administration was not satisfied with this restriction and asked for total ban where both special representator of the US president, Patrick Moynihan and the US Attorney General, John Mitchell repeatedly declared that “80 percent of the narcotic drugs in US territory was made of Turkish poppy³⁰⁴” and this announcement was used by US media intensely in order to generate a public opinion³⁰⁵. Indeed, US administration was criticizing Turkey for not fulfilling the requirement stemming from 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and also defending itself that US pressure was not a cover up for Vietnam failure but an old standing demand since

Available on <http://www.tmo.gov.tr/Upload/Document/hashassektrraporu.pdf>. Last Accessed on 25/05/2019

³⁰⁴ Daniel P. Moynihan (Assistant to the President), “Memorandum for Honorable John N. Mitchell, Attorney General” (18 September 1969) in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969-1972 Available on <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e1/45827.htm>

³⁰⁵ Haydar Çakmak, “Haşhaş Krizi”, in Haydar Çakmak (ed), *Türk Dış Politikasında 41 Kriz: 1924-2014*, (Ankara: Kripto Yayınları, 2016), 137.

Porter Resolution of 1923³⁰⁶. Besides, US claim was that revenue gained from the poppy export in Turkey was less than one percent of Turkish Gross Domestic Products at that time and Turkish claims about the poppy issue was more populist demagoguery towards voters rather than logical attempts³⁰⁷. Interestingly, official US documents also shows that a bombing attack on Blue Mosque of Turkey as a retaliation to Turkey's so-called aggression against the US in poppy issue was planned by Moynihan according to what Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs of the United States, reported³⁰⁸.

In contrast, Turkish claim was that the US attempt to fight against Turkish poppy cultivation was a populist domestic policy of Nixon administration where he aimed to direct the domestic attention away from Vietnam failure and found Turkey a more suitable country to impose his domination rather than the Golden Triangle where he had no control over illicit opium trade of local groups arising from Vietnam War³⁰⁹. Moreover, it was also argued that US was not intervening to Golden Triangle because CIA itself was responsible for illicit trade there³¹⁰. The first offer raised by the Senator Patrick Moynihan, special representative of Nixon, was to buy all poppy harvest of 1969 as the US government, which was rejected by Demirel due to his claim that poppy in Turkey had pre-set buyers in national and international markets. The second offer raised by William Handley, newly appointed US Ambassador in Ankara, was a reimbursement of five million US dollar by the US government in

³⁰⁶ Çağrı Erhan, *Beyaz Savaş: Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinde Afyon Sorunu*, (İstanbul: Altınbaş Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2018), 41-82.

³⁰⁷ See the released and declassified CIA Document Title "The Suppression of Poppy Production in Turkey" Available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82S00205R000100150002-6.pdf> Last Accessed on 08/08/2019.

³⁰⁸ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume XXIX Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, eds James E. Miller, Douglas E. Selva and Laurie Van Hook (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 431, Available on <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d423> Last accessed on 01/08/2019

³⁰⁹ Çağrı Erhan, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler", in Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular Belgeler Yorumlar. Cilt 1: 1919-1980*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), 702.

³¹⁰ Erhan, *Beyaz Savaş: Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinde Afyon Sorunu*, 79.

return for stopping poppy cultivation, which was also rejected by Demirel due to his concerns for economic situation of poppy farmers. The third offer by John Ingersoll, US Justice Department's Narcotic and Dangerous Drugs Office Director, offering to support the farmers with a credit of three million US dollar if only the cultivation banned totally was also rejected by Demirel. Even though poppy cultivation was the only economic source for farmers which Demirel government depended on in terms of their potential for mass vote in elections, US pressure forced Demirel administration to limit cultivation to seven provinces in 1970 and four in 1971 through Cabinet Decrees. Nonetheless, US administration was not happy due to the lack of total ban which was achieved by Nihat Erim government who came to power with the support of army after 1971 military memorandum and after Demirel was forced to resign.

At those times, while the US propagated the "Turkish poppy being the source for 80 percent of narcotics in the US" claims worldwide, domestic politicians of Turkey pointed out India which was immune from poppy cultivation ban and blamed the US for tripping up Turkey to gain foreign currency by exporting poppy³¹¹. Besides, they also accused the US of manipulating poppy issue in order to enlarge its domestic market for its synthetic narcotics which were alternative to narcotics that are made of poppy. At that time, Demirel announced that poppy cultivation in Turkey was equal to 120 tonnes and that was too far from serving the purpose of corresponding 80 percent of the narcotics in US territory³¹². So and so, later in 1971 after the poppy cultivation ban, John Ingersoll confessed before the US Congress that the information for 80 percent of narcotics in US territory was produced in Marseilles laboratories from Turkey's poppy was an estimated information taken from French Narcotic Bureau which had only eleven staff, three cars and a very low budget³¹³. Besides, the Strategic Intelligence Office justified Demirel's statement by noting that

³¹¹ Mustafa Salep, "Türkiye-Amerika İlişkilerinde Haşhaş Ekiminin Yasaklanması Meselesi", *Akademik Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, Yıl: 5, Sayı: 47, (Haziran 2017), 351-367, 357.

³¹² Ali Gevilli "Yükseliş ve Düşüş" as cited in Salep, "Türkiye-Amerika İlişkilerinde Haşhaş Ekiminin Yasaklanması Meselesi", 358.

³¹³ Alfred W. McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 207.

they discovered that Turkey's poppy supply was only 100 tonnes which consisted for only five percent of World's illicit drug market and the Southeast Asia was responsible for the main supply³¹⁴. No matter those statements were declared before the congress, poppy cultivation prohibition for Turkey continued until 1974 and even created a new crisis after releasing the ban.

This poppy cultivation came to an end in 1971, if nothing else on paper, in the period of Erim's technocratic cabinet which was supported by the army and had no concern for vote and elections³¹⁵. In this respect, Windle, in his statistical study, discovered that there wasn't a substantial decrease in illicit global poppy supply after the ban in turkey and this ban negatively affected the medicine market in Turkey which resulted in dramatic increase in domestic medicine prices³¹⁶. Even though a financial aid programme of 35.7 million dollars transfer to ex-poppy cultivating farmers within 3 years was initiated and a project for re-directing cultivation to other plants was promised, it was highly complained by farmers that the financial aid had either been delayed or never come. Indeed, only two million dollars of aid was sent and this aid was transferred to Turkish Ministry of Finance which failed to distribute it to farmers accordingly³¹⁷. Besides, poppy farmers and the cultivation areas could not adapt to new crops offered by the project³¹⁸. This, in return, was highly used as political campaign by almost all political parties in 1973 elections where all parties promised to release the ban if they come to power.

Finally, newly elected prime minister, Bülent Ecevit and his coalition government with National Salvation Party released the poppy cultivation ban in July 1974. Ecevit's civilian government first released the ban for seven provinces with a Cabinet Decree on 1 July 1974, then announced the legal safeguard measures for preventing the illegal supply of poppy to the markets with another Cabinet Decree on

³¹⁴ Ibid., 207.

³¹⁵Çakmak, "Haşhaş Krizi", 141.

³¹⁶ James Windle, "A Very Gradual Suppression: A History of Turkish Opium Controls, 1933-1974", *European Journal of Criminology*, Vol 11, Issue 2, (2013), 195-212, 10.

³¹⁷Çakmak, "Haşhaş Krizi", 142.

³¹⁸ Ibid., 142.

6 December 1974. Indeed, Hale argues that this decision was Ford administration's proposal³¹⁹ however Ecevit later mentioned just the opposite in an interview in 2002 and pointed out the disapprobation of the US for poppy cultivation release as the main reason for the US embargo on arms sale to Turkey in those times³²⁰. Supporting Ecevit's argument, Barutçu also mentions that US Senator Wayne declared in a non-official meeting that the real reason for arms sale embargo was lifting poppy cultivation ban³²¹.

Considering that the first "Cyprus Peace Operation", Turkey's military intervention to Cyprus was on 20 July 1974 and the second on 15 August 1974 where the second one was not welcome by the US administration, the initial signals of the embargo in the congress which was even before the 20th June put Ecevit's argument straight. As a matter of fact, an article published in the "Economist"³²² on 13 July 1974 quoted the US congressmen Charles Ranger and Lester Wolf's announcement that Turkey was not an important cornerstone for NATO alliance and 82-million-dollar embargo on arms sale would be necessary as a response to cultivation release. Likewise, a similar press was releases by "Time Magazine"³²³ on 15 July 1974 which, after mentioning that the poppy cultivation ban was resulted in decrease for drug addiction in US from 600.000 people to 200.000 people from 1967 to 1971, argued that releasing poppy cultivation ban may bring an embargo of arms sale to Turkey which stands for 236 million dollar. Moreover, this article also mentions that Turkey would retaliate by suspending the US use of NATO military bases settled within Turkish territory. On the other hand, it is also possible to see embargo proposals in the congress which directly targets the Turkish intervention on Cyprus as the

³¹⁹ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774*, (New York: Routledge, 2012), 160.

³²⁰ Interview with Bülent Ecevit. Available on <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ecevitin-amerika-ile-hesaplamasi-48078>

³²¹ Ecmel Barutçu, *Hariciye Koridoru*, (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, 1999), 138.

³²² "Poppy Power", *The Economist (London, England)*, Saturday, July 13, 1974, Vol. 252, Issue 6829, 49.

³²³ "Opium's Lethal Return". *TIME Magazine*, 0040781X, 7/15/1974, Vol. 104, Issue 3.

reason³²⁴ that is why it would be right to mention that the US embargo on arms sale was an accumulated and combined response of US administration to Turkish intervention on Cyprus together with releasing poppy cultivation ban.

Here one may need to ask for why the US ignored the Southeast Asia and was so convinced that Turkey was guilty and should ban poppy cultivation on Turkey even though Turkey was recognized by the UN as an official legalized opium producer according to 1953 Opium Protocol and 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Was it because US administration thought that it would be easy to take Turkey's support for this domestic politics game or it would be easy to force Turkey in diplomatic relations which was already warned with Johnson Letter early in 1960s? How would Demirel's decision to decrease poppy cultivation for 70 percent be evaluated even though it had quite negative affect for his interests in domestic politics? Was it his own decision as the political decision maker or a result of public institutions reflecting their reflexes to decision-making process? The following part of this chapter seeks for answer for all those questions by evaluating the decision-making process for this foreign policy crisis.

4.2.2. Crisis Management and Decision-Making Process

As mentioned in previous parts of this chapter, staying strictly in NATO bloc but also having good relations with Soviet bloc in economic relations in détente period of the Cold War, trying to keep developed relations with non-alignment movement and especially with the members from Middle East in order to gain support in United Nations for securing foreign policy matters related to national interest, anti-Americanism rising within the country due to bad past experiences of Jupiter missiles and Johnson Letter together with protest attitude of 1968's student and labour movement, discontent of the military against Demirel for accusing him of not controlling the students' protests and social unrest, and finally the overthrow of Demirel government by his opponents within his Justice Party in 1970's budget

³²⁴ For those kind of proposals, See <https://www.congress.gov/search?searchResultViewType=expanded&q=%7B%22source%22%3A%22legislation%22%2C%22search%22%3A%22arms+sale%22%2C%22congress%22%3A93%7D>
Last Accessed on 17/06/2019.

voting could be mentioned which propose the opportunities and the limitations for Demirel as the political decision-maker.

Aksu defines this crisis as unexpected and unmeant non-violent economic crisis with its political reactions where Turkey followed a limited escalation crisis strategy with utilization of diplomatic negotiations as a response to controlled pressure strategy of the US administration³²⁵. Throughout the crisis, Demirel's resistance to poppy cultivation ban ended when he was forced to resign after military memorandum and Erim government's ban on cultivation was abolished after 1974 decision of Ecevit government where "*status quo ante*" for Turkey was reached in poppy cultivation with some legislative restrictions and control, however lifting the ban together with Cyprus intervention ended in arms sale embargo of the US. Within this crisis, the main official position of Turkey was that the claims about Turkish poppy poisoning US youth was far from being true where the total amount of poppy cultivated in Turkey was quite small amount compared to overall drug market in the US. Therefore, it would be wrong to pressure Turkish farmers to give up their main economic source for their living. In contrast to this argument, US administration was in a position to believe that Turkish claims were nothing other than domestic popular concerns of the government where it was believed by the US administration and media that around 80 percent of the source for illicit drugs in the US territory was illegal poppy trade of Turkish poppy.

To start with, continuous pressure of US administration on Demirel for totally banning the poppy cultivation was strongly resisted by him even though he accepted to gradually decrease the cultivation areas and limit the production. Here, Demirel repeatedly declared that total ban of poppy cultivation would damage a considerable amount of the farmers, which also constitute a strong number of potential voters for Justice Party, strongly depend on poppy cultivation for their survival where those farmers not only benefit the opium in it but also utilize different parts of the poppy crop for their earnings and living³²⁶. In this respect, he was blamed for being a

³²⁵ Aksu, *Türk Dış Politikasında Karar Alma ve Kriz Yönetim Süreçleri*, derived from the tables in the pages 72, 77, 93, 102 and 107.

³²⁶ Turgut, *Demirel'in Dünyası*, 441.

populist leader and refusing to support the global war against drugs by the US administration where Turkey was accused of being responsible for not restricting illicit opium trade.

Alexis Johnson, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs of the United States mentions in his letter to Kennedy, Secretary of Treasury, that Demirel was unable to take dramatic steps in eliminating poppy cultivation due to his weakened condition in the National Assembly starting from 1970 together with the domestic pressure from rural constituency and risk of criticism for bending the knee to foreign pressure by leftist intelligentsia³²⁷. Thus, Demirel's offer to US administration was collection of the Turkish poppy by Turkish administration in 1970 for the sake of preventing illicit trading rather than a total ban on production. Indeed, here, looking at how Demirel government gradually decreased the poppy cultivation areas and declared that Turkey's 100 tonnes of poppy cultivation could not be a considerable source for US youth's drug addiction, it could be argued that Demirel's position was to show US administration that level of drug addiction and amount of illicit drugs had not changed in the US even though Turkey considerably decreased its poppy cultivation, so that he could convince US administration to release its pressure on Turkish government on poppy cultivation issue.

Against this argument, a telegram from Handley, US Ambassador in Ankara, to Department of State could be referred where Handley mentioned that Demirel told him and to Ambassador Hart in 1967 to totally eliminate poppy cultivation in three to five years by 1972³²⁸. Oppositely, the first argument of convincing US by decreasing the plantation areas is also supported by Demirel's argument where he told "*If we ban the poppy cultivation totally after US request, that means we accepted*

³²⁷ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume XXIX Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, eds James E. Miller, Douglas E. Selvage and Laurie Van Hook (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 432. Available on <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d423> Last accessed on 03/08/2019

³²⁸ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume XXIX Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, eds James E. Miller, Douglas E. Selvage and Laurie Van Hook (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 446. Available on <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d423> Last accessed on 03/08/2019

*the accusation that we are responsible for poisoning the US youth.*³²⁹ As a patient and cautious political leader, it would be plausible for Demirel to wait for a certain time until US would be convinced so that he could change their idea to ban the production however military memorandum did not give the “certain waiting time” in that crisis. Besides, it could have a plausible explanation of limiting poppy cultivation areas for Demirel where he could give the excuse of fulfilling a responsibility stemming from 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs³³⁰ rather than kneeling down for US pressure. Looking from this perspective, a CIA report about Turkey’s capability and willingness to collect the 1970 opium crop which was submitted to Harry C. Blaney, special assistant to Moynihan, presents a supporting evidence for this argument where that report notes that:

[...]If the Turkish collection effort against the 1970 opium crop is successful, it can then be anticipated that Ankara will urge that continued Turkish production of opium under controlled conditions constitutes a desirable solution of past problems. Citing the presumed success of the 1970 collection effort, Demirel could argue that Turkish production would no longer be a source for the illicit market. (...) The reported statements of and recent remarks of Foreign Minister Caglayangil to US officials strongly indicate bureaucratic support for this position.³³¹

Then, a question could be raised on how Demirel’s decisions during the poppy crisis were shaped and what the role of military and MFA was in shaping those decisions. The main decision of Demirel was, without doubt, to convince US administration for changing their idea to ban the poppy cultivation where he resisted to the US offers mentioned in previous paragraphs.

At the time of poppy crisis, it was obvious that the position of military was to keep its good relations with US administration, and economic or domestic aspect of the poppy cultivation was not “*sine qua non*” when compared to military and economic support coming from US under a time of good relations. This argument

³²⁹ Turgut, *Demirel’in Dünyası*, 444.

³³⁰ This Act was approved by the Grand Assembly in 1967 and entered into force in 1968 in the period of Demirel government, and limiting the crop areas also started in accordance with this act.

³³¹ CIA Report “Turkey’s capability and willingness to collect the 1970 opium crop”, 11. Available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp82s00205r000100180002-3>

could be supported with the case that poppy cultivation was totally banned in Erim government just after the military memorandum where that government was fully supported by the military³³². However, it is controversial whether there was a recommendation or pressure on Demirel by military or not. In this respect, it could be traced back in another CIA report on 22 March 1971, just ten days after military memorandum, that US believed that military neither had enough information about opium problem nor settled it as a political agenda until the governmental control after memorandum that is why report notes that:

The military, who will set priorities in Turkey for the foreseeable future, are the final arbiters. (...) They are essentially uninformed on the international opium problem, as it affects Turkey, and have taken no stand. President Sunay's influence with the present top leaders remains strong, and he has recently been made aware of the dimensions of the problem by Director Ingersoll. The way is thus open to convincing the military decision-makers of the immediacy of the danger.³³³

This argument mentioned in CIA report, however, could be challenged with an understanding that it would be impossible for military not to have enough information about opium problem where NSC informed its members about the situation in its meetings on the one hand and Turkish Gendarmerie division of the military was responsible for taking necessary measures against illicit opium traffic and illegal dealers on the other. In this respect, it would not be wrong to argue that opium issue in foreign policy was not regarded as a primary problem for military to deal with in its focus orientation when compared to domestic security problems stemming from student and labour riots which could also be supported with the same CIA report also mentioning that opium problem was not also regarded as a primary concern for Erim government at the beginning who had to cope with imminent

³³² In one of the CIA documents which is declassified and released, it is said that Erim government was free of political suppression in domestic party politics and he was fully supported by military. See the CIA document named "The Suppression of Poppy Production in Turkey, available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82S00205R000100150002-6.pdf> Last Accessed on 10/09/2019.

³³³ CIA Report no "CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070010-8" on 22 March 1971, 2. Available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070010-8> 10/09/2019

domestic problems that were regarded to challenge legitimacy of the regime³³⁴. Looking within this perspective, a top-secret daily brief presented to US president by CIA on 20 May 1969 also supports the idea that Demirel was not pressured by military in poppy crisis where that brief writes down that “*The military would probably prefer to remain the background, serving as the final arbiter on crucial decisions, but allowing the Demirel civilian government to continue doing most of the country’s official business.*”³³⁵

About the position of MFA, CIA report quoted previously saying that “*The reported statements of and recent remarks of Foreign Minister Caglayangil to US officials strongly indicate bureaucratic support for this position*” clearly mentions that MFA was in line with arguments of Demirel and even it could be understood that MFA was the leading institution in Demirel’s policy orientation on poppy crisis. At this point, it is important to mention that Alpogan believes that Demirel would never have a mind of his own in challenging Turkey’s strongest ally without consulting and negotiating the details of the problem with its possible ramifications with MFA especially in a Cold War atmosphere³³⁶, which supports the argument held above. Indeed, in line with Alpogan’s argument and CIA document, Öymen also recalls how MFA bureaucracy supported Ecevit government’s decision for lifting the poppy cultivation ban which could be also regarded as a policy continuation from Demirel periods³³⁷.

Searching through foreign policy developments of Turkey from the beginning of the poppy crisis, one can argue that policy developments challenging American interests, such as 1969 Bilateral Defence and Cooperation Agreement, limiting the U-2 plane activities over military facilities, accelerated talks with Soviet Union and not permitting the use of military bases in Arab-Israel War, could be regarded as retaliation against US due to poppy issue. This argument, indeed contains some

³³⁴ CIA Report no “CIA-RDP80B01495R001400070010-8” on 22 March 1971, 1.

³³⁵ “The President’s Daily Brief on 20 May 1969”, prepared by CIA. Document No: DOC_0005976783 https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/search/site/DOC_0005976783

³³⁶ Interview with Alpogan.

³³⁷ Interview with Öymen.

weakness and inconsistencies to be criticized. First of all, Bilateral Defence and Cooperation Agreement on 3 July 1969 was an effort to merge into one and bring an order to the 54 different agreements for “Military Easiness” that were authorized under the third article of NATO some of which imprecisely signed by MFA bureaucrats or military officers where MFA Secretary General Şükrü Elekdağ spent great effort in this work burden of merging those agreements³³⁸. Besides, government’s will for its efforts for overcoming the complexity and diffusiveness of multiple agreements was notified to US administration on 7 April 1966³³⁹, before poppy crisis rose. Secondly, limiting U-2 activities and accelerating the talks with Soviet Union was rather an outcome of newly developed multi-dimensional policy orientation after Johnson’s letter in order not to surrender Turkey’s security to only one country. Lastly, not permitting the use of bases in Arab-Israel War could be regarded as a balanced policy for good relations with Arab countries in order to get their support in Cyprus issue at the UN³⁴⁰. Crucially, because it was the US administration who regarded poppy issue as a crisis with Turkey and considering Turkey’s willingness for not making this problem a major policy crisis, there would be no use in imposing any retaliation to US, which would be make the situation worse.

Since the beginning of crisis, Demirel held the argument that main responsibility and policy target of US administration should be increasing its efforts in eliminating the drug traffic in its borders rather than pressuring Turkey to end its poppy production where his final solution to poppy cultivation issue was to bring a licence system with strict control where he believed that a total ban would not be sustainable³⁴¹. Considering the media pressure on US administration, that policy target would not be seen enough that is why US threat of imposing economic sanctions to Turkey in July 1970 could be regarded as de-escalating the tension of

³³⁸ Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*, 132.

³³⁹ Tuncer, “Süleyman Demirel”, 164.

³⁴⁰ Several arguments and notes in CIA Special Report on 25 November 1966 about Demirel government’s foreign policy presents similarity with the arguments noted above. See CIA Special Report no: CIA-RDP79-00927A005500070002-5. Available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/search/site/CIA-RDP79-00927A005500070002-5>

³⁴¹ Turgut, *Demirel’in Dünyası*, 444.

US public pressure where a remarkable portion of it was supporting to play tough with Turkey.

A memorandum of Heroin Task Force Meeting on 17 August 1970 which was submitted to Kissinger by CIA before the meeting mentions a disagreement within US departments about their approach to Turkey where US Department of Treasury was fond of economic sanctions but Defence and State departments were against any approach to Turkey through the use of economic sanctions threat. Reminding the rising anti-Americanism in Turkish domestic situation due to unilateral US pressure on poppy issue, memorandum recommends to Kissinger some policy actions very close to Demirel's proposals where the first includes a multilateral platform rather than unilateral US existence so that domestic pressure could be decreased on Demirel, second includes a concentration of US efforts on licencing the opium production for cutting the illicit trade lines, and finally recalling the possible alternative sanctions and measures to Turkey unless the government fails to collect the whole 1970 crop and fulfil its commitment to US administration about restricting poppy cultivation areas to only one city for 1971³⁴².

From the time from late 1970 till the March 1971, Demirel was very busy with domestic turbulence where rising opposition within his party, increasing violence through conflicts between ideological groups in student and labour movements, accelerated accusation to his family and relatives about corruption files, and finally the increased tension within the military which was seemed enthusiastic about intervening in political functioning of the government were challenging him so much that he could not do a lot in foreign policy crisis of poppy issue. The only response to continuous threat of US sanctions was withdrawing the symbolic Turkish military presence in South Korea in January 1971³⁴³, where Demirel did not have the chance to survive much in order to fulfil his commitments or achieve policy targets in poppy cultivation crisis.

³⁴² Memorandums for both June and August meetings of Heroin Task Force are in Document number: LOC-HAK-7-5-29-7. Available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/loc-hak-7-5-29-7>

³⁴³ Turgut, *Demirel'in Dünyası*, 446.

Poppy crisis halted when Erim government prohibited the cultivation however it re-emerged as a crisis when Ecevit government removed the ban on 1 July 1974, 19 days before Turkey's military intervention to Cyprus, named as "Cyprus Peace Operation" by Turkey. Following the removal of the poppy ban and Cyprus intervention, US arms sale embargo put Turkey in a rough situation where poppy issue became of secondary importance for Turkish and US foreign policy both of which had to deal multiple problems. Interestingly, as a final note, Demirel's solution for licencing poppy cultivation was brought in to action after 1974 and it seemed that US did not complain about illicit opium trafficking and Turkey being the source after this licencing system was implemented.

4.2.3. Findings and Discussion

As it has been discussed throughout this chapter, foreign policy decision making on poppy crisis was shaped by political leadership of Demirel and his interaction with state institutions. At this point, a matrix for decision making and variables influencing those decisions is presented in the table below. As a first argument, it could be noted that Demirel was highly influenced by international structure where détente period provided relative autonomy to the countries like Turkey in their foreign policy from the leader of their alliance. Combined with suitable domestic developments starting from Johnson Letter that also enabled to act relatively free from the US, international and domestic dynamics seemed to provided opportunity for Demirel to perform his "foreign policy with personality". However, it is also noteworthy that rising wave of anti-Americanism inside the country posed also a threat for his understanding of having good relations with the west for the sake of economic development and modernization.

Table 4: Table for Decision Making in Cold War Single Party

VARIABLES	CHARACTERISTICS AND OUTCOMES
Characteristics of International Structure	Détente Period in Bipolar Structure of Cold War
	Rising Soviet Influence and Popularity due to Balance in Arms and Cuban Crisis
	Rising Non-Alignment Movement together with Independence Movements in Africa and Revolutions in Latin America
Characteristics of Regional Developments	Balance between Importance of Israel for Turkey and Rising Importance of Arab Countries for Cyprus Case
	Rising Conflicts with Greece due to Escalated Tensions in Cyprus
	Economic Relations with the Soviet Union Under Concern for Security Threats
Characteristics of Domestic Politics	Rising Conflicts within Social Forces as Negative Externality of 1961 Freedoms
	Single Party Government within Party Conflicts/Strong Anti-American Opposition
	Strong and Influential Military/ Strong MFA Bureaucracy with Strong Minister/Newly Established NSC with More Interest in Domestic Politics
Crisis Management	Unintended Economic Crisis with Political Aspects Triggered by Outside Force
	Turkey's Limited Escalation Strategy vs US Administration's controlled Pressure
	Crisis was solved after Demirel's forced resignation
Demirel's Leadership	Prime Minister of Single Party Government
	Resistance to US Pressure but Prefers Diplomatic Means and Alternative Solutions with the Help of MFA
	Active Participation to Crisis
DECISION MAKING STYLE	No Imposition from Military, Active Leading by MFA Bureaucracy
	Active Participation by Demirel where He Strives for Convincing US for Alternative Solutions
	Harmony and Coordination Between Political Leader and State Institutions
	Open to information, challenge constraints, peaceful, cooperative understanding in tactics, risk averse

Here, his resistance to US pressure on poppy cultivation ban could be regarded as a result of his domestic calculations over the farmers on the one hand and his concern for being criticized by state intellectuals and leftist movements as being a US puppet where he was also coping to make himself accepted among them.

In his foreign policy leadership for poppy crisis, it would also be possible to claim that using domestic pressure of farmers and anti-American movements as a

leverage against US in its policy of pressure, Demirel aimed to pacify US insistence which also asserted its domestic pressure over poppy issue³⁴⁴. Additionally, it would not be wrong to argue that surrendering to US pressure on such kind of domestically related issue would worsen the ongoing anti-American protests to a higher level of violence which could be a difficult situation and could attract military's attention in involving in politics which Demirel would prefer to prevent.

About the role and influence of military in decision-making process of poppy crisis, it is understood from the official documents of US Departments that military was not involved in crisis process even though it had the potential channels of influence in domestic or foreign issues in that period. Even after the military memorandum, it is told previously that US administration spent great effort for putting poppy issue into military's final agenda. Under this perspective, it would not be wrong to claim that military intervened in foreign policy cases if only those cases directly related to and had impact on interests of military, where poppy crisis was out of its agenda priority. Supporting this argument, it would be mentioned how military was actively involved in decision making for Cyprus issue in 1967. Besides, problems in domestic politics were so entangled that an issue of superiority and high priority for domestic problems was the primary issue for military where intervening to poppy issue would put military in difficult position for two main reasons. On the one hand, it would create a risk of confrontation with farmers as a social class other than leftist movements because poppy crisis was posing a risk of damaging economic welfare of a certain portion of citizens. On the other hand, risk of being labelled as pro-American loyal army of NATO was so high that military would keep itself away from this issue on the eve of a possible and imminent intervention to Cyprus where a popular domestic was highly needed.

Revisiting the memoirs of diplomats and US documents, role of MFA bureaucracy in conducting the poppy crisis seems quite apparent where a harmony

³⁴⁴ Interestingly, overviewing the historical progress of Turkish-American relations, a secret report of CIA later on 5 September 1981, notes that relations between Turkey and the US maintained only at state level without and domestic public pressure on the US for developing better relations because US citizens was ignorant on Turkish citizens and their concerns due to lack of a Turkish lobby. Document No: CIA-RDP83B00140R000100120003-9, 4. Available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83B00140R000100120003-9.pdf>

between Çağlayangil and bureaucracy could be regarded as main source of confidence for Demirel in his resistance against the US. Having experienced a great disappointment for solely leaning on US alliance in following Turkey's interests in previous periods, it could be claimed that MFA bureaucracy restored its operational codes to a more cautious attitude towards western allies especially considering poppy issue together with Cyprus problem. At this point, even though western alliance was kept as unchanged priority, a balanced and diversified understanding of relation tried to be conducted through non-western blocs. In consistent with this approach, it could be argued that poppy crisis would be seen as a prestige contestation against the US by rejecting to pay the price for US administration's Vietnam failure and its efforts for smoothing down its domestic conflicts.

To sum up, utilizing the opportunities of international structure and domestic politics, Demirel enjoyed its single party government and cooperative MFA bureaucracy in his decision-making process for poppy crisis where he was not posed or challenged by any influence of military in his leadership at this case.

4.2.4. Comparison with Other Crises

Could it be argued that Demirel have the same way of managing all foreign policy crisis of this period in the same way? At this point, Demirel's leadership for Cyprus crisis in 1967 could be compared with poppy crisis in order to bring a comprehensive understanding about his decision-making process in Cold War under single party government. Even though this intervention was not held due to lack of necessary military equipment at that time, Demirel's orders for reinforcement of military enabled Ecevit government to operate the 1974 intervention successfully. Being aware of possible US reaction with memories about Johnson Letter together with insufficient military equipment, it is argued that Demirel preferred to find diplomatic ground and international support for solving the Cyprus problem even though military vested him with authority of any kind of intervention³⁴⁵. Both poppy and Cyprus crises could be regarded as the ones that triggered high domestic pressure

³⁴⁵ Şihmantepe, *Türk Dış Politikasında Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel. Dış Politikada Kriz Davranışları Üzerine Bir Araştırma*, 97-112.

of nationalistic and anti-imperialist attitude towards foreign issues. In this respect, Demirel could be argued to pursue similar leadership of considering domestic developments on the one hand and active participation to the crisis with his cautious, pragmatic and realist understanding on the other hand where he filtered the bureaucratic proposals for his final decision. No matter military was in favour of any decision of Demirel on intervention, he was cautious to initiate a military intervention that would end with failure under circumstances. Indeed, a CIA report on 27 November 1967 noted the position of Demirel by writing that:

The 27th of November has passed with no reports of any attempted coup by the military in Turkey. (This date had been mentioned as the deadline for action by dissident Turkish Ground and Air Force officers against Demirel government, if the Cyprus problem was still unresolved.)³⁴⁶

As it was discussed earlier, military preferred to participate more actively in foreign policy problems that were under its priority as it was in Cyprus case. However, having enjoyed the single party government and better economic developments, Demirel felt comfortable in pursuing his own decision by disregarding the proposals of military. About the position of MFA bureaucracy on Cyprus problem, memoirs of Yavuzalp and Barutçu mention the disapprobation on Greek Cypriots' attitude on the hand and willingness for solving the problem through diplomatic efforts on the other even though triggered events finally put the necessity and inevitability of a possible Turkish intervention. In this respect, it could be argued that Demirel and MFA bureaucracy shared the position for initiating all attempts for diplomatic solution but preparing for a military intervention at the same time if diplomatic efforts could not bring any solution.

In conclusion, foreign policy leadership of Demirel in Cyprus crisis also presented similarities in its essence of decision making where similar patterns could be followed in his attitude on poppy crisis.

³⁴⁶ CIA Intelligence Memorandum on "The Cyprus Situation" on 27 November 1967. Document no: CIA-RDP79T00826A003000060001-6. Available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/search/site/CIA-RDP79T00826A003000060001-6>

CHAPTER 5

DEMIREL IN COLD WAR COALITION (1975-1980) AND US ARMS SALE EMBARGO CRISIS

Turkish diplomacy is very well trained. They never refrain from defending national interests. Whenever a problem appears, our diplomats fight at the front”
Süleyman Demirel³⁴⁷

Contrary to the previous section, when Demirel took office, the effects of his three-term single-party ruling persisted; and rather than finding events in his arms, he faced with the reflections of the actions in the past. After the end of his third government being forced to resign with the military memorandum of 1971, the military-supported Erim governments and the subsequent Melen, Talu, Ecevit and Irmak governments were quite short-lived. Other than the monthly Ecevit government from 21 June 1977 to 21 July 1977, Demirel reappeared as Prime Minister from 31 March 1975 to until 5 January 1978 with two nationalist coalition governments. When this period is examined, it is observed that the changes in domestic and external dynamics created changes in Demirel's discourse and policies, and in addition, it is observed that the coalition governments led to different decision-making process rather than the one in the previous single-party governments. In this section, within the context of the constraints brought about by the dynamics of the period, the relationship between Demirel and institutions in the crisis management process of the embargo, referred to as the arms sale embargo crisis starting with the

³⁴⁷ Ergen, *Cumhurbaşkanı Süleyman Demirel'in Söylev ve Demeçleri*, 1867.

stand of arms shipments on 5 February 1975 after Turkey's "Cyprus Peace Operation" and being abolished partly in August 1977 and totally in September 1978.

5.1. Developments of the Period

5.1.1. Developments Before Demirel

From 12 March 1971 when his ruling ended, to 31 March 1975, when he was reinstated, there were international and regional changes, and with the reflection of these changes in domestic politics, the changed atmosphere in domestic politics had inevitably affected foreign policy as well. Demirel, who fell into the crisis environment as a result of serious decisions taken on foreign policy, had to solve the problems that developed outside of his administration, although most of them were the successive reflection of the events that occurred during his rule.

The new economic system that came with the end of the Bretton Woods system and the new balance of power that came with it increased the weight of new actors other than the United States. The period of détente with the Soviet Union was reinforced by new agreements such as Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT 1) of 1972 that would restrict nuclear weapons, and the Soviet Union entered into a period in which it became more influential in the Middle East. With the US' decreasing reputation in international arena, the possibility and capability of policy diversification of medium-sized states such as Turkey increased; and regional dynamics changed after the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. Besides, Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 just after releasing the poppy cultivation ban triggered problems with US administration which Demirel had to deal with in his prime ministry period. Looking at the policy diversification, Turkey's increased relations with the Soviet Union³⁴⁸ in Demirel's previous governments seemed to accelerate in the period of military memorandum. It is also important to note that in April 1972, Turkey even signed the "Good Neighbourhood Principles Declaration" with Soviet Union being mainly referred to peaceful neighbourhood, non-intervention to domestic

³⁴⁸ Turkey ranked one of the highest credit takers from Soviet Union as a non-Soviet state. About Soviet financial aids on Turkey and other states, See Roger A. Kanet, "Soviet Policy Toward the Developing World: The Role of Economic Assistance and Aid", *Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College*, Carlisle Barracks: Pennsylvania, (May, 1980) Available on <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a089126.pdf>

sovereignty, respecting to border security, respecting to free choice of economic, political and cultural system, refraining from use of force and peaceful solution for international disagreements³⁴⁹.

5.1.2. International Developments of the Period

The political reflection of the international developments of this period was most prominently in 1972 with the consolidation of the détente period, thanks to the restriction of strategic nuclear weapons with the SALT 1 Agreement signed between the US and the Soviet Union³⁵⁰. Unlike the international prestige of the United States, which began to decline after the Vietnam war, the Soviet Union began to increase its prestige in countries outside the Eastern bloc.

Other than SALT 1 Agreement, a significant international development was the rise of European Security and Cooperation Conference which started negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions between Western and Eastern Bloc from the beginning of 1973 and resulted in signing the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, which Turkey signed on 1 August 1975. Three main focal point of this act was political-military, humanitarian and economic-environmental aspects of security and its essential attention was on limiting the arms and forces over the European territory and its neighbours³⁵¹. This, due to its focus on humanitarian issues, brought a tension between Soviet Union and the US which also resulted in escalation of problems between two states³⁵².

When it comes to economic situation, especially after the Bretton Woods system and the economic system bound to the gold standard came to an end, the countries' search for solutions to economic uncertainty started, and with the OPEC

³⁴⁹ For further discussion about this Declaration, See Ebru Gençalp, "Türk Basımında İkili Ziyaretler Boyutunda Türk Sovyet İlişkileri (1965-1980), *Journal of Modern Turkish History Studies*, XIV/29, (Autumn, 2014), 315-352.

³⁵⁰ <https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/salt-agreements-signed>. For details about Salt Treaties please also see <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/salt>

³⁵¹ See <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-and-the-organization-for-security-and-cooperation-in-europe-osce.en.mfa>

³⁵² Mehmet Gönlübol and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "1973-1983 Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası" in Mehmet Gönlübol (ed.), *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1995)*, (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2014), 544.

oil crisis that was hit off to give a lesson to the Western countries supporting Israel in the Arab-Israeli war, serious turmoil in the world economic system occurred in 1973. In addition to that, with the strengthening of the European Economic Community under the leadership of Germany, the economic moves of Japan, the emergence of China with a new model in the far east and the strengthening of the Non-Aligned Movement, the international system, despite being seen as bipolar, shifted towards different phase in which new alternatives could be evaluated. Demirel changed its attitude towards foreign policy decisions in line with the regional developments discussed below in addition to the constraints imposed by the system in this international atmosphere.

5.1.3. Regional Developments of the Period

This period's regional developments brought Turkey into a serious situation of escalated tension in the region. The changes in Greece, which was the main factor of the majority of the foreign policy crises in this period, undoubtedly have the biggest impact on regional developments. Although the junta leader Papadopoulos abrogated Greek monarchy, proclaimed the Hellenic Republic and declared himself as president after the military takeover, he was dismissed with a new military coup led by Yoannides and the period of the annual juntas in Greece started again. There is no doubt that in addition to this development, when Greece suddenly decided to withdraw from NATO's military wing in 1974 after the Cyprus intervention of Turkey, it is observed that regional problems cannot be solved through NATO. Concerned that the rising Soviet prestige would also influence Greece, the Western alliance tried to act with sensitivities that would not upset Greece³⁵³. These developments, while reducing Turkey's agricultural exports and increasing the industrial imports, adversely affected Turkey's industrial exports as a result of the EEC's concessions to other countries in the region via regional trade agreements³⁵⁴.

These developments, combined with the oil crisis, not only brought about the questioning of its place in Western alliance and suspending its concessions at EEC in

³⁵³ Sönmezoğlu, *Soğuk Savaş Döneminde Türk Dış Politikası: 1945-1991*, 299.

³⁵⁴ Oran, "Görelî Özerklik 3: 1960-1980", 664 and 668.

1978 by Turkey that was dramatically adversely affected economically, but also encouraged Turkey about policy diversification that would support it in foreign policy decisions. The “Declaration of Good Neighbourhood Principles” signed with the Soviet Union in 1972 led to signing the “Second Economic and Technological Cooperation Agreement” in the period just before Demirel³⁵⁵, and thanks to that, the low-interest long-term credits prioritizing industrial investments, which could not be obtained from the West, were obtained from the Soviet Union.

This period’s two serious issues, oil shock of 1973 and Cyprus intervention of 1974, brought the idea of policy diversification in foreign policy in favour of Middle Eastern Arab world where Turkey found itself seeking for new alternative policy sources that support it economically and politically for national security³⁵⁶. Although Demirel did not doubt the indispensability and necessity of the alliance with the West, his government aimed to establish good relations with the Arab world, which he thought that would contribute to the solution of foreign policy problems in the international platform, by supporting it with the cases such as Palestine issue, especially in the Islamic Conference Organization. In this period, unlike the Erim government, which refused to sign the Islamic Conference Law in 1971, he joined the Islamic Conference Organization at the level of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in 1976, with the support of the nationalist front, he recognized the Palestinian Liberation Organization by declaring that he would act in concert with Arab world regarding Palestinian issue³⁵⁷.

5.1.4. Domestic Developments of the Period

Comparing this period with the previous period when Demirel was in power under single party government, the most important domestic policy development was the emergence of two rival parties, namely, Nationalist Movement Party (NMP) and

³⁵⁵ The first Economic and Technological Cooperation Agreement with Soviet Union was signed on 25 March 1967, and that second one was signed on 9 January 1975. Nevzat Şimşek [et. al.], “Analysis of Bilateral Trade Relations between Turkey and Russia Federation”, *Bilig*, Number 83, (Autumn 2017), 1-26, 5.)

³⁵⁶ Balcı, *Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler ve Uygulamalar*, 175.

³⁵⁷ Tuncer, “Süleyman Demirel”, 216.

National Salvation Party (NSP), that built their ideology on nationalism and the religious theme, respectively, which deteriorated Demirel's dominant influence in right-wing politics. On the one hand, the damage of the US's reputation in international politics due to Vietnam War, and on the other, the clear anti-Soviet ideological position of the coalition partners NMP and NSP, brought a serious challenge in domestic politics in this period combined with the anti-American public stand due to arms sale embargo.

A more dynamic and violent process was experienced in the domestic dynamics compared to the previous period, due to the revision of the liberal articles of the 1961 Constitution after the memorandum of 1971³⁵⁸ and the reaction coming from the left due to the execution of three students (Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan) together with the negative trend in the national economy. Due to the inflation (that had been reduced during his single-party ruling) reaching to double-digit numbers as a result of populist policies of short-term coalitions of the post-1971 period; the newly-felt economic impacts of the 66% devaluation made in 1970, and the oil shock in 1973, the chances of receiving support in foreign policy from economic welfare in domestic politics were quite limited. This, inevitably led to behaving dominant in foreign affairs, particularly in matters of domestic politics, which Demirel worried about falling back against coalition partners. The facts that in an economic environment where consumer goods could be supplied at high prices on the black market, tension between the right and left wing protestors were fuelled on the basis of violence and climbed to the top with mass massacres not only suppressed Demirel in domestic politics, but also made it difficult for him to meet on the common ground with the parties outside the coalition and even with the coalition parties regarding foreign policy due to the tension at the parliament.

³⁵⁸ On 30 September 1971, Law no:1488 changed 35 articles of 1961 Constitution that were related to fundamental rights and freedoms. See Özkan Tikveş, "Anayasa'da Onbeş Yıllık Dönemde (1961-1976) Yapılan Değişiklikler ve Ekler", *Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi*, 19-60, available on <http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/38/309/2957.pdf> [Gerger, from a class-based perspective, notes that 1960s' economic development through import substitution policy aimed an increase in labour payments however labour movement was not happy with the level of payments where they used their right to riot which arised from 1961 constitution. This, in return, threatened interests of capital class which resulted in challenging atmosphere of 1971 memorandum and as a result, articles related to freedom was cancelled after the memorandum. In Gerger, *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Polisiği: Soğuk Savaş'tan 'Yeni Dünya Düzeni'ne*, 131]

In this period, due to negative attitude of US administration towards Turkey as a result of Cyprus intervention, domestic politics was almost fully shaped under anti-American ideological stand both in the left wing and right-wing politicians, to some extent. In addition to the ideological stance of Erbakan's party, trying to have a prestige in foreign policy issues affecting domestic politics could be shown as a justification for being anti-US however Demirel still aimed to keep a balance between Turkey's NATO membership and US alliance and multilateral policies with other countries in a clear consideration in not ruining the essence of relations with west³⁵⁹. Although Demirel opposed to the ban for poppy cultivation in his previous period, it was fresh in the memories that in 1974, Erbakan, in his coalition with Ecevit, had lifted the poppy cultivation ban by Erim government and achieved the Cyprus intervention. Thus, it could be said that Demirel, who did not want to lose ground against Erbakan before the public opinion, had to make his national stance in foreign policy be felt more clearly especially in matters concerning domestic politics. In this context, according to Tuncer, Demirel took lessons from his foreign policy that disturbed the west in the previous period and emphasized anti-communism and Turkish nationalism in this period³⁶⁰.

In such a period in which domestic politics were so complicated and interconnected with foreign policy in respect to the problems to be resolved, Demirel suspended the ongoing defence agreement, namely, the CDCA (Common Defence Cooperation Agreement) with the US; limited US aircrafts' free flights among NATO bases in Turkey; imposed restrictions on the duty-free goods the US soldiers brought³⁶¹.

³⁵⁹ Tuncer, "Süleyman Demirel", 171.

³⁶⁰ Ibid., 139.

³⁶¹ Please note that Demirel carefully used the term "military installations/facilities" rather than "military bases" in order not to give an impression of loss of sovereignty against US, and the term "suspended or closed" for the operations of those establishments rather than "confiscated" in order to open a ground for negotiations with US administration. Bağcı mentions that the term "military base" has negative connotation in Turkish. Hüseyin Bağcı, "Türkiye'ye Soğuk Savaşta Biçilen Elbise Artık Dar Gelmektedir". in Habibe Özdal, Osman Bahadır Dinçer, and Mehmet Yeğin (eds.), *Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası: Cilt 4*, (USAK, 2011), 187. Demirel's speech on 5 April 1966 saying that "*There is no American military bases in Turkey. There are only establishment/facilities for our common defence.*" is available on <http://www.gecmisgazete.com/haber/-turkiye-de-amerikan-ussu-diye-bir-sey-yok-turkiye-de-tesisler-var->

In sum, multiple actors in right wing politics posing a challenge to Demirel's earlier domestic monopoly in right wing politics, economic problems and ideological confrontations triggering wide range of violence, and finally ongoing confrontation with left wing parties affecting foreign policy for the sake of domestic calculations could be mentioned as the limits for Demirel's foreign policy leadership in terms of domestic variables.

5.1.5. Organizational Developments of the Period

The structure and role of state institutions in Turkish foreign policy making was evaluated in detail in the previous chapter together with organizational developments of that period due to institutional and legal changes. In order not to repeat their overall role and impact on decision-making process mentioned previously, this chapter and the following two chapters only assess the organizational changes in the periods specifically studied.

5.1.5.1. Military and National Security Council

The military bureaucracy, after 11 years from the military coup in 1960, became primary source of influence with the military memorandum of 1971 and aimed to increase its effectiveness in foreign policy by bringing some changes in the organizational structure of this period. With this memorandum, which was formulated as “*showing sensitivity to the issues specified by the Turkish Armed Forces if a coup like the one in 1960 is not desired*”³⁶², instead of closing the political parties, it was decided that a government consisting of technocrats supported by military would continue to work in the parliament. Aiming to increase its influence in domestic and foreign policy, the military saw the NSC as a prioritized committee in this sense and started organizational changes from this council. Gürpınar states

³⁶² This was the note written in the memorandum to warn the politicians about possibility of a total military takeover unless they behave carefully about the sensitivity of the military. For the full text of memorandum, See Milliyet, 13 March 1971. Available on http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/PO0kiH2OGkhrKoztWXeAEw_x3D_x3D. Last Accessed on 22/08/2019. [For Demirel's criticism about that memorandum and for the full text of both memorandum and NSC declaration before memorandum, See Demirel, *1971 Buhranı ve Aydınlığa Doğru*,]

that, adding the title of “Security Council Member” to the titles of the “Chief of General Staff” and “Force Commander” as well as changing military’s representative in the NSC by including all force commanders at the rank of four stars could be seen the formulations that aim to increase the effectiveness of the army on NSC and showed that NSC was trying to be a Council above the Council of Ministers³⁶³.

About the role of military, it would not be wrong to argue that 1971 memorandum deteriorated the popular prestige of military within public but increased its de facto dominance over politics however 1974 intervention to Cyprus brought a popular support to military again and this also increased its domain of influence on foreign policy issues. Here, about the strategic tactic of Demirel is evaluated by Cizre as breaking the invisible ties between army and Republican People’s Party by manipulating the leftist ideology of Ecevit and complaining his party to military so that it could be easier to conduct his own policy priorities without a strong alliance of military and Republican party against him³⁶⁴.

In the previous chapter, close tendency of the military in keeping developed relations with the West and the US, especially, for the sake of modernization of the army in alliance with NATO was noted where most of the financial and military assistance was provided from the US. In this period, however, a change in military’s stand is noteworthy where arms sale embargo of the US after Cyprus intervention of Turkey nourished an idea of not solely depending on US assistance. In this respect, it could be argued that a defence strategy against potential retaliation of Greece to Cyprus in the Aegean Sea was prioritized in military’s security understanding where the Fourth Army of TAF, namely the Aegean Army, was established in 1975 outside the NATO command in order to confront any kind of Greek aggression in the region

³⁶³ Gürpınar, “Milli Güvenlik Kurulu ve Dış Politika”, 81. [After 1971 memorandum, two key amendments were done in the structure of NSC. The first one was changing the “convey opinion to Ministerial Cabinet in order to help to Ministerial Cabinet” term to “provide recommendation to Ministerial Cabinet”, and the second one was bringing the term “Commanders of the Forces” instead of “Representatives of the Forces” so that only commanders of the Forces with four star generals could be members. See Yıldız, “Ordunun Türk Dış Politikasındaki Rolü: Kurumsal Olmayan Mekanizmalar”, 361.]

³⁶⁴ Cizre, *AP Ordu İlişkileri: Bir İkilemin Anatomisi*, pp 130-137

without confronting NATO even though Greece left the military part of it at that time³⁶⁵.

5.1.5.2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Civilian Bureaucracy

From the perspective of the MFA, it is seen that there was no significant institutional change compared to the previous period, and the State Planning Organization, which was established in the 1960s, continued to struggle with the MFA bureaucracy in the ongoing developments with the Ankara Agreement on European integration. Feeling the corporate identity and priorities in secure, thanks to Çağlayangil being the Minister again with the reassurance of Demirel, the foreign ministry, with the systemic constraints of the ongoing Cold War, continued to work by being faithful to the foreign policy of the Republic expected to be sustained and continued its commitment to be isolated from the effects of domestic politics as much as possible.

Here it is important to note that Baytok mentions a group identity change within the MFA rather than an institutional change where westernist faction of 1960s left its leading role to a reformist group in 1970s after Gündüz Ökçün became the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Ecevit's government and that faction was more eager to seek for alternatives in Turkish foreign policy instead of fully leaning on west and the US³⁶⁶. Baytok's argument is compared with other memoirs of the diplomats by Sert and this period is defined as a time when westernism was balanced with alternatives³⁶⁷. Memoirs show that this group of diplomats were also active in Irmak government and Demirel's coalition period where a continuity in national cases was seen obviously. It is noteworthy to mention that it was the first time that some diplomats were asked by Çağlayangil to prepare a report for Turkey's potential for foreign policy alternatives which resulted in preparation of "New International

³⁶⁵ Stephen Mann, "The Greek-Turkish Dispute in the Aegean Sea: Its Ramifications for NATO and the Prospects for Resolution", *Master's Thesis Submitted to Naval Post Graduate School*, (Monterey, California, 2001), 29.

³⁶⁶ Taner Baytok, *Dış Politikada Bir Nefes: Anılar*, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2005), 248.

³⁶⁷ Sert, "İçeriden Gelen Ses: Bir Hatırat Yazarı Olarak Türk Diplomatı ve Türk Hariciyesinde 1960-1980 Döneminin Hatıratlar Üzerinden Analizi", 7.

Economic Order and Turkey: Negotiation Process Between Developed Countries and Developing Countries³⁶⁸” in 1977. This report briefly summarized that changing economic dynamics made it necessary for Turkey to develop multifaceted alternative paradigms towards countries of non-western bloc due to decreasing strategic importance of Turkey after détente period in terms of its important geographical location for security concerns of the west, which Turkey could never be a real part of it³⁶⁹. It could be argued that this report of alternative perspectives within MFA bureaucracy was associated with the political atmosphere of domestic and international issues however official practices of MFA in that period gives clues that continuation in main traditional foreign policy path did not change in action. This continuity will be evaluated in detail in following crisis management part of this chapter in order to assess the institutional priorities and their impact on political decision makers.

Lastly, in terms of institutional developments in organizational structure of MFA, it is seen that improved specialization and compartmentalization in departments related to economic and trade issues due to changing dynamics of world economic system, division between Cyprus Department and Greece Department due to newly rising problems with Greece on Aegean Sea other than Cyprus issue, and finally increased importance on security issues due to brutal assassinations directed to Turkish diplomats by ASALA terrorism, burst into prominence³⁷⁰.

5.1.5.3. Political Decision Maker(s)

Özkeçeci-Taner argues that in foreign policy decision making under a coalition government, parties of coalition may have different priorities and orientations in both domestic and foreign policies which may create a disharmony in

³⁶⁸ Yeni Uluslararası Ekonomik Düzen ve Türkiye: Gelişmiş ve Gelişmekte Olan Ülkeler Arasındaki Müzakere Süreçleri, *Dışişleri Belleteni*, 1977” cited in Ibid., 9.

³⁶⁹ Ibid., 9. Also interviews with Bayar and Öymen.

³⁷⁰ Özcoşkun, *Cumhuriyetin Kuruluşundan Bugüne Dışişleri Bakanlığı Teşkilat Yapısı (1920-2018)*, 52-68.

policy making and it matters which party rules which ministry³⁷¹. Looking from this perspective, this period's coalition governments with NMP and NSP pose a challenge to Prime Minister Demirel where the Minister for National Defence was not from his party, however he was still the dominant actor in foreign policy making³⁷². Because of the new actors of right-wing politics which were also coalition members, Demirel had to revise his leadership methods and his view of foreign policy due to the constraints imposed on him arising from coalition partnership. One of the most prominent examples which severely limited Demirel's sphere of action in foreign policy could be mentioned where NSP's stand was more religious and anti-American and NMP's stand was more patriotic and anti-communist. Yavuzalp notes that the NSP leader Erbakan, who did not agree to compromise with the US during the US' arms embargo process, was pushing Foreign Minister Çağlayangil with a rain of questions at the meetings of NSC held before the negotiations with the US and Foreign Ministers³⁷³.

For the period up until the arms sale embargo was lifted, the fourth and the fifth governments of Demirel was in rule in his two coalitions between 1975-1977 and 1977-1978 and his sixth coalition was in rule between 1979-1980 after the embargo was lifted and when the strategic cooperation agreement was signed between Turkey and the US. The fourth and the fifth programmes, other than general issues of good relations with traditional alliances and special ties to Arab World, specifically notes an improved relation with China on the one hand and selective language to the foreign policy problems of the time where the fourth one clearly notes potential precautions for the US and the arms sale embargo with a faithful belief for better relations and the fifth one mentions the problems with Greece on Aegean

³⁷¹ Binnur Özkeçeci-Taner, "Koalisyon Hükümetleri ve Türk Dış Politikasının Oluşturulması", in Ertan Efeğil and Rıdvan Kalaycı (eds.), *Dış Politika Teorileri Bağlamında Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, Ankara: Nobel Yayınları, 2012), 278.

³⁷² In his fourth government cabinet, Ferit Melen was the Minister for National Defence and he was member of Republican Trust Party, small member of coalition government. His Foreign Affairs Minister was İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, from his party. Later in his fifth government, Minister for National Defence Ministry became his party members Saadettin Bilgiç and Turan Kapanlı, and Minister of Foreign Affairs became Çağlayangil again.

³⁷³ Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*, p 135-136

Sea³⁷⁴. The sixth Demirel government's programme, on the other hand, prefers a shorter text for foreign policy where the section about relations with the US is toned down after lifting the embargo whereas a more menacing language is used for the Greece due to accelerated tension at that time³⁷⁵.

5.2. Crisis and Crisis Management

5.2.1. Turkey's Military Intervention to Cyprus and US Arms Sale Embargo on Turkey

Only a few numbers of arms sale embargo in world history has brought the same impact as US arms sale embargo did on Turkey which was an embargo from one NATO member to another member that suspended the military aids for the first time since 1947 Truman Doctrine. Coinciding to releasing the poppy cultivation ban, the arms sale embargo of the US just after Turkey's military intervention to Cyprus island, due to its right to guarantee the state of affairs in the island arising from the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements³⁷⁶, in order to protect Turkish population settled in the island from Greek aggression generated a serious foreign policy crisis between Turkey and the US.

In this chapter, it is aimed to focus on decision-making process throughout the crisis by briefly summarizing the key turning points of the Cyprus problem that paved way to arms sale embargo rather than going into details about the historical background of the Cyprus issue³⁷⁷. Cyprus Republic was founded on 16 August 1960 by Turkish and Greek communities settled in the island after the Agreements signed at Zurich and London Conferences in 1959 which brought a right to guarantee its state of affairs by Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom. In 1963, however, escalated aggression to Turkish community by Greek community under "Akritas

³⁷⁴ For Demirel's speeches on fourth and fifth government programmes, See Neziroğlu and Yılmaz (eds.), *Başbakanlarımız ve Genel Kurul Konuşmaları: Cilt 6*, 127-149 and 379-403.

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 457-476.

³⁷⁶ These agreements are available at <http://www.unaturkey.org/dergiler-bulletins/43-say-07-number-07-spring-2003-/99-the-zurich-and-london-agreements-.pdf>

³⁷⁷ For a discussion about developments in Cyprus up until Zurich and London Agreements, See Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, 103-124.

Plan³⁷⁸” forced Turkey to take necessary measures on the island in order to protect the security of Turkish community. After 21 December 1963, namely the “Bloody Christmas”, Turkey took 63 fighter jets aloft around the island and expressed the possibility of intervention to island which brought the initial signals of the crisis between Turkey and the US and resulted in famous 1964 Johnson Letter sent from US President Lyndon B. Johnson to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü saying that any weaponry sent by US was not allowed or authorized to use by Turkey for an intervention to Cyprus³⁷⁹. This letter did not only brought about a loss of confidence by Turkey to the US but also led Demirel government to pursue some sort of anti-American foreign policy path in the region by suspending the use of military bases in Turkey by the US for any kind of military support to Israel when the war between Arab states and Israel broke out.

Way before 1974 intervention, due to re-escalation of aggression by Greek community under Grivas leadership³⁸⁰, Turkish Grand National Assembly approved the permission for military intervention in 1967 when Demirel government was in power however Demirel government was aware of inadequate military capacity that is why he successfully achieved to force Greeks to withdraw by using diplomatic manoeuvres and military threat together. Considering the Johnson Letter and possibility of the lack of US military support, Demirel government started initiatives to strengthen military capacity with domestic and national sources which reaped its fruits in 1974 military intervention.

On 15 July 1974, the military coup in Cyprus being supported and directed by the government of Greece which was also established after military coup in the mainland, overthrew the Makarios and declared Sampson as the new president. Because Turkey’s diplomatic efforts in global arena backfired, this unilateral attempt

³⁷⁸ Akritas Plan available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/akritas-plan.en.mfa>. Last Accessed on 22/08/2019

³⁷⁹ <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/06/06/archives/johnson-warns-İnönü-on-cyprus-invites-him-to-us-for-talksturkey.html>. Last Accessed on 22/08/2019.

³⁸⁰ Tozun Bahcheli, Theodore A. Coulombis, and Patricia Carley, “Greek-Turkish Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy Cyprus, the Aegean, and Regional Stability” *United States Institute of Peace*, 1-44. Available on <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/pwks17.pdf> Last Accessed on 23/08/2019.

pushed Turkey to initiate military intervention by pointing out its guarantee right for justification on 20 July 1974 by Ecevit government. After putting Greece into a disadvantageous position with this intervention, Turkey re-started her demarche on United Nations ground however the deadlock in diplomatic attempts due to unwillingness of Greece was seen as a delaying tactic that is why Turkey initiated the second intervention on 15 August 1974 and enlarged the controlled area to 40 percent of the island in order to provide security for Turkish community fragmented around the island. This second intervention, unlike the first one, was seen as aggression by the UN and the US which resulted in the US arms sale embargo decision on Turkey³⁸¹.

US administration, by referring to 1961 Foreign Assistance Act that enables other states to use weaponry provided by the US only in national self-defence, declared that the Turkey's military intervention to Cyprus island was out of keeping with 1961 act and enacted a law to start arms sale embargo by 5 February 1975 which started the foreign policy crisis. Here, one may raise the question on whether it was the US President or the US Congress when we refer to US administration above. As a matter of fact, 1973 War Power Act³⁸² after the turbulence in Vietnam War and Nixon's resignation in 9 August 1974 due to Watergate Scandal brought a serious power to the Congress in domestic politics and also put a pressure on US Presidency. Within this circumstance, Congressmen repeatedly initiated proposals for arms sale embargo on Turkey and President Ford eventually had to approve that embargo even though he vetoed most of those proposals. Proposals after Cyprus intervention first introduced on 15 August 1974 by a group of congressmen headed by Indiana Congressmen John Brademas who were also pressured by Greek lobbying groups in the US³⁸³. Then after, President Ford vetoed two proposals that were signed by the Congress in October however he eventually signed the Resolution in December which offered to suspend 200-million-dollar worth of military support unless Turkey

³⁸¹ Murat Karagöz "US Arms Embargo Against Turkey After 30 Years: An Institutional Approach Towards US Policy Making", *Perceptions*, (Winter 2004 – 2005).

³⁸² Available on <http://www.columbia.edu/~gjl0/warpow.html>

³⁸³ Karagöz, "US Arms Embargo Against Turkey After 30 Years: An Institutional Approach Towards US Policy Making".

withdraws her army from the island until 5 February 1975³⁸⁴. This proposal for suspension even included the fighter jets of which costs were already paid by Turkey. Indeed, it was a good opportunity for the congressmen who desired for giving a lesson to Turkey for lifting the poppy cultivation ban.

Here, it is important to note that US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was close to Turkish argument that US military aid was an obligation due to NATO alliance rather than a favour and he believed that this embargo decision would evoke the hostile attitude towards the US by Turkey which had geostrategic importance at the region³⁸⁵. So and so, he turned out right when the crisis escalated by Turkey's unilateral declaration for the Cyprus Federal Turkish State on 13 February 1975 and Turkey gave the control of military bases to Turkish Armed Force and banned free flight of US fighter jets along military bases on 25 July 1975 when proposal for toning down the arms sale embargo was rejected on 24 July 1975 by the House of Representatives where 223 counter votes threw out the 206 upvotes³⁸⁶. Demirel government also responded to US embargo by informing US administration on 25 June 1975 that Turkey abrogated the Bilateral Defence and Cooperation Agreement between two states which was in force since 1969. Ford administration's useless efforts to sign Defence and Economic Cooperation Act (DECA) on 26 March 1976 offering one-billion-dollar military aid in return for opening military bases did not solve any issue because the congress did not approve that act. Even though US President's efforts to prevent US power loss in the Middle East was evaded by the

³⁸⁴ In order to listen "Resolution expressing the sense of the House regarding the halt of U.S. economic and military assistance to Turkey until all Turkish Armed Forces have been withdrawn from Cyprus" sponsored by Thomas O'Neill Jr., and then by Brademas, please visit <https://www.congress.gov/search?searchResultViewType=expanded&q=%7B%22congress%22%3A%5B%2293%22%5D%2C%22source%22%3A%22legislation%22%2C%22search%22%3A%22arms+sale%22%7D>

³⁸⁵ Kissinger defended that US-Turkey relations should not be damaged due to a ban on arms sale however he repeatedly noted the demands and expectations of the congress about relatiating Turkey for lifting the opium ban and operation in Cyprus. See one of his letters to US president available on Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume XXX Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, 1973–1976, eds Edward C. Keefer and Laurie Van Hook (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 208.

³⁸⁶ Argyris A. Fatouros, "The Turkish Aid Ban: Review and Assessment", *Articles by Maurer Faculty.Paper 1905*, (1976), 5-25.

congress, the year 1978 was a turning point in this respect. Iran Shah criticizing Khomeini with his letter of January 1978³⁸⁷ after June 1977 student protests escalated the domestic tension in Iran and it was an early signal for changing regional dynamics in the Middle East. Considering that the US wouldn't want to lose Turkey as an ally in the Middle East after a possible regime change in its old-ally Iran³⁸⁸, Presidential Office and the Congress in the US come up with a consensus on toning down the arms sale embargo on Turkey on 26 September 1978 by the "Resolution No: 95-384" even though there had been some disagreements between them during the process due to President Carter's April decision on lifting the ban unconditionally³⁸⁹. In return for re-opening the military bases to US armed forces, foreign policy crisis ended after this resolution.

Turkey's military intervention to Cyprus not only started a crisis between Turkey and the US but also led the overthrow of coup government in Greece and withdrawal of Greece from military part of the NATO. In terms of a positive externality of this arms sale embargo, it would be noted that Turkey focused its attention on developing national defence industry in order not to face with such kind of challenge again. The next part of the chapter analyses the role of Prime Minister Demirel as a decision maker and institutions within their own priorities throughout this foreign policy crisis.

5.2.2. Crisis Management and Decision Making

Looking at the period between 1974-1980, Turkey experienced short-termed, weak and unstable coalition governments with conflictual domestic and foreign policy priorities where domestic economic, social and political problems peaked and regional conflicts after Cyprus intervention brought several challenges to Turkey in

³⁸⁷ Ahmad Ashraf, and Ali Banuazizi, "The State, Classes and Modes of Mobilization in the Iranian Revolution". *State, Culture, and Society*, 1:3, (1985), 3-40.

³⁸⁸ A secret report of CIA later on 5 September 1981, clearly notes the rising importance and inevitable necessity for Turkish friendship in the region after Iranian Revolution and Soviet invasion to Afghanistan. Document No: CIA-RDP83B00140R000100120003-9, 2-3. Available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83B00140R000100120003-9.pdf>

³⁸⁹ The Senate sent the draft on 26 July 1978 and the House of Representatives passed the resolution on 1 August 1978. Gönlübol and Kürkçüoğlu, "1973-1983 Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası", 592.

terms of foreign policy making. Adding the arms sale embargo of US, the leader of Turkey's western alliance, as a so called "punishment" for Turkey's intervention on Cyprus where the Soviet Union also did not approve this intervention as the leader of Eastern Bloc, it could be right to argue that international, regional and domestic developments posed limits to Demirel's foreign policy making rather than providing any opportunities. All in all, short term coalition governments of Demirel with his right-wing rivals with serious conflicting policy orientations found it difficult to apply his own preferred policies in foreign affairs.

Arms sale embargo has been notified with its characteristic in being an economic issue that is why Aksu mentions that this crisis was not included in his study of crisis management where the focus of that study excluded the foreign policy crisis with economic content³⁹⁰. Nevertheless, regarding the implications from poppy crisis, this crisis could be also defined as expected economic and non-violent crisis with political aspect where Turkey pursued a controlled pressure with tit-for-tat strategy. It was an expected crisis because Turkey would be aware of a possible reaction of the US due to clarification of its possible actions since Johnson's Letter in case Turkey's military involvement in Cyprus by using the weaponry with US origin. Besides, because this arms sale embargo could not be assessed without its non-fissile link with Cyprus intervention, its political aspect dominates the foreign policy more than economic aspect where Turkish retaliation was based on political responses. Finally, Turkey's controlled pressure with a tit-for-tat strategy reveals the path through solution of the crisis with non-violent measures through diplomatic efforts.

Evaluating the political positions on both sides, Turkey, from the beginning, defends its argument of inevitability for a Turkish military involvement in the island for the lives of innocent Turkish Cypriots where long-term diplomatic efforts was no use in ending military aggression of Greek Cypriots supported by mainland Greece. That is why Demirel strictly noted that this conflict between Turkey and Greece should not turn to a conflict between Turkey and the US due to unfair US embargo on arms sale which was an unacceptable act of hostility damaging the relations

³⁹⁰ Aksu, *Türk Dış Politikasında Karar Alma ve Kriz Yönetim Süreçleri*, 76.

between two allies of NATO and Western Bloc. US administration, on the other hand, regarded this action of Turkish military involvement as an implicit attack against another NATO member with fragile domestic situation where US arms were used. Here, rather than the first intervention in 20th July, Turkey was blamed for violating the efforts of Geneva meetings for peaceful solution with its second intervention in 15th August. Here, Baytok, in his memoirs, notes that even the US Defence Secretary Laird asked Turkish Defence Minister Işık for getting Turkey's skates on first intervention so that the operation could end in a couple of days³⁹¹. About position of US administration, it is important to note some key arguments here where this arms sale embargo was understood by Turkey as a punishment with hidden intentions of the US.

First of all, it could be argued that inevitability of arms sale embargo was not only stemming from Turkish involvement in Cyprus but also from the efforts of both Treasury department and congressmen in US administration to impose economic sanctions and embargo on Turkey as a response to its position in poppy crisis which was argued in this chapter and previous chapter on poppy crisis in detail. That is why Turkish involvement in Cyprus could be regarded as a ground where US administration found a just cause to show muscle to Turkey in response to its foreign policy attitude recently. In addition to desire of congressmen in punishing Turkey which was argued before, a CIA report in 1970 writing down that “*During the meeting, Treasury (Rossides) will insist most strongly economic sanctions, and charge that we have been too soft on Turks.*”³⁹² could be regarded as earlier eagerness within US administration and supports the argument above when assessed together with another CIA report in July, 1975, after a year from Cyprus intervention, noting that “*Now, for the first time, Turks cannot escape the painful conclusion that they will*

³⁹¹ Baytok, *Dış Politikada Bir Nefes*, 195.

³⁹² Memorandums for both June and August meetings of Heroin Task Force are in Document number: LOC-HAK-7-5-29-7. Available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/loc-hak-7-5-29-7>

*have to pay a high price for their action a year ago and their inaction.*³⁹³” As another hidden intention of the US, Sander argues that the main intention behind the arms sale embargo was to bring a balance of arms between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea where Turkish advantageous position in arms race would severely deteriorate the stability over the region unless Turkey’s military rise was hampered by the US³⁹⁴. Indeed, this argument could be supported with the arguments of a CIA report submitted in June 1988 in order to show how military balance was aimed to succeed in which it says that:

[...]After the 1974 Cyprus crisis, several factors combined to allow Greece to reduce the military imbalance that had existed in favour of Turkey until then. From 1975 to 1978, a US arms embargo against Turkey, imposed because of Ankara’s use of US-supplied weapons in the invasion of Cyprus, virtually halted the modernization of Turkey’s armed forces and severely curtailed its ability to maintain its military equipment, which is largely of US origin. Greece, under no such restriction during this period, continued to receive US military assistance and procure US tanks, aircraft, and other equipment.³⁹⁵

Looking at the official positions of Turkey and the US, Prime Minister Demirel’s political leadership and decision-making in foreign policy could be argued to be shaped within a clear consideration of terms of actions to force or convince US administration in lifting the embargo which otherwise would seriously damage Turkey’s economic and military development in its position with NATO defence system as a wing state. Within this perspective, Demirel’s first announcement, just 15 days after he came to power, was his 15th April public announcement showing his determination about Turkey’s probable action with strong words saying that:

³⁹³ Those words are underlined in the original document. Memorandum on “Turkish Reaction to Failure to Lift US Arms Embargo” Document no: CIA-RDP80M01066A001100020007-3 Available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/search/site/CIA-RDP80M01066A001100020007-3>

³⁹⁴ Oral Sander, “Türkiye’nin Batı Bağlantısı, ABD ve Türkiye” in Oral Sander (revised by Melek Fırat), *Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası*, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2013), 127.

³⁹⁵ CIA Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on “The Military Balance Between Greece and Turkey: How It Stands-Where It Is Headed-What It Means”, June 1988, 4. Document no: CIA-RDP93T00837R000400040002-4. Available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP93T00837R000400040002-4.pdf>

[...W]e consider the embargo as a hostile act. If the US congress does not lift the embargo, it will become imperative for us to take the measures necessitated by the situation with regard to the bilateral defence agreements between Turkey and the US in the field of security. The government shall not forego any sacrifice necessary for the defence of Turkey. We shall look for and find the means of procuring all the arms and material needed by our Armed Forces.³⁹⁶

Considering that military bases was the most important leverage of Turkey against the US, it would be an expected threat of measure for US administration where even CIA reports of 1971 before the military memorandum noted a possible action of army generals using military bases as a trump-card for bargaining if a military intervention would exist and if the US would have not welcome the military plot³⁹⁷. At this point, in order to understand how this decision of retaliation through military bases was emerged and evolved, it is here important to ask when this idea was first raised. Şihmantepe argues that it was first Ministry of Defence in Sadi Irmak government which made an announcement on 9 February 1975 for necessity of cancelling the bilateral agreement on defence cooperation to prevent the use of military bases by US forces, as a response to arms sale embargo³⁹⁸. Indeed, reviewing public declarations of NSC meetings, it was the first time on 4 February 1975 NSC meeting when suspension of military bases was mentioned where the public press said that:

[...T]he main impact of cutting the aids will be on our bilateral agreements based on defence alliance. In this respect, Congress is giving harm to mutual hep and balance on cooperation. At this point, US Congress will carry the can for the responsibility of reconsidering the conditions of defence cooperation based on current necessity. Under these circumstances, we do

³⁹⁶ “Demirel Tells Correspondent About Turkish Foreign Policy”, CIA Document No: LOC-HAK-239-6-30-7. Available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/loc-hak-239-6-30-7>

³⁹⁷ “Turkey: Winter of Discontent”, *CIA Office of National Estimates*, Memorandum on January, 7, 1971, p 11. Document No: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000110007-6 Available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/search/site/CIA-RDP85T00875R002000110007-6>

³⁹⁸ Şihmantepe, *Türk Dış Politikasında Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel & Dış Politika Kriz Davranışları Üzerine Bir Araştırma*, 117.

not see any use in sustaining the negotiations of benefitting from facilities based on bilateral defence cooperation agreement.³⁹⁹

That is to say, policy action for putting a halt on bilateral defence cooperation agreement could be regarded as a decision of either MFA bureaucracy or military rather than Demirel's own decision however it is noteworthy to mention that Demirel accepted this proposal in his own decision-making as a continuity in foreign policy. Here, Öymen clearly utters that a retaliation of suspending the use of military bases in terms of reciprocity for arms sale embargo was the one of different alternatives proposed by MFA bureaucracy, which was strongly supported by diplomats⁴⁰⁰. Indeed, Yavuzalp also notes in his memoirs that MFA bureaucracy was attaching great importance for continuing pressure on US administration in every bureaucratic and political ground that is why MFA recommended highly to Demirel for retaining this ongoing pressure⁴⁰¹. Besides, in order to show how Demirel formulates his own policy orientation after carefully listening all related state institutions, he gives the example of previous negotiations through signature of 1969 Bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement where Demirel refused MFA recommendation for claiming a considerable amount of financial aid from Americans in return for using military installations and accepted military's recommendation for demanding three billion dollar, which was quite a big number and could not be acceptable by US administration⁴⁰². In this respect, rather than mainly leaning on one single institution, it would be right to claim that Demirel was making his own decisions based on careful calculation in his mind after collecting the technical data from related state departments and formulating them into political decisions.

In May 1975, Turkey weighted its demarche and granted a term of respite to US administration for its decision to lift the embargo up until 24 July 1975, when the decision for embargo was voted in the House of Representatives. The first step of

³⁹⁹ Original text of the declaration of the meeting is in Öztürk and Yurteri, *MGK: Dünyü ve Bugünüyle Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*, 33.

⁴⁰⁰ Interview with Öymen.

⁴⁰¹ Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*, 138.

⁴⁰² *Ibid.*, 133.

Foreign Affairs Minister Çağlayangil's announcement on 17 July 1975 after NSC meeting, declaring the suspension of the use of military bases settled in Turkey by the US fighter jets and further steps unless US lift the embargo in one month was the last call for US administration and resulted in halting bilateral agreement of 1969 on 25 July 1975 because the House rejected to lift the embargo⁴⁰³.

Here political conditions in domestic situation gain importance in explaining Demirel's decision making where he was criticized and challenged by Ecevit's opposition party and media and even by his coalition partner Erbakan for acting too soft in his policies against embargo. Reminding that this period was instable in domestic political terms due to many local municipal, senatorial and national elections and populist policies of conflicting political parties, it would not be wrong to argue that Demirel was influenced and pressured by domestic concerns. Erbakan's continuous pressure on Demirel in both domestic and foreign policy issues could be mentioned as serious limitations in Demirel's liberty of action where CIA reports concluded that Demirel's strong action about bilateral agreement was because of Erbakan's criticism against him for not taking stronger measures⁴⁰⁴. Besides, another CIA report in September 1975 also notes about this domestic rivalry and its impact on foreign policy that;

In Ankara, Prime Minister Demirel is reluctant to make any concessions on Cyprus that might leave him vulnerable in the partial Senate elections next month. Demirel's rightist coalition partner, Necmettin Erbakan, has taken a no-concession position on Cyprus and would be quick to turn any major conciliation gestures by Demirel to his own political advantage.⁴⁰⁵

⁴⁰³ Use of the military bases by US army was banned with a cabinet decree on 25 July 1975 by Demirel government and control was given to Turkish Armed Forces on 26 July 1975. For the newspapers of the day, See <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/Arsiv/1975/07/26> [Tuncer notes that 17th June decision was regarded as a temporary situation and criticized by some journalists for being gutless in taking real steps. In Tuncer, "Süleyman Demirel", 170.]

⁴⁰⁴ CIA Staff Note on 8 August 1975. Document no: CIA-RDP86T00608R000500010042-1. Available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/search/site/CIA-RDP86T00608R000500010042-1>

⁴⁰⁵A Top Secret CIA Report on Western Europe, 3. Document no: CIA-RDP79T00865A001700080002-5 Available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/search/site/CIA-RDP79T00865A001700080002-5>

Eralp, looking at another foreign policy issue, argues how Demirel feared from fall of coalition government that is why he warned Çağlayangil not to bring the issue of European Economic Community on the table concerning that Erbakan would veto it⁴⁰⁶.

Being stuck between resistance of his coalition partner and concerns of military, Demirel was looking for a middle ground for his response to embargo. A CIA report on 16 June 1975, the day before Turkish NSC meeting was held, argues that Demirel was convinced that US Congress would not lift the embargo and he was prepared for firm actions to force US administration however he needed the agreement of Turkish military leaders who were reluctant to take any irreversible measures and prefer gradual approach against US that they consider as irreplaceable ally for military development⁴⁰⁷. This report was followed by another report the day after NSC meeting where it was argued that Demirel was using the argument of being under domestic pressure in order to benefit from embargo in domestic politics where he would present as a victory if a presumed lift of embargo happens in response to his threat of retaliation or he would take his steps that he would argue he anticipated⁴⁰⁸. Here, in a memorandum of meeting held by US administration on 19 June 1975, Kissinger also notes the domestic concerns of Demirel in making any move on embargo and Cyprus issues where he reads Demirel's 9th June message to him that embargo limited his ability to not only make progress on the Cyprus territorial issue but also prevent counteraction that might hurt the US-Turkish relations; and adds by saying that;

DEMIREL couldn't accept the deal we had been working on, for domestic reasons. If Ecevit were in office, I am convinced we would now have a solution. (...) But DEMIREL is looking for some way to manage it so he doesn't get beaten to death domestically.⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁶ Eralp, *Perdeyi Aralarken: Bir 'monşer'in Haturatı*, 44.

⁴⁰⁷ CIA Report on "The President's Daily Brief 16 July 1975", Document No: DOC_0006014825. Available on https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/search/site/DOC_0006014825

⁴⁰⁸ CIA Report on "The President's Daily Brief 17 July 1975", Document No: DOC_0006014826. Available on https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/search/site/DOC_0006014826

⁴⁰⁹ Kissinger mentions the point that Ecevit was confident for being the one who took Cyprus but Demirel couldn't do it in 1967. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume XXX

Here, recalling the rising domestic prestige of military after Cyprus intervention, Balcı notes that military had strong influence over foreign policy issues where even groups within Justice Party and Nationalist Movement Party also supported the idea of necessity for involvement of military in foreign policy issues⁴¹⁰. Besides, it was military which was expected to be affected most from the embargo where almost all military equipment depended on US assistance. Supporting the argument of compromise between Demirel and military in embargo crisis, 9 July 1975 report of CIA mentions that;

Demirel and Turkish General Staff have been casting about for an appropriate response to make on July 17, however, and may see such a compromise as a way out of the dilemma they created for themselves with the establishment of deadline. (...) Demirel fears a sharp swing to the left in Turkey if the embargo continued and sees the possibility of an arms agreement with the Soviet Union as becoming more likely. The ministry of defence has gone so far as to institute a study of the consequences of abandoning Turkey's move toward...(the rest of the sentence is dimmed and classified)⁴¹¹

A turning point for Turkish controlled pressure on US administration other than the military bases could be argued where Turkey turned a different policy action. Until then, Turkish decision-making principle was based on not surrendering to embargo by giving concessions on Cyprus issue that is why Demirel repeatedly mentioned the ineffectiveness and unfairness of US administration giving harm to Turkish-American relationship in return to a conflict between Turkey and Greece. Having reconsidered the inseparable link of the embargo with Turkish military existence in Cyprus, Turkey understood that embargo would not be lifted unless some steps taken in Cyprus issue that is why CIA report on September 1975 mentions that

Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, 1973–1976, eds Edward C. Keefer and Laurie Van Hook (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 228. Available on <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v30/d228#fn:1.5.4.2.16.86.32.4>

⁴¹⁰ Balcı, *Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler ve Uygulamalar*, 163.

⁴¹¹ Staff note prepared by CIA, Documents No: CIA-RDP79T00865A001300220002-3 and DOC_0006014919. Available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/search/site/CIA-RDP79T00865A001300220002-3>

Turkey first time announced in 3rd September that around 1500 Turkish commandos in Cyprus would return to Turkey in the first week of September⁴¹².

Having assessed the impact of the banning the use of military bases for US interests, continued pressure of US military and President's office forced the Congress to take steps for partly lifting the embargo for commercial arms sale ratified by the President on 6 October 1975 which was welcomed by Demirel as a fruit of his policy but not satisfied enough unless the embargo was totally lifted⁴¹³. Here, CIA report on 4 October 1975 mentions that military was pleased with partial lifting of embargo however Demirel was avoiding to overplay his hands just before the negotiations for a new defence agreement with the US⁴¹⁴.

About this turning point in policy action of Turkey, one may raise the question about who initiated this effort of withdrawing the troops as a negotiation base with the US. A CIA report in November 1975 reports about the efforts of military to withdraw some troops even though it was not welcome by Demirel and that report writes that;

Meanwhile, the Turkish General Staff, which is becoming increasingly annoyed at the Demirel government's failure to confront the country's foreign and domestic problems, is reportedly considering a plan to withdraw a substantial number of the approximately 32,000 Turkish troops still in Cyprus. (one line declassified) The plan has already been approved by General Staff Chief Sancar and is now being examined by the service chiefs. If the service chiefs approve, the withdrawal reportedly will be implemented without recourse to the government.⁴¹⁵

⁴¹² A Top Secret CIA Report on Western Europe, Document no: CIA-RDP79T00865A001700080002-5. Available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/search/site/CIA-RDP79T00865A001700080002-5>

⁴¹³ Commander Forces of Navy and Air Force in the US wrote letters to the Congress and White House in order to show how severe the damage was after ban on military bases. Box 42, folder "Turkey - Military Aid Embargo (7)" of the John Marsh Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library Available on <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0067/7787174.pdf>

⁴¹⁴ In CIA National Intelligence Bulletin, 3. Document no: CIA-RDP79T00975A028200010023-3. Available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/search/site/CIA-RDP79T00975A028200010023-3>

⁴¹⁵ CIA Report on "Western Europe, Canada, International Organizations", November 25, 1975, 11. Document no: CIA-RDP79T00865A002200210001-5. Available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/search/site/CIA-RDP79T00865A002200210001-5>

This same report, additionally concludes that;

Although portrayed as a cost saving measure, such a move would be made in part with an eye to the approaching reconsideration by Congress of the question of military aid to Turkey. The move might also reflect a genuine desire by the General Staff to break the deadlock in the intercommunal talks, as well as a wish to push Demirel into action on the diplomatic front.⁴¹⁶

An argument could be raised here about the dichotomy in Demirel's foreign policy decision making. Even though Demirel wanted to keep better relations with US in his overall tendency, he was felt to be forced with domestic dynamics because of the high connectedness of foreign policy issues of Cyprus and embargo with domestic dynamics which, at the end of the day, would determine the faith of his administration. Rising anti-American feelings within some groups of MFA bureaucracy and young military officers which was honed with Ecevit government's practices before Demirel together with popular nationalism of citizens after successful intervention to Cyprus and Erbakan's continuous resistance against any moves to better relations with the US could be argued to clash with Demirel's will to repair relations where military, with its popularity after Cyprus intervention, also wanted to ease the tension with the US. Within this challenge in domestic politics, it could be claimed that Demirel played a conciliatory role between different units of domestic politics where seemed to resist against the US on the one hand but negotiated for better relations for the sake of economic and political recovery for the country. Indeed, a comprehensive report of CIA submitted on 28 October 1975 gives clear impression of how US administration perceived the situation that Demirel was in coping with conciliating the different positions of NSC and his domestic rivals in politics where that report mentions three points as saying that;

-The National Security Council meeting on October 20 agreed to recommend that talks be opened with the US on the bases and to try again for a solution to the Cyprus problem. The cabinet has yet to meet to consider the Council's recommendations, and when it does, Demirel's most troublesome coalition partner, Necmettin Erbakan-who feels on stronger ground there than in the Security Council-may still raise objections to the Council's recommendations.

⁴¹⁶ CIA Report on "Western Europe, Canada, International Organizations", November 25, 1975, 12.

-In approaching sensitive foreign policy issues, Demirel will also be keeping an eye on opposition leader Ecevit and the military. (...) Their views on Cyprus are not far apart, but Ecevit continues to take a hard line on the US bases.

-The military wants to consolidate gains made last summer on Cyprus, restore relations with the US, and ease Turkey's sense of isolation. Military leaders generally agree that the government's continuing inaction is adding to these already sensitive problems. They may already have put pressure on politicians-Demirel in particular-to reach some solutions on the Cyprus issue and move to normalize relations with the US.⁴¹⁷

As a matter of fact, US embargo was giving serious harm to Turkish economy and military where economic sustainability and continuation of military existence was not possible under the embargo. On the other hand, a fragile and vulnerable Turkey would easily be turned its face to national modernization or to new partners for military equipment and economic aid other than the US support which could also harm US interests in the near future. Looking from this perspective of being stuck in NSC recommendations and political rivals' pressure, it is important to assess the change in political attitude of the parties towards foreign policy issues after senate elections on 12 October 1975, one week before NSC meeting. Regarding that Demirel's party gained five more seats and Erbakan's party lost one in that Senate elections compared to previous 1973 senate election⁴¹⁸; it could be argued that Demirel would throw his weight around foreign policy issues disregarding the domestic concerns of Erbakan. At this point, after mentioning how pro-US Turkish officers turned to lack of confidence on leaning on US military support, Turkish efforts of negotiations with Soviet Union and Middle Eastern Arab states for searching alternative sources for military and economic aid, CIA reports a built consensus between Erbakan and Demirel in informing each other prior to any foreign policy decision which in return Erbakan agreed on not to pressure Demirel in his decisions about US embargo but continue to its stand on Cyprus issue; and that report

⁴¹⁷ CIA Central Intelligence Bulletin. Document no: CIA-RDP79T00975A028200010013-4. Available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/search/site/CIA-RDP79T00975A028200010013-4>

⁴¹⁸ Tunca Özgüşi, *Türk Parlamento Tarihinde Cumhuriyet Senatosu*, (Ankara: TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Yayınları No:153, 2012), 254-259. Available on https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/yayinlar/cumhuriyet_senatosu.pdf

adds that “*Erbakan has left the matter of the US bases largely to Demirel because the subject does not interest him and because a high profile on this issue would put him in regular contact with the military leadership.*”⁴¹⁹ This could be interpreted as dominance of military on political parties in foreign policy issues for this period together with Demirel’s successful role of gathering different decision making units under the roof of his own foreign policy priorities by balancing different them with his conciliatory role. At this point, reminding Demirel government’s efforts on taking steps for military bases and Cyprus, a telegram from US Embassy in Turkey to US Department of States on 5 November 1975 writes down that;

DEMIREL and Caglayangil are adroit maneuverers and they may therefore find a way to do so (especially if the military supports them behind the scenes)—but our present assessment is that the odds of the PriMin–FonMin team accomplishing this are very long against.⁴²⁰

Having re-strengthened his position of influence in foreign policy, Demirel government first announced in February 1976 that Turkey would withdraw its military forces of 2000 commandos from Cyprus and later in March 1976 signed a new defence cooperation agreement with the US with a pre-condition of lifting the embargo and ratifying the agreement in the US Congress before it entered into force⁴²¹. At this point, it would be wrong to claim that Demirel’s efforts in restoring good relations with US was for either pleasing the US allies of him or refraining from possible punishments of US in the future. Recalling the “adroit maneuverers” of US reports, it should also be argued Demirel’s manoeuvres on how he played his hands in order to bring the bilateral Turkish-American relations to an equal and balanced understanding rather than simply surrendering to the US. While he was opening the negotiations for a new defence agreement with US administration, he was also

⁴¹⁹ CIA Report on “Western Europe, Canada, International Organizations”, November 25, 1975. Document no: CIA-RDP79T00865A002200210001-5. Available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/search/site/CIA-RDP79T00865A002200210001-5>

⁴²⁰ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume XXX Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, 1973–1976, eds Edward C. Keefer and Laurie Van Hook (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 238. Available on <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v30/d238>

⁴²¹ Gönlübol and Kürkçüoğlu, “1973-1983 Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası”, 591.

manipulating his negotiation efforts with the Soviet Union as a signal to US at the eve of defence cooperation. At this point, Bureau of Intelligence and Research prepares a note for US President saying that;

[...B]y stating Turkey's intention to negotiate a political document with the USSR, while holding back any details, Çağlayangil probably is using the threat of a joint declaration as a pressure tactic on the US. According to a [less than 1 line not declassified] report, Prime Minister DEMIREL told [less than 1 line not declassified] that future American and Western behavior in areas of interest to Ankara will determine the temperature of Turkey's relations with the USSR. American military assistance, US-Turkish base negotiations, and support on the Cyprus issue are the key determinants in Ankara's thinking.⁴²²

Additionally, Çağlayangil, in his negotiations with US administration over the US aid to Turkey and activation of military installations, argued the necessity to separate Turkish-Greek relations from Turkish-American relations and added that \$200 million aid per year and \$50 million export-import credit offer of the US was not enough for Turkey where he was overtrumping⁴²³.

It could be noteworthy that, in overcoming the military bases problem, US efforts in its demarche over the government was not the only diplomatic efforts towards the government but also included the attempts to relief Demirel in the face of domestic political opposition. In this respect, interestingly, US President also invited Ecevit to White House on 29 July 1976 by utilizing the social ties between Ecevit and Kissinger in order to convince him to loosen his pressure on Demirel in military bases and Cyprus issue where Ecevit also noted the domestic pressure over Demirel by saying that;

[...I] asked to form a minority government because I thought if the problem wasn't solved right away it would be more difficult. The new Government inherited my coalition so they weren't able to make many moves. I had been

⁴²²Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume XXX Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, 1973–1976, eds Edward C. Keefer and Laurie Van Hook (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 239. Available on <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v30/d239>

⁴²³ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume XXX Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, 1973–1976, eds Edward C. Keefer and Laurie Van Hook (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 241. Available on <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v30/d241>

critical of the Government and urged them to make some conciliatory moves.⁴²⁴

Considering those developments of 1976 together with the failure of US Congress to approve that new defence cooperation agreement in November 1976⁴²⁵, the US experienced a change in its administration when Carter took the presidential office from his predecessor Ford in January 1977. Here, a critical point should be mentioned in evaluating Turkish policy orientation in embargo where Turkish administration was not happy with US President Ford sending defence cooperation agreement to Congress in a hurry before leaving the office. Searching through official documents of US State Department, it is observed that Turkey seemed quite enthusiastic about quickly putting military bases into service in return to US signing the new defence cooperation agreement where Demirel wrote a letter to new President Carter in February 1977 notifying the urgent necessity to solving the agreement issue⁴²⁶. Therefore, it would not be wrong to argue that Demirel's decision making on embargo crisis during 1977 turned to persuading new US administration for signing and ratifying the US-Turkey Defence Cooperation Agreement so that the arms sale embargo could totally be lifted, where domestic pressure from Ecevit was also no longer a problem due to Ecevit's decreasing charisma after his failure to sustain his government more than one month with lack of confidence vote in July 1971. Here, Eralp mentions the efforts of MFA bureaucracy in international organizations for pressuring US administration by adding annotations to every NATO

⁴²⁴ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume XXX Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, 1973–1976, eds Edward C. Keefer and Laurie Van Hook (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 243. Available on <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v30/d243> [Note: Under these circumstances, it was not a surprise, when Ecevit was Prime Minister, that Denktaş declared on 20 July 1978 that 35.000 Greek Cypriot immigrant would be inhabited in “Maraş region” of Cyprus. Gönlübol and Kürkçüoğlu, “1973-1983 Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası”, 592]

⁴²⁵ A telegram from US Embassy in Ankara to US State Department in November 1975 makes predictions about possible future of US-Turkey relations after Congress' failure. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume XXX Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, 1973–1976, eds Edward C. Keefer and Laurie Van Hook (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 247. Available on <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v30/d247>

⁴²⁶ Turkish Ambassador Esenbel's arguments, Demirel's letter and Carter's reply are available in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXI Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, 1973–1976, eds David Zierler and Adam M. Howard (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014), Document 84, 86 and 87. Available on <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v21/ch3>

declaration for budgeting principles of NATO members by complaining about Turkey's inability to obey those budgeting principles due to US embargo⁴²⁷. In addition to Eralp's memoir about MFA's pressure, reports and telegrams in US official documents also add the efforts of top generals of TAF in pressuring US counterparts where those reports even note a warning from Turkish generals about writing a discomforting report and putting it into policy agenda of Turkish NSC's meeting on 4 March 1977⁴²⁸. This could also be argued as an important influence of military in foreign policy through the use of its power in NSC.

Those pressure from MFA bureaucracy and TAF also run together with diplomatic efforts through a solution in Cyprus and iterative meetings were held with Greece and Cyprus in Geneva under US mediation. Besides withdrawal of Turkish commandos from the island also was used as symbolic concessions for presenting Turkish good faith where Çağlayangil declared in a meeting with US officers that 2634 more troops would be withdrawn starting from December 1977⁴²⁹. After diplomatic efforts of Demirel government for more than one year, Ecevit's coalition government came in to governance on 5 January 1978 and Demirel left the prime ministry. Finally, after Ecevit's seven months demarche including the playing of Soviet card⁴³⁰, arms sale embargo was lifted when congress passed the "Resolution No: 95-384" on 26 July 1978 and President Carter ratified it on 26 September 1978⁴³¹.

⁴²⁷ Eralp, *Perdeyi Aralarken: Bir 'monşer'in Hatıratı*, 48. [He also notes in page 49 that Foreign Affairs Minister of previous Ecevit government, Gündüz Ökçün, told to US Ambassador Spiers that he personally did not want the lift of embargo. Probably, by this way, he aimed to persuade his own bureaucratic group to for necessity and possibility of alternative policy orientations other than the US.]

⁴²⁸ Turkish Ambassador Esenbel's arguments, Demirel's letter and Carter's reply are available in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXI Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, 1973–1976, eds David Zierler and Adam M. Howard (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014), Document 89, 91, 92 and 93. Available on <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v21/ch3>

⁴²⁹ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXI Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, 1973–1976, eds David Zierler and Adam M. Howard (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014), Document 104. Available on <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v21/ch3>

⁴³⁰ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXI Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, 1973–1976, eds David Zierler and Adam M. Howard (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014), Document 114. Available on <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v21/ch3>

⁴³¹ Gönübol and Kürkçüoğlu, "1973-1983 Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası", 591

Even though arms sale embargo was lifted, use of military bases by the US forces was not up until 30 March 1980, when Demirel's new government signed the new defence and economic cooperation agreement with the US administration and took the full control of those military installations in Turkish territory.

5.2.3. Findings and Discussion

In previous parts of this chapter, behaviours and policy actions of different state institutions and Demirel under specific foreign policy crisis of arms sale embargo have been evaluated and a matrix of decisions and dynamics behind those decisions have been developed in the table below. Regarding the decisions of Demirel with respect to dynamics of the period, some arguments about political leadership on foreign policy and role of state institutions could be held. First of all, it would not be wrong to claim that Demirel was highly influenced in his foreign policy decisions by domestic politics when his government was a weak and divided government with conflicting priorities. Here the main limitation for Demirel was seen as the ongoing accusation of being pro-American, which would be a disadvantage for domestic politics in this period. Therefore, his policy actions were seriously restricted by his coalition partners and also by opposition parties through manipulation of popular domestic priorities. It is also important to note that he tended to move towards his primary policy objectives whenever he felt comfortable with domestic situation as it was in Senate elections of 1975 when domestic politics went in his favour.

Table 5: Table for Decision Making in Cold War Coalition

VARIABLES	CHARACTERISTICS AND OUTCOMES
Characteristics of International Structure	Re-escalation of Tensions in Bipolar Structure of Cold War
	End of Bretton Woods System and Turbulence in Politics and Economy
	Rising Non-Alignment Movement and Third World after Oil Shock
Characteristics of Regional Developments	Rising Importance of Middle East and Africa due to Oil Shock
	High Level of Conflicts with Greece due to Cyprus and Aegean Problems
	Rising Importance of Soviet Union as a Trump-card
Characteristics of Domestic Politics	Rising Nationalism but Domestic Ideological and Violent Confrontations under Political and Economic Turbulence
	Weak and Divided Coalition with Party Conflicts/Strong Anti-American Opposition
	Strong and Influential Military/ Reformist MFA Bureaucracy with Strong Minister/Increasing NSC Interest in Foreign Politics
Crisis Management	Expected Economic Crisis with Political Aspects Triggered by Outside Force
	Turkey's Controlled Pressure Strategy vs US Administration's Gradual De-escalation with Limited Response Strategy
	Crisis was solved by lifting embargo through issue bundling where limited concessions on Cyprus issue and trump-cards against embargo used simultaneously.
Demirel's Leadership	Prime Minister of Weak and Divided Coalition Government
	Resistance to Unilateral US domination and Prefers Diplomatic Pressure and Controlled Manoeuvres
	Active Participation to Crisis and Compromise with military and MFA
DECISION MAKING STYLE	Direct and Indirect Influence of Military and Active Involvement of MFA Bureaucracy
	Active Participation by Demirel where He Used His Political Channels and Negotiation Skills in Pressuring US Administration
	Highly Influenced by Domestic Determinants and Balanced Different Priorities of Different Units Under a Careful Sequence of Political and Diplomatic Manoeuvres
	Open to information, challenge constraints, peaceful, cooperative understanding in tactics, risk averse

Here, it is clear that Demirel was not eager to formulate his policy priorities in against the interests of US administration however he did not hesitate to deteriorate those priorities when Turkish national interest required otherwise. That is to say, it would be wrong to label Demirel as pro-American in ideological terms but, as a necessity for his target for reaching a developed economy with stable political

conditions, it would be regarded that he believed the indispensability of Turkish-American alliance under equal and mutual relations. His political manoeuvres in developing controlled and better relations but never turning his face totally to Soviet Union on the one hand, making decisions that would harm to US interest but also maintaining the communication channels on the other hand, could be regarded as Demirel's way of building equal relations and showing the importance of Turkey to the US, for the sake of Turkish national interest.

Last but not least, international structure also plays important role in Demirel's foreign policy leadership where bi-polar Cold War structure forced middle range countries to choose either west or east for their security, and Turkey was seemed to have no other chance than being a member of western alliance where serious concern for its security was peaked due to Soviet threats to its territorial sovereignty since Stalin period.

With regard to foreign policy decision making, military had direct and indirect influence on embargo crisis by utilizing its popular support after Cyprus intervention on the one hand and its traditional channels of domination in bureaucracy and politics on the other. When compared to poppy crisis of previous period, military was more involved in decision making in embargo crisis through NSC meetings and direct meetings with its American counterparts. Here, it could be argued that involvement and influence of military on foreign policy decision making is directly related to the main topic of crisis where military would not prefer to indulge in crisis unless it is directly related to main concerns and priorities of military. That is to say, because arms sale embargo adversely affected TAF at the first place, military found itself to increase its influence on decision making.

When the discussion on role of MFA bureaucracy is held, its role of carrying out government's established foreign policy seemed to exceed to formulation as well. Here, Öymen argues that intervention to Cyprus was indispensable for Turkey since 1967 and MFA bureaucracy was very strict about its reflex about incoming intervention no matter the governments argued otherwise⁴³². In this respect, it would be understandable to dominate the formulation process of policy actions against any

⁴³² Öymen, *Zor Rota, Gençlik ve Diplomasi Anıları*, 88.

foreign retaliation to Turkish intervention. Considering this argument together with Eralp's and Yavuzalp's memoirs mentioned previously, it could be argued that active participation of MFA bureaucracy through its recommendations to Demirel and taking part in negotiations for signing the new defence cooperation agreement were the channels that MFA used in formulation of decision making.

In sum, as mentioned in official documents of US administration in addition to memoirs of Turkish politicians and retired officials, it would be concluded that Demirel's foreign policy leadership in this period was restricted by international structure and domestic political rivals due to conflicting interests but also influenced by state institutions where he eventually formulated and implemented his policy priorities that were in line with state institutions and also gradually overcome the domestic pressure on him by carefully utilizing developments in domestic politics.

5.2.4. Comparison with Other Crises

Looking at the other foreign policy crises of this period such as Casus Belli Crisis of 1973-1976 stemming from territorial waters conflict on the Aegean Sea with Greece and the NOTAM-FIR Crisis of 1974-1979 due to sovereignty right over flight information route above Aegean Sea, it could be traced back a consistency in Demirel's decision-making process. Similar to arms sale embargo, these two crises also had economic and political perspective. They differ from embargo crisis in two aspects where these two crises targeted Greece as a regional power rather than the US as great power and these two crises included a threat to territorial integrity and sovereignty rights.

Independent from those differences, researches of Şihmantepe and Aksu reveal that prioritizing domestic developments, seeking for US assistance, opening up a ground for diplomatic efforts but also presenting the force of military as a trump-card, realist, pragmatic and active participation was dominant characteristics of Demirel's decision making in those crises as well embargo crisis⁴³³.

⁴³³ Şihmantepe, *Türk Dış Politikasında Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel & Dış Politika Kriz Davranışları Üzerine Bir Araştırma*, 188-201.

This, as a result, presents a supporting argument for Demirel's leadership on foreign policy in Cold War period under coalition government which were already mentioned throughout this chapter.

CHAPTER 6

DEMIREL IN POST-COLD WAR COALITION AND NAKHICHEVAN CRISIS

You should not put your nation and state into an action which is not well calculated and not all there. You cannot solve any problem with your thrill.

Süleyman Demirel⁴³⁴

Having twelve years passed after Demirel who had to leave the power for the second time with the 1980 military intervention, the governments of the Motherland Party⁴³⁵ started in 1983 after the government called the “coup government” lasted eight years and ended on 20 November 1991. After then, the seventh Demirel government came to power in coalition with Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP), which lasted until 25 June 1993 until he was elected as the President. Demirel was politically forbidden with the 1982 referendum after the military coup in 1980 and his ban was lifted in September 1987 with the referendum. Despite failing to take power in the first dominant elections in 1987, Demirel came to power with the coalition government in the following elections with his True Path Party which got the biggest share of vote. Radical changes occurred both in domestic and external domain during the period when he was politically banned and this opened a new page for Demirel including his foreign policy leadership in this new world order.

⁴³⁴ His speech for opening ceremony of Demirel Museum in 2014 cited by Bayar in interview with him.

⁴³⁵ Two governments of Turgut Özal, one government of Yıldırım Akbulut and one being the five-month Mesut Yılmaz government when Turgut Özal became the president.

6.1. Developments of the Period

6.1.1. Developments Before Demirel

The Cold War period, which symbolically ended with the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989, had ended up with the victory of Western alliance, with the establishment of the Russian Federation on 12 December 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The end of bipolar world system and separation of many new countries from Soviet Union, which surrounded Turkey in the close neighbourhood, had also brought serious changes in global and regional manners. In the new order of the new world, which was freed from the necessity of having a security-oriented foreign policy and from the crushing between communist Eastern regimes and liberal Western regimes, a new process being multi-polar, multi-oriented and having multi-agenda had been expected to occur, and this had also made for Turkey a necessity to have a new approach⁴³⁶.

The great change and transformation for Turkey had actually begun before the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the military coup that took place within eight months following the 24 January 1980 decisions⁴³⁷ in which the economy took on a new understanding, all parties were closed and many people from right and left-wing politicians to youth and labour movement leaders were sent to prison. In this respect, Turkey experienced a period with full of heavy bills that would never be forgotten and Özal governments started by ending Uluşu government. During a period of military rule, the 1982 Constitution was put into force by being voted in the referendum and a new form was given to the legislative, executive and judicial powers. After the coup government imposed political bans to all party leaders

⁴³⁶ Hüseyin Bağcı and İdris Bal, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: New Problems and Opportunities”, in İdris Bal (ed.), *Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era*, (Boca Raton-Florida& USA: Brown Walker Press, 2004), 98-99.

⁴³⁷ Those decisions, known as the Economic Stability Decisions, included a series of radical economic measures some of which were devaluation of 32,7 % in Turkish currency, lifting the state subsidies on goods other than agriculture, energy and transportation and limiting the subsidies on agriculture, and liberalizing the free trade on imports and exports. For a discussion on those decisions See Ferit Bağcı, “1980 Sonrası Türkiye’de Yabancı Sermaye Hareketleri ve Dış Politikaya Yansımaları”, *Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi*, Vol 5, No:9, (2009), 119-146. [Here, İlhan Kesici notes that 24th January Decisions were planned to declare in 1st January however, because Evren sent a letter of ultimatum to the President on 27 December 1979 for taking economic measures, Demirel postponed the declaration to 24th January in order not to be regarded to be pressured by military. Kesici’s comments are available in Vakıf 2000 panel, 41-50.]

including Demirel in order not to see old faces in politics, new leaders emerged in domestic politics; new economic dynamics via economic liberalization and export-oriented growth strategy came into play. As a result of neo-liberal policies implemented in parallel with Washington Consensus⁴³⁸ which was summarized as privatization, liberalization and deregulation, serious changes occurred in Turkey. In this new era that shaped domestic dynamics significantly, Demirel, with his coalition government, ruled the state as political decision-maker in the new foreign policy crisis.

6.1.2. International Developments of the Period

With the Western Bloc's triumph and the end of containment policy, the end of bipolar system in international order has brought new opportunities and quests in foreign policy as well as new challenges for the states and there is no doubt that Turkey was one of the countries most affected from this new international system. The revisionist of the threat of Soviet Union and the status quoist foreign policy principle fed by the security-oriented NATO alliance was eliminated; at the very least, expected to be eliminated with the collapse of the eastern bloc. Despite keeping its existence in the new order, NATO, by directing its common security understanding in a different manner, now focused on new types of threats outside Eastern Bloc such as peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention⁴³⁹ and the concept of security umbrella lost its importance for Turkey compared to the Cold War era.

In reality, despite the process that began with the Carter Doctrine which presented US vital interest in the security of oil resources in the Persian Gulf⁴⁴⁰, the chain of regional wars that had risen during the George Bush leadership between 1988-1992 had shown that the world did not enter a period of peace. In this new era

⁴³⁸ Charles Gore, "The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries", *World Development*, Vol. 28, No. 5, (2000), 789-804.

⁴³⁹ For NATO's "The Alliance's Strategic Concept, November 1991", See [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm?](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm?text=23847)

⁴⁴⁰ Michael T. Klare, *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict*, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001), 84.

with its term “New World Order⁴⁴¹”, issues outside security such as transborder issues, human rights, global terrorism and especially economic concerns were supposed to increase its weight in world states’ foreign policy priorities as for Turkey. Here, although Kirişçi said that obedient and passive foreign policy understanding of Cold War era had to change with activeness, as Tuncer argued, Turkey continued its traditional approach described as passivity by some without giving up the status quo principle at the beginning of this new era⁴⁴².

In this new system, which Fukuyama called the “End of History”⁴⁴³, but which was the real beginning of the new world order by some, turned the world to a global village, as McLuhan described it early in 1962⁴⁴⁴. In such an era that every corner of the world was accessible to everyone online thanks to the development of digital technologies, the logistics networks of multinational corporations despite having crossed the borders in 1970s, had reached to a new dimension thanks to the effective use of the internet during this period. As a matter of fact, Naim argues that the source of those changes was mainly due to three revolutions as “The More Revolution, The Mobility Revolution and The Mentality Revolution” which he claims that birth of internet and end of Cold War brought an increase in power capability of multinational companies and micro powers and rise of new actors in foreign policy agenda⁴⁴⁵. The concept of border-based security in parallel with the traditional nation-state sovereignty understanding of the Cold War took on a new understanding which questioned the security responsibilities of states towards their own citizens, such as human rights and minority rights. Undoubtedly, this understanding brought about a broad coverage of new concepts and issues in the foreign policy agendas of the

⁴⁴¹ For the term “New World Order” and its historical references, See Eric A. Miller and Steve A. Yetiv, “The New World Order in Theory and Practice: The Bush Administration's Worldview in Transition”, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Mar., 2001), 56-68.

⁴⁴² Cited in Tuncer, “Süleyman Demirel”, 151.

⁴⁴³ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and The Last Man*, (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

⁴⁴⁴ Eric McLuhan, “The Source of the Term Global Village”, *McLuhan Studies*, Issue 2, (1996), Available on http://projects.chass.utoronto.ca/mcluhan-studies/v1_iss2/1_2art2.htm Last Accessed on 18/09/2019.

⁴⁴⁵ Moises Naim, *The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge isn't What It Used to Be*, (Philadelphia: Basic Books, 2013), 54.

countries. Although there are those who claim that the world entered into a new period of peace as opposed to scholars like Huntington who argued that the clash of civilizations would be evident in the new system rather than the struggle of ideologies⁴⁴⁶, as Rapoport claimed⁴⁴⁷, the proliferation of the “wave of religious terrorism”, ending anarchist, new left and anti-colonialist terror waves in the new world order showed that the new clash of civilizations based on the axis of religion was not that remote.

The most prominent feature of the new international system in economic and social terms was the reflection of the change of the international structure under GATT in global trade. In such a new era in which the distinction between high politics and low politics ended and economics became dominant again, the Uruguay Round starting in 1987 ended in 1994 and formed the basis for the establishment of a new international trade institution, namely World Trade Organization (WTO); and thanks to the previous round, namely Tokyo round, regional trade agreements were concentrated in the world and a period of serious liberalization in global trade began⁴⁴⁸. Trade liberalization has turned multinational corporations into more prominent actors in the system during this period in which it was believed that countries could resolve their foreign policy problems that they could not solve in political arena thanks the domino effect of regional trade agreements.

Under the light of all these systemic changes and developments, Demirel had to pursue a new foreign policy diversified with economic and cultural determinants other than security issues. Therefore, he had to keep advanced relations with Western countries with whom a long-term alliance had continued under NATO alliance on the

⁴⁴⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Simon&Schuster, 1996).

⁴⁴⁷ David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terror: International Dimensions and Consequences”, *An International History of Terrorism: Western and Non-Western Experiences*, (2013), 282-310. Available on https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286896869_The_four_waves_of_modern_terror_International_dimensions_and_consequences [Since whether the acts of terrorists are a necessity of the religion in which they believe, or whether these transnational organizations abuse religious elements to legitimize their own “spiritual interests” for their propaganda in the eyes of the masses is controversial, this term is used in quotations.]

⁴⁴⁸ For historical progress of World Trade Organization, See https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/history_e/history_e.htm. Last Accessed on 24/09/2019.

one hand and accelerated relations with the Central Asian Turkic States who had been integrated to Soviet Union ideologically for years on the other hand in addition to developed relations with other regional states in the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East on cultural and economic bases.

6.1.3. Regional Developments of the Period

If the question of “which part of the world was mostly affected by the end of Cold War?” is asked, undoubtedly the first answer in minds would be Turkey's neighbours and its close geography; namely, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East. As Robins stated⁴⁴⁹, all status quo was disrupted in the neighbouring region of Turkey which did not leave the status quo. The states under the Soviet influence in the Balkans created a new status quo by regaining their independence, Western phobia developed under the axis of Israeli opposition in the Middle East Arab countries and their approach towards Russia took a new phase under the axis of clash of civilizations with the west. In the Caucasus, after the soviet experience, a new era with conflicts and tensions began to escalate due to the concerns for new Russian Federation’s possible policies against the independence process. While the Balkan countries were striving to integrate into liberal Western world through detaching themselves from the soviet experience, they were being shaken by ethnic tensions, historical and chronical problems. This, in return, deeply affected Turkey’s foreign policy towards the region and Greece took its place again as the main agenda.

Here, Bağcı and Bal argue that Turkish decision makers had to find themselves to follow an active foreign policy as a search for new alliances after end of western alliance against soviet threat and Turkey had to deal with its security problems by its own that arise from the water issue, PKK and separatism in its borders with neighbour countries, which were frozen issues in the Cold War period due to stable conditions in East-West confrontation⁴⁵⁰.

⁴⁴⁹ Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War*, 6.

⁴⁵⁰ Bağcı and Bal, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: New Problems and Opportunities”, 99.

When it comes to the Middle East, after the Iranian Islamic Revolution that took place at the end of the Cold War, an important ally of the United States shifted to the opposite side and a regional structure occurred in the region which was called the “Axis of Evil⁴⁵¹” in the future by the US. Contrary to the expectations for the new Middle East where the threat to Israel reached to the peak due to addition of Khomeini's Iran to the Arab countries, the first war took place not with Israel but between Iraq and Iran. Immediately after that war, the reflections of the Gulf War of the US against Iraq came to the front just before Demirel came to power. This policy of the US, called “Dual containment policy⁴⁵²”, aimed to contain Iran on the one hand and Iraq on the other hand similar to Cold War's containment policy and this brought about a new constraint for the Middle East countries because of the humanitarian intervention, which was the new concept of NATO led by the United States.

Resistance movements that blended the struggle for independence with the religious theme in the Caucasus, where the political situation was uncertain after the long-term Soviet rule, made the foreign policy process of regional countries more sensitive due to Russia's unending concerns in its policy towards this region. In this complex environment which was just next to the borders of Turkey, while differences in approaches of the institutions and leaders were felt, sensitiveness of relations that would be carried out with Russia constituted a serious constraint for all foreign policy makers. It is also important to mention one of the most conflictual regional development over the region where military conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabagh territories since 1988 had an important impact on Turkish foreign policy on the Caucasus because this foreign policy was argued to be mainly shaped depending on that conflict⁴⁵³. Regarding this conflictual situation in Caucasus region, it is also important to note the shift in foreign policy orientation

⁴⁵¹ This term is first used by George Bush, US President in his speech available on <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> Last Accessed on 24/09/2019.

⁴⁵² For the article on Dual Containment By Brzezinski et. al., See <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/persian-gulf/1997-05-01/differentiated-containment>

⁴⁵³ Mustafa Aydın, “Kafkasya ve Orta Asyayla İlişkiler” in Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar-Cilt 2*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010), 401.

of Russia from a cooperative understanding with western countries to an idea of restoring its past influence over old soviet states through application of “Near Abroad Doctrine⁴⁵⁴” starting from 1993.

Other than all these, the EU, which accelerated its development while seeming to admit the US leadership under NATO umbrella, became an important actor triggering difficulties for Turkey in solving the problems with Greece especially in Cyprus and Aegean Sea issues because Greece started to play its EU membership against Turkey. At this point, Turkey lost one of its most important trump-card against Greece when Turkish military government and Kenan Evren did not veto re-accession of Greece to NATO due to US General Rogers’ “soldier word⁴⁵⁵” for assuring Evren that Greece will not pose any problem for Turkey in its EU membership.

Such a great deal of changes occurring in Turkey's neighbours and in its near geography undoubtedly constituted both opportunities and obstacles for leadership that Demirel was trying to create with a new discourse and understanding, and institutions’ relations with this political decision maker showed differences in parallel with the mentioned regional developments compared to the Cold War period.

6.1.4. Domestic Developments of the Period

The belief that Demirel was an old-style politician who would have difficulty in reading the new developments and the new state of the international system since he had been abandoned from politics for about seven years⁴⁵⁶ does not actually coincide with the vision he stated in that period. As a matter of fact, probably because he read well the internal and external developments of the period when he was not in power and politics, he undermined Turgut Özal's party in the first elections and

⁴⁵⁴ Russian Federation has given special attention to old soviet states surrounding it after the end of Cold War due to their geographical and geopolitical importance in Russian foreign policy which was associated with a doctrine called Kozyrev Doctrine or Near Abroad Doctrine. For a further discussion on this doctrine, See Bohuslav Litera, “The Kozyrev Doctrine-A Russian Variation on the Monroe Doctrine”, *Perspectives-Institute of International Relations*, No:4, (Winter 94/95), 45-52.

⁴⁵⁵ Öymen, *Zor Rota, Gençlik ve Diplomasi Anıları*, 474.

⁴⁵⁶ Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War*, 59.

overthrew his party from the government as being the first party in the second election.

By reading the spirit of the time and demonstrating a good analysis of the requirements of the age and the expectation of the citizens who voted, Demirel analysed what the military regime brought and took away. After a period of intense arrestment and executions of both members of the leftist and nationalist right-masses, which made citizens being politically passive, dynamics of domestic politics fostered the identity of political religious conservatism in a new conceptualization of national identity, namely the Turk-Islam Synthesis, against rising Kurdish separatist movements which grew with the prison conditions of the military coup. When the sudden liberalization of capital movements for rapid integration rather instead of planned actions were also added to these movements, newly emerged political and economic problems brought about the rise of changing domestic identities, especially political Islamic identity in this period⁴⁵⁷.

Here it is important to note the impact of 24 January 1980's economic decisions and export led growth policy on foreign policy understanding of Turkey. Turan, rightly points out that export led growth policy brought a necessity in diversification of trade channels and partners other than the Western countries and brought a necessity to develop a trade oriented foreign policy towards Middle Eastern neighbours in this period⁴⁵⁸. Likewise, Yalvaç notes that this foreign trade orientation towards Middle East was a result of looking for a regional leadership in Muslim Middle East after disappointment of Turkey's membership refusal by the EU; and this new role was supported by the US in its new approach towards the Middle East⁴⁵⁹.

⁴⁵⁷ It would be argued that consequences of the fight between nationalist and communist ideologies for the last decade pushed the military regime to foster Islamism as a unifying cement in order to overcome ideological tensions in the new period.

⁴⁵⁸ İlder Turan, "Türk Dış Politikasında Gerçekçilik, Öngörü, Liderlik" in Ümit Özdağ and Yelda Demirağ (ed.), *Stratejik Derinlikte Savrulan Türk Dış Politikası*, (Ankara: Kripto Yayınları, 2016), p 20 [Here, Koçer mentions Huntington's argument that Turkish foreign policy in this period took an Islamic appearance in the neighbourhood. Gökhan Koçer, *Türk Dış Politikasında İslam: Arafta Olmak Ya Da Bir Pragmatizm Örneği*, (Ankara: Öğreti & Pegem Yayınları, 2003), 10]

⁴⁵⁹ Yalvaç, "A Historical Materialist Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy: Class, State, and Hegemony", 13. [It is noteworthy to mention that conservative tradesmen, later known as Anatolian Tigers, found it easier to enter into Middle Eastern markets.]

While the EU and its reforms were favoured in a smooth atmosphere in domestic dynamics thanks to Turkey's application for the purpose of full EU membership by considering Helsinki Final Act in 1987, this application was rejected in a way in 1989 and Turkey's accelerated effort for being a member of Europe was regressed for this certain period where there was also a serious resistance because of the belief that Europe interfered in Turkey's domestic affairs under human rights violation claims. In such a period of dilemma, the sensitivity of the effects of domestic dynamics on foreign policy increased and it would not be wrong to say that alliance with the West was no longer an obligation in a situation where there was no threat of Soviet expansionism. As a matter of fact, having criticized Özal for his definition of "Strategic Cooperation" for the relations with the US, a discourse of "Improved Partnership"⁴⁶⁰ regarding the relations with the US was developed by Demirel where expressing the discourse of "*Turkish World from Adriatic to the Great Wall of China*" also came into prominence as examples of his changing attitude in this sense.

Looking from domestic perspective, Turkey had to cope with serious security issues threatening it domestically which also had a foreign policy aspect due to neighbouring countries' support for this security threat. The infamous practices of 1980 coup which were not a big problem for the USA but voiced frequently by the EU⁴⁶¹, not only put Turkey into trouble but also led to rise of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a terrorist organization⁴⁶², which made its first attack on Eruh Raid in 1984. This organization posed a serious security threat with its violent attacks to

⁴⁶⁰ Tuncer, "Süleyman Demirel", 175.

⁴⁶¹ Çağrı Erhan and Tuğrul Arat, "Avrupa Topluluklarıyla İlişkiler" in Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar-Cilt 2*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010), 88.

⁴⁶² The discussion about being terrorist, militant, guerilla or freedom fighter is beyond the focus of this thesis however it is important to note that PKK has been recognized as a terrorist organization by Turkey, NATO, EU and several other world actors. For those decisions of recognition PKK as terrorist organization, see official journal of European Union dated 31/05/2006 on <http://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/docs/EUterrorlist-May-06.pdf>; official declaration of Counter Terrorism Unit of the United States on <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>; Declaration of NATO on http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200512/20/eng20051220_229424.html

civilians and state officers with its separatist claims even though it was initially underestimated and neglected by Özal who labelled them as “three to five looters”⁴⁶³.

In summary, in this period, in which the global economic, political and social developments created new parameters in affecting Turkey’s own domestic dynamics, Demirel also took a different approach regarding his leadership in foreign policy compared to Cold War years.

6.1.5. Organizational Developments of the Period

Robins calls the period from 1991 to 1994 as academic and bureaucratic approach of Turkish foreign policy where the dominant personal approach of Özal ended in 1991⁴⁶⁴. According to him, this period of foreign policy in terms of organizational developments could be summarized as repairment of Özal’s personal approaches’ consequences and as a period where well-functioning of state institutions had been restored by Demirel who was believed to respect to institutional hierarchy. Uzgel, on the other hand, defines this period, starting from 1991 to 2002, with the dominance of military and its “golden age” in foreign policy issues due to security concerns of the state⁴⁶⁵.

6.1.5.1. Military and National Security Council

Which parameters could be used to measure the increasing role of military in foreign policy making? Koçer, here, mentions the evident increase in military spending, increased involvement of the military in multinational and regional organizations such as NATO and its peacekeeping operations, successful results gained from coercive diplomacy with the power of army, and public diplomacy operated by military in shaping public opinion, as the evidential data for the rise of

⁴⁶³ Hasan Pulur’s article available on <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/yazarlar/hasan-pulur/ozal-26-yil-once-uc-bes-capulcu-demisti-1272484> Last Accessed on 18/09/2019.

⁴⁶⁴ Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War*, 59.

⁴⁶⁵ Uzgel, “Türk Dış Politikasının Oluşturulması”, 84.

the military in foreign policy making in Turkey after the end of Cold War⁴⁶⁶. Then, why and how the military increased its impact on policy making? Uzgel here notes that the fight with separatist activities of PKK, rise of political Islam that challenged the regime of the Republic, and ineffectiveness of politicians in coping with economic troubles could be regarded as the motivations behind increasing role of military which he labels the golden age of military's role in policy making even though it lost its prominence in its role of modernizing the country⁴⁶⁷.

Military, as mentioned in the previous chapters, utilizes NSC and other institutions in order to increase its active position in foreign policy by securitization of domestic policy issues. In this respect, it is important to ask what kind of changes were brought about by developments in domestic politics for state institutions after the end of Cold War or the last government of Demirel? The answer to this question is undoubtedly hidden within the changes in the priorities of the institutions as a result of new international system and regional developments and the changes in the powers and structure of those institutions after 1982 Constitution.

First of all, parallel to the broadness of the concept of security of the new order, the Constitution of 1982 also expanded the scope of NSC by enlarging the idea of the security concept. The issue of providing recommendations in the previous periods was reinforced by legal arrangements providing that NSC would forward the measures it deemed necessary to the Council of Ministers and that these measures would be the priority of the Council of Ministers. Thus, together with the amendment that equalized civilian and military members of NSC by decreasing the number of civilian members, the capacity of the TAF for directing political decision makers in foreign policy through the NSC increased⁴⁶⁸. In fact, in his study, after examining the public releases published at the end of 79 NSC meetings between 1985-1991, Gürpınar explains how the military conveyed its institutional opinion on foreign

⁴⁶⁶ Gökhan Koçer, "1990'lı Yıllarda Askerî Yapı ve Türk Dış Politikası", *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi*, 29 (1-2), (2002), 123-158.

⁴⁶⁷ Uzgel, "Between Praetorianism and Democracy: The Role of the Military in Turkish Foreign Policy", 184.

⁴⁶⁸ Ünlü Bilgiç, "The Military and Europeanization Reforms in Turkey", 804. Also see Yıldız, "Ordunun Türk Dış Politikasındaki Rolü: Kurumsal Olmayan Mekanizmalar", 361.

policy issues which was considered to be important for military and those statements increased for the period between 1991-2000⁴⁶⁹. In the pertinent study, it is summarized that the soldiers determined what would be considered to be a security issue and the opinions of the military members were the last words to be heard after proposals of the President and the Prime Minister were raised, according to which Doğan Güreş, Chief of General Staff of Turkish Armed Forces, reported⁴⁷⁰. Besides, attention of NSC on foreign policy issues seemed to increase compared to previous periods where Gürpınar notes that in NSC meetings' public statements, foreign policy agenda consisted of 60% total agenda between 1991-2003 and this proportion was only 19 % for the meetings between 1985-1991⁴⁷¹. Here, considering that NSC Secretary General sets the policy agenda of those meetings in regard with his own understanding of national issues based on his institutional background, an argument about the rising portion of security oriented foreign policy agenda could be associated with NSC Secretary Generals with military background and their connection with TAF which brings up the dominance of military in agenda setting.

Additionally, different than previous periods, military also utilized the newly established civilian higher institutions such as Higher Education Council or Radio and Television Higher Council by appointing the retired military officers to their top administration after 1980 takeover so that it could impose a direct control on civilian bureaucracy⁴⁷².

As the last point about the change in foreign policy orientation of the military, it is important to mention Uzgel's argument that end of Cold War radically changed military's understanding from securing the country's regime against Soviet threat to securing the country from the close neighbours against their so called support to separatist and Islamist movements which were regarded to have a final target for

⁴⁶⁹ Gürpınar "Milli Güvenlik Kurulu ve Dış Politika", 73-104.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid., 82.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid., 97.

⁴⁷² Uzgel, "Between Praetorianism and Democracy: The Role of the Military in Turkish Foreign Policy", 182.

dividing Turkey⁴⁷³. Within this respect of protecting the country against separatist movements supported both by neighbours and Western powers, military's attitude towards diplomatic core of MFA and its policy orientation also experienced a change. Even though it was discussed in the previous chapters that military and MFA bureaucracy had a strong cooperation in foreign policy understanding in line with their Kemalist identity in Cold War period, Uzgel notes that military's attitude towards MFA bureaucracy changed in this period because military believed that diplomats softened their understanding in security concerns and preferred a "conciliatory stance"⁴⁷⁴.

6.1.5.2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Civilian Bureaucracy

From the perspective of the MFA, this period was regarded as the years that institutional priorities and institutional reflexes were exhibited almost at least. In this process where the ending signals of Cold War completely changed the status quo, MFA bureaucracy, which was accused of being passive by Özal, was kept away from many foreign policy issues and Özal weakened the institutional influence of the MFA by including the State Planning Organization and the Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade to foreign policy ground in his trade diplomacy. Moreover, it is argued that he ignored the institutional traditions and opted to move out of hierarchical discipline of MFA bureaucracy with back-door channels by using diplomats which were in similar understanding with him⁴⁷⁵. When Demirel took office, the ability of MFA bureaucracy to reflect its own reflexes to the political decision-makers was inevitably affected seriously.

After the end of Cold War, politicians believed that MFA bureaucracy was passive and unable to read the new developments of the new system⁴⁷⁶ however it could be regarded as cautious approach of the MFA rather than passivism due to its

⁴⁷³ Ibid., 189.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid., 190.

⁴⁷⁵ Interview with Bayar.

⁴⁷⁶ Interview with Zeybek.

accumulated experience and as prudence to see what other states would do in order not to make a fatal mistake in newly developing world system. Looking from the perspective that MFA diplomats frequently making discussions and brain storm meetings inside the ministry about the future of international relations and possible policy alternatives of Turkey which is a duty ascribed to Directorate General for Policy Planning, it would be inaccurate to believe that MFA was unable to read the new developments where its bureaucrats served as ambassadors in many different countries and were more open to new information about developments all over the world⁴⁷⁷.

In addition to the traditional institutions, it is necessary to mention certain issues regarding two institutions in Özal period. First one is the National Intelligence Organization, the civil institution of the security bureaucracy, who strengthened its role in foreign policy within the framework of new defence and security concepts. Appointment of a civilian leader to the top office of intelligence bureaucracy by Özal was seen as a good opportunity for Demirel because his aim was also to civilize the military structure of intelligence bureaucracy which did not share any crucial information with Demirel before the 1980 coup⁴⁷⁸. The other one is Özal's active use of boutique and dynamic institutions such as the Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade in many foreign policy issues in order to improve export-oriented growth and restore a new foreign policy approach towards neighbouring countries by moving them to commercial platform. The MFA, being left out by the prime ministry in Özal's time regarding the trade oriented foreign policy understanding, got in difficulty to adopt its institutional priorities to political decision-makers on foreign policy issues. Hence, when Demirel took office, organizational developments at the

⁴⁷⁷ Interview with Karayağın.

⁴⁷⁸ Here, Demirel complains about not being informed by National Intelligence Organization about the forthcoming military coup. However, Eralp notes in his memoirs that Coşkun Kırcı, Permanent Representative of Turkey at UN in that time, was entrusted by military to inform Demirel about the coup a day before it was carried out. Demirel's complain mentioned in his interview with Murat Yetkin is available on Murat Yetkin, "12 Eylül'ü Demirel Anlatıyor", available on <http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/12-eylulu-demirel-anlatiyor1-757070/>. For Eralp's argument, See Eralp, *Perdeyi Aralarken: Bir 'monşer'in Hatıratı*, 57.

institutions took place in that way and the influence areas of the institutions that would affect Demirel's leadership in foreign policy were reshaped to this extent.

When it finally comes to institutional developments of MFA in terms of its organizational structure, Özcoşkun first mentions the organizational changes in 1981 where desk system based on countries was brought in instead of dealing with cultural, economic and political issues of countries separately, which however was given up with the 1982 change and turned back to old system⁴⁷⁹. Beside this reorientation, changing the title of “Secretary General” to “Undersecretary”, opening a representative office to Istanbul due to increasing work load in that city, decreasing the number of Directorate Generals from 16 to 7 by merging some of them, which also increased again to 15 after institutional change of 1991, and finally newly established divisions for Central Asian Turkic States and newly independent ex-Soviet States could be regarded as new developments in MFA’s institutional structure⁴⁸⁰.

6.1.5.3. Political Decision Maker(s)

After a long term of political ban in Turkish political life, Demirel ranked the first in his second election in 1991 and, between 20 November 1991 and 16 May 1993, formed a coalition government with SDPP of Erdal İnönü, the son of İsmet İnönü who was an earlier rival of Demirel in Cold War time. As discussed in chapter three, Demirel seemed more cooperative with leftist ideology in this period after his experience of the second military intervention to his governments where he was blamed by the military regime for not cooperating with Ecevit in Cold War years. Unlike his previous coalitions of Cold War with Erbakan where Erbakan challenged the foreign policy understanding of Demirel and Çağlayangil, it is argued that minister of MFA in this new coalition government got on well with Demirel in a harmonious working atmosphere⁴⁸¹ even though Minister of Foreign Affairs was

⁴⁷⁹ Özcoşkun, *Cumhuriyetin Kuruluşundan Bugüne Dışişleri Bakanlığı Teşkilat Yapısı (1920-2018)*, 68-104.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid., 68-104.

⁴⁸¹ Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War*, 60.

appointed from SDPP⁴⁸², not from Demirel's party. Çetin, MFA Minister of that period, clearly mentions that he found a very cooperative environment with Demirel in conducting foreign policy where Demirel even assigned him to make presentations about foreign policy issues to party group of True Path Party when there had been concerns or criticisms about important foreign policy issues⁴⁸³.

Looking at the foreign policy part of the government programme, new developments in the world system through democratization and peaceful cooperation and appearing risks of new challenges due to ethnic, religious and racist separatism is mentioned in the first place and Turkey's need for a consistent dynamic foreign policy without personal or adventurous passion. Moreover, accelerating the continuous relations with Europe, NATO and the West together with developing the political, economic and cultural relations with new neighbourhood and East Asia are emphasized as new priorities for foreign policy goals of the government. Finally, a modern approach of holistic understanding to security issues in foreign policy is mentioned without giving concessions on national cases like Cyprus issue⁴⁸⁴.

6.2. Crisis and Crisis Management

6.2.1. Nakhichevan Crisis

Different than the previous chapters which deal with the crisis occurred in Cold War time, this chapter focuses on a Post-Cold War crisis named Nakhichevan Crisis, which has a differing characteristic by its nature because Turkey indirectly stepped into this crisis due to border security concerns. After the end of Cold War, on 3 May 1992, this crisis broke out when newly independent Armenia attacked on Sederek district of Nakhichevan which located very close to Turkish border and the crisis escalated following the second attack on the same place through Armenian invasion. Turkey, by reminding of its guarantee right for securing the state of affairs

⁴⁸² Minister of Foreign Affairs in this period was Hikmet Çetin who later became the leader of Republican People's Party

⁴⁸³ Interview with Çetin.

⁴⁸⁴ For the seventh Demirel government programme of the coalition government, See Neziroğlu and Yılmaz (eds.), *Başbakanlarımız ve Genel Kurul Konuşmaları-Cilt 6*, 621-651.

in Nakhichevan arising from 1920 Gümri (Alexandropol-Guimri) Agreement, 1921 Kars Agreement and 1921 Moscow Agreement, announced Armenia to withdraw its army from Nakhichevan⁴⁸⁵. Although the imminent crisis broke out with Armenian invasion on Sederek, escalation of tensions in the region had already started in 1989 when the military confrontations between Azerbaijan and Armenia started over Nagorno Karabagh territories which eventually widened to Nakhichevan in 1991 after Armenian attack to this territory and Turkey became a part of the crisis due to border problems.

This Armenian invasion was quite important and posed a serious threat for Turkey due to two main reasons. Firstly, without doubt, military activities of Armenia next to Turkish border were threatening for the Turkish provinces near around due to unexpected artillery fire hitting there. Secondly, hostility coming from Armenia was posing a serious threat to territorial integrity of Turkey because Armenian Independence declaration includes the term “Western Armenia” for mentioning the eastern Turkish territories and even the Constitution of Armenia denied the borders settled in Kars and Moscow Agreements and implicitly declared that the eastern part of Turkey was Armenian land invaded by Turkey which should be taken back⁴⁸⁶.

Under these circumstances, Turkey became a part of the crisis however a confrontation with Armenia was also a potential trigger for Russia to be a part of the crisis being on the side of Armenia due to historical, strategical and religious concerns. The United States’ increasing involvement in Caucasus Region after the Gulf War due to region’s closeness to energy resources would alert Russian Federation which aimed to restore its influence over the region as it was in Cold War. This, combined with religious affinity and previous ideological intimacy with Armenia, led Russia support Armenia with military equipment where they also signed

⁴⁸⁵ Laçın İdil Öztüğ, “Border Security in Turkish Foreign Policy Crises” in Fuat Aksu and Helin S. Ertem (eds.), *Analysing Foreign Policy Crises in Turkey: Conceptual, Theoretical and Practical Questions*, (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017), 169.

⁴⁸⁶ For Article 11 of Armenian Independence Declaration of 1990, See <https://www.gov.am/en/independence/>. For Article 13 of the Constitution of Armenia which was enacted in 1995 and included Ağrı Mount in its coat of arms, See the non-official translation available on <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/travail/docs/960/Constitution%20of%20the%20Republic%20of%20Armenia.pdf>

1921 Cooperation Agreement on security issues. Besides, the fear of triggering a Muslim-Christian conflict in Post-Cold War's new dynamics which was almost experienced in 1990 when Soviet Russia invaded Azerbaijan lands, also put Turkey in a concerned situation⁴⁸⁷.

On the other side of the medal, as another power of the region, Iran also sided with Armenia because sectarian problems created border problems with Azerbaijan together with the conflicts on sharing Caspian Basin and energy resources. Moreover, a possible confrontation of Turkey and Russia would not welcome NATO members where NATO's new situation was under question.

On such an occasion, Turkey focused on solving the border problems with Armenia by mentioning its guarantee right on Nakhichevan as it did in Cyprus case even though Turkish guarantee right in Nakhichevan was not as direct and clear as in Cyprus⁴⁸⁸. Looking back to the Nakhichevan case historically, Turkish side and Armenian side signed the Gümrü (Alexandropol-Guimri) Agreement on 3 December 1920 and settled the eastern borders of Turkey however Soviet Union did not recognize this agreement⁴⁸⁹. Later on, Turkey and Soviet Union signed another agreement on Moscow⁴⁹⁰ on 16 March 1921 which reassured the eastern borders of Turkey and determined Nakhichevan's status as an autonomous state under safekeeping of Azerbaijan with the condition to leave its patronage to no other state by saying in the third article that "*Contracting sides agreed on an autonomous region*

⁴⁸⁷ Interviews with Bayar and Zeybek.

⁴⁸⁸ Fuat Aksu and Yunus Çolak "Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Krizlerinde Ahdi Hukuk: Kıbrıs ve Nahçıvan Krizleri", *Bilig*, Sayı 88, (Kış, 2019), 19-54, 46. [For a comprehensive understanding about the discussion on Turkey's guarantee right and autonomous status of Nakhichevan, See Bahadır Bumin Özarlan, "Bir Özerk Cumhuriyet Örneği Olarak Nahçıvan Özerk Cumhuriyeti", *1st International Symposium on Turkish and Azerbaijani Relations*, Kastamonu, (12 – 14 May 2016), 578-590.]

⁴⁸⁹ French version of the original text for Gümrü Agreement (Alexandropol-Guimri) is available on http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/Kutuphane/Kurucu_Anasmalar/gumru-anlasmasi-fransizca.pdf. For English translation, See <http://www.deutscharmenischegesellschaft.de/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Vertrag-von-Alexandropol-2.-Dezember-1920.pdf>

⁴⁹⁰ The original name of the agreement is "Friendship and Brotherhood Agreement Between Turkey and USSR". French version of the original text is available on http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/Kutuphane/Kurucu_Anasmalar/1921-moskova-anlasmasi-fransizca.pdf. For translation to English, See <https://www.deutscharmenischegesellschaft.de/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Vertrag-von-Moskau-16.-M%C3%A4rz-1921.pdf>

within the borders of Nakhichevan under safekeeping of Azerbaijan". Kars Agreement signed in 13 October 1921 between Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia also re-approved Nakhichevan's status however Armenia, after its independence in 1990, rejected to accept the borders settled with Kars Agreement that is why tension was escalated⁴⁹¹.

When the Nakhichevan crisis broke out in 1992 May as a result of ongoing tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan since 1989, Turkey referred to the third article of Moscow Agreement and reminded its right to intervene unless Armenian soldiers' withdrawal. At this stage of the crisis, Heydar Aliyev, leader of autonomous Nakhichevan district, asked for help in terms of a Turkish military intervention⁴⁹² to the invaded land on 18 May 1992 during second Armenian attack to Sederek, and this resulted in accelerated military heap (by locating a mechanized division) inside Turkish territory located near Armenian soldiers just after an Armenian artillery accidentally hit Şaror district governorship. Even though the initial response of the Prime Minister Demirel was conducting negotiations with Bush administration and mentioning the Turkish guaranteeing role for Nakhichevan, indeed, official declaration of MFA of Turkey was more threatening and even the President Özal mentioned the necessity to imminent military intervention⁴⁹³.

Here, it is important to mention some milestones that changed the course of actions during crisis. Even though Aliyev initially asked for Turkish military support in terms of an intervention, this attitude changed to keeping Turkey out of any intervention on 23 May 1992 because Petrosian, President of Armenia, accepted the withdrawal under a precondition of keeping Turkey out of the issue⁴⁹⁴. At this point

⁴⁹¹ French version of the original text for Kars Agreement is available on http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/Kutuphane/Kurucu_Anlasmalar/1921-kars-anlasmasi.pdf. For English translation, See <https://www.deutscharmenischegesellschaft.de/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Vertrag-von-Kars-23.-Oktober-1921.pdf>

⁴⁹² Fuat Aksu "Türk Dış Politikası Krizlerinde Karar Alma Süreçleri: 1992-1993 Nahçıvan Krizi", Available on <http://tdpkrizleri.org/index.php/1991-nahcivan-krizi>

⁴⁹³ Laçın İdil Öztığ "Türkiye ve Ermenistan İlişkilerinde Nahçıvan Sorunu", *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Xviii/36, (2018-Bahar/Spring), 413-430, 418 and 422.

⁴⁹⁴ Aksu and Çolak "Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Krizlerinde Ahdi Hukuk: Kıbrıs ve Nahçıvan Krizleri", 9-54.

Demirel conducted a high-level diplomacy with Boris Yeltsin, Head of Russian Federation, and a joint declaration was announced for ending the conflict in Nakhichevan⁴⁹⁵ however this did not change the situation that Armenia continued its military attacks. While Demirel was toning up his warning at the opening of “Hasret Bridge” in Nakhichevan by saying that “*Whoever follows a path to gain land by use of force should know that there would be a bigger power that can use force*”⁴⁹⁶ and President Özal even mentioning the possibility of military intervention, Turkey was increasing its military existence within the borders and taking fighter jets aloft for exploration mission in order to show how determined it was. Those attempts did not stop Armenian army and Petrosian accused Turkey of triggering the military conflict. Even though tension in the crisis was eased for a couple of months, in 6 April 1993, it was escalated for the second time when both sides increased their military heap on both sides of the border⁴⁹⁷. Then, in mid-September 1993, the crisis again turned to a lower level of conflict. At the end of the day, military clashes slowed down in the region for a while and Turkey turned its face to diplomatic demarche. Then after, this foreign policy crisis was no longer a primary issue for Turkish politics even though a low level of escalated tensions were observed up until 1996.

Looking at Nakhichevan crisis, the possibility of a regional war, a high probability of a conflict between Muslim and Christian world in Post-Cold War atmosphere, possibility of NATO intervention due to a triggered tension between Turkey and Russia even though this possibility was seen as a very low chance by Wondra⁴⁹⁸, a potential confrontation between Russia and the US over Caucasus region might all be seen as limits that restricted Turkey to use the option for military intervention. In this respect, the next part of this chapter deals with decision-making process during the crisis and search for how institutions and Demirel interacted.

⁴⁹⁵ Tuncer, “Süleyman Demirel”, 227.

⁴⁹⁶ Öztığ “Türkiye ve Ermenistan İlişkilerinde Nahçıvan Sorunu”, 413-430.

⁴⁹⁷ Öztığ, “Border Security in Turkish Foreign Policy Crises”, 169.

⁴⁹⁸ Nic Wondra “Security and Escalation: An Argument for a Russian Security Role” in P. Terrence Hopmann and Dr. I. William Zartman (ed.) “Nagorno Karabakh: Understanding Conflict”, *Conflict Management Programme*, Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies, (2013), 155-171.

6.2.2. Crisis Management

Revisiting the timeline of the crisis period, it could be mentioned that hegemonic role of the US and relative autonomy of middle range countries in foreign policy in Post-Cold War period as the determinant for international structure, newly independent Armenia and its revisionist attempts together with a conflictual atmosphere in Caucasus as regional developments, new attempts for Turkish foreign policy formulation with too many unknown factors in the new world dynamics together with Demirel's coalition government with a left-wing party for the first time in his political career as domestic determinants, presented the variables for opportunities and limitations for foreign policy crisis management.

As the first note, it is important to mention the official position for Turkey and Armenia. Turkey clearly mentioned its guarantee right to prevent any attempt for unlinking Nakhichevan from Azerbaijan which was originated from early agreements signed by both Turkey and Armenia. Within this point of view, even though Turkey recognized independence of Armenia as one of the first countries on 16 December 1991 and started humanitarian aids at the beginning⁴⁹⁹, Armenian attacks to Nakhichevan were seen as threat for both Turkey's border security and its right of guarantee. Armenia, on the other side, based on its independence declaration of independence from Soviet Union, followed a revisionist policy and refrained from accepting its rights and obligations arising from Kars Agreement in order not to recognize Nakhichevan as a territorial part of Azerbaijan⁵⁰⁰. Here, Aydın argues that Armenian President Petrosian was in favour of developing good relations with Turkey in case of a Russian irredentism after Soviet dissolution however hawkish Armenian politicians forced him to stand inside the traditional Armenian nationalism against Turkey that is why Armenian Parliament declared in February 1991 that Armenia would no longer recognize the Turkish-Armenian border settled by Kars Agreement⁵⁰¹.

⁴⁹⁹ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/reasons-between-turkey-and-armenia%20.en.mfa>

⁵⁰⁰ Bölükbaşı, *Dışişleri İskelesi: Dışişleri'nde 34 Yıl*, 297.

⁵⁰¹ Aydın, "Kafkasya ve Orta Asya ile İlişkiler", 407.

Here, this foreign policy crisis between Turkey and Armenia could be divided into three phases where pre-crisis period starts with independence of Armenia and its attempts for revisionist territorial changes. In this pre-crisis phase, military confrontation between Azerbaijan and Armenia starting from 1988 on Nagorno Karabagh was followed carefully by Turkish MFA but not regarded as a serious threat for Turkey's sovereignty up until the time Armenia attacked on and invaded Sederek village of Nakhichevan, which was the main and only territorial link between Turkey and Nakhichevan⁵⁰². For this period, looking at the US State Department's declassified and released confidential documents, it could be argued that Turkey and Armenia were seeking a common ground for starting diplomatic relations with the help of US mediation for a peaceful regional order in South Caucasia, where the US sent clear messages to Armenia through a strong diplomatic demarche to renounce its territorial claims on Turkish border as Turkey's prerequisite on the one hand, and also to Turkey not to engage in any forceful military measure in Nagorno Karabagh despite the domestic political pressure on the other hand⁵⁰³. At this phase, therefore, Turkish diplomatic efforts were merely on bringing a peaceful solution for Nagorno Karabagh conflict through Turkish mediation on Minsk Group formed by Turkey, Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia⁵⁰⁴. Turkish-Armenian relations were more at diplomatic level where Armenian attacks on the region were seriously followed by the MFA with a cautious stance after recognition of Armenia even though no diplomatic connection was observed other than initial humanitarian aid. Besides, it is noteworthy that political pressure of opposition parties in the government and the President Özal together with public opinion after Armenian assaults on Khodzhalı

⁵⁰² Aksu and Çolak "Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Krizlerinde Ahdi Hukuk: Kıbrıs ve Nahçıvan Krizleri", 42.

⁵⁰³ UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2009-03553 Doc No. C17604506 Date: 07/22/2016. Full transcripts for unclassified documents released under "Freedom of Information Act" are available on <https://foia.state.gov/Search/Search.aspx>. (Please search the unclassified documents with case and document number mentioned)

⁵⁰⁴ UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2009-03553 Doc No. C17604194 Date: 07/22/2016.

was in favour of a military response to Armenia even though Demirel government preferred a more imperturbable attitude⁵⁰⁵.

The second phase, regarded as the imminent crisis, starting from invasion of Sederek in 3rd May by Armenia and ending at the end of 1993 when the military conflicts toned down in Nakhichevan after Armenian forces halted their attacks for a while. It could be argued for this phase that tensions were escalated twice where the first one referred to the May-June period of 1992 and the second one in April 1993. This second phase is labelled as an indirect territorial border crisis by Aksu because initial focus of Armenia was attacking to Azerbaijan's sovereignty rather than creating a border problem with Turkey; and the crisis was solved thanks to the coercive diplomacy of Turkey supported with threat of using forceful military measures against Armenia's limited reversible probe strategy⁵⁰⁶. When the first part of this second phase is evaluated, it could be argued that Prime Minister Demirel presented a cautious approach to crisis where his initial speech after 3rd May attack to Sederek was "*There is no abnormal situation and anything to be alert for. There is only a breach of border issue. I will talk to President Bush.*"⁵⁰⁷ Following the attack on Gunnuk and Shusha in 7th May, Demirel toned up by reminding Turkey's guarantee right in Nakhichevan to US President Bush that Turkey would no longer tolerate the Armenian attacks unless they ended. Unlike Demirel, both Minister and Undersecretary of MFA were stating strict declarations about Turkey's probable forceful activities against Armenian assaults⁵⁰⁸. The President Özal was presenting even more rigid approach to Armenia where he was repeatedly mentioning a warn signal of military attack to Armenia⁵⁰⁹.

⁵⁰⁵ Aydın, "Kafkasya ve Orta Asyayla İlişkiler", 402.

⁵⁰⁶ Aksu, *Türk Dış Politikasında Karar Alma ve Kriz Yönetim Süreçleri*, derived from the tables in the pages 72, 77, 93, 102 and 111.

⁵⁰⁷ "Anormal Bir Durum Yok", *Milliyet*, 5 May 1992, p.17 in Öztığ, "Türkiye ve Ermenistan İlişkilerinde Nahçıvan Sorunu", 418.

⁵⁰⁸ Öztığ "Türkiye ve Ermenistan İlişkilerinde Nahçıvan Sorunu", 419-420.

⁵⁰⁹ Tuncer, "Süleyman Demirel", 227.

Here, two turning points for the course of the crisis could be mentioned where the first would be attack on Sederek in 18th May and the second would be Demirel's visit to Russian Federation in 25th May. After Aliyev's request for Turkish support in military intervention following the 18th May attack when an Armenian artillery hit Şaror district, which was 20 km away from Turkish border, a ministerial cabinet declaration announcing Turkey's probable change in its peaceful policy was followed by deployment of Turkish military forces on the border in 21st May. This was regarded as a possible break in Minsk Group by the US administration and a probable hardening in Russian position that could be resulted in involvement of the EC, CSCE and the UN to the issue⁵¹⁰. At this stage, after Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hikmet Çetin talked to the US Secretary of State James Baker regarding Turkish concerns about "worsening the situation", on 22 May 1992, Baker sent a letter to Armenian Foreign Affairs Minister Rafael Hovannisian and also oral summary of the letter to Turkish MFA where that letter was saying that;

As we discussed on May 9, I am deeply concerned by the escalation of fighting in both Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan. (...) We understand Armenian fears about the possibility of Turkish intervention in the area and will continue to advise the Turkish government that we consider any such moves unacceptable. But that means Armenia must avoid actions that make such moves by Turkey more likely. (...) We will not recognize any unilateral change in Nagorno-Karabakh's status made on the basis of military force or violence in the enclave. The US government will hold responsible those forces who undermine mediation. (...)⁵¹¹

Turkey had to tone down after this message together with Aliyev's declaration mentioning that no Turkish help was needed at that stage when after Armenia stipulated a precondition of Turkey's withdrawal from the crisis in order to end military conflict⁵¹². Besides, Armenia also halted its military actions for a while even

⁵¹⁰ UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2013-01627 Doc No. C05436105 Date: 06/05/2014.

⁵¹¹ UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2009-03553 Doc No. C17604488 Date: 07/22/2016.

⁵¹² Öztüğ "Türkiye ve Ermenistan İlişkilerinde Nahçıvan Sorunu", 421.

though it re-started again from 31st May till the end of Rome Conferences in June 1992. Here, even though it was initially noted by US Ambassador in Ankara that “*It bears the entire responsibility for stalemating the efforts for a peaceful resolution*”⁵¹³ in his letter to State Department in DC in 9th June, the US continued its role of mediation for diplomatic demarche because it is understood from US documents that good relations between Turkey and Armenia could only be achieved under peaceful and moderate policy understanding of Petrosian which otherwise would push him towards a different approach due to domestic pressure of Armenian politics⁵¹⁴. This document also notes that any apathy of the US in Nagorno Karabakh conflict would have a negative effect in Turkey’s eagerness for its participation to joint forces operating in Iraq and Bosnia.

Having considered the US impact on Demirel’s attitude in this crisis, as the second turning point, Demirel’s visit to Moscow on 25 May 1992 clearly shows the difference in Demirel’s tone where his initial statement of “*Are we the only state to make war? Are we the only state that has an army? I say that, whoever asks for why we are not fighting is free to go and fight.*”⁵¹⁵ in 23rd May changed to “*Whoever follows a path to gain land by use of force should know that there would be a bigger power that can use force.*” in opening of “Hasret Bridge” in 28th May. Here, an argument could be held for Demirel’s decision making. As he mentioned in his interviews, which was noted in previous chapters, about the necessity for cooperating with Russia in the region in Post-Cold War where the regional states saw Russia as a “preying bird”, it could be understood that Demirel reached an agreement for cooperation with Russia in ending Armenian aggression over the region in order to eliminate US concerns on possible hardening in Russian position, that is why Demirel hardened his speech tone after having agreement with Russia about solving the

⁵¹³ UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2013-01627 Doc No. C05436117 Date: 06/05/2014.

⁵¹⁴ UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2009-03553 Doc No. C17604463 Date: 07/22/2016.

⁵¹⁵ Fikret Bila, “İstiyorlarsa Gidip Savaşınlar”, Milliyet, 20/05/1992. Available on http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/9uHYxVh0COX149v3lRoCfw_x3D_x3D_Last Accessed on 28/09/2019.

conflict⁵¹⁶. Besides, Çetin argues that Armenian aggression was supported by Russia in back channels that is why it was important to hold an agreement with Russia before any serious move towards Armenia⁵¹⁷. Moreover, he adds that it was his recommendation to Demirel to visit Moscow and find a common ground against Armenia in its aggression⁵¹⁸.

After Turkey found a legitimate ground for its prospective actions towards use of forceful means unless Armenia halted its attacks, there had been a loose cease fire with some random Armenian attacks until 6 April 1993 when Armenia attacked Nagorno Karabakh again; and thus, resulted in military deployment of Turkey over the border⁵¹⁹. Here, the second crisis of the second phase has some important aspects for a critical evaluation of policy changes in both sides. Looking at the Armenian side, it could be argued that Petrosian swayed to a less moderate policy where he increased the volume of accusing Turkey for the being the source of conflict. Moreover, this time, Armenia declared that it would require military assistance from Russia in case Turkish military deployment would turn to an attack on Armenian territories⁵²⁰. Considering this Armenian attitude together with early signals of transformation in Russian foreign policy from Kozyrev's more cooperative policy to security oriented Russian dominance of Near Abroad Doctrine in 1993, it would be understood as a challenging development for Turkey⁵²¹. On Turkish side, in contrast to its initial efforts for moderate relations with Armenia such as inviting Armenia to be a member of Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) on 25 June

⁵¹⁶ After this meeting with Yeltsin in Moscow, Demirel told Hikmet Çetin that "*I got what I needed*". In Şihmantepe, *Türk Dış Politikasında Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel & Dış Politika Kriz Davranışları Üzerine Bir Araştırma*, 142. [This conversation is also approved by Çetin. Interview with Çetin.]

⁵¹⁷ Interview with Çetin.

⁵¹⁸ Interview with Çetin.

⁵¹⁹ Aksu and Çolak "Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Krizlerinde Ahdi Hukuk: Kıbrıs ve Nahçıvan Krizleri", 43.

⁵²⁰ Öztüğ "Türkiye ve Ermenistan İlişkilerinde Nahçıvan Sorunu", 422.

⁵²¹ Here, Tuygan comments on Russia's position in favour of continued escalation in accordance with its interest of territorial influence. He also notes that Armenian lobby was quite strong in France and the US, as two leading countries of Minsk Group. In Tuygan, *Gönüllü Diplomat, Dışişlerinde Kırk Yıl*, 220.

1992 and inviting Petrosian to Anıtkabir memorial and opening of Ataturk Dam, diplomatic initiatives for good relations halted by closing the main roads and railways for blocking any aid to Armenia in addition to increasing military deployment on the border where there was a high tension and pressure of domestic politics⁵²².

Regarding those developments in that specific circumstances, even though the domestic pressure from public and opposition parties in the parliament was at its highest level, Demirel had not changed his position for non-military solutions through international support despite the domestic popularity of President Özal's military oriented declarations such as his 7th April speech in his visit to Kyrgyzstan saying that;

[...W]hat if Turkey would turn on a serious military dime on the border and three cannon balls would fall on the Armenian side? That is to say, if you go further, I am here. This should be done in action, not only with words.⁵²³

It is here noteworthy that the Minister Çetin left the President Özal's meeting in Turkish Embassy in Bishkek and this was regarded as a protest to Özal's statement by newspapers⁵²⁴. Interestingly, Özal's strong announcement suddenly shifted to a closer position to Demirel's stance after Özal's visit to Azerbaijan on 14 April 1993 where he stated that Azerbaijan should provide its own defence and handle the problems by its own where Turkey could only provide with moral support⁵²⁵. At this point, it could be argued that Azerbaijan was also influenced by Russia's new role in the crisis that is why Aliyev also did not want any Turkish intervention into the crisis in order not to worsen the situation for Azerbaijan, which brought Özal to his new position⁵²⁶.

⁵²² Bölükbaşı, *Dışişleri İskelesi: Dışişleri'nde 34 Yıl*, 301.

⁵²³ Askeri Önlemler Şart", *Milliyet*, 8 April 1993 as cited in Öztüğ "Türkiye ve Ermenistan İlişkilerinde Nahçıvan Sorunu", 422.

⁵²⁴ "Büyük Skandal", *Milliyet*, 8 April 1993. [Both Çetin and Bayar strongly reject validity of this newspaper argument which will be discussed in the following part.]

⁵²⁵ Bilal Şimşir's note as cited in Öztüğ "Türkiye ve Ermenistan İlişkilerinde Nahçıvan Sorunu", 422.

⁵²⁶ A Secret Memorandum for White House gives clue which supports that argument where it writes down that "(...) Clif met the President of Azerbaijan and the Armenian Foreign Minister and

After Özal's sudden death on 17 April 1993, initial clues of Demirel's prospective presidency was observed and he became the President on 16 May 1993⁵²⁷. Even though Özal switched his policy closer to Demirel's arguments, domestic pressure in the parliament was still high against Demirel's government. At that time, especially on 27 April 1993, there was a harsh discussion in the parliament where Demirel was criticized for his cautious policy and opposition was holding an argument for showing real muscles to Armenia with military responses. Kayseri Deputy Abdullah Gül from the opposition blamed Demirel government for being responsible for Armenian attacks due to his "wrong foreign policy" in soothing the crisis and giving courage to Armenia and Gül even tabled a motion of censure for Demirel by mentioning that;

[...T]he main principle of government's foreign policy pursued is taking no initiative "without being backed by world states". By declaring this truth in every platform, Turkey has lost its power of deterrence against possible attacks on its national interests.⁵²⁸

After being elected as the ninth President of Turkey, it could be argued that Demirel's foreign policy orientation towards Nakhichevan crisis did not change even though there had been some escalation in the tensions in September 1993. The time period from 3rd September to 12th September was recorded as a third escalation period since May 1992 where, this time, both Turkish and Armenian military forces were heavily deployed across the border⁵²⁹ and this escalation was the peak for Turkey's

encouraged them to settle their dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh peacefully." UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2006-04657 Doc No. C17823880 Date: 06/01/2017.

⁵²⁷ Demirel's effort in being president was also noted in the same secret memorandum for White House prepared by Christopher Warren, saying that "(...) *The President's invitation to meet Prime Minister Demirel in May was well received and front-page news. But Demirel is maneuvering to replace Ozal, which may prevent his coming to Washington.*" UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2006-04657 Doc No. C17823880 Date: 06/01/2017.

⁵²⁸ All discussion on 27 April 1993, 95th gathering of the parliament is available on <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d19/c034/tbmm19034095.pdf> (Especially 220 and 221 for the quotation)

⁵²⁹ At this time, Turkish government even brought the issue to the parliament in order to get authorization for a military operation. Öztüğ, "Border Security in Turkish Foreign Policy Crises", 170.

coercive diplomacy. At the end of that escalation, Armenian forces ceased fire for a period; thus, imminent crisis was noted to be ended.

Looking at the efforts of international community, recalling its statements on 29 January 1993 (S/25199) and on 6 April 1993 (S/25539) about the concerns for Nagorno Karabakh conflict, the UN declared its “Resolution No: 822” which demanded a cease fire and withdrawal all forces from the occupied areas of Azerbaijan and it was later followed by “Resolution No: 853” on 29th July, “Resolution No: 874” on 14 October 1993 and “Resolution No: 884” on 12 November 1993⁵³⁰. However, those resolutions did not put an end to ongoing conflicts which continued for a long time with ups and downs. Throughout this period, Demirel’s efforts for gathering international support for ending Armenian aggression were noteworthy to mention, and these efforts could be understood as his target for bringing Nakhichevan problem to international agenda in the same way that Bosnia problem was held.

The third phase, starting from September 1993 has been known with its ups and downs in conflict due to un-occasional attacks of Armenia to the region where attack on Sederek and Gunnet in June 1994 and conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia in Yerashavan in February 1996 could be mentioned as highlights for escalation in military conflicts⁵³¹. As a state policy, Turkey decided not to open the borders between Turkey and Armenia unless Armenia withdrew its military forces from Azerbaijan’s territories⁵³². Problems over the region still remain unsolved and pose potential danger for unexpected military confrontations however the case could be regarded to fade out in Turkey’s foreign policy as a case for crisis even though careful policies within broader foreign policy principles continue to be implemented.

⁵³⁰ See <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/822> Last Accessed on 28/09/2019.

⁵³¹ Öztüğ, “Border Security in Turkish Foreign Policy Crises”, 170.

⁵³² Onur Öymen, *Uçurumun Kenarında Dış Politika: Eleştiriler, Yorumlar, Uyarılar*, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2012), 263.

6.2.3. Findings and Discussion

In the table below, highlights in crisis management and decision making are mentioned together with underlying systemic, regional, domestic and organizational dynamics behind those decisions.

Table 6: Table for Post-Cold War Coalition

VARIABLES	CHARACTERISTICS AND OUTCOMES
Characteristics of International Structure	US Hegemony and Vital Interests on Both Persian Gulf and Caspian Energy Resources
	Hegemonic Rule with Multiple Power Centres
	Middle Range States with Relative Autonomy in Their Foreign Policy
Characteristics of Regional Developments	Rising Russia in Old Soviet States with New Abroad Policy
	European Influence on Domestic Politics Related to Security and Humanitarian Issues
	Armenia, Newly Independent State with Revisionist Desires
Characteristics of Domestic Politics	Security Oriented Concerns Towards PKK
	Strong Coalition Government of Left-Right Parties with Good Relations in Foreign Policy Issues
	Strong and Influential Military / Strong MFA Bureaucracy/Rising Interest of NSC in Foreign Policy Issues
Crisis Management	Indirect Territorial Border Crisis out of Ongoing Conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia
	Turkey's Coercive Diplomacy with Threat of Use of Force vs Limited Reversible Probe Strategy of Armenia
	Imminent crisis was solved, but problems and conflict continued
Demirel's Leadership	Prime Minister for the first half and Head of NSC as President on the Second Half of the Crisis/No Change in His Policy Orientation
	Prefers Diplomatic Means and De-escalation of Tensions without Any Use of Force
	Active participation to imminent crisis by using US and Russian mediation on the one hand and toning down the forceful approach of President and military
DECISION MAKING STYLE	Controlled and influenced military, bureaucracy and president through his legislative Power of Prime Ministry and Presidency After the Change in the Middle of Crisis
	Looked for international support for crisis management and diplomatic negotiations
	Leading role in decision making with active participation
	Open to information, peaceful, relationship focused, evangelistic, cooperative understanding in tactics, risk averse

This period mainly differs from previous periods with its new systemic factor where international system has switched to a Post-Cold War system where hegemonic power of the US with multiple power centres dominates the system rather than Cold War's balance of deterrence between Soviet Union and the US. Having assessed the impact of those multidimensional developments in policy making and leadership, it could be argued that Prime Minister Demirel was more vulnerable to dynamics of international system rather than domestic development where his policy actions throughout the crisis were mainly shaped by a will for convincing and asking the consent of the US as hegemonic power and Russia Federation as regional power.

Besides, his focus on developing good relations with Armenia without offending Azerbaijan could be related to his understanding of developing harmonious foreign policy based on national interests but also in line with policies of the US over the region based on its vital interests of securing energy routes. That is why internationalizing the problem and getting support from world states against Armenia, rather than a unilateral intervention, dominates Demirel's leadership in this specific foreign policy crisis on Nakhichevan.

Unlike previous Cold War periods, it would not be wrong to say that Demirel resisted to criticism of his opponents in domestic politics for the sake of his foreign policy understanding. Here, his good relations with coalition partner where that partner had not to prefer to hit below the belt in domestic politics by manipulating the foreign policy issues could be understood as a strengthening point for his resistance to manoeuvres in domestic politics. It could also be possible to note that no resistance from MFA bureaucracy and military dominated the decision making due to unclear and ambiguous atmosphere of new international system where Özal already deteriorated institutional reflexes and influence of MFA and military, that is why they would have preferred to act in harmony with Demirel's government.

About the influence of military on decision making for Nakhichevan crisis, as it was discussed previously about the argument of Zeybek for military's position in normal times, it is observed here that military stayed back of the stage and preferred to perform its responsibilities in military terms as a component of coercive diplomacy. Here, it could be argued that the main priority for military in this period

was fighting against PKK separatism and ramifications of the Gulf War in Iraq that is why solving the problem of border crisis would be regarded as a duty of MFA bureaucracy and government. Having recalled the discussion at NSC meeting on 13 March 1992, Bayar mentions that military was convinced to use diplomatic measures rather than military intervention after comprehensive presentation of Teoman Koman, General Commander of TAF and Undersecretary of National Intelligence Organization, about military situation of Armenia and Azerbaijan on Nakhichevan and Karabakh problem⁵³³. Here, Vahapoğlu also adds that military was closer to Demirel's position at that time due to unexpected consequences of a military intervention at the first place without carefully calculating political ramifications⁵³⁴. In this respect, it would not be wrong to claim that military was not fond of an imminent military operation as Özal supported.

The period starting from Özal's prime ministry, it has been discussed that MFA bureaucracy was put on the back burner and traditional hierarchical bureaucratic understanding was undermined and was even accused of not following the international developments in the new system due to its bureaucracy's "passive attitude" on foreign policy issues. This "passive attitude", however, had been regarded as cautious and prudent understanding gained from accumulated experience of Turkish diplomatic history by MFA in its institutional perspective. Unlike Özal, it could be mentioned that Demirel respected much more to this cautious understanding which was in line with his own understanding. Within this perspective, it would not be wrong to argue that MFA bureaucracy and Demirel worked in full coordination throughout the crisis where even the critical decision for visiting Moscow in May 1992 was also proposed by Minister Çetin after his consultation to MFA bureaucracy⁵³⁵. Even though newspapers exaggerated this coordination by regarding Çetin's walkout in Özal's meeting in Kyrgyzstan as a sign for this cooperation against Özal's hawkish approach, Bayar rejects the idea that Çetin would show that kind of non-bureaucratic sign of protest where he had served as an interlocuter between Özal

⁵³³ Interview with Bayar.

⁵³⁴ Interview with Vahapoğlu.

⁵³⁵ Interview with Çetin.

and Demirel since Özal and Çetin were friends from State Planning Organization times⁵³⁶. Çetin also notes that this walkout was not an implication of a protest which could not be held by a minister against the president⁵³⁷.

Additionally, considering the secret diplomacy conducted by MFA bureaucracy in 1992 in order to neutralize and normalize Armenia as it was argued by Bölükbaşı, it could be said that the MFA was the leading institution in Demirel's decision-making process even though the final idea of cooperating with Russia and the US on Nakhichevan problem belonged to him.

To conclude, by resisting to domestic political pressure, Demirel could be considered to draw his attention to international developments in his foreign policy leadership for Nakhichevan crisis and he preferred to solve the problem without direct military confrontation through a unilateral intervention which was adopted by other hawkish political leaders at the last stage.

6.2.4. Comparison with Other Crises

In this period, Muavenet crisis with the US and Bosnia crisis could be regarded as other foreign policy crises which would be compared to Nakhichevan crisis in terms of political decision-making. Having analysed the crisis of Turkish Muavenet armoured ship hit by the US in NATO military exercise, Şihmantepe mentions that Demirel was prudent, cautious, realist and pragmatic in his decision making and he prioritized international dynamics in his policy understanding where he refrained from any confrontation with the US. Besides, rather than any military retaliation or other forceful measures, he searched ground for diplomatic talks in order to solve the problem.

Additionally, Çetin, Bayar and Öymen argue that Demirel performed as a pioneer in Bosnia crisis and even offered valuable recommendations to the US and NATO in search for peaceful solutions⁵³⁸. This attitude, rather than being afraid of big powers, could be understood as Demirel's general Post-Cold War tendency for

⁵³⁶ Interview with Bayar.

⁵³⁷ Interview with Çetin.

⁵³⁸ Interviews with Çetin, Bayar and Öymen.

not confronting hegemonic powers that would pose a danger for Turkey's new foreign policy formulation of developing multidimensional approach for being a regional power in new international dynamics with too many unknowns. In this respect, it could be argued that his way of leadership and decision making in these foreign policy issues had similar patterns with his leadership on Nakhichevan crisis.

CHAPTER 7

DEMIREL THE PRESIDENT AND KARDAK-IMIA CRISIS

Leader is the one who has the power
of resolution.

Süleyman Demirel⁵³⁹

With the death of President Turgut Özal on 17 April 1993, the new era, which began with Prime Minister Demirel being the President, was not only a period of continuity of the previous period, but also a period in which the effects of the end of the Cold War were felt more clearly and new agenda issues emerged. It is observed that a process of foreign policy started, in which the nation-states eroded with the new security concept in the world; the number of regional crises increased compared to the Cold War period, the international and the regional problems deeply affected Turkey. The political, economic and military developments of this period in which the states, which have been under the umbrella of the bipolar world for a long time, were facing new problems in the new system, undoubtedly affected the medium-sized states mostly. Turkey also strived to find out how to solve the crises it faced in parallel with the decision on how to implement traditional foreign policy in this new process within the dynamics of leader and institutions. In this section, after summarizing the developments and dynamics of the period that restricted foreign policy or offered opportunities, the relationship between institutions and decision-making dynamics during the Kardak-Imia crisis (in which Demirel was the President), which has been labelled as a near war between Turkey and Greece, is assessed.

⁵³⁹ His speech for opening ceremony of Demirel Museum in 2014 cited by Bayar in interview with him.

7.1. Developments of the Period

7.1.1. Developments Before Demirel

In reality, it would not be right to use the term pre-Demirel developments for this period because Demirel, whose political leadership as a prime minister was examined so far, passed directly to the Presidency as a result of the sudden death of Özal during his term as prime minister and there were no interruptions. Thus, what is actually examined in this period is, in order to see how the institutions' role and changing role of the leader in decision-making is shaped, how Demirel used the presidency position, which was already said to have a limited authority in foreign policy as a representative body, and whether he developed a different understanding when he was in a different leadership position. In this context, the answer to the question of "What happened in the pre-President Demirel period?" can be summarized as the tension and disagreement created by the intervention of Özal, who defined his power in a broad way, in institutions and events in foreign policy issues where the previous President Özal could not participate as actively as his term during the prime ministry. Demirel interpreted Özal's assertion that the government and the Prime Minister were responsible for foreign policy during his presidency in a different manner and adopted a very active administration style in foreign policy as opposed to his previous periods.

7.1.2. International Developments of the Period

International developments of this period could be summarized as ascertaining and realizing the emergence of ramifications and consequences of the earlier developments of Post-Cold War changes. While the world had yet to understand the effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demolished bipolar system, the fact that the United States had declared itself as the protector of this new system of the new world order, set forth the requirements of the new international system as well. However, although Clinton, who took office in 1992 and was not as hawkish as Bush, prioritized economic activities with a war-free understanding for foreign policy in his eight-year administration, this did not change the fact that the realities of the new world were regional crises and conflicts. Besides, the area of

scope in US vital interests was seen to being enlarged from Persian Gulf to Caspian Basin at those times⁵⁴⁰. Along with the changing concept of security and vital interests through securing the trade and energy resources, human rights, minorities, humanitarian interventions and ethnic conflicts, as well as rising waves of international terrorism and environmental problems, showed that trans-border problems that forced the nation-states in the new system were the main agenda item in foreign policy⁵⁴¹.

As a result of the transparency and outward opening of Gorbachev's policy of glasnost and perestroika, the Soviet Union collapsed, but the Near Abroad policy of newly established Russian Federation showed that the interest in the disintegrated old soviet countries had not diminished. Cognate countries for Turkey, Central Asian countries which were perceived as energy security for the US were the neighbors that were an essential element of security for the Russian Federation, and it was obvious that within the concept of Near Abroad Doctrine, RF would not remain silent to the shift of axis in these countries. Thus, in contrast to the opportunity of opening brought about by the nonexistence of Soviet Union, the existence of the Russian Federation became a new constraint for Turkey who would develop a foreign policy in the new world order⁵⁴². Here, Tayfur and Göymen utter that Post-Cold War contest between Russia and the US turned to a rivalry for energy sources inside the territories of old Soviet States⁵⁴³, and this brings the idea that Russia's new policy should not be understood only in security matters.

The end of the Cold War undoubtedly led to the Europe's getting out of the US' protection shield and emergence of it as a new power center. In reality, this issue, what may be perceived as a positive externality of the Cold War period, investments of Germany in infrastructure and economy, who did not even have to bear the costs

⁵⁴⁰ Klare, *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict*, 19.

⁵⁴¹ Bağcı and Bal, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: New Problems and Opportunities", 98.

⁵⁴² Tuncer, "Süleyman Demirel", 196.

⁵⁴³ M. Fatih Tayfur and Korel Göymen, "Decision Making in Turkish Foreign Policy: The Caspian Oil Pipeline Issue", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 38: 2, (2002), 101-122.

of feeding the army for a long period of time during this period, and investments of Europe, who did not feel the need to make large investments in defense under the US umbrella, led to the emergence of European Community as a big economic power after Cold War. As a matter of fact, Europe, which established its own defense force on the basis of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and established the European Conventional Forces, became a non-NATO security element and had the opportunity to convey its different priorities to the international system despite the USA, thanks to the cooperation with the Russian Federation⁵⁴⁴.

The first thing that comes to mind when looking at the international economic developments of the period is the restructuring of the GATT in the form of the World Trade Organization as of 1 January 1995 and the aim to liberalize the world trade by means of elimination of non-tariff barriers in international trade and limiting tariffs⁵⁴⁵. Although the free trade motto fueled the understanding that would erode the borders of the nation-state, and the fact that the financial capital class precluded the trade of goods with a new understanding of capital seemed to be good in the first place, the negative effect of such interconnectedness of world markets through finance was clearly felt by the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis.

In short, international dynamics of the period can be summarized as a hegemonic rule of the US where multiple powers exist and a ground for medium size states also appears to act independently in multiple dimensions of political, economic and non-traditional security issues compared to Cold War.

7.1.3. Regional Developments of the Period

It would not be wrong to describe the new period as a period in which regional conflicts increased but did not jump out of the region, rather than a period when regional tensions turned into international crises. Regional crises in the form of US interventions or humanitarian interventions with ethnic-based domestic problems

⁵⁴⁴ Bölükbaşı argues that OSCE was a clever plan of old Soviet Union in order to divide NATO alliance and bring a more suitable order for its security strategy. Bölükbaşı, *Dışişleri İskelesi: Dışişleri'nde 34 Yıl*, 78.

⁵⁴⁵ For historical progress of World Trade Organization, See https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/history_e/history_e.htm

have become revisionist in the form of revision of borders or the threat of the existence of the country's power, in contrast to the Cold War's form of export of regime and ideology.

Although the peace-building project of Europe, which envisaged mutual limitations of conventional weapons under quotas through European Conventional Forces Treaty in the process of European Charter of Paris provided disarmament in the region, from the perspective of Turkey, despite the fact that it achieved to keep the weapons in the southeast region within the framework of the fight against PKK⁵⁴⁶, it was still a problem. In this period, from the perspective of Turkey, Europe was seen as an indispensable entity to be joined while it was also an entity bringing the issues such as human rights and minorities to the agenda for full membership continuously as a prerequisite and trying to affect the country's domestic politics⁵⁴⁷. Indeed, while the foreign policy problems experienced with Greece had taken place in the security axis in the previous periods, in this period, they were evaluated in the out-of-security axis by the EU and used as a prerequisite for full membership. Thus, in the foreign policy problems with Greece, the address was not Greece anymore but the EU.

While it became problematic to create policies for Turkey as regional problems experienced after the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the Balkans turned into ethnic conflicts, it is also observed that Turkey cooperated with the US in this region by following parallel policies⁵⁴⁸. Amidst these regional tensions, it would not be wrong to argue that one of the biggest issues for Turkey to be handled in the Balkans was the Bosnia crisis and the KLA activities started in Kosovo in 1998. As the distinctive feature of this period, Turkey's active participation to humanitarian intervention or peacekeeping operations of NATO and UN in the region in coordination with the United States comes to the fore.

An important argument about Yugoslavia conflict could be held on the position of Greece accordingly. Due to historical tension with Macedonia and fear of

⁵⁴⁶ Mehmet Gönlübol and Hakan Bingün, "1990-1995 Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası", in Mehmet Gönlübol (ed.), *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1995)*, (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2014), 698.

⁵⁴⁷ Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War*, 136-137.

⁵⁴⁸ Tuncer, "Süleyman Demirel", 179.

a possible anti-Greek Balkan coalition led by Turkey, in a CIA report on 28 December 1992, Greek efforts to block UN membership and international recognition of Macedonia were told to lead Greece to a confrontation with US policies over the region on the one hand and made it closer to Serbia as its historical ally on the other⁵⁴⁹. This could be regarded as an opportunity for Turkey turning to be an important actor to limit Greek efforts over the region which would also be understood as a rapprochement to US policies. Besides, Bayar and Çetin note that Demirel was very influential in formulation of NATO operations on the region with his productive efforts and long-term experience which were all welcome by state leaders of the NATO members⁵⁵⁰.

It is very difficult to determine the most complicated period for the Middle East as all the periods are complicated for this region. However, it can be argued that the Post-Cold War period has been the one in which the complications reached to serious dimensions. After Iran-Iraq war, Iraq's attack to Kuwait led by Saddam Hussein on the one hand, and the policies it implemented towards the Kurdish groups in its northern region not only increased the tension of the region but also brought in the intervention of global powers together with a huge refugee problem to Turkey. Stating that it will not remain silent towards regional developments via the double containment policy and the Carter Doctrine, the US and the European Union, which declared its sensitivity on minority rights, played an active role in the conflicts of the region. With the Iraqi war of the US, which aimed to isolate the countries of the region such as Iran, Iraq and Syria from the international system by means of Security Council of the UN⁵⁵¹, the regional policies evolved into a process of instability that was difficult to predict by all countries, and the discomfort in Arab countries caused by the rise of Israel became the second factor complicating the region.

⁵⁴⁹ Memorandum on "CIA Responses to Clinton Transition Team Questions on the Balkans", 28 December 1992, 34. DOC No: C06002393 Available on <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5235e80d993294098d51752d>

⁵⁵⁰ Interviews Bayar and Çetin.

⁵⁵¹ Henry Kissinger, *World Order*, (UK: Random House & Penguin Books, 2015), 129.

Saddam's policy towards Kurds and his plans on the region, together with the US intervention and embargo, created serious problems and constraints in both foreign policy and domestic politics for Turkey. Kurdish parliament declared in the north of Iraq and the shortness and unsteadiness of the alliances that the emerging Kurdish actors such as Talabani and Barzani constructed both with other countries in the region and with the United States made it mandatory for Turkey to pursue a policy towards unsteady actors in the region. As an example, “Barzani, Iraq and Turkey” alliance against “Talabani, Iran and PKK” axis transformed into “Barzani, Talabani and USA” alliance against Turkey as a result of Turkey’s giving support to the Turkmen tribal areas in a very short period of time at a time⁵⁵². Operation Provide Comfort, the existence and purpose of which was controversial for many years with its hidden agenda, emerged as another constraint in the face of Turkey in addition to the unstable alliances. And the presence of “Poised Hammer”, which banned flights over 36th parallel until Turkey’s control increased and coordination center was moved to Silopi, was a confusing element in domestic politics.

In sum, it would be argued that, in addition to concerns mentioned above, Turkey’s main concern in foreign policy issues with regard to security problems has been a potential threat of PKK with its transborder problems and Syria’s uncooperative attitude in helping Turkey for those concerns together with a potential confrontation in Aegean Sea with Greece.

7.1.4. Domestic Developments of the Period

It would be absurd to think that such a process in which the international system was in such a big change, and the regional dynamics were so turbulent would not affect Turkey's domestic dynamics. While the perception of almost all neighboring countries changed with the end of the Cold War after 1980s which were the years of Özal's economic liberalization and opening policy after the military coup, Turkey would experience the reflections of changing domestic dynamics to foreign policy within the framework of these new developments.

⁵⁵² Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War*, 305-325.

The main issue remarkable in domestic politics is the conflict between the pressures of highbrows, who thought that it was very close to be a member of the EU thanks to application for full membership in 1987 and accession to Customs Union in 1995, and that it was necessary to make necessary reforms envisaged by the EU in order to get economic welfare and peace, and the contrary pressure of those led by Armed Forces, who thought that the EU should not get involved in domestic politics⁵⁵³. The economic crisis that erupted in 1994 as a negative externality of economic liberalization, and the foreign debt spiral, which manifested itself with the April 5 decisions⁵⁵⁴, and the social problems caused by the serious privatization of the accompanying SOEs, together with the bloody actions of the PKK, fueled the discontent towards the EU and Western institutions and strengthened Islamic tendencies within the country. In the intellectuals who saw the European Union as the only solution for the country, criticisms against Islamic groups and military practices against PKK increased and there occurred a debate on the axis of conservatism and modernity.

Adopting military methods in the fight against an armed group like the PKK, Turkey was tried to be cornered on every platform by the EU regarding minority issues and human rights violations; and these issues were even used as preconditions to be a member of the EU and to get external economic aids. Moreover, the Armenian events that took place almost 70 years ago were also added to this and, Armenian, Greek and Kurdish lobbies' lobbying activities against Turkey in Europe and the US became a dynamic that restricted foreign policy significantly⁵⁵⁵.

⁵⁵³ Ibid., 209.

⁵⁵⁴ In order to recover from the economic turbulence experienced in 1994, Çiller Government, on 5 April 1994, declared a series of economic stability measures in interest rates, state subsidies, privatization and government spending. For a broader analysis of those decisions, See Salih Köse, "24 Ocak 1980 ve 5 Nisan 1994 İstikrar Programları Çerçevesinde Yapılan Hukuki ve Kurumsal Düzenlemelerin Mukayeseli Analizi", *Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı Uzmanlık Tezi*, Yayın No: DPT-2508, (Temmuz,2000), Available on <http://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/SalihKOSE.pdf>

⁵⁵⁵ İlhan Uzgel, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler" in Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar-Cilt 2*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010), especially pages between 59-67 [Earlier reactions of Turkey to this lobby activities and how they were perceived by US administration is assessed in a CIA Document on May 18, 1987. Document No: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303280001-2. Available on

Adding economic struggles to all these, in Turkey, conflicting policy orientation of different political parties within coalition governments dragged foreign policy to unsustainability and instability where the famous February 28 memorandum stated by Armed Forces in the NSC was believed to restore and reorganize country's traditional foreign policy by overthrowing the coalition government of Erbakan that was seen as a threat to state tradition by the military.

7.1.5. Organizational Developments of the Period

This period of Demirel differs in its terms where his leadership and decision making as president is first evaluated in this thesis. It is seen that, unlike his attitude towards role of presidency in foreign policy making when he was prime minister, Demirel actively participated in foreign policy making in this period. This period, in foreign policy formulation is associated with a weak, divided and competitive approach by Robins⁵⁵⁶ due to domestic instabilities in governing the state, while Uzgel still notes a continuation in the weight of the military in foreign policy making⁵⁵⁷.

7.1.5.1. Military and National Security Council

Uzgel defines a pattern of foreign policy understanding of Turkish military with its tendency in consubstantiating the domestic and foreign threats no matter it is communism in Cold War and separatism or political Islam in Post-Cold War⁵⁵⁸. He argues that, putting the military discipline and hierarchical rank at the centre, military, unlike civilian bureaucracy, presents a unanimity in its decision position in foreign policy and does not welcome public debate over its decision proposals. This, at the end of the day, evolves its role of consultation to formulation and execution of the foreign policy especially in its “golden age”⁵⁵⁹. According to Balçı, in this period,

<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90T00114R000303280001-2.pdf>]

⁵⁵⁶ Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War*, 62.

⁵⁵⁷ Uzgel, “Türk Dış Politikasının Oluşturulması”, 84-90.

⁵⁵⁸ Uzgel, “Between Praetorianism and Democracy: The Role of the Military in Turkish Foreign Policy”, 187.

⁵⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 187.

military entrenched its role in foreign policy by utilizing National Security Council and so called “Red Book⁵⁶⁰” on the one hand and by making public declarations frequently in order to make its presence in foreign policy issues felt⁵⁶¹. Here, rather than a “Red Book”, National Security Policy Document and National Military Strategic Paper together with increased number of special documents including action plans toward specific neighbours prepared by the military could be regarded as the source of increasing role of military in policy making as Uzgel argues⁵⁶².

Here, Özcan reveals some other sources of the increasing role of military in foreign policy making in that period where intense cross border operations of the military against PKK on the one hand and Elekdağ’s newly developed concept of “Two and a half war strategy⁵⁶³” for Turkey’s security increased the security concerns and accelerated military’s role⁵⁶⁴. This intense participation of the military in policy making even reached to a stage in Erbakan’s prime ministry that Uzgel mentions a two-staged foreign policy in which military’s foreign policy worked together with Erbakan’s government policy where these two policies conflicted and Çevik Bir acted as the “foreign affairs minister” of military⁵⁶⁵.

⁵⁶⁰ “Red Book” has been discussed in Turkish political and public life for years where this secret book of the military about security issues which is believed to remain unchanged for years and immune from governments, however, as a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Prime Minister and member of NSC, Karayalçın notes this book as a popular myth which he never saw or knew anyone that has seen this so called red book. Interview with Karayalçın.

⁵⁶¹ Balçı, *Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler ve Uygulamalar*, 238.

⁵⁶² Uzgel, “Between Praetorianism and Democracy: The Role of the Military in Turkish Foreign Policy”, 192-193.

⁵⁶³ In this strategy, Şükrü Elekdağ, former Undersecretary for Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argued that Turkey should develop its security orientation in preparation for two wars at the same time, one on the south with Syria and one on the west with Greece, together with a half war within territories with PKK. Published in *Milliyet*, 02/12/1994. Available on http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/x2F_x2F_d1XBNQN7Fa96mKu2bOJg_x3D_x3D [Also, a comprehensive version is available in MFA SAM Papers, Vol I, (March-May 1996). See <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/SukruElekdag.pdf>]

⁵⁶⁴ Özcan also notes that military even did not inform government about those cross-border operations. In Özcan, “The Changing Role of Turkey’s Military in Foreign Policy Making”, 25-27.

⁵⁶⁵ Uzgel, “Between Praetorianism and Democracy: The Role of the Military in Turkish Foreign Policy”, 205.

In addition to all those arguments mentioned, it is also important to note an unfamiliar legislative change where Prime Ministry Crisis Management Centre Regulation was signed by the Council of Ministers on 30 September 1996 which, through its third, fifth and sixth articles, implicitly delegated the authority of prime minister to NSC Secretary General in crisis situations stemming from domestic and foreign threats for national unity in social, cultural, economic and humanitarian issues⁵⁶⁶. The reason for this regulation could be argued as limiting the role of prime minister and increasing the role NSC in crisis time which was because of either perturbative attitude of Erbakan for military or concerning stance of Çiller in foreign policy making in Kardak-Imia crisis. Celasin mentions that this duty has never been used by any of the Secretary Generals for NSC no matter that regulation was in use⁵⁶⁷.

In sum, active role of military in foreign policy making continued in this period up until the political reform process for membership to European Union accelerated in 2000s which decreased military's participation but increased the role of non-governmental organizations and civilian bureaucracy where the institutional reform on NSC enabled the assignment of first civilian Secretary General, Yiğit Alpogan, and deteriorated the dominance of the military in NSC by also increasing the number of civilian member since 2003⁵⁶⁸. Even though those reforms are believed to contuse the dominant role of military, Ünlü Bilgiç argues that none of those reforms had been taken despite the will of military and she comes up with an argument that military still secured its dominance against politicians by preserving the structure of high military council on the one hand and keeping the hierarchical supremacy of the Chief of General Staff of Turkish Armed Forces to Minister of National Defence thanks to his ongoing direct hierarchical tie to prime minister⁵⁶⁹.

⁵⁶⁶This regulation was abrogated in 2011. For the 1996 Regulation on Prime Ministry Crisis Management Centre, See <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/22872.pdf>

⁵⁶⁷Interview with Celasin.

⁵⁶⁸ Özcan, "The Changing Role of Turkey's Military in Foreign Policy Making", 25 and 31.

⁵⁶⁹ Ünlü Bilgiç, "The Military and Europeanization Reforms in Turkey", 803-824. [It is noteworthy that those remarks are no longer valid after the latest legal changes in the laws following the 15 July 2016's failed coup attempt where Chief of General Staff is tied to National Defence Minister in addition to change in the structure of high military council]

7.1.5.2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Civilian Bureaucracy

Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been well known with its stable position where its minister has not changed too often in order not to bring institutional instability however this period is noted as an exception to this understanding where short-term governing periods of coalition governments brought frequent change of nine times in foreign affairs minister between July 1994 and June 1997⁵⁷⁰. This frequent change, in return, caused an instability within the MFA bureaucracy in addition to rise of military in foreign policy issues on the hand but paved the way for Undersecretary of the ministry and top bureaucracy to act more active on behalf of the ministers who almost had no chance to learn about the foreign policy and operating principles of bureaucracy.

In addition to institutional turbulence caused by political instability, Karayalçın notes a legal change in political system in November 1994, inspired from European political system, which enabled deputy prime ministers from the second biggest party of the coalition governments to be minister of foreign affairs at the same time, and he was the first who served as minister of foreign affairs and deputy prime minister at the same time in coalition government of True Path Party and Socialist Democratic Republican Party⁵⁷¹. This in return, could be argued that both increased the ability of MFA to act more actively in foreign policy making of the governments and generated a check and balance system within the coalition partners.

In addition to changing dynamics about role mentioned above, it is also important to note Tayfur and Göymen's argument that the MFA still has the capability to influence foreign policy through NSC by benefitting the privilege of setting the state's priorities in the National Security Policy Paper in accordance with its institutional priorities in several issues that might touch upon foreign policy issue,

⁵⁷⁰ Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War*, 62.

⁵⁷¹ He mentions that deputy prime ministers could only serve as "Minister for the State" at the same time due to a legal obligation coming from 1949 which was changed in 1994 in order to increase the effectiveness of second party of the coalition in foreign policy issues. Interview with Karayalçın. [Even though no official change in any legal documents related to this issue is found, it is believed that Karayalçın referred to a governing principle or tradition rather than a legal obligation. For assignation of Karayalçın as both Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister, see http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/22139_1.pdf]

even though this privilege started to be challenged by different ministries in specific cases such as energy and agriculture due to legislations related to EU candidacy⁵⁷².

In this period, in terms of organizational structure, it could be argued that establishing both “Center for Strategic Research” and “Research and Publication Center” was remarkable changes other than reasserting and then retracting the desk system due to lack of necessary human resources⁵⁷³.

7.1.5.3. Political Decision Maker(s)

In the period between 1993 and 1997, Turkey experienced a frequent change in governments where Tansu Çiller (in her three cabinets), Mesut Yılmaz and Necmettin Erbakan served as prime ministers in short term coalition governments. After Hikmet Çetin’s term ended, Mümtaz Soysal, Murat Karayalçın, Erdal İnönü, Coşkun Kırca and Deniz Baykal served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in Çiller’s coalition governments; Emre Gönensay served in Yılmaz’s coalition government, Tansu Çiller and İsmail Cem served in Erbakan’s coalition government⁵⁷⁴. This, in return, could be argued to increase the influence of MFA bureaucracy rather than less-experienced ministers within their short-term administrations.

As noted in previous chapters where Demirel told that governments put too much burden on him in foreign policy issues, Turkey experienced a different foreign policy formulation practice in this period where conflicting stance of military and politicians sometimes became apparent and different contending policies tried to be operated at the same time which Uzgel mentions a two-staged foreign policy as in the case of military’s positive approach to Israel in contrast to Erbakan’s negative

⁵⁷² Tayfur and Göymen, “Decision Making in Turkish Foreign Policy: The Caspian Oil Pipeline Issue”, 116-117. [Please also note that, among the Undersecretaries of line ministries, Undersecretary of MFA had a privilege of being the only Undersecretary who could attend NSC meetings. In Bölükbaşı, *Dışişleri İskelesi: Dışişleri’nde 34 Yıl*, 38.]

⁵⁷³ Özcoşkun, *Cumhuriyetin Kuruluşundan Bugüne Dışişleri Bakanlığı Teşkilat Yapısı (1920-2018)*, 108-118.

⁵⁷⁴ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakanlari-listesi.tr.mfa> [Compared to 27 ministers for the 70 years-time from establishment of the Republic to this period, eight ministers for three years present an instability in political leadership for foreign policy.]

attitude⁵⁷⁵. This conflictual contest ended in 1997's military memorandum which Koçer originally argues that “*a power that was expected to be outside the politics was overthrown by a power which was also expected to be outside the politics*” in order to note the unusual role of military in politics and Erbakan's Islamist approach in order to challenge secularist state identity⁵⁷⁶.

Then, it is here important to ask what kind of political leadership Demirel presented as the president who was immune from election concern of domestic politics and challenges this time. Öymen argues that Demirel embarked on a neutral leadership style free from bias and domestic politics thanks to positioning himself above and outside the party conflicts which in return brought the respect of military and MFA bureaucracy for him⁵⁷⁷. In order to attract the attention of politicians to specific issues of foreign policy, he preferred to write advisory letters to prime ministers at that period⁵⁷⁸. Likewise, Karayalçın utters that Demirel's principle of inviting the Prime Minister, chief of General Staff of TAF and Minister of Foreign Affairs in order to come up with policy formulation after discussing all details put him in a position to tidy up the different decision-making units in policy formulation⁵⁷⁹. Moreover, he also opened a channel for legislation and National Assembly in foreign policy making which improved democratic participation to policy issues⁵⁸⁰. Demirel noted that he preferred a good communication with institutions and kept a balance between government and state institutions in a careful consideration of right delegation of duties according to competency⁵⁸¹.

As a president, Demirel was not able to participate in meetings of cabinet however he railed multiple channels in order to be informed about foreign policy

⁵⁷⁵ Uzgel, “Between Praetorianism and Democracy: The Role of the Military in Turkish Foreign Policy”, 193.

⁵⁷⁶ Koçer, *Türk Dış Politikasında İslam: Arafta Olmak Ya Da Bir Pragmatizm Örneği*, 16.

⁵⁷⁷ Öymen, *Zor Rota, Gençlik ve Diplomasi Anıları*, 337.

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid., 337.

⁵⁷⁹ Interview with Karayalçın.

⁵⁸⁰ Interview with Karayalçın.

⁵⁸¹ Demirel's argument is cited in Kılıçoğlu, “Süleyman Demirel ve Dış Politika”, 227.

matters where his involvement was needed due to turbulence of governmental politics. Here, because foreign policy and bureaucracy of the foreign policy were quite important to Demirel, he ordered to be informed in every critical foreign policy development by MFA diplomats where he also preferred to keep MFA Undersecretary in most of his meetings which would not be familiar to other undersecretaries of other state institutions⁵⁸². Additionally, in case of a crisis, Karayalçın also mentions Demirel's crisis management leadership in which he constituted small crisis desk composed of prime minister, chief of general staff and minister of foreign affairs in order to operate a harmonious crisis strategy⁵⁸³.

This period is argued to be a confusing time for policy makers of other countries where they got difficulty in addressing the true content for Turkish foreign policy making where conflictual and inconsistent declarations of different state institutions puzzled them⁵⁸⁴. That is why Demirel prioritized his image on foreign policy by making frequent official declarations on foreign policy, as the highest authority of Turkish Republic⁵⁸⁵.

Because the focal point of this thesis in terms of political decision maker is Demirel, in this part, rather than noting the foreign policy principles of government programs, it is important to mention Demirel's attitude in foreign policy making. As mentioned before, Demirel was giving importance to NSC in policy formulation and Karayalçın argues that he used NSC effectively in consolidating policy orientation of different institutions as the head of NSC, where he preferred to issue the political problems by directly asking questions to the NSC member who was specifically responsible for specific problem due to his/her expertise⁵⁸⁶. This, in return, according to Karayalçın, brought a coordination to institutions and prevented the military from

⁵⁸² Both Bayar and Öymen repeatedly mentioned how Demirel care about and give importance on MFA bureaucracy. Interviews with Bayar and Öymen.

⁵⁸³ Interview with Karayalçın.

⁵⁸⁴ Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War*, 66.

⁵⁸⁵ Kılıçoğlu, "Süleyman Demirel ve Dış Politika", 231.

⁵⁸⁶ Interview with Karayalçın.

dominating foreign policy issues unrelated to them⁵⁸⁷. About his leadership at NSC, Celasin, Vahapoğlu and Bayar mention the same point by uttering that Demirel always tried to build a ground for a common decision between institutions and aimed to ask every question until he was totally convinced about the foreign policy decision proposals of MFA or military and focused on persuading them with his question when he had a different policy orientation than those proposals⁵⁸⁸.

Here, one may argue that Demirel would have utilized NSC as a shadow cabinet in order to pressure the government which was not under Demirel's political leadership. By mentioning the importance of legitimacy of state institutions within their defined legal roles by legislations, Vahapoğlu rejects the validity of this argument and notes that this argument was not consistent with Demirel's way of leadership where he prioritized well-functioning of state institutions without any back-channel manipulation of their roles⁵⁸⁹. Considering this argument together with the powerful position of Demirel in domestic politics due to his charismatic leadership and past experience on politics, it could be argued that Demirel would not need that kind of shadow cabinet in order to pressure government where he already preferred to use a legitimate way by writing down recommendation letters to prime ministers as president about foreign policy issues.

When looking at Demirel's foreign policy priorities, it is seen that his cautious and prudent approach away from risky adventure was consolidated with his active role in prospering the peace and seeking for cooperation with big powers in conflictual issues⁵⁹⁰. He is regarded to increase his dominance by recalling his duty of supreme military command when governments run into adventure and risky policies that would end up with a military conflict⁵⁹¹.

⁵⁸⁷ Interview with Karayalçın.

⁵⁸⁸ Interviews with Celasin, Bayar and Vahapoğlu.

⁵⁸⁹ Interview with Vahapoğlu.

⁵⁹⁰ Kılıçoğlu, "Süleyman Demirel ve Dış Politika", 253.

⁵⁹¹ In Kardak-Imia crisis, Demirel reminds his duty to Çiller who was ready to start a military operation against Greece. Demirel's interview is available in Şihmantepe, *Türk Dış Politikasında Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel & Dış Politika Kriz Davranışları Üzerine Bir Araştırma*, 163.

In sum, President Demirel's changing role in foreign policy with his consolidatory approach to different decision-making units and active participation in foreign policy by utilizing multiple channels in accordance with legal responsibilities could be summarized as this period's foreign policy leadership for him.

7.2. Crisis and Crisis Management

7.2.1. Kardak-Imia Crisis

As a two set of rocks settled in 3,8 nautical miles away from Turkish coasts and 5,5 nautical miles away from the Greek Kalymnos Island⁵⁹², Kardak-Imia⁵⁹³ triggered a serious foreign policy crisis between Turkey and Greece when Turkish merchant-bulk carrier Figen Akat ran aground onto eastern rock of Kardak-Imia on 25 December 1995. Having regarded this rocky island settled in Turkish territorial sea, the captain of Figen Akat ship refused to accept the help of coastguards of Greek administration and waited for the help of Turkish coastguards. This was the initial step of the crisis which was not evolved to a military confrontation yet. After being refloated to Gulluk port of Turkey in 28th December by the help of "Matsas Star", a Greek towboat rented by a Turkish company called "Ömür", Greek administration was informed about the situation by the Greek coastguard⁵⁹⁴. At this point on 29

⁵⁹² <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/background-note-on-aegean-disputes.en.mfa> For historical background of Kardak-Imia rocks, See Onur Öymen, *Silahsız Savaş: Bir Mücadele Sanatı Olarak Diplomasi*, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2002), 474-490.

⁵⁹³ In this thesis, Kardak-Imia is used as its official version in order not to make any confusion. Originally, Kardak-Imia was labelled as "İkizler" by Ahmad Muhiddin Piri (Piri Reis), an Ottoman navigator and geographer. This name was changed to well known "İkizce" which was also used by Turkish Armed Forces in official declarations. Türkmen Parlak, "Tarihte İkizce Adacıkları", in Mustafa Güzel, "Kardak Krizi Sorunu Kapsamında Türk-Yunan İlişkileri", *Graduate Dissertation Submitted to Dokuz Eylül University Principles of Atatürk and Revolution History Institute*, İzmir, (2007), 41

⁵⁹⁴ Here, Jacobides mentions the name of Matsas Star that helped the Figen Akat ship however Mumcu claims that it was the Turkish company "Omur" which saved Figen Akat and refloated it to Güllük. Öymen, on the other hand, clearly mentions that it was a Greek ship rented by the Turkish company "Omur" which refloated Figen Akat to Güllük. See Michael G. Jacobides, "The Inherent Limits of Organizational Structure and the Unfulfilled Role of Hierarchy: Lessons from a Near War", *London Business School Working Papers*, V:1.5, (July 5, 2005), 14, and Cumhur Mumcu, "Kardak Krizi (1996)" in Haydar Çakmak (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikasında 41 Kriz: 1924-2014*, (Ankara: Kripto Yayınları, 2016), 236. It is important to note that Theodoros Pangalos, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece in that time, mentions that Figen Akat ship saved herself and refloated with her own motors without the help of Greek coastguards. Talks in BBC Witness is available at

December 1995, as a response to Greek verbal note claiming that Figen Akat ran aground on to a “Greek island called Imia”, Turkish Ministry of Foreign replied with a verbal note to Greek Embassy in Ankara mentioning that Kardak-Imia rocks was registered to the Turkish province of Muğla by reminding the 4 January 1932 Turkish-Italian documents and 1947 Paris Treaty and further noted Turkey’s willingness for negotiating the status of rocks and islets which was not identified by any law⁵⁹⁵. As a response to this verbal note, on 9 January 1996, Greek authorities addressed a verbal note by mentioning the status of Kardak-Imia as an islet of Dodecanese Island chain rather than a rock and, by interpreting 1932 documents and Paris Treaty different than Turkish side, noted that Turkey had affirmed Kardak-Imia’s belonging to Italy in 1932 documents and Kardak-Imia was left to Greece by Italy together with the rest of Dodecanese island chain due to 1947 Paris Treaty⁵⁹⁶.

Indeed, up until 20th of January when the Greek periodical journal “Empisteutiko Gramma” published the Kardak-Imia incident, just one day after Kostas Simitis was endowed with the authority to form the government, and later on 24th January Greek Antenna TV revealed the issue, two sides were handling the problem at the diplomatic level where two sides were running diplomatic efforts in order not to escalate the problem of Kardak-Imia⁵⁹⁷.

The tension increased after the Mayor of Kalymnos initiated an action of planting Greek flag on Kardak-Imia when the incident was published in Turkish newspaper Hürriyet on 25 January 1996⁵⁹⁸. Then, in 27th January, some Turkish journalists from the same newspaper, through a helicopter flew, went to Kardak-Imia

https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p04km4gd#sa-link_location=story-body&intlink_from_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fturkce%2Fhaberler-turkiye-38394643&intlink_ts=1562674069387-sa

⁵⁹⁵ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/background-note-on-aegean-disputes.en.mfa>

⁵⁹⁶ Those arguments in Greek note verbal to Turkey was reported by MFA Minister Baykal in his speech on parliamentary minutes of 30 January 1996. See pages 74-89, available on <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d20/c001/tbmm20001006.pdf>

⁵⁹⁷ Panagiotis Dimitrakis, “Intelligence for Crisis Management: The Case of the January 1996 Greek–Turkish Crisis”, *European Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4, (Dec. 2008), 455-493, 461.

⁵⁹⁸ Hürriyet, 28/01/1996, available on http://www.uzumbaba.com/belgeseller/tarihi_gazeteler/1993-1997/tarihi_gazeteler_1993-1997.htm Last Accessed on 01/10/2019.

and switched the Greek flag with Turkish flag which resulted in Greek armed forces' landing on Kardak-Imia in order to re-switch the flags. At this point, the incident turned to a high-level foreign policy crisis that would have resulted in a war.

Two days later, Greek Prime Minister Simitis announced a strong nationalistic message on the status of Kardak-Imia and high determination of Greece in defending it against any nationalistic claims coming from abroad⁵⁹⁹. Then Turkey's note verbal on 29 January 1996 as a response to 9th January Greek verbal note (No: 155/3/50) repeated the previous statements of 29th December Turkish Note by saying that;

The Kardak rocks which lie 5.5 nautical miles away from the nearest Greek island can neither be defined as being adjacent nor could they be termed as islets. In this context, the Kardak rocks which lie at 3.8 nautical miles off the Turkish mainland belong to Turkey and the Greek challenge to Turkish sovereignty cannot be sustained under international law.

and re-offered the negotiation for determining the status of all rocks, islets and islands which was not identified by any law by noting that;

In the light of this background, it is obvious that the possession of small island, islets and rocks in the Aegean has yet to be determined by agreement. Therefore, attempts by Greece to inhabit the small islands, islets and rocks in question in an artificial and demonstrative fashion can in no way create any legal consequences in regard to their status. The Government of Turkey is ready to enter into negotiations with Greece with a view to determining the possession of small islands, islets and rocks in the Aegean.”⁶⁰⁰

At the same day, Turkish Prime Minister Çiller's patriotic announcement saying that “*This flag will come down, these soldiers will go*⁶⁰¹” escalated the tension in Greek side. Here it is also important to note that the results of general elections of 24 December 1995 in Turkey forced Çiller to continue the coalition government with Republican People Party (CHP) which was not very solid and comfortable.

⁵⁹⁹ For public announcements of Simitis during the crisis, See <https://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/01/world/charges-fly-as-the-greeks-and-turks-avert-a-war.html>

⁶⁰⁰ For the full document of this note verbal, See Ali Kurumahmut (ed.), *Ege'de Temel Sorun: Egemenliği Tartışmalı Adalar*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1998) Appendix 20 and 21. For derived copy of that verbal note, please visit <http://www.turkishgreek.org/29-ocak-1996-tarihli-tuerk-notas>

⁶⁰¹ <http://www.gecmisgazete.com/haber/o-bayrak-inecek?tamBoyut>

At the day of 30th January, Aegean Sea around Kardak-Imia was full of Turkish and Greek naval forces both of which were ready for a war where both armies were mobilized. At the same time, Bill Clinton, President of USA, Warren Christopher, US Secretary of State and Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State, conducted mediation between Turkey and Greece, and Nicholas Burns, spokesman of the State Department mentioned that the US had no position for which country has the sovereignty over Kardak-Imia⁶⁰². Under these circumstances, the situation in the crisis totally changed at midnight when a group of special boat squadron of Turkish special forces landed to western side rock of Kardak-Imia, known as Small Imia⁶⁰³ by Greeks, where there were no Greek commandos at that time. This operation, equated the armed forces on Kardak rocks and opened a new level for negotiations where Greece felt itself to either withdraw its forces or initiate a war. Indeed, Erkaya notes that even though the timing of special forces' landing to Kardak was changed several times by Çiller depending on the negotiations with Clinton, Turkish Naval Forces applied their own operation procedure strictly in line with the initial plan that was decided⁶⁰⁴. Here Öymen, Undersecretary of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs at that time, mentions that Holbrooke called him at 2 a.m. in 31st January and told about the US informative intelligence about Turkish preparation for landing on Kardak and he replied that “*We are not planning, troops are already there.*”⁶⁰⁵

Finally, Greek administration withdrew its forces from Kardak-Imia and Turkish administration did so in return, which ended the crisis that could have ended in a war. Interestingly, Pangalos later mentioned his talk with Holbrooke in which

⁶⁰²<https://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/01/world/charges-fly-as-the-greeks-and-turks-avert-a-war.html>

⁶⁰³ Dimitrakis also claims that there is a third rock of Kardak-Imia group which is very small and unnamed. Dimitrakis, “Intelligence for Crisis Management: The Case of the January 1996 Greek–Turkish Crisis”, 459.

⁶⁰⁴ Taner Baytok, *Bir Asker Bir Diplomat: Güven Erkaya-Taner Baytok Söyleşi*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık A.Ş.,2001), 193.

⁶⁰⁵ Öymen, *Zor Rota, Gençlik ve Diplomasi Anıları*, 360. His talks are available on https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p04km4gd#sa-link_location=story-body&intlink_from_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fturkce%2Fhaberler-turkiye-38394643&intlink_ts=1562674069387-sa

Holbrooke mentioned that there was no possibility of war due to the covert US preparation for electronic jamming around the crisis area in case a military attack starts⁶⁰⁶. This crisis resulted in resignation of Chief of Armed Forces of Greece, Limberis, who failed to prevent Turkish commandos landing on the second rock due to lack of intelligence but supported a military attack on Turkey after Greece lost advantageous position⁶⁰⁷.

Looking at this foreign policy crisis that could be labelled as an imminent crisis leading to a near war, the next part of this chapter focuses its attention on how Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Armed Forces and Turkish Prime Minister acted within their own policy priorities and how President Demirel took position vis a vis those positions.

7.2.2. Crisis Management

Looking at the period when Kardak-Imia crisis broke out, hegemonic power of the US as the leading state in international system under multi-centred power structure, rally of Russian Federation in old soviet states due to its New Abroad Policy, security concerns derived from two and a half war strategy where Greece, Syria and PKK separatism were seen as prominent dangers, domestic struggle between secularism and political Islam, rise of military in security oriented domestic and foreign policy, instability in government coalitions which led to a weakness in MFA ruling, and finally legislative role of president in Turkish Constitution could be regarded as possible opportunities or threats for Demirel in his foreign policy leadership for crisis management.

About the Kardak-Imia, official position of Turkey could be summarized as follows: Kardak could not be given to Greece by Italy with 1947 Paris Treaty because

⁶⁰⁶ Talks in BBC Witness is available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p04km4gd#sa-link_location=story-body&intlink_from_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fturkce%2Fhaberler-turkiye-38394643&intlink_ts=1562674069387-sa

⁶⁰⁷ For a comprehensive discussion on turbulence of Greek decision makers during the crisis which is reported from the book “Politics for a Creative Greece (1996-2004)”, written by Kostas Simitis as his memoirs, please visit <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/simitisin-kardak-anilari-254257>

this rock was given to Italy by Turkey in 1932 Turkish-Italian documents⁶⁰⁸. The 4 January 1932 document was valid because it was ratified and registered with the League of Nations in accordance with Article 11 of the Covenant and this 4th January document does not refer to Kardak or Imia. On the other hand, 28 December 1932 document refers to “Imia Islets” being given to Italy however this document was not valid because it was not registered with the League of Nations considering the Italian administration under Mussolini. Greece, however, claims that Imia was under Greek sovereignty due to 1947 Paris Treaty and all 1932 Turkish-Italian Documents, where 28th December document did not need to be registered with League of Nations to be valid. Following the crisis, these official positions determined the crisis management strategies of Turkey and Greece.

The time period from maritime accident of Figen Akat ship to withdrawal of Turkish and Greek soldiers from Kardak-Imia rocks and removal of both flags builds the backbone of Kardak-Imia Crisis where status quo ante has been the final situation. Aksu defines this period as a political, military and legislative crisis in repetitious conflict with threat of use of force in a condition of sovereignty concern where crisis was triggered by a non-violent action of outside forces⁶⁰⁹, and mentions the crisis management strategy followed by Turkey as coercive diplomacy whereas strategy of Greece was “fait accompli”⁶¹⁰. The reason for defining this crisis as a part of repetitious conflict stems from ongoing conflicts between Turkey and Greece over Aegean Sea due to four main conflicting issues such as problems over territorial waters, status and sovereignty over some islands, islets and rocks, use of air space and flight information route (FIR) and finally disarmament of east Aegean islands

⁶⁰⁸ For a comprehensive summary of official positions, See Melek Fırat, “Kardak Kayalıklarına İlişkin Türk ve Yunan Tezleri” in Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar-Cilt 2*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010), 466-467.

⁶⁰⁹ Aksu, *Türk Dış Politikasında Karar Alma ve Kriz Yönetim Süreçleri*, derived from the tables in the pages 72, 77, 91 and 102.

⁶¹⁰ In Aksu’s study, Thomas Selling’s “Arms and Influence” and Alexander George’s “Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics” is used in defining the “Coercive diplomacy” which is summarized as using the threat of use of force in order to influence the actions of the rival states in foreign policy. Fuat Aksu, “Kuvvet Kullanma Tehditine Dayalı Dış Politika Krizlerinde Güvenlik Kavramı”, in Evren Balta Paker and İsmet Akça (eds.), *Türkiye’de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), 475-502.

which Bölükbaşı argues⁶¹¹. Within Kardak-Imia perspective, the essential issue that triggered the crisis in that accident of Figen Akat dates back to Hamburg Convention of 1979 which regulates the maritime search and rescue procedures⁶¹² in case an accident where Turkey registered its Turkish Search and Rescue Regulation to International Maritime Organization on 7 January 1989 but Greece lately ratified the convention on 20 March 1989⁶¹³. This convention on setting the area of responsibility for maritime search and rescue brings the issue of territorial waters and it can be argued that the threat of a conflict was imminent when Greek Parliament ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on 21 July 1995 and noted that “Greece shall determine when and how it shall exercise these rights, according to its national strategy. This shall not imply that Greece renounces these rights in any way.”⁶¹⁴ where the Convention enables the countries to enlarge their territorial waters up to 12 miles⁶¹⁵, which also means a serious threat for Turkish sovereignty in the Aegean region that is why Turkey has not ratified that Convention yet and had declared in 1976 that any attempts of Greece to enlarge its territorial waters beyond six miles would be regarded as “*casus belli*”⁶¹⁶. Under those circumstances,

⁶¹¹Bölükbaşı, *Dışişleri İşkelesi: Dışişleri'nde 34 Yıl*, 115. For a comprehensive analysis of those problems in Aegean Sea, See Deniz Bölükbaşı, *Turkey and Greece, The Aegean Disputes: A Unique Case in International Law*, (London&UK: Cavendish Publishing, 2004).

⁶¹² For the maritime search and rescue procedures mentioned in the convention, See full regulation of convention at <https://onboard-aquarius.org/uploads/2018/08/SAR-Convention-1979.pdf>

⁶¹³ Turkey defines its area of responsibility for maritime search and rescue regulation by dividing Aegean Sea in the median with a condition until it is negotiated with Greece. In contrast, Greece declares full responsibility over the Aegean Sea after ratifying Hamburg Convention. In Bölükbaşı, *Dışişleri İşkelesi: Dışişleri'nde 34 Yıl*, 147.

⁶¹⁴ For the full document of the UN Convention on the sea and Greek note, See https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=en#EndDec

⁶¹⁵ Indeed, historical development of the limits for territorial waters dates back to 17th century cannon-shot principle of “*terrae dominum finitur, ubi finitur armorium vis*” which means that territorial waters could be enlarged based on outer range of coastal artillery weapons. In <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199551248.001.0001/acref-9780199551248-e-471>

⁶¹⁶ Şükrü Elekdağ, in his newspaper article “Ege’de Kriz Belgeleri” on Milliyet, 11 February 1996, mentions that Çağlayangil, Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1976, sent a letter to US administration on 15 April 1976 to note Turkey’s decision on announcing “*Casus belli*” for any attempts of Greece for enlarging its territorial waters beyond 6 miles. For newspaper article written by Şükrü Elekdağ and the

escalation in tensions between Turkey and Greece would be expected at any case even though a fight for a small rock was not understandable for the US administration⁶¹⁷ at the beginning of the crisis unless the problem would be perceived from that issue of larger sovereignty threats.

From a perspective of crisis and crisis management, Kardak-Imia Crisis could be divided into three phases where the first phase was operating secret diplomacy through verbal notes without any public announcement, the second was escalation of the tensions due to intense propagated pressure on decision makers due to public press of the media just after mayor of Kalymnos planted a Greek flag on Kardak-Imia rock, and finally the third phase where negotiations continued over the period after ending the imminent crisis. In the first phase of the crisis, it was clear that Turkish and Greek ministries of foreign affairs bureaucracy were following a regular diplomacy through addressing verbal notes behind the scenes in order to present their demands over responsibility of maritime search and rescue for Figen Akat ship by mentioning sovereignty claims on Kardak-Imia. At this time period, the case was more about addressing states' position on sovereignty claims rather than a level of military confrontation where political leaders were not much aware of political ramification of the situation.

At the second phase of the crisis, public concerns and awareness about the situation, which was triggered and provoked by the media of Turkey and Greece after flagging the Kardak-Imia rocks was heard by the public, escalated the tensions in newly established Turkish and Greek governments both of which had serious political

letter of Çağlayan, See Fuat Aksu, "Ege Denizine İlişkin Sorunlar: Karasularının Genişletilmesi Sorunu", available at <http://www.turkishgreek.org/iki-uelke-arasindaki-temel-sorunlar-ve-taraflarin-yaklasimlari/ege-denizi-ne-iliskin-sorunlar/karasular-n-n-genisletilmesi-sorunu>

⁶¹⁷ US President Bill Clinton, in the conference for "Leadership for Sustainable Success" held in 9th Bosphorus Summit, recalled the Kardak-Imia crisis by speaking that "*I was at phone call with Russian Prime Minister on security talks. My assistant, in the middle of the talks, noted that Turkey and Greece was at the edge of a war because of a small rock inhabited by a couple of sheep. I thought it was a joke...*" in "Clinton Kardak Krizini Şaka Sanmış", Haber 7, 03/11/2009, available on <http://www.haber7.com/dunya/haber/450016-clinton-kardak-krizini-saka-sanmis>

survival issues due to instable conditions that were arisen from results of the recent elections in both countries⁶¹⁸.

Öymen argues that second stage of the crisis was held in full coordination and consensus in terms of decision making by government, MFA bureaucracy and military⁶¹⁹. This argument could be valid for the final critical stage of the crisis in its last day however memoirs and documents reveal that there was not a consensus on decision making throughout this second stage. Here, Mumcu, based on Leng and Wheeler's study of "Influence Strategies, Success and War⁶²⁰", raises an argument that groups within state apparatus play more important role than the individual leaders in decision making⁶²¹. At this point, Güven Erkaya, Commander of Turkish Naval Forces at that time, in his memoirs, notes that the main understanding of the Turkish Armed Forces about Kardak-Imia was that the rocks belonged to Turkey and there was no confusion about the Turkish sovereignty over there, and they informed the Prime Minister Çiller in that way⁶²². On the other hand, official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was that Turkey had sovereignty claims over Kardak-Imia as did Greece⁶²³.

Here, both the verbal notes sent by MFA mentioning the willingness for negotiations on status of those kinds of islets and rocks which has problems with sovereignty issue and Ömer Akbel's public press noting that "*Turkey said from the*

⁶¹⁸ By revisiting the media monitoring report and searching through media headlines, Manis notes that Greek media used a more intense 'hate speech' compared to Turkish media even though both escalated the tension of public which resulted in a strong pressure on governments for more aggressive moves for being perceived as patriotic. In Athanasios Manis, "The Role of Media in the Imia/Kardak Crisis: The Importance of Media Influence and Its Limitations?", *4th Hellenic Observatory PhD Symposium on Contemporary Greece Hellenic Observatory*, European Institute, LSE (June 25-26,2009), 9.

⁶¹⁹ Interview with Öymen.

⁶²⁰ Russell J. Leng and Hugh G. Wheeler, "Influence Strategies, Success and War", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol 23, Issue 4, (1979), 655-684.

⁶²¹ Mumcu, "Kardak Krizi", 237.

⁶²² Erkaya also notes that according to military, the option for recognizing the ownership and showing the seriousness of Turkey was preferable compared to only other alternative option (for him) for not recognizing the ownership and doing nothing. Baytok, *Bir Asker Bir Diplomat: Güven Erkaya-Taner Baytok Söyleşi*, p 192

⁶²³ Aydın Şihmantepe, "Kardak Krizi Sürecinin Kriz Yönetim Prensipleri Açısından İncelenmesi", *Güvenlik Stratejileri*, Yıl 9, Sayı 17, (2013), 127-155, 146.

beginning that the issue was not merely the ownership of Kardak rocks, which Turkey claims as its own under international law.” on the one hand and Deniz Baykal’s speech that *“This sovereignty claim of Greece cannot be approved by Turkey. It is not only for Kardak, but also for other several islands, islets and rocks over the Aegean which presents same features of Kardak with undetermined sovereignty status.”* on the other, give clues about position of MFA in presenting sovereignty claims rather than a strict recognition of ownership⁶²⁴. It is important to mention here that Bölükbaşı notes a disagreement within the MFA bureaucracy towards Öymen, Undersecretary of MFA at the time, about solving the crisis but also reminds that the landing military forces of Greece on one of the Kardak rocks left less options for Turkey to seek for peaceful diplomatic solutions⁶²⁵. Here, no matter the alternative ways for solution, MFA was in clear consistency in its position that those rocks never belonged to Greece, and Greece should withdraw its claim of sovereignty there so that the situation in those rocks would turn to “status quo ante”.

Çiller at that time, maintained even a more rigid stance than the military and was presenting an eagerness to use military force as soon as possible⁶²⁶. Unlike Çiller’s announcements about the unquestioned ownership and sovereignty over Kardak-Imia and her “*hawkish attitude*” during the crisis, Şihmantepe argues that President Demirel was more prone to solving the crisis through diplomatic demarche without any direct military confrontation where he said that *“(…) Problem should be solved peacefully, there is no need to beat the drums of war imminently. There is a*

⁶²⁴ Akbel was spokesman for MFA, Baykal was Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister of coalition government at the time of Kardak-Imia crisis. Akbel’s and Baykal’s speeches were available on web archive of Directorate General (DG) for Press and Information, Prime Ministry of Republic of Turkey however all online archives of the DG have been suspended after abrogation of the DG and establishment of Directorate of Communication, Presidency of the Republic of Turkey due to administrative change in July, 2018. For the full documents of the speeches accessed by Şener at his published book, See Şener, *Türk Dış Politikasında Güç Kullanma Seçeneği (1923-2010): Teorik, Tarihsel ve Hukuksal Bir Analiz*, 514, 515 and 521.

⁶²⁵ Bölükbaşı, *Dışişleri İskelesi: Dışişleri’nde 34 Yıl*, 185.

⁶²⁶ Cengiz Erişen and Barış Kesgin, “Dış Politikada Psikolojik Unsurlar: Türk- Yunan İlişkilerinin Analizi”, in Ertan Efeğil and Rıdvan Kalaycı (eds.), *Dış Politika Teorileri Bağlamında Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, (Ankara: Nobel Yayınları, 2012), 571.

*pile of islands over the region, ownership of which are unknown.*⁶²⁷” About the legal status of Kardak-Imia, Demirel also said that;

The main issue was not Kardak, it was an issue of Aegean sovereignty where there was plenty of rocks and islets under the status like Kardak. The lands remained from Ottoman Empire should be under Turkish sovereignty unless their status was arranged with a legal agreement.⁶²⁸

At that time, US President Bill Clinton was negotiating with both Demirel and Çiller on the one hand and Simitis on the other in order to end the crisis through the help of US mediation where Clinton believed that reason for escalation of the tensions was Turkey’s refusal of Greek sovereignty Kardak-Imia gained with 1947 Paris Treaty, a closer argument to Greek position⁶²⁹. Demirel, despite not being a part of the cabinet meetings, was the head of NSC as president and is argued to take position to balance Çiller, military and MFA for a solution through non-military measures if not necessary. Moreover, Yalçın Doğan mentions in his newspaper article that Demirel also warned Çiller that government would not need any further permission if the problem would be solved in diplomatic means as a border issue but he should intervene if it had turned to a military conflict because he was the supreme commander of Turkish Armed Forces in war situation according to Constitution⁶³⁰. That is why, in order not to trigger a war, he refused Çiller’s initial proposal for landing the troops to the rock where Greek troops already settled⁶³¹. Here, Demirel

⁶²⁷ Quoted from Cüneyt Arcayürek,” 28 Şubat’a Giden İlk Adım: Büyüklere Masallar, Küçüklere Gerçekler” as cited in Şihmantepe, *Türk Dış Politikasında Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel & Dış Politika Kriz Davranışları Üzerine Bir Araştırma*, 159 and 163.

⁶²⁸ Demirel’s video interview in M. Ali Birand’s 28th February Document, which is available on <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-x7gNxHPD1w&t=702s> Last accessed on 06/09/2019.

⁶²⁹ Bill Clinton, *My Life*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 832-833. [It seems that official declaration of State Department’s spokesman noted in the previous part was not in line with Clinton’s personal perception of the source crisis]

⁶³⁰ Demirel’s quotes from Yalçın Doğan’s article “Demirel-Çiller Başkomutanlık Savaşı”, *Milliyet*, 07/02/1996, cited in Şihmantepe, *Türk Dış Politikasında Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel & Dış Politika Kriz Davranışları Üzerine Bir Araştırma*, 165.

⁶³¹ According to Demirel, this proposal was offered to Çiller by military. For the full speech of Demirel, See Nur Batur, *Yürekten Gülerekten Yürüdüm: Atina’da Bir Türk, Bir Gazeteci, Bir Kadın*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2004), 50, 51 and 52.

also mentioned that he warned both the military and Çiller about their eagerness for a military response that it would be impossible to explain a war to our own citizens in the future even if it would be plausible for the day of crisis⁶³². In this respect, Bayar argues that Demirel had been very careful on keeping a balance between citizen's expectations and state institutions' policy priorities that is why he always filtered those institutions' proposals within his own understanding about future expectations of citizens. He also adds Demirel's speech saying that "*Citizens votes for us because they assume that we are wise people. If our decisions threaten citizens' trade of bread, then they call us to account.*"⁶³³

One may question the underlying reason for Çiller's tough stance in favour of military wing. One answer might be that Çiller's tough stance was due to the confirmation of clear Turkish sovereignty on Kardak-Imia by Undersecretary of MFA at the high-level meeting held with top military officers and top MFA bureaucrats in 29th January, hours before Çiller's strong public announcement⁶³⁴. Aksu reports from Erkaya that, in that meeting, Öymen clearly replied positively Çiller's question asking that "*Is our document strong? Does the island legally belong to us?*"⁶³⁵ It is noteworthy that Çiller, as the prime minister of a weak coalition where Erbakan's party was in opposition even though it was the first party with the highest vote in the election of 24 December 1995 but was not able to form a coalition, was also politically pressured by Erbakan in order to take even tougher stance in national cases such as Kardak⁶³⁶. When parliamentary minutes are evaluated, it could be seen

⁶³² Demirel's video interview in M. Ali Birand's 28th February Document, which is available on <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-x7gNxHPD1w&t=702s> Last accessed on 06/09/2019.

⁶³³ Interview with Mehmet Ali Bayar on 23/09/2019 in İstanbul.

⁶³⁴ Here, there is a difference of opinion within MFA bureaucracy about how clear the Turkish sovereignty over Kardak-Imia. Bölükbaşı, well known with his experience in international law and Aegean dispute, notes that sovereignty claims of both sides stems from different interpretation of the law which had ambiguity in interpretation. Bölükbaşı, *Dışişleri İskelesi: Dışişleri 'nde 34 Yıl*, 179.

⁶³⁵ As cited in Fuat Aksu, "Turkish-Greek Relations: From Conflict to Détente the Last Decade", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, (Annual 2001), 167-201, 14.

⁶³⁶ Erbakan criticized Çiller for not being nationalist enough with a his words saying that "*I don't get it enough only planting a flag*", In M. Ali Birand's 28th February Document, which is available on <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-x7gNxHPD1w&t=702s> Last accessed on 06/09/2019.

that not only Erbakan but also other opposition parties criticized the government for its policy of negotiating on Kardak-Imia and those parties proposed a direct military attack on Greece without any negotiation⁶³⁷. Considering the harsh statements of Kamran İnan in those minutes who served as an experienced diplomat for several years, those proposals for military response could be regarded as a political game of driving the government into corner; however, it could be understood that Çiller was intimidated by that political move due to her lack of experience on foreign policy crisis management.

As another answer, it would not be wrong to argue that Çiller, who did not have any past experience in foreign policy crisis management, developed close relations with military in her fight against PKK which also brought domestic popularity for her. Besides, Çiller was quite close with nationalist leader Alpaslan Türkeş in domestic political issues which would also be regarded as a factor for Çiller's rigid stance.

At the very critical time of the crisis, in order to initiate a coercive diplomacy against Greece in pushing it for withdrawal of its forces in order not to trigger a war and stay in difficult position internationally, İnal Batu from MFA bureaucracy (Deputy Undersecretary) proposed an offer of landing Turkish troops, if possible in military techniques, to the second rock of Kardak-Imia twin rocks, which was not deployed with Greek commandos⁶³⁸. Even though the initial position of military was preparing for a military conflict or a near war, this offer was accepted by military quickly, especially by Commander of Naval Forces-Erkaya⁶³⁹. As a result of executing this plan and Turkish special boat squadrons landed on the second twin rock at a late-night operation without even Greek side realizing it, Greek government

⁶³⁷ For that discussion in parliamentary minutes, See pages 74-89 available on <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d20/c001/tbmm20001006.pdf>

⁶³⁸ Cansu Çamlıbel's video interview with İnal Batu on Kardak-Imia crisis decision making is available at <https://www.vidivodo.com/emekli-buyukelci-inal-batu> Last accessed on 02/09/2019.

⁶³⁹ Batu also adds that Çiller was not happy with this plan that is why she suddenly left the meeting. Batu's video interview in M. Ali Birand's 28th February Document, which is available on <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-x7gNxHPD1w&t=702s> Last accessed on 06/09/2019. [Erkaya's attitude is also available in Erkaya's memoirs, See Baytok, *Bir Asker Bir Diplomat: Güven Erkaya-Taner Baytok Söyleşi*, 193.]

was pressured by the US administration to withdraw its forces from the Kardak rocks together with Turkish forces in order not to trigger a war. At the end of the day, imminent crisis ended but the problem reached to another phase.

Here, in terms of decision making and institutional dynamics, it is important to note how Öymen's proposals to Greek Ambassador in Ankara for solving the problem through diplomatic means was rejected by Greek side⁶⁴⁰, which could be argued to led MFA bureaucracy moving from peaceful diplomatic efforts to coercive diplomacy by threat of using forceful measures. One may need to ask why Greece was not eager to negotiate through diplomatic initiatives. In addition to patriotic stand for defending an issue of sovereignty against their top rival in Aegean Sea, Dimitrakis, after his search on Greek national documents and his interviews with top Greek officials of crisis time, comes up with that firm stand of Greece in not stepping back to negotiations was due to a clandestine game of intrigue of Defence Secretary Gerasimos Arsenis for overthrowing Prime Minister Simitis so that he could be the premier that is why he manipulated the media and government over a possible Turkish aggression based on an alleged "intelligence document" which was later refuted and confuted by Major General-Dimitrios Dimou, first deputy chief of Army General staff who had access to all secret intelligence gathered from army and secret service (EYP)⁶⁴¹. Indeed, for both Turkish and Greek sides, beyond the sole sovereignty over Kardak-Imia rocks, this issue was about the sovereignty over more than 150 islets and rocks around Aegean which would challenge the territorial waters claims of both sides and change the Aegean border according to MFA diplomats⁶⁴².

Turning back to Demirel's foreign policy leadership in this crisis, one may raise a question on why Demirel acted in such a way that he did not consider Çiller's and military's proposal of military intervention to the island. Having no political responsibility on the government, Demirel was immune from political criticism

⁶⁴⁰ Öymen, *Zor Rota, Gençlik ve Diplomasi Anıları*, 374.

⁶⁴¹ Dimitrakis, "Intelligence for Crisis Management: The Case of the January 1996 Greek-Turkish Crisis", 455-493.

⁶⁴² For speech notes of MFA diplomats, See Aksu, "Turkish-Greek Relations: From Conflict to Détente the Last Decade", 14.

within the parliament and had the space for acting in concrete understanding of following national interest free from political calculations for elections. Besides, Alpogan also notes that, if there is a ground for diplomatic efforts, Demirel's personality could never let an adventure in foreign policy that would bring catastrophic consequences to citizens that is why he preferred to pursue a demarche through assistance for the US mediation where it would never desire a military confrontation between Turkey and Greece over the Aegean Sea⁶⁴³.

In the third phase of Kardak-Imia issue, after the imminent crisis was solved but the problem remained, it is argued that a conflict within MFA appeared in terms of way of conducting the solving problem in which Bölükbaşı and Eralp⁶⁴⁴, against Undersecretary Öymen's counter will, recommended to Prime Minister Yılmaz that Turkey should offer a solution to Greece through asking the help of International Court of Justice (ICJ), and Yılmaz's offer to Greece for applying for ICJ was refused by Greece which was believed to stuck Greece in international arena about legitimacy of its claims by Bölükbaşı⁶⁴⁵. There has been a long discussion about disagreement within MFA bureaucracy and even Prime Minister Yılmaz, after the crisis, argued that top bureaucrats of MFA misled the government during Kardak-Imia crisis, which was discussed by Güneri Cıvaoglu and later by Cengiz Çandar claiming that Öymen, in order to sway and manipulate the government in accordance with his own arguments, hid a document from Baykal sent by Italian administration which confirmed Greek sovereignty on Kardak⁶⁴⁶. Here, this argument was controverted by Baykal and both Öymen and some other MFA diplomats refuted this argument by

⁶⁴³ Interviews with Öymen, Bayar and Alpogan.

⁶⁴⁴ At that time, Yalım Eralp was foreign affairs advisor to Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz.

⁶⁴⁵ According to Bölükbaşı, not asking for help of third party international courts has been an important institutional reflex up until this announcement due to unexpected problems resulted from application for Mosul case in 1920s. Bölükbaşı, *Dışişleri İskelesi: Dışişleri'nde 34 Yıl*, 189 and 288.

⁶⁴⁶ Öymen notes that it was Güneri Cıvaoplu who first raised his claims about "hidden documents". Cengiz Çandar's argument in his newspaper article "Ayıptır, Zulümdür, Cinayettir..." on *Hürriyet*, 13/11/2009 is available at <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ayiptir-zulumdur-cinayettir-12934737> [Yalım Eralp, former ambassador and foreign policy advisor to Çiller and Yılmaz, supports this accusation to Öymen in his memoirs. Eralp, *Perdeyi Aralarken: Bir 'monşer'in Hatıratı*, 194]

mentioning impossibility of hiding that kind of document where second and third copies are sent directly to offices of president and prime minister simultaneously⁶⁴⁷.

This third phase might be summarized as a period of negotiations where status quo ante was reached but a negative attitude towards Turkey by EU was experienced for the sake of supporting Greece, as one of its members. Both 15 February 1996 and 15 July 1996 declarations of European Union clearly mention its persuasion in supporting Greek claims where both declarations used “*neighbour state that EU wants to develop good relations*” for defining Turkey, “*provocative military operations in its territorial claims against sovereignty of a member state*” for mentioning Turkey’s position and “*inviting Turkey to respect to international law and territorial integrity of Member States*” for noting EU’s official argument⁶⁴⁸. This position of EU might be regarded as a serious obstacle for Turkish foreign policy making in the third phase where domestic conflicts around the discussion of the reforms for EU membership continued together with increased security concerns in and outside the country.

Within these circumstances, conflict over sovereignty of Kardak-Imia rocks remain unsolved where ups and downs in tensions over Aegean dispute continued without any direct military confrontation. Along this phase, it could be argued that Demirel’s active participation faded out and routine diplomatic demarche sustained through the governmental efforts.

7.2.3. Findings and Discussion

In the matrix for Kardak-Imia crisis decision making below, it could be seen that hegemonic role of the US played a major role in ending the crisis where problem in the Aegean Sea was not regarded as a major issue of interest by Russia Federation but was seen as an attack on sovereign territories of a member state by the European Union. Domestic political developments, on the other hand, played a great role in

⁶⁴⁷ Both Öymen and Batu clearly refute this accusation to Öymen. Besides, even though Bölükbaşı mentioned his disagreement with Öymen, he also refutes this claim of hiding a document of Italian administration. See Öymen, *Zor Rota, Gençlik ve Diplomasi Anıları*, 364-365; Bölükbaşı, *Dışişleri İskelesi: Dışişleri’nde 34 Yıl*, 180.

⁶⁴⁸ Those two declarations are available on <http://www.hri.org/MFA/foreign/bilateral/declaration.htm> and <http://www.hri.org/MFA/foreign/bilateral/europ.htm>

conflict within Turkish decision makers where weak coalition government posed a limitation for the government but President Demirel moved out of this political concern.

Table 7: Table for Decision Making in Post-Cold War Presidency

VARIABLES	CHARACTERISTICS AND OUTCOMES
Characteristics of International Structure	US Hegemony and Vital Interests on Both Persian Gulf and Caspian Energy Resources
	Hegemonic Rule with Multiple Power Centres
	Middle Range States with Relative Autonomy in Their Foreign Policy
Characteristics of Regional Developments	Rising Russia in Old Soviet States with New Abroad Policy
	European Influence on Domestic Politics Related to Security and Humanitarian Issues
	Greece, as a member of NATO and European Union
Characteristics of Domestic Politics	Security Oriented Concerns Towards Greece, Syria and PKK
	Weak Coalition Government due to Economic and Political Turbulence
	Strong and Influential Military / Divided MFA Bureaucracy/High Interest of NSC in Foreign Policy Issues
Crisis Management	Imminent Sovereignty Crisis with Greece as a Part of Repetitious Conflict
	Coercive Diplomacy with Threat of Use of Force / 3rd Party Mediation by US
	Imminent crisis was solved, but problems and conflict continued
Demirel's Leadership	Head of NSC as President but not a part of government
	Prefers diplomatic means and de-escalation of tensions without any use of force
	Active participation to imminent crisis by using US mediation on the one hand and toning down the forceful approach of government and military
DECISION MAKING STYLE	Controlled and influenced military, bureaucracy and politicians through his legislative power of presidency and NSC
	Looked for international support for crisis management and diplomatic negotiations
	Mediatory and conciliatory role in decision making with active participation
	Open to information, peaceful, relationship focused, evangelistic, cooperative understanding in tactics, risk averse

Under consideration of those international, regional, domestic and organizational developments, the first argument that could be held here is that no matter prime minister or president, Demirel's leadership on foreign policy issues had

been mainly shaped by international structure of the Post-Cold War period. In this respect, as it was the same in Nakhichevan crisis, Demirel required US mediation in solving the problem rather than a unilateral military intervention in this Kardak-Imia case. Without surrendering to unilateral Greek act by responding with a well proportionate force, he accepted policy proposal from MFA bureaucracy which was also considered reasonable by military as well. Besides, rather than simply asking for US mediatory assistance, Demirel used his tactic of mentioning possible repercussions of a probable Turkish response to Greek aggression unless there is a US mediation in the crisis. At this point, it could be well argued that Demirel's leadership on this crisis was regarded as major factor in solving the problem without an unexpected war. Here, Bayar notes about Demirel's leadership that he believed military had no right to declare a war in democratic regimes that is why he did not let military intervene with MFA bureaucracy in its duties defined legally⁶⁴⁹.

Military's position in this crisis could be evaluated from two perspective. First of all, it has been regarded that military had a very influential role in politics for this period due to security-oriented domestic problems and their ramifications on foreign policy. That is to say, military could be said to have important channels and instruments to influence foreign policy decision making that is why proposals of military were quite influential in Çiller's decision making as political decision maker. However, because military would not want to bear the consequences of being the one picking a war for political problems in foreign policy, it would be plausible for military to be quickly convinced by any diplomatic move than a war that would raise as an alternative to prevent war. Secondly, military's public prestige stemming from its fight against PKK would be severely damaged if it would have forced government to conduct a policy contrary to policy proposal of MFA bureaucracy which was also supported by president.

As it was discussed previously, MFA bureaucracy determined a stance of sovereignty claim with a just legal position on Kardak-Imia however its route in this crisis was to turn back to *status quo ante* rather than taking the control of the twin rocks. Within this perspective, its policy orientation could be argued as deterring

⁶⁴⁹ Interview with Bayar.

Greece so that it would withdraw its forces rather than capturing or taking possession over Kardak-Imia by a military operation. That is why Turkey also withdrew its military forces on the second rock of the twins just after withdrawal of Greek commandos. Because it could have triggered a sequence of crisis over other islands, islets and rocks sharing same political and legal conditions with Kardak-Imia, it would be right to claim that main political position of MFA bureaucracy was far away from any military confrontation and was conducting diplomatic initiatives and negotiations in order to determine the status of Kardak like islets and rocks over the Aegean Sea. In this respect, it could be mentioned that Demirel's cautious policy understanding matched up with prudent attitude of MFA bureaucracy for keeping the country away from dangerous adventure if there had been a possible alternative of diplomatic means for securing national interest.

In sum, Demirel's pressure on government for searching for alternative policy actions than a military intervention, mediation of the US with a pressure on Greece, the best possible alternative policy action proposed by MFA bureaucracy and traditional wisdom of military on delicate foreign policy issues could be mentioned as highlights of Turkish foreign policy decision making on Kardak-Imia crisis.

7.2.4. Comparison with Other Crises

Other than Kardak-Imia crisis, Turkey faced with foreign policy crisis of territorial waters on Aegean Sea and S-300 missiles against Greece on the one hand and Öcalan crisis with Syria and Greece on the other. For the first two crises mentioned, same pattern of Demirel's leadership for acting pragmatically, realistically and cautiously in order not to cause a dangerous adventure for Turkey could be seen; however, Öcalan crisis presents a different approach in Demirel's leadership where, this time, he seemed quite determinant in choosing forceful measures. Even though he continued to conduct diplomatic demarche in international arena, his closeness for moving towards a military approach to Syria could be regarded as a deviation in his overall understanding of sticking out to peaceful solutions.

Here Şihmantepe argues that, unlike Kardak-Imia crisis, Demirel was not much active in S-300 missile crisis and he preferred to stay at back stage because there was no time pressure or imminent threat of war that is why he chose to leave the crisis management to government⁶⁵⁰. In Öcalan crisis, however, Demirel presented a leadership of conducting a determinant coercive diplomacy which was totally in line with military's stance. Making similar threatening speeches with top generals of military⁶⁵¹, Demirel, this time, did not act lenitively but pursued a forceful diplomacy where he explained that he strictly followed a leadership based on decisions held by NSC⁶⁵². This crisis could be regarded as a unique case for Post-Cold war period where weak coalition government, military, MFA bureaucracy and the President Demirel conducted a foreign policy in full coordination. It would be because of the fact that this was a problem threatening state security for a long time and counterparts of the crisis had not make any acceptable efforts in solution. Looking from another perspective, due to its high connection with domestic politics and popularity in the public, this crisis could be accepted as an issue for consolidating and conciliating different units of Turkish state which were frayed off due to domestic conflicts before and after military memorandum of 28 February 1997. Besides, this coercive diplomacy could be understood in a way that international support was already taken from the US in addition to green light of Israel for its supports as it was reported by Özkan⁶⁵³. Here, by noting how Demirel were using his own influence and authority in critical foreign policy cases thanks to his charismatic leadership and international network, Öymen notes that Öcalan crisis could be regarded as one of such cases where Demirel's individual influence was very dominant whenever

⁶⁵⁰ Şihmantepe, *Türk Dış Politikasında Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel & Dış Politika Kriz Davranışları Üzerine Bir Araştırma*, 166-172.

⁶⁵¹ Press release for General Atilla Ateş's speech is available on <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/suriyeye-sabrimiz-kalmadi-39038649>

⁶⁵² Şihmantepe, *Türk Dış Politikasında Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel & Dış Politika Kriz Davranışları Üzerine Bir Araştırma*, 176.

⁶⁵³ Tuncay Özkan, *Operasyon*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2000), [This support of US and Israel is also mentioned in Thomas Gordon's non-academic memoirs. Thomas Gordon, *Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad*, (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2009)]

bureaucracy got stuck at international level⁶⁵⁴. Likewise, Çetin mentions how Demirel actively participated to Öcalan crisis by putting coercive pressure to Syria on the one hand and utilized the influence of Mubarak as a mediator between Turkey and Syria on the other⁶⁵⁵. In this respect, independent from the underlying background, Öcalan crisis could be regarded differently in terms of Demirel's approach to Post-Cold War crisis.

For this period, another crisis with Iran in May 1995 would also be mentioned even though it was not labelled as a foreign policy crisis in the literature. Before Kardak-Imia crisis, with the support of military, Çiller's decision for a military operation within Iranian territory due to a chase for PKK members had been cancelled by Demirel at the last minute which would have broken out a serious conflict with Iran at that time⁶⁵⁶. According to Çetin and Öymen, this unexpected decision of Çiller was prevented and a possible crisis was overcome by Demirel thanks to his participation through diplomatic conversations with Rafsanjani and cautious warning to government⁶⁵⁷. All in all, excluding the unique characteristics of specific crises, it could be argued that Demirel's approach for this period's foreign policy crises presented a similar way of leadership where he prioritized international support and third-party mediation rather than sticking to dominance of domestic developments.

⁶⁵⁴ Interview with Öymen.

⁶⁵⁵ Interview with Çetin.

⁶⁵⁶ For the details about Iran operation, See Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Çankaya Muhalefeti*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2002).

⁶⁵⁷ Interviews with Bayar, Çetin and Öymen. [Bayar also mentions that, under consideration for power capacity and resources, Demirel followed a stronger policy in Öcalan crisis but resisted to a military intervention to Iran even though military and Çiller were not in line with him.]

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

What could be concluded about operating mechanism of Turkish foreign policy making and underlying dynamics behind the black-box? Does Turkey have a unique way of decision making in political practice for its foreign policy? What could be mentioned about Demirel's leadership on specific foreign policy crises and the consistency with leadership trait analysis assessed in theoretical chapter. Throughout the research, this thesis has analysed the interrelation between state institutions and their influence on foreign policy decision-making process of Süleyman Demirel as the political leader in order to understand how priorities of state institutions were developed and whether those priorities were taken into consideration by Demirel in his final decision or not. In the analysis of his decision-making process, impact of international, regional, domestic and organization developments together with type of political unit and role of the leader in that unit have been assessed as the first step for their role of constraining decision maker on the one hand and offering opportunities on the other. Then it is evaluated how the role of state institutions evolve in that process and how those institutions put their institutional priorities in the foreign policy agenda of that political leader. Finally, effect of the process itself in decision making has been assessed by analysing the various types of foreign policy crises considering the varying roles and strategies of political decision maker.

Demirel and Constraints for His Decision Making in Foreign Policy

Within consideration of the relation between political leaders and state institutions in foreign policy making, by also searching through the academic literature on those points, the first conclusion of this thesis is that political decision

makers have the dominant primary role in foreign policy making due to their both legal and traditional role in governing. The legal role defined in legislation together with their legal authority for appointing or unseating top officials in any state institutions give a primary source of power to prime ministers in foreign policy decision making and appointing the ones that will conduct that policy. In this respect, having enjoyed that legal and traditional role, it could be said that Demirel used this power pertinaciously but had not run counter to proposals of state institutions because he attached importance to accumulated technical experience of those institutions where his bureaucratic past also rooted in that same experience. That is to say, rather than total acquiescing to all policy proposals of institutions developed within their institutional culture and experience, Demirel selectively utilized these proposals as long as they were in line with his own understanding of realist, pragmatic and cautious policy priorities. In this respect, it could be said that, with the exception of prime ministers being exclusively strong source of power as political decision makers due to traditional Turkish state experience, Allison and Zelikow's bureaucratic politics model fit in Demirel's foreign policy leadership up to a point where his decision-making process provided environment for bureaucracy to get involved in that process through institutional channels and personage connections.

It is important to note here that Demirel's pragmatism could not be regarded as a Machiavellian pragmatism of short-term opportunistic calculations. In this respect, Bayar regards Demirel as a more Kantian leader with his orientation for peace keeping⁶⁵⁸.

Secondly, it could be noted that type of the government has been highly influential in foreign policy decision making due to tendency in Turkish policy making for interconnecting foreign policy issues and domestic policy issues where governments have been pressured in foreign policy decision making by opposition parties and even by their coalition partners for the sake of popularism in domestic politics. This, in return, puts governments in a dilemma of choosing between long-term national interests, which would not be visible in their credentials, and short-term individual goals for their future in domestic politics. This could be a high source of

⁶⁵⁸ Interview with Bayar.

influence if the coalition government has been between parties with the same or similar ideological front. In other words, if coalition partners appeal to same voting bloc, it could be argued that this tendency to manipulate foreign policy issues for the sake of domestic gains increases. Demirel, in most of the cases, could be argued to isolate foreign policy decision making from domestic goals with the exception of his coalition with Erbakan in Cold War.

Even though his manoeuvres in coalition government would be regarded as conjunctural temporary political games until gaining enough power⁶⁵⁹, this brings the third conclusion that Demirel was influenced by domestic politics in his foreign policy leadership in the Cold War period in contrast to his leadership in Post-Cold War period.

Even though Tuncer reports from Demirel that he mentioned the dominance of domestic dynamics to foreign dynamics⁶⁶⁰, this research finds out that this argument of Demirel could be valid for his Cold War administrations however foreign developments or international structure seemed to play a major role in his foreign policy leadership than domestic developments in Post-Cold War. Looking at the table of matrix below, a comparison between Demirel's decisions in foreign policy crises reveal that systemic determinants had a great role in influencing his decision priorities. Especially his resisting stance to the US in Cold War period for his prospective gains in domestic politics, such as in poppy and embargo crisis, could not be visible in the Post-Cold War. Here, his resistance could not be regarded only as a result of domestic calculation but also his foreign policy approach of international relations at equal level and his understanding of "foreign policy with personality".

Another conclusion that could be derived from practices of Demirel is his adaptation of leadership style to changing role in state apparatus. President Demirel come to the forefront with is leadership in conciliating different state institutions, governments and parliament for a common policy agenda so that a stronger decision-making process could be achieved. Especially his leadership at NSC meetings could be regarded as his new way of involvement in foreign policy decision making where

⁶⁵⁹ Bayar supports this argument rather than a total influence of government type on Demirel.

⁶⁶⁰ Tuncer, "Süleyman Demirel", 150.

he persuaded state institutions and government for his policy orientation whenever there is contradiction between institutional priorities.

Table 8: Matrix for Decision Making in Changing Role and Period

CRISES	PERIOD	ROLE OF DEMİREL	LEADERSHIP
Cyprus Crisis (1967)	C.W.	P.M. in Single Party Gov.	Domestic >Foreign
Poppy Crisis (1968-1974)	C.W.	P.M. in Single Party Gov.	Domestic>Foreign
Casus Belli Crisis (1973-1976)	C.W.	P.M. in Coal. Gov.	Domestic>Foreign
NOTAM-FIR Crisis (1974-1979)	C.W.	P.M. in Coal. Gov.	Domestic>Foreign
Nakhichevan Crisis (1992-1994)	Post-C.W.	P.M. in Coal. Gov./ President	Foreign>Domestic
Muavenet Crisis (1992)	Post-C.W.	President	Foreign>Domestic
Aegean Sea Crisis (1994-1995)	Post-C.W.	President/Weak Coal. Gov.	Foreign>Domestic
Kardak-Imia Crisis (1996)	Post-C.W.	President/Weak Coal. Gov.	Foreign>Domestic
S-300 Missile Crisis (1997)	Post-C.W.	President/Weak Coal. Gov.	Foreign>Domestic
Öcalan Crisis (1998)	Post-C.W.	President/Weak Coal. Gov.	Domestic>Foreign*

As in the cases of Öcalan crisis and the attempt for military intervention to Iran by Çiller government on 7 May 1995, it could be argued that Demirel resisted to government and military for preventing them to pursue their policy proposals. Here, Öcalan crisis, even though it was not a selected case in this research, presents a difference in Demirel’s peaceful Post-Cold War leadership where he preferred threatening attitude and mentioned forceful measures against Syria and Greece.

As discussed in the previous chapter, it could be argued that he was certain about international support for capturing the leader of a terrorist organization where

it was claimed to be assured by the US at the initial stage. Within this perspective, it could still be argued that Demirel's position for granting international support and legitimacy in his policy actions were valid in all of the crises cases.

As it was discussed in theoretical chapter that concern for economic development, building a strategic vision, seeking foreign alliance when decision maker is in trouble in domestic politics and finally the need for success in their domestic policy agenda affect foreign policy making as structural dynamics, Demirel also utilized those dynamics in his foreign policy making. Keeping strong alliance with the US and developing relations with Soviet Union for his concerns for economic development in the Cold War, increasing international relations with Middle Eastern states, European Union and Central Asian states for building a strategic vision in the Post-Cold War, conducting a foreign policy with careful timing and successful manoeuvres in Cyprus and arms sale embargo together with poppy crisis by manipulating domestic politics could be regarded as the structural instruments utilized by Demirel in his foreign policy leadership.

Last but not least, it could be observed that Demirel in Post-Cold War period preferred to get on well with the US as hegemonic power and Russia Federation as regional power in almost all foreign policy crisis in contrast to his resistance to both states in Cold War crises.

This policy orientation could be either regarded as past experience of Demirel about his policies and military interventions following those policies, or bringing a new perspective to his policy understanding that new world order would not let foreign policies that were not in line with hegemonic power's or regional powers' global priorities. This, however, did not mean that Demirel pursued policies whatever those powers dictated but could be said that he asked for their assistance or mediation in problems for the sake of peaceful solutions which otherwise would bring unilateral Turkish intervention that would damage their policy priorities.

Demirel and State Institutions: Cooperation and Coordination in Foreign Policy Making

National Security Council in Foreign Policy Decision Making

What kind of conclusions could be drawn for role of state institutions and institutional and other channels that were used for participating decision-making process of Demirel? Considering the importance of institutions and institutionalization of “Constitutional State” for Demirel, NSC could be argued to have a very crucial role in his foreign policy decision making due to its role in policy recommendations to government on the one hand and its nature of reaching a final compromised decision as a result of brain storm based on technical expertise of different key institutions and objective information immune from political influence. In his presidency, it has been argued that his way of reaching a decision by asking questions to every member of NSC and to bureaucrats in accordance with their technical expertise and experience provided an environment for NSC members to hold their arguments free from any kind of pressure⁶⁶¹.

About his prime ministry in Cold War and Post-Cold War, it could be concluded based on interviews that Demirel carefully considered the concerns of military and MFA bureaucracy at those NSC meetings in order to filter their technical proposals in his own decision-making process in order to come up with well calculated policies based on resources, capabilities and limitations of state institutions which were expected to conduct his directives.

About the functioning of NSC and military’s influence on other members of NSC, even though academic literature mentions the dominance and pressure of military members at NSC meetings, it could not neither be validated through written memoirs nor through interviews.

It would be right to note a potential implicit power of military for influencing or pressuring civilian members of NSC due to traditional sources of its power and nature of foreign policy crises of Turkey however this potential power had not been

⁶⁶¹ Interviews with Vahapoğlu, Celasin, Öymen and Bayar.

exerted by military in normal conditions⁶⁶². Considering this argument based on interviews and written documents, it would be concluded that none of state institutions had deteriorated their legally and institutionally defined roles at NSC meetings and this institution had been regarded as the core source for decision making in foreign policy issues.

Military in Foreign Policy Decision Making

It has been argued that traditional role of military in Turkish politics brought military a suitable ground for participating foreign policy issues which also utilized the legal and institutional channels for legitimization of its involvement in non-military issues. Even though democratic regimes prefer to benefit from military only as a source of defence power in grand policies for foreign affairs, it could be said that Turkish military had more than this in policy formulation. As the primary institutional channel, National Security Council had been regarded as the ground that top leaders of military issued their concerns and policy priorities in foreign policy through securitization of political issues as the main guardian of the regime. As it is seen in poppy crisis in contrast to Cyprus or embargo crises, it could be observed that military did not prefer to involve in foreign policy issues if they did not have priority in policy agenda of military where involvement of military in poppy crisis was not visible in Demirel's decision making.

Even though Bayar's argument on Demirel's efforts for keeping military distant from MFA's functioning in foreign policy was mentioned that, it could still be argued that arms sale embargo and policies after Cyprus intervention presented a picture where military involved highly in foreign policy decision making. However, it is also noteworthy that Demirel let military to actively participate to those crises as long as it was in line with his priorities which could also be regarded as Demirel's way of utilizing domestic power of military in foreign policy issues against his political opponents or foreign rivals.

⁶⁶² In interviews, Çetin, Karayalçın, Öymen and Vahapoğlu note that a pressure by military on Demirel or civilian bureaucracy had never been experienced at NSC meetings in their terms.

Here it is also worth to revisit Allison and Zelikow's organizational behaviour model where they mentioned the policy proposals of state institution prepared under short-sighted institutional priorities based on pre-established templates which could be only sufficient enough rather than rationally calculated optimum proposals. Kardak-Imia crisis, for instance, reveals that military could only propose alternative actions based on its military tactics which could lead to a war or far from solving the problem. Cyprus case of 1967 also presents an example for this short-sighted institutional understanding where a probable failure was prevented thanks to Demirel's awareness about unreadiness of military in terms of its equipment for an intervention, which brought the victory of 1974 intervention due to early preparations for equipping the army.

It has been discussed in earlier chapters that military would not prefer to intervene in foreign policy process in normal political conditions if the case was not in its priority. At this point, it would not be wrong to argue that military preferred to stay back and let the last word to politicians in crises which would lead to a war and would hold military responsible for ramifications. Cases for Nakhichevan and Kardak-Imia support this conclusion where military did not insist on its own policy proposals and compromised with alternatives proposed by MFA bureaucracy.

At the last stage, it could be concluded that military was not as active in all foreign policy issues and influential in neither MFA bureaucracy's functioning nor Demirel's decision making as it has been argued in common literature even though a moderate level of involvement could be regarded if the case had a priority in military's security agenda⁶⁶³.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Foreign Policy Decision Making

It has been discussed that legal role provided by Constitution and other legislations give the duty of conducting governments' foreign policy objectives to

⁶⁶³ This argument is also supported by Bayar and Öymen where Bayar mention that Demirel never allowed military to intervene MFA functioning and Öymen underlines that military was quite respectful to state institutions and never had any intention to dominate MFA bureaucracy and even asked almost all military issues to MFA as long as they included a foreign policy dimension. Even though there had been some disagreements within policy alternatives, MFA bureaucracy always tried its best to find suitable ground for conciliation. Interviews with Bayar and Öymen.

MFA and its de-facto involvement in preparation for foreign policy part of government programme and National Security Policy Documents provide an environment for its bureaucracy to move from conducting to formulating foreign policy even though this formulation could not go beyond the will of governments. Under this discussion, it could be concluded that MFA bureaucracy actively participated to all foreign policy crises decision making in Demirel's leadership thanks to its very well-trained diplomats and their institutional channels through political decision makers. Because traditional policy principles of "*pacta sunt servanda*" and "*status quo*" for keeping the country away from irredentism and dangerous adventures together with policy orientation of realist, pragmatist and cautious approach has been shared by both Demirel and MFA bureaucracy, it could be concluded that this bureaucratic core has been the major element in Demirel's decision making where its policy proposals have been filtered by Demirel in consideration of voters' preferences and expectations with his political leadership. Even though Demirel dominated the decision-making process in foreign policy crises, it would be right to mention the influence of MFA thanks to its technical expertise and historical experience.

Other than presenting information and providing policy alternatives at NSC meetings, MFA bureaucracy utilized other bureaucratic channels which included providing foreign policy advisors to Demirel in his prime ministry and presidency as a direct channel for communication in policy formulation on the one hand and using personal connections of its ministers as an advantage for providing information and alternative actions in foreign policy issues in accordance with bureaucratic politics model of Allison and Zelikow. This, however, could not go beyond providing proposals as long as the information was filtered carefully because Demirel had been well aware of every detail about policy issues in his leadership⁶⁶⁴. As in the case of Kardak-Imia crisis, for instance, it could be noted that Demirel was not convinced with the arguments of Çiller provided by MFA Undersecretary and he warned both government and state institutions to be cautious and accurate in their arguments and

⁶⁶⁴ Interview with Bayar.

actions where his approval was needed in case of a military confrontation as the Chief Commander of the Army. That is to say, MFA bureaucracy was supported and included in foreign policy decision making by Demirel because its proposals and arguments were in line with international legitimacy gained by international law and bilateral agreements due to its accumulated experience and expertise.

Finally, unlike Özal administration, under Demirel's leadership, there could be argued a mutual respect and trust between Demirel and MFA bureaucracy where Demirel gave importance to institutional role of MFA and MFA bureaucracy provided the best support in bureaucratic terms with highest efforts⁶⁶⁵. In this respect, MFA bureaucracy could be regarded to have a discrete opportunity of preserving its institutional culture and priorities in addition to finding suitable environment for making itself heard in terms of defending national interest in its own way of understanding.

Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) and Concluding Remarks

In the table below, role and influence of the actors in decision making for specific foreign policy crises has been summarized together with constraining dynamics for leadership where Demirel's Leadership Trait Analysis has also been added in to matrix. As it was discussed in the theoretical and biographical chapters, leadership traits such as being open to information, challenging constrains, peaceful nature, cooperative and risk averse tactics rather than threatening strategy have been measured in LTA for Demirel. Revisiting poppy and embargo crises for Cold War period on the one hand, Nakhichevan and Kardak-Imia crises for Post-Cold War period on the other hand, it could be argued that leadership traits mentioned in the literature corresponded with Demirel's policy actions and leadership.

⁶⁶⁵ Interview with Ziyal.

Table 9: Matrix for Decision Making and Role of Actors

Actor/Crisis	Poppy	Embargo	Nakhichevan	Kardak-Imia
Military	No Influence in Demirel period	High Influence, Diplomatic Means,	Moderate Influence, Coercive	High Influence, Coercive, Military Means
MFA	Resistance, Diplomatic Means	Coercive, Cautious, Diplomatic Means	Cautious, Diplomatic Means	Coercive, Diplomatic Means
Constraints	International and domestic in opposite directions	Domestic	Domestic and regional	International, regional and domestic in opposite directions
Demirel	Resistance, Cautious, Diplomatic Means	Coercive, Cautious, Diplomatic Means	Cautious, Peaceful, Diplomatic Means	Cautious, Peaceful, Diplomatic Means
LTA Analysis	Open to information, challenge constraints, peaceful, cooperative understanding in tactics, risk averse	Open to information, challenge constraints, peaceful, cooperative understanding in tactics, risk averse	Open to information, peaceful, relationship focused, evangelistic, cooperative understanding in tactics, risk averse	Open to information, peaceful, relationship focused, evangelistic, cooperative understanding in tactics, risk averse

Even though a distinction for Demirel's leadership was made between his prime ministry and presidency in the literature, it could be argued that this distinction would be better concluded when it is made between Demirel's leadership in Cold

War and Post-Cold War periods. In Post-Cold War period, no matter he was prime minister or president, it could be observed that he presented relationship focused and evangelistic traits in his leadership on foreign policy crises.

In this respect, a conclusion could be drawn about the consistency in quantitative analysis and interpretative evaluation about Demirel's foreign policy leadership by assessing his decision-making process in those cases analysed. All in all, insights derived from Turkish state tradition should also be considered in order to complete the framework for functioning of mechanisms within black-box. First of all, traditional prestige and popularity of military opens could be regarded to provide environment for military's involvement to foreign policy unlike other democratic regimes however it could also be observed that military had not abused this source of power by drawing its own lines for constraining itself in crises situations in accordance with its traditional role of guarding the state.

Even after the military interventions as the worst cases, military quickly withdrew from civilian administration and left the foreign policy ground to politicians and well-experienced MFA bureaucracy with some exceptions such as approving the return of Greece to NATO without informing MFA⁶⁶⁶.

Secondly, state tradition could be understood as principles and practices filtered and brewed within accumulated experience of institutions and technical expertise of officers within these institutions. At this point, MFA bureaucracy has been well praised by Demirel due to high quality observed in policy practices conducted by that bureaucracy due to experience and expertise, some of whom were even martyred by ASALA terrorism when those diplomats were striving for their nation. Within this consideration, it could be noted that MFA bureaucracy has been doing its best in order to serve the governments disregarding their ideological differences and Demirel benefitted from this bureaucracy as much as possible. Even in the relations with Armenia and psychological barriers of past experiences due to

⁶⁶⁶Here, Bayar argues that decision for reversal of NOTAM 714 above Aegean Sea in February 1980 was a very well-planned diplomatic action prepared and conducted by MFA bureaucracy and Demirel in order to show Turkey's position in ending conflicts without giving up an important trump-card however accepting Greece to NATO demolished this diplomatic move. Interview with Bayar. For the discussions about reversal of NOTAM 714 in parliamentary minutes on 26/04/1980, See <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/t19/c019/tbmm19019032.pdf>

ASALA terrorism, efforts of MFA bureaucracy in conducting relations with Armenia in Nakhichevan crisis through secret diplomacy reveal that MFA did not pose an institutional reflex or resistance for managing foreign policy for the sake of national interest. There is no evidence that MFA bureaucracy implicitly or explicitly refused to provide its service to any kind of government with any ideology as long as a government pose a threat to national interest in foreign policy for ideological or domestic purposes. Indeed, it is also not possible for civil servants in legal terms to refuse providing service who are appointed by governments however MFA finds out some institutional channels to materialize whenever a government goes too far in deteriorating national interest with adventurous policy orientation. As an example, Bayar notes how MFA bureaucrats directly contacted to President Demirel when Çiller government prepared a military operation against Iran in contrast to MFA recommendations⁶⁶⁷. Nonetheless, this could be regarded as an exceptional way of participating decision making in non-conventional way and MFA bureaucracy mostly prefer to use its legal role of providing policy alternatives to its minister in accordance with rules of hierarchy.

Finally, being elected thanks to voters' preferences, political leaders have enjoyed being the primary source of power in governing the country in line with its premises reported in election campaign and government programme. Because it is political leaders who are major actor to be called to account by public, they are regarded as the main legitimate source of power in formulating and conducting foreign policy in line with national interest which should be built on needs of the nation. Having aware of this right and duty, political leaders such as Demirel prioritize the will of nation in their decision making and filter the institutional priorities within their motivation supported by public. Under this consideration, rather than starting all over again by rejecting any past practices, it could be concluded that Demirel continued most of the ongoing policy practices prepared within main principles and orientation derived from institutional expertise and experience, which had been trusted by him.

⁶⁶⁷ Interview with Bayar.

In sum, Demirel did not pursue a foreign policy as a lone wolf in a desire of being a hero but coordinated and conciliated various responsible parties and units in order to develop the foreign policy where its principles and priorities were reached out of common wisdom of “Constitutional state” as he mostly referred.

This thesis attempted to bring a unique hybrid research design in order to understand the political leadership and institutional influence in foreign policy making with their counter interaction and interrelation. Within this perspective, its focus on opening up the black-box of Turkish state in foreign policy formulation and application has aimed to draw some highlights for scholars in their prospective studies. Besides, its findings and conclusions, which were supported with academic literature, parliamentary minutes, oral interviews, biographical memoirs and official documents released by US state departments, could be regarded as a source of data driven out of historical cases with its international and domestic variables for the use prospective policy makers. Even though individual bias and subjectivity of memoirs and interviews have been tried to neutralize by cross-check between the information supported by the informants and by double check with supporting US documents, it has still the limitation of unavailability for access to Turkish national archives of National Security Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Turkish Armed Forces. It is believed that a more comprehensive and straight head research could be achieved when classification problem of national archives is overcome and opened to use of researchers.

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Interviews

Interview with Ergin Celasin 13/09/2019 in Ankara

Interview with Hikmet Çetin on 02/10/2019 in Ankara

Interview with Mehmet Ali Bayar on 23/09/2019 in İstanbul

Interview with Muhsin Demirel on 17/09/2019 in Ankara

Interview with Murat Karayalçın on 28/08/2019 in Ankara

Interview with Mustafa Hidayet Vahapoğlu on 27/09/2019 in Ankara

Interview with Namık Kemal Zeybek on 11/07/2019 in Ankara

Interview with Onur Öymen on 26/09/2019 in İstanbul

Interview with Uğur Ziyal on 28/09/2019 in Ankara

Interview with Yiğit Alpogan on 09/09/2019 in Ankara

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APPENDICES

A: INTERVIEW LIST

N.	Name-Surname	Date-Place	Connection to Demirel
1	Ergin Celasin	On 13/09/2019 in Ankara	Former Turkish Air Forces Force Commander and Former Secretary General for NSC
2	Hikmet Çetin	On 03/10/2019 in Ankara	Former Foreign Affairs Minister
3	Mehmet Ali Bayar	On 23/09/2019 in İstanbul	Foreign policy advisor to Demirel
4	Murat Karayalçın	On 28/08/2019 in Ankara	Former Foreign Affairs Minister
5	Mustafa Hidayet Vahapoğlu	On 27/09/2019 in Ankara	Longest Serving Bureaucrat and Colonel at Secretariat General for NSC
6	Muhsin Demirel	On 17/09/2019 in Ankara	Retired Specialist at State Planning Organization, Acquaintance of Demirel in his politically banned period
7	Namık Kemal Zeybek	On 11/07/2019 in Ankara	Policy Advisor to Demirel on Central Asia, Former Minister of Culture and Minister of State
8	Onur Öymen	On 26/09/2019 in İstanbul	Former Undersecretary for MFA
9	Uğur Ziyal	On 28/09/2019 in Ankara	Former Undersecretary for MFA
10	Yiğit Alpogan	On 09/09/2019 in Ankara	First Civilian Secretary General for NSC

B: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Questions on Demirel's Foreign Policy Leadership and Decision Making

- 1- How would you evaluate Demirel's principles, vision and practices on foreign policy issues?
- 2- What would you like to say about foreign policy leadership and decision making of Demirel?
- 3- How would you evaluate Demirel's foreign policy decision making in Cold-War, Post-Cold War, in single party government, coalition government, prime ministry and presidency?
- 4- What could be argued about Demirel's decision making and leadership when there had been a discord between military and MFA bureaucracy in foreign policy issues?
- 5- What would you like to say about Demirel's decision-making process for poppy crisis?
- 6- What would you like to say about Demirel's decision-making process for US arms sale embargo crisis?
- 7- What would you like to say about Demirel's decision-making process for Nakhichevan crisis?
- 8- What would you like to say about Demirel's decision-making process for Kardak-Imia crisis?
- 9- What would you like to mention about Demirel's attitude towards MFA bureaucracy, military and other institutions in his foreign policy decision making?

Questions on Role of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bureaucracy in Foreign Policy Decision Making

- 1- How would you evaluate the role of MFA bureaucracy in defining, formulating and conducting the foreign policy?
- 2- What would you like to argue about channels and instruments that MFA bureaucracy utilized in participating Demirel's foreign policy decision making?
- 3- Could it be possible to mention any kind of resistance or institutional reflex of MFA bureaucracy against political decision makers in foreign policy making?

- 4- What would you like to argue about application of organizational behaviour model and bureaucratic politics model of Allison and Zelikow in Turkish foreign policy making in terms of MFA bureaucracy? (Two models are summarized to informants)
- 5- What would you like to say about role of MFA bureaucracy in Demirel's decision-making process for poppy crisis? Could you please evaluate the role of MFA bureaucracy at every stage of Demirel's decisions?
- 6- What would you like to say about role of MFA bureaucracy in Demirel's decision-making process for US arms sale embargo crisis? Could you please evaluate the role of MFA bureaucracy at every stage of Demirel's decisions?
- 7- What would you like to say about role of MFA bureaucracy in Demirel's decision-making process for Nakhichevan crisis? Could you please evaluate the role of MFA bureaucracy at every stage of Demirel's decisions?
- 8- What would you like to say about role of MFA bureaucracy in Demirel's decision-making process for Kardak-Imia crisis? Could you please evaluate the role of MFA bureaucracy at every stage of Demirel's decisions?

Questions on Role of Military in Foreign Policy Decision Making

- 1- How would you evaluate de-facto traditional role attributed to military in terms of foreign policy making?
- 2- Would you agree with the argument that military used its influence and power in order to pressure civilian bureaucracy and political decision makers in foreign policy issues?
- 3- What would you like to argue about channels and instruments that military utilized in participating Demirel's foreign policy decision making?
- 4- Could it be possible to mention any kind of resistance or institutional reflex of military against political decision makers in foreign policy making?
- 5- What would you like to argue about application of organizational behaviour model and bureaucratic politics model of Allison and Zelikow in Turkish foreign policy making in terms of military?
- 6- What would you like to say about role of military in Demirel's decision-making process for poppy crisis? Could you please evaluate the role of MFA bureaucracy at every stage of Demirel's decisions?
- 7- What would you like to say about role of military in Demirel's decision-making process for US arms sale embargo crisis? Could you please evaluate the role of MFA bureaucracy at every stage of Demirel's decisions?
- 8- What would you like to say about role of military in Demirel's decision-making process for Nakhichevan crisis? Could you please evaluate the role of MFA bureaucracy at every stage of Demirel's decisions?
- 9- What would you like to say about role of military in Demirel's decision-making process for Kardak-Imia crisis? Could you please evaluate the role of MFA bureaucracy at every stage of Demirel's decisions?

Questions on Functioning of NSC in Foreign Policy Decision Making

- 1- What would you like to say about agenda setting, functioning and decision-making processes for NSC and General Secretariat for NSC?
- 2- How would you evaluate the role, influence and dominance of different state institutions in foreign policy decision making at NSC meetings?
- 3- What would you like to mention about role of NSC in foreign policy making for Cold War and Post-Cold War periods?
- 4- How would you evaluate the role of National Intelligence Organization in foreign policy decision making at NSC meetings?
- 5- How would you evaluate Demirel's approach to National Security Council (NSC) in foreign policy making in his prime ministry and presidency?

C: DECLASSIFIED CIA DOCUMENTS

1- Scope: Demirel // Document No: CIA-RDP79-00927A005500070002-5

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left best typified by the Marxist Turkish Labor Party (TLP) headed by Mehmet Ali Aybar, who was arrested in 1953 for Communist activities.

Demirel will remain on trial during the coming year. He must gain complete control of the lethargic administrative machinery of government. He is already convinced of the danger of overreacting to criticism, and appears determined not to make the same mistakes that led to the downfall in 1960--and later execution by the military government--of prime minister Menderes. Demirel's government must promote a new vigor in the national economy in a way that will sustain the confidence of the people and especially the business community.

Democracy is likewise on trial. In the face of the influential RPP-oriented minority which believes it knows best what is good for Turkey and that it

should rule in Turkey regardless of the popular will. Demirel must prove that his thesis of the "national will" is the right choice for Turkey.

Demirel and His Government

Demirel uses his own humble beginnings to explain his faith in democracy for Turkey. He relates himself to the people and their problems and professes a great faith in their vitality and capacity. Demirel--an engineer by profession--is basically a technocrat, having been general director of the State Hydraulic Works (DSI) before the revolution and as such gaining a reputation for honesty and able administration. He is also recognized as a better-than-average economist, and is a firm believer in the free enterprise system. He helped prepare Turkey's first five-year economic plan 1963-67 and has visited the US twice--in 1949 and 1950 as an AID grantee and again in 1954 and 1955 as the first Turk to receive an Eisenhower exchange scholarship.

It was not until 1962 that Demirel gained any important stature in policies. His choice as president general of the JP in 1964 was widely acclaimed as a triumph for its moderate faction and was regarded as improving the party acceptability to the military leadership. The JP under Demirel won election in 1965 on a platform associating Turkey with the West and favoring increased private investment.

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The Demirel government has remained substantially unchanged during its first year. The prime minister, however, has been under considerable pressure within the JP to make several new appointments. Largely for political reasons, he has postponed such a move until after the party's national convention--scheduled for 27-30 November--in order to avoid opposition on the convention floor. The anticipated changes are not expected to represent any change in policy.

Demirel's greatest accomplishment has been winning the confidence, cooperation, and support of the military high command. The finesse with which he handled the delicate circumstances surrounding the presidential transition from the incapacitated General Cemal Gursel to General Cevdet Sunay drew widespread admiration. Sunay's selection as president in late March 1966 offered public proof of the rapprochement between the JP and the military high command.

Deficiencies

Demirel's regime is weak in several areas. It is short of technically and administratively qualified personnel, thus limiting Demirel's ability to reform the civil service. The opposition, though disunited, is strong and there is continued evidence of dissension among the lower echelons of the military. The inventory of problems also includes the perennial Cyprus dispute, increasing concern over the Kurdish minority, increasing leftist activities, an upsurge of

anti-Americanism, and a budgetary deficit.

The underlying political tension and the incipient military unease probably were the most persistent sources of concern during the past year. There were times when the opposition appeared determined to provoke military intervention. Early in the year, lengthy debates over the thorny Cyprus issue and over adoption of the annual budget, plus a filibuster over the electoral bill, produced an acrimonious atmosphere in the assembly and for a time threatened to develop into a full-scale crisis. Although there were reports of new plotting within the military, the opposition, which was promoting the crisis atmosphere, apparently realized that it stood to lose as much as the JP from military intervention in government affairs. In any event, the political atmosphere was not conducive to another revolution at this time.

While the Turkish political scene now appears generally calm, and Demirel and opposition leader Inonu have even been observed recently arm in arm, the underlying tension among the political forces still exists. The deep split in Turkey's political life was demonstrated recently by the highly partisan press treatment of the death of former president Gursel on the anniversary of the execution of former prime minister Menderes. Some people even alleged it was retribution. To some extent the aura of the 27 May 1960 revolution remains the touchstone of political identity

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in Turkey. Representatives of the RPP have indicated that, during the current session of parliament, they will continue to emphasize the importance of the revolution and guide their action accordingly.

Former president Bayar, jailed after the 1960 revolution, but given a presidential amnesty last July because of age and ill health, is also apparently trying to reinject his influence into the political scene. There were even reports that he had given the word to dump Demirel, but there is no evidence that he has the influence to accomplish such a feat. Demirel accords Bayar a certain prestige as a senior citizen and former government leader and meets with him from time to time, but there is no evidence that Bayar has any influence on Demirel's decisions.

Demirel and the Military

The Demirel regime has the general sanction of the military high command, but political extremists of both left and right have their sympathizers in military circles. This has been exploited by the opposition to deepen antiregime sentiment and drive a wedge between the military leaders and the lower echelons of the armed forces.

Some of the "life senators" --former members of the military Committee of National Union (CNU) that engineered the 1960 revolution--have tried to fan the sparks of dissension with the ultimate goal of unseating the

government. Since the senatorial elections last June, there has also been a campaign by the opposition press against selected military leaders designed to alienate the body of the military from its top leadership.

If the junior officers can be convinced that the high command has thrown in its lot with the JP, they may be encouraged to attempt another coup patterned after the abortive 1962-63 attempt led by retired Colonel Aydemir, who was executed for his efforts. There is also some danger that General Tural, the chief of the General Staff and his associates might generate politically unwise countermeasures against the opposition which could lead to increasing unrest.

For example, the Turkish National Security Council is reported to have decided recently to take action against the leftist press, especially those elements attacking the military. Plans are currently being drawn up to implement this decision.

Economic Accomplishments

The economic accomplishments of the Demirel regime have been more impressive than its legislative record.

Economic activity in Turkey, on the upswing since 1964, experienced a sharp rise during the past year. Industrial production has increased markedly agricultural production is expected to reach record levels, due in part to above-average rainfall, and the over-all

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increase in the gross national product is expected to be close to 8.4 percent as compared with the 7 percent target set by the development plan. During the first nine months of 1966, private foreign investment almost doubled the total amount invested in either 1964 or 1965. For the first time in several years, the World Bank has made a direct loan to Turkey, reflecting greater confidence in Turkey's economic future.

The new upsurge of confidence among the Turkish business community resulted largely from a major publicity campaign by the government, including stumping tours this past summer by Prime Minister Demirel, President Sunay, and other government officials. Demirel claimed that the government is currently working on nearly 600 projects and that investments during the second five-year plan (1968-72) are expected to exceed \$10 billion. Major new projects include a new petrochemical plant in western Turkey and the Keban Dam on the Euphrates River in eastern Turkey. The government plans to triple both cement and electric power production, to double the country's oil refinery capacity, and to build a new copper complex, an aluminum plant, and a paper-making plant.

Soviet aid will be utilized for some of these projects under a protocol signed in November 1965. The protocol covers seven new industrial projects. These include a plant to produce vodka. A sulfuric acid plant is scheduled for completion in 1969 on a Soviet credit of \$4.4 million which is to be repaid by Turkish exports to the USSR over a 15-year period.

Foreign Relations

The Demirel regime remains firmly committed to Turkey's Western orientation and its ties to NATO and CENTO, but it has been subjected to strong opposition pressure to assume a more independent stance based primarily on Turkey's national self-interest.

This pressure, which reflects latent xenophobia and deep frustration over Cyprus, has caused an increase in anti-Americanism, marked by press attacks, demonstrations, insults, and open animosity and has led to restrictions of US military activity in Turkey. The tone of the propaganda, which has included exploitation of forged documents, suggests Communist participation. Recent demonstrations in Ankara and Adana may indicate that the US will soon face a new wave of anti-Americanism, particularly now that parliament is back in session.

The Demirel government has been promoting what has been termed a "foreign policy with a personality." The year has been marked by an unusually large number of contacts with the leaders of other countries--probably more than during any comparable period in modern Turkish history. In these exchange visits, the regime has tried to demonstrate its ability to broaden relations outside NATO and CENTO. In recent months the government has expanded Turkey's bilateral relations with the Arab states and the countries of Eastern Europe and has indicated its intention to establish closer ties with the new states of Africa.

The continuing dialogue on the Cyprus issue between Turkey and Greece has eased criticism of the government's handling of

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this dispute. Nonetheless, the opposition has indicated that Cyprus will probably become a major subject for debate during the upcoming general discussion of the budget for next year. The opposition wants to know more about what has been said during the highly secretive discussions over the past few months.

On Vietnam, the most that can be said is that the government has expressed sympathy for the people of South Vietnam who are struggling against Communism. The Turkish press is divided on the issue, with the leftist-influenced newspapers condemning the US action in Vietnam. The government has given its general moral and political support of US policy on Vietnam, but military support is not being contemplated at this time.

In general, the Demirel government's foreign policy has increased the country's stature abroad and has been popular at

home even though there is a growing popular demand for a more flexible and independent foreign policy which would lessen Turkey's dependence on the US. Most of these critics, however, want Turkey to maintain its Western orientation, although the Marxist Turkish Labor Party and some rightist elements tend to favor a more neutralist policy. Meanwhile, NATO remains the cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy, and Turkey continues to support the US on all basic East-West issues. Turkey recently requested a major review of bilateral US-Turkish mutual security arrangements and the sizable US presence and investment in Turkey may have to be reduced or at least brought under closer Turkish supervision.

Sunay as President

Cevdet Sunay, who resigned as chief of the Turkish General Staff to become President of Turkey in March 1966, is basically anti-Communist, pro-NATO, and pro-US. He is Turkey's most respected military leader, and lends much prestige to the government. Sunay regards himself as a needed stabilizing factor in the current political situation.

Under the terms of the constitution, the presidency is largely a ceremonial nonpolitical office with little power except through personal influence. The president has the authority to delay legislation but does not have a veto.

In his few months in office, General Sunay has adapted exceedingly well and is demonstrating considerable political acumen.

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length" and De Gaulle's departure makes it less of an election campaign issue. Barzel agreed that integration should not play a part in the campaign, but he expressed the fear that Brandt might take an initiative designed to inject it into the election. Both men continue to favor UK entry into the Common Market but neither expects it to happen quickly or easily.

Despite these strains in the coalition, the member parties will probably hang together until the elections, even though the government will be able to accomplish little of significance.

MIDDLE EAST

There is nothing significant to report.

SOVIET AFFAIRS

There is nothing significant to report.

II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS

TURKEY

The military is exerting strong pressure to prevent passage today of a constitutional amendment restoring full political rights to those ousted by the military coup nine years ago.

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[REDACTED] 50X1
[REDACTED] 50X1

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The beneficiaries of the amendment would be the faction led by former President Bayar in Prime Minister Demirel's Justice Party. (Bayar and his associates, while now permitted to belong to a political party, are still proscribed from running for office.) Demirel had been dragging his feet on introducing the bill, advocated not unnaturally by the Bayar faction, until opposition leader Inonu forced his hand by coming out for it ten days ago.

The odds are that the military's muscle flexing will be enough to persuade the Senate either to shelve the bill or defeat it. The military would probably much prefer to remain in the background, serving as the final arbiter on crucial decisions, but allowing the Demirel civilian government to continue doing most of the country's official business.

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Implications

If the Turkish collection effort against the 1970 opium crop is successful, it can then be anticipated that Ankara will urge that continued Turkish production of opium under controlled conditions constitutes a desirable resolution of past problems. Citing the presumed success of the 1970 collection effort, Demirel could argue that Turkish production would no longer be a source for the illicit market. Production henceforth would be strictly for domestic medicinal use and legal medicinal exports. The reported statements of officials in the state crop purchasing monopoly and recent remarks of Foreign Minister Caglayangill to US officials strongly indicate bureaucratic support for this position.

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Although poppy provides key support to a segment of the Turkish agricultural economy as a cash crop, it does not divert much land or labor from other crop output. Poppy, as noted above, is restricted to a very small portion of the cultivated land, and the bulk of the crop -- about 70% -- is in the ground during the winter season, when wheat is virtually the only other crop under cultivation. Since wheat requires little care between planting and harvesting, the farmer has plenty of time to devote to the raising of poppy and the harvesting of opium gum at no real cost to other production.

Even though poppy is grown on land that is otherwise nonproductive during the winter, it causes serious mineral depletion and the land so used must be rotated. In addition, poppy is not harvested until late May or early June; therefore, this land cannot be used for spring planting of other crops. Also a summer crop frequently is planted that is harvested early in the fall. Finally, the growing of poppy is a risky venture, depending upon favorable climatic conditions during the period and critical timing for harvesting.

In effecting a cessation of poppy cultivation in Turkey, problems would arise from the fact that no direct substitute crop is available, i.e., another crop that can be grown in the same season and earn a comparable cash income for the farmer. Winter wheat is practically the only other crop worthwhile or even possible to grow and the value of its output per unit of land is only about 40% that of poppy. Substituting winter wheat for poppy therefore would at best be only a partial offset to the farmer for forgoing poppy production, particularly since it is less readily marketable than poppy.

The need to concentrate on spring crops indicates that crop substitution would be a difficult change in a way of life in Turkish farming, which would have to occur in initial conditions of low productivity and primitive techniques. Russian sunflowers, sugar beets, and grain sorghums also are technical possibilities for summer production in the Anatolian Plain given average rainfall. Yields are likely to be considerably lower, however, than in areas with more adequate moisture. Other crops may

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be feasible as partial substitutes but in any case the question of crop suitability is a technical one that has yet to be worked out by specialists and the test of experience. What can be concluded at this point is that because of the technical difficulties and also because of the need to change human habits, crop substitution that fully compensates for the suppression of poppy would probably take many years to complete; it certainly could not be accomplished overnight.

Alternative Means of Suppressing Poppy Production

Crop substitution can be advanced as the only sensible way to abolish poppy production in Turkey in the long-run, but pre-emptive buying could be quite useful in the short-term.* If, for example, Turkey planned to terminate poppy production next year or possibly the next, then many of the types of pre-emptive buying might be used to good effect. These might include: an attempt by the Turkish government to buy up the entire crop; US pharmaceutical firms buying more than their usual annual amount of Turkish opium and stockpiling the surplus supply (the US firms would probably agree to this); and even, if need be, some buying from the illicit market. To be effective even in the short-run, of course, pre-emptive buying from the farmer presumes the ability to offer a price sufficiently high so that he receives an income at least equal to his usual income from licit and illicit production combined.

The Costs of Suppression and a Crop Substitution Program

The first principle to accept if the objective is to assure getting Turkey out of poppy production rapidly is the superiority of a multi-faceted attack on the problem. At the outset it seems safe to assume that no single approach -- such as plowing under the crop -- would be completely successful. Even with a combination of approaches complete success in the first year of the effort is probably not attainable. A multi-faceted attack, however, promises the greatest gains within the shortest time. To go a step further, the attack would from

* *Extensive pre-emptive buying in the long-run, of course, would only stimulate production.*

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the beginning address itself not only to controlling supply from the 1970 crop or suppressing future production but it would also from the beginning develop a crop substitution program. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The need for US assistance and, as appropriate, participation in the effort would be taken for granted.

The suppression aspects of a multi-faceted attack on Turkish poppy production would entail no very great costs. If the Turkish government were to attempt to buy the entire 1970 crop and fully compensate the farmers for their previous licit and illicit income, the cost could range from \$4 million to \$5 million. The Turkish government might possibly decide, moreover, to wait a year and purchase the 1971 crop also before enforcing a discontinuance of production. Considering the complexities of the enforcement task, the US aid appropriation to the Turkish police, \$1.4 million, probably represents a very conservative estimate of the likely costs.

The final bill for a crop substitution program would exceed the \$1.6 million US aid to Turkey currently in the pipeline for this purpose. Crop substitution costs at this stage are, of course, unpredictable. Depending on the scope of the definition, the total bill for crop substitution could be quite large. Aside from the initial cost for capital and technical assistance for starting new crops, the viability of the program would ultimately require educational and other costs that would be essential to raising the general level of agricultural technology. At some unknown point the expenditures on crop substitution would merge with the large costs of the development process itself. As will be argued below, however, there is little danger that the US would have to assume the burden of many of these larger developmental costs.

Turkey's Enforcement

The Turkish government has fairly strong political capabilities to enforce the suppression aspects of a crop substitution program. Prime

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Minister Demirel has both the prestige and popular appeal to be secure and effective in his leadership. The Turkish bureaucracy could reasonably be relied upon to make strong efforts to enforce suppression if it were ordered to do so.

Some indication of the Turkish capability for controls may be seen in the government's regulation of poppy acreage, traditionally on individual farms and more recently in reducing the number of provinces where poppy is grown, reportedly from 21 in 1967 to 11 in 1969. A government purchasing organization, TMO, monopolizes the legal opium trade and sets the production quotas that determine how much gum each farmer must deliver to the state. The Turkish monopoly usually purchases the amount of opium gum it thinks it can sell on the world licit market. This normally leaves the farmer with a surplus which he disposes of illicitly, usually for more but sometimes for even less than the government price.

Despite its considerable political capabilities, however, the Turkish government would find it difficult to enforce complete suppression of poppy production within a short period, say, two years. Demirel cannot be expected to blithely ignore the economic interest of the farm-owning poppy growers, who are politically the most influential segment of the population in their part of Anatolia. Rather than risk alienating the farmers he would doubtless prefer to sweeten poppy prohibition with full compensation for production forgone. In any event, it seems evident that he will resist taking action as drastic as plowing under the 1970 crop. Even though the Turkish police are relatively efficient, the essentially intractable nature of crop acreage control in general should also be considered. A pertinent example is the difficulties the US government encounters and the efforts it continuously exerts to control domestic tobacco and rice acreage. An additional enforcement problem of unknown proportion is the stockpiles of illicit opium that may exist in Turkey. Still, if the Turkish government were assured that outside financial aid would be

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available, its capability and probably its will to enforce suppression would be enhanced. In the first and possibly even the second year of a suppression effort, this aid would probably have to include funds for TMO to purchase all it could of the poppy crop.

Turkey probably does not have the capability to carry out a crop substitution program on its own within a short period of time. Thus far, not even a plan for a crop substitution program has been drawn up, and no Turkish request has been made to utilize any of the \$1.6 million the United States made available in September 1968 for crop substitution. In the circumstances there is nothing surprising in this lack of response. As explained above, crop substitution for the summer season on the Anatolian Plain is an unknown if not unknowable quantity. Mere appropriations of AID dollars may contribute very little to the solution of the problems when no searching technical studies of production possibilities have been made and no plans set forth for model experiments. The Turks lack the trained scientific and technical personnel to conduct the required planning alone. At present, moreover, the US is in no position to quickly advise them as to the best crops and required input packages. The relatively backward state of agricultural technology in the poppy areas and the persisting conservative attitude of the farmers toward innovation further impair the Turkish capability to advance crop substitution.

From the standpoint of the US the costs of effecting a cessation of poppy production in Turkey should be quite manageable, even when crop substitution is taken into account. If the US paid the entire costs of the suppressive aspects of the program (compensation to farmers plus police costs), the bill would still amount to less than \$5 million for purchasing all the opium in any one year plus some probably lesser cost for assistance to the Turkish police. As for crop substitution, the US is unlikely to be able to spend money very quickly in any case, for a real beginning has yet to be made. If, however, the aim is to assure an effective crop substitution program, there would be an urgent need to increase substantially the amount of US aid already allocated for this purpose. Even with a substantial increase the cost to the US

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
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would not need to be excessive. The Turks themselves presently have little insight into the cost potential of crop substitution, especially as the costs would relate to larger developmental costs. They would therefore be likely to consider any additional US aid as a bonus and it might give spur to their incentive.

It is implicit that if the aim is to make aid to Turkey for crop substitution effective, then that aid would have to be based on a long-term US involvement. The present US aid allocated for crop substitution is thus inadequate in regard to long-range planning as well as in terms of a realistic appraisal of costs.

Under present guidelines there may be an impairment to the US capability to effect a cessation of poppy production in Turkey by means of official assistance. To put the maxim that AID dollars alone are not enough in another way: the speed of utilization is of the essence. Whatever the responsibilities of the Turks themselves, none of the deliveries against the aid to the Turkish police had actually been made as of November 1969. Approved orders against this police aid so far amount to only \$440,000 out of the \$1.4 million made available. As could have been anticipated, Turkish police officials have been quick to protest their incapacities for suppression in recent talks with their US counterparts, citing the non-delivery of technical equipment as justification. Not only did Turkish police officials cite the delayed deliveries of technical equipment but so have higher governmental authorities, including the Under Secretary of the Ministry of Interior.



ConclusionsGeneral Feasibility

A US effort to effect a suppression of poppy production in Turkey appears feasible, if a multi-faceted attack is made on the problems that would arise. This presumes that the US effort would include official aid to the Turks for both suppression and crop substitution purposes. In view of Turkish political and control capabilities and the US capability for economic support, it is possible that production could be almost completely suppressed within a two-year period. The crop substitution program, however, would require a long-term commitment of US aid.

Political Action

Because US participation in Turkish suppression and crop substitution programs would mostly be open to public observation, the manner or "style" with which the US effort is administered could be crucial not only for its success but also for the preservation of sound and harmonious US-Turkish relations. US involvement is almost certain to increase the visibility of the US presence in Turkey, a circumstance likely to increase the sensitivity of Turkish feelings toward US power.

1. Mount advance planning exercises in anticipation of difficulties for US-Turkish relations that might arise from US involvement.
2. Draw up specific guidelines for conduct of US personnel to be directly involved in Turkish suppression or crop substitution programs.
3. Set 1971 as the first target year for suppression of opium production by the Turkish government.

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Economic Assistance

In general the urgent needs are for a speedy utilization of aid once specific allocations have been approved and for launching research and planning efforts when the appropriate uses of aid are in question. Recent experience indicates that slow utilization of aid for the Turkish police could hinder enforcement of suppression. If accountability requirements or other administrative procedures on the US side are such as to preclude more rapid utilization, these should be streamlined. No effective crop substitution program is likely to materialize until extensive research and planning has been carried out.

For Pre-emptive Buying

1. Offer the Turks the sum required for purchase by their government of the entire 1970 opium gum harvest. Consider figures in the range of \$4 million to \$5 million.
2. Advise the Turkish government and TMO to set a price to the farmer for opium such that he would be fully compensated for his previously illicit production and have no incentive to sell opium in the illicit market.
3. Further persuade TMO to revise quotas upward for farm deliveries of opium to the state, so that little of the product would be available for illicit buyers in any case.
4. In order to ease the strain on TMO from the resulting large inventory of opium, request US pharmaceutical firms to buy and stockpile an amount equal to past illicit production, say, about 60 tons.

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5. Revise the existing US import quota on opium to allow for the resulting increase in imports.
6. Consider pre-emptive buying in the illicit market only as an extreme measure of last resort and then only with the knowledge and support of the Turkish authorities. Otherwise we will run afoul of their suppression forces and their harsh penalties against illicit traffickers, thereby risking situations acutely embarrassing to both governments.

For Turkish Police

1. Streamline administrative procedures if necessary in order to speed up deliveries of equipment to the Turkish police.
2. Make a technical study of Turkish police requirements for suppression and control, with a view to increasing the present AID allocation to the police in support of any proposed program.

For Crop Substitution

1. Set a more realistic figure for US aid for this purpose. Consider, to start with, what could be accomplished with \$8 million to \$12 million.
2. Prepare for a long-term AID commitment for Turkish crop substitution.
3. Set machinery for planning and research in motion that focuses on the problems peculiar to the agronomy and horticulture of areas where poppy is grown.

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Some Cautions and Long-Term Considerations

The suppression of poppy production in any single country cannot by itself disrupt the international supply of heroin for long. Given the world distribution of poppy production over many areas subject to limited control, especially the Far East, supply would soon increase to meet any conceivable demand. Given, moreover, the present capabilities of the illicit marketers, new channels of supply most likely would be developed in a relatively short time. In addition, any US effort to halt illicit poppy production in one country would risk adverse consequences for the US, both internally and in its external relations. Higher prices for heroin would almost certainly boost crime rates in drug-victim countries while the treatment bill for their addicts would be suddenly raised. Certain risks would be incurred to the relations between the US and the producing country targeted for a suppression program, risks that would escalate unless the most careful methods of US participation were employed.

Despite the short-term impact on supply, the undesirable effects, and the possible risks, however, there are offsetting gains that might justify a US policy decision to effect a cessation of poppy production in one country, especially an important source of supply like Turkey. 25X1X1

The moral gain to Turkey and the lustre added to its world image may also be noted as the Turkish government regards opium production as undesirable and is pledged to its complete eradication after 1972.

However worthwhile the possible gains, the selection of Turkey as a priority target would make little sense unless the US effort there were viewed as only part of a larger program embracing the build-up of domestic controls and rehabilitation. The effort in Turkey as well as the ongoing effort in Mexico should also be viewed as only the first of many similar efforts in a series of

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opium-producing countries. As already noted, there is little doubt that channels in the illicit market would readily shift.

Since a program of the requisite size in Turkey could certainly not remain "invisible," it should probably be publicized as a joint US-Turkish effort not only to stamp out an evil but also as a first step toward a viable crop substitution program directly beneficial to Turkey and potentially beneficial to other countries.

If it is assumed that Turkey -- as the major source of opium for the heroin supply -- is the most likely priority target country, then the relative advisability of various means that might be employed toward the cessation of production becomes a key issue. Capabilities on both the US and Turkish sides must be examined. It is essential that the program launched entail the minimum risks to US-Turkish relations. Only in light of all these issues can the feasibility of abolishing poppy production in Turkey in the near-term future, say this year or next, be assessed.

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in the revulsion generated by the activities of the urban terrorists, it seems highly unlikely that the military will ever look to such elements for guidance or inspiration.

24. Nonetheless, repression is not apt to make the university scene more than superficially quiet. The strains that spawned the movement of political violence are not susceptible to easy solution. It will be difficult to adapt the present university system to produce graduates that fit existing social needs. Nor is it likely that any early consensus will be reached on the role of the university graduate in society. Hence, if freedom of expression is restored, the universities are likely again to become a focal point of discontent with the regime.

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

25. For the moment, the US is benefiting from the restrictions on the expression of leftist views in Turkey. These elements consider the US their declared enemy; even before martial law was imposed, some critics of the US were promoting the line that the military move to dump Demirel had been directed by Washington. Now these voices are

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necessarily stilled, and the US is being lambasted only in organs from outside Turkey, such as the clandestine Bizim Radyo. And, indeed, the excesses of the terrorists may have generated some sympathy for the US.

26. But the US is apt to experience increasing difficulties in working with the Erim regime. The elitist approach is compounded of nationalist sensitivity. Erim's program and the pronouncements of Cabinet figures indicate that the new regime may be more rigorous in pressing Turkey's own interests at the expense of those of her allies. American private investment may be particularly affected: the Erim government is committed to take over certain mining and mineral ventures and to tightening terms of others. The repatriation of foreign exchange is also likely to be made increasingly difficult. In short, Turkey is likely to become a considerably less welcoming place for American private investment.

27. There will also be an impact on government-to-government relations. Turkey and the US have been engaged in negotiating subsidiary implementing agreements for activities and facilities operated under the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) of July 1969. These implementing accords were to be

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completed by July 1970; thus far none has been concluded. The essential sticking point has been the insistence of the Turkish military establishment on regaining the concessions made by the civilian authorities in the DCA. The soldiers are adamant in their desire to gain explicit authority to control the details of US operations in Turkey. With the general rise of military assertiveness in Turkey, therefore, the prospects of the Erim government being able to induce the soldiers to back down seems small.

28. Rising nationalist sensitivity also impinges on the opium question -- a matter of increasing importance to the US. The Demirel government talked sweetly about first eliminating, then merely restricting, opium production. It also cooperated with US narcotics officials. But

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] the JP did not assign

a high priority to solving this problem.

29. Erim recognizes the "humanitarian" obligation to stop opium production in Turkey. But he wishes to avoid giving the appearance of acting under US pressure. Thus his government is pressing Washington to give him a breathing spell

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and to work through multilateral, rather than bilateral, channels on this issue. It is difficult to predict whether or not Erim will prove a more effective collaborator with the US on opium matters than his predecessor. Those in his government do not have ties to the illicit producers, nor does his government depend on the political support of poppy growing regions. On the other hand, he has been deeply pre-occupied with other matters more pressing to the survival of the regime. The question of opium -- which is not a social problem in Turkey -- can scarcely compete in Erim's eyes with many of the other demands on his time. Hence, even if Erim does take a more effective stand against the diversion of opium into illicit channels, he is not likely to move either as speedily or as completely as the US would wish.

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22 March 1971

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Probable Attitude of Nihat Erim Toward Opium Control

1. Any action that Premier-designate Nihat Erim sponsors in the matter of tightening Turkey's restrictions on the production and sale of opium will depend on three factors: (a) the degree to which his government concerns itself with this problem; (b) the attitude of the Turkish military leadership; and (c) his personal feelings.
2. Erim has been designated interim premier at a time of political upheaval. His choice derives from a combination of attributes that recommend him to the military leaders: coolness, stability, experience, and lack of any driving personal ambition. His job is to regain control of the situation by suppressing political radicals and to restore normalcy to Turkey. He will have the backing of the military in this, and can be expected to draw upon their resources to the full extent needed.
3. His main preoccupation will, therefore, be with matters of public order. The opium licensing bill now awaiting parliamentary consideration and the organizational changes in the collection and enforcement agencies will have far lower priorities. Nevertheless, these matters have already achieved a degree of momentum. If the more violent dissidents can be brought under control, and if reasonable calm can be returned to college campuses, there is nothing to prevent the Demirel-inaugurated opium control program from moving forward, or even accelerating during the next few months.
4. The opium control legislation never became a major political football, as was feared by many. In its present mood, and conscious of being under the watchful eye of the military, Parliament may now move ahead on the opium bill, along with other legislation,

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with far less debate in the pre-voting phase than was usually the case under Demirel. Stricter enforcement of laws on the sale and distribution of opium, already planned, will probably be carried out in 1971. If he is able to do so, Erim may wish to review the present plan of attack. Any decision of his to change the existing organization or program would be likely to increase the effectiveness of the campaign.

5. The military, who will set priorities in Turkey for the foreseeable future, are the final arbiters. This applies whether they rule directly or through a parliamentary government. They are essentially uninformed on the international opium problem, as it affects Turkey, and have taken no stand. President Sunay's influence with the present top leaders remains strong, and he has recently been made aware of the dimensions of the problem by Director Ingersoll. The way is thus open to convincing the military decision-makers of the immediacy of the danger. Those who do this should encounter no particular preconceptions or resistance, but the generals will probably be more receptive if they expect some tangible return to Turkey for their cooperation.

6. Little is known of Erim's personal attitude toward the international drug trade or Turkey's role in it, but several factors are encouraging. As a widely recognized expert on international law, he can be expected to favor Turkey's living up to its commitments under the 1961 UN convention on the international movement of narcotics. In this regard, he would be more sensitive to criticism from abroad than most other Turkish leaders.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
His political base is secure; he does not appear to have any further political ambitions; and he would probably be far less deterred from acting than was Demirel by press charges of subservience to US interests.

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DEMIREL TELLS CORRESPONDENT ABOUT TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

LD 15 19 19 ANKARA ANATOLIA IN ENGLISH 15 16 GMT 15 APR 75 LD

(TEXT) ANKARA 15 (A.A.)--IN AN INTERVIEW COVERING SEVERAL TOPICS GIVEN TO THE CORRESPONDENT OF ONE OF THE MAJOR ISTANBUL DAILIES, PRIME MINISTER SULEYMAN DEMIREL ALSO ANSWERED QUESTIONS RELATING TO TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY.

ON THE U.S. ARMS EMBARGO, BILATERAL RELATIONS AND TREATIES, DEMIREL SAID: "WE CONSIDER THE EMBARGO AS A HOSTILE ACT. IF THE U.S. CONGRESS DOES NOT LIFT THE EMBARGO, IT WILL BECOME IMPERATIVE FOR US TO TAKE THE MEASURES NECESSITATED BY THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE BILATERAL DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY. AND THE BAN SHOULD BE REVERSED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME, OF COURSE."

IN CASE THE ARMS BAN IS NOT LIFTED, DEMIREL STATED, "THE GOVERNMENT SHALL NOT FOREGO ANY SACRIFICE NECESSARY FOR THE DEFENCE OF TURKEY. WE SHALL LOOK FOR AND FIND THE MEANS OF PROCURING ALL THE ARMS AND MATERIEL NEEDED BY OUR ARMED FORCES."

ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF GREECE EXTENDING ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS TO 12 MILES, DEMIREL SAID, "WE SHALL DEFINITELY OPPOSE IT". IF GREECE CREATES A DE FACTO SITUATION, SHE WILL FIND HERSELF FACED BY "A CORRESPONDING DE FACTO SITUATION."

ON EXPLORATIONS FOR PETROLEUM IN THE AEGEAN SEA, THE PREMIER STATED, "TURKEY STANDS FIRM ABOUT HER RIGHTS OVER THE AEGEAN CONTINENTAL SHELF. SHE WILL NOT RENOUNCE THEM, AND WE SHALL ACT ACCORDINGLY."

ON CYPRUS, DEMIREL SPOKE AS FOLLOWS: "THE FEDERATED TURKISH STATE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. OUR POLICY IS A FEDERATION ON GEOGRAPHICAL BASES. THE GREEK SIDE CAN SET UP THEIR STATE, THE TWO COMMUNITIES CAN JOIN IN A FEDERATION--A FEDERATION OF TWO FEDERATED STATES. WE CANNOT SEE ANY OTHER WAY OUT, AND THIS IS THE DE FACTO STATE OF AFFAIRS ANYWAY."

DEMIREL ADDED THAT TURKEY WOULD MAKE NO CONCESSIONS WHATEVER WITH REGARD TO CYPRUS.

16 APR 0120Z JTC/AK

cc: WI
AH

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION
August 15, 1970

MEMORANDUM FORMMR. KISSINGER

OSD, DEA Reviews Completed

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: Heroin Task Force Meeting, Monday, August 17, at 3 p. m.

In view of the apparent strong differences of opinion within the bureaucracy on our goals and interests in Turkey, you requested the Working Party of the Task Force to prepare a memo setting out an agreed factual assessment and alternative courses of action. This memo and a covering summary are at Tab A. On August 7, you sent the memo to all members of the Task Force and suggested that it serve as the basis for the meeting (Tab B). The last Task Force meeting was on June 9, was chaired by Dr. Moynihan, and covered a variety of subjects other than Turkey (a summary is at Tab C).

Your main purpose at the meeting will be to reach agreement that we will not apply sanctions to Turkey over the opium issue. In recent months, Treasury has been attempting to hold up PL 480 programs for Turkey and desires even stronger measures. It will also be important to secure the agreement of all members that every effort should be made to prevent publicity of our dealings with the Turks on this, so that unfortunate effects of the recent extremely adverse Turkish reaction to public pressure can be reduced.

During the meeting, Treasury (Rossides) will insist most strongly on using economic sanctions, and will charge that we have been too soft on the Turks. Defense will probably argue against any actions that might make the Turks become uncooperative with respect to our military activities in Turkey. State will argue that the Turks are already taking helpful actions, and that they can be brought along further without sanctions or massive financial incentives.

OSD & DOJ review complete pages 1-3

On-file TREA, NSC, HHS/HEW release instructions apply

Talking Points

It might be best to begin the meeting by asking Ambassador Handley to present an assessment of the current situation in Turkey.

CONFIDENTIAL

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FOLLOW UP ACTION, DISTR, OR DISTRIBUTION.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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RHODESIA-ZAMBIA: [redacted]

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USSR-TURKEY: The USSR has suggested that Premier Kosygin visit Turkey for a ground-breaking ceremony for a joint dam project on the international border. Ankara is agreeable to the visit but no date has been set.

The Soviets apparently hope to come to a conclusion on terms of the "political document" the two countries agreed last December to sign. The Turks found unacceptable an initial Soviet draft. The Turks would prefer a document that resembles the declaration of good neighborly relations the two countries signed in 1972.

Turkish Prime Minister Demirel told the US ambassador earlier this month that it would be some

--continued

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

time before such a new document was signed. The Prime Minister will be careful to keep the issue alive, however, since he views it as an important card to hold while the US Congress deals with the US-Turkish defense cooperation agreement.

Demirel reportedly also sees the prospective meeting with Kosygin as an opportunity to explore possibilities for acquiring additional Soviet economic aid for Turkey, which already ranks high among the recipients of Soviet assistance.

* * *

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

TURKEY-GREECE-CYPRUS

Reaction to the partial lifting of the US arms embargo against Turkey has been relatively subdued among both Greeks and Turks. Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil termed the action on the embargo a positive development but ruled out any immediate change in the status of the deactivated US installations. Any such move will apparently hinge on negotiations--as yet unscheduled--for a new US-Turkish defense cooperation agreement.

The Turks undoubtedly still hope for a complete lifting of the embargo. The Demirel government's cautious reaction yesterday probably reflected not only a desire to avoid overplaying its hand prior to negotiations for a new defense agreement but also its reading of the political mood as the senatorial elections on October 12 draw near.

Demirel presumably hopes that even a partial lifting of the embargo will be viewed as a foreign policy success for his government. He apparently remains wary, however, of appearing to kowtow to the Americans. Speaking at a campaign rally, opposition leader Ecevit severely criticized the US action, especially the provision for consultation on opium-poppy controls.

Reaction in Greece and Cyprus was also restrained. Significant anti-US demonstrations failed to materialize in either Athens or Nicosia. Both the Greek and Greek Cypriot media presented essentially factual reports of the voting in the US Senate and the bill. Greek and Greek Cypriot government officials expressed regrets over the resumption of arms shipments to Turkey, but said they understood that those who supported the move believed it would lead to progress toward a settlement of the Cyprus issue.

(continued)

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Although action on the embargo removes a major impediment to progress on the Cyprus problem, no movement is likely until the Turks can assess the results of their elections. Should Demirel's party do well or hold its own as compared with its 1973 performance, chances for movement toward a Cyprus settlement would improve. Even then, however, progress would probably be slow, given the difficulties in getting meaningful negotiations under way and Turkish problems of coordinating policy with Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash. Should Demirel's party falter in the elections, his capacity to promote a Cyprus settlement would be severely limited.

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
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Base Issue Difficult for Demirel

Evidence is accumulating that, for political and psychological reasons, Turkey is unlikely to put its relationship with the US back on its old footing, even if the arms embargo is lifted.

The exclusive control over the installations that the US once enjoyed is unlikely to be restored. Turkish commanders will probably retain the administrative command they now exercise and it is possible that the Turks may charge the US rent for the installations and/or place them under a "NATO umbrella."



Foreign Minister Caglayangil, however, this week publicly rejected the possibility of reactivating the bases under some kind of NATO formula. His statement was probably intended to bring pressure on the US Congress to revise its decision on the arms embargo and to blunt opposition criticisms of its policy toward the bases.

Opposition leader Ecevit had earlier ruled out either a rental arrangement or placing the bases under NATO control. In part with an eye on the upcoming senate elections, Ecevit has been accusing the government of not being far-reaching enough or decisive enough in its

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countermeasures. He has also raised questions about the continued presence of American forces in Turkey. The congressional decision to retain the embargo has given impetus to those elements in Ecevit's party and in Turkey who advocate a non-aligned or at least a more independent policy for Turkey. It is clear that Ecevit and his Republican People's party will push for a diminution of the US role, whether the embargo is lifted or not.

An official of the Republican People's Party has told the US embassy that his party does not at this time advocate either the expulsion of the US troops or the dismantling of US installations. He said that Ecevit's comments on the bases were designed to press the government to clarify its stand--move that the government has been reluctant to do, preferring to wait out the next congressional vote on the arms embargo.

Demirel is also having trouble with his coalition partner, Deputy Prime Minister Erbakan, who has been privately critical of Demirel's handling of the retaliatory measures against the US bases; he would have preferred stronger action. The deterioration in relations between the two men has reached the point where Demirel can barely bring himself to speak to Erbakan, and the latter--encouraged by the thought that his Salvationist party might show significant gains in the October election--is less willing to compromise.

The two also clashed recently over the selection of 63 new provincial governors--a problem which reportedly almost pulled the fragile coalition apart. The final list of appointments, which was hammered out by Ecevit and Demirel, displeased both President Koruturk and high-ranking officers in the army. The latter were concerned that some of the appointees were dishonest and incompetent; they also objected to the appointment of

August 8, 1975

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certain religious figures, who they claimed represented anti-Ataturkist principles. The list was finally accepted by President Koruturk after some of the more controversial figures were removed.

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August 8, 1975

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
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August 8, 1975

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August 8, 1975

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August 8, 1975

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

TURKEY

The Turkish national security council issued an uninformative communique following yesterday's extraordinary meeting on how to react to the US arms embargo. Prime Minister Demirel has promised that Foreign Minister Caglayangil will make an announcement this morning.

Demirel has said Turkey must take counter-measures against the US because of new indications that the arms embargo will not be lifted and because he is under domestic pressure in Turkey. In fact, we have no evidence of an increase in pressure on Demirel, either from the general public or from the military. Even his political opposition, led by former prime minister Ecevit, has refrained from inflammatory statements.

Demirel, rather, appears to have seized the issue as a chance to strengthen his own political position. He may well have reasoned that he could only gain from bringing matters to a head. If the embargo were lifted, he would be credited with forcing the US to back down; if the embargo were maintained, he would only have anticipated the development and begun the steps he would have been forced to take anyway.

6

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

TURKEY

The Turkish national security council will meet today to consider retaliation against the US for the arms embargo.

Prime Minister Demirel said at a press conference yesterday that Turkey cannot be expected to carry out bilateral agreements that have been unilaterally abrogated by the US. He called on NATO to "heal the wounds" caused by the arms embargo and hinted that if the West European allies are unwilling to help fill Turkey's armaments gap, Ankara might consider reducing or ending its participation in the alliance.

Demirel reportedly has become convinced that the US Congress will not lift the embargo. He may see the threat of firm action as Turkey's only means of bringing pressure on the US to change its policy. To make the threat more credible, Demirel may be willing to take the first steps toward reducing the US presence.

To take any such action, however, Demirel will need the agreement of Turkish military leaders. They have so far demonstrated considerable reluctance to take any irreversible steps. Turkish generals, most of whom believe Ankara has no alternative to its alliance with the US and Western Europe, are likely to argue in today's council session for a very gradual approach. This might begin with a request to the US that it begin preparations to withdraw from those facilities

that benefit Turkey least.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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


Turkish Politicians, Press React to Government's
Postponement of Action Against US Bases

Opposition criticism of the Demirel government's decision to postpone action against the US bases has been neither as severe nor as sustained as the government had feared.

The leading opposition figure, Bulent Ecevit, waited three days before issuing a statement that strongly attacked the US arms embargo but made only a brief reference to the "excessively soft-line" policy of Prime Minister Demirel. One of Ecevit's associates in the Republican Peoples Party told a US embassy official that the party was exercising restraint because of the realization that there is little sentiment in Turkey for loosening ties with the US. The US embassy believes that Republican leaders do not want to leave themselves open to the charge that they forced the government to retaliate against US installations.

Democratic Party leader Bozbeyli accused the government of following a "hesitant and indecisive" policy on the arms embargo issue. The leader of the newly formed and miniscule Socialist Party, Mehmet Ali Aybar, claimed that the US bases endangered Turkey and must be closed.

The Turkish press responded with scorn and dismay to the government's decision to temporize before initiating action against the bases. After this initial reaction, however, the base issue received less emphasis while the arms embargo itself continued to be given major play. 

July 22, 1975

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The Cyprus Crisis

The Greco-Turkish dispute over the status of Cyprus, which began in the 1950s, reached a peak in July 1974 when Turkey's military intervention foiled an attempt by the Greek military junta to gain control of the Cypriot Government and lay the foundation for the eventual union (enosis) of Cyprus with Greece. [redacted]

Faced with this disaster, the Greek military junta resigned and turned the reigns of government over to former Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis. His hastily formed interim civilian government attempted to negotiate the withdrawal of Turkish forces from northern Cyprus, but the talks broke down due to Greece's refusal to accept Turkish proposals that six autonomous Turkish Cypriot cantons be established on the island. [redacted]

Greece refused to accept responsibility for the junta-engineered debacle. Instead, the Greeks blamed the United States for what they viewed as US support of the Greek military junta during its years in power and acquiescence in the Turkish intervention in Cyprus. The United States was even

accused of collusion with the junta in its attempted assassination of then Cypriot President Makarios. Greek frustration was heightened by the plight of some 160,000 Greek Cypriots who fled from their homes in northern Cyprus to the southern, Greek Cypriot sector of the island. Karamanlis, though personally pro-American and pro-NATO, felt compelled to demonstrate his country's displeasure with NATO—and especially the United States—by withdrawing Greece from the military wing of the Alliance. The consequences of this decision are still apparent despite the ostensible reintegration of Greece into NATO's military wing in 1980. [redacted]

If US attitudes before and during the Cyprus crisis displeased Athens, the US arms embargo infuriated Ankara. Turkey retaliated by abrogating the 1969 Defense Economic and Cooperation Agreement and by suspending operations at all US-occupied military facilities in Turkey not clearly connected with the NATO mission. These restrictions endured until the US embargo was lifted in 1978. [redacted]

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Impact of the Cyprus Crisis

After the 1974 Cyprus crisis, several factors combined to allow Greece to reduce the military imbalance that had existed in favor of Turkey until then. From 1975 to 1978, a US arms embargo against Turkey, imposed because of Ankara's use of US-supplied weapons in the invasion of Cyprus, virtually halted the modernization of Turkey's armed forces and severely curtailed its ability to maintain its military equipment, which is largely of US origin. Greece, under no such restrictions during this period, continued to receive US military assistance and procure US tanks, aircraft, and other equipment. [redacted]

From the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, Greece's economy grew faster than Turkey's. Greece was able to supplement the equipment it procured with US assistance with additional purchases of tanks,

armored personnel carriers, fighter aircraft, missile-equipped patrol boats, submarines, and frigates from France, West Germany, and the Netherlands. This influx of modern equipment enabled Greece to enhance the defensive capabilities of its ground forces in Thrace and the Aegean islands and to establish a qualitative edge over Turkey in modern aircraft and ships. [redacted]

By the time Prime Minister Papandreu and his Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) were elected in October 1981, Greece was already well on its way to establishing a strong defense in the Aegean. Greece had fortified its Aegean islands, improved its defenses in Thrace, and developed the potential to challenge, if not defeat, the Turkish Air Force and Navy in the Aegean. [redacted]

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
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
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24 November 1975




The Possibility of Turkish Acquisition of
Soviet Arms



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
2. The US arms embargo of February-October 1975 severely reduced the effectiveness of the Turkish armed forces, particularly the air force, because they were almost entirely equipped with US weapons systems. As a result, even many normally pro-US Turkish officers were persuaded that their forces must never again be so heavily dependent on US armaments. Consequently, while continuing to seek more reliable access to the US as a source of military equipment, the Turks have stepped up their efforts both to locate alternate foreign sources and to improve their indigenous production capability. Most

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


of this effort has been directed towards closer ties with West Europe and with other Moslem states, but some expression of interest in Soviet equipment is understandable, if only to make the West more amenable to Turkish requests, e.g. during the Defense Cooperation Agreement negotiations with the U.S. The Soviets, eager to take advantage of US-Turkish difficulties, probably would offer such equipment on terms more attractive than those normally offered by Western European sources.

3. There is no evidence that any serious negotiations between Turkey and the Soviet Union for the purchase of arms have yet taken place, although some exploratory discussions undoubtedly preceded the Turkish decision to send a General Staff representative to Moscow. The Turks apparently have expressed a specific interest in a Soviet offer to provide helicopters, but it is not clear whether these would be for military or civilian use.



4. Although the USSR obviously has the capability to participate in the major re-equipment of the Turkish forces, Turkey probably would turn to it only as a last resort and would certainly see no value in moving from heavy dependence on the US to heavy dependence on the USSR. The acquisition of some equipment such as helicopters seems possible, however, particularly if the financial terms offered by the Soviets were favorable. Such a purchase could appear particularly appealing to Demirel as a way of countering criticism from Ecevit and the Republican People's Party that he has been too closely tied to the US. Defenders of such a purchase might also point out that a precedent for the acquisition of Soviet arms was set by Kemal Ataturk himself during the early days of the Turkish republic.



D: ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS OF US STATE DEPARTMENT

1- Selected Documents on Poppy Crisis

425. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 12, 1969.

SUBJECT

Narcotic Imports from Turkey

Pursuant to discussion at our meeting of December 4² on narcotics, I have now thoroughly discussed the Turkish situation with Ambassador Handley, and there is enclosed a proposed plan of action³ prepared by Mr. Harry Schwartz, Chairman of the Working Group.

Briefly, I suggest that on his return to Turkey Ambassador Handley make a renewed effort to obtain Demirel's agreement to plow under the present crop. To strengthen his hand on this, we have worked out with AID authority for Handley to make a firm offer of a \$5 million grant-financed commodity import program to help the Turkish Government pay for plowing under the crop. Ambassador Handley's hand will, of course, be greatly strengthened by his ability to say that the President has personally discussed this matter with him. Additionally, in view of our inability to work out a Washington visit for Demirel until the middle of next year, it would be a dramatic and most forceful back-up to our efforts in Ankara, if the President were to call in the Turkish Ambassador here directly to express to him the President's concern over the situation.

If the foregoing course of action is not successful, we should seek to have the Turkish Government agree that all opium poppy crops after the 1970 crops are illegal and have legal purchases by U.S. pharmaceutical firms from the 1970 crops increased to a level sufficient to siphon the entire Turkish crop into legal channels. It is understood from BNDD that our pharmaceutical firms would be willing to do this and that it would not involve any outlay of U.S. Government funds. There is, of course, no guarantee that some Turkish opium would nevertheless find its way into illicit channels; but it is estimated that the amount should be about one-fourth of the previous level.

If neither of the foregoing courses of action are successful, we shall then need to reconsider the whole situation.

In the meantime, we have, through the French Embassy here, requested that the French Government support all efforts that we are making with the Government of Turkey.

Jack Ingersoll, who is in Paris, has not seen the attached. You may wish to get his reaction when he returns on December 15.

UAJ

426. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Opium Production in Turkey

Ambassador Handley's visit with you on December 22² will undoubtedly assist him in his efforts to convince the Turkish Government to destroy the 1970 poppy crop prior to harvest in the spring. If this effort is not successful, as may be likely, our fallback position is to arrange for an increased legal purchase of the 1970 crop and thereby reduce by 75% the amount of opium finding its way into the illegal traffic. This pre-emptive purchase scheme would be coupled with an effort to get the Turkish Government to make poppy planting illegal following the 1970 crop.

Under Secretary Johnson has recommended that you call in the Turkish Ambassador directly to express your concern over the harmful effects of the Turkish opium production. He suggests that this would be dramatic and forceful support to our other efforts.³

While such an action would add a dramatic touch, it seems to me that it might engage your prestige too much, particularly since there is little likelihood of the Turks agreeing to destroy the present crop. It might be better for you to consider calling in the Turkish Ambassador after we have received the Prime Minister's response to Ambassador Handley's next approach. At that time the impact of receiving the Turkish Ambassador would increase the chances of the Turks accepting our fallback position.

Recommendations

- 1) That you approve the game plan described in the first paragraph.

Approve

Disapprove

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1244, Saunders Subject Files, Turkey 1969. Confidential. Sent for action. Sonnenfeldt sent this memorandum to Kissinger on December 22 under cover of a memorandum recommending that he sign it and send it to the President. Kissinger wrote on Sonnenfeldt's covering memorandum: "1. Calling on Amb is tactical issue. 2. Getting Pres to support heroin game plan is [illegible—policy?]. Do to-day-Dec. 26." Haig wrote the following on the top of the page: "Retype memo to Johnson but move memo to Pres." There was a note indicating that it was "done."

² See Document 427.

³ See Document 425.

2) That you call in the Turkish Ambassador *after*⁴ we have received the Prime Minister's response.⁵

Approve

Disapprove

Prefer to see the Turkish Ambassador now

⁴ The President circled "after" and checked the approval option.

⁵ On January 7, 1970, Kissinger sent a memorandum to Johnson stating that the President agreed with Johnson's suggestion that Handley "make a renewed effort to obtain the Prime Minister's agreement to destroy the present crop" and offer \$5 million assistance to help the Turkish Government plow under the crop. If that was not successful, Kissinger agreed that "we seek to increase legal purchases of the 1970 crop coupled with an agreement by the Turkish Government to stop poppy production after the 1970 crop." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1244, Saunders Subject Files, Turkey 1969)

429. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 1, 1970, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Opium

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

His Excellency Melih Esenbel, Turkish Ambassador

S/NM—Mr. Harry Schwartz

NEA/TUR—Frank E. Cash, Jr.

The Secretary began by expressing his regrets about the earthquakes in Turkey.² Ambassador Esenbel said his Government was grateful for the assistance provided by Embassy Ankara. The Secretary said we would continue to do everything we could.

The Secretary then said that he, the President, and all Americans are seriously concerned about the narcotics problem in the United States. Its consequences are tragic. Any delay in control efforts is destructive. Ambassador Handley wishes to discuss the illicit opium arriving in this country from Turkey further with Prime Minister Demirel just as soon as possible. We would like to move very fast on this. Public and Congressional pressure is building up. This is really the only problem existing between our two Governments. Everything else is going smoothly. We don't think money is a problem. We're prepared to compensate Turkish farmers.

In response to the Secretary's question as to whether Mr. Schwartz had anything to add, the latter said what we fear is the loss of a generation.

Ambassador Esenbel said the GOT has taken some control measures at its borders. A new security force is being equipped to cope with the illicit traffic. Turkey has cooperated for many years with the U.S., France, and Germany in this field. Poppy cultivation in Turkey has been gradually reduced from an initial forty-two provinces down to nine at present and will shortly be restricted even further. The Foreign Minister has been dealing with this matter very confidentially, and the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, INCO-DRUGS 17 US TUR. Confidential. Drafted by Cash and approved in S on April 7. The meeting took place in Secretary Rogers's office.

² The earthquakes struck western Anatolia March 28-29 destroying and damaging a number of towns and leaving 1,200 killed and 90,000 homeless.

436. **Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State**¹

Ankara, October 5, 1970, 1200Z.

6301. Subject: Ingersoll Visit to Turkey—Presidential Letter. Ref: State 159705 and 163371.²

1. I have serious doubts about having the President write a “secret letter” to the Prime Minister of Turkey on the opium question. Letters of this kind do not stay secret very long, and it will be recalled that my own instructions were to discuss the matter personally with the Prime Minister and deliver only an oral message from the President to him.

2. In the present atmosphere surrounding opium, it is absolutely essential that there be no indication of heavy unilateral US pressure on the Prime Minister at a moment when he is girding himself for a major political fight at his convention this month and facing the opening of Parliament the first week of November. Moreover, a letter from a former President of the United States (i.e., the Johnson letter on Cyprus) still remains the single most painful event (as far as the Turks are concerned) in our history since World War II.

3. There is no doubt in the Prime Minister’s mind of the President’s personal interest in this matter. I have communicated that a number of times, and against the risks I do not see anything to be gained at this time by having a personal written letter from the President to Prime Minister Demirel delivered by Mr. Ingersoll.

4. With regard to the suggestion in para 5 (State 159705) that Mr. Ingersoll be given a Presidential letter to be shown here and elsewhere,

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

² Telegram 159705, September 9, 1970, to Ankara outlined plans for Ingersoll’s visit to Turkey. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/INGERSOLL) Telegram 163371 to Ankara, October 3, reported that Ingersoll had told Turkish representatives that he would carry a letter from President Nixon to Prime Minister Demirel on the issue of narcotics. (Ibid.)

Ambassador did not have precise information on the program. He did know, however, that a high-level decision has been made to eradicate poppy cultivation completely, but he did not know how rapidly this could be done. Turkish farmers have grown poppies for cooking oil for 800 years. It is, therefore, not so easy to uproot such a tradition. It will take time. It is not really a question of money.

The Secretary said that inasmuch as 80% of the illicit heroin coming into the U.S. is believed to originate in Turkey, we would be willing to cooperate in any kind of control system.

In response to the Ambassador's question, Mr. Schwartz said the UN machinery is not effective in producing the results the U.S. must have.

The Secretary said the only real solution is the cessation of poppy cultivation. We could compensate—or more than compensate—any loss. There is bound to be more and more public discussion of this issue, and Turkey's reputation in this country will suffer. This we would regret. We know the Turkish Government is trying to be helpful, and we are not unappreciative. But speed is essential. And, once again, we are willing to help in any way we can. Ambassador Handley will be discussing this further with the Prime Minister.

Ambassador Esenbel said he would report the Secretary's remarks. He believes his Government is fully aware of this problem.

The Ambassador said that, at the request of the Robert College Board, he would like to mention the fact that the College needs about a million dollars more a year in AID funds in order not to be forced to cut back its operations, which would be a shame.

Mr. Cash explained that we and the College are caught between spiralling cost of education and limited amounts of AID funds.

The Secretary told the Ambassador we would see what we could do.

I do not have strong feelings one way or the other. I do think, however, that its use might be awkward here since I do not know how it would be used in practice. Simply to show it to the Prime Minister and retain it for use elsewhere makes it look like a passport. However, I do not feel strongly about this, and it may be of use in opening doors elsewhere. Frankly, I believe that it would be more tasteful and less awkward if Mr. Ingersoll, when he sees the Prime Minister, were to say something like this: "As you know, Ambassador Handley has told you of the deep interest that the President has in this matter. The President has asked me, following the recent meeting of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, to make a trip through various capitals in Europe, and it is for that reason that I am here." Certainly he will not have to show credentials. They will be assumed.³

Handley

³ In telegram 167166 to Ankara, October 9, the Department forwarded the text of a Presidential letter that conformed to Handley's suggestions. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971) A copy of the letter is *ibid.*

437. Editorial Note

On November 10, 1970, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel postponed his visit to the United States, citing among other reasons his desire to be in Ankara when the Turkish Parliament voted on an opium licensing bill.

442. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for Domestic Affairs (Krogh)¹

Washington, March 25, 1971.

SUBJECT

Turkey's New Government and the Opium Problem

In response to your memos,² I asked CIA to give us its reading on the new Turkish government's³ possible attitudes and capabilities in relation to the problem of further reducing the flow of illegal opium from Turkey. The *main conclusions of the CIA analysts* are:

—The new Prime Minister's immediate preoccupation will be to regain control of public order by suppressing political radicals. The opium licensing bill now awaiting parliamentary consideration and the organizational changes in the collection and enforcement agencies will necessarily have lower priorities for the moment.

—Nevertheless, these programs have already achieved a momentum of their own. If the more violent dissidents can be brought under control and calm restored to college campuses, there is nothing to prevent the opium control program from moving forward or even accelerating during the next few months.

—Conscious of being under the watchful eye of the military, Parliament may now move ahead on the opium bill with far less debate in the pre-voting phase than was usually the case while Demirel was in office and each move became hostage to opposition efforts to make life uncomfortable for him.

—The military will set priorities in Turkey for the foreseeable future and are the final arbiters, even if they choose to go on as they are now working through a parliamentary government. They are essentially uninformed on the international opium problem as it affects Turkey. They have taken no stand. As you know, President Sunay has been initiated into the problem and his influence with the present top military leaders remains strong.

—Thus, the way is now open to convincing the military decision-makers of the urgency of the opium problem. We should encounter no

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Noform. Sent for information. Concluded in by Downey and sent through Haig.

² Additional documentation relating to narcotics policy for Turkey is *ibid.*, White House Special Files, Staff Members Office Files, Egil Krogh, Subject Files, Heroin/Turkey. Also see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972, Documents 143–227.

³ Following Demirel's March 12 resignation under military pressure, President Sunay designated Nihat Erim to form a new government. Erim resigned from the Republican Peoples Party and formed a coalition government with representatives from both the RPP and Justice Party, which won a vote of confidence on April 7.

particular pre-conceptions or resistance, although the generals will probably be more receptive if they expect some tangible return to Turkey for their cooperation.

—Little is known of Prime Minister Erim's personal attitude toward this problem. He is, however, an expert on international law, and his recognition of Turkey's need to live up to its commitments under the 1961 UN convention can be used to encourage his support. He is genuinely well disposed toward the U.S. His political base is secure, and he would probably be far less deterred from acting than was Demirel by charges of subservience to U.S. interests.

Our program thus falls now under three objectives, and I have noted below each what I have asked State to do in respect to it:

1. The most urgent aspect of the program is to improve the enforcement and control measures in order to achieve the complete collection of this year's crop. This is critical because an effective program for buying up production would provide "insurance" against failure of the government to make other desired moves toward licensing and eradication. It would also have more immediate impact. As you know, a program for doing this came out of Jim Parker's⁴ December visit to Turkey. At the same time, the Turkish Soil Products Office (TMO), which is responsible for buying up the crop, has developed a program for enlarging its organization and increasing the collection force in each of the seven provinces where poppies are now grown legally. All of this can be done in the absence of a licensing law under the previous law that sets up the system for declaring opium to be grown. This law contains enough teeth to permit the government of Turkey to be sure the farmer fills out an honest declaration and then to collect everything declared.

Action being taken: Ambassador Handley has been authorized to say that the U.S. would meet the costs of this program. So far the Turks have acted as if they are prepared to handle these themselves. Unless BNDD sees technical deficiencies we can correct or further encouragement we can provide, this seems on the tracks.

2. The objective of second and almost parallel immediacy is the passage by parliament of the *licensing and control law*. Ambassador Handley has already made some approaches to the military and key members of parliament, stressing the importance which we attach to the passage of this legislation. If it does not seem to be moving as we would like, Secretary Rogers will put it on the top of his agenda when he goes to Ankara on April 30 for the CENTO ministerial meeting.

Action being taken: In addition to the above, I have asked that Ambassador Handley submit a plan for impressing on the military, as well

⁴ An officer of the BNDD.

431. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Turkish Affairs (Cash) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)¹

Washington, June 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

Let's Not Throw the Turkish Baby Out With the Narcotics Bathwater

Last December Moynihan told Bill Handley and me that we should bomb the Blue Mosque in retaliation for the way the Turks are "aggressing" against us with opium.² (The same day, incidentally, the President told Bill in low key, "do your best.") We thought at the time Moynihan was joking. Now, I'm not so sure.

I am becoming increasingly concerned that various people in the Government (including Rossides,³ who has demonstrated his disregard for US-Turkish relations, and Kleindienst)⁴ without responsibility for US foreign relations, but understandably anxious and frustrated over our horrendous narcotics problem, may be fully prepared to see irreparable damage done to all our other interests in Turkey in the attempt to solve this problem. And—worst of all—without any real prospect that our narcotics problem will thus be solved.

At least with the "Johnson letter"⁵ there was a real chance that a Greek-Turkish war would be prevented. This was accomplished and, therefore, the risk—and the high price paid in damage to US-Turkish relations—was, in my view, justified.

But if Turkey produced not one more poppy, our problem would not be solved. Opium is produced in Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, India, etc. etc. As long as there is a demand, there will be a supply. Furthermore, even if the USG can agree internally that opium should be eliminated worldwide, which is very doubtful, and could achieve this, which is even more doubtful, the experts say addicts would find a substitute—any substitute (LSD for example)—because their need is so compelling.

¹ Source: Department of State, Turkish Desk Files: Lot 74 D 29, Soc 11-5. Confidential. Drafted by Cash and sent through Davies (NEA). A copy was sent to Saunders.

² No record of this conversation was found. Sisco drew an arrow from this line and annotated: "I agree. Pls be sure I'm on clearance for everything. Stay alert. I'm willing to confront Moynihan. JJS."

³ Eugene Rossides, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.

⁴ Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst.

⁵ Reference is to President Johnson's June 5, 1964, letter to Prime Minister Inonu warning against military intervention in Cyprus. For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, vol. XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Document 54.

In other words, this is a problem that must be solved primarily at the heart, i.e. the user in this country, and secondarily by attempting to control what comes in over the borders of this country, not what goes out over the borders of any number of other countries throughout the world.

The argument is made that if an abrupt cessation of Turkish production could be obtained (which it can't), narcotics dealers would be flushed out in their attempts to rearrange their supply lines to other sources. It seems incredible that as adroit as these criminals are, and with all the publicity our efforts with Turkey have been given—over our and the Turks' objections—that other arrangements have not been made. Surely contingency planning is not a government monopoly.

All of this is not to say that we should not urge the Turks to do everything possible that will be of real assistance to us; we should and are. And we should be willing to pay the price the achievable results are worth.

The questions are: what will be of real assistance to us; what is achievable; and what should we pay?

Since 1966 we have been putting heavy pressure on Demirel (to the point of irritating him considerably), and he has: been progressively reducing the provinces in which poppies may be grown (with a resultant loss of votes); cooperating with us in improving control, including permitting US agents to roam Turkey (a considerable risk for both him and us); and promised to end production in '71. He, incidentally, is the *only* one who has been willing to commit himself to eradication. All other Turks have emphasized increased controls only. If we lose Demirel—a real possibility even if we don't add to his present serious difficulties—we lose the Turkish commitment to eradication.

Bill Handley says—and I think his telegrams show—that he has used every arrow in his quiver with the Turks on opium. Although they have been stupid in not sending someone from Ankara to the CCMS, we are convinced that they are doing as much as they can to help us.

I am certain from the various noises that have been made that we will quite soon be under very heavy pressure to use AID, PL 480, MAP, and anything else available as blunt instruments to bludgeon the Turks into doing our bidding. Anyone who knows the Turks knows this simply won't work. They are just not amenable to that kind of persuasion. Worse yet, if there are even indications of this kind of direct pressure, such as a holdup of the program loan or a delay in PL 480, this will get the Turks' backs up and may well cause a slackening in the cooperation we are presently getting on narcotics. If such pressure were to become public knowledge—as would almost certainly be the case—our other exceedingly important interests in Turkey would suffer.

Our relations with Turkey can't stand another "Johnson letter" with so little prospect of accomplishing what we wish.

443. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey¹

Washington, April 13, 1971, 1945Z.

62159. For Ambassador Handley from the Secretary. Subj: Opium. Ref: Ankara 2208.²

1. Greatly appreciate helpful and comprehensive message on steps we should take in initial contacts with new government. We endorse your view that opium is number one question, particularly in light estimate that strong likelihood of little if any change toward our other interests.

2. We agree with your basic analysis and strategy contained para 3 reftel. Given the lengths taken to maintain thread of constitutionality during recent crisis, we see no possibility that new government will contravene the decree which designates reduction from seven to four provinces for planting in 1971.

3. Concur that it wise and useful to summarize our discussions with GOT since 1966. You should indicate that GOT had informed us in 1967 that its goal was eradication to be accomplished over three to four year period to minimize adverse impact on Turkish farmer. Since new leadership has told us that it envisions continuity in foreign policy we hope that it will endorse goal of eradication. We believe that both on tactical grounds and as follow-on of our conversations with Demirel government you should inform Erim government we continue to feel eradication is best ultimate solution. Therefore you should ask Erim's plans in this regard, and in ensuing discussion propose no further planting beginning in 1972. If the GOT indicates that this timetable for eradication is not feasible, you should urge the reduction to one, or at the maximum two provinces in 1972 with corresponding decrease in acreage, coupled with assurances of an effective licensing, control and collection system.

4. It would be obviously unfair to make Turkish farmer suffer from economic dislocation that will result from eradication. We would prefer assistance to Turkey, if desired, move through the UN or other international institutions. The new UN fund for drug abuse control envisages assistance in law enforcement as well as pilot projects in

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Ogden; cleared by Sisco, Cash, H.R. Wellman (S/NM), Davies, Johnson, and Eliot; cleared for information by Ingersoll, Eugene Rossides (Treasury), MacDonald, F.A. Bartimo (OSD/COUNS), and CIA; approved by Rogers.

² Not found.

development of economic alternatives to opium production. USG will, if other sources cannot provide, stand ready consider assistance to ameliorate impact of eradication.

5. We agree that it would be most useful to continue broaden base of contacts within Turkey, building on your representations to major political parties, leaders of Grand National Assembly and discreet contacts with senior military leaders. We, too, see no advantage in actively involving military leaders and agree that any effort on our part to get them to take more active role will be resisted. However, we should definitely make sure they are kept will informed of our concerns. We will also attempt to stimulate greater activism on part of Germans, French and others to broaden third country contacts along lines you suggest.

6. We have already involved Turkish Ambassador more deeply and more frequently. Problem of opium raised with Esenbel by Under Secretary Johnson on March 22 and at greater length by Asst Sec Sisco April 1. Sisco pointed out public sentiment reflected in Congress were about forty measures pending aimed at stemming narcotics flow into US. Noted it important that pending licensing and control bill be enacted promptly, and equally important that a comprehensive plan be developed and adequate resources made available to collect the entire crop this year. Also urged that further reductions (number unspecified) be made in number of poppy provinces for 1972 planting.

7. Please advise soonest results your initial conversations with Foreign Minister and Prime Minister.³

Irwin

2- Selected Documents on Arms Sale Embargo

238. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, November 5, 1975, 1223Z.

8214. Subj: Current Situation in Turkey.

1. Those who have followed recent Embassy reporting are aware current situation here is a discouraging one. This telegram summarizes where matters now stand in the key areas of USG interests.

2. With respect to Cyprus, it is increasingly clear that the GOT's capacity for maneuver is severely circumscribed. Demirel and Caglayangil have found a way to get Turks to the table and in a stance which incorporates willingness to discuss territory adjustments. But it is by a tortured back-door process that this has been achieved. And what must seem to objective observers elsewhere as a notably limited and tentative initiative on the Turkish part is, in effect, presented to us

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 34, Turkey, Exdis to Secretary of State 2. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, Istanbul, Adana, and Izmir.

here by Turk officials as a precarious, high-risk effort in view of the difficult domestic political situation the Demirel–Caglayangil team is facing. In effect, the Turks have said they will discuss territory if it is raised at the resumed talks, but Ankara’s political exigencies require that any initiative on this subject come from the other side. When one sees how difficult it has been for the GOT to achieve even this position, a serious question arises as to whether, once a negotiation begins, there is any real possibility that the Turks can show even a minimum of flexibility or spirit of compromise. Demirel and Caglayangil are adroit maneuverers and they may therefore find a way to do so (especially if the military supports them behind the scenes)—but our present assessment is that the odds of the PriMin–FonMin team accomplishing this are very long against.

3. Unpromising as these odds are, however, I think we have for the present made all the approaches we should to the GOT on this subject. We should now reserve our next round of effort for the period when the talks are actually about to start. Then, through both diplomatic and military channels, we should do all we can to get the Turks to display at least the necessary minimum of flexibility, on territory and other issues, as the talks get underway.

4. With respect to a revised US-Turkish defense cooperation relationship, the situation is equally discouraging. The Turkish opening position is a source of serious concern. There is a one-sidedness to the Turk position which radically undercuts the kind of mutuality of sacrifice and commitment that is essential for a viable relationship. If I thought this Turk document was simply an extreme opening position in a tough bargaining situation, I would not be as concerned as I am. Unfortunately, however, while the Turks obviously have some “give” in their initial position, I doubt that there is very much. Moreover, what little there is, is not likely to be forthcoming very quickly.

5. Here again, therefore, an objective look at the situation brings disturbing conclusions. We must recognize that the shortsighted requirements of Turkish nationalism and the weakness of the current government are likely to override a realistic sense of Turkey’s security needs. This could well mean that either (A) we will not be able to negotiate an acceptable basis for a security partnership on anything like the scale we have known here before, or that in any event (B) this process will take so long that through an inevitable interim attrition our security position here will have largely disappeared long before a new *modus vivendi* is achieved.

6. Things do not have to turn out this badly, of course. I have scant hope that the Turks will respond affirmatively (they have not yet given us an answer) to the Secretary’s request for a partial reactivation of closed Common Defense Installations (CDI’s) as our revised security

relationship negotiations get underway. I think there is some possibility, however, that as the negotiations proceed, we will be able to bridge the gap in some areas of difference in a way that will permit, at some point in the weeks ahead, a resumption of some CDI activities here. I do not think the prospects are particularly good for this, but on the other hand the possibility cannot be ruled out. In the meantime, I urge that Washington adopt the Embassy's recommendation that we eschew arguments over principle and instead go back to the Elekdag negotiators with a specific counter-proposal as soon as possible. Concerned as I am by a number of the unacceptable principles which underlie the Turk draft, it is a losing game to take these principles on frontally. The Turks, with their weak government, in their current super nationalist phase, and in their post embargo period, will be largely unyielding. We must seek instead to find a practicable and acceptable *modus vivendi* out of the grey areas lying between the Turkish and American drafts. We should support the basic points of our counter-draft by references to the essential partnership principles which underlie them, but if we are to make any progress we must keep the basic negotiations away from arguments over principles and instead on *modus vivendi* specifics.

7. Serious as should be the state of our concern over the current US-Turkish relationship, we must carefully avoid for the present escalating this concern in a dramatic or confrontation-type way. The embargo-embroiled US-Turkish relationship is far more bruised than sometimes is realized—and is badly in need of a respite. After eight months of embargo, the October 2 vote has supplied this in part, but whatever respite we now have, it needs to last somewhat longer before we can afford to get into anything like the early rounds of a showdown over the new defense cooperation relationship.

8. To avoid this latter (and also not to undermine whatever influence we have on the Cyprus situation), our counter-position respecting our future relationship on security should be pursued primarily in the ongoing Elekdag level negotiations and should not be escalated in any major way to higher levels of the GOT at this point. If in these negotiations the gap subsequently proves to be as unbridgeable as I fear, then that will be the time to escalate our efforts.

9. This does not mean we should not mention our concerns (as I have done and will do again) in a general way to the FonMin and high government officials here. But the basic point is that despite the very serious nature of the problem we are facing vis-à-vis our future security relationship, we should continue for the present to focus on negotiations (A) in the Elekdag-Macomber channel and (B) while eschewing arguments over principle seek to narrow the gap in very specific areas between the two competing draft agreements.

10. The foregoing are my two major areas of concern, and I will not lengthen this message further by detailing still others of considerable importance which have to do—the above problems aside—with the question of whether Turkey is going to remain capable of being an effective and useful ally. The weak government situation here is not only a liability with respect to Cyprus and US security relationships. The Turkish economy is in a deteriorating condition and no Turkish Government has taken effective measures to deal with it for a dangerously long period. Reserves are declining; inflation is rampant; unemployment is staggering. Student violence continues to paralyze major sections of the university community. And under such circumstances of a deteriorating Turkish internal and international position, the question that always lurks in the background is just how much more will the Turk military take before intervening.

11. Despite the foregoing catalog of problems, however, Turkish society remains relatively stable and resilient. The Turks remain as one of the most courageous and patriotic people of any of our Western allies. Turkish geography has not lost its value for the defense of the West, nor have the Turkish people lost any of their zeal and determination to protect it from incursions from the North. The game is therefore still very much worth the candle. At the same time, it is obvious that the nature of the relationship which has existed between Turkey and the U.S. for 30 years is undergoing a serious sea change. Down the road we should be able to reconstruct a new and viable relationship, but in today's circumstances it seems almost inevitable that it will be a relationship based on less mutual sacrifice, and less mutual confidence and commitment, than that which existed prior to February 5, 1975.

Macomber

242. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 26, 1976, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT

The Secretary's Meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil

PARTICIPANTS

Turkey
Foreign Minister Caglayangil
Ambassador Esenbel

U.S.
Secretary of State Kissinger
Ambassador Macomber
Assistant Secretary Hartman

The Secretary: I just wanted to cover in a smaller group² two important issues. I wanted you to know that we are going to have a major domestic problem on the Cyprus question in the absence of anything concrete happening. Obviously if there was a prospect of progress that would be best. I was wondering if I should ask David Bruce to visit Ankara, Athens and Nicosia to speak with the parties and see if he could help to bridge the territorial issue.

Foreign Minister: I have a very great problem of presentation. If Ambassador Bruce as a retired NATO Ambassador pays calls in a number of NATO countries this would make it easier for me.

The Secretary: No, he would have to be either a representative of the Secretary of State or the President specifically on this issue to do us any good here domestically.

Foreign Minister: That would certainly cause a reaction in Turkish opinion. If it could be done privately, I think that would be all right.

The Secretary: It must be official or it won't help us. We need this for our public.

Foreign Minister: Let me see what I can do when I get back to Ankara. I will certainly try.

The Secretary: I can't tell you how much it would help us. As you know, David Bruce is a good friend.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 275, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman and approved in S on April 30. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

² Kissinger and Caglayangil had met with a larger group in the Secretary's conference room at noon. (Memorandum of conversation, March 26; *ibid.*) Kissinger and Caglayangil signed the U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement on March 26. (Department of State *Bulletin*, April 19, 1976, pp. 503-504)

Foreign Minister: Yes, I know he is a good friend and I know that you need something like this for your own public relations so that you can show you are active on this issue.

The Secretary: This will be especially important while Congress is considering our new agreement.

Foreign Minister: I will let you know but it would certainly be better if Cyprus is not the only problem he discusses. If he could be sent out to talk about restoring US-Turkish relations.

The Secretary: Maybe I could make him my adviser for conditions in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Esenbel: Maybe you could even send him to Beirut.

The Secretary: Now let me mention the second point. On the Aegean it is of the utmost importance that you show the greatest restraint so that there are no provocations. I do not wish to get into the middle of the debate on the substantive issues.

Foreign Minister: This is a very delicate matter and I hope you will use your influence with the Greeks as well.

The Secretary: I certainly will.

247. **Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹**

Ankara, November 8, 1976, 1225Z.

8462. For Eagleburger and Hartman. Subj: Future Course of US/Turkish Security Relationship.

1. The failure of the 94th Congress to approve the new US/Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) prior to its early Oct adjournment² may turn out to have more significant consequences than as yet sensed either by the Congress or by many Turks.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976. Confidential. Repeated to Istanbul, Izmir, Adana, Athens, Nicosia, USNATO, USNMR SHAPE, USDOCOSOUTH INTAF Naples, EUCOM, and the Department of Defense.

² The Senate Foreign Relations Committee considered S.J. Res. 204, which implemented the DCA, in September at the request of the Ford administration in order to show Turkey that the process to restore bilateral relations had begun. No action was taken on the resolution prior to adjournment. (*Congress and the Nation, 1973-1976*, Vol. IV, p. 888)

2. If the Congress had endorsed the DCA before adjournment the Turkish Parliament would almost certainly have soon followed suit, thereby again placing the presently threatened US/Turk military partnership on a stable foundation. Some months from now we may find ourselves looking back on last summer as a lost opportunity which may not come back to us again. This is not inevitable; matters may not take such an unfortunate turn. But it is a sufficiently real possibility as to require that we take clear note of it at this time—and make a major effort to avoid it.

3. A key to the problem is timing. Even if the next Congress endorses the DCA, the effort to restore our relationships here can still fail. It can fail because of the congressional action's not coming soon enough to avoid the pre-election campaign which we will soon be headed into here in Turkey.

4. The Turkish general elections have to be held not later than next October, and they may come as early as this coming spring. As in the United States, the Turkish political campaigns begin many months before election day and once this period is under way, the Parliament's tendency is to put off controversial legislative actions until after the election. Acting at least in part on this same principle, the Congress has delayed action on the DCA until mid-winter at the earliest.

5. Even if President Ford had been re-elected, it would appear from our vantage point here that it would at best have been problematic as to whether completion of congressional action on the DCA could have been achieved by a mid-winter time period. With the arrival of a new administration, it would appear that this would be even more problematic. Presumably, any new administration would wish to re-examine the DCA before deciding the stance it would take respecting it. After weighing current circumstances—and our basic interests—in the Eastern Mediterranean, however, I would very much hope that the new administration will decide to endorse this agreement as it is presently written and seek early congressional approval. But even if it should decide to do this, there is still the danger that in competition with the many other problems the new administration must face, this decision will be delayed to a point where mid-winter congressional action becomes an impossibility.

6. An additional factor is the timing of USG-GOG agreement on a new US/Greek DCA.³ It is possible that the conclusion of this agreement may be delayed until some time after the new administration takes office. If, as we assume, the new administration will wish, if it is

³ See Document 64 and footnote 3 thereto.

at all possible, to go to the Congress with both agreements at the same time, this could cause further delay in seeking congressional action on the US-Turkish DCA.

7. While deadline predictions are especially risky, it would appear to me now that if the Congress has not completed action on the DCA by mid-March, it will then be too late for the Turkish Parliament to act on it prior to their own election campaigns. If I am correct in my assumption that the elections will be next fall rather than next spring, this means that Turkish parliamentary action will be delayed for the better part of an additional year. Moreover, it is likely to mean that the agreement itself will become an important and controversial issue in the campaign. For the longer the Congress delays action on the DCA the more likely it is that the political opposition to the Demirel government (and increasing segments of the Turkish public) will become committed to the defeat or renegotiation of the DCA, and/or that the Demirel government itself may collapse or be defeated, thus leaving the DCA with no sponsor. All this in turn means that by November 1977, when the election is over and the Turkish Parliament has reconvened, there can be no assurances that the agreement can still be passed by the Parliament, even though today it would be passed without very much difficulty—and once passed would cease to be either a major or current issue here.

8. In addition, the longer we delay in putting back on a solid basis the US/Turk relationship, the longer we add to the risk of serious Greek/Turk confrontations—confrontations which could eventually be of a character to threaten prospects for restoring military partnerships with either Turkey or Greece.

9. We have considered what the situation would be here if Congress did not complete action on the DCA before the Turkish political campaign started but did give its endorsement sometime after the campaign was underway. This would perhaps have a marginally beneficial effect in reducing the political contentiousness of this issue in the campaign, but only a marginal one. It would also give us the opportunity to argue that all the shut down installations should immediately be reopened. (Turk negotiators in Washington last March said that these installations would be reopened immediately after favorable congressional action, but that was before the GOT decided that the agreement also had to be put through its own Parliament.) Unfortunately, however, I believe that the GOT could not agree to do this prior to its own Parliament having acted, particularly in the midst of a hard-fought political campaign.

10. Possibly the consequences of delayed congressional action could turn out to be less serious than the foregoing suggests. If Congress should continue to vote significant military assistance levels to

Turkey in the interim, both governments could end up muddling through an extended additional period of uncertainty. It is also possible, although I think unlikely, that in the intervening period, international and/or Turkish domestic developments would not rule out congressional and parliamentary approval roughly 13 to 15 months from now. To count on this, however, is a high-risk course indeed.

11. It is also possible that having found that we can get through one additional year or somewhat more without an agreement (but with continuing military assistance appropriations), we could then continue to get along in the years thereafter, still without either side having acted formally on the DCA. Again this would be a high-risk course, but it is a possibility that cannot be ruled out altogether. Should we end up following this latter route, we would have to insist on the opening of most of our closed down installations. We might not need to insist on all being reopened but certainly most of them must be allowed to function if the flow of our assistance is to continue. Even if our relationship could limp along in this way, however, it would be seriously plagued by the absence of all the key administrative and other vital arrangements which have been so carefully battled over in the DCA. Eventually we would have to work out, formally or informally, substitute arrangements which are not likely to be as desirable or workable as those embodied in the present DCA.

12. Another course that the new administration may examine is the negotiating of a new DCA, or at least the entering into of new negotiations designed to amend the present DCA—while insuring that at least the present level of military assistance continues to flow while this process is under way. The serious danger here, however, is that such an action would continue to invite all the basic risks of delay noted earlier. It also risks our ending up with either no agreement or an agreement less advantageous to us than the present one.

13. Still another approach would be to adopt the position of a number of congressional critics, i.e., that the DCA should be pressed with the Congress only when there is substantial progress in the Cyprus situation. Any public attempt to use this kind of open leverage on the Turks will be as unwise and unsuccessful in the future as it has been in the past. It will not produce progress on Cyprus. It will only hasten the deterioration of the US-Turk security partnership. On the other hand, the Turks have an even greater security stake in restoring the US-Turk partnership than does the US. If they can, without a display of public duress, be pushed into a more flexible and constructive stance on the Cyprus problem, this could help immeasurably with the Congress and thus help also Turkey's own security position. For the basic reasons repeatedly spelled out in the Embassy's earlier reporting, this will not be easy to accomplish. In a separate message, however, we will

be commenting on how a new effort in this regard might most effectively be mounted.⁴

14. Regardless of whether such an effort can succeed, however, the basic point of this message remains: namely, that failure to get early congressional endorsement of the new DCA risks the continued deterioration and disintegration of the US-Turk security partnership. Given the importance of this partnership to the world strategic balance and to US security interests, it therefore seems to me that it is essential that the present administration make a major effort to convince the new administration of the need to move the DCA through the Congress in the early weeks of the next congressional session.

15. Otherwise we may find that inadvertently, but quite possibly irrevocably, we have lost a military partnership which, in our own security interest, we simply cannot afford to lose. This is not to suggest that if the partnership does disintegrate the Turks will switch sides in the Cold War. Initially they will probably not leave NATO. What will take place, however, (along with a probable increase in Greek-Turkish tensions) is (1) a disintegration of strength on the eastern flank of NATO; (2) the creation of a power vacuum in this area with all the obvious dangers this entails; and (3) a serious diminution of the US presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, along with all that this in turn entails not only for our NATO interests, but also for our interests with respect to Israel and the rest of the Middle East.

Macomber

3- Selected Documents for Nakhichevan Crisis

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2009-03553 Doc No. C17604506 Date: 07/22/2016 **E164**

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ORIGIN EUR-01

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HA-09 H-01 INRE-00 INR-01 L-03 ADS-00 M-01
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIG-01 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-01 PRS-01
P-01 SNP-01 SP-01 SSO-00 SS-01 TRSE-00 T-01
USIE-00 /031R

DRAFTED BY: EUR/ISCA/BI:RMILLS:RMM

APPROVED BY: EUR:TMTNILES

EUR:RJOHNSON

EUR/ISCA:LNAPPER

EUR/SE:DRANSOM

S/P:JHANNAH

P:CVANVOORST C:RWILSON

S/S-O:MBMARSHALL

NSC:KHILL

S/S:RALAMANTIA

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY YEREVAN

INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 102596

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, TU, AM, AJ, ZJ

SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON RESOLUTION OF TURKISH-ARMENIAN BORDER
ISSUE

REF: YEREVAN 66

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PAGE 02 STATE 102596 020204Z

1. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE.

2. ALTHOUGH ARMENIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HOVANNISIAN'S LETTER
TO SECRETARY BAKER ON THE ISSUE OF TURKISH BORDER
RECOGNITION (REF) DOES NOT MEET THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT'S
STATED OBJECTIVES, IT DOES PRESENT A BASIS FOR FURTHER
DIALOGUE BETWEEN ANKARA AND YEREVAN. IT IS IN THE
INTERESTS OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE SO THAT
FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS CAN BE ESTABLISHED AND BOTH CAN
MOVE TO BUILD THE DIPLOMATIC AND COMMERCIAL TIES THAT ARE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK H PEREZ

DATE/CASE ID: 02 FEB 2012 200903553

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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2009-03553 Doc No. C17604506 Date: 07/22/2016

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3. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DOES NOT TAKE A POSITION ON THE DESIRABILITY OF THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE ON BORDERS SOUGHT BY ANKARA OR THAT OFFERED BY YEREVAN IN THE LETTER. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS OBVIOUSLY NOT IN A POSITION TO FORCE EITHER SIDE TO AGREE TO ANY PROPOSED LANGUAGE. THE U.S.

GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO URGE BOTH SIDES, HOWEVER, TO BEGIN A REAL DIALOGUE SO THE ISSUE CAN BE RESOLVED AND WE ARE WILLING TO COMMUNICATE PROPOSED LANGUAGE BETWEEN THE PARTIES SHOULD THIS BE NECESSARY. IN THAT LIGHT, EMBASSY ANKARA IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE POINTS AT PARA. 4, AND TEXT OF LETTER AS SET FORTH IN REF, TO THE TURKISH MFA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. EMBASSY YEREVAN IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE POINTS AT PARA. 5 TO ARMENIAN MFA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

4. BEGIN POINTS FOR TURKISH MFA:

-- THE INCREMENTAL PROGRESS MADE OVER THE LAST SEVERAL
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WEEKS IN DEVELOPING A MEDIATION PROCESS WITH REGARD TO NAGORNO-KARABAKH IS A CAUSE FOR CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM. THESE MEDIATION EFFORTS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OFFER THE PROMISE OF ENDING THE VIOLENCE AND RESOLVING THIS CONFLICT, IF THE PARTIES TO THE VIOLENCE SINCERELY WANT PEACE.

-- TURKEY HAS PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN OBTAINING AGREEMENT ON THE CSCE MEDIATION EFFORT.

-- WE UNDERSTAND THE DOMESTIC PRESSURES THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IS UNDER CONCERNING SUPPORT FOR AZERBAIJAN.

-- BUT TO BE EFFECTIVE IN HELPING TO ACHIEVE A MEDIATED SOLUTION, BOTH TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES MUST CONTINUE TO TAKE A BALANCED, EVEN-HANDED POSITION.

-- WE UNDERSTAND THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN MAINTAINING YOUR GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF EVENHANDEDNESS IF YOU COULD POINT TO PROGRESS IN NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH ARMENIA.

-- TO THAT END, WE ARE URGING ARMENIA TO WORK ACTIVELY TO NORMALIZE ITS RELATIONS WITH TURKEY AND CONVEY TO YOU

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-- ARMENIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HOVANNISIAN HAS SENT A
LETTER TO SECRETARY BAKER IN WHICH HE DISCUSSED THE
ARMENIAN POSITION ON RECOGNITION OF TURKISH BORDERS.

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-- IT IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO
COMMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ARMENIAN POSITION, OR
FOR THAT MATTER ON THE TURKISH POSITION. WE DO
BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT FOREIGN MINISTER HOVANNISIAN'S
STATED POSITION IN THE LETTER PRESENTS A BASIS FOR

FURTHER DIALOGUE BETWEEN TURKEY AND ARMENIA.

,, WE ARE TELLING THE ARMENIAN GOVERNMENT THAT IT MUST
ADDRESS THIS ISSUE WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT DIRECTLY.

-- WE ARE PASSING THE LETTER TO YOU SO THAT YOU WILL BE
BETTER ABLE TO RESPOND TO THE ARMENIAN GOVERNMENT WHEN
YEREVAN ADDRESSES YOU DIRECTLY ON THIS ISSUE AS WE ARE
URGING IT TO DO.

-- WE URGE THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IN TURN TO ENGAGE THE
ARMENIANS ON THE BORDER ISSUE SO THAT IT CAN BE
RESOLVED AND RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND ARMENIA
NORMALIZED.

-- WE LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING TO WORK WITH TURKEY, OUR
NATO AND CSCE PARTNERS, AND THE UN TO FIND A PEACEFUL
RESOLUTION TO THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT BASED ON
GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATION.

END POINTS FOR TURKISH MFA.

5. BEGIN POINTS FOR ARMENIAN MFA:

-- AS YOU KNOW THERE IS GROWING DOMESTIC POLITICAL
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-- NONETHELESS THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDS THAT
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CANNOT CONDONE MILITARY
INTERVENTION BY ANY OUTSIDE PARTY IN THE CONFLICT OVER
NAGORNO-KARABAKH.

-- TURKEY REMAINS COMMITTED TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF
THE CONFLICT OVER NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND WILL BE CRUCIAL
TO CONVINCING AZERBAIJAN TO ACCEPT MEDIATION.

-- ANKARA ALSO WANTS AND NEEDS GOOD RELATIONS WITH
ARMENIA. IT IS UNDERTAKING SEVERAL ACTIONS TO IMPROVE
RELATIONS.

-- FOR EXAMPLE, ANKARA IS ALLOWING HUMANITARIAN AID
SHIPMENTS TO TRANSIT TURKISH AIR SPACE AND OVERLAND
BORDERS--DESPITE THE AZERBAIJANI BLOCKADES AND VERY
STRONG PUBLIC OPPOSITION IN TURKEY.

-- AS SHIPPERS OF THE AID, NO ONE IS MORE DETERMINED THAT
IT ARRIVE IN ARMENIA THAN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. WE
ASSURE YOU THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IS BEING
FORTHCOMING ON THIS ISSUE.

-- BUT IT WOULD BOLSTER ANKARA'S EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN ITS
POLICY OF EVENHANDEDNESS IF IT COULD POINT TO PROGRESS
IN NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH ARMENIA.

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PAGE 06 STATE 102596 020204Z

-- THE MARCH 16 LETTER SECRETARY BAKER RECEIVED FROM
FOREIGN MINISTER HOVANNISIAN DISCUSSING THE ARMENIAN
GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON RECOGNITION OF TURKISH
BORDERS OFFERS A BASIS FOR DIRECT DIALOGUE BETWEEN
TURKEY AND ARMENIA.

-- IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO
COMMENT ON THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE ON TURKISH BORDERS IN
THE LETTER, BUT WE HAVE URGED YOU IN THE PAST--AND DO
SO NOW--TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE AND APPROPRIATE ASSURANCES
TO TURKEY ON BORDERS AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2009-03553 Doc No. C17604506 Date: 07/22/2016
-- WE URGE THERE FORE THAT FOREIGN MINISTER HOVANNISIAN'S
LETTER OF MARCH 16 BE COMMUNICATED TO ANKARA DIRECTLY
AND BE FOLLOWED UP BY GOOD FAITH TALKS ON THE ISSUE
BETWEEN YOUR GOVERNMENT AND TURKEY.

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-- WE HAVE PASSED THE MARCH 16 LETTER TO THE TURKISH
GOVERNMENT AND URGED THAT ANKARA BE PREPARED TO FULLY
ENGAGE THE ARMENIAN GOVERNMENT IN RESOLVING THIS ISSUE
SO THAT THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZING ARMENIAN-TURKISH
RELATIONS CAN MOVE FORWARD.

-- FULL ARMENIAN RELATIONS WITH TURKEY WOULD HAVE AN
IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON REDUCING TENSIONS IN THE REGION
AND IMPROVING CONDITIONS IN ARMENIA. PROGRESS IN
BUILDING THE ARMENIAN ECONOMY AND TIES TO THE WEST
REQUIRES THAT ARMENIA HAVE SOLID TIES TO ITS
NEIGHBORS INCLUDING TURKEY.

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-- THIS IS BEING HELD UP BY THE FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE
BORDER ISSUE. WE URGE YOU TO BEGIN A DIALOGUE NOW
WITH TURKEY THAT WILL RESOLVE THIS ISSUE.

END POINTS TO ARMENIAN MFA.

6. YEREVAN MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
BAKER

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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2009-03553 Doc No. C17604506 Date: 07/22/2016

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United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

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DECL: OADR

ACTION MEMORANDUM
S/S

RELEASED IN FULL

TO: The Acting Secretary

THROUGH: P - Mr. Kanter

FROM: EUR - Thomas M.T. Niles

SUBJECT: Letters to the Foreign Ministers of Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Turkey and Russia on Nagorno-Karabakh

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether to approve the attached cables with the texts of letters from you to the Foreign Ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Russia regarding Nagorno-Karabakh and the Minsk Group negotiations.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

These letters are a follow-up to your meetings with Cetin and Kozyrev in New York and, especially, with Hovannisian and Kasymov in Washington. The purpose of the letters is three-fold: 1) to reiterate our conviction that the Minsk Group currently represents the best possible forum for negotiating a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and to channel divergent energies (such as the Sochi agreement, greater UN involvement, or attempts to re-negotiate the CSCE mandate) into the Minsk Group effort; 2) to press for an unconditional, monitored ceasefire and to respond to specific hindrances to a ceasefire raised by Hovannisian (the status of the N-K Armenians at the talks) and Kasymov (tying a ceasefire to an early Armenian withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh); and 3) to advise the recipients of Ambassador Maresca's trip to the region and to seek their cooperation in making the Ambassador's discussions as fruitful as possible.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK H PEREZ
DATE/CASE ID: 26 JAN 2012 200903553

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B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 STATE 064291 010858Z
ORIGIN P-01

INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CCO-00 COR-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 SS-01
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DRAFTED BY EUR/ISCA/BI:RMILLS:RMM
APPROVED BY EUR:RKAUZLARICH
EUR/ISCA:CNAPPER EUR/ISCA/BI:DHESS
EUR/SE:DRANSOME S/S:WITTOCH
EUR/RPM:BHILL S/P:JHOLMES
S/P:DROSS S/S-O:LEBUTLER
P:CKELLY NSC:KHILL
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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1156-59 IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY YEREVAN 0200-
USMISSION USNATO 6763-66
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 6870-73

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 064291

ANKARA PLEASE PASS TO UNDERSECRETARY KANTER VIENNA FOR CSCC

TOPOL 3045

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TOPOL NUMBER ADDED)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, AM, AJ, TU
SUBJECT:) STATE 61687 B) ANKARA 2788
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 STATE 064291 010858Z

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO TURKISH GOVERNMENT ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS FOR UNDERSECRETARY KANTER.
2. THE SITUATION IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH (NKO) HAS GROWN MORE UNSTABLE AND VIOLENT OVER THE PAST WEEK. THE FEBRUARY 20

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK H PEREZ
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 28 FEB 2017
DATE/CASE ID: 02 FEB 2012 200903553

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2009-03553 Doc No. C17604521 Date: 07/22/2016
COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE RUSSIAN, ARMENIAN, AND AZERBAIJANI
FOREIGN MINISTERS HAS NOT LED TO A CEASE-FIRE IN NKO OR
PRODUCED FURTHER DIALOGUE. SHELLING AND ATTACKS ON
VILLAGES THROUGHOUT NKO HAVE ESCALATED AND THE CAPITAL OF
STEPANAKERT IS SUFFERING HEAVY DAMAGE AND CASUALTIES. THE
PUBLIC SPOTLIGHT FOCUSED ON THE SITUATION BY THE VISIT OF
THE CSCE RAPPORTEUR MISSION AND THE JUST CONCLUDED CSCE
COMMITTEE OF SENIOR OFFICIALS (CSO) MEETING IN PRAGUE HAS
NOT STOPPED THE VIOLENCE FROM ESCALATING. THE SEIZURE OF
LARGE QUANTITIES OF WEAPONS. INCLUDING GRAD MISSILES AND
LAUNCHERS, FROM THE CIS MILITARY DEPOT AT AGDAM HAS
INFLAMED ARMENIAN FEARS THAT THE AZERBAIJANIS INTEND AN
ALL-OUT MILITARY SOLUTION IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH.
IMPLEMENTATION OF CIS MILITARY COMMANDER SHAPOSHNIKOV'S

UNCLASSIFIED

ANNOUNCEMENT ON FEBRUARY 28 THAT THE LAST CIS REGIMENT WILL
BE IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAWN FROM NKO AND THAT ALL CIS OUTPOSTS
WILL BE REMOVED FROM THE ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI FRONTIER WILL
REMOVE THE LAST BUFFERS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

3. SECRETARY BAKER PASSED A MESSAGE TO ANKARA ON FEBRUARY
28, ASKING THAT THE TURKS ENCOURAGE BOTH BAKU AND YEREVAN
TO IMPLEMENT THE FEBRUARY 20 COMMUNIQUE (REF). THE
SITUATION ON THE GROUND IS RAPIDLY WORSENING AND REQUIRES
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PAGE 03 STATE 064291 010858Z
THAT WE NOW ENGAGE THE TURKS IN A DEEPER EXCHANGE ON NKO.
IN A DEMARCHE ON FEBRUARY 26, THE TURKISH MFA SIGNALED ITS
CONCERN TO US ABOUT INCREASING ARMENIAN ATTACKS AND
FORMALLY PROPOSED THAT WE AGREE TO COOPERATE IN SEVERAL
WAYS: USE OUR INFLUENCE ON ARMENIA, WITH TURKISH INFLUENCE
ON AZERBAIJAN, TO HALT THE FIGHTING; AN EMBARGO ON ARMS FOR
BOTH COUNTRIES; CONSULTATIONS ON RECOURSE TO THE U.N.
SECURITY COUNCIL, AND RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS (REF B). WE CAN
WELCOME THE TURKISH PROPOSALS AND AGREE TO THE SPECIFIC
ITEMS. WE CAN CONSULT ON RECOURSE TO THE UNSC, ALTHOUGH WE
PREFER THE RUSSIAN MEDIATION EFFORT AT THIS TIME. BUT WE
MUST ALSO USE THE TURKISH DEMARCHE AND YOUR VISIT AS A
BASIS FOR A FRANK DISCUSSION THAT, AT THIS MOMENT THE KEY
TO STOPPING THE RAPID DRIFT TOWARD WAR IS RESTRAINING THE
AZERBAIJANIS. WE MUST URGE THE TURKS TO USE THEIR
INFLUENCE WITH AZERBAIJAN TO HAVE BAKU STOP ESCALATING THE
VIOLENCE AND SERIOUSLY PURSUE MEDIATION WITH THE ARMENIANS
IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH.

B1

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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2009-03553 Doc No. C17604521 Date: 07/22/2016

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ORIGIN EUR-01

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	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-01	PRS-01	P-01	RPCS-01	SNP-01
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DRAFTED BY: EUR/ISCA/WST:RMILLS:RMM
 APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY
 EUR:TMTNILES EUR:RKAZULARICH
 EUR/ISCA:LNAPPER EUR/RPM:WHILL EUR/ISCA/WST:DHESS
 S/P:JHANNAH EUR/SE:DRANSOME P:CVANVOORST
 NSC:NO'LEARYS/S-S:MEMMARSHALL S/S:ITOH
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 TO AMEMBASSY YEREVAN IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 INFO AMEMBASSY BAKU IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY MINSK
 AMEMBASSY TBILISI
 AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
 EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
 USMISSION USNATO
 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 164014

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PAGE 02 STATE 164014 221909Z
HELSINKI FOR US DEL CSCE; VIENNA FOR US DEL CPC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, AM, AJ, TU, AJ, CSCE
 SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER
 HOVANNISIAN ON WORSENING SITUATION IN
 NAGORNO-KARABAKH

CORRECTED COPY MRN 158016 ADDING PARA. 3 AND CORRECTING
SUBJECT LINE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK H PEREZ
 CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
 DECLASSIFY AFTER: 18 MAY 2017
 DATE/CASE ID: 02 FEB 2012 200903553

UNCLASSIFIED

2. TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER CETIN SPOKE WITH SECRETARY BAKER ON MAY 17 TO EXPRESS TURKEY'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE WORSENING SITUATION IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH (NKO) AND ARMENIAN MILITARY ACTION IN LACHIN AND NAKHICHEVAN.

B1

3. PRESIDENT BUSH MET WITH TURKISH PRESIDENT OZAL THE SAME DAY IN HOUSTON, WHERE OZAL IS RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT.

OZAL MADE THE SAME POINTS TO THE PRESIDENT AND URGED THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT PRESS YEREVAN TO REIN IN ARMENIAN FORCES IN NKO AND STOP FURTHER MILITARY ACTIONS THAT ARE GIVING THE ARMENIANS DE FACTO CONTROL OVER NKO.

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4. IN RESPONSE TO THESE DISCUSSIONS, THE SECRETARY HAS APPROVED THE FOLLOWING LETTER FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY TO FOREIGN MINISTER HOVANNISIAN. EMBASSY YEREVAN CHARGE SHOULD DELIVER THE LETTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO HOVANNISIAN OR MEMBER OF HIS MFA STAFF. NO/NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

5. BEGIN TEXT OF SECRETARY'S LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER HOVANNISIAN:

DEAR RAFFI:

AS WE DISCUSSED ON MAY 9, I AM DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THE ESCALATION OF FIGHTING IN BOTH NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND NAKHICHEVAN. OUR CONCERN HAS TAKEN ON EVEN GREATER URGENCY IN THE ENSUING WEEK.

IF ARMENIAN FORCES IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH MOVE INTO LACHIN AND ESTABLISH A CORRIDOR BETWEEN NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND ARMENIA, OR PURSUE MILITARY ACTION IN NAKHICHEVAN, I FEAR IT COULD LEAD TO THE COLLAPSE OF MEDIATION EFFORTS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. INCLUDING THE CSCE EFFORT, AND A DANGEROUS ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT.

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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2009-03553 Doc No. C17604488 Date: 07/22/2016
YOU MUST UNDERSTAND THAT ARMENIAN MILITARY ACTIONS IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH ARE DANGEROUSLY ESCALATING POLITICAL PRESSURES ON THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO INCREASE ITS SUPPORT FOR AZERBAIJAN. WE UNDERSTAND ARMENIAN FEARS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF TURKISH INTERVENTION IN THE AREA AND WILL CONTINUE TO ADVISE THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT THAT WE CONSIDER ANY SUCH MOVES UNACCEPTABLE. BUT THAT MEANS ARMENIA MUST
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AVOID ACTIONS THAT MAKE SUCH MOVES BY TURKEY MORE LIKELY.
WE WILL NOT BE EFFECTIVE OTHERWISE.

WE ARE WORKING HARD TO PROMOTE THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS CONFLICT THROUGH THE CSCE-SPONSORED PEACE CONFERENCE. OVER THE LAST SEVERAL WEEKS. HOWEVER. THE ACTIONS OF ARMENIAN FORCES IN NKO AND ARMENIA HAVE THREATENED THE PROSPECTS FOR THE CONFERENCE. IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR ANY AZERBAIJANI GOVERNMENT TO COME TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IF ARMENIAN FORCES ARE ACHIEVING DE FACTO CONTROL OVER NKO ON THE GROUND.

I URGE THAT THE ARMENIAN GOVERNMENT TAKE STEPS TO DEMONSTRATE ITS COMMITMENT TO END THE RECENT FIGHTING IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH. IN PARTICULAR, ARMENIAN ACTION TO MOVE FROM LACHIN TO OPEN A CORRIDOR WITH ARMENIA OR AGAINST THE TOWN OF SADEREK AND THE BRIDGE THERE THAT CONNECTS TURKEY AND NAKHICHEVAN WOULD HAVE A MOST DESTABILIZING EFFECT ON THE SITUATION. WE URGE THAT YOU TAKE EVERY ACTION TO PREVENT SUCH ATTACKS.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS CONSISTENTLY STATED TO ALL SIDES THAT NO LASTING SOLUTION TO THIS CONFLICT CAN BE ACHIEVED BY MILITARY FORCE OR VIOLENCE. WE WILL NOT RECOGNIZE ANY UNILATERAL CHANGE IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH'S STATUS MADE ON THE BASIS OF MILITARY FORCE OR VIOLENCE IN THE ENCLAVE. ALL SIDES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENDING THE CONFLICT THROUGH GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATION BASED ON CSCE AND OTHER INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL HOLD RESPONSIBLE THOSE FORCES WHO
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THE U.S. GOVERNMENT LOOKS TO THE ARMENIAN GOVERNMENT,
RAFFI, TO ACT WITH RESTRAINT AND COURAGE TO STOP THE
ESCALATING VIOLENCE AND KEEP ALIVE THIS HISTORIC
OPPORTUNITY FOR NEGOTIATION. YOU NEED TO KNOW THAT THERE
IS A CONSENSUS GROWING IN THE CSCE TO CONDEMN ARMENIA, AND
WE WILL FIND IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO STOP SUCH A
CONDEMNATION UNLESS YOU TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO DE-ESCLATE
THE CONFLICT.

I HOPE WE WILL BE ABLE TO MEET LATER THIS WEEK IN LISBON
DURING THE COORDINATING CONFERENCE TO FURTHER DISCUSS THE
WORRISOME SITUATION IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND NAKHICHEVAN AND
TO DISCUSS THE STEPS THAT MUST BE TAKEN NOW TO END THIS
TRAGIC CONFLICT.

SINCERELY YOURS,

JAMES A. BAKER III
SECRETARY OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

END TEXT OF LETTER TO HOVANNISIAN.

6. FOR EMBASSY ANKARA: EMBASSY SHOULD IMMEDIATELY INFORM
TURKISH MFA OF THE SECRETARY'S LETTER AND MAY PROVIDE MFA

WITH ORAL SUMMARY OF ITS CONTENTS.

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7. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
EAGLEBURGER

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RELEASED IN FULL

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ACTION EUR-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-15	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	CFE-01	C-01
	DODE-00	CISA-02	HA-09	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19
	L-03	ADS-00	MOFM-01	MOF-03	M-01	NPI-01	NRRC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-01	PRS-01
	P-01	RP-10	RPCS-01	SCT-03	SDEL-01	SNP-01	SP-01
	SSO-00	SS-01	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	/088W	

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O 261826Z MAY 92
 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9084
 INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA
 AMEMBASSY TBILISI
 AMEMBASSY YEREVAN
 AMEMBASSY BAKU
 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
 AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 015284

HELSINKI FOR USDEL CSCE; VIENNA FOR USDEL CPC

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ISCA

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, AM, AJ, TU, AJ, CSCE
 SUBJECT: NAGORNO-KARABAKH: SECRETARY'S LETTER TO FM
 HOVANNISIAN: REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION TO
 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 15284 261828Z
BRIEF THE RUSSIAN MFA

REF: STATE 164014

1. (CONFIDENTIAL--ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. WE NOTED THAT REFTTEL AUTHORIZED EMBASSY ANKARA TO PROVIDE THE TURKISH MFA AN ORAL SUMMARY OF THE SECRETARY'S LETTER TO FM HOVANNISIAN. IN VIEW OF THE RUSSIANS' OBVIOUS CONCERNS WITH THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH SITUATION AND SENSITIVITY TO TURKISH INVOLVEMENT, WE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK H PEREZ
 DATE/CASE ID: 09 FEB 2012 200903553

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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2009-03553 Doc No. C17604568 Date: 07/22/2016
WOULD APPRECIATE AUTHORIZATION TO PROVIDE AN ORAL SUMMARY OF THE LETTER TO THE RUSSIAN MFA AS WELL; THIS
COULD BE DONE IN CONTEXT OF RECEIVING AN MFA READOUT ON
TURKISH PM DEMIREL'S MAY 25-26 VISIT TO MOSCOW.

UNCLASSIFIED

3. MINIMIZES CONSIDERED. STRAUSS

CONFIDENTIAL

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UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2009-03553 Doc No. C17604568 Date: 07/22/2016

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ORIGIN EUR-01

RELEASED IN FULL

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	CPR-02	CFE-01	C-01
	DODE-00	CISA-02	HA-09	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19
	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-02	OMB-01
	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	RPCS-01	SNP-01	SP-01
	SSC-01	SSO-00	SS-01	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	/074R

DRAFTED BY: EUR/SE:DRTARPEY:DRT
 APPROVED BY: THE ACTING SECRETARY
 EUR:TMTNILES EUR:MRYAN EUR/SE:DRANSOM
 EUR/ISCA:LNAPPER D:JWARLICK EUR/ISCA/WST:NTONGOUR
 EUR/RPM:JMARESCA T:JSCHMIDT EUR/RPM:SRUEDY
 P:EMALLOY S/S:RLWILSON S/P:TZAMOSTNY S/S-O:JBRIGGS
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O R 060004Z OCT 92
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
 INFO AMEMBASSY BAKU
 AMEMBASSY YEREVAN
 EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
 AMEMBASSY ALMA ATA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 326027

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE, FASS AMB. KORNBLUM

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: OPDC, CSCE, PREL, US, TU, AJ, AM, RS
 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 326027 060008Z
 SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM ACTING SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER TO
 FOREIGN MINISTER CETIN

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. DEPARTMENT REQUESTS EMBASSY TO FORWARD FOLLOWING
 MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER CETIN. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL
 WILL FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK H PEREZ
 DATE/CASE ID: 02 FEB 2012 200903553

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I WAS PLEASED THAT WE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET LAST WEEK IN NEW YORK. YOU WILL RECALL THAT WE AGREED TO WORK CLOSELY ON A NUMBER OF PRESSING ISSUES. INCLUDING THE SITUATION IN THE CAUCASUS. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THE ONGOING CONFLICT OVER NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND SHARES YOUR FRUSTRATION WITH THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. AS I MENTIONED WHEN WE MET. I AM CONVINCED THAT THE MINSK GROUP PROCESS REMAINS THE BEST HOPE FOR RESOLVING THE DISPUTE.

IT IS THE ONLY FORUM WHICH INCLUDES REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL INTERESTED PARTIES, INCLUDING THE ARMENIAN AND AZERI COMMUNITIES OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH. IT IS ALSO THE ONLY PEACE MECHANISM THAT IS PREPARED TO DEPLOY AN OBSERVER FORCE TO MONITOR A CEASEFIRE.

I AM ALARMED BY THE IMPASSE IN THE MINSK GROUP TALKS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A BREAKDOWN IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

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ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS SITUATION. ARMENIA HAS BACKED THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH ARMENIANS' UNREASONABLE DEMAND TO ALTER THEIR STATUS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS. AZERBAIJAN. FOR ITS PART, HAS RAISED NEW AND UNACCEPTABLE PRECONDITIONS TO A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

I WAS PLEASED TO HEAR THAT YOUR DISCUSSIONS IN NEW YORK WITH BOTH THE AZERIS AND ARMENIANS WERE PRODUCTIVE. I URGE YOU TO CONTINUE THOSE DISCUSSIONS. WE ARE LOOKING TO TURKEY TO PRESS THE AZERBAIJAN GOVERNMENT TO DROP ITS PRECONDITIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE.

THE PEACE PROCESS HAS ENTERED A CRITICAL STAGE. THE UNITED NATIONS HAS EMPHASIZED ITS CONFIDENCE IN THE CSCE MINSK GROUP. AND THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL HAS INDICATED THAT THE U.N. WILL NOT UNDERTAKE A SEPARATE MEDIATION EFFORT. OTHER CEASEFIRE EFFORTS HAVE FAILED IN THE PAST BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF A MONITORING MECHANISM AND THE FAILURE TO INCLUDE THE ARMENIAN AND AZERI COMMUNITIES OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH AS PARTICIPANTS. THE CSCE PROCESS INCLUDES THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH COMMUNITIES AND IS PREPARING TO DEPLOY AN OBSERVER TEAM TO MONITOR A CEASEFIRE. IF THE ROME TALKS ARE ALLOWED TO COLLAPSE. HOWEVER, IT WILL BE

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E: CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Kürkçü, Burak
Nationality: Turkish (TC)
Date and Place of Birth: 15 August 1983, Elazığ
Marital Status: Single
Phone: +90 533 123 1456
email: burakkurkcu1923@gmail.com

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MSc	LSE, Two-Year MPA	2013
BSc	METU International Relations	2006
High School	Elazığ Anadolu High School	2001

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2019 May- Present	Ministry of Trade	Counsellor to the Minister
2019 January- 2019 May	Ministry of Trade	Director General for General Directorate of Personnel Affairs
2018 July- 2019 January	Ministry of Trade	Head of Personnel Affairs Department
2017 February- 2018 July	Ministry of Economy	Head of Personnel Affairs Department
2013-2017	Ministry of Economy	Deputy Head of Personnel Affairs
2011-2013	Ministry of Economy	Foreign Trade Specialist
2011-2010 June	Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade	Foreign Trade Specialist
2007 April	Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade	Assistant Foreign Trade Specialist

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Intermediate German, Beginner Russian

PUBLICATIONS

1. Kürkçü, Burak, *Babruka: Müzakere ve İkna Teknikleri*, İstanbul: İnkılap Yayınları, 2016
2. Kürkçü, Burak, *Küçük İmparator: Liderin 23 Adımı*, İstanbul: İnkılap Yayınları, 2016

HOBBIES

Judo, Chess, Versification, Cooking

F: TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Türk dış politikasının arkasındaki mantığı anlamak için Süleyman Demirel neden çok önemli bir kişiliktir? Onu diğer siyasi liderlerden farklı kılan nedir? Eski bir bürokrat olarak siyasi bir lidere nasıl dönüştüğü ve Türk siyasetinde kırk yıla yakın nasıl görev aldığı düşünüldüğünde, Demirel'in liderliği ve siyasi tecrübesi Türk dış politika tecrübesini anlayabilmek için özel bir önemi hak etmektedir. Bu çalışma, Süleyman Demirel'in tecrübesi ve kişisel kabiliyetlerine odaklanarak, Türk dış politikası krizlerinin yönetiminde siyasi liderlik ve karar alma mekanizması ile devlet kurumlarının bu karar mekanizmasındaki rollerini incelemektedir. Dış politika karar sürecinde devletin kara kutusunun işleyiş mekanizmasını ve esaslarını anlayabilmek için devletin kurumlarının birbiriyle nasıl müzakere ettiklerini ve dış politikayı kendi önceliklerine uygun olarak nasıl yönlendirmeye çalıştıklarını anlamak gerekmektedir.

Çeşitli akademisyenler Türk dış politikasını farklı hususlara odaklanarak detaylıca çalışmış olsalar da bu çalışmalar genellikle devlet kurumlarının Türk dış politikasının oluşturulmasına ilişkin katkılarını ve kara kutunun açılmasını öncelik olarak görmemektedir. Bu noktada, Gerçekçi-Realist gelenek devlet içindeki kurumsal birimlerin işleyiş mekanizmasını göz ardı edip iç politika ile dış politika arasında keskin bir ayrım yaparak dış politikada ortaya çıkan kararların tekil ve çıkarları maksimuma yükseltmeyi planlayan aktörün rasyonel kararları olduğunu değerlendirmektedir. Bu tez çalışması ise sözü edilen kara kutunun içindeki işleyiş mekanizmasını inceleyerek Türk dış politikasının siyasi karar alıcı lider ile devlet kurumları arasındaki müzakere ve ikna süreçleri sonunda nasıl şekillendirildiğine ilişkin geniş bir anlayış ve detaylı bir araştırma sunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bir başka deyişle, farklı devlet kurumlarının kendi kurumsal önceliklerini nasıl belirledikleri, bu önceliklere uygun olarak siyasi karar alıcıyı ve diğer devlet kurumlarını nasıl etkiledikleri ve karar mekanizmasında önceden belirlenmiş şablonlar ve kurumsal

miyopluk sebebiyle dış politika kararlarının akılcı olup olmayacağı hususları bu tez çalışmasının ana odaklarını oluşturmaktadır. Türk dış politikasına ilişkin tarihsel bakış açısı sunan kronolojik çalışmalardan farklı olarak bu çalışma özellikle karar alma süreçleri ve devlet kurumlarının bu süreçte siyasi karar alıcı ile hangi kanalları kullanarak ne şekilde iletişim kurduğu ve ne ölçüde etkilediğini incelemekte, bu amaçla da Süleyman Demirel dönemlerini örnek vaka incelemesi olarak seçmektedir.

Neden Süleyman Demirel sorusunun cevabı ise işte burada önem kazanmaktadır. Türkiye yakın yüzyıl siyasi tarihinin yaklaşık kırk yılının değişik dönemlerinde siyasi karar alıcı olarak görev alan Demirel, hem Soğuk Savaş, hem de Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde görev yapmış olması, hem tek parti hükümeti hem koalisyon hükümetlerinde Başbakan olarak görev yapmış olması, hem başbakanlık hem cumhurbaşkanlığı görevlerinde bulunmuş olması sebebiyle özgün bir örnek olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Buna ilaveten, Demirel'in kendi liderliği ve felsefesine ilişkin olarak bizzat kendisi tarafından pek çok yazı yazılmış ve mülakat verilmiş olması da bilgi açısından birincil kaynak kolaylığı sağlamaktadır.

Bu çalışmada ilk olarak Demirel'in karar alma mekanizmasının nasıl şekillendiği ve devlet kurumlarının öncelik ve kurumsal reflekslerini dikkate alıp almadığı incelenmektedir. Türkiye siyasi tarihinde İsmet İnönü ile aynı sayıda olmak üzere en fazla dış politika krizini yöneten iki liderden biri olarak farklı uluslararası sistemlerde ve farklı hükümet tiplerinde görev almış olması sebebiyle Demirel siyasi karar alıcı olarak ayrı bir yere konulabilmektedir. Bu anlamda, Demirel'in dış politika liderliği de çeşitli akademisyenler tarafından çalışılmış olmakla birlikte özellikle dış politika krizleri esnasında devlet kurumlarıyla ne tür bir karar dinamiği içinde bulunduğu ilişkin olarak literatürde kapsamlı bir çalışma noktasında boşluk olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Bu sebeple, Türkiye'de dış politika konusunda milli çıkarların nasıl şekillendirildiğine ve kriz anlarında politika uygulama süreçlerinin nasıl yapılandırıldığına ilişkin olarak bu çalışma özgün bir inceleme ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır.

Dış politikada özellikle kriz anlarına odaklanılmasındaki temel tez, siyasi liderlerin karar mekanizmasına rutin diplomasiden farklı olarak daha etkin katılım sağlaması sebebiyle siyasi karar mekanizmasının daha isabetli ölçülebileceği ve

devlet kurumlarının bu mekanizmadaki asıl rollerinin daha iyi tespit edilebileceği değerlendirilmesidir. Bu çerçevede, dış politikanın dar bir diplomat kadrosuyla tek siyasi karar alıcı tarafından yönetildiği İsmet İnönü ve Adnan Menderes dönemleri ya da diplomat kadrosunun öncelikli olarak dikkate alınmadığı Turgut Özal ve Recep Tayyip Erdoğan dönemlerinden ziyade, devlet kurumlarıyla ilişkilerini iyi tutmuş ve bürokrasinin fikirlerine önem vermiş olan bir lider olarak tanınan Demirel'in bu çalışmada incelenmesinin faydalı olacağı düşünülmüştür.

Belirtilen hususlar ışığında, bu çalışmada üç temel araştırma sorusuna cevap aranmaktadır. İlk soru, Demirel'in dış politika karar mekanizması ve liderliğine ne tür etkenlerin sınırlar getirdiğidir. Bu etkenlerden özellikle uluslararası sistemsel ve bölgesel gelişmeler ile iç politikadaki ekonomik, sosyal ve siyasal dinamikler ile yönettiği hükümetin tek parti hükümeti veya koalisyon hükümeti olup olmadığına göre hükümet tipi incelemeye alınarak, Demirel'in bulunduğu siyasi liderlik rolünün biçimi de dikkate alınmaktadır.

İkinci soru, devlet kurumlarının dış politikanın oluşturulmasında, siyasi karar alıcıların ortaya koyduğu politikayı yürütmenin dışında bir rollerinin olup olmadığı ve dış politikanın oluşturulma evresine etki edip etmediklerinin anlaşılmasıdır. Bu soruya cevap ararken de lider ile devlet kurumları arasındaki ilişki ve süreçler analiz edilerek karar mekanizmasına dahil olmak için kurumlar tarafından hangi kanalların kullanıldığı ve ne seviyede etkili olabildikleri incelenmektedir.

Son soru ise karar mekanizmasında ortaya çıkan süreçlerin rolünü anlamak üzere spesifik olarak dış politika krizlerinin niteliği ve bu krizlerde karar mekanizmasının ne şekilde işlediğidir. Önceki paragraflarda da belirtildiği üzere, dış politikada kriz anları rutin günlük diplomasiden farklı olarak karar süresinin kısıtlı olduğu ve kaynakların akılcı karar vermek için önceden planlanmış olmadığı, beklenmeyen ve tetiklenmiş süreçlerdir. Bu sebeple, siyasi karar alıcının liderliği daha fazla ön plana çıkmakta ve devlet kurumlarının buradaki rolü ve etkisi artmakta iken aynı zamanda krizin niteliği de doğal olarak karar dinamiğini doğrudan etkilemektedir. Bu çerçevede, çalışmada özel olarak seçilmiş dış politika krizlerine ilişkin olarak da süreç analizi önem kazanmaktadır. Tüm bu soruların cevabını tek bir çalışmada bulmak zor olmakla birlikte, Demirel'in her bir dış politika krizindeki

karar mekanizması, etkilendiği iç ve dış faktörler ile devlet kurumlarının süreçteki rollerine ilişkin yapılan bir matris tablosu, tezin analiz sürecini kolaylaştırmaktadır.

Bu tez çalışması, söz konusu soruları cevaplarken nitel bir yöntem ve yorumsal bir yaklaşım takip etmekte, bunun için de Amerikan arşiv belgeleri, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (TBMM) tutanakları, hükümet programları, basın açıklamaları ve liderlerin resmi beyanatları, emekli diplomatların anıları ve Demirel dönemlerindeki dış politika krizlerinde aktif görev almış siyasetçi ve üst düzey devlet görevlileriyle yüz yüze yapılan görüşmelerden faydalanmaktadır. Burada, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı ve Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri arşivlerinin tasnif sorunu ya da gizlilik sebebiyle araştırmacıların erişimine açılmamış olması şüphesiz çalışma açısından büyük bir kısıt teşkil etmekle birlikte, bu problem, “Bilgi Özgürlüğü Yasası” çerçevesinde erişime açılan ABD Dışişleri Bakanlığı ve Merkezi İstihbarat Teşkilatı (CIA) arşivlerinde yer alan bilgilerin yarı yapılandırılmış mülakatlar ve anılardan elde edilen bilgilerle karşılaştırılması ve eşleştirilmesi suretiyle aşmaya çalışılmaktadır. Şüphesiz bir diğer kısıt da mülakatlarda bilgi sunanların geçmişi değerlendirirken öznel olabilmesi ya da olaylarda kendi rollerini olduğundan fazla göstermesi şeklinde tezahür edebilmektedir. Bu problemi de aşabilmek için mülakat çıktıları kendi içinde ve diplomatların anıları ile karşılaştırılmakta ve eşleştirilmektedir.

Çalışmada dış politika krizleri seçilirken, değişen uluslararası dinamikler, iç dinamikler, hükümet tipleri ve aldığı liderlik görevleri çerçevesinde karar mekanizmasında değişiklik olup olmadığı test edilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Bu sebeple biri Soğuk Savaş döneminde ve diğeri Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde olmak üzere iki kriz koalisyon hükümetleri esnasında yaşananlardan, bir adet kriz Soğuk Savaş dönemi tek parti hükümetinde ve bir adet kriz de Soğuk Savaş sonrasında Demirel’in tek parti hükümeti bulunmadığı için cumhurbaşkanlığı döneminde yaşanan krizlerden seçilmiştir. Devlet kurumlarının etkisi araştırılırken de pek çok devlet kurumunun farklı nokta ve konularda dış politika kararlarına dahil olabileceği bilinmekle birlikte dış politikanın ana omurgasını oluşturan Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (TSK) ve kurumların müzakere ve fikir alışverişi masasına siyasi liderle birlikte oturdukları Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (MGK) bu tezin ana çalışma alanı olarak

sınırlandırılmış olup, Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (MİT) da elde somut veri oldukça değerlendirmeye dahil edilmiştir.

Çalışmanın kompozisyonu incelendiğinde, giriş bölümünün ardından dış politika analizine ilişkin temel kuramsal yaklaşımlar, bu yaklaşımlara eleştirel bakış açısı sunarak dış politikayı farklı açılardan inceleyen orta seviye yaklaşımlar, lider odaklı ve kurum odaklı diğer yaklaşımlar ve Türk dış politikasının şimdiye kadar ne şekilde çalışıldığına ilişkin literatür taramasının yer aldığı bir teorik altyapı bölümü bulunmaktadır. Realizm ve Liberalizm gibi ana teorilerin dış politikada göz önünde tutmadığı hususlardan yola çıkarak alternatif öneriler sunan Konstrüktivizm, Neo-klasik Realizm ve Dış Politika Analizi Kuramı gibi teoriler değerlendirildikten sonra lider odaklı yaklaşımlar ışığında politik psikoloji alanında yapılan çalışmalardan, liderin geçmiş hayatının karar mekanizmasını nasıl etkilediğini ölçümleyen “Operasyonel kod analizi (OCA)” ve “Liderlik karakter analizi (LTA)” gibi yöntemler üzerinde durulurken kurum odaklı yaklaşımlardan Graham Allison ve Philip Zelikow’un kuramsallaştırdığı “Organizasyonel davranış modeli (OBM)” ve “Bürokratik siyaset modeli (BPM)” incelenmiştir. Böylelikle, çalışmanın kavramsal ve kuramsal çerçevesi için eklektik ve çok boyutlu bir yaklaşım benimsenerek lider ve kurum odaklı teoriler ile Neo-klasik Realist yaklaşım birlikte kullanılmıştır.

Tezin kavramsal ve teorik çerçevesinin oluşturulduğu söz konusu bölümün ardından Süleyman Demirel’in genel liderlik ve dış politika anlayışının incelendiği bölüm gelmektedir. Bu bölümde, psikolojik ve sosyal arka plan ile geçmiş yaşam dinamiklerinin Demirel’in liderliğini ve karar mekanizmasını nasıl etkilediği incelenmiş ve teorik altyapıya uygun olarak OCA ile LTA alanında Demirel’e dair yapılmış çalışmalar analiz edilmiştir. Bunlarla birlikte, Türkiye’nin dış politika prensipleri ve temel anlayışına ilişkin olarak Demirel’in yaklaşımı ve kendi dönemlerinde dış politika önceliklerini nasıl biçimlendirdiği konusunda kapsamlı bir inceleme gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Demirel’e ilişkin bu bölümden itibaren peş peşe gelen dört bölümde farklı dönemlerdeki farklı dış politika krizleri ve karar alma süreçleri analiz edilerek bu incelemede yukarıda bahsedilen metot ve metodoloji dikkate alınmıştır. ABD ile yaşanan Afyon Ekimi Krizi’nin değerlendirildiği dördüncü bölüm, Silah Ambargosu

Krizi'nin değerlendirildiği beşinci bölüm, Ermenistan ile yaşanan Nahçıvan Krizi'nin değerlendirildiği altıncı bölüm ve Yunanistan ile yaşanan Kardak Krizi'nin değerlendirildiği yedinci bölüm sonrasında çalışmanın çıktılarının analiz edildiği ve nihai yargıların belirtildiği sonuç bölümü ile çalışma sonlandırılmıştır.

Burada, dış politika krizlerinin değerlendirilme yöntemine detaylı şekilde değinmekte fayda görülmektedir. Vaka olarak seçilen dış politika krizleri incelenirken, krizin meydana geldiği dönemin uluslararası ve bölgesel gelişmeleri ile iç politika gelişmeleri incelendikten sonra ilgili devlet kurumlarının organizasyonel gelişimleri ve siyasi karar alıcı olarak Demirel'in ne tür bir hükümet ve rol ile görev yaptığı da incelemeye dahil edilmektedir.

Bu çerçevede, ilk olarak, Afyon Ekimi Krizi'nin başladığı dönemde uluslararası sistem Soğuk Savaşın yumuşama evresi olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Küba füzeleri bunalımı sonrasında, Sovyetler Birliği'nin ABD ile silah yarışında denge oluşturduğu anlaşılınca uluslararası tansiyonun düşürülmesiyle başlayan yumuşama evresinin Türkiye gibi orta büyüklükteki devletlere içinde buldukları bloktan göreceli olarak bağımsız ve rahat hareket etme kabiliyeti ve buna uygun dış politika belirleme imkânı sağladığı görülmektedir. Türkiye için bu süreçte Sovyetler Birliği'ne yönelik güvenlik temelli çekinceler devam etmekle birlikte ekonomik alanda ilişkilerin güçlendirildiği söylenebilmektedir. Bu kapsamda, ülkeyi ekonomik büyüme ile güçlendirmeyi hedefleyen ve geleneksel güvenlik eksenli dış politika anlayışına toplumsal refahı da ekleyen Demirel için ABD veya Batı ülkelerinden elde edemediği sanayi ve altyapı kredilerini Sovyetler Birliği'nden temin etmek mümkün hale gelmiştir.

Dönemin bölgesel gelişmelerinde en göze çarpan iki husustan biri Arap devletleriyle İsrail arasında Ortadoğu'da gerçekleşen savaş, diğeri de Türkiye'nin de üç garantör ülkeden biri olduğu Kıbrıs adasında Rumlar tarafından "Enosis" hedefiyle Kıbrıslı Türklere karşı başlatılan şiddet eylemleridir. İlk bakışta fark edilmese de Türk dış politikası açısından birbirleriyle bağlantılı olan bu iki gelişme Demirel için karar mekanizmasında hem bir fırsat hem de kısıt oluşturmuştur. Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs'ta yaşanan şiddet olaylarına karşı sessiz kalması düşünülememekle birlikte, 1964'teki Johnson Mektubu'nun etkisini de dikkate

alarak, mevcut askeri ekipmanın Kıbrıs'a müdahale için yetersiz olduğunu fark eden Demirel, askerinin ve iç politikanın baskısına rağmen dış politikada ülkeyi başarısızlıkla sonuçlanabilecek bir harekate sürüklemekten vazgeçmiş, ancak onun döneminde başlatılan yerli savunma sanayii çalışmaları sayesinde 1974'teki Kıbrıs harekâtı başarıyla sonuçlanmıştır. Bu dönemde, Kıbrıs konusunda Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) başta olmak üzere uluslararası platformlarda meşru destek arayışına giren Demirel özellikle Ortadoğu'daki Arap devletlerinin ve Bağlantısızlar Hareketi'nin sayısal niteliğini de dikkate alarak Arap ülkeleriyle daha canlı ilişkiler yürütmeyi tercih etmiştir.

İç politikada tek parti iktidarı olmanın rahatlığının yanında, yükselen anti-emperyalist ve anti-Amerikancı eğilim Demirel'in "Şahsiyetli Dış Politika" olarak tanımladığı ve Batı ile yakın ilişkilerin yanında Sovyetler Birliği başta olmak üzere diğer devletlerle de geliştirilmiş ortaklıkların kurulmasına odaklanan politikası için uygun zemin hazırlamakla birlikte yükselen anti-Amerikancılık afyon krizi başta olmak üzere çeşitli konularda da Demirel için bir kısıt oluşturmuştur. ABD'de Başkan Richard Nixon yönetiminin Vietnam hezimetini sonrasında iç politikada pozisyon güçlendirme amacıyla başlattığına inanılan Amerikan gençliğini uyuşturucu batağından kurtarma odaklı küresel savaşta Türkiye'nin afyon ekimini hedef olarak aldığı değerlendirilen bu krizde, Türkiye'den afyon ekimini tamamen yasaklaması talep edilmiş ancak Demirel hükümeti lisanslama ve ekim alanlarını kısıtlama gibi afyon ekimini kontrol edebilecek yöntemleri teklif etse de tamamen yasaklama talebini reddetmiştir.

Türkiye içinde Demirel'i destekleyen pek çok oy veren vatandaşın afyon ekimiyle geçimini sağladığı gerçeğinin yanında, ABD'nin yasaklama talebinin kabul edilmesinin zımnen Amerikan gençliğini zehirleyen Türkiye olduğunun kabulü anlamına geleceği gerekçesi ve iç politikada Amerikancı olarak etiketleneceği çekincesiyle kriz boyunca kararlı duran Demirel'in, özellikle Dışişleri Bakanlığı bürokrasisi ile yakın çalışma içinde olduğu ve destek aldığı değerlendirmesi artık gizliliği kaldırılmış olan CIA belgelerinde açıkça görülmektedir. TSK'nın dış politika önceliklerinden sayılmadığı ve Kıbrıs konusunda iç desteği sağlam tutmak istediği için afyon gibi iç politikayı doğrudan ilgilendiren bir konuda Amerikancı olarak

etiketlenmekten çekindiği değerlendirilen bu krizin karar mekanizmasından uzak durduğu hususu da diğer bir tespit olarak ön plana çıkmaktadır.

Afyon krizinde sonuç olarak Demirel hükümeti son ana kadar ABD'nin yasaklama talebine karşı direnmiş ancak 12 Mart 1971 askeri muhtırası ile Demirel istifaya zorlandıktan sonra herhangi bir iç politika hesap kaygısı olmayan ve yeni kurulan Nihat Erim hükümeti afyon ekimini tamamen yasaklamıştır. Bilahare, 1974 yılında Bülent Ecevit hükümeti tarafından afyon ekimi yeniden serbest bırakılmış olmakla birlikte bu dönemde ABD ile Türkiye arasında baş gösteren diğer krizler sebebiyle afyon olayı dış politika gündeminde daha az görünür olmuştur.

Beşinci bölümde detaylıca incelenen silah ambargosu krizi ise Soğuk Savaşta yumuşamanın sona ermeye başladığı ve tansiyonun yeniden yükseldiği bir uluslararası atmosferde, “Bretton Woods” sistemi denilen uluslararası ekonomik sistemin sonlandığı ve petrol krizleri sebebiyle ülkelerin ekonomik bunalımlar yaşadığı bir süreçte, Demirel'in koalisyon hükümeti lideri olarak tecrübe ettiği bir dış politika krizi olarak dikkat çekmektedir. ABD ile Sovyetler Birliği arasındaki gerilimin arttığı bu dönemde, 1974 yılında gerçekleştirilen “Kıbrıs Barış Harekâtı” sebebiyle Türkiye ile bölge ülkelerinden Yunanistan arasındaki gerilim savaşın eşiğine kadar tırmanmıştır. Afyon ekiminin yeniden serbest bırakılmasından çok kısa bir süre sonra Kıbrıs'a gerçekleştirilen bu müdahale, ABD tarafından verilen silahların amaç dışı kullanıldığı belirtilerek Türkiye'ye silah ambargosu uygulanması şeklinde karşılık bulmuştur.

Türkiye'nin ABD ile ilişkilerinin Yunanistan ile ilişkilere endekslenmesinin sakıncaları Demirel tarafından dile getirilmekle birlikte ambargo kararından vazgeçmeyen Amerikan kongresinin kararı neticesinde Demirel hükümeti de karşı hamle yapmak zorunda olduğunu belirtmiş ve Türkiye'deki ortak askeri tesislerin ABD tarafından kullanımının durdurulduğunu ve 1969 tarihli Ortak Savunma ve İşbirliği Anlaşması'nın bu sebeple askıya alındığını bildirmiştir.

Bu kriz esnasında bir önceki dönemden farklı olarak ilk göze çarpan husus Demirel'in milliyetçi cephe hükümetleri adı altında Necmettin Erbakan liderliğindeki Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP), Alpaslan Türkeş liderliğindeki Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) ve Turan Feyzioğlu liderliğindeki Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi (CGP) ile iki

koalisyon hükümetini Başbakan olarak yönettiği gerçeğidir. Aynı ideolojik ve sosyolojik oy tabanına hitap eden partiler arasında kurulmuş bu koalisyonun iç politikada zemin kaybetmemek adına Demirel'in dış politika liderliği için ciddi bir kısıt oluşturduğu ve özellikle Erbakan tarafından dış politika kararlarının iç politika konusu yapılarak sıklıkla eleştirildiği fark edilmektedir. Türkiye'nin NATO şemsiyesinde bir kanat ülke olarak güvenliğini ciddi şekilde etkileyen ve askeri modernizasyona derinden zarar veren silah ambargosu krizi boyunca ABD ile uzlaşacak bir formül arayan Demirel ve Dışişleri Bakanı İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil'in, bu kısıt da dikkate alınarak yeterince rahat hareket edemediği CIA belgelerinde ilk dikkat edilen husustur. Sadi İrmak hükümeti esnasında Şubat 1975'te MGK toplantısı sonrası yayınlanan basın bildirisinde ilk kez dile getirilen askeri üslerin kullanımının yasaklanması yaptırımını, Demirel hükümeti tarafından aynen uygulanmış olmakla birlikte Demirel'in iç politikada gücünü pekiştirmesinin ardından çeşitli diplomatik manevralar gerçekleştirdiği görülmektedir. Türkiye'nin Yunanistan ile Ege Denizi'nde askeri gücünün dengelenmesi amacıyla uygulandığı CIA belgelerinden anlaşılan silah ambargosunun, Türkiye tarafından Kıbrıs konusunda çeşitli adımlar atılmadıkça kaldırılmayacağı Demirel tarafından anlaşılmış olmakla birlikte, hem koalisyon ortağı tarafından hem de muhalefetteki "Kıbrıs Fatihisi" olarak tanımlanan Ecevit tarafından oluşturulan baskı sebebiyle Demirel'in yumuşamaya yönelik hamlelerini belirli bir süre bir türlü gerçekleştiremediği görülmektedir.

Dış politika liderliği açısından ABD ile eşit seviyede karşılıklı ilişki yürütülmesi gerektiğine inanan ve askeri üslere ilişkin yaptırımın meşru ve haklı olduğunu değerlendiren Demirel'in karar mekanizmasına bakıldığında, pragmatik açıdan bu ambargonun devamının TSK başta olmak üzere ülkeye verdiği zararın farkında ve ambargonun kaldırılması için gerekli adımların atılması gerektiği fikrinde olduğu görülmektedir. Bu sebeple, iç politikadaki dengeyi Cumhuriyet Senatosu seçimleri sonrasında kendi lehine çevirdiği anda, ülkenin milli çıkarlarına uygun olduğuna inandığı ama Türkiye'nin uluslararası itibarına da zarar vermeyecek şekilde Kıbrıs konusunda asker azaltmak gibi bir takım yapıcı adımlar attığı görülen Demirel'in aynı zamanda 1975'in sonundan itibaren ABD ile yeni bir Savunma ve İşbirliği Anlaşması imzalanması için müzakereleri başlattığı anlaşılmaktadır. 1976

yılıının Mart ayında imzalanan yeni anlaşmanın eskisine nazaran Türkiye'nin ortak tesislerdeki denetimini daha da artırmasına olanak sağlayan hususlar içerdiği görülmekle birlikte bu anlaşma ABD Kongresi tarafından uzun süre onaylanmadığı için yürürlüğe girmemiştir. Yine de 1975'in Ekim ayından itibaren ambargoda bir hafifleme başlatılarak Türkiye ile müzakerelerin yolu da açık tutulmuştur.

Burada, TSK'nın doğrudan öncelikli gündemi olarak değerlendirilen ambargo krizinde dış politika karar mekanizmasına oldukça aktif katıldığı ve MGK'yı bu anlamda aktif olarak kullandığı, hatta yer yer Demirel'i bu konuda çözüme ilişkin adımlar atmak konusunda etkilemeye çalıştığı görülmüştür. Öte yandan Dışişleri Bakanlığı bürokrasisinin Demirel'i destekleme ve politika önerileriyle besleme konusunda aktif olarak karar mekanizmasına dahil olduğu ve buna ilaveten ABD'yi NATO zemininde zorlamak için aktif bir diplomatik baskı gerçekleştirdiği fark edilmiştir.

Özellikle Yunan lobisinin etkisinden dolayı ambargonun devam etmesi konusunda direnen ABD Kongresi'nin Başkan Gerald Ford yönetimi boyunca bunu sağlayabildiği görülmekle birlikte sorunun çözüldüğü Başkan Jimmy Carter yönetiminde, İran'da yaşanan gelişmelerin ABD aleyhine ilerlemesi ve bölgede Türkiye'nin müttefikliğinin öneminin artması da dikkate alınarak nihayet sorun çözülmüş ve 1978 yılında ambargonun kaldırılmasına karar verilmiştir. Bu sürece ilişkin olarak ABD Dışişleri Bakanlığı arşivlerinde ilginç bir husus ön plana çıkmaktadır. Demirel ve Çağlayangil'i "maharetli manevracılar" olarak olumlu anlamda niteleyen ABD yönetiminin Demirel'in üzerindeki iç politika baskısını hafifletmesi ve sorunun çözümüne katkı sağlaması için muhalefet lideri Ecevit'i ABD'ye davet etmiş olmaları, ambargonun iki ülke için de olumsuz değerlendirildiği ancak hem ABD yönetiminin Kongre tarafından iç politikada baskı altına alındığını hem de Demirel hükümetinin koalisyon ortağı MSP ve ana muhalefet tarafından iç politikada baskı altına alındığını göstermektedir. Sonuç olarak, Demirel hükümetlerinin diplomatik hamlelerinin neticesinde Ecevit hükümeti dönemine denk gelen tarihlerde ambargo kaldırılmış ve yaklaşık üç yıl süren kriz sona ermiştir.

Altıncı bölümde, Soğuk Savaşın sona erdiği, Yeni Dünya Düzeni olarak nitelendirilen ve sınır güvenliği ile ideolojik yayılmacılık kaygıları dışındaki pek çok

konunun dış politikada yer aldığı yeni bir uluslararası sistem altında Demirel hükümetinin kriz yönetimi incelenmektedir. İnsan hakları, çevre, terörizm ve çeşitli sınırlar üstü güvenlik sorunlarının Soğuk Savaştaki ideoloji eksenli güvenlik kaygılarının yerini aldığı bu yeni dönemde dağılan Sovyetler Birliği coğrafyasında yeni kurulmuş pek çok ülke komünizm sonrası yeni rejimlerine uyum sağlamaya çalışırken bölgesel pek çok çatışma meydana gelmiş, bunun yanında ABD'nin hegemonyasında çeşitli güç merkezlerinin de yer aldığı bir uluslararası sistem oluşmuştur. Bölgesel olarak oldukça çekişmeli ve çatışmalı alanların ortasında bulunan Türkiye, 12 Eylül 1980'de yapılan askeri darbe sonrasında gelen siyasi yasakların 1987 yılında kaldırılmasıyla birlikte, ikinci seçimlerde Demirel'in yeniden koalisyon hükümeti lideri olarak yönetime geçtiği bir süreci tecrübe etmiştir. Soğuk Savaş döneminden farklı olarak daha fazla dışa açılan, yeni uluslararası konjonktürün sağladığı olanaklardan faydalanmak isteyen, aynı zamanda Soğuk Savaş dönemi ideolojik sınırlandırmaların etkisinden kurtularak sosyal demokrat ve sol tabana sahip Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti (SHP) ile koalisyon hükümeti kuran Demirel'in bu dönemde iç politika etkenlerini ikinci plana attığı ve dış politikayı kendi öncelikli gündemi olarak belirlediği anlaşılmaktadır.

Yunanistan ile Ege Denizi eksenli egemenlik sorunlarının ve güney komşular ile PKK temelli güvenlik sorunlarının artmaya başladığı bu dönemde, Kafkaslarda yeni kurulan ülkelerle ilişkilerin güçlendirilmesi hedeflenmesine rağmen Ermenistan'ın Azerbaycan ile yaşadığı Dağlık Karabağ sorununun, Ermenistan'ın Nahçıvan'a gerçekleştirdiği saldırılar sonrasında derinleştiği ve Türkiye açısından bir sınır krizi meydana getirdiği gözlemlenmektedir. Altıncı bölümün ana araştırma vakası olan Nahçıvan krizi, çatışmaların dolaylı bir sonucu olarak Türkiye'yi krize dahil etmiş ve Ermenistan'ın bağımsızlığı sonrasında Türkiye'nin doğu topraklarına ilişkin taleplerinden ötürü söz konusu krizi derinleştirerek Türkiye'yi çatışmaların eşiğine taşımıştır.

Bu yeni uluslararası ve bölgeler gelişmeler ışığında hegemon güç olan ABD ve bölgesel güç olarak etkisini devam ettiren yeni Rusya Federasyonu ile iş birliği ve uyumlu politikaları öncelik olarak kabul eden Demirel'in yeni koalisyon hükümetinde, Soğuk Savaş dönemindeki milliyetçi cephe hükümetlerinden farklı

olarak herhangi bir koalisyon içi baskıya dış politikada maruz kalmadığı dikkat çekmektedir. Dönemin Cumhurbaşkanı Özal'ın askeri müdahaleyi tercih eden şahin yaklaşımın aksine Demirel, Ermenistan ile yaşanan Nahçıvan sorununu diplomatik yollarla ve uluslararası dünyayı meşru bir müdahale için dahil ederek çözümlenmeyi amaçlamıştır. Bu dış politika yaklaşımı ve karar mekanizmasında hem Dışişleri Bakanlığı bürokrasisinden hem de TSK'dan tam destek aldığı ve koalisyon ortağı ile uyumlu bir politika yürüttüğü görülen Demirel'in Cumhurbaşkanı Özal'dan, muhalefet partilerinden ve hatta bazen kendi parti grubundan eleştiri olsa bile iç politikadaki baskılara direndiği söz konusu krizi popülist politikalarından uzak tutarak barışçıl ve meşru zeminde çözmeyi amaçladığı dikkat çekmiştir. Krizin ilerleyen dönemlerinde Özal'ın vefatının ardından cumhurbaşkanlığı görevine gelen Demirel'in bu aşamada da aynı yöntem ve liderlik profiliyle kriz yönetimine dikkat ettiği ve zaman içinde krizin etkisinin gündemde azaldığı fark edilmektedir.

Demirel'in cumhurbaşkanlığı dönemine ilişkin tez çalışmasının son vaka araştırması olarak incelenen ve Yunanistan ile Türkiye'yi savaşın eşiğine getiren Kardak krizi, yedinci bölümün odağını oluşturmaktadır. Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılması ve Soğuk Savaş döneminin sona ermesinin ardından bir önceki döneme kıyasla gerçek etkilerin hissedilmeye başlandığı bu dönemde, Rusya'nın Yakın Çevre Doktrini çerçevesinde Kafkasya ve Orta Asya'da etkisini yeniden artırdığı görülmektedir. Diğer taraftan, Avrupa Birliği'nin kurulmasıyla birlikte Avrupa ülkelerinin de yeniden güç merkezi olarak ortaya çıktığı ve ABD hegemonyasının yanında bu güç merkezlerinin de küresel sorunlarda ön plana çıkarak aktif rol aldıkları dikkat çekmektedir.

Uluslararası sistemin yukarıda belirtilen dengelerle oluştuğu bir atmosferde Türkiye, iç politikada Kürdistan İşçi Partisi (PKK) temelli ayrılıkçı hareketlerin bölge ülkeleriyle olan ilişki dinamiği sebebiyle güvenlik eksenli dış politikaya dönmüş ve aynı zamanda Büyükelçi Şükrü Elekdağ'ın tanımladığı "İki Buçuk Savaş Stratejisi" çerçevesinde dış politika önceliklerini Yunanistan, Suriye ve PKK ile aynı anda çatışmayı karşılayacak biçimde güncellemiştir. Ekonomik, sosyal ve siyasal problemlerden ötürü zayıf ve kısa ömürlü koalisyon hükümetlerinin ortaya çıkardığı politik istikrarsızlık ve eş zamanlı olarak güvenlik kaygıları devam ederken Ege

Denizi'nde Yunanistan'ın Imia, Türkiye'nin ise Kardak (İkizce) adını verdiği küçük bir kayalıkta meydana gelen bir deniz kazası sonrası egemenlik tartışmalarının Türkiye'yi Yunanistan ile savaşın eşiğine getirmesi, dış politikada Kardak krizini ortaya çıkarmıştır.

Figen Akat isimli Türk nakliye gemisinin Kardak kayalığına çarpması sonucu geminin limana çekilme işleminin hangi ülke tarafından yapılacağı üzerinden başlayan karşılıklı diplomatik notaların ardından, Kalimnos adası Belediye Başkanı'nın bir grup ile kayalığa Yunan bayrağı dikmesinin ardından Hürriyet Gazetesi muhabirlerinin kiraladıkları helikopterle gidip bu bayrağı Türk bayrağı ile değiştirmesi sonrasında Yunan askeri kuvvetlerinin adaya asker çıkarmasıyla kriz haline dönüşmüştür. Bu süreçte iki ülke medyasının da olayları milli duygular ekseninde tırmandırmasıyla tetiklenen iç kamuoyu karar vericiler üzerinde sert önlemler alınması için baskı oluşturarak krizi bir yakın savaş eşiğine taşımıştır.

Tansu Çiller'in Başbakan olarak yönetmek durumunda kaldığı Kardak krizi aslında Yunanistan ile Ege Denizi üzerinde devam eden kıta sahanlığı ve uluslararası havacılık alanındaki sorunların bir devamı olarak ortaya çıkmış olsa da ani bir şekilde tetiklenmesi sebebiyle hızlı bir dış politika karar mekanizmasını gerektirmiştir. Yunanistan'da yeni kurulmuş Kostas Simitis hükümetinin iç politikada maruz kaldığı baskıya benzer şekilde Türkiye'deki seçimler sonrası geçici hükümeti devam ettiren Çiller'in iç politikada maruz kaldığı baskı, askerinin de verdiği destek ile Çiller'i sert bir askeri müdahale seçeneğine yakınlaştırmıştır. Demirel'in Cumhurbaşkanı olarak uzun dönem tecrübesinin ışığında diplomasiyi önceleyip askeri seçeneğe yakın olmayışı, ABD ile konuyu müzakere edip, ABD arabuluculuğunu öncelikle hale getirmeye gayret edişi ve ülkeyi tehlikeli bir maceraya sokabilecek ani ve sert kararlardan uzak tutan itidalli duruşu, Çiller'i ve askeri kanadı savaş ilanına neden olabilecek askeri çatışmadan farklı bir karar sürecine itmiştir.

Burada, Yunanistan'ın geleneksel sorunlara eskisinden farklı olarak Avrupa Birliği üyesi olarak dahil olup süreci bu şekilde yönetmeye çalışması Türkiye'nin karar mekanizmasında önemli bir kısıt oluşturmuştur. Diğer taraftan, İki Buçuk Savaş Stratejisi temelinde Yunanistan ile bir savaşın kaçınılmaz olabileceğini değerlendirip bu ekseninde hazırlık yapan TSK'nın geçmiş dönemde PKK ile mücadelede Çiller ile

geliştirdiği yakınlık göz önüne alındığında, Çiller'in karar mekanizmasında TSK'nın etkisinin yüksek olduğu varsayımının yerinde olduğu değerlendirilmektedir. Dışışleri Bakanlığı bürokrasisinin konuya yaklaşımı incelendiğinde ise, Kardak kayalıklarının egemenliği konusunda görüş ayrılıkları bulunmakla birlikte, Ege'de Kardak'la aynı statüde bulunan 150 civarı adacık ve kayalık düşünüldüğünde, Yunanistan'ın bu tek taraflı oldu bitti biçimindeki hamlesinin kabul edilemeyeceği ve gerekli cevabın verilmesi gerektiği noktasında fikir birliği görülmektedir.

Bu aşamada, Demirel'in askeri bir müdahalenin muhtemel sonuçları nedeniyle böyle bir karara direnmesiyle birlikte Dışışleri Bakanlığı bürokrasisi içinde yer alan tartışma sonucunda, askerlere de makul gelen ve diplomatik açıdan Yunanistan'ı geri adım atmaya zorlayacak olan bir öneri Dışışleri Bakanlığı Müsteşar Yardımcısı İnal Batu tarafından teklif edilmiş ve Batu'nun önerdiği şekilde Kardak'taki diğer kayalığa gizli bir gece operasyonu ile çıkan Türk SAT komandolarının varlığı Yunanistan'ı savaşa girmemek için askerlerini kayalıktan geri çekmeye zorlamıştır. Aynı esnada Türk komandolarının da kayalıktan çekilmesiyle kriz 31 Ocak 1996 günü sona ermiş ancak kriz sonrasında söz konusu egemenlik sorunları ekseninde tartışmalar uzun süre devam etmiş ve sorun bugüne kadar çözümsüz olarak bırakılmıştır. Bu krizde Yunanistan'ın Avrupa Birliği üyesi olarak sorunu Avrupa ile Türkiye arasında yaşanan bir krize çevirmesi Türkiye açısından ciddi bir problem olmakla birlikte, Demirel'in kriz esnasında ABD'nin arabuluculuğunu ön plana çıkarması bu sorunun çözümünde büyük bir öneme sahiptir.

Dört dış politika krizine ilişkin karar süreci incelendiğinde, beklenmeyen, kasıtsız ve şiddet içermeyen, ekonomik ve siyasi temelli afyon krizinde ABD'nin kontrollü baskı uygulama stratejisi karşısında Türkiye'nin sınırlı tırmandırma stratejisi uyguladığı görülmektedir. Beklenen ve şiddet içermeyen, ekonomik ve siyasi temelli silah ambargosu krizinde ise ABD'nin sınırlı cevap stratejisine karşı Türkiye'nin mütekabiliyet çerçevesinde kontrollü baskı stratejisi uyguladığı tespit edilmektedir. Soğuk Savaş ertesinde meydana gelen, dolaylı sınır krizi olarak nitelendirilen Nahçıvan krizinde Ermenistan'ın sınırlı geri döndürülebilir sondaj stratejisine ve güvenlik ve egemenlik temelli Kardak krizinde Yunanistan'ın oldu

bitti stratejisine karşı Türkiye'nin askeri güç tehdidi ile zorlayıcı diplomasi stratejisini uyguladığı ve bu stratejinin her iki kriz içinde başarı sağladığı anlaşılmaktadır. Uygulanan stratejiler değişebilmekle birlikte Demirel'in dış politika karar mekanizmasındaki realist, pragmatist ve barış odaklı mutedil liderlik anlayışı değişiklik göstermemektedir.

Sonuç olarak, Süleyman Demirel dönemlerinde yaşanan dış politika krizlerinde uluslararası gelişmeler, bölgesel gelişmeler, iç politika gelişmeleri ve organizasyonel gelişmeler çerçevesinde siyasi liderlik ve dış politika karar mekanizmasının nasıl şekillendiği yukarıda özetlenen kriz yönetim süreçleri ile analiz edilerek bu krizlerde devlet kurumları olarak Dışişleri Bakanlığı ve TSK'nın karar mekanizması içindeki rolleri incelenmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu değerlendirmeler ışığında, Demirel'in dış politika liderliği ve karar süreçleri ile devlet kurumlarının rollerine dair aşağıdaki sonuçlara ulaşılmıştır.

İlk olarak Demirel'in dış politika liderliğini Soğuk Savaş dönemi ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönem olmak üzere ikiye ayırmak ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde uluslararası güç dengelerini iç politika dengelerine göre daha fazla ön planda tuttuğunu ifade etmek mümkündür. Her ne kadar akademik literatür Başbakan Demirel ile Cumhurbaşkanı Demirel arasında bu ayrımı yapmış olsa da SHP ile gerçekleştirdiği koalisyon hükümetindeki başbakanlık döneminin incelendiği Nahçıvan krizinde de cumhurbaşkanlığı döneminde sergilemiş olduğu dış politika liderliği ile benzer karar mekanizmasına sahip olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır.

İkinci olarak, Demirel'in dış politika karar mekanizmasını ve liderliğini iç politika mekanizmasından genel olarak ayrı tuttuğu ve dış politikada milli çıkarlar ekseninde devletin devamlılığı hususuna riayet edip hassas davrandığı gözlemlenmekle birlikte, Soğuk Savaş döneminde koalisyon hükümetlerinde aynı ideolojik kamptan partilerle iç politika eksenli sorunlar yaşadığı ve yer yer dış politikayı bu çerçevede hedeflediği biçimde yönetemediği anlaşılmaktadır.

Üçüncü sonuç, Demirel'in devlet kurumları ile yakın bir ilişki içinde bu kurumların teknik bilgisi ve tecrübesine önem verdiği, dış politika liderliğinde devlet kurumlarına rağmen veya kurumların ikna edilmediği bir politika anlayışı benimsemediği tespitidir. Gerçekleştirilen mülakatlar ve diplomatik hatıratlarda da

bu hususa sıklıkla değinildiği ve Demirel'in devlet kurumlarını zorlayan değil kurumlarla iş birliği içinde karar veren bir siyasi lider olduğu anlaşılmıştır. Burada, TSK'nın kendi öncelikli gündeminde yer alan dış politika konularında karar mekanizmasına katılımının daha aktif olduğu anlaşılmakla birlikte literatürde iddia edildiği şekilde bir baskı gücü kullandığı ya da siyasi liderlere ve diğer devlet kurumlarına baskı yolu ile etki ettiğine dair hiçbir veri bulunmamıştır. Aksine, yüz yüze mülakatlarda dış politika konusunda askerlerin oldukça saygılı ve hassas olduğu belirtilmiştir. Dışişleri Bakanlığı bürokrasisi ise özellikle siyasi liderlerin dış politika gündemlerinde, hükümet programlarının dış politika bölümlerine katkı sunarak ve Milli Güvenlik Siyaset Belgelerinin hazırlanmasına aktif katılım sağlayarak yasalarla verilen yetkiler sayesinde etki edebilmekte ve alanını güçlendirebilmektedir. Özellikle Demirel gibi diplomasinin ayrı bir bilim ve uzmanlık gerektiren bir sanat olduğuna inanan bir siyasi karar alıcının görevde bulunması halinde dış politikayı uygulama olarak tanımlanan rolünden dış politikayı belirleme ve oluşturma rolüne de dahil olduğunu belirtmek yanlış olmayacaktır.

Dördüncü husus olarak, Demirel'in dış politika kararlarında uluslararası meşruiyete, kurumlara ve kurumsallaşmaya verdiği önem çerçevesinde kurumların rollerine saygı duyan ve kurumlar arası görev çatışmasının önüne geçen bir liderlik sergilediği anlaşılmaktadır. Özellikle MGK'yı devlet kurumlarının politika önerilerini aktarıp savunabileceği, beyin fırtınası ile ortak bir karara varabileceği, hepsinden önemlisi devletin uyumlu şekilde çalışıp siyasi karar alıcıyla fikir birliğine varması için tartışmaların yürütülebileceği bir kurum olarak gördüğü anlaşılan Demirel'in bu kurul vasıtasıyla tüm kurumları ikna etmek ve kendisi de kurumların önerileri konusunda ikna olmak amacıyla verimli şekilde işleyen bir platform oluşturduğunu ifade etmek yerinde olacaktır. Burada, özellikle belirtilmesi gereken bir sonuç da Demirel'in devlet kurumlarından gelen önerileri vatandaşın beklentileri ve refahı ışığında değerlendirip kendi filtrelerinde süzdükten sonra nihai karar olarak belirlediği hususudur. Bu noktada Demirel'in devlet ile vatandaş arasında kendisini bir denge ve bütünleştirici unsur olarak gördüğü ifade edilebilir.

Teorik çerçevede üzerinde durulan OCA ve LTA açısından Demirel'in dış politika kriz davranışları incelendiğinde, bilgiye açıklık, kısıt ve engellere karşı

mücadele, barışçıl yaklaşım, uzlaşmacı ve iş birliği temelli taktikler ve riskten kaçınan liderlik karakterlerine Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde ilişki odaklı ve evangelistik (umut vaat edici ve uzlaştırıcı) liderlik yaklaşımının da eklendiği gözlemlenmiştir. Bu noktada, istatistiki yöntemlerle ölçülen liderlik özelliklerinin vaka analizleri ve mülakat çıktılarıyla büyük oranda benzerlik gösterdiği ve tutarlılık sergilediği görülmektedir.

Ayrıca, Demirel'in dış politikada karar alma mekanizmasında arka kapı yöntemleri olarak nitelendirilen ve kurumlar dışındaki Özel Temsilcileri kullanma taktiğini kullanıp kullanmadığına ilişkin bir değerlendirme yapılmış ve Demirel'in bürokrasi dışı kişilerin teknik tecrübesi ve bilgisine önem vermekle birlikte bu kanallardan gelen bilgi ve önerileri mutlaka devlet kurumları ile paylaştığı ve kurumların bu noktadaki değerlendirmelerini esas aldığı anlaşılmıştır. Bunun yanında özellikle kriz anlarında kendi şahsi prestiji ve etkinliği sayesinde diğer devlet temsilcileriyle ilişkilerini olayların çözümü noktasında devreye soktuğu ve diplomasının yetersiz kaldığı noktalarda bireysel desteğiyle diplomatlara destek sunduğu değerlendirilmiştir.

Son olarak, akademik literatür ve yüz yüze mülakatlar birlikte değerlendirildiğinde Türk dış politikasında karar alma mekanizmasına ilişkin çok önemli bir husus ortaya çıkmaktadır. Siyasi liderlerin yasalarla verilmiş yetki çerçevesinde tüm üst düzey bürokratları görevden alma ve atama yetkisi liderin Türk devlet yapısındaki geleneksel gücüyle birleştirildiğinde, karar almaya ilişkin kara kutuda siyasi lideri başat aktör olarak ön plana çıkarmaktadır. Gücün kaynağı olmaya ilişkin bu etkiden ötürü siyasi liderler dış politikada istedikleri takdirde devlet kurumlarını göz ardı edebilmekte veya karar mekanizmasındaki rollerini azaltabilmekte iken, Demirel'in bu yöntemi tercih etmesinde kendi bürokratik geçmişi sayesinde devletin birikmiş tecrübesi ve kurumsal uzmanlığına önem vermesi asli unsur olarak göze çarpmaktadır. Kendi özel kalem müdürlerini özellikle Dışişleri Bakanlığı bürokratlarından seçmesi ise, devlet kurumları içinde Dışişleri Bakanlığı'nın kurumsal hafızasına ve uzmanlığına verdiği önemi göstermekle birlikte Bakanlık bürokrasisinin kurumsal olarak karar mekanizmasında daha aktif ve etkin olarak yer alabilmesine olanak sağlamaktadır.

Özet olarak, dış politika krizlerinde Demirel'in devlet kurumlarının politika önerilerine önem veren ancak kendi filtreleriyle süzdüğü bu önerileri vatandaşın beklentilerini de dikkate alarak dengeleyen bir liderlik örneği sergilediği görülmektedir. TSK'nın literatürde belirtilen geleneksel ve kurumsal gücünün dış politikaya etki etmek için ciddi bir potansiyel oluşturduğunu söylemek mümkün olmakla birlikte, bu potansiyelin kendi politika önceliklerinde çok hassas derecede yer alan hususlar dışında kullanılmadığı, özellikle dış politika krizlerinde işi konunun asıl teknik uzmanı ve sorumlusu olan Dışişleri Bakanlığı bürokrasisine ve vatandaşa hesap vermekle sorumlu siyasi karar alıcıya bırakarak alınan nihai karara uyum sağladığı anlaşılmaktadır. Türkiye'nin geleneksel dış politika öncelikleriyle uyum içinde olan, kurum ve kurumsallaşmaya önem veren ve dış politikanın yürütülme biçiminde hassas davranan Demirel'in karar mekanizmasında MGK ve Dışişleri Bakanlığı bürokrasisinin ciddi rolü olduğunun tespit edildiği bu çalışma, olayların canlı tanıklarının tespitleri ve Amerikan arşiv belgelerinin ışığında Türk dış politikasının kara kutusunun işleyiş mekanizmasını inceleyerek literatüre katkı sunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Sonuç olarak, kurumsal reflekslerin ve önceliklerin dış politikada karar mekanizması içinde nasıl gündeme getirildiğini ve siyasi karar alıcıya ne şekilde sunulduğunu inceleyen bu tez çalışmasının hem akademik çalışma yürütecek araştırmacılara hem de Türkiye'nin karar mekanizmasında yer almayı hedefleyen geleceğin politikacılarına bir kaynak olarak fayda sağlayacağı ümit edilmektedir.

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