TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP IN ASIA-PACIFIC

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HYUNSOO YOON

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Yaşar KONDAKÇI
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science/Arts / Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Oktay F. TANRISEVER
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science/Arts/Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Oktay F. TANRISEVER
Supervisor

Examine Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Çınar ÖZEN (ANKARA U, IR)
Prof. Dr. Oktay F. TANRISEVER (METU, IR)
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zerrin TORUN (METU, IR)
I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name: Hyunsoo Yoon
Signature:
ABSTRACT

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Yoon, Hyunsoo
Master, Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Oktay F. Tanrisever

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This thesis analyses Turkish foreign policy towards Asia-Pacific by focusing on the diplomatic, economic and cultural aspects. In the 2010s, Turkey and the six Asia-Pacific countries have agreed to elevate their relationship into strategic partnership. Contrary to the views of several scholars who emphasize the continuity in Turkey's Asia-Pacific policy, this thesis argues that there are significant changes in Turkey's orientation towards this region as compared to Ankara's earlier policies. The thesis also demonstrates that Turkey is projecting a smart power strategy onto the region by combining its hard and soft power capabilities.

Keywords: Turkey, Asia-Pacific, smart power, trading state, strategic partnership
ÖZ

TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASI VE
ASYA-PASİFİK’TEKİ STRATEJİK ORTAKLIKLARI

Yoon, Hyunsoo
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
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Ekim 2019, 117 sayfa


Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Asya-Pasifik, akıllı güç, tüccar devlet, stratejik ortaklık
To my little Tobias and Beatrice
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<tr>
<td>ACD</td>
<td>Asia Cooperation Dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIIB</td>
<td>Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN+3</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations Plus 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRI</td>
<td>Belt and Road Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Association of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CICA</td>
<td>Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia</td>
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<td>D-8</td>
<td>Developing 8</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEİK</td>
<td>Turkish Foreign Economic Relation Board</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>G20</td>
<td>Group of Twenty</td>
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<td>G7</td>
<td>Group of Seven</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Growth Domestic Product</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPY</td>
<td>Japanese Yen</td>
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<tr>
<td>KEPCO</td>
<td>Korea Electric Power Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>KOTUBA</td>
<td>Korea-Turkey Business Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIKTA</td>
<td>Partnership between Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, Australia</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIF</td>
<td>Pacific Islands Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organisation</td>
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<td>SK E&amp;C</td>
<td>SK Engineering and Construction</td>
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<tr>
<td>TİKA</td>
<td>Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency</td>
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<td>TİM</td>
<td>Turkish Exporters Assembly</td>
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<td>TMD</td>
<td>Turkish Contractors Association</td>
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<td>TOBB</td>
<td>Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchangers</td>
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<td>TÖMER</td>
<td>Turkish and Foreign Languages Research and Application Centre of Ankara University</td>
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<tr>
<td>TÜSİAD</td>
<td>Turkish Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UND</td>
<td>Turkish International Transporters Association</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>YTB</td>
<td>Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Turkey has developed close relationship with Asia-Pacific countries in the 21st century and lifted its respective relationship with them to the level of strategic partnership, namely Japan (in 2013), South Korea (in 2012), China (in 2010), Indonesia (in 2011), Malaysia (in 2014) and Singapore (in 2014).1 Also, Ankara’s new foreign policy initiative called Yeniden Asya (Asia Anew) tells us that Turkish Asian policy is going to make a historical change.2 The Asia Anew Initiative consists of 4 main pillars: “improvement of interstate relations; expanding the trade capacity of the private sector; improvement of academic cooperation; development of interaction between the societies.”3

1.1. Scope and Objective

This thesis studies relations between Turkey and the six Asia-Pacific countries within the framework of Nye’s smart power concept. First of all, this thesis analyses the nature of their relations. It especially highlights the role of political, economic, and cultural factors in both Turkey and the six Asia-Pacific countries. It focuses on the

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significance of the liberal reorientation of general Turkish foreign policy since Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal, which have driven the rapid development of Turkish-Asia Pacific relations even until today.4

Second, this thesis also aims to analyse Turkey’s smart power strategy towards the region. According to Joseph Nye, “Smart power is the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies.”5 Turkey is likely to have a smart power strategy for the region. Turkey’s Asia-Pacific policy in the 21st century is not only interested in developing economic relations, but also diplomatic and cultural relations. For example, Turkey has rapidly developed its smart power resources by signing free trade agreements and establishing Turkish cultural centres in the 2010s.6 This thesis especially focuses on how Turkey engages in such a far region and reacts to regional affairs despite the geographical distance between them.

1.2. Literature Review

Many scholars have accepted that the contemporary Turkish foreign policy is being shaped by economic factors and most of their arguments are based on Kemal Kirişci’s concept of the trading state. In his article, Kemal Kirişci argues that; “the decision in the early 1980s during Özal’s years to open up and liberalise Turkish economy” resulted in the “growth of a new business elite” and “Turkey’s trade relations with the external World.”7 He asserts that; “the state influenced by the military-political and


7 Kirişci, Kemal, The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State, New Perspectives on Turkey, no.40, 2009, P. 38
territorial system disturbed the Turkish trading state.”\textsuperscript{8} Based on his argument, Sinan Ülgen defined a trading state as a state which “emphasises the role of economic interdependence in its foreign policy, in contrast to states that rely on military hard power.”\textsuperscript{9}

However, accepting the concept of the trading state, some scholars focus not only on Turkey’s economic power, but also on Turkey’s soft power. Unlike economic power, soft power is a power of attracting and getting others to want the outcomes that one wants and co-opts people.\textsuperscript{10} Nye argues that; “transmission of culture occurs through commerce, personal contacts, visits, and exchanges.”\textsuperscript{11}

A Chinese scholar, Zan Tao, insisted that; “Turkey’s capacity for influences lies in its soft power as Turkey’s attraction among Chinese Muslims is becoming more pronounced and China sees Turkey’s peaceful Islamic teachings as a bulwark against extremism.”\textsuperscript{12} Selçuk Esenbel and Altay Atlı highlighted “Turkey’s efforts to expand its outreach.” “The policy-makers have made frequent visits to the region not only with politicians and bureaucrats but also with business executives and academics.”\textsuperscript{13}

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\textsuperscript{8} Ibid, P. 53

\textsuperscript{9} Ülgen, Sinan, A Place in the Sun or Fifteen Minutes of Fame? Understanding Turkey’s New Foreign Policy, \textit{Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Europe}, No.1, December 2010, pp.9-11


\textsuperscript{11} Ibid, P. 13

\textsuperscript{12} Tao, Zan, An Alternative Partner to the West? Turkey’s Growing Relations with China, \textit{Middle East Institute}, 2007. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://www.mei.edu/publications/alternative-partner-west-turkeys-growing-relations-china#_ftnref26)

As several scholars have accepted, this thesis is largely influenced by Kirişçi’s concept of trading state and admits that economic factors are Turkey’s main interest in the region. However, as some scholars argued, Turkey’s strategy in Asia-Pacific has shown that Turkey is promoting its soft power over regional countries regardless of their trade volume with Turkey. While Turkey is projecting a strategy onto the region which has characteristics of both hard and soft power, unfortunately, there have been few studies focusing on it.

Combining the two concepts of economic and soft power is already done by Joseph Nye by developing the concept of smart power.\textsuperscript{14} He defines smart power as “the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies.”\textsuperscript{15} This implies that Turkey might have developed its own smart power by combining two power resources into strategies. “When combined, the political, cultural, and economic values of Turkey and its unique position as a bridge between East and West would generate Turkey’s integrative power.”\textsuperscript{16} Keyman and Sazak also highlighted that; “Turkey possesses the right set of resources to convert its soft power into smart power.”\textsuperscript{17}

1.3. Argument

This thesis argues that Turkish Asia-Pacific policy has made significant changes in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century compared to the past. As other scholars argued, this thesis largely accepts


\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., pp.22-23


\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
the trading state concept in analysing early changes in Turkish Asia-Pacific policy.\textsuperscript{18} However, this thesis differs from the arguments of these scholars in understanding later changes in the policy during the 2010s. The main argument of the thesis is that Turkish Asia-Policy in the 2010s began to develop a \textit{smart power} strategy by combining its hard and soft power capability in order to achieve economic success and desired goals in easier way.\textsuperscript{19}

By analysing Turkey’s relations with the six strategic partner countries, namely Japan, South Korea, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, on the scope of their diplomatic, economic and cultural relations within the framework of smart power concept, the thesis also argues that Turkey has already applied the new strategies onto the region.\textsuperscript{20} This thesis also insists that Turkey’s turn to East doesn’t necessarily mean that Turkey is making an axis shift from Europe to Asia and Turkey’s turn to East is an extension of developments of the general policy.\textsuperscript{21} As a consequence, the thesis claims that Turkey’s new Asian initiative is deeply related with the smart power strategy.

\textsuperscript{18} Kirişçi, Kemal, \textit{The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State}, \textit{New Perspectives on Turkey}, no.40, 2009; Ülgen, Sinan, \textit{A Place in the Sun or Fifteen Minutes of Fame? Understanding Turkey’s New Foreign Policy}, \textit{Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Europe}, No.1, December 2010, pp.9-11


1.4. Research Method

In order to analyse Turkey’s smart power strategy in the Asia-Pacific, it is required to assess Turkey’s hard and soft power resources which have developed throughout the history. Also, historical development of diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations between Turkey and the Asia-Pacific countries are studied as well in a sense that they indicate how successful the strategy is.

In this research, governmental data, statistics, academic studies, newspapers, library resources are used in order to offer better understanding of Turkey’s smart power strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. Due to unpopularity of the region among Turkey’s academics, academic sources for the thesis are not accumulated sufficiently. Therefore, the thesis largely depends on internet sources such as online news and articles.

1.5. Organisation of the Thesis

The first chapter briefly introduces the general outline of this thesis. The main argument of this thesis is that Turkey is developing smart power strategies in order to achieve economic success through its relations with the six strategic partners by maximising its hard and soft power over the region.

The second chapter focuses on rising Turkish trading state and highlights Turkey’s need for economic expansion. It also analyses its Asia-Pacific policy in the 21st and development of strategic partnership in the scope of Joseph Nye’s smart power

Chapters between the third to the sixth consist of brief introduction of foreign policy, economy and security concerns of the six countries, namely Japan, South Korea, China and Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore). Also, these chapters analyse development of diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations between Turkey and respective Asia-Pacific countries.

The last chapter briefly summarises findings within the overall thesis. This chapter points out some conditions for Turkey’s economic success in the region from a smart
power perspective as well. As a result, this thesis argues that Turkey needs to develop specific strategies for respective countries in the region.
CHAPTER 2

TURKISH ASIA-PACIFIC POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the thesis analyses Turkey’s turn to the East from the view on the basis of two concepts, the trading state and smart power.\textsuperscript{22} The thesis highlights the role of economic factors in Turkish foreign policy since the 90s and argues that Turkey’s economic interest has been one of the main reasons of Turkey’s expansion in Asia-Pacific.\textsuperscript{23}

However, for both Turkey and Asia-Pacific countries are still strangers to each other, the thesis also insists that they needed to develop a new strategy in order to overcome physical and psychological distance. As a consequence, the thesis asserts that Turkey now considers both hard and soft power capability in order to maximise its economic success in the Asia-Pacific region by developing specific strategies.\textsuperscript{24}

2.2. The Rise of Turkish Trading State

In understanding of developments in Turkish foreign policy since Özal’s period, Kirişçi’s concept of the trading state has affected many scholars. In fact, from the views


of Esenbel, Atlı, and Tao, Turkey’s expansion in Asia-Pacific is cognate with economic orientation of Turkish foreign policy.25

According to Kemal Kirişçi, “the decision in the early 1980s during Özal’s years to open up and liberalise Turkish economy resulted in the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s trade relations with the external World.”26 He also asserts that; “the state influenced by the military-political and territorial system disturbed the Turkish trading state.”27 He added that; “the liberal market policies since the 1980s allowed business interest groups to access the government and foreign policy.”28 Based on his argument, Sinan Ülgen defined a trading state as “a state which emphasises the role of economic interdependence in its foreign policy,” in contrast to states that rely on military hard power.29

The approach of both Kirişçi and Ülgen connotes multiple meanings. Firstly, Turkish foreign policy until the Özal’s era had been oriented by military interest and now prioritises economic factors.30 Secondly, thanks to liberal policy since Özal, a new business elite and non-governmental actors have come forward as important factors in


26 Kirişçi, Kemal, The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State, New Perspectives on Turkey, no.40, 2009, P. 38

27 Ibid, P. 53

28 Ibid. P.46

29 Ülgen, Sinan, A Place in the Sun or Fifteen Minutes of Fame? Understanding Turkey’s New Foreign Policy, Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Europe, No.1, December 2010, pp.9-11

30 Ibid.
decision-making process. \textsuperscript{31} Lastly, in cooperation with businessmen and non-governmental actors in various fields, Turkey has tried to increase trade volume and establish economic relationship with new regions.\textsuperscript{32}

These three points are true of Turkey’s expansion in Asia-Pacific as well. First, “the policy started to be reshaped with the economic interest since 1990s as the major economies in East Asia, especially China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, improved their economic capacities and the balance of power in the region got stabilised with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the normalisation of Sino-American relations.”\textsuperscript{33}

Second, business interest groups like “Turkish Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSİAD), Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB), Turkish Exporters Assembly (TIM), Foreign Economic Relation Board (DEİK), International Transporters Association (UND), and Turkish Contractors Association (TMD)” have deeply participated in Turkish Asia-Pacific policy. \textsuperscript{34} They also established joint organisations with respective Asia-Pacific countries such as KOTUBA (Korea-Turkey Business Association), Chinese Turkish

\textsuperscript{31} Kirişçi, Kemal, The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State, \textit{New Perspectives on Turkey}, no.40, 2009

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ibid.} P.46


Economic and Cultural Exchange Association (中土經濟及文化交流協會), and Turkish-Indonesian Business Council.35

Lastly, Turkey has signed different agreements with Asia-Pacific countries in order to increase trade volume and make more regional markets accessible for Turkish businessmen.36 For example, Turkey has signed free trade agreements with South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore in the 21st century and is negotiating with Japan, Indonesia, Thailand as well, covering most of the major economies in the region.37 Also, Turkey signed various trade protocols with Asia-Pacific countries, even with North Korea.38

However, it is noticeable that many of these changes happened only in the 2010s. This point implies that there are more factors in growth in Turkey’s trade volume with the region apart from economic reorientation of Turkish foreign policy. For instance, all three free trade agreements between Turkey and Asia-Pacific countries are signed in the 2010s. Although Turkish government had supported Turkish businessmen to enter

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markets in Asia-Pacific, trade volume with the region remained at very low level compared to other regions such as Europe and the Middle East.\textsuperscript{39}

Turkey’s trade volume with Asia-Pacific region started to increase to remarkable level only after the middle of the 2000s. While Turkey’s import from Asia-Pacific made up 6.9\% of Turkey’s total import in 1989 and remained around 10\% until the early 2000s, it started to grow dramatically since 2003 and reached 22.05\% in 2016.\textsuperscript{40} Now, import from the Asia-Pacific region surpasses that from Africa, North and South America, South Asia, and even the Middle East.\textsuperscript{41} Asia-Pacific has become the second important region for Turkey in terms of Turkey’s import market, following Europe and Central Asia in the first place.\textsuperscript{42}

Despite the fact that Turkey’s trade volume with Asia-Pacific remained at very low level until the early 2000s, the trading state concept still well explains Turkey’s main purpose of its expansion in the region. For the region is physically far from Turkey and Turkey has been interested mainly in relations with Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East, there is supposed to be a reason for Turkey’s dynamic turn to East Asia. In this sense, this approach reminds us that Turkey has increased trade volume with the region to considerable level despite the tremendous trade deficit with the region for the sake of its economic expansion.\textsuperscript{43}


\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{43} World’s Top Exports, \textit{Turkey’s top trading partners}, 2019. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from http://www.worldstopexports.com/turkeys-top-import-partners/)
2.3. In Search of a New Opportunity in the Asia-Pacific Century

Although the trading state approach tells us a lot, it doesn’t directly explain why Turkey should have begun a risky adventure by announcing a new policy initiative for Asia and increasing trade volume despite the increasing trade deficit with the region. In other words, Turkey declared the initiative even though its traditional Western partners might consider it as “Turkey’s axis shift from Europe to Asia.”

There have been three different terms defining this region, namely Far East, East Asia, and Asia-Pacific, and these definitions of regions have been promoted by different states to suit their own purposes. Far East is the oldest term referring to this region, but this is a Euro-centric term for the term was originally used to denote the Far East as “the farthest east of the three easts, beyond the Near East and the Middle East from the European perception since the 12th century.”

Unlike the European term, East Asia is more geographically limited and therefore excludes the Western powers such as the USA and Australia. Compared to the two terms, the term of Asia-Pacific is “mainly supported by the USA and legitimises the involvement of the USA in East Asian affairs.” According to McDougall, “US support has been a major factor in enabling the concept to become established and the


46 McDougall, Derek, Asia Pacific in World Politics. Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2007, P. 6


48 McDougall, Derek, Asia Pacific in World Politics. Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2007, P. 6
Western powers in this region such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have similar reasons to promote this term.”\(^{49}\)

While there have been three different terms based on different perspectives, it can’t be denied that Turkey has preferred and used the Eurocentric term of “Far East” (in Turkish \textit{Uzak Doğu}) to refer to this region. There could be two reasons for Turkey’s use of this term. First, Turkey might have used this term in accordance with the Europeanised foreign policy, considering that traditional Turkish foreign policy had aimed for making Turkey a “European state” and “joining the Western system.”\(^{50}\)

Second, Turkey is literally far from the region and didn’t have much chance to engage in this region until the end of the Cold War. There are few Turkish scholars who used the term East Asia, but the use of East Asia has been limited. It can’t be denied that the term Far East is still widely used in Turkey, not being replaced by “\textit{Doğu Asya}” (East Asia), while “the Far East is almost replaced by another term East Asia in English language since 1960s.”\(^{51}\)

However, Turkey’s perception of this region is completely changed in the 21\(^{st}\) century as East Asia rose. The rapid growth of this region and Turkey’s political and economic stabilisation in the late 20\(^{th}\) century allowed both the Asia-Pacific countries and Turkey to seek a new partnership with each other. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that “in line with its multi-dimensional foreign policy and in view of the growing economic and political significance of Asia-Pacific, Turkey has put into effect policies

\(^{49}\) Ibid.

\(^{50}\) Tür, Özlem and Han, Ahmet K., A framework for understanding changing Turkish foreign policy. In Ö. Z. Oktav (Ed.). \textit{Turkey in the 21st Century: Quest for a New Foreign Policy}. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011, P. 8

geared towards opening up to the region, which has gained considerable depth in recent years.”

The usual definition of Asia-Pacific includes East Asia and the Western powers of the Pacific. East Asia is also divided into Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Northeast Asia consists of China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Russia (the Russian Far East), and Mongolia. Southeast Asian countries are Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and these countries except East Timor are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Western powers of the Pacific are mainly Australia and New Zealand. There are also countries in North America such as the USA and Canada, which actively engage in the Asia-Pacific region, and some Latin American countries like Mexico, Peru, and Chile which are members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs seems to accept the general definition of Asia-Pacific, but they stated that Turkey has developed strategic partnership especially with six countries in the region, namely China, Japan, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore, which means that Turkey is mainly interested in partnership with these countries and might limit the use of the term Asia-Pacific in referring to them.

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53 ASEAN, "ASEAN member states." (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://asean.org/asean/asean-member-states/)

54 APEC, "APEC member economies." (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Member-Economies)

Now we’re living in the Asia-Pacific century. It has been argued that; “the global leadership moved across the Pacific to Asia during this century, just as the global leadership moved from Europe to North America in the 1900s.”

Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also stated that; “it is now apparent that the defining theme of the 21st century will be the rise of the Asia-Pacific region.”

It is obvious that the rise of Asia-Pacific region is largely based on economic success of regional countries, but there are more to be taken into consideration such as political, military and cultural developments in the region. In this sense, Turkey is interested in developing not only economic relations with the regional countries, but also relations within various field. As Turkish Ministry of Foreign Policy highlighted, “the rise started primarily in the economic field, but its political, military and cultural implications have gradually begun to manifest themselves.”

The statement of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs underlines the volume of Asia-Pacific economy as well as other developments. As noted, “the Asian continent contains around 45 percent of the world population, as well as 30 percent of the world economy” and “any political, military, economic development in the region as well as developments regarding environmental impacts of industrialisation, access to food, raw materials and energy resources have global affects.”

If Turkey was interested only in economic success in Asia-Pacific, the decisions made by Turkey to increase trade volume would be a non-sense. Currently, increasing the

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58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.
trade volume with Asia-Pacific simply means increasing trade deficit. Among 10 major countries with which Turkey incurred the highest trade deficits, four countries are located in the Asia-Pacific region: China (-$17.8 billion, ranked in second), South Korea (-$5.4 billion, ranked in fourth), Japan (-$3.6 billion, ranked in eighth), and Malaysia (-$1.8 billion, ranked in tenth).60

In this sense, Turkish trading state doesn’t offer a solution to this tremendous trade deficit. This point requires Turkish decision-makers to find out a new strategy. “Although these cashflow deficiencies clearly indicate Turkey’s competitive disadvantages with the above countries, but also represent key opportunities for Turkey to develop country-specific strategies to strengthen its overall position in international trade.”61

The key to understand Turkey’s decision to increase its ties with Asia-Pacific despite its disadvantages lies in Turkey’s comprehension of soft power. Unlike hard (military and economic) power, soft power is “a power of attracting and getting others to want the outcomes that one wants and co-opted people rather than coerces them.”62

Many scholars now accept that Turkey has begun improving its soft power over the region. A Chinese scholar, Zan Tao, insisted that; “Turkey’s capacity for influences lies in its soft power as Turkey’s attraction among Chinese Muslims is becoming more pronounced and China sees Turkey’s peaceful Islamic teachings as a bulwark against

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61 Ibid.

Selçuk Esenbel and Altay Atlı highlighted “Turkey’s efforts to expand its outreach.” The policy-makers have made frequent visits to the region not only with politicians and bureaucrats but also with business executives and academics. Also, they are “opening new diplomatic missions, launching new flight destinations of Turkish Airlines, lifting visa requirements, establishing Turkish schools and cultural centres promoting Turkish language and culture” in the Asia-Pacific region.

Consequently, it is now safe to insist that Turkey is projecting a strategy containing both economic and cultural understanding onto Asia-Pacific. Leaving the trade deficit aside, Turkey is trying to be more integrated with the region and engaging in regional affairs. This tells us that Turkey must have a complex and developed strategy for the region, not limited in the view of the trading state. Cultural expansion has become one of the main goals of Turkey’s 2023 Vision. Turkish President Erdoğan argued that “Turkey needs to set new cultural goals in accordance with the 2023 Vision” and said that; “as the society, the business world, NGOs, universities, people of arts and culture, we should join forces and make a better use of the means and resources we have.”

2.4. Factors Shaping Turkish Asia-Pacific Policy

Rosenau argued that; “all foreign policy analysts either explain the external behaviour of societies in terms of five sets of variables, or they proceed in such a way that their explanations can be recast in terms of the five sets: the individual factors, the role

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63 Tao, Zan, An Alternative Partner to the West? Turkey’s Growing Relations with China, Middle East Institute, 2013. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://www.mei.edu/publications/alternative-partner-west-turkeys-growing-relations-china#_ftnref26)


factors, the governmental factors, the societal factors, and the systemic factors.”

Therefore, factors which influence Turkey’s foreign policy decisions in the Asia-Pacific region can be explained in the five sets of variables as well. In order to analyse these five factors, Ahmet Sözen’s model of four settings is applied: “conceptual setting; micro-setting; domestic macro-setting; and external macro-setting.”

Conceptual setting refers to “the theoretical source of ideas that are readily available for the decision-maker that he or she either consciously or unconsciously utilises in making policy choices.” The theoretical source of Turkish decision-makers is liberalism. While former Turkish decision-makers were mainly interested in security or economic issues in the region, the current Turkish decision-makers are interested in economic, cultural and religious issues simultaneously. For example, Turkey is developing economic partnership with non-Muslim secular countries in Northeast Asia such as Japan, South Korea, China and also engaging in Muslim minority issues in Southeast Asia such as the Philippines and Myanmar.

Sözen puts, “micro-setting is the domain in which the human dimension of foreign policy-making comes into the picture and his setting can be divided in two, as

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67 Sözen, Ahmet, A paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy: transition and challenges. Turkish Studies, 11:1, 2010

68 Ibid.

69 Kirişçi, Kemal, The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State, New Perspectives on Turkey, no.40, 2009, P. 53


personality (social, educational, religious background, ideology of the decision-maker) and role variables (external behaviour of the decision-maker).” In this sense, Turkish foreign policy is influenced by the personalities and roles of the AKP leadership. The AKP claimed that; “their political identity is similar to the European Christian democrats and referred itself to conservative democrats, but not Islamist democrats, promising democracy, more individual liberties, market economy and welfare for the poor.”

The current Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, is a founding member of the AKP and was appointed as the minister of Foreign Affairs by Davutoğlu. He contributed in shaping Turkish foreign policy by extending Turkey’s soft power understanding. For example, aiming to promote Turkish language and culture, Turkey recently opened Yunus Emre Institute in Seoul, the capital city of South Korea, after Erdoğan and Çavuşoğlu paid official visit to South Korea in May 2018. Turkey has opened three branches of Yunus Emre Institute in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan, Malaysia and South Korea.

There are plenty of domestic factors for Turkey to change its policy towards the Asia-Pacific region. A new business class in Turkey, so-called the Anatolian Tigers, needed Turkish government to give them access to more foreign markets and capitals. TİKA

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72 Ibid.

73 Ibid. P. 110-111


(Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency) has been central to Turkey’s policymaking. As Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated; “TİKA has been working to contribute to the social and economic development of the region.”

Second, the long-lasting turbulence of Turkish economy and politics was solved in the 2000s under the AKP government and this allowed Turkish decision-makers to design multi-dimensional, more assertive and strategic foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region. The shift in Turkey’s Asia-Pacific policy was realised as Turkish foreign policy could use more resources and gain more public attention. According to Çolakoğlu, “due to weak coalition governments between 1991-2001, Turkey couldn’t implement effective foreign policy strategies and Turkish economy experienced two financial crises in 1994 and 2001.”

Third, the Asia-Pacific region became the second major region from which Turkey imported, following Europe and Central Asia. China and South Korea are also listed in the list of 10 major countries from which Turkey imported. As mentioned above,

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among 10 major countries with which Turkey incurred the highest trade deficits, four 
countries are located in the Asia-Pacific region.82

Fourth, the influence of Asia-Pacific capital increased in Turkish markets. For example, 
among ten major mobile vendors in Turkey, six companies are Asia-Pacific capital 
(April 2019): Samsung (South Korean, 53.52% of market share), Huawei (Chinese, 
8.66% of market share), LG (South Korean, 4.08% of market share), Lenovo (Chinese, 
1.18% of market share), Sony Ericsson (Japanese, 1.06% of market share), HTC 
(Taiwanese, 1.05% of market share).83

There are other examples such as the popularity of South Korean cosmetic products 
among Turkish customers and Chinese-Japanese designer brand “Miniso” which has 
32 branches in Turkey. 84 The Asia-Pacific cultural products like music, games, 
animations and films are getting popularity in Turkey. Japanese game console, Sony’s 
Playstation is ruling the video game market in Turkey (89.23% of market share, April 
2019).85 Also, it is now well-known that Korean boy-bands such as BTS and EXO 
became famous among Turkish teenagers.86 There are co-produced films such as

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Turkish-Japanese *Ertuğrul 1890* (2015) and Turkish-South Korean *Ayla* (2017, 2018.)

### 2.5. The Trading State with Smart Power Strategy

Turkish Asia-Pacific policy affected by the factors has begun to take a specific form with smart strategy. As Joseph Nye defines, “smart power is the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies.”

Hard power consists of military power and economic power, but as military consideration of Turkish foreign policy has declined under the AKP, Turkey is now interested more in enhancing its economic power. Unlike hard power which is based on power of command, coercion and inducement, soft power is “the ability to shape the preferences of others by attracting and co-opting them.”

Both economic and soft power is produced by their own resources, but the concept of smart power tells us that hard and soft power can reinforce each other. A well-designed smart power strategy allows a state to achieve its desired outcomes and behaviour from the target. This means that Turkey can achieve economic success through a smart power strategy even if its economic power over the region is limited, on the condition that its soft power attracts and co-opts Asia-Pacific countries without

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abusing “power of command, coercion and inducement.”

It is also important that even hard power resources can produce soft power.

The current Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu argued that; “Turkey is the country that makes the most effective use of soft power in the world”. Turkey has actively claimed its soft power capability and opened new diplomatic missions, launched new flight destinations of Turkish Airlines, lifted visa requirements, established Turkish cultural centres promoting Turkish language and culture in the Asia-Pacific region.

In a view based on the concept of soft power, “transmission of culture occurs through commerce, personal contacts, visits, and exchanges.” Unlike military power or economic power, “soft power often consists of intangible factors such as institutions, ideas, values, culture, and the perceived legitimacy of policies.” Nye insisted that; “the soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid. P. 52


98 Ibid, P.21
and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).”

Based on facts, Turkey is now projecting a strategy onto the region which has characteristics of both hard and soft power. It is becoming clearer that Turkey is developing a new strategy promoting and combining its economic and soft power in such a remote region in which Turkey had never been a major actor. There are many clues which shows that Turkey has an actual smart power strategy.

The main reason why Turkey might have developed a smart power strategy is because this approach promises Turkey power of a new dimension, which is called integrative and structural power. When combined, as Fuat Keyman and Onur Sazak put, “the political, cultural, and economic values of Turkey and its unique position as a “bridge” between East and West would generate Turkey’s integrative power.”

Integrative power is “an ability to create networks of trust that enable groups to work together toward common goals and structural power is a power which bridges or exploits structural holes and controls communication between certain parts of the network.” This view was also expressed by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt

99 Ibid. P.13


102 Ibid.

Çavuşoğlu as he insisted that; “Turkey is the axis itself which combines Europe and Asia.”

Another reason could be because Turkey already possesses “the right set of resources to convert its soft power into smart power.” According to this view, Turkey can use its readily available soft power resources in order to achieve economic success. In other words, with a proper power conversion strategy to convert its soft power into smart power, even if Turkey’s economic power over the region is limited, Turkey will be able to achieve its desired outcomes.

2.6. Turkey’s Smart Power Strategy and Partners

Turkey lifted its relationship with respective Asia-Pacific countries to the level of strategic partnership, namely Japan (in 2013), South Korea (in 2012), China (in 2010), Indonesia (in 2011), Malaysia (in 2014) and Singapore (in 2014) respectively. There is no doubt that they all have become important actors in international affairs and Turkey’s main partners in the region. The term ‘strategic partnership’ hasn’t been clearly defined by Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although not all agreements

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are accessible, Turkey’s agreement of strategic partnership with Japan implies the
definition of the term.\textsuperscript{108}

Apparently, strategic partnership described in this declaration includes “increased
cooporation on political field, economic field, cultural and scientific-technological
field, and regional affairs and international fora.”\textsuperscript{109} Turkey has closely related with
the six strategic partners in international organisations such as UN, G20, OECD,
MIKTA and D-8 within the frame of both economic and soft power consideration.
Furthermore, Turkey is monitoring developments in APEC and ASEAN, regional
organisations in Asia-Pacific.\textsuperscript{110}

Turkey-South Korea relations are a good example of Turkey’s smart strategy
application for three points. First, Turkish decision-makers desired to expand the trade
volume even though Turkey’s trade deficit with South Korea is growing.\textsuperscript{111} Second,
they have accepted South Korea as a main partner in governmental transportation and
infrastructure projects and asked more investments from the country for the
accomplishment of the 2023 Vision.\textsuperscript{112} Third, they demanded support from South

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{108} Joint Declaration on the Establishment of Strategic Partnership between Japan and the Republic of Turkey, 2013. (Retributed on 3 September 2019 from https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000004160.pdf)

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{110} Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, Relations between Turkey and Indonesia. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-indonesia.en.mfa)

\textsuperscript{111} Cheong Wa Dae, Republic of Korea, The President and Turkish President Speak By Phone, 2017. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Briefings/19)

\textsuperscript{112} Daily Sabah, Turkey, South Korea agree on cooperation for success of 2023 vision, 2018. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2018/05/03/turkey-south-korea-agree-on-cooperation-for-success-of-2023-vision)
\end{footnotes}
Korean government for Turkish cultural centre and they opened the centre within less than a year.\textsuperscript{113}

The first and second points are quite comprehensible since Turkey is a growing trading state. However, the third point is remarkable in a sense that Turkey has never had such an official organisation in South Korea, which promotes its language education, cultural exchange, tourism and so on.\textsuperscript{114}

Turkey’s strategic partnership is a product of its institutionalised smart power strategy and it can be assumed that Turkey is planning to accomplish the 2023 Vision by combining its hard and soft power with a proper smart power strategy in cooperation with its Asia-Pacific strategic partners. Strategic partnership apparently refers to increased cooperation on political field, economic field, cultural and scientific-technological field, and regional affairs and international fora.\textsuperscript{115} This perfectly corresponds with Nye’s approach of smart power.\textsuperscript{116}

Turkey’s smart strategy for the region can be analysed into five factors: “(1) preferred goals or outcomes, (2) available resources, (3) the positions and preferences of the targets of influence attempts, (4) forms of power behaviour likely to succeed, (5) the probability of success.”\textsuperscript{117}

First, preferred goals are what Turkey aims to achieve in the Asia-Pacific region. Turkey is attempting to join and engage in several regional and international

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{114} Yunus Emre Institute, \textit{Yunus Emre Institute’s Seoul branch opens}. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://www.yee.org.tr/en/news/yunus-emre-institutes-seoul-branch-opens)

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.


organisations such as D-8, ASEAN, MIKTA, etc.\textsuperscript{118} The preferred goals or outcomes of Turkey’s Asia-Pacific are: (1) expanding Turkey’s export market in the region; (2) receiving investment from regional countries; and (3) getting support for Turkey’s political position in international arena.\textsuperscript{119}

The first goal has been fulfilled as Turkey signed and negotiates for free trade agreements with regional countries.\textsuperscript{120} The second goal also has been accomplished as the investment from the Asia-Pacific countries to Turkey exceeded $7.5 billion by the end of 2017 and as many Asia-Pacific firms have contributed in developing Turkey’s infrastructure.\textsuperscript{121} The third goal has been fulfilled by elevating its relations with six regional countries to strategic partnership, opening new embassies; cooperating with the regional countries in international organisations such as UN, G20, IOC, and MIKTA; accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of ASEAN, membership of the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), active participation in the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) as Post-Forum Dialogue Partner and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as Dialogue Partner, etc.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{118} Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, \textit{Turkey’s Relations with the Asia-Pacific Region}. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-relations-with-east-asia-and-the-pacific.en.mfa)

\textsuperscript{119} Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, \textit{Asya-Pasifik ülkelerle ilişkiler}. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/dogu-asya-ve-pasifik-ulkeleleri-ile-iliskiler.tr.mfa)


\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Ibid.}. 

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Second, available resources refer to Turkey’s hard and soft power resources readily available in the region. Turkey already has soft power resources and instruments in the region, such as tourism. China is a particularly important market for the Turkish tourism industry.\textsuperscript{123} Also, Turkish government and Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially under the leadership of Çavuşoğlu, are supporting Yunus Emre Institute in Japan, South Korea and Malaysia. Yunus Emre Institute is the counterpart to China’s Confucius Institutes, and South Korea’s Korean Culture Centre and Sejong Institute. It promotes Turkish language and culture abroad.\textsuperscript{124}

There is also the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), which coordinates the activities for Turks living abroad, related communities and Turkish governmental scholarship programs for foreign students.\textsuperscript{125} Furthermore, Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism actively sponsors several activities to promote Turkish culture, history, language, and tourism in the Asia-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{126}

As Çavuşoğlu insisted; “Turkey’s flag carrier Turkish Airlines is a prominent soft power instrument of Turkey as well.”\textsuperscript{127} Covering most of the major cities in the Asia-Pacific region, Turkish Airlines flies to Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai and Hong Kong in China, Denpasar and Jakarta in Indonesia, Osaka and Tokyo in Japan, Kuala Lumpur.


\textsuperscript{124} Yunus Emre Institute, \textit{Yunus Emre Institute}. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://www.yee.org.tr/en/corporate/yunus-emre-institute)

\textsuperscript{125} Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, Republic of Turkey, \textit{Institution}. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://www.ytb.gov.tr/en/corporate/institution)


in Malaysia, Ulaanbaatar in Mongolia, Manila in the Philippines, Singapore, Seoul in South Korea, Taipei in Taiwan, Bangkok and Phuket in Thailand, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam.\(^{128}\) It also codeshares with major Asia-Pacific airlines such as Air China, All Nippon Airways (Japanese), Asiana Airlines (South Korea), Garuda Indonesia, Malindo Air (Malaysia), Philippine Airlines, Singapore Airlines, Thai Airways.\(^{129}\)

Although Turkey’s trade deficit in the Asia-Pacific region is tremendous, it can be also an economic power resource.\(^{130}\) Turkey can use its trade deficit as an economic power resource by “controlling the access of Asia-Pacific capital to its markets.”\(^{131}\) The imbalance within trade between South Korea and Turkey allowed Turkey to reach its goal in the region, as an agreement on the investment sector with South Korea was one of the main agendas during Erdoğan’s visit to South Korea.\(^{132}\)

Third, the preferences of the targets of influence attempts are what the targeted countries desire to gain from Turkey. Many Asia-Pacific countries seem to be interested in Turkey’s role as “a bridge between East and West.”\(^{133}\) For instance, China sees Turkey as a part of the Silk Road Economic Belt (丝绸之路经济带), which is going

\(^{128}\) Turkish Airlines, *Our Destinations*. (Retrieved on 2 September from https://www.turkishairlines.com/en-jp/flights/)


\(^{131}\) *Ibid*.


to connect Central Asia, West Asia, the Middle East and Europe. The preferences of the Asia-Pacific countries are entering Turkish markets and getting an access to Europe and the Middle East through Turkey. Also, Turkey signed a customs union with EU in 1995.

Many Asia-Pacific firms are interested in both Turkish and European markets. For example, one of the biggest South Korean capital SK Group established a joint e-commerce company called “n11” with Turkish company, Doğuş Planet. Another South Korean capital, CJ Group, bought Turkish biggest cinema group, Mars Cinema Group, which is famous for its brand “Cinemaximum” and CJ Group is also planning to enter European cinema markets on the basis of Turkish cinema chain.

Fourth, forms of power behaviour likely to succeed are between command and co-optive power, “ranging along a spectrum from coercion to economic inducement to agenda setting to pure attraction.” As the targets of the strategy are usually economies bigger than that of Turkey, coercion would not be effective. Also, as many Asia-Pacific countries have strong cultural influence on Turkey and as Turkey’s soft power resources in the Asia-Pacific region have been limited except resources regarding its tourism, pure attraction would not be a successful form of power.

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134 See Illustration 1


behaviour as well. Therefore, successful forms of power behaviour would be situated between economic inducement and agenda setting.\textsuperscript{139}

Turkey seems to prefer the co-optive behaviour of soft power instead of the command behaviour of hard power. The current Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu insisted that; “permanent power is soft power” and “hard power can be used when needed, but it needs to be measured, fair, and in compliance with international law”.\textsuperscript{140}

Lastly, the probability of success is related with Turkey’s understanding of its previous policy in the region and Turkey’s position in international politics. With proper strategies and strategic partnership, Turkey is likely to achieve its goals. In the past, “Turkey’s economic and political crises have limited relations with Asia-Pacific countries.”\textsuperscript{141} “Increased economic capacity of both Turkey and Asia-Pacific countries allows them to have stronger relationship.”\textsuperscript{142}

For smart power strategy contains more forms of power behaviour, there are more options for Turkey to apply to the countries with different historical contexts and positions in international arena. For example, Turkey can be a mediator between non-Muslim majority and Muslim minorities in Asia-Pacific countries.\textsuperscript{143} On the other hand, Turkey can be an important economic partner for Japan and South Korea in a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{139} Ibid.


\item \textsuperscript{141} Çolakoğlu, Selçuk, Turkey’s East Asian Policy: From Security Concerns to Trade Partnership. \textit{Perceptions, Vol. 17}, 2012, P.140

\item \textsuperscript{142} Ibid.

\end{itemize}
sense they are interested in Turkey’s geopolitical location surrounded by Europe, West Asia and North Africa.\footnote{Ibid.}

2.7. Conclusion

In this chapter, the thesis analysed Turkish Asia-Pacific policy in the view based on two concepts, the trading state and smart power. The thesis tested if the trading state concept is relevant with Turkish Asia-Pacific policy and found out that the concept doesn’t fully explain developments in the policy during the 2010s for Turkey has continued to expand its relations with Asia-Pacific countries despite its growing trade deficit. In this sense, the thesis argued that the changes during the 2010s can be explained through the smart power concept and highlighted that Turkey has developed its soft power capability in Asia-Pacific in order to achieve economic success.

To test whether this argument is relevant with major countries in the region, Turkey’s diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with Japan, South Korea, China, and Southeast Asian countries is analysed in the next 4 chapters. For Northeast Asian countries and Southeast Asian countries have quite different history in terms of relations with Turkey and different backgrounds, they are analysed separately. Since Japan had been one of Turkey’s main partners in the region and it had offered the most foreign aid to Turkey, Turkey’s relations with Japan are analysed in the first place.
CHAPTER 3

TURKEY AND JAPAN

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the influence of deterioration of Turkish-Japanese relations over Turkey’s general Asia-Pacific policy is analysed. There is no doubt that Japan has been one of Turkey’s main partners in international politics so far. Japan has been one of the big economies that provided foreign investments to Turkey. Former Turkish President and Prime Minister Turgut Özal was personally interested in Japanese affairs and improved bilateral relations with Japan in 1980s.

However, Japan reduced investments in Turkey during the 1990s due to its long-lasting economic depression since 1991 and Turkey’s political and economic instability. Although Japan has tried to recover its relations with Turkey back as much as in the past, many evidences show that Turkey might have turned its face away from Japan to China and South Korea. To restore their close relationship, Japan and Turkey

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146 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, Japan-Turkey Relations (Basic Data). (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/turkey/data.html)


148 Akkemik, K. Ali, Is Turkey turning its face away from Japan to China and Korea? Evidence from trade relations, Perceptions, Vol.21, No.1, P.45
should develop common interest in energy issues and support each other in various fields on the basis of the long friendship.\(^{149}\)

### 3.2. Japan’s Diplomatic Principles

According to Japanese Foreign Ministry, there are six principles of Japan’s foreign policy: “(1) strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance and promoting the networking of allies and friendly nations; (2) enhancing relations with neighbouring countries; (3) promoting economic diplomacy; (4) contributing to address global issues; (5) contributing to the peace and stability of the Middle East; and (6) promoting a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”\(^{150}\)

The six principles are relevant with Japan’s approach to its relations with Turkey. Japan sees Turkey as an important country for “its NATO membership, efforts to join the EU, multifaceted diplomacy with states in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.”\(^{151}\) Japan regards Turkey as a pro-Japan country while it is worried with growing tensions between Turkey and U.S.\(^{152}\)

### 3.3. Turkey’s Diplomatic and Economic Relations with Japan

Turkish-Japanese relations have the longest history amongst any other countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Their friendship dates back to the late Ottoman era. Sultan \(Abdülhamid\ II\) was deeply impressed by Japan’s rapid modernisation following the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and sent a frigate named after \(Ertuğrul\), the father of the


\(^{151}\) *Ibid*.

\(^{152}\) *Ibid*.
founder of the Ottoman Empire, to Japan in 14 July 1889 in order to boost bilateral relations between the Ottoman Empire and Japan.\textsuperscript{153}

Unfortunately, on the way back to the Empire in 16 September 1890, the \textit{Ertuğrul} encountered a typhoon and sank near the present-day town of Kushimoto, Wakayama Prefecture.\textsuperscript{154} Although 527 personals lost their lives including the admiral Ali Osman Paşa, Japanese islanders saved 69 members of the frigate.\textsuperscript{155} This news reached the empire and its successor, Turkey, tried to establish a deeper relationship with Japan. As the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated; “hospitality and assistance shown by the Japanese Government and the people for its survivors after this tragic accident is considered as the starting point of the friendship between the two countries”.\textsuperscript{156}

Citing that Turkey has debt of gratitude from the tragedy of \textit{Ertuğrul}, Turkey repaid the kindness shown by Japan in 1985 by sending two airliners in order to evacuate 215 Japanese from Tehran, Iran during the Iran-Iraq War after Saddam Hussein announced that Iraqi military would begin targeting even commercial airliners over Iran.\textsuperscript{157} As

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{155} 13 personals suffered from cholera and died before the sinking of the Ertuğrul
\item \textsuperscript{156} Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, \textit{Relations between Turkey and Japan}. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-japan.en.mfa)
\end{itemize}
the Ministry underlined; “this evacuation constituted another emotional turning point in bilateral relations.”\textsuperscript{158}

The old friendship between Turkey and Japan extended to their economic and cultural relations. Turkey has been interested in economic cooperation with Japan and Japanese foreign direct investment. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that; “Japan is the third biggest economy after USA and China, and Japanese loans financed important projects in Turkey.”\textsuperscript{159}

As Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, Japan regards Turkey as one of its most important aid recipients in the Middle East and actively provides assistance for three reasons: “(1) Turkey is an important nation and is contributing to regional stability with its moderate and realistic foreign policy and by working harmoniously with the West while maintaining friendly and cooperative relations with neighbouring Eastern European countries and Newly Independent States; (2) Turkey’s need for aid is strong due to its large population; (3) Turkey is geopolitically important because of its location at the crossroads of Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.”\textsuperscript{160}

According to the Ministry, Japanese foreign direct investment in Turkey was 2.7 billion USD for the period of 2002-2018.\textsuperscript{161} The Ministry stated that; “important projects such as Marmaray, the Bridge of Haliç, Hasan Uğurlu Barrage, Altinkaya

\textsuperscript{158} Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, \textit{Relations between Turkey and Japan}. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-japan.en.mfa)


\textsuperscript{160} Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, \textit{Japan-Turkey Relations (Basic Data)}. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/turkey/data.html)

Barrage, Second Bosporus Bridge had been financed with the loans provided by Japanese International Cooperation Agency.”  

According to the data given by Turkish Investment Office, Japan is the 10th investor in Turkey. “While 99 among 104 countries decreased their investment in Turkey, Japan was one of the five countries which raised investment in Turkey even after the 2016 coup d’état attempt in Turkey and Turkey’s military operations beyond the border.”

Table 1 shows the amount of Japanese foreign direct investment in Turkey since 2008 to 2017. Turkey has received approximately 60% of Japanese investment in Europe. In 2009, Japanese investment in Turkey was ¥38,914 million ($355 million). However, while Turkey’s percentage has remained around 50-70%, Japan decreased its investment in Europe.

There are other reasons for the stagnation of Turkish-Japanese relations apart from Japan’s decreased investment in Turkey. Çolakoğlu argues that Japan was somewhat responsible for the failure of Turkey’s project of being a model to Central Asia in the 1990s. Turkish foreign policy in Central Asia during the 1990s was shaped to present Turkey as the model of a democratic and secular country to the Muslim people of the region by using the advantage of its historical and cultural ties. Although Japan was asked to contribute economically, through development aid, capital and

162 Ibid.


166 Ibid.
technology, Japan rejected Turkey’s request in order “not to come into conflict with Russia and China in its expansion in Central Asia.”

Table 1. Japanese FDI in Turkey (2009-2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Japan’s FDI in Turkey/ Japan’s Total Investment in Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>38,914</td>
<td>67.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>54,577</td>
<td>72.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>15,470</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>22,417</td>
<td>78.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>12,884</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>16,789</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>10,632</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>9,711</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>16,541</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Japanese FDI in Turkey (2009-2017)

Turkey’s dissatisfaction with Japan eventually pushed Turkey to find out new partners in Asia-Pacific. As shown in Table 2, Japan had led Turkey’s import from Asia-Pacific until the early 2000s. However, Japanese economic power over Turkey has gradually decreased as China and South Korea rapidly rose in the late 20th century. Turkey’s import from both China and South Korea surpassed that from Japan in 2005. This literally meant Japan’s disadvantage in Turkish domestic market.

Source: Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

Table 2. Turkey’s Import from Japan, South Korea and China (1990-2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>1,590</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,109</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>3,109</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>3,298</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,140</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>3,140</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>3,140</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.Korea</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>3,485</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>4,764</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,764</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>7,057</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>7,057</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>1,322</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,322</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>6,885</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>17,181</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17,181</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>24,873</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>24,873</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,668</td>
<td>2,505</td>
<td>4,082</td>
<td>13,479</td>
<td>25,243</td>
<td>35,070</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

million USD

Source: World Integrated Trade Solution, World Bank\(^{169}\)

Even though Japan decreased its investment in Turkey, Japan didn’t discontinue investment and kept bilateral trade with Turkey. Currently, around 200 Japanese companies are operating in Turkey and 5 Turkish companies are in Japan.\(^{170}\) Major exports from Japan are machinery and equipment, automotive products, iron and steel.\(^{171}\) Major Japanese companies in Turkey are usually automotive companies such as Toyota, Honda and Nissan.\(^{172}\) For example, Toyota has its own car factory in Sakarya, Turkey and doubled its manufacturing capacity in 2016.\(^{173}\)

\(^{169}\) Import from Japan, South Korea, and China, originally provided by WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution), World Bank. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://wits.worldbank.org)


\(^{171}\) Ibid.


However, Turkey’s resentment against Japan wasn’t soothed despite Japan’s continued investment in Turkey because Japan has already signed free trade agreement with the European Union but keeps postponing signing the agreement with Turkey.\textsuperscript{174} Turkey signed customs union agreement with the European Union in 31 December 1995 and Japan was interested in Turkey’s free trade agreements with important economies. Turkey has worked on negotiation with Japan in order to catch up on President Erdoğan’s visit to the 14th G20 Summit in 2019 in Japan.\textsuperscript{175}

However, as the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement entered into force on 1 February 2019, Japan might not be very interested in signing free trade agreement with Turkey.\textsuperscript{176} Since Japan has recently signed FTA with the EU, Japanese automotive products can enter European market and Turkey’s market through European market tariff-free 7 years later. However, Turkish products cannot enter Japanese market free of tariff because Turkey hasn’t signed separate FTA with Japan so far. What is worse, this situation might result in decrease in Turkey’s export.\textsuperscript{177}

Recently, Japan gave up Sinop Nuclear Plant Project because of doubled construction cost due to increased safety requirements after the tragic accident of Japan’s Fukushima Nuclear Plant and the fall of Turkish Lira.\textsuperscript{178} This also resulted in Turkey’s dissatisfaction with Japan. Many countries contested for the Sinop Nuclear Plant


\textsuperscript{175} \textit{Ibid}.


\textsuperscript{178} Nikkei Asian Preview, \textit{Japan to scrap up Turkey nuclear project}, 2018. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Japan-to-scrap-Turkey-nuclear-project)
project and Turkey considered South Korean company as well. Former Turkish President Abdullah Gül visited South Korea for negotiations with the South Korean state-owned company KEPCO to build a nuclear power plant in Sinop.179

Although Japan gave up the project, the two countries are still seeking cooperation in other fields.180 Turkey still considers Japan as a partner in various fields including clean coal, renewable energy, R&D work, developing human resources transportation projects.181

Japan is also interested in energy issues in the Middle East. Japan’s dependency on energy resources from the Middle East has been intensified after the meltdown of Fukushima Nuclear Plant in 2011.182 Japan wants to offer an alternative to China’s Silk Road Initiative to countries in the Middle East.183 In order to meet Japan’s need, Turkey can mediate between Japan and other Middle Eastern countries like Iran, UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.184


182 Middle East Eye, *What is Japan’s strategy in the Middle East?* 2019. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/what-japans-strategy-middle-east)


3.4. Turkey’s Cultural Relations with Japan

In 2015 Japan announced a new activist Middle East policy. Although Japan is mainly targeting Arab countries and Iran, Turkey has been one of Japan’s trustful partners in the region. Japan still wants to ensure access to stable sources of energy. Japan recognises Turkey as a country which plays a big role in the Middle East and an important partner as its strategic partner.

Both Turkey and Japan are interested in improving cultural relations. Turkey celebrated the year 2010 as ‘the Japan Year in Turkey’ on the occasion of the 120th year of the Ertuğrul Frigate Disaster. In December 2015, Turkish-Japanese co-produced film named Ertuğrul 1890 (in Japanese 海難 1890) was released. Japan is also celebrating the year 2019 as ‘Year of Turkish Culture in Japan’.

Japan was the first Asia-Pacific country to open its cultural centre in Turkey. On 3 May 1998, the Turkish-Japanese foundation cultural centre (Türk Japon Vakfı Kültür Merkezi) was opened in Ankara and President of Turkey, Süleyman Demirel, and

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185 Lamont, Christopher K. and Pannwitz, Hannah, “Japan’s New Middle East Policy: Good News for Europe?” Clingendael, 2015


188 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, Japan-Turkey Relations (Basic Data). (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/turkey/data.html)


190 Ibid.
Prince and Princess Tomohito of Mikasa attended the opening ceremony.\footnote{Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, \textit{Japan-Turkey Relations (Basic Data)}. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/turkey/data.html)} The centre holds a variety of cultural events in Turkey. As Japanese Foreign Ministry states, the centre functions as a base for not only cultural exchange between two countries but also other various field of exchange.\footnote{Türk Japon Vakfı, \textit{Tarihçe}. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from http://www.tjv.org.tr/tr/hakkimizda/tarihce/)}

As a counterpart to Japanese Cultural Centre in Turkey, Turkey is also running Yunus Emre Institute in Tokyo, Japan.\footnote{Yunus Emre Institute, Tokyo. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://tokyo.yee.org.tr)} Yunus Emre Institute offers not only Turkish course for free of charge, but also 	extit{Ebru}, Turkish calligraphy, Turkish cuisine, etc.\footnote{Sözcü, \textit{Tokyo’da Türkçe açılımı}, 2016. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/gundem/tokyo-turkce-acilimi-1518973/)}

3.5. Conclusion

Turkey and Japan have an old and strong relationship based on historical events. Turkey had seen Japan as a new opportunity for itself. Japan has been one of Turkey’s trustful trade partners and investors. There are many organisations and associations which show their long-lasting friendly relationship.

While Chinese and Korean influence on Turkey has grown, it cannot be denied that Japan has been the most popular among them in Turkey for decades. Japan still offers foreign direct investment to Turkey more than any other Asia-Pacific countries and cultural exchange between two countries is being expanded.

However, as China and South Korea have risen rapidly in the late 1990s, Japanese economic and cultural influence on Turkey has decreased gradually and relatively compared to them. The reasons why Japan’s influence over Turkey declined might be:
decreased Japanese FDI in Turkey; postponed FTA between Japan and Turkey; Japan’s cancellation of Sinop Nuclear Plant Project; and also, rapid economic and cultural expansion of China and South Korea in Turkish market and long-lasting economic recession of Japan.

Japan’s indifference to enhancing relations with Turkey could have affected Turkey to give relative advantage to other Asia-Pacific countries, especially for South Korea. To restore their close relationship, Japan and Turkey should develop common interest in energy issues and support each other in various fields on the basis of the long friendship.

In the next chapter, Turkey’s diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with South Korea will be discussed. This chapter also tests South Korea as a development model for Turkey.
CHAPTER 4

TURKEY AND SOUTH KOREA

4.1. Introduction

South Korea has been an attractive alternative to Japan for Turkey. South Korea largely replaced Japan’s role for Turkey. In the past relations between Turkey and South Korea had been oriented by their military interests. Their bilateral relations started as Turkey sent its armed forces to the Korean peninsula during the Korean war.\(^{195}\) The two countries could continue their close relationship because they were both Western allies.

However, as the two countries both have become prominent middle power countries, they share a lot of common interest aside from military.\(^{196}\) They agreed to lift their relationship to the level of strategic partnership in 2012 and strengthened it in the framework of MIKTA as well.\(^{197}\) South Korea is also an attractive development model for Turkey.\(^{198}\) Although Turkey has trade deficit with South Korea, Turkey wants to


expand the trade volume and get investments from South Korea.\textsuperscript{199} South Korea has played an important role in fulfilment of Turkey’s 2023 Vision and Turkey has continuously supported South Korea’s claim for the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula against North Korea as well.\textsuperscript{200}

\textbf{4.2. South Korea’s Diplomatic Principles}

South Korea’s diplomatic principles are: “(1) restoration of summit diplomacy with four countries [U.S, Japan, China and Russia]; (2) securing momentum for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula; (3) expanding the diplomatic horizons through diversification of diplomacy; (4) enhancing Korea’s role and standing in the international community; and (5) diplomacy together with the people.”\textsuperscript{201}

South Korea announced the New Northern Policy which targets Russia, Tajikistan and Central Asian Turkic states, namely Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan, which might interest Turkey.\textsuperscript{202}

\textbf{4.3. Turkey’s Economic Relations with South Korea}

Economic relations between Turkey and South Korea have rapidly grown during the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. Two countries have actively related with each other in economic context. Both countries have seen each other as a new opportunity for economic expansion.

\textsuperscript{199} Cheong Wa Dae, Republic of Korea, \textit{President calls Turkish counterpart}, 2017. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://english1.president.go.kr/Media/News/54)

\textsuperscript{200} \textit{Ibid}.


\textsuperscript{202} \textit{Ibid}.
Their economic partnership is strong and firm compared to other Asia-Pacific countries for several reasons:

First, the two countries signed free trade agreement in 2013. It was Turkey’s first FTA with a major economy in the Asia-Pacific region. While Malaysia and Singapore also signed FTA with Turkey, their GDP value is lower than that of South Korea as in Table 3.

Table 3. The Six Countries and Turkey in World GDP Rankings (2019)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP (Nominal)</th>
<th>% Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>14,172.20</td>
<td>16.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>5,220.57</td>
<td>5.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1,699.68</td>
<td>1.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1,066.84</td>
<td>1.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>631.16</td>
<td>0.717%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>372.63</td>
<td>0.423%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>359.62</td>
<td>0.41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

billion USD

Source: World Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Second, Turkey and South Korea are members of MIKTA. MIKTA was created in New York in September 2013 at a meeting held on the side-lines of Leaders’ Week of the

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UN General Assembly. MIKTA is a cross-regional consultative platform between Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia to increase mutual understanding, deepen bilateral ties, and find common grounds for cooperation.

The most recent MIKTA Foreign Ministers’ meeting was held in New York, USA on 27 September 2018. While the ministers including Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha discussed various topics, they also covered topics such as trade wars and the future of international trade, recent developments in Turkey and the region and updates on the issue of the Korean Peninsula.

Third, the trade volume between Turkey and South Korea now exceeds the volume between Japan and Turkey as in Table 4. Japan has been Turkey’s most important economic partner in the region throughout the history. However, as the trade volume between Turkey and Japan and Japanese foreign direct investment in Turkey decrease, China and South Korea have risen as alternatives to Japan. While China is leading Turkey’s import market, import from South Korea is also remarkable as it is 9th largest in Turkey’s import market as in Table 5.

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206 Ibid.


209 Ak kemik, K. Ali, Is Turkey turning its face away from Japan to China and Korea? Evidence from trade relations, Perceptions, Vol.21
Table 4. Turkey’s Trade Volume with Japan and South Korea (1990-2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1,359</td>
<td>1,580</td>
<td>1,739</td>
<td>3,343</td>
<td>3,570</td>
<td>3,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Korea</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>1,183</td>
<td>3,518</td>
<td>5,068</td>
<td>7,626</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

million USD

Source: World Integrated Trade Solution, World Bank

However, Turkey has expressed that the trade between the two countries has to be more balanced. While the trade volume has dramatically increased, it is too much one-sided. In 2018, while the trade volume was $7.26 billion, Turkey’s trade deficit with South Korea was -$5.42 billion. Özmen expressed that; “investment of Korean companies could be one of ways to fix this issue.” Özmen picked Hyundai Motor as a good example as 35% of Hyundai cars produced in Turkey were exported outside Turkey, mainly to the EU in 2005.

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210 Turkey’s Trade Volume with Japan and South Korea (1990-2015), extracted from the original data provided by WITTS (World Integrated Trade Solution), World Bank. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://wits.worldbank.org)


212 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, Güney Kore’nin Ekonomisi. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/guney-kore_ekonomisi.tr.mfa)


214 Ibid.
Table 5. Turkey’s Top 10 Import Partners in 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Import</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>23,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>21,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>19,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>11,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>11,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>8,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>7,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>6,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>S. Korea</td>
<td>6,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>6,549</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

million USD

Source: World Integrated Trade Solution, World Bank\(^{215}\)

The Eurasia Tunnel was also built by SK E&C. The tunnel is the world’s first double-deck road tunnel across the Bosporus strait of Istanbul. SK E&C will be in charge of maintenance and operation until June 2041.\(^{216}\) The Eurasia Tunnel Project was recognised as the Global Best Project in the tunnel and bridge sector in 2016 by the Engineering News Record.\(^{217}\)

\(^{215}\) Ibid.


\(^{217}\) Ibid.
South Korean companies and Turkish companies are cooperating within the frame of KOTUBA (Korea-Turkey Business Association). This association was established in 1989 as a result of cooperation between Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK, Diş Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurumu) and South Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry (대한상공회의소). KOTUBA was originally organised by Turkish businessmen and the purpose of KOTUBA is mainly to support development in economic relations, bilateral trade and investment between the two countries.

According to Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, more than 300 South Korean firms operate in Turkey and 28 Turkish firms in South Korea. For instance, Samsung Electronics is leading Turkey’s smartphone market and its market share is 53.52%, ranked in the first.

Although Turkey’s trade deficit got intensified, Turkey still wants to continue to expand the trade volume. The main reason could be because Turkey needs South Korean investments in its transportation and infrastructure projects for the fulfilment

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218 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, Güney Kore’nin Ekonomisi. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/guney-kore_ekonomisi.tr.mfa)

219 Ibid.


221 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, Güney Kore’nin Ekonomisi. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/guney-kore_ekonomisi.tr.mfa)


223 Cheong Wa Dae, Republic of Korea, President calls Turkish counterpart, 2017. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://english1.president.go.kr/Media/News/54)
of the 2023 Vision. “The two countries signed four bilateral agreements on cooperation in higher education; information, telecommunication, space and satellite technologies; industry and energy; and health and medical science,” which are relevant with main goals of the 2023 Vision.

South Korea has been an attractive development model for Turkey. “Even though Turkey implemented a state-led industrialisation strategy during the Cold War as South Korea did, Turkey couldn’t be successful as much as South Korea.” “Turkey started to strengthen its manufacturing industry by giving economic incentives to encourage more investment in key areas, such as automobile, defence industry, railway systems, renewable energy technologies, petrochemical industry, medical devices and so on.” South Korea agreed to contribute in such areas and has already done several projects in favour of Turkey’s 2023 Vision. As South Korea is planning to enhance

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224 Daily Sabah, Turkey, South Korea agree on cooperation for success of 2023 vision, 2018. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2018/05/03/turkey-south-korea-agree-on-cooperation-for-success-of-2023-vision)


228 Ibid.

cooperation with Central Asian countries by announcing the New Northern Policy, Turkey might mediate them as well.\textsuperscript{230}

**4.4. Turkey’s Cultural Relations with South Korea**

South Korea’s experience is not limited in industrial area. South Korea is also a middle power country with a strong soft power capability. South Korea’s cultural invasion, or so-called *Hallyu* (the Korean wave), has become very influential even in Turkey. There are about 150,000 K-Pop (Korean Pop) fans registered in Turkey.\textsuperscript{231} During the Gyeongju expo in Istanbul, a popular music program in South Korea “Music Bank” was held in Turkey for the first time, at Ülker Sports Arena which accommodates 15,000 people.\textsuperscript{232}

Korean Culture Centre (Kore Kültür Merkezi) was established on 13 October 2011 in Ankara, Turkey in order to reinforce cultural exchanges between Korea and Turkey and it is run by the South Korean government.\textsuperscript{233} Korean Culture Centre offers various courses on Korean language, Korean food, Taekwondo, Korean traditional dress, K-Pop Academy, calligraphy, and traditional Korean musical instruments for free of charge.\textsuperscript{234}


\textsuperscript{233} Korean Cultural Center, Ankara, *Kültür Merkezi Hakkında*. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from http://tr.korean-culture.org/tr/6/contents/331#none)

\textsuperscript{234} Ibid.
The centre also cooperates with schools and universities in Turkey. For example, students of the department of Korean language and literature at Ankara University organised “Korean Culture Day (Kore Kültür Günü)” at a high school in Ankara, sponsored by the cultural centre, celebrating the 60th anniversary of Korea-Turkey diplomatic relations. In 2018, the centre organised two free concerts at Middle East Technical University: a traditional Korean music performance named “Jeong Ga Ak Hoe – Nonilda” on 3 October and one with a traditional Korean instrument named “CelloGayageum” on 21 December as well.

Korean language has become a popular language in Turkey. According to Turkish Council of Higher Education, department of Korean language and literature is established in Ankara University (1989), Erciyes University (1998) and Istanbul University (2016). Also, Korean is now taught in high schools in Turkey as a second foreign language as well. According to Korean Cultural Centre, Sejong

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Institute, which offers official Korean courses, has 5 branches in Turkey as in Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa and Trabzon.\textsuperscript{240}

On the other hand, Turkey’s approach to its cultural relations with South Korea is mainly based on its tourism and culture. Turkey is one of popular destinations among South Korean tourists. According to Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 120,622 South Korean tourists visited Turkey in 2017.\textsuperscript{241}

While Ankara University had run TÖMER (Türkçe Öğretim Merkezi, Turkish Education Centre) in South Korea, it mainly served as a language education centre and its capacity was limited since it was attached to Hankuk University of Foreign Studies and not a governmental organisation.\textsuperscript{242} After Erdoğan and Çavuşoğlu paid official visit to South Korea in May 2018, Turkey established Yunus Emre Institute in Seoul, the capital city of South Korea in order to promote Turkish language and culture in the country.\textsuperscript{243}

4.5. Conclusion

Turkey and South Korea have developed a partnership since the very beginning of their political relations. The two countries agreed to elevate their diplomatic relations to strategic partnership in 2013. The two countries are closely supporting each other on global stage as in G20, OECD, MIKTA, etc. The free trade agreement between Turkey and South Korea is Turkey’s first FTA with a major economy in Asia-Pacific.


\textsuperscript{241} Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, \textit{Güney Kore’nin Ekonomisi}. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/guney-kore_ekonomisi.tr.mfa)

\textsuperscript{242} Ankara Üniversitesi, TÖMER Güney Kore birimi. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from http://tomer.ankara.edu.tr/guney-kore-birimi/)

\textsuperscript{243} Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, \textit{Güney Kore’nin Ekonomisi}. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/guney-kore_ekonomisi.tr.mfa)
Although Turkey’s trade deficit increases as the trade volume grows, Turkey still desires to deepen cooperation with South Korea in order to fulfil the 2023 Vision. South Korea’s New North Policy might interest Turkey.

South Korean firms have contributed in Turkey’s infrastructure and got popularity in Turkey’s market. It should be noticed that South Korea might be a good model of development for Turkey. Their close relations are likely to continue as they share similar values and interests in international and domestic affairs.

In the next chapter, Turkey’s diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with China will be discussed. China has become Turkey’s most important trade partner and also strategic partner. This chapter focuses on new policy initiatives of Turkey and China.
CHAPTER 5

TURKEY AND CHINA

5.1. Introduction

In this chapter, Turkey’s diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with China will be discussed. Turkey announced Asia Anew initiative and China also declared its Silk Road Initiative.\(^{244}\) The main question of this chapter is whether Turkey’s Asia Anew initiative would harmonise with its Chinese counterpart. There is no doubt that China’s new project will give a new opportunity to Turkey and Turkey has applied many policies to take part in the project.\(^{245}\)

However, the two countries often had incompatible understandings in international affairs and Turkey couldn’t have sufficiently obtained China’s attention and benefits from China.\(^{246}\) Turkey’s claim for human rights and democracy doesn’t accommodate


\(^{245}\) Akçay, Nurettin, Turkey-China relations within the concept of the New Silk Road Project, \textit{ANKASAM}, 1 (3), 2017, P.75; Ergenç, Ceren, Can two ends of Asia meet? An overview of contemporary Turkey-China relations, \textit{East Asia}, 32, 2015, P.292

\(^{246}\) Akçay, Nurettin, Turkey-China relations within the concept of the New Silk Road Project, \textit{ANKASAM}, 1 (3), 2017, P.77
with China’s core values. Turkey needs to develop strategies to take advantage of China’s policy without putting its relations with China at risk.

5.2. Principles and Framework of the Belt and Road Initiative

The Belt and Road Initiative is China’s systematic project to integrate the development strategies of the countries along the Belt and Road. The initiative is designed to “uphold the global free trade regime and the open world economy in the spirit of open regional cooperation.” China claims that the initiative is an extension of “the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which have been basic principles of China’s diplomacy for 50 years.” The five principles are: “mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.”

The purposes of the initiative are: “(1) promoting orderly and free flow of economic factors, highly efficient allocation of resources and deep integration of markets; (2) encouraging the countries along the Belt and Road to achieve economic policy

247 Üngör, Çağdaş, Turkey and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: few shared values and no common destiny, Middle East Institute, 2013. (Retrieved on 19 September 2019 from https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkey-and-shanghai-cooperation-organization-few-shared-values-and-no-common-destiny)


249 Ibid.


coordination and carry out broader and more in-depth regional cooperation of higher standards; (3) and jointly creating an open, inclusive and balanced regional economic cooperation architecture that benefits all.”

The framework of the Belt and Road Initiative consists of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The Silk Road Economic Belt links China with: the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and West Asia; and Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road establishes two sea ways: one from China’s coast to Europe throughout the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean; and one from China’s coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific Ocean.

5.3. Turkey’s Diplomatic and Economic Relations with China

In the 21st century, Turkey-China diplomatic relations shifted to a new phase. As Turkey began to move the focus of its foreign policy from West to East, China became the most important partner in Turkey’s expansion to East. China sees Turkey as a part of the Silk Road Economic Belt (丝绸之路经济带) as in Illustration 1. Since the economic belt is going to connect Central Asia, West Asia, the Middle East and Europe, Turkey’s geographical location will be crucial to this project. The two countries also maintain sound cooperation under such multilateral frameworks as the United Nations, G20 and Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia.

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Turkey-China economic relations have developed mostly during the 21st century. As in Table 1, Turkey’s import from China has tremendously increased during the 21st century. As Akkemik puts, the rise of China in the world economy has been reflected in China’s increasing share in Turkey’s trade and China became an important supplier of industrial materials and intermediate inputs for Turkish industries.257 Akkemik also

Source: Herbert Smith Freehills


argues that; “the deterioration of Japan’s importance for Turkish trade has continued as China joined the World Trade Organisation in November 2001.”\textsuperscript{258}

However, as Çolakoğlu claimed, “even though Turkey expects benefits from China offering huge economic opportunities, China has pursued opposite policies of the Turkish claims in the international arena as in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh issues.”\textsuperscript{259} Akçay also asserted that; “China’s political moves had not the sufficiency to be beneficial for Turkey.”\textsuperscript{260} He argued that; “Turkey should take considerable economic and political steps in order to balance its relations with China.”\textsuperscript{261} Turkey reached a trade surplus against China only in 1993-1994 and for all the other years, China has been much more advantageous in the bilateral trade between the two countries.\textsuperscript{262} “Turkey didn’t obtain the expected attention and benefits in the economic relations as well as the political relations.”\textsuperscript{263}

Turkey’s dialogue partner membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was an important factor for its policy towards Asia. As Turkey’s relations with EU and NATO have continuously deteriorated, Turkey has developed relations with the SCO members. Erşen argues that; “this process is likely to continue with a growing momentum for two main reasons: first, the centre of gravity in the world economy is

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{258} \textit{Ibid}, pp.46-47
\item \textsuperscript{259} Çolakoğlu, Selçuk, Türkiye-Çin ilişkileri: tek taraflı aşk mı? \textit{Ortadoğu Analizi}, Vol.4 No.45, 2012, P.53
\item \textsuperscript{260} Akçay, Nurettin, Turkey-China relations within the concept of the New Silk Road Project, \textit{ANKASAM}, 1 (3), 2017, P.77
\item \textsuperscript{261} Çolakoğlu, Selçuk, Türkiye-Çin ilişkileri: tek taraflı aşk mı? \textit{Ortadoğu Analizi}, Vol.4 No.45, 2012, P.53
\item \textsuperscript{262} \textit{Ibid}.
\item \textsuperscript{263} Akçay, Nurettin, Turkey-China relations within the concept of the New Silk Road Project, \textit{ANKASAM}, 1 (3), 2017, P.77
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
moving from America and Europe toward Asia and China has become the world’s second largest economy; second, the financial crisis in Europe resulted into Turkey’s seeking for the Asian/Eurasian alternative.”

However, “Turkey’s claim for human rights and democracy does not accommodate with SCO’s values (mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity) and disturbs Turkey’s achieving full SCO membership.”

Despite Turkey’s irrelevance for SCO’s values, in the 2010s, China’s new diplomacy “the Belt and Road Initiative (一带一路)” brought a major change to Turkey-China economic relations. The Silk Road Economic Belt is a plan to “unite the countries and subregions along the route of the ancient Silk Road through trade, transportation, energy cooperation.” Not only China and Turkey, but all of Turkey’s strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific region except Japan, namely South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, signed agreements related to the Belt and Road Initiative as in Illustration 2.

It is argued that China’s Belt and Road Initiative might solve the problems in bilateral trade between the two countries. Akçay insists that the new Silk Road project is crucial because it provides to Turkey the chance to enhance its economic, social and political

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266 Ergenç, Ceren, Can two ends of Asia meet? An overview of contemporary Turkey-China relations, *East Asia*, 32, 2015, P.291
relations with China. Ceren Ergenç asserts that “Turkey’s new foreign policy orientation appears to be compatible with China’s Silk Road policy.”

Illustration 2. Countries and Regions Which Signed Agreements for BRI

Source: The Dialogue

Turkey has become an important partner in China’s Belt and Road policy. Turkey is included in the New Silk Road Diplomacy via the Turkey-Pakistan-China railroad

[267] Akçay, Nurettin, Turkey-China relations within the concept of the New Silk Road Project, ANKASAM, 1 (3), 2017, P.75

[268] Ergenç, Ceren, Can two ends of Asia meet? An overview of contemporary Turkey-China relations, East Asia, 32, 2015, P.292

project as well as several bilateral initiatives in trade and investment.\textsuperscript{270} As Akçay puts, “Turkey is considered as the gateway to the Middle East, Central Asia and North Africa so it has a central position for the Belt and Road policy in terms of land, sea and air transportation.”\textsuperscript{271}

\textbf{Table 6. Turkey’s Trade Deficit with China}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Trade Deficit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>-21.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>-22.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>-22.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>-23.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>-20.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>-17.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

billion USD

\textbf{Source: TUIK}\textsuperscript{272}

Turkey’s trade deficit with China has been tremendous as in Table 6. Turkey has been trying to solve this issue by strengthening economic partnership with China. First, Turkey has been trying to increase export to China. According to Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “the process of the export of Turkish agricultural and food products

\textsuperscript{270} \textit{Ibid}, P.291

\textsuperscript{271} Akçay, Nurettin, Turkey-China relations within the concept of the New Silk Road Project, \textit{ANKASAM}, 1 (3), 2017, P.81

\textsuperscript{272} \textit{Ibid}
to Chinese market is on track.”

Also, “Turkey and China signed protocols about milk and dairy products, cherry and pistachio during G20 Antalya and Hangzhou Summits.” Table 7 shows that Turkey’s export to China has rapidly increased and became the largest among its export to the Asia-Pacific region.

**Table 7. Turkey’s Export to China and its Share in Asia-Pacific Since 2000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.Korea</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>2,269</td>
<td>2,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>3,915</td>
<td>4,316</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

million USD

**Source:** World Integrated Trade Solution, World Bank

Second, Turkey has received approximately “2 billion USD from China as investments in energy, infrastructure, logistic, finance, diving, telecommunication and livestock sectors.” Third, Turkey is developing tourism in order to enhance economic and

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273 **Ibid.**


275 Turkey’s export to China and its share in Asia-Pacific since 2000, extracted from the original data provided by WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution), World Bank. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://wits.worldbank.org)

276 **Ibid.**
cultural relations with China. As the Ministry reported, the number of Chinese tourists travelling to Turkey reached up to 39,000 with a 60% increase in 2018. In order to avoid too much dependence on China, Turkey needs to decrease import from China by increasing import from other countries, such as Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN countries. Also, Turkey could try to increase its export to China. It is important that China is the largest import market for Turkey as in Table 7. The future of Turkish-Chinese relations depends on Turkey’s newly designed policy initiative.

5.4. Turkey’s Cultural Relations with China

As mentioned above, one of the main problems within the bilateral relations between Turkey and China is irrelevance of their core values and interests. Turkey’s claim for human rights have offended Beijing several times. For example, Turkey often criticised China for its harsh treatment of Uyghur Muslims.

277 Ibid.


280 Üngör, Çağdaş, Turkey and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: few shared values and no common destiny, Middle East Institute, 2013. (Retrieved on 19 September 2019 from https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkey-and-shanghai-cooperation-organization-few-shared-values-and-no-common-destiny)


68
Although Turkey has tried to enhance ties with China, China condemned Turkey, arguing that “Turkey’s accusations are groundless.”

Turkey’s engagement in the Uyghur dispute has a long history. “The Ottoman Empire sent the Uyghurs a shipment of weapons against the Qing dynasty” and the modern Turkish Republic “resettled thousands of Uyghurs with U.S. support.”

For China has helped Turkey economically by transferring $1 billion worth of funds to Turkey in 2019, Turkey’s dependency on China increased. Although Turkish government has developed plans to boost ties with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Turkey’s relations with China is in danger again. Turkey cannot easily ignore the Uyghur issue because Turkey’s claims for human rights and historical ties with the Uyghur people are important values of the current ruling party of Turkey.

Turkey might try to enhance ties with China in order to avoid political conflicts. In fact, they both have continued to promote friendly cultural relations regardless of the Uyghur issue. There are various institutions which support Turkey-China cultural relations. Chinese Turkish Economic and Cultural Exchange Association

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282 Ibid.


(中土經濟及文化交流協會) is established to promote business, education and cultural links between Turkey, China and Hong Kong.\(^{287}\)

Turkey-China Friendship Foundation (Türk-Çin Dostluk Vakfı) is also a foundation aiming to develop cooperation and friendship relations between the two countries.\(^{288}\)

Chinese Cultural Centre (Çin Kültür Merkezi) is a private cultural centre which has provided various courses on Chinese language, Chinese cuisine, Chinese art, etc.\(^{289}\)

Confucius Institutes are one of the most prominent institutions which support Turkey-China cultural relations. According to Confucius Headquarters, there are four branches in Turkey as at Middle East Technical University (2008), Boğaziçi University (2010), Okan University (2013), and Yeditepe University (2017).\(^{290}\)

Confucius Institute at Middle East Technical University is the first Confucius Institute in Turkey. Confucius Institute aims to promote Chinese language learning, the teaching of Chinese, and the understanding of the Chinese culture in Turkey.\(^{291}\)

Turkish language is also taught at two universities in China as at Menzu University in Beijing and Xinjiang University in Urumqi (Capital of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous


\(^{289}\) Çin Kültür Merkezi, Hakkımızda. ( Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://www.cinkultur.com/Hakkimizda/hakkimizda/)

\(^{290}\) Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban). ( Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from http://www.hanban.org/hanbancn/template/cioltab_en1.htm#)

Turkey is also planning to open its cultural centre Yunus Emre Institute in China recently. The institute is going to promote Turkish culture and language in China. Turkish ambassador in China said that “Turkey hosts the Confucius Institute but had no such institute in China”. He announced that Chinese authorities gave the green light to the opening of the institute thanks to a deal between the two countries in 2017.

5.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, Turkey’s diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with China are discussed. The main question of this chapter is whether Turkey’s Asia Anew initiative would harmonise with its Chinese counterpart.

During the 21st century, Turkey’s economic dependence on China has been intensified and Turkey’s trade deficit with China has become tremendous. While Turkey has tried to establish a deeper relationship with China in order to fix the problems, China hasn’t been active in cooperation with Turkey due to its concerns for separatism in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

However, as both China and Turkey adopted a new initiative promoting partnership with countries and subregions on the ancient Silk Road, Turkey and China got a new chance to strengthen their bilateral relations. Turkey is trying to increase its export to China as well in order to decrease its dependence on China.

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292 Turkish Language Center, *Turkish*. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://Turkishlanguagecenter.com/University/Turkish_Study_Abroad.html)


Although the two countries often had incompatible understandings in international affairs and Turkey couldn’t have sufficiently obtained China’s attention and benefits from China, the two countries have seen each other as important partner.

While there are still concerns for growing Turkey’s dependence on China and Turkey’s trade deficit with China, Turkey seems to be consent with China’s new expansive policy towards West Asia and Europe.

In the next chapter, Turkey’s diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with ASEAN member states will be analysed. While Northeast Asian countries, namely Japan, China, and South Korea, are all bigger economies compared to Turkey, most of Southeast Asian countries have smaller economies and need Turkey’s investments and participation in various fields. In this sense, despite their relatively smaller economies, ASEAN countries are now crucial to Turkish Asia-Pacific policy.
CHAPTER 6

TURKEY AND ASEAN COUNTRIES

6.1. Introduction

In this chapter, Turkey’s general policy towards ASEAN member states is discussed. Turkey has closely monitored developments within ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and Turkey had tried to establish institutional ties with ASEAN since 1999.\textsuperscript{295} There are 10 member states, namely Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.\textsuperscript{296} While Northeast Asian countries including Japan, Korea, and China haven’t established a strong regional consultative group, Southeast Asian countries have such an organisation whose establishment takes back to 1967.\textsuperscript{297}

As other major economies such as USA, EU, Canada, Russia, India, Australia, and also ASEAN+3 members (Japan, South Korea, China), Turkey has developed close partnership with ASEAN and achieved the status of Sectoral Dialogue Partner of ASEAN.\textsuperscript{298} Turkey considers ASEAN as “the most important framework of

\textsuperscript{295} Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, \textit{Turkey’s relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)}. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/asean.en.mfa)

\textsuperscript{296} ASEAN, \textit{ASEAN member states}. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://asean.org/asean/asean-member-states/)

\textsuperscript{297} ASEAN, \textit{About ASEAN}. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://asean.org/asean/about-asean/)

\textsuperscript{298} ASEAN, \textit{External Relations}. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://asean.org/asean/external-relations/)
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.”

“Turkey’s ultimate objective in Southeast Asia is to achieve Dialogue Partnership.”

6.2. ASEAN’s Purposes and Principles

Turkey has been interested in the volume of Southeast Asian economy. Turkey’s engagement in Southeast Asia is marked by its cooperation with ASEAN. The Foreign Ministry states that; “with its combined GDP amounting to the 7th biggest economy in the world, the 4th largest trading entity and with a dynamic population around 650 million, and located in the middle of strategic sea routes, ASEAN is the key regional organization and an important actor in its region.”

ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand and there are ten member states, namely Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

The aims and purposes of ASEAN are: “to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region; to promote regional peace and stability; to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields; to provide assistance to each other in the educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres; to collaborate for their agriculture and industries, their trade, for study of the problems

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299 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, *Turkey’s relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)*. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/asean.en.mfa)

300 Ibid.

301 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, *Turkey’s relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)*. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/asean.en.mfa)

302 ASEAN, *ASEAN member states*. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://asean.org/asean/asean-member-states/)
of international trade; their transportation and communication facilities, and the living
standards of their peoples; to promote Southeast Asian studies; to maintain close and
beneficial cooperation with international and regional organisations.”

Fundamental principles of ASEAN are: “mutual respect for the independence,
sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations; the right
every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion
or coercion; non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; settlement of
differences or disputes by peaceful manner; renunciation of the threat or use of force;
effective cooperation among themselves.”

Turkey agrees on ASEAN’s purposes and principles as it achieved the status of
Sectoral Dialogue Partner of ASEAN. Also, “Turkey acceded to the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, which reflects Turkey’s commitment to
regional peace, and stability.” Turkey’s ultimate objective in Southeast Asia is to
achieve Dialogue Partnership. Turkey’s relations with ASEAN is likely to be
enhanced with the new Asia Anew Initiative.

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303 ASEAN, Establishment. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://asean.org/asean/about-asean/overview/)

304 Ibid.

305 ASEAN, External Relations. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://asean.org/asean/external-relations/)


307 Ibid.

6.3. Turkey’s Diplomatic and Economic Relations with ASEAN Countries

Although Turkey’s trade volume with Southeast Asia is a lot smaller than Northeast Asia, it is growing very fast. According to the Ministry, Turkey’s trade volume with ASEAN countries rose from 1.3 billion USD in 2002 to 8.7 billion USD in 2016. Turkey is also an investor in Southeast Asia. TİKA has actively provided “development assistance through various projects in the region which cost nearly 147.8 million USD between 2005 and 2015.”

Turkey’s growing interest in Southeast Asia is marked with its partnership with major economies in the region. Turkey lifted its relationship with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to the level of strategic partnership. Also, Turkey signed free trade agreements with Malaysia and Singapore and it is negotiating with Indonesia and Thailand.

There are joint business councils between Turkey and Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. According to Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK), Turkish-Indonesian Business Council was founded in 1995 under the umbrella of Turkey-Asia-Pacific Business Councils with the aim of improving bilateral trade relations between

309 Ibid.

310 Ibid.


the two countries.\textsuperscript{313} Turkey-Malaysia Business Council was constituted by the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) and National Chamber of Industry and Commerce of Malaysia in 1995.\textsuperscript{314} Turkey-Singapore Business Council was established in 2004.\textsuperscript{315}

There are also a number of Turkish firms in the region. There are more than 50 Turkish companies registered in Singapore including Opet Trade Pte Ltd, a part of Koç Holding.\textsuperscript{316} Also, many Southeast Asian firms are working in Turkey. Currently, 42 Malaysian firms operate in Turkey.\textsuperscript{317}

FDI and development assistance are also important for Turkey-ASEAN relations. Malaysia’s FDI reached 844 million USD in March 2015 while Turkey’s FDI in Malaysia is 200 million USD according to the data collected by Turkish embassy in Bangkok.\textsuperscript{318} Turkey’s FDI to ASEAN increased by 55% from $22.61 million USD in

\begin{flushleft}


\textsuperscript{316} Albay, Erdoğan, Turkey-Singapore relations: a manifestation of Turkey’s growing interest in SE Asia, Middle East Institute, 2013. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkey-singapore-relations-manifestation-turkeys-growing-interest-se-asia)


\textsuperscript{318} Ibid.\end{flushleft}
2017 to $35.03 million USD in 2018.\textsuperscript{319} Turkey’s ultimate objective in Southeast Asia is to achieve Dialogue Partnership.\textsuperscript{320} Turkey’s 3 strategic partners in Northeast Asia, namely Japan, China, and South Korea, have already attained the status of dialogue partner as in Table 8.

**Table 8. ASEAN’s External Relations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dialogue Partners</th>
<th>Sectoral Partners</th>
<th>Development Partner</th>
<th>Observer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada (1975)</td>
<td>Switzerland (2016)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU (1977)</td>
<td>Turkey (2018)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (1977)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UN (1977)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States (1977)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea (1991)</td>
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<tr>
<td>India (1995)</td>
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<tr>
<td>China (1995)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia (1996)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Avrasya İncelemeleri Merkezi\textsuperscript{321}


\textsuperscript{320} Ibid.

6.4. Turkey’s Cultural Relations with ASEAN Countries

Turkey has been interested not only in Southeast Asia’s growing economy, but also in its cultural diversity. Turkey’s interest in Southeast Asia takes back to the Ottoman era. The Ottoman Empire supported the Sultanate of Aceh (currently Indonesia and Malaysia) against the Portuguese aggression.\(^{322}\) There are Muslim minorities in Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand while Muslims are majority in Indonesia and Malaysia.\(^{323}\) While Turkey highlights its link with the ancient Silk Road in developing its relations with Northeast Asian countries, Turkey’s approach to Southeast Asia is related with Southeast Asia’s religious background.\(^{324}\)

Turkey’s interest in religious issues in Southeast Asia led Turkey to pursue intensified economic relationship with Indonesia and Malaysia. D-8 (Developing-8) was established for “development cooperation among Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey” and “aimed to improve member states’ position in the global economy, diversify and create new opportunities in trade relations, enhance participation in decision-making at international level, and improve standards of living.”\(^{325}\) Former Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan was the


\(^{323}\) Institute for South Asia Studies, UC Berkeley, Islam in Southeast Asia. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from https://southasia.berkeley.edu/islam-southeast-asia)


\(^{325}\) D-8, Brief history of D-8. (Retrieved on 3 September 2019 from http://developing8.org/about-d-8/brief-history-of-d-8/)
main supporter of “the idea of cooperation among major Muslim developing countries.”

Turkey is also interested in cooperation for education with Southeast Asian countries. “Turkish Ministry of Education added Malay-Indonesian language to the public-school curriculum in 2018.” However, there is no higher education for Malay-Indonesian language at university level in Turkey so far. According to Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkish government has allocated 815 higher education scholarships to Indonesian citizens.” Turkish government is running Yunus Emre Institute in Malaysia in order to promote culture, arts and civilisation of both countries.

One of the non-governmental actors contributing in Turkey-Southeast Asian cultural relations is Turkey’s Ibn Haldun University. The university took over several technical courses at the Al Bukhary International University in Malaysia, setting up its branch campus in Malaysia.

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6.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, Turkey’s general policy towards ASEAN member states is discussed. Turkey has closely monitored developments within ASEAN and Turkey had tried to establish institutional ties with ASEAN since 1999. There are 10 member states, namely Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Southeast Asian countries have such an organisation whose establishment takes back to 1967.

Turkey has developed close partnership with ASEAN and achieved the status of Sectoral Dialogue Partner of ASEAN. Turkey considers ASEAN as the most important framework of cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Turkey’s ultimate objective in Southeast Asia is to achieve Dialogue Partnership.

Turkey has been interested in cooperation with ASEAN and its ties with ASEAN are likely to be intensified as Turkey announced a new policy initiative. Turkey is interested in both economic and cultural cooperation with ASEAN countries. Turkey has its special place in Southeast Asia in a sense that Turkey shares religious background of some countries in the region and contributed in solving Muslim minority issues in the region. Turkey’s contribution in Southeast Asia’s religious and security issues shows that Turkey’s interest in the region is not limited in its economic consideration.

In the next chapter, the main argument of the thesis will be stressed again and findings of the thesis will be discussed.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

On 8 August 2019 Ankara announced a new policy initiative “Asia Anew.” Turkey claimed that Turkey is a bridge between the East and the West with its geographical position, its role and activities. Asia is no longer a periphery of Turkish foreign policy. Rather, Asia has become central to the policy. This thesis analysed the characteristics of Turkish Asia-Pacific policy in the 2010s in order to see how the policy is different from its past.

Since the economic reorientation of Turkish foreign policy by Turgut Özal, Turkey has gradually tried to change itself into a trading state. Many scholars agreed that the Turkish state has supported the new business class and tried to open new overseas markets. However, Turkey’s economic expansion in Central Asia and Asia-Pacific could only achieve limited success due to economic and political crises in Turkey.

As Turkey’s economy and politics got stabilised, Turkey could gradually enhance its relations with Asia-Pacific countries. Compared to the past, Turkey applied more assertive and globalist approach to the policy. As a result, Turkey could sign several trade agreements with the region and lifted its relationship with six Asia-Pacific countries, namely Japan (in 2013), South Korea (in 2012), China (in 2010), Indonesia (in 2011), Malaysia (in 2014) and Singapore (in 2014), to the level of strategic partnership. However, closer partnership with these countries eventually resulted in Turkey’s increasing trade deficit with them.

Although the trading state approach well explains Turkey’s recent approach to the region, it doesn’t show why Turkey tries to increase trade volume with Asia-Pacific countries despite its tremendous trade deficit. If Turkey didn’t have a strategy in doing
so, this could be a nonsense. However, Turkey’s approach in the 2010s differs from the former policy in using power resources.

Recent studies on Turkish foreign policy show that Turkey is aware of its soft power capability and started to use soft power resources to convert them into economic power. The thesis tested whether this claim is relevant with Turkish Asia-Pacific policy and found out that Turkey has begun to engage in various fields which are not directly related with Turkey’s economic expansion.

The key to understand Turkey’s decision to increase its ties with Asia-Pacific despite its disadvantages lies in Turkey’s comprehension of soft power. Unlike hard (military and economic) power, soft power is a power of attracting and getting others to want the outcomes that one wants and co-opts people.

Unlike the policy in the 2000s, Turkey is now projecting a strategy onto the region which has characteristics of both hard and soft power. It is becoming clearer that Turkey is developing a new strategy promoting and combining its economic and soft power in such a remote region in which Turkey had never been a major actor. There are many clues which shows that Turkey has an actual smart power strategy.

The main reason why Turkey might have developed a smart power strategy is because this approach promises Turkey power of a new dimension, which is called integrative and structural power. When combined, as Fuat Keyman and Onur Sazak put, the political, cultural, and economic values of Turkey and its unique position as a bridge between East and West would generate Turkey’s integrative power.

This view was also expressed by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu as he insisted that; “Turkey is the axis itself which combines Europe and Asia.” Turkish decision-makers are aware of that the Asia-Pacific countries are interested in Turkey’s role as a bridge between East and West. On the basis of its geostrategic significance, Turkey’s integrative power and structural power, which link the Asia-Pacific region with Europe and the Middle East, is bringing a new paradigm to both Turkey and the Asia-Pacific countries.
Turkey’s main partner in the region had been Japan. Turkey-Japan bilateral relations have a long history which take back to the late Ottoman era. Turkey has been interested in Japan’s foreign direct investment since Özal’s era. Japan’s contributions in Turkey’s infrastructure were also remarkable.

However, Turkish-Japanese relations are stagnated due to: decreased Japanese FDI in Turkey; postponed FTA between Japan and Turkey; Japan’s cancellation of Sinop Nuclear Plant Project; and also rapid economic and cultural expansion of China and South Korea in Turkish market and long-lasting economic recession of Japan. Japan’s indifference to enhancing relations with Turkey affected Turkey to give relative advantage to other Asia-Pacific countries, especially for South Korea.

With relative advantage, South Korea attracted Turkey as an alternative to Japan. South Korea has been Turkey’s close partner since the Korean war and cooperated with Turkey in various fields. As South Korea’s economic and cultural power over Turkey has increased, South Korea is considered as a development model for Turkey by some politicians and scholars. Although Turkey’s trade deficit increases as the trade volume grows, Turkey still desires to deepen cooperation with South Korea in order to fulfil the 2023 Vision.

China has risen as another alternative to Japan as well. Turkey has been interested in cooperation with China in developing China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. However, China has often felt threatened by religious issues in the region. Turkey often criticised China for its harsh treatment of Uyghur Muslims and China has shown its anger against Turkey as well. Although Turkey has tried to enhance ties with China, China condemned Turkey, arguing that Turkey’s accusations are groundless.

While Turkey has tried to establish a deeper relationship with China in order to fix the problems, China hasn’t been active in cooperation with Turkey due to its concerns for separatism in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. As China adopted a new policy promoting partnership with countries and subregions on the ancient Silk Road, Turkey
and China got a new chance to strengthen their bilateral relations. China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Turkey’s Asia Anew Initiative can work in harmony.

Turkey’s assertive policy is also apparent in Southeast Asia. Turkey has closely monitored developments within the framework of ASEAN and Turkey had tried to establish institutional ties with ASEAN since 1999. Turkey achieved the status of Sectoral Dialogue Partner of ASEAN. Turkey considers ASEAN as the most important framework of cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

Turkey’s ultimate objective in Southeast Asia is to achieve Dialogue Partnership. Turkey’s interest in Southeast Asia is mostly related with its economic expansion, but Turkey also has its special place in Southeast Asia in a sense that Turkey shares religious background of some countries in the region. Turkey has also contributed in regional peace and security by mediating Muslim minorities in the region with the government as in the Philippines.

To conclude, this thesis argued that Turkish Asia-Pacific policy in the 2010s has some significant changes from both the 1990s and the 2000s. Plus, the thesis insisted that these changes are related not only with the trading state, but also with Turkey’s smart power consideration. Turkey is increasing trade volume with the Asia-Pacific countries and strengthening its cultural power over the region at the same time. Turkey seems to have applied a smart strategy towards the region. Turkey’s unique position as a “bridge” between East and West would bring Turkey integrative power.

Turkey’s increased soft power capability and continued economic interest gave rise to the new policy initiative and the initiative targeted Asia. Contrary to misunderstanding of the West, Turkey is not turning its back on Europe. Rather, Turkey is promoting Asia-centred policy as other European countries do. However, there are still many obstacles and limitations left to overcome. In order to achieve its desired outcomes and economic success in the region, Turkey needs to develop more power resources and better smart power strategy for respective Asia-Pacific countries with better understanding of historical and cultural background of the region.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET


Asya-Pasifik bölgesindeki büyük ekonomiler APEC (Asya-Pasifik İşbirliği Forumu) örgütünü kurmuştur. APEC üyelerinde Avustralya, Brunei, Kanada, Şili, Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti, Hong Kong, Endonezya, Japonya, Kore, Malezya, Meksika, Yeni Zelanda, Papua Yeni Gine, Peru, Filipinler, Rusya Federasyonu, Singapur, Tayvan, Tayland, ABD ve Vietnam bulunmaktadır. Türkiye henüz APEC üyesi değildir ama APEC’i yakından takip etmektedir.


“Asya-Pasifik bölgesinin giderek artan siyasi ve ekonomik önemine bağlı olarak Asya-Pasifik bölgesinde açılış politikasını uygulamaya koyan” Türkiye, “ihracat pazarlarınızın çeşitlendirilmesi, Türkiye’ye doğrudan yabancı yatırım çekilmesi ve Türkiye’nin siyasi pozisyonlarına uluslararası alanda destek sağlanması amaçlarına yönelik olarak Güneydoğu Asya ülkeleri ve bölgedeki başat örgüt olan ASEAN ile ilişkilerinin geliştirilmesine önem atfetmektedir.”

Birçok uzman Türkiye’nin 90’lı yıllarda politikasının Kemal Kırıçoğ’u’nun tükçar devlet kavramıyla aktıkları yordur. Turgut Özal’ın ekonomik reformu Türkiye’yı tükçar devlete dönüştümesine ve “Anadolu Kapıları” denilen yeni bir girişimci sınıfın doğmasına neden olmuştur. Türkiye tükçar devleti o dönemde beri genişleyen ekonomik politikasını uygulamıştır. Lakin 90’lı yıllarda ekonomik ve siyasal kriz
sebebiyle Türkiye’nin Orta Asya ve Asya-Pasifik bölgelerindeki genişlemesi istediği kadar başarılı olmamıştır.


2018 yılında yapılmış bir istatistike göre, Türkiye’nin en çok ticaret açığı olduğu 10 ülkede Çin ($17,8 milyar), Güney Kore ($5,4 milyar), Japonya ($3,6 milyar) ve Malezya’yi ($1,8 milyar) kapsayan 4 ülke Asya-Pasifik bölgesinde bulunmaktadır. Türkiye’nin Asya-Pasifik bölgesine bağlılığı da güçlenmektedir.


Son günlerdeki Türk dış politikası araştırmalarına göre, Türkiye’nin yumuşak güç kabiliyetiyle ilgilenmeye ve ekonomik gücüne dönüştürmek için yumuşak güç kaynağını geliştirmeye başlamıştır. Selçuk Esenbel ve Zan Tao gibi uzmanlar Türkiye’nin zaten yumuşak güç kabiliyetiyle ilgilendiğini iddia etmiştir. Bu tez de aynı biçimde
Türkiye’nin Asya-Pasifik bölgesinde kendi yumuşak güç kâbiliyeti ve ekonomik güç kâbiliyetiyle ilgilenip ilgilenmediğine bakmıştır.

Türkiye zaten birçok yumuşak güç kaynaklarına sahipti. Turizm, yurtdışında Türkçe ve Türk kültür eğitimini sağlayan Yunus Emre Enstitüsü ve Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı’nın yabancı öğrenciler verilen bursları gibi farklı araçları vardır. Bir de Türk Hava Yolları’ının Pekin, Guangzhou, Şanghay ve Hong Kong (Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti); Denpasar ve Jakarta (Endonezya); Osaka ve Tokyo (Japonya); Kuala Lumpur (Malezya), Ulaanbaatar (Moğolistan), Manila (Filipinler), Singapur, Seul (Güney Kore); Taipei (Tayvan); Bangkok ve Phuket (Tayland); Hanoi ve Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam)’yi kapsayarak neredeyse tüm Asya-Pasifik ülkelerine yolcularını taşımaktadır.


Türkiye’nin yumuşak güç ve sert güç bakımı dışişleri Bakanı Çavuşoğlu’nun konuşmasında tekrar belli olmuştur. 11 Mayıs 2018’de Türkiye dışişleri Bakanı Çavuşoğlu, kalıcı gücün yumuşak güç olduğunu ve Türkiye’nin dünyanın en etkileyici bir şekilde yumuşak güc kullanabilen ülke olduğunu iddia etmiştir. Ayrıca sert gücün ancak sınırlı ve ulusal yasaya uygun olarak bir şekilde kullanlabildiğini öne sürmüştür.


Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti ve Güney Kore Türkiye’nin önemli ticaret ortakları oluyorken Japonya’nın etkisi de azalmıştır. 2010’lu yıllarda Japonya ve Türkiye enerji konusunda anlaşabiliyor için Sinop Projesi için anlaşmayı imzalamıştı. Ama Japonya projenin bütçesi zamanla büyüdüğü için projeden vazgeçmeye karar vermiştir.


Her iki ülke de kültürel ilişkilerini geliştirmek için kültür merkezini kurup desteklemektedir. Ertuğrul faciasını anmak için iki ülkenin ortak yapımıyla Ertuğrul 1890 adlı bir film çekilmiştir.

Japonya özellikle enerji konusunda ilgisini göstermektedir ve onun için Orta Doğu ülkeleriyle daha sağlam ilişkilerini kurmayı hedeflemektedir. Bu tez Japonya’yla daha yakın ortaklık kurmak isterse Türkiye’nin aracılık yaparak Japonya ve Orta Doğu’yu bağlayan ülke olmasının gerektiğini öne sürmektedir.


Güney Kore ve Türkiye uluslararası örgütlerde birbirlerini desteklemektedir. Özellikle MIKTA (Meksika, Endonezya, Güney Kore, Türkiye, Avustralya) kapsamında iki
ülkenin dışişleri bakanı sıkça görmektedir. Güney Kore Türkiye’nin 2023 Vizyonu’nun gerçekleştirilmesi için özellikle toplu taşıma sektöründe altyapı yatırımını yapmaktadır.

Güney Kore serbest ticaret anlaşması Türkiye’nin Asya-Pasifik bölgesindeki büyük ekonomiyle imzalanan ilk serbest ticaret anlaşmasıydı. Türkiye ticaret açığını azaltmak için Güney Kore’nin yatırımının artması gerektiğini öne sürmüştür. Dışişleri Bakanlığına göre Türkiye’de faaliyet gösteren Kore firmaların sayısı 300’den fazladır.

Güney Kore’nin kültürel etkisi zamanla daha güçlenmektedir. 150.000 Türk vatandaş K-Pop (Kore Pop) hayranıdır. Ankara’da bulunan Kore Kültür Merkezi de okullar ve üniversitelerle ortak etkinlikler desteklemektedir. Korece Türkçe liselerinde öğretilen seçmeli ikincisi yabancı dillere eklenmiştir.

Türkiye’yi ziyaret eden Koreli turistlerin sayısı da artmaktadır. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığına göre 2017 yılında 120.622 Kore vatandaş Türkiye’yi ziyaret etmiştir. Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’ın Kore ziyaretinden sonra Türkiye de Güney Kore’de kültür merkezini kurmuştur ve Yunus Emre Enstitüsü’nün şubesi de Kore’nin başkentinde açılmıştır.

Güney Kore’nin de Yeni Kuzey Polisikasi denilen yeni bir açılımı vardır. Güney Kore Rusya aracılığıyla Orta Asya Türk devletleriyle ortaklık kurmayı planlamaktadır. Türkiye de Güney Kore’nin projesine yardım ederek daha güçlü ortaklık kurabilecektir.


Türkiye Çin’le daha sağlam ilişkileri kurmak için çalışmıştır. Çin’in Yol ve Kuşak Projesi iki ülkenin ilişkileri için yeni bir fırsat olmuştur. Çin Türkiye’nin stratejik
değerine vurgu yaparak Türkiye aracılığıyla Avrupa’ya giren yeni bir İpek Yolu’nu planlamıştır. Türkiye’nin Yeniden Asya açılımı Çin’in açılımıyla uyuşacaktır. Fakat Xinjiang Uygur Özerk Bölgesi hakkında anlayışları farklı olduğu için iki ülkenin ilişkileri her zaman tehlikedede bulabilmiştir.


Çin’in farklı sistemi ve anlayışları Türkiye ve Çin ilişkilerinde engel olabilmektedir ama kültürel ilişkileri sayesinde iki ülkenin ilişkileri de devamlı ilerlemektedir. Sonuç olarak Türkiye Çin’in bölgesel ortağı olabiliyor ve Türkiye de Orta Asya ülkeleriyle ilgilendiği için Çin’le ortaklık kurabilirdir.


Türkiye ASEAN üyelerinden Malezya ve Singapur’la serbest ticaret anlaşmasını imzalamıştır. Şu anda Endonezya ve Tayland’la da anlaşma için müzakerede bulunmaktadır. DEİK, TOBB ve TİKA Güneydoğu Asya ülkeleriyle ilgilenmektedir. Özellikle 50 Türk firması Singapur’da faaliyet göstermektedir. 42 Malezya firması
Türkiye’de çalışmaktadır. Türkiye-ASEAN ticaret hacmi 1,3 milyar ABD dolarından (2002 yılında) 8,7 ADB doları (2016 yılında) olmuştur.


APPENDIX B: TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics

Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Marine Sciences

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : ...............................................................

Adı / Name : ...............................................................

Bölümü / Department : ...............................................................

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English) : ...............................................................

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: Yüksek Lisans / Master ☐ Doktora / PhD ☐

1. Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır. / Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide.

2. Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır. / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of two years. *

3. Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır. / Secure the entire work for period of six months. *

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Tarih / Date ............................................................