THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHIITE POLITICS AND MILITANCY IN IRAQ:

THE CASE OF HASHD AL-SHAABI

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO

THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

OF

MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR

THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE

IN

THE DEPARTMENT OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES

OCTOBER 2019

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences.

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ABSTRACT

THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHIITE POLITICS AND MILITANCY IN IRAQ:
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October 2019, 122 pages

The Iraqi Shiite Islamic movement, which aims to combat western ideologies at the end of the 1950s and to mobilize the Shiite masses in this struggle, is one of the most prominent activist movements in the Shiite world. This movement, which aims to transform the Shiite society and to establish an Islamic state by reaching the state apparatus, has been divided and transformed into many Shiite political and militia movements. The changes within the Iraqi state apparatus were influential in the transformation process of the Iraqi Shiite Islamic movement as well as the regional developments that could be considered as a turning point.

Hashd Al-Shaabi, formed in 2014, against the ISIS, the fundemantalist organization that occupied one-third of Iraq, is an umbrella paramilitary organization composed of rival political and militia groups that emerged as a result of the historical transformation of the Iraqi Shiite Islamic movement even though its groups gathered for the common purpose of fighting against ISIS. In this respect, this thesis will focus on the historical transformation process of the Iraqi Shiite Islamic politics and will deal with explaining the reflections of this transformation on Hashdi Shabi, which is a heterogeneous organization.

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ÖZ

IRAK'TA Şİİ SİYASİ VE MİLİS HAREKETLERİN DÖNÜŞÜMÜ: HASHD AL SHAABI ÖRNEĞİ

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Ekim 2019, 122 sayfa

1950'li yılların sonunda batı menşeli ideolojiler ile mücadele etmek ve Şii kitleleri bu mücadele yolunda mobilize etmeyi amaçlayan Irak Şii İslami hareketi, Şii dünyasında en köklü aktivasyon tarihi olan hareketlerden birisidir. Hem Şii toplumunu dönüştürmeyi hem de devlet aygıtına ulaşarak bir İslam devleti kurma amacı taşıyan bu hareket zaman içerisinde tranformasyona uğrayarak bölünmüş ve birbirine rakip birçok siyasal ve milis Şii harekete dönüşmüştür. Irak Şii İslami hareketinin dönüşüm sürecinde Irak devlet aygıtı içerisindeki değişimler etkili olduğu kadar, dönüm noktası sayılabilecek bölgesel gelişmeler de etkili olmuştur.

2014 yılında Irak'ın üçte birini işgal eden fundemantalist organizasyon IŞİD'e karşı, Ayetullah Asli Sistani'nin fetvası ile kurulan Hashd Al-Shaabi ise, IŞİD'e karşı savaşmak gibi ortak bir amaç için bir araya gelseler de Irak Şii İslami hareketinin tarihsel dönüşümü sonucunda ortaya çıkan rakip siyasal ve milis grupların oluşturduğu şenmsiye bir paramiliter organizasyondur. Bu tez bu bağlamda Irak Şii İslami hareketinin tarihsel dönüşüm sürecine odaklanarak bu dönüşümün hetorojen yapıya sahip Hashd Al Shaabi üzerindeki yansımalarını açıklamaya çalışacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Hashd Al Shaabi, Irak, Şii İslamcılık, Milis hareketler, Şii Rekabeti

To my beloved family

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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ISIS - Islamic State of Iraq and Levant

SCIRI- Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq

ISCI- Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq

PLO- Palestinian Liberation Organization

US- United States

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Research Question and the Main Argument

The emergence of the Shiite Islamic movement in Iraq was a response to the nationalist and especially secular and communist movements that had risen rapidly in the 1940s and 1950s. The most frightening aspect of rising secularism and communism for Shiite clergy and traditional Shiite society was the spread of these movements to the masses through the state apparatus or through civil society organizations. Especially during the Ottoman Empire, within the decentralized structure, the Shiite society, which maintained its autonomy in social affairs, was a community that was historically distant from the Sunni-centered power and lived mostly in the periphery. Although this was politically disadvantageous for them, it also facilitated the maintenance of traditional religious ties.

However, during the monarchy period, the great migration movements of Shiites from perirphery to cities began and these urbanized masses aimed to be involved in the political processes in which they were historically excluded. Since the 1940s, the Shiites have increasingly joined the communist movements, which they considered as more inclusive as oposed to pan-Arabism. [1] Young Shiite clergymen, on the other hand, wanted to respond to the rapid spread of communism and weakening of traditional religious ties among the Shiite community in Iraq through the means of modern era. Consequently, an

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[1] Nakash Y. *The Shi'is of Iraq*, Princeton- New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 97-132

ideological map based on Shiite Islam was created, as well as traditional ways of preaching to combat rival ideologies. In the late 1950s, the Islamic Call Party and the Iraqi Shiite Islamist movement began their adventure in Iraq's political life.

The movement gained power and grew in the face of declining communist movements over the years. However, this growing movement was considered as a danger by Sunni and tribal-centered powers.[2] The movement began to evolve during the period of oppression by developing new mobilization strategies. In addition, important developments such as the Iranian Islamic Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, the collapse of the Baath power, and the recent ISIS invasion have influenced the militancy, division, and adoption of different political strategies of the Shiite Islamic movements. In short, the Iraqi Shiite Islamic movement, which joined the political arena to combat communism and secularism in the 50s, has evolved into major rival political and religious structures. Hashd Al-Shaabi, established as an umbrella paramilitary army against the occupation of ISIS, has thus become another place where these different political and religious groups are competing.

In the light of what we highlighted above, this thesis deals with the transformation of the Shiite Islamic movement of Iraq, which was born since the end of 1950s, and its reflections on the paramilitary organization Hashd Al Shaabi. Therefore, this thesis argues that the Iraqi Shiite Islamic movement is not a monolithic movement, but rather contains groups that have proliferated over the years and adopted different political strategies and have different political interests. In addition, we emphasize that the regional transformations that took place in the past sixty-five years had a major impact on this differentiation. In conclusion, we argue that Hashd Al Shaabi is not a monolithic either, but rather a heterogeneous structure which is the product of this historical differentiation.

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[2] Ibid., 136

1.2. Methodology

This thesis focuses on the main historical developments within the state apparatus of Iraq and the regional developments around Iraq to explain the birth and evolution of the Shiite politics in Iraq and its reflections on Hashd Al Shaabi. Thus, the developments that took place at the end of the monarchy period until 2019 and the different reactions of the Shiite Islamic groups to these changes will be examined in a historical development process.

This thesis likewise aims to explain the fundamental issues in which the groups within Hashd Al-Shaabi conflict, as a result of a historical development process. In this regard, this thesis has focused on sources that are based on the political history of Iraq and the historical development of different Shiite groups in order to explain the political evolution of Shiite Islamic movements and militancy from the late 1950s to 2014. In order to explain the heterogeneous structure of Hashd Al Shaabi in particular, in the light of the previous historical process, comparative analysis was carried by accessing sources focused on the main issues in which Hashd Al Shaabi groups conflict.

1.3. Literature Review

As mentioned, in the second and third chapters, this thesis refers to sources which generally examine Iraq and different Shiite groups in the historical process. For instance, the book titled "Iraq: A Political History", which examines the political history of Iraq written by Adeed Dawisha, especially known for his work on the history of Iraq, has been enlightening in understanding the evolution of the Iraqi state apparatus. As for the Iraqi Shiite political history,

The Sh'ite Movement in Iraq written by the late Iraqi academician Faleh Jabar and The Shi'is of Iraq written the Israeli academician Yitzhak Nakash, which examine the process of the formation of different cultural, socio-economic and ideological

differences between Shiite Islamic groups has been valuable studies for this work. In the third part of the thesis, we examined Phebe Marr's book titled "A Modern History of Iraq" to focus on the post-1980 period. Phebe Marr's work was another important resource that we focused on in order to understand the political developments between the post-1980 state and Shiites and between rival Shiite groups.

Besides, Sharif M. Shuja's article titled "Islamic Revolution in Iran And Its Impact On Iraq" focused on the reflections of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the turning development of the Shiite Islamic movements in Iraq, was important to understand the effects of the revolution. Plus, Khalil Osman's "Sectarianism in Iraq: The Making of State and Nation Since 1920" was an important book for understanding the sectarian organization of the Iraqi Baath Party. We also focus on articles and books focusing especially on the Iran-Iraq War and the rival Shiite groups Islamic Call Party, Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Sadrists, in the third chapter, to better understand the evolutionary process of these groups.

In the fourth chapter of the thesis, the studies focusing on the group dynamics in Hashd Al-Shaabi and the main differences of opinion between the groups were selected. In particular, Renad Mansour's book titled "The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq's Futur"e, which he co-authored with Faleh Jabar, contributed to our study for the classification of Hashd Al-Shaabi groups, as well as they contributed to other researchers to classify. However, the main difference of our study from the work of Mansour and Jabar is that we examine the differences of Hashd Al-Shaabi groups as a result of a broad historical process. At the same time, the studies carried out by academics and researchers of Clingendael Institute of International Relations in the Netherlands on Hashd Al-Shaabi shed light on this thesis both in the classification stage of Hashd Al-Shaabi groups and to focus on the fundamental differences of the groups.

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1.4. Academic Significance

The majority of political commentaries on Hashd Al-Shaabi have been that the paramilitary organization monolithic and consisted of pro-Iranian groups, so far. Especially in the headlines, the name of Hashd Al-Shaabi has been mostly used for pro-Iranian groups. However, some important studies in the last two years have tried to understand the complex and heterogeneous structure of Hashd Al-Shaabi as well. However, they also ignored to focus on the historical process of the evolution process of Shhite Islamic movements that affected the classifaction of Hashd Al Shaabi groups. This study, on the other hand, argues that Hashd Al-Shaabi is a heterogeneous structure and aims to explain this through a broad historical perspective which is based on the evolution process of the Iraqi Shiite Islamic movement. In this regard, unlike other studies, this thesis also argues that the reasons of rivalry between the Hashd Al-Shaabi groups are found in the evolutionary process of the Shiite Islamic movements.

1.5. The Chapters of Thesis

This thesis consists of five chapters. The first introduction chapter provides information about the general map and purpose of the study.In the second chapter of the study, we examine the roots of Shiite Islamic movements and militancy. To this end, we focus on the period in which the communist movements began to strengthen at the end of the monarchy and the emergence of the first political Shiite Islamic movement. Furhermore, we discuss the changes in the state apparatus which caused the rise of the Shiite Islamic movements, and later how the harsh pressures on the Shiite Islamic movement in the Ba'ath period affected the evolutionary process. We will also discuss Baath's strategies of marginalizing Shiites and the role of Shiite rituals in the evolutionary process. In this chapter, we will focus on the last stage of the Iraqi Shiite Islamic movements before turning into militant movement.

In the third part of the study, we will focus on the effects of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War which divided Iraqi Shiite Islamic groups into several groups. In addition, the Baath Party's relations with Shiite Islamic groups will also be discussed in this chapter. We will also examine the competition process of diaspora Shiism and Iraqi Shiism that emerged in this period and the beginning of the ideological and social divisions between Shiite groups that will become more violent in the future.Most importantly, this chapter will shed light on the process of Shiite groups adopting pragmatism and new strategies.

The fourth chapter will focus on the ISIS occupation and the formation process of Hashd Al-Shaabi. General information about basic perspectives of Hashd Al-Shaabi groups will be given as well in this chapter. Finally, in order to prove that this organization is not a monolithic group, their fundamental differences will be analyze in a comparative way, and the evolution of Shiite political Islamic movements and militancy will illuminate the rivalry between the Hashd Al-Shaabi groups. The final chapter in which the results of the study are analyzed will be the conclusion section.

CHAPTER 2

THE ROOTS OF SHIITE ISLAMIST POLITICS AND MILITANCY IN IRAQ

2.1. Introduction

The second chapter of the thesis aims to investigate the roots of the Shiite Islamic movement and militancy in Iraq. For this, we will firstly focus on the increasing popularity of the communist movements among the Shiites since the end of the monarchy and the emergence of the Shiite Islamic movements as a response. The first reactions of traditional and young clergy against communism and the birth of the Islamic Call party, which is considered the pioneer of modern Iraqi Shiite Islamic movements, will also be the subject of this chapter.

In addition, we will focus on the struggle areas faced by the Islamic Call party in this chapter. In this respect, the relations of the Sunni-centered secular Baath administration with a Shiite Islamic party will shed light on the process of transformation of the Islamic Call party. In the last part of the chapter, Baath Party's strategies of marginalizing the Shiites and the response of the Islamic Call Party to the Ba'th pressure through religious values peculiar to Shiites and the evolution of the militancy will be examined.

2.2. The First Shiite Efforts to Reach the State Apparatus

Iraqi Shiite society has historically been involved in many political movements, especially in nationalist, communist and Islamist, since the country's

independence.[3] Within these political movements, the Shiites has chosen to integrate into the state and other political organizations groups in the existing political system. The main motivations of the Iraqi Shiites regarding this political integration were the idea of being involved in the political processes that they were excluded for centuries, through nationalism, communism and Islamism, which they considered as inclusive ideologies.

One of the most important reasons for this choice was that the monarchy, who had no social base in Iraq and were originally from Hejaz, Arabia, preffered to ally with former Sunni bureaucracy around the previous administration and a high-class urban mass at that time.[4] [5] Thus, the monarchy has never reached the supporters who were farmers engaged in agriculture or the urban middle-lower class. At that time, the majority of the Iraqi people living in the periphery and engaged in agriculture were the Shiites. Therefore, Iraqi people, including the Shiites, generally identified the monarchy and the clique around it with arrogance and being alinated to Iraqi people. Therefore, it was quite impossible for the Shiites to be integrated into the administration during the monarchy.

As for the Shiites in the Pan-Arabist movements, they were not effective at the administrative level within these political organizations. The main reason for this was that the administrative level of the Arab nationalist movements was mostly dominated by urban Sunni groups.[6] Therefore, Shiites living in the periphery have

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[3] Marcinkowski M I. (2004). *Religion and Politics in Iraq: Muslim Shia Clerics Between Quietism and Resistance*, Singapore, Pustaka Nasional Pte Ltd., p.46

[4] Daweesha, Adeed (2009). *Iraq A Political History,* UK, Princeton University Press, p.72

[5] Cordesman Anthony H. & Davies Emma R. (2008) *Iraq's Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict Volume 1*, USA, Praeger Security International, p.3

[6] Nakash, 1994, p.133

had difficulty in reaching decision-making positions within the Pan-Arab political movements.

As for the Communist movements that were active in the country in those years, especially after the 40s and 50s, the Iraqi Shiites constituted almost half of the administrative level of the Iraqi Communist Party, which has been active since the 1920s. In addition, the Iraqi Communist Party was strongly supported in southern Iraq, where the Shiites mostly populated.[7] As opposed to Pan-Arabism, the fact that the Iraqi Communist Party was not only ruled by the Sunni elites, but also embraced the principle of class equality, created opportunities for Shiites who migrated from the periphery to cities, in order to participate in political processes.[8]

2.3. The Rise of Communism among the Shiites as a Threat to Traditional Shiism

The years after the dethronment of Faisal II were the years when the Iraqi Communist Party increased its influence at the state level.[9] The main reason for this is the rapprochement between President Abdul Karim Qasim and the Iraqi Communist Party, whose political mobilization capabilities had improved till the late 50s. In sum, Abdul Karim Qasim had needed the mass support of the Iraqi Communist Party and aimed at resisting the second man of the coup, Abd al-Salam Arif and the Baath Party, which aimed at uniting Iraq with Egypt and Syria,

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[7] Ibid., p.132-133

[8] Ibid., p.133

[9] Ibid., p.135

then known as the United Arab Republic.[10][11] Arif, who had close ties with Jamal Abd al-Naser, often advocated Iraq's involvement in this union. Abd al-Karim Qasim's resistance to Arif led him to cooperate more with the communists in order to reach public support.

The Iraqi Communist Party was organized underground during the monarchy era.[12] However, during the Abd al-Karim Qasim era, they obtained important positions in the state apparatus and the army within the framework of tacit agreement with Abd al-Karim Qasim.[13] Besides, they increased their mass mobilization capabilities which had made them the most influential political organization in the country until the early 1960s. Plus, the Iraqi Communist Party prevented the coup against Qasim and its power within the state apparatus increased in 1959.[14]

The rise of the of communism propaganda in Iraq through the state apparatus and the positive reaction of the Shiite masses to the communists' policies began to disturb the traditional Shiite clergy. The Shiite ulema, regarded as the protector of traditional ties in Iraqi Shiite society, perceived the fact that the Shiites had

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[10] Ismael, T. Y. (2008), *The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Iraq*, USA, Cambridge University Press, p.87

[11] Nakash, 1994, p.135

[12] Ibid., p.110

[13] Ismael, 2008, p.87

[14] Daweesha, 2009, p.176

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engaged in politics through communism and secularism as a threat to their position in society and traditional ties.[15]

In this respect, the Shiite clergy resistance, which began in the second half of the 1950s, advocated the necessity of an Islamic inner renewal, primarily against communism, secularism and nationalism. Thereafter, the idea of an Islamic movement, which would able to take place within the legal political system and had a strong ideological pattern, has gained popularity among the young Shiite clergy. Therefore, the organizational process of the Shiite Islamic movement in Iraq coincides with the second half of the 1950s by reacting to the developments after the 1958 coup.[16]

2.4. Initial Steps Against Increasing Communism Wave and Birth of Shi'ite Islamism In Iraq

President Abdul Karim Qasim's secularization efforts and alliance with the Communist Party became more apparent after 1959. Especially, the Personal Status Law introduced by the state has strengthened this alliance. This law, which was introduced by Abdul Karim Qasim Administration in 1959, aimed to challenge the traditional assumptions and raise the position of women in society through an official law.[17] Through this law basically:

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[15] Jabar, Faleh (2013) *The Shi'ite Movement in Iraq*, London, Saqi Books, 2013, p.75

[16] Ibid., p.75

[17] Efrati, Noga, *Women under the Monarchy: A Backdrop for Post-Saddam Events* in Zeidel R., Baram A., Rohde Achim (2010). *Iraq Between Occupations: Perspectives from 1920 to the Present*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, p.122

- Equality of testimony of women and men before the law was accepted

- Iraqi women was granted equal rights of inheritance with men.

- Early marriage and polygamy was banned

- The rights and protection status of women increased in the event of divorce.[18]

The Iraqi Communist Party Associations and the Defense of Women's Right League lobbied for the enactment of this law.[19] The new law put an end the domination and prestige of traditional clergy over ordinary life, and thus the greatest initial reaction came from Shiite and Sunni clerics, on the grounds that the new law would weaken traditional Islamic ties and the concern that their influence over religous would diminish.[20]

Clubs and unions have generally filled the gap of political parties in the beginning of Qasim era. These non-governmental organizations, which carried out serious political efforts for the enactment of the new Personal Status Law in 1961, were mainly controlled by the communists.[21] [22] Shortly, these unions, presented a new

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[18] Beitler, Ruth Margolies & Martinez Angelica R. (2010). *Women's Roles in the Middle East and North Africa*, Santa Barbara- California, Greenwood, p.142

[19] Efrati, 2010, p.122

[20] Nakash, 1994, p. 135

[21] Jabar, Faleh (2013) *The Shi'ite Movement in Iraq*, London, Saqi Books, 2013, p .75

[22] Daweesha, 2009, p.192

and simple map for political struggle for the lower-class Shiite masses who had not fairly enter into the state apparatus, despite their numerical majority.

The rise of the communism propaganda, the establishment of a secular society through mass media, trade unions, women and youth clubs have been perceived by Shiite scholars as a serious attack on traditional Shiite Islamic values.[23] The first serious step against the communism and the danger of weakening of traditional ties, was taken through Mohsen Al-Hakim, the country's largest Shiite authority, which governs the Hawza[24] in Najaf. Mohsen Al-Hakim issued a fatwa in response to the political spheres opened by the Abd al-Karim Qasim administration for the communists, emphasizing that communism is incompatible with Islamic principles and that it is not permissible for Muslims to become members of the Iraqi Communist Party and its relevant formations.[25]

Furthermore, the young Shiite clergy who aimed at preserving traditional Shiism began using the mass media with the support of the Hawza, against secularism and communism which spreaded through the state, Iraqi Communist Party and its relevant unions respectively. For this, some newspapers were published in order to reach the urban Shiites who abandoned the traditional habits such as listening religious sermons at mosques. Consequently, the traditional Shiite authority had to

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[23] Abidi, Abbas, "Jama'at Al-Ulama Fi L-Najaf Al-Ashraf" in Gholamali Haddad Adel, Mohammad Jafar Elmi, Hassan Taromi-Rad eds. (2012) Muslim Organisations in the Twentieth Century: Selected Entries from Encyclopedia of the World Of Islam, London, EWI Press Ltd., p.78

[24] The most prominent Shiite seminary for the clerical education in Najaf, Iraq in which the shrine of Ali, the first imam of the Shiites, is located.

[25] Marcinkowski M I. (2004) Religion and Politics in Iraq: Muslim Shia Clerics Between Quietism and Resistance, Singapore, Pustaka Nasional Pte Ltd., p.43

apply the strategies used by modern ideological organizations to realize the religious renewal of the Shiite masses.

In addition to all these developments, especially the young Shiite clergy aimed to create a new ideological movement with their writings in order to present a new political, economic and social map to the Shiite masses against the rival ideologies such as communism and liberalism. Young Shiite clergy, inspired by Sunni Islamist movements such as Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami, ledtraditional clerical movements to evolve into a new political party, the Islamic Call Party, led by traditional Shiites and merchants.

2.5. Islamic Call Party and Iraqi Shiite Activism

The Islamic Call Party was founded in 1957, by the reformist cleric Mohammad Baqir Al-Sadr in Najaf, and some other young clerics and Shiite traders, to openly participate in the multi-party system and compete with rival ideologies. [26] However, the Islamic Call Party has described the option of revolution as a future-oriented option for the goal of the Islamic State, which it considers as the ultimate goal. As a result, however, it did not follow a revolutionary path especially until the mid-70s, in order to complete the stage of expansion considering the political conjuncture of the country.

We can say that the Islamic Call Party is the source of Shiite Islamic movements in Iraq and the diaspora in the coming years. The main reason for this is that the Islamic Call Party is not only limited to preserving traditional religious ties in the society, but also focused on creating a political struggle map for Shiite masses at the political level. Therefore, it is one of the few political movements that led the Shiite Islamic movements in Iraq and the Arab world in an intellectual and operational context, although it is divided into different fractions in the future.

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[26] Jabar, Faleh, 2013, p.76

Mohammad Baqir Al-Sadr, a Shiite cleric, was the architect of the Islamic Call party's theoretical framework. Al-Sadr advocated the struggle against rival ideologies both intellectually and operationally within the existing system, rather than taking only a religious stance by issuing fatwa through the Najaf Hawza. For this, while he aimed to demonstrate how Western philosophy and Islamic values conflict in his intellectual work, Falsafatuna (Our Philosophy); he proposed an economic system based on Islamic principles in the face of the economic goals of Marxism with his another work, Our Economics (Iqtisaduna). [27] Briefly, Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr aimed to present a new Islamic ideological model for Shiite society and Iraqis instead of the ideologies which he codified as Western and non-Islamic. In this respect we can sum the main ideological principle of Islamic Call Party determined by Mohammad Baqer Al-Sadr.

Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr's proposed action model for the Islamic Call Party is to mobilize middle-class and sub-middle Shiite families in cities. In other words, this group, which is the main supporters of the Iraqi Communist Party, has been the main mass that the Call Party aimed to reach since the 1960s. The most important characteristic of these groups that the Call Party aimed to reach is that it is a young and activist mass. Therefore, we can say that this mass provided the action capability of the Iraqi Communist Party in the 50s.

The 1960s, which included the process of the Party's reaching to the masses, also included administrative changes within the state. Firstly, the President Abd al-Karim Qasim was executed as a result of the nationalist Baathists' coup in 1963 and the administration was taken over by Abd al-Salam Arif, non-Baathist nationalist and Baath Party.[28] The Iraqi Communist Party and its relevant forces

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[27] Marcinkowski, 2004, p.44

[28] Daweesha, 2009, p.186

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were suppressed by the new administration after this nationalist coup, and the mass mobilization power of this party began to decrease.[29] The harsh state pressure on the Iraqi Communist Party during this period, and the inability of the party to take initiatives to meet the economic expectations of the Shiite working class enabled the political rise of the Islamic Call Party in the big cities. Alongside with these reasons, the fact that the Abd al-Salam Arif, the new President and the Baathists opened up limited political spaces for the Islamists in the early months of his presidency, with the aim of receiving the support of the Shiite clergy in the new era is another important factor in the political rise of the Islamic Call Party.

During the Abd al-Salam Arif era, the followers of the Islamic Call Party increased, however the dose of sectarianism began to rise significantly as well. During his presidency, Abd al-Salam Arif preferred to appoint Sunnis from his own tribe and hometown to military positions. It is claimed that Arif's growth in an atmosphere far from Shiites and Christians shaped his social codes as a Sunni and in this respect he approached these two religious groups with suspicion.[30]

Arif's identification of Shiism with Iran in particular and with non-Arabness, and the questioning of the Shiites' loyalty to Iraq and Arabness has increased considerably with the nationalist governments began with Arif.[31] The dose of increasing sectarianism would increase in the 70s and would continue to be one of the main debates of the Iran-Iraq tensions and that will even become a phenomenon that will continue till today in different ways.

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[29] Ibid., p.229

[30] Ibid,. p.205

[31] Ibid.

Thus, the era of Abd al-Salam Arif and his successor and brother Abdul Rahman Arif represents the period in which the Islamic Call Party tried to gain the popular base that the Communist Party began to lose and found a relative expansion. However, as opposed to Abd al-Karim Qasim era, this period was also the beginning of the period in which the nationalist and Baathist governments preferred to apply sectarianism, communalism and tribalism in the state apparatus[32]. In other words, the sectarian attitude of the governments, which began during the Arif periods and institutionalized by the Baath, and the Iran-Iraq tension were the harbinger of the period in which the Islamic Call Party would confront with the state in the new struggle areas.

2.6. The First Challenge: Arab Nationalist Baath vs Islamic Call Party

The Ba'athists' full seizure of power with the 1968 coup, meant the beginning of a new era for the Shiite activism. The Shiite Islamic activism, in the previous period, aimed to combat communism and secularism ideologically and politically without directly attacking the state. However, the massively growing Shiite Islamic movement and in particular the Ba'ath Party, which codified the Islamic Call Party as a big threat to the regime, chose to directly target the Islamic Call Party which would be a hard case.[33]

The pioneers of the 1968 coup of the Iraqi Baath Party were Hassan Al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein, who are both Sunni from Tikrit and members of the same tribe.[34] The first priority of Al-Bakr and Hussein, who dominated the new

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[32] Osman Khalil (2015). *Sectarianism in Iraq: The Making of State and Nation Since 1920*, New York, Routledge, New York, p.76

[33] Ibid., p.79

[34] DeFronzo James (2010). *The Iraq War: Origins and Consequences*, New York, Routledge, p.70

17

adinistration, was to take control of the army and to appoint the Sunnis from Tikrit to the key points.[35] The most important reason is that they aimed to prevent a new coup attempt from different Sunni factions within the army. Hence, the attitudes of Al-Bakr and Hussein, who were skeptical of even Sunni rivals affiliated to different tribes within the army, towards the Shiite Islamists opposing the regime has also been shaped based on security concerns, during this period.

As for the Islamic Call Party, the party, as noted, took advantage of the limited political opportunities given by Abd al-Salam Arif in the name of balancing the communists. Besides, Baath's harsh pressure on the communists and its relevant organizations after 1968, made it easier for the Islamic Call Party to reach Shiite masses, especially in large cities.[36] In short, the beginning of this period marks the years in which the Islamic Call Party grew massively as Baath government increased their political pressure on the Iraqi Communist Party.[37]

However, the fact that Islamic Call Party began to obtain the mass mobilization power of communists, mostly supported by the Shiites, emerged as a potential political danger for Ba'ath after 1968 as noted above.[38] In this respect, we can summarize the reasons why Ba'ath codified the Shiites and the Islamic Call Party as a potential threat as follows:

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[35] Ibid., p.71

[36] Farouk-Sluglett Marion & Sluglett Peter (2001). *Iraq Since 1958 From Revolution to Dictatorship*, London-New York, I.B Tauris, p. 229

[37] Fattah Hala & Caso Franc (2009). *A Brief History of Iraq,* New York, Facts on File Books, p.214

[38] Nakash, 1994, p. 136

- The Shiites masses had been intensively acting with the Iraqi Communist Party since the 1950s and the Iraqi Communist Party was ideologically politically rivals of the Ba'ath.

- Hasan Al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein preferred tribal and sect-based organization in the administrative level of the state, which had experienced two military coup in a short time. The most important reason for that was the Al-Bakr and Hussein's desire to control the key points within the state apparatus with Sunnis from Tikrit due to the fear of a new coup. Therefore, the Shiites was considered as a danger according to the new organization algorithm of the system.

- The secular Arab nationalist Baath movement has coded all Islamic ideologies both Shiite and Sunni as a danger. Therefore, according to the administration, it is possible for an Islamic movement with a great mass of support to take a revolutionary character against the Baath who cannot consolidate its power.

- The ideological leaders of the Islamic Call Party are Shiite clergy. Although the idea of a universal Islamism was emphasized during its foundation years, it is a Shiite Islamist party that appeals to the Shiite masses. The Baath Party's leadership considers a Shiite party that addresses the Shiites, which makes up of the majority of the country's population, as a danger to the regime.[39] [40]

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[39] Ibid., p.133

[40] Osman, 2015, p.76

Thus, the Baath Party, which controlled the army, increased its pressure on the Islamic Call Party, which it codified as an important internal threat to the regime. First of all, the mass media of the Islamic Call Party such as Risalat Al-Islam, which increased the mobility of the organization in big cities, were closed down. Beside, since 1970, the first arrests against the party's leadership were carried out and and some members of the party including Shiite clerics, were executed.[41]

2.7. The Roots of the Fear of Baath Regarding Iran and Iraqi Shiites and Road to Iraqi Shiite Civil Resistance

Shiite clergy became the driving force and many Sunni clergy supported the uprisings against the British occupation in 1918 and 1920.[42] In this respect, the mobilization power of Shiites, which made up the majority of the country, frightened both the British and the new King Faisal I, who was originally from the Hejaz, Arabia. Even after Faisal I ascended the throne, the majority of Shiites did were not satisfied with Faisal I, as a non-Iraqi Sunni ruler.[43] Following these events, both the British and the Sunni king, aimed to form the administrative and the high-ranking army staff of the state with the Sunnis.[44] However, also, the number of Shiites among the educated bureaucrats was quite low at that time. Therefore, the history of the fact that the Shiites was considered as a threat to the state in Iraq is based on these events, as well.

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[41] Shanahan, Roger (2004) *Shi'a Political Development in Iraq: The Case of the Islamic Da'wa Party*, Third World Quarterly Vol. 25, No. 5, pp. 943-954, p.945

[42] Nakash, 1994, p. 65

[43] Daweesha, 2009, p.14

[44] Yassiri, Munaf (2006). *What Is Happening in Iraq?: The Abc of the Current Situation in Iraq* , USA, Xlibris Corporation, p.19

As for the nationalist governments era, Baath's has been been a Sunni-dominated for decaded espeacally increasingly after 1968 even though some Shiite politicians also played a role in the establishment of Ba'ath in 1952.[45] The idea of a transnational United Arab Republic has been a priority for this administration, and the desire United Arab Republic which includes Iraq under a single Arab flag, which peaked in the second half of 50s, encouraged the Baath leaders and other Arab nationalists as well. Thus, especially during this period, the Shiites' general opposition to the idea of a large Arab state where they would become a minority compared to Iraq, in which they were the majority, triggered the the Baathist and nationalist Sunnis to question the Arabness of Iraqi Shiites.[4647] These accusations have been voiced by many politicians to date, including former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

The ruling people who ruled Iraq from the monarchy era till the end of the Baath period, expressed their skepticism about the Iraqi Shiites by referring to Iraq during the Arab Empire era in the 8th century.[48] During this period, the name called Shu'ubi, which was used to describe the Persians and Assyrians who demanded equality with the Arabs on the grounds that the Arabs were granted privilege, was, first to describe the Iranian Iraqis and then the Arab Shiites who presented grievances against the Iraqi governments and his definition was used

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[45] Barry Rubin (2012). *The Middle East: A Guide to Politics, Economics, Society and Culture*, Routledge, p. 374

[46] Daweesha, 2009, p.144

[47] Dawisha, Adeed (2009). *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair*, Princeton University Press, p.174

[48] Daweesha, Adeed (2009). *Iraq A Political History, UK, Princeton University Press,* p.205

more during the Baath period in order to place them in a defensive position.[49] Firstly, Baath used the term Shu'ubi to label the communists, and almost half of the rulers of the Iraqi Communist Party were Iraqi Shiites in the 1950s.[50]

The loyalty of Iranian-descended Iraqis and Iraqi Arab Shiites to Arabness has begun to be questioned, especially since the Shatt-al-Arab dispute in the 1930s and later in all the Iraq-Iranian tension periods. During the monarchy period, Iraqi state deported some Iranian-descendant Shiite clergy due to the inreasing tensions between Iraq and Iran and from 1963 onwards, such deportations increased during the Baath period.[51]

Both Iran's support for the Iraqi Kurdish groups clashing with the Ba'ath and the increasing street demonstrations organized by the Islamic Call Party against the Baath in the 1970s, caused Baath to take a more repressive attitude to the political Shia Islamic movement. Baath also took a more nationalist and sectarian stance after the Shatt al-Arab crisis in the 1970s, and deported tens of thousands of Iranian-descended Iraqis from the country and arrested many members of the Islamic Call Party as well. The Shiites' first serious reaction to the government rose during this period by Muhsin Al-Hakim, who ruled the Najaf Hawza at that time. Al-Hakim opposed the expulsion of Iranian-descended Iraqis from Iraq.[52]

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[49] Nakash, 1994, p.113

[50] Bengio Ofra (1998). *Saddam's Word: The Political Discourse in Iraq,* New York, Oxford University Press, p.104

[51] Yitzhak Nakash (2006). *Reaching for Power: The Shi'a in the Modern Arab World*, Princeton-New Jersey, Prince University Press, p.87

[52] Jabar, 2013, p.203-204

However, the Ba'ath firstly aimed to take advantage of Al-Hakim's prestige among the Shiite world. For this, the Minister of Defense personally met Al-Hakim and asked him to mediate between Iraq and Iran. Yet, al-Hakim insisted on his criticism, firstly demanded that the expulsion of the Iranian-descended Iraqis to be stopped and the release of approximately 25,000 detainees Shiite Iraqis who were mostly members of the Islamic Call Party.[53] Due to authority concerns, these demands were rejected by the Ba'ath and the harshest measures were taken against Shiite Islamists. Plus, Baath attacked Najaf in many ways, accusing Muhsin Al-Hakim of working with Iraqi Kurds and CIA against Baath in 1970[54]:

- Khums[55] incomes began to be tightly controlled.

- The Iraqi border points on the Iranian border were closed and the Iranians who come for pilgrimage and education were banned from entering the country.

- Defined as Iranian citizens, thousands of Arab and Kurd Shiites were deported from Iraq to Iran.

- Hawza students were also recruited for the army.

- Economic activities in Najaf and Karbala were strictly observed, and the state increased taxes for trade by 4-5 times.[56]

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[53] Ibid., 204

[54] Ibid.

[55] The name of the Islamic tax that Muslims give one-fifth of their income to Islamic communities or clerics.

[56] Ibid.

In contrast to the traditional Najaf clergy, al-Hakim pursued a struggling and confrontational policy against the Ba'ath, though not a militarist. In this respect, it is Muhsin al-Hakim who initiated the civilian resistance of Shiite Islamism before it evolved into militarism. The character of the civil resistance stage was determined by the Baath's attitude towards the Shiites as well as by the conjunctural developments.

2.8. Increasing Baath Pressure, Civil Resistance and Road to Shiite Militancy

The first half of the 1970s also marked the political rise of Vice President Saddam Hussein. Taking advantage of the passive stance of his cousin, President Hassan Al-Bakr, Saddam Hussein began to create a political clique around himself. Saddam Hussein has acted as the de facto president till he announced his official presidency in 1979. He attended in high-level international meetings and summits that Iraqi President Al-Bakr should attend, and he also signed the Algiers Agreement signed with the Shah of Iran in 1975 for the Iraqi side.[57]

The confrontational and non-compromise attitude of Saddam Hussein, who is the de facto ruler of the state, also influenced the state's strategy against Islamic movements. Saddam Hussein, unlike the nationalist Arif periods, which opened up limited political space for the Islamic movements, ordered the arrest and execution of even clerics as well as not reconciling with the Shiite Islamists. However, after Mohsen al-Hakim, the more confrontational head of Najaf Hawza, was replaced by the apolitical Abulqasim Khoei, Mohammad Baqir Al-Sadr, the ideological leader of the Islamic Call Party, began to pursue a more confrontational strategy against Baathist repression in the first period of the second half of the 70s.

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[57] Daweesha, 2009, p.213

Firstly, some Islamic Call Party sympahthizers were arrested and executed on charges of alleged coup and treason during this period.[58] In the following years, some leading members of the party was also executed. [59]Therefore, many Islamic Call Party members had to flee to the Gulf, Syria and Lebanon Iran when the Ba'ath pressure reached its peak in the 70s. Many Iraqi, Lebanese, Iranian members of the Islamic Call Party, established the branches of the the party in these countries, and these branches were also influential in the emergence of militant Shiite Islamist movements such as the Lebanese Hezbollah. These developments constituted the first steps of the Shiite Islamic movements to acquire a transnational and militant character.

The Islamic Call Party in Iraq continued to operate secretly underground due to the severe state pressure in the 1970s. [60] Mohammad Baqir Al-Sadr, the ideological leader of the movement, determined the reaction of the Islamic Call Party to the Baathist administration, in this process. Al-Sadr opposed the revolutionary attitude towards the Baathists despite the chain arrests, executions and exiles in the first half of the 70s.

However, in the middle of the second half of the 70s, the movement emerged from the underground, transforming the Shiite rituals, such as the great Ashura ceremonies, into mass demonstrations.[61] The first demonstration of the Shiite Islamists, who alarmed the Baath government, took place in Najaf during the

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[58] Jabar, 2013, p.204

[59] Ibid., p.207

[60] Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett, 2001, p.229

[61] Rizk Khoury, Dina (2013). *Iraq in Wartime: Soldiering, Martyrdom, and Remembrance, New York,* Cambridge University Press, p.25

Ashura ceremonies, in 1974 and 1975. [62] The demostration were quickly suppressed and five leaders of the Islamic Call Party were arrested and executed. Baath also ignored the religious and tribal sensitivities and executed many leading clergy accused of organizing and participating demonstrations. Obviously, the reaction of the Baathist administration to the 1974 demonstrations gave clues regarding its future reactions in the years to come.

The Marad Al-Ras demonstrations, which are considered a turning point in Shiite Islamic activism, took place during the 1977 Ashura ceremonies in Najaf and turned into a huge challenge to the Baath administration. [63] The Ba'ath administration which experienced the 1974 demonstrations had previously banned the Ashura ceremonies.[64] However, due to the intense pressure and the lack of democratic demonstration rights, the Shiite Islamist masses took great risks and applied the rituals to protest the Baath policies.

The demonstrations firstly began when the Shiite masses started traditional march from Najaf to Karbala by ignoring the ban. Police responded to the Shiite masses, who did not end the march, by opening fire and the underground cells of the Islamic Call Party were involved in the demonstrations. The insurgency grew, and the demonstrators began to invade the police stations and clashed with the army, by using their own arms and the others which the weapons they seized from police stations.[65] The rebellion was harshly suppressed by the Baath, but this uprising gave the Shiite Islamic movement self-confidence for years to come. This uprising

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[62] Jabar, 2013, p.208

[63] Ibid.

[64] Mockaitis Thomas R.(2013), *The Iraq War Encyclopedia*, Santa-Barbara-California, ABD-CLIO, LLC, p.223

[65]Jabar, 2013, p.212

and the armed clashes marked the beginning of the evolution of Shiite Islamic activism into militancy. [66] The Marad Al-Ras demonstrations became an inspirational development for the Shiite militancy not only in Iraq, but also for that of Iran, which also began to revolt against the Shah in 1978 and 1979. The strength of the strategies of Marad al-Ras would be seen in this anti-Shah protests. [67] Therefore, the transnational aspect of Shiite Islamic activism and militantism in the Middle East was also shaped by the steps the Islamic Call Party had taken since the second half of the 70s.

Consequently, we can summarize the reasons for the fact that the Islamic Call Party began to pursue a revolutionary strategy that eventually evolved into militancy after 1977 can be listed as follows:

- Iraq settled the Shatt al-Arab conflict with Iran through the Algeria Agreement in 1975 and Iran cut off its support for the Iraqi Kurds who clashed with Iraq. Therefore, Baath, who temporarily solved two important internal and external problems, directed the whole repression strategy to the Islamic Call Party.

- The harsh Baathist pressure on the Islamic Call Party increased. The movement declared illegal and therefore the ideological leaders of the party thought there there was no room for the Islamic Call Party to fight the Baath politically within the system.

- Some members of the Islamic Call Party and other small Iraqi Shiite Islamist groups, who went to Lebanon as a result of the Ba'ath pressure

[67] Alshamary Marsin (2013). Shrines of Dissidence: Shi'a Clerics and Political Mobilization in Baathist Iraq, *Wellesley College Digital Scholarship and Archive- Master Thesis*, p.4. Retrieved from: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ae15/f7973c560348db7c1872ab6dd45f9a8ca356.pdf

received armed training in the camps of the the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and this initiative affected the Shiite Islamic movements in the region.

- The success of revolutionary anti-Shah protests in Iran in 1978 under the influence of a Shiite clergy, Ayatollah Rohollah Khomeini affected motivated the Islamic Movements in Iraq which are eager to overthrow Baath. [68] [69]

As a result, The Marad al-Ras demonstrations marked the end of Shiite Islamic ideological resistance in Iraq, and the beginning of militancy phase although the insurgency was harshly suppressed. This uprising also affected the Baathist political strategy towards the Shiite masses. For instance, Baath declared Ali's birthday as a public holiday to curb the Shiite masses by realizing the political use of religious Shiite symbolism.[70] Beside, Saddam Hussein began to visit the Shite shrines and the Shiite religious values was also used with the aim of reconstruction a new Iraqi identity.[71]

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[68] Louër Laurence (2008). *Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf,* London, Hurst Publishers, p.125

[69] Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett, 2001, p.200-201

[70] Hiro, Dilip (2003). *Neighbors, Not Friends: Iraq and Iran After the Gulf Wars*, London-New York, Routledge p.15

[71] Jabar, 2013, p. 215

CHAPTER 3

THE EVOLUTION OF IRAQI SHIITE POLITICS AND MILITANCY

3.1. Introduction

The third part of the thesis focuses on the impact of major political and social changes next to Iraq, such as the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War on the Iraqi Shiite Islamic movements, and the evolution of Shiite Islamic movements by being affected by the attitudes of Iraqi government and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Most importantly, this chapter aims to explain the schism of Iraqi Shiite Islamic movement and the fact that these splitted groups and the Islamic Call Party have turned into political parties that would compete with each other with their militia wings.

This chapter argues that the fact that the schism of the Iraqi Shiite Islamic movement created a struggle for power, especially after the collapse of the Baath with the US occupation of Iraq. This chapter also aims to illustrate that the rival Shia parties which engaged in ideological struggle with each other, but also entered into a a new power struggle to gain material strength within the state apparatus. In addition, these parties, which seized power after 2003, adopted sectarian attitudes and political clique-building strategies against their opponents, as the Baath Party had adopted.

3.2. Iranian Islamic Revolution

3.2.1. How Did The Revolution Started?

The Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 has caused many political changes not only in Iran but also in the region and the world. The most important reason for this is that the revolution evolved into an Islamic one and had transnational expansionist ideals. Iran's political position in the international political arena during the Shah period completely changed and the US lost an important ally during the Cold War and even won a new enemy after the revolution.[72] The fact that the new regime was proclaimed as a Shiite Islamic Republic based on the guidance of a Shiite Ayatollah after the referendum held on March 30-31, 1979, also alarmed the Sunni-dominated Arab countries with considerable Shiite populations.[73] [74]

Ironically, the road to the Iranian Islamic Revolution began in Iraq. Anti-Shah protests increased in 1978 due to rising inflation, income injustice and pressure of the intelligence organization SAVAK and Ayatollah Rohollah Khomeini, who was a fierce Shah opponent and had been living in exile in Najaf, Iraq for 15 years, has been chosen by the masses as a leader for the anti-Shah insurgency.

However, the fact that Khomeini who lived in Najaf was close to Iran during this period made the Shah alarmed and easily asked Saddam Hussein to deport Khomeini thanks the improving Iran-Iraq relations after the Algiers Agreement

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[72] Juneau Thomas (2015). *Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy,* Stanford-California, Stanford University Press, p.91

[73] Curtis Glenn E.& Hooglund Eric (2008*). Iran: A Country Study*, Area Handbook Series, p.56

[74] Salamey Imad (2017). *The Decline of Nation-States after the Arab Spring: The Rise of Communitocracy*, New York, Routledge, p. 22

and Saddam Hussein helped him regarding this issue.[75] Khomeini, who migrated France from Iraq, where he was deported, obtained more maneuvering space to steer the growing rebellion thanks to his aides and supporters surrounded him and foreign press, as opposed to his times in Iraq.[76] Thus, the Shah and Saddam Hussein indirectly and ironically contributed to the acceleration of the revolution process.

3.2.2. Why Did the Revolution Affect Mostly Iraq?

Briefly, the revolution that was not expected by the Shah's Western allies and the countries in the region, has been perceived as a security problem by Sunni-dominated Iraq and the Gulf countries. The most important reason for this is that the new regime declared the transnational character of the revolution and put the "export of revolution" article in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Islamic Revolution of Iran has undoubtedly left no effect in any country in the world as much as in Iraq. We can summarize the reasons of this huge effect as follows:

- First and foremost, the two countries are neighbor countries with a border of approximately 1460 km, and this geographical proximity has historically allowed them to influence each other socially, culturally and economically.

- Iran declared that the Islamic Revolution undertook a transnational mission and would try to spread the revolution to Muslim countries.

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[75] Hunt Courtney (2005). *The History of Iraq,* Westport-Connectitut-London- Greenwood Press, p. 90

[76] Amanat Abbas (2017). *Iran: A Modern History*, New Haven-London, Yale University Press, p.720

- Nearly 90% of the Iranian population and 60-65% of the Iraqi population are Shiite Muslims. Although the universal Islamic aspect of the revolution is emphasized, the Iranian Islamic Revolution is a Shiite Islamic revolution. Therefore, it has been considered by that the revolution has a high potential to spread to Iraq, where the political Shiite Islamic movement is more rooted than that of Iran.

- The political tension between Iran and Iraq has continued for years. Events such as the Shatt al-Arab conflict, Iran's support for the Iraqi Kurds, and the expulsion of thousands of Iranian descended and Shiite Iraqis to Iran are the main reasons for this tension.

- Even though the two countries resolved these problems with the 1975 Algeria Agreement, the radical political change that took place in Iran in 1979 caused these problems to be brought up again.[77] [78]

3.2.3. Khomeini's Iraq Choose

Wilayat al-Faqih, the government system which Khomeini theorized during his stay in Iraq, was determined as the government system of the new regime. According to this government system, the Islamic country must be guided by only one high-ranking cleric in the name of God, in the absence of the twelfth imam who is considered to have disappeared according to Shiite Islam.

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[77] Ibid., p.213-214

[78] Dougherty, Beth K (2004). *Historical Dictionary of Iraq*, Lanham- Maryland- Oxford, Scarecrow Press Inc, p.349

As for the new regime's transnational mission called the export of revolution, those who aimed to apply this principle passionately after the revolution, were the ones who were in contact with international anti-imperialist left and Islamist groups. Those who received doctrinal and military training in the camps of revolutionary movements in Cuba, Lebanon and Europe, such as Ibrahim Yazdi, Sadegh Tabatabai and Mostafa Chamran, were influential in Khomeini's prioritization of the export of revolution.[79][80] Especially Yazdi's words, who was considered as Khomeini's right-hand man in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, is important in terms of illuminating this process:

> *"The success of the Islamic Revoltuion in Iran has shown Arab neighbours that Islam provides the ideological basis for change within Muslim countries and can also replace Arab nationalism as a rallying power for Arap people"* [81]

In this respect, we can list the reasons of the fact that Khomeini chose Iraq as the main target for the export of the revolution:

- Neighboring Iraq, of which about 60-65% are Shiite Muslims, is considered as the most suitable point for the spread of the revolution.

- The political Shiite Islamic movement in Iraq is one of the most well-established Islamist movements in terms of organizational capacity among

[79] Reisinezhad, Arash (2019). *The Shah of Iran, the Iraqi Kurds, and the Lebanese Shia*, Cham-Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan, p.191

[80] Sinkaya, Bayram (2016). *The Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics: Elites and Shifting Relations,* New York, Routledge, p.111

[81] Shuja Sharif M. (1980). Islamic Revolution in Iran and Its Impact on Iraq, *Islamic Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Autumn 1980)*, pp. 213-233, Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, Islamabad, p.21

Muslim countries. Khomeini considers that, even under pressure, the movement has revolutionary potential.

- Khomeini has lived in Najaf for about 13 years in which he had given lectures titled Wilayat Al-Faqih State System which would shape the state system of Iranian Islamic Republic to his puppils in Najaf Hawza his had important networks within the Iraqi Shiite Islamic movement. He was also critical of that this would be an advantage for him.[82]

3.3. Islamic Call Party After the Revolution: First Militant Structure

The Islamic Call Party, as known, had not choose to engage in armed conflict with the Baath despite the pressure until 1977 Marad Al-Ras Uprising since it was believed that there was still time to complete the expansion of the party and during that period which Baath even executed clerics, the state's deterrence was very strong.

However, that fact that Baath's attempt to use Shiite symbols at the state level, and its further attempts to recruit Shiites into the state apparatus also gave the Islamic Call Party self-confidence although the Marada Al-Ras uprising was harshly suppressed. However, what really led the Islamic Call Party to the streets with the call of Mohammad Baqir Al-Sadr was the the Islamic Revolution in 1979 in Iran.[83]

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[82] Ahram Ariel I & Gledhill John (2017). *Exiles and Political Islam Contrasting Khomeini's Religious Nationalism with Bin Laden's Violent Globalism* in *Transnational Actors in War and Peace: Militants, Activists, and Corporations in World Politics,* Malet David & Anderson Miriam J. (eds), Washington DC, Georgetown University Press, p.110

[83] Jabar, 2013, p.227

The demonstrations evolved into a revolutionary path in Iran, encouraged Mohammad Baqir Al-Sadr, the leader of the Islamic Call Party, to take a new initiative, and Al-Sadr made statements supporting this process. He personally congratulated Khomeini by the telegraph upon the success of the revolution.[84] Furthermore, Al-Sadr ordered students to celebrate the revolution in Najaf. The most critical development that alarmed the Baath was the fact that Baqir al-Sadr, who was highly regarded in terms of religious rank, forbade the Iraqi Shiites to be member of Baath.[85]

Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr aimed the same type of Islamic revolution to take place in Iraq and ordered the people to spread demonstrations especially in the apolitical Najaf Hawza. Khomeini and pro-Islamic demonstrations in Iran began to rise, however Al-Sadr and several Islamic Call Party leaders were arrested in 1979.[86] Especially Al-Sadr's arrest led to new protest waves. Islamic Call Party, using its own mobilization capability in many events, ensured the release of al-Sadr through this demonstrations.

During this process, as seen in the case of Al-Sadr's release, the Islamic Call Party made a serious gain against the Baath For the first time, which provided the ground for the party's armed arm to take action against the Ba'ath. In 1979, a Shiite Islamic party established its own militia organization called Shahid al-Sadr, for the first time.[87] Shahid al-Sadr, established as the military wing of the Islamic

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[84] Ibid., p.228

[85] Ibid., p.231

[86] Dawisha, Adeed (2009). *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair*, Princeton University Press, p.222

[87] Shanahan, Roger (2004). Shi'a Political Development in Iraq: The Case of the Islamic Da'wa Party, *Third World Quarterly Vol. 25, No. 5, pp. 943-954*, p.946

Call Party, made an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in 1980.[88] Baath supression against the Islamic Call Party reached its highest level, following the assassination attempt. Most importantly, Mohammad Baqir Al-Sadr and his sister Bint al-Huda were arrested and executed, tens of thousands of members of the Call Party fled mainly to Iran Syria, Lebanon and the Gulf.[89]

However, the fact that the leaders of the movement went to Iran made them more vulnerable to Iran, in particular. As a result, even though the execution of Al-Sadr caused the Iraqi Shiite Islamic movement to enter a completely militant stage and the movement gained a revolutionary character, at the same time, it is divided into factions which are in different countries and adopt different political aims and strategies. As for the Islamic Call Party, the party was divided and weakened, however the underground organization in Iraq remained somewhat active. However, as a result, The Iranian Islamic Revolution was clearly a phenomenon that triggered the largest political Shiite Islamic movement in Iraq to fully engage in the process of revolution.

3.4. Iran-Iraq War

3.4.1. Historical Background of the War

It is possible to base the reasons of the war that took place in 1980-1988 on the 1920s. It is known that the newly established nation-states in the region denied their drawn borders and pursued irredentist policies at the level of discourse and

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[88] Ibid.

[89] Dai, Yamao (2008). Transformation of the Islamic Daʻwa Party in Iraq: From the Revolutionary Period to the Diaspora Era, *Asian and African Area Studies, 7 (2): 238-267*, p.241

action, after the First World War. In this historical process, while Iraq claimed that the Khuzistan province of Iran where the Arabs mostly concentrated, was a historical Iraqi territory, Iran also repeatedly claimed that the Shatt al-Arab border should be thalweg line and claiming some Arab populated islands in the Gulf.[90] [91]

In addition, there has been a constant skepticism and fear regarding Iran which dates back to the monarchy period of Iraq, among the Sunni bureaucracy who dominated the administrative staff of Iraq.[92] This skepticism regarding Iranians has also been applied by some rulers towards the Iraqi Shiites over the years and their loyalty to Arabness has been questioned by these authorities. These judgments began in the monarchy period and increased with the advent of the Baath period.

Furthermore, apart from the first 13 years of the Cold War period, Iran and Iraq took part in different camps. As known, after the end of the Iraqi monarchy with a military coup in 1958, withdrew from the Baghdad Pact established by the royalist Iraq, Iran and Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan and UK against the threat of the Soviet Union to the region. Iraqi Republic, after 1958, especially during the Baath period, contrary to the monarchy era, approached the Soviet Union and purchased arms from this state for decades, even though it was not a satellite of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, since the second Shah of Iran ascended the throne in 1941, Iran has mainly pursued Western and US-oriented foreign policiy by

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[90] Amanat Abbas, 2017, p.643

[91] Farrokh Kaveh (2011). *Iran at War: 1500-1988,* UK, Osprey Publishing, p.313

[92] Yitzhak Nakash (2006). *Reaching for Power: The Shi'a in the Modern Arab World*, Princeton-New Jersey, Prince University Press, p.113

limiting the Soviet role in the region.[93] [94] During the Cold War, royalist Iran and Saudi Arabia, which were in rivalry with the republican Arab states such as Iraq, Egypt and Syria became part of the US strategy in the Gulf and whole region. All in all, the anti-monarchist and Arab nationalist Baath coded its neighbor, the monarchist and non-Arab Iran as his most serious rival in the region.

However, all these problems were temporarily suspended after the resolution of the Shatt al-Arab conflict with the Algeria Agreement, and the Iran-Iraq relations had remained calm for almost four years till 1979. With this agreement, the thalweg of the border river on Shatt al-Arab has been accepted as the final border and border conflicts between the two countries finally ended.[95] The Kurdish insurgency against Baath in the north also ended after Iran stopped supporting them and the parties had not made any statement including irredentist intentions for four years.[96]

3.4.2. Temporary Resolution and Road to War

Iraq did not engage in an struggle with Iran regarding Shiite Islamists in Iraq, although they both had conflicting policies during the first half of the 1970s. Because Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, tha Shah of Iran, has not followed Shiite-

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[93] Smolansky Oles M.& Smolansky Bettie Moretz (1991) *The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence,* Durhan-London, Duke University Press, p.28

[94] Green Jerrold D, *The Soviet Union, the Persian Gulf, and the Iran-Iraq War* in Kolodziej Edward A.& Kanet, Roger E.eds. (1989). *Limits of Soviet Power, London,* Macmillan, Press, p. 263

[95] Shuja, 1980, p.227

[96] Ibid., p.219

oriented foreign policies and not support the Islamist Shiites during his reign. Instead of that, in order to destabilize Iraq, during the tension between the two countries was high, Iran the was the main supporter Iraqi Kurdish groups fighting against the central government. [97] Therefore, first of all, the Shah of Iran represented a secular power like Baath and refrained from supporting Shiite Islamist movements that could create problems in his own country. As a result of, for Baath, Iran, was not a Shiite-related threat to Iraq which the Shiites constitutes 90 percent of the country.

However, the fact that the Iranian Shah left the country after nearly a year of demonstrations and the declaration of the Islamic Republic a month later disrupted global and regional dynamics in 1979. The Islamic Republic of Iran represented that all the problems suspended between Iran and Iraq four years ago could become problems again, for Baath. As a matter of fact, the expansionist attitude of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the fact that it chose Iraq as the first country for the export of the revolution also revived the past conflicts.

First of all, the new Islamic Republic began supporting the Iraqi Kurds opposing the central government militarily and politically, which the Shah stopped supporting after the Algeria Agreement in 1975 and encouraging the Shiites to revolt. Secondly, Ayatollah Khomeini openly supported the mass Shiite demonstrations inIraq against government. Saddam Hussein reopened the irredentist agenda and claimed that Khuzistan was Arab soil and tried to reach the Arab population living in this region.

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[97] Ibid, p.220

3.4.3. The War Begins

The first armed conflict occurred near Ghasr-e Shirin between the country on September, 1980, and then Iran sent artillery to Iraq's Khanaqin and Mandali cities in early September during the tension which had lasted for months.[98] Afterwards, Iraq threatened to seize the region of Zain Al-Khaws in Iran claiming it was allocated to Iraq according the Algiers Aggremeent. After the exchange of fires lasted for days, President Saddam Hussein unilaterally abolished the 1975 Algerian Agreement claiming that Iran has violated the aggreement by supporting Iraqi Kurds and Islamic Call Party.[99] We can say that Saddam Hussein had three goals in starting this war:

- Removing a Shiite Islamic threat that calls the Iraqi Shiites to rebel against Iraq and that was unwelcomed by the West which believe countering new Iran considered as extremists is a necessity.

- Seizing the oil-rich Khuzistan province, which Iraq has considered as Iraqi soil for more than fifty years in different periods and installing an anti-Islamic Republic of Iran administration in Khuzistan as well.

- Being the leader of Arab world defeating Islamic Republic of Iran which was considered as a threat to Arab Gulf Countries as well. [100] [101]

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[98] Hiro, Dilip (1991), *The Longest War_ The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict*, Routledge, New York, Routledge, p.39

[99] Johnson, Rob (2011). *The Iran-Iraq War,* New York, Palgrave Macmillan, p.44

[100] Axworthy, Michael (2013*). Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic*, New York, Oxford University Press, p.xxi

[101] Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett, 2001, p.257

The Iraqi army crossed the border and launched invading Iran on September 23, 1980.[102] Saddam Hussein's prediction was that the Islamist revolutionaries who could not achieve internal control would lose the war immediately. However, on the contrary, Iranian Islamists destroyed almost all opposition political structures under the pretext of war and consolidated its power in the country. In other words, the attack of Saddam Hussein on Iran offered the excuse that the Shiite Islamists were seeking, to consolidate their power.

Iran began offensive attacks on Iraqi territory after seizing all the occupied territories by Iraq in 1982. As a result, Saddam Hussein's thesis that the newly established regime could not be mobilized and would quickly surrender due to Iran's internal conflicts was wrong. On the contrary, Iranian people from all segments united against Iraq in order to fight an external threat.[103]

Because, Saddam Hussein did not take into account Iran's resistance capacity during the war. Frankly, Iraq, supporting the opponents of the Islamic revolution, considering that the Arabs would revolt in Khuzistan, and taking the support of the Western and Gulf countries, assumed that Iran would soon accept a cease-fire proposal in favor of Iraq. However, under the influence of militanist politicians close to Khomeini in the administration, Iran did not accept the cease-fire proposals proposed many times and the war that stalemated continued until 1988.[104] These militant politicians have played a key role in Iran's support to Shiite Iraqi groups.

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[102] Karsh, Efraim (2009). *The Iran-Iraq War,* New York, Rosen Publishing Group Inc., p.7

[103] Barry Rubin, 2012, p. 107

[104] Ibid., 516

The war ended in 1988 after Iran accepted the cease-fire and has brought severe consequences for the two countries, both militarily and economically. The two countries suffered humanitarian loss and experienced military, economic and social destruction. This war meant for Iraq, the loss of about half a million people, including soldiers and civilians and the most violent clashes took place in the war arena, where Iraqi Shiites lived mostly.[105] In other words, Shiite has been the biggest loser in Iraq in terms of human loss.

3.4.4. Iraqi Shiites and Baath During the Iran-Iraq War

Apart from the Shiite Islamic masses who had to flee to Iran during the war, there was no Shiite uprising in Iraq against the Iraqi army during the war time. Therefore, neither Ba'ath's belief that sectarian affiliations would create security concerns nor Iran's idea that Shiites would rebel against the government was correct. On the contrary, the Shiites constituted the majority of the soldiers in the Iraqi army and these soldiers did not take a different attitude from that of Sunnis and stood alongside with their country and fought against the Iranian army. [106]

However, Baath took several steps to gain the support of the Shiite people, both before and during the war. The main reasons for Baath to take these steps was that the state's concern that the Iranian Islamic Revolution would influence the Shiite Iraqis and the soldiers' sectarian affilation would pose a security threat during the war. These steps taken by Baath are as follows:

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[105] Dawisha, Adeed (2009) *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair*, Princeton University Press, 2009, p.223

[106] Farouk-Sluglett Marion & Sluglett, 2001, p.258

- Ali's birthday is declared as a public holiday.

- Some Shiite members have been appointed to the Provincial Army Commands.

- Many financial resources were allocated to Najaf Hawza and housing, hospital and water system projects were implemented to improve the social and economic situation of the all the Iraqis including Shiites.

- It was propagated that Baath did not have a problem with Shiism and that Saddam Hussein was a descendant of Islamic prophet Muhammad.

- The stories of the uprising led by the Shiite clergy against the British occupation in 1918, was used in propaganda strategies during the Iran-Iraq War. 1918 Uprising was intentionally chosen by the Ba'ath because it had nationalist Iraqi character as well as Islamic one. [107] [108]

Saddam Hussein's mobilization strategy toward Iraqis, including the Shiites during the war, was mainly based on Arabism. Hussein pursued a strategy focusing on the alleged hostility of the Persians to the Arab nation considering the Shiite Iraqis is also Arab. Inspired by the Qadisiyah War, in which the Arab armies defeated the Persians in the seventh centrury, the Iran-Iraq War was named by the Ba'ath as Saddam's Qadisiyah. [109]

[107] Phebe, Marr (2012). *The Modern History of Iraq*, USA, Westview Press, p.195

[108] Abdul-Raof, Hussein (2010). *Schools of Qur'anic Exegesis: Genesis and Development*, USA-Canada, Routledge, p.61

[109] Daweesha, Adeed (2009). *Iraq A Political History*, UK, Princeton University Press, 2009,176

[109] Marr, 2012,208

Another issue which Baath feared about is that the mobilization ability of Iraqi Shiite Islamic groups, supported by Iran. To this end, Baath executed leading members of the Islamic Call Party and its ideologist Mohammad Baqir Al-Sadr in the 1980s. After the Islamic Call Party, Saddam Hussein's second target was the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) consisted of Iraqi Shiite Islamists escaped from the Baath pressure and established by Iran in Tehran. Baath raided the underground cells of SCIRI in Iraq and executed a significant part of the representatives of the Al-Hakim family in Iraq who ran SCIRI.[110]

3.5. SCIRI and Badr Brigades: Khomeinism and Pragmatism

3.5.1. What Does SCIRI's Inception Mean to Iraqi Shiite Islamism?

We see that Shiite Islamic movements in Iraq has been organized around an important cleric family or a clergyman tarting from the Islamic Call Party in Iraq. Therefore, as seen in the example of the Islamic Call Party and Mohammad Baqer Al-Sadr, we see that Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) are organized around Al-Hakim family and Sadr Movement around Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr and his son Moqtada al-Sadr.

As for the SCIRI, organized around the al-Hakim family, one of the leading Iraqi mujtahid families in Najaf, was founded in 1982 by a trilateral group consisted of Al-Hakim family, the Islamic Call Party and independent Iraqi Shiite clergy in

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[110] Cockburn, Patrick (2008) *Muqtada Al-Sadr and the Battle for the Future of Iraq*, New York, Scribner, 182

with the intervention of Iran.[111] The main purpose of the movement was to become an umbrella structure that unites all Iraqi Shiite Islamic groups.[112]

The main driving force of this motivation is the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran aimed to unite all Iraqi Shiite opposition groups with this umbrella structure and in order to control them easily. However, SCIRI has turned into a Shiite Islamic movement with Iranian-orientation during the Iran-Iraq War, instead of being a unifying organization and firstly the Islamic Call Party and the independents left the organization.

The Iraqi Shiite Islamic movements in the diaspora, including SCIRI, were revolutionary movements owing the influence of the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution. As the name implies, SCIRI's final goal was the establishment of Shiite Islamic state in Iraq.[113] However, SCIRI's difference in ideological affilation compared to other Shiite Islamic movements in the diaspora is that it adopted the Wilayat al-Faqih government system theorized by Ayattollah Khomeini, then Iranian supreme leader. Beside, SCIRI began to follow Khomeini also religiously, instead of the apolitical Abulqasim Al-Khoei, which ruled the Najaf Hawza. This ideological and religious positioning is also the main reason for the ideological differences of the Islamic Call Party and SCIRI in the following years since Da'wa was not eager to follow directives of Iran and Khomeni like SCIRI.[114]

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[111] Jabar, 2013, p 235

[112] Marr, 2012, p. 196

[113] Ibid.

[114] Ibid.

SCIRI's organizational experience was also important during this period, for its future. SCIRI periodically arranged its financial affairs, propaganda works and parliamentary meetings and more importantly opened representative offices in some European cities.[115] The fact that SCIRI formed a institutional system through a formel administrative structure made it easy to adapt to the post-Baath period in Iraq after 2003. Sadrists, SCIRI's biggest rival, did not leave Iraq and continued their secret organization underground. Therefore, Therefore, the process of Sadrists'adaption to the new system was different from that of SCIRI.

3.5.2. Badr Brigades as the Armed Wing of SCIRI

The Badr Brigades, established by Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as the military wing of SCIRI, fought against the Iraqi army starting in 1982, during the Iran-Iraq War. Badr's fighters consisted of the Iraqi Shiites who were or fled to Iran and the the Shiite members of Iraqi army, aka prisoners of war (POW) captured by Iran during the war.[116] The Badr Brigades, which fought on the Iranian side until the end of the war, also carried out intelligence activities for Iran, both through the underground network in Iraq and across the border. This facts are still an important reason why SCIRI and Badr Brigades is considered as pro-Iran, including by many Shiites.[117] We can list the reasons for this fact as follows:

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[115] International Crisis Group (2007). Shiite Politics in Iraq: The Role of Supreme Council, *Middle East Report N°70 – 15 November 2007*, p.7. Retrieved from:
https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/473d5d632.pdf

[116] Ibid. p.4

[117] Ibid.

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- National affilation is more dominant than sectarian affilations among Iraqi Shiites during the war. The majority of Iraqi soldiers were the Shiite Iraqis. In this respect, SCIRI, which fought against the Iraqi army alongside Iran and tortured Shiite POW, is considered as one of the reasons for the humanitarian loss of Iraqis.

- SCIRI groups who infiltrated Iraq during the war made propaganda for Khomeini's government system theory, Wilayat al-Faqih. This theory, rejected in Najaf, considered as the highest Shiite religious authority in Iraq.

- SCIRI's political rival Sadrists, who have great public support, have accused SCIRI founders of not struggling in Iraq.[118] [119]

The number of Badr's troops was more than 10,000 during the Iran-Iraq War.[120] Besides, they operated as a brigade of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and all their military equipment was supplied by Iran. In this sense, The Badr Brigades gained experience both formally and asymmetrically in terms of organization and military experience. Therefore the Badr Brigades were the most easily adapted Shiite Islamist militant movement to the process of entering the state apparatus after the US occupation and the process of militancy after the ISIS occupation.

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[118] Ibid.

[119] Ibid. p.6

[120] Potter L., Sick G. (2004). *Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War*, USA, Palgrave Macmillan, p.127

3.5.3. Pragmatist Era of SCIRI

The fact that Baath was not overthrown at the end of the Iran-Iraq War and the political isolation of Iran by the West forced SCIRI to pursue a more flexible and pragmatist policy. In this respect, the second half of the 1990s was a period of pragmatism for SCIRI. By realizing that Iran's foreign policy did not exactly match that of the movement, SCIRI began to get closer to the West, especially to the United States.[121] SCIRI which had met with US officials at various periods, increased contacts with the US in the early 2000s. However, although SCIRI's organic ties with Iran have weakened compared to the past, it has maintained close relations with Tehran and the headquarter of the party had been Tehran till 2003. Beside, the pragmatist administration in Tehran after Khomeini also preffered to use SCIRI as an mediator in its contacts with the US.[122] We can summarize SCIRI's new flexible political strategy as follows:

- The pragmatist politicians such as Hashemi Rafsanjani came to power in Iran after the devastated Iran-Iraq War, replacing the radicals who prioritized the export of the revolution. Even though Iraq presented a new challenge to the countries of the region by invading Kuwait, Iran, focused on the reconstruction of the country, kept neutral. As a result, pragmatist in the power prioritized post-war restoration and moderate foreign policy.

- The US was the most determinant foreign force in the region after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Iran have had no diplomatic relations with the US, especially since the 1980 Hostage Crisis. Therefore SCIRI, realizing that the US will be arbiter in the future of Iraq after the first Gulf

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[121] International Crisis Group, 2007, p.8

[122] Ibid., 2

War, aimed to approach the US and its Western allies in a pragmatic way.
123 124

The fact that SCIRI accelerated its negotiations with the US before the 2003 invasion and that it became closer to the West is an indication that a militant and revolutionary movement could prioritize pragmatist diplomatic preferences. SCIRI has succeeded in a strategy change and has secured its position in the government after the US invasion, thanks to its strategic policy change. Therefore, SCIRI and Sadrists, who fought against US forces after the invasion, took part in different sides.

3.6. Sadrists

3.6.1. The birth of Sadrist Movement

As well as the Ba'ath pressure, the results of the Iran-Iraq and the Gulf Wars and economic sanctions imposed by the US against Iraq were also destructive for the Iraqi people including Shiites. Especially with the harsh US sanctions, the Shiite Iraqis, alongside with big political and humanatiran losses, suffered economic losses as well. The state also failed to satisfy with people in terms of social services after two major wars and sanctions. This has mobilized some of the leading Shiite clergy to provide social services for people.

Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr, the relative of Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, was the most prominent Shiite clerics who had huge social network. Mohammad Sadiq Al-Sadr's social network grew with his charity worksand his followers were has been

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[123] Axworthy Michael, 2013, p. 310-311

[124] Kaim Markus (2016). *Great Powers and Regional Orders: The United States and the Persian Gulf*, USA, Routledge, p.16

called as Sadrists. The movement also developed a political attitude in the coming years and became the strongest Shiite political and social formation in Iraq.

The major difference of the Mohammad Sadiq Al-Sadr and his family from the Al-Hakim family and other leading Islamic Call Party members is that they maintained Shiite Islamic activism within Iraq, not from the diaspora. Besides, unlike the Islamic Call Party and SCIRI, the support to Sadrists among poor and ordinary people is much greater.[125] We can summarize the fact that Sadrists have the largest mass in Iraq as follows:

- The pacification of the Iraqi Communist Party over the years as a result of Ba'ath pressure led the poor and labour Shiite masses to find alternative organizations such as Islamic movements.

- Upon the social and economic destruction in Iraq after two major wars, Mohammad Sadiq Al-Sadr focused on providing social and physical services to the poor Shiite people living in the ghettos of big cities, especially in Baghdad, through social networks and charities that he had established.

- Whereas the Shiite Islamic movements in the diaspora had not pursued Iraq-centered policies due to external influences, Sadrist, isolated as a national moverment, focused on Iraqi Shiite society and influenced the masses criticizing the quiteist clergy in Najaf Hawza.[126][127][128]

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[125] Marr, 2012, p.249

[126] Jabar, 2013, p.183

[127] Louër, 2008, p.261

[128] Cordesman, Davies, 2008, p.39

Sadrists are also a political movement as well as helping the Shiites who suffered from economic difficulties. Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr demonstrated his political stance especially on Friday sermons in mosques and tens of thousands of people had participated in his sermons over the years.[129] Instead of a formal language preferred by the elite, He preferred to use a colloquial language spoken on the streets in his sermons, which brought him closer to the ordinary Iraqis.[130]

Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr had not only criticized the Baath administration and the West, but also criticized the apolitical Najaf and the Shiite groups in the diaspora, which he had called as foreign oriented and elitist, and accused them of escaping. Therefore, we can summarize the Sadrists' political stance in the early 90s as anti-Baathist, anti-elitist, anti-Westernist and pro-Iraqi.

3.6.2. The First Challenge: Baath vs Sadrists

As for Baath's attitude towards Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr and his movement, Saddam Hussein initially aimed at taking advantages of the fame of Mohammad Sadiq Al-Sadr among the ordinary Shiite people and considered him to challenge Ali Sistani who is still the head of Najaf Hawza.[131] The reasons of this strategy can be summarized as follows:

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[129] Jabar, 2013, p.183

[130] Blaydes, Lisa (2018). *State of Repression: Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Princeton and Oxford*, Princeton University Press p.257

[131] Jabar, 2013, p.183

- First of all, Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr had not engaged in a direct anti-Baathist situation until the late 90s, but rather focused on social and economic activities.

- Mohammad Sadiq Al-Sadr, an Arab as opposed to Abolqasim Khoei who was an Iranian with Azerbaijani descent, took a political stance against Iran, the US and Iranian-oriented Iraqi Shiite Islamic groups, which Baath considered as enemies.[132]

Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr did not react positively or negatively to this goal of Ba'ath and after this attitude, he was accused by SCIRI of cooperating with Saddam Hussein.[133] As a result, SCIRI and Dawa, whom Al-Sadr accused of being Iran-oriented, accused Sadrists of being Baath-oriented. However, Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr's ability to mobilize masses with his sermons participated by tens of thousands of people and his direct criticism of Baathist policies led Saddam Hussein to target Al-Sadr.[134] Because the fact that Al-Sadr proposed a new charismatic leadership to the Shiite masses, as his distant cousin Mohammad Baqir Al-Sadr did in the late 1970s, created a new threat to Baath administration. Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr and his older two sons were killed in 1999 as result of an assassination committed by Ba'ath.[135]

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[132] Louër, 2008, p.259

[133] Jabar, 2013, p.183

[134] Blaydes, 2018, p. 257

[135] Cordesman, Davies, 2008, p. 40

3.6.3. Sadrists after the Baath

The Sadr movement, which remained underground between 1999 and 2003, did not pursue cooperation with the United States, unlike the Islamic Call Party, SCIRI and secular Shiites after the US invasion. As mentioned, the Sadrists' opposition to the West can be attributed to developments related to US sanctions and the 1991 rebellion. However, the suspicious and rebellious attitudes of the Sadrists kept them away from formal political processes from some years after the US invasion, unlike the other Shiite Islamist parties, the Islamic Call Party and SCIRI.

The youngest son of Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr, Moqtada al-Sadr, brought the Sadr movement which had remained underground for four years back to the Iraqi political scene after the US occupation. Political offices and charities of Sadrist Movement reopened in Shiite-dominated neigborhoods in the Iraqi cities. [136] Meanwhile, the fact that Moqtada al-Sadr called the US-led occupation forces in the country to leave the country after Baath was toppled, gave a clue regarding the next attitudes of the movement towards the US forces.

Afterwards, SCIRI, Dawa and other political entities, did not want Sadrists to be included in the Iraqi Governing Council[137], in which they were represented and the Sadrists announced that they had formed a shadow cabinet observing the Council. Considering the political developments regarding the Sadrist in the first years of the occupation, the rebellious strategies of the Sadrists can be summarized as follows:

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[136] Steed, Brian L. (2019). *Iraq War: The Essential Reference Guide*, Santa-Barbara-California, ABC-CLIO, p.109

[137] The temporary government formed just after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

- Sadrists aimed to maintain their anti-US stance in the 90s in order to keep their popular support active since the US occupation has never been popular among the ordinary Iraqi people.

- They considered that they should be politically more determinant compared to SCIRI and Dawa, because they remained in Iraq during the harsh Baathist repression after the 80s and is supported more by the Shiite masses. [138]

Sadrist Movement, in this tense period, announced that they formed a militia called Mahdi Army in 2003 while demanding political rights as well and began to clash with the US forces and SCIRI.[139] Mahdi Army and other militias spltited from this group would be most violent Shiite Islamist fought aganinst both the US forces and rival Shiites. In response to these rebellious actions of Sadrist, The Iraqi Governing Council supported by the US temporarily closed the Sadrists' newspaper Al-Hawza, and thereupon, the armed wing of the movement, Mahdi Army, took action and launched attacks again on the US-led coalition forces in 2004.[140] In the following months, the Mahdi Army engaged in armed clashes with the US forces across Iraq, SCIRI and Sistani supporters in Karbala and Najaf respectively.[141] [142] The heavy defeat of the Sadrists against all these forces in

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[138] Hayden, Tom (2007). *Ending the War in Iraq*, New York, Akashic Books, p. 70

[139] Marr, 2012, p.277

[140] Cordesman, Anthony & Khazai H., Sam (2014). *Iraq in Crisis*, Center for Strategic&International Studies, Royman&Littlefield, p.152

[141] Tucker-Jones Anthony (2014). *The Iraq War: Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003*, UK, Pen&Sword Military, p. 105

Najaf led the movement to make political changes. Moqtada al-Sadr's strategy failed and Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who led the Najaf Hawza after became the main determinant of political processes from the post-2003 transition period to the first elections in 2005. [143]

3.6.4. Sadrists New Era: Populist, Pragmatist and Sectarian

The Sadrists participated in the 2005 Parliamentary Elections with the United Iraqi Alliance, led by SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz Al-Hakim, and won 28 seats. Subsequently, Sadrists received 6 ministries, including the Ministry of Health, within the established cabinet after the elections. [144] The fact that Sadrists preffered to receive Ministry of Health related to maintaining and increasing the popularity among the people by continuing social assistance services through the ministry. Therefore, participating in the same coalition and cabinet in the 2005 and 2006 general elections alongside with the rival Shiite formations is an indication that Sadrists can take pragmatist attitudes according to the conjuncture. Therefore, the fact that the Iraqi Shiite Movements do not pursue a monolithic political strategy and could change their political attitudes according to the conjoncture was also seen in the case of Sadrist Movement like that of SCIRI and Islamic Call Party.

However, while the Sadrists pragmatically participated in elections and cabinets with their rivals, after a while they started their attacks against the coalition forces again in order to maintain its anti-Westernist stance. In addition, during the sectarian clashes following the bombing of Al-Qaida's Ali Al-Askar Mosque in

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[142] Marr, 2012, p. 277

[143] Ibid., 285

[144] Dougherty, 2004, p.525

2006 revealed that the Mahdi Army elements massacred the civilian Sunni Iraqis.[145] [146]Lastly, Mahdi Army elements entered into serious clashes with the rival Shiite militias Badr Brigades in Karbala and Basra in 2007.[147]

In this respect, the Mahdi Army's role which intensifies and prolongs the process of sectarian and intra-Shite clashes after 2006, has eroded its popularity among both Sunnis and Shiites. Therefore, the movement, which adopted an anti-elitist political stance against rival Shiite parties and tried to maintain its popularity in the eyes of the poor masses, dissolved the Mahdi Army in 2008. Moqtada Al-Sadr announced that the Mahdi Army would transform itself into an organization called Momahidoon, which would carry out religious education and economic aid projects. Then, Moqtada al-Sadr went to Iran, where he would remain for three years.[148]

The fact that Moqtada al-Sadr, who criticized Iran's influence over Iraq after the US invasion, first received arm support from Iran in 2004 and then went to Iran in 2008-2011 due to increasing government and the US pressure on himself, is the indacator of Sadrists' complex relations with Iran.

The movement continued to work in the social sphere and maintained its presence in Iraqi political life while Moqtada al-Sadr was in Iran. The Sadrists also

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[145] Cockburn, 2008, p.184

[146] International Crisis Group (2008). Iraq's Civil War The Sadrist and the Surge, *Middle East Report N°72 – 7 February 2008*, p.3. Retrieved from: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47ab2c342.pdf

[147] Ibid., p.11

[148] Cordesman, Davies, 2008, p, 194

participated in the 2010 parliamentary elections, winning 40 seats and 7 ministries in the cabinet.[149]

In the meantime, Moqtada al-Sadr became more vulnerable to Iran's political influence during his time in Iran like the other Shiite leaders when they were in Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. In this respect, Iran played a key role in convincing Al-Sadr to support in the Nouri Al-Maliki Government, who al-Sadr entered an armed conflict between 2006 and 2008.[150] The main reason of the Iranian insistence on uniting the Shiites around the cabinet is that Iran, instead of the divided Shiites, prefer all the Shiite movements to gather around the names close to Iran, such as Abd al-Aziz Al-Hakim or Nouri al-Maliki, which he could easily control.

Moqtada al-Sadr pursued a less aggressive policy in Iraq, where he returned after US troops left Iraq. Al-Sadr's main political strategy in this period was to restore his declined popularity between 2006 and 2008. In order to restore this popularity, Al-Sadr has sought to undertake an independent observer mission that oversees the government as well as providing social services for the poor people. Besides, Al-Sadr tried that Peace Day Brigades which he formed after the dissolution of the Mahdi Army, to gain more infleunce area in Baghdad against Iran-backed Asaib Ahl al-Haq, splitted from the Mahdi Army in 2006.[151]

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[149] Dougherty, 2004, p.525

[150] Eisenstadt, Michael & Knights, Michael, and Ali, Ahmed (2011) Iran's Influence in Iraq Countering Tehran's Whole-of-Government Approach, Washington Institute Near East Policy, p.4

[151] Dougherty, 2004, p.90

3.7. Islamic Call Party After 1980: Failed War and Approachment to West and Road to Power

The Islamic Call Party is the Shite Islamist Party which experienced the Baath repression earliest and most intense. The fact that a significant part of the movement which experienced more violent attacks by the Baath after the Iranian Islamic Revolution, had to go to the diaspora, divided the movement. The leadership of the Islamic Call Party in Tehran remained under Iranian political pressure during the 80s.

The fact that the movement was deprived of mass support during the Iran-Iraq War and that the Baath administration did not collapse at the end of this war made the party vulnerable to foreign pressures The most important reason for this is the fact that the Islamic Call Party's demonstration capability, which brought dynamism to the movement in the second half of the 70s, disappeared with the forced migration to Iran, as well as losing his ideologist and charismatic leader, Mohammad Baqir Al-Sadr.

Thus, the Islamic Call Party, which has suffered a serious supporter and leadership crisis, faced the birth of another Shiite Islamist organizations such as SCIRI. Although SCIRI, was established as an umbrella organization that included the Islamic Call Party, it was transformed into an organization under the strict control of Iran. Afterwards, a big group of Islamic Call Party splitted from the umbrella organization which pledged allegiance to Wilayat Al-Faqih, due to some Islamic Call Party leaders who has not accepted Khomeini as their religious guide.[152]After this division, Iran preferred to mainly support SCIRI among Iraqi Shiite Islamist groups.

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[152] Shanahan, 2004, p.947-948

The Iran-Iraq War settled down into a stalemate, the West's support for Baath-led Iraq against Iran, and the Iranian pressure on the Islamic Call Party clergy forced the Islamic Call Party to find new alternatives to work against Baath. For this reason, the Islamic Call Party has prioritized rapprochement with the West before SCIRI, and to this end, the party wanted to explain to the West that it aimed primarily to see a democratic system in Iraq that did not conflict with Islamic principles. The fact that Islamic Call Party opened new offices in London as well as Damascus and Beirut is related to these aforementioned goals.[153]

The fact that Islamic Call Party distanced the party from Iran and the clergy aimed to remain a political movement rather than a revolutionary and militant movement is a strategy change that began in the late 80s.[154] This pragmatist change and the desire to move closer to the West could also seen in the case of SCIRI, however unlike the Islamic Call Party, SCIRI maintained its ideological and military ties with Iran. The desire of the Islamic Call Party during this period to be independent from Iran idelogically and politically was mainly based on the fact that the party aimed to show that it was committed to Iraqiness and Najaf Hawza.

The Islamic Call Party, like other Iraqi political diaspora organizations, produced programs regarding what kind of Iraq they wanted to see in the post-Baath period, in the period leading up to 2003. In other words, the after Saddam Hussein period, the issue of how the new governance system will be and how the power will be distributed has been on the agenda of the Islamic Call Party.

The Islamic Call Party, after changing its revolutionary Islamist character, declared that the party would be a follower of a democratic and pluralist system in

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[153] Dai, 2008, p.260

[154] Ibid., p.262

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Iraq. In this respect, the Islamic Call Party rejected the sharing of power based on sectarian quotas in the future Iraq.[155] Ironically, however, it will be the Islamic Call Party, which has been accused of sectarianism in the new system, especially during the Nuri Al-Maliki period.

The umbrella alliance Iran-backed United Iraqi Alliance involved almost all Shiite political parties emerged as the first party, after the first parliamentary election held at the end of the mandate of the Provisional Governing Council. [156]Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, the leader of the Islamic Call Party, became prime minister after the formation of the cabinet. In short, the new period after 2005, is a transitional period in which the Islamic Call Party began to turn into the state itself from a diaspora militant and political organization. During this period, since 2005 till 2018, the prominent Islamic Call Party members such as Ibrahim Al-Jafari, Nouri Al-Maliki and Haydar Al-Ibadi ruled Iraq as prime ministers. [157]

The Islamic Call Party, ISCI (SCIRI) and Badr Organization and the Sadrists has begun to form their own cliques in the state apparatus since 2005, due to muhassasa[158] system.[159] Therefore, in addition to ideological tensions between rival Shiite Islamist parties, material power struggle became one of the most important parts of this competition in the post-2003 period.

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[155] Ibid, 257- 260

[156] Cordesman, Davies, 2008, p 152

[157] Hasan, Harith (2009). From Radical to Rentier Islamism: The Case of Iraq's Dawa Party, Carnegie Middle East Center, April 16, 2009. Retrieved from: https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/04/16/from-radical-to-rentier-islamism-case-of-iraq-s-dawa-party-pub-78887

[158] The system through which the Iraqi government distrubates the positions in the state apparatus, based on sectarian and party quotas.

[159] Marr, 2012, p. 353

In this respect, the Nouri Al-Maliki period, which lasted for eight years, brought about the statification of the party, and at the same time meant a period in which the Islamic Call Party distributed power to its allies rather than prioritizing ideological issues. This period marks a period in which the Sunnis were excluded from the administration, the power was gathered in the hands of rival Shiite parties under the leadership of the Islamic Call Party. During Nouri Al-Maliki era, Sunnis in the the security apparatus of the state were replaced by Shiite names who were loyal to Nouri al-Maliki. Shortly he created a politburo around him consisted of these loyal men.[160] Plus, he, at times, tried to be a deterrent against his opponents with the alliance he formed with the Iranian-backed Shiite militia group, Asaib Ahl al-Haq.

Haydar Al-Abadi era, which began in 2014 and ended in 2018, represents the period in which the politicians of the Islamic Call Party, who were close to the West, became the head of the government, due the pressure of the US which is alarmed by the growth of ISIS on Iraq. Haidar al-Ibadi was supported by Ammar Al-Hakim[161] and Moqtada Al-Sadr. However, Badr Organization and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, who allied with Al-Maliki, approached this new era with skepticism. In particular, the concern of the Badr Organization was related to the possible elimination of the autonomous structures they had formed in the Ministry of Interior and the police forces.

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[160] Rayburn, Joel (2014). *Iraq After America: Strongmen, Sectarians, Resistance*, Stanford-California, Stanford University Hoover Institution Press, p.51

[161] The son of the late Abdalaziz Al-Hakim who was the head of ISCI. Ammar Al-Hakim currently heads another Shiite Islamist party called Al-Hikmah distancing himself from veteran Pro-Iran ISCI politicians.

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Haydar Al-Ibadi, who is a weak figure, took over the mission of eliminating sectarian compeititon by aiming to be more inclusive in the state apparatus and interest-based cliques established by Al-Maliki at the state level.[162] However, especially the ISIS occupation, the establishment of Hashd Al-Shaabi and the increasing US-Iran tension did not leave enough room for maneuver within the Iraqi political system. Hence, under the influence of these three main events, Heydar Al-Ibadi has entered a period of struggle with rival Shia political organizations and militias to preserve the central authority of the state, as expected.

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[162] Parigi Giovanni, The Land of Two Rivers Through Arab Shi'a Eyes in After Mosul: Re-Inventing Iraq Plebani, Andrea (eds) (2017). Milano, Ledizioni LediPublishing, p. 56 Retrieved from: https://www.ispionline.it/it/EBook/Rapporto_IRAQ/Iraq_web.pdf

CHAPTER 4

FORCED TOGETHERNESS: HASHD AL SHAABI

4.1. Introduction

The fourth chapter of thesis argue that Hashd Al-Shaabi is also one of struggle areas between the rival Shiite groups and therefore it is not a monolithic paramilitary organization. In this chapter, this thesis divides Hashd Al Shaabi groups into three factions applying the classification of Renad Mansour and Faleh Jabbar to understand the fundamental differences between these three factions.[163]

This thesis also argue that the reason of the differences of the militia groups is related to the political stance of the Shiite group to which they belong and that the roots of these differences are seen in the transformation process of Shiite Islamic movements. Therefore, the main conflict points of these there factions will be explained in this chapter by a comparative analysis, after focusing on the emergence of Hashd Al-Shaabi and understanding who the main groups of these three factions are.

4.2. The Emergence of Hashd Al-Shaabi

The terrorist activities of the Iraqi branch of Al-Qaida, which began after the 2003 US invasion and continued until 2013, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) occupation, were one of the most serious problems destabilized post-Baath

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[163] Mansour Renad & Jabar Faleh A., (2017) The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq's Future, Carnegie Middle East Center, April 28, 2017; p.1. Retrieved from:
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_63_Mansour_PMF_Final_Web.pdf

Iraq. In 2013, the terrorist organization the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), which changed the map of Iraq by rebranding itself Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), firstly seized Fallujah, Ramadi, the second largest city in the country, Mosul, and then a third of the country.[164] The occupation of Mosul in 2014 and the collapse of the Iraqi army in the face of ISIS occupation and the potential occupation threat of ISIS to Kirkuk, Baghdad and southern Iraq, caused the biggest domestic disasters in the country for the last 11 years.

The main difference of ISIS from its predecessors, Al Qaida of Iraq and Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), is that it now has a goal to gain territory as well as terrorist attacks aimed at destabilizing Iraq. ISIS declared that it created an Islamic state ruled by a caliph, and beyond, began to increase territory gains primarily in Iraq and Syria. When ISIS invaded Mosul in March 2014 and then approached Samarra and the capital Baghdad, where the shrines of the Shiites' 8th and 9th imams were located, Ayatollah Ali Sistani issued a fatwa and called on all Iraqis to fight ISIL.[165]

Frankly, Sistani called on all Iraqis to resist, regardless of sect and religion.[166] However, this call was interpreted as a holy jihad mostly by the Shiites. Therefore, the Shiite masses interpreted fighting ISIS as a struggle for existence for them, in the power vacuum that arises from the weakness ad partial collapse of the army, and considering the fact that ISIL had an ideology which excluded Shiites from Islam and massacred the Shiite Iraqis in the territories it seized.[167]

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[164] Dougherty, 2004, p.84

[165] Weiss, Michael & Hassan, Hassan (2016). ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (Updated Edition), New York, Regan Arts, p.239

[166] Mansour, Jabar, p.7

[167] Ezzeddine, Nancy & Sulz, Matthias & van Veen, Erwin (2019. The Hashd is dead, long live the Hashd! Fragmentation and consolidation, *Netherlands Institute of International Relations*

[168]Following this call, Hashd Al-Shaabi, the umbrella paramilitary organization, the overwhelming majority of which was composed of Shiite militia groups.

Hashd Al-Shaabi, which fought against ISIS between 2014-2017 with the support of the United Joint Task Force, headed by the United States, and Iran's organizational support, played a major role in the seizure of occupying cities such as Tikrit, Ramadi, Mosul respectively from ISIL, and in the complete defeat of the terrorist organization. However, these Shiite militia groups with different ideological affiliations and political agendas continued their rivalry within Hashd Al-Shaabi as well.[169] Therefore, the Iraqi Shiite Islamic movement, which has begun to disintegrate since the early 80s continued their power struggles after the ISIS occupation.

4.3. Who Constitutes Hashd Al-Shaabi?

Hashd Al-Shaabi is an umbrella paramilitary organization composed of about 60 militia organizations.[170] As for the total number of fighters of this umbrella

'Clingendael', July, 2019; p.2. Retrieved from:
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2019-07/the-hashd-is-dead-long-live-the-hashd.pdf

[168] Weiss, Hassan, 2016, p.223

[169] Ezzeddine, Nancy & van Veen, Erwin (2018). CRU Policy Brief - Power in perspective: Four key insights into Iraq's Al-Hashd al-Sha'abi, *Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', June, 2018*; p.3 Retrieved from:
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/PB_Power_in_perspective.pdf

[170] Felbab-Brown, Vanda (2019). Policy Brief- Pitfalls Of The Paramilitary Paradigm: The Iraqi State, Geopolitics, and Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi, *Foreign Policy at Brookings and UN University Centre for Policy Research, June, 2019;* p.3. Retrieved from: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/FP_20190625_iraq_felbab_brown.pdf

organization, there are no conclusive figures. This is due to the fact that some fighters are registered as reserve soldiers, and do not receive salaries from the budget, and some militia groups occasionally leave Hashd Al-Shaabi for political and economic reasons and conduct military operations on their own. However, Hashd Al-Shaabi Comission says that they have 152.000 registered fighters in Iraq even though some sources claim that is not the exact number.[171] It is also noted that there are around 122.000 Hashd Al-Shaabi fighters who are paid salaries from the state budget.[172]

In addition, there are also some Hashd Al-Shaabi elements of Sunni, Christian, Yazidi, Shabak and militia groups affilated to Sunni tribes. These groups, like the Shiite groups, participated in operations against ISIS under the command of the Hashd Al-Shaabi Commission, an executive structure affiliated to the Ministry of Interior and the Prime Ministry.[173]

We will focus, in this part, on the Shiite militia groups in Hashhd Al-Shaabi only within the evolution process of the Shiite Islamic movements and militancy in Iraq. The differences of these groups dated back to the 1980s have changed considerably in the light of the political changes for 40 years. The increasing political, economic and social rivalry between the Shiite groups, the Iran-US tension and regional developments were the developments that pushed the rival Shiite groups to take new political stances after 2014. Therefore, the Shia militia groups of Hashd Al-Shaabi represented different factions in the context of ideological, political, religious affilation, economic interests. In order to better

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[171] Ibid, p. 3

[172] Ibid., p.3

[173] Abbas, Hassan (2017). The Myth and Reality of Iraq's al-Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces): A Way Forward, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Amman Office , p.5. Retrieved from: https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/13689.pdf

understand the heterogeneous structure of Hashd Al-Shaabi and their main clashes, we can roughly group the organization as follows.

- **Pro-Iran Side of Hashd Al-Shaabi:** They are the dominant groups in the Hashd Al Shaabi administration, declaring their loyalty to the Iranian Religious Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The most prominent militia groups of this faction are Badr Brigades, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, Kataeb Hezbollah and Harakat Al-Nujaba.

- **Pro-Sadr Side of Hashd Al-Shaabi:** Saraya Al-Salam, the last stage of the militia movements of the Sadrist movement starting with the Mahdi Army, represents the Sadrists in Hashd Al-Shaabi. Therefore, their political stance is determined by Moqtada Al-Sadr.

- **Pro-Sistani Side of Hashd Al-Shaabi:** Hashd Al-Shaabi militia groups that adopt the political and religious stance of Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who is the head of the Najaf Hawza.[174] [175]

These three groups represent competing political movements in the political arena, except the pro-Sistani Hashd Al-Shaabi groups. Therefore, the political preferences of rival political after the ISIS occupation are the main reasons for the divisions within Hashd Al-Shaabi. Apart from the common attitude towards ISIS between 2014-2019, these groups have serious differences of opinion on issues related to Iran, political involvement, religious ans political commitment, the economic interests and Hashd Al-Shaabi's integration into the state. Therefore,

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[174] Mansour, Jabar, p.1

[175] Ezzeddine, van Veen, 2018, p.3

different attitudes towards these four issues will be analyzed to better understand the divisions within the umbrella organization.

4.4. Who are the Pro-Iranian Hashd Al-Shaabi Groups?

4.4.1. Pro-Iran Side of Hashd al-Shaabi

The Iranian-backed Hashd al-Shaabi groups are mainly composed of Badr Brigades, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, Kataeb Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba, and other small pro-Tehran Hashd Al-Shabi groups.[176] The most common thing among them is that they swear allegiance to the Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It is estimated that around 40-50 of the militia groups in Hashd Al-Shaabi are pro Iranian.[177] However, we will focus on the most prominent pro-Iran Hashd Al-Shaabi groups.

4.4.2. Badr Brigades

Badr Brigades, as known, was the armed wing of SCIRI, which was founded by Iran in 1982 and changed its name to ISCI in 2007.[178] However, in 2012, Badr Brigades left ISCI-led by Al-Hakim and continued politics with the Badr Organization, which he described as a separate political formation. The most important reason is for this split was that Al-Hakim family preferred to follow Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who rules Najaf Hawza by leaving following Khamenei and

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[176] Al-Khoei, Hayder, "*Al-Hashd Al-Sha'bi: Iraq's Double-Edged Sword*" in *Iraq After ISIS The Challenges of Post-War Recovery,* Eriksson Jacob, Khaleel Ahmed eds. (2019), , Cham-Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan, p.103

[177] Ibid., p.110

[178] Ibid., p.104

approached more to the US. As known, Al-Hakim family, after removing "revolution" from the name of organization" began to maintain its Iraqi side more and pledged loyalty to Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the head of Najaf Hawza.[179]

The Badr Brigades' relations with Iran go back to the Iran-Iraq War. In addition to fighting on the Iranian side during the Iran-Iraq War, the Badr Brigades carried out intelligence activities for Iran within Iraq. The militias of Badr, therefore, could be named the first special Iranian Revolutionary Forces-backed special militia groups. Therefore, the relations of Badr Brigades with Iran in the field of military and security are much more rooted than that of the other Iranian backed Hashd al-Shaabi elements and the leader of the pro-Iranian group in Hashd al-Shaabi.

Badr Brigades is known as the most experienced and the biggest military militia group among the Hashd Al-Shaabi troops. The strentgh of Badr Brigades in Hashd Al-Shaabi is around 15000 fighters. [180] They have also fighters in Syria who fight on the side of Bashar Al-Assad and Iran. Above all, Badr Brigades controls the Interior Ministry and the Hashd Al-Shaabi Commission. [181] This military and diplomatic power has also given the Badr Brigades and other pro-Iranian militia groups political maneuverability.

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[179] International Crisis Group (2007) Shiite Politics in Iraq: The Role of Supreme Council, *Middle East Report N°70 – 15 November 2007*, p.i

[180] Nader, Alireza (2015) Iran's Role in Iraq: Room for Cooperation?. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, p.9. Retrieved from:
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE151/RAND_PE151.pdf

[181] Al-Khoei, 2019, p.104

4.4.3. Asaib Ahl Al-Haq

Asaib Ahl Al-Haq was founded in 2006 by splitting from Mahdi Army due to differences of opinion the group had with Moqtada Al-Sadr.[182] Since then, it has been supported by Iran both militarily and financially. In the 2000s, while Iran aimed to gain influence in Iraqi politics with the ISCI and Badr Organization, at the same time aimed to destabilize US forces with Asaib Ahl Al-Haq' attacks on the coalition forces.

The militia group is led by Qais Al-Khazali, who is close to Mohammad Sadiq Al-Sadr, the father of Moqtada Al-Sadr. Howvever, after 2006, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq declared his allegiance to the Iranian religious leader Ali Khamenei. Qais Al-Khazali was arrested by the coalition forces in 2007 and served two years in prison and released in 2009.

Asaib Ahl Al-Haq has about 5000-10.000 fighters and three brigades in Hashd Al-Shaabi.[183] Besides it has sent militias to fight alongside Bashar Al-Assad and Iran.[184] It is one of the groups that give the most support to Iran's regional policies and emphasizes its transnational identity.

The group has been on the agenda of the Iraqi politics for nearly 15 years with its role in sectarian conflicts. The sectarian attacks of the Asaib Ahl Al-Haq against

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[182] O'Driscoll, Dylan & van Zoonen, Dave (2017). The Hashd al-Shaabi and Iraq Subnationalism and the State, Middle East Research Institute, p.19. Retrieved from: http://www.meri-k.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/PMF-Report-0.2.pdf

[183] Nader, 2015, p.10

[184] Phillips, Christopher (2017). T*he Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East,* New Haven and London, Yale University Press, p.163

Sunnis have caused uneasiness many times in the 2000s and during the war against ISIL.[185] Therefore its patrolling activities in some Sunni towns after the end of ISIS occupation creates uneasiness as well.

This militia group, which was formerly among the Sadrists, thus continues the tradition of social aid. It opens religious schools in Shiite dominated cities and carries out social assistance projects to poor Shiites.[186] Therefore, it is the militia group with the strongest social base among the pro-Iranian groups. The most important reason for this is that the roots of the movement date back to the Mohammad Sadiq Al-Sadr era, which initiated social aid campaign for the poor Shiites in the 90s.

4.4.4. Kataeb Hezbollah

Kataeb Hezbollah was founded with the support of Iran in 2007. Mahdi Al-Mohandis, the leader of the militia group, is a former member of the Badr Brigades . He is also a close figure to Qasim Soleimani, the commander of the Jerusalem Force of Iranian Revolutionary Guards, who was considered as Iran's power in the field during the Syrian and Iraqi Civil War after 2014.

Mahdi Al-Mohandis, who was a active member of the Dawa Party in the 70s, and one of the tens of thousands of Dawa Party members who fled Iran in the late 70s. He was one of the names who was close to the Revolutionary Guards in Iran as well, was claimed to be one of the planners of the suicide bombings allegedly committed in the name of Iran, in Kuwait in 1983. In this attack, US Embassy in

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[185] Cordesman, Davies, 2008, p.201

[186] Ezzeddine, van Veen, 2018, p.9

France was bombed and Mahdi Al-Mohandis was sentenced to death in absentia.[187]

However, the influence of Kataeb Hezbollah in Hashd Al-Shaabi is greater than the number of fighters. Kataeb Hezbollah actually consists of few relatively small pro-Iranian militia groups. However, the influence of Kataeb Hezbollah in Hashd Al-Shaabi is greater than the number of fighters. It is because Mahdi Al-Mohandis, the leader of this movement, is the deputy commander of the Hashd Al-Shaabi.[188] Furthermore, Mohandis is claimed to be the de facto leader of Hashd Al-Shaabi, due to serious Iranian support to him.

Kataeb Hezbollah is represented by a brigade of approximately 3,000 fighters in Hashd Al-Shaabi.[189] The movement is also one of the transnational Hashd Al-Shaabi groups fighting alongside with Bashar Al-Assad and Iran in the Syrian Civil War.

4.4.5. Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba

The fighters of this movement had fought under Asaib Ahl Al-Haq which splitted from the Mahdi Army till 2012.[190] However, the warlord Akram Al-Kaabi, who

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[187] Brennan Richard R. & Jr &, Ries Charles P. & Hanauer, Larry & Connable, Ben & Kelly, Terrence K. & McNerney Michael J.& Young, Stephanie & Campbell, Jason & McMahon, K. Scott (2013); Ending the Final Transition, the US Operational Maneuver, War in Distablishment United State Forces-Iraq; USA, Rand Corporation, p.138-139. Retrieved from: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR232/RAND_RR232.pdf

[188] O'Driscoll Dylan & van Zoonen Dave, 2017, p.23.

[189] Nader, Alireza, 2015, p.11.

[190] Dougherty, 2004, p.90

left this militia group, founded Harakat Hazbollah Al-Nujaba with the support of Iran a year later. First of all, the main mission of Harakat Hazbollah Al-Nujaba was to fight only in Syria in 2013, unlike the other groups. However, as a result of Sistani's call, the militia group also joined Hashd Al-Shaabi.

The command echelon of Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba consists of Shiite leaders who carried out joint operations with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards during the Iran-Iraq War. The movement, which has a strong connection with Iran, is the most militia group with its transnational character and closeness to Iran. One of the most important examples of this is the fact that the movement left Asaib Ahl Al-Haq who did not want to fight in areas other than the Shiite shrines in Damascus, fought in Aleppo Battle in 2015.[191]Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba is represented in Hashd Al-Shaabi with a few thousand fighters. It is known that they are deployed with several thousands fighters in many points of Syria to fight on the side of Bashar Al-Assad.

4.5. Pro-Sadr Side of Hashd al-Shaabi: Saraya Al-Salam

Saraya al-Salam, established in 2014 after ISIL massacred Shiite soldiers in Camp Speicher, Tikrit became the paramilitary armed force of the Sadrist Movement[192]. Saraya Al-Salam joined Hashd al-Shaabi after the relgious fatwa of Ayatollah Ali Sistani. It is the Shiite militia structure with the highest mass power in Hashd Al-Shaabi.

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[191] Smyth Phillip (2015). The Shiite Jihad in Syria and its Regional Effects Washington Institute, Understanding the Organizations Deployed to Syria, Washington DC, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Appendice no:2. Retrieved from:
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus138_Smyth-2.pdf

[192] Mansour & Jabar, 2017, p.14

It is estimated that there are more than 20.000 Saraya Al-Salam fighters, but in Hashd Al-Shaabi it is represented by 3000 fighters.[193] Since the Hashd Al-Shaabi Commission is dominated by pro-Iranian groups, these groups also carry out recruitment and salary distribution. The fact that Saray Al Salam's number of fighters is low in Hashd Al-Shaabi and high outside, is because less military positions are allocated to them compared to that Pro-Iran Hashd Al-Shaabi groups.[194]

Saraya Al-Salam also has around 100,000 reserve volunteer fighters.[195] The high number of Sadrists' voluntary fighters is related to the high public support. The reason for this is historical. Sadrists have grown up with social work since the 90s and then evolved into politics. Therefore, they gained great popularity among the poor Shiite masses. In this respect, despite their small number in Hashd Al-Shaabi, Saraya Al-Salam is a serious Shiite opponent against Pro-Irani Hashd Al-Shaabi groups because of Sadrists' great public support and political network.

Saraya Al-Salam is essentially the armed militia of the Sadrists, the successor of the Mahdi Army, Promised Day Brigades. Like its predecessors, it adopts a Iraqi-centered and nationalist political stance, not transnational as opposed to Pro-Iranian groups.[196] Moqtada Al-Sadr aimed to increase his declining prestige due to the massacres against Sunnis civilians in which the Mahdi Army involved during

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[193] Ibid, p.20

[194] Ezzeddine & van Veen, 2018, p.8

[195] Mansour & Jabar, 2017, p.14

[196] Ezzeddine & van Veen, 2018, p.3

the sectarian war between 2004 and 2008, through Saraya Al-Salam's anti-sectarian and Iraqi strategy.

4.6. Pro-Sistani Side of Hashd Al-Shaabi

These groups represents the armed militia groups which made allegiance to Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who ruled the Najaf Hawza and was considered the greatest religious among all the parties.[197] [198] The fact that these groups are directly affiliated to Sistani, and their mission to protect the shrines increased their legitimacy among Iraqi Shiite masses. These groups are not militia groups that were established before or are not the successors of a militia group as well. Theese militia groups were established in 2014 after Ayatollah Ali Sistani called for the fight against ISIL.[199]

Ali Al-Akbar Brigades, Saraya Al-Ataba al-Hussainiya, Saraya Al-Ataba al-Abbasiya, Saraya Al-Atabaa Al-Alawiya, are Pro-Sistani militia Hashd Al-Shaabi groups.[200] They are also known as shrine protectors or militias and named after the four Shiite tombs in Iraq. [201]

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[197] Mansour & Jabar, 2017, p.14

[198] Ezzeddine & van Veen, 2018, p.7

[199] Abbas, Hassan, 2017, p.5

[200] Rudolf, Inna (2017) From Battlefield to Ballot Box: Contextualising the Rise and Evolution of Iraq's Popular Mobilisation Units, The International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, UK, ICSR King's College London, p. 24. Retrieved from: https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/ICSR-Report-From-Battlefield-to-Ballot-Box-Contextualising-the-Rise-and-Evolution-of-Iraq%E2%80%99s-Popular-Mobilisation-Units.pdf

[201] Ibid.

In addition, the Pro-Iran Hashd Al-Shaabi Commission does not allocate sufficient budget and military equipment to these groups, just as it did to Saraya al-Salam and they also does not prefer to recruit many soldiers than Pro-Sistani groups. These groups are fully committed to Ayatollah Ali Sistani in religious and political terms. Therefore, they worked in coordination with former prime minister Heydar Al-Ibadi and current prime minister Adil Abdulmahdi, as Sistani wanted to strengthen the central government.

4.7. Conflicting Issues within Hashd Al Shaabi

4.7.1. Iran Connection and Transnationalism

The positions of pro-Iranian groups and other groups vary greatly considering the relations of Hashd Al-Shaabi groups with Iran. Hashd Al-Shaabi's pro-Iranian groups describe the asymmetric relationship with Iran through transnational dynamics within the framework of Axis of Resistance. Frankly, this internationalized framework is applied to fight against Iran's foes through these milita groups.[202]However, other groups criticize this asymmetric relationship and advocates that inter-state relations should be symmetrical and institutional. Therefore, the fact that non-state actors such as Badr Brigades, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq and Kataeb Hezbollah maintain political, military and economic relations differently from that of the government is harshly ciricized by the other two groups.

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[202] Vatanka Alex (2018) Iran's Use Of Shi'i Militant Proxies Ideological And Practical Expediency Versus Uncertain Sustainability, Washington DC, Middle East Institute, June, 2018, p.18. Retrieved from:
https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Vatanka_PolicyPaper.pdf

Pro-Iranian groups follow the Iranian Religious Leader Ali Khamenei as religious mentor, not Ali Sistani, who ruled Najaf Hawza. In other words, they take into account the regional political strategies of Ali Khamanei, including in Iraq, by accepting Wilayat al-Faqih, Khomeini's theory of the state system. Therefore, when it comes to the conflicting interests of Iraq and Iran, the political position of these groups leads to political crises in the country. These crises emerged most often during the increasing US-Iran tension in 2019, following threats of these groups that they would attack US forces in Iraq, in case possible US attack on Iran. [203]

Therefore, the participation of Iranian-backed groups in transnational military operations together with Tehran is the most opposed issue among the other factions of Hashd Al-Shaabi. The military and political alliance, which mainly includes Iran, Syria and Lebanon Hezbollah, called Axis of Resistance, has grown with the addition of the Ansarullah Movement in Yemen and Iraqi milita movements such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataeb Hezbollah and Harakat Al-Nujaba in Iraq. This Iraqi militia groups are still fighting on the side of Bashar Al-Assad and Iran in Syria, within the framework of this alliance.

In addition, pro-Iranian Hashd Al-Shaabi groups came to the fore by their use the territories which they controlled in Iraq for Axis of Resistance's interest in Syria after defeating ISIS. The pro-Iranian militias, such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataeb Hezbollah, began to control the city of Al-Qaim, where the Iraq-Syria border crossing point is, after the ISIS invasion and began ensuring that Iranian weapons from this region have transferred to Syria through Kataib Hezbollah's

[203]Abdo, Geneive (March 20, 2019) "Iraq Prepares to Evict U.S. Troops" Retrieved from: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/20/iraq-prepares-to-evict-u-s-troops/

efforts.[204] Beside, Badr Brigades also foccuses on patrolling around Iran-Iraq border to provide Iran's security with their forces. Therefore, the transnational character of the Iranian-backed Hashd al-Shaabi groups differentiated them from the Pro-Sadrists and Pro-Sistani Hashd al-Shaabi groups whose policies are mainly focused on Iraq.

In particular, former Prime Minister Heydar Al-Abadi described the fact that pro-Iranian militia groups fight in the territory of another country as illegal, and ordered the fighters to return. Moqtada Al-Sadr and Pro-Sistani groups criticized the Iraqi militia groups' war presence in Syrian Civil War and Moqtada Al-Sadr even advocated the resignation of Bashar Al-Assad. [205206] Thus, the transnational character of the pro-Iranian groups has been interpreted as disregarding the interests of Iraq by Sadrists and other groups, creating the biggest problem between the other Hashd Al-Shaabi groups.

Pro-Iranian Hashd Al-Shaabi, on the basis of his religious and ideological ties to Iran, is seeking to support Iran not only in Syria but also in Iraq against the US. Iraq has been trying to pursue a balance policy between the US and Iran, especially since 2003, and the developments between these two countries at

[204] Adesnik, David & Ben Taleblu, Behnam (2019). Burning Bridge The Iranian Land Corridor to the Mediterranean, Washington DC, Foundation for Democracies (FDD) Press, p.21 Retrieved from: https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/fdd-report-burning-bridge.pdf

[205] Mansour & Jabar, 2017, p.17

[206] Reuters (April 9, 2017) *"Sadr becomes first Iraqi Shi'ite leader to urge Assad to step down"* , https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-syria-sadr/sadr-becomes-first-iraqi-shiite-leader-to-urge-assad-to-step-down-idUSKBN17B070

different times have destabilized Iraq. These groups try to position Iraq alongside Iran by threatening the government with attacking the US bases in Iraq.[207]

4.7.2. Entering Politics

The pro-Iranian groups of Hashd Al-Shaabi members have declared their willingness to take part in the political arena many times[208]. The biggest reason for this, is to take advantage of Al-Shaabi's success on the battlefield in the political arena. In this regard, Badr Brigades have been a guide for the Iranian-backed groups of Hashd Al-Shaabi to enter politics due to his experience in the political arena. The Badr Brigades, the leader group of Hashd Al-Shaabi's Iran-backed factions and Badr Brigades's leader Hadi Al-Amiri have been involved in Iraqi politics since 2003 managing one of the main figures of that .[209]

Iran has also supported the entry of prominent Hashd al-Shaabi groups such as Badr Brigades, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, Kataeb Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba into politics, which it has supported politically and militarily for years. It is claimed that Iran orders these groups to increase their political power of by benefiting from the popularity of Hashd al-Shaabi and thus to prevent anti-Iranian policies in the parliament and cabinet.

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[207] Majidyar, Ahmad (January 2, 2018). Iran-Backed Militia Groups Threaten US Forces in Iraq. Retrieved from: https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-backed-militia-groups-threaten-us-forces-iraq

[208] Ezzeddine, Nancy & Sulz, Matthias & van Veen, Erwin (2018). From soldiers to politicians? Iraq's Al-Hashd Al-Sha'abi 'on the march', Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', November, 2018; p. 9. Retrieved from:
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/PB_From_Soldiers_to_Politicians_0.pdf

[209] Steinberg Guido (2017). The Badr Organization Iran's Most Important Instrument in Iraq, German Institute for International and Security Affair- SWP Comments, July, 2017; p.3. Retrieved from: https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2017C26_sbg.pdf

These Iranian-backed groups entered the 2018 Parliamentary Elections under the Fatah Coalition led by Hadi Al-Ameri, leader of the Badr Brigades and won 48 seats becoming the second party after the Sadrists.[210] After the elections, they became a key party for the establishment of the cabinet and formed a political bloc called the Construction in parliament with former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki. In turn, Sadrists, Ammar Al-Hakim's Hikmah Movement who pledged allegiance to Sistani and Haidar Al-Ibadi's Nasr Coation formed an anti-Iranian intervention bloc called Reform.[211] The Construction bloc has become Iran's main political ally in Iraq.[212] As a result, the transition process of Iran-backed Hashd Al-Shaabi groups to politics was completed without leaving their weapons.

This political attack has been frequently criticized by the Pro-Sadr and Pro-Sistani factions before and after the election. The main point of criticism is that militant groups such as Asaib Ahl Al-Haq and Kataeb Hezbollah, who are notorious in the sectarian conflict between 2004-2008, can use militia against both Sunnis and rival Shiite groups in a deterrence strategy. However, starting in 2005, the Sadrists, in a pragmatic move, entered coalitions with parliamentary candidates and participated in all general elections, winning more than 30 deputies each time. Therefore, as a matter of fact, the main opposition of Moqtada Al-Sadr to the Fatah Coalition is that he is concerned that Iranian influence will increase in the parliament and government.

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[210] Ezzeddine & Sulz & van Veen, 2018, p.2

[211] Mansour Renad (2019), Iraq's 2018 Government Formation: Unpacking the Friction between Reform and the Status Quo, LSE Middle East Centre Report, February, p. 11. Retrieved from: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/100099/1/Mansour_Iraq_s_2018_government_formation_2019.pdf

[212] Ibid.

Since his return from Iran in 2011, Moqtada Al-Sadr has reduced sectarian rhetoric and has sharply criticized Iran's political, military and economic influence over Iraq in a more nationalist tone within years and distanced his movement from Iran.[213] He advocated Iraq's approach to Arab countries and even met Iran's regional rival, Saudi Arabia's successor Mohammad Bin Salman. Moreover, Sadrists, who announced his participation in the 2018 elections, later participated in elections with the coalition named Sairoon along with the anti-Iranian Iraqi Communist Party and other formations and won the elections as the first party. Iran, on the other hand, reacted to therse moves through the foreign policy adviser of the religious leader Ali Khamenei Ali Akbar Velayati before the elections. Velayati said, "They will not allow the communists and liberals to rule Iraq."[214] Sadr also announced that he would not form a coalition with pro-Iranian Fatah. Therefore, Sadr's opposition to the participation of pro-Iranian Hashd Al-Shaabi groups in the elections is the continuation of his recent political stance against increasing Iranian influence over Iraq.

As for pro-Sistani Hashd Al-Shaabi group's attiude regarding entering politics we should focus on the attitude of Ayatollah Ali Sistani regarding the political efforts of armed groups.[215] As known, Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who ruled the Najaf Hawza, intervened in political processes when he personally preferred such as the 2005

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[213] Beston, Husen Arif (2019): Iran's Struggle for Strategic Dominance in a Post-ISIS Iraq, Asian Affairs, p.13. Retrieved from:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/03068374.2019.1636525?scroll=top&needAccess=true

[214] Mamouri, Ali (February 26, 2018) *"Iranian interference in Iraqi election stirs anger among Iraqis"* Retrieved from: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/02/iran-iraq-election-velayati.html

[215] Ezzeddine & Sulz & van Veen, 2018, p. 5

General Elections, the US and Iran's attitude towards Iraqi politics and the call for war against ISIL in 2014. In this respect, in 2017, he preferred to intervene in the process before the 2018 General Elections and opposed all the Hashd Al-Shaabi militia groups' participation in the elections without releasing their weapons including that of pro-Iranian Hashd Al-Shaabi groups which had annouced their participation before.[216][217] Sistani's attitude is again concerned that Iran might consolidate its influence over Iraq through Fatah Coalition. As it is known, Ayatollah Ali Sistani opposes the Iranian Wilayat Al-Faqih system and Iran's influence over Iraq.[218]

4.7.3. Administration, Economic Power and Interests

Hashd Al-Shaabi is led by a committee called Hashd Al-Shaabi Commission affiliated to the Ministry of Interior and thus Prime Ministry was established to demonstrate that the umbrella organization will have a state-run instutional organization. The president of the Commission, Faleh Al-Fayyad, known for his closeness to Iran, and pro-Iran Kataeb Hezbollah leader Mahdi Al-Mohandis.[219] In addition, Iranian-backed groups dominate Hashd al-Shaabi's leadership. The fact

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[216] Rudolf, 2017, p. 13

[217] Kotan, Bilge Nesibe, "Why Ayatollah Sistani opposes Hashd al Shaabi to run for Iraqi elections?" (December 15, 2017) retrieved from: https://www.trtworld.com/mea/why-ayatollah-sistani-opposes-hashd-al-shaabi-to-run-for-iraqi-elections--13337

[218] Alaaldin, Ranj(2017), Containing Shiite Militias: The Battle for Stability in Iraq, Doha-Qatar, Brookings Doha Center, December, 2017; p.5. Retrieved from: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/12_17_shiite_militias_in_iraq.pdf

[219] Ezzeddine, Nancy & Sulz, Matthias & van Veen, Erwin (2019), The Hashd is dead, long live the Hashd! Fragmentation and consolidation, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', July, 2019; p.12-15

that there are too many Badr Brigade members the Ministry of Interior and the strength of Badr Brigade's political lobbying capabilities within militia groups has been instrumental in the pro-Iranian factions' dominance of the Hashd Al-Shaabi Commission.

Badr Brigades members and Vice President Mahdi Al-Mohandis, who dominate the Hashd Al Shaabi Commission, are responsible for the military and administrative issues such as military operations, recruitment and appointments, as well as the budget. In this regard, instead of allocating adequate funds to Pro-Sadr and Pro-Sistani Hashd al-Shaabi groups, pro-Iranian groups favor themselves in the distribution of state-funded funds, using their administrative power. [220] This emerges another major problem between Pro-Sistani and Pro-Sadr factions which cticicized the unfair distrubition and Pro-Iran factions.

The reason of the large number of pro-Iranian groups in Hashd Al-Shaabi, is also attributed to corruption in fund distrubution processes. The fact that the majority of Pro-Sadr and Pro-Sistani fighters do not receive adequate salaries from the budget, is related to the choices in Hashd Al-Shaabi Commission. Pro-Sadr Hashd Al-Shaabi forces support their fighters by their donation system and businesses activities and can not recruit more fighters. Pro-Sistani Hashd Al-Shaabi groups, on the other hand, support non-salaried fighters through shrine funds and remain with limited fighters.[221].While Pro-Iran Hashd Al-Shaabi groups have significant financial resource such as more amount of salary and also Iranian financial support, can recruit more fighters to work with them.

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[220] Ezzeddine, Nancy & van Veen, Erwin (2018), CRU Policy Brief - Power in perspective: Four key insights into Iraq's Al-Hashd al-Sha'abi, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', June, 2018, p.7

[221] Rudolf, 2017, p. 12

Another conflict between these three groups is the economic activities of the primarily Pro-Iranian groups and the Pro-Sadr groups. For instance, a number of pro-Iranian groups engaged in reconstruction works in the Sunni-populated cities, which suffered greatly after the ISIS invasion and conflict.[222] As the Iranian Revolutionary Guards undertook the reconstruction works for the reconstruction of the destroyed cities of Iran after the Iran-Iraq War, Pro-Iran Hashd Al-Shaabi groups applied the same model in Iraq.[223] [224] These groups, such as Badr Brigades, Kataeb Hezbollah, and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, who are involved in reconstruction works, also enable the Iranian Revolutionary Guards to engage in reconstruction works the Khatam al-Anbiya foundation in the areas liberated from the ISIL occupation.

The fact that the Pro-Iran Hashd Al-Shaabi groups are the security forces at the border points of Iraq, which is strategically important, allowed them to control of business activities at the borders at the same time. It is known that Badr Brigades, Kataeb Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, which control the border gates such as Al-Qaim and Shalamche, collect illegal taxes on goods crossing the border.[225]

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[222] Ezzeddine, Nancy & Sulz, Matthias & van Veen, Erwin (2018) From soldiers to politicians? Iraq's Al-Hashd Al-Sha'abi 'on the march', Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', November, 2018; p. 10

[223] Wehrey, Frederic & Green, Jerrold D.& Nichiporuk, Brian & Nader,Alireza & Hansell, Lydia & Nafisi, Rasool & Bohan S. R., (2009) The Rise of the Pasdaran, Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, USA, Rand Corporation, p.56. Retrieved from: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG821.pdf

[224]Ezzeddine Nancy & Sulz,Matthias & van Veen, 2018, p. 8

[225] Ezzeddine, Nancy & Sulz, Matthias & van Veen, Erwin (2019), The Hashd is dead, long live the Hashd! Fragmentation and consolidation, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', July, 2019; p. 10-17

Therefore, the weakness of the central state and the administrative dominance of pro-Iranian groups have opened up new economic areas for them.

Pro-Sadr, Pro-Sistani and the central government argue that the economic activities of the Pro-Iran Hashd Al-Shaabi groups undermine institutionalism of the state. However, the claims that the Pro-Sadr group, like other rival Shiite Pro-Iran groups, are aimed at economic interest are important, too. In this respect, Sadrists' confrontation with the Asaib Ahl Al-Haq over the seizure of the taxi market in Karbala shows that Sadrists also seek economic power as political and armed group.[226] Pro-Sistani Hashd Al-Shaabi groups, on the other hand, are mainly the shrine protection groups and not interested in economic activities.[227] And they cover their expenses from the money donated to the shrines except the salaries paid by the state. Furthermore, Ayatollah Ali Sistani opposes these groups' pursuit of political and economic interests.

4.7.4. Religious and Political Affiliation

Although it is not the sole cause of conflicts between Hashd Al-Shaabi groups, religious and political orientation is also the reason for the political differences between these groups. Even though, almost all of the Shiite militia groups that form Hashd Al-Shaabi are the followers of the Shiite Islamist tradition of Iraq, they have entered into new religious and political positions for years, accroding the changing conjuncture.

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[226] Ezzeddine, Nancy & Sulz, Matthias, van Veen, Erwin (2018) From soldiers to politicians? Iraq's Al-Hashd Al-Sha'abi 'on the march', Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', November, 2018; p. 11

[227] Felbab-Brown, 2019, p.5

Therefore, the religious and political orientations of the three Hashd Al-Shaabi factions that we grouped differ from each other. As for the Pro-Iran group, common characteristics of the leading militia groups of this faction the fact that they accept Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Spirtual Leader of Iran, as the greatest spirtual authority[228]. The most important reason why Badr Brigades left ISCI in particular was that the Al-Hakim family began to follow Ayatollah Sistani in religious issues, instead of Khamenei during their Iraqisation process. Badr Brigades' insistence on following Khamenei also means insistence on ideological transnational characters. Badr leader Hadi Al-Ameri's statement about Khamenei explains this:

> *The majority of us believe that... Khamenei has all the qualifications as an Islamic leader. He is the leader not only for Iranians but the Islamic nation. I believe so and I take pride in it. [229]*

Considering Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as the highest religious and political authority also applies to Kataeb Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq. Especially Kataeb Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba are more radicals in this regard. Kataeb Hezbollah leader Mahdi Al-Mohandis frequently express his loyalty to Khamenei, while Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba leader Akram Al-Kaabi declared that they even would overthrow the Iraqi government if Khamanei wants it ".[230]

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[228] Mansour Renad & Jabar Faleh A., (2017) The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq's Future, Carnegie Middle East Center, April 28, 2017; p.13

[229] Parker, Ned & Dehghanpisheh, Babak & Coles, Isabel (February 24, 2015) (April 9, 2017). "*Special Report - How Iran's military chiefs operate in Iraq"*. Retrieved from: https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN0LS0VC20150224?sp=true

[230] Bourrat, Flavien & Alexandre, D'Espinose de Lacaillerie (2019) Shiite Militias and State an in Iraq, Between integration an empowerment, IRSEM - Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l'Ecole

Asaib Ahl Al-Haq likewise explains his religious and political devotion to Khamenei and Wilayat Al-Faqih, However, the leader of the movement, explained that it is impossible to implement Wilayat Al-Faqih, in the administration system in Iraq and he also implied that they respected Najaf's opposition to this theory. [231] Therefore, despite AH pledged allegiance to to Khamenei both politically and religiously, it is religiously closer to the Iraqi line compared to other pro-Iranian groups. The most important reason for this flexibility is that the origin of the movement is based on the Iraqi nationalist cleric Mohammad Sadiq Al-Sadr's tradition.

Moqtada Al-Sadr represents s religious authority as well as a political leader for Saraya Al- Salam, Pro-Sadr Hashd Al Shaabi group.[232]The main reason of this is that Sadrists consider that declaring religious allegiance means declaring political commitment as well. As a matter of fact, Al-Sadr, who previously declared his allegiance to Iranian-descended and Iraqi-born cleric Ayatollah Kazem Al-Haeri before 2004, he later rejected Al-Haeri's political directives. Plus, Al-Sadr's dispute with Sistani dates back to his father Mohammad Sadiq Al-Sadr's era and

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Militaire, Paris, Research Paper No. 68, January 2019, p.8. Retrieved from: https://www.irsem.fr/data/files/irsem/documents/document/file/3054/RP%20IRSEM%2068.pdf

[231] Knights, Michael and Sherko, Frzand (2019) Can Asaib Ahl al-Haq Join the Political Mainstream?, February 14, 2019, Retrieved from: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/can-asaib-ahl-al-haq-join-the-political-mainstream

[232] Mansour & Jabar, 2017, p.15

the early stages of the US occupation. At that time, like his late father, Moqtada Al-Sadr accused him of apoliticism.[233]

Besides, the Sadrists have adopted a more nationalist political attitude since the early 90s. The political reason for that is that they have not left Iraq and remained Iraqi-centered for more almost 30 years. Especially since 2011, Moqtada Al-Sadr has taken a much harsher attitude at the discursive level against both the US and Iraqi influence on Iraq. However, the fact that Mahdi Army was involved in massacres in the sectarian war against Sunni civilians between 2004 and 2008 had diminished its prestige. Therefore, given all these reasons, Saraya Al-Salam joined Hashd Al-Shaabi in a more nationalist and antisectarian discourse.

Sistani's supra-political stance influenced the Pro-Sistani Hashd groups. These groups that accept the Najaf tradition and Sistani as their main religious tradition obeying his will respectively.[234] They do not pledge allegiance to Sadrists, Fatah Coalition or any other political group. They also adopt Sistani's Iraqi-centered position against the transtional orientation of Pro-Iran groups and remained disturbed with Iran's influence in Iraq.[235] They declared their sole mission as protecting the Shiite shrines in Iraq and were interested in politics. As a result, apart from material disputes, the three factions of Hashd Al-Shaabi represent different traditions in religious and political terms.

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[233] Rahimi, Babak (2007) Ayatollah Sistani and the Democratization of Post-Ba'athist Iraq, Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace, June 2007, p.15. Retrieved from: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr187.pdf

[234] Mansour & Jabar, 2017, p.14

[235] Ibid. p.18

4.7.5. Integration Problem

After Hashd Al-Shaabi's major role in ending the ISIL occupation, the umbrella organzation's popularity has increased rapidly among the Iraqi people. However, the integration problems between the state and the heterogeneous organization, Hashd Al-Shaabi became more visible, after the defeat of their common enemy, ISIL. The fact that the then Prime Minister Haidar Al-Ibadi issued a law in 2016 which highlighted that Hashd Al-Shaabi will have independent status within the Iraqi army and will be affiliated to the general commander of the armed forces was the first step towards the full integration of Hashd Al-Shaabi.[236]

The Iraqi government's central authority has been shaken for years, as result of the major serial developments which harmed the country such as US occupation, sectarian warfare, political and armed struggle between the Shiites, the Al Qaida attacks, the last ISIL invasion and lastly some of the Hashd Al-Shaabi group's transnational military operations and economic and political activities. In this respect, the central government, which aimed to restore its authority, especially after the end of the ISIL invasion, aimed to solve the integration problem of Hashd Al-Shaabi, as well. The central government, After making calls many times at the discursive level, Prime Minister Adil Abdulmahdi issued a decree calling for full integration of all Hashd Al-Shaabi groups. most recently, on 1 July

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[236] Ezzeddine, Nancy & Sulz, Matthias & van Veen, Erwin (2018) From soldiers to politicians? Iraq's Al-Hashd Al-Sha'abi 'on the march', Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', November, 2018; p. 3

2019.[237] However, the three Hashd Al-Shaabi factions approached differently towards this decree and the other calls made by the state for nearly three years.[238]

In particular, the first expectation of Pro-Iranian groups was to be attached to the army, but to maintain their separate independent status. For these groups, being attached to the army means that the salaries they receive from the state budget will continue to be paid. Independent status represents independent military patrols carried out within the country, continuation of economic activities, and beyond, transnational operations with Iran.

Pro-Iranian groups have not reacted positively to the government demanding full integration or proposed their own models, so far. In particular, the more rebel groups of Pro-Iran groups, Kataeb Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba approached with suspicion with the integration call of the state in a simple way.[239] [240] Asaib Ahl Al-Haq leader Qais Al-Khazali also argued that a possible integration would proffesionalize Hashd Al-Shaabi. However, by suggesting his own modelof integration, he implied that Hashd Al-Shaabi would remain autonomous within the army.[241]

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[237] Rubin, Alissa J. & Hassan, Falih (July 1, 2019) *"Iraqi Prime Minister Tries to Rein in Militias, and Their Grip on Economy"*. Retrieved from:
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/01/world/middleeast/iraq-armed-groups-prime-minister.html

[238] Mansour, Jabar, 2017, p.17

[239] Ibid.

[240] Mamouri, Ali (July 8, 2019). "Shiite militias react angrily to decree integrating them into Iraqi forces" Retrieved from:
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/07/iraq-pmu-iraq-us-saudi.html

[241] Mamouri, Ali (July 2, 2019). *"Iraq orders militias to fully integrate into state security forces"*

The Badr Brigades, on the other hand, are closer to the state apparatus because they have involved in politics within the SCIRI , ISCI and independently and dominated the police forces[242]. Badr Brigades are also represented in government at ministerial level. Therefore, the integration of Hashd al-Shaabi as a autonomous structure into the army or law enforcement forces is mainly supported by the Badr Brigades within these groups with Asaib Ahl Al-Haq. As it is known, Badr Brigades, which have been controlling the Ministry of Interior for many years, constituting the majority of the police forcesand maintaining their autonomous capability within this structure. In this respect, Hadi Al-Ameri, Badr Brigades' leader announced that they would be a [autonomous] part of state if they would not take to control it.[243]

Pro-Iranian groups' resistance to integration or conditional integration proposals are strongly criticized by the Sadrists, especially on the grounds that they will institutionalize Iranian influence within the army with those proposals. Sadrists and Ayatollah Ali Sistani, aiming at strengthening the central government, defend all the militia groups, including their affiliated militia groups, to be integrated into the army. [244][245]

Retrieved from: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/07/iraq-pmu-iran-abdul-mahdi-shiite-militias.html

[242] International Crisis Group, 2007, p.10

[243] England, Andrew (July 31, 2018). *"Iraq's Shia militias: capturing the state"* Retrieved from: https://www.ft.com/content/ba4f7bb2-6d4d-11e8-852d-d8b934ff5ffa

[244] Rudolf, , 2017, p. 13

[245] Kotan, Bilge Nesibe (December 15, 2017). "Why Ayatollah Sistani opposes Hashd al Shaabi to run for Iraqi elections?" Retrieved from: https://www.trtworld.com/mea/why-ayatollah-sistani-opposes-hashd-al-shaabi-to-run-for-iraqi-elections--13337

As for Pro-Sistani groups, since they are not affiliated to any political group, they declared that they would abide by the call for full integration or disband their militia groups. However, the Sadrists proposed the condition that the state should have sufficient power for integration or disbanding the militia groups. [246] The biggest reservation of the Sadrists regarding this issue is that their political rivals, Iranian backed Hashd Al-Shaabi, are not fully integrated into the army. [247] Therefore, he expressed the unilateral and unconditional integration of Saraya Al-Salam may reduce Sadrists' deterrence in the political arena. Accordingly, the Sadrists expect the Pro-Iran groups to unconditionally accept to full integration.

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[246] Mansour, Jabar Faleh, 2017, p.17

[247] Mamouri, Ali (July 2, 2019)*"Iraq orders militias to fully integrate into state security forces".* Retreieved from: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/07/iraq-pmu-iran-abdul-mahdi-shiite-militias.html

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

It has been revealed that the Iraqi Shiite Islamic movement is not monolithic and contains many different groups to conflict anf fight with each other. The evolution of the Iraqi Shiite Islamic movement in about sixty-five years has proved this.

The Iraqi Shiite Islamic movement, which firstly aimed to reach the Shiite people who adhered communism, in order to guide them based on Shiite Islamic values, has evolved over time as a result of the Baath pressure and its asymmetric relations with Iran and the West, and has developed new mobilization strategies.

Iraqi Shiite Islamists, like Iraqi communist Shiites, have adopted strategies of joining the state apparatus which has been out for centuries. However, it could be seen that the Shiite Islamists had not found a space in the state apparatus until 2003, as the communists found during the Qasim period in the late 1950s. Besides being marginalized with sectarian prejudices, they were also subjected to great violence especially during the Baath Party. Therefore, the signs of the fact that Shiite Islamist movement gained a militant character were seen at the end of the 70s.

However, the Iranian Islamic Revolution was the catalyst for the Iraqi Shiite Islamic movements to gain a completely militant and recolutionary character. Considering the weakness of the Islamic movements in Iran compared to that of Iraq, the success of this Islamic revolution has ensured that the Iraqi Shiite Islamists adopted more revolutionary attitudes forming armed groups to combat Baath Party. However, the Ba'ath Party suppressed these efforts of the Shiite Islamic movements and the prominent members of the movement fled to Iran.

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After this period, ideological and social divisions between the SCIRI founded by Iran, the Islamic Call Party and Shiite Islamists in Iraq emerged. The main reason for this was that the Shiite Islamist parties in the diaspora followed Iran-oriented policies by fighting alongside with Iran against Iraqi Army consisted of mainly Shiite soldiers while the Shiite Islamists in Iraq struggle with the destruction of Iran-Iraq and the First Gulf War and sanctions imposed by the US as well as the Baath pressure. Therefore, the developments related to the Iran-Iraq War period and the immediate aftermath was the period in which the political orientation differences between the Iraqi-based Sadrist, which developed their social base and gained a more nationalist stance, and the Badr Brigades, which gained a more transnational and Iranian orientation, were sharpened and this struggle continued to the present day.

Beside, the fact that Baath did not collapse after the Iran-Iraq War and that the US became the main arbiter in the Middle East after the Cold War, the political changes in the Iranian administration led to the process of rapprochement of the SCIRI and the Islamic Party, directly or through intermediaries in the 90s, with the West and the US. Therefore, it was seen that Shiite Islamic movements could take pragmatist attitudes within the conjuncture, in this evolution process. Increasing contacts with the Islamic Call Party and SCIRI with the US in the 90s and 2000s and their support to the US invasion of Iraq made them the most important political actors of the post-2003 period in Iraq.

However, Sadrists that pointed out that those who stayed in Iraq between 1980 and 2003 had the right to govern the country as opposed to the ones who stayed in the diaspora, waged a war on the Islamic Call Party, the Badr Brigades most importantly, the US forces within the country, with his own militia group called Mahdi Army, and. That is, this period marked the beginning of the period in which the Shiite militancy could pull the guns on each other. However, Sadrists, who also entered elections and involved in governments with their Shiite rivals

during the war, showed that the Shiite Islamic movements could also focus on material interests in a pragmatist manner.

In short, the post-2003 period marked a period in which Shiite movements such as the Badr Brigades and Sadrists have not abandon their asymmetric activities and has not disband their militias, but has dominated the ministries. In other words, this was a period when militia structures infiltrated into the state and organized in an autonomous way within the state apparatus. Beside, using military power as a political deterrence, and prioritizing transnational asymmetric relations rather than the domestic and foreign policy priorities of nation-state and seeking economic interests became among the general characteristics of militia structures.

In this regard, Hashd Al-Shaabi inherited the process of evolution of rival Shiite political and militia movements. Thus, the end of the war against ISIS, the common enemy, showed that these rival formations again had different agendas. It is clear that these different interests and goals will further weaken the already-weak Iraqi central government. Especially, the possible rise of the US-Iran tension and the possibility that the transnational groups will act together with Iran at this point, could cause a military confrontation between the nationalist Pro-Sadr group, which has great military and power and social base, and Pro-Iranian groups, as well as weakening the central government. In addition, pro-Iranian groups can also experience a political confrontation in against Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who has an Iraq-centered stance.

Therefore, if the armed Hashd Al-Shaabi groups with different political, economic and social motivations are not formally integrated into the state, that they will create a greater security problem in the future for Iraq, as an unstable state in the region. As a matter of fact, these groups, within their evolution process, showed that they could create a big security risk for Iraqi people before 2014. However, the critical question is whether central government and state institutions should be strengthened in the face of independent or autonomous militias. Otherwise, as

long as the political rivalry between the rival Shiite groups continues, these rival groups are more likely to form new militia groups against the weak institutions and carry out political and economic activities using their arms as a deterrence force.

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APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

IRAK'TA Şİİ SİYASİ VE MİLİS HAREKETLERİN DÖNÜŞÜMÜ: HASHD AL SHAABI ÖRNEĞİ

Araştırma Sorusu ve Temel Argüman

Irak Şii İslami hareketinin doğuşu, ülkede 40'lı ve 50'li yıllarda hızla yükselişe geçen milliyetçi ve özellikle seküler ve komünist hareketlere yanıt anlamı taşıyordu. Şii din adamları ve geleneksel Şii toplum için yükselen sekülerizm ve komünizmin onlar için en korkutucu yanı, bu hareketlerin devlet aygıtıyla ya da sivil toplum örgütleri aracılığıyla geniş kitlelere yayılmasıydı. Özellikle Osmanlı İmparatorluğu döneminde, adem-i merkeziyetçi yapı içerisinde, sosyal meselelerinde özerkliğini koruyan Şii toplumu, tarihsel olarak Sünni merkezli iktidardan uzak kalan ve çoğunlukla merkezden uzak kırda yaşayan bir topluluktu. Bu durum onlar için siyasi olarak dezavantaj olsa da geleneksel dini bağların korunmasını da kolaylaştırmıştı.

Ancak monarşi döneminde kırdan şehirlere Şiilerin büyük göç hareketleri başladı ve şehirleşen bu kitleler tarihsel olarak dışlandıkları siyasi süreçlere dâhil olmak istediler. Şiler 1940'lı yıllardan itibaren artan bir şekilde daha kapsayıcı olarak gördükleri komünist hareketlere katıldılar. Özellikle 1940'lı ve 1950'li yıllarda Irak Komünist Partisi'nin yönetim kadrosunun önemli bir bölümünü Şii Iraklılar oluşturuyordu. Genç Şii din adamları ise, Irak Şii toplumu arasında komünizmin hızla yayılmasına ve geleneksel dini bağların zayıflamasına, geleneksel olarak değil modern dönemin getirdiği araçlar ile karşılık vermek istediler. Dolayısıyla, rakip ideolojilerle mücadele etmek için vaaz gibi geleneksel yolların kullanılmasının yanı sıra, Şii İslam temelli bir ideolojik harita oluşturuldu. 1950'li

yılların sonunda İslami Davet Partisi ile Iraklı Şii İslamcı hareketin Irak siyasi hayatı içerisindeki serüveni bu şekilde başladı.

Hareket yıllar içerisinde gerileyen komünist hareketler karşısında güç kazandı ve büyüdü. Ancak büyüyen hareket bu kez Sünni ve aşiret merkezli iktidarlar tarafından tehlike olarak görüldü. Hareket baskı içerisindeki döneminde yeni mobilizasyon stratejileri geliştererek kısacası evirilmeye başladı. Bunun yanında, İran İslam Devrimi, İran-Irak Savaşı, Baas iktidarının çökmesi ve en son IŞİD işgali gibi önemli gelişmeler Şii İslami hareketlerin militanlaşmasına, bölünmesine, farklı siyasal stratejiler benimsemesine etki ettiler. Kısacası, 50'li yıllarda komünizm ve sekülerizm ile mücadele etmek için siyasi areneya dâhil olan Irak Şii İslami hareketi zaman içerisinde birbirine rakip olan büyük siyasal ve dini yapılara dönüştü. Dolayısıyla IŞİD işgaline karşı şemsiye paramiliter ordu olarak kurulan Hashd Al-Shaabi bu farklı siyasal ve dini grupların rekabet yaşadığı başka bir mecra haline geldi.

Bu tez, bahsettiklerimizin ışığında 1950'li yılların sonundan itibaren doğan Irak Şii İslami hareketinin zaman içerisindeki dönüşümünü ve bunun paramiliter organizasyon Hashd Al Shaabi üzerindeki yansımalarını konu edinmektedir. Dolayısıyla bu tez, anlattıklarımızın ışığında, Irak Şii İslami hareketinin monolitik bir yapısı olmadığı aksine yıllar içerinde çoğalan ve birbirinden farklı siyasal stratejiler benimseyen ve farklı siyasal çıkarları bulunan grupları barındırdığını savunmaktadır. Bunun yanında bu farklılaşmada, yaklaşık altmış beş yıl içerisinde yaşanan bölgesel dönüşümlerin büyük etkisi olduğunu vurgulamaktayız. Sonuç olarak da, Hashd Al Shaabi'nin de monolitik olmadığı, aksine bu tarihsel farklılaşmanın bir ürünü olan hetorojen bir yapı olduğunu iddia etmekteyiz.

Yöntem

Bu tez, Irak Şii İslami hareketinin doğuşunu, evrimini ve Hashd Al Shaabi üzerindeki yansımalarını açıklamak için Irak devlet aygıtındaki temel tarihsel

gelişmelere ve Irak'taki bölgesel gelişmelere odaklanmaktadır. Bunun için monarşi döneminin sonunda başlayan tarihsel dönemden 2019 yılına kadar bu çerçevede yaşanan gelişmeler ve Şii İslami grupların bu değişimlere verdiği farklı tepkiler yine tarihsel bir gelişim süreci içerisinde incelenmektedir.

Bu tez aynı şekilde, yine tarihsel bir gelişim sürecinin sonucu olarak Hashd Al-Shaabi içerisinde oluşan fraksiyonların, ayrıştığı noktaları karşılıklı analizler şeklinde açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu bakımdan, bu tez, genel anlamda, 1950'li yılların sonundan 2014'e kadar Şii İslami hareketlerin ve militanizmin politik evirimini açıklamak için, Irak tarihini ve farklı Şii grupların tarihsel gelişim sürecini temel alan kaynaklara odaklanmıştır. Özel olarak Hashd Al Shaabi'yi açıklamak için ise, önceki tarihsel sürecin ışığında, Hashd Al Shaabi'nin dört yıl içerisinde ayrıştığı temel konulara odaklanan kaynaklara ulaşılarak karşılıklı analizler yapılmıştır.

Ne Tür Kaynaklar İncelendi?

Bahsedildiği gibi bu tez, ikinci ve üçüncü bölümlerde genel olarak Irak'ı ve farklı Şii grupları tarihsel süreç içerisinde inceleyen kaynaklara başvurmuştur. Özellikle Irak tarihi üzerine yaptığı çalışmalarla tanınan Adeed Dawisha'nın Irak Siyasi Tarihi'ni inceleyen Iraq: A Political History tarihi kitabı, Irak devlet aygıtının evirilme sürecini anlamakta aydınlatıcı olmuştur. Irak Şii Siyasal Tarihi'ne gelince, Şii İslami gruplar arasındaki farklı kültürel, sosyo-ekonomik ve ideolojik farklılıkların oluşum sürecini detaylı bir şeki inceleyen merhum Iraklı akademisyen Faleh Jabar ve İsrailli akademisyen Yitzhak Nakash'ın sırasıyla The Sh'ite Movement in Iraq ve The Shi'is of Iraq kitapları bu teze ışık tutan değerli çalışmalar olmuştur.

Tez üçüncü bölümünde 1980 sonrası döneme yakın tarihi daha detaylı anlatan ABD'li ünlü Irak tarihçisi Phebe Marr'ın A Modern History of Iraq çalışmasına odaklandık. Phebe Marr'ın çalışması 1980 sonrası devlet ve Şiiler arasındaki ve

rakip Şii gruplar arasındaki siyasal gelişmeleri anlamak için başvurduğumuz diğer önemli bir kaynak oldu. Bunun yanı sıra Irak Şii İslami hareketlerinin militanlaşma dönemi için dönüm noktası olan İran İslam Devrimi'nin Irak'taki yansımalarına odaklanan Sharif M. Shuja'nın Islamic Revolution in Iran and Its Impacts on Iraq adlı makalesi, İran Devrimi'nin ulus ötesi yönünün Irak'taki etkilerini anlamada önemliydi. Bunların yanı sıra Khalil Osman'ın Sectarianism in Iraq: The Making of State and Nation Since 1920 eseri Irak Baas Partisi'nin mezhepsel örgütlenmesini anlamak için kilit noktalarda önemli bir kaynak oluşturdu.

Bunların yanı sıra yine üçüncü bölümde İran-Irak Savaşı'ndaki ve rakip Şii gruplar Islamic Call Party gelişmelere Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) ve Sadristlere ayrı ayrı odaklanan makaleler ve kitaplardan da bu grupların evrim sürecini daha iyi anlamak için odaklanılmıştır. Tezin dördünce bölümünde ise genel olarak Hashd Al-Shaabi içerisindeki grup dinamiklerine ve gruplar arasındaki temek görüş farklılıklarına odaklanan çalışmalar seçilmiştir. Özellikle Renad Mansour'un Faleh Jabar ile hazırladığı The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq's Future çalışması, başka çalışmalara örnek olduğu gibi, bizim çalışmamıza da Hashd Al-Shaabi gruplarının sınıflandırılmasında kaynak sağlamıştır. Ancak bizim çalışmamamızın Mansour ve Jabar'ın çalışmasından temel farkı Hashd Al-Shaabi gruplarının farklılıklarını geniş bir tarihsel bir sürecin sonucunda incelemesidir. Yine aynı şekilde, Hollanda Clingendael Uluslararası İlişkiler Enstitüsü akademisyen ve araştırmacılarının Hashd Al-Shaabi üzerine hazırladığı çalışmalar hem grupları sınıflandırma aşamasında hem de grupların temel ayrılıklarına odaklanmak için yine bu teze ışık tutmuştur.

Tezin Akademik Önemi

Bugüne dek Hashd Al-Shaabi üzerine yapılan yorumların çoğunluğu paramiliter organizasyonun monolitik ve sadece İran yanlısı gruplardan oluştuğu yönündeydi. Özellikle basına yansıyan manşetlerde Hashd Al-Shaabi ismi yalnızca İran yanlısı

gruplar için kullanılmaya başlandı. Bununla birlikte son iki yıl içerisinde yapılan bazı önemli çalışmalar da Hashd Al-Shaabi'nin kompleks ve heterojen yapısını anlamaya çalıştı. Ancak bu çalışmalar da birkaç yıllık süreçleri göz önünde bulunduran Hashd Al-Shaabi'yi açıklarken Şii İslami hareketlerin tarihsel evrilme sürecine odaklanmadılar. Dolayısıyla genel olarak Hashd Al-Shaabi'yi analiz ederken Hashd Al-Shaabi fraksiyonlarının son yıllardaki siyasal anlaşmazlık süreçlerine gönderme yaparak açıklamak istediler. Bu çalışma ise daha farklı olarak Hashd Al-Shaabi'yi hetorojen yapı olduğunu savunurken bunu Irak Şii İslami hareketinin yaklaşık altmış beş yıllık evrim sürecinin sonunda geniş bir tarihsel perspektifle açıklamak istemektedir. Bu bakımdan bu tez, diğer çalışmalardan farklı olarak Hashd Al-Shaabi grupları arasındaki rekabetin nedenlerini altmış beş yıllık süreç içerisinde gelişen Şii İslami hareketlerin evrim sürecinde aramaktadır.

Tezin Bölümleri

Bu tez toplam beş ayrı bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk giriş bölümünde çalışmanın genel haritası ve amacı ile ilgili bilgi verilmektedir. Sıralarsak birinci bölüm tezin araştırma sorusu ve temel argümanı, yöntemi, çalışma sırasında ne tür kaynaklar kullanıldığı ve ötesinde Irak Şii İslami hareketleri ve Hashd Al Shaabi üzerine yapılan çalışmalardan nasıl farklılaştığını konu edinmektedir.

Çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde ise Şii İslami siyasal ve militan hareketlerin hareketlerin köklerini incelemekteyiz. Bunun için öncelikle monarşi döneminin sonunda komünist hareketlerin güçlenmeye başladığı dönemden ve buna karşılık ilk siyasal şii islami hareketin doğuşundan bahsetmekteyiz. Bu dönemde komünizmin neden Şii kitleler arasında yayıldığına, devlet aygıtı olan ilişkilerine ve bu ilişkilere Şii ulemanın neden tepki verdiğine odaklanmaktayız. Bu bağlamda bölümün ilk kısmı esas itibariyle siyasal Şii İslami hareketlerin doğuşunu konu edinmektedir.

Bunun yanında devlet aygıtındaki askeri darbeler yoluyla meydana gelen değişikliklerin Şii İslami hareketlere başlangıçta yayılma fırsatı vermesine rağmen, özellikle Baas döneminde Şii islami hareket üzerindeki sert baskıların evrim sürecine nasıl etki ettiğine odaklanmaktayız. Bu bölümde ayrıca seküler Baas iktidarının mezhebe ve aşirete dayalı örgütlenme neden benimsediğine, neden Şiileri ve özellikle Şii islamcı hareketleri öteki olarak tanımlamasının nedenlerine odaklanacağız. Tezin bu kısmınıon son bölümüne doğru ise artan Baas Partisi baskısı karşısında Şii İslami hareketlerin geliştirdiği yeni protesto biçimine odaklanacağız. Baas'ın Şiileri ötekileştirme stratejilerine ve aşura ve erbain gibi Şii ritüellerin nasıl protesto gösterilerine dönüştüğünü ve hareketin devrimci güdülerini harekete geçirmeye başlamasını tartışacağız. Bu bölümün sonunda İran İslam Devrimi'nin Irak içerisine getirdiği ilk küçük kıvılcımlara ve Şii İslami hareketleri ilk milis gücü ve giriştiği oparasyonu ve sonuçlarını tartışacağız.

Çalışmanın üçüncü bölümünde ise Irak Şii İslami hareketi'ni tamamen militanlaştıran ve aynı zamanda bölen İran İslam Devrimi'nin ve İran-Irak Savaşı'nın Irak ve Şii İslami hareket üzerindeki etkilerine odaklanacağız. Öncelikle İran İslam Devrimi'nin neden Baas Partisi tarafından tehike olarak tanımlandığına ve Iraklı Şii İslami hareketlerin bu devrimden ne ölçüde etkilendikleri yine bu bölümün tartışma konuları içinde olacaktır. Bunun yanında Baas Partisi'nin Şii İslami gruplarla ilişkileri yine bu bölümde de tartışılacak. Bu dönemde ortaya çıkan diaspora Şiiliğinin ve Irak şiiliğinin rekabet sürecine ve Şii gruplar arasında gelecekte daha da şiddetlenecek ideolojik ve sosyal ayrışmaların başlangıcına da değineceğiz. En önemlisi bu bölüm Şii grupların pragmatizm ve yeni stratejiler benimseme sürecine ışık tutacak. Bu bölümde son olarak 2003 ABD işgali sonrasında Şii İslami hareketlerin ve milislerin aldıkları farklı siyasal ve askeri duruşlar ve daha da önemlisi birbiriyle girdikleri devlet aygıtına yerleşme çatışmasına odaklanılacaktır.

Dördüncü bölüm ise IŞİD işgaline ve Hashd Al-Shaabi'nin kuruluş sürecine odaklanacak. Sonrasında üç ayrı grup altında Hashd Al-Shaabi gruplarının temel perspektifleri hakkında genel bilgiler verilecektir. Son olarak ise bu organizasyonun monolitik bir grup olmadığını kanıtlamak için temel görüş ayrılıkları karşılıklı olarak analiz edilecektir ve dolayısıyla Şii siyasi ve milis hareketlerin zaman içerisinde geçirdiği değişimlerin Hashd Al-Shaabi grupları arasındaki rekabeti nedenlerini de aydınlattığı görülecektir. Çalışmanın sonuçlarının analiz edildiği sonuç bölüm ise sonuç bölümü olacaktır.

Sonuç

Irak Şii İslami hareketinin monolitik bir hareket olmadığı aksine birbiriyle birçok farklı mecrada çatışan farklı grupları barındırdığı ortaya çıkmıştır. Açıkçası Irak Şii İslami hareketinin yaklaşık altmış beş yıl içerisinde geçirdiği evrim bu durumu kanıtlar niteliktedir. Öncelikle komünizm takipçisi Şii bireyleri Şii İslam temelinde yeni bir iç yenilenmeye çağıran Irak Şii İslami hareketi zaman içerisinde Baas baskısı ve Batı ve İran ile girdiği asimetrik ilişkiler sonucunda evrime uğramış ve yeni mobilizasyon strratejileri benimsemiştir.

Irak Şii İslami hareketi tıpkı komünizm takipçisi Şiiler gibi yüzyıllar boyu dışında kaldıkları devlet aygıtına yönetim kademelerine ulaşmak istemişlerdir. Ancak 2003 yılına kadar süren yoğun Baas Partisi baskısı sonucunda Şii İslami hareket bu isteğini başaramamıştır. Baas Partisi'nin Şiiler hakkında sahip olduğu önyargıların yanı sıra, bu hareket on yıllar boyunca şiddetli olarak Baas baskısına maruz kalmıştır. Bu bakımdan, artan baskılar sonucunda ve İran İslam Devrimi'nin de etkisiyle Irak Şii İslami hareketi 1970'li yılların sonunda militan ve devrimci bir karakter kazanmıştır.

Söylendiği gibi, İran İslam Devrimi özellikle İslami Davet Partisi'nin militan ve devrimci bir nitelik kazanmasını hızlandırmıştır. İran İslam Devrimi kısaca Iraklı Şii İslamcılar için özgüven kazandırıcı bir olay olmuştur. Bunun en önemli nedeni

İran İslam Devrimi sürecinde Iraklı Şii İslamcılara nazaran organizasyonel olarak çok daha geri olan bir Şii İslami hareket başarıya ulaşabilmiştir. Bu bakımdan Iraklı Şii İslamcılar benzer bir devrimin yaklaşık %65'ini Şiilerin oluşturduğu bir Irak'ta yaşanabileceğini varsaymışlardır. Ancak bu dönemde İslami Davet Partisi'nin Baas'a karşı ataklarına Baas çok sert yanıtlar vermiş. Hareketin ideoloğu ve lider Muhammed Bakır Al Sadr ve birçok İslami Davet Partisi üyesini idam etmiştir ve İslami Davet Partisi'nin birçok üyesi de İran'a kaçmak zorunda kalmıştır.

Şii İslami hareketler dolayısıyla İran İslam Devrimi'nden sonra Irak'ta bir devrime ulaşmaktan ziyade parçalanma döneminde girmişlerdir. İran kendi inisiyatifiyle Irak İslam Devrimi Yüksek Konseyi adlı Iraklı göçmenlerden oluşan şemsiye bir yapı kurarak, bütün Iraklı Şii İslamcıları İran kontrolüne almayı amaçlamıştır. Öncelikle bu oluşum içerisinde yer alan İslami Davet Partisi bir süre sonra bu oluşumdan ayrılarak İran İslam Cumhuriyeti ideolojisi ile arasına mesafe koymuştur. Bu dönemde Irak İslam Devrimi Yüksek Konseyi'nin silahlı kanadı Bedir Tugayları kurulmuş ve 1980'lerdeki Iraklı ilk Şii milis yapıyı oluşturmuştur. Bu askeri yapı İran-Irak Savaşı'nda İran'ın yanında Irak'a karşı savaşmış ulus-ötesi askeri ve siyasal önceliklerinin temellerini o yıllarda atmıştır.

Bunun yanında Irak'ta kalan Şiiler Baas baskısı altında yaşamaya devam ederken aynı zamanda İran-Irak Savaşı ve Kuveyt Savaşı gibi iki büyük savaşın getirdiği yıkım ve 1.Körfez Savaşı sonrası uygulanan ABD yaptırımları sonucunda zor bir döneme girmişlerdir. Bu dönemde sosyal yardım faaliyetleri ile Şii kitlelere ulaşan Muhammed Sadiq Sadr ve hareketi tıllar içinde büyeyerek diasporadaki Şii İslamcılara karşı Irak-merkezli ve milliyetçi bir Şii İslami duruşu benimsemiştir. Sadrcılar ve Badr Tugaylarının arasındaki çekişmeler 1988 sonrasındaki dönüşüm sürecine dayanmaktadır.

Bunun yanında İran-Irak Savaşı sonucunda Baas Partisi'nin çökmemesi, ABD'nin Soğuk Savaş sonrasında Ortadoğu'da başat belirleyici güç haline gelmesi ve

Ayetullah Ruhullah Humeyni sonrası İran yönetimine pragmatistlerin gelmesi Irak İslam Devrimi Yüksek Konseyi ve İslami Davet Partisi'nin Baas Partisi'ne karşı yeni müttefik bulma arayışlarına girmelerine neden olmuştur. Bu bağlamda, öncelikle İslami Davet ve ardından Irak İslam Devrimi Yüksek Konseyi Batı ve ABD ile yakınlaşmaya başlamış ve aralarındaki görüşmeler 2003 yılındaki ABD'nin Irak işgaline doğru daha da hızlanmıştır. Şii İslami hareketlerin ve milis grupların zaman içerisinde pragmatist tutumlar alabileceği bu örneklerde görülmüştür. Bu iki Şi İslami oluşumun pragmatizm stratejisi ABD'nin Irak'ı işgalinden sonra onları ülkenin devlet aygıtında en güçlü partileri haline dönüşmesini getirmiştir.

Ancak bunların yanında, bunların yanında 1980 ve 2003 yılları arasında Baas baskısı döneminde Irak'ta bulunan Sadrcılar diaspora partileri olarak tanımlanan İslami davet Partisi, Irak İslam Devrimi Yüksek Konseyi ve askeri kanadı Bedir'e tavır alarak ülkeyi Baas döneminde Irak'ta kalmayı tercihe denlerin yönetmesini savunmuştur. Bunun yanında Mehdi Ordusu adıyla bir milis organizasyon kurarark hem ABD güçleri hem de rakip Şii gruplardan özellikle Bedir Tugayları ile silahlı çatışmalara girmiştir. Ancak bunun yanında Sadrcılar, siyasi süreçlere katılarak devlet aygıtında yer etmek ve diğer gruplar gibi bu gücü kendi takipçileri adına kullanmak istemişlerdir. Sadrcıların ABD kontrolü altında rakipleriyle aynı kabinede yer alması bu hareketin de zaman içinde evrime uğrayarak pragmatist stratejiler benimseyebileceğini göstermiştir.

Kısacası 2003 sonrası dönem hem siyasi hem de milis grupları bulunan Bedir Tugayları ve Sadrcıların asimetrik ilişkilerini tek etmediği, milis gruplarını feshetmediği ve materyal çıkarlar ğeşinde koşarak bazı bakanlıkları domine ettiği döneme işaret etmiştir. Başka bir deyişle bu dönem, milis gruplarının silahlarını bırakmadan devlet kademelerine sızdığı ve devlet aygıtında otonom yapılarını sürdürdüğü bir dönemdir. Bunun yanında, rakip Şii milis organizasyonların askeri güçlerini siyasal amaçları için caydırıcı bir güç olarak kullanmaları, ulus-ötesi ve asimetrik ilişkileri önceleyerek Irak ulusunun çıkarlarını ikinci plana atmaları,

kendi iç ve dış politika önceliklerini belirlemeleri bu dönemin milis yapılarının genel karakteristikleri arasındadır.

Bu bakımdan Hashd Al Shaabi rakip siyasal Şii hareketlerin ve milis grupların everim süreçlerini miras olarak almıştır. Bu bakımdan ortak düşman olan IŞİD işgalinin sona ermesinden sonra bu grupların farklı ajandalarının olduğu tekrar gün yüzüne çıktı. Açıkçası bu farklı çıkar ve hedeflerin Irak merkezi hükumetini zayıflattğı açıktır. Özellikle önümüzdeki süreçte yükselebilecek ABD-İran gerginliği, ulus ötesi grupların bu noktada İran ile hareket etme ihtimali, askeri gücü ve sosyal tabanı oldukça güçlü olan Sadr yanlısı ve İran yanlısı grupları askeri bir çatışmaya sürükleyebilir. Bunun yanında İran yanlısı gruplar Irak merkezli duruşu ile bilinen Ayetuallah Ali Sistani'yi de karşılarına alabilirler.

Bu bakımdan, eğer farklı politik, ekonomik ve sosyal motivasyona sahip Hashd Al Shaabi grupları formel bir şekilde devlete entegre edilmezlerse, bu durum ileriki süreçte istikrarsız bir devlet olan Irak'a çok daha büyük bir güvenlik problemi oluşturacaktır. Nitekim bu gruplar özellikle 2014 öncesinde merkezi hükumet ile çatışarak büyük güvenlik riskleri oluşturmuştur. Bu nedenle buradaki kritik soru Irak merkezi hükumeti ve kurumlarının güçlendirilip güçlendirilmeyeceğidir. Diğer bir deyişle bağımsız ya da otonom milis grupların oluşmasını engelleyecek bir sistemin inşa edilmesi gerekmektedir. Aksi takdirde, Iraklı Şii siyasi gruplar arasında rekabet süreci devam ettikçe, bu rakip oluşumlar yeni milis gruplar oluşturmayı sürdürmesi muhtemeldir.

APPENDIX B. TEZ İZİN FORMU/THESIS PERMISSION FORM

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TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (**İngilizce** / English) : The Evolution of the Shiite Politics and Militancy in Iraq: the Case of Hashd Al-Shaabi

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE**: Yüksek Lisans** / Master ■   **Doktora** / PhD ☐

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