INTERGROUP FORGIVENESS IN THE CONTEXT OF TURKEY

DEMET İSLAMBAY

OCTOBER 2019

INTERGROUP FORGIVENESS IN THE CONTEXT OF TURKEY

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

DEMET İSLAMBAY

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

OCTOBER 2019

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

—————————————————
Prof. Dr. Yaşar KONDAKÇI
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

—————————————————
Prof. Dr. Sibel KAZAK-BERUMENT
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

—————————————————
Asst. Prof. Dr. Banu CİNGÖZ ULU
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Derya Hasta	(Ankara Uni., PSY)	—————————
Asst. Prof. Dr. Banu Cingöz Ulu	(METU, PSY)	—————————
Prof. Dr. Nuray Sakallı Uğurlu	(METU, PSY)	—————————
Asst. Prof. Dr. Besim Can Zırh	(METU, SOC)	—————————
Asst. Prof. Dr. Gülçin Akbaş Uslu	(Atılım Uni., PSY)	—————————

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name: Demet İslambay

Signature:

ABSTRACT

INTERGROUP FORGIVENESS IN THE CONTEXT OF TURKEY

İslambay, Demet

Ph.D., Department of Psychology
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Banu Cingöz Ulu

October 2019, 162 pages

The concept of intergroup forgiveness has recently been put forward mainly to understand emerging conflicts coming from the past and to and understand and examine the bases of reconciliation. The primary aim of this study is to examine the roots of intergroup forgiveness in Turkey. Within this context, in the present study, willingness to forgive outgroups is investigated –for Turks as ethnic majority group- and Armenians and Kurds as the minority groups. First, a series of in-depth interviews with people from the three groups mentioned above are conducted to understand the ideas of different group members in terms of forgiving the outgroups with whom they conflict. Secondly, the willingness to forgive the outgroups and their possible antecedents are examined from a quantitative approach. In this correlational study, where willingness to forgive outgroups is the outcome variable, ethnic glorification is the predictor variable, the contempt and defense of ingroup historical narratives (Firmly Entrenched Narrative ClosurE, FENCE) are mediators, and intergroup contact and the strength of ethnic identity are control variables. The proposed model is tested for Armenians and Turks, as well as Kurds and Turks.

Keywords: intergroup forgiveness, social identification, historical narratives, intergroup contact, and intergroup emotions

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE BAĞLAMINDA GRUPLAR ARASI AFFETME

İslambay, Demet

Doktora, Psikoloji Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Banu Cingöz Ulu

Ekim 2019, 162 sayfa

Gruplar arası affetme kavramı özellikle son yıllarda ortaya çıkan çatışma ortamlarını, ya da geçmişten gelen çatışmalı durumları çözmek ve uzlaşmaya varmanın temellerini anlamak amacıyla ortaya atılmıştır. Gruplar arası affetmenin dinamiklerini Türkiye bağlamında incelemek bu çalışmanın temel amacıdır. Bu bağlamda, gruplar arası affetme kavramı Türkiye örnekleminde, çoğunluk olan Türkleri ve Türklerle çatışma içinde bulunan azınlıklar olan Ermeniler ve Kürtleri kapsayacaktır. İlk olarak, farklı gruplardan insanların çatışma içinde bulunulan grupları affetmeye yönelik fikirlerini anlamak amacıyla bahsi geçen üç gruptan insanlarla derinlemesine görüşmeler yapılmıştır. İkinci olarak ise, dış grupları affetme isteği ve bunun olası öncülleri niceliksel bir yaklaşımla araştırılmıştır. Bağımlı değişkenin çatışma içinde olunan dış grubu affetme isteği, bağımsız değişkenin etnik grubu yüceltme, aracı değişkenlerin ise küçümseme ve grup içi tarihsel anlatılarının savunulması (yerleşik anlatının kapanmışlığı, YAK) olduğu mevcut çalışmada, gruplar arası temas ve etnik kimlikle özdeşimin gücü kontrol değişkenleri olarak ele alınmıştır. Önerilen model, hem Ermeniler ve Türkler bağlamında, hem de Kürtler ve Türkler bağlamında test edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: gruplar arası affetme, sosyal özdeşleşme, yerleşik anlatının kapanmışlığı (YAK), gruplar arası temas ve gruplar arası duygular

to the memory of Hrant Dink & Tahir Elçi

&

to people who have not the opportunity to escape from conflict and violence

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thanks to Assist. Prof. Dr. Banu Cingöz Ulu for her guidance, support, and friendliness throughout my dissertation.

Thank you, Prof. Dr. Nuray Sakallı Uğurlu, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Derya Hasta, Assist. Prof. Dr. Gülçin Akbaş Uslu, Assist. Prof. Dr. Besim Can Zırh for taking part in my dissertation committee and essential comments and contributions. Assist. Prof. Dr. Nevin Solak, who was on my thesis monitoring committee but could not participate in the defense, thank you very much for your valuable feedbacks.

My dear participants, who have played the most prominent role in the emergence of this thesis, thank you very much!

I have had the opportunity to make perfect friendships throughout my life, and now I have several families all over the world! My family in Ankara: Beril Türkoğlu, Gülden Sayılan, Hatice Ferhat, and Merve Özger; my family in Canada: Gülay Kılıçaslan; my family in the USA: Dilara Hasdemir and Serhat Bilyaz, I have always felt your presence and support as it is now. Thank you for motivating and making me feel that I am not alone when I was too close to give up.

Aydın Bayad, Canan Coşkan, Elif Sandal Önal, Ercan Şen, and Yasemin Gülsüm Acar, we shoulder a considerable burden together both academically and psychologically. Your presence is very precious; thank you very much...

Thanks to Brady Wagoner and Ignacio Brescó de Luna, thank you for hosting me in Aalborg, where we had enlightening discussions on social issues in psychology!

I am grateful to my parents, to my sisters Dilek and Zeynep (the joker), to my brother Deniz for their unconditional support and staying with me until the very end, … and to my lovely nieces Elif and Zeynep, who always make me happy.

This Ph.D. journey has been the most stressful time of my life. There is too much difference between what I imagined on my way at the beginning and now! I want to express my gratitude to my dear partner Cevdet, who has made this journey painless; thank you for being the most beautiful change of my life!

TABLE OF CONTENS

x

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"Forgiving is difficult …. Nonetheless, forgiving is necessary and desirable. It paves the way for reconciliation and furthers healing, thereby making a better future possible." (Staub & Pearlman, 2001, p. 197)

Today, many countries are plural in the sense that they are comprised of different ethnic, political, religious, cultural, and social groups. The possibility of intergroup conflict is more likely in such countries than in other countries. Aftermath of such conflicts, apologizing and forgiving at a collective level have gained increasing attention in world politics, especially in recent years when the globalized world has tried to bring many nations together. We started to hear the names of countries that we have not heard before for their past wrongdoings. Apologizing or expressing guilt is still tricky and undesirable for many nations in the world. For example, the Australian Government did not accept past wrongdoings toward Aborigines for a long time. Similarly, the acts of White Americans towards Black Americans and Palestinian Nakba in 1948 by Israelis (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009) are some examples for which the parties do not accept their past or ongoing mistakes. In contexts that involve conflict such as the examples given above, often one group is the victim, and the other is the perpetrator.

Nonetheless, which group is classified as which party is subject to change according to the testimonies of the groups. The perpetrators tend to see themselves as victims as well, even if they are accused at the same time. For example, Iran sees itself as a victim of terrorism, while many other nations see Iran as serving to terror (Bahgat, 2003). Moreover, power relations between groups may change throughout history, in such a way that a group may both be the victim and the perpetrator at different times, such as the Jews during the Holocaust and as part of Israel towards Palestinians (Green, Visintin, Hristova, Bozhanova, Pereira, & Staerklé, 2017). Thus, to

1

understand forgiveness and the dynamics behind it, it is crucial to understand why people need to forgive each other. In most situations, the conflict between parties deteriorates the relationship between groups. The scope of the conflict is pervasive, along with the reasons for it. These conflict situations range from minor tolerable disputes to intractable conflicts. They generally stem from political, religious, ethnic, and national issues, economic, social, and cultural concerns. Kurt Lewin, who is one of the first psychologists to write about conflict, claims that whether conflictual relations will be present or not depends on the tension level between groups or their social atmosphere (Lewin, 1997). The general aim in conflicting societies becomes ending the conflict or taking it into a functional and practical setting where there is no violence, destruction, and wrongdoing. However, since conflict is utilized by those who have the power in politics and maintained by these powerful means in most societies, changing the conflict may not be an aim but a normative tendency if they would like to sustain a peaceful coexistence. This tendency is possible only when the perpetrators acknowledge their wrongdoings, and the victims forgive the perpetrators.

The primary aim of the present dissertation is to investigate the intentions of minority and majority groups to forgive each other. The reason that intention to forgive is taken for both minorities and majorities is that they may position or perceive themselves as the victim rendering forgiveness, even if the cause of being wronged or sources for victimhood differ for the parties. In this light, this dissertation aims to cover the relationship between ethnic glorification and willingness to forgive where the intervening roles of outgroup contempt and historical defensiveness (Firmly Entrenched Narrative Closure) are also examined.

This dissertation consists of four chapters. In Chapter 1, the relevant literature review is introduced. First, the intergroup forgiveness literature is presented in detail. Second, the role of intergroup emotions in intergroup forgiveness is examined, and the possible contribution of contempt is discussed. Third, identification with ethnic groups from a social identity perspective is elaborated. Next, the importance of historical narratives with forgiving outgroups is addressed. Lastly, a statistical model

is proposed for this study. Chapter 2 involves a qualitative study (Study 1) which seeks willingness to forgive dynamics in three different groups in Turkey: Armenians, Kurds, and Turks. Chapter 3 is formed of two correlational studies (Studies 2 & 3) to examine the relationship between ethnic glorification and willingness to forgive outgroups by testing the proposed model. Finally, Chapter 4 contains a general discussion and conclusion about the findings of the studies.

1.1 The Scope of the Present Dissertation

According to Hannah Arendt (1958/2013), when the victim forgives, and the perpetrator has been forgiven, they are saved from being the victims of their actions forever. In Jean-Paul Sartre's words, "freedom is what you do with what has been done to you." (Sartre, 1946, p. 495). Thus, forgiveness may pave the way for the emancipation of collective selves, which does not necessarily mean forgetting the past, but to create a vision for the future by taking lessons from the past.

Forgiveness has been studied heavily in interpersonal relationships, but its place in intergroup relations has an upward trend as well. In order for intergroup forgiveness to occur, there should be a conflict, crime, or war, along with a victim and a perpetrator group. Two of the intersecting points that those three categories meet is ingroup identification and collective/intergroup emotions.

According to social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 1986), individuals see their self-concept from their categorizations to specific groups which are the primary sources of pride and self-esteem. Moreover, this theory suggests that individuals tend to see their groups as superior to outgroups by attributing positive characteristics to their groups (e.g., Breakwell, 2010; Demoulin, Leyens, & Yzerbyt, 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1979); which is one of the ways that intergroup emotions emerge (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Smith, 1993).

Anger, fear, and self-pity are some examples of emotions that occur in intergroup conflict and forgiveness contexts (e.g., Bar-Tal et al., 2009). These emotions are the most employed ones in the contexts of intergroup relations. However, contempt has not been heavily studied in relevant studies so far. Based on

the experience of my life, contempt has an essential effect on intergroup conflict and relations, and I would not underestimate and would include it in the present study since I am curious about the impact of contempt in Turkey context. The previous studies in intergroup relations, the power ad role of contempt often emphasized (e.g., Fischer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, and Haidt, 1999) which is discussed in the following sections. Hence, the present dissertation takes intergroup emotions, precisely contempt, into consideration concerning intergroup forgiveness.

Furthermore, history and historical narratives are at the core of intergroup conflict and forgiveness. If members of a group refuse any alternative explanations about the reasons for the conflict between their groups and outgroups, their historical and collective narratives tend to glorify their past. Apart from ingroup identification, intergroup emotions, and intergroup contact, the present dissertation also examines the role of ingroup narratives that focus on the defense of their history on willingness to forgive.

Intergroup contact is another factor that heavily influences intergroup forgiveness (e.g., Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, Hamberger, & Niens, 2006). It is widely supported that intergroup contact helps to ameliorate undesirable results of the conflict societies (McKeown & Psaltis, 2017). In the present dissertation, I speculate about whether the willingness to forgive, over and above intergroup contact, would be associated with ethnic glorification with the mediatory roles of contempt and historical defensiveness. For this reason, I control intergroup contact while examining the relationship between ethnic glorification and willingness to forgive.

Although the conflict environment in Turkey and relationships with minorities have thoroughly been examined in different branches of social sciences, this topic has not been studied with ethnic Armenians in Turkey, and there are only a few studies including Kurds and Turks in terms of intergroup forgiveness in psychological research (e.g., Baysu & Duman, 2016; Baysu & Coşkan, 2018; Bilali, 2012; Bocheńska, 2018). This dissertation examines intergroup conflict and forgiveness

between majority group Turks and two different minority groups: Armenians and Kurds.

In the following sections, I present the relevant literature review on the variables and relationships between those variables.

1.2 Intergroup Forgiveness

What is intergroup forgiveness? What are the precursors and consequences of intergroup forgiveness? How and under which conditions do individuals and groups forgive each other? Can forgiveness compensate for crimes or mistakes? Can feeling guilt, accepting past mistakes, or apologies from the perpetrating party, and understanding the opposite party for wrongdoings be sufficient for forgiving? Is forgiving possible for the parties who are still in an ongoing conflict with each other? Is penance a precondition for forgiving? What is the opposite of forgiving? Many important questions, as such, can be formulated and articulated in order to understand the reasons and outcomes of conflict and forgiveness. The present study aims to understand intergroup forgiveness and its antecedents in Turkey.

Forgiveness, which is described as organizing interpersonal relationships and establishing prosocial conformity between the victim and the perpetrator (Scobie & Scobie, 1998), has often been examined in interpersonal relationships. At a more general level, intergroup forgiveness is defined as the situation in which the forgiving party sees the offending party's humanity and reacts with thoughtfulness even though the wrongdoer does not have a privilege to such consideration (Enright, Freedman, & Rique, 1998). Dinnick and Noor (2019) propose a more explicit definition of intergroup forgiveness recently as "the decision for a victimized group to suppress their desire to seek retaliation against, or to avoid, members of the perpetrator group."

Although interpersonal and intergroup versions share common points, such as a reduction in the negative feelings towards the perpetrator party, there are also critical differences between the two types of forgiveness. For example, social identity in intergroup forgiveness replaces personal identity in interpersonal forgiveness; the group replaces the self at the intergroup level. The fundamental difference between

the two concepts is that victims ascribe blame to groups or a collective rather than an individual at the intergroup level. Tavuchis (1991) categorizes forgiveness under four possible scenarios: one-to-one (between individuals, which is interpersonal level), one-to-many (between an individual and a group), many-to-one (between a group and an individual), and many-to-many (between groups, which is denominated as intergroup level). That is, intergroup forgiveness cannot appear at the individual level (see Enright et al., 2016 for a broader discussion). In other words, there should be 'many-to-many' conditions for forgiveness to be possible.

Moreover, there is active political participation at the intergroup level (Swart & Hewstone, 2012) since intergroup forgiveness concerns a larger collective. We receive answers from individuals who might seem odd while measuring intergroup forgiveness. However, we treat them as a member of their groups. There has not been much debate about this before, and this is highly controversial among researchers from different fields.

Some related concepts need clarification for the intergroup context. Collective guilt, reconciliation, and intergroup forgiveness are related to each other since their contexts are typically the same. That is, collective guilt, intergroup forgiveness, and reconciliation are the three different aspects within the spectrum of conflict. Collective guilt[1] is about a group's feeling of remorse because of past wrongdoings to the outgroup. History might be read as a tool that facilitates ingroup formation; groups collect their stories about their past and shape their present according to their experiences (Liu et al., 2002). In this light, group-based guilt is conceptualized as the feeling when the ingroup is responsible for any illegitimate acts or maltreatment (Branscombe, 2004). Individuals or groups do not have to feel guilt or victimhood directly; some may experience "guilt by association" (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). Feeling collective guilt means that members of a perpetrator

---

[1] In the present dissertation, 'collective guilt' and 'group-based guilt' are used interchangeably.

group are not forgiven for their past wrong-doings (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). Collective guilt, thus, might motivate people to give support for the conciliatory acts like intergroup forgiveness. Myers, Hewstone, and Cairns (2009) find evidence that collective guilt positively predicted intergroup forgiveness. In other words, if a perpetrator group feels collective guilt, the likelihood of intergroup forgiveness increases. Thus, the collective guilt and intergroup forgiveness literature are parallel to each other, and they might be said to be co-dependent.

On the other hand, reconciliation is about refreshing the relationship between the two conflicting parties to establish trust and a peaceful environment (Enright et al., 2016). For example, a victim group might forgive the perpetrator group without reconciling. Thus, reconciliation is the next step of the intergroup forgiveness process (Borris & Diehl, 1998).

Intergroup forgiveness has so far been examined in relation with a broad range of variables including ingroup identification (Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, McLernon, Niens, & Noor, 2004; Noor & Brown, 2007), perceived victimization (Noor et al., 2008), intergroup contact (Hewstone et al., 2004; Moeschberger, Dixon, Niens, & Cairns, 2005; Tam, 2005), emotions (Ensari & Miller, 2002; Hewstone et al., 2004; Nadler & Liviatan, 2004), intergroup reconciliation (Cehajic, Brown, & Castano, 2008), outgroup heterogeneity (Cehajic et al, 2008; Islam & Hewstone, 1993a;), and common ingroup identity (Noor & Brown, 2007). Genocide is also considered within this context (Vollhardt & Bilewicz, 2013). These wide-ranging subjects have been examined for various groups such as Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, Israelis, and Palestinians in Israel, Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda, Turks, Kurds, and Armenians in Turkey exemplify how intergroup conflict prevails throughout the world.

The inclusion of intergroup forgiveness in the literature has allowed individual and collective emotions, not previously considered as one of the main predictors of political behavior, but to be considered as an essential variable in understanding and terminating conflict between groups (Shnabel, Nadler, Canetti-Nisim, & Ullrich,

7

2008). According to Noor and his colleagues (2008), creating a vision for the future should come through forgiving the past, not forgetting it. Studies in this area show that intergroup forgiveness is not always far-fetched, but that it is possible to get rid of the negative sentiments of revenge. Furthermore, it can play a crucial role in preventing the victim group from becoming a victim again and ensuring its potential to repair relationships (Noor, Branscombe, & Hewstone, 2015). By taking these possibilities into account and in the light of the findings in the literature, the relationship between intergroup forgiveness and its antecedents are presented in the following sections.

1.3 Social Identity Theory

Social identities have been relevant to intergroup conflict and forgiveness situations. Here, social identity perspectives related to willingness to forgive are examined. Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) and subsequently, self-categorization theory (SCT, Turner, 1999; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) are the most eminent theories having an impact on explaining groups' effect on determining group emotions and beliefs (Bar-Tal et al., 2009; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2006).

Since intergroup forgiveness is a construct related to individuals/citizens, groups/nations and societies/states, SIT is appropriate to figure it out, as it has been considered as the main theoretical background in intergroup forgiveness studies, bringing identity to the fore of the relationship between conflict and reconciliation (Bakke, O'Loughlin, & Ward, 2009). Furthermore, when human identity is reminded to the members of groups in conflict, their willingness to forgive tends to increase (Wohl and Branscombe, 2005). However, when social identities are reminded to the participants, namely their ethnic and national identifications, their forgiveness tends to decrease (See also Greenaway, Quinn, and Louis, 2011). This is because of the effort to see their group superior and authoritative in comparison to outgroups. Studies relying on the SIT paradigm including identification, intergroup emotions, historical narratives, and intergroup contact, achieved substantial grounds that identity-related

8

issues have made room for intergroup forgiveness (Hanke et al., 2012). Thus, social identities are of paramount importance to conflict and forgiveness contexts.

SIT is a theory of group membership, social categorization, and intergroup discrimination. Specifically, it tries to understand the fundamentals behind the questions why people want to categorize themselves to certain groups, why they prioritize their groups over other groups and try to differentiate themselves from others positively, why certain conflicts arise between groups and what are the implications? (Abrams & Hogg, 2010). That is, SIT analyzes the dynamics of the self and the group. One of the most important premises of SIT relates to the cognitive and motivational processes of positive distinctiveness as a means to understand the relationship between individuals and groups.

As a comprehensive theory, SIT can be examined at three levels: self, group, and societal (see Deaux, 2000). At the self-level, people categorize themselves and become members of certain groups (e.g., Edwards, 1998; Hogg, 2006). At the group level, SIT has the capacity to catch the dynamics of intergroup relations (e.g., Hogg, 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1979;). And at the societal level, SIT contributes to the understanding of society and social systems (Breakwell, 1993; Moscovici, 1988).

Although past researchers have a common idea that social identity is unidimensional, later researchers claim that it is a multidimensional concept (Cameron & Lalonde, 2001). Multidimensionality means involving distinct affective, cognitive, and behavioral components such as group self-esteem, self-categorization, attachment and commitment to the group, ingroup positivity, ingroup ties, and outgroup hostility. Which dimension is more important or prior depends on the context (see Ashmore, Jussim, Wilder, & Heppen, 2001 for a broader discussion). While this claim is quite valid now, how researchers approach social identity is still a matter of debate among different researchers. In a similar manner, national and ethnic identities have been conceptualized and measured differently by almost every researcher according to their research culture (e.g., political science vs. social psychology). For example, regarding national identity, Kosterman and Feshbach

(1989) differentiate nationalism and patriotism. According to this distinction, while patriotism triggers the feeling of love and pride for a nation that is about attachment, nationalism demonstrates attitudes about national superiority and an adjustment for national dominance. In a different conceptualization, Staub (1997) differentiate three types of patriotism as blind (stiff and unpermissive attachment to the nation; intolerance to criticism), conventional (conforming to the norms of the group and positive identification with the group) and constructive (critical attachment to the nation; eagerness for a change in a positive manner by questioning the acts of the group).

Following and moving on previous studies, Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan (2006) assert that these suggestions can be categorized under two modes of national identification: attachment and glorification. Attachment refers to a strong emotional and cognitive commitment to the ingroup, which refers to Kosterman and Feshbach's (1989) patriotism and Staub's (1997) conventional patriotism. Moreover, attachment to an ingroup is about feeling an emotional bond to the national group and including it to their self-concept and contributing to their groups (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & Eidelson, 2008). On the other hand, Kosterman and Feshbach's (1989) nationalism and Staub's (1997) blind patriotism can be brought under the roof of glorification, which refers to feeling superiority in comparison with other groups. When it comes to nationalism, glorification of an ingroup is about seeing one's own national group superior to others, defending this superiority and is related to nationalism and strong commitment to flag, rules, and policies of a nation in order to protect their social identity and power (Mashuri, Zaduqisti, & Ula, 2017; Roccas et al., 2006). It also justifies historical wrongdoings and individuals of the wrongdoer group and stimulates the silencing (Bilali, 2013).

The most crucial difference between attachment and glorification is that glorification includes a comparison with other groups bringing the superiority of the group to the fore, whereas attachment does not contain such a comparative element bringing ingroup commitment to the fore, and thus allows individuals to be more

critical towards their ingroups (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010). Although the two concepts are highly correlated, they can take counter roles when separated experimentally or statistically (Klar & Bilewicz, 2017). To illustrate, ingroup glorification, not attachment, is related to adverse impacts of ingroup identification, i.e., justifying the groups' past misconducts (Leidner et al., 2010). Furthermore, glorification is negatively correlated to group-based guilt, whereas there is no correlation between attachment and group-based guilt (Roccas et al., 2008). Also, high ingroup glorification predicts a lower number of victims estimated by the participants by the treatment of Turks on Armenians where Turks are the perpetrator and Armenians are the victim (Bilali, 2013).

Furthermore, national attachment contains contextual criticism and ambivalence, while glorification contains an unconditional and unquestioned commitment to ingroups. For these reasons, in the present dissertation, I want to focus on the possible effect of glorification, but not attachment. I expect a negative association between ethnic glorification and willingness to forgive. However, since the strength of ethnic identities might play an important role in willingness to forgive as well.

In the context of intergroup forgiveness, the ingroup has generally been examined as national or ethnic groups. In the present dissertation, the ingroup is addressed at the ethnic level. When individuals in these groups identify themselves with their ethnic origin, it becomes ethnic identification (e.g., I am a Turk, I am an Arab). On the other hand, when individuals in these groups identify themselves with their nations, namely the Turkish Republic, it becomes national identification (e.g., I am a citizen of the Turkish Republic). Thus, it is vital to consider ethnic identities, not equivalent to national identity. For example, Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) find a reliable and significant negative correlation between ethnic and religious ingroup identification and Dutch nation-state identification among minority Turkish people living in the Netherlands. In other words, although ethnic and national identities are not the same, they can be mutually exclusive. Additionally, individuals from the

majority group generally conceptualize national identity from their ethnic perspective; and individuals who do not belong to the majority's ethnic background are seen as outgroup members, for example, immigrants or ethnic minorities (Brylka, Mähönen, & Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2015).

In multicultural societies where conflict prevails, national identity is in struggle with ethnic or cultural identities in the context of relations between the majority and minority cultural groups. Investigating the structure of Turkish national identity in terms of its ethnocultural (the idea that brings people together on sharing a common historical and cultural heritage) and civic markers (the idea that brings people together on the same citizenship provisions, it is not compulsory to have a shared past), Cingöz Ulu (2008) finds that the more Turks support ethnocultural and civic conceptions, the less inclusive their attitudes towards minorities and the more prejudice they display against Kurds.

In a Dutch sample, participants are given passages describing the Netherlands' colonial use of Indonesia in a positive, negative, and mixed frame. Dutch identification is measured before the presentation of these passages. Both low and high identifiers feel intense guilt in the negative frame and weaker guilt in the positive frame. However, when the frame includes both positive and negative elements, i.e., mixed frame, low identifiers have higher scores on guilt than high identifiers (Doosje et al., 1998). That is, they, as low identifiers, tend to accept their groups' mistakes. Parallel to this finding, Doosje and Branscombe (2003) assert that high identifiers might elaborate more on the reasons for guilt in comparison to low identifiers. In other words, individuals' identifications with their groups might differentiate them in terms of their elaborating more on reasons of guilt.

Moreover, when individuals are firmly attached to their ingroup, they tend to ponder on the credibility of the source of the message given about their groups' wrongdoings when it comes to an outgroup. Accordingly, they are not willing to repair past harm. In contrast, low identifiers tend to accept the message given about their groups' wrongdoings in the experiment when it comes to an outgroup (Doosje et al.,

2006). That is to say; ingroup identification is closely related to accepting past wrongdoings, which in turn, depends on the source of the message given about the past. Besides, Branscombe (2004) highlights the importance of the correlates of ingroup identification, such as ingroup responsibility, legitimacy, and immorality perceptions and the cost of achieving justice in the context of collective guilt. Moreover, Roccas et al. (2006) propose that identification might both increase and decrease group-based guilt at the same time, depending on the mode of identification. Specifically, the authors find that ingroup attachment predicts group-based guilt on the condition that glorification is kept constant.

In the Northern Irish context (Protestants and Catholics), higher identifiers with their religious ingroups tend not to forgive outgroup members; and the results are similar in the Chilean context between political rightists and political leftists (Noor et al., 2008). These cases exemplify the importance of self-categorization to specific groups for individuals. Differently, in Northern Ireland, ingroup identification is a negative predictor of intergroup forgiveness only for Protestants (the majority), not for Catholics (the minority); where these two groups have conflicted for many years (Hewstone et al., 2006). Although there are similarities in the forgiveness context in different cultures, some researchers found differences between cultures in terms of correlates of forgiveness. For example, while intergroup forgiveness is related to individual and personal characteristics in Western cultures, it is found that forgiveness is related to more group-level characteristics such as group solidarity in Eastern societies (see Fu, Watkins, & Hui, 2004; Kadiangandu, Gauché, Vinsonneau, & Mullet, 2007). It is essential to study this topic in different contexts and cultures to see whether the results are similar or not.

Generally, ingroup identification (either ethnic or national identification) corresponds to an increase in intolerance towards the outgroup. Although there are findings that support this relationship, for example, the negative attitudes of Black South Africans to an outside group (White South Africans) are exacerbated by the power of ingroup identifications (Duckitt & Mphuthing, 1998), it might not be the

case every time. To put it differently, in some cases ingroup identification might not correspond to a decrease in outgroup tolerance in the intergroup conflict contexts for several reasons.

First, people might tend to accept system-justifying ideologies (Jost & Banaji, 1994) by which individuals could maintain the system along with their personal and social goals. For instance, in the intergroup conflict situations, minorities might want to gain a place in the majority group and system, and might not show intolerance towards outgroup members not to harm their interests. Second, identity might not be seen as social categorizations to certain groups literally. Slightly, its content could be changed depending on the circumstances about individuals' benefits and political agenda (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Third, people might respect the universal values of humanity, which might replace particular group identities. Next, identification with the groups is generally assessed by attachment to the groups. However, for example, high glorifiers are less likely to feel remorse for past misdeeds (Roccas et al., 2006). Thus, it becomes crucial which dimension of identification is taken into consideration while evaluating the outgroup. Last, people might find relatable emotions with outgroup members and become more sympathetic since they might have been victims of a conflict already. In other words, they might not want to give or reflect their own negative experiences to others. Thus, in a society where there is at least a minority group, ethnic identifications should be examined rigorously. Since the composition of ethnic identities is formed by the relationship between different ethnic groups, power of the state and localization (Chee-Beng, 2000), examining ethnic identifications in the context of intergroup forgiveness has much to offer. Therefore, one of the social identities that belong to individuals and stand out in the context of forgiveness between groups is their ethnic glorification, and strength of ethnic identification in the present context.

Although ingroup glorification is one of the main focus of the present dissertation, the strength of identity is paramount for the intergroup contexts, which is firmly related to group memberships and overlooked by the social identity

researchers. The strength of identification means the degree of one's feeling committed to his/her ingroup. It is similar to the ingroup attachment explained above, but they are not the same. While ingroup attachment is related to commitment and contribution to ingroup and integrating it to their self-concepts; the concern of strength of identity is determining the level of ingroup identification.

The strength of identification is a two-dimension construct. These dimensions are group-level self-investment which consists of solidarity, satisfaction, and centrality; and group-level self-definition, which consist of individual self-stereotyping and ingroup homogeneity (Leach et al., 2008). These components lead people to have both individual-level and group-level attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. Self-investment is about the level of commitment and positive feelings about ingroup and manifests itself through strong bonds with ingroup. Self-definition is about having commonalities with ingroup. For the aims of the present dissertation, the self-investment dimension is taken into consideration.

Individuals who feel a strong identification with their ingroup tend to show antipathy towards outgroup members (Perreault & Bourhis, 1999). In political settings, it is showed that the strength of identification predicts intergroup differentiation (Kelly, 1988). In other words, when it comes to political issues, group members tend to compare their groups with outgroups by seeing and showing the superior characteristics of their groups.

As Huddy (2001) claims, more emphasis should be given to identity strength for a better understanding of real-world identities. Although not investigated in detail much in intergroup forgiveness studies, individuals' strength of identification might take a powerful role. This variable is kept constant in the present study since I am curious about the relationship between ethnic glorification and willingness to forgive.

The degree of glorification with one's ingroup, might arouse strong and most probably negative emotions towards the members of the outgroups and positive emotions towards the ingroups. This, in turn, influences willingness to forgive

15

individuals in an ongoing or past conflict. Hence, intergroup emotions are discussed next.

1.4 Intergroup Emotions

Affective processes and emotions have substantial effects on intergroup relations and outgroup evaluations (e.g., Giner-Sorolla, 2012; Mackie et al., 2000). A wide range of emotions occurs after any interaction between two groups, regardless of being good or bad. That is, this experience brings out intergroup emotions. According to Giner-Sorolla (2012), emotions serve three functions: associative, self-regulatory, and communicative. First, the associative function establishes the contact between objects and emotions; and withstands any possible adjustments. For example, feeling pride when seeing the national flag or feeling disgust when confronted with minority group members are some examples where this function appears (Giner-Sorolla & Cichocka, 2016). This function might play a significant role in intergroup prejudice. Second, self-regulatory function at the group level emerges when an individual identifies himself/herself with his/her ingroup. To illustrate, collective narcissism, a type of emotional investment in inflated and unrealistic thoughts about one's group's perfection (de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009) might activate defensive reactions to outgroups and might prevent the feeling of guilt for the group's past wrongdoings. The last one is the communicative function, which allows social communication. It is shaped by what we want to tell people and accordingly, has an essential impact on intergroup relations. With the help of this function, groups might communicate some emotions, such as guilt, shame, or empathy. For example, emotional expressions directly influence the success of intergroup apologies (Wohl, Hornsey, & Bennett, 2012). Therefore, emotions are influential in conflict situations; however, they might not readily correspond in the conflicting parties. However, the importance of emotions remains unchanged.

Emotions can both cause conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007), and they can also provide forgiveness (e.g., McCullough, Pargament, & Thoresten, 2000; Tam, Hewstone, Cairns, Tausch, Maio, & Kenworthy, 2007). For example, enhancing positive

intergroup emotions can both promote social harmony among groups and endanger the pursuit of social justice and collective action among minority groups (Li, Rovenpor, & Leidner, 2016). When individuals categorize and identify themselves with their groups, they elude their identities and react emotionally to their groups as well. Therefore, to feel some emotions towards the outgroup and its members, a certain level of identification with the group is needed, as Smith et al. (2007) assert. For example, when a group likes an outgroup, individuals in the group might bear sympathy for the outgroup. In contrast, when an outgroup or a conflicting group threatens a group, individuals in the group might display anger or fear toward the outgroup (Iyer & Leach, 2008; Miller, Smith, & Mackie, 2004).

Past traumas may result in certain emotions such as anger and hatred towards the outgroups (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2008). Generally, collective emotions such as hatred, anger, fear, and pride are emphasized in intergroup conflict contexts (Bar-Tal, 2007), and such emotions must be taken into account while examining intergroup dynamics (Halperin, 2016). According to intergroup emotions theory (Smith, 1993), intergroup emotions might be more successful in anticipating intergroup behavior rather than attitudes (Mackie & Smith, 2004). In parallel with the assertions of intergroup emotion theory, when group-level self is reminded and reinforced, participants show stronger emotions regarding common disadvantage, than when the individual-level self is salient (Smith, Seger & Mackie, 2007; van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2008). Positive intergroup emotions help to increase sharing and bonding between groups (Paez, 2010) and create restorative behavior (Bobowik, Bilbao, & Momoitio, 2010).

Some research implies that forgiveness is entrenched in emotions (e.g., Harber & Wenberg, 2005). Anger is one of the emotions that predict forgiveness; it leads to decreased levels of forgiveness (e.g., McCullough et al., 2000; Tam et al., 2007). Hope is one of the vital emotions that lead to a higher willingness to forgive the outgroup (Moeschberger et al., 2005). Furthermore, trust (e.g., Cairns, Tam, Hewstone, & Niens, 2005; Hewstone et al., 2008; Noor et al., 2008) and empathy (Noor et al., 2008)

17

are found to be the strongest predictors of intergroup forgiveness. For example, outgroup trust is negatively correlated with negative emotions and positively correlated with outgroup contact and positive emotions (Hewstone et al., 2008). Trust is a multifaceted concept including ingroup and outgroup trust, trust in the political system and politicians; however, in the forgiveness context, the most frequently used one is outgroup trust.

Some studies assessed that moderate or high identification with an ingroup predicts the progress of group-level emotions (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Mathieu, Gordijn, & Wigboldus, 2006). In other words, when one's group is essential to her/him, she/he experiences the feelings and emotions obtaining from their group membership more strongly compared to those for whom their groups carry less importance. It is contended that an individual's ingroup identification with her/his group leads to more comfortable, frequent, and intense experience of emotional responses to the ingroup and outgroups (Mackie, Silver, & Smith, 2004). Additionally, ingroup identification is a predictor of anger towards outgroups regarding terrorist attacks (Iyer & Leach, 2008). Hence, intergroup emotions show that ingroup contexts, personal benefit, or harm in a situation can operate at the level of social identity and thus creates a positive ingroup and negative outgroup feelings.

1.4.1 Outgroup Contempt in the Present Context

Emotions such as shame, guilt, or anger might be the most studied emotions in intergroup forgiveness context when the relevant literature is examined. However, contempt, which I think one of the understudied emotions in the conflict contexts, has not well-built literature, particularly in psychological research. In the present dissertation, I focus mainly on contempt.

Contempt is defined as "the act of despising" and "lack of respect or reverence for something" (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2018). Furthermore, the word contempt is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as "the feeling that a person or a thing is worthless or beneath consideration" (2018). As a negative emotion, contempt has its source in two independent dimensions. One is the historical and social experiences

18

of individuals and groups, whether or not there is a specific incident or behavior. In other words, the cumulative experiences of individuals lead them to feel contempt. The other one is about situations where individuals have certain representations of and transmissions about some groups, although they might not have any interactions with them.

Outgroup contempt is defined in the psychological literature as a discrete emotion which "arises when a person's or group's character is appraised as bad and unresponsive to change, leading to attempts to socially exclude the target" (Fischer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016). In light of this definition, Buckels and Trapnell (2013) assert that contempt evokes dehumanization effects; these two are positively and significantly correlated in a refugee context (Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson, & Mihic, 2008). Furhermore, in their study on the Stereotype Content Model, Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick (2007) found that people link contempt along with some other negative emotions such as pity, admiration, and envy to some groups including poor people, homeless people, and Black people that are seen as not having enough social warmth and competence. Contempt in the present dissertation is related to two dimensions: people might have collected experiences and memories about the outgroup, and also they might have no experience but merely representations of them. In other words, there is contempt for individuals and groups who do not experience conflict directly.

Additionally, Rozin et al. (1999) state that contempt is drawn out when the social order is disregarded. In other words, contempt elicitation is possible when the generally accepted norms of a society or a group are challenged. The authors show evidence both from the US and Japan, which are different from each other in terms of their cultures and values. Nonetheless, similar results from both countries imply the cross-cultural universality of contempt.

Smith and Mackie (2008) claim that in intergroup conflict settings, individuals who are directly participating in the conflict or who are bystanders whose identifications with their groups are high are inclined to feel intense negative feelings towards outgroup members including contempt. Although contempt has not been

19

studied very much in intergroup forgiveness contexts, it may have explanatory power in terms of forgiveness in the context of Turkey because contempt gives rise to the social exclusion of the subject of the contempt in intergroup contexts (Fischer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016) and thus, might have a role to shape the forgiveness intentions of individuals.

In his recent book The Turkishness Contract (*Türklük Sözleşmesi*), Ünlü (2018) highlights the importance of emotions and affectivity in their role to understand modern Turkey's history and epistemological, psychological, and emotional worlds of individuals. As intergroup conflicts are portrayed by intergroup emotions that have significant effects on determining social and intergroup relations, contempt is examined within the context of intergroup forgiveness.

Furthermore, I propose that seeing other group members disparaged from a perception of glorified ethnic identity would lead to a more defensive stance for ingroup historical narratives. Defending historical narratives and their possible relationship with willingness to forgive is addressed in the next part.

1.5 Defense of Ingroup Historical Narratives

History is one of the most commonly referred factors in intergroup forgiveness context since conflict between groups emerges in historical processes. Approaching intergroup forgiveness without a historical background of the relationship between groups comes short of capturing the essence of the possibility to forgive. Hence, considering historical narratives becomes of foremost relevance. Historical narratives are stories about the ingroup that ingroup members tell each other, and other people and groups (Klar & Baram, 2016) and help ingroup members to create a sense of collective continuity and endurance (Sani et al., 2007). These stories are generally about the events in the group's history that represent the ingroup as fair, legitimate, and innocent, especially in times of intergroup conflict (Kelman, 1999). By this means, historical group narratives supply a haven, or a protected shell for a collective identity for ingroup members, which might be a powerful determinant of intergroup forgiveness.

In both historical, ongoing, and post-conflict situations, the ingroups consistently represent themselves as the victim, not the perpetrator. These representations lead ingroup members to idealize their history and to hide the dark sides of their past (Bilewicz, 2016). Understanding why some people are more decisive and persistent in supporting or defending their historical group narratives is also essential in the context of intergroup forgiveness, which is related to ingroup identification. Klar and Baram (2016) propose Firmly Entrenched Narrative ClosurE (FENCE), namely the defense of ingroup historical narratives, which is the degree of individuals' motivation and inclination to support and defend their versions of history and to reject the alternative ones.

The authors find that the defense of ingroup historical narratives (FENCE) is predicted by ingroup glorification, but not by ingroup attachment. In other words, individuals who see their nations eminent in comparison with other nations tend to resist alternative narratives. Also, this resistance, in turn, positively predicts the probability of willingness to behave in critical manners, i.e., exposing different versions of narratives by outgroup members. In order for there to be a willingness to forgive, individuals should have a critical point of view about their past, cultural, and political history. As Bilewicz (2007) points out, making ingroup history focal can evoke emotions at a collective level or vice versa. If individuals have higher scores in FENCE, the probability of forgiving the outgroup might decrease. In this light, FENCE might be a consequence of outgroup contempt.

In the next part, intergroup contact, which has been regarded as one of the best strategies to minimize prejudice and to enhance the positive relationship between groups, and its relationship with intergroup forgiveness is discussed.

1.6 Intergroup Contact

Intergroup contact is one of the most encountered concepts both quantitatively and qualitatively in intergroup relations and prejudice contexts (see Al Ramiah & Hewstone, 2013) and it relies on Allport's (1954) contact hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, individuals in a particular group find themselves in an improved

position in terms of their relationships with other groups on the condition that the member of a group have equal status, common goals with the members of outgroups. Intergroup contact decreases or eliminates intergroup conflict when particular circumstances are reached by bringing conflicting parties together. Especially, taken together with social identities and social categorizations of people, intergroup contact offers convenient formulations of ingroup-outgroup differentiations (Marková, 2012). Understanding the categorizations of individuals providing some insights to explore 'we' and 'they' attributions is helpful to frame intergroup contact, and subsequently intergroup forgiveness and conflict resolution.

In the intergroup forgiveness and peace context, contact has been examined broadly in many societies such as Northern Ireland (Hewstone et al., 2006), Chile (Manzi & González, 2007; Noor et al., 2008), Bosnia-Herzegovina (Cehajic et al, 2008), and Israel (e.g., Biton & Salamon, 2006; Maoz & Ellis, 2008). It is widely agreed upon that intergroup contact has positive effects on reducing prejudice (e.g., Pettigrew, 1998) and increasing forgiving tendencies (e.g., Biton & Salamon, 2006; Cehajic et al., 2008; Hewstone et al., 2006; Manzi & González, 2007) so intergroup contact is included and controlled in the present study in order to prevent its potential effect on other variables and the relationship between them.

In order for intergroup contact to be successful in forgiveness and reconciliation conditions, it should be meaningful and maintained (e.g., Cehajic et al., 2008; Nadler & Liviatan, 2004). Intergroup contact is one of the important factors in explaining the role of intergroup emotions in intergroup forgiveness context (Miller et al., 2004). Specifically, contact may increase empathy, outgroup trust (e.g., Cehajic et al., 2008), and forgiveness (e.g., Cehajic et al., 2008; Paluck, 2009) among the members of victimized groups. In this way, intergroup contact is a predictor of intergroup forgiveness (e.g., Cairns et al., 2005); higher levels of contact increase willingness to forgive the outgroup (Hewstone et al., 2004).

Direct or indirect intergroup contact can help groups learn about each other. By this means, groups develop positive thoughts toward each other, which in turn

influence their possible future interactions (Brown & Hewstone, 2005). Empathy increased intergroup contact and vice versa in the Northern Irish context, meaning that empathy and contact strongly affect each other (Moeschberger et al., 2005). Moreover, good quality of contact is a promoter of trust between groups (Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy, & Cairns, 2009).

The importance of intergroup contact has been supported in various conflicting societies such as Bosnia-Herzegovina (Cehajic et al., 2008), Rwanda (Paluck, 2009; Rimé et. al, 2011), Sri Lanka (Malhotra and Liyanage, 2005), Israel (Biton & Salamon, 2006), and Northern Ireland (Hewstone et al., 2008; Tam et al., 2007). It is evident that intergroup contact is an important variable in almost every society where intergroup conflict and forgiveness apply. In another saying, it has already been found in previous studies that intergroup contact has an undeniable effect on intergroup forgiveness, but I want to investigate the effect of other variables that can predict forgiveness on the condition that the contact is kept constant. In the present study, I want to see the effects of other variables over and above intergroup contact so that it is measured and controlled for in the model.

1.7 Mapping the Conflict in Turkey

Given an important geopolitical position in the Middle East, Turkey (Anatolia specifically) has been one of the most conflict-ridden societies in the world. Events in history are important for both ingroup narratives and intergroup forgiveness. In the history of the Turkish Republic, there are a number of events that created tension between several groups. Each party in conflict have their interpretations of the roots, expansion, and outcomes of the conflict, and therefore, their conceptions of the conflict remedy and possibility to forgive changes. In order to explore the intentions to forgiveness of these group members, we should know the backgrounds of the conflicts and perceptions of the past. Conflict includes not only physical or direct violence but also some structural elements behind it. Galtung (1996) elucidates this as an idea saying, "[c]onflict is much more than what meets the naked eye as 'trouble,'

23

direct violence. There is also the violence frozen into structures and the culture that legitimizes violence" (p. 8).

For the present dissertation, I chose two contexts where mass atrocities (i.e., Armenian massacres by Turks in the late 1800s and early 1900s, and interethnic conflict between Kurds and Turks) have been committed because of intergroup conflict that makes intergroup forgiveness a must. In the present section, reasons, results, and current situation of conflicts between Armenians and Turks that is more historical, and Kurds and Turks that is still ongoing is discussed.

1.7.1 The Armenian-Turkish Conflict

The conflict between Armenians and Turks has been named many times such as "1915 Events," "Armenian Deportation," "Armenian Revolt," "Armenian Problem," and "so-called Armenian genocide" or "Armenian Question," and "Armenian Genocide" by different parties representing different groups. Having been termed several times, one may understand how intractable the conflict between Armenians and Turks is. It dates back to the late 19th and the early 20th century, the period of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The Armenians were known as 'millet-i sadıka' meaning loyal nation by Ottoman Turks in the millet system of the Ottoman Empire (Lewis, 1961).

Having been a well-off non-Muslim community, and having an important place in the economy, Armenians were subjected to maltreatment in the late 1800s and early 1900s. The fact that the Armenians were different from the Turks in terms of both their ethnicity and religious identities constituted a threat for Turks. Since the perception that damage to the external groups within the country would increase the welfare of the country, that situation had not caused any moral problems, and many Armenians have lost their lives, and many had to leave their land (Akçam, 2006). Notably, between the years 1884 and 1886, mass killings were carried out by the Hamidiye Light Cavalry, and about 100,000 Armenians were killed in Bitlis, Trabzon, Muş, Sason, and Erzurum regions (Özdoğan & Kılıçdağı, 2012). Sarkissian (1938) points out four different reasons why Armenians complained about the Ottoman

24

Empire: the denial to recognize the testimony of non-Muslims in the courts; rights violations related to taxation; the oppression by the state officials such as rapes, attacks, and assaults; and the anger of Kurdish and Circassian civilians and the pressure applied by them. On April 24, 1915, nearly 800 Armenian intellectuals and notables were exiled (Phillips, 2012). This date was a turning point for Armenians in Turkey. From this date on, Turkish Armenians would no longer be able to continue their lives as they used to, even 1.5 million Armenian women, children and men were killed. Moreover, nearly 1.5 million of Armenians were forced to expel to the Syrian Desert of Deyr-Zor to death (Dagirmanjian, 1996). For this reason, this landmark date has gained recognition as the anniversary of the Armenian genocide throughout the world.

Especially with the pressure of Britain and France, minorities, especially non-Muslims, were granted certain rights within the Lausanne Peace Treaty in 1923 (George, 2017). Armenians were of one the non-Muslim minority groups recognized and had equal civil and political rights such as establishing religious, social, or educational institutions in their mother tongue.

The expropriation of Armenians and creating a pure Turkish economy, and reintroduction of nationalist policies (Roshwald, 2001) were the results of attacks carried out. Bloxham (2005) marks that the confiscation of the property of the Ottoman Armenians by the Young Turks was an economic consequence of the search for loyal citizens at the ideological level as defined by the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP). Akçam (2006) claims that the leaders of the CUP believed that the only remedy to save the state was the removal of non-Turkish elements from the Anatolia with the loss of the Balkan War. According to him, the demographic structure of Anatolia was changed and reshaped to create a homogenized population. The first pillar of this purpose was the liquidation of non-Muslims from Anatolia and the cultural assimilation of the non-Turkish Muslim communities.

Mostly men and boys were killed; the CUP did not display the same catastrophe and fierceness for the women and girls. The CUP ideology, of course, has

welcomed Armenian women's and girls' integration into Turkish culture, as long as they no longer live in Armenian groups but are secluded in a Muslim environment. In other words, women and girls were tolerated, provided that their Armenian identity was dissolved (Tachjian, 2009). As a result, the surviving Armenians not only were Turkified but also were forced to become Muslims. Some of them were forced to convert to Islam, but some of them just appeared as Muslims.

According to Bilali (2013), perhaps the best-known denial of mass killings is the Turkish State's disclaimer about the past harm doing to Armenians, at the beginning of the 1900s. The issue revolves around whether the mass killings were genocide or not. Most international (e.g., Bloxham, 2005; Nazer, 1968) and a few Turkish scholars (e.g., Akçam, 2012) confront with the reality of the genocide and assert that more than a million Armenians were killed because of the persecution and deportation by the Turkish military to annihilate them. However, according to the official Turkish narrative, Armenians were seen as betrayers and terrorists (Ekmekçioğlu, 2015) and in cooperation with the Russian army against Turks, which was the raison d'être for attacks of Turks towards Armenians in order to preserve their territorial integrity (Jorgensen, 2003). Moreover, Turks claim that the clash stems from inter-communal warfare (Lewy, 205) and should not be regarded as a one-way conflict.

The memory of Armenians in Turkey, in Armenia, and the diaspora is mainly constructed with the remnants of mass killings or the genocide, which in turn led to the construction of Armenian ethnic identity (Tachjian, 2009). For this reason, Armenians are expecting a formal apology from the Turkish State for the 1915 Events, which the Turkish State completely rejects.

Nazer (1968) claims that the Armenian massacre was the first genocide of the twentieth century. The 1915 Events have a significant influence on Armenians both politically and psychologically, and the effects can still be seen in Armenians in Turkey. Armenian identity has been shaped by the genocide and its ongoing negation. Additionally, the trauma of the Armenians was conveyed through generations with

narratives, stories, rituals, traditions, and art to the present day, which also has shaped their identity formation (Islambay, 2018).

The perceptions of Armenian individuals in Turkey are of paramount significance, not only understanding the discrimination they experience but also recognizing the growing polarization between the groups. As Erçetin (2014) argues, the legal arrangements related to the Armenian institutions, the court decisions, and bureaucratic obstacles that Armenians encounter are also essential parameters that enable us to understand the view of the Armenians. For example, Armenians have restrictions on property acquisition, which is one of the factors leading to an increase in the gap between the groups.

The Armenian ethnic identity has been often seen as a medium of insult for years. For instance, 'Armenian bastards' (Ermeni dölü) is used for scorning both combatant and civilian Kurds (Gourlay, 2018), and they have been seen as instigators of betrayal. There are even discriminatory and ingrained proverbs about non-Muslims, including Armenians. Some examples are "to swallow like Agop's goose" ("Agop'un kazı gibi yutmak") means eating voraciously, where Agop is an Armenian male name, and this racist statement identifies Armenians with greed; "mincing like an Armenian bride" ("Ermeni gelini gibi kırıtmak" is used to mean slow movement, indirectly aims to humiliate Armenian women. These racist and sexist statements are still used in the dictionary of the Turkish Language Association. Further, the President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan once in a live broadcast said that "Some have said I am Georgian. Excuse me, but they have said even uglier things, they have called me Armenian, but I am Turkish" (Bana Gürcü, affedersin çok daha çirkin şeylerle Ermeni diyenler oldu, 2014). Erdoğan's statement created a massive debate between the Armenians and dissidents.

On the other hand, for the last 20 years, the Armenian issue has become more visible in the field of art and culture and later with the efforts of Hrant Dink, who was a Christian Anatolian Armenian journalist, and rights activist was assassinated on 19th January 2007, by a 17-year old Turkish nationalist (who will get out of jail in 5 years)

in broad daylight, in front of the Agos newspaper building in İstanbul. Agos is the only Armenian-Turkish newspaper and Turkey's best-known Armenian voice which is founded by Hrant Dink and his friends in 1996. He was the common link between different groups that lived peacefully for centuries and then somewhat turned to enemies to establish reconciliation. According to him, the Armenian Genocide question will have closure only when Armenians can mourn for their grandparents as the Turks have done for theirs. His funeral procession united the Armenian and Turkish citizens in what is believed to be one of the largest funerals ever held in modern Turkey, with about 200,000 mourners marched in the protest of assassination chanting "We are all Armenians," "We are all Hrant Dink," and "Never Forget and Never Forgive." Many people who did not even hear Hrant Dink's name while he was alive participated in the funeral procession.

Although Hrant Dink's murder has subversive effects on Armenians leading themselves to withdrawing into themselves and emotionally re-experiencing 1915 events, it is also a 'milestone' both for Armenians and other groups. It is seen as a turning point for the Armenian ethnic identity and, embedded and silent collective memories within Armenians. On the other hand, since the funeral brought many people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds together in mourning as a collective action, Armenians thought that Armenian identity in Turkey has started to be recognized (İslambay, 2018).

Meanwhile, there were some positive attempts by the Turkish government in 2007. Armenian Church of Holy Cross on Akdamar Island, Van Lake which is included in the UNESCO World Heritage List, was reopened as a museum and after a couple of years, worship was also allowed. In 2011, Armenian Surp Giragos Church in Diyarbakır, which is the most prominent Armenian Church in the Middle East renovated and reopened to worship with the contributions of municipalities (Üngör, 2014).

Meanwhile, although the current conflict between Armenians and Turks affects the relationship between Armenia and Turkey at the state level, the problem must be resolved primarily between the Armenians from Turkey and the Turks.

1.7.2 The Kurdish-Turkish Conflict

The conflict between Kurds, who are the group who probably encounter the Turkish security forces the most, has been maintained for long years and has been named as "Kurdish Question," "Kurdish Issue" or "Kurdish Problem." Some analysts think it is a problem stemming from Kurdish military forces and some others assert it is a critical issue to be solved by listening to each group.

As the largest ethnic group in the world who do not have an independent state (Bezci, 2018), Kurds are mainly living across four different countries: Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq. The Kurds are the most populous minority in Turkey, and the conflict between the Turks and the Kurds dates back to the early years of the Turkish Republic. From the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 to now, Turkey has been dominated by the idea of nationalism with lots of non-Turkish groups have been marginalized. These previous forms of denials, lead to many tribe-based Kurdish revolts in the late years of the Ottoman Empire and the early years of the Turkish Republic. Although these revolts were mostly directed towards the secular and centralized position of the nation-state, it later evolved into an ethnonational form (Bozarslan, 2000). Although state officials claimed ethnic, political, and cultural rights of Kurds would be recognized immediately after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, there has been a continuous, systematic policy to ignore Kurds until the 1990s (Yeğen, 2010). For example, the Kurdish names of some cities and villages have been renamed in Turkish, speaking Kurdish was forbidden, traditional and distinctive Kurdish clothes were also forbidden. Along with this interference in the cultural, social, and political lives of Kurds, there was a sharp educational reform. The primary purpose of teachers working in Kurdish regions was teaching Turkish to Kurdish children, which was one of the primary aims of the Turkish Republic to assimilate the Kurds (van Bruinessen, 2000).

From the establishment of the Turkish Republic to the 1990s, the Kurdish Question has been regarded as an outcome of backwardness and economic underdevelopment of Kurds (Avci, 2018). After the September 1980 coup d'état, the Kurdish Question gained a new dimension. Under the military junta rule, radical leftist and rightist groups, academics, journalists, and progressive student groups were oppressed and subordinated for being seen as propagators of socialism (Gökalp, 2007). This is the period when the most severe persecution toward Kurds has started. For instance, Kenan Evren, then-president of Turkey, claimed that the Kurds were a group of Turks living in the snowy mountains and that the word 'Kürt' (Kurd in English) was derived from the sound 'kart kurt' while walking on the snow. This polemical inference has become to determine the State's official position regarding the Kurdish Question. That is, there exists no Kurds, so there is no Kurdish Question. It led Kurds to orient themselves in a more ethnonational way of acting.

The most vehement time of the conflict dates back to early 1980s, when the PKK (Partîya Karkerên Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers Party), regarded as a terrorist organization by the Turkish State, began to operate a guerrilla war towards Turkish security forces (van Bruinessen, 1998) and 1990s when Kurds encountered the most arduous interventions of the State (Avci, 2018). The PKK aimed to fight for Kurds' cultural and political rights. The ongoing intra-national conflict, especially in the South Eastern Anatolian region and the Eastern Anatolian region, has caused many casualties in both groups so far. Also, many Kurdish people were forced to leave their villages and migrate to Western cities. This was the first time many Turks came into contact with Kurds, who were seen as wild, uncouth, and violent. Kurds, at the same time, were forced to speak Turkish, though many of them did not previously know the language. Nationalist sentiments overwhelmingly reciprocated on the public and the mainstream media. What was happening in the Kurdish regions was either absent or distorted in the media. This shaped the collective memory and representations of Turks with regard to Kurds.

In the 1990s, during the ruling period of Turgut Özal, the president after Kenan Evren, Kurdish Question was no longer taboo, and the Kurdish Question was accepted and was started to be discussed on the political level. However, since there was no active action other than the adoption of the Kurdish problem, the issue remained at the level of discourse during the Özal period. However, after the capture of the leader of the PKK Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, in Kenya, and his arrival to Turkey, the Kurdish Question took to a new form.

Shaking the fundamentals of traditional Kemalist state ideology, the pro-Islamist Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) came to power in 2002 and is still extant. After the AKP came to power, it wanted to create an awareness in the context of minorities through the discourse of 'unity' to gain access to the European Union. It smoothed ruffled feathers of militaristic and secular discourses of previous rulers. Starting from 2009, the AKP government initiated a series of reforms including the "Kurdish Opening" ("*Kürt Açılımı*") after losing to Kurdish parties in the Kurdish regions in the local elections in 2009 compared to 2007 parliamentary elections. There were also other reasons for starting the peace process. The PKK increased its attacks against Turkish security forces that cause a great loss of lives in 2012, which was an indication of the strengthening of the organization. Moreover, AKP has begun to rethink Öcalan's role in a possible peace process, as there was a mass hunger strike in prisons across Turkey -nearly 600 political prisoners were protesting the isolation of Abdullah Öcalan and that the education in mother tongue was not taken seriously on the government's agenda- which had ended with Öcalan's call. This was effective in rethinking Öcalan's position in the peace process.

At the end of 2012, with the approval of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then-prime minister and the current president of Turkey, negotiations started with Abdullah Öcalan to disarm and to build the peace process between Kurds and Turks. The talks were promising for almost the whole country, with a positive atmosphere in general. People started talking in Kurdish more comfortably in public spaces. Kurdish-language was included in the written and visual media. Such changes have increased

the AKP's votes in the Kurdish regions. Then, the PKK guerrillas started to withdraw from Turkey passing through the country border.

The peace process was expected to take place in three phases. The first phase, as just mentioned, is the withdrawal of PKK guerrillas from the borders of Turkey. The second phase included the guarantee of the granting of constitutional, social, and cultural rights to the Kurds. Moreover, the last phase was about the release of weapons and the involvement of PKK members in active legal politics (Larrabee, 2013).

However, the negotiations of the peace process lasted two years, between 2013 and 2015. The discourse of the Kurds began to change to being legal, political actors and having fundamental human rights rather than 'national liberation' (Öktem, 2004). While reinforcing the legitimacy of the Kurdish issue on the international stage, a new Kurdish political agenda emphasizing democracy and human rights may have reciprocated on a larger audience among Turkish voters (Güneş, 2007). The pro-Kurdish political party People's Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP), and its bylaw which encompasses different groups with the attention to the diversity of religions, languages, social, and cultural backgrounds have succeeded as such it passed the 10 % threshold which is required to gain seats in the parliament. After that, a series of political hardships were faced, and people became more polarized than before: a fruitless election in June 2015 and the resumption of the armed conflict between Turkish security forces and the PKK. Moreover, AKP's fear of losing its power and cross-border policies (e.g., Syria) was also effective. That is, this cannot be regarded as a sole and sudden change of policy.

After a long-term denial, the government recognized Kurds as an ethnic group. However, the approach has evolved to "There is no Kurdish question, but terrorism problem." This, in turn, led to grassroots mobilization among Kurds, especially in the east and southeast parts of Turkey. The clashes, although varying in intensity, continue to this date.

Cagaptay (2006) argues that people in Turkey assume all Muslims as Turks disregarding their ethnicity and the language they speak. Since the Kurds were not

non-Muslims, like Armenians and Greeks, the conflict continued basing on ethnic and national identities. Minorities such as Kurds in the time of the Ottoman Empire had no problems with the state due to the empire's policy on religion. Problems began with the attempt to construct a homogeneous nation under the name of Turk and with the related nationalist discourses, or nationalist sensitivity. Despite attempts to be Turkified, Kurds have resisted this and engaged in movements in nationalist axes. Kurds are demanding some rights such as the right to be educated in their mother tongue, constitutional arrangements taking minorities into account, extended rights to local administrations, and the release of political prisoners. The refusal of these demands further deepens the conflict between the two parties.

The present study may be a step to understand civilians' intentions and then to take steps towards peace. Besides, comprehending the tendencies of the groups related to forgiveness might establish a peaceful environment and increase wellbeing (see Freedman & Enright, 1996).

1.8 The Present Research

In general, majority groups keep the power in their hands, especially in public spaces and official history (Wagoner, 2015) and minorities have generally been oppressed all over the world. Majorities, in their relationship with minorities, tend to be dominant and influential, especially in non-written rules, in public places or the mainstream media. Thus, it is a corollary that different social groups may have different points of view with regard to positioning themselves in a possible reconciliation platform (e.g., Brown, Kouri, & Hirst, 2012), because those groups experience the situations differently according to their language, customs, and narratives (Mazzara & Leone, 2001). We do not know much about the outcomes of a shared national identity for the majority and minority groups' perspectives of intergroup conflicts, i.e., the Turkish context (Bilali, 2013).

Intergroup forgiveness is a recently developed concept, and there are a few studies on this topic in Turkey. Since each society has its characteristics and conflict dynamics, it is essential to approach each conflict situation with culture/society-

33

specific determinants. The concept of forgiveness is named 'intergroup forgiveness' at the intergroup level. However, what we mean when we say intergroup forgiveness is not fully understood because the concept of forgiveness hosts many concepts such as unforgiveness, guilt, willingness to forgive, conditions for and outcomes of forgiveness, victimhood. For example, Gobodo-Madikizela (2008) claims that some types of acts are unforgivable because they exceed the borders of human acceptability. In the present dissertation, the concept of willingness to forgive is employed in order to understand intergroup forgiveness.

There are both violent – between Kurds and Turks - and non-violent (at the moment)– between Armenians and Turks – conflicts in Turkey. As Bar-Tal claims (2000), in order to understand the conflict between groups, we should understand collective beliefs and emotions regarding these groups. Given that Kurds and Armenians are the minorities living in Turkey, this study aims to understand the current positioning of these groups in the current Turkish society by looking at their willingness to forgive related to Turks, and vice versa. That is, there are three separate studies. In this light, the present dissertation first focuses on laypeople's understanding of intergroup forgiveness. Second, it focuses on the relationship between ethnic identifications and willingness to forgive with the possible mediatory effects outgroup contempt and to defend historical narratives and arising from the conflict between Turks and Kurds and Turks and Armenians from a social identity perspective. In the correlational model, intergroup contact and strength of identity are controlled (See Figure 1 for the proposed model).

One of the most important contributions of the present dissertation may be the examining willingness to forgive tendencies of both minority and majority groups, i.e., an ongoing, active conflict between Kurds and Turks and, the ongoing, silent conflict between Armenians and Turks, where Turks are the common group in the two independent conflicts. Kurds', Armenians', and Turks' willingness to forgive matter because, those inclinations have a role in shaping intergroup relations and in assessing whether societies unite or divide (see Liu, Lawrence, Ward, & Abraham, 2002). Thus,

understanding their thoughts and perceived group norms, identification with the groups, and different forms of attachment to their ingroups shape the members' intergroup attitudes, emotions, and willingness to forgive.

Figure 1 The Role of contempt and FENCE in the relationship between ethnic ingroup glorification and willingness to forgive while controlling the possible effect of strength of ethnic identification and intergroup contact

The current dissertation employs a social identity stance through which willingness to forgive is examined in the Kurdish, Armenian, and Turkish groups. There are one exploratory study and two correlational studies to explore the willingness to forgive the groups above. Hypotheses and exploratory aims of the present study are as follows.

Study 1: This study aims to find out how forgiveness is understood by the three groups in conflict. In order to reveal this, the following questions were asked: What does forgiveness mean to Armenians, Kurds, and Turks? What do they understand from forgiving? On what conditions they would be willing the forgive the relevant outgroup? What role do future intentions play in willingness to forgive? For this aim, I conducted several interviews with the members of all three groups.

Studies 2 and 3: These two studies aim to test the following hypotheses which are expected to apply to the relationship between Armenians and Turks; and Kurds and Turks.

H1: Ethnic glorification positively predicts outgroup contempt.

H2: Ethnic glorification negatively predicts willingness to forgive outgroups.

H3: FENCE negatively predicts willingness to forgive outgroups.

H4: Outgroup contempt mediates the association between ethnic glorification and FENCE, which in turn negatively predicts willingness to forgive outgroups, provided that intergroup contact and strength of ethnic identity are controlled for statistically.

I also explore whether Turks' willingness to forgive levels differs in relation to the two outgroups, Armenians and Kurds. Study 1 and Study 2 & 3 are summarized in Table 1, adapted to the present dissertation from Bauer, Gaskell, and Allum (2000, p. 5).

Table 1

Summary of Studies 1, 2 & 3

Study	Design Principles	Data elicitation	Data analysis	Knowledge interests
1	Case study, Participant observation	Individual interviewing, Audio recordings	Coding, Thematic analysis	Themes constructing intergroup

Study	Design Principles	Data elicitation	Data analysis	Knowledge interests
				forgiveness in the context of Turkey
2 & 3	Sample survey	Questionnaire	Statistical Modelling	The relationship between intergroup forgiveness and its possible antecedents

In Study 1, intergroup forgiveness conceptualizations of laypeople are explored with the help of in-depth interviews to get some reflections from the social structure rather than preferring some pre-agreed ideas on intergroup forgiveness. Since understanding the necessary conditions for and outcomes of forgiving outgroups from a culture or context-based point of view is challenging for such a topic; qualitative approaches might be helpful to grasp the culture or context-specific characteristics. In another saying, intergroup forgiveness is context-based and how to approach it is one of the most important steps in this research area.

In this kind of research, the ideas coming from the discussions in the literature are presented to the participants in survey/questionnaire forms, which is one of the shortcomings of topics such as this (Hanke, 2009). Additionally, the measurement instruments of intergroup forgiveness generally do not apply to all parties in conflict, and the scales consist of items related to reasons for, conditions and outcomes of forgiveness.

In Studies 2 and 3, I test the proposed model quantitatively, which includes willingness for forgiving and its possible antecedents.

CHAPTER 2

EXAMINING INTERGROUP FORGIVENESS IN THE CONTEXT OF TURKEY: A QUALITATIVE APPROACH

2.1 Study 1: A Qualitative Approach to Intergroup Forgiveness

Study 1 aims to uncover the culturally relevant core for intergroup forgiveness by laypeople. It explores how members of the different parties in conflict see intergroup forgiveness, what it means to them, and what are the facilitators and barriers for forgiving outgroups in the context of Turkey, by elicitation of relevant themes in three groups: Armenians, Kurds, and Turks. It investigates participants' comprehension and articulation of intergroup forgiveness and future intentions and whether there are similar accounts of justifications in terms of the relationship between group members.

2.1.1 Method

2.1.1.1 Participants

After getting the necessary ethical approval from The Human Subject Ethics Committee from Middle East Technical University (See Appendix A), I conduct fifteen semi-structured in-depth interviews with sixteen people (two Armenian participants attended as a couple). Six of them are Armenians (three females and three males), five of them are Kurds (two females and three males), and five of them are Turks (two females and three males) who identify themselves ethnically belonging to their groups. Ages of participants range between 20 to 62 (M = 35.25, SD = 13.32). Participants are reached through convenience and snowball sampling. While three participants are interviewed online via Skype, the other 12 interviews are carried out face to face. First, each participant is informed about the aim of the study and is requested to fill out the consent forms (See Appendix B). Then, demographic questions are asked to participants and the questions related to intergroup forgiveness

are presented (See Appendix C for the demographics and interview questions). All questions are open-ended. Table 2 presents participants' ethnicity, gender, age, job, the political party they vote for, and whether they have been influenced by the past and ongoing conflicts in Turkey or not.

Table 2

Demographics of Participants

P	Ethnicity	Gender	Age	Hometown	Political Party	Job	Influence from Conflict	
							Direct	Indirect
1	Armenian	M	24	İstanbul	HDP	Historian	Yes	Yes
2	Armenian	M	50	Diyarbakır	-	Worker	Yes	Yes
3	Armenian	F	48	Diyarbakır	HDP	Housewife	Yes	Yes
4	Armenian	M	31	Yerevan	-	Chef	No	Yes
5	Armenian	F	23	Yerevan	-	Linguist	No	Yes
6	Armenian	F	29	İstanbul	HDP	Archaeologist	No	Yes
7	Kurd	M	24	Kars	HDP	Unemployed	Yes	Yes
8	Kurd	M	48	Diyarbakır	AKP	Village guard	No	Yes
9	Kurd	F	30	Mardin	AKP	Housewife	Yes	Yes
10	Kurd	F	49	Mardin	HDP	Politician	Yes	Yes
11	Kurd	M	53	Konya	HDP	Teacher	Yes	Yes
12	Turk	M	24	Erzurum	CHP	Undergraduate	Yes	Yes
13	Turk	M	62	İstanbul	İyi Party	Merchant	Yes	No
14	Turk	M	24	Konya	AKP	Engineer	Yes	Yes
15	Turk	F	20	Erzincan	AKP	Undergraduate	No	No
16	Turk	F	25	İstanbul	HDP	Psychologist	No	Yes

2.1.1.2 Procedure

Interviews take place in Ankara, Diyarbakır, İstanbul, Konya, Mardin, and Van; pursuing the balance of different ethnic groups in order to reach representational equality, their geographical dispersion, age, gender, and the political party they

support. Interviews are conducted in public places like cafés or restaurants, and in participants' homes, between May and June 2018, before the presidential elections in Turkey take place on June 24, 2018, ruling out possible effects of a recent political change so that they do not affect the answers of the interviewers. All interviews except one are audio-recorded with the consent of the respondents. One interview with the Armenian couple is not recorded, so I took notes during the interview. Furthermore, all interviews are in Turkish. As long as the participants do not spontaneously address or touch upon other questions, all questions are asked in the same order to each participant to remain consistent across the interviews. The interview questions are as follows:

1. What do you understand from forgiving, and what does forgiving another group mean to you?
2. What kind of problems or tensions do you think have been there between different groups that have been living in Turkey? Who do you think are these groups?
3. Were past wrongdoings acknowledged and forgiven - or is it possible to forgive past wrongdoings of perpetrator groups? (Why, how, when, under what circumstances?),
4. How would you define 'coming terms with the past'?
5. What do you think the consequences of forgiving other groups can be?
6. When you consider the different ethnic and religious groups in Turkey, do you think it possible to live together and do you want to live with outgroup members?
7. Assuming your future grandchildren, or if I ask you to think about the upcoming generations, under what circumstances would you want them to live in Turkey?
8. Please imagine you have power or you have been ruling the country (Turkey), what would you do or what decisions would you make in order to solve the problems between groups?

However, some participants also cover some of the other relevant topics such as collective memory and historical representations; and some additional questions are asked depending on the flow of the interviews relying on the semi-structured nature. All interviews are transcribed verbatim and checked for possible problems with the record. Their mean length is 46 minutes (M = 1 hour and 3 minutes, SD = 25.51 for Armenians; M = 41 minutes, SD = 19.24 for Kurds; and M = 34 minutes for Turks, SD = 12.06). The total duration of the interviews is 10 hours, 43 minutes.

During the interviews, belonging to one of these three ethnicities, sometimes I get emotional, and sometimes I have to calm participants down. These are some roadblocks for me as the researcher. However, having been raised in a multicultural environment and closely acquainted with people from all three ethnic backgrounds, I tried to become as neutral as I could.

I also want to note that Turks are the most accessible group to recruit. Armenians and Kurds are much difficult to recruit, and many of them refuse to be interviewed. For this very reason, I have to build trust with the participants. Since interpersonal trust is quite low in Turkey (OECD, 2017), especially for the last few years after coup d'état attempt in 2016, it is difficult to convince participants to interview. After contacting with common acquaintances or third parties like intermediary agencies, I am able to conduct the interviews with Armenians and Kurds.

Furthermore, sometimes, it has become very difficult to ask questions to the participants since the topics discussed have the potentials of increasing tension and emotional intensity. I try to stay calm and impartial and to continue interviews in a smooth way.

2.1.2 Analysis

Thematic analysis is a qualitative methodological approach that permits researchers analyzing a reasonable account of data both with and without relying on any methodological and epistemological background. In other words, it is exploratory in a flexible way. Furthermore, it renders determining, analyzing, and discussing patterns or themes along with similarities and differences within data (Boyatzis, 1998;

Braun & Clarke, 2006). For these very reasons, I employ thematic analysis to identify major themes and items for the interviews which have been very complex.

Following Braun and Clarke (2006), after transcribing all data verbatim, I read and reread the data. Besides, another social psychologist coded the data. After reading all the data, we made an assessment of what the participants' statements were about and gathered them under certain themes separately. Then I compared my own coding with those of the other coder. The similarity index was above 75%. After deciding on the final version of the coding, we categorized the codes once more into the subthemes which constituted the general themes. We almost agreed on the same coding except for few negligible differences.

There are no pre-determined themes before interviews take place. I prefer to see what arose from the interviews and want to use a data-driven (i.e., inductive) approach. Then, I create codes and assign relevant data under these codes. Although there are no pre-determined themes, my analysis is partially informed by some theoretically driven concepts and constructs. In this case, those questions are related to the social identities of participants. For example, I wonder whether the responses of participants are influenced by their positions according to their ethnic groups, whether different ethnic groups have common or shared opinions in terms of intergroup forgiveness. From this side, this study is deductive partially. So I use a retroductive approach (Glynos & Howarth, 2007), which integrates inductive and deductive approaches.

In qualitative studies, it is very explicit that the researcher shoulders all the responsibility and takes the initiative in analyzing data and reaching the results. I approach this qualitative study from a cultural psychology perspective. However, one cannot claim there is a neutral stance in cultural psychology (Greenfield, 2000). If we admit that language is a type of expression of culture (e.g., Fattal, 2017), the languages the participants speak also inform how they express and define forgiveness toward outgroups. Thus, neither the researcher nor the data itself can be taken as objective, politically, or socially impartial units in this study.

42

In the next part, I summarize the findings of the qualitative study. A, K, and T stands for Armenian, Kurdish, and Turkish participants, respectively. For example, A1_M means first male Armenian participant or T5_F means fifth female Turkish participant.

2.1.3 Results of the Qualitative Study

Participants' answers to questions are primarily patterned by their social identities and/or ideologies and their political party choice. Nonetheless, responses of members of distinct ethnic groups display similar attitudes and feelings in terms of forgiving outgroups -perpetrators in their words- and living together, suggesting ingroup patterns of intergroup forgiveness.

What the participants see as conflict and what they do not might affect their willingness to forgive tendencies. Therefore, I first ask the participants whether there is conflict, disagreement, or tension that existed between different groups in Turkey. When asked which groups living in Turkey have been in conflict in terms of past or present problems or tensions, Armenian participants mention the conflicts between Turks and Armenians, Kurds, Jews, Greeks, Christians, Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Yezidis. Participants' accounts often display that Armenians generally referred to the groups representing ethnic-based conflicts, while rarely mentioning groups representing politics-based conflicts. Moreover, Armenians' accounts are characterized by their referral to various distinct ethnic groups. Indeed, among the three groups, the Armenians mention the largest range of ethnic groups, almost all of which are victim groups from their perspectives.

Kurdish participants refer to conflicts between Turks and Kurds, Armenians, Jews, Assyrians; conservatives and seculars; rightists and leftists; and Alevis and Sunnis. In other words, Kurds' general representation of group conflicts in Turkey involves ethnic, religious, and politically based conflicts.

Antecedents of the Conflict
- Power Conflict
- Othering
- Non-recognition of Rights

The Necessary Conditions for Intergroup Forgiveness
- Rights-Based Conditions
- Conditions Related to the National Integrity and Boundaries
- Necessity of Confrontation with the Past
- Rejection

Possible Outcomes of the Intergroup Forgiveness
- Dialogue
- Psychological Outcomes
- Grief in Common

Figure 2 The portrayal of the main themes and sub-themes of intergroup forgiveness.

Turkish participants refer to conflicts between Turks and Kurds, Armenians, Jews, Circassians; rightists and leftists; and Alevis and Sunnis; the difficulties that LGBTQ+ individuals and groups face, and the gender-based conflict. They also refer to a wide range of groups, including ethnic, religious, social, sexual, and political groups.

Asked about intergroup forgiveness, participants first define what forgiveness and intergroup forgiveness is. Second, they mention the premises and reasons of intergroup forgiveness. Then, they indicate conditions and circumstances for intergroup forgiveness to be present. Finally, they specify the possible consequences of groups' forgiving each other. The weight of these specific parts varies by the group

as is presented in the following sections. Following Braun and Clarke (2006), based on these constituent parts of intergroup conflict, I deduce three general themes as the antecedents of the conflict, necessary conditions for intergroup forgiveness and possible outcomes of intergroup forgiveness for all groups. The sub-themes are determined according to the characteristics of participants' answers in each group. These main themes and sub-themes are summarized in Figure 2.

Besides three themes, there are three distinct groups among all participants based on their attitudes towards forgiving outgroups. The first group consists of participants who assert there is no such conflict between the groups in question. The second group of participants acknowledges the conflict. However, they also believe that there can be a way to live together on the condition that mutual interests are satisfied. The third group consists of participants, although not many, who expressed that they would never forgive.

I explain in the square brackets ([]) to clarify what the participants meant, which are my interpretations of what they mean.

2.1.3.1 The Antecedents of the Conflict

All participants' responses contain certain elements that constitute the antecedents of the conflict. For what and which reasons they attribute to the origin of the conflict is considered. In fact, in this part, not only the reasons but also the events that preceded the main reasons for conflict are mentioned in a disconnected manner. The antecedents of the different conflict contexts which are dated back in time and structural causes rather than immediate ones are characterized by general sub-themes for each group. These are power conflict, othering, and educational factors. Although the sub-themes are the same for each group, the meanings participants attribute to those themes differ.

2.1.3.1.1 Power Conflict

According to Fisher (2006), power conflict occurs when each group desires to maximize its influence and control in its relationship with the other groups where the premises of the mutual win-lose positioning become evident over time. In power

45

conflict, the powerful side makes reference to methods such as threat, deception, and manipulation, instead of using its power in persuasion and efforts to reach valid and correct information.

This sub-theme refers to the patterns of attitudes and behaviors of different ethnic groups in question. Armenian and Kurdish participants mostly highlight the need for power and the threat they perceive from Turks in general and the Turkish state in specific. Turks, on the other hand, emphasize their need for power in terms of dominating the Turkish state since because the majority, in general, may perceive themselves as the group that knows what is important and just, what needs to be done, and what actions are to be taken. The following excerpt points out the need for the power of Turks and their perceived threat by an Armenian participant:

> On the largest scale, there was trying to create a homogeneous society, but it does not happen. I mean, relative success is achieved, but the traces left behind are more than their achievements. Then the genocide..., an identity is tried to be assimilated and killed for the aim of destroying it (A1_M).

As a result of the threat perceived by the Ottoman Empire in its downturn, the Ottomans started to seek and endorse a singular identity: "one race, one language, and one religion," which in turn prepare the grounds for disaggregation of peoples are marked by an Armenian participant as follows:

> In the past, there were no big problems, everyone was inoffensive and unobtrusive. However, Armenians, Greeks, and Jews had become enemies in the last period of the Ottoman Empire. One language, one religion, one race… (A3_F).

This participant highlights the past wrongdoings of the Turkish side and exemplifies a recent treatment of civilians to Kurds. Another participant acknowledges that other groups besides Turks also have this need for power:

> The ego, the need for peoples to acquire and manage land and power... Because of such needs, many ethnic groups living here wanted to strengthen themselves in some way. Together with the strengthening of the Ottoman state was manifested in Ottoman Anatolia in Turkey. Many local kingdoms in the east, the Armenian kingdom, and later the Assyrians, and the followers of the Kurds in their wake, sought land and power for themselves. This is what they wanted, and of course, they were right… (A6_F).

She understands that various ethnic groups wanted to have an autonomous structure. However, she finds it quite wrong to do so by using oppression mechanisms and destroying people and their properties:

> When the Ottomans started to see the Armenians as a threat with increasing nationalism, they wanted to destroy the Armenians with the idea of creating a pure nation in Anatolia. That is, they [Ottomans] wanted to break their dominance. Likewise, the same thing happened to the Kurds. Kurds have also rebelled so much that they [Ottomans] tried to suppress them in this way. Together with the Armenians, many Syrians and non-Muslims were deported and slaughtered (A6_F).

Another Armenian participant points to some wrong policies to obtain power and 'purify' the nation from on-Muslim 'threats' which had led to undesirable results, and in turn, Armenians were adversely affected:

> The people were intended to kill, and also their property was attempted... An ethnicity was attempted totally. One of the biggest mistakes was collaborating with the Committee for Union and Progress. Because the deputies sent to death under the name of the exile, the Armenian great figures…They [Turks] cannot believe it (A2_M).

Turks in the present study generally regard the Kurds as the group with which they are in conflict and I observe that they are more silent about the other groups. A Turkish participant believes that the conflict between Kurds and Turks will be solved by laypeople in Turkey, especially those who have seriously been influenced by the outcomes of the conflict:

> It should be discussed under a common denominator. But in my opinion, this can be corrected by reforms that are more likely to be demanded by the people than by politics. Instead of the speech of the politicians…Those living in those regions, there are both Kurds and Turks in Diyarbakir. For example, there may be a leader among the Turks, and among the people a leader or a family who could lead the Kurds… I think it should be done by laypeople who can be the leader. They have to come from the people. For instance, I think that there should be people among the people who could be leaders among the Turks and among the Kurds who might be the leader, or by the people who can be a family or a leader. They have to be commoners (T3_M).

Power conflict generally recounts the nationalist sentiments of the majority, namely Turks, by the respondents. The following participant thinks that banal

nationalism is used by the majority group, Turks; she states other groups' using victim language frequently, emphasizing the need of groups' showing empathy towards each other at the same time.

> I think that the Turks have embraced the banal nationalism in their relations with other minorities in Turkey. Other parties may be using the victim language too much. When this happens, while one party says "we never do genocide", on the other side there would be a perception that only their losses have occurred. To lower this, I think groups need to show empathy towards each other (T5_F).

Another participant admits the mistaken nationalist acts of the Turks in his own way, indicating:

> In the 90s, there were counter-guerrilla movements, state structures and so on, and these were big mistakes. If this dirty period were it not for, perhaps the stronger side could be the Turkish side at the table. But big mistakes were made. There were unsolved murders, no one who knew them already could not refuse this argument, they happened. The nationalist fractions also admit that these happened (T5_M).

Some of the Turkish participants mention that the educational system is inadequate in addressing the regional needs of people. One interviewee mentions the governments' lack of action in relation to educational problems.

> Let me tell you the mistakes made by the Turkish side. I think the main point of the problem is lack of education. In Southeastern and Eastern Anatolia, there is a shortage of education. In other words, if you cannot give a certain level of education to people, this time they resort to different ways… It is a mistake that the state did not support the educational system in the East as much as it did in the West (T5_M).

The above quotation implies that a lack of educational opportunities in the Eastern regions of Turkey gives rise to the 'terror' problem. The mainstream 'Kurds should be educated' discourse can be seen here. The educational solutions by nationalist Turks that focus on the Kurdish Question can be essentially regarded as a subtext of assimilation which is an outcome of dominance. Besides, some of the Turkish participants settle 'terror' once and for all for being the sole reason the conflict between Kurds and Turks in Turkey:

Terror ... Terror, of course, what else could it be? (T4_F)

Of course, every person has the right to seek owns rights... But of course, I'm against making it illegally and by the use of terror and violence (T5_M).

In sum, Armenians, Kurds, and Turks have something to say on power conflict but their accounts often grounded on different constructions since almost all conflicts between groups are pertinent to power, whether indirectly or directly (Coleman, 2006). To illustrate, while Armenians and Kurds generally see the power as a negative and an augmenter factor of the conflict, Turks see the power as a must-have phenomenon.

2.1.3.1.2 Othering

In Lister's words, othering is a "process of differentiation and demarcation, by which the line is drawn between 'us' and 'them' – between the more and the less powerful –and through which social distance is established and maintained" (2004, p. 101). In this light, othering is functional for buttressing identity for the majority groups. Jensen (2011) claims that othering stands at the core of identity formation process and subordinate people are often relegated to lower in status both in discourse and action. Moreover, the majority has the power to describe, where the other is represented as inferior. The interviews support the general discourse on othering and discrimination reported in previous studies. Othering might be both an antecedent and a consequence of the conflict. However, it is taken as an antecedent is this context. This subtheme represents how Armenians and Kurds in Turkey perceive themselves as individuals and as a group in the eyes of other groups.

The following excerpt shows how an Armenian interviewee feels quite uncomfortable with the othering discourse and behavior of some of Turks, but wants to live with other groups at the same time:

While there is still a chance of living together in fraternity, it is the biggest mistake to offend other people by saying 'only us'. Instead of winning these people over, they act against them. When they can take those people with them, they Those people are, of course, resisting justifiably (A3_F).

Almost all Armenian participants agree upon the impossibility of living together because of the othering mechanisms leading contempt. One participant illustrates this issue by giving a recent experience:

> Just yesterday, a man emptied the rubbish container in front of Surp Takavor Church [in İstanbul]. On the one hand, you will say that Allah's house is the place of worship, they are counting Jesus, as the prophet, they take Jesus where he worshiped and they dump the garbage. How to live together? (A2_M)

Another Armenian participant brings attention to prejudice and discrimination towards non-Muslim people in general:

> There is huge discrimination when we look at it from another point of view. They say 'we have done nothing, our ancestors have done, what does it have to do with us' but when you look at, you see too much discrimination in the daily life against the non-Muslim people. (A1_M)

The following Kurdish participant claims the necessity of showing each other respect and breaking down the taboos and prejudices which cause conflict between groups:

> Everyone has to tolerate each other fraternally. So, it is possible to live together, but the conflict continues and there will always be uneasiness. I don't know…this or that political opinion. Some wear headscarves, some walk around bareheaded, some naked (K1_M).

Another Kurdish participant, on the other hand, asserts that there is tolerance between different ethnic and religious groups, representing the second group of participants who are willing to forgive. She believes that the disagreements are created by politicians and political elites:

> It's a beautiful life. And all kinds of people with Arabs, Kurds, Circassians, and Turks... Assyrians, Armenians, Yezidis... They get along. There's tolerance. Without the downward reflections of the polarization of the upper layer, there is no problem with the tradesmen, peasants, laborers, and farmers (K3_F).

The quotation above specifies the conflict is conceived by the upper layer, namely political elites, which constituted the other subtheme, the source of disagreement. Not only Kurds but also some Armenian participants touch upon the

50

difficulties that Kurds face in daily life. An Armenian participant exemplifies the prejudice towards Kurds due to physical appearance:

> I think the Kurds undergo more than the Armenians because there is a physical distinction. Some of them are darker-skinned. Once at Ataturk airport, we are all passing, we got off the subway, we all have suitcases. Every time, they're stopping a Kurd, they're opening their bag. That is enough! Are you a whittler? Thus, we are not equal, and in order to achieve equality, the mentality needs to be transformed and changed (A1_M).

> Another Kurdish participant says:

> We did not forget the construction worker who was killed for speaking Kurdish in Antalya. He didn't do anything; he only spoke Kurdish. They don't want us; they don't accept us in any way. We have no problem with them, they have a problem with us. (A3_F).

The above quotation implies that discrimination and prejudice in everyday life create the 'we/you,' 'we/they,' or 'us/them' dichotomy which serves reasonable recital of the facts in intergroup relations.

2.1.3.1.3 Non-recognition of Rights

The last sub-theme of the antecedents of different contexts of conflict is non-recognition of rights. This sub-theme encompasses regional lack of education, the need for educational reforms and the demands of language which are illustrated by the following excerpts from participants three ethnic backgrounds.

Kurds see not being educated in Kurdish is one of the anterior of the conflict between Kurds and Turks. Moreover, solving this problem might also facilitate the process of forgiveness:

> There were some demands of Kurds in the peace process. Education in the mother tongue was one of the demands (K5_M).

> An Armenian participant, having been educated in his mother-tongue in Armenian schools emphasizes the need for education in mother-tongue also for Kurds:

> After that, very basic rights are not given, in other words, the right to education in the mother tongue, I don't know…The right to dance in one's music…They had busted a wedding that was playing Kurdish music. That's so funny (A1_M).

51

Another Armenian participant illustrates the silence in history lessons and thinks that apology can come with regulations in education:

> I studied at the Armenian school, I was at the Armenian school until the end of high school, and in the history classes we received, nothing about 1915 would ever have passed. Nothing positive or negative passed and I would not see any historical thing about a minority group. There is not Armenian history, Kurdish history, even the history of prehistoric people. Only Ottoman History and History of the Republic [Turkish Republic]. We just grew up seeing them and we had no idea [about other histories]. Only the information we receive from the family, what our family tells us, the information we watched on television… So the children are oriented in that way. If we start with education, it can be improved. Anyway, a pardon, an apology would be possible (A6_F).

2.1.3.2 Necessary Conditions for Intergroup Forgiveness

Some participants highlight the necessity of certain conditions in order forgiveness to start budding, while some of them totally reject the possibility of forgiving outgroups for the past harm doings. There are four general sub-themes on the necessary conditions for intergroup forgiveness. These are rights-based conditions, conditions related to the national integrity and boundaries, the necessity of confrontation with the past, and rejection. In the following sections, sub-themes with respect to three ethnic groups are presented.

2.1.3.2.1 Rights-Based Conditions

Rights-based conditions involve a wide range of claims as a result of the perceived discrimination of the minority groups and some members of the majority group. While it is related to apology and recognition, returning historical lands for Armenians, it is much more related to the demands like peace and democracy and education in mother tongue for Kurdish people.

Albeit, more than 100 years have passed since the events of 1915 and there is an independent state of Armenia at the moment, those seem not to make sense for Turkey Armenians because they still see themselves as the real owners of the land and show an emotional commitment. The following quote from an Armenian interviewee, who says that although the wounds will never be healed and the past will never be

forgotten, the possibility of forgiveness can be discussed if their historical lands are returned.

> How can it be resolved? How can a little bit of the pain be mitigated? This wound will never heal; I can't help it. More than half of the land we call Turkey today is actually the land ancestors of the Armenians. Even if we accept it or not, this is the case… This is the Armenian land, and what we know as Anatolia means Western Armenia. First of all, in order there to be détente or to decrease the dosage [of the conflict], there should be the unconditional return of the lands. Or, the establishment of commitment [of Armenians] to these lands in a more realistic way. It is necessary to make visits to these lands in a hassle-free way, to obtain property, even those who are alive must be returned their goods and properties…If we can do that, the hostility and hatred will disappear to some extent (A2_M).

An Armenian participant believes that education is the most important element for people to forgive each other and live together, and this has to be reformed. She states:

> Even though we live in rich geography, there has always been such an effort to prevail. War and conflict have always been in Turkey; I think it continues in the Anatolian land now. When we go to another country, another continent, I can say such a thing [living together] is possible but very difficult in Turkey. Maybe in the future, but so much effort is needed. I think education is the most important. Education has to change first. With education, people need to change their perspectives and obtain a different understanding (A6_F).

Apology, as a very important factor to pave the way for forgiveness, is highlighted by the Armenian participants frequently as a demanded right. They express both political and an emotional need. They also mention the possible outcomes of the apology. The following excerpt by an Armenian participant shows the emotional importance of the apology for the past wrongdoings from the Turkish side:

> Personally, of course, not in the concrete sense, but in an abstract sense, I will certainly accept the apology when I think of the past conditions and mistakes. I can forgive since I believe in a verbal apology for the past harm doing. However, it is difficult for me to forgive the harm doing I witness; I think I cannot forgive those I have witnessed (A6_F).

There is an important point that the above quote marks. Although the above participant accepts and welcomes the apology for past harm doings which she does

not directly experience or is not exposed to, which is 'guilt by association' (Doosje et al., 1998); it is seen that she does not accept the apology for the harm doings she has witnessed.

Another Armenian participant illustrates and differentiates this dilemma of accepting an apology from the descendants of the past and the present perpetrators:

> I have to break it up first. Now, yes, there was a genocide and I have a memory of it, I have traces of it. But there are three generations, I cannot almost establish a direct connection... Why so, because once I have no [direct] memory of it, the narrative of it did not come to me. I'm so disconnected from that story that it didn't come to me that far. I can't make this connection ...Well, where do you get into this conflict? In the media, here and there. Since a hate speech is always produced on Armenianness, you face with this directly in the streets, you see yourself as a subject of this hate speech. I wasn't even aware that I was Armenian until Hrant [Dink] was killed. I was something, I had a difference, I was going to a different school, I was speaking a different language. My mother says 'Don't speak Armenian in the street, by Jove! I say why, but I don't think it's too weird. The murder of Hrant was the breaking point for me. We can be killed for this reason [being an Armenian]. You know, my forgiveness starts there… The point I have to forgive is that it only starts in 2007 with the murder of Hrant. Then it starts with the murder of Sevag [The Armenian citizen of Turkey who was killed while doing his military service]. I have to forgive those. It's not so hard to forgive them, I think (A1_M).

He also exemplifies the discrimination and fear of his family in their daily lives in Turkey by not speaking Armenian in the streets. A Turkish participant also touches upon the importance of realizing the mistakes and apologizing:

> Of course, the faulty group should admit their mistakes, should be able to search for solutions that can repair these mistakes, and apologize for them. If the other group says 'Yes, we made a mistake, we have done this as a nation, as a country, but now we want to redeem ourselves, what can we do? We want to share your pain with other groups, maybe there can be something in common, but as I said, the group that should be forgiven must first accept their mistakes (T5_F).

The following Kurdish interviewee points out the urgent need of peace and democracy for all people in Turkey and wants from Kurdish and Turkish sides to return to the peace process:

People no longer have life security; people do not feel safe. Decisions at every moment are devastating, plundering, breaking families up. Society is also anti-war; it doesn't want war. Today when you look at Turkey as a whole, no ethnic identity also demands war. They support peace and democracy. Also, Turkey also must come to immediate peace and democracy, no matter how the war is going; in the end, there is peace. However, in order to come to peace, we are not obliged to pay price and to face destruction. There may be a common path. There's a middle way. Yeah. If the peace processes come into question again due to that middle way, if the conditions of peace come into force again, if they ripen and form it, I believe that the whole society welcomes. So forgiveness is budded when the rights and law demands and requests of people come true. Only if those conditions are met, it [Turkey] can come to a comfortable, wealthy, strong, respected, valid and popular position in the world; with embracing the whole society not with 50 percent polarization (K3_F).

Moreover, the political and collective rights demands of Kurdish people are also frequently mentioned in the interviews. A Kurdish participant reminds the fundamental rights that Kurds demand in the following excerpt:

Previously, in the peace process, there were 3-4 items that were required [by Kurds]. Like constitutional assurance, education in the mother tongue, autonomy for municipalities... If they are fulfilled, there will be those who are lost at the end of the fight. Despite these, even worse situations may occur in the future so that that forgiveness can be thought of. Of course, we do not say "Let's surrender completely, never mind, everything will be according to what they say," as a matter of fact, that in such situation forgiveness would be impossible (K5_E).

The above excerpt quoted from a Kurdish participant displays the opinions and the language of some participants in terms of the 'us and them' dichotomy which designates the ethnical exclusivist manners of the people who think in a similar way in which their social identities are shaped. Additionally, the fact that the groups, which are assumed to be equal in the constitution, are not treated equally in practice even in the very basic situations gets reactions from the participants:

Turks and Kurds are equal. Really equal. Turks and Armenians are also equal in the constitution. The state has nothing to do with religion. What happens in practice? You can be educated in Turkish; why can't people be educated in Kurdish? You can walk on the street or pass the police check comfortably, why can't the other pass? (A1_M).

Why Kurds and Turks are in the conflict is justified in different ways by the Kurdish participants. While some of them see the reasons for conflict stemming from the personal characteristics and prejudice, which is welded in different social identities; some other participants signify that it is politics and politicians, rather than laypeople, responsible for the conflict.

> It is a conflict within the political parties, no conflict between the state and the citizens. Absolutely not… The state and its citizens are one. For example, on July 15 [2016, coup attempt], all groups, in all races, did not accept the initiative, rather as a body, they stood against it, and this was really a great opportunity for the government. The government could use this opportunity to bring different groups together and move towards the same line, rather than to polarize Turkey. It was a great opportunity to open up democratic grounds, but our government did not consider this opportunity (K3_F).

The quotation above implies people's need to act together and the government's eschewal from taking any opportunity for it. Instead, injustice turns into a form where anti-democratic practices and polarization become endemic.

Rights-based conditions involve a different range of demands from the minority groups like material rights, apology and non-discrimination for Armenians; or political and collective rights, educational rights, and peace and democracy for Kurds so that forgiveness to be one step closer.

2.1.3.2.2 Conditions Related to the National Integrity and Boundaries

This theme includes the conditions related to the political decisions and wishes of the groups in question. Disarming PKK is one of the most encountered conditions for Turks to forgiveness to be present. For example, although the following participant does not mention PKK, he implies it and sees its laying down arms as a must-condition:

> If the facts come up, if something is actually being explored and revealed by truly neutral people, then I don't think that people will refuse it. But a process is required. I don't think that at this stage, especially at this time, nobody will say something like that [forgiving each other] for both sides. First of all, the weapons must be released. But of course, I don't think the state should lay down arms. Because, especially in our area, I think the military must be strong.

56

The military structure needs to be strong. The other side has to lay down weapons. Responsible people have to be put in the trial because they have killed many innocent people. Of course, troublesome people from this side also need to be put in trial. I just mentioned, there was something called JITEM in the 90s, and so on. Those who set them up, those who committed the crimes must be put in the trial (T1_M).

He differentiates his ingroup (Turks) and outgroup (Kurds) with 'this side and other side' dichotomy. Neither he sees himself completely identified with his ingroup, nor he justifies the outgroup, yet, he believes that the trials will bring justice.

Additionally, a Turkish participant thinks that the war between Turks and Kurds only originates from one side and she will forgive if the war ends:

I will forgive [Kurds] if the war ends (T4_F).

She seems keeping her ingroup from taking collective responsibility for the ongoing conflict. The term 'indivisible integrity' is generally used for the aim of Turkey's preserving its boundaries from any external powers. It is first mentioned in the 1982 Constitution of the Turkish Republic and has been referred frequently to reflect how much importance attributed to it in the political atmosphere. In this light, indivisible integrity is often denoted by the Turkish participants as the following excerpt shows:

The first condition of the forgiveness, I think, is Turkey's indivisible integrity and its remaining in a single piece. Because I think that our Kurdish citizens are doing business in an important city like Istanbul. In other words, I think about the indivisible integrity of our country that both Turkey and the East loses. Because I think that the East Region will face big trouble in terms of trade in case of a division in the east and they will have very important economic problems (T3_M).

The above Turkish participant also uses 'us and them' dichotomy like his Kurdish counterparts. Furthermore, although this participant highlights the importance of the indivisible integrity of Turkey, he assumes the East Region of Turkey as an independent part of Turkey, by clearly demarcating the 'us' and the 'them.' On the other hand, some participants specify the necessity of a reciprocal agreement of the groups rather than focusing on a single group's demands:

We forgive if our interests are kept without harm. So let me just say. How to forgive…If we believe that our own ideas will not be crushed, we can live again in accordance with our own ideas. So we can forgive if we can agree on a certain point. If a common ground is found (T2_M).

On the other hand, one of the Armenian participants argues the importance of disarming PKK for Kurdish-Turkish conflict and opening the border gate between Armenia and Turkey for Armenian-Turkish conflict to soften the relationship between two parties and to ensure the possibility of forgiving as follows:

Negotiation. There is nothing else to do. You do the peace process, but the Kurdish-Turkish or Kurdish-State relationship is clearer, you need to negotiate. The PKK needs to lay down arms. Besides, some rights must be guaranteed. When you look at the Armenian-Turkish conflict, you don't need to do anything, just open the border gate. To accept the genocide, I think it's the job after that. You can't go through the genocide, it won't help. So, genocide is a huge conflict area. There is no benefit to anyone. I think it's the job after that. From now on, I think that the next generation of people must die. The current generation of 60-year-olds must die so that we can solve this problem (A1_M).

He, contrary to most other Armenians, thinks that the genocide should be the agenda of the afterward. Since the collective memories of 1915 is still alive for the old generation, he thinks that the next generations will be more likely and lean towards to forgive. One other Armenian participant from Yerevan, living in Turkey also highlights the border issue. They say they would open the border gate if they had power in their hands:

I would open the border gate. I would find my grandfather's house and bring my grandmother to here, Van, and I would show her. We wouldn't have noticed the difference between Kurds, Turks, Armenians, and Syrian. We would make the people who come here feel free (A4-5_M-F, pair interview).

On the other hand, one of the Armenian interviewees thinks the contrary about the border gate due to economic troubles of Armenia. He says:

The border is closed now; I do not want to the border be opened. This is because Turkey will swallow Armenia, ruin, finish as it did to Georgia. Turkey sees Georgia as its backyard…In that case, though, Turkey would do the same to Armenia in the same way. Turkey is a very large economy, Armenia is a small country, on the contrary, a tiny economy. Therefore, Turkey would swallow Armenia, ruin it, smash it. Armenia from both sides, Azerbaijan on

the other side, Turkey on this side, is blockaded. So I don't want that gate opening in this way with this intent (A2_M).

2.1.3.2.3 The Necessity of Confrontation with the Past

This sub-theme illustrates the necessity of confrontation with the past in order to proceed in the way of forgiveness. Without confrontation, it would be impossible to meet on common ground and to reconcile. Most participants from all three groups agree upon the significance of the necessity of confrontation with the past as a condition to forgiving outgroups.

The following participants specify both the inclination of the Turkish nation to glorify its past and the vitality of breaking with the past:

> We have become a country that always speaks from the past, so we cannot handle most of the problems today. Instead of speaking from the past, rather than talking about the past, accepting that this country from Hakkâri, Diyarbakır to İstanbul is ours, we should continue to work throughout this purpose and work to bring our country to the levels of European countries that we so much admire. We, as the Turkish Nation, is a nation that boasted in our past. Turks have also had their mistakes. Since we like to boast about our past, we don't want to talk about things that are wrong (T3_M).

Another Turkish participant, in parallel with the quotation above, says:

> People don't confront with good things. It is important to ask about what and why the past mistakes were present, how we take lessons from past mistakes. There are, of course, groups that can confront the past, but I don't think there is much. Especially I don't think that the Turks engage in it much, because the Ottoman Empire is coming directly to their minds when speaking from the past. The time between falls off the map. So I do not think that it is very possible in Turkey. I mean, there's a group that's much more proud of the past, maybe not even fully aware of it (T5_F).

Below, there is an Armenian participant clarifying the relationship between collective memories and coming into terms with the past, and its importance to proceed to the next step, which is forgiving each other:

> When you don't confront with the past, you cannot move forward because of the previous steps. Since you can't get over it and you left that collective memory in that way, or you are trying to produce a new memory, you're

59

constantly fighting with the real thing. 103 years has past and we're still talking about 1915. For example, when the [Turkish] Republic was founded in 1920, we opened a new page, there would be acceptance, if it was said that "yes, there was genocide", it wouldn't be a debate today. And I don't think a lot of things would be a debate. Because when we confront with something ... the point of sincerity is important here. If you accept the wrong things you have done, you try not to do it in the next step. However, because we cannot confront with 1915, troubles occur easily and quickly (A1_M).

The following Kurdish participant underlines similar things with others in the other groups:

It is necessary to reveal all the mistakes made by us, and by the opposite side, not to avoid them and not to cover up the guilt (K5_M).

Almost all participants mention the necessity of confrontation with the past; however, what should happen before the confrontation is to stop the current discrimination and hate crimes between the groups. Although participants emphasize this issue in their discourse, we can see that this is not possible in practice.

2.1.3.2.4 Rejection

Rejection is about the refusal of forgiving outgroups or hopelessness about the situation, and it represents the participants from the third group who never forgive. Some participants, as non-forgivers, totally reject forgiving perpetrators.

The following quote demonstrates the impossibility of forgiving for some participants:

In no way can I forgive. If they can bring my grandfather's family to me, let me forgive them. If they could bring my grandparents, their brothers, and sisters, fathers, mothers, relatives, to the little baby they killed, I can forgive. I don't want the property; I don't forgive (A3_F).

A Kurdish interviewee dwells on the impossibility of forgiving each other relying on the economic factors:

I'd rather have the future of my own child, than the future of the murdered ancestor. I think of my own child. That is why I think that economic facts are more important, and I don't think that [forgiving is possible] where economic destruction can take place. In fact, there is a vicious cycle. Destruction and construction, destruction and construction... That's why I said that in 40-50

years, it [the history] has to be erased in some way, otherwise, it is not possible [to forgive] (K1_M).

2.1.3.3 Possible Outcomes of Intergroup Forgiveness

Participants touch upon various outcomes or consequences of the forgiving outgroups. These outcomes or consequences can be grouped under three general themes which are dialogue, psychological outcomes and grief in common.

2.1.3.3.1 Dialogue

Dialogue, can be seen as both a way for forgiveness and reconciliation and as an outcome of forgiving the outgroups, and at the same time as feeding the other consequences of the forgiving, maybe one of the most important outcomes of a possible forgiveness scenario in the present context, and would bring peace for different groups.

> If there would be peace, if they completely forgive each other, then there would be no problems. Both of them take each other's beautiful sides, do not see their bad sides. That would happen (T2_M).

An Armenian participant sees dialogue as an immediate result of the forgiveness and its psychological impacts.

> I think saying 'I apologize for my own ancestor' would be a fair enough attempt to forgive. Of course, the dialogue would develop much. Sincerity would occur, the discrimination would be eliminated, the restlessness would be lifted. These are the most important criteria for coexistence. With the convenience of being together, you can live a more comfortable life. There is no such possibility of minorities right now. Most of them are very uneasy and uncomfortable because they do not involve the minorities in the structure they built and that there is no excuse for mistakes. There are concrete and certain rights that were taken away from them. They also suffer in a spiritual sense. Communication, this time, of course, communication will improve. I think it will be a healthier and fairer society (A6_K).

2.1.3.3.2 Psychological Outcomes

Forgiving each other may bring inner peace for some people. Some participants think that forgiveness will contribute to psychological well-being. Otherwise, it may be very hard to get rid of the emotional burden of not forgiving.

The following participants emphasize the spiritual well-being that forgiveness would bring:

> We have to love, but we have seen Turks as our enemies for a long time. When we read the holy book, we understood. It says: "Forgive, and God will forgive you." God created both the Turks and us. We can forgive. This healing comes from God. Whatever one does to oneself, hatred will come again…Hate is a disease; it makes someone miserable. Forgiveness is a healer. We forgave. Peace came and we're very comfortable right now. While we were looking from another side before forgiving, we are now looking from the other side. We are very tranquil right now (A4-5_M-F).

The fact that people are psychologically negatively affected by the outcomes of the conflict, this situation may push them to forgive outgroups. They want to live together in peace. It also shows that the effort of one group to prevail over another is futile as the following excerpt indicates:

> No matter where there is room for both groups. They both have rights, it is both the Kurdish region and the Turkish region. Yes, it is Turkey but should be a place where also Kurds live comfortably, I think (K4_F).

2.1.3.3.3 Grief in Common

Turkey involves several different cultures and ethnicities which are immersed in collective rites of co-remembering and commemoration. However, political and ethnic differentiations make collective and/or common mourning almost impossible for different ethnic groups in Turkey. The following excerpt clearly illustrates the importance of strengthening and sustaining the groups' feelings by communization of the pain, in other words, common suffering, which accordingly serves to grief in common:

> Maybe there can be collective or common mourning over the losses. I think very basic things in common can be shared (T5_F).

Justice and conscience may be what drives people to mourn collectively. As a result of collective or common mourning, the maintenance of collective boundaries and common commemorative practices can be assured. Second, it helps to ensure the collective continuity and consistency of individuals and/or groups, which is collective

62

identity. Last but not least, the continuity between the past and the present can be established.

2.1.4. Discussion

Although there is a common understanding among the participants that forgiveness is vital to pave the way for dialogue and reconciliation, they differ from each other in terms of the antecedents of the conflict and necessary conditions for forgiveness. In other words, even though the opinions of the three group members are different, they refer to or mark the same categories, later we call them themes since no separate assessment for each group is carried out and all interviews are evaluated in the same way.

To start with, the political ideologies of the participants are substantial in their reflections related to willingness to forgive. For example, there is a left-right polarity for Kurds and Turks. While a Turk supporting HDP may have similar ideas or tendencies with a Kurd supporting HDP; a Kurd supporting AKP may have similar ideas or tendencies with a Turk supporting AKP although they define themselves ethnically Kurd or Turk. Since there is no right-wing Armenian participant in this part of the study, I cannot comment for Armenian participants regarding ideologies. Although I try to reach as many participants from different ideological orientations as, it is arduous to reach Armenians. Their ethnic identification may not reveal their way of thinking per se enough, but in this case, the political party they support plays the role of litmus paper for bringing out the different thoughts and tendencies between participants. Likewise, Akarsu and Cingöz Ulu (2018) obtain similar results that political identification is more decisive than ethnic identification in historical representations. This is why I try to protect the balance of the political parties that participants support. Thus, these interviews may or may not reflect the views of the all group members.

The ways of thinking depend on both participants' social identifications and the way of establishing the relationship between the past and the future. This illustrates how social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981) is helpful to explain individuals'

belonging to certain categories or groups and their historical representations. The context in which identities are displayed is paramount (Drury & Reicher, 2000, 2005). That means identity does not exist in a vacuum. Identity and how it is expressed and when it becomes salient are all about the environment in which a person finds oneself. One's ethnic identity or identity as a political party supporter forms, changes, and expresses itself based on where they are, what they are doing and, who they are interacting with. In addition, Gençoğlu (2015) states that the formation of the identity also creates some unchangeable truths about the group, assuming a collective belief in them, so that the collective memory becomes the glue for the unchangable collective facts and the collective identity. Thus individuals may form their ideas about forgiving outgroups whom they are in conflict according to their political party preferences, the environment they live in and people they interact with, which in turn helps to shape their ethnic or national identifications.

Historical narratives are also of paramount to conflict contexts. They pose a threat to social identities of members of ingroup, especially who have highly identified themselves with their groups. When the perpetrators are reminded of past and ongoing conflicts, they generally tend to make a rational explanation or employ an ethnocentric approach to defend themselves; or they tend to talk on the causes and consequences a lot or remain silent (Bilewicz, 2016). In the present study, right-wing Turks generally employ an ethnocentric approach to explain the conflict with Kurds, and remain silent about the conflict with Armenians. It may be a preference for them to remain silent in situations where they feel guilt, and talk more in situations where they feel as victims.

Apart from the themes, the results of the qualitative analysis reveal that three different ways of thinking can be defined in terms of intensions to forgive. The first group of participants agree that there is, indeed, no such conflict between Armenians, Kurds, and Turks in Turkey. According to them, the problems stem from discriminative attitudes and behaviors of the Turkish government, legal authorities, the politicians within the country, and international powers outside the country. If those powerful institutions or people take an official unifying and reconciliatory role

to bring people from different ethnic backgrounds together, there would be no need for people to shift to 'new attitude' concerning their relationships with outgroups. Instead, they believe that people from different ethnic backgrounds can live in a more comfortable and peaceful environment as a result of the everyday way of behaving each other being included in many stages of managing society from politics to the economy by normalizing relationships between groups at large. In other words, to this group of participants, it is not about forgiving each other; it is about to learn to live together; peace culture should be spread each part of the society to prevent deeper ruptures. To sum up, intergroup forgiveness is symbolic to them. In the present study, some Turks and Kurds support this view.

Then the second group of participants indicated that groups should not forget the past; the wrongdoings committed to them, or their ancestors by the perpetrators. They want to keep their collective memories alive and commemorate important events that influence them deeply. However, they indicate that groups should not use the past as a vengeance tool and should leave it aside. Then, we all must seek ways to live together in peace from now on. Furthermore, they also insist on seeking a guarantee for the protection of their rights. Some Armenians and Kurds follow this assertion.

The last group is those state that they will never forgive. Although fewer in number, some respondents believe that it is not possible for them to forgive outgroups. Some participants express their firm beliefs that they would never forgive the outgroups for the past-wrongdoings. They have stigmatized the outgroups and have marginalized them even if they do not have an organic relationship with the people involved in the massacres in the past. Some Kurds and Armenians, but not Turks, follow this assertion.

As a general comment, following the interviews and my field observations, although there are few participants who never want to forgive outgroups, I may say that the overall atmosphere of the interviews and observations signal a demand for the continuity of interwoven relationships between the groups. These relationships seem to be resilient rather than brittle.

CHAPTER 3

TESTS FOR THE PROPOSED MODEL EXAMINING THE LINKS BETWEEN ETHNIC GLORIFICATION AND WILLINGNESS TO FORGIVE

3.1 Study 2: The Case of Armenians and Turks

Study 2 is based on a quantitative approach and explores the proposed model for Armenians and Turks. In the present part, previously proposed model (See Figure 1) is examined for the relationship between Armenians and Turks.

3.1.1 Method

3.1.1.1 Participants and Procedure

The minimum required sample size is calculated with the help of G*Power 3.1.9.2 software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2009). The determined sample size for each group was 98 at 80% power, 0.05 alpha level, and medium effect size.

There are 93 Armenians participate in the present study (42 females, 50 males, and 1 other). The age of Armenian participants ranges from 18 to 63 ($M_{age} = 32.09$, $SD = 10.37$). 62 (66.7%) of participants are university students or have a university or a higher degree, and there are three (3.2%) participants having a secondary school degree, 15 (16.1%) participants have a high school degree, and 13 (14%) participants have degrees from upper secondary education. Fourteen (15%) participants perceive themselves to be belonging to lower and lower-middle classes, while almost all participants, 79 of them (85%), perceive their socio-economic status as middle and upper-middle classes. 45 (48.4%) of Armenian participants are non-believers, whereas 48 (51.6%) of them are believers. However, over half of the participants do not prefer to indicate their religions. There are 40 Christians and three Muslims of the rest.

For the ideological orientation question, 79.1% of participants place themselves at the left side of the scale, while 20.9% of participants place themselves at the right side of the scale. Among the participants who answer the question which political party they vote for June 2018 general elections, three participants indicate their support to Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP), 11 participants support Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP), and 60 of them support People's Democratic Party (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*, HDP). Taken together, these results suggest that more than half of the Armenian participants are left-wingers.

There are 266 Turks in the present study (136 females, 109 males, and 4 other). The age of Turkish participants ranges from 17 to 74 (M_{age} = 29.83, SD = 9.72). 186 (69.9%) of them are university students or have a university or a higher degree, and there are only one (.04%) participant having primary school degree, two (.08%) participants having secondary school degree, 42 (15.8%) participants have a high school degree, and 21 (7.9%) participants have degrees from upper secondary education. 54 (19.8%) participants perceive themselves as belonging to lower and lower-middle classes, nearly half of the participants, 134 of them (50.4%), see themselves in the middle-class category, 64 of them (24.1%), perceive their socio-economic status as reflecting upper-middle class and upper class. 163 (61.3%) of Turkish participants are non-believers, whereas 89 (33.5%) of them are believers. However, 14 (5.3%) participants do not prefer to indicate their religions.

Among participants who answer the ideological orientation question, %78.7 of Turks are left-wingers while % 21.3 of them are right-wingers. Two-hundred thirty-nine Turkish participants indicate their political party choice for June 2018 general elections: 11 of them vote for AKP, 92 of them vote for CHP, 87 of them vote for HDP, seven of them vote for İyi Party, three of them vote for Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP), five of them vote for other non-listed parties, and 34 of participants indicate that they did not vote for June 2018 general elections.

All participants are reached through an online survey which is distributed from social media platforms and via direct communication through e-mail to the researcher's personal contacts. The present questionnaire is open only for the participants who ethnically define themselves as Armenians and Turks, other participants are thanked and directed to the end of the survey. The participants are told that the questionnaire is about interethnic relations between Armenians and Turks. First, they read the informed consent form (See Appendix D) and then fill the questions and scales of Strength of Identity, Responsibility, FENCE (Firmly Entrenched Narrative Closure Scale), Outgroup Contempt, Ingroup Glorification, Intergroup Contact, Willingness to Forgive Outgroup and Demographics, respectively. After completing the questionnaire, they are fully debriefed concerning the essence of the study and each variable is defined and described to them.

3.1.1.2 Measurement Instruments

3.1.1.2.1 Strength of Identification Scale. The strength of ethnic identification is measured by the Multi-Component Ingroup Identification Scale (Leach et.al, 2008). In the original scale, there are two dimensions as group-level self-investment which has solidarity, satisfaction, and centrality components; and group-level self-definition which has self-stereotyping and ingroup homogeneity components. The scale has been adapted to Turkish by Balaban (2013) and is found to be reliable for a Turkish sample (α = .94). For the purpose of the present dissertation, only the first dimension which is consisted of 10 items such as "I feel a bond with Armenians/Kurds/Turks," "I am glad to be Armenian/Kurd/Turk," and "Being Armenian/Kurd/Turk is an important part of how I see myself" is utilized. It is measured with a slider from zero (This expression does not reflect my thoughts at all) to 100 (This expression reflects my thought completely), and higher scores indicate stronger identification. In the present study, the scale ends up with 1-factor solution and seems to be internally consistent as well (For Armenians α = .91, For Turks α = .96; See Appendix E for the scale).

3.1.1.2.2 FENCE (Firmly Entrenched Narrative Closure Scale). Klar and Baram (2016) introduce FENCE as a new construct and develop a 1-factor measurement of it which aims to assess individuals' motivations to protect their ingroup historical narratives by glorifying their historical past and denying antagonistic counter-narratives in intractable intergroup conflict situations. FENCE is an ideal motivational measurement about the positioning of individuals in relation to their historical past. The original scale is in English and is adapted to Turkish by the researcher for the first time. So, I first translate FENCE into Turkish and re-translate them a couple of times within certain time intervals. Then, in order to establish a more reliable scale, translation-back translation method is used where one bilingual linguist, one bilingual sociologist and one native social psychologist involve in. Thus, the Turkish version of FENCE is created (See Appendix F).

The scale consists of 12 items and is rated on 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree), higher scores indicate a more defensive approach to the group-level historical narratives. Some sample items are "To preserve our unity as a group we must believe that our path is the right one," "It is important for us, as a group, to know that we are on the right side of the conflict," and "People who doubt we are right strengthen the other side." Three items do not load to the main factor, nor they constitute another factor. For this reason, they are removed from the scale (Removed items can be seen in the scale, Appendix F). The last version of the 9-item FENCE scale is reliable for both groups, for Armenians $\alpha = .83$, for Turks $\alpha = .88$.

3.1.1.2.3 Outgroup Contempt Scale. We have created 6 items for assessing contempt towards outgroups (See Appendix G) following Schriber, Chung, Sorensen, and Robins' (2017) Dispositional Contempt Scale. We adapt this inter-individual contempt scale to the intergroup context. Participants rate the items with a slider from zero (This expression does not reflect my thoughts at all) to 100 (This expression reflects my thought completely), higher scores indicate higher outgroup contempt. It measures how much one feels contempt towards outgroups with the questions such as

69

"I often lose respect for others" and "Feeling contempt for others comes naturally to me." The outgroup contempt scale consists of 1-factor and the internal reliability is α = .82 for Armenians and α = .79 for Turks.

3.1.1.2.4 Ingroup Glorification Scale. To measure the degree of glorification, a newly adopted version of ingroup glorification scale is used (Sandal Önal, in progress). This uses items from Ingroup Glorification Scale (Roccas et al., 2006) and Collective Narcissism Scale (de Zavala et al., 2009), and ends up with a 1-factor solution. The last version of the scale consists of 8 items (See Appendix H) which are rated on 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree), higher scores indicating high levels of glorification. "We are morally superior than others," and "Our traditions and values are just enough to hold this country together" are some of the example items. For the present context, this scale consists of 1-factor, same as the original adaptation. This scale is reliable for both groups in the present study, the reliability coefficient is α = .81 for Armenians and α = .89 for Turks.

3.1.1.2.5 Intergroup Contact Scale. Islam and Hewstone's (2003) 10-item Social Contact scale is used to measure the contact between two groups, which has been adapted to Turkish (Akbaş, 2010, See Appendix I). This scale is based on two domains as quality and quantity of contact. 5 items are rated on a 6-point Likert scale (ranging from 1-Never to 6-Always) assess the quantity of contact by posing questions regarding the frequency and recurrence of communication in formal and informal settings. The rest 5 items are rated again on a 6-point Likert scale assess the quality of contact in relation to equality, voluntarism, sincerity, contentedness, and competitiveness. For Armenian participants, the internal reliability of the adapted scale for the present study is α = .87 (α = .83 for the adapted version) for the quantity of contact, and α = .89 (α = .83 for the adapted version) for the quality of the contact. For Turkish participants, the internal reliability of the adapted scale for the present study is α = .91 for the quantity of contact, and α = .75 for the quality of the contact.

3.1.1.2.6 Willingness to Forgive Outgroup Scale. We specifically create six items to assess participants' degree of willingness to forgive outgroups through

70

examining the related literature and reading the interviews (See Appendix J for the items). "How realistic is it to forgive Armenians/Kurds/Turks?" is one example among the questions which are rated between 1 and 9. It is reliable for both samples, α = .88 for Armenians, and α = .70 for Turks.

3.1.1.2.7 Demographics. Participants are asked to answer a set of demographic questions including their sex, age, educational level, job, hometown, socio-economic status, religion, political orientation and the political party they vote for the June 2018 general elections.

3.1.2 Results

Before analysis, all variables are tested for accuracy of data entry, missing values, outliers, and the assumptions of multivariate analysis. Data management and analysis are performed using SPSS 22. Missing values are less than 5% for both groups, and they are left in their original forms.

For determining outliers, firstly, multivariate outlier analysis is conducted. Mahalanobis distance measure indicates one outlier among Armenian participants and four multivariate outliers among Turkish participants; who are above the cut-off value $\chi^2 (6) = 22.46$. Then univariate outliers are examined by calculating z-score of each variable separately for both groups. The cut-off for z-score is taken as ± 1.96; accordingly, one Armenian and 29 Turkish participants are also removed from the analysis. The criterion of not including participants in the analysis is that they exceeded the cut-off z-score in any variable in order to get robust results. After all, there are 93 Armenian and 266 Turkish participants for the analyses. Furthermore, normality (except for contempt variable), and multicollinearity assumptions are met as well.

3.1.2.1 Exploratory Factor Analyses of FENCE, Outgroup Contempt, and Willingness to Forgive Scales for Study 2

In the present dissertation, FENCE scale is adopted to Turkish; outgroup contempt and willingness to forgive scales are constructed. In order to test the applicability of these scales to the context of Turkey, they are subjected to factor

71

analysis. Their factor loadings are examined. Moreover, their reliability coefficients are reported which are within the acceptable criteria.

First of all, the exploratory factor analysis of FENCE is done for the group of Turks. Principle Component Analysis with Promax Rotation is conducted to explore the factor structure of the FENCE scale in a Turkish sample. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure

Of Sampling Adequacy test is found to be .90, signaling the appropriateness of the data for factor analysis. Initially, there are three factors with eigenvalues over 1.00, and these three factors explain 62.51% of the total variance. However, the reverse items (Item 3, 6, and 11) do not load to any factor. Then I decide to remove all reverse items from the analysis (Items 3, 6, and 11). Moreover, the results of the scree plot and parallel analysis also suggest that a 1-factor solution is more appropriate as in the original study. Therefore, the aftermath of the further analysis, there is a single factor explaining 52.24% of the total variance.

The same procedure is followed for the Armenian sample. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy test for Armenians is found to be .80, yielding the factorability structure of the data. There is again a 1-factor solution with explaining 45.19% of total variance after removing the same three items from the analysis (see Table 3 for for an overview of the FENCE scale items for both Armenian and Turkish samples).

Table 3

Factor loadings and univariate summary statistics of FENCE scale for Armenians and Turkish samples

Items	Armenians	M	SD	Turks	M	SD
1. Kendi tarihi hakkında şüpheleri olan bir grup güçsüz düşer.	.78	3.81	1.78	.73	2.38	1.53
2. Haklı olduğumuzla ilgili şüpheleri olan Ermeniler/Türkler karşı tarafı güçlendirir.	.78	3.43	1.68	.79	2.08	1.30
4. Ermeniler/Türkler olarak bizim yanlış bir şey yapmadığımız inancında birleşmemiz önemlidir.	.73	3.59	1.62	.77	1.87	1.14
5. Çatışmanın haklı tarafı olduğumuzu bilmek, bizim için önemlidir.	.69	4.00	1.55	.74	2.36	1.48
7. Bir grup olarak birlik ve beraberliğimizi korumak için, yolumuzun doğru yol olduğuna inanmak zorundayız.	.68	3.59	1.64	.76	2.20	1.40
8. Kendi içimizde yaşadığımız fikir ayrılıkları, bizi diğer grup karşısında güçsüz kılar.	.60	3.52	1.67	.74	2.34	1.43
9. Çatışma tarihine yönelik sağlam ve tutarlı bir yaklaşım grubumuzu güçlendirecektir.	.60	4.52	1.36	.59	3.65	1.67
10. Çatışmaya yönelik bizim grubumuzun anlattıkları, diğer grup tarafından anlatılanlara göre daha doğrudur.	.60	4.81	1.23	.80	2.60	1.41
12. Diğer grup ve bizim grubumuz arasında geçmişte veya günümüzde olanlar için bizi suçlama eğilimi olan insanlardan rahatsız olurum.	.54	5.03	1.14	.54	3.88	1.70
Eigenvalue	4.07			4.70		
Variance (%)	45.19			52.24		
Cronbach's α	.83			.88		

Secondly, exploratory factor analysis for outgroup contempt is conducted for both Armenians and Turks. Principle Component Analysis with Promax Rotation is employed to explore the factor structure of the outgroup contempt scale for Armenian and Turkish samples. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy test is found to be .81 for Armenians, and .79 for Turks, which says that the data is suitable

for factor analysis. There is 1-factor solution with eigenvalues over 1.00 for both groups, explaining 53.22% variance for Armenians, and 54.68% for Turks (See Table 4 for for an overview of the outgroup contempt scale items).

Table 4

Factor loadings and univariate summary statistics of outgroup contempt scale for Armenian and Turkish samples

Items	Armenians	M	SD	Turks	M	SD
1. Türkler'i/Ermeniler'i pek umursamam.	.89	24.90	27.15	.65	20.14	26.36
2. Türkler'e/Ermeniler'e karşı saygımı hızlıca yitirebilirim.	.79	28.77	29.30	.83	8.38	15.66
3. Türkler'i/Ermeniler'i çok da ciddiye almam.	.75	23.70	26.01	.73	10.76	19.21
4. Türkler'i/Ermeniler'i küçümserim.	.68	10.71	17.80	.78	3.90	10.71
5. Bize göre Türkler/Ermeniler gözümde daha değersizdir.	.67	12.30	22.06	.75	3.62	10.53
6. Bazı davranışlarını düşündüğüm zaman Türkler'i/Ermeniler'i hor görmem işten bile değil.	.62	28.14	30.99	.69	8.78	19.24
Eigenvalue	3.19			3.28		
Variance (%)	53.22			54.68		
Cronbach's α	.82			.79		

The last variable examined about factor structure is willingness to forgive for which exploratory factor analysis is also carried out. Principle Component Analysis with Promax Rotation is utilized to investigate the factor structure of the willingness to forgive scale both for Armenian and Turkish samples. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy test is adequate, .86 for Armenians, and .76 for Turks. That is, the data is convenient for factor analysis. Willingness to forgive scale yields 1-factor solution with eigenvalues over 1.00 for both groups, explaining 62.50% variance for Armenians, and 46.18% for Turks (See Table 5 for for an overview of the outgroup contempt scale items).

Table 5

Factor loadings and univariate summary statistics of willingness to forgive scale for Armenian and Turkish samples

Items	Armenians	M	SD	Turks	M	SD
1. Türkler'i/Ermeniler'i sizin kişisel olarak affedebilmeniz sizce ne kadar gerçekçidir?	.86	7.02	2.51	.82	7.83	2.27
2. Ermeniler/Türkler olarak Türkler'i/Ermeniler'i affetmek sizce ne kadar gerçekçidir?	.84	3.83	2.61	.43	5.10	3.06
3. Türkler'i/Ermeniler'i affedebilmeniz sizin için ne derece mümkündür?	.83	5.94	2.72	.81	8.16	1.74
4. Türkler'i/Ermeniler'i affedebilmeyi siz kişisel olarak ne kadar isterdiniz?	.83	4.80	2.70	.69	7.78	2.27
5. Şartlar arzu ettiğiniz gibi olsa, Türkler'i/Ermeniler'i affetmeye ne kadar gönüllü olurdunuz?	.74	5.76	2.67	.77	8.44	1.46
6. Türkler'i/Ermeniler'i affedebilmek için gerekli koşulların sağlanabilmesi sizce ne kadar olasıdır?	.61	7.51	2.23	.41	5.44	3.12
Eigenvalue	3.75			2.77		
Variance (%)	62.50			46.18		
Cronbach's α	.88			.70		

3.1.2.2 Results for Validity of FENCE, Outgroup Contempt, and Willingness to Forgive Scales for Study 2

To make sure whether FENCE, outgroup contempt, and willingness to forgive measure what is intended, I examine their relationships between other variables in the study. Previous studies regarding FENCE propose a strong significant relationship between FENCE and ingroup glorification. For the present study, FENCE is expected to be in positive correlation with the strength of identity, outgroup contempt, and ethnic glorification; and in negative correlation with the willingness to forgive. Secondly, outgroup contempt is expected to correlate positively with ethnic glorification, FENCE, and strength of identification, while it is expected to correlate negatively with quality of contact, quantity of contact, and willingness to forgive.

Then, willingness to forgive is supposed to correlate negatively with the strength of identity, FENCE, outgroup contempt, and ethnic glorification. Moreover, the willingness to forgive is assumed to correlate with the quality and quantity of intergroup contact positively. Concerning these three variables, the previous expectations are mostly proved for both samples (See Table 6 for descriptive statistics, Cronbach Alphas, and bivariate correlations between variables both for Armenians and Turks).

Table 6

Descriptive Statistics and Cronbach Alphas of, and Bivariate Correlations between Variables[1]

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Possible Range	(0-100)	(1-6)	(0-100)	(1-6)	(1-6)	(1-6)	(1-9)
Armenians (n = 93)							
1. Strength of Identity	(.91)						
2. FENCE	.42**	(.83)					
3. Contempt	.16	.10	(.82)				
4. Glorification	.49**	.65**	.25*	(.81)			
5. Contact Quantity	-.20*	-.11	-.28**	-.15	(.87)		
6. Contact Quality	-.32**	-.13	-.33**	-.21*	.57**	(.89)	
7. Forgiveness	-.37**	-32.**	-.37**	-.33**	.35**	.52**	(.88)
Mean	71.48	4.07	22.20	3.48	4.90	4.81	5.75
SD	.91	.97	19.36	1.01	1.05	1.08	2.02
Turks (n = 266)							
1. Strength of Identity	(.96)						
2. FENCE	.70**	(.88)					
3. Contempt	.35**	.38**	(.79)				
4. Glorification	.77**	.79**	.43**	(.88)			
5. Contact Quantity	-.08	-.12*	-.21**	-.20**	(.91)		
6. Contact Quality	-.15*	-.28**	-.41**	-.24**	.33**	(.75)	
7. Forgiveness	-.20**	-.26**	-.28**	-.26**	.10	.24**	(.70)
Mean	35.98	2.60	9.35	2.06	2.14	5.20	7.07
SD	27.84	1.03	12.56	1.00	1.09	.87	1.58

[1] Cronbach Alpha coefficients for the scales can be seen in parentheses.
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

3.1.2.3 The Comparison of Armenian and Turkish Samples in Terms of Variables in the Proposed Model

A series of independent samples t-test are conducted to compare groups in terms of variables in the model. First, Armenian sample and Turkish sample are compared. Results reveal that, these two samples significantly differed from each other in each variable (See Table 7 for the Results of independent samples t-test and descriptive statistics for Kurds and Turks).

Strength of identification: Homogeneity of variances assumption is not satisfied, as Levene's F Test is significant, $F(1, 357) = 6.32, p < .05$. Hence, the values under equal variances not assumed are taken into consideration. There is a statistically significant difference in the scores of Armenian ($M = 71.48, SD = 22.97$) and Turkish ($M = 35.98, SD = 27.85$) participants, $t(193.185) = 12.11, p < .001$. These results suggest that Armenians have higher scores than Turks in terms of strength of identification. In other words, Armenians have more strong identification to their ethnic identities than Turks.

FENCE: Homogeneity of variances assumption is satisfied, as Levene's F Test is not significant, $F(1, 357) = .19 \ p = .66$. There is a statistically significant difference in the scores of Armenian ($M = 4.07, SD = .97$) and Turkish ($M = 2.60, SD = 1.03$) participants, $t(357) = 12.04, p < .001$. These results suggest that Armenians have higher scores than Turks in terms of FENCE. In other words, Armenian participants defend their historical narratives more than Turkish participants in this study.

Outgroup contempt: Homogeneity of variances assumption is not satisfied, as Levene's F Test is significant, $F(1, 357) = 6.32, p < .001$. Hence, the values under equal variances not assumed are taken into consideration. Armenians ($M = 22.20, SD = 19.37$) and Turks ($M = 9.37, SD = 12.56$) significantly differed from each other in terms of outgroup contempt scores, $t(120.148) = 5.98, p < .001$, which means Armenians feel more contempt towards Turks than Turks have towards Armenians in this sample.

77

Ethnic glorification: Homogeneity of variances assumption is satisfied, as Levene's F Test is not significant, $F(1, 357) = .39$ $p = .84$. There is a statistically significant difference in the scores of Armenian ($M = 3.48$, $SD = 1.01$) and Turkish ($M = 2.06$, $SD = 1.00$) participants, $t(357) = 11.76$, $p < .001$. These results show that Armenians have higher scores than Turks in terms of ethnic glorification, which means Armenian participants glorify their ingroups more than Turkish participants in the present study study.

Quantity of contact: Homogeneity of variances assumption is satisfied, since Levene's F Test is not significant, $F(1, 357) = .46$, $p = .50$. There is a statistically significant difference in the scores of Armenian and Turkish participants, $t(357) = 21.09$, $p < .001$. Results reveal that Armenians are more in contact ($M = 4.90$, $SD = 1.05$) with Turks, than Turks with Armenians ($M = 2.14$, $SD = 1.09$).

Quality of contact: Homogeneity of variances assumption is not satisfied, as Levene's F Test is significant, $F(1, 357) = 4.93$, $p < .05$. Hence, the values under equal variances not assumed are taken into consideration. Results demonstrate that there is a statistically significant difference in the scores of Armenian and Turkish participants in terms of quality of contact, $t(136.263) = -3.14$, $p < .01$. This means Turks have more qualified relationships with Armenians ($M = 5.20$, $SD = .87$), in comparison to Armenians ($M = 4.81$, $SD = 1.08$).

Willingness to forgive: Levene's F Test is significant, $F(1, 357) = 11.98$, $p < .01$, so homogeneity of variances assumption is not met. Hence, the values under equal variances not assumed are interpreted. Results indicate that there is a statistically significant difference in the scores of Armenian and Turkish participants in terms of willingness to forgive each other, $t(136.231) = -5.72$, $p < .001$. That is, Turkish participants are more willing to forgive Armenians ($M = 5.75$, $SD = 2.02$), in comparison to Armenian participants' willingness to forgive Turks ($M = 7.07$, $SD = 1.58$)

These results reveal that Turks in this study generally have more positive attitudes towards Armenians, than of Armenians towards Turks. Moreover, Turks' willingness to forgive is higher than that of Armenians. This may be due to the fact that most of the Turkish participants are left-wingers, as it is known that left-wing people support minority groups more than right-wing people (Just, 2017).

Table 7

The results of independent samples t-test and descriptive statistics for Armenians and Turks

			Armenians (n = 93)		Turks (n = 266)			
		Possible Range	M	SD	M	SD	Mean Diff.	*t*-value
1.	Strength of Identity	(0-100)	71.48	22.97	35.98	27.85	35.50	12.11***
2.	FENCE	(1-6)	4.07	.97	2.60	1.03	1.47	12.03***
3.	Contempt	(0-100)	22.20	19.37	9.37	12.56	12.86	5.98***
4.	Glorification	(1-6)	3.48	1.01	2.06	1.00	1.42	11.76***
5.	Contact Quantity	(1-6)	4.90	1.05	2.14	1.09	2.76	21.09***
6.	Contact Quality	(1-6)	4.81	1.08	5.20	.87	-.39	-3.14**
7.	Forgiveness	(1-9)	5.75	2.02	7.07	1.58	-1.32	-5.72***

*** *t*-value is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).

3.1.2.4 Results of the Predicted Model

In the present study, in order to test the serial mediation model, I use SPSS PROCESS macro, Model 6 (Hayes, 2016), with 5000 bootstrapped samples, for examining the relationship between ethnic glorification as the predictor, willingness to forgive as the outcome variable, outgroup contempt and FENCE as mediator variables, and strength of ethnic identification, quality and quantity of intergroup contact as control variables the effects of which are kept constant.

3.1.2.4.1 Armenians

For Armenians, ethnic glorification does not predict outgroup contempt (B = 3.88, SE = 2.15, p = .07, 95% CI [-.40, 8.17]). FENCE is predicted by ethnic glorification in a positive and significant way (B = .57, SE = .00, p < .001, 95% CI

[.39, .75]). This reveals that the more Armenians glorify their groups, the more they defend their historical narratives. In addition, contrary to my expectations, outgroup contempt does not predict FENCE significantly, (B = -.00, SE = .00, p = .40, 95% CI [-.01, .00]). Only ethnic glorification explains 44% variance in FENCE, R^2 = .44, F (5, 87) = 13.69, p < .001.

Willingness to forgive is significantly predicted by outgroup contempt (B = -.02, SE = .00, p < .05, 95 % CI [-.03, -.00]), which means Armenians' having more contempt towards Turks decreases the probability of their willingness to forgive them. Among the control variables, only quality of contact (B = .69, SE = .20, p < .001, 95 % CI [.29, 1.00]) significantly and positively predicts willingness to forgive, meaning as the quality of contact between Armenians and Turks increase, Armenians tend to be willing to forgive Turks more. Hence, outgroup contempt and quality of contact explain 39% variance in willingness to forgive, R^2 = .39, F (6, 86) = 9.12, p < .001.

Three indirect effects are tested in the present model for Armenians: the effect of glorification on forgiveness with outgroup contempt being the mediator variable, the effect of glorification on forgiveness with FENCE being the mediator variable, and the effect of glorification on forgiveness with outgroup contempt and FENCE being the mediator variables. None of them is significant. Similarly, total effect is also not significant (B = -.33, SE = .19, 95, p = .09, 95% CI [-.72, -.06] and ; See Figure 3 for the proposed model for Armenians).

Figure 3 The Results of the Proposed Model for Armenians in Their Relationship with the Turks (Solid lines indicate statistically significant effects (standardized coefficients), dashed lines indicate non-significant effects.)

3.1.2.4.2 Turks

As can be seen from the model, ethnic glorification predicts outgroup contempt positively and significantly (B = 3.45, SE = 1.06, p < .01, 95% CI [1.36, 5.54]). As the Turks more ethnically glorify themselves, they tend to have high levels of outgroup contempt towards Armenians. The control variables are also included in the analysis. According to the presented results, ethnic glorification and quality of intergroup contact explain %29 of the variance in outgroup contempt, $R^2 = .29$, $F_{(4, 261)} = 26.20$, p < .001.

FENCE is predicted by ethnic glorification in a positive and significant way (B = .60, SE = .06, p < .001, 95% CI [.47, .71]). This reveals that the more Turks glorify their groups, the more they defend their historical narratives. In addition,

contrary to my expectations, outgroup contempt does not predict FENCE significantly, (B = .00, SE = .00, p = .71, 95% CI [-.00, .00]). Ethnic glorification, the strength of ethnic identification, and quality of intergroup contact explain 66% variance in FENCE, R^2 = .66, F (5, 260) = 100.71, p < .001.


Figure 4 The Results of the Proposed Model for Turks in Their Relationship with the Armenians (Solid lines indicate statistically significant effects (standardized coefficients), dashed lines indicate non-significant effects.)

Surprisingly, willingness to forgive is only significantly predicted by outgroup contempt (B = -.02, SE = .03, p < .05, 95% CI [-.03, -.00]), which means Turks' having more contempt towards Armenians decreases the probability of their willingness to forgive Armenians where outgroup contempt explains 12% variance in willingness to forgive, R^2 = .12, F (6, 259) = 6.02, p < .001.

Three indirect effects are tested in the present model. First of all, the effect of glorification on forgiveness with outgroup contempt being the mediator variable is significant (B = -.06, SE = .03, 95% CI [-.14, -.00]). This means as Turks glorify more, their contempt towards Armenians increase, which in turn decreases their willingness to forgive Armenians. Meanwhile, the effect of glorification on forgiveness with FENCE being the mediator variable and the effect of glorification on forgiveness with outgroup contempt and FENCE being the mediator variables are not significant. Nonetheless, total effect of glorification on willingness to forgive is significant (B = -.33, SE = .14, 95, p < .05, 95% CI [-.63, -.04]; and See Figure 4 for the tested model for Turks).

3.2 Study 3: The Case of Kurds and Turks

In Study 3, the previously proposed model is examined for the relationship between Kurds and Turks.

3.2.1 Method

3.2.1.1 Participants and Procedure

There are 238 Kurds participated in the present study (86 females, 147 males, and 5 unknown). The age of Kurdish participants ranges from 18 to 65 (M_{age} = 30.39, SD = 8.81). 168 (72.1%) of participants are university students or have a university or a higher degree, and there are five (2.1%) participants having primary and secondary school degree, 39 (16.7 %) participants have a high school degree, and 21 (8.8%) participants have degrees from upper secondary education. Five (2.1%) participants do not answer this question. Seventy-six (31.9%) participants perceive themselves as belonging to lower and lower-middle class. Nearly half of the participants, 117 of them (49.2%), perceive themselves as belonging to the middle class. In addition, 40 (16.8%) participants perceive their socio-economic status as reflecting upper-middle class and upper class. Five (2.1%) participants do not indicate their socio-economic status. While 87 (36.6%) of Kurdish participants are believers, 146 (61.3%) of them are non-believers. Again, five (2.1%) participants do not answer this question.

For the ideological orientation question, 78.9% of Kurdish participants place themselves at the left side of the ideological orientation scale, while 17.2% of them place themselves at the right side of the scale. Among the participants who answer the question which political party they vote for June 2018 general elections, 186 (78.2%) participants vote for People's Democratic Party (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*, HDP), 8 (3.4%) participants votefor Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi,* CHP). Thirty-three participants indicate that they did not participate in the elections. There is one vote for each of the following parties, Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP), İyi Party, Saadet Party, and Other from the Kurdish participants. Hence, these results reveal that most of the Kurdish participants are left-oriented.

There are 187 Turks in the present study (62 females, 121 males, and 4 unknown). The age of Turkish participants ranges from 18 to 63 (M_{age} = 29.79, SD = 8.11). 146 (78.1%) of them are university students or have a university or a higher degree, and there are 27 (14.4%) participants who have a high school degree, and 11 (5.9%) participants have degrees from upper secondary education. Twenty-five (13.4%) participants perceive themselves as belonging to lower and lower-middle classes, above half of the participants, 110 of them (58.8%), see themselves in the middle-class category, 49 of them (26.2%), perceive their socio-economic status as reflecting upper-middle class and upper class. One-hundred and seven (57.2%) of Turkish participants are non-believers, whereas 77 (41.2%) of them are believers. Three (1.6%) participants do not indicate their religion.

Whilst 83% of Turkish participants are left-wingers, 17% of them are right-wingers. There are 177 participants who answer the question which political party they had voted for June 2018 general elections, 77 (43.5%) participants vote for CHP, 58 (31%) participants vote for HDP, 10 of them vote for İyi Party, 9 of them vote for AKP. While Saadet Party and Other parties who are non-listed get two votes, there is only one vote for MHP among Turkish participants. Additionally, 18 (10.2%) participants indicate that they did not participate in the elections. Like all other

samples in the present dissertation, this sample consists of mostly left-wing participants.

As in study 2, all participants are reached through an online survey which is distributed from social media platforms. The present questionnaire is open only for the participants who ethnically define themselves as Kurds and Turks, other participants are thanked and directed to the end of the survey. The participants are told that the questionnaire is about interethnic relations between Kurds and Turks. First, they read the informed consent form and then fill the questions and scales of Strength of Identity, Responsibility, FENCE (Firmly Entrenched Narrative Closure Scale), Outgroup Contempt, Ingroup Glorification, Intergroup Contact, Willingness to Forgive Outgroup and Demographics in separate blocks, respectively. After completing the questionnaire, they are fully debriefed concerning the essence of the study, sample, and each variable is defined and described to them.

3.2.1.2 Measurement Instruments

3.2.1.2.1 Strength of Identification Scale. As in Study 2, the strength of ethnic identification is measured with Multi-Component Ingroup Identification Scale (Leach et al., 2008). The scale seems to be internally consistent for the present sample (For Kurds $\alpha = .85$, For Turks $\alpha = .96$) and is consisted of 1-factor.

3.2.1.2.2 FENCE (Firmly Entrenched Narrative Closure Scale). The same scale as in Study 2 is utilized to measure historical defensiveness of the participants. Three items do not load to the main factor, nor they constitute another factor. For this reason, they are removed from the scale. The last version of the 9-item FENCE scale is reliable for both groups, for Kurds $\alpha = .80$, for Turks $\alpha = .80$.

3.2.1.2.3 Outgroup Contempt Scale. The same scale as in Study 2 is used for the second part of the study and the internal reliability for this scale is $\alpha = .84$ for Kurds and $\alpha = .87$ for Turks.

3.2.1.2.4 Ingroup Glorification Scale. The same scale as in Study 2 is utilized, which is reliable for both groups in the present study, the reliability coefficient is $\alpha = .71$ for Kurds, and $\alpha = .87$ for Turks.

3.2.1.2.5 Intergroup Contact Scale. The same scale as in Study 2 is employed for the present study. For Kurdish participants, the internal reliability of this scale is $\alpha = .90$ for the quantity of contact, and $\alpha = .86$ for the quality of the contact. For Turkish participants, the internal reliability of the adapted scale for the present study is $\alpha = .90$ for the quantity of contact, and $\alpha = .65$ for the quality of the contact.

3.2.1.2.6 Willingness to Forgive Outgroup Scale. Our previously created scale items are used to measure the degree of willingness to forgive outgroups. For the Kurdish sample, this scale yields 1-factor explaining 59.25 % variance and 41.06 % variance for the Turkish sample. It is reliable for both samples, $\alpha = .86$ for Kurds, and $\alpha = .65$ for Turks.

3.2.1.2.7 Demographics. The same demographic form as in Study 2 is employed to learn the demographic backgrounds of the participants.

3.2.2 Results

Preceding the analysis, all variables are tested to ensure the accuracy of data entry, to check and edit the missing values, and to test the assumptions of multivariate analysis. All statistical analyses are conducted using SPSS 22. Since missing values are not above 5 % for both groups, they are left as missing.

In order to determine outliers, firstly, multivariate outlier analysis is conducted. According to the results of Mahalanobis distance measure, there are three multivariate outliers in Kurdish sample, and three multivariate outliers in the Turkish sample. These participants are removed from the data since they are above the cut-off value $\chi^2 (6) = 22.46$ Then univariate outliers are examined by calculating z-score of each variable for both groups. The cut-off for z-score is taken as ± 1.96, accordingly 56 Kurdish and 24 Turkish participants ar also removed from the analysis. The criterion of not including participants in the analysis is that they exceed the cut-off z-

score in any variable in order to get robust results. After all, 238 Kurdish and 187 Turkish participants remain in the analysis. Furthermore, normality and multicollinearity assumptions are also fulfilled.

3.2.2.1 Exploratory Factor Analyses of FENCE, Outgroup Contempt, and Willingness to Forgive Scales for Study 3

For Study 3, exploratory factor analysis of FENCE is conducted for both groups. For Kurdish sample, Principle Component Analysis with Promax Rotation is conducted to explore the factor structure of the FENCE scale. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy test is .84, which indicates the factorability of the data. As in Study 2, I remove all reverse items (Item 3, Item 6 and Item 11) since it would be better to have the same data in both studies. Again, the results of the scree plot and parallel analysis also suggest that a 1-factor solution is more appropriate as in the original study. Therefore, there is a 1-factor solution consists of 9 items explaining 38.85% of the total variance. The same procedure is followed for the Turkish sample. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy test for Turks is .89, yielding the factorability structure of the data. There is again a 1-factor solution by explaining 52.24% of total variance after removing three items from the analysis (see Table 7 for an overview of the scale items). The same procedure is repeated for outgroup contempt and willingness to forgiveness scale. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy test of outgroup contempt scale is adequate, .81 for Kurds, and .84 for Turks. Moreover, it is .85 for Kurds, and .71 for Turks for the willingness to forgive scale. These results give evidence that the data is fit for factor analysis. For outgroup contempt scale, there is 1-factor solution with eigenvalues over 1.00 for both groups, explaining 55.26% variance for Kurds and 64.70% for Turks (See Table X for an overview of the outgroup contempt scale items). In addition, willingness to forgive scale also yields 1-factor solution for both samples explaining 59.25% variance for Kurds and 41.06% for Turks (See Table 8 and Table 9 for an overview of the outgroup contempt scale and willingness to forgive scale items for Kurdish and Turkish samples, respectively).

Table 8

Factor loadings and univariate summary statistics of FENCE for Kurdish and Turkish Samples

Items	Kurds	M	SD	Turks	M	SD
1. Kendi tarihi hakkında şüpheleri olan bir grup güçsüz düşer.	.72	4.94	1.00	.59	3.65	1.67
2. Haklı olduğumuzla ilgili şüpheleri olan Ermeniler/Türkler karşı tarafı güçlendirir.	.67	4.03	1.52	.79	2.08	1.30
4. Ermeniler/Türkler olarak bizim yanlış bir şey yapmadığımız inancında birleşmemiz önemlidir.	.67	4.30	1.57	.73	2.38	1.53
5. Çatışmanın haklı tarafı olduğumuzu bilmek, bizim için önemlidir.	.66	4.08	1.51	.76	2.20	1.40
7. Bir grup olarak birlik ve beraberliğimizi korumak için, yolumuzun doğru yol olduğuna inanmak zorundayız.	.66	4.76	1.27	.74	2.36	1.49
8. Kendi içimizde yaşadığımız fikir ayrılıkları, bizi diğer grup karşısında güçsüz kılar.	.60	4.64	1.22	.80	2.60	1.42
9. Çatışma tarihine yönelik sağlam ve tutarlı bir yaklaşım grubumuzu güçlendirecektir.	.60	4.07	1.55	.77	1.87	1.14
10. Çatışmaya yönelik bizim grubumuzun anlattıkları, diğer grup tarafından anlatılanlara göre daha doğrudur.	.53	4.03	1.63	.74	2.34	1.43
12. Diğer grup ve bizim grubumuz arasında geçmişte veya günümüzde olanlar için bizi suçlama eğilimi olan insanlardan rahatsız olurum.	.45	5.14	1.12	.54	3.88	1.70
Eigenvalue	3.50			4.70		
Variance (%)	38.85			52.24		
Cronbach's α	.80			.80		

Table 9

Factor loadings and univariate summary statistics of outgroup contempt scale for Kurdish and Turkish samples

Items	Kurds	M	SD	Turks	M	SD
1. Türkleri/Kürtleri pek umursamam.	.84	24.11	28.00	.70	14.05	19.14
2. Türklere/Kürtlere karşı saygımı hızlıca yitirebilirim.	.78	32.70	32.68	.86	14.81	21.14
3. Türkleri/Kürtleri çok da ciddiye almam.	.76	24.10	28.00	.87	9.16	14.58
4. Türkleri/Kürtleri küçümserim.	.72	12.27	20.82	.87	5.73	12.38
5. Bize göre Türkler/Kürtler gözümde daha değersizdir.	.69	9.61	19.08	.81	4.75	12.39
6. Bazı davranışlarını düşündüğüm zaman Türkleri/Kürtleri hor görmem işten bile değil.	.66	30.53	31.03	.70	12.70	21.01
Eigenvalue	3.31			3.88		
Variance (%)	55.26			64.70		
Cronbach's α	.84			.87		

Table 10

Factor loadings and univariate summary statistics of outgroup contempt scale for Kurdish and Turkish samples

Items	Kurds	M	SD	Turks	M	SD
1. Türkler'i/Kürtler'i affedebilmeniz sizin için ne derece mümkündür?	.86	6.06	2.43	.82	8.12	1.68
2. Kürtler/Türkler olarak Türkler'i/Kürtler'i affetmek sizce ne kadar gerçekçidir?	.82	5.54	2.71	.51	5.74	2.72
3. Türkler'i/Kürtler'i sizin kişisel olarak affedebilmeniz sizce ne kadar gerçekçidir?	.81	5.74	2.78	.73	8.04	1.88
4. Şartlar arzu ettiğiniz gibi olsa, Türkler'i/Kürtler'i affetmeye ne kadar gönüllü olurdunuz?	.77	7.44	2.16	.73	8.64	1.08
5. Türkler'i/Kürtler'i affedebilmeyi siz kişisel olarak ne kadar isterdiniz?	.74	6.95	2.37	.35	8.00	1.85
6. Türkler'i/Kürtler'i affedebilmek için gerekli koşulların sağlanabilmesi sizce ne kadar olasıdır?	.60	4.38	2.74	.59	6.32	2.61
Eigenvalue	3.55			2.46		
Variance (%)	59.25			41.06		
Cronbach's α	.86			.65		

3.2.2.2 Results for Validity of FENCE, Outgroup Contempt, and Willingness to Forgive Scales for Study 3

To test the validity of FENCE, outgroup contempt, and willingness to forgive scales, I examine their correlations between other variables in the study. Concerning these three variables, the previous expectations are mostly proved (See Table 4 for descriptive statistics, Cronbach Alphas, and bivariate correlations between variables both for Kurdish and Turkish samples).

Table 11

Descriptive Statistics and Cronbach Alphas of, and Bivariate Correlations between Variables[1]

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Possible Range	(0-100)	(1-6)	(0-100)	(1-6)	(1-6)	(1-6)	(1-9)
Kurds (n = 238)							
1. Strength of Identity	(.85)						
2. FENCE	.37**	(.80)					
3. Contempt	.04	.12	(.84)				
4. Glorification	.41**	.46**	.06	(.71)			
5. ContactQuantity	-.23*	-.19**	-.26**	-.10	(.90)		
6. Contact Quality	-.23**	-.28**	-.43**	-.15*	.53**	(.86)	
Forgiveness	-.11	-18.**	-.37**	-.06	.16*	.37**	(.86)
Mean	79.66	3.95	22.46	3.85	4.69	4.33	6.02
SD	17.61	.59	19.63	.82	1.14	1.16	1.91
Turks (n = 187)							
1. Strength of Identity	(.96)						
2. FENCE	.63**	(.80)					
3. Contempt	.33**	.33**	(.87)				
4. Glorification	.70**	.72**	.34**	(.87)			
5. ContactQuantity	-.17*	-.20**	-.27**	-.13	(.90)		
6. Contact Quality	-.22**	-.23**	-.41**	-.25**	.46**	(.65)	
7. Forgiveness	-.14	-.26**	-.36**	-.25**	-.20**	.42**	(.65)
Mean	40.57	2.61	10.60	2.22	3.82	5.41	7.32
SD	27.89	.91	13.99	.94	1.19	.65	1.58

[1] Cronbach Alpha coefficients for the scales can be seen in parentheses.
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

The correlational pattern is similar across all groups, where the correlations between FENCE and other variables are higher for Turks compared to Armenians and Kurds. Although the relationship between FENCE and outgroup contempt is not significant for minorities Armenians and Kurds, these results indicate that the FENCE scale seems suitable for the context of Turkey. In other words, FENCE may be valid, as well as reliable for the groups living in Turkey.

3.2.2.3 The Comparison of Kurdish and Turkish Samples in Terms of Variables in the Proposed Model

A series of independent samples t-test are conducted to compare Kurdish and Turkish samples in terms of their scores on each variable. Results reveal that, these two samples significantly differed from each other in each variable (See Table 12 for the Results of independent samples t-test and descriptive statistics for Kurds and Turks)

Strength of identification: Homogeneity of variances assumption is not met, as Levene's F Test is significant, $F(1, 423) = 62.00$, $p < .001$. Hence, the values under equal variances not assumed are taken into consideration. There is a statistically significant difference in the scores of Kurdish ($M = 79.66$, $SD = 17.61$) and Turkish ($M = 40.57$, $SD = 27.89$) participants, $t(297.852) = 16.72$, $p < .001$. These results suggest that Kurds have higher scores than Turks in terms of strength of identification. In other words, Kurds are more strongly identified to their ethnic groups than Turks.

FENCE: Homogeneity of variances assumption is not satisfied, as Levene's F Test is significant, $F(1, 423) = 48.27$, $p < .001$. However, there is a statistically significant difference in the scores of Kurds and Turks, $t(303.279) = 17.38$, $p < .001$. These results suggest that Kurds have higher scores ($M = 3.94$, $SD = .58$) than Turks ($M = 2.61$, $SD = .90$) in terms of FENCE. In other words, Kurdish participants defend their historical narratives more than Turkish participants in this study.

Outgroup contempt: Homogeneity of variances assumption is not satisfied, since Levene's F Test is significant, $F(1, 423) = 30.95$, $p < .001$. Hence, the values under equal variances not assumed are taken into consideration. Kurds ($M = 22.46$,

SD = 19.63) and Turks (*M* = 10.59, *SD* = 13.99) significantly differed from each other in terms of outgroup contempt scores, $t(417.910) = 7.25$, $p < .001$, which means Kurds feel more contempt towards Turks than Turks have towards Armenians in this sample.

Ethnic glorification: Homogeneity of variances assumption is not met, as Levene's F Test is significant, $F(1, 423) = 5.82$, $p < .05$. There is a statistically significant difference in the scores of Kurdish and Turkish participants, $t(368.904) = 18.68$, $p < .001$. These results show that Kurds have higher scores (*M* = 3.85, *SD* = .81) than Turks (*M* = 2.22, *SD* = .95) in terms of ethnic glorification, which means Kurdish participants glorify their ingroups more than Turkish participants in the present study.

Quantity of contact: Homogeneity of variances assumption is satisfied, since Levene's F Test is not significant, $F(1, 423) = .14$, $p = .71$. There is a statistically significant difference in the scores of Kurdish and Turkish participants, $t(423) = 7.63$, $p < .001$. Results reveal that Kurds are more in contact (*M* = 4.69, *SD* = 1.15) with Turks, than Turks with Kurds (*M* = 3.82, *SD* = 1.19).

Quality of contact: Homogeneity of variances assumption is violated, as Levene's F Test is significant, $F(1, 423) = 64.81$, $p < .001$. Hence, the values under equal variances not assumed are taken into consideration. Results demonstrate that there is a statistically significant difference in the scores of Kurdish and Turkish participants in terms of quality of contact, $t(384.409) = -12.12$, $p < .01$. This means Turks have more qualified relationships with Kurds (*M* = 5.41, *SD* = .64), in comparison to Kurds' (*M* = 4.33, *SD* = 1.16) having more qualified relationships with Turks.

Willingness to forgive: Since Levene's F Test is significant, $F(1, 423) = 29.32$, $p < .001$, homogeneity of variances assumption is violated. Results indicate that there is a statistically significant difference in the scores of Kurdish and Turkish participants in terms of willingness to forgive each other, $t(420.178) = -8.13$, $p < .001$. That is, Turkish participants are more willing to forgive Kurds (*M* = 7.32, *SD* = 1.38), in

comparison to Kurdish participants' willingness to forgive Turks ($M = 6.02$, $SD = 1.91$).

As in the case of Armenian and Turkish samples, these results reveal that Turks in this study generally have more positive attitudes towards Kurds, than of Kurds towards Turks. This may be because Turks are dominantly left-wingers in the present study, as it is known that left-wing people support minority groups more than right-wing people (Just, 2017). Moreover, Turks appears to be more willing to forgive in both cases. This may be related to the majority's feeling collective guilt. In other words, they may suppress their feeling of collective guilt with a desire to forgive the victim groups more.

Results also demonstrate the efforts of Armenians and Kurds to further embrace and protect their identities since their strength of identity, ethnic glorification, and FENCE scores significantly higher than of Turks. This may due to their perception of threat from the majority group (Ashmore et. al, 2001).

Table 12

The results of independent samples t-test and descriptive statistics for Kurds and Turks

			Kurds (n = 238)		Turks (n = 187)			
		Possible Range	M	SD	M	SD	Mean Diff.	*t*-value
1.	Strength of Identity	(0-100)	79.66	17.61	40.57	27.89	39.09	16.72***
2.	FENCE	(1-6)	3.94	.59	2.61	.90	.07	17.38***
3.	Contempt	(0-100)	22.45	19.63	10.59	13.99	11.86	7.25***
4.	Glorification	(1-6)	3.85	.81	2.22	.94	1.62	18.68***
5.	Contact Quantity	(1-6)	4.69	1.14	3.82	1.19	.87	7.62***
6.	Contact Quality	(1-6)	4.33	1.16	5.41	.65	-.1.07	-12.12***
7.	Forgiveness	(1-9)	6.02	1.91	7.32	1.38	-1.30	-8.14***

** *t*-value is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*** *t*-value is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).

3.2.2.4 Results of the Predicted Model

In Study 3, the same predicted model in Study 2 is tested with Kurdish and Turkish participants. In order to test the serial mediation model, I use SPSS PROCESS macro, Model 6 (Hayes, 2016), with 5000 bootstrapped samples, to examine ethnic glorification as the predictor, willingness to forgive as the outcome variable, outgroup contempt and FENCE as mediator variables, and strength of ethnic identification, quality, and quantity of intergroup contact as control variables. For Study 3, the predicted model is tested among Kurdish and Turkish samples.

3.2.2.4.1 Kurds

For Kurdish sample, the first mediator variable outgroup contempt is not predicted by ethnic glorification (B = .47, SE = 1.55, p = .76, 95% CI [-2.60, 3.54]). In predicting outgroup contempt, the quality of intergroup contact is the only significant predictor variable which explained %19 of the variance, R^2 = .19, F (4, 232) = 13.33, p < .001.

The second mediator variable, namely FENCE, is predicted by ethnic glorification positively and significantly (B = .26, SE = .04, p < .001, 95% CI [.18, .35]). This reveals that as the degree of Kurds' ethnic glorification increases, the degree of defensiveness of their historical narratives also increase. In addition, contrary to the initial expectations, outgroup contempt does not predict FENCE significantly, (B = .00, SE = .00, p = .85, 95% CI [-.00, .00]). To sum up, ethnic glorification, the strength of ethnic identification, and quality of intergroup contact explain 29% variance in FENCE, R^2 = .29, F(5, 231) = 19.27, p < .001.

The outcome variable willingness to forgive is predicted by outgroup contempt (B = -.02, SE = .00, p < .001, 95% CI [-.03, -.01]) significantly and negatively and by quality of intergroup contact (B = .45, SE = .12, p < .001, 95% CI [.20, .69]. Outgroup contempt and quality of intergroup contact explain 21% variance in willingness to forgive, R^2 = .21, F (6, 230) = 10.05, p < .001.

In the present model, three indirect effects are tested, none of which is significant. The first indirect effect is the effect of glorification on willingness to

forgive where outgroup contempt is the mediator variable. The second indirect effect is the relationship between glorification and forgiveness with FENCE being the mediator variable. The last indirect effect tests the effect of glorification on forgiveness with outgroup contempt and FENCE being the mediator variables. In addition, the total effect of ethnic glorification on willingness to forgive is not significant as well (See Figure 5 for the tested model for Turks).


Figure 5 The Results of the Proposed Model for Kurds in Their Relationship with the Turks (Solid lines indicate statistically significant effects (standardized coefficients), dashed lines indicate non-significant effects.)

3.2.2.4.2 Turks

For Turkish participants, ethnic glorification does not predict outgroup contempt (B = 2.28, SE = 1.35, p = .09, 95% CI [-.38, 4.85]). Then, FENCE is predicted by ethnic glorification in a positive and significant way (B = .17, SE = .06,

p < .001, 95% CI [.38, .64]). This reveals that the more Turks glorify their groups, the more they defend their historical narratives. In addition, contrary to my expectations, outgroup contempt does not predict FENCE, (B = -.00, SE = .00, p = .30, 95% CI [-.00, .01]). Ethnic glorification and the strength of ethnic identification explain 44% variance in FENCE, R^2 = .56, F (5, 181) = 45.90, p < .001.

Willingness to forgive is significantly predicted by outgroup contempt (B = -.01, SE = .00, p < .05, 95% CI [-.03, -.00]) and quality of intergroup contact (B = .69, SE = .16, p < .001, 95% CI [.36, 1.02]). These two variables explain 25% variables in willingness to forgive, R^2 = .25, F (6, 180) = 9.89, p < .001. These results mean that Turks' feeling more contempt towards Kurds decreases the probability of their willingness to forgive them; and as the quality of contact between Kurds and Turks increase, Turks' tendency to forgive Kurds increases.

Three indirect effects are tested in the present model as in the previous studies. None of the indirect effects, namely the effect of glorification on forgiveness with outgroup contempt being the mediator variable, the effect of glorification on forgiveness with FENCE being the mediator variable, and the effect of glorification on forgiveness with outgroup contempt and FENCE being the mediator variables is significant. However, total effect of ethnic glorification on willingness to forgive is significant (B = -.34, SE = .13, p < .05, 95% CI [-.61, -.07]; See Figure 6 for the tested model for Turks).

Figure 6 The Results of the Proposed Model for Turks in Their Relationship with the Kurds (Solid lines indicate statistically significant effects (standardized coefficients), dashed lines indicate non-significant effects.)

3.2.2.4.3 The Comparison of Turkish Samples in Terms of Willingness to Forgive Tendencies

To test whether the two Turkish samples in the relationship with Kurds ($n =$ 187) and Armenians ($n =$ 266), statistically significantly different from each other or not, independent samples t-test is performed. Homogeneity of variances assumption is satisfied, as Levene's F Test is not significant, $F(451) = 2.16$, $p = .14$. However, there is not a statistically significant difference in the scores of the two Turkish samples, $t(451) = 1.70$, p = 0.9.

3.3 Discussion

Grounded in previous intergroup forgiveness literature, specifically, I predict that different motivational and cognitive elements strengthening the scope of identity and identification process would have an effect on willingness to forgive. Particularly, Study 2 is conducted to test the relationship between ethnic glorification and willingness to forgive related outgroups as well as the relationship among different possible predictors of willingness to forgive for the relationships between Armenians and Turks and Kurds and Turks.

I hypothesize that ethnic glorification would predict willingness to forgive with the mediation roles of contempt and FENCE. Although the correlations between the variables are significant, the results of regression analyses show that this would not be as expected. One of the unexpected results of this dissertation is that ethnic glorification does not predict willingness to forgive. The former literature suggests that high identifiers tend to forgive outgroups less, in comparison to low identifiers (Brown et al., 2007). This is not supported in this dissertation. However, despite the high correlation between these; high-low identification is not the same thing as glorification. Similarly, Hornsey and Wohl (2013) fail to find an effect of national identification on forgiveness in the context where Australians and Canadians are either perpetrators or victims. Unexpextedly, Hamer, Penczek, and Bilewicz, (2017) reveal that intergroup forgiveness is correlates positively with national identification on the condition that it bears a sense of belonging and being open to other groups.

Ethnic glorification in the present context predicts outgroup contempt only for the Turkish sample in relation to Armenians. According to Blake (2017), as group members perceive the outgroup members as the other and see that they do not comply with our ingroup standards, they feel contempt towards outgroup members. For the relationship between Kurds and Turks, religion may help to close the gap between these two ethnic groups. So, religion here acts as a common ingroup identity for Turks and Kurds, which is an important factor that reduces prejudice, while there is no such

ground for Armenians. In other words, this may be because Armenians are non-Muslims and Turks stand aloof from them and generally not in contact with Armenians since they live in a closed community in Turkey. As can be seen from the results, the contact of Turks with Armenians and Kurds is quantitatively and qualitatively different.

Secondly, outgroup contempt does not predict the FENCE in any group. Nonetheless, in all samples, ethnic glorification predicts FENCE as the previous research suggests (Klar & Baram, 2016; Klar & Bilewicz, 2017). One of the most remarkable consequences of Study 2 is to determine the vital role of outgroup contempt explaining the willingness to forgive relevant outgroups. For all groups, contempt predicts willingness to forgive significantly and negatively. It is widely known that intergroup emotions have a strong explanatory power in intergroup forgiveness. It is known that positive intergroup emotions ameliorate the relationship between the groups in conflict, and increases the likelihood of intergroup forgiveness at the same time. On the other hand, negative intergroup emotions alleviate the probability of intergroup forgiveness. However, to the best of my knowledge, contempt has not been not examined in the context of intergroup forgiveness so far. From this point of view, it can be said that this is a natural resistance within culture given that contempt is triggered by social practices and ingroup values (Blake, 2017), and thus predicts willingness to forgive in a negative way.

Although in all samples FENCE is significantly and negatively correlated with willingness to forgive, in none of the models, FENCE predicts the outcome variable willingness to forgive. That means defense of the historical narratives seems related not to have explained in willingness to forgive directly. Hence, the mediating effects of outgroup contempt and FENCE may not have been able to be represented in the samples of Armenians, Kurd, and Turks.

On the other hand, among the control variables, quality of intergroup contact has much to offer in explaining the willingness to forgive, except for the Turkish sample in relation to Armenians. The reason for this may be that many Turks may not

be in contact with the Armenians. Positive intergroup contact not only reduces the levels of prejudice and discrimination (Al Ramiah & Hewstone, 2013; Pettigrew, 1998) but also has the potential to encourage a willingness to forgive outgroups (e.g., Cehajic et al., 2008; Miller et al., 2004). Thus, emphasizing intergroup contact while taking initiatives and policymaking to reduce intergroup conflict may bring groups closer to each other.

In spite of that, given the conditions of intergroup contact, the situations between the groups with a high level of conflict might make it even more difficult because it may be difficult to provide contact conditions between groups who have tense relations. For example, Husnu, Mertan, and Rustemli (2008), in their longitudinal study, investigate the change of attitude after the intergroup contact conditions, which is the experience in the process of opening the border between Northern Cyprus and Southern Cyprus. The attitudes of the participants are found still negative after 10 years of the contact experience. The researchers explain this result by some variables such as competition among groups, negative conditions, decrease in post-contact status and feeling of frustration. Thus, in such cases, the nature of the contact and the possible scenarios to be created in order willingness to forgive to increase should be prepared very meticulously and carefully. For example, instead of direct and real contact situations, vicarious intergroup contact may be employed at the beginning (Husnu, Mertan, & Cicek, 2018).

Whilst the model tested is not significant, Studies 2 and 3 contribute to the literature in various aspects. First, for the present dissertation, the FENCE scale is adopted to Turkish context and it had high levels of reliability for all samples. Two different scales are formed, outgroup contempt scale and willingness to forgive scale. Both scales seem to be reliable and valid for the context of Turkey and may be used for further studies. Second, the present study expands the research on intergroup forgiveness literature by including two variables in the model, contempt, and FENCE, which are not previously discussed in the context of intergroup forgiveness. Third, there are two conflict situations examined in the present dissertation. It is important

to examine the two groups, whose conflict antecedents, processes and, outcomes are different from each other in the sense that they develop different perspectives; since an active ongoing (Kurdish-Turkish) and a relatively silent (Armenian-Turkish) conflict were examined.

Despite its contributions to the relevant literature, this research has several limitations. First, because of the low response rate for all the three samples -especially for Armenians- may not be representative for the rest of the population. Reaching Armenian people is very tedious and difficult since they generally do not want to participate in such studies. The number of people I reach through gatekeepers was barely up to that. In fact, most Armenians do not want to be the subject of anything, which is reasonable. Even sample size calculation gives 98 as the appropriate sample size for each group; the power is taken as .80, which is lower bound. For future studies, power may be taken .85 or .90.

Second, for each group, nearly half of the participants see themselves as belonging to middle-class. In a middle-class formal labor sector, the majority of people works as civil servants, have a regular income, benefit from the social rights of the state, but on the other hand have no other source of income (Saraçoğlu, 2011). Considering that the most affected people generally belong to the lower class, their lack of participation in the current study may have affected the results.

Third, most of the participants from all three groups are left-wingers since they place themselves at the left half of the ideology scale. Therefore, the likelihood of generalizability of the results decreases considerably. Reaching people from all segments of the ideologies on such a political and sensitive issue might yield better results. On the other hand, it constitutes a strength at the same time; as such, what the right-wingers think about this issue is already known as emerged in the interviews. They are far from forgiving and seeing mistakes made by their group. Reaching this kind of results within a mostly left-wingers group becomes valuable for us.

Another limitation stems from the measurement of intergroup forgiveness, which is essentially a very comprehensive and gradual process. Although this is the

method of choice for most researchers in this field, the measurement of intergroup forgiveness directly through immediate scales may not be accurate. Asking the participants whether they would forgive without a condition, and asking them to process it emotionally or cognitively, may have led to poor and unpredictable results.

CHAPTER 4

GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

"The stupid neither forgive nor forget; the naïve forgive and forget; the wise forgive but do not forget." Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams (as cited in McLernon, Cairns, Lewis, & Hewstone, 2003)

Although there is not a consensus among researchers from different fields on what intergroup forgiveness is, they broadly recognize that what intergroup forgiveness is not. As such, it is different from remembering and forgetting, pardoning, and ignoring (Hornsey & Wohl, 2013). However, researchers widely agree that intergroup forgiveness contains changes in emotions as well as attitudes of group members towards perpetrator group members from a negative to a positive manner (McCullough et al., 2000). Intergroup forgiveness between groups hardly wholly resolves the conflict between groups in and of itself, but it can at least constitute a first step for reconciliation. In other words, intergroup forgiveness comes after conflict resolution and paves the way for reconciliation.

Additionally, there is also a lack of agreement on the measurement of it since each conflict context has its characteristics. The first study in this dissertation examines the understandings of laypeople among Armenians, Kurds, and Turks living in Turkey regarding intergroup forgiveness. It undertakes to identify the essential mechanisms of intergroup forgiveness. These essential mechanisms are the causes, consequences, and conditions of forgiveness based on three groups. It helps us explore the concept of intergroup forgiveness in Turkey. The second and third studies identify the underlying mechanisms of intergroup forgiveness and examine its relationship with ethnic identification, intergroup emotions (i.e., contempt), and defense of historical narratives.

Historical events and memories generally live through the collective memories of both victims and perpetrators and are of great importance in terms of determining

present-day relationships of groups (Cairns & Roe, 2003). However, some milestones can change the course of events, like peace processes, apologies, or violence. They can pave the way for peace and reconciliation, or oppositely intensify the conflict. For peace to come, groups should forgive each other, even if not, they have to be inclined to leave the past wrongdoings aside. In other words, forgiveness may suspend or cease the chronicles of vengeance. Therefore, examining the perspective of both parties from a social psychological perspective helps us understand the underlying motivations of forgiveness. In other words, this dissertation sheds light on what people know and what they think about, what representations they have for conflict and forgiveness, and what suggestions they have for a possible conflict solution.

In general, in intergroup conflict and forgiveness research, only the victim groups are included. The present study brings a different perspective to the concept of forgiveness, including the majority or the perpetrator. To put it differently, groups who are seen as either perpetrators or victims are involved. In the context of the conflict between groups, from the perspective of groups, who the perpetrator is or who the victim is quite controversial, and because even the perpetrators of the genocide regard themselves as victims (Bilali, 2013), both parties in the conflicts were included in the present dissertation.

Including the perceptions of both parties in the present dissertation is essential for several reasons. First, it helps to establish a fully-developed assessment and understanding of the situation. Both victims and perpetrators have their representations of history and the formation of memories. They tend to distort their memories of the past, yet differently. While victims tend to remark about the harm doing of perpetrators, perpetrators try to minimize the negative consequences of their harm doing and negative acts (Baumeister & Catanese, 2001). However, in the first study, The Turks, the majority or the perpetrator group, prefer to remain silent about the conflict with the Armenians, while expressing themselves as victims of the conflict with the Kurds. Understanding how both the victim and perpetrator positioning

themselves in conflict gives us clues like doing needs assessments after listening to both parties about how forgiveness could be possible.

Second, examining forgiveness both for victims and perpetrators portrays the needs and expectations of the groups. Understanding these needs and expectations increases the probability of psychological wellbeing both among the members of victim and perpetrator groups (e.g., Bono, McCullough, & Root, 2008) and decreases the probability of psychiatric morbidity (Myers et. al., 2009).

In order to consolidate their identity, groups either claim themselves as victims, or they tend to remain silent (Bilali, 2012). The present thesis examines both ongoing-silent and ongoing-active conflicts. As seen in the interviews, Turks are generally silent when asked about their relations with Armenians, or they say it was a completely different matter in comparison to the conflict with Kurds. This may be due to the lack of contact between Armenians and Turks in Turkey. Although Armenians are in contact with the Turks in many areas of their daily lives, Turks do not have the opportunity to have contact with Armenians, because Armenians are very few Turkey and most of them live in Istanbul. Besides, Armenians have a closed community, and they do not have much contact with other groups until they go to college (İslambay, 2018). Study 2 supports this inference. While the quality of contact of Armenians, Kurds, and Turks in relation to Kurds significantly predict intergroup forgiveness, Turks' quality of contact with Armenians does not.

Even if the conflict between Kurds and Turks has been going on for many years, and the effects are felt both on individual and group basis, it is not enough to bring reconciliation to the agenda. Although the attempt of the peace process between Kurds and Turks was not successful in the recent past, the parties at least once sat at the reconciliation table. On the other hand, the conflict between Turks and Armenians had been 'silent' until 1980. However, according to Özbek (2016), it has changed a lot after the 1980s due to four critical factors. The first factor is the liberation of the collective memory from the Kemalist hegemony, which generally tends to sweep the genocide under the mat. The second factor is people's growing interest in interethnic

105

or intergroup contact, which prepares the ground for questioning the exclusionary content of Turkish nationalism. The third one is the individuals' and groups' pursuit of democracy and human rights. The last one is the pressure of countries that recognize/accept the genocide formally or informally. Although the assassination of Hrant Dink has brought a new dimension to the conflict between Armenians and Turks, the conflict with the Armenians remains a taboo for Turks.

The data obtained from the interviews reveal that one of the sub-themes of antecedents of the conflict is othering. This has a direct and organic relationship with outgroup contempt. The quotation about emptying the rubbish container in front of a church in Study 1 precisely illustrates how some people feel disdain towards Armenians. Besides, in cases where ingroup standards are violated, ingroup members show contempt toward others who are considered as a threat (Blake, 2017). Results of Study 2 justify this relationship. Ethnic glorification predicts outgroup contempt only for the Turkish sample concerning Armenians. In other words, the more Turks glorify their groups, the more they feel contempt towards Armenians. This may reveal the differences in the approach of Turks to Armenians and Kurds. Studies 1 and 2 show that Turks are in less frequent contact with Armenians and view them more other than Kurds.

Interviews also suggest that Kurds are no longer excluded socially and politically by Turks, but they are subjected to an 'exclusive recognition, in Saracoglu's words (2009). In other words, Turks recognize Kurds as a separate 'community.' This is unlike the traditional assimilationist state discourse based on ignorance and denial, which sees Kurds as part of the Turkish nation and included in citizenship practices. This may be due to the contact between Kurds and Turks in many aspects of daily life. Intergroup comparisons support this assertion that Turks have little contact with Armenians in comparison to Kurds.

Consequently, intergroup contact is widely accepted to decrease prejudice towards minority members among majority members (e.g., Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). Study 3 parallels this finding, where quality of contact significantly predicts

willingness to forgive. After accepting the existence of the Kurds, Turks began to have a way of consensus and reconciliation. As some participants in Study 1 suggest, the belief that the conflict between Turks and Kurds will be resolved by laypeople, not by politicians, can be regarded as one of the positive outcomes of intergroup contact.

When it comes to Armenians, apart from the dialogue and reconciliation, even the recognition of the conflict is out of the question. There is a silence about the existence of the conflict with Armenians. According to Saracoglu (2011), the anti-Greek, anti-Armenian, and anti-Semite stance have entirely different historical sources, which are mostly obtained from the nationalist rhetoric and policies of the Turkish state. However, the negative perception of the Kurds is not based on the "imagined other" but the "experienced other." In other words, rather than an ideologically and artificially pumped, Kurdish hostility is based on the exclusion and experience of Kurds in everyday life and the content takes shape through this recognition. However, this requires to discuss the role of intergroup contact in mitigating the conflict since it does not seem to work in Turkish-Kurdish relations.

Furthermore, just like previous studies, minorities did address the negative and lasting consequences of past mistakes by perpetrators in the context of conflict (see Baumeister & Catanese, 2001), the majority either emphasizes the mitigating conditions that cause their actions to minimize the consequences on the victims or remains silent. However, it was previously discussed that the conflict between the Armenians and the Kurds are different from each other. That is, the Turks' view of the Kurds and the Armenians seems quite different from each other. While the gateway of official Turkish nationalism is open to Muslim peoples such as Kurds, non-Muslim minority groups such as Armenians are not included within the confines of it (see also Aydın, 2015; Yeğen, 2006). The Armenians have been held as the subjects of xenophobia in comparison to Kurds. The media and the state, overstepping the mark, declare that the PKK leader and even its militants are Armenians, not Kurds. Studies 2 and 3 also support that Turks' ethnic glorification predicted outgroup contempt for Armenians, not Kurds.

The findings of the present dissertation elucidate some social-psychological determinants of willingness to forgive. Outgroup contempt and quality of intergroup contact seem to have significant explanatory power in willingness to forgive. In this dissertation, the importance of the quality of contact comes to the fore, but the quantity of contact does not predict forgiveness in any sample. This shows us that the quality of contact is more influential than the quantity in the context of these groups in Turkey. However, the current findings necessitate an additional investigation of the effect of ethnic glorification on willingness to forgive and other dimensions of intergroup forgiveness because this study is the first in the context of the Armenians in Turkey and among the first ones in the context of the Kurds. Additionally, the adopted and constructed scales (FENCE scale, outgroup contempt scale, and willingness to forgive outgroups scale) need further analysis since it is the first time that these scales are used in the context of Turkey.

In general, the situations between groups in conflict are not that complex. That is, in the previous literature, researchers generally have given emphasis on the apparently separated roles of the groups as perpetrators and victims like Israeli-Palestinian and Tutsis-Hutus conflict in Rwanda. However, in the context of Turkey, all three groups see themselves as victims, at least to a certain extent. This means that the roles of perpetrator and victim are intertwined, which means that it is a challenging context to investigate. Moreover, the three distinct tendencies ('no conflict,' 'forgive but do not forget,' and 'never forgive') emerge from the interviews may have appeared in other studies. In Studies 2 and 3, not reaching the results we expect on willingness to forgive may be related to participants who think forgiveness is impossible and symbolic, rather than realistic. In order to prevent this, participants may be asked whether forgiveness is meaningful to them, or if they see it as symbolic or not (Neto, da Conceição Pinto, & Mullet, 2007), prior to asking them questions on willingness to forgive. Further studies may ask whether they are symbolic before measuring forgiveness. These may also have influenced the results in terms of expected relationships moderately.

In the world where class-based polarization is replaced with identity politics (Tilly, 2002), intractable conflicts between groups become inevitable since ethnic identifications may give rise to polarization. In such conditions, conflict resolution, forgiveness, and peace become the matter of the context. This dissertation tries to focus on forgiveness, which is about both a positive attitudinal and emotional change towards conflict and a situation that provides personal healing (Roe & Cairns, 2003). Kriesberg (2001) considers forgiveness as a notion that must be accompanied by truth, justice, and personal security or group security.

While presenting two different conflict situations, I try to reveal the interplay between the groups and their interactions for a possible peaceful co-existence scraped from ethnopolitical violence. Before undertaking to provide the correct solutions to the Kurdish-Turkish and the Armenian-Turkish conflicts, and offering policy recommendations for the establishment of peace; historical, social, cultural, and political relations between these groups need to be investigated and analyzed extensively since the needs and expectations of groups substantially differ from each other. Also, groups should avoid committing intergroup crimes and violence, because what we call confrontation begins with not committing crimes in the present day. Involving both parties of the conflict situations and examining some possible social psychological factors may help to find common ground for forgiveness and reconciliation. For example, understanding the reasons for power conflict, ensuring the recognition of fundamental rights, or increasing intergroup contact are some of the positive ways to establish this common ground. Hence, the present dissertation may initiate exploratory research in this field. It is necessary to go one step further than bringing the groups in conflict together in order to provide a real peace environment and conflict resolution and to evolve relationships to a better form. Therefore, we think this study contributes to the literature on the social psychology of peace and conflict.

REFERENCES

Abrams, D., & Hogg, M. A. (2010). Social identity and self-categorization. In J. F. Dovidio (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination (pp. 179-93). Sage Publications. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446200919.n11

Akarsu, A. S. & Cingöz Ulu, B. (2018, July). The Past Lies in the Present: A Social Psychological Investigation of History and Identity. Oral Presentation at 24th Congress of the International Association of Cross Cultural Psychology, Guelph, Canada.

Akbaş G. (2010). Social Identity and Intergroup Relations: The Case of Alevis and Sunnis in Amasya (Unpublished master's thesis). Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey.

Akçam, T. (2006). A shameful act: The Armenian genocide and the question of Turkish responsibility. New York, NY: Metropolitan.

Akçam, T. (2012). The Young Turks' crime against humanity: The Armenian genocide and ethnic cleansing in the Ottoman Empire. Princeton University Press.

Al Ramiah, A., & Hewstone, M. (2013). Intergroup contact as a tool for reducing, resolving, and preventing intergroup conflict: evidence, limitations, and potential. American Psychologist, 68(7), 527-542. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0032603

Allport, G. A. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.

Allpress, J. A., Brown, R., Giner-Sorolla, R., Deonna, J. A., & Teroni, F. (2014). Two faces of group-based shame: Moral shame and image shame differentially predict positive and negative orientations to ingroup wrongdoing. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40(10), 1270-1284. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167214540724

Arendt, H. (2013). The human condition. University of Chicago Press.

Ashmore, R. D., Jussim, L., Wilder, D., & Heppen, J. (2001). Toward a social identity framework for intergroup conflict. In R. D. Ashmore, L. Jussim, & D. Wilder (Eds.), Social identity, intergroup conflict, and conflict reduction (pp. 213–249). New York: Oxford University Press.

Avci, E. U. (2018). Denial of the Kurdish question in the personal narratives of lay people. Ethnicities. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796818786307

Aydın, E. (2015). Ermeniler ne Yaşadı? Sorumluluğu Nerede Aranmalı? İçinde A.Çubukçu, N.Onaran, C.H.Zariç ve O.Öztürk (Der) Utanç ve Onur: 1915-2015 Ermeni Soykırımının 100. Yılı. İstanbul: Evrensel Basım Yayın. s.19-40.

Bahgat, G. (2003). Iran, the United States, and the war on terrorism. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26(2), 93-104. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100390145189

Bakke, K. M., O'Loughlin, J., & Ward, M. D. (2009). Reconciliation in conflict-affected societies: Multilevel modeling of individual and contextual factors in the North Caucasus of Russia. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 99(5), 1012-1021.

Balaban, Ç.D. (2013). The roles of intergroup threat, social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism in predicting Turks' prejudice toward Kurds (Unpublished master's thesis). Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey.

Bana Gürcü, affedersin çok daha çirkin şeylerle Ermeni diyenler oldu. (2014, August 6). Diken. Retrieved from http://www.diken.com.tr/afedersin-cok-daha-cirkin-seylerle-ermeni-diyen-oldu/

Bar-Tal, D. (2000). Shared beliefs in a society: Social psychological analysis. Sage Publications.

Bar-Tal, D. (2007). Sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts. American Behavioral Scientist, 50, 1430–1453. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764207302462

Bar-Tal, D., Chernyak-Hai, L., Schori, N., & Gundar, A. (2009). A sense of self-perceived collective victimhood in intractable conflicts. International Review of the Red Cross, 91(874), 229-258. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383109990221

Bauer, M. W., Gaskell, G. D., & Allum, N. C. (2000). Quality, quantity and knowledge interests. Avoiding confusions. In M. W. Bauer & G. D. Gaskell (Eds.), Qualitative researching with text, image and sound (pp. 4–17). London: Sage Publications. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781849209731.n1

Baumeister, R. F., & Catanese, K. (2001). Victims and Perpetrators Provide Discrepant Accounts: Motivated Cognitive Distortions about Interpersonal Transgressions. In J. P. Forgas, D. K. Williams, & L. Wheeler (Eds.), The Social Mind (pp. 274–93). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Baumeister, R. F., & Catanese, K. (2001). Victims and Perpetrators Provide Discrepant Accounts: Motivated Cognitive Distortions about Interpersonal Transgressions. In J. P. Forgas, K. D. Williams, & L. Wheeler, (Eds.), Social Mind (pp. 274–93). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Baysu, G. & Coşkan, C. (2018). Reconciliation and intergroup forgiveness: The case of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, Turkish Studies, 19(5), 748-772. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2018.1484287

Baysu, G., & Duman, Y. (2016). Why does identity matter? A Two-Path Model to Intergroup Forgiveness via İngroup Bias and Outgroup Blame. Psychological Research, 19(1), 43-51.

Bezci, E. B. (2018) Guest editor's introduction: Trajectory for Kurds. Middle East Critique, 27(1), (1-6). https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2017.1411108

Bilali, R. (2012). Identity centrality and in-group superiority differentially predict reactions to historical victimization and harm doing. International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV), 6(2), 321-337. https://doi.org/10.4119/UNIBI/ijcv.223

Bilali, R. (2013). National Narrative and Social Psychological Influences in Turks' Denial of the Mass Killings of Armenians as Genocide. Journal of Social Issues, 69(1), 16-33. https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12001

Bilewicz, M. (2007). History as an obstacle: Impact of temporal-based social categorizations on Polish-Jewish intergroup contact. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 10(4), 551-563. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430207081540

Bilewicz, M. (2016). The dark side of emotion regulation: Historical defensiveness as an obstacle in reconciliation. Psychological Inquiry, 27(2), 89-95. https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2016.1162130

Biton, Y., & Salomon, G. (2006). Peace in the eyes of Israeli and Palestinian youths: Effects of collective narratives and peace education program. Journal of Peace Research, 43, 167–180. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343306061888

Blake, T. (2017). Affective Aversion, Ethics, and Fiction. In D. R. Wehrs & T. Blake (Eds.), Handbook of Affect Studies and Textual Criticism (pp. 207-234). Palgrave MacMillan.

Bloxham, D. (2005). The great game of genocide: Imperialism, nationalism, and the destruction of the Ottoman Armenians. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Bobowik, M., Bilbao, M. Á., & Momoitio, J. (2010). Psychosocial effects of forgiveness petition and "self-criticism" by the Basque Government and Parliament directed to the victims of collective violence. Revista de Psicología Social, 25(1), 87-100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1174/021347410790193478

Bocheńska, J. (2018). Humanising the Actors and Working through the Conflict: The Role of Kurdish Literary Narratives and Culture in the Reconciliation Process

in Turkey. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV)*, 12(1), 636. https://doi.org/10.4119/UNIBI/ijcv.636

Bono, G., McCullough, M. E., & Root, L. M. (2008). Forgiveness, feeling connected to others, and well-being: Two longitudinal studies. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 34, 182–195. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167207310025

Borris, E., & Diehl, P.F. (1998). Forgiveness, reconciliation, and the contribution of international peacekeeping. In H.L. Langholtz (Ed.), The psychology of peacekeeping (pp. 207-222). Westport: Praeger Publishers.

Boyatzis, R. E. (1998). Transforming qualitative information: Thematic analysis and code
development. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Bozarslan, H. (2000). 2000. Why the Armed Struggle? Understanding Violence in Kurdistan of Turkey. In F. Ibrahim, & G. Gurbey (Eds.), The Kurdish Conflict Turkey: Obstacles and Chances for Peace and Democracy (pp. 17-30). New York: St. Martin's Press.

Branscombe, N. R. (2004). A social psychological process perspective on collective guilt. In N. R. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), Collective guilt: International perspectives (pp. 320–334). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative research in psychology*, 3(2), 77-101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa

Breakwell, G. M. (1993). Social representations and social identity. *Papers on social representations*, 2(3), 198-217.

Breakwell, G. M. (2010). Resisting representations and identity processes. *Papers on Social Representations*, 19, 6-1. Retrieved from http://www.psr.jku.at/

Brown, A. D., Kouri, N., & Hirst, W. (2012). Memory's Malleability: Its Role in Shaping Collective Memory and Social Identity. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 3, 257. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00257

Brown, R., & Hewstone, M. (2005). An integrative theory of intergroup contact. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 255-343). London, England: Elsevier Academic Press.

Brown, R., Eller, A., Leeds, S., & Stace, K. (2007). Intergroup contact and intergroup attitudes: A longitudinal study. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 37(4), 692-703. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.384

Brylka, A., Mähönen, T. A., & Jasinskaja-Lahti, I. (2015). National Identification and Intergroup Attitudes Among Members of the National Majority and Immigrants: Preliminary Evidence for the Mediational Role of Psychological

113

Ownership of a Country. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 3*(1), 24-45. https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v3i1.275

Buckels, E. E., & Trapnell, P. D. (2013). Disgust facilitates outgroup dehumanization. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 16*(6), 771–780. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430212471738

Cagaptay, S. (2006). *Islam, secularism and nationalism in modern Turkey: who is a Turk?*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203968925

Cairns, E., & Roe, M. D. (2003). Introduction: Why memories in conflict?. In E. Cairns & M. D. Roe (Eds.), *The role of memory in ethnic conflict* (pp. 3-8). Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403919823_1

Cairns, E., Tam, T., Hewstone, M., & Niens, U. (2005). Intergroup forgiveness and intergroup conflict: Northern Ireland, A case study. In E. L. Worthington (Ed.), *Handbook of Forgiveness* (pp. 461-476). Taylor and Francis. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0035582

Cameron, J. E., & Lalonde, R. N. (2001). Social identification and gender-related ideology in women and men. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 40*(1), 59-77. https://doi.org/10.1348/014466601164696

Cehajic, S., Brown, R., & Castano, E. (2008). Forgive and forget? Antecedents and consequences of intergroup forgiveness in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Political Psychology, 29*(3), 351-367. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00634.x

Chee-Beng, T. (2000). Ethnic identities and national identities: Some examples from Malaysia. *Identities Global Studies in Culture and Power, 6*(4), 441-480. https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2000.9962652

Coleman, P. T. (2006). Power and Conflict. In M. Deutsch, P. T. Coleman, & E. C. Marcus (Eds.), *The handbook of conflict resolution: Theory and practice*, (pp. 120-143). John Wiley & Sons.

Contempt. (2018). In Merriam-Webster.com. Retrieved from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/contempt

Contempt. (2018). In OxfordDictionaries.com. Retrieved from https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/contempt

Dagirmanjian, S. (1996). Armenian families. In M. McGoldrick, J. Giordano, & J.K. Pearce (Eds.), *Ethnicity and family therapy* (2nd ed., pp 376-391). New York, NY: The Guildford Press.

de Zavala, A. G., Cichocka, A., Eidelson, R., & Jayawickreme, N. (2009). Collective narcissism and its social consequences. *Journal of personality and social psychology, 97*(6), 1074. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0016904

Deaux, K. (2000). Models, meanings and motivations. In D. Capozza & R. Brown (Eds.), Social identity processes: Trends in theory and research (pp. 1-14). http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446218617.n1

Demoulin, S., Leyens, J. P., & Yzerbyt, V. (2006). Lay theories of essentialism. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 9(1), 25-42. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430206059855

Dinnick, I., & Noor, M. (2019). Intergroup Forgiveness: The Interplay Between Who We Are and What Tales We Tell. In K. Sassenberg & M. Vliek (Eds.), Social Psychology in Action (pp. 221-237). Springer, Cham.

Doosje, B. E., Branscombe, N. R., Spears, R., & Manstead, A. S. (2006). Antecedents and consequences of group-based guilt: The effects of ingroup identification. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 9(3), 325-338. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1368430206064637

Doosje, B., & Branscombe, N. R. (2003). Attributions for the negative historical actions of a group. European Journal of Social Psychology, 33(2), 235-248. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.142

Doosje, B., Branscombe, N. R., Spears, R., & Manstead, A. S. (1998). Guilty by association: When one's group has a negative history. Journal of personality and social psychology, 75(4), 872. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.75.4.872

Duckitt, J., & Mphuthing, T. (1998). Group identification and intergroup attitudes: a longitudinal analysis in South Africa. Journal of personality and social psychology, 74(1), 80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.74.1.80

Edwards, D. (1998). The relevant thing about her: Social identity categories in use. In C. Antaki & S. Widdicombe (Eds.), Identities in talk (pp. 15-33). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Ekmekçioğlu, L. (2015). Scholarship on the Armenian Genocide as a gendered event and process. New Perspectives on Turkey, 53, 185-190. https://doi.org/10.1017/npt.2015.35

Enright, R. D., Freedman, S. R., & Rique, J. (1998). The psychology of interpersonal forgiveness. In R. D. Enright & J. North (Eds.), Exploring forgiveness (pp. 46 – 62). Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Enright, R. D., Lee, Y. R., Hirshberg, M. J., Litts, B. K., Schirmer, E. B., Irwin, A. J., ... & Song, J. Y. (2016). Examining group forgiveness: Conceptual and empirical issues. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 22(2), 153. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pac0000153

Ensari, N., & Miller, N. (2002). The outgroup must not be so bad after all: the effects of disclosure, typicality, and salience on intergroup bias. Journal of personality and social psychology, 83(2), 313. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.83.2.313

Esses, V. M., Veenvliet, S., Hodson, G., & Mihic, L. (2008). Justice, morality, and the dehumanization of refugees. Social Justice Research, 21(1), 4-25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11211-007-0058-4

Fattal, L. F. (2017). Bilingualism and Project Arts-Based Learning. Using Photography and Other Arts-Based Methods With English Language Learners: Guidance, Resources, and Activities for P-12 Educators, 59.

Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Buchner, A., & Lang, A. G. (2009). Statistical power analyses using G* Power 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression analyses. Behavior research methods, 41(4), 1149-1160. https://doi.org/10.3758/BRM.41.4.1149

Fischer, A., & Giner-Sorolla, R. (2016). Contempt: Derogating others while keeping calm. Emotion Review, 8(4), 346-357. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1754073915610439

Fisher, R. J. (2006). Intergroup conflict. In M. Deutsch, P. T. Coleman, & E. C. Marcus (Eds.), The handbook of conflict resolution: Theory and practice, (pp. 176-196). John Wiley & Sons.

Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J., & Glick, P. (2007). Universal dimensions of social cognition: Warmth and competence. Trends in cognitive sciences, 11(2), 77-83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(07)00002-0

Freedman, S. R., & Enright, R. D. (1996). Forgiveness as an intervention goal with incest survivors. Journal of consulting and clinical psychology, 64(5), 983. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-006X.64.5.983

Fu, H., Watkins, D., & Hui, E. K. P. (2004). Personality correlates of the disposition towards interpersonal forgiveness: A Chinese perspective. International Journal of Psychology, 39, 305–316. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207590344000402

Galtung, J. (1996). Peace by peaceful means: Peace and conflict, development and civilization. PRIO. London & Thousand Oaks & New Delhi: Sage.

Gençoğlu, A. (2015). Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Kurucu Bir Ögesi Olarak Kolektif Bellek: Okul Ders Kitaplarında Çanakkale Savaşı Anlatıları. İletişim Kuram ve Araştırma Dergisi, (331-351).

George, D. L. (2017). War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (Vol. 1). Pickle Partners Publishing.

Giner-Sorolla, R. (2012). Judging passions: Moral emotions in persons and groups. New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Giner-Sorolla, R., & Cichocka, A. (2016). Emotion regulation beyond appraisals: Other routes to sustained and changed intergroup feelings. Psychological Inquiry, 27(2), 96-100. https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2016.1160760

Glynos, J., & Howarth, D. (2007). Logics of critical explanation in social and political theory. Routledge.

Gobodo-Madikizela, P. (2008). Transforming trauma in the aftermath of gross human rights abuses: Making public spaces intimate through the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In A. Nadler, T. Malloy, J. D. Fisher (Eds.), Social psychology of intergroup reconciliation: from violent conflict to peaceful co-existence (pp. 57-75). Oxford University Press.

Gökalp, D. (2007). Beyond Ethnopolitical Contention: The State, Citizenship and Violence in the 'New' Kurdish question in Turkey. (Unpublished PhD dissertation). The University of Texas at Austin, Texas, USA.

Gourlay, W. (2018). The Kurds and the "Others": Kurdish Politics as an Inclusive, Multi-ethnic Vehicle in Turkey. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2018.1541300

Green, E. G., Visintin, E. P., Hristova, A., Bozhanova, A., Pereira, A., & Staerklé, C. (2017). Collective victimhood and acknowledgement of outgroup suffering across history: Majority and minority perspectives. European Journal of Social Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2237

Greenaway, K. H., Quinn, E. A., & Louis, W. R. (2011). Appealing to common humanity increases forgiveness but reduces collective action among victims of historical atrocities. European Journal of Social Psychology, 41(5), 569-573. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.802

Greenfield, P. M. (2000). Three approaches to the psychology of culture: Where do they come from? Where can they go? *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, *3*(3), 223-240. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-839X.00066

Güneş, C. (2007). Kurdish Politics in Turkey: A Question of Identity. The International Journal of Kurdish Studies, 21(1-2), 17-36.

Halperin, E. (2016). Emotions in conflict: Inhibitors and facilitators of peace making. New York: Routledge.

Hamer, K., Penczek, M., & Bilewicz, M. (2017). "Humanum ignoscere est". The relationship of national and supranational identifications with intergroup forgiveness. Personality and Individual Differences, 105, 257-263. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2016.09.058

Hanke, K. (2009). Victim and Perpetrator Perspectives in Post World War II Contexts: Intergroup forgiveness and historical closure in Europe and East Asia. Unpublished doctoral thesis. Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.

Hanke, K., Liu, J. H., Hilton, D. J., Bilewicz, M., Garber, I., Huang, L. L., ... & Wang, F. (2013). When the past haunts the present: Intergroup forgiveness and historical closure in post-World War II societies in Asia and in Europe. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 37(3), 287-301. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2012.05.003

Harber, K. D., & Wenberg, K. E. (2005). Emotional disclosure and closeness toward offenders. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 734–746. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167204272720

Hayes, A. F. (2016). The process macro for SPSS and SAS. Retrieved from www.processmacro.org.

Hewstone, M., Cairns, E., Voci, A., Hamberger, J., & Niens, U. (2006). Intergroup contact, forgiveness, and experience of "The Troubles" in Northern Ireland. Journal of Social Issues, 62(1), 99-120. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2006.00441.x

Hewstone, M., Cairns, E., Voci, A., McLernon, F., Niens, U., & Noor, M. (2004). Intergroup forgiveness and guilt in Northern Ireland. In N. R. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), Collective guilt: International perspectives, (pp. 193-215). Cambridge University Press.

Hewstone, M., Kenworthy, J. B., Cairns, E., Tausch, N., Hughes, J., Tam, T., ... & Pinder, C. (2008). Stepping stones to reconciliation in Northern Ireland: Intergroup contact, forgiveness and trust. In A. Nadler, T. Malloy, J. D. Fisher (Eds.), Social psychology of intergroup reconciliation: from violent conflict to peaceful co-existence (pp. 199-226). Oxford University Press.

Hogg, M. A. (2006). Social identity theory. In P. J. Burke (Ed.), Contemporary social psychological theories (pp. 111–136). Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Hornsey, M. J., & Wohl, M. J. (2013). We are sorry: Intergroup apologies and their tenuous link with intergroup forgiveness. European Review of Social Psychology, 24(1), 1-31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/josi.12000

Husnu, S., Mertan, B. & Rüstemli, A. (2008). Intergroup Contact: The Case of Cyprus. XXIXth International Congress of Psychology, University of Berlin, Germany.

Husnu, S., Mertan, B., & Cicek, O. (2018). Reducing Turkish Cypriot children's prejudice toward Greek Cypriots: Vicarious and extended intergroup contact through storytelling. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 21(1), 178-192. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430216656469

Islam, M. R., & Hewstone, M. (1993). Dimensions of contact as predictors of intergroup anxiety, perceived outgroup variability, and outgroup attitude: An integrative model. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19(6), 700-710. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167293196005.

Islambay, D. (July, 2018). *The Emergence of Collective Memory Behind Deferred Mourning: Assassination of Hrant Dink.* Oral Presentation at 24th Congress of the International Association of Cross Cultural Psychology, Guelph, Canada.

Iyer, A., & Leach, C. W. (2008). Emotion in intergroup relations. European review of social psychology, 19(1), 86-125.Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the production of false consciousness. British journal of social psychology, 33(1), 1-27. https://doi.org/10.1080/10463280802079738

Jensen, S. Q. (2011). Othering, identity formation and agency. Qualitative studies, 2(2), 63-78. https://doi.org/10.7146/qs.v2i2.5510

Jorgensen, T. (2003). Turkey, the U.S. and the Armenian genocide. In S. L. B. Jensen (Ed.), Genocide: Cases, comparisons, and contemporary debate (pp. 193–224). Copenhagen, Denmark: Werks Offset.

Kadiangandu, J. K., Gauché, M., Vinsonneau, G., & Mullet, E. (2007). Conceptualizations of forgiveness: Collectivist-Congolese versus individualist-French viewpoints. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 38, 432– 437. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022107302312

Kelman, H. C. (1999). The interdependence of Israeli and Palestinian national identities: The role of the other in existential conflicts. Journal of Social Issues, 55, 581–600. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00134

Klar, Y., & Baram, H. (2016). In DeFENCE of the In-Group Historical Narrative in an Intractable Intergroup Conflict: An Individual-Difference Perspective. Political Psychology, 37(1), 37-53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/pops.12229

Klar, Y., & Bilewicz, M. (2017). From socially motivated lay historians to lay censors: Epistemic conformity and defensive group identification. Memory Studies, 10(3), 334-346. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698017701616

Kosterman, R., & Feshbach, S. (1989). Toward a measure of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes. Political Psychology, 10, 257–274. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3791647

Kriesberg, L. (2001). Changing Forms of Coexistence. In M. Abu-Nimer (Eds.), Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory and Practice (pp. 47-64) . Lexington Books, Lanham.

Larrabee, F. S. (2013). Turkey's New Kurdish Opening. *Survival*, *55*(5), 133-146. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2013.841816

Leidner, B., Castono, E., Zaiser, E., & Giner-Sorolla, R. (2010). İngroup glorification, moral disengagement, and justice in the context of collective violence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36, 1115–1139. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167210376391

Lewin, K. (1997). Resolving social conflicts and field theory in social science. American Psychological Association.

Lewis, H. B. (1971). *Shame and guilt in neurosis*. New York, NY: International Universities Press.

Lewy, G. (2005). *The Armenian massacres in Ottoman Turkey. A disputed genocide.* Salt Lake City, UT: The University of Utah Press.

Li, M., Rovenpor, D. R., & Leidner, B. (2016). Regulating the Scope of an Emotion Regulation Perspective on Intergroup Reconciliation. *Psychological Inquiry*, *27*(2), 117-123. https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2016.1163960

Liu, J. H., Lawrence, B., Ward, C., & Abraham, S. (2002). Social representations of history in Malaysia and Singapore: On the relationship between national and ethnic identity. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, *5*(1), 3-20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-839X.00091

Just, A. (2017). *Race, Ethnicity, and Political Behavior*. Retrieved September 2019, from Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.238

Mackie, D. M., & Smith, E. R. (Eds.) (2004). *From prejudice to intergroup emotions: Differentiated reactions to social groups*. New York, NY & Hove, UK: Psychology Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.79.4.602

Mackie, D. M., Devos, T., & Smith, E. R. (2000). Intergroup emotions: explaining offensive action tendencies in an intergroup context. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *79*(4), 602. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.79.4.602

Mackie, D. M., Silver, L. A., & Smith, E. R. (2004). Intergroup emotions: Emotion as an intergroup phenomenon. In L. Z. Tiedens & C. W. Leach (Eds.), *The social life of emotions* (pp. 227–245). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Malhotra, D., & Liyanage, S. (2005). Long-term effects of peace workshops in protracted conflicts. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49, 908–924. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002705281153

Manzi, J., & González, R. (2007). Forgiveness and reparation in Chile: The role of cognitive and emotional intergroup antecedents. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, *13*(1), 71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0094025

Maoz, I., & Ellis, D. G. (2008). Intergroup communication as a predictor of Jewish-Israeli agreement with integrative solutions to the Israeli Palestinian conflict: The mediating effects of outgroup trust and guilt. *Journal of Communication*, 58, 490 –507. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.00396.x

Marková, I. (2012). Introduction: conflict and trust in dialogical perspective. In I. Marková & A. Gillespie (Eds.), *Trust and conflict: Representation, culture and dialogue* (pp. 1-14). Routledge.

Mashuri, A., Zaduqisti, E., & Ula, M. (2017). A Majority Group's Perspective-taking Towards a Minority Group: Its Antecedents and Impact on Support for Minority Helping. *Psychology and Developing Societies*, *29*(1), 44-73. https://doi.org/10.1177/0971333616689191

Mazzara, B. M., & Leone, G. (2001). Collective memory and intergroup relations. *Revista de Psicologia Social*, *16*(3), 349-367. https://doi.org/10.1174/021347401317351080

McCullough, M. E., Pargament, K. I., & Thoresen, C. E. (2000). The psychology of forgiveness: History, conceptual issues, and overview. In M. E. McCullough, K. I. Pargament & C. E. Thoresen (Eds.), Forgiveness: Theory, research, and practice (pp. 1–14). New York: Guilford.

McKeown, S., & Psaltis, C. (2017). Intergroup Contact and the Mediating Role of Intergroup Trust on Outgroup Evaluation and Future Contact Intentions in Cyprus and Northern Ireland. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology. Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pac0000275

McLernon, F., Cairns, E., Lewis, C. A., & Hewstone, M. (2003). Memories of recent conflict and forgiveness in Northern Ireland. In E. Cairns & M. D. Roe (Eds.), The role of memory in ethnic conflict (pp. 125-143). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Miller, D. A., Smith, E. R., & Mackie, D. M. (2004). Effects of intergroup contact and political predispositions on prejudice: Role of intergroup emotions. Group processes & intergroup relations, 7(3), 221-237. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1368430204046109

Moeschberger, S. L., Dixon, D. N., Niens, U., & Cairns, E. (2005). Forgiveness in Northern Ireland: A Model for Peace in the Midst of the" Troubles". Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 11(2), 199. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327949pac1102_5

Moscovici, S. (1988). Notes towards a description of social representations. *European journal of social psychology*, *18*(3), 211-250. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420180303

Myers, E., Hewstone, M., & Cairns, E. (2009). Impact of conflict on mental health in Northern Ireland: The mediating role of intergroup forgiveness and collective guilt. *Political Psychology*, 30, 269–290. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00691.x

Nadler, A., & Liviatan, I. (2004). Intergroup reconciliation processes in Israel: Theoretical analysis and empirical findings. In N. R. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective guilt: International perspectives*, (pp. 216-233). Cambridge University Press.

Nazer, J. (1968). *The first genocide of the twentieth century: The Armenian massacre*. New York, NY: T. and T. Publishing.

Neto, F., da Conceição Pinto, M., & Mullet, E. (2007). Intergroup forgiveness: East Timorese and Angolan perspectives. *Journal of Peace Research*, *44*(6), 711-728. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343307082067

Noor, M., & Brown, R. (2007). *Generosity versus grudge: The role of identity in fostering intergroup forgiveness attitudes between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland*. Manuscript submitted for publication.

Noor, M., Branscombe, N. R., & Hewstone, M. (2015). When group members forgive: Antecedents and consequences. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *18*(5), 577 – 588. https://doi.org/10.1177/136843021558660

Noor, M., Brown, R., & Prentice, G. (2008). Prospects for intergroup reconciliation: Social-psychological predictors of intergroup forgiveness and reparation in Northern Ireland and Chile. In A. Nadler, T. Malloy, J. D. Fisher (Eds.), *Social psychology of intergroup reconciliation: from violent conflict to peaceful co-existence* (pp. 97-114). Oxford University Press.

Noor, M., Brown, R., Gonzalez, R., Manzi, J., & Lewis, C. A. (2008). On positive psychological outcomes: What helps groups with a history of conflict to forgive and reconcile with each other? *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *34*(6), 819-832. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167208315555

OECD. (2017). How's Life? 2017: Measuring Well-being. OECD Publishing: Paris. https://doi.org/10.1787/how_life-2017-en.

Öktem, K. (2004). Incorporating the time and space of the ethnic 'other': nationalism and space in Southeast Turkey in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. *Nations and Nationalism*, *10*(4), 559-578. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1354-5078.2004.00182.x

Özbek, E. E. (2016). *Commemorating the Armenian Genocide: The Politics of Memory and National Identity*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. https://doi.org/10.22215/etd/2016-11844

Özdoğan, G. G., & Kılıçdağı, O. (2012). *Hearing Turkey's Armenians: Issues, demands and policy recommendations*. TESEV publications.

Paez, D. (2010). Official or political apologies and improvement of intergroup relations: A neo-Durkheimian approach to official apologies as rituals. *Revista de Psicología Social*, *25*(1), 101-115. https://doi.org/10.1174/021347410790193504

Paluck, E. L. (2009). Reducing intergroup prejudice and conflict using the media: A field experiment in Rwanda. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *96*(3), 574–587. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0011989

Perreault, S., & Bourhis, R. Y. (1999). Ethnocentrism, social identification, and discrimination. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *25*(1), 92-103. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167299025001008

Pettigrew, T. F. (1998). Intergroup contact theory. *Annual review of psychology, 49*(1), 65-85.

Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp. (2011). *When groups meet: The dynamics of intergroup contact.* Hove: Psychology Press. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.49.1.65

Phillips, D. L. (2012). *Diplomatic history: The Turkey-Armenia protocols.* New York, NY: Institute for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia University & Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School.

Reicher, S., & Hopkins, N. (2001). *Self and nation*. London: Sage.

Roccas, S., Klar, Y., & Liviatan, I. (2006). The paradox of group-based guilt: Modes of national identification, conflict vehemence, and reactions to the ingroup's moral violations. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *91*(4), 698. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.91.4.698

Roccas, S., Sagiv, L., Schwartz, S., Halevy, N., & Eidelson, R. (2008). Toward a unifying model of identification with groups: Integrating theoretical perspectives. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *12*(3), 280-306. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868308319225

Roe, M. D. & Cairns, E., (2003). Memories in Conflict: Review and a Look to the Future. In E. Cairns & M. D. Roe (Eds.), T*he role of memory in ethnic conflict*, (pp. 171-199). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Roshwald, A. (2001). *Ethnic nationalism and the fall of empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East, 1914–1923*. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/109.1.153

Rozin, P., Lowery, L., Imada, S., & Haidt, J. (1999). The CAD triad hypothesis: a mapping between three moral emotions (contempt, anger, disgust) and three moral codes (community, autonomy, divinity). *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *76*(4), 574. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.76.4.574

Sandal Önal, E. (in progress). *Dimensions of Othering in Young People: The Influence of Group Identification and The Impacts On Political Diversity.* Doctoral Dissertation, Istanbul Bilgi University, Istanbul.

Sani, F., Bowe, M., Herrera, M., Manna, C., Cossa, T., Miao, X., & Zhou, Y. (2007). Perceived collective continuity: Seeing groups as entities that move through time. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *37*(6), 1118-1134. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.430

Saracoglu, C. (2009). 'Exclusive recognition': the new dimensions of the question of ethnicity and nationalism in Turkey. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *32*(4), 640-658. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870802065226

Saraçoğlu, C. (2011). Şehir, Orta Sınıf ve Kürtler. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Sartre, J. P. (1946). Existentialism and Humanism. New Haven: Yale.

Schriber, R. A., Chung, J. M., Sorensen, K. S., & Robins, R. W. (2017). Dispositional contempt: A first look at the contemptuous person. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *113*(2), 280-309. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000101

Scobie, E. D., & Scobie, G. E. W. (1998). Damaging events: The perceived need for forgiveness. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, *28*(4), 373-402. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5914.00081

Shnabel, N., Nadler, A., Canetti-Nisim, D., & Ullrich, J. (2008). The Role of Acceptance and Empowerment in Promoting Reconciliation from the Perspective of the Needs-Based Model. *Social Issues and Policy Review*, *2*(1), 159-186. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-2409.2008.00014.x

Smith, A. D. (2001). *Nationalism: Theory, ideology, history*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press.

Smith, E. R. (1993). Social identity and social emotions: Toward new conceptualizations of prejudice. In D. M. Mackie & D. L. Hamilton (Eds.), *Affect, cognition, and stereotyping: Interactive processes in group perception* (pp. 297-315). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Smith, E. R., & Mackie, D. M. (2008). Intergroup emotions. In L. F. Barrett, M. Lewis, & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (pp. 412-423). The Guilford Press.

Smith, E. R., Seger, C. R., & Mackie, D. M. (2007). Can emotions be truly group level? Evidence regarding four conceptual criteria. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *93*(3), 431–446. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.3.431

Staub, E., & Pearlman, L. A. (2001). Healing, reconciliation, and forgiving after genocide and other collective violence. In R. G. Helmick & R. L. Peterson (Eds.), *Forgiveness and reconciliation: Religion, public policy and conflict transformation* (pp. 195–217). Radnor, PA: Templeton Foundation Press.

Staub, E., Pearlman, L. A., Gubin, A., & Hagengimana, A. (2005). Healing, reconciliation, forgiving and the prevention of violence after genocide or mass killing: An intervention and its experimental evaluation in Rwanda. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, *24*(3), 297–334. https://doi.org/10.1521/jscp.24.3.297.65617

Swart, H., & Hewstone, M. (2012). Forgiveness, intergroup. In D. J. Christie (Eds.), *The encyclopedia of peace psychology* (pp. 445–449). Malden, MA: Wiley.

Tachjian, V. (2009). Gender, nationalism, exclusion: the reintegration process of female survivors of the Armenian genocide. Nations and Nationalism, 15(1), 60-80. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2009.00366.x

Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (eds.), Social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33– 48). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behaviour. In S. Worchel, & W. G. Austin (eds.), *Psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 7-24). Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203505984-16

Tajfel, H. E. (1981). *Human groups and social categories: Studies in social psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tam, T. Y. (2005). *The impact of intergroup contact on Catholic-Protestant relations in Northern Ireland: a focus on affective and emphatic psychological processes.* (Unpublished Doctoral dissertation). University of Oxford, England).

Tam, T., Hewstone, M., Cairns, E., Tausch, N., Maio, G., & Kenworthy, J. (2007). The impact of intergroup emotions on forgiveness in Northern Ireland. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *10*(1), 119-136.

Tam, T., Hewstone, M., Kenworthy, J. B., Cairns, E., Marinetti, C., Geddes, L., & Parkinson, B. (2008). Postconflict reconciliation: Intergroup forgiveness and implicit biases in Northern Ireland. *Journal of Social Issues*, *64*(2), 303-320. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.00563.x

Tam, T., Hewstone, M., Kenworthy, J., & Cairns, E. (2009). Intergroup trust in Northern Ireland. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *35*(1), 45-59. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167208325004

Tavuchis, N. (1991). *Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Tilly, C. (2002). Violent and nonviolent trajectories in contentious politics. In K. Worcester, S. A. Bermanzohn, & M. Ungar (Eds.), *Violence and Politics: Globalization's Paradox* (pp. 12-31). New York: Routledge London.

Turner, J. C. (1999). Some current issues in research on social identity and selfcategorization theories. In N. Ellemers, R. Spears & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Social identity: Context, commitment, content* (pp. 6–34). Oxford: Blackwell.

Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). *Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory.* Oxford, England: Blackwell.

Üngör, U. Ü. (2014). Lost in commemoration: the Armenian genocide in memory and identity. *Patterns of Prejudice*, *48*(2), 147-166. https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2014.902210

van Bruinessen, M. (1998). Shifting national and ethnic identities: The Kurds in Turkey and the European diaspora. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, *18*(1), 39-52. https://doi.org/10.1080/13602009808716392

van Bruinessen, M. (2000). *Kurdish ethno-nationalism versus nation-building states.* Analectica Isisiana, XLVII. Istanbul: Isis.

van Zomeren, M., Spears, R., & Leach, C. W. (2008). Exploring psychological mechanisms of collective action: Does relevance of group identity influence how people cope with collective disadvantage? *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *47*(2), 353-372. https://doi.org/10.1348/014466607X231091

Verkuyten, M., & Yildiz, A. A. (2007). National (dis) identification and ethnic and religious identity: A study among Turkish-Dutch Muslims. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *33*(10), 1448-1462. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167207304276

Vollhardt, J. R., & Bilewicz, M. (2013). After the genocide: Psychological perspectives on victim, bystander, and perpetrator groups. *Journal of Social Issues*, *69*(1), 1-15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/josi.12000

Wagoner, B. (2015). Collective remembering as a process of social representation. In G. Sammut, E., Andreouli, G. Gaskell & Valsiner, J. (Eds.). *The Cambridge handbook of social representations* (pp. 143-162). Cambridge University Press.

Wohl, M. J., & Branscombe, N. R. (2005). Forgiveness and collective guilt assignment to historical perpetrator groups depend on level of social category inclusiveness. *Journal of personality and social psychology, 88*(2), 288. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.88.2.288

Wohl, M. J., Hornsey, M. J., & Bennett, S. H. (2012). Why group apologies succeed and fail: intergroup forgiveness and the role of primary and secondary emotions. *Journal of personality and social psychology, 102*(2), 306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0024838

Yeğen, M. (2006). Müstakbel Türk'ten Sözde Vatandaşa. İletişim Yayınları. İstanbul.

Yeğen, M. (2010). The Kurdish question in Turkey: denial to recognition. In M. Casier & J. Jongerden (Eds.), *Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey* (pp. 66-84). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2012.652858

Yzerbyt, V. Y., Dumont, M., Mathieu, B., Gordijn, E., & Wigboldus, D. (2006). Social comparison and group-based emotions. In S. Guimond (Eds.), *Social comparison and social psychology: Understanding cognition, intergroup relations, and culture* (pp. 174–205). New York: Cambridge University Press.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Human Subjects Ethics Committee Approval of Middle East Technical University

UYGULAMALI ETİK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
APPLIED ETHICS RESEARCH CENTER

ORTA DOĞU TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

DUMLUPINAR BULVARI 06800
ÇANKAYA ANKARA/TURKEY
T: +90 312 210 22 91
F: +90 312 210 79 59
ueam@metu.edu.tr
www.ueam.metu.edu.tr

Sayı: 28620816 / 163

27 ŞUBAT 2018

Konu: Değerlendirme Sonucu

Gönderen: ODTÜ İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu (İAEK)

İlgi: İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu

Sayın Yrd. Doç. Dr. Banu CİNGÖZ ULU

Danışmanlığını yaptığınız doktora öğrencisi Demet İSLAMBAY' ın *"Türkiye Bağlamında Gruplararası Affetme"* başlıklı araştırması İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu tarafından uygun görülerek gerekli onay **2018-SOS-026** protokol numarası ile **09.04.2018 - 30.04.2019** tarihleri arasında geçerli olmak üzere verilmiştir.

Bilgilerinize saygılarımla sunarım.

Prof. Dr. Ş. Halil TURAN
Başkan V

Prof. Dr. Ayhan SOL
Üye

Prof. Dr. Ayhan Gürbüz DEMİR
Üye

Doç. Dr. Yaşar KONDAKÇI
Üye

Doç. Dr. Zana ÇITAK
Üye

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Pınar KAYGAN
Üye

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Emre SELÇUK
Üye

128

Appendix B: Consent Form for Study 1
BİLGİLENDİRME VE GÖNÜLLÜ KATILIM ONAY FORMU

Bu araştırma, Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Psikoloji Bölümü Sosyal Psikoloji doktora öğrencisi Demet İslambay tarafından, Yard. Doç. Dr. Banu Cingöz Ulu danışmanlığında yürütülmektedir. Bu araştırma kapsamında Türkler, Ermeniler ve Kürtler dikkate alınarak Türkiye'de süregelen çatışmalı ortamın farklı etnik kökenler tarafından nasıl değerlendirildiğini, ve bu grupların karşılıklı olarak birbirilerini affetme eğilimlerini anlamaktır. Bu doğrultuda, kendisini Türk, Ermeni ya da Kürt olarak tanımlayan katılımcılarla çeşitli görüşmeler yapılmaktadır. Bu çalışmada sorulara vereceğiniz yanıtlar büyük önem taşımaktadır. Sorulan soruların doğru veya yanlış bir cevabı yoktur, önemli olan sizin ne düşündüğünüz ve ne hissettiğinizdir. Sizden kimliğinizle ilgili hiçbir bilgi istenmemektedir. Vereceğiniz bilgiler kimlik bilgileriniz alınmadan tamamıyla gizli tutularak, yalnızca araştırmacılar tarafından, grup düzeyinde değerlendirilecektir. Soruları yanıtlamanız yaklaşık 45-60 dakikanızı alacaktır. Görüşmelerden elde edilecek sonuçlar sadece bilimsel amaçlı olarak kullanılacaktır. Görüşmeye katılım tamamen gönüllülük esasına dayanmaktadır. Çalışmada sizi rahatsız eden herhangi bir soruyla karşılaşırsanız ya da görüşmeye devam etmek istemezseniz yarıda bırakabilirsiniz. Veri toplama ve analiz sürecinin sonunda elde edilen bulgularla ilgili tüm sorularınız cevaplandırılacaktır. Yardımlarınız ve katılımınız için teşekkür ederiz.

Mevcut araştırma, Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi'nin Uygulamalı Etik Araştırma Merkezi İnsan Araştırmaları Komitesi tarafından incelenmiş ve onaylanmıştır. Araştırmayla ilgili herhangi bir sorunuz olursa, araştırmacıyla (Demet İslambay, demetislambay@gmail.com), ya da tez danışmanıyla (Banu Cingöz Ulu, cingoz@metu.edu.tr) iletişim kurabilirsiniz. Bunun yanı sıra, ODTÜ Psikoloji Bölümü'ne 0312 210-3182 numaralı telefondan, ya da Uygulamalı Etik Araştırma Merkezi'ne de 0312 210-7348 numaralı telefon veya ueam@metu.edu.tr e-posta adresinden erişebilirsiniz.

Bu çalışmaya tamamen gönüllü olarak katılmayı **kabul ediyorum.** (Formu doldurup imzaladıktan sonra uygulayıcıya geri veriniz).

İmza: Tarih:

Appendix C: Demographics and Interview Questions

B1. Demographic questions

1. Cinsiyetiniz: _____

2. Yaşınız: _____

3. Nerelisiniz? _____

4. Eğitim durumunuz (En son bitirdiğiniz eğitim seviyesi): _____

5. Mesleğiniz nedir? _____

6. Hayat standartlarınızı düşündüğünüzde, kendinizi hangi sınıfta görüyorsunuz (sosyoekonomik açıdan)? _____

7. Hangi etnik kökene mensupsunuz? _____

8. Türkiye'de süregelen çatışmalardan doğrudan etkilendiniz mi? _____ Evet ise ne gibi? _____

9. Herhangi bir dine inanıyor musunuz? _____ Evet ise hangisi? _____

10. Oy kullanıyor musunuz? _____ Evet ise hangi partiye?_____

B2. Semi-structured interview questions

1. Sizce geçmişte Türkiye'de farklı gruplar arasında ne tür sorunlar ya da gerginlikler yaşandı? Bu gruplar kimlerdir sizce?

2. Başka bir grubu affetmek ne demektir, ne anlıyorsunuz?

3. (Yukarıda bahsedilen anlaşmazlıklar hatırlatılarak) Yapılan yanlışlar nelerdir? (İpucu: her iki taraf için de)

4. Geçmişte yaşanan bu gerginlikler ya da anlaşmazlıklar affedildi mi -ya da bunların affedilmesi mümkün müdür? (Neden, nasıl, ne zaman, hangi koşulda?)

5. Geçmişle yüzleşmek ne demektir?

6. Geçmişten bu yana, diğer gruplarla ilişkilerinizi tarihsel olarak düşündüğünüzde, sizin kişisel olarak affedeceğiniz veya affedemeyeceğiniz, ve sizin grubunuzun genel olarak (İpucu: çoğunluğunun, liderlerinin, vs.) affedip affetmeyeceği şeyler var mıdır, nelerdir bunlar? Hangi koşullar altında affedersiniz? Peki grubunuz?

7. Affetmenin sonuçları neler olabilir sizce?

8. Türkiye'deki farklı etnik ve dini grupları düşündüğünüz zaman, hep beraberce yasamak mümkün müdür sizce, siz ister misiniz? (Cevaplanmamışsa: Hangileri ile? Hangi koşullar altında, ne olsa?)

9. İleride torunlarınız olduğunu, ya da sonraki nesilleri düşünmenizi istesem, onların nasıl bir Türkiye'de yaşamasını isterdiniz? (İpucu: Türkler, Kürtler, Ermeniler, Aleviler, vb. Farklı etnik ve kültürel gruplar ve bunların birlikteliği/ayrılığı açısından)

10. Elinizde güç olsa ya da ülkeyi yönetiyor olsanız, bu gruplar arasındaki anlaşmazlık ya da gerginlik üzerine nasıl bir yol izlerdiniz? Nasıl kararlar alırdınız?

Appendix D: Consent Form for Studies 2 & 3

BİLGİLENDİRME VE GÖNÜLLÜ KATILIM ONAY FORMU

Bu araştırma, Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Psikoloji Bölümü Sosyal Psikoloji doktora öğrencisi Demet İslambay tarafından, Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Banu Cingöz Ulu danışmanlığında yürütülmektedir. Bu araştırma kapsamında farklı etnik gruplar dikkate alınarak gruplar arasındaki ilişkiler sosyal psikolojik açıdan incelenecektir. Çalışmanın bu aşamasına yalnızca kendilerini etnik olarak Kürt ya da Türk olarak tanımlayan katılımcılar dâhil edilecektir. Dolayısıyla, kendinizi etnik açıdan bu iki gruptan herhangi birisinin üyesi olarak tanımlamıyorsanız aşağıdaki "hayır" kutucuğuna basarak çalışmaya katılmayabilirsiniz.

Bu ankette size yaşınız, mesleğiniz, doğum yeriniz, eğitim ve gelir düzeyiniz ve kendinizi farklı köklere göre tanımlayıp tanımlamadığınıza dair bir takım sorular soracağız. Bunların yanı sıra, Türkiye'de bulunan etnik gruplardan olan Kürtler ve Türkler arasındaki ilişkiye dair farklı ifadelerin sizin görüşlerinizi ne kadar iyi yansıttığını belirtmenizi isteyeceğiz. Soruları yanıtlamanız yaklaşık 15 dakikanızı   alacaktır.

Bu ankette gazetelerden, televizyonlardan, medyadan ve etraftan duyabileceğimiz bir takım cümleler ve ifadeler yer almaktadır. Sizden bu görüşleri değerlendirmenizi ve onlara ne derecede katılıp katılmadığınızı belirtmenizi istiyoruz. Bu ifade ve cümleler, bizim bu konulardaki görüşlerimizi dile getirmemektedir. Sizi temin ederiz ki burada vereceğiniz bilgiler ve görüşleriniz tamamen anonim kalacak (kimliğinizle hiç bir şekilde ilişkilendirilmeyecek) ve gizli tutulacaktır (başka şahıslara açıklanmayacaktır). Nihayetinde ulaşmak istediğimiz, sizin fikir ve görüşleriniz olduğundan, sizden olabildiğince dürüst ve açık olmanızı rica ediyoruz. Vereceğiniz cevapların kimliğinizle ilişkilendirilmesine imkân yoktur. Sizin yanıtlarınız diğer katılımcılarınkilerle birleştirilecek ve bir bütün olarak istatistiksel analizlere tabi tutulacaktır. Bütün katılımcıların sağlamış olduğu cevapları içeren dosya, dijital bir biçimde 5 yıl boyunca saklanıp, sonra da güvenli bir biçimde imha edilecektir. Bu veriler, şifreyle korunmuş bir bilgisayarda araştırmacı tarafından incelenecektir. Bu çalışmanın sonuçları bilimsel dergi veya toplantılarda sunulabilir.

Ankete katılım tamamen gönüllülük esasına dayanmaktadır. Çalışmada sizi rahatsız eden herhangi bir soruyla karşılaşırsanız ya da ankete devam etmek istemezseniz anketi yarıda bırakabilirsiniz. Ancak verimizin doğruluğu ve araştırmanın sağlıklı çıkarımlar yapabilmesi için yine de tüm soruları doldurmanız bizlerin çok işine yarayacaktır. Veri toplama ve analiz sürecinin sonunda elde edilen bulgularla ilgili tüm sorularınız cevaplandırılacaktır. Yardımlarınız ve katılımınız için teşekkür ederiz.

Bu proje, Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi'nin Uygulamalı Etik Araştırma Merkezi İnsan Araştırmaları Komitesi tarafından incelenmiş ve onaylanmıştır. Araştırmayla ilgili herhangi bir sorunuz olursa, araştırmacıyla (Demet İslambay, demetislambay@gmail.com), ya da tez danışmanıyla (Banu Cingöz Ulu, cingoz@metu.edu.tr) iletişim kurabilirsiniz. Bunun yanı sıra, ODTÜ Psikoloji Bölümü'ne 0312 210-3182 numaralı telefondan, ya da Uygulamalı Etik Araştırma Merkezi'ne de 0312 210-7348 numaralı telefon veya ueam@metu.edu.tr e-posta adresinden erişebilirsiniz.

Appendix E: Strength of Identification Scale

1. Ermenilerle/Kürtlerle/Türklerle aramda bir bağ olduğunu hissediyorum.

2. Kendimi Ermenilerle/Kürtlerle/Türklerle dayanışma içinde hissediyorum.

3. Kendimi Ermenilere/Kürtlere/Türklere bağlı hissediyorum.

4. Ermeni/Kürt/Türk olmaktan memnunum.

5. Ermenilerin/Kürtlerin/Türklerin gurur duyacak çok şeyi olduğunu düşünüyorum.

6. Ermeni/Kürt/Türk olmak güzel bir şey.

7. Ermeni/Kürt/Türk olmak bana iyi bir his veriyor.

8. Ermeni/Kürt/Türk olduğum gerçeği hakkında sık sık düşünürüm.

9. Ermeni/Kürt/Türk olduğum gerçeği kimliğimin önemli bir parçasıdır.

10. Ermeni/Kürt/Türk olmam, kendimi nasıl gördüğümün önemli bir parçasıdır.

Appendix F: Firmly Entrenched Narrative ClosurE Scale

F1. Yerleşik Anlatının Kapanmışlığı Ölçeği (YAKÖ)

1. Çatışmaya yönelik bizim grubumuzun anlattıkları, diğer grup tarafından anlatılanlara göre daha doğrudur.
2. Bir grup olarak birlik ve beraberliğimizi korumak için, yolumuzun doğru yol olduğuna inanmak zorundayız.
3. Çatışmanın hakkında ileri sürülen farklı yorumlar ile başa çıkabilen insanlara hayranlık duyarım.*
4. Diğer grup ve bizim grubumuz arasında geçmişte veya günümüzde olanlar için bizi suçlama eğilimi olan insanlardan rahatsız olurum.
5. Çatışmanın haklı tarafı olduğumuzu bilmek, bizim için önemlidir.
6. Çatışma hakkında bildiklerimizi sorgulamak her zaman önemlidir. *
7. Kendi içimizde yaşadığımız fikir ayrılıkları bizi diğer grup karşısında güçsüz kılar.
8. Kendi tarihi hakkında şüpheleri olan bir grup güçsüz düşer.
9. Haklı olduğumuzla ilgili şüpheleri olan Ermeniler/Kürtler/Türkler diğer tarafı güçlendirir.
10. Çatışma tarihine yönelik sağlam ve tutarlı bir yaklaşım grubumuzu güçlendirecektir.
11. Çatışmayla ilgili bize öğretilen birçok şeyin yanlış olduğu ortaya çıkarılmıştır. *
12. Ermeniler/Kürtler/Türkler olarak bizim doğru olanı yaptığımız inancında birleşmemiz önemlidir.

*Underlined items were extracted from the analysis.

F2. Original version of the FENCE scale

1. The history of the conflict we grew up with is the most accurate one (vs. history as told by the other group).
2. To preserve our unity as a group we must believe that our path is the right one.
3. I admire people who can cope with different versions of the conflict (reverse coded).
4. I get annoyed with people who tend to blame our side for what is or has happened between the other group and us.
5. It is important for us, as a group, to know that we are on the right side of the conflict.
6. It is always important to question what we know about the conflict (reverse coded).
7. Having many opinions about the conflict weakens us in the face of our enemies.
8. A nation that doubts its history can only get weaker.
9. People who doubt we are right strengthen the other side.
10. A firm, unified attitude towards the history of the conflict will strengthen the nation.
11. Many things that we learned about the conflict have been shown to be wrong (reverse coded).
12. It is important for us to be united in the belief that we, as a State, are doing the right thing.

Appendix G: Outgroup Contempt Scale

Gerginlik/çatışma içinde olduğunuz Türkleri/Kürtleri/Ermenileri genel bir grup olarak düşündüğünüzde, aşağıdaki her bir ifadenin sizin görüşlerinizi ne kadar yansıttığını, imleci 0 ile 100 arasında hareket ettirerek belirtiniz.

0   50   100

0____Bu ifade beni hiç yansıtmıyor.

50___Bu ifade beni kısmen yansıtıyor.

100___Bu ifade beni tamamen yansıtıyor.

1. Türkleri/Kürtleri/Ermenileri pek umursamam.

2. Türklere/Kürtlere/Ermenilere karşı saygımı hızlıca yitirebilirim.

3. Türkleri/Kürtleri/Ermenileri çok da ciddiye almam.

4. Türkleri/Kürtleri/Ermenileri küçümserim.

5. Bize göre Türkler/Kürtler/Ermeniler gözümde daha değersizdir.

6. Bazı davranışlarını düşündüğüm zaman Türkleri/Kürtleri/Ermenileri hor görmem işten bile değil.

Appendix H: Ingroup Glorification Scale

Aşağıdaki her bir ifadeye ne ölçüde katıldığınızı 1 (Kesinlikle katılmıyorum) ile 6 (Kesinlikle katılıyorum) arasında bir seçim yaparak belirtiniz.

1. Herkesin, bizim gücümüzü daha çabuk fark etmesini isterdim.
2. Biz özel muameleyi hak ediyoruz.
3. Biz diğerlerine göre daha hoşgörülü ve sabırlıyız.
4. Bizim tarihimiz gurur vericidir.
5. Eğer dünyada bizim daha büyük bir söz hakkımız olsaydı, dünya çok daha iyi bir yer olurdu.
6. Bizim gelenek ve değerlerimiz bu ülkedeki her grubu temsil eder.
7. Bizim bu ülkedeki gerçek değerimiz anlaşılmıyor.
8. Türkler/ Ermeniler/Kürtler, bizim daha güçlü olmamızdan korkarlar.

Appendix I: Intergroup Contact Scale

Aşağıdaki kısımda Türklerle/Kürtlerle/Ermenilerle ne düzeyde temasta olduğunuzu anlamak için bazı sorular sorulmuştur. Aşağıdaki her bir soruya, 1 (Hiç) ile 6 (Her zaman) arasında bir yanıt veriniz.

Quantity of Contact

1. Ne sıklıkta Türklerle/Kürtlerle/Ermenilerle okul/iş gibi resmi yerlerde iletişim halindesiniz?

2. Ne sıklıkta Türklerle/Kürtlerle/Ermenilerle komşu olarak iletişim halindesiniz?

3. Ne sıklıkta Türklerle/Kürtlerle/Ermenilerle yakın arkadaş-dost olarak iletişim halindesiniz?

4. Ne sıklıkta Türklerle/Kürtlerle/Ermenilerle resmi olmayan/özel konuşmalar yapmaktasınız?

5. Ne sıklıkta Türk/Kürt/Ermeni tanıdıklarınıza ev ziyaretine gitmektesiniz?

Quality of Contact

1. Türklerle/Kürtlerle olan ilişkilerinizde iki tarafın da eşit olduğunu hisseder misiniz?
1……….2……….3……….4……….5……….6
Kesinlikle
Eşit Değil   Kesinlikle Eşit

2. Türklerle/Kürtlerle ilişkilerinizi gönüllü olarak mı yoksa istemeden/mecburi olarak mı sürdürüyorsunuz?
1……….2……….3……….4……….5……….6
Tamamıyla

İstemeden   Tamamen İsteyerek

3. Türklerle/Kürtlerle olan ilişkiniz yüzeysel mi yoksa tamamen içten midir?
1……….2……….3……….4……….5……….6
Tamamen Yüzeysel   Tamamıyla İçten

4. Türklerle/Kürtlerle olan ilişkinizden keyif/memnuniyet duyar mısınız?
1……….2……….3……….4……….5……….6
Hiç Memnun Değilim   Çok Memnunum

5. Türklerle/Kürtlerle olan ilişkiniz rekabete mi yoksa işbirliğine mi dayanır?
1……….2……….3……….4……….5……….6
Rekabete Dayanır   İşbirliğine Dayanır

Appendix J: Willingness to Forgive Outgroups Scale

Aşağıdaki soruları, geçmişte ve günümüzde Ermeniler/Türkler, Kürtler/Türkler arasında yaşanan/yaşanagelen gerginlik ve çatışmayı düşünerek sağ taraftaki imleci 1 ile 9 arasında hareket ettirerek yanıtlayınız.

1. Türkleri/Kürtleri/Ermenileri affedebilmeyi siz kişisel olarak ne kadar isterdiniz?

   1: Hiç istemezdim   9: Çok isterdim

2. Türkleri/Kürtleri/Ermenileri affedebilmek için gerekli koşulların sağlanabilmesi sizce ne kadar olasıdır?

   1: Hiç olası değildir   9: Çok olasıdır

3. Türkleri/Kürtleri/Ermenileri sizin kişisel olarak affedebilmeniz sizce ne kadar gerçekçidir?

   1: Hiç gerçekçi değildir   9: Çok gerçekçidir

4. Türkler/Kürtler/Ermeniler olarak Türkleri/Kürtleri/Ermenileri affetmek sizce ne kadar gerçekçidir?

   1: Hiç gerçekçi değildir   9: Çok gerçekçidir

5. Türkleri/Kürtleri/Ermenileri affedebilmeniz sizin için ne derece mümkündür?

   1: Hiç mümkün değildir   9: Çok mümkündür

6. Şartlar arzu ettiğiniz gibi olsa, Türkleri/Kürtleri/Ermenileri affetmeye ne kadar gönüllü olurdunuz?

   1: Hiç gönüllü olmazdım   9: Çok gönüllü olurdum

Appendix K: Curriculum Vitae

Demet İslambay

demetislambay@gmail.com

Academic Background

2014 - 2019	Middle East Technical University Department of Psychology PhD in Social Psychology
2012 - 2014	Middle East Technical University Department of Psychology MSc in Social Psychology
2007 - 2012	Middle East Technical University Department of Business Administration BSc in Business Administration

Related Experience

June 2019 to present	Leader Women Association Monitoring and Evaluation Officer
October 2017 - October 2018	Aalborg University Department of Communication and Psychology, The Niels Bohr Professorship Centre for Cultural Psychology Visiting Researcher
July 2016 - October 2017	Social Sciences University of Ankara Department of Psychology Research Assistant
June 2014 - July 2016	Middle East Technical University, Ankara Department of Psychology Research Assistant
January 2014 - June 2014	Social Sciences University of Ankara Department of Psychology Research Assistant

Current Research Interests

Intergroup dynamics, minorities, intergroup forgiveness, social identity, peace and conflict, citizenship, social and historical representations, and gender.

Skills

Languages

- Kurdish: Native
- Turkish: Native
- English: Advanced
- French: Pre-Intermediate

Computer and Software Knowledge

- SPSS, EQS
- MAXQDA, NVivo
- MATLAB (Psyctoolbox)
- Canva

Publications

İslambay, D. (2019). Gender identity and community dynamics in India: A commentary. In A. Palackal, N. Chaudhary, & G. Marsico (Eds.), Making of Distinctions: Towards a Social Science of Inclusive Oppositions. Springer.

İslambay, D. & Akça, E. (under review). Gender Everywhere: Gendered Spaces. In B. Cingöz Ulu, & S. Ceylan (Eds.), The Social Psychology of Gender and Its Reflections in an Honor Culture: The Case of Turkey. Guilford Press.

İslambay, D. (in progress). Shared or private: a brief look at individual and collective bereavement.

İslambay, D., Cingöz Ulu, B. & Wagoner, B. (in progress). Armenians' social representations of citizenship: Diyarbakır and İstanbul comparison.

Ramazan, S., Voyvoda, E., Lacey-Barnacle, M., Karababa, E., Topal, C. and Islambay, D. (2017). Energy justice - a social sciences and humanities cross-cutting theme report. Cambridge: SHAPE ENERGY.

İslambay, D., Fidan, M., Türkoğlu, B. & Sayılan, G. (2016). İfade özgürlüğüne yönelik tutumların belirleyicileri olarak sosyopolitik tutumlar ve ideolojik kimlikler. D. Kökdemir & Z. Yeniçeri (Eds.), 1. Sosyal Psikoloji Kongresi Bildiri Kitapçığı içinde (292-303).

İslambay, D. & Cingöz Ulu, B. (2016). Milliyetçiliğin politik psikolojisi [Political Psychology of Nationalism]. In Dirilen Gümüş, Ö. (Eds.), Siyaset Psikolojisi 2. Cilt [Political Psychology, Volume 2]. Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık.

İslambay, D. (2015). Ermeniler'de kimlik oluşturmada kentin rolü: Diyarbakır ve İstanbul karşılaştırması [The role of the city in creating Armenian identity in Turkey: Diyarbakır and İstanbul comparison]. Mevsimlik Dergi.

Conference Presentations

Soylu Yalcinkaya, N., Kurtis, T., Adams, G., Cingöz Ulu, B., & Islambay, D. (July, 2018). Representations of History, National Identity, and Multiculturalism in Turkish Settings. Oral

Presentation at 24th Congress of the International Association of Cross Cultural Psychology, Guelph, Canada.

İslambay, D. (July, 2018). The Emergence of Collective Memory Behind Deferred Mourning: Assassination of Hrant Dink. Oral Presentation at 24th Congress of the International Association of Cross Cultural Psychology, Guelph, Canada.

İslambay, D., Tekeş, B., Özdemir, F., & Öner-Özkan, B. (April, 2018). Sosyal psikolojik açıdan toplumsal yas. Oral Presentation at 2nd Psychology Congress of Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Turkey. (Collective bereavement from a social psychological perspective)

İslambay, D., Cingöz Ulu, B., & Bayat, E. (June, 2017). Armenians in southeastern Turkey: Multiple Identities and representations of citizenship. Oral Presentation at 40th International Society of Political Psychology Conference, Edinburgh, Scotland.

İslambay, D., Fidan, M., Türkoğlu, B. & Sayılan, G. (November, 2016). İfade özgürlüğüne yönelik tutumların belirleyicileri olarak sosyo-politik tutumlar ve ideolojik kimlik [Socio-political attitudes and ideological identity as determinants of attitudes towards freedom of expression]. Oral Presentation at 1st Social Psychology Congress, Başkent University, Ankara, Turkey.

Tekeş, B., İmamoğlu, O., Özdemir, F., İslambay, D. & Öner-Özkan, B. (September, 2016). Siyasal görüş ve ahlak ilişkisinde düşünme ihtiyacı ve tanınma ihtiyacının aracı rolleri. Oral Presentation at 19th National Psychology Congress, İzmir, Turkey.

Özdemir, F., İslambay, D., Tekeş, B. & Öner-Özkan, B. (July, 2016). The mediator role of human strength between egoistic relative deprivation and subjective well-being. Oral Presentation at 31st International Congress of Psychology, Yokohama, Japan.

Fidan, M. & İslambay, D. (November, 2015). Türk ve Kürt taksi şoförlerinde barış sürecinin sosyal temsilleri (Social representations of peace process in Turkish and Kurdish taxi drivers), Oral Presentation at 14th Turkish Social Sciences Congress, METU, Ankara, Turkey.

İslambay, D. & Cingöz Ulu, B. (October, 2015). Armenians in southeastern Turkey: Multiple Identities and representations of citizenship. Oral Presentation at the 'Mapping Nations, Locating Citizens' Conference, Toronto, Canada.

İslambay, D. & Öner-Özkan, B. (July, 2015). Examination of non-material beliefs in Turkish sample with the predictability of locus of control and religiosity. Poster presented at 14th European Congress of Psychology, Milan, Italy.

Projects and Certificates

- Nature4Cities, ongoing project. Nature-Based Solutions as part of H2020 funded by the European Union.
- SHAPE ENERGY, ongoing project. Social Sciences and Humanities for Advancing Policy in European Energy, as part of H2020 funded by the European Union.
- Courses Against Discrimination (March 2017 – June 2017), Ankara Solidarity Academy (Ankara Dayanışma Akademisi-ADA).
- Visual Methods Training (February, 2018), Department of Communication and Psychology, Aalborg University, Denmark.
- In-depth Interview and Focus Group Methods Training (February, 2015), Atılım University, Ankara, Turkey.
- Political Psychology and Social Problems (February, 2015), Department of Psychology, Ankara University, Turkey.

Awards and Grants Received

ISPP (International Society of Social Psychology) Small Grant and **Grant from Aalborg University, applicant and organizer** for the workshop held at Aalborg University, Denmark in September 24-25, 2018. Title: Historical Representations of Minorities in Societies with Identity-Based Conflict.

Professional Affiliations

- International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP)
- Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI)
- European Association of Social Psychology (EASP)

Voluntary Work

Eşit Haklar İçin İzleme Derneği/Association for Monitoring Equal Rights, Phone: 0212 293 63 77, Mobile Phone: 0501 212 72 77, www.esithaklar.org

Kolektif düzeyde özür dilemek ve affetmek dünya siyasetinde, özellikle de küreselleşmiş dünyanın birçok ülkeyi bir araya getirmeye çalıştığı son yıllarda önem kazanmaya başlamıştır. Özür dilemek veya suçu ifade etmek, dünyadaki birçok millet için hala zor ve istenmeyen bir durumdur. Örneğin, Avustralya Hükümeti uzun süredir geçmişte Aborijinlere yapılan kötü muameleyi kabul etmeyi reddetmiştir. Benzer şekilde, 1948'de İsrailliler ve Filistinliler arasındaki Nakba olayı (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009), Beyaz Amerikalıların Siyah Amerikalılara yönelik eylemleri gruplar arası çatışmalara örnek verilebilir.

Yukarıda verilen örnekler gibi çatışmayı içeren bağlamlarda, genellikle bir grup mağdur, diğeri ise faildir. Bununla birlikte, hangi grubun fail hangi grubun mağdur olduğu grupların beyanlarına göre farklılık göstermektedir. Failler, suçlanmalarına rağmen aynı zamanda kendilerini mağdur olarak görme eğilimindedirler. Örneğin pek çok ülke İran'ı teröre hizmet ediyor gibi görürken, İran kendisini bir terör kurbanı olarak görmektedir (Bahgat, 2003). Dahası, gruplar arasındaki iktidar ilişkileri tarih boyunca değişebilir; öyle ki bir grup farklı zamanlarda hem mağdur hem de fail olabilir. Yahudi Soykırımı sırasında Yahudiler ve İsrail'in Filistinlilere yönelik eylemlerindeki Yahudiler buna örnek olarak gösterilebilir (Green, Visintin, Hristova, Bozhanova, Pereira, & Staerklé, 2017). Bu nedenle, affetmeyi ve onun arkasındaki dinamikleri anlamak için insanların neden birbirlerini affetmeleri gerektiğini anlamak çok önemlidir. Çoğu durumda, taraflar arasındaki çatışma gruplar arasındaki ilişkiyi kötüleştirir. Bu çatışma durumları, küçük anlaşmazlıklardan, zorlu çatışmalara kadar uzanmaktadır ve genellikle politik, dini, etnik ve ulusal meselelerden, ekonomik, sosyal ve kültürel endişelerden kaynaklanmaktadır. Bununla birlikte pek çok toplumda çatışma, siyasal güce sahip olan ve bu gücü devam ettirmek isteyenler tarafından kullanıldığından, çatışmayı sona erdirmek veya şiddet ve yıkımın olmadığı işlevsel ve pratik bir ortama sokmak oldukça zordur. Bu eğilim ancak faillerin yanlışlıklarını kabul etmesi ve mağdurların failleri affetmesi durumunda mümkündür.

Gruplar arası affetme için başvurulan temel teorik çerçeve, genellikle sosyal kimlik kuramı (SKK; Tajfel ve Turner, 1979; 1986) ile sağlanmaktadır. Sosyal kimlik kuramına göre bireyler kendi benliklerini üye ya da dâhil oldukları ve aynı zamanda gurur ve öz saygı kaynağı olan gruplar aracılığıyla gösterirler. Ayrıca SKK, bireylerin kendi gruplarına olumlu özellikler ekleyerek kendi gruplarını diğer gruplardan daha üstün görme eğiliminde olduklarını (örn., Breakwell, 2010; Demoulin, Leyens ve Yzerbyt, 2006; Tajfel ve Turner, 1979) ve bunun gruplar arası duygularının ortaya çıkma yollarından biri olduğunu ileri sürmektedir (Mackie, Devos ve Smith, 2000; Smith, 1993). Gruplar arası çatışma bağlamında affetmeyi yordamak için kullanılan ana değişkenler, SKK'nın kimliğin özdeşimi ile ilgilenmesi, bu özdeşimin tarihsel süreçten bağımsız olmaması ve çatışmaya uyarlanabilir olması bakımından SKK odaklıdır. Bu değişkenlerden bazıları grup temelli duygular, gruplar arası temas, grup dışı tutumlar ve empati, güven ve rekabetçi mağduriyet gibi gruplar arası duygulardır. Mevcut tezde ele alınan değişkenler aşağıdaki gibi özetlenebilir:

Gruplar arası affetme: Gruplararası affetme, grupla özdeşleşme (Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, McLernon, Niens ve Noor, 2004; Noor ve Brown, 2007), algılanan mağduriyet (Noor ve ark., 2008), gruplar arası temas (Hewstone ve ark., 2004; Moeschberger, Dixon, Niens, & Cairns, 2005; Tam, 2005), duygular (Ensari ve Miller, 2002; Hewstone ve ark., 2004; Nadler ve Liviatan, 2004), gruplar arası uzlaşma (Cehajic, Brown, & Castano, 2008) ve ortak iç grup kimliği (Noor & Brown, 2007) de dâhil olmak üzere çok çeşitli değişkenlerle ilişkili bulunmuştur.

İç grubu yüceltme: Birinin kendi ulusal grubunu diğerlerinden üstün görmesi, bu üstünlüğü savunmasıdır. Bireylerin milliyetçiliği ve sosyal kimliklerinin gücünü korumak için ülkelerinin bayrağına, kurallarına ve politikalarına olan güçlü bağlılığı vurgular (Roccas ve ark., 2006). Aynı zamanda tarihsel yanlışlıklar gerekçe sağlar ve geçmişteki kötü muamelelere yönelik sessiz kalma durumunu teşvik eder (Bilali, 2013). İç grup yüceltmesinin grup temelli suçlulukla negatif korelasyonu olduğu bilinmekle birlikte, kendilerini iç gruplarıyla fazla yücelten bireylerin geçmiş

143

hatalardan dolayı pişmanlık duyma olasılığının daha düşük olduğu bulunmuştur (Roccas ve ark. 2006).

Etnik kimlikle özdeşim gücü: İç grup kimliği ile özdeşim, gruplar arası affetme eğilimlerinin farklılaşmasını sağlayan en önemli değişkenlerden birisidir. Huddy'nin (2001) iddia ettiği gibi, gerçek dünya kimliklerinin daha iyi anlaşılabilmesi için kimlikle özdeşim gücüne daha fazla önem verilmelidir. Gruplar arası affetme çalışmalarında, bireylerin kimliğini belirleme gücü güçlü bir rol oynayabilir. Noor ve arkadaşları (2008), kimlikle özdeşim gücünün, bağımsız değişken (örneğin suçluluk) ile gruplar arası affetme arasındaki ilişkiyi yönlendiren temel bir güç olduğunu öne sürmüştür.

Küçümseme: Affective processes and emotions have substantial effects on intergroup relations and out-group evaluations (e.g., Giner-Sorolla, 2012; Mackie et al., 2000). Some research implies that forgiveness is entrenched in emotions. Örneğin, öfke, korku ve kendine acımak, gruplar arası çatışma ve bağışlama bağlamlarında ortaya çıkan bazı duygu örnekleridir (örneğin, Bar-Tal ve diğerleri, 2009). Bu duygular, gruplar arası ilişkiler bağlamında en çok kullanılanlardır. Gruplar arası ilişkilerde daha önce yapılan çalışmalarda, küçümsemenin gücü ve rolü sık sık vurgulanmış olsa da (örneğin, Fischer ve Giner-Sorolla, 2016; Rozin, Lowery, Imada ve Haidt, 1999), küçümseme duygusuna gruplar arası affetme bağlamında şu ana kadar yapılan ilgili çalışmalarda çok fazla yer verilmemiştir. Olumsuz bir duygu olan küçümseme, birbirinden bağımsız iki şekilde görülebilir. Bunlardan ilki, bireylerin ve grupların tarihsel ve sosyal deneyimleri aracılığı ile oluşan küçümsemedir. Başka bir deyişle, bireylerin deneyimleri dış grup üyelerine karşı küçümseme hissetmelerine yol açmaktadır. Diğeri ise, bireylerin bazı gruplarla etkileşime girmemiş olmalarına rağmen, bu gruplar hakkında belli temsilleri olması durumunda oluşan küçümsemedir. Gruplar arası çatışma bağlamında düşünülecek olursa, küçümseme hem doğrudan tecrübeler, hem de doğrudan olmayan yani temsiller ya da aktarılan bellek sonucunda ortaya çıkar. Türkiye bağlamında affetme konusunda açıklayıcı bir güce sahip olabilir çünkü küçümseme, öznenin gruplar arası bağlamlarda sosyal

olarak dışlanmasına yol açar (Fischer & Giner-Sorolla, 2015) ve bu nedenle, bireylerin affedilme niyetlerini şekillendirmede rol oynayabilir. İnsanların hem dış grupla ilgili deneyimler ve anılar ve aynı zamanda kendileriyle temsil ettikleri deneyimler olmayabilir. Bu nedenle mevcut tez küçümseme duygusuna gruplar arası affetme bağlamında yer vermektedir.

Yerleşik anlatının kapanmışlığı (YAK): Yerleşik anlatının kapanmışlığı, ya da Grup içi tarihsel anlatıların savunulması gruplar arası çatışma bağlamında çok önemlidir çünkü tarihsel bağlamı göz önünde bulundurur**.** Tarihsel anlatılar, grup içi üyelerin birbirlerine ve diğer insanlara ve gruplara anlattıkları (Klar & Baram, 2016) ve grup üyelerine ortak bir süreklilik ve dayanıklılık duygusu yaratmalarını sağlayan (Sani ve ark., 2007) hikayelerdir. Klar ve Baram (2016), FENCE'i (), bireyin iç grup tarihini savunmak ve alternatiflerini reddetmek için motive olma durumunu, topluluk içi tarihsel anlatıların savunmasına olan yatkınlık derecesini öne sürmüştür. Sosyal kimlik yalnızca kolektif ahlaki duyguların kaynağı değil, aynı zamanda suçluluk, utanç ya da pişmanlık gibi olumsuz duyguların düzenlenmesini teşvik eden bir sistem olan tarihsel anlatıların savunulmasının kaynağıdır. Bireylerin FENCE puanları yükseldikçe, dış grubu affetme olasılığı düşebilir. Bu bağlamda, FENCE, dış gruba yönelik küçümsemenin bir sonucu olarak, grup içi etnik yüceltme ve affetme isteği arasında aracı bir rol oynayabilir.

Gruplar arası temas: Gruplar arası temasın, farklı sosyal grupların üyeleri arasında, ilgili gruba karşı tutumların geliştirilmesine katkıda bulunduğu bilinmektedir (Al Ramiah & Hewstone, 2013). Affetme bağlamında gruplar arası temasın önemi, Bosna-Hersek (Cehajic ve diğerleri, 2008), Ruanda (Paluck, 2009; Rimé ve diğerleri, 2011), Sri Lanka (Malhotra ve Liyanage, 2005), İsrail (Biton ve Salamon, 2006) ve Kuzey İrlanda (Hewstone ve diğerleri, 2008; Tam ve diğerleri, 2007) gibi çatışmalı toplumlarda desteklenmiştir. Yani gruplar arası temasın, gruplar arası affetmeyi yordadığı bulunmuştur. Bu bulgular ışığında mevcut tez, gruplar arası teması kontrol değişken olarak almıştır. Temas değişkeninin dâhil edildiği bütün çalışmalarda, temasın affetme üzerinde olumlu etkisini görmekteyiz fakat bu tezde,

temas kontrol edildiği takdirde diğer değişkenlerin affetme isteği ile arasındaki ilişkinin nasıl olacağı incelenmiştir.

Mevcut tezin temel amacı, azınlık ve çoğunluk gruplarının birbirlerini affetme niyetlerini araştırmaktır. Affetme niyetinin hem azınlıklar hem de çoğunluklar için alınması, kendilerini haksızlık nedeni ya da mağduriyet kaynakları taraflar için farklı olsa bile, kendilerini mağdur olarak affedebilecekleri gibi konumlandırabilir ya da algılayabilir. Bu bağlamda bu tez, hem Ermeniler ve Türkler arasındaki, hem de Kürtler ve Türkler arasındaki çatışmayı ele almıştır.

Mevcut tez kapsamında 3 çalışma yürütülmüştür. Çalışma 1, Türkiye'deki üç farklı grupta affetme dinamiklerini araştıran nitel bir çalışmadan oluşmaktadır. Çalışma 2, etnik yüceltme (ingroup glorification) ile dış grupları affetme arasındaki ilişkiyi, dış gruplara yönelik küçümsemenin ve grup içi tarihsel anlatılarının savunulmasının (FENCE) aracı rolü bağlamında Ermeniler ve Türkler arasındaki çatışmayı istatiksel olarak incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma 3, Çalışma 2'de önerilen aracı değişken modelini Kürtler ve Türkler arasındaki çatışma bağlamında test etmektedir.

Çalışma 1

Çalışma 1'de, gruplar arası affetmeyle ilgili kavramlar, daha önceden belirlenmiş temalar üzerinde gitmekten ziyade, sosyal yapıdan bir miktar yansıma elde etmek için yapılan derinlemesine görüşmelerin yardımı ile araştırılmıştır. Gruplar arası affetmenin farklı gruplardan sıradan insanlar için ne ifade ettiği, Türkiye bağlamında gruplar arası affetmeyi kolaylaştıran ve engelleyen faktörlerin neler olduğu, Ermeniler, Kürtler ve Türkler bağlamında incelenmiştir.

Yöntem

Çalışma 1 kapsamında on altı kişiyle on beş yarı yapılandırılmış derinlemesine görüşme yapılmıştır. Bunlardan altısı Ermeni (üç kadın ve üç erkek), beşi Kürt (2 kadın ve üç erkek) ve beşi Türk'tür (2 kadın ve 3 erkek). Katılımcıların yaşları 20 ila 62 arasında değişmektedir (M = 35.25, SD = 13.32) (Katılımcıların demografik

146

bilgileri Tablo1'de verilmiştir). Katılımcılara çatışma içinde oldukları gruplar sorulduktan sonra affetme ile ilgili birtakım sorular sorulmuştur (Bkz. Ek C).

Bulgular

Katılımcıların cevapları, öncelikle sosyal kimlikleri, ideolojileri ve siyasi parti seçimleriyle şekillenmiştir. Farklı etnik gruplardan insanların dış grupları/failleri affetmeye ve birlikte yaşamaya yönelik tutumlarının ve duygularının çok farklılaşmadığı da görülmüştür. Fakat Ermeniler, Kürtler ve Türklerin kendi grupları özelinde affetme şartlarını da ayrı ayrı belirtmiştir.

Nitel veriyi analiz etmek için tematik analiz (Braun & Clarke, 2006) yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Buna göre üç ana tema, gruplar arası çatışmanın sebepleri, gruplar arası affetme için gerekli koşullar ve gruplar arası affetmenin olası sonuçları olarak belirlenmiştir. Temaların üç grup için aynı olması, farklı grup üyelerinin aynı düşündüğü anlamına gelmemektedir. Her grup, belirlenen temalar doğrultusunda kendi fikrini ifade etmiştir. Alt temalar, katılımcıların her gruptaki cevaplarının özelliklerine göre belirlenir. Gruplar arası çatışmanın sebepleri, güç çatışması, ötekileştirme ve hakların tanınmaması alt temalarından oluşmaktadır. Gruplar arası affetme için gerekli koşullar teması, hak temelli şartlar, ulusal bütünlük ve sınırlarla ilgili şartlar, geçmişle yüzleşmenin gerekliliği ve reddetme alt temalarından oluşmaktadır. Son olarak gruplar arası affetmenin olası sonuçları, diyalog, psikolojik çıktılar ve ortak yas alt temalarından oluşmuştur. Bu ana temalar ve alt temalar Şekil 2'de özetlenmiştir. Bu üç temanın yanı sıra, gruplar arası affetme konusundaki tutumları nedeniyle birbirlerinden farklılaşan üç grup ortaya çıkmıştır. İlk grup, söz konusu gruplar arasında böyle bir çatışma olmadığını iddia eden katılımcılardan oluşmaktadır. İkinci katılımcı grubu çatışmanın varlığını kabul eder fakat aynı zamanda, ortak çıkarların karşılanması koşuluyla birlikte yaşamanın bir yolu olabileceğine inanıyorlar. Üçüncü grubu ise hiçbir zaman affetmeyeceğini dile getiren katılımcılar oluşturmaktadır.

Tartışma

Katılımcıların politik ideolojileri, çatışma içinde oldukları grupları affetmeye istekli olma konusundaki yansımaları bakımından büyük önem taşımaktadır. Mesela, Kürtler ve Türkler arasında sol-sağ kutuplaşması görülmektedir. HDP'yi destekleyen bir Türk, HDP'yi destekleyen bir Kürt ile benzer fikirlere veya eğilimlere sahip olabilirken; AKP'yi destekleyen bir Kürt, kendilerini etnik olarak Kürt veya Türk olarak tanımlamasına rağmen, AKP'yi destekleyen bir Türk ile benzer fikir veya eğilimlere sahip olabilmektedir. Etnik kimlikleri, kendileri için yeterli düşünme biçimini göstermeyebilir, ancak bu durumda, destekledikleri siyasi parti, katılımcılar arasındaki farklı düşünce ve eğilimleri ortaya çıkarmak için turnusol kâğıdı görevi görmektedir. Aynı şekilde, Akarsu ve Cingöz-Ulu (2018), siyasi kimliklerin tarihsel temsillerde etnik kimliklerden daha belirleyici olduğu konusunda benzer sonuçlar elde etmiştir.

Düşünme biçimleri, hem katılımcıların sosyal kimliklerine hem de geçmiş ile gelecek arasındaki ilişkiyi kurma yoluna bağlıdır. Bu, sosyal kimlik kuramının (Tajfel, 1981) belirli kategorilere veya gruplara ait bireylerin tarihsel temsillerini açıklamalarına yardımcı yardımcı olduğunu göstermektedir. Kimliklerin ortaya çıktığı bağlam çok önemlidir (Drury ve Reicher, 2000, 2005). Kişinin etnik veya politik kimlikleri nerede olduklarına, ne yaptıklarına ve kimle etkileşime girdiklerine dayanarak kendisini değiştirir. Buna ek olarak, Gençoğlu (2015), kimliğin oluşumunun grupla ilgili bazı değişmez gerçekler yarattığını, ortak bir inanç varsaydığını, böylece kolektif hafızanın değiştirilemeyen kolektif gerçekler ve kolektif kimlik için bir tutkal olduğunu belirtir. Böylece bireyler, siyasi parti tercihlerine, yaşadıkları çevreye ve etkileşime girdikleri insanlara göre çatışma halinde oldukları grupların affedilmesi ile ilgili fikirlerini oluşturabilir ve bu da etnik veya ulusal kimliklerini şekillendirmeye yardımcı olabilir.

Çalışma 2

Çalışma 2, nicel bir yaklaşıma dayanmakta ve Ermeniler ve Türkler için önerilen modeli incelemektedir. Bu bölümde, daha önce önerilen model (Bkz. Şekil

1), Ermeniler ve Türkler arasındaki ilişki bağlamında her grup için ayrı ayrı incelenmiştir. Bağımlı değişkenin dış grupları affetme isteği, bağımsız değişkenin ise iç grubu yüceltme olduğu bu tezde, dış gruba yönelik küçümseme ve yerleşik anlatının kapanmışlığı aracı değişkenler olarak ele alınmıştır. Buna ek olarak, etnik kimlikle özdeşim gücü ve gruplar arası temas (temasın niceliği ve niteliği) değişkenleri ile kontrol değişkenleri olarak analize sokulmuştur.

Yöntem

Bu çalışmanın verileri internet ortamında çeşitli sosyal medya platformları aracılığıyla paylaşılan bir anket üzerinden toplanmıştır. 93 Ermeni ve 266 Türk katılımcının dâhil olduğu bu çalışmada, aşağıdaki ölçekler kullanılmıştır.

Etnik kimlikle özdeşim gücü ölçeği. Leach ve arkadaşları (2008) tarafından geliştirilen ve bireylerin gruplarıyla olan özdeşim gücünü ölçen bu ölçek, grup seviyesinde öz yatırım ve grup seviyesinde öz tanımlama şeklinde iki boyuttan oluşmaktadır. Ölçek Balaban (2013) tarafından Türkçe'ye uyarlanmıştır ($\alpha = .94$). Bu tez çalışmasında, dayanışma, tatmin ve merkeziyet kategorilerinden oluşan grup seviyesinde öz yatırım boyutu kullanılmış olup sıfır (Bu ifade hiçbir zaman düşüncelerimi yansıtmıyor) ve 100 (Bu ifade düşüncemi tamamen yansıtıyor) arası puanlama ile ölçülmüştür. Tek faktörlü bu ölçek, hem Ermeniler ($\alpha = .91$) hem de Türkler için ($\alpha = .96$) güvenilir görünmektedir (Ölçek için Ek E'ye bakınız).

Yerleşik anlatının kapanmışlığı ölçeği (YAK, FENCE). Klar ve Baram (2016), bireylerin geçmişlerini yücelterek ve grup içi çatışma durumlarında antagonistik karşı anlatıları inkâr ederek grup içi tarihsel anlatılarını koruma motivasyonlarını değerlendirmeyi amaçlayan 1 faktörlü bir ölçüm geliştirmiştir. Bu ölçek ilk kez araştırmacı tarafından Türkçe'ye uyarlanmıştır (Türkçe ve İngilizce versiyonlar için Bkz. Ek F). Ölçek 12 maddeden oluşmaktadır ve 1 (Kesinlikle katılmıyorum) ile 6 (Kesinlikle katılıyorum) arasında değişen 6 puanlık Likert ölçeğinde derecelendirilmiştir, daha yüksek puanlar grup düzeyinde tarihsel anlatılara daha savunmacı bir yaklaşım olduğunu göstermektedir. Mevcut çalışmada üç madde ana faktöre yüklenmediği ve başka bir faktör de oluşturmadığı için ölçekten

149

çıkarılmıştır. 9 maddelik YAK ölçeğinin son versiyonu her iki grup için de güvenilirdir (Ermeniler α = .83, Türkler α = .88).

Dış gruba yönelik küçümseme ölçeği. Schriber, Chung, Sorensen ve Robins'in (2017) Küçümseme Eğilimi Ölçeği'ne dayanarak oluşturulan 6 madde (Bkz. Ek G), sıfır (Bu ifade hiçbir zaman düşüncelerimi yansıtmıyor) ve 100 (Bu ifade düşüncemi tamamen yansıtıyor) arası puanlama ile ölçülmüştür. Ölçek 1 faktörden oluşmakta olup, iç güvenilirlik katsayıları Ermeniler için α =.82 ve Türkler için α = .79 olarak bulunmuştur.

İç grubu yüceltme ölçeği. Bu ölçek, Sandal Önal'ın (devam etmekte) İç grubu yüceltme (Roccas ve ark., 2006) ve Kolektif Narsisizm ölçeklerinden (de Zavala ve ark., 2009) aldığı çeşitli maddelerden oluşur ve 1 faktörlü bir çözümle sonuçlanır (Bkz. Ek H). 1 (Kesinlikle katılmıyorum) ile 6 (Kesinlikle katılıyorum) arasında değişen 6 puanlık Likert ölçeğinde derecelendirilen bu ölçek, her iki grup için de güvenilirdir, güvenirlik katsayısı Ermeniler için α = .81 ve Türkler için α = .89'dur.

Gruplar arası temas ölçeği. Islam ve Hewstone'un (2003) 10 maddelik sosyal temas ölçeği, Türkçe'ye Akbaş (2010, Bkz. Ek I) tarafından uyarlanmış olup, temasın niteliği ve niceliği olarak iki boyuttan oluşmaktadır Her iki boyut da 6 puanlık Likert tipi 5 maddeden oluşmaktadır. Ermeni katılımcılar için bu ölçeğin iç güvenilirliği, temasın niceliği α = .87, temasın niteliği α = .89 şeklindedir. Türk katılımcılar için, temasın niceliği α = .91 ve temasın niteliği α = .75 olarak bulunmuştur.

Dış grupları affetme isteği ölçeği. İlgili literatürü ve Çalışma 1'deki görüşmeler göz önünde bulundurularak katılımcıların dış grup üyelerini affetmeye istekli olma derecelerini değerlendirmek için 6 madde oluşturulmuştur (Bkz. Ek J). Maddeleri 1 ile 9 arasında derecelendirilen bu ölçek her iki örnek için de güvenilir bulunmuştur, Ermeniler için α = .88, ve Türkler için α = .70.

Demografik bilgiler. Katılımcılardan cinsiyetleri, yaşları, eğitim düzeyleri, meslekleri, memleketleri, sosyo-ekonomik durumları, dinleri, siyasi yönelimleri ve

Haziran 2018 genel seçimleri için oy kullandıkları siyasi partileri içeren bir dizi demografik soruyu yanıtlamaları istenmiştir.

Bulgular

Önerilen modeli test etmek için SPSS PROCESS makro, Model 6 (Hayes, 2016) kullanılmıştır. Sonuçlara göre, Ermeniler için etnik iç grubu yüceltme, dış gruba yönelik küçümsemeyi yordamamıştır (B = 3.88, SE = 2.15, p = .07,% 95 CI [-.40, 8.17]). YAK, etnik iç grubu yüceltme tarafından pozitif ve anlamlı bir şekilde yordanmıştır (B = .57, SE = .00, p <.001,% 95 CI [.39, .75]). Bu, Ermenilerin gruplarını yüceltme derecelerinin artmasıyla, tarihsel anlatılarını daha fazla savunduklarını ortaya koymaktadır. Ek olarak, beklenenin tersine, dış gruba yönelik küçümseme, YAK'ı anlamlı bir şekilde yordamamıştır (B = -.00, SE = .00, p = .40,% 95 CI [-.01, .00]). Sadece etnik yüceltme, YAK'ta % 44 oranında bir varyans açıklamaktadır, R^2 = .44, F(5, 87) = 13.69, p <.001.

Dış grubu affetmeye yönelik istekli olma durumu, dış gruba yönelik küçümseme (B = -.02, SE = .00, p <.05,% 95 CI [-.03, -.00]) tarafından anlamlı bir şekilde yordanmıştır. Kontrol değişkenleri arasında sadece temasın niteliği (B = .69, SE = .20, p <.001,% 95 CI [.29, 1.00]) dış grubu affetmeye yönelik isteği anlamlı ve pozitif bir şekilde yordamıştır. Ermenilerle Türkler arasındaki temas kalitesi arttıkça, Ermeniler Türkler'i affetmeye daha fazla istekli olma eğilimindedir. Dış gruba yönelik küçümseme ve temasın kalitesi affetmeye istekli olma üzerinde %39 varyans açıklamaktadır, R^2 = .39, F(6, 86) = 9.12, p <.001.

Bu modelde Ermeniler için üç dolaylı etki test edilmiştir. Bunlar, etnik iç grubu yüceltme ve dış grubu affetmeye yönelik istek arasındaki ilişkide dış gruba yönelik küçümsemenin aracı etkisi, etnik iç grubu yüceltme ve dış grubu affetmeye yönelik istek arasındaki ilişkide YAK'ın aracı etkisi ve etnik iç grubu yüceltme ve dış grubu affetmeye yönelik istek arasındaki ilişkide dış gruba yönelik küçümsemenin ve YAK'ın aynı andaki aracı etkisi şeklindedir. Bu ilişkilerden hiçbiri anlamlı bulunmamıştır. Benzer şekilde, toplam etki de anlamlı değildir (B = -.33, SE = .19,

95, p = .09,% 95 CI [-.72, -.06] (Şekil 3 Ermeniler için test edilmiş modeli göstermektedir).

Türkler için etnik iç grubu yüceltme, dış gruba yönelik küçümsemeyi anlamlı ve pozitif bir yönde yordamıştır (B = 3.45, SE = 1.06, p < .01, 95% CI [1.36, 5.54]). Türkler etnik olarak kendilerini daha fazla yücelttikçe, Ermeniler'I daha fazla küçümse eğilimindedirler. Kontrol değişkenleri de analize dahil edilmiştir. Sunulan sonuçlara göre, etnik yüceltme ve gruplar arası temasın kalitesi, dış gruba yönelik küçümsemedeki varyansın % 29'unu açıklamaktadır, R^2 = .29, F(4, 261) = 26.20, p <.001.

YAK, etnik iç grubu yüceltme tarafından pozitif ve anlamlı bir şekilde yordanmıştır (B = .60, SE = .06, p < .001, 95% CI [.47, .71]). Bu, Türklerin gruplarını yücelttikçe, tarihsel anlatılarını daha savunma eğiliminde olduklarını göstermektedir. Bununla beraber, beklenenin aksine, dış gruba yönelik küçümseme YAK'ı anlamlı şekilde yordamamıştır (B = .00, SE = .00, p = .71, % 95 CI [-.00, .00]). Etnik yüceltme, etnik kimlikle özdeşim gücü ve gruplar arası temasın niteliği, YAK'ta %66 oranında bir varyans açıklamaktadır, R^2 = .66, F(5, 260) = 100.71, p <.001.

Dış grubu affetmeye yönelik istekli olma durumu, sadece dış gruba yönelik küçümseme tarafından anlamlı bir şekilde yordanmıştır (B = -.02, SE = .03, p < .05, 95% CI [-.03, -.00]). Yani Türklerin Ermeniler'e yönelik küçümseme duygusu arttıkça, onları affetmeye istekli olma derecesi de artmaktadır. Ermeniler'e yönelik küçümseme, dış grubu affetmeye yönelik istekli olma durumunda %12'lik bir varyans açıklamaktadır, R^2 = .12, F (6, 259) = 6.02, p <.001.

Daha önce sözü edilen üç dolaylı etki, Türkler için de test edilmiştir. Etnik iç grubu yüceltme ve dış grubu affetmeye yönelik istek arasındaki ilişkide dış gruba yönelik küçümsemenin aracı etkisi anlamlı bulunmuştur (B = -.06, SE = .03, 95% CI [-.14, -.00]). Bu, Türkler'in gruplarını yüceltme derecesi arttıkça, Ermeniler'e yönelik küçümsemenin de aracılığıyla, Ermeniler'i affetme istekleri azalmaktadır. Diğer iki dolaylı etki anlamlı değildir. Fakat, etnik yüceltmenin dış grubu affetmeye yönelik

istek üzerindeki toplam etkisi anlamlı bulunmuştur (B = -.33, SE = .14, 95, p <.05, %95 CI [-.63, -.04] (Şekil 4 Türkler için test edilmiş modeli göstermektedir).

Çalışma 3

Çalışma 3, çalışma 2'de Ermeniler ve Türkler için test edilen modeli, Kürtler ve Türkler için test etmiştir.

Yöntem

Bu çalışmanın verileri yine internet ortamında çeşitli sosyal medya platformları aracılığıyla paylaşılan bir anket üzerinden toplanmıştır. 238 Kürt ve 187 Türk katılımcınıdâhil olduğu bu çalışmada, Çalışma 1'deki ölçeklerin aynısı kullanılmıştır.

Etnik kimlikle özdeşim gücü ölçeği. Bu ölçek, hem Kürtler (α = .85) hem de Türkler için (α = .96) güvenilir görünmektedir.

Yerleşik anlatının kapanmışlığı ölçeği (YAK, FENCE). 9 maddelik YAK ölçeğinin son versiyonu her iki grup için de güvenilirdir (Kürtler α = .80, Türkler α = .80).

Dış gruba yönelik küçümseme ölçeği. Ölçek yine tek faktörden oluşmakta olup, iç güvenilirlik katsayıları Kürtler için α =.84 ve Türkler için α = .87 olarak bulunmuştur.

İç grubu yüceltme ölçeği. Ölçek, her iki grup için de güvenilirdir, güvenirlik katsayısı Ermeniler için α = .71 ve Türkler için α = .87'dir.

Gruplar arası temas ölçeği. Kürt katılımcılar için bu ölçeğin iç güvenilirliği, temasın niceliği α = .90, temasın niteliği α = .86 şeklindedir. Türk katılımcılar için, temasın niceliği α = .90 ve temasın niteliği α = .65 olarak bulunmuştur.

Dış grupları affetme isteği ölçeği. Bu ölçeğin güvenilirlik katsayıları Kürtler için α = .88 ve Türkler için α = .70 şeklinde bulunmuştur.

Demografik bilgiler. Çalışma 1'de kullanılan demografik form bu çalışmada da uygulanmıştır.

Bulgular

Önerilen modeli test etmek için SPSS PROCESS makro, Model 6 (Hayes, 2016) kullanılmıştır. Kürtler için etnik iç grubu yüceltme, dış gruba yönelik küçümsemeyi yordamamıştır (B = .47, SE = 1.55, p = .76, 95% CI [-2.60, 3.54]). YAK, etnik iç grubu yüceltme tarafından pozitif ve anlamlı bir şekilde yordanmıştır (B = .26, SE = .04, p < .001, 95% CI [.18, .35]). Bu, Kürtler'in gruplarını yüceltme derecelerinin artması sayesinde, tarihsel anlatılarını da daha fazla savunduklarını ortaya koymaktadır. Ek olarak, beklenenin tersine, dış gruba yönelik küçümseme, YAK'ı anlamlı bir şekilde yordamamıştır , (B = .00, SE = .00, p = .85, 95% CI [-.00, .00]). Etnik yüceltme, etnik kimlikle özdeşim gücü ve gruplar arası temasın niteliği, YAK'ta %29 oranında bir varyans açıklamaktadır, R^2 = .29, F(5, 231) = 19.27, p < .001.

Dış grubu affetmeye yönelik istekli olma durumu, dış gruba yönelik küçümseme tarafından anlamlı ve negatif bir şekilde yordanmıştır (B = -.02, SE = .00, p < .001, 95% CI [-.03, -.01]). Türkler'e yönelik küçümseme ve temasın niteliği dış grubu affetmeye yönelik istekli olma durumu üzerinde %21'lik bir varyans açıklamaktadır, R^2 = .21, F (6, 230) = 10.05, p < .001.

Bu modelde yine üç dolaylı etki test edilmiştir. Bu ilişkilerden hiçbirisi anlamlı bulunmamıştır. Benzer şekilde, toplam etki de anlamlı değildir (B = -.33, SE = .19, 95, p = .09,% 95 CI [-.72, -.06] (Kürtler için önerilen model için Şekil 5'e bakınız).

Türkler için de genel olarak benzer sonuçlar bulunmuştur. Dış gruba yönelik küçümseme, etnik iç grubu yüceltme tarafından yordamamıştır (B = 2.28, SE = 1.35, p = .09, 95% CI [-.38, 4.85]). YAK, etnik iç grubu yüceltme tarafından pozitif ve anlamlı bir şekilde yordanmıştır (B = .17, SE = .06, p < .001, 95% CI [.38, .64]). Bu, Türkler'in gruplarını yüceltme derecelerinin artmasıyla beraber, tarihsel anlatılarını

savunma derecelerinin de artması anlamına gelmektedir. Bununla beraber, dış gruba yönelik küçümseme, YAK'ı anlamlı bir şekilde yordamamıştır, (B = -.00, SE = .00, p = .30, 95% CI [-.00, .01]). Etnik yüceltme ve etnik kimlikle özdeşim gücü YAK'ta %44 oranında bir varyans açıklamaktadır, R^2 = .56, F (5, 181) = 45.90, p < .001.

Dış grubu affetmeye yönelik istekli olma durumu, dış gruba yönelik küçümseme (B = -.01, SE = .00, p < .05, 95% CI [-.03, -.00]) ve temasın niteliği (B = .69, SE = .16, p < .001, 95% CI [.36, 1.02]) tarafından anlamlı şekilde yordanmıştır. Bu iki değişkeni, Türkler'in Kürtler'i affetmeye yönelik istekli olma durumları üzerinde %25'lik bir varyans açıklamaktadır, R^2 = .25, F (6, 180) = 9.89, p < .001.

Bu modelde yine üç dolaylı etki test edilmiştir. Bu ilişkilerden hiçbirisi anlamlı bulunmamıştır. Fakat etnik yüceltmenin dış grubu affetmeye yönelik istek üzerindeki doğrudan etkisi anlamlı bulunmuştur (B = -.34, SE = .13, p < .05, 95% CI [-.61, -.07] (Türkler için önerilen model için Şekil 6'ya bakınız).

Son olarak, Türkler'in dış grupları affetmeye yönelik isteklerinin Ermeniler ve Kürtler bağlamında farklılaşıp farklılaşmadığını test etmek için, bağımsız gruplar t-testi uygulanmış, fakat anlamlı bir fark bulunamamıştır, t (451) = 1.70, p = 0.9.

Tartışma

Daha önceki gruplar arası affetme literatürüne dayanarak, özellikle kimlik ve kimliklendirme sürecini güçlendiren farklı motivasyonel ve bilişsel öğelerin dış grupları affetme isteği üzerinde bir etkisi olacağını öngörülmüştür. Daha önce bahsedilen ilişkileri test etmek için Çalışma 2 ve Çalışma 3 yürütülmüştür.

Değişkenler arasındaki korelasyonlar çoğunlukla anlamlı olmakla birlikte, regresyon analizlerinin sonuçları ilişkilerim beklendiği gibi olmayacağını göstermektedir. Bu tezin beklenmedik sonuçlarından birisi, etnik yüceltmenin dış grupları affetme isteği üzerinde etkisinin olmadığıdır. Bu bulgu bu zamana kadar yapılan çalışmaların bulgularıyla aynı doğrultuda değildir. Bazı çalışmalar, grup kimliği ile yüksek düzeyde özdeşleşenlerin düşük düzeyde özdeşleşenlere kıyasla dış grupları daha az affetme eğiliminde olduğunu göstermektedir (örn., Brown ve ark.,

155

2007). Fakat bu bulgu mevcut tezde desteklenmemektedir. Benzer şekilde Hornsey ve Wohl (2013), Avustralyalıların ve Kanadalıların fail ya da mağdur oldukları durumlarda, ulusal kimliğin affetme üzerindeki etkisini bulamamıştır. Beklenmedik bir şekilde, Hamer, Penczek ve Bilewicz, (2017), gruplar arası affetmenin, ait olma ve diğer gruplara açık olma duygusu taşıması koşuluyla, ulusal kimlikle pozitif ilişkili olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Buradan, iç grupla özdeşimin hangi anlamda ve hangi bağlamda kullanıldığının oldukça önemli olduğu sonucuna ulaşılabilmektedir.

Bu çalışmada, etnik iç grubu yüceltme, sadece Ermeniler ile olan ilişkilerinde Türkler örnekleminde dış gruba yönelik küçümsemeyi yordamıştır. Blake'e (2017) göre, grup üyeleri dış grup üyelerini öteki olarak algıladığında ve onların grup içi standartlara uymadıklarını gördüklerinde, dış grup üyelerini küçümserler. Kürtler ve Türkler arasındaki ilişki için, din olgusu bu iki etnik grup arasındaki ilişkilerin bir nebze iyi olmasına yardımcı olabilir. Dolayısıyla burada din, Türkler ve Kürtler için önyargıyı azaltan önemli bir etken olan ortak bir grup kimliği görevi üstlenmektedir, ancak Ermeniler ve Türkler arasındaki ilişki için böyle bir zemin bulunmamaktadır. Başka bir deyişle bu bulgu, Ermenilerin Müslüman olmaması, kapalı bir cemaat içinde yaşamalarından dolayı Türklerle temasta bulunmamaları ve Türkler'in kendilerinden uzak durmaları gibi durumların sonucunda ortaya çıkabilmektedir. Sonuçlardan da anlaşılacağı gibi, Türklerin Ermeniler ve Kürtlerle temasları niceliksel ve niteliksel olarak farklıdır.

Kürtler ve Türkler arasındaki ilişki için, din bu iki etnik grup arasındaki boşluğu kapatmaya yardımcı olabilir. Dolayısıyla burada din, önyargıyı azaltan önemli bir etken olan Türkler ve Kürtler için ortak bir topluluk kimliği görevi görüyor, ancak Ermeniler için böyle bir zemin yok. Başka bir deyişle, bunun nedeni Ermenilerin Müslüman olmadıkları ve Türklerin Türkiye'de kapalı bir toplulukta yaşadıkları için Ermenilerle temasta bulunmamaları ve onlardan uzak durmaları olabilir. Sonuçlardan da anlaşılacağı gibi, Türklerin Ermeniler ve Kürtlerle temasları niceliksel ve niteliksel olarak farklıdır.

İkincisi, dış gruba yönelik küçümseme, herhangi bir gruptaki YAK' yordamamıştır. Bununla birlikte, tüm örneklemlerde etnik yüceltme, önceki araştırmalarla tutarlı olarak (Klar & Baram, 2016; Klar & Bilewicz, 2017), YAK'ı anlamlı bir şekilde yordamıştır. Çalışma 2'nin en dikkat çekici sonuçlarından biri, dış gruba yönelik küçümsemenin, ilgili dış grupları affetmeye yönelik isteği bütün gruplarda açıklayan hayati rolünü belirlemektir. Gruplar arası duyguların, gruplar arası affetme konusunda güçlü bir açıklayıcı güce sahip olduğu zaten bilinmektedir. Gruplar arası pozitif duyguların çatışma içindeki gruplar arasındaki ilişkiyi iyileştirdiği ve aynı zamanda gruplar arası affetme olasılığını arttırdığı da daha önceki çalışmalar tarafından ispatlanmıştır. Öte yandan, olumsuz gruplar arası duygular, gruplar arası affetme olasılığını azaltmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, bilindiği kadarıyla dış gruba yönelik küçümseme, şu ana kadar gruplar arası affetme bağlamında hiçbir çalışmada incelenmemiştir. Bu bakış açısına göre, dış gruba yönelik küçümsemenin sosyal pratikler ve grup içi değerler tarafından tetiklenmesiyle ortaya çıktığı ve kültürde doğal bir direnç olduğu söylenebilir (Blake, 2017) ve bu nedenle dış grupları affetmeye yönelik isteği olumsuz bir şekilde yordamaktadır.

Öte yandan, kontrol değişkenleri arasında gruplar arası temasın kalitesi, Ermeniler bağlamında incelenen Türk örneklemi dışında, dış grupları affetmeye yönelik isteği açıklamada önemli rol oynamaktadır. Bunun nedeni birçok Türk'ün Ermeniler ile temas halinde olmaması olabilir. Olumlu gruplar arası temas sadece önyargı ve ayrımcılık seviyelerini düşürmekle kalmaz (Al Ramiah & Hewstone, 2013; Pettigrew, 1998), aynı zamanda dış grupları affetmeye istekli olmalarını teşvik etme potansiyeline de sahiptir (örn., Cehajic vd., 2008; Miller ve ark. , 2004). Bu nedenle, grup içi çatışmaları azaltmak ve grupların bir araya gelmelerini sağlamak için inisiyatif alırken gruplar arası teması vurgulamak için politikalar oluşturulabilir.

Çalışma 2 ve 3'te test edilen model anlamlı olmasa da, mevcut tez literatüre çeşitli yönlerden katkıda bulunmaktadır. İlk olarak, mevcut tez için, YAK (FENCE) ölçeği Türkiye bağlamına uyarlanmıştır ve tüm örneklemler için yüksek güvenilirlik katsayılarına sahiptir. Ek olarak, dış gruba yönelik küçümseme ve dış grubu affetmeye

yönelik istek affetmeye istekli olma ölçekleri geliştirilmiştir. Bu ölçeklerin her grup için faktör analizleri yapılmış, örneklemlere uygunluğu test edilmiştir. İkinci olarak, bu çalışma, daha önce gruplar arası affetme bağlamında tartışılmayan iki değişkeni ele alarak (dış gruba yönelik küçümseme ve YAK) gruplar arası affetme araştırmalarını genişletmektedir. Üçüncüsü, bu tez çalışmasında incelenen iki çatışma durumu vardır. Çatışma öncüleri, süreçleri ve sonuçları farklı bakış açıları geliştirdiğimiz anlamında birbirinden farklı olan iki grubu incelemek önemlidir; Aktif bir süren (Kürt-Türk) ve nispeten sessiz (Ermeni-Türk) bir çatışma incelendiğinden beri. Üçüncüsü, bu tez çalışmasında incelenen iki çatışma durumu vardır. Çatışma öncülleri, süreçleri ve sonuçları birbirlerinden farklı olan iki grup incelenmektedir. Süregelen aktif bir çatışma (Kürt-Türk) ile aktif ve nispeten sessiz (Ermeni-Türk) iki farklı çatışma ele alınmaktadır.

Genel Tartışma ve Sonuç

Genel olarak, gruplar arası çatışma ve bağışlama araştırmalarında sadece mağdur gruplar dâhil edilmektedir. Bu tez, çoğunluğu ve/veya faili dâhil ederek gruplar arası affetme çalışmalarına farklı bir bakış açısı getirmektedir. Gruplar arası çatışma bağlamında, mağdurun ya da failin kim olduğu çok tartışmalıdır, çünkü soykırımın failleri bile kendilerini mağdur olarak görebilmektedir (Bilali, 2013). Bu sebeple mevcut çalışmaya çatışmanın her iki tarafını da dahil etmek hem gruplar arası affetme altında yatan dinamikleri anlamak, hem de daha geniş bir bakış açısı sunmak adına faydalı olacaktır.

Kürtler ve Türkler arasındaki çatışma yıllardır devam etse de ve etkiler hem bireysel hem de grup bazında çok fazla hissedilse bile, bunlar uzlaşmayı gündeme getirmek yeterli olmamaktadır. Kürtler ve Türkler arasındaki barış sürecinin girişimi yakın geçmişte başarılı olmamasına rağmen, tarafların en az bir kez uzlaşma masasına oturmaları grupların gelecekteki ilişkileri açısından belirleyici olabilir. Öte yandan, Türkler ve Ermeniler arasındaki çatışma 1980 yılına kadar 'sessizdi". Ancak Özbek'e (2016) göre, 1980'lerden sonra dört kritik faktör için Türkler bu sessizliği bozdu. İlk faktör, kolektif hafızanın, genel olarak soykırımı minder altında süpürme eğiliminde

olan Kemalist hegemonyadan kurtarılmasıdır. İkinci faktör, insanların Türk milliyetçiliğinin dışlayıcı içeriğini sorgulamaya zemin hazırlayan etnik ve gruplar arası bağlantıya olan ilgisinin artmasıdır. Üçüncüsü, bireylerin ve grupların demokrasi ve insan hakları üzerine daha fazla eğilmeleridir. Sonuncusu soykırımı resmen veya gayrı resmi olarak tanıyan/kabul eden ülkelerin baskısıdır. Hrant Dink cinayeti, Ermenilerle Türkler arasındaki çatışmaya yeni bir boyut getirmiş olsa da Ermenilerle olan çatışma Türkler için hala bir tabu olarak kalmaya devam etmektedir.

Çalışma 1'deki görüşmelerden elde edilen verilerin ortaya koyduğu gibi, çatışmanın öncüllerinin alt temalarından biri de dış gruba yönelik küçümseme ile doğrudan ve organik bir ilişkiye sahip olan ötekileştirmedir. Çalışma 1'de Ermeni bir katılımcının aktardığı üzere, çöp konteynerini bir kilisenin önüne boşaltma, bazı kişilerin ya da grupların Ermenileri nasıl küçümsediklerine bir örnek olarak verilebilir. Ayrıca, grup içi standartların ihlal edildiği durumlarda, grup içi üyeler tehdit olarak algılanan ötekilere yönelik küçümseme duyar (Blake, 2017). Çalışma 2'nin sonuçları bu ilişkiyi haklı çıkarmaktadır. Etnik yüceltme, sadece Türk örneklemi için (Ermenilerle olan ilişkileri bağlamında) için dış grubu küçümsemeyi yordamıştır. Başka bir deyişle, Türkler gruplarını ne kadar çok yüceltirlerse, Ermenilere karşı da o kadar küçümseme duymaktadırlar. Burada da Türkler'in Ermeniler'e ve Kürtler'e yaklaşımındaki farklılıklar ortaya çıkmaktadır. Çalışma 1 ve 2, Türkler'in Ermeniler ile daha az temasta olduklarını ve onları Kürtlerden daha çok öteki olarak gördüğünü göstermektedir.

Görüşmeler, Kürtlerin artık sosyal ve politik olarak Türkler tarafından dışlanmadığını, ancak Saraçoğlu'nun deyimiyle "tanıyarak dışlama"ya maruz kaldıklarını göstermektedir (2009). Bir başka deyişle, Türkler Kürtler'i, Türkler Kürtleri cehalet ve inkâr üzerine kurulu geleneksel asimilasyonist devlet söyleminin aksine, ayrı bir 'topluluk' olarak tanımaktadır. Yani Kürtler'i, Türk milletinin bir parçası olarak görmekte ve vatandaşlık uygulamalarına dâhil etmektedir. Bu, gruplar arasında temas, çoğunluk üyeleri arasında azınlık üyelerine yönelik önyargıyı azaltmak için yaygın olarak kabul edildiğinden, Kürtler ve Türkler arasındaki günlük

yaşamın birçok yönündeki temasından kaynaklanıyor olabilir (örneğin, Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). Çalışma 3, temas kalitesinin affetmeye istekli olduğunu anlamlı şekilde öngördüğü durumlarda bunu desteklemektedir. Kürtlerin varlığını kabul ettikten sonra, Türkler bir fikir birliği ve uzlaşma sağlamaya başladı. Görüşlerin öne sürdüğü gibi, Türkler, siyasetçiler yerine, meslekten olmayanların Kürtlerle olan çatışmaların çözülmesinde yer almasının gerekliliğini vurgulamaktadır. Bu, gündelik yaşamın pek çok alanında Kürtler ve Türkler arasındaki temastan kaynaklanıyor olabilir. Gruplar arası temasın, çoğunluk üyelerinin azınlık üyelerine yönelik önyargısını azalttığı yaygın olarak kabul edilmektedir (örneğin, Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). Çalışma 3, temas kalitesinin affetmeye yönelik isteği anlamlı şekilde öngördüğü durumlarda bunu desteklemektedir. Çalışma 1'deki bazı katılımcıların öne sürdüğü gibi, Türkler ve Kürtler arasındaki çatışmanın siyasetçiler tarafından değil, halk tarafından çözüleceği inancı gruplar arası temasın olumlu sonuçlarından bir tanesi olarak değerlendirebilir.

Ermeniler söz konusu olduğunda ise, diyalog ve uzlaşma şöyle dursun, çatışmanın tanınması bile söz konusu değildir. Türkler ile Ermeniler arasındaki çatışmada sürekli bir sessizlik görülmektedir. Saraçoğlu'ya (2011) göre, Yunan karşıtı, Ermeni karşıtı ve Yahudi karşıtı duruş, daha çok Türk devletinin milliyetçi söylemlerinden ve politikalarından elde edilen tamamen farklı tarihsel kaynaklara sahiptir. Ancak, Kürtlerin olumsuz algılanması "hayal edilen öteki"ye değil, "deneyimlenen öteki"ye dayanmaktadır. Ermeniler için "hayal edilen öteki" söz konusu olabilmektedir.

Sınıf temelli kutuplaşmaların, yerini kimlik politikalarına bıraktığı günümüz dünyasında (Tilly, 2002), gruplar arası çatışma kaçınılmaz hale gelmektedir. Bu gibi durumlarda, çatışmanın çözümü, affetme ve barış bağlamın konusu haline gelmektedir. Bu tez, hem çatışmaya karşı olumlu bir tutum hem de duygusal değişim ve kişisel iyileşme sağlayan bir durumla ilgili olan affetme (Roe & Cairns, 2003) üzerine odaklanmaya çalışmaktadır. Örneğin, güç çatışmasının nedenlerini anlamak, temel hakların tanınmasını sağlamak veya gruplar arası teması artırmak, gruplar

160

arasında ortak bir zemin oluşturmanın olumlu yollarından bazılarıdır. Bu nedenle, mevcut tez bu alanda Türkiye bağlamından ilklerden sayılabilir. Gerçek bir barış ortamı ve çatışma çözümü sağlamak ve ilişkileri daha iyi bir hale getirmek için grupları bir araya getirmekten bir adım öteye geçmek gerekir. Bu nedenle, bu çalışmanın barışın ve çatışmanın sosyal ve politik psikolojisi literatürüne önemli bir katkıda bulunduğunu düşünülmektedir.

Appendix M: Tez İzin Formu/Thesis Permission Form

<u>ENSTİTÜ</u> / INSTITUTE

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences ☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences ☒

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics ☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics ☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Marine Sciences ☐

<u>YAZARIN</u> / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname: İslambay

Adı / Name: Demet

Bölümü / Department: Psikoloji / Psychology

<u>TEZİN ADI</u> / TITLE OF THE THESIS (**İngilizce** / English) : Intergroup Forgiveness in the Context of Turkey

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: **Yüksek Lisans** / Master ☐ **Doktora /** PhD ☒

1. Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır. / Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide. ☒

2. Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır. / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of two year. * ☐

3. Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır. / Secure the entire work for period of six months. ☐

* Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu Kararının basılı kopyası tezle birlikte kütüphaneye teslim edilecektir. A copy of the Decision of the Institute Administrative Committee will be delivered to the library together with the printed thesis.

Yazarın imzası / Signature **Tarih** / Date