

BREXIT AND THE UK'S ALTERNATIVE FUTURE SECURITY AND
DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION

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ABSTRACT

BREXIT AND THE UK'S ALTERNATIVE FUTURE SECURITY AND DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION

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The UK decided to leave the EU on 23 June 2016 with a historical referendum. Brexit vote paved the way for new academic discussions on European disintegration process. There are concerns over Brexit that it could lead to a domino effect and increase the anti-EU voices among member states. There is a vital need to find a new security and defense partnership to secure the borders of Europe as reducing cooperation will not be a logical or intended option for both parties. This thesis aims to analyze alternative options for post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense relationship. It will argue that the most viable option for the UK is to establish bilateral/trilateral or multilateral relations with privileged partners while also supporting close and ambitious EU-NATO cooperation.

Keywords: Brexit vote, European disintegration, anti-EU voices, post-Brexit security and defense

ÖZ

BREXIT VE İNGİLTERE’NİN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ İLE GELECEKTEKİ ALTERNATİF GÜVENLİK VE SAVUNMA İLİŞKİSİ

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İngiltere, 23 Haziran 2016’da yapılan tarihi bir referandumla AB’den ayrılmaya karar verdi. Brexit oyu, Avrupa dağılma süreci hakkında yeni akademik tartışmaların önünü açtı. Brexit’in domino etkisine yol açabileceği ve üye ülkeler arasındaki AB karşıtı sesleri artırabileceğine dair endişeler var. İşbirliğini azaltmak her iki taraf için de mantıklı veya amaçlanan bir seçenek olmayacağından Avrupa sınırlarını güvenceye almak için yeni bir güvenlik ve savunma ortaklığı bulmak oldukça önem arz etmektedir. Bu tez, Brexit sonrası AB-İngiltere güvenlik ve savunma ilişkisi için alternatif seçenekleri analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. İngiltere için en uygun seçeneğin, ayrıcalıklı ortaklarla ikili / üçlü veya çok taraflı ilişkiler kurmasının aynı zamanda da yakın ve azimli AB-NATO işbirliğini desteklemesi olduğunu savunacak.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Brexit oyu, Avrupa dağılma süreci, AB karşıtlığı, Brexit sonrası güvenlik ve savunma ilişkisi

To my lovely grandmother and grandfather who I lost during my thesis process
and
My beloved mother and father

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---------------|--|
| BREXIT | British Exit from the EU |
| CARD | Coordinated Annual Review on Defense |
| CFSP | Common Foreign and Security Policy |
| CSDP | Common Security and Defense Policy |
| EDA | European Defense Agency |
| EMU | European Monetary Union |
| ESDP | European Security and Defense Policy |
| ESS | European Security Strategy |
| EUGS | The European Union’s Global Strategy |
| FAC | Foreign Affairs Council |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| MPCC | Military Planning and Conduct Capability |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NHS | National Health Service |
| ODA | Official Development Assistant |
| PESCO | Permanent Structured Cooperation |
| SDSR | Strategic Defense and Security Review |
| UKIP | UK Independence Party |

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose and Delimitation of the Research

The main purpose of this research is to investigate the alternative options for EU-UK post-Brexit security and defense partnership. In academic literature and press, different models for the UK's new economic relationship with the EU have been discussing mostly. These models are Membership of the EEA as Norwegian model, Membership of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) as Swiss model, the Canadian model with Free Trade Agreement, Turkish model in Customs Union and Reliance on World Trade Organization (WTO) as Singaporean model. Yet, potential implications of Brexit vote for security and defense policy is another contested issue which deserves attention. This research is delimited to examine the implications of Brexit for security and defense policies. It does not explore socio-economic, political implications of Brexit directly or in detail.

1.2 Research Questions

This thesis's main question is: How might the security and defense partnership between the EU and the UK be shaped after Brexit?

As sub questions this thesis will also try to answer: 1) Why did the UK citizens choose to leave the EU? 2) How did the negotiation process evolved? 3) Why is it important to establish an EU-UK security and defense partnership after Brexit? 4) What are the possible options for post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense partnership?

1.3 Literature Review

Keohane et al. discuss about the uncertainties of the EU's future after Brexit by exemplifying security crisis including Donald Trump presidency, unpredictable Russia, terrorism and migration flows.¹ They argue that these threats could not be undertaken alone and Europe need allies for support especially in burdening of militaristic aspects.² Thus, they stress on the vital need of Germany, France and the UK's cooperation on post-Brexit European security and defense.³ In a similar view, Martill and Sus point out that since both the EU and the UK have matched capabilities and the current international environment include several threats for each side, developing Post-Brexit security and defense policies are their particular interest.⁴ Yet, establishing a new security and defense partnership will depend on several factors. For example, the EU should choose whether it slows down its further integration or not and how the EU will determine the differentiated access to third countries and member states.⁵ Thus, the process needs to answer broader questions in terms of reciprocity of interests and the possibility of different institutional agreements.

Bakker argues that it is clear that in numbers of capabilities, knowledge, experience and resources the EU will suffer in defense, however, it has to be kept in

¹ Daniel Keohane and et.al, Brexit and European Insecurity. In Strategic Trends 2017, Zurich: Center for Security Studies.,2017, p.55

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Benjamin Martill, and Monika Sus, Post-Brexit EU/UK security cooperation: NATO, CSDP+, or 'French connection'?, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 2018, 20(4), 846-863. doi:10.1177/1369148118796979,p.848

⁵ Ibid.

mind that the UK “is leaving the EU, not Europe”⁶ and that these capabilities will still be available to European security in NATO and coalitions-of-the-willing contexts.⁷ On the contrary, Calcara sees Brexit as a win-win situation for the EU and the UK.⁸ From Calcara’s point view, defense-industrial partnership of the EU and the UK would not need to be damaged.⁹ Also, Brexit would enforce the EU to take major steps to increase armaments cooperation and these steps will eventually led to enhancing EU defense expenditures and may be resulted in spill over impact in the UK.¹⁰ Lain and Nouwens examine the consequences of Brexit on European security and defense and stresses the UK’s major contributions to European security especially in counterterrorism through CSDP.¹¹ In terms of the UK’s contributions in CSDP missions and operations, they discuss that if the UK withdraws from the European security structures after CSDP, both the EU and the UK lose enormously in terms of defense capabilities and global prestige.¹² Thus, they advocate a sustained cooperation in post-Brexit between these two parties as long as they share mutual interest in

⁶ Dick Zandee and et.al, European defence: how to engage the UK after Brexit? Clingendael, 2017, p.22

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Antonio Calcara, Brexit: what impact on armaments cooperation? Global Affairs, 3(2), 2017, 139-152, doi:10.1080/23340460.2017.1342555, p.10

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Sarah Lain and Veerle Nouwens, The consequences of Brexit for European security and defence. Berlin: Rusi., 2016, p.6

¹² Ibid.

securing European borders and citizens.¹³ Therefore, it is in the interest of both parties to find formulas about how the UK can be engaged in European defense and after Brexit.

Major and Mölling examine Brexit in two ways.¹⁴ On the one hand, Brexit will consume governmental energy in domestic conflicts and in bargain between the remaining member states. On the other hand, Brexit will be a positive catalyzer to regenerate CSDP.¹⁵ Correspondingly, Turpin also considers Brexit as “a potential catalyst for a renewed UK-EU defense relationship”.¹⁶ He argues the UK’s involvement in European security and defense cooperation will be conditional in terms of domestic pressures.¹⁷ Blagden addresses that in a complex domestic and international system that include social, political and economic drawbacks, “the interaction effects of seeking Britain’s extraction from the EU will be numerous, bitterly contested, and often unexpected.”¹⁸

Black et al. also mention about the future security and defense relations between the EU and the UK after Brexit and they argue both parties would have an interest in multinational military cooperation for their mutual political and operational

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, *Brexit, Security and Defence: A political problem, not a military one* (3), The Swedish Institute of International Affairs., 2017, p.3

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Lee Turpin, *The Future of UK-EU Defence Cooperation Post-Brexit: A Neoclassical Realist Approach*, Paper presented at ECPR General Conference 2018., 2018, p.25

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ David Blagden, *Britain and the world after Brexit*, *International Politics*, 2017, 54(1), 1-25, doi:10.1057/s41311-017-0015-2, p.12

advantages.¹⁹ They outline the future arrangements that the UK could continue to involve in CSDP as a non-member state such as Norway and Turkey and it might negotiate a new arrangement for its case by case involvement in CSDP missions/operations.²⁰ Moreover, the UK might be disengaged from the security and defense activities and cut its contributions in several areas such as battlegroup roster, Operational Headquarters or maritime assets in Mediterranean. This would result in enhanced contribution for remaining EU states or reduction in CSDP capabilities.²¹ Dalay signifies that Brexit would serve as a template for Turkey as the EU and the UK negotiates a new deal for the aim of forming a new relationship. He summarizes his view in a way that

The regional reshuffling created by Brexit provides new incentives for Turkey and the EU to contemplate alternative arrangements and overcome the anxieties and expectations created by the long defunct and largely illusory membership process.²²

Black et al. figure out that even the UK might continue its involvement on a case-by-case basis, the EU's defense capabilities will be undermined seriously after the loss of the UK's military capabilities.²³ In addition, they deliberate on the EU's actorness and the credibility of CSDP by arguing that Brexit vote could be a sign of political dividedness of the EU.²⁴ The uncertainties occurred after the Brexit vote might curtail

¹⁹ James Black and et.al, Defence and security after Brexit. Retrieved from RAND Corporation website: <http://www.rand.org/t/RR1786>, 2017, p.66 (Accessed on 2 March 2019)

²⁰ Ibid., p.68.

²¹ Ibid., p.69

²² Galip Dalay, Turkey and Europe after Brexit: Looking beyond EU membership, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies., 2016, p.2

²³ Black and et.al, op.cit., p.76.

²⁴ Ibid.

the decision making processes with increasing caution among EU states and economic decline due to Brexit could lead to fall in defense budgets and abandon of 2 percent pledge on defense by the EU member states.²⁵ Martill and Sus claim that since the EU is resistant to give the UK a strong role in defining security policy, the most possible options for the future security and defense partnership is a cooperation of the UK with NATO and CSDP+ or a cooperation with French bilaterally.²⁶ Dumoulin states that after Brexit, the UK's relations with the EU and the US might be affected and also there could be a potential change in the European continent's landscape since the UK and the EU shares common history, geography and culture.²⁷ He also warns about the consequences of Brexit in terms of their potential effects for both parties and he argues that since both parties should need each other, Brexit might open a door to create a better vision for the EU's foreign and security policies.²⁸ In a similar perspective with Dumoulin, Keohane et al. point out that Brexit vote gives an opportunity for the EU to rethink its security and defense policies. For this aim, they illustrate the attempts of Berlin and Paris to strengthen common defense policies after Brexit vote.²⁹ Oliver and Williams examine Brexit in terms of the relations between the EU-US and the UK-

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Martill and Sus, op.cit., p.849.

²⁷ Andre Dumoulin, Brexit and European defence An in depth analysis (20), The Centre for Security and Defence Studies (CSDS) of the Royal Higher Institute for Defence.,2016, p.2

²⁸ Ibid., pp.4-5.

²⁹ Daniel Keohane and et.al, Brexit and European Insecurity. In Strategic Trends 2017. Zurich: Center for Security Studies., 2017,p.57

US.³⁰ They argue that Brexit decision would not serve as a good outcome for the US and add that

Some British Eurosceptics might dream of Britain becoming a North Atlantic Singapore or a 'Switzerland with nukes', neglecting the fact that Singapore and Switzerland play minor roles in regional politics and are ultimately subject to regional politics rather than shapers of it.³¹

While some scholars take an optimistic view about the effects Brexit vote, some are pessimistic about it. McBride discusses about the UK's hesitant relationship with the EU by stressing the UK's opt outs from central EU policies such as common currency and Schengen area.³² With the increasing Euroscepticism, Brexit supporters reclaimed their national sovereignty and believed that the UK should deal with immigration by freeing itself from EU regulations. He argues that Brexit intimidate the EU's desires for a common security and defense policy.³³ Bew and Elefreiu deliberate on the UK's important advantage on its role on shaping events for its own benefit and global image. They success of Brexit will be linked to the UK's deliberations on its global role in world affairs especially in the following five years.³⁴

³⁰ Tim Oliver and Micheal J. Williams, Special relationships in flux: Brexit and the future of the US-EU and US-UK relationships. *International Affairs*, 2016, 92(3), 547-567, doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12606, p.41

³¹ Ibid.

³² James McBride, The Debate Over Brexit, Retrieved from <http://www.cfr.org/unitedkingdom/debateoverbrexit/p3774>, 2016, p.5 (Accessed on 30 March 2019)

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ John Bew and Gabriel Elefteriu, Making Sense of British Foreign Policy After Brexit, *Policy Exchange*, 2016, p.2

1.4 Research Methodology

This research has been conducted through both qualitative and quantitative method. It comprises both interpretative analysis and secondary data analysis. For content analysis, there are non-randomly selected several texts from the population of texts such as published books on related topic, articles, reviews, and official documents of the EU, newspapers and reports. For secondary data analysis, data was collected and tabulated by other sources. These data were obtained from government agencies, data collected by other researchers and publicly available third-party data.

1.5 Organization of the Thesis

This thesis is composed of six parts. The first chapter aims to provide a general outlook of the thesis. It includes purpose and delimitation of the thesis, research questions, literature review, and research methodology. Lastly, organization of each chapter will be stated in order.

In the second chapter, this thesis will evaluate the dynamics of European integration process and the UK's position in the EU as a member state. Together with this, crisis which were occurred due to the European integration process will be examined in order to investigate how European member states and specifically the UK are being challenged by the specific factors and also stress the need to secure Europe from these challenges. Finally, the term of "Euroscepticism" will be analyzed to reveal the growing anti-EU establishments within EU and the UK by also examining its root causes.

In the third chapter, Brexit vote will be analyzed under the sections of the path to Brexit referendum, reasons behind Brexit, Remain and Leave campaigns during referendum, Brexit referendum analysis, and international views on Brexit. Furthermore, negotiation process will be examined under the sections of June 2017 the UK general election, Brexit negotiation terminology and possible models, the

negotiation process including the Withdrawal Agreement, the Transition Period and the Political Declaration.

In the fourth chapter, security and defense history of the EU will be explained including Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the European Union's Global Strategy (EUGS), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), relations with NATO and finally the possible effects of Brexit on security and defense partnership of the EU and the UK in order to give a general picture before analyzing the alternative options.

In the fifth chapter, reasons for establishing this post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense partnership and the EU's responses to the UK's demands for creating a new security and defense partnership after Brexit will be investigated. Finally, the alternative options for post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense partnership will be explained.

In conclusion, this thesis will conclude that the most viable option for future EU-UK security and defense relationship is that the UK will create bilateral/trilateral or multilateral partnership with EU member states while also supporting EU-NATO cooperation. As long as both the EU and the UK continually express their red lines which slows down the process, this type of relationship would serve as a most pragmatic option to secure the European continent.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF EU-UK RELATIONS

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will examine the dynamics of European integration process in order to give a general picture about how the European integration process was evolved. Then, I will follow with the analysis of the UK's membership in the EU to give a general understanding about the UK's position in the EU as a member state. After that, crisis which were occurred due to the European integration process will be examined. These crises will be analyzed in two sections such as challenges for the EU in general and more specifically challenges for the UK. The main purpose of these analysis is to show how European states and specifically the UK are being challenged by the specific factors and also to point out the need to secure Europe from these challenges. Finally, the term "Euroscepticism" will be clarified separately under the sub-sections of Euroscepticism in the EU and Euroscepticism the UK. The major aim of this section is to reveal the growing anti-EU establishments among the European states and the UK and examine its root causes.

2.2 Understanding the European Integration Process

Hooghe and Marks describe the European Union as "a part of a system of multi-level governance which facilitates social interaction across national boundaries, increases immigration and undermines national sovereignty."³⁵ Therefore, they see

³⁵ Hooghe and Marks, *op.cit.*, p.11.

European integration process as a means to form a collective European identity while jurisdictional form is designed by the expressions of public opinion and political parties.³⁶ Moreover, they stress the importance of economic choices of interest groups while examining the European integration because they argue that from 1950s and to late 1980s, this calculation is at heart of European integration.³⁷ Schmitter examines Haas's perception about the historical turning points of the European Union by harmonizing David Mitrany's functionalism and Jean Monnet's pragmatism.³⁸ In the critics of Schmitter, he discusses Haas's point of view about European Union as:

While he never denied the role played by national states pursuing their (allegedly) unitary interests, he was among the first to realize that, by liberalizing flows of trade, investment and persons across previously well-protected borders, regional integration had the potential to transform the inter-state system that had long characterized Europe and been responsible for two recent World Wars.³⁹

Therefore, neofunctionalism defines that national governments and their citizens would change their original positions as long as their expectations are satisfied by the system. Eventually, social and economic integration would spill over into political integration.⁴⁰ For example, after the Cold War, national security issues regarding with energy, migration or border control were thought to create spill-overs into practical arenas. In contrast to the views of Haas's and Monnet's, Moravcsik defines European

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Philippe C. Schmitter, Ernst B. Haas and the legacy of neofunctionalism, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2005, 12(2), 255-272, p.256, doi:10.1080/13501760500043951

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p.257

integration process as “a stable political equilibrium”.⁴¹ He argues that integration process reached its limits and there is no need to expand or deepen it. This stability is called by Moravcsik as “constitutional maturity”.⁴²

Bolleyer and Börzel describe the European Union as a confederation.⁴³ They believe that member states have not only formed institutions to favor joint decision making in common areas, they also coordinate to solve collective problems. In this intergovernmental cooperation, even if there are legally binding agreements, there is no higher authority to force states into compliance which eventually resulted in member states de facto opt-outs. Thus, the Treaty of Rome of 1957 proposed a qualified majority voting to further collective agreement and the Lisbon Treaty accepted it as a standard rule of the EU.⁴⁴

Sevilay Kahraman analyzes the periods of European integration process.⁴⁵ In her analysis, she examines the mid-1950s as the years in which the EU laid the foundations for European integration under supranational reconciliation with implicit public support.⁴⁶ In the mid-1960s, due to the transition from sectoral integration to general economic integration, there was a clash between the Community model and

⁴¹ Andrew Moravcsik, The European constitutional compromise and the neofunctionalist legacy, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2005, 12(2), 349-386, doi:10.1080/13501760500044215

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Nicole Bolleyer and Tanja A. Börzel, Balancing integration and flexibility in the European Union: Constitutional dispositions and dynamics of coordination, *Comparative European Politics*, 2014, 12(4-5), 384-403, doi:10.1057/cep.2014.8, p. 385

⁴⁴ Ibid, p.7.

⁴⁵ Sevilay Kahraman, Batı Cephesinde Yeni Bir Şey Yok mu? Fonksiyonalist Avrupa Birliği ve Fonksiyonalizm-sonrası Avrupa Bütünleşmesi, *METU Studies in Development*, 2013, 40(2), 247-275, p.268

⁴⁶ Ibid.

the intergovernmental negotiation model which eventually resulted in more politically elite model of integration.⁴⁷ Yet, revitalization of integration occurred in 1980s with institutional and policy reforms while in 1990s showed that the European integration process became more politicized and gained a post-functional character.⁴⁸ Finally, the 2000s were the period in which European integration was re-politicized in the context of national identity with declining public support for the EU and resistance for supranational policy and institutional integration.⁴⁹

The foundation of the European Union was based on a goal for the creation of a European common market and customs union in the first place. While, the European Economic Community composed six Member states in the beginning, European integration process turned to an important example of inter-state cooperation over the past 500 years. Integration in all areas has advanced from the Treaty of Rome (1957) and to the Treaty of Lisbon (2007). During this phases, EU membership has increased from six to 27. The founders of the EU believed that when they create an economic integration, it would be followed by the political integration. As one of the leading European integration scholar Ernst Haas examines this idea in his theory of regional integration.⁵⁰ With the spill-over effects, engagement of the process of EU integration would increase when rules and policies shifted to Brussels. Even if citizens were not so interested in the EU project during the 1960s, the view of Europe would be embedded in their political activities gradually.⁵¹ Yet, Holzinger and Schimmelfenning

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Haas, *op.cit.*,p. 13.

⁵¹ Neil Fligstein and et.al, European Integration, Nationalism and European Identity, *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2012, 50, 106-122, p. 385, doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02230.x, p. 385

argue that since the 1970s, differentiated integration has been the main subject of European integration. They stress the opt-outs from European Monetary Union and Schengen, as well as the concept of “Enhanced Cooperation”.⁵²

In the years of 1980s, the new projects were relaunched by the EU in order to enhance cooperation. These projects were the creation of single market, establishing Schengen Agreement, creating Euro and further enlargement processes. The member states made several reforms so as to make establishment of a political agreement easier. So, they increased the power of the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice so as to reach EU rules. Fligstein and et al. discuss about identity politics which are reshaped by several events.⁵³ Since 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty, political and cultural integration took the place of economic integration. Therefore, some European citizens felt threatened by the increased capabilities of EU institutions.⁵⁴ Furthermore, EU enlargement was resulted in soften the traditional lines between Western and Eastern Europe with the accession of ex-communist countries. Finally, migration to Western Europe changed the cultural and religious composition of Europe. Immigrants from the Southern Europe constitutes major share in the post-war period.⁵⁵ These integration and enlargement processes resulted in a creation of a political and cultural environment that European citizens form a discourse of “the Other” when defining their Europeanness.⁵⁶ States who hold strong feeling of national sovereignty such as the UK, Denmark and Sweden are most critical about the integration process.

⁵² Katharina Holzinger and Frank Schimmelfennig, Differentiated Integration in The European Union: Many Concepts, Sparse Theory, Few Data, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2012, 19(2), 292-305, doi:10.1080/13501763.2012.641747, pp.292-293

⁵³ Fligstein and et.al, loc.cit.

⁵⁴ Fligstein and et.al, op.cit., p.113.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.114.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

Especially, the UK is skeptical about further policies of the EU and it views the EU as an intergovernmental organization only directed towards freedom of trade and travel. Thus, the UK citizens hold the most national view in their political activities. Thus, Fligstein et al. link the fate of the EU with the perceptions of ordinary EU citizens towards cultural and economic integration.⁵⁷ They argue that integration process create winners and losers in a way that winners who are the most benefited from the EU's single market will support political parties' liberalization steps while losers who are older workers or blue-collars will support their national governments in order to protect their rights from the intervention of foreigners and the EU.⁵⁸ In a similar view with Fligstein et al., Hobolt and Wratil also discuss about the distributional outcomes of the European integration process which eventually resulted in cost and benefit analysis. They argue that gradually, integration process would be threatened by national identities. They examine this process as "the crisis demonstrates that public opinion on integration might be more dynamic and responsive to the changing nature of the integration process than stylized theories predict."⁵⁹

In 1990s, with the extent of market integration and re-existence of political union reinforced partisan conflicts. In general, in three decades of European integration, public opinion was missing in the generalizations of neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. Thus, while this period was acknowledged as permissive consensus, the period after 1991 could be characterized as constraining dissensus.⁶⁰ Therefore, The Maastricht Treaty allowed some member states to retain their national sovereignty. As a most Eurosceptic states, Denmark and the UK asked for opt-outs

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p.118

⁵⁹ Sara B. Hobolt and Christopher Wratil, Public opinion and the crisis: the dynamics of support for the euro. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2015, 22(2), 238-256, doi:10.1080/13501763.2014.994022, p.16

⁶⁰ Hooghe and Marks, *op.cit.*, p.5

from specific areas. They decided to opt-out from the Economic and Monetary Union and refused to join the Euro. Furthermore, the UK received an opt-out from the Social Charter due to its national concerns over the EU measures such as border control and migration. It opted out from nearly 50 percent of Justice and Home Affairs policies and these paved the way for differentiated integration.⁶¹

Bolleyer and Börzel examine the conflict between member states who advocate further integration and those who are reluctant such as the UK and Denmark in the deepening and widening process of the EU. They describe opt-outs a “a double-edged sword”⁶² that opt-out states face the threat of being excluded from important decision making processes while remaining states form new policies.⁶³ For example, the United Kingdom was given an opt-out from the Fiscal Pact which was signed by 25 member states in 2012 even if David Cameron tried to seek concessions regarding with tax regulation. Also, Medrano signifies the decline in support of EU membership since 2010 and argues that groups who did not express any feelings about their state’s membership gradually started to declare their membership as a bad thing.⁶⁴ With regard to this process, Medrano references Hooghe and Marks’s expression of transition from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus. This transition is mostly noticeable in the United Kingdom, France and Germany. Medrano defines the UK’s image as ‘reluctant’ European and he discusses that in 2010, it is the only state which had negative net support of European membership.⁶⁵ While the UK assesses

⁶¹ Bolleyer and Börzel, *op.cit.*, p.10

⁶² *Ibid.*, p.11.

⁶³ *Ibid.*


⁶⁴ Juan D. Medrano, The Limits of European Integration. *Journal of European Integration*, 2012, 34(2), 191-204, doi:10.1080/07036337.2012.641091, p.192

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

European integration with regard to its national interest and as a means to provide trade and security in a pragmatic vision, Germany and France hold a normative view of European integration with solidarity and rule-based system.⁶⁶ Medrano examines the integration process in a way that

The lack of a unified stance on how to move forward, the constant revisions to previously agreed treaty reforms in order to accommodate different countries' demands, not only slow down the process of European integration; they also lead to popular disaffection. The commonality that one should stress is the widespread lack of support for further transfers of sovereignty among European Union member states.⁶⁷

The figure below shows that while Germany, Belgium, Finland, Portugal and Sweden favors more integration, many other countries such as Poland, Ireland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Great Britain strongly against the further integration.



⁶⁶ Ibid., p.196.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p.197.

Figure 1 Change in public attitudes towards further EU integration between 2004 and 2014 ⁶⁸

In addition to these, McLaren argues that critics about integration process also occurs when citizens differ in their feelings about national versus European identity. She stresses that the strength of national identity is an important factor in the first place. Another important factor is whether they see the EU as a threat to this identity. ⁶⁹ Figure below illustrates that Greeks, British and Northern Irish tend to be most threatened by the EU and they believe their national identity and culture will be lost due to the integration process.




Figure 2 National perceptions of the EU as a symbolic threat ⁷⁰

In a nutshell, future studies on European integration process should aim to investigate the transformations by the EU, by member states and also by citizens. Also,

⁶⁸ Harold Clarke and et.al, *Brexit*, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2017, p.317

⁶⁹ Lauren McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, Basingstoke, England: Springer, 2005, p.7

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p.89

I take a similar view with Murray in her perspective that arguments about the EU whether it is a finished or unfinished project are not enough to understand its very meaning, “it is however important to recognize that it is an entity that is in a constant state of flux, or what has been referred to as a moving target.”⁷¹

2.3 Analysis of the UK’s Membership of the EU

Europe was challenged both economically and politically after the World War II. The US contributed the rebuilding of Europe with its Marshall Aid worth 13 billion \$ between 1948 and 1952. Similarly, it contributed to the political reestablishment of a unified Europe. It supported the Western Europe’s capitalist and liberal-democratic cooperation and helped the creation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948 so as to integrate Marshall Aid countries into one political unit. The OEEC facilitated intra-European trade and economic cooperation by several tasks such as reducing tariffs and trade barriers, creating a customs union and free trade area, and achieving conditions for utilization of labour. The US wanted the UK to play a leadership role in this organization.⁷²

After the economic success of the EEC, The UK government applied for the EEC membership in 1961. It was a historical moment for the UK and also a great opportunity to follow European economic developments. The UK joined the EEC in 1973 along with Ireland, Denmark, and Norway to slow down its relative economic decline. Campos and Coricelli examine that the UK’s per capita GDP between 1950 and 1973 was stable and joining the EU helped to slow down the UK’s relative

⁷¹ Philomena Murray, Uses and Abuses of the Concept of Integration, *The SAGE Handbook of European Studies*, 2009, 227-244, doi:10.4135/9780857021045.n13, p. 230

⁷² Kayla McCrary, *Brexit: An Analysis of Eurosceptic Mobilisation and the British Vote to Leave the European Union* (Master's thesis, University Honors College), 2016, p.28 Retrieved from <https://jewlscholar.mtsu.edu/handle/mtsu/5092> (Accessed on 6 April 2019)

economic decline. They also state that in three main areas including trade, FDI and finance, Britain benefited significantly from EU integration.⁷³

Britain has always been a net contributor to the European budget when it entered the EEC in 1973. France could not reach that position until the end of the twentieth century. On the other hand, Germany was the major budgetary source for European construction from the Treaty of Rome and it remains the same today. On the other hand, MacShane believes that Germany did not have Britain's security obligations to defend democratic Europe during the Cold War era.⁷⁴ Since its accession, the UK tried to reinforce its approach by shaping the security of the continent by preserving a leading diplomatic role, managing the international relations of Europe, and increasing British trade and investment through a broadening and deepening of Europe.⁷⁵ The UK's four interconnected strategic goals with respect to the EU are to maintain and to deepen the EU's single market in line with liberalization and deregulation project of the EU's foreign economic policy; to follow enlargement process with a strong preference for a wider EU; to resist the deepening of integration by preferring intergovernmentalism over supranationalism; to maintain the UK's leadership role and to prevent a Franco-German partnership set the agenda for the future strategic priorities of the EU.⁷⁶

⁷³ Nauro Campos and Fabrizio Coricelli, *The Economics of UK-EU Relations: From the Treaty of Rome to the Vote for Brexit*, Basingstoke, England: Springer, 2017, p.74

⁷⁴ Denis MacShane, *Brexit: How Britain will Leave Europe*, London, United Kingdom: I.B.Tauris, 2015, p.11

⁷⁵ Richard Whitman, *Brexit or Bremain: what future for the UK's European diplomatic strategy?* *International Affairs*, 92(3), 509-529. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12607, 2016, p.509

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p.511

In 1975, both Norway and Britain held referendums about EEC membership. As a result, the Norwegians said ‘nei’ and the British said ‘yes’.⁷⁷ The referendum question was “Do you think the United Kingdom should stay in the European Community (the Common Market)?” As a result, 67, 23 % of British population favored EC membership while 32, 77% of them voted against EC membership.⁷⁸ McCrary signifies that the overall results of the 1975 referendum was a victory of pro-Europeans because only two regions voted “no” to EC membership including Shetland Islands and Western Isles in Scotland.⁷⁹

Table 1 Results of EC Membership Referendum in 1975⁸⁰

| | Votes | Percentages |
|------------------------|--------------|--------------------|
| Yes | 17,378,581 | 67.23% |
| No | 8,470,073 | 32.77% |
| Valid Votes | 25,848,654 | 99.79% |
| Invalid or Blank Votes | 54,540 | 0.21% |
| Total Votes | 25,903,194 | 100.00% |
| Registered/Turnout | 40,456,8677 | 64.03% |

Both the Conservative and Labour governments in the UK argue that the integration process should be limited to market integration which was based on intergovernmentalist principles. This perspective was one of the main problems for UK–EU relations including UK’s absence or opt- outs from three important policy

⁷⁷ Richard Baldwin, *Brexit Beckons: Thinking ahead by leading economists*. Geneva: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2016, p.3

⁷⁸ McCrary, *op.cit.*, p.55

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p.35.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p.55.

initiatives: the Schengen system on free movement of people, which was launched in the mid- 1980s; the Social Charter of 1989 and the Social Chapter protocol to the Maastricht Treaty; and the establishment of the single currency within a system of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).⁸¹ In the 1990s, Euroscepticism of the UK became apparent. It did not join the Eurozone that is a currency union between a majority of EU states and the Schengen Area which is a borderless area across much of the continent of Europe. Factors behind these decisions was to maintain the British Pound, to manage UK borders and to control immigration.⁸² These EU-related issues captured both media interest and the public opinion in recent decades.

Overall, the UK's policy towards Europe could be characterized by doubts and crisis. This historical skepticism followed by the 'Leave' vote in the referendum on 23 June 2016 which led to a fundamental crisis. Eventually, this might lead to abandoning membership and finding solutions to secure a new relationship as a non-member state with the EU.⁸³

In the next section, international and domestic challenges that EU and the UK face due to the integration process will be clarified so as to give a general picture about intense and growing concerns of European member states and the UK over the reliability and stability of the EU.

⁸¹ Maurizio Carbone, *National Politics and European Integration: From the Constitution to the Lisbon Treaty*, Gloucestershire, England: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010, p.72

⁸² Anthony Ridge-Newman and (et al.), *Reporting the Road to Brexit: International Media and the EU Referendum 2016*, Basingstoke, England: Springer, 2018, p.111

⁸³ Dinan, Desmond and et.al, *The Political Economic Context of EU Crises, The European Union in Crisis*, 33-53, doi:10.1057/978-1-137-60427-9_3, 2017, p.33

2.4 Crisis-Driven European Integration

2.4.1 Challenges for the European Union

The EU is both a supranational entity and an intergovernmental organization which was formed through binding treaties. The member states of the EU have passed laws and embraced common policies on different range of areas. They can freely move goods, services, people, and capital in a single market and also share a common trade policy and a common agricultural policy. In addition to these, the Eurozone that comprises of 19 member states refers to a common currency. The Schengen area allows four non-European country and twenty-two EU members to engage in external borders management. By doing so, individuals can travel without their passports. Likewise, the EU took steps to develop a common foreign and security policies.⁸⁴ However, especially in the last decade, European countries have been coping with internal and external challenges in which European strategies and tools have been contested in dealing with these challenges.

First of all, the EU economies have been affected enormously from the 2008-2009 global recession. This led to the Eurozone debt crisis which increased the concerns regarding with the structure and viability of the Eurozone. Several EU countries tried to cope with the condition of slow economic growth which resulted in high unemployment. The EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) financially assisted Ireland, Portugal, Greece and Cyprus in order to prevent their default. In addition, Europe's financial sector also affected from the Eurozone crisis and led to the collapse of indebted banks in many countries. Furthermore, slow economic growth and high employment continue to threaten specifically young population in some countries.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ McCrary, op.cit., p.1

⁸⁵ Kristin Archick, *The European Union: Ongoing Challenges and Future Prospects*, Congressional Research Service, 2018, p.6

While globalization and advancements in technology offer new opportunities, they also bring new challenges. Rising extremism and terrorism are another challenges for the EU. These are highly interconnected in nature; terrorism fed and supported by extremist ideologies. Similarly, migration flows due to instability, extremism and conflict in the Middle East and Africa also threatens Europe. Economy-driven refugees have sought for a better future by migrating to Europe. As a result, a number of migration crises in and around Europe occurred in the post-cold war era.⁸⁶ Moreover, the rise of populism and anti-European tendencies of political parties have increased due to these economic and societal pressures which have boosted Eurosceptic voices in the EU. The views of Eurosceptic political parties are fueled by fears of influx of migrants as a result of immigration. Concerns about globalization and a loss of European identity have resulted in a high support for these political parties.

The EU is also criticized due to its lack of strong leadership and decreasing solidarity. It has relied on key member states in developing essential policies including France and Germany's contributions in creating a common currency or France and the UK's contributions to common foreign and security policies. Yet, a strong EU leadership has been lacking in recent years. Germany's strong position in the EU may have occurred because others were dealing with their own domestic issues and economies.⁸⁷

Another important concern for the EU is about Trump's competitive liberalism and his skepticism about the EU. A Pew poll which was conducted in 2017 asked the EU states about Trump's strategies in world affairs. 25 percent of Italians, 22 percent of Britons, 14 percent of French, 11 percent of Germans, and only 7 percent of

⁸⁶ HM Government, *The Future Relationship Between The United Kingdom And The European Union*, 2018, p.5

⁸⁷ Archick, *op.cit.*, p.8.

Spaniards were believed Trump is doing right in world affairs.⁸⁸ Putin got higher scores than Trump in Italy, Britain and France, especially, in Germany his score was twice as high from Trump.⁸⁹ In addition, with Trump's slogan of "America First" increases the anxieties of EU member states. This foreign policy led to a withdrawing from the nuclear deal with Iran. It is clear that even if US will remain a partner of the EU in the international arena, the close relationship two powers could change its direction.

Lately, the EU faces a current challenge which is related with the UK's expected departure from the EU. British voters decided to leave the EU by 52% to 48% in June 2016. The two parties have been conducting withdrawal negotiations and to develop a new future partnership framework. It is important to emphasize that the UK will remain as a member of the EU as far as it formally exits the union. Yet, forming a new relationship with the UK after Brexit is one the major concerns of the EU. For the UK, it now faces a challenge to position itself in the world affairs as a non-EU state. The following section is devoted to key challenges that the UK will most likely to face in the coming years.

2.4.2 Possible Challenges of Brexit for the UK

The UK faces several challenges in today's international arena. To begin with, the UK combats with the economic pressures of competitiveness, productivity and investment resulting from globalization. Despite globalization gives some opportunities for the UK, industries should adapt rapidly to the new technologies and

⁸⁸ Gedmin Muravchik and Jeffrey Gedmin, The Trump Effect in Europe, 2018, June 5, Retrieved from <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/06/05/the-trump-effect-in-europe/> (Accessed on 10 June 2019)

⁸⁹ Ibid.

changing markets.⁹⁰ Niblett argues that compared to other European states, the UK’s economy survived well from the 2008-2009 financial crisis. He defends the view that many countries and industries have benefited from the economic globalization.⁹¹ In the figure below from OECD, Niblett tries to stress the trends in G7 economies. It is apparent that the UK’s GDP growth shows a rising momentum after the years of 2008-2009 while Italy’s GDP growth shows a downwards trend especially after 2011.




Figure 3 GDP growth in G7 economies (Q1 2008) ⁹²

However, the state of economic growth also increases the level of immigration both intra-EU and outside the EU. The figure below reveals that according to 2050 projections, the UK would become the EU’s largest country in terms of its population.⁹³

⁹⁰ Robin Niblett, Britain, Europe and the World Rethinking the UK’s Circles of Influence, 2015, p.2 Retrieved from Chatham House website: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/20151019BritainEuropeWorldNiblettFinal.pdf> (Accessed on 12 March 2019)

⁹¹ Ibid., p.5.

⁹² Ibid., p.6.

⁹³ Ibid., p.7.




Figure 4 Projected populations to 2050 in selected countries⁹⁴

Increasingly competitive global economy challenges the UK’s abilities to cope with it. Figure below illustrates that the UK’s debt-to- GDP ratio increased from 52 % in 2008 to 90 % in 2014 due to the huge budget deficits resulting from the financial crisis.⁹⁵ This expected rise in terms of budget deficit may cause to potential inflation, increase in national debt and decline in future spending by the government.



Figure 5 UK budget deficit and national debt as % of GDP between 2008–14⁹⁶

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p.8.

Niblett also stresses another challenge for the UK in terms of its national capabilities to combat with Russian aggression, geopolitical tensions in Asia and also terrorism in the Middle East.⁹⁷ He supports the idea that the UK should find ways to adapt to the new international order created by globalization after the Cold War.⁹⁸ Thus, domestic nationalism stemmed from the need to protect these countries from such challenges. Because the UK's defense budget decreased by 19 percent by the coalition government between 2010 and 2015, confronting with these several risks with the domestic defense resources and political cohesion become difficult for the UK.⁹⁹ The May 2015 general election created a single-party government, yet, the domestic political environment in the UK fragmented because The Scottish National Party and UK Independence Party (UKIP) are very skeptical about NATO and military intervention, on the other hand, the Labour Party supporters does not share similar views.¹⁰⁰

After giving a general overview about the European integration process, the membership of the UK in the EU and crisis-driven integration process, it is necessary to mention Euroscepticism before analyzing the Brexit referendum because it is strongly linked with the UK's decision to leave the Union. This section is divided into two parts as Euroscepticism is not only a British phenomenon. Thus, the term will be analyzed both from the viewpoint of EU member states and the UK separately.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p.7.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p.9.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

2.5 Euroscepticism

2.5.1 Euroscepticism in the EU

McCrary supposes that the term “Eurosceptic” has multiple definitions.¹⁰¹ He defines it as a disappointment about the EU and its multiple goals especially further integration and EU institutions including the European Parliament or the European Commission.¹⁰² He also points out the general disapproval of the EU’s economic policies in several member states and strong distrustfulness to the EU’s handling of economy especially in Greece, Italy, France, Spain, Sweden and the UK.¹⁰³

Europeans generally disapprove of EU’s handling of economy

Do you ___ of the way the European Union is dealing with European economic issues?




Figure 6 Disapproval of Europeans about EU’s handling of economy¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ McCrary, *op.cit.*, p.11

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p.22

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

Moreover, Cabral et.al, define ‘Euroscepticism’ as a critical attitude towards the notion of integration.¹⁰⁵ Forster adds that a Eurosceptic is distrustful with utility and viability of Economic and Political Union by giving three significant elements of this definition.¹⁰⁶ The first definition is related with the opposition of economic and political integration within Europe and second one is the opposition to the transformation of the EC into the EU in 1993 and the third one is associating Eurosceptics with the Conservative Party rather than other political parties.¹⁰⁷ Therefore, the term is generally used to represent the opponents of European integration.

Riley and Ghilès defend that several challenges that the EU face including euro flows after the economic crisis in 2008, Russian’s intervention to the post-cold war balance of power in Europe, ISIS’s terrorist attacks and huge migration flows resulted in powerful anti-EU establishments across the continent.¹⁰⁸ The figure below reveals the percentage of nationals in several countries who are distrustful with the EU. The evidence suggests that from 2007 to 2012, the lack of trust in the EU has increased in countries such as Poland, Italy, France, Germany, UK and Spain.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ Cabral and et.al, *After Brexit: Consequences for the European Union*, Basingstoke, England: Springer, 2017, p.62

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Anthony Forster, *Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics: Opposition to Europe in the Conservative and Labour Parties since 1945*. London, England: Routledge, 2003, p.2

¹⁰⁸ Alan Riley and Francis Ghilès, *BREXIT: Causes and Consequences*, CIDOB Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, 159, 2016, p.1 Retrieved from https://www.cidob.org/publicaciones/serie_de_publicacion/notes_internacionals/n1_159/brexit_uses_and_consequences (Accessed on 2 April 2019)

¹⁰⁹ MacShane, *op.cit.*, p.200.




Figure 7 Lack of trust in the EU (2013).¹¹⁰

Cabral et al. discuss about types of Euroscepticism.¹¹¹ While hard euroscepticism supports a withdrawal from the EU with regard to its rejection of the European project, soft euroscepticism criticize one or a number of policy areas through the sense of national interest.¹¹² Hard Euroscepticism has a principal objection to the European integration as it contradicts with national interests. However, soft Euroscepticism does not have a principal objection to European integration. In the figure below, they also give four types of Euroscepticism based on several criterions including economics, sovereignty, democratic legitimacy, and political.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Cabral and et.al, op.cit., p.64

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ McCrary, op.cit., p.11

| Eurocepticism based on economic criterion | Eurocepticism based on the criterion of sovereignty | Eurocepticism based on democratic criterion | Eurocepticism based on political criterion |
|---|---|---|--|
| Quantifies pragmatically the major benefits and costs arising from EU membership, resulted or not from a cooperative process. | Considers that, at EU level, cooperation should not be a challenge to national sovereignty. These eurosceptics support supranational cooperation in matters that the state can not manage alone (such as environmental issues and the fight against organized crime), but wish to preserve national skills for socio-cultural policies. | Perceives the current institutional structure of the Union as inadequate in terms of representation and democratic participation of citizens. | Assesses EU action based on the doctrine of belonging to a political family; analysts believe that the dominant form of this disproof is social. |

Figure 8 Types of Eurocepticism ¹¹⁴

Szczerbiak and Taggart explains their understanding of Eurocepticism that

The process of European integration relies on the support of publics and party politicians for its continued existence. And much of that support or lack of it stems from what the EU is doing and looking like for ordinary citizens. However, our research shows that the fate of European integration at least partly depends on the structures of competition inherent in domestic party systems. In other words, the fate of European integration does not entirely depend on the nature of European integration.¹¹⁵

The figure below indicates the levels of public and party-based Eurocepticism. It can be seen that the UK has both high levels of public and party-based Eurocepticism while Germany and Greece have the low levels of Eurocepticism.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p.12.

¹¹⁵ Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, "The Party Politics of Eurocepticism in EU Member and Candidate States", 'Opposing Europe Research Network' Working Paper, 2002, 6, pp. 1-45, p.26

| | <i>Low Levels of Public Euroscepticism</i> | <i>High Levels of Public Euroscepticism</i> |
|--|--|---|
| <i>Low Party-Based Euroscepticism</i> | Spain Bulgaria Greece Ireland Germany Portugal Belgium Luxembourg Italy Netherlands | Slovenia Finland Lithuania Poland |
| <i>High Party-Based Euroscepticism</i> | Romania France Slovakia Hungary | Sweden Austria Latvia Estonia United Kingdom Denmark Czech Republic |

Figure 9 Levels of party-based Euroscepticism by levels of public Euroscepticism¹¹⁶

Historically, while the UK has constituted a case of high public Euroscepticism, this has been accompanied by high party-based Euroscepticism since the early 1990s. The next section then turns to the transformation of Euroscepticism in the UK.

2.5.2 Euroscepticism in the UK

In the academic literature, historians explain multiple reasons for British Euroscepticism. One of these arguments is that there was a lack of commitment towards European integration among British political elites after the Second World War as a result of clashing British and continental interests.¹¹⁷ Thus, Harmsen and Spiering argue that it could continue its association with the Commonwealth or it could deepen the ‘special relationship’ with the US.¹¹⁸ Another argument raises from the

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.19.

¹¹⁷ Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering, *Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration*, Amsterdam, Netherlands: Rodopi, , 2004, p.137

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

history of the British political economy based on free trade and economic cooperation with the USA. This resulted in support of the Anglophone globalization. In addition to these, the construction of British cultural ‘identity’ sustained the sentiment of Euroscepticism. This approach made Britons to reject a European future after 1945 because Europe was seen as alien and contradictory to their post-colonial identity.¹¹⁹ Similarly, Riley and Ghilès explain that the UK is in a different position from its European neighbors with regard to its unique position as an unconquered island nation, a long tradition of parliamentary democracy.¹²⁰ Forster lists the roots of Euroscepticism in the formulation of British policy such as the failed membership applications of 1961 and 1967, the passage of the EC Bill of 1970 to 1972, the referendum of June 1975, the Single European Act of 1986, the Political and Monetary Union agenda in the form of the Maastricht Treaty, and the single currency.¹²¹

Euroscepticism as a term entered the British domestic politics and media in the mid-1980s. Eurosceptics are defined as non-enthusiastic people about the increasing powers of the European Union. In 1988, the promise of the European Commission’s president, Jacques Delors about reinforcing labour and social regulations of Europe’s single market led to the growing Euroscepticism. The UK’s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher believed that EU interfered with their national politics. Thus, this term increased its popularity with her famous “Bruges Speech” of September 1988.¹²²

¹¹⁹ Cabral and et.al, op.cit., p.65.

¹²⁰ Riley and Ghilès, loc.cit.

¹²¹ Forster, op.cit., p.129.

¹²² Cardiff EDC. (2016). Information Guide: Euroscepticism. Retrieved from <https://orca.cf.ac.uk/77359/1/Euroscepticism.pdf> (Accessed on 5 April 2019)

Harmsen and Spiering argue that scholars tend to associate the UK's every doubt of the European institutions with Euroscepticism.¹²³ Yet, while the term is used by those who support for withdrawal the UK from the EU, there are some British people and groups who are skeptical towards the EU but do not advocate a withdrawal. The 'Europe Yes, Euro No Campaign'¹²⁴ can be seen as anxious but not skeptical to all idea of the EU. Yet, a poll published in 2013 by the American Pew Research Center indicated that in the UK only 41 per cent had a favorable view of the EU.¹²⁵ Moreover, in France, support for the EU was declined dramatically. While in 2012, 60 percent of French people favored the EU, only 41 per cent of French people polled were in favor of the EU.¹²⁶ From this figure below, we can conclude that the UK and Greece have little trust to the EU in contrast to Romania and Denmark.



¹²³ Harmsen and Spiering, *op.cit.*, p.130.


¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ MacShane, *op.cit.*, p.199.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

Figure 10 Tendency to trust the European Union¹²⁷

Lately, British Euroscepticism is regarded not only as a product post-war resentment, but that of several deep-rooted national attitudes. It generally regards British identity, traditions and culture are being under threat from forces in Brussels and Strasbourg.¹²⁸ Thus, there is a broad acceptance that the British identity is different and unlike ‘the Europeans’.¹²⁹ Similarly, the British are unique in defining themselves as special, exceptional, nationally different from all the others. The uniqueness of the British identity emerges from a contrast between the national Self and corporate European Other.¹³⁰



¹²⁷ Zanny Beddoes, The Brexit Briefs: Our guide to Britain’s EU referendum, The Economist, 2016, June 11, p.4 Retrieved from <https://www.economist.com/sites/default/files/EconomistBrexitBriefs16.pdf> (Accessed on 10 April 2019)

¹²⁸ MacShane, *op.cit.*, p.10.

¹²⁹ Harmsen and Spiering, *op.cit.*, p.144.

¹³⁰ Forster, *op.cit.*, p.130.

Figure 11 Percentage of people in Britain who describe themselves as European (1996 – 2014) ¹³¹

The study of national identity from the British Social Attitudes data from 1996 – 2014 showed a trend of social attitude towards the EU and it is apparent that most respondents do not themselves as Europeans. ¹³² The effect of Britishness, social attitude toward “being European” and national identity could be regarded as one of the roots causes of Brexit vote.

McCrary argues that another source of significant tension between the UK and the EU is related to their governance styles. ¹³³ The EU is a supranational body in which its member states have pooled their national sovereignty under joint institutions and decision making processes. Eventually, these decisions bind all the member states. Furthermore, like political integration, there is also an economic integration in the European Union. In free trade area, there are no tariffs and barriers within member states and there is an EMU with the Euro. The UK is an opt-out country in regard to single currency provision and also is not a member of the Eurozone. ¹³⁴ In a similar view, Beddoes describes Britain’s position within the club as a form of transactional relationship which is based on cost-benefit analysis. ¹³⁵ Because, the UK has a strong feeling of national sovereignty, it sees the EU as an intergovernmental organization that is directed towards ensuring free trade and security. The EU policies that odds

¹³¹ McCrary, *op.cit.*, p.16.

¹³² *Ibid.*, p.17.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p.18

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.18

¹³⁵ Beddoes, *loc.cit.*

with the UK's national interests or threatens the UK's national sovereignty are not favored.

Over the last decade, growing public skepticism towards integration has led to increasing calls for the UK to quit the EU. As a result, the UK has entered into a new crisis about how to withdraw from the EU. The referendum outcome for 'Brexit' signifies one of the most decisive moments in the post-war British history. The difficult task today for the UK government is to negotiate its future relationship with the EU.¹³⁶

2.6 Conclusion

The major aim of this chapter has been to provide a general framework for the historical relations of the EU and the UK. For this purpose, this chapter has first examined the dynamics of European integration process. Then, in order to specify the nature of EU-UK relations, the UK's membership of the EU is analyzed in detail. These historical explanations are followed by a debate of challenges that both the EU and the UK have faced due to the integration process. The last section of this chapter have focused on the term of "Euroscepticism" with sub-sections of Euroscepticism in the EU and in the UK.

¹³⁶ Dinan Desmond and et.al, op.cit., p.3.

CHAPTER 3

THE PROCESS OF BREXIT REFERENDUM AND BREXIT NEGOTIATIONS

3.1 Introduction

After analyzing the historical relations between the EU and the UK in the previous chapter, this chapter mainly examines Brexit under two sections such as The Process of Brexit and the Brexit Negotiations. In the first section, the path to Brexit referendum, reasons behind Brexit, Remain and Leave campaigns during referendum, Brexit referendum analysis, international views on Brexit will be analyzed. The main purpose of this section is to give a detailed picture about Brexit referendum from the beginning to the negotiation path. Second section will give a more legal and historical overview of the negotiation process in order for a better understanding of how the EU and the UK organize their future relationship after Brexit. Also, this section mainly consists of government reports and fact-sheets on both legally binding and non-binding documents. In this second section, June 2017 the UK general election, Brexit negotiation terminology and possible models, the negotiation process including the Withdrawal Agreement, the Transition Period and the Political Declaration will be examined. The main focus on this second section is to show the progress in the negotiations between the EU and the UK and also to illustrate the efforts of both the EU and the UK's negotiating team in aim of reaching a deal for future relations.

3.2 The Process of Brexit Referendum

3.2.1 The Road to Brexit Referendum

Beddoes signifies the very idea of the European Union as moving towards an “ever closer union”.¹³⁷ However, when the Union deepened through successive reforms, some member states did not want it or had not enough capabilities to reach this goal. With regard to Britain, as figure below reveals that, it has more opt outs than any other country such as the Schengen, the euro and most EU policies in justice and home affairs.¹³⁸




Figure 12 Relationship of European nations to European organizations¹³⁹

Despite opting out from the Euro and Schengen, the UK was positively engaged with the EU and also tried to support EU issues through bilateral relations. Especially, the UK created close relationships with France and Germany; promoted

¹³⁷ Beddoes, *op.cit.*, p.19.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

economic liberalization within the EU; and in terms of assisting the deepening of European integration.¹⁴⁰ Yet, Whitman examines that David Cameron's two governments from 2010 onwards sought to de-centre the EU in the UK's approach towards foreign policy.¹⁴¹ The Conservative Party prioritized the UK's foreign policy interests while neglecting bilateral relations about Eurozone and migration crisis in the EU. The UK tried to protect its national sovereignty over its borders, financial interests as well as national security. Eventually, this approach resulted in conducting the referendum on the UK's membership in the EU.

The UK had three national referendums in its history. In 1975, Harold Wilson's Labour government called a referendum on the Common Market by suggesting revised terms. In 2011, the vote was on replacing the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system with alternative vote (AV) system for state elections and third one is the EU membership referendum in 2016. Cameron delivered his 'Europe' speech on 23 January 2013 in Bloomberg in London and promised to renegotiate the UK's membership of the EU if re-elected as Prime Minister. With this attempt, hard Eurosceptics achieved a key goal because a possible Brexit vote was on the agenda with an exit option from the EU.¹⁴² In the May 2015 General Election, after the Conservative Party won a majority, Cameron planned to negotiate a 'new settlement' for Britain in Europe.¹⁴³ The deal included several topics such as limitations of EU migrants' benefits in work area, 'an emergency safeguard' for securing businesses in London and a treaty change which

¹⁴⁰ Richard Whitman, UK foreign and security policy post-Brexit: The search for a European Strategy (1), The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2018, p.2

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p.3.

¹⁴² Dinan, Desmond and et.al, *op.cit.*, p.7.

¹⁴³ Sara Hobolt, The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(9), 1259-1277, 2016, doi:10.1080/13501763.2016.1225785, p.1261

would decrease the UK's obligation of reaching 'ever closer union'. Finally, the agreement was reached by the European Council in February 2016. It included a legally-binding decision on a new settlement for the UK within the EU. Veto over Eurozone criteria and four-year ban on EU migrants' in-work benefits were not granted. Yet, access to these benefits could be phased in over four years. As a result, Cameron declared his intention to remain in the EU and supposed that any decision to leave the EU would risk the country to be in an unknown process.¹⁴⁴

In the next sub-section, key reasons behind the Brexit referendum which combine both historical tendencies of the UK and today's international challenges that both the EU and the UK face will be examined.

3.2.2 Key Reasons Behind Brexit

As mentioned in the first chapter, Europe is now facing both internal and external threats. Internal threats are related with the rise of nationalism and political extremism in several member states. External threats could be listed as: the assertiveness of Russia and Arab world and Africa's conflicts, China's rapid growth and more recently, Donald Trump's Presidency toward undermining global environmental and trade regimes.¹⁴⁵ In this conjuncture, Brexit referendum was primarily fought over immigration, sovereignty, the economy and general dissatisfaction with politics. Yet, Duke argues that concerns over security played in the background with the arguments of full control of immigration and borders.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ Dinan, Desmond and et.al, op.cit., p.10.

¹⁴⁵ Malcolm Chalmers, Brexit and European Security, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2018, p.3

¹⁴⁶ Simon Duke, The Elusive Quest for European Security: From EDC to CFSP, Basingstoke, England: Springer, 1999, p.1

Hobolt sets four interrelated factors that shaped voting behavior including socio-economic factors; geographical identities; concerns about the domestic political environment and policy attitudes.¹⁴⁷ Similarly, Vasilopoulou lists the factors behind Brexit referendum such as party preferences, national economy, and cost benefit analysis of European integration, identity, political regimes, education and income levels.¹⁴⁸ In addition to these views, Welfens shares a research conducted among voters in Britain who were asked to answer the question of “three most important issues for you and your family”. Responses indicated that National Health Service (NHS) (50%), economy, low wages, and immigration (each with over 20%) were most important issues for British people.¹⁴⁹ Hobolt supposes the main drive of the Brexit process is the rising support for populist Eurosceptic parties across Europe after the Eurozone crisis.¹⁵⁰ In the domestic sphere, the political force of Brexit was the Independence Party (UKIP) led by Nigel Farage which is a xenophobic and right wing party. Leaders of the party was aware that people’s emotions and fears would influence their referendum decision.¹⁵¹ During the referendum campaign, traditional concerns about sovereignty and immigration were combined by UKIP. The party’s main strategy was to give anti-EU and anti-immigration messages to the public.¹⁵² Henderson *et al.*, state

¹⁴⁷ Hobolt, *op.cit.*, p.1267.

¹⁴⁸ Sofia Vasilopoulou, UK Euroscepticism and the Brexit Referendum, *The Political Quarterly*, 87(2), 219-227, 2016, doi:10.1111/1467-923x.12258, p.224

¹⁴⁹ Paul Welfens, *An Accidental Brexit: New EU and Transatlantic Economic Perspectives*, Basingstoke, England: Springer, 2017, p.47

¹⁵⁰ Hobolt, *op.cit.*, p.1272.

¹⁵¹ Ramiro Troitiño and et.al, *Brexit: History, Reasoning and Perspectives*, Basingstoke, England: Springer, 2018, p.107

¹⁵² Frank Schimmelfennig, Brexit: differentiated disintegration in the European Union, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2018, doi:10.1080/13501763.2018.1467954, p.9

populist arguments of this right party as: “UKIP’s ability to do this was partly endogenous to Britain’s long-standing weak sense of pan-European identity.”¹⁵³ Specifically, UKIP warned British citizens about the negative outcomes of EU proposals about visa-free travel to Turkish citizens and uncontrolled immigration. Nigel Farage acted as an important figure during the referendum campaign of UKIP. Usherwood argues that as a charismatic Eurosceptic leader, Nigel Farage’s ‘breaking point’ poster which showed refugees waiting to enter the UK mobilized British voters.¹⁵⁴ Also, Boris Johnson’s campaign played a vital role during referendum. Their rhetoric about ‘left behind’ communities resulted in a popular support from especially workers and old voters.¹⁵⁵

Historically, many British leaders such as Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and citizens adopted a skeptical about the EU. Specifically, factors such as economic dissatisfaction, globalization and immigration issues, and anti-elite attitudes played key roles in the referendum agenda.¹⁵⁶ In the literature, many scholars stress more on the immigration factor among these different factors. Especially, with the rising nationalist forces fueled by anti-immigration attitudes, the decline of support for the EU institutions is not only in the UK but also across Europe including France, Netherlands, Italy, Poland, Hungary and even Germany.¹⁵⁷ Specifically, Angela

¹⁵³ Ailsa Henderson and et.al, How Brexit was made in England. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 2017, 1-16, p.4, doi:10.1177/1369148117730542


¹⁵⁴ Simon Usherwood, Did Ukip win the referendum? *Political Insight*, 2016, 7(2), 27-29, doi:10.1177/2041905816666146, pp.27-29

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ Derek Mix, *The United Kingdom: Background, Brexit, and Relations with the United States*, The United Kingdom: Background, Brexit, and Relations with the United States, 2018, p.3

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p.2.

Merkel’s refugee policy of 2015 has affected many British voters negatively who are skeptical about the EU’s immigration policy.¹⁵⁸ In March 2016, EU leaders agreed upon allowing individuals arriving in Greece to transit the Western Balkans to seek asylum in other EU countries. Also, an agreement with Turkey was reached to diminish the flows to Greece.¹⁵⁹ As mentioned in the first chapter, protecting national sovereignty always played an important role in Britain’s strategic thinking in world affairs. So, the growing concerns over national sovereignty and desire to control of borders was interlinked in the UK’s current situation. According to the YouGov research, between March-June 2016, approximately 60% of people in Britain thought there would be less immigration to the UK if it exit the EU.¹⁶⁰



¹⁵⁸ Welfens, *op.cit.*, p.52.

¹⁵⁹ Archick, *op.cit.*, p.13.

¹⁶⁰ Daniel Jackson and et.al, *EU Referendum Analysis 2016: Media, Voters and the Campaign*, The Centre for the Study of Journalism, Culture and Community, 2016, p.120

Figure 13 British attitudes over Immigration (March-June 2016) ¹⁶¹

Overall, it can be summarized that traditional anti-EU sentiments were fueled by socio-economic concerns related to globalization, immigration and also identity politics backed by Eurosceptic parties were dominated the agenda before Brexit referendum. The next sub-section will mainly state positions and rhetoric of the Remain and Leave campaigns. Their point of views' in public campaigns, domestic political arena, news media and newspapers will be described in order to show the strengths and weakness of the each campaign.

3.2.3 Remain and Leave Campaigns

In the Brexit referendum campaign, there were two sides such as 'Britain Stronger in Europe' who defended to remain in the EU and 'Vote Leave' who advocated to exit the Union. 'Britain Stronger in Europe' was backed by key figures from the Conservative Party such as Prime Minister David Cameron and Chancellor George Osborne and from Labour MPs such as Jeremy Corbyn and Alan Johnson. 'Vote Leave' campaign was backed by senior Conservatives such as Michael Gove and Boris Johnson, Gisela Stuart and Graham Stringer from Labour MPs and Nigel Farage, Douglas Carswell and Suzanne Evans from UKIP. ¹⁶² Vote Remain argued that the UK should avoid the economic risk of Brexit. Its 'Project Fear' message was generally about this certain risk. ¹⁶³ On the other hand, Vote Leave wanted more control over British borders by restricting immigration. This campaign discussed that national sovereignty was being eroded by the EU and its institutions. So, control over decision-making processes should be taken from Brussels because the EU lacks democratic

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Brian Wheeler and et.al, Brexit: All you need to know, 2019, May 10, Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887> (Accessed on 20 May 2019)

¹⁶³ Clarke, *op.cit.*, p.100.

legitimacy and accountability. Also, advocates of Vote Leave believed that the UK's economy was being curbed by the EU regulations. Thus, the UK should search for new economic partners in growing economies. Moreover, immigration to the UK was cutting job opportunities and providing lower wages for British nationals.¹⁶⁴ As Hobolt lists the main arguments of both Remain and Leave camp in the figure below, the Remain side believed that the economic uncertainties of Brexit pushed voters to select the status quo option while the Leave side showed the referendum as a huge opportunity to regain control over national sovereignty.¹⁶⁵ The referendum result was also defined by values, identities and outlook such as Englishness. The link between English nationalism and Euroscepticism that was highlighted by Leave campaign outweighed the arguments of the Remain campaign including benefits connected to trade and wealth.¹⁶⁶ Ham examines this two polarizing nature of the Brexit debate and argue the 'Leave' campaign saw the very image of the EU as a fossilized nature in the past while the 'Remain' campaign believed that the EU is essential for the UK's prosperity and safety.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁴ Welfens, op.cit., p.49.

¹⁶⁵ Hobolt, op.cit., p.1262.

¹⁶⁶ Tim Oliver, Fifty Shades of Brexit: Britain's EU Referendum and its Implications for Europe and Britain, *The International Spectator*, 52(1), 1-11, 2017, doi:10.1080/03932729.2017.1259802, p.4

¹⁶⁷ Peter Ham, *Brexit: Strategic Consequences for Europe*, Clingendael, 2016, p.2

Table 2 Main arguments of Remain and Leave voters¹⁶⁸

| Main referendum arguments: | Mentioned mainly by | |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------|
| | Leave voters | Remain voters |
| Immigration control | X | |
| No trust in Prime Minister/Government | X | |
| Cost of EU membership | X | |
| Security implications | X | |
| Lack of knowledge and trust | X | |
| Lack of information | X | X |
| Economic risk of Brexit | | X |
| Economic stability in the EU | | X |
| Economic benefits from the EU | | X |

In addition to these, Eurosceptics including Vote Leave, Leave. EU and Grassroots Out used public fears about further enlargement of the EU to compass Albania, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey. These groups were composed of Boris Johnson, Nigel Farage, Michael Gove, George Galloway, Priti Patel, Douglas Carswell, Steve Baker and Bernard Jenkin.¹⁶⁹ Their “take back control’ strategy assumed that voting leave the EU could save £350 million each week in order to use in National Health Service (NHS). In contrast, ‘Britain Stronger in Europe’ addressed vital consequences of Brexit economically. They warned that workers could lose £38 a week, households could be worse off £4,300 each year and house prices may fall by 18 percent.¹⁷⁰

In domestic arena, UKIP was in the ‘Leave’ camp whereas the Greens and Liberal Democrats in the ‘Remain’ camp. In terms of conservatives, there were two different campaigns, including Conservatives for Reform in Europe who supported the UK’s EU membership and Conservatives for Britain who supported Brexit. Prime

¹⁶⁸ Hobolt, *op.cit.*, p.1263.

¹⁶⁹ Rozina Sabur, Who wants to leave the European Union? 2016, June 20, Retrieved from <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/19/who-wants-to-leave-the-european-union/> (Accessed on 25 May 2019)

¹⁷⁰ Harold Clarke and et.al, Why Britain Voted for Brexit: An Individual-Level Analysis of the 2016 Referendum Vote, *Parliamentary Affairs*, 70(3), 2017, 439-464. doi:10.1093/pa/gsx005, p.440

Minister David Cameron and Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne were in favor of continued membership of the EU while Justice Secretary Michael Gove and Mayor of London Boris Johnson were supporting Brexit. Labour was campaigning to stay in the EU.¹⁷¹ Lamond and Reid mention that the UK's government spent £9.3m on brochures which were sent to every household in England, Scotland and Wales so as to influence people to vote Remain. Nevertheless, 220,000 people protested this spending and wanted David Cameron to stop from using taxpayers' money.¹⁷²

In the news media, Brexit campaign was also dominated by the economy, immigration, and the conduct of the referendum. Media coverage of the 'Vote Leave' campaign underlined the potential savings for NHS, reclaiming sovereignty over borders, control of immigration, and free trade with the rest of the world. The Remain side, 'Britain Stronger in Europe', targeted the economic risks for house prices, jobs, prices, trade, businesses, and investments.¹⁷³ It can be argued that the Leave campaign used social media effectively while targeting their messages. The news media reported this campaign as a 'Tory story' and place Leave arguments largely.¹⁷⁴ In the newspapers, editorials on different sides criticized campaign. A narrative of 'us vs them' was used largely in their critics. They highlighted the gap between politicians, elites, experts and the electorate.¹⁷⁵ The Vote Leave side claimed their arguments in long-standing assumptions about the country's future. Immigration, loss of

¹⁷¹ Vasilopoulou, *op.cit.*, p.221.

¹⁷² Lamond and Reid *op.cit.*, p.59.

¹⁷³ Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Understanding Brexit: Cultural Resentment Versus Economic Grievances, SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018, doi:10.2139/ssrn.3231896, p.4

¹⁷⁴ Daniel Jackson and et.al, *op.cit.*, p.17.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p.36.

sovereignty, the gap between elites and poor society reflected in various ways. In contrast, the Remain side emphasized about the benefits of single market, fiscal stability and the free movement of people.¹⁷⁶

After giving characteristics of both Remain and Leave campaigns, Brexit referendum results will be analyzed in the next sub-section. Main reasons for voting Remain or Leave will be examined and also voting differences in terms of intra-country, age, educational qualifications and domestic political arena will be analyzed.

3.2.4 Analysis of the Brexit Referendum Results

In April, opinion polls showed that the voting difference between two camps were very close. On 23 June, many ‘leave’ side were expecting a defeat because majority of votes were in Remain side before the referendum. However, in the early hours of 24 June, Leave campaign’s victory was revealed.¹⁷⁷ As figure below illustrates, the referendum question was ‘Should the UK remain a member of the EU or leave the EU?’ 33.5 million Citizen in the UK voted in this national referendum and 51, 9 per cent of voters decided to leave the EU with 72, 2 per cent of turnout.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p.61.

¹⁷⁷ Desmond and et.al, *op.cit.*, p.12.

¹⁷⁸ Clarke and et.al, *op.cit.*, p.24.

| | |
|---|--------------------------|
| Referendum on the United Kingdom's membership of the European Union | |
| Vote only once by putting a cross <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> in the box next to your choice | |
| Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union? | |
| Remain a member of the European Union | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Leave the European Union | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Figure 14 Referendum paper¹⁷⁹




Figure 15 Referendum results¹⁸⁰

Leave decision exemplifies one of the major crisis in the history of the EU because a member state has decided to leave the Union for the first time in history. However, as mentioned in first chapter, with its increasing Euroscepticism and anxiety

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p.155.

¹⁸⁰ The Electoral Commission, EU referendum result visualisations, Retrieved from <https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/eu-referendum-result-visualisations> (Accessed on 15 April 2019)

with integration process, the UK caused not much surprise for the EU.¹⁸¹ On 13 July, Theresa May succeeded David Cameron as Prime Minister and examined the outcome by her famous words “Brexit means Brexit.”¹⁸² Tim Oliver argues about the reasons to vote Leave by highlighting Britain’s historical negative and Eurosceptic image of the EU.¹⁸³ Additionally, “left behind” communities and individuals played a vital role in the outcome with their struggle with the EU’s globalized, open economies. He examines the connection between economic situation and support for leaving the EU and argue that older, poorer, less skilled workers voted to leave. In party behavior, UKIP was supported by the voters in deprived areas across the UK. According to Jackson et al., while sovereignty and immigration played a vital role in voting leave, economic factors played major role in voting remain.¹⁸⁴



¹⁸¹ Desmond and et.al, op.cit., p.16.

¹⁸² Norris and Inglehart, op.cit., p.2.

¹⁸³ Oliver, loc. cit.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., p.3.

Figure 16 Most important issue in deciding how to vote¹⁸⁵

Figure below shows the main reasons behind the vote Leave according to a field work conducted on 24 June 2016. According to What UK Thinks, strong will to take powers back from the Brussels and migration crisis were main drivers to vote Leave while voters' decision to remain in the EU could strongly be linked to their economic perceptions.¹⁸⁶




Figure 17 Main reasons in decision to vote Leave¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁵ Jackson and et.al, op.cit., p.115.

¹⁸⁶ What UK Thinks, What was the main reason why you decided to vote for the UK to leave the EU?, 2016, Retrieved from <https://whatukthinks.org/eu/questions/what-was-the-main-reason-why-you-decided-to-vote-for-the-uk-to-leave-the-eu/> (Accessed on 13 May 2019)

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.




Figure 18 Main reasons in decision to vote Remain¹⁸⁸

From now on, I will analyze the referendum results in line with intra-country divisions, age, educational qualifications and domestic political arena. In general, there were divisions in the country in terms of their voting choices. There were younger pro-remain voters and older Brexit minded people. There were also high educational with professional jobs pro-remain voters and less qualified Brexiteers. Also, there were regional differences across the country. As figure below reveals that while 53.4% of English voters supported Brexit, only 38.0% of Scottish voters voted Leave. Due to the England's vast majority of the population, result was in favor of Brexit.

¹⁸⁸ What UK Thinks, What was the main reason why you decided to vote for the UK to remain in the EU?, 2016, Retrieved from <https://whatukthinks.org/eu/questions/what-was-the-main-reason-why-you-decided-to-vote-for-the-uk-to-remain-in-the-eu/> (Accessed on 13 May 2019)




Figure 19 Intra-country percentages of support for Brexit¹⁸⁹

In terms of geographical differences, in the larger multicultural cities especially London, the Remain side outweighed the Leave Vote. In the English countryside and in the north-eastern towns, the Leave side was victorious. Whereas both England and Wales voted 53 per cent Leave vote, Northern Ireland and Scotland voted Remain at 56 and 62 per cent.¹⁹⁰

Baldwin reveals a conduct on the day of the vote that the young and employed choose to Remain. While 73% of 18 to 24 year-olds voted Remain, 60% of over-65s voted Leave.¹⁹¹

Table 3 Vote by age at the 2016 UK Referendum on membership of the European Union (%)¹⁹²

| | 18-24 | 25-34 | 35-44 | 45-54 | 55-64 | 65+ |
|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----|
| Leave | 27 | 38 | 48 | 56 | 57 | 60 |
| Remain | 73 | 62 | 52 | 44 | 43 | 40 |

¹⁸⁹ Will Kenton, Brexit Definition, W. 2015, May 4, Retrieved from <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/brexit.asp#ixzz4ikbR6Lb3> (Accessed on 8 April 2019)

¹⁹⁰ Hobolt, *op.cit.*, p.1273.

¹⁹¹ Richard Baldwin, *op.cit.*, p.5.

¹⁹² Jackson and et.al, *op.cit.*, p.109.

In terms of qualifications, while less-educated voted Leave, those with university degrees supported remain. The two figures below mirror each other in a way that The Leave vote was higher in which there are people who do not hold any qualifications, whereas it was lower in places where there is a larger number high educational people.¹⁹³




Figure 20 Educational qualification and support for Leave¹⁹⁴

In parliament, 138 Conservative MPs voted ‘Leave’. However, a majority of MPs choose to remain in the EU. Generally, of the 650 MPs, 479 favored ‘Remain’ option.¹⁹⁵

In general, referendum results point out that while national sovereignty and immigration were major reasons to vote Leave, economic concerns of Brexit played a vital role in the voter’s decision to remain in the EU. In terms of intra-country voting

¹⁹³ Iain Begg, *Brexit: why, what next and how?* CESifo Forum, 17(1), 30-3, 2016, p.34

¹⁹⁴ Matthew Goodwin and Oliver Heath, *The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An Aggregate-level Analysis of the Result*, *The Political Quarterly*, 87(3), 323-332, 2016, doi:10.1111/1467-923x.12285, p.5

¹⁹⁵ Political Studies Association, *Brexit: Six months on*, *The UK in a Changing Europe Initiative*, 2016, p.5

behaviors, while people who live in multicultural cities voted to Remain, residents of English countryside and the North-Eastern towns voted to Leave the EU. Also, young, employed and well-qualified voters decided to Remain whilst old, un-employed and less-qualified voters decided to Leave. After analyzing the referendum results in the domestic arena, it is also important to state the European views of Brexit. For this purpose, next sub-section will give a general overview of the European reactions to the Brexit referendum results.

The Pew Research Center conducted a research in 10 EU countries before the Brexit referendum. This research showed that only 16% of countries believed that it would be a good thing if the UK left. 70% of those responded in a way that it would be bad. The figure below reveals that 89% of Swedes, 75% of Dutch and 74% of Germans thought Brexit would be a bad thing for the EU while it was lower in France (62%) and in Italy (57%).¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁶ Francis Jacobs, *The EU after Brexit: Institutional and Policy Implications*, Basingstoke, England: Springer, 2018, p.16

Table 4 Respondent data for UK leaving the EU¹⁹⁷

| | | Q50N. If the UK were to leave the European Union, do you think this would be a good thing or a bad thing for the EU? | | | |
|-------------|--------------|--|-----------|------------|-------|
| | | Good thing | Bad thing | DK/Refused | Total |
| France | Spring, 2016 | 32 | 62 | 7 | 100 |
| Germany | Spring, 2016 | 16 | 74 | 10 | 100 |
| Greece | Spring, 2016 | 14 | 65 | 21 | 100 |
| Hungary | Spring, 2016 | 10 | 70 | 20 | 100 |
| Italy | Spring, 2016 | 23 | 57 | 20 | 100 |
| Netherlands | Spring, 2016 | 17 | 75 | 8 | 100 |
| Poland | Spring, 2016 | 11 | 66 | 23 | 100 |
| Spain | Spring, 2016 | 16 | 70 | 14 | 100 |
| Sweden | Spring, 2016 | 8 | 89 | 3 | 100 |

While some Eurosceptic nationalists have welcomed the referendum outcome; most of the EU leaders have expressed their regret about the UK’s leaving the EU.¹⁹⁸ British departure would have a significant impact on the EU member states. The Union tackles with the euro crisis with slow growth, unemployment is high. Many leaders such as Angela Merkel seem to be politically weakened.¹⁹⁹ Thus, member states concern over the longer term effects of Brexit for the EU because it might lose prestige in the international arena from the Britain’s exit. Also, the balance of power would change after Brexit in line with Germany and France.

3.3 The Process of Brexit Negotiations

This sub-section will be devoted to the process in the aftermath of Brexit referendum. It will first examine the June 2017 elections to show the domestic political environment in the beginning of the negotiations. Then, it will give a detailed

¹⁹⁷ McCrary, op.cit., p.25.

¹⁹⁸ Desmond and et.al, op.cit., p.15.

¹⁹⁹ Beddoes, op.cit., p.11.

information about the Brexit terminologies that will be used and criticized broadly during the negotiation process. Also, this sub-section will tend to study the phases, arrangements, agreements and declarations during the negotiation period in order to give a detailed picture about the negotiation process.

3.3.1 The June 2017 UK General Election

Prime Minister David Cameron resigned after the unexpected Brexit referendum outcome and Theresa May became the leader of the Conservative party and the government in July 2016. Then, she called a snap election which was known as June 2017 UK General Election. The main aim for this election was to empower the UK's hand in the Brexit negotiations by raising the government's parliamentary mandate. The main focus of the Conservative campaign was on Theresa May's strong and reliable leadership character that would lead her to deliver the best deal in the Brexit negotiations. However, during the campaign, Labour leader surpassed her and became more popular. Also, during the campaigns Brexit was not a main subject of the Conservatives and Labour Party. Rather, they stressed on the commitments about honoring the referendum result without giving the details of their plans for Brexit. It could be resulted from the internal party divisions over the future relationships with the EU. Theresa May in her major speech on Brexit revealed her aim in a way that government would leave the EU and also the Single Market and the Customs Union.²⁰⁰ This speech showed her direction in line with the so-called 'clean break'.²⁰¹

²⁰⁰ Heather Stewart, Theresa May to reveal new Brexit deal, 2019, July 7 Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/may/21/theresa-may-to-reveal-new-brexit-deal> (Accessed on 15 July 2019)

²⁰¹ Sara Hobolt, Brexit and the 2017 UK General Election, *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 56, 39-50, doi:10.1111/jcms.12751, 2018, p.42

Table 5 2017 UK General Election results²⁰²

| <i>Party</i> | <i>Leader</i> | <i>Brexit position</i> | <i>Seats 2017</i> | <i>Vote share 2017 (%)</i> | <i>Change in vote share since 2015</i> |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|-------------------|----------------------------|--|
| Conservative Party | Theresa May | Hard Brexit | 317 | 42.3 | +5.5 |
| Labour Party | Jeremy Corbyn | No 2 nd referendum "Jobs first Brexit" | 262 | 40.0 | +9.5 |
| Scottish National Party | Nicola Sturgeon | No 2 nd referendum Soft Brexit | 35 | 3.0 | -1.7 |
| Liberal Democrats | Tim Farron | Soft Brexit 2 nd referendum on deal | 12 | 7.4 | -0.5 |
| Democratic Unionist Party | Arlene Foster | Hard Brexit No 2 nd referendum | 10 | 0.9 | +0.3 |
| Sinn Féin | Gerry Adams | Special status for Northern Ireland within the EU | 7 | 0.7 | +0.2 |
| Plaid Cymru | Leanne Wood | Soft Brexit | 4 | 0.5 | -0.1 |
| Green Party | Jonathan Bartley & Caroline Lucas | Soft Brexit 2 nd referendum on deal | 1 | 1.6 | -2.1 |
| UK Independence Party | Paul Nuttall | Hard Brexit No 2 nd referendum | 0 | 1.8 | -10.8 |

As a result of the election, the Conservatives lost the majority of seats in the parliament. As figure shows, despite the fact that the Conservative Party increased their share and total number of votes, it lost the one they had. As mention before, with Jeremy Corbyn's successful campaign, Labour Party increased its vote by ten percent. While gaining 30 seats more. In contrast, The UKIP vote decreased enormously. Yet, only five seats were lost to the Conservatives. Labour got 18 per cent of the UKIP's vote. In sum, the Conservatives won sixty more seats than Labour Party.²⁰³ Also, the Conservative party needed the support of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) which is the right-wing Northern Irish party to form a minority government. DUP resists the proposals of "special status" for Northern Ireland in the Brexit negotiations. The party's main concern was the preservation of the Union by arguing that differences between Northern Ireland and Great Britain could lead to disintegration of the UK. Overall, after the election, the UK government's position in the negotiations have been weakened. Moreover, it could not provide any certainty about how the UK's position

²⁰² *Ibid.*, p.43

²⁰³ Andrew Gamble, Taking back control: the political implications of Brexit, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2018, 25(8), 1215-1232, doi:10.1080/13501763.2018.1467952, p.1223

will be on the future UK–EU relationship. Specifically, Theresa May’s position within the Conservative party and within parliament was so weakened that she was described as a ‘dead woman walking’ after the elections.²⁰⁴ This showed her weakened authority over the supporters of Hard Brexit within her Cabinet. This eventually decreased her ability to compromise in the Brexit negotiations. In this domestic environment, she had to find a balance between hard-liners in both the Conservative Party and the DUP and a parliamentarians who advocated a softer Brexit approach.²⁰⁵ In February 2017, the government’s strategy was in line with ‘hard Brexit’ which refers to full departure from the EU customs union and single market without a deal. For this strategy, the UK could negotiate a new free trade agreement with the EU. So, before a trade agreement was signed, the UK and the EU could apply tariffs and restrictions on each other. However, after the result of the June 2017 UK general election, ‘soft Brexit’ advocates proposed that the UK should maintain some elements of its EU single market membership.²⁰⁶ As Whitman argues ‘hard Brexit’ could put the UK in an uncertain position and he adds: “For the EU-UK relationship, a hard Brexit would lead to a prolonged post-fact untangling of a relationship inevitably and rapidly descending into animosity.”²⁰⁷ Therefore, ‘soft Brexit’ serves as a better option because the EU and the UK could gain time to form a future relationship in line with their own interests.

²⁰⁴ Jessica Elgot, Osborne says Theresa May is a 'dead woman walking', 2019, March 7, Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/11/george-osborne-says-theresa-may-is-a-dead-woman-walking> (Accessed on 9 April 2019)

²⁰⁵ Hobolt, *op.cit.*, p. 9.

²⁰⁶ Mix, *op.cit.*, p.4.

²⁰⁷ Richard G. Whitman, Soft or hard Brexit?, p.4

3.3.2 Brexit Negotiations Period

The legal process for leaving the EU began when Theresa May triggered Article 50 on 29 March 2017. The UK was planned to exit the EU on Friday 29 March 2019. But, the EU was not interested in giving more favorable terms to a divorcing country. Also, there was a complication about elections for the European Parliament on 6-9 June 2019 because the UK needed to submit candidates for the Parliament if it was still a member of the EU at the time. The aim of this two-year time frame was about negotiating the withdrawal terms between the EU and the UK. In the case of no exit deal, the UK would leave the EU without a proper agreement leading harsh economic consequences and damaging the UK's global prestige. In addition, if no exit deal was reached on trade relations, the UK would have to continue its trade relations with the EU under WTO rules.²⁰⁸

The first phase of the negotiations started on 22 May 2017 when the EU 27 leaders adopted a decision to open the Brexit negotiations with the UK. On 19 June 2017, Michel Barnier as an EU Chief Negotiator and David Davis as a Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union launched the first round of Brexit negotiations and the Council adopted negotiating directives including important topics such as citizens' rights, the financial settlement, the Northern Irish border and other separation issues. During the first phase of the negotiations after six rounds, the EU and the UK established a joint report on 8 December 2017. In the joint report, the important topics covered such as citizens' rights, financial statement and the Northern Irish border. With regard to citizens' rights, following settlements issued. Until the withdrawal date, both the EU and UK citizens' will have granted the right of free movement. Newcomers before that date would have the right to stay and apply for permanent residency. Also, they will enjoy equal treatment in areas such as employment, health care, social benefits and education. In the financial statement, divorce bill was highly

²⁰⁸ Leon Cornelissen, Brexit – the options and consequences for the UK. Robeco Investment Solutions, 2017, p.15

debated. Hard-Brexiteers in the UK supported the idea that the UK should pay nothing while the EU wanted the UK pay as high as €100 billion.

In the Joint Report mentions the total cost for the UK as about €40-€45 billion. Finally, the Northern Ireland and the border between the Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland were critical topics for both parties. In the joint report, the UK avoided a hard border including checks and controls. “The backstop”²⁰⁹ refers to an arrangement for Irish border while protecting the Good Friday Agreement/Belfast Agreement. It ensures an open border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) disagrees with this arrangement because it leads to divergence of regulations between Northern Ireland and the UK. On the other hand, many people in Northern Ireland are in favor of the backstop because it provides privileged access to the EU and the UK markets. Yet, Brexiteers avoid the backstop because this arrangement could remove the UK’s ability to change its tariffs in trade agreements. Thus, this situation will block the UK’s independence in trade policies which is one of the UK government’s red lines. Also, the common travel area between the UK and Ireland will operate same in order not to interfere with the Ireland’s obligations under EU law. Also, Northern Irish people will be guaranteed a right to select Irish or British citizenship, or both. Irish citizens will have the rights of EU citizens.²¹⁰

On 8 December 2017, when sufficient progress has been made on Brexit talks, Donald Tusk issued the draft negotiation guidelines so as to move to the second phase of Brexit negotiations and on 15 December. As a result, new negotiation directives provided further details of the transition period. In this transition period, the EU law will continue to apply in the UK as if it were a member state but the UK will not

²⁰⁹ The Northern Ireland Backstop. (n.d.). Retrieved from <https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/printpdf/7107> (Accessed on 25 April 2019)

²¹⁰ Mix, op.cit., p.8.

participate in EU-decision making processes and institutions as a third country. On 28 February 2017, draft Withdrawal Agreement between the EU and the UK was published by the European Commission. It consists of six parts such as a Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland, introductory provisions, citizens' rights, and other separation issues such as goods placed on the market before the withdrawal date, transitional arrangements, financial provisions and institutional provisions. On 19 June 2017, a joint statement was published by showing the progress on the terms of the draft Withdrawal Agreement.²¹¹ On 24 July 2018, Government White Paper about future relationship between the UK and the EU was published. On 6 September 2018, the House of Commons declared a possible General Debate two days later about the legislation process of the withdrawal agreement.²¹² In the White Paper, Theresa May stated that

It is the spirit in which my Government has approached this White Paper. And it is the spirit in which I now expect the EU to engage in the next phase of the negotiations...Our proposal is comprehensive. It is ambitious. And it strikes the balance we need – between rights and obligations. It would ensure that we leave the EU, without leaving Europe.²¹³

In White Paper, the UK government gave a detailed proposal for a principled and practical Brexit.²¹⁴ A principled Brexit refers to an appreciation of Brexit referendum result in which the UK citizens made a decision to take back control the UK'S borders, laws and money. White Paper refers some customs arrangements which

²¹¹ Council of the European Union, Brexit, 2018 Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-uk-after-referendum/> (Accessed on 2 May 2019)

²¹² Graeme Cowie, Legislating for the withdrawal agreement (0203), The House of Commons Library, 2018

²¹³ HM Government, *op.cit.*, p.1.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

will enable the UK to temporarily remain in the EU customs market but not its single market. It proposes a new economic and security partnership with the EU.

As regards economic partnership, it focuses on avoiding a hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland for the integrity of the UK and it proposes a free trade area without harming the UK's internal market. It proposes a fair and balanced partnership with the EU. In terms of security partnership, White Paper examines the importance of European security and the UK's unconditional commitment on it. It signifies the UK's historical participation in common policies on security, defense and foreign areas. It acknowledges the common threats that the both parties face in the world and proposing a new and close security partnership including operational means, participation in Europol and Eurojust, collective approaches on foreign policy and defense issues and joint capability development.²¹⁵ In sum, in order to reach these practical relationship while also protecting prosperity and the security of both UK and EU citizens, both parties should rely on their commitments. So, the government wanted the UK's negotiating team to negotiate a Withdrawal Agreement with the EU.

3.3.2.1 Brexit Negotiation Terminology and Possible Models for the Brexit Process

Before analyzing the agreements and declarations between the EU and the UK in the negotiation process, it is necessary to give information on the general terminology and models used in the negotiation process.

Firstly, there are several agreements that will be used by the EU and the UK during the negotiation process. The negotiations could involve legal framework of future relations between two parties. In the negotiation process, the EU and the UK could arrange agreements such as:

- Withdrawal Agreement: It is an agreement about the arrangements in order to cease the UK's status as an EU member.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

- Future Relationship Arrangement: It can be composed of several arrangements or agreements about the post-Brexit relationship between the EU and the UK.

- Interim Arrangements: These arrangements could manage the periods between the UK's withdrawal and the coming into force of the UK's Future Relationship Arrangement.²¹⁶

Secondly, it is important to start with the Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty Article 50 outlines how the withdrawal process will work. Moreover, it might be used as a significant tool to renegotiate a better deal with the EU whereas keeping the option of staying inside the EU alive.²¹⁷ Practically, The European Council must be notified by a state wishing to withdraw in order to plan negotiating guidelines. The European Council Guidelines is conducted by the Union in negotiations with the State and an agreement is concluded including the arrangements for withdrawal.²¹⁸ Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) allows a Member State unilaterally to exit from the EU in line with its own constitutional requirements. It states that

A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.²¹⁹

²¹⁶ Hogan Lovells, *Brexit: Navigating the negotiations a practical roadmap*, Hogan Lovells International LLP, 2017

²¹⁷ European Movement International, *The consequences of a British exit from the European Union*, Europe for Citizens Programme of the European Union, 2017, p.11

²¹⁸ Vaughne Miller, *Leaving the EU (13/42)*, House of Commons Library, 2013, p.10

²¹⁹ Eva-Maria Poptcheva, *Article 50 TEU: Withdrawal of a Member State from the EU*, European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016, p.2

The exit negotiations would take place in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In order to adopt a decision for the opening of the negotiation process and nominating the Union negotiator or the head of the EU's negotiation team, the European Commission -with specific European Council's guidelines- should submit a recommendation to the Council.²²⁰ EU 27, the Commission and the UK should involve in the exit negotiations. The consent of the European Parliament and unanimous agreement of the Council are needed for a withdrawal agreement. The UK might need to negotiate a withdrawal with the EU within two years. Afterwards, the transition period could be extended by unanimous agreement among the 27 Member States while any Member State can veto it. Before the withdrawal agreement enters into force or the formal negotiation process ends, the departing member state bound to the EU treaties.²²¹

Thirdly, there are also possible models/mechanism in the negotiation process. Nowadays, "cliff edge" is highly being stressed by both the EU and the UK. So, it is beneficial to mention the mechanism of the negotiation process. There are 3 models/mechanism in the negotiation process such as Glide Path, Cliff Hanger and Cliff Edge. Firstly, Glide Path favors a rapid agreement between the UK and the EU so as to provide a high degree of stability for an extended Interim Period. In this mechanism, following the Article 50 Date, rules governing the UK's membership of the EU would take effect and also continue to apply. In addition, arrangements for the longer term might be renegotiated and implemented over an extended Interim Period. Nevertheless, there is a risk of both authorizing a convenient legal mechanism and compromising a political consensus in line with an orderly Brexit rapidly. Secondly, in Cliff Hanger, both parties would agree upon an agreement sustaining a key aspects of their relationship. Yet, it would be reached only at the last appropriate moment to enter into force from the Article 50 Date. The negotiation and other necessary

²²⁰ Miller, loc. cit.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, p.11.

approvals/ ratifications would be carried over the period prior to the Article 50 Date. Despite this mechanism could be seen as the most natural process, there are also uncertainties in this model. Although it would reestablish the UK’s membership of the EU with a new and long term arrangements, negotiating “prior to the Article 50 Date” would complicate the diplomatic negotiations and create uncertainties throughout the process. Even the Article 50 Day extended by the UK and the EU unanimously, uncertainties over the outcome of the negotiations on citizens and businesses would be the same. Finally, in Cliff Edge process, the UK and EU would fail to agree upon a proper agreement by the Article 50 date. So, the UK would exit from the EU on the Article 50 Date and become a third country. The two parties could reach a new relationship model at a later date. In today’s complexity of political relations, the UK and the EU are now facing the risk of uncertainties during the negotiations and the sudden change on the Article 50 Date.

Table 6 Negotiation process mechanisms/models ²²²

| Glide Path | Cliff Hanger | Cliff Edge |
|---|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Agree on Withdrawal Agreement by March 2018 - Continues status quo with change mechanism - Subsequent long term deal starts from status quo - Early confidence of continuity - Ability to input into considered long term process | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Wide ranging long term agreement reached - New agreement an evolution of status quo - Agreement not reached until “eleventh hour” - High uncertainty until 29 March 2019 - Eventually, considerable continuity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Little or no substantive agreement by the time of exit - UK falls back on World Trade Organisation rules - Possible agreement reached at later date - High uncertainty until 19 March 2019 - Significant sudden change as well as uncertainty |

From later on, I will give detailed information on the negotiation period including legal processes, dialogues between the EU and the UK, negotiated

²²² Ibid.

documents and provisioned agreements and also perspectives' of the UK's parliament on these specific issues.

3.3.2.2 The Withdrawal Agreement

In mid-November 2018, the UK and the EU concluded a draft withdrawal agreement and a draft political declaration which demonstrates the future EU-UK relationship. In the draft withdrawal agreement, there is a 21-month transition period where the UK is a third state not an EU member. Nevertheless, EU rule of law will be applied to the UK during this period.²²³ With regard to the Northern Ireland and backstop, the draft withdrawal agreement suggest that Northern Ireland would remain in the EU customs union while the rest of the UK would not. Theresa May strictly opposed that this is undesirable for the government.²²⁴ On 25 November 2018, the Withdrawal Agreement of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community which provides the terms of the UK's withdrawal from the EU on 30 March 2019 was established by the EU and the UK.²²⁵ This agreement is a legally binding document consisting of 585 pages. Moreover, the agreement provides a 21-month transition period which is extendable only once in order for helping citizens and businesses to prepare to new relations. Essentially, the UK will remain as a Member State without having a right to participate in any EU decision-making and without its representation rights.²²⁶ The most critical issues that covered in the withdrawal agreement are:

²²³ Archick, *op.cit.*, p.10.

²²⁴ Mix, *loc. cit.*

²²⁵ European Commission, *Brexit Negotiations: What is in the Withdrawal Agreement*, 2018

²²⁶ Carmen Cirlig, *Brexit: Understanding the withdrawal agreement and political declaration*, European Parliamentary Research Service, 2019, p.8

expected transition period between 29 March 2019 and 31 December 2020, financial settlement which is also known as exit bill, rights of EU citizens after the transition period, and Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. Thus, with the Joint Committee, the agreement set up committees on citizens' rights, other separation provisions, the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, the Protocol on the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus, the Protocol on Gibraltar and the financial provisions.²²⁷ The Withdrawal Agreement made common provisions which appoint standards with the aim of the proper operation of the agreement. With regard to citizens' rights, it guarantees a right to stay for both 3 million EU citizens in the UK and 1 million UK citizens in EU. In line with separation issues including goods, intellectual property rights, criminal cooperation and also the use of data, the agreement ensures an orderly withdrawal as the transition period ends. Also, it provides a transition period where the UK will be treated as a Member state without participation in EU governance. The aim of this period is to adapt citizens and business to the withdrawal of the UK. For the financial settlement, the agreement ensures that both the EU and the UK will be obliged to their financial commitments while the UK was a member state.²²⁸

As mentioned before, three are added to the also Withdrawal Agreement, namely, Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, Protocol on the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus and Protocol on Gibraltar. In the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland both the EU and the UK recognize the unique character of Northern Ireland. This Protocol suggested that the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland will be an EU external border after Brexit with the border checks on goods that enter in the EU single market and also ensured to prevent a hard border on Ireland while respecting the 1998 Good Friday/Belfast Agreement that was the peace process in Northern Ireland and created

²²⁷ Cowie, *op.cit.*, p.8-28.

²²⁸ European Union Committee, *Brexit: the Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration (24)*, The Authority of the House of Lords, 2018

a cooperation between north and south. The Protocol also includes the ‘backstop’ arrangement so as to avoid a hard border in Ireland that will apply at the end of the transition period unless there will be another arrangements.²²⁹ However, the Withdrawal Agreement does not demonstrate the terms of future EU-UK trade relations. These relations will be negotiated post-Brexit. Article 129 proposes that the UK is free to follow its own free trade agreements during the transition period.²³⁰ Yet, these agreements could not enter into force during the transition period without the approval of the EU. Also, if no trade deal was negotiated when the withdrawal agreement passed, Irish backstop could take effect. So, the UK would not be the member of single market but it would be in customs union.

3.3.2.3 The Transition Period

The Withdrawal Agreement establishes a transition period which is until the end of 2020. The transition period is agreed to end on 31 December 2020. The aim of the negotiated transition period is to allow time for businesses and citizens to prepare themselves for the new arrangements and also to negotiate the future relationship agreements based on the terms of the political declaration. Unlike March 2018 draft, extending the transition period is provided by the withdrawal agreement. The transition period can be extended only once for one or two years until the end of 2022 by the Joint Committee before 1 July 2020. In this period, Union law will be applied to the UK and the UK would participate in the EU Customs Union and the Single Market. Also, the UK will be adhere to the EU's trade policy. Until the withdrawal date, the UK will not participate in EU decision-making.²³¹ Moreover, the Common Foreign and Security Policy will be applied to the UK during the transition period. Thus, the

²²⁹ Cirlig, op.cit., p.8.

²³⁰ European Union Committee, loc. cit.

²³¹ European Commission, Brexit Negotiations, loc.cit.

UK would participate in EU military and civilian missions/operations under CSDP without any leadership role. Yet, the UK will not be able to participate in enhanced cooperation prepared after the withdrawal date such as PESCO although it could be invited to participate in the PESCO projects as a third country. In addition to these, the Justice and Home Affairs policy will also be applied to the UK during the transition period while bound by EU acts. Also, the UK will be bound to pay its financial obligations undertaken while it was an EU member state. These financial obligations derive from the EU budget such as Multi-Annual Financial Framework 2014-2020, the European Investment Bank, the European Central Bank, the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, EU Trust Funds, Council agencies and also the European Development Fund. Not but not the least, without EU authorization, trade agreements that signed or ratified with other countries might not enter into force during the transition period.

3.3.2.4 The Political Declaration

On 14 November 2018, a seven page outline of the Political Declaration was published alongside the draft Withdrawal Agreement. After negotiations, on 22 November a full 26-page draft 'Political Declaration' was published. Finally, on 25 November 2018, the Political Declaration was approved by the European Council and one day later, the Government presented the final text to Parliament. The Political Declaration sets out that formal negotiations on the future UK-EU relationship will start only after UK withdrawal on 29 March 2019.²³² It provides “free and fair trade, defending individual rights and the rule of law, protecting workers, consumers and the environment, and standing together against threats to rights and values from without or within”.²³³ Also, the rights and obligations, the autonomy of the EU's decision-making and the integrity of the single market and customs union was provisioned.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ European Union Committee, loc.cit.

Unlike the withdrawal agreement, the political declaration is not a legally binding document. The future relationship agreements will be relied on the ratification process by the European Parliament and the EU-27. The political declaration includes two pillars such as the economic and the security partnership. Moreover, it consists of provisions on institutional and governance, the formal negotiation process for the future arrangements.

The Economic Partnership provided by the Political Declaration sets out an ambitious and balanced partnership. It will be based on a free trade area (FTA) through wider sectoral cooperation. The FTA will consist of several arrangements on trade while relying on deep regulatory and customs cooperation. Beyond their WTO commitments, a certain level of liberalization will be needed for trade in services and investment. Future EU-UK trade deal models comprise benefits and drawbacks and depends on the UK's political decision whether it chooses soft or hard Brexit. Norwegian or Swiss models are its options for soft Brexit. Choosing hard Brexit relating with no deal scenario should not be the intention of the UK. In a similar view, Cornelissen argues WTO is the worst option standing for hard Brexit by warning about no-deal scenario that will lead to severe disruption on trade and travel.²³⁴ Therefore, Canada option is the most favorable option in which the UK could control immigration and form free trade agreements with the rest of the world.

The Security Partnership will consist of several areas such as foreign policy and security and defense cooperation, law enforcements on criminal issues, cybersecurity, civil protection, health security, illegal migration and counter-terrorism. Also, through a security of information agreement, the UK and the EU will share both classified and sensitive non-classified information. With regard the future EU-UK foreign policy, security and defense cooperation, the two parties will follow a dialogue, consultation and exchange of information. Specific for the political dialogue, the UK will be able to be invited to the informal EU-27 meetings. Moreover, this cooperation

²³⁴ Cornelissen, *op.cit.*, 25


might also broaden to areas of cooperation in third countries, international fora, EU military and civilian missions/operations, exchanges on intelligence and cooperation on space and in international development.²³⁵

Nevertheless, the UK parliament rejected the Withdrawal Agreement on 15 January 2019 in the Meaningful Vote by 432 votes to 202. This was the biggest defeat for the government since 1918. After this defeat, Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn's "vote of no confidence" voted in the government and it won the vote by 325 to 306. Thus, Theresa May's Plan B was tabled in order to renegotiate the 'backstop' as long as changing the backstop plan was favored 317 to 301 by MPs. On March 12, May's plan was rejected again by 391 votes to 242 in the second Meaningful Vote. Also, leaving the EU without a deal was rejected by 321 votes to 278 because its consequences were highly seen damageable. On 21 March, the UK's leave date was set on 22 May 2019 if there is an agreement in the parliament. Otherwise, the UK would leave the EU on 12 April 2019 without a deal. On 29 March, Theresa May's EU withdrawal agreement was defeated for a third time by 344 votes to 286 with a margin of 58. So, the UK missed the EU deadline to delay Brexit to 22 May. On 1 April, four alternative options for Brexit was tabled but none of them was succeeded. Proposal on a customs union was rejected by 273 votes to 276, option on a common market was rejected by 261 votes to 282, on a second referendum by 280 votes to 292 and finally no-deal option in Brexit was defeated by 191 votes to 292. On 11 April, the UK was granted a six-month extension which is 31 October 2019 after five hours talks in Brussels. It is important to note that the UK can leave the EU before this time if Theresa May's withdrawal deal pass in the parliament. Also, the UK would participate in European Parliamentary elections selecting 73 MPs since it is still a member of the EU on 23-26 May.²³⁶

²³⁵ Cirliq, op.cit., p.9-11.

²³⁶ Velta International, Brexit - Timeline of Events, 2019 Retrieved from <https://www.velta.co.uk/FAQs/brexit/Brexit-timeline-of-events/> (Accessed on 23 April 2019)

Table 7 Meaningful Votes in the UK Parliament²³⁷



On 24 May, after her attempts to pass the Withdrawal Agreement three times and all was rejected, Theresa May declared her resignation with the announcement in front of 10 Downing Street. She finalized her speech as: “I do so with no ill will, but with enormous and enduring gratitude to have had the opportunity to serve the country I love.”²³⁸ On 23 July, Boris Johnson was selected as a new Conservative Party leader and Prime Minister after defeating his closest competitor, Jeremy Hunt. Time will show whether the new Conservative Party leader will succeed in passing the deal in the parliament or not. Or will the UK be in a vicious circle?

3.4 Conclusion

Chapter 2 which comprises of the Process of Brexit Referendum and Brexit Negotiations have analyzed the Brexit process from the very beginning of the referendum to the negotiation period. This chapter was divided into two parts including

²³⁷ BBC News, MPs reject May's EU withdrawal agreement, 2019, March 30 Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-47752017> (Accessed on 24 May 2019)

²³⁸ The New York Times, Full Text of Theresa May's Resignation Speech, 2019, May 24 Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/24/world/europe/may-speech.html> (Accessed on 3 June 2019)

the process of Brexit referendum and the process of Brexit Negotiations. Road to the Brexit referendum, reasons behind Brexit vote, campaigns' during Brexit, analysis of the Brexit referendum results and international reactions to Brexit decision have been analyzed for the purpose of understanding the process in the first place. After the analysis of the first part, second part have examined mainly the negotiations processes from the June 2017 The UK general elections to the Theresa May's resignation and new attempts to select a new Conservative Party Leader to finalize a deal for the future relations between the EU and the UK. The main focus on this part was to evaluate the complex negotiation process and to show two parties' intentions and red-lines that eventually blocked the process from the UK's side with the resignation of Theresa May.

CHAPTER 4

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY AND THE POSSIBLE IMPACT OF BREXIT ON FUTURE EU-UK SECURITY PARTNERSHIP

4.1 Introduction

The second part of the thesis structure begins with Chapter 4. This chapter starts with the history of the European security integration process. It follows with the detailed analysis of Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the European Union's Global Strategy (EUGS), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and Europe's security relations with NATO. Relations with NATO will be divided into two sub-sections such as the EU's relations with NATO and the UK's relations with NATO. Finally the possible effects of Brexit for the EU and the UK's security and defense partnership will be analyzed through the UK's defense capabilities and the effects of Brexit on the future EU-UK security and defense partnership. The main aim of this chapter is to give adequate information on the security and defense relationship between the EU and the UK by outlining key historical events and the general conjuncture before analyzing the alternative security partnership for the both parties. This chapter serves as a bridge between introductory chapters dealing with the historical relations and the Brexit process and the last chapter that will examine the alternative options for the future security and defense relationship of the EU and the UK. In order for a better understanding of these alternatives, it is important to have a general knowledge on the historical developments and views on security and defense relations and how these relations would be affected by the Brexit vote.

4.2 History of the European Security Integration

Chappell et.al, argue that main characteristics of strategic actorness can be summarized as having an independent capacity to gather and evaluate intelligence, being able to formulate political, selecting wisely among the resources to achieve these goals, the ability to implement its strategy on the ground and being able to evaluate its own actions and learn for the future.²³⁹ Thus, an eventual security role for the EU had always been envisioned by its founding fathers. Yet, with the initial failure to establish a European Defense Community (EDC) in 1954, security and defense policy was not considered as part of the plans for European political integration. Defense functions were provided by either the Atlantic alliance or by national governments themselves. For the analysis of Western European Union (WEU), Howorth examines the WEU as a mechanism of connecting France with NATO and also the UK with the EU.²⁴⁰ France has continually attempted to restructure the WEU in line with autonomous European defense organization outside NATO.²⁴¹ For this purpose, in 1982 with a Franco-German defense dialogue, they tended to expand the WEU due to the need for constructing a European integration that includes security and defense pillar.²⁴² This goal highlights the mission of WEU as to bolster the European pillar of the Alliance.²⁴³ In 1992, Maastricht Treaty signified the role of the WEU as being a defense component

²³⁹ Laura Chappell and et.al, *The EU, Strategy and Security Policy: Regional and Strategic Challenges*, London, England: Routledge, 2016, p.4

²⁴⁰ Jolyon Howorth, *The Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma: France, Britain, and the ESDP*. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 2005, 3(1), 39-54, doi:10.1080/14794010508656816, p.42

²⁴¹ Sevilay Kahraman, *NATO-EU Relationship: Partners or Rivals?* In *Trans - Avrupa Güvenlik Sorunları*, 2008, pp. 33-47, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, p.36

²⁴² Terver Lloyd and Anne Deighton, *Western European Union 1954-1997: Defence, Security, Integration*, *International Journal*, 1998, 53(2), doi:10.2307/40203313, p.369

²⁴³ Howorth, [loc.cit](#)

of the EU. Yet, WEU's defense role could be examined by the division between the Europeanists and the Atlanticists. Sevily Kahraman examines the operational side of the WEU in crisis management as modest in 1990s.²⁴⁴ She also discusses that even the adoption of Petersburg tasks in 1992 could not change the decisive role of NATO in the European attempts to bolster their military capabilities.²⁴⁵

The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 set up a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) so as to elaborate and implement decisions and actions with security and defense implications. With the establishment of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the use of military and civilian instruments by the EU alongside with the CFSP was integrated into its role. While the CFSP's role was to build a shared identity with political integration and to reduce reliance to the US, ESDP could not only be seen as a political project but also it involved a strategic elements. As Kahraman states: "The quest for European security autonomy is not therefore, just the logical consequence of the end of the Cold War order in Europe but also related to the inner dynamics of postwar European integration movement."²⁴⁶ Following Maastricht, the EU agreed upon a new set of missions which were called as 'Petersberg tasks' short of traditional territorial defense. These tasks were including humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management such as peacemaking. Although the fulfillment of these tasks was obstructed by the old fashioned structures and inadequate capabilities of the defense capabilities of most member states, the acceptance of the Petersberg tasks showed the EU's willingness to engage in crisis-management with civilian and military actions.

²⁴⁴ Kahraman, op.cit., p.37.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Kahraman, op.cit., p.30

From 1947 to 1997, European security cooperation was blocked by France and the UK due to their clashing views on how the transatlantic relationship would be effected by this cooperation and balance of power within Europe. After the Kosovo crisis of 1998, the EU's two most important military powers the UK and France issued a historic declaration at St-Malo. St. Malo Declaration showed a vital need for autonomous crisis management for the EU. Declaration showed the readiness and desire of the EU to confront the international challenges with its autonomous action backed by capable military forces. There was a need to develop a capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces. According to the Declaration, the Union would engage in a military action. They saw the potential need for a European defense policy to strengthen European autonomy and decrease their dependence on the US through NATO. But, for Atlanticists, NATO remained the key pillar for defense and security policy.²⁴⁷

In 2003, The Headline Goals was adopted to create a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) which included capable 60.000 troops which are deployable within 60 days and sustainable for one year. In order to strengthen the European commitment, the European Capability Action Plan was established for ensuring compliance for the Headline Goals of 2003. In 2010, new Headline Goal was adopted due to the incapability of the Helsinki Headline Goal. With the new concept of Battlegroups and the establishment of the European Defense Agency (EDA), the transformation of the European security and defense gained momentum. The Battlegroups are highly capable for intense warfare and fight against terrorism with its 1.500 deployable troops in 15 days and they are sustainable for 30 days. Nevertheless, Ladzig points out the shortcomings in defense spending with the asymmetric national defense expenditures among European states.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁷ Jürgen Habermas, *The Crisis of the European Union: A Response*, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2014, p.74

²⁴⁸ Jeannette Ladzig, *European Security and Defence Policy*. Federal Trust Policy Brief, 2006, 26(3), p.200

In 2003, the Berlin Plus arrangement was signed with the aim of making use of NATO structures and mechanisms in ESDP missions. Since January 2003, the EU under ESDP participated in several missions such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia and Aceh. With the participation of 8,000 police and military personnel, several security and humanitarian crisis management tasks were achieved including law enforcement and ceasefire monitoring. In the same year, European Security Strategy was adopted for the aim of securing Europe and stabilizing European neighborhood. With the establishment of the European Defense Agency in 2004, it had several tasks including increasing defense capabilities for crisis management, promoting and developing European military cooperation, empowering the European industrial and technological base, building a competitive European defense equipment market and boosting research about strategic technologies for future defense and security capabilities.²⁴⁹

In 2009, when the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, the ESDP was succeeded by the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This initiative paved the way for defining and implementing an external policy by the Union for the first time. In addition, with the concept of “enhanced cooperation” of the Lisbon Treaty, the member states would advance in CFSP.²⁵⁰ In comparison, Smith and Hill explain the role of ESDP that ESDP’s conflict resolution mechanism examines processes from beginning to end and ranges from short to longer terms.²⁵¹ However, the ESDP had shortcomings such as lack of solidarity and desire to contribute resources. Also with

²⁴⁹ Habermas, *op.cit.*, p.81.

²⁵⁰ Enrique M. Benavente, *The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) After The Entry Into Force Of The Lisbon Treaty (5/09)*. Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, p.21

²⁵¹ Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, *International Relations and the European Union*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011, p.25

the absence of convergence, member states pursued realism in their planning by prioritizing their national interests over common interests. For example, Kosovo or Afghanistan police training was delayed due to the lack of resources. Moreover, the ESDP lacked intelligence mechanism which is security and defense related tool. For all these reasons, the Lisbon Treaty tried to reform these shortcomings by stressing the need for coherence for external action and bringing external action instruments in a new External Service.²⁵²

After the adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003 the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has prepared EU Global Strategy by June 2016. The new document introduced a guidance and tools to deliver the essentials for the Member States for future relations with the neighborhood and Europe's strategic partners.²⁵³ It is notion of 'principled pragmatism' is expressed by Larik as:

a focus on the EU's neighborhood, more flexibility in terms of promoting regional integration, clarifying that the EU will connect and facilitate rather than try to deliver on its own, and blending normative foreign policy with the pursuit of its own interests.²⁵⁴

He also discusses about the capabilities– expectations gap in a way that while EUGS seeks to lower expectations in EU foreign policy, this gap will be even wider with Brexit. The loss could only be compensated with the intense cooperation between EU 27 along with close and continued partnership between the EU and the UK.²⁵⁵

²⁵² Kahraman, *op.cit.*, p.42.

²⁵³ Valentin Naumescu and Agnes Nicolescu, The Impact of Brexit on Central and Eastern European Security, *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, 18(1), 93-112, 2018, p. 101

²⁵⁴ Joris Larik, The EU's Global Strategy in the Age of Brexit and 'America First'. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2018, 23(3), 343-364, p.357

²⁵⁵ Larik *op.cit.*, p.358.

Less than one month, at the NATO summit in Warsaw, the EU and NATO leaders signed a joint declaration.²⁵⁶ This document signified both parties' intention to act against common threats and their shared vision to strengthen the transatlantic security. After Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump as the US president, there was a renewed Franco-German activism in order to boost European military cooperation by the establishment of EU military headquarters and closer efforts in defense integration. In the Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defense, published by the European Commission in June 2017, the resulting common security and defense policy reviewed as a number of small-scale actions building on ad hoc solidarity and voluntary participation between member states. Thus, the vital need for reforms resulted in Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 2017. Except Denmark, Malta, and the United Kingdom, all EU member states participated in PESCO. Thus, PESCO stands for differentiated integration. PESCO members launched PESCO 17 projects including a central base for training missions, funding of operations and steps to measure capability development. There is an active role for the Commission through a European Defense Fund. Also, in the form of a security union, there is an agreed need to respond to the global challenges.²⁵⁷

After giving a general overview of European security and defense integration process, I will examine the CSDP, EUGS, PESCO and relations with NATO in detail so as to have a better understanding of those arrangements, policies and relations.

²⁵⁶ Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2018, Retrieved from Brussels website: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/36096/nato_eu_final_eng.pdf (Accessed on 3 July 2019)

²⁵⁷ Patrick Keatinge, The EU's role in security and defence after Brexit, Institute of International and European Affairs, 2018, p.1

4.2.1 The Operationalization of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)

Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has made significant developments in the area of foreign and security policy. However, the EU has struggled to develop the adequate military means and tools to resolve conflicts in the Balkans and the Middle East. After NATO's military operation in Kosovo, the EU tried to manage foreign security-related problems through a new institutional framework which was called the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In 2013, the European Council expressed three major priorities of CSDP including "increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of common security and defence policy (CSDP); the development of capabilities; and strengthening Europe's defence industry."²⁵⁸ After that, the European Parliament (EP) tried to encourage EU member states to make progress on managing capability resources effectively. EP resolution of 2017 expressed the need for further development on European both military and civilian capabilities. Thus, Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) was established so as to command missions and also Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) was created for compatibility of defense spending. Efforts taken by EU member states in the wake of St Malo and Cologne were resulted in the creation of Brussels-based bureaucracies. In order to manage the CSDP, permanent structures were established since the Helsinki Council through the outlines of Council documents and strategic guidelines provided by the European Security Strategy. The Treaty of Lisbon envisioned a comprehensive approach to crisis management and intervention in crisis situations at the cornerstone of capacity building and institutional reform processes.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁸ European Parliament, Development of Capabilities For Common Security And Defence Policy, 2019, June 20, Retrieved from <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-europe-as-a-stronger-global-actor/file-development-of-capabilities-for-csdp> (Accessed on 7 July 2019)

²⁵⁹ Giovanni Faleg, *The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy: Learning Communities in International Organizations*, Basingstoke, England: Springer, 2016, p.16

According to European Union External Action Service's factsheet, since 2003 The CSDP has launched 34 missions/operations in different range of geographical areas.²⁶⁰ There were four critical drivers behind CSDP including external forces deriving from the end of the Cold War; new tasks and concepts such as crisis management entered the academic literature in the post-Westphalian new world order; the reoccurrence of military conflicts in the European continent especially Western Balkans and the advancement of a European defense industry.²⁶¹ Therefore, CSDP missions and operations could be regarded as EU's collective effort for enhancing security and defense and also it is a part of an international security arena which is changing rapidly.

These CSDP options consist of both civilian and military missions. Current CSDP missions consist the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, the European Union Advisory Mission Ukraine on civilian security sector reform, a civilian police service reform programme in Afghanistan and the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya. It also set maritime operations such as Operation Atalanta in Somalia and Operation Sophia in the Mediterranean. The CSDP's eighteen battlegroups include 1,500 troops and two of these are always ready for deployment. In 2017, the EU maintains the deployment of military and civilian missions. As of December 2017, there were 16 ongoing CSDP missions and operations. Six of them were military and 10 of them was civilian missions. While 2,685 personnel were deployed for military missions, 1,878 personnel were deployed for civilian missions.²⁶²

²⁶⁰ European Union External Action Service, EU Missions and Operations As part of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 2018 Retrieved from Bruxelles website: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet-csdp_missions_and_operations_05-03-2018.pdf (Accessed on 30 March 2019)

²⁶¹ Faleg, *op.cit.*, p.16.

²⁶² Lain and Nouwens, *op.cit.*, p.3.

As figure below reveals that both the civilian and military missions of CSDP showed an increasing trend over years, however, the number of civilian operations/missions outweighed the number of military actions. The goals of CSDP missions/operations can be analyzed from the second figure. The security goal of CSDP missions/operations increased dramatically between 2011 and 2015. Also, the training goal enhanced from 2014 to 2016. Comparing with the security and training goals, the figure reveals that monitoring, border control and reforming policies goals remained stable between 2015 and 2017.




Figure 21 Active EU operations and missions per year ²⁶³

²⁶³Ulrich Krotz and et.al, Eu’s Global Engagement: A Database Of Csdp Military Operations and Civilian Missions Worldwide (Version 2.0), European University Institute/Global Governance Programme, 2017, p.80




Figure 22 Trend of active CSDP missions and operations by goal ²⁶⁴

The European Defense Agency (EDA) which was established by the Council of Defense Ministers in 2004 is one of the key components of CSDP. It manages crises and boosts the EU’s defense capabilities. The EDA’s 1- year and 3-year work programmes are supported by general and ad hoc budgets from the Member States’ contributions. In 2017, general budget was EUR 31 million. Rather than traditional military tasks, the European Defense Agency is coordinating research and development capabilities of the EU. While CSDP creates a common defense policy, it is largely dependent on national capabilities of EU member states. A unanimity is needed in the Council’s decision-making processes to participate in military engagements. ²⁶⁵

The CSDP policy after the 2000s evolved with new planning capabilities, structures, procedures and operational experience with 34 missions. Nevertheless, establishing CSDP operations have difficulties in the areas of force generation,

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵Zsuzsanna Csornai, Evaluating the Effects of Brexit on the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (E-2017/14), Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017, p.5

common financing, enablers, intelligence and logistics.²⁶⁶ Also, CSDP continues to be heavily dependent on the most capable member states and its institutions.²⁶⁷ CSDP's first mission which was called as European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) involved a police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was launched to succeed the UN International Police Task Force in 2003. The EUPM mission has shifted the Bosnia-Herzegovina Police Agency into one with enhanced powers and has fostered major new state agencies.²⁶⁸ This mission was followed by the EU's first military operation which was known as Operation Concordia under which the EU deployed a military force to help a ceasefire between the government and rebel forces in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In addition, the EU also set a civilian mission called Operation Proxima to monitor, mentor, and reform the police, promote sound policing standards, fight organized crime, help create a border police and support the overall political environment in that country. In December 2004, the EU enhanced its commitment to state-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina with Operation Althea and launched a peace mission consisting of 7,000 troops from 24 EU and 10 non-EU member states acting under a UN mandate. This was the EU's third and also largest military operation. In 2003 at the request of the UN, the EU launched a second military mission called Operation Artemis in the unstable Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo. In this operation, EU troops guided people to return to their homes and re-opened markets, defended refugee camps, secured the airport and protected the safety of civilians, UN employees, and humanitarian aid workers.²⁶⁹ Artemis was seen as a test case for the EU because it

²⁶⁶ Nathalie Tocci, *Framing the EU Global Strategy: A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World*, Basingstoke, England: Springer, 2017, p.93

²⁶⁷ Laura Chappell and et.al, loc.cit.

²⁶⁸ Richardson, op.cit.,p.258.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., p.259.

was distant from the European region and organized independently from NATO. After that mission, EUFOR RD-Congo was deployed in 2006. There was EU rapid reaction forces to secure the environment during the DRC's presidential and legislative elections. Also, the EU led a police mission called EUPOL-Kinshasa in 2005 in order to help DRC to set up efficient police programmes. In addition to these missions, the EU has made many contributions to the Middle East peace process. In other smaller-scale CSDP operations taken place in Georgia, Iraq, Indonesia, Moldova, Sudan, and Ukraine, the EU tried to establish independent judiciaries, to oversee a ceasefire or border crossing, and to establish effective police and military forces.²⁷⁰

However, it is very important to assess the EU's failures in addressing capability shortfalls and the limits of shared European strategic culture in the way of further development of the CSDP. For such analysis of CSDP, it is useful to begin with the examination of 'capability-expectations' gap. Hill argues that the gap will be closed when capabilities increase and expectations decreased and he defines capabilities as "cohesiveness, resources and operational capacity".²⁷¹ Thus, developments for autonomous European security and defense could be a starting point for this concept in a way that when expectations are to be increased in a significant manner, there is a necessity for a greater political and institutional advance. The Union's collective aim of strengthening the military capabilities during time is now facing a dilemma about whether the Union will depend on other forms of security or/and relying on the individual member state's military armed forces. Hill investigates 'capabilities-expectations gap' in three aspects including "mutual obligation, operational capacity and resources."²⁷²

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p.260.

²⁷¹ Christopher Hill, *The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role*, *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1993, 31(3), 305-328, doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.1993.tb00466.x, p.322

²⁷² *Ibid.*, p.320.

In the meantime, CSDP shortfalls inhibit its performance. Tardy lists three important elements for CSDP such as “commitment of the member states, coherence and efficiency of the EU operation, and host state buy-in.”²⁷³ With regard to the commitment of member states, CSDP’s state-led character serves a good starting point. This character requires commitment and support for CSDP initiative. The lack of political will is a determinant between the member states’ attitudes and reaching a common EU operation. In this centrality of member states’, an operation could only be achieved through the support of member states which are ready to provide resources. Nevertheless, CSDP operations lacks efficient political support from the majority of states that eventually affect the number of operations, allocation of resources and ambition level. Tardy links existing problems to:

the fragmentation of the recruitment process, an unevenly developed culture of civilian crisis management within EU member states, and the difficulty to attract skilled personnel for deployments in sometimes dangerous environments. The level of financial commitment is equally limited, both for civilian missions and military operations.²⁷⁴

These shortfalls limit the ability of CSDP operations and hinders the image of the EU in terms of its ambition to play a central role in European security. Different strategic perceptions of member states resulted in three shortfalls of CSDP. First one is about the risk calculations of member states in crisis management. Their engagement level is at lowest when they consider the risks to their troops in a military operation. Second is about rational cost and benefit calculations in establishing CSDP operation. Third is related to the limited financial contributions of member states to CSDP operations. Thus, the EU prefers other options such as NATO or national channels. In this exercise, the EU features as one among a few other options, and not necessarily the preferred one. National policies, NATO, and to a lesser extent the UN, are equally important security policy options. Indeed there are quite a few cases where some states

²⁷³ Thierry Tardy, *CSDP in Action – What Contribution to International Security?* (134) European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2015, p.43

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

are more active through national channels than through the existing CSDP operation or mission.²⁷⁵

Another shortfall is related to capacities of the EU to plan and run civilian/military operations. Thus, relations between Headquarters and the operation ground as well as field and EU delegations are discussed in terms of their clashing priorities or institutions cultures. Also, in the military sphere, the EU use the resources of member states or NATO in order to manage operations. This eventually leads to critics about the EU's security provider role. Even after the revision of the crisis management practices in 2013, member states' level of control over planning slows down the launching new operations. Last but not the least, the success of a mission depends on the consent of the host state. In civilian or military missions/operations, the EU is challenged by the difficulty of operationalizing local ownership. This operationalization ranges from gaining consent in local governance to host country's level of absorbability of assistance.

In addition, Haesebrouck criticizes the small-scale CSDP operations that provide unclear benefits to member states and summarizes CSDP failures from the perspective of some international relation's theories about CSDP failures.²⁷⁶ While liberalism stresses the need for the level of the member states' domestic interest for crisis management, it fails to understand the reasons about why CSDP operations are seen unambitious in some member state's domestic environment. Constructivism argues that divergences in member state's strategic cultures limits the collective culture of operations. Yet, it also fails to express the link between these diverging strategic cultures and launching of small-scale operations. In order to explain the latter, rational-choice institutionalism investigates ineffective institutional form of CSDP.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Tim Haesebrouck, *Explaining the Pattern of CSDP-Operations: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis*, *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, 2015, 15(2), p.18

This ineffectiveness is explained by Realism with the reluctance of states in transferring their national sovereignty to an institution.²⁷⁷

Even if the ESDP is replaced by CSDP with a change of “Europe” to “Common”, the centrality of states remains in the policy practices. NATO’s vital role in European security did not change much. While CSDP has an intergovernmental character in which member states’ decisions are taken by unanimity, member states remain reluctant to transfer their decision making power to an institution. Thus, due to the absence of a structured collaboration of national policies, the EU continues to be fragmented along national lines.²⁷⁸

4.2.1.1 The UK’s Position in the CSDP

Worré divides the UK’s role in European defense into three stages.²⁷⁹ The first period was between 1947 and 1969. This period took place in the aftermath of Second World War and during the early development of the Cold War. In this period, the United Kingdom focused on establishing mutual relations with the United States and making decisions with the support of the American ally. This strategy resulted in tensions in Europe specifically with France. The second period occurred between 1970 and 1990. Parallel to the opening of West-East Europe dialogue in the Cold War was highlighted and Britain decided to take part in several defense cooperation organizations in line with national interests. The third period which took place between

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ Tom Dyson and Theodore Konstanidies, Understanding the Limitations of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, 2013, September 26, Retrieved from <https://www.e-ir.info/2013/09/26/understanding-the-limitations-of-the-eus-common-security-and-defence-policy-a-legal-perspective/> (Accessed on 27 March 2019)

²⁷⁹ Phillip Worré, The consequences of a British exit from the EU and CSDP: An analytical timeline, 2013, p.3, Retrieved from ISIS Europe website: http://www.natowatch.org/sites/default/files/isis_europe_nato_watch_occasional_paper_january_2013.pdf (Accessed on 9 May 2019)

1991 and 2013 was defined by Worre as an opposition of European integration initiatives.²⁸⁰ Now, bilateral relations between the EU and the UK are going through the new fourth stage which was defined by the Brexit vote. In this section, the UK's position in CSDP will be analyzed in terms of its capabilities, the level of commitment and intention to contribute to future European defense and security.

While the EU's average was 15.72 personnel, the UK has contributed with 25 personnel for each CSDP mission which equals to 2.3% of the total contributions of all the EU member states.²⁸¹ Between 2003 and 2015, the UK contributed with only 110 out of 12,140 EU military personnel and 209 out of 4895 civilian personnel. The UK has only been a leading country in terms of personnel contributions, in a regional maritime capacity building mission in Somalia with 19 personnel, out of the 35 CSDP operations.²⁸² As the figure below illustrates between 2003 and 2014, the UK tended to participate civilian missions compared to military ones. The highest number of personnel joined in the civilian mission of EULEX Kosovo. This mission is followed by the two military missions of EUFOR Somalia and EUTM Mali.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁸¹ Duke, *op.cit.*, p. 14.

²⁸² *Ibid.*




Figure 23 UK personnel contributions to CSDP missions and operations (2003-2014)²⁸³

In terms of CSDP, successive UK governments have had a cautious approach to the European defense integration while the pro-European French view prioritized an independent European military capability within NATO. The UK saw the development of an EU defense policy as a complementary to NATO.²⁸⁴ The UK's commitments to the CSDP can be seen in two approaches. At St. Malo, both France and Britain called for EU autonomous decision-making and action with capable military forces so as to combat with international crisis in the absence of Atlantic Alliance. Yet, Biscop argues that unlike other European countries, the UK saw European defense and transatlantic relationship as a zero sum game.²⁸⁵ He believes that the UK led the CSDP so as to block it. Especially in military operations, the UK

²⁸³ Dick Zandee and et.al, *op.cit.*, p.7.

²⁸⁴ Miller, *op.cit.*, p.85.

²⁸⁵ Sven Biscop, The UK and European defence: leading or leaving? *International Affairs*, 2012, 88(6), 1297-1313, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01133.x, p.1297

tried to block those aspects of CSDP that were contradictory with its interests.²⁸⁶ Second was about lack of interest and commitment to initiatives such as Battlegroups and European Defence Agency (EDA).²⁸⁷ The UK has remained cautious about the entire concept of the CSDP by opposing the coordination of military hardware and personnel and was a slim contributor to CSDP.²⁸⁸ It has preferred contributing to capacity- building projects based on civilian missions.²⁸⁹ Furthermore, it has long denied both the expansion of the European Defence Agency and the establishment of a permanent military EU operational headquarters.²⁹⁰

Brexit now poses a potential threat to the EU's security and defense goals. The UK's participation in future close relationship with the EU is seen desirable and fundamental. Nevertheless, the High Representative Federica Mogherini argues that the UK's CSDP contributions were limited and the EU could pursue its ambition without these contributions by citing the UK's contribution to civilian missions (with 3 %) and military operations (with 6 %).²⁹¹ Yet, the UK's defense capabilities are non-negligible and the EU member states would not compensate the loss of the UK's security and defense capabilities in the existing framework of CSDP after Brexit.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁷ Benjamin Martill and Uta Staiger, *Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of Europe*, London, England: UCL Press, 2018, p.178

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p.179.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁹¹ Federica Mogherini, *The European Union in a Changing Global Environment*, Brussels: The European Commission, 2016

4.3 The European Union's Global Strategy (EUGS)

Since the establishment of CFSP, the EU declared two security strategies which were the European Security Strategy of 2003 and European Security and Global Strategy of 2016. While the former as European Security Strategy was more optimistic language by examining that 'Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free'²⁹², the later one expresses that 'The purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned'²⁹³ Hence, it is important to analyze the processes that eventually lead the EU to "respond to past crises and to think ahead for creating a stronger EU presence on the world stage."²⁹⁴

The post-9/11 conjuncture was highly defined by an extraordinary combination of non-state actors with their mass destruction or disruption capabilities. Also, there was a nuclear challenge for the Union along with a WMD proliferation with the end of the Cold War.²⁹⁵ In addition, the threat of terrorism is considered as one of the vital problems for Europe. Since Madrid (2004) and London (2005) attacks, counter-terrorism measures were increased by European efforts. As regards Muslim communities in Europe, priority was given to increase their sense of Western belonging.²⁹⁶ More importantly, the EU has incorporated the fight against terrorism

²⁹² European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, 2003, Brussels, p.3

²⁹³ European Union, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy, 2016, Brussels

²⁹⁴ Larik, op.cit., p.363.

²⁹⁵ Sven Biscop and Jan Andersson, The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe, London, England: Routledge, 2007, p.27

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.37.

into its CSDP and JHA agenda. It is argued that the UK and EU citizens are being challenged by the same threats. These threats resulted from advances in technology leading to cyber threats, the destruction of the rules-based international order that leads to less consensus.²⁹⁷

The outbreak of the Arab Spring uprisings and the Russian intervention in Ukraine and the illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 were major challenges in the EU's neighborhood that are discussed in the EUGS. Because, the Arab Spring movements have led to an influx of migrants which are directly linked to the EU's migration policy and border management. In addition, the Ukrainian crisis in 2013 resulted in the sanctions towards the Russian Federation. This led to the clash of views between member states. They expressed their dissatisfaction with the EU's approach to counter and punish Russia. Also, EU member states such as Poland, Greece, Latvia, and the UK have enhanced their defense spending and are pledged to spend 2 percent defense expenditure.²⁹⁸ Thus, the Arab Spring and the Russian invasion of Ukraine made Europeans reevaluate their role and responsibility which resulted in the adoption of the European Global Strategy in 2016.

After the Munich Security Conference in 2014, Germany deliberated its will to play a bigger role in defense policy. Also, after the British referendum, German leaders claimed a joint statement on defense cooperation with France. They saw Brexit referendum as an opportunity to revitalize the EU's defense. Since it seems hard to compensate the UK's position due to its military capabilities and a nuclear deterrence, Germany's intention is to replace the UK with France in CSDP. In this regard, France could take a bigger role in military deployment in conflict-resolution and peacekeeping missions.²⁹⁹ These assertive views of the Franco-German security partnership are

²⁹⁷ Duke, *op.cit.*, p.18.

²⁹⁸ Csornai, *op.cit.*, p.4.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.11.

reflected in the integrationist document of The European Global Strategy 2016. Moreover, goals and objectives of the EUGS were referenced in the common defense paper of the French and German governments for further integration in CFSP.³⁰⁰ This Franco-German initiative points out persisting bilateralism and differences within EU in terms of sharing risks and resources. These bilateral initiatives should expand to European consensus in the future. The Global Strategy urges for a common foreign and security policy with a more united and self-governing CFSP. Specifically, it requests to create a European Operational Headquarters (OHQ), expand command and control structures for CSDP missions. The UK's departure might give an opportunity for policymakers to pursue such reforms to CFSP.³⁰¹

EUGS is a new vision in terms of collective response to Euroscepticism and anti-globalism by supporting liberal and rule-based governance.³⁰² It marks that the threats that the EU faces have 'both an internal and an external dimension' and they include 'terrorism, hybrid threats, cyber and energy security, organized crime and external border management'³⁰³ The EUGS is also a sophisticated document that highlights the EU's aims and priorities in the age of Euroscepticism. It highlights the importance of law and governance by promoting them as the Union's interest. It differs from previous documents with its emphasis on geographical priorities. By stressing the limits of the EU, it argues that expectations should be managed carefully and resources should be used more effectively. Also, with the effect of Brexit and Donald

³⁰⁰ Rafael Sampson, *Brexit and the CFSP A window of opportunity?* (Master's thesis, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands), 2017, p.15 Retrieved from https://is.muni.cz/th/ncmdp/Rafael_Sampson.pdf (Accessed on 17 April 2019)

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p.16.

³⁰² Larik, *op.cit.*, p.344.

³⁰³ Duke, *loc.cit.*

Trump Administration, the document can be seen as “a mere reiteration of values which seemed to be widely shared into a manifesto upholding them in the face of adversity from within the ‘West’.”³⁰⁴ While the EU’s ‘Global Strategy’ has universal endeavors, its strategic priorities are in line with European neighborhood to the east and the south.³⁰⁵ It also includes several aspects of EU foreign policy such as human rights, sustainable development and security and defense integration within the EU. So, it calls for the need to preserve, bolster and develop the European values through rule based governance.

Despite the timing of its publication was overshadowed by the Brexit vote, the new EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in June 2016 demonstrated the EU’s strategic goals for the first time since 2003.³⁰⁶ Regarding the relevancy of European security strategy after Brexit can be linked with the EUGS. Larik argues that, “the need for nuance, in terms of pragmatism and prioritization, becomes even more salient when a Member State with one of the largest economies, militaries and international clouts is preparing to leave.”³⁰⁷ The UK’s future position in the global outlook including its diplomatic network and also the security and defense strategy along with military capabilities would shape the security of Europe. As mentioned in previous sections, with regard to Christopher Hill’s concept of the capabilities– expectations gap, ‘principled pragmatism’ of the EUGS could be an attempt to diminish expectations in EU foreign policy. Because, the UK’s possible exit from the EU could lead to widen this gap by lowering the EU’s capabilities. On the other hand, the loss could be compensated with the efforts of member states in building more close and continued cooperation. This

³⁰⁴ Larik, op.cit., p.364.

³⁰⁵ Duke, op.cit., p.19.

³⁰⁶ Besch and Black, op.cit., p.63.

³⁰⁷ Larik, op.cit., p.356.

future cooperation strategy of the UK was stressed in the White Paper by creating ‘a future partnership with the EU unlike any other EU-third country relationship’.³⁰⁸ However, in a future security and defense cooperation, the UK would not enjoy the same rights in line with its status as a member state. As long as there is a possible participation option for the UK as a third country in the CFSP, veto power in decision making process of CFSP will not be granted to a non-member state.³⁰⁹ This point will also made for the UK participation in PESCO.

4.4 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)

PESCO was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty to strengthen defense integration together with EDA. It allows deeper cooperation because it relies on contributions and intentions of member states rather than size of their GDP or military forces. The entry conditions were stated in the Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation of the Treaty of Lisbon.³¹⁰ The Treaty of European Union let Member States deepen the integration process in the defense area. PESCO gives willing Member States the opportunity to enhance military capabilities to strengthen defense cooperation by taking systematic steps towards a more reliable CSDP. The Treaty contends five requirements for states to establish PESCO: They must cooperate and review to accomplish the targets on the expenditure of defense equipment; bring their defense mechanism with each other by harmonizing their military needs; take adequate measures to improve the availability, flexibility and deploy ability of their forces; cooperate to formulate the shortfalls and take part in the development of European

³⁰⁸ HM Government, op.cit., p.93.

³⁰⁹ Ibid., p.97.

³¹⁰ Csornai, op.cit., p.6.

equipment programmes in EDA.³¹¹ Also, willing member states should notify the High Representative and the Council. Then the Council adopts the decision to establish the PESCO. Thus, it is possible for states to conclude an agreement through the process of article 218 TFEU. Yet, this process requires the unanimity of the Council and consent of the EP.³¹²

PESCO's three elements are including the European External Action Service (EEAS), EUMS, and the EDA. The most important tasks as defined by the Council decision of December 2017 are related with the EUMS (estimation of operational project proposals and compliance) and the EDA (estimation of capability development project proposals and compliance). The EEAS has a more coordinating role and will act as the editor of the Annual Report on PESCO which the High Representative presents to the Council.³¹³ The Council decision has two consecutive initial phases; 2018-2020 and 2021-2025 for the fulfilment of the PESCO commitments. In the first category, defense expenditure criteria are covered. The main task is to define more specific objectives with regard to existing agreements. For example, NATO member states have a pledge to spend 2% of their GDP on defense by 2024.³¹⁴ The second category consists of harmonizing military needs through the implementation of Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD) and involvement in the EDF. Operational capabilities for EU-led operations belong to third category. The fourth category is about the European shortfalls in capability development by stressing the

³¹¹ Daniela Haverkamp, *Brexit and the CSDP A close EU-UK cooperation?* (Master's thesis, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands), 2017, p.6 Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319137064_Brexit_and_the_CSDP_Brexit_and_the_CSDP_A_close_EU-UK_cooperation (Accessed on 3 June 2019)

³¹² *Ibid.*, p.19.

³¹³ Zandee, *op.cit.*, p.3.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.4.

importance of collaborative views instead of national solutions. Also, there is a point to enhance Europe’s strategic autonomy and the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). Final commitments for the PESCO participants are about taking part in the development of European equipment programmes in the framework of EDA.

Table 8 17 PESCO projects³¹⁵

| Operational | Capability development | Other |
|--|---|-------------------|
| European Medical Command | European Secure Software Defined Radio (ESSOR) | Military Mobility |
| Network of logistic hubs in Europe and support to Operations | Maritime (semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures | |
| European Training Mission Competence Centre | Harbour & Maritime Surveillance and Protection | |
| European Training Certification Centre for European Armies | Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance | |
| Energy Operational Function | Strategic Command and Control System for CSDP Missions and Operations | |
| Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package | Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle/ Amphibious Assault Vehicle/Light Armoured Vehicle | |
| Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform | Indirect Fire Support (EuroArtillery) | |
| Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security | | |
| EUFOR Crisis Response Operation (EUFOR CROC) | | |

PESCO projects that are revealed in the figure above address European shortfalls, operational and capability-related.³¹⁶ Political leadership and parliamentary support are significant elements in launching these projects in order for Defense Ministries embedding PESCO and European defense cooperation. Also, third states can join the PESCO projects after they complete the procedural steps. First, the general conditions for these third states are developed by the Council. After the examination

³¹⁵ Ibid., p.7.

³¹⁶ Ibid., p.13.

of Council whether a third state meets the requirements or not, an administrative arrangement is established for the concerned state according to the procedures and decision making autonomy of the Union.³¹⁷ Third countries that can add a considerable value to PESCO projects could be invited by EU member states to these projects. Yet, decision-making rights are not given to these countries. So, the absence of these rights might contradict with the UK's interests in terms of shaping policies.

4.5 Security Relations with NATO

4.5.1 The EU's Relations with NATO

The relationship between the EU and NATO might be described in three ways.³¹⁸ Firstly, with the Lisbon Treaty NATO's domination was stressed in a way that CSDP could not intervene the sovereign state's national commitments. Secondly, the EU–NATO declaration of 2002 was adopted to enhance strategic cooperation. It laid down the EU's crisis management capacities where NATO is not present. The Berlin Plus Agreement gave the EU an opportunity to use capabilities otherwise offered to NATO, where NATO is not involved. Thirdly, while there is EU-NATO in crisis management, the EU operates through its civilian forces because of its lower military capabilities compared to NATO.³¹⁹

Analysis of EU–NATO relations after 1989 point out the legacy of the Cold War which refers to burden-sharing problem and development of these organizations

³¹⁷ European Defense Agency, Permanent Structured Cooperation, Retrieved from <https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/permanent-structured-cooperation> (Accessed on 20 June 2019)

³¹⁸ Csornai, *op.cit.*, p.5.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*

in a parallel path.³²⁰ While bottom-up cooperation in the Gulf of Aden, Afghanistan and Kosovo signifies this relationship, they are ad hoc in nature.³²¹ It can be argued that after the end of the Cold War, the development of EU–NATO strategy changed due to the competition between both organizations and their internal uncertainties about their future security role in the European and international context.³²² However, searching for relevant partners in an increasingly unpredictable and changing world is a tough situation.³²³ In addition, NATO is still the most important factor of the transatlantic relationship.

4.5.2 The UK's Relations with NATO

Several member states specifically the UK have long assumed that the EU-NATO relationship is essentially competitive. So, the British policy toward the development of an EU security have been rested on the presumption that this development would weaken transatlantic links.³²⁴ British Atlanticism was dated back to the decline of British Empire and transferring the global hegemony to the US.³²⁵ During the foundation of NATO, Britain's global role was declining while the US and

³²⁰ Laura Chappell and et.al, *op.cit.*, p.165.

³²¹ *Ibid.*

³²² *Ibid.*

³²³ Martin Reichard, *The EU-NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective*, London, England: Routledge, 2016, p.33

³²⁴ Nina Græger and Kristin M. Haugevik, *The revival of Atlanticism in NATO? Changing security identities in Britain, Norway and Denmark*. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2008, p.18

³²⁵ *Ibid.*

Soviet Union gained strength. The notion of ‘special relationship’ between Britain and the US was first launched by Winston Churchill in 1946 and he explains British foreign policy by stressing importance of the America, the Commonwealth and the Europe.³²⁶ In addition, their similarities in terms of culture, language and politics had effect on the basis of their cooperation.

The UK’s position before St Malo towards CSDP could be examined with a realist approach in a way that the UK sought its relative power in NATO and opposed any establishment that could be a threat to the Alliance.³²⁷ Thus, it supported the entire reliance on NATO for security and defense areas. While Margaret Thatcher was skeptical about the development of CSDP by arguing that it could collapse NATO, Tony Blair saw NATO and the EU as two separate organizations which have no duplication and also accepted NATO as an important security and defense provider.³²⁸

The UK’s 2015 Strategic Defense and Security Review highlights NATO’s importance for the UK’s defense policy and approves their ‘special relationship’ as leading economic and defense powers.³²⁹ Furthermore, the document underlines bilateral defense and security relationships with France, Germany and Poland. Also, the UK and the US retain not just a ‘special relationship’, but also promote an ‘Alliance of Democracies’ to cope with international terrorism.³³⁰ Apparently, the UK holds a

³²⁶ Winston Churchill, ‘Sinews of Peace’, Speech given at the Westminster College, 5 March 1946

³²⁷ Catharine Gegout, The french and british change in position in the CESDP : a security community and historical -institutionalist perspective, *Politique européenne*, 2002, 8(4), 62, p.69
doi:10.3917/poeu.008.0062

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.66.

³²⁹ Great Britain Office, *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom*, 2015

³³⁰ Ham, *op.cit.*, p.8.

‘NATO first’ principle.³³¹ However, the US’ reliability could be challenged for Europe. If Trump continues to follow his pragmatism, the UK will have to achieve its ambition through European cooperation.³³² This validates the thesis despite their ‘special relationship’, the UK dramatically needs the EU and the CSDP.³³³ This analysis can be linked with the UK’s interest in creating the CSDP in history. Gegout exemplifies three main reasons of the UK’s acceptance of the creation of CSDP.³³⁴ First reason is about US-UK disagreement on Serbia. In 1995, the UK was disturbed by the US’ instructed behavior to the EU for putting embargo on Serbia and bombing it. So, transatlantic relations were relatively at its low point. Second reason was linked to the UK’s past experiences in failed policies. In capabilities of the EU during the Balkan crisis affected the UK’s decision for creating a CSDP. For example, the EU’s lack of credibility in Kosovo criticized by British Prime Minister and also British officials in a way that the EU failed to place 40,000 soldiers within two months. Also, the EU’s air cooperation was criticized in terms of its inabilities in a way that 90 % of the bombings were accomplished by the US capabilities. Thus, the EU was highly dependent on the US’ sharing of information, transportation and intelligence capabilities. Lastly, the UK’s intention of being a part of the EU decision making process of the EU was another driving factor.³³⁵ Biscop argues that the UK would cooperate with EU institutions and participate in multinational cooperation and Brexit

³³¹ Csornai, op.cit., p.8.

³³² Sven Biscop, All or nothing? The EU Global Strategy and defence policy after the Brexit, *Contemporary Security Policy*, 37(3), 431-445, 2016, doi:10.1080/13523260.2016.1238120, p.445

³³³ Federico Santopinto, CSDP after Brexit: the way forward (PE 603.852), Policy Department for External Relations Directorate General for External Policies of the Union, 2018, p.5

³³⁴ Gegout, op.cit., p.70.

³³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.71.

vote could not be seen as a decision to undermine the security of Europe due to the geographical tendencies by stating:

If ideology and emotions are allowed to continue to trump pragmatism however, the UK will discover that in some areas neither the US nor NATO is likely to take the lead, and nothing much can be achieved without European cooperation. Where will that leave Britain? In a worse position, alas, than the remaining EU Member States, for the absence of British engagement would be a serious obstacle to, but not the end, of European defense. If truly European defense really is what the others want.³³⁶

In a nutshell, the United States' relationship with the UK could be specified by common ideas, shared values, common international obstacles, and leaders with Atlanticist viewpoint. The US governments' will for the European Allies would be a deeper cooperation on international peace and security issues.³³⁷ With regard to its historic position as a geostrategic link between Europe and the US, Britain has always played a key role for the relations with NATO. The UK will continue to be central to US economic and security interests in the light of the rise of instabilities from the south and east of the Europe's borders. The US could prefer relying on the EU involving the UK as a member state which are taking adequate measures in order to preserve security in and around Europe rather than conserving a deep UK–US security relationship.³³⁸ Because Britain's objections for cooperation with European states in security and defense will undermine the Atlantic Alliance rather than conserve it.³³⁹ Therefore, the UK's future security and defense strategy should be based on a balance between NATO and the EU. However, the US's position will be crucial in trilateral relations in terms of its rhetoric and perception of relations. From the UK's side, relations should

³³⁶ Biscop, op.cit., p.443

³³⁷ Luis Simón, Britain, the European Union and the Future of Europe: A Geostrategic Perspective, *The RUSI Journal*, 2015, 160(5), 16-23, doi:10.1080/03071847.2015.1102536, p.19

³³⁸ Niblett, op.cit., p.30.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*

be seen as positive-sum game as long as it needs both NATO and the EU as basis of its post-Brexit security and defense interests which will be analyzed in the next section.

4.6 Possible Effects of Brexit on the EU-UK's Security and Defense Partnership

In previous sections, important historical developments in the EU-UK's security partnership have been examined. From now on, I will analyze the possible effects of Brexit to the future security and defense partnership of the EU and the UK. This section will be divided into two parts. First sub-section called the UK's defense capabilities and actorness in the EU and it aims to illustrate the UK's strengths in the areas of security and defense in order to better evaluate the effects of Brexit in these areas. Second sub-section called the effects of Brexit on the EU-UK security and defense partnership analyzes the potential impacts of Brexit for this partnership.

4.6.1 The UK's Security and Defense Capabilities and Actorness in the EU

To begin with, the UK was a founding member of the CSDP. Through this framework, the UK worked with its partner states to provide military and civilian missions. Presently, 150 personnel were provided for EU operations and missions by the UK. All 15 CSDP missions and operations were backed by the contributions of the UK in terms of finance, military equipment, expertise and personnel.³⁴⁰ In the EU's Operation Atalanta, the UK contributed to decrease the pirate attacks dramatically. Also, the UK successfully assisted with its ships, personnel and funding for training in the EU's Operation Sophia which was about to the migrant problem in the Mediterranean.³⁴¹ It also helped to preserve security in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the EU

³⁴⁰ HM Government, op.cit., p.10.

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*

Operation Althea. Moreover, it played a vital role by providing adequate resources to the missions taken place in Somalia, Ukraine, Georgia and Kosovo. The Operational Headquarters were arranged by the UK for several EU Battlegroup actions.³⁴² With its enhanced strategic airlift capabilities, it made the distant operations accessible for the EU.³⁴³

The UK's armed forces provide capable fighting forces for the European Union.³⁴⁴ The UK has deployable corps for a joint action, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), human intelligence and an electronic warfare capability.³⁴⁵ The UK might leverage its Five Eyes intelligence alliance including Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States.³⁴⁶ Moreover, 50% of all heavy transport aircraft and 25% of all heavy transport helicopters are provided by the UK. Their capabilities were testified both in French led operations in Mali and in humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief operations due to the Hurricane Irma in 2017.³⁴⁷ In the sea domain, half of nuclear powered attack submarines in the EU is provided by the UK's Royal Navy.³⁴⁸ Furthermore, the UK deployed 13,000 military personnel overseas in 2017.³⁴⁹

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ Ibid., p.11

³⁴⁴ Christian Mölling and Bastian Giegerich, The United Kingdom's contribution to European security and defence, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018, p.6

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ Ibid., p.2.

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., p.8.

Importantly, some projects such as the F-35 combat aircraft rely on UK component manufacture. Moreover, the UK contributes to European security with its intelligence database. Thus, The UK’s defense industry maintain its recognizable advantages with regard to its skills and technology.³⁵⁰ As the figure below illustrates, the UK’s proportion compared to EU-27 is very high in the areas such as UAVs, intelligence, aircrafts.




Figure 24 The UK’s share of overall military-equipment holdings in the EU (2018)³⁵¹

In addition to these, the UK has always cooperated with other member states in addressing common threats with the ambition of increasing European security. The agreement on the Iran nuclear deal could be seen as a successful example for the UK’s foreign policy success. In July 2015, this deal imposed limitations for prohibiting Iran

³⁵⁰ Ibid., p.2.

³⁵¹ Peter Round and et.al, European strategic autonomy and Brexit, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018, p.3

to establish a nuclear weapons capability. Furthermore, the UK has advocated reform in Ukraine and Counter Terrorism capability framework in Tunisia.³⁵² In 2017, the UK and Ukraine met in an international conference in London in which Ukraine government made commitments over the ambitious Reform Action Plan from 2017 to 2020. Reform process in Ukraine serves the UK's interests in advocating closer integration of Ukraine with Europe due to the value of Ukraine as an energy supplier and transit.³⁵³ The UK and France have worked with Tunisia on aviation security. Also, Tunisian agents were trained by these states to respond terrorist attacks. Also, the UK helped Tunisia in the areas of hotel security and medical training.³⁵⁴ In terms of Counter Terrorism, the UK has worked together with the EU so as to weaken the risk of terrorism to citizens and common interests in and around Europe.³⁵⁵ In regard with counter-terrorism operations, while political elites and judiciaries in many European countries are distrustful of intelligence services, the UK model of counter-terrorism is effective in terms of the intelligence agencies and the police.³⁵⁶

The UK also builds bilateral defense and security partnerships with European states. For example, the UK-France Lancaster House Treaties of 2010 accommodates

³⁵² HM Government, *op.cit.*, p.6.

³⁵³ Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Britain and Ukraine? Partners for Reform, 2011, July 14, Retrieved from <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/britain-and-ukraine-partners-for-reform> (Accessed on 22 June 2019)

³⁵⁴ Anthony Dworkin, and Fatim-Zohra Malki, The Southern Front Line: EU Counterterrorism Cooperation with Tunisia And Morocco (246), 2018, Retrieved from ECFR website: https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/the_southern_front_line_eu_counter_terrorism_cooperation.pdf (Accessed on 11 July 2019)

³⁵⁵ HM Government, *loc.cit.*

³⁵⁶ Nigel Inkster, Brexit, Intelligence and Terrorism, *Survival*, 58(3), 23-30, 2016, p.26 doi:10.1080/00396338.2016.1186974

a structure for deeper defense cooperation, military capability and nuclear elements. UK and France are the two largest R&D spenders and important nuclear powers. Another example is that the UK is reinforcing its defense relationship with Germany. By developing the Joint Expeditionary Force with partners, the UK and its partners will be able to react rapidly to the situations occurring anywhere in the world.³⁵⁷ As a result of the UK's close cooperation with its European partners, several important defense capabilities were built such as Eurofighter Typhoon (an air force) and Meteor (world's leading air to air missile).³⁵⁸ As figure below illustrates that the UK's share of aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines is about half of the EU's total military assets.




Figure 25 The UK's share of total EU military assets³⁵⁹

³⁵⁷ HM Government, op.cit., p.9.

³⁵⁸ HM Government, op.cit., p.67.

³⁵⁹ Haverkamp, op.cit., p.6.

In terms of defense expenditures, the UK's defense budget is the largest within Europe and it ranks second after the US in NATO. The UK is the only European state that meets both the NATO's objective of spending 2 per cent of GDP on defense and the UN objective of spending 0.7 per cent of gross national income on international development. With its leading role in exporting military equipment, the UK's pledge was to spend £178 billion in 2015. In the following year, £5.9 billion were spent for the military exports and £4.3 billion were allocated to security exports.³⁶⁰ In Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending in 2016, the UK ranked as the third donor country worldwide, after Germany and the US with its commitment to spend 0.7% of gross national income on ODA. This was used for conflict advisers in line with EU CSDP missions so as to empower the missions to address the root causes of conflict.³⁶¹ Moreover, the UK has pledged to provide at least 50 per cent of development spending in fragile states and regions. The UK's £1.2 billion Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) can be seen as one of the world's largest mechanisms in conflict resolution and addressing instability in terms of securing European neighborhood and overseas.³⁶²

³⁶⁰ HM Government, op.cit., p.12.

³⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p.10

³⁶² *Ibid.*

UK defence overview

| | Amount | Notes |
|-----------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------------|
| Overall defence exp. | £34.4bn | 5 th largest in the world |
| Operations exp. | £1.1bn | |
| Equipment and infrastructure exp. | £7.8bn | |
| Defence exp. p/c | £532 | 3 rd largest in NATO |
| % GDP spent in defence | 2.2% | |

UK Full Time Trained Military Personnel & Civilians

| 2015 | Strength 1 April 2015 | Reserves | Total |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|----------|---------|
| Naval | 30,060 | 3,160 | 33,220 |
| Army | 82,230 | 25,880 | 108,110 |
| RAF | 31,830 | 2,220 | 34,050 |
| Total Service Personnel | 144,120 | 31,260 | 175,380 |
| Civilian | 58,160 | 0 | 58,160 |
| Total Personnel | 202,280 | 31,260 | 233,540 |

Figure 26 The UK's defense overview and trained personnel ³⁶³

As figure above illustrates in 2015, the UK's overall defense expenditures were about £ 34.4 bn which is the 5th largest in the world and with £532bn it was ranked 3rd in NATO. Also, the UK spent 2.2% of its GDP in defense. In the figure below, the UK is the second largest defense exporter after USA based on the contracts signed between 2007 and 2016 while France, Italy and Germany as European member states ranked 4th, 5th and 6th in defense exports. ³⁶⁴

³⁶³ Csornai, op.cit., p.7.

³⁶⁴ Csornai, op.cit., p.8.




Figure 27 Top ten defense exporters in the world (2007–2016)

It is argued by the UK in the Future Partnership paper that sustaining European security is a vital issue for both the EU and the UK especially in today’s challenging, unexpected and diverse international environment.³⁶⁵ The UK requests a future partnership with the EU which differs from the other third country relationships. Such partnership should be linked to common goals and values while tackling several threats. It will be the UK’s intention to build a partnership with the EU in order for its global defense, progress and diplomacy. Protecting the security as well as the citizens of the continent will be the UK’s indisputable aim.³⁶⁶ The UK’s commitment and ambition to work with the EU for the European security is stressed in the Future Partnership Paper. It claims that “In tackling the diverse, changing threats we all face today, it is in the interests of both the EU and UK that we ensure cooperation on European security.”³⁶⁷ Yet, the paper suggests the UK’s involvement in the future

³⁶⁵ HM Government, *op.cit.*, p.22.

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

partnership framework should not be similar to any third state relationship. So, the UK offers a unique partnership in terms of the degree of engagement by pointing out two parties' shared values and goals to combat threats.³⁶⁸

Martill and Sus assess the extent of the UK's commitment to future security and defense partnership on following grounds: "the viability of the 'global Britain' alternative; the UK's interest in participating in EU-led policies, programmes, and operations; and whether close cooperation is feasible in the context of the negotiations."³⁶⁹ In terms of the viability of 'global Britain', it is important to define what 'global Britain' means. It refers to the UK's post-Brexit foreign policy goals and ideas in which the UK pursues a new role in global arena in terms of "economic openness, trade deals with rising powers such as China, and the renewal of its Commonwealth ties and its 'special relationship' with the US".³⁷⁰ Yet, according to Martill and Sus, Theresa May's idea of 'global Britain' does not fit with the 21st century's realities.³⁷¹ For example, while the US' geographical and economic interests shift to the Asia-Pacific region, it is unlikely that a trade shift from Europe to the US' to compensate the loss of the UK after Brexit is unlikely. Also, whether there is an existing demand or not for a global Britain in the regions such as China and Japan remains contested regardless of the UK's intention to enhance engagement.

They further point out to a declining pattern in the UK's military capabilities since the 1960s and for nuclear deterrent, in practice, the UK is dependent to US' technology and strategy.³⁷² In terms of British interest in participating EU policies and

³⁶⁸ Ibid.

³⁶⁹ Martill and Sus, op.cit., p.849.

³⁷⁰ Ibid., p.850.

³⁷¹ Ibid.

³⁷² Ibid.

operations, Martill and Sus first examine the role of the UK in European security and defense and note the declining commitment of the UK to CSDP while giving priority to NATO and bilateral relations especially with France.³⁷³ However, due to the deterioration of regional security environment and concerns over lessening of US commitment strengthens the need for greater European cooperation.³⁷⁴ Lastly, as to feasibility of the European option, they examine the fiery rhetoric of both parties during negotiations.³⁷⁵ The UK government has shown interest in continued cooperation with Europe. Yet, there is a risk of continuation of anti-EU sentiments in future British politics. This could give the UK an opportunity to find a relatively acceptable cooperation framework in which the national sovereignty cost is kept lowest.³⁷⁶

Since 2016, the UK government has repeatedly claimed that Brexit vote should not be seen as the UK's intention to withdraw from global affairs. This claim was linked with the vision of 'Global Britain'.³⁷⁷ Theresa May outlined the UK's vision of Global Britain in her speech in 2016 as follows:

Brexit should not just prompt us to think about our new relationship with the European Union. It should make us think about our role in the wider world. It should make us think of Global Britain, a country with the self-confidence and the freedom to look beyond the continent of Europe and to the economic and diplomatic opportunities of the wider world. Because we know that the referendum was not a vote to turn in ourselves, to cut ourselves off from the

³⁷³ Ibid.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

³⁷⁷ Great Britain. Parliament, House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Britain: Sixth Report of Session 2017-19, 2018, p.1

world. It was a vote for Britain to stand tall, to believe in ourselves, to forge an ambitious and optimistic new role in the world.³⁷⁸

Thus, the vision of Global Britain of Theresa May pointed out the UK's future foreign policy goals and ambitions after Brexit. Yet, Gifkins et.al, criticize the absence of clarity of Global Britain from the UK's point of view.³⁷⁹ Therefore, there is a vital need for the UK to consider the aims and implications of this new strategy and as different from the existing foreign policy strategy. Discussions should be made whether the vision of Global Britain serves as a rebranding action or an ambitious step to reevaluate the role and priorities of the UK in foreign affairs.³⁸⁰ Gifkins et.al, also mention about external perceptions on Global Britain. They argue that UN diplomats see this vision as a slogan for attracting the UK domestic audience.³⁸¹ Thus, external actors have not convinced in terms of the very meaning and effect of it about new direction of UK foreign policy. Thus, the UK and his new Prime Minister Boris Johnson should reexamine the value of this vision in a detailed manner.

4.6.2 Effects of Brexit on the EU-UK Security and Defense Partnership

The risk of leaving the EU will result in several unintended consequences for the EU. The balance of power in CSDP will be transformed in a way that new alliances will show up.³⁸² Italy's role would be enhanced. Concerns of Poland over the security

³⁷⁸ Ibid., p.7.

³⁷⁹ Jess Gifkins and et.al, Global Britain in the United Nations, 2019, UNA-UK, p.8

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

³⁸¹ Ibid., p.9.

³⁸² Major and Mölling, op.cit., p.6.

of the European southern border would trigger due to the instabilities and terrorism threat.³⁸³ Additionally, individual states may continue to act as a substantial blocking power. The major effect would be in the civilian side of the CSDP operations because of the high number of civilian contributions of the UK. Especially, ongoing Althea mission could be affected in a way that it is an operation connected to NATO with Berlin Plus. Without the UK's support, the mandate of the operation would be weakened. However, British contributions to the operations will not end; as Former Defense Secretary Michael Cathel Fallon has stated the UK's enthusiasm in these operations will continue through 'special' third party participation.³⁸⁴

Brexit will risk the EU losing a member state capable of deploying armed forces around the globe. The UK is among five EU member states which possesses an Operational Headquarters (OHQ) and also it has ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance). Militarily, the EU will lose about 20% of its overall capabilities and 25% key facilitators after Brexit.³⁸⁵ There is a potential risk of losing Northwood operational headquarters, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Despite of the fact that France could compensate this loss with its own ISR capabilities, the EU will be able to put less on the table.³⁸⁶

Another important issue for the EU is that according to the European Defense Agency (EDA) each €100 million reduction in the defense spending following Brexit result in a €150 million decline in EU GDP. It would be related to a €40 million cut in

³⁸³ Ibid.

³⁸⁴ Zandee and et.al, op.cit., p.7.

³⁸⁵ Major and Mölling, op.cit., p.5.

³⁸⁶ Zandee and et.al, op.cit., p.3.

EU tax revenues resulting with the loss of 2,870 jobs.³⁸⁷ Therefore, most EU countries cannot act separately on military capability because of the fact that the overall process is too expensive and difficult to manage.³⁸⁸ Also, states may not have sufficient tools to deliver these capabilities.

From the EU's perspective, the opportunity of European presence in the significant organizations would be lost.³⁸⁹ Essential diplomatic networks provided by the UK thanks to its permanent seat in UN Security Council will be lost.³⁹⁰ While the EU's defense elements in terms of capabilities, knowledge, experience and resources will be diminished, these elements will be available through NATO and coalitions of the willing contexts as long as the UK "is leaving the EU, not Europe".³⁹¹ There is a consensus over the importance of the UK's resources and capabilities for European security. However, the degree to which both parties will adjust their defense capabilities and the level of their partnership will be decided in future. Yet, the British rhetoric saw Brexit negotiations as a zero-sum game.³⁹² The negative image of the EU was emphasized by domestic interests. They summarize the EU's position during the negotiation process as:

³⁸⁷ Matthew Uttley and Benedict Wilkinson, A spin of the wheel? Defence procurement and defence industries in the Brexit debates, *International Affairs*, 2016, 92(3), 569-586. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12605, p.570

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁹ Mölling and Giegerich, *op.cit.*, p.4.

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁹¹ Zandee and et.al, *op.cit.*, p.22.

³⁹² Benjamin Martill and Monica Sus, *Known Unknowns: EU foreign, security, and defence policy after Brexit*, Dahrendorf Forum, 2018, p.8

The EU, meanwhile, has an incentive to punish Britain in order to prevent ‘contagion’, but it also has an incentive to portray the UK as a spoiler, since this helps reinforce solidarity between the EU27 and distracts from genuine differences between the remaining member states.³⁹³

Yet, the UK’s interest in close cooperation between the EU will tend to increase in the future as the idea of ‘Global Britain’ is unrealistic in terms of British capabilities and the changing international environment. This potential increase in close cooperation is due to the fact that the UK will be interested in recovering its credibility, safeguarding regional stability due to the diminished US commitment. On the EU side, it is unclear that whether Brexit will encourage the EU towards further integration or will lead to disintegrative trends. The European Union security chief Julian King said “On some issues there will be winners and losers, but there is a mutual, shared self-interest when it comes to security and defense.”³⁹⁴ Centre for European Reform outlines the EU’s objectives on future security and defense partnership with the UK in a way that

They are to ensure that there will be no security vacuum in Europe after Britain’s withdrawal; to make sure that bilateral defence and security co-operation between the UK and EU member-states is not put at risk; to prevent Brexit from having any impact on the EU-NATO strategic partnership; and to achieve an unconditional UK commitment to maintaining European security, even after Brexit.³⁹⁵

In their study entitled *The United Kingdom and the European Union: What would a “Brexit” mean for the EU and other States around the World?* Oliver and

³⁹³ Ibid.

³⁹⁴ Martin Banks, Top EU security chief emphasizes 'shared self-interest? in defense cooperation after Brexit, 2018, September 25, Retrieved from <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/09/25/top-eu-security-chief-emphasizes-shared-self-interest-in-defense-cooperation-after-brexit/> (Accessed on 16 June 2019)

³⁹⁵ Centre for European Union, Brexit negotiations in the field of defence: Lessons learnt and moving forward, 2019, July 19, Retrieved from <https://www.cer.eu/in-the-press/brexit-negotiations-field-defence-lessons-learnt-and-moving-forward> (Accessed on 2 August 2019)

Möller held the view that the UK's future role in the EU's security and defense policies is hard to be replaced:

Whether it is the United States or France, there is a clear realization that the EU and Europe's place in the world would lose from a British withdrawal. Without Britain, France would face Germany's "culture of restraint" on external affairs, which could find support from other member states. For the United States, an EU without Britain would further complicate transatlantic relations by stunting its long sought for improvements to the European arm of NATO, as well as a reduction in Europe's dependence on the United States and efforts to make Europe take on a more global role.³⁹⁶

Martill and Sus examine three patterns for the EU, including "the danger of fragmentation, recent advances in the EU's security and defense and the changing balance of power and the renewed Franco-German axis."³⁹⁷ Firstly, Brexit would increase anti-EU sentiments of other member states' in the Union. Also, member states would question the benefits that get from their membership of the EU if the UK would achieve a good deal. Secondly, given the absence of the UK's priorities of NATO and risk of veto, the EU could launch new security and defense initiatives. For example, in 2017 both the EU Military Headquarters for planning and managing capabilities and PESCO was established. Member states who have similar interests and capabilities may launch more advanced projects by increasing European defense. Thirdly, it is important to find a new engine in EU security and defense in order to replace Franco-British partnership. Thus, Brexit will result in the revival of Franco-German engine as Germany begins to be more effective in international security. Also, these attempts are supported by several decision makers in Germany. There are strong signs for Franco-German leadership in the EU with the potential withdrawal of the UK. Thus, for the

³⁹⁶ Tim Oliver and Almut Möller, *The United Kingdom and the European Union: What would a "Brexit" mean for the EU and other States around the World?*, 2018, p.108, Retrieved from The German Council on Foreign Relations website: https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/55608/ssoar-2014-moller_et_al-The_United_Kingdom_and_the.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2014-moller_et_al-The_United_Kingdom_and_the.pdf (Accessed on 12 June 2019)

³⁹⁷ Martill and Sus, *op.cit.*, p.9.

closer collaboration of EU27 on security and defense after Brexit, the role of strong leadership matters to decrease the diverging national views on threat perceptions or on NATO. While France and Italy recognize Brexit as an opportunity for strengthening their role in European security and defense, Poland and the Baltic states embrace the UK's commitment to NATO.

Therefore, the extent to which the deal that the EU offers to the UK is essential to deal with the increasing anti-EU tendencies of member states and the UK's unwillingness in accepting existing third party arrangements. The UK's participation in European security and defense seems beneficial for the EU. Martill and Sus demonstrate the possible future participation as "UK participation in CSDP as a third country, "a broadening of NATO's role on the continent, and renewed bilateralism and the 'French connection'." ³⁹⁸ Third party participation comes with the absence of a formal say in agenda-setting and decision making process. Furthermore, there is a potential loss of seat on Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and the impossibility of leading EU Battlegroups or authorizing EU-led missions. Also, the EU refrains from granting additional benefits to a non-member state that could damage the autonomy of decision making processes. Therefore, the EU should carefully consider the existing third-party cooperation framework in order not to create obvious losers. The UK, however, expresses its intention as "special partnership including on foreign, defence, and security, and development engagement that goes beyond existing third country arrangements" ³⁹⁹

In addition to these concerns, bilateral relations of the UK with individual countries will be affected. France and Germany will have to take the lead in establishing foreign policy institutions. Irwin argues that if the UK leaves the EU, Germany should play a bigger role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy and in

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.16.

³⁹⁹ HM Government, *op.cit.*, p.2.

terms of the UK and France relations, joint defense procurement might be damaged if the UK choose to collaborate more with the US.⁴⁰⁰ The UK provides assistance to a partner countries such as France during its operations in Mali. Moreover, in Libya operations in 2011, the UK used its airlift and air-to-air-refueling capabilities.⁴⁰¹

Overall, the possible impacts of Brexit for two parties resemble the two sides of a one coin. On the EU's side, the Union would lose the UK's sophisticated military capabilities and decrease its ability to tackle with economic issues and also migration crisis. If the UK leaves the EU due to its national considerations about the disadvantages of the EU but at the same time keeps its benefits viable, this could increase the calls for exiting the EU from other member states.⁴⁰² On the UK's side, both its chance to further national foreign policy through the Union and its bilateral relations with other EU states would be damaged.⁴⁰³ Freedman criticizes that the UK's possible exit will not make each party more powerful to tackle with the international challenges such as Russia or ISIS. On the contrary, they will be more prone to threats.⁴⁰⁴ It should be noted that isolation is not a logical tactic for today's world. Therefore, in order to preserve Western interests and values, the UK should harmonize European solidarity and transatlantic partnership.⁴⁰⁵

⁴⁰⁰ Gregor Irwin, *Brexit: the impact on the UK and the EU*, London: Global Counsel, 2015, p.25

⁴⁰¹ Peter Round and et.al, loc.cit.

⁴⁰² Nick Witney, *European Defence: An Open Goal for Britain*, *The RUSI Journal*, 160(5), 12-15, doi:10.1080/03071847.2015.1102535, 2015, p.14

⁴⁰³ Whitman, *op.cit.*, p. 260.

⁴⁰⁴ Lawrence Freedman, *Brexit and the Law of Unintended Consequences*, *Survival*, 2016, 58(3), 7-12, doi:10.1080/00396338.2016.1186972, p.12

⁴⁰⁵ Witney, loc.cit.

4.7 Conclusion

In the Chapter 4, the history of European security integration has been stated with the sub-sections of common security and defense policy (CSDP), European Union's Global Strategy (EUGS), PESCO, security relations with NATO with the sub-sections such as the EU's relations with NATO and the UK's relations with NATO. The aim of this part was to show the developments on security and defense area. For this aim, several missions/operations in CSDP have been examined. PESCO's development and projects have been examined. Also, the EU's latest strategy document for the aim of securing Europe has been provided even if it was overshadowed by the Brexit vote. Even though the EU took steps to increase European security which led to the formation of CSDP, limits of CSDP including the centrality of member states with diverging strategic cultures and calculations, cost-benefits analysis of member states in operations/missions, limited financial contributions and also usage of resources. Thus, the phrase of 'Common' barely defines the character of this policy. The UK's intention to enhance EU's autonomous decision-making along with its military capabilities in St. Malo was remarkable. On the one hand, the UK contributed to CSDP missions and operations in terms of finance, military equipment, expertise and personnel. Yet, the UK, especially in military operations, limit some aspects of CSDP and opposed to the expansion of EDA and creation of permanent military EU operational headquarters. Rather, it chose to participate in capacity-building projects based on civilian missions. Security relations with NATO has been analyzed in order to stress that NATO is and will an important organization for the both parties in their security and defense relations. NATO could act as bridge between the EU and the UK in post Brexit security and defense partnership as long as both the EUGS and the UK attach an essential role to NATO for collective defense. Thus, it can be estimated that the EU-UK partnership could be experienced through Atlantic Alliance which will serve as a dialogue platform for both parties. Finally the possible effects of Brexit to the EU and the UK's security and defense partnership with the sub-sections including the UK's security and defense capabilities and the effects of Brexit

on the EU-UK security and defense partnership have been examined. Lastly, The UK's considerable amount of security and defense capabilities have been analyzed so as to make a connection to the following sub-section about the possible effects of Brexit because these two sub-sections are interlinked. This thesis examines that close cooperation between the EU and the UK on the challenges including terrorism, cyber-threats, and crisis in and out Europe, protection of human rights and so on is a vital need and reducing cooperation will not be a logical or intended option for both parties.

CHAPTER 5

ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR THE EU-UK SECURITY AND DEFENSE PARTNERSHIP AFTER BREXIT

5.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters, the EU-UK relations have been analyzed in terms of their political, economic and military cooperation. The main aim of these chapters were to show how the EU-UK relations evolved over time which led to the UK's decision to leave the EU and also to illustrate the possible effects of Brexit on the future security and defense relationship between the EU and the UK by examining both the EU's security and defense integration and the UK's contributions these areas with its own capabilities. The outcome will be reciprocal that both parties will be affected by the Brexit vote. Thus, there is a vital need to find a new security and defense partnership to secure the borders of Europe. As most of the discussions concentrate on the future trade models including Norwegian, Swiss or Turkey, there is a shortage of sources that deal with the possible security and defense models for the future EU-UK partnership. It should be highlighted that new security and partnership model will also serve as a template for the other non-EU states such as Turkey or Norway. Chapter 5 will first assess the EU's responses to the UK's demands for the creation of a new security and defense partnership after Brexit. Then, it will concentrate on the reasons for establishing this post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense partnership before giving the alternative options. After these examinations, Chapter 5 deals with the alternative options for both the EU and the UK in order to establish a new security and defense model. These options will be analyzed in several

sub-sections such as Partnership through bilateralism or trilateralism, Civilian power Europe-PESCO plus UK-Unleashed Continental Europe, Partnership through Framework Participation Agreement and Permanent Observer Status, The UK as an Integrated Player- Associated Partner or Detached Observer. Finally, Chapter 5 will give some recommendations for establishing a new and consistent post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense partnership.

5.2 Reasons for Establishing a Post-Brexit EU-UK Security and Defense Partnership

Chalmers focuses on the shared values and geographical context of the EU and the UK.⁴⁰⁶ Thus, there is a vital need to cooperate on security area after Brexit. Yet, the EU will define its foreign, security and defense policies on its own. Moreover, from 31 October 2019, the UK will no longer participate in existing EU mechanisms. Justice and police cooperation, intelligence exchanges and the UK's withdrawal from CSDP will have economic costs and will damage the national security.⁴⁰⁷

Therefore, in order to eliminate these transaction costs, these two parties should form a new and considerable security partnership. The third party agreements such as Framework Participation Agreements and Administrative Arrangements which were ratified with Norway, Switzerland and Canada may not provide an adequate model for the future EU-UK security relations as the UK demands more privileged status.⁴⁰⁸ As mentioned earlier, both the EU and the UK have an interest in maintaining close security and defense relations. On the one hand, the EU needs the UK for its strategic capabilities and political actorness. On the other hand, the UK proposed its interest to

⁴⁰⁶ Chalmers, op.cit., p.9.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

participate in EU security and defense policy several times. The UK will continue to be an important security player in Europe outside the EU through its membership in the international organizations such as NATO the UN Security Council. ⁴⁰⁹ So, the point is that the UK should focus on strengthening this role outside the EU.

From the EU's perspective, Lain and Nouwens argue that EU member states can be benefitted from the British exit that without the UK's traditional opposition to more integration in defense and security policy, EU member states could take initiatives more easily without the blocking of the UK.⁴¹⁰ Yet, this scenario could also lead to the hidden divisions within the EU member states concerning the security and defense thinking. Thus, the EU should rethink its foreign policy threat assumptions and what degree its voice is 'united' in terms of these assessments. For example, Germany and France differ in terms of their understanding in EU defense. While France is more interested in counter terrorism arrangements and involving in missions in line with its own national interests, Germany is more tended to harmonize the defense policies. In addition to these, the EU should also reassess its existing CSDP and security arrangements in dealing with the security threats. As an example, in 2016, the Paris and Brussels attacks showed deficiencies in these existing frameworks in terms of processing and use of intelligence. Overall, re-consideration of the present security and foreign policy in light of Brexit could lead to a more flexible and effective EU security and foreign policy involving the UK in precise areas. ⁴¹¹ The UK may choose to form bilateral/ trilateral and multilateral alliances with EU member states while also supporting EU-NATO cooperation. In this cooperation on security and defense, the UK will have the opportunity to preserve its national interests and also to

⁴⁰⁹ Lain and Nouwens, op.cit., p.1

⁴¹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.10.

strengthen its position in both European and international arenas. In this respect, the US's position will be critical. The US has always encouraged European states to boost their efforts for the security of their continent. Even if NATO is a transatlantic defense cooperation, US administrations have supported the EU in organizing its own Security and Defense Policy if the policies do not contradict with NATO. Thus, the US also supports the new post-Brexit security and defense partnership between the EU and the UK for three reasons.⁴¹²

First reason is that the UK and France are two states with a severe defense capabilities and the UK pledged to spend at least 2% of its GDP on defense measures. The UK's leaders have pushed other EU member states in order to contribute more. Brexit would clearly decrease the EU's defense capacities.

Second reason is that the US relies on its traditional ally and special partner in the EU defense coordination. As long as the US does not perceive of the EU defense structures as undermining the US relationship with Europe and NATO, the UK governments have consistently preserved the importance of NATO while cooperating in defense issues to strengthen the European forces.

Third reason is about the Middle East. While the US is significant actor in the Middle East, the UK cooperated with the US both in the invasion of Iraq through a coalition of willing and occupation of Afghanistan. However, coordination in the Middle East is a complex process through EU, UN or NATO. Thus, there is a need for broader cooperation. If the UK acts with the EU in a cooperative manner, it can easily access broader markets, have a larger budget and political voice.⁴¹³ These elements are referred as soft power while pursuing the EU interests. Nevertheless, if the UK withdraws from the EU, the credibility of EU foreign policy in the Middle East would be decreased. The EU's voice will be less influential in the Middle East without the

⁴¹² Miller, op.cit., p.80.

⁴¹³ Ibid., p.83.

UK's security and defense capacities and experience in foreign policy. Also, the EU would be more prone to develop policies confronting with the US views.⁴¹⁴

Finally, there is also a growing concern in both in public and political arena about the consequences of a no-deal scenario. In this scenario, the UK could act independently in its diplomacy or could decide to cooperate with other member states bilaterally. According to European Movement International, the UK relies on EU research funds for its organizations, businesses and universities.⁴¹⁵ The UK might not have an access to the R&D funds which is €90 million.⁴¹⁶ Exiting from the EU would also end up losing 32,000 EU academics working in the R&D field.⁴¹⁷ Also, the UK is unlikely to sustain its same access in European databases such as Europol in the no-deal scenario and it will try bilateral non-EU mechanisms. Also, if it wants to collaborate with Schengen countries, it would have to obtain European Court of Justice Jurisdiction as well as contribute to the EU budget. In addition to these, it would also have to be adhere to the EU's privacy standards.⁴¹⁸

5.3 The EU's Responses to the UK's Demands for Post-Brexit Security and Defense Partnership

The vital need to continued security and defense cooperation between London and Brussels was provisioned in The UK's 2015 Strategic Defense and Security

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

⁴¹⁵ European Movement International, Brexit, and now what? Possible Scenarios for Security and Defence, Europe for Citizens Programme of the European Union, 2017, p.4

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid.

Review (SDSR) and the EU's 2016 Global Strategy by focusing on the shared threats. The UK leaders argue that without a new security treaty ensuring the post-Brexit security relations, the EU-UK cooperation on confronting terrorism and criminal issues will lack the present day capabilities.⁴¹⁹

In the White Paper, the UK government examined the UK's position in the EU in a way that

It has worked with all Member States to develop a significant suite of tools that supports the UK's and the EU's combined operational capabilities, and helps keep citizens safe. The UK will no longer be part of the EU's common policies on foreign, defense, security, justice and home affairs. Instead, the Government is proposing a new security partnership that maintains close cooperation – because as the world continues to change, so too do the threats the UK and the EU both face.⁴²⁰

For these purposes, the UK government envisioned a new security partnership based on:

- sustaining the capabilities of the both parties in order to secure citizens' lives and making a law enforcement to share critical data and information so as to confront with serious criminality and terrorism.

- joining the agencies such as Europol and Eurojust so as to share information
- making arrangements on the coordination of foreign policy, defense and development areas in order to confront with international challenges and also ensuring the deployment of the UK's important assets, intelligence and capabilities for the European values.

- ensuring a joint capability development which composes of operational effectiveness of militaries, and increasing competitiveness of the European defense industry to face with the global challenges.

⁴¹⁹ Great Britain Office, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, 2015

⁴²⁰ HM Government, op.cit.,p.9

- developing a wider cooperation to confront with illegal migration and also through a strategic dialogue, cooperating on the issues of cyber security and terrorism, health security and also civil protection. ⁴²¹

The UK government also stresses that “the UK leaves the EU without leaving Europe”⁴²² As long as new and challenging security threats for both the EU and the UK do not recognize the borders, the security relationship of both parties would not be the same as before. The future security partnership will have to secure both the EU and the UK citizens. Thus, there should be a comprehensive and single security partnership to tackle terrorism threat, instabilities in the neighborhood, managing migration and using of data. In order to deliver the visions mentioned above, the security partnership should

- be notified by the shared security context;

- conserve the law and cooperation capabilities in criminal areas through sharing the sensitive data and information and ensure the cooperation in terrorism through Eurojust and the Europol and;

- continue cooperation on foreign policy, defense and development, including consultation on the global challenges that the UK and the EU face, coordination where it is more effective to work side-by-side, and capability development to deliver the means to tackle current and future threats; and

- ensure a joint action on wider security areas such as illegal migration, cyber security, terrorism, civil protection and health security. ⁴²³

The White Paper acknowledges that “the world is becoming more complex and volatile. These complex and overlapping challenges are likely to remain security

⁴²¹ Ibid., p.10

⁴²² Ibid., p.11.

⁴²³ HM Government, op.cit., p.53

priorities for the UK and the EU over the next decade. They require an unprecedented depth and breadth of cooperation to keep people safe across the whole of the continent.”⁴²⁴

The transition period aims to let citizens in Britain and businesses maintain the benefits negotiated by EU to its members. In this period, the United Kingdom will have to comply with the European treaties. Also, it will pay its budgetary contributions to the EU. Yet, participation in the decision making processes and political representation in the EU was not granted to the UK as a third country.⁴²⁵

After analyzing the participation from the UK’s side, it is important to discuss this issue from the EU’s perspective. To begin with, participation of third countries in CSDP institutional structures is a difficult task. Because, if the UK is granted so many privileges such as having power and voting rights in over projects or future strategic plans, other countries in the same position such as Turkey and Norway will demand the same rights. Cyprus and Greece are concerning the involvement of the UK in CSDP for that reason.

The EU’s Framework Participation Agreements (FPA) is mentioned in the Withdrawal agreement for the involvement of non-EU country to the CSDP’s civilian and military missions. Presently, 18 FPAs (one of them was with the US) have been signed. However, FPAs does not assure a guarantee involvement in the operations. Third countries can also participate through Battlegroups without taking on the role of framework nation. In addition to the Framework Participation Agreements, Administrative Arrangements (AA) also let the European Defense Agency (EDA) to cooperate with third countries. Nevertheless, these conditions will not suit for the UK as long as it seeks a more special relationship. The EU’s strategy on this issue is leaving

⁴²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.54.

⁴²⁵ Santopinto, *op.cit.*, p.17.

the door open for the possible future projects with the UK and also with a more precise agreement in which involvement of the UK in activities are clearly set.⁴²⁶

The possible future participation in the PESCO or EDF is possible. Yet, the possible participation to the missions/operations as a third country was not provisioned in The European Treaties. Santopinto argues “the conditions for third countries to access the EU’s decision-making procedures may well be tougher than those of NATO”⁴²⁷ Despite the problems that UK faces in this time of uncertainties, they are not altogether without alternative options. The UK’s ultimate position should be critically understood by the EU while forming a new relationship.

The Political Declaration foresees a “broad, comprehensive and balanced security partnership” includes both law enforcement and administrative collaboration in criminal issues and foreign policy, security and defense cooperation.⁴²⁸ In terms of operational cooperation, Paragraph 88 of the Declaration express both the EU and the UK will collaborate to identify terms for operational cooperation via Europol and Eurojust.⁴²⁹ While these two agencies are vital for the UK’s law enforcements, whether the cooperation with Eurojust and Europol will be different or not from the existing third country arrangements is a crucial point. In terms of Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing, the EU and the UK will cooperate through international organizations such as the Financial Action Task Force to deal with the money laundering and financing terrorism. With regard to Classified and sensitive non-classified information, the both parties admitted to deal a Security of Information Agreement with other Implementing Arrangements so as to preserve classified

⁴²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.20.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.21.

⁴²⁸ European Union Committee, Political Declaration, op.cit., para 80.

⁴²⁹ *Ibid.*, para 88.

information. Moreover, the UK will also withdraw from the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) while aiming to form adequate arrangements through formal negotiations. Overall, the future security relationship between the EU and the UK will be based on the UK's consent to follow both EU rules and the CJEU jurisdiction.

With an open ended clause, Paragraph 92 of the Declaration commits both parties to “support ambitious, close and lasting cooperation on external action”.⁴³⁰ In terms of Consultation and cooperation, Paragraph signifies a political dialogue between the two parties on both Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) by expressing “flexible consultation between the Parties at different levels”.⁴³¹ However, it is not precise about the UK's future position as a third country. Paragraph 97 also reflects that the “High Representative may, where appropriate, invite the United Kingdom to informal Ministerial meetings of the Member States of the Union”.⁴³² In terms of sanctions, The Declaration states that parties will follow independent sanctions policies in line with their respective foreign policies. However, it opens the door to forthcoming arrangements on sanctions which would be mutually binding. With regard to Operations and missions, the Declaration suggests a Framework Participation Agreement which can facilitate the UK's participation “on a case by case basis in CSDP missions and operations”. Importantly, the Declaration considers that the UK would join in the Force Generation conference which is about mission planning. This is an important status that is reserved by the EU member states. Thus, influence over the planning and designing the mission of the UK and its possible future cooperation and consultations would be significant. In terms of defense capabilities development, The Declaration envisages a future Administrative Agreement for the UK to

⁴³⁰ *Ibid.*, para 92.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*, para 97.

⁴³² *Ibid.*

participate in projects of the European Defense Agency which is also valid for non-EU third states such as Norway and Ukraine. Also, the UK would join the projects of the European Defence Fund. Also, through the invitation from the Council of the European, it could participate in the projects of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Finally, in terms of Development cooperation, Paragraph 108 offers a dialogue which will be based on “mutually reinforcing” attitudes in delivering cooperation. Next paragraph argues that the UK would participate in the EU development mechanisms. There is no additional clarity.⁴³³ In a nutshell, in the beginning of the negotiations, the UK took a hard negotiating position by proposing its red lines. However, it needed to soften these red lines in order to reach an agreement. Then, the EU expressed that there would be no renegotiation process. While abstaining to give additional clarities and privileges to the UK, the EU prefers to leave the door open for further developments in some areas mentioned above.

5.4 Alternative Models for the Post-Brexit EU-UK Security and Defense Relationship

5.4.1 Partnership through Bilateralism / Trilateralism

The UK’s both bilateral and trilateral relationship with the EU member states and states outside the Europe will be affected by Brexit. The aim should be focused on finding privileged partners for building bilateral or trilateral relations in the security and defense partnership outside the EU framework. Bilateral defense structures the UK established with EU member states exemplifies this option. One of them is Lancaster House treaties of 2010 between the UK and France which also established the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force for crisis management. Another bilateral structure was called Quadriga annual meetings between the UK and Poland. In

⁴³³ Ibid, para 108-109.

addition, collaboration between Germany and the UK ended up guarantying the UK's military presence in Germany post-2020. In terms of multilateral cooperation, Joint Expeditionary Force which was led by the UK involves seven EU member states out of nine states.⁴³⁴

Nevertheless, Whitman argues that “this may prove to be circumscribed if the defense aspects of the EU's Global Strategy (and especially PESCO) are brought fully into fruition.” Also, there is a possible risk for building this type of relationship outside the EU framework that the degree of complexity should only be achieved with broader and precise diplomatic relationship between the EU and the UK in order to secure a partnership that could replace the present set of relations.⁴³⁵

Finding format for future relationship between the UK, France and Germany will be a crucial task due to a political uncertainties that these states face at present. For example, France and Germany's mutual interests on a specific future agenda for the EU would clash with the UK's interests. Whitman argues “As the relationship between the UK, France and Germany extends beyond EU issues (and with existing collaboration on European and international security and global economic governance) a new trilateralism might be envisaged.”⁴³⁶

Outside of the EU framework, while the Three may pursue strong bilateral relationship, they will also face a dilemma in struggling to make their bilateral relations special. Pursuing privileged partnerships in which bilateral interests remain stable while pursuing a tactical bilateralism if needed would be the strategy for the UK.⁴³⁷In

⁴³⁴ Tania Latici, What role in European defence for a post-Brexit United Kingdom? European Parliamentary Research Service, 2019, p.2

⁴³⁵ Whitman, *op.cit.*, p.8.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.10.

order to achieve this type of relationship, the UK should pursue formal political dialogue arrangements with France and Germany such as the Nordic Union.⁴³⁸

Overall, the extent and degree of the UK's security and defense cooperation with the EU as a privileged partner will be clarified in the 'final status' the EU-UK agreement. There are three possible alternatives for the UK. In first case, the UK will entirely be opted into EU's foreign and security policy arrangements as the first non-member state which grants full participant rights. Alternatively, the UK may build a privileged partnership in specific areas in which bilateral interests are prone to be stable, yet the parties could pursue a tactical bilateralism. Partnership through formal political dialogue arrangements seems to be the most advantageous for the UK. Lastly, the UK will be locked out and treated as a non-privileged state. Internal security issues will be dependent on the form of Europol and also information sharing cooperation. Its associations in security and defense will be on similar terms as Norway which would not be advantageous for the UK.

5.4.2 Civilian Power Europe-PESCO Plus UK- Unleashed Continental Europe

The UK's vital defense capabilities and contributions to the CSDP have been analyzed earlier. After Brexit, CSDP's military capabilities will be decreased. As a result, the EU would seek fading CSDP and create a "civilian superpower" because without the presence and contributions of the UK, the EU will have to adjust its goals and aims to its own capacities.⁴³⁹ Despite the CSDP has developed with Franco-British collaboration after St Malo agreement, "the UK and (to some extent even) France have lost interest in a '*Europe-puissance*'.⁴⁴⁰ In post-Brexit partnership framework, the UK

⁴³⁸ Ibid.

⁴³⁹ Ham, op.cit., p.10.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid.

acknowledges that it could not play a leadership role in CSDP and also loses its membership status in EDA in which the UK contributed with its military and defense-industrial capabilities.

Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) of 2017 examines NATO as an important component of the UK's future defense and security policies by stressing 'special relationship' with the US. Moreover, SDSR also gives importance to bilateral relations with France, Germany and Poland without offering a commitment to CSDP.⁴⁴¹

While EUGS promotes a comprehensive approach for future security and defense strategies, it also signals a transition to a "Civilian Power Europe". From German's perspective, this transition suits its new leadership role in economic and political aspects of this outlook. Also, Ham argues that "Without British support, France is unable to instill *Realpolitik* in the EU's security discourse, which is now dominated by debates on humanitarian issues, dealing with climate change and intensifying cultural dialogue as key EU foreign and security policies."⁴⁴²

After Brexit, France and Germany would redirect their attention to permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) in order to increase their bilateral security and defense collaboration. With this mechanism, they would strengthen the EU's ambitions and arrive at European Defense Union (EDU). Both France and Germany were encouraged by Brexit to activate PESCO mechanism in order for a European Defense Union and sustaining close bilateral security and defense relations with the UK. The UK's interest in the EU is not in the comfort zone called civilian power but in the EU that develops high level of security and defense cooperation while being open to flexible arrangements with third non-EU countries.⁴⁴³ Therefore, PESCO is

⁴⁴¹ Great Britain Office, loc.cit.

⁴⁴² Ham, loc.cit.

⁴⁴³ Ham, op.cit., p.14.

recognized to compensate for the loss of Britain's defense capabilities in the CSDP and PESCO plus UK scenario pursues this logic of flexibility which is embedded in strong institutional frameworks.⁴⁴⁴ New initiatives on PESCO may create a more ambitious vision for the European Defense Union. Ham argues that "The cold-turkey option (which assumes that Brexit will not be well managed and less than congenial) may apply to the first phase (one year or so) after Brexit."⁴⁴⁵ Yet, geography matters in building a new partnership to cope with similar security and defense challenges.

Brexit might stimulate to drive to transform the EU's Political Union into a completely federal Europe including a strong security and defense element. Ham assumes that "although the UK has certainly not been single-handedly responsible for blocking the development of a more solid CSDP, Brexit has allowed the CSDP to become fully and organically incorporated within the process of federalizing the EU."⁴⁴⁶ However, the Eurosceptic voices in the EU would oppose this federal end-goal. Also, the EU may find that the Europe's security balance will be recalibrated after Brexit by further limiting its military relevance to US. Thus, the so called "small power EU" along with its military power after Brexit would reorganized itself by turning to a federal Europe with a CSDP. It would be the realistic solution to keep the US and NATO in Europe.

In terms of NATO and the UN, the EU and the UK should foster the implementation of EU-NATO cooperation. This cooperation should be backed by an EU-NATO Security Arrangement. In the absence of this arrangement, there would not be an exchange of important information and documents. Furthermore, the UK would also support the EU-NATO partnership through its membership in NATO with

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.16

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p.19.

initiatives and working groups that deal with capability development, security and defense planning and cyber-threats.⁴⁴⁷

In sum, if Brexit negotiation process is regulated well, the EU will confront with existential choices. These are following the Civilian Europe path while disregarding the CSDP, opting for a United States of Europe through a European Defense Union or preferring a more flexible and close security and defense cooperation that includes the UK within NATO.⁴⁴⁸ This option of the EU harmonizes the federal Europe choice with a concrete CSDP/EDU in order to eliminate the risk of losing the US and NATO. In this way, member states who traditionally held an Atlanticist view could grasp CSDP/EDU.

5.4.3 Partnership through Framework Participation Agreement and Permanent Observer Status

Both the EU and UK should aspire to develop an ambitious and special security and defense partnership while recognizing the UK's status a distinct player after Brexit. The UK already is and will continue to play a leading role in EU international development assistance with its capable forces as a member of the UN Security Council and NATO. Willing member states would share their capabilities and military forces under the European Defense Agency using the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). They also could benefit from PESCO in order for creating multinational forces in the aim of NATO or an EU mission/operation. The CFSP and CSDP are intergovernmental in nature and they are respecting the sovereignty of each member state in foreign and defense policy. Thus, there would be mechanisms involving the UK voluntarily but without a veto right in the EU security and defense issues while respecting the autonomy of both the UK and the EU. According to Blunt,

⁴⁴⁷ Whitman, *op.cit.*, p.14.

⁴⁴⁸ Ham, *op.cit.*, p.21.

mechanisms for the efficient arrangements for the EU-UK cooperation in security and defence after Brexit rest on three formulas⁴⁴⁹:

1. An Enhanced Framework Participation Agreement
2. Permanent Observer Status for the UK in the Political and Security Committee
3. Regular high-level political dialogue

Through, framework agreements, non-EU countries could participate in case-by-case CSDP missions/operations when they agree on the conditions. Several countries including Norway, Turkey, Canada, Serbia and Ukraine have framework agreements in place. In addition to these, the US also signed a Framework Agreement in order to attend EU-led crisis management operations in May 2011. However, these Framework Participation Agreements (FPAs) accommodate very limited of participation in the formulation and planning stages as the table below illustrates.

⁴⁴⁹ Crispin Blunt, Post-Brexit EU-UK Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2017, p.5

Table 9 The UK's post-transition security and defense options ⁴⁵⁰

| <i>UK level of engagement with EU</i> | <i>Type of EU instrument</i> | <i>Conditions of instruments</i> | <i>Pros for UK</i> | <i>Cons for UK</i> |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|--|---|
| High | Bespoke Treaty | Legally binding & ratification by European Parl. & EU members | Reflects joint UK-EU interests & allow for some secondment and staff/exchange of classified material | Unlikely to allow UK nearer EU decision-making tables & others likely to demand similar rights if granted |
| High | Association Agreement | Legally binding & ratification by European Parl. & EU members | Highest level of formal dialogue and greatest chance to influence EU | UK must respect internal market, customs union and four freedoms |
| Medium | Strategic Partnership Agreement | Legally binding, ratification by European Parl. and EU members | High levels of dialogue that extend into home security cooperation | Normally accompanied by extensive trade agreement & not unique |
| Medium | Partnership & Cooperation Agreement | Legally binding and consent of Council and European Parl. needed | Less formal than Assoc. Agt. but still extensive dialogue | Designed primarily for EU's neighbouring countries & not unique |
| Low | Framework Participation Agreement | Legal framework for third party contributions to CSDP operations/missions | Can be done on an case-by-case basis & demonstration of solidarity with EU | Inability to shape decisions on CSDP operation/mission mandates & not unique |
| Low | Declarations/ <i>ad hoc</i> alignment | Associate with declaration on bilateral basis | Allows for divergence when in UK interests | UK can only associate but not shape decisions & not unique |

Thus, NATO's bilateral relations with its partners could be an inspiration for the EU. Through this partnership, countries decide on the scope and intensity of their relations with NATO and also through bilateral partnership documents they express their aims within this bilateral cooperation. These established documents are including "Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP); Individual Partnership and Action Plan (IPAP); Annual National Programme (ANP)." ⁴⁵¹ In 2014, the EOP was established at the Wales Summit in order to enhance NATO's cooperation with partner states "which are eligible to have a more exclusive, tailor-made relationship with the Alliance."⁴⁵² Also, in the following years, the Enhanced Opportunities

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁵¹ Zandee and et.al, op.cit., p.19.

⁴⁵² Pauli Järvenpää, NATO's Truly Enhanced Partnership. Retrieved from International Centre for Defence and Security, 2016 website: https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2016/Pauli_Jarvenpaa_-_NATO_s_Truly_Enhanced_Partnership.pdf, p.3 (Accessed on 20 August 2019)

Partners (EOP) could broaden its scope by adding other qualified partners which are interested in developing a partnership and contributing new capabilities. NATO's close cooperation with five non-member allies such as Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan and Sweden which are called as 'Enhanced Opportunity' partners may be regarded as a role model for the future EU-UK cooperation. This cooperation could be beneficial while considering possible models for political dialogue and cooperation between the EU and UK after Brexit.⁴⁵³

Blunt lists additional elements in order to foster strong and reliable institutional ties between the EU and the UK such as:

- An automatic right of first refusal to participate in initiatives.
- A defined role in development of mission concept and purpose through PSC and CMPD consultation.
- The possibility of seconding national experts to relevant directorates of the EEAS and relevant committees.
- Guaranteed inclusion in force generation conferences and committee of contributors.
- The possibility of hosting Operating Headquarters (the UK could retain Northwood for ATALANTA and put Northwood or other centres at the disposal of future operations).
- An agreement for the sharing of confidential intelligence and planning documents, as the US has with the EU.⁴⁵⁴

Framework Participation Agreements (FPAs) have been used by non-EU states in attending CSDP missions however, they cannot participate in processes such as organization, preparation or commanding. After Brexit, the UK could suggest contribution to CSDP missions/operations with its vital capacities including strategic airlift or in ISR. In addition, for the future EU-UK security and defense partnership, arrangements on sharing intelligence will be important because of the UK's capacities and contributions in this area. Similarly, due to the UK's high-quality personnel

⁴⁵³ Blunt, loc.cit.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid.

capacities, its involvement in the civilian CSDP missions will be crucial for the EU. The UK's participation in the EU battlegroups should also be covered in such an agreement. Therefore, the EU would create a new FPA for a third party country with vital strategic importance for CSDP.⁴⁵⁵

In terms of the European Defense Agency (EDA), the UK has also had vital influence since 2004. While a country must be an EU member to participate in EDA, the non-EU countries could join EDA through Administrative Arrangements. For example, Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine, and Serbia have signed the Administrative Arrangements to this end. Administrative Arrangements enable countries' participation in interaction process, projects and voluntary personnel contributions.⁴⁵⁶ However, these Arrangements provide no rights on voting and automatic presence at any meeting. Therefore, the EU would form a new approach for non-EU states who are interested in security and defense partnership with the high-level commitments.⁴⁵⁷ These countries might participate in missions/operations and development processes and also EDF acts with the assumption of making financial contributions to the fund.⁴⁵⁸

For the future dialogue and close coordination on the security and defense issues, the UK should obtain a permanent observer status in the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The observer status would be defined by specific procedures and rules in terms of speaking rights and rights on agendas. Following cases should be rules: how the UK's positions will be recorded in terms of timing and documents and also when the UK representative will be absent from discussions. Through a special partnership treaty governing the observer status of the UK, the speaking right for the

⁴⁵⁵ Mölling and Giegerich, *op.cit.*, p.13.

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.14.

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

UK's representative should be given in discussions. This rule would not open doors for other third countries such as candidates while preparing the treaty.⁴⁵⁹

The UK's government has declared its interest in participating specific European programmes such as Horizon 2020 because making an appropriate contribution to these programmes was seen reasonable. Because, the UK government intends to ensure the continued cooperation of EU-UK researchers, universities and businesses in post-Brexit in terms of science and innovation. The Withdrawal Agreement allows this cooperation in European programmes along with funding until the end of 2020 and in post-Brexit era. So, negotiations would also include the future financing of these programmes and arrangements. As a new model of security and defense partnership, they could create external financing mechanisms for the possible contributions.⁴⁶⁰

5.4.4 The UK as an Integrated Player-Associated Partner-Detached Observer

As mentioned before, the UK will not be the participant of Foreign Affairs Council, European Council and Political and Security Committee after Brexit. However, the UK can still participate in the EU's security and defense structure with a special status under the form of EU+1 model. Such an Integrated player model assumes that in terms of CSDP, while the UK remains outside the EU, it would stay inside the CSDP by sustaining its existing commitments to present civilian and military arrangements. In addition, the UK would also continue its commitments in terms of Battlegroups as deployable forces. Moreover, the UK would continue to participate on a case-by-case projects by holding an associate membership status in the European Defense Agency (EDA). Furthermore, the UK would hold an observer status on the

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p.7.

⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p.8.

Agency's Steering Board while contributing to the European Defense Agency (EDA)'s budget.⁴⁶¹

Associated partner model demonstrates much looser EU-UK security and defense relationship than the integrated player model. This security and defense partnership would imitate the existing model between the EU and Norway. In this model, there should an arrangement where the UK would adjust itself with the EU's foreign policy actions, sanctions and as well as declarations at the invitation of the European Union. In this model, while the UK would be outside the military planning in the EU's structures, the UK would decide to join implementation aspects. In order for this, the UK should sign a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) to join in CSDP missions on case-by-case basis. Moreover, the UK may sustain its ongoing presence in an EU Battlegroup. Nevertheless, in the Associated Partner model, the UK would have no direct influence over the development of EU foreign, security and defense policies.⁴⁶²

In the Detached observer model, the UK will be separated both politically and organizationally from the EU's foreign, security and defense policies. Yet, the UK might prefer privileged bilateral relationships with EU member states. By doing so, the UK would use this as an advantage to influence the EU's foreign, security and defense policy other than seeking this aim with third party arrangements. While this model gives the UK a greatest autonomy, the UK's level of influence will shrink automatically in the EU's security and defense policy.⁴⁶³ In terms of CSDP, the UK might imitate the model of the EU-US practice. While the US did not participate in CSDP military missions, the US joined in CSDP civilian operations on a case-by-case

⁴⁶¹ Whitman, *op.cit.*, p.6.

⁴⁶² *Ibid.*

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*, p.7.

basis thanks to the framework agreement on crisis management operations signed in 2011.⁴⁶⁴

Table 10 Post-Brexit participation levels of the UK in the areas of CFSP and CSDP⁴⁶⁵

| | Battlegroups | European Defence Agency | Working Groups | Political and Security Committee | CSDP | | Foreign Affairs Council Membership |
|--------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|---|-----------------------------------|---------------------|---|
| | | | | | Civilian Operations | Military Operations | |
| Full EU membership | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Integrated player | YES | ASSOCIATE MEMBER | NO | SPECIAL STATUS (cooperation on selected agenda) | YES | YES | SPECIAL STATUS (in-Council cooperation on selected agenda) |
| Associated Partner | Permanent participation | Administrative Agreement | NO | NO | Framework Participation Agreement | | NO (Norway model –foreign policy synchronisation on 'dialogue' basis) |
| Detached observer | NO | NO | NO | NO | Case-by-case basis | NO | NO |

To sum up, options suggested by Mölling, Giegerich and Whitman overlap in some ways. For example, through FPAs, as a non-EU state the UK could continue to participate in case-by-case operations or missions in CSDP. However, this option comes with some drawbacks that the UK would not enjoy voting rights, automatic presence at meetings or any leadership role in decision making processes in which the UK expressed its intention as contradictory to this type of relationship. In addition, establishing a bilateral/trilateral or multilateral cooperation between interested EU member states and the UK is another option. The UK could form privileged relationships with some EU member states such as Germany, France or Poland. This thesis argues that the most viable option for future EU-UK security and defense relationship is that the UK will create bilateral/trilateral or multilateral partnership with willing EU member states while also supporting EU-NATO cooperation.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid., p.7.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid., p.6.

5.5 Recommendations for the Post-Brexit EU-UK Security and Defense Partnership

- Brexit should be seen as an opportunity for the EU to rethink its integration process.
- As long as the European Defense Fund (EDF) is the EU's vital tool to advocate a security defense integration process, the EDF rule of law and budget should be secured by the EP.
- The EU should precisely define the future security and defense partnership with the UK it should find the answer to whether the EU will build its strategic autonomy with the UK or not.
- The EU should deliberate on the UK's post-Brexit international posture before making final arrangements on the security and defense partnership especially in the areas of CFSP and CSDP.
- The EU's today wait and see strategy should transform to more flexible one by attracting the UK's attention and also keeping it in a certain distance.
- The future EU-UK partnership should be changeable aiming to see the behaviors of each other and degree to rely on commitments. For this reason, the EU should not put a harsh treaty in security and defense areas.
- The EU and the UK should create a framework for dialogue which is both formal and informal.
- The EU and the UK might draft a FPA that give enough room for both parties by defining the terms and level of association of the UK to the operations on case-by-case basis.
- The UK's cooperation through PESCO or EDA should be limited before proving itself in terms of willingness and behavior in the objectives of these policies. The level of cooperation would be changed during time.⁴⁶⁶
- The EU and the UK should continue to work through NATO as a common dialogue platform to ensure the security of European continent.

⁴⁶⁶ Santopinto, op.cit., p.40.

- The EU could replicate the US's relations with 'Enhanced Opportunity' partners to build a new security and defense relations.
- The UK would establish bilateral/trilateral or multilateral relationship with willing and interested member states.

5.6 Conclusion

In Chapter 5, declarations and agreements have been analyzed so as to reveal the EU's responses to the UK's demand on establishing Post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense partnership. The main aim for this section was to give an overview about the negotiation process on specifically security and defense areas. Also, major reasons for creating a Post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense partnership have been examined through the lens of both the EU and the UK as acting alone in this global arena filled with several unexpected threats and crisis is not a rational choice. For this reason, next section called Alternative Models for Post-Brexit EU-UK Security and Defense partnership has been presented several options for both the EU and the UK in terms of creating a post-Brexit partnership. This section has been divided four sub-sections including Partnership through bilateralism or trialateralism, Civilian power Europe-PESCO plus UK- Unleashed Continental Europe, Partnership through Framework Participation Agreement and Permanent Observer Status, The UK as an Integrated Player- Associated Partner or Detached Observer. These options would serve a guidance for other non-EU countries such as Turkey who are interested in establishing security and defense partnership with the EU. Finally, recommendations for establishing Post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense partnership have been given as a guidance for incomplete process between the EU and the UK. This study envisages that the most viable option for future EU-UK security and defense relationship is that the UK will create bilateral/trilateral or multilateral partnership with EU member states while also supporting EU-NATO cooperation. As long as both the EU and the UK continually express their red lines which slows down the process, this type of

relationship would serve as a pragmatic option in dealing with the security of European continent.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The UK decided to leave the EU on 23 June 2016 with a historical referendum. This leave decision is regarded as one of the major EU crisis in history because for the first time a member state has decided to leave the Union. Brexit vote which is related to the current socio-economic and political unrest paved the way for new discussions on European integration process. Furthermore, there are concerns over European disintegration that Brexit could lead to a domino effect and increase the anti-EU voices among member states. It is important to stress that Euroscepticism has not analyzed as a public debate, it has analyzed as a phenomenon that relates with the dissatisfaction of the UK citizens about the EU. Brexit referendum signifies that Leave decision was highly related to the concerns over national sovereignty and immigration while Remain side was propagating about the economic risks of Brexit. It can be concluded that the UK's negative and Eurosceptic image of the EU along with "left behind" communities played a vital role in the leave decision. Catherine Ashton who served as EU High representative and also as a first Vice President of the European Commission argued about three important reasons behind Brexit vote including pooling national sovereignty, stagnation of wages of workers and paying a lot of money to EU. So, there is now a question about the UK's new role in the European continent as a non EU member state. As long as isolation is not a logical option, there is a vital need to establish a new form of relation between the EU and the UK. In this respect, the aim of this thesis is to answer: How might the security and defense partnership between the EU and the UK be shaped after Brexit?

In order to better explore this question, the formal negotiation process and the UK's existing role along with 'possible' partnership models in the European security and defense framework are discussed. As the scholarly literature on post-Brexit

security and defense partnership is recently emerging, the main puzzle of this study is to find out the most viable option for both parties in an ongoing and incomplete process. Also, as most of the discussions concentrate on the future trade models including Norwegian, Swiss or Turkish ones, there is a shortage of sources that deal with the possible security and defense models for the future EU-UK partnership.

However, both parties' rhetoric and red lines give insight into a possible future partnership. In White Paper, the UK government proposed a detailed proposal for a principled and practical Brexit. It stresses the importance of European security and the UK's unconditional commitment in building a new security and defense partnership by acknowledging the common threats that the both parties face. Also, the Withdrawal Agreement which establishes a transition period until the end of 2020 outlines the proposed partnership with the UK. It was rejected by three times by the UK parliament. After her failed attempts to get a Meaningful Vote in the parliament, Theresa May declared her resignation and recently replaced by Boris Johnson as the new Conservative leader to have the responsibility to realize Brexit.

From the EU's side, there were several attempts to enhance European security including the establishment of CSDP, EDA, EDF, PESCO and close cooperation with NATO. Also, despite the timing publication was overshadowed by the Brexit vote, the new EU Global Strategy (EUGS) of 2016 demonstrated the EU's new strategic goals. However, these efforts also include some limitations. For example, in terms of CSDP, the centrality of member states with diverging strategic cultures and calculations, cost-benefits analysis of member states in operations/missions, limited financial contributions and also usage of resources blocks its capabilities. From the UK's side, its intention to enhance EU's autonomous decision-making along with its military capabilities in St. Malo was remarkable. On the one hand, the UK contributed to CSDP missions and operations in terms of finance, military equipment, expertise and personnel. However, the UK, especially in military operations, limit some aspects of CSDP by opposing the expansion of EDA and creation of permanent military EU operational headquarters. Rather, it chose to participate in capacity- building projects based on civilian missions. On the other hand, both parties acknowledge the

importance of NATO in their security and defense relations. Thus, NATO could act as bridge between the EU and the UK in post Brexit security and defense partnership as long as both the EUGS and the UK attach an essential role to NATO for collective defense. There is also a newly established phenomenon called ‘global Britain’ which refers to the UK’s post-Brexit foreign policy goals and ideas in which the UK pursues a new role in global arena in terms of economic openness, trade deals with rising powers such as China, and the renewal of its Commonwealth ties and its ‘special relationship’ with the US.”⁴⁶⁷ Boris Johnson signaled its intention to boost the UK’s global standing while focusing on trade deals with Asia and America. Since 2016, the UK government’s statements on the Brexit decision could be linked with the vision of ‘Global Britain’. According to the UK government, Brexit vote is not an intention of cutting itself from the world but it was as a catalyst for evolving to a Global Britain. Yet, the viability of Global Britain will serve as a test case for the UK’s new and ambitious future plans in global arena.

The future position of the UK in world affairs will also have an impact on the EU. Thus, there is a vital need to find a new security and defense partnership to secure the borders of Europe as long as reducing cooperation will not be a logical or intended option for both parties. Alternative models for post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense partnership have been presented in this thesis. These include partnership through bilateralism/trilateralism or multilateralism, civilian power Europe-PESCO plus UK- Unleashed Continental Europe, partnership through Framework Participation Agreement and permanent observer Status, the UK as an integrated player- associated partner or detached Observer. It is important to stress that signing a FPA is a minimum criteria for a non-member state participation. The UK’s possible participation formula would rely on signing a FPA plus detached observer. These options would also serve a guidance for other non-EU countries such as Turkey who are interested in establishing security and defense partnership with the EU. This thesis

⁴⁶⁷ Martill and Sus, op.cit., p.8.

concludes that the most viable option for future EU-UK security and defense relationship is that the UK will create bilateral/trilateral or multilateral partnership with privileged partners such as France, Germany or Poland while also supporting close and ambitious EU-NATO cooperation. By doing so, the EU could benefit from the British exit that without the UK's traditional opposition to more integration in defense and security policy and it could lead to a more flexible and effective EU security and foreign policy involving the UK in precise areas. In addition, the UK would have the opportunity to preserve its national interests and also to strengthen its position in both European and international arenas.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: TÜRKÇE ÖZET / TURKISH SUMMARY

İngiltere, 23 Haziran 2016'da yapılan tarihi bir referandumla AB'den ayrılmaya karar verdi. Brexit oyu, Avrupa dağılma süreci hakkında yeni akademik tartışmaların da önünü açtı. Brexit'in domino etkisine yol açabileceği ve üye ülkeler arasındaki AB karşıtı sesleri artırabileceğine dair endişeler ortaya çıktı. İşbirliğini azaltmak her iki taraf için de mantıklı veya amaçlanan bir seçenek olmayacağından Avrupa sınırlarını güvenceye almak için yeni bir güvenlik ve savunma ortaklığı bulmak oldukça önem arz etmekte olduğundan tez ana sorusu “Brexit'ten sonra AB ile İngiltere arasındaki güvenlik ve savunma ortaklığı nasıl şekillenebilir?” olarak belirlenmiştir. Bunun ile birlikte tez, “İngiltere vatandaşları neden AB'den ayrılmayı seçtiler” “Müzakere süreci nasıl gelişti?” “Brexit'ten sonra bir AB-İngiltere güvenlik ve savunma ortaklığı kurmak neden önemlidir?” ve “Brexit sonrası AB-İngiltere güvenlik ve savunma ortaklığı için olası seçenekler nelerdir?” gibi alt sorulara da cevap bulmayı hedeflemiştir. Bu soruların cevaplama adına sürecin tarihsel, siyasal ve olgusal kritik dönüm noktaları incelenmiş olup İngiltere ve Avrupa Birliği'nin gelecekte oluşturacakları alternatif güvenlik ve savunma politikaları içerisinde iki taraf için de en uygun model saptanmaya çalışılmıştır.

Avrupa Birliği'nin entegrasyon sürecini özetlemek gerekirse, 1950'lerin ortalarında AB, uluslararası uzlaşma ve örtülü halk desteği ile Avrupa entegrasyonunun temellerini attı. 1960'ların ortasında ise sektörel entegrasyondan genel ekonomik entegrasyona geçiş nedeniyle, Topluluk modeli ile hükümetler arası müzakere modeli arasında bir çatışma yaşandı. Bunun sonucunda elit entegrasyon modeli ortaya çıktı. 1980'lerde AB entegrasyonunun yeniden canlandırılması adına kurumsal ve politik reformlar gerçekleştirildi. 1990'larda Avrupa entegrasyon süreci

daha da politikleşmeye başladı ve işlevsel bir nitelik kazandı. 2000'li yıllarda Avrupa entegrasyonu, AB'ye kamu desteğinin azalması ve uluslarüstü politika ve kurumsal entegrasyona karşı direnç ile birlikte ulusal kimlik bağlamında yeniden siyasallaştırıldı. Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu'nun ekonomik başarısından sonra, Birleşik Krallık hükümeti 1961'de AET üyeliği için başvuruda bulundu. Bu, Birleşik Krallık için tarihi bir an oldu ve aynı zamanda Avrupa'daki ekonomik gelişmeleri takip etmesi adına büyük bir fırsattı. İngiltere, nispeten ekonomik düşüşünü yavaşlatmak için 1973'te AET'ye katıldı. İngiltere'nin AB'ye ilişkin dört bağlantılı stratejik hedefi: AB'nin dış ekonomik politikasının serbestleştirilmesi ve bu projeye paralel olarak AB'nin tek pazarını korumak ve derinleştirmek, AB genişleme sürecini takip etmek, hükümetlerarasılığı uluslarüstücülüğe tercih ederek bütünleşmenin derinleşmesine direnmek ve son olarak İngiltere'nin liderlik rolünü koruyarak AB'nin gelecekteki stratejik öncelikleri için gündem belirleyecek olan bir Fransız-Alman ortaklığının önlenmekti. 1975'te, hem Norveç hem de İngiltere, AET üyeliği ile ilgili referandum düzenledi. Referandum sorusu "İngiltere'nin Avrupa Topluluğu'nda (Ortak Pazar) kalması gerektiğini düşünüyor musunuz?" idi. Sonuç olarak, İngiliz nüfusunun % 67, 23'ü AB üyeliğini tercih ederken, % 32, 77'si AB üyeliğine karşı oy kullandı. İngiltere, entegrasyon sürecinin hükümetlerarası ilkelere dayanan pazar entegrasyonu ile sınırlı olması gerektiğini savundu. Bu bakış açısı, İngiltere'nin dışarda kalmayı tercih ettiği AB politikaları ve kararları da dahil olmak üzere İngiltere-AB ilişkileri için temel sorunlardan biriydi. İngiltere, Schengen sistemi, 1989'un Sosyal Şartı, Maastricht Antlaşması'na Sosyal Bölüm protokolü ve ortak para birimi politikalarının dışında kalmayı tercih etmiştir.

2008-2009 küresel durgunluğu, Avro Bölgesi'nin yapısı ve uygulanabilirliği ile ilgili endişeleri artıran Avro Bölgesi borç krizine yol açtı. Yükselen aşırılıkçılık ve terörizm AB için bir başka zorluktur. Benzer şekilde, Orta Doğu ve Afrika'daki istikrarsızlık, aşırılıkçılık ve çatışmaya bağlı göç akımları da Avrupa'yı tehdit etmekte. Küreselleşmenin getirdiği endişeler ile Avrupa kimliği kaybı söylemi Avrupa vatandaşlarının sağcı siyasi partilere desteğini arttırmıştır. Bunlar ile birlikte AB, güçlü liderlik eksikliği ve azalan dayanışma nedeniyle de eleştirilmekte. Çünkü

AB, Fransa ve Almanya'nın ortak bir para birimi yaratmasına katkısı veya Fransa ve İngiltere'nin ortak dış politika ve güvenlik politikalarına katkısı gibi temel politikaların geliştirilmesinde bu kilit üye devletlere bel bağlamıştır. AB için bir diğer önemli endişe, Trump'ın rekabetçi liberalizmi ve AB'ye olan şüphesi ile ilgilidir. Ayrıca, Trump'ın “Önce Amerika” sloganı, AB üye devletlerinin endişelerini arttırmakta. Son zamanlarda ise AB, İngiltere'nin AB'den beklenen ayrılışı ile ilgili mevcut bir sorunla karşı karşıyadır. İngiltere ise, küreselleşmeden kaynaklanan rekabet gücü, verimlilik ve yatırımın ekonomik baskıları ile mücadele etmektedir. Ekonomik büyüme hem AB içi hem de AB dışındaki göç seviyesini arttırıyor. İngiltere'nin borç / GSYH'ye oranı, finansal krizden kaynaklanan büyük bütçe açıkları nedeniyle artmıştır. Bu da, potansiyel enflasyona, ulusal borcun artmasına ve devlet tarafından gelecekteki harcamalarda düşüşe neden olabilir. İngiltere'nin, Rus saldırganlığı, Asya'daki jeopolitik gerilimler ve Orta Doğu'daki terörizm ile mücadele etme konusundaki ulusal yetenekleri açısından zorluk yaşayabilir. Dolayısıyla, İngiltere içerisindeki milliyetçilik, bu tür zorluklardan koruma ihtiyacından doğmuştur.

Avrupa şüpheciliklerinin anlamına baktığımızda karşımıza birkaç açıklama çıkmaktadır. Bunlardan biri, Avrupa şüpheciliklerini AB ve hedeflerini - özellikle daha fazla entegrasyon ve Avrupa Parlamentosu veya Avrupa Komisyonu dahil olmak üzere- bir hayal kırıklığı olarak nitelendirendir. Bunun yanında entegrasyon kavramına karşı da eleştirel bir tutum söz konusudur. Avrupa şüphecilikliği ayrıca, Avrupa'daki ekonomik ve politik entegrasyona muhalefet ve 1993'te Ekonomik Topluluğu'nun AB'ye dönüşümüne muhalefet olarak da karşımıza çıkmaktadır. İngiltere'deki Avrupa Şüphecilikğine bakıldığında, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra İngiliz ve kıta menfaatlerinin çatışması sonucu İngiliz siyasi elitleri arasında Avrupa entegrasyonuna bağlılık eksikliği durumunu görmekteyiz. İngiltere'nin ABD ile serbest ticaret ve ekonomik işbirliğine dayanan İngiliz siyasi ekonomisinin tarihi de bu süreçte karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Ayrıca, İngiliz kültürel “kimliğinin” inşası Avrupa şüphecilikliğini sürdüren bir diğer etkidir. İngiltere açısından o, uzun bir parlamenter demokrasi geleneği olan fethedilmemiş bir ada ülkesi olarak eşsiz konumu

bakımından Avrupa komşularından farklı bir konumdadır. Terim olarak Avrupa Şüpheciliği, 1980'lerin ortalarında İngiliz iç siyasetine ve medyasına girmiştir. Avrupa şüphecileri; AB'nin artan güçleri konusunda istekli olmayan insanlar olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Sadece savaş sonrası ürünü olarak değil, aynı zamanda köklü ulusal tutumların ürünü olarak algılanmaktadır. Benzer şekilde, İngilizler kendilerini diğerlerinden farklı, özel ve istisnai olarak tanımlamalar, Ulusal Benlik ile “Öteki” arasında bir çatışmaya yol açmıştır.

Avro ve Schengen'den vazgeçmesine rağmen, İngiltere AB ile pozitif bir ilişki kurmuştur ve iki taraflı ilişkiler yoluyla AB sorunlarını desteklemeye çalışmıştır. Bununla birlikte, Muhafazakar Parti, AB'deki Avro Bölgesi ve göç krizi ile ilgili ikili ilişkileri ihmal ederken İngiltere'nin dış politika çıkarlarına öncelik verdi. İngiltere, sınırları açısından ulusal egemenliğini, finansal çıkarlarını ve ulusal güvenliğini korumaya çalışmıştır. David Cameron 23 Ocak 2013 tarihinde Londra'da ünlü “Avrupa” konuşmasını yaptı ve Başbakan olarak yeniden seçilmesi durumunda İngiltere'nin AB üyeliğini yeniden müzakere etmeye söz verdi. Bu girişimde, sert Avrupa şüphecileri kilit bir hedefe ulaştı; çünkü AB'den çıkış seçeneğiyle birlikte olası bir Brexit oyu gündemdeydi. Mayıs 2015 Genel Seçimleri'nde, Muhafazakar Partinin çoğunluğu kazanmasının ardından Cameron, Avrupa'da İngiltere için “yeni bir yapılanma” görüşmesi planladı. Artık İngiltere'nin AB üyeliğini sorgulaması ve olası Brexit referandumu gündemdeydi. Mevcut ortam, geleneksel AB karşıtı duygular, küreselleşme, göç ve sosyo-ekonomik kaygılarla birleşti ve Avrupa şüphecisi partilerin desteklediği ulusal kimlik politikaları Brexit referandumu öncesi gündemde yer aldı. Brexit referandum kampanyasında, AB'de kalmayı savunan “İngiltere Avrupa'da Daha Güçlü” ve Birlik'ten çıkmayı savunan “AB'den Ayrılmaya Oy Ver” şeklinde iki taraf vardı. 24 Haziran'da, İngiltere'deki 33,5 milyon vatandaş bu ulusal referandumda oy kullandı ve seçmenlerin yüzde 51,9'u AB'den% 72,2'lik katılım oranıyla çıkmaya karar verdi. 13 Temmuz'da Theresa May, David Cameron'un yerine Başbakan oldu ve referandum sonucunu “Brexit Brexit'tir” sözüyle değerlendirdi. Referandum sonucunda, ulusal egemenlik ve göçmenlik konusu ayrılmak için oy kullananların ana nedenleri arasındaydı. Brexit'in doğuracağı

ekonomik kaygılar ise kalma yönünde oy kullanan seçmenler için önemli rol oynadı. Ülke içi oy verme davranışları açısından, çok kültürlü şehirlerde yaşayan insanlar AB'de kalma yönünde oy verirken; kırsalda ve Kuzey-Doğu kasabalarında yaşayanlar AB'den ayrılmak için oy kullandı. Ayrıca, genç, istihdamlı ve nitelikli seçmenler kalma yönünde oy kullanırken; yaşlı, işsiz ve daha az kalifiye olan seçmenler AB'den ayrılma yönünde oy kullanmıştır.

AB'den ayrılma konusundaki yasal süreç, Theresa May'ın 29 Mart 2017'deki 50. Maddeyi yürürlüğe koyması ile başladı. Müzakerelerin ilk aşaması, 22 Mayıs 2017'de AB-27 liderlerinin İngiltere ile Brexit müzakerelerini başlatma kararını almasıyla başladı. Altı tur süren müzakerelerin ilk aşamasında, AB ve İngiltere 8 Aralık 2017 tarihinde ortak bir rapor hazırladı. Bu raporda işlenen konular: vatandaşların hakları (serbest dolaşım hakkı), mali tablo (İngiltere'nin toplam çıkış maliyeti yaklaşık 40-45 milyar avro) ve Kuzey İrlanda sınırydı. AB ile İngiltere arasındaki Çekilme Anlaşması taslağı 28 Şubat 2017 tarihinde Avrupa Komisyonu tarafından yayımlandı. 24 Temmuz 2018'de, İngiltere ile AB arasındaki gelecekteki ilişkisi için ilkeli ve pratik bir Brexit yaşamak adına açıklamalar içeren Beyaz Kitap İngiltere hükümeti tarafından yayımlandı.

25 Kasım 2018'de yayımlanan Çekilme Anlaşması 585 sayfadan oluşan ve yasal olarak bağlayıcı bir belgedir. Anlaşma yalnızca bir kez genişletilebilen 21 aylık bir geçiş süresi sağlamaktadır. Bu anlaşmaya göre İngiltere, herhangi bir AB karar alma sürecine katılma hakkına sahip olmadan ve temsili olmadan Üye Devlet olarak kalacaktır. Anlaşmadaki kritik konular: 29 Mart 2019 ve 31 Aralık 2020 tarihleri arasında beklenen geçiş süresi, çıkış faturası olarak da bilinen mali çözüm, geçiş döneminden sonra AB vatandaşlarının hakları ve İrlanda / Kuzey İrlanda Protokolü'dür. İşbu anlaşmaya göre İngiltere'deki 3 milyon AB vatandaşı ve AB'deki 1 milyon İngiltere vatandaşı için kalma hakkı garanti altına alınmıştır. Ayrıca, İngiltere'nin üye devletken hem AB hem de İngiltere'nin vermiş oldukları finansal taahhütlerini yerine getirmesi kararlaştırılmıştır. Kuzey İrlanda'da kuzey ile güney arasında bir işbirliği yaratan 1998 Good Friday / Belfast Anlaşması'na saygı duyarak, İrlanda'da fiziki bir sınır oluşmasını önlemek amaçlanmıştır. Çekilme Anlaşması,

gelecekteki AB-İngiltere ticaret ilişkilerinin şartlarını göstermez, bu ilişkiler Brexit sonrası müzakere edilecektir.

Geçiş Dönemi, işletmelerin ve vatandaşların kendilerini yeni düzenlemelere hazırlamaları için zaman tanımak ve siyasi bildirim şartlarına dayanarak gelecekteki ilişki anlaşmalarını müzakere etmek adına 31 Aralık 2020'de sona erecek şekilde kabul edilmiştir. Geçiş süresi 2022 sonuna kadar sadece bir veya iki yıl uzatılabilir. Bu dönemde İngiltere, AB Gümrük Birliği'ne ve Tek Pazar'a katılabilecek ve AB'nin ticaret politikasına bağlı kalacaktır. Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası, geçiş dönemi boyunca İngiltere'ye uygulanacaktır. İngiltere, ODGP altındaki AB askeri ve sivil misyonlarına / operasyonlarına liderlik rolü olmadan katılabilecektir. İngiltere, PESCO projelerine katılabilmek için üçüncü bir ülke olarak davet edilebilecektir. Ayrıca, AB üye devleti iken üstlenilen finansal yükümlülüklerini ödemekle yükümlü olacaktır.

25 Kasım 2018'de yayımlanan Siyasi Deklarasyon, gelecekteki İngiltere-AB ilişkisi üzerine resmi müzakereleri ortaya koymaktadır. Bu deklarasyonun ana argümanları: “serbest ve adil ticaret, bireysel hakları ve hukukun üstünlüğünü savunmak, işçileri, tüketicileri ve çevreyi korumak ve kişisel hak ve değerlere dışarıdan ya da içeriden gelen tehditlere karşı birlikte hareket etmek”tir. Çekilme Anlaşması'nın aksine, Siyasi Deklarasyon yasal olarak bağlayıcı bir belge değildir. Siyasi Deklarasyon tarafından sağlanan Ekonomik Ortaklık, iddialı ve dengeli bir ortaklık kurmayı amaçlayarak daha geniş sektörel işbirliği ile serbest ticaret bölgesine dayanmaktadır. Güvenlik Ortaklığı ise; siber güvenlik, sivil koruma, sağlık güvenliği, yasadışı göç ve terörle mücadele gibi çeşitli alanlardan oluşacaktır. İngiltere ve AB, sınıflandırılmış ve hassas sınıflandırılmamış gizli bilgi ve verileri paylaşacaktır. İki taraf bir diyalog, danışma ve bilgi alışverişi içerisinde olacaktır. Çekilme Anlaşması'nı üç kez parlamentodan geçirme girişimlerinden ve hepsi reddedildikten sonra Theresa May, 24 Mayıs'ta istifasını ilan etmiştir. 23 Temmuz'da Boris Johnson, en yakın rakibi Jeremy Hunt'ı mağlup ettikten sonra yeni Muhafazakar Parti lideri ve Başbakan seçildi. Yeni Muhafazakar Parti liderinin anlaşmayı mecliste geçirip geçirmemekte başarılı olup olmayacağını zaman gösterecektir.

Soğuk Savaşın sona ermesinden bu yana, AB dış ve güvenlik politikası alanında önemli gelişmeler kaydetmiştir. Avrupa Konseyi, 2013 yılında “ortak güvenlik ve savunma politikasının (OGSP) etkinliğini, görünürlüğünü ve etkisini artırmak; kapasitesini geliştirmek ve Avrupa'nın savunma sanayisini güçlendirmek adına birçok önemli adım atmıştır. OGSP 2003'ten bu yana toplamda 34 adet sivil ve askeri operasyon/misyonlarda bulunmuştur. Fakat “kapasite-beklenti” açığı Avrupa'nın güvenlik ve savunma entegrasyonuna darbe vurmaktadır. Şu göz önünde bulundurulmalıdır ki, beklentilerin belirgin bir şekilde artması durumunda, daha büyük bir politik ve kurumsal ilerleme için bir zorunluluğu doğmaktadır. Mevcut eksiklikler OGSP operasyonlarının yeteneğini sınırlamakta ve AB imajını zedelemektedir. Bunların arasında; üye devletlerin kriz yönetimindeki risk hesaplamaları, üye devletlerin OGSP operasyonlarında rasyonel maliyet ve fayda hesaplamaları ve sınırlı mali katkıları, operasyonların tutarlılığı ve etkinliği ve ev sahibi devletin katılım oranı yer almaktadır. Özetle, devletlerin merkezîyetçi politika uygulamaları OGSP kapsamında devam etmektedir. Bu durumda ise NATO'nun Avrupa güvenliğindeki hayati rolü pek değişmemiştir. OGSP hükümetler arası bir niteliğe sahip olsa da, üye devletler karar alma güçlerini bir kuruma aktarmakta isteksiz davranmaktadır. Ulusal politikalarda yapılandırılmış bir işbirliğinin olmayışı nedeniyle, AB ulusal sınırlar çerçevesinde ayrılmaya devam etmektedir. İngiltere hükümetleri OGSP'ye karşı temkinli bir yaklaşıma sahipken; Avrupa yanlısı Fransız görüşü, NATO içerisinde bağımsız bir Avrupa askeri kapasitesini savundu. İngiltere ise AB savunma politikasının gelişimini NATO'yu tamamlayıcı nitelikte gördü. Ayrıca, İngiltere, Avrupa savunmasını ve transatlantik ilişkiyi sıfır toplamlı bir oyun olarak gördü. Özellikle askeri operasyonlarda İngiltere, OGSP'nin kendi çıkarlarıyla çelişen yönlerini engellemeye çalıştı ve sivil misyonları temel alan kapasite geliştirme projelerine katkıda bulunmayı tercih etti. Avrupa Savunma Ajansı (EDA) gibi inisiyatiflere ilgi ve bağlılık eksikliği yaşadı. Şu göz önünde bulundurulmalıdır ki İngiltere'nin savunma alanındaki yetenekleri ihmal edilemez niteliktedir ve AB üye ülkeleri Brexit'ten sonra mevcut OGSP çerçevesinde İngiltere'nin güvenlik ve savunma yeteneklerinin kaybını telafi etmekte zorlanabilir.

AB, 2003 yılında Avrupa Güvenlik Stratejisi ve 2016 yılında Avrupa Güvenlik ve Küresel Stratejisi olmak üzere iki güvenlik stratejisi ilan etti. Birincisi, “Avrupa hiç bu kadar müreffeh, bu kadar güvenli ya da bu kadar özgür olmadı” diyerek, daha iyimser bir dile sahipti. İkincisi ise “Birliğimizin amacı, hatta varlığı sorgulanmaktadır” ifadesini içerir. 2016 yılındaki Avrupa Güvenlik ve Küresel Stratejisi, liberal ve kurala dayalı yönetişimi destekleyerek Avrupa şüpheciliğine ve küreselleşme karşıtlığına ortak bir tepki niteğilindedir. Aynı zamanda, AB’nin Avrupa karşıtlığı çağındaki amaç ve önceliklerini vurgulayan sofistike bir belgedir. Hukuk ve yönetişimin önemini vurgulamaktadır. Coğrafi öncelikler üzerinde durmasından kaynaklı da önceki belgelerden farklıdır. İngiltere’nin AB’den çıkması, AB’nin kapasitesinin düşmesine yol açabilir. Öte yandan, kayıp, üye devletlerin daha yakın ve sürekli işbirliği kurma çabaları ile telafi edilebilir. İngiltere’nin diplomatik ağı ve ayrıca askeri yeteneklerle birlikte güvenlik ve savunma stratejisini içeren küresel görünümdeki gelecekteki konumu, Avrupa’nın güvenliğini şekillendirecektir.

Avrupa Savunma Ajansı (ASA) ile birlikte savunma entegrasyonunu güçlendirmek için Lizbon Antlaşması ile Daimi Yapısal İşbirliği (DYİ) tanıtılmıştır. DYİ, GSYİH'larının veya askeri güçlerinin büyüklüğünden ziyade üye devletlerin katkılarına ve niyetlerine dayandırılmıştır. DYİ taahhütlerinin yerine getirilmesi için 2018-2020 ve 2021-2025 olmak üzere iki süreç bulunmaktadır. DYİ projelerine göre NATO üye devletlerinin 2024 yılına kadar GSYİH’nın% 2’sini savunma için harcayacakları taahhütü vardır. Ayrıca, Savunma Koordineli Yıllık İnceleme'nin uygulanması ve Avrupa Savunma Fon’una katılım söz konusudur. Bunlara ek olarak, AB liderliğindeki operasyonlar için operasyonel kapasiteleri arttırmak amaçlanmıştır. PESCO projelerine önemli bir değer katabilecek üçüncü ülkeler, AB üye ülkeleri tarafından bu projelere davet edilebilir. Ancak bu ülkelere karar verme hakkı verilmemektedir. Dolayısıyla, bu hakların yokluğu, politikaları şekillendirme açısından İngiltere’nin çıkarlarıyla çelişebilir.

ABD’nin İngiltere’yle ilişkisi, ortak fikirler, paylaşılan değerler, ortak uluslararası engeller ve Atlantikçi bakış açısına sahip liderler tarafından belirlenebilir. İngiltere, Avrupa ile ABD arasındaki jeostratejik bir bağlantı olarak

konumlandırıldığında, NATO ile ilişkilerde her zaman kilit bir rol oynamıştır. Avrupa sınırlarının güneyindeki ve doğusundaki istikrarsızlıkların artması ışığında ABD ekonomik ve güvenlik çıkarlarının merkezinde olmaya devam edecektir. Bu nedenle, İngiltere'nin gelecekteki güvenlik ve savunma stratejisi NATO ve AB arasındaki dengeye dayanmalıdır. Bununla birlikte, ABD'nin konumu, söylem ve ilişki algısı açısından üçlü ilişkilerde çok önemli olacaktır. İngiltere açısından, Brexit sonrası güvenlik ve savunma menfaatlerinin temeli olarak hem NATO'ya hem de AB'ye ihtiyaç duyduğu sürece ilişkiler pozitif toplamı bir oyun olarak görülmelidir.

İngiltere'nin AB'deki güvenlik ve savunma yetenekleri ve aktörlüğü incelediğinde göz ardı edilemeyecek bir öneme sahip olduğunu görülmektedir. İngiltere finansal, askeri teçhizat, uzmanlık ve OGSP personeli katkıları bakımından önemli bir devlettir. Ortak tehditleri ele almak için diğer üye devletlerle işbirliği içerisinde olup insansız hava araçları (İHA), insan zekası ve elektronik savaş kapasiteli konuşlandırılabilir askeri güce sahiptir. Ayrıca Fransa ile birlikte en büyük iki Ar-Ge harcaması yapan devlet olup önemli nükleer güce de sahiptir. Bunların yanında İngiltere, NATO'nun GSYİH'nin yüzde 2'si harcama hedefini karşılayan tek Avrupa devletidir. 2016 yılında Resmi Kalkınma Yardımı harcamalarında, Almanya ve ABD'den sonra dünya çapında üçüncü bağışçı ülke olarak yer aldı. Ayrıca, Çatışma, İstikrar ve Güvenlik Fonu'na 1,2 milyar Sterlin'lik katkısı bulunmaktadır.

İngiltere'nin gelecekteki güvenlik ve savunma ortaklığına bağlılığını şu gerekçelerle değerlendirmektedir: 1) Küresel İngiltere alternatifinin uygulanabilirliği (Küresel İngiltere kavramı, Brexit sonrası dış politika hedeflerini ve İngiltere'nin ekonomik açıklığı, Çin gibi yükselen güçlerle ticaret anlaşmaları açısından "küresel alanda yeni bir rol üstlendiği düşüncelerini ve Milletler Topluluğu ile ilişkilerinin yenilenmesi ve ABD ile 'özel ilişkisi' ni ifade eder), 2) İngiltere'nin AB'nin yönettiği politikalara, programlara ve operasyonlara katılma konusundaki ilgisi, 3) müzakereler bağlamında yakın işbirliğinin mümkün olup olmadığı. Theresa May'ın "Küresel İngiltere" fikri, 21. yüzyılın gerçekleriyle ve ABD'nin Asya-Pasifik'e yönelttiği coğrafi ve ekonomik çıkarlarla uyumsuzdur. Çin ve Japonya gibi bölgelerde küresel bir İngiltere için mevcut bir talep olup olmadığı bir diğer tartışma

konusudur. Ayrıca, İngiltere'nin 1960'lı yıllardan bu yana askeri yeteneklerinde ve nükleer caydırıcılığindeki azalma ile ABD'nin teknolojisine ve stratejisine bağlılığı bu iddaayı gerekçelendirmektedir. Böylelikle, Avrupa seçeneğinin uygulanabilirliği, ulusal egemenlik maliyetinin düşük tutulduğu nispeten kabul edilebilir bir işbirliği çerçevesinin bulunmasına bağlıdır.

Brexit'in AB-İngiltere güvenlik ve savunma ortaklığı üzerindeki etkileri bir diğer önemli husustur. Brexit, OGSP'deki güç dengesine değiştirerek yeni ittifakların ortaya çıkarabilirken İtalya gibi ülkelerin de rolünü arttırabilir. İngiltere'nin sivil operasyonlara katkısının çok fazla olması nedeniyle OGSP'nin operasyonlarının sivil tarafında daha büyük bir etki beklenmektedir. Ayrıca, devam eden Althea misyonu, NATO'ya Berlin Plus ile bağlı bir operasyon olduğu için etkilenebilir. AB, tüm dünyaya silahlı kuvvetlerini dağıtabilecek bir üye devleti kaybedecek ve GSYİH'da 150 milyon € düşüş yaşayacaktır. AB vergi gelirlerinde yaşanacak 40 milyon Euro'luk kesinti sebebiyle 2.870 iş kaybı yaşanacaktır. Bunlara ek olarak, İngiltere'nin BM Güvenlik Konseyi'deki daimi oturumu sayesinde sağladığı temel diplomatik ağılar kaybedilecektir.

İngiltere'nin AB arasındaki yakın işbirliğine olan ilgisi, 'Küresel İngiltere' fikrinin İngiliz yetenekleri ve değişen uluslararası çevre açısından gerçekçi olmadığı için gelecekte daha da artma eğiliminde olacaktır. İngiltere, ABD'nin taahhüdünün azalması nedeniyle bölgesel istikrarı güvence altına alarak güvenilirliğini geri kazanmaya çalışacaktır. Brexit sonrası, üye ülkeler, eğer İngiltere iyi bir anlaşma elde ederse, AB üyeliğinden elde ettikleri faydaları sorgulayabilir. AB kararlarında Brexit sonrası İngiltere'nin veto riski olmadığı göz önüne alındığında AB yeni güvenlik ve savunma girişimleri başlatabilir. Benzer çıkarları ve yetenekleri olan üye devletler, Avrupa savunmasını artırarak daha gelişmiş projeler başlatabilir. Bu bağlamda, Franco-İngiliz ortaklığının yerini alması adına AB güvenliği ve savunmasında yeni bir ortaklık bulmak önem kazanacaktır. İngiltere'nin olası çıkışının her bir partiyi Rusya veya IŞİD gibi uluslararası zorluklarla başa çıkmada daha güçlü hale getirmeyecek, aksine, tehditlere daha yatkın olacaktır. İzole olmak Batı dünyasının çıkarları ve değerlerini korumak için bugünün dünyası adına mantıklı bir taktik

olmayacağından İngiltere, Avrupa dayanışması ve transatlantik ortaklığa uyum sağlamalıdır.

İngiltere'nin AB ile gelecekte kuracağı güvenlik ve savunma ilişkisi bağlamındaki çeşitli alternatifler bulunmaktadır. Bunlardan ilki ikili/üçlü veya çoklu ortaklıktır. İngiltere, ikili çıkarların istikrarlı olmaya eğilimli olduğu belirli alanlarda imtiyazlı bir ortaklık kurabilir, ancak taraflar taktiksel taraflılık izleyebilir. Resmi siyasi diyalog düzenlemeleriyle ortaklık, İngiltere için avantajlı olabilir. İngiltere imtiyazsız bir devlet olarak ele alınacak olup iç güvenlik sorunları bilgi paylaşım işbirliğine bağlı olacaktır. Diğer alternatif modelde AB, OSGP'yi yok sayıp "sivil bir süper güç" yaratacaktır; çünkü İngiltere'nin varlığı ve katkıları olmadan, AB hedeflerini ve amaçlarını kendi kapasitelerine göre ayarlamak zorunda kalacaktır. Bu alternatife ek olarak Fransa ve Almanya, ikili güvenlik ve savunma işbirliğini arttırmak için dikkatlerini daimi yapısal işbirliğine (DYİ) yönlendirebilir. Ya da Brexit, AB'nin Siyasi Birliği'ni güçlü bir güvenlik ve savunma unsuru da dahil olmak üzere tamamen federal bir Avrupa'ya dönüştürmek için teşvik edebilir. Fakat AB'deki Avrupa karşıtı sesler bu federal son hedefine karşı çıkabilir. Diğer alternatif modeller olan Çerçeve Katılım Anlaşması ve kalıcı gözlemci statüsü ile ortaklık, İngiltere'yi gönüllü olarak içeren ancak AB güvenlik ve savunma konularında veto hakkı olmayan ve hem İngiltere'nin hem de AB'nin özerkliğine saygı duyan mekanizmalardır. Bu mekanizmaların içerisinde: Gelişmiş Çerçeve Katılım Sözleşmesi, Siyasi ve Güvenlik Komitesi'nde İngiltere İçin Kalıcı Gözlemci Statüsü ve Düzenli üst düzey politik diyalog mevcuttur. Çerçeve anlaşmaları kapsamında, AB üyesi olmayan ülkeler, şartlar üzerinde anlaşmaları halinde, duruma göre OGSP misyonlarına / operasyonlarına katılabilir (Norveç, Türkiye, Kanada, Sırbistan ve Ukrayna gibi). Fakat, bu çerçevede üye olmayan ülkenin sürecin formülasyon ve planlama aşamalarına katılımı sınırlı kalmaktadır. Bu bağlamda NATO'nun "Gelişmiş Fırsat" ortakları olarak adlandırılan Avustralya, Finlandiya, Gürcistan, Ürdün ve İsveç gibi beş üye olmayan müttefiki ile yakın işbirliğinin gelecekteki AB-İngiltere işbirliği için bir rol model olarak kabul edilebilir. Ayrıca, AB üyesi olmayan ülkeler Avrupa Savunma Ajansı'na İdari Düzenlemeler yoluyla katılabilirler. İdari Düzenlemeler,

lkelerin etkileşim sürecine, projelere ve gönll personel katkılarına katılımını saęlamaktadır. İşbu Dzenlemeler, ye olmayan devletlere herhangi bir toplantıda oy kullanma ve otomatik olarak bulunma hakkı vermez. Bu lkeler misyonlara / operasyonlara ve gelişim süreçlerine katılabilir ve Avrupa savunma fonuna mali katkı yapma varsayımıyla hareket ederler. Gelecekteki diyalog ve güvenlik ve savunma konularında yakın koordinasyona sahip olan İngiltere, Siyasi ve Güvenlik Komitesi'nde kalıcı bir gözlemci stats edinebilir. Gözlemci durumu, konuşma hakları ve gündemdeki haklar bakımından özel usul ve kurallarla tanımlanacaktır.

Gelecekteki konumu itibari ile “Entegre Oyuncu” olarak İngiltere, AB + 1 modeli biçiminde özel bir stat alır. İngiltere, Brexit'ten sonra Dışışleri Konseyi, Avrupa Konseyi ve Siyasi ve Güvenlik Komitesi'ne katılamaz. İngiltere AB dışında kalsa da, OGSP açısından sivil ve askeri dzenlemeleri sunma konusundaki vaatlerini srdrebilir. Ayrıca, konuşlandırılabilir güçler bakımından taahhtlerine devam edebilir. İngiltere, Avrupa Savunma Ajansı'nda ortak yelik stats elde ederek vaka bazında projelere katılmaya devam edebilir ve btçeye katkıda bulunurken Ajans'ın Ynetim Kurulu'nda gözlemci statsne sahip olabilir. “İlişkili Ortak Modeli”, Entegre Oyuncu modelinden daha gevşek bir AB-İngiltere güvenlik ve savunma ilişkisini göstermektedir. Bu model AB ile Norveç arasındaki mevcut modeli taklit etmektedir. İngiltere, AB'nin yapılarında askeri planlamanın dışında kalırken, İngiltere uygulama ynlerine katılmaya karar verebilir. Bunun için İngiltere, duruma gre OGSP misyonlarına katılmak için bir Çerçeve Katılım Anlaşması imzalamalıdır. Bununla birlikte, İlişkili Ortak modelinde, İngiltere'nin AB dış, güvenlik ve savunma politikalarının gelişimi zerinde doęrudan bir etkisi olmayacaktır. “Mstakil Gzlemci” modelinde, İngiltere hem siyasi hem de rgtsel olarak AB'nin dış güvenlik ve savunma politikalarından ayrılacaktır. İngiltere, AB ye lkeleriyle imtiyazlı ikili ilişkileri tercih edebilir. Bu model İngiltere'ye en byk zerklięi verirken, İngiltere'nin AB'nin güvenlik ve savunma politikasındaki etkisi dramatik şekilde azalacaktır. OGSP açısından İngiltere, AB-ABD uygulamasının modelini taklit edebilir. ABD OGSP askeri misyonlarına katılmamışken, sivil operasyonlara vaka bazında katılım gstermiştir. Bu modeldeki dezavantajlar ise İngiltere, oy

kullanma haklarından, toplantılarda otomatik olarak varlığından veya karar verme süreçlerindeki liderlik rolünün varlığından mahrum kalacaktır. İngiltere'nin Brexit sonrası AB ile oluşturacağı gelecekteki partnerlik modeli, AB ile güvenlik ve savunma ortaklığı kurmak isteyen Türkiye gibi diğer AB dışındaki ülkeler için de rehberlik yapacaktır. Bu tez, gelecekteki AB-İngiltere güvenlik ve savunma ilişkisi için en uygun seçeneğin, İngiltere'nin Fransa, Almanya veya Polonya gibi ayrıcalıklı ortaklarla ikili ve üçlü veya çok taraflı ortaklık kurmak ve aynı zamanda yakın ve iddialı AB-NATO işbirliğini desteklemek olduğunu savunmaktadır. Böylece AB, İngiltere'nin savunma ve güvenlik politikasında daha fazla entegrasyona karşı olan geleneksel muhalefeti olmadan daha etkili bir AB güvenlik ve dış politikası oluştururken İngiltere de, hem ulusal çıkarlarını koruma bağlamında hem de Avrupa kıtasında ve uluslararası arenada konumunu güçlendirme fırsatına sahip olacaktır.

APPENDIX B: TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics

Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Marine Sciences

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname:

Adı / Name

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