CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF NATIONALISM DISCOURSE IN TURKISH
HISTORICAL ADVENTURE MOVIES
(1965-1980)

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ABSTRACT

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This study aims to present a contextual analysis of nationalism discourse in Turkish historical adventure movies which were made as film series (Tarkan, Karaoğlan,Malkoçoğlu, Kara Murat and Battal Gazi) between 1965 and 1980. To provide the necessary theoretical basis, Gramsci's theory of ideology together with critical discourse methodology is applied. As such, this study conceptualizes a non-reductionist and contextual understanding of ideology in order to show the dynamic relation between cinema, politics and society. To provide the basis for the contextual reading of the selected movies, (operationalizing Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony) in which ways Turkish nationalism is articulated with the ideological frames of right-wing hegemony between 1965 and 1980 is defined. To see, in which ways Turkish nationalism is constructed and how this discursive construction is socio-politically conditioned, the discourse of Turkish nationalism in the movies is analyzed. This discourse analysis aims to present (1) how Turkish national identity is constructed, (2) in which ways the other/enemy is defined and (3) how Turkish national history is narrated within the selected movies.

ÖZ

TARİHİ AVENTÜR TÜRK FİLMLERİNDEKİ MİLLİYETÇİ SÖYLEMİN SOSYO-POLİTİK ANALİZİ
(1965-1980)

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Bu çalışma 1965 ve 1980 yılları arasında seri olarak çekilen tarihi avantür Türk filmlerindeki (Tarkan, Karaoğlan, Malkoçoğlu, Kara Murat ve Battal Gazi) milliyetçi söylemin sosyo-politik ve tarihsel bir analizini sunmayı amaçlar. Gramsci'nin ideoloji teorisi ve eleştirel söylem analizi bu tez için gerekli kavramsal çerçeveyi sunar. Böylece, sinema, toplum ve siyaset arasındaki dinamik ilişkiyi göstermek için indirgemeci olmayan ve sosyo-politik bağlamdan da kopuk olmayan bir ideoloji kavramsallaştırması geliştirilir. Filmlerin sosyo-politik söylem analizini sunmak için, Gramsci'nin hegemonya kavramı işlevselleştirilir ve 1965 ve 1980 yılları arasında Türk milliyetçiliğinin sağ hegemonyayla ideolojik ilişkisi belirlenir. Bu filmdeki Türk milliyetçiliğinin söylemsel olarak nasıl inşa edildiği ve bu söylemin dönemin sosyo-politik bağlamıyla olan ilişkisi irdelenir. Filmlerdeki Türk milliyetçiliği söylemi (1) Türk milli kimliğinin nasıl kurgulandığı (2) öteki/düşmanın nasıl tanımlandığı ve (3) Türk milli tarihinin nasıl anlatıldığı üzerinden incelenir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Tarihi avantür türk filmleri, milliyetçi söylem, Türk milliyetçiliği, ideoloji

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1.The Rationale of the Research

In Turkey, historical movies and television series have gained popularity especially in the last decade. Rising popularity of Diriliş Ertuğrul, Mehmetçik Kut'ül Amare, Payitaht Abdülhamid and Muhteşem Yüzyıl television series, and Fetih 1453, Direniş Karatay movies would be given as the most popular examples. These movies and television series are criticized due to the lack of accuracy and not complying with the historical facts. The goal of these movies is, in fact, enjoyment, not just history education or propagation. History is used and abused as a marketable narrative to attract audiences and to draw profit. Yet, the picture is not that simple because how past is constructed is not independent from politics and ideology. The discourse of cinema including the images, figures, myths, social practices, theoretical positions, narratives and systems of beliefs are conditioned by the socio-political context while simultaneously bound together to construct and disseminate certain ideologies and (re)produce power relations.

Within this context (the rising popularity of historical movies), there was further an attempt to re-make the movies of historical adventure genre. Fatih'in Fedaisi: Kara Murat (2015), Karaoğlan (2013) were the products of this attempt. Regarding the rise of historical movies in contemporary Turkey, the analysis of historical adventure movies is a trending (not an outdated) subject. This research aims to present a contextual analysis of the nationalism discourse in historical adventure movies made between 1965 and 1980. Gramscian theory of 'ideology' together with 'critical discourse methodology' provides the theoretical basis for this

research. This research critically scrutinizes the content, constituents, claims and traits of nationalism discourse in the movies. As such, it would provide important insights to comprehend how historical movies construct certain meanings and social relations through constructing a fictional past instead of mirroring the historical facts. As such, in which ways this construction is related with the contemporary socio-political context and relations of power and dominance would be revealed.

This research accounts that popular culture has its efficacy in terms of shaping politics and society while at the same time, politics and society also affects the popular culture. Thus, how nationalism discourse of the historical adventure movies are affected by the socio-political context besides the simultaneous (ideological) effects of this discourse in terms of shaping society and politics bears signification. This dynamic relation could not be revealed unless a non-reductionist and multi-disciplinary perspective is adopted.

1.2.Method and Methodology

This study intends to incorporate socio-political, historical and cultural developments of the era into the analysis. This multi-dimensional analysis could show the dynamic interaction between cinema, culture, society, politics and history. It, therefore, provides more concrete and realist conclusions. This could only be achieved when qualitative research techniques is applied. Although quantitative research technique provides generalization due to providing more accurate information, it fails to capture the specificities of the historical context. Thus, qualitative research techniques successfully provide the methodological framework, although quantitative research techniques become redundant.

As a qualitative research method(ology), critical discourse analysis is applied. Critical discourse analysis holds the claim that the goal of the discourse is not to

mirror the world, objectively. Instead, discourse is socially constructed and has a significant role in terms of constructing meaning and social relations. Here, critical does not merely mean criticizing the status-quo; instead, it refers to a critical account of relating discourse practices with broader social, political and ideological frame of activities. Van Dijk (1993) defines the basic principle of discourse theory as to relate discourse (either text or talk) with power, dominance, ideology, inequalities, and politics. Thus it is possible to define critical discourse theory as a socio-political discourse analysis which reveals the relations of social power and which unmasks how discursive practices (re)produce the power relations and inequalities. Here, Fairclough (1989) draws attention to the text-context relations in the context of how discourses legitimize or naturalize the current social structures, the relations of power and inequalities. As such, instead of a merely observational and explanatory analysis, this methodology provides a critical socio-political account that concentrates on the relationship between discursive practices and socio-political context.

Historical movies do not only (mis)represent the past but also provides significant insights about the history of their own time. They consciously or unconsciously carry the marks of social, political, cultural, economic life of their own time. They, moreover, shows how history/past is perceived and specifically (re)constructed during the period when these movies were made. Akbaş, similarly, argues that although the subject of historical movies is cases, facts and characters of the past, they do also represent the social conditions, norms, ideologies of the time when they are produced (Akbaş, 2018, p. 177). Therefore, the analysis discusses how nationalism discourse of these movies integrate with socio-political context, wider socio-political projects and power relations.

This research, adopting the method(ology) of critical discourse analysis, intends to present a contextual analysis of nationalism discourse in historical adventure movies made between 1965 and 1980. In 1960's and 1970's Turkey, more than

half of the population is illiterate and television is not widespread. Within this context, cinema became the most significant popular culture means. For example, 50 million people went to the cinema in 1966 only in İstanbul. This number represents only the registered audiences. If unregistered ones is moreover considered, how cinema is extremely popular is evidently seen (Tunç, 2012, p. 97). Considering the extreme popularity of cinema together with its dynamic relation with society and politics, it is evidently seen that the discourse analysis of the movies occupies a highly important place.

Until 1965, social realist movies which give special attention to the socio-economic problems of Turkish society had been rising in Turkish cinema. While social realism had been dissolving after 1965, historical adventure movies as a specific genre of Yeşilçam was risen. This specific genre became dominant in Turkish cinema between 1965 and 1975 and nearly a hundred historical adventure movies was made. It is not possible to incorporate all these movies into this research. Instead, the most popular films are planned to be chosen as a representative group. Here, methodological and scientific criteria to define how to choose the most popular one is required. The goal is to choose the blockbusters which could be defined by way of box-ticket gross. Nonetheless, there is not any registered numeric data considering box-office numbers before 1989.

Yet, there is still an alternative way to find out which movies managed to draw the most audiences. Regional management system as a specific mode of production dominated Turkish cinema during the period between 1960 and 1980 (Erkılıç & Ünal, 2018, p. 54). Turkish cinema was not economically self-sufficient in 1960's. The lack of capital investment in cinema drives the sector to pass to regional management system as a working solution. To see how this system works, the operator gives money as advance or bond to the producer so that the producer can have necessary fund to make the movie. Here, the preferences of the audience play a major role. The regional manager observes the reactions and expectations of the

audiences. These preferences are delivered to the producer so that the producer will make the movie as ordered. The goal is to draw as many audiences as possible to make more profit.

Within this system, the artistic value of the movie remains in the background while the box-office gross of the movie (or in other words, making profit) become predominant. Thus, the best movie is the one which draws as many audiences as possible. Unless a movie attracts audiences and does well in the box-office, the following films are never made. If a movie is made as a film series, this proves that this movie attracts audiences and it affords more than its budget. Therefore, this study chooses the historical adventure movies which were made as a film series between 1965 and 1980. These film series are defined as follows: Karaoğlan, Tarkan, Malkoçoğlu, Kara Murat and Battal Gazi.

There are also other indicators that proves the selected film series are preferred by the audiences. Initially, the original film series are replicated. For example, 'Bozkırlar Şahini Tark-Han', 'Tarkan Canavarlı Kule' and 'Tarkan Camokaya Karşı' was made as replicas of Tarkan original film series. By replicating the main character of the original film series, the goal is to draw more audiences.

Accordingly, the producers did never want to end the film series despite the occurrence of many problems even for example with the director or with the lead actors. For example, in Malkoçoğlu film series, the lead actor of the first six movies was Cüneyt Arkın but he did not play in the last movie. Without him, the next movie (Kurt Bey) was made and Serdar Gökhan played the lead role. In Battal Gazi film series, the first movie of the series is directed by Atıf Yılmaz. After Yılmaz quitted, Natuk Baytan as the director continued with the next movies. This insistence on the continuation of these film series proves that these movies were making good profit and the producers did not want to cut down their profit by ending the series.

In order to present a contextual analysis, the role of Turkish nationalism in Turkish political life between 1965 and 1980 is initially analyzed. During this period, how Turkish nationalism is integrated with anti-communism and Turkish-Islamic synthesis in order to (re)constitute right wing hegemony is defined. When it comes to movie analysis, the goal is to trace a) how Turkish nationalism is framed in these movies and accordingly b) to which extent the discourse of Turkish nationalism in the movies represents similar arguments, themes, and contents with the contextual appearance of Turkish nationalism in right-wing hegemony. In order to do so, the discourse of Turkish nationalism in these movies are critically analyzed under three major themes. (1). How Turkish national identity discursively constructed. Since ethnicity is an exclusive category, the second theme intends to define (2). 'Who/what is 'the other' of Turkish identity.' Consequently, (3) how these movies narrate the story of (fictional) national past with reference to 'Turkish epic literature' and 'Turkish myths' is revealed. As such, the contextuality of Turkish nationalism discourse in the movies is revealed.

1.3. Limitations of the Study

Regarding the dynamic relation, between cinema, politics and society, the effects of these movies in social and political arena is not covered in this study. This study accepts that these movies play a significant role in terms of shaping socio-political life. There are concrete evidences proving the accuracy of this argument. Firstly, the way these movies were made as film series proves the popularity of these movies among the society. Secondly, these movies are watched /known by the whole society even today and they are still televised by Channel 7 (Kanal 7). Lastly, the characters, signs and symbols of these movies still occupies a place in Turkish nationalism discourse. For example, Malkaçoğlu and Kara Murat are highly important figures for Gray Wolves Organization *(Ülkü Ocakları)* and their

associated commando camps. Yet, the systematic and scientific analysis of the effect of these movies is out of the scope of this study.

1.4. Limitations of the Current Literature

The analysis of Turkish historical adventure movies has not been a brand-new subject. Since cinema and movie analysis become trending especially in the last decade, researchers, academicians and students especially from the 'Department of Communication' gives attention to the analysis of historical adventure movies. Yet, the literature is neither extensive nor comprehensive. There have been only a few unpublished master and Ph.D. thesis together with a few articles.

The first group of these researches touches upon historical adventure movies as a related topic/part of their subject-matter instead of merely focusing on it. For example, Mehmet Bağır (2016), in his master thesis, studies the historical movies in Turkish cinema and analyzes historical adventure movies as a part of it. He concludes that they were made for making profit. Yet, they hold a significant place for defining and shaping Turkish collective consciousness. Fantastic Turkish Cinema, the book written by Scognamillo and Demirhan, could be given as another example. This book analyzes the fantastic movies in Turkish cinema and deals with Turkish historical adventure movies as a part of it. They argue that there have been nearly a hundred of historical adventure movies but they all reflect the same pattern. A Turkish national hero – depictured as a physically attractive man who is extremely much more powerful than the enemy – does not only protect weaken, powerless and oppressed people but also fight for national glory (Scognamillo & Demirhan, 2005). There have been another group of researches (Erdoğan & Göktürk, 2001; Özön, 2013; Scognamillo, 2010; Teksoy, 2007; Tunç, 2012) focusing on the development of Turkish cinema. They analyze the economic structure, general traits, leading actors, scenarist, directors, and genres of Turkish cinema in different time-periods. Instead of providing in-depth analysis, these

studies touch upon historical adventure movies, very briefly as a specific genre of Yeşilçam cinema between 1965 and 1975. Since these studies do not focus on historical adventure movies, they are not able to provide an extensive analysis even though they present true and realistic arguments.

On the other hand, the studies which focus on historical adventure movies generally fail to provide a contextual analysis. The article of Akbaş (2018), could be given as an example of this category. Akbaş analyzes the content of historical adventure movies. She concludes that these movies play a significant place in the construction of Turkish identity and Turkish history. Although her work is quite breathtaking and highly beneficial for this study, she fails to address the socio-political context which shapes the content of these movies. Another example is the Ph.D. thesis of T. Emre Yıldırım which specializes especially on Turkish adventure movies. He focuses on the movies in which Cüneyt Arkın played the lead actor and analyzes them from psychoanalysis perspective. He defines how these movies produce psycho-myths and mythos. He claims that these movies help to let off the aggression caused of Cyprus events. In other words, they enable Turkish people to take their revenge from the West (represented by Byzantium), fictionally (Yıldırım, 2013). Accordingly, the article of Eray Alaca (2017) provides a highly successful discourse analysis. Alaca reveals the discourse of Turkish nationalism in Kara Murat film series. He concludes that these movies give special attention to Ottoman history. In the movies, one of the major elements of Turkish national identity is represented as Islam. Therefore, being Turkish means and requires being Muslim, too. He presents a comprehensive discourse analysis, which is, however, not contextual. Lastly, the master thesis written by Burç Karabulut (2013), presents the discourse analysis of Tarkan and Malkoçoğlu film series. As much as I understand, he argues that these movies represent a Westernized subject and a discourse of Westernization. Nonetheless, I do not find his argument convincing. These movies, instead, designates West as the major enemy and attributes pure evilness to West. To conclude, all of these researches

fail to provide a contextual analysis in order to show the dynamic relation between cinema, politics, and society.

The last category is consisted of the researches which do not approach these movies from a socio-political perspective. The master thesis written by Fatih Gençer (2016), reveals the signs of Turkish mythology and Turkish epic literature in Tarkan film series. Mythological and semiological analysis of Tarkan movies is quite an interesting subject-matter and it provides important insights in the context of how Turkish epic literature enriches the content of these movies. Nonetheless, these topics are mostly irrelevant for a socio-political analysis of the movies.

As seen, the literature is highly limited. It should be extended and advanced. There are only a few studies which focus merely on historical adventure movies as a genre. Although the researchers approach the movies from very different perspectives, they fail to address the dynamic relation among cinema, politics and society and overlook the effects of socio-political context within which the movie was made. The researches which aim to study the nationalism discourse in these movies concludes that these movies present a Turkish nationalism discourse. This is, however, self-evident. It is more important to conceptualize Turkish nationalism from a contextual and non-reductionist perspective. By providing a contextual, multi-dimensional and interdisciplinary analysis, this study will fill the gap in the literature as well as advancing it.

1.5.The Plan of the Study

This study is consisted of five chapters; the content of each chapter can be summarized as follows:

'Chapter 1: Introduction' explains the rationale, methodology, limitations and literature review of the research. The chapter aims to discusses the importance of the research, its method(ology), it limitations and its contribution to the literature.

'Chapter 2: How to approach Nationalism Discourse through the Lens of Ideology Discussion' provides the necessary theoretical basis for the study. After briefly discussing the 'ideology' conceptualization in Marxist tradition, it dwells on Gramsci's theorization of 'ideology' with his conceptualization of 'hegemony'. This chapter proposes a non-reductionist approach to integrate ideology, discourse and cinema with reference to Gramscian theory and critical discourse methodology.

'Chapter 3: Political History of Turkish Nationalism (1965-1980)' aims to explain not only the contextual roots of the rise of Turkish nationalism but also how Turkish nationalism is integrated with wider socio-political projects. Regarding the socio-political history of the era (1965-1980), this chapter discusses how Turkish nationalism is articulated with right-wing hegemony.

'Chapter 4: Film Analysis' presents the thematic discourse analysis of Turkish nationalism within the selected movies. The narratives, images, symbols, myths, dialogues, and proposition within the movies are analyzed in order to specify the major themes and concepts used to define Turkish nationalism. The goal is to reveal how Turkish nationalism is discursively constructed in these movies and how this discursive construction is related with the socio-political context of the era.

'Chapter 5: Conclusion' summarizes the findings of the research.

CHAPTER 2

HOW TO APPROACH NATIONALISM DISCOURSE THROUGH THE LENS OF 'IDEOLOGY' DISCUSSION

The goal of this chapter is to conceptualize a non-reductionist and contextual understanding of ideology, which provides the theoretical basis for this research. After discussing very briefly about the origin of ideology, this chapter goes on with Marxist theorization of ideology to show how Marxist understanding provide significant insights to understand the function of Turkish nationalism as an ideological discourse. Basing on the principles of Gramscian theory of ideology and critical discourse analysis, how to conceptualize the relation between 'ideology', 'discourse' and 'cinema/popular culture' is defined.

2.1. The Origin of 'Ideology' and 'Ideology Critique'

The term 'ideology' which combines the Greek terms 'eidos' and 'logos' is first used by Destutt de Tracy. He initially conceptualizes ideology his essayistic presentations *(Memoire sur la Faculte de Penser)* that periodically took place between 1796 and 1798 in Institute de France at Paris (Bulut, 2011, p. 184). He refused to use the name psychology and metaphysics which defined the science of ideas in past ages. For him, they have a negative as well as disgraced impression associated with being misleading and false. Ideology, on the other hand, contends nothing doubtful or uncertain. Tracy constructed this new science *(ideology),* as a neologism which could better be understood as a rational science of 'knowledge of effect' and their 'practical consciousness'. The goal of this new science is to reach true knowledge through the use of rigid methodology of natural sciences such as experiment, observation and classification of facts. He subsequently coins

the term 'ideology' as the study of ideas *(science des idee)* and approaches ideology as the founding of all other sciences/disciplines. He asserts that since all sciences contends different combination of ideas, it is evident that ideology (the science of ideas) is genealogically the first science where all other sciences would derive from. As such, ideology turns out to be the basis of grammar, logic, education, morality and art and that all should cooperate to regulate the society (Kennedy, 1979, p. 355). This conceptualization of ideology as the new science to regulate society is, of course, not independent from political connotations[1].

It was this political connotation of ideology that led to a pejorative understanding. Napoleon Bonaparte astutely adopt a negative sense of 'ideology.' He accused ideologists of being 'unrealistic idealistic fanatics' and call them 'ideologues' in pejorative sense. As such, the negative conceptualization ideology was born and this negative term is later adopted by Marx in his writings.

2.2. Marxist Understanding of 'Ideology'

Although this research bases on Gramscian theory, it is necessary to explain how ideology is conceptualized in Marxist tradition. Unless situated within Marxist tradition, Gramscian theory can never be properly comprehended.

Ideology, in its negative sense, refers a particular kind of social consciousness which mystifies the social reality and conveys a distorted version of it. Ideology,

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[1] Tracy uses 'ideology' to regulate the society, education and politics in his struggle against Catholic Church. He conceives ideology as the basis of morality. When Tracy became the Counsellor of Public Instruction, he drafted circulars to draw attention to the significant role of ideology in French education system. According to him, to avoid any further moral and metaphysic errors, young generation should be thought the principles of ideology together with the secular texts of Enlightment. As such, ideology, for ideologists, is used to construct a secular Republican regime where the enlightened elites play a prominent role. De Tracy's ideology is, thus, seen as the political doctrine of liberal intellectuals even though it is, originally, defined as an empirical science by De Tracy and the ideologists (Bulut, 2011, p. 186; Rehmann, 2017, pp. 25–27).

as a negative term, is believed to work on behalf of the bourgeoisie class and their class interest while simultaneously impeding the subordinated class to see social reality. Negative conceptualization of ideology has its basis from *'German Ideology'* written by Marx and Engels. Here, they define 'ideology' with reference to the metaphor of 'camera obscura' to claim that ideology turns the image of social reality on its head. That is to say, ideology reflects a distorted and false image of social reality (Ransome, 2011, pp. 158–159). Here, ideology is not conceived as belonging to the realm of ideas. It is, rather, perceived as a product of material reality. To put this in their own words, "consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence and the existence of man in their actual life process" (1978, p. 154). Marx and Engels, in German ideology, aims to break down Hegelian idealism (which claims that all thoughts, ideas and conception stem from consciousness). They argue that all thoughts, ideas and conceptions are interwoven with material reality. They are the product of society's material condition. Ideology, thereby, obscures inverts and mystifies the social realities (Marx & Engels, 2004, p. 36). Within this picture, although ideology presents itself as universal, it functions for the benefit of existing social order (status-quo) and its beneficiaries. Ideology, therefore, cannot be conceptualized independent from class-conflict. Ruling class who controls the means of production also controls the ideological production. That means ideology always works for the interests of the ruling class.

In fact, Marx uses 'ideology' with several meanings. Besides the pejorative meaning used in 'German Ideology', Marx uses ideology as a more neutral term in 'Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy[2]'. Marx (1978)

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[2]Although Marxism is mostly associated with the negative conceptualization of ideology in literature, Marxists – lived after Marx's death – generally adopt a more neutral conceptualization of ideology. The most apparent example of this neural approach is seen in Lukacs and Lenin. German Ideology is first published in 1932 but Lenin died in 1924 before its publication and Lukacs published 'History and Class Consciousness' which he elaborates on the concept of ideology in 1920 (Atılgan, 2012, p. 292). Which means both of them do not have the chance to read 'German Ideology' where Marx uses ideology as a negative term.

in this writing, makes the distinction between base and superstructure and defines economic structure *(base)* as the real foundation on which rises a legal and political superstructure, and which corresponds to definite forms of social consciousness (p. 5). In this understanding, economic structure/base conditions superstructure consisting of social, political and ideological spheres.

Mouffe (1979) defines 'economism' as a major impediment against understanding the autonomy of politics and ideology in Marxist tradition. Economism appears as an obstacle in two different forms. The first problem of economism is understanding politics and ideology as subordinated to economy; which thereby approaches superstructure as epiphenomena. The second complexity stems from attributing ideology as a necessary class-belonging (p. 168). Lenin, Lukacs, Adorno/Horkheimer (Frankfurt School), Althusser and Gramsci could be defined as the most popular ideology theorists in Marxist tradition. This research adopts Gramscian theory because Gramsci could be seen as the only theorist who successfully overcome economism problem and provide a non-reductionist theory of ideology. The account of Lenin[3] and Lukacs[4]–relates ideology with class

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[3]Lenin approaches 'ideology' as a neutral term referring either socialist or bourgeoisie ideology. Lenin believes that proletariat, by himself, cannot gain an independent ideology for itself. Put it another way, an independent ideology cannot be gained in the process of revolutionary movement by proletariat, therefore, it is only possible to talk about either a bourgeoisie ideology or a socialist ideology (Rehmann, 2017, p. 77). It is not possible to talk about third ideology (or a middle course) because class antagonism, for him, led to the formation of either socialist or bourgeoisie ideology while never allowing another non-class or above class ideology. He further elaborates more on 'ideology' and theorize his Marxist-Leninist understanding— that become the state-ideology of Soviet Union. Within this theorization, vanguard party – represented by Communist Party in Soviet Union – is believed to bring socialist ideology by establishing the dictatorship of proletariat and full development of socialism.

[4] Lukacs follows Lenin's usage of ideology as a neutral term. He defines ideology with references to 'reification' and in relation with classes. He argues that capitalism imposes itself as self-evident for the masses. He designates a revolutionary theory and ever-renewed struggle against capitalism and bourgeoisie ideology. Within this theory, ideological maturity (referring true class consciousness) occupies an important place. He defines class consciousness as "class condition is unconscious of one's own socio-historical and economic condition. This condition is given as a definite structural relation, a definite formal nexus which appears to govern the whole life" (Lukacs, 1971, p. 52). According to him, class consciousness is different from individual consciousness. It

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consciousness and classes, thereby, fails to overcome the problem of economism in second form. Frankfurt School's popular conceptualization of culture industry[5] is predominantly based on a mechanic understanding of base and superstructure. Within this understanding, the distinct autonomy of ideology is neglected. When it comes to Althusser[6], although he presents a non-reductionist perspective of ideology by initiating the discussion of 'overdetermination', he conceives

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represents never the whole nor the average of individual consciousness. Instead, he talks about a historical class consciousness which represent the class as a whole. Lukacs believes in proletariat as the agent of revolution. For him, only proletariat is capable of understanding the true nature of society due to its central position within society. As such, proletariat is presented as the principle agent who can combine theory and action together with true class consciousness.

[5] Frankfurt School's account of ideology is related with the term 'culture industry' coined by Adorno and Horkheimer. Culture industry is used to define the standardized production of cultural goods. In other words, popular culture referring to the mass produced entertainment manipulate and deceive the masses in favor of the monopoly of capitalism. That means, popular culture creates passive and homogenized masses who consumes what is offered to him. As such, cultural products not only help to make profit but also produce passive masses dependent upon capitalist system and its products. Capitalist production, thus, dominates the superstructure in favor of the ruler. This theory shows how the logic of domination in capitalist system functions in both economic and ideological level.

[6] Lastly, Althusser's account of ideology aims to explain how ideology functions for the continuity of capitalist system. According to him, the reproduction of capitalist system requires not only the reproduction of productive forces but also the reproduction of the existing social order (1977, p. 124). Here, submission to the capitalist order is necessary for the continuity of the system. This submission can only be achieved through ideology. He proposes a new reformulation between base and superstructure; in which he argues that superstructure is not mechanically determined by economic base but it has its own effectivity. He succeeds in showing the complexity of social formation by initiating the term 'over-determination'. In capitalism, there is never a simple contradiction (referring to capital X labor contradiction). Instead, it is possible to talk about an overdetermined contradiction which is specified by historically concrete forms and circumstances. To avoid economic determinism, he claims that economy determines in the last instance. Which is to say, superstructure has its own effectivity (Althusser, 2005, p. 106). Althusser further distinguished ideological state apparatuses from repressive state apparatuses. For him, repressive state apparatuses function mainly by repression and secondly by ideology whereas ideological state apparatuses operate predominantly by ideology and secondly by repression (1977, p. 139). He defines repressive state apparatuses as police and army and defines ideological state apparatuses as religion, family, education, media and communication apparatuses, and trade unions. He defines ideology as the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence (1977, p. 162). Here, he argues that ideologies derive from material life. This argument is associated with his conceptualization of subjection/interpellation through ideology. He claims that ideology interpellates individuals as subjects, which as a result impose the subject who s/he is. As such, ideology ensures the submission of the subject to the capitalist order.

individuals are effects of social institutions but not as agents. Instead of this pessimist picture where individuals are trapped within structure, this research believes in the active role of individual who has the power to construct an alternative.

Gramsci, on the other hand, presents a non-reductionist theory of ideology and enables us to grasp how ideological terrain is integrated with ethico-political struggle and economic base. As such, his approach helps to provide a contextual analysis of nationalism discourse.

2.3. Gramsci's Theory of 'Ideology' and 'Hegemony'

Gramsci presents a theory of ideology integrated with his conceptualization of hegemony. Hegemony, for Gramsci, implies an intellectual and moral leadership consisting of the unity of economic, political, intellectual and moral spheres, and that is beyond a simple class-alliance. This unity could only be ensured by the spread of an ideology throughout the whole society (Mouffe, 1979, pp. 179–181). According to Gramsci, only the hegemonic classes – either 'bourgeoisie' or 'proletariat' – are capable of ensuring hegemony. The hegemonic class can articulate the interests and tendencies of subordinating groups to its own. In other words, hegemony, could only be constituted when the interests of the subordinated classes get integrated with those of hegemonic class. Only then, the natural-popular support/will can be achieved.

For the hegemonic class to reach the hegemonic level, it should overcome corporatism and some of its economic corporate interests. Here, Gramsci makes a distinction between hegemonic and corporatist classes. To ensure national-popular will, the transition from corporate to hegemonic class is the key. He defines three stages/moments of class consciousness, which are primitive economic, political economic and hegemonic. Primitive economic consciousness refers to the interests

of a profession or a similar group. Accordingly, political economic moment refers to the consciousness of class interest expressed at economic level. Hegemony, on the other hand, refers to a universal moment where corporate limits are transcended and where the unity between political, economic, intellectual and moral spheres is ensured (Mouffe, 1979, p. 180).

The term 'hegemony' is first used by Lenin, referring to a working-class strategy to ensure class-alliances. Gramsci uses this term quite differently. In Gramsci's usage, it is not solely the strategy of proletariat, but of bourgeoisie, too. For Mouffe, Gramsci adds a new dimension – intellectual and moral leadership – to Lenin's inextricably political understanding of the concept (Mouffe, 1979, p. 184). Bobbio also draws attention the different contents of 'hegemony' in the usage of Lenin and Gramsci. According to Bobbio, 'force' is the decisive moment for Lenin and in his theorization dictatorship and hegemony proceed together whereas Gramsci approaches force as an instrumental moment because hegemony, for him, is beyond dictatorship. Bobbio specifies a second distinction between these two by arguing, in Gramsci's theory, the constitution of hegemony comes before the conquest of power whereas for Lenin conquest of power comes first (Bobbio, 1979, p. 40). In fact, in Gramsci's theorization, ruling class constitutes its hegemony by way of both coercion/force and persuasion. Coercion and persuasion cannot be perceived as absolute opposition to each other (Texier, 1979, p. 72). The unity coercion and persuasion requires 'producing consent' as one of a key strategy of ensuring hegemony.

This argument of the unity of force and consent is directly related with his understanding of state and civil society. Gramsci engenders a new conception of state which he calls 'integral state[7]' meaning that state should not be approached

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[7] He proposes two different formulation of state, one of which is a narrower sense of state where political society refers to state apparatuses. In his writings, sometimes he mentions how political

in a narrower sense as government apparatuses. Integral state, instead, consist of both state and civil society. Despite the methodological separation in theory, civil society and state cannot be separated in material life. Accordingly, hegemonic relations should be established in both civil society and political society with the use of both coercion and persuasion.

Gramsci's approach draws attention to the efficacy of superstructure. For him, political struggle does not only consist of simple labor-capital conflict, but it involves more complex social conflicts, antagonisms and relations. He, therefore, believes in the indispensable unity of infrastructure and superstructure with the conceptualization of 'historical bloc'. Historical bloc implies the organic unity of superstructure and infrastructure. He also establishes the link between superstructure and infrastructure (or the hegemony and working class) by stipulating that only hegemonic classes – either bourgeoisie or proletariat – is capable of constituting its hegemony over other social groups. Collective national will/hegemony could only be formed through ideology and the exercise of intellectual and moral leadership.

Ideology, for Gramsci, is neither false consciousness nor the mere appearances with any efficacy. Instead, he defines ideology as the terrain where 'men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle.' Ideology, in this approach, organizes action. Or, in other words, as stressed out by Mouffe, subjects are never given but they are always produced by ideology. Subjects are always the product of social practice (1979, p. 186). Gramsci does not approach ideology belonging merely to the fields of ideas and beliefs. Instead, it consists of the practical activities, social relations besides ideas and beliefs.

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society and civil society is the same in certain moments. Lastly, he proposes a broader definition of state which is called 'integral state' consisting both political and civil society.

Gramsci's theory contends three forms of ideology with varying degrees; philosopy/worldview, common sense and folklore. Philosophy, representing highest level of abstraction and contending highest degree of coherency in itself, refers to a critical and coherent conception of the world. This world-view is the popular expression of the communal life and organize human masses. Or, in other words, historical activity is shaped through human consciousness gained through this world-view of the collective body, which refers to organic ideologies. This organic ideologies are manifested in all actions. The second and much simpler form of ideology is 'common sense' meaning the diffused, uncoordinated form of thought shared by a particular group of people in a specific time-period. As Yetiş (2015) argues, common sense implies the spontaneous (non-critical) philosophy of ordinary people manifested in everyday life. It is the articulation of ideology with common belief in an inconsistent way, that provide important insights to understand the psychology and perception level of human masses (p. 90). The last and the simplest form of thought is 'folklore' As Yetiş defines, it contends the sum of beliefs, practices and cultural traditions –implying a fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential form of thought – as part of the historical heritage of social formation. He further argues that, in Gramscian theory, hegemony should be constituted and continuously reconstituted in these three levels of ideology. Only then, hegemony could be reconstituted in national level (2015, p. 90).

Theory of ideology, for Gramsci, cannot be separated from the theory of intellectuals. In fact, the hierarchy of ideologies is correlated with the hierarchy of intellectuals. Intellectuals occupy an important place for the dissemination of ideology to the human masses. The first and highest category of intellectuals (correlated with 'philosophy/world-view) is the philosophers who are capable of theorizing new social formations/systems. The lower level of intellectuals (correlating with 'common sense') refers to for example academicians, university instructors who serve to disseminate the ideology. In other words, this group of intellectuals fulfill the directive function of an ideology while the philosophers are

charged as an organizer. The last and the simplest category of intellectuals is consisted of common people (correlating with 'folklore'). Since every person is capable of contemplation, each individual could be considered as intellectual, for Gramsci[8].

Ideological struggle, for Mouffe (1979), always contends the disarticulation-rearticulation of the ideological elements within struggle between hegemonic classes (p. 193). The common world-view serves as a cement/unifying principle and helps to articulate different class interests to the organic ideology. This articulation is always influenced by historical and national factors, which makes it more complex. Since the struggle of hegemony implies constituting the national-popular will, the class aspiring to be hegemonic need to nationalize itself. Only as such, it could appear as the representative of the general interest. Within this process, 'nationalism' and 'patriotism' is the most common discourses to apply, in order for the hegemonic classes to nationalize itself.

2.4. Ideology, Discourse and Cinema

Gramscian understanding of ideology and the methodology of (critical) discourse analysis is applied in order to see how ideology, discourse and cinema is related. In fact, the aim is not to delve into the details of the ontological and epistemological details of discourse theory, but rather, to address the socio-political nature of discourse.

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[8] He makes a further distinction between organic and traditional intellectuals. Organic intellectuals refer to the moral and intellectual leader of the historical bloc and organic ideology whereas traditional intellectuals are seen as residual who are the intellectuals of the former historical bloc. Clergyman is the most typical example of the traditional intellectuals, who might be seen as detached from social classes and above class-relations. Lastly, in terms of intellectual discussion, Gramsci approaches political party as a new form of 'Modern Prince' (referring to the working class party) and emphasizes on the importance of its revival as an intellectual.

Discourse analysis involves a combination of post-Marxist, post-structuralist and post-Saussurian linguistic theory. There have been various disagreements within social theory, especially about whether discourse is 'constituted' or 'constitutive'. Post-structuralist perspective, especially the ones drawn on Foucault's theories, believes in a constructivist ontology. For them, discourse mediated our entire perception of reality. This understanding does not mean that external reality does not have an independent existence. Instead, it is emphasized that the world is composed of discourses and we cannot perceive these objects and the world outside of discourses. Critical discourse analysis (which is adopted by this research) criticizes this constructivist ontology and claims that social reality exists independent from discourse and it conditions discourse to a significant extent.

When we look at the basic premises of critical discourse methodology, it is a socio-political discourse analysis which initially addresses the social and political problems/concerns. There have been a wide literature drawing attention to the political nature of discourse and discourse analysis (see: Fairclough, 1992, 2003; Wodak & Meyer, 2009). Here, text-context relations holds an important place and critical discourse analysis links the text/discourse with a broader aspect such as society, politics, culture and ideology. This could only be achieved only if interdisciplinary perspective is adopted. This multi-disciplinary perspective is not expected to provide merely an observational and descriptive analysis. Instead, it needs to be critical in the sense of concentrating on power relations, inequalities and injustices underlying the discursive practices.

Discourse theory re-formulates the Gramscian term of 'hegemony' and re-defines 'ideology'. There is an epistemological distinction between critical discourse theory and Laclau and Mouffe's theory of discourse with regard to the constitutive and constituted character of discourse. Laclau and Mouffe, adopting the constitutive ontology of discourse, are the most influential names of post-Marxist tradition who re-define 'ideology' and 'hegemony' within discourse theory. As

discussed, Gramsci argues that hegemonic classes is capable of manufacturing popular consent through discursive practices within superstructure. Hegemony, here, implies the construction of (class) consciousness and class belonging. Within this picture, superstructure is not merely epiphenomena (the mere reflection of base); instead, it has its efficacy and therefore, it can affect material reality. Laclau and Mouffe is affected by Gramsci's softened approach of Marxism. They take his ideas further by dissolving the entire division between base and superstructure. Instead of such a division, for them, discourse mediated our entire perception of reality (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Therefore, we cannot speak of an objective material reality which divides people into different class positions. Instead, political and discursive processes result with the formation of different social groups in society. This understanding does not mean that external reality does not have an independent existence. Instead, it means that world is composed of discourses and we cannot perceive the world outside the discourses. Simultaneously, they coin a constructivist conception of hegemony which is defined as a struggle for production of meaning. For Laclau and Mouffe, since discourse entirely mediates our perception of social reality, we can never talk about a permanently fixed meaning. Therefore, there is a broad array of discourses each of which compete for structuring the material reality and instill its ideology by defining what true is (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985).

Instead of a constructivist understanding of hegemony referring to fixation of meaning by the authorities (or, in other words, enforcing a particular definition of truth), this research adopts Gramsci's understanding. Gramsci's hegemony refers to the manufacturing of collective popular will through the articulation of different class interests. This articulation is not independent from discursive practices, but rather, it is achieved through the mediation of discourse. Here, discourse is conditioned by a broader socio-political context while simultaneously contributing to the construction of certain meanings and social relations. Hegemony, at the end, is constituted and creates a 'consensus' through the use of both persuasion/consent

and coercion. As such, power relations seem natural, hidden and unquestioned and appears as a common sense perception. Here, Fairclough (1989) draws attention to how discursive properties of text contribute to the (re)production of power relations. For him, the discourse does not always have to be manipulative and propagative. Instead, power relations are (re)produced through common sense discourses. As such, discourses work as a political logic that construct contemporary socio-political structure as if a natural and neutral phenomena while simultaneously hiding the injustices, inequalities and power relations.

Douglas Kellner appears as one of the key names associated with contextual readings of films. He applies a non-monolithic and non-reductionist ideology critique. Instead of a semantic analysis which narrowly focuses on text properties, he argues that discourse analysis should contain images, figures, myths, social practices, theoretical positions, narratives and systems of beliefs because these are all bound together for the construction of ideology. In his various researches, Kellner tries to provide a contextual readings of American films (see Kellner & Ryan, 1988). To do this, he situates the ideological analysis of the movies within the existing socio-political context and relates it with actual socio-political struggles. Instead of approaching movies as merely a tool for ideological manipulation or propagation, contextual perspective enables him to link the movies with social, political, ideological and cultural dynamics and to define in which ways the films contribute to the reproduction of power relations.

Having the similar purpose of presenting a contextual film analysis, this research follows Gramscian understanding of hegemony and operationalizes it to understand Turkish nationalism as an ideological discourse between 1965 and 1980. As such, the goal is to see how Turkish nationalism is articulated with the socio-political dynamics, ideological elements and hegemony projects. Approaching cinema as a terrain of struggle for hegemony between various groups and classes, to which extent the hegemonic understanding of Turkish nationalism

is seen in the movies and in which ways the discourse of Turkish nationalism in the movies contributes to the (re)production of power relations.

To provide the basis for the contextual reading of the selected movies and to define the hegemonic understanding of Turkish nationalism between 1965 and 1980, the following chapter tries to describe the political history of Turkish nationalism between 1965 and 1980.

CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL HISTORY OF 'TURKISH NATIONALISM' (1965-1980)

This chapter attempts to analyze in which ways Turkish nationalism is used in terms of the construction of hegemonic relations between 1965 and 1980. After having defined contextual roots of the rise of Turkish nationalism, how to conceptualize the right-wing hegemony is described. The ideological orientation of right-wing hegemony is defined as liberal-conservative understanding having the distinct strains of 'anti-communism' and 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis', both of which directly appeal to Turkish nationalism discourse in order to constitute collective popular will. In which ways, 'anti-communism' and 'Turkish-Islamic' synthesis as the hegemonic principles, concretely shape Turkish politics and civil society will further be analyzed[9].

3.1. Contextual Roots of the Rise of 'Turkish Nationalism'

Considering the historical context and socio-political developments of 1960's, the major cornerstones conditioning the rise of Turkish nationalism is defined as follows: (1). Cyprus issue and (2). the rise of socialism as a counter-hegemonic bloc.

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[9] Between 1965 and 1980 Turkey experienced one of the most dynamic period of Republican history in terms of socio-economic, political, cultural life. This period is, therefore, discussed with reference to a wide range of different topic such as urbanization, rural-urban migration, industrialization, political radicalization, diversified cultural life, economic crisis and so on. Since it is impossible to integrate all these aspects into the research, it is preferred to concentrate on the political changes in order to reveal the political and ideological function of Turkish nationalism.

3.1.1. Cyprus Issue

London-Zurich Treaties of 1959 took place with the participation of the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, Greece and Turkish Republic. The final decision of the meeting is declared with the agreement of partners on the foundation of Republic of Cyprus, which was established as a partnership state in 1960. The constitution of the Republic divides the legislature and executive offices between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, proportionally. As such, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were regarded equal partners and co-founders of Cyprus Republic. United Kingdom, Turkey, and Greece – having legacy interests on the newly established Cyprus Republic– all agreed upon the protection and preservation of the partnership and balance. The goal was to restrain either Turkish Cypriots or Greek Cypriots to impose its political will over the other.

Nonetheless, Greek Cypriots are not content with the birth of the partnership state. They never abandon 'Enosis plan' which aims to unite Cyprus Island with Greece. The first president of the Republic, Arcbishop Macarois, who is in favor of Enosis Plan, further provokes the national will of Greek Cypriots. After about three years, the partnership was destructed. The Greek Cypriots unilaterally abolished the basic articles of the constitution about the equal partnership. This abolition, dispossessing the veto power of Turks, make Turkish Cypriots become a minority in the Republic (Özcan, 2017, p. 231). As such, the partnership was fractured and the state was usurped by Greek Cypriots.

December 1963, EOKA (the armed nationalist group fighting for the goal of Enosis) started to attack Turkish Cypriots to turn the island into a Greek island annexed with Greece. The night 20-21 December 1963, the violence was its peak, which is known as 'Bloody Christmas'. Hundreds of people were killed within the clashes. Turkish villages were harshly damaged. Many Turkish Cypriots, moreover, fled their homes/villages and displaced into enclaves. UN troops came

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to the island and drew a Green Line/buffer to quell the violence at 1964. This attempt was never successful and the ongoing clashes was continuing with the determined effort of achieving the Enosis Plan with the support of the President, Macarois.

This deplorable situation of the Turkish Cypriots gave rise to the nationalist feelings in Turkey. Turkey – designated as the guarantor of peace with Greece and United Kingdom in the foundation treaty of Cyprus Republic – was aspiring to intervene on behalf of Turkish Cypriots. Yet, America does not let it happen. Johnson Letter received by Prime Minister İnönü warns Turkey if Turkey as a member of NATO intervenes in Cyprus without the full consent of NATO together with the consent of its allies and guarantors, NATO does not protect Turkey against any possible Soviet attack (Ergüç, 2017, p. 263). Reminding Turkey's alliance with US against communism, this letter shows any intervention in Cyprus will let Turkey all alone and defenseless against Soviet Union in international arena. Turkey takes a step backward and does not intervene for almost a decade, until 1974.

In 1971, EOKA B – the follow-up of EOKA formed at 1971, sharing the same goal with Enosis Plan – launched a bloody coup-d'état. This coup was a great and unacceptable threat to Turkish community which was under attack for almost a decade. Turkish Cypriots appealed the guarantor states – Turkey, Greece and United Kingdom – for help. Despite the unwillingness of the other guarantors, Turkish army launched the island at 1974 in order to restore the peace and balance. Later, in 1975, a population exchange is experienced, whereby, Turkish Cypriots displaced into the north while the Greeks Cypriots moved to the south of the island. In 1975, Turkish populated north side of the island as a self-government decide to rename itself as 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus[10]'.

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[10] Later in 1983, this state rename itself as 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' and adopt a new constitution.

The Cyprus events evoked a nationalist feeling in Turkey, which was hampered with Johnson Letter. The deplorable situation of Turkish Cypriots, lasting almost a decade, keep the nationalist feeling alive, constantly. The military intervention of Turkey to Cyprus was launched with a great support and eager of Turkish population. Therefore, Yıldırım rightfully claims that the reason why historical adventure movies, displaying a self-evident Turkish nationalism, become so popular between 1965 and 1975 is directly related with the Cyprus issue reaching its peak during this period (2013, s. 20).

3.1.2. The Rise of Socialism as a Counter-Hegemonic Bloc

What makes 1960's and 1970's different is predominantly the rise of working class as a political agent and concordantly the upsurge of leftist movements[11]. The rise of Turkish left during this period, in all detail, proceeds the limits of this study. The goal is to show how a new political culture based on socialist principles was rising as a counter-hegemonic bloc (or, in other words, as a threat to the current hegemony).

Within this period, the number of workers has massively been rising. As stated, the number of workers in 1963 was 2 million 745, and increased to 4 million 55 in 1971. The percentage of unionization was 18% in 1967, this percentage increased

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[11]To look at the socio-political roots of the rise of leftist politics, Turkey experienced a gradual transformation process especially in terms of socio-economic and political structure. With the massive rural-urban migration started in 1950's, the socio-economic structure of the cities began to change. The influx of migrants initiated dynamism in economy and urbanization. New factories were established and a new urbanization process began. The new comers were generally employed at industrial zones and factories. By this way, working class people has increased in number and therefore, become more apparent, more operative not only in socio-economic but also in political life of the cities. Accordingly, in parallel with the global conjecture, 1968 spirit also affected Turkish politics in the context of accelerating the rise of leftist movements in Turkey. The increase in syndical activities, the rise of student movements, the alliance of students with workers and peasants, the awakening of class consciousness and resentment towards the incumbent regime among workers, students, and peasants become prominent.

to 29, 6% in 1971. The number of workers who are a member of a trade union was 295 thousand 710 in 1963, this number increased to 2 million 362 thousand in 1971 (Atılgan, 2015, p. 529). Not only the working class but also other social groups/classes are politicized. The rise of student movements, peasant resistance, and the unionization struggle of civil servants are distinct examples of this politicization within leftist camp.

Working class is rising not only in number but also in effect. The collaboration and alliances among different class fractions are, further, seen. For example, one of the most important, large-scaled protest was organized at 15-16 June, 1970 in order to protest the legal draft to limit the syndical activities and the influence of 'Revolutionary Confederation of Labor Unions' *(Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu/DİSK)[12]*. It is estimated that more than a hundred thousand workers were participated to the movement and government declared martial law at that night for 60 days. This, proves the massive impact of the protest, which is seen as a threat for the status-quo. Another example would be Kavel resistance, which influences the changes in 'Trade Union Act (Law no: 274)' and 'Collective Labor, Agreement, Strike' and 'Lockout Act (Law no: 275)' on behalf of working class (Atılgan, 2015, p. 531). 1 May commemorations with the participation of thousands of workers might be considered as another example.[13] The strikes/lockouts, factory occupations, university occupations become widely common.

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[12] Since English acronmys of these organizations are neither common nor known, Turkish acronyms are preferred for the readers to follow easier.

[13] The most known example is the tragic First May Celebration at 1977. At 1 May 1977, it is estimated that five hundred thousand people gathered in Taksim square to celebrate, which result with a tragedy. After hearing three gunshots (still clouded in mystery who did the shot), the security forces intervened with noise bombs and weapons, which caused a deadly pandemonium and resulted with the killing of 40 people and hundreds of injured. For more information, see (Ozan, 2015, p. 674-676)

In concordance with the rise of working class, the influence and scope of syndical activities increased. It is, therefore, not coincidence that DİSK was established in 1967. The new act, (Law No: 624) on the Unions of Civil Servants, led to the formation of a civil servant syndicate, despite bringing many restrictions on strikes, protests, lockouts. Thereby, Turkish Teachers Syndicate *(Türkiye Öğretmenler Sendikası/TÖS)* was established. Before the transient military regime prohibited TÖS, a new association, the All Teachers Coalition and Solidarity Association *(Tüm Öğretmenler Birleşme ve Dayanışma Derneği/TÖB-DER)* was established and replaced TÖS (Grollmann & Rauner, 2007, p. 235). DİSK, TÖS and its follow up TÖB-DER took active place in the organization of strikes, lockouts, protests in order to improve the position and condition of workers. The official report states that between 1965 and 1980, hundreds of strikes were organized and caused more than millions of lost working days as seen in Table 1 which is obtained from the report of Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı, 1998, p. 65)

Table 1: The number of lost working days

Year	The number of strikes	The number of workers participated in strikes	The number of lost working days because of strikes
1965	46	6.593	336.836
1966	42	11.414	430.104
1967	101	9.499	350.037
1968	54	5.289	174.905

1969	74	12.601	235.134
1970	72	21.156	220.189
1971	78	10.916	476.116
1972	48	14.879	659.362
1973	55	12.286	671.135
1974	110	25.546	1.109.401
1975	116	13.708	668.797
1976	58	7.240	325.830
1977	59	15.682	1.397.124
1978	87	9.748	426.127
1979	126	21.011	1.147.011
1980	220	84.832	1.303.253

In fact, a new leftist culture was forming in all spheres of life. Leftist ideology was spreading to the all fields of socio-cultural and political life As the intellectual leaders of leftist organizations, the most prominent discussions were issued by the major three organizations in 1960's, TİP, MDD, Yön-Devrim.

Turkish Labor Party *(Türkiye İşçi Partisi/TİP)* as one of the milestones in Turkish history of leftist politics, is the first legal socialist party who has seat in parliament. It was founded at 13 February 1961 and the founders were the trade unionists. During the first year after foundation, the party was silent and it did fail to find favor in public. After Mehmet Ali Aybar was elected as the party-leader at 9 February 1962, the impression of the party started to change. TİP participated in local election held in 1963 and got 2.9% of the votes. The major success of the party was the results of 1965 general elections. TİP got 3% of votes and held 15 deputy in the parliament (Şener, 2007, p. 360). After entering the parliament, different opinions and disagreements emerged within the party. New conceptualizations of Mehmet Ali Aybar (e.g. Turkish model of socialism) is believed to accelerate the disagreements within the party. TİP, lastly participated in 1969 general elections, which is generally considered as a failure for the party.

In this election, TİP got 2.5% of votes and held only 2 deputies (Mehmet Ali Aybar and Rıza Kuas) in the parliament (Şener, 2007, p. 364).

TİP might be defined as a socialist party under the leadership of working class that aims to come power within democratic rule and procedure. Until 1965, 'socialism' as a word did not appear in any documents of party because of the political-historical context in Turkey. Yet, the party program and agenda proves the socialist agenda of the party even though the party abstained using the word 'socialism' directly (Şener, 2007, p. 369). Anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism, full independence and socio-economic development, socialism without revolution (implying that socialism could be achieved by a peaceful parliamentary change of the regime) could be identified as the major themes of party agenda. In fact, TİP could not be conceptualized as a proletarian class party. Instead, TİP appeals to whole fractions of workers in society. Within 1960's, despite the flow of rural-urban migration, more than %50 of national population lives in rural. Thereby, cooperation and collaboration with peasants occupies an important place for the party program (Alış, 2009, p. 107). When membership composition of the party is further scrutinized, it is seen that different fractions of left – leftist intellectuals, trade-unionist, Kurds, peasants, workers – is represented within the party. In fact, the goal is to unite all these people under the ideal of socialism.

The relative liberalization of 1961 constitution provides a much wider spectrum of political activity and conditions the political mobilization of Kurds. Kurdish activism was appeared under TİP. TİP was the first legal party that recognized the Kurdish nation. During its 4th Congress in 1970, TIP declared that

> There is a Kurdish nation lived in the East part of Turkey. The fascist authority – the ruling elites – has been implementing a policy of assimilation and intimidation. The solution was the socialist revolution which would be brought by the collective struggle of Kurdish and Turkish socialist (Alış, 2012, p. 75).

Due to this declaration and party program stressing on the national rights of Kurds, Constitutional Court closed TIP (Decree no: 1991/1). In fact, TİP was not an ethnic based party, aiming for Kurdish independence, but rather, TİP's discourse was more inclusive and more sympathetic to Kurdish population. The only ideal of TİP is socialist revolution.

Under the leadership of TİP, public meetings called as Revolutionary East Cultural Association *(Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları / DDKO)* were organized on regular basis starting from 1967 in order to take attention to Kurdish question (Ekinci, 2011, p. 66). Kurdish political movement, during this period, displays secular and leftist features in line with Marxist and Leninist discourse. Therefore, it is not surprising that Kurdish political activism is flourished under the leadership of TİP. After Illegal Kurdistan Workers Party *(Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan/PKK)* was launched by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978 by claiming to rescue Kurds from the repression and exploitation and to unite them under Kurdistan (Bruinessen, 1992, p. 59), Kurdish movement was separated from Turkish socialist left. Relative silence of Kurds was then replaced with a very loud, radical and forceful action.

To continue with Yön-Devrim movement, it is named after the chronicle 'Journal of Yön' *(Yön Dergisi)* which was firstly published at December 1961. It was influential especially among military-bureaucratic elites, university students, and a group of leftist intellectuals. The most popular name of the movement is Doğan Avcıoğlu (1926 -1983). His books –the most popular ones are 'Order of Turkey' *(Türkiye'nin Düzeni)* and 'History of the Turkish Nation' *(Türklerin Tarihi)* – were highly influential in terms of defining the political agenda of the movement. Besides Avcıoğlu, many influential leftist intellectuals (e.g. Sadun Aren, Çetin Altan, Mihri Belli, Mümtaz Soysal, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, İlhan Selçuk, Hasan Cemal and Abdi İpekçi) did also write/publish in Yön journal.

To achieve national socialist model, Avcıoğlu, on contrary to TİP, does not believe in democratic methods. For him, the initial step for socialism is a coup d'état which should be carried under the leadership of military-bureaucratic elites (Tekeli & İlkin, 2003, p. 469). Avcıoğlu approaches Turkish military as the inheritor of Atatürk who enables Turkey to gain full independence. That is why, military-bureaucratic elites are believed to have a revolutionary potential and given a major role to bring socialist revolution. In his theory, upon the coup, a united national front/ national party, the core body of which includes military-bureaucratic elites, university students, workers and peasants should be formed to rule the country. Here, the importance of the alliance with peasants is emphasized. Since more than half of the population lives in rural, a national united front can never be formed unless the peasants are involved. Avcıoğlu also highlights that the national party should be classless, which means that this party should never favor one class over another (Akdere & Karadeniz, 1996, p. 232). The major theme discussed by the organization is, in fact, 'national socialism'[14], and 'national development' under the leadership of 'military-bureaucratic elites'.

To mention about National Democratic Revolution (*Milli Demokratik Devrim*/*MDD*), it gives special attention to anti-imperialist struggle together with socio-economic development. Mihri Belli, the leading figure of the movement, brings up a new conceptualization termed 'national democratic revolution'. As Lipovsky (1991) states, Belli, same with Aybar/TİP, believes the importance of

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[14] Turkish socialism, a new conceptualization, is delivered by Avcıoğlu. Avcıoğlu identifies three types of economic development model as 1. Capitalist development adopted in the societies where bourgeoisie revolution was enabled such as America, 2. Socialist model adopted by Soviet Union and based on proletarian dictatorship and 3. National development model adopted by societies experienced late industrialization and concordantly late modernization such as Romania, Bulgaria. National development model, for Avcıoğlu, is a national socialist model that relies upon statist policies but does not impose proletarian dictatorship. Turkish socialism conceptualization corresponds with this national socialist model. Here, Avcıoğlu argues that Turkey as a late industrialized country belong to Asiatic countries. That is to say, in Turkey, class-conflicts are not clearly defined and occurred, yet. Adopting statist economy policies can prevent any class conflicts to appear.

democratic methods for the struggle of socialism. Yet, unlike Aybar, Belli believes in the importance and necessity of two-staged revolution because he attributes great importance to the struggle of anti-feudalism (p. 101). Which is to say, the dissolution of feudalism and constitution of capitalism appears as a prerequisite for the transition to socialism.

Almost every socialist organization is closed with the military operation at 1971. After the transitional military regime, Turkish left began to re-organize starting from 1974. During this period, however, the fertile intellectual atmosphere of left disappeared. Although leftist movement became more popularized and massified, the internal conflicts, fragmentations became more apparent. Moreover, the political struggle were transferred into violent street fights with ultra-nationalist groups, which further conditions the emergence of illegal leftist organization adopted armed struggle as the major strategy.

The socialist camp is too fragmented and divided that nearly each leader of the 1960's movement (e.g. Behice Boran, Mehmet Ali Aybar, Mihri Belli) established his/her own individual parties. In 1974, Turkish Socialist Labor Party *(Türkiye Sosyalist İşçi Partisi/TSİP)* was established under the leadership Ahmet Kaçmaz (who is a former TİP activist). It was the first socialist party established after 1971 military coup. This party accuses TİP of passivity and criticizes TİP of believing in parliamentary change of the regime. The party, further, criticizes MDD as overemphasizing the role of military-bureaucratic elites. This party, instead, asserts the importance of the alliance between workers and peasants, which is believed to bring the democratic people's power (Ozan, 2015, p. 706). Later, in 1975, Belli and his followers founded Turkish Workers Party *(Türkiye Emekçi Partisi/TEP).* The immediate task of the party is defined as to attain full political and economic independence and to sustain the democratization of Turkey (Lipovsky, 1991, p. 105). Behice Boran, who was the former chairman of TİP, reestablished the party after she was released from prison in 1974. The new TİP

declares itself as a socialist organization of working classes, which seek to obtain power by legal ways. In 1975, Aybar established another socialist part, Socialist Party *(Sosyalist Parti/SP)* and it is renamed The Socialist Revolutionary Party (Sosyalist Devrimci Parti/SDP) in 1977. The goal of the party is declared to change the social structure, thereby, to build socialism in Turkey (Lipovsky, 1991, p. 105). Lastly, the Maoist Doğu Perinçek established Turkish Workers and Peasants Party *(Türkiye İşçi Köylü Partisi/TİKP)* in 1978. Instead of a collaboration within leftist camps, this party accept all political agents against the Nationalist Movement Party and its fascism as an ally regardless of their ideological formation[15] (Ozan, 2015, p. 708).

Student organizations do also occupy an important place within leftist camp. As well as collaborating with other socialist organizations, they take active part within protests and strikes. Federation of Idea Clubs *(Fikir Klüpleri Federasyonu/FKF)* was established in 1965 and it supported TİP and its policies (Ünüvar, 2007a, p.821). After FKF's self-closure in 1969, Revolutionary Youth *(Devrimci Gençlik/Dev-Genç)* was established as a follow-up. They believe not the working class but the student movement will change the regime and bring socialism (Ünüvar, 2007b, p. 830).

Turkey's first violent left-wing groups did also appear within this period. The most influential ones are Turkish People's Liberation Army, Turkish People's Liberation Party /Front *(Türkiye Halkın Kurtuluş Ordusu/THKO)* and Turkish Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Party *(Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi Köylü Partisi/TİİKP).* After 1971 coup d'etat, Turkish army delivered a severe blow to the socialist organizations. Thousands of supporters and leaders were sentenced. Although some of the organizations managed to survive, they stayed in low profile. After 1974, mainly due to the release of political leaders by general amnesty, new

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[15] For further information about leftist parties between 1960-1980, see (Lipovsky, 1991)

splinter groups appeared. The most influential ones were Marxist Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit *(Marxist-Leninist Silahlı Propaganda Birliği/MLSPB)* and Revolutionary Path *(Devrimci Yol/Dev-yol)*, which were the splinters from previous THKO. Later, in 1978, Revolutionary Path divided and a new group named as Revolutionary Left *(Devrimci Sol/Dev-sol)* emerged (Bingöl, 2016, pp. 220–221). There are many other small splinter groups emerged as a result of the divisions within the main organizations.

As a conclusion, it might be asserted that socialist organizations managed to organize a counter-hegemonic bloc both within political and civil society especially by way of many non-governmental organizations (such as working class organizations, student organizations). Nonetheless, they do not enable to grasp the political power either by legal or illegal ways.

If the major debates of leftist organizations listed above is scrutinized, nationalism is not presented as an identity claim by leftist organizations. Instead, nationalism is articulated with the leftist principles of 'anti-imperialism', 'socialism', socio-economic development/national development', and 'full independence'[16]. Şener specifies the meaning of Turkish nationalism, for leftist organizations. Turkish nationalism is the ideological expression of the reaction against colonialism, exploitation, foreign intervention, that Turkey as a semi-colonial country has been suffering from (Şener, 2007, p. 370). Thus, Turkish left does not conceptualize a Turkish national identity. Nationalism is, instead, articulated with political-economic understanding of left.

The hegemonic bloc of the era, on the other hand, appeals Turkish nationalism as an identity discourse. The following sections discuss how Turkish nationalism is

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[16] For detailed information about the nationalism discourse of Turkish left, see (Atılgan, 2009).

articulated with right-wing hegemony as a major constituent of 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis' and 'anti-communism'.

3.2. The Articulation of 'Turkish Nationalism' with Right-wing Hegemony

To define the hegemonic bloc and the hegemonic principles between 1965 and 1980, until 12 Mart 1971 military coup d'etat, Justice Party *(Adalet Partisi)* was the hegemonic power. After the coup, there are transitory governments until 1973 general elections. After the election, Republican People's Party took the power only for a short time. This period between 1973 and 1980 could be defined as a crisis of representation, (or a parliamentary crisis) because until 1980 coup d'etat, there are many governments which could never last long. The most prominent ones are three minority governments called 'National Front'. It represents the increasing importance of Islamization and anti-communism in shaping Turkish politics. In fact, even its constitution is legitimized on the ground of blaming the former Republican People's Party regime as pro-communist. As stated by Ozan, I. National Front (consisting of Justice Party *(Adalet Partisi),* National Salvation Party *(Milli Selamet Partisi),* Nationalists Movement Party *(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi),* and Republican Reliance Party *(Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi)*) assert that they want to form the government against the danger of communism in Turkey. Which is to say, anti-communism/anti-left and Islam is the ideological common point of this union, which came to power on the basis of not leaving the country to the left[17] (Ozan, 2015, p. 693). Therefore, it is not coincidence that increasing Islamization and anti-communism as becoming state strategy did shape the politics of 1970's in Turkey.

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[17] This anti-communist stance is not distinctive to right wing parties in 1970's but it is more like a state ideology. For example, Republican People's Party shared the same anti-communist stance, and thereby, Bülent Ecevit coins his conceptualization of 'left-of-center' which brings more moderate leftist principles in order to keep working class away from communism.

The right wing hegemony, allied with industrial bourgeoisie, share a liberal-conservative understanding, and adopt the hegemonic principles of anti-communism and Islamization/Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Ultra-nationalism, during this period, manages to integrate Islam with their understanding since both of them share the hatred of communism. That brings the new understanding 'Turkish-Islamic' synthesis, which would officially be adopted as a state-ideology after 1980.

The following sections dwell on in which ways Turkish-Islamic synthesis and anti-communism which are both integrated with Turkish nationalism discourse is framed and functioned in civil society and political society. The way to do this is to analyze the political/civil society organizations, their alliance with the state and their role in politicizing the masses to constitute the collective will in accordance with their ideological framework.

3.2.1. Turkish-Islamic Synthesis

Same with Turkish nationalism, Islam functions a key role in terms of constituting the collective popular will/hegemony in Turkey. Turkish-Islamic synthesis become one of a distinct strain of liberal-conservative ideology of the right wing parties especially after 1970's. Copeaux (1998) defines Turkish-Islamic synthesis as a way of idealization of Islam in a way to turn Islam into an element of Turkish national culture. For this understanding, Islam is seen superior than Turkish nation because Turkish nation cannot survive without Islam. On the other hand, Turkish nation/culture protect Islam and make it more powerful (p. 56).

Here, it is important to define how and through which channels Turkish-Islamic synthesis operates within politics and society. There are certain organizations who actively take part in defining the ideological framework of Turkish-Islamic synthesis as well as politicizing the masses in accordance with this ideology. 'The

Institute for Studying Turkish Culture *(Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü)'* is one of the most prominent ones especially in terms of defining the ideological framework of Turkish national culture. The monthly-published journal 'Turkish Culture' *(Türk Kültürü)* occupy a key position for the task of defining and decontaminating the elements of Turkish national culture. According to this organization, the historically rooted and distinctive Turkish national culture has been developing and enriching for centuries, since the early establishment of Turkish nation. It is, therefore, significant to study Turkish culture and its constituents.

This organization, for Copeaux, paves the way for the establishment of 'Intellectuals' Organization *(Aydınlar Ocağı)'.* It was established in 1970 under the leadership of İbrahim Kafesoğlu who is a prominent figure of Turkish nationalists. Copeaux (1998) defines its role by stating that this organization enables nationalists and Islamists to unite their views under the framework of Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which is seen as the main basis of Turkish nation. To accomplish this task, this organization organizes seminars, scientific meetings, congresses and colloquiums to propagate Turkish-Islamic synthesis (p. 58). For this purpose, Intellectuals' Organization develops alliance and organic relations with Ilim Yayma Society *(İlim Yayma Cemiyeti),* which is an Islamist organization. The alliance between these two organizations also illustrates the attempt of combining Islam with Turkish national identity. The former president, Turgut Özal is one of a follower of this organization (Copeaux, 1998, p. 58). Even more, Turgut Özal present his work '24 January Decisions', which bases the economic transformation of Turkey with 1980 coup d'état, at Intellectuals Organization in the first place before the official presentation to the state authorities. Yaşlı further argues that the organization proposes neo-liberalism for the economic crisis of Turkey and Islamization for the hegemony crisis of Turkey in 1970's (Yaşlı, 2014, p. 385). Both neo-liberalism and Islam (Turkish-Islamic synthesis as the new conceptualization) has turned out to be a state-ideology especially after 1980's.

These examples show the key position of the organization in defining Turkish politics.

Other Islamic organizations of the era are Turkish National Student Union *(Milli Türk Talebe Birliği)* and Raiders Organization *(Akıncılar Derneği)* that support the National Vision Movement and its political representative 'National Salvation Party *(Milli Selamet Partisi).* Although Grey Wolves and ultra-nationalist groups have organic relations with Turkish National Student Union during 1960's and they together take part in many nationalist attacks (e.g. Bloody Sunday), in 1969 Congress of Turkish National Student Union, the ultra-nationalist groups left the organization and joined Grey Wolves Organization. As such, during 1970's, Turkish National Student Union adopt an Islamist vision. For example, the emblem of the organization consisting of the star and crescent together with a wolf was changed to a holly book inside the crescent (Ozan, 2015, p. 701). Thus, the nationalist symbol of the organization is changed with a more Islamist one together with the similar change in the ideological orientation of the organization. In case of Raider's Organization, it was established in 1976 and it managed to develop organic relations with National Salvation Party. It began to operate as the youth wing of the party for a short time (Ozan, 2015, p. 701).

Lastly, the adoption of Nine Light Doctrine *(Dokuz Işık Doktrini)* by Alparslan Türkeş and his party also shows the increasing importance of Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Alparslan Türkeş who is ex-colonel joined the Republican Villagers Nation Party *(Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi/CKMP)* in 1964. He took the power and became the new chairman of the party, in 1965. Since this situation disturbed the senior party members because of political disagreements with Türkeş, they resigned from the party. This enables Türkeş to redesign the party by adopting Nine Light Doctrine in 1967 Congress of the party. This doctrine is consisted of nine principles listed as follows: nationalism, idealism, moralism, communitarianism, peasantism, scientism, liberty/libertarianism,

personality/individualism, developmentalism, industrialism and tehnicalism. Later, in 1969 Congress, Türkeş dismisses the oppositional groups (a). followers of Nihal Atsız – who dismiss Islam in conceptualizing ultra-nationalism – and (b). the group of communitarian-nationalists, who are in favor of a secular understanding and rename the party as 'Nationalist Movement Party *(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi/MHP)* (Yaşlı, 2014, p. 380). Since then, this party and the associated Grey Wolf Organization, which operates as if a youth branch of the party have been one of the milestones in terms of being a representative of Turkish-Islamic synthesis. As further cited by Yaşlı, Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti, in his radio-speech before the senate election of Republican Peasants' Nation Party at 1968 states that:

> Republican Peasants' Nation Party is the party of those who fear nothing but Allah. Fearless people should come to us, join the army of faith. My brothers and sisters, who have faith, we are preparing for a new battle of Manzikert. This war will be a war of souls, a war of believers and unbelievers. The unbelievers, hypocrites, pro-Moscows communists, Zionists, and all other –ists will be destroyed by this war (Yaşlı, 2014, p. 380)

This speech shows that Islam is integrated with the nationalist discourse for the sake of anti-communist struggle. The new slogan[18] 'Turk as much as Tian Shan / and Muslim as much as Mount Hira' also proves the Islamic orientation of the nationalists. A new emblem for the party, consisted of a figure of wolf – a mythic symbol is believed to represent the power of Turks – is adopted. This wolf figure is placed into the figure of three crescents from Ottoman period – which represent Islamic jihad understanding (Yaşlı, 2014, p. 380). All these has proven the increasing importance of Islam/Turkish-Islamic synthesis not only in terms of anti-communist struggle but also in defining Turkish politics. Thereby, the concepts and symbols of Islam such as jihad, martyrdom, and three crescents are integrated

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[18] Tanrı Dağı kadar Türk, Hira Dağı kadar Müslüman.

with the ideological framework of Turkish nationalism and patriotism. These symbols and concepts are directly appealed for politicizing masses especially for the struggle against communism.

Ayyob draws attention to the instrumentalization of Islam by political agents. He discusses that Islamism, in practice, always function as context-based. That is to say, Islamic vocabulary is employed to pursue certain political objectives in discrete settings (Ayoob, 2004, pp. 1–2). In Turkish case (1965-1980), this intermingle of Islam and politics is further used to constitute the hegemony and shape the society in line with this ideological framework. To achieve this, besides Islamic organizations and their local branches, Islamic intellectual activities (literary works, Islamic movies, journals) rises, and Islam is further integrated with the education system. Etienne Copeaux shows how Turkish-Islamic synthesis shape the official historiography and become part of national education by analyzing the content of 'history books'(see: Copeaux, 1998).

In short, Turkish-Islamic synthesis has turned out to be a reference point that bound all right parties together and conditions the constitution of right-wing hegemony. At this point, Islam and nationalism, shared a mutual hatred of communism, is appealed to produce consent, (or in other words, as a nationalizing principle for collective popular will) and it is further instrumentalized for the struggle against communism. The next section discusses the key role of anti-communism for the constitution of right-wing hegemony.

3.2.2. Anti-Communism

During this period, communism is presented as a national threat due to the rise of left as a counter hegemonic-bloc threatening the current hegemony. Turkish nationalism turn out to be the best way to appeal more people to fight against the alleged national threat, communism. As well as the foundation of many

organizations (e.g. Grey wolves and their local branches, anti-communist organizations, student clubs, commando camps) based on nationalist ideology, political parties, governments and even the state appeal to Turkish nationalism to gain legitimacy and support for their activities.

Communism is not seen as a political alternative/choice for right-wing hegemony. Rather, it is conceptualized as a terrorist threat against the integrity of Turkish nation. As stated by Koca (2017), Alpaslan Türkeş, in his book 'Unknowns of an Era' *(Bir Devrin Perde Arkası)* emphasizes that the goal of communism is to destroy Turkish nation. In other words, communism is believed to threaten the national and territorial integrity. Thus, communism should be destroyed for the good of Turkish nation. In order to do so, Türkeş argues that all national forces should unite with nationalist aspirations. Within this conceptualization, communism is conveyed as a national problem regarding the whole nation, not as a political choice, because it is believed that the goal of communism is to destroy Turkish nation (p. 553). Reminding Truman Doctrine – providing financial and military aid to the governments that were actively struggling against communism by USA, and thereby, setting a basis for an alliance between USA and Turkey (Koca, 2017, p. 546) –, it is not coincidence that not only the nationalist parties but also all organs of state adopt anti-communism. In fact, especially during 1970's, anti-communism is adopted as a state-strategy which shapes the socio-political life of Turkey.

A Moscow image, representing the enemy of nation/alism, patriotism and Islam, is created. The booklet of anti-communism, prepared by Tural (the formerly Chief of General Staff) describes, one of its sections, what will happen in case the alleged 'communist disaster' occur:

> Turkish nation will be seperated into ethnicities. Moreover, religion will be removed, thereby, the mosques will be destroyed. Turkish men will

deported to the Russian steppes. A group of communist men will be brought to raise the new generation. Turkishness will be destroyed. The elder people will be murdered unless they can afford themselves. The state administration will be handed by the servants of Moscow party. Everything will be handled according to communist principles and standards (Koca, 2017, p. 553).

This conceptualization of 'Moscow image' represents the fear of occupation by Soviet Union. During the time of Cold War, this discourse of an external enemy, represented by Moscow image, is appealed to ensure national unity and solidarity. Thereby, it is expected to strengthen the national identity attachment. This discourse paves the way for the constitution of anti-communist institutions and street fights with leftist groups. In short, anti-communism shapes the actual socio-political struggles and contributes to defining the ideological formation of political right.

To look at the nationalist (civil society) organizations, anti-communist institutions is one of the milestones to scrutinize. The first anti-communist institution is established in Zonguldak in 1950. Later in 1956, a branch of the institution is founded in İstanbul and in 1963 another branch was established in İzmir. Until 1960's, communism is not conceptualized as a national threat. Therefore, after the foundation of İzmir Brach in 1963, anti-communist institutions became more important and more apparent. Since 'communist threat' (the rise of left) has frightened the government, these institutions managed to get integrated with the state. For example, in Turkish Assembly, a commission is established in early 1960's in order to struggle against communism. This struggle became more powerful with the establishment of anti-communist institution in İzmir. the members of Justice Party, and Republican Villagers Nation Party took active place in the foundation of the institution (Meşe, 2013, p. 63-64) and the president, Cemal Gürsel was awarded with the honorary presidency of the institution. anti-communist institutions are qualified as public benefit organization until 1968 and they receive support from government budget (Meşe, 2013, p. 68). The relation

with the government enable the institution to widen its scope of influence within society. For example, as Koca stated, in 1965, there are 61 branches of the institution and later in 1968, this number is increased to 141 in Turkey (2017, p. 558).

In its regulation, the goal of the institution is defined to strengthen the unity among Turkish nation and to create a national consciousness of history, homeland, culture. While doing so, this institution combats with communism which does harm Turkish national unity (TKMD, 1963, p. 3). If the scope of institutions' activities is analyzed, it is seen that they are mainly based on publications, (e.g. publishing journals, booklets, books) in order to create a collective consciousness against communism. To give some examples, Journal of Struggle *(Komunizmle Mücadele Dergisi),* War Against Communism *(Komunizmle Savaş),* and Journal of Union against Communism *(Komunizmle Mücadele Birliği Dergisi)* were published within the body of the institution. They further publish books of the well-known rightist writers too. Some of these books are, 'Against Communist Provocations *(Komunist Tahrikleri Karşısında)* written by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Turkish Moscow and Communist *(Türk Moskof and Komunist)* by Nejdet Sançar, and Communism in Turkey and Village Institutes *(Türkiye'de Komünizma ve Köy Enstitüleri)* by Necip Fazıl Kısakürek. They offer to form an anti-communist federation to unite their powers with different organizations for the struggle against communism. To do this, they offer collaboration to Turkish Hearths *(Türk Ocakları),* Intellectuals Club *(Aydınlar Klubü),* some local cultural organizations, and teachers' association (Meşe, 2013, pp. 70, 82–94).

Another significant anti-communist organization is 'Grey Wolves' *(Ülkü Ocakları)* and the associated 'commando camps'. This organization might be defined as a para-military group gathered around Türkeş's ultra-nationalist doctrine. Their goal, according to their regulation, is defined to raise national consciousness/awareness especially within students in order to enable them to feel

attached to Islam, Turkishness and Turkish culture. The regulation defines the task of the organization as to combat with any communist threat that are against Turkish national unity. The members are trained at commando camps and fight with leftist groups, which, escalates the violence all around the country. In Ankara, İzmir, İstanbul and Adana, 170 tents were established and more than a thousand young Turkish men were trained within these camps (Darendelioğlu, 1977, pp. 414–415, 417). This organization is, in collaboration with, other anti-communist organizations, and especially with Turkish National Student Union *(Milli Türk Talebe Birliği).* Both of the organizations are held responsible for the tragedy of 'Bloody Sunday'[19].

To conclude this chapter, the contextual roots of the rise of Turkish nationalism during this period is defined as (1). the rise of Turkish left and (2). Cyprus issue. Turkish left arises as an alternative hegemony project, which do operate within different spheres of civil society but which is not able to conquer the political power. The official statistics (including the number of workers attended the strikes, the missing working days because of strikes) shows how the rise of left has shaken the status-quo, thereby, appear as a threat/an alternative against the current hegemony. Within this contextual picture, right wing parties is united under the liberal-conservative ideology, and appeals to 'anti-communism' and 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis (especially after 1970) in order to reproduce their hegemony. Here, it is possible to argue that Islam and Turkish nationalism is used as a way to produce consent, or let's say, to constitute the collective popular will. Turkish nationalism, integrated with Islam and anti-communism, emphasizes on the

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[19] Which is, left wing students supported by labor party and labor union gathered to protest American Sixth Fleet at the Bosporus. Meanwhile, the right-wing students came and attack the leftist students with using knives and batons. At the end, 17 students were killed and 34 students were injured, which is still remained as a bloodstained blot escalating further political violence in Turkey.

importance of the unity/solidarity of Turkish nation against the external communist threat.

CHAPTER 4

FILM ANALYSIS

Finlayson stresses on the irreducible specificity of the national phenomena. He argues that individual nationalisms always contain a very particular 'content' that aims to define the general culture and values of the 'national' people and which, in turn, is related to the construction and deployment of such values within political ideological discourse (Finlayson, 1998). In a similar vein, this chapter intends to analyze how the specificities of Turkish nationalism is constructed in historical adventure movies and in which ways this discursive construction is socially conditioned and related with wider socio- political and ideological relations.

To analyze the movies within its own history, the general overview of Turkish cinema between 1965 and 1980 is described. Then, short description and thematic discourse analysis of the movies are presented. Thematic discourse analysis consisted of three major themes 1. How Turkish national identity is constructed 2. How the enemy is defined 3. How national past is narrated. To refrain from a reductionist semantic analysis, this chapter analyzes the narratives, ideologies, beliefs, myths, legends, figures within the movies so that a critical and contextual discourse analysis could be presented.

4.1. General Overview of Turkish Cinema between 1965 and 1980

The period between 1965 and 1975 is marked by the domination of historical adventure movies as a genre of Yeşilçam in Turkish cinema. Nonetheless, after 1975 the family gradually left the movie theaters due to the escalated violence shed blood in the streets and the widespread of television which provides a safe

entertainment at homes (Erdoğan & Göktürk, 2001, p. 537). Moreover, economic crisis appeared after OPEC crises and Cyprus Peace Operation (1974) reduced the production volume of film industry. This situation went bad to worse when television became widespread. After all, new genres were introduced to draw audiences. Erotic movies and arabesque movies were gaining popularity while historical adventure movies gradually disappeared after 1975.

Between 1965 and 1980, the most apparent characteristics of Turkish cinema is the extremely increasing number of movies. The continually increasing demand of the audiences caused a rapid expansion in film business. For example, in 1961 the number of film was 166 and it was twice the figure of the previous year. Later in 1972, it reached its peak with 298 films (Erdoğan & Göktürk, 2001, p. 535). In 1966, Turkish cinema ranked as the top 4th country among the whole world countries in terms of generating the maximum number of movies. In this ranking, the first country was Japan which made 442 movies in 1966, the second was India with 332 movies, Hong-Kong was the third with 300 movies and accordingly Turkey was the fourth with 224 movies (Erus, 2015, p. 42).

According to TUIK data-set, in 1965 %48.76 and in 1970 %56.2 of the whole population is literate (Öztürk, 2013, p. 22). This shows that nearly half of the population is illiterate and unable to reach written sources of popular culture such as newspapers, novels, story books. Within this picture, the audio-visual character of the cinema enables to reach a wider population. This is why cinema became the most popular and widespread category of popular culture during this period.

Besides the increasing number of movies, the diversified and fertile cultural atmosphere of 1960's especially as a result of the effect 1968 movements might also be seen as a distinct character of 1960's and 1970's Turkish cinema. For example, within the first half of 1960's, the hegemony of Yeşilçam cinema was shaken with the rise of social realist movies which focuses on socio-political

problems and realities of Turkey. Many new periodicals – which could be exemplified by Si-Sa, Yeni Sinema, Sine-Film, Sinema 65, Genç Sinema, Ulusal Sinema – was published. New film festivals (e.g. Hisar Short Film Festival) were arranged, new cinema clubs/associations (e.g. Turkish Cinematek club,) and labor unions for cinema-workers (e.g. Sine-İş) were established[20].

Regional management system as the socio-economic structure and censorship as the direct interference of Turkish state as one of the defining characteristics of Turkish cinema during this period. Without taking into consideration of these, the development of Turkish cinema during this period could never be comprehended. The following sections will, therefore, delve into the details of 'regional management system' and 'censorship mechanism'.

4.1.1. Regional Management System

Regional management system as a specific mode of production dominated Turkish cinema between 1960 and 1980 (Erkılıç & Ünal, 2018, p. 54). Turkish cinema is not economically self-sufficient in 1960's. The lack of capital investment in cinema drives the sector to pass to regional management system as a working solution. To see how this system works, the operator gives money as advance or bond to the producer so that the producer can have necessary fund to make the movie. Here, the preferences of the audience play a major role. The regional manager observes the reactions, expectations of the audiences. These preferences of audiences are delivered to the producer so that the producer will make the movie as ordered. In fact, the goal is to draw more audience to make more profit.

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[20] Although these developments are highly important to understand the development of Turkish cinema as well as its general traits between 1965 and 1980, it is quite irrelevant to the subject of this study. Therefore, I do not delve into details.

Therefore, the artistic value of the movie remains in the background while the box-office gross of the movie (or in other words, making profit) become predominant.

Within this structure, the same companies not only export and distribute but also produce the movies. This system divides Turkey into 6 districts which are defined as follows:

1. İstanbul Region (includes the following cities İstanbul, Tekirdağ, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Bursa, Çanakkale, Edirne ve Kırklareli)

2. Adana Region (includes the following cities Adana, Konya, Niğde, Mersin, Malatya, Van, Kayseri, Hatay, Gaziantep, Siirt, Urfa, Elazığ, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Bitlis, Adıyaman, Tunceli, Bingöl, Muş ve Hakkari)

3. İzmir Region (includes the following cities İzmir, Aydın, Muğla, Manisa, Burdur, Balıkesir, Isparta, Antalya, Afyon, Kütahya, Uşak ve Denizli)

4. Ankara Region (includes the following cities Ankara, Çankırı, Kırşehir, Yozgat and Bolu)

5. Samsun Region (includes the following cities Samsun, Amasya, Artvin, Çorum, Ordu, Trabzon, Sinop, Erzurum, Kars, Ağrı, Erzincan ve Gümüşhane)

6. Zonguldak Region (includes the following cities Zonguldak ve Kastamonu) (Erkılıç & Ünal, 2018, p. 57; Tunç, 2012, pp. 93–942)

The producers collect the necessary financial resources from the operators in these regions. Without the advance or bond the operators provide, the producers cannot make the movie.

The preferences of the audience determine almost everything about the movie. The content, subject, type and the lead actor of the movie is defined on the basis of audience preferences. The preferences of each region might also change. As Tunç

stated, Istanbul region preferred romantic movies, İzmir-Aydın region preferred historical movies, Samsun region preferred conservative movies and Ankara region & Adana region preferred adventure movies (2012, p. 96). The preferences of the audiences also determine who to select for acting. The audiences want to see a specific actor with a specific role in a movie. The movies are generally known with the name of the star actor but not the scenarist. Despite the continued increase of film numbers, the number of scenarists and directors remain the same. Screenplays were written in a rush – sometimes on the spot – just before shooting started (Erdoğan & Göktürk, 2001, p. 536).

Since the star actors play such a key role in the movies, the producers are obliged to increase star-payments. Tunç (2012) states that the largest part of a film budget is reserved for star-payment. Star payments are at least twice more than any other cost items of a movie. Within this picture, the producers save money on actors and studio-times but no investment was made on technical equipment, infrastructural capacities, or studios (pp. 96-102).

Regional management structure solves the financial problem of Turkish cinema so that Turkish cinema could become financially self-sufficient. Nonetheless, it is criticized of producing monolithic, similar and poor quality movies. If a movie managed to draw attention, the content of the movie is replicated and many other similar movies were made. That is why melodramas – especially the romance between rich man and poor woman – became such a pattern to follow. Within this picture, cinema sector become industrialized. The audiences turn into customers and the movies become part of cinema industry like commodity while the artistic value of the movie is ignored (Bordwell, Staiger, & Thompson, 1985, pp. 80–95).

4.1.2. Censorship

In 1934 'The Regulation on the Control of Films and Film Screenplays' was formulated as part of the 'Police Duty and Authorization Law', and it was applied with minor revisions until 1985 (Erdoğan & Göktürk, 2001, pp. 537). The preliminary draft of 1961 constitution involved a progressive article declaring that the cinema cannot be censored. Nonetheless, this article was not issued in the constitution. The censorship code enacted at 1934 stayed valid. This censorship code declares that the movies should be approved by the 'Board of Censors'. This board consisted of 5 main members; two members from 'Ministry of Interior', one from the 'Ministry of Tourism', one from the 'Ministry of Education', and one from the police. Moreover, depending on the content of the movie, additional members coming from the 'General Staff of the Army', 'The Ministry of Commerce' could join the board. Before production, the scenario of the movie is submitted to the Board. The board can authorize, ban or request revisions. If the scenario is authorized, the director is allowed to make the movie. After movie-shooting is done, the movie is submitted to the Board for authorization, again. In order to be authorized, the films should avoid;

1. Political propaganda of any state
2. Degrading an ethnic community or race
3. Hurting the feelings of fellow states and nations
4. Propagating religion
5. Propagating political, economic and social ideologies that contradicted the national regime
6. Contradicting national and moral values
7. Denigrating the military and security of the country
8. Being harmful to the discipline and security of the country
9. Provoking crime
10. Criticizing Turkey (Özgüç, 1976, pp. 12–13).

Any objections raised against the decisions of the Board addresses to the 'Ministry of Interior' which reserves the right to authorize or ban the film even if the film is approved/banned by the Board of Censors.

Despite the minor changes with the reformulation of censorship act in 1977, the tyranny of censorship in Turkish cinema remained untouched until 1985. In practice, the governments interpreted this code arbitrarily and enforces it in a way to take advantage (Erus, 2015, p. 45). In line with government ideology in 1960's, censorship targets directly the marks of leftist politics and bans the movies which carry any traces of leftist ideology. It became worsened and overwhelming after AP took power in 1965 elections (Daldal, Saydam, & Erus, 2017). For example, since the censorship committee did not authorize, film negatives of Dry Summer *(Susuz Yaz)* – which won Golden Bear award – were hiddenly flight from Turkey and entered the festival. During 1960's, other social realist movies similarly struggled with overwhelming censorship mechanism'[21].

This censorship mechanism impairs the quality of movies. To avoid any risk of being banned, scenarists make similar movies (a popular example is melodramas) which do have the similar scenario and touch upon the same topic. Censorship, thereby, restrained the artistic creativity of scenarists and forced them to adopt an auto-control mechanism. At the end, hundreds of similar movies were made and gained popularity.

4.2. A Short Description of the Selected Movies

Between the years of 1965 and 1975, many historical adventure movies were made. Besides the selected film series (Karaoğlan, Tarkan, Malkoçoğlu, Kara Murat, Battal Gazi), Hakanlar Çarpışıyor, Kılıç Arslan, Korkusuz Cengaver,

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[21] In order to see further about the overwhelming censorship mechanisms exercised over social realists movies, see (Öztürk, 2013).

Alparslan'ın Fedaisi, Horasanın Üç Atlısı are the most known examples. As a direct result of regional management system, all of these movies have similar story lines and the same lead actors (e.g. Cüneyt Arkın, Kartal Tibet).

This study examines the most popular historical adventure movies made between 1965 and 1980. Following the reactions, expectations and preferences of the audiences, regional management system aims to draw as many audiences as possible to constitute an economically self-sufficient cinema. Basing on the rationale of the regional management system, the movies made as film series are accepted as the most popular movies because the following movies are never made unless a movie draws much attention and makes profit. The most popular movies are, therefore, defined as Karaoğlan, Malkoçoğlu, Tarkan, Kara Murat and Battal Gazi. There are also other indicators that further proves the extreme popularity of these movies. For example, the original film series are replicated by different directors. Replicating the major characters of the original series, Bozkırlar Şahini Tark-Han, Tarkan Canavarlı Kule and Tarkan Camokaya Karşi, the goal is to attract more audiences. Moreover, the insistence of the producers not to end but to continue the film series despite the occurrence of problems even with the directors and producers also prove that these movies are making good profit.

To start with Karaoğlan film series, it is adopted from a historical comic strip created by Suat Yalaz. The comic strip is firstly published in daily Akşam newspaper. Later, it started to be published as a separate comic strip at 1963. Since it managed to attract attention and became popular, Suat Yalaz decided to adopt this comic strip into the cinema. Altay'dan Gelen Yiğit as the first movie of the Karaoğlan series were made at 1965. It was followed by Baybora'nın Oğlu (1966) and Camoka'nın İntikamı (1966). After having a break for a couple of years, Cengizhan'ın Hazineleri (the last movie of the series) were made at 1972. To look at the content of the series very briefly, the story takes place between 12th and 13th century in Central Asia when Genghis Khan reigned over. Karaoğlan – the main

character – is a Uygur Turk. He is potrayed as a young and brave nomadic scout from Genghis Khan's army. The stories contain his adventures during his travel throughout Eurasia. Karaoğlan is portrayed as a brave, honest hero who is extremely good at fighting. The stories of Karaoğlan bases on pre-Islamic Turkish history in Central Asia.

To move on with Tarkan film series, it is also adopted from Tarkan comic strip created by Sezgin Burak. It is consisted of five movies, narrating the story of the fictional character Tarkan. Tarkan (1969) –the first movie of the series— was directed by Tunç Başaran. The following movies are Tarkan Gümüş Eyer (1970), Tarkan Viking Kanı (1971), Tarkan: Altın Madalyon (1973) and Tarkan: Güçlü Kahraman (1973), respectively. The following four movies are all directed by Mehmet Aslan. Tarkan film series takes place in 5th century, during the reign of Atilla. Tarkan is portrayed as a Hun Turk warrior who represents the justice, strength, trustfulness, or in short the power of Turks. The stories in the movies took places in Europe and Asia where Tarkan travels to fight against and takes revenge from the enemies of Turks. Same with Karaoğlan, Tarkan film series also concentrates on the pre-Islamic Turkish history. Both Karaoğlan and Tarkan characters are acted out by Kartal Tibet. As stated, regional management system tries to follow the preferences of audiences even in terms of selecting the lead actors. This, in turn, results with matching certain actors with specific roles, which might be exemplified with the case of Kartal Tibet's act as the Turkish hero in both Tarkan and Karaoğlan film series.

In case of Malkoçoğlu film series, its major character – Malkoçoğlu – is a famous raider from Ottoman army. He is not a fictional character; but rather, a famous epic figure who is believed to live in early Ottoman period. The film series is consisted of seven movies which are chronologically as follows: Malkoçoğlu (1966), Malkoçoğlu Krallara Karşı (1967), Malkoçoğlu Kara Korsan (1968), Malkoçoğlu Akıncılar Geliyor (1969), Malkoçoğlu Cem Sultan (1970), Malkoçoğlu Ölüm

Fedaileri (1971), and Malkoçoğlu Kurt Bey (1973). Malkoçoğlu, in these movies, are portrayed as a brave Turkish soldier who ceaselessly toils for the national glory of Ottoman army. He is always assigned with certain military tasks (e.g. invading enemy territories) which requires a continuous struggle against enemies. Malkoçoğlu character is acted out by Cüneyt Arkın in the first six movies but in the last movie (Malkoçoğlu Kurt Bey) it is acted out by Serdar Gökhan. The stories generally takes place in parts of Europe which is represented as enemy territories.

To continue with Battal Gazi film series, Battal Gazi is a famous epic character. The film series is consisted of four movies which are chronologically made as follows: Battal Gazi Destanı (1971), Battal Gazi'nin İntikamı (1972), Battal Gazi Geliyor (1973) and Battal Gazi'nin Oğlu (1974). The first movie – Battal Gazi Destanı (1971) – is directed by Atıf Yılmaz but the following three movies are directed by Natuk Baytan. In reality, Battal Gazi is Muslim Arab who is believed to live in Anatolia during 8th century. In the movies, however, he is portrayed as if a Turkish ruler/commander who do fight against Byzantium. He is further portrayed such a strong Turkish commander/warrior that Byzantium leaders fear from. The stories in the movies concentrate on the struggle between Byzantium and Muslim Turks in Anatolia. The movies take place especially in Malatya – where Battal Gazi and previously his father (Hüseyin Gazi) is the ruler/commander – and in Amorion that occupies a central position for Anatolian Muslims.

Lastly, to explain briefly Kara Murat film series, Kara Murat is a fictional character. He is portrayed as a special force soldier in Ottoman Army during the reign of Mehmed II. Within the movies, the stories generally take place in enemy territories where Kara Murat is assigned to be a spy to fulfill a military mission. The movies highlight the conquest of İstanbul by Mehmed II which is believed to represent the power of Ottoman Empire. The Byzantium, on the other hand, is portrayed the major enemy who is too weak and is too terrified from Ottoman Empire. The first movie of the series is Kara Murat Fatih'in Fedaisi (1972) and it

is followed by Kara Murat Fatih'in Fermanı (1973), Kara Murat Ölüm Emri (1974), Kara Murat Kara Şovalyeye Karşı (1975), Kara Murat Şeyh Gaffar'a karşı (1976), and Kara Murat Denizler hakimi (1977). These movies are directed by Natuk Baytan who is also the director of Battal Gazi film series.

Cüneyt Arkın play the lead role in Malkoğlu, Kara Murat and Battal Gazi film series. In fact, Cüneyt Arkın was the star-player who was preferred to act in these historical adventure movies. He started to play this specific role of Turkish national hero with Malkoçoğlu film series at 1966. Later, he played the same role in more than a dozens of historical adventure movies. Besides Kara Murat, Malkoçoğlu and Battal Gazi film series, he also played the same role in Hakanlar Çarpışıyor, Kılıç Arslan, Korkusuz Cengaver, Alparslan'ın Fedaisi, Horasanın 3 Atlısı movies. After 1975, the popularity of historical adventure movies gradually disappeared. Coordinately, the last role of Cüneyt Arkın in historical adventure movies is in Kara Murat film series that ended in 1978.

In short, since these movies are product of regional management system, it is not surprising that all of them present a similar story which goes around a Turkish national hero fighting against enemies and the national heroes are all acted out by same lead actors.

4.3. Thematic Discourse Analysis

The goal of this section is to analyze a) how the discourse of Turkish nationalism is constructed b) to which extent this discourse carries similar claims, arguments, and themes with the hegemonic understanding of Turkish nationalism between 1965 and 1980. To do this, the discourse of Turkish nationalism in the movies are critically analyzed under three major themes. (1). How Turkish national identity discursively constructed with reference to the major concepts of 'Turkish ethnicity', 'Islam', 'warriorship', 'shared ancestry' and 'good morality'. Since

ethnicity is an exclusive category, the second theme intends to define (2). Who/what is 'the other' of Turkish identity. Here, 'Christian West associated with 'pure evilness' is portrayed as the major enemy of Turkish nation due to posing an external threat against national unity and solidarity. Consequently, (3). how these movies narrate the story of a (fictional) national past with reference to 'Turkish epic literature' and 'Turkish myths' is revealed.

4.3.1. Construction of Turkish National Identity

Nationalism helps to distinguish 'us' from 'them' and divides humanity into distinctive and conflicting groups. While doing so, it asserts distinctions to unify a nation, and emphasizes on its uniqueness and distinctiveness. Within this context, nationalism contains a set of belief about the nation. The distinctive attributes of nation are, moreover, believed to be shared by all in nation. Nationalism addresses to all members of a nation irrespective of their ideological differences. Here, Grosby emphasizes on the significance of collective consciousness for nationalism. When the members of a nation not only participate in the same tradition but also understand themselves as being different from those who do not, then there exists a self-designating shared beliefs which is called a 'collective consciousness' (Grosby, 2005, p. 10). Grosby, therefore, defines nation as a social relation of collective self-consciousness. This distinguishing self-consciousness is expressed in everyday through various practices such as symbols, folklore, myths, and songs (Grosby, 2005, p. 10). Within this context, historical adventure movies might be seen as a social practice that helps to (re)create the collective self-consciousness of Turkish nation.

In these movies, Turkish ethnic origin – which is gained by birth –has the upmost significance in terms of defining Turkish nation. In other words, the superiority of ethno-national bond is highlighted as the major element of collective self-consciousness. The major distinction in nationalism literature is between

primordialist and modernist approaches. This division emerges from a disagreement about the history of nation/nationalism. In a very brief summary, modernist approaches conceptualize nation/nationalism as the product of modernization process while primordialism approaches nation(alism) as deriving from early ethnic ties and sentiments. Primordialists believe that ethnic attachments which are related with biology becomes social in terms of nation building (Reynolds cited in Freeman, 1998, p. 25). Since an upmost significance is attributed to the tie of blood, emotional attachment to national identity arises (Fenton, 2003, p. 79). Primordialism, thus, supposes that individuals feel strongly appertained to their ethnicity and ethnicity is believed to be irrational in the sense of being emotional, sacred, passionate, but never a matter of calculation (Fenton, 2003, p. 82). These movies adopt a primordialist perspective of ethnicity, which asserts that ethnic groups are organically developed into nations and the members of a nation are all ancestrally related.

Connor, Breuilly and Horrowitz as the representatives of primordialist approach emphasizes more on the importance of kinship ties. Connor submits that ethno-nationalism appeals to the notion of common genetic inheritance, which is to say, members of a nation are all ancestrally related. This convincing feeling of kinship, for him, is the core of ethno-psychology which refers to the non-rational and emotional character of ethno-nationalism (Connor, 1993). In fact, the factual existence of this kinship ties is not proven by any (scientific) evidence but its truth is taken for granted. This is to say, people are convinced by the argument of common genetic inheritance and attached to this kinship ties as if they really exist. To strengthen the argument of kinship ties, blood, ethnic origin and common ancestry is emphasized as if the major elements to define a nation. In a similar vein, within these movies, coming from Turkish ethnic origin is the main requirement of being a Turk. Which is to say, Turkish identity is gained at birth.

These movies emphasizes that if you are born as a Turk, you are inherently superior to others. In fact, you are inherited the superior physical and moral skills from your Turkish ancestors. In 'Battal Gazi'nin Oğlu', similar with the story of Pharaoh, the son of Battal Gazi is raised as if a Christian Prince. Byzantium leader Antonio and everyone else knows that he is the son of Antonio. Nonetheless, he never behaves like a true Christian. Even as a little child, he refuses to have religious education from the clergyman and says *'I do not want to see the ugly face of the clergyman. One day, I will slaughter all clergyman in the world'*. He draws a donkey and attaches it to the back of the clergyman to make fun of him. When he grows up, he has extreme ability of fighting and good morality. A Turk explain his confusion by saying *'He is extremely good at fighting as if a Turk. He is a clean-hearted, good man as if Muslim. However, he is a Byzantium. What an insoluble confusion.'* Even Antonio – who is believed to be the father – says '*He helps Turks to escape from the castle. I do not understand. He behaves like an enemy instead of a son from my blood.'* The case of Battal Gazi shows that how you are raised (referring to the social conditions) does not change your biology/Turkish identity. Turkish nationalism, as such, is portrayed as a natural and neutral phenomena while simultaneously hiding injustices, ideological differences, and inequalities.

Within the movies, the Turkish national super hero – who represent the ideal Turk – is physically superior and sexually attractive than enemies. With the help of the fantastic elements, the superheroes are portrayed as if a legendary character who has almost supernatural gifts and skills. For example, the parents of Tarkan were murdered by the enemies. His nanny rescued him at the cost of sacrificing the life of her own child and herself. Tarkan was raised by grey wolves and drank wolf-milk with other baby-wolfs. He gains extraordinary skills which enables him to fight against and defeat strong armies all alone.

In fact, Turkishness is associated with warriorship together with an extreme ability of fighting skills. These movies portray an image of extremely powerful Turkish

national hero, representing the claim that "one Turk is worth the whole world". Within these movies, Turkish national heroes are all good at riding horse, shooting arrows, swordplay and fighting, which are the essential traits of a warrior. These heroes are educated and trained in order to develop these skills from their early childhood. The image of national heroes shows how brave and powerful warrior a Turk is. It is, further, believed that the whole world acknowledges the extreme power and superiority of Turks in fighting. In Kara Murat, Fatih'in Fedaisi, a character named Mihal asks Kara Murat *'you look like a brave man, are u Turk?'* In the same movie, the executioner of Voivode of Wallachia tells Kara Murat that *'I did learn not only bravery but also daring from you, Turk.'*

This image of Turks associated with strength, bravery and daredevilry concomitantly portrays Turkish nation as the most powerful and superior nation that frightens the enemies. In these movies, the heroes never kneel before anyone even if they know they will die unless they do. In Tarkan, Altın Madalyon, Tarkan was captured by Vandals. When the King of Vandal asks Tarkan to kneel down, Tarkan responds *'We are Turks and Turks never kneels before anyone.'* The similar scenes where Turkish national hero can never be subdued is commonly seen in other movies, too. Which, in turn, represents Turkish nation as the most noble, sovereign and powerful. In Kara Murat, one of the Byzantium leader speaks out the strength of Turkish nation by saying *'if the enemy is strong as Turks, everyone kneels before him.'*

Not only the warrior skills but also good morality appears as one of the major concepts attributed to Turk/ishness. The image of a Turk is portrayed as a just and honest man who can never stay silent on injustices. The national heroes always fight against injustices and stay by the oppressed and innocent group of people. In one of the scenes of Tarkan, Tarkan entered into a roadhouse to rest and stay for the night. In the roadhouse, he witnessed that a man promises the other to release the captured man if he pays the money. Although the man pays the money, he did

not promise his word. He got the money and did not release the slave. Tarkan cannot stay silent on the injustice that the foreign man has experienced. He asked the man to keep his word. When he refuses, Tarkan gets involved and fight against him to ensure justice. Another example might be the scene – which is commonly seen in every movie; a woman is captured by the enemies and they try to torture and rape her. Turkish national hero cannot stay silent to this barbarism and rescue the women [22].

In fact, good morality is also associated with social norms and national values. Therefore, respect to the elders, the commitment to the family, the importance of family-life, pudicity are defined as virtuous behaviors of Turks. For example, when Kara Murat learns her mother is kidnapped by the Christians, he goes after her mother to rescue although he has an unfinished mission to complete, assigned by Mehmed II. This means, when it comes to family, it goes first. The case of Battal Gazi's son who ceaselessly toils to rescue his father even though he knows he might die is another example which strikingly shows the importance and priority of family ties. As the last example, the importance of pudicity is strikingly reflected in Battal Gazi Geliyor. The Christian soldiers raped the daughter of Battal Gazi. She kills herself and wants her older brother to say her father that *'I kill myself for honour'.* Thus, it might be asserted that these movies represent the ideal social norms in Turkish culture as virtuous behaviors of good morality.

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[22] This is always followed by a romantic relation between the woman and the national hero (who is also portrayed as a sexually attractive man). Besides highlighting the moral traits of a Turk, this scene bears important insights about how Turkish nationalism approaches gender. The woman is portrayed as weak and submissive who needs the help of a man. In fact, what these movies tells about the role/position of woman in Turkish nationalism might be studied from gender perspective. Moreover, the difference between the representation of Turkish woman and Byzantium woman is also an interesting point. Representing as a bearer of Turkish national culture, Turkish Muslim woman follows the requirements of Islam and national culture, and virginity is always emphasized as a noble virtue of Turkish women. She is always portrayed as an integral part of her family and family always comes first, for her. Byzantium woman, on the other hand, might betray her family in order to help the noble Turks. For Byzantium woman virginity is not an issue even for the ones whom the heroes are in love. Since the representation of woman in these movies goes beyond the scope of this study, it appears as a future research avenue for fellow researchers.

Turkish nation, in these movies, is portrayed as a unified, homogenous and integral whole. This representation mystifies any ideological differences, class antagonisms and life-style differences within a nation. The movies generally portrays the life in a Turkish village where all people, more or less, live under same conditions without any class differences (e.g. feudal or peasants). It is expressed that wealth and money means nothing but what really matters is the continuation of Turkish nation with its power and nobility. In Kara Murat Fatih'in Fedaisi, Kara Murat explain his life purpose by saying '*I do have nothing to do with wealth and money. All I want is to be a raider (akıncı) and fight under Turkish flag and fall martyred for Turkish nation'*. In every movie of the series, after Kara Murat completes his mission in enemy territories, he always rescues Turkish captives held in Byzantium dungeons at the cost of risking his own life. Which shows that he never turns back on any Turk. That gives a very clear message that a Turk can only rely on a Turk to protect him, which consequently means Turks should live in unity and solidarity.

Islam appears as another major element to define Turkishness, especially in the movies made after 1970. In these movies, Turkish identity and Islamic identity seems to be interwoven and inseparable, which implies that if one is a Turk, he is a Muslim, too. In Kara Murat Ölüm Fermanı, Janissaries tries to guess the nationality of Kara Murat by saying '*he fights as good as a Turkish man'*. Upon this, Kara Murat introduces himself as '*I am Turk and I am a Muslim. My name is Kara Murat'*. Telling his name together with his religion and nationality shows importance of religion (and, of course, nationality) in his self-identity formation. In fact, Islam is not conceptualized outside of Turkish national culture. In other words, an independent Islamic community which is not Turkish (e.g. Arabs) are never mentioned. Instead, Islam, as one of the major elements of Turkishness – is always integrated with Turkish national culture. For example, although Battal Gazi is an Arabic origin seyyid – means being the descendant of the Prophet Muhammad

– as stated in Battalname and Saltukname – he was Turkified in Battal Gazi film series. In Saltukname, Battal Gazi, taking the opportunity of being from this distinctive lineage, is hailed as a premier Muslim warrior who toils ceaselessly for political hegemony of Islam. Battal Gazi is depictured in Saltukname as follows:

> the Muslim hero is an adept in converting people of power and authority to the 'right religion' by persuasion, ruse or force as he is in dispensing with them by sword or the dagger when they refuse to declare allegiance to Islam   (Karamustafa, 2015, p. 359).

In Battal Gazi and Malkaçoğlu film series, however, the protagonist is hailed as a Turkish national hero who toils for national goals. The heroic labor is for national goals but not for proselytism. Moreover, in the movies, we can never see a sheeted woman, which is the most common style in Muslim countries. Instead, the clothing of Turkish woman in the movies represents the Anatolian style, which is associated with Turkish national culture.

Converting religion is another important concept that is overemphasized in every movie made after 1970. Since Turkish ethnicity is gained by birth, it cannot be renounced by will. Thereby, renouncing Islam is represented as equal with renouncing Turkish identity. In one of the scenes from Kara Murat Fatih'in Fedaisi, the captive Turks are buried in ground up to their necks and the Greek leader is slaughtering them while a Christian clergyman suggests to ask the buried Turks to change their religion and force them to convert to Christianity in return of saving their lives. Greek leader then asks *'Turks, if you renounce Islam and accept Christianity, I will spare your life'.* The buried men reply all together the following phase *'We are born as Muslim and we will die as Muslim. We will never change our religion'.* They continue with reciting kalima shahadah *(Islamic confession of faith)* in unison. Similarly, in Kara Murat Fatih'in Fedaisi, the Voivoide of Wallachia asks Turkish captives to change their nationality. He asks *'Turks and Muslims, you will be punished to death. I will spare your life only if*

you change your nationality and convert to Christianity'. In 'Battal Gazi Geliyor', Battal Gazi, as the sirdar of Malatya, is forced to kiss the cross and accept Christianity in front of his people. He refuses to do so by reciting kalima shahadah in unision with the crowd. Since he does not accept Christianity, Christians enchain Battal Gazi and torture him, rape her daughter. Yet, Turks never renounce Islam and change their religion despite everything.

On the other hand, Christians – who has a good moral character – are always influenced by justice, bravery, honesty of Turks. At the end, they change their religion and become Muslim. The most striking example is the case of a clergyman who decides to be a Muslim in Battal Gazi Geliyor. There are a group of Christians who came together to fight against the oppression of Black Knight. They meet with the son of Battal Gazi and they are all influenced by his good morality and thereby, accept Islam. A clergyman among them asks the son of Battal Gazi *'rescue me from the cruelty and oppression of Christians and help me to become Muslim.'* Another example is the case of Hammer who is one of the greatest warrior in Byzantium. He is so impressed when Battal Gazi defeats him but not kill him. Upon this, he changes his religion. Since Turkish ethnic identity is gained by birth, the Christians cannot gain Turkish identity, by will. Here, accepting Islam could be seen as a way to become part of Turkish-Islamic community and live within it.

If the film series made before 1970 is analyzed, Tarkan and Karaoğlan series concentrate on the pre-Islamic Turkish history when polytheism is the dominant religious form. The figures of polytheistic religion (e.g. Buddha, God of War) become prominent while any references to Islam is seen. In Malkoçoğlu series (made before 1970), Turks are portrayed as Muslims but Islam and Islamic rituals are not much emphasized within the story-lines. For example, although salaat, praying in mosque, reciting kalima shahada is commonly seen in Kara Murat and Battal Gazi film series, these rituals are hardly seen in Malkoçoğlu. Instead, the most common scene in Malkoçoğlu is drinking in a bar room, which can never be

seen in Battal Gazi and Kara Murat series due to the prohibition of alcohol by Islam. As a result, it seems possible to assert that the movies made before 1970 (Tarkan, Karaoğlan and Malkoçoğlu series) presents a more secular discourse of Turkish nationalism while the movies made after 1970 (Kara Murat and Battal Gazi series) share similarity with Turkish-Islamic synthesis. In fact, the movies made after 1970 does not mention about an outside Islamic world and does not give any references to Islamic unity. Instead, Islam is defined as an integral element of Turkish national identity. In other words, Islam is not conceptualized outside of Turkishness. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the movies made after 1970 adopt a softened version of Turkish-Islamic synthesis. After 1980 when Turkish-Islamic synthesis has become a state-ideology, the synthesis gets more radicalized and appears as an opposition to the secular system. Within this context, Islamic identity gained priority and being the leader of Islamic union has become the national goal.

Nationalism as an exclusive category always requires 'the other' to define the 'self'. It is, therefore, not surprising that the collective consciousness is constructed on the basis of a division between 'self' and 'the other'. The following section scrutinizes how 'the enemy' is framed in the film series.

4.3.2. Defining the Enemy

Within these movies, the enemy is described as the Christian West (only with the exception of Karaoğlan film series). The main concept to define the enemy is 'evil'. Thereby, the politics is oversimplified as if a war between the good (represented by Turks) and evil (represented by West). An initial move of an enemy to harm Turks is associated with the evilness of the enemy and this initial move further justifies the 'desire of revenge' for Turks - which appears as another common theme shared by all the movies. To construct the other as the evil, the Orientalist discourse is, further, referred and reversed.

Karaoğlan and Tarkan film series concentrates on pre-Islamic Turkish history. The major enemy of Karaoğlan is Camoka who is a barbaric chieftain of the raiders lives in an uncivilized community. In Karaoğlan series, there are lots of references to China where Turks are believed to have political disputes with during 12th and 13th century in Central Asia. China is generally portrayed as 'the other'. For example, *'Chinese take you/your mother'* is a common phrase of curse/imprecation in the movies. In Tarkan series, Tarkan is a soldier of Atilla, and the stories take place in North and Middle Europe where Romans, Vikings and Vandals dwells (Karabulut, 2013, p. 17). The enemy is, accordingly, defined as Vandals, Vikings, China, Romans and of course Byzantium. In Malkaçoğlu, Kara Murat and Battal Gazi series, the enemy is always Byzantium which is also the direct target of the reversed Orientalist discourse.

Edward W. Said's book *Orientalism*, firstly published in 1978, reveals how West construct a body of monolithic and stereotyped discourse towards Orient/East (Said, 2003):

> The target of *Orientalism* was of course Orientalism, which Said began by defining very broadly as not merely an academic discipline but as a style of thought based on an ontological and epistemological distinction between 'the Orient' and (most of the time) 'the Occident.' That is, for Said Orientalism denoted the entire way of thinking which based itself on the dichotomization of the Orient – for his purposes, the 'world of Islam' – and the West as two distinct and fundamentally different civilizations or entities (Lockman, 2004, p. 184).

This epistemological and ontological difference is an imaginary line which is not much about the physical geography, but more like an human construction. Orientalist discourse that conceptualizes the Orient as feminine, erotic, exotic, and savage while portraying West as Christian, civilized, and moral (Herath, 2015, p.

32). In other words, this discourse accedes West to a superior position while constructing Orient as inferior.

These movies reverses the Orientalist discourse. Which is to say, the superior position is undertaken by Turkish nation while West is always conceptualized as inferior, savage, barbaric, perverted and sex-addict. As put by Akbaş (2018), the enemy never gives up plundering, robbery, raping women, torturing the innocents (Akbaş, 2018, p. 189). One of the most apparent example of this conceptualization is seen in Malkoçoğlu and Cem Sultan. The enemy abducted Polat's mother and the girl he loves. When the enemy try to torture and rape them, Polat's mother shouts out *'We are Turk and we are human. But, you are animals and you can never touch us'*. In Tarkan series, Vandals and Romans are also de-humanized and depictured as non-civilized barbaric hordes. As Karabulut translates the prologue of Tarkan Mars'ın Kılıcı

> *The story begins at archaic ages when the emperor of Hun, Atilla, conquered the whole Europe. If he gets the sword of Mars, he will reach the supreme power. If the European Kings get the sword, they will have the power to stop Atilla, the Hun….. European Kings who are afraid of Hun Turks are after the sword of Mars. The brutal Vandal King and the sly, bloodthirsty Roman Emperor Valentinianus want to capture the sword of Mars (Karabulut, 2013, p. 18)*

Ottoman harem occupies a pivotal role within Orientalist discourse. As stated by (Herath, 2015), the inaccessibility of the Ottoman harems to European males helps to perpetuate the image of the harem as purely sexual in nature. Orient, thereby, depictures as sexually perverted in Orientalist discourse. (p. 31). Reversely, these movies approaches West as morally perverted. The scenes with full of sexual perversion portrays the image of a sex-addict West who recklessly torture, rape and slaughter women (which represents a passive, oppressed yet highly sexualized women figure). The most striking example is seen in the movie Tarkan Viking Kanı. The captured Hun women are brought to the party by Vikings. It is, then,

announced that Viking men can choose whoever they want. Upon this, an extreme version of sexual perversion is seen in the following scenes. Viking man try to rape Hun women while simultaneously torturing, slaughtering, drowning, burning (by throwing into fire) them. Another striking example is also seen in Malkoçoğlu Cem Sultan. Malkoçoğlu and his son Polat was taken as prisoner. The Western king want to watch them while they are getting murdered. He tells *'the most noble, supreme enjoyment is to watch a murder'*. While he is telling this, he is making love with a women in front of the prisoners and the others. He continues (referring to the moment when he will be hang out)

> *your feet will shake and you will not feel your back. Your shoulders will no longer takes the weight of your head, you will fall to the ground and then you will die. And that, I will see that your eyes will open and your tongue will dangle.*

While telling this, he is still with the woman and this speaking gives him a great pleasure.

The enemy is, sometimes, portrayed as a weak and powerless figure who is, moreover, associated with a feminine and impotent image. This could further be understood as another example of the reversion of Orientalism. The most explicit example is seen in Tarkan, Altın Madalyon. In the movie, Zeki Alasya plays the role of Grand King of Vandal and he kidnapped the son of the Hun Emperor – Atilla. Tarkan and his friends are assigned to rescue the child. The Grand King of Vandal cannot directly confront with Atilla. He, instead, sets trap behind him and collaborates with the sorcerer, Gosha in order to find a way to kill Atilla. Gosha, cast a spell over Tarkan and make him a slave of herself. She, consequently, orders Tarkan to murder Atilla. At that night when Tarkan was sent to murder Atilla by way of using witchcraft, Grand King of Vandal organized a party to celebrate the death of Atilla. With the help of the friends of Tarkan, the spell is reversed. They all together attack the party to fulfill their incomplete task – which is to rescue

Atilla's child. While Tarkan and his companions were fighting, the Grand King of Vandal is too terrified to fight back. The grey wolf – Tarkan's companion – unravel the King's cloth and get his butt opened. This example strikingly shows how the enemy is depictured as an impotent, powerless and weak figure.

Scognamillo and Demirhan (2005) states that historical adventure movies always depicture Byzantium as despot, cruel and corrupted. However, historical reality proves that as having the most active harbor of Mediterranean, Byzantium is the center of art and information. Regardless of whether historically accurate or nor, Byzantium is portrayed as cruel and it will be cruel, forever[23] in these movies (p. 146). Scognamillo and Demirhan, moreover, adds that either Viking, China or whoever the enemy is, it always represents darkness, thereby it is always depictured as barbaric, furious and cruel. They always nurture enmity towards Turks (2005, pp. 140-141). As stated by Alaca, the scenario of the films are always the same in writing the history – innocent Turks, blameless Muslims, harmless people, defenseless old people, women and children are always slaughtered by the enemy (Alaca, 2017, p. 426). Within this story, the enemy always tries to do harm, sets traps, deceives people, tortures innocent and defenseless Muslim Turks and breaks his word. Erdoğan and Göktürk (2001) summarizes this general pattern as follows

> Tarkan, Karaoğlan, Malkoçoğlu, Kara Murat and Battal Gazi are openly superheroes, fighting in the name of their country or for some oppressed community against an enemy. Their actions are justified by the enemy's initial move (massacre, torture, breaking an oath, and so on (Erdoğan & Göktürk, 2001, p. 537).

In fact, the evilness of the enemy create a legitimate ground for the Turks to fight back in order to take revenge.

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[23] Kahpe Bizans her zaman kahpe kalacaktır.

The atrocities that Turks are subject to and the desire of revenge appear as another major theme/concept which are stressed out during the whole story of each movie. To give one of the most direct example of this revenge oriented discourse, in Kara Murat, Fatih'in Fedaisi, Byzantine Empire raid and plundered Turkish villages and slaughter the innocent and defenseless Muslim Turks. Kara Murat's mother is also murdered. After Kara Murat buries his mom, he says '*I am begging God not to take my life before I take my revenge from the murderer of my mother'.* At the end of the movie, Kara Murat takes the opportunity to take his revenge and while shooting arrows to the murderer/enemy, he says *'This arrow is for my mother, this one is for Kabasakal, this one is for Mihal and this one is for all the Muslims you killed'.*

In fact, these movies create a figure of an evil enemy who never abandons doing harms to Turks. Against this external enemy image, Turks are expected to create a (national) sense of unity and solidarity. The revenge-oriented discourse, further, legitimizes the fight of Turks, which further implies that Turks should win in order for the justice to be ensured.

4.3.3. Re-creating a Turkish National History

These movies (re)construct a fictional past for Turkish nation through the uses and abuses of history. To do this, references to the Turkish myths and Turkish epic literature is commonly seen in every movie. Besides revealing these references, this section tries to relate the national history narrative in these movies with official and/or alternative historiography.

History, in public mind plays a pivotal role in terms of (re)building a national identity and (re)creating collective consciousness. History, therefore, can never merely be reduced into facts. Instead, history should be approached as the shared memories among the members of the nation. The shared memories might not be

historically accurate. Moreover, it does not have to prove its accuracy. What matter, instead, is the shared belief on its accuracy without question. It helps to create a feel belonging to a nation, or in other words, a national identification. As well stated by Arif (2017), "that an enduring sense of political community cannot develop without tales of the past that inspire feelings of trust and belonging in a population"(p. 9). Grosby explains the pivotal role of past in terms of understanding the present with reference to the concept of 'temporal depth'. For him, every nation has its own understanding of its distinctive past that conveyed through stories, legends, folklore, myths, culture, epic and heroic stories. Whether historically accurate or not, these memories contribute to the understanding of the present. This component of time – when an understanding of the past constructs how to approach the present – is called 'temporal depth'. As such, national history establishes a continuity between the past, and the present (2005, pp. 8-11).

In fact, epics, romances, myths, hagiographies, tales and romances provide insightful knowledge about the popular beliefs, conceptions and habits of thinking of the specified culture and era. Despite not being considered as direct historical sources, these corpuses of works are mostly applied for the construction of national past. Here, the references to the supernatural invokes the emotions –which, in turn, helps to glorify the nation and strengthen the national belonging.

As stated by Scognamillo and Demirhan (2005), the myths, legends, tales, the supernatural plays a pivotal role to narrate Turkish national history, in the movies (p. 173). In fact, Turkish epic literature is mostly referred but (mis)used to create the (imagined) national past. Battalgazi and Malkoçoğlu are epic figures while others –Tarkan, Karaoğlan, Kara Murat – are fictional characters. The storyline of all heroes – either fictional or real – contends direct references to Turkish the legends, tales, myths and hagiographies. Yet any of epic references does not follow original literary text, accurately. Although the events, symbols and characters are similar, they are all rewritten and get integrated into a different storyline.

Battal Gazi and Malkaçoğlu are epic figures whose stories are narrated in Battalname and Saltukname, respectively. Although Battal Gazi, as a descendant of Prophet Muhammad, is an Arabic origin seyyid, he is Turkified in Battal Gazi series. In Saltukname, Battal Gazi is hailed as a premier Muslim warrior who toils ceaselessly for the political hegemony of Islam. In Battal Gazi series, however, Battal Gazi is hailed as if a Turkish national hero who toils for national goals. In the film series, the heroic labor is presented as if it is for national goals but not for proselytism. Yet, there are still cases when Christians convert to Islam, in the movies. In each of these cases (e.g. the case of Hammer), however, the Christians are influenced by good morality of Turks and change their religion by their own decision, without any interference (without force or persuasion). This shows that the original texts are distorted and an apocryphal overemphasis on Turkish nation(alism) is integrated into to the storyline of the movies.

Tarkan and Karaoğlan film series (made before 1970) concentrates on pre-Islamic Turkish history. The storylines contend references to the pre-Islamic Turkish epic literature. Banarlı defines epic literature as poetics narrating the stories of national heroism that take place in early years of history (or even in pre-historic era). The protagonists of these heroic narratives are gods and goddess, son of God, sorcerers, mythical beasts, angels and many other non-human and super-natural figures. Although the stories sound more like an imaginary fairy-tale, they explain so much about the historical development of a nation and provide important insights about nationalism self-understanding (Banarlı, 2004, p. 1).

In Tarkan film series, the wolf figure – that occupies one of a key position in pre-Islamic Turkish epic literature – is central within the story. Tarkan's parents are murdered and he is raised by wolfs. There are scenes that show Tarkan drinking wolf-milk through the breast of a wolf with other baby-wolves. The wolf, then, become Tarkan's companion and in every adventure of Tarkan, the wolf always

fights side by side with Tarkan. In fact, the wolf is hailed as if a human-being (not an animal). In Tarkan Viking Kanı, the wolf has a child. The wolf, his son and Tarkan are around a table to eat. Neither the baby-wolf nor the wolf would like to start eating. Upon this, Tarkan says that '*The wolf does not want to eat before feeding his son but the baby-wolf does not want to start eating before his father. The wolf is raising his son in line with Turkish customs'*. When Tarkan gets wounded, the wolf finds the necessary healing herbs to get him cured. When Tarkan is trapped in a dungeon, in order to rescue Tarkan, the wolf takes down a rope for him to climb up. In any matter, the wolf would never abandons Tarkan. The wolf figure is also appeared in one scene of Malkaçoğlu. When Malkaçoğlu is captured by the enemy, an unknown wolf came and rescue him[24].

The wolf figure occupies a central place in pre-Islamic epic literature especially in Bozkurt (Grey Wolf) Legend, Ergenekon Legend and Oghuz Khagan Legend. The wolf, in Turkic mythology, symbolizes honor and power. It is also considered as a semi-God who is the mother of many Turkic tribes. The legend of Bozkurt narrates a story of a young boy who could survive from a raid that destructs his village. A she-wolf rescues him and cures his injuries. Later, the young boy impregnates the wolf and the wolf gives birth to ten boys who are described as half-human and half-wolf. Ashina, one of these sons, becomes the leader and he subsequently establishes/rules many Turkic nomadic tribes. In Tarkan film series, although the theme of 'rescuing by a wolf' is similar with the original text, it is integrated to a totally different story-line. In Ergenekon legend, Turks are trapped in Ergenekon valley for almost four centuries. A blacksmith could manage to melt the rock and create a passage which enables Turks to go out of the valley under the guidance of a grey-wolf called Asena. In Oghuz Khagan legend, a gray wolf is also depictured as a guide who march before Oghuz army (Ögel, 1997, pp. 19–42). The figure of

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[24] Yet, the wolf is not seen anywhere else throughout the movie.

grey wolf is almost hailed as a half-god who represents the power of warship attributed to Turks. For that matter, the first Turkish flag is believed to have a grey-wolf head figure on it (Banarlı, 2004, p. 3). In Tarkan film series, the same flag is seen in front of Turkic nomad tents. Reminding how the legends play crucial place in terms of the construction of Turkish national identity, the references to Turkic mythology, therefore, strengthens the national emphasis of the movies. That, moreover, makes the imagined national past in these movies more appealing, attractive and realistic.

The movies made before 1970 display a secular tone of Turkish nationalism. During these times, 'Turkish History Thesis' were still popular and disseminating through education (Copeaux, 1998). This thesis accounts a reassuring new past which recounts the central-Asian origin of Turks while bypassing Ottoman past. The distinctive feature of this account is its emphasis on pre-Islamic Turkish history while not mentioning about Islam in Turkish past, at all. According to this thesis, Central Asia is the motherland of Turks where prehistoric Turkish civilization dwells. Due to climate changes and natural factors, Turks migrate to Mesopotamia. The ancient civilizations are described as barbaric, savage and uncivilized. For this thesis, with the influx of Turkish migration, they learn the civilizing techniques (e.g. agriculture, irrigation) from Turks. Turkish nation, within this picture, is described as the bearer/leader of civilization. This thesis enables the Kemalist regime to argue that Kemalist reforms are not imitations of the West but a return to the roots because they are originated by Central Asian Turks and West imitated them, at the first place (Köken, 2002, pp. 86–96). As such, Turks are described as the superior nation which creates greatest changes and brings civilization to the whole world. This account historically proves the superiority of Turkish nation (especially over West). Karaoğlan and Tarkan film series share similar arguments with 'Turkish History Thesis' by concentrating on Central Asian roots of Turks while not mentioning about Islam. Moreover, the image of West, in these movies, as uncivilized and barbaric while Turkishness is

associated with civilization also confirms the claims of the thesis. After 1970, this thesis loses its influence while Turkish-Islamic synthesis become widely popular. It is, therefore, not a coincidence that the movies made after 1970 (Battal Gazi and Kara Murat series) concentrates on Turkish-Islamic history and consequently glorifies Ottoman past.

In short, the references to Turkish History Thesis is lost in the movies made after 1970. After 1970, while Turkish History Thesis was losing its credit, Turkish-Islamic synthesis appear as the hegemonic approach towards Turkish nation. Especially after 1970, Islam has risen as a political alternative especially with the effect of Nationalist Front minority governments. The shared hatred of communism, moreover, enables the nationalist groups to ally with Islam. For example, Nationalist Villagers' Party adopted Nine Light Doctrine and re-named itself as Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) under the leadership of Alparslan Türkeş. MHP became one of the major representatives of Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Thus, the change in the content of the movies are directly related with this change in contemporary political life.

4.3.4. Contextuality of Nationalism Discourse

A contextual analysis defines how cinematic texts are related with the actual struggles within contemporary politics. Instead of a reductionist approach that associates movies with certain political groups and ideologies as well as approaching the movies as tools of ideological propagation, this research adopts a non-reductionist contextual analysis. It situates the movies and genres within whole picture of the contemporary politics so that how these movies are related with actual socio-political struggles and power dynamics in contemporary socio-political life could be revealed.

These movies does not have a purpose of ideological propaganda. That is to say, they are not made by any political authorities in order to (re)build or support a specific kind of ideological discourse. Any political party does not interfere in determining the subject and content of these movies and none of the scenarists, producers and directors of the movies do not have any organic relation/affiliation with the political parties[25]. Moreover, the movies do not get any financial support/resources from political authorities. Commercial profit, instead of an ideological propaganda, is the main purpose of the movies. The regional managers successfully grasp the rise of nationalism discourse together with anti-Western reactions, which is mainly caused by the Cyprus events. Nearly all Turkish citizens share this common-sense feeling. The movies explicitly express this nationalist feeling, that thereby manages to draw more audiences and make more profit.

These movies do not represent a consistent and integrated ideological picture. Nation, according to Cambridge dictionary, is defined as a large body of people united by 'common descent', 'history', 'culture', or 'language', inhabiting a particular country or 'territory'. Common descent (Turkish ethnic identity) and shared history (Turkish national past) are prominently emphasized within the narrative of Turkish nationalism in the movies. Any references to Turkish language is hardly seen. .Any references to Turkish patria/territory is not seen, either. The stories generally take place in enemy territories. Thus, the movies do not present a coherent and integrated ideological picture of Turkish nationalism. They do also display anachronism. While constructing the discourse of Turkish nationalism, many ahistorical, supernatural, irrational and fantastic elements are combined

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[25]Despite the overwhelming censorship mechanisms (especially exercised over social realist movies), these movies do never get in trouble with censorship. They are approved by the Censorship Committee without revisions. This proves that political authorities do not think that the content of the movies do pose a threat against the political hegemony unlike social realist movies affiliated with left politics. In short, since political authorities appreciate these movies, they do not get in trouble of censorship mechanisms, that might be considered as an indirect government support.

together with comic and erotic scenes. This is to say, they contain the contrasting, inconsistent and conflicting elements all together. Moreover, many fantastic, irrational and unhistorical elements are integrated to the story. During this period – when television is not widespread and nearly half of the population is illiterate – cinema is the most widespread and popular way for entertainment. If you further consider the major goal of regional management system as to attract more audiences, this anachronism seems reasonable.

Between 1965 and 1980, Turkish nationalism is articulated with the hegemonic principles of 'anti-communism' and 'Turkish-Islamic syntheses' of right-wing hegemony. Nationalism discourse in these movies complies with these principles. Initially, the movies made after 1970 provide a striking example of Turkish-Islamic synthesis. In these movies, Islam is presented as an indispensable part of Turkish national identity. In a similar vein, these movies concentrates on the Ottoman era and present it as if a golden age when West/Christianity is conquered by Turkish-Islamic nation. Consequently, the overemphasis on the unity and solidarity of Turkish nation while simultaneously ignoring any ideological/class antagonisms and life-style differences complies with the arguments of anti-communism. Against an external threat *(communism),* anti-communism also highlights the importance of solidarity and unity of Turkish nation. Despite sharing a similar ideological discourse with anti-communism, these movies depicture 'West' as the external enemy, instead of a Moscow image/communism. This could be seen as a reflection of the anti-Western reaction caused by Cyprus issue.

Despite having similar discourse with the right-wing hegemony, a monolithic reading that approaches these movies as a tool for the dissemination of dominant ideology and a purveyor of false consciousness is misleading. Since the movies are the terrain of contestation, they cannot be conceptualized as merely a reflection of dominant ideology. For example, it might also be read as a response to the rise of communist threat against the existing hegemony. They, moreover, reflect the

common-sense feeling in the society. Therefore, the movies involves direct references to the actual socio-political struggles and debates. For example, despite the similar content with anti-communist discourse, the movies portrays West as the enemy instead of Moscow.

It is possible to assert that discourse of Turkish nationalism presented in the movies conforms to the nationalism discourse of right-wing hegemony because they both share the similar discourse of 'anti-communism' and 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis.' Yet, this does not mean that these movies are the sites of dominant ideology. Reminding Gramsci conceptualization of hegemony referring to the constitution of collective popular will through the articulation of different class interests, these movies represent the hegemonic understanding of nationalism which turns out to be the common-sense in society. This common-sense feelings are not manufactured by a specific social class, instead refers to the hegemonic understanding above classes[26]. That is to say, the narrative of Turkish nationalism in the movies do not merely reflect the understanding of ruling class and its political interests. Instead, it was especially adopted by the lower rural classes. Grey Wolf organization and commando camps uses the the figure of a Turkish fighter and Turkish warrior to mobilize nationalist groups especially to fight against leftist groups in streets. As Ozan specified, the populist ultra-nationalism of Grey Wolf uses the shared dissatisfaction, victimization and anger of lower class rural population (Ozan, 2015, p. 701). For the political politicization of these people, the images of bravery and fighting is applied. These images become highly influential especially on the young generation in 1970's. For Erdoğan and Göktürk (2001), these films produce sites of identification mainly for adolescents who assumed a national identity by imaging fights against the enemy (p. 537). Thus,

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[26] Yet, since common-sense is related with the constitution of hegemony, it is not independent from power-relations. It is, therefore, not surprising that this common sense understanding does mostly comply with right wing conceptualization of Turkish nationalism integrated with the distinct strains of anti-communism and Turkish-Islamic synthesis of liberal conservative ideology.

discourse of Turkish nationalism helps to reconstruct hegemony and produce consent between 1965 and 1980. In other words, Turkish nationalism operates as the cement that unite both ruling class and working classes under same ideals.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This study presents a contextual analysis of nationalism discourse in Turkish historical adventure movies which were made between 1965 and 1980. Considering the rise of historical television series and movies (e.g. Diriliş Ertuğrul, Mehmetçik Kut'ül Amare, Payitaht Abdülhamid and Muhteşem Yüzyıl, Fetih 1453), historical adventure genre appears as a trending subject. There is even a further attempt to re-make the historical adventure movies. Fatih'in Fedaisi: Kara Murat (2015), Karaoğlan (2013) were the products of this attempt. The genre of historical adventure movies were dominant between 1965 and 1975. After then, historical adventure movies were disappearing while new genres (e.g. erotic movies, arabesque movies) were introduced in the second half of 1970's. Since there are nearly a hundred historical movies, it is not possible to incorporate all of them to the study. A scientific and legitimate methodological way is necessary to determine which movies to choose.

The statistics could provide concrete data so that the most popular movies could have been chosen as a representative group. Nonetheless, until 1989, no statistical data was recorded regarding the box-office gross of movies. Yet, there is still another way to define which movies are the most popular ones and attract more audiences. Between 1965 and 1980, regional management system as a specific mode of production was adopted in Turkish cinema. The lack of capital investment in cinema drives the sector to pass to regional management system to constitute an economically self-sufficient system. When to look how this system works, the operator gives money as advance or bond to the producer so that the producer can have necessary fund to make the movie. Here, the preferences of the audiences are

delivered to the producer so that s/he will make the movie as ordered. In other words, the operators make an order movie which s/he predicts the audiences will certainly love. In fact, the goal is to draw as many audiences as possible to make more profit. Within this system, if a movie is made as a film series, this proves that this movie attracts audiences and it affords more than its budget. Therefore, this study chooses the historical adventure movies which were made as a film series between 1965 and 1980. These film series are defined as follows: Karaoğlan, Tarkan, Malkoçoğlu, Kara Murat and Battal Gazi.

It is aimed to incorporate socio-political, historical and cultural developments of the era into the analysis. Achieving such a multi-dimensional analysis enables to show the dynamic interaction between cinema, culture, society, politics and history. To achieve such a multi-dimensional analysis, qualitative research techniques is required. As a qualitative research method(ology), critical discourse analysis is applied. Critical discourse analysis holds the claim that the goal of the discourse is not to mirror the world, objectively. Instead, discourse is socially constructed and has a significant role in terms of constructing meaning and social relations. Here, critical does not merely mean criticizing the status-quo; instead, it refers to a critical account of relating discourse practices with broader social, political and ideological frame of activities. In fact, it is possible to define critical discourse theory as a socio-political discourse analysis which conceal the relations of social power and which unmask how discursive practices (re)produce the power relations and inequalities.

Together with critical discourse methodology, Gramsci's theory of ideology provides the necessary theoretical basis for this study. Instead of a constructivist understanding of hegemony referring to fixation of meaning by the authorities (or, in other words, enforcing a particular definition of truth), this research adopts Gramsci's understanding. Gramsci's hegemony refers to the manufacturing of collective popular will through the articulation of different class interests. In fact,

the articulation of the interests of different classes is not independent from discursive practices. Instead, collective consensus is achieved by discursive practices and this discourse is conditioned by a broader socio-political context while simultaneously contributing to the construction of meaning and social relations. Here, hegemony creates a 'consensus' by way of persuasion techniques and coercion. As such, power relations seem natural, hidden and unquestioned and it appears as a common sense perception.

Kellner, who is a key name associated with contextual reading of films, argues that discourse analysis contains images, figures, myths, social practices, narratives, belief systems and theoretical positions because these are all bound together for the construction of ideology. In his various researches, Kellner tries to provide a contextual readings of American films (see: Kellner & Ryan, 1988). Instead of approaching movies as merely a tool for ideological manipulation or propagation, contextual perspective manages to link the movies with social, political, ideological and cultural dynamics and defines in which ways the films contribute to the reproduction of power relations. Following this methodology, this research presents a contextual reading (based on Gramscian theory and critical discourse methodology) of historical adventure movies.

Within this perspective, the contextual roots of the rise of Turkish nationalism during this period is defined as (1). the rise of Turkish left and (2). Cyprus issue. Turkish left arisen as an alternative hegemony project, which do operate within different spheres of civil society but which is not able to conquer the political power. Right-wing hegemony, on the other hand, is united under the liberal-conservative ideology appeals to Turkish nationalism discourse and get it integrated with their hegemonic principles of 'anti-communism' and 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis (especially after 1970). Turkish nationalism, here, emphasizes on the importance of the unity/solidarity of Turkish nation against the external

communist threat. Turkish nationalism together with Islam is used as a way to produce consent, to constitute the collective popular will.

On the other hand, nationalism discourse in the movies is analyzed in terms of (1) How self is constructed (2) How the other is defined (3) How Turkish national history is narrated. Initially, the self / Turkish national identity is constructed with reference to the major concepts of 'Turkish ethnicity', 'Islam', 'warriorship', 'shared ancestry' and 'good morality'. These traits are all gained by birth. In other words, national identity is presented as if a biological category instead of social construct. Turkish nationalism, as such, is portrayed as a natural and neutral phenomena while simultaneously hiding injustices, ideological differences, and inequalities. If you are born as a Turk, you are inherently superior to others. The protagonists of the stories who represent the ideal Turk are always portrayed as the ultimate heroes who possess superior physical strength, unmatched fighting skills, distinctive intelligence and good morality. The image of national heroes shows how brave and powerful warrior a Turk is. This image of Turks associated with strength, bravery and daredevilry concomitantly portrays Turkish nation as the most powerful and superior nation that frightens West/Europe. Turkish nation is, further, portrayed as unified, homogenous and integral whole which mystifies any ideological differences, class antagonisms and life-style differences within a nation. It is expressed that wealth and money means nothing but what really matters is the continuation of Turkish nation with its power and nobility.

Since ethnicity is an exclusive category, the second theme intends to define 'who/what is 'the other' of Turkish identity.' In the movies, 'West' and 'Christianity' associated with 'pure evilness' is portrayed as the other/enemy of Turkish nation due to posing an external threat against the sovereignty and solidarity of Turkish nation. While describing the West as 'the other', these movies reverses the Orientalist discourse. Which is to say, the superior position is undertaken by Turkish nation while West is always conceptualized as inferior,

savage, barbaric, perverted and sex-addict. The politics is, further, oversimplified as a war between good and bad. This legitimizes the fight of Turks either for the name of their country or for an oppressed group.

Consequently, how these movies narrate the story of a fictional national past with reference to 'Turkish epic literature' and 'Turkish myths' is revealed. These movies narrate the stories of a Turkish national hero who is sometimes a fictional figure adopted by comic strips or sometimes an epic figure from Turkish national history. Battalgazi and Malkoçoğlu are epic figures while others –Tarkan, Karaoğlan, Kara Murat – are fictional characters. Yet the storyline of all heroes – either fictional or real – contends direct references to Turkish legends, myths, tales and hagiographies. Yet any of epic references does not follow the original literary texts, accurately. Although the events, the symbols or the characters are similar, they are rewritten and integrated into a different storyline.

Additionally, the movies made before 1970 display a secular tone of Turkish nationalism share similar arguments with 'Turkish History Thesis' by concentrating on pre-Islamic history and Central Asian roots of Turks. After 1970, this thesis loses its influence while Turkish-Islamic synthesis become widely popular. It is, therefore, not a coincidence that the movies made after 1970 (Battal Gazi and Kara Murat film series) concentrates on Turkish-Islamic history and consequently glorifies Ottoman past. In these movies, Turkish identity and Islamic identity seems to be interwoven and inseparable, which implies that if one is a Turk, he is a Muslim, too.

Lastly, these movies cannot be conceptualized as movies having the purpose of ideological propaganda, which is to say, these movies are not made by political powers in order to (re)build and support a specific kind of ideological discourse. In fact, the regional managers successfully grasp the hegemonic discourse of the rise of nationalism and anti-Western reactions mainly caused by the Cyprus events.

This common-sense feeling is shared by nearly all Turkish citizens. The movies explicitly express these feelings, which enable to draw more audiences and make more profit. Therefore, the purpose of these movies is not ideological propaganda but the main purpose is commercial profit. As a result, these movies do not represent a consistent and integrated ideological picture, but rather display anachronism. While constructing the discourse of Turkish nationalism, many ahistorical, supernatural, irrational and fantastic elements are combined together with comic and erotic scenes. This is to say, they contain the contrasting, inconsistent and conflicting elements all together.

Between 1965 and 1980, Turkish nationalism is articulated with the hegemonic principles of 'anti-communism' and 'Turkish-Islamic syntheses' of right-wing hegemony. Nationalism discourse in these movies complies with these principles. Nonetheless, a monolithic reading that approaches these movies as a tool for the dissemination of dominant ideology and a purveyor of false consciousness is misleading. Since the movies are the terrain of contestation, they cannot be conceptualized as merely a reflection of dominant ideology. It might also be read as a response to the communist threat to the existing hegemony.

Reminding Gramsci conceptualization of hegemony referring to the constitution of collective popular will through the articulation of different class interests, these movies represent the hegemonic understanding of nationalism which turns out to be the common-sense in society. Since the conceptualization of common-sense is not manufactured by a specific social class (instead refers to a hegemonic understanding which is above classes), it provides important insights about the socio-political and cultural life. Yet, the constitution of common-sense is directly related with the constitution of hegemony, it is not independent from power-relations. It is, therefore, not surprising that this common sense understanding does mostly comply with right wing conceptualization of Turkish nationalism

integrated with the distinct strains of anti-communism and Turkish-Islamic synthesis of liberal conservative ideology.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu çalışma 1965-1975 yıllarına damgasını vuran tarihi avantür film furyasına odaklanır. Gramsci'nin hegemonya ve ideoloji kavramsallaştırmasını Türkiye tarihinde 1965-1980 yılları özelinde işlevselleştirerek, bu kavramlar üzerinden bütünsel bir dönem okuması sunar. Böylece, popüler kültür/ideoloji, toplum ve devlet/siyasi iktidar arasındaki diyalektik ilişkiyi, bu ilişkinin içeriğini, niteliğini tarihsel ve somut olarak açığa çıkarmayı hedefler. 1965-1975 yılları arasında popüler olan tarihi avantür film furyasıyla dolaşıma sokulan milliyetçi kimlik söyleminin içeriğini analiz ederek, mevcut tarihsel, sosyo-politik ortamla ilişkisini incelemek ve mevcut hegemonya veya karşı hegemonya projelerinin (yeniden) üretimindeki rolünü somut olarak belirlemek çalışmanın temel sorunsalı olarak belirtilebilir.

Bu dönem birçok tarihi avantür film çekilmiştir ve bu filmlerin tamamının söylem analizinin bu çalışmaya dahil edilmesi mümkün değildir. Bu çalışmanın odak noktasını oluşturan filmler seçilirken, yöntemsel olarak bu dönem içerisinde en çok gişe yapmış filmler seçilecekti. Fakat Türkiye'de gişe rakamları 1989 itibariyle kayda geçmiştir, dolayısıyla, çalışmanın odaklandığı döneme ait sayısal verilere ulaşamayız. Yine de, bu dönem en çok izlenen/gişe yapan filmleri alternatif bir yöntemle bulunabilir. Dönemin sinemasının sosyo-ekonomik özelliklerine ve işleyişine baktığımızda sinemada bölge işletmeciliği sisteminin uygulandığı görülür.

Bu üretim tarzında bölge işletmecileri hangi tür filmlerin rağbet gördüğüne dair raporlar verir ve halkın ne tür bir film istediğini (konu, oyuncu ve hatta yönetmen)

belirtir ve yapımcılar da bir sonraki dönemde yapacakları filmlerin neredeyse her türlü özelliğini bölge işletmecilerinin ve dolaylı olarak da seyircinin talebine göre şekillendirirler. Bu sistemde bölge işletmecileri filmin göreceği tepkiyi aşağı yukarı bildikleri için tahmini getiriye kıyasla belirli bir bütçe ayırırlar ve bunu yapımcıya avans olarak verirler (Erkılıç & Ünal, 2018, ss. 56–61; Tunç, 2012, s. 93).

O dönem 'bölge işletmeciliği sistemi'nden dolayı halk tarafından beğenilen, gişe yapacağına inanılan filmler gösterime girer. Dolayısıyla, bir filmin seri şeklinde çekilmiş olması, diğer bir ifadeyle filmin devamının çekilmesi demek filmin halk tarafından beğenildiğinin ve kendi bütçesini fazlasıyla karşılayabildiğinin ispatıdır. Bu çalışma bu sebepten dolayı, 1965-1980 yılları arasında seri şeklinde çekilen tarihi avantür filmlere odaklanır. Bu film serileri, Karaoğlan, Tarkan, Malkoçoğlu, Kara Murat ve Battal Gazidir. Hatta filmlerin orijinal serileri haricinde farklı senaristlerce çeşitli kopyalarının üretilmesi de filmlerin çok rağbet gördüğünün kanıtıdır. Bu filmler o dönem o kadar çok izlenir ki, farklı senaristlerce ve farklı oyuncuların oynadığı yan filmler çıkarılır. Örneğin, Tarkan'ın orijinal serisinin haricinde Bozkırlar Şahini Tark-Han, Tarkan Canavarlı Kule ve Tarkan Camokaya karşı filmleri çıkar. Karaoğlan film serisi tarihi avantür filmlerin Türkiye'de ilk örneğidir ve seyirci tarafından da çok tutulur. Karaoğlan'ın baş düşmanı Camoka'yla Tarkan'ı karşı karşıya getiren bu Tarkan Camoka'ya karşı filmi de filmlerin halk tarafından ilgiyle izlendiğinin bir kanıtıdır. Fakat bu serilerin dışında da çoğunlukla yıldız oyuncuların benzer olduğu ve benzer konuların işlendiği Hakanlar Çarpışıyor, Kılıç Arslan, Korkusuz Cengaver, Alparslan'ın Fedaisi, Horasanın 3 Atlısı gibi birçok film çekilmiştir. Özetle halk bu filmlere rağbet göstermiş ve bölge işletmecileri de halkın özellikle konu ve oyuncu isteklerini dikkate alarak bu filmlerin devamını ve benzerlerini çekmeye devam etmişlerdir.

Karaoğlan, Tarkan, Malkoçoğlu, Kara Murat ve Battal Gazi film serilerine odaklanan bu çalışma, nitel araştırma yöntemlerinden eleştirel söylem analizi methodolojisini ve Gramsci'nin ideoloji kavramsallaştırmasını kullanır. Böylece, ideoloji, söylem ve sinema arasındaki ilişki hem sosyo-politik bağlamla ilişkilendirilebilir hem de indirgemeci olmayan bir bakış açısından ele alınabilir. Gramsci üst-yapısal alanı, ekonomik yapının bir yansımasına indirgemeyen bir kavramsallaştırma sunar. Böylece Gramsci ideoloji kavramı, ideolojinin somut sosyo-politik mücadelelerle olan ilişkisini de açığa çıkarmaya olanak sağlar. Gramsci için hegemonya, toplumsal sınıflar ve gruplar arasındaki kendiliğinden rızaya dayalı ideolojik üstünlük ilişkilerini tanımlar. Bu kavram özellikle sınıfsal iktidar ilişkilerinin yeniden üretimini anlamlandırmak açısından işlevseldir. Gramsci, devlet-sivil toplum incelemesi yaparken egemenliğin yalnızca tahakkümle sürdürülemeyeceğini savunur. Bu bağlamda, kapitalizme özgü toplumsal egemenlik ve siyasal iktidar süreçleri burjuvazi ve bağımlı sınıflar arasındaki ilişkiler söz konusu olduğunda, rıza ve zorlamanın özgül bir bileşiminden doğar (Yetiş, 2015, pp. 88–89). Hegemonya egemen sınıfın ahlaki önderlik yeteneğiyle doğrudan ilişkilidir. Gramsci, toplumsal yapının yeniden üretiminde ideolojik hegemonyanın önemine dikkat çeker. İdeoloji Gramsci için sınıf bilincinin gelişmesiyle yakından ilişkilidir. Hegemonya kendiliğinden rıza süreçleriyle yaygınlık kazanan egemen sınıf ideolojisinin toplumda ortak duyu haline gelmesini ifade eder. Gramsci'nin hegemonya kuramı ekonomik yapı ve üstyapılar bütünlüğünün organik birliği anlamına gelen tarihsel blok kavramına dayanır. Böylece, hegemonyanın siyasal, ekonomik ve ideolojik düzeylerde yansımaları bütünselci bir bağlama yerleştirilir. Kendiliğinde rıza sürecinin üretilmesinde ve hegemonyanın kurulmasında söylemsel pratikler önemli bir işlev görür. Sinema da doğrudan ideolojik propaganda amacıyla kullanılmasa da, sosyal, politik, ideolojik ve kültürel dinamiklerle doğrudan ilişkilidir. Hegemonyanın ve toplumsal güç ilişkilerinin (yeniden) üretilmesinde bir işlev üstlenir.

1965-1980 yılları Türkiye'de milliyetçiliğin yükselişe geçtiği bir dönemdir. Bu dönemde milliyetçiliğin yükselişe geçmesinin nedenleri Türkiye'de sınıf mücadelesi ve sol hareketlerin yükselişe geçmesi, Kıbrıs Sorunu, ve Kürt hareketinin siyasallaşması olarak tanımlanabilir. Yükselen Türk milliyetçiliği söyleminin dönemin sağ hegemonyasına nasıl eklemlendiğine baktığımızda, Türk milliyetçiliği söyleminin yükselen İslam (yumuşatılmış bir Türk-İslam sentezi) ve anti-komünist söylemle birleştiğini görürüz. Aşağıdaki bölümlerde bu filmlerin tematik söylem analizi yapılacak ve bu söylemin sağ-hegemonyanın milliyetçilik anlayışıyla benzerlikleri ele alınacaktır.

Filmlerin Tematik Söylem Analizi

Millet ve milliyetçilik arasındaki ilişki de birçok farklı teorisyen tarafından ele alınmıştır. Milletin mi yoksa milliyetçiliğin mi diğerinin önceliği konusundaki tarihsel kronolojik bir tartışma milliyetçilik literatürünün önde gelen isimlerinden teorisyenleri tarafından çokça tartışılmıştır. Millet ve milliyetçilik arasındaki ilişkiyi tarihsel kronolojik olarak ele almaktan ziyade, bu zorunlu ilişkinin milletin üyeleri/vatandaşlar arasındaki ortaklık duygusunu sürekli kılmak ve canlı tutmak işlevi gördüğünü belirtmek gerekir. Tam da bu sebepten, Brubaker etnisiteyi bir eylem kategorisi olarak tanımlar (Brubaker, 1996). Yani, ulus analitik bir kategori değildir. Günlük hayatta ve hatta literatürde birçok yazında homojen bir ulus ve onun çıkarları var gibi yansıtılır. Oysa ulus nesnel, bağımsız olarak var olan ve toplumu şekillendiren bir kategori değildir. Tersine ulus söylemin bir nesnesi olarak var olur. Başka bir ifadeyle, ulus üzerinden söylem geliştirilen, kurgusal bir kategoridir. Finlayson'ın milliyetçiliği bir hegemonya projesi olarak tanımlaması ve milliyetçiliğin hangi siyasal projelerle eklemlendiğinin önemini vurgulaması da bu sebeptendir. Milliyetçilik somut içerik olarak kendisini bambaşka şekillerde sunabilir. Hegemonya kurmak isteyen siyasi failin, milliyetçiliği kurgularken; kime seslendiği ve nasıl seslendiği, kimleri içerdiği,

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kimleri dışarda bıraktığı, kimleri öteki/düşman olarak tanımladığı üzerinden aynı ülke içerisinde bile farklı milliyetçiliklerin oluşmasına sebep olur.

Bu çalışma, filmlerdeki milliyetçilik kurgusunu yapı-bozuma uğratarak, milliyetçiliğin öğelerinin kurgusal olarak nasıl inşa edildiğini tematik bir söylem analizi yaparak gösterir. Böylece, kurgulanan milliyetçi söylemin mevcut tarihsel ve sosyo-politik bağlamda yorumlanması ve siyasi faillerin hegemonya veya karşı hegemonya projeleriyle ilişkisine ışık tutulabilecektir.

Türk Milli Kimliğinin (Benliğin) İnşası

Aslında milliyetçilik farklı ideolojilerden insanların ortak olarak paylaştığı bir duygu halidir. Milliyetçilik biriciklik ve farklılıkları vurgulayan dışlayıcı bir kavramdır. Bu sayede, safları pekiştirmeyi ve farklılıkları da elimine etmeyi amaçlar. Grosby için kollektif bilinç kavramı milliyetçi hissiyatın oluşmasında kilit rol oynar. Zira ancak kollektif kendilik bilinci sayesinde bireyin aidiyet duygusu/millete bağlılığı sağlanır. Kollektif kendilik bilinci belirli bir kültüre referans verir. Grosby, ulusu kollektif kendilik bilinci üzerinden işleyen bir sosyal ilişki olarak tanımlar. Aslında, aynı coğrayada yaşama, aynı dili konuşma ile derinleşen bireylerarası ilişki kollektif bilinç kavramıyla karşılanır. Aynı geleneğe katılım kollektif bilincin tanımlanmasında temel referans noktasıdır. Öz-farkındalık hali olarak da tanımlanabilecek olan bu kollektif kendilik bilinci, çeşitli pratiklerle devam ettirilir. Günlük eylemler, semboller, mitler, ve çeşitli kurumlar ulusal düzeyde bu öz-farkındalığın devamlılığını sağlarlar (Grosby, 2005). Bu filmler de öz-farkındalığın yeniden üretilmesini sağlayan pratiklerin bir örneği olarak yorumlanabilir.

Milliyetçi literatürde temel ayrım, modernist ve Primordialist yaklaşımlar arasındadır. Primordialist yaklaşım, kimliklerin sembollerle kurulumuna önem gösterirler. Ulusun, doğrudan etnik kimlikle olan ilişkisini savunur. Primordialist

teorisyenler ulusun realize edilmesinde öncelikli olarak ortak ata nosyonunun önemli olduğunu söylerler. Primordialist teorisyenlerden, Connor, Horrowitz ve Breuilly ortak ata nosyonunu üzerinde ağırlıkla dururlar. Örneğin, Connor, ulus ataları düzeyinde birbiriyle ilişkili olduğunu duyumsayan insan grubudur der. Akrabalık bağları üzerinden insanların ulusa sadakatinin sağlandığını savunur. Burada, akrabalık bağı gerçekten vaka düzeyinde var olması anlamında değil ama öyleymişcesine kabul edildiğine vurgu yapar. Akrabalık referanslı dilin kendisinin de bilinç-dışı unsurlardan ve duygusal alandan etkilendiğini vurgular. Örneğin, mitler, şiirler, efsaneler insan psikesinin derinliklerine ulaşabilir ve sıradan somut olayları duygu yüklü fantazmalara dönüştürebilir. Connor için etno-nationalism rasyonel olanın alanına değil, duygu ve bilinçdışı alanına yerleştirilir. Akrabalık söyleminin en önemli unsurları, kan ve ortak ata vurgusudur. Dolayısıyla bu filmlerde de akrabalık dili, ortak ata ve kan söylemi seferber edilir (Connor, 1993). Filmlerde sık sık Türkoğlu Türküm, Türk soyundan geliyorum replikleri dikkat çeker.

Fantastik öğelerin ağırlıklı olduğu bu filmlerde, Türk olmayı temsil eden başkahraman mücadelecidir, halktan yanadır, ezilen ve güçsüz olanın koruyucusudur, fiziksel gücü düşmanlardan üstündür ve cinsel cazibeye sahiptir. Bu kahramanlar, tüm zaaflarından sıyrılmıştır ve kusurlarından arınmıştır. Kahramanlar adeta efsaneleşmişlerdir. Bu kahramanların temsil ettiği Türklük ve Türk olmak da adeta insanüstü özelliklere sahip olmakla eşdeğer gösterilir. Fiziksel olarak güçlülüğü temsil eden Türklük, aynı zamanda belirli ahlaki yüceliği de temsil eder. Türk olmak adaletli ve dürüst olmakla eşdeğer olarak gösterilir. Örneğin, filmlerde başkahramanlar asla çevrelerindeki haksızlıklara kayıtsız kalamazlar. Hiçbir zaman bana dokunmayan yılan bin yaşasın demezler.

Tüm Türkler benzer koşullarda gösterilir. Sınıfsal farklılıklar, farklı yaşam tarzları, ideolojik farklılıkların üstü örtülür. Yekpare, kaynaşmış ve birlik,beraberlik

içerisinde bir Türk ulusu anlatısı sunulur. Zenginliğin, paranın önemli olmadığı, yegâne olan Türk milletinin yüceliği ve devamlılığı olduğu mesajı verilir.

Özellikle 1970 sonrasında çekilen, Kara Murat ve Battal Gazi film serilerinde Türklük ve Müslümanlık birbirinden ayrı değildir (Alaca, 2017, p. 423). Yani, Türk olmak Müslüman olmak demektir. Bu filmlerde, din değiştirmek önemli bir tema olarak karşımıza çıkar.Türklükten vazgeçmek ve dinini değiştirmek aynı şey gibi sunulur. Her iki seride de, düşman olarak betimlenen Bizanslılara esir aldıkları Türkler'e dininizi değiştirirseniz, canınızı bağışlarım der. Fakat Türkler Müslüman doğduklarını ve Müslüman öleceklerini vurgularlar. Bu sahne her filmde defalarca tekrarlanır. Diğer taraftan, Müslüman Türklerin düşman üzerinde her zaman olumlu bir etkisi söz konusudur. Türklerin yiğitliğin, dürüstlüğünden etkilenen Hristiyanlar din değiştirerek Müslüman olurlar. Bu kişiler genelde kahpe Bizans'ın yiğit insanları olarak tasvir edilir. Din değiştirerek doğru yolu bulurlar ve daha asil, daha erdemli, daha iyi bireylere dönüşürler. Aslında, Türklük doğuştan gelen biyolojik bir kategori olarak sunulduğu için, Hristiyanların din değiştirerek Müslüman olmaları, Türk-Müslüman toplumuna dahil olmalarının bir yolu olarak yorumlanabilir.

Karaoğlan ve Tarkan serisi ise İslamiyet öncesi Türk tarihine odaklanır. Müslüman bir Türk portresi çizilmez. Çok tanrılı dinin egemen olduğu bu filmlerde, Savaş Tanrısı, Buda gibi çok tanrılı dinlerin figürleri ön plana çıkar. Özetle, 1970 öncesi çekilen tarihi avantür filmlerde daha seküler bir milliyetçi söylem hakimdir. 1970 sonrasında dolaşıma sokulan milliyetçi söylem ise Türk-İslam sentezinin izlerini taşır. 1970 sonrası çekilen Kara Murat ve Battal Gazi filmlerindeki İslam vurgusu tesadüfi değildir.

Aslında Türkler ve diğer devletler arasındaki ilişki, her zaman iyi ve kötünün bir savaşına indirgenir ve Türk kahraman her zaman iyiyi temsil eder. İçinde zerre iyilik barındırmayan düşman ise her şeyiyle tamamen kötüdür. Kollektif bilincin

kendisi ben ve öteki ayrımını ön varsayar. Kollektif kendilik bilincinin gelişmesi için / millet olabilmek için dışarıda bırakılan ötekinin belirlenmesi gerekir.Bu filmlerde de, 'biz'den olmayan ötekinin kötüyü temsil etmesi düşman olarak imgelenmesi, 'biz'im en yüce ve en iyiyi temsil ediyor olmamız şaşırtıcı değildir.

Düşmanın/Ötekinin Tanımlanması

Edward Said, Oryantalizm kavramıyla, Batı'nın 18. ve 19. yüzyılda Doğu ile karşılaşmasının neticesinde, Batı'nın algı ve gözlemleri üzerinden Doğu'ya ilişkin ürettiği tekil bir 'öteki' söylemine vurgu yapar. Aslında Said, Foucaultcu bağlamda bilgi ve iktidar arasındaki ilişkisi çerçevesinde Batılı toplumların Doğu'ya yönelik ürettikleri tekil, sterotipik söylem bütününü açığa çıkarır (Said, 2003). Said, Oryantalist söylemde Doğu ve Batı arasında epistemolojik ve ontolojik mutlak bir farklılık bulunduğunu söyler. Batılı yazında Doğu'ya yönelik söylemlerin izini sürer. Doğu'ya yönelik sistematik ve sterotipik söylemler bütününü Oryantalizm olarak tanımlar (Said, 2003). Bu Oryantalist söylemde, Doğu despotik, zorba, sapkın, cinsellik düşkünü, tembel, uyuşuk, çalışma disiplininden yoksun olarak resmedilir. Bu filmlerde ise Oryantalist söylemin ters-yüz edilerek, Oryantalist yazında Doğu'yu tanımlamak için kullanılan tüm bu sterotipik söylemlerin Batı'yı tanımlamak için kullanıldığını görüyoruz. Bu filmlerin tamamında Türkler ve düşmanları arasındaki savaş konu olarak işlenir. Düşman bütün filmlerde hep barbar, işkenceci, yağmacı, olarak tasvir edilir. Akbaş'ın ifadesiyle, "düşman hep tecavüz etmekten, gasp etmekten çekinmeyen talan edip yağmalayan, insanlıktan uzak olarak tasvir edilir" (Akbaş, 2018, p. 189). Oryantalist söylemin özellikle hareme yönelik sapkınlık iddiaları ve Türkleri cinsellik düşkünü olarak resmetmeleri tersine çevrilir. Batı'ya (yani düşmana) atfedilen bu özellikler, sapkınlık ve cinselliğin uç noktalarda yer aldığı sahnelerle çarpıcı bir şekilde tasvir edilir. Yine Oryantalist söylemin ters-yüz edilmesinin bir devamı olarak, düşman yer yer zayıf, güçsüz ve gülünç gösterilir.

Karaoğlan ve Tarkan film serileri İslamiyet öncesine odaklanır. Karaoğlan filminde baş düşman Camoka'dır. Yerleşik düzene geçmemiş bir toplumda, barbar, yağmacı bir çete reisidir. Bu filmde yer yer, İslamiyet öncesi dönemde Orta Asya'da siyasal ilişkilerin yakın olarak yaşandığı Çin öteki olarak tasvir edilir. Tarkan film serisinde ise, düşman/öteki çoğunlukla Bizans olmakla birlikte, bazen Vikingler, bazen Çin olarak karşımıza çıkar. Malkoçoğlu, Kara Murat ve Battal Gazi serilerinde ise, düşman hep Bizans'tır. Bizans tersine çevrilen Oryantalist söylemin nesnesi olarak karşımıza çıkar. Scognamillo ve Demirhan'a göre, bu filmlerde hep çürümüş, zorba, gaddar bir Bizans tasviriyle karşılaşırız. Bizans'ın Akdeniz'in en işlek limanı, bilgi ve sanat merkezi olması tarihsel bir gerçeklik olsa da bu filmlerde asla bunları göremeyiz. Bu filmler için, kahpe Bizans, kahpe kalacaktır (G Scognamillo & Demirhan, 2005, p. 146).

Scognamillo ve Demirhan'a göre, kahramanların mücadele ettiği düşman ister Viking olsun, ister Çin'den gelmiş olsun her defasında kapkaradır, barbardır, gözü dönmüştür ve her defasında nedenli, ya da nedensiz Türk düşmanıdır (2005, s. 140). Batı'nın Türklere düşman olmasının sebebi Türklerin en yüce devlet olduğu için Türklerden korkmaları ve Türkleri kıskanmaları olarak tasvir edilir. Türkler ise, Bizans, Vikingler, Çin ya da Avrupa'ya karşı sebepsiz yere bir düşmanlık gütmez. Her zaman maddi bir sebep, somut bir olay düşmanlığın sebebi olarak sunulur. Her filmde, düşman Türk'e zulmeder ve bu da düşmanlığın ve öç alma isteğinin somut gerekçesi olarak sunulur. Haklı bir gerekçeyle savaşan Türkler kazanır ve adalet yerini bulur. Tüm filmlerde düşman hep kalleşlik yapar, tuzak kurar, sözünde durmaz. Oysa Türkler haklıdır, adil ve dürüst bir şekilde savaşırlar. Sonuçta, ötekinin düşman olarak tasvir edilmesinin meşru bir gerekçesi sunulur.

Milli Tarih Anlatısı

Tarih belleğin yeniden inşasında ve üretilmesinde önemli bir rol oynar. Geçmiş, bugünü anlamak ve anlamlandırmak için önemlidir. Dolayısıyla tarih aslında hem

geçmişi üreten hem de geçmişin ürünü olarak ortaya çıkar. Milli tarih yazımı ortak anılar toplamının oluşturulmasıdır. Milli tarih yazımında genelde tarihsel gerçeklik birebir yansıtılmaz. Tarihsel anlatıların doğruluğunun ispatı da gerekmez. Tersine her ulusun tarihsel doğruluk derdi olmayan mitleri, hikayeleri, kahramanlık anıları vardır. Bunlar ulusların kendilerini ayırmasının ve farklılaştırmasını sağlar. Geçmiş zaman ve geçmiş zamana dair referanslar bugünün anlamlandırılması, kavranması ve yaşanması sürecinde hayati rol oynarlar. Üstelik bu anılar toplamı bireyin kendilik algısını oluştururken de önemli rol oynar.

Burada geçmişin doğruluğundan ziyade bu geçmiş üzerinde ortak bir inanç oluşturulması önemlidir. Çoğu zaman, geçmiş araçsallaştırılır ve yapay bir milli tarih anlatısı oluşturulur. Tarih aslında sürekli olarak yeniden yazılır ve tarih aracılığıyla sonradan gelenek oluşturulur. Örneğin, folklorik öğeler, yaratılmış kültür öğeleri, kahramanlık hikayeleri seferber edilir. Milli tarih yazımında destanlar, kahramanlıklar, efsaneler, mitler önemli yer tutar. Milletler çoğu zaman kendi kökenlerini tarih dışı unsurlarla açıklarlar. Efsaneler, mitler, destanlar milli tarih yazımının en önemli kaynaklarındandır. Çoğu zaman hayal edilmiş ve gerçek olduğu iddia edilen birtakım akıl dışı, gerçeklik dışı unsurlara inanılır ve bunlarla övünülür.

Benzer şekilde, ulus devlet formunun ortaya çıkması 19.yy'a denk gelse de, milletlerin en eski tarihlerden beri var oldukları savunulur. Türk kimliği ve Türk tarihi de incelenen film serilerinin temel konusudur. Bu filmlerde dünya tarihinin Türkleştirilmesi ve ezelden beri var olduğu iddia edilen Türk milletinin tarihi serüveni konu edinilir. Farklı kahramanların hikâyelerini ve farklı tarihsel dönemleri konu alsa da, hepsi benzer, pek değişmeyen şablonlara dayanır. Abartılar, rastlantılar, mitik ve doğaüstü olaylar filmin olay örgüsünde önemli yer tutarlar (Scognamillo & Demirhan, 2005, s. 173). Türk tarihinin önde gelen isimleri olarak sunulan bu kahramanların maceralarında en önemli ortak payda, Türk olmaları ve Türk tarihinin gelişmesinde oynadıkları kilit roldür. Bu

bağlamda, bu filmler milli tarih yazımına katkıda bulunan eserler olarak yorumlanabilir.

Bu filmlerin konusu sözlü tarihin en önemli ürünü destanlardan etkilenmiştir. Destanlar milletlerin din, fazilet ve milli kahramanlık maceralarının manzum hikâyeleridir. Bu maceralar milletlerin tarihten önceki devirlerinde veya tarihlerin kuruluşu asırlarında başlar ve bazen tarih boyunca devam eder. Kahramanları arasında Tanrılar, Tanrıçalar, Bozkurt'un çocuğu, ağaç karnında doğmuş insanlar bulunur. İlk bakışta hayal ürünü olarak görünürler. Fakat masalsı bir atmosferle insanlık tarihinin nasıl başlayıp, nasıl geliştiğini anlatan destanlar, çoğu zaman milletleri meydana getiren fikir ve hissiyatın yapı taşlarını oluştururlar. Destanlar içerisinde zengin mitolojik unsurlar da barındırlar (Banarlı, 2004, s. 1).

İslamiyet öncesi Türk destanlarında (Bozkurt Destanı, Oğuz Kağan Destanı, Ergenekon Destanı, Türeyiş Destanı) kurt figürü öne çıkar. Bozkurt bu destanlarda Türk'ün hayal ve savaş gücünü temsil eder ve adeta tanrılaştırılmıştır. Türk Edebiyat Tarihi Ansiklopedisinde anlatıldığı üzere "Türkler anayurtlarının bu müthiş varlığına önceleri Tanrı diye tapmışlar, sonra kendilerinin Bozkurt soyundan geldiklerine, böylelikle birer Bozkurt olduklarına inanmışlardır. Oğuz Destan'ında bozkurtun bir nakarat gibi tekrarlanan vazifesi Türk ordularının önünde yürüyerek onlara yol göstermesidir. Türeyiş Destanında da Tanrı erkek bir kurt şeklinde yeryüzüne iner ve Uygur hakanının Tanrılarla evlenmek için yaratılan iki güzel kızıyla evlenir. Uygur neslinin bu izdivaçtan çoğaldığına inanılır (Ögel, 1997, pp. 19–42). Özellikle İslamiyet öncesi Türk destanlarında bozkurt adeta yarı tanrısal bir figürdür ve Türklerin savaş gücünü temsil eder. Hatta altından bozkurt başlı bayrağın da ilk Türk bayrağı olduğuna inanılır (Banarlı, 2004, p. 3). İslamiyet öncesi Türk tarihe odaklanan Tarkan film serisinde, bozkurt figürünün bu denli öne çıkmasının sebebi de milli destanlardan etkilenmiş olmasıdır. Bu destanlardaki simgeler, mitolojik unsurlar ve olayların birçoğu değiştirilerek Tarkan filmine uyarlanmıştır.

Tarkan, Karaoğlan ve Kara Murat milli tarihten uyarlanmış epik figürler değillerdir. Yine de bu filmlerde destanlara ve sözlü tarih ürünlerine referanslara rastlanır. Battal Gazi ve Malkoçoğlu ise hikâyeleri sırasıyla Battalname ve Saltukname'de anlatılan epik figürlerdir. Battalname'de Arab bir seyid olarak geçen Battal Gazi, İslam dininin yayılması için çalışır. Fakat bu film serisinde Battal Gazi Türkleştirilir ve amacı dinin yayılmasından ziyade ulusal çıkarlar olarak tasvir edilir. Battal Gazi serisinin de gösterdiği üzere, her ne kadar bütün film serilerinde destanlar, mitler, folklora referanslar barındırsa da, hiçbirisi orjinal metinleri ve olayları yansıtmaz. Benzer figürler, olaylar, kişiler farklı bir hikayenin parçası olarak anlatılır.

1970 öncesi çekilen Karaoğlan ve Tarkan film serilerinde Türk tarih tezinin izlerini sürmek mümkündür. Türk Tarih Tezi, 1931 yılında kurulan Türk Tarihini Tetkik Cemiyeti (sonrasında Türk Tarih Kurumuna evrilir) çalışmalarıyla oluşturulmaya başlar. Atatürk'ün yanında Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Yusuf Akçura gibi dönemin önemli milliyetçi isimleri de Türk tarih tezinin yazılmasında aktif rol alırlar. Türk Tarih Tezinde Antik Tarihin en başından başlayan bir Türk tarihi anlatısı sunulur. Türkler ilk olarak Orta-Asya'da görünürler ve hızla çevrelerini medenileştirirler. Dünyanın geri kalanı koyu vahşet içerisinde yaşarken, Türkler medenidir. İklim ve doğanın etkisiyle Mezopotamya ve Anadolu'ya göç etmek zorunda kalırlar. M.Ö. 2. milenyumda ilk Türk varlığının görüldüğüne inanılır. Hititler Türktür. Yakın geçmişi göz ardı ederek Türk milletinin kadim zamanlardan beri var olduğu iddia edilir (Köken, 2002, pp. 86–96). Diğer bir ifadeyle, Osmanlı geçmişine değinilmez ve Türk tarihinin Orta Asya'dan başladığına vurgu yapılır. Erken Cumhuriyet döneminde kaleme alınan Türk tarih tezi ilk medeniyeti Türkler kurduğunu iddia eder. Batı ise bu medeniyetten yararlanıp ilerlemiştir. Türklerin vahşi, gaddar, medeni olmayan vb. oryantalist tezler doğru değildir. Bu tez aslında Türklerin en eski zamanlardan var olduğunu ispatlamaya çalışır. Yani, Türkler aslında İslam diniyle doğmuş değillerdi. İslamiyet öncesinde bütün dinlere eşit mesafede duran

Şamanist bir topluluk olarak Türkler vardır. Böylece, Türk tarih tezi, ezelden ebediyete bir süreklilik ve kadimdik iddiasını barındırır.

1960larda hala dolaşımda olan Türk Tarih Tez'inden izler bu dönem çekilen Karaoğlan ve Tarkan filmlerinde net bir şekilde kendisini gösterir. 1970 sonrası dönemde Türk-İslam sentezinin egemen olmaya başlamasıyla, Türk Tarih tezi geçerliliğini ve etkisini yitirmeye başlar. 1970 sonrasında çekilen Kara Murat ve Battal Gazi filmlerinin Türklerin Orta Asya geçmişine değil de, Osmanlı tarihini konu alması tesadüf değildir. 1970 sonrası filmlerde Osmanlı dönemi altın çağ olarak yansıtılır ve bu dönemde Müslüman Türklerin kahramanlıkları anlatılır.

Sonuç Yerine

Bu filmler iktidarın kendi eliyle bilinçli olarak üretip dağıtıma soktukları filmler değildir. Kıbrıs Olaylarıyla birlikte toplumda tepkisel olarak yükselen milliyetçi duygu ve Batı karşıtlığının sinemada yansımalarıdır. Bu filmler özelinde incelediğimizde, iktidarı elinde bulunduranların siyasi faillerin film içeriklerini doğrudan şekillendirmemiş olmalarının yanında, yapımcı veya senaristlerinin de o dönemki mevcut iktidarla organik bir bağları söz konusu değildir. Bu bağlamda, bu filmler bölge işletmecilerinin o dönem için toplumdaki mevcut tepkileri ticarete çevirdikleri filmler olarak görülebilir. Bu bağlamda, toplumdaki mevcut ideolojik öğelerden beslenen filmler, tedavüle girdikten sonra bilinçli ya da bilinçsiz olarak mevcut düzenin yeniden üretiminde rol oynar. Bu süreçte iktidarın doğrudan filmlere yönelik finansman sağlamak, destekleme, içerik oluşturma gibi bir etkisi söz konusu değildir. Fakat filmlerin sansür sorunuyla çok fazla uğraşmak zorunda kalmaması iktidarın dolaylı bir desteği olarak görülebilir.

Bu filmler tarih ve tarih dışını bir arada barındırırlar, anakroniktirler. İçerdiği ideolojik öğelerinin yanında, yanında mizah ve erotizm içerirler. O dönem sinema en önemli eğlence aracıdır. Televizyonun yaygınlaşmadığı ve halkın büyük

kesiminin okuma yazma bilmediği bir dönemde, sinema çok sayıda izleyici ulaşır ve insanların en önemli sosyalleşme ve eğlence aracına dönüşür. Bu filmlere baktığımızda da filmlerin bütüncül bir ideoloji anlatısı içermedikleri görülür. Toplumda mevcut olan ortak duyunun farklı unsurlarını barındırırlar ve çoğunlukla anakroniktirler. Bu unsurlar kimi zaman birbiriyle çelişir, kimi zaman birbiriyle uyumsuzdur. Bu filmler de benzer şekilde, tarih ve tarih dışı öğeleri bir arada barındırır. Kahramanlık hikâyeleriyle Türk milli tarihine dair ipuçları sunmanın yanında, kahramanın hikayesini anlatırken çoğu zaman akıl dışına kaçan, mizah unsuru barındıran ve erotik sahneler içeren filmlerdir. Bu durum, bu filmlerin belirli bir ideolojiyi yaymak için çekilen propaganda filmi olmadıklarının; tersine, bölge işletmecilerinin toplumdaki mevcut ortak duyuyu ticarete dönüştürdükleri eğlence filmleri olduğunun göstergesidir.

Bu filmler dönemin sağ hegemonyasının Türk milliyetçiliğine yaklaşımı olan Türk-İslam sentezi ve anti-komunist söylemden izler barındırırlar. Özellikle 1970 sonrası filmlerde İslam vurgusu dikkat çeker. Türk toplumunun sınıfsal ve ideolojik farklardan azade yekpare sunulması anti-komunist söylemin bir uzantısı olarak görülebilir. Dönemin anti-komunizminin en önemli özelliği olan dış-düşman Moskava imgesine benzer olarak, Batı dış düşman olarak tasvir edilir. Her ne kadar sağ hegemonyanın milliyetçiliğini yansıtıyor olsa da, bu filmleri bir tür yanlış bilinç oluşturmak için iktidarın ideolojik manipüpulasyon aracı olarak görmek yanıltıcıdır. Bu filmler bir ideolojik manüpülasyondan ziyade toplumda yükselen sola bir tepki olarak da okunabilir. Aslında Gramsci'nin hegemonya kavramı, toplumda farklı sınıfların çıkarlarının artikülasyonudur. Yani egemen sınıfın önderdiliği önemli olsa da, bir tür sınıf dominasyonu değildir. Milliyetçilik ise bir anlamda iktidarın rıza üretiminde etkilidir. Fakat bu hegemonik sınıfın çıkarlarını yansıtan da ziyade ortak duyuya dönüşmüş bir algı olarak okunmalıdır. Bu filmler iktidar sınıfının çıkarlarını yansıtan bir tür manipülasyon aracı olmaktan ziyade, özellikle Kıbrıs olaylarıyla birlikte yükselen Türk milliyetçiliği söyleminin toplumda ortak duyu haline gelmiş halini yansıtırlar. Hegemonya farklı sınıfların

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çıkarlarının artikülasyonu anlamına geldiğini hatırlarsak, dönemin hegemonik Türk milliyetçiliği toplumda ortak duyu haline gelmiştir. Siyaset, toplum ve popüler kültür arasındaki ilişkiye baktığımızda da, bu ilişki tek yönlü bir belirlenim ilişkisi değildir, diyalektik bir ilişkidir. Popüler kültür eserleri toplumdaki mevcut ideolojilerden, ortak duyu öğelerinden beslenir. Diğer taraftan, ortaya çıkan eserler sosyo-politik alanın şekillenmesi etkin rol oynarlar etkiler. Mevcut hegemonyanın yeniden üretiminde ve/ya alternatif bir hegemonyanın inşasında kilit rol oynayan ideolojik alanın (yeniden) üretilmesinde aktif rol alırlar. Sonuçta, sinema ve popüler kültür herhangi bir sınıfın tekelinde üretilen/şekillenen bir alan olmamakla beraber, toplumsal güç ilişkilerinden de azade değildir.

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YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname   : Çakır

Adı / Name   : Dilek

Bölümü / Department   : Sosyoloji

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (**İngilizce** / English) : Contextual Analysis of Nationalism Discourse in Turkish al Adventure Movies (1965-1980)

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE**: Yüksek Lisans** / Master ☐   **Doktora** / PhD ☐

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