

A COMPARISON OF THE EU'S AND THE U.S.' DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN  
EGYPT

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **A COMPARISON OF THE EU'S AND THE U.S.' DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN EGYPT**

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Democracy promotion has become a prominent international policy tool after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This study evaluates the core values of the different democracy understandings and compares the substance and styles of democracy promotion of the EU and the USA in Egypt. While the policy tools and target countries of the both have varied, Egypt is one of the common interest area of these two powers due to its importance. While the democracy promotion discourse on Egypt was too strong, democratization of Egypt has been overshadowed by the other interests of the EU and the U.S.

**Keywords:** Democracy Promotion, the EU, the U.S., Egypt.

## Öz

### AB VE ABD’NİN MİSİR’DAKİ DEMOKRASİ TEŞVİKLERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRILMASI

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Sovyetler Birliği’nin çöküşünden sonra demokrasi teşviki önemli bir uluslararası politika aracı haline gelmiştir. Bu çalışma Mısır’daki AB ve ABD’nin farklı demokrasi teşviki politikalarını incelemektedir. Mısır taşıdığı önemden dolayı bu iki gücün ortak ilgi alanına girmektedir. Mısır için demokrasi teşviki bağlamındaki söylem güçlü olmasına rağmen, AB ve ABD’nin Mısır’daki diğer çıkarları, Mısır’ın demokratikleştirilmesi çabasının önüne geçmiştir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Demokrasi Teşviki, AB, ABD, Mısır.

*To My Parents*

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## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Democracy is one of the most used and well-known term in social sciences. Democracy promotion is also a popular term and almost everybody has an idea about it. However, there is not a widely agreed definition of it. Its meaning varies in different theories and practices. 20<sup>th</sup> and the 21<sup>st</sup> centuries have witnessed different implementations of democracy promotion by different states with different aims.

Democracy promotion is as old as democracy itself. Ancient Greeks (Pangle, 16) were one of the most aggressive defenders of democracy and their attitude to expand their democratic norms in the other countries is regarded as the oldest version of democracy promotion abroad. However, contemporary and intense use of democracy promotion has started to circulate in the Cold War era against communism for containing “non-democratic” socialist countries throughout the globe. (Sedeca and Nicolas, 5) Despite this initial use of the term, the implementation of democracy promotion has accelerated after the Cold War to fully democratize countries that were formerly part of the Warsaw Pact and to tackle the emerging challenges elsewhere. The European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.) have been the major promoters of democracy in this period. It is also observed that some developing countries, such as Turkey and China, spend efforts on democracy promotion, especially in the African countries. Among these democracy promotion efforts, this study concentrates on the activities of the said major power, specifically in Egypt.

The EU and the U.S. are the main powers of the Western world. Their policies could have spillover effect all over the world. In the globalization era, their role as

hegemons is central to the global political climate. They used to have the same enemy, which was the Soviet Union, and then terrorism became their shared fear. Therefore, they acted similarly in the world affairs. However, the 2003 Iraq war became a turning point in their relationship according to some scholars, such as Ronald Asmus et al.(2003), who says the relationship between them has fractured due to the Americans' unilateralist military action in Iraq and Afghanistan. (Asmus, Everts and Isernia, 2)However, Cavatorta and Durac claim that the reason the EU embraced a more assertive role in international affairs and diverged from American policies is because the EU's Common and Foreign Security Policy<sup>1</sup> (CFSP) has been strengthened. The promotion of democracy in third countries is something both of these two powers do. So it is worth to see whether there is a divergence or continuity in their approaches. Analyzing the similarities and the differences of these two powers' democracy promotion styles is important to understand how keen these Western hegemons are in democracy promotion and whether they can cooperate in this sphere. It should be stated that this study does not look at the impact or outcome of these two actors' democracy promotion activities, it examines what the EU and the U.S. did in Egypt in terms of democracy promotion and how.

Egypt was a protectorate of the United Kingdom until the 1950s and Egypt's relations with Europe were very strong. The Suez Canal crisis changed this situation and then the U.S. started to establish strong ties with Egypt. Therefore, there are both American and European influences on Egypt. However, they are not only external democracy promoters in Egypt: France and the United Kingdom are the other actors that are also active and contribute to the spread of Western norms, such as democracy and liberal economy in Egypt, but their activities and relations

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<sup>1</sup> CFSP is a common policy created for the EU by the member states with the Maastricht Treaty (1992). With this policy, the EU member states have committed to act in a common strategy on security and foreign policy issues in line with the civilian and military capabilities of the EU. See more: [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/420/common-foreign-and-security-policy-cfsp\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/420/common-foreign-and-security-policy-cfsp_en) Access Date: 12.07.2019

with Egypt are not the focus of this thesis. Thus, Egypt is a convenient case to see the major Western powers' external democracy promotion implementations and the distinctions between their democracy promotion policies. Hence, our question here is this: What are the similarities and differences between American and European democracy promotion styles in Egypt?

Egypt is one of the most important countries in the MENA region. It is the largest Arab state by population and has a strategic geopolitical location due to the Suez Canal and Straits of Tiran. It has also a key reconciliatory role in the conflict between the Arab world and Israel, and it is among allies of the latter in the region. Due to these reasons, engaging with Egypt politically, economically and militarily is highly important for the leading democracy promoters. Supporting the democratization of Egypt is among the foreign policy goals of the EU and the U.S.. Democratizing Egypt would have a spillover effect on the other Arab states, but other policy priorities and national interests have overshadowed the democracy promotion, as this thesis will demonstrate. Therefore, Egypt is an important case to compare democracy promotion styles and the true motives behind their policies. Although promotion of democracy in third countries is only a small part of foreign policy, analyzing American and European foreign policies towards Egypt in general is out of the scope of this thesis. We do not mean to explore how the EU or the U.S. formulates their external democracy promotion policies in general and in Egypt throughout this study. Another limitation is that the outcomes of these policies cannot be measured and assessed. Foreign policy analysis of the two powers or studying the impact of their policies in Egypt exceeds the scope of this work. Especially the literature on the European foreign policy and foreign policy analysis are beyond the scope of this thesis.

After the Cold War, the EU found an opportunity to spread liberal democratic values such as human rights and free trade to the former Warsaw Pact and beyond with different kinds of programs. These programs include the Euro-Mediterranean

Partnership (EMP), European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). The countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region are part of these programs too, and the EU has followed a democracy promotion policy in this region, where states mainly display non-democratic characteristics. The EU is also concerned by trade, migration and energy issues, and the autocratic regimes of the said region have benefited from the EU funds in these spheres throughout the implementation of the EMP and the ENP. Egypt has been one of these benefiting countries and has a special engagement with the EU. Constituting democracy in Egypt has not been the sole priority from a European perspective. Other goals, such as economic or political concerns have been ahead of the democratization issue in Egypt. Therefore, we observe that the European attitude is very close to utilitarian approach among the external democracy promotion understandings, despite the expectations of a normatively oriented action.

The U.S. also has a long history of democracy promotion. Unlike the EU, the U.S. also tried to democratize in long distance states, such as Japan, Iraq or Afghanistan. It also accelerated its activities after the Cold War, but the most significant turning point was 9/11. The U.S. used military intervention to democratize Iraq and Afghanistan. Programs such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) operate in the MENA region and Egypt. They promote supremacy of law, democracy and sound governance, electoral processes as well as trying to increase living standards of the people. After Israel, Egypt is the biggest target for the American foreign aid. This study focuses on Egypt to understand the American democracy promotion activities, which also display a utilitarian tendency.

We will evaluate the characteristics of both American and European democracy promotion activities in Egypt's case in this study. However, it has to be pointed out that how Egypt would democratize is beyond the scope of this study. Following this introduction there is a short chapter defining democracy promotion. In a subsequent short analytical background chapter, an overview of Egypt's relations with the EU and the U.S. will be presented. Then American and European activities towards Egypt will be evaluated whether they were before or after the Arab Spring. Subsequently, a comparison of the two approaches will be made in the final chapter before the conclusion.

It is observed that the concern about democratization of Egypt has been overshadowed by the other concerns of the EU and the U.S. Europeans want to promote cooperation in energy, tackle migration and liberalize the Egyptian economy. On the other hand, security problems of Israel dominate of the American engagement with Egypt, particularly in its democracy promotion instruments. Therefore, democracy promotion in Egypt has not been for the sake of democracy only and instead of democratizing Egypt, the American and European funds have contributed to legitimization of an autocratic administration.

In this study, qualitative method has been used to answer our research question. This thesis has relied on official documents, second-hand sources, websites and reports. Although discourse analysis is not aimed, the speeches of officials have been also used to gather information throughout our study.

### **1.1. What Does Democracy Promotion Mean?**

Democracy is among the most commonly concepts in international relations. Its history dates back to ancient times. "Democracy" derives from Greek "demos" (people) and "kratos" (rule) and means "rules by the people" (Jent, 242). The Cambridge Dictionary defines democracy as "the belief in freedom and equality

between people, or a system of government based on this belief, in which power is either held by elected representatives or directly by the people themselves.”<sup>2</sup> Therefore, it can be said that free elections, freedom and equality between people and an institutionally democratic governance are the intrinsic components of the democracy. The liberal functioning market is the other side of the coin. From David Held’s point of view, the definition of democracy can be understood more comprehensively. He states that without strict social and economic rights, and if the state does not intervene for the implementation of these rights, people cannot really use their democratic rights. Moreover, the neutrality of the state may also accelerate the new forms of inequality and the implementation of the social and economic liberties could systematically be disrupted by wealth and status. (Held, 320) It can be inferred that democracy exists “not only as a political, but also as a social and economic system”. Robert Dahl lists elected representatives, just elections, broad suffrage, freedom of expression and association among main components of democracy (Dahl, 2).

Democracy promotion (DP) is a relatively new term compared to democracy. However, Pangle and Huber point out that it is as old as democracy in history. They state that ancient Athens was possibly the most aggressive promoter of democracy in history (Pangle, 16 and Huber, 2015, 1). Nevertheless, we became familiar with democracy promotion, as with today’s many other international relations terms, after the Cold War. After this period, exporting democracy became an important phenomenon internationally, especially for fulfilling economic goals. Although the term is comparatively more popular than democracy, it is as important as democracy today. It is widely used in international politics as well, but still, there is not sufficient academic agreement on the definition of the term. According to Huber, it covers all tools of state craft that are aimed at helping the transition to, or strengthening the already existing democracy in third countries (Huber, 2015, 23). It

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<sup>2</sup> See more: [www.dictionary.cambridge.org/tr/s%C3%B6zl%C3%BCk/ingilizce/democracy](http://www.dictionary.cambridge.org/tr/s%C3%B6zl%C3%BCk/ingilizce/democracy) Access Date: 15.12.2018



can be deduced that Huber is more concerned with what the promoters want to achieve with the policies rather than the effectiveness of said policies. Also, this definition hints that democracy promotion is not objective but subjective. (Huber, 2015, 23) The goals of the promoter determine the way of democratization and the target; but the outcomes often stay behind these goals.

Burnell (2011) divides democracy promotion into two sections: active and passive segments of the democracy promotion (Burnell, 2011, 90). He defines active promotion as “intentional and deliberate”, and passive promotion covering “a wide range of international factors that may positively influence democratic trends”, such as culture and public diplomacy. Active influences are those that have the purpose of influencing the type of regime and/or direction of regime change. Active external democracy promoter allies with one of the parties in a domestic political clash and tries to shape the dominant values, political structures and institutions of the recipient country (Burnell, 2011, 90)

Therefore, if a foreign policy is intended to democratize another country and if it is expressed explicitly that this corresponds to an active democracy promotion, then all other implicit, especially social and economic actions, are examined as passive democracy promotion facilities. This is highly related to the notion of “soft power” (Nye, 1990),<sup>3</sup> which refers to achieving goals through political, economic, social or cultural attractions rather than coercive methods. But democracy promotion is not synonymous with it, because democracy promotion may include coercive actions. However, this kind of actions are not an item of soft power.

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<sup>3</sup> Soft power is a term used for capability of a country, which enables to attract other countries with public diplomacy, foreign aid and culture.

Burnell draws a framework for democracy promotion starting with democracy assistance, which is usually referred to as special political assistance programs that share know-how on how to build and strengthen democracy (Burnell, 2017, 38). He widened the definition of democracy promotion to include the use of diplomatic pressure and the practice of making international agreements politically conditional. He also adds that supporting social development and national economies are indispensable for developing countries concerning democratization or receiving democracy promotion.

According to Freyburg et al., democracy promotion comprises “non-violent activities by a state or international organization that have the potential to bring about, strengthen, and support democracy in a third country” (Freyburg, 10). This definition includes all voluntary actions foreign powers endorse in order to democratize authoritarian governments in third countries. The voluntary element makes it stand out from others, as coercive actions and conditionality are excluded in this perspective.

The EU defines democracy promotion as “all measures designed to facilitate democratic development” in a European Council Report, named “The EU Approach to Democracy Promotion in External Relations- Food for Thought”.<sup>4</sup> In this report, democracy promotion is said, “to encompass the full range of external relations and development cooperation activities which contribute to the development and consolidation of democracy in third countries”. The American point of view is that, democracy promotion covers all state craft promoting democracy in third countries (Lawson and Epstein, 2019, 1). In this study, all foreign policy activities that support regime transition and improve the quality of democratic standards in the target

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<sup>4</sup> The EU Approach to Democracy Promotion in External Relations. Food For Thought. Council of EU PSC Discussion Paper (June 2006). p. 3 Available unofficially at: [www.democracyagenda.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=8](http://www.democracyagenda.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=8) Access Date: 03.07.2019

country will be considered democracy promotion. The coercive actions are not suitable with the nature of democracy and the meaning of “promotion”, so the coercive methods of democratization will not be regarded as democracy promotion in this study.

## **1.2. Normative and Utilitarian Approaches**

Democracy promotion’s functions vary in different theories. Realist theories argue that external democracy promotion is an instrument, which shapes the foreign policy with other instruments; while normative theories advocate that it defines what is appropriate behavior (Wolff and Wurm, 2011, 80). In other words, in liberal and realist thought, i.e. utilitarian approach, external democracy promotion is just one tool in international affairs; while in normative approach, external democracy promotion has a higher priority in comparison to the other means.

The ultimate aim in the utilitarian approach is to globalize democratic regimes in order to avert wars as well as to secure a peaceful international order (Wolff and Wurm, 2011, 79). This approach has its roots in Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” idea the implication of which is this: A rational country would not use force aggressively. Therefore, this theory attaches a huge importance to the democratization of a non-democratic international actor to sustain the international order and secure national interests. Therefore, democracy, security and economy is highly interconnected with each other in terms of the utilitarian approach and democracy promotion is often used for securing national interests in international relations.

According to the normative approach, democratic members can solve their problems in peaceful and consensus-oriented methods without conflicting.

According to its assumptions, the states who own normative values, such as political stability, and institutional constraints act in line with these values and have less tendencies to involve in conflict and conflict-escalation than the other states (Maoz and Russett, 633). In this perspective, democratic states need to export their methods of conflict resolution to non-democratic states. In order for democracy promotion to succeed, more democratic partners would be welcomed to the international community and these ensure more democratic “nature” in solving the problems and maximization of welfare (Wolff and Wurm, 2011, 81). Therefore, democracy promotion is linked with democratic cultures of the sender state as the morally right thing to do (Jones, Newburn and Smith, 41). Supporting opposition forces and movements have been legitimized for the sake of these moral values in the normative understanding of democracy promotion against oppressive governments (Wolff and Wurm, 2011, 81). But while doing so, the right of self-determination should be observed carefully. If the receiver shares the aim of “deepening” or “consolidating” its democratic credentials, promoting democracy is appropriate with respect to the normative approach (Wolff and Wurm, 2011, 81).

Utilitarian democratic peace theories are thought to be a part of rationalist perspectives of international relations theories. External promotion is used as a tool for supporting either security/power or economic interests. However, normative approaches of the democratic peace are more compatible with either reflectivist views, which place a higher value on the culture of target countries, or the international normative order (Wolff and Wurm, 2011, 82).

It can be clearly understood from the definition of a prominent American foreign policy tool named USAID that the American style of democracy promotion is much related with the utilitarian approach. USAID is defined as “the world's premier international development agency and a catalytic actor driving development results.” According to USAID, “its work advances the U.S.’ national security and

economic prosperity, demonstrates American generosity, and promotes a path to recipient self-reliance and resilience.”<sup>5</sup>There is an emphasis on national security here, which is very compatible with the utilitarian democracy promotion. Apart from this definition, U.S.’ military partnerships and the usage of hard power in some cases (i.e. Iraq) to democratize a nation consolidates its utilitarian attitude.

The constitution of the EU, i.e. Lisbon Treaty, places the fundamental rights and cultural norms above other goals such as defense policy. The EU has never used hard power in democracy promotion. Therefore, we can assume that the EU has a normative stance. But when we examine the implementation of its policies in Egypt, we clearly see that the EU has pursued more realistic objectives in various areas such as security, energy and trade along with democracy promotion. Although preserving opposition forces is the main element of the normative understanding, Europeans have chosen to engage with autocratic governments for ensuring their own strategic interests, just like Americans.

### **1.3. Essential Elements of Democracy Promotion**

Democracy promotion may have three different elements. These are; working with government, working with civil society, as well as connecting the two institutionally. These three elements may vary according to the type of democracy promotion practices and the democracy promotion channels used by the promoter. For example, while the U.S. often prefers to engage with civil society and individuals with its USAID programs<sup>6</sup>, the EU tries to bring about the institution building efforts

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<sup>5</sup> See more: [www.stories.usaid.gov/about/](http://www.stories.usaid.gov/about/) Access Date:04.07.2019

<sup>6</sup> See more: [www.usaid.gov/work-usaid/how-to-work-with-usaid](http://www.usaid.gov/work-usaid/how-to-work-with-usaid) Acces Date: 04.07.2019

between governments and the society in the MEDA and ENP<sup>7</sup> Framework. Note that Americans have also supported governmental institutions with its other funding mechanisms, such as MEPI or direct state aids to national governments. All in all, the big majority of foreign aids of the two powers has been given to national governments in the Egyptian case, as the readers will see in the following pages.

Democracy promotion may cover many tools, such as foreign aid and military intervention. In addition to positive instruments, there are negative democracy promotion instruments to be imposed on the political elites of the third country. Restrictions of entry or freezing of financial assets are examples of this (Kotzian, Knodt and Urdze, 999).

There is a little difference between democracy promotion and democratization. The former can be considered a path towards the latter. Democratization is about transforming an authoritarian state and establishing a proper democracy. Democracy promotion is among the instruments in this pursuit. For instance, funding political parties, which are essential for democracy, is a democracy promotion tool used for the democratization of the recipient country. Therefore, democracy promotion is mainly characterized by the sender state's activities. To put it another way, the subject of democracy promotion is the promoter, whereas the subject in democratization is the recipient. It could be conceived that democracy promotion could only contribute to democratization, and it does not substitute it. The focus of this thesis will be non-coercive democracy promotion instruments, instead of their ultimate aim of democratization.

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<sup>7</sup> See more: [www.publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/858f1eb3-be99-44d8-98c4-9bd793e91374.0004.02/DOC\\_2](http://www.publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/858f1eb3-be99-44d8-98c4-9bd793e91374.0004.02/DOC_2) , and [www.ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/southern-neighbourhood\\_en](http://www.ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/southern-neighbourhood_en) Access Date: 04.07.2019

This thesis concerns itself with the democracy promotion activities of the most important foreign powersthat exert their influence in Egypt: the U.S. and the EU. Our goal is finding the similarities and differences between these two actors' democracy promotion activities in Egypt. This is an interesting question as the EU is often portrayed as the normatively oriented actor, whereas the U.S. is defined as the utilitarian one. The goal is to question whether this is the case in Egypt. It should be stated that a wider question on how Egypt can democratize is not the research question guiding this thesis.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **ANALYTICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RELATIONS WITH EGYPT**

#### **2.1. Egypt-EU Partnership**

The Egyptian-European relations started in the 1970s with a Cooperation Agreement whose aim was to “contribute to Egypt’s economic and social development.”<sup>8</sup> The agreement entailed financial and technical aid and covered cooperation in areas such as economy and trade. In its framework, the first financial protocol (1978-1981) was signed, which meant an aid of 170 million Euros to Egypt. There was no stable contractual framework or predetermined term for the long term planning decisions in the Cooperation Agreement, which relied on joint management and co-dependence. The agreement enabled Egypt to freely export raw materials and industrial goods to the Europe. Agricultural exports also benefited from tariff exemptions. Most-Favoured Nation (MNF) status was also given to Egypt in the field of trade.

Financial cooperation is an important part of the Egyptian-European relationship. Since the 1977 Agreement, four financial protocols have been signed and under these protocols, Egypt was granted assistance from both commission’s budget and European Investment Bank’s (EIB) loans. Consequently, Egypt was named as the first beneficiary of the EU funds among non-member states in the Mediterranean region. During the Gulf crisis, (1990-1991) Egypt also received food aid as a form of special assistance.

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<sup>8</sup>See more : [www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release MEMO-95-2\\_en.htm](http://www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-95-2_en.htm) Access Date: 03.06.2019



The main cooperation areas of the EU and Egypt are agriculture (48%) and environmental and social protection (33%) according to the EU.<sup>9</sup> Democracy assistance was not stated within these cooperation areas.

Overall strategy of the EU's assistance towards Egypt was based on "more and more" principle as more modernization/restructuring process could enable receiving more funds from the EU (Blockmans, 54). With the understanding of positive conditionality, the total amount of three financial protocols is committed to accelerate Egyptian modernization and more than 75% of the Fourth Protocol was also distributed in Egypt on the basis of this strategy.<sup>10</sup> The EU gives a priority in funding to reforming the Egyptian economy, especially through the use of private sector development programs. Support to implementation of strategies to foster Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MISMESIS) in Egypt, Green Energy Fund (Funded by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), Invest in MED, Gender Equality in the Political Process<sup>11</sup> and Helwan Waste Water Project are among the EU funded projects for the development of Egypt. European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and European Investment Bank (EIB) are provide support to the Egyptian infrastructure and foster its private sector projects, such as sanitation services,<sup>12</sup> public transport,<sup>13</sup> women in business, fostering MISMESIS, environmental and agricultural field and power/energy.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> See more : [www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-95-2\\_en.htm](http://www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-95-2_en.htm) Access Date: 11.06.2019

<sup>11</sup> See more: [www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/area/projects\\_nl?page=1](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/area/projects_nl?page=1) Access Date: 13.06.2019

<sup>12</sup> See more: [www.eib.org/en/press/all/2018-255-eib-reinforces-its-support-to-egypt-eur-214-million-to-improve-access-to-sanitation-services-in-the-nile-delta](http://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2018-255-eib-reinforces-its-support-to-egypt-eur-214-million-to-improve-access-to-sanitation-services-in-the-nile-delta) Access Date: 13.06.2019

### 2.1.1. Economic Reform of Egypt and the EU

The Egyptian has been reforming towards liberalization since the 1980s (Hoekman and Djankov, 281). This is Egypt's main long-term goal and it has two dimensions: high and stable growth and fighting poverty by providing income equality.<sup>15</sup> Egypt is implementing five-year development programs as some other emerging countries, such as India and Indonesia. Egypt aims to achieve a desirable growth supporting private sector as a catalyser and liberalising its economy with some measures, such as changing the business environment for facilitating domestic and foreign investments by tax cuts, providing precise and understandable investment policies and regulations, and enhancing the ties between business and government.<sup>16</sup>

Egypt trades with the EU the most.<sup>17</sup> The Association Agreement, signed by Egypt and the EU, creates a zone of free trade between the two entities. Enforced since 2004, the agreement improved trade conditions so much that the trade volume has

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<sup>13</sup> See more: [www.eib.org/en/press/all/2018-208-eib-signs-eur-375-million-financing-agreement-with-nbe-to-support-smes-in-egypt.htm](http://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2018-208-eib-signs-eur-375-million-financing-agreement-with-nbe-to-support-smes-in-egypt.htm) Access Date: 13.06.2019

<sup>14</sup> See more: [www.ebrd.com/work-with-us/project-finance/project-summary-documents.html?1=1&filterCountry=Egypt](http://www.ebrd.com/work-with-us/project-finance/project-summary-documents.html?1=1&filterCountry=Egypt) Access Date: 13.06.2019

<sup>15</sup> Background Notes on the State of Economic and Governance Reforms in Egypt, OECD, See more: [www.oecd.org/countries/egypt/40252444.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/countries/egypt/40252444.pdf) Access Date: 13.06.2019

<sup>16</sup> Background Notes on the State of Economic and Governance Reforms in Egypt, OECD, See more: [www.oecd.org/countries/egypt/40252444.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/countries/egypt/40252444.pdf) Access Date: 13.06.2019

<sup>17</sup> See more: [www.ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/egypt/](http://www.ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/egypt/) Access Date: 13.06.2019

increased from 11.8 billion Euros to 27.9 billion Euros between 2004 and 2017.<sup>18</sup> Therefore, the EU is one of the benefiteres and the supporters of the transformation of Egyptian economy through its funds and supports for enhancing liberal policies of Egyptian administrations.

### **2.1.2. Energy Issues**

Energy remains an important part of the European foreign affairs. The EU is pursuing a multi-dimensional approach to secure its energy needs by diversifying its resources and eliminating its dependency through its policies that emphasize renewable energy and cooperation with the third parties. In 2006, the European Commission outlined its need of having uninterrupted energy supply with "A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy". A mechanism for rapid solutions in case of energy crisis was established with this paper.<sup>19</sup> The EU has also initiated Energy Action Plans, which designs its energy policies, for securing more routes. In 2007, the first "Energy Action Plan" was created in 2007, the second one in 2008 (Umbach, 1230).

- i) The needs of infrastructure for diversifying energy supplies;
- ii) Energy relations with the third countries;
- iii) Oil and gas stocks and crisis response mechanisms;
- iv) Energy efficiency;
- v) Making the best use of the EU's internal energy resources

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Energy: A Shaping Factor for Regional Stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, Directorate General for External Policies, Policy Department, 2017. See more: [www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/578044/EXPO\\_STU\(2017\)578044\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/578044/EXPO_STU(2017)578044_EN.pdf)  
Access Date: 14.06.2019 p. 8

were addressed in these action plans.<sup>20</sup>

Because of its large natural gas reserves, Egypt is a significant stakeholder to the EU. According to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimations, there are considerable natural gas resources in the Nile Delta and Levant Basin that have not yet been discovered.<sup>21</sup>

Egypt is called as the cornerstone<sup>22</sup> of the Eastern Mediterranean gas markets because it has been one of the main gas exporters for more than four decades in the region. The EU defines Egypt as very important in its energy market, as Egypt has developed a large Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) infrastructure as well as two international pipelines: the Egypt-Israel pipeline and the Arab Gas Pipeline.<sup>23</sup>

The EU also initiated steps to turn Egypt into an energy hub and supported a range of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). For instance, The European Investment Bank (EIB) financed a wind farm in the Gulf of Suez, midcap funds and loans and in

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<sup>20</sup> European Commission (2008), Second Strategic Energy Review – An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan, COM(2008)0781.

<sup>21</sup>Energy: A Shaping Factor for Regional Stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, Directorate General for External Policies, Policy Department, 2017. See more:  
[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/578044/EXPO\\_STU\(2017\)578044\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/578044/EXPO_STU(2017)578044_EN.pdf) Access Date: 14.06.2019 p. 16

<sup>22</sup>Energy: A Shaping Factor for Regional Stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, Directorate General for External Policies, Policy Department, 2017. See more:  
[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/578044/EXPO\\_STU\(2017\)578044\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/578044/EXPO_STU(2017)578044_EN.pdf) Access Date: 14.06.2019 Pg. 13

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

bank loans for SMEs in Egypt, worth of EUR 471.9 million in 2017. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is paying to draft a solar grid code and a guide for engineers to connect solar plants to the grid. EBRD is loaning as much as EUR 37.9 million with other parties for a new plant in the Benban solar complex. There is a further 200 MW planned at Kom Ombo near Aswan and EBRD is paying EUR 1.5 million for the consultants to run it (Mason, 2).<sup>24</sup>

### **2.1.3. Migration Policy of the EU and Cooperation with Egypt**

Europe is tackling with the migration problem since the Second World War. Its high unemployment rates have made it necessary to tackle the migration problem due to a fear of both negative economic and social consequences (Zimmerman, 48). Strengthening cooperation immigration on the agenda of the EU-Egypt ENP Action Plan.<sup>25</sup> Monitoring, analysing migration trends from Egypt to Europe, promoting the discussions between the EU states and Egypt on socio-political and cultural dimensions of the migration issues as well as its security dimensions (ENP Action Plan, 29) have been at the heart of this Action Plan.

In 1995, Klaus F. Zimmermann estimated that a south-north migration needs more attention due to high threat capacity in the next few decades (Zimmermann, 1995, 48); this is what Europe faces today. It has been predicted that Egypt (and Turkey) would be one of the biggest immigrant sending countries to Europe due to its intense population rates (Zimmermann, 1995, 48) and its strategic location of transiting migrant route. Migration problem is central to the Egyptian-European

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<sup>24</sup> See more: <https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Spot-on8-Recovering-EU-Egypt-Relations.pdf> Access Date: 14.06.2019

<sup>25</sup> EU-Egypt ENP Action Plan, p.5

relations and it is a particularly prioritized issue of the partnership. Egypt-EU relations on migration are well defined by the ENP Action Plan. It emphasizes legal and practical issues regarding the management of migration from Egypt to Europe based on cooperation (Seeberg, 167).

## **2.2. Egypt's Significance for the U.S.**

From an American perspective, Egypt is a valuable partner due its strategic location and energy reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its importance has arisen out of Egypt's moderate position between the Arabs and Israel and its strategic position during the Cold War. Also Egypt was regarded as one of the Middle Eastern partners for countering terrorism in the early 2000s. The American-Egyptian relations have been committed to advancing security in the Middle East.<sup>26</sup>

The American-Egyptian relations was first established in 1922, just after the independence of Egypt from the British Empire. Then a strategic partnership between the two states was created<sup>27</sup> in 1979 Camp David Accords<sup>28</sup>. Since then expanding commercial ties, increasing foreign direct investments, ensuring safe

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<sup>26</sup> See more: [www.egyptembassy.net/egypt-us-relations/](http://www.egyptembassy.net/egypt-us-relations/) Access Date: 29.06.2019

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Camp David Accords were the agreements between the Israeli and Egypt which finished the 30 years of conflict between Israel and the Arabs. Since the beginning of the establishment of Israel in 1947, five wars occurred between the Arabs and Israeli in 1947, 1948, 1949, 1956, 1967 and 1973, which prevent stability in the region. These Accords were signed during Anwar Sadat's period in Egypt, who runned country between 1970 and 1981, the year he was assassinated by the Islamist militants. He started the open-door policy, in other words *infitah*, "in Egyptian economy that refers to neo-liberal economy policies for attracting trade and investment. See more: <https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/infitah> Access Date: 19.08.2019

transit routes in the Suez Canal and modernizing the Egyptian army to fight against terrorism have become the priority areas in this strategic partnership, which has sustained for 40 years.<sup>29</sup>

It can be observed that a decent U.S.-Egypt partnership started with the Camp David Accords. Until this agreement, Egypt's belligerent behaviour towards Israel and having assistance from the Soviet Union made Americans reluctant to cooperate with it during the 1950s and 1960s (Mark, 6). After the Camp David Accords, the U.S. guaranteed Israeli security and in line with this goal, preservation of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was promised (Mark, 6). Insulating the Egyptian administration from the Soviet influence and containing of the Soviets were other important concerns of the U.S. in this cooperation. Indeed, a pro-Western Egypt drastically reduced the Soviet agency in the Middle East from then on (Bessma, 88). However, as stated in a US Congress Report, in 40 years the U.S.-Egyptian relations have transformed into an energy, security and trade cooperation with a limited connection to Israel (Mark, 6) and containment of communism despite the security concerns.

### **2.2.1. American Foreign Aid to Egypt**

In July 1954, American President Truman signed the first financial aid package of 40 million dollars which gave equal attention to military and economic fields. This aid package was given at the time when the British was withdrawing from the Suez Canal (Zimmermann, 2017, 185). Nasser<sup>30</sup> demanded a military aid worth one

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<sup>29</sup>See more: [www.egyptembassy.net/egypt-us-relations/](http://www.egyptembassy.net/egypt-us-relations/) Access Date: 29.06.2019

<sup>30</sup> Gamal Abdel Nasser was one of the most important Presidents of Egypt during the Cold-War who governed country between 1956 and 1970. He got closer to the Soviets and Egypt experienced a

hundred million dollars., but the American Congress rejected this demand in 1955. The U.S.imposed conditions on the aid package it offered, such as creating a Military Advisory Group to monitor the use of this aid and having relations with Israel (Zimmermann, 2017, 186). Then Nasser turned to the Soviets to get similar support. Nasser announced that he would use Egypt's cotton revenues to get Czech arms valued at two hundred million dollars (Zimmermann, 2017, 186). When the UK and the U.S. cancelled the Aswan High Dam Project , Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal and this was followed by the 1956 Arab-Israeli war.

Egypt was funded with short-term aid packages with economic aims, such as supporting agriculture and rural development<sup>31</sup> between 1959-1967. After the six days war of 1967, USAID terminated its mission in Egypt and until 1975, Egypt did not receive any kind of USAID aid. Egyptian- Israeli peace accords of 1977 became a turning point and since then Egypt became one of the major receivers of American aid.

The U.S. has been providing Egypt with foreign assistance, sharing military equipment and know-how with Egyptian administration as well as cooperating with Egypt for the latter's economic development. U.S. aid to Egypt has dual positive effects for both sides. For the Americans, giving foreign aid to Egypt has had various characteristics strategically, diplomatically and politically. The country had led every Arab war against Israel. Therefore, a pacified, neutral and pro-Western Egypt would

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one-party Arab socialist state during his period. Industrialization of Egypt was accelerated; land reforms and nationalizing of Suez Canal were held in this period. He was the leader of non-alignment movement, which was very important during the Cold-War period. He opposed to the Eisenhower Doctrine that foresaw more proactive policies in the Middle East for diluting the effect of communism sourced by the Soviets. See more: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Gamal-Abdel-Nasser/Nassers-accomplishments> Access Date: 20.08.2019.

<sup>31</sup>See more: [www.explorer.usaid.gov/aid-trends.html](http://www.explorer.usaid.gov/aid-trends.html) Access Date: 30.06.2019



prevent further Arab-Israeli conflicts (Momani, 88). The American assistance was of great importance for the Egyptian administrations as well. It has inspired a strategic partnership with Egypt for the regional stability.<sup>32</sup> Settlement of the conflict against Israel, the Gulf's security, the Middle East's stability, and Egypt's economic development were the main components of this partnership (Aly and Moneim).<sup>33</sup> The U.S. gave over 70 billion dollars to Egypt since the signing of the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel; 30 billion as economic assistance and 40 billion as military assistance (Aly and Moneim). Moreover, the U.S. forgave almost half of Egypt's debt, about 20.2 billion dollars, in return for Mubarak's<sup>34</sup> pivotal role in the Gulf War.<sup>35</sup> The U.S. did not only engage in debt forgiveness, but also it facilitated the disbursement of the IMF loans to Egypt in order to ease the economic crisis of Egypt (Greenhouse, 2017) in the 1990's, that Mubarak faced. Egyptian administration initiated a reform program in almost every part of Egyptian politics, including in monetary policy, infrastructure investment policy, banking sector and bureaucracy to tackle the economic problems of Egypt in the early 2000's. This initiative has created a ruling-elite in Egypt, who benefits from these reforms. The U.S. was one of the supporters of Egyptian reform program; it supported the establishment of market regulatory institutions between 2004

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<sup>32</sup> U.S. Relations with Egypt, Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of State. See more: <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-egypt/> Access Date: 14.06.2019

<sup>33</sup> See more: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/egypt-u.s.-relations-and-egyptian-foreign-policy> Access Date: 04.07.2019

<sup>34</sup> Hosni Mubarak was a former president of Egypt who ruled the country for 30 years between 1981-2011 in the state-of-emergency. He was one of the key allies of the Western powers in the region. Liberalization of Egyptian economy and Egypt's major reconciliatory role between Israel and the Arabs are the main characteristics of his period.

<sup>35</sup> Greenhouse, Steven. Half of Egypt's \$20.2 Billion Debt Being Forgiven by U.S. and Allies. See More: [www.nytimes.com/1991/05/27/business/half-of-egypt-s-20.2-billion-debt-being-forgiven-by-us-and-allies.html?mtref=www.google.com&gwh=F3A9626D14DDB4248DFF710640082CD6&gwt=pay](http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/27/business/half-of-egypt-s-20.2-billion-debt-being-forgiven-by-us-and-allies.html?mtref=www.google.com&gwh=F3A9626D14DDB4248DFF710640082CD6&gwt=pay) Access Date: 01.07.2019

and 2010 (Zimmermann, 2017, 184). Supporting this reform agenda with its assistance was not only a tool of seeking geopolitical returns for the U.S. This kind of aids were also conceived as a tool to support the autocratic regimes. Because of these aids, the autocratic regimes in question could keep oppressing their people. Moreover, Egyptian administrations have legitimized their power both in domestic and regional policies with American support (Selim, 144). Egypt collaborated with the U.S. to meet economic and political challenges, such as counter terrorism and boosting economic resilience of Egypt.<sup>36</sup> But rewards of military partnership overwhelms that of the economic cooperation from an American perspective. Finally, these aims neither democratized Egypt nor improved Egyptian economy. Instead, the Egyptian administrations have assumed these aids as “given” and “forthcoming” as long as the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt is sustained and U.S. strategic interests continue (Clarke, 204).

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<sup>36</sup> See more: [www.egyptembassy.net/media/Egypt\\_America\\_032817.pdf](http://www.egyptembassy.net/media/Egypt_America_032817.pdf) Access Date: 15.06.2019

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **THE EUROPEAN WAY OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN EGYPT**

#### **3.1. Historical Evaluation of the EU Democracy Promotion Activities**

After the Cold War, the EU began to use liberal democratic political values in international affairs. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the West was left alone to guide developing and underdeveloped countries. It was also allowed to export its norms to former Warsaw Pact and other third countries.

First systematic efforts for democracy promotion have been observed just after the first enlargement of the EU. The development policies towards the candidate countries can be evaluated as the initiative of the exporting democracy and these are mainly granting economic concessions to the former colonies of EU members (Börzel and Risse, 2009, 37). The main reason of promoting democracy is the belief that the EU would be safest if the world was full of well-governed democratic countries.<sup>37</sup>

Democracy promotion centered on "The Lomé Agreements", the first of which was signed in 1975 between the European Union and the third world countries as African, Caribbean and Pacific Group (ACP countries) until the end of the 1980s as cited in Börzel and Risse (2009). In the third agreements of Lomé, which was applied between 1985 and 1990, political considerations like those that exporting democracy became explicit for the first time. With this agreement, the Europe announced that human dignity, covering "the value of the human person" and "the

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<sup>37</sup>See more: "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, European External Action Service, Brussels, 12 December 2003." p.8.

equality between genders", as well as economic, social and cultural rights would be observed. (Preamble, Art. 4 and Annex I). However, there were no negative conditionalities in these agreements against violations (Börzel and Risse, 2009, 39).

The democracy promotion policies of the EU have evolved over time. It is possible to understand the framework of the EU's relations with others more deeply by analyzing the history of this evolution. 1975 Helsinki Summit is a very important point of the initial European democracy promotion targeting close neighborhood. The values of the West, such as free movement of the people, and humanitarian aids, were covered in Human basket. Thanks to this basket the EU had a chance to intervene in its close neighborhood's domestic affairs under the democracy promotion discourse, in other words the EU has developed different policy agendas for its democracy promotion policies.

The main roots of democracy promotion of the European Union in the third parties were established in Helsinki Accords, which was signed between the West and the Soviet Union in 1975. The Final Act of Helsinki Accords consisted of three baskets of "security", "economic" and "human rights":

- (i) The first basket is mainly related with the security dimension that covers the security, "human rights, and fundamental freedoms", which were announced as crucial for the participating states.
- (ii) As the second basket, the economic dimension highlights the importance of "economic", "scientific", "technological" and "environmental cooperation", as well as "migrant labor", "vocational training" and "the promotion of tourism".
- (iii) Human dimension is the last, but the most comprehensive and important one, which is dedicated "to cooperation in humanitarian" and other fields as "freer movement of people"; "human contacts", including "family reunification and visits"; (in the era of Cold War) "freedom of

information", including "working conditions for journalists"; and "cultural and educational exchanges".<sup>38</sup> This last basket would be the basis of the forthcoming democracy promotion activities of the EU. Helsinki Accords can be seen as a juncture in the conflict between the individuals and the authority of the state. The West has gained the chance to criticize the Soviet Union in terms of this basket.

This act refers to humanitarian dimension in the Soviet countries. The third basket was worded<sup>39</sup> and resounded more than the other Baskets and is a kind of early democracy promotion tool for the West.

After the breakdown of the Soviet Union in the Eastern part of Europe, the enlargement of the EU has been associated with having promoted significantly "economic recovery", "peace", "stability" and "democratic transition" in its close neighborhood (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008, 188). Therefore the EU treaties as Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice, refer to "human rights" and "democratic principles" as an essential element of liberal Western values since 1992 (Huber, 2015, 103).

In line with Council's 1991 Luxembourg Summit, the EU was to provide food deliveries, technical assistance, to foster democratization of the Soviet Union and its integration to the world economy. In addition to the USSR; Central and Eastern Europe was an important area of focus of the EU's first democracy promotion efforts according to the declaration of this Summit. To draw an outline of the EU's

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<sup>38</sup> See more: [www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act](http://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act).

<sup>39</sup> See more: [www.humanrights.ch/en/standards/europe/osce/helsinki/](http://www.humanrights.ch/en/standards/europe/osce/helsinki/).

democracy promotion activities in the third parties, "a declaration on human rights" was announced with the Luxembourg Summit Presidency Conclusions stating that the Community and its member States committed to follow their foreign policy of "promoting and safeguarding human rights" and "fundamental freedoms" in all around the world against the existence of deliberate infringement of "human rights" in several countries.<sup>40</sup>

Regarding democracy promotion in the Middle East, "a declaration on the Peace Process in the Middle East" was also annexed to the conclusion of this summit. It is highlighted in this declaration that the European Council reiterates:

..determination of the Community and its Member States to contribute to the economic and social development of all peoples in the region once the prospect of peace is clear. For this purpose, the Community and its member States will work to promote intra-regional solidarity and relations of friendship and cooperation with all countries in the region (Luxembourg Summit Decisions)

Moreover, it is deliberately stated that the Community and its Member States emphasize their own interest in a "political dialogue" with "regional groupings".<sup>41</sup>

The framework of the relations with the Baltic States, Middle East, Western Sahara, Algeria, Southern Africa and the other developing countries were outlined in Luxembourg Summit decisions "on the basis of democracy", "human rights" and

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<sup>40</sup> See more: Annex V, 1991 Luxembourg Summit Decisions, p. 25.

<sup>41</sup> Annex II, 1991 Luxembourg Summit, pg. 22.

"the rule of law". And this Summit was the basis of upcoming EU policies of the Europe-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighborhood Partnership.

The initial exploratory projects on democracy promotion were funded by the EU in the framework of the early democracy promotion programs as a goal of development cooperation (Van Hüllen, 2009, 6). One of these programs, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), which was established by the "Barcelona Declaration" in 1995, was the first multilateral settlement between the EU and the third states. Later it transformed into European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The other program is the European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights (EIDHR). Although it was adopted in 1994 for the first time, European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights (EIDHR) was broadened by the EU in 2014 for binding up the wounds of the Middle Eastern countries after the Arab uprisings and its importance has increased in the eyes of the EU member states.

### **3.2. Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Policy (EMP) and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)**

The first direct EU democracy promotion policy towards the *Mediterranean* neighbors used to be "based on a regional (multilateral) framework", which is called as Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) Policy. After the end of the Cold War, the EU redefined and upgraded its relations with the Mediterranean countries due to "the rise of new security challenges" in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East region (Börzel and Risse, 2009, 39). Börzel and Risse state that, the preferential trade agreements applied between these countries and the EU did not reduce "the development gap" between the EU and its Mediterranean partners. (Börzel and Risse, 2009, 39). Because of this reason, the 'Barcelona Process', which was established by the Barcelona Declaration of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in 1995, aimed to "re-launch the EU–Mediterranean cooperation" and with a "multilateral framework".

In this declaration, the aim of the relation between the Mediterranean countries and the EU was stated to be “a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures.”<sup>42</sup> To achieve these goals, the EU institutionalized its Mediterranean policy under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and then it was transformed into European Neighborhood Policy.

The EU has applied a number of policy of instruments for promoting democracy in its Southern neighbors with "1995 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership" and "the 2003/2004 European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)". "Political dialogue", "democracy assistance", and "political conditionality" was comprised by the EMP. EMP relied on "persuasion", "capacity building", and "rewards" instead of coercive actions as sanctions. As stated by Hüllen, the EU has always seek a predominantly 'positive' approach in line with "its global policy for promoting democracy" and "human rights" (Van Hüllen, 2009, 6).

The EU identified three baskets on which the new Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) would focus: "political stability and security", "economic and financial cooperation", and "cooperation on social, cultural and humanitarian issues" around the Mediterranean region while the ENP is mainly focusing on stabilization, security and prosperity giving particular importance to the EU's Eastern neighbors (Börzel and Risse, 2009, 39).

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<sup>42</sup> See more: Barcelona Declaration 1995.



### 3.2.1. EMP

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was the first general framework for the relations between the European Union, its 15 Member States namely "Germany, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom" and 12 countries of the Mediterranean; "Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey" situated in the South and East of the Mediterranean area (Phillippart, 2003, 1). Barcelona Declaration was the founder of the EMP, which was announced in the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in 1995. Signing states committed themselves to develop

The rule of law and democracy in their political systems" and to "respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of association for peaceful purposes, and freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.

This declaration was not envisaged a legally binding situation. However, the Association Agreements, which would be signed by all individual partners in the framework of the EMP, were to be "legally binding" (Huber, 2015, 108). The EU would create a special relationship with these states thanks to these Association Agreements.

As cited in Attina (2003), Euro-Mediterranean Partnership developed along two different dimensions as economic and political. , The economic and political one: The economic line originated from "the state of the world economy" after the transformation of the capitalism in the 1970s, reflected by neo-liberal policies, and

political line originated from "the state of international (in-) security in the Mediterranean and the Middle East area" in the second half of the 1990s. Some authors<sup>43</sup> highlight "the economic cause" of the EMP while the others<sup>44</sup> focus on the political dimension. Attina (2003) argues that the two causes are connected in a subsequent relationship and reconstruct each other. The need for extending the importance of the actions of the political line was provoked by the failure of the strategy in the economic dimension.

The EU has pursued its democracy assistance towards the Mediterranean region through diverse instruments, and EMP is one of the most important of them. The nuance of the EMP was on "peace", "security", and "stability" in the region. As cited in Huber, it was a special European "security practice" (Adler and Crawford, 3) and its foundations were established in the Helsinki Process.

The EU ensured some economic as well as technical assistance for the implementation of EMP through "Mediterranean Development Assistance (MEDA) Program" and allocated funds of the European Investment Bank as announced by the European Commission in a press release.<sup>45</sup> "Human rights", and "democracy" was stated as essential elements in the bilateral agreements between the EU and its Southern Mediterranean countries and these agreements allowed these partners to take "appropriate measures" in case of any infringement allowing for the

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<sup>43</sup> These authors and sources are: Joffe, E. George H. "Relations between the Middle East and the West." *Middle East Journal* 48.2 (1994): 250-267. Pg. 251.- Nienhaus, Volker. "Promoting Development and Stability Through a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Zone" *European Foreign Affairs Review* 4. (1999) 501-518. Pg. 501

<sup>44</sup>For detailed information: Spencer, Claire. "EU and Common Strategies: The Revealing Case of the Mediterranean, The." *Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev.* 6 (2001): 31-51.,Pg. 32.

<sup>45</sup>See more: [www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release MEMO-04-294 en.htm](http://www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-04-294_en.htm)

"alteration of the contents of cooperation programs" or "the channels used up to the '*suspension of cooperation*'" (Börzel and Risse, 2009, 41).<sup>46</sup> However, the cooperation had not been suspended and negative conditionality was not used during the implementation of the MEDA. This program covers some "technical and financial measures" to support the reform of "economic and social structure".<sup>47</sup> And these measures outweighed instead of enhancing democratic reforms in the Mediterranean countries. Therefore, the EU needed to create a special democracy assistance program under MEDA as MEDA Democracy (Youngs, 2001, 8).

The first phase of MEDA was initiated in 1996 and it was called MEDA I, then it amended in 2000 and this second phase was named as MEDA II)-. MEDA enabled the European Union's Mediterranean partners financial and technical assistance .<sup>48</sup> All the various bilateral financial protocols that exist with the countries in the Mediterranean basin were gathered under the roof of MEDA program. Interventions under the MEDA Program covered four main sectors: "support for structural adjustment", "economic transition and private sector development", "strengthening socio-economic balance" and "strengthening civil societies". The overall objective may be summarized as "*supporting transition in the context of wider regional integration, while seeking to maintain social cohesion*" (Holden, 350). As stated by Holden, MEDA was supposed to adopt a "strategic approach" in support of these objectives (Holden, 350).

Areas of focus of EMP were specified in the Barcelona declaration. It was stated that "strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights", "sustainable and

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<sup>46</sup> See more: European Commission 1995: Annex II.

<sup>47</sup> See more: Council Regulation (EC) No [1488/96](#) of 23 July 1996.

<sup>48</sup> See more: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Ar15006>.

balanced economic and social development", "measures to combat poverty" and "promotion of greater understanding between cultures", in other words democracy, were the objectives which would be fulfilled with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Democracy had not been clearly stated explicitly as an area to be cooperated under MEDA. Although negative conditionality was not adopted by the EU in general, MEDA provided for it if any infringement was held but it had not been ever used. According to the MEDA Regulation, "respect for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms is an essential element of the partnership, the violation of which justifies the adoption of appropriate measures". The Regulation states that "these measures can be adopted by the Council acting by a qualified majority on a Commission proposal".<sup>49</sup>

Regarding democracy promotion facilities, as stated by Youngs, a special MEDA program was adopted, aiming only the "promotion of democracy" and "human rights". The MEDA Democracy Program was created in 1996 following the European Parliament initiative for enhancing local, national and regional institutions and promoting "a plural civil society" by strengthening non-profit Civil Society Organizations that involved in the furthering of "democracy", "rule of law" and "freedom of expression" (Attina, 190).

Projects on training and education on human rights and democracy as well as women rights, enhancing awareness campaigns and media was funded by the MEDA Democracy Program. Although this Partnership Program was signed between the governments, as stated by Federica Bicchì (2006), MEDA Democracy was assumed as a special partnerships between European NGOs and the local ones. However, the EU has refrained to fund groups that are considered "Islamic", even

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<sup>49</sup> See more: [www.eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Ar15006](http://www.eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Ar15006).

though at least some of these groups are the main cornerstone of civil society in the Arab world (Börzel and Risse, 2009, 45).

Although the strengthening of democracy was the first priority of the EU after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in practice it stayed behind the economic-financial cooperation and could not go beyond the social, cultural and human exchanges. During the period of MEDA I, for 1995-1999, democracy and human rights remained in the shadow of the economic and financial objectives of the EU. After a decade of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU's emphasis on democracy diminished. The priorities of the regional cooperation were defined<sup>50</sup> as (i) industrial cooperation, (ii) environment, (iii) water, (iv) information society, (v) energy and (vi) transport in the evaluation of the MEDA's first phase. Democracy was not mentioned as an agenda item on the regional cooperation field between the EU and its Southern Neighbors.

The allocated amount of the funds for the democracy and human rights were very low under MEDA I, amounting only to 36 million Euros for regional and bilateral projects. However the overall funding for MEDA I was 3.425 million Euros in total.<sup>51</sup> Nevertheless, democratization was highlighted in the discourses of the EU officials. As stated in the foreword by the EU Commissioner of the Euromed Info Note, released in 2005,

In preparation of the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary summit, we have issued a Communication setting out proposals for revitalizing the Euro-Mediterranean relationship by focusing on three key areas: human rights and democratization, economic reform and growth, and education.

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<sup>50</sup>The Barcelona Process Five Years on 1995-2000, See more: [www.publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/891f7ea8-fa7d-4228-8192-7efde5a7bea6\\_p.11](http://www.publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/891f7ea8-fa7d-4228-8192-7efde5a7bea6_p.11) Access Date: 25.12.2018

<sup>51</sup> See more: [www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-96-847\\_en.htm](http://www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-96-847_en.htm) Access Date: 25.12.2018

However, in comparison with the other areas as economic development, infrastructure investment, democracy and human rights remained behind in terms of the funding it received from the EU and this is one of the inconsistencies between the EU's rhetoric and its practice and an indicator of the failure of this program.

The shift of attention away from democracy promotion in the EMP became apparent especially in MEDA II program. The cooperation areas covered by MEDA II were "Social Affairs, Culture-Media, Public Management, Local Development, Energy, Industry, Co-op & Development, Economy – Finances" excluding democracy and human rights.<sup>52</sup> Showing the gap between the EU's discourse and its practice, no sectoral ministerial conference was held during the MEDA I and MEDA II periods regarding the democratic transition of these countries. Although several sectoral ministerial conferences took place between 1996 and 2005, none of them was related with democracy and human rights.<sup>53</sup> This is due to the dual policy goal-intention to promote its core values and pursue its interests in the region and preserving its own interests of the EU and the EU chose not to upset its autocratic partners in order to pursue its interests.

### **3.2.2.ENP**

European Neighborhood Policy was announced as the enhancement of Barcelona process in 2003. The policy was outlined by the European Commission in its

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<sup>52</sup> See more: [www.emwis.org/overview/fol101997/fol221357](http://www.emwis.org/overview/fol101997/fol221357) Access Date: 25.12.2018

<sup>53</sup> See more: [www.europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/euromed/index.htm](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/index.htm) Access Date: 25.12.2018

"Communication on Wider Europe".<sup>54</sup> According to the Article 8(1) of the Treaty on the European Union,

The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighboring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighborliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterized by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.<sup>55</sup>

These were the objectives of the ENP since its foundation. In April 2015 conclusions of the Council it was also stated that

The ENP aims to develop a democratic, stable and prosperous neighborhood, based on a commitment to fundamental values, including the rule of law, the protection of human rights and gender equality.<sup>56</sup>

European Neighborhood Policy was taken into effect in 2003. The EU started to implement this policy due to the Eastern Neighbors to offer a privileged relationship for building upon "a mutual commitment" in regard to "common values", as the Southern neighbors that were treated under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Börzel and Risse (2009) assert that the ENP aims at "going beyond existing forms of cooperation" by suggesting "a deeper political relationship and economic integration" (Börzel and Risse, 2009, 43).

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<sup>54</sup> For more detail: Brussels, 11.03.2003, (COM2003), 104 final.

<sup>55</sup> See more: [www.eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12012M/TXT](http://www.eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12012M/TXT) Access Date: 25.12.2018

<sup>56</sup> See more: [www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/04/20-council-conclusions-review-european-neighbourhood-policy](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/04/20-council-conclusions-review-european-neighbourhood-policy) Access Date: 04.01.2019

The core of the European Neighborhood Policy was the bilateral ENP Action Plans that adopted between the EU and its each partner. The plans covered by ENP, defines an agenda of "political and economic reforms" with short-term and medium-term priorities. Sub-committees have been created for the implementation and The European Commission and these sub-committees have been jointly monitored these reforms. Progress reports prepared by the partner countries regularly, have been also evaluated by these joint-venture. (Börzel and Risse, 2009, 53).

With the 2004 enlargement, the EU needed to update its external policy towards Middle East and the Mediterranean region. The EMP was transformed into ENP. This new policy approach was a clear response to "the changing composition", "shifting borders", and "altered geopolitical outlook" of the EU that enlargement precisely implies (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 19). In comparison with the EMP, ENP is focusing more on the EU's close neighborhood due to the perception of security threats. Although the Commission announced that regarding the Mediterranean region, the ENP "will be implemented through the Barcelona Process and the Association Agreements with each partner country"<sup>57</sup> ENP differentiates from the EMP in three ways according to Del Sarto and Schumacher:

- The ENP changes "regionalism" of the EMP, with the "bilateralism": the Neighborhood Policy contains of upgrading relations with the neighbors that are politically and economically "most advanced" and/or present a commitment to implement important "political" and "economic reforms".
- ENP foresees only positive conditionality, while negative conditionality was foreseen in EMP.
- ENP is "much more straightforward" in regard to EU's own special interests. This finds an expression in the Commission's 2003 final communication as

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<sup>57</sup> See more : European Commission, (COM (2003) 104 final, p. 15.



"close cooperation with the neighbors" in order to enable the EU to provide "security" and "welfare" to its European citizens as well as the "effective control of borders", explicitly mentioned as a "common interest" (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 23).

The ENP was presented by the EU as a considerable extension of the opportunities for inclusion already offered to the countries concerned. This new policy would give the Eastern neighbor countries definitely closer relations with the EU compared with the other non-neighbor countries that means a chance to integrate further "economically" in the immense EU market for achieving the four fundamental freedoms of "movement, persons, goods, services and capital" in the long term (Aliboni, 2005, 2). However, as Aliboni points out distinctive regions were encompassed by the ENP, which are the Eastern European and the Mediterranean areas, meaning that they are brought into the same policy framework. According to the conclusions<sup>58</sup> adopted by the European Council; "Egypt, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Syria Azerbaijan, Georgia, Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Libya, Palestine, Morocco", and "Tunisia" were also deliberated as neighbor countries but in reality the stance of the EU has differentiated between them: while for some Eastern Europe countries, such as Ukraine, an EU membership prospect was talked about (Inayeh and Forbrig, 4), a similar situation has not even come into the agenda for the Mediterranean countries. The 2004 conclusion also covers a "Strategic Partnership" between the Mediterranean countries and the EU, whose objective is "to promote the development of a common zone of peace, prosperity and progress in the Mediterranean and the Middle East".

ENP creates a solid policy agenda under which, through "partnership" and "dialogue", and "recognizing diversities", the Union would follow to:

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<sup>58</sup> See more: Presidency Conclusions, 16-17 December 2004.

- Promote political reform, good governance, democracy and human rights;
- Stimulate trade and economic cooperation, economic liberalization and people to people contacts;
- Promote conflict prevention and resolution in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and measures to combat terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and illegal immigration.<sup>59</sup>

It can be understood that the EU's policies towards the region would be more comprehensive and strengthened by the adoption of this strategic partnership. In comparison with the EMP, the emphasis on security increased with the implementation of the ENP.

With regard to ENP, in 2007, the new European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) was welcomed, replacing MEDA and "containing an explicit suspension clause".<sup>60</sup> In the context of the ENPI, EU and its sixteen neighbors in the South and in the East have stronger relationships than the MEDA Program, at least financially. For the period of 2007-2013, 11.2 billion Euro were allocated and for 2014-2020 this amount has increased to 15.4 billion Euro. In 2014, its name was replaced as European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI).

During the life span of ENPI, Arab Uprisings occurred in the region. After the Arab Uprisings, the priorities of this program included supporting good governance, democracy and the rule of law on a "more" for "more" basis. Nevertheless, the EU's

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<sup>59</sup>See more: [www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_DOC-04-2\\_en.htm](http://www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-04-2_en.htm). Access Date: 10.01.2019.

<sup>60</sup> For more detail: Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument, OJ L 310, 9.11.2006: 1–14.

priorities nuance were the same as before the uprisings.<sup>61</sup> Currently it is still used as a tool for promoting democracy in the Southern Mediterranean and Eastern Neighbors of the EU.

However, in its practice, the democracy promotion mission of the EU in the framework of the ENP was more softened than MEDA II. Several ENP partners have prominently enhanced their close ties with the EU, and the ENP has been able to provide considerable support for these countries' reforms since its inauguration. On the other side, especially in the Southern region, a number of partners have also experienced conflict and instability during the implementation of the ENP. Arising complex and new challenges from Arab Uprising have only been considered partially. According to "2015 Review of the ENP", issued by European Commission, "principles of democratic governance" have been adopted by only a few partners. This result is only one of the signs of the distance between the EU's ideals and its success in its neighborhoods with regard to democracy promotion. It is also acknowledged in this review that the EU had played a strong role in supporting the reform process in ambitious partner countries. Nevertheless in the countries with a limited interest in the EU norms and standards, the impact was less apparent. It is advised<sup>62</sup> that the ENP must leave behind the one-size-fits-all policy and diversify its policies, and focus on European values and principles to achieve its goals.

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<sup>61</sup> See more: Overview of ENPI results 2007-2013. (Access Link : [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/overview-european-neighbourhood-and-partnership-instrument-enpi-results-2007-2013\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/overview-european-neighbourhood-and-partnership-instrument-enpi-results-2007-2013_en), Access Date: 29.01.2019)

<sup>62</sup> 2015 Review of the ENP, Joint Communication To The European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions, Brussels, 18.11.2015 JOIN(2015) 50 final, p. 11.

### **3.3. European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)**

In 1994, the EU started to implement a special democracy assistance program for "all regions of the world" which is called as "the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)" (Huber, 2015, 101). Although EIDHR was created in 1994 at the request of the European Parliament (EP), its adoption was reiterated by many regulations of the Council. The whole budget of this program has been devoted to promotion of human rights and democracy and have been gathered under the title "European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights" (Bicchi, 2009, 64). In 1999, "the European Initiative for Development and Human Rights" was accepted as a comprehensive strategy for "supporting of democratization", "the strengthening of the rule of law" and "the development of a pluralist and democratic civil society" by the EU.<sup>63</sup> Apart from ENPI and MEDA, EIDHR gave a special importance to "democracy and human rights" and focused only in this area and it was not limited to only Southern Mediterranean and the Eastern Neighborhood.

According to Bicchi and Voltolini (2013), the main characteristic of the EIDHR, compared to other geographical and thematic budgetary lines, is its "independence of action," which allows it to directly address non-governmental actors (Bichi and Voltolini, 2013, 83). It means that the EIDHR can operate "without host government consent," thus including also those cases in which the third country's regime might have an interest in preventing cooperation. The EU does not have to sign a convention with the respective governments. In the European Parliament's and Council's Regulation of 2006/1889, which creates a aninstrument for the promotion of democracy, it is stated that

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<sup>63</sup> EIDHR 976/1999, preamble.

This Regulation establishes a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide (European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights) allowing for assistance independent from the consent of third country governments and other public authorities.

The objectives of the EIDHR were outlined in this regulation as:<sup>64</sup>

- enhancing the respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international and regional human rights instruments, and promoting and consolidating democracy and democratic reform in third countries, mainly through support for civil society organizations, providing support and solidarity to human rights defenders and victims of repression and abuse, and strengthening civil society activity in the field of human rights and democracy promotion;
- supporting and strengthening the international and regional framework for the protection, promotion and monitoring of human rights, the promotion of democracy and the rule of law, and reinforcing an active role for civil society within these frameworks;
- building confidence in and enhancing the reliability of electoral processes, in particular through election observation missions, and through support for local civil society organizations involved in these processes.

Due to this reason, EIDHR is differentiated from MEDA and ENPI funds. The main areas of focus of the EIDHR are the empowerment and increasing engagement of underrepresented or disempowered people, such as women, minorities, and indigenous people (Bicchi and Voltolini, 2013, 87). Funds are given to Civil Society Organizations (CSO) directly but these CSO's need to register with the governments before starting their activities (Reynaert, 2011, 631). Therefore, the hypothesis of non-interference of the governments to EIDHR loses its validity. The biggest majority of the funds under EIDHR funneled into human rights issues and Youngs

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<sup>64</sup> For more detail: Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006.

(2003) states that the predominance of human rights aimed at "broader shaping of democratic institutional structures" (Youngs, 2003, 130). These ideas are also supported by Bicchi (2006) who highlights that in the early 2000's most of the funds for micro projects of the CSO's channeled into the promotion of human rights, rather than the promotion of the democratic process (Bicchi, 2006, 297). The motive behind the promotion of civil society is that the civil society could contribute to the legitimatization of the neo liberal state through its civil participation particularly ensuring to attract their focus on anti-corruption and good governance (Reynaert, 2011, 633). The EU has chosen this tool to control autocratic governments implicitly against corruption and bad governance.

As can be seen the supported fields by the EU programs are the uncontroversial human rights, importance of which could not be denied by the authoritarian governments; so the impact of the EIDHR on the democracy transformation in these states have also remained limited as MEDA and ENP.

### **3.4. Overall Assessment of the EU Tools**

EU's democracy promotion policies towards the Mediterranean reveal some differences between its aims and practices. The question that must be asked is whether the EU is doing all these to promote its values in non-democratic states and transform them or to sustain and strengthen its interests in the region.

As stated by Torun (2012) these policies have been implemented by taking into account the priorities of the EU, and "not the needs of the individuals in the region" (Torun, 83). The priorities of the EU have been establishing a market-based

economy (Roccu, 2018, 48), fight against terrorism, and immigration control.<sup>65</sup> These priorities have forced the EU to engage with the authoritarian states. On the other side authoritarian regimes preferred to engage with the EU's policies if only the EU's agenda was in line with their interests (Van Hüllen, 2009, 7).

According to Youngs, EU's policy has as its main goal the transformation of the Southern Mediterranean countries into a liberal economy driven by markets through economic liberalization (Youngs, 2009, 910). The EU has intensified its policies on economic sector reform and privatization in the region. These aims were both followed in MEDA and ENPI. Especially in ENPI "more and more" strategy has been adopted in response to economic reforms in the Mediterranean countries (Reynaert, 2011, 627). This has meant more reform on economy and more support for the autocratic states in international arena. Inequality has risen in the region as a consequence of these economic reforms and instead of establishing democracy in the country, autocratic leaders had chance to get Western support and they have become more strong (Pace, Seeberg and Cavatorta, 2009, 9).

The democratic transition of these regimes was not "main focus" of the EU's support. However, CSOs were supported as part of the EU's democracy promotion. But even this promotion of civil society was also limited and problematic. It did not achieve its main goals because the supported CSOs were registered with the governments.

EU's concerns about "the destabilization of the region", which would affect "the EU's security" in terms of "migration" and "energy supply" (Panebianco and Rossi, 4), the fear to bring into power Islamist extremists, (Youngs, 2009, 911) obstructed support to democratization in the region. As a result, "cooperation on democracy

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<sup>65</sup>For more detail: Council of the EU, Five-Year Work Programme, 2005.

and human rights" helped to the "authoritarian regimes" to be "successful" in their strategies to survive in the region and, at least in the short run, helped to stabilize "authoritarian rulers" (Van Hüllen, 2015, 2).

### **3.5. Democracy Promotion Policies of the EU in Egypt**

Egypt and the European Community settled their first relationship in 1966.<sup>66</sup> Current relations between the EU and Egypt are based on the Barcelona Declaration which established the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. However, the roots of this relationship were laid down in the Preferential Trade Agreements signed in 1975, a cooperation agreement signed in 1976<sup>67</sup> and Euro-Egyptian Council established in 1983 (Gillespie, 68). Barcelona Declaration started the implementation of the EMP between the EU and Egypt. With almost 80 million population, Egypt sees itself as "the largest country" in the region with its strong, "albeit underexploited", economic potential and "an important strategic role" in the MENA region (Comelli, 2). According to the Egypt's country report of the ENP, Egypt has enjoyed MEDA I and MEDA II funds (in millions of Euro).

In proportion with its population these allocated funds stayed behind the other funding states as Tunisia or Morocco. According to Egypt country paper, projects and programs under MEDA I focused mainly on the promotion of key economic and social reforms. Cooperation areas were defined in MEDA II as: (i) *"promoting the implementation of EU-Egypt Association Agreement which aims to establish conditions for the free-trade area between the two parties"*, (ii) *"supporting the*

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<sup>66</sup> For more detail: Annex of ENP Country Report, Egypt

<sup>67</sup> For more detail: Egypt Country Report 2005.



*process of economic transition of Egypt and its reforms", (iii) "supporting stability and sustainable and balanced socio-economic development in Egypt".*<sup>68</sup> From the bilateral programs and actions under the 1<sup>st</sup> chapter of the Barcelona process, Egypt only benefitted 20 million Euros for the Children at risk program which aimed at protecting vulnerable groups of the society. This was part of the support towards civil organizations under this chapter. In regard to human rights, justice, freedom and security issues, Egypt was not a beneficiary partner of the MEDA funds.<sup>69</sup> However, private sector development program –privatization and private sector participation in infrastructure- under the 2<sup>nd</sup> chapter, economic and financial dimension of the Barcelona, and poverty, health, gender equality, developing human resources and vocational education and training programs are the other programs that Egypt benefitted under the 3<sup>rd</sup> chapter, namely social, cultural and human chapter. Although Egypt was the most needed state of the 1<sup>st</sup> chapter, because of being in a state of emergency since 1981, it was not supported by the EU in terms of democracy, instead the EU preferred to support Egypt's privatization and its market liberalization during the implementation of the EMP.

The Joint Action Plan outlined the relations between Egypt and the EU in regard to ENP which was adopted in 2007. Complying with this Action Plan, 558 million Euros were allocated for the period of 2007-2010 for Egypt under the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)<sup>70</sup>. The main priority objectives of this fund were;

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<sup>68</sup> For more detail: Egypt Country Paper.

<sup>69</sup> For more detail: Euromed Information Note, 2005.

<sup>70</sup> For more detail: Egypt Country Strategic Paper, 2007-2013.

- "Political reform and good governance",
- "Competitiveness and productivity of the economy",
- "Socio-economic sustainability of the development process".

According to European Union Delegation's sources nearly 1.3 billion Euros was allocated to Egypt in total. This assistance of the EU is provided in the form of grants to Egypt. For the period between 2014 and 2020, the new European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI) is the main financial instrument of the EU-Egypt cooperation.<sup>71</sup> Moreover, in addition to the ENI funding, Egypt is also funded by additional support under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. For the period of 2014-2017 the EU granted 4 million Euros to Egypt under EIDHR.<sup>72</sup>

It can be argued that the EU funds have not been used mainly in the field of democracy and human rights; instead, they were spent especially for infrastructure and capacity building. Although the EU supports the countries who want to improve its core values as "human rights" and "democracy", in Egypt's case, these main values on democracy have been turned a blind eye by the EU. Instead of funding democracy related facilities - the EU has avoided to fund the activities in this field-, the EU supported undeniable human rights of vulnerable groups, women, children etc. Although the EU support has been formulated as enhancing Egypt's infrastructure for achieving democratic goals, the democratic transition of Egypt was not fulfilled and this shows the inconsistency between the EU's democracy promotion discourse and its implementation.

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<sup>71</sup> See more: [www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/1156/egypt-and-eu\\_en](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/1156/egypt-and-eu_en). Access Date: 30.01.2019

<sup>72</sup> See more: [www.ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/egypt\\_lt](http://www.ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/egypt_lt). Access Date: 30.01.2019

Actually, the EU's support towards Egypt does not arise out of a concern to spread its core values and transform Egypt into a democratic state, but it originates from the EU's own interest in and special relationship with Egypt. The EU has both political and security concerns as stated in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) agenda<sup>73</sup> and economic-financial priorities. The main feature of the EU's financial-economic reforms was on banking regulation (Ikram, 63 and Roll, 352) in Egypt and as a result of this, the special relations between Egyptian elites and the Europeans developed during the Mubarak period. This particular relationship gave rise to reforming of Egyptian economy along the lines long promoted by international financial institutions, as well as main donors and partners like the EU (Roccu, 2013, 39). In parallel with the EU's transformative power on Egyptian economy, the EU's articulation of the security-stability nexus (Roccu and Voltolini, 2018, 2) in its economic relations with Egypt had three tightly inter-connected features: Firstly, as cited in Pace (2009), stability was largely perceived as political stability by the EU and it was assumed to be particularly the stability of Mubarak regime. Mubarak regime was able to help the EU achieving its goals not only in Egypt but also its beyond in Southern Mediterranean (Roccu, 2018, 47). The importance of the Egypt for the West had been very crucial since the 1973 Yom-Kippur Arab-Israeli war. Since that war, Egypt had been seen as the interlocutor between Arabs and the West and the defender of the "Middle East Peace Process". Egypt has taken a key role in the "Arab Israeli conflict". Secondly, the regime stability of the Egypt could ensure preserving the security and profit of the EU based firms' investments in Egypt (Roccu, 2018, 47). EU based firms took a prominent role in Egypt and "security" was assumed in economic terms as "these firms' interests" (Roccu, 2018, 48 ). As a last feature, this pursuit of profits and market shares of the European companies necessitated to avoid damaging the regime stability of Mubarak and its government, which had been in a state of emergency since 1981. For this reason, the reforms that the EU sought in Egyptian economy aimed to ensure the security of these firms.

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<sup>73</sup>See more: [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/420/common-foreign-and-security-policy-cfsp\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/420/common-foreign-and-security-policy-cfsp_en) Access Date: 11.07.2019

In addition to economic interests of the EU there were some political reasons to cooperate with the non-democratic regime of Egypt. The core focus of the EU was security (Santini, 139) in its democracy promotion agenda and this entailed cooperation with a non-democratic Mubarak government for other political reasons: (i) the cooperation between the EU and Egypt on immigrant control,<sup>74</sup> (ii) the counterterrorism policies of the EU (Hollis, 93), (iii) the EU's fear of Islamists who may come to power in Egypt and (iv) the EU's need to preserve energy routes from North Africa and keep the energy prices, especially gas and oil, stable (Isaac, 2013, 41) are all very related with the EU's CFSP agenda. All these reasons have shaped the EU's democracy promotion activities in the Mediterranean region, particularly in Egypt. Therefore, it can be argued that the EU's practice did not help democratic transition of Egypt; instead, the democracy promotion policies caused the prolongation of the Mubarak period and postponed electoralism.<sup>75</sup>

### **3.6. The EU's Democracy Promotion Policies in Egypt after the Arab Uprisings**

Arab uprisings refer to the civil movements, which started in Tunisia in 2010 and spreaded all over the region in the Middle East. Egypt has also witnessed it starting in January 2011. The anti-Mubarak protests began in the early 2011 and these protests and revolts brought the end of the Mubarak period who had been ruling Egypt in a state of emergency since 1981. The EU's policy towards Egyptian uprising was hesitant when the early protests had started. Instead of domestic demand of

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<sup>74</sup> See more: [www.ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/north-africa/egypt/enhancing-response-migration-challenges-egypt-ermce\\_en](http://www.ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/north-africa/egypt/enhancing-response-migration-challenges-egypt-ermce_en) Access Date: 28.01.2019

<sup>75</sup> According to Terry Karl (1986), electoralism means "the belief that merely holding elections will channel political action into peaceful contests among elites and accord public legitimacy to the winners". Electoralism is a step towards democracy but does not meet the full meaning of democracy.

overthrowing Mubarak, initial EU releases did not refer to the overthrow of Mubarak, rather the EU called on the Mubarak regime to cease its aggression against peaceful protesters and fulfill committed reforms (Isaac, 2014, 156). However after the Muslim Brotherhood's victory the EU found itself a defender of the Egyptian uprising between 2011-2013 period as can be seen in its press release, namely "EU's response to the Arab Spring: The State-of-Play after Two Years" which was published on the European Commission website on February 8, 2013. In the Egypt part of this announcement, it was clearly stated that since the initial protests occurred in Tahrir square couple of years ago, the EU has always seemed supporter of the movement for democracy and human rights in Egypt, and the EU called for an inclusive and peaceful transition."<sup>76</sup> The EU named this period as a "transition" and the EU policy makers alleged that the EU would support this transition both financially and politically.

The democracy promotion policy of the EU has changed just a little bit, not much, after the Egyptian uprising. It was stated that the ENP would be implemented in a new framework by the EU according to the "more-for-more" principle, to preserve the EU's interest in Egypt. The unchanged attitude of the EU was mainly driven by the EU's prioritization of the security understanding over democracy. However the EU announced that it would support democratic transitions through the "Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PfDSP)". This partnership was built on three elements, namely, "democratic transformation", "a partnership with people and civil society" and "sustainable and inclusive growth".<sup>77</sup> This partnership covers the understanding of the self-determination and sovereignty of the partner

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<sup>76</sup> European Commission Press Release, EU's response to the "Arab Spring": The State-of-Play after Two Years, 2013, Pg. 6. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-13-81\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-81_en.htm) Access Date : 20.01.2019.

<sup>77</sup> European Commission, High Representative of the EU For Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Staff Working Document, Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity: Report on activities in 2011 and Roadmap for future action, Brussels, 15.05.2012. Pg. Introduction.

states while accepting democratic and economic rights of the people. The support of the EU towards the transition period was clearly stated in this document.

The EU's policy response towards Egyptian uprising was seemed mild and sympathetic. It chose to implement "more for more" understanding to these developments and increased its aid budget for Egypt. It was announced that the EU was to give 449 millions of Euro for the 2011-2013 period in regard to financial support of the Egyptian transition. With the support of the European Investment Bank and the European Bank of the Reconstruction and the Development, the EU also pledged an additional 5 billions of Euro during the implementation of "the EU-Egypt Task Force". The composition of these assistances was mainly consisting of supporting socio-economic reforms, deepening trade and investment relations.<sup>78</sup> Following the overthrowing of Mubarak, the main priorities has become "political reform" and "good governance"; "competitiveness and productivity of the economy"; and "socio-economic sustainability of the development process" (Dandashly, 2018, 73). The EU devoted only 44.9 millions of Euro for "democracy", "human rights" and "judiciary reforms" but Egypt did not benefit from that because of the lack of demanded EU reforms (Dandashly, 2018, 73).

"EU-Egypt Task Force" under the European Neighborhood Policy was a refreshment of the relations with Egypt and it received 5 billion Euros from the EU. In order to show the EU's strong support<sup>79</sup> and sustain its ties with Morsi<sup>80</sup> Government, the EU

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<sup>78</sup>European Commission Press Release, EU's response to the "Arab Spring": The State-of-Play after Two Years, 2013, Pg. 6. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-13-81\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-81_en.htm) Access Date : 20.01.2019.

<sup>79</sup> For more detail: EU-Egypt Task Force - Co-chairs conclusions, 2012, pg. 1.

has started a new era in EU-Egypt Relations with this platform and committed to a new relationship between Morsi's government and the EU. In the "Co-chairs' Conclusions" of the first meeting of the "Task Force", it was reiterated that the EU-Egypt Relations would be sustained on the basis of "the rule of law", "promotion of peace, prosperity and stability" and the overarching values of human rights", "respect for social justice", "social-economic development" and "good governance". The Task Force was called as the "largest-ever meeting between the European Union and Egypt" (Virgili, 2014, 53). However, the Muslim Brotherhood's human rights violations have not been subjected to any negative conditionality by the EU. Instead, the European Union recognized the requirement to offer more benefits to Egypt (Colombo and Tocci, 86). The aims of this increased aid was to preserve the EU's own interest in Egypt as well as support "economic and social developments" in the form of "micro credits for SME's", conducting pilot projects on agriculture", "water treatment" and "rural development" (Colombo and Tocci, 87).

The transition period did not end with Morsi presidency. Egyptian army took over power from "the first democratically elected president Mohammed Morsi" on July 3, 2013. This was called as "coup" by the Muslim Brotherhood's followers, on the other hand it was called as "correction" by the new regime's supporters.<sup>81</sup> The constitution of the Egypt was suspended by the army and the first democratically elected president was put under house arrest. The EU only called all these turmoil

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<sup>80</sup> Mohamed Morsi was a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, who governed the country after the first uprising between June 2012 and July 2013. After the coup-d'état of Abdulfettah el Sisi in July 2013, he was arrested and he died in prison in June 2019. Morsi was the first democratically elected leader of Egypt and his election was seen as the victory of the Arab uprising in Egypt. His period was seen to have ended the autocratic administration in Egypt by many of the supporters. On the other hand, he frightened some Egyptians with a potential theocratic regime in Egypt. See more: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/17/world/middleeast/mohamed-morsi-dead.html> Access Date: 20.08.2019

<sup>81</sup> See more : [www.edition.cnn.com/2013/07/03/world/meast/egypt-protests/](http://www.edition.cnn.com/2013/07/03/world/meast/egypt-protests/) Access date: 22.01.2019

as “disturbing” and “awkward”.<sup>82</sup> Cutting the aid of 5 billion Euros to “EU-Egypt Task Force” was not on the agenda of the EU leaders when these bloody incidents started in July 2013. The EU leaders only agreed on suspending arms export licenses of Egypt and they called both sides of the conflict to negotiation table.<sup>83</sup> In regard to EU’s articulation, it can be seen that the EU chose to sustain its former relations with the Egypt. The EU could have chosen to increase its democracy assistance funds in Egypt as a response to the deterioration after the coup. But instead of building and supporting democracy, ENI’s focus was mostly on “social protection”, “poverty alleviation”, “transparency and business environment”, “local socio-economic development” and; “governance, quality of life and environment” in the period between 2014–2016 (Dandashly, 2018, 73). Moreover, the EU influence on Egyptian domestic policy and economy decreased under the Sisi<sup>84</sup> presidency (Roccu and Voltolini, 2018, 16). The reason is that the EU found itself in the Southern Mediterranean, especially in Egypt, competing with the rich Gulf countries’ aid to Egypt, including aid by “Saudi Arabia”, “Qatar” and “United Arab Emirates” (Korteweg, 2013).<sup>85</sup> Sisi, unlike Mubarak and Morsi, did not choose to rely on the West’s aid, and this has reduced the EU’s power in Egypt. However, he has been successful to establish good relations with both the EU and the U.S.

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<sup>82</sup> See more: [www.euobserver.com/foreign/120766](http://www.euobserver.com/foreign/120766) Access Date: 17.01.2019

<sup>83</sup> See more: [www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/aug/21/eu-egypt-violence-aid-programmes](http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/aug/21/eu-egypt-violence-aid-programmes) Access Date : 07.01.2019

<sup>84</sup> Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is the current president of Egypt who took power from Mohamed Morsi by the July 2013 coup in Egypt. He has been accused of having overturned democracy by removing Morsi from power who was the first freely elected President of Egypt. After declaring himself as the President of Egypt in 2014, he has established good relations with the West and has had their international support.

<sup>85</sup> See more: <https://www.cer.eu/insights/europes-struggle-influence-egypt> Access Date: 22.01.2019.



Overall, the democracy promotion of the EU has not changed steeply after the Arab uprising. The EU has avoided using its “stick” on Egypt for the democracy and human rights abuses. The EU has refrained from criticizing these violations by directly targeting the administration of Sisi instead they indulged in his non-democratic policies - as France continues to sell arms to Egypt while Macron criticizes Sisi on repression and the U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo’s Cairo visit amounted to a permission for Sisi to do whatever he wants in domestic policy because just two weeks after Pompeo’s visit fifteen innocent people were executed- (Darrag, 2019),<sup>86</sup> even though the transition period of Egypt was seen as “worse than Mubarak”<sup>87</sup> period. It is very clear that the EU is highly utilitarian oriented, while implementing its external democracy promotion policies in Egypt.

### **3.7. Conclusion**

Democracy promotion is a long-standing foreign policy agenda of the EU and Egypt is the special focus of this agenda of the EU. The EU has used MEDA, EMP, ENP and EIDHR to expand its democratic values in Egypt. However, these policies have not effected Egypt well in terms of democracy. Rather, the interests of the EU towards market liberalization, establishing a “Free Trade Area”, dealing with the refugee problem and securing energy routes got ahead of the democratization of Egypt.

A big amount of the EU funds were used to enhance Egypt’s infrastructure and banking reform in order to safeguard the EU firms operating in Egypt. In addition to

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<sup>86</sup> Darrag, Amir. “EU indulgence of Sisi’s brutal tactics is fueling violence and instability in Sinai” <https://www.euronews.com/2019/02/28/eu-indulgence-of-sisi-s-brutal-tactics-is-fueling-violence-and-instability-in-sinai-view> Access Date: 12.04.2019

<sup>87</sup> See more: The Economist, “Worse than Mubarek” <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2015/05/02/worse-than-mubarak> (2015) Access Date: 22.01.2019

the economic dimension of the EU's interests, security concerns such as the fight against terrorism and refugee problem are the political dimensions of the EU's democracy promotion agenda in Egypt. In terms of democracy and human rights, EIDHR is the leading channel of the EU funding instruments, which helps to empower women and people in need of protection via CSO's. Nevertheless, partner CSO's have only been selected from those who are registered with the government so their impact has been restricted due to their commitment to an autocratic government. Therefore, the EU democracy promotion agenda stayed behind the EU's political and economic interests in Egypt, and remained limited. It not only strengthened autocratic administrations in Egypt, but also kept back Egypt's move from autocracy to democracy.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE U.S. WAY OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN EGYPT

Democracy promotion activities of the U.S. have a long history. Nevertheless, it has become the core element of the U.S.' foreign policy in the twentieth century (Singh, 1). According to Congressional Research Service Report (2017), it is believed that the external democracy promotion policy is important and essential for both global development and the U.S.' own national security (Lawson and Epstein, 2017, 19). Because, economic growth could only be enhanced by the democratic states and these states could preserve human rights. Moreover, it is assumed as these states are less likely to enter into war with one another as a result of the liberal thought. The main focus of the U.S. aid to promote democracy is "electoral democracy", covering "free and fair elections". "Support for fundamental rights and standards" that makes the democracy meaningful is also reflected by the understanding of the U.S. style of democracy promotion. (Lawson and Epstein, 2017, 19). "Supporting fair elections", "judicial reforms", "law enforcement reforms", "municipal governance and human rights" and "the rule of law" are the examples of democracy promotion assistance and these have been reflecting the a range of U.S.' activities in terms of democracy promotion at least discursively.

"The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961" (FAA) can be seen as the origin of the U.S.' democracy assistance as an official foreign policy tool. It is stated in this act that the U.S. would assist developing states on the "building of democracy", "the restoration of the peace", "the improvement of living conditions" in developing countries and their development.<sup>88</sup> This law was amended in years and have had some changes in

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<sup>88</sup> See more: Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), p.135.

its scope. Additionally, the U.S. adopted more regional focused democracy promotion regulations as shown by “the Central America Democracy, Peace, and Development Initiative (FAA §461; 22 U.S.C. 2271)”, “the Freedom Support Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-511; 22 U.S.C. 2295)”, and “the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 (22 U.S.C. 5401 et seq.)” in years. Moreover, NED activities are adopted through “the 1983 National Endowment for Democracy Act (P.L. 98-164; 22 U.S.C. 4411-4416)” (Lawson and Epstein, 2019, 3).

In the framework of the democracy promotion programs and policies, the U.S. seems to aim promoting “good governance (characterized by participation, transparency, accountability, effectiveness, and equity)”, “rule of law”, and “promotion of human rights”. These fields have funded more than the programs for “promoting electoral process”, and “political participation” (Lawson and Epstein, 2017, Preface).

The range of the U.S.’ democracy promotion activities extend from Japan to Bolivia. The initial assistance on democracy promotion started after the Second Cold War with Japan and Germany (Lawson and Epstein, 2017, 4). The U.S. supported the democratic transition of the non-democratic countries including Iran and Guatemala. In the 1970’s democracy assistance policies of the U.S. were intensified and then the U.S.’ democracy promotion discourse has continued with a rising trend. The U.S. has seemed to choose civil society organizations to be supported as the main receiver of the U.S. democracy assistance.

Supporting and strengthening civil society organizations are the main mechanisms to promote the U.S.’ democracy understanding. However, this understanding differentiated in different countries in practice. The U.S. supported “friendly tyrants” in Central America for the fear of leftist bottom up movements.

Nevertheless, it stuck to its civil society friends in the Soviet countries in the name of democracy in the 1980's. Especially in 1989, when the revolutions started in Eastern European States, civil society organizations became key actors to overcome communism and establish Western style of democracies (Ottoway and Carothers, 2000, 7). However, this trend had some changes during Bush and Clinton's administration periods in the 1990's. Despite their intense advocacy on promoting civil society (Ottoway and Carothers, 2000, 7), father-son presidents Bush and Clinton preferred to engage with the authorities regardless of whether they are democratic or not. Even though "civil society" was one of the core recipients of the democracy funds, in some countries such as Egypt, military aid, in other words aid to the government, has had the biggest share in total funding. Therefore, direct government funding has constituted a major amount of the U.S. assistance and that funding was seen as promoting democracy during both the Bush and Clinton periods (Ottoway and Carothers, 2000, 7).

#### **4.1. Historical Evaluation of the U.S.' Democracy Promotion Activities**

Historically, American leaders have demonstrated a strong and continuing trend to consider the "U.S.' 'mission' to spread Western democratic values" and "a liberal political model" abroad. They also see that non-democratic regimes are "a potential national security threat" for the U.S.' national interests. The belief is that "democracies are more stable international actors" and democratic states are better partners for security and trade. In addition to these characteristics of democracy, it helps to develop human rights, economic growth and development in the world. Therefore, democracy has been always one of the top agendas of the U.S.' leaders (Sedaca and Bouchet, 2014, 5).

The fundamental content of democracy promotion activities settled significantly from the Carter to the Reagan administration. Jimmy Carter was the starter of external democracy promotion implementer during the Cold War “to set human rights” and “democratic freedoms” (Huber, 2015, 51). How to pursue this agenda was established during Reagan period. When the Reagan administration came to power in the White House, the focus of the democracy promotion shifted toward “an electoral model of democracy” at the cost of “the human rights agenda”. Reagan announced his policy agenda of democracy promotion in his “Crusade for Freedom speech” to the British Parliament in 1982 (Huber, 2015, 53). He emphasized the importance of democracy and the self-determination rights of the states and explicitly highlighted the priority of democracy promotion in this speech saying that “No, democracy is not a fragile flower. Still it needs cultivating. If the rest of this century is to witness the gradual growth of freedom and democratic ideals, we must take actions to assist the campaign for democracy”.<sup>89</sup>

George H. W. Bush sustained the democracy promotion rhetoric, which was also a characteristic of the Reagan period. He expressed his willingness for promoting democracy in his speeches (Fowler, 241). Although Reagan’s foreign policy pursued the theory of political science that democracy triggered economic prosperity, the George H.W.Bush administration altered the fundamental linkage, founding their foreign policy on the theory that free market forces lead to democracy. Moreover, Bush’s democracy promotion discourse were limited to only two regions: Latin America and Eastern Europe (Fowler, 241). On the other hand, during his term in office, four military interventions were held in the name of democracy promotion: Philippines, Panama, Iraqi and Somalia. While security was the main concern of these interventions, democracy promotion was also on the agenda of the George H. W. Bush administration, but only discursively (Fowler, 242).

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<sup>89</sup>See more: <http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/reagan-parliament.htm> Access Date: 01.02.2019

Democracy promotion has become one of the important foreign policy items of President Clinton's agenda. He titled his initial security strategy as "National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" and he asserted that enlarging the community of democratic and free market nations would serve all U.S. strategic interests (Lawson and Epstein, 2019, 6). 1990's presented a suitable environment for the U.S.' democracy promotion activities because the liberal norms did not face rival thoughts like communism. Therefore, Clinton created a "Democracy and Governance Office" at the United State Agency for International Development (USAID), and the "Office of Transition Initiatives", to support democracy in transition countries (Lawson and Epstein, 2019, 6).

In light of the 9/11, the external democracy promotion policy seemed important for the George W. Bush's administration. "The Millennium Challenge Corporation" and "Middle East Partnership Initiative" were established in the post 9/11 environment. Obama administration also sustained the democracy promotion policy as a tool for its foreign relations. On the other hand, Obama also improved relations with non-democratic countries such as Russia and Iran.

Since Carter, all of the U.S. presidents have given a special importance to the notion of democracy promotion in a changing trend in conformity with the U.S.' national interests and policy dynamics.

#### **4.2. The U.S Agency for International Development (USAID)**

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) derives its legal status from "The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA)". In 1961, it was realized that there was a need for a single agency to be responsible for foreign economic development abroad. President John F. Kennedy realized this need to collect all development

policies in a an agency and this agency was named as USAID. The aim of this agency was defined as “to promote social and economic development” and on November 3 in 1961, USAID was founded..<sup>90</sup>

USAID is one of the primary institutions of the U.S. foreign assistance programs. It shares this mission with the State Department on “democracy promotion” and “human rights assistance” (Lawson and Epstein, 2019, 9). The funds are allocated to the programs such as “agriculture and food security”, “democracy”, “human rights and governance”, “economic growth and trade”, “education”, “environment and global climate change”, “gender equality and woman’s empowerment”, “global health”, “water and sanitation” and “working in crisis and conflict”.<sup>91</sup>The programs are generally planned, managed, and observed by “USAID officials” in the funded country. Implementation of the programs are conducted by the nongovernmental partners in the recipient country (Lawson and Epstein, 2019, 9).

USAID have dual goals both internationally and domestically. When the recipient country gets richer, the demand for the U.S.’ goods and products gets higher too. Therefore, by supporting economic growth and self-sufficiency in the underdeveloped countries, USAID helps to create stronger and more demanding markets for the U.S. exports.<sup>92</sup>

Although USAID was settled in the 1960’s, its main work towards current mission of supporting democracy started in the 1980’s, during the Reagan period. Reagan’s

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<sup>90</sup> See more: <https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/usaaid-history> Access Date: 15.02.2019

<sup>91</sup> See more: <https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do> Access Date: 11.04.2019

<sup>92</sup> See more: <https://www.usaid.gov/reports-and-data> Access Date: 15.02.2019



emphasis on democracy against communism strengthened the USAID's role as an important tool (Carothers, 2009, 10). At the same time, "National Endowment for Democracy (NED)" was established in this period. But USAID's role in the 1980's was mainly confined to South America with a small scale of support to Asian states (Carothers, 2009, 10). When it comes to the 1990's, USAID's work has greatly expanded. The collapse of the Soviet and autocratic states has prepared a friendly environment for USAID's activities. The U.S.' assistance ranged from Eastern Europe to sub-Saharan Africa (Carothers, 2009, 10). USAID's budget started to be in an increasing trend after that. The total budget was 165 million dollars in 1991; it was increased to 635 million by 1999. This increasing trend continued in the 2000's too. But the overall funding level of democracy promotion was increased due to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Carothers, 2009, 11).

USAID was seen a slow mechanism full of bureaucrats to achieve the U.S.' goals during the term of George W. Bush (Carothers, 2009, 11). Some changes in the organizational structure of USAID was made in the 2000's as "The center for democracy and governance" was downgraded from a "center" to an "office" (Carothers, 2009, 12). In addition to this change, by the end of the Bush period, there were no senior level officials in the agency to fully focus on democracy issues, in spite of Bush's strong rhetoric on "freedom agenda" and democracy (Carothers, 2009, 12).

Currently USAID operates in 142 countries and a big majority of the funds is channeled to the "strategically important countries" like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Egypt.<sup>93</sup> The proportions of the spending by the sector vary from country to country. In USAID's website, the total spending can be viewed from 2014 by fiscal year. For the 2014 fiscal year, government and civil society were supported with 1.4

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<sup>93</sup> See more: <https://results.usaid.gov/results>

billions of dollars, while total spending was 17.68 billion dollars.<sup>94</sup> For the 2015 fiscal year, 1.3 billions of dollars were spent for the government and civil society and total spending was 18.292 billion dollars.<sup>95</sup> For the 2016 fiscal year, spending on government and civil society was not changed with 1.3 billions of dollars, while the total spending was 19.047 billion dollars.<sup>96</sup> In 2017, the spending for government and civil society was 1.6 billion dollars and the total spending increased to 19.316 billion dollars.<sup>97</sup> The proportion of the democracy related areas has shown a stable trend while the total funds have been increasing. Agriculture has the biggest share, while the funds for business and administration services are on the second in total funding of the USAID's operational fields. "General environmental protection", "health", "banking and financial services", "maternal and child health with family planning" are the other areas funded by the USAID.

#### **4.3. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED)**

"The American Political Foundation" founded an office in Washington, to provide "briefings", "appointments", and "other assistance" to "foreign parties", "parliamentary", and "academic visitors" to the United States, in 1980,. Two years later, President Reagan announced his goal to initiate mechanisms for "fostering the infrastructure of democracy", which covers "the system of a free press",

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<sup>94</sup> See more: <https://results.usaid.gov/results/country?fiscalYear=2014>

<sup>95</sup> See more: <https://results.usaid.gov/results/country?fiscalYear=2015>

<sup>96</sup> See more: <https://results.usaid.gov/results/country?fiscalYear=2016>

<sup>97</sup> See more: <https://results.usaid.gov/results/country?fiscalYear=2017>

“unions”, “political parties” and “universities”, that helps people to live in a democratic environment. This speech is regarded as one of the most important milestones in the founding of the “National Endowment for Democracy”<sup>98</sup>, which is assumed as one of the main mechanisms of external democracy promotion by the U.S.

The study of the “American Political Foundation” was funded by a 300.000 dollars award from the “Agency for International Development (AID)” and it became known as “The Democracy Program”.<sup>99</sup> The administrative board of this program consisted of a different range of participants in the U.S. politics and foreign policy making and then “the Democracy Program” suggested founding of a “private”, “bipartisan”, “non-profit organization” to be known as “the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)”. Although it was founded as a non-governmental body, the NED would be supported mainly through annual funds and it is subjected to congressional observance.<sup>100</sup> In line with this, National Endowment for Democracy would serve as “a grant-making foundation”, to distribute funds to different individuals and private organizations for “the purpose of promoting democracy” abroad.<sup>101</sup>

NED does not generate its own programs; instead it funds non-governmental organizations that are dealt with democracy promotion and human rights. The

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<sup>98</sup> See more: <https://www.ned.org/about/history/>

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

slogan of the NED is “supporting freedom around the world”.<sup>102</sup> It operates in almost 90 countries around the world for sustaining democratic goals. NED’s main operational field is to foster the “growth of the democratic institutions” abroad including non-governmental actors, unions of trade, political parties, functioning “free markets and business organizations” that help to preserve human rights, the rule of law and an independent media.<sup>103</sup> “Freedom of information”, “political processes”, “democratic ideas and values”, “strengthening political institutions”, “accountability”, “human rights”, “rule of law”, “civic education”, “NGO strengthening”, “freedom of association”, “developing market economy”, and “conflict resolution” are sponsored programs by the NED. Every year, NED informs the Congress to Congress regarding its activities in every quarter of the year and it acknowledges the funds received from the State (Lawson and Epstein, 2019, 11).

National Endowment for Democracy is different from USAID in several ways. Firstly, USAID is a tool of the State Department, NED is an independent institution funded by the U.S. Congress. Including its independent institutional characteristics, NED can support activities related with democracy in places where USAID or other official American entities are restricted by “law” or “diplomatic considerations”. Secondly, NED’s activities are generally regarded as more independent of the U.S. national foreign policy considerations compared with democracy and human rights activities implemented by the U.S. Department of State or USAID. NED grants are evaluated and confirmed or declined on a case-by-case basis by the NED board of directors. Lastly, emphasis of democracy and human rights in the areas supported by NED is much more nuanced than the USAID’s.

The outcomes of the NED grants are very surprising in terms of their goals. According to Scott and Steele (2005), the NED funds were not able to establish

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<sup>102</sup> See more: [www.ned.org](http://www.ned.org)

<sup>103</sup> See more: <https://www.ned.org/about/>

greater democratization. The outcome of their model is that there is a negative correlation between these funds and democracy scores. The NED aid neither established democracy in the recipient countries nor monitored democratization (Scott and Steele, 2005, 453). The negative correlation between democracy assistance and the democracy scores gave rise to a “dictatorship resistance”. This means that democracy assistance of NED strengthened the autocratic regimes in the 1990’s, instead of helping democratic transition (Scott and Steele, 2005, 454).

#### **4.4. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)**

The Department of State attached a special importance to the assistance of democracy as part of the foreign policy agenda after 9/11 in order to cope with radicalized terrorist groups. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was established to ensure democracy against these radical groups by the U.S Congress in 2004 for providing U.S. foreign assistance by focusing on good governance, country ownership, and results.<sup>104</sup> MCC works closely with the other countries that have been chosen according to their scores on a several indicators such as “ruling justly, investing in people, and encouraging economic freedom”.<sup>105</sup> “Human rights” and “democracy promotion activities” are not a usual funding field of MCC (Lawson and Epstein, 2019, 11). However, it is argued that the MCC selection process supports and promotes democracy and human rights, because MCC program eligibility is determined by specific must-hold signs related to civil liberties and political rights (Lawson and Epstein, 2019, 11). MCC aims to enable its partners accountable and transparent for “maintaining good democratic governance” during their

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<sup>104</sup>See more: <https://www.mcc.gov/about> Access Date: 31.01.2019

<sup>105</sup> See more: <https://www.mcc.gov/resources/doc/guide-to-the-indicators-fy-2019> Access Date: 11.04.2019

cooperation with MCC, and in cases where problems emerge, MCC has the right to suspend or terminate funding programs unilaterally. Therefore, the negative conditionality of losing an MCC program has created strong control for the U.S. government in promoting its own policy goals (Lawson and Epstein, 2019, 11).

MCC ensures “time-limited” grants for strengthening institutional capacity, promoting economic growth, and tackling with poverty. These investments have dual policy achievement. Firstly, the U.S. has the chance to support stability and prosperity in its partner countries. As a second achievement, MCC also preserves and enhances American interests with its cost-effective projects, limited staff, and an evidence-based approach. Due to its dual achievements, MCC is regarded as a good investment for the American people.<sup>106</sup>

In the environment of 9/11 terrorist attacks, it was realized that the lack of democracy in the Middle East was one of the major threats to Western democracies; therefore, “The U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)” was established as another tool for supporting democracy proponents in the region (Lawson and Epstein, 2019, 6). “The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)” program goals to improve stability and prosperity in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and supports governments and their citizens to achieve democratic values as shared political, economic and stability objectives (Lawson and Epstein, 2019, 6). The MEPI program’s field of work can be seen as the harmonization of the aims of NED and MCC. It responds to the needs and emerging opportunities for citizens and institutions that target two core objectives of liberal democracies: “Participatory Governance”, and “Economic Opportunity” (Lawson and Epstein, 2019, 6) for the wealth of the nations. The cross-cutting themes of these programs are that all of them are focusing on the relationship between the citizens and the

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<sup>106</sup>See more: <https://www.mcc.gov/about> Access Date: 10.02.2019

government. Regulating private sector, expanding democratic values via Civil Society Organizations and supporting good governance in state structure are among the goals of these programs<sup>107</sup> for the democratization of the MENA countries.

#### **4.5. U.S.' Democracy Promotion Policies in Egypt**

The U.S. implements differentiated democracy assistance with several different policies, which can be classified in four sections: “diplomacy”, “economic engagement”, “regional policy initiatives”, and “military intervention” (Markakis, 4). The first category, diplomacy, is the main tool of the U.S.’ foreign policy as a traditional democratic tool among the states. Usage of this tool by the democracy promoter country is both safe and useful in order to achieve its democratic goals. Secondly, the other afore-mentioned tools, including “economic engagement”, “regional policy initiatives” and even “military intervention” have been largely used by the U.S. in the Middle East. USAID, NED, MCC and MEPI are widely employed in the region as the important tools. Economic engagement is the other important channel to secure U.S.’ interests and values in other countries. There is a positive correlation with economic power and military intervention. Thanks to the economic power, the U.S. has been able to steer its relations with undemocratic states. The capacity of military intervention is determined by democracy promoter’s economy and the U.S. has become a leader position in the world, which uses military intervention in the name of democratic transition of autocratic regimes.

The U.S.’ interests in the Middle East have a long-standing history. The U.S. has turned its face to the Middle East after the Second World War. The main motivation of this policy was oil and then the Israeli question was added to its concerns. The

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<sup>107</sup> See more: <https://mepi.state.gov/about-mepi/> Access Date: 18.04.2019

“Suez Canal Crisis”<sup>108</sup> of 1956 has also empowered the position of the U.S. in the region (Markakis, 77).

Having Suez Canal territorially and being the most populous Arab state, Egypt, has drawn special attention of the U.S.. Since the 1979 Camp David Accords, Egypt has become completely an ally of the U.S. in the region (Markakis, 90). After these Accords, Egypt has a mediator role between the Israeli and the Arab States having the U.S.’ support in the Middle East. The 1979 Peace Treaty with Israel still preserves its position as the most significant diplomatic achievement for the promotion of Arab-Israeli peace in the world. This accord enabled Egypt to have the second largest share of the U.S. funds after Israel (Sharp, 2019, 6 and Cook, 2019).<sup>109</sup>

Egypt has also a strong civil society tradition with more than thirteen thousands NGO’s registered with the government (Brouwer, 25). Egypt has several trade unions, thirteen political parties, a number of human rights groups and an enormous social organization, Muslim Brotherhood, to expand democracy understanding in the country (Brouwer, 26). All of these have prepared a suitable environment for American way of democracy assistance. NED is one of the American democracy promoting institution in Egypt. It mainly funds civil society and

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<sup>108</sup> Till 1956, Suez Canal was governed by a joint venture of Britain, France and Egypt. In 1956 it was nationalized by the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The British engaged in a secret agreement with the French to intervene in Egypt. Another secret agreement with Israel provided the excuse for these two countries to intervene in Egypt, as Israel accepted to attack Egypt. When the conflict started between Israel and Egypt, the British and the French started a military intervention with the stated goal of ending the conflict. The threat of the support of Soviets to the Egyptians disturbed the USA. The USA called on Britain and France to withdraw from Egypt. For protecting the region from the Soviets, the USA supported Egypt in this war and then secured withdrawal of Britain and France. In the aftermath of this Suez crisis USA has taken a hegemonic role in the Middle East. See more: <https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/suez-crisis> Access Date: 18.04.2019

<sup>109</sup> Cook, Steven A. “Democracy Aid to Egypt Only Makes Matters Worse”, See more: <https://www.newsweek.com/democracy-aid-egypt-only-makes-matters-worse-80043>. Access Date: 01.04.2019.



individuals in the fields of healthcare, “freedom of information”, “human rights”, “democratic ideas and values” and “accountability and governance”. However, the amount of funds in this program is ultra-low in comparison with the U.S.’ military and economic aids to the Egyptian government. For 2018, just 10.000 dollars was allocated for Freedom Information and 35.000 dollars for Human Rights in Egypt<sup>110</sup>, while military aid was 1.306.800.000 dollars in the same year (Sharp, 2019, 27). Egyptian government has always had chance to repress the democracy demands of these civil society groups with support of the military and economic aids of the U.S.

U.S.’ democracy promotion activities in Egypt started just before the signing of Camp David Accords. U.S.-Egypt partnership, established under the USAID umbrella began in 1975. USAID undertook the mission of repairing Egypt’s destroyed infrastructure after the Arab-Israeli wars. Fixing ports and canals, providing clean water and sanitation for all Egyptians, establishing telecommunication tools and grain storage systems were the main projects of this U.S.-Egypt partnership in 1975. One year later, USAID expanded its partnership in Egypt and a renewable energy project was decided to be established in Egypt. Providing know how, human resources and technical assistance for this project was to be delivered by the U.S. via USAID program.<sup>111</sup> The Middle East Regional Cooperation Program (MERC) has been another USAID program applied by the U.S. in Egypt, which aims to enhance research cooperation between Egyptians and Israelis since 1981. Struggling against regional development challenges is the main aim of the MERC and developing

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<sup>110</sup> See more: [www.ned.org](http://www.ned.org) Access Date: 19.04.2019

<sup>111</sup> See more :  
[www.usaid.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapJournal/index.html?appid=cfc534c9234b492abcee7f80fb91cae6](http://www.usaid.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapJournal/index.html?appid=cfc534c9234b492abcee7f80fb91cae6) Access Date: 19.04.2019

sensitive detection methods for viruses infecting agriculture is one of the supported projects of the MERC.<sup>112</sup>

U.S. funds are mainly funneled into women empowerment, minorities, creating jobs and increasing marketable abilities of the Egyptian people and enhancing civil society in Egypt<sup>113</sup> instead of promoting and preserving truly democratic rights of the people. In addition to these undeniable human rights, market reforms of the Egypt was on the top agenda of the U.S. governments. Especially during the Clinton period in the beginning of 1990's, economic policy was the main concern of the U.S.' engagement with Egypt (Markakis, 93). Market liberalization and fiscal debt problems of Egypt during this period gave the way to Clinton administration to create a special economic policy of "1994 U.S.-Egypt Partnership for Economic Growth" (Markakis, 94). This partnership established a high-level cooperation between the two governments to foster economic reform and increase the private sector role in the Egyptian economy (Markakis, 94), which would enable Egypt to have democratic values. The possibility of a "Free Trade Agreement" between the U.S. and Egypt was another concern of the U.S. support in the era of the Clinton administration (Markakis, 94). The strong emphasis on the free market was mainly due to the understanding of the strong relationship between liberal market and democracy. Anwar Sadat's initiative of "open door policy", in other words *infitah*, which was sustained also during the Mubarak period, has been observed the first attempts towards the democratization of Egypt (Selim, 6). *Infitah* policy covers a number of reforms in the Egyptian economy towards the liberalization and embracing of neo-liberal economy policies in the 1990's that aims to move the Egyptian economy away from Nasser's nationalization with state-led economy policies for integrating Egypt's integration to the global economy (Selim, 51).

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<sup>112</sup> See more: <https://www.usaid.gov/where-we-work/middle-east/merc> Access Date: 19.04.2019

<sup>113</sup> See more: <https://www.usaid.gov/egypt>

The policies of the Clinton administration was to establish the foundations of the G.W. Bush's post-11 September initiatives to democratize Egypt. During the Clinton period, the policies towards calling for economic reform and the strengthening of civil society were important steps (Markakis, 106) for the MEPI, MCC and USAID's programs in Egypt.

#### **4.5.1. George W. Bush Period**

George W. Bush came to the office following the Clinton period in the U.S.. His democracy promotion rhetoric in Egypt can be assumed as the continuation of his predecessor's with some changes, because his attitude towards the Middle East in terms of democracy promotion was mainly shaped by the 9/11 attacks. The terrorist attacks held in New York, Virginia and Pennsylvania gave rise to pre-emptive policy against the terrorist attacks and his democracy promotion agenda was reflected in the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan (Markakis, 98). This attitude of the Bush administration's democratization was called as "aggressive" (Gambill, 2019).<sup>114</sup> Because Bush's democracy promotion activities mainly included military interventions of Iraq and Afghanistan. In his remarks at the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the NED, Bush addressed Egypt explicitly as an actor on the way of democracy. He emphasized that "democracy is the only way to achieve national success and dignity and Egypt would sustain its role as the main American ally in the region".<sup>115</sup> This speech was later named as "Freedom Agenda" by the administration (Gilley, 659). Freedom Agenda was a critique of the U.S.' post-Cold War strategy in the region. It

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<sup>114</sup> Gambill, Gary C. "Bush Was Right". See more : <https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/09/bush-was-right/> Access Date: 28.03.2019

<sup>115</sup> See more: <https://www.ned.org/remarks-by-president-george-w-bush-at-the-20th-anniversary/> Access Date: 28.03.2019

discursively emphasized human rights instead of supporting autocratic leaders in the Middle East (Gilley, 659). Although Freedom Agenda policy seemed to democratize autocratic Middle Eastern states, the final aim of democratization did not realize. Instead, extremism, radicalism and Anti-Americanism raised in the region in the aftermath of 2005 and 2006 elections (Wittes and Yerkes, 2006).

The Bush administration increased its economic support to Egypt between 2004 and 2007. The share of the aids on “democracy and governance” increased “by 133 percent”, “from 37 million dollars to 86.5 million dollars”—almost about a fifth of its all annual economic aid package to Cairo (Cooks, 2009).<sup>116</sup> The expense of these raises was reimbursed by cuts to aid towards “agriculture”, “environment”, “health care” and “infrastructure development”. The programs of these fields faced funding cuts ranging from 44 to 100 percent. Because of the change in the supported programs, some successfully implemented programs were eliminated, such as “improving the conditions of the poor rural farmers”. Instead of these kind of programs, Bush administration applied new programs, like running political-reform conferences for Egypt's regional governors who were only responsible to Mubarak and with more than half of them being police or military officers (Cooks, 2009). On the other hand, in 2004, the Bush administration closed an “NGO Service Center” opened in Egypt in 1999, because of the Egyptian government’s ability to control and undermine it (Gilley, 659). Owing to these policies, as stated by Gilley (2013), Egyptian people have benefitted less than the autocratic administration team of the Mubarak government from Bush’s democracy promotion activities (Gilley, 659).

Another characteristic of the Bush administration’s democracy promotion was that, supporting Islamist groups was something that was refrained in this period. While

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<sup>116</sup>Cook, Steven A. “Democracy Aid to Egypt Only Makes Matters Worse”, See more: <https://www.newsweek.com/democracy-aid-egypt-only-makes-matters-worse-80043> Access Date: 01.04.2019.

the secular liberal opposition groups were the focus of the U.S.' engagement with the Egyptian politics, the largest opposition movements of Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was not represented in the meetings between the U.S. and Egypt in terms of democracy promotion (Markakis, 100). The U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice clearly stated that the U.S. had no contacts with Muslim Brotherhood instead they have support Egyptian government within its own laws and reform process, adding that the U.S. would not think to have contact with Muslim Brotherhood in the future too, in a meeting with various civil society members of Egypt in Cairo<sup>117</sup> in 2005. This is an explicit sign that the Bush government avoided supporting Islamist groups in Egypt due to the fear of the violation of Israel-Egypt Peace Accords after Mubarak (Isaac, 2017, 24), despite the fact that democratization of Egypt would not seem possible with a policy of ignoring the biggest opposition group, Muslim Brotherhood.

The main tool of the U.S. is bilateral economic aid (covering military assistance) to Egypt, which is calculated as 78.3 billions of dollars for the years between 1946 and 2016 (Sharp, 2019, 25). These dollars were allocated to military aid, but there is no official record of those funds (Sharp, 2019, 21). Only in July 2007, the George W. Bush Administration had announced, as a part of a larger arms package to the region, that it would begin discussions with Egypt on a proposed 13 billion dollars military aid agreement over a 10-year period. Since Egypt was already receiving approximately 1.3 billion dollars a year in military assistance, the announcement represented no major change in the U.S. aid policy toward Egypt. Since then, no such bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on U.S. military aid to Egypt has been reached by the Bush, Obama, or Trump Administrations with the Egyptian government (Sharp, 2019, 21). The U.S. used those two tools to preserve regional stability, sustain the treaty of Camp David and counter terrorism (Sharp, 2019, 22), since terrorism is perceived as a main threat to democracy.

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<sup>117</sup> See more : <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0506/S00328/rice-qa-at-the-american-university-in-cairo.htm> Access Date: 04.05.2019

In terms of democracy, MEPI supported election monitors from the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies and the Egyptian Association for Supporting Democracy. These organizations were trained with U.S. funds under the MEPI, given for the first time without Egyptian government approval (Gilley, 669) during the Bush period. These institutions received 520,000 dollars in MEPI funding, allowing them to increase their monitoring team from 168 in the 2005 elections to more than 5,000 for the 2010 polls (Gilley, 669). These monitors recorded the fraud of the 2010 elections and then paved the way to Tahrir Square demonstrations, frustrated by what they had seen (Gilley, 669). As cited by Bruce, thanks to these programs of the U.S., Egyptians witnessed the most transparent electoral process in 2005.<sup>118</sup>

Bush's democracy promotion towards Egypt can be characterized by ups and downs. While he put freedom and democracy at the top of his foreign policy agenda, its success in terms of achieving democracy in Egypt should be questioned. Bush increased democracy and governance funds in Egypt in 2002<sup>119</sup> but this did not help to secure democracy and alleviate Anti-Americanism sourced by Iraq war and the U.S.-Israeli relations.<sup>120</sup> Moreover, the main actors of the uprising were anti-Western groups due to the West's strong support to Mubarak administration.<sup>121</sup> The military interventions of his administration in Iraq and Afghanistan got negative reaction in the region. Especially in the Iraq case, democracy promotion was never

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<sup>118</sup> "Egypt" in Freedom in the World (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2006).

<sup>119</sup> See more: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/02/14/why-obama-shouldnt-increase-democracy-aid-to-egypt/> Access Date: 25.04.2019

<sup>120</sup> See more: <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2004/04/understanding-arab-anti-americanism.html> Access Date: 25.04.2019

<sup>121</sup> See more: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/middle-east-egypt-us-policy/409537/> Access Date: 25.04.2019

listed as the original justification of the military intervention, instead possession of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and the link between Iraq and al-Qaeda were asserted as the biggest threat for the Western Democracies (Selim, 92). This understanding also legitimized the U.S.' cooperation with autocratic Middle Eastern states to preserve stability. This cooperation also planted more seeds of the radicalism and anti-Americanism in both Sinai Peninsula and beyond.

#### **4.6. Arab Uprisings and the Reaction U.S. in Terms of Democracy Promotion**

Following Bush, Barack Obama came to the presidency office in the U.S. His tone was softer than Bush's foreign policy. At least he did not start any military intervention in the Middle East in the name of democracy. Nevertheless, he sustained traditional clumsy democracy promotion policies of the U.S. preferring a security co-operation with a friendly and stable Egypt instead of more democratic Egypt.<sup>122</sup>

The discourse of democracy promotion in the foreign policy of the U.S. was reinterpreted during the Obama administration in parallel with its own strategic priorities and diplomatic way. Obama administration turned the prism of democracy promotion towards a better engagement with how it views America's role and needs in the world. This is not a new attitude because in the recent decades, American presidents have reinterpreted and adapted the democracy tradition to comply with their strategic priorities and political inclinations. For example, Jimmy Carter moisturized his democracy promotion agenda with human rights in a post-Vietnam and post-Watergate context, Ronald Reagan nuanced anti-communism in the final decade of the Cold War, Bill Clinton highlighted American

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<sup>122</sup> See more: <https://theconversation.com/obama-has-put-national-security-ahead-of-promoting-democracy-abroad-62711> Access Date: 19.04.2019

economic renewal within post-Cold War -globalization- era and George W. Bush's main priority was the War on Terror after 9/11 (Bouchet, 2011, 573).

Obama's initial democracy promotion policy in Egypt was parallel with his predecessors Clinton and George W. Bush. But his policy differed from this traditional approach of the U.S. in five contexts due to the domestic developments in Egypt politics (Bouchet, 2016).<sup>123</sup> These contexts mainly come from Egypt's domestic policy improvements starting with the 2011 Arab uprisings.

Obama had good relations with Mubarak just before the uprising on the framework of the "principled pragmatism".<sup>124</sup> Bush was rarely criticizing Mubarak on human rights abuses and announcing that the U.S. would oppose an additional foreign aid to Egypt (Slevin, 2002)<sup>125</sup>, Obama did not announce such an opposition against Mubarak before the Egyptian uprising. He told the press in 2009 that Mubarak was a substantial ally of the U.S. and they would work together in the region and the cooperation between the Obama administration and Mubarak regime would continue.<sup>126</sup> During the initial two years of Obama period, the U.S.' military aid was 2.603.232.000 dollars and economic aid was 989.688.055 dollars to Mubarak

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<sup>123</sup> See more: <https://www.e-ir.info/2016/09/06/long-game-hard-choices-the-obama-administration-and-democracy-in-egypt/> Access Date: 02.04.2019

<sup>124</sup> "Principled pragmatism" refers to relations with the autocratic regimes. According to Hillary Clinton this engagement was constructed on the recognition of a link between development, democracy and human rights. See more: <https://www.politico.com/blogs/ben-smith/2009/12/principled-pragmatism-on-human-rights-023486>

<sup>125</sup> Slevin, Peter. "Bush, in Shift on Egypt, Links New Aid to Rights", See more : [https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/08/15/bush-in-shift-on-egypt-links-new-aid-to-rights/36a608d5-56b7-4ebe-9356-7135b8e0cabe/?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.f2ce3df6115f](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/08/15/bush-in-shift-on-egypt-links-new-aid-to-rights/36a608d5-56b7-4ebe-9356-7135b8e0cabe/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f2ce3df6115f) Access Date: 04.04.2019

<sup>126</sup> President Obama and President Mubarak Speaks to Press (2009). See more: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iEkHL74NCak>



government (Sharp, 2019, 27). Moreover, Obama administration reduced the total amounts of the U.S. funds for democracy promotion by 43 percent for the 2009/2010 fiscal year (Sharp, 2019, 27). USAID also changed its policy on funding and it diverted its funds to only government registered NGO's in Egypt (Selim, 94) during the Obama period.

When the protests began in Tahrir square in 2011, Obama's policy changed and democracy became apparent in his speeches at the discursive level. In his initial speeches about the protests, he refrained from an explicit opposition against Mubarak saying that the regime should not use violence on protesters and Egypt's future should be determined by the Egyptians (Dreyfus, 2012).<sup>127</sup> His call to Egyptian military for being "professional and patient" was assumed as the "turning point" in the Egyptian uprising (Dreyfus, 2012). He called for an immediate action for transition in the Egyptian government and for the change to start in the same speech on February 1, 2011. After this date, he deliberately supported the opposition in Egypt and disposed of Mubarak. The administration separated his ways with Mubarak only when it became evident that Mubarak's position was no more sustainable in the country and the Obama administration made apparent its preference for an orderly and smooth transition that would be led by the Egyptian military (Carothers, 2013, 208). The U.S.' "cautious" and extremely reactive daily policies during the early protests of 2011 can be regarded as an attempt to keep the equations in the Egyptian balance of powers (Bouchet, 2011, 586). When the Mubarak period ended in February 2011, Obama administration announced that the U.S. would cut its democracy and governance funding to Egypt.<sup>128</sup> But the protestors' victory against Mubarak's autocracy became clear, the U.S. media

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<sup>127</sup> Dreyfus, Bob. "Obama and Egypt's Revolution". See more: <https://www.thenation.com/article/obama-and-egypts-revolution/> Access Date: 04.04.2019

<sup>128</sup> See more: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/02/14/why-obama-shouldnt-increase-democracy-aid-to-egypt/> Access Date: 25.04.2019

announced that the U.S.' democracy-building campaigns played a bigger role in stimulating protests than was previously known and it was acknowledged that the key leaders of the movements have been trained by the Americans in the fields of campaigning, organizing through new media tools and monitoring elections (Nixon, 2011).<sup>129</sup> Although the huge amount of the U.S. funds were channeled to military instead of democratic goals, the U.S. lived and let live for itself in Egypt's democratization process.

After the Muslim Brotherhood took office in Egypt, Obama demonstrated his goodwill towards the new democratically elected regime. Along 2011 and 2012 the U.S. funded Egyptian army to carry through its transition promises (Carothers, 2013, 209) for achieving the U.S.' "democratic" achievements. But that aid had seen some cuts after the newly elected government of Egypt detained some Americans and Europeans who are engaged in democracy assistance programs in Egypt. The Obama administration decided to end its large amount of assistance to the Egyptian military (Carothers, 2013, 209) but it was not implemented. During the Morsi period, the U.S. did not challenge the Muslim Brotherhood's human rights and democracy violations, because the regime did not act against the U.S. foreign policy. Increasing American frustration with the abuse of democratic and human rights only led to a slow increase in the criticisms at the level of discourse expressed by lower-level officials (Bouchet, 2016).<sup>130</sup> The reason of this ineffective criticism to condemn the Muslim Brotherhood's undemocratic policies is that the U.S. believed that only Muslim Brotherhood could ensure the stability in Egypt and the Arab world after Mubarak. The Muslim Brotherhood was seen as the most-organized entity in the country and they were perceived to have the capability to restore

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<sup>129</sup> Nixon, Ron. "U.S. Groups Helped Nurture Arab Uprisings". 2011. See more: <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/world/15aid.html>

<sup>130</sup>See more: <https://www.e-ir.info/2016/09/06/long-game-hard-choices-the-obama-administration-and-democracy-in-egypt/> Access Date: 02.04.2019

stability and preserve the same strategic coalitions of the previous regime (Selim, 100).

When Fattah El-Sisi came to power in Egypt after the coup in 2013, the U.S. stance to this new undemocratic change was not clear, unlike the beginning of the 2011 protests. In 2011, Obama primarily supported Mubarak at the beginning, and then changed his side when the end of Mubarak period became clear. But in 2013 coup, his administration declared that they were on “neither side”.<sup>131</sup> However, the main thought of the U.S. was to demand new elections or a broader coalition in Egyptian politics.<sup>132</sup> Therefore, the U.S. sustained its democratic, military, and economic support to undemocratic Sisi government regardless of how they violated the democracy in Egypt. The Obama administration announced that they would cut all aid to the coup administration of Egypt in 2013<sup>133</sup> but this was not implemented, instead economic aid from the U.S. to Egypt was increased from 90.260.725 dollars (for 2012) to 330.576.763 dollars in 2013 (Sharp, 2019, 27).

The idealist characteristics of Obama’s discourse were not compatible with his policy of democracy promotion implementation. Engagement with the autocratic government of Mubarak and sustaining this engagement with the following autocratic Morsi and Sisi administrations are not compatible with democracy’s own ideals. Additionally, this inconsistency between theory and practice was not suitable for democracy promotion idea; it was more in line with “principled pragmatism” of

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<sup>131</sup> See more: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/egypt-obama-us-mohamed-morsi-crisis> Access Date: 09.04.2019

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

<sup>133</sup> See more: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/09/us-cut-aid-egypt-obama-morsi> Access Date: 09.04.2019

his own period. As his predecessors, Obama chose stability and security in democracy-stability nexus.

The subtitle of the general U.S. approach is that it funded Egyptian administration just for enhancing its strategic priorities. Instead of raising awareness of the Egyptian citizens regarding their own democratic rights and establishing more democratic environments, the U.S. support just helped to strengthen the autocratic administrations in Egypt both before the uprising and after that.

#### **4.7. Conclusion**

The fact is the United States has spent many billions of dollars in Egypt on arms, commodities, and Egypt-defined “development”, but not on democracy and NGOs (Carpenter, 2009).<sup>134</sup> Ambassador Francis Ricciardone defined the training of Egyptian army officials as a kind of planting the seeds of democratic transformation within military and argued that the most decisively “transformative” way of the U.S. military assistance, is to send more Egyptian officers to train in the U.S. But this explanation is far from plausibility of the U.S.’ democracy promotion aims in Egypt (Markakis, 101).

The democracy promotion funds for Egypt constitutes only small portion of the whole funds for the country. During the Mubarak period, the U.S. was unwilling to democratize Egypt, rather it focused on the inhibition of the political rise of the anti-Western groups like the Muslim Brotherhood as an outcome of democracy promotion (Selim, 92). Arab uprisings did not make any changes on this policy. Although the U.S. policy makers took sides with the Egyptian protestors discursively,

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<sup>134</sup> See more: <https://blogs.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/05/ditching-democracy-in-egypt/comment-page-1/> Access Date : 01.04.2019

in reality, the U.S. did not support change in autocratic governments of Egypt until the last minutes (Selim, 97).

According to Freedom House's report on freedom in the world ranking, Egypt is not "free" in terms of democracy (Sharp, 2019, 4) due to its undemocratic policies towards its own people but it still attracts democracy support tools of the U.S. due to its importance in the Arab-Israeli conflict and cooperation with the U.S. administration on counter-terrorism.<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>135</sup>Egypt and the United States: Collaborating to Fight Terrorism, Fact Sheet, Embassy of Egypt, Washington D.C. , And also see more : <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180907-joint-military-counter-terror-training-operation-between-egypt-and-us/> Access Date: 11.04.2019

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **COMPARISON OF THE TWO APPROACHES REGARDING EGYPT**

#### **5.1. Similarities of the Democracy Promotion Policies**

Western democracy promotion activities in the Middle East have overwhelmingly been sustained by two actors: the EU and the U.S. These two different styles have shared some common characteristics as well as divergences. Perhaps due to these characteristics, they are sometimes perceived to compensate each other's deficiencies in the region (Isaac and Kares, 2017, 29). American and the EU approaches are very similar in terms of responding to threats to security, strengthening governance and supporting development in the Mediterranean (Isaac and Kares, 2017, 29).

According to Isaac and Kares (2017), the EU's neo-functional policies towards the Mediterranean with non-military tools are convenient to cope with several soft security threats. These policies serve a kind of complementary role in addition to the American military presence in the Middle East (Isaac and Kares, 2017, 29). The U.S. benefits from a comparative advantage from such complementarity in democracy promotion policies. This complementarity makes the U.S. more advantageous in security issues against a growing benefit for the EU in economic development and governance issues, even if both actors have dealt with democratization and political reform from a security perspective (Isaac and Kares, 2017, 29). Therefore, the American and European policies are not in conflict or they have their independent but compatible goals, which are based on "shared

interests". This situation is demonstrated in the big majority of the policy areas dealt by the EU and the U.S., from security concerns and democracy issues to economic development and preserving allied trade partners. However, the analysis in this study ends with the Obama period. It is observed that the cooperation will probably be more complicated in the future, because of Donald Trump's policies, especially, the "America First" policy.

The European multilateralism towards undemocratic Mediterranean states complements the American unilateralism (Isaac and Kares, 2017, 29). However, Risse and Babayan (2015) advocate that, is the hard-soft power dichotomy no longer applies when comparing the American and European democracy promotion policies. Because, the two policies have merged in terms of goals, strategies and instruments (Babayan and Viviani, 2013, 10). But the EU still avoids to bring democracy into undemocratic countries, such as Iraq and Afghanistan by coercive methods. This ensures that it can get support from its people in terms of democracy (Babayan and Viviani, 2013, 10).

The two Western powers give importance to liberal values in their policies in a similar way, but in fact, they prioritize stability instead of democracy in practice. This is evident in the relationship between the Western and the autocratic states of the Middle East. Supporting these governments in areas other than democracy and human rights, has contributed to the stabilization of the autocratic regimes in the Mediterranean. And the reason of this support can be explained by the fear that a sudden change in these regimes would bring anti-Western and Islamist governments into power in the region and threaten the access to natural resources or the security of borders which would be jeopardized by regime change, political instability, civil war and migration flows in the region (Börzel, Dandashly and Risse, 2015, 7). As it is known, when the Islamists came to power in some Mediterranean states such as Tunisia and Egypt after the Arab uprisings, the Western powers were

surprised by this change and reacted slowly and inconsistently (Börzel, Dandashly and Risse, 2015, 7).

Another similarity of the EU-U.S. democracy promotion policies is the deepening gap between the rhetoric and the practices (Isaac and Kares, 2017, 27). While conditionality was not a matter of the agreements between the bilateral relations of the U.S. and the local governments, the EU envisaged a kind of positive conditionality in its MEDA and ENP programs on a “more for more” basis for the Mediterranean countries. However, the membership of these countries to the Union was not at stake, so in practice the EU’s positive conditionality was not very effective on these autocratic countries. Moreover, negative conditionality was only foreseen in the ENP framework. However, it was not adopted against any infringement of human rights in these regimes (Isaac and Kares, 2017, 27).

Another observed similarity between the two approaches is that they have the utilitarian characteristics. (Junemann and Maggi, 117) According to this understanding, external democracy promotion is a foreign policy strategy to pursue the sender actor’s national interests with foreign policy instruments, rather than seeking normative purposes. Democracy promotion is also used as one of the instrumental tools (Junemann and Maggi, 117). The EU was established on democratic values and norms, and its decision-making bodies highlight these norms. The normative approach to democracy promotion policies in other countries may fit the EU’s characteristics. However, this study suggests that in practice, the EU does not export democracy just for the sake of these norms, as this study on the Egyptian case reveals. It has implemented external democracy promotion policies for its own interests and this corresponds to the understanding of utilitarian approach. This is similar to foreign policy of the U.S. and specifically its external democracy promotion policies. They have both targeted to contribute to the democratization, discursively, of a non-democratic country by supporting the authoritarian



government as long as that government acts in line with their own interests. Foreign aid are also common instruments in the EU's and the implementations of the U.S.. Due to these items, democracy promotion policies of the EU and the U.S. can be regarded as the examples of the utilitarian understanding of the democracy promotion, especially in our case of Egypt.

The utilitarian understanding of democracy promotion involves highly selective policies<sup>136</sup> , which have been applied by the West since 2001 until now due to political, and security concerns. These policies are characterized by high rhetoric more than policy practices, a top down approach and modest funds for democracy related projects. Both the U.S. and the EU have overwhelmingly cooperated with the governments instead of the citizens and they have allocated modest funding to the democracy and governance projects and economic development of the Mediterranean region has been aimed by the EU and the U.S. for the sake of stabilization (Isaac and Kares, 2017, 28).

Lastly, neither the American nor the European way of democracy promotion led to achievements towards liberal democracy in the recipient country, namely Egypt. Therefore, they both are criticized by their taxpayers inside (Magen, Risse and McFaul, 5) since they helped to stabilize undemocratic governments abroad.

#### **5.1.1. Similarities in Egyptian Case**

The democracy promotion efforts of the transatlantic democracy promoters have a stable trend in Egypt (Selim, 81). The EU and the U.S. have often acted simultaneously. A characteristic is that the biggest majority of their financial aids

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<sup>136</sup> <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/01/10/how-the-west-selectively-promotes-democracy-through-sanctions/>

have been given to the central government instead of non-governmental actors. This can be explained by the top-down approach, which means the decisions are taken by the executive authority.<sup>137</sup> As stated by Huber (2008) this approach has necessitated that the big majority of the MEPI funds were given to the central government before 2011 in the MENA region (Huber, 2008, 45-49).<sup>138</sup> Similarly, the most of EU funds given through ENPI went to the Egyptian government. When the EU's funds are compared with the military support of the U.S. to the Egyptian administrations, Egypt was a "medium scale recipient of the EU funds" in the framework of MEDA and the ENP aids.<sup>139</sup>

The main reason behind the modest funding allocation to Egypt is that the Western powers did not want a regime change in this country (Imtiaz, 9). Therefore, they preferred to use a "top-down" strategy for the democratization of Egypt. This strategy necessitates engagement with a combination of the state institutions and the political parties (Youngs, 2002, 14). Youngs calls this as "political-institutional sphere within a political society". In addition, he sees this as an essence of democracy. It is argued that a top-down strategy ensures to associate the political contract understanding of John Locke with political parties, which play an essential function in the aggregation of interests, and one or more layers of the local government (Imtiaz, 9). However, the EU refrained from supporting political parties in the MENA, but the U.S. did not refrain from supporting political parties.

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<sup>137</sup> See More: <https://politicalpipeline.wordpress.com/2013/02/21/top-down-and-bottom-up-approaches-within-implementation/> Access Date: 18.05.2019

<sup>138</sup> See also : The Annexes of Isaac and Kares 2017.

<sup>139</sup> See more: [https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/area/projects\\_en?page=1](https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/area/projects_en?page=1) Access Date: 15.05.2019

One of the distinctive characteristics of Egypt in its region is that it is a rich country in terms of its civil society organizations. Therefore, these organizations have constituted an important place in the democratization of Egyptian politics. The U.S. and the EU have often engaged with them expressing a desire to implement a “bottom-up” strategy for the democracy promotion. These policies have aimed to strengthen civil society to preserve good governance. However, the civil society received limited support from the Western powers compared to the central government. The EU and the U.S. cautiously supported civil society movements (Risse and Babayan, 2015, 382). In line with this refrainment, the big majority of the supported Civil Society Organizations (CSO’s) have been consisting of those, which are registered to the Egyptian governments. These registered CSO’s have been regarded as “quasi governmental” organizations and the shared point of these organizations were that they have non-Islamist characteristics (Cassarino and Tocci, 5). In spite of these characteristics of prudential bottom up strategy, Egyptian uprising took place in 2011 with the contributions of the CSO’s, this made Western powers surprised, and that is why the Western reaction was slow and inconsistent during the uprising (Börzel, Dandashly and Risse, 2015, 7).

Americans and Europeans both needed a change in their discriminatory policy towards Islamist movements after 2011. They updated their schemes to fund a wide range of civil society organizations, but it is still being stated that the big majority of the funds are being channeled to registered CSO’s in Egypt (Stephan, Lakhani and Naviwala, 5).

Another similarity between the two policy approaches is that both actors have funded the same sectors (Dalacoura, 2005, 966): both funded decentralization projects and legal/judicial programs (Isaac and Kares, 2017, 29). In addition to these democracy related programs, agriculture and private businesses are the two other important sectors funded by both actors under their democratization policy.

Development cooperation was among main aims of the European democracy promotion programs, MEDA, EMP and ENP in Egypt (Van Hüllen, 2009, 6). The cooperation areas under these programs were financial sector, environment, and women's empowerment. The U.S. has also supported these sectors with its democracy promotion programs, such as USAID, MEPI and MCC.

Americans and Europeans have also tried to create areas of free trade between Egypt and themselves. This was another concern of the Western powers in their relationship with Egypt. Economic development was integral to the democracy promotion agenda and it was thought that economic development of Egypt would contribute to this possible FTA. On the other hand, economic development has also been seen vital for the progress of Egypt in democracy. When stating their interest on Egyptian economic development, the EU and the U.S. often stress the connection between democracy and liberal economy. However, in order to enhance liberal economy, they supported an illiberal regional power and an important progress was not recorded in terms of liberal democratic values.

The last similarity concerns the political cooperation policy of these two powers with local opposition actors in Egypt. Supporting the Muslim Brotherhood was not considered until they won the 2012 elections. When protests erupted in Cairo, the Western powers called for a "peaceful transition" and nuanced the importance of stability in the Egypt. Until the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood, they sustained their daily policies. As stated by Wolff (2015) with the "religious turn" the Western powers have engaged with the Islamists in Egypt (Wolff, 2015, 2). The Islamists did not even have the right to comment on Egypt's democratization before the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood after the uprisings. However, neither the U.S. nor the EU did not leave their pragmatic pursuit of stabilization when they began supporting political Islamists after 2011 (Isaac and Kares, 2017, 25-26).

## 5.2. Differences in General

Democratization have three broad tasks as (a) ending the authoritarian regime (the first wave of the democratization) (b) constituting a democratic regime (the second wave) and (c) enhancing the democratic regime according to Huntington (Huntington, 50). Americans prioritize the first, while Europeans prioritize the third (Imtiaz, 9). The EU believes that the regime-change can be ensured through policy changes instead of a removal of the autocratic regime by a military intervention. While the U.S. does not refrain to use military intervention regardless of geographical boundaries, European democracy promotion activities show a strict geographically concentric pattern and more emphasis on neighboring countries than the distant countries (Imtiaz, 9). The Mediterranean region is one of the territories, which are focused on by both of them with shared and different goals.

European democracy promotion started in the 1990s with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Although the initial steps were taken in the Cold War era, the involvement of the American military in the Middle East for democracy promotion started after the 9/11 attacks. Initially, the U.S. wanted to contain the Soviet Union, having secure energy resources and securing Israel in the region (Dalacoura, 2010, 59). Regarding democracy promotion policy practices, the analysis of Isaac and Kares (2017) indicates that there is an explicit difference between American and European priorities in the Mediterranean region. While the U.S. interests and practices have aimed to affect the Eastern Mediterranean countries, such as Syria, Egypt, Israel and Cyprus specifically due to strategic and hard security interests, the EU has concentrated on all the Mediterranean sub-regions, coding these regions as the EU's "neighborhood" (Isaac and Kares, 21). However, rather than the Southern Mediterranean, Western Balkans received more attention from the EU. The Western Balkans has been given accession prospects while other parts of the Mediterranean (Southern and Eastern Mediterranean) have been considered in

light of their increasingly rising economic, political, social demographic and security interdependence with Europe itself (Isaac and Kares, 21). Another issue is that the Americans were criticized for their non-holistic approach by Europeans. While the European attitude towards the Middle East is based on gradual and comprehensive processes with its links liberal democratic values structure, the U.S. conducts promotion activities based on its own understanding of democracy style (Youngs and Wittes, 96). The European perspective is that an increase in social justice could democracy. It is a view that sees a spillover effect from the economics to the politics. For example, pro-poor policies of the European governments are regarded as a supplement to these governments' democracy promotion activities (Hartmann, 35). The assumption in Europe is that increasing living standards of the people would serve to increase democratic standards of the countries. The relation between different social grounds of democracy, i.e. local participation, modernization of governance structure and social justice has been neglected by the U.S. and the Europeans criticized this implementation of the U.S., stating that "developing democracy is not like making instant coffee" (Patten, 2004).<sup>140</sup>

Another distinction is that while the U.S. has a balanced fund allocation especially in the USAID funds between the government and the civil society, the EU has focuses on the governments in its EMP and ENP programs (Huber, 2008, 58). It can be said that the U.S. has balanced top down and the bottom up strategies in the USAID. However, the EU has mainly focused on capacity building of the state structure in its programs and this means that the Europeans overwhelmingly used a top-down strategy The EU engaged with CSOs within the EIDHR framework. This reminds us that the EU has also chosen the bottom up approach, but these CSO's were all registered ones to the government. Therefore, an indirect permission of

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<sup>140</sup> Patten, Chris. (2004) "Islam and the West: At the Crossroads," speech at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, May 24, 2004. See more: [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-04-256\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-04-256_en.htm) Access Date: 02.07.2019

government has been a matter in EIDHR too and the EU's overall top-down approach was not changed by the implementation of the EIDHR program.

The last divergence democracy promotion methods is this: the EU can offer membership, if a candidate country democratizes. The European Union has often promoted democracy near its close neighborhood, especially in the post-Soviet countries. It has used its magnetic “pull” in and gifted membership to reformist governments. However the U.S. does not have any chance to offer any membership as a reward for democratization, instead the American way of democracy is perceived as “push” with coercive actions and its export of democracy has a narrower impact as seen in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan (Magen, Risse and McFaul, 16).

#### **5.2.1. Differences in Egyptian Case**

There have been a few differences between the American and European policies towards Egypt. Israel’s security and the war on terror were the main motives for the American in their dealings with Mubarak (Selim, 92). They worked with Mubarak in line with the “context” of war on terror, and this cooperation helped to legitimize the repressive and violent policies of the Mubarak regime on Islamist opposition (Selim, 93). This partnership had its roots in past cooperations (Selim, 93).

The European policies in Egypt did not prioritize Egypt’s democratization. Instead, liberalizing Egyptian economy was on the foremost priority. Moreover, securing energy and trade routes and dealing with migration problems were the other concerns of the EU, while investing in “Egyptian democracy”. The way the EU allocated its aid funds demonstrates this. The democracy promotion aid was only 1.2 billion Euros between 1996 and 2006, which equals to 120 million every year

(Selim, 93). The 15 years old Barcelona Process's assessment has confirmed this observation. The most successful basket of the Barcelona process was the economic basket when compared with the political/security and the last basket, namely, social/cultural basket (Selim, 94). In this context, the EU tried to control illegal immigration and ensure information exchange with intelligence services for counter-terrorism, which in turn encouraged the autocratic administration in Egypt (Selim, 94).

The Americans and Europeans have supported almost the same sectors in this region. The two powers prefer to enhance functioning liberal economic institutions and development goal projects. However, the U.S. supported one more area than the EU: the military. International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program is the assistance program to train "future leaders" and extend the capabilities of the national armies.<sup>141</sup> According to the State Department, the IMET does not only enhance military capabilities of the allied countries, it also enhances the knowledge of the military and civilian personnel in terms of maintaining the democratic values and it improves the standard of human rights in their countries.<sup>142</sup> This program nuances the capability of the "hard" power of the U.S. in the region. In comparison with the IMET funds, democracy and human rights support of the two powers remained very low in the Egypt.

Market capitalization, tackling irregular migration and securing energy routes are mostly considered as the main priorities of the EU in its partnership with Egypt, while preserving Israel in the region and funding the Egyptian military for Israel's

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<sup>141</sup> See more: <https://www.dsca.mil/programs/international-military-education-training-imet> Access Date: 08.05.2019

<sup>142</sup> See more: Description of the Programs <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/213450.pdf> Access Date: 08.05.2019



safety, as well as fight against terrorism are mostly prioritized by the U.S.. Democracy promotion has been used as an instrument by both powers to achieve these goals.

### **5.3. Conclusion**

The EU and the U.S. are the main democracy promoters in the Middle East. Although there are differences between their methods, the similarities have been more numerous in Egypt's democratization.

Both of them funded the central government for further liberalization of the Egyptian economy. They focused on sectors such as agriculture, energy and infrastructure. They also both funded CSOs, but only non-Islamist and state-registered ones. However, political parties are not a shared target of the two powers. While the U.S. funded political parties, the EU did not follow suit with it.

When faced with a choice between democracy and stability, both actors chose the latter. An autocratic administration could serve the Western interests by securing Israel, helping fight against terrorism, providing safety of energy routes and tackling irregular migration.

After the Arab uprisings, both have changed their attitude toward Islamists and announced their support for the Muslim Brotherhood, even though they did not engage with this biggest opposition movement in Egyptian politics before. This revised policy of the two powers could only be explained by the importance they attach to the stability of Egypt for their interests.

The major difference between the democracy promotion policies of the two powers arises because of the American military aid to Egypt. The U.S. funded the Egyptian army for democratization as well as security. The same cannot be said about the EU.

Policy concerns including stabilizing the region for trade and economic purposes, securing Israel, having sustainable energy sources and tackling the migration problem overwhelmed their concerns for democracy in Egypt. Therefore, we conclude that both actors followed a utilitarian method.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **CONCLUSION**

Democracy promotion is among the most widely analysed concepts in contemporary international relations. Although its history dates back to ancient times, the modern implementation of it has started just after the Second World War and has been accelerated after the Cold War.

The EU and the U.S. are the two most important agents of democracy promotion in the Middle East and North Africa, including Egypt. The EU used EMP, ENP, the EIDHR for helping the democratic transition in Egypt. The U.S. has also implemented USAID, MEPI and the NED as instruments. Nevertheless, the allocated funds for democracy promotion lagged behind the military aid given by the U.S. and infrastructure investment done by the EU to Egypt. They both supported civil society, supremacy of law, sound governance and democratic transition of state institutions, but the funds received by autocratic administrations in Egypt in other areas have exceeded all of the democracy-aimed funds. Therefore, democracy promotion was overshadowed by other goals. It is observed that the EU and the U.S. have implemented the democracy promotion from a utilitarian perspective.

There are a few reasons why democracy promotion has lagged. A large amount of European funds has been invested in the reform of the Egyptian economy and Egypt's infrastructure as in the other Mediterranean countries, which have been parties to the EMP and the ENP. Because there are several European firms operating in Egypt, to safeguard them is very important for the EU. The EU is also

dependent on Egyptian energy reserves and securing energy routes and having long-standing contracts and reliable supply of energy are vital for all European member states. On the other hand, migration related issues constitute the important part of the ENP Action Plan.<sup>143</sup> Compared to more pressing issues, democratization of Egypt is not a priority from a European perspective. This is why Mubarak was supported by the Europeans in spite of his autocratic leadership. The external support legitimized his power in both internal and regional politics and prevented the regime change. The EU was slow to react to the Arab Spring. Firstly, the EU refrained to act and support the protestors. When the Muslim Brotherhood won the elections in 2012, the EU showed its intention to support the new government, but this support was not substantial. The EU promised to give only 44.9 million Euros for political and judiciary reforms after Mubarak was overthrown, and retracted on this promise due to the lack of necessary reforms expected from the government of Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>144</sup> Nevertheless, the EU did not show this sensitivity towards reforms, when Sisi took power by a coup in 2013 in Egypt. It only called the bloody coup as “disturbing” and “awkward”.<sup>145</sup> Cutting the aid of 5 billion Euros to the EU-Egypt Task Force was not even an issue on the EU’s agenda. It only agreed on suspending arms license of Egypt,<sup>146</sup> whose military equipment has been mainly supplied by the Americans. The EU refrained from criticizing the Sisi government even though its non-democratic domestic policies are considered to be

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<sup>143</sup> See more: [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-07-284\\_en.htm?locale=en](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-07-284_en.htm?locale=en) Access Date: 11.07.2019

<sup>144</sup> Ibid.

<sup>145</sup> See more: <https://euobserver.com/foreign/120766> (Access Date: 17.01.2019).

<sup>146</sup> See more: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/aug/21/eu-egypt-violence-aid-programmes> (Access Date : 07.01.2019)

“worse than Mubarak” period.<sup>147</sup> This shows us that the only supranational entity which is supposed to be based on shared values of liberal democracy can easily ignore these “idealistic” concepts in service of more “realistic” concerns. Moreover, the EU’s non-sincerity towards the democratization could be understood from its undifferentiated policy approach, which does not fit with the autocratic administrations of Egypt.

The U.S. has also important concerns for engaging with Egyptian administrations, such as containment of the communism during the Cold War, securing Israel in the region both during and post-Cold War and tackling extremism, since then. For these reasons, Egypt became the largest recipient of the American funds following Israel. However, the major amount of the funds has been allocated to the Egyptian army, instead of Egypt’s democratic transition. This is defined as “seeding democratic seeds within the military” (Carpenter, 2009)<sup>148</sup> by the U.S.. As for supporting Mubarak, the U.S. adopted a similar approach to the EU and supported him until the last minute. Therefore, the regime removal did not occur with active American support. On the contrary, the American backing of Mubarak stabilized the autocratic regime.

Mubarak’s removal and the Muslim Brotherhood’s victory in elections did not change much in the American-Egyptian relations. When the Muslim Brotherhood came to power, they were seen as the most reliable entity by the U.S. to sustain the strategic relationship with Egypt and ensure stability. Therefore, their violations of democracy and human rights were overlooked and condemned only by lower-level

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<sup>147</sup> The Economist, “Worse than Mubarek” <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2015/05/02/worse-than-mubarak> (2015) Access Date: 22.01.2019

<sup>148</sup> See more: <https://blogs.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/05/ditching-democracy-in-egypt/comment-page-1/>

U.S. officials (Bouchet, 2016).<sup>149</sup> The reaction of the U.S. to 2013 coup was the same with the EU. The U.S. sustained its democratic, military, and economic support to the Sisi government regardless of the undemocratic way they came to power and undemocratic actions. The U.S. announced that they would cut all aids to the coup administration of Egypt in 2013,<sup>150</sup> but this did not come into force. Nevertheless, the U.S. increased its economic aid to Egypt with a substantial amount from 2012 to 2013 (Sharp, 2019, 27).

Overall, the EU and the U.S. have had similar democracy promotion understandings with regard to Egypt. They have supported democratic ideas as long as these ideas do not conflict with their other policy interests. They both refrained from engaging with the Muslim Brotherhood until their victory in the elections. Most of the funds were given to the central government instead of local or non-governmental actors. The main motivation of this allocation is that neither of them wanted a regime change in Egypt. Because the Muslim Brotherhood were the biggest opposition party in Egyptian politics and they may have risen to power in a possible democratic election and this occurred indeed. The EU's and the U.S.' fear of the Muslim Brotherhood is related with the Muslim Brotherhood's Islamic characteristics and anti-Western discourse. The Muslim Brotherhood administration may not have reserved the Western interests in the region well, (Cavatorta and Durac, 2009, 5) so neither the EU nor the U.S. wanted to see the Muslim Brotherhood rising to power, they preferred Mubarak's loyalty.

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<sup>149</sup> See more: <https://www.e-ir.info/2016/09/06/long-game-hard-choices-the-obama-administration-and-democracy-in-egypt/> Access Date: 02.04.2019

<sup>150</sup> See more: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/09/us-cut-aid-egypt-obama-morsi> Access Date: 09.04.2019

Having a strategic ally in the region has been more important than Egypt's democratization. Therefore, the EU and the U.S. supported autocratic administrations, turning a blind eye to these governments', even the Muslim Brotherhood's, non-democratic policies. However, the EU and the U.S. have both supported Civil Society Organizations (CSO's) in Egypt, if they are registered with the Egyptian government. This shows us that the two powers have cautiously engaged with local actors and the top-down characteristics of their policies have overwhelmed the bottom-up strategy of democratization.

It can be observed that the EU and the U.S. have implemented similar styles of democracy promotion policies in line with their own interests and there is not an important divergence between their approaches. Although the EU could seem close to normative understanding of the democracy promotion, in Egypt, they both have acted in the utilitarian way. The self-interests of democracy promoters in Egypt have postponed the democratization process and their other priorities have overshadowed the democratic rights of the Egyptians.

Despite these similarities, there are also some differences. The EU focuses on the third wave of Huntington's democratization's broad tasks, namely "enhancing the democratic regime" (Huntington, 16). For this, the EU pays attention to the different social grounds of democracy. However, the U.S. has mainly focused on the first wave of ending the authoritarian regime (Huntington, 16). Its coercive action in the form of military intervention to install democracy was never implemented by the EU. Another point of note is that while their priorities were different, they were not clashing. The EU has focused on liberalizing the Egyptian economy to safeguard the European firms' rights, to cope with irregular migration flowing from Egypt to Europe, and to secure energy routes, whereas securing Israel and fighting against terrorism caused by the Middle Eastern extremist groups are mostly prioritized by

the U.S. in its relations with Egypt. Therefore, they can cooperate in this sphere, sustaining the de facto division of labour in the future.

Although recommendation is not the aim of this study, there appears to be a need to focus more on the Egyptian society's socio-economic structure for ensuring Egypt's democratization. Without understanding the needs of the Egyptians, just a top-down approach is not enough to transform the autocratic regimes and meet the Egyptians' expectations in a democratization process. Therefore, the external democracy promotion implementers should strengthen the bottom up approach in the Egypt case.



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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A: TÜRKÇE ÖZET/TURKISH SUMMARY

#### *Giriş*

Demokrasi teşviği uluslararası ilişkiler literatüründe en az “demokrasi” kadar popüler ve önemli bir kavramdır. Özellikle 2. Dünya Savaşı’ndan sonra başlayan Soğuk Savaş’la birlikte daha çok popülerleşen demokrasi teşviği 11 Eylül 2001 saldırılarından sonra da önemini korumaya devam etmiştir. Demokrasi teşviğinin tam olarak ne olduğuna yönelik üzerinde uzlaşılmış ortak bir tanım olmasa da, demokrasi teşviği antik çağlardan beri farklı uluslararası aktörler tarafından farklı amaçlarla kullanılagelmektedir. Avrupa Birliği’nin demokrasi teşviği tanımında, demokrasiyi tesis eden, güçlendiren her tür dış politika uygulaması demokrasi teşviği olarak adlandırılmaktadır. ABD tanımında ise, demokrasi teşviği için askeri operasyon da söz konusu olabilmektedir. Bu çalışmada, demokrasiyi güçlendiren veya tesis eden her tür dış politika uygulaması demokrasi teşviği olarak ele alınmaktadır. Askeri operasyonlar gibi zorlayıcı tedbirler ise demokrasi teşviği tanımına dahil edilmemektedir.

AB ve ABD Batı dünyasının temel uluslararası aktörleridir. Bu aktörlerin politikaları tüm dünyada önemli etkiler doğurmaktadır. Soğuk Savaş döneminde AB ve ABD Sovyet tehdidine karşı ortak hareket etmiştir. 2000’li yıllarda artan terör tehdidine karşı da bu iki aktör yine birlikte politika geliştirmiştir. Demokrasi teşviği de bu iki aktörün yine birlikte hareket ettiği alanlardan biridir fakat 2003 Irak Savaşı ile birlikte, AB ve ABD’nin uluslararası platformdaki ortak tavrında bazı ayrılıklar oluşmaya başlamıştır. Mısır ise sahip olduğu stratejik konum ve Arap-İsrail anlaşmazlığındaki önemli siyasi rolü nedeniyle AB ve ABD’nin her zaman askeri,

ekonomik ve siyasi amaçlarla bölgedeki ortaklarından biri olmuştur. Ayrıca Ortadoğu'daki güçlü sivil toplum yapısına sahip ülkelerden de biri olduğu için demokrasi teşviği alanında hem AB'nin hem de ABD'nin ortak politika yürüttüğü devletlerden biridir. Bu nedenle, Ortadoğunun en önemli ülkelerinden biri olan Mısır özelinde bu iki aktörün demokrasi teşviği politikaları arasında herhangi bir ayrışma olup olmadığı, ne açılardan benzerlikler olduğu bu tezin temel araştırma konusunu oluşturmaktadır.

Uluslararası ilişkiler literatüründe demokrasi teşviğini açıklamaya çalışan farklı düşünce okulları bulunmaktadır. Bu çalışmada demokrasi teşviği; aktif ve pasif demokrasi teşviki modelleri ile faydacı ve normatif bakış açılarına göre incelenmeye çalışılmıştır. Demokrasi teşviki genelde demokrasi yardımları ile yapılmakta olup, bu yardımlar ekonomik yardım, teknik yardım veya askeri yardım gibi çeşitli farklı kategorilere ayrılmaktadır. Aktif demokrasi teşvikinde, bir uluslararası aktör/devlet, başka bir devleti "demokratikleştirmek" adına doğrudan ve açıkça girişimde bulunmaktadır. Pasif demokrasi teşvikinde ise toplumsal ve ekonomik bazı faaliyetler demokrasinin gelişmesi için faydalı görüldüğü ve bizzat başka bir ülkeyi demokratikleştirmek için yapıldığı söylenmediği sürece pasif demokrasi teşviki olarak ifade edilmektedir. Pasif demokrasi teşvikinin unsurları, uluslararası ilişkiler literatüründeki "yumuşak güç" tanımıyla da oldukça yakından ilgilidir. Normatif anlayışa göre, devletler, hukukun üstünlüğü, insan hakları gibi herkes tarafından kabul gören demokratik normlara olan bağlılıklarından dolayı başka devletlere karşı demokrasi teşviki faaliyetinde bulunmaktadırlar. Normatif bakış açısına göre demokrasi teşvikinde bulunan ülkeler, demokrasi teşviğini sadece bu normları yaygınlaştırmak için kullanıp, bu politikanın altında başka herhangi bir çıkar gütmemektedirler. Faydacı bakış açısı genel olarak Immanuel Kant'ın "Demokratik Barış Teorisi"ne dayanmaktadır. Bu teoriye göre, demokratik devletlerin birbirileri ile savaşıp, işbirliğine giderek, toplam refahı artıracığına inanılmaktadır. Faydacı bakış açısında, devletler ve uluslararası aktörler, kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda

hareket ederek, demokrasi teşviğini bu özel çıkarlarını gerçekleştirmek amacıyla bir araç olarak kullanmaktadırlar. Mevcut çalışmada Avrupa Birliği ve ABD'nin, Mısır'a yönelik uyguladıkları demokrasi teşviki politikalarında hangi yaklaşıma göre hareket ettikleri incelenmeye çalışılmıştır. Mısır'da demokrasi teşviki politikaları uygulayan Fransa ve İngiltere gibi başka Avrupalı Devletler de olmakla birlikte, bu devletlerin demokrasi teşviki politikalarının incelenmesi bu tezin kapsamı dışındadır.

Demokrasi teşviki gerek Avrupa Birliği'nin gerekse de ABD'nin dış politikalarının birer parçası olmakla birlikte, bu güçlerin dış politikalarının analizi bu çalışmanın kapsamını aşmaktadır. Ayrıca uygulanan demokrasi teşviki politikalarının etkilerini değerlendirmek de bu tezin kapsamına girmemektedir. Sadece, AB ve ABD'nin demokrasi teşviki konusunda Mısır'da ne yaptığı ve nasıl yaptığını incelemek bu araştırmanın temel hedefidir. Bu tez kapsamında, araştırma yöntemi olarak literatür araştırması kullanılmış olup; resmi kaynaklar, anlaşmalar, raporlar, konuşmalar, bilimsel yayınlar ve internet kaynakları esas alınarak, Avrupa Birliği ve ABD'nin demokrasi teşviki politikaları incelenmeye çalışılmıştır. Yapılan incelemeler sonucunda ise Mısır özelindeki AB ve ABD demokrasi teşviki politikaları arasındaki farklılıklar ve benzerlikler tespit edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Ayrıca hem AB hem de ABD açısından uygulanan demokrasi teşviki politikalarının, bu ülkelerin kendi çıkarlarından bağımsız olmadığı ortaya konmaya çalışılmıştır.

Demokrasi teşvikinin olmazsa olmaz bazı unsurları vardır. Bu unsurlar, demokrasi teşvikinde bulunan ülkedeki sivil toplum kuruluşları ile işbirliği içinde olmak, aynı zamanda söz konusu ülkenin hükümeti ile de birlikte çalışmak ve son olarak yerel hükümet ve sivil toplum arasındaki ilişkiyi güçlendirmek için kapasite geliştirme faaliyetlerinde bulunmaktır. Mısır özelinde hem Avrupa Birliği hem de ABD bu üç unsuru da gerçekleştirmiştir. Fakat yerel hükümetle işbirliği içinde olmak hem AB'nin hem de ABD'nin daha ağır basan tercihi olmuştur.

### *Mısır ve AB/ABD İlişkilerinin Arka Planı*

Mısır ve Avrupa Birliği ilişkileri, AB'nin ilk ortaya çıktığı dönemde kurulmaya başlanmıştır. Özellikle İngiltere ve Fransa, Mısır ile 1800'lerden beri yakın ilişki içerisindeydi. Fakat bu çalışmada spesifik Avrupa ülkeleri yerine Avrupa Birliği ve Mısır arasındaki ilişkiler ele alınmaya çalışılmıştır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Avrupa Birliği kendi çıkarlarını korumak ve bölge ülkeleri ile iyi ilişkiler geliştirmek için çeşitli programlar geliştirmiştir. Bu programlar Avrupa-Akdeniz İşbirliği Programı (EMP) ve Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası (ENP)'dir. Her ne kadar Avrupa birliği normatif bir algı ile hareket ediyor gibi görünse de, söz konusu programlardaki AB'nin enerji, gözmen sorunu ve güvenlik gibi çözüm bulmaya çalıştığı temel amaçları gözönünde bulundurulduğunda, daha çok faydacı bir yaklaşıma sahip olduğu gözlenmektedir.

Aynı şekilde ABD de, gerek Soğuk Savaş Dönemi'nde gerekse de Soğuk Savaş'tan sonra bölge ülkeleri ile iyi ilişkiler geliştirmeye çalışmıştır. Demokrasi teşviği de bu politikalarından biridir. AB gibi ABD de demokrasi teşviği için USAID, MEPI, MCC ve NED gibi bazı özel programlar geliştirmiştir. Bu programların ayrıntılarına girmeden önce Mısır'ın AB ve ABD ile olan tarihsel ilişkilerini anlamak, bu iki aktörün Mısır'daki demokrasi teşviki politikalarını anlamaya yardımcı olmaktadır.

Avrupa Birliği'nin Mısır ile ilişkisi 1970'li yıllarda "İşbirliği Anlaşması" ile başlamıştır. Bu anlaşma ile başlayan süreçte AB, Mısır'ın ekonomik ve sosyal açıdan gelişmesi için çeşitli mali yardımlar yaparak, Mısır'a bazı gümrük muafiyetleri sağlamıştır. 1970'li yıllardan bu yana Mısır ve AB arasında dört adet mali protokol anlaşması imzalanarak, Mısır'ın altyapı yatırımları için Avrupa Yatırım Bankası'nın da çeşitli fonlarından istifade etmiştir

AB ve ABD arasındaki mali yardımlardaki sektörel dağılım; tarım, çevre ve toplumsal koruma, ekonomik işbirliği, enerji, bilimsel alanda işbirliği ve sağlık alanındadır. Demokrasi teşviği alanı bu işbirliği alanları içerisinde yer almamıştır.

Mısır'ın ekonomik açıdan liberalizasyonu AB için kilit öneme sahip olmuştur. Bu önemi, Mısır'da iş yapan çok sayıda Avrupalı şirketin haklarını güvence altına almaktan kaynaklanmaktadır. Ayrıca Avrupa, Mısır'ın en büyük ticaret ortağıdır. Ortak bir Serbest Ticaret Bölgesi oluşturmak da AB-Mısır İşbirliği'nin temel hedefleri arasında yer almaktadır.

Enerji konusu da, AB ve Mısır arasındaki kilit öneme sahip konulardan biridir. Mısır, Kuzey Afrika ve AB arasındaki enerji yolları arasında stratejik öneme sahip bir ülkedir. Ayrıca kendi gaz rezervleri de bu önemini güçlendirmektedir. Avrupa'nın enerji bağımlılığı gözönünde bulundurulduğunda, enerji fiyatlarının istikrarı ve enerji verimliliği politikaları açısından Mısır'ın istikrar içinde olması, AB için vazgeçilmez konulardan biridir.

Mülteci konusu da yine Mısır ve AB arasındaki önemli konulardan biridir. Güney'den Kuzey'e mülteci rotalarının üzerinde yer alan Mısır, Avrupa'ya ulaşan mültecilerin sayısının azalması konusunda, Avrupa için büyük önem arzeden bir ülkedir.

Mısır'ın ABD için önemi ise büyük ölçüde Arap-İsrail meselesindeki Mısır'ın arabulucu rolünden kaynaklanmaktadır. İsrail'in bölgedeki güvenliği için, Mısır ile işbirliğine ihtiyacı vardır. Bu nedenle Mısır'ın bölge ülkelerinden ayrılarak, İsrail'le iyi ilişkiler geliştirmesi, ABD için önem arz etmektedir. Terörizmle mücadele konusunda da Mısır, ABD'nin bölgedeki en büyük ortaklarından biridir. Söz konusu işbirliği 1979 Camp David Anlaşması ile kurulmuştur. Fakat bu anlaşmadan önce de Mısır, ABD



iin kilit neme sahip lkelerden biri olmuştur. ABD tarafından, Batı yanlısı bir Mısır'ın, Sovyetler'in Ortadağı'daki etkilerini azaltacağına inanılmış ve komünizmi evreleme politikasında kilit neme sahip olmuştur.

Mısır, İsrail'den sonra en ok ABD yardımı alan ikinci lke konumundadır. Bu yardımların oğı askeri alanda yapılmaktadır. Bu askeri yardımlar, demokrasinin temellerini Mısır ordusu iinde atmak olarak ifade edilse de, asıl neden Mısır'ın istikrarı ve İsrail'in gvenliğıdir.

Gerek AB'nin, gerekse de ABD'nin Mısır ile olan işbirliğı ve Mısır'ın otokratik hkmetlerine sağıladıkları yardımlar, bu hkmetlerin kendi otokratik ynetimlerini glendirmelerine neden olmuş ve gerek i politikada gerekse de dıř politikada meşruiyetlerini sağımlarına yardımcı olmuştur.

#### *AB'nin Mısır'daki Demokrasi Teşviğı Faaliyetleri*

Avrupa Birliğı, demokratik normlar zerine kurulmuş bir uluslararası rgt olsa da, Mısır zelinde, demokrasi teşviki alanında faydacı bir yaklaşım benimsemiştir. Enerji, ekonomi, ve gmen sorunu gibi konular, AB'nin Mısır'da uyguladığı demokrasi teşviğı politikalarını glgelemiştir.

Avrupa-Akdeniz Ortaklık Politikası (EMP) ve Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası (ENP), AB'nin Mısır'da uyguladığı demokrasi teşviki politikalarının yasal zeminin oluşturmıştır. Avrupa-Akdeniz Ortaklık Politikası, 1995 Barselona Deklerasyonu ile ilan edilmiş, Avrupa ve Akdeniz lkeleri arasındaki işbirliğini geliştirmeyi amaçlayan bir politikaadır. Bu politika, AB'nin, Akdeniz lkeleri ile Tercihli Ticaret Anlaşmaları imzalayarak, bu lekelerin ekonomik ve toplumsal gelişmelerine katkıda bulunup

demokratikleşmelerine destek olmayı hedeflemektedir. Hukukun üstünlüğü ve temel özgürlükler ile ifade ve din özgürlüğü Barselona Deklerasyonu ile imzacı ülkeler tarafından taahhüt edilen temel konulardır.

Avrupa Akdeniz Ortaklık Politikası'nın iki boyutu bulunmaktadır: Siyasi ve ekonomik boyut. Bu iki boyut birbirleri ile etkileşim halinde olup, bir taraftaki gelişmeler diğer tarafı da etkilemektedir. Ekonomik boyut, 1970'lerde başlayan neo-liberal politikalar ile ilgilidir ve Akdeniz ülkelerinin bu neo-liberal politikaları uygulamalarını sağlamayı hedeflemektedir. Politik boyutu ise Soğuk Savaş'tan sonraki dönemde bölgede oluşan yeni güvenlik problemlerinden kaynaklanmaktadır. EMP'nin vurgusu, bölgedeki barış, güvenlik ve istikrarın sağlanması üzerinedir. Akdeniz Kalkınma Yardımı Programı (MEDA), EMP'nin uygulanması için AB tarafından oluşturulmuş bir programdır. MEDA I ve MEDA II olmak üzere 2 aşama halinde uygulanmıştır. Genel olarak MEDA ile demokrasi teşviği yerine, ekonomik yapıdaki reformların desteklenmesi amacıyla finansal ve teknik yardımlar yer almıştır. Demokrasi teşviğine yönelik özel olarak MEDA Demokrasi Programı uygulanmış, ve sivil toplumun güçlendirilmesi amaçlanmıştır.

2003 yılında Avrupa-Akdeniz Ortaklık Politikası revize edilip genişletilerek, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası uygulanmaya başlanmıştır. ENP, Avrupa Birliği ile işbirliği içinde olan ülkeler arasında imzalanan Aksiyon Planları ile uygulanmıştır. Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası'nda, AB'nin odak noktası Akdeniz Bölgeleri'nden Doğu Avrupa'ya kayarak, bu ülkelerin demokratikleşmesi ve AB'ye entegrasyonu daha ön plana çıkmıştır. EMP'ye kıyasla, AB'nin kendi çıkarları ENP'de daha çok vurgulanmıştır. ENP'de siyasi reformların desteklenmesi, demokrasinin güçlendirilmesi ve insan hakları ile, ekonomik işbirliğinin artırılması temel hedefler olarak ifade edilmiştir. ENP'nin uygulanması sırasında Ortadoğu'da Arap Baharı meydana çıkmış, buna ilişkin de AB, en azından söylem düzeyinde, bu ülkelerin demokratikleşmesini desteklediğini ifade etmiştir.

Demokrasi ve İnsan Hakları İçin Avrupa Politikası (EIDHR) AB'nin demokrasi teşviki için uyguladığı politika araçlarından bir diğeridir. Bu politika 1994'ten beri uygulanagelmiş olup, sadece demokrasi ve insan haklarını geliştirmek için kullanılmıştır. Fakat bütçesi EMP ve ENP'ye kıyasla oldukça düşük düzeyde kalmıştır. EIDHR'ın EMP ve ENP'den farkı, yerel hükümetin izni olmadan doğrudan sivil toplum örgütleri ile AB'nin işbirliği yapabilmesidir fakat bu sivil toplum örgütlerini genelde İslami olmayan ve hükümete kayıtlı örgütler oluşturduğu için, söz konusu yerel hükümetlerin dolaylı bir müdahalesi yine EIDHR'da söz konusu olmuştur. EIDHR'ın desteklediği alanlar, seçimlerin serbestliği gibi demokratik haklardan ziyade kadın hakları, azınlık hakları gibi vazgeçilemeyen insan haklarından oluşmaktadır. Bu nedenle de yine demokrasi teşviki alanındaki katkıları sınırlı kalmaktadır.

Mısır özelinde Avrupa Birliği yukarıda sayılan tüm politika kanallarını kullanmıştır. Fakat Mısır'ın demokratikleşmesi AB tarafından her koşulda dile getirilse de, buna yönelik politikaları kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda kısıtlı kalmıştır. İstikrar-demokrasi döngüsünde AB her zaman istikrar boyutunu tercih etmiş ve Mısır'ın otokratik yönetimlerini desteklemiştir. Arap Baharı'ndan sonra da durum pek değişmemiş, Mısır'da kurulan yeni hükümetlerin demokratik olmayan politikaları AB tarafından pek tepki ile karşılanmamıştır.

#### *ABD'nin Mısır'daki Demokrasi Teşviki Faaliyetleri*

Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, demokrasi teşviğini Japonya'dan Bolivya'ya kadar uzanan dünyanın çeşitli bölgelerinde doğrudan kendi ulusal çıkarları için dış politikasının bir parçası haline getirmiştir. Ayrıca AB'nin aksine, askeri operasyonları da demokrasi teşviki adına altında kullanmıştır. Jimmy Carter'dan, Obama'ya kadar tüm liderler, dış politika gündemlerinde demokratik olmayan ülkelerin demokratikleşmesine verdikleri önemden bahsetmiştir fakat bunu o ülkelerin demokratikleşmesi adına değil doğrudan ABD çıkarları için yapmışlardır.

Uluslararası Kalkınma İçin ABD Ajansı (USAID), ABD'nin demokrasi teşviki için kurduğu organizasyonlardan en önemlisidir. 1961'den beri yaklaşık 142 ülkede faaliyet gösteren USAID genel olarak, ekonomik kalkınma yoluyla ülkelerin demokratikleşmesini, aynı zamanda ABD'nin bu ülkelere olan ihracatının artırılmasını sağlamayı hedeflemektedir. USAID ile; tarım ve gıda güvenliği, demokrasi, insan hakları, cinsiyet eşitliği, küresel iklim değişikliği ve temiz içme suyu gibi alanlardaki projeler desteklenmektedir. Sovyetler Birliği'nin çöküşünden sonra, USAID, faaliyet gösterdiği alanları ve bütçesini genişletmiş olmasına rağmen, demokrasi teşviki alanına yönelik desteği sınırlı kalmıştır.

Ulusal Demokrasi Bağışı (NED), ABD'nin demokrasi teşviki için 1983'te oluşturduğu organizasyonlardan biridir. NED kendi programlarını oluşturmak yerine, demokrasi alanında faaliyet gösteren yabancı ülkelerdeki kuruluşları fonları ile desteklemektedir. NED'in sloganı "özgürlüğü dünya çapında desteklemek"tir.

Milenyum Zorlukları Kuruluşu (MCC) ve Ortadoğu İşbirliği İnisiyatifi (MEPI) yine ABD'nin demokrasi teşviki için oluşturduğu ve kullandığı organizasyonlardandır. MCC, 11 Eylül sonrası dönemde, değişen tehdit algılarına karşı bu tehdidin kaynaklandığı ülkelerin demokratikleşmesini sağlamak amacıyla kurulmuştur. Demokrasi ve insan hakları doğrudan MCC'nin fonladığı proje alanları olmamakla birlikte, bu kriterlere sahip ülkeler MCC'nin seçeceği projelerde önceliğe sahip olmaktadır. MCC ile desteklenen temel alanlar; iyi yönetim, kapasite geliştirme, ekonomik büyümeyi destekleme ve yoksullukla mücadeledir. MEPI de MCC ile aynı amaçlarla kurulmuş olup, doğrudan Ortadoğu'yu kendine görev alanı seçen bir organizasyondur. Ortadoğu'dan kaynaklanan terör probleminin Batı demokrasilerine karşı büyük tehdit oluşturması, bu ülkelerin demokratikleşmesini gerektirmektedir ve MEPI doğrudan bu amaçla kurulmuştur. Ortadoğu ülkelerinde, liberal demokrasinin iki bileşeni olan katılımcı yönetim ve ekonomik fırsat bileşenlerini tesis etmek MEPI'nin iki temel hedefidir.

ABD de AB gibi, Mısır'ın demokratikleşmesine, söylem düzeyinde, büyük önem vermiş fakat Mısır'ın demokratik olmayan yönetimlerini de desteklemiştir. AB gibi ABD'de Mısır'daki İslamcı sivil toplum kuruluşlarını desteklemekten çekinmiş ve demokrasi teşvikini, ABD kendi ulusal çıkarları doğrultusunda pragmatik amaçlarla kullanmıştır. İstikrar-demokrasi ikileminde, ABD, Mısır'ın istikrarını tercih etmiş, İsrail'in güvenliğini sağlamak için Mısır ordusuna büyük mali ve teknik yardımda bulunmuştur. Arap Baharı'ndan sonra da ABD politikasında herhangi bir değişiklik olmamıştır. Arap Baharı'ndan sonra Mısır'da kurulan iktidarların demokratik olmayan uygulamalarına ABD göz yummuş, demokrasi teşviğindeki politikaları sadece söylem düzeyinde kalmış ve kendi çıkarlarını korumak için Mısır'la işbirliğini sürdürmeye devam etmiştir.

#### *AB ve ABD Demokrasi Teşviğinin Mısır Özelinde Karşılaştırılması*

Avrupa Birliği de ABD de Mısır özelinde demokrasi teşviğini söylemlerinde hep vurgulamışlar fakat gerek Mubarek gerekse de Mubarek sonrası rejimler tarafından uygulanan demokratik olmayan politikalara herhangi bir tepki vermemişlerdir. Ayrıca hem AB, hem de ABD pragmatik amaçlarla demokrasi teşviğini uygulayıp, demokrasi-istikrar ikileminde tercihlerini istikrardan yana kullanmışlardır.

Her iki aktör de Mısır hükümetleri ile daha yakın ilişkiler kurarak, demokrasi teşviğinde tepeden inmece bir yaklaşım benimsemişlerdir. Mısır'daki bazı sivil toplum örgütleri de AB ve ABD tarafından belli ölçüde desteklenmiş fakat bu örgütler hep İslami olmayan örgütler arasından seçilmiştir. Arap Baharı'ndan önce her iki güç de Müslüman Kardeşler ile ilişki kurmaktan çekinmiş ve olası Müslüman Kardeşler hükümetinin, Mısır'daki Batı çıkarlarını zedelemesinden endişe duymuştur. Fakat, Arap Baharı ile Mısır'da Müslüman Kardeşler'in iktidara gelmesi kesinleştikten sonra önce ABD sonra ise AB bu tutumlarını değiştirerek, yeni kurulan Müslüman Kardeşler Hükümeti ile ilişkilerini geliştirmiştir. Fakat Müslüman

Kardeşler'in iktidar geldiği yılın hemen ertesi yıl Abdel Fattah sisi liderliğinde yapılan darbeye de hem AB hem de ABD herhangi bir tepki vermemiştir.

AB ve ABD'nin Mısır'daki demokrasi teşviki politikalarındaki bir diğer benzerlik de destekledikleri sektörler olmuştur. Her iki aktör de Mısır'ın ekonomik anlamda neo-liberal politikalar uygulamalarını desteklemiş ve kalkınma işbirliği, finans sektörü, tarım ve özel sektör programları her iki güç tarafından desteklenen alanlar olmuştur.

Her iki ülkenin demokrasi teşviki bağlamındaki son benzerlik ise, tüm bu yardımlar çerçevesinde Mısır ile aralarında kurulacak bir Serbest Ticaret Bölgesi kurulması hedefidir. Hem AB hem de ABD, Mısır ile işbirliği çerçevesinde bir Serbest Ticaret Bölgesi kurulmasını hedeflemiş fakat bu amaçları henüz gerçekleştirilememiştir.

AB ve ABD 'nin Mısır özelindeki demokrasi teşviki politikalarındaki farklılıklar benzerliklerine kıyasla daha azdır. En belirgin farklılık, askeri politikalar konusundadır. Zorlayıcı tedbirler hiçbir zaman AB'nin demokrasi teşviki için benimsediği politikalar içinde yer almamasına rağmen, ABD, demokrasi adı altında Irak ve Afganistan'a askeri müdahale yapmaktan çekinmemiştir. ABD demokrasi teşviki adı altında Mısır ordusuna da oldukça büyük yardımlar yapmıştır. Fakat Avrupa Birliği'nin Mısır ordusuna yönelik herhangi bir yardımı söz konusu olmamıştır.

Bir diğer farklılık, ABD için, bölgede ve Mısır özelinde, İsrail'in güvenliği kilit öneme sahip bir konuyken, AB için, daha çok, enerji, göçmen sorunu ve Mısır'da iş yapan Avrupalı firmaların çıkarlarını ön planda tutan ekonomi politikaları ön planda olmuştur.

Özetle, her iki aktör de demokrasi teşviğini sadece kendi çıkarları ile uyumlu olduğu ölçüde desteklemiş, Mısır halkının ihtiyaçlarını giderecek bir demokratikleştirme politikasını benimsememişlerdir. Demokrasi teşviki, AB ve ABD'nin Mısır'daki kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda güttükleri politikaların gölgesinde kalmıştır. Bu bağlamda, her iki gücün de Mısır'daki demokratik olmayan hükümetleri desteklemesi, bu demokratik olmayan rejimlerin daha çok meşrulaşmasına ve Mısır'daki demokratikleşmenin gecikmesine sebebiyet vermiştir. Mısır'ın nasıl demokratikleştirileceği bu tezin kapsamı dışında kalmakla birlikte, ülke halkının ihtiyaçlarının daha iyi belirlenerek, buna uygun politikalar geliştirilmesi, Mısır'ın demokratikleşmesi bağlamında önem arz etmektedir.

## APPENDIX B: TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM

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Bölümü / Department : ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER/INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English) : A COMPARISON OF THE EU'S AND THE U.S.' DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN EGYPT**

**TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: Yüksek Lisans / Master**

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